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A Comparison Of Contemporary Conservatism In Great Britain And The Unitedstates
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A Comparison Of Contemporary Conservatism In Great Britain And The Unitedstates
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This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received HUGGARD, Nathaniel Letchm ere, 1919- A COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY CONSERVATISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. U niversity of Southern California, Ph.D., 1967 P olitical Science, general U niversity Microfilms, Inc., Ann A rbor, M ichigan © - Nathaniel Lotclinoro lln^pard All Rights Reserved A COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY CONSERVATISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES by Nathaniel Letchmere Huggard A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Political Science) January 1967 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SC H O O L UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ... ....................................... mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y under the direction of h.2.3...Dissertation Com- Dean February 1967 DISSERTATION COM M ITTEE TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ........................... Scope Objectives of the Study Why Study Was Selected Sources Plan of the Study II. CONSERVATISM AND CONSERVATIVES......... Historical Origins and Philosophical Sources of Conservatism Origin and Development of British Conservatism Origin and Development of American Conservatism New Conservatism in America III. HUMAN NATURE, SOCIETY, CHANGE........... Human Nature Classical Contemporary British and American views Society Classical, contemporary British and American positions Change Classical Contemporary British ideas Contemporary American ideas Chapter Page IV. LIBERTY AND EQUALITY..................... 152 Historical Origins Modern Aspects Law and morality Diffusion of power Foreign affairs V. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE............. 198 Private Property, Freedom, and Efficiency State Social and Economic Activity Introduction Contemporary Conservative and Republican Party views Policies Monetary Fiscal Social welfare expenditures Regulation Planning Nat ionallzat ion Rule by Expert or Amateur VI. SUtMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................... 307 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 330 ill CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Scope This study is concerned with an analysis and comparison of conservative political thought and policies in the United States and Great Britain between 1945 and 1965. Moderate conservatism in both countries is the basic type examined. In Britain this is represented in the writings of Conservative Party politicians such as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Richard Butler, and Quinton Hogg; and conservative intellectuals Michael Oakeshott, T. E. Utley, and J. Stuart Maclure. In the United States this is embraced in the writings of Republican Party politicians such as Robert Taft, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater to a lesser extent; and intellectuals Clinton Rossiter, Francis G. Wilson, and Arthur Larson. However, as needed, there is discussion of particular varieties such as the New Conservatism of American 1 2 Intellectuals like Russell Kirk, John Hallowell, and Peter Vlereck. Comparison o£ contemporary American and British conservatism requires seeing their positions in perspec tive. This necessitates an examination of the classical Conservatism of Burke and Adams— the ancestors, respec tively, of British and American conservatism— and of seeing it in relation to the secular Western political tradition which goes back to the Renaissance and Reformation and beyond to the Graeco-Roman and Judaic-Christian traditions. Particular emphasis needs to be placed on Renaissance humanism, and the impetus it gave to the empiricism, hedonism, and conventionalism of the modern age; and on Reformation libertarianism, all combining to produce the autonomous moral man of modern times. Comparison also means studying the pervasive liberal Influence of Locke on American conservatism and the American political tradition and the equally pervasive conservative influence of Burke on British conservatism and the British political tradi tion. Comparison also involves the investigation of the roots of the Republican Party in the laissez-faire con servatism of Sumner, Field, Carnegie, and Conwell; and in the influence of Whigs and Federalists. Similarly, it 3 makes necessary the tracing o£ the Conservative Party through Lord Randolph Churchill, Disraeli, Peel, Burke, and to the Tories. Objectives of the Study 1. By reference to the literature to analyze and state the body of permanent conservative principles regard ing man's nature, society, change, religion, liberty, equality, rule of law, private property, and state social and economic activity. 2. To examine the presence of these principles In contemporary British and American conservatism and their applicability to the problems facing contemporary British and American society. 3. To discern to what extent American and British conservatism agree with classical Conservatism and with each other. Why Study Was Selected Much has been written on American and British con servatism separately. There appeared, however, to be a need for a systematic comparative study of these two ver sions of conservatism In view of the differences and 4 similarities between the Republican Party and American conservative Intellectuals, and the Conservative Party and British conservative intellectuals. The writer felt there was an opportunity in this area for profitable research and writing. The need appeared all the more so in view of the satisfactory electoral performance of the Conservative Party since 1945— it formed the government between 1951 and 1963— and the generally unsatisfactory electoral per formance of the Republican Party during the same time. General Eisenhower's election is not usually admitted to be a success for American conservatism. Sources The abundance of conservative political literature, both original and secondary, made selection, based on ade quate reading, a central problem. The general bibliography and the use of sources in the body of the dissertation provide the comprehensive answer. As indicative only, the following original sources were useful: Plato, The Republic; Ernest Barker, Aristotle's Politics; Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, especially the Physics. Metaphysics. and Nicho-Machean Ethics; Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method; Edwin A. Burtt, The English 5 Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, which included Bacon's Novum Organum and The Advancement of Learning; Edmund Burke, Works (Bohn edition); George A. Peek (Jr.)* The Political Writings of John Adams; The Federalist; R. J. White, The Conservative Tradition; William Flavelle Mony- penny and George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli; Hugh Cecil, Conservatism; Alpheus T. Mason, Free Government in the Making, which included excellent readings on the American laissez-faire conservatives; Winston S. Churchill, Liberalism and the Social Problem. Europe Unite. In the Balance; Anthony Eden, Full Circle; Michael Oake- shott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays; T. E. Utley and J. Stuart Maclure, Documents of Modern Political Thought; T. V. Smith and Robert A. Taft, Foundations of Democracy; Allan Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America; Russell Kirk, The Con servative Mind and A Program for Conservatives. Some useful secondary sources were: Alan Grimes, American Political Thought; Richard Rose, Politics in England; George Sabine, History of Political Theory; Leo Strauss and Richard Cropsey, History of Political Philos ophy; Francis G. Wilson, The American Political Mind. Among journals, pamphlets, and newspapers were: The American Political Science Review. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Conservative Political Centre pamphlets, Harvard Business Review. Political Quarterly. Political Science Quarterly, and Public Opinion Quarterly. Useful in connection with the parts of the study related to economic theory and policy were: Adam Smith, The Wealth of Rations; John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy; Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics; John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money, and The End of Laissez Faire; Alvin Hansen, Economic Policy and Full Employment; Harold M. Groves, Financing Government; Eric Roll, History of Economic Thought. Plan of the Study Chapter II describes, analyzes, and identifies the basic principles of the classical Conservatism of Burke and Adams and of contemporary British and Aster lean conservatism in order that they may be used as needed in the remainder of the study. Conservatism in its different versions is viewed as a modern, hedonistic, empirical, conventionalist doctrine o£ politics, as an integral part of the secular Western political tradition, and as having emerged from the humanism of the Renaissance and the libertarianism of the Protestant Reformation. Its virtues are those conso nant with a society based upon private property capitalism and constitutional government. British conservatism is traced to its Burkean and Tory ancestry and the implications of this are considered particularly with regard to state social and economic activity. Contemporary American conservatism as an anti- New Deal manifestation is traced to its post-Civil War laissez-faire conservative origins and to its Whig and Federalist influences. The conservative influence of Burke on British conservatism and the British political tradition and mind, and the liberal influence of Locke on American conservatism and the American political tradition and mind are examined. In Chapter III, the related areas of human nature, society, and change are developed. The views of classical and contemporary British and American conservatism in these areas are analyzed and compared. Classical Conservatism sees human nature in its ontological structure to be com plex, intricate, good and evil, but dynamically oriented toward virtue teleologlcally working Itself out In history and political society. Man Is both a "Creature of God" and a "self-maker," possesses Individuality, moral free agency, and needs religion and education to politicize him. British and American conservatives share this general view but are more optimistic, particularly American, due to the liberal Influence of Locke and Jefferson, and the frontier tradition. Conservatives consider society to be natural and historical, and that man and his liberties and duties are Inseparable from It. Society Is a hierarchical complex of relationships, classes, groups, and Interests. The state, whose power must be limited and diffused, Is the central coordinating mechanism. Religion Is essential both for personal salvation and social cohesion. Aristocracy Is openly admitted by classical and British conservatives, but American conservatives do not even accept the natural variety; however, they do say the best should rule. Society, like all other phenomena, Is subject to change. Classical and British conservatives have a more flexible approach to change. Chapter IV discusses the key Ideas of liberty and equality and the relationship of political democracy, 9 power, rule of law, property, and foreign affaire to them ae viewed by claeeical and contemporary American and British conservatives. Conservatives consider liberty to be the fundamental objective of autonomous, moral man. Liberty is a solid historical achievement, not an abetract quality, and requires the virtue of moderation and the institution of private property. If liberty so conceived is secured, then equality of the right kind, that is, equality of opportunity respecting legal and moral rights, will be assured. Private property guarantees this. Chapter V deals with what is, perhaps, the most fundamental problem facing political thought and public policy at the present time— the relationship of the state to the individual in social and economic life. Conserva tives consider that the expansion of state social and economic activity threatens private property market capi talism, which they defend on the grounds of liberty and efficiency. Liberty, however, is the paramount considera tion. Private property assures liberty by providing an area of individual moral free agency beyond the reach of the state and by diffusing power throughout the society. The expansion of state social and economic activity con centrates more total power in the hands of the state and 10 accordingly threatens liberty. Consequently, British and American conservatives limit such state activity to the requirements of private property and Its virtues. Liberty, justice, equity, equality of opportunity, and economic efficiency demand some form of private property capitalism In the opinion of conservatives from Burke and Adams to contemporary American and British. British conservatives, due to their Burkean empiri cism and Tory traditions of social responsibility, are able to accommodate much wider state social and economic func tions. American conservatives, because of the Ideological status given to their abstracted version of Locke— reinforced by the lalssez-falre conservative Integration of Locke, Smith, and Spencer— have an antl-statlst bias which causes them to reject as socialistic much state activity. Monetary, fiscal, regulatory, retraining, plan ning, and public enterprise policies are used In varying degrees to implement state activities aiming at basic standards and security and the promotion and maintenance of full employment, stability, and growth without inflation. Chapter VI is devoted to summarizing the previous chapters and to drawing some relevant conclusions and implications. CHAPTER II CONSERVATISM AND CONSERVATIVES Historical Origins and Philosophical Sources of Conservatism Conservatism^- is a system of political doctrines-- though not an a priori political ideology— which first explicitly emerged in opposition to the abstract, extrem ist, rationalistic, innovating tendencies of the French Revolution. Lord Hugh Cecil speaks of Conservatism . as a force called into activity by the French Revolution, and operating against the tendencies that that Revolution *The Conservatism discussed in this dissertation is the Anglo-American varieties with their similarities and differences. The writer thinks that European Conserva tism— whether that of Hegel, de Maistre, or Mettemich— with its different substantive content, historical setting and experience, and mood and bias has very little, if any, common ground with English-speaking Conservatism. He accepts Professor Peter Viereck's recantations from Metter- nich as the archetype conservative and deplores this defect in the first place. 11 12 9 set up." And Rosslter says, "Chronologically, this conservatism Is a philosophy of politics that has existed only since the French Revolution." There Is overwhelming agreement among both American and British scholars of history and politics that the writings of Edmund Burke, especially his Reflections on the Revolution In France— although his works both before and after the Reflections contain basically the same political principles^— are the prime doctrinal source of modern political Conservatism and that Burke provided the most fundamental, elaborate, and systematic presentation of Conservatism yet uttered. Speaking of Burke In this con nection, Francis G. Wilson says: "... Burke's writings are the doctrinal source of modern conservatism."^ And Clinton Rosslter observes: "... Burke's Reflections on the Revolution In France (1790) Is rightly considered the first and greatest statement of consciously conservative ^Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1912), p. 244. 3 Clinton Rosslter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 16. ^Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 295-296. ^Francis Graham Wilson, The Case for Conservatism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1951), p. 5. 13 principles."6 R. J. White, a British scholar, states: . . . Europe was made, said Burke, by Christianity and the spirit of a gentleman, and he proceeded, in his great onslaught upon the Jacobin political geometers, to formulate from the facts, the values, and even the fictions, of the traditional society of western Europe, that body of ideas that we now know as the political philosophy of Conservatism.? John Adams, second President of the United States, stands next to Burke as one of the original formulators of the principles of modern Conservatism. British con servatives pay scant attention to Adams, but American scholars give him increasing attention. "Here, in John Adams of Quincy," says Rosslter, "was the model of the American conservative."^ Russell Kirk agrees when he observes that "his learning and his courage made him great, Q and he became the founder of true conservatism in America." Considering his position on property, moderation, law, order, equality, virtue and balance, these views regarding Adams seem correct. ^Rosslter, p. 16. ^R. J. White (ed.), The Conservative Tradition (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 14. Q °Rossiter, p. 116. 9 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 80. 14 There is another source of Conservative doctrines, The Federalist, that must be mentioned even though it, as John Adam'8 A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, was written before the out break of the French Revolution, and even though its specific purpose was to support the United States Constitution as drawn up in 1787. But its insistence that legitimacy in government is based upon justice and the consent of the governed, its safeguards against an "excess of democracy," and its concern that men of "property and principle" should govern, make its views Conservatism. Francis G. Wilson expresses these sentiments when he says, "In my opinion, this series of papers ranks with the writings of Burke in the creation of the modern conservative spirit in politics."1,0 In support of this view, Rosslter remarks: The Federalist is conservatism— we may fairly say Conservatism— at its finest and most construc tive. There is no talk of elites or a sharply limited suffrage; there is no talk of men who are or can be angels. There is voiced through all its pages the conditional hope that men who are properly educated, encouraged, informed, and checked can govern themselves wisely and well. The Federalist is neither defeatist nor cynical; it is grimly con fident of the feasibility of liberty.H 10Wilson, p. 56. ^Hlosslter, pp. 110-111.' w 15 Conservatism on the level of practice, that is to say, on the level of party politics, has its original sources, in Britain, in the activities of Sir Robert Peel and the Conservatives after the passage of the Great Reform Act in 1832, and, in the United States, in the activities of the Federalist Party. R. J. White states that "Con servatism was, to all intents and purposes, invented by Sir Robert Peel in the decade which followed the passing of 12 the Great Reform Bill." In connection with the Federal ists, Rosslter makes the statement that . . . the conservatives, under Washington, hence forth to be known as Federalists, could look back on two notable achievements: the Revolution, . . . and the Constitution; . . .13 The Great Reform Act of 1832— which Peel and the Tories opposed— was due to the pressure of those two immense forces of change, industrialism and political democracy. Under Peel's leadership, the Conservative Party (Lord Hugh Cecil says this name was adopted in 1835)*^ went out into the considerably expanded and dif ferently textured electorate and organized and consolidated 12White (ed.), pp. 10-11. ^Rosslter, p. 111. l^Cecil, p. 64. 16 its own political power, and despite Disraeli's taunt to the effect that Feel's activities amounted to Tory men and Whig principlesand his claim of educating the Conserva tive Party, . .it was owing to Feel that he had any party to educate.By accommodating to an unavoidable and existing change, the Conservative Party had obeyed one of the basic precepts of Conservatism as laid down by Burke, that "we must all obey the great law of change. But the Federalist Party forfeited much of its claim of being conservative because of its complete Inability to accommodate to these forces of industrialism and political democracy, and it paid the price of political death in the election of 1816. Rosslter writes of the Federalist Party: [it] . . . was a high-principled party of the Right that simply could not come to terms with the liberalism inherent in the American environ ment. It was too proudly and inflexibly conserva tive to outlast even the first explosive assaults of capitalistic democracy.18 ^H/hite (ed.), p. 17. 16Ibid., p. 162. ^Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke (London: H. G. Bohn, 1854-56), III, 340. ^^Rossiter, p. 121. 17 Conservatism's roots, however, lie more deeply in the Western secular tradition than indicated in its £irst explicit doctrinal and practical expressions. And a fuller understanding of Conservatism necessitates seeing it in perspective within the modern secular, duallstic Western tradition. Such an understanding requires tracing Con servatism's roots to the secularism of the Renaissance and 19 to the liberterianism of the Protestant Reformation. The Renaissance and Reformation constituted a completely new restatement and reformulation of Western life and thought in the fields of science, philosophy, aesthetics, morality, ethics, politics, and religion. The bias was, and has been characteristically secular but with a powerful religious element. Secularism has been unable to eradicate the teachings of the Judaic-Christian tradition, although it has been able to modify them. Thus, Western dualism has survived.*0 Keith Felling has sunned up the influence of these forces on Conservatism in the following words: But the Catholic order, the classic Renaissance state, new or revived concepts of law, and the reformed churches, which had made so many and such profound contributions to conservative thinking, ^^Rossiter, p. 121. *°Strauss, pp. 7-8; 165-166. 18 between them bequeathed the frame within which the thought of Hooker, of the divine right school, and ultimately of Burke, were set. In turn primarily a philosophical, a legal, a Christian, and historic concept, each new orientation overlaid, without destroying, Its predecessor, and after passing through the rebel sieves of Hobbes and Hume, emerged as a body of thought, which claimed the warranty of history and congrulty with science.21 Secularism has permeated every significant modern political doctrine, Including Conservatism, except that of 22 the modern followers of Aquinas. Its forms are many and for the purposes of this work It will be discussed In terms of political hedonism, conventionalism, purist rationalism, historical rationalism, and dualism. Political hedonism is the modern version of classical Epicureanism. It agrees with Epicureanism that virtue or happiness Is the satisfying of human wants that may range all the way from creature comforts to the aesthetic. The human virtues are deduced from human wants, desires, and passions. They are not deduced from a system of teleologlcal absolutes, a Highest Good, known by philosophical contemplation or theological revelation which was the position of the classical Greeks, Plato and 21Xeith Felling, "The Principles of Conservatism," Political Quarterly. XXIV (June, 1953), 131. ^Strauss, p. 8. Aristotle, with their cardinal virtues justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance; or the medieval Christians, Augustine and Aquinas, with the Christian virtues £aith, hope, and charity. But modern political hedonism differs from Epicurean hedonism in an essential point. Epicurean ism teaches that the attainment of virtue can only be achieved outside of and by the rejection of political society. Modern political hedonism contends that of it self virtue is, as Locke stated, "unendowed." Its actualization requires both political society and the appropriate arrangements within it. Hobbes, claims Leo Strauss, was "... the creator of political hedonism, a doctrine which has revolutionized human life everywhere on a scale never yet approached by any other teaching. Political hedonism leads to a form of humanitarian- ism that is "based on the premise that the fundamental moral facts are rights which correspond to the basic bodily wants."^ Political hedonism is the political expression of the teachings of modern science and philosophy that human 20 knowledge is created and pursued, not for virtue but for power, in order to give man control over the whole range of nature that he be able to Improve his human well-being. Francis Bacon, the founder of the inductive method, states the modern orientation well when he declares that ". . . the roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together, and are nearly the same."2^ Bacon further affirms it when he declares that if human knowledge is increased "... there cannot but follow an improvement in 26 man's estate and an enlargement of his power over nature." Briefly stated, the doctrines of political hedonism are that the virtues in terms of which men enter into and live within political society are deduced from man's natural passions, and that the purposes of political society are to satisfy man's wants as determined by his passions and emotions. Hobbes, the authoritarian; Locke, the constitutional liberal; Burke, the constitutional con servative are in this mold. "The passions that Incline men to peace," says Hobbes, "are fear of death, desire of ^Francis Bacon, Novum Organum. in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York: The Modem Library, 1939) , p. 89. 26Ibld., p. 123. 21 such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them.1,2 ^ And he continues that the virtue, justice, deduced from the passions or emotions, requires merely "that men perform their covenants made"28 because "... the nature of justice consisteth in 9 Q keeping of valid covenants." Locke's political hedonism is equally clear: The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things w a n t i n g .30 As each man's own property is protected and enlarged "the public good"3*’ ensues. Edmund Burke also belongs to the school of modern political hedonism. His property doctrine is as secular and capitalistic as is Locke's. As did Hobbes and Locke ^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. in The English Philos ophers from Bacon to Hill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York: The Modern Library, 19395", p. 162. 28lbld., p. 168. 29Ibid. 30 John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Hill. ed. Edwin Burtt (New York: The Modem Library, 1939), p. 453. 3IIbid., p. 438. 22 before him, he broke with Hooker's Christian doctrines concerning property. His views are thus expressed: The love of lucre, though sometimes carried to a ridiculous, sometimes to a vicious excess, is — the grand cause of prosperity to all states. In this natural, this reasonable, this powerful, this prolific principle. . . . it is for the statesman to employ it as he finds it, with all its concomitant excellencies, with all its imperfections on its head.32 Burke also rejects Aristotle's natural philosophy but says that Epicureanism is ". . . the most approaching to rational."33 And while repudiating the French Revolu tion, Burke has "... recourse to the same fundamental principle which is at the bottom of the revolutionary theorems and which is alien to all earlier thought."3^ Conservatism's acceptance and support of modern conventionalism is another manifestation of its modernism. Conventionalism is the view that man, the autonomous moral being, takes his bearings from his own activities. It rejects philosophical or theological absolutism. It is ultimately based upon extreme skepticism, upon the position 32Burke, V, 313. 33Ibid. , VI, 250. 3^Strauss, p. 316. 23 that the universe is essentially unknowable and that man's comprehension of it depends on man devising intellectual tools to create islands of understanding. "The understand ing," asserts Bacon, "must not therefore be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weightB to keep it from leaping and flying.Hobbes's view that "... justice consist- eth in keeping valid contracts" is conventionalism in explicit form. John Locke's doctrine of the unequal and unlimited acquisition of private property and its profit able investment once civil society has been set up and money introduced is a most politically persuasive conven- 37 tionalist position. Burke's position in arguing from circumstance and not from genus, definition or similitude, shows his harmony with conventionalism.^ "Circumstances . . . give in reality," says Burke, "to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating 39 effect." John Adams was also well aware that human ^^Bacon, p. 71. ^^Hobbes, p. 162. ^Strauss, pp. 239-251. ■^Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 55-84. 3%dmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 18. 24 society derived from man's own efforts and building4® and that only by experience, education, and appropriate civil and political institutions can liberty and property be secured and the virtue upon which they are built come into being. As Adams declared: The best republics will be virtuous, and have been so; but we may hazard a conjecture that the virtues have been the effect of the well-ordered constitution rather than the cause.^ Essential to modern conventionalism is the idea that "we 42 only understand what we make." The modern theory of knowledge as expressed by scientific method is another aspect of secularism which has far-reaching implications both for political philosophy in general and Conservatism in particular. The modern theory of knowledge assumes an intelligent subject studying an external reality about which he can acquire valid and useful knowledge if he uses the proper techniques and methods. Given the proper orientation by the subject, 40Kirk, pp. 112-125. 41 John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in George A. Peek, Jr. (ed.). Political Writings of John Adams (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 162. 42Strauss, p. 174. 25 which in the modern era is that man seeks knowledge to control nature in order to have a better life, scientific method moves along the line of observing, classifying, generalizing (induction) , experimental measurement in terms of time, length, and mass— ideas must be reduced to stubborn and irreducible facts by measurement— deduction, prediction in an unending activity. Bacon puts the matter as follows: Although the roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together, and are nearly the same, nevertheless on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions, it is safer to begin and raise the sciences from those foundations which have relation to practice, and to let the active part itself be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative counterpart.43 Bacon also points out in another passage that, . . . the light of new axioms, which having been educed from those particulars by a certain method and rule, shall in their turn point out the way again to new particulars, greater things may be looked for.44 Thus Bacon points out that true and valid knowledge involves not only rules, principles and method, but also experience and practice of the activity involved. These 43gacon, p. 89. 44Ibid. , p. 70. two strands— principles and practice--in the modern view of knowledge, flowed over into politics and political thought. The political interpretation of the view which emphasized principles and theory, reinforced by Descartes' deductive approach, led to the phenomenon known as ration alism in politics.*5 The political interpretation of the thought which emphasized practice and experience led to the conservative reaction, or what is here called "historical rationalism." Rationalism derives political authority and legitimacy from the combined use of reason and technique. Previous experience counts for little and may be harmful to a good ordering of society. Rationalism takes the view that man'8 political problems can be stated and solved in terms of doctrines and ideology formulated from an a priori position. It identifies the substantive political knowl edge with the ideology. It leads to an emphasis on theory and to doctrinalrism in politics.*5 Hobbes, who discussed politics on the level of science and scholarship, was the *5Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., 1962) , pp. 1-36. first modern political ideologist and rationalist. The "Parisian philosophers" of the French Revolution with their "theoretic dogma," "armed doctrine," and "speculatism," and Marxists represent an Intense form of rationalism in politics. Locke's formulation and statement in terms of principle, even in the English context, of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, is a mild form of rationalism.^7 The use of Locke's principles, in abstracted form, in the American experience, is a more sophisticated rationalism; and this use, powerfully supplemented by Smith and Spencer, has imparted to the American political tradition and to American conservatism within that tradition, strong and characteristic political and economic individualism which constitute one of their most distinguishing features. F. A. Hayek's economic doctrines, which in their policy 48 implications are a plan not to plan, and left wing British Socialists' insistence on planning and national ization, as a matter of principle, are also versions of rationalism in politics. ^7Ibid. , pp. 26-30. ^®F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944). 28 The aspect of the modern scientific theory of knowledge which emphasizes experience and practice is harmonious to Conservatism or historical rationalism. Practical knowledge, in its political form, corresponds to the traditional historical knowledge of the political society. This traditional knowledge embraces the prescrip tive institutions and the principles and customs governing their functioning. Practical knowledge, the tradition, cannot be learned and absorbed merely by studying a state ment of its principles, although such a statement could be made. Such knowledge demands actual participation in the concrete, self-moved activity. The practical and the analytical go together and cannot exist independently. Concrete historical knowledge whether in science, art or politics exists, then, in a dualism of technique and practice. Michael Oakeshott puts it thus: In short, nowhere, and pre-eminently not in political activity, can technical knowledge be separated from practical knowledge, and nowhere can they be considered identical with another or able to take the place of one another. 49 Historical rationalism— in its political expression first formulated by Burke— and Conservatism see knowledge ^^Oakeshott, p. 9. 29 as dualistic and as human understanding of the whole historical process which man, acting in accordance with the moral Instincts of his God-given nature actually Invented and made in concrete human activity. This view of knowledge helps to understand Conservatism's modernism and secularism. It helps to understand its acceptance of empiricism, conventionalism, moderation, the argument from circumstance rather than from genus, similitude or defini tion, its use of prudence— practical justice— in order to divine the intimations of the tradition to bring about and accommodate change within the tradition, and its acceptance of history as a guide. History, which is man made, becomes the standard of different national societies and the diver sity of national traditions shows the latitude given man as maker of his destiny rather than as a merely passive created being.History thus gives man the certainty which modern skepticism's teachings of the essential unknowabillty of the universe require. History becomes one of the islands of certainty, one of the constructs. "But history," as Strauss points out, "limits our vision in exactly the same way in which the conscious constructs ^®Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 134. 30 limited the vision of Hobbes. . . ."51 History and nature are congruent and such congruence which Is characteristic of Burke and Conservatism is secularist, empirical, and modem. On this point Strauss remarks: It was the tragedy of Burke's radical contem poraries and of his historicist successors that where he saw continuity between nature and history, they saw contradiction.52 Modem constitutionalism is another aspect of the secularism characteristic of the modem era. It is, to a significant degree, a secularized form of pre-modern Christian dualism which received its first systematic statement in St. Augustine's City of God, wherein it was shown, among other things, how a society could function with two heads— Church and State. Pope Gelasius, in his doctrine of the two swords, and other pontiffs expressed a similar view.33 The Church acted as an external limitation upon the secular power of the State. This Christian dual ism passed away with the Renaissance and Reformation and ^Strauss, p. 176. 52 J*Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Thought (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 619. ^George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1961), pp. 224-227. 31 hat been replaced In the modern Chriatian-Humanitt era by a purely secular form of constitutionalism limiting the power of the State.^ This modern doctrine found its earliest expressions in the works of men such as Bodin and Grotlus. And although Conservatism does not have an exclu sive claim on modern constitutionalism with its doctrines of limitation and diffusion of power, nonetheless Anglo- Saxon conservatism's traditionalism, acting in Britain through its Tory ancestry and in America through her Colonial inheritance, can claim a special relationship to the great landmarks of the traditions such as Habeas Corpus and the whole apparatus of the Common Law, Magna Carta, Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights. The writings of Locke and Burke, which rely upon secular constitutional arrangements to check the power of the State, protect the liberty of the individual, and yet to maintain a coherent civil society reveal the new bias. If their writings in this regard are contrasted with those of Richard Hooker, ^Frederick M. Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948). In this study Watkins takes the view that the con stitutional, liberal, Western tradition is a secular one with limitations on public officials operating through secular Parliamentary institutions since the decline of the Church's political authority. See especially pp. xi and 181-207. 32 the bias becomes even more evident. The Protestant Reformation and its libertarian theological doctrines, supplemented by Renaissance human ism , also had a profound effect on political thought. The Reformation's teaching of the autonomous moral individual has been thoroughly embraced by Conservatism. This doc trine led to constitutional liberties for man in his public or citizenship activities and to privacy in his personal life. The teaching of the autonomous moral man, of indi vidual moral free agency is essentially the doctrine of individuality which, while it is not the exclusive preserve of Conservatism, it is a fundamental and-consistent facet of Conservatism and one which it has never confused with individualism, economic or political, as Liberalism has tended to do. In commenting upon the place of Coleridge in Conservatism, the role of Protestantism is pointed out by White: . . . Coleridge . . . looked back beyond the Jacobins ... to the platonic tradition of Sidney, Shakespeare and Milton, and to the Protestant libertarianism of the centuries since the Renaissance. He brought to Conservatism a philosophic emphasis upon the moral free-agency of the individual within an organic society. . . .55 ^^White (ed.), p. 15. 33 Origin and Development of British Conservatism In Great Britain the Conservative Party is the political home of those whose mood and bias toward the theory and practice of politics is conservative. The word "Conservative" was first used to describe the Party in 1835 when, under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel, it was accommodating its principles and policies to the results of the Reform Act of 1832. And although the posture and policies of the contemporary Party have been developed in terms of a challenge-response mechanism from the 1830's to the present in relation to the great problems connected with the growth and deepening of industrial, urban capital ism, the expansion and complete acceptance of political democracy, and the economic role of the State in society, its lineage is traceable to more distant times— to Burke and to its Tory ancestry.^ Both the teachings of Burke and the traditions of Toryism are very evident and very powerful forces in the contemporary British Conservative Party, some of whose most important leaders are Winston ^^Nigel Birch, The Conservative Party (London: Collins, 1949). This work is an excellent analytical and historical survey of the origins and development of the Conservative Party. 34 Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, Alac Home, Lord Salisbury, Edward Heath, Richard Butler, Enoch Powell, and Iain Macleod on the level of party leaders and politicians; and Michael Oakeshott, T. E. Utley, and J. S. Maclure on the level of intellectuals. The word "Tory" originally meant an Irish bandit. Politically it was first used in 1678 by Titus Oates as an expression of odium and condemnation of the Cavaliers. The Cavaliers appeared in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. They were the defenders of Crown, Lords, Church and Constitution, although very few of them supported the Stuarts' divine right of kings theories or Archbishop Laud'8 pretensions. Stafford signed the Petition of Right and helped force the king to sign it. Falkland and Hyde helped abolish Star Chamber, Council of Wales, Court of High Commission, and the Triennial Act. The Cavaliers wanted reform of the Stuart tyranny and absurdities without revolution and within the implications of the ancient and fundamental Institutions of the realm. They played an important part in the restoration of 1660, the constitu tional settlement of 1688— which with subsequent modifica tions still forms the basis of the British State— and, under the name Tory, helped to bring Walpole down in 1740 35 after fifty years of Whig rule, formed the government in 1783 under Pitt the Younger, and again in the nineteenth century (before 1832) under Liverpool and Wellington. After the Reform Act of 1832, under the name Conservative, they formed governments in the remainder of the nineteenth century under Peel, Derby, Disraeli, and Lord Salisbury. In the twentieth century the Conservatives were in power under Balfour, were in Asquith's World War I coalition, and after Lloyd George's eclipse in 1922, were either the gov ernment or the main element in coalitions until 1945— except for two relatively short periods of Labour rule in 1924 and 1929 to 1931. Between 1945 and 1965, the Con servative Party was the government more than half the time, and when out of power its strength in Parliament and the country ranged from significant to formidable. The Conservative Party, then, in one form or another of its ancestry has outlived Stuarts, Cromwell, Whig*, Chatha- mites, King's Party, Liberals and, even at the zenith of power of democratic, constitutional socialism since World War II, it is viable as government or alternate government. The Party explains this long continuity of existence and service by saying that, while it must have support through out the political spectrum, it is not a class party and that it stands and has always stood for the true, perma nent, popular interests of the British nation as expressed in terms of its institutions and traditions and in its eliciting the political intimations of those traditions in accommodating inevitable and desirable change— the Party being . . the perfect secular analogy of its great historical ally, the Church of England. Toryism is traceable to and was deeply Influenced and colored by the experience of the Christian and feudal C O times. In essence, Toryism in contemporary British conservatism may be summed up as the quite successful attempt to retain and use some of the values and tenets of that older society in modern, industrial, democratic, capitalist society. The main Tory principles are: (1) Acceptance and preservation of the national historic institutions and traditions in Church and State. This led to positive advocacy of patriotism and religious faith even though the social and political utility of organized religion was as important as individual consolation and salvation. (2) Acceptance of political Inequality of men 57White (ed.), p. 1. 37 as an empirical fact, while at the same time accepting man's moral and spiritual equality as human beings. (3) Power is a trust and those exercising it will do so within the meaning of the ethics of the system, and that power will be diffused and limited. (4) The private prop erty principle is accepted, but as property is a form of material power it has an obligation to contribute to the public interest and to individuals. And the state as the organized moral force of society may rightfully regulate private property within the limits of public well-being and individual moral free agency. Benjamin Disraeli, who "... combined Burke's imaginative grasp of ideas with Peel's mighty sense of the necessary and the possible . . ."59 inserted the "organic filaments" of Toryism into Peel's conservatism which, as well as much genuine Conservatism also had strong Whig tendencies. Disraeli's Tory message to conservatism was: first, trust and faith in Britain's historic traditions and institutions in Crown, Parliament, and Church; second, faith in the people whose condition must be improved and who also must be enfranchised. Disraeli expressed it 59Ibid., p. 16. 38 a* follows: . . . if . . . instead of falling under . . . the thralldom of Capital, under the thralldom of those who, while they boast of their intelligence, are more proud of their wealth, if we must find new forces to maintain the ancient throne and immemo rial monarchy of England, 1 for one hope we may find that novel power in the invigorating energies of an educated and enfranchised people.80 Disraeli hoped that by uniting within the body politic the historic Institutions, which were the reposi tory of Britain's political wisdom and prudence, and an enlightened and enfranchised people that the Conservative Party could foster the national interest, the interest of every class, group and section, rather than the Interest of some special class, the industrial capitalist class, which, in Disraeli's opinion, the Liberal Party represented and furthered. The Reform Act of 1867 showed that the Tory-Conservative Party had finally accepted the principle of political democracy, even though it must be admitted that Disraeli acted from moral expediency rather than from moral Instinct. The passage on behalf of the working classes of much legislation, as the Artisan Dwelling Act ^William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, rev. by G. E. Buckle (new edition, 2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), I, 767. 39 the Compulsory Education Act, the Employers and Workmen Act, and the Conspiracy Act during his premiership between 1874-1880 showed not only that the Tory-Conservative Party believed in improving the condition of the people, but also demonstrated an aspect of Conservatism which at the present time is one of its principal features— that on the basis of empirical considerations the state can and should act to promote the general and individual well-being. In the year8 between the death of Disraeli in 1880 and the present time, the most illustrious example of Tory democracy is Lord Randolph Churchill, who was an aristocrat by birth but a democrat by moral instinct. His maxim was "Trust the people." He clearly foresaw that unless the Conservative Party established a firm and powerful base among the working classes it would become less influential and that labor would ultimately forsake the Liberal Party and form its own political arm--and the Labor Party is that arm. But Randolph Churchill's short life, intran sigence, and too great a sense of his own Indispensability prevented him from making concrete political achievement. However, from the time of Churchill's death in 1886 until the end of World War II, the leadership of the Conservative Party under men like Salisbury, Balfour, Law, Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain, and the influx with the Liberal Unionist of vast masses of both old and new wealth and property slowed down and diluted, but did not extirpate, the Tory element in the Conservative Party. But since the end of World War II, the Tory tradition of the Conservative Party has been revived under the leadership of Winston Churchill— the greatest Tory of the twentieth century— supported by the Party and particularly by such leaders as Eden and Butler. The Tory revival in the Conservative Party may be explained in terms of the need to reorganize Britain's economy for prosperity and even survival in a world where her industrial, military, and diplomatic posi tion has been so radically altered, in terms of the need of the Party's survival depending upon accommodating its policies to the mood of social reform in the electorate, and in terms of its Tory traditions. In Britain today the Conservative Party accepts in principle nationalization and the welfare state, and its differences here with the Labor Party are mainly those of degree and dogma. ^*The Conservative Party presently accepts and implements full employment, stabilization, growth, and non-inflationary policies and social insurance schemes to guarantee a basic national minimum but with no upper limit on accumulation. See T. E. Utley and J. Stuart Maclure, "Conservative Party Manifesto," Documents of Modern Politi cal Thought (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 76. 41 Burke's political principles and doctrines consti tute the other strand in contemporary British conservatism. Burke's views on the theory and practice o£ politics in Britain in the last century and a half have been unique: ... It is impossible, for example, to think of any British statesman of whom it might be truth fully said that his mind had been formed by Locke or Hobbes, yet it is equally impossible to think of any outstanding English parliamentarian during this period of whom it can be said that he alto gether escaped the influence of Burke.62 Burke's views are central to British political thought. "He is," observes T. E. Utley, "the Aquinas of British political thought. ... In short, . . . Burke is the central point from which heresies diverge."^3 And Harold Laski states that "Burke has endured as the perma nent manual of political wisdom without which statesmen are as sailors on an uncharted sea."^ Says Attlee, "The dominant note of the history of this country is its con tinuity. It is our national habit to look for precedents E. Utley, Edmund Burke (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc. , 1957), p. 5. 63Ibid. ^Harold J. Laski, Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham (London: Wllllams-Morthgate, 1920) , p. 172. 42 in tha past for avary atap forward which we make.”65 Burke la not tha axcluaive property of any one political party and yet ha ia not wholly repudiated by any except Faaclat or Communist, which are not Britiah in any event. The reaulta of Burke'a unique and central poaition are that both contemporary Britiah conaervatiam and the whole Brit- iah political tradition are Conaervative in the claaaical aen8e of the word. Both contemporary Britiah conaervatiam and the Britiah political tradition accept in principle the two baaic ideas of empiricism and skepticism, which contain both Burke'a and the Anglo-Saxon peoples' contribution of wisdom about politics.^ Burke'8 empiricism and skeptic ism are in agreement with the philosophical positions of Bacon and Locke, and they also complement each other. They are principles reconciling man to his own limitations. Hia skepticism sterna from hia belief that human reason alone cannot solve man's problems; and in order that he might find the answer, that he might find certainty and legitimacy, it led him to ^Clement Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), pp. 770-771. 660tley, p. 32. 43 argue from circumstance and to the acceptance of history as the guide. It led him to a position of reverence and moderation, and while it made him a Conservative, it kept him from being a doctrinaire one such as Hegel. Skepticism is not only a prerequisite of modern scientific method pioneered by Bacon and other English scientists and philos ophers in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but doubt is also a quality of the British nation which dis likes clear-cut certainty, and "Burke is prevented from being a doctrinaire Conservative by this English quality of doubt."^7 Burke'8 skepticism— and also his empiricism— are not only Implicit in his political writings but are explicitly set forth in the only purely theoretical and philosophical work he ever wrote, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, where he says: . . . When we go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things we go out of our depth. All we do after is but a faint struggle, which shows we are in an element which does not belong to us.68 67Ibid.. p. 31. ^Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. T. J. Boulton (London: Boutledge and Regan Paul, 1958) , p. 54. 44 Burke's empiricism, philosophically inseparable from his skepticism, stems in its political implications from his view that civil society began and exists to provide for human happiness and satisfy human wants. "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants he said. Man makes civil society— the contrivance— not by using abstract, metaphysical, a priori principles and theories but by using concrete knowledge gained by experience, experiment, practice, and history all under the direction of prudence which is ". . . the first of all virtues. . . ."7® Government is an experimental, practical science, an empirical art and "art is man's nature." Art is man's activity in making the arrangements for the satisfaction of his wants by Imitating the proc esses of nature in its self-fulfillment from the lower to the higher. Burke asserts: The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that science. . . ,7* CQ Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 90. 70Ibid., p. 93. 71Ibid., p. 91. 45 Moreover, man's reason and moral Instincts and affections naturally operate so that his acts are coopera tive. Thus the conventional and contractual nature of civil society become not a mere utilitarian legalistic contract but a partnership: Society is indeed a contract. . . . It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. ... it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.72 Such words as experience, experimental, practical, con venience, convention, art, history, prescription, and prejudice show Burke's political empiricism derived from his skepticism, from that "English quality of doubt."7^ Conservatism's empiricism expresses itself politi cally by accepting or effecting beneficial social reform if the national interest, rather than class interests, is promoted and if the traditional, national interests in Church and State are preserved. Burke, Peel, Disraeli, Randolph Churchill, Winston Churchill, and contemporary conservatives take this position. Peel's empiricism— and 72Ibid. , pp. 139-140. 73Utley, p. 32. Peel had in him, as did Burke, much Whig repentant or unrepentant^— is demonstrated in his words and actions with respect to the Reform Act and its consequences, and also with respect to the repeal of the Corn Laws. In both cases he claims to have acted to promote the national Interest and preserve the traditional institutions in Church and State. Relative to the Reform Act, Peel's empiricism took the form of loyally accepting it as a final solution of the constitutional issue raised by broadening the fran chise, of attempting to attach the middle classes to the Conservative Party by giving the Party a middle class creed, and by registering the voters, and in preserving the national Institutions of Britain. Peel's own words explain: ... I consider the Reform Bill a final and irrevo cable settlement of a great constitutional question. At the same time ... it is our firm resolution to maintain to the utmost of our power the limited monarchy of this country ... to maintain inviolate the United Church of England and Ireland. . . . This is the appeal we make to the middle classes— to those who are mainly the depositories of the elective franchise. . . . ^White (ed.), p. 12. U7 I do hope the Conservative Party of this country will continue to secure for themselves . . . the possession of that power and influence in the state which their wealth, their intelligence, their character, fully entitle them to exercise. 1 hope they will carefully consider every fran chise to which the law entitles them, and to secure to themselves the exercise of it. He defended his repeal of the Corn Laws on the same grounds. He speaks for himself: . . . the real question at issue is the improvement of the social and moral condition of the masses of the population. . . . The mere interest of the landlords, or the occupying tenants . . . are sub ordinate. . . . Sir, I do not believe that the great Institutions of the country have suffered during our administra tion of power.76 Peel's empiricism may be summed up by saying it was first, an amalgam of his lack of insight into political ideas as such and his astute and powerful sense of the possible and necessary. Second, it created the Conserva tive Party which goes back through Tories and Cavaliers to the early seventeenth century and forward to the present time. Third, it gave the Conservative Party a middle class creed which Disraeli modified but could not remove. ^Robert Peel, The Tamworth Manifesto, in White, pp. 157-161. 76Ibid., pp. 196-197. Disraeli— who argued from circumstance as did Burke and Feel— also based his political empiricism on promotion of the national interest and preservation of the national Institutions in Church and State. His history was Tory history which he romanticized and glorified by lavishing praise upon Britain's traditional institutions. He infused the spirit of his Toryism, characterized by traditionalism, emphasis on aristocratic values and leader ship, responsibility to the working classes and the poor, into the Conservative Party partly modifying its middle class creed bequeathed by Peel and giving the Party a general bias it still possesses. His political empiricism is shown at its expediential best in the Reform Act of 1867, about which he writes: The working classes will now probably have a more extensive sympathy with our political institutions, which, if they are in a healthy state, ought to enlist popular feeling because they should be embodi ments of the popular requirements of the country.77 Contemporary British conservatives accept empiri cism in the form of preferring circumstance to theory, and of promoting the national interest and preserving the traditional institutions. The argument from circumstance 7?Benjamin Disraeli, Speech, House of Comsons, 1867, in White, p. 170. 49 is an inheritance from Burke, who adapted Bacon's empiri cism to the study of politics. The fostering of the national interest and the preservation of the traditional institutions emanate from Toryism and historical experience and also constitute prudent, empirical, current politics considering the mood and composition of the British elec torate. Winston Churchill well typifies these views. Relative to the argument from circumstance, Churchill 7R remarks that "Logic is a poor guide compared to custom."70 And again he says: . . . Guidance in these mundane matters is granted to us only step by step, or at the utmost a step or two ahead. There is therefore wisdom in reserv ing one's decisions as long as possible and until all the facts and forces that will be potent at the moment are revealed.79 On the matters of the national interest and tradi tional institutions, Churchill's position is plain: Deep down in the heart of the old fashioned Tory, however unreflecting, there lurks a whole some respect for the ancient forms and safeguards of the English Constitution, and a recognition of 7®Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, October 28, 1943. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons) , CCCXCIIX (1942-43), 404. 79 Colin R. Coote (ed.), A Churchill Reader; The Wit and Wisdom of Sir Winston Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954), p. 149. 50 the fact that some day they nay be found of great consequence and use.80 And again he asserts: The House of Commons Is a living and deathless entity which survived unflinchingly the tests and hazards of war. It preserved our constitutional liberties under our ancient monarchy in a manner which has given a sense of stability not only to this island but as an example to nations in many lands.81 Conservative Intellectuals in Britain today also exhibit the empirical and skeptical point of view. Michael Oakeshott, who admits being a skeptic and claims to be an oo empiricist, is representative of their thinking. His empiricism possesses two main aspects: (1) adherence to a given political tradition, (2) rejection of ideological politics. Taken together, these two positions represent a preference for circumstance over theory, which was first expressed by Burke in his attack against the "metaphysi cians" of the French Revolution. In Oakeshott's first position, his empiricism is implicit in his view that true human activity is a 80lbid., p. 144. 81Ibid., p. 130. 82(>akeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Ration alism in Politics . . . . pp. 1-9. 51 seIf-moved, Integrated, concrete activity carried on in achieving an actual undertaking. Political activity ie such and requires knowledge of the actual tradition of a given political society whether that society exists from choice or chance. A political tradition is a manner of political behavior reflected in institutions, customs, and the flow of sympathy of the tradition. It has an ethos, a direction of movement, and is an identifiable entity even though it cannot be written as a mathematical equation. Men make these traditions and must live within their impli cations and intimations. Politics is an art and not abstract theory. "Politics," says Oakeshott, "1 take to be the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice has brought together."8^ And in more graphic language he explains: In political activity, then, men sail a bound less and bottomless sea; there is neither harbor for shelter nor floor for anchorage; neither starting- place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to1 keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behavior in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion.8* 880akeshott, "Political Education," in Rationalism in Politics . . . , p. 112. 84Ibid. , p. 127. 52 In his second position, Oakeshott's empiricism is a rejection o£ the ideological style in politics whether the ideology is a detached premeditated structure, such as Marxism; or the use o£ an abstracted version o£ another political tradition, as found in applying Locke to the French Revolution; and to a lesser extent, to the American Revolution. As did Burke, he rejects abstract theory; but, as did Burke, he accepts true theory as useful. True theory is drawn out o£ the actual tradition, is never to be confused with actual tradition, and can be profitably used by those who understand the tradition to the step by step solution of problems that are intimated in the tradition. Origin and Development of American Conservatism Contemporary American conservatism is essentially a modified version of laissez-faire conservatism of the Age of Enterprise and in its more immediate genesis is the offspring of the anti-New*Deal coalition of President Franklin Roosevelt's first term.***' The Republican Party 85Ibid. , pp. 128-136. 88Rosslter, Chap. V (pp. 172-212) 53 is the political home of contemporary American conserva tives and Its principles and policies are those of Asierican conservatism today. The Party's spectrum is sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate with a modicum of harmony the views of the radical right, such as the John Birch Society; the right of center represented by Goldwater and his numerous supporters; the moderate center, which includes the bulk of the Party, consisting of such men as Herbert Hoover, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and William W. Scranton; and eastern Republicans in such men as Jacob K. Javits and Nelson Rockefeller, who are left of center. The ranks of contemporary American conservatism also include many intellectuals such as Clinton Rossiter, Arthur Larson, Francis Wilson, Raymond Moley, Clarence Manion, Robert Weaver, Peter Vlereck, and John Hallowell. Russell Kirk, Rossiter, Larson, and Wilson find wide sympathy within the moderate center. Moley and Manion are distinctly right of center. Viereck is a Burkean whose confessed mistake in selecting Metternich as the conserva tive archetype shows some misunderstanding, in this writer's view, of English-speaking classical Conservatism. Weaver, Hallowell, and Kirk are transcendentalists. Kirk, 54 whom Rossiter describes as ". . .a man born one hundred and fifty years too late and in the wrong country ,"®7 has almost nothing in common with the Republican Party. Although contemporary American conservatism is strongly influenced by the values and spirit of laissez- faire conservatism of the period 1865 to 1870, its roots and lineage, as do those of the whole liberal American political tradition, go back beyond that to Locke and beyond him to the Putney Debates in Cromwell's New Model oo Army. The Putney Debates reveal that two revolutions took place during the English Civil War in the seventeenth century. The first of these took the form of Leveller egalitarianism and political democracy. Colonel Ralnboro's words "... that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he"8^ expresses that point of view. The second took the form of bourgeois capitalism, the defense of private property, and the advocacy of 87Ibid., p. 211. 88 Robert Green McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Aae of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 4-7. 8^William Y. Elliott and Neil A. McDonald, Western Political Heritage (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949), p. 559. 55 political and economic liberalism. John Locke was the ultimate defender of property, but Cromwell's son-in-law, Colonel Ireton, makes the issue very clear: ... I think that no person hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the Kingdom, and in determining or choosing those that shall determine what laws we shall be ruled by here . . . that hath not a permanent fixed Interest in this Kingdom. . . .90 The thrust to political democracy and the defense of private property have been elemental forces in American politics from the beginning of independent national exist ence. The Declaration of Independence found support in the principles of political democracy and the Constitution of 1787 in Locke's private property doctrines. Jefferson— always more conservative when in office— was a political democrat as was Jackson. The Federalists, in whose ranks stood Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jay and John Adams, were defenders of private property and were anxious that the Constitution guard against "an excess of democracy" and that political power remain beyond the reach of "men without property and principle." The Federalists' belief that the possession of private property indicated wisdom and political virtue, their anti-democratic bias, and their 90Ibid 56 elitism shows their conservatism. But their inability to accommodate to the changes brought about by the forces of political democracy and industrial capitalism imposed strict limitations on their conservatism and also caused their political death in 1816. Rossiter describes the Federalists as . .a high principled party of the Right that simply coulcUnot come to terms with the liberalism 91 inherent in the American environment." The American Whigs succeeded the Federalists as an indigenous conservative party. Its leadership was a type of urban patriciate drawn from the industrial, commercial, and financial communities of North, South and East, and was able to obtain enough support in the West and from the working classes in the towns and cities to win the Presi dency in 1841 and 1849. Rossiter speculates that it might have given something of Conservatism to American conserva tism if the slavery issue had not extinguished it in the middle 1850's. The Whig Party openly accepted and concili ated industrial capitalism and political democracy, performing a function in the United States similar to that of Peel in England. 91 Rossiter, p. 121. 57 Even though the tendency to political democracy hat been a powerful one in the American political experience, qo Locke'8 teachings have been the pre-eminent influence. Locke's teachings regarding conventionalism, hedonism, political and economic individualism, constitutionalism, representative institutions, and particularly private property are liberal teachings. They have given to the whole American political tradition and to American con servatism within that tradition a liberal tinge and bias from the time of John Adams, whose "principles," says Rossiter, "have proved at least as relevant to the American 93 experience as those of . . . Thomas Jefferson," to the present. In the view of Lionel Trilling, liberalism is "not only the dominant but even the sole tradition in America today.Locke's liberal status in the United States is comparable to Burke's conservatism in Britain. ^McCloskey, pp. 6-13; Jasper B. Shannon, "Conservatism," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (November, 1962), pp. 14-15. ^Rossiter, p. 113; Clinton Rossiter, "The Legacy of John Adams," Yale Review (Summer, 1957), pp. 529-550. ^Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1953), p. 9. 58 But at the same time it must be made clear that there exlet elements o£ genuine Conservatism within both the American political tradition and contemporary American conservatism. And this derives first from the native American feeling that the existing constitutional system assures about as much liberty and political virtue as possible; second, Locke's position as rationalizer and defender of the settlement of 1688 was a conservative position; third, the writings of both Adams and Burke were a conservative reformulation of Locke under pressure from the theories and events of the French Revolution. Locke's liberalism in the American political expe rience is not due entirely to the substance of his thought, although that has been great. It is due also to the ideo logical status given to the abstracted version of Locke's writings in the United States first by the Founding Fathers and continuously since that time.^ This ideological status enjoyed by Locke has had two principal effects: (1) It has inserted into the American political tradition and contemporary American conservatism a rationalistic streak that manifests itself in the form of materialism, ^Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Ration alism in Politics . . . . pp. 26-28. 59 dogmatism, optimism, uniformity, and conformity. (2) It has reinforced his substantive liberalism so that the Lockean tradition is still powerful. It was synthesized with the intellectual infusions of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer, and in this form provided the ethical support of laissez-faire conservatism and has been adapted to accom modate practical pressures and changes whether in the form of Grangers, Populists, Progressives, Theodore Roosevelt's Square Deal, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, Harry Truman's Fair Deal, Dwight Eisenhower's New Republicanism, John Kennedy's New Fron tier, or Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Laissez-faire conservatism was an exclusively American phenomenon. Locke, Smith, and Spencer provided its Intellectual and ethical foundations. Locke's doctrines of private civil property, which taught that the purpose of civil society was to promote and protect the unequal and unlimited acquisition of private property and its profit able investment, express the spirit of capitalism.^ Adam ^^For a discussion concerning the relationship between Locke's doctrine of the unequal and unlimited acquisition of private property and the spirit of capital ism, see Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 234-251; and C. B. Macpherson, ''Locksand Capitalist Appropriation," Western Political Quarterly. IV (December, 1951), 550-566. 60 Smith took this doctrine of private property out of its msrcantllistic institutional structure and fitted it into the new institutional structure— which, in fact, corre sponded to the actual changes in the British political and economic structure--of the laissez-faire market economy in accordance with whose principles resources were allocated so that cost was minimized, output optimized, and well being maximized. Herbert Spencer took Charles Darwin's principles of organic biological evolution— heredity, mutation, adaptation to the environment through natural selection, survival of the fittest through struggle— and attempted to apply them to the problems of organization, development, and progress of society and to the role of the state and the welfare and morality of the individual. He attempted to give scientific validity to the ethical 97 views of Locke and Smith. This secular, materialistic, hedonistic religion had very able American disciples and missionaries covering the whole spectrum of American life and society. On the academic level, William Graham Sumner of Yale University 97Sabine, pp. 721-725; Richard C. Cortner, "Liberals, Conservatives and Labor," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (November, 1962), pp. 45-46. 61 gave the gospel of Social Darwinism— laissez-faire conservatism--its most coherent, logical, and unmitigated expression rejecting even the tariff so strongly supported by the business community. The judiciary, in opinions and dissents of Supreme Court Justices as Field, Sutherland and Peckham, hammered out the principles of judicial conserva tism and wove laissez-faire conservatism's principles into the due process of law clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, despite the view of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905) , that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."^® The Protestant churches--and the Protestant ethic has had a broad and permeating influ ence in shaping both American and British political thought— provided eloquent spokesmen in such people as Baptist Russell Conwell, Presbyterian Henry Ward Beecher, Episcopalian Bishop Lawrence, all of whom identified the acquisitive, materialistic, competitive individualism and virtues of frugality, self-denial, and enterprise of ^®Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905)," in Charles Fairman, American Constitutional Decisions (New York: Holt, 1952), p. 334. See Lochner v. Mew York. 198 U.S. 45, 255 Ct. , 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905). 62 laissez-faire industrial capitalism with God's will. Even Pope Pius X spoke approvingly of J. P. Morgan, Sr., but Pius X's encyclical Rerum Novarum constitutes the Roman Catholic Church'8 views at that time. Journalism and literature echoed the refrain. Indeed, laissez-faire conservatism and its virtues became equated in the public mind with patriotism, loyalty, democracy, the basic social consensus of the American people, even with the American Way of Life. Rossiter comments: . . . Laissez-faire conservatism, the label I shall apply to this new philosophy, rose to prominence between 1865 and 1885, to ascendancy between 1885 and 1920, to domination— to virtual identification with the American Way— in the 1920's.** The new post-Civll War leaders of American society, the new right, the new elite, the new believers in politi cal, economic, and social inequality— the laissez-faire conservatives— were drawn from the industrialists, railroad magnates, and financiers of the North and Northeast; and all were masters of the corporate techniques. They built the post-Civil War United States in their own image and were in many ways the real victors of the Civil War. And this industrial plutocracy, in spite of reform movements ^^Rossiter, p. 134. 63 from Grangers to Woodrow Wilson In the interests of more effective and real political democracy and economic compe tition, retained domination of the political, economic, and social life of the United States until Franklin Roosevelt's economic and social reforms. In assuming leadership of post-Civil War America, the laissez-faire conservatives were able to make a prac tical and profitable arrangement with the two giant forces of political democracy and industrial capitalism which had swept the conservative Federalists out of existence and had converted their conservative successors, the Whigs, into the "shop and till" party. They boldly accepted political democracy as a fact of American life and ruth lessly seized control of the entire political apparatus of the laissez-faire democratic state.*®® They themselves became the agents and proponents of those vast technologi cal and economic Innovations which transformed the United States from being primarily an agricultural nation before the Civil War to being half industrial and half agricul tural by 1910, and so that today less than 10 per cent of the labor force is in agriculture and only one in twenty of *®®Shannon, p. 17. 64 the whole population.101 The laietez-falre conservatives effected their political, economic, social, and cultural leadership of the United States by using the Jeffersonian phraseology, the language of liberalism, the language of liberty and equality.102 In Jefferson's terms the words liberty and equality had a humanitarian meaning derived in part from Stoic and Christian traditions, in part from the Levellers whose political egalitarianism was a secular version of Stoic and Christian views of human moral worth, and in part by implication from Locke. But the laissez-faire conservatives gave the words liberty and equality an exclu sively economic interpretation consistent with their prac tical business objectives of accumulating and profitably investing capital, an interpretation which was made possible by the materialistic ethic of the period as expressed in Social Darwinism. These industrial-business leaders believed that "civilization was equated with industrialization, and progress was defined as the accumu lation of capital and the proliferation of industrial l01ibid. 102McCloskey, p. 12. inventions."1®3 This distortion and twisting of the meaning of the words liberty and equality has had far- reaching results and has effectively removed, for more than one hundred years, American conservatism from Conservatism except in so far as it advocates such ideas as traditional ism, stability, loyalty, unity, elitism, and a concealed anti-democratic bias. The laissez-faire conservatives interpreted liberty to mean the economic freedom to choose and pursue one's calling and avocation within the framework of law. It meant that to all men in accordance with their ability and ambition "... everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex and condition."1®*' And equality was interpreted as equality of opportunity. It meant "... the equality of right among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life."1®3 Justice Stephen J. Field's dissent 103Ibid. Justice Stephen J. Field, "Dissent in Slaughter House Cases (1873)," in Fairman, p. 320. See Slaughter House Cases. 16 Wallace 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). 66 In the Slaughter House Cages (1873) became the law in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) when Justice Rufus W. Peckham spoke for a unanimous Court; and In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) Justice George Sutherland Imposed the same limitations, using the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, on economic regulations by the federal govern ment as Allgeyer v. Louisiana put on state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment. But liberty stood higher In the scale of values than did equality. These men completely rejected the idea of equality of status, merit and reward, and here they agreed with John Adams. They believed men to be basically unequal in strength, ability, ambition, character, and effort. Consequently, economic liberty and equality of economic opportunity would result in a natural aristocracy of those successful In business who would be the leaders of the great numbers of workers necessary in an industrial society. However, the workers were also valuable and meritorious, needing the same qualities— though lesser ability— as the elite and those qualities were self-denial, thrift, enterprise, and effort. The principle of the natural harmony of Interests operating through the market held the two groups together so that the automatic and 67 unintended result was promotion of both the public and Individual well-being. William Graham Sumner put it thus: ... No man can acquire a million without helping a million men to increase their own little fortunes all the way down through all the social grades. . . . The millionaires are a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men, to pick out those . who can meet the requirement of certain work to be done. . . . They get high wages and live in luxury but the bargain is a good one for society.106 Andrew Carnegie symbolizes the businessman in the age of laissez-faire conservatism. The main problem of the age, said Carnegie, was the administration of wealth so that vast and unequal fortunes could be acquired side by side with the promotion of brotherhood and harmony. After paying the workers market wages, the man of wealth acted as trustee on behalf of the less wealthy classes. In Carnegie's view: . . . The laws of accumulation will be left untouched; the laws of distribution free. Indi vidualism will continue, but the millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor; intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself.107 ^^William Graham Sumner, Consolidation of Wealth: Economic Aspects. in Free Government in the Making, ed. Alpheus T. nason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 573. ^Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, in Mason (ed.), Free Government in the Making, p. 5b>. 68 The Chrletlan churches, especially the Protestant, also gave their support to the materialistic ethic and values of the age. They claimed godliness and wealth went together. Russell Conwell excellently conveys the view point: 1 say that you ought to get rich, and it is your duty to get rich. . . . Money is power, and you ought to be reasonably ambitious to have it. . . . Money printed your bible. . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It is all wrong to be poor, anyhow.108 Contemporary American conservatives, the bulk of whom are located in the wide and moderate center of the Republican Party, whether practical politicians or intel lectuals, support a modified laissez-faire conservatism. The ideas of property, liberty, equality of opportunity, thrift, incentive, enterprise hold a place of central sig nificance in their principles and policies. And these ideas still possess essentially the same meaning as in the Guilded Age. The unqualified belief exists that both t economic efficiency and the personal liberty that only constitutional government guarantees require a private 108Ibid. , p. 571; Russell Conwell, Acres of Diamonds. in Mason (ed.), Free Government in the Making, pp. 564-565. 69 enterprise, incentive, market economy, and allowing equality of opportunity. They claim support for these views on both logical and historical grounds, ultimately resting their case in the Constitution. They, as did their laissez-faire ancestors, dogmatically assert the necessary relationship between liberty and the laissez-faire organi zation of the economy even though both Locke and the Found ing Fathers were mercantilists. The Republican Party finds 109 its basic support in property and the business community. But there is at the same time a tendency to modify this traditionalism with its materialistic, optimistic, absolutist faith in free market capitalism's capacity to solve the fundamental individual and social problems of the present time. But this modifying tendency in no way con stitutes a repudiation of the laissez-faire ethic and method, and the basic Party view still reflects that of the business mind about politics and social problems. The modifying tendency results in a pluralistic outlook wherein the social and community responsibilities of business and ^0%or a discussion of the business mind of the Republican Party, see R. N. Stromberg, Republicanism Reappraised (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1952). See also Marver H. Bernstein, "Political Ideas of Selected American Business Journals," Public Opinion Quarterly. XVII (Summer, 1953), 258-267. 70 industry are emphasized, and where the family and other voluntary associations must be safeguarded and helped, and where even the state has morally useful and necessary functions--other than the maintenance of defense and law and order— to perform in order to promote human individ uality and social cohesion. The new orientation stems partly from electoral defeat and partly from the genuine interest on the part of political leaders and intellectuals to fashion within the liberal American political tradition— and using American materials— a political conservatism upon whose base policies could be formulated to provide a con servative solution for the social problems that confront and will confront the American people. And within the American two-party system a viable Republican Party is necessary. Herbert Hoover stands in the moderate center but is closer to the laissez-faire conservatives than are Robert Taft, Dwight Eisenhower, Rossiter, and Larson. Hoover accepts the great freedoms— freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear— but con tends unreservedly that there is a fifth freedom that makes all the others possible. That freedom is economic freedom, equality of opportunity possible only under an incentive, 71 private enterprise market economy: . . . there Is a Fifth Freedom--economic freedom— without which none of the other four freedoms will be realized. . . . to be free, men must choose their jobs and callings, bargain for their own wages and salaries, save and provide by private property for their families and old age. And they must be free to engage In enterprise so long as each does not Injure his fellowmen.HO Hoover does not exclude all government activity beyond that necessary to enforce business honesty and competitive enterprise, as his establishment of the Recon struction Finance Corporation reveals. But, In general, he equates government social and economic activity with bureaucracy and bureaucracy with tyranny: The key of such government action to economic freedom Is that government must not destroy but promote freedom. When governments exert regulation of economic life, they must do so by definite statutory rules of conduct Imposed by legislative bodies that all men may read as they run and in which they may have at all times the protection of the courts. No final judicial or legislative authority must be delegated to bureaucrats, or at once tyranny begins. ^^Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road. 1941-1945 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1946), p. 222. luibid. 72 Eisenhower's New Republicanism, while most certainly business oriented politically, is a reserved composite of both tendencies. Arthur Larson, one of his closest advisers in the field of political philosophy and ideology, well expresses this composite view of the moder ate New Republicanism: Now we have as much government activity as is necessary, but not enough to stifle the normal motivations of private enterprise. And we have a higher degree of government concern for the needs of people than ever before in our history, while at the same time pursuing a policy of maximum restora tion of responsibility to Individuals and private groups.112 Larson continues that the philosophy of the New Republicanism "involved a sharp change from that of the Truman and Roosevelt Administrations ,”113 and that "the difference is between having faith in private enterprise and not quite having faith in it."*’ * ' 4 He points out that New Republicanism is concerned with individuality and uses the Eisenhower Administration's social security policy as an example. "The striking thing," says Larson, "about ^^Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 10. 113Ibid., p. 17. U4Ibid. , p. 39. 73 these amendments Is the amount of trouble they went to In order to work individual equity . . ."115 He states that they give "... evidence of a philosophy of individualized rather than mass social security."11® Laissez-faire con servatism's individualism is slowly changing to New Repub licanism's individuality in a manner somewhat reminiscent of John S. Mill'8 revision in nineteenth century British utilitarianism but without Mill's profound and subtle intellectualism.117 New Conservatism in America There remains another area of contemporary American conservatism occupied by the New Conservatives and includes such people as Russell Kirk, John Hallowell, Peter Viereck, Eric Voegelin, and Robert Weaver. These are men of loy alty, integrity, scholarship, and judgment. But they are critics. They stand outside the world of affairs. In many areas they clearly stand outside the American political 115Ibid. , p. 150. I16Ibid.. p. 151. 117The Republican Party's philosophy and policies with respect to state economic activity are more fully examined in Chapter V and are there compared with those of the British Conservative Party. 74 tradition, tracing their intellectual ancestry to Burke and European figures like de Maistre and Metternich. Russell Kirk is the most widely known and contro versial of this group. The general substance and positive content of his thought are expressed in what he terms the "six canons of conservative thought."H® These may be summed up as belief in a transcendental moral order bind ing on man and civil society, belief in the principle of hierarchy and social class, support of private property and effort, opposition to Innovating change and concentra tion of power, acceptance of justice as fulfillment of self. But when the underlying bases of his thought are analyzed it is found to be unintegrated and contradictory. He attempts to relate Burke's Conservatism and Disraeli's Toryism to the economic liberalism of the Republican Party. This is comparable to measuring two different magnitudes without a transformation factor. Kirk's acceptance of Burke as his intellectual ancestor and inspiration gives him much trouble as an American conservative. Basically it puts him clearly out side the American political tradition whether that 118Kirk, pp. 7-8. 75 tradition is viewed in terms of the laissez-faire conserva tive synthesis of Locke, Smith, and Spencer or that still considerable element in it--one third according to 119 Rossiter— traceable to John Adams. Consequently, Kirk shares, intellectually, almost nothing with contemporary American conservatism, with its still powerful laissez- faire bias, as it is exhibited by the practical political leaders and conservative intellectuals of the Republican Party. He is also denied much kinship with Adams, who not only read his political lessons with Locke but with Locke adapted to the American environment and the American experience: . . . For all his talk about aristocracy and inequal ity, John Adams was John Adams and not Edmund Burke. The town meetings, schools, farms, and churches of New England— not the monarchy, peerage, estates and Church of old England— were the institutional base on which he built his Conservative theory. . . . The philosophical similarities between men like Burke and Adams cannot be ignored, but . . . American conservatism must be judged on American standards, the standards of a country that has been big, new, diversified, successful, and non-feudal, a country in which Liberalism has been the common faith and middle-class democracy the common practice.120 Kirk'8 acceptance of Burke as his intellectual source not only makes his own position incompatible with 119Rossiter, p. 188. 120Ibld.. p. 129. 76 the American political tradition and with contemporary American conservatism, hut it also leads him to the dilemma of rejecting Burke himself because he violates Burke's fundamental philosophical position of always argu ing from circumstance. Burke argued from circumstance and with complete consistency whether he was opposing inter ference by George III in the affairs of Parliament, defending the American colonies, Impeaching Warren Hast ings, or opposing the French Revolution. If Kirk really behaved as a Burkean Conservative, he would accept both the theory and practice of the Liberal American political tradition and articulate from it a conservative theory that would defend it and that would be intimated in it. Burke defended the British Constitution on this ground when it was under attack from the innovating doctrines of the "Parisian philosophers." But Instead of a conservative defense of the exist ing American political system, Kirk expresses an irrational and sentimental attachment to, and attempts the preserva tion of, an intellectual and political tradition that never has existed in America since national independence or colonial times. This is a dogmatic position inconsistent with Burke and leads to a ". . . conservatism of nostalgia, 77 the confusion of concrete living roots, with abstract 121 yearning for roots.' Speaking of Kirk and the New Con servatives in general, on this point Samuel P. Huntington points out that "their rejection of the existing American political and social system makes it impossible for them to be truly conservative."*’ 22 Huntington continues: "They seek to conserve an intellectual tradition which does not exist rather than institutions which do exist.nl23 British conservative intellectual Michael Oakeshott would also not agree with Kirk's flight to Burke. Oakeshott clearly states that the function of politics is the "... attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together."12^ Moreover, a political thinker must draw out of the tradition those * - 2^Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 150. * - 22Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," The American Political Science Review. LI (June, 1957), 47. See also Clinton Rossiter, "Wanted: An American Confervatism," Fortune. March, 1950, pp. 95 ff.; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., '*The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia," The Reporter. June 16, 1945, pp. 9-12. *2^Huntington, p. 472. ^^Oakeshott, "Political Educationin Rationalism in Politics . . . , p. 112. 78 principles in terms of which a political education could be developed that would be helpful in attending to these arrangements. This would be conservatism. Oakeshott con siders the abridgement of one political tradition through a process of intellectual abstraction and its application to another situation, such as the use of Locke in the American political tradition, to be rationalism in politics and the ideological use of the abridgement.*2^ He warns regarding this. But Kirk goes even further than this. He attempts to force into the Burkean mold the Liberal American political tradition which does not share Burke. He distorts the abridgement in this effort and falls into the trap which Oakeshott strongly warned against, of iden tifying the abridgement or the ideology with the actual tradition of political behavior. Indeed, Oakeshott consid ers the abridgement itself a distortion, not to mention its misuse. Kirk's transposing of Burke to the American political tradition is at variance with Oakeshott, who declares that: . . . the benefit to be had from observing what the distortion reveals is lost when the distortion itself is given the office of a criterion . . . 125Ibid., pp. 120-123. 79 because the abridgement itsel£ never, in fact, provides the whole of the knowledge used in political activity.12* * Thus, Kirk is cut off not only from Burke but also from Oakeshott whom he considers . .a brilliant disciple of Burke."127 Kirk's flight to Burke results in an unwitting dogmatism that leads him to do what he denied intending to do, namely, ". . .to preaching a neat metaphysics of conservatism."12® And this makes Kirk a type of ideologist who may be, says Kirk, either ". . .an a priori reasoner 129 or an a posteriori reasoner." Kirk is a strong supporter of private property market capitalism but his defense of it leads him to ambiguities, confusions, and conflicts. On the one hand, he condemns American materialism and its covetousness and avarice— forgetting, apparently, that Locke's doctrine of civil property removed the Biblical injunction against covetousness— and asserts that as a result, America is suffering moral decay, cultural decline, and vulgarity in 126Ibld.. p. 125. 127Kirk, p. 541. 12®Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. , 1954) , p. 2. 129Ibid., p. 4. tastes. He states that the American Way is equivalent to being "... Industrialized, motorized, Hollywoodized, capitalized, federalized, corporatized, synchronized, and 1 modernized." w All this exists so that avarice may be gratified and "... avarice, ... is desiring more wealth than one's soul can support properly."^l Kirfc warns that "confounding prosperity with strength and virtue is . . . perilous. . . However, on the other hand, he has unreserved praise for free market capitalism whose materialism is derived from the Lockean acquisitiveness. Free market capitalist enterprise, says Kirk, guarantees economic efficiency, political freedom, and is related to religious toleration and liberty. In this particular area— but on different grounds— Kirk agrees with Goldwater's economic views and those of the right wing of the Republican Party. His general position may be summed up as follows: Political freedom and economic freedom, the great majority of Americans think, are bound together in separably. Nor can freedom of religious opinion be 130Ibid., p. 199. 81 altogether separated from freedom of economic life. ... a free economy is a support of all freedom. . 133 • • In condemning materialism and praising market capitalism, Kirk fails to see that both must go together. It seems most contradictory to praise the method and condemn the results. Kirk's economic views reveal serious ignorance with respect to the role of government in social and economic life. He points out that "... our economy seems remark ably stable, . . . and our periods of recession or tempo rary unemployment are brief and moderate."134 yhat he should realize, as most qualified observers know and admit, is that the performance of the American economy is due in large measure to public economic policy even though Kirk considers such policies to be "servile" and "collectiv ist. Franct8 w. Coker comments on Kirk's views: Kirk does not take time to point out that our free economy has required various sorts of govern mental aids and restraints to keep it stable and efficient; that, from colonial times on, we have had a "mixed economy," with changing mixtures; 133Russell Kirk, The American Cause (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1957), p. 93. 134Ibid., p. 115. 135Ibid., pp. 106-108. 82 that demands for governmental intervention have come from various groups of energetic citizens, speaking variously in terms of special practical needs and of general principles of social justice, and from our ablest statesmen, from the beginnings of our national independence— more demanding, however, a totally planned economy or an equal sharing of goods for everybody.^36 And as Currin V. Shields also points out, the United States has had a long tradition of empirical collectivism— much of it on the state and local government level--which should 137 not be equated with tyranny. It is also curious to conciliate Kirk's ideas opposing state economic action with his admiration for Disraeli's Toryism with its record for social legislation during his prime ministry (1874-1880). There is another aspect of Kirk's position which brings very considerable criticism upon him from some New Conservative intellectuals. This is his apparent sympathy with extreme right wing phenomena such as evidenced in McCarthyism, with its overtones of guilt by association and accusation, and in the activities of the John Birch Society. 136Francis w* Coker, in American Political Science Review, LII (December, 1958), 1142. Coker reviews Russell Kirk's book, The American Cause, and devastatingly but gentlemanly demolishes Kirk's position. 137currin V. Shields, "The American Tradition of Empirical Collectivism," The American Political Science Review. XLVI (March, 1953), 104-120. 83 Peter Viereck is directly and openly critical of Kirk with respect to his position on McCarthyism and the John Birch Society.Viereck inflicts detailed criticism and strong moral condemnation upon Kirk for the letter's silence on McCarthy. Says Viereck, "Kirk is bankrupt . . . for having been wrong— no, worse than wrong, morally evasive— on such profounder issues as McCarthyism."139 viereck laments this all the more because, he says, Kirk is accepted as being ". . . intellectually and ethically respectable."*-4® Viereck also sharply rebukes Kirk for vacillation and political expediency relative to the John Birch Society. Ultimately, asserts Viereck, Kirk's criticism in 1962 of the Birch Society ended in demanding Welch's resignation, but without repudiating the Birch Society's immoderation, and that the motive was to obtain public support for Goldwater. In Viereck'8 opinion, both McCarthyism and the activities of the John Birch Society are "... thought- controlling nationalism, uprooting the traditional liber ties (including the 5th amendment) planted by America's founder s. "*’ 4*‘ *-^®Viereck, pp. 146-151. ^ ^Ibld. , p. 150. 140Ibid., p. 149. 141Ibid. . p. 151. 84 Clinton Rossiter is more restrained in his criti cism of extremism on the Right, but he is nonetheless equally opposed to it. Speaking of ultra-conservatives, Rossiter observes that "men who engage in this sort of political extremism can only be classed as 'pseudo- conservatives. ' Whatever else it is, McCarthyism is not conservat ism." Both Viereck and Rossiter oppose the political radicalism of the extreme Right. They oppose its attack on the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and on eminent individual Americans. They oppose its readiness to use vigorously the investigative power of Congress. They feel its immoderation in its desire to safeguard American liberty and security according to its own interpretation violates the American tradition of the right to dissent. Viereck and Rossiter take the view that the use of improper means to obtain the most praiseworthy ends is contradictory to American constitutional liberty. ^^Rossiter, p. 185. CHAPTER III HUMAN NATURE, SOCIETY, CHANGE Traditional and contemporary American and British conservatism reveal a remarkable similarity of viewpoint regarding human nature, society, and change. Basically, they all see human nature, in its bourgeois context within the Western tradition, as a composite of good and evil with varying degrees of emphasis. They see society and man as naturally belonging together. They all agree that society is a natural, organic, historically rooted, hierar chical , pluralistic structure made by man in pursuit of his many-sided human perfection. The traditional and contem porary British views are almost identical. Contemporary American views, however, show traces of the idea of an actual historical beginning of political society derived from the experience of declaring independence and making the constitution. There is also general agreement amongst them with respect to change— the usual position being that 85 86 change in terms of specific reform is acceptable but that innovation or careless tinkering is to be rejected. There is less flexibility in contemporary American than in contemporary British conservatism regarding social change. Human Nature Classical Burke's views on human nature are the most sophis ticated and systematic in either the traditional or contemporary literature. Burke sees man as a creature of God and an autonomous moral being who is always an end but never merely a means. Human nature in its ontological^ structure is complex, Intricate, good and evil, and dynami cally oriented toward virtue; and moves teleologically toward moral perfection in man-made, conventional, politi cal systems under the superintendency of prudence, which is, Burke explains, ". . . the god of this lower world"^ 1-See Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Thought (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 602-603, and 619 for discussion on this point. 2 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke (London: H. G. Bohn, 1854-56), II, 28. 87 and "... the first of all virtues. . . He believes human morality exists in a balance between man's non- rational nature— his passions, feelings , and sentiments— and his reason. Man's passions, feelings, and sentiments— which express the needs and wants of human nature— are the primary sources of human morality, but as there is, states Burke, ". . .a general infirmity of human nature,"^ reason, acting in the service of the natural sentiments and with their aid, sees the proper structure of human values and expresses human moral law for a given national society.^ Some of man's natural passions and sentiments are the desire for self-preservation and utility, love of acquisition and kindred, the religious sense which Burke called "... the grand prejudice, and that which holds all the other preju dices together";** and what he termed "... the natural taste and relish of equity and justice."7 ^Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), p. 93. ^Burke, The Works . . . . I, 307. ^Strauss and Cropsey, p. 602. ^Burke, The Works . . . . VI, 52. 7Ibid., II, 11. 88 John Adams' bourgeois morality is almost identical with that expressed in Adam Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments.^ Adams sees human nature as a complex of appetites, emotions, and passions. "Nature," asserts Adams, "... has wrought the passions into the texture and Q essence of the soul. ..." Man is both weak and virtuous and, he explains, "human nature with all its infirmities and deprivation, is still capable of great things. . . ."10 He enumerated such passions as the desire for self” preservation, emulation, pride, acquisition, avarice, ambition, and love. The passions are all unlimited and are the source of progress and well-being. Government should control and regulate them, but not eradicate them. Speaking of regulating the passions, he observes: ... To regulate and not to eradicate them is the province of policy. It is of the highest impor tance to education, to life, and to society, not only that they should not be destroyed, but that 8?or a discussion of this point see George A. Peek, Jr. (ed.), The Political Writings of John Adams (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1954), p. xxi. Q 7John Adams, Discourses on Davila, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden (ede.). The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 130. lOAdams, Letter to Nathan Webb, in Koch and Peden (eds.) , p. 3. 89 they should be gratified, encouraged, and arranged on the side of virtue.H Contemporary British and American Views Contemporary British and American conservatives also see man in terms of tension between his emotional and rational nature. Winston Churchill stated: "The best side of men'8 nature will in the end surely come uppermost. But this doctrine has its limits."1^ Quinton Hogg points out that "man is an imperfect creature with a streak of evil as well as good in his inmost nature.Clinton Rossiter says: "Man ... is a composite of good and evil, a blend of ennobling excellencies and degrading imperfections."^ Russell Kirk asserts that "the world is always a battle ground between good and evil in human nature. ^Adams, Discourses on Davila, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 131. ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, February 22, 1906. See Great Britain, 4 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Lords and Commons) , CLII (1906), 571. 13 Quinton Hogg, The Conservative Case (London: Penguin Books, Ltd. , 1959), p. 14. ^Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 16. ^Russell Kirk, The American Cause (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1957), p. 35. 90 Society Classical. Contemporary British and American Positions Natural.— Traditional and contemporary American and British conservatives see man, state, and society as concomitant entities. Historically, naturally, and organi cally they exist together and have always done so. Burke, the founder of historical rationalism and thus of the historical and organic theory of the state and society, says, "He who gave us our nature to be perfected by our virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection: he willed, therefore, the state."1-8 But although Burke states that God is ". . . the one great Master, Author and Founder of society"1' 7 nonetheless, he continues, "... Man, whose prerogative it is to be in a great degree a creature of his own making"1- * * must actually build his own national civil society in conformity with his own nature and the circumstances, sentiments and feelings of the time Ifyjurke, Reflections . . . . p. 142. 17Ibid., p. 134. 18Ibid. 91 because, Burke states, "Every age has its own manners and its politics dependent upon them. . . ."^ Thus, while God created man and established society as an institution, man must make his own way toward moral virtue and natural human perfection in his own man-made society through historical time under the guidance of reason and prudential wisdom. Man'8 art makes society and the virtues thus acquired become, through custom, prejudice and habit, his second nature. Such activity is wisdom. Burke explains: "Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance; her pride is in the use."^® Civil society so con ceived is natural to man because it permits the operation of reason, and man, Burke asserts, ". . . is never fully in his natural state but . . . where reason may be best culti vated and most predominates."^ Civil society thus ordained by Providence and thus made by man's art and con ventions may be considered the result of a contract but, if so, such a contract has a cosmic nature and is, Burke testifies: ^Burke, The Works . . . . I, 312. 20 Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 224. ^Hurke, The Works . . . . Ill, 86. 92 . . . but a clause In the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the higher with the lower natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place.22 In spite of man's emulation, avarice, and general depravity, Adams says, "There is in the human breast a social affec tion which extends to our whole species, faintly indeed, but in some degree.Men, as a result, states Adams, ". . . were intended by nature to live together in society, and in this way to restrain one another, and in general they are a very good kind of creatures.Although man's nature pointed him toward society, once there the virtues were developed. As Adams explains: "We may hazard a con jecture that the virtues have been the effect of the well- 9 * > ordered constitution rather than the cause. Contemporary British conservatives accept the views of Burke and Adams regarding man's natural social inclina tions. Kenneth Pickthorn sees the antithesis of individual 22Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 146. ^ ^ Adams, Letter to James Warner, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 46. 2^Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Govern ment of the United States of America, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 99. 25Ibid. and state as unreal. His opinions are representative. He asserts, ’ ’ Man, . . . means an animal, part of whose essence is society. . . Pickthorn continues, "He has a multi plicity of personages, and the whole of him goes into no one of them more than momentarily."^7 The conservative view of society, Quinton Hogg states, "... may be described as the organic theory of society"^® in which there is a proper balance of liberty and authority. Winston Churchill affirms that "human beings and human societies are not structures that are built or machines that are forged. They are plants that grow and must be tended as such."^ Keith Feiling explains, "The Constitu tion is more than Acts of Parliament and Common Law; it also embodies racial character and inherited ideals. Life is process without pause. 2®Kenneth Pickthorn, Principles and Prejudices, in R. J. White (ed.), The Conservative Tradition (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 51. *7Ibid. , p. 52. ^Hogg^ pt 28. ^^Wlnston S. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance (Cambridge, Mass.: River side Press, 1951), p. 47. ^Keith Felling, "Principles of Conservatism," The Political Quarterly. XXIV (June, 1953), 132. 94 Contemporary American conservatives show like beliefs in the historical and organic nature of society and man'8 natural proclivities for it. Rossiter says, "Society is a living organism with roots deep in the past. 31 The true community, ... is a tree, not a machine." He continues, "Society is cellular"^ and "Society is a unity."33 "Man," Rossiter says, "is a social animal whose best interests are served by co-operating with other men."34 Arthur Larson implies that government and society are natural and emphasizes "the necessity of attuning government to the deepest moral and ethical principles."35 Practicing conservative politicians in the United States do very little thinking either about human nature or the origins of political society. Generally, they are disposed to accept on faith the principles of the Constitution as 36 they have been practiced in the American experience. 3^-Rossiter, p. 26. 32ibid., p. 27. 33jbid. , p. 28. 34jtogSj L ter^ p# 27. 35 Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 148. 3^For further discussion see Jasper B. Shannon, "Conservatism," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (November. 1962). p. 15. 95 Classical and contemporary British and American conservatives display wide agreement respecting the struc ture and content of society. Society— which they consider natural, historical, and organic— is the whole hierarchi cal, social environment, framework and inheritance, and includes the state, political parties, schools, churches, family, voluntary associations, communities, neighborhoods, property, and all other groups and interests. Society cover8 the whole ambit of primary and secondary associ ations. Society is a pluralistic system of associations and relationships with every element in it having a moral function to perform in developing and promoting hitman individuality and virtue. Participation in the processes of society enhances individuality and virtue, and the more these are developed and refined, the better moral and social being the individual becomes. This complexity of human society is one of the essential safeguards of human liberty without which man is not an end in himself, and to be a moral being, man must be an end in himself. The state, the exclusive possessor and wielder of lawful physical coercion, has a central function in the social complex. It performs the primary moral duties of national defense and of coordinating the activities of the other 96 groups and associations to promote the private and public good. But it is not morally competent to supplant them or their functions, but it may give their operations a bias through its power to orient the social environment. Depending on circumstances, this may be morally right even in the case of a state religious establishment. But state- promoted unity must not be carried too far because this would curtail the free flowering of individuality and virtue. In this matter of unity, conservatives would reject Plato and tend to agree with Aristotle that public political policy must not, as he said, "... turn harmony into mere unison or reduce a theme to a single beat."3^ Prescription, custom, expediency, utility, equity, circum stances under the prudential guidance of those who under stand the intimation of the tradition and can obtain the support of public opinion are the criteria of state policy and action. Implicit in both Burke and Adams is the conception of a pluralistic and mixed system of society which exists to promote moral free agency and privacy through participa tion in its activities and processes. On the political level, both opposed unlimited and unbalanced power. Burke applauded the settlement of 1688 with the balance of ^Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), Sec. 14, p. 51. 97 interests it provided through the equilibrium of power in Crown, Lords, and Commons; and Adams was equally proud of the limits which the Constitution of 1787 placed upon and within federal and state governments. Beyond the state and its organization, both also observed the Importance of family, property, neighborhood, and other associations and groups. "We begin," claims Burke, "our public affections qo in our families." We must, advocates Adams, "... elevate the minds of our children and . . . excite in them an habitual contempt of . . . injustice . . . and an ambi tion to excel in virtue.Regarding the other social areas, Burke explains: To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society is the first principle (germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love of our country, and to man- Adams reveals almost identical sentiments when he discusses attachment to the social entities and the correlative social affection, when he says: 3®Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 278. oq Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams. in Koch and Peden (eds.) , p. 47. 40 Burke, Reflections . . ♦ . pp. 71-72. 98 The nation, kingdom or community to which we belong is embraced by it. . . . It is stronger still towards the province to which we belong, and in which we had our birth. It is stronger and stronger as we descend to the county, town, parish, neighborhood and family which we call our own.41 Quinton Hogg largely represents the feelings and beliefs of contemporary British conservatives relative to the pluralistic nature of society in the interests of variety, liberty, and individuality. The state and its authority are unreservedly accepted provided the tradi tional constitutional arrangements are respected. "Consti tutional authority," Hogg claims, "remains the first article of a Conservative creed."4^ But the reach of the state is clearly limited to public concerns, and there must be a wide area left for the free play of individual action and energy. Says Hogg: ... To the great majority of Conservatives, reli gion , art, study, family, country, friends , music, fun, duty, all the joy and riches of existence of which the poor no less than the rich are the indefeasible freeholders, all these are higher in the scale than their handmaiden, the political struggle.43 4^Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams. in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 46. 42Hogg, p. 53. 43Ibld.. pp. 12-13. 99 Clinton Ro8siter describes the contemporary American conservative position and also suggests some useful modifications. In Rosslter's opinion, while present-day American conservatives still support a form of lalssez-falre economic Individualism, they are now much more conscious of society and Its uses. The conservative, says Rosslter, "... has merged his old belief In rugged Individualism with his new concern for social stability and 44 has produced an alloy that he calls 'free cooperation.' * * But Rosslter thinks this Improvement Is Insufficient and believes conservatives must become more concerned with, he explains, ". . . those needs and pressures that Impel man to seek aid and comfort by associating with other men and thus, to some extent, submitting to their collective will."4^ There must be a new and systematic approach regarding the Individual's relationship to both voluntary and compulsory associations. Power.— Conservatives regard the question of political power as a fundamental one primarily due to Its 44Rosslter , p. 199. 45Ibld. , p. 260. connection with human liberty.They know that political power— which is public force— exists wherever society does and that discussion regarding its limits and ethical and moral justification are as old as political philosophy itself, reaching back to Plato's Republic and Laws. and Aristotle's Politics. Conservatives generally have a strong power sense and consider it both as a necessary evil to curb man'8 passions and appetites, and a means to virtue by putting man's will under the dominion of reason, wisdom, and prudence in political society. The inordinate desire for power is rejected. Power must be limited and con trolled by proper legal and constitutional procedures and must also be widely diffused throughout the complex of a pluralistic society. Conservatives, however, while requir ing limitation and diffusion of power, also realize that the exercise of power must be considered as a trust placed in the hands of those who are chosen to govern for a time and who know and live by the moral rules of the society and its political tradition. Power must perform service to society and individuals if it is to be morally grounded. ^^The relationship between power, authority, and liberty is discussed more systematlcslly in Chapter IV of this dissertation. 101 Burke possesses a profound Insight into political power and Its relationship to liberty. He says, "... liberty, when men act in bodies, is power. He under stands human desire and grasping for power, condemns it, and says it must be curbed by constitutional and moral principles. Explains Burke: It is not necessary to teach men to thirst after power. But it is very expedient that by moral instruction they should be taught, and by their civil constitutions they should be compelled, to put many restrictions upon the immoderate exercise of it, and the inordinate desire.4$ Power is a trust and, states Burke, "All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea they act in trust. . . ."49 And he censors those who, he claims, "... have betrayed their trust in order to obtain that power.The exercise of unlimited power is evil and, he asserts, ". . . must be the greatest we can conceive to happen in the management of human affairs.He feared, rightly as it happened, that the upheavals in France during the Revolution which 47 Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 19. ^®Burke, The Works . . . . Ill, 77. 49 Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 134. 50Ibld.. p. 79. 51Ibid. , p. 70. 102 destroyed the checks on power, would make "... the person who really commands the army . . . the master of your whole republic."32 Power that Is unchecked is power without responsibility, and such power leads to terror and crimes. Power needs responsibility. "Responsibility," Burke explains, "prevents crimes."5^ if power is unlimited and lacks responsibility, Burke states, "... defects of 54 wisdom are to be supplied by the plenitude of force." John Adams clearly sees that political power is the core of society. Its control and uses occupy much of his thought. His final answer is expressed in terms of bal ance, equilibrium, and separation of power if liberty is to be had. The legislative, executive, and judicial power, he says, "... have an unalterable foundation in nature; . . . they exist in every society, natural and artificial."33 Power is natural and unavoidable in political society. Winston Churchill, typical of present-day British conservatives, considers the question of power in a light similar to Burke and Adams. He believes power is morally 52Ibid.. p. 310. 53lbid. . p. 286. 54Ibld., p. 237. Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions . . . . in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 100. 103 right and necessary and must be sought not merely to control other human beings, but in order to serve the cause of the national welfare and even of humanity itself. Churchill's explanation of power upon becoming Prime Minister in 1940 illustrates the position. "Power," states Churchill, "for the purpose of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding to personal pomp, is rightly judged base."56 "But," he continues, "power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing."^ Herbert Hoover also condemns what he calls "the C Q grasping spirit of more and more power," and calls for limitation, diffusion, and control for undue concentrations of both public and private power. Clinton Rosslter states, "The American conservative has looked with favor on the diffusion of political power. He must now grasp the appli cability of this conservative principle to society, culture, and economy."59 5*Vinston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 15. 57Ibid. 58 Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. , 1946), p. 223. 5^Rossiter, p. 261. 104 Aristocracy.— History has so far taught that political society must contain both government and governed. Hierarchy and inequality in some form seem inescapable with respect to political leadership. The question of political leadership is a fundamental one in any society and is par ticularly so in modern, constitutional, representative political democracies where, regardless of the excellence of political leadership and policy, the verdict of the ordinary citizens expressed through the ballot box must be accepted at any given time on current issues. The excel lence required of political leadership in constitutional democracies must be brought into consensus with the views of the people who must also exercise the self-discipline which self-government demands. The survival and evolution of free government in its progressive quality and variety necessitates such consensus. Prudential political leader ship must not merely follow the shifts in public opinion but must give it an orientation, an inclination, a leaning; and this is, explains Burke, ". . .a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill"^ and, he continues, ". . . requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human ®°Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 90. necessities."61 Political leadership £alls in its duty unless it prudentially sets forth the intimations of the tradition. Aristocracy, the rule of excellence— which will also be the rule of the few, as only a few will possess excellence— has been advocated since the dawn of political philosophy. It is implicit in the Socratic formulation "Virtue is Knowledge" and was classed by Plato and Aristotle as the second highest in the normal polls. An aristocrat must possess, asserts Aristotle, "good faith and 62 . . . merit as well as wealth." Burke and Adams also considered merit, virtue, talents, adequate stable wealth, and to some degree, birth, as characteristics of aristoc racy which they both supported. Then, in political and social leadership, Burke and Adams were supporters of hierarchy and inequality. They were, however, at the same time supporters of the moral equality of individuals and of political liberty. These positions are compatible. Burke supported aristocracy and did so on the grounds that it was beneficent and natural. He states: 61Ibid. ^Aristotle, Sec. 7, p. 204. 106 A true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the state, or separable from it. It is an essential integrant part of any large body rightly constituted. It is formed out of a class of legitimate presumptions, which, taken as gen eralities, must be admitted for actual truths.63 His defense of the British aristocracy, whose prop erty base was in landed and mercantile wealth and some of whose members had the requisite excellence, was due not only to his belief that aristocracy was natural, but also because such defense was necessary to his defense of the British Constitution, which also contained monarchical and democratic elements. Nonetheless, Burke refused to endorse an insolent aristocracy of mere property, blood, and titles and required it to possess talents, virtue, wisdom, ability, and prudence. Burke did not, he said, "... wish to confine power, authority and distinction to blood, and 64 names, and titles." He continued, "There is no qualifi cation for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive."^ Every country needs to utilize its people's abilities, talents, and virtues. 63gurke, The Works . . . . Ill, 85. C J , Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 76. 65Ibid. 107 John Adams supported natural aristocracy and con sidered it beneficent. "There is a voice within us," Adams says, "which seems to intimate that real merit should govern the world. . . He continues: "Few men will deny that there is a natural aristocracy of virtues and talents in every nation. . . ."67 And he further testifies that "knowledge, . . . genius, strength, activity, indus try, beauty, and twenty other things, will forever be a 68 natural cause of aristocracy." The British Conservative Party at the present time supports the principles of aristocracy, hierarchy, and inequality in social and political leadership as strongly and as obviously as did Burke or Adams. The British ruling class, the unmistakable evidence of this aristocratic lean ing, exists in as plain view as it did in the days of Henry VIII or Burke. Leo Strauss asserts, "Britain has always had a ruling class, and it is scarcely less 69 recognizable today than it was four hundred years ago." ^John Adams, Discourses on Davila, in George A. Peek, Jr. (ed.) , The Political Writings of John Adams (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1954), p. 185. ^Adams, Letter to John Taylor, in Peek (ed.), p. 199. ^Ibid. , p. 209. ^Strauss and Cropsey, p. 125. 108 However, through the generations and centuries its compo sition has changed from landed aristocracy to include conmercialists, industrialists, bankers, and other owners and managers of property. The ruling class, whose natural political home is the Conservative Party, has co-opted the leading members of the other classes as these classes emerged and rose in wealth, power, responsibility, and political consciousness. This fluidity and flexibility in interclass social mobility permits the Party and the ruling classes— while never losing their identity--to be continuously replenished and reinvigorated, to keep in touch with the changes in social attitudes and opinions, and to keep their feet firmly planted in the real sources of political power which, as Burke learned from the French Revolution, are in the voting public as well as in prop erty. The Party's sensitivity to talent, changing social attitudes, the class structure and its political implica tions are well illustrated in the selection of Edward Heath as Party leader. Heath, whose father is a carpenter and building contractor, is of lower middle-class birth and lacks the wealth, prominent family connections, and exclu sive schooling usually associated with Tory leaders and 109 prime minister*.70 But he has the ability and the Tory attitudes. His selection does not change the aristocratic bias of the Party, but does show its growth and renewal capacity as well as its political astuteness. The Conservative Party accepts the class structure of society and its concomitant inequality, not because of a dogmatic elitism, but because it sees inequality as a reflection of unavoidable social and economic factors. Inequality, hierarchy, and aristocracy based on the actual structure of society are merely empirical facts to be accepted and used politically. The mass of the British people also accept this type of inequality, as demonstrated by their election of a Conservative Government in 1935 in the depth of the depression and by their election of Conservative Governments since World War II, when the democratic socialism of the Labor Party was at its zenith. The Party's aristocratic approach to politics, which it shrewdly, honestly, and instinctively exploits, has two important consequences. First, it gives the Party an electoral advantage in that it appeals not only to those 70For a discussion of Heath's family background see article by Ray Vicker in Wall Street Journal. July 27, 1965, p. 4. 110 who are already like it, but also to those who want to become like it. Second, the Party makes an important con tribution to political life by keeping this sort o£ politi cal message a living reality. This approach to politics is the core of British conservatism in the past and now.71 However, the Conservative Party's support of inequality, hierarchy, and aristocracy as working political principles must not be considered as being an anti-demo cratic bias, for the Party fully accepts constitutional, representative democracy. And even if some sections of it displayed such a tendency, its own inner self-regulating forces deriving from its national and popular foundations, as well as competition with the Labor Party, would nullify it. The Party knows that to be a national party it cannot be a class party, and even though it represents the inter ests and expresses the values of private property people, it must design and advocate policies and programs that have wide appeal to all classes if it is to gain office. The Party well knows the importance of votes. As Churchill explains: 71Por a discussion of this and related points see William A. Robson and T. B. N. McKitterick (eds.), "The Adaptable Party," The Political Quarterly. XXXII (July- September, 1961), 209-213. Ill The foundation of all democracy le that the people have the right to vote. ... At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy Is the little man, walking Into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper. No amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming Importance of that point.72 Contemporary American conservatives, although they believe that the best men should occupy the top positions In political, economic, and social power, and although they say the Republican Party is the party of principle and property, avoid openly expressing themselves in favor of any kind of a serving aristocracy. They do not even support the natural variety espoused by both Adams and Jefferson. Liberal egalitarianism Is too potent a force to permit advocacy of aristocracy and consequently of inequality in spite of the fact that the class structure 73 in the United States is well defined, is supported by conservatives, and that the real, concentrated power base of the Republican Party is, and will probably continue to ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Coamons, October 31, 1944. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parli amentary Debates (Coamons), CDIV (1943-4^), 667. 70 See Lloyd Warner, Social Class in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), especially Chapter 1, pp. 3-33. "Every aspect of American thought and action," says Warner, "is powerfully influenced by social class. . . (p. 32). 112 be, in the business community and private property. But in the United States there is not the open acceptance by the people of the idea of aristocracy as there is in Britain, which points toward the political leadership possessing a sort of prudential excellence in the Hellenic sense. The American people in an overwhelming percentage feel they belong to a vague entity called the middle class, which, in their view, essentially makes America a society without class distinctions. As Raymond Moley states, "One of the most treasured American ideals is our belief in a classless society The mass of the American people feel that the safety and the nurture of the Republic depend upon the virtues and ethics of this class. However, regardless of what the people or Moley say, the strong economic and property component American conservatives insert into the idea of liberty, and the emphasis they put on equality of opportunity in their view of equality, in fact, make the Republican Party a supporter of a type of inequality and, therefore, of hierarchy and aristocracy, directly related to business success and property acquisition— and this obvious fact has not escaped the notice of the American ^^Raymond Moley, The Republican Opportunity (Mew York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1962), p. 70. 113 electorate. American conaervativea must, in the intereata of the Republican Party, the two-party political ayatem, and the national welfare adapt their belief in thia business mind type of inequality to the political require- menta of modern, induatrial, Interdependent American 8ociety. The ariatocracy of the buaineaa mind must be replaced by the ariatocracy of the political mind— which alao haa wide room for the private property principle— acceptable to the American political tradition. The need for the United Statea to put more truat in her beat rather than in her mediocre membera is one that haa already received much attention. In thia connection, Francis 6. Wilson expresses the opinion that what America needs, as he says, ". . . is an intellectual application of the primary conservatism of the West. . . He indicates that the moat able people must come forward to political leadership.Clinton Rosslter takes a similar stand. Rosslter believes that American conservative political theory needs re-thinking, re-shaping, and re-stating in a form compatible with American traditions ^Francis G. Wilson, The Case for Conservatism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1951), p. 26. 76Ibid. , pp. 25-34. and the needs o£ contemporary American society.77 This work in theory must come first. As Rossiter asserts: "The new conservatism will do more harm than good unless it can arouse and be aroused by an earnest adventure in political theory."7* * Once accomplished, these principles are to be accepted and advocated by the Republican Party and submitted to the discussion and decision of the American people. There is, then, obviously a great need for the re-education of American conservative leaders who are not to be products of business, law, or successful military men. They will need a broad education over the whole field of the humanities adaptable to the political factor. British conservative political leaders now possess this sort of background and experience. Aristotelian amateurism, oriented to American issues, is needed. British conservative leaders already display these qualifi cations to a very considerable degree. Religion.— Conservatism, classical and contempo rary, although it claims no monopoly in the area, defends 77Rossiter discusses these problems in Conservatism in America. Chapter IV, pp. 244-272. In general the primacy of religion in human affaire, whether religion is considered in terms of individual consolation and salvation or of its political and social utility. In its political uses, religion provides social cohesion and purpose and emphasizes the area of privacy and individuality beyond the competence of politics and state power and serves as a criterion of criticism of secular authority. Conservatism, however, since it is a political philosophy, puts more emphasis on the political and social functions of religion. Conservatives in general consider religion as the source and inspiration of all human activity and that the religious instinct is a natural feeling or sentiment which Providence implanted in man's nature and which man possesses as a creature of God and an autonomous moral being making his way in this universe, of which society is a segment, partly by his own contrivances. Man is drawn to religious belief not only because of his nature, but also because of the incomprehensibility of the universe of which he and his makings are a part, and because he needs religious inspiration to create his own works— whether science or society. Incomprehensibility, the source of skepticism, leads to piety. 116 Burke embraced both the individual and political aspects of religion. He termed religion "... the great 79 ruling principle of the moral and the natural world . . ." and asserted that "... man is by his constitution a reli- Q A gious animal . . . and "we know, and what is better, we inwardly feel that religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort."81 Religion is ". . . the grand prejudice, and that which holds all the other prejudices together. . . ."82 If religion were to be abolished, men, he claims, "... are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take place of it."83 The substitute of the French metaphysi cians for religion "goes by the name of a Civic Educa tion."^ In its bearing on the individual, Burke considers the consolations of religious belief apply both "to the poor"85 and "to the distresses of the miserable great."88 ^^Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 146. 80Ibid. , p. 131. 81Ibid., p. 130. 82Burke, The Works . . . . VI, 52. aa Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 132. 84Ibid., p. 211. 85lbld p< 147 86Ibid. 117 In Its political implications, Burke sees religion as both a check on the exercise o£ power and as a means of partici pating in power. In so far as religion checks the exercise of power, the political leaders must know they hold their power in trust, and as Burke says: "They are to account for their conduct of that trust to the one great Master, Author and Founder of society.1,87 Consequently, Burke thinks necessary "the consecration of the state, by a state religious establishment. . . ,"88 In the area of partici pation in political power by the people, the state reli gious establishment is also a useful vehicle. "Free citizens," states Burke, ". . .in order to secure their freedom . . . must enjoy some determinate portion of power,"89 and as a further safeguard against the power of the state it is necessary to incorporate and identify "the estate of the church with the mass of private property. . 90 . ." In both its individual and political applications, religion helps check "the natural progress of the passions from frailty to vice. . . ,"9^ The "frailty" of the human 87Ibid. , p. 134. 88Ibid. 90Ibid., p. 146. 89Ibid. 91Ibid. , p. 205. 118 race does not require that conservatives accept the doc trine of Original Sin as a result of the Fall in the Garden of Eden, but only that in order to fulfill his potentialities man must place himself both as an individual and in his political society under the dominion of pru dence, virtue, and law. It is important to understand Burke's views on religion, especially with respect to their political implications, in the context of his own philosophical and intellectual position of political hedonism, empiricism, skepticism, and historical rationalism. The result was, as Leo Strauss says, ". . .a modification of the tradi tional belief in Providence. The modification is . . . 'secularization."'92 As a result of this secularization the churches are not merely religions, but also traditional, national political institutions— a fact well understood by John Adams and expressed by his phrase "political Chris tians." This secularization of Burke's thought is trace able through Hooker to Aquinas, who, in his synthesis of Aristotle's secular philosophy with Christian theology made concessions to secularism while attempting to maintain the 9^Leo Strauss, natural Eight and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 317. 119 supremacy of Christian theology. However, except in the 93 case of the Jesuits, secularism has won out in the West not only in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences and their supporting disciplines. The Renaissance widened and deepened the process of secularization Aquinas permitted. And the Protestant Reformation, while it was a genuine attempt to purify Christian doctrines according to its own lights, was also an adaptation of the traditional Christian ethic to the secular intellectual requirements of the modern age across the whole spectrum of human thought and action. Burke's words that European civilization is the result of the combination of "the spirit of a gentleman 94 and the spirit of religion" are to be understood within this framework of secularism as is the function of religion in general in conservative political thought. However, the Christian doctrine of the salvation of the individual human soul remained intact, although the Protestant churches modified the method of achieving this. But this modifica tion itself, by removing much of the mystery, shows the ^For further discussion see Strauss, Natural Right . . . . pp. 7-8. ^Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 115. 120 Influence of secularism. The new political and secular role of religion, however, brought ambiguities with respect to its precise function in politics. This is illustrated in Burke's words of criticism regarding the political activities of Dr. Price that "politics and the pulpit are terms that have AC little agreement."7' 7 Apparently, although religion is a powerful political force, the real check on political power is to be applied through secular constitutions erected in historical time by man's art. John Adams, a Unitarian, also supported religion both for individual salvation and as necessary for politi cal society. "Allegiance to the Creator and the Governor of the Milky Way and the Nebulae, and benevolence to all his creatures," says Adams, "is my religion.He also believes "in a future state of rewards and punishments, but not eternal."9^ Humanity being only a small part of the universe cannot fully understand it, and, states Adams: 95Ibid., p. 23. 9^Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 171. 97 Adams, Letter to F. A. Vanderkamp. in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 193. 121 "There is only one being in the universe who comprehends go it, and our last resource is resignation." Relative to the political implications of religion, Adams believed God had instituted a moral and intellectual government of all Creation and asserted that "human government is more or less perfect as it approaches ... an imitation of this 99 perfect plan of divine and moral government." Human liberty is part of this Providential order. "We have a right to liberty," he believed, "derived from our Maker."*- ®® However, man must build this liberty into his political institutions, but legislation is not to be considered "in any other light than as ordinary arts and sciences, only more importantAlthough, as with Burke and contempo rary conservatives, rationalism and secularism Influenced his religious views, when he reflected upon political society without religion, he remarked: 98 Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 196. OQ Adams, Diary. in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 30. ^^Adams, Dissertation on the Caujn Law, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 18. ^^Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions . . . . in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 85. 122 ... It there a possibility that the government of nations may fall into the hands of men who teach the most disconsolate of all creeds, that men are but fireflies and that this all is with out a father?102 Contemporary British conservatives adhere to the religious tradition— as modified by the secularism and humanism of the modern centuries— in politics. Quinton Hogg affirms: There can be no genuine Conservatism which is not founded upon a religious view of the basis of civil obligation, and there can be no true reli gion where the basis of civil obligation is treated as purely secular.103 Hogg believes that the violence and tyranny of the twenti eth century is due to "a retrogression from humanity, and a conscious abandonment of religion. Winston Churchill sees religion— Christianity— as a means of eternal salvation for the individual human soul and as a standard for individual and political ethics. Churchill asserts: . . . The flame of Christian ethics is still our highest guide, to guard and cherish it our finest interest, both spiritually and materially. The fulfillment of spiritual duty in our daily life 102 Adams, Discourses on Davila, in Peek (ed.), p. 193. 103Hogg, p. 19. . 104Ibid. , p. 25. 123 i f vital to our survival. Only by bringing it into perfect application can we hope to solve for our* serves the problems of this world and not of this world a l o n e .*05 However, Churchill sees tension between Christian ethics and the requirements of statecraft, especially in the field of foreign affairs. He says: The Sermon on the MOunt is the last word in Christian ethics. . . . Still it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding States. Their duty is first to deal with other nations to avoid strife and war. . . . But the safety of the State, the lives and freedom of their own fellow-countrymen, to whom they owe their position, make it right and imperative in the last resort, . . . that the use of force should not be excluded. . . . It is baffling to reflect that what men call honor does not always correspond to Christian e t h i c s .106 The tension which Churchill sees between Christian ethics and the requirements of statecraft in foreign affairs sometimes leads him to a type of cynicism and fatalism about religion. It alone cannot save man from mass slaughter in wars using modern science and technology. Speaking of World War 1, he states: "Religion having discreetly avoided conflict on the fundamental issues, lO^Winston s. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 48. ^^Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958) , p. 320. offered its encouragements and consolations, through all its forms, impartially to all the combatants."1* 07 Man's historical experience, his institutions, and his prudence must also be pressed into service. Despite the tension, however, Churchill accepts Christian ethics in their indi vidual and social Implications. Although Churchill and Burke have wide agreement regarding religion— Burke showed no cynicism— they arrived at different conclusions regarding the possible movement of human history, the destiny of man, and the survival of traditional liberty and freedom. When it appeared to Burke that the doctrines of the French Revolution might succeed, his philosophy of circumstance and his secularized version of Providence showed themselves. If they should succeed they should be regarded, rather, he states, ". . .as decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of 108 men." To oppose them, he says, "... will not be 109 resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate." Churchill, however, facing disaster in 1940, proclaimed, ^^Winston S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1932) , p. 246. 10®Burke, The Works . . . . Ill, 393. 125 "We shall draw from the heart of suffering Itself the means of inspiration and survival.His optimism regarding man's destiny is again shown when he declares, "People in bondage need never despair. Let them hope and trust in the genius of mankind."*** Michael Oakeshott, however, rejects the view that conservatism in politics requires religious faith and practice. He also denies the necessity of the associated views of the absolute moral value of human personality or the belief in a transcendental natural law providentially revealing justice which human beings and human society must follow or face disaster. He admits, however, that many people who are conservative politically have supported some of these positions and may even believe their conservatism to be founded upon and deduced from these beliefs. But his own position in these respects is clear: . . . What makes a conservative disposition in politics intelligible is nothing to do with a natural law or a providential order, nothing to do with morals or religion; it is the observation **®Winston S. Churchill, Blood. Sweat and Tears (Mew York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941) , p. 369. U1Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 47. 126 of our current manner of living combined with the belief . . . that governing la a apacific and limited activity, namely the provision and custody of general rules of conduct. . . .112 Contemporary American conservatives firmly support the individual and political benefits of religion. Gener ally their views echo the Declaration of Independence as well as the traditional writers. Herbert Hoover declares that America derives her liberties and strength not only "from great political and social truths, but from spiritual convictions . . . from a deep and abiding faith in Almighty God."^3 in itg service to individuals, Christianity per forms "the great task of healing the hearts of those who mourn, of bringing strength to those who must be strong."^^ Eisenhower states, "The political freedoms we know, the American concept of democracy, certainly include a faith related to some religion.Rossiter says, "The mortar that holds together the mosaic of Conservatism is religious 112Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., 1962) , p. 184. ^Hoover, p. 378. u4Ibid., p. 379. ^^Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Allan Taylor (ed.), What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), p. 50. 127 feelingand "no Conservative can afford to be casual about religion."**7 However, Rossiter does admit the possibility that the individual American conservative may 118 "belong to . . . any or no church," thus qualifying to some extent the necessity of religion to a conservative. Russell Kirk asserts: "The United States is a Christian 119 nation," and "Christian doctrines . . . have formed 1 90 American character and society. . . Conservatism is often considered outmoded and anti intellectual because of its espousal of religion in human affairs. But since some of the greatest modern scientists and philosophical thinkers also support religion in some form, this claim is debatable. Albert Einstein considers man's religious feelings as the source of his cosmic bear ings and of the inspiration without which man would never create theoretical science. Einstein states that "cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and noblest motive for scientific research."*2* The origins of religion, and 116Rossiter, p. 43. **7Ibid. **8Ibid. , p. 246. 119Kirk, p. 23. *20Ibid., p. 25. 121 Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1954), p. 39. 128 science and art as well, are in the emotion and experience of mystery that comes from, says Einstein, "a knowledge of the existence of something we cannot understand ,”^22 and like Burke, he reveres what he cannot understand. He con tinues: M. . . science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be, and outside of its domain value judgements 123 remain necessary." "Religion," he claims, "deals only 124 with evaluations of human thought and action. . . ." Religion provides the essential faith upon which scientific articulation depends. "I cannot," Einstein asserts, "con ceive of a genuine scientist without that faith."125 He sums up by saying that "science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind."126 Alfred North Whitehead also supports the univer sality and the fundamental need of religion in human affairs. "Religion," Whitehead states, "is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the 12 7 passing flux of immediate things." The religious 122Ibid. . p. 11. 123Ibid., p. 45. 124Ibld. 12^Ibid. , p. 46. 126Ibid. 127 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The New American Library, 1959), p. 171. 129 vision, he continues, "claims nothing but worship"1,28 and "its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism.”^9 ls meaningless without religious worship of God, but with it, life is, he says, "an adven- ture of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable."130 Religious rituals must inspire this worship of God because, states Whitehead, "the power of God is the worship he inspires."131 Conservatives and these modern scientific and philosophical thinkers will, however, have some differences regarding the content of religion. Conservatives will sup port some given historical religious system and its moral teachings because they are concerned with politics which, as did Burke, they consider to be the principles of morality enlarged. Anglo-American conservatives, for historical reasons, generally support Protestant Chris tianity and this explains why, to a significant degree, they have so strong a libertarian bias because, as Burke said, "All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, 128Ibid. , p. 172. 129Ibid., p. 171. 130Ibid., p. 172. 131Ibid. Is a sort of dissent,"13^ and continued, "... the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance: It is the dis- sidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion."^33 In Britain, conservatives tend toward Anglicanism and in the United States toward the Free Churches, although in both countries any religious follow ing is acceptable. Conservatives, because of the moral uses to which they put religion, see God as an anthropomor phic Being and support a formal, organized church, a systematic theology, and appropriate rituals. Modern scientists and philosophers, as such, do not visualize God in terms of anthropomorphism. Their view of religion as a "cosmic feeling" or "vision" possessing a super-personal value"*3^ or feelings of "worship" makes it unnecessary and even impossible to visualize God as an anthropomorphic Being. In Einstein's case, no formal church organization, rituals, or systematic theology are required.*33 Whitehead thinks lofty rituals impel toward *3^Burke, The Works . . . . I, 466. 133Ibid. 134Einstein, p. 45. 131 the deep reverence and worship of God.138 However, in so far as religious feelings have application to man's moral and social life, Einstein admits "they exist in a healthy society as powerful traditions . . .'*137 and says that "they come into being not through demonstration but through 138 revelation, through the medium of powerful personalities." He further agrees that the cosmic religious feeling of a genuine scientist ". . .is beyond question closely akin to that which has possessed the religious geniuses of all 1 4 Q ages." J He also states: "The highest principles for our aspirations and judgements are given to us in the Jewish- Christian religious tradition."1^8 Whitehead, who states that "Greece was the mother of Europe . . . however, feels that to use religion because of its political and social value is to debase and erode it. He expresses his position as follows: . . . The nonreligious motive which has entered into modern religious thought is the desire for a comfortable organization of society. Religion has been presented as valuable for the ordering of life. Its claims have been rested upon its 136Whitehead, p. 172. 137Einstein, p. 42. 138Ibid. , p. 43. 139Ibid. , p. 40. ^®Einatein, p. 43. ^*Whitahead, p. 14. 132 function as a sanction to right conduct. We have here a subtle degradation of religious Ideas . . . . The Insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour.14* But regardless of the agreements and disagreements concern ing religious content and Its social uses, both classical and contemporary conservatives and modern scientists and philosophers support the religious principle as Inherent In man's nature. Change The Ideas of permanence and change are Implicit In the Idea of nature Invented In the sixth and seventh centuries B.C. by the Ionian philosophers whose pioneering Intellectual efforts mark the beginning of European philos ophy. Aristotle— who refers to philosophers as men who discourse on nature and who contrasts them with their predecessors who discoursed on gods and myths*-4^— Is our best authority on the lonlans and considers, as did they In general, that nature Is "the Immediate persisting material of anything which has within Itself a beginning of 142Ibid., p. 171. ^Aristotle, In Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941 IT, pp. 692-693. 133 movement or change."*44 All Is permanence and all Is flux. Change is natural, inevitable, universal; yet, since iden tity is preserved, change is not innovation. Aristotle's view on nature, permanence, and change stated at the begin ning of the philosophic era is shared also by modem philosophical thinkers. Says Alfred North Whitehead: There are two principles inherent in the nature of things, recurring in some particular embodiments whatever we explore— the spirit of change and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing real without both. Mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing. . . . Mere con servation without change cannot conserve.145 Classical Conservatism has always placed the idea of change, which has such a long and authoritative intellectual pedigree in the West, in a central position among its principles. Conservatism's view, moreover, that society is an organic, hierarchical, natural, self-moved concrete activity lends itself to the idea that society also has within itself its own principles of permanence (identity) and change which are to be observed. These principles of 144Aristotle, in Richard Hope (ed.), Aristotle's Physics (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 25. 145Whitehead, p. 179. 134 permanence and change are applicable to political society even though it Is not a natural entity but a man-made entity, a product and Invention of human art and therefore a system of moral affections and relationships Involving freedom of human choice and freedom from natural necessity, although operating in part within an environment of physi cal phenomena controllable only by science and technology. But, nonetheless, society is a work of art and even though it has an empirical identity it possesses no mathematically designated center of gravity or equilibrium positions, does not obey the law of causation, and while it changes not all of its parts change in the same direction or at the same rate necessarily. Change in the tradition, which can be regarded as a flow of sympathy, must be articulated by human prudence in the hands of those who know both the general principles and the details of the tradition. Only a knowledge of details can give a knowledge of the whole tradition. Such knowledge, so articulated, of society so conceived necessitates that change will be slow, will be limited to the reform of specific problems not excluding changes in the foundations of the tradition providing its identity is maintained, will be moderate and tolerant and have the basic support of public opinion as an expression 135 of the feelings, customs, and manners of the people who have an affection and loyalty for their tradition based on its familiarity and utility, and will understand progress not as necessarily Inevitable but as a more adequate pro* vision of human wants in terms of the tradition. Conserva tism considers change inevitable, but requires also permanence and identity of the tradition because without it the resources for the solution of society's problems are unavailable. Conservatism is, to a large extent, a theory of change. It resists change in the fundamental principles of the tradition but is ready to adapt these principles to the solution, legislative or otherwise, of problems created by changing circumstances. It views the principles and values of the tradition as the tools and capital which alone can be used to solve, in so far as they are solvable, emerging social problems. It criticizes new doctrines and policy in terms of the tradition and adaptation to it, thus revealing its empiricism and skepticism, its preference for practice over abstract theory. Conservatives think the burden of proof of improvement and progress from change and reform--they reject innovation--is on the proposer because all change involves loss to someone, is not always what is 136 expected to be because of the non-operation of the law of causation, and even can adversely affect both the Intended and unintended activities. Conservatives think this burden to be on themselves when they are the agents of change, as was the case with the laissez-faire conservatives in the United States in the decades after the Civil War and in Britain since World War II. Change detached from the tra dition is a move toward the unknown and is to be avoided. The two great tests which this theory of change must meet in the contemporary world involves the problem of individual liberty connected with expanding state economic activity and the problem of human values resulting from the massiveness and acceleration of modern science and tech nology. Conservatism's answer to these problems must be in terms of empiricism and skepticism. The tradition must be adapted to the changes, but the changes must be molded also to conform to the tradition. Our codes of morality and institutions continuously changing are our only tools with which to do the job. Policy must emerge from them. Burke's ideas on change and the related ideas of reform, progress, inheritance, tradition, experience, expedience, and time are fundamental to his political thought. Burke considers change inevitable and asserts: 137 "A state without the means of some change is without the means of Its conservation,"1^0 and continues, "the two principles of conservation and correction"147 are necessary in a properly developed political system. Change applies to the general design of the Constitution as well as to its details.Since society as a work of man's art to pro vide for his wants is natural, its principles must t Burke claims, "... follow nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it,"149 and change will be, he explains, "... slow, and in some cases almost impercep tible"150 following procedures of "analogical precedent"151 1 CO and "philosophic analogy" rather than metaphysical abstraction. If this is done, states Burke, ". . . in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete."155 Time possesses a healing quality and an authority which helps the political tradi tion solve the problems it asks and, proclaims Burke, *48Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 37. 147Ibid. 148Ibid. , p. 244. 149Ibid., p. 53. 150Ibid. , p. 239. 151Ibid., p. 50. 152Ibid.. p. 54. 153Ibld. 138 "The species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always acts right.If nature is followed and time given, the identity of the tradition is kept; and unless it is kept, Burke feels "men would become little better than the flies of a summer. Following the method of nature also assures, Burke explains, that ". . . our constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts’ ’ 1^8 assuring variety, individuality, and freedom. To fashion change in the tradition and also to maintain its identity requires prudential statesmanship which demands, Burke asserts, "a disposition to preserve, and an ability to Improve. . . ."157 Burke sharply rejects innovation and contrasts it to change, saying innovation destroys. "A spirit of innovation," he claims, "is gener ally the result of a selfish temper and confined views."158 Innovators are disposed, he fears, ". . .to cut up the infant for the sake of the experiment 9 "By hating vices too much," he feels, "they come to love men too 154surke, The Works . . . . VI, 147. l^Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 137. 156Ibid., p. 53. l57Ibid. , p. 223. 158Ibid., p. 53. 159Ibid., p. 235. 139 little."1* * 0 Prudent reform is the answer and its limits are, he says, "... the rules of law, the rules of policy, and the service of the state."1* * 1 John Adams also accepted the Inevitability and universality of change. Explains Adams, "All that part of creation which lies within our observation, is liable to 162 change. Even mighty states and Kingdoms are not except." Although Adams did not develop a theory of change as such, implicit in his writings is his belief that traditional political institutions and values must be supported and radical change is not acceptable. His opposition to British colonial policy, which he thought violated the constitutional rights of the colonies developed over almost two centuries, illustrates an important aspect of conserva tive thought— that of, on occasion, resorting to violence to defend historical institutions and values. As Francis G. Wilson asserts: "When given values are at 163 8take the conservative can even become a revolutionary." 160Ibid., p. 241. l-^Burke, The Works . . . . II, 104. Adams, Letter to Nathan Webb, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 3. 163Wilaon, p. 2. 140 Contemporary British Ideas Contemporary British conservative opinions on change and the related ideas of continuity, tradition, custom, inheritance, time, reform, progress, and the pref erence for practice over theory correspond closely to those of Burke. Regarding time, Churchill claims: "It is a mistake to look too far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled at a time."*^ He continues: "We cannot say 'the past is the past' without surrendering the future.Continuity is a fact. Change is inevi table and, says Churchill, "The world moves on and we dwell in a constantly changing climate of opinion."166 He further explains, "The only way a man can remain consistent amid changing circumstances is to change with them while ^finston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, February 27, 1945, in Charles Eade (ed.), Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1946), p. 84. * ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, Hay 14, 1938. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCCXXXIII (1937-38), 98. I66Winaton S. Churchill, Speech at Bellevue, Manchester, December, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 211. 141 preserving the same dominating p u r p o s e . " * - ^ gut regardless of the inevitability of change, Churchill asserts: "We must beware of needless innovations especially when guided by logic"*^® because, he states, "logic is a poor guide i go when compared to custom." All change must be careful, slow change giving an opportunity for growth to the politi cal system because, he believes, "Human beings and human societies are not structures that are built or machines that are forged. They are plants that grow and must be tended as such."*7® Tradition and change go together, and, remarks Churchill, "A love of tradition has never weakened a nation, indeed, it has strengthened nations in their hour of peril; but the new view must come, the world l^Winston g. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures. p. 39. *®®Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, 1942, in Charles Eade (ed.), The End of the Beginning (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1942), p. 257. 169 Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, 1943, in Charles Eade (ed.), Onwards to Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 317. 170Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 47. must roll forward."*71 The alterations brought about by the massive increase in science and technology concern Churchill very much and also further illustrate his idea of change. These problems, in a world where chance and circumstance are so evident, relate both to personal liberty within society and to foreign affairs. In the area of personal liberty, Churchill is aware that man could lose his freedom and become merely an obedient automaton or puppet reacting to the requirements of technological society as planned by 1 72 scientists. In foreign affairs he sees the possibility that the enormous slaughter and destruction that could be imposed by modern weapons might make it impossible for man to defend his liberties by means of his natural virtues such as courage and valor. J These problems exist because, states Churchill, "science bestowed immense new ^Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 29, 1944. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), CDVI (1944-45), 33. ^-^^Churchlll discusses this problem in an essay entitled "Fifty Years Hence," in Winston S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 269-280. l^Churchill discusses this issue in an essay entitled "Shall We All Commit Suicide?" in Winston S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 245-252. 143 powers on man, and, at the same time created conditions which were largely beyond his comprehension and still more beyond his control,”174 and, he continues, "this vast expansion was unhappily not accompanied by any noticeable advance in the stature of man, either in his mental facul ties, or his moral character.”175 But despite the problems they create, science and technology must be expanded at an increasing rate if, he explains, ". . .we are to bring the broad masses of the people in every land to the table of abundance. . . ."*7^ However, in spite of all problems and difficulties, Churchill is hopeful about man's future and feels human nature is such that through education and the proper use and adaptation of his moral, religious, and political institutions man's destiny is onward and upward. He pro claims, "On the whole 1 remain an optimist."*-77 His views on human nature, its qualities, and its evolution through time are thus expressed: * - 7Sfinston S. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 44. 175Ibid. 176Ibid., p. 40. 177Ibid., p. 43. 144 . . . The genua homo ... is e tough creature. . . . His nature hat been shaped and his virtues ingrained by many years of struggle, fear and pain, and his spirit has, from the earliest dawn of history, shown itself upon occasion capable of mounting to the sub lime, far above material conditions or mortal terrors. He still remains man. . . .1?° Education of all kinds, from the lowest to the highest, is essential. There must be, he says, "... the diffusion in every form of education of an improved quality 179 to scores of millions of men and women." Universities must, he claims, "... teach wisdom, not a trade; charac- 180 ter, not technicalities." If they do this, the univer sities can help, he states, "... make sure that science 181 is our servant and not our master. ^ He continues: "Ho amount of technical knowledge can replace the comprehension 182 of the humanities or the study of history and philosophy." Christian ethics are essential to the required character, and, he explains, "their revival and application is a 183 practical need, whether spiritual or secular in nature." 178Ibid. , p. 46. 179Ibid. , p. 40. *88Winston S. Churchill, Speech, University of Copenhagen, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance. p. 388. 181Ibld. 182Ibid. 183Ibid. 145 Science ie ethically neutral and man must give it its goals. Ultimately, the answer to the problems must be given in terms of the resources and values of the tradi tion. He remarks: . . . Our inheritance of well-founded, slowly con ceived codes of honour, morals and manners, . . . of the principles of freedom and justice, are far more precious to us than anything which scientific discoveries could bestow.^^4 Thus, man who is free in his spirit, strong in his will, resolute in his determination can exercise conscious control over his own destiny in the modern scientific world of chance and circumstance. To achieve this success, man has at his disposal his experience and his institutions and traditions whose moral foundations are an amalgam of an habitual and customary code and of a reflective Christian ethic. This amalgam must take the form of a living flow of practices and virtues in terms of which institutions may be adapted to changing circumstances and they in turn molded to the institutions. In this way, man's freedom may be assured, his well-being promoted, and his true glory achieved. 18Sfinston S. Churchill, Speech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 47. 146 Quinton Hogg also compares political systems to "living creatures"and points out that "no living organ- 186 ism can remain static and alive." He also observes that "a living society can only change healthily when it changes naturally--that is, in accordance with its acquired and inherited character, and at a given rate."1®7 Thus time, change, and heredity are necessarily related and are implicit in nature. He equates change with reform and requires that reform should only "be introduced to deal with a concrete situation, to produce a concrete good Iflg result." Generalized change imposes uniformity and hinders variety. It is to be opposed because it hurts individuality and freedom and assumes, states Hogg, "... an understanding of individual tradition, proclivities and requirements.m1®9 geform also heads off revolution because, he says, "Reform is in reality the surest guaran tee against revolution"1^® and continues, "The traditional is the best corrective yet discovered for the unbalanced 185 Hogg, p. 29. 187 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 188 Ibid., p. 32 190 Ibid., p. 30. 147 191 and ephemeral Influence of the fashion of the moment. Hogg Is also alert to the problems presented by modern science and technology to contemporary Western society and sees the source of political and economic stress in, he affirms, "... the deep tension between modern scientific knowledge and power and our traditional ethic and culture."*^ Michael Oakeshott, while adhering to the Burkean view on change, treats the subject with academic sophis tication. Oakeshott considers a political tradition as having no premeditated beginning, no final end, no neces sary progress, no necessary operation of the law of causation, and no mathematical definitiveness. But it does have an ethos, an identity, a continuity, and a direc tion of movement. It is a continuing flow of sympathy whose intimations can be known only through familiarity with the tradition which requires both knowledge of its general principles and also of its details— and mostly of its details because, observes Oakeshott, ". . .to know only the gist of it is to know nothing."*9^ The political 191Ibid.. p. 31. 19^Oakeshott, p. 129. 192Ibid.. p. 11. 148 tradition la always undergoing change because as desires change it is necessary to modify the political arrangements through which they are satisfied. The articulation of the intimations of the tradition involves change in order to realize what is implicit but not actual. Conservatism, according to Oakeshott, sees change as unavoidable alteration of circumstances to which indi viduals and a political tradition must accommodate. Accommodation involves both change and continuity, thus maintaining the identity of the tradition. Conservatism, however, rejects innovation which is the deliberately planned and executed alterations of the tradition for explicitly designed benefit and progress. Innovation is rejected because it destroys the identity of the tradition and thus obliterates the resources it has with which to accomplish the purposes of political life. Change without permanence is a perversion. Conservatism is not mere opposition to change and requires both permanence and change. It accepts change because, he observes, "changes are circumstances to which we have to accommodate our selves. . . ."^4 But rejects innovation because, he 149 continues, "... Innovating is always an equivocal 195 enterprise. Contemporary American Ideas Contemporary American conservatives are also much aware of change and the need to adapt to it. Francis 6. Wilson states, "Conservatism . . . must be in part a theory of change. It must recognize change, advocate it, and resist it as the case may be."1-9® But there must be per manence along with the changes and, Wilson asserts, "The contemporary right is a fluid conservatism that seeks the defense of older and primary values through an acceleration 197 of change in political habits and economic arrangements." Clinton Rossiter recognizes that the United States is a nation of dynamic economic and technological change and that the relevant cultural, social, and political changes must come. Rossiter declares: "Change will con tinue to be the essence of American life, and the conserva tive . . . should devoqp his best efforts to direct it into channels of progress."1' 9* * "Conservatives will have to decide whether," he observes, ". . .to hold fast, move 195Ibld., p. 171. 197Ibid., p. 41. l9®Wileon, p. 2. 19®Roasiter, p. 300. 150 ahead slowly under duress, or strike out boldly toward 199 firmer ground." But Rossiter is also cognizant that the intellectual sterility and practical staleness2®® of American conservatism, and the influence in the Republican Party of the immoderates on the right, will make difficult the necessary adaptations to the changing circumstances while maintaining, he states, "... all our great values, traditions, and institutions."2®*" Such American conserva tism, claims Rossiter, "... will trace its Intellectual lineage to Adams rather than Burke; it will be conservative without being Conservative."202 Herbert Hoover's ideas on change fairly well typify those of the practicing American conservative politician. His desire for stability allows little room for change. He emphasizes the tradition which he terms "a splendid store- house of integrity and freedom . . resembling Burke's statement on the British Constitution, which he called "the inestimable treasure we have. . . ,*'2®4 But unlike 199Ibid., p. 301. 200Ibid. , p. 225. 201Ibid.. p. 301. 202Ibid. , p. 300. 203 ‘ ■''■'Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 21. 204Burke, The Works . . . . VI, 153. 151 Burke, who formulated a theory of change which has been developed and applied by practical British conservative politicians, Hoover and contemporary American conservative politicians have no explicit theory of change and have not been able to alter the business mind view about politics Inherited from the laissez-faire conservatives. Conse quently, electoral defeat Is the result. National military heroes are not always available, and In any case are not a satisfactory substitute by political parties for viable political principles able to accommodate Inevitable social change brought about by humanity pursuing its desires and providing for its wants. Non-political models of any kind— whether business, trade unions or otherwise— are incompatible with a conservative view of politics because the use of such models leads to dogmatism and rigidity. Conservatism, however, which views politics as an art uses moderation and compromise covering the whole range of man's secular life. I CHAPTER IV LIBERTY AND EQUALITY Conservatism, both classical and contemporary, accords to the Western political tradition's ideas o£ liberty and equality a basic and substantive position. It differs from other constitutional political theories in these matters mainly in emphasis. Conservatism interprets liberty and equality in terms of the relationship between man's rational, moral nature and law, power (constitution alism and the rule of law) , the institution of private property, and the relationship between the state and the individual in economic life. Liberty has always occupied a higher status than equality in its scheme of values. Conservatives generally feel that if liberty existing within a framework of constitutional government and private property prevails then equality of the right kind— equality of opportunity anchored upon the essential moral and legal equality of man— is assured. Contemporary American and 152 153 British conservatism accept political democracy as neces sary to present-day conceptions of liberty and equality. However, they are also faced on the level both of party politics and public policy on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other, with the corollary of political democracy— economic democracy. That corollary in its most generalized form demands security which is the modern form of equality emphasizing the economic element. The nature of modern, interdependent, industrial capitalism demands attention to the problem of individual and social security, which in turn has required a widening of the economic and social activity of the state through appropriate monetary, fiscal, regulatory, retraining and relocation, welfare, planning, and public enterprise policies involving not only the expansion and stabilization of the national income, but also its redistribution in the interests of equalizing individual, family, and class incomes. The relationship of the state to the Individual in these economic matters constitutes, perhaps, the most important problem of con temporary politics, and it is particularly crucial to contemporary American and British conservatives because such state action cuts to the heart of their ideas regard ing equality of opportunity (equity), rule of law, and 154 private property with Its concomitant connotations of moral free agency, privacy, and liberty. Historical Origins The Ideas of liberty and equality as they are understood In the constitutional democracies of the con temporary West are inherent in the Western intellectual and political tradition and are not to be found in other political traditions past or present. They are different yet closely related ideas both philosophically and histori cally, are implicit in the Western conceptions of justice, law and citizenship, and view man as an autonomous moral being who must always be considered an end and never merely a means. They had their genesis in the thought of Aris totle and have been influenced by Stoicism, Roman Law, Christianity, Renaissance humanism, the libertarianism of the Protestant Reformation all modified and molded by the development and acceptance of empiricism, hedonism, skepticism, rationalism, and constitutionalism of the modem centuries. The fact that authority and privilege, rather than liberty and equality, have usually prevailed, does not detract from the viability and fundamental significance of these ideas. Today they are more widely realized and enjoyed politically, economically, and socially than ever before in the history of the West.^ Culture, though simpler, is more widely spread. Aristotle's views on liberty and equality are clearly stated in his discussion on the polls and its citizenship. Political society based upon natural impulse and common interest^ requires freedom. States Aristotle, ". . . the polls is an association of free men." It is of the essence of the liberty and equality inherent in citizenship to participate in political power under law, and it is significant to the West that Aristotle's defini tion of citizenship is the democratic one. "The citizen," asserts Aristotle, "is a man who shares in the adminlstra- ..4 tion of justice and in the holding of office." Thus Aristotle, although he advocated aristocratic excellence in political rule, first put forward the fundamental and ^Leslie Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960)7 Chapters 5 and 9, respectively, provide a comprehensive discussion on the theoretical and historical aspects of equality and liberty. ^Ernest Barker (trans.), The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 111. 156 recurring Western theme of liberty and equality under law, the theme that liberty, law, equality, justice, and citi zenship move Inseparably together. However, In addition to his attitude on aristocracy and slavery, there Is another area In which Aristotle's outlook on liberty and equality Is much different from that prevailing In modern constitutional doctrines and especially conservatism. His organlsmlc theory of the state, regardless of his criticism of Plato for overempha sizing unity, excludes the modern concept of Individuality with Its large concession to privacy even In these days of the mixed economy and the welfare state. The polls was, as Ernest Barker explains, ". . .an Integrated system of social ethics. . . ."5 It was a compound whose elements constituted, In a fashion, our Ideas of family, school, church, state, and society chemically united and, therefore, no place for Individuality and privacy as now known existed. The unmitigated and extra-political Stoicism of Zeno and Chryslppus continued the theme of human moral equality and freedom under law. In their cosmopolls— their ethical world state— In which, after Alexander's 5Ibld. , Sec. Ill, p. xlvli. 157 destruction of the polls— man could find his self- fulfillment, all men under the Fatherhood of God were equal and all were free If they obeyed God's law, the natural law. But In this form It had little practical effect on liberty and equality. However, In the form In which It was revised by Panaetlus and Polybius— who In effect fused Greek urbanity and political virtues Into Stoicism— and transmitted through the Sclplonlc Circle and the writings of Cicero to educated Romans with their ethic of dedicated public service, It has been most Influential especially through the medium of Roman Law whose heritage Is a common possession of Western legal systems. The humanizing effect of Stoicism-*Christian ethics had little or no effect— on Roman Law through the work of such Roman jurists as Galus In the second century A.D. , and Ulplan In the third was widespread. Now lus naturale served as an ethical criteria for both gentium and lus civile. The Influence extended to both the private and public law areas. The Roman private law Idea of an Indi vidual as a legal person with legal rights developed and sharpened and there resulted a more genuine equality before the law In terms of manumission of slaves, reduction In the power of the father over the family, and elevation In the 158 legal statue of women. The Roman public law doctrine of limitation on the powers of rulers became more meaningful. Summing up the contributions to liberty and equality of the Stoic-influenced Roman Law, George H. Sabine explains, "Legalist argumentation— reasoning in terms of men's rights and of the justifiable powers of rulers— became and remained a generally accepted method of political theorizing."** The Christian doctrine of the equality and immortality of the human soul leads the Christian Church to support equality and liberty where it has an explicit social teaching. However, its main emphasis being on the next world has often led it to the reverse. As Tawney states, "The canon law appears to have recognized and enforced serfdom."^ The most important contribution to equality and liberty on the part of Christianity came as a result of the coupling of the principle of dissent inherent in Protestantism with the humanism and secularism of the Renaissance. John Wesley's eighteenth century social ^George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 168. ^R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: The New American Library, 192 6) , p. 57. 159 gospel and tha present-day position of the churches against racial discrimination are examples. Modern Aspects The modern doctrines of liberty and equality are largely secular and are derived generally— but also draw upon their ancestry— from Renaissance intellectual humanism and the Reformation's adaptation of the Protestant ethic to the requirements of the modem age. The ideas of liberty and equality as found in Locke, Bentham, Smith, Kant, Burke and Adams, for example, are in this mold. Man is an auton omous moral being by nature and civil society must be built accordingly. As Kant says, ". . .so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."8 The first purely modern, secular statement of equality and liberty occurred during the Civil War in England in the seventeenth century. The Leveller position of equality and liberty based upon citizenship alone was not to be realized for two and one-half centuries. The ^T. K. Abbott (trans.), Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc. , 1929), p. 56. 160 ideas of liberty and equality implicit in Locke's property doctrines, which in themselves lead to political and social inequality, were accepted. Locke has been democratized yet his property doctrines are a basic characteristic especially of contemporary American and British conserva tism. The democratization of Locke, the conciliation of his property doctrines with political democracy is due both to the requirements of party politics accommodating the thrust to equality and liberty and to the fact that implicit in Locke is the idea of the inherent moral worth of man as the sole possessor of his own body and all its manifestations and creations. Law and Morality Burke, an advocate of aristocracy and of Locke's property doctrines, was also a supporter of human legal and moral equality and of political liberty. Burke's conception of liberty and equality is derived from his idea of law. Law, as a universal, has its foundations in equity and utility. Law, as a particular, is a convention of man and an inherent principle of civil society, helping society achieve its beneficent purposes. "Law itself," Burke 161 remarks, "is only bene£lcence acting by a rule."9 Civil society rightly limits liberty and equality that they may be enjoyed. Says Burke, "Liberty, too, oust be limited in order to be possessed."^ Human law is, however, merely declaratory and all its arrangements and procedures must adhere to its general sources, equity, and utility. Explains Burke: In reality, there are two and only two sources of law; ... I mean equity and utility. With respect to the former, it grows out of the great rule of equality, which is grounded upon our com mon nature. . . . The other foundation of law, which is utility, must be understood, not of partial or limited, but of general and public utility . . . derived directly from our rational nature. . . Law, liberty, equality, justice, equity, utility, and policy exist simultaneously and must serve the general interest of society and not the particular interests of any individual, group, or class. "Partiality and law," says Burke, "are contradictory terms.He continues, "Liberty, if 1 understand it at all is a general principle. ^Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), p. 88. lOgduund Burke, The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke (London: H. G. Bohn, 1854-56), II, 30. U Ibid. , VI, 22. 12Ibid. . p. 23. 162 . . . Partial freedom seema to me a most invidious mode of slavery."13 The generality of law and liberty and the legal and moral requirements of equality are consistent with a hierarchical class structure of society, disparities in material wealth, non-participation in political power by the masses, and aristocracy in social and political leader ship because happiness and beneficence— the purposes of civil society— may be enjoyed in any social status. Burke declares, "Happiness . . . is to be found by virtue in all conditions; in which consists the true moral equality of mankind. . . John Adams advocated aristocracy and private prop erty and also supported human legal and moral equality and constitutional liberty. As did Burke, he believed that human equality and liberty were derived from law, as a universal moral principle necessarily consistent with man's rational nature, and as a man-made structure arranging equality and liberty congruent with morality and the wants of man in society. Adams states that "all men are bora to equal rights is true. . . . This is as indubitable as a 13Ibid., II, 7-8. ^Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 58. 163 moral government In the universe. Regarding liberty, he says, "We have a right to It derived from our Maker."1® The law of society is morally bound to observe such liberty and equality in its arrangements. Regarding these arrange ments, Adams says, "There are different orders of offices, but none of men."^ He approved Massachusetts enjoying what he termed ". . .a moral and political equality of rights and duties among all the Individuals. . . ."18 Actual liberty and equality must be developed by, he claimed, "... experience, reflection, education and civil and political institutions. . . ."^ These views on liberty and equality were compatible in Adams' mind with his aristocratic and inequalitarian position relative to John Adams, Letter to John Taylor, in George A. Peek, Jr. (ed.), Political Writings of Jofin Adams (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, IncT, 1956), p. 201. 18 John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden (eds.). The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 18. 1^Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Govern ment of the United States of America, in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 93. 18Ibid., p. 95. 19 Adams, Letter to John Adams (October 18, 1790), in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 122. 164 social and political leadership. Conservatives in Britain and the United States adhere in general to the classical Conservative tradition o£ liberty and equality under law considered as a universal moral principle and as a man-made force within civil society. As Quinton Hogg declares, "What distinguishes British Conservatism is that while its ideology and reli gion are anchored in eternal precepts, its practical approach . . . remains empirical and at times even frankly experimental.In discussing the empirical aspect of British liberties, R. J. White says they are largely due to what he calls "... the steady enforcement of a few precious principles which have been found by the strictest test of practice over many centuries best to serve the 21 needs of human personality." Robert Taft continues the tradition of liberty and equality under law. He considers the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to embody the moral and universal aspects of law. Asserts Taft, "The Declaration 20 Quinton Hogg, The Conservative Case (Harmonds- worth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1959), pp. 16-17. ^*R. J. White (ed.), The Conservative Tradition (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 5. 165 of Independence declared that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 99 unalienable [aic] rights. . . ." On the practical level, the courts are the main guardians. Taft states, "One of the great principles of a republic is equality, and the most important aspect of equality is equality before the courts. Diffusion of Power Constitutionalism.— Conservatives from Burke and Adams to the present accept power as a moral necessity in society.2^ Power, which ultimately involves the use of public force, is a kind of justice because by putting limits on man's passions, inclinations, and depravities both in individuals and the population at large, it guar antees order without which liberty could not exist. As Burke stated: "Society requires that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of 22T. V. Smith and Robert A. Taft, Foundations of Democracy (Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939) , p. 14. 23Ibid., p. 89. 2^See Chapter III, pp. 99-103. 166 25 men should frequently be thwarted. ..." "This," he continues, "can only be done b£ a power out of them selves."2^ Liberty requires power but also can exist only If power is limited and diffused. Conservatives fully accept Adams' view that unlimited power leads to Its abuse and this is despotism or tyranny. Power necessarily mani fests itself in the legislative, executive, and judicial functions and therefore they must be limited. Asserts Adams, "Liberty and the laws depend entirely on a separa tion of them in the frame of government."22 Limitation of power inherently involves diffusion of power. Constitu tionalism in its most general sense involves limiting and diffusing power in the interest of liberty and equality. And while both conservatives and reformists (Democratic Party in the United States and the Labor Party in Britain) accept and respect the common heritage of Anglo-American constitutionalism, there are certain aspects of it on which contemporary American and British conservatives have characteristic views. Constitutionalism operates through 25Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 90. 2 6Ibld. 27 Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions . . . . in Peek (ed.), p. 143. 167 the principles of the separation of powers, rule of law, local government, political democracy, and party politics. Conservatives have typical views on these principles. The principle of the separation of powers is implicit in both the American and British constitutional systems, although it is much more explicit in the American. The fusion of power between the executive and the legisla ture in the British parliamentary system tends to dilute the principle in its classic form. But the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the rights and privi leges of the House of Commons— which British conservatives strongly defend--and the operation of party politics keep the principle viable and operative. Present-day American conservatives also resist expansion of the Executive power and seek an equilibrium favoring, if possible, the Court— otherwise, the Congress. Contemporary American conservatives support a limitatlonl8t view on the power of the presidency. They inherit this view in its twentieth century context from William Howard Taft. The view is also to be found in the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and Eisenhower. The Republican Party's llmitationlst view is in sharp contrast with the expansionist view of the Democratic Party. 168 Democrats, commencing with Wilson— Theodore Roosevelt also took a wide view of the presidential power--and continuing with Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had to deal with excep tional domestic and foreign problems, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson consider that the office of the presidency should be as big as the man holding it can make it. The shrink age of presidential power results in the widening of the power of the Court or Congress. Eisenhower made great efforts to conciliate Republican leaders in Congress— especially Senator Taft before his death— and his relaxed view concerning the presidency is further seen in his habit of delegating power to his aides such as Sherman Adams and some of his principal cabinet officers including Humphreys and Dulles. Some of the most articulate conservative comments on the powers and duties of the executive came from Robert Taft during Franklin Roosevelt's administration. Taft readily admits the President has wide powers of initiative in proposing legislation to Congress. Taft states: "He may display any amount of initiative, adopt many policies through his administrative powers under the Constitution or existing law, and recommend store important changes in 169 policy to Congress."2® However, Taft unqualifiedly Insists that the main duty of the President is to administer and execute existing laws in order to give them coherence and effect. Explains Taft, "After all, the principal duty of the President is to wield the executive power and execute the laws of the United States."^9 Taft criticizes Roosevelt for proposing too many programs and not executing them, and blamed this confusion on a disorientation of presidential power from the administrative to the initia tive function.^ Summing up the matter, Taft says, "A combination of too much initiative and too little adminis tration may be a good deal worse even than a simple following of tradition.If tradition were followed, the President would concentrate on administration. Winston Churchill is fully aware of the fusion of power between the executive and the legislature in the British parliamentary system and the tendency it causes to paramountcy by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He 2®Smith and Taft, p. 59. 29Ibid. , p. 60. ^°Taft also opposed the content of much New Deal legislation. ^Smith and Taft, p. 69. particularly fears executive oppression from the Labor Government implementing its policies especially on the basis of mandate. He looks to the House of Commons exer cising its constitutional rights and privileges to check and balance the inordinate executive power. The House of ComBions is, then, not only the workshop of political democracy but also a kind of national deliberative council safeguarding the peoples' liberties. "The House of Commons," says Churchill, "stands for freedom and law."32 He continues, "It is the champion of the people against executive oppression."33 "it stands," he asserts, "forever against oligarchy and one man rule."3^ The principle known as the Rule of Law is a basic method of limiting and diffusing power in the interest of liberty. It is fundamentally accepted by all constitu tional political doctrines in the United States and Britain. Some of its basic elements are that one may be tried for infraction of existing law only and that such 32winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, October 24, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance (London: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 407. 171 infractions, whether on the part of the highest officials or the most humble citizens, are heard before the ordinary courts of law. Conservatives feel that the delegation of so much power to quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative administrative tribunals, because of the increased economic and social activities by the state, is eroding this prin ciple. Herbert Hoover states: "No final judicial or legislative authority must be delegated to bureaucrats, or at once tyranny begins.Winston Churchill remarks, "Regulations increasingly take the place of statutes passed by Parliament."^ Local government.— Emphasis on local government is an obvious characteristic of contemporary conservatives in the United States and Britain. Local government traditions have a long history in both countries. Both Burke and Adams emphasized the importance of the locality in politl- 37 cal life. Conservatives take the position that the ^Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1946), p. 223. 3 inston S. Churchill, Speech, Woodford, July 28, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance. p. 168. 37 See Chapter III, pp. 96-98. 172 closer the government is to the individual the more easily he can control it in order to guarantee and promote liberty and individuality. In the United States the federal system guarantees constitutional permanence to the states under whose general control the local political subdivisions lie. Modern tech nology, by unifying and integrating the economy, has made many problems national in scope, tending to promote centralization in Washington. This tendency has been reinforced by the fact that while the states have much constitutional power, the federal government has the finances by which to influence them. But the Republican Party, since New Deal days, has been the steadfast defender of local government in the interests of diffusing power and consequently promoting liberty. "If the individual is to have as large a share as possible in government," observes Arthur Larson, "the principle of localism as against cen tralization follows."38 Robert Taft agrees with this position. Taft claims, "Local self-government is the key to democracy."3^ in addition to the federal structure of 3®Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 200. 3^Smith and Taft, p. 108. 173 government, the federal structure and nature of the national political parties adds to the vitality of the local government tradition in the United States. The national politicians--even the President— cannot gain con trol over the political parties. Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to purge the Democratic Party of his opponents in 1936 is an example of such failure. Contemporary British conservatives are also strong supporters of local government autonomy. Their heritage in this matter goes back to Tudor times when the Anglican parson and the Justice of the Peace, both most likely to be Tories, carried on much of local government activity in the areas of education, helping the poor, and administering the less important cases of law. These arrangements gen erally continued until Peel revamped the administrative and fiscal structure during his 1841-46 ministry, replacing parson and Justice of the Peace with the national civil servant. Even then Disraeli objected to these reforms as injuring local government. In 1888, Lord Salisbury's conservative government passed the Local Government Act extending to county councils the elective principle gained 174 by the city boroughs In 1835 Among contemporary British conservatives, Enoch Powell— on the right wing of the Con servative Party— is a leading advocate of the importance of local self-government. But beyond saying he hopes financial resources will be made available to them he con tributes little.*1 During discussions in the House of Commons in 1943 regarding reform of local government machinery to improve local government services, Winston Churchill stated: The Government are [sic], however, very much alive to the need for avoiding any weakening of the structure of local government, and I can give the assurance that in framing any proposals in relation to particular services for submission to this House, they will pay the most careful regard to this factor.*2 However, in spite of the long tradition of local government in Britain, it is a more delicate task to main tain it there than in the United States. This is so because most problems in Britain are or soon become *®See K. B. Smellie, Great Britain Since 1688 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 234. ^See William A. Robson and T. E. M. McKittrick (eds.), "Notes and Comments," Political Quarterly. XXIV (April-June, 1953), 126-127. ^Winston S. Churchill, Onwards to Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 291. 175 national ones, as the political parties there are highly centralized in the national organs and because In the unitary British state the local governments are the legal creatures of Parliament. The sense of the people and political leaders in Parliament determine the matter. Democracy and political parties.— Conservatives in Britain and the United States fully accept constitutional political democracy. This is a basic departure from the anti-democratic positions of Burke, and the Tories before 1832, and the Federalists— and Adams was a Federalist— before their eclipse in 1816. Political democracy based on universal suffrage with free elections, and operated through party politics and party government under proper legal, constitutional, and ethical safeguards diffuses power through all classes and interests of society. Accordingly, it is consistent with liberty and equality derived from the tradition as it changes and evolves to satisfy human wants and values. In a broad sense, politi cal democracy is a gamble on and an estimate of the good judgment of the common people on the leaders and the parties who come forward and compete to obtain power to promote the welfare of the society and its citizens. The 176 gamble and the estimate have ao far proved wise. The education and elevation of the people, the constitutional system, and leaders serving rather than mastering the state, explain it. After the Reform Act of 1832, the Conservative Party was able to accept the widened franchise— it also had to accept the implication of its further widening--as a constitutional settlement due to Its empiricism inherited from Burke and the Tories, and especially to Peel's prac tical bent. Empiricism and political expediency could justify Disraeli's Reform Act of 1867. Continuing empiri cism and expediency, and the genuine acceptance of political democracy as part of the political tradition and environment beginning with Lord Randolph Churchill explains the Party's present support of democracy. In affirming democracy, Churchill supports, as he states, "... the true representation of the people . . . our Parliamentary and democratic system to which we all adhere.' The acceptance of political democracy based on a widened franchise was earlier obtained in the United States ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, February 16, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 247. 177 than In Britain. The Whigs, conservative successors to the Federalists, accepted it as did the Republican Party from its birth in 1854. ’ ’ The Right had ... to accept," says Rossiter, "the ground rules o£ democracy or be thrown out of the game for disloyalty and perversity."^ Conservatives accept party politics and party government as indispensable and desirable. Party is the natural political vehicle. In the American and British experience there has generally been a two-party system. The mass-based political parties today with their elaborate organization and control are much more complex than in the days of Burke and Adams, but the general principle of party remains much the same. In his classic definition of a political party, Burke states, "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.Adams states, "All nations, under all gov ernments, must have parties; the great secret is to control them."^ Explains Winston Churchill, "Party government is ^Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 220. ^Burke, The Works . . . . I, 375. ^Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions . . . . in Peek (ed.), p. 145. 178 not obnoxious to democracy. Indeed, Parliamentary democ- ttA7 racy has flourished under party government. Herbert Hoover remarks, "Obviously, our form of representative government can function only with two major political parties who differ in attitude and measures. While American and British conservatives accept political democracy as consistent with liberty and equality, with the fundamental principle that legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed, they also retain reservations about it characteristic of Burke and Adams. These reservations in effect constitute doubt concerning the wisdom of majority political decisions and take the form of conservatives testing these decisions in comparison with the constitutional institutions, customs, procedures, conventions, qualities, and values that have been accumu lated through time and experience. In part this is a genuine view toward change, and in part a way to promote their own partisan interest or slow down policies and legislation injurious to their Interest. ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, September 13, 1943 , in Charles Eade (ed.) , Onwards to Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 305. IQ Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 138. 179 Before 1937 the Supreme Court provided the main constitutional safeguards for American conservatives. Since then the performance of the Court has been generally disappointing to them and, disillusioned, they have resorted to Congress— utilizing the whole intricate mecha nism of congressional politics, committees, procedures, and delaying and blocking tactics to check the executive power. The resort to Congress involves a view of Congress as a national jury. Robert Taft states, "Congress, first of all, is a jury, passing on one proposal after another, prepared by other men or groups in Congress or out of AO Congress." The resort to Congress also involves repudi ation of what Taft calls ". . .a mandate directly from the people which Congress must obey without discussion.But conservatives will doubtless be happier when the Court is more conservative than the country generally. British conservatives have fewer formal institu tional means of checking majority decisions. There is no judicial review. The sovereignty of Parliament and fusion of powers in reality means the majority party in Commons ^Smlth and Taft, p. 52. 50Ibid., p. 60. 180 rule*. They oust rely upon the customs, conventions, end procedures— and which they can articulate— to check majority decisions considered unwise and hurtful of the tradition and the true public Interest. In Churchill's view there must be adherence to what he calls "all the slowly gathered treasures, customs, qualities, and tradi tions of the famous and ancient British State.Again he asserts: ... We all value and cherish our broad free Parli amentary system, and It Is our duty to submit ourselves with all the grace we can to whatever may be the will of the people from time to time, subject to the procedure of Parliament and to the Inalien able rights of the minority.52 Private property.— The Institution of private property and the relationship of the state to the Individ ual In economic matters raise basic Issues with respect to liberty and equality. Conservatives, while accepting state authority and action have also always placed the private property principle at the center of their political thought. 5Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, September 28, 1949, In Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 86. ^^Wlnston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, February 16, 1948, In Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 245. 181 The conception of property they espouse Is essentially Lockean, consequently reflecting the spirit of capitalism— the market, free enterprise, acquisitive society*-with Its ethic of the unlimited and unequal accumulation of private property and Its profitable Investment. Conservatives support and defend private property for two basic reasons: economic efficiency and constitutional and personal lib erty. Liberty, however, is the paramount and sufficient justification for the private property market economy in some form— they would retain private property even if socialism were more efficient, which, in the long-run period they deny on both historical and theoretical grounds. Private property, whose principle is to be unequal, is necessary if liberty and individuality are to exist and flourish. Private property promotes liberty because it diffuses power and also provides leisure and an area of Individual moral free agency where individuality and virtue are beyond the reach of unjust political and other social power and are therefore enhanced. Implicit in this idea of moral free agency is the idea that human personality and private property are co-existent; a posi tion which Burke, Adams, and contemporary American and British conservatives— along with Locke— support. 182 Conservative! also have always accepted the posi tion that private property involves power, that it is a trust, and that it oust promote the general well-being. As a result, they accept state control and supervision of property.^ The criteria of such control are based upon empirical considerations and the requirements of justice. Doctrinaire principles are not sufficient grounds for state action and the taxing away of property for class purposes repudiates justice. However, conservatives in both Britain and the United States— more so in Britain— today accept state action to provide some minimum equality or security without levelling downwards. Such security seems to be implicit in a political democracy operating in an inter dependent, urban, industrialized society, and there has been a steady expansion of state activity. Conservatives, nonetheless, repudiate state policies which Interfere with equality of opportunity— the only true equality— inherent in the liberty found in the private property economy. Equality of opportunity according to ability, ambition, and energy leads to inequality of wealth. Conservatives accept the principle of no levelling downwards but opportunity 53 State economic activity is examined in Chapter V. upwards as masting with justlca ths requirements of liberty and aquallty. Edmund Burke clearly and consistently accepts the private property enterprise principle thus revealing his bourgeois ethic. "The love of lucre," states Burke, "Is ••54 the grand cause of prosperity In all states. Acquisi tion of property is praiseworthy and particularly because it can be inherited. Says Burke, "It makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; It grafts benevolence even upon avarice.The property principle leads to Inequality. "The characteristic essence of property," explains Burke, "formed out of the combined principles of Its acquisition and conservation, is to be unequal.He rejects level ling in the name of equality. Burke states, "Believe me, Sir, those who attempt to level, never equalise."^7 He supports equality of opportunity. Asserts Burke, "Every thing ought to be open; but not indifferently to every man."^® Private property, however, must serve its ^Burke, The Works . . . Burke, Reflections . . 56Ibid., p. 77. V, 313. p. 78. 57Ibid. , p. 74. 184 ben*fleant purposes or the state may regulate It. Speaking on state regulation of property, Burke asserts, "The supreme authority has the full, sovereign superintendence . . . over all property ... to give It a direction agree able to the purposes of Its institution."^9 John Adams Is direct and uncompromising in his support of property and clearly relates the necessity of property to liberty. Says Adams, "Property is surely a right of mankind as really as liberty."^0 The existence of society Itself requires property: . . . The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the lava of God, and that there Is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny com mence . 61 In its nature, property is unequal and both rich and poor must have their property protected. Adams states: "The rich . . . have as clear and as sacred a right to their large property as others have to theirs which is smaller. . . ."62 Liberty in the form of equality of opportunity of necessity leads to unequal property due to inheritance and 59Ibid., p. 150. ^Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions . . . . in Peek (ed.), p. 148. 61Ibid. 62Ibid. , p. 156. 185 to the fact eome people have, ae Adams explains, "... 63 greater skill, Industry and success In business. ..." British conservatives support private property and consider It necessary to liberty and equality o£ opportu nity. Winston Churchill asserts, "Personally I think that private property has a right to be defended. Our civilisa tion was built up In private property, and can only be defended In private property."6^ Churchill relates the particular type of Individuality and liberty found in the English-speaking world today to property ownership— origi nally land ownership— historically practiced in England. Explains Churchill, "This strong strain of individualism, based on land ownership, was afterwards to play a persist ent part, not only in the blood but In the politics of England."65 This view on the relationship of property and liberty is consonant with the Conservative Party's idea of 63Ibid., p. 133. ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, August 11, 1947. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1946-47), 1295. 63Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Copenhagen Univer sity, October 10, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 387. See also John Richard Greene, Nations of the World (New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1898), pp. 18-19. 186 a property-owning democracy originally put forth by Anthony Eden at the Blackpool Party Conference in 1946.^ The property-owning democracy principle also very closely relates to diffusion of power and provision of leisure for human advancement and liberty. While accepting state economic activity, British conservatives insist it must not interfere with liberty in the form of equality of opportu nity. Churchill states, "We seek to establish minimum standards of life below which no one will be allowed to sink or fall. Then there must be free competition upwards— upwards but not downwards.There must be no levelling and Churchill condemns the Socialists for what he calls "... levelling down to the weakest and least 68 productive types." Yet liberty and equality of opportu nity are compatible with universal, compulsory social insurance. Churchill asserts, "You must rank me and my ^Anthony Eden, "A Nation-wide Property Owning Democracy," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), pp. 77-78. (Pamphlet.) ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Primrose League, April 18, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 67. ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, March 12, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 46. 187 colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory Insurance for all classes, for all purposes from the cradle to the grave.”* * 9 Contemporary American conservatives have also been forced to face the demands for state economic and social action in the Interests of security.7® Their laissez-faire conservative ancestry, however, makes them essentially anti-statist. Their main emphasis is on liberty and equality of opportunity. Says Robert Taft, "The American way of life does not guarantee equality in mental power or in character or in energy."7* He continues, "The basis of the American way of life has been equal opportunity to improve one's condition by one's own effort."72 But gov ernment must establish some security and equality. "The Republican Party," says Taft, "thoroughly approves of old age pensions, unemployment insurance, relief when neces- 73 sary, and subsidized housing." However, security and equality must not be pushed too far. Eisenhower asserts, ^Winston S. Churchill, Broadcast Speech, March 21, 1943, in Eade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 54. 7®See Chapter II, pp. 69-73. 7*Smith and Taft, p. 16. 72Ibid. . p. 14. 73Ibid. , p. 267. 188 "1 am quite certain that the human being could not continue to exist if he had perfect security."7^ Freedom and equality of opportunity require private property and free enterprise. "Without free enterprise," says Eisenhower, "the political freedom we know cannot exist. . . ."7^ He continues, "Property right is merely one of the human rights, and if it is not sustained all others will dis appear."^ Conservative intellectual Richard M. Weaver says, "The right of private property, . . . is, in fact the last metaphysical right remaining to us."77 Foreign Affairs Foreign relations among sovereign states involve power and ultimately war and the use of force. War inflicts loss of life and property and imposes restrictions on whole peoples. Consequently, war raises basic issues regarding liberty and equality. The issues emerge on the religious and secular levels and are aggravated by the 7^Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Allan Taylor (ed.), What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), p. 76. 75Ibid., p. 50. 76Ibid., p. 51. 77Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 130. 189 existence of modern technology with its capacity for meet slaughter. The religious dilemma has been met by the Christian churches defending wars of self-defense and in extending to all combatants the comforts of their doctrines and sacraments.7* * The secular problems raised by war and the use of force are concerned with conciliating the prin ciples of liberty and human moral equality, which are based on the conception of man as an autonomous being who is an end in himself and never merely a means, with the technical requirements of war. Conservatives in general morally justify war in defense of the national security and interest. They con sider that the liberties which have been built up by national societies, the domestic political, social and economic institutions through which they are secured, the military and commercial Interests in the world by which all this is sustained, morally justify the use of force in their defense against foreign threat or attack. The coun try's interests are its government's business and— with concessions to conscientious objectors--citizens are morally obligated to fight for their country. 7®See Chapter 111, pp. 122-124. 190 Conservatives support this position within a framework that accepts peace as the true aim of foreign policy— because in time of peace security and freedom are more assured— that repudiates war for material gain alone, that acknowl edges the limited applicability and benefits of force, and that understands that war involves the suspension of the accepted rules of human morality. Burke's position on war and the use of force expresses the fundamentals. Conservatives in general would accept it. War must have just purposes— defense of the traditional liberties and the nation's security. On this basis Burke condemned Britain's use of force against the American colonies and considered Britain herself had violated the British Constitution in her colonial policy. On the same basis he early and vigorously advocated mili tary intervention against Jacobin France in order, he said, ". . .to save my country from the iron yoke of its power, and from the more dreadful contagion of its principles."79 British freedom and security required war with France because, asserted Burke, "This new system of robbery in France cannot be rendered safe by any art; it must be 79Burke, The Works . . . . V, 133. 191 destroyed or It will destroy all Europe."88 He would prosecute a just and necessary war even though force was, he said, ". . . but a feeble Instrument,"81 and admitted, "War suspends the rules of iK»ral obligation and what is 82 long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated." John Adams also justifies war in the defense of liberty and the national security. "Be it remembered," states Adams, "that liberty at all hazards must be 83 defended." He supported the Revolutionary War and the use of force from whatever source available because, he claimed, "Britain has been filled with folly, and America with wisdom."8^ Winston Churchill has well elaborated his position on war. It is analogous to Burke's. Churchill understands war from experience; he dislikes it and fully recognizes the danger to civilization that modern wars with weapons of mass destruction present. Yet Churchill is also aware 80Ibid., p. 257. 81Ibid., I, 463. 82Ibid.. II, 11. 83 Adams, Dissertation . . . . in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 18. ^Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams (July 3, 1776), in Koch and Peden (eds.), p. 59. 192 that war la a continuous a lament In foreign affairs. He explains, "The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes thsre has never been peace oe in the world." He would, therefore, have force available and use it when most effective in defending national secur ity. States Churchill, "There is no merit in putting off a war if when it comes, it is a worse war or one much harder to w i n . "86 But he warns that "war is war but not folly, and it would be folly to invite a disaster which 87 would help nobody." He also recognizes that war suspends moral rules. He asserts, "In war-time . . . truth is so precious that she should be attended by a bodyguard of lies."**** He considers it right to sacrifice life and limit property rights and liberty to the exigencies of war and the requirements of victory. Says Churchill, "We . . . 85Winston S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1934), p. 245. 8 ins ton S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958) , p. 3207 87Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 479. 88Winston S. Churchill, in Colin R. Coote (ed.), A Churchill Reader; The Wit and Wisdom of Sir Winston Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954), p. 213. 193 voted into the hands of the Government, for the sake of our country's survival, practically all the rights of 89 property and, more precious still, of liberty. ..." Such limiting will not cause liberty to shrivel in the post-war world. However, he considers that the basic freedoms should be retained as much as possible and where vital. During the debate on the vote of confidence (January 27, 1942), arising out of military reverses, he said: "1 stand by the ancient, constitutional, Parliamen- 90 tary doctrine of free debate and faithful voting." Herbert Hoover also fully understands the fact of war in human history and the necessity— although he is not a Republican internationalist— of using United States military force to maintain world peace and to defend American security. But force has limited use. States Hoover, "(far is justified only as an instrument for a specific consequence."^ That consequence is peace. He ^Sfinston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, Hay 12, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 29. ^Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, January 27, 1942, in Charles Bade (ed.), The End of the Beginning (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1942), p. 14. 91 Hoover, Addresses . . . (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955) , p. 73. 194 completely eupporte the neceeeery sacrifice of life and controls on property and liberty. "We must sacrifice," 92 says Hoover, "much economic freedom to win the war." However, he calls these controls "... economic F a s c i s m . " ^ He fears war-time economic controls may freeze into the economy and remain in the post-war years leading to statism and collectivism, thus reducing personal and political liberty. Asserts Hoover, "Even the temporary suspension of economic liberty creates grave dangers because liberty rapidly atrophies from disuse."^ This fear reveals a dogmatic and ideological inheritance from laissez-faire conservatism to which, in a modified form, he is dedicated. Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican internationalist, unreservedly supports the use of force to protect American interesta and security and to promote world peace and stability as essential to the preservation of the constitu tional democracies. "We cannot," he states, "escape the AC responsibilities of leadership." J This may involve the 93Hoover, Addresses . . . (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. , Inc., 1946), p. 225. 93Ibid. 94Ibid. 95 Elsenhower, in Taylor (ed.), What Elsenhower Thinks. p. 127. 195 use of force to guarantee what he calls "... world conditions essential to the preservation of our own freedoms.Eisenhower is prepared to impose the neces sary restrictions in war, but does not consider this to be a threat to the return of customary liberty when peace returns. Although the foreign policies of the United States and Britain pursue similar interests and objectives, there is a significant difference in their bias and mode of operation. This is partly due to experience and partly to the influence of elements in their respective political traditions. British foreign policy, especially that of the Conservative Party, while fully aware of the ideological ingredient which international communism inserts into foreign affairs, tends to put this fact within the frame work of an approach oriented to accommodating traditional and developing national interests. The resort to the national Interest doctrine was used to fathom Russian plans in the early months of World War II. Discussing Russian policy at that time, Churchill declared, "It is a riddle wrapped inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. 96Ibid.. p. 130. 196 97 That key is Russian national Interest." Quinton Hogg axprasaaa a similar viewpoint. Hogg reveals, "The problem o£ peace Is to discover a means whereby differently minded nations can avoid war. . . ."9® The method British foreign policy uses is empirical, derived from its own political tradition, attempting to adjust conflicting and competing national interests within permissible limits. Explains Churchill, "It would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia until everything is settled."99 United States foreign policy, while becoming more practical and empirical with time and experience, has exhibited a rationalistic attitude. This bias is inherent in the American political tradition and its basic defect in foreign affairs is the tendency to make hasty, generalized conclusions assigning an exclusive cause— communist ideol ogy— to very complicated and long-standing historical 97 * Winston S. Churchill, Broadcast Speech, September 27, 1939, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Blood. Sweat and Tears (Hew York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 173. 98 Hogg, The Conservative Case, p. 47. 99Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, Hay 11, 1953. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), DXV (1952-53), 895. 197 problems. In this context, foreign policy tends to assume a moralistic posture which, although it may be laudable, Inclines to miss the main point that foreign policy deals with the promotion and maintenance of a world power con figuration conducive to promoting the country's national interest and International stability. The long delay in granting diplomatic recognition to Russia and the non- recognition of Red China are examples of moralism. In discussing recognition of communist countries, Herbert Hoover asserts, "We can hold up standards in the world a little better if we do not invite them into our homes by so-called diplomatic recognition."100 This is to be con trasted with the British practice of recognition of the government in actual control of a country regardless of their political views. "The reason for having diplomatic relations," states Churchill, "is not to confer a compli ment, but to secure a convenience."101 However, the moralistic streak in Hoover's foreign policy opinions does not lead him to support ideological wars. Hoover 102 remarks, "Such wars have no ending and no victory." 100Hoover, Addresses . . . (Stanford, 1951), p. 65. 101Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 17, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 144. 102Hoover, Addresses . . . (Stanford, 1951), p. 73. CHAPTER V PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE Private Property. Freedom, and Efficiency The relationship o£ the state to the individual in social and economic life is undoubtedly the most Important problem facing political philosophy in the Western world today and, apart from foreign affairs where national free dom and physical survival are at stake, the most funda mental one for public policy. The role of the state in political society has been debated since the beginning of political speculation. The minimum role assigned to the state is to guarantee subsistence and physical safety. Implicit here is the role of the state as the guarantor of security, equality, and liberty. The state does what no other social organ or individual has the legal and moral authority, the physical power, the economic and admlnlstra tive resources to perform. The state must act in those 198 199 areas where there are external effects impinging on all of whom a majority agree are a matter of general concern and action, and which cannot be priced by the market. The state so acting is conceived as the provider of the socially necessary overhead capital whether in its role as maintainer of minimum subsistence and security or in its contemporary function of increasingly participating in eco' nomic and social life by means of direct assistance, regu lation, stabilizing and planning, and public enterprise policies.^ The mighty quests for security and opportunity are the basic forces tending to expand state social and economic activity. All these activities of the state impact directly upon the institution of private property which conservatives from Burke and Adams to the present have always defended on the grounds of efficiency and lib erty, although to them liberty is a sufficient justifies- tion. Doctrinaire and thematic interferences with the arrangements of the institution of private property cannot be accepted. All change in these arrangements must be ^Marshall E. Dimock, Business and Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. , 1961), pp. 11-16. ^See Chapter IV, pp. 180-188. 200 empirically justified in conformity with the tradition and its virtues. The institution of private property and its rela tionship to the state and to society in general have occupied Western political philosophy from its beginning. Plato solved these problems by abolishing private property for citizens. Aristotle supported private property owner ship but insisted that private property have a public use. Aristotle defends private property on the grounds of incentive, progress, pleasure, liberality, prescription, and leisure needed to participate in political activity. Property— mostly in land— was definitely subordinated to politics and ethics. In medieval times, property— mostly in land— was conceived in terms of a system of reciprocal and mutual rights and duties. Avarice was considered a sin by the medieval Christian Church. The main purpose of life was not accumulation of wealth but salvation of one's Immortal soul. Aquinas— and Hooker later agreed— pro pounded the idea of the usufruct of property. The capitalist conception of property is fundamen tally different from the Aristotelian and medieval. It is 3Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 49-50. 201 hedonistic, secularist, and conventionalist. The emergence of capitalism and its ideas on property out of the heavily theologically dominated feudal era is a complex affair and took several generations. Essentially it required the transformation of the Christian sin, avarice, into the capitalist virtue, acquisition. The liberating of acquisi tion requires that man learn and be taught not to be satisfied with what he merely needs for comfort, but to want without limit. Acquisition in turn demands justifica tion in this life and the next. The Protestant ethic of the later Puritans performed this important task. The acquisitive bourgeois capitalist society with its ethical and moral justification of the unequal and unlimited accumulation of private property and its profitable invest ment; with its virtues of self-sacrifice, thrift, enter prise, Incentive and contrivance; with its economic individualism and its moral and political individuality became established in Western Europe and Britain by 1550. Colonization brought the system to the New World. John Locke empiricist, hedonist, conventionalist, bourgeois rationalizer, and philosopher of the settlement of 1688, and secularizer of the foundations of economic life and political obligation formulated the basic principles of this acquisitive and constitutionalist society. Locke considered the protection of property— In the sense of life, liberty, and estate— to be the sole purpose of civil society. Locke considers property to be coexistent and coeval with human personality and not merely an external good of the soul as Aristotle thought. States Locke, "Every man has a property In his own person. This nobody has a right to but himself."^ The foundation of property is in man himself and not in civil society. The source of wealth and property is human labor and activity ranging from the most menial to the highest of which man is capable. Locke observes, "Labor makes the far greater part of the value of things we enjoy in this world."5 The invention of money in the most advanced stages of the state of nature frees acquisition and leads to greater and more unequal natural property and the right to these possessions. By introducing money, man has agreed, as Locke explains, ". . .to enlarge his posses sions . . . and ... to a disproportionate and unequal ^John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt (New York: The Modern Library, 1939), p. 413. 203 possession of the earth. . . ."** Money morally justifies the employer and employee wage relationship. Civil society and its conventional and utilitarian arrangements protect this already unequal natural property and grant title and protection to a still greater and more unequal civil pri vate property. Political society sets up the arrangements and rules which govern and limit the acquisitive activities of the competitors. And there are many possible rules and arrangements and modifications of them. Conservatives from Burke and Adams to the present agree with Locke on this point. Says Anthony Eden, "Government can only create the conditions. It is industry which must create the wealth."^ Since its emergence from the economic and political arrangements of feudalism, private property market capital ism— whether mercantilist, laissez falre, or the mixed economy of the present time— has always been historically associated in the English-speaking world with constitu tional, liberal, representative government as it has evolved and developed in the last three centuries to its existing democratic form. Conservatives, classical and 6Ibid., p. 422. ^Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 295. 204 contemporary, have always contended that the traditional, constitutional, political, and personal liberties of the English-speaking peoples are inseparable from the private property market system of economic organization which they also consider to be the most efficient in the production of wealth and well-being. Personal and political freedom requires economic freedom. Conservatives, however, do not argue that the market economic organization must rigidly adhere to one form or type. Change is the rule. The principles of the free economy and the free political system must be restated by each generation and thus applied to the solution of social problems. If this is done, the ethical and political goals of succeeding generations can be achieved within the framework of constitutional govern ment and the private property capitalist economic system. Contemporary British conservatives, due to their Burkean empiricist and Tory ancestry, are much more flexible and adaptive to broad and widening state economic and social activity than are present-day American conservatives who, despite modification, are still strongly imbued with the ideology of their laissez-faire conservative ancestors. Both contemporary British and American conserva tives completely reject the view that traditional liberties 205 could be enjoyed if a socialist, planned economy replaced the private property market economy. Such concentration of power in the state stifles incentive and smothers liberty. Conservatives consider advocacy of such socialist ideas subversive to liberty or, at best, theoretic dogma tism which is at variance with their understanding of politics as a prudential and empirical art and of political philosophy as a body of doctrine constructed from experi ence in the tradition. Conservatives, thus, reject socialism but accept state economic and social activity provided the private property principle is retained. What general criteria are available to test the existence and maintenance of the private property principle in the face of wide and growing state social and economic activity due to the interdepend ence of the economy, the availability of wealth to pay for the public services the people demand, and the growth of large corporations and unions necessitating big government? Locke's views on money give help in this question. Money gives a right to larger and unequal possessions and the cooperative arrangements of political society allow even more inequality. These cooperative arrangements may permit wide variations with respect to the economic role of the 206 state— although Locke was not, Indeed, primarily inter ested in this question— and leave the property principle intact i£ the money motive and Incentive remains. Burke also clearly comprehended that the money motive lies at the heart of capitalism and its historically concomitant constitutional, libertarian political system. Burke remarks: Monied men ought to be allowed to set a value on their money. . . . The love of lucre is the grand cause of prosperity to all states. ... It is for the statesman to employ it as he finds it.8 Continuing, Burke explains that the money motive is one g "of the great natural energies." The statesman must not thwart it if private property, liberty, and economic efficiency are to survive, and therefore state economic and social activity must not extirpate the money motive. The importance of taxation in the Anglo-American constitu tional tradition also reveals the money motive criteria. Says Burke: Most of the contests in the ancient common wealths turned primarily on the right of election of magistrates, or on the balance among the several ^Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke (London: H. 6. Bohn, 1854-56), V, 313. 9Ibid. 207 orders of the state. The question of money with them was not so immediate. But in England it was otherwise. John M. Keynes, who is the intellectual source of so much of the contemporary orthodoxy regarding the economic role of the state, also supports the money motive criteria. Relative to public economic and social policies, Keynes observes: There is nothing in them which is seriously incompatible with what seems to me to be the essential characteristic of Capitalism, namely the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine.H The money motive guide does not answer the question of what the state shall do, but only indicates the limit to which state action can be pushed if the private property principle and constitutional government are to survive. The relationship between cooperation and competi tion is an important question in regard to state economic and social activity, particularly in English-speaking countries with their long traditions of constitutional ^Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America (New York: Laurel Book Co., 1922), p. 64. ^John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissec Falre (London: The Hogarth Press, 1927), p. 50. government end market capitalism. Conservatives see society as a hierarchical, pluralistic, cooperative arrangement for the provision of human wants with the state as the coordinator of the cooperative arrangements and the market as the mechanism solving the basic economic prob lems. Therefore, they see cooperation and competition as complementary and Interdependent forces. They do not agree with Kropotkin that cooperation is morally and biologically superior, or with Spencer that competition is. Conserva tives consider there must be a balance between the two forces and that the most satisfactory situation obtains when the cooperative arrangements identifying the purposes for which the group exists are reconciled with the competi tive individuality of the members for whose fulfillment the group emerged in the first place. Conservatives sup port the position that the political process acting through the state, indicating the public sphere, may define and select the ethical objectives of each generation and may rightly provide the legal framework, the socially necessary overhead capital and so orient the competitive forces of the market to achieve such aims provided economic and political freedom and the Incentive which produces the 209 wealth to pay for these goals are not trampled. Social and political cooperation must not be pushed to where it extinguishes man's individuality. State Social and Economic Activity Introduction Capitalism was established as the decisive mode of economic production in the West by 1550, and as the exclu- 12 sive method by 1650. Since its emergence, it has passed through three main stages— mercantilism, laissez faire, and the mixed economy of the present. Each of these stages has been characterized by a certain type of relationship between the cooperative association of society, the state, and the competitive agency— the market. State social and economic activity was based upon simple humanitarianlsm and general principles of reform and control. During the mercantilist era lasting until about 1700 A.D., the eco nomic regulatory power of the state surpassed the strength of the market. In England, public concern for individual welfare is illustrated in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, 12 **R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1926), pp. 150-151. 210 while control of the economy by the state was provided by the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts. Both the govern ment and the mercantilist economists, such as Gresham and Petty, were much Interested in prices, subsistence, the balance of payments (bullion movements), and the balance of trade. Laissez-faire industrial capitalism existed in full force in Britain by 1750, lasting there with some legislative modification until the final quarter of the nineteenth century. In the United States it maintained itself until the New Deal period. Under laissez faire, the economic power of the market surpassed that of the state whose functions were limited to defense, Internal security, and protection of property. The administration of property was left to the price mechanism of the market operating in accordance with the principles of minimizing cost, optimizing output, and maximizing well-being unavoid able in a framework of scarcity and unlimited human wants. The English classical economists Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, and the American economist Sumner even more so, and in the main the industrialists of the era, subscribed to this view of limited state functions and a free market. The Industrialists were concerned with accumulating wealth, 211 and the economists in defending the system and in develop ing a long-run theory of distribution in terms of full employment equilibrium. Their analytical models did not provide a tool for public economic and social policies to deal with the fundamental problems of Instability and inequality. It remained for Keynes to perform this task. However, there was during this period social reform as illustrated by the Factory Acts and Disraeli's reforms between 1874 and 1880 in Britain, and attempts at state economic control there as expressed in the Banking and Currency Act of 1844.*^ Guided capitalism or the mixed economy which came into existence as the result of experience, the financial collapse of 1929 and the ensuing world-wide depression— themselves the results of capitalism's basic maladjustments in its laissez-faire form— the dislocations of World War I and World War II, assumes a partnership between the market and the state. The state, through various types of public policy, participates with the businessman in the entre preneurial risk-taking function, but the basic economic ^For a discussion of relevant money and banking problems see F. Cyril James, The Economics of Money. Credit and Banking (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1940) , pp. 167-170. 212 decisions regarding output and prices— however the govern ment is greatly interested in prices of factors of produc tion and consumer goods and the general price level— is left to the market mechanism as it functions under condi tions of workable imperfect competition. Conservatives in the United States and Britain accept in principle the mixed economy, but with difference in emphasis. Both histori cally and philosophically, state economic and social activity are compatible with capitalism. Industrial market capitalism has produced in the contemporary world a dynamic, interdependent, urban society of great material abundance and wealth, and shortened hours of toil and increased leisure. It has also produced funda mental and characteristic social and economic problems whose root cause is the replacement of land, which was the basis of security in feudal times, with market industrial ism. Artificial conventionalism replaced the more natural agricultural economy. The most important problems inhering in contemporary industrial capitalism are those connected with Instability, less than full employment utilisation of resources, inequality in the distribution of income, imperfect competition, inflationary pressures especially as full employment is approached, insecurity regarding 213 jobs, sickness, age and other misfortunes, technological displacement of labor, education, and leisure. Historically the state has constantly widened its social and economic activities in the public Interest as successive generations have conceived it and has imple mented these activities through constitutional processes. At the present time the state seeks to promote and maintain a high, stable, and growing level of income employment and production without inflation, and to assure social security and educational opportunities. The state attempts to achieve these economic and social objectives within a framework of workable imperfect competition and constitu tional democracy by pursuing appropriate monetary, fiscal, social welfare, regulation, planning, and public enter prise policies. Conservatives today in the United States and Britain accept these public policies upon an empirical but never on a doctrinaire basis. They are ever mindful of the problems arising to liberty and efficiency in the doctrinaire expansion of state functions. Contemporary Conservative and Republican Party views. — The adaptive, empirical, experimental, pragmatic, and 214 non-doctrinaire position of the contemporary British Con servative Party on the matter of state economic and social activity is traceable to two sources: (1) Burke's com pensating laissez-faire and empiricist positions, end (2) Toryism in the line of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' squire and Anglican vicar, the nineteenth century's Sadler, Oastler, and Shaftesbury— who together returned Toryism from the laissez-faire position of Smith's disciples Pitt the Younger and Liverpool— and to Disraeli and the early twentieth century's Lord Hugh Cecil.^ The Conservative Party's simultaneous strong support of private market capitalism and state economic and social activity including even state ownership and operation of property in certain cases, reflects its dual origins. The severe and unabated excesses of laissez-faire Industrial capitalism in Britain in the first quarter of the nineteenth century called forth almost immediately state intervention on behalf of the security and welfare of the working classes. Factory Acts in 1819, 1833, 1842, and 1844 controlled conditions and hours of work for women ^See R. J. White (ed.), The Conservative Tradi tion (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 207- 223. 215 and children in industry, while the Ten Hours Act of 1847 protected men employed in the mines. Most of this social reform legislation was inspired on traditional humanitarian grounds by Tories like Sadler, Oastler, and Shaftesbury. Disraeli's reforms between 1874 and 1880 are a continuing example of how Toryism protects the working classes and the public interest from "the thralldom of capital." The philosophical basis of state interference was stated by Disraeli as follows: In attempting to legislate upon social matters the great object is to be practical— to have before us some distinct aims and some distinct means by which they can be accomplished.15 Lord Hugh Cecil succinctly states the essence of Conservatism-Toryism in the area of state social and economic activity indicating the need to be practical, to respect tradition and change, and to respect justice and liberty. States Cecil: ... as long as State action does not involve what is unjust or oppressive it cannot be said that the principles of Conservatism are hostile to it. . . . any scheme for enlarging the function of the State must be judged by Conservatives merely on its merits without reference to any general formula, but from a standpoint prudently distrustful of the untried, and ^Benjamin Disraeli, in Edward Clark, Beniamin Disraeli (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 206. 216 preferring to develop what exists rather than to demolish and reconstruct. Conservative reform need not, therefore, proceed on purely Individualist lines. There Is no antithesis between Conservatism and Socialism, or even between Conservatism and Liberalism. . . . Conservatives have no difficulty In welcoming the social activity of the State.16 Burke's lalssez-falre empiricism provides the other main facet of Influence regarding state activity on the Conservative Party. Burke's lalssez-falre position In economic life was developed Independently of Adam Smith. It Is clear and direct. Burke states, "The balance between consumption and production makes price. The market settles, and alone can settle, that price.Government can do nothing to help the Individual directly In economic life. Remarks Burke, "To provide for us In our necessities 1 f t Is not In the power of government." He continues: My opinion Is against an over-doing of any kind of administration, and more especially against this most momentous of all meddling on the part of authority; the meddling with the subsistence of the people.W However, Burke's general philosophical empiricism, his support of variety, change, and the prudential handling l^Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1912), p. 195. 1^Burke, The Works . . . . V, 97. 18Ibld. , V, 2. I9Ibld., V, 108. 217 of political affairs in the light of circumstances makes him a source in support of practical state economic and social action.^® Sir Robert Feel, Sr.— father of Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel— textile Industrialist and sponsor of the first Factory Act in 1819 is an example of the com patibility relative to state economic and social activity between Burkean empiricism and market capitalism. The Conservative Party today also finds such compatibility. The Party draws on both aspects of Burke and upon Toryism which, although land based, also originated in a capitalist environment, agriculture itself becoming infected with the spirit of trade as early as the sixteenth century.21 The Party's present business and market orientation is derived mainly from Burke, reinforced by the advent into it in the 1880's of the great landed and industrial wealth of the Liberal Unionists. The dualism Implicit in the combination of Burke and Toryism regarding state economic and social activity is obvious in contemporary British conservatism. The Party stands for private property and market capitalism 20At the time of Burke's writings, the administra tive resources of the state were scanty. 21Tawney, pp. 117-123. 218 on the one hand and for state activity based on empirical need and justice on the other. R. A. Butler remarks: We are not a Party of unbridled, brutal capi talism, and never have been. Although we believe In personal responsibility and personal Initiative In business, we are not the political children of the laissez-faire school.22 Anthony Eden asserts, "We will seek to achieve the proper balance between the organizing power of the State and the drive and force of free enterprise."^ Says Churchill: We seek to benefit private enterprise with the knowledge and guiding power of modern Governments, without sacrificing the initiative and drive of individual effort under free competitive conditions.2^ The Conservative Party fully accepts government responsibility for full employment and stability as its support of the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy shows. The White Paper states, "The Government accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance 22r . a . Butler, "The Conservative Faith Restated," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 11. (Pamphlet.) 23 Anthony Eden, "Conservative Points of View," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 73. (Pamphlet.) 2*Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Awr, Hay 16, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1950), p. 100. 219 of a high and stable level of employment after the war.”25 The responsibility of the government for the social welfare of the people was also accepted by the Conservative Party. The 1944 Education Act and its support of the National Health Scheme, Family Allowances and other social insur ance, and housing are clear proof. The Conservative Party position on the social services is well expressed in the pamphlet, "The Right Road for Britain.” They are a cooperative system of mutual aid and self help provided by the whole nation and designed to give to all the basic minimum of security, of housing, of opportunity, of employment, and of liv ing standards below which our duty to one another forbids us to permit anyone to fall.2® The Labor Party also shared the views that full employment, stability, a more equitable redistribution of the national income, and social security were the responsibility of the state and yet there was great political controversy between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. And the reason for the controversy reveals the basic thread of the Con servative Party— its opposition to politics being directed ^5White Paper, Employment Policy. Cmd. 6527 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1944), p. A2. 2*”The Right Road for Britain,” The New Conserva tism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 115. (Pamphlet.) 220 by ideology end doctrine rather than by prudence. Comments Churchill, "The two aides of the House face each other deeply divided by ideological differences."2^ However, British conservatives, whether classical or contemporary, demand that such state activity be limited by the requirements of freedom and justice. This means that private property must not be destroyed or abused because justice and freedom are dependent upon private property. Confiscations and unfair distribution of wealth are inconsistent with justice, which, says Burke, ". . .is the great standing policy of society."2® Cecil comments, "It is . . . plain that to take what one man has and give it to another is unjust, even though the first man is rich 29 and the second poor. ..." Referring to the national isation of the steel industry, Churchill states, "It is not a plan to help our patient struggling people, but a 30 burglar's jemmy to crack the capitalist crib." 2 ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, May 7, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1951), p. 226. 2^Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), p. 221. 2^Cecil, p. 196. ^^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 460. 221 Contemporary American conservative* are as stead fast in their loyalty to their laissez-faire conservative ancestry— although they have modified it— as are British conservatives to their Burkean laissez-faire empiricism and Toryism's supervised capitalism. They are essentially anti-statist and distrust state power more than the British. They also accept the morality of the market more than do the British. However, in fact, they concede, even though rather unwillingly, the need for state social and economic activity but appear not to have persuaded the electorate of the adequacy of their position. While they have accepted in principle the Employment Act of 1946, they are restrained in the monetary and fiscal policies needed to implement it. Nor have they elaborated their position on the social services as has the Conservative Party. There is lacking also an equivalent of the Con servative Party's Industrial Charter and Agricultural Charter. Larson states the general character of the Repub lican Party's philosophy. Says Larson, "Now we have as much governmental activity as is necessary but not enough to stifle the normal motivations of private enterprise." 31 Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 10. 222 American conservatism1a doctrinaire, ideological, anti-statism, and its emphasis on the importance of private effort in general, reveals itself in particular form in the attempt of some of its members to picture and to estab lish the industrial corporation as the typical American social Institution through which many of the most funda mental social, political, ethical, and economic problems of mass, urban, capitalist society can be solved. Peter Drucker, Adolphe Berle, Lloyd Warner, Raymond W. Miller, and John K. Jessup support, with variations, this general conception of the corporation. Says Drucker: What we look for in an analyzing American society is the institution which sets the standard for the way of life and the mode of living of our citizens which leads, molds and directs. . . . And this, in our society today, is the large c o r p o r a t i o n .32 Berle takes this position even further. Asserts Berle: The future may see the economic organization now typified as the corporation not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization.33 32peter F. Drucker, Concent of the Corporation (New York: John Day Co., 1946), pp. 6-7. 33 ’ '"'Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner C. Msans, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 357. 223 Miller takes a more moderate view: "This new kind o£ capitalism," he says, "is based on the idea of a fair profit for free business enterprise combined with enlight- ened service to the community." Private corporations' activities, based upon prudence and generous social comprehension, to promote individual security and well-being and community service are to be commended. But to have the corporation supplant the state is quite another matter. On this point, Berle's position is out of step with the general Western political tradition. It also finds no support in Locke, Smith, or even Spencer, and is thus cut off from its own laissez- faire conservative intellectual ancestry. Spencer, although he believed competition would result in a higher type of individual and society, did not envisage the state abdicating its role in defense, law and order, and protec tion of property and contract. Locke, while he considered human activity to be the source of wealth and property, believed that civil society, characterized by the existence of the coercive political state, gave title to civil prop erty including corporate property. Fortunately, Berle's ^Raymond W. Miller, Can Capitalism Compete? (New York: The Ronald Press Co. , 1959!), p. vii. 224 position is not general among American conservatives. Contemporary British conservatives— who also draw on Locke— have no sympathy for such debasement of the state and for replacing it with any type of private association. They support Burke's idea of the state as a partnership in all achievement and every virtue. They even frown upon the excessive political activity of private voluntary groups as a threat to the working of the party system. Churchill's attitude on the trades unions illustrates the point. "We hope," observes Churchill, "that Conservative wage-eamers . , . will join the trade unions and will take an effective part in their work not as Party men but as good trade 35 unionists." Politics as an empirical art in the manage ment of the state cannot accept domination by the corporate mind, the trade union mind, or any other private mind. Even right wing laissez-faire Tories like Enoch Powell would not take the private property thesis to Berle's extreme. Enoch Powell, although he opposes the Conserva tive Party's welfare position, would not take the state out of social affairs and let corporations do its job. 35yinston S. Churchill, Speech, Londonderry, October 13, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 103. 225 Foliclei.--The policies which the state uses in implementing its activities are monetary, fiscal, social welfare expenditures, regulation, planning, and national ization. 1. Monetary.— Monetary policy means the management of the legal reserves of the commercial banks by the central bank— in the United States the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks, and in England the Bank of England. The central bank manages the legal reserves, usually cash, government bonds, and acceptable commercial paper, and fixed by law, by varying the re discount rate, open market operations, and altering reserve ratio requirements. The objectives of monetary policy are full employment, stability, and growth without inflation. By 1793, the Bank of England had unofficially assumed the functions of a central bank, this position being formalized in the 1840's.36 The United States did not achieve com parable results until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, although it had been hoped that the Bank of North America and the First and Second Banks ^James, pp. 145, 167. 226 of the United States would perform this function. The National Banking System prevailing between 1864 and 1913 was totally inadequate as a central bank. Monetary policy, of all public economic policies, is the most amenable to private enterprise market capital ism. Consequently, it is strongly favored by American and British conservatives. There are two principal reasons why conservatives favor monetary policy: (1) It is non- regulatory in nature. The use of state power tends to be reduced. Central bank action to change the interest rate and the money supply, for example, by open market opera tions, does not directly interfere with decisions and transactions between the banks and customers. However, an i Interstate Commerce Commission order is a direct regulation. (2) It operates flexibly in phase with the assumed long-run tendency of the market to achieve full employment equilib rium utilization of resources and reinforces its actualiza tion. Monetary policy is a much more effective tool to control long-term growth and inflation than to manage short-term cyclical industrial fluctuations in output and prices, although it is also useful here. Monetary policy is useful in controlling the economy because it can be made to affect the level of investment and consumption spending. If the central bank forces down the interest rate simultaneously increasing the money supply, both Investment and consumption are increased, thus expanding the national income— the multi plier principle operating on the investment increase. Monetary policy, operating with discretion and flexibility to control short-term disturbances, should also make available the right quantity of money at the right price so that all profitable investment opportunities can be exploited in the Interests of promoting long-run stability, growth, and full employment without Inflation. American conservatives support a flexible and discretionary monetary policy. Arthur Larson states, "If signs of inflation appear . . . the government can . . . act to tighten the supply of money and credit."37 He continues, "In a mild degree, 1955 saw the application of some of these measures. . . . The Federal Reserve Bank discount rate was gradually raised from 1.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent."38 Eisenhower's monetary policy exhibited two prin cipal characteristics: (1) It tended to be restrictive 3^Larson, p. 54. 38Ibid. 228 with relatively high interest rates and scarcity of money. The result was general stability in the price level, but with unemployment usually ranging about 5.5 per cent of the labor force, thus higher than the accepted upper limit of 4 per cent. (2) It was oriented toward a free market in money, a view which approves the diffusion of control between Treasury and Federal Reserve Board. Remarks McChesney Martin: 1 think it is a free market. I think one of the great blastings of our economy today is that neither the Federal Reserve nor the Treasury is strong enough to override the forces at the grass roots that are there in the economy. . . . Now, you can vitiate the forces of supply and demand, but you pay a price for it, and . . . neither the Federal Reserve nor the Treasury can afford to ignore the forces of the market unless they want to have unbridled inflation.39 British conservatives also favor monetary policy for similar reasons— stability and growth and concurrence with the market economy. Anthony Eden supports what he terms "flexible monetary policies." Quinton Hogg states: In the fight against inflation Conservatives, instead of using the elaborate system of physical controls which proved totally inadequate under the Socialists, have returned to the use of a ^Quoted in Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties (New York: The Macmillan Co., 19f>2) , p. 101. 229 flexible monetary policy. The main feature of this has been varying interest rates based on changes in Bank rate. . . The flexible monetary policies of the Conservative Party— as must all public economic policies in Britain— are formulated and executed within the limits required to contain inflation, keep unemployment low, increase produc tivity, and retain a satisfactory balance of payments situation. The balance of payments is particularly crucial to Britain as it reflects the terms upon which she does business with the rest of the world, and this is vital to a nation which imports almost half her food and raw mate rials and pays for them by persuading other nations to buy her industrial wares in a very competitive market. Brit ain's whole diplomatic and military position in the world, as well as the earning of the livelihood of her people, requires the balance of payments to be manageable. If the balance of payments is favorable, then expansionary but non-inflationary monetary policy is applied. The reverse occurs if the balance of payments is unfavorable. This "stop-go" procedure was rigidly enforced between 1951 and 1961, when a considerable amount of long-term central ^Quinton Hogg, The Conservative Case (Harmonds- worth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1959), p. 145. 230 planning waa Introduced to pronote Investment, growth, productivity, and control Inflation ao aa to protect the British economy against fluctuations in the international market. The National Economic Development Council to promote growth and the National Incomes Commission to keep wages and salaries in line with production were estab lished.41 2. Fiscal.--Fiscal policy embraces the role of the budget— taxation, government expenditure, and the Implied deficits and surpluses— in the over-all performance of the economy. "Fiscal policy," Paul Samuelson states, l k ! J "means government expenditure and tax policy." Harold M. Groves considers fiscal policy deals with what he calls ". . . taxation, the public debt, and public expend itures."4^ Groves continues, "The essence of fiscal policy is to adjust the size of deficit or surplus in accordance with the needs of the total economy in deflation or 41Clair Wilcox, at al., Economies of the World Today (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), p. 55. 4^Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw- Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), p. 332. 4^Harold M. Groves, Financing Government (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), p. 528. 231 inflation."^ The leverage effects on the economy derive from the budgetary deficit or surplus. The general alms of fiscal policy are to stabilize the economy by reducing the swings of the business cycle; to help insure a full employment level of expenditures in the combined private and public sectors, removing either a deflationary or inflationary gap; to promote economic growth; and to delimit resource allocation between their public and private uses. Stabilizing the economy by reducing the fluctuations of the business cycle involves the budget in compensatory activities. The budget acts like a balance wheel in the economy. On the upswing gov ernment spending is reduced and tax receipts are larger, due either to movement into the higher marginal tax rates or because they are raised by legislative (or administra tive discretionary) enactment. On the downswing government spending is increased and tax collections are reduced, due either to movement into the lower marginal tax rates or because they are reduced by legislative (or discretionary administrative) enactment. Automatic stabilizers such as the progressive income tax, farm subsidies, and social 232 security absorb the first shocks, but if these are heavy and prolonged, the automatic stabilizers should be sup plemented by discretionary fiscal action. The use of fiscal policy to achieve full employment without inflation requires a statistical determination of the total level of spending required. If a deflationary gap is indicated, taxes should be reduced and/or government spending increased resulting, if necessary, in a budget deficit and increase in the national debt. If an infla tionary gap is estimated, taxes should be raised and/or government spending reduced resulting, perhaps, in a budget surplus to be applied to national debt reduction. What proportion of the deflationary gap is to be filled by pub lic or private spending— whether investment or consumer in either case— is a matter of policy. Once the non-infla- tionary full employment equilibrium level of resource used is reached, the budget can be used to maintain this posi tion which reflects the social decision regarding private and public spending. Long-term growth will be considerably attained if stability and full employment without inflation are realized. Then the principal problem is to pursue tax and spending policies designed to produce the desired amount 233 of capital formation which, together with technological advance, alone can generate economic growth. Public spending on consumer goods, while it adds to employment and some induced investment through the operation of the acceleration principle, mostly puts additional strain on existing capital capacity. If the growth budget is to be politically acceptable to the decision makers in the pri vate economy— and this is fundamental to the success of the policy and the buoyant functioning of the market— they must approve its size, the distribution of the tax burden, and the projects (investment or consumption) upon which public spending is to be applied. Monetary and fiscal policy must be coordinated if stability, full employment, and growth are to be achieved. Monetary policy must counter the natural tendency of the conmercial banks' loan and interest policies to move with the business cycle. It must also provide the Interest rate and money supply needed for full employment, non- inf latlonary investment, and consumption spending. If full employment and growth are to be maintained, the proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies must be provided. If faster growth is desired, easy money (with low interest rates and a large money supply) and tight fiscal policy 234 (with budget surplus and rsgrsssivs taxes) are needed. The savings, faster accumulated by the tight fiscal policy, will be coaxed into investment by the low interest rates. If slower growth and more welfare consumption is desired, a tight money policy (high interest rates and reduced money supply) and an easy fiscal policy (high progressive income taxes and budget deficit) should be implemented. Monetary and fiscal policies must be designed and imple mented that maximize the performance of the basic human economic functions— the desire and the ability to work, consume, save, and invest— within the framework of free market capitalism operating according to principles which minimize cost, optimize output, and maximize well-being. The use of monetary and fiscal policy as tools of economic control derive from the experience of the depres sion of the 1930's and from the teachings of J. M. Keynes. Government by its nature must act when emergency or disaster hits society. But it should have a guide, and this Keynes p r o v i d e d .45 The Keynesian doctrines of vigor ous monetary and fiscal policies to get out of the 45J o h n Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money (London: The Macmillan Co., 1936). This work developed the original analytical and policy model in these areas. 235 depression end to stey prosperous ere besed upon his thesis that nature capitalism generates excess savings. Monetary and fiscal policy oust create profitable investment oppor tunities for these savings, otherwise the national Incone will fall by a multiple of these excess savings. Thrift— still a virtue but now more involuntary— requires enter prise. This enterprise depends significantly on public economic policies. The use of fiscal policy is unavoidable in modern capitalistic society. The only choice is whether it is to be prudently and deliberately planned using available knowledge, or is to be haphazard and ill-contrived, based on ignorance and misplaced political opposition. Planned fiscal policy conceives the budget in terms of its effects on the economy and as a means to provide for social wants. Depending on what is chosen, the budget will be in balance or show a deficit or surplus. If continuing deficits and consequent increases in the national debt are selected, this may be less burdensome than balanced or surplus budg ets. This will be the case if the combined effects of the central bank forcing down the rate of interest— and the interest is what will be repaid by taxes— on the government bonds and the expansion stimulus given to the national 236 income by the deficit ere such to make the rate of growth of intereat on the debt smaller than the rate of growth of the national Income. On the other hand, balanced or sur plus budgets may be secured at the cost of a depressed national income where the burden of the debt interest com pared to the national income is higher. Properly managed deficits— although deficits as such are indeed not here advocated— are compatible with non-inflationary stability, full employment, growth, and the proper allocation between public and private spending whether investment or con sumption. Within the framework of its modified laissez-faire conservatism, the Republican Party accepts in principle the use of fiscal policy which requires a greater application of state power than does monetary policy. The Party accepts it with more reservations than it does monetary policy. However, compared with the Democratic Party, it advocates smaller budgets and emphasizes the need for balancing them. But none the less, during Eisenhower's two terms approximately twenty billion dollars in deficits were accumulated, relatively high unemployment rates pre vailed, and no substantial tax reduction occurred. 237 Robert Taft expresses the general conservative view. Remarks Taft, "Mo nation ever has continued indefi nitely an unbalanced budget without ultimate collapse. He fears deficit-produced inflation. Taft says, "If we ever have real inflation it is doubtful if we could re instate the American system of individual freedom and initiative until we had wasted many years under state socialism."47 Larson considers it necessary to, as he states, "... stop inflation, check government spending, balance the budget. . . ."*® Eisenhower asserts, "Expenditures and consequently taxes are too high. We 49 must take steps that would make a reduction possible.’ Maurice Stans, Budget Director under Eisenhower, states, "The federal government should have a balanced budget. ... Of this I am deeply convinced."**® 4®T. V. Smith and Robert A. Taft, Foundations of Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 227. 47Ibid. 4®Larson, p. 45. 49 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties, p. 129. ^Maurice Stans, "The Need for Balanced Federal Budgets," in Paul A. Samuelson, et al. (eds.), Readings in Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. , 1964), p. 156. 238 There ere two general classes of reasons why American conservatives advocate limited and balanced budg ets. First, deficits cause inflation. Second, they are an undemocratic method of allocating the resource use of society. Inflation is opposed because it is immoral and is also economically wasteful. Neil H. Jacoby says, "Even a limited inflation is immoral; and, as soon as it becomes generally anticipated, it is economically wasteful. Stans declares, "Inflation is an insidious threat to the strength of the United States.Conservatives consider that a stable dollar is the prerequisite for the solution of all other long-run economic problems. They also con sider that deficits are Ineffective in reducing unemploy ment. Henry Hazlltt observes: In the United States we have had 29 deficits in the last 35 years. The dollar has lost 43 per cent of its purchasing power even since 1945. Statistical studies show no correlation over the last 35 years between deficits and percentage of unemployment.53 ^Neil H. Jacoby, "Full Employment, Economic Freedom and Stable Prices," in Shelley M. Mark and D. M. Slate (eds.), Economics in Action (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co. , 1959), p. 230. 52 Stans, "The Need . . . ," in Samuelson, et al. , p. 156. 53 Henry Hazlltt, Newsweek. June 21, 1965, p. 82. 239 Raymond J. Saulniar assorts, "The accepted wisdom on these matters ... is that deficits do have a harmful effect at some point."5* While inflation is one of these effects, Saulnier points out: . . . the greatest danger in a fiscal strategy that employs the deficit as a deliberate instrument of policy is that ... it makes it possible to reshape the nation's social structure in a manner that is essentially undemocratic.55 Contemporary British conservatives accept a flex ible fiscal policy as a useful economic tool. Their view is accomodative to their empiricism, Toryism, support of the private property market system, and Britain's reliance on international trade and investment. They strongly oppose the doctrinaire and thematic use of spending and taxing which the Labor Party advocates. However, they support a wider, more flexible and functional use of fiscal policy than do American conservatives. But their attach ment to private property capitalism reflects a fiscal policy orientation resembling that of American conserva tives, adjusted for their empirical and Tory traditions. 5*Raymond J. Saulnier, "Do Deficits Matter?" The Conservative Papers (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 146. 55Ibid.. p. 161. 240 Churchill declares: The wasteful and needless expenditure by the Government oust be reduced by several hundred million pounds a year, and a large part of this when saved, must be immediately given in relief of taxation in such a way as to increase the incentive to diligence, thrift, ingenuity and profit-making.5 * Anthony Eden states that "heavy direct taxation petrifies effort."57 One of the outstanding differences between American and British conservatives in the field of fiscal policy is that connected with budget deficits. American conserva tives stand in principle for the balanced budget and strongly oppose budget deficits, and here reflect a form of economic Puritanism. British conservatives, however, taking a more empirical and comprehending view of the budget as a tool of public economic policy, are not con cerned with the deficits in themselves but how the over-all taxing and spending activities of the government affect inflation, unemployment, productivity and growth, and the balance of payments. In fact, Quinton Hogg criticizes the 55Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Brighton, October 4, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 157. 57Eden, p. 308. 241 Labor Government for Crying Co curb InflaCion after World War II, by Increasing Caxea and accumulaCing large budgaC surpluses which, he claims, hurcs Che abiliCy and desire Co save and invesC but did noc much reduce spending. Says Hogg: The Labour Government had attempted Co fight inflation without the use of the monetary mechanism, and had attempted instead to cut spending power by increasing taxation and running a vast Budget sur plus. This policy failed, because high taxation reduced saving rather than spending, and at the same time reduced incentives.58 There is another aspect of fiscal policy in which British conservatives differ from American, namely, the use of discretionary variation in the tax rates to compen sate the swings of the business cycle. When Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, presented his budget in 1961, he asked and Parliament approved authority to alter the tax rates within specified limits by order- in-council.59 The United States Congress refused a compa rable request by President Kennedy at about the same time. Although there are these differences in the areas of deficits and tax rates alteration, American and British 5®Hogg, p. 147. 5®See U. S. Hews and World Report. May 1, 1961, p. 113. 242 conservatives agree that the mein lines of fiscal policy should aim at preserving the private enterprise system and improving its performance, and that these achievements demand that inflation be contained and the value of the monetary unit be kept relatively stable. British conserve tives, as do American, say that inflation is immoral and fraudulent and that it must be brought under control before the other economic objectives of full employment, growth, and a fair sharing of the social dividend can be attained. Churchill is direct regarding the moral aspects of inflation. Churchill declares, "All social reform, whether by insurance or state grants and subsidies, which is not founded upon a stable medium of internal exchange, becomes a swindle and a fraud."60 Quinton Hogg asserts, "Inflation had become the great blot upon the post-war years, in exactly the same way as unemployment had marred the pre-war years. . . ."61 Conservative intellectual Michael Oakeshott, who is a great admirer of the views American economist Henry C. Simons put forth in his book ^°Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Brighton, October 4, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 138. 6lHogg, p. 145. 243 Bcon<w»ric Policy for a Free Society, states, "The third object o£ this economic policy is e stable currency . . . inflation is the mother of servitude."^ The economic and political effects of taxation and government spending are more direct than are those of monetary policy. Government expenditures, whether for the ordinary expenses of the state or for broader social pur poses , either by bidding up the prices of resources or by administrative allocation, directly compete with the pri vate market for their use. Economic questions of price and efficiency are involved as are political and ethical ones of purpose and effectiveness. All public expenditures, except those on self-liquidating public activities, must be paid for either by printing new money, borrowing on the national debt, or by taxation. Taxation provides most of the public revenues. Taxation either for revenue or con trol diverts income and property from private to public uses and directly affects the quantity and balance of investment and consumption spending. If distortion to the economy is to be avoided, only the surpluses— which are ^Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., 1962), p. 58. present even under conditions o£ perfect competition-* accruing to the factors of production are taxable; and then only in accordance with the principles of optimum inequal ity, which leaves the basic economic functions of saving, investing, consuming, and working undeterred. Public expenditures, no matter how ethically and morally justi fiable, must be conceived within the context of economic cost and incentive taxation, otherwise each may have a smaller though more equal slice of a reduced and more slowly growing national income, rather than a larger though less equal piece of an increased and more rapidly growing social output. Effective political ethics and social justice relative to government expenditures and taxation must make terms with the economic realities and be articu lated within a framework of prudence. 3. Social welfare expenditures. — Government social welfare programs aimed at providing minimum national material standards of life, security with freedom, and reasonable equality of opportunity essentially involve a redistribution of the national income in the direction of equalisation even though the contributory principle, which conservatives generally support, is used in some measure. 245 These public expenditures cover the whole field of social welfare and action in the areas of (a) social security— direct aid to the needy, old age, disability, survivors and unemployment insurance and family allowances; (b) health; (c) education and leisure; and (d) housing. Contemporary American and British conservatives accept these programs in principle and apply them in practice as modified by their respective traditions and the requirements of prac tical politics. In consequence, British conservatives go much farther than do American in these social expenditures, which result in a redistribution of the national income. British conservatives fully accept the welfare state with its element of compulsion, and even claim more credit for its creation than they allow to the Labor Party, saying it ] was created by the wartime Coalition Government based upon a preponderant Conservative Party majority in the House of Commons. Explains Hogg, "The modern Welfare State, with all its advantages and shortcomings ... is the creation of the wartime Coalition Government."^ Their empiricism, Toryism, and the influence of the Beveridge Report naming the "giant" social evils of want, idleness, ignorance, ^Hogg, p. 109. 246 disease, and squalor as objects of simultaneous public action account for their position. (a) Social security.— American conservatives are also aware of these social problems and evils and have approached their solution within the framework of their modified laissez-faire conservatism. They reject the welfare state in principle. Instead, while supporting some of the programs by federal action, they talk about the need and the desirability of constructing a welfare community featuring the private and voluntary efforts of groups and individuals. Rossiter advocates ". . .a 'welfare commu nity' that will prove less dangerous in power and more benevolent in operation than the 'welfare state' proposed by enthusiastic reformers."^ They fear the use of public power even in these welfare areas much more than do British conservatives who consider they know how to control it. They allow the state much narrower action and, except for parts of the social security phase, they are less com mitted than are British conservatives and reject family allowances and compulsory national health insurance even ^Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 285. 247 for the aged. They ere reticent in the areas of education, leisure, and housing. British conservatives support broad programs in all these areas. British conservatives support compulsory national insurance covering the entire field of social security, as well as that of national health. The Conservative Party's support for social security in the fields of assistance to the destitute, disability, old age, survivors, unemploy ment, and family allowances is broad and in line with its traditions. Conservatives are, as Churchill states, ". . . strong partisans of national compulsory insurance."^ Churchill himself introduced, as a member of the Liberal Government, the first Unemployment Act in 1909, and as Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920's instituted the Widows and Orphans Act and lowered the qualifying age from 70 to 65 years for the Old Age Pension. The Wartime National Government had prepared the legisla tion for the Family Allowances Act later passed by the Labor Government and Conservatives take credit for its conception, as well as for the Education Act and National ^^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, March 21, 1943, in Charles Bade (ed.), Onwards to Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944), p. 54. 248 Health Act. Remarks Churchill, "As the head of the Wartime Government 1 proclaimed the Four-Years' Plan of social reform— Education, Family Allowances and the National Health Scheme."^ Hogg agrees. "Before ever the Labour Government assumed power," says Hogg, "... the White Papers had been published— on national insurance and national health; and two of the most important pieces of legislation passed— for education and for family allow ances."^7 The Republican Party does not have the Tory tradi tion of social responsibility nor Churchill's type of experience in the field of social security and insurance. When the Social Security Act of 1935 was passed, Herbert Hoover called it . . this stupendous squandering of resources, this inevitable increase in taxes."**® He indi cated it was a step toward national bankruptcy. Robert Taft claims, "The Republican Party thoroughly approves of ®®Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, January 21, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 158. 67Hogg, p. 109. 88 Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road. 1933-38 (New York: Charles Scribnerbs Sons, 1938), p. 156. 249 old age panelone, unemployment insurance, relief when necessary. He considers some sort of publicly provided social insurance is necessary in modern industrial capitalism. Says Taft, "We owe to every man a reasonable allowance to protect him and his family against the inequalities of our economic system."70 Although Taft considers the cost of the Social Security Act too "great,"7* its administration a "welter of confusion,"72 he supports its principle. States Taft: Today every party and every sincere student of social conditions is in favor of relief, adequate old age pensions, mothers' pensions, and unemployment Insurance, and all feel that the Federal Government must take the lead and provide the financial resources necessary to make the plan effective.73 President Eisenhower's Administration broadened the coverage, raised the benefits, Individualized its operations, and increased the taxes to help finance it. Arthur Larson supports this expansion and says it repre sents consensus thinking of the Republican Party and the American people.7^ 69Smith and Taft, p. 267. 70Ibid., p. 151. 71Ibid. 72Ibid.. p. 152. 73Ibid. . p. 144. 7*See Chapter II, pp. 72-73. 250 (b) Health.— The comparative attitudes o£ contemporary British and American conservatives toward compulsory national health Insurance Is Illustrative of their orientation and bias. British conservatives' Toryism and American conservatives' laissez-faire outlook are revealed. British conservatives have no hesitation in applying compulsion to the National Health Service. They regard health to be a public matter and even consider they adopted the National Health Service as policy during World i War II.^ The element of privacy is retained by permitting patients to choose their doctors and doctors to refuse patients. Compulsion, privacy, and availability of medi cal, surgical, and hospital services are reconciled. The Conservative Party acted to guard against misuse, waste, and over use by hypochondriacs, by assessing small charges for prescriptions, dentures, wigs, and spectacles. The Labor Party opposed these charges. American conservatives do not accept the principle of national compulsory health insurance, even for the aged. Although President Truman called for a compulsory national ^See footnote 66 for Churchill's claims on this point. 251 health insurance plan in his State of the Union Message in 1949, President Eisenhower proposed a voluntary scheme, which is also the position of the American MSdlcal Associ ation. However, the Kerr-Mills Act, which the Republicans supported, was passed in 1960. This act provides federal grants-in-aid on a matching basis to states meeting federal standards to help pay the medical costs of the needy aged after a means test. In effect, this is not medical insur ance, but poor aid. The Republican Party does not consider health insurance a public matter. Harley Lutz, professor emeritus of public finance at Princeton University, well expresses the Republican position: It is one thing to make available enough hospitals, clinics, laboratories, nursing homes and other facilities to accommodate all who may have need of their services. It is quite another thing to extend such services at public expense to any persons other than those who are demon strably unable to pay the cost.76 (c) Education and leisure.--Contemporary British and American conservatives support the traditional emphasis on education as a moralizing and civilizing agency. Education is needed in the scientific and ^^Harley L. Lutz, "Mistake in Medicare," Wall Street Journal. March 17, 1965, p. 14. technological areas to expand our power over nature, in order to improve our material well-being and security, as far as human capacity can take it. Education is also needed to prevent the inundation of hedonistic materialism and scientism. To go forward we must understand and nour ish the Graeco-Roman tradition— the wisdom of Greek philosophy and Roman law, the Judaic-Christian revelation using their ethics in both the secular and spiritual spheres, Renaissance and modern humanism, and the native contribution of the English-speaking peoples in the treas ures of the Common Law and the institutions of constitu tional, representative democracy. Education is needed, too, in order to make proper use of the increased and increasing leisure resulting from expanding technology largely due to automation. Society's making available of educational resources on the basis of ability rather than of class privilege is simultaneously the most democratic and the most aristocratic of policies. It brings about morally and physically the elevation of the condition of the broad masses of the people and at the same time permits the merited upward movement of ability and work. It helps to realise equality of opportunity. 253 British conservative's support of education is clear both in deed and word. The 1944 National Education Act was passed when Churchill was Prime Minister, and makes education a public expense from kindergarten through university if examinations reveal adequate ability. The universities must, he says, "... teach wisdom, not a trade. . . ,"77 Referring to the availability of the British universities, he states: They are no longer, as they were in bygone generations, the close preserve of wealth and rank. ... On the contrary, three quarters of the universities are now filled by young men from the public elementary schools and I rejoice that this is so. 78 Education must keep up with material advancement. He asserts, "Unless the Intellect of a nation keeps abreast of all material improvements, the society in which that occurs is no longer progressing."79 The survival of democracy depends to a large extent on education in the 77Winston S. Churchill, Speech, University of Copenhagen, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance. p. 388. 7®Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, February 16, 1948. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), CDXLVII (1947-48), 870. 79Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Bristol, October 19, 1949, in Coote (ed.), A Churchill Reader . . . . p. 379. 254 political and moral traditions so that the people are better enabled to judge properly of men and measures. Observes Sir David Eccles: So it is that the survival of democracy depends on the judgement of common men about the uncommon men who will always come forward and offer their services as specialists or leaders of society.80 American conservatives also see the basic signifi cance of education, but their legislative performance lags behind that of the British. During Eisenhower's adminis tration the National Defense Education Act was passed as an emergency measure making federal funds available to university students, but did nothing to Increase educa tional plants or to decrease the teacher shortage. The Republican Party's philosophy regarding government economic and social action, strong conviction that education is a state and local affair, and the parochial school question explain their position. Eisenhower's view on federal aid to education is obvious. He states, "I will have no Federal money in higher education as long as there is one ®®David Eccles, "An Educated Democracy," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 80. (Pamphlet.) 255 •Ingle lota of Federal control coming with it."®* There is no American equivalent of the British University Grants Coomlttee. Regarding the scope of education, Eisenhower remarks, "The academic range must involve the entire mate- rial, intellectual, and spiritual aspects of life."®2 Leisure is of growing importance as wealth increases and the work week is shortened. Leisure— not loafing— and wealth are the civilizers of man. Leisure implies activity in satisfying tastes. Tastes are differ ent for various individuals, classes, and ages of a society. Education for leisure must adapt itself to these facts and provide a wide range of activities. The moneyed and cultured minority should be encouraged and if neces sary, even subsidized. Educational leisure opportunities for the development of individual excellence in Itself, as well as that of political and social leadership, should be provided. Physical and incidental facilities for those so inclined should be made available for pleasure alone if that is the taste. But the bias at all levels, as far as ®*Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Allan Taylor (ed.), What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), p. 84. 82 Ibid. , p. 115. 256 possible, should be directed toward raising the cultural level of all classes. Speaking for British conservatives, David Fairbairn says, "In such a scheme of things it will be seen there is a proper place for preachers, teachers, 83 bakers and clowns." Clinton Rossiter generally supports such a position and is especially interested in raising the general American cultural level. Observes Rossiter, "Americans can conform at a much higher cultural level ..84 than that most of them now occupy." Education of the businessman is of particular concern to both American and British conservatives. If private enterprise capitalism is to survive and fulfill its social responsibilities, the education of its leadership in economic, political, social, and cultural matters is of prime Importance. Rossiter considers that in business- minded America education must, as he says, "seek earnestly to narrow the distressing rift between the academic and 85 business worlds." This is unavoidable in Rossiter's ®^David Fairbairn, "An Approach to Leisure," Tradition and Change (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1954), p. 94. (Pamphlet.) 84 Rossiter, p. 297. 85Ibid., p. 283. 257 86 opinion in order to develop e "welfare coummity" rather than a welfare state, and to make American capitalism what 87 he calls "... the mighty servant of American democracy." British conservative John Rodgers also deals with the education of the businessman. Rodgers considers that business management people should have a good general education at top university level with a specialization in management. They must see the broad social implications of property as well as making business efficient. Rodgers states: The function of management, therefore is not only to pay attention to the end product of industry . . . but to see the whole endeavor as a social organization designed to promote human happiness and well-being both of the workers . . . and the consumers. . . .88 The introduction of automated machinery— based upon continuous operating automatic mechanisms, computers, and servo-mechanisms— into the production and management decision-making processes has resulted not only in educa tional needs for leisure due to increased productivity. It has also necessitated education concerning itself with 86Ibid., p. 285. 87Ibid. , p. 284. 88 John Rodgers, "Training the Hanagers," Prospect for Capitalism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1954), p. 47. (Pamphlet.) 258 the retraining of the displaced employees. The aucceea of such efforts depends upon the open acceptance of automation and its benefits, controlling its pace, and broad community effort by government, business, and unions to retrain and to find profitable employment for those affected. The Republican Party attempted to handle this problem in part by providing for the training of electronic technicians, draftsmen, and other categories needed in national defense under sections of the National Defense Education Act in 1958. The Area Redevelopment Act of 1960 carried the matter further. Within the pattern of its general views regarding federal aid to education, American conservatives support the position of Ray R. Eppert, Chairman, Burroughs Corporation. States Eppert, "We need to develop a policy of closer cooperation among business, labor, educational, governmental leadership to make the most of the opportunities of automation."®^ The British Education Act of 1944 took technical education into account and the general public responsi bility of retraining workers displaced by automation is handled within its framework. After graduating from ®®Ray R. Eppert, "Automation and National Policy," Vital Speeches. XXXI, No. 10 (March 1, 1965), 318. 259 technical school and taking a job, the employee is kept up to date by excused time £rom work to pursue publicly financed technical education, the content of which is a joint product of industry, government, and the various vocational associations. Churchill spoke on the need for a wide and flexible technical education approach as early as 1944. Remarks Churchill: After school-time ends, we must not throw our youth uncared-for and unsupervised onto the labour market, with its "blind alley" occupations which start so fair and often end so foul. We must make plans for part-time release from industry, so that our young people may have the chance to carry on their general education, and also to obtain a specialized education which will fit them better for their work.^O However, there is an aspect of automation which educational retraining cannot itself provide an effective solution. This problem relates to people whose mental ability and emotional structure make it impossible to retrain them for the type of jobs available in automated society which requires human activity. In such a society these kinds of jobs either do not exist or, if they do, automatic machines do them more cheaply so that under the market pricing mechanism these individuals are unsoployable. 90Winston S. Churchill, Broadcast Speech, March 21, 1963, in Eade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 57. 260 John Fischer, editor-in-chief, Harper1 § Magazine, terms this situation "The Stupidity Problem"resulting from "The Overdeveloped Society." Education, by making some jobs such as personal services employment respectable, could do much to further the solution. But state sponsor ship of activities— such as conservation of the national patrimony and beautification of both the rural and urban environments— which demand redistribution of the national income, will be required. Such activities fall in the category of socially necessary overhead capital in a wealthy, automated society. The alternative to such a program appears to be unending direct assistance with all its evils of idleness, frustration, and lack of self- respect . (d) Housing.--The need to house the population, especially the lower income groups in the rapidly growing ^\john Fischer, "The Stupidity Problem," in Myron L. Joseph, et al. (eds.), Economic Analysis and Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 528. 92 Ibid. For other readings on automation see: Myron L. Joseph, et al. (eds.), Economic Analysis and Policy. pp. 515-531; Campbell R. McConnell and Robert C. Bingham (eds.), Economic Issues (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 79-82; Alfred L. Malabre, "Automation Alarm Is Proving False," Wall Street Journal. December 23, 1965, p. 6. 261 urban and metropolitan areas, at adequate minimum standards has required public subsidizing of family homes in the United States and Britain. British and American conserva tives accept the principle of housing subsidization. Both accept public ownership of houses, the British more so than the American conservatives. Both tend to emphasize assistance to the private builders for rent and sale by making financial resources available to them. British and American conservatives support rent subsidies to housing built with public money. The British conservatives sup ported a much more vigorous program after World War 11, not only because of their tradition, but also because of the urgent practical need of housing due to the destruction of some four million houses by bombing during the war and to the smaller per capita wealth in Britain. Except for aid to housing in Washington and defense areas during World War 1, there had been no federal assist ance to public housing until Hoover established the Federal Home Loan Bank System in 1932. This act had in mind stabilizing the economy as well as improving housing. During the depression, and since World War 11, the concept of aiding low-income housing and slum clearance has strongly developed. Federal assistance takes two forms. 262 First, legislation to divert private funds to housing needs and to insure these funds. The Federal Home Loan Banks and the Federal Housing Administration are examples. Second, direct loans by the Federal Government to cities, municipalities and states to finance house building, and direct annual contributions to help pay the cost of operating such public housing projects. The work of the Federal Public Housing Administration falls into this category. Government bodies do not build the houses, as is the case to some extent in Britain, even under the Con servatives. Although Robert Taft states that "the Republican 93 Party thoroughly approves . . . subsidized housing, the Party's performance has been expressed in practice in terms of its views that housing is a state and local government affair, that private enterprise should function widely in low cost housing through loan support, and its philosophy of limited government, balanced budgets, and economic stability. As a result, during Eisenhower's Administra tion, federal budget allocations including loans and subsidies fell 18 per cent, while Gross National Product 93Smith and Taft, p. 267. 263 rose 40 per cent, and the number of houses built with federal subsidies fell from 42 f000 annually in the late 1940's and early 1950's to 19,000 annually in 1954-1955.^ Population growth and urbanization continued. Public aid to housing began in Britain with the passage of Disraeli's Artisan Dwelling Act during his 1874- 1880 premiership. It was part of his and the Conservative Party's plan to elevate the condition of the people. "Health and the laws of health" required it. At the present time, 25 per cent of all dwellings and 70 per cent of those built since the war in Britain are owned by public authorities and rented to low income groups with a govern ment subsidy of 40 per cent of the annual cost.^ The Conservative Party strongly supports subsidizing housing. Asserts Churchill, "I agree with you that housing comes first in the whole field of social progress."^ He con tinues, "Homes and houses come before health, because over crowding and slum dwellings are fatal to the family life ^See Harris, pp. 281-285. ^Wilcox et al., p. 64. 96Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Blackpool, October 14, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance. p. 401. 264 and breed more lllneseee than the doctors can cure."^ The Party supports building council houses at subsidized rents and financial assistance to private builders producing houses for sale and rent. States Churchill, ''There is 98 still a great need for council houses. . . But he opposed the Labor Government's position that four out of five new houses must be council houses. Observes Churchill, "Freedom of choice and variety of method are also the main solutions of the urgent problem of housing Q Q our people.1 1 "Our Conservative policy,n he states, is to give greater freedom to the private builder."*®® But in times of shortages of building materials luxury building would not be allowed. (e) Cost and effects.— The question of the cost of these various social expenditures looms large in the eyes of British and American conservatives. They are concerned with the effects of the taxes— and the budget deficits— necessary to pay for these programs on Incentive ^Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, London, October 14, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 117. 100Ibid. 265 and growth. Churchill fears the very high progressive tax rates in Britain will result in the destruction of existing wealth and discouragement in the production of new, with resulting impoverishment. Churchill states, "You may try to destroy wealth, and find all you have done is to increase poverty."1 * 01- He continues, "The production of new wealth is far more beneficial . . . than the liquida tion of old wealth."1,0^ Robert Taft also sees the burden of social spending as a serious problem. Asserts Taft, "The principal diffi culty in any system of social security is the tremendous cost on the majority of the people who still provide their own social security."1 * 0^ If the cost is too high it may be ruinous to the economy. Says Taft, "We may destroy the whole basis of the very economic system to which we are looking to provide social security itself."10^ 1,01Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, March 12, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 43. ^^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, August 16, 1945, in Bade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 305. 103Snith and Tnft, p. 151. 104Ibid. 266 Justice to all, rich and poor alike, ia an impor tant consideration to conservatives in the redistribution of income and property involved in social spending and taxation. "Compassion, charity and generosity are noble virtues," remarks Churchill, "but the government should be just before it is generous."10^ Large investors, as he says, "have their rights and are entitled to justice."10* * If equality through redistributive taxation is pushed too far, liberty and justice are fundamentally violated. Churchill rejects what he calls, "The Socialist ideal to 107 reduce us to one vast Wormwood Scrubbery." Taking the property of Individuals and classes and awarding it to others to provide them with security is a form of injustice; i if pursued excessively. Conservative American economist Roger A. Freeman states, "Conservatives believe that gov ernment should disturb relative economic positions only to | 105Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, ! March 12, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 30. 10^finston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 16, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 461. 10^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, March 12, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 41. 267 the extent to which compassion and justice demand it."*- ®® The lower income groups, however, are not always the chief beneficiaries from all the services and programs made available through social action, even if pushed to the extent of the welfare state. Richard Tltmuss points out that by knowing what services are available and by using tax advantages which are present, even though the rates are high and progressive, the higher income groups in Britain receive the chief benefits in the fields of i health, education, and housing. Says Titmuss, "We have ] learned from 15 years experience of the Health Service that; j the higher income groups know how to make better use of 109 the service." These groups select the quality care and services in hospitals, surgery, maternity, and psychiatric therapy. Regarding housing, he states, "The subsidy paid by the state to many middle-class families buying their own homes is greater than that received by poor tenants of j 108Rogar A. Freeman, "Economic Priorities: Needs v.j Expediency," The Conservative Papers (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 111. ^Richard Titmuss, "They Have the Know-How," Toronto Daily Star. November 26, 1964, p. 6. Titmuss is Professor of Social Administration in the University of London. 268 public housing schemes."^® Relative to education, he observes, "The higher income groups do better, too, in the high cost sectors of education.According to Titmuss, a father of two earning sixty thousand dollars per year obtains thirteen times more from the state in educational benefits than a father of two earning fifteen hundred dollars annually.**2 Conservatives would claim that these findings of Titmuss support their contention that equality cannot be legislated and that attempts to do so are misguided. Equality, conformity, and standardization beyond a point are not in accord with human nature and free society, but variety, diversity, lack of uniformity, and equality of opportunity are. Equality of access and opportunity, how ever , are not the same things as equality of outcome, which cannot and should not be assured. If equality of opportunity is provided by social action— and it should be--then the result depends generally on ability, ambition, self-sacrifice, integrity, character, ingenuity, and work. Luck may play its part in the individual case— and luck can always change— but it will not prevail in the general 110Ibid. 111Ibid. 112Ibid. 269 situation. The unfortunate will always need help and increasing wealth and leisure makes it available, but this should not be purchased at the cost of slowing progress. Some British conservatives consider the present affluence of British society calls for a fundamental reorientation and redirection of welfare state schemes and activities away from providing for basic necessities and alleviating primary poverty, except for the very bottom layer, and toward more adequate public provision for the social environment, education, leisure, and problems of personality and emotional adjustment in complex, intricate, modern, technological society. The Bow Group takes this position.Peter Goldman also strongly supports such a redirection of public redistributive expenditures. Goldman i recommends: ... a major shift in the nature, direction and emphasis of social spending— away from the crude services which working people ought increasingly to be able to provide for themselves, and towards modern services crying out for community effort or finance: namely, the vigorous creation and maintenance by public authority of the finest environmental conditions for our people, and the H3see Richard Rose, "Tensions in Conservative Philosophy," The Political Quarterly. XXXII (July- September, 1961), 279; Iain Macleod and J. Enoch Powell, The Social Services (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1954). (Pamphlet,) 270 generous application of public money to the subtler problems of personality, social adjustment and edu cation in its widest sense. Goldman does not ask for less but for more over-all social expenditures. He continues, "My argument, on the contrary, is that we should aspire to spend more, much more, and establish conditions in which our resources will expand to meet these aspirations."11^ 4. Regulation. — Government economic regulation means the action of the state establishing or influencing prices and outputs in specific industries. It is justified on the ground that capitalism as a method of economic pro duction demands reasonably free play of the competitive market forces of supply and demand if the rules of effi ciency and ethics of capitalistic marginal cost pricing are to be achieved in the interests of material well-being and freedom. Consequently, if the market mechanism fails or refuses to perform its rationing activities under con ditions of workable imperfect competition, the state should use its police power to prevent great concentrations of ^^Peter Goldman, The Future of the Welfare State (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1958), p. 10. (Pamphlet.) private, corporate property from manipulating the market to the detriment of the public Interest. State economic regulation may be given a twofold classification. First, that which seeks to encourage workable Imperfect competi tion In normal type Industries whose firms are large In order to have the economies of scale deriving from modern technology. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Celler Merger Act seek to perform this purpose In such Industries as steel, chemicals, and automobile manufacturing. Second, that applying to natural monopolies or public utility type Industries. In these Industries, public regulation of prices and outputs of goods and services is clearly justi fied as is the use of subsidies if the politically defined public interest dictates. The method of control may be by private ownership and public regulation, as is favored in the United States and Illustrated by the Interstate Com merce Commission and the state public utilities commis sions. Or it may be by public ownership and operation, as is favored In Britain and illustrated by the Conservative Government nationalizing London's public transportation in 1933 and putting it under the supervision of the London Passenger Transport Board. There are no significant dif ferences relative to efficiency and liberty as to which 272 method is used. American tastes and traditions favor the one method and British the other. The views of the Republican Party and those of the Conservative Party regarding the regulation of steel pro vide a good understanding of their respective views on the regulation of an industry which is not a public utility, yet is strategic and characterized by monopolistic compe tition. The Republican Party considers that the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Taft-Hartley Act are adequate and within their limits the steel companies should fix prices and outputs. Before nationalization of steel and after they denationalized it, the Conservative Party resorted to a Tripartite Board of Control for the Industry. The Board consisted of equal numbers drawn from the unions, management, and government— one of whom was chairman. The Board supervised the steel industry and controlled prices and outputs. Power and control were concentrated and diffused in such a blend that both public and private interests were satisfied. In defending this arrangesient against nationalization and using it as a model for other similar Industries, Churchill says: In this and similar matters the ideal for which all parties should seek to strive is to combine the . . . ingenuity of private enterprise under the 273 natural stimulus of profit and loss, and the immense power and economy of a vast cooperative unit of pro** duction, with the necessary safeguards of the rights of the State and the smaller producers. The most recent form of economic regulation is the guideline approach whereby increases in prices, wages, profits, and Incomes are kept within the limits of govern ment specified increases in productivity. Guideline regulation emerged in response to the threat of inflation, the control of which is now considered a public concern in economies operating at or near the full employment level of their resources. Stable full employment and growth require that inflation not be allowed to happen. Inflation disrupts the basic economic decision-making process by twisting the equilibrium cost-price ratios and undermining confidence in the future. Guideline regulation attempts to keep cost and aggregate demand conditions in balance so that growth without depression and, if possible, recession, may continue. The United States economy is now in the early months of its sixth year of growth not interrupted even by recession, and guideline and other types of public economic policies are attempting to keep this process going. ^^tflnston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 16, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 450. In its ultimate effects, guideline regulation (like any other kind) affects prices and output decisions by industries and firms. The attitude of American con servatives to it varies from confusion coupled with acceptance in comparative silence to outright opposition based upon laissez-faire conservative ideology. The con fusion and comparative acceptance view shows the inclina tion of business leaders to accept, though rather unwillingly, the President's idea of the general interest if they only knew. The situation resulting from the steel price increases by Bethlehem and United States Steel in the autumn of 1965 is illustrative. The Bethlehem increase of five dollars per ton in structurals came first and would have increased the average price of steel by two-tenths of one per cent. It was condemned as inflationary. Shortly afterward, United States Steel raised the price of struc turals two dollars and fifty cents per ton, which would have raised the average price of steel one-tenth of one per cent. It was hailed by the White House as in accord with guideline policy. Quite rightly, business leaders are confused and say so.In the meantime, pricing decisions must be made. *17See Albert R. Carr, "Pricing Puzzle," Wall Street Journal. January 10, 1966, p. 12; Alan L. Otten, ^Soft on Government?" Wall Street Journal. January 13, 1966, p. 10; George A. Nikolaieff, "Lessons in Steel," Wall Street Journal. May 8, 1966, p. 12. 275 There ie eleo outright opposition to the whole guideline approach. Business and political leaders in this group see in it the substitution of the "consensuscrat" for the bureaucrat. They call it government by guideline. Observes George Champion, Chairman of the Board, The Chase Manhattan Bank: In my judgement the new trend toward government by guideline is one of the most insidious and dan gerous on the national scene today. . . . The guideline approach represents a giant step away from self-reliance and personal responsibility and toward federal domination of our national economy. Barry Goldwater expressed similar sentiments on the occa sion of President Kennedy's confrontation with the steel industry in 1962. Goldwater declared Kennedy was trying "to socialize the business of the country.Governor Rockefeller termed it "very sad."*20 gut the public and private interests must be reconciled. British conservatives, however, not only support the policy but developed it in 1959 when the Macmillan **®George Champion, "Threat to Economic Freedom," Vital Speeches. XXXI, No. 17 (June 25, 1965), 521. **^Quoted in Randall B. Ripley, Public Policies and Their Politics (New York: W. V. Norton and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 128. Government set up the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes after the White Paper on The Economic Implications 121 of Full Employment reported the need to control infla tion, Which is as big a problem for contemporary public policy as to obtain full employment was in the past. The guideline approach was furthered when the Conservative Government established, in 1961, the National Incomes Commission to check inflation along with the National Economic Development Council as part of its move toward central economic planning considered necessary for the full and equitable use of Britain's resources. 5. Planning.— Planning in its most general sense is the organized application of systematic reasoning to devise a course of action in relation to the circum stances to achieve a given goal. Its alternative is guessing. The planning process normally involves research and analysis, determination of goals and objectives, find ing different solutions to the problems, policy decisions, and finally implementation of the plan.^2 Planning seeks ^Hfhite Paper, The Economic Implications of Full Employment. Cmd. 9725 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 7T9$6). 122Dimock, pp. 450-458; 468-470; Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago frees, 1962), pp. 1-21; Arthur L. Grey and John E. Elliott Economic Issues and Policies (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1965), pp. 491-499; fr. A. Hayek, at al., Collectivist Economic Planning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 277 to reduce the chance end riek of trial end error methods. It inherently Implies control Which should feature a dynamic combination of centralization and decentralize** tion123 in the interests of efficiency, freedom, flexi- billty, and creativity. Planning of some type is unavoidable in any reflective activity whether on the individual, group, corporation, or governmental level. Planning in itself is neutral, ethically and politically, and is as appropriate to the private property constitu tional Western democracies as to the public property totalitarian systems of the communist states. The essen tial differences lie in how and by whom the plan is prepared, for what purposes, and how it is implemented. Planning in the authoritarian socialist states is highly centralized, rigid, comprehensive, and strictly 1956); F. ▲. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1944); John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (London: Macmillan, 1968); Ben W. Lewis, British Planning and nationalization (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1952); Henry C. Wallich, The Cost of Freedom (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 19-73; Ferdynand Zwelg, The Planning of Societies (London: Seeker end Warburg, 123 JFor an analytical discussion of the problems of centralization and decentralisation see Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State (New York: lonald Press Co., 1948) , pp. 130-154. 278 under the control of the politlcel apparatus of the state. The politlcel heads of the state acting through the Central Planning Comnlsalon assign production quotas, which must be net, to the selected industries and firms and fix accounting prices to the factors of production, including a payment to the state for its organizing, management, and risk-taking functions, and to the consumer goods made. Unless there is freedom of consumer choice, the assigned prices and outputs reflect the priorities of the planners. If there is freedom of consumer choice— and there is no reason short of economic scarcity why it should not be present in such systems— this kind of total central plan ning is both logically and practically impossible. Logically, it is Impossible on account of the limitless number of variables present in the form of the prices, quantities, and qualities of producer and consumer goods and services. Such a production plan would involve a limitless number of equations which could not be written. On the practical level, no one man or group of men in any such central planning body possesses the functional knowl edge which is necessary to the operation of advanced, opulent, industrial economies and which is diffused throughout private antarpriaa systems in a centralized- decentralized continuum, even if thara la damocratlc national aconomlc planning and othar typaa of controla auch aa monetary and flacal oparatlona. If waata la to ba avoldad In thla typa of cantrally plannad aconomy, whether or not thara la fraadom of conaumar cholca, tha accounting i prlcaa aaalgnad to tha producer and conaumar gooda and aervlcea muat perform the aama functlona of minimising coat, optimizing outptit, and maximizing well-being aa doaa tha pricing mechanics in a private antarpriaa market e c o n o m y .*^4 Control over tha parte and dataila of tha plan on tha operational level la aacurad by appointing j communlat party mambara, whose power la superior, to super-; j visa tha factory managers and othar bureaucratic offlclals,j although dilution of this practice is occurring in tha decentralization procedures recently taking place in tha i planning practices of tha Eastern European communist I states. Incentive la obtained by a combination of wide inequality of material reward reinforced by political terror of extrema form if necessary, although this practice is also declining in its moat brutal aspects. Efficiency, ^^Wilcox at al., pp. 26-37; Hayek at al., pp. 245-290. 280 economic democracy, and liberty are not found by using this kind of planning. Since World War II, the constitutional private enterprise democracies of the West— except the United States— have developed and used democratic national eco nomic planning.*25 This development received Impetus from the experience and successes of World War II, and from the desire to assure a more productive utilization of resources and a more equitable distribution of the national income in the interests of social justice and human welfare. Plan ning was to be used as an instrument of control, stability, and opportunity. The general criterion of all such plan ning has been the prerequisite that it operate within the framework and ethos of political and personal liberty as they are known in the West. Arbitrarily assigned and coercively enforced production goals, prices, wages, incomes, savings, and investment have never occurred. Direction of labor has not taken place. It has been planning by inducement and voluntary commitment rather than by coercion. There has been a prudent balance of *25gob«rt L. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (Englewood Cliffs, H.J.: Frentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 191-192. centralization and decentralization. The private enter prise market economy in ita essence has been preserved even in Britain— the land of its birth— where some of the basic and strategic industries amounting to one fifth of the total economy have been nationalized. The experience has shown that planning, nationalization, private enter prise, liberty, and efficiency are compatible in theory and practice if properly mixed in consonance with the traditions of free society. There can be no doubt, however, that democratic national economic planning raises problems for liberty and efficiency. The main problem raised for liberty is the increased centralization of control and concentration of power in the hands of the state. Government power increases because its decisions are, in fact, business decisions for which it must share increased responsibility Increased government power is exercised in defining the goals of the economy, and in the use of monetary, fiscal, and regulatory powers to achieve them no matter how much democratization of compulsion occurs through voluntary counltment, decentralization, and prior agreement to agree This matter of increased government power in economic 282 planning— and planning of soma sort seams unavoidable— is a fundamental one since the liberties of the English- speaking people have been so significantly developed and realized by limiting and diffusing power, and their Instinctive genius in this will need continuous employment if freedom and planning are to exist side by side. Implicitly Involved are the maintenance of the rule of law and the full acceptance of the traditional libertarian political and social ethics by all those involved in the planning process and by widening sections of the people. Democratic national economic planning also raises problems for economic efficiency in private enterprise economies in that it could reduce incentive by diluting the connection between the ownership of property and its administration. Ultimately the efficiency problem resolves itself, assuming given technology and resources, into decision-making power over prices and outputs. If the needed planning and the recognized efficiency of private enterprise are to be present simultaneously, tha pricing function muat essentially remain in the market, which activities will necessarily be modified by the acceptance of the social responsibility to control inflation by observing Agreed-upon productivity guidelines relative to prices, wages, and Incones. Peacetime British national economic planning first arrived with the election of the Labor Government in 1945. The record of succeeding Conservative Governments clearly indicates that in some form it will be a permanent, approved, necessary, and practical element in the future political, social, and economic life of Britain. An examination of British planning machinery and how the Con servative Governments between 1951-1963 changed and used the Labor Government's arrangements throws light on how the Conservatives— and the Laborites also— approached the problems of efficiency and liberty. The Labor Government elected in 1945 inherited the wartime planning machinery in the form of Interdepartmental committees and the econom ics and statistical divisions of the Cabinet Secretariat under which operated their Official Steering Committee originally chaired by Herbert Morrlsson. In 1947, the Central Economic Planning Staff headed by the Chief Economic Planning Officer was established and placed in the new Ministry of Economic Affairs, but later in the same year was transferred to the Treasury. The Conservative 284 j Govcmaint completed the centralization in 1951, when it i alao put the remaining economic aectiona of the Cabinet Secretariat in the Treaaury. The planning machinery ! remained there until 1964, when the Wilaon Labor Government | again put it in the Miniatry of Economic Affairs. In 1961,j the Conaervatlve Government reorganized the planning machinery, which in all caaea ia under the general super- viaion of the Cabinet, and intenalfied ita uae, actting up the National Economic Development Council to aupervlae j [ i investment and aavinga and the National Incomee Commlaaion i to control inflation.Voluntary cooperation waa relied j t i upon to obtain compliance and in order to aecure the efficiency of the market mechaniem in allocating the uae of reaourcea. The composition of the planning bodies ia alao indicative of the attempts to get efficiency by keeping the plans creative and responsive and to guard liberty by diffusing power. The mixed membership of the central planning bodies and their subordinate industrial councils is drawn from government, business, unions, and the general 126por a discussion of the historical development of British planning see the following: Gwendolen Carter et al., Major Foreign Powers (Mew York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), pp. 138-139; Wilcox et al., pp. 54-57. 285 public. This tends to assure that the goals o£ the plans and the private and public policies to achieve them are the result of voluntary cooperation based upon informed free discussion and reasonable compromise. Compulsion becomes democratised. The goals in the form of estimates of desired achievement and the policies to effect them are ; i I not the result of forced draft economic and political j action. The doctrinaire and thematic approach to planning j of the Labor Government “-which the Conservatives vigorouslyj opposed— in practice was pragmatic, and the backing away j i from the direction of labor in 1947 showed that compulsion would not be used to achieve goals. The goals of the first Bconomlc Survey (1947) were presented as desirable targets, and each subsequent Economic Survey had fewer targets and increasing emphasis was placed on analysis of trends. Between 1951 and 1961, the Conservatives relied on analys ing trends and providing information using monetary and fiscal operations to implement public policy, quickly removing price and allocation controls.*2 7 But their acceptance of the welfare state, support of the principles #t al.. p. 57. 286 of the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, and retention of the mas a of the nationalized Industrie*, even though their administration was decentralized, made a great deal of central planning necessary in practice, as their placingj i I of all planning machinery in the Treasury indicates. In I 1961, in order to shield Britain from the fluctuations of j I the world market upon which she so largely depends to earn j her living and maintain her power, in order to utilize j fully the domestic resources of the British economy and to control inflation, the Conservative Government fully | i accepted the concept and apparatus of long-term voluntary j i national economic planning which it practiced until ! I defeated in 1963. The National Economic Development | Council and the National Incomes Commission constituted j I the new machinery. | Churchill typifies the Conservative Party view on planning between 1951 and 1961, and Sir Oliver Franks that after 1961. Conceptually, Churchill opposes the doctri- I naire and thematic advocacy of planning espoused by the 1 j Labor Party, although circumstances and expediency forced him to use considerable planning. Aside from his opposi- j j tion to "theme" end "doctrine" in the same manner in which | Burke opposed the "theoretic dogma" of the French Revolu- i t tion, Churchill opposes planning on the grounds that it is inefficient and impracticable and threatens liberty by the great concentration of power in the hands of the state. Regarding the practical and inefficiency aspects of plan ning, Churchill asserts, "1 do not believe in the capacity j I I of the state to plan and enforce an active high grade productivity upon its members or s u b j e c t s ."128 He con trasts the difference between Conservative planning and i Labor planning. States Churchill, "There is planning on | both sides but the aim and emphasis are different. We I | plan for choices and they plan for rules."129 planning pursues the making available of choices and opportunity, both efficiency and freedom will result. Remarks Churchill, "The more a man's choice is free, the more i likely it is to be wise and fruitful, not only to the chooser but to the community in which he dwells.M^0 fha 128Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, October 28, 1947. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), CDXLIII (1947-48), 702. l^^JInston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, | April 24, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.) , In the Balance. p. 265. j 130Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, October 14, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 115. 288 state can help free choice by providing in format Ion and wall-concalvad laws for private antarpriaa. "Tha Stata organisation oust," says Churchill, "go ahaad and forasaa development a in science and industry Then only, with planning and controle swept aeide, can private antarpriaa do the job. States Churchill, "Private enterprise and management within tha well-conceived laws of a modern State are the only fertile forms in which production can | | be carried on."132 Churchill does not consider centralised i planning on prices and outputs a "well-conceived" law. In support of his contention that doctrinaire i planning is subversive to liberty, Churchill cites the fact that the Labor Government took the legal power in 1947, after over two years of peace, to direct labor. On this matter Churchill explains: Under the 1945 Act and the Regulation made under it the Government can now direct labor. . . . This power to choose or change occupation, hitherto considered the mark of the difference between democracy and serfdom in one form or another, . . . they have not dared to use, not ^Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, Blackpool, October 14, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 394. ^Wlneton S. Churchill, Speech, Perth, May 28, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 343. 289 because they have not got the legal power, hut becauee they are In fear of arousing the deep spirit of the British nation, which, in tine of peace, has always stood up for these fundenental liberties.133 The fact that the Labor Government did not direct labor is very frequently used to support the position that planning, nationalization, and controls are not necessarily! j detrimental to freedom. And this is so under certain i j conditions. But it is also disquieting that the power was ever legally assumed, and it will probably never be known whether inner promptings or Conservative opposition pre- vented its use. "We shall not," asserts Churchill, "rely upon the compulsory direction of labor in time of Oliver Franks fully accepts the need and the duty of government national economic planning, even though he clearly sees this puts the state directly in the business decision-making process on the highest level of establish ing goals and priorities usually performed by the pricing ^^Wlnston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, August 8, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 121. ! 13Sflnston S. Churchill, Speech, London, October 14, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.) , In the Balance. p. 111. 290 i mechanism. He considers planning unavoidable. "My reflee- i tions 9" says Franks, "have lad me to conclude that some 1 4 C form of central planning and control is inevitable." i Government sets the objectives for the economy. Remarks Franks, "Government has decided what the future pattern of j the economy shall be and has laid down programmes of action accordingly."13 6 hq is candid and admits that such state activity puts government in business management and that the power of business is thereby reduced. States Franks: "If the State is active in planning and control . . . the decisions which the State makes are industrial and com mercial decisions and diminish the field in which business can display the same qualities. . . .”137 But there will be no coercion by the state. Franks comments, "Government will depend for the carrying out of its general decisions on undertakings voluntarily given by Industry and commerce."^3® 135 Oliver Franks, Central Planning and Control in War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 19. 136Ibid. , p. 42. 13?Ibid. , p. 18. 138Ibid. , p. 44. 291 i Franks moves beyond Churchill and aeea the state participating in the pricing and output decisions, which the latter leaves principally to the £ree market. But i Franks is still nearer to Churchill than to the Labor Partyj j in that he implicitly assumes private property arrange ments . The activities of the National Resources Planning Board, 1934-43, constituted the only central economic planning ever to take place in the United States. Today there is no single national economic planning agency, I I i although the Bureau of the Budget and the President's | Council of Economic Advisers are planning bodies for strategic sectors of the economy. American business corpo rations also make wide use of planning in the conduct of their affairs in order to maximise profits. The coamon i factor in this typically American decentralised mode of private-public planning is that both bodies use estimates and analyses regarding the prospective growth rate of the national income as a frame of reference.This means consistency in the planning decisions is approximated. i 139Gerhard Colin and Theodore Geiger, "The American! Economy Today and Tomorrow," in Paul A. Sanuelson, et al., Readings in Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 468-470. j 292 The strategic public agencies of control and stabilisation give the economy the politically and ethically approved public bias and provide the general framework within which the pragmatic workable competition of the market fixes prices and outputs within the recently developed guide- posts system to control inflation. There is no significant support in either of the two major American political parties or among liberal i academicians for national economic planning and control. The Republican Party especially would not accept even that type of planning— or its machinery— that existed in Britain under Conservative Governments between 1951 and 1961, and even less between 1961 and 1963. It would be considered socialism. Their opposition derives from their laisses- faire conservative ideology, their fear— shared by the Democratic Party also— of increasing the power of the Executive, and from the abundance of the American economy. American conservatives repudiate central planning because they consider it inefficient and harmful to lib- | erty. National economic planning in Britain has experi enced, as Milton Friedman states, ”... limited success or outright failure to achieve stated objectives."1A0 140priedman, p. 11. 293 This inefficiency ia due to inadequacy of information and a weak coordinating mechanism available to the central planners. Friedman explains: Their combined knowledge cannot come close to matching the aggregate knowledge of the many people spread throughout the economy. And they have no system of transmitting Information or co-ordinating the actions of millions of individuals that is any- j thing like the efficiency of the market.141 Friedman thinks planning has also hurt freedom. "Collec- tivist economic planning," says Friedman, "has indeed interfered with individual freedom. i Hoover and Taft express similar views. Regarding ' I a planned economy, Hoover asserts, "That is a form of i totalitarian economy which the American people are not likely to accept in peace for it would do violence to our whole concept of freedom.He continues, "Such measures would more likely decrease than increase our productiv ity. "1A4 sharply distinguishes the difference between ^^Milton Friedman, "Can a Controlled Economy Work?" The Conservative Papers (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 169. ^^Frledman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 11. ^^Herbert Hoover, Addresses upon the American Road, 1945-48 (Mew York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. , 1949) , p. 116. I what he calls "... self-organisation with governmental bureaucratic o r g a n i z a t i o n . " * ^ Taft continues, "It is the difference between freedom and slavery. "*'44 6. Nationalization.— Nationalisation (the pub lie ownership and operation of resources)of all the means of production, distribution, and exchange is com pletely incompatible with political conservatism as it is understood in the English-speaking world. Socialization of resources and their administration by a central plan for use, rather than by the market guided by ethically and politically approved state economic and social activity for profit and well-being, contradicts the conservative position in support of private property. Conservatism requires the Lockean capitalist conception of property— even though modified to suit prevailing needs and circum stances— for its views of man as a free moral agent and citizen, for economic efficiency, and material abundance. 145smith and Taft, p. 268. 146Ibid. 147por £ discussion on policy and management of nationalized industry see William ▲. Robson, Problems of Nationalized Industry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). The private enterprise market economy in some form is prerequisite. Private property is both means and end. Contemporary American and British conservatives support this general position within the framework of their dif fering laissez-faire conservative and Tory-empirical traditions. Nationalization may, however, be justified if ! empirically necessary. On this basis British conservatives; favor nationalizing natural monopolies and public utlli- ; l ties, while American prefer public regulation. On empiri- ! i cal grounds British conservatives either favored or did not seriously oppose nationalization of the coal mines and | ! the railways. In these two industries the practical con- i siderations were that they were outmoded and inefficient and the vast capital outlays needed for efficient moderni- j zation were beyond the reach of the private capital market. i However, in these regular industries, both American and I j British conservatives oppose the extension of the principle! ] of nationalization on the grounds it is inefficient and harms liberty. American conservatives are more dogmatic in their opposition than are British. The empirical approach of British conservatives to nationalization on merit of specific industries is well 296 expressed by Eden and Churchill. Eden observes, "All prejudices ere equally fatal to good governsient. . . . For It Is as wrong to oppose nationalization on grounds of prejudice as It Is to support nationalization from blind subservience to a theory."1*® Churchill's position Is j equally explicit. Says Churchill, "There Is a broadening field for State ownership and enterprise, especially In relation to monopolies of all kinds.n1*^ Again he states, "I believe there Is a broadening field for State enter- i | prise In modern conditions."1^® "Modern conditions" are I I not limited to monopolies and could mean other appropriate Industries as coal and railways. Churchill considers there j Is room for both private and the right kind of state enter prise. He declares, "He can make State enterprise and free enterprise both serve national Interests and pull the national wagon side by side. . . He sees nothing | l^Anthony Eden, "The Conservative Faith Restated," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 18. (Pamphlet.) ^^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, March 21, 1943, In Eade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 60. ^Owinston g. Churchill, Speech, Avr, May 16, 1947, In Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite. p. 100. ^Hfinston S. Churchill, Speech, London, March 21, 1943, In Eade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 61. 297 immoral in nationalization of suitable industries if there is just compensation to the owners. Churchill remarks, "I am not going to pretend I see anything immoral in the nationalization of the railways provided fair compensation is paid to the present o w n e r s ."*52 The Conservative Party, however, vehemently opposes the Labor Party's doctrinaire Fabianism with its theories that nationalization of resources and their planned use are panaceas for capitalism's diseases of unemployment, instability, and Inequality. Prudence, not theme and doctrine, is the foundation of the art of poll* tics. Total nationalization is opposed because it is considered Inefficient and harmful to liberty. Churchill asserts: 1 believe that the monopoly by the State of all the means of production, distribution and exchange would be fatal both to our material well-being and to our personal freedom, as we have long enjoyed them. The cost of state management takes more from the workers than will ever be taken by the profits of private enterprise. It is not the Interest of the wage earners to have to deal with the all- powerful State employer rather than with the flexi bility of private enterprise.153 ^^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 30, 1946. See Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parlia mentary Debates (Commons), CDXXX (1946-47) , 30. inston S. Churchill, Speech, Brighton, October 4, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ea.), Europe Unite, p. 158. 298 Economic efficiency demands incentive, contrivance, and the prospect of gain or loss of the market mechanism directed by wise and beneficial public economic and social policies. It requires, as Churchill states, "... free enterprise with its rewards and forfeits directed by social legislation. . . .”154 Risk taking, then, is a joint i affair of the market and the state. In the nationalized i industries— except where the pricing mechanism could not be made to work— there will be inefficiency because of the ! lack of incentive and the clumsiness in administration due ; to over-centralization. Incentive will be reduced because they are, as Churchill says, ". . . to be ruled by people who have no Interest in being right and suffer no conse- j I quences for being w r o n g . "155 in the administrative area, i i over-centralization, by pushing the span of control beyond j i i its operable limits, causes inefficiency. In the Indus- i [ tries which could not be denationalized, decentralization must be enforced. "All that can be done," explains i Churchill, is to decentralize and cut down the enormously 154yinston S. Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, October 28, 1947, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 177. S. Churchill, Speech, Perth, Hay 28, 1948, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Europe Unite, p. 343. 299 swollen costs of management."15* Total nationalisation would hurt llbsrty because it would concentrate all the economic and political power in the hands of those who control the state. It would violate the principle of diffusion and limitation of power so fundamental and essential to liberty. "We must beware," remarks Churchill, "of trying to build a society in which i nobody counts for anything except a politician or an official, a society where enterprise gains no reward and i thrift no privileges."157 under socialism this would be the case in the view of the Conservative Party. "The State," asserts Churchill, "is to be the arch-employer, i the arch-planner, the arch-administrator and ruler, and the arch-caucus boss."!’ 5* Private property must exist in 1 j great concentrations and be widely diffused to act as an equipoise against the political power of the state and as | a vehicle of self-fulfillment: ■-----—------------------------------------------------- I 15*Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, October 14, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 114. 157Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, March 21, 1943, in Bade (ed.), Onwards to Victory, p. 56. 1*®Winston S. Churchill, Speech, London, June 4, 1945, in Coote (ed.), A Churchill Reader . . . . p. 263. 300 Private property ie an equipoise to political power. If it ceases to exist rank in the bureauc racy, or perhaps in the Party, will be the sole means by which men can fulfill their natural ambitions. When this happens personal liberty is gone.159 Nationalization of an efficient industry cannot be justified. It would be a mere grasping for power. It was for this reason that the Conservative Party so vigorously opposed the nationalization of the steel industry and denationalized it after winning the election in 1951. "All this is to be thrown into disorder," observes Churchill, "not because the Government want more steel but because they want more power."160 When the Conservative Party was elected in 1951, it was confronted with the nationalized Industries. Steel and highway freight transportation were denationalized. The others were retained under government ownership, illus trating a conservative principle to accept basic change. These industries were denationalized to obtain flexibility,! *5^"Social Effects of the Redistribution of Income," The New Conservatism (London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1955), p. 121. (Pamphlet.) 1 ^Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Woodford, January 28, 1950, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance, p. 166. 301 freedom of consumer choice, and reduce the cost of manage ment. Explains Churchill, "It Is physically Impossible to undo much that has been done."*^ Nationalisation of all or of the central means of production, distribution, and exchange has never been advocated by either the Republican or Democratic Party in the United States. The main reason for this is the strength of the Lockean conception of capitalist property reinforced by the integration with Smith and Spencer. This guarded against the intellectual fermentation of John S. Mill, T. H. Green— the Oxford idealist— and the Fabians. There is, however, considerable public ownership and operation of resources in the United States on all levels of government. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the St. Lawrence Water Development Corporation are federal public corporations. The chief public enterprise activi ties lie in the fields of public utilities and natural monopolies. Even in these areas the Republican Party prefers private ownership and public regulation, as is well illustrated by its position on the development of ^Hhniton S. Churchill, Speech, London, October 14, 1949, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), In the Balance. p. 114. 302 hydro-electric power. The Democratic Party tend* to favor public enterprise in theee areas. The Republican Party opposes public enterprise because it is inefficient and hurts liberty. Nationaliza tion leads to socialism. Goldwater's stand on the Hell's Canyon development on the Snake River is Illustrative. Asserts Goldwater, "That is nationalization of a basic industry. ... It will be only a matter of time until we nationalize other basic industries."I-62 The inefficiency of public power enterprises is hidden by the tax breaks and the subsidies they receive, and by applying a shorter yardstick to government than to private enterprise. Con tinues Goldwater, "As taxes on the power companies have increased and subsidies to Federal power operations have increased, the yardstick applied to Government power has become shorter.m163 Larson takes a more moderate view on public power. Government money should be used to finance those parts of the project not profitable for private enterprise and beyond its capacity, if, as he remarks, "... the size of 162garry Goldwater, in Shelley N. Mark and Daniel M. Slate (eds.), Economics in Action, p. 176. 163Ibid. the project ie beyond the reach of any private entrepreneur or group."16^ But from thia point on, private enterprise should be used. States Larson, "Private enterprise should be allowed to handle everything of a commercial nature that it can."165 Larson fully expresses the philosophy of the Party on public enterprise when he says: The business of government is government, not business. Of all the activities of government vis-a-vis business, the one which combines all the most hurtful and inexcusable features is the direct operation of business ventures in compe tition with private entrepreneurs.166 On this basis he approves the government's disposal of the Inland Waterways Corporation and other public enterprises and says the process should continue.16^ Rule by Expert or Amateur There is a controversy in Western political thought i dating from Plato and Aristotle as to whether the expert or the amateur should govern. Plato advocated the rule of the ^■^Larson, p. 70. l^Ibid. 166Ibid., p. 67. 16^See ibid., pp. 68-69 for a discussion on these points. 304 •Xpert and Aristotle that of the amateur. The expert pot** •esses and uses techniques claiming general validity for them, and in the field of politics this leads to doctri- nairism and the ideological approach to the solution of political, social, and economic problems. The expert may be priest, philosopher, intellectual, socialist theoreti cian, or faithful follower of the classical economists or Keynes. The amateur is a generalist and possesses no panaceas based on technique or expertise. He uses pru dence , "... the first of all virtues"and works in terms of moderation and compromise, using a combination of thought and experience in the tradition to establish the ends and the means of the society. In their approach to state economic and social activity, British conservatives favor the amateur or gen eralist approach. This is the approach of Aristotle's statesman or of Burke's conception of the state as ". . .a partnership in every virtue."169 xt is also the view of Churchill, who, while admitting the necessity of expert knowledge, rejects the rule of expertise. Says *®®Burke, Reflections . . . . p. 93. 169Ibid., p. 139. 305 Churchill, "Expert knowledge, however indispensable, is no substitute £or a generous and comprehending outlook upon the human story. . . ."170 American conservatives tend to the expert position in their approach. The type of expertise they support is that embodied in the business mind. Locke and the success of American business account for this. This kind of mind limits the horizon of politics and leads to the missing of many opportunities to the detriment of American conserva tism and the general interest as well. Thoughtful American conservatives are concerned with this. Clinton Rossiter stresses the need for education. Robert F. Bradford emphasizes the necessity for businessmen to participate in public affairs.I7* Regarding education, Rossiter states: The conservative . . . should be the chief defender of what we call "liberal education," for it is this kind of education, in contrast to technical or scientific or professional training, that encourages the broad and historically-minded point of view.172 l^Offinston S. Churchill, Speech, Miami University, February 26, 1946, in Coote (ed.), A Churchill Reader . . P. 377. *7*Robert F. Bradford, "Politics, Pressure Groups, and the Business Men," Harvard Business Review. October- December, 1953, pp. 33-41. 172Rossiter, p. 279. 306 Liberal education and political participation, then, are the means by which the business mind can be adapted to the generalist position. This would strengthen the defense of private property capitalism and allow the restatement of American individualism in contemporary terms. If education and political participation are suc cessful— and there seems to be no other routes open— then American conservatism, without deserting its traditions, would be better able to promote the solution of the prob lems of modern society. CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Conservatism is a political doctrine first stated by Burke and Adams in opposition to the extremist, innovat ing, rationalistic, equalitarian, theoretic dogmas of the French Revolution. It is an integral part of the secular Western political tradition and emerged from the hedonism, materialism, and conventionalism of the post-Renaissance era and the Protestant libertarianism of the Reformation period. Through the Renaissance it links up with the Graeco-Roman experience. Through the Reformation it joins with the Judaic-Christian tradition. Philosophically it is empiricist and skepticist, which it inherits from Descartes and Bacon--but chiefly Bacon— through Locke. Conservatism expresses its empiricism and skepti cism in the form of historical rationalism which espouses the cause of the national political tradition and experi ence against purist rationalism's ideological and 307 308 i j doctrinaire approach to political question*. On this i basis, Burke defended the Inherited and traditional prin ciples of the British constitution against the metaphysical dogmas of the French Revolution's philosophers and advo cated the Rights of Englishmen rather than the Rights of Man. John Adams performed a comparable task in the United States. It is within this broad framework and the narrower limits of their national and party political traditions that contemporary American and British conservatives approach the study and the solution of political problems. Contemporary British conservatism traces its ancestry to Burke, with his empiricism and skepticism, and to Toryism with its sense of social responsibility on the part of the well-placed to the less fortunate. Conse quently it is flexible, pragmatic, practical, and empirical in its attitudes and policies toward important social and economic problems, especially those involving state activity, and much more so than is contemporary American conservatism. Burke's pervasive Influence upon the British political mind has given the whole British political tradi tion a conservative bias and has made today's British conservatism much closer to classical Conservatism than is American. Locke's Influence, however, filtered through 309 Burke, is still present in British conservatism. Contemporary American conservatism and the American political tradition as well“-although both have elements of genuine Conservatism in them— are essentially liberal. This is due to the pre-eminence of Locke, whose Influence in America is comparable to that of Burke in Britain. Locke's influence is due not only to the content of his doctrines but also to his being accepted as ideologist of the American political tradition. This called for the use of an abstracted version of Locke which, together with the pioneer tradition in the United States, has produced a rationalistic and dogmatic streak in the American political tradition and in American conservatism. The laissez-faire conservative Integration of Locke with Smith and Spencer-- especially Spencer— reinforced this dogmatic streak and, in addition, stamped on American conservatism an almost unmitigated market capitalism in terms of which it approaches the solution of contemporary social and economic problems. The dogmatic and doctrinaire posture of contem porary American conservatism is most evident with respect to state social and economic activity. American and British conservatives, as did Burke and Adams, see human nature ontologlcally in terms of 310 virtues and vices, but dynamically oriented toward virtue. Man is perfectible in the sense that he can be improved, but he cannot be made perfect by any type of political society or by education or religion. But all these help in controlling and improving man by subjecting his will, appetites, and passions to the dominion of wisdom, pru dence , law, and the coercive power of the state. Education by developing knowledge and choices; Inculcating ideas of morality, understanding and dedication to the tradition; and a sense of personal responsibility and excellence per forms a vital civilizing function. So does religion by serving as a cohesive and stabilizing social influence. Religion also provides spiritual solace for all men— rich and poor alike— in that private realm of man's life beyond the reach of human capacity. Man's imperfect nature and his need for privacy in fundamental areas limit the scope of political action. In these areas individual moral regeneration must provide the solutions. Man, society, and state are concomitant entities historically, naturally, and organically. Society is the whole hierarchical and pluralistic complex of groups and relationships which man's art made and which man uses to realize his virtue and satisfy his wants. Society embraces 311 family, church, school, voluntary associations, state, and the entire Inheritance and tradition. The state, although its power is limited, is the sole possessor of lawful coercive force and is the central coordinating mechanism in society. Power is a central concern to conservatives. Political society necessarily implies physical power in the possession of the state adequate to maintain conditions of minimum security and subsistence. Power is required to restrain man's passions and to promote citizen morality and justice, and is accordingly consonant with virtue. The question of power is a fundamental one chiefly because of its connection with liberty. If liberty is to be safe guarded, power must be limited by appropriate and adequate legal and institutional procedures; be widely diffused throughout the entire mass of a diverse, varied, and pluralistic society; and its exercise must be considered a moral trust to promote individual and social betterment. British conservatives tend to put more trust in the moral restraint of those exercising power, and the more flexible and less formalistic character of the British constitu tional system appears to require this. 312 Leadership Is a requisite £or any political activity and political philosophy oust deal with the issue. There is considerable difference between British and Ameri can conservatives on this matter. Political leadership, widely experienced in practical politics and liberally educated in political ideas, is very deficient in the Republican Party but plentiful in the Conservative Party. This aristocratic view toward leadership is a definite principle of the Conservative Party and the practice of co-opting sustains it. But American conservatives are becoming aware of the need of such leadership. If their efforts are to prove successful, it will be necessary that the business-mind approach to political issues be modified by education and political participation. Constitutional i political democracy, and a viable two-party system in terms1 of which the experience of the English-speaking people has found it works best, demand articulate political leader- i j ship if it is to prove adequate to the needs of the modem age. Conservatism, if it is to form the government approximately half the time, if it is to serve as the engine and also the brake on the political vehicle, needs this type of leadership which, from the intimations of the tradition, can produce positive programs and policies that 313 I an adequately educated electorate will be persuaded meets Its desires and satisfies its ssnse of social justice. Implicit in this concept of political leadership is a tradition of public service which is more prevalent among British than American conservatives. Conservatism is frequently accused of being antl- intellectual because of its acceptance of religion and attachment to tradition. It rejects this charge. In defense of their religious position, conservatives point out that (1) history demonstrates man is a being who worships and who, therefore, has a religious instinct; and (2) modern science, although it rejects the anthropomorphic view of God, accepts the need of the religious instinct andi feeling, both to articulate scientific theories and to pro-i vide criteria for the use of scientific knowledge and power. Since both history and science support religion, conservatives do not consider the charge of anti-intellec- tualism against them because of their support of religion to be well founded. Conservatives defend their attachment to tradition against the charge that it is anti-intellectual in terms of their preference for practice over theory. They consider that true knowledge involves actual participation in a 314 self-moved activity and that only such knowledge will enable the valid statement of the activity's principles. These criteria also apply to the political tradition. The true intellectual in the political realm will concern him self with developing the tradition's principles from experience in it. Conservatives do not consider the con struction of ideological theories to be the mark of an intellectual. Change is Inevitable in all natural and man-made activities. Change implies permanence and flux. Con servatism in a fundamental sense is a theory of change. Conservatives see the political tradition as a self-moved activity with its own ethos and direction of movement. But since the law of causation does not apply to it, change! j in the tradition can be brought about only by prudential articulation of its intimations conceived as a flow of sympathy. Change accomplished in this way preserves the identity of the tradition and this is vital since the tradition possesses the only resources available with which to solve the problems and take advantage of the opportu nities presented by increasing secularism, science, and technology. If the identity of the tradition is lost— if its Graeco-Roman, Judaic-Christian, and Anglo-Saxon 315 elements are extinguished— there may be great material abundance and power, but personal and political freedom and the criteria of moral judgments may be lost. Con servatives think these things will be lost if the identity of the tradition is extirpated. The tradition must be adapted to change and unavoidable changes in circumstances molded to the tradition. British conservatives are adept and flexible in accommodating their position to the unavoidable changes in circumstances, particularly those relating to state social and economic activity. They defend older and primary values and adapt to new economic and political arrange ments. They have changed their front but not their ground. Their Burkean empiricism and their Tory traditions permit this type of maneuvering. Some moderate American conserva tive Intellectuals also advocate this type of adaptation in terms of the American liberal political tradition and history. However, ideological rationalism in the form of the business mind has largely thwarted practicing American conservative politicians from altering their generally anti-statist bias. The New Conservatism propounded by some American conservative intellectuals who advocate a form of 316 transcendentalism finds no counterpart among British conservatives, whether politicians or intellectuals. New Conservatism stands outside the American political tradi tion. It seeks to force American conservatism into the Burkean mold rather than developing in terms of American traditions and by using American materials. It provides no significantly useful philosophical or policy criteria. The private property principle lies at the heart of conservative political thought from the time of Burke and Adams to contemporary American and British positions. Conservatives defend private property on the grounds of liberty and efficiency. And even if a socialist, planned economy were more efficient— and conservatives completely reject this on both historical and theoretical grounds-- liberty is so precious and fundamental to the nature of human personality and the purposes and ends of man's life that the private enterprise economy in some form would still be maintained. The conception of property that conservatives espouse is essentially Lockean— prudently modified to current requirements— and consequently embodies the bourgeois ethic of the acquisitive and achieving capitalistic society. Renaissance humanism, hedonism, secularism, conventionalism, empiricism, and the Protestant Reformation'8 libertarianiaa and adaptation of the Chris tian ethic to the requirements of the modern age provide the Lockean property doctrine with its intellectual, philosophical, moral bias and content. Liberty, equity, justice, utility, equality of opportunity— the only defensible kind of equality— power and its limitation and diffusion, security, all the great concepts and ideas of the existing and developing Western political tradition gravitate around the arrangements and principles of the institution of private property. The expansion of government economic and social activity since the turn of the century, and particularly since the Great Depression of the 1930's and the period i following World War II, has brought the political power of I the state and the institution of private property into conflict and controversy at many points. Such state i activity concentrates more political and economic power I in the hands of government and cuts to the center of the conservative position on liberty and efficiency. British conservatives, due to their empiricism and Toryism, are more flexible, adaptive, practical, and experimental than are American in their approach to state social and economic activity in the interests of providing acceptable minimum 318 standards of social welfare and security, equality of I opportunity, and promoting and maintaining high, stable, and growing levels of income, employment, and production without inflation. American conservatives' approach to these Issues is expressed generally in terms of their modified laissez-faire conservatism with its pronounced i streak of ideological dogmatism, although there is advocacy by some conservative intellectuals and signs of growing acceptance by practical conservatives of the need of wider state action. However, both American and British conserva tives stoutly defend the private property market economy against excessive state action. In the field of maintaining basic minimum standards of life, the Conservative Party's Toryism provides ample precedent. The broad provisions of the Wartime Coalition and Conservative Governments after World War II (in the areas of education, social services, health, and housing) have their roots in the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Factory Acts, Disraeli's social legislation, and the Conservative reforms of the 1920's and 1930's. The Conservatives fully accept the welfare state which they consider their politi cal child, although they admit they did not christen it. Compulsory national insurance for the social services and 319 health, extensive aid to education and housing, including public ownership of houses and subsidization of rent if necessary, raise no serious problems for liberty, equality of opportunity, and efficiency to the Conservative Party. Conservatives consider such arrangements implicit in the private property principle rightly interpreted in its contemporary context. American conservatives are not prepared to go nearly so far as British conservatives in the public pro vision of minimum standards in the fields of the social services, education, housing, and health Insurance. Their laissez-faire conservatism leads them to view many of these needed and desirable reforms as socialistic. They greatly emphasize the moral superiority of private voluntary effort in these vital areas of security and equality of opportu nity, believing that liberty is better safeguarded when built upon a foundation of personal and individual respon sibility. They fear state power and prefer a welfare society or community to the welfare state. Although there is a difference in the extent to which British and American conservatives go in the public provision of minimum security and equality of opportunity, there is still essential agreement on the basic issue. 320 j Both agree that private property in respect to its acquisi tion and preservation leads necessarily to inequality of social status and possession of wealth. Inequality is unavoidable due to the differences in the ability, ambi tion, energy, and character of individuals. Consequently, unfair and imprudent redistribution of property or income i from those who have to those who do not is inconsistent with liberty and justice. Liberty and essential security are compatible with fair shares but not equal shares. Equal shares is levelling and is a denial of liberty, justice, security, and equality of opportunity. Liberty, security, and equality of opportunity demand the pruden- tially appropriate balance between the market forces of i commutative justice and the principles of distributive justice applied by the state in conformity with the com munity' s sense of social well-being. Optimum inequality, not arithmetic equality, is consonant with liberty, justice, security, and equality of opportunity. Governmental responsibility for the maintenance of a high, stable, and growing level of income, employment, and production without inflation is completely accepted in principle by American and British conservatives. Conserva tives in both countries approach these problems in terms 321 of their respective political traditions with the result that British conservatives use more vigorous state action in the over-all sense than do American. There are simi larities and dissimilarities in the type and the intensity of use of the various policies— monetary, fiscal, planning, regulatory, and nationalization— utilized to achieve these objectives. The common characteristic of all these poli cies is the expansion of state power with resulting problems for liberty and efficiency. American and British conservatives fully approve the use of discretionary and flexible monetary policy. They approve monetary policy because it exercises a general Influence on the economy, does not affect pricing and out put decisions directly, and operates in phase with the classical assumptions regarding price flexibility, factor mobility, and the long-run, full-employment equilibrium utilization of resources. Under the Elsenhower Administra tion, monetary policy tended to be restrictive, with more concern for controlling Inflation and maintaining stability than for growth. British conservatives tended to make a more vigorous use of monetary policy with the balance of payments situation supplying the signals for varying the interest rate. 322 Fiscal policy is also accaptad by British and American conservatives, but with more cara than is monetary. Fiscal policy operates more directly on market prices and output decisions and also affects the distribu tion of the national income. Conservatives in the United : States and Britain agree that the budget should not subvert the market economy operating under the stimuli of profit and loss. Consequently, the level of government expendi tures and taxes should be kept to that necessary for ordinary costs of government, basic social standards, and prudent national defense— and with no waste of the public dollar. The health and productivity of the market economy are the main long-run considerations. Also, they both j agree that fiscal operations should be non-inflationary. Inflation in itself is immoral and fraudulent and economi cally destructive. The essential differences lie in the greater willingness of British conservatives to use fiscal policy generally in a more vigorous manner, to apply dis cretionary changes in the tax rates under the authority of delegated legislation, and to view budget deficits as neither good nor bad, but merely as part of the general picture. American conservatives reject discretionary power for the executive branch of the government over tax rates 323 ; and are concerned over the morality, prudence, and infla tionary effects of budget deficits. Government national economic planning involves a far greater use of state power than does monetary or fiscal policy. Even assuming democratic voluntary planning and its necessity, government power is expanded into the busi ness decision-making process. Planning increases govern ment power in that the state becomes Involved in the policy-making activities of assigning the economic goals of the society. State power is further expanded in the developing and implementing of the public and private economic policies necessary to achieve these goals. Increased government power is further augmented as the guideline approach to keep prices, wages, profits, and incomes in line with state-determined productivity schedules seems to follow— as in Britain between 1961-63 under the Conservative Government. There is also the aspect of implied threats of stronger action if voluntary restraint is ineffective in making guideline policy work. And even in democratic Britain the Labor Government took, but never used, the legal power to direct labor in peace time. Planning becomes involved in goals, prices, and outputs with resulting concentration of economic and political power in the hand# of the state. Such concentra tion rune counter to the libertarian principle of limiting and diffusing power. Planning also raises problems of economic effi ciency as well as those of liberty. Concentration of power as a result of planning causes clumsiness in administration by overextending the span of control. Planning tends to reduce incentive by diluting the relationship between the ownership and the administration and enjoyment of property. This constitutes a matter for concern in that a privately owned, extensively planned economy might obtain the worst— rather than the best— features of both the laissez-faire and socialist systems. British conservatives under Churchill limited their| planning activities largely to providing information and analyzing trends. However, between 1961-63, the Conserva tive Party adopted a type of long-run economic planning I designed to shield the British economy from the fluctua tions in the world market and to develop Britain's domestic resources fully. It became involved with guideline activity. American conservatives are even more biased against planning than are British. The word "stability" is preferred to "planning." However, the operations of the 325 l Budget Bureau and the Council of Economic Advieera consti tute planning and link up with private corporate planning through the use of common estimates regarding the national income. American conservatives are less favorably disposed to guideline policies than are British. Nationalization of all resources and their planned administration and use is in principle totally in opposi tion to a conservative view of politics. Such lodging of almost all economic and political power in the hands of the state would be a denial of liberty, and the administra tion of price and output by bureaucratic decision— instead of the market— reduces efficiency. Liberty, as British and American conservatives understand it, cannot exist under total socialization of resources. British conserva tives , however, accept nationalization on empirical evidence in the case of natural or socially induced monopo lies and also in the case of other industries, such as coal and the railways, where the huge funds needed to bring them up to efficiency standards are beyond the reach of the private capital market. But they oppose the nationaliza tion of an efficient industry such as steel. American conservatives are hostile to nationalization, even to the public production of hydro-electric power. They prefer 326 regulation if at all possible, whether or not there is monopoly. Public economic policies to promote and maintain full employment, stability, growth, and to control infla tion, and those designed to redistribute the national income to establish basic standards of life and security are parts of a single process. The production and wealth necessary to pay for the services and the leisure wanted must come from human economic activity making use of the best organization and technology available. The incentive, thrust, and ability of the mixed economy to provide this wealth must not be curbed by well-meaning although imprudent--still worse would be retributive— redistribution policies. Social ethics and economic cost must be accom modative. However, within this framework, generous and comprehending social welfare policies to assure minimum standards and security, to widen the participation by all classes In the material and moral gains of society, to make available a discriminating leisure, to develop per sonal integrity and character, to diversify human person ality, and to promote equality of opportunity are justified. These policies strengthen liberty and efficiency. 327 Thera is no doubt that the nature, the problems, and the opportunities of contemporary constitutional capitalistic society make necessary and desirable wide and adequate state social and economic activity and policies to underwrite the basic riskiness Inherent in it. There is also no doubt that these activities and policies raise problems for liberty and efficiency. In the last analysis the policies and activities, and the defense of liberty and efficiency, must be accomodated within the substance of the political tradition grounded in the private prop erty principle adjusted to the needs, desires, and virtues of each generation. Change must be accommodated while maintaining the identity of the tradition. The British Conservative Party, due to its empiri cism and Toryism, has been able not only to accommodate these policies and activities, but even to articulate from the Intimations of its own and the British political tradi tion , positive, pragmatic, expediential policies accepted by the electorate as meeting its needs and desires. The fact of Conservative Governments between 1951-64 testifies to this success. However, the decisive 1966 Labor Govern ment win, even allowing for the swing of the political pendulum, is clear evidence that no political party can 328 ! rest on its laurels. This is particularly so of any conservative political party because of its tendency to preserve the status quo and to change slowly. The Con* servative Party, as it did after its overwhelming defeat in 1945, must continue to broaden its base in the elector* ate by making pragmatic appeals on living issues while simultaneously maintaining the private property principle in viable form. Reaction to change is not enough. The Republican Party approaches these needed and desirable state policies and activities in terms of its modified laissez-faire conservatism. Its ideological bias in the form of the business-mlnd approach to politics has led it to a generally anti-statist position, and it has accordingly missed opportunities to serve the general interest and to strengthen its own electoral position. The strengthening of its electoral position is a funda mental need of the Republican Party because political power, like liberty, atrophies from lack of use. The Republican Party's electoral strength can be Increased only by the Party deliberately broadening its base by making pragmatic appeals on living political issues. If the Party does not so broaden its base, the public issues will pass it by, and rather than being a national political party 329 I l that approximately half the time could win the presidency, and a majority of legislative and other executive offices, it will more and more tend to become a political faction performing the role of an elected lobby for lobbyists. In order to survive, a political party needs power and not merely influence. Participation in power means exercise of responsibility. Such exercise of responsibility would exert influences tending to modify the business-mind approach to politics of the Republican Party and to move this dogmatic, expertise type of mind toward the generalist type which, because of the nature of the stuff of politics, is the true political mind. 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Creator
Huggard, Nathaniel Letchmere
(author)
Core Title
A Comparison Of Contemporary Conservatism In Great Britain And The Unitedstates
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
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Political Science
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University of Southern California
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English
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Krinsky, Fred (
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), Anderson, William H. (
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), Hinderson, T. (
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124053
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Huggard, Nathaniel Letchmere
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political science, general