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Pay Utility In The Public Sector

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Pay Utility In The Public Sector

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Content INFORMATION TO USERS This material w a s produced from a microfilm copy of tha original document. Whila tha most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have bean us ed , tha quality is heavily dependant upon tha quality of tha original submitted. Tha following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The s ig n or "target" for p a g a s apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Pags(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent p a g e s . This may have necessitated cutting thru an image a n d duplicating adjaoant p a g a s to insure you complete continuity. 2. W h an a n image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it i s an indication that tha photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus c a u s e a blurred image. You will find a good im age of the pa g e in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., wa s part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It i s customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand comer of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning i s continued again - beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of u s ers indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be mad e from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific p a g a s you wish reproduced. 6. PLEASE NOTE: Some p e g a s may have indistinct print. Filmed a s received. Xsrox University Microfilms 300 North Zoob Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 41106 74- 11,714 TURKEL, Suleyman, 1942- PAY UTILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. University* of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973 Political Science, public administration University Microfilm s, A XEROX Com pany, Ann Arbor, M ichigan THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. PAY UTILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR By Suleyman Turkel A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Publlo Administration) September 1973 T H I a RAD U ATE SCHOOL U N IV E R S ITY PARK LQS A N G E L **, C A LIFO R N IA * 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by Suleyman TurlMl under the direction of A.AS.. Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of the degree of D O C TO R O F P H IL O S O P H Y Date.. DISSERTA TIO N C O M ^ T J E E j / CUhm ....... To my p*r«nts whose encouragement in many ways made it possible to complete this study. 11 TABLE OP CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES.................................▼ LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS.........................vl PREFACE.........................................Til CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.........................1 The Need for the Research The Purpose of the Study The Problem A Theoretloml Ground for the Study Mot1ration and Pay Mot1rational Models Reconsidered The Researoh Strategy Summary II. REVIEW OF MOTIVATION THEORY LITERATURE. . 42 Definition of Motlratlon DrIre Theory Expeotanoy Theory Accommodation and Synthesis In Motlratlon Theory Applied Motlratlon Theory Lawler's Model Summary III. DESIGN OP THE STUDY..................... 96 Utility Theory and Hypothesis Conoeptual Hypothesis I Conceptual Hypothesis II Empirical Hypothesis I Conoeptual Hypothesis III Empirical Hypothesis II 111 Conoeptual Hypothesis IV Emplrloal Hypothesis III Conoeptual Hypothesis V Emplrloal Hypothesis IV Conoeptual Hypothesis VI Emplrloal Hypothesis V Development of the Research Instrument Questionnaire Construction The Utility Grid Operationalisation of the Hypotheses Pretest of the Questionnaire The Sample and Sampling Procedure Administration of the Questionnaire Statlstloal Method of Data Analysis Summary IV. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY................. Descriptive Analysis The Denographlo/Organlrational Variables Fairness-Equity-Satisfaction Variables Belief In Union, Fay Seoreoy, and Deolelon-Haklng Correlation Analysis Test of Emplrloal Hypotheses Summary V. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS, . Implication of the Findings Conclusion APPENDIX BIBLIOGRAPHY LIST OF TABLES Table P««® I, Summary of the Findings of the Grid..........129 II* Summary of the Associations . • ............131 III* Linear and Power Functions ............... 138 IV* Variablei Sice of Organisation...............140 V, Varlablet Level of Salary .................. 143 VI, Variablei The Amount of the Last Pay Increase......................... 145 VII. Varlablet Time since Last Pay Increase, , , , 146 VIII. Varlablet Union Membership ................ 1^8 IX. Variable! Speciality Variable .............. 150 X. Variable! Sex................................151 XI, Variable! Age....................... . * , 153 XII* Variable! Number of Years of Education . , , 154 XIII. Variable! Degree of Education................ 157 XIV. Variable! Years of Experience................ 158 XV. Variable! Fairness 161 XVI. Variable! Equity ........................... 162 XVII. Variable! Satisfaction........................164 XVIII. Variable! Belief In Unions.................... I65 XIX. Variable! Pay Seoreoy ,, * * . . ..........167 XX. Variable! Deolslon-Making Policy.............. 168 ▼ LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page I. Interrelationships among Dimensions of Work Behaviors and Attitudes............. 25 II. A Utlllty-Motlvatlon-to-Work Model ........ 27 III. External Stimulus and Response........... 52 IV. Internal Stlnulus and Response •••*... 52 V. Expeotaney Model by Porter and Lawler ... 67 VI. Representation of Linear* Logarithmic, and Power Funotlons........................... 105 VII. Peroentage of Perceived Equitable Merit Increase , .................... ...... 106 VIII. Correlations (Produot-Monent) by Giles and Barrett......................... 107 IX. Frequenoles on the Utility G r i d ......... 17? X. Frequenoles Obtained ..................... 176 XI. Utility Curve by Sohuster and Colettl. . . . 162 XII. Utility Curve of the Suggested Amounts of Pay In Four Publle Organisations .... 190 vl PREFACE The success and feasibility of this empirical study was made possible through the oooperation and guid ance of my professors, colleagues, and a number of public employees in city administration. There Is a great deal owed to Professor Gilbert Siegel whose interest in the research, versatile experience, and guidance were great assets in the completion of this research. Professor Alex McEaohern has been very generous with his time and advloe ooncemlng the analysis of data and the statistical methodology used. Professor Pollard has guided me throughout other researches which led to the advancement of this study, 1 am also grateful for my colleagues Jay Schmster and Guven Uzgll who individually contributed to the development of certain parts in this research. The senior city engineers of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Inglewood, and Claremont were cooperative and facilitated the process of conducting the emplrloal part of the survey. I also extend my deepest thanks to the Turkish Government whose generous grant allowed this study. vil CHAFTBB I I MTBODUCTI OM Haiti r«pr«««nt an «lioat unlTereal fora of lndnoeaent for indlTlduale to perforn* Hoot workera re- oelwe ass* kind of eoonoale reauneratton for work Ins* *nd orgaalaatlone develop ooaplai ayetena for dataralnlns tha aasoat of tha renuneratlon to ba giun to on Individual worker. Tha nature and tha alee of a worker*a pay la a ooaplaz raaaltaat of a larga noabar of faetora which lnolxda tha lntrlnaia oontant of hi a Job, tha relative eupply and danand of labor for that lob, tha workar*a eealority, and hla level of perforaanee* If tha workar la a noabar of a labor wnlan, tha wage datamlnatloa prooaaa la further In- fluanaad by negot let lone between union and nanagcaant which often exerolaea a deolalve Influanoa on both abaolute and relative wage levela. Thue, ooapanaatlon thaorlaa explain quaatlona about tha ralatlonahlp between a non, hla work, and tha rewarda ha reoelYoa for working* Hoot of tha early atudlee In the developaeut of ooapanaatlon^ thought hawe bean oonduoted by eeonoalata* Soholara of thle dlaolpllne hare dewaloped a ayateaatlsed body of knowladga known aa "wage theory** * The oouroee of "wage theory** go aa far baek aa the phyaloorata and awb* eequently Adaa Salth. In hla faaoua book Wealth of Watlona z he developed a formal theory of wag* levela and wage atruo- ture, Hla aaln lntaraat waa to dataralna tha natural level of wagaa In aoelety, Although tha oonoapt of "natural wagaa" haa baan greatly disputed, alnea In every ayataa tha level of wagaa la lnfluanoad by aoolal and hlatorloal fac to ra, hla atudy on tha atruotura and dlffarantlala of wagaa la atlll In a Haltad way In uaa by tha nodarn ooapanaatlon praotltlonara. Kodam waga thaory whloh haa alaoat 200 yaara of hlatorloal roota la atlll daallng aalnly with thaaa two aata of questlona, Tha flrat inquiry foouaaa on tha level 2 of wagaa In aoclaty In general, Hora precisely, why la tha ganaral waga level what It la* and tha aaoond part of waga thaory trlaa aaaantlally to find anawara to tha quaa tlona of what oauaaa tha waga atruotura to ba what It la and why do thaaa ratea and atruoturaa wary widely between 3 netIona, flrma* lnduatrlaa, and gaographlo regions? An Important aapaet of tha olaaaloal aoononlo theory* from whloh waga thaory grew* waa tha aaeuaptlon that man la an eoonoalo being, Thla meant to a ay that man*a deolalona are rational and ha attaapta to maximize hla profit* or aoononlo rewarda* In all tranaaotlona in cluding hla labor aerrloaa. Thaaa aaaumptlona about man have baan quaatlonad by oontemporary behavioral aolantlata* and yet motivation-to-work thaory aotually haa produoad aoma awl dance of tha limited validity of tha aaaumptlona. 3 Lower-order needs, for txaspli, are the prime motivetore until they are satisfied, and probably for many of the sooletles of today's world the assumption that nan Is motivated by economic needs Is valid, The wage theory# thus, has historically emphasised eoonomlo motivation. This Is to say that the oholoe mechanism in decision making for human beings Is stimulated by eoonomlo remunera tion slnoe it Is Instrumental In satisfying human needs. Motivation-to-work theory, whloh Is the produot of the twentieth century, foouses on the Immediate Job itself, the work plaee, the worker, and the situational and environmental faotors In organisational behavior. The central theme of mot1vatIon-to-work theory provides answers to questions of l)what causes a worker to work? 2) Why does he ehoose a particular organisation or oooupatlon? 3)What makes hla leave one organisation for another T b)what is the role of reward systems in lnduolng workers to produoe at maximum oapaoltyt Ito, Students of the behavioral solenoes have approaohcd these and related questions on motivation from different perspectives, A group of studies whloh oomblned the rational nan ooneept of eoonomios and specialisation pro cesses emphasised that employees must be given eoonomlo Incentives If they are to work at their full oapaolty. Other groups, however, suggested that nan Is a social being, and, therefore, he should be oonsldered within a social 4 context. To motivate such a person, we need to 90 beyond one elenent of organisational prmotloee. There auet be a aulti-faoeted treataent of notlratIon-to-work. In aueh an approaoh, the lnoentlve system is a part of the motlvatlonsl sohene. The role of the lnoentlve ayaten In organisational not1ratIon haa been subject to different treatment. While soae oonsidered it aa the only eouroe of motivation in organisations, others Ignored It beoaaae it la not a moti vating faotor but a "hygiene" factor. I.e., Its abaenoe nay result in low norale and/or low motivation. Yet* It cannot itself lnorease motivation. Many reeent studies, however, have produced evldenoe that the lnoentlve system is still of oonaldermble lnfluenoe In motivating workers when used properly. Studies based upon the expeotanoy theories of motivation and those developed from the eognltlve dlsson- anoe theory of human behavior provided sufficient data to suggest a multiple interaction between motivation to work and the organisational reward system. Hypotheses proposed and tested from these theories went beyond the slnpllstlo view of the relationship that exists among a worker, his work, and his reward# They considered not only the objec tive probabilities (observable work behavior and workers* reaotlon to organisational impulses), but lnoluded subjeo- tlve probabilities aueh as the subjective value of reward, satisfaction, and so on. 5 On* of tho bule oonoopt s in eoonoay Is tho •utility" ooneopt* Tho torn la used to study tho human oholoo aeohanlsm In on aoononlo situation. How wuoh of an exoesa of ooaaodlty *A* does a parson doslro to substltuto for sons of ooaaodlty *B*T Tho proforonoo proooss Is ox- plalnod with tho "utility" oonoopt. Tho usage and nood for a particular ooaaodlty dotoralno tho "utility" and tho relative value of that ooaaodlty for a parson. Slneo tho baslo oonoom has boon to prodlot huaan behavior In eholeo situations, studonts of tho bohaTloral selonoos have utilised tho utility oonoopt In studying different eleaents of organizational behavior. For example, questions sueh as what Is tho attractiveness of different anounts of money.and tho role of those aaounts In tho motlvatlon-to-work have nothodologically and thoorotloally boooao meaningful areas of research oonoom. In tho aaao tradition, tho researoher In this study intends to oxaalno tho utility of different sizes of pay lnoreaents In rela tionship to notlvation-to-work In publlo organisations. This researoh is aimed specifically at extending our under standing of human behavior toward reward systems and determining the trend In motivational patterns of publlo employees In particular. 6 Tha »iid for th< Htiwoh Until raoant yi«ri alupllstlo tlawa about tha rolo of pap aa a motivator lav* doalnatad aost rasaareh. Some, ■uoh aa waa tha oaaa with tha aolantlflc nanagaaant, thought of aonap aa tha aola aourea of aotlvatlon for workara to parfora at a aazlaua oapaoltpi othara allulnatad pap ooaplatalp from thalr atudlaa oa aotlvatlon la tha ballaf that In organisational Ufa thara ara aora Important aotlrating factor* than pap. Sueh atudlaa. whloh war* aapaolallp oharaatarlatlo of tho huaan ralatlona movement alaaad tha laportano* of tha pspohologloal rola of eoapen- aatlon. Pap* however. aaaaa to b* ona organisational variable whloh haa at laaat two adrantagaa from a raaaareh point of rlaw. Flrat of all. it appaara to b* aaap to quantify and haa a aaanlng that la aharad aoroaa aanp oul* tural and athnlo groups. Seoond, unllk* othar organIsa* tlonal rarlablas whloh ara dlfflehlt to ohanga and lnflu- enoe, e.g.. laadarahlp stylo, pap oan ba aaallp oontrollad * and ohangad. This la a aonsldarabla adrantaga for tha studant of tha baharloral aelanoaa baoaua* ha aap usa pap aa an ozparlaantal rarlabia. Tat tha fact raaalns that until raeantlp thara hara baan faw atudlaa In tha oontazt mentioned above. The reason for this aaaaa to ba that aost pap adalnlstratlon 7 practical have not boon roaooroh oriented, havo tended to bo bosod upon aaauaptlono and traditions, and have developed out of tho poroonal ozporloneo of a few dodloatod pooplo. Therefore, aoot organisational pay plana have boon heavily influoneod by ohanoo olrouaatanooa and tho polleloa of othor organisations, I.e., a "no too" attltudo. Coaponaatlon for work oonatltutoa tho largoat slnglo lton of oost In aoat organisations. lot studios on dlfforont functions of pay soon to bo oxtroaoly lialtod. Ono of tho loast orplorod areas aaong than appears to bo tho psyehologleal role of pay, i.e.. Its role In notlratIon* to-work. Thors are, for oxaaple, only a fow studios In whloh hypothesos related to tho eubjeotlve Talus of reward and porfomanoe wore proposed and tested. Therefore, there Is need for related researoh to extend our understanding of tho aotlTatlonal role of pay In formal organisations, Tho Purpose of tho atudr Tho two aaln purposes of the present study are, first, to examine tho utility of different amounts of pay for employees In the publlo seotor and, seoond, to test some hypotheses oonoemlng the subjective yalue of pay and mot1Tation-to-work as affooted by some demographio, organi sational and satisfaotlon-equlty-falmess variables. In addition to these alms, the researcher Intends to extend previous and reoent studies on the utility of pay 8 4 and oonpare thalr findings with this rsssareh , thus exploring sons of ths gray araas whloh ax 1st batwaan aotlvatlon-to~work and tha role of organisational lnoentlve aystans. Th. FPCM.WI Tha history of thaorlslng about tha subjeotlve value of nonay to Individuals goas baok as far as tha 16th oantury. Tha systsnatio traatnant of tha subjeot, however* is tha pxoduot of tha 20th oantury. Tha raason for suoh dalay of oparatlonallsatlon of tha ooneapt aaaaa to ba that aoholars dlsagraad on how to naasura subjective utility. In addition to tha soarolty of good studios on tha utility of nonay * tha author waa unabls to unoover any aajor rasaaroh Involving a oonparatlva analysis of tha utility of pay In savaral publlo organisations. Tha prob- lanf thsrsfors, to whloh this rasaaroh Is dlraatad nay ba statad as follows t What Is tha natura of ralatlonshlps anong dlffarsnt anounts of pay and tha subjective valua anploysas attach to thasa anounts? Furthermore, what ara tha rolas of sona intervening variables on thasa relation* ships. 9 A Th«or»tlc*l ground for tlw fltuta "AotIon &• the beginning of everything. In bttiln«aa m In mrjr othor human aotlTity, nothing of any consequence happens until an individual vanti to aot, What ha aoooapll- ahaa dapanda to a considerable aztant on how muoh, and on why ha wants to aot* That auoh la obviousi bayond that points tha nature of , huaan motivation bsoomes oonplaz and subtle.** A puzzling qua at Ion aakad ooeaalonally by tha atudantz of behavioral aolanoaa la Mwhat aakaa paopla aot tha way thay do and what dataralnaa tho d&raetlon In auoh an notion?** To azplaln thaaa and ralatad Inqulrlaa about tha natura and dlraotlon of huaan motives, a nuabar of thaorlaa have baan atatad whloh suggest a aolantlflo ex- planatlon for why paopla ohooaa particular baharlora over others to obtain (or not to obtain) thalr goals. Tha mag nitude of this question slowly has baan aads olaar as of tha different dlaolpllnes, stroaallnad thalr terminology• ralntarpratad thalr divergent biases, and collated thalr various findings. Tha earlier approaohas of different dlsolpllnes reoognlzed each other's thaory only to a limited aztant. However, more recent formulations have developed eztenslve and multl-faoeted synthases of theories and emplrloal data of several dlsolpllnas. Tha and offset has baan tha expansion of eoope and ooaplexlty of using oonoepts for merly thought to ba mutually ozeluslve, but now reoognlzed 10 *8 being complimentary and often parallel aapeota of a larger problem.^ Simultaneous with these developments In baslo motivational theory have been several praotleal applica tions of theory to the fields of business and Industrial management. The oonoem has been formulated as "why some workers tend to be high producers" or "why persons of largely similar backgrounds, engaged In the same activities under comparable conditions, exhibit considerable variabi lity In output". Specifically, what determines high pro- 7 ductlvlty? In other words, what are the determining fao- tors In human behavior to obtain oooperatlon of Individuals for the accomplishment of certain desired goals In organi sational activities? In attempting to provide answers to these questions, several aspects of organisations (struc tural settings, material, Individuals, and organisational processes) have been examined by students of organisation theory. Pay In organisations, as one of these variables, most often has been studied relative to motivation. It seems that pay performs a number of functions which contribute to the survival of the organisation. People receiving pay In exohange for their energy (physical or mental) view It as a form of reward for what they have given to the organisation (energy, time, or the saorlflcs of other aotlvlties to help the organisation realise Its roal(s). The effectiveness of such a reward system depends 11 to i o u degree, Along with other nrUblti, upon Mtlifao* tlon with pop whloh, in turn, ukta oaplopees fool sot lo- fi od with tholr Job, activates than, shins tholr ooaultaent 8 to tho organisation, and keeps thoa In tho organisation. Thus, tho aotlvatlonal rolo of pap sooaa to have aanp ranlfleatlono for organisational oonduot. Hotlratlon mnA nr 9 Tho applloatlon of "DrIts and Kxpootaaey Thoory" to tho problew of pap as a aot1rator has dons a groat doal to dotornlno tho ordor of lnportanoo of tho aotlratlonal ▼orlob 1 os whloh aap bo satlsflod bp pap. In gonoml, Drlro Thoory has postulatod a sorlos of physiological variables, auoh as tho physiological nood for basic sustl- nanec, which Is usually referred to os prlaarp nood and aotlro. Those are viewed os tho first concern of tho Indi vidual, and tho reword ho receives froa his oaplopaont oust first satisfy those needs. In a oontoaporarp context, there are aanp societies In whloh reward has no further lapllcotlons for satisfaction — reward Is a goal In Itself, Much of tho world still follows an agrarian wap of life wherein tho product of agricultural work, tho harvested crop, is dlrootlp oonsuaed bp tho faraor, and the oxooos bartered or sold to acquire the baslo necessities not produced bp the faraor hlaself • Here, reward Is the goal 12 toward whloh offort la dlraotad* and parforaanoa laval la not Juat an adjunot hut, inataad* orltloally oantral to azlatanoe « poor porforaanaa lltarmlly aaana atarvatlon. In thla aanaa, raward anat ha dlatlngulahad froa pay* whloh la lta lndnatrial oountarpart* An alaaat pwra lntarprata- tlon of Drlva Thaory* than* nay ba appllad In tha llnltad oontazt of traditional agrarian aaolaty. In laduatrial aoolaty, whara tha baalo naada of anbalatanoa ara eharaotarlatloally provided far by higher atandarda of living* aaoondary naada and aot 1 too ara auoh aora important, Tha goal of raward* traaalatad Into pay In thla oontazt* baaoaaa ona goal anong aany. Tha baalo Maooaoalo aanM of agrarian aoolaty baooaaa tha "aoolal aair and* to aoaa aztant* tha Half-aotualltad aan" la tha oontazt of lndaatry and nodam buslnaaa. Othar "payoholo gical" faotora* auoh aa lntrlnalo raward or latarparaonal ralatlona* of tan have aa groat aa lnpaot aa pay on aaployaa motlvatlona. Bzpaotaaoy Thaory* flrat* pointad to tha lnportaaea of aaoondary naada aa paroalvad by tha lndlvldmd, but tha nunaroua varlablaa whloh actually oparato in tha aotlvatlon of laduatrial and bualaaaa aaployaaa hava out- atrlppad tha alupllalty of Bzpaotaaoy Thaory azplanatlona of bahavlor and foroad tha davalopaant of nodal a with lnoraaaad aapaoity for handling nultlpla altuatlona.10 Valanoa la tha tam that haa baan wood to oharae- tarlsa tha ralatlon of ona variable to tha othara with 13 whloh It operates, u i tho valence of pay &• now recog nised (tlbilti not too olearly) as a function of tho situational determinants of tho pereelved valuo. 8ono of thooo oituotlonol dotomlnonto are oharaoteristics of tho work performed and of tho type of organisation la whloh a poraon lo employed, Adana haa ahown tho dlfforont attl- tudoa toward pay of pleoe-rate workora and hourly-rato workers, and It haa boon auggoatod that aueh dlffortnooa nay bo explained by both tho differential potential of rowarda other than pay and tho divergence of attitudes toward Job oontent hold by persons at opposite ends of tho 11 Job speotrua, College students and national guardsaon have been reported as having different views of tho utility of pay beyond a certain level of lnoonet and persona In publlo and private organisations have dsnonstrated a 12 alnllar departure in attitude. The applied theories of aotlvatlon discussed herein have atteapted to aeoouat for nany of the variables that lnfluenee the ability of pay to activate. The Path- Goal Hypothesis predlota that pay will be an Important activator when It Is viewed by the Individual aa an lapor tant goal toward whloh there exists sons feasible path,^ The laportanoe of pay aa a goal, however, nay be subllaated In the interest of Intrinsic goals requiring different paths. Vrooa haa, In hla two-level aodel, outlined the Xk deolslon-maklng process that operates on tho path-goal Ik oonoopt to dotoralno tho valcnoe of pop. In that model, pay la ono of several poaalhlo goala, and tho subleotlve •valuation of tho Individual about tho valuo of pay, together with hla subleotlve perception of how attainable hla goals nay bo, dotominoe pay valonoo. Galbraith and Cunnings have listed these outooaos as relevant to the individual's determination of pay valonooi fringe benefits (f), pronotlon (p), supportive behavior (s), and group aooeptenoe In their formula V m v# >VBIpa ♦ Vflpf* vp*pp * vaIpa ♦ vgIpg perforaanoe equals the sun of the products of the valenoes of eaoh of these footers (» pay) and the perceived (p) Instrumentality of eaoh. In addition, the variable Vf has been ineluded to aooount for the personal ego involve ment of the individual In the task, a significant factor at many levels of work which has been overlooked in most models until reoently. Pay, as seen by Horsberg, aay be equally Influen tial In both the Job content and the lob environment, and 16 this has been substantiated by experimentation. To the extent that it may bo assumed that Job environment is of greater importance at one end of the lob spectrum (among assembly workers, for example) and lob oontent of greater importance at the other end of the lob spectrum (among 15 •nglMcra or aarlne blologlati), tho utility, and hence valence, of pay hu boon ohown to decrease aaong eaployees in private oonoomo aftor a oortaln level of salary lo attalnod. At tho aaae tlao, Adaao* oxaaplo of lowered production aaong overpaid pleoe-rate workers auggtite that the utility of pay aay be superseded la the equation by the "utility** of optima effort exerted in the task assigned, Equity Theory, of oourse, has been directly con cerned with pay and aotlvatlon and haa been used to prediet the relationship of piece-work and hourly pay rates to perforaaaee. This has been explained as a function of the cognitive dissonance the worker associates with inequity between inputs and outoonee, and the atteapt of the worker to reduoe dissonance by aanlpulatlng inputs and outoonee toward what is subjectively perceived as a balanoe between then. Bxpeotanoy Theory aekes the contrasting prediction that the worker will always try to aaxiaise his outoonee. Both theories have aarshalled lapresslve experlaental evldcaoe to illustrate each assuaptlon, Adana has sug gested that these aseunptlons are not necessarily autually exclusive and that, as noted earlier, perhaps the theories apply to separate sets of conditions. Following this line of thinking. It aay be that In cases where pay la of prl- aary laportanoe to an individual and other factors are definitely secondary or not 1 sport ant at all, the 16 Uptotmojr Theory prediotlon that the individual will seek to atzlalii his outooaes will prmll and that* In easts where other variables Intervene and lessen the valenoe of pay, the Individual any atteapt to balance pay (outeoae) against his Inputs In order to achieve another goal. In any oase« exaalnatlon of the Yrooa model. whloh allows not only one goal* but also for several goals operating eiaultaneously* shows olearly that Oqulty Theory Is applloable. when several goals exist siaultaneously. and the Individual Is disposed to atteapt to aehleve then all (as he night be to aohleve high pay* status* and good Interpersonal relations all at the saae tlae)* the indivi dual aust evaluate the valenoe and lnstruaentallty of each goal and the effort necessary to achieve each against the saae factors for each of the other goals and arrive finally at what he peroelves as a balanced approach to his job that will aehleve all the goals together. Here* his lnoone and output will be balanoed against one another In order to achieve aaxlalsatlon of his goals. This points to an Integrated Interpretation of Kxpeetanoy and Itulty Theory assunptlons about pay aotlvatlon whloh Is as ooa- plex as the Interrelationships eaong all the variables that act on pay aotlvatlon. In the light of studies of aodem business and Industry* where a considerable number of secondary goals Influence aotlvatlon* the ability of pay to aot as a 17 Mtlntor la no longar taken atrletlp for gnuited, Pap no a aotlvator la rawgliig fron thoao atudloa •• on lnoraailngly partloularlatlo aothod of MnlpuUtlng tho porfomonoo of aaplopaaa, and gnmllMtlon haa baoono oorraapondlnglp difficult. In ordor to utlllca pap to aotlvata lndlvlduala offoetlvolp, It la now undoratood that nuaaroua varlablaa partloular to tho poraonal attl- tudoa of workora, tho oharaotorlatloa of tholr work, and tho naturo of tho organlaatlon for whloh thop work auat bo takon Into aeoount In tho aotlvatlon nodol. Motivational Modola Booonaldarod Booauao aotlvatlon lnvolvoa ooaploz poraonalltp oharaotorlatloa aa wall aa ooaplleatod apatoaa whloh oslat around lndlvlduala, atudonta of tho awbjoot tond to alapUfy It bp applplng poraonal and dlaolpllnarp blaaoa In aolvoting a atartlng ground for thoorlslng and roaoaroh. Thap rooOg- nlaad tho faot that although It la not tho aola oauaa of huaan notion, aotlvatlon aap bo tho prlaarp oauaa of boha- vlor. Slnoo no at bohavlora prlaarllp aro born althor fron oognltlva aotlvoa (atroaaod bp azpootanop thoorlaa) and tho oondltlonad raaotlona (daalt with aoatlp bp drlva-hablt thoorlaa) or fron unoonaeloua aotlvoa whloh. In turn, over lap both tho oognltlva aotlvoa and tho oondltlonad raaotlona. Moat thoorlaa of aotlvatlon havo boon dovolopod to IS •ipUln the nature and oause-effeot relationship between the eognltlvi and drive habite actives. The difficulties faeed In handling unoonsolous human motive# have been oauaed bp their omlaalen by moat psychologists. Souroee of motivated behavior either oan be fruetration-lnetlooted or oonstruotlve-goal dlroeted- lntentlonal* or both. The frustration-instigated behavior# usually are rigid* stereotyped end compulsive. Therefore# Haler suggests that there should be a different set of 17 principles dealing with these motives. Kedern motivation theories should work with constructive and goal-dlreoted- lntentlonal behaviors. It Is appropriate here to note our awareness of the faot that unoonsoloue and frustration-Instigated behavior do have lapaet on so-called constructive behavior. But for the sake of slnpllelty and the problem of measure ment of motives# Haler's position appears to be acceptable by this author. Accepting his position makes it easier to operationalise the variables in studies of motivation and to determine to some degree oause-effect relationships among these variables. Host motivational models developed for organisational use have drawn their theoretical expla nations from a mix of theoretical orientations. They embrace variables extracted from both the so-called drlve- hablt and expectancy theories of motivation. This seems a logical ground since both have their weak and strong points. 19 On* controversy between th«c« theories ooatora around the handlins of foar In huau behavior. Drive Theory handles oxpooted throat* In tom* of anticipatory •notional roaotlon* that havo tho saao fnnetlonal proper- tlo* ao anticipating coal roaotlon*• Thai, tho thoory give* a <11 root In* solo to foollnc of foar in tom* of ■•looting speciflo avoidance behavior. Bxpootaaoy thoorlea on tho othor hand, explain foar a* a negative foroo in aotlvatlon and suggest that tho prosonoo of suoh a fooling 18 oan bo a aupprooant foroo in huaan porfomanoo, Therefore, Bxpootaaoy Thoory soon* to oaptnro a roallstlo rlov of tho rolo of foar in huaan aotlvatlon boeanoo aoot positive huaan behaviors aro not tho rooult of foar or othor negative foollnc* tut of goal-dlreotod, oonatruotlvo Intentions, Also, tho Bxpootaaoy Thoory appear* to bo goarod toward a nor* roallstlo approach than tho drive- habit thoory In it* handling of tho of foot* of anticipated goal* In aotlvatlon, Drlvo Thoory baaloally atatos that a drlvo or an antiolpatorr goal roaotlon aot* to aotlvato all responses (hablta) that aro olloltod In a situation. Thus, tho atrongth of aotlvatlon to porfom wall oan bo lnoroaaod by tho anticipation of goal* that aro In no way conditioned to or rolatod to porfomanoo, Bxpootaaoy Thoory* on tho other hand* dooa not aako auoh a generalisa- tlon of arousal state*. It argno* that a por*on*« activa tion to porfom an aot is a funotion only of tho valonoo 20 of those r«mrd« whloh are seen to bo related to perforates 19 that oot. 8uch on argument oooao to have o groat value for nany students of tho behavioral ooloneoo olnoo It allows enough leeway for tho propor rolo of porforaanoo ao rolatod to aotlvatlon In organisations. Tot, Bxpootaaoy Thoory aloo hao boon oritlolsod on tho ground that It fallo to spoolfy how people loam what 20 Is approprlato behavior la different stlaulus situations. Drive Thoory goes to great lengths to spoolfy how gHr 21 develops and how It oan bo altered. Thus* tho ooneept of habit in Drive Thoory explains tho prooess of how an Individual learns to aot oorreetly In a given situation. This point, however, has boon systeaatlsally Ignored In oxpoetsnoy value oriented aotlvatlonal theories. Another valid orltlolsu of Bxpootaney Thoory a teas fron tho foot that It has boon vague and ahlsterleal In orientation when It ooaes to specifying how people develop beliefs about tho oonsequeaees of behaving in a eertaln Banner. In othor words, Bxpeetanoy Thoory has never olearly stated how people develop their response- stlaulus subjective probabilities. The final weak point In Bxpootaaoy Thoory ooaes fron tho Inadequacy of explana tions about what faotors determine the valenoe of outoomes. There is no proper theory about determinants of the valenoe of outoomes. Overall evaluation of the theories load us to be 21 Inclined toward expectancy theories lor two main reasonsi the llrst one Is the fact that most nodels mentioned In the preoedlng section hare been oriented primarily to expectancy theories of motlratlon. The seoond reason Is the stipremaoy of Expeotanoy Theory in providing a better un derstanding of human motlratlon in organisational settings slnoe It accounts for subjeotlve value systems of Indivi duals as well as objective possibilities In huaan behavior, unlike over-generallzatlons made In drive-habit theories. Having clarlefled some of the Issues about motiva ted behaviors and origins of the motivational models, we will consider briefly the models whloh are more completely discussed In Chapter II. This Is done In order to put our researoh and hypotheses In proper perspective. Most models, we will see, have been generally con structed around two Interrelated sets of variables. The first set was bora out of inquiries of what constitutes a person's belief oonoernlng the probability that If he puts effort Into performing at a certain Intended level, he will be able to perform at that level. In other words, what Is the relationship between the effort expenditure and, aa a result of It, the accomplished activities? Furthermore, what are the Intervening variables that lnteraot on the effort-perlormance (E-P) outcome probabilities?22 To answer suoh related questions, model builders see the Individual as a role oocupant faced with a set of possible alternative 22 behaviors. Here* the problems for aotlntlonal models aro to explain why persona will ohooaa on* aot of alternatives and raj act othor sets. Thajr perceive that tho direction of tho behavior In anoh oholoe altuatlona la to none decree determined by* first* paraonallty properties* variables anoh aa the belief ayataa of a person, his habits (,1 !,), drives* needs* expeotatlons as well as his rationale and ability i and secondly* a combination of be liefs about what the outcomes of aeeempllshlnc the Intended level of porformanee will be (P-O) and the valenoe (V) of these outoomes. These (P-0) and (V) constructs constitute the seoond set of relations whloh act upon the first set (B-P) and have a considerable amount of Impact on the dlreotlon of expected motivated behaviors. The (P-O) relation In this eouneotlon seems to be equal to the concept of Instrumentality which* as stated by Vroom* refers to an Individual's perception of relationship between first level outeomas (participation) and seoond 23 level outcomes (rewards* group acceptance* etc.). The oonocpt of valence (V) which refers to the strength of the person's desire for an outcome Is a function of Its perceived Instrumentality as an outcome (I.e.* rewards). Thus* valence of an outcome appears to be 2b a function of two factorst motive and incentive. Motive represents subjective aspects of decision and some charac teristics of the Individual who Is facing the choice situation, ifhtmi lnoontlrs characterizes ths nlu« of an outoone, This Is an Important distinction in ths varianoe of tho valenoe of an outoons bsoauss, for example. thsrs aro situations In whloh an Individual nay dsslrs an objsot tut rooolTS llttls satisfaction froa Its attalnaent* or ho mar have a strong urge to avoid an object whloh ho lator finds to bo quits valuable. Thus* at any glvon tlao* thoro sap bo a substantial dlsorepanoy botwoon anticipated sat1ofactIon fron an outoons (i.e., Its sub jective valenoe) and the aotual satisfaction whloh the 2< outoons provides (I.e.* Its value). The Implication of this distinction suggests that the relationship between an Individual's desire to obtain eertaln outoomes and aotual satlsfaetlon he reoelves Is a very oonplex and dynamic Interaction. There are several generally aoeepted situational as well as personality variables affeotlng the Interactional relations between the subjeetlve value (utility) of* and the aotual value of an outoons (extrlnsle reward). This Is the main foous of our study. But* before we begin to exaalne the dynanlos of the Interactions* we want to establish a proper relationship anong four essen tial variables whloh oonatltute the baekbone of all moti vational models whloh provide powerful oonoeptual tools for understanding suoh dynanlo Interactions. These varia bles are* effort* perfornanee, satisfaction* and rewards. The direction of Interactions anong and between 2k th«i« vtrlablu hart, to tho author'■ knowledge, boon boot ooneeptuallsed and analysed In tho review of Porohology 26 of Mon at Work by dalth and Cranny. Thoy propotod that employee perforaanoe la a function of oaployoo efforti thlo In turn nay bo oontrollable by organltatlonal incen tives (reward) and vice versa. Hore pay aay produce aoro effort* and uoro effort aay produoo aoro pay. Management oan affeot productivity or aat&afaetlon only lndlrootly through appropriately structuring tho ways rowarda will bo ▼lowed by tho worker. However* effort by ltaolf doea not noooaaarlly produoo higher perforuano* booauao there aay bo a laok of talon or akllla. Assuming there la aufflolent talent* wo oan aaauao that InoontlToa produoo In the oaplo yoo tho netting of higher targete* whloh produoee aoro effort* and that thla* In turn* produoea goal aohloToaant and eat laf aot Ion. Thua* aatlaf notion la related to per- foraanoo only through tho offoota of effort or Intentlone. Howard* aro alao related to perforaanoe only through their rolatlonahlp with effort, aatlafaotlon* however* aay alao be dlreotly produced by organisational rowarda without an Inoreaae In effort and perforaanoe. Thla eltuatlon la depleted aa in the following figure (Figure 1). A model whloh depleta a preliminary rolatlonahlp between pay and lte utility will be propoeed In the following pagea (Figure 2), The model eaeentlally keepa the aaln oharaotorlatloa of the Salth and Cranny model and 24 these mlablii to tho author*o knowledge• boon boot conceptualised and analysed In tho review of Psychology 26 of Han at Work by Smith and Cranny. Thay propooad that amployee parfomanoa is a function of aaployaa effort i this in turn aay bs oontrollabls by organisational incen tives (reward) and vice versa. Nora pay nay produce more effort* and acre effort aay produce more pay. Management oan affeot productivity or satisfaction only indiraotly through appropriately structuring the ways rewards will be viewed by the worker. However* effort by itself does not necessarily produce higher perforaanoe because there aay be a lack of talen or skills. Assuming there is sufficient talent* we oan assume that incentives produce in the emplo yee the setting of higher targets* whloh produces more effort, and that this* in turn* produces goal aohleveacnt and aatlsfaotlon. Thus, satisfaction Is related to per- foraanee only through the effects of effort or intentions. Bernards are also related to perforaanoe only through their relationship with effort. Satisfaction* however* aay alao be dlreotly produced by organisational rewards without an lnorease in effort and perforaanoe. This situation is depleted as in the following figure (Figure 1). A model which deplots a preliminary relationship between pay and its utility will be proposed In the following pages (Figure 2). The aodel essentially keeps the aaln characteristics of the Snlth and Cranny aodel and 25 Perfornanoe \k.---- Effort Satlefaotion Figure I - Intarralatlonahlpa among Dimensions of Work Behaviors and Attitudea. Adapted from P. C. Smith and C.J. Cranny* "Psychology of Men at Work**' Annual Review of Psychology. Vol. XIX, 1956, pp. 537^7. ----- 26 breaks down the reward system into Its eomponents, Organi sations provide two different sets of rewards for organi sational perforaanoe. The first set oonslsts of non- aaterlal rewards naaed "Intrinsic rewards"* I.e., symbols* satisfaction* self-esteem, etc. The seoond set* however* Includes aaterlal rewards* I.e.* pay* fringe benefits* eto, and Is called "extrlnslo rewards". The utlllty-aotlvatlon- to-work aodel oan be pictured as In Figure 2, The directional relationships anong the baslo variables reward (Box b), perforaanoe (Box 2), satisfaction (Box 3)* and effort (Box 1) are Justified according to aalth and Cranny's explanations. To their aodel* we add the utility of reward (Box 6)« the extrlnslo rewards (Box 7)* the equity of reward (Box 6)* and such variables In general as those relating to the organisation (Box 9). Soclo-deaographic characteristics (Box 11) and other perceptions (Box 10) whloh are thought of as acting upon the relationship between utility and the value of extrlnslo reward. Another addition to the 8alth and Cranny aodel Is (Box 5) whloh contains suoh variables as ability* self- esteea* problea-solving approach* needs* learning* and expectations. Host variables mentioned In Box 3 overlap with the variables that constitute Box 11, This repetition results froa the author's desire to show the role and direction of the variables (Box 11 and Box 5) In forming perceptions (Box 6* 7* and 8), ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLE EQUITY PERCEPTION OTHER PERCEPTIONS - Size of organization - Fairness - Belief in unions - Level of salary - Re'ward/Contri- - Fairness of p - Public/private butions system - Pay increase - Reward/inter - Policy making - Union/non-union relations - Specialization - Experience 9 3 10 Utility and Extrinsic Reward Expected Value (Pay 6 7 Ability Self-esteem Problem solving Needs Internal Control vs External Learning Expectations REWARD k - Intrinsic - Extrinsic PERFORMANCE DEMOGRAPHIC VARIA BLES - Sex - Age - Education - Experience - Degree 11 EFFORT f 'SATISFACTION 1 C ....... 3 FIGURE II - A UTILITY-MOTIVATION-TO-WORK MODEL 28 As lndloattd b«for«t th« Interactions aaoni and between variables ars very dynamic and bars a different blend of relationship at an/ siren tlae. Therefore( we will not try to detemlne a static dlreotlonal trend anong these variables. We see that every variable in the figure affects other variables and is being affected by each and the totality of variables. The aaln research interest in the aodel is on the relationship between extrinsic organisational reward (pay) and subjeotlve expected value (utility) that lndlvl- duale attach to their pay. Experimental works on choice stress either one of these two general concepts of behavior. One is learning theory in which the units of behavior are reeponeescand the eeoond is that oholoe anong reeponaes is presumably determined by sequences of previous responses and the reinforcements oontlngsnt upon then. These oon* tlngenoles between response and reinforcement are often 27 treated as probabilistic. Psychologists have been presented with an alter- native conceptualisation of behavior that stems fron the 28 works of economists* statisticians* and matheaaticlans. Por then a choice la aade anong a set of alternative coursee-of-actlen. Once a eourse-of-action has been eelee- ted* It Is presumed that oertala events occur that are to be oalled out ooaes. If the objeotlve probabilities of the 29 outooaes are unknown* the choice la termed uncertain. 29 whether the oholoo la rliky or uncertain, tho Aagrn of bollof about tho outooao la a subjeotlve ovont that Mat bo aoaaurod psychologically. Thla aoaauro la ofton oallod a aoalo of subjeotlve probability. Tho ooneopt of subjective probability aarroa tho saae purpoao for tho ohoioe-theorlats aa does tho ldoa of partial reinforcement for tho psychologist walng learning thoory. A thoory of oholeo la oonoomod with outooao a that have a doalrablo and uadoalrablo proporty aa a function of tho evaluative proooaaoa of tho organ*m. Thla proporty funetiona to assign to oaoh outooao a nuaorloal quantity toraod lta "utility". By tho uao of utility, aa a doflnod aoaauro of outooaes, ooonoalata study what tho behavior In a oho loo-situation should bo, Thoro hawo boon aany suggestions about thoso normative aodoa of behavior, and a few of the so-oallod rational erltor&a of oholoo havo boon Investigated experimentally. ' * 0 It la characteristic of alaoat all tho criteria, however, that tho variables entering Into tho oholoo aaong alternatives aro aoro or loaa exhausted by two numbers. Pi ret, tho likelihood that a particular outooao will oo our when any given alternative la oho sen, and aeoond, tho utility of tho outooao that does ooour. Tho essontlal difference between the thoory of oholoo and tho theory of learning la that tho oholoo experiments consistently contain two Independent variables 30 instead of "reinforoeaaat", Thoss are 1) ths utility of outoouco sad 2) ths likelihood of ths outooaee. Thsrs srs t nuaber of sspsrlBsntal studios that grow out of thasa theoretical explanations of huaan»ehoioe acohanlan. Stareas sad Oalaater asked a group ef subjects to sake rating Judgacnte of the proportloa of blue dots aaong blue and green dots readonly soatterod orer a surface* their ooaputatloas produced linear functions relating Judged category of blue and green dots except 31 for usual dlstorltlons at the tuo end categories* A slailar finding supporting the rlew that subjeotlre probability is linearly related to obserrod proportions was obtained by gdwarda la his direct estina- 32 tlon of subjeotlre probability experloacnt* As projected fron these psychological experlnente* it can be assuaed that then is a linear relationship between the aaount of pay and Its utility* to put It In another way* increases in pay cause the saae lerel of utility proportionately* I.e.* a aan beharos in a rational way. The assuaptlon that people actually bshare in a rational way Is oontra* dloted by obserrable beharlor In nany situations* People are* for exanple* willing to buy insurance eren though the person whs sells the insurance aakeo a profit* People are alao willing to buy lottery tickets eren though the lottery aakee a profit. These exanples indicate sons of the paradoxes lndlrlduals face on a dally basis. An 18th n oaaturr atfthMBtltlan, Denial Baraoulll* poiliUttd that thin pirtlpw m b bo naolvwA hr u m l n c that paopla Mt ao aa to auiiliB BtpMtcd utllitr* rtth«r than 33 axpaotad Til*#, Puthiraort, h« poatulatad that aa Individual’a waalth lafluaaoaa tha utllitr of additional aanar ao that an additional dollar haa aara utllitr for tha poor thaa tha rloh aaa. For hla, tha valua of aoaor night ba a logarithm e fnaetloa of tha nuabor of do liar a. Prlodaaa and Savaga aaarohod far anawara to tha quaatlon of whr aoaa paopla,who bur luauraaaa (with a negative aonar value) la ordar not to taka rlaka, will alao bur lottarr tlokata (alao with a negative axpaotad 34 aonar value) for tha purpoaa of taking a rlak, Thar axplalnod thoaa behavior* br a doublr Inflictad utllitr ourve for aonar» a aaa la willing to aooopt "fair** lnaur- aaaa (i.e., whloh haa saro axpaotad aoaor value) baoauaa aarloua loaa agalnat whloh ha la lnaurlng would have a lowar axpaotad utllitr than tha oartala loaa of tha laauranoa prealua, Thua» thar a aaa to bo auggeatlng that deoreaalag Marginal utllitr la ooaalatant with avoidaaoe of rlaka. Tha paraoa alao would ba willing to bur * lottarr tlakat baoauaa lta axpaotad utllitr la greater than a oartaln loaa of tha ooat of tha tlokat, Tha laoraaalng utllitr curve Involved In tha lottarr turna down* however* aa It boooaaa naoaaaarr to have aora aonar to bar aoro tlokata for 3 * •BhMMMt of the probability of winning. Markowlts proposed that tho origin of a person's utility curve for money bo takou ao his ouotoaary financial oitnation. Tho original onrro In aoouaod to bo firat oonoave and thon oonvex* If tho person's oantonary stato of wealth changes, thon tho ahapo of hia utility onrro will ttma ronain generally tho aano with roapoot to whom ho now iaf and ao hia rink-taking boharior will ronain protty anoh tho aano lnatoad of ohanging with every ohango of wealth aa in the Prledman-Savage formulations* In on ozporlnont on Harvard undergraduates and national Ouardsmen, Hosteller and Hogoo found oat that, in general* for money* tho Harvard nndorgradnatoa had dimi nishing utilitioa while tho national Ouardanon had inereas- lng marginal utility?7 Thun, tho utility ourro Hosteller and Hegee dorlro la different fron tho one Friedman and Savage wore talking about* Galanter aakod Sa how auoh money would bo twioo aa desirable aa $10*00 and othor amounts* Ho reported that with an exponent of about 0*5 there la a decreasing marginal utility function* There have boon two studios dealing with tho aotual utility of pay in organisational settings. Tho first one used a agnltude estimation teohnlque to determine tho rolatlonahlp between merit lnoreases and satiafaction for professional employees of aa eleetrle organisation* The researchers found that the generally aeoepted Bemeulllan 33 oonoopt of diminishing utllitr for sash added dollar of merit increase woo not supportod bp tho findings. This is oontrarp to oeooptod eoonomlo thoory but oonslstont with tho equity thoorp* tho second research was oonduotod bp Sohuster ond Collettl.39 Thop roplloatod a uodiflod Torsion of HO tho roooaroh performed bp Giles and Barrott among 3, haring similar doaographio organisations. Tholr findings lndioatod that a ourrillnoar rolationship ozlsts botwoon tho dlfforont amounts of pap and tho subjeotlre raises (utility) attaohod to tho pap in tho prlTiato organisation. In tho publle organisation, howeror, tholr findings showod a llnoar rolatlonahlp for tho utllltp of tho dlfforont amount of pap. What all thoso rosoarohora soom to suggoot is that tho studios on tho oxpootod subJootlTo ralue of tho pap lm organisations aro InoonelualTo and oonfuslng. Howoror. it has boon shown that tho pap porooptiono (equity, satis* footIon from pap. utllltp funotlon of extrinsic roward. and falrmoss) aro Important aspoots of organisational motlratlon. Thoroforo, it oooms Important to thoorlso and tost soao hppothosos about tho relationships that exist botwoon dlfforont amounts of extrinsic rawards (pap) tho subjection Oxpootod raluo (utllltp) omplopoos attach to thoso g&ron amounts. m B i f t i r a n The ratMroh tuaitleai atatad la tho praoadlng ••otion ara broad In aoopo and gonoral la naturo. and thaj do not apoolfloallr ldoatlfr tho rolatlonahlp oxpoe- tod botwoon tho aajor warlabloa. Tho kor hfpothoaoo for thla atndr aro atatod in tho following atatoaonta. th» Hypoth»»«« . For publlo organisations a ourrllinoar rolatloa- ahip oxlata botwoon tho dlfforont alaoa of oxtrlnaio roward (par) and tho aubJootlTo oxpootod waluo (utllitr) of thoao glTon aaounta. Tho lino of boat fit for tho rolatlonahlp ohangoa aeoordlng to* 1- aoao doaographlo warlabloa, whloh aro i a) aox b) ago o) oduoatlon d) aoadoalo dogrooa oarnod 11- aoao organiaatlonal warlabloa, whloh aroi a) alxo of tho orgaaltatlon b) aanlorltr o) oxporloneo d) apoelalltr doflnod aa adalnlatratlwo, toohnloal, aoorotarlal. and toohnloal rolo o) union aoaborahlp f) annual aalarr g) loot par Inoroaao h) aaount of tlao alnoo loot par Inoroaao 111- aatlafaotlon/oqmltr/falmoaa porooptlon warlabloa* whloh aroi a) falmoaa of tho proaont par b) oqultr of tho proaoat par o) aatlafnotion roeolrod fron tho par IV- aoa« other pireiptloM, whloh trii a) belief In functionality of union nolo In pay perceptions b) pop eeorcoy o) lnvolreaent In polley design Vorloblooi Our baale quootlon la what kind of rolatlonahlp aay exist botwoon tho organisational oztrlnalo roward (pay) and tho subjectire ralue poraona attach to pay (utility). That rolatlonahlp nay bo dotorulnod by sereral oota of lntorronlng rarlabloa. Thua, wo hare ono baalo lndopondont variable (pay aagnltudoa). Aa tho nodol suggests, It la poaalblo to lnoludo sereral lntorronlng rarlabloa. lot, wo hare ohoaon only four oota, whloh aeoordlng to thla roaoarehor'a opinion* aro dlrootly rolatod to tho utility funotlon of pay. Tho flrat aot oonalata of organisational rarlabloa. Pay la an organisational phonoaonon. Thoroforo, It aooaa logical to assuac that aoao organisational rarlabloa aay haro dlroet lnfluonoo on tho utility funotlon of pay, Tho eight rarlabloa aroi organisation, seniority, experlenoe, opoolallty, union aoaborahlp, lorol of annual salary, also of last pay Inoroaao, and aaount of tine slnoo last pay Inoroaao. Tho seoond sot la aado up of aoao eoolo* deaographle rarlabloa. Tho utility concept la a subjeotlre raluo. By definition, therefore, tho utility of pay should bo colored by aoao poraonal factors. Sex, education ago, and aoadoalo degrees earned aro tho four rarlabloa 36 In this uttgorj Ineluded In our study* Ths third sst lnoludes fslmsss of ths present pay sad sstlsfsot&on reoelved ffon ths pay. Ths rsssareh sabraosd thrss addi tional variables whloh arsi 1) bsllsf In ths sffloaoy of unions, 2) pay ssorsoy, and 3) Involvement la organisa tional design. In ths dsslgn and oonduot of flsld rsssaroh, particularly Investigations regarding organisational bsharlor and peroeptlons, prlas oonsldsratlon aust bs given to ths sslsotlon and oontrol of variables and praotloal aspsots of ths rsssaroh situation such as randoalsatlon of saapls, cost, and tins. Ths rssearohsr aust. In aa attsapt to aoooaaodats thsss factors, foraulats osrtaln assumptions aad sstablish boundarlss for ths study. Consequently, this study Is based on a number of ground rules and limitations that should bs noted. Ths effort to measure ths utility of pay was baaed upon ths assumption that "utility* 1 is a measurable property of organisational pay. There seem to be several methods for the measurement of suoh sub J sot Ire personal values. For our purpose, the rsssaroh instrument used In this study was oonsldered to be aa effeotlve yardstick for sueh measurement, Organisational pay was thought of In terms of dollar value of reward an Individual reoelves fron an organisation* Purtharmora* It aaa aaaunad that tha utllitr of pap la an Important Tar labia in organisational motlratlon and oan ba ut 111 sad for studplng organisational baharlor toward pap* Tha rarlabloa In tha rasaaroh ara aaaunad to haro a dlraot affaet on tha utllltp funatlon of organisa tional pap* In addition to thaaa assumptions* tha author aooapts tha notion that tha also of a public organisation la a funotlon of tha population to whloh tha organisation proTldas ssrrlesa* Limitations! Tha am post faoto natura of tha studp la psrhaps Its aost sarloua waaknaaa* Plaid studios ofton auffar from Inabllltp to oontrol tha lndapandant rarlabloa * fallura to randomlsa tha aampla* laok of praolalon In aaaauraaont of tha rarlabloa and praotloal problsua of faaslbllltp. sampling, ooat. and tlaa* Thla atudp was not an azoaptlon to thaaa problama* Pap. aa tha onlp lndapandant rarlabla was pradatarmlnad bp tho organisation* Tharafora. tha quaatlons about pap pareaptlons ara almad at aanslag faallngs of lndlrlduals toward praaant pap. Tha utllltp funotlon of pap. howorar* was aoaaurad in tho rasaaroh bp an hppothatloal pap aagnltuda aatlmatlon toohnlquo baoauaa of tha author's 38 Inability to oontrol tho fount of aotual pay in tho organisations, Tho Instrument In tho roooaroh was uaod by two previous roooarohoro on tho subjeet. With alight modifloatlon, it waa administered in tho prooft rasaaroh, too. Thla has both favorablo and unfavorable aapoeta. It seems favorablo booouao ono of our purposes la to oompare our findings with tho findings of thoso two roaoarohoa. Yet, wo will not bo able to detemlne tho offset of tho research lnstxuaf t on tho results. Summary Tho Introduction of tho eubjeot, tho need, tho main purposes, and tho spoolflo roooaroh problf wore lntroduoed In a systematic way to prepare readers to follow tho theorotleal and analytlo explanations for tho rationale of tho study. In tho following pages, a theore- tloal frame of roforonoo, roooaroh strategy, hypothsos, variables, general assumptions and limitations wore pre sented to plaee the roooaroh In porspootlvo. Tho following ohapter will be devoted to a review of the motivation theory literature as related to tho stated purposes of tho prosft roooaroh. NOT S3 CHAPTER I 1. A lth o u g h the author le aware of the different usages of the words "Incentive", "wage", "salary", "com pensation", and "income", they will be used Interchangeably throughout this study, 2. Wage level is the amount of lnooae received by an employee. The following are the major factors that lnfluenoe the level of wagesi a) public polloy on pay, b) going wages, o) union wage polloy and oolleotlve bar gaining, and d) management philosophy on proper wage and salary levels, 3. Wage structure is a hlerarohy of Jobs to which wage rates have been attaohed. 4. Brian A. Giles and G, Barrett, "Utility of Merit Increases,” Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 53, No, 2, 1971, pp. 103-109t Jay R. Schuster andJ. A, Collettl, "The Relationship between Perceptions Concerning Magnitudes of Pay and Perceived Utility of Payt Fubllo and Private Organizations Compared** (unpublished paper). 5. Saul W. GeHerman, Motivation and Productivity (New York 1 American Management Association, Ino,, 19631. 6. K, B, Madson, Theories of Motivation (Kent, Ohio 1 Kent State University Press, 1$&BK 7* B. Georgopolous at.al. "A Path-Goal Approach to Productivity," Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 41, No. 6, 1957, pp. 3^5-355. 8. Edward E. Lawler, III, Par and Organizational Effectiveness! A Psychological View (foew Yorki McGraw-Hill, Inc., 19?l). 9* There will be a detailed review of the dif ferent theories on the subjeot In Chapter IX. 10. See, for example, L. W, Porter and E. E. Lawler, Management Attitudes and (Chicago, III Rlohard D. Irwin Publications, 1966)• 39 40 11. Stacy Adams, "Effect* of Overpayment," Journal of Personality and Soolal Psychology. Vol. 10. Mo. 3, 1 W , w. 3I5-$1*>.---------- ----- 12. P. Nage* and M, Hosteller, "An Experimental Measurement Utility," Journal of Political Economy. Vol.59* 1951. PP. 371-404. 13. B. Georgopolous at. al. Op. Clt. 14. Victor B. Vroom, Motivation and Work (Nan Yorki John Wiley and Sons, Ino., 1964), 15. J. Galbraith and L. Cunning*, "An Experiment al Invaatlgatlon of tha Motivational Determinants of Task Performance," Organisational Behavior and Hunan Per- fomanca. Vol. 2, 1907. PP. 257-257. 16. F. Hersberg at. al. Tha Motivation to Work (New Yorki Chapman and Hall, Inc,,1959). 17. N, R. F. Malar, "Frustration Theory■ Restatement and Extension," Psychological Review. Vol. 63, 1956, pp. 370-368. 18. w. J, Atkinson, An Introduction to Motivation (Princeton, Naw Jereseyt Van Norstrand, 1^64J. 19. Victor H. Vroom, Op. Clt. 20. W. J. Atkinson, Op. Clt. 21. Sea "Review of Literature", Chapter II. 22. Lawler III, Op. Clt. 23. Vroom, Op. Clt. 24. Atkinson, Op. Clt. 25. Vroom, Op. Clt. 26. P. C, Smith and C, J. Cranny, "Psychology of Man at Work," Annual Review of Paroholoiar. Vol. 19* 19/0, pp. 467-497. 27. C. B. Ferster and B. F. Skinner, Schedules of Relnforoement (New York, N.Y.1 Appleton Corp., 1957) 28. Ward Edwards* "Behavior Dsolslon Theory," Annual Review of Psychology. Vol, 12* 1961* pp, 47A-498, 29. Ibid. 30. Lawler III, Op. Clt. 31. 3, S. Stovena and E. H, Galanter, "Ratio Soales and Category Soales for a Doten Feroeptual Continue," Journa^ ^Experimental Psychology. Vol. 5<t* No. 19. 195*. 32. Ward Edwards* "The Predletlon of Deolslons among Bets," Journal of Experimental Psychology. Vol. 5*. 1955# PP. 201^211?: 33. D. Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk," in G. A. Miller (ed,)* Mathematics and Psychology (New Yorkt Wiley and Sons, Ino., 3^. m. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choloes Involving Risk." Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 56, 19*8, pp. 579-30*. 35. H. Markowlts, "The Utility of Wealth," Journal of Folltloal Economy. Vol, 60, 1952, pp. 151*158. 36. Ibid. 37. Nagee and Mosteller, Op. Clt. 36. Giles and Barrett, Op. Clt. 39* Jay R. Sohuster and Jerome A. Collettl, "The Relationship between Perceptions Concerning Magnitude of Fay and Peroelved Utility of Pay* Public and Private Organisations Compared," (unpublished article}. *0. Giles and Barrett, Op. Clt. CHAPTER XI HKvxnr op HOTXVATIOI THBOHY LITERATURE Coneluloni derived from the study of motivation ▼try to • largo extent aoeording to tho particular dloolpllno whloh hu focused its thoory and athod on tho subject, Largely hypothetical ooolal oolonoo discip- IIm i , such c« soolology, which have only rooontly experienced expansion in thoir repertoire of quantified methodology, tend to evolve oonoeptual analogies and abstract models of motivation, while disciplines more experienced in the empiricism of the physical sciences, suoh as biology, view motivation In terms of empirical constructs and functional morphology. One class of theory Is based on deductive assumptions about the cerebral func tions from observation of the organism^ behavior in a social context, and attempts to represent the operations of the brain with abstract geometries and mathematical formulae. The other class of theory is based on Inductive assumptions about cerebral functions from observations of eleetron flow between eleotroohealoal fields in brain oolls measured by mioroeleetrodo probes, attempts to represent the operations of the brain with maps of functional areas, >2 43 dlagrui of Mttral pathways, and mlorophotographs. In thla context, preliminary raaaaroh In aotlntloa has baan stated In tha taxalnology of, and b&aaad toward tha apaelflo lntaraat of aaoh eeparate dlaalpllna. For a long tlaa tha work of aaparata, aoaatlaaa antagonlatlo, dlaelpllnaa waa viewed aa antually exclusive, and tha student found hlaaalf strandad between apparently oontra- dletory oonoaptual and enplrloal explanations of motlva- tlon. At tha aaae tlaa, the theorlea of tha nuaaroua dlaelpllnaa Involved and tha pondaroua body of data aocumulated auggaat an extreme of eoaplaxlty outalde tha eapaelty of any alngla dlaalpllna. It la becoming dear that motivation la not a almple phenomenon that landa ltaalf to an aaay explanation.1 Tha magnitude of tha motivation problem haa baan alowly made clear aa more recent reaeareh haa ooneentrated on tha objeetlve almllarltlaa of tha different dlaelpllnaa, atreamllnad thalr terminology, reinterpreted thalr diver gent blaa, and collated tha varloue oollactlona of data from each discipline. Tha naw definitions that have followed flrat took tha form of tha minor accommodation of one theory to limited aapaots of another, but lately they have merged Into extensive and nmltl-faeeted syntheses of tha theories and empirical data of several dlaelpllnaa. Tha affect haa baan tha expansion of tha disciplinary synthesis Into an aggregate greater In aoope and complexity 44 than the na of Its contributing souroos. Conoopts formerly thought to bo n t m U i exclusive have now boon rooognlsed as ooapleuentary, and ofton parallel* aspoots of a larger probloa. This synthesis will bo exaained brieflya bat tho larger oonoern of this review will bo with tho oonooptoal theories of activation developed in tho soeial sciences, rather than with tho eaplrioal 2 theories of tho physical selanoes. Simultaneous with this development of basic motivational theory* there hare been introduced several praotloal applications of motivational theory to the field of business and industrial uanageaent. However* an unfortunate caphasls on sone applied theories (such as those of Hersberg and ideas) has tended to equate then with the baslo notlvatloaal theories froa which the study 3 of aotlvatlon Is derived (those of Tolaan-and Hull), One distinction that should be kept clear throughout the following dlseusslon of aotlvatlon theory is the difference between the abstract theories which foraulate an eaeom* passing fraaework In abstract terns and the applied theo ries whloh handle selected aspeots of Halted toplos in terainology appropriate to the oontext of the toples. This assists in aalntalning the proper perspective while exaalnlng the several theories of aotlvatlon* and hopefully reducing the amount of confusion due to their apparent contradictions. *5 This review of Motivation study will follow a dovelopaontal approMtai btilxmlng with aoao generalisations on tho natnro of Motivation and proceeding to tho oarlloot ooaprehenslve attonpto of tho expectancy and drlvo thoorioo forwulating Motivational theory. Thoro will follow a brief oootlon demonstrating tho proeooo by whioh tho 111* dlopoood thoorioo lator Managed aoao aooonaodatlon to rooolvo tholr inoonolotonoioo and a roouao of Nadaon'o synthesis. Tho appllod thoorioo (two-factor, equity, and path-goal) will bo troatod separately and( finally, roforonoo will bo nado to aotlvatlon thoory aa it applloo to tho probloa of pay and Motivation. Doflnltlon of Motivation In tho otrletoot oonao of tho word, thoro io no ooaaonly aoooptod doflnltlon of Motivation that io olthor ooaprohonolvo or aoourato. Tho varlouo thoorioo of Motivation, whleh havo long olnoo polarisod Into poyoho- logloal and phyolologloal interpretations, aro thoaoolvoo attonpto to doflno tho nature of Motivation, albeit in functional terns. Consequently, aoet writers on tho subjeot paao over tho definition of Motivation with only a brief generalisation and go on to tho subJset of aotlvatlon theory. Oooaslonally, tho dloeueelon of thoory hao pronpted a wore spoolflo interpretation tailored by the theorists* observations and extended tho definition. Thus, 46 the definition of aotlvatlon progrtiiM In ooaplexlty froa tho otandard "etlaulu* to act" to that which relate* * "how behavior gets started, 1* energised, le contained, lo directed, and la stopped and what kind of subjective reaction le preeent In the organl a while all thle la 4 going on" . and finally to the two-part definition of Atkinsoni a) the tandenoy for the direction or selec tivity of behavior to be governed in aoae way by lta relation to objectively definable ooneequeneee, and the tendency of behavior to peralat until the end or goal la attalnedi b) a theoretical conception of the oonteapora- neoua determinant* of purpoalve oharaoterls- tloa of behavior.5 Atkinson further nodlfled thla definition by noting that aotlvatlon has both degree and direction. It la generally recognised that while aotlvatlon nay be a prlnary oause of behavior. It la not necessarily the sole oause of behavior. In addition to oognltlve notIves stressed by expeotanoy theorists, there are conditioned reactions (habits) stressed by drive theorists and also a third category of unoonsoious aotlvatlon that overlaps both oognltlve aotlvatlon and conditioned reaotlon, Uhoonsolous aotlvatlon oertalnly enters Into the cognitive processes, although without the awareness of the Individual that would produoe expectancy and is Itself a pro duet of oognltlve learning, but it exhibits olassloal stlwulus- *7 rtipoait behavior u * conditioned r coot ion to stlaull. The difficulty of applying eaplrloal acthodc to tho study of tho unoonsolous alnd has severely llaltod tho aaount of attention given unoonsolous aotlvatlon In oon- toaporary aotlvatlon thoory. In tho Interest, therefore, of utilising a definition sufflolently broad to snooapass all the presently known aotlvatlons of behavior, whether or not they have been studied thoroughly, the above definition of Atkinson will serve. It should be reaeabered, however, that the theories whloh follow are theaselves aore speelflo definitions of aotlvatlon. grtmntm Drive theory originated with the stlaulus* response (S-B) research of the first deoades of this oentury. Thorndike • first, discussed the relationship between stlauls and response In his low of Iffoot, whloh stated that In anlaals the greater the satisfaction or dlsooafort of responses nade to stlaull, the greater the strengthening or weakening of the assoolatlon between the stlaulus and the response.^ Pavlov extended knowledge of this association between stlsnls and response with his work on conditioned reflexes, where It was shown that abstract stlaull oould elicit specific responses. ^ 48 Woodworth aubatltuted tho ton "drlwo" for tho anblguoua "lnatlnot" of tho 19th oentury payotology. Inotlnot ooold not aooount for tho aany ooelol lndnoeaenta to bohawlor beoauae It woo baaed on on onology botwoon anlnala and moni huaan aoolallsatlon oxtondod for beyond that of onloola and, thua, tho aoope of tho analog?. Ho dlatlngulahed botwoon neohonloa, or how an aot la dono» and g drlwo, or what lndnoed tho aot. Later, ho furthor dia- tlngulahed botwoon drlwo and lnduoenenta-to-aot that woro oonparatlwely long-laatlng and whloh night llo doraant in tho organloa for aoao tlno boforo atIsolating an? roaponao. Thoao ho oallod notlwea. At thlo point, tho diwergenoe In thought that eventually roaultod in drlwo and expeotaaoy thoorloa waa roproaontod by arguaonta for a) aaaoolatlon In 3-R aa tho dotonlnant of bohawlor and b) for "purpoolwe action aa 9 a total reaction of tho organlan". Woodworth*a”notlwe" waa an attonpt to aooount for lnnor tondonoloa of tho organlan to aook aoao goal, whloh auportod tho ldoa of purpoalwo aotIon aa oppoaod to blologloal drlwo. Tolnan (1912) then attributed oognltlwe attrlbutoa to aotlwe, whloh allowed for tho operation of tho organlan'a aubjeo- tlwo knowledge of lta enwlronaent in tho organlan*a roaponao. For Tolnan, nolar bohawlor boaano tho Inter notion of S-H aaaoolatlona and oognltlwe knowledge. To tho thoorlata who enphaalsed oondltlonod roaponao In k 9 ■ o tlv * tlo & # tho ln to rfo ro n o o o f o o g n ltlv o thought dolayod roaponao a t tho o r lt lo a l p o in t and d id n o t o x p la ln th o a u to a a tlo rosponooa th a t by o xp o rlao n t had boon ohown to lo avo no tla o f o r th o u g h t.*0 Thlo lo a d H u ll In 19*3 to dovolop ovor a nuabor o f yoaro th o oonoopt o f "habit** ao 11 tho loamod dotoralnant of boharlor baaod on oondltlonlng. Drlvo thoorlato than proooodod to oxplaln prooont bohavlor in toraa of paat oondltlonlng and aaaoolatlona.whllo oxpootanoy thoorlato oonoontratod on oognltlvo undoratand- lng of proaont otlaull and tholr laplloatlona for what night bo oxpootod to tako plaoo In tho fwturo. In Bull*a thoory* drlvo la atlaulatod by tho rlao of aoao blologloal nood (auoh aa hungor or thlrat) whloh aetlvatoo tho organloa to bohavlor doalgnod to aatlafy tho nood. Prlaary drlvoa aro thoao lnnato In tho organlaa* and to thoao Bull addod a aot of aooondary drlvoa whloh aro aoqulrod through oondltlonlng (auoh aa foar). Tho longor tho porlod of nood doprlvatlon, tho groator boeoaoa tho atrongth of tho drlvo for nood oatlofaotlon. Aa tho organlaa galna ozporloneo In aoloot* lng tho approprlato rtoponao to a partieular otlaull. tho organlaa boooaoa oondltlonod to roapond autoaatloally with tho approprlato roaponao. Dlfforont prlaary and oooondary nooda hypothotloally roproduoo qualltatlvoly dlfforont pattorno of Intomal atlaalatlon* and thla oxpando tho organlaa* a roportolro of oondltlonod roaponaoa. 50 The strmgth of thoao oondltlonod roaponaoa# or hablta# Inereaaee with tho aacnltvdt ond nuabor of relnforoeaonta# tho oontlnulty of tho relnforoeaonta during oondltlonlng• and tho olooor tonporol prozlnlty of tho otlnnlvo and roaponao# Tho drlvo etlaulue mnetlonat than# to ezelte tho organlan and rognlato tho lntenalty of lta roaponao* whllo habit glvea dlrootIon to tho roaponao# Thla rolatlon of drlvo and habit waa expreeeed • e*r - a^ x D Tho proaonoo of a valuo for excitatory potontlal (>Er) lnplloa that bohavlor would roault, whllo a valuo of zoro for any faetor would roault In no bohavlor (dlarogard- lng tho aaladjuotaent roaultlng froa a zoro valuo for H and a high valuo for D)# In thla aquation# howovor# whoro drlvo and habit aro tho nultlplloatlvo faotora of ozolto* aont# aotlvatlon eonoa to oqual drlvo for no othor roaaon than It la aoro olearly dlatlngulahablo froa ozoltoaont and habit# Thla haa naturally lad to oztonalvo ozaalnatlon of aotlvatlon aa doflnod In Bull'a drlvo thoory. Hull hlaaolf roallsod tho ahortooalng of thla thoory*a falluro to adoquatoly oxplaln tho antlelpatlon of a goal ovldonood by aubjoota In oxporlnonta# Drlvo alono oould not oxplaln tho aotlvatlon whloh roaultod In antici pation# nor oould habit aooount for tho varying otrongtha of antlolpation wltnoaaod# Bull than hypothoaltod goal antlelpatlon aa a function of loomed aoooadary roaponao# 51 and added tha ldaa of ( > lnoantlTaM to Drive Theory to 12 aooount for tha strength of antlelpatlon. Prlaary ralnforoara are defined aa thoaa objecta that dlreetly satisfy an lnaadlata need (thirat - water). At tha aaaa tlaa* tha prlaary relnforeer appears with other eeooadary stimuli. and* aa In Pavlov's experlnents, through thalr aaaoolatlon with tha prlaary relnforeer tha aaeondary stlaull also baooaa asaoelatad with tha lanedlate need. After aufflolant oondltlonlng. tha aaeondary atlaull ean also elicit a response to tha original need (empty water bowl - thirst). Beeause of thalr teaporal proximity* aaeondary atlaull baooaa seoond- ary ralnforoara. Tha degree of response a aaeondary relnforeer ean ellolt la oonsldered to be a fraetlon of tha total response to tha prlaary relnforeer and la held to be roughly proportionate to tha relation of aaeondary and prlaary atlaull (tha sight of an eapty water bowl would stlaulate thirst aora readily than tha sound of a training whistle if tha whistle ware used for other train ing purposes aa wall and only lndlreetly related as a sig nal to drink). Vary simply, than, any stimulus asaeolatad with tha response evoked by another stimulus oould Itself be asaoelatad with tha response and exolte tha response. In tha oaae of a series of stimuli (8^. 82* 83 . and thalr resulting responses (H^, 82* a3 ••••) there will be 52 subsequent Internal stlaulatloa(s) of various klnaesthetlo roooptora and thalr aaaoelatad araaa In tha oortex, whloh funotlon jut aa any envlronaental atlaulus. Thla nay ba represented In tha following figure (Figure 3)* S j - ■ ' 1 1 > S i 1-* at—» Bj—* Bj —» *3 Figure 3 •* Bxtamal stiaulua and Baaponaa Thla naana that tha lntarnal atlaulus (a^) will ba preaant at the naaent tha aeoond external atinulua (Sj) la reeelved, and a^ will than ba aaaoelatad with tha aaoond response (R2). After thla ohaln*reaotlon is oondltloned into tha organlan, Bull aalntalnad that tha first stiaulua, without any other subsequent atlaull, would exolte a ohaln of oondltlonod responses (Figure 4). \ Hl— ► "l— y *2— > *2— 4 r3— 4 «3 Figure 4 — Internal Stiaulua and Baaponaa Bull hypothesised that this subjective ohaln of association proceeded aore qulokly than tho eventa It rapraaantad, aa tha events ooeurred In tha natural world, Bren whan the event and tha first atlaulus began at the saaa Instant, tha ohaln-reaetlon proceeded so fast that tha 53 internal itlMlna i2 light precede the arrival cf the eeeond atlaulua froa the event and evoke the responae In thla way. Bull aald that the organira waa able to foraee event a to ooaa before they actually took place and anticipate then, ftiii aleo concluded that aotlvatlon had two aapeota » drive and Incentive, Incentive, In Bull*a worda, eorreaponded roughly with the oonoept of reward. If the aaount of the reward happened to be unexpectedly large, the vleual atlaulua arlalng froa the reward would be greater and evoke a oorreepondlngly greater (aore proapt and vtgoroua) reaponae, lrreapectlve of the etrength of the aaaoolated drive, Thua, the reinforcing atlaulua becaae aa Incentive to action, and large aaounta of the atlaulua becaae aore of an incentive than email aaounta. Inoentlve waa then defined aa the determinant of the atrength of goal anticipation, Hull later refined hie notion of the incentive faotor in aotlvatlon with the reault that Drive Theory incentive aore oloaely approxl- anted expectancy Theory valence. Bxpcotancr Theory The oonoept of expectancy ref era to the cognitive expectation that a particular action will lead to a particular goal. Valence refera in general to oharaoterle- tloa of the goal itaelf and of the Individual. Aa with 5* Dr It* Theory, these factors ooablnt multlplloatively. Valence la tha aoat widely lntarpratad of tha two faotorat and several otharwlsa similar thaorlas have developed unaiallar Interpretations of valence. Obviously, Hxpeo- tanoy Thoory oarrlaa greater psyohologloal aaphasls than Drive Theory. This oan ba aaan to ba tha raault of tho boundarlaa sat for Drive Thaory by tha limitations of S-B oonoapts drawn froa behavioral rasaaroh. To loan • (Performance V motor ■ Bxpeotanoy z Danand) To loan approaohad tha study of motivation with a sat of psyohologloal praoapts that plaead grwt lmportanoa on motivational varlablas of savaral categories. it has alraady baan not ad that Telman reoognlsed tha physlologloal naads atressad in Drive Theory, and ha made somewhat tha same distinction as Hull between primary needs (sueh as hunger and thirst) and aoqulrad secondary naads (social 13 oontaet or fear)« However, Tolman also lnoluded demands and azpaotatlons as oognltlve factors In aotlvatlon and also provided for hlgher-order personality varlablas whloh have motivational status* suoh as beliefs and values. Although Tolman did not formulate so detailed a motiva tional thaory as Hull, ha determined what have coma to be considered muoh more practical constituents of motivation. Ha defined expectancy as forward-looking cognition based on experlenoe that assessed tha subjeotive probability of attaining a goal. Tha attraotiveness of tha goal (demand) 55 was dtttraintd toy n m obanottr&ftlo of tho lndlTldnal, and of tho goal objeot. Ho aloo referred to tho lapulse to aot produoed by oxpootanoy and dual-faceted doaand faetoro operating ault lpll oat lvely ao tho porforaaneo vector. Thla was a far aoro prooloo doflnltlon of aotlva- tlonal faotoro than BulX'o drlvo and lnoentlve, Yet, Tolaan*a thoory hold several things In ooaaon with Hull'o thoory — prlaary noodav prooont oognltlon toaood on paot learning experience, and tho S-B function ao aa operational oharaotorlotlo of both oognltlvo and non-oognltlvo notlva- tlon whloh woro all reoognlsed as baolo to both theories* Lowln i (Psyohologloal Poroo ■ Potonoy z Valoneo) Lowln ozaalnod aotlvatlon In studios with huaan beings (Tolaan used anlaals) and arrived at oonoluslons olallar to Tolaan*s.15 Vtat Tolaan oallod "oxpootanoyM was torued "potonoy" by Lowln* but tho tora "oxpootanoy" gained acceptance. What Tolaan roforrod to as "doaand" was oallod "valenoe" by Lowln* and* in this ease* tho latter tora has prevailed, Tho saao oharaoterlstloo of tho Individual and of tho goal objeot whloh woro functions of Tolaan*s doaand* woro expressed toy Lowln as tho func tions of valence t v“* ■ *g * « Hero* tho valoneo (Va^) of tho aotlvlty or objeet whloh represents tho goal of a person Is deteralned by a systoa In tension (tg) whloh represents tho aoaentary 56 strength of the nsod of tho Individual for tho particular aotlvlty or goal object and also by tho lnoontlvo oharao- torlstlos of tho objoet Itself (G), Onoo dotoralnod, valoneo then aets on potonoy (expectanoy) to prodnoe tho psyohologloal foroo (porforaanoo vootor) to spur aotIon. Lowln wont on to work with Tolaan and was lnstru- aental In ridding psychology of tho laproolso language oarrlod over froa tho 19th oentury. Ho also Introduced operational oonoepto and definitions, based on aodern sclentIflo nethods that woro oapablo of aarhhalllng all of Tolaan's aotlvatlonal variables Into a systoaatlo and functional order, Atkinsoni (Tendonoy • Hxpeetanoy x Valonoe) Atkinson has rovlsod tho oxpootanoy equation Into slightly aore general toras whloh aro bettor suited to researeh In aohlovoaont•activation. Ho has also aado laportant contributions to general Hxpeetanoy Thoory through his expansion of tho nuabor of aotlvatlonal varia bles to bo taken Into aooount In tho equation.^ Tho valonoe faotor in Atkinson's equation Is Itself tho produot of two faetorsi aotIts (J^) and incen tive (Ig). and like Tolaan*s doaand and Lowln*s valence* tho factors of valence represent eoae oharaeterlstle of tho Individual and of tho objeot or goal. Mc is tho strength of tho disposition or aotlvo <K) toward a parti cular class of goals (G)» and Ig Is tho valuo or lnoontlvo 57 (I) of tho opoelflo goal (g) relative to tho value of tho othor goals In that class, A comparison of tho Lowln and Atkinson valoneo equations will bettor Illustrate their differences and tho separate purposes to whloh they may be applied In activation probloas. Lowln Va. t. represents the momentary strength of the need of the Individual for the parti* eular activity or goal object, G represents the incentive characteristics of the aotlvity or goal Itself, Atkinson Va_ ■ t x G IU Is the strength of the disposition toward a parti cular class of goals. I is the value of the speci fic goal relative to the other goals of that class. The Lewin equation has been designed for indivi duals, speaks of individual "need", and is by definition brief in duration. The Atkinson equation Is equally applicable to either the Individual or the group, and H_ u oould representa for example, the unified achievement goals of a business firm, while I( stood for one of the achievement goals about which an employee must make a decision, "Disposition*' is substituted for ”neodM in the 58 Atkinson equation, both because nood Is a nor* temporal phsnossnon and because It Is an psyohologloal trait, and so lass approprlato a torn than disposition for dosorlbing tho feelings of an Individual In a group about tho goals of tho group, Tho doflnltlon of tho Atkinson equation Implies lengthier duration or, possibly, tho Indefinite exist on oo of a standardised and accepted class of goals In a oondltlonod group. Designed to aoooaaodatc either Individual or group problems, the Atkinson Sxpeo- tanoy Theory Is most appropriate for studies of motivation In large business oonoerns and industry, Atkinson also noted several variables that had not previously been given enough attention In motivation study, and In some cases he proposed a system of mathema tical representation derived from Levint It allowed for the algebralo cancellation of factors In the equation to approximate the effect of conflicting motivational varia bles In the mind of the individual, and it later served to guide Vroom toward a considerably advanced and complex equation for valence cancellation. One point Atkinson has made Is that all present motivation theories are designed to describe the arousal of behavioral tendencies and their progress toward goal fulfillment. Behavior is regarded as an episodic progression from one aotlvatlonal cycle to the next. Aetually, one stimulus will arrive simultaneously with others In the middle of a motivational cycle and at 59 th e o e ip h tlo n o f aoao a o t, B ehavior la a ooatlm ioua a tro a a w ith no d le o e m a b le pauaea in a o t lv it y , and th a fu n d a a a n ta l p rob le a la to aooount fo r th a In a c t l- ▼ ltj. A tklnaon fe e le th a t Bxpeotanoy Thaory a u at aooount f o r a o t lv it y a lre a d y In progreee a t th a t la a o f a a tla u lu a , aa w a ll aa o th a r fa o to rs , Thaaa l a t t a r ln o lu d a a p e ra o n a llty aa a h ie ra rc h y o f a o tlv e e dapaadant on ln ta m a l and a z ta rn a l o o n d ltlo n a f o r o o n tln u lty th a v o lu n ta ry and In v o lu n ta ry In te rru p tio n o f b o havlor and how I t a ffa o ta a o tlv a tlo n , and a t la u ll whloh do not th a n aa lv aa e l l e l t ' a roaponao but whloh o p ara ta on a lra a d y a o tlv a tondanolao to produoa change# In t h a lr a tre n g th . Bdwardai ( SubJaotlva Bxpaotad U t i l i t y ■ SubJaotlva P ro b a b ility x U t i l i t y ) Bdwarda haa davalopad aa a o o n o alo ally o rie n t ad th a o ry o f azpaotaney baaed on th a r o le o f d e o la lo n -n a k ln g 17 in eoonoaloa. O r ig in a lly o raatad to handle probleue o f eoonoalo r le k , th a th a o ry haa ooae to ra a a a b la th a azpao* tanoy th a o rla a o f T o la a n , Lew ln, and A tkln aon . L ik a A tk ln a o n 'a th e o ry , Bdwarda* th a o ry la a la n te d tow ard a p a r tic u la r purpoaa — th a t o f a e o e rta ln ln g th a r o le o f d e e le lo n -n d k ln g In a o tlv a tlo n — b u t, n a v a rth a la a a , a t111 worka aa a g e n e ra l expeotanoy th e o ry . Tha e la a a lo a l aaau ap tlo n about " 00000010" nan waa th a t ha waa a r a tio n a l e ra a tu ra who would a o t to a a x ln la e 60 expeoted value. let, lnrtitMnti la Insurance and lottery tlokoto hare a negative expeoted value | ao tha oonoept waa adjusted to allow for subjective eatlaatea of waive, whloh Bdwarda teraed "utility". Every objeot haa pain* giving or pleaeure-glvlng propertlea for varloua Indivi duals, and theae propertlea are the objeot'a utility -- utility aay be negative aa well aa positive. Utility doea not neoeaaarlly oolnoide with the objective (dollar) value of the objeot. Also, people tend to aake deolalona regarding rlek on the baala of what they peroelve aa the probability of auooeaa (subjeotlve probability) rather than on the baala of objeotlve probability, although It la uaually required that the objective probabilities be defin ed In the problew. Therefore, these two variables will operate together anltlplloatlvely to doteralne aaxlalca tion of the subjective expeoted utility of aay objeot. In the oaae of several simultaneous options, the variables work Independently on eaoh option* 3SU - «P - . pBn ) - < „ 0 U - , pV u The aua In thla equation la not an lapetua to aot, but statlo decision about a oondltlon. Therefore, the variables are weighed against eaoh other to aeleot the variable of greatest value, whloh la subjectively expeoted to have the greatest utility. In a aotlvatlon equation, tho variables aay have poaltlve or negative values and lnfluenoe, but one positive variable aultlpll oat lvely, and 61 tb« result la a produet and an urge to aetv Instead of a sus as in tho decision equation. Bdwarda haa shown that positive and negative outooaea will Influence the SSU and that expeoted poaltlve outooaee induce greater optlalaa Into the deolelon problea than do expected negative outooaea. Another variable that aap enter the problea la dlatlngulahod froa “utility of the outooae" aa "utility of achieving the outooae". Where It does not natter how the outooae la achieved (aa In a gaae) thla variable will not operate* but when the nethod of aehleveaent le laportant (aa in a teat of aklll) the relative difficulty of achieving the outooae nay alter the aaaeaaaent of the SBU. Tolaan*a expectancy (and Lewis's potency) refera to the oognltlve expectation that a particular act will lead to a particular outooae* and for each act of activa ted behavior there la an expeotanoy value (even sero), Bdwarda* subjective probability la dealgned In the sane way* and the operation of subjective perception la the aaae aa in expectancy. Utility haa not been as well defined as deaand or valonoe* but because the analysis of utility la baaed on pleasure/paln principles* there aay be the laplloatlon that eharaoteristics of the Individual and of the object are considered* If not stated. Vroom (Foroe • Expeotanoy x Valence) Vrooa'e theory haa been dealgned apeolfloally 62 to dMl with aotlvatlon in work situation*• In his nodal, szpsotaney la th# sans prlnolpl* that operates In Tolnan's thaory and Is synonymous with Bdwarda' subjaotlv* probability, Vrooa assigns a Talus to It froa saro to on*. Zsro lndloatas subJsotIt# oartalnty that tha aot will hot ba followad by tha daslrsd outooa#, and ona lndl eat as sub J sot Its oartalnty that tha aot will ba followad by tha daslrad outoona.18 Vrooa'■ Talenoe follows Tolnan's original prsoapt and Is a nultlplloatIts product of characteristics of th* outooa* and of th* Individual i thass factor# determine cffaotlT* orientations toward particular outooaas. Valano* for an outooa* Is positive whan a parson prefers attaining th* autcoaa, neutral whan ha Is unoonosrned about th# outoona, and nagatlv# whan ha prefers not attaining It to attaining It. Tha values assigned are between +1 and *1. Valano* Is not naoassarlly related to th* subjaotlv* value of tha outooa#i a parson aay antlolpat# satisfaction, but not ba satisfied after attalnaant of tha outooae. In addition to th* valance of tha outoona, which determines In tha parson's mind tha Intensity of expected satisfaction with th# outooae, Vrooa also oonsldars th* ability of tha naans of achieving tha outooae to do so successfully. This Is Instrumentality of th* naans or of th* object that will attain tha ooutooa*. Th# phrase Vrooa has adapted Is "Instrumentality of tha objeot". This 63 lnatruMntallty oorreeponde roughly to tho oonoopt of "path" in tho Fath-Goal Hypothesis discussed below, Vrooa oxprooood tho funotlonal rolatlonohlp of ▼oloneo and Instrumentality and of valonoe and expeotanoy In two propositionsi a) "Tho valonoe of an outooae to a parson Is a aonotonloally lnoreasing function of tho algebralo mi of tho prodnots of tho valenoes of all othor outooaos and his oonooptIons of Its instrumentality for tho attalnnont of those other outooaes. b) Tho foroe on a parson to perform an aot Is a aonotonloally lnoreasing funetlon of tho algebralo sua of tho prodnots of all tho valenoes of all outooaos and tho strength of his expectations that the aot will bo foUpwod by tho attalnnont of those outooaos." Considerable oonfuslon Is possible because of Vrooa*s use of the single term "valonoe" for two separate faotors In his equation. If (a) Is paraphrased to road "the valonoe^ or an outooae Is a funotlon of tho valeneo2 of all other outooaos and their Instrumentality, it oan be seen that valonoe^ Is the value whloh funotlons In (b). In (b) the "valenoes of all outooaos" aro produots of two variables. However• It oeens that valonoe^ Is. for eaoh of the other outooaes, an Independent variable unrelated to Instrumentality, Valonoo2 Is truly determined by offootlve orientation only. Therefore, valonoo2 oannot equal valeneei. Although the equation operates without dlffleulty when applied to a speolflo situation, the thoory Is not 64 accurately stated. This dlsorepanoy itMi froa Vrooa* s failure to oonslder wore clearly what faotors produo* aaeh of tho "valeneea2 of all othor outooaos" that ooablno with lnstruaentallty, Lowln dooldod thoso faators woro tg and ( « Atklnaon ldontlflod Nq and X(f bat Vrooa dloaloooo tho probloa with tho singularly laproolso doflnltlon "affeotlve orlontatlono toward particular outooaos" for valenos. Muoh tho saao probloa haa ozlstod for Sdwards* general1ca tion about utility, Vrooa's thoory doss, however, prorldo ono of tho bost aot hods of aooountlng for nuaorous lntorrolatod variables, tfhon tho valenoes of all poaslblo outooaos aro allowed to oporato frooly In tho equation, tho aathoaa* tloal probloa aoro olosoly approaehos tho psyohologloal probloa of eonfllotlng stlaull, and dlsplaooaont of tho ▼alonoo of any single outooao aay ooour If thoro aro othor outooaos with stronger valonoe. Porter L*Mltr (Bzpootanoy Model)i Porter and Lawler generally subsorlbo to Bxpeotanoy Thoory following Atkinson (1964) and Vrooa (1964). Of partloular Interest Is their theoretloal aodol of expectancy operations utilising variables of tho business aanageaent world. Tho lntorrolatod variables of 20 the aodol Include 1 i 65 Value of rmrd refers to how attractive or diilrtblt a potential outooaa of an individual'* beha- ▼lor In tho work situation may be. gffort-rewwd probability rsfsrs to an Indivi dual's psrosptlons of whsthsr diffsrontlal rawards ars basad on differential amounts of effort on his part in the work situation, gffort refers to the energy expended to perfora soae task, but does not neoeasarlly oorrelate with how successfully the task is carried out. Abilities and traits refer to the relatively long-term oharaoteristics of individuals that remain largely unaffeeted by momentary ohanges In their environmental situations. Bole paroaotlon refers to the way in whloh the Individual defines his Job and the types of effort he believes are essential to effeotlve Job performance. Performance refers to a person's accomplishments on the tasks that ooaprlse his Job, Rewards refer to desirable states of affairs that a person receives from either his own thinking or the motions of others. Peroslvsd Boultable rewards refer to the amount of reward that a person feels la fair, given his perfor mance on tasks he has been asked to undertake by the organisation. 66 Satisfaction refers to the extent to whloh rewards actually received meet or exoeed the peroelved equitable level of rewards. The variables are arranged In the following model (figure 5) alter sequential organisation and cumulative order to approximate the order In whloh motivational stimuli are thought to aooumulate in the mind. The model also contains a feedback loop from satisfaction to value of reward, beoause the employee's satisfaction with the Job is believed to determine the value he attaches to the rewards of the Job. This model allows considerable roam for the subjective perceptions of the employee* Several variables are completely subjective, and only effort", "ability", "performance'*, and "reward" have external objeotlve measures (in addition to subjective measures). Abilities and traits attempt to account for personality and Intelligence, and together with effort and role per ceptions they are figures as the determinants of perfor mance. Effort alons, it is noted, does not necessarily correlate with performance. The Porter and Lawler model agrees with the requirements of Tolman's and Atkinson's Expectancy Theory. Characteristics of the Individual and of the goal combine raultlplloatlvely to determine the subjeotlve expeotanoy (perceived el* fort-reward probability), and there Is a place for the lnoentlve characteristics of a speolfle goal 1 i l Li L ® _ ABILITIES , PERCEIVED VALUE OF AND > £ SUITABLE REWARD TRAITS REWARDS I PERCEIVED EFFORT * REWARD PROBABILITY i k EFFORT ^ ~ U \ p e r fo r m a n c e (ACCOMPLISHMENT) 0 ROLE PERCEPTIONS INTRINSIC REWARDS SATISFACTION EXTRINSIC REWARDS FIGURE V - EXPECTANCY MODEL Adapted from Porter and Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and Performance. Homewood, 111.: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1968. 68 (Ttlut of rmrd) mm It 1« related to m partloular oImi of soalf (poroolTod equitable reward*) ♦ Tho e l m U r •truoture of tho aodol aooounta for oooo aotivlty already In pnirtii, and tho nodol lnolvdea onough variable* to handle tho internal and oztomal oonditlono that oporato to dot oral no tho individual * a hierarchy of not 1 t o o. Ono ahortoonlng of tho aodol la that It dooa not aooount for a aufflelent nuabor of faotora that Influoaoo tho lndivi- dual froa outaldo tho oontozt of tho baalnoaa aanagoaont altaatlon (ago involvement, or primary nooda lndopondont of tho work environment). Tho faotora in Edward* ‘ aquation alao haTo oountorparta In tho aodol. In partloular, tho utility of aohlovlng an outooao appoara vary aiallar to perceived effort reward probability. Aoooaaodat ion and 8mthoala in WatlTmtlon Th«orr The theorlee of motivation whloh aroao froa different diaoiplinoa aeveral dooadoa ago have now dove- loped to a point where it la elear thoy ahare aany tralta in oommon, and it nay bo aald that tho Matate of tho art" haa advanced far onough to auggoat their aynthoaia would roault in a uaofulnoaa extended toy an lneroaoat of tho aroaa outaide their overlap. Bull*a earlier view of inoontlvo in motivation, being a funetlon of tho aaount of reward, apeolflod that 69 any ohanga in th a amount o f raw ard would r a a u lt in g rad u al ohangaa In bahavlor aa tha organlaa baooaaa oondltlonad to tha now raward. Expaotanoy thaorlata agraa that lnoantlTa oould hara th la a ffa o t but d lf f a r In t h a lr a x p la n a tlo n o f tha laamlng prooaaa. Looming, aasatad Tolaan, waa not naoaaaarlly dapandant on blologlaal aondltlonlng* and a prior raward oould affaot praaant bahavlor bafauaa aftar tha ohanga In lnoantlva* tha organlaa haa aoquirad an axpaetaney that lnoantlva haa boon ehangad. Expaotanoy Thaory hald that an laadadlata ohanga In behavior oould raault froa ohangaa In lnoantlva. Tha taaporal llaltatlona of 3-R oondltlonlng raqulrad aora tlaa for looming to taka place, Whan experimentation warIflad tha abrupt ohanga In behavior aftar ohangaa In lnoantlTa* (1952) waa foread to altar hi a thaory. TO do thla* ha addad an lntarranlng variable K to hla original equations glr • D z K x fHr *K' waa ldantlflad aa tha antlolpatory goal roaotlon and waa poatulatad aa oparmtlonal whenever a ohanga too k plaoa In th a aaount o f raw ard (ln o a n tlT a ). Thla brought Drive Thaory an oh oloaar to tha oonoapta of oognltlra axpaotatlon that oharaotarlsad Expaotanoy Thaory. Latar Spenoe (1956) raalltod that tha antlolpatory goal roaotlon waa not naoaaaarlly a motivation factor tlad to tha drlwa atlaulua and that it oould aot aa a aouroa of ganaral exeltenant whloh* togathar with habit* natlTataa 70 21 perforaanoe* InewtlTi motivation In Drive Theory hM since bean interpreted as ssparats froa ths learning prooess. Early ozpsotanoy theory forecasts that an organism would always "consider” an aot irrespective of how aany tines the orsanlsa had performed the act. Hull, it nay be recalled, took issue with this assumption in his early work as he felt habit to be an integral part of behavior* Atkinson (1964) realised that given an Infinite number of behavioral options, the organlsa usually selects only a few for behavior and aore often only one. If there were aany aore options and were assumed to be reasonably similar so that one was no aore difficult to achieve than the next and the rewards were the same, then there has to be a reason why only m few were repeatedly selected* Atkinson attributed this to habit, whloh defines the set of possible motions that oould be ellolted and sets as a limitation to motivation* Atkinson then added an Intervening variable for habit to his formula« Trg - *rg x *g * h * s*p In the saae way Bull's revision brought Drive Theory eloser to Espeetanoy Theoryt Atkinson's revision of Bxpeotanoy Theory has done the reverse* The theories oontlnue to aergc as research and experimentation progress* Madoon (1968) has suggested a theory of activation based on an extensive eoaparlson of the above mentioned 71 thaorlaa and aany othara outaid* tha aoopa of thla ravlaw, whloh drawa togathar aavaral of tha thaorlaa In a ajnthaala of oonaldarabla aoopa. Hadaon'a thaory la auggaatlva of tha dlraotlon In whloh thaorlaa of Motivation will prograaa 2 in tha futura. In Hadaon*a tarma. oantral Motivation la lntar- pratad phyalologloally aa tha axouaal of tha anargy laval of tha brain ataa (aapaolally tha ratloular ayataa and tha aora apaolflo "Motivation oantara" of tha hypothalanua)• Cantral Motivation ltaalf la tha oonblnad affaot of Motivating lnpulaao from tha organlan'a varloua organa, Motivating fro" th* anvlronaant, and tha lnfluanea of tha on-going oognltlva prooaaati of tha oarabral oortax. Cantral Motivation la alwaya lnfluanoad by Individually dlffarant dlapoaltlona of both a oonatltutlonal and an aoqulrad natura. Hadaon alao ldantlflaa two groupa of hunan aotivaa (following Hull and Tolaan)i prlnary and aaeondary . "A prlnary notlva la a oantral Motivation whloh fron birth, or aftar Maturation, la funotlon- folftod to parlpharal. Motivating lapulaaa or atlaull, "A aaoondary notlva la a oantral Motivation whloh la, aftar a laamlng prooaaa, datarnlnad by parlpharal. Motivating atlaull."23--------- Hadaon than offara a ganarallsad Hat of hunan n o tlv a a d a rlv a d fro a th a l l a t a o f a a v a ra l o th a ra (Toknan* 1951* Xoungi 1936, HoDougalli 1932. M urray. 1938, C a tta il* 1950. and S tagnar and K arow akli 1952), 72 P rln a ry Nursing Hunger Thirst Sex Seourlty Aggression S o c ia l Contsot Aohlevanent Powsr Possession Temperature Paln-avoldanoe Bzorstlon Oxygon Rsst and Sleep Activity The alapllolty of Hudson's approach and Its failure to lnelude aany speolfle Tarlables of activation and a aodel of their slaultaneous operations are painfully evident when his synthesis Is ooapared to Its souroesi sons of whloh appear In the foregoing seotlons herein. The effort to acooaaodate the various aotlrational theories now existing Is probably at the sane stage of development as motivation theory Itself was at In 1916, so that com prehensive synthesis aay be expected to be a product of the ooning decades. For the tlae being, those motivated toward this goal ay have to reaain content with the Intrinsic reward of effort rather than perforaanoe. Applied Motivation Theory H«r«t>«r«' . T iro -F acto r T h « o m Hercberg (1959) has discussed the lack of slg- nlfloant applloatlon of aotlvatlon theories to the subjeet of Job attitudes. In his view, nost of the work In 73 notlrational theory la Halted to studies of soolal groups and aa auoh haa not baan dlreotly r a la tad to tha 2k Individual on tha Job. ' Ha, tharafora» aat out to daduoa froa atudlaa of lndlvlduala In tha work altuatlon a motivational thaory of apaolflo application, towing on Flanagan*a data on "critical lnoldanta" and Heresy's atudlaa of aood flux, aa wall aa tha atandard aoolologloal and anthropological atudlaa of Industry, Harsbarg utllixad a aathod of quantIflad oontant analysis of lntarrlaw with anglnaara and aooountanta to davalop a "two-faotor" thaory of work aotlvatlon. Harsbarg oonoludad froa hla atudy that tha faotora leading to Job aatlafaotlon and aotlvatlon wara aeparate and dlatlnot froa faotora leading to Job dla- aatlafactlon. Thaaa two feellnga did not turn out to be oppoaltaa. Tha oppoalta of Job aatlafaotlon waa not Job dlaaatlafaotlon, but rather no Job aatlafaotlon. Convaraaly, tha oppoalta of Job dlaaatlafaotlon waa no Job dlssatls- faction. Job aatlafaotlon la aaan aa related to peyoho* logical aapaeta of tha Individual and hla ability to aohlava and axparlanea payohological growth. Tha atlaull that provide for growth through aohleveaent on tha Job are found to ealnate froa Job oontant. Tha faotora of Job oontant that notlvata eaployees are recognition, tha work Itaelf, raaponalblllty, and advaneeaent. Thua, tha presenoe of these faotora prorid# aatlafaotlon with tha job» and thalr abaanoa leaves tha Individual unsatisfied, but not neoessarlly dlaaatlaflad. In tha lattar ease, tha unaatlaflad Individual doaa not faal aotlvatad to parfora batter, nor to laava tha Job* ha la simply ambl- valent. Job dlaaatlafaotlon la aaan aa related to Innate phyalologloal drivea of tha Individual, for example, hla drive to avoid pain froa hla environment. Tha atlaull that lnduoa paln-avoldanoe bahavlor are a part of tha lob environment. Tha faotora Involved In dlaaatlafaotlon with Job environment, called "hygiene" faotora by Harsbarg, ar company polloy and adalnlatratlon, super* vlalon. Interpersonal relatione, working oondltlona, salary, status, and security, Zf there are no problems with any of these faotora, tha employee experiences no dlaaatlafaotlon with hla Job, although this does not naoaaaarlly lead to satlsfaotlon. Problems with these faotora oause dlaaatlafaotlon, injure performanoe and motivation, and lead to a high rate of turnover. The lnTluenoe of drlve/ezpeotanoy motivational theory la easily traoed In these oonelualons of Harsbarg'a. The emphasis of Drive Theory on physlologloal S-B la refleoted In Hersberg's analysis of "hygiene", or dls- satlsfaotlmn In the Job environment. The emphasis of Expaotanoy Theory on oognltlve motivation and psychological 75 factors of behavior la reflected In hla analysis of motivational faotora arising from tha Job oontant. It la slgnlfloant for tha plausablllty of tha synthesis approaoh to aotlvatlon thaory that Harsbarg found It naoaaaary to aarga tha tanata of Drive and Expaotanoy Thaory In hla Two-Faotor Thaory* but thla alao auggaata that Two-Paotor Thaory la a now dapartura only lnaofar aa It la a prac tical applloatlmn of axlatlng motivational thaory* Crltloa of Two-Paotor Thaory hava auggaatad that aoma of tha motivational faotora whloh Harsbarg haa llatad aa althar motivational or "hygienic" ara not quite ao dlatlnot In thalr application to Job oontant or envlron- mant and actually overlap to a greater degree than reoog- nlzed. However* Harsbarg (1968) seams to hava aocountad for euoh faotora more accurately In hla bar-graph repre sentation of motivation and "hygiene" faotora* wherein tha salary factor* for example* straddles tha line between aatlafaotlon and dlaaatlafaotlon and has bean noted as nearly equally Influential In both motivation and hygiene, Harsbarg want on froa these conclusions to dis tinguish between methods of altering tha olroumatanoas of tha Job to motivate employees, Horlsontal Job loading refers to arbitrarily lneraaslng work quotas* adding busy work, rotating employees froa one difficult assign ment to another* and taking away difficult portIona of a Job to stimulate batter performance on what la left. 76 At best, these ataiurii only raault In short-term ohanges In parfomanoa. Vertloal loading refers to removing aoaa oontrola whlla ratalnlng aooountabllity, inoraaaing accountability of lndlriduala for thalr own work, diriding work aooording to ooaplata unita of production, granting additional authority, making pariodle raporta dlraotly arailabia to tha workar lnataad of hla supervisor. Introducing naw taaka of graduated difficulty that hare not bean previously attemptad , and aaalgnlng apaolfle and speolallsed taaka that will enable aaployaaa to expand thalr own axpartlaa. Harsbarg haa aabodlad hla findInga and auggeatlona in a program called "Job enrichment” and taken It to industry to be put Into praotloe. Aa a pilot project, tha results of tha program are not yet oonclualra, but ao far very good results hare bean obtained. Although soma researohers do not agree that Two-Paotor Thaory la aligned with earlier drIra and expaotanoy theories of aotlratlon, and la an applied version of abstract theory, Two-Faotor Theory still appears to be an affaotire translation of general motivational theory into the language of the modern business world. Adams * acuity Theoryi Adams has examined wage inequities and their 2% effeota on worker productivity. His baale assumption la that when a person performs work in exchange for pay, he 77 has beliefa about hla inputa and about the pap he reoelvea or hla outoone, Adana uaed the reoent peyohologloal concept of ”eognltlve” diaaonanoe” to deaorlbe the feeling of Inequity that reeulte when one peraon'a Job Input* and/ or outoonea appear to that peraon to be out of adjuatuent with that whloh he peroelwea to be the Job lnputa and/or outoonea of another peraon. Cognitive diaaonanoe then proapta the peraon to reduoe the diaaonanoe and eatabliah ooneonanoe between hla Job lnputa and outoonea In relation to the lnputa and outoonea of thoae with whon he oonparee hlnaelf. The atrength of the not1vatIon to reduoe the Inequity will be proportionate to the aagnitude of the peroelved Inequity. Of the aany poaalble waye of reduolng cognitive diaaonanoe* Adana ohoae to exaalne ohangaa In produotlvlty lnputa. Adana* hypotheala la that when a peraon la paid by the hour* hla produotlvlty will be greater when he pereelvee hla pay aa Inequitably large than when he per* oelvea an Identical pay aa being equitable and that when a peraon la paid on a pleoe-work baala* hla produotlvlty will be leaa when he perceive* hla pay aa Inequitably large than when he peroelvea ldentlal pay aa being equi table. The validity of the behavior hypothealced for theae four eltuatlon* haa been borne out by experimentation. If the pleee-rate la higher than expeoted* worker* will produce leaa but do hlgher-quallty work. If the 78 plses-rate it levtr tlmn sxpsotsd. workers will produo* ■or* but do lower-quallty work. Uaai1 findings In this situation hay* sons intsrssting lnplloatlons for Expec tancy and Dr Its Thaory. Expectancy Thsory forseaats lnorsassd notlTatIon whsn InesntlT* Is lnorsassd, as doss DrlT* Thsory. Adaas* findings show th* opposlts phenomenon, howsrsr, for In this oas* lnorsassd Inesntirs lands to lowsr produotlTlty. and lowsrsd InesntlT* loads to hlghsr produetlTlty. Th* dlffsrsnos. howsrsr. Is nor* apparsnt than real, for tha language of Expaotanoy Thsory Is "aotlTatlon” and not " produet iTltyr Bxpsetanoy Thsory doss not sstahllsh any dlrsot oorr slat Ion between InesntlT* and produotlTlty. but doss bstwssn InesntlT* and aotlTatlen as wall as othsr Tarlablss whloh prsosd* produotlTlty. On* factor Is the prsrlously nsntlonsd "peroelved equitable reward? This faetor dstsrnlnss for ths worker what hs psroslTss as ths optLaws pay for his work, and th* opt lawn Is. of oours*. based on his psresptlons of his needs, whloh nay b* satisfied whsn hs rsesiTss optlnua pay. To attain this optlnua. ths worker has sstlasted ths aaount of effort that will be required of hla. In Adams' sxaapl*. It is not difficult to under stand that a worker, who Is rseslTlng what h* psroslTss as equitable reward optlaal for his ness, sight not feel It nsosssary to lnoreas* his effort If that would gain hla nor* pay than Is optlaal for his needs, aImply, a worker light bo iotlvit«d to fool that on oaay Job la aoro loportont than ono that pay* aoro nonoy than ho nood, l,o«, ho profora to "take it oaay" on tho Job if ho oan oontlnuo to rooolTo all tho aonoy ho roqulroa. Workora in tho plooo-rato altuatlon aay Tory wall bo aotlratod to aalntaln a atato of hoaooataala botwoon of fort and lneoao, whoroaa workora in aalarlod poaltlona (ooaaonly hlghor-lorol poaltlona)aay Juat aa wall bo aotlTatod to lnoroaao of fort and produotlTlty at orory opportunity to aatlafy roqulro- aonta for adranooaont typloal of aalarlod poaltlona, Tho llaitod horizon for ohango and adranooaont In plooo-work poaltlona ofton Halt tho plooo-workor*a aabltlona and* In turn* hla orpoetationa and oanao hla to ozhlblt aotlra tion# that dlffor froa thoao of tho aalarlod workor, If thla la tho oaao, and It la aaauaod that tho plooo-workor aooka to aohloro hoaooataala botwoon offort and optlaal lnooao, than oxporlaontal lnoroaaoa In plooo-work ratoa ahould alao bo atartod froa a point wuoh lowor than tho optlaal lnooao. Inatoad of atartlng froa a high point, aa did Adaaa, and no ring up and down, tho ozporiaont ahould alao atart froa a low point and aoro up. In aueh an ozporiaont, It aay bo prodlotod that plooo-workor produo tlTlty will lnoroaao aa tho ploeo-werk rato until aggrogato aalary roaehoa an optlaal point, aftor whloh tho boharlor will roappoar, Tho point horo la that thoorlata haro boon mistakenly led to a re-exaalnatlon of tho Expaotanoy Theory In light of tho flndlngo of Equity Theory, when In reality tho flndlngo of Equity Thoory boor out tho postu- lotod relationship botwoon incentive and motivation In Bxpeetanoy Thoory and aotually point to tho nood for reoearoh In tho ooaparatlwo payohology and aotlTatlon of workora at various level* of industry In order to explain tho flndlngo of Adaas* oxporlaonta. If tho hourly rate la higher than oxpootod# Adaao suggoots that produotlvlty will bo higher. If tho hourly rate ie lower than oxpootod, produotlvlty will bo lower. This correspond* with tho forooaata of Expaotanoy and Drive Theory. One of tho alternate explanations of Adaao * observations of wage Inequities is that they aro a function of th* arousal of Job Insecurities rather than of disson ance (Evans and Nollnarli 1970)t It has oast sows doubt on Adaao* experlaontal method* and given rise to a debate 26 that has oontlnuod for several years. The attoapts to Justify one or th* other of the ooneluslons9 which have taken place as a result* have generated additional infor mation about aotlvatlon. For example• when Adaas replied to the argument In 196**t he was lapressed by the strength of th* dlssonanoe-reduolng motive. As predicted, produc tivity in the hlgh-dlssonano* (HD) situation was slgnlfl^ oantly lower than in the low-dissonano* (ID) situation. 81 Beoauae HD eubjeota war# induoed to believe that they wara comparatively unqualified, but wara neverthelsee paid at tha atandard rata, tha aaauaptlon waa they took aora oara with thalr work In ordar to ba "worthy** of tha rata and raduoa dlaaonanca (tha lntarpratatlona of aotlvatlon diverge at thla point). Thla raduoad thalr quantity of produotlon, Tha work whloh tha eubjeota parforaad waa proofreading, ao that tha aaaaura of tha baat work waa the dlaeovery of all tha arrora placed on a printed page. Unexpectedly, the HD aubjaota not only found tha Inten tional arrora, but alao marked additional parta of tho text aa lnoorreot. Thaae "non-errora" ware of a type that aetually permitted little or no baala for being peroelved aa arrorai therefore, the phenomenon haa bean interpreted aa an example of the atrength of the drive aometimea preaant in Individuals to raduoa cognitive diaaonanoe. Daaplta tha oontraate aaen between Bqulty and Expaotanoy Thaorlaa by aoae theorists (Lawleri 1971)27, It la no more true of thaae thaorlaa that they are mutually exoluslve than It la of Drive and Expaotanoy Thaorlaa. Behavior need not be Interpreted alone on the baala of one theory, but, aa Adama himself haa euggeated (1968), multiple motivational atatea aay determine behavior, alternating In domlnanoy at a partloular point In time and at tha oonflux of a partloular aat of atlaull. The Important queatlon la not whloh theory la operative, but 28 under whet oonditione eeoh 1« asoendant. 82 Georgopouloe1 Path-Goal Hypothesisi The Path-Goal Hypothesis first foraulated by 29 Brayfleld and Crookett (1955) has been extended by 30 Georgopoulos et al. (1957)* As one of Its prlnelple oon- oerns is the question of why some workers tend to be high produeers and soae not. Thla hypothesis aay very aptly be aptly be applied to questions (In the previous section) of eonparatlve aotlvatlon of workers in different areas of Industry. The hypothesis la also the theoretical core of the Vrooa aotlvatlon aodel. Obviously, slallar In psyehologloal eaphaals to * ’forward-looking" expaotanoy theory, the Path-Goal Hypo thesis holds that individual produotlvlty Is the funotlon of Individual aotlvatlon to produoe at a given level and depends upon 1) the partloular needs of the Individual as refleoted In the goals toward whloh he is novlng, and 2) his peroeptlon regarding the relative usefulness of produotlvlty as a path to goal-attainaent (lnstruaentallty). The path to be followed in a given oase will be a funotlon of the expectations of the individual. If a worker sees high produotlvlty as a path leading to the attalnaent of one or aore of his personal goals, he will tend to be a high producer. If, on the other hand, he sees low produo tlvlty as a path suited to his purpose, he will tend to be a low producer. 83 Returning to Adams'Bqulty Thoory for o moment, in tho oose of tho oYorpald plooo-workor whooo produotlon hoa foilon with o rloo In tho ploeo-work rate, tho Path-Goal Hypothoolo niggoiti that produotlTlty la not oonaldorod by tho workor to bo a path loading to tho aohloTemont of any goal* whloh aoro atrongly ouggosts that goalo dlffor botwoon plooo-workora and oalary non,* Tho Path-Goal Hypothoala views produotlTlty IoyoI ao roprooanting purpoalTo bohaTlor whloh la dotoralnod through tho Interaction of path-goal perception, IotoI of nood* and IotoI of freedom, aa woll aa othor aoolal- payohological rarlabl«a auoh aa group noma. Tho experl- aontal findInga of Georgopouloa, baaod on aultlwarlate analyala of lntorriowa whloh dlrootly queried aubjoota on tholr opinion of tho uaofulnoaa of high and low produotl Tlty IotoIo for attainment of glTon goalo, hare boon oonala- tont onough to land aoao weight to tho hypothoala, Georgopouloe readily admits, however, that not all tho warlanoe In produotlTlty lowola can bo aooounted for by tho path-goal ooneopt, Othor aothoda of tooting tho oonoopt hare not deaonatrated tho appropriate correla tion botwoon produotlon and oognltlwo goal-seeking, and othor variables, rational and nonratlonal, have boon obaorrod aa oporatlTo. Goorgopouloo auggoata that tho Path-Goal Hypothoala ahould bo uaod aa a aupplenent to othor ozplanatlona of aotlTatlon and not aa a substitute. 8k Allot th* path-goal approach, while l*aa uaaful in explaining th* goal* of group solidarity and promotion, reveal*d that "aaklng aore aoney in th* long run" waa a goal toward whloh produotlTlty was ooneletently observed by Informant* to b* a prinolpal path. Lawler** Model Following Lawler and Porter's study on th* Botlratlonal role of pay In relation with perforaanoe and satisfaction* Lawler has oonplled th* results of r*s*aroh on th* act1rational rol* of reward syst*a. In his th*or*tioal study« Par and Oraanlsatlonal Effectiveness! A Psroholoaloal View, he proposes a uotlvatlonal aodel whloh go*s beyond th* 1966 aodel a*ntion*d above and lnolud** for *xaapl*, soa* stat*a*nts about how objeots acquire ral*no*f and It takes past learning Into 31 aooount nuoh nor* than do other ezpeotanoy theories." The aodel deplots aotlrated behaviors In relation with reward systea as an Interaction between the effort (2) perforaanoe (P) probability and a person's subjeotlv* probability that perforaanoe will lead an outooa* (0) aultlplled by the desirability strength of th* outooa** (ralenoe). As Figure Illustrates* the aodel shows that aotlvatlon to perforn at a given level le prlaarlly determined by two set*of variables. The flrat of thane le the peraon'a belief concerning the probability that If he puts effort Into performing at that level* he will be able to perfora at that level (Box 1). Thla aubjeotlve probability oan vary froa 1 (aure that effort will lead to Intended perforaanoe) to 0 (aure that effort will not load to intended perfor aanoe). It la Influenced by two faotoraa 1) the aubjeot'a eelf-eeteen (Box 3)* I.e.* hla general beliefa about hla ability to oope with and oontrol hla environment (Argyrla. 1964 and fiotter. 1966)• and 2) hla prevloua pereonal and obaerved experlenoe In alallar and ldentloal atlaulua altua- tlona (Box 4). The aodel alao ahowa that a peraon*a aelf-eateea la lnfluaneed by hla Job perforaanoe (loop a). In general, the higher the peraon ratea hla aelf- eateea and the aore he haa been able to perfora effeotlvely In alallar atlaulua altuatlona. the higher will be hla effort- perforaanee (E-r) eubjactive probability. The one quailfloatInn that la neoeaaary here oonoerna people with very low self- eateea. Soae lndlvlduala with extreaely low aelf-eateea aay dlatort reality and have high and unreel1atlo E-F probabllltlea. The aeoond faotor that lnfluenoea aotlvatlon la really aade up of a ooabl- natlon of bellefa about what the outeoaea of aoooapllahlng the Intended level of perforaanoe will be and the valenee of theae outooaea (Box 2), The figure ahowa that a peraon*a aubjeotlve probability and that perforaanoe will lead to an out- cone (P-O) ahould be aultlplled by the valenoe of that outeoae (V). Finally. It auggeata that the produeta of all proba bility tlaea valenoe ooablnatlona ahould be added together for all outooaea that are eeen to be related to the Intended level of perforaanoe. Thla la repreaanted In the aodel by the 'E* algn. Valenee la eonaldered to vary froa el (very dealrable) to -1 )very undealreble) and the perforaanoe outooaea probabllltlea to vary froa el (perforaanoe la aure to lead to outeoae) to 0 (perforaanoe dooa not lead to outooae). Henee. thla aeoond faotor will be larger 86 for good Job perforaanoe, tho aoro poaltlvely nlutd rwardi art soon to bo obtolnod *o a rooult of good perforaanoe, and tho looo negatively valued outooaea oro aeon to rooult froa good perforaanoe, 32 Lovlor ouggoot that too baolo faotora lnfluonoo tho atrongth of a poraon'a aotlvatlon to porfora effeotlve- 1| i 1) tho poraon'a bollof that hla offort oan bo oon- ▼ortod Into porforaanoo (S-F) and 2) tho not attraotlve- noaa of tho eventa that aro folt to ooao froa good porforaanoo (P-0) (V). Thonv ho addroaaoo hlaaolf to tho quoatlon of what aro tho Intervening varlabloa In thla foraula whloh affoet tho dlrootlon of bahavlorT Tho natural atartlng point aay bo flrat, to look at tho relatlonahlp that ozlata botwoon tho aaount of effort put Into tho perfor aanoe and tho outooaea of porforalng at auoh level. Ho atatoa that i When oonalderatlon la being given to tho outooaea aaaoolatod with porforaanoo that anong othor thinge, tho aaount of effort put Into tho porforaanoo oan lnfluonoo tho outooaea of tho porforaanoo, Partloularly when porforalng at a given level la per ceived to require a largo aaount of effort or groat aaorlfloea, thla oan bo a very laportant lnfluonoo on aotlvatlon, Out- ooaoa like fooling tired oan beooae aaaoolatod with trying to porfora at a glvon level, and thlo nay dooroaao tho poraon'a aotlvatlon to porfora at that level or oven lnoroaao It If tho peraon yaluea tho fooling, Tho point la that the proooaa one auat go tnrough to oer- fora at a partloular level nay load to eertaln outooaea being aaaoolatod with 87 trying to porfora at that lorol, and this nay affaot tho aotlTatlon to par- fora at that lorol, 33 Tho point Lawlor aakoo la that tho aaount of offort oxortod to porfora at a oortain IotoI aay bo aaaoolatod with oortain outooaaa aa suoh, phyaloally bolng tlrod.laposslblllty of porforalng taaka, whloh In turn affaot tho aotlTatlon of tho indlrldual. in othor worda, aponding offort la tho funotlon of subjoetlro proooaaoa whloh go on In tho Bind of a poraon aa wall aa of tho onrlronaont in whloh tho poraon la working (harsbarg*a oonoopt of "hyglonoM faotora In aotlTatlon), Tho aooond Tarlablo whloh la drawn froa Vrooa's aotlra* tlonal aodol la. In turn, atroaallnod froa tho oxpootaney thaorlaa of Foak (1955) and Lowln (1938) and la tho lnatruaontallty of an outooao, Vrooa lndloatod that i Noana aoqulro Taluo aa a oonaoquoneo of oxpootod rolatlonahlp to onda, Foak (1955) haa dlaeuaaod thla rolatlonahlp In aoao dotal1. Sho hypothoaltoo that attltudoa, l.o,, affoetlTo orlontatlona toward objoota aro *rolatod to tho onda whloh tho objoot aorroa.* Froa thla gonoral hypothoala, it la poaalblo for Foak to distinguish two typos of dotomlnants of attltudoa i l)tho oognlsod lnatruaontallty of tho objoot of tho attltudo for tho atialnaont of Tarlous oonaoquonoos and 2)tho lntonalty and tho naturo of tho offoot oxpootod froa thoso oonaoquonoos, 3^ An objoot aoqulroa laportanoo for an Indlrldual aa a funotlon of Its poroolrod lnatruaontallty for obtaining othor doslrod outooao a, that la to aay that 88 to whloh outooao lo poroolvod to satisfy needs", (Box 5). Tho third variable In tho aodol Is tho poroolvod fairness of tho lnput-outooae balance (Box 6), Basing upon Adaao* studios on wage Inequities and tholr offoots 35 on worker produotlvlty, Lawler suggests that this point is Included in order to explain tho offoot of poroolvod In equity when plooo rate payment is used, Tho work on hourly pay inequity oan bo explained by tho baslo expectancy aodol without reference to oonoept of equity. The assumption here lo that poroolvod over-payment oan load to a deorease in tho valenoe of pay suoh that snail aaounts of pay aay bo loss attractive than aaounts that aro poroolvod to bo fair, After this point, tho relationship aaong variables and tho explanation of how those variables lnteraot seem to be very vague and unolear. In tho aodol, Lawler Inser ted four non-personal variables whloh, If understood oorreetly, have an lnpaot on the motivation of individuals. The first one la an Individual differonoo faotor referring to a belief In Internal versus external oontrol (Box 7), Aooordlng to hla, done people see the world in terms of Internal oontrol, while others see It In terms of external oontrol (the world aots on them). It would eeea that the aore a person Is oriented toward internal con trol, the aore he will feel that perfor aanoe will lead to outooaea, while the aore he Is oriented toward external con trol, the leas likely he will be able to have high perforaanee-outooae. 37 89 Good porforaanoo nay require exerting onough effort. Yet, aa indicated above, the effeotlTeneaa of effort expenditure la related to the degree whloh a peraon la oabable of doing the given teak. In other worda, converting effort into a deaired level of perforaanoe requirea aklll and abllltlea appropriate on the taak. A nuaber of authora (e.g., Frenoh, 1957i Lawler 1966t Looke, 19641 Haler, 19551 and Vrooa,1964) have argued that aotlvatlon and ability ooablne aultlplloatlvdly to deteralne perforaanoe. Great anounta of effort cannot 38 aake up for very low ability. Lawler aeea another faotor (Box 8) Intervening between effort and perforaanoe. He atatea It la aaauaed that thla peroeptlon la learned through prevloua experience and a eoaewhat alallar to the Drive theory eHr oonoept. Thla, how-to-do-it peroeptlon oan obviously vary widely In aoouraoy. It la ahown to ooablne aultlplloatlvely with effort In order to atreaa the point that unleaa It la aoourate, perforaanoe will be 0, Just aa when ability la low, 39 Exaaplea of thla view are nuaeroua In organisa tional life, i.e., when erroneoua how-to-do-lt peroeptlona exlat, the perforaanoe of aanagera la low, even though 40 their effort or aotlvatlon aay be high. Finally, he explalne the role of reward In the aodel. Rward la aeen froa two polnta of view. Flrat, the relatlonahlp between reward and perforaanoe1 and aeoond, the oonneotlon between the aaount of rewarde and the 90 laportano* th* parson attaohos to It. As Lawler Mid ... rowards do not always follow dlraotly froa perforaano*. Thoroforo, th* rolatlon- •hlp botwoon Mtiafaotlon and p*rforaano* 1* not Tory oloar. It 1* *uffiol*nt to not* horo that tho thoory do** not ••• •atlsfaotlon a* strongly affooting p*r- foraano* or aotlratlon. Th* aotlratlon to p«rfora la d*t*mln*d by th* p*ro*lT*d oons*qu*no*s of good porfomano* and by a p*raon'a estlnat* of th* probability that •ffort oan b* conr*rt*d Into sueoessful perfomanoe. ^1 His aod«l la thought of aa an on-going dynaalo systea. Th*r*for*» by Its syst*aatle nature, all rarlables hare positIt*f nagatlr*, or neutralising *ffoots on *aoh other, as w*ll as aaong th*as*lT*St when th*y ar* s*«n froa a not1rational point of rl*w. Slno* reward Is a part of the aod*l and la thought of as haring a not1ra tional role, all S-R theories of aotlratlon ar* based upon this oone*pt. Th* aaount of raward, i.e., pay, night b* on* of th* Important variable* In a aotlrational aod*l. Equity Th*ory suggests that p*re*lr*d or*r-payn*nt, for «zaaple, oan load to a d*cr*as# in the attraotIrenes* of pay for son* p*opl*. Lawlar, therefore, suggests that A currlllnear relationship b*tw**n th* aaount of pay and th* ral*no* of pay suoh that snail aaount* and r*ry large aaount* of pay nay b* less attraotlr* than aaount* that ar* p*ro*lr*d to b* fair, Th*r* has b**n surprisingly littl* research on th* ralatlr* ralue, utility or attmotlr*n*ss p*opl* plao* on different aaount* of aon*y. There has, how*r*r. 91 been • long history of theorising about it. Giles and Barrett (1970) have re viewed some of tha theory and researoh, and thay oonolude that both tha rosaaroh and tha theorising oontaln a number of different points of view. For example. In 1928 Cramer postulated that Talus of money might be a power function of the amount, while Bernoulli hypothesised a logarithmic function. 42 In summary, what Lawler has done Is to oomblne the expeetaney model of Vroom, the Bqulty Theory of Adams end Lawler and Porter's perfomanee-reward probability model into a more complicated model of motivation. The model Incorporates the internal-subjective as well as external conditions that operate to determine the lndlvi- dual's hlerarohy of motives. It does aooount for a sufficient number of faetors that lnfluenoe the Individual froa outside the context of organisational situation (ego Involvement or primary needs Independent of the work environment). summary This review of motivation theories inoluded the most relevant studies on the subject to the present research. This chapter starts with some generalisations on the nature of motivation and oontlnues to the earliest oomprehenslve attempts of the expeetaney and drive theorists to formulate motivational theory. The applied theories (two-factor, equity and path-goal) were treated 92 itp « r a t« l]r i *n d , f i n a ll y , r t f a r m e t i w a r* aada to M o tiva tio n th a o rj a * i t la a p p lla d to th a p ro b laa o f ooapanaa- tlo n , Tha daslgn of tha raaaaroh, oparatlonallsatlon of variablaa, tha nathodology and othar proeadural aattara will ba tha aubjaot of tha following ohaptar. NOTES CHAPTER II 1. J. W. Atkinson, An Introduction to Motivation (Princeton, N.J.i Von Nostrand Inc., 1964). 2. Ibid, 3. Thera will be more explanation about Hersberg et, al. Adams, Tolaan, and Hull's studies In the following pages. N, R. Jones, NebraskaSymposium on Motivation (Lincoln, Nebraskai University of Nebraska £ress, 1955), 5. Atkinson, Op, Clt. 6. £, L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligencet Empirical Studies (New Yorki MacMillan A Co., 1911)• 7. I. P. Pavlov. Conditioned Reflexes, (trans lated by G.V, Anrep) (Londoni uxiora university Press,192?). 8. R. S. Woodworth and H, Sohlosberg, Experimental Psychology (New Yorki Holt Press, 195*0< 9. V. MoDougall, Outline of Psychology (New Yorki Scribner Inc., 1923). 10, C. E. Tolman, Purposive Behavior In Animals and Men (New Yorki Century Inc., 1332), 11. C. L. Hull, Principles of Behavior (New Yorki Appleton-Century, Inc., 1943). 12* Ibid. 13. Tolman, Op. Clt. 14. Ibid. 15. K. Lewln, The Conceptual Representation and P R it, t § 5 8 T * r p nrwM, north IS, 19307# 93 9* 16. Atkinson, Op. Clt. 17* Ward Edwards,"The Theory of Deoleion Making," The Perohologloal Bulletin, Vol. 51. 195**. PP. 3SO-JH7i "The Theory of Behavioral Deoleion Making," Annuel Review of Psychology. 1962. 18. V. H. Vrooa, Work end Motivation (New Yorki John Wiley end Sons, Ino,, 1*^64J, 19. Ibid. 20. L, W. Porter end S. Lawler, flfflffffrlftl ^tt|tude end Per+’ qpfpf (Hoaewood. Illi Irwln-Dorsey, Inc.. 21. K. W, Spence, Behavior Theory end Condition ing (New Haven. Conneotlouti Yale University Press, 1956). 22. K. B. Madson, Theorlee of Motivation (Kent, Ohioi Kent Stete University press, 196b}, 23. Ibid. F, Hersberg et. el.. The Motivation to Work (New Yorki Chepeen end Hell, 1949). 25. S. Adaas, "Toward an Understanding of Inequity*’ Journ^ j>f^Abnoraal end Social Psychology. Vol. 6?, 1963. 26. Ibid. 27. Ward Lawler, Per end Organisational Bffeotlve- j^|^i A Psrohologloal View (New torki McGraw-Hill, Inc,, 26. S. Adeaa, "Effects of Overpeyaenti Two Coaaents on Lawler's Paper."Journal of Personality end Social Psychology. Vol. 60, l56e. pp. 315-316. 29, A. H. Brarfleld and w, H, Crockett, "ffiroloyee Attitudes and Saployee Performance," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 52, 1955. PP. 396-^. 30. B. 3. Oeorgopoulos et. el.. "A Path-Goal Vo{™?f* l?;?r>K?tffi-5i3.JoUrn*1 °f Appll*d pwohalQBT. 95 31. Lawler, Op. Clt. 32. Ibid.. pp. 107-108, 33. Ibid.. pp. 108-109. 34. Vrooa, Op. Clt. 35. Lawler, Op. Clt. See “Review of Literature." 36. Ibid.. p. 109. 3?. Ibid.. p. 110. 38. Ibid.. p. 113. 39. Ibid. p. 113. 40. Porter and Lawler, Op. Clt. 41. Lawler.Op.Clt.. p. 113 1*1*. CHAPTER III DESIGN OP THE STUD! Th* design of th* researoh oonduetad In oonnao- tlon with this study la based speolfloally on tha prerlously statad objeotlres of tha study and on tha thaoratloal formulations, That design proTided a systeaa- tlo organisation of tha lntallaotual and aaplrleal aetlrl- tlaa assoolatad with tha study. Essentially, two objeotlres wars sought In tha studyi 1) to find an answar(s) to tha quastlon of Mls aora pay pareelrad as haring aore or lass utility than a statad aqultabl* aaount of aonay lnoraasa In publlo organi sations'* and 2) to aooount for rarlanoa In tha affaots of paroaptlon of pay on aotlratlon In organisations. Sarsral topios wars lntroduoad in prarlous chapters about tha utility oonoept and aotlratlon. Das* orlptlon of the rasaaroh design and Its rational* will b* discussed In this part of tha study. Utility Theory and Hypothesis Tha oonoapta, assumptions, and propositions dlsoussod In Chapter II war* plaoad Into a daduetir* thaoratloal sohaa*. They ware arranged In a descending order of abstraotloni aaoh suooeedlng laral was derlrad 96 9? from the former, and operational hypotheses were deduced at the lowest level* Subsequent eapirloal operations reflooted on the validity and adequaoy of the hypotheses• Illuminated the utility of the theory and provided the basis for more refined and aeourate predietIons. The following assumptions, propositions, and hypotheses were developed for the study. Assumption One i The utility function of pay Is a measurable variable in organisational studies. Assumption Two i Pereelved utility of reward is positively related to productlvlty. Assumption Three i Satisfaction and "utility* of pay are positively related. Assumption Four i The utility of pay is one of the deter minants of motivation in organisational motivation. Conceptual Hypothesis 1 Pay as a reward oan be a source of motivation and satisfaction in organisations. Assumption Five i The attractiveness of an object for an individual ranges from -1 (non-desirable). 0 (neutral), and 41 (maximum desire to obtain). The strength of desire is conditioned by i 1. an individual's perception of the instrumentality of an object for goal attainment, 98 2. an Individual's past axparlanea In a similar situation with tha objeot, and 3. an Individual's ballaf about his capability of performing a given duty to obtain the desired outoome. Cono«ptu«X Hrpoth.»L h Motivation Is a positive funotlon of the Instru mentality of the reward system, a person's capability to perform, and his learning experience. Assumption Six i The organisational reward system oonslsts of 1) extrinsic rewards. I.e., pay and 2) lntrlnslo rewards. I.e., satisfaction. The relationship between the extrinsic reward system and Its peroelved utility for goal attainment Is a dynamic and changing prooess according to 1, an Individual's perception of the extrlnslo reward system, 2, the nature of the organisation, and 3, some environmental variables. Empirical Hypothesis 1 The utility curve of pay for public eaployees Is a curvilinear relationship slnoe there Is always discre pancy between the actual amount of pay and Its peroelved utility by the employee to attain his Intended goal. Assumption Seven i The organisation as a broad condition ing environment affeots the rationality of individuals In conceiving organisational realities. 99 Con««Btn»l Bypoth«»l« III The perceptions of an individual about an organi zation La a function of 1) tha organisation Itself, 2) the Individual's feelings of his relation to the organization, and 3) his role in realisation of the organizational goal. gmplrioal Hypothesis II The shape of the utility curve in the public organization ehanges in relation to 1) the physical size of the organization, 2) the level of the individual's salary, 3) the aaount of the last pay Increase, 4) union or non-union aenbershlp, and 5) the level of specializa tion defined as adalnlstratlve, teohnloal, and secretarial- derloal roles. Assumption Bighti An Individual acquires his perception about reality through his personal experience with his environment. This experience is affected by sex, age, education, and the length of work experience. Conceptual Hypothesis IV The importance of an extrlnslo reward ohangee according to 1) sexual differences of individuals, 2) age, 3) educational attainments, and 4) the length of experience in his organizational role. 100 Empirical Hypothesis III The shape of tho utility ourve In publle organi zations changes according to 1) bolng sal* or female, 2) ago, 3) the number of yoars of formal eduoatlon, and *0 ths numbar of yoars of oxporlonoo in tho organisational rolo and IotoI of specialisation. Uiuiptlon Mlnoi Poolings of falrnoss or unfairness of an outoomo(s) of his aotlvltles have a dlroot offset on tho motivation of a person. Conceptual Hypothesis V Feelings of equity or Inequity by an Individual about organisational oonduet affect work outputs, work quality, and attitudes toward work. Empirical Hypothesis IV The shape of the utility curve for pay In publio organisations Is affected by feelings of fairness and satisfaction toward pay by the employee. Assumption Tern Unions play a vital role In determining the level of wages In society. Assumption Eleven> "SecretlvenessM in pay poliolea is a prevailing attitude of the management. Assumption Twelvei The employees' Joining In polloy forma tion is an Important funotlon In organisations. 101 Conceptual Hypothesis VI Involvement toy employees in organizational deolslon-aaklng has a positive sffsot on ths not1vatIon of the employees. Bnplrloal Hypothesis V The shape of the utility curve for pay in public organizations is affeoted toy 1) belief In functionality of unions, 2) perception of the fairness of the present pay systea, and 3) perception of contributions to the formation of organizational poliolee. Development of the Hesearoh Instrument Host attempts in literature dealing with "utility" can toe grouped around two toaslo approaches. The first group Is the so-oalled dlreot estimation techniques in which a researcher asks dlreotly the question of "how valuable is this thing or money to you?" The method has been utilized in a number of studies in economics and psychology,1 The seoond group of the students of organizational behavior tried to predict "utility" from indirect measure ments via the so-called subjective expected utility <SEU) and projection models. The analysis of phantasies and stories, study of ohoioes that a person makes among alternative courses of action, observation of oonsummatory behavior and exploration of "deoision time" are a few 102 2 example* In this category. What approach, than, 1* suitable to the study of utility of pay in public organisations, or In other words, what kind of research is appropriate In aeasurlng the attraetlTeness of different aaount■ of pay In the publlo organisations? An lnstruaent utilised for suoh purpose should satisfy at least two Important conditions. First, since the aim Is to measure utility of different amounts of pay, the researoher should be able to manipulate the independent variables (pay). Second, the lnstruaent should be reliable In measuring the attraotlveness people attach to the different amounts of pay. As pointed out In the previous seotlons, the aaount of pay was predetermined by the sampled organisation and the researoher was Incapable of alternating these amounts. The lnstruaent of the researoh, as a result of this reality, developed In two parts. The first part is aimed at gathering Information about deaographlo characteristics of the Ss and their perception of fairness and adequaoy of pay, and the satis* faction they receive from the present reward system. Th* utility scale had to be hypothetloally constructed to be different from th* pay soal* because aotuai compensation was not under the oontrd. of this researcher. 103 ftttftloiMilf Contraction A questionnaire m« d«r«lop«d to link the theo retical oonoepts end the empirical reelItlee of the reeeereh subject(s). The questionnaire lnoluded i 1. cite of the organisation (controlled variable), ege, eduoatlon, diploma, seniority, experience, speciality, unlon-eeeberehlp, level of celery• eeount of leet pey Increase, end the tine since lest pey Increases 2. fairness of pay, equity, satisfaction, belief In union-role, pay seereoy and contribution to organisational policiesi and 3. fourteen different aaounts of suggested pay Increases and related satisfaction point ranges between 0 and 209 (22 Intervals). Questionnaire Items were developed on the basis of theoretloal variables and hypotheses and lnoluded an hypo- , 3 thetloal pay lnorease soale. Except for the oontrols and demographic variables, eaoh of the Items lnoluded a statement and a soale with 129 am. for the purpose of continuity In measurement. Personal reaotlons were recorded by the respondents for eaoh of the statements whloh related to fairness of pay, equity, satlsfaction, unlon-role, pay seoreoy and self* claimed importance in formation of organisational polloles. The questionnaire oarrled the following instructioni Please indicate your response to the following scntenoes on the line after eaoh a & r a . " $ i 3 ! a ui s r « a * i i 2 S ; 10 If you disagree* however* nark th* left end of th* lln*. If you f**l that your response falls between th*** two extremes* pl*as* aark any point on th* lln* whloh aatoh** your feelings* A utility grid* whloh will b* explained In th* following pag**t oonstitut** th* third part of th* questionnaire* Th* Utility Grid Th* utility grid* as lndloatsd in th* previous ••etlon* was slallar in its baslo constmotion to th* on* previously us*d first by Brian A. Giles and Gerald V. Barrettand secondly r*plloat*d by Jay R. Schuster and J«ron* A. Oollettl.5 Th* aaounts of sugg*st*d pay and th*lr order of app*arano* on th* grid was k*pt th* saa*. Th* basic dlff*r*no* was th* pr*sua*d satisfaction points ranging froa 0 to 209 and spread over twenty-two (22) equally divided intervals* Giles and Barrett ask*d th* following question*!^ "1. Fourteen posslbl* aerlt lnor*as*s $ 1700 are listed to the l*ft. Choos* and writ* on th* lln* below th* n*rlt $ 500 lnor*as* which you f**l would b* fair and equitable at your n*xt $ 1000 yearly performance appraisal based on your own peroelved Job perfor- $ 900 nano* and contribution to the oca- pany. $ 2100 2* Your n*xt task Is to show your satls- $ 600 faction with each of th* reaalnlng aerlt Increases. You do this by | 1100 writing down in the score box beside •ach merit increase a nuaber which shows your satisfaction In relation 105 » o + > a o O 0 9 + » « S w Merit I Pover Increasing Linear Logarithmic Pover-Deereasing FIGURE VI - Representation of Linear, Logarithmic and Pover Functions Peroent of Peroelred Equitable HerIt Increase FIGURE VII - Obtained regression line for percentage of peroelred equitable aerlt Increase as a predictor of utility. (A utile Is a hypo thetical unit of utility.) 10? Correlation! (Produot-Moaent) between Percentage Equitable Merit Increase, ac a Power Funotlon of Satisfaction with the Saaple Divided by Age, Profession, and Years of Service in the Coapany. Saaple N Correlation P AGE Under 30 24 .79 2,28 30 and over 40 ,80 2.17 Profession Engineer 31 .77 2.16 Nonengineer 33 .62 2.2? Service Under 3 years 35 .78 2.15 3 years and over 29 .81 2.29 Figure VIII - The Suanarles of Brian A. Giles and Gerald V, Barrett, ‘ 'Utility of Merit Increases," Journal of Applied Psvoholoior. Vol. LV, No, 2, 1971, pp. 103-109. 108 to tho fair and oqultablo aorlt lnoroaao ohoaan atooTO. Your fair and oqultablo aorlt lnoroaao haa boon aaalgnod a value of 10, Uoo thlo aorlt lnoroaao aa a atandard and aoore every othor aorlt lnoroaao In rolatlon to this atandard. For exaaple, If any othor aorlt ln oroaao would aooa to bring jou five tlaoa aa aueh oatlofaotlon, wrlto In a aooro of 50. If aorlt lnoroaao would bring you only half aa aueh oatlofaotlon, wrlto In a aooro of 5*1 If a aorlt lnoroaao would oooa to bring only 1/20 of tho oatlofaotlon aa tho atandard, wrlto In a aooro of 0.5. You aay uao any wholo or doolaal nunboro that aro groator than aoro, no aattor how aaall or how largo thoy aro, Juot oo long aa thoy roproaont how aueh oatlofaotlon tho aorlt ln oroaao would bring you aa oonparod to tho atandard aorlt lnoroaao." Aa aay bo dotootod. It la Tory difficult to underatand tho wholo proeoduro and eoaprohonalTo thinking about how tho proooaa worka. Thoroforo, tho lnatruaont was aodlflod aa In Appendix 'A*. operational!tation of tho Hrpothoaoa tho eaplrloal hypothec#a and related quootlonnalro atatoaonta aro auanarlzed below. Thoy bridge oonoopta of zkotlTotlon-utlllty theory and tho roapondont*a poraonal roaotlona to tho utility aoaloa. * 700 $ 2500 $ 1300 $ 800 | 300 $ 1500 $ 3000 109 I- Peaogrsphlo Variables Pour demographlo variables were lnoluded In the questionnaire. They are i 1) sezt 2) agei 3) educa tion, nuaber of years of formal eduoatlom 4) academic degree earnedi a) high school, b) Junior college, o) B.S. or B.A., d) U.S. or H,A*, e) Ph.D., and f) others. II- Organisational Variables Seven variables which related to organisation ooaprlsed the seoond group of variables In the first part of the questionnaire. Slse of Organisation! The first variable deternlnes the slse of the organisations. Four publlo organisa tions (nunlolpal governaents) were selected acoordlng to the else of the population they serve. It was assumed that there was a positive correlation between the size of a publlo organisation and the nuaber In Its oonstltuenoy. The population of the cities was approzlaately 40,000 - 160,000 - 360,000 and 1,500,000 Individuals. The publlo works departments of these oltles were seleoted on study because the preliminary Investigation revealed that sample groups could be dlsoretely differentiated as to levels of salaries of employees* Job specialisations, education, and earned degrees. Ho Seniority i This ooneept was thought of as "the nunbsr of years" in ths sane type of work ths Individual psrforas. Speciality < Thrss broad categories of organ1eational specialities wsrsi 1) teohnioal, i.e., snglnssrs, tsohnlolansi 2) adalnlstrativs speciality, supervisors with declelon-naking rssponslbllltyi 3) olsrloal/ secretarial, and other supporting activities for the administrative and teohnloal personnel. Annual salary i The yearly 1 noose was oonsldered to be the annual salary. Fringe benefits were not lnoluded In this ooneept due to difficulties In translating then Into dollar amounts. Union Membershipi Union was distinguished fron association, th* pay Increasei The lnorease was the aaount of additional dollars the eaployees received froa organi sations either as raises or living oost adjustments per month. Amount of Time Slnoe Last Pay Increases The date when the "raise" or oost of living adjustment was offered to the employee. I l l - 3 » t l. f .Q t l o n - la a lt y - F .ln > .. . P .r o .p tlo n V w l . b l . . The first four questions In Part II of the ques tionnaire were designed to obtain employees1 feelings about their pay In terae of equity* fairness* and satisfaction. These variables were related to hypothesis IV. Fairness of Present Pari Statsaents 1 and 2 of Fart II were foraulated to find out eaployees' peroeption of the equitability of their pay. Responses were recorded on a 129 aa line showing " strongly disagree" at the left and "strongly agree" at the right end. Baulty of Present Pari Data on the equitability of pay were obtained froa stateaent 3 of Part II. The respondent rated hie agreeaent or dlsagreeaent with the stateaent in ooaparlson with his work associates. Satlsfactloni Data on satisfaction froa pay were obtained froa stateaent 4 of Part II, whloh related to hypothesis IV. The eaployees were asked to indicate their reaotlon to the stateaent on a 129 aa line. IV- Belief in Union Rolei Reoelvlng a fair aaount of pay and the union role peroeption providing such aaounts were the aaln theae of stateaent 5* V- Pay Secrecyi Feelings about pay seoreoy and scheduled aerlt increases were obtained froa stateaent 6, Part II* which related to hypothesis V. The responses were recorded on a 129 aa. line. VI- Policy Deelani The lnvolveaent in the design of polloy for attalnaent of organisational goals was the ala of stateaent 7, Part II* whloh related to 112 hypothesis V. Peelings were rsoordsd on a 129 mm 11ns. Prstsst of ths Questionnaire the questionnaire was pretested under similar olrouastanoes to those of organisations seleoted for ths study. It was given to ten (10) seeretarles and working graduate students In ths School of Publlo Administration, University of Southern California. The gxoup voluntarily agreed to partlelpate In the pretest of the questionnaire. All participants were given opportunity during and follow ing the questionnaire adalnlstratIon to dlsouss direotly the reactions to over-all design and construction of the lnstruaent and to Its parts. Based on their responses, soae changes in the foraat and In Individual statements were aade, and the lnstruaent was slapllfled and shortened for the sake of time and understandablllty. The Sample and Sampling Procedures Sampling Is taking any portion of a population or universe as representative of that population or universe. The main purpose of the study as stated was to explore the relationship between different amounts of pay and their peroelved utility by public eaployees. Pour cities In the Southern California area were chosen aooordlng to population else. The following cri teria were the essential oonslderations In the seleotlon of samples. 1X3 On* of th* purpose* of th* study Is to d*t*rnln* If organisation sis* has an lapaot on th* o*ntral hypo thesis outooa*. Th* s*oond important consideration was to lnolud* groups whos* salaries w*r* slgnlfloantly different. Th* publlo works departments In th*s* four cities s**m*d to b* appropriate units for th* researoh sine* their *mploy**s consist ofi 1) high-salaried people, administrators and senior engineersi 2) middle-salaried employees. Junior engineers and oraftsaeni and 3) low-salaried technical personnel, clerk*, and secretaries. Th* third aim was to assure comparability of functions performed in each organisation. Th* sample satisfied this need slno* all muniolpal publlo works departments studied employing people with similar educa tional attainment and skill, e.g., engineers, craftsmen, clerks, and secretaries. The first step in the selection prooess was to obtain a list of employees with their titles, i.e., engineers, chief engineers, senior oraftsmen. Junior oraftm- men, secretaries, olerks, eto. Th* percentage of each group In the population was ooaputed In order to assure th* representativeness of each group In the sample. The seoond stage was to seleot 3s randomly from among their own group aooordlng to th* percentages. 114 af th. Qu.»tlotroalr. The heads of the departments were Informed about the purpose o f the study either by the dissertation ooamlttee Chairman or other Individuals with aeeess to the organisation. The researcher visited eaoh organisa tion aooordlng to the tine sohedule of the organisation head. The first step, after introducing the researoher. was to fully explain the nature and the scope of the study. The organisation heads then Introduced the resear cher to the supervisors and asked for their full coopera tion with the researcher. A list of eaployees was obtained in order to study the aake-up and characteristics of the population. After carefully studying eaoh list, the researcher randomly chose the sample in proportion to the total population from the lists. The saaple was divided Into small groups of eight (8) to ten (10) Individuals. Each group was requested to gather in a plaoe designated by the head of the organisation (for example, coffee room). A ten to fifteen-minute explanation was given to inform the saaple of the purpose and procedure In filling out the questionnaire. Every subject reoorded individually his reactions to the the statements and answered the questions. The researoher was present In the room during these sessions, thus any questions raised by the subjects were answered. Supervisors were requested to ask eaployees to refrain from discussing the researoh with other employees 115 who had not fIliad out questionnaires* Through this procedure* the researoher assumes that the subjects did not haws the ohanoe to influence each other* Two-hundred questionnaires were taken by the researcher to the organi sations* Except for one refusal* all questionnaires were filled out and returned to the researcher. Statistical Method of Data Analysis Statistical operations with the data were per formed to produce* 1- desorlptlve Information such as means* frequencies* per centages, modes* medians* standard deviations* minimum and maximum valuesi 2- measurement of aseoclatlons to determine the strength of relationships In those groups In which statistically significant distributions were obtained* and 3- results of the testing of the significance of the differences In the values of eaoh group obtained. A major objective of this study was to measure the utility of different amounts of pay In publlo organi sations. To accomplish that, the researoher organised and analysed the available data* the association between the different amounts of dollars and the utility of these figures was established* and finally the line of best fit was drawn. The line was fit In terms of* 1} linear* 2) logarlthmlo* and 3) power funotlon relationship. 116 A series of forty teste using as exponent 0.05, 0,10. 0,15, 0.20. 0,25 • 2,00 were performed in order to find out the best power funetlon exponent. The one repre senting the highest oorrslatIon was considered to be the line of best fit, A seoond major objective of the study was to test the Impact of some demographic, organisation, equity, satisfaction, fairness, and other variables on the utility function of the different amounts of pay. The test of the line of best fit was performed for eaoh group. This measure of association, which Is based on the Pearson r, allowed a more refined Judgment as to the extent to whloh one variable accounted for differences In the utility of different amounts of pay. Summary Descriptions and explanations of the hypotheses development of the research Instrument, questionnaire, operationalisation of the hypotheses, pretest of the questionnaire, the sample and sampling prooedure, adminis tration of the questionnaire and statistical methods In data analysis were related to the objectives of the study to ■ 1- measure the utility of the different amounts of money 2- aocount for variance In change of utility of the dif ferent amount of money as affeoted by the selected variables. 117 The riiMreh pnetaitf were planned to InoraMi the level of self-awareness In the researoher* ellnlnate unnecessary bias* and improve the validity and reliability of the findings. The findings of the reeeareh *111 be the subject of the next chapter. NOTES CHAPTER III 1. 30* for review of the literature on "utility", Ward Edwards, "Behavioral DeoisIon Thoory," Annual HoTlaw of Psyoholoar. Vol. 12, 1961, pp. 473-1*98, 2. See for exanplo, Victor H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (New Yorki John Wiley and Sons, 1964) pp. 2o-23. 3. The questionnaire is reproduoed in Appendix A. 4. Brian A. Giles and Gerald V. Barrett, "Utility of Merit Increases," Journal of Applied Psroholour. Vol. 55* 1971. PP. 103-109. 5. Jay R. dohuster and Jeroae A. Collettl, "The Relationship between Peroeptlons Conoemlng Magnitude of Pay and Peroelved Utility of Payi Publlo and Private Organisations Compared," (unpublished artlole). 6. Giles and Barrett, Op. Clt. lie CHAPTER IV FINDINGS OF THE STUDY The Bain purposes of the present chapter a 1) desorlbe tha oharaotarlatloa of the saaple* 2) taat tha eaplrloal hypotheses 3) evaluate tha affaota of tha variable on tha Motivational utility nodal* and finally <0 draw oonolualona from tha strength of aaaooiatlona obtained in tha atudy. Descriptive Analysis Thla part will ba traatad undar four aub-tltles aeoordlng to tha groups of variables which wara utillsad In tha praaant raaaareh. Thaaa groups lnoluda i 1) tha demographic and organisational varlablaa 2) falmaaa-aqulty-aatiafaotlon varlablaa 3) belief in union* pay aystens* and tha role of deolslon- naklng in organisation varlablaa* and *0 tha utility measurement, Tha Deaographlc and Organisational Varlablaa A- o rg a n !s a t lo n a Aa pointed out* four organlsatlone wara aalaotad for tha atudy. Thay lnoludai 119 120 Organisation Kuibtr of SubJeots Relative Frequenoy B- Sex One hundred and forty-six sales (146) and fifty- three feaalee (53) were ineluded in the saaple. Neat technical and administrative personnel were aen. In the olerleal/seeretarlal groups, females were the dominant group. Org. #1 Org. #2 Org, #3 Org, #4 91 60 8 4.0* *5,7* 30,2* 20. 1* 199 Subjeots 100 * C- Ass For the sake of slmpliolty the subjects were divided Into three groupsi iSl Below 30 years 31 - 45 years 46 years and above Number of Subjects Percentage 33.2* 38.2* 28,6* 66 76 57 RESULTS Mean Mode Minimum Maximum Standard Median Range 37.99 years 25.00 years 18.00 years 65.00 years Deviation 10,985 121 D- gduoatlon The subjeots were stratified in throe levelsi tfuaber of leers Nuaber of Subjeots Percentage ef aduoetion _________________ _________ 12 years and below 34 17.1* 13 - 15 years 78 39.2* 16 years and above 67 43.7 R B 3 U L T a Kean 14,97 years Mode 14.00 Mlnlaua 12.00 Maxlaua 21,00 Standard Deviation 1.977 Median 14.979 Range 9.000 E- Degree There were six different aoadealo degrees desorlbed In the questionnaire. The last one "others* did not obtain any response. Therefore, there were only five aoadealo degree categories with responses Dtscaa Muaber of Subjects Percentage High School 59 29.6* Junior College 53 26.6* B.A. or B.S. 72 36.6* M.A. or M.S. 14 7.0 Ph.D. 1 0.5 Others 0 0 199 100 * 122 F- Seniority It was measured by the number of yaara an aaployaa apant with tha praaant organisation Seniority Number of SubJeota Laaa than 6 yeara 113 7-13 yeara 38 13 yaara and above 46 Percentage 58,8* 19.1* 24.1* Total 199 100 iiSULTS Naan 8.156 yaara Node 3.000 Nlnlaua 0 yaara Maximum 31.000 yaara Standard Deviation 7.073 Median 5.125 Range 31.000 G- gyptrlenoe Thla waa eonaldarad aa tha nuabar of yaara an Individual apant In tha aaaa kind of work which ha waa performing during tha reeearoh. Ksperlcnoe Nuabar of SubJeota Laaa than 7 yaara 77 7-13 yaara 55 13 yaara and above 67 Fyrcfntage 38.7* 27*6* 35*7* T o ta l 199 100 * 123 HB8ULT3 Mean 11.196 years Mode 3.000 Minimum 0 years Maximum 40.000 years Standard Deviation 8.387 Median 9.000 Range 40.000 H- Speciality The speciality was considered as the ldnd of Job whloh the Individuals performed. Speciality Humber of Subjects Percentage Teohnloal 108 5*. 3* Administrative 46 23.1$ Clerloal/Seoretarlal *5 22.6% Total 199 100 % I- Union Membership Another Important variable In studying organisa tional pay Is the role of union. Membership Humber of Subjects Percentage Union Members 10 5.0$ Non-union Members 189 95.0$ Total 199 100 % J~ Salary This variable was thought of as the amount of dollars employees receive annually. 124 Stlm U t<1 Number of SubJeota Percentage Below #9000 (low) 103 51.8* #9001 - #12,000 (sodium) 80 40,2* #12,001 and above (high) 16 8.0* Total 199 100 * RESULTS Naan #13,111.55 Mod# #12,000.00 Nlnlaua # 2,946.00 Maxima #31,000.00 Standard Deviation f t 5,133.65 Median #12,448.75 Range #31.000.00 K- The La«t Par Inoreaae (dollars/aonth) Tha aaount of tha laat pay lnoraaaa la another variable which la praauaad to have an important affaot on tha utility function of pay, Tha Aaount of lnoraaaa Nuabar of SubJeota Percentage Below #50.00 103 51.8* #51.00 - $100.00 80 40.2* #101.00 or above 16 8.0* Total 199 100 * R B 3 U L T 3 Naan $55,884 Node 0 Maxima #244,00 Minlnun i S R S j r1 D,Tl*tlon IM Range 125 L- Period alnoa Last Par lnoraaaa (months) The tlae eleaent beara laportanoe In aeaaurlng aatlafaotlon received froa tha organisational pay lnoraaaa Therefore* wa aakad about tha nuabar of aontha alnoa tha laat pay lnoraaaa. Muabar of SuteJlaota 60 137 2 Muabar of Months Below 6 aontha 7 - 12 aontha Abova 12 aontha Percentage 30. 2$ 68. 6$ 1.0$ Total 199 100 $ RESULTS Maan Mo da Mlnlaua Mazlaua 17.00 aontha Standard Day1atIon 2.72 Madlan 7.09 6. 3*f aontha 7.00 0 aontha Falrnaaa-Eaultr-Satlafaotlon Varlablaa A- Falrnaaa Tha flrat variable In thla group la "falraeas" of pay. Tha subjects wara olaaaflad in tha following oatagorlaai Muabar of SubJeota Unfair 68 Neutral 71 Fair 60 Total 199 3*. 2* 35.731 30.2$ 168— $ 126 B- The Contribution^Par Balance This variable Is another way of aeaeurlng "fairness" of the present pay. Eaoh category reoelved the following frequenciesi Nuabar of Sub!sota Percentage Pay matches contribution to organization 7* 37.2* Neutral 71 35.7* Pay does not matoh oon* trlbution to organization 51 27.1* Total 199 100 * C- Eaultv Variable Equity or inequity of present pay seens to have Important effects on the utility function of pay. In this categoryt the following resulte were obtained* Wuaber of Subjects Percentage Inequitable 79 39.7% Neutral 67 33.7% Equitable 53 26.6* Total 199 100 % D- Satisfaction This Is the reported satisfaction an employee receives from his present pay. 127 Number of Subjects Percentage Inequitable 79 39*7£ Neutral 67 33.7^ Equitable 53 26.6^ Total 199 100 % Belief in Union, Par Secreor. and Decision-Making A- Belief In Union Believing In the role of union nay affeot the utility of pay. The response to this variable Is as followsI Nuaber of Subjeots Percentage Dysfunctional 108 5**.3* Neutral 58 29.1* Satisfied 33 16.6* Total 199 100 * B- Pay Secrecy How pay Is determined seems to have certain effeots on the functions of organisational pay. The answers to this variable are as follows* 126 Dysfunotlonal Neutral Functional Nuabar of Subjecta 72 72 55 Total 199 Percentage 36.2* 36. 2* 27. 6* 100 * C- The Deolilon-Making Role In Organisation* Self-stated Importance In declslon-maklng role la as followsi Number of aubJeots 80 66 53 Not lnportant Neutral Important Percentage bo. 2* 33.2* 26.6* Total 199 100 * The frequenolee of responses to the utility grid are summarized on the following pages. The suggested Increases In dollar aaounts shown In the first column are reorganized according to their aaounts. starting from the smallest at the bottom of the Y axis ($300) going up to the largest aaount ($3000). The X axis represents the satis faction points ranging from 0 to 209. The means of the responses were indicated in the last column of the grid. The numbers In eaoh row are the frequencies of expressed satisfaction (utility) for the dollar aaounts Indicated at the start of that particular row. For example. #300 would $ Inc rease/ Year 0-9 10 20 30 UO 50 6o 70 80 90 100 lie 120 130 litO 150 160 170 180 190 200 < Kean 3000 12 6 3 5 7 l 0 0 2 7 0 8 4 5 11 6 2 7 9 3 I t 66 5 I t 2500 6 6 3 I t 3 5 3 2 0 2 16 3 12 I t 9 7 i t 5 9 22 30 kk 51 2100 9 3 6 h 1 c ; s 2 I t 6 5 12 9 6 8 10 13 10 6 15 111 22 2 r 1*0 17C0 6 I t 0 2 I t 6 5 5 9 9 18 5 17 11 10 13 15 11 20 3 13 13 28 1500 10 0 5 3 1 6 7 8 12 12 11 17 15 11 12 21 15 10 8 5 6 6 19 1300 li 0 1 0 5 8 11 7 11 11 30 lit 12 12 23 10 8 10 I t 3 5 3 10 1100 10 1 0 6 li 9 8 17 2C 19 26 10 13 lit 10 9 I t 2 2 1 3 01 1000 8 1 1 I t 7 7 9 7 17 21 3* 11 18 10 9 10 5 3 2 0 I t 2 98 900 10 2 5 5 11 16 7 8 21 2k 16 20 lit 7 8 3 2 2 3 1 3 0 86 800 11 3 1 lit 17 13 15 16 2 I t 12 19 18 15 13 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 76 700 29 5 lU 17 12 13 13 20 11 13 15 13 9 3 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 I t 6 U 6oo 20 9 2k 15 lit 12 21 12 15 9 23 lit 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 60 500 28 20 21 19 6 31 10 21 5 lit 19 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 UB 300 79 30 20 17 9 11 7 3 6 5 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 27 Table I Summary of Findings of the Grid ro <0 130 give zero satlsfaotlon to seventy-nine (79) subjeots, ten (10) points satlsfaotlon to thirty (30) subjeots, twenty (20) points satlsfaotlon to twenty (20) subjeots, and so forth. Correlation Analysis The first baslo ala of the present researoh waa to aeasure the nature of association that exists between proposed different aaounts of pay and expeoted utility through the magnitude estlastIon technique. The data was gathered by using the so-oalled utility grid desorlbed In the preoeedlng section. Responses to suggested aaounts of pay were correlated. The degree of association was measured by the oorrelation coefficient (r). A linear and two ourrllinear (power and logarithmic function) correla tions formulae were used to test the best ourve line for the association.^ r» 0.5672 for linear funotlon, r» .5978 for logarithmic funotlon, and r» .5999 for power funotlon (the exponent- 0,10) were obtained. The power funotlon represents a better association than the other two. The second main purpose of the study was to aocount for variance In the utility funotlon of pay as affected by some selected organizational, personal, equity- satlsfaction-fairness, and other variables In the four publlo organizations. The findings are summarized In Table 11* The results of the three kinds of funotlons TABLE II - SUMMARY OF THE ASSOCIATIONS VARIABLE GROUP LINEAR (r) LOGARITHMIC (r) POVER (r) EXP03FKT HUMBER C? SUBJECTS Size of Organization Org. #1 .61*llt . 6828 .6821 .10 8 * Org. #2 .5760 .6058 .60^2 .15 91 Org. #3 • 5763 .5992 .6007 .20 60 Org. 0k .1*862 . 5U60 .51+10 .10 1*0 i Sex Men .6211 .61*29 .6U58 .15 | llifi Women .1*288 .1+919 .1*865 .10 53 . Age 0 - 30 yean . 5118 .5586 .551*9 .10 .20 66 76 31 - 1*5 " . 3821 .6077 .6092 U6 A above .561*6 .5908 .5912 Education 0 - 12 yrs. .51*19 • 5700 .5692 .15 32 13 - 15 yrs. .1*908 . 5331 .5303 .10 78 16 A above .6358 .6615 .661*1 .15 87 TABLE II - SUMMARY OF THE ASSOCIATIONS (Cont'd) VARIABLE GROUP LINEAR (r) LOGARITHMIC (r) POWER (r) EXPONENT NUMBER OF! ST JEJECTS ! Academic Degree High School .5560 .5918 .5899 .15 59 Jr. College .1*986 .5259 .5233 .10 53 B.A. or B.S. . 5953 .6278 .6276 .15 72 M .A. or M.S, -b?71 .'Tl!*3 .7178 .2? li* Ph.D. .9958 • 9^36 -9968 1.00 1 Seniority 0 - 6 yrs. .52U . 5633 .5628 .15 113 7 -13 yrs. . 557li 5793 . 5300 .20 38 1h & above .6201 .61*66 .61*73 .20 1*8 Experience 0 - 6 yrs. .521*5 .5682 .5655 .10 77 7-13 yrs. .6206 .61*53 .61*72 .20 55 _ lU It above . 51*20 .5703 .5699 .20 6? 132 TABLE II - SUMMARY OF ASSOCIATIONS (Cont'd) VARIABLE GROUP LINEAR (r) LOGARITHMIC (r) POWER (r) EXPONENT NUMBER OF SUBJECTS Speciality Technical Administra tive Clerical • 579T • 7015 . 1196 . 6oll -72U5 .1782 .6100 .7275 .1730 .15 .25 .10 108 16 15 Union Membership Member .3839 .1615 .15 10 Non-Member .5670 .5967 .5993 .10 189 Salary $ 0-9000 .1136 .1613 .1601 .10 103 $9001-12000 .5717. .6109 .6oei .10 80 $12001 & above .6371 .6 586 .6621 .15 16 Amount of the Last Fay $ C - 50 .5168 .5512 .5532 .15 103 Increase $ 51 -100 .5981 .6311 .6317 .15 80 - $101 & above .7093 .7132 .7217 .10 - .15 16 TABLE II - TABLE OF ASSOCIATIONS (Cont’d) VARIABLE GROUP LINEAR (r) LOGARITHMIC (r) FOtfER (r) EXPONENT NUMBER OF SUBJECTS Number of Months since Last Pay Increase 0 - 6 7-12 13 A above • 5378 . 56 ’ k .8035 .5873 .5897 .8283 .5838 .5922 .8305 .10 .20 60 137 2 Fairness of Unfair .59^3 .6090 .6130 .25 63 Pay Neutral . 5895 .6226 . 6219 .15 -.20 71 (1) Fair .1*799 .53*^ .5298 .10 10 Fairness of Pay (2) Unfair 5686 . 5821 .5861 .20-.25 71* Neutral Fair .6069 .5038 - 6 U 3 3 . 5660 .6128 .5612 .15 .10 71 51 Equity of Equitable .5618 .5850 .5871 .20 79 Pay Neutral .5879 .6169 .6168 .20 67 ' Non-Equit- able .5320 . 5361 .5821 .05 53 TABLE II - SUMMARY OF THE ASSOCIATIONS (Cont'd) VARIABLE GROUP LINEAR (r) LOGARITHMIC (r) POWER (r) EXPONENT NUMBER 0! SUBJECTS Satisfaction from Pay Unsatisfied Neutral .5979 .5803 .0167 .6211 .6201 .6186 .15 .15 102 56 Satisfied . 1*7 90 .5320 .5271 .10 1*1 Belief in Union Func tion Non-Believer Neutral . 5593 .5700 .5969 ■ 5978 .5970 .5973 .15 .20 108 58 Believer .5331* .5615 .5601* .20 33 Pay Secrecy Dysfunction al .7103 .7275 .7317 .25 t ! * j * Neutral -51*72 .5790 . 5733 .20 72 Functional .1*500 .1*971* .1+930 .10 72 Contribution to Decision- Not Import ant .1*977 .5270 .5262 .20 80 Making Neutral . 6l6L .6585 .6567 .15 66 • Important .5812 .6103 .6099 .20 53 1 1 1 136 (linear, logarithmic, and power) are Indicated along with exponents of power funxtlone and the nuaber of subjeots in eaoh group. The rationale behind giving these three values of the different funetlons is to show that one funotlon represents the association better than the others. The higher the eorrelatlon of the coefficient, the better the relationship is represented. The exponents of power for* mulae are given in order to enable the reader to Judge the shape of the line of the best fit for a particular group. The nuaber of the subjeots in eaoh group are shown in the last oolunn. So, a reader will easily grasp the signifi cance or unimportance of the relationship. A dose look reveals the fact that In aost oases the power funotlon produoed the higher correlations. All the r scores are oheoked against the number of subjects in eaoh group and obtained statistical significance for each r score. Test of Empirical Hypothesis The desorlptlve and correlational analysis of the findings were suanarlaed in the previous parts of this seo- tlon. The eaplrloal hypotheses with their theoretical Justifications will be tested in this part. There are several techniques developed to deter mine the dlreotlon of the oholoe mechanism in the human behavior. The procedure so-called magnitude estimation has been used In several areas of inquiry into human 137 behavior to estimate huaan responses. Psychologists, for example, employed the teohnlque to estimate oonsensus oonoemlng Intensity or degree of suoh variables as strength of expressed attitudes, pleasantness of musloal selections, seriousness of orlmes, and other subjective dimensions for whloh stimuli can be arrayed only on non- 2 metric or nominal scales. The present research. In terms of Its methodology, was streamlined from the same philosophy. It was assumed that the subjeotlve value people attach to their pay oan be measured by this teohnlque. The expressed utility of the different amounts of pay was correlated with the amounts suggested by the researoh Instrument (the utility grid). Zt was predicted that the utility of pay In the publlo sector Is better represented by a curvilinear rela tionship than a linear funotlon (Empirical Hypothesis 1). The data were obtained by the utility grid that was described In the seotlon on methodology. The responses to speolflo aaounts of pay were correlated by linear, logarlthmlo, and power correlational formulae. The hypothesis was tested between the linear and power funotlons. The results are shown In Table III. The hypothesis was rejeeted at 0.5 level of confidence. V A R I A B L E rl r2 *1 Zg U H1 s2 HYPOTHESIS * Linear - Power .5672 . 5999 . 6Uii6 .6931 .235 199 199 ReJ ected TABLE III- Linear and Power Functions 139 Baplrloal Hypothesis XI Hypothesis II-Ai Tha Size of Organization There seeas to ba enough raaaaroh evidence Indicating that tha laportanoa of pay to workers changes according to tha typa of organisation for whloh thay work. Lawler, for example, demonstrated that aanagara who work In industrial organizations plaoa tha aost laportanoa on payi psopla who work in government aganolaa plaoa lass aaphasls on payi paopla who work in hospitals and soolal sarrloa organizations plaoa tha laast laportanoa on pay.^ Tha explanation for tha variation in tha laportanoa of pay for employees of different kinds of organizations rests on tha faot that paopla tend to work for organizations that thay i f faal will satisfy their aost Important needs. By tha saaa token, tha rasaarehar is interested In tha affaot of tha size of tha organization on axpaotad subjective value employees axpaot froa thalr pay. Hypo thesis 1Z-A assarts that tha size of tha organization affaots tha utility curve of pay. Pour different sizes of publlo organizations wara selected to test tha hypothesis, and tha results are shown in Table IV. Tha test was per formed at 0.5 level of oonfldenoe, and tha hypothesis was rejeoted. Hypothesis II-Bi Level of Salary Literature and raaaaroh in both aoonoalos and In V A R I ABLE rl r2 Z1 *2 0 51 *2 HYPOTHESIS (Org. 1) (Org. 2) .6821 .6072 .8328 .7026 .80 8 91 Rejected (Org. l) (Org. 1*) .6821 .5^10 .8328 .60U2 .28 8 Uo Rejected (Org. 1) (Org. 3) .6821 .6007 - - - B 60 Rejected (Org. 2) (Org. 3) .6072 .6007 - - - 91 60 ReJ ected (Org. 3) (Org. 1*) .6007 . 5^10 .7026 .601*2 - 91 1*0 Rejected Table IV - Siae of Organisation m organisational studios suggest that the level of pay received by an employee affeota the value of this extrinsic reward In organisations. The well-publicised Bernoullian postulate asserts that an Individual's wealth Is lnfluenoed by the utility of additional aoney so that an additional dollar has more utility for poor than rloh aen. Two studies In the area of organisational behavior have found a dlreet relationship between the aaount of pay an Indivi dual reoelves and the Importanoe of pay to that Individual. Both studies report that the more pay an Individual reoelves the less lnportant pay to hla becomes.** Another line of studies which associated pay as a aeans to satisfy huaan needs produced evidence showing that the higher the pay the aore satisfaction enployees received. The explanation for this conclusion seeas to be that pay usually Is associated with the satisfaction of 7 security and esteem needs areas , and, therefore, It seeas reasonable to suggest that the larger the pay the aore It becomes Important (the expectancy theories of motivation* the instrumentality concepts). Opshal and Dunnette pointed out, however, that it Is not clear whether the lnoreased satisfaction of higher pay is due to the pay itself or to the higher Job level, better duties, and privileges that so often acooapany higher 142 Hypothesis II-B, whloh was bom of those lines of thinking* asserts that the utility of pay ohanges according to the level of salary in public organizations. It was tested at 0.5 level of eonfldenoe and obtained a significance of difference between the expressed subjective value of pay for employees receiving less than $9»000 (low level) and $9001 and 12,000 (medium). There were no significant findings between the groups $0-9000 (low level) and $12001 and above (high level), and $9001 - $12,000 and $12001 and above. Results are shown In Table V. Hypotheses 1I-C and II-D The Last Par Increase and the Length of Time Slnoe the Last Par Increase Studies previously eonduoted suggest that a meaningful pay Increase is a funotlon of the size of the present pay. Muoh larger amounts, for example, were needed for a raise to be meaningful to the higher paid employees than those in the lower braoket of organizational pay system. It was, therefore, suggested that the importance of a raise to an employee can probably be best understood by considering the percentage increase it represents rather than by considering the absolute amount 9 of increase. The percentage might be lower, yet represents a meaningful raise for a person who receives a substantially large amount of pay. 1 V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U ■l H2 HYPOTHESIS > (0-9000) - (9001-1200< (0-9000) - (12001 & above) (9001-12000) (12001 & above) l).U60l+ .1 +601* .6081* .6081* .6621 .6621 • 1*973 .1*973 • 7057 • 7057 .7057 .7961* 1.96 1-39 103 103 80 80 16 16 Accepted Rejected Rejected Table V - Level of Salary * VJ 144 Two hypotheses about the pay In or ease ware proposed In tha present study. The first hypothesis pre dicted that the utility ourves of people for pay ohanges according to the slse of the last pay lnorease they received* The test of this hypothesis at 0* 5 level of slgnifloanoe produced the following results presented In Table VI* The second hypothesis projeoted that the length of tine slnoe the last pay lnorease affects the utility ourve of pay. The test of hypotheses at 0.5 level of sig nificance did not oonflra the hypotheses (Table VII). Hypoth..!. ii.fi Union Membership Studies on the behavior of employees who Join unions have substantiated the conclusion that dissatisfac tion with pay* along with other problems, produoed union memberships* strikes* and the filing of exoesslve numbers of grievances. A study In the psychology of Industrial oonfllot reports that employees see unions as organisations 10 whloh oan help them to obtain higher wages. A number of studies also Indicate that there is a direct relationship between Issues of pay and strikes* and excessive grievance filing behavior.To be reasonable. It would seem that since employees Join unions to obtain larger monetary rewards from organisations* union members must attaoh more value to pay than non-members. It was, therefore, hypo- V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U *1 ®2 HYPOTHESIS $ (0-50) (51-100) • 5532 .6312 .6213 . 7 U U 7 103 80 Rejected (0-50) (101- above) . 5532 .7217 .6213 .9118 0.90 103 16 Rejected (51-100) (101- above) .6312 -7217 .7^7 -9118 80 16 Rejected Table VI - The Amount of the Last Pay Increase V A R I A B L E rl T o Z1 z2 U 51 ®2 HYPOTHESIS Months (0-6) (7-12) .5838 • 5922 6o 137 Rejected (0-6) (13 & above) * i .5838 .8305 - - - 60 2 Rejected (7-12) (13 * above) i i 1 .5922 .8305 “ * 137 2 Rejected Table VII - Time since Last Pay Increase 9 *1 14? theslzed that union meabers havs a different utility ourve than do non-union aeabers. Tha taat of hypothesis did not yield a significant dlffaranea at 0.5 level. Reeulta are shown in Table VIIX. Hypotheela Il-Fi Speciality There seeas to be two groups of oonfllotlng findings about the relationship between the level of Job and the lnportanoe of pay attaohed to that partloular level. One group of studies asserts that as an employee moves towards the oenter of the deolslon-aaklng prooesa* pay becomes less Important. Blue-oollar workers seem to value aoney aore than white oollar workersi managers report 13 that pay is leas laportant than do workers. ^ Lower level aanagers plaoe more importance on pay than do middle level managers, and top level aanagers rate pay less laportant 14 than do middle-level aanagers. Yet, there Is another line of research showing that pay is more important to executives than to lower- level employees. In a survey, employees were asked to rate Jobs offering different degrees of security and pay. Executives tended to give aore weight to high salary, while 15 lower-level employees gave higher rating to security. It was, therefore, predloted from these oonfllotlng findings that the level of specialization (as defined In this study) Is one of the variables that affeot the utility V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U ®1 N2 HYPOTHESIS t * Union - Non Union ! .U615 .5993 . ^999 .6900 0.2U 10 189 ReJ ected Table VIII - Union Membership 1^9 of different amounts of pay In publio organisations. The hypothesis was tested at 0,j level of oonfldenee, and the results shown In Table IX were obtained. Demographic? Variables The seoond group of variables included In the study were so-called deaographlo variables. Sex* age, education, and experience were eeleoted for this group. The following four hypotheses In this oategory were proposed. Empirical Hypothesis III-Ai Sex So women have different attitudes toward pay than aen? This seeas to be a central question which many researohers have tried to answer. There seeas to be a trend In the findings of nost researches that pay Is more important to men than to women. For example, Centers and Bugental reported that aore aen than women ohoose pay as an Important job faotor.1^ A similar conclusion was reaohed by a group of organisational studies oonducted previously. It was, therefore, hypothesised that women have a different utility ourve for pay than do men. As the following table (Table X) indicates, the correlation for women was considerably lower. The hypothesis was tested at the 0.5 level of slgnlfloanoe and was confirmed. V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U *1 *2 HYPOTHESIS Technical-Administra tive .6100 .7275 .7089 .9160 1.28 108 1*6 Rejected Administrative-Clerk/ Secretary .7275 . 1*730 .9160 .5126 3.39 1 * 6 U5 Accepted Technical-Clerk/ Secretary .6100 .1*730 .7089 .5126 1.28 108 1*5 Rejected Table IX - Speciality Variable V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 s2 U »1 n2 HYPOTHESIS Men - Women .6558 .U86f c .7616 .5308 1.97 1U6 53 Accepted Table X - Sex Variable 152 Empirical Hypothesis III-Bi Age Studies on the relationship between age and the iaportanoe of pay seen to lndloate that as people get 18 older pay beooaes less laportant to them. There seeas to be two different sets of explanations for this tendenoy In human behavior. The first explanation Is that older people through seniority usually oooupy higher positions In the organisations as ooapared to younger groups of workers. Consequently, they reoelve higher pay whloh, In turn. Is Instrumental to the satisfaction of other needs. The second way of Interpreting this tendenoy Is that the magnitude of need Is changing as a function of age. As workers get older, they tend to put aore eaphasls 19 on seourlty and esteem needs than do younger members. In a review of the literature on the relationship between age and pay, it was suggested that wages decrease In Importance with age, at least to the age of forty, at 20 whloh time they then Increase In Importance. This pro position would Imply an opposing view to the previous explanation, and Indeed It has been Interpreted this way. 21 In essence, it is in aocordanoe with those explanations. If most people value aore seourlty and esteea as their age lnoreases, and seourlty Is seen In having enough resouroes to reoelve the same comforts, then the Iaportanoe of pay alght lnorease as they get closer to their retire- V A R I A B L £ rl r2 Z1 z2 U *1 n2 HYPOTHESIS (0-30) Years (31-1*5) .51*1*9 .6092 .621*1 .7057 0.12 66 76 Rejected (31-U5) (1*6 and above] .6092 .5912 - - - - - Rejected ! (0-30) (1*6 and above ] • 55l*9 .5912 .621*1 .6900 0.90 66 57 Rejected Table XI - Age Variable V A R I A B L E rl r 2 Z1 z2 U *1 *2 HYPOTHESIS Years ( 0-12) (13-15) * .5692 . 5303 31* 78 Rejected ( 0-12) (l6 and above) .5692 .661*1 .61*1*6 .7650 0.32 31* 87 Rejected (13-15) (l6 and above) .5303 .661*1 • 5901 .7650 1.20 78 87 Rejected Table XII - Number of Years of Education 155 sent age. The prediction In this research was that there will be a significant difference In the ehape of the utility ourve of the different amounts of pay for the different age groups* The hypothesis was tested between the age groups of 0-30 years and 31-^5 years, 0-30 years and 46 and above• and finally 31-**5 years and 46 and above. The results of the findings at 0*5 level of confidence are shown In Table XX. Hypothesis 111-Ci Education It was predloted that the utility curve of the different amounts of pay changes aocording to the level of eduoatlonal attainment of the subjeot. Two different sets of sub-variables In this category were tested. The first set consists of the numbsr of years of eduoatlon. The subjects were divided Into three groupsi 1) 0-12 years, 2) 13*15 years, and 3) aore than 16 years. The summary of the findings Is shown In Table XII. The same hypothesis was tested acoordlng to academio degrees earned. There were five groups In this category. The highest correlation reoelved was for the Ph.D. Unfortunately, there was only one person In this category. Therefore, the Ph.D. group was not Ineluded In this test. The seoond highest correlation obtained was for the M.A. group. This group was tested against three 156 oth«r groups. At 0.5 level of confidence the result* shown In Table XIIX were obtained. Smplrloal Hypothesis III-Pi Experience Although aost organisational pay designs assign an laportant role to experience In determining the level and the nature of pay for various organisational behaviors, surprisingly there has not been one study, to the author's knowledge, dealing with the Importance of and the length of experience. This variable whloh was defined as the number of years spent with one kind of Job, I.e., fifteen (15) years of secretarial experience* etc., was utilised to test Its lmpaot on the utility ourve of pay. The hypo thesis was tested at 0.5 level of confidence and the results are shown In Table XIV. 3atl*faotlon-B(|ulty-Falrnes* Variables The third group of variables In the study were so-called satisfaction-equlty-falmes* variables. The oholoe mechanism for hunan beings Involves a prooess of weighing Information aooordlng to a set of orlterla. The development of such orlterla, first. Involves a ratio of outoomes to Inputs as peroeived by the person. Inputs oan Include such Items as age, beauty, education, and effort- anything that a person regards as relevant In > f V A R I A B L E r- r2 Z1 z2 U K1 n2 HYPOTHESIS ■ High School - M.A. .5899 .7178 - - - - - ReJ ected Jr. College - M.A. . 5233 .7178 0.5791 .9035 1.02 53 lit Rejected B.S./B.A. - M.A. .6276 .7178 - - - 72 lit Rejected Ph.D. - M.A. - - - - - - - Rejected B.S./B.A.- High School - - - - - - - Rejected Table XIII - Degree of Education V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U *1 n2 HYPOTHESIS Years (0-6) (7 - 13) .5655 .61*72 .6387 .7616 0.1*6 77 55 Rejected (0-6) (ll* and above) . 5655 .5699 - - _ - - Rejected (T—13)(1^ and above) .61*72 .61*72 • * “ ReJ ected Table XIV Years of Experience the exchange for whloh he expeete a Just return. Outoones Involve pay, lntrlnelo Job eatlefactIon and many othere. Theee several inpute and outooaee are auaaed to determine the ratio and are weighed aooordlng to Iaportanoe. Ques tions of equity arise when a person oompares his ratio with oo-workers, supervisors, groups, or even with one*s own ratio. Bqulty exists when the ratio of Inputs and outoomes of the other person are higher or lower than both the inputs and outoomes of the person. Dissatisfaction oeours when ratios are unequal, and It is assumed that the greater the discrepancy between ratios, the greater the Inequity and the pressure to reduoe It. Thus, a person will feel Inequity If he expends high effort for low out oomes (high/low) while his oo-worker gets high outoomes for the same amount of effort (hlgh/hlgh), but he will be even aore bothered if the oo-worker obtains his high out- 22 oome with low inputs (low/high). It Is also assumed that the threshold for feelings of Inequity Is higher when a person Is over-rewarded than when his rewards are lnaequatq Thus, the feeling of satisfaction, equity and fairness are all subjeotlve properties of the human oholoe mechanism and are quite olosely related to eaoh other In this prooess. Therefore, It was predicted that an employee's satisfaction, his feeling of fairness toward his pay and equltablllty of the reward affeot the expected subjective value of pay (utility). 160 Empirical Hypothesis IV-Ai Falrnm It was hypothesized that the stronger the feelings of fairness toward pay, the less subjeotlve expeoted value is attaohed to the pay. There were two statements In the questionnaire whloh alaed at sensing feelings of fairness toward extrinsic rewards In organiza- tlons. The first statement was "I an now fairly paid". The seoond was stated as "the amount of pay aatohes the contribution I make to ay organization". The responses were reoorded on a straight line, the middle representing neutral feelings and the two extreme ends fairness and unfairness. The hypotheses were tested at 0,5 level of slgnlfloanoe and the results are shown In Table XV. B » p lr lo * l H ypoth»»l» IV -B i fa u lty The projection about equity was that If a publlo employee sees his pay as being equitable he has a dif ferent utility ourve for pay than an employee who feels that his pay is inequitable or has neutral attitude toward his pay. The hypothesis was tested at 0,5 level and there was no significant difference. Em>lrlo»l Bypoth.,1, iIVjjCi Sat^sfaot^og Peelings of satisfaction from pay were predloted as having effeots on utility of pay. Employees who are not satisfied with their pay might have a different utility V A R I A B L E i rl r2 Z1 z2 U H1 h2 HYPOTHESIS Heutral - Fair .6219 .5298 .7284 .5901 1.10 71 68 Rejected Unfair - Heutral .6130 .6219 - - - 68 71 Rejected Unfair - Fair . 6130 . 5298 - - - 68 60 Rejected Heutral - Fair .6428 . 5612 - - - Rejected Table XV Fairness Variable V A R I A B L E rl r 2 Z1 z2 U *1 n2 HYPOTHESIS * Inequity - Equity .5871 .5821 _ . Rejected Inequity - Neutral . 5871 .6168 - - - - - Rejected Neutral - Equity .5871 .6168 Rejected Table XVI - Equity Variable 163 ourve than Individuals who slthsr receive satisfaction froa thslr pay or have nsutral feelings toward It. The hypothesis was tested at 0,5 level of slgnlfloanoe and the results are shown in Table XVII. Eaplrloal Hypothesis V-Ai In Union Functionality Three hypotheses were Included in this part of the study. The main theme of these variables is the In volvement In the deoision-making prooess. It was assumed in the first hypothesis that employees Join unions beoause they desire to gain countervailing power against management In designing organ 1satlonal policies and rules. Therefore, the belief that such functionality of unions affeots the utility characteristics of pay In public organizations was predicted, The hypothesis was tested at 0.3 level of sig nificance and the results are shown In Table XVIII, Empirical Hypothesis V-Bi Pay Secrecy The second hypothesis In this eategory was about the funetlon of pay seoreoy. There seem to be oonfllotlng views about the subject. Most aanagers argue that pay seoreoy at the managerial level prevents managers from 23 making an effmotive pay comparison. Yet evldenee indi cates that when pay seoreoy exists, people base their comparisons on Inaccurate information, the tendency then In V A R I A B L E rl r2 *1 *2 U H1 n2 HYPOTHESIS • Dissatisfled-Satisfied .6201 .5271 .7283 . 58U6 0.57 102 lil Rejected Dissatisfied- Neutral .6201 .6186 - - - 102 56 Rejected Satisfied - Neutral . 5271 .6186 - - - Ul 56 Rejected Table XVII Satisfaction Variable V A R I A B L E r-. -L r2 S1 z2 TJ H1 n2 HYPOTHESIS Unbelievers-Neutral .5970 .5973 108 58 Rejected Unbeliever8-Believers .5969 .569^ - - - 108 33 Rejected Heutral-Believers . 5973 .5601* * — w 58 33 Rejected Table XVIII Belief in Unions 166 such « situation appears to be that aanagara overestimate their subordinate pay or lnooae of their peer group. Openness about pay night lead an employee to gain an aoourate perception about the pay struoture of an organisation. A study reported that enployees who had aoourate lnforaatlon about the pay rates In a company were more favorable to the idea of nerlt pay than were those 24 who had little lnforaatlon. Thus, It seeas a reasonable prediction that people who see pay seoreoy as being dys- functional have a different utility ourve for pay than those who see it as funotlonal or have a neutral attitude toward how pay is determined. The hypothesis was tested at 0.5 level of confidence. The results are shown in Table XIX. Empirical Hypothesis V-Ci Involvement In Polloy Malting The third hypothesis was about the self-claimed contribution to the formation of organisational policies. It was projeoted that employees who feel that they con tribute a significant amount to polloy formation have a different utility curve for pay than those who feel they do not contribute or are neutral toward this process. The test was performed at 0.5 level of significance and gave the results shown in Table XX. ' V A R I A B L E rl r2 21 22 U *1 n2 HYPOTHESIS Dysfunctional-Function al • 7317 .1+938 .9330 .51+13 V.57 55 72 Accepted Dysfunctional-Neutral .7317 . 5783 .9330 .6595 2.23 55 72 Accepted Neutral-Functional .5783 .1+938 .6595 .51+13 0.1+8 72 72 Rejected Table XIX - Pay Secrecy V A R I A B L E rl r2 Z1 z2 U *1 *2 HYPOTHESIS Unimportant-Neutral .5262 .6567 .58L6 .7893 l.UU 80 66 Rejected Important-Unimportant . 5262 *6099 - - - 80 53 Rejected Neutral-Important .6567 .6099 66 53 Rejected Table XX - Decision-Making 169 SUMMARY OF THE TESTS OF HYPOTHESES Empirical Hypothesesi Hypothesis Number Variable Hypothesis I Hypothesis II-A Hypothesis II-B Hypothesis IX-C Hypothesis II-D Hypothesis II-E Hypothesis II-F The Utility of Pay Organisational Variables! Slse of Organisation Level of Salary The Aaount of Last Pay Increase The Length of Tlae slnoe last Pay Inorease Union Menbershlp Speciality Hypothesis III-A Hypothesis III-B Hypothesis III-C Denographlo Variables Sex Age Number of Years of Education Hypothesis XII-D Experience Result Rejected Rejected Accepted Rejeoted Rejected Rejeoted Aooepted Aooepted Rejeoted Rejected Rejeoted Hypothesis IV~A Fairness Hypothesis IV-B Equity Hypothesis IV-C Satisfaction Rejeoted Rejected Rejeoted 170 Hypothesis Number Variable Result Hypothesis V-A Hypothesis V-B Hypothesis V-C Belief In Union Functionality Pay Seoreoy Involvement in Polley Pormatlon Rejeoted Aooepted Rejeoted The desorlptlve* correlational analysis and the results of testa of the hypotheses were systeaatloally presented in this ehapter. Discussion and Implications of the findings will be the subject of the following ohapter* NOTES CHAPTER IV 1. Some characteristic* of these functions can be summarized as follows* Linear function* When pairs of (x,y) values fall Into a function thatoan be plotted as a straight line, the function is said to be linear. Such funotlons have extreme ly slaple rules* whloh are always of the fora y* bx+a, where b and a are two constant nunbers. Any changes in the x value oauses the saae proportioned ohange in the y value. Curvilinear function* When pairs of (x,y) values fall into a runotlon that oan be plotted as a curvilinear line* the function is considered to be curvilinear. An exaaple night be that an independent variable x is identified and various values of x are chosen in advance to be presented in the experlnent. Ordinarily• eaoh x value corresponds to an experlaental treatment administered in specific quantity. A regression problem where a curvilinear rule for prediction might make sense is the following* There is an investigation of the effect of environmental noise on the human subject's ability to perform a oomplex task. Several experimental treatments are planned, eaoh treatment differing from the other only in the intensity of noise present while the subjeot performs the task. Eaoh treat ment represents a one-step interval in the intensity of noise within a particular range. A group of some N sub jects chosen at random are assigned at random to the various groups, with N subJsots per group. In the experi ment proper, each subjeot works on the same problem indivi dually in the presence of the assigned intensity of back ground noise. The dependent variable is thus a subjective score on the task, and the independent variable is the noise intensity. The power ourve rises for increasing values of ui and approaches 1.00 for very large values, 2. S, S. Stevens, "A Metric for the Soolal Consensus," Sclenoe. Vol. 151, 1962, pp. 530 - 541, 3. E. E. Lawler III, "The Mythology of Management Compensation," California Management Review. Vol. 9* 1966, pp. 11 - 22. 4. Victor H. Vroom. Motivation in Management (New York* Amerloan Foundation Tof NaAIgttfht iieseaf&h, 172 5. U was obtained through the foraula Ub *1 4 g2 whara e« ■ tha naarast s value for the correlation x - 1 coefficient of tha first group in tha test* *2 B — — tha naarast s value for tha correlation ooefflc- Nx N2 lent of tha second group in tha test. 6. E. E. Lawler and L. H. Porter, "Perception Regarding Management Compensation," Industrial Halations. Vol. 3* 1963* PP. *1 - **9. ?• 8. R. L. Opshal and M. D. Dunnette, "The Role of Financial Compensation in Industrial Motivation," Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 66, 1966, pp. 94 - 118. 9. 3. Zedech and P. C. Smith, "A Psychological Determination of Equitable Payment* A Methodological Studyj" Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 52, 1966, 10. R. Stagner, Psychology of Industrial Confllot (New York* Wiley and Sons, Ino., x95^J. 11. J. James, "An Experimental Study of Tensions In Work Behavior." UC Publications, Vol. 2. 1951. pp. 203- 242. 12. C. H. Cangull, "An Inquiry into Incentives for Workers In an Engineering Factory." Indian Journal of Soolal Work. Vol. 15, 1954, pp. 30 - 40. 13* B, Centers and D. B. Bugental, "Intrinsic and Extrlnsio Job Motivation among Different Segments of the Working Population," Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 50, 1966, pp. 193 - 197. 1 . E. E. Lawler and L. W. Porter, Op . Clt. 15. "Fortune Survey," Fortune. Vol. 35, 1947* p. 10. 16. R. Centers and D. E. Bugental, Op. Clt. 17. See for examples F. Hersberg et. al. The Motivation to WCrk (New Yorki Chapman and Rail,19351« 18. D. N. Lahlrl and P. K. Choudhurl, "Perceived Importance of Job Faotors by Teohnloal and Non-teohnloal Employees," Personnel Psychology. Vol. 19* 1986, pp. 287- 296. 173 19* L. w. Gruenfeld, "A Study of tho Mot1rutIon of Industrial Supervisors,M Psrsonnsl Psrohology. Vol. 15* 1962, pp. 303 - 314| L. W. Portor, "Job Attitudes in Management* Feroeived Iaportanoe of Needs as a Function of Job Level." Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 4?, 1963, pp. 141-145. 20. F, Hersberg et. al. Job Attitudes« Review of Hesearoh and Opinion (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1 the Psychological Service of Pittsburgh, 1957). 21. E. B. Lawler, Op. Clt. 22. J. Staoy Adams, * Effects of Overpayment," J^ugnal of^ysgnallty and Soolal Psychology. Vol. 10, 23. E. E. Lawler, Op. Clt.. pp. 11-12. 24. M. Beer and 0. J. Gery, "Pay System Preference and Their Correlates," (a paper presented at A.P.A. Con vention, San Franolsoo, August 1966), CHAPTER V DISCUSSION OP THE FINDINGS Studying the choice mechanism for Individuals seems to bo quit# an Intriguing subjeot* Tho probloa in volves not only the Incapability of the reeearoher to observe and study dlreotly the subjeotlve processes going on In the alnds of Individuals* but also controlling extraneous lapaots on the subjects and aeasurlng the responses by a meaningful yardstlok. Psyohologlsts, who admittedly confess their Inability to fully oonstruet reliable tools for suoh purposes* have developed certain teohnlques. Magnitude estlaatlon Bethod is one of these that is often used to project a trend in the human selection 1 prooeas among available alternatives. As mentioned above* the teohnlques constituted the backbone of the present study as well. We also lndloated that the theory of oholoe contains two sets of Independent variables. These aret a) the utility of the outcomes* and b) the likelihood of 2 outcomes. Most aotlvatlon-to-work aodels* whloh were presented In detail In the review of literature seotlon* operate basloally on the same premises, studied are the effort*outoome probability* outoome-reward probability and m 175 the attractiveness of these outoomes to determine the 3 direction of human behavior In work situations* Thus, ths thsorlss of eholoe and of th# botlration-to-work ars essentially dealing with human aeoeptanoe or avoldmnoe behavior In certain oontezts* Assuming this oonneetlan, the study Intended to measure the utility of different amounts of pay in publlo organisations and to aoeount for variance in the subjective expeoted value of these amounts as affeoted by some vari ables indicated In the util1ty-motlvation-to-work model. Studies on the human eholoe mechanism lndloate that subjective magnitude is a power function of stimulus magnitude. Varlanoe then beoomes the simple principle that equal stimuli rations produoe equal subjeotlve ratios. This proposition has been substantiated by research per formed on the subjeotlve value of money. For example( the geometrlo means of the Judged magnitude of seriousness of orlmlnal offenses involving money grew as a very preelee power function of the amount of money stolen. Based upon these and related researoh, the author of the study projeoted that employees of publlo organisa tions perceive the utility of different amounts of pay as a curvilinear relationship rather than a monotonloally ohanging funotlon. The correlation analysis of the data In terms of three functions (linear• logarithmic» and power) yielded 176 a batter strength of association (r» 60) for the power formula, alnee the statistical rule 1st the higher the r soore the better It represents the relationship. The preliminary inquiry produced a result whioh is in line with many magnitude estlastIon studies. One of the aaln differences between the results of the present research and others ^ is that the r soore of our study (the Pearson ooeffiolent correlation) is low. Such a low coefficient of correlation oan be attributed to the sethodology of the study. Due to soae initial problens with the questionnaire as it was used by Giles and Barrett and Sohuster and Collettl, we have aodlfied It, The modified questionnaire whleh was oalled the "Utility Grid" suggested deolaal lnoreases In the "utilities" (satisfac tion) such as 10, 20, 30, ... and so forth. 3a may hare been suboonsolously Influenced by assigned utiles growing in equal interval value. let the better explanation for a low r soore seems to relate to the characteristics of the population inoluded in the study. Most studies in related areas have ohosen their subjeots either among oollege students who have little or no experience in making and handling money or from highly teohnloal and sophisticated groups such as engineers and accountants, Zt is naturally expeoted that these people do more calculation because of their training and eduoatlon than those who were randomly seleoted from an 177 organisation or othar roal Ufa situation, Thasa kinds of saaplss lnoluda not only sophlstioatad and highly aduoatad individuals, tout also lass aduoatad and comparatively lass ooaplax parsons. Therefore, thalr inclusion in tha re- saaroh appears to ba another factor whloh pronoted to tha low correlation. Another aost probable explanation can ba Inferred from tha frequencies of responses shown on tha utility- grid, Tha grid was dlvldldad in four equal quadrants In whloh tha number of responses was added up. Tha first quadrant includes tha dollar amounts ranging from 1300 to $1000 and tha satisfaction points from 0 to 100i tha second quadrant lnoludes tha same dollar amount and satisfaction points from 110 up to 209i the third quadrant includes tha dollar amounts from $1100 to $3000 and satisfaction points fron 110 to 209, and tha fourth quadrant Includes tha same dollar amount and satisfaction points ranging from 0 to 100, Tha situation can ba deploted as follows* $ lioo - $ 3000 $ lioo - $ 3000 0 - 100 110 - 209 ^ points ^ points $ 300 - $ 1000 $ 300 - $ 1000 0 - 100 110 - 209 points points 1 2 Figure IX - Frequencies on the Utility Grid 170 If we had a perfect correlation* we would haw* approximately tha aaaa nuabar of frequencies In quadrants number 2 and 4, and nuabar 1 and 3. km aaan in tha follow ing figure* wa hare obtained different numbers of frequen cies in eaoh quadrant. $3000 504 897 36* 64* $1000 4 3 1137 264 $ 300 81* 1 19* 2 Figure X Frequencies obtained Examination of figures in aqoh quadrant reveals two trends in the utility analysis of the different amount of pay in publlo organisations. The majority of reaponses to the dollar amounte ranging from 0300 to $1000 were recorded in the first quadrant (81*), In the third quad* rant* however* only 64* of the responses were reoorded. This can be Interpreted to mean that people in the publlo organisations reoelve the equal amount of satlsfmotion as the proportion of pay inoreases up to $1000* and then decreasing aaount of satlsfaotlon as the dollar aaount Inoreases. 179 Another way of analyzing It, although only 19% of the frequenolea fell in the aeoond quadrant* le that alaoat twloe that 36% wae recorded in the fourth quadrant. This suggests that employees In publlo organizations reoelred less utility froa unaoeeptably low and oonslderably high 6 aaount of pay. The frequenoy distribution explains the shape of the ourre obtained for the association between different aaounts of pay and expressed satisfaction (utiles). The study of the ourre shows that the funotlon rlaes as a straight line up to the $1000 and then ourres downward. The ourrlng down becoaes sharper after $1700. Unfortunately there are only three ralues ($2100* $2500* and $3000) above this aaount. Therefore* the oonoarlty of the ourre does not oarry considerable weight in testing the shape of the ourre. For a future study* It would seen worthwhile to lnolude large aaounts of suggested pay. Indeed* the test of the first eaplrloal hypothesis whloh states that the relationship between the different aaounts of dollars and their utilities is a ourrilinear funotlon* did not give support to the hypothesle. The laok of support night be attributed to the faots that as mentioned In the previous paragraph* 1) there were only three aaounts whloh night be oonsldered by eaployees as oonslderably high pay lnorease* 2) the utility grid night 180 have influenced the oholoe aeohanlsa, end 3) above all, individuals eight here eeeooieted reeeonehle aaounte of lnoreeee (from $300 - $1700) with other values eueh ee 7 higher poeltlon end other organisational benefits. In faot, an extensive review of the literature on the role of flnanaolal ooapensatlon in industrial motivation by opsahl and Dunettee pointed out that reoent researohes do not clarify if the satisfaction people receive Is from their pay alone or pay plus other elements, I.e., Job oontent, Job context, eto. They suggest that the question "how do people value money?" will not be answered aoourately by simply asking thee. Their oonoluslon, therefore, is that In order to gain a real understanding of people's prefe- 8 renoes, we must observe thee In aetual eholoe situations. The findings of the present researoh are not consistent with the findings of Giles and Barrett for a private electronic oonpany, and of Schuster and Collett1 for a publlo research organisation. The first researoh was performed aeong sixty-four professional level personnel (aostly engineers) at a aedlum slsed electronics oompany. Their findings gave vest support to the power funotlon of association with exponents 2,15 to 2,29* The seoond researoh was oonduoted among professional research person nel (one-hundred 3s) in a public organisation. Their data produced support for lnoreaslng power funotlon (no aentlon 9 of the exponent). Therefore, they Inferred that more and 181 more utility (••• figure XI). The present researoh Inclu ded 199 Ss from different levels of the hierarchy and with different educational attainments. In aplte of the diver sities in the oharaoterlstios of the subjeots, the result gave alaoat linearly lnoreasing aaaoolatlon up to $1100, then a slightly downward ourre to $1700, followed by a sharp ourre after $1700. This night be Interpreted as not only giving support to the Adaas* formulation of the equity principle, i.e., the input-output ratio, but also to the Jacques's idea of "unrecognized system of norms of fair payment for a given level of work, unoonsolous know- 10 ledge of these norma being shared among the population"♦ It might be a possibility that the subjects' minds funotlon according to the Jacques's prlnolple, i.e., every employee has certain communicated norms about how much pay lnorease he should reoelve within a certain period of time. There is some evldenoe to lndloate that employee peroeptlon of what constitutes a meaningful raise varied 11 as a funotlon of their present pay. The values in the linearly inoreaslng part of the line seem to be in close approximation to what a meaningful aaount of raise should be for the employees. When the line starts curving down ward, the amount of suggested pay increases. The seoond part of the Sohuster and Collettl study was oonduoted in a private professional research organization. They also Included 100 professionals from this ooapany. They pointed 182 Pay Fairness-Pay Satisfaction Perceptions as a Function of Pay Magnitude Private Organisation Publlo Organisation $ 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 Figure XI The Utility Curve of the Different Aaounts of Pay for a Publlo and a Private Organisation by Jay R* Schuster and Jerone A, Collett1. * 183 out that 3s in tha private organizations ra port an lnoreas- lns peroelved utility In thalr pay lnoraaaaa whloh level off at tha $1000 to $1*300 level and tharaaftar daoraaaa to a point whara additional aonay appaara to have ragrea- alva utility* Xt aaaaa froa tha explanation and tha ahapa of tha curve thay dlaplayad for tha private organi sation that It raaaablaa vary auoh tha llna of baat fit produead by tha praaant raaaaroh. Tharofora* dlffaranoaa In tha llna of baat fit ahould not ba Infarrad to ba tha raault of publlo vs. private oharaotarlatlea of organlza- tlona, but rathar a funotlon of tha aubjaota lnoludad in tha raaaaroh. (Thla point will ba dlaouaaad latar In thla aaotlon undar oonaldaratlon of tha lapaot of organizational, aoolo-daaographle, aqulty-aatlafaotlon-falrnaaa pareaptlona and ao-oallad “other" variables on tha utility ourve.) Indaad, Schuater and Collattl attributed tha aaparata findinga for publlo and private organisations to auoh ▼arlablaa as tha dlffaranoaa In tha pay praetleaa or organizational tha dlffaranoaa In tha attituda of indivi dual a toward organlzatlona In taraa of naad fulminant, tha dlffaranoaa In previous axparlanoa with pay, ato., whloh ara in faot supportive of our vlaw. In auaaary, thara aaaa to ba two diatlnot explana tions for tha flndlnga about tha utility of tha different aaounta of auggaatad pay (in tha fora of pay lnoraaaaa). 184 The first lnferenoe can be Btd« aooordlng to the tost of tho hypothesis for ourvllinsarlty. Tho data faro support to ths llnaar funotlon, whloh suggests that pay utility la psroslTsd as a aonotonloally Increasing funotlon of pay aagnltudes In those publlo organisations. The seeond Interpretation oan be aade froa the line of best fit. It appears to lndloate that the line increases linearly up to the aaount of $1700 and etarts ourvlng downward oonslderably thereafter. Therefore* the findings are In line with those of Sohuster and Collettl relative to the private organisation In their study. Consistent with the second purpose of the study* a dlsoussion will be presented of the test of hypotheses on the effects of the four sets of the variables on the utility ourve lnoluded in the utllity-eotlvatlon-to-work nodel. Bsoept for the hypotheses projeoting significant difference in the utility ourves ofi 1) low and aedlua level salaried eaployees (II-B), 2) administrative and olerloal/secretarlal personnel (II-F)* 3) aen and woaen (III-A), 4) the groups that see pay seoreoy as dysfuno- tlonal~funotlonal and functional-neutral (V-B), all other hypotheses were not supported by the data. There seea to be several possible explanations for the low nuaber of confirmed hypotheses. One explanation nay be based upon the selection of variables. These variables aay have little or no effeot on the laportanee that Is attached to 1*5 different Mounts of pay by individuals, and other vari ables whloh nay ba significant night ba Biasing, Another speculative explanation Is the tendency for Individuals to give socially aooeptable responses when asked to Indi cate their feelings about different aspeots of pay. A respondent way not readily adnlt that he seeks extra pay without feeling sone oonfllet of oonsclenoe. The results also night be attributed to probleas with self-reporting teohnlques. One difficulty with these aethods is that the relnforoenent contingencies present In filling out a self-report questionnaire are quite different froa those in the real life situation, Thus* in the real life situation perceptions about pay are relnforoed by nany faotors of the work environment suoh as organisational role and the pay of one's colleagues, Suoh conditions are not present In an hypothetical situation* as In this research, Anong the hypotheses whloh test the effeots of organisational variables* two were oonflmed. The first one la the hypothesis projecting that there Is a signifi cant difference In the shape of the utility ourve of low and aedlua pay groups. Although the data produoed a correlation ooefflolent of x* 66 for the Ss In the high Inooae level* whloh Is larger than the r score of the aedlua (r» 61) and low level (r* b6) Ss* the hypotheses between high/low and hlgh/aedlua were not oonflraed. The 186 lack of support for these categories stems from the foot that there are only sixteen (16) Ss in the high level Income braoket group. As a result of the snail nunber of subjects, the test did not produce a significant difference* However, if the aedlua and high level wage groups are ooa- blned and tested against the low level groups, a signifi cant difference in the shape of the utility ourves of these groups (Ub 3,12 and P is greater than 0.05) is obtained. The hypothesis for the effect of the wage level can be reconstructed as low/nedlua-hlgh. Interpretations about the findings will be nade aooording to this reconstructed hypothesis. The coefficient correlation for the low-salaried employees (rw 46) is considerably snaller than the r soore of aedlun-hlgh salaried employees (4» 63.5), A literal Interpretation of the result leads to the conclusion that people with low salaries ($9000 or below) reoelve less utility as the amount of salary increases. Medium-high salaried employees ($9001 and above), on the other hand, receive more utility as the amounts increase. This con clusion contradicts well-publicised Bernoulli's thsoren that an individual's wealth Influences the utility of additional money so that en additional dollar has more 12 utility for a poor than a rich man. 18? A ncond ray of explaining thla discrepancy la to look at tho aooond hypothesis oonflraed In thla oatagory. Tho study obtalnod a significant dlfforoneo in tho utility analyala for tho adalnlatratlvo and aoorotarlal/olorloal group*. Korn high salaried employees oooupy adalnlatratlvo and teehnloal positions In tho organlcatIona. Tho aoorotarlal/olorloal personnel, however« fall aalnly In tho low salaried oatogory. At thla point, It aooaod an appropriate procedure to ooablne tho aooroa of adalnlatratlvo and teohnloal onployoos and to tost against olorloal/aoorotarlal groups, as wo did In tho oaao of low salaried people versus tho ooablnatlon of aedlua and high salaried people. The rationale behind ooablnlng these soores Is that aost adalnlstratlve personnel are at the saae tine technically oriented, slnoe aost of thea were proaoted froa lower eohelons, teohnloal Jobs on the hlerarohy. The test of the hypothesis between olerloal/seoretarlal and adalnls- tretive/technical personnel produoed a significant dif ference (U« 2.7) at 0.05 level. Biployees In the olerloal/ secretarial category alght have felt that they deserve up to only a certain aaount (for exaaple, 41000) beoause the noras for pay Increase praotloes do not natch their expec tations, I.e., they are not oognltlvely in allgnaent with 13 the Increase. Adalnlstratlve/teohnloal personnel, however, see larger aaounts as appropriate pay Inoreases 188 whloh they deserve slnoe they ere not held responsible for getting the Job done In the organization. The third hypothesis oonflraed by the data also strengthens Interpretations made for the previous hypo* thesis. The hypothesis predloted that there is a signifi cant dlfferenoe between the utility ourve of aen and woaen for the different suggested nagnitudea of pay. The obtalmd result was slgnlfloantly different (r» 66 for aen. r» 1*9 for women, U- 1.97. and P is greater than 0.05), The finding oan be attributed to the dlfferenoea in fulfillment. Thus, pay be Interpreted as being less important for woaen beoause it is not highly instrumental In the satisfaction of needs whloh rank high (e.g., social), while it Is Instrumental for the satisfaction of aen*s needs whloh 14 rank high (e.g., esteem). Host aen in organizations studied oooupy adminis trative and teohnloal positions, reoelve largvamounts of pay than woaen who are mostly in secretarial/clerical groups. Therefore, the dlfferenoe in the shape of the ourve is not only due to sex but aost probably to their low position In the hierarohy, to low level of salary, and to other organizational variables whloh oause people to expeot small pay Inoreases commensurate with their role in 15 the organization. 189 In summary. the findings of these three oonflraed hypotheses (II-B. II-F, and III-A} lead to the oonoluslon that the utility of different amounts of pay Is aost lnfluenoed by the else of present pay. the organisational role In hlerarehy. and to a Halted degree, by sex. The utility ourves aooordlng to these hypotheses oan be dram as In the following figure (Figure XII). The utlllty-motlvmtion-to-work aodel included the pay seoreoy variable because It oauses satisfaction or dissatisfaction under certain conditions. Lawler lndloated that pay seoreoy at the managerial level prevents managers from making unsatisfactory pay comparisons, thereby 16 minimising pay dlseatlsfaotIon. If pay seoreoy leads to the over-estlmatlon of the pay of others, pay satis faction should be lower with seoreoy. whereas If It leads to the underestimation of the pay of oomparable employees, oatlsfaotIon should be higher with seoreoy. Slnoe the merit system and open pay praotloes are the standard In the publlo seotor. we expeoted that people who see pay seoreoy as dysfunotlonal should have a different utility ourve than those who see pay seoreoy as funotlonal. The test of the hypothesis (r» 73 for funetlonal. r» 58 for neutral and r» 49 for dysfunotlonal groups) produoed a significant dlfferenoe In the pay utility ourves of these groups. The findings are In line 17 with the oonoluslon reaehed by Beer and Gary. They 200 l80 120 100 80 FIGURE XII The Utility Curve of the Suggested Amounts of Pay In Four Public Orga nizations . {The linear line for visual aid) 20 i. j x ■ * A I 1 I i I 200 Uoo 600 800 1000 1200 1U00 16001800 2000 2100 2200 2U00 2600 Suggested Different Amounts of Dollars 190 191 found that employee# who had aoourete Information about the pay rates In a ooapany were wore favorable to the Idea of aerlt pay than were those who had little Information, The exoeptlon In the present researoh was to obtain a higher ooefflolent oorrelatlon for the group who saw the seoreoy as being dysfunctional and a lower r seore for the group who saw It as functional. The oonflraatlon of the antlolpated result ean be attributed to the merit system whloh provides Job as well as promotional seourlty for the employees. Another result supporting this view is the small number of respondents who reported of union membership. One of the prevailing soolal foroes In the growth of unions In an organisation usually Is attributed to laok of seou rlty among the employees. The sample had only ten union members out of 199 3s (5%)• It the previous statements are oorreot, then we may Infer that the merit system is satisfying the seourlty needs of these employees. Overall evaluation of thefindings suggests that the utility of the different slses of pay Is a linear function. This Is to say that the amount of Increase In dollar amounts produces the same amount of Increments of utility In publle organisations. Yet, study of the curve revealed that the linear funotlon holds up to $1700 then ourves downward. As mentioned above* there are only three valuesafter this amount ($1200, $2500, and $3000), Thereftxre, the deoreaalng ourvllinearity was not sufficient aanifeat to affeot the reaulta of the teat. The findings alao Indicate that the utility or the different slses of pay la affeeted by the level of preaent pay, the level of hierarchy, sex, and the preaenoe or abaenoe of pay aeoreoy. The reat of the varlablea Included in the aodel did not produce a significant Im pact on the utility. Thus, It can be oonoluded that the dlfferenoee In the peroelved utility of pay aay not be due to the publlo or private oharaoteriatlca of the organisations, but to aoae organisational and soolo-deaognaphlo variables. Henoeforth, there is a need for more testing of the utility of pay inoreaents as related to motlvatlon-to-work. Implication of the Findings and Conclusion “Does pay motivate?" la a puzzling question for the student of behavioral aclencea. On the one hand, we are constantly told that money la no longer an important aspeot of work In an affluent society. What la Important In motivating workers la the recognition of their ego, social needs, and Job factors other than pay. Therefore, It la suggested that organisations should help individuals grow on-the-job and aid them to realise their potential X 93 so that they may satisfy esteem and other higher needs. let, another group of students of organisational behavior argues that If the goal of organisations Is survival, then we need to Measure and evaluate the per- foraanoe of organisations on the basis of an eoonoalo yard stick (lnput-output ratio). This positivist attitude gives considerable weight to the role of pay In notlvatlug people-to-work. Such was the beginning of solentlflo management, whloh Is based essentially on the aesuaptlon that workers will put forth extra effort on the Job to aaxlalse their eoonoalo gains. Neither the first approach whloh emphasises the unimportance of pay nor the seoond aethod whloh utilises pay as the only souroe of motivation, refleets the organi zational realities of our days, Vhat appears appropriate Is to reoognlse the need for reeeareh In organizational behavior whloh recognizes Job oontezt as well as Job content and gives thea equal treatment In studies. No doubt the expenditure of large amounts of money for compensation has relevanee to behavioral theory, probably there Is less systeaatlo research In this area than In any other field related to worker perforaanoe. For exaaple, we know very little about how pay either lnteraots with other faotors or aots alone to affeot Job behavior. m In this study* we have lntsndsd to Identify the motivational role of the pay in a oertaln context. The oognltlvely oriented theories of motivation tell us that motlvatlon-to-aot Is a funotlon of the subjective expeoted ▼alue of an objeot (In our oase, pay) sultlplled by objective probabilities. The probability of obtaining an objeot ohanges from +1 (sure) to -1 (Impossible). The subjective expeoted value (utility) also ehanges from *1 (trying not to obtain) to +1 (desiring to obtain lOOJf). The oloeer the utility of am object la to +1, the better the motivator. Vloe versa, the oloeer It Is to -1, the object is less of a motivator. In the oase of pay, the Issue Is to lnorease Its attractiveness towards +1, so that Its valence will produoe a reasonable amount of motlvat1on to -work. The model proposed In the first chapter has conceptually shown that the utility of pay (the Intrinsic reward ohareoterlsties of pay) Is an important part of the model. Based on this assumption, the present research tested the utility of different amounts of pay aooordlng to some work and sooio-demographic variables. The results have been discussed in previous parts of this study. The findings have Implications In three different but Interrelated areas of organizational behavior. One area oonoems the methodological Issues In the studies of organizations. It is needless to point out that most 195 researoh studies In ths behavioral solenoes are suffering froa the absenoe of reliable tools. The methodology of the present researoh Is not a perfeot one. It Is oontaml- nated not only by the researoher's Inability to oonstruot a better yardstick but also by the problems existing In behavioral researoh. Yet. one oontrlbutlon to the researoh methodology Is that the measurement teohnlque utilised in the study narrowed the problem of unreliability, with some modification and Improvement, the utility grid can serve well for the purpose In the future. A second area of the implications froa the findings relates to the motivation*to-work model. Most of the variables inoluded In the model were seleoted not socording to some systematic orientation, but rather on the basis of 1) the author's perception. 2) what some other models inoluded. and 3) ease of quantifloation. In the future, variables to be included In a model should be selected aocording to some systematic theoretical orienta tion In terms of ohoIce theory. Although most hypotheses were not oonflrmed. the ones which were aocepted lndloate a trend In the utility analysis of pay. It Is suggested that separate utility analyses be oondueted for persons at different levels of the hlerarohy because perceptions about pay magnitudes vary with organisational level. For example. Individuals struggling to advance In the hierarchy might equate more money with achievement. For them, pay serves 196 not only as a means of satisfying needs dlreotly, tut also as a surrogate for othar outcomes (tha lnatruaantallty oonoept). Indeed, tha higher tha pay and tha position, tha greater tha utility of lnoraasad payi conversely, employees In tha lower aohalons tand to express lower utility for largar amounts of pay. Tha lntarpratatlon was that azpaotatlons for pay are,to a large extant, tha funotlon of tha present pay and organisational oliaate In pay practices. Preparing tha organisational oliaate for motivational penetration aaaas to be one of tha ehallenges of tha 70*s for public organisations. On tha one hand, public organisations are burdened with tha responsibility of bringing Justloe to soolal Inequality In employment (e.g., tha "new earerr"). On tha othar hand, tha Aaerloan eoonoay la faced with an Increasing rata of loss In world market competitive advantages (tha question of productivity). Soaring Inflation and tha ever*increasing burden on tax payers are two othar aspeots of this syndrome. Thus, publle administrators of tha 70's are not working in an atmosphere of affluenoe, but rather an aver tightening olrola of constraints. Host ourrent pay praotloes do not refleot these oondltlons, as do not other behavioral aspects of compensation for organisational work. Specifi cally, perceptions of publle employees about pay are rarely Inoluded In polloy setting and negotiations beoause of laok of solid research In the field. 197 Changing organisational compensation policies ■ay oauae ohangaa in tha paroaptlon of aaployaaa about pay whloh, in turn, nay have an lnstruaental affaot in 00tIrating aaployaaa. In auoh a ohanga prooess, tha rationality of aaployaaa baooaaa an iaportant alaaant, Tha praaant raaaaroh haa ahovn that aoat aaployaaa in publio organisations tend to ehooaa on tha baala of tha ■axialsing prlnolpla. Tha baalo rationality bahind tha ldaa of aaxlaisatlon la that tha Individual aakaa daolalona to anhanoa hla gain aaong poaalbla altarnatlraa. Yet, whan altarnatlraa are atatad In tha fora of dlffarant aaounta of pay, prafaranoaa follow proportion ately up to a eartaln aaount of aonay aftar whloh tha prlnolpla of aaxlaisatlon appaara to loaa lta aagnituda. tfhy doaa tha prlnolpla not hold up ragardlaaa of tha aaount of aonay? It nay ba that aonay la grantad in tha fora of pay, othar organisational oonaldaratlona antar tha prooaaa of paroaptlon and oaloulatlon of aalf Intereat. For example, daalra for a large aaount of pay nay ba relatad to a need for graatar responsibility, a reeling of unfairness, and an awareness of tha organisation's inability to pay. In such olrouastanoes, an employee's paroaptlon of pay, perhaps, oan ba considered to ba a produot of organisation al environment, plus social and individual value systaas. Therefore, tha seoond Implication of tha study saaas to relate to tha area of how individuals sake daolalona 198 regarding organizational natters. This area Include* motlvatlon-to-work, cooperatIrene*#, lnorsased effort expsn- dltures, and the deolslon to leare or to reaaln In the organization. Haring Indicated the first two laplloations of the study (nethodological and motivational factor*), a third issue - the apeclflo usefulness of the findings for the praetltloners - is considered. Host organizational pay system designers faoe three different questionsi 1) What fora of compensation is desirable for employees? 2) How oan the satisfaction from pay be Inoreaaed? 3) How much pay raise Is an acceptable amount? Previous studies have suggested that creating a positive relationship between pay satisfaction and perfor mance does not neoessarlly require spending more money on salaries. Pay oan be used in a variety of ways to enhanoe not1vatlon-to-work without ohanging the overall aaount. One way of going about this is to tie large differences in pay direotly to performance, so that the good performer will be making substantially more than the poor performer. Because good performers have higher inputs, they expeot to reoelve more pay than poorer ones. However, if they are not reoelvlng It, they will be more dissatisfied with their pay than weaker performers. As indicated above, one of th e most challenging tasks for publle organizations Is to inorease the level of productivity without substantial 199 lnorease In the level of per. Because of inflation and the burden on the taxpayer» publlo administrators are required to hold oonstant the aaount of pay for employees. Therefore) one logical possibility is to make ohanges in the present pay system to inorease the motlvatlon-to-work. It appears that the value of the same aaount of pay to different employees varies from Individual to individual. Presum ably, this ooours beoause certain benefits have differen tial appeal among employees. Through utility analysis of alternative pay and benefit packages, the satisfaction froa pay, and hence, motlvatlon-to-work may be increased. A systematic utility analysis oonduoted periodically may provide the Instrument for tying pay to performance In the public sector. This prooedure also oan help praotl- tloners assess equity, fairness, and satisfaction with pay. In summary, the utility analysis teohnique oan be useful ini 1) developing compensation programs whloh offer larger extrlnslo rewards for high performance rather than for marginal performance, 2) using forms of compensation which are oomensurate with the expressed preferences of employees, and 3) tying the level of performance to pay through Inclusion of employees* perception* about the reward performance relationship. NOTES CHAPTER V 1. S. 3* Stevens, "A Metrlo for tha Social Consensus," Science, Vol. 151, 1966, pp. 531 - 541. 2. Eugana Galanter, "Tha Direct Maaauramant of Utility and SubjectIra Probability," Anarloan Journal of Psychology. Vol. 75$ 1962, pp. 208 - 220. 3. Victor H. Vrooa, Motivation in Management (Nav Yorki American Foundation for Management Research, 1965). 4. S. 3, Stevens, Op. Clt. 5. Sea for example Giles and Barrett, "Utility of Merit Increases," Journal of Applied Payohology. Vol.55* 1971# pp. 103 - 109i fe. Galanter. Op. tflTi 6. J. Staoy Adams, "Effeots of Overpayment," Journal of Personality and Soolal Psychology. Vol. 10, 196b, pp. 315 - 316. 7. J. G. Hunt and J. W. Hill, "The New Look in Motivational Theory for Organisational Researoh," Human Organisation. Vol. 26, No. 2, 1969, pp. 100*109. 8. R. L. Opshal and M. D. Dunnette, "The Role of Flnanolal Compensation In Industrial Motivation," Pevohological Bulletin. Vol. 66, 1966, pp. 94-118. 9* Schuster and Collettl Just displayed the line of best fit and confirmed that findings In the public organisations are consistent with the findings of Giles and Barrett, Qp. Clt. 10. Elliot Jacques, Equitable Payment (New Yorki Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961) pp. 1#. 11. 3. Zedeeh and P. C. Smith, "A Psychological Determination of Equitable Payment) A Methodological Study," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52, 1968, PP./j43-j44| J. R. tfhrlBM, 'CsrrvSlllon of Employee Evaluations of Pay Increases." Journal of Applied Psycho logy, Vol. 53, 1969, pp. 581-489?--------- “ ----- £---- 201 202 12. D. Bernoulli, "Exposition of a Now Theory on the Measurement of Bisk," In G. A. Miller (Ed.)» Mathema- tlos and Pevoholomr (New Yorki Wiley and Sons, Ino., 1964), 13. Karl E. Weloh, "The Conoept of Equity In the Peroeptlon of Pay," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, 1966, pp. 414-1*397 14. E. E. Lawler III, "The Mythology of Manage ment Compensation," California Management Review. Vol. 9* 1966, pp. 11-22. ------- ----------- 15. J . R. H ln rlo h s , "C o rre la tio n o f Employee Evaluations o f Pay Inoreases," Journal o f Applied Peroho- lo g y. V o l. 53. 1969. pp. W l-W ? ; 16. E. E. Lawler III, On. Clt. 17. M. Beer and G. J. Gery, "Pay System Prefe rence and Their Correlates," (a paper presented at A.P.A. Convention, San Franoleoo, August 1968). APPENDIX I 203 QUESTIONNAIRE 1, Fourteen possible salary Inorease sices are listed in the table on the attached page. Choose the aaount of aoney that represents a salary inorease per year that would be fair and equitable at your next annual salary Inorease (in the sane Job). Place a X next to the aaount in the ooluan headed* 100 points. 2. Your next task is to show your satisfaction with each of the remaining increases (assuming no ohanges in duties and responsibilities)( by indicating how satis fied eaoh aaount would nake you in relation to the 100 points assigned to your estimate of a fair and equitable salary increase, abore. Indicate these responses by placing a X next to the aaount under the number of points which most closely approximates your feelings. I will receive $675 Increase for next yean I think it is a fair and equitable amount of pay increase, so I place a X In the ooluan headed 100 next to the #675. Then I show the satisfaction I mould reoelved froa $800. A X was plaoed In the ooluan headed 70 (satisfaction points). Next, I have rated the 1X700 Inorease and narked the ooluan headed 120 (satisfaction points) next to $1700, and so on.... Inorease in Dollars/year less ---Satisfaction--Wore less 70 80 90 100 110 120 more $ 675 X $ 1700 X $ 800 X 205 You ore to do the ease thing on the following ohart. Do not automatically assign points to amounts of money In dlreet proportion to your original estimate of a fair and equitable Inorease unless this Is a true reflec tion of your feelings. Satisfaction may not Increase or deorease for you In this way. » LESS------------- '? SATISFACTION POIKTS ^ M03E $ Iac-j re&se/Less Year ! .160 200 More 20 70 10 170C 1000 900 oOO * 1100 1300 600 300 1500 3000 700 r r 206 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Allport, Gordon V. Personality and Social Bnoounter. Boston, Massaohusettesi Beacon Proas, l?60. Andrews, Robsrt I. (ed.). Managerial Compensation! Foundation for Research on Huaan BehaTior. Ann Arbor, Miohlgan, Braun and Brumfield, Ino., 1965. Argyrla, c. Personality and Organisation. New York* Harper A Row, Publishers, 1957. Argprls, C. Integrating the IndlTldual and the Organisa tion. New Yorki John Wiley and Sons, Ino,, 196**> Atkinson, Job W. An Introduction to Motivation. Princeton, N.J.i D. Van Nostrand Press, 1964. Bass, B. M. organisational Psychology. Boston, Masai Allyn and Baoon, Ino., 1965. t l t i l f i n . Hall, Ino., Beloher, David w. lewood Cliffs, N. J.t Prentloe Belaan, Albert A. Trends in Salaries of Classified Federal Workers. Washington, D.C.i United States Depart ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1968. Bernoulli, D. Rmoaltlon of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. New Yorkt Wiley A Sons, Ino,, 1964, Blndra, D, JtotlTltlOttl A Systematic ftelnteraretatlon. New Yorki Ronald Press, 1959* Brown, Judson 3. The Mot1ratIon of Behavior. New Yorkt MoGraw-Hi11 Book Ino,, 1961. Burgess, Leonard. Wage and Salary AdalnlstretIon In a Dmaalo Koonomr. New Yorki karoourt, Braoe and World, Ino,, ly68, Calhoon, Richard P. Personnel Management and Supervision, New Yorki AppIeion-Century-crofts, Inc.,1967. Chrudden, Herbert J, and Sheraan, Arthur. Personnel hg|fftatntr Clnclrmjj^, Ohlot South western Press, 208 Gofer. G. N. end Appley. H. H. Hotlretloni Theory end Reeeeroh. New York* Jo HR Hilly U!d 3BV1I,’ IfW. • T 7&T.----- Del ton, Gene W. end Lewrenoe. Paul R. (ede.), Motlretlon end Control In Organlzetlone, Honewood, ill.a flne boreey Preee, 1971. Dleklneon, Z. C. CoMPonaetlng Induetrlel Effort. New Yorki Roneld Preee, 1937. Dunn, J. D. end Raohel, Prenk M. Wage end 3elery Adnlnla- tretIon» TOtel CoepeneetIon syetene. new xorei HoCrewlHIir Book, IfaS., 1971: ------- Dunnette, Herrin D. end Klrohner, Wayne K. Perohologr Applied to Indnetry. New Yorki Appleton-Century- Crofts, Ino., 19&^« Fereter, C. B. end Skinner, B. F. Sohedulee of Reinforce ment. New Yorki Appleton-Century-Crofte, Inc., 19577 Fereter, C. B. end Mery Perrot. Beherlor Prlnolplee. New Yorkt Appleton-Century-Crofte, Inc., 1968. Gellernen, Seul W, HotIretIon end Produotlrlty. New Yorki Anerloen Management Aeeoeietion, 1963. Gellernen, W. W. Management hr Hot1retIon. New Yorkt Anerloen Menegeaent Aeeoeietion, 1968. Golenhlewekl, Robert T. end Mlehael, Cohen. People In Publlo Serrloe Pereonnel Administration^ Heeoe, 111,, F. B, Peeoook Publlaher, Ino., 1970. Helre, M,i Ghleelll, E. E. t end Porter, L. W, Managerial Thinkingi An International atiidr. New Yorki John Vflley A Sone, Ino., 1966. Herzberg, F. Work end the Nature of Han. Clerelend, Ohlot World Publlsnlng Preee, 1966, Herrberg, F.i Keuener, B.i Petereon, R. 0,i end Cepwell, D. Job Attltud.il R.Tl.W Of ifiwwll w»t opinion* Pltteburgh, Pe,i Peyohologloel Serrloe of Pittsburgh Preee, 1957. 209 Herzberg F.i Msusner, Bernardi and Snyderman, Barbara. The Motivation to Work. New Yorki Chapman and Hall, Ine., 1959. Hull, C, L. Principles of Behavior. New Yorkt Appleton- Century-Crofts, Ino., 1^^3. Hull, C. L. Eaeentlala of Beharlor. New Haven, Conneotloutt Yale UniversIty Pr es s, I§51. Indlk, Bernard. The Motivation to Work. Detroit, Mlohlgsni Management Information Servloes, 1970. James, J. An Experimental Study of Tensions In Work Beharlor. Los Angeles7 California* University of California Publications, 1951* Jones, M. H. (ed.). Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. raskai University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska) 1955. Londoni Heinemann Jacques, Elliot. Equitable Payment. Press, 1961. Jacques, Elliot. Tlne-3pan Handbook. London* Heinemann Press, 196**. Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L. The Social Fey otology of ^ganlzatlons. New Yorki John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Killian, Ray A. Managers Must Leadi A Supervisor'■ Roadman to Advancement.New Yorki American Management Association, 1966. Kimble, Gregory A. Hllaard and Marquis* Conditioning and Learning. New Yorki Appleton-Century-Croffce, Inc., 1961. Lawler, Edward E. Pay and Organizational Effectivenessi A Psychological View.New Yorki MoGraw Hill Bood, Inc., 1971. Leavitt, Harold J. Managerial Psychology. Chicago, 111.t University of Chicago Press, 195&. Leavitt, Harold J. and Pondy, Louis R. (eds.). Readings In Managerial Psychology. 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Personneli A Behavioral Approaoh to Hoaawood, 111.i Richard D. Irwin, Inc,, 19 Miner, H. B. Theory. Naw Yorki MaoMlllan Press, 1971. Morris, Jud, The Art of Motivating. Boston, Mass.i Industrial Education Institute Press, 1968. Oohaltree, Keith, How to Prepare a 9oppd par Plan. New Yorki Public Personnel Association, 1963. Olds, Jaaes. Tha Growth and Structure of MotIras. Glenoo* 111.i Tha Proa Press, 1956. 211 Patohen, M. PartlolpatIon. AohleTeaent, and Involveaent in tha Job.Englewood Cliffs, N. J.• Prentice- Hall, Ino,, 1970. Porter, Lyaan W. and Lawler, Edward, HfiflM4El*L_Mtltude« Ifwd Parfqraanoe. Homewood, Ill,i Rlohard D, Irwin, Inc., I960. Rethllngehafer, Dorothy. Motivation ae Related.to puraonalltT. Hew Yorkt MoGraw»Hlll Book Company, 19631 Ryan, T. A. intentional Behavlori An Approach to Hu m p Motivation.New York* Ronald Preee, 1970. Say lee, L. R. BihiTiflX gf InflUimil , Wgrt .grgMRi). fTitoSr. |lon a^^gontrol. Hew Yorki John Wiley and Sona, Soheln, E. H. 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Creator Turkel, Suleyman (author)

Core Title Pay Utility In The Public Sector

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Advisor Siegel, Gilbert (committee chair), McEachern, Alexander W. (committee member), Pollard, Spencer D. (committee member)

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Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA