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The Politics Of The German Occupation In The Protectorate Of Bohemia And Moravia: A Case Study Of A Totalitarian "Breakthrough"

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The Politics Of The German Occupation In The Protectorate Of Bohemia And Moravia: A Case Study Of A Totalitarian "Breakthrough"

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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 ■ m__. k___./ *._______ »* l_........... ,__rf..../l_ 74-17,327 BROMPTON, Henry Buxbaum, 1917- THE POLITICS OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION IN THE PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA: A CASE STUDY OF A TOTALITARIAN "BREAKTHROUGH". | University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1974 Political Science, general l, ■ * ■■■ ■ x f< ft University Microfilms, A XERO X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan <£) Copyright by HENRY BUXBAUM BROMPTON 197*1 . THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE POLITICS OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION IN THE PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA: A CASE STUDY OF A TOTALITARIAN "BREAKTHROUGH" by Henry Buxbaum Brompton A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Political Science) January 1974 UNIVERSITY O F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALI FORNIA 8 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, w ritten by Henry Buxbaum Brompton under the direction of h i.? .... Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by a ll its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in p a rtia l fu lfillm e n t of requirements of the degree o f DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Dean D a te ... i There are only data for some hypothesis or other. Without a theory, however provisional or loosely for mulated, there is only a miscellany of observations, having no significance either in themselves or over against the plenum of fact from which they have been arbitrarily or accidentally selected. (Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 268) For none of those systems of ideas, which are indis pensable for the understanding of reality at a par ticular moment, can exhaust its infinite richness. They are all attempts, on the basis of the present state of our knowledge and the available conceptual patterns, to bring order into the chaos of those facts, which we have drawn into the field circum scribed by our interest. (Max Weber, Soziolocrie. p. 253) TABLE OP CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES INTRODUCTION . PART I. PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION Chapter I. THE METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF TOTALITARIANISM AS A CONCEPT ............................. II. RECONSTRUCTION OF TOTALITARIANISM AS A WEBERIAN IDEAL TYPE ............... PART II. THE HISTORY OF THE TOTALITARIAN BREAKTHROUGH III. THE SETTING OF THE STAGE: POLICY CONCEPTS AND IMPROVISATIONS ................... Prologue to Occupation The Establishment of the Protectorate The Consolidation of Control Page j vi 1 | I I ! i i i i i i ! I i i 11 33 I 60 | Chapter Page IV. VON NEURATH AS REICH PROTECTOR: THE STRUGGLE FOR PRIMACY IN THE PROTECTORATE.......... 109 The Duumvirate Jurisdictional Rivalries and Contention " for Political Power A Shortlived Alliance: Von Neurath and Frank Make Common Cause against the Neighboring Gaue V. COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE............... 179 Protectorate Government, Resistance and Exile: The Initial Phase The Protectorate Government under Pressure: Intervention by the Police The Disintegration of National Unity: Collaboration and Resistance in Collision VI. REINHARD HEYDRICH: THE SQUARING OF THE CIRCLE............................... '215 Hegemony of the SS The Reign of Terror as System of Government The Germanization of "Space and People" Reorganization of the Protectorate Government and Reform of Administration Heydrich's Assassination iv Chapter Page j VII. K. H. FRANK— PROCONSUL IN BOHEMIA AND Daluege as Acting Reich Protector: Terror Runs Amuck Frank as "Master in Bohemia": The Return to a Moderate Course Gotterdammerung: The Turning of the Tide MORAVIA 257 CONCLUSION 296 BIBLIOGRAPHY 302 V LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Sub-Types of Totalitarianism ................. 39 BA DGFP DHCP i IMT I ! i NCA i TWC i I i i I ! ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES Bundesarchiv, Coblenz. i Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-45. from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Series D (1937-45). Vols. I-IV, VIII. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-58. Otahalova, Libuse, and Cervinkova, Milada, eds. Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politikv, 1939-43. ("Documents of the History of Czechoslo vak Politics, 1939-43.") 2 vols. Prague: Academia, 1966. | International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tri bunal, Nuremberg. 1945-46. 42 vols. Nuremberg, 1947-49. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. 8 vols. and supple ments A, B. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government j Printing Office, 1946-47. | i ! j Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Mili tary Tribunal under Control Council Law No. 10. j 15 vols. Nuremberg, 1946-49. j vii INTRODUCTION Nearly three decades have passed since the defeat of Nazi Germany and, as Professor Sauer has noted, the litera ture dealing with National Socialism is already immense.'*' Only a relatively small number of contributors, however, can be said to have avoided a conspicuous common failure to uti lize adequate conceptual tools. Ideographic in their approach, and lacking an integrative focus, most early studies on Hitlerite Germany centered around personality traits of Nazi leaders, the ideology of the movement, and the extraordinary and catastrophic policies pursued by the regime. With the emergence of the cold war, the prevalent interpretation became that of "totalitarianism. " German National Socialism now appeared as but "one form of a gen- 2 eral disease" of modern technological society, similar to, if not identical with, Communist Russia. Studies focused on! the monolithic structure and all-pervasive terror as fea tures common to both regimes. 1 2 It is only recently that students of National Socialism have discovered behind the monolithic facade of totalitarian rule a veritable chaos of overlapping compe tences, competing bureaucracies and personal feuds. Agrow ing body of empirical investigation has demonstrated the existence in Nazi Germany of a "new type of pluralism, " with rival apparati and groups engaged in incessant conflicts, held together precariously by the charismatic authority of the leader who encouraged and used these conflicts to 3 enhance and secure his own personalized rule. Similar phenomena have been observed by a number of authors to have ; 4 occurred in Communist societies. It is one of the fundamental propositions of this study that, in spite of its monolithic appearance and the claims of homogeneity, German occupation politics in the Protectorate in fact exhibited a multiplicity of frequently conflicting goals and of struggles for power among competing groups with antagonistic ideal and material interests. Theyj constituted an integral part of the politics of Nazi Ger- J many. As complex and multifaceted as those in any other system of domination, these conflicts reflected, and at times foreshadowed, struggles for primacy in the Reich itself, a circumstance largely neglected by most authors of studies on the Protectorate or, at best, considered worthy 5 of only marginal hints from them. A meaningful analysis of the Protectorate under Ger man occupation thus must proceed within the context of the National Socialist political system. Such an approach requires a conceptual framework which would permit the ordering and selecting of relevant data, the explanation of relationships, and the connecting of conflicts within the pccupation power structure to tensions within the structure of the Third Reich. Phenomena, as Professor Henry S. Kariel has pointed out, do not fall but appear because summoned. The social scientist must order the world of facts in terms of a con ceptual framework, for that world otherwise remains an amorphous, chaotic mass of data. The ordering paradigm he chooses directs research in terms of the possible range of questions to be asked and the possible range of answers they yield. The paradigm thus not only tends to determine the facts that are "discovered"; it must also be capable of facilitating the classification of the discovered phenomena and of explaining them coherently. In the absence of an (adequate framework, this enterprise cannot succeed. 4 • • Part I of this study, accordingly, will deal with methodological questions that face the student of Nazi Ger many. An attempt will be made to establish a frame of ref erence capable of contributing to the solution of the prob lems at hand. Chapter I of Part I will discuss the epistemological and methodological status of "totalitarianism" as an analyt-' i i ical tool and summarize serious objections raised against ithe classical formulation of this hitherto dominant para- i ; digm. Chapter II will seek to bridge the gap between the monolithic features of the totalitarian concept and a dichotomous reality disclosing the persistence of strife andj conflict beneath a homogeneous "totalitarian" veneer by sug-i gesting a reconstruction of totalitarianism as a Weberian ideal type. The proposed clarification of the term's methodolog- iical status, it will be argued, will permit clear and junequivocal distinctions to be drawn between totalitarianism; i | las a Weberian construct and actual, concrete societies which can be taxonomically measured and explained with the aid of ; jappropriate ideal types. 5 These pure types serve as guidelines to a complex reality where structures appear in impure and unique admix tures and where they can be observed only in combination with components of other ideal constructs. Actual and | empirically observable political regimes thus appear always as mixed systems exhibiting strains and stresses resulting from the interaction of diverse and frequently incompatible structures and configurations in the same historical situa tion. This study will seek to explain the internal strug gles for primacy not only as random occurrences based on personal rivalries, but as interactions and conflicts between and among the" Nazi system's totalitarian and pre- itotalitarian component parts. Part II of this study will examine the pattern of conflicts and contradictions within the power structure of ;the Nazi occupation in the Protectorate. Mirroring tensions jamong the political elites in the Reich, the contest for primacy in the Protectorate brought the clash of competing Sideas and interests into sharper relief than was the case in Germany itself. As a case study of Nazi politics, the his- itory of the occupation in Bohemia and Moravia thus reveals jthe increasing polarization between Germany's traditional ruling establishment and the radical wing of the Nazis which culminated in the usurpation of hegemony by the SS. As the first occupied country to come under the fulli administrative and political control of the SS, the Protec torate's history contributes significant insights into the purposes and the modus operandi of Himmler's emerging "state within the state." Lacking the restraints imposed on Himm- ler's men in the Reich by traditional administrative insti tutions, the occupied lands became staging grounds for the totalitarian ambitions of the SS. They furnished Himmler's j specialists in violence with ample opportunities for action and provided a territorial base for their growing strength. The outward thrust of conquest and coercive repression by the SS stands in sharp contrast to the primarily internal objectives of Stalin's apparatus of coercion and terror, suggesting significant operational distinctions hitherto 6 obscured by the "uni-totalitarian" approach. Moreover, contingent as it was on the maintenance of unimpaired armament production, SS hegemony in the Protec torate entailed the acceptance of severe limitations on rad ical programs and goals. Abhorrent and odious though the reign of the SS in Bohemia and Moravia remained to the very I end, it tempered and modified the extremist population 7 policies aiming at the expulsion of the Czechs and the resettlement of the Protectorate by Germans favored by party leaders including the Fiihrer himself. Though this study does hardly more than draw attention to the problem, it is hoped that further research may shed some light on the com plex relationship of police policies to the population and resettlement projects embraced by the leaders of regimes. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION I 1 | | Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism: Totalitarian-! ;ism or Fascism?" American Historical Review. LXXIII, No. 2 j {(December, 1967), 404. I i ■ ; ! 2 ! | Ibid.. p. 405. I 3 ! See, for example, Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and ! Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of j (Minnesota Press, 1967); Karl D. Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, andj (Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifuncr: j [Studien zur Errichtung des totalitaren Herrschaftssvstems ini beutschland (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, j jl960) . See also Helmut Krausnick et al., Anatomie des SS- !staates (2 vols.; Freiburg: Walter Verlag, 1965). For jrecent empirical studies see Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy. 1939-1945 (Cambridge, jMass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Dietrich Orlow, The ■Nazis in the Balkans: A Case Study of Totalitarian Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968); Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964); Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969); j {Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler1 s Power (Princeton:; jPrinceton University Press, 1969) . j I i i 4 i I See, for example, Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Isoviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite (New jYork: Praeger, 1966) . See also Gordon H. Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 125. 5 v / | The contributions of Jan Tesar and Stanislav Biman constitute noteworthy exceptions. 6 Alexander J. Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarian ism," American Political Science Review. LVIII (December 1964), 888-901. PART I PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 10 CHAPTER I THE METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF TOTALITARIANISM AS A CONCEPT I All concepts have their history and the term totali tarianism provides an example par excellence. Born of pol emics and political strife, the term was never quite able to shed its value-saturated connotations.^ The word "totalitarian, " it appears, was invented by j Benito Mussolini. It originally denoted the Fascist state's 2 claim to absolute authority and supremacy over society. Rejected by the radical wing of the Nazis because of its emphasis on the bureaucratically organized and all-powerful ; state, the "pan-etatist," fascist perspective gave way to new formulations stressing racial supremacy and total mobi- 3 lization as supreme goals of the National Socialist regime. In the West, the terminology did not come into gen- j eral use until the late 1930's. Initially used as a polem ical term stressing the coercive and anti-parliamentarian 11 12 ; character of the new authoritiarian Italian and German regimes, the concept increasingly focused on similarities I I between Nazi, Fascist, and Communist single-party rule. ! These dictatorships were seen as unique and distinctively ‘ modern systems sharing a series of traits, including commit ments to all-encompassing, "chiliastic" goals and monolithic; controls achieved by pervasive terror aimed at the atomiza- ! ( 4 tion of the masses. Totalitarianism achieved its "classical" academic iformulations with Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitar- j ; i ; i Iianism and Carl J. Friedrich's and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's I 5 ! I Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Strikingly simi- | lar in some respects, the two theories nevertheless differed to a considerable extent in structure, focus and approach, j !Conceiving of totalitarianism primarily in teleological j I !terms, Arendt stressed the motives and dynamic processes of j I ' | I totalitarian movements, while Friedrich and Brzezinski : attempted a structurally oriented, descriptive approach j identifying totalitarianism in terms of a proposed "syn- | ; j 6 i I drome" of six interrelated traits. In spite of the absence I i | of serious attempts to integrate telos and structure into a ! I I I unified and logically interrelated approach, a "totalitarian | theorem" culled in some haphazard fashion from both these 13 ; works went far toward achieving a well-nigh dominant posi- 7 tion in American scholarship and academic thought. During the 1950's the "theorem" remained relatively unchanged. The; i ; following decade witnessed, however, increasing disenchant- : jment with the classical formulations of totalitarianism as scholars began to raise serious questions about the term's usefulness as an analytical tool. This "retreat from total-1 ! 8 itarianism" derived its main impetus from the realization j f ! J _ ; jthat the concept had failed to account for observed changes ; f i i I in Soviet political behavior and had ceased to provide an ; jadequate framework for the analysis of post-Stalinist Com- j I i 9 imunist systems. Moreover, students of the Soviet Union ! ; I |argued that it obstructed awareness of conflicts that had I ; ( jpersisted even under Stalin1s regime despite its monolithic ! i j ! 10 . ' !facade while writers on Nazi Germany claimed that it | | Iobscured incessant struggles of rival power apparati compet-i I ! jing constantly for Hitler's favors and, thus, enhancing the | ! . ‘ ii ! iFiihrer's personalized and arbitrary authority. ; ! ' I i i ! Fundamental inadequacies of the formulation of the j I | I * * jconcept increasingly came under attack. The reductionism j i 12 I land vagueness of Arendt's construct, the lack of explana- j ■ i jtory content of Friedrich and Brzezinski's "totalitarian i " , j ; |syndrome" (and the failure of the latter to interrelate the ; constituent parts of the "syndrome" logically and function- 13 ally) led both Burrowes and Janicke to reject totalitar ianism as useless unless greater conceptual specificity and 1 i a minimal consensus on meaning were to rescue the term. ;Barber, too, objected to confused and conflicting interpre- . 14 tations by diverse exponents, and Sauer described exist- l ; jing theories as "scholarly formulation[s] of our lack of j i 15 |understanding." ! Belatedly and after some hesitation, the need for a ; I jteleological focus and its linkage to totalitarian structure! ( ■ \ land behavior was, eventually, recognized by Brzezinski, who ' jsuggested a new definition "beyond Friedrich's descriptive I i 16 jsyndrome . . . point[ing] [also] to its essence." His i •attempt to surmount the internal contradiction between a | i i ! purportedly nonteleological theory and the crucial role j i ! jassigned to "ideology" as part of the syndrome, however, was; jrejected by Friedrich who appears content to escape the i • ' ‘ problem by focusing on the availability of modern organiza- I I * jtional and technological methods as the primary definitional; i i I i jcriterion of the concept— thus rendering totalitarianism j j [very close to being synonymous with modern dictatorship in j i 17 jgeneral. 15 Finally, a growing number of authors drew attention to the pejorative uses and ideological connotations of the 18 construct. The "uni-totalitarian" approach, asserting virtual identity of Nazism and Soviet Communism permitted ideologues, as Groth pointed out, to charge each of these two regimes with inequities committed by the other. A "boo 19 label" pinned upon a "boo system," the "uni-totalitarian" construct facilitated the empirically unverified and undocu mented extrapolation of intrinsic expansionist tendencies | 2 Q jfrom German National Socialism to Russian Communism. The assumed inherent external aggressiveness of a Communist totalitarianism "perpetually at war with its own 21 people and with the rest of the world," as well as its alleged tendency to become increasingly total in scope and .22 intensity, were seen as an American counter-ideology" Whose purpose was the justification and intensification of i |the external struggle against a totalitarian system immune i 2 3 |to internal remedies. Mounting doubts concerning its validity prompted i | some scholars to undertake determined but not particularly i successful conceptual modifications and manipulations in jtheir attempts to address themselves to a changing Soviet I 24 reality. Totalitarianism with a new face, totalitarianism 16 ; 25 26 without terror, enlightened totalitarianism, totalitar- i ianism without coercion,2^ maturing totalitarianism,28 as well as numerous revisions by Professor Brzezinski, made short and soon discarded appearances. Progressive dilution ! of the original concept rendered it amenable to interminable' adjustments and made it possible to attach a totalitarian label permanently to the Soviet system, no matter what ! ^empirically observable changes occurred there. Such doctor-j ling reduced, however, the concept's taxonomic utility as a I | standard of comparison. Totalitarianism as "a relative ; i irather than absolute category" to be understood "in terms ofj : j ; j imore or less" as suggested by Friedrich confused the measur-j ling rod with the object that was to be measured. Proper j 'classification depends on unambiguous cutoff points and pre-j ;cise categories. Their obfuscation, as Sartori observed, Iproduces "mere generalities conducive only to vagueness and ! i 30 conceptual obscurity." Some students of politics have simply abandoned I 31 j totalitarianism altogether. Barghoorn makes no mention of; ! ■ i 32 ; I the term in his textbook on the USSR. Brzezinski, a i J 'scholar who made his reputation by developing the totalitar-^ 33 i iian society notion, quietly discarded it, while Rigby went! 34 I |so far as to proclaim a "taboo on totalitarianism." j ............17.i The evident professional uneasiness about the "clas-; sical theory" of totalitarianism undoubtedly is due to seri-i . i ous defects both in the formulation and application of the ; v ' ! | ; concept. Rejection of the term, however, would only com- I ; pound our difficulties and add to our problems. Serious analysis simply cannot proceed without a conceptual tool permitting discrimination of Stalinism and Nazism from the absolutist monarchies of the past, and the status-quo ori ented or "modernizing" military dictatorships of the pres ent . The abandonment of the concept leaves scholars without i j * . - - I / * j ;an analytical tool to distinguish Stalinist from post- | ! jStalinist patterns. Prom the point of view of this study it; t I j t renders an analytical approach to the German National ISocialist regime impossible. Such concepts as "modernizing i i ! dictatorships" or "mobilization systems" are simply not ade- i i quate to this task. For Nazism cannot be equated with ! ; Nasserism or with Libya's military regime, nor is it funda- | mentally the equivalent of Italian Fascism or of Francisco i ■ ! Franco's quasi-monarchist rule. Moreover, since "totalitar-i i i iianism" is now a term in wide and almost general use, the i i * i I ^substitution of a new term would create additional semantic j I 35 | problems without any assurance of improved utility. The j j ; i ' ! jonly viable alternative would thus appear to be a rigorous ! I 18 36 reconstruction of the concept. Reconstruction entails i prior clarification of its logical status and methodological | function. ! j A survey of the extensive literature on totalitar ianism reveals the absence of serious attempts to deal sys- ! tematically with methodological issues. Some scholars {appear to be unaware of the need to apply principles of i ! methodology to their work. The relatively low "range of {awareness" amongst other practitioners leads to considerably: I : [less than adequate "cognizance of the differences among I ' : 37 ' itheories, models and ideal types." These terms often are , | ‘ j iused promiscuously and without attention to their specific I I I {structural and functional requirements. Moreover, little attention is paid to the level of abstraction which must, of! 38! {course, be appropriate to the problem under investigation. I Two recent studies attempt a thoroughgoing methodo- | {logical analysis of totalitarianism and its classical formu-i i i i ; jlations. In the course of a rigorous examination and analy-i i ; I i Isis, Martin JMnicke, a German political scientist, demon- I ‘ l t ; Istrates the prevalence of explicit or implicit ideal-typical; i 39 [constructs as well as a considerable degree of confusion j |and internal inconsistencies among the exponents of the {classical concept. Traditional theorists, the author points; out, equated contemporary, ongoing Communist systems with the Nazi regime which had ceased to exist and had completed jits destiny in the historical past. This method obscured j potential differentiations in the political development of 40 .the former. Friedrich, moreover, chose a descriptive approach which was incapable of providing explanations, and |thus merely succeeded "in suggesting a number of analo- 41 gies." In his attempts to rank the regimes of Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin and Stalin in terms of the degrees of their i ; 'approximation to his model, he used totalitarianism, how- i : i 42 lever, as a Weberian pure type. Professor Fleron, an i ) ■ , American analyst, arrives, albeit somewhat hesitatingly, at j a similar conclusion. Close analysis of Friedrich and Brzezinski— he points out— "may indicate that they have i ; neither a model nor a theory, but really an ideal type of j . totalitarianism, another construct to which the term 'model' i i 43 is sometimes applied." Fleron appears to favor the use of; i 44 ideal types, while Janicke entertains some reservations j 45 j about them because they occasion frequent abuses. ; j ! | Max Weber was aware of an "irresistible urge" to use; I 46 heuristic devices for political purposes. He insisted on i methodological self-consciousness and sophistication as the 20 only means to prevent the abuse of ideal types and carefully; specified their construction. An ideal type, according to Weber, "is formed by the: one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view" and by; 'their synthesis with certain elements of reality "into a unified analytical construct (GedankenbiId) . " In its con ceptual purity this mental construct (GedankenbiId) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. "It is," Weber iexplains, "a utopia" and he continues: "Historical research; ifaces the task of determining in each individual case, the I ; lextent to which the ideal construct approximates or divergesj ' 47 I jfrom reality." Necessarily wirklichkeitsfremd. it must ■ 48 never be confused with historical political systems. ! Par from being representations of concrete systems (e.g., the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany) Weber's ideal typesj were nomothetic tools in which certain features appear exag- j | |gerated in order to present them as forcefully as possible. | ! . j j I Precision and clarity achieved through the accentuation of jfeatures are required to provide an unequivocal standard of i jcomparison. j ! : Weber did not regard his ideal types as new, origi- i i ; >nal concepts. He only aimed at methodological perfection ofj devices used in the past without full awareness by "raising ; them to the level of full consciousness." "Any attempt to go beyond the bare establishment of concrete relationships toward the determination of significance," he stated, always has and must make use of concepts which, "if they are pre cisely and unambiguously definable, will be made in the form! 49 of ideal types." This, in fact, is what historians have i 50 :done in using words like "feudalism" or "economic man" .andi what social scientists are doing when they attempt to defined "totalitarian dictatorship." Only explicit awareness of i . ; itheir methodological function can prevent the misuse of such| concepts.^ These ideal constructs are not substitutes for ( : empirical investigations. Concrete historical events and empirical configurations must be compared with ideal con- istructs to ascertain approximation as well as differences i between actual concrete behavior and ideal-typical construe-; ition. Ideal types thus serve as guidelines to a complex reality where structures appear in impure and unique admix- j tures because of their interaction with other elements of ! 52 ! the situation. Designed to analyze concrete configura tions— where they can be observed only in combination with I 1 'components of other ideal constructs— -they serve not only as; 53 taxonomic but also as theoretical terms. Combined into ! : 22 typological series, they offer guidance to the construction of hypotheses aiming at the explanation of empirically veri-| fiable structural relationships in concrete historical i • > politics. Weber linked construction of ideal types to his com-: parative method. The method implies that two or more con stellations or "political systems" are comparable in terms of structures and processes common to them. "One-sided pre-i 1 ! cise constructs, " his ideal types are seen as indispensable i : jtypological devices— as exact yardsticks for the measurement! bf concrete reality. Their reference points are empirically! bbservable "impure" structures, "admixed" configurations and; I the strains and stresses resulting from their interaction with other structures and configurations in the same his- j ! : i torical situation. Weber viewed structural incompatibilities and con- i ; 54 Itradictions as crucial sources of endogenous change, junlike the static, classical "models" of totalitarianism, his ideal types are designed to provide adequate perspec- ; I ; I : Itives for conflict and change in terms of a dialectic con cept which views social structure "as a form of organization! | : held together by force and constraint and reaching continu- i pusly beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself ; 23 the forces that maintain it in an unending process of 55 change." He insists, moreover, on an interpretation of i [structural conflict in terms of "understandable," meaningful! ! ; [human conduct. In contrast to the free-floating, lifeless 1 : 'categories of most "functionalists," Weber's "structures" [reflect decisions and conflicts of participant persons and i [groups, acting and interacting upon material and ideal i ■ ; {interests. Unlike functions, they can and must be reducible: jto the behavior of "intending actors" that cluster around them. ! The utility and adequacy of conceptual frameworks i i ! f [depends, first and foremost, on the type of question raised 1 ; . I I \ [and the nature of the phenomena under investigation. Means [ j i i i rather than ends, all theories and constructs can serve onlyi | ! [one purpose: to render concrete, historical events under- • 56 jstandable. Indeed, whether they are simply constructs of [ [the imagination or whether they serve heuristically impor- i ; j ; Itant purposes cannot be decided by a priori judgments. The I j ; ! • • [sole criterion, here, is their ability to illuminate and i 57 1 [explain the phenomena under investigation. Conflict and [ ; j jtotal change, coercive force and effectiveness— the core j t problems of National Socialist rule— require a methodology j [capable of encompassing their dialectic. The classical formulations of totalitarianism as well as traditional social-system models have failed to provide the necessary perspective while Weber's approach offers a focus and tech- i niques which are adequate to their analysis. NOTES TO CHAPTER I Peter Christian Ludz, "Entwurf einer soziologischen jTheorie totalitar verfasster Gesellschaft," Soziologie der DDR, ed. by Peter Christian Ludz, special supplement no. 8 to Kollner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsvchologie (1964), pp. 11-58. 2 Martin Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft: Anatomie eines politischen Becrriffes (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1971), pp. 2 0-29. The state, according to Mussolini, is the true expression of the individual. In fascist doctrine all interests are conciliated in the unity of the state. See also infra. p. 28, n. 24. 3 Ibid., pp. 36-48. Mussolini's dictum "the party is transient, the state is eternal" was proscribed in the Third Reich (Diehl-Thiele, p. 29). 4 Franz Borkenau, The Totalitarian Enemy (London: Faber and Faber, 1940)$ Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolu tion: A Total State in a World at War (New York: Praeger, 1965)^ Bertram D. Wolfe, Communist Totalitarianism: Keys to the Soviet System (Boston: Beacon, 1956)y J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, I960); jWilliam Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959). 5 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism ](3d ed.j New York: Harcourt, 1966)5 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinsky, Totalitarian Dictatorship and {Autocracy (2d ed., rev. New York: Praeger, 1966). 26 6 The six traits are: (1) An official chiliastic ideology covering all aspects of man's existence, based upon a radical rejection of the existing order, and aiming at the conquest of the world for the new one; (2) a single mass party typically led by one man and consisting of a rela tively small hard-core group of dedicated followers; (3) terroristic police control directed against both the enemies of the regime and arbitrarily selected classes of the popu lation; (4) monopoly over all means of effective mass commu nication; (5) monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat; (6) central control over the economy (Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 22). 7 That the "single classical theory of totalitarian ism" rested more on presumptions than upon fact was first suggested by Robert Burrowes 1 review, "Totalitarianism— The Revised Standard Version," World Politics. XXI (January, 1969), 272. 8 Michael Curtis, "Retreat from Totalitarianism, " in Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, by Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 53. 9 The applicability of totalitarianism to present-day Communist systems has been disputed by, among others, Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarianism"; Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes, " American Politi cal Science Review. LV (June, 1961), 281-93, and "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics. XIX (Jan uary, 1967), 242-57; Alex Inkeles, "Models in the Analysis of Soviet Society," Survey (London), July, 1966, pp. 3-17; Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965); Burrowes, p. 287; Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences," Soviet Studies. XIX, No. 3 (January, 1968), 338, and "Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union: The Political Leadership System," in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed. by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (Chi cago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 22 3; John H. Kautsky, Politi cal Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: Wiley, 1962), and "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," in Fleron, ed., j j pp. 198-2 03; Ludz, p. 16j Martin Janicke, "Aspekte einer i Theorie. des . totalitaren Konflikts, " Politische Viertel- \ liahresschrift. II. Nos. 2-3 (November, 1972), 162-85. ! i I Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism"; j Gordon H. Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics,") World Politics. XVIII (April, 1966), 435-51. I j Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi j Party. pp. 26-28; Schweitzer, passim: Peterson, passim. 12 Burrowes, pp. 2 79-80. 13 Ibid., pp. 283-84; Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft. pp. 12 9-34, 144-50. 14 Benjamin R. Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totalitarianism," in Friedrich, Curtis, and Barber, p. 37. 15 Sauer, p. 408. 16 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1967), ch. i. 17 Carl J. Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory and Prac tice of Totalitarian Regimes," in Friedrich, Curtis, and Barber, p. 126. In the Introduction to the revised edition !of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, too, totalitar ianism is defined as an autocracy based upon modern technol ogy and mass legitimization (p. 4). 18 Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarianism." 19 Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "Introduction," in Fleron, ed., p. 33. 20Janicke, "Aspekte," p. 166. 2H/olfe, p. 294. 22 Carl J. Friedrich, "The Unique Character of Total itarian Society," in Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Con ference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. March. 1953. ed. by Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass.: lHarvard University Press, 1954), p. 53. Not only were Com munist societies destined to "become more, rather than less totalitarian," but terroristic police control, one of the authors' indispensable traits defining totalitarianism, "actually must increase both in scope and in brutality with the growing stability of the regime" (Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956], pp. 27, 171). In Friedrich and Brzezinski1s revised second edition of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy these syndromic attributes were dropped, presumably in order to accommodate the changes occurring in the Soviet Union. 2 3 Herbert J. Spiro and Benjamin R. Barber, "Counter- Ideological Uses of 'Totalitarianism,'" Politics and Society. I, No. 1 (1970), 16-17. The imprecise and "ideological" use of the term is, of course, not preempted by "American coun ter-ideologues" alone. Herbert Marcuse, for example, sees totalitarianism not only as "terroristic political coordina tion of society, but also as non-terroristic economic-techni cal coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests" (Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society [Boston: Beacon, 1964], p. 3). 24 Adam Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). 25 Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totali tarianism without Terror," World Politics. XVI (July, 1964), 558-75. 26Fainsod, passim. 27 H. Ritvo, "Totalitarianism without Coercion?" Problems of Communism. IX, No. 6 (1960), 19-2 9. 28 R. D. Laird, "Some Characteristics of the Soviet Leadership System: A Maturing Totalitarian State," Midwest Journal of Political Science. X, No. 1 (February, 1966), 29-38. 29 29 Carl J. Friedrich, "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends," Problems of Communism. XVII, No. 2 (1968), 43. ■Similarly., the .extension in the revised second edition of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy of the "syndrome" to include "terror whether physical or psychic, . . . whether jof the secret police or of party-directed social pressure" renders the definition of totalitarianism so vague as to preclude its use as a typological term (Friedrich and Brze zinski, p. 22). 30 G. Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review. LXIV (Decem ber, 1970), 1041. 31 For example, see Skilling, Governments of Commu nist East Europe: Alfred G. Meyer, "A Comparative Study of bommunist Political Systems," Slavic Review. XX (March, 1967), 5-6j Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development"; Robert S. Sharlet, "Systematic Political Sci ence and Communist Systems," in Fleron, ed., pp. 207-12; Ourtis, passim: Spiro and Barber, passim. 32 Frederick G. Barghoorn, Politics in the U.S.S.R. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). 33 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and S. P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" Problems of Communism. XV, So. 1 (1966), 1-24. 34 T. H. Rigby, "'Totalitarianism' and Change in Com- nunist Systems," Comparative Politics. IV, No. 3 (April, 1972), 433-53. 35 Burrowes, p. 293. 36 Burrowes and, recently, Janicke (in Totalitare gerrschaft) have recommended revision of the concept as the most practical solution to the dilemma. No serious attempt at reconstruction has, so far, been undertaken. 37 Fleron, "Introduction," p. 24. 1 38 | The conspicuous lack of methodological sophistica tion in the literature on totalitarianism was first pointed jout by Ludz, who observed that the field of studies had |failed to reach the level of awareness attained nearly half ia century ago by Max Weber (Ludz, p. 13). 39 Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft, p. 71. 40 Ibid., p. 129. 41 , . , Ibid. 42 Ibid., pp. 185-86. ! 43 Fleron, "Introduction," p. 21. The notion that the appropriate methodological status of the totalitarian "model" was that of an ideal type was first tentatively sug gested by Inkeles (Alex Inkeles, "The Totalitarian Mystique: Some Impressions of the Dynamics of Totalitarian Society," in Friedrich, ed., p. 87). A number of analysts have since identified "totalitarianism" as an ideal-typical construct without, necessarily, drawing the requisite methodological jconclusions (see, for example, Ludz, passim: Kassof, passim: Meyer, "Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems"; Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism"; Fleron, "Introduction"; Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft). Friedrich, however, refuses to "worry about an ideal type" and refers to his concept as an "average type," a "relative rather than absolute category." This relativization of categories, and the resultant fuzziness and vagueness of his construct, severely reduced its usefulness for typological purposes (Friedrich, "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends"). T. H. Rigby, in his "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the U.S.S.R.," World Politics. XVI (July, 1964), 539-57, attempts to discuss post-Stalinist Russia in terms of Weberian ideal types. 44 Fleron, "Introduction," p. 22. Fleron considers ideal types capable of serving a "heuristic, but not an explanatory function." In contrast to Fleron's opinion, both Carl G. Hempel (Aspects of Scientific Explanation [New York: The Free Press, 1965]) and Abraham Kaplan (The Conduct of Inquiry [San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964]) see Max Weber's constructs primarily as theoretical terms. See infra, n. 53. 45 - ■ ■ Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft. pp. 92-94. 46 Max Weber, Soziolocrie. Weltgeschichtliche Analy- sen. Politik (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1956), pp. 248-50. ^ Ibid.. p. 2 35. 48 "Je weltfremder desto besser leisten sie ihren Dienst terminologisch, klassifikatorisch, heuristisch." ("The further removed from reality they are, the better do they serve their terminological, classificatory and heuris tic purposes.") (Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956], I, 10) 49 Weber, Soziologie. p. 2 37. 50 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: i Essavs in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 59. 51 Weber, Soziologie. p. 245. 52 "Die gleiche historische Erscheinung kann z.B. in einem Teil ihrer Bestandteile 'feudal,' im anderen 'patri monial, ' in noch anderen 'bureaukratisch,' in wieder anderen 'charismatisch' geartet sein." ("The same historical occur rence, for example, may be in some parts 'feudal,' in others 'patrimonial,' and in yet others composed of 'bureaucratic,' or 'charismatic,' elements.") (Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. I, 10) 53 Kaplan, p. 83. Hempel distinguishes between extreme types as strictly typological devices and ideal types as theoretical terms. Max Weber's ideal constructs are designed to combine both these functions. The taxonomic or classificatory use of the construct is, in fact, secon dary to its explanatory function (Hempel, pp. 156-63). ! 32 i i I 54 In his use of the structural approach, Weber came jclose to the Marxist method of analysis. Like Marx, Max Weber saw society as a complex pattern governed by opposing forces. Its essential feature is the presence of antagonis-j tic groups and individuals engaged in conflict and striving | for domination. Conflicts are not random, but the product j of the very structuring of societies and the dialectic of the resolution of these conflicts determines the direction of social change. Weber attempted, however, to "round out" Marx's historical materialism by introducing a dialectic of ideas and of political power as added dimensions of histori cal processes (Gerth and Mills, pp. 47-50). 55 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 159. 56 Kaplan, pp. 115-16. 57 ". . . ob es sich um reines Gedankenspiel Oder um eine wissenschaftlich fruchtbare Begriffbildung handelt, kann a priori niemals entschieden werden; es giebt auch hier nur einen Massstab: den des Erfolges fur die Erkenntnis konkreter Kulturerscheinungen in ihrem Zusammenhang, ihrer ursachlichen Bedingtheit und ihrer Bedeutung. Nicht als Ziel, sondern als Mittel kommt mithin die Bildung abstrakter Idealtypen in Betracht" (Weber, Soziologie. p. 2 37). CHAPTER II RECONSTRUCTION OF TOTALITARIANISM AS A WEBERIAN IDEAL TYPE If disenchantment with classical formulations and Ideological abuses of the concept resulted from methodologi cal confusion, recasting it as a Weberian ideal type offers i jthe opportunity to salvage totalitarianism as an analytical jtool. To be adequate, a reconstruction of totalitarianism will have to meet Weber's methodological specifications: i 1. Awareness of its heuristic functions and limita- j jtions to prevent confusion of conceptual framework with |theory, and the ideal type with concrete political systems. Totalitarian traits do not define empirical historical poli- ! Ities (e.g., the Soviet Union or Nazi Germanythey are properties of the typological tool. j 2 . Precision and clarity achieved through the i ! accentuation of features to provide an unequivocal standard ! i |of measurement, permitting adequate discrimination in terms 34 of significant similarities and dissimilarities (e.g., the capacity to distinguish totalitarian from other patterns of political domination, such as absolute monarchies, tradi tional and modernizing military dictatorships, pluralistic constitutional systems, etc.). 3. A "unified analytical construct" or Gedanken bi Id. which unlike most current concepts of totalitarianism, combines teleological elements and characteristic social I structures and processes into an internally consistent and | logically interrelated configuration and offers explanatory ^hypotheses for these relationships. i j 4. The construction of sub-types and typological series'*' to account for significant structural and behavioral differences between Stalinism and Nazism. Designed to relate these differences to disparate goals and contents of belief systems, they would supplant traditional "uni-totali-j Itarian" approaches which obscured these relationships. 5. Formulations that facilitate the identification ! ; . ! 'of totalitarian ideologies and structures, and their inter- j I I |actions and conflicts with nontotalitarian typological ele- . iments in the same empirical situation. 6. Awareness that these formulations must be jgenetic, i.e., must include the typical conditions for the 35 ! 2 J lappearance of the aspect formulated, and that they must j i ' ! jcontain reference points for statements concerning inter- i ! ! jaction and conflict, to make them reducible to empirically j I j jobserved behavior of plausibly motivated groups and individ-j ! 3 I juals. If this approach entails a loss of the rigor and i i i exactness associated with the natural sciences, this must be accepted in order to render human conduct meaningful in 4 terms of human experience. Political phenomena as cultural events can only be apprehended by means of Verstehen (under standing— standing where the other man stands), that is, in 5 terms of the projects and actions of the political actor. 7. Finally, awareness that totalitarianism, like Weber's "charisma," must be viewed as an inherently unstable j i ideal construct. As revolutionary rule aiming at radical transformation it represents an essentially transitory and ! . |extraordinary exercise of power. It must, inevitably, give j way to "routinization" and "every-day powers" which provide g "the only stable bases of societal order." To meet these conditions and to avoid the serious defects of traditional totalitarian "theories," the concept needs extensive modifications. Taking as its point of departure common assumptions which, despite evident discrep ancies in emphasis and explicit definition, are implicitly ! 36 j shared by most previous interpretations, the ensuing discus-! i i sion will attempt to identify the most significant aspects j iof a required revision and to recast totalitarianism, albeit! j | |only in broad outlines, as a Weberian construct. j I ! An internally coherent ideal-typical reconstruction | | ' i must start by stressing the central role played by totali- j jtarian belief systems. Defined as commitments to a goal i i jentailing a radical transformation of man and society, they ! | jare more than simply one of "six traits" and must be seen asj I ! lessential and indispensable legitimating and energizing j | sources, providing the "link of allegiance of the population] ‘ 7 to the professed values and motives." Universalist— i.e., i based on the proclaimed discovery of a fundamental dynamic ] j jelement of all human history and constructed to explain all |reality— they justify the ruthless harnessing of available resources in pursuit of their goal. They define obstacles (enemies) and specify operational sub-goals as requisite # ( means to the end and thus condition behavior, structures and I 8 processes of totalitarian systems of domination. Both end- goal and sub-goals imply metastatic changes of all existing i social relationships. A metastatic belief system aiming at the reconstruction of man through the structural transforma tion of all his social relationships thus represents the 37 essential and most distinctive trait permitting adequate discrimination of totalitarian from nontotalitarian patterns of domination. "The difference, as Herbert J. Spiro cor rectly observes, "lies not in the commitment to but in the 9 content of the ideologies." It is the intentional as well : as the instrumental content of their belief systems which distinguishes totalitarian from status quo oriented or pluralistic polities. It separates them from theocratic jregimes and religious orders, who, intent upon total con- I I jtrol, did not contemplate achieving the transformation of man through radical structural changes of his social envi ronment. Content with imposing rigorous and often minute regulations of behavior, the structurally undifferentiated theocracies of the past did not attempt to reconstruct man by transforming the matrix of his society. Without adequate! ^technological tools such radical structural changes hardly lappeared to be feasible.The availability of technologi- ] i :cal resources to modern political elites, however, does not necessarily entail attempts aimed at total structural trans-: iformation by force and from above. Such pursuits are, in i i Ifact, relatively rare and constitute exceptions rather than the rule. Thus, it is not modern technology but the 38 ; metastatic content of belief systems which represents the differentia specifica of totalitarianism.' * ' ' * ' Traditional "uni-totalitarianism" obscured the cen- trality of teleological content. It could not accommodate or account for sub-types of totalitarianism and failed to relate significant structural and behavioral differences to disparate goals and priorities of specific belief systems. To overcome this deficiency it is necessary to define sub- types by combining specific substantive goals, situational j : i : context, sets of operational sub-goals, obstacles (enemies) and the principal direction of thrust into internally coher-j ’ I i ent and logically consistent configurations (see Table 1). ! I ' ; Two sub-types, thus, are constructed, deriving internal consistency by relating telos to structure and process. Their disparate goals and genetic conditions entail significant differences in priorities and divergent directions of principal thrust. The choice between primary i ! ; fields of conflict— i.e., between primarily internal and ‘ external aggression— is, moreover, rendered inevitable by I ; the relative scarcity of resources and the need to allocate i I ; them effectively in the face of high odds. The primary i ! field of expansion, as defined by the content of the belief system, obtains operational preference over the secondary, TABLE 1 ; SUB-TYPES OF TOTALITARIANISM Genetic Conditions Sub-Type Specific Substantive Goal Situational Context Sets of Operational Sub-Goals Obstacles (Enemies) Field of Conflict (Direction of Principal Thrust) A Rule of the Developed Directed Inferior Primacy of master-race industrial economy races external socioeconomic structure Armament Conquest of "living space" Big powers aggression B Classless Pre-industrial Collectivization Peasantry Primacy of society backward structure Central planning Industrialization Middle class internal aggression 40 potential field, implying the postponement of internal con flicts in the case of the primacy of external aggression and cautious foreign policies in the case of internal direction 12 :of the principal thrust. Metastatic belief systems and their specific con tent thus define totalitarian thrust and direction. They also provide the "potent mystique" and "supply the great psychic energy required to eradicate and totally to recon- 13 ;struct social structures and personalities." This mys tique "is presented not as a quality of the totalitarian society, but as a quality of the totalitarian leader who 14 ;imposes his conception on . . . society." Destined to save the nation and sole source of a new, revolutionary order, the leader's essentially charismatic authority rests on his identification and association "with some cosmic idea or principle which he had been called to realize in his- 15 jtory." "As the sole agent and interpreter" of the meta static principle, the totalitarian leader "represents a ^revolutionary force." His rule aims at fundamental social jtransformation within the context of a general breakdown of i 17 ilegal-rational or traditional sources of authority. He | "attracts adherents to the extent that he succeeds in incor- 18 porating the utopian goal in his person." The charismatic i ....... '................. 41. i i i jleader thus responds to the need of most men to "concretize i jtheir attachments" when faced with uncertain and unpredict- 19 ' able consequences of fundamental societal change. His j t response to distress "unifies external demands and internal 20 * urges." His authority thus only persists if sustained by j i 21 the myth's legitimating and energizing thrust. Charismatic authority and metastatic belief systems alone, however, are insufficient indices of ideal-typical i 1 totalitarian rule. The projected radical transformation involves the power to penetrate society and to accomplish the required extensive mobilization of men and resources. I Without adequate implementing of structures and institu tions, totalitarian rule remains powerless to effect the desired transformation, and the new order, no more than a I i utopia, will remain relegated forever to the realm of i thought. | i Moreover, totalitarian rule must have the capacity j to neutralize or destroy all autonomous social structures and solidarity groups which impede reconstruction— i.e., all classes, groups and institutions whose perspectives and life styles were shaped by the values of the ancien regime. t Their persistence and the growing conflict with these pre- j l revolutionary structures after the conquest of power reflectj I > a fundamental internal contradiction of totalitarian rule. | j For political ascendancy cannot be achieved without the j assistance of numerically or functionally potent classes and strata whose support has to be won by extensive concessions. jBorn of the old system, their interests are at variance with i jthe radical aims of the new order i j The conquest of power thus requires alliances with i l ipretotalitarian groups whose presence and strength threaten j totalitarian control and obstruct progress toward totalitar-j i i |ian goals. Thrust upon the new order by the old, these powerful traditional structures impose "confining condi- I 22 tions" on charismatic authority. Their elimination entails structural changes which distinguish totalitarian domination from monopolistic one-party regimes. I ! It is during the "breakthrough stage of totalitar ianism" that the apparat of the political police "emerges as 23 the crucial organ of the regime." The intensity of the conflict and the consequent need for extensive repression establishes the security apparatus as the supreme vehicle for the extranormative powers exercised by the leader. Institutionalized terror emerges as a system of government. The political monopoly of the party is replaced by the supremacy of the coercive police. I Thus, while metastasis represents the distinctive | i I i i mark of totalitarian teleology, totalitarian structure is j ■ ■ i j • I jdefined by the dominance of the security apparatus. The ! i jfailure of totalitarian power apparati to secure supremacy jand to achieve revolutionary "breakthroughs" is characteris tic for fascist regimes in which the State absorbs the party j 24 pnd the police and prevails over both. Fascism thus ) represents an aborted totalitarianism. Lacking metastatic i ! content, fascist regimes do not aim at total societal trans- 25 i formation. Pursuing limited aims, they retain most tradi-| jtional institutions and with them the primacy of traditional i i elites that dominate the state. Neither fascist etatism nor the "dual government by 26 party and state" constitute the distinctive structural feature of totalitarian rule. Firmly rooted in legality, the state is capable only of traditional tasks and func tions. Indispensable to the exercise of political power as the principal depository of administrative skills, the state apparatus is not adequate for the purpose of effecting a social revolution from above. The bureaucratic hierarchies that command it, moreover, are opposed to a radical recon struction of society which threatens their traditional roles 27 and their organizational autonomy. 44 j Charged with supervision over all institutions of istate power, the party emerges initially as the main vehicle jfor metastatic change. Since they lack administrative know-{ | jhow and experience, party functionaries, however, are unable i ; |to exercise effective control over the implementation of J policy decisions without the assistance of civil and mili- I I I I | Itary bureaucrats who are absorbed into the party to secure ' i I [their compliance. With its ranks swollen by opportunists j jand penetrated by groups retaining their loyalties to pre- i jtotalitarian social structures, the party grows into an ] jamorphous colossus reflecting the diverse and often compet- jing interests and perspectives of the surrounding society. j [While the party's effectiveness is impaired by the lack of j jcohesiveness, its claim to political monopoly continues to [represent a potential threat to the absolute power of the i leader who relies, increasingly, on the political police as [trusted and effective implementors of his will, j Totalitarian rule (as distinct from the conquest of Ipower by the totalitarian movement) is characterized by the decline of the party and by the ascendancy of the security [apparatus. The former retains solely its functions of i [political recruitment and indoctrination, while the latter j I | [assumes the role of principal extranormative agency of j I 28 * isocial transformation. As specialists in terror, the | ! ' ! |"coercers" of the police alone possess the qualifications j j required for this task. Separated from the civil-service j j i ! structure and exempted from all limitations imposed by pub- 29 lie law, the "disestablished" police rapidly "expands 1 i i . 30 beyond its initial sphere of action." As guardians of i i doctrinal purity and of unconditional loyalty to the leader, the security organs develop police policies of their own andj attempt to "run the entire state machinery . . . with police 31 conceptions and methods, " including the penetration of all institutions with members of their apparatus. The hegemony of the security apparatus and the con sequent displacement of the legal order by the leader's Jundisputed will entail a rapid de-institutionalization of the process of decision making. The decay of both state and I ' ! party bureaucracies constitutes the fully intended result of; this process. For "any bureaucratic order, no matter how 32 iauthoritarian it may be, limits arbitrary power." it ren- i 'ders authority contingent on hierarchically organized insti- l tutions charged with jurisdictionally defined responsibili- j 3 3 ' ties for the implementation of decisions. The disintegra-i j tion of the monopoly of the party over all state and eco- j I nomic structures leads to the emergence of "fiefdoms" of j irival power apparati dependent on the leader (and on his j ! t ! ' ■ immediate entourage) as their sole source of legitimacy and j vying for his support. The ensuing thicket of competing | agencies and ill-defined jurisdictions provides the essen- j I tial basis for the autocratic omnipotence of the totalitar- j i ; ! 34 ian elite. Presiding over all structures but identified with none, the leader and his lieutenants establish their absolute rule by using the security apparatus as the deci- 35 sive factor in the contest among competing groups. Jurisdictional chaos and the persistence of strug- j i gles for power thus are seen as unavoidable by-products of j I I totalitarian rule. Indispensable for the triumph of charis-j matic authority over all limiting institutional arrange- \ ments, they point to an inescapable dilemma of totalitarian j j regimes. For the requirements of charismatic legitimacy as i I an essentially extraordinary exercise of arbitrary power j i i clash with those of a stable administrative apparatus cap able of effective implementation of the political will. In j i the long run, the latter will tend to prevail. As a transi tory and inherently unstable rule, threatened initially by j pretotalitarian structures, totalitarianism will eventually yield to "routinization" by specialized bureaucracies or j 36 territorial proconsular fiefs. i ! i e 1 c * i I Purged of ideological connotations and recast as a Weberian construct, totalitarianism yet may retain only lim ited applicability to the present. Changing Soviet reality demands the use of alternative approachesj increasing "rou- tinization" and differentiation of Communist systems re- 37 quires new concepts adequate to their analysis. Moreover, structural requirements of post-industrial societies appear to be in conflict with the essentially arbitrary and mono- 38 cratic character of totalitarian rule. Reconstructed as an ideal type, the concept remains, however, indispensable to students of the era of Hitler. When employed as a taxonomic device, it will permit compari sons of observed patterns of Nazi domination with the pure type in order to establish the extent of their convergence. Identifying the doctrine of Blut und Boden— of race and "living space"— as metastatic goal, the Fuhrer as its sole charismatic agent, and the men of Himmler's SS as guardians of doctrinal purity and principal carriers of his will, the ideal-typical construct furnishes empirical indices of totalitarian rule. | When the construct is employed as a heuristic tool* j lattention is directed to interactions and conflicts between I f I jand among the Nazi regime's totalitarian and pretotalitarian I ! structures, and explanatory hypotheses are provided concern ing relationships that are assumed to exist, as well as ref- i 39 jerence points facilitating their empirical verification. | jThe construct facilitates a perspective that emphasizes pol icy issues rather than personal rivalries and— following Max jweber— regards political conflicts as consequences of struc- I jtural contradictions rather than merely as expressions of j 40 personal ambitions for political power. Discounting Leither power nor policy, it contributes a dialectic dimen- i l sion to the investigation of struggles for political primacy | j and domination. j 1 I Totalitarianism does not constitute a theory, nor a j i j substitute for or the end result of empirical investigation.I The construct serves as a framework guiding research and analysis. The subject of empirical research is not the totalitarian construct but the concrete historical Nazi regime with its distinct expectations, behavior patterns, socioeconomic structures and environments. Reflecting the content and goal of the National Socialist belief system, and mirroring the situational context of the movement's j 49 emergence, the policies pursued by the Third Reich were determined by the primacy afforded to external expansion. Expansionist policies, in turn, required a demonstrable capacity to pursue them, necessitating a militarily and economically powerful state, and, thus, the cooperation of pretotalitarian elites that commanded its military, adminis- i i jtrative and economic institutions. The Nazis had from the i 41 beginning "courted and cultivated" these potent groups without whose assistance neither conquest of power at home nor expansion abroad could be attained. This alliance was i j 42 made possible by a "congruence of immediate interests" between the totalitarians and the conservative forces sup porting them, for a number of projects embraced by the Nazis appeared to be programmatically acceptable to the ruling groups of the ancien regime. Though they did not subscribe to the National Socialists1 racist, metastatic goal, the established eiites approved Nazi initiatives involving rearmament and economic expansion, the elimination of | France's hegemonial position in Central Europe, the revision of borders with Poland, and the suppression of dissent and 43 social conflict. These issues, in fact, represented the maximal aims of Germany's conservative establishment and could be achieved by means that were conventional and did not require the country's radical social transformation. I I The resultant increase in military and economic strength constituted the essential prerequisite for the realization j o f Hitler's ultimate goal— the Great Germanic Reich estab- | jlished on racial lines. Involving Russia's destruction as |well as extensive resettlement projects in the East, this | vast undertaking appeared to be fraught with risks that were unacceptable to the men of the Right, who sensed that ven- tures on this scale were incompatible with Germany's eco nomic and social structure and would bring about its de- 44 mise. Initially, at least, Hitler's intentional vagueness and ambiguity succeeded in obscuring these conflicting per spectives. To abrogate the treaty of Versailles and re nounce the conditions imposed by it, he needed the industri alists, generals and civil servants who, in turn, hoped to 45 tame and use him for their own purposes. The resultant arrangement imposed within Hitler's Reich a degree of restraint on the radical Nazis, and traces of this symbiotic coalition persisted to the very end of the regime. It also contributed to the maze of competing structures and ill- I defined jurisdictions in the Nazi state. j The concessions made to their conservative allies did not weaken the Nazis. They permitted the radical Ifollowers of Hitler to move in the second phase of the i " ' ' \ i j regime "toward the realization of the core elements of their! I 46 ideology." The new assault by the totalitarian forces j gained its impetus from the suspension of administrative procedures and the permanent state of emergency in the coun-l j tries that had been occupied or defeated in the war. i I - j Checked by influential conservative groups and denied undis-j puted hegemony at home, the men of Himmler's SS gained j ascendancy as a consequence of territorial conquests abroad. The "pacification" of newly acquired territories i i provided the SS opportunity to expand the scope of their j I activities. Specialists in coercion, and responsible to Hitler alone, they were given the task of securing the sub jugation of the occupied lands and placed in charge of j ! i extensive resettlement and population projects aimed at the | acquisition of "living space" for an SS-selected racial | 47 ! elite. | The resultant proliferation of the security appara- j ! tus and the network of agencies at the command of Himmler1s men enabled them to prevail over all rival apparati in the | | occupied countries and to establish a territorial power basej i j for the SS in the conquered lands. The construction of an j j SS-controlled Eastern Empire placed at the disposal of the j ;SS vast recources and secured for them ascendancy over both j ; i I ! state and party hierarchies in the Reich. j ! ' . ' j Constrained, initially, by the need to prepare for ! . | jarmed expansion and blocked by Hitler's alliance with the i ' old German ruling elite, the SS gained primacy through war j | | land aggression. The "totalitarian breakthrough" pursued by i [the SS was in the end accomplished in the conquered East. i | The story of this breakthrough in the occupied lands of I Bohemia and Moravia is the subject of this study. The ensu-i ^ • j ing empirical analysis of the contest for power and of the tension between metastatic intentions and contingent reality in the Protectorate is intended to demonstrate the taxon omic, heuristic, and explanatory utility of the ideal- i typical approach and will attempt to provide verification of the hypothesized structural conflicts. NOTES TO CHAPTER II Typological series are ideal-typical constructs of 'developmental sequences containing hypotheses about the ^ynamic relationships that determine their direction and meaning (Weber, Soziologie. pp. 248-49). 2 In the case of social behavior, these conditions .will include motives and "projects." Neither general con cepts (Gattungsbegri ffe) nor averages (Durchschnittsbe- ■griffe) serve the desired purpose (ibid., pp. 247-48). 3 "Plausible" here means objectively probable, i.e. conforming to our nomological knowledge of social behavior and of its motivations (Theodore Abel, Systematic Sociology in Germany [New York: Columbia University Press, 1929], Ipp. 147-56) . 4 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. I, 7. See also Kaplan (pp. 283-84), who expresses preference for substance over techniques and for "riches" over rigor whenever social scientists confront such a choice. 5 Weber insisted that the methodology of social sci ence as an empirical science of man must be radically dif ferent from that of the natural sciences, for unlike the world of nature, which, as Schutz formulated it, "does not mean anything to the molecules, atoms and electrons, " the observational field of the social scientist, namely social reality, has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings acting and living therein. The social scientist must understand this reality or Lebenswelt (lived world) by "devising models of invariant motives and con structs of typicality. " For a discussion of the epistemo- logical foundation of Weber's methodology see Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences, " Journal of Philosophy. LI, No. 5 (April 29, 1954), 257-73. 54 i ■ 6 i I Joseph Nyomarkay, "Authority, Leadership and the J Concept of Charisma" (unpublished paper, University of 'Southern Califprnia,.. 1972),. p . 13 . See also Ghita Ionescu, | The Politics of the European Communist States (New York: j Praeger, 1967), p. 26. I 7 | Ionescu, p. 26. i 0 | Both the "vague and unshaped material" forming the j basis for Weltanschauungen and the more programmatic and ! •integrated structure of ideologies attempt "to apply general| Ideas to specific situations" and, thus, "to establish j [explicit moral bases for action." Either can serve as an j lingredient of totalitarian belief systems. For significant differences between ideologies and Weltanschauungen. see Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. pp. 19-2 3. g Herbert J. Spiro, "Totalitarianism," International i Encvclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Crowell, |collier, and Macmillan, 1968), XVI, 108. Spiro sees in the j "ruthless pursuit of a single, positively formulated goal . . . the most distinctive common denominator of totalitar ianisms" (p. Ill). j Ibid., p. 107. j I ii See supra. p. 2 7, n. 17. 12Janicke, "Aspekte," pp. 169, 177. j Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Compara- ! tive Politics: A Reader (New York: The Free Press of j Glencoe, 1963), p. 437. See also Inkeles, "The Totalitarian! Mystique," p. 87. 14 Inkeles, "The Totalitarian Mystique," p. 87. 15 . I Nyomarkay, "Authority, Leadership and the Concept j jof Charisma," p. 12. j 55 17 ' Gerth and Mills, p. 73. j i , 1 I 28 . . . . j Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi j Party, p . 21. j 19 • • ■ : ........ - - i David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Lifei (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 305: ". . . the symbolization of a new order in personal terms had been characteristic of jinost situations in the past where basic changes have j joccurred and where large groups need to be set in motion in |order to achieve them." • 20 | Gerth and Mills, p. 73. I i 21 ! Stalin's "spurious charisma" (Easton, p. 304), leaning essentially on institutional legitimization through I party and dogma, represents, in this respect, an imperfect j approximation to the ideal type. His unrestrained manipula-j tions of ideological content and the destruction of all institutional constraints through the "cult of personality," however, provide operational features of considerable func tional equivalence (Janicke, Totalitare Herrschaft. p. 201; j Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. j |p. 21). | I | I 22 | Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Re.vo- ilutionary Breakthroughs," American Political Science Review.! |LIX (December, 1965), 964-74. j ! 2 3- ' | Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics.: |p. 80. | | j ; 2 4 i | "... for the Fascist, everything is in the i State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has | value, outside the State. In this sense Fascism is totali- j itarian, and the Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of | all values, interprets, develops, and gives strength to the I whole life of the people" (Benito Mussolini, "The Doctrine | of Fascism." in The Social and Political Doctrines of Con- j * ............... !temporary Europe, ed. by Michael Oakshott [Oxford: Oxford j (University Press, 1949], p. 21). 25 I Traditional western, bourgeois ideology "perceives! oppression as . . . the denial of individual political j rights and then only when the state is the oppressor" (Joel j C. Edelstein, "Mobilization, Immobilization, and Spontaneous! •Forms of Fascism," Politics and Society. II, No. 3 [1972], i |367). Hence its readiness to identify totalitarianism with | jetatism and to see in totalitarian rule the reemergence of j ithe centralized absolute state. ! I ! ' 2 6 . i i Friedrxch and Brzezinskx, pp. 54-55. i 27 j It was Hegel who identified the bureaucracy with ithe "universal intent of the state." As he saw it, the task |of "officials" was to implement the sovereign's decisions within a framework of "past decisions, existing laws, regu lations, organizations for the securing of common ends, and so forth." Bureaucratic execution of decisions, to Hegel, is the tangible, operational aspect of the state (G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox [Oxford: Clarendon, 1942], pp. 188-93). 2 8 Janicke, "Aspekte," p. 179. 29 j Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University jPress, 1968). 30 i Ionescu, p. 104. i 31 ] Ibid., p. 105. I 3^ ~ Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, p. 27. 33 Diehl-Thiele, p. 7. 34 The anti-institutional character of totalitarian rule was aptly described by Sigmund Neumann, who defined totalitarian demagogues as "the substitute for institutions in times of transition" (pp. 5, 46). 35 Martin Janicke, "Monopolismus und Pluralismus im Kommunistischen Herrschaftssystem," Zeitschrift ftir Politik. XIV, No. 2 (June, 1967), 151. 57 ! The "antinomic balance of charismatic movements j I (leaders and ideas)" with the organizational apparatus j Jthrough which they attempt to dominate constitutes the idynamic element in Weber's construction of .history. (Gerth Jand Mills, p. 55). See also Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesell- Ischaft. II, 551-58. J 37 j Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," pp. 435-51. Weber viewed incompleteness and openendedness as essential elements of the human condition. Par from attempting a premature closure of history he insisted that there are "sciences to which eternal youth is granted." At the very heart of their task lies "not only the transitori ness of all ideal types but at the same time the inevitabil ity of new ones" (Weber, Soziologie, p. 252). I 38 ' Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possi- j bilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Sys tems, " in Friedrich, ed., p. 323j Fleron, "Toward a Recon- ceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union," pp. 2 30-39. Post-industrial societies could well reproduce jthe violence-prone alienation and the regressive content of totalitarianism, without resorting to traits associated with the "ideal type" (Janicke, "Aspekte," pp. 184-88). See also Bertram Gross, "Friendly Fascism: A Model for America," Social Policy, I (November-December, 1970), 46. 39 i Whereas concepts are not subject to empirical j verification, hypothesized factual relationships are. I 40 ' Weber did not develop an explicit theory of con- | flict. His writings reflect, however, a dialectic view of history and present structural incompatibilities and contra- jdictions as crucial sources of endogenous change. Weber j sees "interdependence as a conflictual relationship" and social structure "not only as the static framework of soci ety, but also as the source of a crucial type of change" (Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," American Sociological j Review. XXVIII, No. 5 [October, 1963], 699, 701). j 41 i Alexander J. Groth, Revolution and Elite Access: ! Some Hypotheses on Aspects of Political Change. Comparative I j 58 j government Series, No. 1 (Davis: University of California, Institute of Governmental Affairs, March, 1966), p. 23. 42 Ibid. 43 Arthur Schweitzer ranks mutually acceptable poli cies under five headings: (1) military equality with other powersj (2) national independence from the world economyj |(3) the regaining of military strength through economic rearmament ; (4) the suppression of independent trade unionsj land (5) the invigoration of capitalist institutions that jsuffered during the Great Depression (Schweitzer, p. 51). I 44 | Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, "Hitlers Kriegsziele, " Vierteliahreshefte fur Zeitqeschichte (Stuttgart), VIII, No. 2 (April, 1960), 127. 45 Krausnick et al.. I, 22. 46 Schweitzer, p. 516. i 47 ! The police apparatus had been granted virtual exemption from supervision by German civil and military authorities in the occupied territories of the East (Affi davit of General Keitel, March 29, 1945, Doc. Keitel-12, in [International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Icriminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nurem berg. 1945-46 [hereinafter cited as IMT] [42 vols.j Nurem- I berg, 1947-49], XL, 376). I PART II THE HISTORY OP THE TOTALITARIAN BREAKTHROUGH 59 i j i I I ! CHAPTER III I I I THE SETTING OF THE STAGE i | POLICY CONCEPTS AND IMPROVISATIONS i Prologue to Occupation When German troops entered Prague in the early morn ing hours of March 15, 1939, they did so in the absence of any clear concept as to the policy to be pursued by the occupiers in Bohemia and Moravia. The long-term goals of the Nazis in the Czech lands had not yet been firmly estab lished nor did there exist a concise plan of operation and of the formal structure of government to be imposed upon the hapless Czech nation. The Czechs were the first non-German nation to come junder Nazi rule and thus posed a number of new and difficult problems to their overlords. To make matters worse, the j Munich agreement, concluded only six months before, had created a new political situation, forcing the Reich to reformulate policies and to program actions against | 60 'Czechoslovakia by a series of improvisations rather than according to long-term design. | True, as State Secretary von Weizsacker had cabled a | ! few days after Munich to all German Missions abroad, the j "historic conference of the four leading statesmen" had "completely satisfied the demands listed in the German mem orandum, " and had achieved "an overwhelming success of the | Fiihrer's policy in general."1 Yet, it had failed to satisfyj i i Hitler's maximum objective, the "complete destruction" of 2 Czechoslovakia and the annexation of its dismembered parts. As he told the Hungarian Prime Minister on September 20— ten days before the Munich agreement— he was concerned that the Czechs might "submit to all of his demands" and thus prevent "action by the army [which] would provide the only satisfac- i 3 tory solution." Upon his return to Berlin from Munich, he complained that the agreement "had spoiled my entry into 4 Prague." He had informed Germany's political and military leaders of his decision to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia as early as November 5, 1937 and had assured them that "most probably Great Britain and possibly France, too, had already tacitly written off Czechoslovakia." These two operations 62 iwould help to "release Germany's armed forces for other i 5 jeventualities. " Hitler saw the Sudeten question primarily as a con venient opportunity to bring about the destruction of the ^Czechoslovak state. In a speech celebrating his victory 'over Poland, he regaled his generals with an account of his ! - Jachievements: I i [After the occupation of Austria], the next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. All this could not j be achieved in one campaign. First of all, the west- i ern fortifications had to be completed. It was impos sible to reach the goal with one single effort. It was clear to me from the outset that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia had to be made. Then followed the establish ment of the Protectorate and with that the basis of the action against Poland was laid.6 The incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich and the agreement signed by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Munich had complicated Hitler's designs in Central Europe. An unprovoked military attack against the remaining Czechoslovak lands presumably would have greatly offended the signatory powers of the agreement. But the time for a confrontation with the Western powers had not yet I arrived. Moreover, attempts by Poland and Hungary to estab-J | lish a common border by the annexation of Slovakia and j i ! Ruthenia— a plan tacitly approved by Mussolini but opposed | 63 ! i I _ j by the generals of the German Army— had to be countered. Ini (thwarting these designs on the eastern sections of the (Czechoslovak Republic and by opposing Polish and Hungarian j jattempts to convene a Four Power Conference in order to settle their claims, Berlin's immediate interests coincided, (temporarily and to some degree at least, with those of ' < 7 Prague. | "Czechoslovakia has ceased to be a military factor. •England and France will not want to lose face in Czechoslo vakia, " Hitler is reported to have stated to former Premier k. Daranyi, heading off Hungarian demands at a conference g attended by Ribbentrop on October 14, 1938 in Munich. For i |the time being, at least, Czechoslovakia was not to be I ! I 1 divided among its neighbors. The satellization of the rump state and her subordination to Reich interests would have to | proceed by other than military means. Thus, from October to ! I fhe end of November, 1938, the view of the conservative wing ! Jof the Wilhelmstrasse prevailed over that of the radicals; (Czechoslovakia was to be turned into a satellite, formally independent but under German control and domination. Pursuant to policy decisions concerning Czechoslo- g vakia made by Hitler and Ribbentrop on October 11, Chval- jkovsky, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, was received ; ~ 64"" " I i ! by the Reich Chancellor on October 14. During this conver- I ! i i !' jsatron, Hitler made it clear that Czechoslovakia would have j to accept German direction of her foreign policy, reduce the j jsize of her army, limit the freedom of her press, introduce j I i ! i janti-Jewish legislation and adjust her economy to the j ; . i ‘ i t ! . i jrequirements of the Reich. Czechoslovakia had no choice, hei I | stressed, but to arrive at a friendly agreement with the j j Reich, since it now was a vital part of the German sphere ofj influence.^ j j Czechoslovakia was to be weakened militarily and j | economically and, in some manner, incorporated into the Reich without provoking further international tension. At the same time Hitler issued orders to General.Keitel, to S I prepare contingency plans for a military intervention: "It j must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of J Czechoslovakia should she become hostile toward Germany."1' 1 ’ Upon requests by Reich authorities to submit pro posals concerning a settlement of the Czech problem, two leaders of the remaining German minority group in Czecho slovakia transmitted memoranda to the Foreign Office in i j Berlin. Both Ernst Kundt, the leader of the Bohemian Ger- ! I mans, and Dr. Hans Neuwirth, a prominent representative of the German minority group in Moravia, proposed retention of jczechoslovakia within its post-Munich frontiers, "in view of; the fact that the Munich agreement precludes the military j occupation of Prague and the installation of a Reichs- j statthalter or governor, at least for the time being." | Stressing the economic potential of the Czechoslovak lands i I and the unfavorable consequences of a military annexation of Czechoslovakia on the small nations of Southeastern Europe, ! both leaders urged moderation. "Germany will have to win 'over the Czechs politically, " Kundt recommended. "This is possible if we ensure their national independence and secure their borders against Poland and Hungary." No doubt, how ever, ought to be entertained concerning the primacy of the political and military interests of Germany. "Czechoslo- i i jvakia, henceforth, must be utilized for the vital interests [of the Reich. A similar memorandum was submitted by the political I jstaff of Konrad Henlein in October 1938. Less moderate in jits approach, it proposed a choice between two alternatives: outright annexation or creation of a satellite state. An I attached "Outline of a treaty between the German Reich and j | the post-Munich rump-state" suggested that the Reich recog- | I nize Czechoslovakia's "territorial integrity," while the i i ! I ! ^Czechoslovak government would have to accept the obligation jto exercise its powers "in full accord with the political, j | 13 | military and economic interests of the German Reich." | I i i i ! Aware of the fact that hostility toward the Reich | i j would lead to its destruction, Prague attempted to comply j With German demands as best as it could in order to maintain! ! i j i |a degree of self-rule and its formal sovereignty. A number ! i |of bilateral treaties between Prague and Berlin were signed in November, giving Germany extraterritorial rights on a highway to be constructed and granting the German minority j 14 in Czechoslovakia a privileged position. To cap the policy of piecemeal subordination of a formally independent Czechoslovak state to the military, political and economic control of the Reich, the German For- ! jeign Office prepared a far-reaching treaty of "friendship l ! 15 jand cooperation." It contained provisions assuring exten sive adjustments of Czechoslovakia's military and economic policies to that of the Reich. Czechoslovakia was to I renounce British and French guarantees of its frontiers. It was to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and leave the League of Nations. Its foreign policy was to be conducted in accor- j dance with German interests. Its internal political struc- i i ture would have to be brought into conformity with that of the Reich, "especially with regard to Jews, Freemasons, ! 67 etc." Because of the severity of Germany's demands, Under secretary Woermann, who prepared the notes for a projected 'discussion of the draft treaty with Foreign Minister Chval- I i kovsky, concluded with the caution that "obligations of the | j kind dealing with domestic politics cannot, of course, be limposed upon Czechoslovakia in a treaty destined for publi- Lation.1,16 I i j It was obvious to the moderates of the Wilhelm- i strasse that Czechoslovakia had become sufficiently pliable and demoralized to submit to a policy of peaceful penetra tion. Convinced of the advantages of this approach they. attempted to shape Germany's policy in the desired direc- 17 tion. As late as the end of December, 1938, the German legation in Prague emphasized in its reports to Berlin the submissiveness of "formally independent" Czechoslovakia. In all practical questions which were discussed, the Czechoslovak Government conformed to Germany's wishes . . . In their view they have demonstrated their goodwill by the agreement with reference to Auto bahnen, their attitude towards German orders for armament deliveries, and their conduct in economic and cultural-political matters.18 The friendship treaty, however, was never consum- 19 'mated. "It vanished in the files of Ribbentrop. " By mid- December radical tendencies had regained the upper hand in Berlin. Upon Hitler's instructions, General Keitel issued a 68 1 ; i j i supplementary order to the armed forces on December 17: | i I |"The liquidation of the Czech rump-state" is to be prepared j i "on the assumption that no appreciable resistance is to be 20 expected." Military preparations for the attack began in 21 jmid-January, 1939. Hitler had decided to destroy the I 22 jCzechoslovak state with the help of Slovak Separatism and i j by military occupation of the Czech lands. He had reverted 23 to his pre-Munich goal of full annexation. The finaliza tion of the plan extended from February to mid-March, 1939. Its execution was beset by exigencies and uncertainties requiring constant improvisations. This as well as the I brevity of the time span between final decisions and execu tion prevented the preparation of precise and well-formu lated plans concerning occupation policy and the governance of the Czech lands. Early in 1939 Hitler requested and received numerous proposals concerning the final disposition of Czechoslovakia, j i jNone of them favored a united Bohemia and Moravia. All I j adjacent German Provinces and their Gauleiters put in claims t j for parts of the territory, hoping to increase their power j and jurisdiction in the forthcoming division of the | ! spoils. 69 During the month of March the Army High Command pre pared instructions for separate military occupation regimes i in Bohemia and Moravia and on March 15, the German Foreign I ^Office recommended the establishment of two Protectorates, ! . . . 2 5 one m Bohemia and one in Moravia. A temporary military i administration, with General Blaskovitz holding executive I i ■power in Bohemia and General List in Moravia was, in fact, ! [established and remained in force until April 16, 1939, when ! power was handed over to the Reich Protector who arrived in ! 26 Prague on April 5. Gauleiters Henlein and Burckel were l [assigned to the two army commanders as deputies charged with i [civil administration. Both Henlein and Burckel, however, | were removed after a few days and "dropped out of existence" i 27 in Bohemia and Moravia. i | The decision to preserve for the time being, at [least, the territorial unity of the Czech lands and to [establish a "government of the Protectorate" under a single ! ^central Reich authority was made too late to affect previous i 1 i !dispositions concerning the military occupation regime in I jBohemia and Moravia. The last-minute change was certainly Iclosely connected with the appearance in Berlin of President i Hacha of Czechoslovakia on March 14. His fateful meeting [with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery took place after ' 28 / i jmidnight on March 15. Hacha's compliance with Hitler's ; i | |orders and the agreement he signed, provided Nazi Germany J | j with an unexpected opportunity to cloak its military aggres-i i i - I sion with the mantle of a voluntarily and peacefully accept-j | ed annexation, and thus, to avert hostile reactions by ! 29 France and Great Britain. It did, however, require a reformulation of the legal and political status of the occu- j pied territories and their relations to the Reich. With the German army already marching unopposed into Czechoslovakia, and preparations made for Hitler's triumphant entry into Bohemia a few hours later, this had to be postponed till Hitler's arrival in Prague. 1 The Establishment of the Protectorate i ’ ' " 1 The decree establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia i and Moravia was drafted by Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, Chief of the Reich Chancel lery Lammers and Ministerial Director Gaus. It came after consultations with and upon instructions from Hitler, Rib- bentrop, and probably Reich Minister of the Interior Frick, t at Hradcany castle in Prague, during the night of March | j 15-16, amidst considerable confusion and uncertainty as to j . ^ 30 I its legal provisions. ; Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Reichj ! I as a "Protectorate." Its German inhabitants became citizens) | | 'of the Reich (Reichsburqer) subject to its jurisdiction, the) ; i lother inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia became Protectorate) } j I j jnationals (Protektoratsanqehorige) (Articles I and II). The j iProtectorate was to be "autonomous and self-governing," but j it could exercise its prerogatives only "in accordance with the political, military and economic interests of the Reich") (Article III). Its "autonomy" was further restricted by provisions granting the Reich the power to issue legal orders in the Protectorate, take measures necessary for the maintenenace of law and order (Article XI), and abolish any jexisting laws (Article XII). The decree provided for the iappointment of a Reich Protector with extensive powers. As i jthe representative of the Fvihrer, he could confirm and dis- 1 miss members of the Protectorate Government, veto all laws and administrative measures and void court decisions in order to assure compliance with Reich policies (Article V). The Reich took direct charge of foreign affairs, defense, transportation, post and telegraphs, customs and currency j 31 |matters (Articles VI-X). ! ' i j Soon after the promulgation of the decree, Hitler j ! . | |received Baron Konstantin von Neurath and K. H. Frank m j 72 32 Vienna. He appointed the conservative nobleman and former 33 IReichminister of Foreign Affairs Reich Protector of Bohe- i I mia and Moravia, and made Frank— Deputy Gauleiter of the 34 Sudetenland and Himmler's man — his State Secretary. Von jNeurath was promised Hitler's support "to oppose all i j 35 jexcesses, especially by the Sudeten German element." Due to the absence of a clear political concept and the circumstances surrounding its genesis, the FUhrer's occupation edict undeniably bore the stamp of improvisation. Full of ambiguities— partly intentional, and partly because 36 of lack of time for thorough preparation — it provided for an autonomous government, but handed, in fact, almost unlim- I • 37 jited supervisory and veto powers to the Reich Protector. | iThe latter's position vis-a-vis Reich and Party agencies, on 38 the other hand, was extraordinarily ill-defined. The Reich, it will be remembered, had taken direct charge over defense, transportation, post and telegraphs, customs and jcurrency matters. It could exercise direct jurisdiction in i the Protectorate through appropriate Reich Ministries. Furthermore, a number of so-called Supreme Reich Agencies, such as the Reich Defense Council, the Reichsbank and the Office of the Four Year Plan were authorized to pass laws i I and regulations valid for the whole German Reich and thus, j ipresumably, also for the Protectorate. The Reich, quite 'specifically, had reserved the right to take "measures necessary for security and order in the Protectorate" (Article XI). The exercise of control over police power in Bohemia and Moravia had not been expressly granted to the I Reich Protector. The extent of his powers with respect to t agencies of the Reich with jurisdiction in the Protectorate had not been clarified. K. H. Prank's office, that of State Secretary, was not even mentioned in the decree. His status and authority relative to the Reich Protector remained unspecified. To add to the confusion, the NSDAP organization in j ithe Protectorate was divided into four sections and these ! jwere attached to the adjacent regional districts (Gaue) of the Nazi Party (the Sudeten Gau. Gau Bavarian Ostmark, Gau Niederdonau and Gau Oberdonau) in complete disregard of the frontiers of the Protectorate. This arrangement provided jparty leaders in the neighboring regional districts with a i i foothold in Moravia and Bohemia. In order to coordinate and represent all Party interests at the Office of the Reich Protector, a Central Party Liaison Office (Parteiverbin- dungstelle) under district leader (Gauleiter) Jury was j 74 j jestablished in Prague. It reported, and was directly sub- \ i jordinated, to the Party Chancellery under Hess and later L 39 Bormann. As could be expected, this veritable maze of over lapping and fuzzy jurisdictions opened the way for intrigues ! I land direct interference by Reich and party agencies, requir- i i 40 ling frequent appeals to Hitler as the final authority. I llhe institutional structure of the Protectorate as defined s by the Fiihrer decree was clearly unsuited to serve as frame work for its governance. It would require extensive changes and amendments to untangle its provisions. The scene, thus, was set for a struggle for power between the Reich Protec tor, the Party, the Reich agencies and Himmler's "SS-State," a struggle lasting to the final days of the Protectorate. * * * i Not only the legal and institutional framework, but j the principles and policies to be followed and the mecha- i nisms and techniques of applying them in the Protectorate, I | had not been clearly conceptualized. j i I The immediate military and economic objectives of the occupiers were obvious: complete domination and control) i I in the Protectorate and the full mobilization of its j I t Ieconomic resources for the purposes of the Reich. "What thei i i I i |Germans needed most from the occupied areas is for the j ■i I moment peace, quiet and a minimum of bad feelings," reported' t George F. Kennan on March 29, from the U.S. Legation in | 41 I Prague. j j j | Beyond this, however, there loomed the problem of ; I I |the integration of the Protectorate into the Reich and of j i i j 'Germany's policy toward the Czechs as a nation. j | ! While the military and economic objectives of Ger- j many were amenable to, in fact required, a pragmatic j approach of political moderation, the latter two issues werej closely and fatefully linked with the core of the Nazi j i Weltanschauung— the idea of Blut und Boden. of race and living space. The rough outlines of this unstable mixture of j 42 volkisch (nationalist) and racist elements had been formu lated in Hitler's Mein Kampf and, more forcefully still, in a manuscript written in 1928 but not published during his 43 lifetime. Germany's historical mission was to acquire land for its people, new "living space" in the East, primar- 44 ily in Russia. Only thus could she assure her national survival and the domination of the racially superior Herren- | I volk over inferior eastern races, as intended by destiny. ! ! 76 ! I I jln the center of Europe there was to emerge a new German J 45 jReich extending far beyond its borders of 1914. This new Reich was to be ruled not by the tradi tional "earlier patriotic ideas" of the "bourgeois world," 46 but by "racial insights." Its conquered races were to be weakened in strength and in numbers, partly resettled and ipartly reduced to a mass of helots and servitors of the Ger man nation. "Historically, the only thing we successfully Germanized, " Hitler proclaimed, "has been the soil our fathers conquered with the sword and settled with German 47 peasants." It would not do simply to teach the conquered nations the German language. Germanization based on lan guage would only mix foreign racial elements, "foreign I blood," with that of the German race and thus lead to de-Germanization and the destruction of her Nordic racial i characteristics. "Nationhood, or rather race, was never a 48 matter of language but of blood." That Hitler disliked the Czechs only less than he 49 hated Jews was well-known. He made no secret of his aver sion and had told his close collaborators of his intention to "remove the Czechs from Central Europe and make room for 50 German peasants." At the very least it would be necessary to dam their great fertility and cause "inferior races which 51 ;breed like vermin" to disappear comparatively painlessly. [Hitler also confided his plans for the conquest of Lebens- i raum (living space) to a select circle of top leaders on i 52 jNovember 5, 1937 and surprised and alarmed Generals Blom- jberg and Fritsch as well as Foreign Minister von Neurath with the pronouncement that the expulsion of two million j i Czechs and a million inhabitants of Austria would provide 53 food for five to six million Germans. How and to what extent his sentiments and his i jloosely formulated ideas would affect German policy in [Bohemia and Moravia was, however, by no means evident. The full impact of Hitler's racial views on Germany's conduct |and policies was, as yet, obscured by the intentional vague- . 5 4 ness and inconsistency of his pronouncements. Moreover, Hitler's reluctance to commit himself, his I 55 i tendency to delay decisions, was widely known and his most ardent supporters, those most dedicated to the radical core of his views, were well aware that he would subordinate principles ruthlessly to the necessities of the moment. "How I shall dispose in Bohemia and Moravia, " he stated to Frank, "I shall decide myself only after the war, when I 56 know what will be available to me." His ruthless plans of conquest, subjugation and colonization, however, found avid isupporters among the radical groups in the Nazi Party. i • i I iHimmler and Heydrich seized them eagerly and proceeded to ; ! ! ! I jprepare the basis for their vast power structure by molding j the SS into the chosen tool of Hitler's radical policies andj i 57 ! ;the new ruling caste of the Nazi empire. Both saw the ! (Protectorate as the first opportunity for their plans of SS j i ! settlement and domination.58 j j The radical wing of Henlein1s Sudeten German Party | also made secret plans for the annexation of Bohemia and i Moravia and their incorporation into the German Reich. An ! i I I action program prepared before Munich, probably between May i j jand August, 1938, proposed the appointment of the "leader of [the Sudeten Germans as Reichsstatthalter [Governor] for the i iBohemian lands." The annexation of the territory was to be i i proclaimed from Prague. After a period of military occupa- i I tion the leader of the Sudeten Germans would assume adminis- I trative authority. The plan provided for the appointment of a "leader of the national struggle," camouflaged as director of security. He was to serve under the Reichsstatthalter jwith full powers to take "all measures required for the liquidation of the Czech question," a provision that proba- jbly served as a model for K. H Frank's appointment and his I allotted task in the Protectorate. The Sudeten German i 79 proposals for the Germanization of Bohemia and Moravia were influenced by volkisch nationalism rather than by the bio logical racism of Himmler and the SS. A zone of German settlements was to be established to separate the Czechs from the Slovaks. Czech schools were to be closed down, the jlanguage suppressed and replaced by German. Emigration and resettlement of Czechs abroad would be fostered and large segments of the population encouraged to adopt German j 59 nationality. These extremist views demanding the liquidation of the Czechs as a people, were not shared by the moderate wing of the Sudeten German Party. In the period between Munich I i jand March 15, their deputies Neuwirth and Kundt rejected j proposals of extermination, suppression, and resettlement as i I . 6d [unworkable and contrary to the economic needs of the Reich, j I i The serious threat the radicals posed, however, was well understood by the Czechs as can be discerned in President Hacha's anxious inquiry on March 15 in Berlin and his pathetic relief upon receiving Hitler's assurance that he did not "desire or aim at their denationalization." The two | nations ought to live happily side by side, "the ones as 61 Czechs the others as Germans." 80 I 1 ! Despite these promises, however, discussions at | | I ! i jParty Headquarters as well as in various Reich Agencies and j ■ I ! jeconomic circles on measures to initiate the "final solution! of the Czech problem" began soon after the establishment of 62 the Protectorate. Proposals ranged from removing the f Czechs to Siberia to Germanizing part of the nation. As early as May 30, 1939, Himmler urged the settle- i ment of Germans from South Tyrol in Moravia, since "they ! i I f would add 200,000 nationally conscious Germans of fighting j j spirit and good racial characteristics to Moravia, which j 63 ■ must be made fully and completely German again." General Frederici, Wehrmacht liaison officer at the ! Reich Protectorate in Prague, proposed on July 12, 1939, to the OKW the gradual.removal of the Czech intelligentsia, of I teachers, and of former officers. These "elements leading the struggle for national survival" ought to be induced to ! i i emigrate to the Reich and abroad. The leaderless masses, ! ! i "less concerned about national aims, " would then submit to j peaceful Germanization, "without severe shocks or inter- 64 ■ national complications." | In the same month, Gauleiter Jury recommended com plete Germanization through the permanent settlement of J 65 ! German colonists m the Protectorate. I 81 ; i _ ' I With the conquest of Poland and the fall of France, j I demands for full integration with the Reich and for a radi- j ! . 1 ! ! jcal solution of the Czech problem grew more insistent. The j | lengthy debate about the fate of the Czechs that followed no| i ; jlonger left room for any solution but the complete Germani- j ] i zation of the country. The continuing presence of the Czech nation near the heart of the Reich was rejected as intoler- ! able. I j | i How Germanization ought to proceed, however, was by jno means resolved. For it was obvious that national repres-i i ! i j jsion and efforts at massive colonization would provoke i I ! active resistance in the Protectorate, and thus threaten the i ! iorderly process of production and jeopardize its important i S , 66 ; c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o G e r m a n y s e c o n o m y a n d w a r e f f o r t . i | The tension between the conflicting requirements of j i i i maintaining an efficient economic base for her war machine ! and ideologically grounded demands for the Endldsung (the I i jfinal solution of the Czech problem) defined German opera tive policies for the duration of the occupation. It polar-j . i ized the conflict between the old ruling establishment, ori ented toward traditional methods of rule, and the radicals of the Party and the SS, demanding totalitarian solutions j 82 i * ; ! jand the abandonment of conventional policies and bureau- j ! i cratic expertise. | The Protectorate thus became the stage for a decis- i i ive struggle among the SS, the Nazi Party, and the pretotal- i itarian ruling elites, reflecting their bitter contest for I jsupremacy in the Reich itself. I ' I I ' The Consolidation of Control I : | Hitler's decree of March 16, 1939 had granted the Czechs autonomy in their domestic affairs. It certainly did not foreclose an interpretation of the Protector's role as that of supreme supervisor over a self-governing Protec torate. He could veto measures and issue orders "when delay ' 6 7 j s e e m e d d a n g e r o u s . " T h e r e w a s n o t h i n g t o i n d i c a t e t h a t h e J h a d t h e r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e l e g i s l a t i v e a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s i n n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It soon became obvious, however, that Czech self- government was to be severely restricted. A number of sup plementary orders, issued during the spring and summer, greatly enhanced the powers of the Reich Protector— granting him not only virtually unlimited authority over the "auton omous government" but also primacy over competing Reich and Party agencies in the Protectorate. An order dated March 2 2, 1939 established the Reich I ! ' ■ ■ ! jProtector as the sole representative of the Reich Government and the Fiihrer, "directly subordinated to him and receiving i directives solely from him" A central office of the Reich j j Ministry of the Interior under Dr. W. Stuckart was charged j j with the task of coordinating all measures taken by Reich j agencies in the Protectorate with respect to matters j 68 i reserved to the Reich. The Reich Protector was to be keptl informed and consulted.69 By an order of June 7, he was given the esqplicit right to issue decrees and suspend laws whenever he deemed this necessary and he thus assumed direct and supreme legis- 70 lative authority m the Protectorate. He was empowered to demand reports from all Reich and Protectorate agencies and . . . . 71 to define the range of measures requiring his consent. i A still greater blow to the semblance of self- | government left to the Czechs was the special position enjoyed by the German security organs who formed the back bone of Nazi power in the Protectorate. All police forces in Bohemia and Moravia were subordinated to the Reich Secu- i rity Main Office (RSHA fReichsicherheitshauptamt1) and I | received executive orders directly from Headquarters in J Berlin. Government officials in the Protectorate were j 84 ; i j jsubject to directives issued by the Gestapo (Secret State | ! i . ] Police) and all political offenses were to be tried in Ger- j I I man courts. The Protectorate Government was not even empow-j I ered to effect delay in the execution of measures to which 72 it might have objections. i I i | Of equal importance was the Nazis' success in secur-j I j ing control over the whole apparatus of local administra tion. The granting of Reich citizenship to all German inhabitants provided the opportunity to establish a dual | i system of administration. Special District Commissioners (Oberlandrate). responsible directly to the Reich Protector, were charged with the administration of matters affecting 73 German citizens now subject to Reich jurisdiction. They also exercised supervisory powers over Czech district offi- 74 cials and compelled them to follow their instructions. I For additional leverage, local Germans were appointed as j Special Commissioners (Reqierunqskomissare) to direct the administration in cities of mixed population, despite repeated protests by President Hacha against these arbitrary 75 practices. A small staff of German administrators placed in strategic positions thus established effective direction of the machinery of local government in the Protectorate and |was able to transform the Czech apparatus into a tool of j ! I jNazi rule. J Similar methods were used by the German authorities j to obtain control over the central administration and the i economic resources of the country. The advantage of retaining the existing machinery of i government was obvious. Without an efficient, established j and Czech-speaking civil service, the problems faced by the Reich would have become insurmountable. It was indispen sable for the effective domination of the occupied country and a decisive reason for maintaining a relatively careful approach and the facade of self-government during the ini tial phase of German rule. ! I ! j I ! I j This attitude of moderation found expression in the | prompt approval of a Protectorate Government headed by Gen- i eral Elias. The new Premier was personally known to von Neurath whom he had met at the Disarmament Conference at 76 jGeneva. Most cabinet ministers had been members of the anti-democratic, right-of-center Sirovy and Beran govern- ' ments, which held power in the period after Munich and 77 before the occupation. They remained in offxce, with some minor changes, until Heydrich's radical revision of the Protectorate's political and administrative structure in 'January, 1942 . j At the same time, the German authorities embarked on | ja rapid expansion of the Office of the Reich Protector. i ^Ostensibly serving the purpose of supervising the activities j jof the Czech autonomous government, it was divided into departments, roughly corresponding to the Ministries of the jElias administration. Headed by Assistant State Secretary i }von Burgsdorff, it soon became the actual seat of executive power. Every act of the Protectorate Ministers was subject i I !to review by their counterparts in the Protector's Office i . 79 jand required their consent. In a number of key offices of i the Czech central administration, Germans were placed into L 80 leading positions. i With legislative and administrative powers increas ingly exercised by the German authorities, the modest auton omy granted the Czechs was revealed as an empty shell. "That Czech autonomy has proved a fiction was no longer open to doubt," George F. Kennan reported in May, 1939 from Prague to the U.S. Department of State. "Despite continued German assurances to the contrary, the Protectorate system, i as guaranteed to the Czechs by the Reichskanzler in his 87 decree of March 16, has never been seriously put into jeffect. Hand in hand with these moves went efforts to gain j control over Czech productive resources and to accomplish [the incorporation of the Protectorate into the economy of j ithe Reich. The Nazis undoubtedly considered the exploita- j tion of Bohemia and Moravia for Germany's rearmament as one of their most urgent objectives. The Protectorate, more over, constituted an invaluable source of foreign currency, pzech esqports to Britain, Prance and the U.S. exceeded limports from these countries by a comfortable margin. This i l Ifavorable balance of trade with the West would alleviate Germany's notorious lack of monetary reserves and facilitate | 82 [the importation of needed raw materials. I j Soon after March 15, 1939, the exchange rate of the i German Mark was pegged at 1:10 to the Czech crown, while it had fluctuated between 1:6 and 1:7 before the occupation. The overvaluation of the Reichmark encouraged wholesale pur chases of consumer goods in the Protectorate. More impor tantly, it provided opportunities for the acquisition of Czech properties and enterprises on exceedingly favorable ! 83 ] •terms. Reich currency imported into the Protectorate had i I i I I •to be withdrawn from circulation. The Czech National Bank j ! 88 j I i jwas forced to transfer Reichmark banknotes to the Reichs- | ! I jbank, acquiring in exchange claims against the Reich which j i i jamounted to nearly six billion Reichmarks at the end of the 84 occupation. The establishment of the customs union j between the Reich and the Protectorate in October. 1940 | ' increased inflationary pressures on the crown and permitted the Reich to keep all foreign currency payments earned by 85 Czech exporters abroad. The gold reserve of the Czech National Bank in Prague, as well as gold deposited to the account of the Bank for International Settlement at Basel in 86 London, was taken over by the Reich. Moreover, the Wehr- 87 macht took possession of vast stocks of war materials. The total value of military equipment amounted to 24 billion crowns and provided an extremely important contribution to Germany's military potential.^ On June 21, 1939, the Reich Protector issued a law "regarding Jewish property" over his own signature and with- 89 out consultation of the Czech authorities. It gave the Protector extensive powers to dispose of all Jewish enter prises and to assure their eventual transfer into German 90 hands. The terms of the law were broad enough to include enterprises with one-quarter Jewish capital participation and provided a legal basis for the acquisition of j 89 | i 91 Isubstantial industrial properties in the Protectorate. ! ! 1 ! I |"Aryanization" netted control over capital amounting to wellj j ! pver six billion crowns and German administrators were j i ' i i 92 1 assigned as "trustees" to Jewish firms. j | By taking over majority interest in most Czech banksj i the Germans obtained a dominant place in the financial j s p h e r e , a n d t h e e x t e n s i v e h o l d i n g s o f t h e s e f i n a n c i a l i n s t i - J I tutions assured them control over large segments of trade | 93 and industry. Other important Czech business concerns j i were procured by rate-of-exchange manipulations and outrightj 94 j forced purchases, and a number of Czech firms were put | 95 ! under the supervision of Nazi commissioners. The total | value of movable property acquired by the Germans during thej i i first year of the Protectorate was estimated at 22 billion 96 Czech crowns. | President Hacha protested these intolerable incur- | i ! sions and continuous infringements of property rights to thej 97 I Reich Protector and to Hitler himself. His supplications ! fell on deaf ears and he received no reply to his griev- 98 ances. The Reich Protector had acquired the powers of a i "provincial governor" and all executive and legislative authority was exercised by him or by agencies of the 9° | 99 ■ • Reich. In effect, the Czechs had lost control over i Itheir affairs. i ! i I * * * j While the German authorities were still in the pro- j i i i cess of building their own apparatus, the continued exis- j itence of a powerless but outwardly autonomous and reasonably t jrepresentative Czech government remained an essential ingre dient of their policy. Only thus could they hope to main tain peace and order and achieve the desired transfer of power without serious disruptions of the process of adminis-j itration. i Their success in securing a series of retreats and ! i leventual acceptance of this humiliating role by the aging Hacha and the Protectorate government was greatly assisted i by a small group of Czech fascists and Nazis who offered j i 1 their full support to the occupiers. I The Czech fascists had been a political party with out much influence or support in Czechoslovakia before the German occupation. Following the establishment of the Pro tectorate, their leader, Rudolf Gajda, had after some hesi- j i i tation agreed to disband his movement and advised his fol- j i lowers to join Narodni sourucenstvi (Movement of National j 91 ! : ' ! Unity), the sole official national political organization, j ! ! jwhich, under Hacha's guidance, was to replace the old polit-i i ] jical parties. Only a small extremist Czech Nazi group, cen- I ' I jtered around the periodical Vlajka ("The Banner"), broke I ! with Gajda and turned toward unconditional cooperation with ! 1 j j 100 i jthe Germans. Though banned and declared illegal by Pres-j ident Hacha, the Vlajka group received ample financial sup- j i I port from the funds of the occupation authorities. Encour- j | j j i [aged by Frank and the men of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security! ! j iservice) who had previous contacts with them and wished to i I ' ! !"reward them for services rendered, " the Vlajka extrem- i I I lists opened a vicious attack against the Czech government. \ ! ■ | 'Accusing the Elias cabinet of passive resistance and lack of i j [loyalty to National Socialism and the German Reich, they j ;demanded its resignation. j j Their hopes to gain power in the Protectorate, how- j i ever, were soon to be dashed. As later on in Rumania and | Hungary, the Nazis regarded native right-wing militants as pawns in the struggle for domination but considered them 103 unsuitable to serve as effective tools of control. Lack- i i j ing all moral authority and engaged in incessant squabbles, j j i I 104 I the Vlajka leaders embarrassed even their mentors. As i One of the Reich Protector's advisers reported, "the Vlajka j |is without all influence and carries no weight with the i j (people. We support them solely for the sake of the tenet j 105 'divide et impera' ['divide and rule']." In this endeav-i | or the Nazis succeeded over all expectations. They used the! I (Viajka to intimidate Hacha and deter him from resisting I i ' j j l jtheir mounting encroachments. Moreover, Frank's threats to ! ! ! jdismiss all Ministers and to install a cabinet made up of I right-wing extremists achieved the desired result of wring- i I ing concession after concession from a cowed Protectorate I government. Despite messages from Benes who warned the 106 Czech leaders against continued compliance, they per sisted blindly in their efforts to bar the Vlajka at any I I price from access to power. Hacha and the cabinet failed toj : i i : |see the German threat to grant power to the Vlajka for what j it really was— an effective attempt to undermine the soli- i darity and resolution of the Protectorate government. For what the occupiers needed at that time above all were reli- j | able civil servants and officials who could effectively deal| with the problems of administration. The Vlajka leaders were clearly incapable of this task and the direct adminis- j tration of Bohemia and Moravia by German officials would have greatly increased the problems of the occupation j j 107 authorities. The state of affairs was astutely j 93 jsummarized in a report transmitted to London by the Czech junderground as follows: i • j The Germans do not intend in the least to replace | Hacha, Havelka and Elias with politically insignifi- | cant individuals of doubtful character, such as Rys, j the leader of the Vlajka. They use the Vlajka really I i only as a scare-crow to browbeat Hacha and the Gov- | ernment to render them psychologically incapable of j resistance. . . . It appears, however, that the Hacha i administration fails to realize this sufficiently.108 | | | The rewards the Vlajkists received were meager jindeed. Unable to check their excessive ambitions and to | (reconcile Vlajka nationalism with German political purposes,! ' • i their movement was disbanded and their leaders interned by j 109 rthe Nazis m the concentration camp of Dachau. ! ! | I They played, however, an important role during the • I iinitial phase of the occupation, when the principal German ! i . . . ! jeffort was aimed at securing control of the existing Czech i n o ! network of administration. The threat to impose the j I i t i Vlajka gave the Germans the time they required to build j their own institutions and to replace Czech organs of polit ical direction with a Nazi apparatus of control. With the consolidation of power and with control over the administra- i ■ I j ; jtion firmly in German hands, the initial objective of Nazi i i I I 'rule in the Protectorate had been accomplished. The sue- ; ! ' | f cessful completion of their own institutional framework, in j turn, lent substance to the threat of direct rule by the j i ( Reich in Bohemia and Moravia and made it possible to apply \ j increasing pressures on the Protectorate government. It j was, moreover, an indispensable condition for a move toward i jthe implementation of plans for a "final solution" of the j Czech problem and thus it opened the way to the ascendancy of the radical wing within the Nazi power structure in the Protectorate. 95 I NOTES TO CHAPTER III j i i j i I ‘ ! I ......,^Do,c. NG-17.8.9, in Trials of War Criminals before the I ■Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control Council Law No. 101 ((hereinafter cited as TWC) (15 vols.; Nuremberg, 1946-49), j |xil, 82 3. j I ■ • ! I 2 I German Foreign Office memorandum on Hitler's meet- i ing with Prime Minister Imredy and Foreign Minister .Kanya of| Hungary, September. 2.0,. 1938, in Documents on German Foreign I Policy. 1918-45. from the Archives of the German Foreign j Ministry (hereinafter cited as DGFP). Series D (1937-45) j (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949- ! 58), II, 863-64. | 3t^., Ibid. 4 j Hjalmar Schacht on the witness stand, IMT, XII, 1531. ■ | ! I 5 ‘ Minutes of conference at the Reich Chancellery as recorded by Col. F. Hossbach (Hossbach memorandum), Doc. |386-PS, IMT, XXV, 410. I I 6 i { Speech to the Commanders-in-Chief, Doc. 789-PS, in j i Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (hereinafter cited as NCA) ! (8 vols. and supplements A, B; Washington, DC.: U.S. (Government Printing Office, 1946-47), III, 573. For a detailed account of the Godesberg and Munich meetings, see j Helmuth K G. O. Ronnefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der inter- j nationalen Politik (2 vols.; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, | 1961), I, 570-85. I » 7 v v - i DGFP. D, IV, 39. See also Frantisek Lukes,. Czecho-! Slovakia's Part in the Aggressive Plans of Hitler's Germany I |Shortly after Munich. Problems of Contemporary History, j 96 No. 1 (Prague: Historicky ustav, Nakladatelstvi ceskoslo- venske akadamie ved, 1968), pp. 74-88. For a detailed anal ysis of the period between Munich and March 15, 1939, see Podivnv mir ("The Peculiar Peace") (Prague: Svoboda, 1968),! by the same author. i 8 Lukes, Czechoslovakia 1s Part. p. 70. 9D o c . NG-5750, TWC. XII, 824-26. j I 10DGFP. D, IV, 69-72. ■^October 21, 1938, ibid., pp. 99-100. 12 Memoranda by Hans Neuwirth and Ernst Kundt to the ! German Foreign Office, October, 1938, cited in Die Deutschenl in der Tschechoslowakei. ed. by Vaclav Krai (Prague: Histo ricky ustav, Nakladatelstvi ceskoslovenske akademie ved, 1964), pp. 349-53, 357-62. 13 Proposals of Department VA, Staff of Konrad Hen- lein, concerning the solution of the Czech question, cited in Lesson from History: Documents Concerning Nazi Policies for Germanization and Extermination in Czechoslovakia, ed. by Vaclav Krai and Karel Fremund (Prague: Orbis, 1961), pp. 35-38. 14DGFP. D, IV, 153-54. 15 Undated draft of treaty by Ministerial Director Friedrich Gaus, Woermann Doc. 116, TWC. XII, 833-34. 16 Woermann's memorandum of November 25, 1938, Doc. NG-2993, TWC. XII, 835-38. For the text of the treaty see Heinrich Bodensieck, "Der Plan eines 'Freundschaftsver- trages' zwischen dem Reich und der Tschecho-Slowakei im Jahre 1938," Zeitschrift fur Ostforschung. X (1961), 464-65. 17 Testimony of defendant Weizsacker, who claims to have encouraged the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague to stress in his dispatches to the Foreign Office Czech sub missiveness and willingness to cooperate (TWC. XII, 930-31). i 97 i 18 Report from the German Legation in Prague to the German Foreign Office, December 28, 1938, TWC. XII, 840-43. j 19TWC. XII, 931. 20 j DGFP. D, IV, 185-86. I ^^Vojtech Mastny, "Design or Improvisation? The prigins of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in| |1939, " in Columbia Essays in International Affairs, ed. by i Andrew W. Cordier (New York: Columbia University Press, |l966), p. 138. j i ^ 2 i For the events leading to the secession of Slo vakia see: Jozef Lettrich, A History of Modern Slovakia (London: Atlantic Press, 1956); Joseph A. Mikus, La Slo- vaquie dans le drame de l1Europe: Histoire politique de '1918 a 1950 (Paris: Les lies d'Or, 1955); Jorg K. Honsch, i Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik (Cologne and Graz: Bohlau, 1965); Ferdinand Durcansky, "Mit Tiso. bei Hitler: Die Entstehung der Slowakischen Republik," Politische Stu- idien. VII, No. 80 (1956), 1-10; Ivan Derer, Slovenskv vyvoi a ludacka zrada ("Slovak Developments and the Treason of thei Ludaks") (Prague: Orbis, 1946). j I 2 3 ! j Most historians dealing with the destruction of j Czechoslovakia have accepted the view of a premeditated j (design. Following the opinion of the International Military! Tribunal in Nuremberg (IMT, XII, 436-39), they interpreted j perman policy in terms of Hitler's firm determination to ! smash Prague. See Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations. 1933-62 (New York: New York University Press, 1964); William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960); Vaclav Krai, Pravda o okupaci ("The Truth about the Occupation") (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1962); Milos Hajek, Od Mnichova k 15. breznu |("From Munich to March 15") (Prague: Statni nakladatelstvi politick! literatury, 1959); Jan Kren, Do emigrace: Bur- zoazni zahranicni odboi. 1938-39 ("Into Exile: The Bour- j geois Exile Resistance, 1938-39") (Prague: Nase vojsko, j 1963) . Lukes (Czechoslovakia 1s Part) and Mastny, however, j deny that Germany's policy toward Czechoslovakia was based ! , 98 | i I ! I jon a rigidly fixed timetable. Lukes advances the notion of I ja conservative Wilhelmstrasse alternative to radical Nazi j :annexation policies, while Mastny proposes a post-Munich jGerman policy of hesitation and improvisation, "influenced i by expediency, the international situation, and available j resources." The latter view appears to be consonant with j available documentation. The points of view, however, are i not necessarily mutually exclusive. Hitler's and Ribben- ! trop's preference for radical annexation may well have out- j lasted the need to accommodate conservative and pragmatic j solutions necessitated by circumstances. The reasons for the final decision to occupy Bohemia and Moravia are not definitely established though several inconclusive hypoth eses have been offered. The absence of an influential pro- perman popular movement in Czechoslovakia, Hitler's desire j to demonstrate to the whole world German military power, as i jwell as changes in the international situation and impending! military moves against Poland must have played a part in } this reversal. j 24 * Stanislav Bxman, "Vznik tzv. nemeckeho statnxho ministerstva pro Cechy a Moravu" ("The Origins of the So- Called Germany State Ministry for Bohemia and Moravia"), Sbornxk archivnxch praci (Prague), XVIII (1968), 240. See also Lukes, Podivnv mxr. j ! 25 ■ ' j Mastny, pp. 148-49. The reasons for the estab- j lishment of two "protectorates" are obscure. Some Gau- i leiters. apparently, persisted in advancing the notion of ! distinct ethnic differences between Czechs and Moravians. i The Moravians, it was claimed, "belonged to seven Slavic j tribes more or less sharply differing from each other," and j supposedly "less hostile in their attitudes towards the Ger- j mans than . . . the Czechs of Bohemia" (Krai and Fremund, j eds., pp. 132-33). j 26 Gotthold Rhode, "Das Protektorat Bohmen und Mahren," Das Parlament (Hamburg), March 11, 1964, supplement, P- 3. | I ! 27 i George F. Kennan, From Prague after Munxch: Diplo matic Papers. 1938-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University | Press, 1968), pp. 94-96. Gauleiter Henlein's and Biirckel's I appointments support the view that the Reich authorities | jcontemplated the eventual annexation of Bohemia by the j iSudeten Gau and that of Moravia by the Gau Oberdonau. The | decision to establish a separate Protectorate of Bohemia and; Moravia and the appointment of von Neurath as Reich Protec- j tor rendered the presence of both Gauleiters redundant and j indicated their speedy, though unobtrusive, removal. Apart i from the well-documented, fierce competition between neigh- j boring Gauleiters for a share of the spoils, the background | ;of this episode remains unclear. i ! i ’ 28/ ! Hacha's memorandum concerning his sojourn in Ber- j ilin, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. !pp. 420-22. Definitive evidence indicating the objectives j Hacha hoped to achieve by meeting Hitler is lacking. The j Czech President probably still maintained hopes for a solu- j tion in terms of a small, independent Czech state (Luza, Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, p. 176). The Czechoslovak Prime Minister Beran reportedly expected the establishment of a Czech state "similar to the one in Slovakia" under close German tutelage (Ladislav K. Feierabend, Ve vladach Druhe republikv ["In the Cabinets of the Second Republic"] i[New York: Universum Press, 1961], p. 166). This erroneous jview concerning Hitler1s intentions was very largely due to jtelephone reports received from the Czechoslovak Ambassador ! 'in Berlin (Rudolf Strobinger, A/54— Spion mit drei Gesich- ! tern [Munich: Paul List, 1966], p. 103). 29 The military occupation of Bohemia and Moravia came as a surprise to most students of the political situa- J tion. Even as astute and sophisticated a diplomat as George! F. Kennan thought that Hitler would leave Bohemia and j Moravia unoccupied in order to "preserve the fiction of an independent Czechoslovakia as a source of foreign exchange j and raw materials to Germany" (Kennan, p. 83). j 30 Cross-examination of Lammers, TWC. XII, 986-87, 994-95. See also Zpoved K. H. Franka: Podle vlastnfch yypovedi v dobe vazbv u kraiskeho soudu trestniho na Pan- kraci ("Testimony of K. H. Frank: According to His Own Depositions at the District Criminal Court at Pankrac") (Prague: A. S. tiskarske a nakladatelske podniky, 1946), p. 106. ioo I I 31 ! | DGFP, D, IV, 283-84. Also, Reichsqesetzblatt j !(Berlin), I (1939), 485-88. j i i 32 ! Neurath' s testimony., IMT, XVI, 654. See also | Ceskv narod soudi K. H. Franka ("K. H. Frank on Trial before! jthe Czech Nation") (Prague: Ministerstvo informaci, 1946), ! p. 49. j i ! ! 33 i | For Neurath's background and political beliefs, i jsee John Louis Heinemann, "Constantin Freiherr von Neurath |as Foreign Minister, 1932-35" (unpublished Doctoral disser tation, Cornell University, 1965). I 34 | Ronnefarth, passim: MacAlister Brown, "The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German Fifth Column in Eastern Europe," Journal of Central European Affairs. XIX (July, 1959), 141-43; Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 68; statement of G. Bohm of January 1, 1946, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der iTschechoslowakei, p . 55. ! 35 j IMT, XVI, 654. Frank was appointed despite [Hitler's assurance to Hacha that no Sudeten German would be [chosen (IMT, XXXII, 18). I 36 | Mastny, p. 151. ' 37 I Gerhard Jacoby, Racial State: The German Nation alities Policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944), pp. 52-62. j 38 ✓ Biman, pp. 2 38-39. See also Mastny, p. 151. 39 Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 113. 40 The same organizational principle was used by i Hitler to establish his position of unquestioned predomi- j nance in the early years of the Nazi Party. The policy of j "overlapping jurisdictions" permitted Hitler to become the | central unifying agent of the movement (Nyomarkay, Charisma ! and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, pp. 31-34). j | 41 Kennan, p. 96. ! 42 1 I A. James Gregor. Contemporary Radical Ideologies . ! j(Berkeley: University of California, 1968), p. 204. j 43 i Hitler's Secret Book (New York: Grove Press, I 1961). j 44 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich: Franz Eher, 1942), pp. 739-42. 45 Ibid., pp. 736-38. I 46 i Hitler's Secret Book, p. 45. ! | 47 i Mem Kampf. p. 428. 48,...- ! Ibid. I ! 49 i | Hitler's official interpreter, Paul Schmidt, jok ingly suggested that the Fuhrer's "insane fury against the ICzechs" might have been due to the fact "that he himself had jczech blood in his veins" (Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplo- matischer Bvihne. 192 3-45 [Bonn: Athenaeum, 1958], p. 428). i i 50 | Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London: Thorn ton Butterworth, 1939), p. 46. 51 Ibid. His pathological hatred of the Czechs never left Hitler. See, for example, his frequent denigrating references to them during table conversations at Fiihrer j Headquarters in Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgesprache im j Fuhrerhauptquartier, 1941-42 (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1965), pp. 192, 255, 333, 434. 52 Hossbach memorandum, Doc. 386-PS, IMT, XXV, 410 (see supra, p. 95, n. 5). One week later, on November 12, he addressed a group of party leaders at the Ordensburg Sonthofen in a similar vein (Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen. 1932-1945 [2 vols.; Neustadt a.d. Aisch: Schmidt, 1963], I, 761-63). See also Paul Kluke,'National- j sozialistische Europaideologie," Vierteliahreshefte fur i Zeitgeschichte. Ill, No. 3 (July, 1955), 264-65. j 102 i i 53 Hossbach memorandum, IMT, XXV, 410. Neurath was much upset about this episode. He and the two generals openly, opposed Hitler's plans of aggression .(Telford. Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952], pp. 136-45). 54 Joseph Goebbels explained the tactical value of |intentional vagueness to a select group of German news edi- jtors on April, 1940, as follows: "If someone asks us today iabout our plans for a new Europe, we have to reply that we don't know that yet. Once we have the power, they will see, jand we shall see what we will make of it. . . . Today we jspeak of 'Lebensraum. ' Anyone may view that as he wishes. |What we really mean by it, we shall know when the time is ripe.... So far we have always succeeded in confusing our opponents about Germany's true aims" (cited in H. A. Jacob sen, Der zweite Weltkrieg [Frankfurt: Fischer, 1965], p . 18 0) . 55 Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, p. 42. Goebbels wrote: "The Fuhrer sometimes wavers in his decision if the same matter is brought to him from jdifferent sides" (The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-43, ed. by 'Louis P. Lochner [New York: Doubleday, 1948], p. 268). I 56 | Zpoved K. H. Franka, p. 70. 57 . . Koehl, passim. 58_, . , Ibid., p. 41. 59 The unsigned and undated proposal called Grund- planung OA (Action Program) was found in the archives of Henlein's political bureau in As. For the full text see Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, pp. 220- 27. The Action Program, probably, reflects Frank's point of view (6eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 125). 60 Memoranda by Neuwirth and Kundt to the German For eign Office (see supra. pp. 64-65; 96, n. 12). 61 TWC. XII, 873. 103 62 , . . Frederici report, IMT, XXVI, 375. ' 6 3 ■ Himmler's syntax defies translation: "Ich konnte I Imir vorstellen, dass im bohmisch-mahrischen Raum— am besten j iin Nordmahren— einmal durch Massnahmen des Deutschen Reiches! bezw. des Herrn Reichsprotektors ein solches Gebiet geschaf-i fen werden kdnnte, dass den Vorteil hatte, dass Mahren, dass! 'jwieder voll und ganz deutsch werden muss, einen wertvollen | jzuwachs von 200.000 gutrassigen, sehr bewusst deutschen und j kampferischen Volkselementen bekame" (Memorandum from Himm- i ler to the Reich Protector, May 30, 1939, cited in Conrad F.| jLatour, Sudtirol und die Achse Berlin-Rom. 1938-1945 [Stutt-j igart: Deutsche Verlag Anstalt, 1962], p. 34). ! ! ! I 64 , ! ! Full text in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 39-43. 65 , i Vaclav Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope ("Crimes against! Europe") (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1964), p. 370. According to; a memorandum of a meeting of Party functionaries on May 31 j and June 1, 1943, Jury claimed to have proposed the complete! Germanization of Bohemia and Moravia to Hitler in 1939 | (Karel Fremund, ed., "Dokumenty o nacisticke vyhlazovaci j politice" ["Documents on the Nazi Policy of Extermination"],! i Sbornxk archivnich praci [Prague], XIII [1963], 35). | 1 ; ^ 66 i | Following the invasion of Poland, Hitler had set j jthe maintenance of order and the fullest use of its human I land economic resources as his absolute priority in the Pro- , jtectorate (Trial against K. H. Frank, Proceedings on January! 8, 1946, Archives of the Ministry of Justice, cited in j Vaclav Krai, "The Policy of Germanization Enforced in Bohe- j mia and Moravia by the Fascist Invaders during the Second i World War," Historica. II [Prague: Nakladatelstvi cesko- slovenske akademie ved, 1960], 279). 6 7 i ■ Decree of March 16, 1939, Article V, DGFP. D, IV, ! 283-86. j 68 i Ordinance to the decree of the Fflhrer and Reich ! Chancellor concerning the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, March 22, 1939, Reichsqesetzblatt. I (1939), 549. ! Memorandum of the Reich Ministry of Interior and j |the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, j jApril 1, 1939, in Biman, pp. 239ff. ! 70 Reichscresetzblatt. I (1939), 1039. I 71 I Ibid. | 72 v ’ j Ibid. See also Zpoved K. H. Franka. pp. 74-75. j i 7 3 v Edo Fris et al., "Formy a metody nacisticke okupace v 6eskoslovensku" ("Structure and Methods of the Nazi Occupation in Czechoslovakia"), in Nacisticka okupace Evropy ("The Nazi Occupation of Europe"), Sbornik referatu kongresu dejin evropskeho odboje v Karlovych Varech 1963 j S("Collection of papers presented at the Congress of the His-i jtory of the European Resistance in Carlsbad, 1963") (4 vols.;j Prague: Nase vojsko, 1966), 1-1, 146. See also Jacoby, j p. 61j Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 143. 74 ✓ j Kennan, pp. 172-73; Krai, Pravda o okupaci. !pp. 182, 184. i 75 ' Letter from Reich Protector Neurath to President ! Hacha of June 28, 1939, insisting over Hacha's objections on the appointment of German Commissioners in the cities of iBudweis, Brno, Iglau, Olomouc, and Ostrava (Libuse Otahalova iand Milada Cervinkova, eds., Dokumentv z historie cesko- slovenske politikv. 1939-43 ["Documents of the History of Czechoslovak Politics, 1939-43"— hereinafter cited as DHCP] [2 vols.; Prague: Academia, 1966], II, 441). By the end of 1940, Special Commissioners were in charge of all cities with more than 25,000 German inhabitants, excepting Prague and Pilsen, where German deputy mayors were appointed. Germans were also installed as deputies to the Provincial Presidents of Bohemia and Moravia (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. pp. 162-67). 76 / Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 186. ! 7 7 / • * I The cabinet appointed by President Hacha on j jApril 27, 1939 was made up of the Premier and seven Cabinet | iMinisters; its most important members were Dr. Havelka, ! Deputy Premier, Jaroslav Krejcx, Minister of Justice, Josef j Kalfus, Minister of Finance, and Ladislav K. Feierabend,. j Minister of Agriculture (Ladislav K. Feierabend, Ve vlade ; Protektoratu ["In the Government of the Protectorate"] [New | [York: Universum Press, 1962]). See also Kennan, pp. 143- j 48. ! I ! ! 7g | ! Ordinance of September 1, 1939, Reichsgesetzblatt,i jl (1939), 1691. See also Fris et al.. p. 145. 79 Jacoby, p. 64. i 80 j The Germans took charge of the Office of Price j Control, the Statistical Office, the Labor Office, etc. | I (Karel Sedivy, Why We Want To Transfer the Germans [Prague: j iOrbis, 1946], p. 34). i ! i 8 1 I | Dispatch of May 2 3, 1939 (Kennan, p. 172). i ! I I I g2 S Report of a conference of Goring, Milch, Korner land others on July 25, 1939, noting Goring's statement that j "the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia . . . had taken iplace, among other reasons, to increase Germany's war poten tial by exploiting the industry of the Protectorate" (Doc. IR-133, TWC. XII, 896-97) I 83 | TWC. XIII, 652. I 1 84 Antonin Basch, Germany's Economic Conquest of j Czechoslovakia (Chicago: Czechoslovak National Council of America, [n.d.]), p. 16. ^ 5eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. pp. 52-53. 8 6 | Additional bullion deposited by the Czech National Bank in London was blocked by the British government and saved from falling into German hands (Basch, p. 15). 87 ! The Wehrmach acquired military equipment for 20 ; infantry divisions, over 1500 aircraft, 500 anti-aircraft guns, and over 2 000 artillery pieces (Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. p. 24). I 0 Q v / i Leopold Chmela, Hospodarska okupace Ceskoslovenskal ("The Economic Aspects of the Occupation of Czechoslovakia")! (Prague: Orbis, 1964), p. 70. | 89 . ! Ordinance of the Reich Protector regarding Jewish j property, Verordnuncrsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Bohmen j und Mahren (Prague, 1939), p. 45. The Protectorate govern- j ment had refused Frank's demand that they pass the anti- Jewish Nuremberg laws (Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 44-45). 90 Jacoby, p. 212. 91 Ibid., pp. 2 08-11. Q9 v v * . > - Ibid., pp. 217-18. 93 Basch, pp. 17-18. The only important financial institution that escaped Germanization was the Zivnostenska Banka. It remained under Czech ownership largely because its management was able to utilize the fierce competition between several Reich and Sudeten German banking groups and thus to retain its independence (Fris et al.. p. 57; Krai, Pravda o okupaci, p. 174). 94 The Herman Goring Werke gained control over the ivitkovice Iron Works as well as of Skoda and the Zbrojovka in Brno, while the Mannesman Corporation of Diisseldorf assumed possession of the important Prague Iron Works (Basch, pp. 17-18). 95 Ibid., p. 12. See also Kennan, p. 228. In many cases it was not possible to determine how and by whom these! commissioners had been appointed (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. | p . 182 ) . | 96 ! Kennan, p. 228. A war-tax (Krieqskostenbeitraq). i introduced in 1940, netted in that year alone 600 million j Czech Crowns (ibid.) . For extensive surveys of German j spoliation and economic penetration in the Protectorate see J Chmela, passim: Vaclav Krai, Otazkv hospodarskeho a social- i niho vvvoie v ceskvch zemich v letech 1938-1945 ("Problems i of Economic and Social Development in the Czech Lands, 107 ! ! ! jl938-1945") .(Prague: . Orbis, 1957). See also Eugene V. Erdely, Germany's First European Protectorate (London: j Robert Hale, 1942), for an earlier and less comprehensive j analysis. 97 I Memorandum for a meeting with Reich Protector von | Neurath on April 25, 1939, DHCP. II, 425j letter from Hacha to Hitler, October 11, 1939, ibid., pp. 451-52. 98 ✓ j Krai, Pravda o okupaci, pp. 182-85; Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 98-101. 99 Kennan, p. 188. Von Neurath*s status was similar to that of the British Viceroy in Egypt, wrote Jan Opodensky, the Czech historian and diplomat, on November 11, 1939, to Dr. Benes in London (Kren, p. 151). i I ^°°Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. p. 97. j 101 Cross-examination of von Neurath, IMT, XVII, 6. 102 Tomas Pasak, "Vyvoj Vlajky v obdobi okupace" ("The Development of the Vlajka during the Period of the Occupa tion"), Historie a voienstyx (Prague, 1966), pp. 847-53. In the fall of 1939 the Vlajka leaders went over the heads 'of von Neurath and Frank and addressed complaints directly to Berlin, an indiscretion that caused their eventual down fall (ibid., pp. 855-56). { 1 A n Hitler distrusted the inexperienced and unstable ! fascist "fanatics" of Eastern Europe. He preferred to rely on traditional, authoritarian governments in satellite coun tries, and did not permit ideological affinities to affect the Reich's military-economic interest in stable, collabora-i tionist regimes. For German political involvements with | fascist movements in Eastern, Europe see Martin Broszat, "Faschismus und Kollaboration in Ostmitteleuropa zwischen den Weltkriegen, " Vierteliahreshefte fiir Zeitqeschichte. j •XIV, No. 3 (July, 1966), 225-51. j ! 104 1 j Von Neurath's opinion of the Vlajka, IMP, XVII, j 6. See also Pasak, "Vyvoj Vlajky," pp. 860ff. j 108 105 Memorandum to the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ministry 1 s Representative at the Office of jthe Reich Protector in Prague (cited in Pasak, "Vyvoj Vlajky," p. 855). 106 Message from London to Prague, May 2 9, 1940, con- jtaining Benes' warning against overestimating the threat of jthe Vlajka (Jaroslava Eliasova and Tomas Pasak, "Poznamky k iBenesovym kontaktfim s Eliasem za druhe svetove valky" ["Some jRemarks Concerning the Contacts between Benes and Elias during World War II"], Historie a voienstvx [1967], p. 124). 1 ^^Jan Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicni jednota na pocatku okupace" ("The Unity of the Anti-German Opposition Jat the Start of the Occupation"), Z pocatku odboie ("From the Start of the Occupation"), ed. by Oldrich Janecek (Prague: Ustav dejin socialismu, 1969), p. 489. 108 "Survey of the Political Situation in Bohemia and Moravia in June, 1940," Czech underground report transmitted to London, DHCP. II, 549. 109 Pasak, "Vyvoj Vlajky," p. 894. 1' L0German dependence on the Czech administrative apparatus in the Protectorate and Nazi efforts to deal with this problem were summarized with considerable precision in Frank's "Memorandum on the Czech Problem," submitted to Hitler on August 28, 1940. His proposals include the fol lowing points: "The autonomy of the Protectorate should be gradually abolished, while the corps of officials and civil servants will be retained because: (a) We are, for lack of j trained civil servants, not in a position to fill 7,950 j local councils, 92 district administrations. . . . (b) The Czech administrative apparatus has, by and large, functioned well . . . thanks to the German fist which has directed it. . . . (c) It will suffice if we fill all important key posi tions in the higher administration with a comparatively small but well-trained body of German officials j we issue instructions and lead, i.e. govern, instead of dealing with petty affairs" (Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 269-70). i I i i i CHAPTER IV j | VON NEURATH AS REICH PROTECTOR: i j THE STRUGGLE FOR PRIMACY IN ! THE PROTECTORATE The Duumvirate Hitler was impelled to establish an "autonomous" Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia not only because of the advantages to be gained from securing the continuity of the Czech apparatus of administration, but also because of pressing considerations of foreign policy. The latter were certainly decisive in his choice of Baron Konstantin von Neurath as Reich Protector. Von Neurath was later to state before the Tribunal in Nuremberg that fears that the inva sion of Czechoslovakia "would, at the very least, strongly offend the signatory powers, of the Munich agreement" and that "any aggravation of the situation could bring about an immediate danger of war" were "precisely the reason" why he 1 was asked to accept the appointment. "Generally known 109 110 I 2 jabroad as a peaceful and moderate man, " von Neurath was ! well suited to soothe ruffled nerves and feelings of guilt j jin the West, to abate the rising anxiety among the small | 3 nations of Southeastern Europe, and to bring about the j peaceful incorporation of the Protectorate and the undis- ; jturbed utilization of its economic resources. A Swabian i nobleman and diplomat of the old school, von Neurath enjoyed a good reputation abroad. His appointment as Reich Protec tor could be counted on to make a favorable impression. K. H. Frank, Hitler's choice for the position of State Secretary and second ranking Reich official in the Protectorate, was a man of strikingly contrasting personal- j lity, background and social origin. Unable to complete his legal studies and less than successful as a bookseller in his native Karlsbad, he was, as George Kennan saw it, "the perfect image of the German 'Halbqebildeter1 ['semi-edu- 4 pated'] whom National Socialism has raised to power." A "homo novus," of that "unwilling proletariat of world 5 depression" which had flocked to the Movement by the thou sands, the inordinately ambitious, zealous enemy of the I 6 Czechs, Frank had from the very start embarked on a colli sion course with von Neurath. ! in I ! i i ; The conflict between these two men, which was to \ | I [continue unabated until von Neurath's dismissal, resulted j jnot merely from personal incompatibility or Frank's un- i i • i i * jquenchable ambitions, though both of these factors undoubt- j ! edly played an important part. Fundamentally, their policy j j conflicts with regard to the Protectorate sprang from radi- ! Jcal differences of perspective and social interest, reflect ing the tensions and conflicts between the pretotalitarian, traditional ruling elites and the totalitarian radicals in ' * 7 jthe Reich itself. Seen from this point of view, von j | j Neurath's fall mirrored the removal of the old, conservative! ! j ruling groups from all positions of power in the wake of the! | [disintegration of their alliance with the Nazi party and the i j jSS. It also foreshadowed the emergence of the SS as the j g dominant Fiihrer-executive and their eventual usurpation of i hegemony over all factions of the erstwhile coalition j 9 ! including the NSDAP. I i | German conservative civil servants, generals and I j politicians— men like von Neurath, Schacht, Weizsacker, Beck, Blomberg, and Hassell— had prepared and abetted Hit- j 10 ler's rise to power. Lacking common roots, defeated in j jwar and fearful of impending social upheavals, the old Ger- j man ruling caste had lost control over the currents of | 112 ichange and confidence in its own ability to govern. Tradi- j j i Jtional conservatism no longer prevailed in Germany's right- j I 11 ! list groups and organizations. i ! ! i A representative member of the German conservative i I ! j I jestablishment and the last holdover from Hindenburg's ["Baron's Cabinet" of 1932, von Neurath had stayed on as ! Hitler's Foreign Minister and had formed a long lasting and close relationship with the Fiihrer. Like most of Hitler's conservative supporters, von Neurath, too, recoiled from the excesses of the Nazi extremists and opposed their radical and risky aims. Unlike many such supporters, he was easily persuaded to make far-reaching concessions to, and arrange ments with, the Nazi movement. Highly opportunistic and j . basically sympathetic to the Nazis' anti-democratic, anti liberal tendencies, von Neurath's reactionary instincts came close to the authoritarian, anti-Semitic, nationalist and i 12 imperialist facets of National Socialism. He saw his | I task, and that of other conservative rightists, as that of j ■ deflecting National Socialism from attacks on the estab lished order and of making use of the Nazis' revolutionary ! elan for the foreign and domestic policy objectives of the j old ruling elites. Von Neurath was less perceptive than menj ! like Hassell and Beck, who turned in bitter disappointment j 113 i j with Hitler to active resistance against the regime. Thus, being impassive and intellectually less than keen, von I i ' j Neurath had from the very start gravely underestimated the j revolutionary character and the metastatic dynamics of j 13 1 Nazism. Confusing totalitarian National Socialism with | I i etatist Italian Fascism, he expected the Nazi movement to accept, as Mussolini's Fascists previously had, the suprem acy of the State along with the prospect of inevitable absorption by the legal-rational order and with it subordi- 14 nation to the traditional elites that dominated it. Von Neurath had been dismissed together with Generals Blomberg i i land Fritsch by Hitler a short few months after their attempt I to oppose his notions of inevitable war at the conference inj j j jthe Reich Chancellery of November 5, 1937 (recorded by Colo- j 15 jnel Hossbach), and he had been replaced by Ribbentrop as 16 Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus, von Neurath wel-j corned his appointment as Reich Protector. He conceived it as a chance to avert what he saw as the threat of immediate 17 war in the wake of Hitler's provocation and as an oppor tunity to demonstrate the superiority of conventional meth ods of governance over the naked coercion and brutal repres siveness advocated by the SS and the radical Sudeten Ger- 18 * mans. In this policy, he felt sustained not only by i 114 i | . Hitler's promise to support a conciliatory approach to the | ' ^Czechs, but even more so by the evident advantages the pol- iicy promised to secure for the Reich. The Czechs, he ! believed, "generally disillusioned by the conduct of their former allies in the fall of 1938, " were ready for collab- i 19 oration. He also believed that traditional methods of ! rule— based on governance through and cooptation of local elites— as well as social and economic pressures aimed at the Germanization of the upper strata, surely would work here as they had worked in Prussia's eastern provinces once inhabited by Slavic tribes. The old Bohemian aristocracy, traditionally lukewarm to the democratic Republic, would see the advantages of collaboration with the new regime. Ample orders sustained by Germany's armament needs, staunch anti- Jcommunism, high profits and controlled labor unions would lead native businessmen to throw in their lot with the Reich, or at least to accept the occupation of their country ... 20 in exchange for the business opportunities it offered. The Reich's dire need for peace and order in the Protector ate and the success of the policies he advocated would vin dicate the old establishment, assure its hold over Bohemia and Moravia, and prevent the SS from achieving domination there.21 Von Neurath's concept, of course, ran counter to ! j ! jHitler's stated views on the role of race and to his rejec- j i i i tion of Germanization achieved by "outward acceptance of the 22 German language." Hitler's distrust of von Neurath and the wholly temporary character of all arrangements he had j lagreed to in Prague found expression in his appointment of i jFrank, placing the Reich Protector in effect under supervi- i 2 3 sion by the SD. Prank had joined the Sudeten German Homefront (SHF ! f Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront1), precursor of the Sudeten | i I 24 i [German Party (SdP), in October, 1933. Leadership and key positions in the Front were held by members of a small, semi-secret group of volkisch nationalists, the League of Comrades (KB fKameradschaftsbundl). who had founded and 25 organized the SHF. Strongly influenced by the ideas of j jothmar Spann, the KB embraced his concepts of a corporate j i I State and society which was to replace "decadent" egalitar- i ian democracy, and of the reorganization of central and 26 eastern Europe under German leadership. Their views came closer to those of the Austrian clerico-fascist corporate regime than to those of the Nazi movement. Essentially pro vincial and middle-class in outlook, oriented toward separa-! tism and autonomy from the Reich, the KB became involved in ! 116 ! I ; i la bitter conflict with the Sudeten Nazis (DNSAP) and the 1 27 I jextremists of the Nazi Aufbruch circle. The clash between; i these groups reached considerable intensity, involving even-! tually the Police and Security Services under Himmler and ! ! iHeydrich, who sided with the Nazi faction and attacked the i I ! j : jKB, in a secret report transmitted to Hitler in May, 1936, I j { | 2 8 1 las dangerous enemies of National Socialism. I i ! I ! j Frank, who after the Czechoslovak elections of 1935 ! I ‘ i became chairman of the SdP's parliamentary club, was one of | i the few party leaders without KB connections. Using the j good offices of the former DNSAP leaders Hans Krebs and j 29 I Rudolf Jung, he established close contacts with the Office' for German Ethnic Affairs (VOMI fVolksdeutsche Mittelstellel) and through it with Heydrich, Himmler and the circles around, I 30 I the SD. Since the old guard KB leadership of the SdP, | i including party chairman Konrad Henlein, continued to be i j regarded with the deepest suspicion and distrust by the men i 31 ' around the SD, Frank soon became their trusted confidant— j I j 32 * ! the "man of the SS" (Himmler1s Vertrauensmann) and leader of the radical wing of the party. With the increasing dependence of the Sudeten German Party on support by the i Reich and on financial subsidies from VOMI, Frank's power j j and influence continued to rise. Appointed Henlein's Deputy! i 33 iLeader in 1937, he pressed his demands for subordination j I 34 i jof party objectives to the interests of the Reich and usedj i j his special relationships with Reich authorities to under- ! 35 j mine Henlein1s position. Recommended by Heydrich to Hit- j i ler as "the sole reliable guarantor of the Reich's objec- j I 36 ! tives in the Sudetenland," Frank obtained access to the Fiihrer himself and was delegated by Henlein to see Hitler at 37 the party meeting at Nuremberg in 1938. During the height of the Sudeten crisis, he gained virtual control over the SdP and directed all its actions, following instructions 38 received directly from Berlin. Frank's appointment as State Secretary must have been made with certain reservations, as indicated by the conspicuous absence, in the Fiihrer Decree establishing the j j Protectorate, of specifics as to the State Secretary's func-j 39 tions. Certainly it reflected the influence of the SS. It constituted an evident success for the men around Himm- 40 ler, who now saw m "Germany's first European colonial territory" a field for extensive repressive police actions and the consequent enhancement of their power. The Protec torate, moreover, provided an opportunity to initiate large- scale, SS-dominated resettlement programs as a first step j 41 i toward a future, SS-controlled German Eastern Empire. Thei | 118 ■realization of these plans, however, required the presence, I I jin a position of power, of a man who could be trusted to i i ! jkeep the Protectorate open to SS influence and activities— a man, in short, able to frustrate von Neurath's policy of conciliation and concessions to self-administration. Such a policy, based on a low level of repression, would prevent the build-up of a powerful SS and police apparatus in the Protectorate. It would preserve a nation which, in the view of the SS, could never be trusted, close to the heart of the Reich with a "gullible and reactionary" Reich Protector at its head. This fait accompli could prove difficult to undo at a later date. Prank, who never tired of proclaiming that "the Czechs understand only one language, the language of hard I 42 blows," was the right man for this job. As he saw his i ■ task, it was one of "chasing the Czechs out of their rat- 43 holes" and he was determined to pursue a policy that would prevent any solution permitting them to retain even a modi cum of autonomy and national solidarity. Thus, far from agreeing on a common political course, the Nazis in charge of the apparatus of occupation were divided along sharply drawn lines from the very begin ning. On the one side stood von Neurath, supported by a jgroup of conservative civil servants and by General Fred- j ! ' ■ ! ! • ! jerici and the senior Wehrmacht officers around him; they j j jfavored a policy of collaboration with cooperating circles ! 44 of a demoralized, disillusioned nation, because they were aware of the advantages to be gained by this policy for the . Reich. On the other side stood Frank, radical Nazi and SS- 45 man, heading a hostile albeit shortlived coalition between the Party, the Sudeten German radicals, and the SS. The struggle between these groups unfolded and caused increasing strains among the occupants during the entire von Neurath period of the Protectorate. After a year and a half of Ger- I man occupation, George Kennan reported to Washington contin- i |ued failure by German authorities to agree on a policy jtoward the Czechs: j ! The moderates, still headed by Neurath, would like to give them something in the nature of a real auton omy and make a serious effort to reconcile them to German rule by concessions. The radicals, still headed by Frank, would like to smash them completely as a nation, destroy their intelligentsia, and make Bohemia and Moravia into German provinces. Suprem acy between these two groups can be decided only on the mat of Nazi party politics.46 Jurisdictional Rivalries and Contention for Political Power Hitler's decree of March 16, 1939, establishing a i 47 i "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia," remained in force H .... : ....' ..... 12 o | without substantial changes until August, 1943. A memoran- f . |dum of the Reich Ministry of the Interior of April 1 estab- I I llished the Reich Protector, "upon Hitler's explicit request, J as the sole representative of the Fiihrer in Bohemia and i Moravia." Two ordinances to the Fiihrer Decree, issued on I March 22 and June 7, elaborated on the Protector's status | ! | ! . 48 and granted him impressive formal authority. The extent of his powers with respect to Reich agencies with jurisdic- ! i tion in the Protectorate, however, remained unclearly J defined. Frank's functions in the Protectorate had been left unspecified and the nature of his relationship to the Reich Protector had not been spelled out. Both von Neurath I |and Frank thus had to battle hard and to engage in skillful maneuvers to secure their positions and to define the extent; i • I of their functions and authority in the Protectorate. Initially, at least, foreign and domestic policy considerations favored the Reich Protector. Despite attempts by Frank to obtain approval for the appointment of i Sudeten German radicals, whose names he had submitted to von Neurath, the Reich Protector and the Reich ministry of the Interior reached an agreement that key position in the Pro- j ! 49 jtectorate ought to be filled by officials from the Reich. | Von Neurath was thus able to select his personal staff and | 121 ! | i jsecure the appointment of conservative civil servants from j jthe Reich to leading positions in his administration. Next j i ! only to K. H. Frank stood Assistant State Secretary von j ' ' I Burgsdorff, who headed the Administrative departments in thej , i 50 Office of the Reich Protector. A conservative nationalist! I f and capable civil servant, von Burgsdorff became Frank's i ! | 1 51 I determined opponent in the Protectorate administration. j Von Neurath's principal advisor, Hans Volckers, was also a ! i | conservative and former diplomat. The Armed Forces in the j i [Protectorate were commanded by General Frederici who, as i ! plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protec- [tor, was directly subordinated to the Chief of the High Com- i i [mand (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht). A relatively j moderate soldier, he served also as military advisor to von I 52 Neurath and enjoyed his full confidence. I | Among the first to advance claims in the Protec- ; i torate was Hermann Goring, who, as Plenipotentiary for the | i Four Year Plan, demanded the right to make final decisions on economic matters. Von Neurath was able to sidetrack 53 GSring's efforts. Attempts by the Reich Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Economics to gain a foothold in the Pro tectorate were similarly frustrated. Because of continued jurisdictional conflicts, a Central Office for the 122 j I ! [Protectorate in the Ministry of the Interior, headed by I ; i I i iStuckart, was charged with the coordination of all measures j I s I i taken by Reich agencies in Bohemia and Moravia. Stuckart j 54! was to secure von Neurath's approval for their activities, j I j Von Neurath, however, persisted in complaints against j 1 t 55 [repeated interferences by Reich agencies and was able to [obtain a favorable decision preventing contemplated restric- i ; 56 jtions of his powers in the Protectorate. His intervention < 1 ! I against the NSDAP was equally successful. Party organs were ordered to abstain from undertaking political actions in the 57 Protectorate without his explicit approval. The struggle that decisively determined the extent of the Protector's power in Bohemia and Moravia, however, was that for control over the SS and police forces in Bohemia and Moravia. With out command over the police,political power remained illu sory. This point, however, had not been settled in Hitler's decree establishing the Protectorate. As soon as they had entered the Protectorate in the wake of German troops and before von Neurath's arrival, con tingents of the SS and Gestapo initiated a wave of arrests ! of German political refugees and leading Communist function-! • 1 aries. Aided by Czech Security organs, Aktion Gitter (Oper ation Bars) made 1600 arrests during the first week of the 123 jGerman occupation. By May 2 3, 4639 persons had been appre- i g g jhended. Soon thereafter the Gestapo embarked upon exten- t I |sive confiscations of Jewish property. By granting exit i (permits to Jews on condition that they handed over their | property, the Gestapo was able to amass vast amounts in cash ! . 59 jand securities. During the first three months of the j ' occupation alone confiscations of Jewish holdings amounted to 44 million Marks. The SS retained a considerable part of the confiscated property including a number of industrial enterprises and businesses.^ Von Neurath, undoubtedly,- had hoped to be able to check initial SS excesses. Though the police had not been i i jexpressly made subordinate to him, von Neurath, deriving j i | assurance from Hitler's display of confidence in him, had jassumed that the extensive powers granted him as the repre- i I sentative of the Fiihrer in the Protectorate would include jauthority to regulate the exercise of police power in Bohe- I 61 mia and Moravia. Concerning Frank, "who was not a civil servant but an outsider," as von Neurath's principal adviser Volckers naively testified, the Protector had hoped that the State Secretary would gradually accept his policy and adapt 62 jhimself to the civil service staff. Himmler, however, had no intention of entrusting ! I police powers, and thus undisputed control in the Protector-j * ‘ i j i late, to von Neurath and his clique of conservative bureau- | i jcrats. On April 24, 1939, he appointed Frank Higher SS and t (police Chief (HSSPF fHSherer SS- und Polizeifiihrer 1) in | g q jcharge of all SS and police forces in Bohemia and Moravia. I This office had originally been created by a decree of the Reich Ministry of Interior in 1937 for the express purpose i of integrating all police and SS forces and to facilitate their effective deployment in case of war or national emer- I 64 jgency only. Largely dormant in the territory of the Reich Juntil the final phase of the war, the office was used by Himmler in the occupied territories for the purpose of ! j exempting the SS and police forces stationed there from 65 supervision by civil and military authorities. By binding i j Higher SS and Police Chiefs to direct orders from SS Head- I jquarters in Berlin, Himmler fashioned a phenomenally suc- ; |cessful instrument for the extra-legal implementation of i 'totalitarian policies and for the establishment of SS hegem- ! 00 ony in conquered Europe. Any lingering uncertainties concerning the locus of control over the SS and police in the Protectorate and von Neurath's jurisdictional authority over Frank in his I ~ ............................. • " > " 125] I ! position as SS and Police Chief were resolved by an Ordi- ! . ! | i ;nance issued on September 1, 1939. Part II, dealing with j i the Security Police in the Protectorate, subordinated all j ! 1 police and SS forces directly to Frank. The German security! I i lorgans were charged with the broad and sweeping task of | I j detecting and repressing "all endeavors hostile to the Ger- j { |tnan state and people." They were to "evaluate and make use | i of the information gathered, to keep the Reich Protector and| i officials under his jurisdiction informed, and to offer sug-j 0 * 7 | gestions." The Ordinance contained not even a hint of j fc ! ! supervisory powers to be exercised by the Reich Protector. | jAccording to Frank's own statement after the war, he re- j | ceived orders concerning SS and police actions in the Pro tectorate directly from Himmler. In case of conflict between von Neurath and Himmler's Reich Security Main j I 68 Office, the latter would prevail. Von Neurath, who had j I I been successful in holding his own against other Reich | agencies, had lost the battle against Himmler over the con trol of police powers in the Protectorate. Frank, on the other hand, having gained his own power base in the Protec torate, proceeded to forge the SS and police into a politi cal tool directed against the Reich Protector and his bureaucracy. He used his position as Police Chief | responsible for law and order to complain time and again at I i ■ ' i !the Reich Chancellery against von Neurath's soft policies j | . j |and lost no opportunity to sharpen tensions between the pop-| l ! ulace and the occupation authorities. Aided by daily intel-i jligence reports of the Security Service (SD), Frank sue- j I j deeded in conveying an exaggerated impression of Czech i i ! 69 recalcitrance and hostility. Already on May 2, 1939, jStuckart reported information received from Frank concerning! I ! |the situation in the Protectorate as follows: ! I ' ' j The mood in the Protectorate becomes worse and more | j unfriendly from day to day. The tension is increas- j i ing. The Czechs have recovered from the shock they j received when they were occupied . . . passive resis- j tance of the Czech population is daily increasing. ! j Frank, according to Stuckart, advised him that it would be j I * | j iiecessary to "apply strictest measures," since "Czechs wouldj ! I * mistake friendly treatment and favors for German weak- I ! 70 < ness. " Frank continued to press his attack in Berlin and j 71 lodged protests against von Neurath's lenient attitude. ■He secured the support of Bormann, Hitler's Deputy in the Party Chancellery, who wrote to the Reich Ministry of the Interior that the Fiihrer had been informed about the lack of firm policies pursued against the Czechs by German authori- ! ties in Bohemia and Moravia and had ordered all Oberlandrate (District Commissioners) to follow Frank's directives in all (important political matters, in order to arrive "at correct I . . 72 decisions." Von Neurath, on his part, attempted to coun- j ■ I i ter the attack of his State Secretary. He tried to estab- J j lish close cooperation with Ernst Kundt who had been the jleader of the German minority group in Bohemia after Munich ! and before the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Kundt, he jwrote to Lammers, enjoyed greater popularity with Prague's German inhabitants than Prank and would be useful as an expert on local affairs, despite the fact that well-known personal differences with Frank would stand in the way of 73 Kundt's employment in the Protectorate. Late in May, von Neurath visited Hitler in Berlin to protest against Frank's usurpations of power in the Protectorate. He complained that his State Secretary had caused him embarrassment by his) ! f I support of Czech Fascist riots directed against Hacha and j j the Protectorate Government. He "warned the Fiihrer against j j the policies which Herr Frank had been pursuing with rela- 74 tion to the Czechs." His protests, however, failed to achieve the desired result, for a few days thereafter, Frank delivered a menacing speech in the town of Budweis before a Jgroup of Nazi officials. The German Reich, he warned the j Czechs, "was not Austria-Hungary. The history of 1918 would hot repeat itself." The Germans, he threatened, knew their 128 i ’ i ienemies well and would hold the Czech government to account j | "for any continuation of the underground opposition activi- j ! 75 I {ties . . . ." Severe police reprisals after the shooting j ! j jof a German policeman in the Czech town of Kladno, and con- Jtinued intense police activities during the summer and fall ! i j iof 1939, brought mounting tension between Czechs and Germansj I ! j * 7 0 ■ j jin the Protectorate. The Kladno reprisals were followed ! i ! by the discovery and arrest of members of an information i network which had been established within the official Czech) | censorship bureau in the Protectorate. Organized by the j head of the bureau and former Czech army officer Schmoranz, i ! i the network had supplied valuable intelligence to the Czech { 77 underground and to emigre centers abroad. On August 2 3, iFrank threatened the Protectorate government with severe { ! ! ] 7 Q j {reprisals in case of sabotage. Upon Prank's urgings, von { Neurath signed a special ordinance, placing responsibility j i for acts of sabotage not only on individual offenders but on| I 79 the entire population. In September, immediately after the outbreak of war, the Gestapo arrested several thousand j Czech nationalists, Social Democrats and intellectuals and 80 I incarcerated them xn concentration camps. The wave of i arrests constituted a severe blow against Czech efforts at j 81 ■ peaceful cooperation with the occupation regime and I I prompted von Neurath to intervene with Hitler against the i - . ! 1 ! jexcessive application of preventive detention measures in j 82 the Protectorate. As George Kennan reported: "With ! Iregard to the general atmosphere, it can only be said that j j [feeling among the Czechs could scarcely be more bitter than i i ' i i Q Q lit is at the present without giving rise to real disorder." j * * * It was in this atmosphere of bitterness that the Czech people awaited the arrival of October 28, their National Independence Day. With the exception of some Com- j Winist handbills advocating a general strike, most leaflets [distributed by resistance groups called for nonviolent j j ^demonstrations of national solidarity to celebrate the anni-j i 84 jversary. Instructions of the non-Communist underground i I movements cautioned against confrontations and demanded j i avoidance of violent clashes with the occupation authori- j I 85 i ties. The Czech Protectorate government took extensive measures to prevent disorders. It mobilized sizable police units, prevented all public assemblies in provincial cities, and attempted to limit demonstrations to the capital city, i Prague. Several days before the October 28 holiday, Jezek, the Protectorate Minister of Interior, called on the Chief | ' "............. 130 | I > of the German Security Police in Prague, informed him of the! I j ! ! jextent of police preparations, alerted him to the possible j ; i l i occurrence of peaceful demonstrations in Prague, and re- j I i quested that German security organs maintain restraint and aj 86 ■ tolerant attitude. It seems likely that the relatively i I i permissive approach to demonstrations in Prague represented j ! • j an attempt by the Czech authorities to impress the Germans I with the strength of Czech feelings of patriotism and | national solidarity, and to provide, at the same time, an ; • ! 87 1 opportunity to relieve pent-up emotions. They were, how- j i ever, determined to prevent provocations and promised to spare no effort to maintain public order. Von Neurath j accepted the government's advice, issued orders to ignore ! I | jexpected public manifestations unless they "assumed the I 88 character of a serious threat to public peace and safety," j and departed from the capital. | i Von Neurath's absence provided Frank an opportunity j i to use the demonstration for his own purposes. The extent j ! I land thoroughness of the preparations he undertook attest to i i his intention to bring tensions in the Protectorate to the ! i | boiling point, thus providing himself the opportunity to j ! i demonstrate the need for the use of severe repression and j jhis superior qualifications as guarantor of law and order. Disregarding von Neurath's order, he placed all police and j | ! military units in a state of readiness. Well-organized ! |groups of German students were instructed to provoke clashes ! i with demonstrating Czechs and an ostentatious display of j t j .uniformed SS and SA units was to fuel the excitement. Apart; from minor incidents, the demonstrations, nevertheless, i ! ‘ remained under control and did not seriously threaten public 89 ' <arder. Despite the absence of serious disorders, Frank | ! , jcalled on President Hacha at his summer residence in Lany 'outside Prague and threatened severest reprisals unless j I 90 .Czech police units dispersed the demonstrators. Toward evening Frank took charge of SS and police units and partic- 91 ipated in person in the suppression of the demonstration. 1 Heavily armed security forces were given orders to use fire- ;arms against demonstrators. After gunfire and arrests made j : 1 j by German SS units had excited the crowd, the demonstrations i lassumed a serious character. One Czech worker was killed; i ! • ! i 115 demonstrators were seriously wounded, hundreds injured I 92 and 400 arrested. Upon von Neurath's return, President Hacha com- Iplained to him about German provocations. Without them, he protested, violence and riots could have been avoided. Von j I ! jNeurath expressed regrets about his absence from Prague. j Disavowing Prank quite openly* he stated that he, von j ' I ;Neurath, would have taken a more objective view of matters, j iOn Hacha's request, the Protector promised to free all those1 93 who had been arrested. The events of October 28 revealed clearly and publicly the fundamental differences between von| ■ j jNeurath and Frank. As a memorandum of the Reich Chancelleryj jhad it, there could be little doubt that "Prank had attempt-! led to use the demonstrations in order to instigate sharper i | i and more repressive policies, while the Reich Protector and the Assistant State Secretary appear to disagree with 94 Frank." Prank had overplayed his hand and revealed his i |intentions too blatantly. I The death of Jan Opletal, a Czech medical student iwho had been injured on October 28, provided Frank a second | |chance to accomplish his purposes. At Opletal's funeral, on ! ' | jNovember 15, there were minor demonstrations of fellow stu- f jdents who gathered in small groups and sang patriotic songs. !Czech police dispersed the demonstrators. The funeral pro cession had obtained official permission and proceeded, on 95 the whole, peacefully and quietly, as attested by Heydrich! himself who emphasized the relative unimportance of the | 96 incidents in a letter to the Reich Chancellery. Frank and i I his security apparatus in Prague, however, were determined ! 133 I ; ■ I : ■! : I |to make the most of this opportunity and to reverse their j • j jrelative lack of success in October. | | The rapidly unfolding events leave little doubt that i ■ I they had been initiated by Frank and the SD in Prague. Goaded by exaggerated reports from Frank, an enraged Hitler summoned von Neurath and Frank, accompanied by Frederici and 97 VSlckers, to Berlin. At the Reich Chancellery, Hitler hurled wild accusations at Chvalkovsky, Czech Minister in Berlin, who had been asked to join the meeting, and insisted that the Protectorate government had been responsible for 98 . , the demonstration. Hitler announced that the Czechs did not deserve a better fate than the Poles and declared his firm resolution to suppress all further resistance by any means. At the same time he ordered the closing of all Czech 99 universities for three years, immediate execution of those ) responsible for the demonstration, and the arrest and depor tation to concentration camps of a large number of Czech students. We do not know Frank' s exact role in formulat ing these draconian measures but he hurried to Prague, eager to let loose a reign of terror. Out of a list of leading student functionaries prepared by the SD, Frank designated nine that were to be shot. On the morning of November 16, all Czech universities were occupied by the SS and closed 134 down. Student dormitories were brutally attacked arid all students living in them were arrested. More than 1200 were 101 sent to concentration camps. The nine students, chosen by Frank, were executed on November 17. As he admitted after the war, Frank did not even bother to have them put on 102 trial or sentenced by court-martial. j I Frank1s blow against the universities emasculated j i I the Czech intelligentsia, probably the most determined and radical segment of national resistance against the occupa tion.3-03 His real aim, however, was to counter von Neurath's policy of conciliation and to polarize the conflict between i i ;Czechs and Germans in the Protectorate. Among the nine stu- i Jdents whose execution he had ordered, only one had radical affiliations. Most of them were exponents of right-wing i [organizations who had supported a policy of collaboration with the German authorities. One of the students was deputy chairman of the Union for Cooperation with the Germans. None of them had been involved in resistance activities or participated in incidents that occurred during Opletal's L i 1Q4 funeral. Frank's intervention with Hitler forced von Neurath to assume a harder stance toward the Protectorate govern ment. He reprimanded the Czech Ministers severely and L 135 | 1 accused them of having failed to take all the necessary j i I ! steps to prevent the November demonstrations. In private j i conversations with Hacha, however, he asked the President ! i j i earnestly not to tender his resignation. He held out hopes | of impending changes and told Hacha that his abdication j i 105 i could only harm the Czech cause. Moreover, von Neurath ; tried to lessen the impact of the closing of all universi ties and requested Hitler to permit Czech students to con tinue their studies in German universities. Hitler agreed ! i jto this proposal only after Frank had approved it on condi- t jtion that solely students with requisite racial and politi- I jcal qualifications would be eligible.3-0^ 1 | j The brutality of the SS and the severity of the mea- i sures taken intensified the hatred of the German occupiers felt by most Czechs. As the Oberlandrat in Zlin reported to the Reich Protector, "this hatred tends to give one the impression that . . . coexistence between Czechs and Germans will present at least in this generation, an insoluble prob lem. " The Czechs, as he commented, "were convinced that the closing of the universities had as its sole aim the gradual liquidation of the intelligentsia and, thus, the destruction' 107 of the national leaders of the Czech people." This time, iFrank had!succeeded. The policy of moderation and ! 136 i accommodation to German demands advocated by Hacha and the I (Protectorate government had been severely damaged in the I |eyes of the people. Von Neurath's position in the Protec torate had been undermined and with it any lingering hopes of peaceful cooperation between occupiers and occupied had (vanished. The Protector never quite recovered from this { blow. He is said to have stated to Hacha: "On October 28, 108 Frank was the loser, on November 15, I lost out." i i The victory over Poland strengthened the hands of the extremists of the SS in Nazi Germany. The newly occu pied territories provided the opportunity for immediate large-scale implementation of radical Nazi racial and settlement policies in Eastern Europe. The brutal consoli dation of the newly won territories and the ruthless racial policies sanctioned there by Hitler required a vast exten sion of police powers, an extension that could be easily 109 justified on the grounds of state security. The aggrega tion of SS power in the wake of territorial conquest, more over, brought in its train a profound shifting of power relationships in the Reich itself. On September 2 7, right after the completion of the Polish campaign, Himmler obtained Hitler's approval for the • v consolidation of all police functions under a new central 1371 office, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA [Reich Security |Main Office]), headed by Reinhard Heydrich. The detach- j 'ment and separation of the SS and police from the tradi- j I ' 1 i 112 i tional state apparatus thus was completed. A few days jlater, on October 7, Hitler appointed Himmler Reich Commis- t ' i ! j jsioner for the Strengthening of Germandom (RKF) and charged I i i him with the elimination of all "ethnically alien elements dangerous to the Reich and the German nation" and the ! 113 settlement of Germans in the newly conquered territories. The resettlement and racial population policy in all of Ger man-dominated Europe thus was placed under SS control and j formed the heart and center of Himmler1s emerging power 'structure. I I j The establishment of a secure territorial power base in both Poland and the Protectorate represented the first step toward the construction of an SS empire within the I 'empire of Nazi Europe. Frank's attempt to establish primacy tin Bohemia and Moravia thus enjoyed Himmler's wholehearted i support. As in Poland, the extension of SS power entailed not only the repression of the intelligentsia but the step ping up of severe measures against the Jewish population. Expropriation of Jewish property and the elimination of Jews jfrom economic life in the Protectorate proceeded at a rapid 138 pace. It was followed by the wholesale evacuation, upon i Gestapo orders, of Jewish communities to Prague and other j larger cities, where they were to be concentrated for regis tration to forced labor and deportation.’ *'^ I | At the heart of Himmler's plans for SS hegemony in ! ' I ! I jthe Protectorate stood his resettlement and population pro gram with attendant racial screenings, confiscations and | jdeportations controlled and manipulated by the SS. Already 1 j i on March 31, 1939, hardly more than two weeks after the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, Giinther Pancke, chief of the Race and Settlement Head Office (RuSHA [Rasse- und 115 Siedluncrshauptamt 1) of the SS, suggested to Heydrich that population and settlement projects there should be handled i i exclusively by the SS. This, Pancke said, was because they constituted, "particularly in areas outside the old terri tory of the Reich, primarily a political problem" and, thus, I bught not to be entrusted to the traditional ministerial bureaucracy, "which has demonstrated considerable incompe- I 116 jtence as implementor of political tasks" — as extra- jlegal instrument for the implementation of totalitarian pol icies . In Bohemia and Moravia, however, unlike in Poland, Himmler's project was confronted with considerable diffi- j i 117 culties and obstacles. In his attempt to gain a foothold ! 139 ; ! I jfor an SS-dominated population and settlement program, he I ' ‘ required Prank's assistance, a circumstance which certainly ! contributed to the State Secretary's standing in the eyes of| the SS. The agency earmarked for the implementation of | jHimmler's projects was the Czech Land Office, which had j ' - I i I i been in charge of the Czechoslovak agrarian reform after World War I, and held jurisdiction over, and the right to j i i i appoint public administrators for, confiscated estates and j landed properties. Very soon after the occupation it was J i seized by the men of the RuSHA who also took over two sec- ‘ i I tions of the Czech Ministry of Agriculture which had exer- 118 cised control over state forests and public estates. ‘ Upon Frank's suggestion, the chief of the settlement section | of the RuSHA, SS-Oberfiihrer von Gottberg, introduced to von | Neurath as a Landrat. was placed in charge of the Land I 119 i Office. Von Gottberg immediately embarked upon an exten sive program of confiscations. He ordered the registration ■ of all church-owned estates and placed them under public j . administration. Together with properties formerly owned by j I Jews, these estates were to supply land for extensive German settlements in Bohemia and Moravia. He succeeded in seizing a number of landed estates from other sources and made plans for the expropriation of thousands of Czech farms in Bohemia ! ' 140 ! ! i I . 12 0 . . ! ;and Moravia. Frank participated personally in various j I ! itnanipulations and attempted to use pressure tactics in order j i i to facilitate the acquisition of properties by von Gott- ! 121 i berg's Land Office. Supported by Frank, von Gottberg I developed grandiose projects involving not only the settle- i i I jment of colonists from the ranks of the SS and of Germans I f repatriated from abroad, but the establishment of German i population belts intended to permanently separate the Czechs from their Slovak neighbors, as well as a "landbridge" link ing Prague with the German-inhabited parts of northern 122 Bohemia. The plans, moreover, foresaw the creation of a 12 3 large SS-training camp in the vicinity of Benesov. Von Neurath objected to von Gottberg's activities and opposed Frank1s designs. Conflicting views about settlement and population policies in the Protectorate led to sharp clashes with Frank centering on control over the Land Office. The j f I Protector complained to the Reich Chancellery that von Gott-J berg's activities ran counter to policies in the Protector- 124 ate that had been approved by the Fiihrer, and ordered von Gottberg to suspend the registration of church-owned proper ties. Aided by von Gottberg's indiscretions and scandalous behavior, von Neurath eventually succeeded in securing his removal and obtained permission to appoint Theodor Gross, a 12 5 civil servant, as head of the Land Office. He instructed I ■ ' i jGross to desist from all confiscations of large Czech S • . . ! estates contemplated by von Gottberg and to delay the estab-j 126 lishment of the training camp in Benesov. Frank considered the loss of control over the Land Office not only as a personal defeat but as a serious threat to SS plans aiming at domination of Bohemia and Moravia. He urged Heydrich to approve the establishment of a special department for population questions attached to the Security 127 Police under Frank's supervision and insisted on Gross's speedy removal "in view of the fact that the Land Office and I its task are of decisive importance for the domination of jthis area." As a replacement he suggested an SS-Hauptsturm- ! fiihrer. Fischer, whose appointment would place "this impor- I ■ jtant position" into the hands of a man who "was not only an i I 128 SS-Fiihrer but also a member of the SD-RF SS." For the time being at least, von Neurath had averted large-scale confiscations of Czech estates and deportations of peasants from the countryside. The projected resettle ment of Germans from abroad failed to materialize. Only toward the end of 1941 did a small number of German settlers from Bessarabia arrive in the Protectorate. They were given land and were to resettle within the Czech district of 129 Melnik. Not only Frank's population and settlement projects ■ j but the whole range of ill-conceived extremist policies of the radicals around Himmler were soon to come under recon sideration. SS excesses in Poland had plunged that country into a hopeless food and supply crisis. Hans Frank, the Governor General of Poland, protested the ensuing turmoil and Herman GcJring, fearing the effects of Himmler's re settlement policies on his own armaments empire, demanded an 130 end to the convulsions. Himmler and Heydrich were forced to retreat. With the war in the West still undecided and the need for unimpaired armament production still paramount, Frank's activities in the Protectorate came likewise under increasing attack. Called to a conference with Hitler, von Neurath obtained assurances that the Fuhrer desired the con tinuation of present policies in Bohemia and Moravia. All actions likely to cause unrest among the Czech population i were to be avoided. As the permanent representative of the Foreign Office with the Reich Protector reported: A change in the status of the Protectorate is at present not under consideration, particularly since the required German administrators and civil servants are not available. The colonization of the country by Germans in meaningful numbers cannot proceed. The Germanization of the new territories in the East (e.g., Poland) must be given priority and there are hardly enough German settlers available for that purpose . . . .131 Frank and the SS had overreached themselves. Their time had not yet arrived. Von Neurath and the moderates around him had gained a breathing space. A Shortlived Alliance: Von Neurath and Frank Make Common Cause against the Neighboring Gaue The demonstrations and Nazi repressions of October and November, 1939 were followed by a period of relative quiet in the Protectorate. The terror of the SS had exacted its toll. Intimidated and defenseless, the Czechs were bid ing their time. Von Neurath had returned from his visit in Berlin with his fences mended and his position considerably im proved. Frank and the radicals, though they had suffered a setback, continued to demand tough policies in the Protec torate. They were supported by a barrage of SD and Party reports, stressing the unchanged hostility of the Czechs 132 toward the Reich and urging severe measures against them. The uneasy balance between moderates and radicals in the ! 144 | jProtectorate caused confusion and considerable uncertainty j among German officials. "It is high time," the Oberlandrat j i | in Moravska Ostrava wrote to von Neurath, "to decide once j and for all whether to retain the concept of an autonomous | i l administration for the Protectorate or to apply the methods ‘ i jof a police state." Rejecting the latter as inappropriate, j j the Landrat concluded his note with the complaint that the j policies applied in the Protectorate made it hard to deter- | j mine what position on this issue the Office of the Reich j I 133 Protector had taken. j A new turn of events, however, was to bring the con-1 { ! flict between von Neurath and Prank to a temporary halt and ! j force them into a short-lived alliance. The German vie- ! i I tories in the West had strengthened the hands of the radi cals in the Third Reich. A new wave of terror in Poland had cost the lives of thousands of men and women who, as members of the educated elite, were considered potential leaders of the national resistance. Convinced that their time had j come, extremists in the Nazi Party and the SS demanded an j I end to all compromises. With the fall of Prance, they ; i i argued, formerly valid foreign policy considerations had j become obsolete. With the wind blowing in their favor, the j Party leaders of the adjacent Gaue renewed their demands to I ■abolish the Protectorate and to partition the territory in • ! 135 j order to facilitate rapid Germanization. The new attack j ! i lagainst the integrity of the Protectorate undoubtedly origi-j I j nated in the Gau Sudetenland; its Gauleiter. Henlein, j plagued by economic and administrative difficulties, | i ! I ■ I (attempted to solve them by demanding the incorporation of j jmost of Bohemia into the Sudeten Gau. Moravia was to be joined with the Gau Lower Danubia while "residual areas were to be attached to the adjoining Gaue." Authored by Franz Kiinzel, of the Sudeten Party Head Office (Gauleituncr NSDAP i Sudetenland), the proposal emphasized . "difficulties concern-j ing the administration of the Sudeten Gau" arising from the j I / separation of Czech and German areas which had always con stituted a "topographically and economically" united region. j jAttempting to strengthen the case for partition, Kiinzel i ( stressed the advantages a divided protectorate would offer to speed up the process of Germanization: As it is not possible to count on a complete expul- I sion of the Czech population, it is necessary to j bring about their dispersion among several Gau areas j in a manner that would safeguard the maintenance of a certain proportion between Czechs and Germans.136 . i Kiinzel's proposals found enthusiastic support from Gauleiter 137 Jury whose Gau Niederdonau (Lower Danubia) was to be merged with Moravia, with the city of Brno as district : 146 capital. Jury lost little time and proceeded to solicit | j jsupport for these plans from Party radicals and the extrem- 1 I i iists of the SS. In the middle of August, he called all j j ' | jinterested parties to a meeting in Berlin in order to coor- j jdinate these proposals and submit them to the Fiihrer. The \ j iframework of the Protectorate, the conference agreed, had | jbecome obsolete and a hindrance to speedy Germanization. A I ! jcombmation of various methods promoting denationalization I I f j of the Czechs were suggested as viable solutions to the j . , 138 problem. The growing momentum and serious nature of attacks I 139 Jon the unity of the Protectorate alarmed both von Neurath I jand Frank. Sharing a common interest in the preservation of the status quo they agreed on a concerted approach and j ! • i 'decided to present their arguments in the form of two sepa- | I i i • 1 rate memoranda to the Fiihrer. Credit for the formulation ofj | proposals designed to assure Hitler's approval goes, j i I undoubtedly, to Frank. The parameters of the argument in favor of maintaining the unity of the Protectorate had already been sketched in a report sent by Frank to Himmler 140 as early as June 26, 1940. Breaking once and for all with the primitive vfllkisch chauvinism of the Sudeten German radicals and turning against their demands to absorb all of 1 4 7 I i ♦ Bohemia, Prank's memorandum shows signs of a developing Bohemian-Moravian territorial concept of considerable ! ' i [sophistication, the beginnings of an identification with thej i ! ; i (territory under his control which foreshadows the "procon- i I i i jsular syndrome" characteristic of his future political role j ' : iin the Protectorate. 1 ' ! i • I I Von Neurath and Frank sent their memoranda to the i 141 ! phancellery and requested a meeting with Hitler. Both jstressed the important contributions made to Germany's war ; ! [economy and argued for the preservation of the existing | I 'regime. Both urged, moreover, that the maintenance of the ! ! i I ! j [unity of the Protectorate constituted the precondition for I j ■ i Jits successful Germanization. A partitioning of the terri- ! j ! jtory among the neighboring Gaue would only impede this end. i' It would prevent the implementation of a uniform policy, I intensify Czech nationalism and increase aversion against j j the Reich. j i The ultimate goal of incorporation into the Reich and complete Germanization of the Protectorate, however, i could be achieved by the assimilation of racially suitable j jczechs under centralized guidance from Prague. The racial ! i [characteristics of the Czechs, after centuries of mixing j I ! i Jwith Germans, appeared to permit the assimilation of the ! | 148 i majority of the population; therefore, their wholesale j iexpulsion— unfeasible at any rate under present conditions— ! | jwould not be required. Chaos near the nerve-center of the jReich could, thus, be prevented. Both authors agreed that i j ithe "swollen and hostile intelligentsia," as well as other t i junassimilable and racially inferior elements, would have to be eliminated. On the other hand, the presistence of "Austro-Slavism" among former officials and segments of the j ; ! older population could be counted on to facilitate their | • 4. • 1 4 2 i Germanization. Von Neurath's opportunistic espousal of racist argu- 143 ments notwithstanding, a comparison of both documents reveals extensive differences between the Reich Protector and his State Secretary and lends credence to von Neurath's claim that he had known "from various discussions with Frank| j that the latter, too, was opposed to the partition of the j i Protectorate" and that he had made common cause with Prank i because he was convinced "that together with Prank he would 144 be more likely to influence Hitler." Von Neurath emphasized the achievements of his ! i i administration throughout his memorandum. The structure of j i the existing regime, he attempted to demonstrate, had been ! | j vindicated by its success in securing a peaceful transition I ;and an uninterrupted supply of war materials to the Reich. ! It would, thus, be advantageous to permit the Czechs to i | 'retain their limited administrative autonomy, for such an I I ^ arrangement was best suited "to maintain peace and order" j i iin this part of the world. j Von Neurath's views concerning the Czech's racial j jcharacteristics were purposely vague and nebulous: he j i i (claimed to have detected "a surprising number of fair-hairedj ! I I ! people with intelligent faces and well-built bodies, very i i | similar to those in central and southern Germany." His pre-j ! scription to "cast out" the racially unsuitable parts of the population appeared to be equally ambivalent. I | Von Neurath's memorandum contained no proposals for i iGerman settlements in Bohemia and Moravia. There are no j i i : I suggestions of methods to speed Germanization. The assimi- j j lation of the Czechs, he insisted, would require decades. j I ! Meanwhile, a highly efficient Czech administrative apparatus; | could be relied on to perform the duties assigned to it by j ! 145 1 the Reich. "For this reason, " he summarized in his rec- j j ommendations, "this area deserves special attention and sup-j port in the interests of Greater Germany." He concluded j with the warning to "beware of experiments, including those j I of a purely administrative nature, lest one create ......... :............................... . ~T~~~ 150 ^difficulties in attaining the clear and unambiguous aim of a I .gradual fusion of this territory and its people with the j 146 Greater German Reich." Far from agreeing with von Neurath*s gradualism, Frank missed no opportunity in his memorandum to launch subtle attacks against the "quietist policies" of his chief: "In the long run, Neurath's passive ! jattitude would have to be dropped . . . as the undisturbed functioning of the Reich Protector's administrative appa ratus will not by itself bring about the assimilation or 147 Germanization of the Czechs." This administrative appa ratus had, it is true, functioned well but only "thanks to the German fist." Unlike von Neurath, he provided explicit recommendations to proceed with the process of Germanization i ! by: 1. National mutation of racially suitable Czechs. 2. The expulsion or elimination through "special treatment" (Sonderbehandluncr)148 of racially unassimilable Czechs, the hostile intelligentsia and of all destructive elements. 3. The resettlement of the space freed in this manner by fresh German blood.149 Complete physical elimination of the Czechs from the area of Bohemia and Moravia would not be required, since only part of the people had retained racially inferior character istics. The task of "separating Czechs capable of national mutation from the racially inferior part would be entrusted ] ■ . 151 i |to special commissions (possibly within the framework of the 150 jpublic health service)." An "ambitious population pol- jicy" extending German settlements "from the North right up j i j j ; to the suburbs of Prague," the gradual closing of all Czech ! schools and the reduction of the Czech language to a "mere | | ■ | (Vernacular, as it had been during the 17th and 18th cen- j i 151 jturies, " were to form part of the plan. The successful application of all these methods, however, depended on "a. i I single central Reich authority with one man in command"— "a. i Master in Bohemia" who would "prevent the derogation (das iAbsinken) of political problems to mere problems of adminis- L 4.. .,152 itration. i i | Frank's suggestions with respect to the Czech prob- j !lem, entailing judicious use of both "the carrot and the S 153 ! stick fZuckerbrot und Peitschel." were later adopted by i Heydrich and formed part and parcel of his short and bloody j ! I I ' i regime in Bohemia and Moravia. The major points of Frank's I i i ' i recommendations and of Heydrich's actual policy were depoliticization of the Czechs as a necessary first step to jtheir denationalization, the direction of their whole atten tion to bread-and-butter issues, appeasement of the Czech jworking class by appropriate social and welfare measures, 1 152 | i and termination of the Protectorate's autonomous structure of administration. I . i Heydrich's immediate reaction to Frank's proposals, j I ' ■ however, was rather guarded. In comments submitted to Himm-i | | jler he expressed surprise that 1 1 SS-Gruppenftihrer Frank, who I i i I . | had so far advocated a radical policy aimed at the liquida tion of the Czechs, now suddenly appears to have adopted von I ' Neurath's position— albeit in a modified form: their exten-| ! 154 I sive, though by no means total, assimilation." Noting Frank's failure to offer practical steps and specific pro- j posals as to "how the projected aims could be approached in ^gradual stages," he suggested immediate registration and racial examination of all inhabitants of the area as "first i prerequisite for determining the percentage of those eli gible for Germanization." Racially acceptable Czechs would ! be sent to work in the Reich and subjected there to Germani zation. The Czechs remaining in Bohemia and Moravia "would | then have to be treated with considerable skill" to keep their numbers to manageable proportions. All final deci sions would depend on the outcome of racial tests. Meantime the existing structure of the Protectorate ought to be 155 ■retained. For the time being at least, albeit not wholly i I jwithout reservations, Himmler and Heydrich acceded to Frank's proposals. On September 2 3, Hitler received von ' 156 jNeurath and Frank in Berlin. He decided in favor of iretaining the Protectorate and accepted Frank's proposed ! i ^Germanization of "space and people" as amended by Heydrich's i land Himmler's recommendations: J j Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., the absorption of ! about one-half of the population possessing accept- ! able racial characteristics. This absorption to be | achieved inter alia through increased employment of Czechs in the Reich . . . , in other words by dis persing the compact part of the nation. The other part of the nation will have to be weakened, elimi nated, and expelled from the country by various means. All those that oppose the proposed Germani zation will be dealt with harshly and must be elimi nated. 157 | a few days thereafter, Hitler received Frank alone in pri vate audience and discussed with him plans for the prospec tive Germanization, which were to be prepared by the State Secretary alone and proceed under his personal supervi- 158 sion. Frank's proposals propelled him into a position of iprestige and power. He had emerged as the architect of a concept designed to preserve for the Reich the Czech people's skills and productive resources, while, at the same time, arranging their radical denationalization. What he had offered was a plan to Germanize both "space and people" as a viable alternative to implausible projects to resettle r .......................................................................................... 1 5 4 '] jBohemia and Moravia with German peasant-colonists— an alter-! i ■ ' jnative, moreover, that rested on arguments impeccably based I i • . j on Nazi doctrines of race and blood. Despite his consider- \ able ideological skill and dialectic achievement, Frank, j however, failed to detail the practical steps necessary for j s i ' the implementation of his proposals. His methods lacked j I clarity of purpose. His approach to the problem of main- ! | taining order and undisturbed productivity during periods ofj j | accelerated assimilatory pressure remained exceedingly vaguej . 159 ! and unconvincing. The solution to these problems would ! ! • ! come only with Heydrich1s arrival in the Protectorate. j ! ■ 1 Eager to comply with Heydrich1s instruction, Frank j hurriedly made preparations for a "racial inventory" of the j i ! population and invited Professor Karl Valentin Muller, a 160 Dresden anthropologist, to commence investigations. Heydrich, on his part, requested the RuSHA (Race and Settle-! i ' ment Main Office of the SS) to prepare a preliminary report 161 on the racial character of the Czech population. Within j about a week the RuSHA came up with the desired "rough esti-j | mate": I j 45% [of the Czechs were] predominantly Nordic, j Dinarian or Western people ... i 40% people of mixed marriages . . . with predomi- \ nantly Eastern and Baltic racial characteristics. j 15% racially alien persons.162 i 155 ; : ■ i i ; Comparing the Czech racial structure with that he found j 'i ’ iamong the Sudeten Germans, Konig-Bayer made an astonishing i jdiscovery. The latter, it transpired, had the following i ! ; I racial composition: 25% predominantly Nordic, Dinarian or Western j ! people ... | | 55% people of mixed marriages . . . with predomi- | nantly Eastern and Baltic racial characteristics. ! 20% racially alien persons. I { i"A rough estimate indicates, " he reported, "that the racial composition of the Sudetenland is much inferior to that of the Czech areas of settlement." He concluded that it would thus "appear to be a mistake to distribute racially superior 16 ~ Czech families among racially less valuable German ones." ' j That about 50 percent of the Czech population i | I I possessed racial characteristics which made them acceptable j for Germanization had been assumed by Hitler and Frank long j 164 before the RuSHA's "preliminary" investigations. The remarkable reappearance of that same magic figure of 50 per-j i cent aside, Kdnig-Bayer's report could not have failed to please Heydrich and Frank. It provided an incontestable argument for keeping Henlein and his KB friends in the Sudeten Gau from absorbing the "racially superior" Czechs. When some Party officials appeared reluctant to drop dis cussions concerning the "final solution" of the Czech I 156 . ] I i problem, the Reich Protector prohibited all public utter- t 165 lances on that subject. Hermann Gdring's advice to aban- idon plans for the Protectorate's dismemberment, "for the i l Igarden down there is now fenced in," had been proven correct L 4- 1 6 6 by events. | With the continuation and territorial integrity of i jthe Protectorate secured, Prank resumed his assaults against I von Neurath's policies. This time he aimed at the Reich j Protector's Achilles' heel, the "autonomous" Czech adminis tration. The State Secretary opened his attack in January, 1941, with a campaign against members of the Czech Legion i of World War I, demanding their dismissal from all civil service positions and their elimination from public life. Since Prime Minister Elias had been a prominent member of the Legion, it was obvious that he was the prime target of 167 Frank's thrust. Frank, moreover, wrote to Himmler 168 requesting the Prime Minister's immediate arrest. The Czech cabinet considered resignation. Berlin, however, was not yet ready for drastic changes and von Neurath was able to arrange an amicable settlement. The invasion of Yugoslavia in April of that year provided Frank another opportunity to press his attack. The defiant resistance of the Southern Slavs gave rise to a 157 | i i i igreat wave of sympathy among the Czech people. Two days j i iafter the outbreak of war, the State Secretary ordered all j i j police forces to "take sharpest measures" against hostile j I i ! 170 1 demonstrations in the Protectorate. Egged on by Frank, aj | t jcollaborating, pro-German Czech journalist attempted to ! I • i ! I jembarrass Vice Premier Havelka and two other Czech cabinet ministers by soliciting a declaration of support for Ger- J 171| many's armed forces in their struggle against Yugoslavia. j ■ ! Intended for publication in an official newspaper^ it would j j i have brought the ministers into conflict with the prevailingj I sentiments of the Czech people. When the ministers refused, Frank threatened them with dire consequences and succeeded 172 in securing Havelka's resignation. The influence and j point of view of the State Secretary had, clearly, become paramount in the Protectorate. The days of the EliaS admin istration and of von Neurath's policy of moderation appeared to be numbered. 158 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV IMT, XVI, 654. According to his testimony, von Neurath had obtained assurance of protection from "attacks by political radicals and above all by the SS, police and jthe Sudeten Germans" and Hitler's promise of support for j"winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy." 3 j The effect of German policies in Bohemia and jMoravia upon future plans of expansion into Southeastern |Europe was an important factor in Nazi deliberations con cerning the treatment of the Czechs (Proposals of Depart ment VS, Staff of Konrad Henlein, in Krai and Premund, eds., |p. 37). See also Prank's expressions of concern about Nazi ipolicy aims among "smaller nations of the South-East who ■might be frightened away" in his "Memorandum on the Czech jProblem" of September 28, 1940 (Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, J267). George Kennan assessed German motives for retaining ithe Protectorate as attempts "to offer encouragement to other countries to feel that absorption into the German orbit would not necessarily mean the termination of their national existence" (Kennan, p. 147). 4 Kennan, p. 218. 5 Koehl, p. 17. g Kennan, p. 218. Frank was known among his fellow workers in the SdP as an extraordinarily ambitious man. Dr. Hans Neuwirth, former SdP deputy in the Czechoslovak National Assembly, attested to this reputation in an inter view with this writer in Munich on November 2 0, 1968. 159 ; i ! ! ! ! I ! 7 v v / v / | Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicni jednota," pp. 506-7. ;See also, by the same author, "Poznamky k problemum okupac- | niho rezimu v tzv. 'Protektorate'" ("Some Remarks on the | Problem of the Occupation Regime in the So-Called 'Protec- j jtorate'"), Historie a voienstvx (1964), pp. 176-77. j ! ^Krausnick et al.. I, 28-29. j i < I 9 ■ ' : The mam goals of the coalition between the tradi- ! tional elites and the totalitarians, which occupied the | first phase of the Nazi regime, had been largely achieved byj ithe end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937. They included j military rearmament, consequent redirection of the economy bringing about an end to the period of economic stagnation, military equality with other powers, and the suppression of Jtrade unions. With the achievement of these common goals jthe symbiotic coalition of Nazism with the old elites had come to an end (Schweitzer, p. 504). Schweitzer sees this | coalition as a "quadripartite society" in which "each holder! 'of power possessed a specific sphere of influence over whichl 'he exercised paramount, though 'mutually interpenetrating' I jcontrol: Big business in control of urban business, the j generals dominating the armed forces (excepting the air j force and the, as yet, relatively small SS forces), the I party charged with political recruitment and ideological penetration, and the SS controlling the police and the !'instruments of terror'" (ibid., pp. 504-5). To these groups one must add the civil servants (Beamtentum) who retained control over the administrative structure of the j jstate. Baron von Neurath undoubtedly was a representative j jof the latter. For an instructive account of the role of j |the civil bureaucracy in the Third Reich see Herbert von j Borch, Obriqkeit und Widerstand: Zur politischen Sozioloqiei ] des Beamtentums (Tubingen: J. B. C. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1954). 10Trevor-Roper, pp. 126-27. Johannes Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schrapler, and Gunter Scheel, eds., Ursachen und Folgen vom deutschen iZusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur Staatlichen Neuordnung j iDeutschlands in der Gegenwart (8 vols.; Berlin: Wendler, j 1959-63), Vol. VIII: Die Weimarer Republik (1963), pp. 491-i 92. I 160 1 12 ' For Von Neurath's social and political views see Heinemann, pp. 2 32-56. I 13 j Ulrich von Hassell's frequent and unflattering references to von Neurath describe him as "lazy," "negli gent, " etc. (The Von Hassell Diaries [New York: Hamilton, 1947], pp. 9, 12, 22, 164). i 14 j "Neurath frequently referred to experiences . . . with Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revo lutionary elements should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather experience themselves in responsible positions" (Testimony of character witness !Dr. Kopke concerning von Neurath's attitude toward the Nazi party, IMT, XVII, 109). His obituary in the New York Times quoted von Neurath's view that Nazism was but "a passing fad" and his advice to "let it run its course— in a number of years all would be forgotten" (New York Times. August 16, |1956) . i i ! 15 j Hossbach memorandum, Doc. 386-PS, IMT, XXV, 410 !(see supra. p. 77). I ; On February 4, 1938. Hitler appointed von Neurath ito the purely honorary and politically redundant position of Ipresident of the Secret Cabinet (Taylor, pp. 145ff). See ialso Ronnefarth, pp. 40-41. i ’ i | j | ^Von Neurath's (as most other German conserva tives') policy objectives entailed German rearmament and preparations for a possible war. Their goals, however, were limited to the restoration of Germany's pre-war frontiers j and political status and they hoped to achieve them by meansj short of war with the West (Trevor-Roper, pp. 126-27; Tay- j lor, passim: Schweitzer, passim). 18 According to the testimony of his confidante, Frau von Ritter, before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, von Neurath made no secret of his opposition to j the policies advocated by the SS in the Protectorate and j expressed, in one of his letters to her, the view that "it I 161 Was not possible to establish political power on bayonets alone" (IMT, XI, 448). See also Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 200. | I 19IMT, XVI, 656-57. j i 2 As von Neurath had expected, Czech industrialists and businessmen made the necessary adjustments to the new 'economic situation with comparative ease (Krai, Pravda o bkupaci. pp. 173-74$ Krai, Otazkv. I, 139-40). ! 21 ! The persistent conflict with Nazi radicals that pervades the whole period of von Neurath's presence in the Protectorate leaves little doubt as to the veracity of his 'statement before the Nuremberg Tribunal that one of his principle objectives there was to "prevent this country, jwhich was entrusted to Germany, from coming under the def inite domination of the SS" (IMT, XVI, 16). 22 Mein Kampf, p. 428 (see supra. p. 73). 22Fris et al.. p. 145. ; 24 I Pursuant to suggestions by the Czechoslovak gov ernment that identification as a "Home Front" was hardly compatible with participation in forthcoming parliamentary elections held within the framework of a democratic repub lic, the SFH changed its name to Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) in 1935 (Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. . 79) . j 2 5 I The leaders of the Heimatfront. Konrad Henlein, Heinrich Rutha, Walter Brand, Wilhelm Sebekowsky, Ernst Kundt, and Franz Kunzl, had all been KB members (RGnnefarth, I, 128-33). Founded in 1926, the KB maintained contacts with the vdlkisch "Tatkreis" group in the Reich. Both Gen eral von Schleicher and Franz von Papen were associated with the latter organization (ibid., II, 7Iff). 26 For Othmar Spann's theories see his Per Wahre Staat (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1921)$ Vom We sen des Volkstums (Eger: Bbhmerland, 1920)$ and Die Haupttheorien der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1930). 162 ; ; i ! 27 ' Ronnefarth, I, passim; for a detailed account of j 'the conflicts within the SdP, see Jaroslav Cesar and Bohumilj j£erny, "The Nazi Fifth Column in Czechoslovakia," Historica.j jlV (1962), 2 32 -36. See also Anklacreschrift crecren die Abqe- | ordneten und Senatoren der Sudetendeutschen Partei (Munich: Sudetendeutsches Archiv, 1962), pp. 30, 47. 28 ^ Ronnefarth, I, 128-31. j ! 2 9 I | The Sudeten Nazi party (DNSAP) had been dissolved I as an irredentist group by the Czechoslovak government in 1933. The leaders of the party, the National Assembly Deputies Krebs and Jung, fled to Germany and established close relationships with Himmler and the Volkdeutsche Mit- telstelle (VOMI). See deposition of Georg Bohm, former dis trict leader of the NSDAP in Pilsen, January 8, 1946, in j Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 55. 30 Ibid. See also Ronnefarth, I, 132. VOMI, though j officially not part of the SS, was staffed by SS personnel and closely connected with Himmler through its chief Werner Lorenz who was Himmler's protege. The organization exer cised considerable influence and served as the main channel |for the disbursement of SS-approved subsidies to German j minority groups and ethnic communities abroad. By a secret j Fiihrer order VOMI was made responsible for all ethnic German| activities throughout the world in 1938 (Doc. 837-PS, IMT, ! XXVI, 362-64). For VOMI's origins and development, see j Koehl, pp. 2 9-88. 31 After the annexation of the Sudetenland the i Gestapo arrested a number of leaders of the so-called "Spann Circle." Dr. Brand, suspected of being their "chief-ideolo-, gist," was sent to the concentration camps Sachsenhausen and' Natzweiler, where he remained until 1945 (Collegium Caro- j linum, ed., Die Sudetenfrage in europaischer Sicht [Munich; j Robert Lerche, 1962], p. 159j also, Ronnefarth, II, 72). j Dr. Neuwirth, leader of the SdP in Moravia, was, according to statements made in an interview, indicted in 1941 for j having opposed cooperation between the SdP and the NSDAP (Anklacreschrift. p. 28). The indictment was quashed. Dr. j Neuwirth himself was imprisoned in Czechoslovakia after ! World War II. After his release he moved into West Germany : |and is, at present, an attorney in Munich. 163 32 , ' I Bohm (see supra, n. 29), in Krai, ed., Die Deut- i schen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 55. See also Ronnefarth, j I, 132. ! i 33 According to his own written deposition, made dur-j ing pre-trial examinations, August to September, 1945, Frank! gained this appointment because he, "unlike all the other j members of the leadership of the party, had never belonged J to the KB." Henlein had given in to pressures from the Reich and from within the party and "did not desire to j appoint another KB man as his deputy" (Frank's deposition, j in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 49).: 34 I The SdP contained German nationalists of varying objectives and commitments, ranging from radicals advocating: territorial annexation by the Reich, such as Frank, to mod- I erate conservatives aiming at territorial autonomy within j the Czechoslovak Republic, such as Kundt, Brand and Neuwirth; (Wenzel Jaksch, Europe1 s Road to Potsdam [New York: Praeger,! 1963]j see also Brown, pp. 141, 143). 35 Ronnefarth, I, 132-33. As Deputy Leader of the |SdP Frank remained an outspoken and bitter rival of Henlein i j(ZpovSd K. H. Franka. pp. 7-8). I I I Og Ronnefarth, I, 132-33. 37 Collegium Carolinum, Dr. Walter Schmidts Aufzeich- nungen, Archiv No. 202. Walter Schmidt was the pseudonym used by Hitler's official interpreter, Paul Schmidt. Frank j denied having met Hitler in Nuremberg (Frank's deposition j [see supra. n. 33], in Krai, Die Deutschen in der Tschecho- ! slowakei, p. 49). I i 38 ! Ronnefarth, I, 187. In recognition of his ser- j vices Frank was appointed Brigade Fiihrer (Brigadier General)) in the SS and SS-Fiihrer at the staff of the Reichsfuhrer-SS,! effective November 1, 1938 by special order of Himmler (see ! Himmler, Order of January 17, 1939, in Krai, ed., Die Deut- j schen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 376). j 39 There appears to be reason to believe that Frank had established close contacts with SS-Brigade Fiihrer Otto Ohlendorf, Head of Department III of the Reich Security Main1 164 I i j t i •Office (SD-Inlandsnachrichtendienst. RSHA), one of Heydrich's most trusted collaborators. Ohlendorf's support may well i ;have been decisive in securing Frank's appointment (Biman, j pp. 241, 246-48). Documentary evidence on the background ofj 'Frank's appointment, so far, has not been available. How- j jever, there exists virtually complete agreement among avail-j able sources that it had been engineered by the SS and the | radicals among the Sudeten Germans. Not only von Neurath, j who testified in Nuremberg that the appointment took place | "upon Himmler's instigation" (IMT, XII, 657), but other con-j jtemporaries who held positions of influence in the Protec- | jtorate, support this view. Dr. Neuwirth, prominent leader j !of the SdP, expressed it in a personal interview; similarly yon Burgsdorff, Under Secretary of State in the Protectorate j(IMT, XII, 58) and Frau von Ritter (IMT, XI, 449). For other sources see Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 201; Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicni jednota," p. 507. 40 As Dr. Neuwirth informed me, it was not only Himm ler but Henlein, too, who supported Frank's appointment as State Secretary, because he was glad to rid himself of a jdangerous rival in the Sudeten Gau. Himmler was particu larly eager to prevent the choice of Kundt, former KB man, jwho, as a volkisch conservative, was Frank's outspoken oppo nent. As leader of the Sudeten German ethnic group in post-! Munich Czechoslovakia (see supra. p. 64), Kundt represented a plausible alternative to Frank's appointment. As an apoc ryphal version related by Dr. Neuwirth has it, Kundt, a | bhain smoker, had the misfortune to be holding a cigarette j •in his hand when presented to Hitler at Hradcany castle in j Prague. Hitler, who loathed cigarette smoke, turned away I •from Kundt, who failed in his attempt to be presented to the\ Fiihrer. ! I 41 | Koehl, pp. 41-42. i 42 , Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 201. 43 i As Dr. Neuwirth informed me, Frank remarked during! a conversation with him in March, 1939: "Ja, Neurath, der j ist der noble Mann und Diplomat. Ich werde die Tschechen jaus ihren Rattenldchern aufstobern." j i I I ; I I • j i ! ] i 44 Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 200. | i ; 45 i ; Prank fully accepted his role and was aware of the! 'part he played. In a personal memorandum concerning his j jvisit to Adolf Hitler on May 28, 1942, he reported com plaints he voiced to Himmler at Fiihrer Headquarters concern ing Daluege's appointment as Reich Protector: "I told the jReichsfiihrer quite frankly, that I considered myself person-; jally and without exaggeration, as the guarantor of the line I of the Fiihrer and the SS in the Protectorate and that I i |Viewed Daluege's appointment as unnecessary" (Frank's memo- i randum, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. I p. 475). ! i i - i ! ! "A Year and a Half of the Protectorate of Bohemia j jand Moravia" (report written October, 1940), in Kennan, pp. 2 37-38. I ! 47 ! i See supra. pp. 71-73. j i ^ Ibid.. pp. 83-84. 49 Letters from Frank to von Neurath and the Reich !Ministry of the Interior to the Reich Chancellery, March, il939, Bundesarchiv, Coblenz (hereinafter cited as BA), R 43 11/1329. | 50 i See supra. p. 86. ! si ! Removed from his post in the Protectorate by Heydrich, von Burgsdorff was appointed Governor of Cracow j ! and distinguished himself there by his "decent administra- Jtive practices" (Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-45 [Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, |1961], p. 73, n. 2) . 52 Examination of von Neurath, IMT, XII, 672. On Frank's instigations, Frederici was removed from his com mand in 1941 and transferred to the eastern front. | | 53 i BA, R 43 11/1329. See also Doc. R-133, TWC. XII, j 897. ! I .166 I s i i i I 54 I See supra. p. 83. The "Central Office" was unablej jto assert itself. It engaged in activities of minor impor- j jtance and was finally abolished in 1943. i 55 i I Correspondence between von Neurath and the Reich j Ministry of Interior, July, 1939, BA, R 43 11/1325. j 56 . ! | Ordinance Concerning the Structure of the Adminis-| jtration and the Security Police in the Protectorate, Septem-i jber 1, 1939 (Reichsqesetzblatt. I [1939], 1681). I 57 j BA, R 22/2 9. 58 Gestapo and Sipo daily reports of March 24 and May 23, 1939, cited in Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. p. 372. j See also Fris et al.. p. 12 3. Most were released shortly j thereafter, leaving about 1228 persons in prison (Krai, j Zlocinv proti Evrope. p. 372). See also Kennan, p. 103. j 59 ✓ v Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. pp. 408-9. i 60 | Ibid. Sugar refineries, brick factories, stone [quarries and breweries were favorite targets of the SS. j |These confiscated enterprises were to provide the basis for j Ian extensive economic empire in the Protectorate (Enno I jGeorg, Die wirtschaftlichen Unternehmunqen der SS [Stutt- j igart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1963], pp. 80-83). j ! ' ■ ! 61 ' There is little reason to doubt von Neurath's j itestimony before the Tribunal in Nuremberg that he had j assumed that it was Hitler's intention to place authority j over the police, "if not in his own hands, at least under j his jurisdiction" (IMT, XIX, 296). 62 IMT, XVII, 129. | (LO i BA, R 2/11426. j 64 I | The decree was signed by Himmler, acting for the 'Minister of Interior (Krausnick et al.. I, 133). j i I 65 i j Ibid.. p. 134. j I f i f i • | Ibid., p. 142. 167: 67 I Ordinance Concerning the Structure of the Adminis-j tration and the Security Police in the Protectorate, Part j II, Sec. II (Reichsqesetzblatt. I [1939], 1681). I g p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 74. | 69 I Personal interview with Dr. Hans Neuwirth, Munich,; November 2 0, 1968. See also Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. p. 370. | 70 j Letter from Stuckart to Lammers at the Reich j Chancellery, May 2, 1949, Doc. NG-1817, TWC, XII, 894-95. ' 71 . ! Dispatch from Czech Resistance abroad, June 6, | 1939, DHCP. II, 439. f j 72 / Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, p. 391. 73 Letter from von Neurath to Lammers, May 8, 1939, BA, R 43 11/1324. Kundt, former SdP Deputy and KB member, had favored a compromise after Munich while Frank repre sented the radical course (see supra, pp. 64-66). j i 74 j Kennan, p. 179. See also DHCP. II, 439. 75 ' Kennan, p. 180. j i 76 ! Ibid. . p. 194. According to Kennan, a consider- j able number of arrests of Czechs formerly connected with thej administration of the Sudeten district took place during thej month of June (ibid., p. 181). 7 7 A. Bares and Tomas Pasak, "Odbojova organizace Zdenka Schmoranze" ("The Resistance Organization of Zdenek Schmoranz"), Historie a voienstvi (1968), pp. 1003-33. 78 DHCP. II, 444-46. 79 IMT, XXXIX, 535-46. 80 Krai, Pravda o okupaci. pp. 197, 213, and Fris et al.. p. 12 3, claim that 8000 persons were arrested. j 8 1 Havelka, member of the Protectorate Government, ! iprotested to von Burgsdorff that the arrests had "destroyed j jthelast, chance for cooperation with the Germans" (Krai, IPravda o okupaci. p. 197). i r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! 1 83 i Kennan, p. 194. ; 84 i The illegal central executive organ of the I national resistance movement had decided to celebrate National Independence day by silent mass demonstrations. Large demonstrations and strikes were to be avoided (Feiera-j bend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. p. 93). | 85 s I Persekuce ceskeho studentstva za okupace ("The Persecution of Czech Students during the Occupation") j (Prague: Ministerstvo vnitra, 1946), p. 52. o 6 I I Ibid., pp. 32-33. i gy v s ✓ ! Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicnx jednota, " pp. 495- 1 96. i | o p j ! Affidavit by Werner von Holleben, May 18, 1946, j Doc. Neurath-158, IMT, XVI, 534. See also IMT, XVI, 663-65.j 89v / * f Ceskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. pp. 61-62. See j also Persekuce. pp. 35-42. i ^Kral, Pravda o okupaci, pp. 215-16; Zpoved K. H. j Franka. pp. 59-60. j ^ 6eskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. pp. 61-62. Also, j Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. p. 109. j I I 92 Report by Dr. Stahlecker, Chxef of the German \ Security Police in Prague, quoted in Persekuce. pp. 35-42. j On November 7, Himmler promoted Frank to SS-Gruppenfiihrer in) recognition of the energetic repression of the disorders (5eskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. p. 62 ) . j ! go / v s Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 65, 110; | Persekuce. pp. 55-56. i 169 94 Memorandum of the Reich Chancellery, November 9, 11939, BA, R 43 11/1325. 95 | Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 62. ! 96 "Only small segments of the populations partici pated. German police units did not have to be used to dis perse the demonstrators" (Heydrich to Reich Chancellery, BA, >R 43 II/1342b) . 97 On November 16, 1939 (Volckers' testimony, IMT, JxVTI, 131-32). See also Frank's interrogation, in which he pdmitted having reported to Berlin that he had been an "eye witness to demonstrations . . . of a dangerous nature" (IMT, XVI, 663). 98 Volckers' testimony, IMT, XVII, 131-32. 99 Persekuce. pp. 67, 132. ^ ^ Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 62. Von Neurath claimed that he had not been present when Hitler gave Frank these orders. He had, so he testified, left Frank with Hitler and returned to Prague by train, while Frank commandeered von Neurath's airplane and flew back to Prague, arriving there jlong before von Neurath.(von Neurath's testimony, IMT, XVI, 664-65). See also Volckers'. testimony, IMT, XVII, 132, and affidavit by Theda von Ritter, IMT, XI, 448-49. | 101IMT, XXXIII, 249-51; Persekuce. p. 80. i Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 63. 103 It would be erroneous to assume that von Neurath's jattitude toward the Czech students had been a friendly one. He shared with Frank the view that "the intelligentsia con- | istituted the greatest obstacle to cooperation between Ger mans and Czechs" (von Neurath's examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, IMT, XVII, 63). His proposed policy of coop- j jtation of the Czech upper stratum did not include the intel-l iligentsia. He favored, however, gradual and less violent i 'methods to "reduce them . . . and to diminish their influ- j |ence" (ibid.). The German policy of reducing the Czech 'intelligentsia did not stop with the closing of the univer- jsities. Hundreds of high schools were closed in the course of the occupation. By the end of 1940, 6000 out of 2 00,000 iczech teachers had lost their employment and were directed jto jobs in factories. By the end of 1942, 60 percent of all .Czech high schools had been abolished (Fris et al.. p. 124). ! 10^Persekuce. pp. 81-84; see also Tesar, "Protine- mecka opozicni jednota," p. 504. 105 Report from Prague to Czech National Council in Paris, December 22, 1939, DHCP. II, 497. ' 106 BA, R 43 II/1326a. I | Report of the Oberlandrat in Zlin to the Reich Protector, January 2, 1940, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 398. I I 108DHCP, II, 497. I 109_- , - . _ ] Koehl, p. 43. ■^^Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, p. 58. For a discussion of the conflict between the SS and the High Command of the German Army in Poland see Helmut Krausnick, "Hitler und die Morde in Polen, " Vierteliahre- ishefte fur Zeitqeschichte. XI, No. 2 (April, 196 3), 196-2 09. i 1 111 | "The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party," TWC. I, 257-62. This move, as Koehl has pointed out, facilitated the fusion of police and SS. It enhanced the power of the Superior SS and Police Leaders and "simplified the construc tion of an SS-dominated resettlement and population program of which the RSHA was a necessary building block" placing Heydrich "in a position to control the program" (Koehl, p. 50). 112 The SS and police, subordinated nominally to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, had been placed directly under Heydrich subject to Himmler's orders alone, by the clecree of June 26, 1936 (TWC. I, 257-62). 171 113 / | Decree of October 7, 1939, in Krai and Fremund, jeds., pp. 44-46. i * 1 Jacoby, p. 2 36. See also 6eskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. p. 71. 115 The RuSHA, organized in 1932 as a branch of the j SS, as distinct from the RKF, established in 1939, was ■ charged with the racial examination of candidates for the SSj and of Germans to be resettled in occupied territories. 116 Letter from Pancke to Heydrich, March 31, 1939, ; cited in Krausnick et al.. I, 98. j I 117 * Jurisdiction of Himmler's Reich Commissariat for j the Strengthening of Germandom was not extended to the ter- j ritory of the Protectorate until late in 1941. At that timej Frank was appointed Himmler' s deputy as RKF in Bohemia and ! Moravia (BA, R 2/11402, p. 9). In Poland, by contrast, j Himmler procured full jurisdiction for his Commissariat and i delegated by executive decree of February 11, 1939, his ! powers as RKF to the Higher SS and Police Chiefs, who acted | on direct orders of the Gestapo officers in Berlin and were i not subordinated to local civil and Party officials (Reichs-I cresetzblatt. I [1939], 2133). See also Broszat, National- j sozialistische Polenpolitik. p. 59. j 118 tv / ! Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. p. 15. | 119 ' Koehl, p. 43. See also von Neurath's testimony', ; IMT, XVII, 14. The urgency attached to control over the j Land Office is certainly not unrelated to Himmler's proposal1 to settle Germans from South Tyrol in the Protectorate (see j supra, p. 80). 12 0 Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. p. 395. 121 / v t I Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 47-48, 74.1 10 2 Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. pp. 359-60. 12 3 According to former SdP deputy Dr. Neuwirth, weaponry procurements for the SS, too, played a prominent irole in Himmler's designs in the Protectorate. Attention Ifocused on the Ringhofer plant in Bohemia. 124 i Letter from von Neurath to Reich Chancellery, i June 22, 1939, BA, R 43 II/l324a. 12 5 ■ Letter from von Neurath to Reich Chancellery, iDecember 18, 1939, BA, R 43 II/l324a. j ! 126 I Affidavit of Theodor Gross, May 3, 1946, Doc. i jNeurath-155, IMT, XI, 530-31. ! i i ! 127 I Fremund, ed., p. 11. I 12 8 Frank's notes for a report to Heydrich, October 3 , | 1940, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 79. j i 12 9 i Letter from RKF to Reich Ministry of Finance, I October 9, 1941, BA, R 2/11402, p. 3. j 130 i j As head of the Council of Ministers for the i jDefense of the Reich, Goring's views carried great weight j iwith Hitler. His strong protests against SS actions in I jPoland achieved the desired result. He received Himmler in | |January, 1940, confronted him with numerous complaints and j jwarned that conditions in Poland had undermined the security! jof the Reich (BA, R 43 II/1411a). See also Broszat, Nation-; alsozialistische Polenpolitik. pp. 48, 69, 93. The ensuing j conflict brought an end to the Himmler-Goring axis within j |the NSDAP, an alliance which had been the keystone of the INazi power system since 1933 (Koehl, pp. 21-22). ! 131 1 Cited in letter from Ziemke to Foreign Office, j December 15, 1939, DGFP. D, VIII, 538. 132 ^ Thus, for example, the monthly report of the SD j in Prague for March, 1940: "Die Front zwischen dem deut- j schen und tschechischen Volk had sich somit im Laufe des j ersten Jahres des Protektorats zusehends versteift. Zu einem friedlichen und legalen Zusammenleben mit den Deut- schen . . . sind heute die Tschechen nicht bereit." A monthly report of the Sudeten Gau Party from the district ;of Novy Jicin went still further: "Als ausgesprochene 173 iStaasfeinde mussen samtliche Tschechen meines Kreisgebiets j jbetrachtet werden . . . Unbedingt erforderlich ware es wenn \ [man samtliche Tschechenschulen im Grenzgebiete sperren wiirde! I . . ." (in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei.j ip. 403) . j i 133 I Report from the Oberlandrat in Ostrava to the j jReich Protector, November 22, 1940, BA, R 30/40, pp. 44-85. j I ' I ■ 134 i ! Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik. !p. 183. I i j ! 135 I I See supra. p. 81. As mentioned before, plans to! liquidate the Protectorate and to initiate the "final solu tion" of the Czech problem had made their appearance soon after the occupation. A "Memorandum of Germans in Budweis" j ("Denkschrift der Budweiser Deutschen") petitioned Hitler, ! as early as March, 1939, to separate southern Bohemia from j the Protectorate and to establish an independent "Waldqau" jwith Budweis as the administrative capital (Fremund, ed., ip. 8). On August 11, 1939, Henlein submitted a memorandum ;demanding the incorporation of Ostrava, Teschen, and parts .'surrounding these cities into the Gau Sudetenland (ibid.) . I 136 | "Proposals for a Partition of the Bohemian- Moravian Area," July 25, 1940, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 47-54. Similar proposals were presented to Frank by ! i Gauamtsleiter Staffen of the Sudeten Party who supported j [demands for the incorporation of Bohemia into the Sudeten j Gau on economic grounds: "Prague is not only a center of ! communications but also an economic center and the Protec- | torate constitutes a market for many branches of Sudeten | German industry" (Staffen to Frank, October 5, 1940, in ibid., pp. 82-86). i i 137 Jury headed the Central Party Liaison Office (Parteiverbindunqstelle) in Prague; it was an agency charged with the coordination and representation of Party [interests at the Office of the Reich Protector (see supra. j 'pp. 73-74). | j 138 i Fremund, ed., p. 8; see also supra. p. 80. 174 i i ! ' i 139 . . i ; Among those opposing the preservation of the Pro-| jtectorate was Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, who j had addressed a meeting of the Council of Ministers on j March 2, 1940, demanding for Bohemia and Moravia an occupa- j |tion regime similar to that of the General Government. The j iProtectorate, he claimed, "is not an ideal solution, since j {it must be regarded as transitory. In the long run it can- j inot be possible to permit a people under German domination ! jthe degree of independence exercised by the Czechs" (Doc. j2233-PS, IMT, XXIX, 435). I 140 | Frank's report appears to have been prepared in {order to obtain Himmler's support for a "general plan" idevised by Frank to accomplish Germanization within the Iframework of the Protectorate and to sound him out on those j jproposals. Blaming the halting progress of Germanization on ithe war, Frank pointed to extensive settlement plans readied jby the Land Office and cautioned Himmler that "it had remained an open question who would be put in charge of resettlement." If his "general plan could be carried out," he assured the Reichsfiihrer-SS, "a proposal concerning the future of Bohemia and Moravia, joined together in the Pro tectorate [emphasis by H.B.] could be submitted to the Fiihrer at the appropriate time . . ." (in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 164, n. 13). 141 Von Neurath to Lammers, August 31, 1940, with |attached "Notes on the Future of the Bohemian-Moravian ! Territory" (Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 252-63) and Frank's jmemorandum (pp. 263-71). 142 Ibid. The argument that "Austro-slavism"— i.e., a long tradition of accommodation to Austrian rule— could be considered an element favorable to Germanization appears to have found Hitler's acceptance (Picker, pp. 162-63). 143 His defense before the Nuremberg Tribunal assert ing that he solely "intended to sidetrack this whole affair" and felt it necessary "to present his arguments to Hitler in Hitler's language" appears convincing (Von Neurath's testi mony, IMT, XVII, 104). See also von Burgsdorff's testimony I at Nuremberg, IMT, XII, 61. ; 175 | I | 144 i i Von Neurath's testimony, IMT, XVII, 375. Among jrecent writers on the Protectorate, Detlef Brandes alone j denies the existence of extensive differences and policy j conflicts between von Neurath and Prank in Bohemia and J Moravia (Detlef Brandes, Die Tschechen unter Deutschen Pro- j tektorat [Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1969], pp. 30, 1 129). The preponderant documentary evidence does not sup port this contention. ! 145 i ’ Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 253-59. 146 | Ibid., p. 259. t i 147Ibid.. pp. 263-64. j i 148 ! Sonderbehandlung in Nazi terminology meant physi-j cal extermination of undesirable parts of the population (Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 164, n. 14). 149 i Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 266. j 15°Ibid.. p. 267. | 151Ibid.. p. 268. i I 152 Ibid., p. 269 (emphasis by Frank). It requires little imagination to guess who Frank had in mind as guaran tor of a correct political approach in the Protectorate. 153 , ., Ibid. ■ * " 54D. Hamsik and J. Prazak, Bomba pro Heydricha ("A i Bomb for Heydrich") (Prague: Mlada fronta, 1965), p. 54. His remarks, intended for Himmler only, were not appended to his comments on the proposals transmitted to Frank on Sep tember 11, 1940 and published in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 67-68. i 155 . . 1 Note from Heydrich to Frank containing comments on the latter's proposals, September 11, 1940, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 67-68. 176 ! I ; I ; | 156 / / / j 6eskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. p. 58. See also j Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 158. j 157 I General Frederici's report on a conference with | Frank held on September 10, 1940, Doc. 862-PS, IMT, XI, 375-j 77. See also Ziemke's notes of October 5, 1940, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 80-81. 158 Ziemke to Foreign Office, October 14, 1940 (in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 87): "State Secretary Frank had one more talk with the Fuhrer on October 12 this year. . . . The Protectorate, including the Office of the Reich Protec tor, will be maintained at least for the duration of the wari on the other hand preparations are to be commenced for the prospective Germanization of the land and its inhabi- j tants. The Government of Prime Minister Elias will continue! to be tolerated; accounts will be settled with the resis- ! tance movement . . . at a later stage.... In two or three weeks, State Secretary Frank will have instructions drawn up to start implementation of the Memorandum." 159 The evidence suggests that Frank had not been lable to think this problem through and to demonstrate how (policies requiring "de-politicization and tranquilization" could be made congruent with population transfers to the j Reich, forced de-nationalization and Sonderbehandlung (see | "Proposals of the Office of the Reich Protector for the j Preparation of Germanization in the Protectorate," Novem- j ber 30, 1940, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 101-8). Some of the guidelines for racial determination proposed in this j document bordered on the ridiculous: "... it should be noted that Slavic racial characteristics, apart from Mongol types, are, for instance, a disorderly, careless family life: coupled with a complete lack of feeling for order, for per- | sonal and domestic cleanliness, and of ambitions to advance I oneself" (ibid., p. 105). j i ^Fremund, ed., pp. 18-19. j 161 ✓ j Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 159. j 162 i Memorandum by SS-Oberscharfuhrer Dr. Walter KGnig-Beyer of the RuSHA in Berlin, October 2 3, 1949, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 69-70. 177 163t^ Ibid. 164 Frederici's report of September 10 and Ziemke's inotes of October 5, 1940 (see supra, p. 176, n. 157). SS- jBrigade Ftthrer Hoffman of the RuSHA in Berlin, who visited (Frank September 11-13, reported in a similar vein: "Race investigators will be charged with the registration of racially unacceptable Czechs. As distinct from the Polish population, less than half of the Czechs would be affected by registration" (in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 76). 165 Doc. 3862-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 271. 166 ! Oberlandrat in Ostrava to von Burgsdorff, Septem-| jber 6, 1940 (in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 72). j I 167 / ! Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 203. ■ ! ' j | 168 ✓ / / j i 6eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 95. See also j iTomas Pasak, "Aktivistictx novinari a postoj generala Eliasej jv roce 1941" ("The Activist Journalists and General Elias' j (Attitude in 1941"), Ceskoslovenskv casopis historickv, XV 1(1967), 173-92. j i 9 / ✓ i Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 03. See also Vaclav I iKural, "Hlavnx organizace nekomunistickeho odboje v letech 11939-1941" ("The Principal Organizations of the Non-Commu- I Inist Resistance, 1939-1941"), Odboi a revoluce (Prague), V, j (No. 2 (1967), 5-160. ! 170 j Circular letter from Frank, Aprxl 4, 1971, cited ; jin Krai, Otazkv. Ill, 221. i ; ! j 171 v I Letter from Krychtalek to Havelka, Krejcx and Jezek, April 7, 1941, cited in Pasak, "Aktivistictx novi- j nari," p. 180. ! ! • 172 • Ibid., pp. 180-82. The Czech Vice-Premier's resignation was followed by a wave of arrests and repres sions. On April 12, the influential nationalist Sokol asso ciation was dissolved and most of its functionaries were I arrested. In May, the Gestapo detained a number of former 178 'leading officials of the Social Democratic Party (Czecho- i slovakia Fights Back [Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943], p. 33). See also Cestmir Amort, iHevdrichiada (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1965), pp. 16-17. CHAPTER V ! i j | COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE j I > j I Protectorate Government, Resistance and Exile: The Initial Phase The struggle over primacy in the Protectorate was i hut part and parcel of the larger contest between the total-j i ! t itarian radicals and the German pre-revolutionary elites for control over occupied Europe and the Reich itself. The pol itics of this struggle, however, involved, and were superim posed upon, the confrontation between the occupied and the joccupiers— the subject people and the occupation regime. I I For all political decisions in the Protectorate were affect- i ed by, and the tactical moves and shifting bases of power j among the occupants remained contingent upon, the relation ship between the Czechs and their German overlords. Far from presenting a monolithic front, the subject Czechs, as well as their German rulers, contained contending groups of divergent interests and perspectives. Tossed by I I | 179 ! 180 I i jthe fortunes of war, these factions entered into transient | ! ! jalliances amongst, and perpetually shifting attacks against,j | ■ j leach other. Their changing expectations and kaleidoscopic I I I i j relationships formed the concrete background to the behavior] j bf the individual actors on the stage of politics. !' ! i During the first months after the occupation Czech ! ! ' I j I political life centered around the "autonomous" Protectorate j Government and its auxiliary mass movement, the Narodni sourucenstvi (Movement of National Unity) which, under Hacha1s guidance, had emerged as the.official political mass organization in the Protectorate. The movement soon embraced the vast majority of the Czech population. The only legal i I Ipolitical organization refusing to join it was the numeri- I 1 cally insignificant group of Vlajka extremists. In outlook and composition the Hacha administration resembled the reac tionary and anti-democratic regime of post-Munich Czecho- j I Slovakia. Demoralized by the collapse of Benes1 system of | foreign alliances and impressed by Germany's might, the men around Hacha sought salvation in a policy of massive accom- modations to the Nazi Reich. Even the limited autonomy Hit ler had granted them seemed preferable to the absence of alii self-government which had been the status of the Czechs 1 under Austrian rule in the not too distant past. The loss 181 of national independence was a heavy blow and great trial L 2 Indeed, yet an autonomous Protectorate governed by von i . Neurath seemed an imposition more tolerable than most Czechs I had expected, and less harsh than the fate that had been I I # meted out to the nexghboring Poles. Stressing their strong i ' dislike of Communism and sharing the Reich Protector's Authoritarian and conservative views, Hacha as well as most members of his cabinet were determined to abandon all rem- l i j j nants of the "decadent" former parliamentary democracy and j i I | ! jsought to restore the defeated nation within the framework j i jof a "strong," authoritarian corporate state. The dissolu- j tion of all political parties and decrees prohibiting i ; ' 3 i 'strikes and work stoppages, as well as a number of other I 4 measures, were soon to reveal the decxdedly anti-democratic flavor of the regime. The repressive, right-wing social policies embraced by the new administration provided the Nazis with a welcome opportunity to woo Czech workers with welfare measures and social slogans— an attempt to divide the nation which achieved a degree of success. With nearly all Europe pursuing arrangements with | ^ Nazi Germany, the Hacha administration saw cooperation with i the Reich as their sole realistic choice. During the ini tial phase of the occupation at least, this view was shared ! : " 182 ’ > by a majority of Czechs in the Protectorate. Beyond this, I ' ' i however, the men of the new regime were by no means of one : ! mind as to the tactics to be pursued. Next to the weak and I i i ! 1 vacillating Hacha there was the far more resolute Premier | jElias who, in turn, was opposed by a cautious faction around i jDeputy Premier Havelka. The remainder of the cabinet rangedj I i jfrom determined Nazi opponents, such as the Social Democrat J j ^ | jNecas and the Conservative Feierabend, to the venal Krejcx, j i ! and— after Heydrich's arrival— the outright collaborators j / 5 and opportunists Hruby and Bienert. Initially, the Protec torate government tried to follow a relatively independent i ipolitical course, hoping to use whatever bargaining power they had in defense of the nation's interests. Far from ■ viewing themselves as traitors, members of the government ! ' (regarded cooperation as a means to delay excessive German j jencroachments, and collaboration with the enemy as by no means incompatible with eventual national liberation. For as so often in their history, the fate of the Czechs as a j nation seemed to depend on forces beyond their control. Freedom from foreign oppression, if it came, would result from German defeat and, as it did after World War I, from j jexertions of Czech exiles abroad. Meantime, a policy of ! accommodations and the application of skillful delaying ! 183 i jtactics at home would assure the nation's survival at the lowest possible cost and least sacrifice. i i ! ! The most important personality of Czech political ! I life, however, lived as an exile outside the country. j i Eduard Benes, who had left his homeland and resigned the | 'Presidency of Czechoslovakia under German pressure after the i Munich agreement in the fall of 1938, assumed the leadership of the national liberation movement abroad. Joined by other exiles after the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, he declared the Munich solution null and void and formed a Czechoslovak National Committee to head the struggle for the restoration of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia which, as he |claimed, had never legally ceased to exist. | Prom its very inception the National Committee established close contacts with members of the Protectorate i t government at home. Already in the summer of 1939 it had obtained a declaration of loyalty and support from Premier Elias himself, who was to maintain close relationships with Benes until Heydrich's arrival in Prague. In June, 1939, Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's former Minister to Britain, reported to Benes that he had obtained a message from Elias, who "had placed himself entirely at [his] disposal" and assured him I that he had entered the cabinet solely in order to | protect the nation against Frank and that he and the j government were ready to resign, if this should be I desired. Even Hacha declared himself ready to give I | up his job. I advised them against this. The Ger- ! J mans would certainly appoint Gajda or someone still j j worse.7 ! j i | The cabinet members Feierabend, Kalfus and Necas, | too, were in touch with the National Committee abroad and j 8 kept Benes informed about developments in the Protectorate. i With Hacha, who from the beginning represented a considerably more conciliatory course, Benes did not main- 9 tain a direct connection. Despite great differences in political outlook and ideological commitment, however, he avoided attacks against Hacha during the initial phase of the occupation. Hacha, in turn, at first carefully avoided statements implying acceptance of the status quo and damag ing to Benes' standing abroad. The cautious attitude of the Czech exiles toward Hacha undoubtedly reflected their pre carious diplomatic and political position during the period ! of the "phony war." Both Britain and France had been reluc tant to extend them diplomatic recognition and to accept a commitment to restore the pre-Munich Czechoslovak state.^ Faced with this problem, Benes' primary concern was to main tain a modus vivendi with Hacha and to impress the allies with the unity of purpose between the exiles and the Czech 185 I I j government in Prague. Apart from occasional exhortations to; j resist German pressures and warnings against excessive con- j cessions to Nazi demands, Benes did not repudiate Hacha's i government and did little to disassociate himself from their; opportunistic policies.'1 '1 After the defeat of Prance the j diplomatic status of the Czech exiles improved. They j ! i jobtained British permission to establish a government-in- I jexile and Czech language broadcasts transmitted by the BBC 12 secured them access to the population at home. Benes' most important source of information from, and influence over, the Czech people in the Protectorate was his close— and, until Heydrich's arrival, uninterrupted— j | jcontact with the resistance movement at home. Growing from I small, illegal circles that had sprung up very soon after i jthe Nazi invasion, the Czech underground had become en trenched, by the summer of 1939, around four political cen- i ters. Initially at least, the most important was Obrana j Naroda (ON [Defense of the People]). A right-of-center j organization of former army officers, the ON aimed at a j 13 I temporary military dictatorship after Germany's defeat and| maintained a vast network of local paramilitary and intelli-j gence organizations. Politicke Ustredi (PU [Political Cen- j ! i ter]) was a coordinating agency representing the leadership j i . .' '.......... "... ........'.' 186 ' * I ! ^ jof the five major political parties who had formed the I | i icoalition governments of the pre-Munich republic. Perhaps ! I closest to Benes, it favored the restoration of the pre- j j Munich regime. On the left there emerged the Peticni Vvbor "Vernv Zfistaneme" (PWZ [The Committee of the Petition "We i • i jRemain Faithful"]) which embraced Social-Democratic intel- ! I r {lectuals and trade unionists, and focused on a program of political reform and democratic socialism. The three groups joined forces in the beginning of 1940 under one loosely organized center of resistance— the UVOD (Central Committee of the Home Resistance)— pledging support to Benes and owing 14 allegiance to him. The fourth group, and the only signif icant segment of the resistance to stay outside the loose framework of the UVOD, was the Communist party, which— until Germany * s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941— refused to I i accept Benes1 leadership. In the wake of the Soviet-German treaty of August, 1939, the Communist party accepted— albeit reluctantly— the new course of the Comintern. Attacking the Czech national liberation movement abroad as servants of imperialism, the party rejected all cooperation with the democratic resistance. Though the CP£ continued its agita tion against the Nazi oppressors, the volte face dictated by * Moscow caused much internal dissension and forced the 187 ! • . i 1 . j Czech Communists into isolation from the rest of the j ! 15 I nation. j | | I The Czech democratic resistance at home and the j ! liberation movement abroad were in close contact from the ! i i j ■ ' j beginning. With the aid of courier services and secret j I ! | i radio transmissions, the underground provided Benes in i ! London with military and political information of first-rate! importance. The remarkable intelligence network, which ! obtained some of its most reliable information from Paul | I i Thummel— a senior officer of the German counter-intelligence 16 agency (Abwehr) in Prague — constituted the underground's most important contribution to the struggle for liberation. Relayed by the government-in-exile to British intelligence and later to the Soviet Union, intelligence reports received from Prague assisted Benes greatly and strengthened his bar gaining power vis-a-vis his allies.^ j Apart from intelligence work, anti-German propaganda and some efforts at passive resistance, the Czech Resis tance, however, followed a careful and cautious course. The movement's abstention from large-scale actions of sabotage and resistance resulted, to a certain extent at least, from close links to, and a certain affinity of perspective with, the Elias cabinet. Not only were the cabinet members Necas 188 | i i and Feierabend active participants in the resistance group j ; j ; around the PU, but Elias himself maintained close contact j i ■ 18 i iwith the Czech underground, and most Ministers shared his ! ! I belief in an impending and decisive victory of the Western j | 'allies. Initially, at least, this linkage undoubtedly j I v i i ; ! ' I ismoothed the path of the Czech Resistance. The cabinet gave; | jshelter to underground leaders and assistance to their I | jintelligence network. The Prime Minister arranged for the i ! illicit transfer of funds to the liberation movement abroad I ' ! and provided financial aid to the Czech Resistance at j 19 jhome. Both the cabinet and the Resistance agreed on the j jneed to avoid premature rebellion and Nazi reprisals in i j order to save the nation's strength for the not too distant day of Germany's defeat. In the first period of the occupa tion there was thus no clear line separating official col laboration from clandestine resistance in the Protectorate. Unfolding events, however, were to bring a parting of the ways. The ascendancy of the SS and mounting Nazi pressures i I left little room for expedient policies of cautious opposi tion and for half-hearted conspiratorial groups. They forced the Resistance into increasing radicalization and the Hacha administration onto the slippery path leading from unprincipled accommodation to abject surrender. j The Protectorate Government under Pressure; Intervention bv the Police The Czechs developed a style of resistance unique among European nations— an anti-Nazi underground in clandes tine alliance with a collaborationist Protectorate govern ment . The alliance between government and Resistance i i jexacted, however, an exceedingly heavy price. Not only did i [it retard the development of hard-hitting, determined cen- j ters of insurgence and sabotage at the very time when unham-j j pered production and undisturbed public order in the Protec torate were decisive enemy objectives, but cooperation with an administration tainted by authoritarian tendencies aroused suspicion and distrust on the Left and the social j l conservatism displayed by the cabinet held little appeal fori ✓ large segments of the working class. When the UVOD, | increasingly radicalized by war and repression, adopted a 20 program embracing extensive socialist reforms, the polari zation between the Resistance and the Rightists in the Pro tectorate government could no longer be concealed. The growing breach involved not only the person of Hacha, it affected the relationship between the Resistance and Elias 4 . 2 1 too. 190 I i I j Assisted and aided by the administration, the Czech j ^underground, moreover, neglected to develop conspiratorial 'skills and the vigilance required to evade detection by the J ! 22 ‘ 'Gestapo. A false sense of security and woeful underesti- : ation of the ruthlessly effective German Security Service I brought about speedy disaster. The use of official channels! 1 provided the Resistance access to important sources of | information. Working within legal institutions, the intel- j | 2 3 * ligence network, however, became too conspicuous a target. i I I Discovery of the network was followed by widespread arrests, j s Information obtained from interrogations led the Gestapo to other centers of the underground, with the result that, 1 early in 1940, the ranks of the non-Communist Resistance hadj ; i been severely decimated. j l Long experience in conspiratorial activities saved | Ithe Communist underground temporarily from a similar disas- ! i ter. The party succeeded in establishing an illegal network! 24 i which was completed in the summer of 1939. No match for i ! i the Gestapo, however, it came under increasing pressure, ini j the spring of 1940 a series of actions by the police played j i | havoc with its cadres. The eventual discovery of its secret! | transmitter and the detention of nearly all members of the j i party's Central Committee during the night of February 12 —13,; 191 j ! I ;1941, completed the defeat of the Communists and destroyed | ! 25 ! their communications network with Moscow. | j The arrests and interrogations provided the Gestapo I ! jwith information about the-contacts between the Resistance J i I 1 j and the Protectorate administration. Early in January, 19401 i i ja severe crisis appeared to be imminent. Upon Elias' advicei | I Feierabend and Necas— two cabinet members whose clandestine I t I ; activities had been reported to von Neurath by the police— 26 fled abroad and joined Benes in London. Moreover, state- j iments incriminating the Prime Minister himself had been i I obtained from the arrested intelligence officer Schmoranz, 27 who withdrew, however, his testimony in court. Reports about Elias1 contacts with London received from the Hungar- i ] 28 ian Minister in Berlin added fuel to German suspicions. jBut the time for radical changes in the Protectorate had not I . | yet come. Reliance on a Czech administration with suffi cient authority in the nation to guarantee its peaceful gov ernance was too much of an asset to be lightly discarded. The evident advantages of von Neurath's policies were per suasive and Hitler decided to continue the Reich Protector's 29 moderate course. Despite the embarrassment caused by the departure of i jNecas and Feierabend, von Neurath abstained from all 192 sanctions and was content to accept Hacha's proposal to reconstruct the Elias cabinet. For as he remarked in a con versation with the representative of the Foreign Office in | i jthe Protectorate, "the replacement of Feierabend by some i J other Czech cabinet member was of little consequence, since I I jit would, anyway, be impossible to find completely accept- ' ■ 30 |able and trustworthy candidates for the office." Maneu- I yers and machinations by Czech politicians had to be consid- I | jered part of the game and their indiscretions a price well i jworth paying as long as they delivered the goods. | Frightened by the arrests and fearful of severe j reprisals after the two cabinet ministers' escape, the anxious Hacha attempted to placate the Germans and to win I . jvon Neurath's support against Frank. His choice of new cab inet members reflected a move to the conservative right and toward increasing accommodation. The two men selected to l replace the fugitive ministers were representatives of big | business and the nobility. Count Bubna-Litic, the new Min- I ■ister of Agriculture, owned sizable estates, and the Minis- i ' iter of Trade, Jaroslav Kratochvxl, was connected with mining interests of considerable importance. Men of property and i . I well-known in German social circles, the two appointees could be counted on to make a favorable impression on von 193 ! ; I Neurath. Moreover, Havelka's post as Deputy Prime Minister j was taken by the Minister of Justice, Jaroslav Krejcx, a ! 31 highly pliable man with an opportunistic bent. In the i I I • I Narodnx sourucenstvx— the official mass organization— mem- I i ! bers of the Czech nobility, too, had gained positions of j influence, and two noblemen— Jan Fousek and Count Belcredi— | 1 I 1 ! were appointed chairmen of the 6SSN (Czech-German Friendship Society), an association created to improve Czech-German ' 1 4.' 32 relatxons. ! i In an audience granted to Hacha in February, 1939, jthe Reich Protector not only approved the new cabinet but i I promised intercession in Berlin and redress of grievances I 33 reported to him by the President. Responding to von Neurath's support, President Hacha felt compelled to show i i his appreciation and relief. On the occasion of the Protec- i jtorate's first anniversary, he dispatched a telegram to Hit- I ! ler, expressing his willingness to extend full cooperation i pnd praising the benefits bestowed upon the Czech people; the telegram said, in part, that the Czechs who were "taken by you under the protection of the Reich . . . received their share of considerable advantages; they were I i bpared the horrors of war, though participating in it as I part of the Greater German Reich." "Today," his message } 194 concluded, "I feel the urge to wish Siec und Heil to the I i glorious German arms which protect not only Germany but the i » 34 Czech people, too . " The self-effacing and obsequious tone of the tele gram reflected Hacha's conviction that von Neurath's protec tion had saved the government and nation from Frank's wrath. It was not gratitude alone, however, that motivated the aging President. The complex relationship between Hacha and von Neurath reflected the presence of an added dimension. Adversaries, placed by fate at the heads of contending nations, the two men, though opposed by force of circum stance, regarded each other more as partners than as foes. For, seen from a certain perspective, they were allies who faced a common enemy— the extremist wing of the Nazis— which both men abhorred. Career civil service men of conservative iviews, both, moreover, sought to achieve their goal by a Jpolicy of accommodation, relying on delaying tactics and opposition from within. Among the Czech Resistance at home and the exiles abroad, Hacha's "Sieg-Heil" telegram caused consternation. The Czechoslovak National Committee urged the Protectorate jgovernment to abstain from further demonstrations of servil- 35 v ity and Benes sent an urgent message warning Prague that 195 | i | ■ i iHacha's opportunism had exceeded tolerable limits. A repe- ; ; j itition of such distasteful behavior could do great harm to I i | i ithe political efforts of the exiles and would have to ! ! 36 ! icease. i I . i ! • The amicable relationship between the Protectorate, j jgovernment and the exiles had been exposed to severe I • Istrains. i ! j j The Disintegration of National Unity; ! Collaboration and Resistance j in Collision i I The timidity of the Hacha administration and its j increasingly evident readiness to submit to humiliations and retreat under pressure caused growing disenchantment and i j 'resentment within the ranks of the Resistance. As early as I i ! j I jJanuary, 1940, messages relayed by Resistance leaders to | London expressed their dismay and aversion in no uncertain i | terms: The limits of decency and national honor have been reached. Without honor and moral health the nation, however, cannot endure. This holds with a vengeance for a nation which is small. Yet, it is clear that the administration will have to prostitute them selves if they wish to stay on. Nolens volens they will move toward accommodation with the Germans. j What is to be done?37 j j And again in April, 1940 after Hacha's "Sieg-Heil" message j t to Hitler: ! Czech public opinion is highly critical of the steps j taken by Hacha, the government and the NS . . . Resentment is growing among the people . . . Hacha's accommodations have brought no relief . . . There is | no let up in repressions . . . Germanization and ! J economic pressures proceed as before ... 38 i i i • j i The full extent of the fissure between the official j | | :Czech representatives and the Resistance at home and abroad,; I i jhowever, became apparent after the German victories in the West. Illusory hopes based on expectations of a speedy vic-[ I tory of the Western allies and of imminent liberation, hopes! i i t which hitherto had sustained the weak and vacillating Pro- | I tectorate government, had now to be abandoned. With German j j armed might seemingly invincible, defeatism and despair j gained the upper hand. The capitulation of Belgium occa- i i Isioned alarm and caused, as Elias reported to Benes, "the I I faint-hearted in the government to come forward with pro- ! 1 I i 39 i jposals of far-reaching concessions to the Germans." After; jthe fall of France, the government was seized by panic. j i ■ i I . ( Hacha repeated his previous performance and dispatched yet j 40 another congratulatory telegram to Hitler. The increasing number of declarations of loyalty to Germany and the growing i servility displayed by the cabinet deepened the gulf between! | government and the resistance movement at home and abroad, j For a while, both sides persisted in short-lived attempts to; 197 I i paper over their differences and to postpone the impending i ! j i jcollision, though it became increasingly clear that the i ' jfinal parting of ways was only a matter of time. ! I j i S i A declaration of Hacha denying legitimacy to the ! i igovernment-in-exile at the very moment of its acceptance by I | ' 'Britain worsened relations between Prague and London still i | 41 x j Ifurther. Tensions increased even more after Hacha's j j 'speech in praise of the newly established customs union withI 1 v , I Germany. Benes reacted by attacking Hacha's "joyful accep- ! j tance of incorporation into the Reich" as a deed "worse than! political folly": I I i Explaining to people here that this declaration has ' been obtained under pressure — telling this to a j people facing daily the danger of death, whose homes | and whole cities have gone down in ruin and who are j in danger of losing a world empire is neither effec- j tive and advisable, nor is it honest . . . I am send ing my final warning. If it is not heeded the inev itable break must follow.42 l Torn between attempts to appease their German overlords and | i i demands from London to resist Nazi pressures the disoriented and floundering Protectorate government promised again to heed Benes' warnings. Hacha, moreover, declared that he wasj ready to comply if the government-in-exile requested his . 43 | resxgnatxon. * i i 198 While Benes was still reluctant to drive matters to I ; . I a definite breach, the Resistance at home grew increasingly j jimpatient with collaboration. Voicing mounting revulsion j |with the cunning little tricks, the opportunism and the ! i ; jself-serving attitudes of the men around Hacha, UVOD leaders; i ; jurged London to take an uncompromising stand against the ; ; i jProtectorate government, exempting not even Prime Minister J ■Elias from censure and reprobation: | , v i Novacek [code name for Elias (H.B.)] fails or does j not want to understand the situation and attempts to j avoid responsibility. Whether he gave Havel [code j name for Hacha (H.B.)] your message and report, we j don't know. We recommend not to count on any of them any longer and to cease showing them any considera- ! tion.44 i j i |The ON member, Colonel Balaban, warned that the continued ; i i I j jexistence of the Protectorate government and of its adminis-j i i | I jtrative apparatus succeeded solely in making the task of the! I 45 ■ ' ; German occupiers of Bohemia and Moravia much easier. Meanwhile, the PU leader Prokop Drtina informed Benes that j i jin his view "the government had lost its direction," and I i . | added: j ! • I | It flounders rudderless, pulled hither and thither j by various influential personalities and groups | (including the leaders of the old political parties), ; conducting a policy of trickery and petty deceptions j which provides them with some benefits but does j | nothing at all for the people.46 ! 199 ! ; i In the months since the defeat of France the Czech under- j I I ground had gone through a process of radicalization. ' ! ■ | Despairing of aid from the West, Czech hopes for eventual i j iliberation had turned toward Russia again. Moreover, a ! | | jserious shortage of food had caused great agitation and com-; I i i • i ipelled the Resistance to attack the short-sighted social j I policies of the rightists in Elias' cabinet and the Hacha ! 47 ! administration. Pressures from the resistance movement atj home and reports of an impending new declaration of loyalty j jby Hacha at the occasion of the second anniversary of the j I j (protectorate prompted Benes to dispatch a desperate appeal I to the Protectorate government. Urging "the resolute rejec-| tion of threats and offers of any kind," he demanded most j I earnestly that "Hacha and the government be prepared to j j resign their offices immediately when requested to do so in j order to demonstrate that their commitment to the status quo 48 had been ended." Impressed by Benes' message, Hacha promised to see to it that the humiliation of March 15, 1939 would never be repeated. He declared that he would rather choose death with honor and follow, if necessary, Count Teleki's j 49 / ■ example. Elias, too, promised not to give in, "even if it | |cost him his neck."50 Benes reacted to Hacha's and Elias' j 200 | message with expressions of gratitude and repeated his warn-( ling to abstain from all acts that could embarass negotia- j i Itions for full recognition of the government-in-exile which j j ' ; ! 5 1 | had been proceeding in London. j | . j In spite of noble words and expressions of unity, j | ithe re-established concord proved to be only of short dura- I i tion. Within the cabinet, the disaffection and tension I | i . , v I between Elias and Havelka mounted. Within the Resistance I movement, distrust and hostility toward the Protectorate government and the entire collaborating apparatus of admin- j 52 listration grew still sharper. Wracked by internal dissen- i i sions and weakened by all-too-frequent retreats, the Czech jofficial representation had lost the people 1s respect and the capacity to act. By servility and accommodations they ! had presented the occupants with a framework of authority j and political respectability used by the latter to establishj secure control over the Protectorate. No longer needed by j their masters, they had become esqpendable now. The oppor tunity for resolute resistance had long since passed. Unable to resist German pressures and aware of their I increasing isolation they soon relapsed into indecision and j | confusion. I 201 i ! t I i 1 i The final break came after the Soviet Union's entry j jinto the war. Benes1 immediate and enthusiastic support of j i ! | [ Invaded Russia caused consternation within the conservative,i | ■ | jstaunchly anti-Communist Protectorate government. Suspi- i j jcious of Soviet motives and fearful of social upheaval, the j tnen around Hacha received the new partnership with apprehen-j I | j 53 i sion and mixed emotions. I ! Perturbed by reports from Prague and fearing new j I ^concessions by the faltering, unstable Hacha, Benes sent an i i urgent message warning the Protectorate government to avoid all declarations of support and to abstain from all assis tance to Nazi Germany in its war against the Soviet Union. To prevent bloodshed and chaos after the war, he demanded the immediate resignation of Hacha and his administration. Any further concessions to the Nazis would provide the Communists with an opportunity to usurp power by claiming, not without justification, that we helped Hitler . . . The time to go has arrived. The war j cannot be lost now, and you, at home, are in no posi- j i tion to protect the nation any longer . . . [your { i departure] is necessary to maintain national unity j at the most difficult time in our history.54 j The repeatedly promised resignation, however, was | ■ ' ! | never tendered. Beset by habitual irresolution and confu- I j sion, the government responded with evasions. Elias reacted! 202 ! j by offering excuses for delay and insisted, in his message t j •to Benes, on the need to preserve a well-functioning public j . j 'service | | I in order to prevent economic collapse, which is pos- j sible only if the present regime carries on, though ! I this might require certain concessions. Premature departure could lead to exceedingly damaging conse quences . . . Quiet on all fronts is, at present, j the only responsible counsel.55 ! ; A few days later, he tried to assuage Benes by prom-j j ! iising the government's resignation "if intolerable burdens j i i i I I ! jwere to be imposed on the people." Steps would be taken to j i | jmake sure "that respectable people would refuse to take j j 1.56 lover. i | The tactics of delay and accommodation embraced by |the Protectorate government might have worked had the war been of short duration or conducted against a less ruthless j jfoe. As it was, each retreat led to further concessions j i and, in the end, to complete and abject surrender. Without principles and devoid of all courage, the Hacha administra- i tion became, after Heydrich's arrival, a helpless tool in the hand of their masters. Reflecting, after the war, upon I his relations with Hacha and Elias, Benes wrote to the Min ister of Justice, J. Stransky: i 203 | I . ! Toward the end of the summer of 1941 I gave up all j hope to save anything at home by continuing my con- j tacts with the Protectorate government and of influ- | | encing their activities on behalf of our own and our ! allies' interests. From that moment on, all our ; | actions were directed against all collaboration, j | regardless of pretension. All contact with Hacha 1 j and the so-called Protectorate government c e a s e d .57 | | _ j j In contrast to the demoralized Hacha and the uncer tain, hesitant Elias, the Czech resistance movement received the news of the Soviet-German war with elation and renewed hopes of liberation. The UVOD expressed strong disapproval i / ✓ 58 ! of Hacha's lack of responsibility and EliaS' evasions. j Despite severe losses caused by arrests and executions, the underground reacted to urgent demands for increased resis tance from London as well as they could by stepping up sabo- 59 tage and by some minor demonstrations. After the German invasion of the USSR the Czech Communist party, too, began to expand its activities. Emerging from their isolation, the Communists entered into talks with the democratic resis- 60 i tance and Communist leaflets, calling upon workers to i engage in acts of active resistance against the Nazis, appeared in great numbers.^ The growing number of strikes, work stoppages and I i acts of sabotage which made their appearance during the sum-j ! mer of 1941, however, resulted from severe food shortages i 2 04 I rather than from political agitation. Between May and July, I |1941 the supply situation in the Protectorate had deterio rated rapidly. Prices rose, potato and bread rations had j i been severely restricted, and there ensued widespread dis- ! i 62 1 bontent and increasing unrest among the population. War j production in the Protectorate decreased at a rapid rate and i alarming reports from the German Security Service reached the desk of Heydrich who immediately brought them to Hit- ! I 6 3 ! ler's attention. Noting the critical decline of work j ! morale and factory discipline, the SD reports stressed grow ing resistance activities and agitation from abroad as the 64 principal causes of the unrest. Though the reports were ! ! found to be greatly exaggerated by the Public Prosecutor of i j j the People's Court, Ernst Lautz, who had been dispatched to J i 'Prague to investigate the situation, Frank insisted that i ! j only drastic intervention could avert impending chaos and a | ! 65 I threatening collapse of public order. Supported by the j 66 SD, who demanded the imposition of a state of emergency, he confronted the Reich Protector on September 17, 1941 at a conference which ended abruptly in sharp arguments and 67 I squabbles. A few days later, on September 2 3, 1941, von j j Neurath was summoned to Hitler's headquarters and informed of the Fuhrer's decision to replace him with Reinhold 205 68 iHeydrich, the dreaded Head of the SD and Security Police. j jThe Reich Protector tendered his resignation. The offer, however, was not accepted. On September 2 7, 1941 Berlin jannounced that Reich Protector Konstantin von Neurath had i jasked to be placed on sick leave. "The Fvihrer has granted i i Ivon Neurath's request and appointed Oberqruppenfuhrer } iHeydrich Acting Reich Protector for the period of von 69 j Neurath1s leave." I f 2 06 NOTES TO CHAPTER V ! i | ! 1 See supra. p. 91. 2 After Munich, doubts concerning the viability and j the desirability of an independent Czech state emerged amongj former Austrian civil servants and members of the Czech j upper crust. There appears to be some evidence that these j doubts influenced and affected the thinking of Hacha's j advisers. Some of the leading members of the Bohemian j nobility as well as other Hapsburg legitimists within and j outside the Protectorate favored a restoration of the I Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a viable alternative to German j domination of the Danube basin. These plans received the ! support of influential British and French politicians duringj the "phony" phase of World War II (Reports from Paris to Czechoslovak National Committee in London, October 29, 1939, DHCP. II, 50). 3 v ✓ / / i Nove zakonv a narizenx Protektoratu 6echv a Morava I ("New Statutes and Decrees of the Protectorate of Bohemia i and Moravia"), I (1939), 602. j 4 I E.g., decrees restricting the political rights of Jewish citizens (ibid., p. 561). j 5 See supra. pp. 104-5, n. 77. For a detailed dis- | cussion of the conflicting political attitudes within the j Hacha administration see Eliasova and Pasak, pp. 114-15; j Tomas Pasak, "Nekomunisticky odboj a jeho spoluprace s j protektoratni vladou" ("The Non-Communist Resistance Move- | ment and Its Cooperation with the Protectorate Administra- | tion"), Odboi a revoluce (Prague), V, No. 2, supplement j (1967), 72-75. j 6 v i Eduard Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes: From ! Munich to New War and New Victory (Boston: Houghton Miff- j lin, 1954), p. 63. For other sources dealing with the I i I ! 207 Czechoslovak liberation movement abroad, see Kren, passim: j Gordon H. Skilling,. "The Czechoslovak Str.uggle for National j Liberation," Slavonic and East European Review. XXXIX j(1960), 174-97. j j 7 I | Message of June 26, 1939, cited in Kren, p. 177. ! | ^DHCP. II, 751$ Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. j i 9 i j Contacts were maintained with the aid of Premier i iElias, who together with Count Borek-Dohalsky, a member of the Czech Resistance, served as intermediary between Benes and Hacha. Borek-Dohalsky met his death in the concentra tion camp Terezin (Eliasova and Pasak, pp. 114-15). i - ! 10 j Influential circles around de Monzie in France and j iLord Halifax in Britain doubted that pre-Munich Czechoslo vakia could emerge after the war as a viable state and opted jfor the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (see j supra, n. 2). j i i i | DHCP. II, 594-95. As late as January 20, 1941, IBeneS expressed cautious confidence in Hacha and emphasized jthe need for full cooperation between the exile and Prague: j". . . [the British government] comprehends only now quite jfully my relationship to you in Prague. All this, provided jof course that you will act at the given time, as we need itj jhere. Above all, the absence of Quislings in Prague repre- j jsents to our government here and to our standing in Britain ! !a considerable plus" (cited in Eliasova and Pasak, p. 117, j jn. 44). | ! i ! 12 Halifax to Benes, July 21, 1940, in BeneS, p. 301. j Britain extended full diplomatic recognition to the Czech government in London only after the German invasion of | Russia and simultaneously with recognition by the Soviet j Union on July 18, 1941. 13 v ! Initially, the ON's attitude to Benes was rather j ambivalent. Most officers rejected the pre-Munich "regime of political parties" and affirmed the primacy of the under ground over the politicians abroad (Frantisek Machat, 208 j"Vzpomxnky na spolupraci s Generalem Bxlym" [ "Recollections pf My Contacts with General Bxly"], Odboi a revoluce. V, No. 2, supplement [1967], 11-13). 14 For the development and program of the Czecho slovak underground see Kural, pp. 5-160.;. Karel .Ve.sely- Stainer, Cestou narodnxho odboie: Boiovv vyvoj domacxho odbojoveho hnutx v letech 1938-45 ("With the National Resis tance: The Development of the Struggle of the Resistance Movement") (Prague: Sfinx, 1947); Vilem Kahan, "Uloha a Juroven zpravodajstvx v nekomunistickem odboji" ("The Role an |and Achievements of the Intelligence Service in the Non- jCommunist Resistance"), Odboi a revoluce. V, No. 2, supple ment (1967), 87-104; Vaclav Vrabec, "Peticnx vybor 'Verni zustaneme'" ("Committee of the Petition 'We Remain Faith ful '"), Odboi a revoluce. V, No. 2, supplement (1967), 21- |37. See also Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu: Kren, passim: Krai, Pravda o okupaci: Pasak, "Nekomunisticky □dboj," pp. 71-96. 15 / v For a recent study see Radomxr Luza, "The Commu nist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Resistance, 1939- Il945." Slavic Review. XXVIII (December, 1969), 561-76. } j ^6 | Thummel, senior Abwehr officer in Prague and double agent for the Czech intelligence service, supplied ‘ information on preparations for the invasion of England, on Hitler's plans for the invasion of Yugoslavia, and most xmportantly perhaps, reports about the imminent attack on the USSR. Viewed in Moscow as a western attempt to provoke war between Russia and Germany, the latter were largely dis regarded by the Soviet leadership (Jan Kren and Vaclav kural, "Ke stykum mezi ceskoslovenskym odbojem a SSSR v ietech 1939-1941" ["The Relations between the Czechoslovak j ■ * - Resistance and the USSR, 1939-1941"], Historie a voienstvx [1967], pp. 437-71, 731-71). 27 See Krai, Pravda o okupaci: Hamsxk and Prazak, passim: Benes, p. 158. I i I 18 ✓ v i As a former military officer, Elias had close ilinks to Obran'a naroda. the military branch of the under ground (Ma chat, p. 8) . 19 / v / ’ ' ! Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 147-48. j 20 ! j .........Formulated by the left-of-center PWZ, the program] Za svobodu ("For Freedom") won Benes' endorsement and was | jadopted by the UVOD in 1941. For its features and develop- ] ]ment, see Vrabec, pp. 31-37. Speedy acceptance was, cer- j |tainly, not unrelated to fears concerning the effect of Nazi! janti-capitalist slogans on the Czech blue-collar class j j(Kural, pp. 84-93). Benes, moreover, was fearful lest the j jexpected defeat of Germany open the floodgates of social (revolution and hoped to prevent "Bolshevik chaos" in Czecho- jslovakia by timely social reforms (Feierabend, Ve vlade i Protektoratu. p. 131) . See also PWZ to London, December 11, |l940, DHCP. II, 573. | | ^Kural, p. 107. j I ! j 22 v ✓ I I As Feierabend reports, Rasin, a leading member of the Resistance, complained bitterly that even the ladies of Prague's society talked at their kaffeeklatsch about the UP ]and knew the names of members (Feierabend, Ve vlade Protek- I toratu. p. 120). Cf. George Kennan's observation: "Com- ipared, for example, with illegal Communist organizations in 'other countries, the Czech underground movement seems lax | land amateurish" (Kennan, p. 193). j 2 3„ | i See supra. p. ] | 24 v ■ j Luza, "Communist Party and Czech Resistance, " j p. 565. I ] i i 25 i Ibid.. p. 570. I 26 ✓ v ✓ ] Feierabend. Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 136-37. ! 21 ] Kahan, pp. 94-97. | I 28 / v / ! j Feierabend, Ve vlade Protektoratu. pp. 136-38. 29 ! After the fall of France in the summer of 1940, j the Gestapo discovered implicating documents concerning i Elias' contacts with emigre circles in files which had been j jleft behind in occupied Paris. Determined to build his case! against von Neurath, Frank presented the evidence to Hitler, j Who had agreed to sign orders for Elias1 arrest. Upon von Neurath's urgent intervention, however, the Fiihrer rejected j Elias' arrest as inopportune and told Frank that accounts |would have to be settled later (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. j pp. 186-202; IMT, XIX, 335). See also Helmut Heiber, | |"Zur Justiz im Dritten Reich: . Der Fall EliaS," Viertel- j ijahreshefte fur Zeitqeschichte. Ill, No. 3 (July, 1955), | 279. ! ! | 30 I Ziemke to Foreign Office, January 31, 1940, DGFP. | D, VIII, 724. I i I ! i | Havelka, who had frequently clashed with Frank, j was erroneously regarded by the latter as the evil spirit of! jthe Hacha administration and the leading contact to the I Resistance (Stuckart to Lammers, May 2, 1939, Doc. NG-1817, | TWO. XII, 894-95). See also Feierabend, Ve vlade Protek toratu . p. 44. Elias, who distrusted his cautious but |crafty Deputy, had arranged the latter's demotion as a not all-too-unwelcome gesture to Frank. I 32 ! Jan Fousek— an outspoken Austro-Slav and holder of jthe Austro-Hungarian Order of Maria Theresa— was later appointed Chairman of the NS. 33 Hacha's notes for a discussion with von Neurath on February 19, 1940, DHCP. II, 507-10. 34 Message from Hacha to Hitler, March 15, 1940, ibid., pp. 521-2 3. i ! 35 *v / Exile to Prague, April 19, 1940, cited in Eliasova and Pasak, p. 122. i v Benes to Prague, May 1, 1940, cited in ibid. 37 Resistance to London, January, 1940, DHCP, II, 501-7. 38 DHCP, II, 538-39. j 2 1 1 j I . j j . i 3 v / v t I Message to Benes, June 2, 1940, cited m Eliasova land Pasak, p. 124. The general malaise affected Elias, too. The SD who kept Elias under close observation reported the Premier had fallen victim to deep depressions and given vent to fears that German successes would weaken the Czech people's will to resist (Situation reports of the SD, May | and July, 1940, cited in Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicni j jednota," p. 513). | 40 ! Kural, p. 108. 41DHCP, II. 552. i 42 | Dispatch to Prague, September 28, 1940, cited m : Eliasova and Pasak, p. 127. j ■ j 43 ✓ ^ Hacha, "who felt tired and faint, " told Count j Borek-Dohalsky, Benes' intermediary in Prague: "I am at j your disposal whenever it pleases you. I am looking forward to handing it over. You know to whom ..." (UVOD to London, December 25, 1940, DHCP. II, 594). I 44, ! UVOD to Benes, October 21, 1940, cited in Kural, ip. in. I 45 I Ibid., pp. 109-10. ! i I j 46 i i Dispatch to London, November 26, 1940, ibid., jp- H3. | i ; I 47 I j Ibid., pp. 83-112. i I 4 f t i Benes to Prague, March 20, 1941, cited in Eliasova! and Pasak, pp. 128-30. j 49 ' Borek-Dohalsky to Benei, April 12, 1941, cited in Eliasova and Pasak, pp. 133-35. Count Teleki, Prime Minis ter of Hungary, committed suicide, rather than submit to German demands for the participation of his country in the invasion of Yugoslavia. | i I 50 / . > ; He warned Dohalsky, however, against the cabinet j members Jezek and Krejci "who ought not to be trusted" I (ibid., p. 134). Elias entertained, moreover, serious j 212 doubts as to Havelka's loyalty. These doubts were shared by the UP member Krajina who wrote Benes that Havelka was "influenced by former leaders of the Agrarian party and by business circles who would like to see Benes in permanent exile and preferred national humiliation to the latter's return from abroad" (March 25, 1941, cited in Kural, p. 119). ^Benes to UVOD, April 17 and 21, 1941, cited in jEliasova and Pasak, p. 135. j I 52 ' The Czech underground's hostility and aversion j found expression in increasing attacks against the Protec torate police and rural constabulary, who had acquired a reputation of close cooperation with German security organs (Tesar, "Protinemecka opozicni jednota," pp. 510-11). i 53 / v According to SD reports, Elias made no secret of his hopes for Russia's defeat and an eventual victory of the West over an exhausted Nazi Reich (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 226). ^Benes to Prague, June 24, 1941, DHCP. II, 614. After Russia entered the war and with the extension of full diplomatic recognition to the government-in-exile, the con- j tinued existence of a rival Protectorate government in j Prague had become a political liability and a potential threat to Benes' international standing. The international |situation had reached the point, he later wrote to the Min ister of Justice J. Stransky, "where it became necessary to make a decisive break with all forms of political collabora tion at home" (Benes to Stransky, August 1, 1945, DHCP. II, 753) . ^Message to Benes, August 3, 1941, cited in Elias ova and Pasak, pp. 139-40. 56 Message to Benes, August 7, 1941, cited in ibid. 57Benes to Stransky, August 1, 1945, DHCP. II, 753. 58 * ✓ v x UVOD to London, August 3, 1941, cited in Eliasova and Pasak, p. 140. 59 i Kural, pp. 155-56. i I 60 | Luza, "Communist Party and Czech Resistance," j p. 570. I j 61 j See, for example, the proclamation of the illegal Central Committee of the CPC, June, 1941, in Jiri Dolezal land Jan Kren, eds., Die Kampfende Tschechoslowakei. 1938- | il945: Dokumente fiber die Widerstandsbewegung des tschecho- | slowakischen Volkes in den Jahren 1938-1945 (Prague: Verlag ider Tschechoslowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1964), !pp. 47-49. I 62 Report by von Neurath on the political situation, August, 1941, and Report of Labor Office in Prague, Septem ber, 1941, cited in Krai, Otazkv. pp. 2 32, 2 33. i 6 3 / I Krai, Pravda o okupaci. pp. 229-30. | 64 | SD situation reports, July 18, 1941, and Gestapo jreports from Brno, May 21, 1941, cited in Eliasova and jPasak, p. 137, n. 89. German security organs adopted, on jorders from Prague, severe measures— including the taking of hostages— to suppress strikes and to deal with acts of [resistance (Affidavit of the head of the Gestapo in Hradec jKralove, December 28, 1945, in Dolezal and Kren, eds., p. 53). i 65 ! Heiber, "Zur Justiz im Dritten Reich," p. 279. j During Lautz's stay in Prague he discussed with von Neurath reports on Elias' contacts with London. The Reich Protector [declared quite emphatically that punitive action against [Elias was "out of the question" (ibid,.). 66 Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 321. ^"Proc prisel Heydrich" ("Why Heydrich Came"), Hlas revoluce. September 22, 1961. i ! go J IMT, XVII, 23. See also Zpoved K. H. Franka. jpp. 126-27; Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 31. I 69 | Reichsgesetzblatt. I (1941), 591. Von Neurath's jresignation was officially accepted on August 25, 1943, when jWilhelm Frick, former Reich Minister of the Interior, was iappointed Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia. CHAPTER VI REINHARD HEYDRICH: THE SQUARING OF THE CIRCLE Hegemony of the SS | The wave of unrest in the Protectorate as well as evidence of close contacts between the EliaS cabinet and ! I i BeneS in London certainly contributed to Hitler's growing j dissatisfaction with von Neurath's "soft" policies and to his decision to institute a radical change of course in Bohemia and Moravia. At the very least they served Heydrich and Frank as welcome arguments in support of their conten tion that von Neurath's usefulness in the Protectorate had come to an end. Frank, who undoubtedly had hoped to become Reich Protector, met with Hitler and Heydrich as early as September 21 and 22, to discuss the Czech crisis. They agreed on von Neurath's dismissal two days before the lat- I 1 ! ter ' s arrival at the Flihrer' s headquarters . The repression of sabotage and resistance hardly i L ......._ ......... ...... ...215... ......._ _............. 216 i ■ I I required a change of regime. Such activities could have been handled, as they had in the past, by the highly effec tive and ruthless SD and the German police. Revelations about contacts between the Protectorate government and London, too, did not come as a surprise. Prime Minister Elias had been under close surveillance by the Gestapo for more than a year. An extensive dossier containing evidence on his activities had, twice in the past, been presented by t Frank to Hitler who had, nevertheless, on both these occa sions, rejected the State Secretary's request for Elias's 2 arrest. Although Heydrich and Frank had greatly exaggera ted the extent and seriousness of the resistance, the domi nant factor that determined Hitler's decision to sanction a change of course lay in another direction. Hitler's meeting with Heydrich and Frank took place ■ I shortly after the fall of Kiev at a time when Germany's j 3 victory over the Soviet Union seemed to be close at hand. The German Reich had reached maximal expansion and the peak of its power. Considerations of foreign policy and economic problems appeared to have lost much of their compelling force. With the conquest of "living space" nearly accom- ' plished, Hitler considered the time had arrived to turn to the task of "dividing the gigantic cake into handy pieces" [~.. ... ...~ ' “ ' 217 " j I j i I in order, as he stated with his usual candor, one: "to | ! dominate," two: "to administrate," and three: "to exploit 4 it." Full of hubris, he assured his companions, holding forth as usual at the dinner table: "This territory is now ours. Europe is (no longer) a geographic concept, but one 5 • to be determined by race and blood." And again: "The true border between Europe and Asia is the one dividing the Ger manic from the Slavic world" and it is, therefore, "our duty 6 to draw this line, and place it where we want it." Charged by Hitler with the implementation of his » ideas and following his instructions, SS Headquarters in Berlin developed detailed proposals for the incorporation 7 and Germanization of the conquered Slavic East. The elab oration of these extermination and resettlement schemes into ' a comprehensive proposal— the so-called Generalplan Ost I (General Plan East)— originated around the early fall of j ! 8 1 1941 in the RSHA under Heydrich's direction. Heydrich's dominant role in shaping the plan is indicative of the importance assigned to the aspects of extermination and deportation and their intimate interdependence with German 9 resettlement projects m the East. His proposals concern ing the "final solution" of the Czech problem formed an in tegral part, of the plan. In accordance with Heydrich's I 218 | i ' i j concept, the Generalplan Ost projected the assimilation of "approximately 50 per cent of the Czech population, " the i deportation of "racially undesirable Czechs" to Siberia, j I and the "forced emigration overseas" of the "highly danger ous intelligentsia."10 ( In view of these circumstances, it would appear safe to conclude that Hitler's agreement to entrust the Protec torate to the SS for the purpose of establishing a new racial order in Bohemia and Moravia was not hard to secure. Nor was Heydrich's appointment to direct this task surpris ing— though it must have come as a severe disappointment to Frank. Expectations of an imminent victory in the East made | the Nazis increasingly willing to subordinate practical j considerations of Germany's economic and military interests in Poland and Russia to racial policies dictated by Hitler's 11 ! design of a Greater Germanic Reich. Unlike Poland and Russia, the occupied Czech lands lay too close to the heart of the Reich to risk the disrup tion of war manufacture and vital supply lines by extremist projects . Even so, Bohemia and Moravia, too, were now con- i I i sidered ripe for attack. For in more than two years of occupation, the Germans had made good use of the Protector ate government's collaboration and obtained firm control | ■ ■ ■ ' • ....... '.... - ............................... 219 i | lover the Czech apparatus of administration. Assured of the i , icontinued obedience of a servile and efficient Czech bureau- i cracy, the Nazi occupants were now ready to shed the trap- j | pings of an autonomous Czech administration. More important still, they had found in Heydrich a man of great deviousness and skill combined with exquisite brutality, capable of devising a plan which promised to accomplish Bohemia and Moravia's incorporation into the new Nazi empire built along racial lines, and to initiate the "final solution" of the Czech problem without serious impairment of Germany's war effort.^ Heydrich's own dominant purpose in accepting his new assignment was to secure Bohemia and Moravia as the undis puted domain of the SS. His sudden move to Prague was lundoubtedly prompted by the resurgence of the SS' smolder ing conflict with the Party for power in the Protectorate. Denouncing the lagging progress of Germanization, the Party j i • • i leaders of the neighboring Gaue had secured Bormann's sup port and, in August, 1941, came perilously close to wresting control over population policies in Bohemia and Moravia from the SS. To repel their attack was of vital importance to Heydrich, for the Sudeten party, stung by the disparaging I 13 racial assessment of their Gau by the RuSHA, proposed that t jGermanization be determined by political attitudes rather j |than by criteria of race. Czechs should be judged by their "worthiness" (Eindeutschungswtlrdiqkeit) rather than by their racial "fitness" (EindeutschungsfShigkeit). The SS thus was threatened with severe curtailment of its role in making 14 final selections through racial screenings. To make mat ters still worse, the Army, too, had shown signs of desiring a part of the action and entertained hopes of directing 15 resettlement projects of thexr own. Only Heydrich's energetic intervention managed to thwart these designs and i i to safeguard SS hegemony. Upon the new Acting Reich Pro tector's urgings, Hitler extended, on October 15, 1941, full jurisdiction over race and settlement policies in the Pro- i tectorate to Himmler's Reich Commissariat for the Strength- | I ening of Germandom (RKF) and entrusted Heydrich with the directing of its functions."^ I i i ....................................................... I The Reign of Terror as System j of Government Heydrich's arrival marked, as Frank later stated, "the establishment of absolute rule by the Security Police 17 and the SD." Under Heydrich, the police apparatus assumed the role of supreme executive organ, charged with the imple mentation of the FUhrer's extra-normative political will. I No longer restricted to law enforcement as an administrative j ! : I jorgan responsible for public order, or to the suppression of i I actual and potential political opposition, the security apparatus emerged as principal agent of social transforma tion, and as a policy-making organ aiming at the recon struction of men and society. Rarely was this essential ingredient of totalitarian rule expressed with more candor I jthan in Heydrich's inaugural address to a top-secret meeting 18 of high Nazi officials in Prague. Summarizing his views j on the role of the SS, he saw as their task not only the I ! "arresting, sentencing and observation of people" nor solely "the systematic detection of hostile influences ..." Over and above "the repulsion and suppression of all that is hostile" the SS had the duty "to plan for the supremacy of the German nation and prepare all that was necessary for the future." "Shock troops of the Party" and "guarantors of the National Socialist idea," they were to "act as executive organs accomplishing the mission of the Fiihrer and Reich— a mission leading from the Great German to the Greater Ger- 19 manic Reich." This task, he stressed, could not be accomplished by traditional administrative methods nor by public servants of the old school. It required "an appara tus which can in no way be compared to administrative I institutions and methods valid in the Reich when applied to j 20 i Germans." For German arms had opened up "vast expanses in i Europe" and their exploitation and retention represented a j i J challenge of enormous proportions. This was particularly | i true for the "eastern regions settled in part by Slavs i | . . .," regions which were "to serve as raw material bases j I while their inhabitants would work as helots for great and | 21 I cultural tasks." After what amounted to a virtual sum- j | marization of the General Plan East, Heydrich went on to j I explain that the long-term plan in the Protectorate "re- 22 quired the eventual Germanization of this space." Heydrich declared that he had "no intention to pro ceed according to the old method and make Germans out of j ithis Czech rabble" but would have to "begin by determining racial eligibility and arrange for the screening of the j entire population to establish their national and racial j 23 I background." As he saw it, the Czech people could be j divided into four groups: i Those of good race and positive, political attitudes, who pose not much of a problem— they can be German ized. Then there are those on the opposite pole, of ' • inferior race and with hostile intentions. These people I have to get rid of. There is plenty of space in the East .24 There remains a group in the middle which I shall have to examine very carefully. Here i there are those with positive views but of bad race j and others that are hostile and of good race. The i | former will have to be sent to the Reich and arrange- j j ments will have to be made to prevent them from hav- j ! ing children. . . . Then there remain those that are j I hostile but of good race. They are the most dangerous for they represent the potential national leaders.25 i i The latter could not be transported to the East where they could be expected to organize resistance against the Reich. They would have to be "re-educated," and if this did not work, they would have to be shot ("sie an die Wand zu stellen") This program of racial selection, expulsion, and "special treatment" was to constitute the long-term plan for Bohemia and Moravia. In the short run, though, the inter jests of the Reich required "full use of the huge armament [industry here to support Germany's war effort." Neverthe less, Heydrich insisted that measures to initiate the "final jsolution" be put into effect immediately "under the cover of disguise" for "exigencies of the present could not be per- 27 mitted to affect the final settlement adversely." To accomplish this task, Heydrich devised a strategy jbased upon relentless terror involving the isolation of the Resistance and the wholesale destruction of the Czechs' [national leadership. This reign of terror, however, was to be administered in carefully calculated doses. Aimed at the liquidation of "unassimilable elements," the terror would___ . i i"for tactical reasons, have to stop short of reaching pro- ■ portions which would drive the Czechs to the point of ex- j I 28 ■ jplosion." The true goal of the Nazis was to remain hidden from the population. For as Heydrich pointed out, if the i Czechs knew what was in store for them, "they would be pro- I jvoked into open revolt because they would feel that there 29 remained no other way out." Though demoralized and in timidated by the terror, they had to be left with the illu sion that obedient and submissive Czechs would be permitted I to remain in their country. Harsh treatment of the intel lectual elite and measures favoring workers and peasants would do the rest by driving a wedge between classes and destroying national solidarity. Deprived of leaders and "provided with plenty of grub (Fressen) to make them do their work,the Czechs would lose the will to resist. With their material needs satisfied they would yield to de-politicization and eventual de-nationalization of the racially acceptable stock. Meantime, well-disguised racial examiners would prepare a national register and sort out 31 those eligible for assimilation from those that were not. Heydrich's first act in the Protectorate was the jproclamation of martial law. Summary courts were set up in iBrno and Prague. Death sentences were to be carried out I immediately by shooting or hanging without provisions for > ■ 32 appeal. The first victim of a wave of arrests was Prime I Minister EliaS, who was taken into custody a few hours after' 33 Heydrich's arrival in Prague. Three days thereafter he was put on trial before an emergency session of the German 34 People's Court in Prague and sentenced to death. His i execution was stayed on Hitler's orders, if for no other | reason than because his presence in jail and the consequent threat of incriminating testimony served the purpose of / 35 intimidating Hacha and the Protectorate government. EliaS eventually fell victim to the mass executions ordered by 36 Daluege after Heydrich's assassination. The civil state of emergency proclaimed by Heydrich 37 lasted for 105 days. During the height of the terror, from the end of September to the end of November, 1941, 38 alone, over 340 persons met their deaths. By the end of January, 1942, the total number of executions reached 400- I 500. Between 4,000 and 5,000 persons were arrested, and 39 with few exceptions sent to concentration camps . When the number of executions exceeded the limits set by Heydrich, he ordered, for "optical purposes," the cessation of summary I court actions for eight days and suggested that offenders be 40 shot instead during prearranged "attempted escapes." j 226 ! Aided by carefully prepared lists obtained from previous | interrogations, the Gestapo arrested nearly all members of f ! the tivOD and succeeded in uncovering and destroying the ON's principal intelligence and communications networks to 41 i London. In contrast to the severe blow inflicted upon thei I i tivOD, the Communists' recently reorganized second Central j Committee suffered only relatively minor losses . The vir- j I | tual destruction of the non-Communist underground and the j I j increased activity of the Communists assured them ascendancyj 42 i over all other segments of the Resistance. j I i Heydrich's arrival marked the beginning of large- scale deportations, implementing the decision to exterminate the Bohemian and Moravian Jews. The first transport of 5,000 Jews to extermination camps in Poland left Prague in 43 the fall of 1941 on Heydrich's personal orders. In Feb ruary, 1942, he ordered the setting up of a vast transit 44 camp in the fortress town of Terezin (Theresienstadt) to facilitate the evacuation of all of the Protectorate's Jews: From there the Jews will be taken to the East. Agreements with Minsk and Riga, each of these cities to take 50,000 Jews, have already been reached. After the complete evacuation of all Jews, Theresienstadt will be settled by Germans. Plans will be prepared to turn this city into a centre of German life.4^ 227 ! ! I I ! By February, 1943, two-thirds of the Protectorate's Jews hadj 46 been sent to extermination camps in the East. Transports 1 to the gas chambers continued through 1944, when the evacu- | 47 ation of virtually all Czech Jews had been completed. i The Germanization of "Space and People" j Heydrich's political concept projected the complete Germanization of the Protectorate. In the place of grandi ose but implausible plans to expel most Czechs and resettle Bohemia and Moravia with German peasant-colonists, however, i t he adopted Frank's proposals to Germanize both "space and j people" as the only viable alternative.^® I j | The vast size of the conquered.territories had brought the race and settlement specialists of the SS face j to face with the problem of inadequate manpower and forced them to use available German population resources with the utmost economy. Moreover, a severe depletion of the pool of I I i highly skilled labor in the Protectorate could be expected to provoke severest objections by powerful industrial in terests . Insistence on extremist schemes involving the jdepopulation of Bohemia and Moravia in the face of impres sive arguments against such policies could have endangered SS hegemony in the Protectorate. Faced with such arguments, , 228 I I jHitler, though emotionally in sympathy with the radicals, j 'might have opted for a continuation of von Neurath's pro gram. Heydrich's Germanization proposals, accordingly, provided Czechs of "good race"— i.e., well over half of the Ipopulation— a chance of gaining acceptance as members of the j Herrenrasse in exchange for abandonment and rejection of their nation. Ther denationalization entailed a period of de-politicization and required restraint in the application i of terror, for unrestrained terror might have driven them j ! i into rebellious assertion of national solidarity. Thus, even at the very peak of repression, Heydrich's methods in the Protectorate were less brutal than those adopted in j jPoland and Russia where large-scale Germanization of the population was not contemplated. Moreover, the policies established by Heydrich in the Protectorate were less ex- 49 itreme than the proposals of some of the Gauleiters. as [Well as the views expressed at that time by Hitler, who in j jthe spring of 1942 had warned "against large-scale attempts ! to Germanize Czechs and Poles" and was known to favor their 50 wholesale expulsion. The elaboration of a consistent and subtle policy of repression and its application to the complex problems fac ing him in the Protectorate mark Heydrich as a master of thej 229 itools of terror and coercion. They represent, moreover, the ! jexpansion of the security apparatus beyond its original I J sphere of policy implementation and its involvement in policy formulations that, occasionally, were better attuned 51 to realities than those embraced by political leaders. Unlike Frank, whose original proposals had failed to provide specifics that would accomplish his purposes, Hey drich demonstrated his great administrative ability by pre paring the implementation of his program with careful atten- ' tion to detail. An ordinance of December 18, 1941 subject ing all single, widowed, or divorced Czechs to compulsory labor service in the Reich, provided the opportunity for 52 extensive racial screenings. Extended to all able-bodied i J 53 Czechs by an ordinance of May 4, 1942, the compulsory draft increased the number of Czechs working in the Reich 54 from less than 46,000 in 1941 to 135,158 in 1942. Racially acceptable draftees were housed in separate camps. They were to be detained in the Reich and never allowed to 55 return to the Protectorate. Additional racial screenings conducted under the guise of X-ray examinations for the prevention of tuberculosis and through issuance of identity cards (Kennkarten) were to establish a racial register of the whole Czech population.56 Supplementing the terror and part and parcel of j |Heydrich's master plan for the Protectorate was his attempt I to woo the workers and peasants by extensive welfare meas ures and clever appeals to their resentment of social con ditions . He took sharp steps against black marketeers and |ordered free distribution of clothing and food confiscated j from profiteers to armament workers and factory canteens. On October 28, he raised the rations of fat for workers in i heavy industry and armament plants to the level that pre- 57 vailed in the Reich. Frequent receptions held for workers and peasant delegations at Hraddany castle were to demon- jstrate Heydrich's special concern for their welfare and provided the opportunity to announce substantial improve- ments in health and old-age benefits as well as free vaca- 58 tions in well-known Bohemian spas. Heydrich attempted to raise the wages of workers in industries vital to the war effort. In this respect, how ever, he encountered formidable opposition. Despite his efforts, the wages of Czech workers remained considerably below those of the Reich. German banks and industries with important interests in the Protectorate insisted on a wage freeze and obtained assurances that "the present wage rates I 59 * will be maintained under any circumstances." ! ! 231 ! I ■ ! ! ' I Preoccupied as he was with his project to Germanize i jthe racially acceptable part of the Czech population, Hey- I drich did not neglect to make preparations for the large- scale resettlement of Germans in the Protectorate. Soon after his arrival in the Protectorate, he removed von Neu- 6 0 rath's appointee Theodore Grpss from the Land Office and 6 X replaced him with SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer Fischer, whose 62 appointment had been urged by Frank already a year beforej j ! he thus secured for the SS full control of the Land Office 6 3 and disposition over all properties held by it. With Fischer in charge, seizures of properties by the Land Office 64 increased rapidly. The brunt of the new wave of confis cations was borne by the Czech nobility, whose estates were seized on Heydrich's orders In a complete reversal of von Neurath's policies, Heydrich rejected as wholly unwork able the former Reich Protector's plan to "gain influence and attach the Czechs to the Reich by means of close social 66 contacts with Czech noblemen." Since he urgently needed land, as he announced in his confidential address to lead ing Nazi officials, in order to bring German settlers into the Protectorate, "it would be much easier to get away with seizing a small number of large estates than to confiscate la great number of small properties and drive the farmers I gy I into radical opposition." Hacha, who tried to intervene | j in their favor, was unable to save the landed estates of the ! ■ 68 nobility. Heydrich was equally adamant in removing von Neurath's closest advisors from the Protectorate. He dis missed Volckers, von Holleben', and von Burgsdorff and saw to it that reliable members of the SS held all key positions 69 in Bohemia and Moravia. General Fredenci, who had been closely allied with the former Reich Protector, was replaced by the former Military Attache in Prague, General Tous- • 4 - 70 saint. Reorganization of the Protectorate Government and Reform of j Administration Premier Elias' arrest had left the Protectorate government in a state of utter confusion. President Hacha, who had prepared a letter of resignation,71 was seized by panic. Fearing reprisals, he failed to dispatch the letter 72 and proved unable to carry out his planned abdication. Heydrich had left no doubts that he had at his disposal ample evidence implicating Hacha and a number of government ministers. He informed the old, broken President that both Eliag and Count Bofek-Dohalsky had admitted having delivered * 73 messages from Benes demanding Hacha's resignation. Hacha 233 j denied meeting Dohalsky but admitted that he had received j ✓ 74 ! information concerning Bene§' request from Elias. Com- | pletely shaken, Hacha and the Protectorate ministers assured' Heydrich of their loyalty and willingness to cooperate. In a radio address, Hacha, moreover, appealed to the nation to j I ! "do their duty like men,and to fulfill their obligations to j 75 the Reich fully and sincerely." Satisfied that he had Hacha and the members of the i Protectorate government in his hand, Heydrich accepted their 7 6 declarations of loyalty. He abstained, however, from replacing Elias with a new Premier. Ignoring both President and cabinet completely, he appeared to be ready to abolish the Protectorate government and to eliminate all their func- ! i tions. By December, 1941, the euphoria induced by the vic torious campaign in the East had given way to sober reflec tions . With the German offensive halted before Moscow and i i America's entry into the war, hopes for a speedy German j | victory had to be abandoned. Reviewing German policies in the Protectorate some years later, K. H. Frank eaqplained in a confidential speech that, in the winter of 1941, he and . . . . . . . j Heydrich had "realized that the Blitzkrieg had come to an j end and that the German people and Reich would now have to j 234 ) I | jface the most difficult struggle in their history." Poli- | i j icies had to be reexamined and "prideful thoughts" were dis- j | I jcarded. "A way had to be found to assure full exploitation j i • of the Protectorate's great resources without losing sight 77 jof the distant aim." Faced with a long and arduous war, i Heydrich abandoned his previous attempt to deactivate the Hacha administration and embarked on a sweeping reorganiza tion of the whole machinery of government in the Protecto rate . j | Heydrich's aim was the transformation of the Pro- i tectorate government into "an extended arm of the Reich 78 Protector." He abolished the office of Prime Minister. i i A Chairman (Regierungsvorsitzender) was to preside over j 79 ministerial meetings . The Council of Ministers ceased to I exist, since, as he esqplained in his confidential address to; I i Nazi officials, I cannot tolerate a Czech cabinet which will deliber ate whether instructions received from me should be carried out or not. The Czech ministers can, at best, meet to decide how to carry out such an order. For this purpose they do not need a "cabinet," which might wish to give expression to grievances and de mands . A simple meeting of ministers will do. For the rest I have arranged that only ministers directly I concerned with implementing an order would have to sign directives. It will not be necessary to inform the whole government Czech minister were thus required to pass on directives received, without further ado, to their departments for implementation and the Protectorate ministers became execu- 81 tive organs charged with the carrying out of orders . The new government consisted of seven Ministers . Jaroslav Krejci, who had been Vice-Premier in the Elias cabinet, became Chairman: Chairman Jaroslav Krejci Minister of Interior Richard Bienert Minister of Justice Jaroslav Krejci Minister of Economics and Labor Walter Bertsch Minister of Education and Public Enlightenment Emanuel Moravec Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Adolf Hruby Minister of Transporation and Technology Jindrich Kamenecky Minister of Finances Josef Kalfus Appointed by Heydrich himself, the ministers were selected with considerable care. "Only one of them, the Chairman, wavers politically; he is, however, lazy and full of vanity. 82 If handled properly, he should give us no troubles," Hey drich reported to Bormann. Moravec, a former intelligence colonel turned leading collaborator, enjoyed Heydrich's full confidence as "a highly ambitious man and consistent i i . 83 ! jpartisan of full integration into the Reich." Hruby, the j | | jnew Minister of Agriculture, could be relied on to support | j 84 ' collaboration "for realistic reasons." Bienert, Kame- | i ; necky, and Kalfus were specialists in charge of departments j ! dealing largely with routine matters. The most important post, the Ministry of Economy and Labor, was assigned to a German, Dr. Walter Bertsch, who was "to see to it, that our 85 line and viewpoint will be fully adhered to." In defer ence to Bertsch, who did not speak Czech, only German was toj 86 be spoken during meetings of the ministers. The "autono mous" Protectorate government itself had become an instru- 87 ment of Germanization. The "reconstruction" of the government was paral leled by a reorganization of the entire administrative structure. The Office of the Reich Protector was reduced in size. It was to form a relatively "small staff of lead ing officials" consisting of State Secretary Frank and the heads of its departments . The German chiefs of departments of the Reich Protector's office simultaneously were appointed permanent deputies of the ministers in corresponding Czech ministries . This system of interlocking directorates en abled department heads of the Office of the Reich Protector i to control policy implementation by ministries staffed by ! 88 i jczech public servants and headed by Czech ministers . j | On the level of local administration the number of j | 89 i Special District Commissioners (Oberlandrate) was reduced ! “ r ' i ! from fifteen to seven. They were, henceforth, to act as | "inspectors of the Reich Protector supervising the imple- | mentation of German orders and directives by Czech organs of . 90 administration." All key positions in Czech provincial and county governments were to be staffed by German offi- i cials charged with direct supervision within these local j administrative agencies. The dual system of administration was to be abolished by subordinating all Czech administra tive agencies directly to German superiors. The Czech apparatus of government was to be transformed into an "Administration by Mandate of the Reich" (Reichauftraqs- 91 I verwaltung). The administrative reforms permitted a j j decrease in the number of German officials employed in the | 92 Protectorate, who thus became available for induction into the armed forces or for service elsewhere in Europe. With Hacha demoralized by fear and increasingly incapacitated by 93 senility, Heydrich's organizational revisions succeeded i in reducing the "autonomous" Czech administration to a pup- | pet government controlled by the Nazi occupants. J Heydrich regarded the experience gained in Bohemia i and Moravia as a foundation for future SS domination over all of occupied Europe and for the achievement of primacy j in the Reich itself. He had impressed Hitler with his poli-- i cies in the Protectorate and obtained direct access to the FiShrer, who had consulted with him at headquarters on j 94 several occasions. Encouraged by Hitler, he hoped to resolve serious conflicts with the Army High Command in 95 occupied France and Belgium in favor of the SS and re- j ! ferred Bormann to his policies in the Protectorate as a j model for the integration of occupied countries with the Reich without the "drawbacks" inherent in Germany's public 96 administration: j Since this affects the whole problem of the German administrative system, particularly that in the occupied countries, I shall submit (by orders of the Fiihrer, given me some time ago) detailed and precise proposals, based on experiences gained in the Protectorate, in the newly conquered Eastern j territories and in occupied Europe.97 I j i Heydrich's ambitions were forwarded greatly by a j i - fortuitous coup the SD was able to pull in Prague. Inter rogations of captured mambers of the Czech intelligence network led to the exposure of "Rene," the underground' s most valuable informant. A triumphant Heydrich reported his arrest and informed Bormann that "Rene" was no other than 98 Paul Thtlmmel, a senior officer of the Abwehr (counter- 99 intelligence agency of the Wehrmacht) in Prague. Thiim- mel's capture provided an opportunity to settle accounts with Admiral Canaris, who, as head of the Abwehr. was re garded by Heydrich as a dangerous competitor and foe of the SS. Invited to attend a conference in Prague on May 18, 1942, Canaris was called to account for the political un reliability of his operatives and the inadequacy of their professional training. Heydrich demanded that all Abwehr agents henceforth be trained and made subject to clearance 100 by the SS. Confronted with Thummel's defection, Canaris was forced to accede to these demands. It was to be Hey drich's last success. His assassination, a short while thereafter, prevented the realization of this project, which would have established effective SS control over the German military intelligence network. Heydrich1s As s as s inat ion In the morning of May 27, 1942, two men attacked Heydrich as he proceeded on his daily trip from his country seat to Prague. A hand grenade thrown at his car wounded Heydrich mortally. He died several days later. The at tackers, Jozef Gabfiik and Jan Kubis, were able to make their 102 | escape. i ! i Gabcik and Kubis, two soldiers of the Czechoslovak i 3 army in Great Britain, were members of a group of para chutists who had been dropped into the Protectorate during October, 1941, with orders to prepare Heydrich's assassina- i tion. They succeeded in making contact with the Czech re sistance who provided them with shelter and support, and restored radio communications with London, which had been i disrupted during the reign of terror. ' The wave of arrests had inflicted severe blows upon the Czech underground but had failed to destroy it. Stunned and decimated by the terror, the non-Communist resistance ihad dispersed into atomized groups without contact with each other or with London. Production figures in armament plants had improved during the fall and winter of 1941, and strikes 104 and acts of sabotage had shown a conspicuous decrease. The mass executions had "spread a psychosis of fear" and created an atmosphere of suspicion among the Czech people. "They read the proclamations of executions in silence and 105 departed without a word, their heads bent down." Early in 1942, however, the shock began to wear off. Germany's military reversals in Russia gave the people new hope and the Resistance showed signs of revival: ...... •.... ' 241 : t It seems that the three-hundred executions and the i continuing state of emergency in Prague and Brno ! are forgotten; new forces of the resistance move- j ment are active, wide circles of the population again give expression to their hostile feelings and leaflets make their appearance in considerable numbers . . . The Czech chauvinistic intelligentsia i is particularly active and works hand in hand with j the Communists . . .106 j i Heydrich himself had to admit some doubts concerning the lasting effects of the terror to Bormann: i The decrease in food rations, the British air attacks, the bombing of Plzeft, the landings of airborne agents, the rumor mills fed by broadcasts from London, the centralization of the economy, etc., etc. could not be quite balanced out by military successes of the Reich— particularly in view of events during the i winter— which were received with considerable scep ticism. For this reason the people adopt an attitude of wait and see and the mood here has, in a certain sense, hardened, though, on the whole, there is no j reason for apprehensions. . . .107 J I i i The recovery of the Czech underground, however, was j of rather modest proportions. Resumed resistance activi- ! ties, moreover, were led for the most part by Communist groups, while the non-Communist movements still reeled under 108 the severe losses they had suffered. Fearing the conse quences of an attempt at Heydrich's assassination, the national resistance group which had established contact with Gabcik and Kubis considered the plan inopportune and warned London against its execution: j 242 ! The attempt [against Heydrich's life] would be of | little assistance to the Allies and its consequences for our people would be immense. Not only would it place our hostages and political prisoners into mortal danger but it would also cost additional thou sands of lives and expose the nation to unprecedented repression. At the same time, it would destroy the last remnants of whatever organizations we still dis- j pose of, and, thus, foreclose any future action which I could help the Allies. We beg, therefore, that the j assassination not be carried out. To delay is dan- ! gerous. Give the order immediately. Should an ac- j tion, nevertheless, be required for reasons of foreign relations, direct it against the person of a local Quisling, preferably against E. M. [Emanuel Mora- vec].109 This appeal by the underground was ignored. Gravely concerned about the virtual destruction of the UVOD, the undisguised collaboration of the Hacha administration, and the absence of serious disruptions of Germany's war indus tries, the government in exile had decided on a "spectacular demonstration of resistance" in the ProtectorateFor, as Benes explained in a message to the Czech underground on May 15, 1942, a German peace proposal after a successful offensive in Russia could not be dismissed from considera tion : In such a dangerous situation, existing circumstances in the Protectorate and in Slovakia, i.e., the col laboration with the Germans, Hacha as President, the Protectorate government, Emanuel Moravec, Tiso and ! Tuka, present a great burden, if not a grave threat. j This much is quite clear. In such a situation, acts j of violence, revolts, sabotage and demonstrations j | might be desirable or even unavoidably necessary in j | our country. They would greatly ease our position | | and perhaps save our nation even though at the cost I of great sacrxf ice .H-*- At the time of his death, Heydrich had succeeded in achieving most of the goals he had set for himself in Bohe mia and Moravia. The Protectorate had become a domain of the SS and was to remain so to the end of the occupation. Not only were conservative civil servants around von Neurath expelled and deprived of all power and the influence of Germany's traditional ruling groups on public affairs re- 112 ^ duced to a minimum, but Heydrich's position of undisputed authority had enabled him to defeat all attempts of the party and army to challenge the primacy of the police appa ratus in the Protectorate. During his rule the conflicts between these three apparati effectively ceased. Von Neu- rath's fall and Heydrich's succession thus reflect the grow ing power of the Nazi movement's totalitarian avant-garde— the "state within the state" of the SS. During von Neurath's era, economic, administrative, and foreign policy concerns retained primary importance. Under Heydrich's rule in the Protectorate, ideological pur poses moved into the center of policy decisions. Von Neu rath 's traditional approach, favoring the cooptation of |the Czech upper strata as a means toward eventual Germani- j zation, was abandoned. The implementation of the Endlosung j (the final solution of the Czech problem), defined by the racist principles of the Nazi Weltanschauung. was initi- 113 ated while, at the same time, great care was taken to minimize any deleterious effects of this policy on armament production in the Protectorate. 245 NOTES TO CHAPTER VI Krai, Pravda o okupaci. pp. 2 30-31. Prank admitted! to having conferred with Hitler, Himmler and Bormann on the j morning of September 2 3, before von Neurath's arrival j(Zpoved K. H. Franka. pp. 126-27). i I 2 I October 12, 1940, and, again, February 26, 1941. | jsee supra, p. 156, and p. 209, n. 29. j | 3 j j Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 31. 4D o c . L-221, IMT, XXXVIII, 88. ! 5 I | September 8, 9, and 10 (cited in Picker, p. 144). ! ! ! C j September 2 3, 1941 (in Hitler's Table Talk: 1941- 1944. ed. by Hugh R. Trevor-Roper [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953], p. 37). Hitler's "Slavic world" includes also all West and South Slavic groups who thus were destined to exclusion from his concept of a future Germanic Europe (Kluke, pp. 255-76). 7 "The preparation of plans for German settlement of i the conquered East had been entrusted to the SS" (Meyer- j Hetling's speech in Poznan, October 2 3, 1941, Doc. NO-3348, | cited in Helmut Heiber, "Der Generalplan-Ost," Vierteliahre-1 shefte fur Zeitcreschichte. VI, No. 3 [July, 1958], 284). Asj early as January, 1941, Himmler addressed a meeting of SS ! leaders at Weselburg and told them that the destruction of I 30 million Slavs was a prerequisite of German plans for the j occupied East. He implied that the "inevitable war with I Bolshevism" would have to be utilized for this purpose | (Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski's testimony, IMT, IV, 482). J See also Koehl, pp. 146-47. j 1 ! 246! I . j 1 8 I Doc. NG-2325, cited in Heiber, "Der Generalplan- j |Ost, " p. 295. The plan took its final shape in a memoranduraj published by Meyer-Hetling on May 28, 1942 (ibid., p». 289). ! This document, entitled "Gerneralplan Ost— Rechtliche, wirt-i schaftliche und raumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaus," j unavailable during the Nuremberg trials, has since been ! located in the World War II Records Division, Alexandria, { jVirginia, Microfilm T-84, Roll 73 (Vierteliahreshefte fur Zeitqeschichte. VIII, No. 1 [January, 1960], 119). ! ! 9 I I Koehl, p. 78. j I j j "^Heiber, "Generalplan-Ost," p. 301. As the refer- i jence in the text to the "equally dangerous and undesirable jPolish intelligentsia" makes clear, the phrase "emigration overseas" represents here a widely used Nazi euphemism for extermination. I 11 v / i Gregor, p. 214. See also Tesar, "Poznamky," i p. 189. ! 12 ' A few months thereafter, hopes for a Blitzkrieg inj Russia had faded and German reversals had necessitated a ! i 'reorientation of priorities. During 1943, attention centers| on assuring maximal economic exploitation and the safeguard-; ing of Germany's war effort in occupied Europe. 13 See supra. p. 155. 14 Authored by Franz Kiinzel of the Sudeten Party's Head Office, the proposal entrusted the Gauleiters with the final decision about "worthiness" for Germanization (Letter from Schulte-Schomburg to Heydrich, March 11, 1942, in Krai ; and Fremund, eds., pp. 140-41). See also letter from Ktlnzel to Frank, February 25, 1942,. in Fremund, ed., pp. 29-30). ' 15 Report from Obersturmbannftihrer Bohme, Chief of the SD in Prague, to Heydrich and Frank, May 5, 1941, in iFremund, ed., p. 24: "Wie hier bekannt wird, beabsichtigt *die Wehrmacht im Protektorat eine Gesellschaft zu griinden— j [die Wehrmachts-G.M.B.H. genannt werden soil— die sich mit j der Bauern-Ansiedlung zu befassen hatte. Es ist beabsich- ! tigt, um die TruppeniibungplStze herum einen gewissen j 247 i ! . jStreifen Land von mehreren Kilometern anzukaufen und mit jDeutschen zu besiedeln ..." ( ' 16 Heydrich's memorandum of October 30, 1941, DHCP. II, 462. Circular letter from Lammers, November 14, 1941, BA, R 2/1140, p. 9. See also supra, p. 139, n. 117. 17 Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 130. 18 Heydrich's speech of October 2, 1941, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 113-24. 19Ibid., pp. 114-15. 29Ibid.. p. 119. 21Ibid.. p. 116. 22 Ibid., p. 112 . 2 3, . , Ibid. 24 Heydrich's utter cynicism and the full extent of his intentions were revealed in a confidential address he delivered on February 4, 1942 at the "German Hall" in Prague. Czechs ineligible for Germanization, he declared, "will probably be sent to regions opened up near the Arctic Ocean where concentration camps will provide an ideal future homeland for the 11 million Jews of Europe" (in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 137). Since he was well aware of the decision to exterminate the Jews taken some days earlier at the Grosse-Wannsee Conference near Berlin, his hint was intended to convey to the fully initiated amongst his lis teners the message that a similar fate was in store for a j part of the Czechs. j 25Ibid.. p. 123. | 26Ibid. 1 27Ibid.. p. 122. 28Ibid., p. 119. I 30 i Ibid., p. 120. j 31 i Ibid.. p. 123. j i 32 i The summary courts were staffed by Gestapo offi- j sials and members of the SS. They were empowered to pass i bnly three types of sentences: acquittal, death, or trans- j fer of prisoners to the Gestapo (Czechoslovakia Fights Back, j pp. 128-29). | 3 3 j Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 33. ! 34 i Because of his prominent position and the politi- I sal importance of the case, Elias was tried before the I people's Court rather than the usual Summary Court. For an j jaccount of the trial, see Heiber, "Zur Justiz im Dritten I Reich." i | j j 35 ^ f i Heydrich informed President Hacha that Elias' ^execution had been postponed since the latter would give jevidence during forthcoming trials (DHCP. II, 630) . 36 Havelka and Jezek, though known to have been implicated, escaped execution. The former, arrested to ! together with Elias, was released upon Hacha's intervention I (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 35; Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 126). See also Heydrich's speech of February 4, 1942, ini Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 126-42. ! I 37 ‘ I Until January 2 0, 1942 (Czechoslovakia Fights j Back, p. 129). | 38 List of death sentences by the Summary Courts in Prague and Brno, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschech- oslowakei, pp. 458-59. | 39 / ! Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 127. j 40 1 Notes on a conference with Heydrich, October 17, i 1941, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 125-30. j 249 41 / ✓ Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 25; Krai, Pravda o I okupaci. p. 244. I 42 i "The intense, nearly public activities of the Com-| munist Party convince the masses that it is the only segment! of the Resistance which shuns neither sacrifice nor work. j The Communists impress the people and enjoy their sympa- i |thies" (Message from Prague to London, May 14, 1942, in j Dolezal and Kren, eds., p. 75). See also the report of the ! !chief of the SD on the activities of the Communists during jthe years 1942-43, in ibid., pp. 94-99. J i 43 ! I Notes on conference with Heydrich, October 17, j !l941, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 126. j i 44 ! I Eeskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 71. j ! 45 , | Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 126. | ^Jacoby, p. 241. 47 K. G. Adler, Theresienstadt. 1941-1945: Das Ant- llitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft (Tubingen: Mohr, 1966), pp. 15-22. | 48 Frank's memorandum, Doc. 3859-PS, IMT, XXXIII, 263-71; see supra. pp. 150-54. ! 49 ! See Gauleiter Jury's recommendations, supra. p. 80. Available evidence seems to suggest that the Ger- 'manization proposals of the Sudeten Party, based on politi cal "worthiness" rather than racial "fitness," entailed the jexpulsion of Czechs in numbers far greater than those envis aged by Heydrich. By March, 1942, Jury's Party Liaison Office in Prague had come around to Heydrich's views. Rejecting the policies advocated by Franz Kdnzel of the Sudeten Party's Head Office, Schulte-Schomburg of the Liai son Office informed Heydrich as follows: "... Slowly but surely the view has been gaining ground during the official discussions in the Party Liaison Office that all the people of this space cannot be expelled and replaced by Germans and that it is necessary to reckon with the people in this space; that is, after the racially unacceptable have been | 250 I ! * j jexpelled and the predominant part of the rest educated to jbecome Germans" (Chief of the Party Liaison Office to | iHeydrich, March 11, 1942, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 140).j 50 I Notation for April 5, 1942, cited in Picker, j p. 256. A few weeks later, undoubtedly impressed and per suaded by Heydrich, Hitler had changed his opinion: "Under firm leadership in the Protectorate, it should be possible to reduce the Czech language again to a local dialect. One could turn the Czechs immediately into fanatical supporters of the Reich, if they were given double rations and promised exemption from military service on the Eastern front. Under these circumstances they would consider it their duty to work twice as hard for the armament industry ..." (May 20] 1942, in ibid., p. 363). ! 51 ! The relatively "moderate" character of police pol icies is, by no means, unique to Heydrich1s rule in the Pro-J tectorate. The repressive actions of the police state and | the consequent severance of most feedback links tend to establish the security apparatus as the sole institutional ized contact point with reality and, thus, as a potential, albeit severely distorted, rationalizing element of the regime. The case of Napoleon's feared and powerful Minister of Police, Fouche, provides a striking example. As Yves Levy points out, Fouche chose to spare the Jacobins, acting against his master's wishes who had decreed their complete destruction. Favoring gradual reconciliation in order to secure Napoleon's rule, he, moreover, entered into secret j peace negotiations with Napoleon's enemies abroad and was dismissed by the Emperor, when the latter got wind of Fouche's moves (Yves Levy, "Police and Policy," Government and Opposition. I, No. 4 [1966], 503). Heydrich, of course, far more circumspect than Fouche, succeeded in obtaining Hitler's approval for his proposals. He did, however, declare his intention to formulate independent police poli cies and apply them in the Protectorate with much candor: "The task of protecting the ideology cannot rest on a super ficial, purely administrative view content with fulfilling assignments and carrying out orders, but presupposes deep thought and action based on thorough comprehension of prob lems" (Heydrich's speech, October 2, 1941, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 114). | 251 ! I . ! i i : 52........ i Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnunqen des Protek- | Itorats Bohmen und Mahren (Prague), January 12, 1942, p. 56. j A similar proposal to draft Czech workers for service in the! jReich and subject them to racial examinations, submitted to j iVon Neurath, had been vetoed by him shortly before his dis- j 'missal (Fremund, ed., p. 2 3). j I XXVI, 485. j- j f ^ i j Krai, Otazkv. II, 190. The number of Czech work- ! |ers in the Reich was estimated to have reached 140,000 in 11945 (IMT, XXX, 588). 55 Heydrich's confidential address of February 4, 1942, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 137. 56 ✓ v Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. pp. 388-89. See also Heydrich's report to the Reich Chancellery, July 18, 1942, jin Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 142. ! 57 ! Heydrich had obtained Hitler's approval to |increase the fat rations of Czech workers before his depar ture (Heydrich's speech, October 2, 1942, in Krai and ; Fremund, eds., p. 121). j i I I 58 Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in Amort, ed., j Hevdrichiada, pp. 160-61. I I ! i 59 j j Jacoby, p. 195. See also Charles Wighton, Hey- ; ! drich: Hitler's MOst Evil Henchman (Philadelphia: Chilton, j 1962), p. 258. ^^See supra. pp. 140-41. 61 Report to Bormann and memorandum by Heydrich, joctober 10, 1942, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, p. 462. 62 _ , .. See supra. p. 141. 6 3 As a civil servant of the old school, Gross had, jin Heydrich's own words, performed efficiently and compe tently, but could not be tolerated in that politically jhighly sensitive job (Notes on a conference with Heydrich, | iOctober 17, 1941, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 127). i ' ; 64 ! The holdings of confiscated land by the Land j Office rose from 86,000 hectares in 1940 to 337,000 hectaresi by the end of 1943 (Krai, Zlociny proti Evrope. p. 399). | t 65 I Heydrich's report to Bormann, May 16, 1942, in j Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 155. 66 f Heydrich's speech of February 4, 1942, in ibid., p. 127. I 67 / ! Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 168. j gq DHCP. II, 670-73. Heydrich transferred nearly 1000 landholdings to a new settlement corporation which, in turn, handed these properties to German settlers. The num ber of German colonists brought into Bohemia and Moravia remained, however, relatively modest. By the end of 1942, 6000 Germans from Southeastern Europe and about 600 from the South Tyrol had been settled in the Protectorate (Report of the RKFDB for the year 1942, cited in Krai, Zlociny proti Evrope. p. 399) . 69 Letter from Heydrich to Lammers, October 9, 1941, BA, R 43 11/1324. 70 BA, WO 8-122/9, p. 42. | 71 ‘ DHCP. II, 626. 79 Ibid.. p. 625. ! 7 3 • ' Letter from Heydrich to President Hacha, Novem- { ber 15, 1941, ibid., p. 640. j I 74 ✓ Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 2 39. 75 DHCP, II, 636-37. In reply to this radio message] the Czech government in exile broke off all relations with j the Protectorate government officially and completely. Declaring that Hacha and his ministers had permitted j jthemselves to be turned into tools of the Nazis, Benes jdenied them all authority to speak for the Czech people j j(Ladislav K. Feierabend, Ve vlade v exxlu ["In the Govern ment in Exile"] [2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Universum Press, 1965-66], I, 46). j 76 ' "Had we wished to arrest all those implicated [by j Elias]," Heydrich stated in his speech of February 4, 1942, j "we would have had to arrest many more. . . .1 considered j it inopportune to clean out this place completely, for in I that case we would have had hardly anyone left, here, to j jwork with" (Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 131). j ! | 77 ' Confidential address of Frank in Bad Karlsbrunn, i April, 1944, in Krai and Fremund, eds., pp. 154-55. j i I j y 0 | Heydrich's letter to Bormann, January 22, 1942, inj 'Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 122. j 79 Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in ibid., 80 Heydrich's speech of February 4, 1942, in ibid.. | The Czech minister is, in fact, not a minister in lour sense of the word. As we know very well he just carriesj jout orders" (ibid.). j jp. 157. Ip. 133. ip. 157 12 3 133 82 Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in ibid.. 83 Heydrich to Bormann, January 22, 1942, in ibid., 84_, . , Ibid. 85 Heydrich's speech of February 4, 1942, in ibid., 86 "In this Czech government only German will be spoken, since these gentlemen cannot possibly expect Bertschj to learn Czech" (ibid.). 2 54 j i • . • : 87- , - g . \ Jacoby, p. 66. i i 88 ■ j .........Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in Amort, ed., j Hevdrichiada. pp. 157-58. j i j 89 See supra. p. 84. j 90 I Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in Amort, ed., j Hevdrichiada, p. 158. I i 91 i Ibid., pp. 157-58. The implementation of Hey- j jdrich's administrative reforms was carried out by Frank, j jfollowing the acting Reich Protector's assassination. j I 92 I I Ibid., p. 157. I 93 / i i Medical report on Hacha's mental and physical condition, October 27, 1943, DHCP. II, 731-32. 94 Wighton, p. 255. 95 Heydrich hoped to be appointed Chief of the German administration in occupied France and supervisor of the Vichy regime (Heydrich to Giess, May 7, 1942, in Amort, ed.,i Hevdrichiada. p. 37). j i 96 . ■ l j Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in ibid., ; ip. 157. K. H. Frank, too, attached "extraordinary political! Isignificance" to Heydrich's administrative reforms in the j •Protectorate and regarded them as a "model and example for j the Reich in other areas inhabited by foreign people" j (Speech in Bad Karlsbrunn, April, 1944, in Krai and Fremund, I eds., p. 155). | 97 i Frank's speech in Bad Karlsbrunn, April, 1944, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 155. 980 1Q„ See supra. p. 187. 99 Message from Heydrich to Bormann, May 16, 1942, ini Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 152-55. j i ' i ! ; i ! | 255 I ^00Frank's memorandum on the conference of May 18, 1942, in ibid., p. 35. \ i 101 ! Ibid. See also Harnsik and Prazak, pp. 141-42. 102 For an .account of Heydrich s assassination see Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 1-78; Harnsik and Prazak, passim: Alan Burgess, Seven Men at Daybreak (New York: Dutton, 1960). I 103 / v/ I Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 27; Harnsik and Prazak, pp. 136-38. 104 j BA, WO 8-122/9, pp. 25-32. | j 105 * | SD daily reports, October, 1941, cited in Krai, Zlociny proti Evrope. p. 374. ! i ! j ^^Letter from Frank to Heydrich, January 10, 1942, • Jcited in ibid., pp. 374-75. I | ^^Heydrich to Bormann, May 18, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 152-53. j i 108 ooe See supra. p. 226. 109 | Dispatch from Prague to London, May 12, 1942, reported by Frank to Daluege, June 22, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 2 35-36. | ^^Message to Prague from London, in ibid., p. 35. ! li:LBenes to UVOD, May 15, 1942, in ibid., pp. 35-36. 112 | Note Heydrich's veiled threats against German industrialists, "who only harm the prestige of the Reich by striving for personal profit while carrying out Aryaniza- j tion" and "actually think only of their money bags and their! Mammon" (Heydrich's speech, October 2, 1941, in Krai and i Fremund, eds., p. 122). I t ! 1 113 ' l i The urgency assigned by leading Nazi extremists |to the immediate implementation of policies aimed at racial j •extermination, even at the risk of damage to Germany' s war ! effort, and their fear of delay was, in all likelihood, caused by persistent doubts about the strength of the meta static will of the German people. Apprehension over pre mature routinization or the reassertion of Germany1s pre revolutionary elites is quite evident in Himmler's explana- j jtion for the systematic exterminations in Poland: "Wenn wir! Inamlich jetzt nicht die Nerven haben, dann werden diese jschlechten Nerven an unseren Sdhnen und an unseren Enkeln ; [wieder ausgehen" (Doc. 1918-PS, IMT, XXIX, 98). Similar jarguments were advanced by Dr. B. Adolf, Chairman of the | Federation of Industries in Prague: "This aim (destruction j [of the Czechs as an independent nation) must be achieved by j [making use of the revolutionary energies of the German ■nation, which have been roused by National Socialism, i.e. [it must be achieved . . . during the lifetime of the Fiihrer, ; [or in the course of the next thirty years" (Krai and Fre mund, eds., p. 92). | CHAPTER VII | i K. H. FRANK— PROCONSUL IN BOHEMIA I | i ; AND MORAVIA j i i i ! t Dalueqe as Acting Reich Protector: Terror Runs Amuck Heydrich's reign undoubtedly represented the apex of SS hegemony in Bohemia and Moravia. He succeeded in estab lishing SS power in the Protectorate on a firm foundation and rendered it secure against all other claimants. The conflict between the traditional ruling elites and the totalitarian radicals had been resolved in favor of the latter. Bohemia's and Moravia's territory and resources had been incorporated into the vast empire the SS was building j Jin occupied Europe as their staging ground for the expected final struggle for power over the Greater Germanic Reich. The fullness of Heydrich's power and his undisputed Jauthority eluded his successor. Lacking Heydrich's great i prestige and influence, K. H. Frank had to struggle long ....’... 258 and hard to secure his succession. Though he eventually i ! accomplished the consolidation of his domain in the Protec- j torate and succeeded even in extending SS influence into thJ Sudeten Gau, the territory of his most troublesome rival, Gauleiter Konrad Henlein, Frank was not able to silence the j | active and continuing opposition of the Party. The NSDAP Liaison Office in Prague under Jury, which had been brought firmly under control in Heydrich's era, resisted all of Frank's efforts to dominate it. Supported by the Pleni potentiary of the Vfehrmacht, Schaal, and later by his suc cessor General Toussaint, the Liaison Office provided the neighboring Gauleiters a platform for frequent interventions against Frank and his policies. It thus supplied Henlein, who as the leader of the Sudeten party exercised control over Party affairs in a large part of the Protectorate,'*' a welcome opportunity to counterattack Frank on his home grounds in an effort to weaken his foothold in the Sudeten Gau. .... _ . The ideological concerns of the SS, with their Welt- j anschauunq based upon Blut und Boden. were, moreover, never again to hold the dominant place they had occupied during i i Heydrich's reign. Under his successor, increasing pressures! j on Germany's faltering war machine demanded a reorientation I toward economic priorities, necessitating the indefinite j ! postponement of the Endlosung in the Protectorate. ] I Frank succeeded in his effort to secure Bohemia's | i j and Moravia's industrial capacity for Germany's war effort, j i Transformed into the arsenal of the Reich, the Protectorate | remained one of the quietest of all occupied lands. Com pared with the preceding regimes of von Neurath and Hey drich, Frank's rule represented, for the most part, the ! least eventful period of the Nazi occupation. J * * * | A few hours after the bombing attack that mortally wounded Heydrich, Hitler telephoned Frank and instructed him to conduct the affairs of the government in the Protectorate pending the Acting Protector's expected recovery. He also j ordered the State Secretary: To execute all persons who assisted the attackers or knew of their whereabouts, along with their families. I To arrest as reprisal for the attack, 10,000 politi- | cally suspect Czechs, or seize them if already de- j tained, and shoot them in concentration camps ? | | In the late afternoon of May 27, however, Kurt Daluege, the chief of Germany's Regular Police, arrived in Prague and informed Frank, to the latter's great surprise and profound disappointment, that Hitler had changed Jhiis j ! 260 ; I i instructions and appointed Daluege to assume Heydrich's j 3 duties as interim Acting Reich Protector. The reasons for this abrupt change of Hitler's dispositions are not clear. As Himmler stated to Frank the next day, Hitler had been (looking for a man like SS-Obergruppenfilhrer v. d. Bach- | Zelewski— commander of extermination commandos in occupied , Russia— "who could be relied on to wade through seas of blood without qualms or misgivings." This would teach the Czechs that "if they shot one, another one still worse would 4 follow suit." Perhaps Frank's own interpretation of Hit ler's motives came closest to the truth. As he explained before the Tribunal in Prague: Daluege was appointed because he was a policeman, since it was necessary to take immediate action in the Protectorate using the most ruthless police methods. I was to be kept free from responsibility for these tasks, since I would be needed for affairs C of state and political assignments. j Whatever the reasons that influenced Hitler's choice, Daluege's appointment was, clearly, an improvisation to gain time amidst considerable confusion and to prevent the de terioration of an unexpected and critical situation. His mission, as he declared in directives to the press in the Protectorate, was to create in the country an atmosphere of i 6 i fear and alarm. It reflected Berlin's apprehensions over a ■potential loss of control in Bohemia and Moravia that re- | jquired an immediate demonstration of brutal strength and junimpaired ability to ruthlessly crush all attempts at re- j j | sistance. I I During Daluege's regime the application of terror j and repression, no longer contained within the strict limits imposed by Heydrich, reached proportions approximating the methods used in Poland and the occupied parts of the Soviet i Union. The new deputy of the Reich Protector issued a proclamation instructing all Czechs who had previously failed to report their residences to do so within twenty- four hours. Those who failed to report, as well as Czechs found sheltering unregistered persons, were to be executed, j | As in October and November, 1941, summary courts were set up| I and began the processing of death sentences. But unlike Heydrich's "repression in calculated doses," which had con- { ! crete political goals and aimed at the destruction of the resistance and the Czech political elite that sustained it, the mass terror unleashed by Daluege engulfed political opponents and ordinary citizens alike. Its victims included j persons who were suspected only of "approving the assassina-j i tion attempt." On Hitler's and Himmler's direct orders, ! j I • ! jwhole families were held "collectively responsible" and | • 262 i 7 executed. Between May 29 and June 30, 1942, Regular Police units from the Reich conducted extensive house-to-house i i searches in more than 5,000 communities throughout Bohemia and Moravia. Out of 4,715,501 persons who had to submit to I police identification, 1,148 were arrested and 657 shot on j 8 the spot. The search, however, failed to discover any trace of the assassins. After Heydrich's death in a Prague hospital on June j 4, 1942, Hitler's fury knew no limits. Having summoned j i Hacha and the Protectorate government to Berlin he threat- j i I ened them with dire consequences if the culprits were not found. If the Czechs failed to comply, "several millions would be deported from Bohemia and Moravia . . . the Czech 9 nation would be eliminated from Europe." A few hours after the meeting, Frank relayed Hitler's order to raze the Czech mining village of Lidice to Bohme, the Chief of the Security Police in Prague. That very day, all the village's male inhabitants were shot and the women and children deported."^ The brutality and the extent of Nazi violence paralyzed the Czech population. Seized by panic, marty Czechs expected an immediate bloodbath decimating the population of Bohemia andi I i Moravia. Their fears were by no means unfounded. Berlin's t ! wrath knew no bounds and Hitler's thirst for revenge had, I I 263 ' i apparently, transcended the limits of reason. On June 16, 1942, Hitler ordered Frank to proceed immediately with the I j shooting of 30,000 politically suspect Czechs if the assas- j I 11 sms were not discovered. The Fuhrer's order was never executed. For Karel Curda, one of the parachutists, surrendered voluntarily and provided the Gestapo with information which led them even tually to Kubis' and Gabcik's hiding place at the Orthodox Church of Saint Charles Borromeo in Prague. On June 18, j 1942, after several hours of desperate resistance, Kubis and Gabcik, as well as five other parachutists, died in the 12 catacombs of the church. On July 3, 1942, martial law was lifted. The tide of repression began to recede, but arrests and executions, albeit on a smaller scale, continued into the fall. In the period from May 28 until September 1, 1942, 3,188 Czechs were arrested and 1,357 were sentenced to death by summary 13 courts and executed. Eighty-nine were shot for possession of firearms, 105 for failure to report their residence, 14 eight on the basis of "false accusations," and 477 for 15 approving of the assassination. As Daluege reported to the Ftihrer at the end of September: "The maintenance of a hard course, the climate of fear we were able to create and ; ~ .’..........' .... ............................................." " ” 2641 I j i |the systematic war of nerves which led to a growing feeling j ! • | jof panic among the Czechs, to the point where they expected j j an immediate decimation of the whole nation— all this proved 16 ^ to be tactically, correct." The mass arrests, deporta- I tions, and executions succeeded in crushing, at least for a time, the Czech people's will to resist. The Gestapo ar rested the last remaining members of the tivOD. The Commu nist underground was liquidated as well and almost all its cadres, including the second Central Committee, were anni- | i hilated. The blows directed against the Resistance left it 17 shattered until its reorganization in 1944. With Heydrich's assassins apprehended, Frank, who had certainly approved and most probably authored the Final Report to Hitler, now attempted to turn Berlin's attention to the problem of "securing armament production and the ! 18 ' harvest in the Protectorate, " in short, to the need for a j normalization of the situation in the Protectorate. He | certainly favored a change toward a more lenient course and even recommended to Daluege amnesty for some of those re- 19 cently arrested, for he felt that a continuation of Da luege's mass terror endangered his and Heydrich's projected I i "depoliticization" and denationalization of the Czechs in j Bohemia and Moravia. In Frank's view it was high time to i return the governance of the Protectorate into his experi enced and capable hands. He regarded Daluege as politically| i completely incompetent and the continued presence of the j Acting Protector in Bohemia as an untenable threat to his, Frank's, own authority and to his capacity to act "knowl- i 1 20 edgeably and responsibly" m the Protectorate. Frank had deeply resented Daluege's appointment from the beginning. The very next day after the arrival of the new Acting Reich Protector, Frank sped to the Flihrer's head quarters . There he met first Heinrich Himmler and, as he noted in his personal record of the meeting, "told him quite openly that he saw himself as the guarantor of the political line of the Ftihrer and the SS in the Protectorate and con- 21 jsidered Daluege's appointment redundant." Pursuant to his conversation with Himmler, he was granted an audience with Hitler and received the Fuhrer's assurances of his undimin ished confidence. Hitler told him that Daluege's appoint ment was to remain strictly temporary. The Reich Protector, like India's Viceroy, would in future be confined to cere- jmonial functions. As the "sole expert on the Czechs and the problems of the Protectorate," the State Secretary would j |irtake all political decisions and actually govern Bohemia and ! I 22 [Moravia. Maintaining strong reservations about Daluege's ' 266 j • i i | I mission and fearing the consequences of unleashing unlimited I |mass terror in Bohemia and Moravia, Frank suggested to Hit- j j Iler that the perpetrators of the attempt against Heydrich's i j jlife were almost certainly parachuted into the Protectorate ! ifrom abroad. The attack on Heydrich was not the action of a strong movement of internal resistance. Indiscriminate I reprisals would constitute a deviation from the political line established by Heydrich, which Frank considered to be the only possible and correct policy. The shooting of 10,000 political hostages would drive the Czechs into active resistance, alienate Czech workers and peasants willing to cooperate, and endanger the smooth running of the war effort 2 3 |in the Protectorate. Hitler, as Frank remarked in his notes, "hesitated for a moment, but then declared that he found Frank's arguments persuasive and agreed to rescind his 24 i jorder demanding the shooting of hostages." I Frank departed with what was but half a loaf, for I Daluege was to remain, for the time being at least, Acting Protector in full charge of Bohemia and Moravia. As ten sions between the State Secretary and the Acting Protector concerning the conduct of political affairs in the Protec- | torate rose, Frank grew increasingly impatient. His visits i 2 5 i to the FtShrer's headquarters increased in frequency, but j IHitler remained excruciatingly slow in removing Daluege from i ithe Protectorate. On October 3, 1942, Frank finally suc- i i j ceeded in placing the normalization of the occupation regime on the agenda of a meeting with Hitler, Bormann, and Lammers 26 ! at headquarters. The Fuhrer, however, remained obdurate, j The situation, he explained, had not calmed down suffici ently for a final reorganization of the Protectorate's com mand structure. All he was willing to do for the time being was to charge Lammers with the preparation of a new "Statute of the Protectorate." It was to incorporate Hitler's con cept of the Reich Protector as a strictly ceremonial figure head, while the actual governance and all political deci sions were to be entrusted to "some kind of Chancellery, headed by a responsible man who should be appointed Reichs- minister" (i.e., hold cabinet rank) and could be counted on 27 ; "to safeguard political continuity." Despite Hitler's obvious unwillingness to entrust Frank with full control over Bohemia and Moravia, Frank succeeded, with Himmler's and Lammers' support, in relegat ing the Acting Protector increasingly into the background and in reestablishing his own authority as the decisive policy maker in the Protectorate, a position vouchsafed to 28 him by the FUhrer the day after Daluege's appointment. jThe transfer of actual power was certainly accelerated by j i | |growing evidence of Daluege's obvious incompetence and j i- > i 2 9 ! Jpoliticial obtuseness. With the police repression com- j pleted, there remained, by the end of the year, little cause! | for Daluege's continued presence in Prague. His departure j I from the Protectorate and return to Berlin, during the win- j 30 . i ter of 1942-43, was to leave Frank xn full control of j I Bohemia and Moravia until the collapse of the Reich and the j 31 i end of the occupation. Frank's full and official appoint-j i ment as Reich Minister and Herr in Bohmen (Master in Bohe- ! 32 i mia), an office he had sought so arduously and struggled j i I so hard to secure, was still not in his grasp. It was to I i i be delayed for almost another year. Frank as "Master in Bohemia": The Return to a Moderate Course Daluege's mass terror represented an extraordinarily ferocious episode which ran counter to the main thrust of Nazi occupation policy in the Protectorate. Rather than the inception of the Endlosunq— the implementation of extermina tion procedures leading to the Germanization of Bohemia and Moravia— it reflected Hitler's vindictiveness and loss of nerve after the attempt on Heydrich's life. Initiated on ! Hitler's personal orders, the massive violence appears to ! i have been prompted by the Ftihrer's urge to demonstrate Nazi ; i t i i I ! :Germany's ruthless power in the face of an expected Czech | 33 I insurrection in the wake of the assassination. ! I I With Daluege's departure, the wave of repression ! subsided. The terror had achieved its objective. It had paralyzed the Czechs' will to resist. The fear and panic spread by the terror, however, threatened to affect the workers and to reduce productivity to the point where those responsible for the maintenance of the Protectorate's war 34 potential felt that the time had arrived to change course. Developments on the Russian front and Mussolini's fall had i iforced the Nazi war lords to concentrate all their efforts ion the task of providing Germany's war machine with needed supplies. With resources strained to the point of exhaus tion, "ideological commitments had to be put aside for the i 35 time of the war." Racial screenings and preparations for the Endlosunq had to be abandoned as the mobilization of j reservists for the front denuded Germany's available man power. Moreover, the powerful air attacks launched by the Western allies against Germany's industrial centers enhanced the economic importance of Bohemia and Moravia still fur ther. In the year 1943 Frank had to dispatch 30,000 Czech j ! j workers for compulsory labor service in Germany. By the j r ™ ’ ~ .......... ~ ~ ""270 I ! beginning of 1944, however, the situation had been reversed. The relocation of industries from Germany's threatened cities into the Czech lands had forced the Nazis not only to return most Czechs, but to import foreign workers into the 36 Protectorate and the Sudeten Gau. The former Czechoslovak territories were turned into one of the most important war production centers in Europe. The first indications of Frank's new course became evident in a speech delivered by the State Secretary in the late fall of 1942 . It contained a number of passages di rected toward a renewed effort at "depoliticization" of the Czech masses. Aiming at the Czech peasants, he expressed "appreciation and gratitude . . . for their efforts this 37 year to make up for a few aberrations last year." To the Czech workers he promised, with true Nazi cynicism, that phey would be "the first to taste the blessings of National Socialism and of the new social order when victory is won." As a token of Germany's appreciation they were to receive an increase of bread and meat rations in exchange for "good and 38 decent work." Frank's new policy entailed the abandonment of all perman resettlement plans in Bohemia and Moravia, the end to jracial screenings, and the postponement of the Endlosuncr j ....' ............... “ .....' ..... 2711 I 39 |into the distant future. The fight against all that was i i Czech had to give way to the effort to maintain production in support of the hard-pressed war machine, the final goal of the "New Order" to the intermediate, instrumental goal of winning the war. Economy displaced ideology. Meantime the Czechs would be wooed with adequate food supplies and the promise of some "territorial autonomy" modeled upon "the tradition of Duke Wenceslas," the Czech national saint, who in the distant past had succeeded in bringing about German- 40 Czech understanding. Moreover, while ruthless repression against the Resistance continued, the German occupants' aim was no longer its utter destruction but to render the under ground ineffective by preventing any serious challenge to the war effort. The new course proved to be eminently successful in attaining the goals Frank had set for the Protectorate. The wooing of workers and peasants remained not without suc- 41 cess. War material for Germany's armies kept rolling from 42 Czech foundries, mills, and factories. In Frank's own opinion, "the Czech armament industry kept functioning sur prisingly well and morale among workers, on the whole, 43 remained high, " even m the most dangerous period of the Slovak uprising in 1944. Until the autumn of 1944, sabotage I 272 | jand active resistance in the Protectorate remained rela- j | j Itively ineffective. j j j Paradoxically, the consolidation of Frank's rule j ! I i and, with it, the primacy of the SS in the Protectorate, j required indefinite postponement of all radical plans and a J return to policies that appeared, on the surface at least, to be close to von Neurath's program. With Frank in com mand, the SS no longer felt the need for stirring up na- . . tional tensions to justify the building up of their repres sive apparatus in the Protectorate. Their concern now centered around projects to secure the established positions and to strengthen their hold on Bohemia and Moravia. The men of the SS sought to utilize their political control for i j |the acquisition of industrial enterprises in the Protec- I 44 jtorate. Himmler, in turn, worked quietly in the back- | jground to procure Hitler's official confirmation of Frank as political head of the Protectorate, an appointment that would permit Frank to combine in one hand the exercise of 45 political and of police powers in Bohemia and Moravia. Having twice in the past experienced the thwarting of his I ambitions, Frank intended, this time, to have his powers ! officially confirmed, in black and white and beyond any doubt. Both he and Himmler were fully aware of determined ! 273 opposition by the Nazi party, who wished to prevent the concentration of powers in Frank's hands. For this would mean the end of the Gauleiter's cherished plans of dividing the Protectorate's territory among the neighboring Gaue. Moreover, as it had in the past, the contest for control in the Protectorate reflected a struggle over primacy in the Reich, a struggle that raged this time between the Party and the SS. It was not until August 2 0, 1943, that Hitler signed the decree approving the administrative reorganization of the Protectorate and appointed Frank Minister of State for Bohemia and Moravia and official head of its political 46 administration. Frank's appointment took place in the wake of Mussolini's removal from power by the House of Savoy and the Italian army under Marshal Badoglio. Moved by dis trust and fear of Germany's own prerevolutionary elites, Hitler decided to strengthen the hand of the SS by appoint ing Himmler Reich Minister of the Interior. Dr. Wilhelm Frick, who had been removed from the Minister of Interior to jmake room for Himmler, was given the purely honorific posi tion of Reich Protector. He was to represent Hitler in his function of Head of the German State. All political and administrative powers of the Reich Protector were to be 274 1 exercised by Prank alone. The "Office of the Reich Protec tor" was renamed "Office of the Minister of State for'Bohe- i 47 mxa and Moravia." Prick, who fully understood the purely nominal character of his position, departed a few weeks ! after his appointment, delegating even the exercise of his . . 48 ceremonxal functxons to the new Mxnxster of State. Frank, who had contributed much to the growing power of Himmler's men by turning Bohemia and Moravia into a safe fief of the SS, benefited, in turn, from SS ascendancy in the Reich. He finally attained his cherished aim and became "Master in Bohemia." With Frank securely ensconced, Himmler considered the time had arrived to enlarge the beachhead the SS had woni in Bohemia and Moravia. In the spring of 1944 the area of jurisdiction of the SS regional sector in Prague (SS- Abschnitt Prag) was expanded to include the Sudeten Gau. All SS and police forces in Henlein's Gau were put under Prank's command as Higher Police and SS Leader of the new 49 region (SS-Oberabschnitt) . At the same time Frank re placed Henlein as Himmler's deputy for the Strengthening of Germandom (RKF) in the Sudeten Gau and thus was placed in charge over a unified, SS-dominated population and settle- 50 ment program embracing all of the former Czech lands. 1 IFrank's proconsular powers thus exceeded even those held by jHeydrich while he was Reich Protector in Prague. They pro vided the SS with a foothold in Henlein's Gau and extended j SS influence over the territory of Frank's most outspoken adversary. Moreover, access to, and command over, SS and police forces in the Sudeten Gau made possible the deploy ment of the combined police apparatus of both regions against potential threats of insurgency in the Protectorate. i The transfer of General Toussaint, who had held the post of j j Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht in Prague, to duties out side the Protectorate strengthened Frank's position still 51 more. J The concentration of power in Frank's hands did not fail to offend the Party leaders in the neighboring Gaue. Supported by the NSDAP Liaison Office in Prague, they re doubled their efforts to oppose him. The new, relatively moderate policies pursued by Frank and the cessation of all major Germanization efforts in the Protectorate, though imposed upon the Minister of State by the sheer pressure of circumstances, provided the Party leaders a pretext for counterattack. Advancing demands for a renewal of denation- i alization policies, they gained the support of Martin Bor- mann, the increasingly powerful Chief of Hitler's Party Chancellery, who, during a stormy confrontation at the Ftlhrer's headquarters, denounced Frank as an "enemy of the 52 Party" (Parteifeind). The sharpest and most determined attacks against Frank came from the Sudeten NSDAP which, from the start of the occupation, had laid claim to a "special mission" in the national struggle against the 53 Czechs. With Gau Party headquarters in the Sudeten city of Liberec (Reichenberg), their leaders had jurisdiction over Nazi Party organizations in a large segment of Bohemia 54 and Moravia and demanded the right to shape the conduct of population policies in both the Sudetenland and the Pro- 55 tectorate. Their incessant attempts to intervene in mat ters pertaining to policy decision, and the mounting chorus of their complaints against Frank,^ forced the erstwhile radical hater of Czechs increasingly to take a position in defense of moderate policies and in favor of maintaining "autonomy" for the Czech lands. Sounding much like von Neurath, he declared that the Czech problem could not be "solved in a few years" but would require "several genera- 57 tions" to be brought to a conclusion. Meantime, he warned his opponents that it was certain . . . that the Protectorate will con tinue to exist for the entire period of the war and probably still longer in its present shape and so will the autonomy of Bohemia and Moravia . . . with j | one man at the head who— receiving instructions from j the Ftihrer . . . and accountable to him alone— deter- j mines the political line in the Protectorate. j . i j i "All discussions about the division of the Bohemian-Moraviani i i i area, " he cautioned the leaders of the Sudeten Party, "are j 58 I politically wrong, dangerous, and must cease." His Ger- | manization policy, Frank told them, would be based on a i "systematically executed political neutralization, that is depoliticization of the Czechs," which would aim to "achieve,' 59 first a spiritual and then a national assimilation." This policy would be "planned, prepared, and executed uniformly for the entire Czech nation." As Himmler's Deputy for the Strengthening of Germandom (RKF) with jurisdiction in the Sudetenland, he would not tolerate deviations from this line. Radical denationalization policies against.the Czech minority in the Sudeten Gau. which could cause "public agi tation" and unrest there, as well as in Bohemia and Moravia, could not be permitted. "What will happen," he announced in no uncertain terms, "is rather that the policy towards the Czechs in the Sudeten Gau will adapt itself without much fuss and without causing a stir to the policy pursued by me 60 in the Protectorate." This might involve concessions to Czech farmers, "with a view to the necessities of the war," but, as he assured his former Sudeten German friends, "on the other hand, severest measvires would be taken at the slightest sign of resistance or disloyalty on the part of the Czechs ." j I This political line, he concluded, "accepted as correct and approved by the Reichs fiihrer-SS. would have to be observed 61 and accepted by all Party authorities in every respect." Responsibility for the orderly process of production in therProtectorate, and the knowledge that only success in maintaining the flow of war materials could thwart the de signs of his adversaries, turned Frank into a zealous 62 defender of "territorial autonomy." In this respect, Frank stood by no means alone. He shared the insistence on absolute primacy for what he saw as the interests of his domain with other territorial chieftains such as Gauleiter Albert Foster of Danzig, Erich Koch and Alfred Rosenberg in the occupied lands of the Soviet Union, and Hans Frank, the 63 Governor General of Poland. Faced with jurisdictional i 64 chaos and rivalries fostered by Hitler, these ambitious men denied competing claimants all access to their satrapies and developed what might be called the "Proconsular Syn drome" of increasing and exclusive identification with the ■ territorial units that served as their power bases. I 279 I j ; ! However, while Hans Frank and Rosenberg struggled to moder- j i i ate police excesses and attempted to keep Himmler's SS out i of their domains,^ Frank, Himmler's own Proconsul in j | Bohemia and Moravia, was compelled to defend his fief j against radical incursions by the NSDAP. I Gotterdammerunq: The Turning of the Tide ! Frank's calculations regarding the effects of the severe blows dealt to the Czech underground proved to be correct. During the year 1943 and the first half of 1944, ! | Bohemia and Moravia remained relatively quiet. The resis- j tance movement, still smarting from its losses, lacked 66 organizational strength and remained largely ineffective. | Apart from a few isolated acts of sabotage, major distur- 67 bances of the German war effort failed to materialize. i The deceptive quiet was shattered with the outbreak j 68 on August 29, 1944, of armed insurrection in Slovakia. Surprised by the insurrectionists 1 strength, Berlin ordered Frank to dispatch SS commandos from the Protectorate to Slovakia. In September, 1944, armed Czech partisans from Slovakia crossed the Czech border. The revolt had spread into Bohemia and Moravia. Though Frank succeeded in dis- j persing the most important organized partisan group, the ! j&izka brigade, centers of resistance soon emerged in other j jparts of the country. Faced with the growing threat of i j insurrection in the Protectorate and aware of his lack of 69 adequate military forces, Frank ordered severe measures of repression against guerrilla bands and their local sup- 70 porters. The number of executions rose again. Acts of terror, however, were applied selectively to captured par tisans and their civilian supporters. The shooting of hos tages remained considerably less extensive than in other occupied areas of Europe. With the approach of the Red Army, the situation in Bohemia and Moravia began to deteriorate rapidly. Acts of sabotage rose to dangerous levels. Attacks against railway tracks threatened to disrupt the entire German transporta tion system in the Protectorate as the partisan units in 71 the Czech countryside grew in numbers. Until the early spring of 1945, Frank seemed to have retained hopes of salvaging at least some of the areas occupied by the Reich out of the impending collapse. In a last desperate move he decided to appeal for support from at least a part of the Czech population. Counting on staunchly traditionalist tendencies among the Czech peas antry and playing upon the fears of the propertied classes, iFrank launched a propaganda campaign stressing the "common I i struggle" of Czechs and Germans alike against the approach- j 72 ing "Asian hordes" and their domestic supporters. The hated Czech Quisling, Emanuel Moravec, was confined to the background and a reorganized Protectorate government under 73 the former Minister of Interior, Richard Bienert, received assurances of extensive concessions as a reward for Czech 74 support in the fight "against the common Bolshevik enemy." The German overlords even went so far as to intersperse Czech sentences into their speeches while appealing for popular support in the "common struggle" against the parti- 75 sans . The sudden turn to a policy of national tolerance came too late. Attempts to enlist Czechs into anti-partisan 76 Home Guard units ( Heimatschutz) soon were abandoned. Years of ruthless violence and humiliation had exacted their toll. The floods of hatred felt by Czechs against Germans could no longer be dammed. * * * The policy of retreats and concessions to the Czechs, forced upon Frank by events, inevitably strengthened the hands of his enemies. Centered around the Party Liaison Office in Prague, the opposition against the Minister of ! State, moreover, gained further support with General Tous- 77 saxnt's return to Prague in the fall of 1944. The increase of partisan activities and the growing number of acts of sabotage in the Protectorate provided Party officials the welcome opportunity to clamor for the application of severe repressive measvires against the 78 . Czechs. However, despxte some mxnor gaxns made by the 79 Party, Frank remaxned fxrmly in control and continued to determine the policies pursued in the Protectorate until the early spring of 1945. In February, while Russian armies massed for attack at the borders of Moravia, the Protectorate was declared a war zone and the German Army Group Mitte. commanded by Field Marshal Schorner, was charged with preparing a last, des- 80 perate defense in the Bohemian basin. With Schorner's arrival Frank's authority rapidly decreased. Brooking no interference from either Frank or the NSDAP the Field Mar shal assumed supreme military control and proclaimed Prague a fortified city (Festung Prag), to be defended to the "last 81 drop of blood." General Toussaint, who had been made military commander of Prague, ordered, on March 4, 1945, that the appointment of the political advisor to the German ; 283 I i Igarrison in the city should be made by Gauleiter Henlem. I ! 82 clearly intending thereby to humiliate Frank. Aware of the utter hopelessness of the situation, the latter con ceived the idea of arranging the capitulation of Bohemia and Moravia to the Vfestern allies in order to prevent the occupation of the Protectorate by Soviet armies. He took his plan to Hitler's headquarters and requested permission 83 to dispatch a delegation to the Allied Command. In Bohemia, as everywhere in the Reich, Hitler's edifice of competing satrapies was crumbling as jealous and ambitious sub-leaders struggled for control over the debris. The twilight of the gods had arrived. While Schorner issued orders to take "ruthless action" and to "decimate 84 participants in rebellions," Frank persisted in attempts jto contact Allied Headquarters with the offer to surrender 85 Prague to American troops. Having obtained permission in Flensburg from Admiral Donitz, the new German head of state, Frefnk initiated steps to abolish the Protectorate and to hand over power to an independent Protectorate government made up of Czech conservative politicians headed by Bie- 86 ! nert. His plans were frustrated by the outbreak of fight- ing between Czech armed patriots and German troops in | I ■ ^ Prague. On May 5, the Czech National Council assumed j 87 jleadership of the revolt. After three days of street | I fighting, General Toussaint, commander of the Prague garri- i i son, signed the capitulation at 4:00 P.M. on May 8, 1945. The German occupation of the Protectorate had come to an NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 1 i See supra. pp. 73-74. 2 ' Frank's notes concerning his telephone conversation! jwith Hitler, May 27, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 156. A teletyped message from Himmler confirmed Hitler's order and instructed Frank to take 10,000 hostages, primar ily from the ranks of the Czech intelligentsia. One hundred jof the most prominent intellectual oppositionists were to be jshot that very night (ibid., p. 169). See also Dolezal and Kren, eds., p. 75. j ! 3 I Frank1s notes concerning his visit in Hitler1s j Headquarters, May 28, 1942, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, p. 474. 4 "[Weil Bach-Zelewski] noch scharfer und brutaler lals Heydrich durchgreifen und ohne jede Hemmung durch ein IMeer von Blut waten konnte . . . , das heisst: Wenn sie ] g leinen abschiessen, so kommt sofort immer wxeder exn noch j viel schlimmerer" (ibid., p. 475). ! 5 . Frank's testimony at his trial xn Prague, xn Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 44. Himmler informed Frank that the Fiihrer appointed Daluege because of the latter's accidental 'presence in Prague (Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 136). Daluege jtestified at Frank's trial that he had flown to Prague to offer his help and assistance to Heydrich's wife (Eeskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. p. 111). 6 Memorandum, May 25, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrich iada, p. 189. 7 . Daluege's speech to the Protectorate cabxnet, j May 29, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 191-93. j i 286 j | I I 8 ' Abschlussbericht iiber das Attentat auf Heydrich, IJune 29, 1942, Anlage C, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. | pp. 248-50. ! 9 Frank's notes on the meeting, June 9, 1942, in i ibid., p. 210. | i "^Bohrne's note, June 12, 1942, in ibid., p. 480. j Two weeks later on June 24, 1942, the tiny village of Lezakyi jmet a still crueler fate. All men and women were shot and ! i its children handed over to German authorities. The village was burned to the ground (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. p. 266). See also Abschlussbericht (see supra. n. 8), p. 251. ■^Cestmir Amort, "Krvave nasledky atentatu na j Heydricha" ("The Bloody Consequences of Heydrich's Assassi nation"), Slovenskv-prehliad (Bratislava), No. 48 (1962), p. 2 07. See also Frank's own testimony in Zpoved K. H. j Franka. p. 145; Krai, Zlociny proti Evrope. p. 376. 12 Geschke to Frank, June 29, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 292-95. 13 "Report to the Fiihrer for the Period from May to September 1," in Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. pp. 307-9. With characteristic precision, the report continues: "3. Two Czech villages were razed to the ground: Lidice (95 homes), Lezaky (8 homes)." j 14 Abschlussbericht, Anlage D, in ibid.. pp. 227-32. 15 Czechoslovakia Fights Back, p. 139. 16 "Die Einhaltung der bisherigen politischen Linie, und zwar das harte Zupacken, . . . die von uns kiinstlich erzeugte Stimmungslage und planvoll bewegte Nervenmiihle der Tschechen, Dinge, die zur Steigerung der Angst bis zu Gervichten iiber eine kommende Dezimierung der Gesamtnation fiihrten-erwiess sich als richtig" (Fiihrerbericht from Daluege to Hitler, September, 1942, in Amort, ed., Hevdrich iada. p. 308). j I I 17 V f V , , V ' Jirx Dolezal et al., "Nacisticky teror a narodne | osvobozovacx boj ceskoslovenskeho lidu" ("The Nazi Terror [and the National Liberation Struggle of the Czechoslovak [People"), Nacisticka okupace Evropy. 1-4. 142-43. See also j Luza, "Communist Party and Czech Resistance," p. 571. j j 18 ^ i Report to the Fiihrer for the period from May to ; [September 1, 1942, signed by Frank, in Krai and Fremund, I jeds., p. 144. The document appears to be a draft prepared j by Frank for the Fiihrerbericht dispatched by Daluege to Hitler (see supra. n. 16). j j 19 ! I Frank's memorandum to Daluege, June 19, 1942, in j Amort, ed., Hevdrichiada. p. 22 3. | I 20 I | Frank regarded Daluege as mentally unbalanced. | [Confronted by Daluege as witness at his trial in Prague, j Frank proved unable to hide his dislike and contempt for hisi jformer superior (6eskv narod soudx K. H. Franka. p. 113). j 'See also Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 135. ! ! 21 , Frank s note, May 28, 1942, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 475. ' 22 ! Ibid., p. 478. 2 3 ' Ibid.. p. 476. I 24 ! Ibid. ! 25»' , Bxman, p. 243. Daluege, it appears, was not even invited to j attend the meeting. His loss of prestige is indicated by !the fact that Frank humiliated him by transmitting informa- Jtion on the meeting only two weeks thereafter, on October 21, [1942 (Frank to Daluege> in ibid., pp. 2 74-75). i 27 I Lammer's notes on the meeting, October 10, 1942, j ibid.. pp. 256-57. In his usual, oblique way, Hitler stated! [that he might consider von Neurath's return to the office ofj [Reich Protector, but added immediately that the former Pro- j [tector would have to understand the purely ceremonial nature! 288 I ' i i ! of his office. He would be kept out of affairs of state and! jthe formulation of policies (ibid.). j i I i 28 j i See supra. p. 265. ' ! 29 . j Zpoved K. H . Franka. pp. 135-38; Tesar, Poznamky, " ip. 180. i i 30 \ Bxman, p. 253. ! 31 | Daluege's removal appears to have been engineered iby Himmler. By the fall of 1942 he had decided in favor of 'Frank as future SS-Proconsul in the Protectorate. He had [promised Frank Daluege's recall at the very latest by the spring of 1943 and suggested that, until that time, "cooper ation between the two men ought to be possible" (Frank's letter to Ohlendorf, October 29, 1942, in ibid.., pp. 275- 76). 32 See supra. p. 151. j 3 3 j Tesar, "Poznamky," pp. 182-83. ! 34 j Emil Franzel, Sudetendeutsche Geschichte (Augs burg: Adam Kraft, 1958), p. 407. i ! 35 I Frank's confidential address in Bad Karlsbrunn, ‘ April, 1944, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 155. Vaclav Prucha and Rudolf Olsovsky, "Vliv nacis- ticke okupace na ceskoslovenske hospodarstvx" ("The Impact of the Nazi Occupation on the Czech Economy"), Nacisticka okupace Evropy. 1-3, 96. For the growing number of foreign workers and prisoners of war in the Sudeten Gau see Antonin Faltys, "Postaveni ceskeho pohranicx v ramci velkonemecke rise v letech 1938-45" ("The Position of the Czech Border lands within the Framework of the Greater German Reich, 1938-45"), Historie a vojenstvx (1968), pp. 416-17; Z. Konecny, Pracovnx nasazenx valecnvch zaiatcfl a obvvatel j Evropy v 6SR (1939-1945) ("Labor Utilization of Prisoners ofj War and European Civilians in Czechoslovakia [1939-1945]") ! (Brno: Universita J. E. Purkyne, 1967). ! i German Imperialism and Czechoslovakia: Analysis of a Speech by K. H. Frank. Czechoslovak Documents and Sources (London: Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, j Information Service, 1943), p. 22. j '30 j Ibid., p. 23. Pointing to extensive relocations of industry into the Protectorate, Frank had obtained Hit- | ler's approval for an increase of bread and meat allocations xn Bohemia and Moravia on the occasion of his visit at head quarters on October 3, 1943 (Lammer's notes on the meeting, October 10, 1942, in Bxman, p. 257). ! ' 39 ; Frank's confidential address in Bad Karlsbrunn, April, 1944, in Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 154. 40 Outline of a speech by Martxn Wolf, Chief of the j Department for Cultural Policy at the Office of the Reich Protector, April 18, 1943, in Fremund, ed., p. 36. "Terri- jtorial autonomy" must not be confused with national self- government . The concept represents an attempt to resurrect the medieval idea of the "Crownland Bohemia" as an integral part of the German Reich. | ■ 41 See, for example, reports on the situation in the Protectorate, September 6, 20, 1943, in DHCP. II, 732-33, 736-38. I | 42 For a breakdown of war material produced in \ Bohemia and Moravia see General Schaal's report to Frank, j January 11, 194^t, cited in Tesar, "Poznamky," p. 347. j | 43 I ; General Hofle's testimony before the Tribunal in j Prague, April 27, 1947, cited in ibid., p. 348. j > 4 4 i Letter from Himmler's personal aide-de-camp Brandt to Giess in Prague, September 29, 1942, requesting the acquisition of cement, tiling, roofing, and other building material enterprises for the SS, in Krai, ed., Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei. p. 497. I — i 45 I ! As head of the political administration, Frank would be directly responsible to Hitler, while as Higher Police and SS Leader in the Protectorate he was subject to ! 1 i ! 290 | t 1 i < j j ;supervision by the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and | jthus under Himmler's immediate control. | j j j Zpoved K. H. Franka. p. 152. The Party officials j [opposing Frank were joined by Wilhelm Stuckart, chief of the I .Central Office for the Protectorate in the Reich Ministry of; the Interior (see supra. p. 121), representing the Reich j 'agencies with jurisdiction in the Protectorate. It required] jthe combined efforts of Himmler and Ohlendorf, as well as ! |the support of Reich Minister Lammers, to secure Frank's appointment. For an extensive documentation of the events j leading to Frank's promotion to the office of Minister of j State see Bxman, pp. 254-304. 47 I Circular letter from Lammers, August 29, 1943, in j ibid., p. 302. The expression "Protectorate" was dropped, j it will be noted. The new office was to have jurisdiction j in "Bohemia and Moravia." ! I 48 i Circular letter from Lammers, September 24, 1943, j in ibid., p. 304. I 49 I Tesar, "Poznamky," p. 334. 50 / v Krai, Zlocinv proti Evrope. p. 382. Himmler had appointed Frank RKF in Bohemia and Moravia in 1941. See ! supra, p. 171, n. 117. J ^Tesar, "Poznamky," p. 334. i ^ Zpoved K. H. Franka. pp. 114, 153. j 53 ! j See supra. pp. 78-79. j 54 ' ■ Ibid., pp. 73-74. . I | ^Faltys, "Postavenx ceskeho pohranicx," p. 412. ; The radical Sudeten Nazis regarded the Sudetenland as the j natural staging ground for the Germanization of the "Czech i 'space." — I ; i I 56 I In a meeting at Jablonec (Gablonjz) in the Sudeten-1 [land, held at the end of May, 1943, and attended by Henlein,i Gauleiter Jury and the Deputy Gauleiter of the Gau 291 ; iOberdonau, Eigruber, the assembled Party leaders took sharp j exception to Prank's policies in the Protectorate and called! for the application of the "hard German fist" against the Czechs (Notes on the meeting in Jablonec, May 29, 1943, in Premund, ed., p . 35). j i 57 ■ ' I Prank's address in Bad Karlsbrunn, April, 1944, in| Krai and Fremund, eds., p. 152. 59 ! | Ibid.. p. 154. ! I j 60 i Ibid., p. 158. | 61 ! Ibid., pp. 158-59. j 62 i Frank's enemies in the NSDAP, so he claimed beforei ^ i the Tribunal in Prague, had denounced him to Hitler as a j "Bohemian separatist" (ffesky narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 103). | 6 3 I Koehl, p. 29; Broszat, Nationalsozialistiche j Polenpolitik. pp. 80-83. For the conflict between Koch and j Rosenberg see Doc. PS-02 3, IMT, XXV, 92-96. For Hans | Frank's protest to Hitler concerning conditions in the Gen- i eral Government see Doc. PS-437, IMT, XXVI, 14-37. j | 64 ■ ' Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi. ! Party. pp. 31-34. See also Karl D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 277. 65 ^ Both Hans Frank and Rosenberg came into sharp con-J flict with Himmler and protested against the arbitrary j violence and destructive activities of the SS, which threat-; ened the territories under Frank1s and Rosenberg1s control with social chaos and economic ruin (Koehl, p. 147; Broszat, Nationalsozialistiche Polenpolitik. p. 181). See also j excerpts from Hans Frank's diary, Doc. PS-22 33, IMT, XXIX, I 356-724. Similar struggles between the SS and the German civil authorities occurred in the Netherlands, Denmark, and ! occupied France (Krausnick et al.. I, 142). | n ..................: ..... ; ........: 292 ! | j I j g g | Conditions for the development of a successful Ipartisan or guerilla movement in Bohemia and Moravia were unfavorable. Quite apart from the shrewd policies pursued by von Neurath and Frank, the country lacked the topographi cal features and military traditions supportive of such an undertaking. Moreover, their isolation and the abandonment of the Czechs by all their allies at Munich had shattered their morale and weakened their will to resist. 67 The German Armaments Inspectorate thus was able to report that, during the first quarter of 1944, no major acts of resistance or sabotage had occurred. "Work discipline," the report added, "is satisfactory, and offenses remain relatively few" (Report of the Armament Inspectorate in Bohemia and Moravia, in Detlef Brandes, "Der tschechisc.he Widerstand in den letzten Kriegsjahren, " in Das Jahr 1945 ini der Tschechoslowakei. .ed. by Karl Bosl [Munich and Vienna: I R. Oldenbourg, 1971], p. 109). See also Tesar, "Poznamky," pp. 348, 353. 68 The revolt in Slovakia, led by members of the Slovak resistance movement and joined by elements of the Slovak armed forces, appears to have taken the Germans by surprise. The uprising was finally crushed by the German armed forces at the end of October, 1944. For-accounts of the insurrection in Slovakia see Lettrich, passim: Gustav Husak, Svedectvo o slovenskom narodnom povstani ("Testimony about the Slovak National Uprising") (Bratislava: Vydava- telstvo politickej literatury, 1964). 69 . . Frank esqpressed his growing anxiety m urgent requests for assistance dispatched to Himmler: "The re response of the Czechs to events in Slovakia is overwhelm ing. I am convinced that matters will take a dangerous and serious course unless the revolt in Slovakia is promptly put down" (Dispatch to Himmler, September 3, 1944, in Zlocinv j nacistu za okupace a osvobozeneckv boi naseho lidu ["Nazi j Crimes during the Occupation and the Struggle for Liberation! of Our People") [Prague: Statni nakladatelstvi politicke i literatury, 1961], p. 107). See also Himmler’s reply: "I j am convinced that . . . during the next few weeks one has to! count with a Czech national rising" (Himmler to Frank, ! September 26, 1944, in Tesar, "Poznamky," p. 355). \ 70 ; "Die Vernehmungen von Aufgegriffenen sind sofort | jund kurz durchzufiihren, alle burokratischen und menschlichen! Hemmungen haben zu entfallen" (Frank's order for the sup- j pression of partisan bands, November 3, 1944, in Dolezal and jKren, eds., p . 112 ) . 71 / Tesar, "Poznamky," pp. 376-77; Brandes, "Der tschechische Widerstand," pp. 107-10. i 72 ✓ Campaign speeches by Bienert, Hruby and other mem bers of the Protectorate government (Tesar, "Poznamky, " pp. 362-63). 73 Bienert, who as a former Czech patriot was thought |to possess better credentials, replaced the opportunist jKrejci on January 24, 1945, as head of the Protectorate gov ernment (Rhode, pp. 14-15). 74 As late as May, 1945, the collaborationist Protec-i torate government issued appeals to the Czech people in sup port of an understanding with Germany conducted between |"equals" and based upon an independent Czech state (Edito rial in Narodni politika, May 3, 1945, cited in Tesar, "Poznamky," pp. 380-81). 75 Address by the German Vice-Presxdent of Moravia, cited in ibid., p. 362. 1 | Ibid., p. 366. As the Oberlandrat Jonak in j Qstrava (Mahrisch-Ostrau) noted in one of his reports: j j"There is hardly any contact between the police forces and I ]the local population. This is why disorders caused by the { bandits cannot be checked and why faith in the German autho-j rities has been lost in a number of localities" (cited in j ibid■, p. 371). 77Ibid.. p. 382. 78 > See, for example, a letter complaining about the j increase of activities by "bandits" dispatched to the Reich I Ministry of Propaganda from the leadership of the Party j ^omen's Organization (Frauenschaft) in Ostrava (Mahrisch- j Ostrau) during the first week of November, 1944. Protesting! against the lack of success against the "bandits" displayed ; by the Gestapo, the SS and WH, the letter concludes: . .j it is high time to act decisively and to show the Slavs that (the master of the house knows how to use the hard fist, when (this becomes necessary" (ibid., p. 358). 79 j In his testimony before the Tribunal in Prague, (Frank complained that in the summer and fall of 1944 he had | ilost out to the Party at a number of occasions: Gauleiter j ■Jury obtained permission to transfer considerable numbers of (foreign workers into Bohemia and Moravia in spite of Frank's protests; the German Home Guards (Volkssturm) had been 'placed under the command of the Party; German refugees and ! (evacuees from the East were given permission to stay in j (Bohemia and Moravia; and, most humiliating of all, "the Ger-i man Minister of State failed in his efforts to be appointed j icommissar for the Defense of the Reich (RVKO) in the Protec-j jtorate" (Zpoved K. H. Franka, pp. 114-17). j ; 0 q / / / ■ j 6eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 70. 81 Tesar, "Poznamky," pp. 383-84. o p j Ibid.. p. 383. ( 8 3 i ! On April 4, 1945. Hitler rejected Frank's request! and ordered him to desist from taking any independent ini- J itiative (&eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 79). See also j (Krai, Pravda o okupaci. pp. 333-35. ' 84 / i | Schorner's order of May 2, 1945, in Krai and jFremund, eds., p. 161. The Field Marshal concluded his j (order with an ominous threat: "Similarly, action must be j (taken against those who are soft and tardy in our own ranks, ! jwho fail in this hour." I ■ 85 ✓ / / | 6eskv narod soudi K. H. Franka. p. 79; Brandes, j"Der tschechische Widerstand," p. 113. Both delegations | Isent by Frank to Allied headquarters failed to reach their i (destination. j I ' i | g g ^ ^ j Dolezal et al.. "Nacisticky teror," p. 163. See (also Jurgen Thorwald, Flight in the Winter (London: Odhams, ( (1953), pp. 223-25. 295 ! | v i I For an account of the uprising see Karel Bartosek,; Der Prager Aufstand (Berlin: Deutscher Militarverlag, | 1965) . ! I I { j ! i j CONCLUSION i No conceptual framework can mirror the essential uniqueness of historical events; nor can it contain the complexity and "infinite richness" of reality. At best, it will serve as an ordering paradigm and provide meaningful explanations for the patterns of facts discovered— a partial view to complement other partial views. The sole measure of its worth is the extent of the concept's adequacy for this . task. This study has attempted to reconstruct totalitari anism as an ideal-typical concept and to demonstrate its analytical applicability to the Nazi occupation of the Pro tectorate. Aiming at the conquest of new "living space" in the East, the totalitarian thrust of the Third Reich gave primacy to external expansion. The task of assuring the domination of the Herrenvolk over inferior races was en trusted to Himmler's SS, which achieved ascendancy over all other competing structures as the only one adequate to this 296 297 charge. The totalitarian "breakthrough" of the SS occurred, consequently, in the newly conquered lands of the East. As the first non-German country to come under Nazi rule, Bohemia and Moravia played an important role in the plans of the SS. Control over the strategic and industrial potential of the Protectorate was of decisive importance in the contest for hegemony over the Reich between Germany's established elites and the SS extremists. Weber's typological method brought these conflicts into sharp focus and provided this study with a dialectic perspective for their analysis. Reflecting the content of the Nazi belief system and the genetic conditions of their emergence, these conflicts were presented as struggles for ipower by antagonistic groups and individuals motivated by ideas and interests. They cluster around control of eco nomic resources, the legitimacy of authority, and the structural instability of the apparatus of domination, i.e., the antinomic balance between an essentially arbitrary totalitarian rule and the organizational apparatus required for the implementation of decisions . Circumstances surrounding the genesis of the Pro tectorate favored the traditional forces contending for its domination. Considerations of foreign policy— as well as the need to maintain the productive resources of Bohemia andj i i i Moravia for the Reich— impelled Hitler to entrust the exer cise of political power to men of the traditional ruling elite who were committed to attainment of Germany's aims by conventional means. The evident advantages to be gained from retaining the services of the Czech administrative apparatus imposed, moreover, a need for political modera tion, reflecting the fundamental contradiction between totalitarian goals and their implementation's dependence on a stable institutional framework. In the Protectorate the tension resulting from this paradox was heightened by the conflicting ethnic allegiances of the German rulers and Czech public servants whose collaboration was essential to imple mentation of the Nazi occupants' political will. The radical program of the Nazi extremists (aimed at i the Germanization of the Bohemian "space") appeared to en danger the orderly processes of governance in the Protec torate. In the initial phase of the occupation the totali tarian forces were compelled to accept compromise and re straints . Thus, the alignment of forces in Bohemia and - Moravia reflected the pattern of conflicts within the power structure of Hitler's Reich. SS ascendancy was achieved only after extended ..................... .......' " ’ ~ ....’ 299 : j struggles and in the wake of the revolutionary war against | the USSR. The SS' chances for eventual triumph were greatly I . ! enhanced as a consequence of the failure of the Resistance to prevent extensive cooperation of the Czech administration with their German overlords at home. However, only Hey- drich's devious use of selective terror secured, in the end, the primacy of the police apparatus over all contestants for power in the Protectorate. Heydrich's successor accomplished the consolidation of SS dominance and transformed Bohemia and Moravia into a i territorial base for the SS . German reversals in the East, however, compelled Frank to abandon ideological concerns in favor of economic priorities, and forced him toward in creasing identification with the interests of the terri tories under his control. 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Creator Brompton, Henry Buxbaum (author)

Core Title The Politics Of The German Occupation In The Protectorate Of Bohemia And Moravia: A Case Study Of A Totalitarian "Breakthrough"

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Murray, Ray (committee chair), Knoll, Paul W. (committee member), Krinsky, Fred (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-684957

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