Admission To Membership In The United Nations As An Instrument Of Diplomacy

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Content ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OP DIPLOMACl A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School The University of Southern California In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy *7 Nemeslo Bnoarnaclon prudents June 1959 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CALIFO RNIA GRADUATE SCH O O L UNIVERSITY PARK L O S A NGELES 7, C ALIFOR NIA This dissertation, written by .ip .•?.i.®?* .f1 * * * ..... under the direction of h.%9...Dissertation C om mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements far the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y ... Date ...................... J t t n a j L . . . ! ? ! ? ........... Dean DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ... r \ Chairman • tXad q .. This dissertation, written under the direction of the Chairman of the candidate’s Guidance Committee and approved by all members of the Committee, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of the School of Education in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education. Date JUJ0S*..15.5a.................... Guidance Committee Dean Chairman TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE.......... 1 Statement of the problem .................. 1 Importance of the problem ................ 3 Organization of the remainder of the dissertation ............................ 6 II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE................ 7 Description of group processes in the social sciences...................... 9 Empirical investigations of group dimensions 17 Factor analytic procedures .............. 20 Hemphill1s group dimensions........... 23 Bales' interaction process analysis ... 27 Cattell's factors ...................... 30 On the number of dimensions........ 32 Psychoanalytic formulations ............ 34 Bion's modalities.......... 37 Relation of present study to previous research.......................... 41 Summary.............................. 42 III. Q-TECHNIQUE AND Q-METHODOLOGY . . ........ 43 Q-technique assumptions and procedures ... 43 Methodological issues ... ............ 44 Internal vs. external events .......... 45 iv CHAPTER PAGE Single case vs. large-sample studies . . 46 Singular vs. general propositions ... 47 Dependency vs. interdependency factor analysis............................ 48 Q-technique procedures ..... ........ 49 Factor arrays ........................ 49 The structuring of samples............ 50 Unstructured samples .................. 54 The sorting operation ................ 55 Variance analysis .................... 57 The relationship between factor and variance analysis .................. 59 Q-technique appraisals and investigations . 6l The forced-choice distribution of sorts . 64 Studies of counseling and therapy .... 66 Studies of group characteristics ........ 67 Item construction and selection ........ 69 Factor interpretation .................. 70 Summary................................... 73 IV. THE RESEARCH DESIGN........................ 7^ Components of the study.................. 75 Hypotheses.............................. 75 Brief statement of procedure............ 75 General theoretical approach to group psychology............................ 77 CHAPTER The psychological approach ............ An emphasis on the total situation . . . The principle of contemporaneity . . . . The "constructive" approach .......... The dynamic approach .................. Action research and group dynamics . Selection of theoretical concepts . . . . Assumptions .......................... Concepts involving individual behavior . Concepts involving the situational field (group climate) . . . . ............ Concepts involving attainment of goals . Summary of concepts .................. Selection of research methodology . . . . Factorial design ...................... Q-sort instrument .................... Construction of the research instrument . The sorting process .................. Collection of the data .................... Experimental setting and population . . . Administration of the test instrument . . V. STATISTICAL TREATMENT AND FINDINGS .......... Identification of factors and factor-arrays Selection of the data .................. The correlation matrix .................. v PAGE 78 78 79 79 80 80 81 82 83 84 85 87 88 88 89 90 92 94 94 97 99 99 99 100 vi CHAPTER PAGE Extraction of centroid factors .......... 105 Rotation of reference axes.............. 107 Representation of factors by factor-arrays 114 First-rotation factor-arrays .......... 116 Arrays based on different numbers of sorts.............................. 123 Second-rotation factor-arrays ........ 123 Verification of the theoretically defined dimensions of group behavior ............ 127 Intercorrelations among the first- rotation factor-arrays ................ 127 Homogeneity of variance of the first- rotation factor-arrays ................ 133 Analysis of variance of the first- rotation factor-arrays ................ 136 Interpretation of first-rotation factors in terms of the factorial design .... 146 Factor I' ............................ 147 Factor II1 ............................ 152 Factor III' .......................... 154 Factor IV1 ............................ 157 Total array.......................... 158 Summary of first-rotation factor interpretations................ 158 vii CHAPTER PAGE Intercorrelations among the second- rotation factor-arrays ................ 159 Homogeneity of variance of the second- rotation factor-arrays ................ l6l Analysis of variance of the second- rotation factor-arrays ................ l6l Interpretation of second-rotation factors in terms of the factorial design .... 170 Factor I" ............................ 170 Factor II".......... 170 Factor I I I " .......................... 172 Factor IV"............................ 173 Methodological considerations ........ 173 Summary of interpretations ............ 174 Identification of other group dimensions . . 175 Clinical Interpretation of factors .... 175 Factor I1 ............................ 175 Factor II'............................ 178 Factor I I I ' .......................... 180 Factor IV'............................ 182 Summary of interpretations ............ 184 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.................... 185 Summary of procedures............ 186 Findings.................................. 192 The correlation matrix.................. 192 viii CHAPTER PAGE Extraction of centroid factors ............. 193 Rotation of reference axes................. 193 Representation of factors by factor-arrays 19^ Interpretation of factors in terms of the factorial design ......................... 195 Factor I ................................. 195 Factor I I ............................... 195 Factor III............................... 195 Factor I V ............................... 196 Clinical interpretation of factors .... 196 Conclusions and recommendations ............. 197 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................... 200 APPENDIXES Appendix A: Directions ........................... 212 Appendix B: The Research Instrument ............... 214 LIST OP TABLES TABLE PAGE I. Raw Scores of Q-sorts by Sixteen Members of WTL Training Group One (the Experi mental Sample)........................... 101 II. Calculation of Constants for the Q-sort Correlation Coefficient Formula ........... 104 III. Correlation Matrix for Q-sorts by the Experimental Sample .................... 106 IV. Centroid Factor Matrix and Communalities With Proportions of Variance Contributed by the Centroid Factors................ 108 V. First-rotation Orthogonal Factor Matrix With Rotations Determined by Principles of Simple Structure . ................ 112 VI. Second-rotation Orthogonal Factor Matrix With Rotations Determined by "Depencency" Principles................ 115 VII. Weighting of Scores for Factor-arrays of the First-rotation Factors (Table V) . . 118 VIII. Factor I1 Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements............................. 119 IX. Factor II1 Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements............................. 120 PAGE 121 122 124 126 128 129 130 131 132 135 138 Factor III' Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements ............................ Factor IV' Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements ............................ Total-sorts Factor-array, Based on Sums of Unweighted Scores of All Sixteen Q-sorts Weighting of Scores for Factor-arrays of the Second-rotation Factors (Table VI) Factor I” Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements ............................ Factor II" Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements ............................ Factor III" Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements............................ Factor IV" Factor-array of Weighted Q-sort Statements ............................ Correlations Among the First-rotation Factor-arrays and the Total-sorts Array . Bartlett's Test of Homogeneity of Variance of the First-rotation Factor-arrays and the Total Array for Eighteen Cells With Four Items in Each Cell ................ Summary of Q-sort Scores for First-rotation Factor-arrays and Total Array as Prepara tion for Analysis of Variance Calculations xi TABLE PAGE XXI. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array I1 ............. 139 XXII. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array II1 ............. 140 XXIII. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array III' ........... l4l XXIV. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array IV'............. 142 XXV. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for the Total-sorts Factor-array . 143 XXVI. Summary of F-test Outcomes for First- rotation Factor-arrays and Total Array . 144 XXVII. Correlations Among the Second-rotation Factor-arrays and the Total-sorts Array . 160 XXVIII. Bartlett's Test of Homogeneity of Variance of the Second-rotation Factor-arrays for Eighteen Cells With Four Items in Each C e l l .......................... 162 XXIX. Summary of Q-sort Scores for Second- rotation Factor-arrays as Preparation for Analysis of Variance Calculations .... 163 XXX. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array I " ............ 164 XXXI. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array II"............ 165 xii TABLE PAGE XXXII. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array I I I " ............ 166 XXXIII. Analysis of Variance of the Factorial Design for Factor-array IV".............. 167 XXXIV. Summary of F-test Outcomes for Second- rotation Factor-arrays .................... 168 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE The need for basic research in the area of group phe nomena has been expressed frequently in the literature of several social science disciplines. Although persons who have worked with various natural groups have reported many principles of group operation based on common-sense observa tion and judgment, it has been only in recent years that various aspects of group phenomena have been brought under study by research workers. Thus, a body of principles based on experimental evidence has only Just begun to emerge to take the place of the practical judgments of early workers in the field. The increasing number of research studies re lating to group operations is testimony to the growing in terest of social scientists in the application of the tools of research, both old and new, to this important area of hu man experience. I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The present study examined certain general theoreti cal propositions regarding the dimensions of behavior of persons operating in groups. It specifically sought to de termine whether several such dimensions could be given em pirical verification. The research question, stated in its most general form, was formulated as follows: Can certain 2 theoretically defined dimensions of group behavior be empir ically verified? Such verification involved several preparatory steps: 1. Establishment of a general theoretical viewpoint toward group phenomena, since no generally accepted body of theory existed. 2. Selection of a set of concepts (dimensions) which were not inconsistent with this theoretical viewpoint or with previous research results and which were amenable to operational definitions. 3. Choice of a research methodology which was sympa thetic to the philosophy of science implied in the general theoretical framework and to the operational defining of concepts. 4. Construction of a research instrument which not only incorporated into its design the previously selected dimensions in such a way that their presence could be easily tested, but which also permitted the identification of any unexpected dimensions which appeared in the data. The key discovery in these preliminary steps was a major new work by William Stephenson, The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology (107). The research poten tialities of this approach as presented by Stephenson were sufficiently rich that it was decided to attempt to answer the research question of the present study largely within the Q-methodological framework. In view of this decision, the following hypotheses and alternate hypothesis were pro posed: Hypothesis 1: Certain theoretically defined dimen sions of group behavior can be veri fied by means of Q-technique opera tions. Hypothesis 2: Certain other group dimensions, dif fering from those specified, can be Identified by the same Q-technique operations. Alternate Hypothesis: These Q-technique operations do not give verification of group dimensions II. IMPORTANCE OP THE PROBLEM Long the subject of speculation and the object of scientific neglect, group psychology is today a major focus of research endeavor, as well as public interest. The func tioning or malfunctioning of groups is recognized increas ingly as one of society's major problems. Behind this de velopment lies the general acceptance of two propositions: (l) The health of a democratic society depends upon the ef fectiveness of its component groups, and (2) the scientific method can be applied to the task of Improving group life. On the educational scene, certainly one of major im portance, there has been a growing recognition of the inter relationship between individual and group development--of the reciprocity between worthy individuals and effective groups. Professional educators have become interested in, if not tantalized by, the seeming stimulus to individual and group production provided by the method of group problem solving. Although the phenomena have been studied from many points of view, they have been most generally associated with that research discipline known as group dynamics. Since no clear theory of group psychology exists, group dynamicists have been faced with the problem of cre ating one, often by the very same methods that they wish to study. This "bootstraps" approach is characteristic of the present stage of research. Probably the most troublesome obstacle to the establishment of a productive and generally acceptable theory of group dynamics lies in the lack of agreement among researchers concerning the basic variables, concepts, and "facts" with which laws will deal. Different observers, for example, may all watch the same group discus sion and come out with widely differing descriptions of what took place. Unfortunately, there has been little progress made in determining the degree to which these different de scriptions are merely different ways of talking about exact ly the same thing. In seeking to offer research evidence which would clarify and operationally define some of the basic variables of group behavior, the present study is in harmony with the recent recommendations (1956) of Borgatta, Cottrell and 5 Meyer (9) who feel that further progress in the scientific study of social groups must await a clear and systematic identification of the essential dimensions for describing a social interactional field. Cartwright and Zander (18) point out that financial and institutional support for a systematic empirical attack on the functioning of groups will depend greatly on the development of suitable tech niques for recording and classifying behavior. Cattell (21) states that meaningful measurements of group developmental stages and of inter-group comparisons must wait until we can describe characteristics of groups exactly. Although the importance of this strategy was urged as early as 19^1 by Cottrell (31)# studies pointed in this di rection have been few and for the most part unsatisfactory. The major practical question seems to have been whether the necessary technology and theoretical sophistication were available to implement such a strategy. With the appearance of Stephenson*s book (107), a hopeful and somewhat novel an swer to this question has been suggested. Although most of the elements of his methodology are not new, Stephenson has collected and integrated them in this book in a manner which emphasizes their general research implications and potenti alities. His contributions are discussed in detail in Chap ter III. III. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION 6 In this introductory chapter, a brief statement has been made of the nature of the Investigation and of its im portance to group psychology in particular and to social science in general. Also, reference has been made to the methodological framework within which the investigation took place. In Chapter II a review of pertinent literature has been given. Chapter III is devoted to an exposition of the Q-technique research methodology, and Chapter IV to the re search instrument and research design. In Chapter V the re search findings have been reported, and in Chapter VI a sum mary of the study has been offered and conclusions have been drawn. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE An important development in recent psychological re search has been the wedding of the theoretical and experi mental approaches. At the turn of the century, it was un common for theorists to demand that propositions be testable. Experimentalists, on the other hand, were too willing to make observations on any phenomenon, whether or not the data bore on theoretical issues. Today, most experimenters de rive their hypotheses directly from theoretical premises and try to relate their results to a theoretical structure. This trend has been aided by the refining of the mul tivariate methods of analysis pioneered by Fisher (47). In reviewing the use of variance designs in psychological re search, Kogan (74) has noted that Fisher stresses the great er efficiency and comprehensiveness of the factorial study. Efficiency, Kogan says, is derived from the fact that sever al factors may be evaluated with the same precision and by fewer observations than would be the case in carrying out separate studies for each factor. Greater comprehensiveness comes from the possibility of evaluating not only the over all effects of each of the factors but their interactions as well. Thus, each factor is evaluated, not with other fac tors kept arbitrarily constant, but over the range of varia tion of the other factors involved in the experiment. Kogan has cited several examples of recent researches using fac torial designs, mostly in the psycho-physical area (5^>59j 60,77,121). Analysis of variance and factor methods, then, are rapidly being perfected into rigorous tools for clarifying the type of multivariate relationships that exist in the psychological domain. These tools, it would seem, are most advantageously applied to a young field of investigation, where successful research must strike a balance between raw empiricism and rigorous formalism. In such exploratory research, where the primary aim is to develop hypotheses and investigate ideas, it should be apparent that the basic variables one chooses for his theory will greatly influence the phenomena he observes and the kind of measuring instrument he uses. The review of the re search on group characteristics, therefore, has been focused on those studies which were deliberately planned to clarify both the problem of description and the problem of measure ment . Research findings which have no clear relation to any explicit theoretical conceptualization have been treated briefly or omitted. The chapter has been organized in two main divisions. In the first, representative writings in several different branches of social science have been examined in an attempt to deal with some of the more obvious disparities of termi nology among the special languages that are brought to the study of groups. In the second division, an effort has been made to describe the major classification systems in current use and to review studies using these various systems. Con cepts which have explanatory value for a great variety of groups in widely different social settings have thus been identified. The findings of these studies have been related to the conceptual model which has been developed for inves tigation in the present study. I. DESCRIPTION OF GROUP PROCESSES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Despite the importance of conceptual systems and mod els to social scientists, at the present time there Is no single language that all theorists will agree upon. The great variety of social problems that has motivated research has brought different variables to the fore in each of sev eral disciplines. Furthermore, the conclusions and theoret ical interpretations relating to this research are scattered throughout a variety of publications in several professional fields. A survey of the titles of these publications gives the Impression that there exist at least five distinct group methodologies. Thus, groups are commonly identified as hav ing the functions either of (1) education, (2) counseling, (3) therapy, (4) group dynamics, or (5) leadership training. However, though these labels serve to separate the profes sional settings from one another, they are not a satisfactory basis for distinguishing group characteristics. This fact can be demonstrated through citations from any of the areas. Writing for professional educators, Haiman (64) traced the development of the concept of democratic educa tional leadership. He cited Chapin (26) as writing in 1924 of the need for "socialized leaders who would be more inter ested in helping their groups to achieve common goals for themselves than to build a loyal and faithful following around the leader" (64:36-37)* In 1948, Melby (90) gave to an educational article the title, "Leadership is release of creativity." The principle expressed in this article was seen by Haiman as influencing John Dewey's ideas on progres sive education and stimulating an avalanche of Interest in group discussion (64:37). Haiman then went on to draw an illuminating parallel between these developing concepts of democratic educational leadership and the basic premises of psychotherapy originating with the work of Sigmund Freud. Briefly stated, the democratic leader and the psychiatrist are both seen as persons (1) who try to create favorable conditions for problem-solving rather than telling others what to do; (2) who develop warm and permissive atmospheres in which honest feelings, whether hostile or friendly, can be accepted and objectively discussed; and (3) who respect and have faith in the right of individuals to make decisions and choices when given the facts and freed from disruptive emotional pressures (64:41-42). Although a large number of 11 professional educators may see these proposals as being too "progressive" or "visionary" for current practice, the major ity of psychotherapists apparently has more faith in the re-! generative and creative capacities of the individual (118, 122) . The attempt to combine educational and therapeutic concepts in practical settings can be seen most vividly in reports of teacher workshops and "human relations" courses. Moustakas (92) has attempted to describe the educational outcomes of a two-semester seminar for teachers on "inter personal relations" in which the instructor held the demo cratic philosophy described above. He concluded that (1) the individual learns only if he wants to and only those things which are involved in the growth of the self; (2) any other type of learning is temporary or persists in a context of anxiety; (3) we cannot teach another person directly, on ly, make learning possible by providing materials, resources, and an accepting, supportive climate. A somewhat broader program, sponsored by the Massa chusetts Association for Mental Health beginning in 1950# was reported by Margolin (87). Group discussions were the heart of a mental health workshop in which teachers used in trospective insight to facilitate their understanding of the emotional behavior of children, colleagues, and themselves. Although discussions were focused on objective evaluations of case studies, it was observed that members did not long 12 discuss someone else's situation without bringing their own feelings and reactions into the picture. Such group phenom ena as power struggles, sub-group formation, resistances, and dependence on authority were observed and used by in structors to demonstrate the dynamics of group operation. Research and training activities in the related field of "group dynamics" were given an impetus by the prob lems of leadership training encountered by the Armed Serv ices during World War II (38:213). Essentially, the term describes an area of study and research in the social sci ences, an investigation of the ways that groups form, func tion, and dissolve and of the forces which determine the be havior of groups and group members--such as personal motiva tions, situational factors, interactions, and group goals (18:4). Since the area of group dynamics has been studied both as a pure and an applied science, statements are some times made about "using group dynamics' techniques" (80:211). This, refers to techniques which were originally used to se cure research data about groups In a training workshop. Al though their usefulness for training and leadership purposes has not been overlooked, they remain simply group techniques. Group dynamics, then, Is a field for scientific analysis, study and understanding (l8:x). In approaching the problem of leadership, it was found that although there was abundant evidence that some persons did better jobs of leading than others (7,10), attempts to predict leadership performance by means of per sonality characteristics had not been successful. One of the first major contributions of the group dynamicists was that theories of leadership could not be separated from those of group functioning (55#6l)— that different group situations called for and largely determined what the per sonal characteristics of leaders would be (95)- The study of leadership, therefore, became primarily the study of which group functions or roles needed to be performed if the group's goals were to be reached. Even using this approach, however, it has not been possible to Identify those group functions which are peculiarly functions of leadership. Presently, interest in leadership as such is being super seded by such advances as Gordon's "group-centered" leader ship in which "a group of co-workers participate together both in formulating objectives and in acting with each other bo as to achieve . . . commonly recognized ends" (58:v). Weschler has described a type of human relations training labeled "social sensitivity training" (119) in which members are not led, but encouraged to search for greater under standing into personal and interpersonal relations and to experiment with new, possibly more appropriate, behaviors. Members thus develop "behavioral flexibility"— the ability to behave appropriately, in light of their understanding. The similarity of these goals to those of group therapy (86: 18-46) was not unnoticed by Weschler. He noted that "we 14 know of no 'nervous breakdown' which can be traced to the training experience. We are, however, aware of people who after training have entered psychotherapy" (119:l6o-l6l). Although the domains of education and group dynamics are usually separable to the extent that their situational settings differ, many an educator has made extensive use of group dynamics findings, especially those educators in the field of adult education. Noteworthy examples of these peo ple are Warren Schmidt, Head of the Executive Committee of the Western Training Laboratory for Group Development (Uni versity of California at Los Angeles, Extension Division), and Herbert Thelen (University of Chicago), author of works in "educational dynamics" (ill) and group dynamics (112) and of films illustrating various role-playing and committee- meeting devices. There has been a notable lack of success in differen tiating between the fields of counseling and therapy in spite of the number of attempts made. The general lack of agreement is clearly shown in Combs' attempt to define psy chotherapy for legislative purposes (29). He concluded that it was impossible to differentiate definitely what might be termed "counseling" from "psychotherapy." Not only that, neither could he find stable grounds for distinguishing "group therapy" from "education." Brodsky (12) has tried to characterize group counseling, as distinct from therapy, by the emphasis placed on prevention of--instead of treatment for--personality disturbance, by the inclusion of healthy-- often self-selected--members, and by the active teaching role of the non-psychiatrically trained group leader. He saw similarities between the two processes, however, in the presence of such phenomena as guilt reduction, reality test ing, and growth of self-esteem and insight. He concluded that powerful psychological forces were present in any group educational process. Lifton (8l) attempted to clarify the concept of ther apy by way of describing the conditions that made it impos sible for therapeutic growth to take place, that is, where the teacher or leader represented an evaluative authority figure, or when the group member would lose status by ex pressing negative feelings or ideas. Other sources also have warned of the growth-inhibiting features of authoritar ian leadership (78,80,109). The implication may be that groups differ not so much in terms of their stated goals and purposes, but rather in the degree to which situational and cultural forces permit or inhibit the appearance of spontan eous therapeutic forces. Lifton went on to suggest that the term "group dynamics" be reserved for those processes which assist a group to achieve goals outside the group, that is, which tend to make it an "action" group. Here, the needs of individuals would be secondary to the needs of the group. "Group therapy," then, would cover those occasions where the group was merely a vehicle for the members' clarification of 16 needs, attitudes and values as they tried them out on their peers. To summarize this section, it is apparent that much overlapping of concepts exists among the fields of educa tion, group dynamics, counseling and therapy, and that there exists a need for quantifying operations and theory building in the area of group processes. Cattell has this to say about the problem: . . . Discussion of the problem of measurement at the same time as the problem of meaning is justified by the history of research, which shows that nothing so surely compels precision and realism of conceptualization as the demand for measurement operations. (21:l6l) Although there has been no agreement regarding the classifi cation of group processes, a distinction has been generally made between (1) group task roles (achievement or work roles), and (2) group maintenance or building roles (those whose function it is to maintain or strengthen the group it self). This two-level frame of reference has been variously referred to as "action groups" and "learning groups" by Hai- man (64:79), and in Jennings' sociometric terminology as 1 1 socio-groups" and "psyche-groups" (71)* It must be remem bered that since these levels are in simultaneous operation, any given behavior may contribute both to the task area and to the emotional area (e.g., a member who helps a group solve a difficult problem may also unintentionally help it to develop solidarity.) Although a third type of behavior in a group has been distinguished as non-group-oriented or 17 "individual" behavior, determined more by a member's own personal-emotional needs than by his concern for group prog ress (16), it would seem impractical to try to separate these roles from the group maintenance roles. Thus, we can think of two basic levels of group activity, one concerned with ideas, content, and problem-solving— the task area--and the other concerned with difficulties in personal relation ships which must be worked out before members are free to co-operate effectively with one another— the social-emotion- al area. II. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OP GROUP DIMENSIONS A writer of science fiction, Poul Anderson, in a non- fictional article on the nature of units in the physical sci ences, has said this about "the troublesome dimensions": . . . "Let us carve nature at the points," said Fran cis Bacon, meaning that we should adopt definitions and make distinctions corresponding to real differences in the physical world. But nature's Joints turn out to be rather elusive; in fact, it seems likely that nature is a seamless unity. We carve up the universe of phenomena because that's the only way our minds can deal with it. (1:85) A social science theorist, Walter Coutu, after choosing the Galilean tradition over the Aristotelian, has said this about the analysis of social interaction: . . . Whether we start out to study the static or the dynamic aspects of the universe, whether we want to study matter or process, the whole is far too large for analysis. ... If either of these phenomena is going to be studied, it must be broken into units of some kind. 18 But there are no units of any kind in nature. . . . A unit of measure is a mental construct, a symbol, a response, an act, a way of behaving toward something. ... A mile is not a slice of nature, but a way of act ing toward a socially defined extension of space. (33: 4-5) Both writers, then, have taken the relativistic position with reference to the nature of "truth" or "fact," the posi tion that every truth is a creation of some conceptual sys tem and is measured in terms of the system which creates it. What is essential to an efficient theory is not that it is more "real" than other theories, but as Lewin points out, that (l) its constructs are linked to observable symptoms (facts) by operational definitions, (2) its constructs are logically co-ordinated with one another, and (3) its laws (e.g., relations between behaviors and constructs) have been verified by experiment and are not contradicted by other data (79:242). In addition to suggesting that social processes can and must be divided arbitrarily into some such segments as "acts," Coutu observed that some parts of every act take place "behind closed skins." Although these aspects of be havior cannot be seen without special training or special "instruments," he says, they are nevertheless segments of the total ongoing, continuous life process and must be dealt with by the social scientist (33:7)* Lewin, who has been most creative in applying the field-theoretical point of view to social science, insists 19 that "appearance" must be distinguished from the "underlying facts" of group life, and that laws can be formulated only in regard to these "underlying dynamic entities" or inter vening variables (79:195)* While these underlying entities may be difficult or impossible to observe directly, they express themselves more or less frequently in terms of behaviors which can be ob served, either by others or lntrospectively. The probabili ty of a behavior occurring, then, becomes a statistical con cept which gives an operational definition to the inferred underlying dynamic tendency. These behavioral tendencies do not occur independently of one's social situation, however. For example, a boy may wish to spit like a famous baseball player, but will be unlikely to do so in bed or in church. This line of thought led Coutu to create the term "tendency- in-situation" or "tinsit" as a unit of behavior, defined as a probable behavior in a given situation (33:18-19)*■ This conceptual unit thus avoids the fallacy of separating the behavioral tendency from the situation in which it occurs and leads to the application of statistical operations to the study of individual and group behavior. It is also in harmony with Lewin1s emphasis on perceptual processes as de terminants of action. Thus Lewin finds it impossible to predict group behavior without taking into account the way individuals and groups "see" their own situations and those of other groups (79:198). 20 Experimental verification of these recommendations has come from Sakoda’s analysis of O.S.S. situation tests (102). He found that personality characteristics did not account for all of the variance over a range of test situa tions, and he concluded that the general trait of an indi vidual could only be defined properly within the context of a kind of situation (102;851)* Factor Analytic Procedures Although a list of the variables proposed for de scribing groups would be very long, empirical approaches are few, and generalizations from one study to another are tenu ous. Fortunately, investigators have profited from the work in personality research, and many descriptive efforts have given way to efforts to identify and measure dimensions in terms of factor analytic procedures. Excellent reviews of factor studies of personality have been published by French (49,50) and Cattell (23) which contain useful lessons and suggestions for investigators interested in exploring the dimensions of groups. At the present time, many factor names have been produced and are now in the process of being narrowed down. A lively discussion of the uses and misuses of factor analysis has been observed in recent books and Journals, al though much of the controversy has come from proponents of various methodological approaches to the factorial solution. Also under examination have been the conditions under which factor analysis could be used for generating hypotheses that may be verified by other methods, as opposed to the newer function of testing hypotheses formulated on the basis of other methods. The powerful exploratory value of descrip tive factor analysis has been long granted, but support for explanatory factor analysis has appeared only recently (48). The paucity of experimental studies has made adequate as sessment of these two functions so far impossible. Stephen son (107), however, has supported both uses. Thurstone, in addition to providing a statistical factor methodology (115)# has made the following cogent com ments for the investigator who would assay a factorial study (116): (a) first attempts should cover a restricted domain and avoid the dangers of over-ambitiousness; (b) begin with good psychological ideas, for even clear and clean factorial results must be subjectively interpreted; (c) it is wasteful to try to represent the general population— better to in clude extremes of all available types in the experimental group; (d) experimental populations of several hundred are unnecessary--single subjects can give significant results under certain conditions; (e) do not insist that factors must be uncorrelated to be meaningful and useful— measures of height and weight are correlated, but are useful separate ly; (f) an important contribution can be made even if some or most of the factors are unclear and indeterminant— every factor study is a gamble; and (g) do not be surprised if 22 there is a breakdown of the line of demarcation between in tellect and temperament--these two domains are not so com pletely separated as they have frequently been assumed to be. In their discussion of "Construct validity in psycho logical tests," Cronbach and Meehl (37) have pointed out that factor analysis is one approach to construct valida tion, since constructs may vary from the level of almost pure description to a highly theoretical level involving hypothesized entities and processes. The investigator who proposes to establish such a construct, they say, must speci fy his theory or network of laws clearly enough that others can accept it or reject it. In the early stages of develop ment, however, the hypothesized theory need "go beyond the data" only in the limited sense that it attempts to charac terize the behaviors that belong to an observable but as yet only partially sampled cluster. If predictions regarding the characteristics of this partially sampled structure are found not to agree with the data collected, then either (a) the test does not measure the construct variable, (b) the theoretical network is incorrect, or (c) the experimental design has failed to test the predictions correctly. Loevinger (84) has supported the idea that the proc ess of test validation is virtually co-terminous with the testing of psychological theory. She doubts whether factor analytic studies have produced major theoretical contribu tions, however, and rejects the kind of operationalism which 23 states or implies that any set of operations defines a con cept. In line with Garner, Hake, and Eriksen (53) > she sug gests that only convergent operations define a concept, such as would occur when empirical data conformed to theoretical structural models, both in terms of the variables that were expected to show relationship and those not expected to show relationship. Cronbach and Meehl (37) also have specified that validity must include some external relationships, while Eysenck (44), in proposing a factor analytic method called "criterion analysis," rejects exclusive reliance on statistical properties because simple structure solutions are not unique (i.e., different analyses of the same matrix by different investigators rarely give identical solutions). Loevinger (84) sees the presentation of external correlation evidence as the last step in the complete test construction process, but does not seem to imply, however, that studies of a purely exploratory nature are without value. Hemphill1s Group Dimensions One of the early Investigators of group structure was Hemphill, whose interest in describing characteristics of groups began with an investigation of situational factors in leadership (66). Later Hemphill and Westie (68) published an account of the development of a group measurement instru ment, the Group Dimensions Description Questionnaire. Since its development, several studies have used the questionnaire and most of these results have been drawn together in a 24 recent manual by Hemphill (67). The questionnaire consists of 150 statements about group characteristics to which a member responds on a five- point scale of applicability. The statements yield scores on 13 group dimensions. Since this is an early and still important study, a description of the dimensions has been given as follows: 1. Autonomy: functioning independently of other groups and occupying an independent position in society. 2. Control: regulating the behavior of individuals while they are functioning as group members. 3. Flexibility: informality of procedures rather than adherence to established procedures. 4. Hedonic Tone: general feeling of pleasantness or agreeableness with regard to group membership. 5. Homogeneity: similarity of members with respect to socially relevant characteristics. 6. Intimacy: mutual acquaintance with one another and familiarity with personal details of one an other's lives. 7. Participation: application of time and effort to group activities. 8. Permeability: ready accessibility to membership. 9. Polarization: working toward a single goal which is clear and specific to all members. 25 10. Potency: primary significance of a group for its members. 11. Stability: persistence of a group over a period of time with essentially the same characteristics. 12. Stratification: ordering of members into status hierarchies. 13. Viscidity: functioning of members as a unit. 14. Size: number of group members (omitted from later publications). Although considerable effort was expended in attempt ing to secure independent (orthogonal) dimensions, positive intercorrelations were generally found. A complete centroid analysis of one set of data by Hemphill and Westie (68) gave four relatively substantial factors which Jointly accounted for 58.4 per cent of the total variance of the dimensions. Tentative descriptive names, even though awkward, were at tached to them: (i) Task focused agreeable co-operatlveness vs. Disagreeable control, (il) Responsible membership com mitment vs. Self-structured commitment, (III) Primary group- ness vs. Secondary, and (IV) Small informal size vs. Large formal size. In a later report (67)> Hemphill found different fac tors, as follows: (I) Behavior regulation appearing as so cial structure, (II) Effective synergy, and (III) Primary personal interaction. The term "effective synergy" was tak en from Cattell (19) who introduced it to describe that part 26 of the total energy absorbed by group activity which con tributes to goal achievement rather than to group mainte nance. Although Hemphill has admitted that the above evi dence does not support his claim of 13 independent dimen sions, he feels the need for "further research" before at tempting their reduction or simplification. In spite of its inconclusive nature, this study contributed an important corrective to the "throw-everything-into-the-hopper" school of factor analysis and pointed up the desirability of a much more systematic sampling of the universe of items descrip tive of group behavior. Among the minor factor studies, two attempts to clas sify teacher behavior have some interest. Ryans and Wandt (101) selected 25 "behaviors" from trained observer assess ments of "critical Incidents" and factor analyzed the rat ings of 249 teachers. Six factors, with considerable over lap and fairly high intercorrelations, were extracted but appeared to tap a fairly superficial level of description. Gibb (56) developed a 165-item, five-point, teacher behavior questionnaire and had 119 students rate JO college Instructors. Pour centroid factors bore some resemblance to the Ryans and Wandt factors and to Hemphill's early factors of leadership (66). As examples of social dimensions in volving the type of status differences found in the class room, Gibb's factors are described as follows: (I) Friendly 27 democratic behavior (no great social distance, low domina tion), (II) Communication behavior (facilitates information exchange), (III) Systematic organization behavior, and (IV) Academic emphasis (teacher-set goals). Bales1 Interaction Process Analysis A second major taxonomic attempt has been described by Bales as "interaction process analysis" (3). He assumes that groups meet for a purpose and that when attention is given to this purpose, or task, strains are inevitably cre ated in the social and emotional relations of the group mem bers. Thus, the necessity of adapting to some outer situa tion leads to task-oriented activity which in turn tends to create strains in the existing integration of the group. Unless these emotional strains are faced and resolved, the energy of the group remains bound up in them and activity in the task area deteriorates. The ultimate empirical stuff which must be observed if these processes are to be understood, says Bales, can be thought of under two headings: (a) action or interaction (the overt behavior of Individuals), and (b) situation (the targets of action or interaction--self, others, physical ob jects, etc.). In order to arrive at useful generalizations, Bales develops a set of categories based on the level of the single act. The categories are concerned with the processes or interactions which bear on common task problems and prob lems of social and emotional relationships. An important 28 assumption in this system is that observers can be trained to analyze each act of each individual in the group with re gard to its bearing on these problems. The categories are as follows: 1. Shows solidarity (raises other’s status, gives help). 2. Shows tension release (jokes, laughs, shows sat isfaction) . 3- Agrees (shows passive acceptance, understands, complies). 4. Gives suggestion (direction, implying autonomy for other). 5. Gives opinion (evaluation, analysis, expresses wish). 6. Gives orientation (information, repeats, clari- fies). 7. Asks for orientation (information, confirmation). 8. Asks for opinion (evaluation, analysis). 9. Asks for suggestion (direction, possible ways of action). 10. Disagrees (passive rejection, formality, with holds help). 11. Shows tension (asks for help, withdraws out of field). 12. Shows antagonism (deflates others, defends or as serts self). 29 Categories 1-3 refer to positive acts in the social-emotion al area, 4-9 to the task area (neutral affect), and 10-12 to negative acts in the social-emotional area. A further group ing of categories lists numbers 6 and 7 as concerned with problems of communication. 5 and 8 with evaluation. 4 and 9 with control, 3 and 10 with decision. 2 and 11 with tension reduction, and 1 and 12 with reintegration. The careful Interweaving of these concepts has given Bales' system a multidimensional flavor which has made it probably the most widely used system for small-group re search. In an investigation of role differentiation, Slater (105) studied 20 groups of from 3 to 7 men in terms of Bales? categories and found that the most fundamental type of role differentiation in small experimental groups was the divorc ing of task functions from social-emotional functions. Al though the ideal leader should be able to fill both roles, Slater concluded, these men are rare because of the non compatibility of the two roles and because of the psychologi cal predisposition that most individuals have for a particu lar role. In a therapy group, Talland (110) found sequences of movement that differed from Bales' problem-solving groups. Therapy groups tended to keep emotional disturbance at a certain level, rather than resolve it. Talland concluded, however, that Bales' technique was applicable to therapy groups and small group discussion in general. 30 In a military setting, Borgatta (8) used Bales' cate gories with 125 men in three types of situations: actual, role playing, and paper and pencil projective tests. The following 8 factors were extracted from the data: (I) Military achievement (rank, education), (II) Emo tional assertiveness, (ill) Task ability (leadership), (IV) Military adjustment (age, maturity), (V) Written symbolic gymnastics, (VI) Task supportiveness, (VII) A conceptually unclear factor, and (VIII) Emotional group supportiveness. Again in a military setting, Borgatta and Cottrell (11) used Bales' system plus sociometric and personal data to analyze behavior in actual and role-playing situations. The data from 166 groups of 3 men yielded the following sev en factors: (I) Tension-neutral activity (members operate under tension but behave in neutral patterns), (II) Involvement ac tivity (expressiveness, security), (III) Group identifica tion (belongingness), (IV) Leader-structure, (V) Discussions! involvement (verbal dissipation of tension), (VI) Task in terest (talker-listener relationship), and (VII) Maturity (age, military status). Cattell's Factors The work of Cattell in the classification of both persons and groups has identified him as a leading exponent of factor analytic approaches to the classification problem. He has provided a number of well-formulated statements of the requirements for the classification of groups (19*21). An important element in his work is the distinction of three classes of variables which he identifies as exhaustive: (a) Population variables, which are merely characteristics of the component individuals which are brought by them into the group; (b) Structural variables, which are descriptions of the internal behavior of the group, such as leadership roles, status, and interaction; and (c) Syntality variables, which represent the performances of the group acting as a whole and which define for the group precisely what personality traits do for the individual. Following a pilot study on 21 groups by Cattell and Wispe (24), Cattell, Saunders, and Stice (25) reported a large-scale investigation on leadership, group structure, and group syntality, made with assistance from the Office of Naval Research. This prodigious project produced 15 factors upon analysis of 93 population, structural, and syntality Variables measured on 80 newly-formed groups of 10 men each. A striking general feature of the factor patterns was the high loading for personality variables, an indication of the importance of pre-group personality traits to the quality of group characteristics. The study also supports Cattell’s concepts of synergy (the sum total of the goal-seeking ener gy which any group can command and expend) and of mainte nance synergy (that energy used up in the process of keeping the group in being). Because this is the first large-scale 32 application of factor analysis to the field, the factors are described as follows: (I) Vigorous unquestioned purposefulness vs. Self- conscious unadaptedness, (II) Immediate high synergy vs. Low motivation, (III) Democratic, explicit procedure-orientation vs. Horde urgency, (IV) Schizothyme rigidity vs. Conformity to circumstances, (V) High intrinsic synergy vs. Low intrin sic synergy, (VI) Intelligent role interaction vs. Low mo rale, (VII) Democratic "savoir faire" vs. Lack of self pos session, (VIII) High verbal interaction, (IX) Recklessness, (X) Group elation vs. Group phlegm, (XI) Homogeneity of emo tional maturity, (XII) Disregard of group vs. Acceptance of group goals, (XIII) Frustrating temperamental heterogeneity vs. Morale from homogeneity, (XIV) Diffidence in internal communications, and (XV) Anarchy and disruptedness (sugges tive indications only). In reviewing the empirical approaches to the study of group dimensions, Borgatta, Cottrell, and Meyer (9) con cluded that it was difficult to reduce the number of vari ables to a stable set with factor analytic procedures. How ever, they agreed that these tools were the most powerful currently available and that some such means was necessary in order to reduce the masses of empirical data to manage able proportions. On the Number of Dimensions In contrast to the relatively large number of factors 33 reported in the above studies, Carter (15) contends that in assessing small group or situational test activities, prob ably only three or at most four Independent dimensions of behavior can be evaluated satisfactorily. Starting with a set of interaction categories developed by Carter, Haythorn, Meirowitz, and Lanzetta (16,17), Carter and Couch performed an empirical study which reduced 19 variables to only three factors (32). Carter (15) has cited several other studies which seem to support this three-dimensional theory. In one study, Hemphill and Coons (69) found three factors that sub sumed ten a priori leadership dimensions. In a study by Wherry (120), 292 rating items were sorted into 13 logically distinct categories which reduced to three factors and pos sibly a weak fourth. Clark (28) studied rifle squads in Korea and from an analysis of sociometric choices obtained three factors, though the third was not well defined. Dur ing World War II, the O.S.S. Assessment Staff (9*0 tried to rate participants on 10 different variables. When Sakoda (102) factor analyzed the table of intercorrelations of these ratings, however, he found three factors that ac counted for the 10 variables. Carter (15) concluded that although logical semantic distinctions could be made among a large number of behavior al categories, reports of actual observations could all be adequately included in three dimensions. Furthermore, the factorial compositions of the several independent analyses came out essentially the same, in spite of differences in group size, kind of task, leadership structure, and rating procedures. Carter therefore combined the results and sug gested the following three dimensions as basic to behavior assessment systems: (I) Individual Prominence (efforts to stand out from others and individually achieve personal goals, traits such as aggressiveness, confidence, and striv ing for individual recognition), (II) Group Goal Facilita tion (efforts to assist the group in achieving goals toward which the group is oriented, traits such as efficiency, adaptability, and co-operation), and (III) Sociability (ef forts to establish and maintain cordial and socially satis fying relations with other group members, traits such as friendliness and striving for group acceptance). In the field of group therapy, Corsini and Rosenberg (30) extracted from the literature nine clusters of dynamic mechanisms of therapy which reduced to three factors. The correspondence to Carter's dimensions can easily be seen: (I) Actional mechanisms (reality testing, interaction, ven tilation), (II) Intellectual mechanisms (universalization, intellectuallzation, spectator therapy), and (III) Emotional mechanisms (acceptance, altruism, transference). Psychoanalytic Formulations Contrasting with the more sociological emphasis of the approaches thus far considered is the psychoanalytic orientation which has been well presented by Scheidlinger in 35 his book, Psvchoanalysis and Group Behavior (104) (Chap. 6 also in 18:52-61). Stemming from the classical work of Freud (51), this approach stresses the emotional and motiva tional aspects of the individuals who make up groups and, as might be expected, has been applied chiefly to the use of groups for emotional adjustment and therapeutic purposes. The work of Redl {96), Slavson (106), and Bion (4) is char acteristic of this orientation. Krugman, in a review of Scheidlinger's presentation (76), has stated that the psy choanalytic orientation will be approximately the prevailing point of view in the personnel and guidance field by the middle 1960's. He remarks that psychiatrists went through this phase first, then social workers; in it at present are the psychologists; and beginning to nibble at it, guidance workers. Be that as it may, the psychoanalytic conception holds that an Individual's earliest experiences in the family ba sically predispose his feelings and behavior in groups throughout his life and greatly influence how he reacts to the leader (father-figure) and to other group members (sib lings). Whether these unconscious mechanisms are inter preted to group members, as in analytic group therapy, or merely used as a frame of reference for understanding member actions and interactions, their importance for a general theory of group performance has not been overlooked. In discussing the problem of leadership, for example, Scheidlinger has been able to relate the phenomena of auto cratic vs. democratic leadership to the Freudian concepts of leader-member identification, projection, and dependence. Bion (4) has suggested that the behavior of groups can best be explained by assuming the existence of three basic emotional assumptions in group members: (a) Pairing, the assumption that the group has met to reproduce (perpetu ate) itself; (b) Fight or flight, the assumption that the group has met to attack someone or to run away; and (c) De pendence, the assumption that the group has met to obtain security from a central individual. Task performance is ac complished by using the emotions associated with one basic assumption to suppress and control the emotions associated with the other two. The work group, then, exists at the ex pense of the basic assumption group and maintains its domi nance through group organization and structure. Organiza tion compels co-operation, and channels into work the gre garious energy which would otherwise expend itself in terms of one of the basic assumptions. Familiarity with Bion’s work is shown by Joel and Shapiro (72) in their approach to the problem of recording what goes on in group therapy sessions. After having dis missed the topical classification of discussions as requir ing an unlimited number of categories corresponding to an unlimited variety of verbal contents carrying the same feel ing, the authors hypothesized that interpersonal dynamics 37 could be classified under only three basic reactions: (a) Warmth, (b) Hostility, and (c) Flight from facing or express ing either of the other feelings. Fear, anxiety, Joy, etc., were not used because they were considered affects and not interpersonal affective actions; however, they could become such when given expression and direction. Modification of the three basic categories was seen as taking place through varying degrees of directness, intensity, and direction. Karen Horney (70), a psychoanalyst and Freudian revi sionist who has emphasized the social-interactional influ ences upon personality development, has presented a theory of neurosis based on the existence of fundamentally contra dictory attitudes toward other persons. A striking similar ity to Bion's categories is seen in Horney's description of the three basic interpersonal reactions as (a) moving toward people, (b) moving against them, or (c) moving away from them. Although Horney is a theorist, her insights into in terpersonal dynamics and her ability to give literary ex pression to her observations make her writings a storehouse of intriguing formulations for social psychologists. Blon1s Modalities In Thelen and Stock's investigation of methods for studying work and emotionality conducted under contract with the Office of Naval Research (113)> one of the original aims of the research was to test the usefulness of Bion1s con structs. His formulation appeared to the authors to be a useful point of departure for* several reasons: (a) It of-; fered a parsimonious set of dynamic constructs which dealt with two major factors in group life— cognition and emotion ality; (b) it offered a focus on and a way of understanding the interrelationships between the two factors; (c) his bas ic ideas seemed to apply not only to the group, but to the sub-group and the individual as well, thus facilitating a clarification of the relationships among these entities; and (d) the constructs seemed to be amenable to precise opera tional definition, thus making their use possible both on the level of observation and on the level of explanation. Another of the major objectives of the study of Thelen and Stock was the identification of sub-groups within the total group. In accepting the sub-group as a significant unit within the total group, the authors assumed that the group could be described in terms of a limited number of sub-groups, and that the character of group operation could be defined in terms of the relationships among the sub groups. The type of sub-group which concerned them con sisted of those members who had certain psychological char acteristics in common, specifically, the sharing of certain perceptions about themselves as group members. These emo tional predispositions for action, or "valencies," were de fined in terms of the Bionic modalities. The hope was that a total group could be described, not as a single entity or as a collection of unique individuals, but as an assemblage 39 of perhaps four or five sub-groups, each of which repre sented some unique pattern of valencies. Group structure could then be described in terms of the patterning of sub groups— their character and membership. In order to describe a group in these terms, it was necessary first to assess the valency characteristics of each individual, and second to group individuals according to valency type. Thelen and Stock found that the statisti cal procedure known as Q-technlque exactly met both these requirements. Since this technique and its methodology have been described in detail in Chapter III of the present study, its technical aspects have not been developed at this point. The basic procedure of Thelen and Stock, however, was to construct a self-perceptual instrument of the Q-sort type as a device for getting information about the ways the individu al felt about his own behavior in a group. The Q-sort thus produced a picture of the individual from within his phenom enological framework. The application of factor analysis permitted identification of the number and character of phe nomenological sub-types existing within the total group. Although the Q-sort began with self-perceptual data about the individual, application of statistical procedures iso lated as content those aspects of the individual which he held in common with other group members. In addition to the previously mentioned Bionic cate gories of fight, flight, pairing, and dependency, two 40 additional categories were developed for the self-perceptual Q-sort. They were (a) counter-pairing (a need to keep rela tionships with others formal and impersonal), and (b) coun ter-dependence (a need to maintain the feeling of independ ence or leadership at all times). In constructing the evaluation instrument to be used by group observers, a Q-sort Instrument composed of slightly different categories was developed. The effect of Overtness of Behavior vs. Covertness was added, permitting the forma tion of 20 category-combinations from a 5 X 4 table. One level consisted of the five Overt effects of Pairing, Fight, Flight, Dependency, and Work, while the other level con sisted of the four Covert effects of Pairing, Fight, Flight, and Dependency. Thus, each of the 20 category-combinations consisted of one of the various pairings of the five Overt and four Covert categories. Each category was operationally defined and was represented by five statements which were constructed as replications of this definition. A 100- statement descriptive instrument for observers was thus con structed. This factorially designed Q-sort allowed the analysis of each sort by analysis of variance techniques. Such an analysis permitted the investigators to ascertain whether or not the group observers treated the Bionic cate gories as coherent units of behavior description. In a report of the findings of the Thelen and Stock study, it was shown that all observers made distinctions ) 41 between the major Bionic categories In almost every case at both the Overt and Covert levels of behavior (i.e., the proportion of Q-sorts in which the F-tests were significant at the 5# level was .95 and .93* respectively). Significant distinctions among the 20 sub-categories were made in more than half (.63) of the sorts. It was concluded that the major Bionic categories were important descriptive units of a dynamic nature, that they were theoretically meaningful in terms of the psycho analytic orientation to group processes, that the constructs could be given operational definitions and could be reliably distinguished from one another, that Q-sorting provided an effective means of collecting information relevant to the dimensions of emotionality and work in groups, and that the statistical devices associated with Q-technique provided precise operations for testing the significance of experi mental hypotheses. Relation of Present Study to Previous Research Although the present study has benefited greatly from the theoretical considerations, both explicit and implicit, of all the sources Just reviewed, it has drawn most heavily upon the two research elements brought together for the first time in the study of Thelen and Stock, namely, the dy namic modalities of Bion, and the Q-technique procedures of Stephenson. These matters have been developed more fully in the next two chapters. III. SUMMARY 42 This chapter has reviewed representative writings in several different branches of social science with reference to the terminological confusion that exists. It then has presented the major empirical researches, primarily factor analytic, dealing with the Identification of those variables which have explanatory value for a wide variety of group compositions and group settings. In the following chapter, the research methodology of the present study has been pre sented, and in Chapter IV, a description of the research in strument and of the research design has been given. CHAPTER III Q-TECHNIQUE AND Q-METHODOLOQY In Chapter I, a general statement of the nature of the problem was presented. In Chapter II, research related to the problem was surveyed. The present chapter has been . organized in two divisions. In the first, an attempt has been made to describe the Q-technique procedures and to out line sympathetically the philosophical, psychological, and statistical assumptions upon which Stephenson lays his claim to a new methodology, called Q-methodology. In the second division, critical and analytical appraisals of Stephenson's work and studies utilizing Q-technique procedures have been reviewed. I. Q-TECHNIQUE ASSUMPTIONS AND PROCEDURES Q-technique received its first systematic treatment in England about 20 years ago from Thomson, Burt, and Ste phenson. A brief account is given in Q. H. Thomson's The Pactorlal Analysis of Human Ability (114). In this he re lates that the topic of correlation between persons was first given explicit attention by himself and William Ste phenson independently in British journals published in the summer of 1935. Although Thomson was pessimistic about the technique's possibilities, Stephenson was, and remained, highly optimistic. It was not until Stephenson came to the 44 University of Chicago in the late forties, however, that American interest was stimulated. An important reason for lack of concern in this country appears to be the early ap plication of Q-technique to type-psychology, a field unpopu lar in America. At Chicago, Stephenson's work with the Rogerian research group resulted in a number of significant studies using the Q-technique to analyze the processes and evaluate the outcomes of psychotherapy. These studies are summarized by Carl Rogers and Rosalind Dymond in Psychother apy and Personality Change (99)* Methodological Issues William Stephenson, then, has remained the most steadfast and determined exponent of the technique which has become associated with his name. His recent book, The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology (107), is a basic source of Information, presented in a manner that is "difficult and sometimes unintelligible" (107:7). Much of the fervor with which he expounds his views seems to derive from his feeling that fundamental assumptions regarding the nature of, and the approach to, a valid science of human be havior are at issue: Our concern ... is not to be with Q-technique alone, or even principally. Rather, it.is with a challenge to psychology, in certain of its aspects, to put its house in scientific order. We have many principles to consider, the whole set constituting a methodology. We claim no original au thorship for many of the principles themselves, but the methodology as a whole, we hope, has some newness or is 45 novel, If not radical In many respects. Some acquaint anceship with factor analysis, variance design, modem philosophy of science, and the broader issues of present- day psychology and the social sciences is, of course, indicated. We can make no apology for this seeming com prehensiveness: Indeed, it is a nice compliment to American psychology that these foundations of its sci ence can now be taken for granted. The concern is with far more than the simple operations called "Q-technique." Rather it is with a comprehensive approach to the study of behavior, where man is at issue as a total thinking and behaving being. (107:1, 6-7) Internal vs. external events. Stephenson attacks the separation that psychologists make between "internal" and "external" events as legitimate areas of scientific investi gation. He believes it to be crucial that we investigate "subjectivity," but by non-subjective means. He would treat introspection not "as the means to an impossible end, namely, to discover 'sensations' and 'experience' as existential psychic matters, in a world apart from things" (107:92), but as an aspect of behavior. just as suitable for scientific investigation as that which is observable to others. Dreaming is as much behavior as is jumping a stile or dashing a hundred yards. All is a matter of interacting with this or that situation. Inner experience and be havior are thus alike. Both are matters for objective, operational definition and study. (107:4) What has made the study of subjective, or "inner," experi ence unreliable, then, has been the lack of dependable oper ations . This problem, Stephenson feels, has been solved by his development of Q-technique: Not everyone will agree that thinking is behavior. The matter, however, is of direct concern to us in Q. Q-technique provides a systematic way to handle a per son's retrospections, his reflections about himself and 46 others, his introjections and projections, and much else of an apparent "subjective" nature. (107:86) Single case vs. large-sample studies. Standard psy chometric procedure has long been based on the analysis of tests which have been applied to a sample of persons. The tests are scored objectively and the concern is with the measurement of various abilities which the persons are as sumed to possess in greater or lesser degree, that is, with individual differences. The tests may be subjected to cor relational analysis which looks for factors to explain these individual differences. The procedures are generally iden tified as R-technlque. Stephenson, looking for a method of studying the single case (that is, a single person or a single group of interacting persons), became dissatisfied with the R-tech- nique requirement of large numbers of cases based on the as sumption of individual differences in abilities. capacities, potentialities. or the like. He felt that the assumption was frequently unwarranted, that two persons may gain the same score in a test, for example, but gain it for different reasons. Since R-technique could have no meaning, then, without its belief in inter-individual differences and its requirement of large numbers of cases, it was not a suitable technique for the investigation of theories of intra-Indi vidual "significance," such as are needed in the fields of aesthetics, personality theory, self-psychology, clinical 47 psychology, and the like. Singular vs. general propositions. Having defined the primary area of investigation as that of "inner" behav ior and the subject as the "single case," Stephenson consid ers the question of the generality of results so reached. His approach in Q is to test theories by way of the singular propositions that may be derived from them, claiming that experimental work can only have reference to singular situa tions— as when Newton watched a particular apple dropping from a tree outside his window. No study is regarded ... as anything other than a link in a long theo retical chain. The outlook is one of experimenting with a psychological theory behind one, and not that of try ing to discover "unitary" or "primary" factors. (107: 129) Whereas traditional factor analysis made assumptions without testing them— as when it assumed that everyone had every psychological attribute in some degree--Q-methodology has theory constantly in mind. But the distinction is care fully made between general propositions, or theories, which are never proved for their general implications, and test able singular propositions which can be examined, in princi ple, by means of the operations of a single person. Thus, in relation to psychoanalytic theory, one could assert the general theoretic proposition that dreaming is an uncon scious form of wishful thinking. A particular dream of a particular person, X, could then be made the subject of the singular testable proposition: This dream of X involves 48 wishful thinking. Its testing can then be pursued, as it happens, along Q-technique lines, the details of which will be discussed later. In his emphasis on the single case and the singular proposition, Stephenson does not overlook the need to study other cases. But this will be done for purposes of experi mental verification, rather than of statistical inference. Thus, he proposes a method for the operational definition of psychological facts which is comparable to the physicist's specifications for defining such a fact as blueness of eyes. But just as the fact of blueness is in no way dependent on the proportion of a population having blue eyes, the appear ance of a factor corresponding to X's wishful thinking in the above dream in no way depends on the testing of "large numbers" of persons. It would be foolish to assert that the factors found for X will be found for all, or even some, other persons. But facts of this kind are likely to be found for other persons as well if the theory and the opera tions used are on the right lines. It is this that is "gen eral" with respect to different persons. Dependency vs. lnterdeoendencv factor analysis. The concern of factorists is with "the smallest number of con cepts with which one can order and describe adequately the multiplicity of phenomena that come under [one's] scrutiny" (63:470). A number of methods for factor analysis have been proposed, all of them starting with the same kind of data--a correlation matrix. The correlations are factored, which merely means that a basis is found for classifying the vari ables. Stephenson saw all of the existing factor methods, however, as "interdependency" forms of multivariate analysis in which it was not possible to regard some variables as in dependent and others as dependent effects. Since his inter est was in the development of experimental studies for the purpose of testing theories rather than in discovering new factors, he sought to adapt one factor technique to this end. He selected Thurstone's centroid method because it provided an initial solution which was only one of an innum erable set of possible solutions, thereby requiring a rota tion of axes to find "meaningful" psychological solutions. Whereas Thurstone had to develop the concept of simple structure as a way out of the complete permissiveness of the centroid solution, Stephenson rotated centroid factors to reach predicated effects, if the data would provide them. Thurstone discovers structure, then, while Stephenson postu lates it to answer theoretical questions. He calls his method "dependency" factor analysis, because it postulates explanations or theories as independencies and tests them along dependent lines. Q-technique Procedures Factor arrays. The calculation of factor-arrays is an important procedure in Q. It consists of adding the scores for each statement (one score for each variate), 50 giving greatest weight to those variates with the largest factor loadings. The statements are then ranked in order of their factor scores. for each factor in turn, forming arrays of statements which are the best estimates of the factors. Thus, a factor-array consists of a Q-sort that a person X could have given, in fact, with the same result as was given in the aggregate or "on the average" (the average being a weighted one) by all persons having a significant loading on the factor for this particular analysis. The array has the property that all of the contributing Q-sorts, taken sepa rately, will correlate with it by an amount equal to their loadings on the factor. The structuring of samples. The differences between the basic techniques in R and Q become more apparent at the point where the experimenter defines his experimental popu lation. In R, the population is composed of persons: in Q, it is made up of statements. (The term "statement" is used to cover not only verbal statements, but any other item of a Q-sample, such as a drawing, an art object, a trait name, or the like.) The customary idea about an experimental sample is that it is drawn, in some random manner, from a parent population. Stephenson prefers to apply Fisher's methods of balanced designs (47), achieving a structured sample. Thus, structuring a sample consists of composing it artificially, instead of selecting it at random from a parent population. In R, such representative sampling is commonly used in public-opinion polling to help to prevent sampling biases. In Q, where statements and the like constitute the popula tions, structured samples are of surprising theoretical and practical interest. The concern, clearly, is to select statements according to plan, in such a way as to control possible effects, influences, or independent variables. For example, a randomly chosen sample of statements by Jung on introversion-extroversion would be biased by his predilec tion for describing introversion. A balanced block design merely sorts out the issues in an explicit manner, so that all possibilities are taken care of equally. A balanced block design or factorial design consists of one or more main "effects," each with two or more "levels? the whole of which represents the experimenter's theory. It is surprising the number of psychological theories that can be so represented. If our interest were in the psychoana lytic doctrine, for example, we could make a beginning with a study of "character" development. Two main effects might be specified: (x) the developmental ones, with oral, anal, and genital levels, and (Y) the resulting "characters," such as hysterical, compulsive, and normal. The balanced block design would be presented as follows: Main Effects Levels (X) Developmental (Y) "Characters" (a) oral (b) anal (c) genital (d) hysterical (e) comnulsive (f) normal In order to clothe a design with statements, asser tions from the parent-population of statements are selected 52 which comport with the various combinations, one statement to each combination. In this case, the sample would require 9 statements, one for each of the 9 (3 x 3) combinations, i. e., ad, ae, af, bd, be, etc. Any one sample, thus put to gether, is as acceptable as any other, in principle. It is always possible to find or devise additional samples for any given design, almost indefinitely. If required, the repli cations can be drawn at random from pools of statements for each "cell," or a small committee of judges can be used to compose samples. Thus, the design itself defines a popula tion from which comparable samples can be composed at will, although, for practical reasons, the size of the sample is usually kept between 70 and 150 statements. Although statements are placed in the "cells" of the factorial design on purely theoretical grounds, certain pre cautions are taken, of course, about such matters as con ciseness, clarity, representativeness, and the like. It is essential to achieve a certain homogeneity so that no item is picked out for special regard on any extraneous or inci dental grounds. This may happen, for example, if a state ment is too difficult for anyone to understand. The above block design obviously does not cover all of the possible "characters," but any additional "effects" or "levels" can be added at will, although large numbers of these soon reach into astronomical figures for the size of the sample and increase the difficulty of finding statements 53 to cover all of the possible combinations. The whole of a theory can rarely be represented In one structured sample, nor Is it necessary that it should be, but a beginning can usually be made with a simple design. Theory is thus repre sented, formally, as structure in the sample. The "effects" and "levels" are the independent variables. What is at is sue is the relationships between the variables, in terms of which is explained any factor that appears as a result of statistical operations. Since proof of the general implications of the theory is not sought, there is no "correct" place for any item of a sample. The theory has to be proved indirectly, by way of singular propositions about it. This testing can be pursued without regard to the structure of the sample, namely, by way of factor analysis. Thus, in the above example, we might assert the singular proposition that operations on the sample by X, a research engineer, will produce orthogonal factors I and II. We might further assert that factor I will correspond in large degree to level b of effect X; and that factor II will correspond to level e of effect Y. These singular propositions are, what would be subjected to statistical analysis, not the general theory, although con clusions regarding the general theory would certainly be drawn. In experimental work, although the main effects are usually of greatest interest, the possibility of significant 54 Interactions is always at issue. Thus, for three main ef fects, X, Y, and Z, there are seven possibilities of signif icance, i.e., three single effects, X, Y, and Z; three double interactions, XY, XZ, and YZ; and one triple interac tion, XYZ. Interactions correspond to unspecified effects, that is, present in spite of the specification of all main effects, but they are always implicit in the design at the outset. Unstructured samples. Even when no factorial design is available,. Stephenson would never select a sample purely at random from the population, but would balance it with re spect to at least one effect {e.g., having as many positive as negative statements), and make it as homogeneous as pos sible. Balanced samples, although not fully structured, satisfy the postulate of Q-technique which says that all the essential information should be contained in the Q-array's variation and none of importance in the means of such arrays. For unstructured samples, the factor analysis is con ducted with the expectancy that any explanations should be representable, in the sample at issue, as a balanced block design, usually with two levels for each effect, represent ing positive and negative loadings on the factor. Any other available "cues" may govern the analysis: Thus, in a Q-study in which clinical experts and nov ices participate, we may assert that a solution will be looked for which gives more factors to the clinicians than to the novices, on the ground that it would other wise be difficult to explain what the experts do in 55 terras of factors for novices. Or again, if persons A, B, G, and D can be shown, sociometrically, to be linked to another, E, the investigator may have a "hunch" that factor solutions centered upon E, rather than upon A, B, C, or D, will prove pregnant in some way. (107:39) Structured samples as such cannot be distinguished from unstructured ones. They differ, however, in two impor tant respects. First, error is specified in a structured sample and not in an unstructured one. Second, independen cies are represented formally in the one and not in the other. The sorting operation. After the experimental sample has been composed, the statements are typed on cards, one statement to a card. The cards are well shuffled and pre sented to the operator who first looks them over and gains a "general impression" about them as a whole. He then sorts the cards into a predetermined number of classes, usually 9, 10, or 11, on an approximately-normal frequency basis, ac cording to some condition of instruction. The statements receive different scores corresponding to their "signifi cance" in the eyes of the operator for the given condition of instruction. The operator is not aware of the principles upon which the Q-sample has been constructed. The state ments gain such-and-such "significance," presumably, owing to the action of internal processes, represented in the de sign by the Independent variables. The conditions of instruction given to the operator would be those required by the nature of the "general theoretic” propositions being investigated. Thus, if one were investigating parental attitudes, various conditions of instruction for a "parental” sample might be: (l) Give a description of your parents as they are now; (2) Describe your parents as you think they would describe themselves; (3) Describe the parents you would most like to have had, ideally; and so on. In terms of the instruction given, then, the operator places items that are positively "signif icant" at the high-score end and those that are negatively "significant" at the low-score end, with items judged to be doubtful or neutral at the center of the distribution. It is important that the operation itself be a reasonable one, such as a person can perform without feeling that it gravely distorts what he wishes to do. The operation is clearly more complex than one that calls merely for a two-point choice, such as Yes or No, about each item in turn. All the statements have to be com pared with one another, however loosely. But this provides the important interaction with which Stephenson is con cerned. What is essential from a statistical point of view is that each judgment is given independently and separately for each item. This does not require that the items must be judged without reference to one another, however. Stephen son argues that the assumption of randomness called for in statistical tests is fulfilled because the sorter’s acts of judgment in the sorting may be regarded as randomly given. 57 Certainly, it appears that if the forced choice is abandoned, the distributions of statements may become so skewed that correlation becomes difficult. We argue that if all were error for a Q-sort, a nor mal distribution of scores would be expected for it. But we anticipate significant factors or effects, and therefore a normal curve is not likely. For certain reasons, however, it should be symmetrical. Therefore, we follow the practice of using a much flattened sym metrical distribution of scores for all Q-sorts. (107: 59) Stephenson makes no claim to be the originator of this very simple operation, assuming that something of the kind has been in existence ever since there was a school master to mark essays. He employs considerable ingenuity, however, in analyzing the data thus gathered. Variance analysis. Given several Q-sorts, either from one person under different conditions of instruction or from several individuals under one condition, each array of scores may be examined by way of Fisher's analysis of vari ance methods (47). In effect, the distribution of scores within the structure of the balanced block design is tested for randomness, the experimenter's prediction being that random effects will be over-ridden by the "significance” of the sorter's assessments. Replication variances should first be tested for homogeneity so that "cell" effects may be assumed to be in dependent (that is, the same and normally distributed). Stephenson regards this test as crucial and basic to all else In Q-methodology. If it is satisfied, replication var iances are then used as error "expectancies" for Judging the significance of all systematic effects, that is, by way of small-sample theory and the familiar F-test procedures. If a factorially designed experiment is successful, the error "expectancy" will be smaller than that for any of the exper imental effects or their interactions. Variance analysis can be undertaken for every single Q-sort as a basis for classifying persons into groups of those alike with respect to their significant "effects" and the order of significance of their "levels." The results may then be used as "cues" in a subsequent factorial analy sis. It is common, however, to subject the correlated data to factor analysis first. The variance analysis is then ap plied to the factors themselves, by way of their factor- arrays. Thus, the customary explanation of a factor by in spection gives way to its variance analysis in terms of the postulated "theory" in the sample: We keep theory at hand, so to speak, in the sample; but we wish to use it, not to prove it directly. Its purpose is to explain factors that we arrive at by way of Q-technique operations. This is in keeping with our view of theory as a growing-point for testable proposi tions and with the fundamental principle that science is concerned with the testing of singular propositions. (107:76) In principle, Stephenson sees both the dependent and the freely interpretative procedures as being permissible, al though he feels that "Fisher would argue that one should play the dependent form of analysis exclusively, so as to 59 save one’s self from a posteriori reasoning and, perhaps, overmuch hindsight” (107:126). The relationship between factor and variance analysis. Q-method is involved with two kinds of propositions— those dealt with as factors and those dealt with as explanations for structured samples. Many propositions can be tested by one means without reference to the other. Under certain conditions the same facts can be reached both ways. In all cases it is important to keep in mind the dis tinction between general and singular propositions. Thus, in the case of variance analysis the general theoretic prop osition might be of this nature: (1) Effects X, Y, and Z will be significant for most members of any group of persons. The comparable singular testable proposition would be: (1.1) Effects X, Y, and Z will be significant for most mem bers of the experimental group. In the same way, a singular proposition for factor analysis might be: (1.2) Correspond ing to effects X, Y, and Z, there will be orthogonal factors I, II, and III for the experimental group's Q-sorts. Notice that all such propositions can be tested with out regard to any reasons for their consideration. Hunches, guesses, and the like will be at issue. It is desirable, of course, to be able to say why these assertions were made— to give reasons where one can. Indeed, if one has a theory, he presumably made some original predictions and asserted some propositions in relation to his theory. This much is hypothetical, but the issues are testable. It is a matter of fact whether significant effects will be observed or not. And although the investigator may predict where variance will be found empirically, other propositions may occur sig nificantly— either as well as, or to the exclusion of, pre dicted ones. That is, the asserted explanations may be sup plemented by or replaced by others which have been judged significant by P-tests. A theory that is built into a structured sample, of course, is not necessarily acceptable. It will usually be rejected when its testable propositions are not verifiable. For that matter, even if every testable proposition were shown to be acceptable statistically, the theory could still be rejected and replaced with one that explained the scientific situation better. Dependency factor ana^valfl^ t.h^n . 1a omnl nun ^ fun — putting experimental propositions to test. Because Stephen son believes in the necessity of reserving a place in the research scheme for creativity, "apperception," "psychologi cal intuition," and the like, he permits the psychologist to rotate factors with his theoretical expectancies in mind. ... He knows what to look for and can be relied up on to observe facts that a routine method of analysis could miss altogether. However, subjectivity is not in volved. For all factors so reached are capable of veri fication or proof. (107:44) Another of Stephenson’s list of "tricks" is the practical one of not analyzing data too much. Thus, he usually "makes do" with fewer factors than others might employ, on the grounds that he is satisfied to find some empirical proof for propositions asserted beforehand, although the data might hold more. To the charge that dependency analysis consists merely in getting out what one puts in to start with, Stephenson answers that even for a simple design the effects can be significant in many different ways, and find ing out which are significant may be the whole point of the inquiry. He also sees some genuine inductive possibilities in relation to a theory: The classification provided by variance analysis can be reached by an infinite number of different arrange ments of factors; and choice of factors may be all-im portant. We would also draw attention to the principle that the possibilities or not of dividing an effect into two or more orthogonal components becomes a test of a ’ ’ primary" factor. (107:143) II. Q-TECHNIQUE APPRAISALS AND INVESTIGATIONS An extensive critique of Q-technique procedures has been provided by Mowrer (93)- Although he traces the his torical origins of various features of Q-technique to other sources than Stephenson and claims that Stephenson has am biguously christened a loosely but functionally related group of ideas and special methods with the label "Q-tech- nique," Mowrer credits Stephenson with the introduction of the statistically useful forced-choice technique and with the energetic publicizing of the research potentialities of the general approach. Other procedures which Mowrer feels are not strictly subsumed under the term "Q-technique" are 62 the correlation-of persons (as contrasted with tests) and "inverse" factor analysis of the resulting data. Mowrer attempts to clarify the distinction between Q and R techniques by modifying and expanding Cattell's covar iation chart (20). In the modified chart, Mowrer shows the systematic relationship between the six correlational possi bilities (R,Q,M,N,0, and P) which are logically possible within the three dimensions of persons, tests, and occasions. So little empirical work has been reported in this area, however, that this classification scheme is at present only of theoretical interest. Mowrer sees an advantage in the Q-sort method of por traying personality (which he calls S-sort for general theo retical reasons) in that it provides a great many limited items of information rather than a set of descriptive adjec tives which are too global, or too molar. If we were sure that the items were sufficiently numerous and representative, he says, and if our subjects sorted them with the proper set ' or attitude, we would get for each person a combination of ratings or values which would be unique and which would re liably differentiate each person from every other person (93:348). Cronbach (34,35>36) has been quite critical of Ste phenson for what Cronbach considers to be arbitrary and sub jective manipulations of the factorial matrix in some ex amples. He has also claimed that it is incorrect to apply the F-test to data obtained from forced sorts, because it violates the F-test assumption that the values in each cell are randomly sampled. The forced sort, Cronbach says, is a case of sampling without replacement from a limited number of statements, so that the assignment of any given statement to any given cell modifies the probability of another state ment being assigned to that cell or any other cell. Ste phenson has insisted, however, that the F-test1s assumption of randomness is fulfilled because the sorter's acts of judgment in the sorting may be regarded as randomly given. It would seem that only experimental logic can resolve this difference of opinion. In spite of these criticisms, Cronbach has in general been quite sympathetic to Stephenson's approach but has sub sumed Q-technique under the method of profile-similarity analysis. (Thus, two sorts may be considered as two sepa rate profiles.) The advantage in analyzing similarity in terms of profiles instead of in terms of correlation coeffi cients, argues Cronbach, lies in the fact that important differences in mean scores ("elevation") and in deviations ("scatter") are not lost, as they are by reason of the score-standardization effect of the forced-choice procedure. Cronbach proposes a distance measure as being the more effi cient statistic. But differing as they do in many respects, they are agreed that Q-technique is not a research device to be undertaken by investigators without sophistication in the 64 rationale of Q-methodology. The Forced-Choice Distribution of Sorts With regard to the forced-choice question, Jones (73) has found that when free distribution is permitted, compos ite curves show significant variation from the quasi-normal distribution customarily imposed, tending instead to be U- shaped. He concluded that this variation represented an im portant loss of information. Block (5) sought to determine the nature of this additional information by a comparison of forced and unforced Q-sort descriptions of well-known social figures. He discovered, contrary to Jones' opinion, that the "information" conveyed by the unforced sort, over and above that contained in its forced equivalent, seemed to be a function of (a) idiosyncratic response sets of limited in terest, and (b) response characteristics whose psychological meaning was, or could be, encompassed within the forced-sort situation (e.g., if scatter in the unforced sort reflects "colorfulness" of the social object, then an item, "Is col orful," will by its placement within the forced sort convey the meaning of the eliminated scatter measure). Livson and Nichols (82), having supported Block's conclusions, noted that correlational and item-analysis com parisons of Q-sort descriptions did not always impose the statistical requirement of a quasi-normal distribution. They therefore sought an empirical answer to the question of actual preference of sorters, and also to the question of 65 which distribution was most efficient (i.e., carried the most information reliably). They found the composite dis tribution to be rectangular except for an elevated middle category (differing from Jones) and concluded that neither intra-sorter stability nor inter-sorter communality of dis tribution recommended any one distribution as the preferred one (82:l6l). Their answer to the second question was that even if all sorters had been forced to use a rectangular distribution (thus maximizing the number of inter-item dis criminations and increasing reliability), no appreciable loss of reliability would have resulted from the increased felt-difficulty of the sorting task (82:163). An additional observation of sorter reactions by Liv- son and Nichols was that the sorters appeared to understand readily the procedure of Q-sorting, pointing to its suita bility for expression of judgments by untrained persons. On the other hand, the sorters felt that an element, of random ness often entered into their decisions concerning the move ment of items in and out of categories to meet the forced- normal frequency requirement. The authors, however, found evidence that the sorters were generally incorrect in their evaluations of the reliability of their own judgments (see above) and advised that an experimenter using the Q-sort as an instrument should not be unduly alarmed by disparaging self-evaluations of the method by sorters (82:165). Be that as it may, Purst and Fricke (52) have found that some, but 66 not all, recent studies have confirmed the advantage of the use of forced-choice items. An implication which may be drawn from the above ob servation is that the principle of measurement which re quires minimal stress or exertion by the testee does not ap ply as generally as has been assumed by Loevinger (83) and others. Thus, insofar as the sorter is a poor judge of his own responses and can make reliable judgments even when it is uncomfortable to do so, the "comfortableness" dictum should perhaps be re-examined, at least for the extent of its influence on response validity. Studies of Counseling and Therapy The major report of Q-technlque studies which was available at this writing was probably that of Rogers and Dymond (99) in the field of client-centered psychotherapy. Rogers' (98) theoretical emphasis on the perceptual field of the individual and on the individual's capacity to reorgan ize his field of perception, including his perception of self, had demanded some technique whereby perceptual pat terns could be identified and compared. Q-technique, then, was eagerly embraced as a device which could precisely and efficiently perform this identification and comparison. Several other Q-technique studies in the field of counseling and therapy have some relevance to the present investigation. Block and Bennett (6) have reported that the method of reciprocal Q-sorting lends itself to the diagnosis of confllot and tension in two-person Interactions. Chodor- koff (27) has used both self-perceptual Q-sorts and sorts based on Rorschach, autobiographical, and T.A.T. protocols to demonstrate that defensiveness is primarily a perceptual distortion of certain threatening aspects of the environment and of the self. The extent and nature of this distortion is precisely measured by Q-sorting operations. Fiedler (45, 46) has compared therapeutic relationships in psychoanalytic, nondirective, and Adlerian therapy along the dimensions of communication. emotional distance, and status. Factor analysis of the Q-sort assessments of recorded interviews differentiated expertness from non-expertriess, but not one school from another. Factors seemed to include the concepts of understanding. rapport. warmth. and security. Studies of Group Characteristics The Thelen and Stock study, previously cited (113)» while possibly being the best example of a Q-technique in vestigation of group characteristics, is not generally available. Bates (2), in developing operations for defining group norms and member roles, had observers of discussion groups collect descriptions of "behavioral traits," defined as "the smallest unit of individual behavior having meaning for the members within the framework of the group's activi ties" (2:29). This produced a list of overt and covert items which was used by members to identify each other (thus 68 establishing habitual member roles) and to indicate items which were "shared," "important," and "indispensable" to the group (thus establishing group norms). Although this was not a Q-technique study, it was in several respects typical and could have been easily conducted using the Q-sort in strument . Morsh (91) used a modified Q-sort procedure for stu dent rating of instructors. Student sorts were correlated with a criterion sort to indicate the extent of agreement between the instructor's presentation and that of a criteri on classroom presentation. Ruesch, Block, and Bennett (100) have argued that analysis of social interaction must include the communica tive behavior of all persons participating in a social situ ation, whether they are observers or test subjects. In this orientation, the exchange of messages is a constantly on going process of feedback and correction, and communication, is achieved when correspondence of information has been es tablished. The procedure of observing and measuring the de gree of correspondence was one to which Q-technique was found to be particularly suitable. The innovation intro duced in this study was that each person or group made two sorts, the first on themselves, the second on the other. By correlating the sortings, the degree of agreement present was found, and the areas of disagreement between people or groups were specified. Statement categories used in this study included actions. feelings, and attitudes. at both the overt and covert levels. Item Construction and Selection Although not all group Investigators place such im portance on communication behavior, test item content has been a major concern of any study using verbal methods of evaluation. In considering the selection of items from which-to construct a test, Loevinger (83,84) has suggested that the pool of items should sample widely the area of be haviors which is relevant to the investigation, that the items should capture the content of ordinary speech as much as possible, and that they should be so worded that they will be Indirect expressions of basic feelings and attitudes. The last point is in line with Campbell's observation that the face validity of disguised measures is greater than that for undisguised ones, and also with his subsequent conclu sion that the most promising line for future development of attitude measurement lies in structured, disguised tests (14:6). Loevinger concluded that the task of validating disguised measures was identical with that of validating ap parently undisguised ones, and that the safest course would appear to be to assume that all tests were disguised ones-- human nature being as devious as it is (84:649). Evidence for the latter conclusion has been provided by earlier writers. Meehl (89) observed that while ambigui ty in wording and inaccuracy of memory are sources of error 70 in the traditional view of self-ratings, for the MMPI they may be sources of discrimination. Elias (43) found evidence that ambiguously worded items served projective purposes better than explicitly worded ones. Dorris, Levinson, and Hanfmann (39) found some evidence that third person items are better measures of defended-against or unrecognized per sonality tendencies than first person items. Factor Interpretation With regard to the interpretation of traits, particu larly of factors disclosed by factor analytic procedures, Edwards and Horst (42) have reported on the possible con founding effect of the unrecognized dimension of Social De sirability vs. Undesirability of descriptive statements. They found that when personality trait items were scaled on this continuum and then responded to in the form of a per sonality inventory, the relationship between the proportion of the experimental sample describing themselves with each item and the item's social desirability ranking was linear and correlated .87. This implies that intercorrelations be tween subjects would be higher on an instrument highly loaded with this dimension, and that a Spearman or principal component factor analysis would yield higher loadings in a general factor which should be interpreted as "social desir ability." If the method of orthogonal rotation to simple structure were used, the structure would be expected to be come more ambiguous as the correlations increased. With 71 •analysis of variance procedures, a higher mean on the social ly desirable group would not tell how much variance came from the trait and how much from the tendency to portray oneself as socially desirable. Two solutions to the problem were proposed by Edwards and Horst. The first was to use oblique rotation methods where social desirability should have no influence but would appear as a second-order factor. The second solution was to match a "desirable" item in the test instrument with an "un desirable" item. Analysis of variance could then measure both the trait and the tendency to describe oneself desir ably. Kogan, Quinn, Ax, and Ripley (75) also have reported on the problem in Q-sort studies of controlling the Social Desirability-Undesirability variable (which they incidental ly found to be identical to a Health-Sickness variable). Since the authors found statistical separation of this vari able cumbersome and inefficient, though possible, they sug gested controlling it within the structure of the Q-sort, possibly along the lines indicated by Edwards and Horst. Their study also provided some supportive reasons for Q- technique procedures, including their usefulness to clinical assessors from different disciplines, and the provision of a means for comparing clinical and self-description assess ments of patients. Bearing on Burt's claim of the reciprocity of Q and 72 R-technique procedures (13)/ Lorr, Jenkins, and Medland (83) have performed an experimental comparison of factorial re sults in which they found that the factors isolated by Q,- technique data could be distinguished from those isolated by R-technique data. They concluded that in some instances a Q-analysis may be more useful and enlightening them an R- analysis. A fundamental problem of measurement throughout the sciences which Roby (97) has discussed in connection with the measuring and describing of groups is the extent to which the measurement process Interferes with or influences the measured process. In intrusive measurement (such as questionnaires and Q-sorts), Roby sees delicate problems of motivational control and interference in group activity. On the other hand, he notes the advantages of the sampling con trol which is provided when the relevant behaviors for a given study have been identified. Even when these behaviors have merely been postulated as intervening variables, as in an exploratory investigation, the need to test clinical in sights and hunches overcomes the possible disadvantages of Intrusive measurement. This recent report thus has reiter ated the conclusions reached by Schafer (103) in a much ear lier paper in which research progress is seen as depending both on the "subjective" constructs of clinicians and their continual testing and modification by objective analysis. Ill. SUMMARY 73 This chapter has presented an overview of Q-technique procedures and methodological assumptions as expounded by Stephenson. It has then presented evaluations of these pro cedures and assumptions and has reviewed studies which have investigated various elements of the Q-technique approach. Notice has been taken of both theoretical and practical sug gestions and implications for investigators using Q-technique procedures. In the following chapter, the research design of the present study has been described. CHAPTER IV THE RESEARCH DESIGN Classification of psychological research is ap proached by Edwards (41) in terms of the kind of problem raised. Survey research, according to Edwards, is concerned with the rather general problem of what variables may be of significance in a given area of investigation.. It is ex ploratory in nature and is most useful in the preliminary stages of investigation of the given area. Technique re search, a second type, is concerned with the problem of the method or technique to be used in the making of observations. Since the present study has raised both types of problems, it may be considered to fall into both the survey-research and technique-research classifications. Although many of the principles of experimental procedure have been followed in the research design, the study cannot be properly de scribed as an experiment since control over the variables involved and the conditions under which the variables were observed has not been sufficiently exercised. In Chapter I, a general statement of the nature of the problem was presented. A general review of the litera ture was made in Chapter II, and in Chapter III a survey of references to methodological and procedural issues was pre sented. The present chapter outlines the research design in terms of the hypotheses of the study and the methods by 75 which the data were procured. I. COMPONENTS OP THE STUDY Hypotheses In Chapter I, the research question was stated in its most general form as follows: Can certain theoretically de fined dimensions of group behavior be empirically verified? An affirmative answer to this question was proposed as the first hypothesis of the study. A second hypothesis was pro posed to cover the appearance of any unexpected dimensions in the data. A negative answer to the research question was offered as the alternative hypothesis. These hypotheses were stated as follows: Hypothesis 1: Certain theoretically defined dimen sions of group behavior can be veri fied by means of Q-technlque opera tions . Hypothesis 2: Certain other group dimensions, dif fering from those specified, can be identified by the same Q-technique operations. Alternate Hypothesis: These Q-technique operations do not give verification of group dimensions. Brief Statement of Procedure Before presenting the detailed specifications for each of the steps of the study, a brief overview has been presented. Analysis of the research question indicated that several preparatory steps were involved in the problem. The steps were identified in Chapter I as follows: 1. Establishment of a general theoretical viewpoint toward group phenomena, since no generally accepted body of theory existed. 2. Selection of a set of concepts (dimensions) which were not inconsistent with this theoretical viewpoint or with previous research results and which were amenable to operational definitions. 3. Choice of a research methodology which was sympa thetic to the philosophy of science implied in the general theoretical framework and to the operational defining of concepts. 4. Construction of a research instrument which not only incorporated into its design the previously selected di mensions in such a way that their presence could be easily tested, but also permitted the identification of any unex pected dimensions which appeared in the data. Subsequent to the construction of the research instru ment, the following procedures were undertaken: 5. Selection of two training groups from the Western Training Laboratory in Group Development (WTL) to serve as experimental samples. 6. Administration of the Q-sort research instrument 77 to each of the groups on two separate occasions, one on the second day of group meetings, the other eight days later. 7. Calculation of Pearson product-moment coeffi cients of correlation to produce a correlation matrix for one group on one occasion. 8. Application of a centroid factor analysis to the correlation matrix. 9. Rotation of the centroid factors to positions of "simple structure." 10. Representation of each factor by a factor-array consisting of Q-sort statements ranked in order of signifi cance. 11. Rotation of the centroid factors a second time in terms of "dependency" principles. 12. Representation of the second-rotation factors by factor-arrays. General Theoretical Approach to Group Psychology The term "field theory" in psychology has been ap plied primarily to the work of Gestalt psychologists, and it has been employed to characterize the work of Kurt Lewin and his students. Many other prominent social scientists, of course, are more or less "field-theoretical" in their ap proaches; for example, Krech and Crutchfield, Sullivan, Gardner Murphy, Coutu, Homans, Tolman, the staffs of the Re search Center for Group Dynamics and of the Tavistock Insti tute, to name just a few. Deutsch (38) has described in 78 some detail the main features of the "way of thinking" which characterizes the field-theoretical approach to psychology. These features have been summarized briefly in the following paragraphs. The psychological approach. It is scientifically re spectable, from the field-theoretical point of view, to de scribe the phenomena in which psychologists are interested in concepts that are not reducible to the concepts of phys ics or physiology. Psychology is concerned with the indi vidual’s behavioral transactions with his internal and ex ternal environment. Since all behaviors have directional characteristics,■the purposes which underlie behavior and the goals toward which behavior is directed must be included in a full description of the behavioral process. The form of expression which these motivational forces take is de pendent upon the individual's perception of events, not by the events themselves. Therefore, a necessary experimental datum is the subject's verbal report of what a situation meant to him or what he intended, although these phenomenol ogical descriptions are not accepted as simple portrayals of the "raw truth" of the matter. An emphasis on the total situation. The person and the environment are viewed as one constellation of interde pendent factors, and all psychological events are determined by the mutual relations among the totality of coexisting 79 facts which derive from the momentary condition of the indi vidual and the structure of his environment. This emphasis on the total situation has consequences for research method ology. Instead of picking out one or another isolated ele ment within a situation, the situation as a whole is charac terized. Psychological events are studied then in terms of the units in their relations of interdependence rather than as isolated abstractions. If the original structure is made specific and differentiated, various aspects may then under go a more and more detailed analysis. The principle of contemporaneity. Lewin has empha sized that psychological events have to be explained in terms of the situation which exists at the time the events occur• He points out that even though a past event can cre ate a certain condition which carries over into the present, It is the present condition that is influential at the pres ent. The unit of analysis can not be an instant without time extension, however, but must be of sufficient duration to form meaningful psychological units. The "constructive" approach. The "classificatory" approach assumes that concepts are derived by abstractions from particular objects to an abstract object which embraces the essence of the particular object to which it refers. In the constructive approach, the meaning of any concept is de termined by its relation to other concepts in the system of concepts of which it is a part. This stress on clarifica tion of the conceptual dimensions of psychological con structs led Lewin to emphasize not only the explicit opera tional definitions which provide linkages to observable facts, but also conceptual definitions which establish the linkage between any given concept and other concepts in the system of concepts (or theory). The dynamic approach. The individual is conceived of as a system which tends to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in relation to its environment. This notion stresses the fact that the "whole" remains the same only because of a flexible organization which persists in the midst of change; it con trasts with the mechanistic model which implies the notion that the whole is completely equal to the sum of its parts. In psychology, the dynamic conception leads to an emphasis on such motivational processes as goal-setting, goal-di rected action, need-tension arousal, and tension release. Action research and group dynamics. Lewin felt that the linking of research to social action might give the so cial scientist access to basic social processes which other wise he would be unable to study. He felt that "change studies" were necessary to reveal the underlying psychologi cal processes, and he encouraged co-operation with social agencies that attempted to produce social and community changes. An even deeper concern with the relationship between research and theory led him to link the theoretical analysis and the experimental study of group life into a single approach, which he referred to by the title "group dynamics," and which led to the establishment of the Re search Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Insti tute of Technology in 19^5 (now at the University of Michi gan). Thus, one of Lewin's major contributions was to help make the concept of "group" acceptable to psychologists. Although Lewin actually wrote very little on the theory of group dynamics (however, see 79:Chap. 9), his colleagues and students have produced a formidable array of concepts, in cluding those of "cohesiveness" (forces which bind the parts of a group together), "locomotion" (movement toward a group goal), and many dimensions of "group structure" and "posi tion within a group" (e.g., communication, power, status, and skill). Deutsch has concluded the discussion summarized above with the reminders that the experimental study of small group functioning began in earnest a little over 15 years ago, and that "group dynamics" is no longer the exclusive domain of Lewin and his students, but an integral part of social psychology. Selection of Theoretical Concepts To be useful, a system of concepts (theory) need not cover the total range of phenomena in the area to which it applies. If a conceptual model can be shown to systematize a substantial number of important empirical relationships, it may contribute to later theoretical formulations. It should also be recognized that the choice of theoretical variables in small group research must rest on certain as sumptions regarding human nature and human interaction. The assumptions underlying the present choice of variables have been presented below. Following them are descriptions of the concepts, including the main sources for the "universe" of statements from which the test instrument was constructed. Assumptions. An assumption of the present study was that a theory of group behavior must start with a theory of individual behavior, since groups gather in order that in dividuals may satisfy their needs— be they immediate or de layed, emotional or conceptual (e.g., "to improve myself" or "to learn about groups"). If no completely satisfactory theory of personality is available, any "good" theory may be used but should be stated explicitly so that it may be ob jectively evaluated. Which of the available theories is used may be a matter of personal preference, congenial to the temperament of the investigator. However, some self- consistent system of abstractions or concepts should be pre sented which logically organizes a given area of phenomena as simply as possible. More than one such system is possi ble. Indeed, possibly the abstract terminology of various theories (all "verified") someday will be shown to be equiv alent. A second assumption of the present study was that in dividual behavior always takes place within a "social field," and that the individual's perception of the social field in fluences his choice of behaviors. A third assumption was that the process of interac tion among individuals in a group situation is guided by some more-or-less-clearly defined goals and purposes, and that the attainment of these common goals and values is the primary job of the group and the reason for its existence. Goals may be explicit or implicit; they may refer to the task area or the social-emotional area, or both; they may be concerned primarily with outcomes or with processes; and they may be a source of cohesion or of conflict. But upon the degree of communality and upon the extent of locomotion of a group in the direction of its perceived goals and pur poses depends the continued existence of the group itself. A final assumption of the present investigation was that the unit of description should include all three ele ments described above: the individual, the situation, and the directional tendency guiding the interaction between these two elements. This unit bears considerable theoretical resemblance to that suggested by Coutu (33) and described in Chapter II as an individual's "tendency-in-situation." It also is in harmony with the emphasis on the total situation which is part of the "field-theoretical" point of view. Concepts involving individual behavior. Blon's basic 84 categories, or "modalities," of group behavior (4) included the concepts of pairing, fight, and flight. These represent the affective components of the interpersonal experiences commonly called friendship, aggression, and avoidance. Thelen and Stock (113) have defined these concepts in some detail and also have provided lists of short descriptive statements which characterize and "cover" these concepts. Karen Horney (70)> in presenting a social-interaction al theory of personality conflict, has described in detail the behaviors involved in moving toward. against. and away from people. She has combined insight and literary ability to produce striking descriptions of a wide variety of mani festations of these three basic attitudes. The concepts selected to describe individual behav iors were denoted by the labels friendly, aggressive. and avoiding. At relatively molar levels, they subsume a varie ty of specific actions, such as "makes friends," "shows an ger," and "becomes silent." A "universe" of such statements was compiled from the literature and from group protocol. The two sources most heavily drawn upon were Horney1s Our Inner Conflicts (70) and the study of Bionic categories of Thelen and Stock (113)* Concepts Involving the situational field (group cli mate) . Although the trained observer might be able to sepa rate the emotional climates of a group into many types or qualities, the obvious distinction that a group member is called upon to make Is whether he and his contributions are being received favorably or unfavorably. Thus, he may see the group as being for or against him, accepting or reject ing him, reacting positively or negatively to him. In the present study, it was assumed that an individual would per ceive one or the other of the two climates as predominating, even if he were accepted by some members and rejected by others. In a truly contradictory situation, this individual might describe the group climate with both positive and neg ative statements. It was further assumed that a "neutral" or "non-committal" atmosphere would tend to be felt as nega tive unless it were tempered with feelings of "acceptance" or "permissiveness," in which case a positive feeling-tone was assumed. The concepts selected to describe the group climate or situational field, then, were labeled as supportive and non-supportlve. For this simple and relatively narrow clas sification, a thesaurus was used to avoid too-frequent repe tition of the identifying phrases. Concepts involving attainment of goals. If a group is seen as an arrangement permitting certain energy expendi tures on the part of its component members, that is, as a drive-satisfying device, then the energy which any group can command may be expended broadly in task achievement or group maintenance activities. Both of these activities have in common the co-operative aspect of goal-sharing. In practice, 86 it is difficult to distinguish between them, since a given activity may serve either purpose or both at the same time. In definite contrast are the attempt to meet strictly personal needs, in spite of and usually at the expense of group goals. These self-oriented activities thus lack the co-operative and goal-sharing aspects of group-oriented ac tivities. Thelen and Stock (113) placed these two concepts on a "work" continuum, ranging from "one-level work" (per sonally need-oriented) to "four-level work" (creative prob lem-solving). Both processes do have in common some move- ment toward a goal, whether it be shared or otherwise. On the other hand, goal-attainment forces are some times overcome by disruptive forces, either internal or ex ternal. Therefore, the concept of disintegrative forces— i pressures operating to pull a group apart--has value at this level. The idea of non-goal-achievement because of sheer inertia or lack of motivation also fits into this category. The concepts selected to describe the level of goal- attainment, then, were labeled as group-oriented. self oriented . and non-oriented. Statements for this level came from a wide number of sources. Particularly useful were the researches on group goals and group locomotion collected by Cartwright and Zander (18), the descriptions of group-cen- t tered leadership by Gordon (58), and the follow-up evalua- I tion-sheets of group members who had participated in the 1955 Western Training Laboratory in Group Development at Idyllwild, California. 87 Summary of concepts. A summary of the theoretical concepts, including a brief description of the constellation of behaviors which each covers, follows. For each category, an attempt was made both to "cover" the concept and to choose items that would "hang together." 1. Individual Behaviors a. Friendly: warm, intimate, supportive, unusu ally responsive, moving toward people. b. Aggressive: leading, dominating, opposing, attacking, blocking, moving against people. c. Avoiding: non-involved, passive, over-intel- lectualized, non-committal, withdrawing, mov ing away from people. 2. Group Climates a. Supportive: supporting, encouraging, co-op erative, accepting, rewarding. b. Non-supportlve: opposing, rejecting, compet ing, interfering, penalizing. 3. Goal Attainment a. Group-oriented: co-operation, task achieve ment, problem-solving, group maintenance, co hesiveness . b. Self-oriented: Intrapersonal goals, personal need satisfaction, ego-centeredness, non group-oriented. 88 c. Non-oriented: failure, inertia, disorganiza tion, disruption, disintegration. Selection of Research Methodology The research methodology selected was that advocated by Stephenson and called by him, Q-methodology (107). This methodology was selected because it combined (a) an emphasis on the Individual and his inner experiences as legitimate objects of scientific study, (b) the use of multivariate re search designs (factorial design and balanced block design) for the investigation of complex areas of human behavior, (c) a test instrument (Q-sort) which can reflect a complexi ty of attitudes, perceptions, or feelings with great sensi tivity, (d) the use of multivariate methods of analysis (analysis of variance, factor analysis) as tools for theory building and hypothesis testing, and (e) a completely opera tional process of defining theoretical constructs and empir ical factors (factor arrays). How the present study applied the two elements of factorial design and Q-sort instrument has been described in the following sections. Factorial design. In this type of research design, each of two or more independent variables, or main effects. is varied in two or more ways, called levels. Each varia tion and all possible combinations of variations (interac tions) are considered as separate experimental conditions, and tests of significance can be made on each variation and on any possible interaction of two or more variations. In the present study, the three main effects were designated by the letters A, B, and C, thusly: (A) Individ ual Behaviors, (B) Group Climates, and (C) Goal Attainment. The levels for Main Effect A were labeled (a) Friendly, (b) Aggressive, and (c) Avoiding; for Effect B, (d) Supportive, and (e) Non-supportive; and for Effect C, (f) Group-oriented, (g) Self-oriented, and (h) Non-oriented. The factorial de sign was thus given the following structure: Main Effects Levels A (a) (b) (c) B (d) (e) C (f) (s) (h) It was upon this structure that the Q-sort instrument was constructed. Q-sort Instrument. In an R-technique factorial de sign, the levels can be filled with random samples of per sons who then are exposed to the various experimental condi tions. Tests of significance are made on the effect of the various conditions. Another R-technique procedure would be to structure the sample in terms of persons with known qual ities or characteristics and subject them to one or more ex perimental conditions. The relationship between the experi mental conditions and the personal characteristics could 90 then be calculated. In Q-technique, the sample consists of statements rather than persons, and in a structured sample, statements cover each combination of main effects. In the present study, the factorial design had 18 (3 x 2 x 3) such combina tions, i.e., adf, adg, adh, aef, aeg, aeh, bdf, bdg, bdh, bef, beg, beh, cdf, cdg, cdh, cef, ceg, and ceh. One repli cation of the sample thus consisted of 18 statements, one for each combination. The actual construction of the Q-sort instrument is discussed in the next section. Construction of the Research Instrument The main sources of items used to construct the re search instrument were included in the description of theo retical concepts given above. It should be apparent that the process of item-selection is not and can hardly ever be a wholely random or completely objective process, since it de pends ultimately on a human decision. Eventually, however, the objectivity of the process becomes a matter, not of opinion, but of empirical validation. The degree to which items within a category will "hang together" is a matter of statistical analysis of empirical data, and if the experi menter "guessed wrong," he can always begin over again, this time with the advantage of hindsight. Statements, then, are placed in the "cells" of the factorial design on purely the oretical grounds, although such matters as conciseness, clar ity, and representativeness of items are kept constantly in 91 mind. An innovation of the present study was the inclusion of three effects in each item, a tri-factorial design being demanded by the nature of the theory being investigated. This meant that three bits of information, one for each of the main effects, had to be integrated into a simple declar ative sentence. The general form of each sentence was rep resented by the synthetic statement, "A specific member be havior was reacted to by the group in a certain way, leading to a particular outcome." For a specific example, one might take the behavioral item, "demonstrations of good fellow ship" (level a); the group reaction, "restricted" (e)j.and the outcome, "work of the group improves" (f). The com pleted sentence, representing the combination of effects aef, would be, "When demonstrations of good fellowship are restricted, the work of the group improves." This procedure, then, was followed in constructing all 72 statements, al though the order of elements was frequently varied in the Interest of naturalness and simplicity. It might be expected that the surface similarity of items--the degree to which they all say the same thing— would be lessened by this somewhat synthetic process, and that their tendency to correlate with each other would de crease. In the present attempt to identify trends, rather than to isolate statistically "pure" factors, however, all that was required statistically was that the items 92 intercorrelate to a reasonable degree. When construction of the preliminary instrument was completed, the statements were examined by a small committee of experts in terms of their conceptual relevance and their syntactical clarity. Since the theory embodied in the structure of the sample was tested indirectly, by way of factor analysis, there was no "correct" place for any item of a sample. Many items turned out to be ambiguous, however, and a process of revision was carried out until the commit tee unanimously accepted each item. Since the present study was investigating group structure rather than personality structure, it was decided to phrase all statements in the third person. In effect, this made each group member a group observer, and the data of testing became the communicative behavior of all the per sons participating in the social situation, regardless of whether they were considered to be leaders, members, or ob servers. Members and observers therefore did not need sepa rate evaluation instruments. A second reason for using third-person statements was to avoid the defensiveness which often accompanies self-descriptive test instruments. The sorting process. Participants reflected the im pressions which a group session had made upon them by sort ing the cards (statements) along a bipolar continuum of nine categories wherein the statements are evaluated as most characteristic (typical, frequent, intense) or least characteristic (untypical, infrequent, weak). If the verbal statements printed on cards are sufficiently representative, then the sorter need only possess sufficient memory and evaluative capacity as to allow him to condense his experi ence into the terms which are presented on the cards. The statements consisted of language which attempted to describe feelings, attitudes, opinions, and social actions which might occur in a group session. Each statement contained several bits of information about group behavior. To the extent that the sorter was sensitive to a behavioral stimu lus and recognized it in its verbal form, he attached sig nificance to the statement and gave it an extreme weight. An individual's sorting was a function of his evaluation of the intensity, frequency, and importance of the behavioral events described on the cards. The Judged "importance" of an item was determined by the sorter's value system and might supersede frequency and intensity. The dimension of importance was likely to be a highly personal one. The sorter could employ some highly complex, multidimensional, perhaps even unverbalizable, criterion for the ordering of the items. Furthermore, any given item had to be evaluated in the context of all other items. Thus, the Q-sort allowed for the quantitative expression of an individual's general ized, total-personality, cognitive-emotional, perceptual set. Reliabilities of the order of .80 (100) have attested to the meaningfulness of the complex weighting procedure used by 94 the sorter. The factor analysis of Q-sorts then measured the extent to which certain members used similar perceptual wholes in describing a shared group experience. These per ceptual wholes could have been similar to the theoretical concepts built into the Q-sort instrument or they could have been new combinations of observations which had not been an ticipated. II. COLLECTION OF THE DATA Experimental Setting and Population As part of a broad program of adult education, the University of California at Los Angeles, through the School of Education and the University Extension, sponsors the Western Training Laboratory in Group Development (WTL) each summer. The purpose of this laboratory, as described in a university bulletin, is as follows: . . . The nation's need for practical, effective leaders in all occupations is obvious. This effective leadership depends in large part upon face-to-face work ing relationships in small groups--whether in industry, labor, government, education or civic groups. . . . However, many problems and many questions pre sent themselves. How can a group increase its efficien cy in problem-solving? What causes people to become de fensive in groups? How can we share our group responsi bilities more effectively? . . . For four years, the Western Training Laboratory in Group Development has provided a unique program for leaders of many vocational and professional fields. Basically, WTL is designed to help the participant under stand himself as a group member, to assist him in becom ing a better member of a group and to aid him in apply ing various skills and techniques in dealing with common group problems. The laboratory is a unique educational 95 experience. For two weeks, delegates representing many occupations and specialized fields work together in sev eral types of training groups, theory sessions and gen eral meetings. The important thing is . . . working to gether. As a type of experimental community evolves, delegates become more sensitive to the various aspects of group life--aspects which normally tend to go unno ticed and un-analyzed. (117runpaged) The enrollment is limited to 96 delegates who are se lected upon application from a wide variety of organizations: . . . This Laboratory is recommended specifically for persons who have group work responsibilities: school administrators, business executives, teachers, public health specialists, social welfare workers, youth and recreational leaders, training directors from industry and government, supervisors, union officials and lead ers, hospital executives, public relations consultants, personnel and industrial relations directors, religious education workers, military personnel, community organi zation and lay leaders, etc. (117runpaged) The 1956 site of the WTL was on the new campus of Santa Barbara College, University of California, located seven miles north of Santa Barbara. Delegates were housed in double rooms and attended sessions and ate together for the two-week period. The effect of a temporary cultural "island" was deliberate. Staff members were selected be cause of their experience in group development. They in cluded faculty from various universities and group leaders from business, industry, government, education, and the like. The decision to use training groups for the experi mental population of the present study was influenced by a number of considerations. First, these groups tend to ex press and characterize their emotional reactions as they go. In other words, during the course of the training process they are continually trying to make "feelings" explicit, to diagnose their problems of operation, and to pay attention to the adaptations of individuals. These perceptions are valuable data for understanding the dynamics of groups. Second, there is greater permissiveness than in most "task- oriented" groups because the reactions of each individual have to be taken into account and dealt with much more fully than in situations where performance criteria are "given" by prior purposes and problems. Therefore, a research request was made of the WTL steering committee, headed by Dr. Warren Schmidt, director of UCLA's Department of Conferences and Special Activities. The steering committee was receptive to the idea of augment ing its own research efforts and granted the request. The "curriculum" at WTL consisted of working together in groups ranging in size from seven to one hundred. Some of the sessions were highly structured (the theory sessions), and others were almost completely unstructured ("bull ses sions"). The "basic" training groups were made up of 16 or 17 persons, including two staff members, and were only slightly structured. These basic training groups usually met twice a day for an hour and a half each time. They gave first-hand experience in the exploration of the phenomena of group development and provided opportunities for practicing the skills of group membership and leadership. The staff members operated as nominal leader and observer.. The groups 97 included men and women between the ages of 30 and 60. For purposes of replication, data were collected from two of the basic groups. Administration of the Test Instrument The leaders and observers of the two groups selected were given instructions as to how the Q-sorts were to be ad ministered. To be sure of having sufficient data, and an ticipating the possibility of measuring group changes, two sorts were made--one on the second meeting of the first day, the other eight days later. For each sort, each member--including the leader and observer--was given a packet containing the directions (Ap pendix A), a set of the 72 statements (Appendix B), and nine marked envelopes into which to put the sorted statements. The members were not asked to identify themselves, and only the group leaders did so. The directions requested that the member describe the behavior, feelings, or attitudes of the group by sorting the statements into nine piles ranging from "most characteristic, typical, frequent, intense" to "least characteristic, untypical, infrequent, weak." The number of statements in each pile was fixed, so that the sort was forced into an approximately normal distribution (i.e., 2,4, 8,14,16,14,8,4,2). The completed sorts were collected by the group lead ers, who reported that members had little difficulty in choosing statements for the three piles at either end, but that differentiation was quite difficult in the three center piles. They also reported that the first sorting was quite difficult because of the brevity of the group experience up to that point and because of the novelty of the technique, but that the second sorting was relatively easy. One group leader expressed considerable discomfort at being unable to separate items easily into definite categories and subse quently failed to complete the second sort. These reactions to the sorting task were not inconsistent with those re ported in the literature. CHAPTER V STATISTICAL TREATMENT AND FINDINGS In the last chapter, the present study was described as performing some of the functions of both survey research and technique research. As survey research, the goal of the present study was to answer the research question: Can cer tain theoretically defined dimensions of group behavior be empirically verified? Affirmative and negative answers to this question were proposed as hypotheses. In the present chapter, the experimental data have been factor analyzed and the factors examined to determine whether the predicted di mensions have been given statistical verification. Also, the factor-arrays have been analyzed clinically to determine whether group dimensions other than those predicted could be identified. Concomitantly, the study has been analyzed as technique research, and findings have been presented regard ing the technical procedures utilized in the study. I. IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS AND FACTOR-ARRAYS This section has presented the experimental data, the extraction of factors, and the representation of factors by factor-arrays. Selection of the Data The second sorting of one of the groups was selected 100 for analysis. One group was selected over the other because of a more stable membership (two members were not present on the first day as compared to five in the other group), and because the leader of the group completed both sorts (the group leader did not complete the second sort in the other group). The second sorting was selected over the first when it became apparent that two days was not long enough for definite impressions to become established in the minds of group members. Members also reported more confidence in the sorting process the second time because of their experience with the initial sort. The Correlation Matrix The sixteen sorts of the members of the selected group were tabulated by recording the pile number given each statement by each member. This tabulation has been pre sented in Table I. The individual sorts have been desig nated by small letters k through z. The only member whose sort was identified, the group leader, was listed first (sort k). A Pearson product-moment coefficient of correlation was calculated for each pair of sorts, 120 in all, using the formula for original data (62:160) in which rXy is first computed as follows: where X and Y are original scores in variables X and Y, and ' [n&2 - (gc)2j[i®f2 - (&)*] 101 TABLE I RAW SCORES OF Q-SORTS BY SIXTEEN MEMBERS OF WTL TRAINING GROUP ONE (THE EXPERIMENTAL SAMPLE) Item ________________Group Members unber k 1 m n o P q r s t u V w X y z 1 9 2 5 8 9 7 8 9 8 3 9 4 8 7 9 8 2 6 5 5 7 3 7 2 7 6 2 4 5 4 6 4 7 3 2 2 5 5 4 6 3 3 4 6 4 5 6 3 7 5 4 2 3 5 4 3 4 3 6 2 7 5 5 2 2 3 5 5 4 5 4 6 7 4 3 5 4 7 4 5 3 2 3 4 6 4 5 6 7 3 5 3 6 4 7 6 5 4 2 2 5 7 1 3 2 6 5 5 4 6 4 1 4 4 5 2 5 8 8 5 5 6 5 5 6 3 6 6 2 6 6 7 1 5 7 9 6 5 7 4 6 3 3 6 4 7 8 3 5 5 6 3 10 5 5 4 7 5 4 4 6 4 7 6 6 5 6 3 5 11 8 9 4 4 6 5 3 4 7 2 4 8 3 6 5 6 12 6 5 7 6 6 3 6 5 4 7 5 8 4 5 6 5 13 6 5 5 8 6 3 9 7 5 3 6 4 9 6 4 5 14 3 5 3 2 3 3 1 5 3 3 5 2 3 6 6 5 15 5 3 5 7 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 6 4 5 7 5 16 3 3 7 5 4 5 7 5 6 7 4 3 4 6 6 6 1I 5 2 2 5 5 5 6 1 5 6 4 5 5 6 4 5 18 6 9 7 5 2 8 4 6 7 3 6 5 5 7 6 8 19 7 5 6 6 4 4 7 5 4 3 4 3 6 6 6 6 20 4 8 3 5 6 5 6 7 7 7 4 4 4 5 4 5 21 4 5 2 4 4 7 5 2 7 3 6 6 2 5 3 4 22 2 2 6 4 3 4 1 4 2 8 5 7 4 5 3 4 23 5 5 5 6 6 4 4 5 5 3 4 5 6 1 3 3 24 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 ,4 4 4 2 4 3 4 25 4 4 6 2 5 3 6 6 4 5 4 6 2 6 6 5 26 6 4 4 6 7 9 7 6 8 8 3 4 7 8 7 6 27 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 6 3 4 4 2 28 8 8 6 7 7 8 5 8 9 8 8 7 5 9 8 9 29 6 8 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 2 4 7 5 8 6 5 30 7 7 5 6 9 2 4 4 6 6 6 7 4 6 8 5 31 5 5 4 4 1 4 4 7 4 6 5 4 3 6 5 3 32 7 5 9 2 6 6 6 5 8 5 5 5 7 6 6 4 33 7 5 6 5 2 6 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 6 5 6 34 8 1 6 6 4 6 8 8 7 9 5 6 4 8 7 5 35 7 5 5 5 6 9 6 4 6 4 5 7 5 4 6 2 36 2 6 1 4 3 3 6 5 3 4 7 4 7 4 6 3 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 6l 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 TABLE I (continued) Group Members k 1 m n o q q r s t u V w X y 5 8 4 5 6 5 7 8 3 6 9 4 7 7 6 6 6 4 4 8 4 3 5 7 5 6 4 3 5 4 4 4 6 6 6 3 2 5 1 6 1 5 5 7 4 1 1 5 1 2 6 4 5 2 4 5 5 4 4 1 5 4 4 1 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 8 4 7 4 6 8 8 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 5 4 4 4 3 4 7 6 6 4 3 1 6 4 2 7 4 6 2 5 6 4 3 6 4 6 5 6 4 6 6 3 4 3 5 5 5 3 7 4 7 2 6 4 6 4 3 5 3 3 5 5 5 4 6 2 6 6 7 2 5 4 6 3 7 4 5 4 7 6 5 6 6 7 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 5 4 3 5 4 2 5 3 5 4 3 8 3 4 5 3 3 6 3 5 6 5 2 4 4 2 5 4 4 5 6 4 8 6 6 8 7 8 8 5 6 5 8 5 8 5 6 5 3 5 4 4 6 5 5 3 4 4 .5 5 4 6 4 7 5 5 5 3 5 4 7 7 5 4 5 5 6 8 7 7 7 5 1 4 5 7 7 7 5 5 4 6 3 4 6 6 2 3 5 4 3 8 5 4 4 4 3 4 6 8 6 6 7 5 5 6 6 6 5 4 6 7 9 3 4 7 8 5 6 5 5 1 5 5 7 3 6 7 4 2 4 6 3 3 5 6 5 6 4 7 5 6 5 6 7 7 6 4 6 5 3 2 4 3 7 5 4 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 1 6 4 3 5 4 5 5 8 5 1 5 2 5 5 2 2 6 3 3 6 6 6 8 8 3 5 2 6 5 7 9 5 3 4 3 6 8 5 7 7 7 7 3 6 3 3 7 5 4 7 7 7 3 4 6 6 7 6 8 7 3 6 8 4 4 6 3 5 8 5 4 4 5 6 7 4 5 5 7 3 6 1 6 1 1 2 4 1 1 5 3 1 3 5 6 6 4 9 5 2 6 4 2 5 8 9 8 3 5 6 7 5 5 5 6 7 7 5 6 2 4 6 7 5 7 7 3 5 5 6 5 6 6 5 6 5 8 3 2 9 7 8 9 7 7 9 9 9 9 7 3 9 9 9 3 7 5 7 5 5 6 6 6 6 8 6 5 6 5 3 7 6 5 4 2 5 4 3 6 5 6 1 5 1 103 N is the number of measurements (in this case the number of statements in the Q-sort). When raw scores are small num bers, the use of this forbidding-looking formula is actually the best procedure (62:159)* An added advantage for Q-sort calculations is the fact that this formula can be greatly simplified. In the Q-sort with 9 ranks (piles), raw scores range from 1 to 9- When a forced-choice procedure is used, as in the present study, the number of raw scores of each rank is predetermined for each and every sort. Therefore, the summation of raw scores is identical for each sort, as is the summation of squared raw scores. If these terms are equated in the above formula and the square roots taken, the following formula results: NgXY - (gx)2 rxy ~ - (gx)* This is the formula, then, for a product-moment coefficient of correlation between two forced-choice Q-sorts. For any given sort, computation is further simplified by the fact that N, Jx, and are constants for all of the sorts. Thus, in the present study, N » 72, X* = 360, and £x » 2028. These computations have been presented in Table II. The working formula for the present study, then, is as follows: JXY - 1800 rxy " 228 When correlation coefficients for each pair of sorts TABLE II CALCULATION OF CONSTANTS FOR THE Q-SORT CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FORMULA N X & X2 C V I A 2 9 18 81 162 4 8 32 64 256 8 7 56 49 392 14 6 84 36 304 16 5 80 25 400 14 4 56 16 224 8 3 24 9 72 4 2 8 4 16 2 1 2 1 2 Totals 72 360 2028 N & »t2 had been computed, they were placed into a correlation ma trix, shown in Table III. Included in the matrix are the guessed communalities required for a centroid factor analy sis. The method of estimating communalities was that recom mended by Guilford (63:494), and consisted merely of using the highest correlation coefficient in each column. The co efficients themselves represent the degree of correlation between persons, that is, the extent to which each pair of individuals perceived and described the group experience in a similar manner. Prom a preliminary overview of the matrix, it was apparent that the coefficients were moderately low but almost all positive. The median r of the matrix of .23 is considered a low correlation, showing a definite but small over-all relationship among sorts (62:165). Ten per cent of the sorts show substantial relationships, correlat ing .40 or higher. Of some interest was the fact that the highest set of coefficients was obtained by the group leader (k) with a median r of .35* Extraction of Centroid Factors According to Guilford (63:478), investigators in the United States have invariably used the Thurstone procedures of factor extraction, known as the centroid method (115)* Stephenson has selected Thurstone's method because it re quires a rotation of axes, permitting the investigator to seek a factor solution which is favorable to his theoretical expectations. 106 TABLE III CORRELATION MATRIX FOR Q-SORTS BY THE EXPERIMENTAL SAMPLE srson k 1 m n 0 P q r s t u V w X y z k 55 27 38 26 41 35 43 33 65 13 29 12 39 50 48 35 1 27 21 12 18 15 -1 4 11 17 -6 22 2 3 16 8 20 m 38 12 28 8 19 35 35 13 13 35 16 4 34 36 32 22 n 26 18 8 34 34 -4 23 17 10 8 25 21 33 5 18 27 0 41 15 19 34 45 17 26 9 45 18 21 20 35 16 33 30 P 35 -1 35 -4 17 54 31 28 54 8 9 -3 33 30 33 38 q 43 4 35 23 26 31 52 34 40 23 17 46 53 40 37 24 r 33 11 13 17 9 28 34 41 27 27 22 23 28 41 23 26 s 65 17 13 10 45 54 40 27 65 11 19 -4 27 35 41 33 t 13 -6 35 8 18 8 23 27 11 26 11 1 9 36 8 1 u 29 22 16 25 21 9 17 22 19 11 21 11 31 14 30 37 V 12 2 4 21 20 -3 4.6 23 -4 1 11 22 -7 -1 -4 12 w 39 3 34 33 35 33.,53 28 27 9 31 -7 52 19 31 32 X 50 16 36 5 16 30 40 41 35 36 14 -1 19 50 40 25 y 48 8 32 18 33 33 37 23 41 8 30 -4 31 40 48 37 z 35 20 22 27 30 38 24 26 33 1 37 12 32 25 37 28 All decimal points have been omitted. Diagonal cell entries are guessed communalities. 107 Guilford's detailed directions for extraction of fac tors by the centroid method were followed (63:^93-500), pro ducing the centroid factor matrix presented in Table IV. Pour factors were extracted, although the loadings on the fourth were quite low. The sums of the squared loadings show that the first factor took out about 66$ of the total common- factor variance, the second took out 15$, the third 12$, and the fourth 7$. The values of the obtained communalities are seen to be close to those estimated for the correlation ma trix (the guessed communalities). The size of the communal ities indicates that the analysis has accounted for about one-quarter of the total variance, leaving three-quarters as unique, or specific and error variance (63:355-356). Rotation of Reference Axes One of the incompletely solved problems of factor analysis is that of the rotation of reference axes. It is generally accepted that the initial factor solution, whether reached by the centroid or other methods, is only one of in numerable solutions. Thus, although the positions of the test vectors have become fixed in relation to one another, the particular position of the reference axes given by the initial solution is arbitrary, being influenced by such chance factors as the particular variables included in the correlation matrix, different courses of the centroid analy sis, or the use of different analytic methods from the cen troid . TABLE IV CENTROID FACTOR MATRIX AND COMMUNALITIES WITH PROPORTIONS OF VARIANCE CONTRIBUTED BY THE CENTROID' FACTORS Person Centroid Factor Loadings lo Ho III0 *v0 n k • 763 -.085 -.182 .172 .652 1 .248 .179 -.100 • 151 .127 m .497 -.174 .163 -.273 • 379 n .386 .467 .173 .115 .410 0 .540 .258 -.146 -.129 • 397 P .506 -.301 -.229 -.199 .439 q • 595 -.239 .180 .262 • 512 r .513 -.076 .278 .094 .355 s .634 -.190 -.508 .103 .707 t .304 -.235 .402 -.256 .374 u .447 .301 .041 .090 .301 V .120 .271 .090 -.225 .146 w •577 .076 .146 .095 .369 X .576 -.405 .093 .066 .509 y • 590 -.087 -.141 .138 • 395 z • 557 .227 -.162 -.060 • 391 Siam of Squares 4.236 66# .992 15# .788 12# .447 7# 6.463 100# The original reference axes, then, must, be rotated to a position of "greatest psychological meaning," a position upon which few research psychologists have been willing to agree. The most widely used standard is that of simple structure, propounded by Thurstone (115) > which is based on the broad scientific principle of parsimony. In terms of factor analysis, Thurstone argued, this means that any one test should have the simplest possible factor constitution, and any one factor should require only some of all the pos sible tests. With reference to the factor matrix, this means that every test should have at least one zero loading, and every factor should have some zeros in its column. Guilford (63:508) lists the following additional desiderata: (a) for each pair of rotated factors, there should be some tests having zeros on one factor matched with non-zeros on the other; (b) for each pair of factors, there should be some tests with zero loadings on both; and (c) for every pair of tests, there should be very few pairs of loadings of substantial size. While Thurstone has used rotation in an inductive manner to discover invariant structures assumed to be inher ent in the data, Stephenson has taken the point of view that there are many ways of organizing the data, and that one can look only for evidence of a specific structure cor responding to a specific hypothesis, rather than for proof of any general propositions. What Stephenson has called 110 dependency analysis, then, has both philosophy-of-science and practical implications. At the practical level, it merely means that rotation to simple structure is abandoned in favor of rotation to positions which test the power of the hypothesized factorial design. If the hypothesized ef fects have not actually influenced the data, dependency analysis will fail to find the predicted factors. The anal ysis may then continue, if it be so desired, using simple structure principles to discover whether other meaningful results may be produced. It should be noted that Guilford has not rejected the possibility of using psychological meaning as a guide to ro tation, but he has felt that it should be resorted to only after attempts at simple structure have failed. Such a failure, he has stated (63:509), might occur when the com plexity of tests is generally so great that there is no out standingly compelling solution. With reference to Q-technique factor analysis, Cat- tell (22:94) has questioned the applicability of simple structure assumptions. He doubts that some human beings will completely lack some factor present in others, meaning that the zero-loading standard would fail to apply. Howev er, he thinks that the usual normal distribution of factor endowments in persons would show a clustering at the zero standard score region, and thus give guidance through a "pseudo-simple" structure. In the present study, it was decided to perform two separate rotational solutions: one, following the principles of simple structure; the other, using whatever rotational cues could be found in the factorial design, the experimental sample, and the experimental situation. The results of the first rotation, in which an attempt was made to achieve sim ple structure and positive manifold, are presented in Table V. Every test (person) has at least one zero loading (with in .100) except one (loaded .120), and every factor has one or more zeros in its column. Guilford's other requirements are generally met except for the one requiring each pair of factors to have some matched zero loadings. Incidentally, the four factors totaled 21 zero loadings among their 72 loadings, and only 8 loadings were significantly negative (-.100 or less). In the "dependency" rotation, it was first noted that a large general factor could be expected. In the first place, the factorial design was complex. In addition to the eight main effects, there were 21 double interactions, and 18 triple interactions possible. Furthermore, the field- theoretical philosophy predicted that the more numerous in teractions would supply most of the variance, rather than the main effects. The second reason for expecting a large general factor was that the Q-sort instructions were for each member to describe the same group experience. Indeed, if the group experience were perceived and verbalized 112 TABLE V FIRST-ROTATION ORTHOGONAL FACTOR MATRIX WITH ROTATIONS DETERMINED BY PRINCIPLES OF SIMPLE STRUCTURE Rotated Factor Loadings reraon I' II' III' IV' k .780 .210 .005 .005 1 .213 .255 -.124 .040 m .397 • 035 .410 -.230 n .145 .620 • 0 00 U ) .020 o .407 .385 -.014 -.290 P .582 -.148 .082 -.272 q .593 .104 .284 .265 r .405 .210 .360 .120 s • 792 -.015 -.257 -.127 t .180 -.035 .576 -.097 u .290 .465 .038 -.023 V -.011 .285 .112 -.250 w .450 .342 .220 .040 X .626 -.095 .317 .090 y .613 .145 .007 .020 z .449 .375 -.041 -.225 113 similarly by all members, a large general factor would be the only one extracted. Furthermore, the group leader could be expected to be the best observer in the group and to have the highest loading in the general factor. Since the first centroid factor fulfilled these expectations without rota tion, it was decided to rotate it as little as possible. The presence of such a large factor, howeyer, ob scured the search for other factors, since it was difficult to tell when a clustering of tests was due to general or unique influences. Generally, a cluster was favored when its pattern of effects-tendlng-toward-significance (few ef fects showed evidence of statistical significance) was in the opposite direction of the general over-all pattern. This "principle" was probably the main single cue used to rotate the second and third factors to their final positions. The fourth factor was used merely as an aid in these rota tions, since it possessed too few high loadings on which to base any rotation for its own sake. When the second and third factors were plotted against the first factor on the final graphical representation, the shape of each of the two patterns was that of a hyperplane some distance above the origin, half positive and half nega tive. Although a description of this pattern was not found in the literature, it appears to represent that of a factor whose variables are all positively correlated with a potent general factor. The loadings for the second rotational 114 solution are presented in Table VI. They differ from the first solution in having fewer zero loadings— 17— and more than twice as many significantly negative loadings— 19• Other qualitative differences have been demonstrated in lat er sections which have considered the calculation of an analysis of variance of the factors and the presentation of factor arrays of statements representing each factor. The sequence of rotations for the simple structure solution proceeded as follows: (a) I0-III0 = -20° (counter clockwise); (b) Ix-II0 = -20°; (c) IIx-IIIx = +20°; (d) Ig- IV0 = +10°; (e) = +10°; and (f) III2-IV2 = -20°. The sequence of rotations for the "dependency” solution, on the other hand, proceeded: (a) II0-III0 = -40°; (b) IIIi- IVQ « -25°; (c) Hx-IVx = -20°; and (d) I0-H2 = +10°. Representation of Factors by Factor-Arrays A factor-array consists of the set of Q-sort state ments ranked in order of their significance to a factor. In a real sense, the array of statements is the factor. It is these statements that some cluster of persons agreed were the significant verbal representations of a perceived exper ience. Thus, the array is the best estimate of the factor and can be thought of as the Q-sort that was given "on the average" by the cluster of persons having significant load ings on the factor. A property of the array is that any contributing Q-sort will correlate with it by an amount equal to the Q-sort!s factor loading. 115 TABLE VI SECOND-ROTATION ORTHOGONAL FACTOR MATRIX WITH ROTATIONS DETERMINED BY "DEPENDENCY” PRINCIPLES Rotated Factor Loadings ■ ..I ■ ■ . i i . ■■ ii i n ■ m ■ SI'tJOXI I" II" III" IV" k .716 -.342 -.150 .048 1 .260 .052 -.238 .075 m .495 -.055 .340 -.140 n .455 .350 -.198 .192 0 .562 .079 -.199 -.186 P .440 -.425 .100 -.232 q • 555 -.288 .154 .316 r .522 .005 .199 .225 s • 550 -.540 -.284 -.184 t • 315 .036 .526 -.006 u .481 .155 -.185 .098 V .175 .295 -.002 -.145 w .587 .005 .015 .155 X .515 -.400 .275 .104 y .550 -.283 -.105 .040 z • 570 .025 -.220 -.137 116 First-rotation factor arrays. At the time of the present study, there existed no clear-cut criterion of sig nificance for the selection of sorts from which to calculate the factor array. Certainly it is desirable to have dis criminating items; these come from the sorts having the ex treme loadings. Stephenson (107) generally has used load ings of .40 or above, although he has shown examples using loadings as low as .29* The usual rule-of-thumb criterion of significance for factor loadings is .30. Unfortunately, any such absolute standard poses practical problems. In the present study, for example, an absolute criterion of .30 ap plied to Table V would allow eleven of the sixteen sorts to be used for the array of Factor I', but none would pass the criterion for Factor IV1. In order to have a minimum number of sorts, therefore, the arbitrary decision was made to use the highest one-third of the loadings (six sorts) for each of the factors provided by the simple structure solution (Table V). This decision, though arbitrary, seemed defensible because of the fact that contamination of the factor-arrays by low loadings was avoided by the use of a weighting formu la. Thus, the influence of any given Q-sort became propor tional to its loading on the factor--high loadings having a strong Influence, and low loadings having a weak Influence. Stephenson has expressed the weighting formula as follows (107:120): 117 Wfc PhU - ?») wa = - pfP where Fa and Fb are the factor loadings for factor F of two sorts, a and b, and the ’ ’ weights" gained by each sort are in the proportion Wb to Wa. Since great precision is not es sential in this operation, Stephenson uses approximate weights, usually to the nearest 0.5* In Table VII, the weights for each person selected have been shown for each of the factors in Table V. A weight of 1.00 was given to the person who had the lowest loading in the factor; the other persons were weighted proportionally. These weights were then applied to the scores for each of the 72 statements in turn, with scores reversed for the negative loadings. Since Factor IV1 had all negative loadings except one, the poles of its axis (which had been arbitrarily labeled plus and minus to begin with) were reversed, thus reversing the signs of the loadings for that factor and maintaining the convention of positive manifold for all factors in the first-rotation solution. The weighted scores were then totaled for each item, and the items were ranked from high to low. These sets of ranked items are the factor-arrays for the first-rotation factors. They are shown in Tables VIII through XI. For purposes of factor comparison and for later analysis of var iance calculations, Q-sort scores from 1 to 9 were assigned to all items, conforming to the original quasi-normal TABLE VII WEIGHTING OP SCORES FOR FACTOR-ARRAYS OF THE FIRST-ROTATION FACTORS (TABLE V) Factor Person Loading Approximate Weight I* p .582 1.0 q .593 1.0 y .613 1.0 X .626 1.0 k .780 2.0 s .792 2.0 II' V .285 1.0 w .3^2 1.0 z .375 1.5 0 .385 1.5 u .465 2.0 n .620 3-0 III' s -.257 -1.0 q .284 1.0 X .317 1.5 r • 360 1.5 m .410 2.0 t .576 3-0 IV'* z .225 1.0 m .230 1.0 V .250 1.0 P .272 1.5 q -.265 -1 .5 0 .290 1.5 * Signs reversed to maintain the convention of positive manifold. 119 TABLE VIII FACTOR I1 FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 70 70 9 1 65 9 28 64 8 26 59 8 34 59 8 42 59 8 51 56 7 32 54 7 18 51 7 35 51 7 57 51 7 64 50 7 11 49 7 29 48 7 68 47 6 30 46 6 44 46 6 45 46 6 19 45 6 47 45 6 59 45 6 13 44 6 2 43 6 16 42 6 20 42 6 21 42 6 33 42 6 38 42 6 69 42 6 17 41 5 37 41 5 12 40 5 54 40 5 71 40 5 15 39 5 43 39 5 56 39 5 62 39 5 Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 65 39 5 52 38 5 60 38 5 8 37 5 9 37 5 25 37 5 31 37 5 41 37 5 53 37 5 27 36 4 49 36 4 10 35 4 46 35 4 63 35 4 24 34 4 48 34 4 50 34 4 55 34 4 58 33 4 23 32 4 67 32 4 3 31 3 36 29 3 6l 29 3 5 28 3 6 28 3 14 28 3 7 26 3 39 26 3 72 25 2 22 21 2 4 20 2 66 19 1 40 19 1 Mean - 39-90 S.D. = 10.75 Mean + S.D. = 50.65 Mean - S.D. = 29.15 120 TABLE IX FACTOR II' FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Sum of Number Weights 1 79 1/2 67 78 62 76 70 74 1/2 28 73 54 68 1/2 13 65 1/2 53 65 56 63 71 63 30 62 37 62 10 59 65 59 8 58 69 58 42 57 1/2 12 56 1/2 51 56 1/2 7 54 1/2 26 54 1/2 29 54 1/2 6 54 38 53 1/2 48 53 1/2 2 53 , 15 52 1/2 34 51 1/2 18 51 23 50 1/2 47 50 1/2 63 50 1/2 5 50 19 50 9 49 1/2 11 49 35 49 17 48 3 47 1/2 Q-sort Item Score Number 9 20 9 59 33 8 36 8 55 8 8 64 68 7 16 7 61 7 45 7 57 7 21 7 49 7 58 7 22 32 6 44 6 39 6 4 6 6 72 6 50 6 66 6 25 6 52 6 27 6 46 6 24 6 31 6 43 5 60 5 14 5 5 41 5 40 5 5 Mean 5 S.D. 5 Mean 5 Mean 5 Sum of Q-sort Weights Scores 47 1/2 5 46 1/2 5 46 5 46 5 46 5 45 1/2 4 45 1/2 4 45 4 45 4 44 1/2 4 44 1/2 4 44 4 44 4 44 4 43 1/2 4 h *0 42 1/2 * T 4 42 4 41 4 39 1/2 3 38 1/2 3 38 3 37 , 3 36 1/2 3 36 3 35 1/2 3 35 3 35 3 34 2 33 2 33 2 31 1 29 1/2 1 - 49.78 = 11.40 + S.D. = 61.18 - S.D. = 37.98 121 TABLE X FACTOR III1 FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS • Item Sum of Q-sort Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score Number Weights Score 70 80 9 5 48 1/2 5 34 74 9 40 47 1/2 5 67 47 1/2 5 64 70 1/2 8 65 46 1/2 5 28 67 1/2 8 3 46 5 63 66 8 43 46 5 42 63 1/2 8 59 45 1/2 4 16 62 1/2 7 35 44 4 37 62 1/2 7 38 44 4 12 62 7 48 44 4 26 62 7 50 44 4 68 6l 7 17 43 1/2 4 9 60 1/2 7 62 43 1/2 4 57 60 7 69 43 1/2 4 51 59 1/2 7 15 42 1/2 4 44 42 1/2 4 39 59 6 61 42 1/2 4 22 58 1/2 6 2 41 1/2 4 32 57 1/2 6 10 57 6 24 41 3 25 57 6 27 41 3 46 57 6 41 41 3 71 56 6 60 41 3 31 55 1/2 6 36 40 1/2 3 33 55 1/2 6 53 40 1/2 3 72 55 1/2 6 14 39 1/2 3 47 54 1/2 6 45 38 1/2 3 4 54 6 49 38 1/2 3 6 54 6 23 37 3 20 54 6 8 35 1/2 2 1 53 5 55 35 1/2 2 13 52 1/2 5 11 35 . 2 58 52 1/2 5 21 31 1/2 2 56 52 5 30 51 5 7 29 , 1 54 51 , 5 66 26 1/2 1 19 50 1/2 5 29 50 1/2 5 Mean = 50.10 52 50 1/2 5 S.D. = 10.75 18 50 5 Mean + S.D. - 60.85 Mean - S.D. * 39 .35 122 TABLE XI FACTOR IV’ FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 28 52 9 54 49 1/2 9 62 47 8 8 46 8 11 45 8 42 45 8 55 45 8 1 44 7 2 44 7 18 44 7 26 44 7 38 43 1/2 7 29 43 7 56 43 7 30 42 1/2 6 35 42 1/2 6 63 42 1/2 6 32 42 6 47 42 6 51 41 1/2 6 65 41 1/2 6 22 41 6 50 41 6 3 40 1/2 6 44 40 1/2 6 53 40 1/2 6 70 40 1/2 6 5 40 6 12 39 1/2 5 69 32 , 5 6 38 1/2 5 15 38 1/2 5 39 38 1/2 5 57 38 1/2 5 7 38 5 25 3§ 5 59 38 5 10 37 1/2 5 Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 9 37 5 23 37 5 48 37 5 71 37 5 67 36 1/2 5 4 36 4 21 36 4 64 36 4 68 36 4 33 35 1/2 4 52 35 1/2 4 34 35 4 37 35 4 20 34 1/2 4 46 34 1/2 4 16 34 4 40 34 4 41 33 1/2 4 17 33 4 60 33 4 14 32 i/2 3 24 32 i/2 3 45 32 i/2 3 31 i/2 3 49 31 1/2 3 58 31 3 72 29 1/2 3 13 29 3 27 28 i/2 2 31 27 1/2 2 61 24 1/2 2 36 23 1 43 23 1 66 22 1 Mean = 37*56 S.D. - 6.28 Mean + S.D. - 43-84 Mean - S.D. = 31*28 123 distribution as closely as possible. Since it also was planned to make a clinical interpretation of each factor, the mean and the standard deviation of the array was calcu lated. By using a cutting-point of plus and minus one stand ard deviation, approximately one-third of the items could be included in the analysis. This fraction, although somewhat arbitrary, is of comparable size to those used in standard item analysis procedures. As a matter of interest, an unweighted array based on the summed scores for all sixteen Q-sorts was prepared and has been presented in Table XII. It was thought that such a "total array" might bear some relationship to the rotated factors and thus lead to simplified statistical procedures. Arrays based on different numbers of sorts. As a check on the arbitrary decision of using the top six sorts for factor-array calculations, two of the factors were re calculated with a different number of sorts. When an array for Factor I1 was calculated from eight sorts rather than six, the two arrays correlated .988. When Factor III' was recalculated from three sorts rather than six, the two ar rays correlated .936. From this experience, it was decided that a uniform number of sorts was not necessary, and that more flexible criteria could be used in the calculation of arrays for the second rotational solution. Second-rotation factor-arrays. From the experience 124 TABLE XII TOTAL-SORTS FACTOR-ARRAY, BASED ON SUMS OF UNWEIGHTED SCORES OF ALL SIXTEEN Q-SORTS Item Sum of Q-sort Item Sum of Q-sort Number Soores Score Number Scores Score 70 127 9 59 80 5 28 120 9 44 78 5 15 75 5 1 113 8 58 75 5 42 105 8 6 74 5 51 101 8 25 74 5 26 100 8 45 74 5 48 74 5 34 98 7 37 96 7 52 73 4 18 94 7 17 71 4 64 94 7 55 71 4 30 92 7 5 70 4 54 92 7 23 70 4 57 92 7 3 70 4 29 92 7 46 70 4 32 92 7 31 70 4 21 69 4 62 91 6 36 68 4 71 91 6 39 67 4 13 91 6 50 67 4 68 89 6 49 67 4 67 89 6 12 88 6 43 66 3 56 87 6 60 66 3 63 87 6 7 65 3 35 86 6 22 64 3 47 86 6 27 64 3 69 86 6 72 64 3 11 84 6 41 63 3 20 84 6 65 84 6 6l 62 2 4 6l 2 53 83 5 24 6l 2 10 82 5 14 58 2 19 82 5 8 81 5 40 53 1 9 81 5 66 46 1 16 81 5 38 81 5 2 80 5 33 80 5 125 of calculating factor-arrays for the first rotation factors, it had been determined that the number of sorts on which to base the array was not important in and of itself. There fore, although thirteen of the sixteen sorts were loaded .40 or better on Factor I", it was decided to set the signifi cance level at .55, a point corresponding to a natural gap in the distribution of loadings. This made seven sorts sig nificant, assuring representativeness without unnecessary computational labor. In Factor II”, a significance level of .30 was used, thus including two positive and four negative loadings in the factor-array. In Factors III” and IV", the significance level had to be lowered to .22 and J.9, respec tively, to make a sufficient number of sorts available. Thus, there was a strong doubt that clear and strong defini tions would be found for these two factors, Factor IV” par ticularly. During the process of making the above decisions, a question that was continually in mind was whether the factor- arrays would draw on the same variables to such an extent that they would be indistinguishable. A review of the dis tribution of sorts that were selected for factor-array con struction showed that no pair of arrays had more than two sorts in common. This much overlap was consistent with the amount of intercorrelation among factors, but it did portend a certain amount of overlap among the factor-arrays. The weights were calculated as before, and in Table I TABLE XIII WEIGHTING OF SCORES FOR FACTOR-ARRAYS OF THE SECOND-ROTATION FACTORS (TABLE VI) Factor Person Loading Approximate Weight I" y • 550 1.0 s .550 1.0 q • 555 1.0 0 .562 1.0 z • 570 1.0 w .587 1.0 k .716 2.0 II"* V -.295 -1.0 k .342 1.0 n -.350 -1.0 X .400 1.5 P .425 1.5 s .540 2.5 III" z -.220 -1.0 1 -.238 -1.0 X .275 1.5 s -.284 -1.5 m .340 1.5 t .526 3.0 IV" 0 -.186 -1.0 n .192 1.0 r .225 1.0 P -.232 -1.5 q .316 2.0 * Signs reversed to maintain the convention of positive manifold. 127 XIII the weights for each person selected from Table VI have been shown. Since the majority of Factor II" loadings turned out to be negative, its poles were relabeled, thus reversing the signs of the loadings and maintaining a posi tive relationship with the other factors. The resulting factor-arrays, then, have been presented in Tables XIV through XVII, including their means, standard deviations, and derived Q-sort scores. II. VERIFICATION OF THE THEORETICALLY DEFINED DIMENSIONS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR This section has examined the outcomes of statisti cal tests on the factor-arrays and has offered tentative in terpretations of these outcomes. Intercorrelations Among the First-Rotation Factor-Arrays Since it was expected that the factors would be in tercorrelated, even after the orthogonal rotations, the product-moment correlation between each pair of first-rota tion factor-arrays was calculated. As a matter of interest, the total array based on unweighted summed scores of all sixteen original Q-sorts was Included in the comparison. The table of correlations for the four factor-arrays and the total array has been presented as Table XVIII. Examination of Table XVIII showed that all factors were correlated positively with one another from low to mod erate degree. The highest correlations were those between 128 TABLE XIV FACTOR I" FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Number Sum of Weights Q-sort Score Item Number Siam of Weights Q-sort Score 1 70 28 42 26 51 32 34 57 13 30 62 19 69 11 47 68 29 35 37 44 45 64 % 38 54 59 8 12 56 65 17 20 33 ?3 63 9 68 68 59 58 54 52 51 51 51 50 50 48 47 47 46 46 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 44 44 44 44 43 43 43 43 40 40 40 40 40 39 9 16 39 5 9 48 39 5 2 38 5 8 15 38 5 8 71 38 5 8 8 23 37 4 43 37 4 7 52 37 4 7 60 37 4 7 10 36 4 7 25 36 4 7 49 36 4 7 50 35 4 7 41 34 4 7 55 34 4 58 34 4 6 3 33 4 6 7 33 4 6 21 33 4 6 61 33 4 6 6 5 32 3 6 27 32 3 6 36 32 3 6 46 32 3 6 31 30 3 6 6 29 3 6 24 28 3 6 39 28 3 6 14 27 2 5 4 22 2 5 22 21 2 5 72 21 2 5 66 5 19 1 5 40 18 1 5 = 39-98 5 Mean 5 S.D. = 10.10 5 Mean + S.D. - 50.08 Mean - S.D. = 29.88 129 TABLE XV FACTOR II" FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Number Sum of Weights Q-sort Score 70 63 1/2 9 28 62 9 26 6l 1/2 8 32 58 8 1 58 8 64 57 8 18 56 7 57 55 , 7 42 54 1/2 7 51 54 1/2 7 34 54 1/2 7 45 52 7 47 50 7 44 50 7 11 50 7 35 49 1/2 6 21 49 1/2 6 68 49 6 38 49 6 2 48 1/2 6 20 47 1/2 6 59 47 6 43 47 6 41 47 6 29 46 1/2 6 16 46 1/2 6 69 45 1/2 6 52 44 6 17 44 6 33 43 1/2 5 46 43 5 19 43 , 5 65 42 1/2 5 31 42 5 24 42 5 71 41 1/2 5 37 41 1/2 5 56 41 5 30 4l 5 Item Number 63 60 50 14 13 55 27 25 8 54 15 10 53 3 48 40 23 12 58 49 62 6l 6 36 5 7 39 72 22 4 66 67 Sum of Weights Q-sort Score 41 40 1/2 40 1/2 40 40 40 39 1/2 39 1/2 39 1/2 39 1/2 39 37 3Z 36 35 1/2 35 35 34 34 33 1/2 33 1/2 33 32 1/2 32 1/2 32 32 / 31 1/2 30 1/2 30 , 29 1/2 27 22 1/2 20 1/2 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 Mean = 42.51 S.D. - 9-20 Mean + S.D. = 51-71 Mean - S.D. ■ 33-31 130 TABLE XVI FACTOR III" FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 22 66 1/2 9 34 66 1/2 9 39 65 8 64 60 1/2 8 9 60 8 70 60 8 12 58 7 46 58 , 7 16 57 1/2 7 72 57 7 63 56 7 4 55 1/2 7 10 55 7 26 55 7 31 54 6 42 54 6 40 53 1/2 6 25 53 , 6 33 52 1/2 6 3 52 6 6 52 6 47 52 6 58 52 6 32 51 1/2 6 54 51 1/2 6 28 51 6 37 51 6 17 50 1/2 5 51 50 1/2 5 68 50 1/2 5 5 50 5 30 48 1/2 5 61 48 1/2 5 71 48 1/2 5 52 47 1/2 5 50 47 5 56 47 5 48 46 5 57 46 5 Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 24 45 1/2 5 27 45 i/2 5 65 45 1/2 5 15 45 5 19 45 5 44 45 5 20 44 1/2 4 35 44 1/2 4 67 44 1/2 4 41 43 1/2 4 13 43 4 14 43 4 29 43 4 43 43 4 59 43 4 49 42 4 60 42 4 45 4l 1/2 4 36 41 4 62 40 1/2 3 1 40 3 38 40 3 55 40 3 53 38 1/2 3 18 37 1/2 3 23 37 1/2 3 2 36 1/2 3 69 36 2 21 35 2 66 33 1/2 2 8 30 1/2 1 11 30 1/2 1 7 27 1 Mean - 47.67 S.D. = 8.65 Mean + S.D. * 56.32 Mean - S.D. = 39.02 131 TABLE XVII FACTOR IV" FACTOR-ARRAY OF WEIGHTED Q-SORT STATEMENTS Item Slim of Q-sort Number Weights Score 13 47 1/2 9 70 43 1/2 9 34 42 8 67 42 8 19 40 8 43 40 8 1 38 1/2 7 36 38 1/2 7 37 38 1/2 7 61 38 1/2 7 12 37 1/2 7 16 37 1/2 7 71 37 1/2 7 31 37 6 68 37 6 72 37 6 66 36 1/2 6 49 36 6 58 36 # 6 20 35 1/2 6 25 35 1/2 6 10 35 6 51 35 , 6 57 34 1/2 6 33 34 6 64 34 6 6 33 1/2 6 63 33 1/2 6 29 33 5 42 33 5 56 33 , 5 7 32 1/2 5 15 32 1/2 5 46 32 1/2 5 32 1/2 5 62 32 1/2 5 4 32 5 23 32 5 48 32 5 Item Sum of Q-sort Number Weights Score 69 32 5 60 31 1/2 5 27 31 5 28 31 5 30 31 5 52 31 5 9 30 1/2 4 17 30 1/2 4 26 30 1/2 4 18 30 4 2 29 1/2 4 24 29 1/2 4 39 29 1/2 4 59 29 1/2 4 5 29 4 32 29 4 47 29 , 4 45 28 1/2 4 8 28 4 40 28 4 14 26 1/2 3 21 26 1/2 3 35 26 1/2 3 41 26 1/2 3 65 26 1/2 3 3 26 3 22 26 3 38 26 3 50 26 3 11 25 1/2 2 54 25 1/2 2 44 24 1 55 21 1 Mean = 32.42 S.D. = 5.19 Mean + S.D. = 37-61 Mean - S.D. = 27-23 132 TABLE XVIII CORRELATIONS FACTOR-ARRAYS AMONG THE FIRST-ROTATION AND THE TOTAL-SORTS ARRAY Factor II' III' IV' Total Array I1 .40 .38 .42 .83 II' .20 .59 .68 III' .14 .57 IV' .59 the rotated factors and the total array. The substantial amount of intercorrelation has suggested that the four fac tors might be viewed as representing somewhat different views of the same general situation. That is, each factor would have a substantial loading on the "general" descrip tion plus a certain amount of specificity. The correlation between two factors would then be a function of their agree ment with the "general" description. The total array would not necessarily correspond to this "general" description, since it is a simple averaging of the several descriptions, and there is no reason to expect that the biases (specifici ties) would cancel themselves out in such a summation. Cor related factors are sometimes operated upon by means of oblique rotations and calculation of second-order factors. Stephenson has not favored either of these procedures, since he has not been interested in discovering unitary factors. Instead, he has postulated various theoretical structures, represented them by factorial designs, and tested the de signs by means of homogeneity of variance and analysis of variance procedures. Homogeneity of Variance of the First-Rotation Factor-Arrays Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance is used to test the hypothesis of common population variance. If such a test of significance indicates that the samples could have been drawn from a population or populations with a com mon variance, then any significant values in an analysis of variance must be attributed to differences between the means of samples. Thus, in the present study, Bartlett's test was used to determine whether the cell variances were excessive ly large. If so, then it would be concluded that the four statements in each cell were not always perceived homogene ously, and that this fact should be borne in mind when in terpreting analysis of variance results. Fortunately, al though a significant difference in variance may result in somewhat larger significance levels in the analysis of vari ance calculations, Edwards (40:165) has deemed it unlikely that significant values will be produced only by a differ ence in variances. Thus, even when some indications of het erogeneity of variance are found, analysis of variance can still proceed with this fact in mind. Edwards' directions for using Bartlett's test (40: 195-199) have been followed in the present study. Thus, the sum of squared deviations for each cell was divided by the number of degrees of freedom (n - 1 = 3) to get the variance for each cell. These results have been tabulated in Table XIX. Under the hypothesis of random sampling from a popula tion with a common variance, these cell variances should not differ any more than would be expected in random sampling from a common population. The test of significance for this hypothesis was made by means of chi square, the number of degrees of freedom being one less than the number of cells, or 17. The chi square formula, after Edwards, is as follows: 135 TABLE XIX BARTLETT'S TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE OF THE FIRST-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS AND THE TOTAL ARRAY FOR EIGHTEEN CELLS WITH FOUR ITEMS IN EACH CELL P-i i _______________________ variance__________ ______Factor I1 II1 III' IV1 Total Array adf 4.67 3.67 4.25 5.67 3.33 adg • 25 .67 *92 2.25 .33 adh 4.25 .25 4.67 .67 2.25 aef 1.58 2.25 *33 1.58 2.92 aeg 1.67 4.00 *92 .67 .67 aeh 4.67 4.25 6.00 4.67 7.00 bdf 1*33 2.92 4.67 4.25 1.58 bdg 2.00 2.67 4.25 *92 2.00 bdh , *92 6.92 3.33 1.58 bef 4.25 5.67 1*33 5.67 4.92 beg .92 .92 3*00 .92 .25 beh 4.67 5.00 6.25 4.92 6.92 cdf .92 7.58 1.58 1.58 1.33 cdg 3*33 .92 3*33 2.25 4.92 cdh .67 • 25 2.25 .67 2.00 cef 3*33 4.92 3*67 1.00 4.92 ceg 1.00 1*33 1.58 .92 • 92 ceh 4.92 4.25 1.58 13.33 4.25 Total 45.35 52.44 57*50 55.27 52.09 "Corrected1 1 Chi Square 13.97 18.73 13.13 19.49 16.99 Signifi cance - .70 -35 *70 .30 .45 Level* * The .05 level of significance for chi square with 17 de grees of freedom equals 27*59* Chi square = where n is the number of items per cell, r is the number of square thus calculated has been found to exaggerate slightly the significance level, the more accurate "corrected" value was found by dividing the above result by the following fac tor: These "corrected" values of chi square and the corresponding significance levels for 17 degrees of freedom have been in cluded in Table XIX. Prom Table XIX, it can be seen that the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance has been upheld, even for the total array. The chi square values are not so high that one would expect complete homogeneity, however, and a quick examina tion of the pattern of cell variances showed that six or seven cells in each factor had variances of 4.00 or more. Thus, it would be expected that some cells would be better defined than others, and this fact should prove of interest to one who would undertake the task of further research in this direction. Analysis of Variance of the First-Rotation Factor-Arrays The present study was based on a 3 x 2 x 3 factorial design. Analysis of variance procedures were used to test 2 cells, and s is the cell variance. Since the value of chi Correction = 1 + 137 the null hypothesis that the several independent samples of the factorial design (i.e., the factor-array Q-sort scores) had been drawn at random from a common normal population. The procedures for applying analysis of variance calcula tions to complex factorial designs have been described by Edwards (40:237-247). The basic data were the Q-sort scores for the factor- arrays. These have been summarized for the first-rotation arrays and the total array in Table XX. They were grouped for convenience in terms of the 18 experimental conditions, four replications to a cell. Summaries of the calculations of the variance analyses on the four first-rotation factor- arrays and the total array have been presented in Tables XXI through XXV. The error or denominator term used in calcu lating F was the within-cell variance estimate. A summary of the F-test significance levels (P) for these five analy ses has been presented in Table XXVI. It may be noted that one significant F appeared in each factor, usually for one of the interaction effects. Where P turned out to be significant at the .05 level or better, the significant source of variation was further analyzed by applying Fisher’s t-formula for the test of dif ference between means of small samples. When two samples are of the same size, the formula is as follows (62:228): 138 TABLE XX SUMMARY OP Q-SORT SCORES FOR FIRST-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS AND TOTAL ARRAY AS PREPARATION FOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE CALCULATIONS Cell Item Factor Total Cell Item Factor Total No. I II III IV No. I II III IV adf 1 9 9 5 7 8 bef 10 4 7 6 5 5 19 6 5 5 3 5 28 8 8 8 9 9 37 5 7 7 4 7 46 4 3 6 4 4 55 4 5 2 8 4 64 7 4 8 4 7 adg 2 6 6 4 7 5 beg 11 7 5 2 8 6 20 6 5 6 4 6 29 7 6 5 7 7 38 6 6 4 7 5 47 6 5 6 6 6 56 5 7 5 6 65 5 5 6 6 adh 3 3 5 5 ( d 4 beh 12 5 ( c 7 5 6 21 6 4 2 4 4 30 6 7 5 6 7 39 3 4 6 5 4 48 4 6 4 5 5 57 7 4 7 5 7.. 66 1 3 1 1 1 aef 2 4 6 4 2 cdf 13 6 7 5 3 6 22 2 4 6 6 3 31 5 3 6 2 4 40 1 1 5 4 1 49 4 4 3 3 4 58 4 4 5 3 5 67 4 9 5 5 6 aeg 5 3 5 5 6 4 cdg 14 3 2 3 3 2 23 4 5 3 5 4 32 7 4 6 6 7 41 5 1 3 4 3 50 4 3 4 6 4 5? 6 5 4 5 . 5 68 6 4 7 4 6 a eh h 3 6 6 5 5 cdh 15 5 6 4 5 5 24 4 3 3 3 2 33 6 5 6 4 5 42 8 6 8 8 8 51 7 6 7 6 8 60 5 2 3 4 3 69 6 6 4 5 6 bdf 7 3 6 1 5 3 cef 16 6 4 7 4 5 25 5 3 6 5 5 34 8 6 9 4 7 43 5 2 5 1 3 52 5 3 5 4 4 61 3 4 4 2 2 70 9 8 9 6 9 bdg 8 5 6 2 8 5 ceg 17 5 5 4 4 4 26 8 6 7 7 8 35 7 5 4 6 6 44 6 4 4 6 5 53 5 7 3 6 5 62 5 8 4 8 6 71 5 7 6 5 6 bdh 9 5 5 7 5 5 ceh 18 7 5 5 7 7 27 4 3 3 2 3 3 5 3 1 4 45 6 4 3 3 5 54 5 8 5 9 7 63 4 5 8 6 6 72 2 3 6 3 3 139 TABLE XXI ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY I* Source of Variation Sum of Squares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 6.58 2 3.29 1.31 ns Main effect: B 1.89 1 1.89 ns Main effect: C 7.08 2 3.54 1.41 ns Interaction: AB 14.86 2 7.43 2.95 ns Interaction: AC 12.86 4 3 • 22 1.28 ns Interaction: BC 1.69 2 .85 ns Interaction: ABC 37-04 4 9.26 3.67 .01 Within cells 136.00 54 2.52 Total 218.00 71 140 TABLE XXII ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY II* Source of Variation Sum of Sauares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 3.46 2 1.73 ns Main effect: B .14 1 .14 ns Main effect: C 1.04 2 CM in ns Interaction: AB 25.32 2 12.66 4.52 .05 Interaction: AC 12.63 4 3.16 1.13 ns Interaction: BC 3.07 2 1.54 ns Interaction: ABC 26.09 4 6.52 2.33 ns Within cells 151.25 54 2.80 Total 223.00 71 141 TABLE XXIII ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY III1 Source of Sum of _ Mean Variation_______Squares * Square Main effect: A 2.92 2 1.46 ns Main effect: B 2.78 1 2.78 ns Main effect: C 16.50 2 8.25 2.59 ns Interaction: AB 2.13 2 1.07 ns Interaction: AC 2.08 4 • 52 ns Interaction: BC 28.39 2 14.20 4.45 .05 Interaction: ABC 6.70 4 1.68 ns Within cells 172.5Q 54 3.19 Total 234.00 71 142 TABLE XXIV ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY IV1 Source of Variation Sum of Sauares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 4.71 2 2.36 ns Main effect: B .36 1 .36 ns Main effect: C 29.79 2 14.90 4.86 • 05 Interaction: AB 8.51 2 4.26 1.39 ns Interaction: AC 20.13 4 5.03 1.64 ns Interaction: BC 4.10 2 2.05 ns Interaction: ABC 7.65 4 1.91 ns Within cells 165.75. Sit 3.07 Total 241.00 71 143 TABLE XXV ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR THE TOTAL-SORTS FACTOR-ARRAY Source of Variation Sum Of Sauares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 9.03 2 4.52 1.56 ns Main effect: B .12 1 C V l r - l • ns Main effect: C 1.86 2 •93 ns Interaction: AB 24.25 2 12.13 4.20 .05 Interaction: AC IO.89 4 2.72 ns Interaction: BC 1.59 2 .80 ns Interaction: ABC 22.66 4 5.67 1.96 ns Within cells 54 2.89 Total 226.65 71 144 TABLE XXVI SUMMARY OP F-TEST OUTCOMES FOR FIRST-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS AND TOTAL ARRAY Source of Variation I' Factor II' III1 IV' Total Array Main effect: A ns ns ns ns ns Main effect: B ns ns ns ns ns Main effect: C ns ns ns .05 ns Interaction: AB ns .05 ns ns .05 Interaction: AC ns ns ns ns ns Interaction: BC ns ns .05 ns ns Interaction: ABC .01 ns ns ns ns 145 M2 - Mg t & 12 + & 22 rnTTn'-T).. 2 For computational purposes, t was first calculated from the following equivalent formula: As a result of these calculations, the following significant differences (.05 or better) between cell means were found. The terms have been ranked in order of increasing signifi cance of relationship. Factor I1 aef < cdg, bef, adf, cdf, bdh, bdg, ceg, cef, adg, cdh, beg bdf < adg, cef, cdh, beg Factor II1 ae < ce, be, ad Factor III1 ef > dh, eh, dg, df, eg Factor IV1 g > h, f Total Array ae < cd, ad, ce, be In terms of the factorial design, then, Factor I1 had two triple interactions, aef and bdf. which were significantly t 2 (n)®cf +Sc22) - (E^ ) 2 - ®C2 )2 (n - l)(2)Ci ~ 15^2) 146 small; Factor II1 had the double Interaction ae significant ly small; Factor III1 had the double interaction ef signifi cantly large; Factor IV' had the main effect g significantly large; and the total array had the double interaction ae significantly small. The total array was seen to be most similar to Factor II'. A discussion of these results has been presented in the following sections. Interpretation of First-Rotation Factors in Terms of the Factorial Design Since for each first-rotation factor the F tests re sulted in the rejection of the hypothesis of random sampling from a common population in at least one of the sources of variation, and since the chi square tests as applied to the same data indicated that it was not the variances which dif fered significantly, there was every reason to believe that the significance of the values of F was the result of dif ferences in the means of cells. Thus, the first hypothesis of the study was judged to have been verified. That is, group members who had no prior knowledge of the theoretical framework of the Q-instrument had given a set of Q-sort de scriptions of their group, and statistical analysis of these descriptions had shown that the members were sensitive to some of the predicated effects. The following interpretations were based only upon those cells which were successfully distinguished from the others and which were significantly descriptive of the group. 147 The value of the study does not rest on these interpreta tions, however, since the factor arrays are experimental facts and remain so regardless of the direction or outcome of any interpretation upon them. Factor I1. The appearance of significance at the level of the whole situation--the triple interactions— would seem to lend support to the field-theoretical assumption that perception of psychological events is a function of the mutual relations among the totality of coexisting facts in a situation. Thus the factor-array of statements for Factor V gives support to those who would describe psychological events in terms of units of interdependent relationships. Such units are a continuum away from the atomistic abstrac tions defended as "primary" units by some theorists. Specifically, for Factor I' the units aef and bdf have been shown to be significantly "uncharacteristic" of the experimental situation— which in this case was a specif ic group experience. In identifying these significant units, it was shown not only that the cell statements "hung togeth er," but that a substantial number of group members agreed that certain cells were apt descriptions of what did or did not happen in the group situation. In terms of the factorial design of the present study, the cell aef was composed of three elements: "friendly" in dividual behavior, "non-supportive" group climate, and "group-oriented" goal attainment. The archetype of these / 148 cell statements was of the form, "When a friendly member is not supported, group goals are attained." The actual cell statements, with their weighted Q-sort scores, are as fol lows : Item 40, Score 1: "In order to sustain the group's effort, frequent expressions of good humor are opposed." Item 4, Score 2: "The group is more effective when the amiable member is suppressed." Item 22, Score 2: "When demonstrations of good fel lowship are restricted, the work of the group improves." Item 5Q, Score 4: "The group discourages the display of benevolence so that it can pro gress faster." Since the above statements were judged to be "not character istic," it would seem that they could be summarized in some such sentence as this: Summary, aef: "The effectiveness of our group did not depend on the suppression of good humor and amiability. It might be noted that Item 58 deviated furthest from the cell mean. The deviation apparently was due to the phrase "display of benevolence" which was not seen as completely equivalent to the other "friendly" behaviors. The factorial design of the other significant cell, bdf. contained these elements: "aggressive" individual be havior, "supportive" group climate, and "group-oriented" goal attainment. The model statement took the form, "When 149 an aggressive member is supported, group goals are attained." The actual cell statements are as follows: Item J, Score 3: "General acceptance of the domi neering member eventually makes for a more attractive group." Item 6l, Score 3: "When a member who is always 'playing the same worn-out record1 is met with kindness, he becomes a more active part of the group." Item 25, Score 5: "The egoistic member is helped to become a co-worker through the group1s attentive interest." Item 43, Score 5: "A friendly response to the angry member restores harmony." These "uncharacteristic" statements might be summarized as follows: Summary, bdf: "Our group did not attempt to achieve harmony by giving in to the control ling member." The difference of significance between the first two items and the second two was possibly due to the difference be tween "domination" on one hand, and "anger" and "egoism" on the other. That is, there may have been less acceptance of attempts to control the group than there was of expressions of hostility or selfishness. This interpretation is con sistent with the group-development philosophy which encour ages expression of personal feeling and development of "group-centered" leadership rather than imposing impersonal autocratic controls. It seems to imply, moreover, that to 150 some extent "dominating" behaviors are perceived discrimi- natively from "hostile" or "egoistic" ones, and that it may not be desirable to subsume both under the concept of "ag gression." This sort of implication, of course, is one of the desirable outcomes of the present type of research, since it tends to bring the processes of conceptualization and experimentation closer together. Examination of the cells at the "characteristic" end of Factor I1 was undertaken next. Four cells were seen to be significantly larger than both aef and bdf. The cells were analyzed in a manner similar to that described in de tail above. Only the summary statements have been reported, however, as follows: Summary, beg: "Some members received personal need satisfaction from attacking or oppos ing the rest of the group. Summary, adg: "Some members met their personal needs by keeping things on the level of con geniality." Summary, cdh: "Withdrawn individuals were threatened by a warmly supportive group." Summary, cef: "In spite of the threat involved, and because of the need for group achieve ment, individual passivity was not permitted." Since the two ends of the factor appeared to be com plementary, an attempt was made to integrate them. Thus, a summary statement of the group description provided by Fac tor I1 might take this form: 151 Summary, Factor I1: "Members' expressions of feel ing, whether friendly or hostile were matched by the group (adg, beg,-aef,-bdf), and passivity was discouraged (cef,cdh)." This formulation bears some resemblance to the con cepts of Bion (4), who assumed that groups can meet for the emotional purposes of "pairing," "fight," "flight," or "de pendency," and that task performance is accomplished by us ing the emotions associated with one modality to suppress and control the emotions associated with the others. In the present instance, one could say that emotions associated with "friendship" and "aggression" have been used to sup press and control those associated with losing the protec tion of "avoidance" behavior. Factor I' may also have some similarity to two fac tors reported by Borgatta and Cottrell (11) who used Bales' system of "interaction process analysis" plus sociometric and personal data. Their Factor II was labeled Involvement Activity (expressiveness, security), and their Factor V was called Discussional Involvement (verbal dissipation of ten sion). Cattell (25) has reported factors with such labels as Horde Urgency and Frustrating Temperamental Heterogeneity which may have similarities to the present factor. Carter (15) on the other hand has argued for only three basic di mensions: Individual Prominence (personal goals), Group Goal Facilitation, and Sociability. The present factor has elements of all three of these dimensions, suggesting an 152 even more molar approach than Carter's. To conclude the analysis, Factor I1 was given an identifying name, derived from the elements of tension arous al and reduction which appeared so frequently, as follows: Name, Factor I1: "Tension Control as a Means of Mem ber Involvement and Group Goal Fa cilitation." Factor II1. The significant effect in this factor was the "uncharacteristicness" of the double interaction ae as compared to the "characteristic" effects ce, be, and ad. An immediate resemblance to Factor I' can be seen when one notes that in the first significant triple interaction of Factor I1, aef bore a similar relationship to cef. ceg. bef. beg, adf. and adg. Thus the major change that Factor II' seemed to bring was a dropping off of the "goal attainment" elements: f and g. It might be argued then that Factor II» was merely a partial representation of Factor I'. That is, the perceptions of Factor I' people might operate in a com plex and all-inclusive manner, while Factor II' people might perceive and distinguish among some of the same elements but not all of them. Thus, Factor II1 people might be thought of as less alert to the goal attainment features of a group situation than the more "sophisticated" Factor I' members. With these observations in mind, a closer look was taken of the Factor II1 statements. Twelve statements were Involved in each double 153 Interaction, but only the most significant ones were ex amined in detail. For each such item, the ae elements of "friendly" behavior and "non-supportive" group response have been extracted as follows: Item 40, Score 1: "... frequent expressions of good humor are opposed." Item 4l, Score 1: "The member who affirms his Chris tian charity when the group is hostile . . ." Item 60, Score 2: "When a member gets his head snapped off Just for being under standing . . ." Item 24, Score 3: "The group's failure to appreciate gestures of hospitality ..." Since these items were judged to be "uncharacteristic," a summary statement might take this form: Summary, ae: "Gestures of friendship were not re buffed." Two items of the twelve which had been classified ae in the factorial design did not turn up at the "uncharacteristic" end of this factor: Item 42, Score 6: "It is threatening to have one's overtures rejected by the others." Item 6, Score 6: "A member is disappointed when his expressions of sympathy are not reciprocated." The question might be asked: "Why were these items reacted to in a different manner?" Although this interesting 154 question was outside the scope of the present study, one might speculate that the poignancy of the phrasing caused a personal reaction in members which overrode the effort of describing the group situation. Examination of the "characteristic" end of Factor II' led to the following summary statements: Summary, ad: "Mutual efforts to be liked and accepted were made." Summary, bd: "Mutual disagreement and argument ex isted." Summary, ce: "There was pressure against formality and passivity." As was Factor I1, Factor II' was identified as a uni polar factor. It was similar to Factor I' in its interper sonal emotional elements, but it lacked the element of goal facilitation. Thus, Factor II1 was summarized as follows: Summary, Factor II': "Friendly behavior was encour aged (ad,-ae), while aggression and passivity were opposed (be, ce). Since individual prominence was not permitted, Factor II' was seen to correspond to Carter's dimension of Socia bility and was so named: Name, Factor II': "Sociability." Factor III1. For this factor the double interaction ef was significantly greater than effects dh, eh, dg, df, 155 and eg, in increasing order of significance. In the factor ial design, effect ef was classified as "non-supportive" group behavior and "group-oriented" goal attainment. The statements of greatest significance among the twelve items comprising effect ef were as follows: Item 70, Score 9: Item Score 9: Item 64, Score 8: Item 28, Score 8: Item 16, Score 7: "When the group forces itself to get below the polite surface, it releases the creative energies of its members." "A group that demands participa tion from the reluctant member in creases its problem-solving capa city." "Through group pressure, the ag gressive member learns to cooper ate ." "Members seem to need to bang heads together before constructive work can take place." "Criticism of the undemonstrative member leads to group growth." Since all of the other items had scores of 5 or 6, indicating that the effect was quite homogeneous, no analy sis of divergent items was necessary. The summary statement was as follows: Summary, ef: "Through forced participation, the en ergies of the aggressive and passive members were released for group pur poses." The finding that the group pressure was exerted al most exclusively against the aggressive and passive members 156 made this factor consistent with Factors I1 and II1, where it was found that good humor and amiability were not sup pressed. Examination of the "uncharacteristic" end of Factor III1 led to the following summary statements: Summary, eg: "Resisting the group did not lead to personal satisfaction." Summary, df: "An accepting group attitude did not produce a more attractive group." Summary, dg: "An accepting group attitude did not meet members1 personal needs." Summary, eh: "Conflict did not lead to group fail ure ." Summary, dh: "A friendly group climate did not cause dissatisfaction." Although slightly different emphases were put at either end of this factor, a summary description could still be made as follows: Summary, Factor III1: "Forced participation of mem bers led to group growth (ef, -df), but did not result in the meeting of personal needs (-eg,-dg) or in group disrup tion (-eh,-dh). Factor III', then, emphasized the forced involvement of members for purposes of group goal attainment and denied personal need satisfaction. It was named as follows: Name, Factor III1 : "Forced Participation as a Means of Group Growth." 157 Factor IV1. This factor was the only one in which interactions were not involved. It was the last one to be extracted in the centroid process and had the smallest set of loadings. In the factorial design, the significant ef fect, g, was classified as "self-oriented goals." It was significantly larger than both h and f. The g elements from the most significant of the 24 items were extracted as fol lows : Item 11, Score 8: "... eagerly attacks the group • * • Item 62, Score 8: "... eager to get something off his chest ..." Item 8, Score 8: "... the group . . . meets his needs at the expense of its own." Item 26, Score 7: "... expresses unpopular and even antisocial opinions." Item 38, Score 7: "... builds his own status . . Item 2, Score 7: "... satisfying a personal need to be liked." Item 56, Score 7: "... seems to have a compelling desire for 'belonging'." Item 29, Score 7: ". . .a member asserts his inde pendence." In most researches, evidence for the existence of a concept like "Intrapersonal need satisfaction" would proba bly be welcomed. In the present instance, however, it was the weakest factor and seemed to verify only what other fac tors had already indicated, that members were involving themselves emotionally in a group experience. The factor 153 was therefore merely identified by its factorial design des ignation: Name, Factor IV': "Self-Oriented Goal Attainment." Total array. The total array was not most similar to Factor I', as might have been expected, but to Factor II*. No explanation could be given for this result, and it was concluded that the total array was an accidental consequence of the summation of scores and could not be assumed to cor respond to the factorial design in anything other than an arbitrary manner. Thus, although it was much simpler to make the calculations for the total array than for the fac tor analysis, the simplification did not turn out to lead to any meaningful outcome, at least in the present instance. Summary of first-rotation factor interpretations. Although the names given to the factors represented a great simplification of the factor arrays, they were useful as a means of getting an over-all view of the result of the first rotation of the centroid factors. Together, they gave the following picture: Factor I': "Tension Control as a Means of Member Involvement and Group Goal Facilita tion." Factor II': "Sociability." Factor III': "Forced Participation as a Means of Group Growth." Factor IV1: "Self-Oriented Goal Attainment." 159 The general impression, mentioned previously, was that Factor I1 was the key factor, encompassing the descrip tion of the total situation, and that Factors II1, III1, and IV' represented either (l) sub-groups of members who per ceived only a limited segment of the group experience, (2) statistical separations of the general description into rel atively homogeneous partial descriptions, or (3) a combina tion of the above two possibilities. Under this last possi bility, factors might be formed when the descriptions of members with a limited perception of the experimental event (the group experience) were combined statistically with the partial descriptions of members who also perceived the event in its entirety. It was interesting to note that the fac tors that were extracted earlier and had the higher loadings were the ones with the greater degree of significance vari ance in the higher interactions; that is, Factor I1 was com posed of triple interactions, Factors II1 and III' of double interactions, and Factor IV* of a single main effect. In the next section, the second-rotation factors have been analyzed, and the two analyses have been compared. Intercorrelations Among the Second-Rotation Factor-Arrays The table of correlations for the four second-rota tion factor-arrays and the total array has been presented in Table XXVII. In so far as a comparison with the first-rota tion intercorrelations (Table XVIII) has any significance, it was noted that Factor I" had relatively higher TABLE XXVII CORRELATIONS AMONG THE SECOND-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS AND THE TOTAL-SORTS ARRAY Factor II1 1 III1 1 IV" Array I" .70 -.04 .19 • 90 II" .04 -.05 .63 III" .22 .15 IV" .20 161 correlations with Factor II" and with the total array. Also in relation to the corresponding first-rotation factors, Factors III" and IV" were seen to be considerably more inde pendent of the other factors. In view of the fact that the graphical representation of Factor I" with Factor II" had been quite similar in its visual outlines to that of Factor I" with Factor III", It had been expected that Factor I" would correlate about the same with Factors II" and III". Such was definitely not the case, but no explanation could be given for this result. i Homogeneity of Variance of the Second-Rotation Factor-Arrays Bartlett's test of homogeneity was again used to test the hypothesis of common population variance. The results have been tabulated in Table XXVIII. Again, the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance was upheld for all factors al though a few cells obviously had excessive values. Analysis of Variance of the Second-Rotation Factor-Arrays The Q-sort scores for the second-rotation factor- arrays have been grouped and summarized in Table XXIX. Out comes of the subsequent analyses of variance have been pre sented in Tables XXX through XXXIII, followed by a summary of the F-test significances in Table XXXIV. An explanation of the F-test results for Factor III" has been given in a later section. Fisher's t-test showed the significant variance to be 162 TABLE XXVIII BARTLETT'S TEST OP HOMOGENEITY OP VARIANCE OP THE SECOND-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS FOR EIGHTEEN CELLS WITH POUR ITEMS IN EACH CELL Variance Factor I" II" III” IV" adf 4.33 3.00 2.25 10.75 adg .25 .25 9.92 1.67 adh 3.00 4.92 6.25 2.00 aef 1.58 .92 3.00 1.67 aeg 1.58 2.25 .67 •67 aeh 5.67 2.67 • 92 .67 bdf 0.00 2.00 4.67 I.67 bdg 1.67 5.67 6.67 3.00 bdh 1.58 1.58 3.33 • 92 bef 4.92 5.67 .67 .33 beg .25 • 92 4.67 1.67 beh 6.33 3.00 4.25 • 92 cdf 3.33 3.67 1.00 2.25 cdg 4.92 2.00 .67 2.00 cdh 2.25 1.67 3.00 •33 cef 4.92 2.00 2.67 2.67 ceg .25 .92 • 92 2.67 ceh 4.25 4.67 3. 33 4.92 Total 51.08 47.78 40.78 ’ 'Corrected1 ' Chi Square Signifi cance Level 17.90 .40 11.44 .80 15-42 • 55 17.81 .40 163 TABLE XXIX SUMMARY OF Q-SORT SCORES FOR SECOND-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS AS PREPARATION FOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE CALCULATIONS Cell Item Factor Cell Item Factor Number I II III IV Number I II III IV adf 1 9 8 3 7 bef 10 4 4 7 6 19 7 5 5 8 28 8 9 6 5 37 6 5 6 7 46 3 5 7 5 55_ 4 4 3 1 64 6 8 8 6 adg 2 5 6 3 4 beg 11 6 7 1 2 20 5 6 4 6 29 6 6 4 5 38 6 6 3 3 47 6 7 6 4 56 5 5 5 65 5 5 5 3 adh 3 4 4 I 3 beh 12 5 4 7 7 21 4 6 2 3 30 7 5 5 5 39 3 2 8 4 48 5 4 5 5 57 7 7 5 6 66 1 1 2 6 aef 4 2 2 7 5 cdf 13 7 5 4 9 22 2 2 9 3 31 3 5 6 6 40 1 4 6 4 49 4 3 4 6 58 4 3 6 6 67 6 1 4 8 aeg 5 3 3 5 4 cdg 14 2 5 4 3 23 4 4 3 5 32 7 8 6 4 41 4 6 4 3 50 4 5 5 3 59 6 6 4 4 68 6 6 5 6 aeh 6 3 3 6 6 cdh 15 5 4 5 5 24 3 5 5 4 33 5 5 6 6 42 8 7 6 5 51 8 7 5 6 6o 4 5 4 5 69 7 6 2 5 bdf 7 4 3 1 5 cef 16 5 6 7 7 25 4 4 6 6 34 7 7 9 8 43 4 6 4 8 52 4 6 5 5 61 4 3 5 7 70_ 9 9 8 ? bdg 8 5 4 1 4 ceg 17 5 6 5 4 26 8 8 7 4 35 6 6 4 3 44 6 7 5 1 53 5 4 3 5 62 7 3 3 • p 71, 5 5 5 7 bdh 9 5 5 8 4 ceh 18 6 7 3 4 27 3 4 5 5 36 3 3 4 7 45 6 7 4 4 54 6 4 6 2 63 5 5 7 6 72 2 2 7 6 164 TABLE XXX ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF FOR FACTOR- THE FACTORIAL -ARRAY I" DESIGN Source of Variation Sum of Sauares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 7.46 2 3-73 1.31 ns Main effect: B 6.14 1 6.14 2.16 ns Main effect: C 3.46 2 1.73 ns Interaction: AB 12.32 2 6.16 2.17 ns Interaction: AC 10.71 4 2.68 ns Interaction: BC • 32 2 .16 ns Interaction: ABC 35-34 4 8.84 3.11 .05 Within cells 151-25. 54 2.84 Total 229-00 71 165 TABLE XXXI ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY II" Source of Variation Sum of Sauares DF Mean Sauare F P Main effect: A 3.08 2 1.54 ns Main effect: B .12 1 .12 ns Main effect: C 11.08 2 5.54 2.09 ns Interaction: AB 10.59 2 5.30 2.00 ns Interaction: AC 6.34 4 1.59 ns Interaction: BC 13.59 2 6.80 2.57 ns Interaction: ABC 42.82 4 10.71 4.04 .01 Within cells 142..25 54 2.65 Total 230.87 71 166 TABLE XXXII ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY III" sssssssasaB assB sssB ssassB SB S SH B sB S SB SsaagE aB aeaaesaseaE S S& anssE S Source of Sum of Dp Mean Variation_______Squares Square Main effect: A .38 2 .19 ns Main effect: B 11.69 1 11.69 4.28 .05 Main effect: C 27.71 2 13.86 5.08 .01 Interaction: AB • 51 2 VO C V I • ns Interaction: AC 4.54 4 1.14 ns Interaction: BC 37-02 2 18.51 6.78 .01 Interaction: ABC 3.90 4 .98 ns Within cells 147.25 £4 2.73 Total 233.00 71 167 TABLE XXXIII ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OP THE FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR FACTOR-ARRAY IV" Source of Variation Sum of Sauares DF Mean Square F P Main effect: A 11.58 2 5.79 2.56 ns Main effect: B .12 1 .12 ns Main effect: C 52.33 2 26.17 11.58 .01 Interaction: AB ro VI 2 .13 ns Interaction: AC 12.84 4 3.21 1.42 ns Interaction: BC 4.34 2 2.17 ns Interaction: ABC 7.16 4 1.79 ns Within cells 122.25 5H 2.26 Total 210.87 71 168 TABLE XXXIV SUMMARY OP P-TEST OUTCOMES FOR SECOND-ROTATION FACTOR-ARRAYS Source of Factor Variation I" II" III" - -jyTT Main effect: A ns ns ns ns Main effect: B ns ns • 05 ns Main effect: C ns ns .01 .01 Interaction: AB ns ns ns ns Interaction: AC ns ns ns ns Interaction: BC ns ns .01 ns Interaction: ABC .05 .01 ns ns 169 located in the following cells of the factorial design, ranked in order of increasing significance of relationship: Factor I" aef K cdf, bdf, bdh, cef, adf, cdh, ceg, adg, bdg, beg bdf < cdh, bdg, ceg, beg aeg < bdg Factor II" cef 7 cdf, bdf, beh, aef beg > cdf, bdf, beh, aef adg y beh, aef aef < adf, bef, bdh, cdh, ceg, cdg, cef, beg, adg Factor III" d < e g < h, f ef y dh, eh, dg, df, eg Factor IV" f > h >g In terms of the factorial design, then, Factor I" had the three triple interactions aef, bdf, and aeg significantly small; for Factor II", cef. beg, and adg were significantly small and aef was significantly large; for Factor III", double Interaction ef was significantly large and main ef fects d and g were significantly small; and for Factor IV", main effect f was significantly large and g significantly small. 170 Interpretation of Second-Rotation Factors in Terms of the Factorial Design Since the F test was significant for all four factors in one or more of the sources of variation, and the chi square test indicated that it was not the cell variances that differed significantly, it was concluded that the val ues of F were due to differences in cell means, thus vali dating the factorial design in at least some of its effects. The following interpretations, then, were based on the sig nificant differences between cell means as shown by Fisher’s t-test. Factor I". Little difference could be found between this factor and Factor I1 as far as the factorial design was concerned. Thus, it appeared that the group members were in considerable agreement in their description of the group situation, and that this agreement tended to show up as a compelling primary factor no matter what rotational cues were utilized; for that matter, the factor would have ap peared without rotation. Therefore, no attempt was made to give Factor I" an independent summary or name. Factor II". Since this factor correlated fairly strongly with Factor I” (r =* .70), it was not surprising that the rank orders of the cells were similar. Thus, seven of the cells that were significantly larger than cell aef in Factor 11" had already appeared in this relationship to aef 171 in Factor I". The main difference in the other signifi cances was that the "uncharacteristic" cells were emphasized in Factor I" (as in Factor I')j while the "characteristic" cells received the highest significances in Factor II". Be cause there were some differences, summary statements for the "characteristic" cells of Factor II" were prepared as follows: Summary, cef: "When the passive member is prodded, he contributes to group goals." Summary, beg: "Some members received personal need satisfaction from attacking or oppos ing the rest of the group. Summary, adg: "Some members met their personal needs by keeping things on the level of congeniality." Summary statements for the "uncharacteristic" state ments were as follows: Summary, aef: Summary, beh: Summary, bdf: Summary, cdf: "The effectiveness of the group did not depend on the suppression of good humor and amiability. "Conflict between the group and the selfish member did not lead to group dissolution." "Acceptance of the selfish member did not lead to group progress." "Acceptance of the isolate did not help him to participate constructive ly.1' A summary statement which included both ends of Fac tor II" was constructed as follows: 172 Summary, Factor II": "Group goalB were advanced and some personal needs were met when the passive member was prodded (cef, -cdf), the ag gressive member opposed (beg, -beh,-bdf), and the friendly member supported (adg,-aef)." This summary, in terms of the factorial design, was not significantly different from that of Factor I1 and Fac tor I". Therefore, it was not given an Independent name. Factor III”. In spite of the appearance of signifi cance at three places rather than one, Factor III" turned out to be quite similar to Factor III1. Thus, the addition of the significantly large main effects e and f merely seemed to operate as a duplication of the significantly large double-interaction ef. A minor variation resulted from the addition of the significantly large elements of main effect h, as follows: Item 9> Score 8: Item 39, Score 8: Item 12, Score 7: Item 72, Score 7: The flavor of personal discomfort and tendency toward flight found in this effect was in direct opposition to that found in Factor III'. Thus, it was as if Factor III people were of two types, agreeing on the matter of "forced ... neither valuable . . . nor comfortable ..." ". . . loss of independence and personal identity." ". . . loses interest in the group." ". . . thinks of quitting." 173 participation" and "denial of personal needs," but disagree ing on whether the resulting anxiety made for group cohesion or group disruption. Factor III", therefore, was summarized as follows: Summary, Factor III": "Forced participation of mem bers and denial of personal need satisfaction led to group goals, but threatened group membership." Factor IV". The main difference between this factor and its comparable first-rotation factor was the reversal of direction of "characteristicness" for the levels of main ef fect C. Thus, where Factor IV1 had had level g significant ly large or "characteristic," Factor IV" had g significantly small or "uncharacteristic." It was first thought that this result might be a statistical artifact and the data were re examined. However, it was found (Table XIII) that the num ber of positive loadings on Factor IV" had a clear preponder ance over the negative loadings. It was also noted that Factor IV" correlated positively or insignificantly with the other factors including the total array. Thus, it was con cluded that the direction of "characteristicness" for Fac tor IV" was as it should have been, and the factor was named after its factorial design label, thusly: Name, Factor IV": "Group-Oriented Goals as Opposed to Self-Oriented Goals." Methodological considerations. The question that 174 arose from the above discussion had to do with the validity of the direction of "characteristicness" for Factor IV1 (i. e., g > h,f). If the poles of the axis had not been arbi trarily reversed, the weights would have remained mostly negative and the factor array would have been turned upside down from its present form. This would have put the order of levels for main effect C in agreement with those found for Factor IV", but it would also have created negative cor relations between Factor IV1 and the other first-rotation factors, thus contradicting an apparently obvious positive Interrelationship among them. Thus, although it was diffi cult to understand why Factor IV1 and Factor IV" should stand in this obverse relationship to each other, it was equally difficult to justify procedures which would bring them into harmony with one another. Intuitively, one might suspect that there was something implicitly wrong with Ste phenson's "reversal" technique, or that possibly it should not be applied under one or another of the conditions which existed in the present study. Since no recommendations in regard to this point could be found in the literature, how ever, it was left as an unanswered methodological question. Summary of interpretations. In spite of what were thought to be independent rotational procedures, the second- rotation solution was found to produce factors that were hardly distinguishable from the first-rotation factors. Thus, Factor II" was found to be too highly correlated with 175 Factor I" to be considered an independent factor. Factor III" was quite similar to Factor III1, and Factor IV" was at most merely the reverse of Factor IV'. The first-rotation solution, then, based on principles of simple structure and positive manifold, was just as effective in producing fac tors which were meaningful in terms of the factorial design as the second-rotation solution based on "dependency" clues. In fact, the simple-structure solution produced one factor, Factor II', which was not found in the "dependency" solution. It was somewhat surprising to find how similar were the fac torial results, and it was concluded that a substantial amount of variance could be explained by the use of the the oretically defined effects of the factorial design. II. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER GROUP DIMENSIONS Clinical Interpretation of Factors Although the factorial design was shown to be a use ful way of identifying the variance contained in the various factors, the present study also examined the various factor- arrays without reference to the factorial design. The fol lowing sections have reported the results of the clinical examination of the first-rotation factors. Factor I1. All of the items which fell more than one standard deviation from the mean of the factor array (Table VTII) were listed. Then summaries of the "characteristic" end and the "uncharacteristic" end of the array were made 176 separately and without regard for the factorial design des ignation of the items. The following items were judged most "characteristic" in Factor I1: 70: "When the group forces itself to get below the polite surface, it releases the creative ener gies of its members." Morale is improved by the spontaneous expres sions of feeling toward one another." "Members seem to need to bang heads together be fore constructive work can take place. "The group listens to the member who expresses unpopular and even antisocial opinions. "A group that demands participation from the re luctant member Increases its problem-solving capacity." 42: "It is threatening to have one’s overtures re jected by the others." 51: Because of the human intimacy involved, enter ing a friendly group is a precarious proposition for the over-controlled member." 32: "Protecting the member who won't get emotionally involved adds nothing to the performance of the 28 26 34 ii group. 18: "The group becomes less attractive for members who are rejected because they do not partici pate ." 35: "A member maintains his emotional distance by ignoring the antagonism of the group." 57: "Even with reassurance, it is threatening to give what is distinctly one's own." An interpretive summary was then made of the above items as follows: "To achieve group goals, interaction at the feeling level was not only encouraged (1,26,32) but demanded of members (70,28,34), even though this aroused resistance in the reserved member (18,35) and increased the level of anxiety (42,51*57)•" The items comprising the "uncharacteristic" end of Factor I1 were listed beginning with the most "uncharacter istic" item: 177 40: "In order to sustain the group's effort, fre quent expressions of good humor are opposed." 66: When conflicts occur, members quit trying." 4: "The group is more effective when the amiable member is suppressed." 22: "When demonstrations of good fellowship are re stricted, the work of the group improves." 72: "if the group shows him some definite drawbacks to detachment, the passive member thinks of quitting." 39: In sharing one's inner feelings, there is some loss of independence and personal identity." 7: "General acceptance of the domineering member eventually makes for a more attractive group." 14: "The solitary member is neither criticized nor integrated into the group." 6: "A member is disappointed when his expressions of sympathy are not reciprocated." 5: "When the resentment of the group is turned on the understanding member, he proclaims his hu mility." 61: "When the member who is always 'playing the same worn-out record' is met with kindness, he be comes a more active part of the group." 36: "Attacking the non-committal member is useless." The above items were first summarized as negative statements, then in terms of their positive implications, as follows: "It was not characteristic of the group that positive feeling was opposed for the sake of group effectiveness (40,4,22), nor that sympathy and understanding was re sented or ignored (5,60). Sharing of feelings did not result in a sense of personal loss (39)* Since criti cism of aggressive and detached members did not cause them to retreat from the group (66,72,36), acceptance of these behaviors for the good of the group was not prac ticed (7,14,61). "Stated in positive terms, the group appeared to gain the most when it encouraged the expression of positive feeling, met the challenge of aggression, and attacked detachment." When these summaries were compared with those done in 178 terms of the factorial design, they were seen to be quite similar. Although the clinical summaries were more detailed and somewhat richer, it appeared that the Factor I' name could be applied without violence. Thus, it would seem that either a clinical or a factorial design analysis could be used, depending on the preference of the investigator or the purpose of the investigation, and that the two analyses would be roughly comparable. Factor II*. The items which were more than one stand ard deviation from the mean of Factor II1 have been listed and summarized below, starting with the "characteristic" end: 1: 67: 62: 70: 28: 54: 13: 53: 56: 30: 71: "Morale is improved by the spontaneous expres sions of feeling toward one another." "The self-controlled member has a certain integ rity that the group values." "The selfish member is so eager to get something off his chest that he is unaware of attempts to help." "When the group forces itself to get below the polite surface, it releases the creative ener gies of its members." Members seem to need to bang heads together be fore constructive work can take place. "When the group trespasses on the restricted member, his anxiety disturbs everyone." "From listening to the dispassionate member, the group learns to look at itself objectively." ^The self-sufficient member repulses eager 'therapists'." "The member who intrigues the group with person al revelations seems to have a compelling desire for 1 belonging1." "By bickering with one another, the group avoids facing the real issues." "The imperturbable member reacts to criticism from the group with a kind of intellectual sat isfaction." 179 37! "When a member lays open his feelings of compas sion, the giving of moral support helps group unity." "After a certain amount of emotional interaction helped the group get started (70,1,28' ) , attempts to in dulge in excessive emotionalism (62,54,53*56,37*30) were, resisted by members who maintained their objectivity (67,13*71).” The "uncharacteristic" end of Factor II1 resulted in the following: 40: "In order to sustain the group's effort, frequent expressions of good humor are opposed." 41: "The member who affirms his Christian charity when the group is hostile seems to feel a sense of personal power." 14: "The solitary member is neither criticized nor integrated into the group." 60: "When a member gets his head snapped off just for being understanding, the group has failed in its purpose." 43: "A friendly response to the angry member re stores harmony. 31: "By protecting the inhibited member, the group builds an atmosphere of safety." 24: "The group's failure to appreciate gestures of hospitality is a general source of dissatisfac tion." "Teamwork is achieved by discouraging the com petitive member." "The group's affability is wasted on the dis courteous member." "When prodded, the recluse contributes his in sights to the group." "The egoistic member is helped to become a co worker through the group's attentive interest." "When conflicts occur, members quit trying." 46 27 52 25 66 "It was not characteristic of the group that positive feeling was opposed (40,41,60,24), thus damaging the group (60,24,66). The group did not protect the feel ings of the withdrawn or the hostile members (14,43,31* 27; nor was it able to encourage or force the contribu tion of the individualist (46,52,25)* "Stated in positive terms, the group tried to build a 180 friendly emotional climate but failed to encourage the individualists to give up their attitudes of detachment and resistance in favor of cooperative teamwork." Although these summaries may have suffered from a de gree of over-interpretation, the factor of emotionalism which characterized the factorial design summary of Factor II' was also clearly evident here. Again, then, the results are comparable, although the earlier analysis seemed to be somewhat more concise. Factor III*. The items for this factor were listed and summarized for the "characteristic" end as follows: 70: "When the group forces itself to get below the polite surface, it releases the creative ener gies of its members." 34: A group that demands participation from the re luctant member increases its problem-solving capacity." 64: "Through group pressure, the aggressive member learns to cooperate." 28: "Members seem to need to bang heads together be fore constructive work can take place. 63: "The group's complete acceptance of one's hos tility is disturbing." 42: "It is threatening to have one's overtures re jected by the others." 16: "Criticism of the undemonstrative member leads to group growth." 37: "When a member lays open his feelings of compas sion, the giving of moral support helps group unity." 12: "When the egotist is put in his place, he loses interest in the group." 26: "The group listens to the member who expresses unpopular and even antisocial opinions. 68: "The sedate member is well-liked but doesn't help the group get at basic issues." "in order to build strong work habits, the group de manded participation (70,68,34,16) and aggressive 181 interaction (64,28) from its members, although some were disturbed by the hostility released (63>26) and the dan ger of the group's rejection (42,37>12)." For the "uncharacteristic” end, the following results were obtained: 66: "When conflicts occur, members quit trying." 7: "General acceptance of the domineering member eventually makes for a more attractive group." 21: "in spite of a friendly climate, attempts at in timacy lead to embarrassment." 11: "The hostile member eagerly attacks the group when his position is opposed." 55: "The group becomes more attractive when it en courages expressions of good will." 8: "When the group humors the condescending member, it meets his needs at the expense of its own." 23: "To maintain one1s good nature in an atmosphere of dissension brings a member recognition. 49: "When the isolationist is defended, he turns his inner resourcefulness to the advancement of the group." 45: To submit to the revengeful member is painful for all." 14: "The solitary member is neither criticized nor integrated into the group." "The group did not try to meet the needs of the self- centered (7,o,45) and non-participating members (14,49). Since conflict did not lead to withdrawal (66) or open hostility (11), it was unnecessary to reward amiability (55>23) or to risk its discomforts (21). "Stated in positive terms, the group rejected the personatneed oriented behaviors of domination, withdraw al, and friendly intimacy." These summaries did not stand in opposition to the factorial design interpretation of Factor III1, but there were so many additional elements included that the summaries could hardly be subsumed under the Factor III' name, "Forced Participation as a Means of Group Growth." In addition, of 182 all the factors examined so far, this one had the widest difference in the statements at the two ends of the factor; that is, one end was not obviously the complement of the other. However, it could be said that they tended to sup plement each other. Factor IV*. The "characteristic" end of this factor was listed and summarized as follows: 28: "Members seem to need to bang heads together be fore constructive work can take place. 54: "When the group trespasses on the restricted member, his anxiety disturbs everyone." 62: "The selfish member Is so eager to get something off his chest that he is unaware of attempts to help." 8: "When the group humors the condescending member, it meets his needs at the expense of its own." 11: "The hostile member eagerly attacks the group when his position is opposed.” 42: "It is threatening to have one's overtures re jected by the others." 55: "The group becomes more attractive when it en courages expressions of good will." "Morale is improved by the spontaneous expres sions of feeling toward one another." "Staying on congenial terms with everyone is a way of satisfying a personal need to be liked." 18: "The group becomes less attractive for members who are rejected because they do not partici pate ." 26: "The group listens to the member who expresses unpopular and even antisocial opinions. "Although most members freely exhibited attitudes of aggression (28), hostility (11,26), self-centeredness (62,8), and congeniality (55*1*2), the non-participants felt rejected and anxious (54,42,18)." For the "uncharacteristic" end of Factor IV', the re sults were as follows: 183 66: "When conflicts occur, members quit trying." 43: "A friendly response to the angry member re stores harmony. 36: "Attacking the non-committal member is useless." 6l: "When the member who is always 'playing the same worn-out record' is met with kindness, he be comes a more active part of the group." 31: "By protecting the inhibited member, the group builds an atmosphere of safety." 27: "The group's affability is wasted on the dis courteous member." 13: "From listening to the dispassionate member, the group learns to look at Itself objectively." 72: If the group shows him some definite drawbacks to detachment, the passive member thinks of quitting." 58: The group discourages the display of benevo lence so that it can progress faster." 49: "When the Isolationist is defended, he turns his inner resourcefulness to the advancement of the group." 19: For some it is an easy place to let off steam— which is good for all. "Supporting the angry and detached members did not lead to group growth (43,61,31>13#49,19)• Congeniality was not suppressed (27>5°) and group pressure on the in dividualist did not damage the group (66j36,72). "Stated in positive terms, strong group pressure on the individualist was more apt to promote group growth than congeniality and group acceptance of personal needs." Although these summaries indicated that members' per sonal needs did not run unchecked but were channeled into group activities as much as possible, the summaries could easily be identified by the factorial design label, "Self- Oriented Goal Attainment." Thus, it was as if members were first prodded and encouraged into expressing their selfish needs, and then these emotional energies were diverted to group-oriented ends. This conceptualization is not foreign 184 to practitioners of group therapy, although in the group- therapy setting the processes are usually referred to by such terms as "catharsis" and "cathexis." Summary of interpretations. Since the purpose of a clinical interpretation is richness, rather than reduction to elements, the two types of interpretation which were at tempted in the present study had apparent differences. While the cell statements selected by F and t-tests were rather easy to relate to the hypothesized dimensions of the factorial design without violence, the clinical interpreta tions— upon review— appeared to suffer somewhat from subjec tivity, in spite of the care with which they were developed. In spite of this subjectivity, however, they appeared to complement the factorial-design summaries to a considerable degree. Thus, there was little or no reason to conclude that dimensions other than those predicted had been identi fied. CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The purpose of the present study was to offer empiri cal evidence regarding certain theoretically defined dimen sions of group behavior. Such a study has been considered of importance because of the general lack of agreement among researchers in the field of group psychology concerning the basic variables, concepts, and "facts" with which theories of group dynamics should deal. The most troublesome obsta cle to the establishment of a productive and generally ac ceptable theory of group behavior has appeared to be the de velopment of suitable techniques for recording and classify ing behavior and the systematic identification of the essen tial dimensions for describing a social interactional field. Studies pointed in this direction have been few and for the most part unsatisfactory largely because of the difficulty encountered in blending theoretical sophistication and an adequate technology. The appearance of a new research meth odology, called Q-methodology by its leading exponent, Wil liam Stephenson, gave promise of implementing the desired strategy and was therefore adopted and adapted to the pur pose of the present study. In carrying out the investigation, the following hy pothesis was proposed: "Certain theoretically defined di mensions of group behavior can be verified by means of 188 Purposes end Principles of the United Nations and to set In sueh s Banner as not to involve any breach of the Char ter While members were legally bound not to admit an applicant which failed to possess the expressed quali fications, they were not legally bound to admit an applicant which possessed such qualifications. Accord ing to Professor Kelson: There is no legally effective restriction on the voting of the members of the General Assembly or the Security Council. This becomes manifest by the fact that even if the General Assembly or the Security Council accepts the interpretation of the Court that the enumeration of the conditions in Article It, paragraph 1, is exhaustive, neither a vote of a Member not in conformity with this inter pretation, nor a decision of the General Assemblv or the Seourlty Council based on _suoh votes, could be declared null and void. 5 Certainly the Charter did not provide for a sanction in ease an applloant state whloh possessed the qualifications enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 + was refused admission. A qualified applloant had no legal right to admission In the organization. Admission depended on the dlsoretlon of the Security Council and the General Assembly and their membership, legal respect ^International Court of Justice, Reports of " Condi t ions of ■, uoaaitiwo ox The United Nations," yden: A. W. 65qians Kelsen, op. olt.. p. 7 ^ 9 - * 186 Q-technique operations.” In order to allow for full use of the experimental data, a second hypothesis was proposed: "Certain other group dimensions, differing from those speci fied, can be identified by the same Q-technique operations." A summary of procedures, significant findings, and conclusions has been presented in the following sections. I. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES Since no generally accepted theory of group psycholo gy existed, a general theoretical viewpoint toward group phenomena was established. The field-theoretical approach selected was characterized by the following assumptions: (a) A necessary experimental datum is the subject's phenom enological description of the event in the form of a verbal report of what the event meant to him; (b) Psychological events are studied in terms of the total situation rather than as isolated abstractions; (c) Psychological events are explained in terms of the situation which exists at the time the events occur; (d) The meaning of any concept is deter mined by its relation to other concepts in the system of concepts of which it is a part; and (e) The individual is a dynamic system whose relation to his environment is deter mined largely by such motivational processes as goal-setting, goal-directed action, and tension arousal and release. In selecting the theoretical dimensions of group be havior for investigation, it was recognized that such a system of concepts need not cover the total range of phenom ena in the area to which £t applies. It was also recognized that the choice of theoretical variables In small group re search must rest on certain assumptions regarding human na ture and human interaction. The assumptions underlying the present choice of variables were as follows: (a) A theory of group behavior must start with a theory of individual be havior, since groups gather in order that individuals may satisfy their needs; (b) Individual behavior takes place within a "social field," the perception of which influences the individual's choice of behaviors; (c) The process of in teraction among individuals in a group situation is guided by some more-or-less-clearly defined goals and purposes, and the attainment of these common goals and values is the pri mary job of the group and the reason for its existence; and (d) The unit of description of a group process should in clude all three elements just described--the individual, the situation, and the directional tendency guiding the interac tion between these two elements. The concepts selected to describe the level of indi vidual behaviors were denoted by the labels friendly. ag gressive, and avoiding. The concepts describing the group climate or situational field were labeled supportive and non-supportive♦ The concepts involving attainment of goals were called group-oriented. self-oriented, and non-oriented. The research methodology selected was that advocated 188 by Stephenson and called by him, Q-methodology. This meth odology was selected because it combined (a) an emphasis on the individual and his inner Experiences as legitimate ob jects of scientific study, (b) the use of multivariate re search designs (factorial design and balanced block design) for the investigation of complex areas of human behavior, (c) a test instrument (Q-sort) which can reflect a complexi ty of attitudes, perceptions, or feelings with great sensi tivity, (d) the use of multivariate methods of analysis (analysis of variance, factor analysis) as tools for theory building and hypothesis testing, and (e) a completely opera tional process of defining theoretical constructs and empir ical factors (factor arrays). A research instrument of the Q-sort type was con structed in the form of a 3 x 2 x 3 factorial design, the elements of which corresponded to the theoretical variables described above. Thus, each of the three main effects was varied in either two or three ways (levels), and each vari able plus all combinations of variables (interactions) were considered to be separate experimental conditions. The fac torial design was clothed with descriptive statements cover ing each possible combination of main effects at their vari ous levels, 18 combinations in all; thus, each statement had to Include three bits of information, one for each of the main effects, in a simple descriptive sentence. Four repli cations of the statements resulted in a 72-item Q-sort 189 Instrument (see Appendix B) which was examined by a small committee of experts in terms of conceptual relevance and syntactical clarity. Although there was no truly "correct" place for any item of the sample, many items turned out to be ambiguous, and a process of revision was carried out un til the committee unanimously accepted each item. State ments were phrased in the third person in order to put each group member in the position of being a group observer and to avoid the defensiveness which often accompanies self- descriptive test instruments. Two training groups from the Western Training Labora tory in Group Development (WTL) were selected to serve as experimental subjects for the administration of the Q-sort research instrument. Training groups were used for the ex perimental population because of the greater permissiveness of the group situation, the emphasis on emotional expres siveness, and the frequent diagnosing of problems of group operation. For purposes of replication, data were collected from two groups on two occasions, the second occasion occur ring in the second week of group meetings. The directions requested that the member describe the behavior, feelings, or attitudes of the group by sorting the statements into nine piles ranging from "most characteristic, typical, fre quent, intense" to "least characteristic, untypical, infre quent, weak" (see Appendix A) in a forced-choice, approxi mately normal distribution. 190 The second sorting of one of the groups was selected for statistical analysis because it seemed that group Im pressions were more definite after a week of daily meetings than on the second day, and because the membership was more stable in one group than the other. The sixteen sorts of the members of the selected group were tabulated and a Pear son product-moment coefficient of correlation was calculated for each pair of sorts, 120 in all. The sorts were placed in a correlation matrix and communalities were estimated following Guilford's recommendation of using the highest correlation coefficient in each column. The coefficients thus calculated represented the degree of correlation between persons in the experimental population, that Is, the extent to which each pair of individuals perceived and described the group experience in a similar manner with their Q-sorts. The correlation matrix was subjected to factor analy sis following Thurstone's procedures of factor extraction, known as the centroid method. Four factors were extracted, although loadings on the fourth were quite low. Two separate rotations were performed upon the cen troid factors. The first followed the principles of simple structure, as outlined by Guilford. The second followed Stephenson's dependency principle, which consists of using all available cues to rotate to positions which test the power of the hypothesized factorial design. Each rotated factor, for both rotational solutions, 191 was represented by a factor-array which consisted of the set of Q-sort statements ranked In order of their significance to the factor. By the use of a weighting formula, the in fluence of any given Q-sort was made proportional to its loading on the factor. Thus, the array was regarded as the best estimate of the factor and could be thought of as the Q-sort that was given "on the average" by the cluster of persons having significant loadings on the factor. As a matter of interest, an unweighted array based on the summed scores for all sixteen Q-sorts was prepared. Intercorrelations among the factor-arrays for each rotational solution were calculated, and Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance was used to test the hypothesis of common population variance, that is, to determine whether the four statements in each cell had been perceived homogen eously. Each factor-array was then subjected to analysis of variance procedures to test the null hypothesis that the several independent samples of the factorial design had been drawn at random from a common normal population. Where F- test significance levels reached the .05 level or better, the significant source of variation was further analyzed by applying Fisher's t-test for the significance of difference between means of small samples. Wherever the source of variation could be identified statistically, the statements in significant cells were ex amined, and an interpretation of each factor was made in 192 terms of the hypothesized dimensions. Thus, from a synthe sis of individual cell statements, a descriptive summary and a factor name was given to each factor. As a test of the second hypothesis of the study, a second interpretive summary of a more subjective or clinical nature was made upon each first-rotation factor-array as a whole. Statements were examined in terms of their individu al significances rather than in terms of their membership in significant cells. Thus, a descriptive summary of each fac tor-array was synthesized without regard for the hypothe sized dimensions of the factorial design. II. FINDINGS Since the study performed some of the functions of both survey research and technique research, and because the theoretical and technical issues were interdependent, both types of findings have been presented concurrently. The Correlation Matrix It was found that the requirement of forcing the Q- sorts into a standardized quasi-normal distribution resulted in a marked simplification of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient formula. In the final working for mula, only one term (SCY) required lengthy computational labor. An overview of the correlation matrix showed that the 120 coefficients were moderately low for the most part but 193 almost all positive. The median r of the matrix was .23> but ten per cent were .40 or higher, showing substantial re lationships among some of the sorts. The highest set of co efficients was obtained by the group leader with a median r of .35. Extraction of Centroid Factors Four factors were extracted, of which the first took out about 66# of the total common-factor variance, the sec ond 15#> the third 12#, and the fourth 7#. Together, they accounted for about one-quarter of the total variance, leav ing three-quarters as unique, or specific and error vari ance. Rotation of Reference Axes Although the presence of a potent first factor ob scured the rotational process in both the simple-structure and dependency rotations, the graphical outcome of the sim- ple-structure solution was found to approach the normal con figuration, that is, the sorts tended to cluster around the various axes. In the dependency solution, however, the pat tern of the second and third factors when plotted against the first was that of a hyperplane some distance above the origin, half positive and half negative. It was thought that this pattern might represent that of a factor whose variables were all positively correlated with a potent gen eral factor. 194 Representat1on of Factors by Factor-Arrays Upon calculating the product-moment correlation be tween each pair of factor-arrays, the first-rotation factor- arrays were found to intercorrelate positively with one an other from low to moderate degree. By comparison, the sec ond-rotation factor-arrays showed a relatively higher corre lation between the first two factors, although the second two factors were found to be considerably more independent. An attempt was made to explain the substantial intercorrela tions among the "orthogonal" factors by viewing the four factors as somewhat different representations of the experi mental situation. That is, each factor would have a sub stantial loading on the "general" group description plus a certain amount of specificity. The correlation between two factors would then be viewed as a function of their agree ment with the "general" description. Application of Bartlett's test of homogeneity of var iance upheld the hypothesis of homogeneity for all factor- arrays, although the values were not so high that one would expect complete homogeneity. Thus, it was noticed that some cells were better defined than others, a fact that might be of interest to further researchers in this area. When analysis of variance procedures were applied to the factor-arrays, one or more significant sources of varia tion appeared in each factor, usually for one of the inter action effects of the factorial design, thus supporting the first hypothesis of the study. 195 Interpretation of Factors in Terms of the Factorial Design When the significant cells were examined, it was found that a synthesis of individual cell statements could be made, resulting in a descriptive summary and a factor name for each factor. Such summaries and names were desir able because the significant sources of variation usually appeared in the factorial design in one of the 39 interac tions rather than in one of the nine levels which had al ready been named and identified. Since the second rotation gave fewer independent factors and the results of their analyses were hardly distinguishable from the first-rotation factors, the descriptive summaries and factor names given to each of the latter are presented below. Factor I. Tension Control as a Means of Member In volvement and Group Goal Facilitation: Group goals were ad vanced and some personal needs were met when the passive member was prodded, the aggressive member opposed, and the friendly member supported. Factor II. Sociability: Friendly behavior was en couraged, while aggression and passivity were opposed. Factor III. Forced Participation as a Means of Group Growth: Forced participation of members led to group growth, but did not result in the meeting of personal needs or in 199 in support of Israel's admission, the representa tive of Uruguay held that Israel vas properly a state. He based his opinion of the 191*9 General Assembly resolu tion which conferred a territory upon the new state.8^ The USSR delegate gave the same argument. Accord ing to him, "the State of Israel has been created and exists in accordance with a resolution passed by the General Assembly on November 29, 191*7." It was, there fore, lneorrect to say that the territory of Israel was not defined.8^ The United States representative, in supporting Israel, pointed out that the territory of a state need not be fixed by definite frontiers, citing the early QC history of the United States as an example.0 It was not very surprising that the united States had supported the admission of Israel. Zionist forces In that country had continually demonstrated their flnanolal and polltloal strength.8? On the other hand, 8i*GAOR. 3rd session. Part II, Ad Hoe Political Committee, op. elt.. 1*7th meeting, p.297* 8^SCOR. 383rd meeting, 0£. oit., p. 22* Ibid., 386th meeting, pp. 30-31* 88Ibld.. 383rd meeting, p. 11. Dr. Philip Jessup in holding tnis position takes an exception to the accepted theory of well-defined territory as an element of statehood. 87gee statements of the Hew York City Council In support of Israel's admission, the Hew Tan»lr Times. 196 group disruption. Factor IV. Self-Oriented Goal Attainment. In the second-rotation analysis, Factor IV became Group-Oriented Goals as Opposed to Self-Oriented Goals, but no methodological answer could be found for the apparent re versal . The general impression gained was that Factor I was the key factor, encompassing the description of the total group situation, and that the other factors were partial representations of this description. It was noted that the early-extracted, high-loading factors tended to have their sources of significant variance in the more complex interac tions. Clinical Interpretation of Factors When interpretive summaries were made of each factor- array without regard for the hypothesized dimensions of the factorial design, they were found to be more detailed and somewhat richer than, but not in contrast with, the corre sponding summaries based on the factorial design. Since the two types of summaries seemed to complement each other, it appeared that either a clinical or a factorial-design analy sis could be used, depending on the preference of the inves tigator or the purpose of the investigation, and that the two analyses would be roughly comparable. Thus, the second hypothesis of the study was not supported. 197 III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS On the basis of the findings reported herein, the first hypothesis of the investigation has been found to hold, i.e., certain theoretically defined dimensions of group be havior can be verified by Q-technique operations. Thus, when group members who had no prior knowledge of the theoret ical framework of the Q-instrument gave Q-sort descriptions of their own group processes, statistical analyses of these descriptions showed that the members were sensitive to some of the predicated effects. The appearance of significance at the level of the whole situation--the triple interactions --lent support to the field-theoretical assumption that psy chological events should be viewed in the totality of mutual interrelationships among situational facts, rather than as a collection of atomistic characteristics. In terms of con tent, the key factor emphasized the concept of group goal attainment through a dynamic balance of member Involvements, a notion that is in harmony with current "group-centered" philosophies of social interaction. The second hypothesis of the study was not supported, that is, group dimensions differing from those specified were not verified. Clinical Interpretations of factors were found to suffer from subjectivity and to be difficult or im possible to relate to theoretical assumptions. Methodologically, Stephenson’s "dependency" rotation al procedures did not produce factors which were superior to 198 those obtained from the more common "simple structure" solu tion. It could not be determined whether this was a result of lack of rotational "art" or of a certain compelling gen erality of the data which led to similar factors no matter what rotational procedures were followed. Subject to the limitations and validity of the as sumptions of the study, the following recommendations have been proposed with respect to research in group dimensions and the use of Q-technique procedures: 1. Q-technique procedures make it feasible for the individual experimenter to perform basic research in the area of group psychology. These procedures are admirably adapted to the field-theoretical approach which attempts to view the complexity of interactions in a group event in terms of the total situation rather than as isolated ab stractions . 2. Q-methodology makes possible the wedding of theo ry-building and data-gathering. Thus, the problem of clas sification and the problem of measurement are approached simultaneously by means of factorial designs and multivari ate methods of analysis such as factor analysis and analysis of variance. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Poul. "The Troublesome Dimensions," Astound ing Science Fiction. 58:75-85* 1956. 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Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service, 1953* 51. Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1922. 52. Furst, E. J., and B. G. Fricke. "Development and Ap plications of Structured Tests of Personality," Re view of Educational Research. 26:26-55* 1956. 53. Gamer, W. R., H. W. Hake, and C. W. Eriksen. "Opera tion! sm and the Concept of Perception," Psychological Review. 63:149-159* 1956. 204 54. Gebhard, M. E. "The Effect of Success and Failure Upon the Attractiveness of Activities as a Function of Ex perience, Expectation, and Need," Journal of Experi mental Psychology. 38:371-388, 1948. 55* Glbb, Cecil A. "The Principles and Traits of Leader ship." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 42: 267-284, 1947. ----- 56. _______. "Classroom Behavior of the College Teacher," Educational and Psychological Measurement. 15*254- 263, 1955* 57* Goodling, Richard, and George Guthrie. "Some Practical Considerations in Q-sort Item Selection," Journal of Counseling Psychology. 3:70-72, 1956. 58. Gordon, Thomas. Group-Centered Leadership: A Way of Releasing the Creative Power of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955* 59. Grant, D. A. "Perceptual Versus Analytical Responses to the Number Concept of a Welgl-type Card-sorting Test," Journal of Experimental Psychology. 41:23-29# 1951* 60. _______, and F. A. Mote. "Effects of Brief Flashes of Light Upon the Course of Dark-adaptation," Joumal of Experimental Psychology. 39:610-616, 1949* 61. Guetzkow, Harold (ed.). Groups. Leadership. and Men. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951* 62. Guilford, J. P. Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950. 63. _______. Psychometric Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 195^* 64. Haiman, Franklyn S. Group Leadership and Democratic Action. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950. 65. Hare, A. P., E. F. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales (eds.). Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955* 66. Hemphill, J. K. Situational Factors in Leadership. Bureau of Educational Research Monograph No. 32. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1949* 67. _______. Group Dimensions: A Manual for Their Measure ment. Bureau of Business Research Monograph No. 87. 205 Columbus, Ohio: College of Commerce and Administra tion, Ohio State University Press, 1956. 68. Hemphill, J. K., and C. M. Westie. "The Measurement of Group Dimensions," Journal of Psychology. 29:325-342, 1950. 69. _______, and A. Coons. Leader Behavior Description. Columbus: Personnel Research Board, Ohio State Uni versity, [n.d.]. Referred to by L. F. Carter, "Eval uating the Performance of Individuals as Members of Small Groups," Personnel Psychology. 7:477-484, 1954. 70. Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1945. 71. Jennings, Helen Hall. Leadership and Isolation. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, Inc., 1943. 72. Joel, Walther, and David Shapiro. "A Genotypical Ap proach to the Analysis of Personal Interaction," Journal of Psychology. 28:9-17, 1949* 73. Jones, Austin. "Distributions of Traits in Current Q- sort Methodology," Joumal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53:90-95, 1956. 74. Kogan, Leonard S. "Variance Designs in Psychological Research," Psychological Bulletin. 50:1-40, 1953- 75. Kogan, William, Robert Quinn, Albert Ax, and Herbert Ripley. "Some Methodological Problems in the Quanti fication of Clinical Assessment by Q Array," Journal of Consulting Psychology. 21:57-62, 1957* 76. Krugman, Morris. "Book review of Scheidlinger's Psy choanalysis and Group Behavior," Personnel and Guid ance Journal. 30:140-l4l, 1952. 77. Lawrence, D. H. "Acquired Distinctiveness of Cues: II. Selective Association in a Constant Stimulus Situa tion," Journal of Experimental Psychology. 40:175- 188, 195*5' . 78. Laycock, Samuel. "Mental Hygiene of Classroom Teach ing," Understanding the Child, 16:39-43, 1947. 79. Lewin, Kurt. Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951* 80. Llfton, Walter. "Group Classroom Techniques," Progres sive Education. 30:210-213, 1953. 206 81. Lifton, Walter. "Group Therapy in Educational Institu tions," Review of Educational Research. 24:156-165, 1954. 82. Livson, Norman, and Thomas Nichols. "Discrimination and Reliability in Q-sort Personality Descriptions," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 52:159“ 165/19557 83. Loevlnger, Jane. "Some Principles of Personality Meas urement," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 15:3-17, 1955. 84. _______. "Objective Tests as Instruments of Psycholog ical Theory," Psychological Reports Monographs, Sup plement 9, 3:635“694, 1957• 85. Lorr, Maurice, R. L, Jenkens, and P. F. Medland. "Di rect Versus Obverse Factor Analysis: A Comparison of Results." 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"Bibliography of Small Group Research," Sociometry, 17:107-178, 1954. 109. Super, Donald. "Group Techniques in the Guidance Pro- t ram," Educational and Psychological Measurement. 9: 96-510, ” 1949. 110. Talland, George. "Task and Interaction Process: Some Characteristics of Therapeutic Group Discussion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 50:105- 109, 1955. 111. Thelen, Herbert. "Educational Dynamics: Theory and Research," Journal of Social Issues, 6:1-97* 1950. 112. _______. Dynamics of Groups at Work. Chicago: Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1954. 113. _______, and Dorothy Stock. "Methods for Studying Work and Emotionality in Group Operation." Chicago: Human Dynamics Laboratory, University of Chicago, 1954. (Mimeographed.) 114. Thomson, G. H. The Factorial Analysis of Human Abili ty. London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1939* 115. Thurstone, L. L. Multiple-factor Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947- 116. _______. "Factor Analysis." In Melvin Marx (ed.). 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Wolff, Werner (ed). Success in Psychotherapy: Person ality Monographs. Vol. 3- New York: Grune and Stratton, Inc., 1952. APPENDIXES APPENDIX A DIRECTIONS APPENDIX A DIRECTIONS Please sort the attached statements according to the way they describe the behavior, feelings, or attitudes of your group. Sort the statements Into nine piles, ranging from most char- acteristic--typical, frequent, intense— to least character istic— untypical, infrequent, weak. Each pile must have the following number of statements: Most Least A B C D E P Q H I 2 4 8 14 16 14 8 4 2 You will probably want to begin by sorting the cards into 2 or 3 basic piles. Then place the two statements which you feel are most characteristic of your group in Pile A. The four statements which are next most characteristic should be placed in Pile B, and so on. Pile I will thus contain the two least characteristic statements, and Pile E the sixteen cards which you feel are neutral or irrelevant. After the cards have been sorted, place each pile in one of the separate, marked envelopes. Please identify your group below: APPENDIX B THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT APPENDIX B THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT The following items comprise the complete research instrument and have been grouped for convenience in terms of the 18 experimental conditions, four replications to a.cell. (Cell adf) 1 Morale is improved by the spontaneous expressions of feeling toward one another. 19 For some it is an easy place to let off steam— which is good for all. 37 When a member lays open his feelings of compassion, the giving of moral support helps group unity. 55 The group becomes more attractive when it encourages expressions of good will. (Cell adg) 2 Staying on congenial terms with everyone is a way of satisfying a personal need to be liked. 20 Friendliness is used successfully as a technique to control others. 38 The overconslderate member builds his own status from the approval of others. 56 The member who intrigues the group with personal revel ations seems to have a compelling desire for "belong ing .1 1 (Cell adh) 3 For our purposes, an emphasis on heartiness and jovial ity is unprofitable. 21 In spite of a friendly climate, attempts at intimacy lead to embarrassment. 39 In sharing one's inner feelings, there is some loss of independence and personal identity. 57 Even with reassurance, it is threatening to give what is distinctly one's own. (Cell aef) 4 The group is more effective when the amiable member is suppressed. 215 22 When demonstrations of good fellowship are restricted, the work of the group improves. 40 In order to sustain the group's effort, frequent ex pressions of good humor are opposed. 58 The group discourages the display of benevolence so that it can progress faster. (Cell aeg) 5 When the resentment of the group is turned on the un derstanding member, he proclaims his humility. 23 To maintain one's good nature in an atmosphere of dis sension brings a member recognition. 41 The member who affirms his Christian charity when the group is hostile seems to feel a sense of personal power. 59 Cordiality is protection against the group's antagonism. (Cell aeh) 6 A member is disappointed when his expressions of sympa thy are not reciprocated. 24 The group's failure to appreciate gestures of hospital ity is a general source of dissatisfaction. 42 It Is threatening to have one's overtures rejected by the others. 60 When a member gets his head snapped off Just for being understanding, the group has failed in its purpose. (Cell bdf) 7 General acceptance of the domineering member eventually makes for a more attractive group. 25 The egoistic member Is helped to become a co-worker through the group's attentive interest. 43 A friendly response to the angry member restores harmo ny. 61 When the member who is always "playing the same worn- out record" is met with kindness, he becomes a more active part of the group. (Cell bdg) 8 When the group humors the condescending member, it meets his needs at the expense of its own. 26 The group listens to the member who expresses unpopular and even antisocial opinions. 44 Toleration of the sullen member protects his feelings but leaves the others somewhat irritable. 62 The selfish member is so eager to get something off his chest that he is unaware of attempts to help. 216 (Cell bdh) 9 To permit a member to aggress against others is neither valuable for him nor comfortable for the rest of the group. 27 The group's affability is wasted on the discourteous member. 45 To submit to the revengeful member is painful for all. 63 The group's complete acceptance of one's hostility is disturbing. (Cell bef) 10 The group works more smoothly when the headstrong mem ber is kept in line. 28 Members seem to need to bang heads together before con structive work can take place. 46 Teamwork is achieved by discouraging the competitive member. 64 Through group pressure, the aggressive member learns to co-operate. (Cell beg) 11 The hostile member eagerly attacks the group when his position is opposed. 29 By taking a personal stand despite opposition, a member asserts his independence. 47 The dominating member ignores the group's resentment. 65 By inviting retaliation, the punitive member stays in the center of the stage. (Cell beh) 12 When the egotist is put in his place, he loses interest in the group. 30 By bickering with one another, the group avoids facing the real Issues. 48 Belittling the member who looks down on the others only makes him unco-operative. 66 When conflicts occur, members quit trying. (Cell adf) 13 From listening to the dispassionate member, the group learns to look at Itself objectively. 31 By protecting the inhibited member, the group builds an atmosphere of safety. 49 When the Isolationist is defended, he turns his inner resourcefulness to the advancement of the group. 67 The self-controlled member has a certain integrity that the group values. 217 (Cell cdg) 14 The solitary member is. neither criticized nor inte grated into the group. 32 Protecting the member who won't get emotionally in volved adds nothing to the performance of the group. 50 Humoring the recluse satisfies only his personal need for privacy. 68 The sedate member is well-liked but doesn’t help the group get at basic issues. (Cell cdh) 15 Reassuring the repressed member only makes him suspi cious . 33 Fear of losing one's uniqueness holds back many crea tive offerings in spite of the encouragement of the group. 51 Because of the human intimacy involved, entering a friendly group is a precarious proposition for the over-controlled member. 69 A group where everyone supports formality is rather in effective . (Cell cef) 16 Criticism of the undemonstrative member leads to group growth. 34 A group that demands participation from the reluctant member increases its problem-solving capacity. 52 When prodded, the recluse contributes his insights to the group. 70 When the group forces itself to get below the polite surface, it releases the creative energies of its members. (Cell ceg) 17 The group's attempts at control are rebuffed by the stolid member. 35 A member maintains his emotional distance by ignoring the antagonism of the group. 53 The self-sufficient member repulses eager "therapists. 71 The Imperturbable member reacts to criticism from the group with a kind of intellectual satisfaction. (Cell ceh) 18 The group becomes less attractive for members who are rejected because they do not participate. 36 Attacking the non-committal member is useless. 218 54 When the group trespasses on the restricted member, his anxiety disturbs everyone. 72 If the group shows him some definite drawbacks to de tachment, the passive member thinks of quitting. 223 was an administering authority, eould not Justify a separate and exceptional Method of considering the question of its admission to membership in the TJhlted nations. It was possible, according to hin, for a state to administer a Tfe*ust Territory without being a member of the United nations* 1|. Questionable independence because of disabilities resulting from the war. Disabilities resulting from World War II were used to question the independent status of Austria. The Syrian delegate noted that Austria did not receive international recognition with regard to its existence as a sovereign state after the Agsg^JLugf. It was not considered as a separate enemy state during the war.1**2 The United States representative, however, in support of Austrla*s admission, held that that country had corporate identity. Moreover, he noted that the Moscow Declaration had declared null and void the annexation of Austria by Germany.*^ lUllbld. ^ 2SCCB. 2nd year, l£lith meeting, p. 1262. ^ibld., p. 1263; ibid.. 190th meeting, p. 2128. 2 2k 5* independence restricted by foreign occupa tion* Foreign occupation of the applicant*a territory was another of the concepts used in questioning the independence of applicants* In the case of Austria, the representatire of Australia, although acknowledging that it was not through the fault of the applicant, held that its occupation by foreign troops Halt Austria*a full sovereignty and Independence**^ The USSR delegate expounded that until Austria really occupied the position of an independent and sovereign state, until it ceased to be under the control and.occupation of other states, it was impossible to introduce the question of its admission to the United Rations, for the United Rations might net include any state which was controlled by the laws of another state*^ The American delegate retorted that, while there was military occupation, this did not Impair Austria's sovereignty in the field of international relations which was the most Important point to consider in deciding whether Austria was eligible to become a member of the Wlbld*. 190th meeting, p. 2130. 1U5>qa0R, 2nd session, Vol. II, Plenary Meetings, 117th plenary meeting, p* 1051* 225 United Nations at that tiae* Ha claimed that tha naw control agreement proTldad that Austria Bight exercise such sovereignty**^ Iu supporting tha adalssion of Italy* tha Aaarlean dalagata stated that, for all practical purposes, Italy was not restricted In its sovereignty* The Allied Coaaisslon had bean ter ulna ted on January 31, 19li7» and this, in fact, meant the end of controls in Italy* Only a token ailltary force was now stationed on the north eastern frontier, but this was only for the purpose of ensuring a peaceful solution to that frontier question and not far the purpose of controlling Italy**^ This concept was also applied to the case of the Republic of Korea* The USSR representative objected even to the inclusion of the South Korean application In the agenda on the ground that the Governaent of the Republic of Korea was iaposed upon that country by foreign occupation troops.***® He further declared that, while the Soviet Uhlon had evacuated all its troops froa North Korea at the beginning of December, 19^8, the l1*6SC0R. 190th meeting, 0£# PP* 2128—29• ^Tjbid, f p. 2120; ibid.. 203rd aeeting, pp. 2i; 08- U09; lbld.TSpcclal Supplement No* £, p. 22. ***^Ibld. * Utta year, l;09th aeeting, p* 2; ibid*, 7th year, 573rd aeeting, p* 37* 226 United States had parslatently refused to withdraw Its troops froai South Korea and had been trying to prolong J.U9 their stay under all kinds of pretexts. Regarding Japan* the Soviet representative emphasised that that country was still under the thunb of occupation forces. He declared that Japan was not an independent state* but* on the oontrary* had been con verted Into a colony of the United States. The United States was also accused of econoale penetration and 150 subjugation of the Japanese econony. He concluded that Japan's adalsslon to the United Nations would be preaature* but gave notice that "the sooner the Japanese people free thenselves froa foreign occupation* the sooner It beoones an Independent* free sovereign people* the sooner will the sovereign state be accepted Into the United Nations.1-*1 6. Lack of sovereignty because of uneoncluded and unratlfied peace treaty. Uneoncluded or unratlfied peace treaty was also linked to the lack of sovereignty of the applicants. l - ^Ibld., l^th year* l*23rd aeeting* pp. 1*, 12-13; Ibid.. lilOth nesting* pp. 13* 15* 1^°Ibi,d., 7th year* 598th nesting* p. 1U* ibid.. 601st nesting* pp. 9-10; ibid.. 602nd nesting* pp. 6-7• ^ Ibld.. 602nd nesting* pp. 2, lii-15* 227 The USSR delegate urged that consideration of the admis sion of Japan should be postponed until such time when Japan had concluded normal peace treaties vith the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which would then signify that Japan had again become an independent and sovereign country. Hie representative of Poland questioned the sovereignty of Austria and Italy because they were then i still under the armistice. The representative of Australia stated that Austria and the ex-enemy states could not be regarded as sovereign or independent when they were still subject to armistice agreements.1^ The USSR delegate maintained that until the question of the peace treaty with Austria was settled, until it occupied the position of an Independent sovereign state, it was impossible to introduce the question of its admission to the united Nations.1^ I52ibld., 601st meeting, p. 12. ^^Ibid.. 2nd year, 186th aeeting, pp. 201*6-47. ^ 'pp3°*tj?LtSttPPl*'**n* ,0‘ P* 20* au.. ISiW&ttg*# session, First Committeet Summary Record of Meetings. 99th aeeting, p, 358* 22 8 On the other hand, tha Anarloan dalagata rejected tha "blind application" In all eaaaa of tha thasia that raatrietlona In armistice agreements or other control arrangements vara of such a nature aa to Impair sovereign ty and, thus, make tha applicant Ineligible for 1 CA membership. He believed that Austria's sovereignty was not actually restricted by the unratlfied peace treaty. He vaa strongly opposed to any conclusion that the failure to complete a treaty should lead to the postponing of the consideration of the application of Austria. The people of Austria, he said, should not be penalised because of disagreements between the great powers, that is, because the Soviet Uhlan had not found 1C7 it convenient to ratify the Austrian peace treaty. ^ The delegate of Poland maintained that beoause the peace treaties had not yet been ratified, all the ex-enemy states and Austria could not be considered as sovereign states within the meaning of the Charter and could not qualify for admission to membership in the United Nations.1*8 ^ 8S0QR, Special Supplement Ho. %.» SSL* alt., p. 19. ^ ^Ibld.. p. 21*; ibid., 186th meeting, pp. 2128-29* l^Ibld.. 20£th aeeting, p. 21*29. 229 7* Lack of sovereignty due to the absenee of de Jure recognition. The absenee of £e jure recognition had been a very useful criterion in the diplomatic efforts of states to prevent the admission to membership in world organisations of applicants they did not favor. The United States used that criterion against Costa Rica. Various League members opposed the admission of the States of the Caucasus, for example, because those applicants were not recognised de Jure by the majority of the members of the League, including the principal powers. That same criterion was also applied by the members of the united Rations against the applicants they considered unfavorable. The absence of de lure status was raised by the Syrian delegate during the debate on the admission of Israel. He claimed that Israel's status was de facto, not d£ lure. As j|e fao to recognition did not indicate final and definite recognition) Israel, therefore, did not have sovereign equality with the other members of the organisation. The requirement in the Charter to the effeot that member states should have sovereign equality iqq disqualified Israel from membership in the organisation. l£9lbld.. Ifth year, 385th meeting, p. 5* 230 The Syrian delegate also noted that there were not many countries in the Security Council whioh had given even de facto recognition to Israel; and that, even though Israel was trying with all its efforts to obtain recognition from as many states as possible, it had failed to get a majority or a sufficiently substantial number to have any great effeet upon the positions of other states or the position of the Chited Nations in general*1^0 The United States delegate replied that the United States had given immediate and full (de Jure) recognition to the State of Israel, and de facto reeognltlon to the Provisional Government of Israel« He further explained that co-membership in the United Hatlons did not necessarily Involve bilateral diplomatic relationships among those members* The representative of the Netherlands emphasised 162 the fact that his Government had recognised Israel* The representative of Greeoe also referred to his 163 Government's recognition of Israel* ^®^ld* i pp • 5—6* *•61 ibid.» p. 12; ibid*» 383rd aeeting, p* 13* ^Sqaqr. 3r<s session, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committees £j3sUEX Record of lieetings."TfoEb meeting, p.318* l63ibld.. p. 323* 231 The delegate of Uruguay streeaed the fact that fifty-two nations had recognised the State of Israel and had entered Into diplomatic relations with it.*^ 8. Questionable sovereignty because of the absence of diplomatic relations with particular United Rations members. Tha existence or absence of diplomatic relations had been used or referred to by members of the United Rations In their arguments for or against the admission of particular applicants. This concept used in connec tion with sovereignty was also applied In relation to the peace-loving charaoter of the applicant. This latter point Is discussed below. Under the first category, of course, were the references to diplomatic relations regarding Israel above. In another case, the application for admission by Transjordan was vetoed by the Russian delegate on grounds that that applicant did not have diplomatic relations with his Government. ThsSoviet delegate stated that his Government attached great significance to Its arguments about the lack of diplomatic relations between a particular country and the USSR. Premier Stalin had raised this Issue at Talta during his efforts to have l^Uibld.. l|7th meeting, p. 298. tha two Soviet republios seated as original members at tbo owing conference on intornational organisation* Tha Soviet Premier had not ohanged his Tlews as to the polltieal utility and applicability of this concept with regard to admission of new members to the United Nations. The Soviet delegate emphasised that in every case that a Soviet representative submitted arguments regarding the lack of diplomatie relations, he had in mind a very broad meaning of these arguments. They should not be considered as formal arguments, but rather as statements based on very Important reasons whioh touched upon the qualities of a nation applying for membership* Thus, with regard to Transjordan, for example, lack of diplomatic relations with an important power like the Soviet Union stirred doubts that that country was genuinely Independent. He admitted that at the San Francisco conference some countries had partici pated which, likewise, did not have normal diplomatic relations with his country. But at that time, he explained, the circumstances were different. It was still wartime then and it was possible to tolerate a situation of that kind. At present, however, a situation of that kind was abnormal. For this reason the Soviet Government eould not ecnaider that after the conclusion of the war a country whleh did not have diplomatic 233 relations with the Sorlet Union aatiefied the require ments demanded of eountrlea applying for admission to the Waited Rations.16^ The Chinese delegate regarded the laek of diplo matic relations as a relevant but not conclusive factor In determining admissibility.Yet the Chinese delegate felt that a delay In the consideration of the Mongolian application was advisable because up to that time the Mongolian People's Republic had exchanged representatives with the USSR only* According to him, the laek of diplomatic or consular relations with other countries might be an Indication that the applloant was not yet ready to take Its place as a member of the world 167 community. Shortly after, In a change of attitude toward Outer Mongolia, the Chinese delegate qualified his last statement. He regretted that he might have given the Impression that his Government was opposed to the application of the Mongolian People's Republic. l6£lbid.. 1st year, 2nd series, 56th meeting, pp. 91-92; Ibid., Supplement Ho. I f c , p. 72; Ibid.. 2nd year, See oIHsupp lament wo. JT pp. Ill-15* 166qaor. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committeei summary Reoord of Meetings. 16th meeting, p. 61. i^scCR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement Jo. l£, pp. 6ii-65. 23k This was not tha case, ha explained* What ha did only was to submit certain criteria to tha Cooaittaa for tha Admission of New Members.1®® Othar delegations, however, had agreed with the United States argument that absence of diplomatic relations vas entirely irrelevant to tha matter of admis sion and objected to the use of that eonoept as a condition for the rejeotion of applications for member ship*1^ Nevertheless, like tha United States, soma of those delegations had also made emphatic references to that same eonoept in their arguments for the admission or non-admission of certain applicants* The Australian delegate, in his objection to the admission of Outer Mongolia, had emphasised the fact that that applicant maintained diplomatic relations only with the Soviet Uhion.170 ^ ®Ibld*. 51+th meeting, p* 51J QAOR* 2nd part of the 1st session. First Committee, op. ol t., 15th meeting, p. 56. ^^Refer to the statements of the delegates of Britain, SC OR. i*th year, 383rd meeting, p* 15? QAOR. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committee, op. cli*. ll|.th meeting, p* $2; Argentina, SCOR. 385th meeting, p* lit; Australia, ibid*. 56th meeting, pp. 92, 9b; ibid*. 57th meeting, p* 100; Netherlands, ibid*, 56th meeting, p* 92; Egypt, ibid*, p* 93; France, ibid.1 United States, ibid., PP* 92-93? Brasil, ibid., 57tn meeting, p. 99* 17°Ibid*. 2nd year, Special Supplement No* p* 11* 235 The representatives of the United States and Britain thought that it would be useful to know in deciding upon the application of Outer Mongolia whether the latter would be willing to extend its diplomatic 171 relations with the outer world* The British delegate also believed that the answers to the questionnaire, particularly that which showed Outer Mongolia had diplomatic relations with only two countries demonstrated "that they /Rangolians/^ have not yet gained experience in International affairs sufficiently to equip them to play a part in the inter national work of the United Nations."1?2 He felt, therefore, that at that time "their admission would be premature." With regard to Ceylon, the Australian representa tive emphasised that it maintained diplomatic relations with thirty-six states which proved the reality of Its 173 independence. The United States delegate stressed the fact that Nepal's diplomatic relations with other states, including ^ ljhld., 1st year, 1st series, Supplement No. l j . , p. 66. *72Ibld.« 56th meeting, p* 90* *73(|acb, 3rd session, Part I, ££ Hoc Political Cosnilttees juggUEX B*cord Jl± 2£lBS£» meeting, p. 132. 236 a number of members of tha Unitad Nations, showed tha applicants aovaralgn and lndapandent status.1?** Tha Chinasa dalagata claimed that diplomatic relations batvaan Nepal and its neighbors portrayed clearly that Nepal enjoyed "complete independent s overe ign ty•"*■?$ The representative of Prance, also supporting the admission of Nepal, noted the fact that his Government had established diplomatic relations with Nepal.^^6 The USSR delegate did not make any strong criti cisms on the independence of Nepal, in fact, he would support the admission of Nepal into the United Nations.*-?? The Nepalese Government, in its reply to the Committee on Admissions, declared that Nepal • • • has for centuries been an independent sovereign State. • • • /Tff is responsible for its own foreign relations and no power exercises, or for centuries has exercised, any control or authority over it except its own Government.178 Yet, what was the real situation in Nepal? Nepal had remained secluded in the Himalayan mountains with 174SC0R, 4th year, 439th meeting, p. 132. l?5lbid., p. 7* ^Ibld.. p. 8. 177scqr. 4th year, 439th meeting, pp. 6-7. 178united Nations Document S/C.3/l6. p. 3. 237 contact only with Its neighbors India, Tibst, and China until 1950 when the Rana regise was overthrown. However, India's Influence in Nepal, for geographic and historic reason* resains overwhelming. Nepal was supposedly granted independence by Britain in 1923 after a virtual tutelage under the latter for over a century* Tet British-Indian Influence remained preponderant. After the British left India, Indian Influence became primary. India considers Nepal's position and actions as of vital concern to its security. Prime Minister Nehru has stated on several occasions that the Himalayas are India's northern border, and those mountains run north of Nepal. The 1950 Treaty of Peaoe between India and Nepal stipulates that the two countries should Inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring state likely to cause a breach in the friendly relations with that state. The Nepalese Government also agreed to accept Indian aid in ease of aggression. There is the closest consulta tion between the two governments on Nepal's foreign policy and on much of Nepal's Internal polltlos. mdla is usually kept well informed of Nepalese negotiations with other powers and makes it clear to all concerned 238 that, whatever the aim of such negotiations, India considers Itself directly Involved In Nepal's fate.*’ ?? Under the 1950 trade treaty between the two countries, Nepal did not have any foreign exchange of its own; it was all kept by India which provided Nepal with the necessary foreign exchange to cover Its "reasonable needs."*®® It was only In 1957 that Nepal had persuaded India to let It have Its own foreign exchange, nevertheless, other restrictions remain, for Instance as to tariffs* India has also been granted special rights and privileges in the economic and power development of Nepal which nay be suspected by some as amounting to Indian domination of Nepal* Vlth regard to diplomatic relations, for sometime Britain and then India had the only resident ambassadors In Kathmandu. The United States, France, and other powers later on established diplomatic relations with Nepal* Under a 1955 treaty, Communist China and Nepal agreed to exchange ambassadors. Because of India's wish, however, their ambassadors accredited to New Delhi l^Werner Levi, "Nepal In Tor Id Politics," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 30, September, 1957* P« 239* l60Ibld., p. 21*0. 239 would be those accredited to Nepal and China, respec tively, that la, the Chinese Ambassador to New Delhi was to be also the Ambassador to Nepal, and Nepal*s Ambassador to New Delhi was to be also the Ambassador to China. But, the Chinese have circumvented this Indian position by sending officials with diplomatic standing to Nepal while the Chinese ambassador to India and Nepal, as agreed upon, resides In New Delhi. The Soviet Union, first making contact with Kathmandu through Communist China, established formal diplomatic relations with Nepal in March, 19£7* In spite of Nepal*s Increasing contact with other nations, Indian Influence continues to be predominant. With regard to the Ihdochinese states, the French representative emphasised that each of them— Vietnam, Bambodla, and Laos— had been recognised by mare than thirty states and had exchanged diplomatic missions with many of the recognising states. The United States delegate supported the Prenoh representatives as to the extent of the diplomatic rela tions of the three applicants and stated that his country was one of those states which had recognised and exchanged diplomatic missions with them.*®^ iQllbid.. 7th year, 602nd meeting, pp. 16, 17* Ibid.. 603rd meeting, p. 1. 21+0 With regard to Austria, the United States delegate naintained that that applioant vas a sovereign state capable of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with other states of the international community. In supporting Italy's admission, the American representative argued that a number of states had exchanged full diplomatic representation with Italy. This indicated, according to him, a recognition by those states that, insofar as foreign relations were oonoerned, Italy was completely sovereign.1^ Regarding Finland's admission, the American delegate naintained that it had renewed diplomatic rela tions with other countries and, therefore, was fully independent. ^ The Applicant Must be a Peace-Loving State The applicant must not only be a state; it must be a peace-loving state. Nevertheless, the term "peace- loving" is very vague. Nations have always declared themselves as peace-loving. Itaey all profess promotion of world peaee as a prime goal of their foreign policy. l83jbld., 2nd year, 190th meeting, pp. 2128-29. I81*lbid., p. 2120; ibid., 203rd meeting, p. 21*09; Ibid.. 205tn meeting, p. 2440. iQSlbld.. 206th meeting, p. 21*62. 241 Yet world peace In a world tans community can only be relative and subjective. World peace in a system of power politics can only be consistent with requirements of national security which is also relatively and sub jectively defined. To the Western powers peace is tantamount to preservation of the favored status quo, or allowing changes in the status quo by non-vloleht means or without use of physical force, generally referring to legal or constitutional processes, for the law or the constitution is a legitimization of the status quo. To the Soviet Union or other revolutlonsry powers, this is a false interpretation of peace. To the Soviet Union, for example, permanent peace is possible only when all the nations of the world have become "friendly" to ii, that is, also communist. Only conmiunist states can he really peace-loving. XVi aim, therefore, has been to promote or to create such friendly states. ITaturally any action toward this Soviet aim is resisted by countries of opposing interests or values. Because of the resistance encountered, which does not always spare using police or military force, non-violent means do not always suffice in the establishment of peace- loving communist states; therefore, violent means must have to be used when and if necessary. Yet these violent means, in communist dialectics, because used for the achievement of permanent peace are not considered by the communists as violent or aggressive or war mongering . This Marxian twist, of oourse, has further complicated the definition of peace or of "peace- lovlngness." ▲ Soviet delegate to the Uhited Nations tried to make a simplified differentiation of peace as Interpreted by the Uhited States and by the USSR* "For the people of the USSR," he said, "'peace* is a most honored word, whereas in the United States it is a most dsngerous word and those who call for peace are con sidered subversive characters*"1^ Countries are peace-loving as they appear to conform with or to accept the same interests and values as that of the member doing the judging, or as they expediently serve the policy or diplomatic objectives of that member* Aggression indicates non-peace-loving nature. Charges of acts of aggression had been used to justify opposition to the admission of certain applicants* The Greek Government, for instance, opposed the admission of Albania in view of the fact that the latter had joined iQ63C0R, 7th year, 602nd meeting, pp. 7-8. 21 ;3 the Axis fearers by sending fifteen battalions against Greece In 191+0-Ul*1®^ On the other hand, the delegate of Yugoslavia, In defense of Albania, claimed that the Greek charges were false. According to bin, Albania vas not an aggressor but, as a natter of fact, a victim of aggression. Albania was the first vletln of faelsn In 1 f i f t Europe. In the case of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese dele gate accused that applleant of arned Invasion In the 1 Ao Feltashan region In the province of Slnkiang. 7 Because of this Chinese charge of aggression, the British delegate maintained that a orlna facie doubt as to Mongolia's peace-loving character had been estab lished and, therefore, objected to Mongolia's admission.190 187ibid., 1st year, 1st series, 2nd meeting, pp. 78-80; ibid.. Supplement Mo. 1^, pp. 19-20; GAOR, 2nd session, First committeei Summary Record of Meetings. 102nd meeting, p. 383. *^°Ibid.. 1st year, 2nd series 58th meeting, p. 81+. l89ibld.. 2nd vear. Special Supplement Mo. 3. pp. 8-9, iSn, 38-67. — 190Ibid., p. 11 214* la tappert of Oattr Mongolia, tht USSR dtltgatt, quoting a special eouaunique issued by the Mongolian Government, stated that the allegations by the Chinese representative regarding penetration into China by the Mongolian military units were false and had been fabri cated for provoeative purposes. "The falsity and unlikelihood of these Chinese allegations were evident from the fact that the Peltashan region was in Mongolian territory.*^1 . It was China, he continued, which 192 invaded the territory of Mongolia and not vioe-versa. A few years later, the Chinese Government again accused the Mongolians of enother act of aggression. The Chinese representative claimed that the Mongolian People*s Republic had participated with the Chinese and Korean communists in the war in Korea against the United N a t i o n s . 1 ^ Similarly, this chsrge of aggression was used in opposing the admission of North Korea into the United Nations.l91* 191lbld., PP. 9-10, 13, 37-lfO. 192(i40R, 2nd session, Vol. II, Plenary Meetings. 117th plenary meeting, p. 1052. ^^SCCR. 10th year, 703rd meeting, p. 11} Ibid.. 70l*th meeting, p. 5* ^Ibid.. l*th year, l* 23rd meeting, p. 2; ibid.. 7th year, 595th meeting, pp. 12-15$ ibid.. 10th year, 701*th meeting, p. 5* 21*5 The United States representstire also questioned the peace-loving nature of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ruaanla which had giren woral support to Coosunist aggres- 195 sion in Korea and against Greece. Regarding the application of Israel, the Syrian delegate declared that admission of that applicant would not serve peace but would, on the contrary, disturb peace, for the "so-called State of Israel has no foundation, no existence, except that it has gained by aggression*nl96 He con(jeBne(j Israel's expansion beyond the Halts defined by a General Assenbly resolu tion as aggression* The Egyptian delegate contended that Israel was not a peace-loving state; that even before the ternlna- tlon of the Mandate, It had been guilty of terrorisa 198 against the defenseless Arabs* ^95>QAOR, 7th session. Ad Hoc Political Counitteet Sum cry Record of Meetings. aeetlng, p. 302. 198Ibld., 3rd year, 383rd aeetlng, pp. 18, 19* l97|bld., 381;th aeetlng, p* 26; Ibid. * 385th aeetlng, p* 7; GAOR. 3rd session, Part II. Plenary Meetings. 207th plenary aeetlng, p* 311;. l980|0a, 207th plenary aeetlng, ibid.. pp. 311-13; ibid.. Ad hoc Political Counlttees Suaaarv Record of Meetings. 40th aeetlng, p. 269. 21*6 Aoeordlng to tho delegates or Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, tho aggressiveness and tho non-peace-loving nature of Israel wore demonstrated by its desecration of the Holy places, the expulsion of the Arab population from their homes and land, and the assassination of the United Nations Mediator and other officials Israel which, nevertheless, had gained admission into the Uhited Nations, was now in a position to oppose the application of Jordan "which embarked on hostilities against Israel."200 In another sense of aggression, Japan*s admission was rejected by the USSR delegation because that country had become a base and an obedient instrument of the 201 Uhited States* policy of aggression in the Far Bast* Contemplated aggression was made a reason by the USSR for the rejection of Transjordan*s application* According to the Soviet delegate it was doubtful whether l*2nd meeting ^^See statements of the delegates of Iraq, ibid.: eting, pp* l80-8l; ibid., l*7th meeting, pp* 289- meetlng, pp 200 a. ihl^.. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 1*7th zooaA0R* l*th session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 27th meeting, p* 11*1 ** 201 SCQR* 7th year, 601st meeting, pp. 8-9* Trans Jordan was really Imbued with peaoe-loving Ideals because that country was drsaning of and naklng some sort of attempts to axaouta Its plan for a Oraatar An applicant which la technicalIt at war with a United HatIons member is not paaoa-lowing* The existence of a technical state of war In which the applicant was involwed cast doubt on Its peace-loving nature* 3he Greek Ambassador* in a letter to the Acting Secretary General* stated that Albania had been In a state of war with Greece since October 28* 19U&* This state of war* he argued was based In law on an Albanian decree issued on the eve of the declaration of war by Italy on Prance and the United Kingdom* Albania had closely linked Its destinies with Italy* Albania took advantage of its new ties to carry out a ruthless policy of denationalisa tion of the Greek population of Northern Epirus* Albania had provided the Axis with a springboard on Greeee and Southeastern Europe In general* For these and other reasons* Albania did not qualify as a peace- loving nation whleh was a sine qua non prerequisite of 202GAOR. 2nd year* Vol. II, Plenary Meetings. 117th plenary meeting* p* 1051* 2J+8 of membership. The effects of the premature admission of such a new member in the TJhited Nations, he emphasised, would not take long to be felt* Peace and security in 203 the Balkans would be at stake from the outset. Albania, of course, had something to say about this* The Albanian Government declared that it did not consider itself at war with Greece. The contention that Albania had declared war against Greeoe on October 28, 191|.0, was untenable in view of the faot, the Albanian Government declared, that the Albanian State, at that time, was completely submerged by Fascist Italy and did not possess a legitimate government entitled to speak in the name of the Albanian people*As regards the accusation that Albania constituted a danger to the peace and seourlty of the Balkans, that was utterly ridiculous, aeoordlng to Albanian spokesmen. Albania actually needed peace in order to reconstruct the oountry whloh was devastated by six years of war* Albania could not afford to commit acts of aggression against Greeoe, a nation seven times larger in populatl^?; 203sOCR. 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement Mo* k, pp. 21-21*, 35-U3J ibid*. 55th meeting, pp. 75^6* 20^Ibld.* Supplement Mo. l^, pp. 92-93* 2°5lb^d., p. 9lf. 21*9 The Tagoalav delegate also pointed oat that the Albanians wanted peaceful relationship with other states and that they IdSslred peaceful Internal development* As he stated! The Internal constitution of Albania guarantees her a peaceful development* Thanks to the people's Government during the struggle for national libera tion and social and political reforms which rescued the country from the feudal system that had been the souroe of foreign Influence, thanks also to the full Independence of the country and the libera tion from fascist Influence, the people's democracy is enabled to achieve a complete development whioh, In its essence, can only be peace-loving*206 The representative of Britain, although sympa thetic with Italy's application as supported by the United states, did not fully support thfct application because of the existence of a state of war.^°? Britain at that time had not ratified the peaoe treaty with Italy* Britain still felt the wounds caused by Italy's "stab in the back*" With regard to the application of Siam, the French delegate held that because of Siamese aggression in 191*0 against In do-China, Prance considered ..iftself in a state of war with Slam* In the opinion of his Government, he said, "it would not be proper for Slam, by 206ibid.. 56th meeting, p* 85* 2°7ibld». 2nd year, 201*th meeting, pp* 21*09, 21*18. 2*J0 its admission In the Unitad HatIona, to reoeive acquittal of ita policy of aggression In tha past before haring proved by its deads its willingness to repair tha daaage it had caused."^®® Tha existence of this state of war was denied by the Slam* The Siamese Government, in a latter to tha Seoretary General, stated that Siam, had shown Its desire for peaoe even though its sovereign rights had bean infringed upon from time to time since tha and of tha war in the Pacific* Slam had issued expressed instructions to local Authorities to avoid any clash with the French, to exercise utmost farbearanoe, and 209 not even to retaliate when attacked* Willingness to employ pacific means in the solution of disputes signifies peace-loving character. Upon the settlement of the territorial dispute, as France had wanted, the french delegate supported the admission of Slam into the United Hatlons. This time the frenoh delegate expressed the eonoept of wllllngiess to employ pacific methods in the settlement of boundary disputes as his reason for the admission of Slamt 208ibid.. 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement Wo* ii, p. 76. 209lbl<l.. pp. ll»5-U7. 251 The settlement arrived at la, to oar mind, a factor which should ba taken into account, and auffioe to show that Siaa fulfills the conditions required by the Charter, acre particularly as regards her desire for peace and international Justice.210 This sane coneept was raised in Albano~Greek frontier question and the adalaalon of Albania. The French delegate, for exaaple, believed that the main principle involved in thia question was whether Albania was willing to settle the controversy by pacific 211 aeans. He was supported by the representative of Mexioo.2*2 The Poliah delegate, on the other hand, felt that the attitude of Albania on the territorial dispute had been exaggerated since Albania's declaration of willing ness to undertake Charter obligations in its original application for admission carried automatic acceptance of the prinolple of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.21^ Regarding the Mongolian aggression in the Peltashan region, the Chinese delegate declared that the 210Ibld.. 82nd meeting, pp. 525*26. 211Ibld.. Supplement Mo. l£, p. 60. 212Jbid. 2I3lbid. 252 Mongolian People's Republic bad never attempted negotla- tlon nor mediation nop conciliation. The Mongolian People's Republic had made no suggaatlona for an Inquiry or arbitration or judicial settlement* On tha contrary* Mongolia had started an Invasion with a for ty-eight-hour ultimatum to tha loeal authorities. Whan tha Chinese Government had protested and demanded suspension of hostilities and retirement from the Invaded territory pending Investigation* the Mongolian Government had replied by asserting that the territory eoneerned belonged to Mongolia* These acta, according to the Chinese representative* demonstrated that the Mongolian People's Republlo was not a peace-loving state and* therefore* could not be admitted Into the Uhited Nations*21^ However* the USSR delegate claimed that It was China which had Invaded the territory of Mongolia and not vice-versa.21^ The desire to maintain friendly relations and settle disputes peacefully had been used to support the admission of Israel* The USSR delegate stated that the 21i*Tbld.* 2nd year, Special Supplement Ho. pp* 8-9* lz-13, 36-37* 21%A0R* 2nd year* Vol. Ill, Plenary Meetings* 117th plenary meeting* p* 1052* 253 State of Israel had always wished to lire In pease and entertain peaeeful relations, ineluding peaceful settle- ment of disputes, with all Its neighbors and with all the nations of the world. Israel was not to blame for the fact that this appeal did not meet with any response either from Its neighbors or from some of the distant states.21^ * Inatlgatlon of border Incidents demonstrates non peace- loving nature. Instigation of border inoldents demonstrated the non-peace-loving character of the applicant. The Greek representative, questioned the peace-loving character of Albania when armed bands of Albanians had been allowed to raid Greek territory to loot and kidnap soldiers and eltisens and to harass frontier populations by firing at them. Moreover, the Greek Government claimed that these Albanian provocations and activities were aimed ultimately at overthrowing 217 the regime In Greeoe. 1 The British delegate maintained that a majority of the Commission of Investigation appointed by the Seourity Council, which visited Greece and neighboring 216scor, 3r(j year, 383rd meeting, p. 22. 2 Ibid.. lot year, 2nd series, 55th meeting, pp. 77-78. 25U countries, found that Albania, with two other Governments (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia), was guilty of stirring up strife In Greece.21® The Albanian Government had admitted that border Incidents had occurred, but they had always been pro voked by Greece. The Albanians, It was claimed, were the victims and the Greek fascists and Imperialists were the aggressors. Greece wanted war with Albania in order to grab southern Albania which Greece had called Northern Epirus.219 The USSR representative emphasized that the representatives of three other Balkan States had proved to the Security Council by official data and evidence that those frontier Incidents were being provoked by 220 Greek governmental circles. In connection with those border incidents, the American representative opposed the admission of Bulgaria on the ground that that applicant did not wish to have friendly relations with one of its neighbors, that is, Greece, but, on the other hand, had supported the guerrillas who were fighting the Greek Government. This 2*&Ibld.. 2nd year, 186th meeting, p. 2036. 2l9Ibld., 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. 1^, p. 9U» 220Ibld.. 2nd year, Special Supplement Ho. 2* P*5» 255 conduot of Bulgaria* according to tha American repre sentative* constituted a threat to peace.22* Hie Chinese delegate voted also against the admission of Bulgaria because: When a country has been found by one of our yTFnited Nations/ subsidiary organs to have violated the boundary of another country* I oonsider that vould make it difficult to fulfill the qualifica tion of being a peace-loving State.222 Interference with peaceful foreign shipping shows non-peace-loving character. Interference with peaceful foreign shipping in the applicant*s territorial waters was declared a non-peaceful act and had been used to oppose the admission of Albania, for example. The Greek representative pointed out that the Albanian General Staff had forbidden the entry* without prior notiee and due authority* of Greek merchantmen and tugs into Albanian territorial waters. It was clear, accord ing to the Greek Government* that such a prohibition, hindering as it does peaceful navigation* was improper between states having normal relations in time of peace* such as Albania claimed to enjoy* Furthermore* 221Ibid. * 206th meeting, p* 21*.53* 222Ibid.. 2nd year, 201+th meeting* p. 21*20; ibid.. 206th meeting* p* 21+60. 256 the Greek Government stated, Albanian coastal batteries had »ade the passage of the Straits of Corfu unsafe since they fired indiscriminately on merchantmen passing through them. Thus, during the months of June and July, 192(6, a couple of Turkish vessels were hit.22^ The British delegate explained that a aeries of incidents had given rise to doubts on the part of his Government as to whether the Albanian Government was peace-loving* He cited the firing on two British war ships by Albanian coastal batteries on May 15* 191(6, and the mining of two other warships on October 22, 191(6, while passing through the Straits of Corfu.22h The French delegate, who had previously supported Albania*s admission, because of the Corfu Incidents felt that the Committee should exercise great care in dealing with the Albanian application.2^ But to the USSR delegate, the Incidents in the territorial waters of Albania merely proved how highly the Albanian people prised their newly won independence. Respect of the territorial Integrity and sovereign 223ibld.. 1st year, 2nd series, 55th meeting, p. 75* 22frlbld.. supplement Ho. I f c , pp* 60-61, 82-85* 225lbld*. 2nd year, Special Supplement Mo* 2* 257 rights of all peoplss was completely consonant with tha Charter, and action in defense of those rights was 226 no bar to adnission to membership* Ufaratlfied peace treaty signifies non-peace-loving nature of ex-enemy applicant* The reason of "unratified peace treaties” for the rejection or postponement of admission of ex-enemy states was used in connection with their leek of sovereignty. This same reason was used with reference to the criterion of the peace-loving nature of the applicants. The unratlfled peace treaties used in this latter category appeared to signify that the state of war had not yet been legally terminated between the Allied Powers and the defeated enemy countries. During the discussions on the admission of the ex-enemy states— Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Italy— the Soviet delegate held that the terms of the preambles of their peace treaties, together with Chapter X of the Potsdam Declaration, left no doubt that the four Powers concerned had agreed that the Allied and Associated Powers would support the applica tion of the ex-enemy states only after the conclusion of the peace treaties, including their ratlfication.*^ 226lbld.. p. 5* 227lbld.. p. 19* 258 He, therefore, proposed that the consideration of their applications be postponed until such peace treaties had entered into force.22® According to him, any diseaseion on the subject of their admission would at that time be useless At the appropriate time, that is, when the peaee treaties came into foree by their ratification, his Government would support "the applications of all or, at any rate, of some of these oountries for admission to the United Nations."230 Austria was in a special situation quite different from that of Italy or the Bast Buropean states, yet, as a country which fought for Germany against the Uhited Nations, it was also under an armistice. Likewise, stated the soviet delegate, Austria*s application for membership could be considered only after ratification of its peace treaty by all the great powers.2^ However, the Uhited States delegate contended that there was nothing in the Charter or in the preamble of the peaee treaties that imposed an obligation to postpone consideration of membership applications from 226Ibld., pp. 20, 21, 23, 26. 22^Ibld.. 190th meeting, p. 2124* ^3°Ibld., 186th meeting, pp. 20^.8, 20i*9. 231QA0R. 2nd session, Vol. II, Plenary Meetings. 107th plenary meeting, p. 1051. 259 ex-enemy states until the ratification and the entry into force of the peace treaties, and earlier admission was not precluded,232 The United States delegation had been insistent on the admission of Italy and Austria* Regarding Italy»s application, the United States delegate held that that country had been deolared a co-belligerent and, therefore, should be treated as such, and differently from the ex-enemy states of Hungary, Bulgaria or Rumania* Moreover, the Italian peace treaty had been ratified by all the great powers except the USSR* It would be patently unjust, he argued, to deny the Italian people membership in the United Rations simply because the peace treaty had not 233 been ratified by one great power. Concerning Austria, the Uhited States delegate pointed out that the treaty with that country was in the nature of a bilateral agreement by which various Governments were to recognise the new status of Austria, rather than a peace treaty* It was, he desoribed, "a treaty with a victim of Vasi aggression.”2^* 232acor. p. 201*6; ibid * * 190th meeting, p* 2121; ibid., Special Supplement Wo. pp* 18-19* 233lbld*. Special Supplement Mo* p* 22. 23UqaOR. 2nd session, Plrst Committee, Summary Record of weetinea. 103rd meeting, p. 393* 260 The absence of & peaee treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was, according to the USSR representative* cause for the rejection of that country's application for admission* He laid the absence of such a treaty to an aggressive policy by the Uhited States which was occupying Japan to keep Japan's relations with the USSR and Communist China disrupted and deteriorated*2^ Conduct of applicant during the war as a determi nant of its peace-loving nature * The conduct of the applicant during the war was another one of the gauges employed to determine its peace-loving nature* To the Russians particularly* this was a moat important faotor of admission* for* as the USSR delegate stated: The principles which led the democratic nations to fight the Nazi aggressors had constituted the basis bt the Charter; therefore* it was impossible to Ignore the behavior of the applloant states toward the Nazi aggressors when examining the appli cations for membership in the Uhited Nations.23® However* there appeared to be an inconsistency among the Russians in their rationalisation of this 235aCOR. 7th year* 601st meeting* p* 11; QAOR* 7th session* Ad Hoc Political Committee: Summary Record of Meetings* uUtn meeting, p. 272* 23630®, 2nd year* Speolal Supplement No* p. 2; also* QAOR. 2nd session* First Committee, op. sit** l£>th meeting* p* 55* 261 conoept* While the Raasian delegate in the Seourlty Council described it ae "a fifth basic principle1 * to be added to the expressed qualifications under Article 1+, paragraph 1, of the Charter* the Russian delegate in the General Assembly phrased It within the enumerated criterion of peace-loving nature.2*^ But, to the Russians, this was not at all inconsistent. The Russian delegate in the General Assembly explained that his Government had not violated nor intended to violate Article 1+ of the Charters Neither had it given an incor rect interpretation to the said Artlole. Rather, it believed that: • • • legal formula must be to express polltioal ideas; law and polltios serve the same purpose, and law without politics is meaningless . • • • The function of law is to formulate political Ideas and political thoughts. We are not now talking of legal formula; we are discussing the political side of the question ^of admission/. 38 The statements, therefore, were politically consistent with each other and with Artiele 1+ of the Charter* The USSR delegate affirmed that it was not possible for his Government to admit Ireland and Portugal because these two countries: 237sea 3C0R. 2nd year, Special Supplement No* 3, p* 2; QAOR. 2na year, Vol. II. plenary Meetings* TTfth plenary meeting, p. 101+9. 238, 'QAOR. ibid.* pp. 101+9-50. 262 . • • are not peace-loving states, far ths only peace-loving states are those which were on the side of the peace-loving States whleh fought against Fascism, while those which fought against the peace-loving States and supported Fascism are not peaoe-lOYing States* Such is our definition of the issue.239 Ireland and Portugal were technically neutral during the war* nevertheless, because of strong resent ments against Britain, Free Irish Partisans had expressed sympathy with the fasoist countries* Because of this expression of sympathy and the fact that Ireland did not help the Allies at all, even In the most critical stages of the war, and did not help found the world organization even by a token declaration of war by March 1, 191*5* the USSR delegate believed that It was not fit to enter the Uhited nations*2^0 Churchill had shown the same attitude toward Ireland at Talta. The Yugoslav delegate also believed that the neutrality of such states as Ireland prolonged the war. 239Ibid., p. 1050. 2^°S00B, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement Ho. k, p* 72; Ibid.. 57th meeting, p. 102j Ibid.. 2n<f year. Spec lal"" 85gp lament Ho* p. 15| IblJTTwteth meeting, p.zflkl: loid.. TSh year, 59kth meeting, p. 13j QAOR. oFthe 1st sei _____ - _ _ year, 2nd part or the 1st session, First committeet Suimsyy Record of Meetings, 15th meeting, p. 56| Ibid., 2nd y Vol. ttTpienarvmeetings. 117th plenary meeting, pp. 101*9, 105& meeting, p* session, Part H , 192nd plenary 263 Neutrality «ti, therefore, not the best proof that a people vas peace-loving.2**1 As for Portugal, the Russian verbal attacks had been more serious than with Ireland. Aoeording to the USSR delegate, Portugal*s role during the seoond world war was notorious. He olaiaed that that oountry was the transshipment point through whieh passed American and British oil and the materials which Germany lacked, sueh as wolfram and tin, destined for the Hitlerite military command. Portugal was also aeeused of being a haven for wanted war criminals. Apparently also, the Russians had not forgotten their defeat in the Spanish Civil War by helping the Republican Government which was overthrown by Franco. Portugal, according to the USSR delegate, had helped Franco's victory by allowing supplies for the rebels to pass through its territory. He further recollected that it was on the territory of Portugal that the plans of rebellion brought back from Berlin to be delivered to General Franco was first landed. The Salasar Government was condemned for its fasclstle practices.2**2 2**1GACR. 2nd year, 117th plenery meeting, oj>. clt.. p. 1067. 2**2Ibld.. pp. 1050, 1061-62: ibid.. 2nd part of the 1st session, First committee, l^ih meeting, 264 It wts very probable that the Raeelane also had not forgotten the unweloomed reception the USSR got from the Salazar Government daring Its bid for admission Into the League of Rations In 1934» plaa the brutal suppression of communism In Portugal by the sane govern ment. Similarly* the Russians must have remembered that Ireland vas another of those League members vhleh expressed opposition and hostility to the USSR during the latter*s entry Into that organisation. These small powers* the Russians thought* must be humbled and put In their right plaoea. Poland also opposed the admission of Portugal In view of that country*s fasolst tendencies which the Allies had fought against during the war.2^ India expressed opposition to the admission of Portugal because of the letter's authoritarian govern ment "with Its fascist flavor*" Its elose relationship with Spain* but basically because of Portugal's op. clt.. p. $6; SCCR, 1st year* 2nd series, 57th meeting, p. iCJj ibid.* Supplement Ho. 4* p. 74; ibid.* 2nd year* 166th mooting* pp. 204^-44; ibid.. SpcolaTsapplcwont f o. pp. lo-17; ibid.. 7th yoar* 5 9 4 mooting* p. 13« eo statement of tho Byelorussian representative* GAQR. 2nd session* First Committees Summary Record of Mootings. 101st mooting* pp. 373-74* ^fy^SCOR. yoar* 2nd series* Supplement Ho. 4* P. 74; ibid..57th meeting* p. 109* 265 1 1 thoroughly reactionary# colonial policy which could be seen in Goa . . . On the other hand# the Uhlted States delegate had strongly supported the admission of Portugal* According to him* from the military point of view# Portugal did not aid the Axis powers in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, that applicant had extended valuable aid to the Allies by putting air bases in the Azores at the disposal of the Uhlted States and Britain. And these bases had been of vital importance to the winning of the war in Europe# not only on the western front# but also on the eastern frontj and in the redeployment of the Allied faress after VB-Day these bases had been an important contributing factor in shortening the war against Japan* On the economic side# he added# Portugal behaved as a neutral country under international law.2^-* The Uhlted States delegate had also cited the Potsdam Declaration on the admission to membership of neutrals fulfilling the qualifications under Article 4# with the exception of Spain.2^ 2^OACR, 2nd part of the 1st session# First Committee# op. olt*. 16th meeting# p* 67* 2^SC0R. 2nd year# Special Supplement Ho* ^# p. 17* 2^Tbid., 1st year# 2nd series# 57th meeting# p. 105. 266 The American delegate alao pointed out that two of tho applloanta already admitted— Sweden and Afghanistan— were neutral daring tha war and yet tha USSR had voted in favor of their admission* Hence, ha argued, tha aaaontial criterion of tha acceptability of a candidate vaa not ita conduct daring tha aaeond world war* The real or 1 tar ion vaa that it should be peace-loving, and able and willing to oarry oat tho obllgatlona of tha Charter ,^7 Also tha vary faet that tha dalagataa of Czechoslovakia and Panana had proposed a draft resolution which stated that* Tha General Assembly re eon and a • • • that in investigating tho candidates • • • tha Security Council should take into consideration, among other factors, tho attitude of the Candidata states during the second world war,z4» proved that that condition was external to the Charter* Vara this factor interpreted to bo within tho meaning of Article U of tha Charter there would have bean no necessity for such a resolution* Tet, the Uhlted States, in defending applicants favorable to it, had Itself euphaslsed the contribution 2^7dACR. 2nd part of tho 1st session, First Conulttoe, op. clt.. 17th nesting, p. 71J SCOR* 1st year, 2nd series, 56th nesting, p* 92; ibid.* 57th nesting, pp. 101;, 107; Ibid., 2nd year. Special Supplement Vo. pp. 2-3, 15*16; ibid*, lBbthmeeting, p* zowii ibid.. 7th year, 573rd nesting, p. 33* ^UQqacR. 2nd part of the 1st Session, First Committee, i/th meeting, op. elt*. pp. 69-70* 267 of those applicants to the final victory of the Allied Powers* The first part of the arguments far the admis sion of Portugal above by the United States delegate demonstrates this point* Other members also felt that the factor of conduct during the second world war was extraneous to the Char ter *^^ However, like the United States, they had referred to the favorable conduct during the last world war of the applicants they supported* The British delegate supported the American arguments in behalf of Portugal, and added that Portugal had offered asylum to thousands of refugees who were victims of the Nazis* He emphasised the traditional friendship which had existed between his country and Portugal based on an alliance which had continued since ----- - _ the 1st sessionT"Pirst Committee, op* cit.. 15th meeting, p. 57; ibid*, 2nd session, Vol* II. Plenary Meetings. 117th plenary meeting, pp. 1051*-55; SOcfe. 1st year. 2nd series, 56th meeting, pp. 92, 95; ibid.. 2nd year, Special Supplement Ho* 3, p* 3; France, OAftt. 2nd part of the 1st session. First committee, op. clt*. 17th meeting, p* 71; SO OR. 5oth meeting, op* cl*tT. p. 93; Netherlands, OAOR. knasession, First committee, op. clt.. 96th meeting, p* 31*2; SCOR. 56th meeting, op* clt*. pp* 92, 96* 25°SCCR. 1st year, 2nd series. Supplement No* Jj, 1386.250 2H9Refer.to the statements of the delegates of tain. SCOR. 1st year, 2nd series, 5oth meeting, p. d.. 57th meeting, p . lOli: ibid.. 2nd year. Special ng* p* 91*; P* 73. 268 The French repretentative also stressed Portugal*e assistance to many Frenoh nationals who managed to escape during the war from oocupied France and were helped by that country In joining the Free The representatives of Brazil and Mexico also supported the admission of Portugal claiming that that applicant had maintained its neutrality throughout the war* and did not, as the USSR delegate had contended, The representative of Australia, supporting the admission of Ireland, emphasized also the latter*s neutrality during the war, and that "the most that could be said about that neutral state was that the particular state loved peace not wisely, but too well, but not that that the state was not a peace-loving state*"2^ together with the communists, had applied this argument against Spain* At the San Francisco conference an 25llbld*. Ibid*. 57th meeting, p. 101*. French Army* 251 help the fascist aggressors*2^2 But it should also be noted that these countries, ^ Ibid*, Supplement Ho* ]£, pp* 73-745 Ibid*. 5 meeting, pp. 98-99, 16i, 110* 253qaOB, 2nd session, Vol* II, Plenary Meetings 117th plenary meeting, p* 1055* 269 international organization, a Mexican resolution, which proposed that Spain should not be allowed to become a member of the Uhlted Rations so long as the Franco regime remained in power not only because it was installed with the help of the Axis powers but because it had given help and encouragement to the Axis powers during the war, was approved by acclamation.2^ At Potsdam, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and Britain declared that they would not support any request made by the Franco Government far membership in the United Nations because, owing to its origins, nature and antecedents, and its close relations with the aggressor states, it did not possess the necessary 255 qualifications to justify its admission* The General Committee of the General Assembly, at its London session, confirmed the previous declarations in a new draft resolution which was recommended to the Assembly and 256 passed by this organ by a big majority* 2^UNCIO, Poo aments. Vol. VI, pp. 12l*-26. 2^Cited in GAORt 1st session, Plenary Meetings. 26th plenary meeting, p* 35U, see also ftieTew fork Times, Maroh 27, 19U7, P* 15* ^ ^Ibld*. pp. 353-61, 58U-85; ibid*, 59th plenary meeting, p* 1222* 270 While the USSR had used this eoneept to justify the veto of the application of Ireland and Portugal, on the other hand, It had used the sane concept to sustain the admissibility of Albania and Outer Mongolia Into the organization* The USSR delegate praised the con tribution of the Albanian people In the struggle against the Italian and German fascist aggressors* He cited a series of exploits that illustrated the heroic resist ance of the Albanian patriots against Italian domination. He recounted the failures of successive quisling govern ments and the annexation of Albania by Italy* It was his opinion that the Albanian people and the postwar republican government could not be blamed far the declaration of war on Greeoe in 19U0, which was made by the Italian Government and the quisling Government of Albania* He pointed out that the new Albanian Government had prosecuted and severely punished the Albanian quisling*. He described the underground movement against Italy to which Mussolini himself attributed his reverses in the war against Greece* This behavior of the people of Albania during the war showed that they were capable of contributing effectively to the United 271 Nations work of peaoe and should entitle Albania to admission in the organization.2^ The delegate of Yugoslavia gave full support to the USSR arguments.2^® The French delegate expressed the belief that the USSR delegate had proved not only Albania's desire to fight but its active participation vlth all the means in its possession in the struggle against fascism. Re sympathized vlth Albania's application because his ovn 259 government was made up of resistance leaders. The Greek Government, however# opposed the admis- sion of Albania. Among other reasons# the representative 25?3C0R. 1st year# 2nd series# Supplement No. U# pp. 60# 79-oZt ibid.. 5Uth meeting# p p . o7-fot5: lbT?..*5th meeting# pp. 65-665 ibid.. 57th meeting#jp. 106: ibid.. 2nd year. Special Snpplament No. 3. pp. 5. 29-30, 30-34; ibid.. 186& meeting# pp. i£b32p 35T ibid.. 1 +th year, 1 +4Oth meeting# pp. 5-6; GACR. 2nd part of t6a 1st session# Pirst Committee# l^tn meeting# op. clt.. pp. 55-56; ibid.. 2nd session# First Committee# op. clt.. 98th meeting, p. 356; ibid.. Vol. II# Plenary Meetings. 117th plenary meeting# pp. 1051-52# 10&5. See statements of the Byelorussian delegate, ibid.. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committee# 15th meeting# p. 60: ibid.. 2nd session, First committee# 101st meeting# p. 375* 2^QACR. 2nd session, Vol. II# 117th plenary meeting, on. cit». pp. 1068, 1069-70; SCOR. 1st year, 2nd series# 56tb meeting# pp. 82-83* 2^SC0R. 1st year# 2nd series# Supplement No. j£# p. 60. of Greece questioned the contribution to the war of Albania* He claimed that Albania had been linked by alliance to fascist Italy long before Italian occupa tion, that Albania had declared war on Greece, which war still existed, and that the people of Albania never betrayed the Italians* Albania, according to the Greek delegate, & state in which the resistance move ment did not begin until the fortunes of war had turned against the Axis, should not be aocepted into the United Nations*260 Britain did not deny that Albania had contrib uted somehow to the war against Italy; nevertheless, as the British delegate stated, his Government "• • • consider^s_7 more important to look at Albania as she is than to oonsider what she did or may have done in the past . • • .n26l British delegate had in mind the Corfu Channel incidents and the Albanian border disputes with Greece, which latter country supposedly lay within the British sphere of influence. 260qaCR. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committee, op* clt** 16th meeting, p* 65; SCOR. 1st year, 2nd series, 55th meeting, pp* 69, 70-71, 72-73• 2^1sC0R. 2nd year, 186th meeting, pp* 2035-36* 273 The united States, for various reasons of Its own, had also opposed the admission of Albania* This opposition by the Anglo-American powers, plus their support of Italy, an ex-enemy state, roused the Soviet delegate in the General Assembly into sharp oratory* He declared: In the peace treaty with Italy, a whole series of changes • • • are devoted to Albania* Albania is recognized as having the right to reparations from Italy, and what is the result? Italy, which is liable to pay reparations to Albania for the destruction which it caused in the war against the peace-loving people of Albania, is to be received in the United Nations while Albania, offended, humiliated, Insulted, robbed and looted by the Italian Fascists and having suffered at the hands of that same Italy, is to remain beyond the thres hold, outside the doors of the united Nations • • • • Do you call that Justice? Is it logical? Is it reasonable? The USSR delegate replies to these questions: no, no, nol* 2®2 The United States and Britain had supported the admission of Italy on the ground that It was declared by the Allied Powers to be a co-belligerent in the war against Germany*2^ Yet co-belligerency did not confer a right to membership, as the Russians saw it* They suspected that favoritism for the Italians and 262aA0R• 2nd session, Vol* II, Plenary Meetings. 117th plenary meeting, p* 1052* 263s0CR, 2nd year, 186th meeting, p* 201*6; ibid*, 190th meeting, p* 2120; ibid. 3rd year, 3®5th meeting, p. 22* 27k discrimination against tha Albanians was the basic reason far the Anglo-American attitude* In 1952, Italy became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To the Western powers Italy's admission into the defensive military organiza tion against Communist aggression was prima facie evidence of that country's peace-loving character. To Soviet Russia that membership in the "aggressive North Atlantic bloc" increased doubts as to Italy's peace- loving character and created additional difficulties in settling the question of Italy's admission to the Uhlted Nations.2^* The good war conduct of the Mongolian People»s Republic was a constant argument by the USSR delegation for that country's admission into the Uhlted Nations. Has Mongolians gave considerable aid to the Soviet forces in the economic and military spheres to fight the Japanese. Outer Mongolia declared war an the Axis powers on June 22, 191*1* and actively continued the struggle against the fascist aggressors until their final capitu lation.2^ The sensitiveness of the Russians to the 261*pia., 7th year, 573rd meeting, p. 26} jLbj^d., 591*th meetTngT* P* 13* 26£ibld., 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. 1^, p. 65; ibid., 56th meeting, p. 90; ibld.. 2nd Vear. 275 value of the role of that applicant during the war was demonstrated when the American delegate unguardedly asked the Soviet delegate during the debate on Italy’s admission whether the Mongolian People’s Republic was Important enough to be admitted to membership together with Italy* That query# according to the Soviet dele gate# was a slander on the Mongolian People’s Republic whose participation In the war against Japan helped to save the lives of many Americans who would otherwise have perished had the war continued longer* If only out of gratitude# the United States should stop slander ing the Mongolian People’s Republic and Its people* But# in answer to the question of the American delegate# he continued# there was no question that Outer Mongolia should be admitted because It . • • has earned with the blood of her sons the right to become a member of the United Nations • • • /ih«7 bad a better right to be In the united Nations chan many of those whom the United states delegate Is supporting*266 Special Supplement N o * 3# pp* 9# 37-UO; I b i d .# 186th meeting, p. 2616: Ibid *, 4 th year# iflfOth meeting# pp* 5-6; ibi d *. 7th year# 573rd meeting# pp* 35-36; Q A O R . 2nd part of the 1st session# Pirst Committee# l£th meeting# op* c l t *. p. 56; I b i d *i 2nd session# First Committee# 99th meeting# op* o l t *« p* 356; Ibid * * Vol* II, Plenary M e e t i n g s , ll7tfa plenary meeting# pp. 1052, 1003-04* Refer to the statements of Byelorussian delegate. I b i d *. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committee, 15 th meeting# p. 60; ibi d *. 2nd session# First Committee# 101st meeting# P. 375. 26630OR. 7th year# 573rd meeting# pp* 35-36. 276 And thua ha asked: Did Ireland, Portugal, Ceylon, Nepal or Jordan take part in the struggle against aggression in the seeond world war, and ho w many Ilyas of American soldiers and officers did they savef2®7 Japan*s admission was rejected by the USSR delegate for the reasons that Japan was an active supporter of Hitlerite aggression. Japan had engaged in aggression against China and the countries of Southeast Asia and had attacked the Soviet Union mare than once. The USSR delegate doubted whether militarism in Japan was dead. He accused the United States of encouraging such m ilitarism.268 The delegate of Yugoslavia in supporting Bulgarla*s admission pointed out that while it was true that Bulgaria had fought as an ally of Germany and Italy, Immediately after the overthrow of the monarchy in Bulgaria its new democratic government had mobilised and Its troops had taken an active part in the fight pAq against the Germans. 7 267 ibid. Ibid.. 7th year, 601st meeting, p. 7; ibid 602nd meeting7 pp. 8-9. meeting, o p . c l t .. p. 379* 269gA0R, 2nd session, plrst Committee, 101st 277 Abscnoe of diplomatle relation! signifies non- r>onew-loving nature of tho applicant* Another condition, that of tho "absence of dlploaatlc relatione," vaa aaod by the USSR In tho rejection of aoae of the applicants for membership* It supplemented the erlterlcn of " condUet during the second varld war." Ihls orIterIon was regarded b y many nan-communist oountries as also extraneous to Article k of the Charter,27° although the delegate of the Ukraine had declared that "the so-called new criterion— the existence of diplomatle relations— was no nev erlterlcn bu t the ve r y substance of the peaee- lovlng quality required by Artlele J**"2?1 Ye t those ncn-e one uniat countries had also made strong references to the absenee or existence of dlploaatlc relations vlth applicants for aeaberahip giving value to this factor In determining the acceptability of the applleants* But, as a "Soviet criterion" It had been used by the Russians In their ve t o of the applications of Portugal and Ireland* for example. According to the Soviet delegate* Portugal could not be peaoe-loving because it did n ot maintain and did not vls h to maintain normal diplomatle relations vlth 27°ftefer above, p. 231 ff. 271qAQR. 2nd part of the 1st session* Plrst Committee* itth meeting* op. clt., p. 61*. 278 the USSR, ba t had Instead kept ap its friendly relatione with the fasciatic Franco Government even throughout the years of w a r .2?2 To the Russians, a state maintain ing relations with Spain and the Axis powers and not with the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against those fascist aggressors to ensure the peaceful development of nations, could not be peace- loving.2?^ As for Ireland, Its relations with the USSR were not normal either, and the least that could be said about that country1s conduct during the war was that It had not helped the United Nations In any way.2?** The USSR also opposed the admission of Slam because of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries.2?£ The Soviet Union, Inter alia, took that action against Slam In return for French support of Albania's admission of a few days before. The 2?2Ibid., 15th meeting, p, 56; SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, 56th meeting, p. 103; Ib i d .. Supplement H o . jfc,* p. 7ki ibid.. 2nd year, Spec i a I T u p p lament s o . 3. pp. 16-17* 2?3qaOR. 2nd part of the 1st session, First Committee, loth meeting, op. cl t . . p. 61;. 2? ^ l M d ♦, 15th meeting, p. 56; SC O R . 1st year, 2nd series, 5 6 vn meeting, p. 102; Ibid.. Supplement N o . p. 72; Ibid.. 2nd year, Special Supplement N o . 3. pp. 15- 16. 275sc<jR. Supplement No. Ifc, o p . c l t .. p. 7k• 279 USSR did not oppose the second attempt of Slam to gain admission* By that time Slam had established full diplomatic relations vlth the Soviet Union. Albania's admission was opposed by the Greek Government which* among other reasons* claimed that since normal relations between them had not been established and since Albania had not given evidence that It was a peace-loving state* it should not be admitted as a member of the United Nations .^6 The British delegate* emphasizing that his Government did not have diplomatic relations with Albania* questioned that applicant's peace-loving nature.2 ^ The Uhlted States representative also stated that his country did not maintain diplomatic relations with Albania* and requested more Information on Its peace- 278 loving characteristics. This factor of diplomatic relations was applied by Nationalist China from a different angle In the case of Indonesia's application far membership In the united 27 6xbid*. 5tyth meeting, p. 68. 277ibld.. Supplement No. pp. 60-61* 82-85. 27 8ibld.. pp. 61* 85-88* Ibid.. 2nd year* Special Supplement s o . p. 7* Ibid.* lB6tta meeting, pp. 2835- 3b. 280 Nations* Because the Government of Indonesia had recognized the Peiping Government and, consequently, established diplomatic relations with that Chinese Government, the Government of Nationalist China, which considered such recognition and diplomatic relations as "premature11 and a "lack of faith in the principles of international law," raised doubts as to the peace- loving qualification of Indonesia under Article U of 279 the Charter* However, Nationalist China abstained from voting on the Indonesian application, b u t only after U r had threatened to veto Indonesia»s application because of the let t e r ’s recognition of Red China* The Applicant Must be Able and Willing to Carry Out the Obligations Contained in the Char ter Willingness and ability to carry out the obliga tions contained in the Charter are the last conditions enumerated in Article U, paragraph 1, of the charter that an applicant must possess in order that it may qualify for admission to membership* There is certainly a distinction between "to be willing" and "to be able" to carry out the obligations* Ability is not measured by willingness, nor does willingness demonstrate ^th year, 5 > 03rd meeting, pp* 23- 2 i | . * 281 ability* But they are qualifications both necessary to determine the fitness of the applicant to observe and perform duties or obligations* In the arguments by the members of the organization for or against the candidates for membership the distinction was sometimes made, but most often the two conditions were expressed simultaneously* Doubtful ability and willingness to carry out obligations because of limited diplomatic contact* The delegates of the United States, Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and Egypt maintained that because of its limited diplomatic contact there was not enough Informa-* tion available to show whether the Mongolian P e o p l e d Republic was capable of fulfilling the obligations under 280 the Charter* The Chinese delegate strongly doubted that Outer Mongolia was able to carry out obligations imposed by the Charter because of its very limited diplomatic 28l contact with the outside world* 28oSCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No* J±, p. 66* 28lIbld*, p. 65. 2 82 Resort to military aggression by the applicant shows its unwillingness and inability to fulfill international obligations. With the alleged invasion of the Peltashan region by the Mongolians instead of resorting to peaceful negotiation* mediation* concilia tion* or judicial settlements* the Chinese delegate declared that Outer Mongolia had acted contrary to the obligations of the Charter and would not be able and 282 willing to carry them out after admission. Ike French representative* w i t h regard to Slam's application* claimed that failure by that applicant to r et u r n Indochinese territory whi c h was gained through aggression in the last war to its rightful owner created doubt as to the willingness of Slam to carry out the obligations of the Char ter.2 8 3 But he later retracted this statement* in fact* praised Slam for its willingness to abide by the rules of the Charter* upon 28k settlement of the territorial dispute. In the case of Albania* the British delegate held that the aggressive attitude of that country w h i c h created difficulties far the British military mission 262ibid.. 2nd year* Special Supplement H o . X» pp. 8-9. 283ibid., Supplement H o . Ifc, p. 76. 28^Ibld., 81st meeting* pp. *>25-26. 283 and the War Graves M i s s i o n in carrying out their w o r k in Albania* the r e f u s a l of a v i s a for a British officer on the staff of the British Minister Designate* the shelling and mining of British warships in the Corfu Strait gave rise to doubts that the applicant wou l d be wi lling to carry out the obligations of the Charter*^®-* The A m e r i c a n delegate supported the British contention and added that failure to cooperate wi t h the United Rations Subsidiary Gro u p to bri n g about a settlement of its territorial dispute w i t h Greece demon strated that A l b a n i a was n o t w i l l i n g to carry out 286 Charter obligations* War conduct as a de terrainant of the ability and willingness of the applicant to car r y out international o b l i g a t i o n s . The Greek delegate stated that the aggressive role of wartime A l b a n i a and p r e s e n t - d a y A l b a n i a proved that the Alban i a n s w e r e not capable of me eting loyally the obligations of the C h a r t e r *^87 285 i b l d * . Suppl e m e n t No* ifc, pp. 61, 82-85* ibid.* 2nd year, 3 p e o l a l " s u p p l e m e n t H ffo. pp* 7-8; i b i d .. 186th meeting* pp* 2033-35* 2 ^ I b l d * . Special Supplement N o . PP* 6-7* 2^Ibld.. Supplement No* 1^, pp. 1+1, 59* But, according to the Y u g o s l a v and TJ3SR delegates, n o justified or justifiable doubt could be raised as to the ability and willingness of the Alba n i a n People*s Re public to carry out the obligations deriving from m embership in the United Nations, for that nation without the p r o t e c t i o n of the war laws, waged an undeclared but merciless war on the fascist and nazi aggressors, voluntarily assumed obligations exceeding b y far those required b y the Charter, and carried them out until the collapse of the enemy* They contended that the obliga tions of the members of the United Nations, however serious they mig h t be, ware b y n o means as difficult as those that were indispensable in figh t i n g against the fascist powers at a time w h e n they were powerful* To them, n the logical c onclusion is that A l b a n i a is worthy to become a member and is able and w i l l i n g to carry out all the obligations deriving from membership in the United Nations The USSR delegate a l s o claimed that the Mongo l i a n People*s R e p u b l i c had already b e e n able to make a valuable c o n tribution to common cause in the struggle of the p e ace-loving peop l e s against aggression and there 2 8 8I b l d *. pp. 29, 57, 61* 285 could be no doubt that that republic was completely ready to take upon .itself the obligations contained in 289 the Charter and would carry them out* Regarding Italy* the USSR delegate contended that that ex-enemy state* by Joining the North Atlantic military bloc* had violated the obligations It had assumed under the peace treaty and* therefore* could 290 not be expected to fulfill obligations of membership* The United States delegate* in supporting the admission of Portugal* pointed out that Portugal's behavior as a neutral country during the last war was compatible with international law and should erase all doubts as to that country's ability and willingness to 291 live up to the obligations of the Charter* Violation of peace treaty provisions* especially on human r i g h t s * demonstrates the unwillingness and Inability of the applicant to carry out the obligations of the Charter* Regarding Finland* the United States representative noted that that applloant had satisfac torily fulfilled Its obligations under the Armistice ^®^Ibld*, 56th meeting* pp* 88-89* 290QACR, 7th session* Ad Hoc Political Committee: Summary Record of Meetings. meeting* p* 272* 291Ibid*. Supplement No* li. o* 78: ibid** 2nd year, S p e c T ^ S u pp'Iement’ ffo* " X p. 17* ------ 286 and its general International obligations wbloh demon- atratad lta ability and willingness to carry oat tha obligations laid down In tha Charter and* therefore, ahould be adnltted Into tha Chi tad Rations.2^2 On the other hand* Bulgaria* Hungary, and Rumania* acoordlng to the Uhlted States delegate* had violated peaoe treaty provisions particularly that whloh specified that human rights should be guaranteed In their countries. In the oase of Rumania* assurances of the protection of human rights were also given In 191*6 to the Tripartite Commission sent to that country by the Counoil of Foreign Ministers. Suoh violations necessarily east serious doubt on the willingness of the violator to respect any International agreement or to oarry out the obligations contained In the Charter.2^3 The Uhlted States delegate accused the Rumanian Government of stifling every kind of political and ldeologioal freedom of expression and of liquidating leaders of opposition parties.2^* g92ib^d.. 2nd year* 201*th meeting, p. 21*62. 293qA0R. 2nd session* Vol. II* Plenary Meetings. 118th plenary meeting* p. 1075; ibid.. rirsVCfoBsltteei Summary Record of Meetings. I03ra meeting, pp. 391-92. 29^Ibid.; SCOR. 2nd year. 190th meeting* pp. 2131- 32; ibid., 205th meeting* p. 21*1*6; ibid.. Special Supplement lo. £* pp. 2l** 51* With regard to Hungary* events In that country since the end of May* 19^7> raised doubts on the part of the United States Government that the reorganized H ungarian Government would be able and willing to carry out Charter obligations* According to the United States delegate* the reorganized Hungarian Government came Into existence by methods which were Inconsistent with basic International agreements In force applying to that country* In a series of political crises which It provoked* the minority Communist Party brought about the virtual disintegration of the duly elected majority party. He also accused the communist regime of Hungary of drastically denying the Hungarian people of the rights envisaged In the peace treaty* For instance* political meetings of moderate groups not dominated by the left were being disrupted by communist sympathizers w ith the obvious tacit approval of the police authorities* Also* communist pressure had resulted in the postponement of the annual convention of the National Committee of the Small Holders Party* the party to whi c h the H unga r i a n people gave a majority In the 191+5 election* The present communist regime had passed a new election 288 law which would disfranchise various non-communist elements in future elections*2^-* As regards Bulgaria, the United States delegate charged that the Bulgarian Government had foisted itself upon the Bulgarian people, vitiated democratic processes, and had denied the people their fundamental human rights as guaranteed in the treaty of peace, all of which undeniably showed that that applicant could not 296 carry out the obligations of the Charter* The British representative also opposed the admission of those Eastern European states until they had shown that they were able and willing to carry out Charter obligations by abiding by the guarantees for 297 human rights as set forth in the peace treaties* The Trench representative, for regional considera tions, supported the candidacy of Rumania and Hungary, but rejected Bulgaria*s admission because of the latter*s 29% £ S £ , 2nd ■•■■ion, Vol* II, 118th plenary meeting, op* c l t *. p* 1075; S C O R * 2nd year, Special S u p p l e m e n t No. 3. pp* kli-ii5;~T M d .. 190 th meeting, p* 21^ : l b ! ? *. 201+th meeting, pp* 2l+25>-26* 2^ Q A 0 R . ibid*; S C O R . Special Supplement No* op* c l t *. pp* 25-£6; I b i d *. 20bth meeting, p* 121+53* 297s C 0 R * Supplement N o * 3, sb,. clt*. p* 21+, ibid*. 190th meeting, pp* 2119, 213?; Ibid., 205th meeting, p. 21+33. 289 execution of members of the political opposition which "offends the consciousness of the basic rules and principles of international law and public law in general."^98 The Soviet delegate refuted all the charges of the western powers. He accused the western "colonial powers" of "hypocritical slandering." Accusations against the Bast European applicants of violating human rights were false and an American invention; it was the western powers themselves, in mistreating the minorities in their own countries, in opposing the granting of self-determination to their colonies, which were, in fact, the violators of human rights. He also accused the western powers of trying to interfere with the internal affairs of the East European countries. He noted that the latter countries had already rejected the charges of the United States and Britain and in reply had given documentary evidence explaining the conduct of certain foreign powers. But, irrespective of the wishes of certain foreign circles, the Governments of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had already entered 298ibifl,, 206th meeting, p. 2 l j . l j l j . 290 the road to "true democracy*” and only In this light 299 should the charges against them he considered* The Yugoslav delegate maintained the East European countries were able to discharge their Inter national obligations as proven by their signing the peace treaties and complying with terms thereof* Those countries had not violated fundamental human rights; minorities enjoyed the protection of the Constitution and the law* Hie punishment of traitors did not violate human rights*^°° The Creek representative similarly opposed the admission of Albania because the latter country had violated human rights* including inhuman treatment of minorities* the persecution of the Catholic Church* massacres* and failure to hold free elections* He questioned the ability and willingness of such a regime to fulfill the obligations of the Charter*^0* The delegates of Iraq and Syria believed that Israel* by its violation of the Universal Declaration 299ibid** 20i|th meeting, pp* 2lUi7-U8; ibid** Special Supplement Ho* 2* PP* 27» 53-5w? OACR* 3rd session. Part I. Plenary Meetings. 17£th plenary meeting, P* 792. 3°°GAQRy 2nd session* First Committee* 101st meeting* op* clt.» p* 380. 301SCQR, 1st year* 2nd series* Supplement Ho* l£* p. 22; ibid*. 55th meeting, pp. 68-80* 291 of Human Rights, by the Inhuman treatment of Arabs in Palestine, and by 14s disrespect for International lav, would not be capable or willing to carry out the obliga- -102 tioms of the Char ter. Disregard of Uhited Nations requests or decisions Indicates the unwillingness or inability of the appli cant to fulfill International obligations. The Syrian delegate also stated that in view of the deliberate and premeditated massacre of the united Nations Mediator and his colleague In Palestine, it was not possible to accept a declaration from that state that Ur would be obedient to the Security Council* He declared that: When the Jews were told to withdraw from positions which they had no right to occupy, when they were told not to commit breaches of the truce, when they were told not to Increase their munitions or to change their political and military positions, they did not obey at all* It is well known that they have been violating those requests all the time.3*3 302QACR, 3rd session, Part II, Plenary Meetings. 207th plenary meeting, pp. 310, 311*; ibid*. Ad Hoc Political Committee 1 Summary Record of Meetings. 1x2nd meeting, p* 180, i*8th meeting, pp* 3TJ9-316* 3°3Ibld., 207th plenary meeting, p* 311*; Ibid.. Ad Hoc Political Committee, l*8th meeting, pp* 309-10; 55cft. 3rd year, 383rd meeting, pp. 18-19; Ibid., 385th meeting, pp* 8-9. Refer also to statements of other Arab delegatest Egypt, OACR. 207th plenary meeting, Ibid.; Ibid.. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 1*6 th meeting, pp. 267-6^; Lebanon, Ibid *. 207 th plenary meeting, pp. 31b-16; ibid*. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 1*5th Such flouting of Uhited Nut ion* request* and decision* demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of Israel to fulfill Charter obligations* The British delegate also stated that his Government had been disturbed by statements which had been made by responsible Israeli officials which sug gested that the Israeli Government did not Intend to pay attention to certain Uhited Nations resolutions* He referred in particular to the question of Jerusalem: Hie General Assembly has twice recommended the Internationalization of the whole area of Jerusalem, but Israeli representatives, including the Prime Minister himself, have stated that part of Jerusalem must be incorporated in the Israeli State and that internationalization, if it is to be applied at all, can only affect that area held by the Arabs.304 In the light of such statements, the British delegate declared that doubts had arisen as to the willingness of that applicant to carry out Charter obligations* The representative of Pakistan also noted that Israel had not fulfilled the conditions laid down in the resolutions of the Uhited Nations* According to him, although the General Assembly had fixed the meeting, pp. 220-26; Ibid.. 50th meeting, pp. 329-31; Saudi Arabia, ibid*. Ad hoc Political Committee, ltfth meeting, pp. 295-96; Yemen, ibid*. k8th meeting, PP* 305-306. 3°^sggR, 3rd year, 381; th meeting, p. 15; ibid.. 1+th year, 414th meeting, pp. 2-3. frontiers of Israel In its resolutlon of Hovember 29# 191*7# the government of Israel since then had deelared on several occasions that it did not intend to withdraw from the territories oeeupled illegally* Israelis intentions, as he saw them, were that it wanted to carry out a series of annexations which would doubly prejudice the interests of the Arabs, for not only would the territories assigned to the Arab state be incorporated in the Jewltfistate, but the Arabs expelled from these territories would not be able to return to them* Suoh actions and intentions proved that "Israel was Inoapable of fulfilling the obligations of the Charter and— of eourse— not prepared to do so*"^!? Abrogation of existing treaties creates doubts as to the applicant* a wil lingness to carry out Char ter obllaatlone* For another reason, the American delegate doubted whether Albania was willing to carry out Charter obligations. He stated that the Albanian authorities had expressly and in principle called into question the whole range of treaties with the United States, including multilateral treaties to which many 3°$gacr, 3rd session, Part II, Ad Hoe polltleal Committee, op. cit*. l*9th meeting, pp* . r2T-322. 294 states were parties. Abrogation or intention to abro gate existing treaty obligations gave rise to his doubts.^0^ III. INDIVIDUAL ADMISSION AND BLOC ADMISSION The Phited States Proposal far the Admission of all Applicants An early deadlock in 1948 on the admission of new members had led the Uhited States to propose the admission of all the applicants* As the United States delegate to the Security Council stated1 MJr Government proposes that the Council take broad and far-sighted action to extend membership of the Uhited Nations now as far as is consistent vith the provisions of Artiole 4 of the Charter* It, accordingly, proposes that the Counoll now reoommend to the General Assembly the admission of all present applicants* Ve do not disguise the fact that we have misgivings about seme of the applicants especially Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic • • • /out/ in order to aeeelerate the achievement of universality of membership we are prepared to resolve the questions we have had in our minds as to complete readiness of some appli cants to assume the obligations of the Cherter*307 3q6sOCR. 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. veer, Speclal Supplement No. 3■ pp. 6-7# h meeting, p. 303b; unitedNations . 3-8. 3°7sC0R* ist year, 2nd series, 54th meeting, p. 42. p. 61; ibid.. 2nd 35-38; M d * , I86t Document S/U79. pp 295 The proposal was wholeheartedly welcomed by the delegates of Mexleo and Brasil boeauso it was consistent with tholr dosire for universality*30® lbs British and Chinese delegates took a rather ▼ague position* While they did not verbally objeot to the proposal It was questionable whether they had intended to Interpret Article If as broadly as the Auerloan delegate had,3®9 for the British and Chinese delegates had objected and persuaded the Mexlean repre sen tat Ire to withdraw a resolution substantially similar to the United States proposal during the fifty-seventh meeting of the Seourlty Council tbs next day.310 But the Soviet and Australian representatives ▼olced opposition to the United States proposal* To the USSR representative, the principle of universality was unrelated to the issue. He eould not agree that the Security Council "should adopt resolutions for the whole sale admission to the Organisation of all countries which have applied for membership •” As he elaborated! Countries oaanot be regarded as things and dealt with In accordance with a standard measure. When we discuss the question of the admission to the 30Qlbld., pp. Iflf, 1*6. 3°9Ibid., pp* 51-52. 310ibld*. 57th meeting, pp. 121-22. 296 Organisation, va art bound to disease ssoh concrete application separately taking Into consideration all the facts and elrounstanoes relating to the applloatlon In questlon*3U It was obvious that so far as the Russians were concerned It was nore laportant to keep Transjordan, Ireland, and Portugal outside the United Rations than to have Albania and Outer Mongolia Inside* The Australian representative, while expressing his respeot far the doctrine of universality on whleh the Anerloan delegate had based his proposal far the en bloc adnisslon of all pending applications, held that universality did not naan automatic adnisslon of any applleant, but rather adnisslon was oandition by ful fillment of the orlterla laid down In Artiele 4 of the Charter* ga bloc adnisslon was illegal.^12 Because he was ear tain that the USSR delegate would veto the United States resolution, the Anerloan delegate noved to withdraw It* Hurt by the USSR rebuff of his proposal, and beeonlng wore eonvineed of Soviet frigidity on the natter of adnisslon, the Anerloan delegate deelaredt The Uhited States flrnly believes that In the adnisslon of new Menbers there should be no oowpro- uise on principle* The decision upon any applloatlon S^Ibld*. 5bth nesting, p* k7* 312Ibld*. p. 1 *8* 297 should bo nade according to the objective standards of Artlole k of tho Charter • • • • Whothor or not a State qualified for adnisslon to nenbershlp depends upon its possession of these qualifications# It does not depend upon other oonsldorations•3o Thereupon* he nade another proposal t that the Counoll should not reoonmend at that tine the adnisslon of Albania and the Mongolian People*s Republic. The Uhited States hereafter was to hold fast to 14s declara tion of "no compromise on principle" for the next ten pears. In suoh an open debate the USSR delegate naturally exploited the reversal of the Anerloan position. "In asserting that all countries deserved to be admitted and at the sane tine deolarlng that^B»7 would objeot to the adnisslon of sone of then*” he held that the united States representative "indulges in inconsistency and his position is oantradletory.3^ Soviet Proposals for the Slnultaneous Adnisslon of pegging Applicants The following year*' however* the USSR delegate was hlnself to indulge in similar inoonslatency. It was 313lbld.* p. 55* 31fribid. 3I^ibld.. p. 58# 298 the representative of Poland who Introduced the jg| bloo adnisslon of the five ex-enemy states (Hangar7, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland and Italy); nevertheless, the Soviet delegate vas most voeal In having those five applleants 316 admitted as a whole* ' 7 While he had vehemently opposed the admission of Italy before, he now declareds We are ready to agree to the admission of Italy to the Whited Rations, bat only on the eondltloa that all other countries whleh are In the sane position • • • are also admitted* We consider that It is Impossible to make any separate decision on the Italian application, or to consider this ease separately from other similar oases*317 This point, that the admission of the five ex-enemy states was a single question and could only be positively settled by their simultaneous admission, was to be repeatedly emphasised by the Soviet delegate In the succeeding aeetinga*3^ It was apparent that the Xhemlln felt that the communist-led forces In Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were now clearly dominant, with "friendly" governments set up In those states* Soviet Russia, therefore, could now afford to have then become members of the Whited Rations without fear of those 3l6ibld*. 2nd year, 201}tb meeting, pp* 2lill-12* 317ibid.. p. 21* 1U* ^l®rbid., 205th meeting, pp* 211;0-lfl; Ibid*. 206th meeting, pp* 21*76-77 • 299 countries turning thslr bucks against it ones inside the organisation* Up to sens eight days before the USSR delegation had refused to discuss the spplloatlons of those eountrles on grounds that their peace treaties had not been ratified by all the Allied powers, the USSR included* However, the Soviet representative had given a hint that those applications night soon be discussed* indeed, on September 15* I9h7* the USSR ratified the peace treaties and terminated the oontrol commissions* the USSR thought it had now become 1 1 appropriate1 1 to demand their admission, and to press for legal inter national recognition of the "status quo" in Eastern Europe* The Uhited States had never explicitly recognised this region as a Russian sphere of influence and, in 319 fact, rejected that concept* Nevertheless, as a result of certain wartime military and political deci sions, including two specific Anglo-Soviet arrangements on the Balkans in 19Mi, the armlstloe terms with the defeated Axis satellites, and the physical presenoe of Soviet armed forces, the Soviet Union gained a position 3L9gefer to Cordell Hull* II, on* olt*. pp. Ui5l"59* 300 of primacy whloh It soon converted Into one of d o m i n a n c e * 3^0 While the Uhited States and Britain shared authority In Italy with the Soviet Union having only a nominal role, this situation was reversed in the Balkans. Uhder the armlstlee terms drawn up far Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, the Soviet authorities, in the name of the "Allied High Command" exercised broad polltioal and eoanomie powers. Uhder those elrcum- stanees eommunlsatlcn of those countries was inevitable* Tet the Russians were eautlous in effecting their program. The peoples of Bulgaria, Htmgary, and Rumania were not exactly friendly to the Russians] their fight ing alongside the fascist powers against Soviet Russia demonstrated that* And Anti-Soviet leaders In those countries still exercised strong political influence* Moreover, intentions of a still fully mobilised Uhited States towsrd Has tern Europe was unclear. The peace treaties still had to be ratified end their governments yet to be recognised by the Western powers* An open break with the UhitSd States and the Western allies might oreate a polltioal crisis Which could be unfavorable 320John c* Campbell, Ifae Uhited States in World iS?1 Tark: Harper and ft? others, lift 9)» 301 to the com milat side. Soriatlsatlon of tha area should, therefore, ba achieved gradually* Diplomatically, tha Sorlat Union appeared to grant eonaaaalona to tha Waatarn powers. Thaa, in Hungary, for Inatanoa, tha Raaalana acquiesced to an American propoaal for a fraa national alaotlon in 1914-5 In which tha eooaranlats wara daolalvaly dafaatad. Plaaaad with tha alaotlon raaulta, tha TJhlted Stataa axtandad recognition to tha Hungarian regime. In Bulgaria and Rumania, tha Ruaalana alao aceaptad tha Waa tarn propoaal for a broadening of tha orwmmnlat- dominated regime a of Oacrglar and Groaa, respectively, by thalr admiaalon of two additional rapraaantatiraa of tha damoeratle opposition parties in thalr eoontrlaa. That waa earrlad oat by tha Groaa Government which alao pladgad to hold a fraa national alaotlon In tha manner of Hungary* Aa a reault, tha Uhited Stataa grantad raoognltlon to tha Groaa raglna (191*6). Howarar, In tha alaotlon that waa hold aararal non tha lator tha aubatanoa of tha pladga waa Ignored. In Bulgaria tha Waatarn propoaal waa altogathar dlaregarded. Tha Uhited Stataa, therefore, withheld raoognltlon of tha Georgian Government* Tat tha following year, In aplte of unohanged conditions, tha Uhited States waa to 302 ratify tha paaee treaty with Bulgaria and extend recog nition to the existing government. It was the Amoriean hope that those eoneeealona on ite part might bring about the withdrawal of Soviet oeeupatlon troopa and restore politleal freedom In that country. This hope waa to be Illusory. In 191*7* Bulgaria* Hungary* and Rumania were to be rapidly trans formed Into "dictatorships of the proletariat" patterned 321 on the Russian model. The Uhited States had gambled away Its dlplomatlo Instruments of (peaoe-treaty) ratification and recog nition. But another Instrument was to serve Its turn. The three Hast European eountrles had applied for admission to membership in the Uhited Rations. Their aim* or the frustration of their aim* had provided the 3^For excellent articles regarding molted States and USSR polities In Has tern Europe sees Mark Ethridge and C. E. Black* "Vegotlatlng on the Balkans* 191*5-191*7*" MOttotlatlng Wit ft the Russians, ed. by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E* Johns on (Bostons World Peaoe Foundation* 1951)* PP* 181*-2Q1*; Roger H. Wells* "Interim Governments and Occupation Regimes*” The Annals of the Academy of American Political and Soeial Solenooa. Vol. Zb7.lUy* l9l*o* pp* 50-0I1 Joseph »•floueek* ^Geopolitical Trends In Central-Eastern Europe," Ibid.. Vol. 271* Septenbor* 1950* pp* 11-19; Ralph H. Luts* "The Changing Role of Ikon Curtain Countries*” ibid.. pp. 20-22; Eduard Tab or sky* "Government In the •People *e Democracies*," Ibid.■ pp. 55-61; Alexander Dallln* "The Soviet Stake in las tern Europe*” ibid.* Vol. 317* May, 1958* pp. 138-1*5* 303 Uhited States with another diplomatic instrument with which to preae then to restore polltioal freedoa to their people* By this lnstruaent also the Uhited States eould serve notloe to the Soviet Uhlon and to the world that It did not reoognlse Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of Influence. This was really the Soviet alai by the adnisslon of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ruaanla Into the United Nations, It eould legltlnise Its elaln to Eastern Europe* Their adnisslon, of oourse, was pre sented as a ©lain to raoognltlon of their independence and equal sovereign rights by the faally of nations* They, as nuch as Western-baeked Italy, were fully qualified for adnisslon Into the world organisation, aocording to the Soviet spokesnan* He based his position on the Potsdan Agreenent of lty5> vhloh, he said, treated all the ex-eneny states in the sane way without dis- orinlnatlon in respeet to any of tben*^22 However, the Uhited States delegate argued that the provision of the potsdan Agreenent, whloh was also found In the preanble of each treaty, particularly the phrase "enabling the Allied and Associated Powers" did not express any obligation to support an applicant ex-eneny state at a particular tine* The Allied and 322SCCR. 2nd year, 2Qlith neetlng, p. 2ltU|.* 30k Aaaoelated Powers, ha naintained, certainly did not, by accepting that prorlaion of tha Fotadan Agreenent, bind thenaeiwea, without any eandltiona, to aappart applications for nanbarahip of any of tha az-anany atataa ragardlaaa of olronnatanoaa that night in terrene. Tha Alliad and Asaooiatad Powara reserved to thenselres tha opportunity to Judge thoaa applioationa on thalr merits. Thay oould not, in tha wary natura of tha oaaa, ba axpaetad to aign a blank ehaek, aa tha USSR dalagata appeared to ba eontendlng thay ahonld do.323 Ha waa supported by tha Brltiah dalagata who rafarrad to tha Poliah-USSR propoaal aa a "horse-trade."32U To tha Aaatrallan dalagata, tha daal "aaroura of blaeknall."325 Tha Ffsneh representative, for raaaona of universality and raglonalian far or ad tha adnlaalon of tha applleants with tha exoeptlon of Bnlgarla baoanaa of tha axaantlona which had takan plaoa in that aoantry«32^ Tha dalagata of Colonbia aopportad tha adaiaaion of all tha 323Ibid, , pp* 2i*l$-l6, 324ibld.. p. 2 l |l 8 ; aaa alao, ibid., 3rd year, 279th neeting, pp. U|.-l5. 325ibid.. 20t»th naatlng, p. 2 1 * 2 1 j ibid., 205th ■eating, pp. Z t | i i l - l t 2 . 326xbid.. 201* th naating, p. 21*21*. 305 applioanta for reaaona of univeraaiity.327 However# tho Chine ae dalagata Maintained that tha Uhited Hatlona ooaid only try to approach univeraallty* Ha believed that a neohanloal and nathanatioal univeraallty waa not poaalble and vaa never intended by tha anthora of tha Charter# aa vaa evidenced by the fact that the Charter had laid down eondltlona for adHlaalon aa veil aa condltlana far expalaion fron the united Watione*328 The repreaentatlve of Belgian dee lore d that to vote an bloc on the applloatlona for adnlaalon would be contrary to the Charter# for it would naan adding to the eondltlona atlpulated in Article 1(, and thia the Seeurlty Coonjoll could not do.329 The USSR Maneuver for the vholeaale adnlaalon of the five ex-eneny atate had been rebuffed# but the USSR vaa not about to ahlft taotlea. The concept of alnnl- teneoua adnlaalon vaa to be continually Invoked by the Soviet delegation* In April# 192(8# Italy beeane the focua of the debate on Individual adnlaalon veraua eg bloc adnlaalon* General elect!one in Italy were aoheduled to take place 327 ibid.. 205th nee ting, p* 22(43* 328xbld. * 206th neetixig# p* 21(59* 32^ibld.. 205tfa Meeting# pp* 22(38# 22(2(1* 306 the following wo ok. The big powers wore ready to exploit the admission or non-admission of Italy into the United Kations to Attract the electorate to rote for the parties they eaoh f a v o r e d . 330 The united States* Britain* end France Jointly requested reoonsideration of the Italian application. They put the blame for Italy's failure to beoome a member of the United nations on the USSR. Thus the United States delegate pointed outs By attempting to plaoe the Italian applloatlon in use same oateg cry as the applications recelred from States whleh the Council lias determined to be unqualified for membership* the USSR does a grave injustice to the Italian people. . . . If on this renewed consideration of the Italian applica tion, the same taetles are attempted* and if the Council should unfortunately fall to reoommend Italy's adnisslon* the world will, hare no doubt as to the reason for this injustice. The world ean interpret the set In no other war than as an expression by the USSR for a lack of friendship for the people of Italy.331 The USSR delegate had his answers ready. He was aware of the occasion and anticipated the Western more. He replied that the submission of the Western proposal had the single purpose of applying pressure on the internal political situation in Italy in favor of rightist circles. Thus he declaredt 330see A m Jew York Times. April k, 191*8, p. 18; John C. Campbell, op. olt.. pp. . 331SCCR. 3**d year* 279th meeting* p* 7* 307 Saeh conduct, especially on the pert of the Oovernnent of the Uhited States, is understandable* as the latter long ago enbarked on a policy of flagrant Interference in the floneatlo affairs of Italy* and It does not hesitate before the use of any possible neans to attain that end . * • *332 He aocaaed the Western powers of trying to oonfuse and fool the Italian pablle by distorting the position of the USSR on the adnisslon of Italy. According to hln, the USSR was not opposed to the adnisslon of Italy as the Western governnents were trying to ploture It; It was they who* by their dleerlnlnatlon against the peoples of the other applicant states* were preventing Italy»a adnisslon Into the United Hatlcns*333 Bat pressed for a vote* the Soviet delegate had to veto once again Italyvs application* The Uhited States representative referred to the Soviet veto as a way to coerce the other nenbers of the Security Counoil to adnlt non-peaoe-loving nations to vhloh Italy's adnisslon oertalnly coaid not be paired or equated* "Wo friend of Italy*1 1 he said* "could In good eonsclenoe* use Italy In sueh a m a n n e r ."334 The pro western parties von the election* but Italy did not get Into the Uhited Rations* 332jbld.* p* 10. 333lbld*. pp. 11-12. 334ibld.. p. 16. Tat the Kremlin taetlo vaa not really to bar Italy's admission into the United Nations. The immediate purpose was to get the Soviet satellites into the organisation. Italy vas being used as a lever to pry the door open. But the Western powers were not willing to have the cornmuniat countries inside the organization just to let Italy in. The Kremlin had to revise its taotlcs. Fersplcaciously the Kremlin thought that the smaller member nations would be easier to convince than the United States and Britain of accepting the concept of simultaneous admission. The Kremlin, therefore, decided to put the pressure on the small nations by blanketing the whole admission question with the concept. Bn bloc admission was not to be limited to the applications of the five ex-enemy states; it was to apply to all the applications. There would be more levers to pry open more doors of the United Nations. Consequently, the USSR delegate argued that no exception should be made for Ceylon or any other state, and demanded the simultaneous and immediate reconsideration of the twelve applications then pending.^35 The accusation of ’ 'discrimination against oertain countries and favoritism toward others" 309 vaa conveniently hurled againat supporters of the adwis- sIon of tho nan-oownuniat applicants. Iba Ukrainian delegate aav discrimination againat On tar Mongolia* for inatanoe* and favorltian toward Cay Ion aa tha prinary raaaon for raaolationa by ncn-coamunlat nenbars to give prafaranoa to tha oonaidaration of Ceylon's applica- Napal vaa alao oaught in tha Soriat davand for tha a^ bloo adnisslon of all applicants. Though having eonaldarad Sepal's qnallfloation aa not antlraly aatls- faetory whan it flrat applied* tha Ukrainian dalagata navarthalaaa stated that ha vaa praparad to vota for that applicant on tha condition that tha rapraaantatlvaa of tha "Anglo-Anerlcan bloc" would caaaa thalr policy of dlaorlalnatlcn againat a nunber of atataa with vhloh paaoa traatlaa had bean oonoluded* aa wall aa againat atataa which had rendered great and affective reaiatanoe during tha atruggle againat tha faaclat aggressors.-*-^ Tha USSR dalagata lengthily dlaaouraad on tha policy of " discrimination’ ’ and "favorltlsM” of tha Waa tarn powers. Ha aaldt 336ibld. . pp. 32-33* 337Ibid. ■ i f t h year, 439th nee ting, pp. 6-7; ibid. . 440th wee ting, pp. 3-0. 310 If we analyse the situation* we see that the Uhited States* the Uhited Kingdom, and other states which eonstitnte a majority ih the Security Cotmoil systematically oppose the admission of those /eenmunlst/ countries for the sole reason that all those countries are people's democracies*330 According to him* if Artlele 4 of the Charter vas being violated* It was the Uhited States partloularly that violated It* He accused the Anerloan delegate of using Artiole k as an Instrument of pressure and discrimina tion against the people's democracies to change their polities* On the other hand* he plotured the position of the Soviet Uhlan on the natter as "unbiased and just"; the USSR proposal far the simultaneous admission of all the applicants could not be anything else* Therefore* regarding Nepal's applloatlon* he reasoned thats The Soviet Uhlan does not oppose the admission of Nepal to membership in the Uhited Vat Ions* but It esnnot vote for Vepal as It would be unfair to admit that country alone while systematically..Q refusing the admission of a number of states*^™ Refutation of the USSR allegations by the Uhited States* Britain* and China* and the majority support given them 33Qibld.« l|.39th meeting* p* 9* 339xbid.* pp* 9-10* 311 were to no avail* Sepal'a application vaa vetoed by the USSR and vaa added to tha lengthening waiting liat.^0 A aeven-part reaolution (S/1331 to S/1337 inolualve) by Argentina, which actually vaa enbodled in the General Aaaenbly reaolution (197 (III)) of Deceober 8, 191*8, calling fop the reeonaideratiea ef the pending applioatiene by the Seeupity Council, and a Ruaaian oounter-propoaal were the aubjeeta of lengthy debatea during four eonaeoutive neetlnga (l*l*Oth to l*l*3rd) of the Council* The aubatance of the debatea waa individual adnlaalon according to the aerlta of each eaac againat jg bloc adnlaalon* The order in which the applloatlona ahould be heard and dlaeuaaed waa alao to be involved* The Argentine propoaal had Portugal *a oaae firat on tha Hat (aa in the General Aaaenbly reaolution)* The USSR delegate argued for a etarono- logloal order of preaentatlon and dlaeuaaion which would put Albania*a caae firat on the agenda. Aa the Argentine reaolution did not include the oownunlat applieante, the USSR delegate preaented hla own resolu tion to reeonalder all the thirteen pending applloatlona in ohronologleal order* The preaidant of the Council (Srltlah) held the Argentine propoaal to be in order 3fr°ibld*. pp. 11-16. 312 and, therefore, should bo discussed firat* Accusing tha Waat of oonsplring againat tha Soviet union— "Everything that la happening hare la organised by tha delegations of the Thai ted States and the United Kingdom"— the USSR delegate vetoed all the seven parts of the Argentine resolution*^* Discussion on the USSR resolution was complicated by a Uhited States move to have the thirteen applica tions dlsoussed individually. The USSR delegate objected to the Uhited States notion and subsequently contended that the Anerloan delegate vas out of order* He based his arguments on Rule 32 ef the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure which statedt "Parts of a notion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative unless the original nover objects." The United States representative naln- tained that Rule 32 did not apply as his notion was a procedural one instead of an anendnent to the USSR resolution* He cited the precedent of the Belgian notion for a discussion of the applications separately which was adopted by the Council at its 206th neeting when the representative of Poland had noved a composite 3^-Refer to SCCR. i*th year, 1*1*0th, i*l*lst, l*l*2nd, and l*l*3rd meetings, pp. 3-35* 313 draft resolution calling approval by tho Connell of tbo applications of Hungary, Italy, Bunanla, Bulgaria, and Finland. Tho Frosldont of tho Connell (British) holding that tho Oounoll was "master of its procedure” and could, by a procedural vote, follow any procedure which it elected, felt it his duty to put the notion of the Uhited States to a vote. The notion was oarried. But the USSR delegate pointed outs "• • • by recognizing that the Uhited States notion is in order, the majority of the Security Council has legalised illegality and arbitrariness . • • .”3^2 It was obvious that the USSR would veto the adnisslon of all the non-eommunlst applicants if the application of any of the connuniat countries was rejected by the Western powers. And it was the purpose of the Uhited States notion to do just thats reject Use adnisslon of all the ccnnunlst applicants. The stale mate was to be prolonged with eaoh side putting the blane on the other.3^3 Another attempt by the Western powers to admit Italy into the Uhited Watlons in December, 1951* during 3fr^Ibld.. 1*1*1* th meeting, p. 21. ^See ibid.. 1*1*3* d meeting, pp. 35-^Oj ibid., llWth and fcJt^tlSaeetings, pp. 3 lk the discussion of tho letter frost the Secretary General (S/2J*35) transmitting the text of the Assembly Resolution (5>50(VI)) adopted at its 352nd meeting, failed beoause, aeoordlng to the USSR delegate, to admit that applicant mould be discrimination against the twelve other states which were similarly entitled to admlsslon^Ml as Italy had become a member of HATO, the Soviet Union accused the United States, Britain, and France of selfish military and political desires instead of working for the interests of the united Hat lone Organization*3^ Again claiming the impartiality and non-discriminating attitude of the 8ovlet Union, the Russian delegate submitted a resolution rooommendlng to membership all the thirteen applicants*3^ However, the President of the Council (Ecuador), as advised by the Secretariat, did not put the USSR motion to a vote because of the absence of any eomment on the motion* He also took it for granted that it was the intention and wish of the Council to postpone discussion of that question indefinitely*3**7 3 ibjd*, 6th year, 569th meeting, pp* 23-25* 3* * *Ibld.. p. 2U* 3i*6Ibld.. pp* 25-26* 3l*7Ibld*, p. 33. 315 Tiro aonths later at the Connell's 573rd Mooting the question of Italy's admission vas again raised by the Vestern powers. Bat the USSR delegate was equally persistent In his demand for the simultaneous admission of all the fourteen applicants— Libya had been added to the list. This was, according to him, the only "equitable and objeotlve approach" to a solution of the problem.^® Moreover, this position taken by the Soviet Union, he olaimed, was being mare and more widely supported by the members of the United Hations. Apparently, the USSR delegate was referring to the passage of the USSR draft resolution of simultaneous admission of all the fourteen applications In the Pirst Committee (21 votes far, 12 votes against, 25 absten tions) but whleh did not get the neeessary two-thirds vote In the General Assembly (22 votes for, 21 against, 16 abstentions).3^ Nevertheless, the USSR delegate, quoting the London Times, held that "There is a growing tendeaey to believe that a decision ean be reaehed only In aoeordanee with the Russian proposal."350 3frQlbld.. 7th year, 573rd meeting, p. 9* 3^?Refer to GACR. 6th session. First Gowlttee, Record of Msec Legs. 501st meeting, p. 257; Ibid.. meetings. 369th plenary meeting, p. lj.69* See ex HI, p. 44!;. 350gCCB. 573rd meeting, op. elt.. p. 9* 316 Indeed, daring this Council neetlng the trend seened to furor the Sorlet Union* Whereas previously the Sorlet Union had generally been a Minority of one (or tvo If another ooraunlet coon try was a nember of the Coonell) against ten (or nine) the USSR resolution vas now rejeeted by a rote of six to two, with three abstentions.35ft it would appear that by this rotlng the Sorlet Union had gained three rotes, for the three states whloh abstained nornally would hare roted against the USSR resolution. 7et it was eren of greater inportsnee that one of those abstaining states was the United Klngdon* The British delegate, In defending his abstention, stated! The gorernnent of the United Kingdon attaches great iwportanoe to the broadening of the base of the United Rations. In holding this rlew we hare two points particularly In nlnas admitting Members of the Conaonwealth like Ceylon, and Italy, an applieant state fron Burope. We are also Influenced by the concept of universality • . . . To giro effect to this Idea of universality it is elearly essential, as we see It, that the United Rations should lnolude countries with different ideologies and different systens of gorernnent. We are entirely In farcr of this sines, In our rlew at any rate, the greatest ralue of the United Rations is that It should be a Meeting plaee In whloh rlews can be exchanged and the dlfferenoes between countries or groups of countries, howerer serious they nay be, ean be bannered out and. If possible, reoonolled. We would not, therefore, wish to exelude any applieant 35libid.. p. 32. 317 state simply because it* Internal 0truetor* or the po0ltlon of ite Government in regard to foreign affair* i* different from our* • • • • Sinoe ve feel that it i* both important and urgent that the exiating deadlock on thia qaeation ahould be broken and that • • • the baaia of the United Nation* ahould aa far aa poaaible be broadened, it la for that reaaon that ve ahall not vote against the Soviet Union's draft .resolution, but on the contrary shall aba tain. Britain vaa to maintain that position from then on in spite of oeeasional attacks by the USSR delegation on past British positions regarding the admission of the eoanaunlst states* France, beeauae of the increasing tension in Indochina betveen pro-Frenoh and Vletmlnh forces, vaa to take a stronger role in the "conspiracy vlth the Uhlted States" against the admission of the USSR- sponsored a t a t e s . 3£3 The USSR delegate tried to push through another resolution for eg bloc admission of all pending appli cants during the 590th and 591st nestings of the Security Council* However, that resolution vaa tabled. The smaller powers Greece, Turkey, Chile, and Paklatan urged for postponenent until such tine as the permanent members eould agree among themselves on a convenient 3^2Ibid*, pp. 16-17* 3£3por example, see statement of the French delegate, Ibid.* pp. 20-21* 318 eolation to tho Impasse on admission. These non- permanent members fait that tha big powers ahould haad the General Assembly raaolatlon (5o6(VT)) which requested tha paraanant aaabera to "confer with ona another on tha aubjeet of tha pending applications far membership of tha Uhltad Rations J3#* During tha 59^th meeting, tha USSR delegate preaaed far the diaoaaaion of hia raaolatlon* Debatea during that meeting and tha next three aeetlnga ware to center on tha USSR raaolatlon far almultaneoaa admlaalon* Tha USSR delegate attacked tha repeated prcpoaala by tha Uhlted Stataa and Ita "armor-bearera" for Individual examination of tha applleationa aa a "waata of time" and really . • • nothing more than a contrived pretext, dealgned first to eaneeal their oppositions to the admission of the soontries of the people*a democracy to membership in the Uhlted Rations, and to provoke a aeries of new votes by the USSR delegation against the Anglo-American solicitations, whloh are Illegal and contrary to the Charter, designed, in other words to provoke the next regular series of the so-called USSR "vetoes" In order to Increase the total and serve the purposes of Uhlted States propa ganda* 355 3^Ibld*. 590th meeting, pp. 8-17, Ibid*. 591st meeting, pp. 1-20. Id.. 59Uth meeting, pp. 8-20; of. statement of the Uhlted States delegate, Ibid.. 59>th meeting, pp. 18-20. 319 Similar attack* war* to bo made by the USSR delegate daring the anooeedlng six Meetings of the Council against the united States for the latter*s draft resolution on the separate discussion of Japan's appli cation, against France for a corresponding proposal an the applications of the Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, and against Pakistan for a resolution proposing an individual admission for Libya,^^ He accused the united States primarily of selfishly using one yardstick for seme countries and quite a different one for other oountries. Thus the USSR delegate declaredt He ^Ehe United States delegate/ likes Italy and he votes for the admission of Italy* He likes Libya and is for Libya, (eto*)* But ho does not like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania and votes against their admission • • • • As long as the United States continues to violate those ^peaoe/ treaties the Security Coonoil will not be in a position to take a decision on the question of the admission of nev Members • • • *357 The USSR delegation had consistently kept up this threat the united States had likewise prevented the admission of the Soviet-sponsored applicants* Velther of the superpowers would give in to the demands of the 3£*See ibid*, 596th, 598th, 599th, 600th, 601st, 602nd, and 603rd mootings, 3£7ibld,> 601st mooting, pp, 12, 17* 320 other* While Britain had ahlftad its position on tho ■attar of adaission* froa diraot opposition to eg bloc adaission to that of abstention* It appeared that the United States was not ready to follow the sane oourse* The United States alaed to stand rigidly on its "principles*" As farmer Secretary of State Janes 7* Byrnes was to state before the Ad Hoc Political Comnlttee on October $, 1953* Bat we cannot engage in bargaining when the question is one of principle* Heretofore we hare objected to the adaission of these fire /eoaaunist/ applicants on the ground that they are not peaoe- lowing* as required by the Charter* If under any package deal we now agree to adalt then* by iaplloa- tlon we are saying they bare beeone "peace-lowing" states. We cannot say that* If we cannot say it* then we are saying we are willing to sacrifice principle for a price* The United States Oovernaent is unwilling to do that* We are anxious to see the fourteen qualified peaoe-loving states adnltted but we deen it far acre important for the welfare of those states and all other states that this organisation should aaintaln its integrity as aa agency for the preservation of peace*35o Because of the inflexible positions of the super powers* the Security Council was not to discuss the question of the adaission of new aeabers during the next two years* 1953 and 195U* The General Asseably* however* 35QqaOR. 8th session* Ad Hoc Political Coaaitteet Suaaarv Beoord o£ Meetings* Uth aeetlng* p. 15* 321 daring Its eighth sssslon In October, 1953# adopted a rssolatlon (716 (VIII)) establishing a Good Offless Coamlttee and ins true ting It to explore tbs posslbllltlss of finding a solution to tho probloa of adaission. Tbs following year this Ooaaittoo was requested by tbs General Asseably in another resolution (817 (IX)) to continue its efforts In that direction. Two General Assembly resolutions were before the Security Counoil at the outset of the debate on the adaission of new aeabers in Deoeaber, 1955* These were resolutions 817 (IX) In whloh the Asseably, inter alia, had sent baok the pending applications to the Seourlty Coonoil "for further consideration and positive reeoa- aendations," and resolution 918 (X) in whloh the Asseably, Inter alia, requested the Council to consider, "in the light of general opinion In favor of the widest possible aeabershlp of the United Vations," the pending applications of all those eighteen countries about which no problca of unification arose. It was this latter resolution, overwhelmingly passed by the General Asseably, whieh was to beeosw the core of the compromise on the adaission of new aeabers. 322 IV. THE 1955 COMPROMISE OH THE ADMISSION OP HEM MEMBERS Heed for * polltloal Solution of the Iu p m m "The positions of the peruanant aeabers of ths Seourlty Coonoil on tbs question of adaission were not neeessarlly laaotable in rlew of the evolution of the International ataosphere.N This stateaent by Dr. Belaunde of Peru, Chalraan of the Good Offices Coaalttee appointed by the General Asseably, expressed an optlaisa that the problea of the adaission of nev aeabers would inevitably be solved. Indeed, events in the years of 1952 to 1955 seeaed to aove toward that direction. The pirst Coaalttee during Its Sixth Session had passed a Soviet draft resolution proposing the slaultaneous adaission of fourteen applicants although that resolution was not passed by the General Asseably itself. During the Eighth Session of the General Asseably, Its ££ Hoc Political coaalttee approved the creation of a Good Offloes Coaalttee to explore with the aeabers of the Security Connell solutions, prlaarlly political, whloh would facilitate the adaission of now 359qa,QR. loth session. Ad Hoe Political Coaalttee: Suaaarv Record of Meetines. 25th nesting, p. 107* 323 aeabers* It cum to bo realised by many of tho members that tho logal and aoral approaehoa had not boon pcaorful enough to produce results* polltieal solutions, there fore, ohonld bo explored* Thao tho Philippine delegate, for example, who had stood firmly with the Uhlted States on this Issue, now hold thats It appeared no longer possible to lapleaent that prlnolple /universality by aeons of a Juridical solution* The polltloal approach alone seeaed to be practicable, but due aeeount auat be taken of the application of the rule of unanialty In the Security Counoll and the exlatenee of a proposal for.the slaultaneous adaission of fourteen States*3©0 Slallar sentlaents were expressed by the delegates of aany of the saaller states*3^1 Such sentlaent had been previously expressed by the spokesaan for Britain during the £73rd nesting of the Security Council* Molotov*a Proposals for Slaultaneous A*il«»lon st P«ndln* Appll««nt» The political solution, It appeared, was closer to the Russian proposal of slaultaneous admission than to that of individual adaission and strict adherenoe to Article k advocated by the United States* This apparent advantage was to be exploited by Mr* Molotov 360ibld», 6th session, 9th meeting, p* 39* PP* 59- ___ ^ See IMd*, pp. 39-1*1! ibid., 12th d*, 17th meeting, p* 66. 12th meeting, daring the tenth anniversary nesting of tho Uni tod lotions ot Son praneiseo* There Molotov hod h In tod thot tho USSR wantod o qalok settlenent of tho adnlssion problem to oose Intornotlonol tension#^2 Later, In private tolks vlth tho dologotos of foru ond Canada, Molotov offorod tvo alternative "package deals" to ond the deadlock on admission* Tho first was o snail poekogo of six eoontrlos which consisted of tho Western-booked Austria, Italy, ond Finland, ond Soviet-backed Bulgaria, Hungary, and Runanla, His expressed reasons for tho snail paekago wore legal, based on tho terns of tho Potsdan Agrsonants vhoroby tho Allied powers would adnlt those defeated countries after their peace treaties had been signed and ratified.3^3 Austria, of course, had explicitly proalsed to stay neutral between Bast and West as part of the price for Russian ratification of Its peace treaty* Finland had signed a friendship poet with the Soviet Uhlon In 191(8 and had oontinued its friendly relations vlth the Russians, Finland was expected to pursue a neutral eourso, Italy, of the three, was expected to side with the West* Yet not only the pro-Western Italian psrties but also the 362 ^ m_qw York Tines. June 22, 1955* P* 1* 363ibid* 325 eoaaunists and left-vlng socialists had elaaored for its adaission into tho United Rations. m a way tho Rnaaian villlngnoaa to adait Italy vaa an atteapt to plaoato tho oabarraaaod Italian coaaunista and left-ving socialists* Tho throe-for-throe quid pro oao was actually three-for-one in Russia's favor* Chaneoa for aeooptanee of tho aaall paekago by tho Woat vaa minlaal* Therefore, Molotov offered a larger paekago ooaprioing sixteen coon tries vhioh ino laded tho above six applicants plus Albania, Outer Mongolia, Caabodia, Ceylon, Ireland, Portugal, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Mepal.^^ Molotov aade tho subtle laplioation that thia M g paekago vaa aaro advantageous to tho Meat nuaorieally* It vaa eleven to five in favor of the nen-eoaaunist vorld, although of the eleven at least four could be expected to follov neutralist policies. Tot the Soviet Foreign Coaaissar knew that the larger paekago vould be acre acceptable, to the aaaller nations especially, and had a better ehanee of endorse ment by the vorld organisation* The then recent Arab ia ian conference at Bandung had reeonaended the 36I»ibid*. June 28, 1955* P* 3* admission of all those countries, and the big package was practically In agreement with that of the conference's recommendation.^'’ While Japan had also been included in the Bandog recommendation. Molotov had not included it in his second proposal because the peaoe treaty between Japan end the USSR had not yet been concluded. As a natter of fact, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet TJnion were then going on in London, and the entry of Japan into the United Rations undoubtedly was a bargaining advantage in the hands of the Russians that oould be used to induce the Japanese to accept some of the disputed terms in favor of Russia* Moreover, it was questionable whether the majority of Aslans had genuinely felt that Japan should be admitted to the United Rations. The wounds of war in the hearts of many Aslans Whom Japan had conquered and brutalised had not yet healed. And reparations by Japan to these countries had not yet been settled. Japan's spplicatlon could be omitted from the list without great political damage to Russia in its relations with the Aslan oountrles. But. while Molotov omitted Japan from the large package proposal, he did not completely shut the door to Japan's entry into the United Rations. According to Dr. Belaunde. 36^Refer to The Rew York Times. April 25. 1955# p. 6. 327 Mr. Molotov, before leaving San Francisco# told him that he (Molotov) voald consider Japan's addition to the six teen* nation paokage deai.3^ As early as July# Prime Minister Mehru# in a aessage to Frlne Minister Eotevala of Ceylon# stated that the USSR would baek the adaission of the applicants from Asia and Africa# including Japan.3^7 Favorable consideration undoubtedly would depend upon Japan's acceptance of some of the Russian demands at their peace treaty negotiations. The large paokage was also designed to win the approval of the South Americans who felt sympathetic toward the admission of Portugal# Italy# and Ireland for historical# cultural# racial# and religious ties# and the Buropean members for regional reasons. These proposals by Molotov# of course# were no different from those previously submitted by the Soviet delegation in the Security Council and the General Assembly# But constant hammering of such proposals by the Russians continuously suggested that they sincerely desired a solution of the problem as much as the smaller countries wanted its solution# and that such proposals could only 366The Mew York Times. October It# 1955* P* 3 367Ibid.. July 22, 1955» P. 1* be the basis of a positive solution. Ihdeed, It night be said that the Russian proposal of simultaneous admission, because of the weariness from the long drawn out struggle between the great powers on the natter of admission, had become Irresistible to nare and more of the smaller powers. The smaller powers increasingly were beginning to overlook "principles'1 and, in fact, most of them could see no issue of principle as being involved; members of the United Rations had shifted positions whenever political circumstances demanded that they do so. The issue of admission into the United Rations, the smaller powers now began to admit, was primarily political. Legalism and moralists had not solved the deadlock on admission. Its solution lay in a polltloal compromise. The Canadian "Package Deal" The Canadian Secretary of State far External Affairs, Mr. Lester Pearson, felt that the "initiative" for a popular move of this type should com from the West. He, therefore, proposed another package deal, actually Molotov's large paokage plus Japan. Mr. Pearson was oonvlnoed that on balance it would be good far the Uhlted Rations to be more nearly representative of the world as it Is, regardless of the problems this might 329 produce fop the Uhlted States and others. He, of eourse, desired to assist oertaln of the appllosnts, notably Ceylon and Japan*^® He knev that Britain would support his proposal whloh would in turn help encourage the Commonwealth nations to adopt the Canadian proposal. Britain had shifted position, from a strict to a liberal Interpretation of Article 1*, paragraph 1, of the Charter as early as 1952. And In March, 195U» Ambassador Gladwyn Jebb had urged the United States to realise that Communists must participate In the Uhlted Nations to make that organisation a truly unlrersal forum.3^9 India, of course, for sometime had been sympathetic to the Russian proposals for en bloc admission. The United States, on the other hand, was not eery enthusiastic about any package deals, Canadian or Russian. Its delegation to the United Rations had con sistently rejected proposals of en bloc admission since August, 191*6, when Its own proposal for similar admission 36SWilliam R. PrTe, "18-17-16— And Ve Lost the Game," The Reporter. Vol. 11*, January 26, 1956, pp. 12- 131 P. h . Soward and Bdgar H. Melnnis, Canada and the Uji|t^d Rations (Hew Yorks Manhattan Publishing Comp any, 369jhe Raw York Times. March 19, 195U# P* 1* 330 of all tha applicant® was opposed by the USSR whloh was then championing Article I 4 and individual adaission* Since that time the American delegates had rigidly Main tained that only applicants qualifying under Article li of the Charter could be admitted* Consequently, they had rejected all the communist applicants. This United States position had been continuously justified to the American people* Strict adherenoe to Artlole k was necessary to contain communism* While technically it could not be applied against the seating of the Peiping regime, by blurring the difference between "admission" and "representation," Article 1* was also utilised as a political rationale for the exclusion of Red China. The Uhlted States had become so much of a champion of Article k that it could not easily reverse its position and accept the package deals offered by Molotov or Pearson* The (U. S*) House Poreign Affairs Committee urged the admission of only "friendly" and, therefore, 370 the non-communist nations. Secretary Dulles, in a publio statement, maintained that the United States would aeoept only those qualified applicants and pro tested the vetoing of their applications by the USSR.-^* 370The Hew York Times, July 13* 1955# p* 2* 371ibld*. September 23, 1955# P* Ul ibid.. October 5# 1955# P* 11• 331 But aa the Americans were convinced of the rightness of their position* so were the Canadians* As the Canadian delegate to the Asseably explained: . • • while the conditions for the adaission of new Members were olearly set forth in the Charter* the reeord of past controversies showed that the problem was of a political nature* and that* as in many other fields* the only possibility of solution lay in a compromise* Soae applicants were controlled by regimes or were pursuing polloies unacceptable to his delega tion but they were more likely to Increase In tolerance and understanding within the Uhlted Nations than outside It* Membership In the Tftiited Nations entailed the assumption of obligations* and when the countries to whose admission some members objected were committed to the purposes of the United Nations and subjected to Its rules* they would probably become more acoeptable members of the world community.372 He* therefore* presented a draft resolution embodying the paokage proposal of Mr* Pearson. Spain* whloh had just applied for adaission* had been added to Pearson's paokage proposal bringing the total to eighteen nations. It might be noted that Canada with the same realism actively supported the admission of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations* The Canadian resolution gained Immediate aceeptanoe among the smaller powers with the result that that resolution oame to be sponsored by twenty-seven other nations* 372GA0R» 10th session. Ad Hoc Polltloal Committee* op. olt** 25th meeting* p* 1007 332 The delegate of Nav Zealand had Immediately aldad with hla Canadian oollaagaa baeaaaa as ha polntad oats It was not always aasj to damonstrate objectively that a State had fulfilled those criteria /rod*? Article U7 80 that even In good faith--which had not invariably been apparent— It was possible to reach different judgments on the merits of individual applications.373 The Indian delegate held that: Since the membership question was primarily political* It could only be resolved In the light of political considerations and oornaon sense* with due regard for legal principles* When objections were raised to the people*s democracies on the ground that they were under Soviet influence and were not Independent sovereign States* it should be borne In mind that the Soviet Union Itself was a member of the United nations* Surely if the presenoe of the Soviet Union was aoeepted and even deemed necessary* the people»s democracies should not be excluded*374 Australia* which had been a perennial foe of en bloc adaission* also changed position* The Australian delegate deolared: Australia had never favored the Idea of a "package deal*" and had always been of the opinion that each application must be considered on Its merits* It had* however* beoomo Increasingly apparent that refusal to aecept those applicants whose fidelity to the principles of the United Vatlons seemed doubtful would prevent the admission of other countries* whloh nevertheless desired to be members of the United Watlons • • • to facilitate their adaission it was therefore necessary to admit other countries whose applications called for some reservations*375 373 i b l d *. p. 115* 37Uibld* * 31st meeting* p* li|6* 375ibld.. 28th meeting* pp* 125*26* 333 Greece, vhioh had also stubbornly resisted tha adaission of eoaaunist applloants, partioulsrly Albania and Bulgaria, oana to realise the necessity of nutual eonoession by both sides if the adaission problea was to be settled* Aa the Greek delegate described it: The good sheep could not be kept outside the fold indefinitely for fear that a few blaok sheep night slip inside* The door to the fold vas therefore being opened and all were to be adnitted indis criminately. That method, while not ideal, at least had the nerlt of providing a solution.37© These were representative of the opinions uttered by the various delegations which had come to the support of the Canadian resolution* The inclusion of Spain on the package list had found increased support of the Canadian resolution anong the South Anerloan countries. While uost of these South American countries had opposed the adaission of Spain at the San praaelseo conference and in the early years of the United If at ions, they had gradually cone to accept the Franco regime. Already in 1953* nine Latin Amerioan nations had urged Spain to apply for membership in the United Wations.377 now they had 376jbld** p. 123* 377 now York Tines, January 3, 1953* P* 3; ibid.. September 2*f, 1955* P» 2. 33k enthusiastically rallied behind the Canadian reeolation for Spain's adaission into the organisation* In spite of the objeotlons by China and Cuba, it beeame apparent that other aeabers of the General Assembly were Joining the Canadian bandwagon.^?® The Batista Government of Cuba* whloh did not maintain diplomatie relations with the USSR for political-ideological reasons, unfalteringly supported Chlang Kai-shek. The flrenty-Blght Power Draft Resolution for the Admission of Blah teen Pending Applicants The Canadian resolution eaae to be sponsored by twenty-seven other members. This Joint draft resolution (918(X)) calling for the admission of all pending appli cations, exeluding the divided states of Korea and Vietnam, was passed by the General Assembly by a vote of 52 to 2, with 5 abstentions. The Uhlted states, Trance, Belgium, Greeee, and Israel abstained.379 IaPa#i abstained from voting on the admission of the Arab and Moslem states of Jordan and Libya. 378GA0R, 10th session# Ag Bee Polltloal Committee, QP. clt., 2bth meeting, pp. 113$ ibid.. 27th meeting, p. 1. 379ibjd.. 32nd meeting# p. 153* See Annex HI, p. 4U7. 335 Greece was not sore whether It should rote far the admission of Albania and Bulgaria. Belgian could not yet reoonoile the paokage pro posal with Article 4 the Charter and the adtisary opinion of the world court. France abstained instead of voting against the resolution because of the willingness of Its sponsors and supporters to compromise on the discussion of the Algerian problem. The United States having sensed the desire of the majority of the members of the General Assembly had abstained instead of registering a negative vote* although the American delegate had not ceased to pro claim that he could not support the admission of the Soviet-sponsored states.3^0 yet to explain his absten tion* he reasoned that abstention in votes on the membership applications of the East European countries did not imply endorsement of their regimes. He emphasised: In fact* there is reason to hope that membership in the Uhlted Hat ions will to some extent bring the peoples of these nations closer to independence. The overriding fact Is that the admission of thirteen free nations greatly outweighs whatever GAOR. 10th session. Ad Hop Polltloal Committee on clt.. 31st meeting* pp. llj. 5-46* 336 drawbacks there may be In admission of the others— because the thirteen would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Natlons*3ol The united States had to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages of easting a negative vote* There were more disadvantages* The Uhlted States was under pressure not only from Canada and the South Anerican neighbors, but from the governments of the applieant states, particularly Italy, Spain, and Japan* During Mr* Dulles* visit to Rome on October 23rd, Italian officials had complained to the American Secretary of State that the United States was not doing enough to obtain Italy*s admission into the United Nations. The Italians believed that Italy should be admitted even If some countries that the Uhlted States would rather see remain outside the Uhlted Nations had to be admitted at the same t l m e . 3 ® ^ It appeared that similar problems were discussed by Generalisslmo pranoo and Secretary Dulles during the letter's visit to Madrid the following month.3®3 38lihe New York Times. November 11*, 1955* p* 11* 382Ibld*. October 23* 1955* P* U Ibid*. November 5* 1955* P* If Ibid*. December 10, 1955* P* 12. 383IMd*, November 2, 1955* P* 18; Ibid.. November 5, 1955* p* 1* 337 Japan had also baen clamoring for ths acceptance of the package proposal* The Japanese had demonstrated the Importance to them of their country’s admission Into the United Hat ions by the passage of resolutions by both houses of the Japanese Diet urging acceptance of the package deal*"*®^ A negative vote by the Uhlted States In the Assembly might be Interpreted by the Japanese that It vould veto the paokage proposal In the Security Council* Defeat of the package deal because of the American veto or maneuver could mean a propaganda and political defeat for the pro-American Hatoyama Government in Japan* American declarations to the effect that the Uhlted states vould not thwart the vill of the qualified majority by Its veto In the Security Council and a public statement by Ambassador Lodge that the United States would abstain on Albania* Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in order to get admission of the Western- supported states had not eased the anxiety of the Japanese, the Italians, and the Spaniards along vlth their supporters in the United Hatlona*^®^ 38Uibld*. December 8, 1955# P* lU# ibid.. December lo, 1955* P* 12. 385ibld*. lovember 11*, 1955# P* !• 338 Particularly disturbing were statements by Hr* Lodga that tha United Stataa vaa oppoaad to tha admission of Outar Mongolia baeausa that applicant vas not really Independent but merely a province under the divided control of the Soviet Union and Red China*^®^ In a secret conference between the big powers efforts to break the admissions deadlock failed. Tha admission of tha Mongolian People's Republic was the main obstacle.-*^ Tha soviet delegation had made it very clear that the package deal would be vetoed unless Outer Mongolia was also included* As the Soviet delegate put its "It was eighteen or nonel"388 Uhlted States delegate had* before the voting on the joint resolution* Insisted on the admission of seventeen* Outer Mongolia was to be excluded from the deal* Undoubtedly the Uhlted States had tried to exert counter-pressure on Canada to omit Mongolia from the package list* Ambassador Lodge even publicly oalled for an early meeting of the security Council vlth the Implication that the united States 386ibid., November 11, 1955# p. 13I ibid** November ill* 1955# P* !• 3f l 7ibid*. November 20, 1955# PP« 1# 2; ibid*. IV, pp. 2* 3* 3®®Ibid*, November 15* 1955# P* I) ibid*. November lo* 1955# P* 2Ul Ibid.. December 2,1955* P* 6* would bo able to block tho package of eighteen by the abstention of lta supporters In that organ or even by Its veto.3®9 Canada and twenty-one other nations at that stage moved to block the early meeting of the ■aon Council* Their strategy was to seek the backing of the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority so that the United States would have no excuse to wthwart the will of the qualified majority*1 1 They believed that it was the United States that had to be persuaded to aceept the package. The USSR needed no persuasion; it was all for the package deal* Even in the ease of faseist Spain with whleh Russia did not have diplomatic rela tions, Moscow di<j not offer objections. Moscow was aware of the bettering relations between Spain and the South American countries whloh had previously been hostile to the Franco Government, and the inclusion of Spain in the package list would gain the support of those South Americans for the en bloc proposal* Earlier In talks with Dr* Belaunde, before leaving as the USSR representative in the General Assembly, Mr. Molotov had told the Chairman of the Good Offloes Committee that Spain might be added to the package deal when the latter 3fl9lbld.. VoT*Eb*r 16, 1955, P- ll». 3’ °jnd. 31*0 applied for membership.391 it waa upon that statement by the Ruaalan Foreign Xlnlater that the Latin Amerloan members urged Spain to apply for nenberehlp in the TJhlted Fat lone. The Soviet Union realized the neeeaaity of Baking efforta to reach aone neaaure of friendly underatending with Spain. It would be to Soviet Ruesla's advantage if Spain could be lured back to its traditional neutrality* for in that eaae the Anerloana might be denied the uae of the military baaea they were then building in Spain.392 Why then* in aplte of the obvloua Soviet diplo matic offenaive oaloulated to prejudice United Statea polielea, ahould the United Statea take a firm poaltion agalnat the adnlaalon of Outer Mongolia* which admission waa the key to the aolutlen of the atalematef Surely the United Statea had more to loae from keeping Italy* Spain* and Japan out of the united Fatlona than to have Outer Mongolia In the organization. Surely the United Statea waa not aacrlfieing "principle." Prinoiple had already been aacrlfleed by Ita lndlreot aaaent to the entry of the Bast European eonmmnlat statea whose 39lIbld.. October 5, 1955. p. 11. 392See The Economist. "Moaccm Woo a Madrid," Vol. 177# October 2“ i S T p p V ’ 396-99; Ibid.* "A Place for Spain*" Eoveaber 12, 1955# P* 31*1 application* it had mare stubbornly oppoaad in the past than tha application of tha Mongolian People*s Republic, and also by Its support of Franco Spain* Tha United Statas had beeone tha victim of its moralistic anti-Red China erusada* Tha United States had maneuvered itself into a position where It could not abandon tha Formosa Government of Chiang Kai-shek even whan, as in tha matter of admission to tha United Rations, tha latter was pursuing a policy that oould be politically dis astrous to tha United Statas In Its relations with other countries* Tha Formosa Government had been portrayed to tha American publlo as tha only true raprasantatlva of tha Chinese people and should, therefore, continue to repre sent then in the Uhited Rations* Row the Chiang Government was threatening to veto the admission of Outer Mongolia even if it meant that the other appli cants would also be vetoed by the opposition* The Uhlted States undeniably wanted the defeat of the eg bloc proposal without being blamed for it* However, it would like the Soviet Uhion blamed for it and not Rationalist China* The USSR, of course, wanted the an bloc proposal to get through, but if it was not to get through, it wanted Chiang Kai-shek to get blamed far it* Rationalist 3U2 China, by blocking the deal, would incur the displeasure of the other members of the United Nations, like the South Amerioan countries which had hitherto been unf aw arable to, or had opposed, the seating of Communist China* And, indeed, supporters of the package deal were threatening to expel Nationalist China from the organization if it blocked the eij bloc proposal.393 To save the Formosa seat in the United Nations, the united StAtes had to openly declare its position on Outer Mongolia hoping that its announced opposition might convince at least another three members of the Council to abstain from voting on Mongolia*s application and by this prevent the letter's admission Instead of by a Chinese veto* Responsibility for the defeat of the package proposal would be shared by the abstaining Council members together with Nationalist China and the United States* Even when the potential abstainers, because under heavy pressure by supporters of the Joint draft resolution would decide not to abstain, the United States, by its declared objection to Mongolia's admis sion, would have shifted part of the blame away from Formosa to Itself, and thus might be able to save the Formosa seat in the United Nations* 393ihe New York Times, December U* 1955* IV* P* 31 ibid*. December 6,1955, P* Si ibid.. December 8, 1955* p* 1* 343 But Washington was not totally In agreement with Chiang Kai-shek* Certainly a reallstlo appraisal of the situation convinced Washington that the West could afford to admit Outer Mongolia* Pressure was put on Chiang* But the United States* as did the other countries* underestimated the value far the Formosa Government of the rejection of Outer Mongolia's applica tion and the courage and shrewdness of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek* In late September* when the movement for the admission of all eighteen apppllcants* Including Outer Mongolia* was In full swing* Chiang Kai-shek's Foreign Minister* Mr* Yeh, had declared that the Formosa Government opposed and would veto the admission of Outer Mongoiia*^^ The Taipei announcement was not taken seriously* Chiang Kai-shek* it was believed* was only eoholng Washington* A change of attitude In Washington would create a similar change of attitude In Taipei. The members of the Uhited Nations believed that Chiang could not really afford to antagonize the Uhited States; the very survival of his regime depended on the goodwill and the protection of that great Amerioan 39i*Tbld*. September 29* 19$5> P* !*• power. It had also been taken for granted that tha Talpal Government would do what Waahington bade it to do. But Chiang Kai-shek really meant to reto tha adulealon of Outer Mongolia* Ha rejected three separate appeals from President Eisenhower not to oaat hla veto against the application of the Mongolian People's Republic. In those messages President Elsenhower made it dear to Chiang Kai-shek that Rationalist China would jeopardise Its own chances of staying in the Chited Nations by blocking the package proposal.Presumably the American arguments had been that# by using the veto# the Nationalists would alienate various non-communist states thereby endangering their own (Nationalists) position, and would also reveal a "dent" in Amerioan-Natlanal1st relations. The Nationalist Chinese Foreign Offioe nevertheless Issued statements that it would not consider any compromise on the Mongolian issue, and Foreign Minister Teh, after his fourth conference with American Ambassador Bankin, reasserted the veto threat.^96 In another conference betareen the two officials, Teh again held that China 395 ______ jr pp. 1, k 396Ibld., December k, 1955# P« 10 ^JMd.# November 30, 1955# PP» 1# 121 Ibid.. December 7# 1955# P« 17 J ibid.. December 9, 1955# 31*5 would veto Outer Mongolia*a a p p l i c a t i o n .397 Apparently, Teh*a reaaaertlon of Intent to uae the veto waa In anawer to Secretory Dallea* atatement at the time of the eonferencea at Farnoaa that the Uhited Statea waa oppoaed to any veto on the adnlaaion of new members,398 Including a veto by Nationallet China. Chiang Kai-shek knew he waa taking a big gamble In antagonising the Eisenhower administration. But he calculated that Washington could not hastily withdraw its ecanomie and military old for fear of domestic political repercussions and beoause Formosa was valuable aa a link in the chain of Pacific Island bases. The last effective source of pressure on Chiang was lost early that year when the United States gave him the Mhtual Defense Treaty he wanted.399 nevertheless, the lasue of Outer Mongolia must have been one of deepest concern to the Generalissimo for him to have taken such a gamble In losing the friendship of the Eisenhower administration. Certainly Chiang Kai-shek must have felt personal bitterness toward the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia which had contributed to his expulsion 397Ibid.. December 8, 1955* p. 1* ^9^ibld.» December 7, 1955* PP* 16, 17. 399niinam R. Frye, op. olt.. p. ll*. 346 from the Chinese mainland. Alao Outar Mongolia# In the Peltashan invasion# had hit him in the back while he waa almost flat on hla face. Non-admission of Outer Mongolia had given him a vengeful satisfaction# not to exclude a gain in personal prestige among his supporters because of the manner in which he had demonstrated that he was still his own boas. As claimed also by the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations# the overwhelming majority of overseas Chinese supported the vetoing of Outer Mongolia's application,**00 and Chiang definitely had no wish to antagonize them. Another explanation far Chiang's action could be that he had Intended the veto as a bargaining weapon. It was well known that France had successfully used the threat of veto to delete the question of Algeria from the agenda of the Tenth Assembly as price for it* non- opposition to the joint resolution far en bloc admission#**°* and Chiang could be doing the same thing to prolong his stay in the United Nations. **°°T. Tslang# "The Reason for My Veto#" The Reporter. Vol. 14* February 9# 1956. 401Thc New York Times. November 24# 1955* P« ibid.# November ^5# iv55* pV 1; Ibid.# November 2o, 3U7 A noat logloal explanation for tha veto of Outar Mongolla’a application was that Chiang wanted to dlarupt the Genera negotiations between Red China and the United States and thus delay or prevent a rapprochement between Washington and Peiping. The Generallsslno knew that Secretary Dalles was working hard for such a rapprochewent.^02 By vetoing Outer Mongolia and thereby wrecking the package deal, he ooald Seattle Dalles* policy of disengagement in the Par Bast. He woald devalue the diplomatic weight of Red Chinese prospective representation in the Uhited Rations which the United States held in reserve to force a compromise on the Peiping Governnent when the right time came. By vetoing Outer Mongolia, thereby preventing the admission of all the eighteen applicants, the membership of the General Assembly would be held to sixty. In this Assembly of sixty the United States had a virtual power of veto to stop a move to oust Rationalist China. In spite of Latin American threats to expel Rationalist China if the latter bloeked the paokage deal, Chiang felt that the United States oould nevertheless mobilise the twenty Latln-Amerlcan votes to prevent the lining up of a two-thirds majority which could vote to admit Peiping. ^William R. prye, op. clt.. p. 14* 3U8 Taipei felt eonfldent that it oould force the (U. S.) State Department to align the Latin Anerloans in its defense. Timely action through the China lobby and the right ving of the Republican Party would have farced Dulles' hand, especially in that Important election y«ar.^°3 Another reason for blocking the passage of the an bloc proposal would be to prevent establishment of a precedent. Without any such precedent of en bloc admission, the principle of individual admission or selective membership would strictly apply. By the process of individual admission or selective membership and by obsouring the distinction between admission and representation, the seating of Red China could be barred indefinitely. The Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, of course, had based his objections to the Mongolian appli cation on the juridical conditions under Article 1*, paragraph 1, of the Charter. He held that Outer Mongolia did not qualify for admission under Article 1*. Outer Mongolia was not independents its Independence ^°3i(arlo Rossi, "New Members Shift Balance," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 35, January 15, 19$6, p. t>5; refer also to statements of Director Harold Stasmfc The New York Times. Deoember 12, 1955* P* 131 The New rork^Tffmcs, December 15, 1955* 31*9 existed only in Russian propaganda* Outar Mongolia was not peace-loving; it had engaged In aggression In the Peltashan region* and had participated vith the Chinese and Korean comnunists in the war in Korea against the United Rations. Outer Mongolia far its lack of inde pendence would not be able to carry out the obligations of the Charter* nor because of its non-peace-loving character be willing to carry out such obligations. Testimony to the contrary by the USSR and its communist satellites and even by India was biased and should not be accepted. Regarding the en bloc admission of all eighteen applicants* the Chinese delegate claimed that voting far such admission would legalise and formalise a principle and procedure which most members had admitted before was contrary to the Charter and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. He also emphasised the equal rights of sovereign states* and ridiculed acceptance of the package proposal as bowing to USSR dictation. He saidx The Soviet union's stand is eighteen or none • . • the sponsors of this draft resolution answer x yes* all eighteen. Therefore* in the substance of this matter* the sponsors and supporters have made a . OJ total surrender to the dlotates of the Soviet Ufaioirr ^ 1*01*80OR. 10th year* 703rd meeting* pp. 5*11; refer also to previous statements of the Chinese delegate* The Hew York Times. December 3* 1955* P* !• 350 American hope* far tha rejection of Mongolia's application by the abstention of at least three other menbers of the Council besides Itself and China were to be shattered. Great Britain seened to have wavered under Anerlean pressure and looked as If it would abstain from voting on the Mongolian application. Yet also pressed by the Commonwealth nations, the British Socialist Party, and most probably by Red China, Britain held to Its support of the package of eighteen. As the British delegate was to say during the Council debates: It is true that Article 1} of the Charter lays down specific qualifications for membership. There is, however, nothing which prevents each Member of the United Rations from assaying the qualifications of a candidate with benevolence— and my delegation's attitude will be an attitude of the utmost limit of benevolence. And regarding Outer Mongolia, he continued: mdla, for whose political judgment we have great respect, has reoognised Outer Mongolia and estab lished diplomatic relations with it. This makes It easier for us not to press our reservations to the point of abstention, and makes it possible for us to feel Justified in easting our vote in favor of that country.1 *0? France had also been won over to the package arrangement. The deletion of the Algerlen issue from the Assembly ^O^The Mew York Times, December 2, 1955# P« 6. fr°6gC0R, loth year, 701st meeting, p« 11* W i b l d ., 703rd meeting, p* it* 351 agenda had ealmed down France, In spite of previous statements that it would n o t vote far nations which it believed would oast their ballots against Franoe on colonial i s s u e s . T u r k e y , which had committed Itself to abstain on the en bloc proposal, could not long hold out against the pressure exerted on it by the Arab and other Moslem countries.**0 ^ It had become clear that China was left wi t h no alternative but to use the veto. The General Assembly resolution (9l8(X)) came before the Security Council on December 10, 1955* The Soviet delegate applauded the passage of the joint resolution for eg bloc admission; It had been a Russian project for nine y e a r s . Yet aware of the sentiments of the Chinese delegate, and support for him (Chinese delegate) by the American delegate, the USSR represents* tlve proposed a plan of procedure and order of voting "which would preclude the possibility of any accidents or surprises,” meaning a double-cross. Mr. Sobolev laid down the USSR plan as follows: (1) the Security Council and the General Assembly would examine the applications in accordance with a list drawn up in chronological ^ ° ^The Mew York Times. November 5* 1955* P« !• frQ9ybld.. November 25* 1955* P* 6. UlOSee SCCFU 701st meeting, op. clt.. p. 13* 352 order; (2) the meetings of the Security council and the General Assembly vould consider and vote Immediately on each applicant recommended to it by the Security Council; the Security Council should n o t begin to consider or vote on the next application until the General Assembly had taken a decision on the preceding application.1*11 Ihe soviet delegate was n o t trusting any of his colleagues in spite of the fifty vote plurality in the General Assembly given to the joint draft resolution* That mistrust was resented by many of the delegates* As the delegate of Iran commented; ". • • to carry mis- trust so far is an insult to the General Assembly . • • • Hew Zealand and Brazil proposed a joint resolution on the procedure of voting to be followed by the two organs whi c h was quite different from the Russian pro posal. That joint proposal# however# was rejected by the Soviet delegate.1*13 Further resentment was expressed b y other dele gates by absenting themselves from a private meeting called by the delegates of Canada# India# and Ecuador for the purpose of extracting from them an assurance ^^See ibid.» pp. 14-15$ ibid.. 702nd meeting# p* 9. ^^Ibld*. 702nd meeting# p. 10. fy^Ibld., 701st meeting# pp* 19-20* 353 that they would not "double-cross" the Russians* And sows of those wh o attended the meeting objected angrily to making any pledges to the R u s s i a n s * ^ ^ Unquestionably the nesting was a diplonatie blunder on the part of Canada* India* and Ecuador* The Chinese and American delegates could not have been less overjoyed at the turn of events* But the head of the Soviet delegation* hr* Kuznetsov* was persuaded by the Canadian and British delegates to withdraw the proposal of Sobolev and to aoeept the He w Zealand-Brazil resolu tion on the procedure of examining end voting on the a p p l i c a t i o n s C h i n e s e and American hopes of channel ing the blame for failure to solve the admission question to the Soviet Union fizzled. In another maneuver to avoid easting his veto* the Chinese delegate presented resolutions to have the controversial states of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam added to the list of sixteen* The Assembly package of eighteen was out down to sixteen by the Chinese delegate* Finland and Nepal were omitted from the list beoause they had recognized Red China* ^ W i l l i a m R* Frye, oj>. e l t *. p* 17; lhe New York Times. Deoember 13, 1955* p* 6* f r ^Ibid. Nevertheless, Ceylon, which had alao recognized Red China, waa not acratehed from the Hat. The Chlneae delegate waa apparently trying to ereate confusion* He waa making certain that the Soviet delegate would not agree to the new proposals and would, therefore, veto this new package of eighteen* Every new proposal and every veto of the USSR of the new proposal might convince the other members of the United Nations that it was the USSR and not China which did not want a solution of the problem of admission* They would also prolong discus* slon and delay deoislon of the Council until the end of the 1955 session of the Assembly which would occur in a few days* The Chinese resolutions, however, did not gain the approval of the Council members except the Uhited States and France, the latter because of its commitment to support the admission of South Vietnam***^ The frltish delegate and the other delegates supporting the en bloc resolution thought that the Chinese proposals to seoure the admission of the divided republics were not practical politics, although they supported the admission of those two countries when they were put to WsCCR, op. elt., 703rd meeting, pp. 4-5# Ibid** 704th meeting, pp* 4# o* 355 a vote. Their applications, however, were vetoed by tha USSR.1*17 China*a tactics of diversion and delay failed. The Chinese delegate had to resort to the veto to pre vent the admission of Outer Mongolia. This led to the USSR ve t o of all non-communist applicants.1*1® It seemed that the deadlock on admission of new members was to remain unsolved. The great powers were not willing to acoommodate each other. While China and the United Stress maintained their rigid positions against the entry of Outer Mongolia# the USSR had been similarly inflexible on its stand of "eighteen or none." But C h i n * rather than Soviet Russia#was branded the villain. In a shrewd propaganda move# Bulganin and Khrushchev# in a Joint declaration wi t h InAlt'i-liltai with whom they were visiting# declared timely their support of universal membership of the United Rations implying that the Chinese v e t o of the package prevented the attainment of such universality as the members of the Uhited Rations had w a n t e d W e r e the General fr17 Ibld.. 701* th meeting# pp. *>* 10. See Annex III, p. U 3 2 T " frlBlbld., pp. 11-12. See Ann e x III# p. 1 ^32. The Rew Y o r k Times. December ll*, 1955* p. 11*. 356 Assembly not to adjourn in throo day®, throats to oust tho Chiang Kai-shek Government from the organization voald have boon tried, if not ouocooofully earriod out. 7ov tho Soviet Union waa determined, ao Mr. Molotov had implied earlier, to aolve tho problem of admission* The USSR was to spring another surprise. Like his previous reversal of Sobolev's proposal on the procedure of voting, Kuznetsov was again to demonstrate his flexibility. It appeared, nevertheless, that Kuznetsov's flexibility conformed with an alternate plan decided by the Kremlin before the December debates. The ICremlln, not taking any chances of a Chinese sabotage of the en bloc admission proposal, had prepared a second plan whieh was to be executed after a Chinese veto had prevented the adoption of the Canadian package of eighteen. Vow when almost all thought that the solution of the admission problem would have to wait indefinitely, Kuznetsov called the Scoretary of the Security Council and asked far an urgent meeting of the Counoll. The Council met again on December U|th* At this meeting, the USSR representative was to offer "Flan Two" whloh he desorlbed as an effort to meet the demands of the United States and China* He declared, therefore, that the USSR: 357 Da airing to facilitate a solution of tha long drawn out question of tha admission of new members, withdraws the negative vote it oast with respeet to a number of States, and will vote far their admission* It does not inelude Japan among those countries, considering that the applications of Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic, in respeet of whioh the Security Council was unable yesterday to adopt a favorable recommendation will be deferred to the next session of the General Assembly* Omission of Japan's application from the list was based on the ground that the peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union had not yet been concluded• That reason carried the implication that Japan had better meet the Russian demands, for example, neutralism and non-remilitarisation, regarding the peace treaty or its admission to the Uhited Rations might not even be approved in the next session of the Assembly* Pairing it with Outer Mongolia also carried the implication that it was China's veto of the latter applicant more than anything else that prevented Japan's admission* And, indeed, the Japanese delegate had blamed the Formosa Government for the rejection of his country's applica tion*^21’ Behind this latter implication was a subtle Russian move to revive Japanese-Vatlonallat Chinese animosity whleh, Russia hoped, would lead to closer fr20sC0R. op* elt.. 705th meeting, pp* 1-2* ^21The Hew York Times, December 11* * 1955* P* 1* eoonomlo and dipIonatic relations between Japan and Red China* Certainly Socialists in Japan had urged for quick recognition of Conmunist China because of Formosa's veto of Outer Mongolia which they believed led to Japan's omission from the list of new members*^2 Nationalist China had previously threatened to veto Japan's application if the latter should conclude a peace treaty with Communist China or enter into any agreements which might imply recognition of the Peking G o v e r n m e n t * 4^3 y0 the Socialists, Japan should no longer let itself be blackmailed by Nationalist China* The failure of Japan to gain entry into the world organisation through the veto of Outer Mongolia by the Formosa regime negated the effectiveness of the direct threats by Formosa to veto the Japanese application* Moreover, some Japanese, particularly the Socialists, had gone farther in their Interpretation of the crisis* They argued that Japan's alliance with the United States was precisely the factor that made a settlement with the Soviet Union difficult. The way to make a f r ^Ibld*. December 16, 19$5# p* Ur The Economist, "Damaged Package for Tokyo," Vol. 177* December Zif, 19&, P. 1093* 423ihe New York Times, September 13* 1955* P* 4* 359 satisfactory bargain with tha USSR, they argued waa to declare Japan's independenee of the united States*^2* * The United States waa no doubt aware of these Implications* Mr. Lodge, therefore, urged the admission of Japan* He proposed the inclusion of Japan in the package deal after that country was stricken from the USSR's revised list* That proposal was rejeeted by the Soviet delegate*^2^ Mr* Lodge presented another draft resolution proposing that the Security Council recommend to the General Assembly Japan's admission at the letter's eleventh regular session* This was also vetoed by the USSR delegate.The American delegate proposed far the third time to have Japan admitted* Again his resolution was vetoed by the USSR delegate.^*2? The Soviet delegate, after his rejection of the third American resolution for Japan's admission, himself pro posed the simultaneous admission of Japan and Outer ^^Refer to Richard P. Stebbina, The Uhited States ln^yorld Af^lrs. 1956, (Hew York* Harper and Brothers, U25scor, op. olt*. 705th meeting, p* 3* ^ I b l d .. 706th Mating, p. 1. W i b U . . pp. 3, 20. See Annex III, p. 1+35. This was the 46th and last veto (to date) by the USSR on the natter of admission to membership* 360 Mongolia* but thia proposal was rejected by a majority of tha Counoll. This Soviet effort night be interpreted as an attempt to plaeate Outer Mongolia* but also actually to offset the American intention. Since the USSR was not willing to admit Japan without Outer Mongolia* the successive American resolutions were undoubtedly designed to pin the blame for the rejection of Japan on Soviet Russia Instead of on Nationalist China. The Chinese delegate* for his part* had brilliantly argued for Japan*s admission in support of the three Uhited Statea resolutions* trying to extricate his Government from the blame the USSR delegate had put on it.1 *28 The United States was partially successful in accomplishing its alms. The soviet vetoes on Japan*s admission were again to be denounced by the majority of the Council. Pro-American Japanese stayed at the helm of the Japanese state. Nationalist China was not to be expelled from the Uhited Nations during the next (eleventh) session of the Assembly as it had been threatened* and still is a member of the Uhited Nations. Soviet Russia had approved Japan*s admission In fr28ibig.. 705th meeting* p. U; ibid.. 706th meeting* pp. 9-10. December, 1956, unaccompanied by Outer Mongolia* The Japanese had to make political and territorial con cessions to the satisfaction of the Russians,^29 some of them being made in exchange for Japan's admission into the United Nations* With regard to Outer Mongolia, the USSR had not pressed for its admission since December, 1955* The USSR must feel that that applicant mould not be able to get in as long as Nationalist China remained seated in the Security Council* The USSR did not attempt to tie Outer Mongolia's application vith that of the Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, or Ghana* It mould not have been diplomatically mlse for the USSR to have dene so* The Soviet Uhion had been portrayed as the hero of the 1955 drama and there mas no vital reason for it to destroy mhat mas left of that image* The admission of Outer Mongolia could malt* What mas important for the Russians mas to unseat the Formosa Government from the Seeurlty council, better yet from the Uhited Nations Organisation itself, and to substitute in its place the Peiping Government* The seating of Communist China mould almost automatically guarantee the admission of Outer Mongolia* ^%iohard P* St ebb ins, op. elt*. pp. 296-97* CHAPTER IX SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS To gain admission into an organisation, •specially a profitable one, is obviously an objective far most outsiders. Admission to membership in the United Nations has been one of the Immediate objectives of praetleaily every non-member nation of the world* Nations may have wished to join the United Nations beeaase of a genuine or altruistic desire for world order and well-being and universal brotherhood* Essen tially, however, their wish to join the United Nations * has depended on the belief that their national Interests would be better served by membership In that organisa tion* That wish or belief is ealeulated in terms of benefits and advantages* Certainly the United Nations eould offer them, especially the smaller and newly-born states, economic, social, and eduoatlonal benefits, a measure of seourity, wider political influence, and greater prestige, or a more universal recognition; even the aspirations for world order and peace and brotherhood enter in the calculation* Because states do diligently aspire for admis sion to membership in the Uhited Nations, this specific objective has been shrewdly employed as a diplomatic weapon by the members of the organisation, either to gain concessions from the individual applicant state or as a political lever or part of that lever far the admission of another state or bloc of states that the particular United Nations member may favor* For example, the Soviet Union used the application for membership of Japan to gain territorial and political concessions from that applicant during their peace treaty negotiations, and as part of the diplomatie lever to gain the admission of the communist applicant states or as an individual lever to gain the admission of Outer Mongolia* Yet an applicant state whose admission is highly valued in the bargaining process or in the general political-ideological struggle may use ita own admission as a diplomatic instrument against those members which value so much ita admission* In other words, admission to membership in the United Nations becomes for that applicant state at once a diplomatic objective and a diplomatic instrument* Again take the ease of Japan* The Uhited States strongly supported its admission to membership in the Uhited Nations. The strategic posi tion of Japan, regarded as essential in the network of the Uhited States Pacific defenses, has made it impera tive for the United States to maintain the best of relations with that applicant* Moreover, Japan Inside the United Nations, If led by a pro-Western government, would give the Vest an additional vote. This politloal and military Importance of a pro-Western Japan had made It possible far the Hatoyama Government to use the admission of Japan to membership In the United Nations, Inter alia, as a diplomatic instrument to gain political favors or concessions from the United States. Public attacks by the Soviet delegates to the Uhlted Nations regarding the American occupation of Japan during the debates on the Japanese application all the more aided the Japanese Government to see ore the lessening of military and economic restrictions by the Uhlted States. Nevertheless, It cannot be denied that the admission of Japan to membership In the Uhlted Nations was a stronger bargaining weapon in the hands of the United States than in the hands of Japan* Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Transjordan, Ceylon and other pro-Western candidates for admission In some manner had used their admission to membership in the Uhlted Nations as a price for their support of the Uhlted States and the West In the ldeologioal struggle. Of course, the reverse was true: the United States and the Western countries would support their candidacy only if they remained on the side of the West* 365 The same political bargaining night be said to have transpired in the dlplonatie relations between the Soviet Union and the East European communist states with regard to the admission of the latter states to membership In the Uhlted Hations. While the Soviet Union unquestionably has the power and the position to coerce the East European states to do what it wants them to do, still wise diplomacy on the part of the Kremlin needs to take into account some of the demands of those eountrles if only to maintain their self- respect, but also to keep their loyalty* Defense and political-ideological considerations are primary in the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe* Eastern Europe has been eonverted into a defensive tier, and may well be an offensive tier, for Soviet Russia. Russia oannot afford to have that area turned against it or once more made into a springboard for a Western attack against it* It is for the USSR a "cordon aanltaire in reverse•" It is an area penetrated by doctrinal oommunlsm which the Soviet union cannot yield to Imperialistic capitalism* the Kremlin, though backed by military power and the Communist party, must have to keep this vital area within its sphere of Influence also by diplomatic means* Inter alia, the USSR had, therefore, to sponsor the entry of the East European states Into the world organization. Unquestionably, the Bast Buropean states desired admission to membership in the United Vat ions. Their military and polltleal- ideologlcal importance to the USSR had made It possible for them, though to a lesser extent perhaps as compared with Japan vis-i-vis the United States, to use their admission to membership in the United Nations as a bargaining tool In their relations with the Soviet Uhion* While their entry into the United Nations was selfishly designed by Soviet Russia to gain legal recognition of its sphere of influence In that area by the West, to Increase its voting power in the organiza tion, and to increase its prestige in the Bast European countries by posing as the champion of their sovereign rights in demanding their admission to membership in the United Nations where they could seat in equality with the other nations of the world, the Russian purposes all the more increased the value of admission to membership of those Bast European states as a diplomatic weapon by thoseoountrles against it. It appeared that the Mongolian People's Republic was not able to use the Instrument of its own admission to membership in the organisation as effectively as the East European states in its diplomacy vis-&-vis the USSR. Soviet Russia minimised Outer 367 Mongolia's admission by the rejection of the Amerloan proposal far e£ bloc admission in 191*6, sacrificed it in the compromise of 1955* failed to get it admitted with Japan, and did not press for its admission together vlth the Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco or Ghana. Neutralist countries had also taken advantage of the political-ideological struggle between the East and the West. Their neutralist position on most interna tional issues, paradoxical to, and yet consistent with, the struggle for votes and support, had become so valued by both sides so that their admission to membership in the organization could be used by them as an Instrument of diplomacy in their relations with either side. Their neutralist position, in part, had made it possible far Afghanistan, Sweden, Iceland, Yemen, Pakistan, Burma, Slam, Israel and Indonesia to gain admission into the United Nations. Because they were all then uncommitted in the ideological struggle, Russia did not find it necessary to veto their application; in fact, Russia enthusiastically supported and welcomed their admission. Regarding Afghanistan, the USSR had been ccnoerned with the admission of that country into a world organization since the days of the League of Nations. Yet, regardless of the above arguments for the utility of the admission to membership in the united Nations as a diplomatic weapon because of the olrcum- stances caused by the East-West struggle, the very faet that admission to membership in the United Nations has been an immediate objective for the appiloant states in order to attain the further ends of foreign policy, like national security, qualifies it as an instrument of diplomacy. Anything short of war— an alternative means of policy— usable in the attainment of the further ends of foreign policy, whether Itself an innedlate objective or not, becomes a useful instrument of diplomacy. How ever, the use of the admission to membership in the United Nations as an Instrument of diplomacy has been more visible in the politics of the members doing the Judging than those of the applicant states. As in the League of Nations, admission to member ship in the United Nations was regarded as a political, rather than as a striotly legal, issue. In the admission to original membership in the United Nations Informal criteria, undeniably political in substance, were used in the selection of candidates. To qualify as an original member the applicant must have declared war against the enemy, must have shown good conduct during the war, must have diplomatic relations with the sponsoring powers of the organisation, and must be able to conduct its foreign relations. It is true that the 369 declarations of war again*t the enemy by tho associated nation* and Argentina were token declaration* of war* Nevertheless, the declaration of war waa a condition whloh wu*t have been fulfilled by the candidate If It was to gain admission* An associated nation which did not declare war against the enemy could not have been admitted. Similarly* Argentina would not have been supported by the United States and most of the South American countries If It had not declared war against Germany and Japan* The conditions for admission to original member ship were arbitrarily applied* They were strictly applied against candidates the particular sponsoring powor did not favor; yet the same sponsoring power might be willing to disregard them If Its Immediate objective called for compromise* For example* the United States at Yalta excluded pro-Nazi Argentina from membership In the contemplated world organization* However, the United States* In order to gain the Important support of the South American countries for the establishment of the Uhlted Nations Organization and the aeoeptanee of other agreements arrived at Yalta* such as the admission of the two Soviet republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine* had to compromise and aooept the wish of the South American countries for the admission of 370 Argentina. Or taka another example. Bje Soviet Union did not object to the membership of India and the Philippines, both of which were then unable to conduct their foreign relations, and to any two of the forty- eight American states. They were concessions by the Soviet Union to the Anglo-American powers in exchange far the original membership of Soviet Byelorussia and the Soviet Ukraine* But the conditions for membership were strictly applied by the Soviet Union against Argentina when the latter sought membership in the United Nations during the San Francisco conference. Tet even with regard to Argentina, the USSR for practical reasons— Argent ina*s admission, which was supported by the majority of delegations, was inevitable— passed by that applicant*s fulfillment of the conditions for membership and tried to maneuver an Argentina-for-Poland trade. In the admission of subsequent members legal or quasi-legal arguments were constantly used in the debates to support particular policies of each United Nations member; but legalisms were made to serve the political Interests as the elroumstanoes demanded or warranted. The Soviet view that the "legal formula must be to express political ideas" was also applied in practice by the non-communist members. Consequently, 371 legal formula waa to be arbitrarily applied* Applicants for admission to membership in the United Nations unfavorable to the voting member were opposed beoause they did not possess the formal qualifications laid down in Article U, paragraph 1, of the Charter: that the applicant must be a peaoe-loving state, and able and willing, as Judged by the Organisation, to oarry out the obligations of the Charter. Yet other applicants which appeared to be in the same oategary as the unfavorable candidates were supported by the same voting member for various political and ideologioal reasons* Various concepts or elements were applied under each of these formal criteria in the examination of the applications* For instance, the applloant must possess the four elements of statehood: a territory, a people, a government, and independence or sovereignty* the latter being determined by the mode of the estab lishment and maintenance of the state, by the extent of the defense arrangements between the applicant and its former colonial power, by its ability to conduct foreign relations, by the disabilities resulting from the war, by foreign occupation, by the uneanoluded ar unratified peace treaty, by the absence of ,de lure recognition, or by the absence of diploma tie relations with particular Uhlted Nations members. 372 The peace-loving character of the applicant vac questioned because of its use of aggressive means or because of its aggressive intentions* An applioant vas not peace-loving because of its instigation of border incidents, interference with peaceful foreign shipping, unwillingness to employ pacific means in the settlement of disputes, or because of the existence of a technical state of war between it and a United Nations member, the unratifled peace treaty, the unfavorable war conduct of the applicant during the war, or beoause of the absence of diplomatic relations between the applicant and particular United Nations members. Under ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of the Charter, references were made to the limited diplomatic eontaot of the applioant, its resort to milltsry aggression, l.ts unfavorable war record, its violation of peace treaty provisions, especially an human rights, its disregard of United Nations requests or decisions, or its abrogation of existing treaties with a member or members of the United Nations* Thus the application of Albania, for example, was opposed by the United States because of Albania's abrogation of the existing bilateral treaties between them; by the United States and Britain because of the lack of diplo matic relations between them and the applioant; by 373 Britain and Greece because of that applicant*a unfavor able war conduct, the Instigation of border incidents with Greece, and Interference with peaceful foreign shipping; by Greece because of their territorial dispute and the existence of a technical state of war be taroen then* The USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia took the opposite view* They held that Albania had a favorable war record and was fully qualified for admission to membership aocording to the conditions laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter* The applicant and the supporters, of course, in this case subscribe to the same political and ideologioal beliefs* The admission of the Mongolian People's Republic was opposed by China, the United States, Britain, Australia, Egypt and the Netherlands because of the lack of diplomatic relations of that applicant with them and the other members of the United Nations; by the United States, Britain and Australia because of Outer Mongolia*s doubtful ability to eonduet foreign relations; by China because of Mongolia's Invasion of Chinese territory in the peltashan region and that applicant's unwillingness to settle the territorial dispute by peaceful means. China, before the alleged invasion, had been willing to support Outer Mongolia's admission. The 37k Soviet Union and Poland supported Outer Mongolia*a application. ®iey particularly put emphasis on the war contributiona of that applioant and the node of the eatabliahroent of that country's independence by a plebiscite vhioh was formally accepted by China. India, following a neutralist position on that matter, also supported the admission of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union and Poland took the lead against the admission of Transjordan. They questioned the mode of the establishment and the maintenance of that applicant state, its independence because of the defense arrangements with ETitain, its ability to conduct foreign relations, its peace-loving character because of the lack of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and to the aggressive designs of Jordan for the formation of a Greater Syria. Israel did not vote in favor of Jordan because of the latter»s hostility against that member. Britain and the sister Arab states and the other Moslem states defended the admission of Jordan. Ireland*s application was rejected by the Soviet Union and Poland on the grounds that that applioant did not maintain diplomatic relations with the USSR and had an unfavorable war record. Ireland had used that argument against the admission of Soviet Russia into 375 the League of Nations* The United States, because of its close relations with that applicant and in an effort to placate its Irish population, and Australia, because of the long tradition of friendship between it and the applicant, strongly argued for the admission of Ireland. The USSR similarly voted against the admission of Portugal because that applicant did not have diplo matic relations with Soviet Russia and had conducted Itself unfavorably during the war* Portugal had also rejected the entry of the USSR into the League of Rations because of the lack of diplomatic relations between them. India opposed Portugalfs admission because of the fasolstlc sentiments of that oountry's government, but more because of Pcrtugal*s reactionary colonial policy in Goa. The United States, France, Britain, especially the latter, because of their long tradition of friendship vlth the applioant plus the fact that it had made available to the allies the use of the Aseres as a naval base during the war, and Brazil, because of historical, cultural and racial ties, defended the admission of Portugal* France opposed the admission of Slam on the grounds that there existed a technical state of war beteeen them and that Slam, by falling to return French 376 territory gained through aggression during the last war, was unwilling and unable to carry out the obligations of the Charter* Upon the settlement of the territorial claims, however, Prance worked for the unanimous support of the admission of Slam to membership* The Soviet Union had voted against the application of Sian when the latter first applied for admission because of the lack of diplomatic relations between them* Tbe acceptance of a Soviet mission by Slsm, one of the largest in Southeast Asia, made Russia reverse its position* Regarding "aklstan's admission, Afghanistan refused to vote for that o oun try * s admission because of territorial disagreements betmreen them* The United States and Britain led the opposition to the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania* Those applicants were held to be non-peace-loving because of the moral support they had given Horth Korea during the latter*s invasion of South Korea* They were also accused of violating peaee-treaty provisions, especially those regarding human rights, which demon strated their inability and unwillingness to fulfill the obligations contained in the Charter* France objected to the executions of political prisoners by the Bulgarian Government* Greece also especially 377 objected to Bulgaria'* admission because of that appli cant's provocation of border incidents against that member* The Soviet Union at first submitted the post ponement of the applications of those ex-enemy states until their peace treaties had been ratified. But upon the ratification of their peace treaties and, of course, their eommunlzation, the USSR consistently sup ported their admission into the United Rations. The application of Austria was rejected by the Soviet Union because that applicant's peace treaty had not been ratified and that it was still occupied by foreign troops. The United States, on the other hand, maintained that neither the unratifled peace treaty nor the occupation of Austria impaired the letter's sovereignty nor reflected negatively on the peace-loving character of that applicant. Austria, the United States maintained, was able to conduct foreign relations and had normal diplomatic relations with the members of the united Rations and was fully qualified for admission into the organisation. The Soviet Union also voted against Finland's admission for the reason that the peace treaty of that ex-enemy country had not yet been ratified. That was also a primary reason far the rejection of Italy's application by the soviet Union, In addition, the USSR 378 denounced the war oonduct of Italy; Italy's co-belllg- erency was minimised by the USSR. Italy was later accused of violating peace treaty provisions by its joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which, according to the Soviet Union, showed its non-peace- loving nature and inability and unwillingness to observe the obligations of the Charter* The United States strongly defended the qualifications of Italy under Article U of the Charter. The USSR and Poland questioned the statehood of Ceylon, particularly the node of the establishment and maintenance of that applicant state, the inability to conduct foreign relations and the effects of the defense arrangements with Britain* Obviously Britain and the Commonwealth countries strongly argued for the admission of that new dominion* The admission of Israel was opposed by the Arab states and other Moslem states, like Pakistan* Syria contested the frontiers of Israel, questioned the legal existence of the government and the existence of the state itself* The Arab states oentended that Israel had not been recognized de lure by the members of the United nations* They emphasised, together with Pakistan, the territorial aggrsaslon of Israel in Palestine, the violation of human rights by the 379 mistreatment, maaaaore, and displacement of tha Arab population In araaa oeeuplad by Iarael and along tha bordera of Iaraal with tha Arab states, tha assesslna- tlon of tha Tfalted HatIona mediator and hla colleague, and dlaregard of United Hatlona requeeta and declalona with reapact to tha Paleatlne problem. Britain and France, both of which had hopea of maintaining their intereata In tha Arab world, aupparted the Arab con tention with regard to tha Indafinitanaaa of tha territory and tha unwilllngnaaa and Inability of Iaraal to carry out tha obllgatlona contained In tha Charter baeauaa of Ita dlaregard of United Hatlona raquaata and declalona with regard to Paleatlne. The United Stataa and tha USSR both aupparted the Iaraell applica tion for admiaalon to memberahlp, tha United Stataa baeauaa of Ita sympathetic attitude toward tha Jawa who Buffered heavily from Nazi peraecutlon and baeauaa of tha atrong preaaure from tha Jewish organlzatlona In that country, and tha USSR baeauaa of tha belief that an Iaraell atata would benefit tha revolutionary move ment agalnat Erltlah imperiallam. Baat-Waat dlsagreamenta ware particularly obvious In tha dabataa on tha admiaalon of tha divided atataa of Korea and Vietnam. The Uhlted Stataa and China, leading tha Weatern camp, claimed that tha Republic of Korea was the only lawful government of all Korea, being the duly elected representative of the people and acknowledged by the General Assembly of the United Ratlone. The aggression of North Korea against the lawful government, whioh was allegedly supported materially and morally by the eommunlst countries, was denounced by the Western powers. On the other side, the Soviet Union declared that the "reactionary govern ment of Syngman Rheen was a puppet government Imposed upon the people of South Korea by American occupation troops and that the "so-called Republic of Korea" was Illegally established by the illegal Interim Committee. The communist and non-couuunlst powers took similar positions with regard to the North and South Vietnam. Nepal<s application was questioned by the USSR because of that applicant's unsatisfactory psrtrayal of full statehood. India, most concerned with a friendly Nepal, supported that country's admission. The United States, Britain, Prance and China also supported the admission of Nepal emphasising the diplomatic relations of that applicant with members of the United Nations and the ability to conduct external affairs. China did not vote, In fact threatened to veto, for Indonesia's admission because of that applicant's "premature" recognition of the Peiping Government 381 which was Interpreted es a sign of Indonesian hostility and* therefore* that applicant's non-peace-lowing character by the Chlang Kai-shek regime. Pakistan and the Mo>lea countries strongly supported the admission of Libya whleh they claimed was a creation of the General Assembly and* Ipso facto* entitled to membership In the United nations. Japan's admission was rejected by the Soviet Union on grounds that that applicant did not possess the qualifications specified In Article i j . ; far example* Japan was not fully Independent and could not oonduot foreign relations because subjected to military occupa tion and economic subversion by the United States* and because of the unoonoluded peace treaty with the USSR and the People's Republic of China* the latter of which was also a factor revealing Its non-peace-loving nature. Japan's peace-loving charaoter was further attacked because Japan had allowed Itself to beoome a base of American aggression In the Par East. The Uhlted States vigorously defended the admission of Japan. The application of the Indochinese states of Laos and Cambodia were also rejeoted by the Soviet Union beoause of their questionable Independence from Prance. Phance* supported by the Uhlted States* Britain* Australia* and other pro-Western members refuted the 382 USSR charges by emphasizing the recognition and diplo matic relations of those states with a majority of the Uhlted Ration* members. Most of the United Nations members, including both the United states and the USSR opposed the admis sion of Spain beoause of its faseistic Franco Government and its pro-Nazi attitude during the war* The Latin American countries which, beoause of histori cal, cultural and racial ties with Spain, were closely concerned with the status of that country were divided in the acceptance of Spain Into the organization, and in taking strong measures against it because of its unfavorable war conduct and faseistic practices. Some of the Latin American oountries favored the use of strong measures against Spain because of their antl-faseistlc views and strong attachment to the Republican Government, the supporters of which in those countries were actively campaigning for the ousting of Franco, Other South American countries opposed the use of strong measures not because of their attachment to the Franco regime, but because of their concern that such intervention might set a precedent in the practice of the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of individual nations, particularly their own. 383 The oriterla of "absence of dlplomatl. 0 relations" and "unfavorable eonduot during tha «arN eonstantlj appliad by tha Soviet Union againat tha admiaalon of non grata appllcanta Ilka Ireland, Portugal and Transjordan vara erlticlead by tha maabara favoring thalr admiaalon* While tha latter maabara had alao made strong rafaranoaa to those criteria In support of, or in objection to, tha candidates they favored or did not favor, they, navarthalaaa, raquaatad tha advisory opinion of tha International Court of Justice* Tha majority opinion, vhieh held that tha conditions laid down in Article U, paragraph 1, of tha Charter vara "exhaustive," vaa constantly introduced in tha debates on admissions against tha opposition of tha Soviet Uhion and its supporters* Tha Soviet delegate cogently pointed out that that aajorlty opinion vas indeed a false aajorlty opinion because of the fact that tvo of tha majority judges in vriting thalr ovn individual opinions agreed vlth the minority viav and, therefore, making this minority opinion tha true majority opinion, and to tha Soviet viav that the matter of admission to membership vas highly political vhlch did not axeluda tha use or introduction of political conditions* Tat the request for an advisory opinion, even if only for 381* jurldloal elucidation, was not necessary; those two "political" criteria were also legal criteria certainly interprstable, and the USSR had so Interpreted thew, within the provisions of Article 1*, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Bat if they were to be regarded as political criteria, precedents regarding the natter of admission to original membership in the United Nations showed that they had been used in the seoret diplomacy at Yalta and in the open diplomaoy at San F**nclseo. The criterion of "absence of diplomatic relations" had also been constantly Invoked in the debates on admis sion to membership in the League of Nations. Even an advisory opinion on the legality of the praotlee of rejecting applicants based on the ooneept of en bloc or simultaneous admission seemed unwarranted. "Horse- trading" was part of the politios of admission to original membership in the United Nations. The only effects of such an advisory opinion were that it supplied the Vestern majority with an additional debating tool against the Soviet Union and that it proved the Soviet susplolons of an anti-communist collusion among the majority of the Uhlted Nations members. The Uhlted States had been the first to propose the admission of all the pending applicants in 191*6, and had been supported by the majority of the Ifolted Nations members. Based on previous practices of the admission to original membership at Yalta and at San Francisco, that proposal vas properly in order* It waa unfortunate that the Soviet Union did not then find it vise to aooept that proposal* The Kremlin thought It viser polltlos to keep Ireland, Portugal and Transjordan out of the United Nations than to have Albania and Outer Mongolia Inside that organization and had emphasised the principle of individual admission acoardlng to the conditions of Article kt paragraph 1, of the Charter* The strong desire to have the East European communist states Inside the United Nations, but in vlev of the opposition by the Western majority, oompelled the Soviet Union to resort to the ooncept of simultaneous admission* As the Soviet Union end the United Statee shifted positions vith regard to the application of the concept of en bloc admission so did the position of their supporters shift, though not to the negleot of the other objectives of their ovn foreign policy* Britain, for example, vhloh supported eloaely the United States position on the admlsalon problem accepted on its ovn the principle of en bloc admission in 1952* China did not oppose the United states proposal for the admission of all applicants, but vhlle the United States after ten years of rigid opposition to the en bloc proposals finally accepted to compromise by accepting the joint draft resolution which proposed the admission of all pending applications, except the divided states of Korea and Vietnam, China opposed that resolution because of its strong opposition to the admission of Outer Mongolia. Cuba was the only other state that voted against that resolution because of its extreme anti- Soviet view and its lack of diplomatic relations with the USSR* The joint draft resolution was sponsored by the small nations, led by Canada, India and Peru, whloh became oonvlneed that the stalemate on the admission issue could only be solved by a political solution along the lines of the Soviet proposals. Likewise, the definitions and positions with regard to the principle of universality, which was used to support both the arguments for eg bloc admission and individual admission according to the quallfloations specified In Article i f . , paragraph 1, of the Charter, by the members shifted aeoordlng to the necessities of practical polltlos. As in the League of Rations, strong arguments were voiced for the universality of the United Rations; and similarly, a goal of aelective membership, with eventual aspirations towards univer sality of the United Rations, was adopted* Some 387 nations, like Sweden, Burns and Ecuador, had made the universality of the United Nations an objective of their foreign policy and, therefore, had consistently voted for the admission of all applicant states. Nevertheless, other members had defined universality as the admission of all candidates except those that they opposed. For example, Syria, which had strongly argued for the universal membership of the Uhlted Nations, did not inolude Israel In its definition of universality. Similarly, most of the pro-Western members exoluded the Soviet-sponsored applicants from their conceptions of universality. The Interpretations by the United Nations members of paragraph 2 of Article 1* of the Charter regarding the formal procedure of the admission of new members also conflicted. In eontrast with the League of Nations where only the Assembly had a formal role, admission to membership In the Uhlted Nations is within the oommon competence of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The admission of applicant states "will be effected by a decision of the General Aasembly upon the reoommendatlon of the Security Council." The meaning of the term "recommendation," whether it meant a mere advice or a preliminary decision was the subject of mueh debate. The permanent members of the Security 388 Council, particularly tha Soviet Union, and some smaller states which subscribed to the reality of big power polities, argued for its interpretation as a preliminary decision* Most of the smaller powers, which were opposed to big power dominance and privilege within the United Nations, regarded recommendation as a mere advice and as legally weightless and subject to being heeded or ignored by the General Assembly which alone had the power of decision to admit or not to admit any applicant state* They held that the recommendation with regard to the admission of new members did not carry the same weight as the "recommendation" with respect to measures to restore or maintain international peace and security* But security in its broad meaning could include admission to membership In the organisation* Certainly the admission of states which would further increase the voting power of an anti-Soviet aajorlty could be considered by the USSR as detrimental to Its security interests* Concurrently, the majority of smaller powers questioned the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union in the rejection of non-communist applicants* They argued that the veto did not apply in the matter of admission to membership in the organization, or that the use of the veto should be restricted or altogether abolished* The records of 389 the conference on international organisation regarding the meaning of the term "recommendation" and the nee of the veto In the matter of admission to membership In the United Nations might lend some support to their position! nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the opposite view might also be inferred, perhaps even more strongly* It was very unlikely that the big power sponsors, especially the Soviet Union, had desired a subordinate role for themselves and the Security Counoil, where they had created permanent seats for themselves and had extended to themselves the privilege of veto, in a matter of such political importance as the admis sion of new members* ihelr high politios at Dumbarton Oaks, at Yalta, and at San Pranclsco, whether conducted secretly or openly, revealed the great political significance to the big powers of the natter of admis sion of new members* proposals by the smaller powers at the united Nations conference on international organisation to define the Council's recommendation on candidates for admission as merely advisory, or to make the General Assembly, like the League Assembly, solely responsible for the admission of new members were rejected by all the great powers* The rules of procedure of both the Security Council and the General Assembly also required that the 390 application of any atata must first be Judged by the Security Council and, according to its Judgment, might or might not recommend the particular applicant. The General Assembly could not act upon an application foe* admission to membership without the favorable recom mendation of the Security Council. The International Court of Justice, in a 1950 advisory opinion, ruled that the decision of the General Assembly was subsequent to the Council's recommendation, that is, the Assembly could not decide upon an application until after the Council had made a recommendation. The Court, however, was not expllolt on the legality of the Council's praotice of giving to the Assembly only its favorable recommendation, but the Court's argumentation seemed to imply support of suoh practice, implicitly the recommendation was a preliminary decision and by such the Security Council was entitled to give to the General Assembly only its favorable recoHiendation if it so desired. Like the earlier request for an advisory opinion on psragraph 1 of Article l j . , the request for an advisory opinion on psragraph 2 of the same article appeared unwarranted. The text of the psragraph and the rules of procedure of both organs clearly expressed the power of the Seeurity Council to recommend the applications that should be finally decided upon by the Assembly. 391 On the matter of tho reto, proposals to anend or restrict or abolish that instroatent or privilege would not be legally possible while the Soviet Union renained uncooperative with the Majority* But as a Minority power the Soviet Union would not be willing to forego that right* The united States, Britain, France, and China, finding theaselves usually on the same side of the issue and supported by the Majority of the United Nations members,were willing to give up the right of veto on the natter of adnisslon to nenbershlp* Yet China also had to exercise that privilege when it found itself in the Minority with regard to the adnisslon of Outer Mongolia. Power polities required that the majority try to dlserm the Minority of that veto power and that the Minority try to defend its possession and use of that power* The constant and consistent use of the veto power by Soviet Russia to proteet Its interests fron the adverse designs of the Majority was visibly the oause of the stalemate on the adnisslon problen; but the vetoes and the deadlock on admissions were Merely aspects of the oollldlng interests of the great powers* The possession and wielding of the veto power by the permanent Members and inability of the snaller Members to by-pass or curb that power manifestly demonstrated the deoislve role of the great powers in 392 international politic®. Yet the fact that the snail nations attempted to restrain the power of the big nations revealed that the small nations were not unimportant aetars in the stage of international polities. Because such attempts to restrain the power of the big nations were pursued relative to the admis sion of new members, the admission to membership had in that way become an instrument of diplomacy of the small natlaps. Every member nation had its own view of the issue of admission to membership in the United Nations; each view rested on the interpretation of the national interests which might be expressed as the immediate and long-term objectives of foreign policy. The active or passive attitude or role that a member state took or played in the matter of admission to membership depended on its awareness of the active or passive relationship between that natter and its national interests or objectives. Taking into consideration that the matter of admission to membership in the organisation would actively serve in the achievement or satisfaction of its interests or objectives, the member state actively employed its voting on this matter as an instrument of diplomacy. States whose interests would be adversely affected by the adnisslon 393 of captain applicants actively opposed their admission, and those states whose interests would be favorably affected supported their admission* Member states opposed the admission of particular applicants because of their territorial or population disputes, or religious or ideological conflicts, or the negative effects on the member's prestige or voting strength or moral, legal and relative power position* On the other hand, member states favored the admission of particular applicants because of their cultural, ideological, racial or religious affinity, co-membership in the same regional organisations, desire for the genuine universality of the organisation, or the positive effects on the member's prestige or voting strength or moral, legal and relative power position* Clearly the legal arguments were made to serve those political considerations. This was inevitable; political units in their decisions on a highly political issue oould not but be influeneedby their political interests. While the political interests ohanged according to the circumstances, the legal positions of the member states accordingly beoame inconsistent* ITue, certain states tried to maintain legal consistency, yet their initial legal positions had bean based on their political alms or preconceptions or beliefs* 39*f Hence* those states* while consistently urging for the Individual adnlaalon of applicants until they became convinced of the neceaslty for a political aolution of the lmpaaae on admissions* nevertheless* were not con- alatent in the application of the formal condltiona for membership; far example* they argued for the admiaalon of Jordan* Ceylon* Nepal* Laos or Cambodia becauae those appllcanta were Independent and able to conduct their foreign relations* but opposed the adnlaalon of Outer Mongolia which was Just aa independent and able to conduct lta own foreign relations aa those five applicants. The rejection of Outer Mongolia apparently was baaed on political-ideological considerations instead of the legal criteria. It may be concluded that* aa in the League of Nations* legalisms regarding admission to membership and* therefore* the admission to membership Itself were arbitrarily used to serve diplomacy In the pursuit of political-ideologloal objectives. Yet the political- ideological considerations or objeetlves were not always overriding; they might give way to the expediencies of Realpolltllr; they might be compromised. Indeed the eg bloc proposals and the 1955 compromise on admissions based on the en bloc principle devalued the importance of the political-ideological considerations or objectives. Bat their devaluation vas not absolute. The Soviet Union* for instance* accepted the entry of the anti-oommunist states of Ireland and Portugal* but only to hare its communist proteges admitted. The United States compromised on the admission of the Bast European communist states* but only to save the applicant states* like Japan or Italy* from falling into the hands of leftist parties* or to prerent the disruption of Western unity by its inflexible position on the matter. The admission to membership in the United Nations vas an aspeot of the cold war and eould not be oleanly Isolated from polltleal-ldeologloal implications. The implications were broad; they eould inrolre voting strength* for example. The Soviet union certainly wanted the admis sion of the communist applicants to increase the size of the communist bloc in the United Nations; similsrly* the Western and the neutralist powers respectively desired the admission of pro-Western and uncommitted applicants to inerease their voting strength. In the eompronlse of 1955 the Soviet Chion gained four votes* increasing the size of the communist bloc to nine; ten of the new members were considered pro- West and two neutralist. But only the communist bloc might be truly called a bloc. The Western camp or the 396 neutralist group had not always dearly voted as a bloc; nations supposedly mewhere of these groups had voted according to their Individual Interpretation of the Issues or as they had been put under pressure diplo matically* In the voting on admissions, the Western powers had generally aligned themselves against the communist powers, and the neutralist powers, like India, Burma or Sweden, had supported the principle of universality and the admission of all applicants, regardless of political Ideology* India, of course, had opposed Portugal's admission beoause the latter had frustrated India's interests with regard to Ooa, but, except for that case, It had been rather consistent In its policy of non-alignment. Voting in the United Vations had been viewed according to regional groupings* If bloo-voting corresponded to geographical considerations, In the light of the compromise and the subsequent admission of five more states, the Afro-Aslan group comprised twenty- eight states, the United States and the Latin American countries twenty-one, Western Europe seventeen, the Commonwealth countries six, and the Soviet bloc nine* Apparently when united, the Afro-Aslan group eould block the adoption of any Important resolution In the General Assembly, twenty-seven votes being needed to 397 blook important questions* Similarly, the American group* together with the Western European countries or the Commonwealth countries, could block any Important resolution by the Afro-Aslan group, even with the support of the Soviet bloc, or by the Soviet bloc supported by the Afro-Aslan group. Contrariwise, neither the Uhited States nor the USSR eould secure adoption of Important resolutions without the support of the Afro-Aslan and the Latin American countries* It might be said that the admission of new members had benefited the smaller countries more than It had the big powers* Yet while the 1955 compromise on admissions might be regarded as a diplomatic failure or success for the United States, it certainly was a diplomatic success for the Soviet Union which got its East European prot^g£fe in the organisation, clearly demonstrating the triumph of its views regarding big power politics, and for China which was able to block the admission of Outer Mongolia against the almost unanimous wish of the Uhlted Nations members and still retain its seat in that organisation* The value of the use of admission to membership in the Uhlted Nations as an instrument of dlplomaey may have depredated after the 1955 compromise; five states have been 398 adaltted slnoe than without opposition* Nevertheless, tho divided states of Korea, Vietnam and Geraany are atill to be adaittad and that instrunent aay again raassert its utility* BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY I. PRIMARY MATERIALS A. LEAGUE OP NATIONS League of Nations* Offlolal Journal. Assembly. Plenary Maetings. 1920 ff. . Official Journal. Assanbly. Meatlngs of Committees. 1926 ff. _______• Official Journal* Council. Yarbatln Record of Maetings. 1926 ff . . Monthly Sunnary. 1920 ff. _______. Yearbook. 1920 ff. B. UNITED NATIONS United Nations. Conference on International Organisation. Pooaments. 1$ yols.; New Yorkt United Nations Information Organisation, 191*5. . Documents. L9U6 ff* . Official Record. General Assembly. Ad Hoc Polltloal Committee. Summery Record of MecTTngs. . Official Record. General Assembly. First Commit tee. Summary ffeoord of Meetings. 191*6 ff. . Official Record. General Assembly. General Committee. Summary Record of Meetings. 191*6 ff. . Official Record. Security Council. Verbatim Record Of Meetings. 191*6 ff. . Repertory of Praotlce of United Nations Organs vol. I; Few yorkt 1955. n r: « S g j g £ M f 4 . & « 9 f » ? l2as • Review (monthly). 191*6 ff. • Yearbook. 191*6 ff* C. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE International Court of Justlee. Reports of Judgments. Advisory Opinions and Orders. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a &tate in tbe UhltedNations. Advisory Opinion of March 1. 19jfo. Leyden: A. W. Si j tlhofr * a FuWl isETng dotnpany, 1955. 60 pp. . Reparts of Judgments. Advisory Opinions and Orders. Conditions of Admission of a state yo Member sh in' in the UnTto'd aa iions. Advisory to In Ion of Mar goT T91ib7 Leydens A. tf. SlJtbo#f*s "Publishing Company, 191*8. 66 pp. D. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS United States Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Information on the Soviet Union on International Relations. olst“3ongress. 2nd ’ Ses’ sTonTwash lngton: Government Printing Office, 1950. 5k pp. . House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 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L., "Old and New Diplomacy," Yale Review, 36:2*05-22, March, 191*7• Wright, E., "Abdullah*a Jordan: 19l*7-195l»H Middle East Journal, 5*1*39-60, September, 1951* "Why the Attack on the Charter?" New Times. 1*1*5-10, October, 1953* D. NEWSPAPERS The New York Times A N N E X ANNEX I LIST OP MEMBERS OP THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS1 I. ORIGINAL MEMBERS A* Signatories of Belgium Bolivia Brazil British Empire Aus tralia Canada New Zealand South Africa India China Cuba Czechoslovakia Ecuador (did not ratify) France Greece Guatemala B* States Invited to Argentina Chile Colombia Denmark Netherlands Norway the Treaty of Peace Haiti Hedjaz (did not ratify) Honduras Italy Japan Liberia Nicaragua Panama Peru Poland Portugal Roomania Serb-Croat-Slovene State Slam Uruguay United States of America (did not ratify) Accede to the Covenant Paraguay Persia Salvador Spain Sweden Switzerland Venezuela ^Data from the Official Journal of the League Assembly are used in this Annex* ANNEX I (continued) 1*23 II. SUBSEQUENT MEMBERS Abyssinia Afghanistan Albania Austria Bulgaria Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt Esthonla Finland Germany Hungary Iraq Irish Free State Latvia Li thuanla Luxemburg Mexioo ©irkey Union of Soviet Socialist Republlos Yugoslavia ANNEX II LIST OP MEMBERS OP THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S1 I. ORIGINAL MEMBERS A. Signatories of tbs United Nations Declaration of January 1, 191*2 The United States of America The United Kingdom Ifce Union of Soviet Socialist Republics China Australia Honduras Belgium India Canada Luxemburg Costa Rica Netherlands Cuba New Zealand Czechoslovakia Nicaragua Dominican Republic Norway El Salvador Panama Greece Poland Guatemala South Africa Haiti Yugoslavia B. Later Signatories of the United Nations Declaration, with the Dates of their Notification of their Adherence Brazil February 8, 191*3 Bolivia April 27, 191*3 Chile February 12, 191*5 Colombia Deoember 22, 191*3 Commonwealth of the Philippines June 10, 191*2 Ecuador February 7, 191*5 Egypt February 27, 19U5 Ethiopia July 28, 191*2 France Deoember 26, 191*1* Iraq January 16, 191*3 Iran September 10, 191*3 Lebanon March 1, 191*5 Liberia February 26, 191*1* ^Data from the Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, the Official Records of the Uhlted Nations, and from Roosevelt and the Russians by Edward R. Stettlnlus, Jr., are useT*ln this Annex. ANNEX II (continued) 425 Mezleo Paraguay Peru Saudi Arabia Syria Turkey Uruguay Venezuela June 5» 1942 pebruary 12, 1945 February 11, 1945 r v o r u a r j ± 1.* March 1, 1945 March 1, 1945 Pebruary 23, 1945 Pebruary 23, 1945 February 16, 1945 C« Nations Admitted to Original Membership by the United Nations Conference on International Organization Argentina Denmark Soviet Socialist Republic of Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine II. SUBSEQUENT MEMBERS Albania Austria Bulgaria Burma Afghanistan Japan Jordan Laos Libya Cambodia Ceylon Finland G h a n a Hungary Iceland Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Morocco Nepal Pakistan Portugal Rumania Slam Spain Sudan Sweden Tunisia Yemen ANNEX III TABULATION OF PRINCIPAL INSTANCES IN WHICH FORMAL VOTES RELATING TO THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS WERE TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY1 APPLICATIONS AND „ DRAFT RESOLUTIONS2 191*6 Albania ( 25. 1)5 Mongolian People’s Republic (21*.5) Afghanistan (2.7) Transjordan (8.7) I. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND DATE FOR vote3 AGAINST ABST. RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 57 th mtg.. 29.8 5 3* 3 Not Recommended i i i t 6 3* 2 t i i t i t i t 10 0 1 Recommended i t n 8 2* 1 Not Recommended ^ata fron the Official Records of both the Security Council and the General Assembly and from the Repertory of Practices of United Nations Organs (Vol. I and Supplement No. 1) are used In this table. 2Draft resolutions (d.r.) are identified as such only when they are concerned with a number of applications. ^When a negative vote by one or more permanent members is included, votes against the applicants or resolutions are marked with an asterisk («). Abst. means abstention. ^Date of application by the particular state APPLICATIONS AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS 191+6 (cant'd*) Ireland (2.8) Portugal (2.8) Iceland ( 2.8) Sweden (9.8) Sian (5.8) 191+7 Albania MPR Transjordan Ireland Portugal Yemen (21.7) Pakistan (15.8) Hungary ( 22. 1+) Italy (7.5) Austria (2.7) Rumania (10.7) Bulgaria (26.7) ANNEX III MEETING AND DATE 57th mtg. 29.8 83rd mtg. 12.12 I86th mtg. 18.8 N 1 1 n it tt n n it It N 190th mtg. 21.8 n n t i n w it (continued) FOR VOTE AGAINST ABST. RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 9 1* 1 Not Recommended 8 2« 1 tt it 10 0 1 Recommended 10 0 1 n 11 0 0 tt 3 l+* k Not Recommended 3 3* 5 n tt 9 1* l tt it 9 1« l tt it 9 2* 0 it it 11 0 0 Recommended 11 0 0 it 1 1« 9 Not Recommended 9 1» 1 n n 8 1* 2 it it 1 0 10 it it 1 1* 9 £ ANNEX III (continued) APPLICATIONS AND MEETING AND VOTE RESULT OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS DATE FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 191*7 (cont'd*) Finland 190 th mtg. 21.8 9 2* 0 Not Recommended 191*8 Burma (27*2) 279th mtg. 10.1* 10 0 1 Recomnended Italy ti n 9 2# 0 Not Recomended Ceylon (28.5) 3£l*t mtg. 18.8 9 2« 0 i t n Ceylon 38k th 386th mtg. 15.12 9 2« 0 i t i t Israel *25*5) mtg. 17.12 5 1 5 it n 191*9 Israel 1*11* th ■tg. r? 9 1 1 Recommended Republic of Korea (19.1) Democratic People*s Republic of Korea5 (19*1) l*23rd N mtg. 8.i* n 9 2* 0 Not Recommended Nepal (13*2) 1*3 9 th mtg. 7.9 9 2* 0 Not Recommended Portugal l*l*3rd mtg. 13.9 9 2* 0 II N Jordan i t n 9 2* 0 n n Italy «t i t 9 2* 0 t t i t 5no vote was taken on this application as such* A USSR draft resolution to refer the application to the Counell*s Conn It tee on Admislon of Hew Members was rejected at the l*10th meeting on 16 February, 191*9: 2 votes in favor, 8 against, 1 abstention* ANNEX III APPLICATIONS AIL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (19U9 cont»d.) Finland Ireland Austria Ceylon Albania MPR Bulgaria Ruaania Hungary d.r. to recoaaend the adaission of Albania, MPR, Bulgaria, Ruaania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal (S/13l * 0Aev. 2) 1950 Indonesia 503rd atg. 26.9 (25.9) 1951 No Votes MEETING AND DATE l*l*3rd atg. 13*9 n it Ml5th atg* 15*9 i t i f N If If It N If ^One of the aeabers of the Security voting on this resolution. (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST ABST. RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 9 2 * 0 Not 9 2 « 0 n 9 2 * 0 n 9 2 * 0 N 2 1 8 If 2 2 * 7 tt 3 1 7 II 3 1 7 It 3 1 7 It h 2 b6 Not H It If If tt If If 10 0 1 Reconaended Council did not participate in the ANNEX in APPLICATIONS AND MEETING AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS DATE 1952 Italy 573rd ntg. 6.2 d.r. reeoanendlng N M tha simultaneous admission of Albania, MPR, Bulgaria, Ruaania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya ( 25. 12. 51) (3/210*9/ Rev.l) d.r. recoaaendIng the 597th ntg. 8.9 aiaultanaoua adnlaslon of aaae lii applicants (S/2661*) Libya 600th ntg. 16.9 Japan 602nd ntg. 18.9 (15.6) Vietnam 603rd ntg. 19.9 (17.12.51) Laos ( 30.6) Cambodia ( 25.6) Democratic Republic of Vletnaa (27.12.51) n n (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST ABST. RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 10 2 la 6* 0 3 Not Reconaended Not Adopted 2 5* k Not Adopted 10 la 0 Not Reconaended 10 la 0 n it 10 la 0 It N 10 1 0 n It 10 1 0 n It 1 10 0 n It • C r V * » o ANNEX III (Continued) APPLICATIONS AND MEETING AND VOTE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS DATE FOR AGAINST ABST. 1953-195U No Votes 1955 d.r. (S/3502) providing that the Council, noting tha Ganaral Asseubly resolution (A/RES/357 (918(X)), and having con sidered separately the applications for nenber- ship of Albania* MPR* Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Runania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Canbodla, Japan, Laos, and Spain (22.9), would reeomend to the Assembly the admission of those countries and anenduent (S/3506) to add the Republics of Korea and Vietnaa to the list.7 RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 7The voting on this d.r. and on the aaendnent Included a vote on the various parts of the proposal and a separate vote on the inclusion of each of the countries listed both in the d.r. and in the amendment. APPLICATIONS AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ANNEX III MEETING AND DATE 1955 (cont*d.) 1st paragraph of the 701jth mtg. 13 • preamble t A M Opening vorde of the II ¥1 2nd paragraph Inclusion of: Republic of Korea V I ft AC Republic of Vietnam 9 1 If Albania I V ft MPR ft If Jordan If It Ireland tv ft Portugal ft AS ft ft Hungary Italy If ft TV ft Austria ft ft Rumania ft If Bulgaria ft ft Finland It ft Ceylon tt ft Nepal ft ft Libya ft ft Cambodia ft ft Japan ft ft Laos tt ft Spain ft ft (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST ABST. RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS 8 0 3 Adopted 9 0 2 n Renubllc of Korea " " 9 1* 1 Not Included Republic of Vietnam " " 9 1* 1 «f n Albania " " 7 0 k Included MPR •» f f 8 1* 2 Not Included Jordan n M 10 1* 0 n 11 Ireland n 1 1 1* 0 « « Portugal " w 10 1* 0 n n Hungary n 1 1 9 0 2 Included l u f y * " 10 1* 0 Not Included Austria " " 1 0 1* 0 1 1 it Rumania n " 9 0 2 Included Bulgaria " 11 9 0 2 n Finland " w 10 1* 0 Not Included Ceylon ” " 10 1* 0 11 1 1 Nepal " " 10 1* 0 tt it Libya " " 10 1* 0 it tt Cambodia " • n 10 1* 0 H N Japan " " 1 0 1* 0 n it Laos " " 10 1* 0 1 1 1 1 Spain " ” 9 1* 1 n 1 1 V j J ro ANNEX III APPLICATIONS AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS 1955 (cont'd.) 2nd paragraph of tha preamble (aa a vhola) d.r. (S/3509) proriding that tha Council, baarlng in mind tha General Assembly resolution A/RES/357(918(X)), haring considered tha applica tions for membership of Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, and Spain, would recommend to tha Ganarai Assembly tha admission of those countries and amend ment to add Japan to that list.8 1st paragraph of tha 705th mtg. Ilf. 12 preamble Opening words of " " tha 2nd paragraph MEETING AND DATE 701* th mtg. 13*12 ®This d.r. was voted upon in parts. (continued) FOR 1 8 9 VOTE RESULT OF AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 1* 6 Not Adopted 0 3 Adopted 0 2 ■Cr VjJ W APPLICATIONS AND DRAFT RBSOLT7TIONS 1955 (cent*d) Amendment to add Japan Candidature of Albania Jordan Ireland Portugal Hangarj Italy Austria Rumania Bulgaria Finland Ceylon Nepal Libya Cambodia Laos Spain 2nd paragraph as a whole Operative paragraph ANNEX III MEETING AND DATE 705th mtg. Ill* 12 i t n tt n tt it n 1 1 if if tt tt it tt it 11 « « it . tt it tt it it it it tt tt n tt tt it it it it n d.r. as a whole H it (eontinued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 10 1« 0 Not Adopted 8 0 3 Approved 11 0 0 ■ 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 " 9 0 2 11 0 0 11 0 0 9 0 2 9 0 2 " 11 0 0 » 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 " 10 0 1 " 8 0 3 " 8 0 3 8 0 3 • P - VjJ - C r annex in APPLICATIONS AND MEETING AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS DATE 1955 (cont»d.) d.r. (S/3510) to reeonnend to the General Aeeenbly that It adnlt Japan at Its 11th regular section 706th ntg. 15*12 d.r. (3/3512) to recoamend to the General Assembly that It adnlt the MPR and Japan at Its 11th regular session N N 1956 Ihe Sudan (6.2) 716th ntg. 6.2 Morocco (20.7) 731flt ntg. 20.7 Tunisia (26.7) 732nd ntg. 26.7 Japan 756th ntg. 12.12 1957 Ghana 775th ntg. 7.3 (continued) VOTE RESULT OP FOR AOAIHST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 1C 1# 0 Hot Adopted 1 0 10 « " 11 0 0 Reconaended 11 0 0 » 11 0 0 » 11 0 0 " 11 0 0 » - p - VA ANNEX III (continued) IftAPT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 191*6 d.r. (A/179), 1st Coaalttee recommended the applications of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden, per recoaaendation of the Security Council d.r. (A/185), 1st Consittee reconaended that the Security Council re-examine the applications of Albania, MIR, Jordan, Breland, and Portugal in accordance with Article li of the Charter II. GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING AND VOTE RESULT OP DATE FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS9 1*7 th atg. 9*11 Unanimous Res. 31* (I)* l*9th atg. 9.11 Unanimous Res. 35(1) ^Resolutions which have effected admission of new members are marked with an asterisk (*)• DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 191+6 (cont'd.) d.r. (A/26I 1), General Committee recommended, per recommendation of the Security Connell, Siam’s admission 191*7 d.*. U/399), 1st Committee recommended the applications of Yemen and Pakistan, per recommendation of the Security Council d.r, (a A 7 1 ) , 1st Committee recommended requesting the permanent members of the Council to oonsult with a view to reaching agreement an the admission of pending applicants, and submit their conclusions to the Council ANNEX III MEETING AND DATE 67th mtg., 15.12 92nd mtg. 30.9 118th mtg. 17.11 (continued) FOR VOTE AGAINST ABST. Unanimous Unanimous RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS Res. 101(1)# Res. 108(11)# 1 5 Res. 113A(II) DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 191*7 (cont'd.) Sane d.r.# 1st Committee recommended that the Assembly request an advisory opinion from the Internatlonal Court of Justice ANNEX III MEETING AND DATE 118th mtg. 17.11 Same d.r.* 1st Committee recommended that the Assembly request the Council to reconsider the application of Ireland Same d.r* re Portugal n tt Same d.r. re Jordan n tt Same d.r. re Italy tt n Same d.r. re Finland tt tt Same d.r. re Austria M tt (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 1*0 8 2 Res. 113B(H) 1*3 8 1 Res. 113C(II) 1 * 0 9 3 W 8 0 1 * 3 8 1 1 4 * 8 0 1 * 3 8 1 Res. 113D(II) Res. 113E(II) Res. 113F(II) Res. 113GCII) Res. 113H(II) ANNEX III (continued) DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 191+8 d.r. by the President of the Assembly, per recommendation of the Council, to admit Burma d.r. (A/761), Ad Hoc Political CammTTtee recommended that the Council reconsider the applications of Italy and Finland in the llght of the advisory opinion of the International Court of justice MEETING AND DATE 131st mtg. 194 VOTE FOR AGAINST ABST. Unanimous 177th mtg. 8.12 11 17 RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS Res. 188(S-2)* Rejected Sane d.r. re Portugal Same d.r. re Jordan Sane d.r. re Italy Same d.r. re Finland Same d.r. re Ireland Same d.r. re Austria Same d.r. re Ceylon 177th mtg. t i n • f it i t i t 8.12 t t i f ft it 1 1 H 39 1 + 0 37 38 38 7 1 I 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 1 2 0 Res. Res. Res. Res. R es. Res. Res. 197C(III 197D(III 197B(III 197F(III 197G(III 197H(III 1971(111 ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOW1ENDED BY JHE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 19U9 , d.r* (A/855)* Ad jgoc Political Counlttee, referring to tha reconmendation of tha Council, recomended tha adnission of Israel d.r* (a/1066), Ad Hoc Political COHBifTaa recommended raquasting tha Council to reconsider tha application of Austria Sana d.r. ra Ceylon N n Sana d.r. ra Finland N it Sana d.r* ra Iceland n it Sana d.r* ra Italy H it Sana d.r* ra Jordan tt tt Sana d.r* ra Republic it it of Korea Sana d.r* ra Portugal n n Sana d.r* re Nepal it it MEETING AND DATE 207th mtg. 11*5 252nd ntg* 22.11 (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 37 12 9 Ras. 273(111)* 51 5 2 Res. 296A(IV) 53 5 1 Ras. 53 5 1 Ras. 51 5 1 Ras. 5i 6 l Ras. 50 5 2 Ras. 50 6 3 Ras. 53 5 1 Ras. 52 5 1 Ras. ANNEX III (continued) DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY To THE PLENARY 191*9 (cont«d.) Sane d.r* recommended requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice Same d.r* recommended requesting the permanent members of the Council to refrain from the use of the veto, and that the Council keep under consideration in the light of Article 1*(1), all pending applications USSR d.r. (A/1079) " " 12 32 13 Rejected recommended that the Council reconsider the applications of Albania, MFR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal MEETING AND VOTE RESULT OF DATE FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 252nd mtg. 22.11 1*2 9 6 Res. 296J(IV) 2£2nd mtg. 22.11 I *2 5 11 Res. 296K(IV) ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMUTTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1950 d.r, (A/Ll*03) by Au»trail* and India recowended tha admission of Indonesia, noting tha reeonnenda- tion of tha Security Council USSR d.r. (A/1577) racoBMandad that tha Council review tha application of 13 listed states d.r. U/1585) by El Salvador to urge tha Council to recon sider tha applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal MEETING AND DATE 289th ntg. 28.9 289th ntg. 28.9 289th ntg. 28.9 (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST Unaninous 18 22 RESULT OF ABST. PROCEEDINGS Res. 191(V)* 15 Rejected 13 19 13 Rejected ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS MEETING AND RECOMMENDED BY THE DATE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1950 (eont*d.) Joint d.r. (A/I57I) 3l8th mtg. 4.12 requested the Council to keep the pending applications under con sideration in accordance with resolutions 296 A-I and K(IV) 1951 d.r. (A/1990), U*h 352nd ntg. 7.12 Conslttee recoomended requesting the Council to adnlt Italy (in connection with the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council) 1952 , d.r. (A/2100), 1st 370th mtg. 1.2 Conslttee recamended that the Council recon sider all pending applications basing its action exclusively on the conditions of the Charter (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 1*6 5' 2 Res. 1*95(V) 54 5 l Res. 550(VI) 43 8 7 Res. 506a (VI) ANNEX HI DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BT THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1952 (eont’dj San* d.r. reeoMaended the conalderatlon by the Council of the 13 Hated at ate a aa veil as tho now application of Libya (initially propoaod by tho USSR) Sane d.r. requeeted tho Council to report to tho 7th aoaalon of tho Aaaeably on tho atatua of appllcationa all ponding d.r. (a/23^1 and Corr. 1), Ad Hoc Political T/oemTEtee rocoonondod tho eatab- llahaent of a Special Counlttee to atudy tho quoation of tho adnlaaion of new nenbera MEETING AND DATE 370th ntg. 1.2 370th ntg. 1.2 410th ntg. 21.12 (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST 22 21 36 5 RESULT OF ABST. PROCEEDINGS 16 Not adopted bocauao it did not obtain tho required two- thlrda Majority 14 Roa. 506B(VI) 48 5 6 Roa. 620A(VII) ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS MEETING AND RECOMMENDED EY THE DATE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1952 (cant’d.) Sane d.r. requested l^IOth ntg. 21.12 the Council to take note of the Assembly determination that Japan was qualified for admission and should be admitted Same d.r. re Vietnam Same d.r. re Cambodia Same d.r. re Laos Same d.r. re Libya Same d.r. re Jordan it n ft n n it ft It It It d.r. (A/L.142) by Poland recommended that the Council reconsider all 14 listed applicants (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 50 5 4 Res. 620B(VII) 40 5 12 Res. 620C(VII) 38 5 14 620D(Vn) 36 5 14 Res. 620E(VH) 51 5 3 Res. 620F(VII) 49 5 3 R620G(VII) 9 30 10 Rejected ■ p- ■ f r VJT ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BT 1BE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1953 , d.r. (A/2520), Ad Hoc Political CommlTtee recommended tha estab lishment of a Committee of Good Offlcaa to axplora tha possibilities of finding a solution to tha admission problem 195U , d.r. (A/2793)» Ad floe 501*t mtg. 23.11 Political CommlTEee recommend ad that tha Council reconsider and give positive recom mendations on the pending applications in the light of the general feeling in favor of universality; recommended the Committee of Good Offices to continue its work MEETING AND DATE ll53rd mtg. 8.12 (continued) VOTE FOR AGAINST ABST. Unanimous RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS Res. 718(VII) Unanimous Res. 817(IX) ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEE, OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1955 , d.r. (A/3079), Ad Hoc Political CommiTEee recommended that tho Assembly request tho Council, in tho light of tho general opinion in favor of tho vldost possible membership of tho UN, the ponding applications of all those 16 states about which no problem of unification arose; to request the Council to report on those applica tions during the 10th session of the Assembly Joint d.r. (A/L.208) 555th mtg. 11; . 12 provided that the Assembly, having received the recommendation of the Council on 16 countries admit them to membership: MEETING AND DATE 552nd mtg. 8.12 (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 52 2 5 Res. 918(X) Res. 995(X)* ANNEX III DRAFT RESOLUTIONS MEETING AND RECOMMENDED BY THE DATE RELEVANT COMMITTEE* OR SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE PLENARY 1955 (eont*d.) Albania 555th ntg. 11+^12 Jordan Ireland Portugal Hungary Italy Austria Rumania Bulgaria Finland Ceylon Nepal Libya Cambodia Laos Spain « « n n it ti n it M I t It It I I I t It It It ft It It It It It It It It It It It It 1956 Sudan 57Uth mtg. 12.11 Morocco n " Tunisia * " Japan 623rd mtg. 18.12 1957 Ghana 668th ntg. 8.3 (continued) VOTE RESULT OF FOR AGAINST ABST. PROCEEDINGS 1+8 3 5 Admitted 55 0 1 56 0 0 56 0 0 9 2 5 6 0 0 56 0 0 1+9 0 0 50 2 2 57 o 0 57 0 o 57 0 o 56 o l 57 0 0 57 o o 55 o 2 i t N It It I t It It It It It It It t t It It Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous ti

Asset Metadata

Creator Prudente, Nemesio Encarnacion (author)

Core Title Admission To Membership In The United Nations As An Instrument Of Diplomacy

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Advisor Berkes, Rose N. (committee chair), Anderson, Totton J. (committee member), Harley, John Eugene (committee member), Rodee, Carlton C. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-40835

Unique identifier UC11356696

Identifier 5903525.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-40835 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 5903525.pdf

Dmrecord 40835

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Prudente, Nemesio Encarnacion

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA