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Frank Wedekind And The Search For Morality

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Frank Wedekind And The Search For Morality

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Content ThU dissertation has been
m icrofilm ed exactly u received ® 7-5316
WESTERVELT, William Osborne, 1930-
FRA.NK WEDEKIND AND THE SEARCH FOR MORALITY.
University of Southern California, Fh.D., 1966
Language and Literature, modern
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
FRANK. WEDEKIND AND THE
SEARCH FOR MORALITY
by
William Osborne Westervelt
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(German)
June 1966
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
William Osborne Westervelt
under the direction of h..^...Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by a ll its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
Date.
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chmrmaa
PREFACE
The idea to carry out this study began to take
form in a seminar on Expressionism which I attended at
the University of Southern California. Prof. John Spalek,
who conducted the seminar, made reference to the con
flicts in Wedekind's concept of morality. My limited
familiarity with several of Wedekind's early plays sug
gested that the moral conflicts in them might be explored
in terms of the Individual in opposition to society.
Wedekind's essay, Kunst und Slttliohkeit, which
compares the relative roles of art, religion and morality,
gave me a conceptual basis for a systematic investigation
of his search for morality.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. Spalek for his
painstaking supervision of the project, for his valuable
suggestions and for the untiring patience with which he
has guided me during my work. My sincere thanks go also
to the other members of my supervisory committee,
Prof. Harold von Hofe, Prof. John T. Waterman and
Prof. Max L. Berkey.
San Diego, California
May 1966
il
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION ................................... 1
CHAPTER
I. PERSONAL AND PUBLIC MORALITY.............. 17
II. WEDEKIND AND ZEITGEIST. A SEARCH FOR
THE IDIOM OF MORALITY................. 46
III. MORALITY— A RATIONAL OR IRRATIONAL
IMPERATIVE?........... 76
IV. THE ROLE OF WOMAN IN THE SEARCH
FOR MORALITY..............................106
V. THE FUNCTION OF DEATH IN THE SEARCH
FOR MORALITY..............................141
VI. HETMANN'S CONCEPT OF MORALITY—
THE ALTRUISTIC SUICIDE....................170
VII. NICOLO'S CONCEPT OF MORALITY—
THE PENITENT SUICIDE......................206
VIII. THE MORALITIES OF SCHOLZ AND KEITH—
THE SUICIDE OF DESPERATION................248
CONCLUSION....................................... 283
APPENDIX......................................... 299
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................... 301
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INTRODUCTION
In the opening scene of Tod und Teufel Castl
Plano protests against the amorous advances of the emanci
pated feminist Elfriedes "Ihre Worte treffen die
Todeswunde, die lch mit auf die Welt gebraoht habe und der
ich voraussichtlich sterben werde. . . . Ich bin . . .
moralist." (V, 16) - * -
Throughout his life Wedekind thought of himself
as a moralist. In the years since his death, admirers
and detractors alike have continued to describe him as a
moralist. Jethro Bithell comments, "The butt of his
vitriolic attack is conventional morality, but he him
self, in repeated self-interpretation through the mouths
of his characters, claims to be a moralist and, incredible
as it seems to us, the claim has been upheld by the most
serious academic critics of Germany."? J^jdwlg Marcuse
calls Wedekind "der rlgoroseste Moralist, well er das
Tier noch unter das Moralgesetz stellt. Wedekind 1st
*In the present study all quotations from the
primary works have been taken from the nine volume Prank
WedekindsGesammelte Werke (Munich: Georg Mdller, 1919-
lgsrr:----------------------
^Modern German Literature 1880-1950 (London,
1 9 5 9 ), P. 55T
1
selbst beim Anbliok eines Pferdes noch Moralist.He
classified Wedekind's work as "die Tragfldie des
Morallsten, der die Moral tlberwinden will."^ Joachim
Friedenthal, in the Nachwort to the Collected Works, de
scribes the basic paradox of Wedekind's work: "Der
pathetische Moralist Wedekind stand in ewiger
Fechterstellung zu dem luziferischen Zyniker Wedekind"
(IX, 464).
Occasionally the secondary literature may take
exception to the concept of-Wedekind as moralist. Leroy
Shaw writes, "jedenfalls tun wlr Wedekind keinen schflnen
Dlenst ihn mlt diesem Namen [i.e., Moralist] zu taufen
.... Die Bezeichnung Moralist 1st nichts anderes als
ein Kosttim, das dem Dlchter angezogen wlrd um die
Hochzeit zwlsohen Kunst und Leben vorzutfluschen."5 On
‘ tte whole, however, as Bithell claims, most critics con
tinue to describe Wedekind as a moralist.
The purpose of this study is to examine the
various aspects of Wedekind's concept of morality as the
philosophical basis of hiB belletristic writings. Less
^Die Welt der Tragodle (Berlin, 1923), pp. 159-
160. ----
4Ibid., p. 165.
5See "Bekenntnis und Erkenntnls in Wedekind's Die
Zensur," Frank. Wedekind zum 100. Gteburtstag, published
by the Stadtblbliothek MflnoherTtl954), p. 5$.
attention Is paid to what the critics and the secondary
literature have to say about the problem, for until the
present study, no one has concerned himself specifically
with an analysis of Wedekind's claim to morality. In the
belief that his work is an artistic formulation of his
search for morality,- attention is focused instead on what
Wedekind himself understood by the moral life.
In a comparison between Wedekind and Ibsen, Paul
Feohter contrasts Ibsen's conventional concern for Mem's
struggle toward the ethical ideal with Wedekind's uncon
ventional concern:
tfber der Welt Ibsens steht das Ideal des (ethlsch)
rlchtlg Lebenwollens: seine Menschen slnd alle
frtiher einmal gegen sich oder andere schuldig
geworden, indem sie falsoh, gegen die ethische
Idee, gelebt haben. ttber der Welt Wedekinds
steht als Ziel nur das Leben selber; nooh seine
Moral, die er spttterhin predlgt, 1st 1m Grunde
nlchts als elne Verkleidung dieses Ziels. Er
welss von keiner Ethik im alten Slnne und selhe
Menschen ebenfalls nicht; so wlssen sie auch
nlchts von Schuld und Stihne.
IbBen was concerned with Man's failure to serve
an ethical ideal, based on the need of society to preserve
and strengthen itself. He did not question the validity
of that ideal. Wedekind sought, on the other hand, an
ethical ideal which could justify and endorse the irration
al drives and instincts which he felt to be the basis of
^Frank Wedekind: Der Mensoh und das Werk (Jena,
1920), p. 20.
4
all life.
For the young Wedekind, the basis of life Is
Instinct. His uncritical faith in Instinct is the premise
of his search for morality. He believes that Man is a
divine being to the extent that he is a creature of in
stinct. The purpose of life is to explore the Ood-given
appetites which join human beings together.?
Wedekind's search is intensely personal. He
seeks to establish instinct as the basis of all life by
affirming the positive nature of his own instinctive
hunger for life. He believes that each man must person
ally and consciously pursue the demands of his own physi
cal and spiritual appetites, in response to his desire for
values relevant to himself as an individual organism. The
pursuit of morality is not a community endeavor. Neither
the individual's motivation for searching, nor the results
of the search, can be shared directly with other men.
Ultimate questions, like ultimate truths, must be pursued
individually. The premise of the present study is that
Wedekind's independent and lonely search for morality is
symbolically recorded in his artistic work.
^The Novelle, Rabbi Esra (1896), formulates
Wedekind's concept of morality based on instinct more
clearly than any other belletristic work. It is an ideal
ized portrayal of the poet's hope that through instinct the
beauty and significance of life may be realized.
5
Though Wedekind stresses the Importance of the
Individual as the basic unit of humanity, he realizes
that Man cannot be moral In Isolation. Slttlichkelt is
only meaningful in terms of Man's relationship to other
men: "Der Allelnstehende kann nlcht slttllch seln. Nur
der Mensch unter Menschen 1st slttllch" (IX, 379).
For Wedekind, the plural of Man Is not society,
but humanity (die Menschheit). The tension which charac
terizes the artist in his search for a valid morality is
t
based upon the conflict between society and humanity.
Slttlichkelt, as the highest possible expression of human'
behavior, is an aspect of Menschlichkeit.
Man's attempt to comprehend metaphysical power
and to apply his comprehension of that power to his own
life is the basis of religious experience. Because
Wedekind'8 concept of instinct, as the only valid basis of
morality, assumes a metaphysical origin, his search re
sembles a religious quest.® The difference between Man's
®The Taugenlchts fragment illustrates Wedekind's
hope of formulating Man's highest aspirations— his
striving to know God— as an aspect of his sexuality:
Wer 1st der grosse Unbekannte?
Duroh Maoht und durch Dunkelhelt
Herrsohen die belden zu zwelt:
Religion und Qesohleohtigkelt.
Wollen sioh gegenseltlg bekehren,
Als wenn sie nicht ein und dasselbe w&ren!
(XX, 253).
search for religious truth and Wedekind's search for moral
truth is that morality, for the poet, begins where re
ligion leaves off. The premise of his search assumes that
divine power reveals Itself as instinct in the individual
organism. The task at hand, therefore, is not to under
stand the deity, but to explore the presence of the deity
in the lives of men. For Wedekind, Ood is the object of
religion; Man Is the object of morality.
Wedekind'8 search for morality never loses sight
of the role which fate plays in the lives of men. The
fact that Man Is a creature of instinct in the first place
is a matter of fate. The poet's hope of making instinct
the basis of morality is an ex post facto attempt to
utilize what cannot be eliminated from Man's nature. His
attempt to formulate guide lines by which Man might lead
a moral life is based on his hope that— despite the forces
of fate— there is still an area in which Man can Work
effectively to achieve the best that is In him.
In an essay entitled Kunst und Slttlichkelt
(1906) he writes,
Was 1st Sittliohkeit? Slttlichkelt 1st etwas
sehr Hohes. Sagen wir elnmal vorerst, dass
Sittliohkeit das HSchste 1st, was der Mensch
Erstreben kann.
Slttlichkelt besteht darin, dass der Mensch
7
das Beste tut, was er naeh bestem Oewlssen
tun kann (IX, 379)*9
Sittliohkeit Implies the possibility of human
perfection within a specified area of human behavior where
Man is free to choose. Because the Individual Is limited
in time and space he can achieve Slttlichkelt, not as a
state of being with validity for all men, but as the
highest of which he— as a separate organism within a given
context— is capable. What is moral for one man may be
immoral for another; what is moral at one time may be
immoral at another. The essay continues: "Es gibt
verschledene Arten Sittliohkeit . . . Slttlichkelt des
Soldaten (blinder Gehorsam). Slttlichkelt des Ktinstlers
(fflr seine Oberzeugung einzutreten)" (IX, 379).10
^Wedekind gives no explanation of what he under
stands by the word Oewlssen. It is Impossible to deter
mine whether, like instinct, it is an inherent attribute
of human life or, like the ability to know (wissen) and
to judge, it is an acquired capacity for reflecting on
one1s own actions.
^-^Wedekind's definition of morality is atavistic.
It recalls Martin Luther's concept of "office" (Amt),
whereby the behavior of every individual- is determined
by his station in life.
8
In the dramatic fragment Die Jungfrau (1908),11
Included In the posthumously published works, Wedekind
Is again concerned with morality as a concept meaningful
only when confined to a specific situation— this time to
women before and after marriage:
Jedes Welb erkfimpft slch seine Moral selber.
Seine Moral vor der She muss, wenn es zum
hiJohstmflgl1chen Prelse eln Bttndnls elngehen
will, der Moral naoh der She dlrekt entge-
gengesetzt seln. Deshalb erschelnt auch die
Moral des Welbes hlnfMlliger (IX, 196).
Although Wedekind Insists that morality Is rele
vant only within a given context, once that context has
been established, It assumes an absolute character.
Wedekind's definition of morality In superlative terms—
"das Hflchste, was der Mensch erstreben kann"— Implies the
recognition of an absolute goal within each life. To this
extent, not only religion, but also morality Is a search
for ultimate values.
Wedekind Is the first to recognize that the moral
ity of the Individual may conflict with the eternal search
for religious values. He emphasizes repeatedly that while
morality Is concerned with human behavior, religion Is
concerned with Immortal and supernatural forces In a
^See Arthur Kutsoher, Prank Wedekind: Seln Leben
und Belne Werke (Georg Mflller: Munich, I931)* ill* 1&5*
for chronological classification of Die Jungfrau. Here
after, all references to Kutsoher's three volume study
will be Identified with the word Kutsoher followed by tb&-
ume and.page number.
9
metaphysical realm:
JSs [die Religion] . . . handelt sich um Tod
und Leben. Btrlger Tod, ewiges Leben. Well es
sich um so gewaltige Werte handelt, muss die
Religion fanatlgoh sein. Die Religion kennt
kelnen Spass. Die Religion nlmmt deshalb den
wtitendsten Kampf gegen die Slttlichkelt auf . . .
(IX, 380).
Because orthodoxy, for Wedekind, cannot be a true
reflection of either morality or religion, he attacks the
Church as an incongruous mixture of both. He feels that
organized religion has betrayed Nan through its suppres
sion of instinctive appetites, the source of which is
10
divine. The leaders of the Church, believing themselves
vested with the authority to sit in judgment over lesser
men, misuse that authority to serve the narrow and selfish
objectives of an institution which is more social than
religious. Wedekind holds the Church directly responsible,
as an example of the tyranny of the institution over the
hearts and minds of men:
Was wlrd aus den Pharisilern und Schriftgelehrten . . .
aus alien Pfaffen und Rlchtern, die die Polter
anwandten? Nach der Sittliohkeit sind sie
unantastbar. Aber die Religion, die hlmmelhoch
tiber der Slttlichkelt steht, hat keln gutes
Wort tfflr sie. Sie haben das Ewige dem
Zeitllchen geopfert. Sie haben ihren Lohn
dahln (IX, 380).
While recognizing the conflict between the forces
12Represented by Pastor Kahlbauch of Frflhlings
Srwaohen and Dr. Prantl of Die Zensur.
10
of religion and morality, Wedekind hopes to resolve that
conflict through art. In a 1903 notebook he formulates
his belief that art, though requiring no external justi
fication beyond Itself, may yet point the way toward a
more meaningful concept of morality:
Die [moderne] Kunst 1st um lhrer selbst wlllen
da, arB pro artej sie darf sich nicht mit Moral
und Ntitzllchkeit einlassen. Kunst und Sittlich-
keit haben nlchts mitelnander zu tun. Erst wo
die Slttlichkelt aufhSrt, beglnnt die Kunst.
Allerdings: Sittliohkeit 1st das HSchste
Ergebnis der Kunst, aber niemals wlrd Kunst
ein Ergebnis der Slttlichkelt seln. Ich bin
nicht gekommen (die Slttlichkelt) aufzulSsen,
sondern (die Kunst)13 zu erfflllen. Slttlichkelt
1st verflnderllch. Religion und Kunst nicht
(Kutscher, II, 154-155).
For Wedekind it is the artist, not the priest, who
is the immediate recipient of divine truth and the per
sonification of revealed religion. The artist accepts
the absolute laws of nature without bowing to the tyranny
of fallible human institutions. As the epitome of Moral
Man, the artist must bear witness to a conscious spirit
of creation, which reflects the divine source of his
creative power. True art, like true morality, demands
selfless dedication. The artist must remain indifferent
to the promise of salvation and the hope of eternal life.
He must acoept the risk of Infinite suffering and eternal
^•3The parentheses are from Kutsoher^
11
damnation for the sake of his art: "... Die Kunst 1st
eln Luxus geblet ftir diejenigen, die zu hoch stehen, um
gegen die Slttlichkelt zu verstossen, die zu selbstlos
14
sind, um der Religion zu bedurfen" (IX, 380).
In illustrating the hierarchy of morality, re
ligion and art, Wedekind cites the case of the condemned
man who is led to the gallows by the priest. After the
execution the experience passes into the realm of art,
which triumphs over both morality (the fact that the man
was condemned) and institutionalized religion (symbolized
by the priest): M
Der zum Tode Verurteilte wird aus der Zelle bis
zum Schafott von der Religion geleitet, und 1st
14
Both Herakles and Prometheus of Wedekind's last
great drama (1917) exemplify the need of the artist to
endure humiliation and pain as a part of Nan's conquest
over baseness and Immorality. In response to Herakles'
question— "Wodurch, Prometheus, ludst so unversShnlich/
Du dir eat Blitzesschleudrers Rache auf?"— the fabled
Titan answers, "Dadurch, das ich an Nacht lhm nicht
gewaohsen/ An Kunst ihm weitaus tiberlegen bln . . .
(VII, 240). Prometheus' prayer addressed to fate, re
flects the necessary indifference to pain expected of the
artist whose chief concern is the welfare of humanity:
Dank, Schicksal, dir dass sie [die Menschen]
nicht mehr zu tllgen,
Durch nlchts mehr auszurotten sind. Daftir
H&ng' ich hler oben gern, solang's lhm gut
scheint.
Der Sohmerz von keinem Gelerschnabel kommt
Der Freude am Gedeihn der Menscheit bel.
(VII, 239).
12
seln Haupt gefalien, dann bem&chtlgt sloh seiner
die Kunst. Deshalb steht die Religion hlmmelhoch
fiber der Slttlichkelt, die Kunst hlmmelhoch fiber
beldenH(1X380).
What to the criminal Is no more than an experience of
horror, and to the priest no more than the performance of
a ritualistic duty, Is to the artist a deeply meaningful
experience, which, translated Into the symbolic language
of art, may deepen and Intensify his life:
Glauben Sie . . . dass der Verurtellte (Qekfipfte)
elnen Vortell davon hat, dass sich die Kunst seiner
annlmmt? Den Vortell haben Sie! Denn Ihr lnneres
(seellsches) Leben wurde dadurch entfaltet und
berelchert, wie durch kelnen anderen Besltz (IX, 380-
381).
At all times and In all places the primary concern
of the moralist has been to seek answers to the ques
tions: Why does Man live? What Is the ultimate purpose
of life? Unless he can answer these questions, Man seeks
In vain for an understanding of moral values. The con
cepts "good" and "evil" have no meaning In the abstract.
They take on meaning only when confined to a specified
context. For Wedekind, that context Is nothing less than
life Itself.
Life per se Is neither "good" nor "evil" except
as Man superimposes his concept of "good" or "evil" upon
It. To believe, as Wedekind does, that the source of life
Is metaphysical and that Creation was divinely Inspired,
Is a premise that can neither be proved nor disproved.
13
To equate the divine source of life with absolute good Is
merely a matter of definition.
Zf the deity and all his works are "good," then
Nan, as a part of those works, Is also "good." Accord
ing to Wedekind, Man preserves his goodness to the extent
that he reflects and perpetuates Creation. When he op
poses the continuation of the creative process, he
contributes to "evil." The basic alternative in life is
either to yield to the compulsion of instinct or to
suppress it. If instinct is equivalent" to Man's capacity
for "good," then the suppression of instinct is a trans
gression against the nobler aspects of one's nature. If,
on the other hand, instinct is not only the basis of
Man's capacity for "good," but also of his capacity for
"evil," then Man is obliged to restrain it.
As Wedekind matures, his belief in developing a
morality based on instinct becomes more and more dis
illusioned. His hope is shattered both externally by
society and the corruption of institutions, and internally
by the conflict between rational and irrational forces.
Reason, which subjects instinct to detailed and merciless
scrutiny, threatens the poet's faith in natural appetites
as a potential basis for Man's highest aspirations, With
out reason Man could not know the destructive power of
instinct and he would suffer from that power no more than
14
animals suffer from It. Because he Is endowed with rea-
• *
son, however, Nan begins to question the validity of
Instinct. He observes his procreative urges transformed
Into a destructive force which threatens both the society
and himself. Reason tells Man that what he had originally
regarded as an Infallible link with the deity, may, In
fact, be an Instrument of chaos and "evil."
Out of the poet's growing apprehension concerning
the validity of Instinct as the basis of morality, comes
the desire to establish an ethical basis for life built
on reason. To this extent Wedekind strives toward a
purely humanistic morality, stripped of the thelstlc
overtones which characterized the idealism of his youth.
In his concluding remarks on Schloss Wettersteln, Pechter
remarks,
. . . dieser amoralisch, d.h. frel seln wollende
Moralist konnte nicht hlndern, dass nooh seln
kftltester Zynisraus auf elnen limner erneuten
Karapf mlt elngeborener Sehnsucht zur Ethik
wuchB und bo zuletzt trotz alien ethisch blelbt
(Pechter, 117).
The present study contrasts the young Wedekind's
naive concept of morality based on Instinct with the
mature poet's subjection of that concept to the merciless
examination of reason.
Beginning with an analysis of the oonfllct between
individual and social concepts of morality, the study
continues by exploring Wedekind's Insistence that ethloal
15
values be meaningful to the Individual In his own terms.
The poet's alienated position among his contemporaries
Is considered the result of his belief that Man, not socie
ty, Is the common denominator of life.
Characteristic of his search for morality is
Wedekind's attempt to Justify his faith in instinct
through Qefflhl and Vernunft. Examples of rational and
Irrational characters from the dramas are discussed as an
aspect of that attempt.
The last half of the study is concerned with
Wedekind's concept of suicide as an indication of the
individual's position in society. The roles-played by
fatalism and pessimism, altruism and egoism, are discussed
in terms of three categories of suicide: the altruists,
the penitents and the victims of despair. A major figure
from each of three main plays written at the turn of the
century is examined in detail as an example of each type of
suicide.
The study concludes with a summary of the important
points discussed along the path that began with the poet's
naive belief in instinct. The mature Wedekind's doubt,
disillusionment and fear— resulting from his growing belief
that Instinct is the cause and not the cure for the suffer
ing of humanity— is considered as the basic theme of his
artistic production. We aspire to compensate for the
failure of the moralist by affirming the success of the
artist.
CHAPTER I
PERSONAL AND PUBLIC MORALITY
Wedekind's concept of morality divides Into two
Incompatible components: Individual and public morality.
Even a tentative formulation of his search cannot avoid
the conflict between the Individual and his society.
In the 1906 foreword to his Bttchse der Pandora.
Wedekind distinguishes between the personal morality of
the individual (menschliohe Moral) and the public morality
of an institutionalized society (bttrgerllche Moral). He
claims that the real thesis of the Pandora drama is the
conflict between these two basic concepts of morality. It
Is the conflict between "... bPrgerllcher Moral, zu de-
ren Schutz der Richter berufen 1st, und menschlicher Moral,
die sich Jeder lrdlschen Oerlchtsbarkelt entzleht" (III,
106) .
Wedekind's work Is an insistent testimony to the
superior claim of menschllche Moral. Even as he recogni
zes the necessity of bPrgerllche Moral, he consistently
relegates It to a position of secondary importance. He
realizes that In order to substantiate the claim that
mensohllohe Moral is ultimately more Important than bPr
gerllche Moral he must penetrate and comprehend the funda
mental nature (Wesen) of the world and of men:
17
18
. . • wenn die menschliche Moral hfiher als die
bfirgerllehe stehen will, dann muss ale aller-
dlnga auch auf elne tlefere umfassendere
Kenntnis von Wesen der Welt und des Mensohen
gegrUndet seln (III, 107)*
The desire to perceive the Wesen of life Is the character
istic which separates the seeker from other nen.^
In the Jungfrau fragment Wedekind speaks of Christ
as an example of the superior claim of menschliche Moral:
Dass die bfirgerllehe Qesellschaft nicht das hfich-
ste Ziel menschllcher Entwlcklung 1st, erglbt sich
schon (daraus), dass die gr&ssten Menschen wle z.
B. Christus, dlrekte Pelnde der bttrgerlichen Qe
sellschaft waren, erglbt sich schon daraus, dass
die Menschheit ausgesprochene Felnde der bttr-
glichen Qesellschaft, wle z. B. Christus, als
lhre auagesprochenen Felnde anbetet.
Die bfirgerliche Qesellschaft 1st nicht der
^•Gyorgy Luk^cs, the Marxist critic, was particu
larly interested In Wedekind as a poet of social protest.
In his Sklzze einer Qeschlchte der neueren deutschen
Llteratur (Berlin. 1955). he wrote concerning what he con
sidered Wedekind’s "... falsoh aufgefasste Wesen." Ac
cording to Lukacs, Wedekind was led astray by his belief
that Instinct Is the basis of morality:
Aber in der Qrundlage von Wedekinds Karlkaturls-
tik llegt elne lhm unbewusst gebllebene Mysti
fication . . . . (es) lfist sich bel Wedekind das
Elementare, vor allem das Sexuelle, aber auch
alles andere Instlnktm&sslge am Menschen, aus
dem Qesamtzusammenhang heraus, stellt sich als
selbststftndige Macht der Welt, der Qesellschaft,
die als starres System toter und tfitender Kon-
ventionen erschelnt, abstrakt gegenfiber (Lukrfes,
In good Hegelian tradition Luka'cs has clearly Isolated the
Thesis (society) and the Antithesis (instinct). He blames
weaekind's Insistence on instinct as the Antithesis of so
ciety for the poet's inability to arrive at a nnai Syn
thesis of the dialectical forces. Luka'cs would hope to
discover a Synthesis based on a theory of social regenera
tion.
19
hdchBte Zweck, sondem nur der krlftige Nfthr-
boden menschlicher Kulturentwieklung . . .
Die Menechheit 1st nicht der bfirgerllchen Ge-
sellschaft wegen da, sondem die bfirgerllehe
Qesellschaft let der Mensehhelt wegen da. Die
bfirgerllehe Qesellschaft let nicht das Hhupt,
die Krone der menschlichen Zivilisation, son-
dem der Nihrboden, das Vegetative, das Posta-
ment, die ErnMhrerin (IX, 193-19*0.2
The search for morality is primarily the search
for menschliche Moral. It is a humanistic striving, for
Man is both the substance and the goal of the search.
Wedekind is indifferent to institutions. His description
of society, as the humus out of which the individual must
draw his strength, is never quite convincing. His theore
tical defense of society finds no formulation in the bel-
letristic writings. Quite the contrary! In play after
play society is presented, not as a means of individual
sustenance, but as a means of individual destruction.
It is the function of bttrgerllehe Moral to pre
serve formal relations between human beings, to defend the
state, the religious beliefs, the educational Ideals, the
sanctity of the family, etc. Taken collectively these
Ideals constitute society. While ostensibly defending
their right to exist, Wedekind quarrels with every
2Reference to Christ as the opponent of society
recurs in a fragment which Wedekind wrote in the hope of
creating a companion piece to the Hldalla dramas "Der
hohe Rat, welcher Chriatus verurteilie, handelte nicht slt-
lich, sondern unsittlich. Wir wttrden heute ebenso handeln"
(Kutsoher, II, 181).
20
institution of organized life.3 jn actual practice so
ciety emerges as a negative entity which coerces the In
dividual to become something other than nature Intended
him to be. The difference, for Wedekind, between
menschliche Moral and bhrgerllche Moral Is not only a dif
ference of Individual versus social emphasis in the pur
suit of one's goals, but also of pure (instinctive) appe
tites versus corrupted (civilized) appetites.
As the young poet of Prtthllngs Brwachen. Wedekind
presents a picture of society living the great lie. In
stitutions (Church, School, Family) have perverted and
suppressed Man's natural capacity for life by confusing
and corrupting his instincts. More than any of Wedekind's
later plays, Frflhllngs Brwachen is an expression of hope
that the Individual may learn to accomodate himself to the
demands of both menschliche and bflrgerllche Moral. The
vermummter Herr Is Wedekind's most successful resolution
of the opposing demands of public and private life. He
3LukrfeB Is predictably pleased with Wedekind's
formulation of the Chnatur of society:
Er hat fBr die dramatlsche Szenlk neue Ausdrucks-
mlttel, neue, tlefwlrkende Relze aus der Verwand-
lung des kapltalistlschen Alltags Ins Oroteske
geschaffen, wobel dlese Verwandlung elne scharf
kritlsche, leidenschaftliehe Enthttllung 1st:
die Wesenloslgkelt, die Bnnatur wird mlt gewal-
tlger sinnlicher Wucht gestaltet ... (Lukrfes,
124).
pays homage to both society (Sollen) and the individual
(Wollen): "Uhter Moral verstehe Ich das reele Produkt
zweier lmaglniren OrSssen. Die lm&ginAren Orttssen slnd
Sollen und Wollen. Das Produkt helsst Moral und l&sst
slch in seiner Reallt&t nicht leugnen" (II, 172). For the
vermummter Herr, public morality as a necessary aspect of
life cannot be denied. Although Sollen and Wollen are
theoretical extremes, the area of conflict between these
two extremes has actual existence. It Is in this area of
tension that an answer to the conflict must present it
self. The vermummter Herr. In recognizing the demands of
both moralities, is Wedekind's most affirmative statement
on life. He demands, along with the objective ability to
view life realistically, faith.in Man's capacity to re
solve the conflict between Sollen and Wollen without ne
glecting his natural instinctive desire for active parti
cipation in life.
He is masked, rather than developed as a full dra
matic personality, not only to give the author the last
word as a kind of Impersonal deus ex machlna. but because
the philosophy of the poet, like the face behind the mask
of the vermummter Herr, remains an enigma, an anonymous
puzzle, Impenetrable to the forces of analysis.
If there is ever to be a resolution of the con
flicting demands of the two moralities mentioned in the
foreword to Pandora, that resolution must take into
consideration that aspect of human nature which reflects
the sacred and procreative power of Nan's instincts. Nan
must be allowed to participate instinctively and emotional
ly in life in order to seek answers to the meaning of
existence. Wedekind's insistence on the necessity of
whole-hearted participation in life is an indispensable
condition in the search for a new morality. At a point
early in the dialogue between Melchior and the vermummter
Herr, the latter replies, when asked about his identity:
"Du lernst mich nioht kennen, ohne dlch mir anzuvertrauen"
(II, 171)* In a very real sense, this is a crystallization
of much of Wedekind's thought concerning the impossibility
of vicarious experience. Whether one is concerned with
the physical quest for meaningful sensual experience or
the metaphysical quest for valid religious experience, in
volvement must be direct and personal. Great truths can
not be communicated through tradition or educational phi
losophies; they are untransmittable. Even a liberal and
enlightened poet cannot prepare the fledgling for partici
pation in the life experience. There is no preparation for
life except life Itself, an experience which must always
be first-hand.
Nelchior's mother, for all her "understanding,"
does not understand at all. She cannot free herself from
the restrictions of a morality she ostensibly opposes, for
she is uneapable of understanding the nature of the forces
23
that brings suffering to the children of the play. For all
her efforts as a liberal and sympathetic parent, her views
are confined to the bttrgerllche Moral. Her letter to Mo
ritz and her conversation with both boys about the selec
tion of suitable reading material reflect her Judgment as
a legitimate heir to an enlightened humanistic tradition.
Her apparent love and understanding for her son contrasts
sharply with Herr Oabor's undivided respect for bttrger-
llche Moral, as expressed in the lines:
Er flndet dort En prisonl . . . eherne Dlszlplin,
Qrundsltze und einen morallschen Zwang, dem er sich
unter alien TAsstftnden zu ffigen hat .... Das Haupt-
gewlcht legt man in der Anstalt auf Entwicklung
einer chrlstlichen Denk- und Empflndungswelse. Der
Junge lernt dort endlich, das Oute wollen statt dee
Interessanten • • • • (II, 157).
When pressed to despair, Frau Oabor's decision to
comply with her husband's wishes nullifies her earlier
courageous defense of Melchior. She is ultimately inca
pable of grasping the true nature of instinctive appe- '
4
tltes. When she yields to the pressure of a society which
insists that asocial elements be locked away, she sinks to
the shallow level of orthodox morality. Her defeat demon
strates Wedekind's contention that the problem of morality
is not to be solved through education or training. Even
the most enlightened educator, unless he feels within
**Frau (labor is a vivid example of Wedekind's con
tention, in regard to Man's aspiration toward morality,
"Mit dem Wollen 1st es nlcht getan" (from Kunst und
aittliohkelt, IX, 379). — —
24
himself the demands of instinctive drives, must fall.
Nan cannot make concessions to society by Ignoring
the individual's pursuit of mensohllohe Moral. Melchior
is a vivid example of the futility of such an attempt.
Both he and Wendla are innocent of the charges of which
society accuses them. Their sexual relationship was an
act of physical necessity. They were agents of an irre
pressible force, which demands obedience with all the
ruthlessness of the gods of ancient tragedy. Though so
ciety may consider it an outrage, nature, in the inevita
ble process of maturation, demands procreative expression.
It is an essential aspect of the awakening of spring.^
It is not only the older generation of Prtthllngs
Erwachen that is incapable of freeing themselves from the
influence of bllraerllche Moral. Moritz Stiefel, aspiring
to meet the demands of social morality, is broken by his
inability to recognize the claims against him of an even
more powerful human morality. His inability to accept
Ilsa, a forerunner of Lulu, when she appears before him as
the incarnation of instinctive appetites, is the result of
his submission to a society whose basic fibre is anti-life.
^The vermummter Herr, in answer to Melchior's con
science qualms-that he is responsible for Wendla's death,
replies, “So viol kann lch dir sagen, dass die Klelne vor-
zfiglich geboren hitte. Sle war musterhaft gebaut" (II,
171).
While Melchior earns the endorsement and support of the
vermummter Herr, Moritz does not.** Moritz was driven to
suicide by an exaggerated sense of duty and obligation to
his parents: "Ehre Vater und Mutter, auf dass du lange
lebst" (II, 173)* Herr Stlefel's lines, repeated three
times at the funeral service— "Der Junge war nlcht von mlrn
(II, 155 ff.)— show that he could not have been less de
serving of his son's sacrifice. The vermummter Herr cri
ticizes Moritz, not because he had destroyed himself, but
because he had exaggerated his obligation to the bttrger-
llche Moral. Moritz had deluded himself Into believing
that he owed his parents the satisfaction of his death be
cause of his failure In school. To Moritz' lament— "Meine
Moral hat mlch In den Tod gejagt. Urn melner lieben Eltern
wlllen griff Ich zum Mordgewehr" (II, 173)— the masked vi
sitor replies, "Oeben Sie sich kelnen Illuslonen hin,
lleber Freund! Ihre lieben Eltern w&ren so wenlg daran
geatorben wle Sle. Rlgoros beurteilt wttrden sie Ja le-
diglich aus gesundheltllchem Bedttrfnls getobt und gewet-
tert haben" (II, 173). He differentiates sharply between
Moritz' false sense of morality and Melchior's genuine
^With Melchior the masked gentleman uses the du-
formj with Moritz the Sle-form, suggesting on the oneHSand
the Intimacy of two life forces, and on the other hand the
remoteness and Irreconcilable contrast between a suicidal
negation of life when confronted with a life-spirit.
26
sense of Morality. Moritz is both the product and the vic
tim of society’s narrow and perverse standard. To the
vermummter Herr, this type of morality is the result of
wishful thinking and the tendency to over-estimate one's
own importance.
Although Melchior realizes that his concept of mo
rality can also lead to despair— to the cloaked visitor he
says, "Ich kann Ihnen aber mlt Bestlnmthelt sagen, mein
Herr, dass, wenn ich Moritz ohne weiteres die Hand gereicht
hUtte, einzlg und alleln meine Moral die Schuld trttge
(11, 173)— his veneration of instinct gives him a healthy
and stable position in life which Moritz lacks. The ver
mummter Herr replies, "DafOr blst du eben nlcht Moritz."
Even before Moritz, Wedekind was concerned with
members of a younger generation so stifled by social moral
ity that they are incapable of pursuing an independent
search for meaning. An example of such an individual is
Elln of the early dramatic fragment Ellns Brweckung (1887).
As a student of theology, he*allows himself to be supported
and cared for by Nettchen, his fiancee of three years (and
forerunner to Keith's Molly). Elln cannot bring himself,
either at the altar or in the boudoir, to consiamuatlng his
relationship with her. In exchange for her loyalty and de
votion he offers her biblical platitudes and a kind of
fraternal diversion, but his feelings for her stop short of
genuine affection. He feels himself tom, not only by his
27
relationship with Nettchen, but also by a similarly unful-
fllling courtship which he carries on with the Church. He
is plagued by momentary flashes of atheism, and by an in
cestuous dreaa of an affair with his sister, celebrated as
a sacrament of the Church,^
His more objective and practical friend Otto, a
medical student, offers him the following diagnosis:
Nun lass dir aber kurz und bfindig sagen,
dass du ein ganz normales Menschenkind bist .
Dein ganzes obel 1st hypertrophierte
Moral - bel Oott ein Ausserat seltner Fall
In unsrer Praxis (IX, 25-26).
Oskar explains Elln's dream as the necessary consequence
of his celibate life, insisting that nature, in one way or
another, must be acknowledged. "Urmutter/ Natur 1st elne
praktlsohe OeschAftsfrau,/ Will's nicht naturans, muss es
naturata./ So Oder so, sle koamt zu ihrem Recht" (IX,
127). Elln, like Rabbi Esra of the short story, is torn
by a feeling of obligation to marry a woman to whom he re
acts with indifferent loyalty. A preoccupation with duty
and conscience, as the by-products of bttrgerliohe Moral.
makes him impotent in his relationship with his intended
mate. His feeling for her is clearly not sexual. He ad
mits to Oskar:
• • • Uhsrer Brautnaeht, Oskar,
Tsiln is typical of the schizophrenic moral theo
rists who frequent Wedekind's dramas. Ernst Soholz of
Keith and even Karl Hetmann fall into the same category.
28
Veraag ich ohne Orauen nloht zu denken.
Weiss Oott, loh llebe sle I Wie Je ein Kind
Die Natter llebte, lleb' ich dieses Weib.
Der Opfertod fttr sie «Ar' air ein Labsal,
Allein zua Bund des Ehebetts, wie aieh donkt,
Bedarf es aehr als guten Wlllens, aehr
Als Opferfreudlgkelt— Bnthuslasaus,
Begelsterung. Voher ich die beziehe,
1st air noeh rJLtselhftXt (IX, 27-28).
Elin is caught between the external demands of the
stifling relationship with the matronly Nettchen and the
Internal deaands of an unfolding passionate nature. Both
his feeling for Nettehen and his concept of Qod are the
result of his inability to face life with courage and con
viction. When Oskar asks him why he does not break away
from the paralyzing Influences of "Oott . . • Nettchen
Schlmmelpfennig . . . und delne eigne leld'ge SchwAche"
(IX, 28), Elin claims that he could sever his belief in
the deity if only it were possible by rational means to
disprove its existence. Admitting to the Promethean sin
of pride, he confesses his desire to match wits with the
deity. Alarmed by an awareness of the divine spark within
himself, Elln's growing consciousness of die menschllche
Moral compels him to participate actively in an emotional
life, which he has always shunned:
Ein Jther Taumel fasst das eltle Herz,
Slch selber Oott zu seln, in sehrankenlosea,
In nlaaermOden Rlngen slch das All,
Die einzlg wahre Helaat zu erobern . . .
Verruchter Irrwahni - unbekfiaaert richtet
Der ew'ger Leaker zwisohen BBs und Out,
Und kelne Formal, die ihn wegbeweise (IX, 30).
29
Oskar tries to discredit the idea of an ew'ger
Lenker by questioning the source of religious experience.
He argues that there is no reason to assume that a deity
must exist simply because one cannot disprove its exist
ence. In an ad absurdum argument he poses as the recipi
ent of a revealed truth that a human figure is hiding be
hind a nearby gravestone. He admonishes Elln to disprove
its existence by taking a look for himself. To Oskar's
surprise a man does appear, suggesting by implication that
Elln's conviction concerning the existence of a divinity
may in fact be a reflection of the truth. Despite moments
of genuine atheism, Elin (like Wedekind) leans more toward
religious belief than toward non-belief. Elln's moments
of doubt are usually the result of temporary discouragement
caused by his misconception of the nature of supernatural
revelation, rather than by an incurably pessimistic spi
rit. His loyalty to both Church and Nettchen is sustained
by his theological studies and remains Intact as long as
he is willing to accept passively the protection of both.
His loyalty to bttrgerllche Moral finally weakens under the
pressure of awakening physical desire. He is no longer
disturbed by dreams of incest. He is fired with the hope
of celebrating love-rites with the child prostitute Ella,
a forerunner ofLulu.®
&The similarity of names— Klln--written even as
Ellas in the original 1887 manuscript (IX, 2)— and Ella,
30
There is an unreal, Pippa-like quality suggested
in the sketchy characterization of Ella, which suggests
that a physical experience with her would be also a pro
found spiritual experience.^
Ella's rage against the Qraf Schwelnltz is based
upon an Intuitive respect for self as the inviolable in
carnation of a deeply moral force. He ridicules her claim
to morality: "Kostbar, hahai— Zum Totschlessen! Dies
felle Fleisch weiss etwas von Moral!" (IX, 52). Ella's
defense reflects her sense of human values, her refusal,
despite professional obligations as a prostitute, to con
sider herself the property of another person. She answers
Schwelnltz:
. . . Ich bin so wenig . . .
Ihr Kab und Out wie Sle ein— Tugendspiegel,
Ich bin kein Rinnsal, werter Herr! Ich bln
Ein ehrllch Strassenmttdchen . , .
Ich tu', was unsre Pflicht,
Vie's Jede tut. Auch hab' ich stets gewusst,
Was Anstand heisst bei wohlerzogenen Stthnen
(ix» 52).
suggests net only the incest motive. Put also the possibi-
llty of finding fulfillment through one's own alter-ego,
implying a kind of mystical-sexual union and harmony with
in the self.
9Qne is reminded also of Agata in Hauptmann's
Ketzer von Soana and of Agathe in Musil's Mann ohne
Jkigenscharten. and of the not uncommon view, persistent in
tne literature of the twentieth century, that only the
purely physical can be truly spiritual. Even Kafka's hope
of salvation centers on the Lenis and the Friedas and the
Olgas.
31
Turning for refuge to Oskar, the pragmatlat and realist,
she reacts with Indignation to the outrageous count:
Wollt1 mlr doeh eher am Wasehtrug Brot verdlenen,
Eh1 das Ich was Uhtugendliches litt'.
Das wider alle Sltte und Moral!
Jetzt wlssen Sle's. Ich will mein rein Qewissen,
Wenn Ich nlchts andres hab1, als Schlmpf und
Prligel (IX, 52).10
For Elln, as for Rabbi Esra, for Ella as for Lulu, no phy
sical relationship Is possible without an Instinctive at
traction for the love object. If that attraction Is mis
sing, a restraining influence within the individual, a
feeling of personal inviolability and a conviction of duty
and obligation toward the self, prevents him from desecra
ting his own person.
Because bfirgerllche Moral— despite Its undeniable
usefulness as a cohesive force In society— can never help
to relate the Individual in a meaningful way to the society
10Qne is reminded of Lulu's remarks to Castl Flani,
as she tells him of her own awakening sexuality, which was
accompanied by an instinctive resistance to any affair
which violated her instinctive perception of morality.
In Jener Zeit glngen mlr die Augen fiber mich auf
und ich erkannte mloh. In melnen Triumen sah ich
Nfccht ffir Hacht den Mann, fflr den loh geschaffen
bin und der ffir mloh geschaffen 1st. Und als Ich
dann wleder auf die Manner losgelassen wurde, da
war ich keine dumme dans mehr. Selther sehe ich
es jedem bel stoekflnsterer Naoht auf hundert
Schrltt Entfernung an, ob wlr ffirelnander bestlmmt
slnd. Uhd wenn leh mlch gegen meine Erkenntnlsse
versfindlge, dann ffihle ich mloh am nfiohsten Tage
an Lelb und Seele besehmutzt und brauehe Woohen
um den Ekel, den Ich vor mlr empflnde, zu Qber-
wlnden (III, 150).
32
In which he finds himself, the true seeker is forced to
rely on personal inclinations and instinctive appetites
which he makes known through his choice of a love partner.
The source of these personal inclinations defies analysis.
It is pointless to try to pin-point them in terms' of
either internal or external Influence, or in terms of phy
sical or supernatural power. In the final analysis it all
comes down to the same thing: instinct.
In the early dramas— particularly Kinder und
Warren. Ellns Erweckung and Prtthllngs Erwachen— members of
the younger generation struggle desperately to conform to
the demands of both types of morality. Despite the con
flicting pressure of middle-class morality, they aspire
with optimism toward a fuller knowledge of themselves and
an individual morality in accordance with their own na
ture. In the dramas that follow, this desire is often
completely stifled by society. An incapacity to see and
understand themselves, heightened by an exaggerated con
viction of their own importance and an inability to feel
compassion for others, make many of Wedekind's dramatic
personalities, like Gerardo of the Kammersftnger (1897),
brutally insensitive individuals.
Gerardo makes an eaay adaptation to outer circum
stances because he has no desire for deeper knowledge of
self . He is untouched by the demands of the menschllohe
Moral. Wedekind calls this type the "brutally intelligent”
33
Like the tlght-rope walkers of the circus essay
(Zirkusgedanken. 1891), they always triumph over circum
stance.
At the opposite end of the social scale are the
zealous moralists who, unable to capitalize on the shabby
Ideals of the common herd, fall to adapt to the external
demands of a philistine society. The elderly composer
DQhrlng of the Kammersflnger Is such a moralist.11 He fan
cies himself the victim of conflicting forces— an unsympa--
thetic and callous society (bQrgerllche Moral) on the one
hand, and an inhumanely exacting art (menschllche Moral)
on the other. It Is to these two masters that he has vain
ly sacrificed his life and his resources. He has striven
tirelessly to make art the focal point of his life and
work.
But for DQhrlng, as for Wedekind, it is not enough
to create art in the privacy of one's own study. It is
characteristic of both drama and opera that the art form
is complete only when presented before a live audience.
DQhrlng, like Wedekind, suffers from his inability to have
his work produced. His personal frustration is an Integral
part of his artistic frustration.
Qerardo, by contrast, recognizes the futility of a
11In the essay Was ich mlr dabel dachte. Wedekind
writes, "Professor DQhring bin ion selber, so wie ich mir
mlt drelunddrelsslg Jahren dem Theater gegenQber erschien"
(IX, 429).
Life idealistically dedicated to art. For him the final
measure of the man rests, not with inner conviction, but
with the world. Success is the absolute, the only relia
ble measure of validity: "Der Nassstab fQr die Bedeutung
eines Nenschen 1st die Welt und nlcht die inner Oberzeu-
gung, die man slch durch jahrelanges HlnbrQten aneignet"
(III, 225).12
Helene Morowa of the final scene, frantic and de
termined in her pursuit of the menschliche Moral, is even
more obsessed than DQhrlng, For her the only quality
which can give life significance is love— a quality viewed
with suspicion by Oerardo: ”In der grossen Welt, in der
ich lebe, hat Jeder Mensch seinen anerkannten reelen Wert.
Wenn slch zwei zusammentun, dann wlssen sle ganz genau,
wlevlel sie vonelnander zu halten haben. Brauchen kelne
Llebe dazu" (ill, 238), In support of the bQrgerllche
Moral, he reminds her of her obligation to husband and
children. The humorous dialogue concerning the age and sex
of the children shows he has never given any of them the
slightest thought or consideration theretofore. By
12In Was ich mlr dabei dachte. Wedekind writes,
Oerardo, elne durch den Erfolg aufgeblasene Phlli-
sterseele, die sich des Brfolges wegen fQr elnen
KQnstler hilt und von alien Brfolgsanbetem da-
fttr gehalten wlrd. Nioht ein grosser Mensch, wie
er selber es zu seln glaubt, sondern elne Moke
in fftnffcausendfaoher VergrQsserung* Selber der
eingeflelschte Brfolgsanbeter und Veriehter alias
kQnstlerlsehen Kimpfens und Ringens (IX, 429).
35
comparison with Helene, Gerardo's continual reference to
the obligations of his contract, his obsessions with duty,
honor and Integrity show that he Is In full command of the
bourgeois virtues.
Gerardo believes that his success has been the re
sult of fate. Fortune has smiled on him consistently
throughout his life. He pompously refuses to take credit
for a successful career which, he feels, Is the only pos
sible outcome for an Interpretative talent such as his.
Because It has brought him ever-increasing acclaim and
wealth, his faith in destiny remains unshakable. His
realism rests on a firm social basis— on position and mo
ney. Far be it from him to oppose the kindly muse I He
regards himself as both the recipient and the instrument
of fate.
Through Gerardo art becomes an Instrument of so
cial morality. It is a tyrant offering the laurel branch
only to those capable of resisting the temptation to pur
sue a private vision of morality. The successful artist
must be able to dedicate himself and all his talents to a
re-enforcement of bourgeois values. Gerardo's lack of
emotional responses to both Dfihrlng and Helene la a prere
quisite of his artistry. Anyone who can repeatedly por
tray Tristan with such conviction, can do so only as an
Imitative and unfeeling performer, not as a human being
36
sensitive to suffering.*3 As the epitome of bQrgerllche
Moral. Oerardo personifies the Ideal in art to the name
less multitudes who clamor to gaff at his showmanship. Ha
sees his role as one of fulfilling certain demands for so
cial Intercourse among the masses. In a superficial at
tempt to console the disconsolate DQhrlng, he tells him,
Wissen Sie, was die kUnstlerlschen BedQrfnlsse des
Publlkums slnd? Bravo zu rufen, Blumen und Kr&nze
zu werfen, Unterhaltungsstoff zu haben, slch sehen
zu lassen, Ah und Oh zu sagen, auch mal Pferde aus-
zuspannen— das slnd die reelen BedQrfnlsse, die
Ich befriedlge (III, 224).
Oddly enough, Oerardo lacks only one quality to
make him an Ideal figure: the ability to respond to other
ill
human beings with sensitivity. His feelings for others
are confined to the superficial and sentimental pretense
of generosity shown when he offers DQhrlng money, and to
the momentary hesitation as he holds Helene's lifeless bo
dy Just before his final exit. Oerardo's inability to
sense the importance to others of the desire for menschliche
Moral is a part of his total lack of compassion.
^^Wedeklnd's attitude toward the artist is often
very much like Thomas Mann's. The artist is a charlatan,
to be regarded with suspicion in direct proportion to the
success of his artistry.
■^According to the 1909 foreword to the play
(written in protest against the common misinterpretation
of the title role) Vedeklnd demands "Tempo, Leldensohaft-
lichkelt und Intelllgenz" (ill, 198) for the portrayal of
Oerardo. It is important to the playwright that Oerardo
emerge as an attractive and appealing figure, for other
wise it makes Helene's suicide look like an act of madness.
37
Measured in society's own terms, Oerardo emerges
as a positive personality. The final action of the play
emphasizes the strength and stability of men of brutal in
telligence. Oerardo is a classic example of a bQrgerllche
Moral which. Indifferent and even hostile to Man's spiri
tual needs, nevertheless capitalizes on middle-class val
ues. His speeches are straightforward. His opinions are
practical and, within a framework of functional values,
generally indisputable. To DQhrlng he remarks:
Ich habe nle etwas aus serge wtihnliches angestrebt;
aber das elne kann ich Ihnen veralchern, mein
Herr, dass ich seit melner frUhesten Klndhelt
nlcht sovlel Zelt Qbrlg gehabt habe, um acht
Tage auf der Strasse zu stehen (III, 222).
DQhrlng replies, "Ich tue es Ja nicht fttr mlch, ich tue es
fUr meine Kunst" (III, 222).
There is something profoundly fatalistic in Wede
kind's belief that, just as the socially prominent are
successful through a happy combination of internal and ex
ternal forces, so are the social outcasts destined,
through an unfortunate combination of those same forces,
to end in disgrace and defeat. Each of the three main
characters of the Kammersflnger believes that fate has
destined him to act in a particular way. It is deeply
Ironic that belief in fatalism, an attitude largely re
sponsible for Oerardo*s success, should also be responsi
ble fdr DQhrlng's and Helene's failure, DQhrlng composes
compulsively. Helene loves compulsively. Each blames his
38
success or lack of success on a force within himself.
Both success and failure emerge as the result of forces
over which Nan has no control.
The conclusion of the play is ultimately pessimis
tic. Gerardo's hollow success is of no moral value to the
person jn search of nenschllche Moral. His success in a
philistine world is an inevitable result of Man's moral
paucity. Yet the hope of realizing a more meaningful mo
rality based on either art or love is equally futile. The
ideal in the case of both Dtthring and Helene turns out to
be nothing more than symptoms of "verschiedenen blinden
Leidenschaften" (III, 197).
Passionate men move along one of two possible
paths. Either they fail, like Dfihrlng, for they carry the
seeds of failure within themselves. Or, like Gerardo,
they prostitute their passion in order to become success
ful. The morality of the bourgeois and the morality of
the individual in search of meaningful experience remain
irreconcilable. The apostle of the bttrgerllche Moral
stifles his emotional response to the world, thereby sa
crificing that part of himself which defined him as a hu
man being. The apostle of the nenschllche Moral, on the
other hand, allows his emotional response to the world to
become so powerful it destroys him. In either case the
search for moral truth is terminated. Without passion
there can be no morality. With an excess of passion there
39
can be no search.
With the drama Die Zensur (1907)# written almost a
decade after the KammeraMnger. Wedekind Incorporates the
conflicting forces of menschllche and bttrgerllche Moral
into one personality. Buridan fully realizes the danger
of a passion which, if allowed free rein, will destroy the
sensitive individual. His protest against Kadidja is, in
fact, a protest against his own capacity for emotional ex
perience. Yet Buridan is equally unwilling to submit to
the tyrannical restrictions Imposed by the exponents of
bttrgerllche Moral. He is caught between the opposing for
ces of Wollen and Sollenj unable to submit to either one.
HS considers himself first and foremost a champion
of the vital and dynamic forces of life. He adamantly de
fends his position against the charges of the Rev. Dr.
Prantl that he, Buridan, has been responsible for the sui
cide of his innocent readers. Buridan claims that it la
the fault of orthodox religion (l. e., morality) and not
the fault of his pessimistic writings that men cannot re
concile their existence to truth. Prantl accuses Buridan
of transgressions against the bttrgerllche Moral. Buridan's
defense is a formulation of a deeper menBohllche Moral:
Wenn mir die Sohllderung des Uhglttcks Oenugtuung
bereltet, so habe ich daffir such ebensovlel ge-
tan, urn die Freuden unseres lrdlschen Daselns in
all ihrer ursprfingllchen Praoht und Herrllchkelt
wieder aufleben zu lassen. Das 1st mein httoh-
ster Stolz, dass mich auch die erdenkllchsten
Widerwirtigkeiten nicht in die Relhen der
40
Vernelner, der Pesslmlsten zu dringen ver-
mochten (V, 131).
Buridan does not actually deny the charge that he
has challenged and upset the traditional forces of order.
He offers Instead the consolation that, although security
and traditional faith In Institutions have been under
mined, the price Is not too high. After all, he contends,
one must consider Han's re-awakened appreciation for the
fullness of creative life, offered as generous recompense
for the broken idols. Not the poet, but the Church, is
the spokesman for the pessimistic camp. Adherence to dog
ma and blind acceptance of orthodoxy Is a denial of the
sacred basis of life. Both Prantl and Buridan claim for
themselves the supreme position of being able to judge
true religious feeling.
Buridan's multilateral attack on Institutions ex
tends beyond an attempt to discredit a sterile Church. It
Is equally vitriolic in its condemnation of art as a pana
cea for the Ills which beset men. Art and literature, he
insists, have no more claim to an occult healing power
than does religion:
Was selt Jahrtausenden als hdehster Lebensgenuss
geschfltzt wird— von slnnllchen Qenfissen rede Ich
natiirlioh gar nicht, aber Kunst und Literatur—
das alles verllert nicht nur jeden Reiz fOr mloh,
sondern erregt mlr ausgesprochenen Widerwillen,
wenn es mlr einlge Zelt versagt war, mein In
ner es mit den Oesetzen, durch die die Welt regiert
wird, in Binklang zu brlngen (Y, 129).
What Wedekind in the foreword to Pandora had
called the "We sen der Welt und des Menschen," Buridan
calls the "Oesetze, durch die die Welt reglert wird." Bu
ridan looks to these laws as the absolute basis of all
being, in his effort to formulate a morality which will
satisfy both the spiritual and the sensual appetites of
Nan, Such physical laws, he believes, are closer to truth
than any superficial order Imposed upon life by society.
It is these laws which the poet seeks to discover. If
there Is a god-spirit which has somehow manifested Itself,
It has done so, not through official spokesmen of dogmatic
organizations, but through life Itself. The compulsion of
the poet to bring his Inner life Into harmony with univer
sal law Is the only proof necessary for the existence of
an absolute morality, absolute both as fact and as goal.
Buridan's belief In these absolute laws has the conviction
of direct revelation from God.1* *
Buridan feels the force of natural law, and the
necessity for compliance, without being able to convince
Prantl of the validity of his belief. He cannot Identify
Prantl with the law.
Buridan is threatened externally by the demands of
15flesetz. for Wedekind, is always closely related
to the concept of necessity (Wotwendlakelt) and of Msn's
recognition of the cause-effect relationship of all phy
sical and spiritual being as established by an origin*!
creator, Peseta is equal to the word of Ood; It demands
uncompromising obedience•
42
bttrgerllche Moral (Church and censorship) and Internally
by the denands of nenschllche Moral (his sensitivity to the
"Oesetze, durch die die Welt reglert wird"). The conflict
is insoluble.1^ In the last analysis it Is not Buridan,
but Prantl, who offers the only real chance to sustain
life under any circumstances. Prantl's objection to Buri
dan on the grounds that the latter's pessimistic philoso
phy precipitates suicide, is substantiated by Kadldja's
leap from the balcony.17 Through Kadidja's suicide Prantl
and the forces of institutional morality regain the supre
macy which, under Buridan's attack, they had momentarily
been forced to surrender.
Just before Kadidja's fatal plunge Buridan had
assumed Prantl's role of the accuser. He admonishes Ka-
didja for being purely physical:
Du kannst deinen Kdrper vor meinen Augen so be-
zaubernd zur Schau stellen, wie es dir irgend-
wle mdgllch 1st. Aber der Sehaustellung mfissen
ebenso vlele httchste nenschllche Werte das
Olelehgewieht halten! (V, 137).
^To Wedekind it is a particularly sobering expe
rience that the conflict cannot be resolved through art,
as he had suggested in the Kunst und Slttllchkelt essay
(1906): "... der Menschengeist nat ein oemde,
auf dem dlese Oegner elnlg werden. Das 1st die Kunst"
(IX, 380).
17The final scene with its inevitable defeat for
Buridan reminds the author of the lines spoken by (tod to
the plowman, written in 1401: "Darumb: Klager, habe ere.
Tod, habe slge" (Johann von Saaz. Der Aokomann aus
Bflhmen.
43
Buridan Is no longer able to look upon Kadldja as
the incarnation of "ursprfingllche Praeht und Herrllch-
keit.1 '
Die Zenaur is a confessional representation of the
artist's inability to free himself from the bttrgerllche
Moral. Although the play is Wedekind's most articulate
attack against the bttrgerllche Moral. it concludes with an
overwhelming argument for the necessity of preserving that
morality.
Wedekind's failure in Pie Zensur to resolve the
conflicting moralities of society versus the individual,
does not imply that Wedekind became resigned. Pollowing
Prantl's triumph over menschllche Moral Wedekind falters,
but does not recant. His personal addiction to the blind
and powerful forces of life severely challenged, but did
not destroy, his continuing search for morality. Fechter
says of the final scene of Pie Zensur:
Man denkt lmmer wleder unwlllkfirlich an den
Schluss der Zensur— so. als ob sioh da inner-
lich etwas Entscheldendes vollzogen hat Oder
hitte vollzlehen mttssen. Zur Zelt der Roman-
tlk wire Wedekind nach die sen Prams sum Katho-
lizlsmus gegangen: in der Zelt des Kapltalls-
mus nahn er die Rttekwendung zu slch selbst und
schrieb neue Bremen (Fechter, III).
The foregoing remarks, discussing the basic dicho
tomy of morality, explore Wedekind's eoneept of nenschllche
and bttrgerllche Moral as defined In the foreword to
Pandora. Wedekind's eonplete artistic work Is an extended
effort to resolve the Inherent conflicts of private and
public morality. He concentrates his efforts In the pur
suit of a menschllche Moral based on Instinct as Man's
purest heritage from the gods. His theoretical defense of
public morality Is the result, not of deep conviction, but
of his apprehension that If the search for morality Is
confined to menschllche Moral alone, then Man has nothing
to fall back upon when instinct leads to chaos and procre
ative power becomes a destructive force.
In the poetic works society Is always antagonistic
to the Individual In search of nenschllche Moral. Parti
cularly In the early plays society exerts great pressure
to coerce the Individual Into supporting public morality.
The key to society's strength In Its suppression of the
Individual Is Its lack of feeling and compassion. Those
Individuals who learn to live dispassionately reap the re
wards of bQrgerllche Moral.
As Wedekind sutures, his notion of menschllche
Moral based on instinct becomes Increasingly pessimistic.
Elln succeeds through the help of a forerunner of Lulu,
but the play resume a fragment. The vermummter Herr
points out the direction between Sollen and Wollen to
cheer Melchior on his way, but even as he sets out to meet
the world Mtlohlor realizes that one day he may return to
Join his suicidal friend Moritz. In their dedication to
menschllohe Moral. DQhrlng and Helens are both destroyed
because of their Inability to conform to the demands of
bttrgerllche Moral. With Buridan the desire to resolve the
internal conflict of both moralities Is crushed when Ka-
didja's suicide forces him to accept the futility of his
endeavor. Even art falls to offer any real assistance or
consolation to the Individual In pursuit of menschllche
Moral.
The attempt to base morality on Instinct Is pre
destined to fall. The laws of nature, manifest In In
stinct, have been overruled by the laws of society. No
reconciliation Is possible.
CHAPTER II
WEDEKIND AND ZEITGEIST. A SEARCH FOR THE
IDIOM OF MORALITY
Buridan's inability to resolve the conflict be
tween menschllche and bflrgerliche Moral makes him
antagonistic to art: "... Kunst und Llteratur— dass
alles verllert nicht nur jeden Reiz ftir mlch, sondern
erregt mir ausgesprochenen Widerwillen, wenn es mlr einlge
Zelt versagt war mein Inneres mit den Gesetzen, durch die
die Welt regiert wird, in Einklang zu bringen" (V, 129).
Wedekind's quarrel with the world, like Burldan's, is the
result, not only of his dissatisfaction with society, but
also his inability to Identify with any of the major con
temporary art movements. His particular artistic idiom
is the result of his lonely and relentless search for
meaning. What he sought could not be expressed in tra
ditional language. Ashley Dukes, in his study, The Young
est Drama, writes, "Wedekind sought a philosophy and
discovered an idiom."1
The question of Wedekind's dispute with oontempo-
1London, 1923, p. 53.
46
rary art is skillfully treated by Lukacs. Describing the
i
Oppositlonsstlmroung which influenced those who at the
turn of the century chose to turn their backs on reality,
iLukacs calls the trend "Abwendung vom wlrkllchen Reichturn
des Lebens." He includes among the members of this group
writers who, like Ricarda Huch, preferred to depict "elne
romantische Wirilichkeit," or who, like Paul Ernst, tended
toward "eine Stllisierung der Wirklichkeit," both Ignoring
social circumstance and physical reality. Lukacs speaks
of the countries which, like Russia and France, have an
authentic literary tradition. Their literature, he main
tains, developed organically as an expression of social
!
;conditions. An example of such authentic literature is
the 19th century Russian novel which emerged spontaneously
from a historical moment: "Die gewaltlgsten Form-
Neuschflpfungen wachsen organlsch aus der bewusst
mltgemachten Gesamtentwioklung von Gesellschaft und Kunst"
;(Lukacs, 123-124). Lukacs believes that the earlier per
iods of German literature had. also had a muoh greater
affinity to their times than was true of the period at the
close of the 19th century. There is an aloofness in the
1 writing of Wedekind'8 contemporaries, claims Lukacs, which
!
|severs literature from the time and circumstances of its
i
origin. He believes that each new development in history
forces a corresponding change in the form and direction
48
of art— "darum muss bei jeder Wendung eine radikal neue
Kunst entstehen." Lukacs is convinced that the new formal
istic or romantic directions in art are lacking in artistic
lvalue, for they avoid that element of historicity which,
I
I according to him, must be present in all great art:
Wer . . . direkt nach dem "Ewigen" und "Zeitlosen"
greift, umarmt eine Wolke. Denn einerseits ist
dieses Zeitlose nur ein Moment, nur der letzte,
allgemeinste Gehalt des ZeitgenOssischen, ist
also, von diesem losgeldst, elne lnhaltlose
Allgemeinheit. Die Dichter kflnnen lm grossen
historischen Ritfaltungsprozess der Menschheit
tlefere oder oberflflchliohere Momente erfassen
und je nachdem wlrd ihr Werk eine dauernde oder
vortibergehende Wlrkung haben. Aber auch das
TlefBte hat nicht aufgehfirt, historisch,
zeltllch, zeitgebunden zu sein (Lukrfcs, 122).
The Romanticists and Formalists together formed a
coalition (Oppositionsstlmmung) whose purpose it was to
discredit a waning Naturalism. Their opposition, however,
was strictly a literary opposition, completely cut off from
the realities of the socio-political world. Wedekind was
unable to sympathize with such esoteric opposition. He
could neither escape into the fantasy of the Neo-romantl-
clsts, nor content himself with the formalistic and
stylistic niceties of Paul Ernst. He was left no alterna-
i
tive but to adopt an attitude of distortion as he faced the
problems of his time.
i
According to lukacs, the new art had to be highly
jpersonal and individual, emphasizing through caricature
the discrepancy between appearance (Brsoheinung) and
reality (Wesen). The artistic success of the caricaturist
depends upon the extent to which he senses this discrep- j
I
ancy, upon his ability to experience the world as it
appears, and to contrast it with the true essence of actual
being, which is the concern of any true work of art
(Lukacs, 124).
Just as Rlcarda Huch and Paul Ernst, together with
their respective followers, opposed the Realism which had
given birth to Naturalism, so did the apostles of a new
feeling in art— which came to be known as Expressionism—
stand in opposition to all three of the others (Neo-
Romanticism, Formalism, and Naturalism). Wedekind and the
Expressionists who followed him shared with the Romanti
cists and Formalists their distaste for Realism and
Naturalism, without, however, becoming a part of either
of the former movements. To this extent, then, Wedekind
opposed the Opposltlonsstlmmung described by Lukacs, only
to become the founder of a third movement whose protest,
in effect, was one of counter-opposition.
For lukacs, Wedekind is a veritable pioneer, dis
covering and establishing new art forms, struggling with a
new poetic idiom. If Wedekind succeeded in becoming an
artist of greater power and more lasting value than his
contemporaries, it may indeed be, as Lukdfos suggests,
I
because of his highly sensitive perception of the world,
50
because of his conviction that the procreative process
constitutes the essential nature of reality, and because
of his belief in the grotesque as the only possible idiom
for the contemporary artist.
Wedekind's insistence on direct confrontation with
the world of reality proved itself to be an unbearably
painful experience. He never learned to absorb hostility
with calm. Equanimity is a quality which he lacked com
pletely. The acrid outbursts of his later plays reflect
dramatically his inability to suffer the "slings and
arrows" of a society whose morality he had so sharply
opposed. Not only did the German theater public, in their
rejection of Wedekind's dramas, move away from him, but
he also moved further and further away from them.
r
Three factors combine forcing Wedekind to take
stock of his belief that instinct constitutes the basis
of mens chi iche Moral: l) his awareness of increasing
hostility on the part of the theater public made him feel
he was "casting pearls before the swine" by sharing with
them a belief that, for him, was tantamount to a religious
credo; 2) a fierce sense of pride made objective Judgment
regarding both the "credo" itself, and the ability of
other men to Judge that "credo," almost Impossible; and
3) what had begun as a firm conviction that natural
appetites were a manifestation of divine will (i.e.,
"good") slowly developed Into an overt fear that Instinct,
if unchecked, could destroy both society and the individu
al. The first two factors contributed greatly to
Wedekind's growing feeling of alienation; the third factor
to his growing misapprehension in regard to Instinct as a
positive force.
Although Wedekind was prevented by his penetrating
perception of the moral conflicts of his time from seeking
escape in the manner of the Neo-Romanticists or Formal
ists, his insistence that life be confronted directly in
all its sobering reality, allowed him no illusions as to
his own role in society. His sensitivity to the intellec
tual and spiritual paucity, not only of contemporary move
ments in literature, but also of contemporary theater
audiences, produces in him a strong feeling of alienation.
It becomes increasingly clear to him that an indifferent
and insensitive audience will never be able to comprehend
2
what he considers significant.
o
cEugen Robert describes in a little volume called
Theaterabend (Munich, 1915)> an evening when Wedekind
prayed the title role in his Hidalla. A final impression
of artistic alienation distinguishes the poet's acting
just as it distinguishes the actor's poetry:
Und der Dlohter in hdohsteigener Person trat
dlesmal an die Rampe mlt elnem Buokel, mit
einem Hinkfuss, mit grossen gldhenden Augen-
und erklflrte, verteldigte, verherrliohte seine
Dlchtung. Es war ein einziger Monolog, - von
den dbrlgen gleichgflltigen Mimen nur fur
Augenblloke gestdrt. F&ohleute, die irgendelne
The problem of differentiating between the super
ficial and the profound demands a sensitivity which common
man lacks. In the foreword to Pandora Wedekldd formulates!
the complexity of the problem:
i
' Erfahrungsgemflss bertihren slch ja auch alle
dlejenlgen Oeblete In lhren ttussersten Konsequenzen,
die slch In lhren gewohnten Erschelnungsformen
als stflrkste Gegensiltze gegentiberstehen.
Heilmittdl und 01ft unterschelden slch nur durch
die Art lhrer Verwendung. Erhabenheit und
L&oherllohkelt werden von der Mitwelt selten
zuverlflsslg unterschleden (ill, 105)•
The artist, like the prophet, becomes a voice dry
ing In the wilderness. Robert recollects: "Man hdrt das
helmllohe Sohluchzen elnes Dlohters, dem eln verstflnd-
nlsloses Publikum und grotesker Dramatlker lm Wege steht"
(Robert, 82). His cries become more anguished with
Increasing repetition, his feeling of alienation more
Intense. The pain of Incommunication never loses Its
Theatersohule sloher mit vorzHgllchen Zeugnlssen
absolvlerten, meInten, Wedekind sel eln
Dilettante; gewlsse ttbertrelbungen des Pathos
bekrflftlgen auch die saohverst&ndlge Vernelnung;
lm ftrossen und Qanzen aber gestaltete der
Sohauspleler Wedekind natdrlioher, glaubhafter,
menschlloher selnen dramatischen Helden als der
Dramatlker Wedekind. Mag die k&hne Phllosophle
rlchtlg oder falsch sein: aus dlesen Wunden
strdmte Mensohenblut. Und es war eln Jammer
anzuhdren, wle unverstanden seine Gedanken
kllngen mussten > zu sehen, wle das Publikum
und der dumme August slch gegenseltlg anstarrten,
und kelner wusste, weshalb der andere dber Ihn
laoht (p. 84).
sting.
Desire to unite diverse elements Is Insufficient;
through will alone there can be no resolution between the
artist and society. Nachtalbe of the Taugenlchts frag
ment, whom Wedekind In his notes Identified with himself,
says at one point, "Selt Ich auf der Welt bln, beflnde
lch mlch In elner schlefen Stellung, obschon loh nle nach
etwas anderem trachtete, als mlch In elner geraden
Stellung zu befinden" (IX, 268).
It Is Wedekind's never-ceasing concern with_the
problem of the alienation of modern Man which makes him
the spiritual and philosophical forerunner of both the
Expressionists and the Absurdists. He was made to feel
the pain of alienation In his own work, not only because
the crltlcB and the censors refused to allow his material
to be published or staged, but even contact with fellow
artists seemed to be denied him. As late as April, 1909,
he wrote to Hermann Buber, "Als lch mit der Schrift-
stellerel anfing, hatte lch wenlg Vertrauen auf Erfolg,
aber lch freute mlch ungemein auf den lnteressanten
Verkehr. Jetzt schelnt es mlr oft, als lebten wlr In
elner Welt von Elnsledlern."3
3prank Wedekind: Qeaammelte Briefe, ed. Fritz
1 Strlch (Munich, 19^4), ll,22i (hereafter cited as
Briefe)•
54
In a letter to Martin Zickel (August, 1901),
Wedekind writes of his decision not to appear again as an
ttberbrettl performer,
i
Aber nun denken Sie sich in meine Lage, der ioh mich
dem Berliner Publicum [sic] als Spassmacher und Hans-
wurst vorstellen soil, wflhrend mir als ernster
Mensch, mit dem besten, was ich zu sagen habe und
was mir selber heilig ist. der Mund versohlossen
bleibt. Das wflre eine ThUtigkeit, die einem in
allerktfrzester Zeit das Herz abfressen raflsste
(Brlefe, II, 77-78).
A month later he again writes to Zickel,
Was nun soil ich mit diesen Bnpfindungen vor einem
Publicum [sic], dem ich die ernstesten Dinge in
kdnstlerisch origineller und gewiss nicht
langweiliger Form zu sagen hfitte, den Hanswurst
machen und mlch in Schmutz w&lzen (Briefe. II, 84).
There can have been no doubt by that time as to
the poet's ability; his craftsmanship as a dramatist had
been proven. But still audience and critic alike remained
unimpressed. The Keith drama, which Wedekind felt was his
greatest achievement, was poorly received. He sensed
hostility and disapproval wherever he went. The greater
the effort, the poorer the reception. Burldan (Zensur)
protests, "Was lch mit dem tlefsten Ernst meiner
Oberzeugung ausspreohe, halten die Mensohen ftir
: Lflsterungen" (V, 124). In November, 1903* Wedekind wrote
I to Arthur Holitsoher, "Das Herdenbewusstseln wuchert hier
I[in Mttnohen] in solohem Masse, dass ich mich oft versuoht
ftlhle, die Feder ohne weiteres aus der Hand zu legen, da
es doch fast unmdgllch ist, sleh lrgend elne [sic]
orlginelle Empflndung zu wahren" (Brlefe, II, 112). In a
1909 esaay entitled, flber Abschaffung der TodeBstrafe,
Wedekind commented, "... der Klelnbtirger [1st] eln
Nensch, der dber sflratliche. Schfitze moderner Blldung
verfflgt, ohne elnen elnzlgen Qedanken selber zu Ende
denken zu kttnnen” (IX, 382).^
Wedekind's Increasing disdain for the theater
public, Instead of undermining his confidence In himself,
made him all the more determined. As his feeling of
alienation grows, his protest against the superficiality
and corruption of society becomes less rational, but more
Intense. Public rejection of his works causes him to
falter for a time In his search for morality. He becomes
emotionally so caught up In his attack against society
Sfedeklnd's growing awareness of his alienation
from society Is no Inconsiderable factor, as Lukacs ack
nowledges, In the poet'8 failure to sustain the high level
of his art In the last decade of his life:
Und je mehr Wedekind In berechtlgter Abwehr gegen
die Anklage der ImmoralltMt ankimpft, je mehr seln
morall8ches Pathos unmittelbar sum Ausdruok kommt
(Perlode selt So 1st das Leben). desto tlefer
slnkt seine Kunst. Das falsoh aufgefasste Wesen
trltt lmmer st&rker In den Vordergrund und
erdrttokt lmmer mehr die oft noch treffenden
Slnzelztige. Es entsteht eln formell grotesker,
inhaltlich verzerrter und verworrener, tlef
prosalscher Utoplsmus (Lukacs, 124).
that he loses sight of the one positive constant which
initiated that search— his belief in instinct as an aspect
of divine revelation.
Pythis of Herakles rails against the son of Zeus,
calling his true opponent not the external forces of
society, but rather the personal conflicts within himself:
"Vie grosses du vollbracht hast, Herakles, Bis heute
misslang dir, Herakles zu bflndlgen" (VII, 197). But
instead of surrendering his individuality to the despair
which alienation engenders, Herakles (like Wedekind),
fired by unquenchable pride, increases the intensity of
his protest.
The sin of hybris, Herakles' desire to measure
his strength against the gods, is the same sin which dis
tracts the poet, diverting him from his high commitment
to art. Even in alienation the artist remains defiant.
Herakles approaches blasphemy in his resistance to
Apollo's domination:
Apollo: Blelb wo du hingehtirst und scheu'
den Frevel!
Herakles: Sohlau rfltst du mir der Ootthelt zu
entBagen.
Apollo: Ist's kelne Gdttergnade, Mensch zu seln?
Herakles: Das will gekonnt seln. Mir gellngt es
nicht. ...
Weil lch von Zeus gestaltet war wle du!
Apollo: Lass delner Abkunft Welshelt dlch
ergdtzen.
Herakles: Zum Rlngkampf fordre lch dich, so hehr
du dastehst!
Apollo: Die Fordrung schon alleln brlngt dir
Verderben!
Herakles: Die lust, des Tods zu spotten, kennst
du nlohti
Apollo: Wer die Schranken durchbricht In
emptirender Wut,
Die vom Herrsoher lm Himmel dem
Menschen gesetzt,
Wer seln Los nloht erftfllt
Wlrd vom leuchtenden Antlitz der Erde
getilgt
Herakles: Von den QOttern verhflhnt, bel den
Menschen verhasst,
Schaff' lch neu mir die Bahn,
tfoerrennend, was brelt In die Quere slch
stellt! (VII, 201).
Wedekind's work, like Herakles' life, Is one long
exercise In defiance.
As the poet develops to full maturity, a tragic
feeling of futility floods over his earlier aspirations.
,Without recanting or diminishing his defiant attack, he
Is nevertheless coerced Into an awareness of the futility
of all doctrine. The mature Wedekind seriously questions
his own former unconditional belief In Instinct as the
basis of all life. What may have been valid as a spon
taneous article of faith becomes hollow as a doctrine. The
Intrusion of an Insensitive and unsympathetic world makes
It Impossible to hold fast to the dynamic relevation of
one's youth. He who has had the experience of divine
revelation must look In upon himself for renewal of his
. strength, for he will find neither support nor affirmation
: from his fellow men. The experience of perceiving a
i
I divine revelation remains as private as it is profound.
58
As was discussed In the introduction to this study,
Wedekind's search for morality is sparked by a premise
which has no real basis in experience. His belief in
instinct as the basic component of Man's moral nature is
a pure article of faith. As such it can neither be proved
nor disproved. His faith precipitates from "pure know
ledge" (Brkenntnis). To be the recipient of revealed truth
is a religious experience. It is not through art, as the
essay Kunst und Slttllchkelt had maintained, but through
Brkenntnis that morality and religion unite.
The mandate to seek, to question and to evaluate
in ethical terms constitutes Wedekind's personal
Erkenntnis. Among his comments recorded in the Jungfrau
fragment he formulates his belief that each man must seek
truth for himself:
Bel Menschen, die die Oebote und Errungenschaften
der Moral als selbstverstttndllch, als g&ttliche
Oebote aohten und unverletzt lassen [i.e.. for
those who have not experienced Brkenntnis1. fillIt
die Unsicherheit und damit die Notwendigkelt, sich
ununterbrochen entwlokeln zu mdssen, fort.
Moral 1st deshalb nachteilig, wenn sie lm Menschen
nlcht neu erworben, neu erkampft, neu geboren 1st.
Die ilberlleferte Moral hat die Aufgabe, den Kampf
zu erleichtern und die Ergenbnlsse zu best&tlgen
1 (IX, 196).
In spite of the pain of alienation and the hybris
|of his own spirit in rebellion against an insensitive
world, the mature Wedekind is forced to accept a simple
59
truth: Erkenntnls is not a flash of inspiration or dogged
allegiance to a particular article of faith (i.e., the
belief that instinct constitutes the highest good).
Erkenntnls is the knowledge that each man must conduct his
own search for meaning. Not the goal, whatever it may be,
but the path toward that goal is essential. The mandate to
search is the summation of all knowledge and the basis of
Erkenntnls.5
Traditional standards of morality (bflrgerllohe
Moral) may help to substantiate the conclusions which the
individual arrives at independently, but they cannot free
him from the obligation of his own personal search. In
exactly the same manner, according to Basil of Stein der
Weisen, it is necessary that the individual seek the deity
on his own:
Wer Oott ist, wissen wir. Und well wir's wlssen,
verschllessen. wir's in uns. Wer Aug1 in Auge
ihn sah, verrdt es nlcht dem eignen Kinde,
wen er gesehen. Was ndtzt es denn dem Kind,
wenn es ihn nlcht auf eigne Kosten findet!
Wer von ihm sprlcht, der tut's vom Hdrensagen
und glaubt an ihn, well er ihn nicht erkannt
(I, 90).
^Kutscher, in sailing attention to some of the
works which Wedekind used for purposes of religious orien
tation, makes the following comment:
In Salomon Relnachs Allgemelner Gteschlchte der
Religion strelcht Wedekind an, "nach der indisohen
Lehre sei Zweok des Daseins nlcht Tugend, sondern
Erkenntnls," und schreibt an den Rand "Irkenntnis
schliesst die Tugend in slch" (Kutscher, II, 156)•
The God which Basil claims to know and fear, but
is unable to share even with his own child, Is the same
as Burldan's concept of the "unerblttllche Gesetzmftsslg-
keit." It Is the same as "Die Gesetze, durch die Welt
reglert wird," mentioned In Wedekind’s foreword to
Pandora. It Is the same force which Lukacs describes as
"das Wesen" and to which Wedekind In Kunst und Sittllch-
kelt had referred as "das Wesen der Welt und des
Menschen."
Although In Wedekind's writings the abstract
terms— menschllche Moral, Religion, Instinkt, Erkenntnls,
Wesen, ewlge Gesetzmflsslgkelt and Notwendigkelt— are used
to Imply final absolutes, when translated Into human
experience they are changed Into relative values. They
are absolute by themselves; they become relative as the
result of Man's Incomplete understanding and Inability
to grasp concepts wholly.
It was mentioned above that one of Wedekind's
difficulties, In trying to justify Instinct as the basis
of menschllche Moral— In addition to the problem of his
alienation In society, and the problem of excessive pride
complicating his perception and control of himself— was
his growing apprehension that It Is a positive force. The
suspicion that Instinct— Instead of being the harbinger of
a divinity— may be the cause of Man's most negative lm-
61
pulses, was expressed even In the works of his youth.
As early as Pruhllngs Erwaohen (1891)— although the poet
blames an insensitive society for profaning the natural
beauty and Innocence of awakening Instincts— instinot
betrays Itself as the cause of violence, perversion,
masochism and ultimate self-destruction.
In the poem Vergflngllohkelt (1900) written in
praise of prepubescent youth, Wedekind writes of a young
man whose Innocence and beauty had fascinated him.
Wle schade, dass alles SchiJne vergeht,
Auch delne Hoheit. ' Die Pubertfit
Macht dlch den ilbrigen Flegeln. flhnlich,
Der Duft ist hin und du wlrst gewfihnlich
( 1, 116) .
What was originally sacred has been reduced,
through the awakening of sexual desire, to something
commonplace and trivial. The poet's longing for the inno
cence of presexualityifinds frequent expression around the
turn of the century. His ideal is marred by a feeling of
disgust and fear.
In the poem Am Scheldewege one finds the lines,
0 Gott, o Welt, erbarmt euch meiner Not;
Ihr wlsst, weswegen lch ihn angetastet.
Ihr wisst, ihr selber Jagtet mich hlnein,
Hit tausend Peltschendieben ins Verderben;
Nehmt mlch hlnweg, solang' lch Mensoh hooh blni
Bin Tier, ein Teufel werd1 ich sonst auf Erden
(I, 110).
62
In the prose fragment Mine Haha (1895-1903) life
in the park is pleasant and profitable only until that
moment in which individual desire for another human being
is aroused— until the awakening of sexus. Prom then on,
the confinement and discipline of the vigorous Spartan
life becomes intolerable. The transformation of the girl,
Hldalla (in contrast to Karl Hetmann, also called Hldalla)
into a young woman 1b painful and odious to her. Her body
becomes bulky and cumbersome, repulsive to herself and to
those about her. The dawn of desire is the beginning of
a terrible formlessness which ends, many years later, with
the heroine's suicide. Lulu (1892-1894), as a concentra
tion of procreative power, is also an example of Wedekind's
growing apprehension concerning the positive value of
instinct.
Despite his conviction, manifest in his art, that
the awakening of instinct unleashes a destructive force
beyond Nan's control, Wedekind persists in its defense.
He is unshakeably convinced that, if morality is to rise
above the commonplace platitudes of bflrgerliche Moral,
it must be pursued for reasons which are not primarily
social. Even though instinct proves itself more vulner
able to corruption than he had supposed, it nevertheless
remains for him the best that Man has. The failure of
Wedekind's search is due less to Inconsistencies in his
argument, and more to the fact that the premise of his
search is open to serious question. He is a victim of
: what Lukacs calls "das falsch aufgefasste Wesen"(p. 124).
Wedekind attempted, with a sincerity and an expenditure of
energy uncommon in poets of his generation, to penetrate
the inner nature (Wesen) of Man. One cannot question
the sincerity, but only the findings of the search.
Wedekind's insistence that life be confronted
squarely— already discussed as the reason why he felt
uncomfortable with contemporary directions in art— also
prevented him from moving toward religion as the path to
higher truth. The idea of a divine creator was not only
acceptable to Wedekind, it constituted the very basis of
! the doctrine of instinct. The idea of a life after death,
which is the crux of Christianity, was, however, unaccept
able in terms of its promise that virtue would be rewarded
and evil punished. Wedekind was not concerned with a
Jenselts. The meaning of life must be sought here and now.
His effort to justify existence within Man's allotted
years defines his role as artist and as moralist.
Prflhlings Erwachen was the first important step
in Wedekind's persistent search for morality as the
, foundation of a meaningful life. It reflects the fervent
i hope that sexual freedom, in a pure atmosphere of awaken-
|
I ing physical desire, may bestow lost beauty and dignity on
i
I a society long bereft of natural feelings. To the extent j
64
that his hope Is articulated, this tragedy of youth is
tendentious writing. It is intended to educate and to
, elevate Man by arousing him to a sense of his own in-
I
{ stinctive potential. It is concerned, not with the
preservation of the soul but with the preservation of
earthly appetites. Frtihlings Brwaohen seeks to awaken Man
to his spiritual potential by making him aware of the
divine power of instinct vested in him. The hope of
achieving personal fulfillment through the recognition of
instinctive drives is the ideal of an artist, a visionary,
a moralist— not the ideal of a Christian, concerned
primarily with his own salvation.
I
Paradoxically, because of the all-too-human
(i.e., social) form which contemporary orthodoxy had
assumed, it was the professed man of religion who stood
to gain the most socially by his commitment to a particu
lar (i.e., Christian) deity. The religious conformist had
clearly the best of two possible worlds. The comfort of
social acceptability which attended his "religious faith"
indicated that eternity had even greater pleasures in
store. By being devout, he was also being practical, and
society a8surlngly affirmed his position.
For Wedekind, however, such "faith" was untenable.
I
; He differentiates sharply between two types of human
beings. The first type (and he includes himself in this
65
group) seeks its Justification through the realization of
an abstract ideal which it elevates to a position of su
preme Importance. In the case of Wedekind, the ideal is
the abstraction of instinctive force. The second type
selects its ideal as the result of empirical observations.
It adapts to whatever the external world (Erschelnung, to
use Lukacs' expression) may offer. In Zirkusgedanken
(1887) Wedekind is careful to emphasize that the differ
ence between poets and business men is not one of Idealism
versus Realism, but rather one of two basically different
types of Idealisms the abstrakt-erhabener and the real-
praktlscher Ideallsmus.
The first group, which he compares to the trapeze
artists, is defeated at that moment when its ideal col
lapses.
Die elnen— und dahln gehSren alle Wdstenpredlger
und Slulenhelligen, auch vlele politische
Schwlrmer, neuerdings besonders sozlalpolltlsche,
sodann weitaus die Mehrheit der Poeten, hier und
da auch eln Philosoph, kurz, Menschen, die sich
fflr die naokte Idee begeistern— diese elnen proj-
izieren das in lhrem Innern geborene Ideal direkt
an das HimmelsgewSlbe, um es dort oben als urewlg-
gfittliche Offenbarung, oder wle sie sich sonst
ausdrdcken mdgen, bewundern zu kdnnen. An dleser
Projektion ohne jede tiefergehende Bezlehung zur
realen Welt 1st nun ihre ganze Lebensfdhrung quasi
aufgehlngt, in deren Bereieh sie durch Oeltendmachung
der eigenen Individuality allerhand Sprdnge,
Verdrehungen, Verrenkungen und Kraftubdngen
ausfdhren, dber die die Jugend und besonders die
Frauenwelt In Verzdoken merit. . . . [Sie] haben
ihren festen Stdtzpunkt dber sich, und solange nur
dieser nioht waokelt, mag ihnen die Welt begegnen, wle
sie will, mag sie verspotten, zergeisseln,
66
verglften, Hungers sterben lessen, zum Holzstoss
oder zur Guillotine ftthren— das alles kann sie in
ihrem Gleiohgewioht nicht beirren. Sie sind so
vollstAndig von der Idee durohdrungen, gleiohsam
besessen, dass sie sioh selbst im argsten Blend
nooh hoch dber der Mensohheit fflhlen. - Sollte
indes das l&itsetzliche einmal elntreten, soilten
die Strioke relssen, in denen das Luftsohiff
hflngt, . . . dann hilft ihnen weder Doktor nooh
Seelenarzt. Jfihlings kopfdber stdrzen sie aus
der sohwindelnden AtherhOhe ihrer Himmelslelter
hernieder und breohen das Geniok. Dieser Vorgang
kleidet sioh nicht selten in das Gewand einer
Selbstentleibungi (IX, 301-302).
The second group of idealists, the real-
praktisohen Idealisten, are the ones whose lives express
and reflect concern for the reality of the world about
them, the world of social forces within which they must
live and work. Successful men are always a part of this
group.
Wen ich in die zweite Kategorie hdherer Idealisten
gerechnet haben mflchte, . . . sind Jene praktlsoh
brauchbaren Menschen, die slch aus den Jewells
gegebenen Lebensverh<nissen ein Bild von
gewisser Vollkommenheit herauskonstruieren, dem
sie in treuem Eifer nachzustreben betadht sind.
Ihr Auge, zu kurzsiohtig, um mit einem Male alle
Himmel zu durchwelsen, erfasst um so grdndlieher
den ihnen zugewiesenen Wlrkungskreis. Sie setzen
die Welt nicht durch fabelhafte salt! mortal! in
Erstaunen, well sie ihrer ganzen AufmerEsamkeit
bedtirfen, um den sohmalen Pfad, den sie sioh
vorgezeiohnet, ohne Fehltritt zurdckzulegen.
Alles Schwftrmen, alles Hlngeben der Personllehkeit
an abstrakte Probleme erklfiren sie fdr Unslnn. In
Jdngeren Jahren haben sie slch auch einmal damlt
befasst, sind aber davon zurtlckgekommen, well
solches Treiben immer auf Abwege ftihrt. So sind
sie denn, eln jeder auf seiner Bahn, grdndllehe
Gelehrte, gewlssenhafte Beamte, gesohiokte
Handwerker, allsorgende HausvAter, liebende
Mdtter oder endlioh harmonisoh ausgeblldete
"Menschen" [sio] geworden. Ja, so sonderbar es
67
klingen mag, der Unlversalmensch Qoethe gehdrt
aueh In dlese Kategorie (IX, 302).
Although ostensibly the essay presents the two
types of idealists without making a value judgment, it
closes with the "loaded" question:
Abstrakt-erhabener und real-praktischer Idealismus!
Stabiles und lablles Gleichgewicht1— Welche der
beiden Lebensftlhrungen lm Zeitalter des Dampfes
und der KLektrizit&t den Vorzug verdlent, wird
kaum im Zwelfel seln. Aber das ethisch-moralische
Tribunal? (IX, 305).
Wedekind does not claim objectivity for either
group. The first group projects an internal picture onto
the "arc of the sky" and claims authority for that picture
as the basis of reality. The second group selects from
the world about it a small segment-which it designates
as the "true" world. It is this segment which becomes
the basis of its reality. Although Wedekind resists
taking sides with either group, his belletrlstic work,
without exception, stands as a testimony to the search for
morality of the first group.
Tributes to the men of practical affairs— who,
without yielding to the excesses of extreme opportunism,
contribute positively to the continued functioning of a
harmonious social order— are very rare Indeed. Aside
from Fritz Schwigerllng of the Llebestrank, he makes no
use of the type for either dramatic or fictional purposes.
One reason may be that the conflicts of such men are |
essentially surface conflicts unrelated to the search for
morality.
In his struggle for meaning and clarity In the
basic questions of life* Wedekind Is drawn toward the un
knowable and the Incommunicable which defines life as a
futile endeavor. His search follows the periphery of
pessimism, for It concentrates on Man's capacity for
tragedy. He attributes his affinity for the tragic muse
to his Inability to turn his back on the harsh earnestness
of life. In the short story Marianne (1887, the same year
In which Zlrkusaedanken appeared) he writes, "Freilioh,
und der schwflrzeste Pessimist darf das nlcht leugnen,
glbt es auf Erden auch gltickliche Menschen die Menge,
Menschen, denen es vergflnnt 1st, fiir lmmer die Augen zu
schliessen, ohne den schroffen Ernst des Lebens, den
schrlllen Schmerz Jemals gekannt zu haben . . . ."
(VIII, 209-210).
Wedekind's Inability to consign himself to the
happy crowd Is both cause and effect of his Imaginative
and perceptive power, a power that reveals, not only the
beauty, but also the chaos and ugliness of Man. Like the
heroes of his own tragedies, the poet refuses to submit to
partial truths. When the search reveals superficiality
and corruption Wedekind considers It a moral Imperative
to protest. However questionable In taste his protest
may be at times, it never lacks the earnest involvement.in
life which Wedekind regards as a prerequisite to art. An
imperative of his morality is that Man must be involved
emotionally and intellectually in the search for meaning.
Morality means both awareness and participation.
In his pursuit of menschliche Moral, Wedekind
becomes the victim of an insoluble conflict. Involvement
implies subjectivity. Valid Judgment implies objectivity.
It is basically impossible to be both subjective and
objective in the pursuit of reliable values. As a moral
ist Wedekind is always subjective, for the search for
morality depends upon personal involvement. As an artist,
however, Wedekind can be extremely objective in his repre
sentation of the great forces of life. When his art is
less effective, it is because the moralist stands in the
way of the artist.
In his dramas Wedekind often formulates his belief
that the searcher must participate directly and conscious
ly in life. Throughout his career the poet is driven by
the desire to keep the fight relevant, earnest and
crucial. Buridan aska, "Aber welche Kurzwell bietet
uns denn das Leben, wenn wlr es nlcht ernst nehmen?!
Eln Spieler, der das Spiel nlcht ernst nimmt, ist eln
Splelverderber! . . . Sobald wir uns ntfber die Gesetze
des Spiels hlnwegsetzen, ist die Freude am Spiel dahln"
70
(v, 125).
In the final graveyard scene of Frdhlings Erwaohen,
Moritz Stlefel, his head tucked underneath his arm, tries
to convince his friend Melchior of the sophistication and
superiority of those who have left the earnest struggle
for life behind them. He remarks, "flber Jammer und Jubel
sind wlr glelch unermessllch erhaben. . . . Die Lebenden
veraohten wlr unsagbar. . . . Wlr lflcheln bei lhren Tragd-
dien— Jeder, fflr sioh . . . ." Melchior replies, "Mlch
ltistet's nlcht dber mich zu lachen" (II, 168). A moment
later the vermummter Herr confirms what Melchior had felt
intuitively, "Sie wlssen dooh, dass das [die Erhabenheit]
Humbug ist — saure Traubeni ... Es lflohelt keiner, der
noch elnen Pfennig in bar besltzt. Der erhabene Humorist
1st das erb&rmllohste, bedauernswerteste OesohOpf der
Schflpfung!" (II, 172).
Although Wedekind as moralist Insisted on subjec
tive involvement in life, as dramatist he realized that
to portray the tragedy of life in tragic terms was to risk
making it seem ridiculous. The result of his belief that
the pathos of life too easily becomes the bathos of the
theater, is his grotesque humor. Humor, for Wedekind, is
a dramatic device through which he hoped to escape the
devastating effect of ridicule.
Through the use of grotesque and satirical
dialogues and situations, Wedekind consciously strove to
present realities of life which would have defied dramat
ic formulation if presented in a straightforward manner.
! A satire against public morality and social institutions,
I
: his humor was Intended to jar a philistine world into
recognition of its corruption.
An example of Wedekind's concept of humor as a
dramatic device is explained in a 1907 letter to Fritz
Basel. Expressing his concern that a particular Berlin
i production of Frflhllngs Erwachen had been played too
tragically, he writes: "Ich glaube, dass das Stflck urn so
; ergrelfende wirkt, je harmloser, je sonniger, je lachender
i
| es gespielt wlrd. So vor allem der Monolog von Moritz,
i
j Schluss vom 2. Akt, den ich bis auf den Schluss lustig
sprechen liess. Ich glaube, das das Stflck, wenn die
| Tragik und Leidenschaftlichkelt betont wlrd, leicht
i 6
abstossend wirken kann" (Briefs, II, 170-171).
Wedekind's intuitive sense of theater made him
irealize that situations which probe Man1s capacity for
i
I suffering and pain are not necessarily best played in an
I
attitude of extreme tragedy. For the grotesque tragedian,
| only through the Interplay of Humor and Ernst can the
^See also comments in Was ich dahei dachte
(IX, 448) for further evidence of Wedekind's insistence
that Frflhllngs Erwachen was Intended as a humorous play.
incongruities of life be represented.
| In the foreword to Pandora, Wedekind describes the
gradual shifting from Witz to Ernst as the athletic
Kraftmensch Rodrigo Quast ridicules the afflicted countess.
His cruel and callous Jibes, directed at Qeschwltz, show
his Inability to feel compassion for an Individual suffer
ing from the curse of unnaturalness. Wedekind intended
that Quast's remarks— designed to provoke laughter from
the audience at the beginning--should, as the scene
progressed, become a dramatic symbol of the insensitivity
of Man:
Ich war mir vfillig klar, dass die Wltze durch den
Ernst, mlt dem ich das Geschick der GrHfin Oeschwitz
behandelte, limner und limner wieder entkr&ftet und
dberfldgelt werden mussten, und dass zum Schluss
der tragische Ernst als bedingungslos anerkannter
Sieger den Kampfplatz behaupten musste, wenn das
Werk seinen Zweck erfflllen sollte (III, 105-104).
According to Basil of Stein der Welsen (1909),
humor is a means of confronting the Inexorable in life:
"Humor 1st Weltanschauung . . . ." (I, 186). It is a
condition, a state of mind on which Man's very existence
depends. He summons humor, his companion of earlier days,
with the words,
Stelg du empor, den ich noch nie verlor,
mein KampfgenossI Mein Kleinodi Mein Humor1
In delnem Zaudern llegt dooh wohl keln Zeichen,
dass schon dee Todes Schatten mloh umschleiohen?
Denn der war auoh als Jttngling nur ein Tor,
der mit dem Alter den Humor verlor.
73
Blelbst du Oesell mlr treu nlcht selbst im Sterben,
dann werd' ich dir dein Hinterteil vergerben
(I. 178).7
j
The need for earnest involvement and participation
I in life— which Wedekind regarded as its prime condition— j
is made bearable through humor. Humor gives the artist
a philosophical framework within which he can continue to
function. Humor, WitZj Ironle, Qrotesk and Komlk— all
terms which Wedekind uses frequently— are possibilities
for enduring inescapable truths and accepting the con
sequences of those truths which might otherwise paralyze
poetic power. Humor creates distance. It aids in the
objectification of experience. It does not alter
1
Wedekind's original premise that bflrgerliche Moral is an
inferior alternative to what the gods of instinctive power
and knowledge Intended life to be, but it helps to mini
mize the crippling effect of that premise on the poet's
productive capacity.
^In a tirade directed at Basil, Guendolin protests
the searing sarcasm and cruel Indifference of his heavy-
handed humor. She recognizes the distressing irony that
humor, for Basil (as also for Wedekind), is often bitter,
self-conscious and a sign of discomfort:
I Dir aber schafft Humor nur Unbehagen!
Du blst eln Sauertopf! Du bist verdreht.'
Du biBt ein Raufbold! Urn es kurz zu sagen,
i Du bist eln Mensch, der keinen Spass versteht
! (1. 186) .
Wedekind's frequent recourse to humor suggests that
without It there can be no earnestness, for earnestness
i
unchecked would destroy life by sheer weight alone. j
Without earnestness there Is no comprehension of essence,
I
of reality, of Wesen. Without Wesen there can be no
morality, for morality (i.e., mensohllche Moral), by
Wedekind's own definition, is built upon a "tiefere
Kenntnls des Wesen der Welt und der Nenschheit." Were
there no morality, no attempt to make meaningful an other
wise amorphous experience, there would be no art, and—
perhaps most significantly of all— no definable purpose
to life.
The foregoing comments explain Wedekind's position
apart from the literary currents of his time. In agree
ment with Luk^cs— that the primary difference between
Wedekind and his contemporaries stems from the fact that
Wedekind sought to face life squarely— it is safe to say
that Wedekind's search for morality is the product of his
inability to run from the great social issues of his time.
His treatment of dramatic materials, particularly his use
of the grotesque, Is a unique idiom and the product of a
philosophical premise untenable in life.
Wedekind's failure to substantiate his doctrine
of morality based on instinct is the result of three
factors: the hostility of society, the hybrls of the
75
poet, and a highly questionable original premise. Wedekind
Is an early— albeit classic— example of the alienated
artist. He Is the victim of the external resistance of
society and the Internal resistance of his own pride. His
premise Is faulty because actual experience shows that,
whatever Its source, Instinct can be a destructive as well
as a productive force. To build a morality around It Is
a very precarious undertaking.
Wedekind's belief In instinct as Han's most
tangible link with a deity is a religious belief. But
the distinction between Wedekind and the traditional
religionists Is that he Is unconcerned with the Christian
promise of a Jenseits. He insists that life, not death,
be made the basis of meaning. In his own particular
i
search for an Ideal he falls into the category--not of the
real-praktischer— but of the abstrakt-erhabener idealist,
according to the description In Zlrkusgedanken.
i
The problem of the subjective moralist versus the
objective artist Is partially resolved by the use of
Humor. Humor Is the underlying principle of Wedekind's
concept of the grotesque. It expresses his hope that the
painful incongruities of life may be formulated as an
artistic experience which contributes to Man's search for
morality. Humor emerges as the one means by which the
artist can confront life directly.
CHAPTER III
MORALITY— A RATIONAL OR IRRATIONAL IMPERATIVE?
The concept of Brkenntnlo (discussed In the pre
vious chapter) Inplied that the basis of Wedekind's belief
in instinct was metaphysical (i.e., irrational). Instinct
is perceived as a direct and incontestable revelation of
the divine. The problem now is to determine whether Man's
rational perception of the instinctive appetites within
himself can be utilized to formulate a valid morality by
which he may live a meaningful life. Even if the poet
were willing to yield to instinct's dominion over his life,
does experience (i.e., reason) affirm or deny his faith in
the validity of his own particular Erkenntnls? Can he ever
really know in rational terms that the path he has chosen
toward morality is a truly reliable one? Or does belief
in instinct remain an article of faith valid only for the
believer?
The following chapter examines Wedekind's attempt
to establish through experience the limitations of knowl
edge (Erkenntnls). In answer to the questions— what is
the true nature of the moral imperative for Wedekind? Is
there an empirical reason why instinct should make Man mo
ral?— we contend that in rational terms the moral impera
tive has only a subjective existence. Wedekind's search
76
77
for morality Is a part of hla Irrational response to the
world about him. There is no incontestable basis for mo
rality. Instinctive desires are unequal to the task of
helping Man to Justify his existence. Though the desire
to validate his own subjective experience of Erkenntnls
absorbs most of the poet's energies, his efforts produce
no measurable rational results. For air the Intensity of
his search for morality, only the search Itself is valid:
"Denn was 1st kttnstlerlsche Produktlon anders als fortge-
setzte, ununterbrochene Selbstkritlk” (IX, 443). It is
the contention of this chapter that a nenachllche Moral
based on instinctive knowledge (Erkenntnls) cannot be sup
ported through rational or irrational experience.
Wedekind's rational goal is to liberate the human
spirit from the double tyranny of emotional (internal) and
social (external) influence, that it might develop to its
fullest potential. If morality is to be anything more
than sheer dogma, then it must be allowed to develop in an
atmosphere of freedom. Herakles, as a personification of
the mature Wedekind, strives to achieve freedom as the es
sence of morality. He comes very close to the Faustian
concept of freedom, as expressed in the lines, "Nur der
verdlent slch Freiheit wle das Leben,/ Der tflglleh sle
erobem mussI" (Faust. Part II, Act V, lines 11, 575-76).
Wedekind's inability to substantiate his concept
of instinct as a moral force parallels his failure to
78
Justify his knowledge of hlnself• He fully realized the
difficulty of trying to find an objective basis for the
compulsions and Instinctive longings of hla own spirit.
In February 1889 he wrote to Any Barte, "Es h&tte wenlg
gefehlt, so wire ich sogar wieder gliublg geworden, denn
gerade das Bewusstsein der eigenen Ohnaaoht und Sohwtohe
war Ja von Jeher die Quelle mensohllcher Religion"
(Briefe. I, No. 43).
Throughout his life Wedekind Is keenly aware of
the Illusive nature of truth. Uhable to content hlnself
with half-truths, he lacked to a painful degree the self-
confidence and poise of Gerhart Hauptmann, with whon the
fashions of the tine often forced him to compare himself.
He lacked Hauptmann's ability-to shift with the literary
climate of the times.1
IfCutscher quotes from the notebooks some notations
which Wedekind had made In preparation for a drama
NiggerJud. which never got beyond the planning stage. In
inese sketchy remarks Wedekind had compared himself to
Hauptmann by compiling two lists which contrasted the cha
racteristics of each:
Wedekind Hauptmann
Nachtmensch xagnenseff
Stadtnenseh Landnensch
Kulturfatske Naturbursche
Theoretlker Blldner
Danker Kttnstler
Rechner Brbauer
linkshindig Sohipfer
seln msserfolg keln Spreoher
beruht auf fe- Verachwenderer
dankenlnhalt seln Hrfolg beruht
selbstbewusst auf Fomallsmus, selbstlos, predlgt
eoht aber die grosse Llebe, mtleld
79
In terms of the two types of Idealists discussed
in Zlrlcusgedanken. Wedekind Is like the abatrakt-erhabener
Idealists Hauptmann Is the real-Praktiacher Idealist.
Hauptmann's observations are verifiable In terms of empi
rical experience. The narrow region which he explores,
Wedekind contends, requires little Imagination. Like
Gerardo, he has the gift of being able to capitalize on the
mediocre taste of the German theater public. His success
Is sufficient "proof" of the validity of his philosophy.
Wedekind'b lack of success, conversely, meant
that he could not substantiate his beliefs In terms which
were acceptable to others. It was not only "sour grapes"
which made the comparison with Hauptmann an unhappy one for
Wedekind. He sought truth and the verification of his con
cept of morality on a far deeper level than Hbuptmann.
His search was for eternal and absolute values. It Is
clear that he was doomed to be rejected by society, for
scheusslloh Huldsamicelt, beziubeitta bbdb
unecht, Unechthelt verunzlert
seln ganzes Wirken, Freude an
der Sohdnhelt des leeren Wortes,
Peer Gynt Brand
Franz Moor Xarl Moor
Mephisto Faust
Keith Scholz
Fraktiker, muss Bthlker, maeht eine glinzende
aich Jeden Karrlere als Grandseigneur
Schritt
erklmpfen
(Kutscher, III, 151).
80
society Measures the validity of ideas in altogether dif
ferent terns.
The difficulty of substantiating his beliefs in em
pirical terns, Wedekind attributed to the general problem
of knowing oneself. The essential being of a man is as il
lusive as his concept of what he feels is the highest good.
The whole problem of knowledge— not as Erkenntnls. but as
a part of Man's capacity for reason and logic— makes the
rational justification of morality very difficult.
Leonore of Schloss Wetteratein reflects the ambi
valence of the poet, who, unable to grasp the reality of
his own being, mocks himself through his own emotional in
volvement in life. "Es 1st ungeheuerllch, wle wenlg wir
Mensehen hler unser Leben wlssen, fiber das wir fortwfihrend
in Entzficken Oder in Entsetzen geraten!" (VI, 42). Man's
failure in general, but particularly the anguish of the
poet, results from his inability to know himself, to ap
praise his own personality as the result of a conscious
process of investigation. In the dramatic fragment,
Tauaenlchta. one finds the following amusing rhymed
couplets:
Venn ich sterbe, was geht's nich an?
Kab ich etwas zu meiner Oeburt getan?
Zu meiner Heirat sohon ich nanoherlel,
War aber nur als Hfilfte dabei.
Als Oanzes konnte ich mlch nle erfassen.
Will's gems Fremden fiberlassen (IX, 168).
For Wedekind, the difficulty of substantiating
81
Man1& ideas and beliefs is, however, more often cause for
serious reflection than for levity. The individual is de
fined in terms of his beliefs. If he cannot support his
beliefs through conscious experience, his whole existence
is threatened. Wedekind senses keenly the extent to which
Man is the victim of misconceptions in regard to himself.
He knows the destructive power of an Intellect which,
turned upon Itself, discovers only phantoms and delusions.
Basil of Stein der Weisen admits to the inevitability of
self-deception:
Der Sterbende kann auf die Mensehheit nur
mlt Wehmut, nur mlt mltleldsvollem Lftcheln
zurfickschaun. Bis zur letzten Stunde wird
der Menseh nlcht mfid, vor Felnden slch zu fUrchten,
die nur sein eignes Him ihm vergetluscht,
und was er fftrchten mttsste, lernt er nie ....
(I, 189-190).
Of all men only the outcast is capable of experi
encing self-knowledge. Like the poet, he is aware of the
tragic implications of knowledge, for his ostracism from
society is both cause and effect of his superior ability
to penetrate the visible world. His capacity for knowl
edge is the result of the objective position he holds out
side the bftrgerllche Moral.
The cripple and the deviate find no cause for re
joicing, however, in their ability to experience the world
objectively. That aspect of reality which Wedekind allows
them to experience and to judge is far removed from the
lofty objectives which the bearer of knowledge might hope
82
to achieve. The essence of truth, for the outcast, is the
confirmation of his own Incorrigible position. His keen
perception of the world presents a hopeless picture of
■leanness and ugliness. These miscarriages of society are
destined to be broken, not elevated, by the awareness of
self.
Whether the distinguishing deformity of the out
cast Is physical: Keith*s limp, Hetmann's general ugli
ness, Simpson's blindness; or purely sensual: the Coun
tess' love for Lulu, Elfriede'B love for Cast! Flanl (Tod
und Teufel). Kffle's love for Tsehamper, Larissa's love
for Hblthoff (Die Kalaerln von Heufundland)— all examples
of neurotic, erotic women— knowledge means recognition and
acceptance of the futility of human striving.
In Schloss Wettersteln Rfidlger suggests that In a
by-gone era there may have been a philosophy of Christian
love which promised redemption and grace for those who
found themselves on the fringes of society. "...
Jesus Chrlstus erfand selnerzelt die geelgnete Weltan
schauung ffir das Heer von Ausgestossenen, das heutzutage
entweder 1m Zuohthaus Oder 1m Irrenhaus sltzt" (VI, 41).
Wedekind has nothing to offer but his belief that tragedy
Is the basis of the human condition. The Inexorable sense
of futility which distinguishes those tragic characters
who have been allowed the dubious advantage of peering for
a moment Into the reoesses of their own souls, cannot. In
83
a post-Nletzschean world, take comfort or solace In a
Christian teaching, the basis of which Nan has destroyed
as a by-product of his increasingly cerebral civilization.
Those whom a conspiracy between the gods and so
ciety has branded as criminally Inclined, Wedekind defends
passionately. In the brothels, the prisons, the asylums
he finds not only the squalor which delighted the Natural
ists, but also an unprofaned humanity championed by the
Revivalists. There is an almost religious overtone, the
cadent Irresistibility of a Salvation Army band, in his
protective compassion for society's refuse.
Profound knowledge brings profound awareness. It
can only come to the sensitive spirit alienated from so
ciety— to the freak, the prostitute, the cripple, the cri
minal, the homo-erotic. In order to "know" (erkennen),
one must have forsaken the ranks of a philistine society.
Considering the nature of that society, as depicted by
Wedekind, the price is perhaps small; but it is neverthe
less a shock-experienoe whenever the outcast discovers the
extent to which he stands in a grotesquely jarring rela
tionship to. the rest of mankind.
The Lesbian countess of Lulu is such a monstrosi
ty. In the first of her two great monologues of the final
scene of Pandora, she reflects,
Die Nenschen kennen sloh nlcht— sle wlssen nlcht,
wle sle sind. Nur wer selbtr keln Nsnsch 1st,
der kennt sle. Jedes Wort, das sle sagen,1st
84
unwahr, erlogen. Das wlssen sle nlcht, denn sle
slnd heate so und norgen so, Je nachdem ob sle ge-
gessen, getrunlcen und gellebt hsben oder nlcht.
Nur der Kflrper blelbt auf elnlge Zeit, was er 1st,
und nur die Kinder haben Vernunft. Die Qrossen
slnd wle die Tlere; kelnes welss, was er tut . . •
Herr Oott, Ich danke dir, dass du mlch nlcht ge-
schaffen hast wle dlese. Ich bln nlcht Menseh;
mein Lelb hat nlohts genelnes alt Nenschenlelbem.
Habe Ich elne Menschenseele! Zerqhalte Nsnschen
tragen eln klelnea, enges Herz In slch; Ich aber
welss, dass es nlcht mein Verdlenst 1st, wenn ich
alles hlngebe, alles opfre • . . (Ill, 187-188).
The Countess, because of her desire for unnatural sensual
stimulation, and because of her ambivalent position beyond
the confines of a senseless morality. Is a spiritual sis
ter to Jack, who— In Ironic contrast to his well-founded
reputation as a sex-aurderer— feels compassion for her.
He strokes her head, calling her "armes Tier" as he senses
her love for Lulu. Oeschwltz has paid the price of ac
quiring knowledge, In common with the criminals, Melchior
Gabor, who precedes her, and Keith, Nloolo, and Karl Het-
aann, who follow her.
Even more Important for present purposes than the
experience of knowledge, which unnerves the Countess, Is
Aiwa Sohdn's confrontation with truth. His final accept
ance of the difficulty of supporting his former doctrine
of Instinct Is Wedekind's formulation of his own enllght-
2
enment. For Aiwa, as for the Countess, the moment of
2For more detailed treatment of the Identity of
Wedekind and Aiwa Sohdn see: Kutscher, I, 373-374.
truth cones only after he has fully acknowledged his posi
tion as an outcast:
Mein Oott* neln Oott, was habe ich aus meinem
Leben genaeht . . • Ich suchte alt klarsten Zlel-
bewusstsein den Verkehr nit Menschen, die nle in
lhren Leben eln Bueh gelesen haben. Ich klam-
merte nlch alt aller Selbstverleugnung und Be-
gelsterung an diese Elements, un zu den hdch-
sten Hfihen diohterischen Ruhaes eaporgetragen
zu werden* Die Rechnung war falsch. Ich bln
der MArtyrer nelnes Berufes (III, 184).
The lines are an indication of Wedekind's growing
skeptlclsa about his earlier belief that the true nature
of nan is aost purely represented by the uneducated. An
unrealistic hope that instinctive Inpulse night have of
fered the only neaningful basis for life is being serious
ly challenged. Bapirlcal observations have shown that the
Instinktwesen is not the inheritor of the earth, as Wede
kind had suggested in the years of Prtthlings Erwachen.
Alwa's noaent of truth forces him to realize that he has
been the victin of a fallacious doctrine concerning the
Jtrue nature of Man. The experience of the intervening
years has nade him realize that the hope of relying solely
upon instinct as a basis for human behavior is simply
anotfcer unreliable article of faith to be discarded.3
The uncultured and the unschooled are not necessarily the
^Alwa's disillusionment is a foreshadowing of what
writers like William Golden (Lord of the Plies), a half
century and two world wars later, rormuiav^ as a rejection
of the romantic, Rousseauistie faith in the divine good
ness of lnstlnetlve force.
86
noblest representatives of creation. They nay, on the con
trary, be the exponents of savagery and barbarism.1 *
It Is not that Wedekind's appreciation of Instinct
ive response as a direct expression of divine will has been
challenged, but rather that along with his reverence for
the power of Instinct, comes an awareness that It Is not a
power to be harnessed. Instinct cannot be utilized as
means toward an end outside of Itself or as the basis of a
new moral Imperative— no matter how Intense one1s subjec
tive belief that It represents the revelation of divine
force.^
^Goethe had already foreseen the danger of roman
ticizing the "virtues" of shallow companions when he al
lowed Wilhelm Melster to travel with the theater rabble In
the early chapters of the LehrJahre.
^The conclusion that Aiwa Sohdn reaches, once he
has become an outcast of society, 1b the same as that for
mulated by the Viennese cultural historian and playwright
Egon Frldell, who, as a young man, had played the walk-on
role of the police commissioner In the 1905 Vienna produc
tion of Pandora— a production praised by Wedekind In the
1906 Foreword io the play, In which he and Tilly had played
Jack and Lulu, respectively.
Frldell does not condemn the possibility of accept
ing instinct as the basis of one's own personal philosophy
(or religion), but objects to Wedekind's attempt to force
the concept upon an unwilling public as if It were a ge
neral truth incapable of refutation. He calls Wedekind's
uncompromising Insistence that the world rise to the man
date of the Instinctive drive a philistrflses Verlangen.
Was seine Weltanschauung anlangt, sowelt sle aus
den einzelnen Aphorlsmenfetzen slch zusammenflleken
lAsst, so erwelst sle slch als der blosse Negatlvab-
druek der landesuebllehen Sexualmoral. Her Phi-
lister dekretiert: jeder Mensoh soli morallsch
seln; worunter er versteht, dass wir unsert
87
Wedekind's characters are lead again and again to
negative and pessimistic conclusions by means of rational
thoughts and objective observations. His outcasts are
%
broken by the pain which accompanies their confrontation
with truth.
There are, however, two positive results of Han's
attemps to support his beliefs with empirical evidence.
The first is the Impetus which failure gives to his
search. With each successive failure to substantiate his
doctrine of instinct, Wedekind tried again from a dif
ferent vantage point to measure and test the validity of
that doctrine. The collected works bear witness to his
sttmtllchen Oellebten helraten aollen. Wedekind de-
kretlert: Jeder Menseh soil unmorallsch seln;
worunter er versteht, dass wir auf Dlnge wie
Jungfernschaft, She, Treue kelnen Wert legen
dfirfen. Aber der zweite Standpunkt 1st bloss der
bequemere und ungebrluchlichere, und kelneswegs
der freiere. Er 1st nur die dogmatlsche fltadre-
hung des ersten. Man kann nimlich such als XM-
morallst noch lmmer ein Phlllster sein. Jeder
Mensch, der von der Anslcht ausgeht, dass die
Qesetze, die fflr ihn gut Bind, auch fflr die an-
deren gelten nttssen, 1st ein Phlllster. Die
Freiheit hingegen besteht darin, dass Jeder tut,
was seine Individuality ihn vorsohreibt. Wenn
■ich Jemand zur Freiheit im Erotlsehen zwlngen
will, wihrend es in meiner Natur llegt, dlese
Bezlehung als vorwlegend unfrele und gebundene
aufzufassen, so besehrinkt er melne Freiheit.
Wenn Jemand von mlr verlangt, ich solle in mo-
rallsohen Dingen keln Phlllster sein, obgleich
gerade dies mlr entsprieht, so stellt er an rnlch
ein philistrdses Verlangen. Wedekinds' Sexual-
philosophie 1st niohts als das gewendete Phi-
Munich, 1931
listerliaa. chte der Heuzelt.
88
efforts. In the draft of a letter to Georg Brandss (oa.
1909)# he attests to the source of his creative power:
Die hohe Bewerthung, die Sle aeinen Arbelten zu
thell [sicfl werden lessen, ausste alch ua so aehr
Bberrasehen, da loh selt vler Jahren welss, dass
Ihnen die auffallendste Selte aelner Produktion,
die sexuelle Sohaaloslgkeit daraus unsympathlsch
1st, Aber jeder Mensch hat wol [sic} etwas Ab-
sonderliehes, das Ihn vorwttrts trelbt, und wlrd
eventuell durch das Verlangen, dlese Absonderlloh-
kelt zu begrelfen, vorwflrts getrieben. Ich gebe
auoh ohne welters zu, dass Ich dleser einen—
Cunleserlich}— alles ttbrige verdanke (Brlefe. II,
322).
The second positive result of Nan1s atteapt to
exaalne his beliefs froa an objective point of view. Is
that through the exercise of reason (Vernunft). one Is led
back to the capacity for eaotion (OefQhl) as the other
pole upon which the aeanlngful life aust be based. Heart
and head, rational and irrational forces stand In a coa-
pleaentary relationship to each other. Wedekind regards
reason as the doorway through which Nan aust pass In order
to judge and to appreciate the extent to which passion and
eaotion control huaan action.
Buridan, in his defense of what he feels to be an
objective approach to art. In his insistence that the
public be aade aware of what he calls, "Die unveraeid-
llchen Folgen aenschlloher Handlungen" (V, 130), builds
his arguaent on his faith in the rational process. Buri
dan 1 s tribute to Vernunft.In his Inpassioned plea to Dr.
Prantl for understanding, is built upon the hope that
89
through the exercise of reason the sensitive human being
■ay be led baok to the heart and to an awareness of Nan's
Infinite potential for what Wedekind ealls die mensehllche
Gttte. Burldan states his position:
... So wahr wle Ich kelne hflhere GottheIt aner-
kennen kann als die hdchste Entfaltung der uns
offenbarten Vernunft— schon aus dea elnzlgen
Grunde, well das hdchste, das edelste Ergebnls
der uns offenbarten Vernunft die mensehllche
Gflte 1st. wihrend Sle nit aller erdenkllohen
Herzensgflte nle dazu gelangen, slch Vernunft
zu erkimpfen (V, 132-133).
Reason, Burldan hopes, say lead Man baok to "goodness" as
the supreme human value. If It Is not corrupted by the
bflrgerllche Moral. It will radiate, like love Itself, In
stinctively and naturally from the heart.
Wedekind expresses through Burldan his belief In
the "logic" of observable consequences. He holds Man
responsible for his own actions. If the world Is doing
badly, It Is because Man is unwilling to see the results
of his own deeds. In defense of his pessimistic writings,
Burldan emphasizes the validity of his observations: "Ich
habe die Polgen, die dem Menschen aus seinen Handlungen
erwaehsen, nlrgends gef&lscht. Ich habe dlese Polgen
Qberall Inner nur in lhrer unerblttllohen Notwendigkelt
zur Anschauung gebraeht" (V, 123)* In support of his wish
for the re-unlfieatlon of sensory perception and religious
faith, he formulates rationally his refusal to accept the
apparent contradictions of these two aspects of human
90
experience:
leh sehe selt Jahren nlcht eln, warun die Ve-
rehrung, die wir sohdnen Farben, schdnen ICttrpern,
der ganzen Schdpfungskraft entgegenbrlngen,
warun alch dleae Oefdhle ewlg In den Haaren lie-
gen aollen! (V, 120).
Burldan1a failure to realize hie wish for the re
unification of dlverae forcea echoes Wedekind'a failure to
atablllze the achlzophrenlc distentions of hla own soul.
With Burldan, as with Wedekind, one has the feel
ing that the attempt to rationally explore the conflicting
elements of hla own morality la more of a pretense than a
deep conviction. By "kissing the Icons" of reason, he
hopes to find favor with intellectual forces. To Insist
on the necessity of Instinctive or emotional justification
of Nan's action, and Ignoring thereby society's demand for
verification, Is to be out of step with the times.^
Burldan, in his attempt to resolve Intellectually
the tensions which torment him, commits the error of turn
ing his back on palpable experience. Through his failure
to recognize in Kadldja a harmonious blend of both spiri
tual and physical forces, his theories become abstract.
They lose their foundation In experience, the only thing
which can give them credibility. In his insistence on
^Kutsoher quotes from one of the early notebooks
(1890) a statement which Wedekind had written while work
ing on Frdhllnms Erwachen1 "Der moderne Nensoh lebt ln-
tellektueii. Der Instinkt, das Oefdhl, die Idee slnd
barbarlsoh" (Kutsoher, I, 23).
91
reason and logical thought processes, he Ignores the goal,
and becomes engulfed in the means. Like Moritz Stlefel of
an earlier era, he Is Incapable of recognizing salvation
when it is offered to him.
According to Wedekind, the world has its own way
of dealing with individuals who aspire toward objective
knowledge. If their own failure to keep their eye on
reality does not destroy them— as in the case of Burldan—
then society, unable to tolerate close scrutiny, will
forcibly remove them from its path. In the anecdote Bln
gefflhrlichee Indlvlduum. Wedekind satirically affirms the
right of society to destroy any individual who thinks he
has a glimpse of objective truth:
Man flndet hln und wieder naive Qemttter, die nit
der fatalen Veranlagung zur Welt konmen, die
Dlnge zu sehen, wle sie slnd. Glttckllcherwelse
gedeihen sle nur in den seltensten Fflllen. Ver-
steht man elnmal, was sie meinen, so 1st soviel
wenigstens sicher, dass man sle mlssversteht.
Fttr gewdhnllch enden sle 1m tlefsten Blend Oder
im Irrenhaus. Das 1st eine ungemelne Beruhi-
gung fOr alls, die slch damit beschiftlgen, aus
den bestehenden Vorurteilen Nutzen zu ziehen
(IX, 331).
The most conclusive evidence of Wedekind's aware
ness that reason, despite Burldan1s insistence to the con
trary, could never produce the desired substantiation of
one's beliefs is found in the fragment Kitsch^ which
appeared posthumously in the ninth volume of the collected
Twritten between February 1916 and Nay 1917. See:
Kutseher, III, 157.
92
works. In a draft of the general plan, Wedekind compares
the first two husbands of the heroine Mathilde: "Der
zwelte Mann 1st der Tagmensch (O.H.), der erste Mann
NAchtmensch (Ich) .... Der erste erhofft das Hell der
Menschheit von dem, was man nlcht wlssen kann. Der zwelte
von dem, was man wlssen kann" (IX, 208). Nowhere Is the
evidence stronger for Wedekind's hope of achieving knowl
edge (Erkenntnls) through that which Man cannot determine
rationally. It confirms his inability to accept rational
experience as a reason for life. Though the desire to
verify one's beliefs may have comparative validity, true
knowledge of Man's potential Is unattainable within the
limitations of reason and therefore Inadequate as confir
mation of mensehllche Moral.
Since there may be no final authority and no cer
tain way to make life a meaningful experience in rational
terms. It may be that it needs no justification outside
itself. As the revelation of a dynamic spirit, life re
mains self-affirmative as its own reason for being—-a
conclusion which challenges the need to search for moral
ity.
Like Herakles of his last great drama, Wedekind
entertains no illusions as to the difficulty of the
search:
So fraud* und ruhmlos 1st keln Kampf
Wle der urn schlichte Menschenwflrde. Kr&fte
Versehlingt der Kampf • • •
93
. . . Ah! Prometheus!
Dlch zu befrel'n, gellngt nur hdchstem Rlngen
(VII, 237).
Wedekind1 s position In regard to Qefflhl and Leld-
enschaft— the basis of Irrational behavior— Is beset by the
same difficulties which Imperil his hope of Justifying mo
rality in terms of Vernunft. Those individuals suffi
ciently sensitive to react emotionally to the world about
them are threatened, rather than aided, by their percep
tion of the world. Man's capacity for emotion usually
leads him to a recognition of his own potential for chaos.
His passions may induce him to involve himself more com
pletely in life than he could ever do by following the
dictates of reason alone. But involvement does not lead
to a confirmation of one's beliefs. Qefflhl and Lelden-
80haft cannot be harnessed. Even at eighteen Wedekind
realized® that human passions— particularly feelings of
love— are involuntary responses. They defy Man's attempt
to use them in support of his search for morality:
Ich begrlff nun nlcht ganz recht, wie man gegen seine
Liebe kflapfen kann, da sle doch elgentlich nicht
aus dem elgenen Wlllen entspringt, sondera mehr
passiver Katur, eben elne Leldensohaft 1st, und
elne gellebte Person kann einen doch unmflgllch
durch einen plfltzlichen Entschluss gleiehgfiltig
werden (Briefe. I, 34).
It is important to differentiate at this point be
tween emotion (Qefflhl— Leldensohaft) and instinct. Both
^Writing from the Lenzburg to his friend Adolph
Vflgtlin.
94
result from impulsea which are not subject to control by
the will. Host of Wedekind's dramatic figures show that
resistance to both emotion and instinct Is pointless.
Finite man cannot hope to win out in his struggle with in
finite forces of nature. Emotion differs from Instinct in
that it is a quality reserved for human beings. Instincts
are shared by all levels of the animal kingdom; emotions
are not. Bsotlon Is a conscious though irrational reac
tion to external stimuli. Instincts are prompted primari
ly by an Internal Impulse. Emotional sensitivity Is an
awareness which prevents men of sensitivity from function
ing like efficient machines. It may either endorse or re
tard instinctive drives.
Wedekind hopes to support his doctrine of instinct
by re-enforclng It with Nan's capacity for emotional res
ponse, Just as instinct forms a bond between the indivi
dual and a divine source, so emotion binds him to other
men. He not only regards Leldenschaft as the single most
important quality of all his dramatic characters— a con
cept discussed in detail in the essay Beaegnung mlt Joseph
KalnzflX. 371)— but he also believes that it constitutes
the very core of life.
One of the most vivid examples of the difference
between Instinct and emotion is portrayed in the short
story Per Brand von Bslyswyl. In striking contrast to the
conclusions of Rabbi Bsra that only the purely physloal can
95
be purely spiritual, the natural instincts of the convict
of Eglyswyl are shallow and meaningless until re-enforced
by the deeply emotional (spiritual) compulsions of a pas
sionate nature. With Marie the convict experiences a love
which makes him sense for the first time the difference
between Man and beast. He recalls,
. . . da tanzte kein Mftdchen 1m 'Egll', und kelne
ging in die Splnnstube, bel der ich.nicht gewesen
zur Nacht (I, 214),
but when he finally meets the chambermaid, Marie,
• . . aus dem Schwabenland • • • dttnn und kleln
wle ein Klenspann, aber Augen hatte sle, die
glngen mlr ins Fleisch, dasB ich sle nlcht mehr
vergass (I, 213),
he realizes suddenly that all the other affairs have been
pure animal lust. He reflects how he had thought upon en
tering the barn, "Ms 1st alles elnsi Mensch Oder Vieh"
(I, 212). When Marie spurns his advances, although she
had encouraged his conversation and even his kisses—
N . • • wir [hattenj uns abgeschleckt • . . ^aberjj als ich
von ihr ging, war sle noch ebenso, wle sle gewesen war als
ich zu ihr kaml" (I, 217)— his passion becomes more power
ful than anything he has ever felt before.
Like Kleist's Kohlhaas and Bhohner's Wozzek, the
convict describes the irrepressible conflict within him as
a raging holocausts
Und dann ffthlte ich es hier oben, hler an der
Kehle, als hitte loh einen Strlok darua und wftrde
gehenkt. Uhd vorn auf der Brest und lm Rftoken
fShite ich es, und dazwisehen war es, als wdrde
alles aufgerlssen. Uhd verglftet war ioh in alien
Adern, von Puaa bla zu Kopf . • . Uhd dann dachte
lch an die Amrain-Susanne, an die Veronika, and die
Marianne. Die alnd schuld, eagte leh « ' < i r , die alnd
schuld! Es war nloht wahr, das weles lch, aber
lch eagte ee air so, und lief hln, die Strasse von
Egliswyl. Manohmal In der Anetalt 1st es air
schon schllaa gewesen In den sleben Jahren, dass
lch geheult habe und alch gekrfiaat auf den Fllesen,
bis sle alch elngesperrt haben, wo keln Llcht und
kelne Luft 1st. Aber dann dachte lch an Jene Naoht
zurfick und sagte air: sle afigen alt dir tun was
sle wollen, Sohllaaeres, ais was du In jener Nacht
erlltten, glbt es nloht auf Oottes Welts und das
hast du hlnter dir. Hfttte alch daaals elner ge-
noaaen und gebunden und Giber die Bank gelegt und
geschlagen, lch hdtte lhn daffir danken wollen.
Aber da war nleaand. Ioh schrle und brfillte wle
ein Tier la Schlachthaus, als lch fiber dihr.Defcg-
darch den Wald kaa. Inner kaa es wle Flaaaen
fiber alch, Inner brennender. Es war, als wire
lch in elnea brennenden Haus. Zu den Fenstern,
zu den Tfiren, wo lch hlnsah, schlugen air helsse
Flaaaen Ins Oesloht. Uhd unter air glfihte der
Boden, wenn er schon gefroren war, dass leh
stampfte und lief (I, 217-218).9
It Is not the Instinctive desire for sensual sa
tisfaction alone which unleashes the Inferno, but rather
desire Intensified by the demand for spiritual and emo-
tlonal satisfaction. Instinctive drives divested of eao-
tional support never offer aore than aoaentary diversion,
for they emphasize Man1s bestiality alone. Only when
prompted by feelings of super-sensual love— as In the ease
of the convict's desire for Marie— does Man begin to ex
plore his full capacity for involuntary Identification
with the love-object. Anything short of fulfillment
9rhe prisoner's graphic recollection of the all-
eonsualng foroes of sensuality, unleashed against his de
fenseless spirit, is a powerful example of Wedekind's
ability as a writer of draaatlo prose.
97
releasee all the savagery and ohaos of which he is capa
ble.10
The problem of emotion and instinct is compli
cated by the poet's conviction that the exercise of the
will has no effect on Nan's desire for passionate in
volvement in life. Any attempt to channel one's emotions
endangers the total personality. Nowhere is there a sug
gestion in Wedekind that a Moritz could learn to be a
Melchior, or that a Ddhrlng could become a Gerardo. The
Marquis von Keith cannot become a Consul Casimir nor Het-
mann a Launhart. It is always the emotional nature which,
in its attempt to reform, belles its own basis, only to
become entangled in an Intricate web of impersonal, sys
tematized, rational and intellectual forces which destroy
him. Moritz tries without success to conform to what he
thinks his parents expect of him, rather than to give his
own deeply passionate nature the opportunity of expressing
itself. Karl Hetm&nn, obsessed with an idea for improving
the race, is unable to free his constricted heart to en
joy the love of the Incomparably feminine Fanny, a more
than adequate compensation for all his abortive schemes.
Buridan of Zenaur is a classic example of an
10Whether or not the object of the passion is
worthy of such infinite devotion is never a question. In
the case of Marie, she repays his tribute to her charm
(his reducing the village to ashes) by summoning the loeal
authorities.
emotional personality threatened by the conflicting de
sire to discipline himself to conform to the demands of
society. In his resistance to Kadldja, he opposes his own
innermost nature. He is ultimately incapable of stifling
his passionate demands on life. In trying to become a
moral force, he almost succeeds in destroying himself.
Defeated in his attempt to win the approval of
Dr. Prantl, the formal representative of a moralistic
church whose task it is to legislate art and thought,
Burldan is likewise unable to return to his former source
of spiritual and physical power— the lovely entertainer
and acrobat, Kadidja. He chokes his capacity for emotion
al experience by smothering it between a desire for in
tellectual freedom on the one hand and a longing for re- -
cognition on the other. For Wedekind,one can either be
intellectually and artistically free and fall, or one can
be Indentured to the dictates of society and succeed. Bu
rldan wants both freedom and success. Though he gains
neither, he pays the price of temporarily sacrificing the
most significant quality of his personality— a healthy ca
pacity for emotional experience (Leldenschaft).
Like Hetmann, Burldan works tirelessly to achieve
a goal which is basically utopian. He longs for a world
that has never been and can never be. But it is not only
because his soheme is unrealistlo, but also because he be
comes emotionally involved in the execution of that
99
scheme, that he falls. Like Hetmann, he is unable to
suppress his own emotional demands on the world. He Is
incapable of disengaging himself emotionally from his
plan to bring light to a world of darkness. His hope for
the harmonious resolution of the conflicting elements of
morality is unworthy of his passionate devotion. Kadidja,
who deserved his love and his patronage, fails to gain It.
Burldan is destined to serve a phantom, while reality
slips through his fingers.
In the opening scene of the play, Kadidja had
told Burldan, "Wenn dich die natttrlichsten Dinge mit
Entsetzen erfttllen, dann gehdrst du doeh selbst zu der
furchtsamen Menge, deren blinde Furcht du immer verspot-
test" (V, 118). Kadidja, like Fanny of Hldalla. and bear
ing a strong resemblance to Helene of Kaamersdnger, is
more than a match for the floundering male spirit. With
all the pathos of Hamlet's, "Qet thee to a nunneryI,"
Burldan cries out to Kadidja, "Zleh eln Reformkleid an,
Kadidja! Zleh eln Reformkleid an! Ich verdurste naoh
Oescfamackloslgkelt, nach unergrttndlleher Seelentlefe, In
der ich mich vor allem, was Slnnllehkeit 1st, verkrlechen
kanni" (V, 138).
Burldan's spirit Is broken, not by the pressure
of the Church or the censor, but rather by his own Inabi
lity to recognize and esteem the real presence of a truly
harmonious being, Kadidja. His criticism that she lacks
100
moral significance suggests his insensitivity, not her
Inadequacy:
Kadidja& Du kannst delnen Kdrper vor meinen
Augen so bezaubemd zur Schau stellen, wle es
dir irgendwle attgllch 1st. Aber der Schau-
stellung nfissen ebenso vlele hdchste menschliche
Werte das Olelchgewleht halteni (V, 137).
Kadidja's suicide, like that of Helene Morowa, Is
prompted by her realization that the love object (Burldan)
is Incapable of adequate response to her Infinite sensi
tivity. Burldan*s mls-directed passion, expressed in his
plea for freedom, is transformed through her death into a
moment of awareness and a deep conviction of guilt, echoed
in his closing lines: "Kadidja! • . • Kadidja! . . . Er
lflsst seiner nlcht spotten! Er l&sst seiner nlcht ver-
sucheni 0 OottJ o Oott, wie unergrfindlich bist
du . . ." (V, 140). Momentarily Burldan is aware of his
capacity for both love and guilt— emotions which, in his
eagerness to find favor with the Church, the censor, and
with society in general, he had failed to honor. For one
brief moment he might, had she not already destroyed her
self, have deserved such a woman as Kadidja.
Despite their inability to succeed in a largely
functional world of indifferent forces, these passionate
personalities— the convict of Eglyswyl, Moritz, Burldan,
Hetmann— remain the basic substance of Wedekind's creative
work. These are only a few of the characters to whoa
Wedekind referred when he wrote:
101
Es wUre sonst wohl such zu t&rlcht, meine Per-
sonen gerade an ihren Anslohten achaltem zu
lasaen • . . Was leh abar at men Personen in
den Mund gelegt habe und woduroh leh sle plas-
tlseh zu gestalten suchte, das 1st Leiden-
sohaft • • • Leidenaehaft zu verkdrpern 1st
aoer seele und Inbegrirr der Schausplelkunst,
aueh dann, wenn sleh die Leldensehaft nlcht
In unartlkulierten Naturlauten Aussert, son-
dern, wle bei unsem Klassikern, In Worten,
die den Zuhdrer etwas zu denken geben
(IX, 373).
The problem of feeling and emotion parallels the
problem of knowledge. Again the poet would like to be
lieve in Its absolute reliability, but the evidence to the
contrary Is too disturbing to ignore. Theoretically at
least he le eager to accept Leldensehaft as the basic hu
man quality through which human beings participate in the
world about them. In practical terms, however, the
greater Man's capacity for feeling, the more vulnerable he
becomes to despair. Wedekind's tragic characters are al
ways persons whose emotional response to life is most In
tense. They are victims of an Insensitive and indifferent
world, but even more so, they are caught up in their own
passionate natures.
Just as individuals of brutale Intclllgenz repre
sent absolute mastery over the forces of reason— at least
to the moralist who struggles unsuccessfully for rational
truths and empirical support of his doctrine— so do the
Kraftmenschen represent absolute mastery over the forces
of emotion to all who hope unsuccessfully to support their
beliefs through their capacity for Irrational experience.
102
The Kraftnenschen succeed in harnessing their emotions,
but the price they pay Is the surrender of their humanity.
One of the most vivid examples of a man whose
response to the world has been dulled to the point where
he is no longer capable of compassion is Tschamper of
Schloss Wetteratein. In contrast to Effie, a woman of
infinite emotional capacity— "Ftir mlch kommen in der Welt
ttberhaupt nur die wenlgen Ausnafcpnemenschen in Betracht,
denen das Unmttgliche mSglloh wlrd" (VI, 47)— Tschamper
risks a fortune to regain a lost faculty for Oeftthl. He
sadistically hopes that by watching his victims tortured
by recollections of previously painful experiences, a vi
carious sensation of pain may help him to achieve the de
sired moment of erotic pleasure. Should his victim's ca
pacity for suffering prove sufficient to re-awaken
Tschamper's response to the world, then he will choose
that moment to terminate his life. He longs for a death
which will coincide with his emotional rebirth as Henscht
Das Flelseh hat selnen eigenen Oeist. Sobald
Die Merven elnes Lebewesens so
Oespannt slnd, dass ioh Nensoh mich fflhle, leere
Den Beeher ioh. Dann 1st die Welt mlch los
(VI, 88).
Of the five Kraftnenschen in Sohloss Wetterstein—
RBdlgsr, Leonora, Luokner, Effle and Tschamper— only
Tschamper remains supremely in command of his emotions.
Paul Fechter says of him,
• • • der einslg wlrklieh Starke, well er lcelne
103
Oeftthlsbetellung an der Welt und am Leben nehr
hat, sondera lhr Leiden und Sterben ledlglich
als genleaaender Zuaohauer nlmmt • • . er blleb
der Sieger, well er, selbat geffihllos, die Frau
belm Oefflhl paekte • . . Der deist ohne Qeffihl
1st Herr fiber Leben und Tod, deasen Anblick ihm
zuletzt die einzlge noeh mfigllche Lust in dleser
fiden Welt blelbt (Fechter, 115-116).H
Wedekind realizes fully that In a practical world
of nundane values there is no compromise for the neoessity
of controlling emotions. The successful man must learn to
react, not from the heart, but from the head. The reward
Is esteem, wealth and power. The price Is the sacrifice
of one's capacity for love, pity, fear or guilt. The
Kraftnenschen all share a common fate of having destroyed
their capacity for passionate participation in life. In
the dramas of the middle and late periods there seems to
be no golden mean. Either emotion consumes reason or
reason consumes emotion.
The foregoing remarks examine Wedekind's attempt
to support his concept of die nenschllohe Moral through
both rational and irrational means. His conclusions In
both instances are generally negative. In the case of
^When, :.ln a scene of grotesque contrasts the un
nerved Bffie excitedly tells Tschamper of the death of her
father, who had been killed In a duel with Rfidiger,
Tschamper dispassionately replies, "Wle eoht und voll In
dlesem filtsten Brdtell/ Oeftthle noeh gedelhm. Amerlka//
Das ganze brltlsohe Weltreioh bringt sovlei/ Oeffihle nlcht
auf (VI, 95)* Wedekind regarded the Anglo-Saxon world as
a culture completely divested of feeling. His disdain for
the unemotional attitude of the British, in particular, was
boundless.
104
rational experience, Wedekind compares himself with
Hauptmann, who contented himself (according to Wedekind)
with the superficial truths which were acceptable to so
ciety (bQrgerllche Moral). Wedekind sought Justification
through aenschllche Moral, the truths of which are more
evasive. The "proof of the greater validity of Haupt
mann's claim to knowledge Is supported by his success.
The whole problem of rationally supporting a be
lief is closely linked to the difficulty of knowing one
self. Wedekind is again pessimistic. Only the outcast
has objective knowledge of himself and of society. He
confirms through reason his grotesque relationship to
other men. The examples of both the Countess and Aiwa
Schdn of Lulu show the destructive effect of self-knowl
edge on the personality. Alwa's objective survey of him
self Is discussed In terms of Wedekind's own development
from Geflihl to Wlssen.
There are two positive results of Man's attempt to
substantiate his existence through reason: 1) the impos
sibility of the task creates a tension which can become
the source of creative power for the artist; 2) through
reason one is led back to the heart, a process which can
not be reversed. Burldan's theory of the indestruotiblllty
of the unity of spiritual and physical forces is an attempt
through reason, to respect the demands of both Vemunft
and Oefllhl.
105
It is safe to say that Wedekind's attempt to
Justify himself and his search for morality through ra
tional means is not completely sincere. By nature and by
temperament he leans heavily in the direction of Qeftthl,
through which life, even void of rational support, con
stantly reaffirms itself.
Man's capacity for emotion emerges as a destruc
tive force. Wedekind illustrated his concept of the dif
ference between emotion and instinct with his portrait of
the convict of Kglyswyl. Oeftthl cannot be sacrificed to
the tyranny of knowledge, as in the case of the Kraft
nenschen, without the individual losing that which de
fines him as a human being. Burldan testifies to the
folly of misplaced emotion. He tries to channel his pas
sion into a doctrine and is brought to the brink of tra
gic awareness. Tschamper is an example of an individual
who succeeds in completely stifling his capacity to feel.
The rest of his life and fortune are spent in trying to
regain that capacity which can again transform him into a
human being with a conscious capacity for life. He falls.
Naither rational nor irrational attempts to make
life meaningful sucoeed. Falling to find within himself
the support he seeks, Man turns to Woman, and the search
continues.
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OP WOMAN IN THE SEARCH
POR MORALITY
The following pages consider the poet's attempt to
find In Woman a reliable guide toward the realization of
his vision of a higher morality. Keeping in mind the
distinction made in the previous chapter between instinct
and emotion, Wedekind considers Woman as a personification
of both— at least until she is exposed to society. For
many of Wedekind's men (Elln, Moritz, Burldan, Hetmann)
emotion is a force in opposition to instinct. The result
is their particular search for morality, a search through
which they hope to resolve the conflicting pressures of
emotion and instinct. For most of Wedekind's women, on
the other hand, emotion usually supports their instinctive
drives (Ella, Wendla, Felissa, Llsiska, Helene, Kadidja).
Man hopes to find in the unified emotional-
instinctive strength of Woman earthly salvation in terms
of his menschliche Moral. Left to his own devices, he
proved himself (as shown in the last chapter) incapable
of substantiating through emotion a morality based upon
instinct. Qefflhl had proved as insupportable as Vernunft
in his attempt to justify the mensohllohe Moral. Both
106
107
rational and irrational forces had failed to console him
when instinct manifested itself as a destructive power.
Hence Wedekind's hope to find in Woman the desired catalyst
through which the conflicts within himself may he resolved.
In his relationships with women, the poet is con
vinced that there must be more than simply a physical
expression of instinctive urges (Per Brand von gglyswyl).
Unless the relationship is rooted in an emotional attach
ment (Oeftihl), it remains shallow and unsatisfying. With
the exception of the conclusions of Rabbi Esra and some of
the tendentious prose which precede 1890, there is no
evidence that the poet expected spiritual satisfaction
from strictly sensual experience. The second stanza of
the poem, Das tote Meer (ca. 1893), shows the poet, almost
thirty years old, taking stock of himself:
An hundert Weiber hatt* lch wohl im Sold,
Mit denen ioh mein Out und Blut vertollt,
Die schtinsten NVmpfen im modernen Babel,
Und ich.blleb leer, vom Scheltel bis zum Nabel
(I» 126) .
If Woman is to assist Man in his search for moral
ity, then she must help him because she is the personifi
cation of both emotion (Oefflhl— Leldensehaft) and instinct.
She has never lost the wholeness which defined both Man
and Woman in a state of Innocence. She has never learned
the pain which comes when amotion has to resist the power
of instinctive drives.
108
Despite Wedekind's sueoess In portraying the female
of the species as dramatically palpable flesh and blood,
he always regards her as a means to Man's salvation and
never as an end In herself. She Is only Indirectly
Important, for her function In society depends upon her
relationship with men.
According to the poet Meier of Kinder und Narren
(1889)* she exists In order to sustain and refresh the
male spirit In Its endless fight against chaos. Despite
the Intentionally sentimental language— a satire on the
spirit of the Qartenlaube which Meier represents— the
lines accurately reflect the young Wedekind's disapproval
of the emancipated woman:
Wenn . . . das Welb elnen Beruf zu erftillen hat,
so 1st es der Beruf den Mann In seiner helllgen
Qual aufrecht zu erhalten • . . es wflre Ja sonst
bis zu elnem gewlssen Gtrad tiberfldsslg ....
Die rflckslchtsvoile Natur, melne Damen, hat In
Ihnen dem Manne eln Entgelt ftir selnen trostlosen
Kampf mlt der Zelt, mlt den Elementen, zugedacht.
Das 1st die Rechtfertigung Ihrer Exlstenz. . . .
Wlr [Milnner] slnd die geborenen Kfimpfer,. 1.
Sle melne Damen, slnd die Oase auf unserer
Wflstenwanderung, In deren Sohatten krlstallhelle
Quellen zu unserer Erfrischung sprudeIn (II, 22-23).
A decade later the poem An eine angehende Lehrerin
(1899) shows the poet's continued Insistence that the chief
function of the female is to play out her divinely-
determined role as the love-object of the male.
Komm heraus aus deiner Oeistesfeste
Und verlass deln ddstree Seminar!
Fdr die Weibllohkeit bleibt doch das Bests,
109
Was am Well) dazu besohaffen war (VIII, 140).
As the incarnation of both emotional and instinc
tive forces, Woman is an idealized personification of
dynamic life. She requires no rational verification as
long as she continues to embody, in her physical presence,
the life-giving force from which she sprung.1
Wedekind's basic classification of Woman parallels
his treatment of men. Both men and women begin life with
a capacity for emotional response. They can be divided
into those who stifle their emotional capacity for life,
thereby gaining fame and fortune; and those who become
victimized by their emotional capacity, thereby destroying
their total personality. The women of the first group
are successful in controlling their emotional response to
the world, but they destroy themselves as Instinktwesen.
1According to Basil of Stein der Welsen (1909), it
would be a grave mistake to try to rely on the wisdom
(Welsheit) of women as the basis of truth. He reflects
the nineteenth-century mlsogynlstlo view of Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche when he says,
Bin Glmpel, wer das Welb vom Nenschen soheldet!
Bin Narr, wer es fflr Satansbrut erklttrt!
Die Welsheit, die am Weibe Schiffbruch leidet.
Die 1st nloht eine Pfennigkerze wertl (I, 175)*
It is foolish to look to Woman in the hope of
finding rational Justification for one's Own life. Ac
cording to Basil, she is hardly worth all the fuss which
the poets persist in making. Not only is she meaningless
as an end in herself, she is also unrelated to Nan's
search for objeotive truth of himself and his morality.
110
The women of the second group are destroyed by the com
bined force of Irrational desires and Instinctive drives
exerting themselves In opposition to an unreceptlve world.
The women of the first group are the female
counterparts to the "brutally Intelligent" Launharts and
Tschampers, women who have debased themselves by playing
a man’s role, by sacrificing their basically emotional
nature In the fight for wealth and prestige. The group
Includes Anna of Keith, Mrs. Grant and the princess of the
Hldalla drama, Magelone of Pandora and Effle In the second
part of Schloss Wettersteln.
Most of Wedekind's women belong to the second
group, however. For reasons beyond their control they
are Incapable of sacrificing their emotional and instinc
tive nature in order to conform to society's conception
of what is acceptable. These are the women who, from
Wendla Bergmann of Frflhllngs Erwachen to Queen Omphale of
Herakles, share an Inexhaustible capacity for what the
poet, in a letter to Adolph Vdgtlln (l88l) called "die
brausende, zdgellose Leldensehaft, die Tumulte des
Herzens" (Briefe, I, 28).
Omphale, queen of Lydia, in an exchange with
Olneus, king of Caladonia, encourages him to sacrifice
his daughter to the monster Aoheloos:
1st er eln Oott, tut lhm tierisches Auseehen
Kelnerlei Abbruoh. Welch albernes Midqhen,
Ill
Das slch vor tlerischem Aussehen entsetzt!
Opfre die Tochter zum Hell der Bedr&ngten!
Slnd wir uns selber zur Last oder slnd wir
Andern zu ntttzen mlt Llebrelz begabt . . .
Bangt elnem Welb vor der Llebe Gefahren?!
Hdohster Geschlckllehkelt bllndllngs vertrauend
Freut slch*8 dem St&rksten gewachsen zu seln
(VII, 204-205).
The group Includes Katharlna of Der Llebestrank,
Klara of Muslk, Kadidja of Zensur, Molly of Keith, Helene
of HammersAnger, Llslska of Tod und Teufel, Wanda of Stein
der Welsen, Fellssa of Die Kalserln von Neufundland and
even the Countess of Lulu. Llslska laments,
. . . Die Lust, das Ungeheuer
Tobt ewlg ungez&hmt In dleser Brust!
Freude zerstlebt, eln Tropfen
Auf hels8em SteinI {
Und die Wollust, ungestlllt,
Eln hungerndes Jammerbild
Sttirzt sloh, dass sle den Tod flnde,
In.alle Abgrflnde! (V, 24-25).
Wanda confesses to her Insatiable appetite In the lines,
. . . Ioh bin . . . elne Frau, der nle eln Mann
genflgt hat, der nle elner genugen wird! Elne Frau,
der die Llebe der ganzen Welt nlcht zu vlel w&rej
Elne Frau, die alles ertrflgt und ewlg unersflttlloh
blelbt.
du hast mlr Blut zu leoken gegebenl Die Mllohsuppe
sohmeokt mlr nloht mehr. Mein Verhttltnls zu dir
war das Gebot melner lnnersten unverf&lsohten Natur!
Mein blinder Instlnkt, mlr das zu versohaffen,
wonaoh mein Wesen verlangt und was keln Mensoh auf
Gottes Erde so zu erftfllen vermoohte wle du!
(V. 208).
Though always In vain, the women of this second
group often try to resist the confining chains of
112
burgerliche Moral* a morality as stifling to emotional
Impulse as the male spirit from which it issues. They
struggle not only against cliches and shallow social con
ventions but also against dynamic and chaotic forces
within themselves.
Katharlna of Der Liebestrank tells of her Phaedra-
like hunger for satisfaction* fulfillment and peace:
Mir trflumte von einem Adler* der hatte Sohwlngen*
dass er den Hlmmel ausmass und er trug einen
Strlok am Puss* der ihn unten am Boden hlelt.
Sohllesslloh braoh lhm das Herz.--Mlr brloht das
Herz: Das Leben wlrft Wogen zur Sonne empor* bis
an die Sterne. Ich weiss es. Ich ftihl es Tag und
Nacht— und sltze da* aohtzehn Jahre alt* klaftertief
unter dem Erdboden* jeder Puls ein Pistolenschussi—
Das Leben tut Abgrdnde auf* in die man beslnnungslos
nlederstdrzt* hilflos* mit gesohlossenen Augen;
und dann hooh oben im Lioht auf dem schflumenden
Wellenkamm— auf und nleder!— lch werde grau und
weiss nichts davon— ' lch habe ZaXre zusohanden
geritten* ich werde nlcht ruhiger. Ioh habe
Beethovensohe Sonaten gekllmpert* ioh werde nlcht
ruhiger. Ich habe W&lfe gebflndlgt* lch werde
nlcht ruhiger— Das Leben hegt nooh geheime Sohfltze*
was es auoh sel* von denen man sioh hier nichts
tr&umen lflsst (II* 193-194).
Like Katharlna* all the women of the second group
remain undiluted concentrations of emotional and instinc
tive force* not because they wish it* but because they
have no choice. Their incurable predilection for sensual
' experience is a part of their fate— "die angeborene
Lasterhaftighelt." In a short prose fragment which appear
ed first in the posthumously published writings of the
collected works* the beginnings of a first-person narra-
113
tive called Der erste Sohritt, there Is a description of
a young blond prostitute:
Sle war ... In lhren Qeblrden lhren Begleitern
gegentiber urn elne Idee unztichtiger als die tibrigen
Mttdchen. Aber kelne Unzucht als Mittel zum Zweck
wle bel den andern, sondern die angeborene
Lasterhaftlgkelt, die von Herzen kommt und zu
Herzen geht. Sle tat slch Oewalt an, um die
dloken Spiessbdrger nlcht noeh mehr zu
skandallsleren (VIII, 270).
Lasterhaftlgkelt. for Wedekind, Is not necessarily
a negative quality. It is rather an extreme manifesta
tion of Leldensehaft. Like instinct Itself, It springs
from a source beyond the realm of ethical Judgment. Its
power cannot be restrained simply by exercising will-power,
no matter how negative the effect of Lasterhaftlgkelt
may be on society. The young prostitute of this fragment
shares the fate of Lulu, whom the prudish painter Schwarz
found both shocking and obscene. Veit Kunz was scandal
ized by the heroine of Pranziska. Kfinig of Tod und
Teufel was shocked by Llslska, Simson by Delila, Burldan
by Kadidja, Hetmann by Fanny. In every Instance It Is the
woman who is shocking to the man, Indicative perhaps of
the poet's conviction that it is essentially the female
Bpirlt which Is peculiarly disposed toward "die
angeborene Lasterhaftlgkelt."
One of the most striking examples of female
Lasterhaftlgkelt is found in the pantomime of the empress
and the weight-lifter. In Die Kalserln von Neufundland
114
It is Fellssa's misfortune to love Holthoff, one of the
brutal Kraftmensohen common in Wedekind's dramas. This
specimen of athletic prowess and physical beauty— of whom
it was rumored that he could balance two cavalry horses
on his chest— is closely related to Rodrigo Quast of the
Lulu plays. The Kaiserin, after watching him lift two
thousand pounds in an orgiastic display of strength, loses
all self-control. Restrained by a straightJacket, she
is carried from the stage in a large wire cage, suggesting
an animal in captivity. In the last of three short
scenes, Fellssa, having been released from the asylum,
finally comes upon Holthoff in a cheap cafe'. By this time
he has become completely debauched and revels in the com
pany of gangsters and prostitutes. When all urge him,
taking their cue from the demented Felissa, to lift the
weights once again, he proves himself incapable of the
feat; one of the weights even slips from the bar, crashing
down on his foot. Grotesquely upstaging Fellssa's act of
Buicide— achieved by strangling herself with strands of
her own hair— the one-time athlete Holthoff hops about the
stage holding his Injured foot in both hands.
Fellssa's demise is prompted, not so much by his
callous and humiliating rejection of her entreaties (as
he turns his fist in front of his forehead, signifying to
the coarse company her demented state), but rather by a
115
shattered physical ideal, by her dlaappointment at his
Inability to sustain the weights whloh symbolically sug
gest his sexual prowess. What had been a powerful symbol
of masculine beauty and virility has been reduced to a
ridiculous clown-like figure.
Although Holthoff lacks the stature and emotional
depth necessary for tragedy, the hyper-sensitive empress,
unnerved by the eroticism of his first performance, is
tragically destroyed when the object of her passion is
reduced to common clay. Like the convict of Qglyswyl, her
appetite having been aroused to the sexual feast, she
cannot be satisfied by anything less than gorging herself.
When two great forces— passion and insensitivity— confront
each other, one of them must give way. The convict
chooses to destroy the world; Pelissa to destroy herself.
Of the two basic types of women— those who sup
press emotion in order to gain position in society, and
those who, unable to control the demands of their passion
ate nature, are destroyed by it— only the women of the
first group are acceptable in terms of the bflrgerllche
Moral. Passionate women are a threat to society,fbr they
are impervious to social criticism, no matter how great
the pressure society exerts on them to contribute to the
common good. These women carry within themselves the
freedom toward which Man aspires in hie search for
116
menschllche Moral. Elfriede of Tod und Teufel exempli
fies Woman’s threat to society as a result of the freedom
which her capacity for love gives her. She tells Castl
Plan!,
. . . melne Llebe zu Ihnen macht mlch so frel
und ktlhn, dass es nichts Unmflgliches ftfr mlch
glbtj Schrelten Sle In Gottes Namen von
Verbrechen zu Verbrechen; lch gehe Ihnen voran!
Gehen Sle Ins Zuchthaus; ich gehe Ihnen voran1
Gehen Sle aus dem Zuchthaus; lch gehe Ihnen
voranI (V, 16).
Woman and the search for the menschllche Moral are
a contradiction of terms. Women has no need to seek
spiritual justification beyond herself. Unlike the male
of the species, she Is aware that her sexuality Is also
spiritual, for she senses Intuitively that it Is an aspect
of divine creation.
In his examination of Woman as key to morality,
Wedekind differentiates between das Weib and die Frau.
Neither seek menschllche Moral, but both the married
woman and the unmarried virgin (Frau and Jungfrau) Beek
their position in terms of the bflrgerliche Moral. They
sacrifice their sexuality to the gpds of society in order
to satisfy the instinct of self-preservation. The Welb
personifies the Instinct of preservation of the race
(Fortpflanzung); the Frau personifies the instinct of
preservation of the individual in society. The Weib
contradicts and endangers the foundations of society; the
117
Frau Is a product of civilization: "Die Frau and die
Jungfrau slnd Produkte der Zlvlllsatlon und nur durch den
Besltz des Hauses mSgllch. Ohne Haus kelne Frau und kelne
Jungfrau" (IX, 187).
Woman's only chance of survival in a world which
Is largely determined by social forces, Is to seek (like
Anna of Keith and the other women of the first group)
security In terms of Sltte--a term which for Wedekind is
i
synonomous with die burgerllche Moral. In the Taugenichts
fragment Wedekind contrasts Man, who already possesses
Sltte, but aspires toward freedom (Freihelt), with Woman,
who possesses freedom, but aspires toward social morality:
"Nach Freihelt strebt der Mann (Kampf mlt der Welt) ./ Das
Weib nach Sltte, (Die Grtindung des Hauses. Dauerhaftlgkelt
der Verhflltnisse)" (IX, 272). Woman pursues her search
for a position in society by becoming a wife and mother.
Her search for Sltte is unrelated to Man's search for
menschllche Moral. It is always void of metaphysical
Implications:
Weib: W&nn hfltt' lch Je im Leben Gott gesucht!
Sozlalist: Was brauchst du Gott! Du suohst den
Mann, das Kind.
Pastor a.D.:Du find'st bei uns [Mftnnern], was wir
von Gott erhoffen.
Weib: Mein Himmel steht auch ohne Gott mlr offen.
(IX, 257).
Once Woman achieves the social position toward which she
aspires, she is no longer das Weib. She has become die
118
Frau, the product of civilization.
For those women In Wedekind who remain outside
acceptable social circles, they Justify their whole exist
ence In terms of their relationship to Man. They find in
him their reason for being, a phenomenon which, unfortun
ately for the male, does not work in reverse. The female
warden of the prison in which Klara of Muslk is detained
remarks to her,
Nehmen Sle sich eln Beisplel an unseren Mannsblldern
da drtiben! Wenn die sechs Wochen bel uns in Kost
slnd, dann haben sle ganz und gar vergessen, dass
es dberhaupt noeh Weiber auf dleser Welt glbt.
Fdnfzehn Jahre bleiben sle dann hier, ohne dass
Ihnen nur im Traum elnmal eln Weib vorkommti
Aber ihr Weibsleute! Euch kann man im dunkeln
an die Kette legen, ihr denkt Tag und Nacht nur
an den Mann. (V, 59)•
Instead of being a means by which Man might be
led back to the divine Bource of his existence, Woman—
whether as temptress or as competitor— threatens to
destroy him. Her mere presence Is an Invitation to the
forces of chaos. Even her resistance to the amorous
advances of the male tends to heighten his excitement:
"Durch den Widerstand des Welbes wlrd die Wirkungskraft
des Mannes gesteigert" (IX, 272). Luckner tells Rddiger
of Schloss Wettersteln, "Strflubt sich das Weib, dann
wttchst beim Mann die Kraft Ins tfbermensohliche. Je
verzweifelter der Widerstand, um so kunstgereohter riumt
ihn der Mann aus dem Weg" (VI, 3d). Wherever she may
119
appear, Woman threatens the basic structure of social
order.
Because It Is the task of society to restrict and
limit chaotic Impulses, It must use every means at Its
disposal to control promiscuous sexual activity:
Das Fortleben der Menschhelt grtindet sich auf das
Geschlechtsleben.* Das Bestehen der btfrgerlichen
Qesellschaft grtindet sich auf Beherrschung des
Geschlechtslebens. Elndflmraung des Geschlechtlebens.
Durch Gesetze werden dem Geschlechtsleben ebenso
wle dem Elgentum Grenzen gezogen ....
Lelchtfertlgkelten lm Geschlechtsverkehr kflnnen
durch Scheldung, unehellche Geburten, Krankhelten
In der bftrgerllche Qesellschaft zerstflrender
wlrken als lelchtfertlge Behandlungvdes Elgentums.
Dementsprechend stellt die strenge Moral, ebenso
wle auch der Tragddiendichter, die Bedeutung des
Geschlichtlebens hoch flber diejenige des Elgentums
(IX, 192-193).2
With' the possible exception of Princess Alma In
her relationship to her father In the drama Konlg Nlcolo.
there Is not one example In any of the major dramas of
a man being helped by the "divine intervention"of Woman.
2According to Casti Piani (Tod und Teufel),
society's most effective device for controlling destrue-
tive sexual Impulse Is to prevent Woman from realizing
the potential power vested In her by Nature.
In der Geschlchte des Paradleses steht, dass der
Himmel dem Weib die Macht der Verfflhrung verlieh.
Das Weib verfdhrt, wen es will. Das Weib verftihrt,
wann es will. Es wartet nlcht auf Llebe. Dlese
hdllisohe Gefahr ftir unsere helllge Kultur
bekimpft die bdrgerllche Qesellschaft damit, dass
sle.das Weib in kdnstlicher Oelstesumnaohtung
erzieht. Das heranwachsende Weib darf nloht wissen,
was eln Weib zu seln bedeutet (V, 17)>
120
In every Instance Woman complicates Man's search for moral
ity. In her own struggle for either Sltte (die Prau) or
for adequate sexual expression (das Weib) she Is always
an obstacle impeding his progress toward truth. Her emo-
V
tlonal and Instinctive capacity, the Intensity and unity
of which sets her apart from Man, has no positive conse
quences for him. In most Instances she is herself
destroyed by an excess of feeling (Qefflhl), though in a
few Instances she is successful in stifling that which had
originally made her superior to Man: her ability to react
spontaneously in harmony with the instinctive and emotion
al forces she represents. In no Instance does she
contribute to Wedekind's aspiration that life makes sense
in terms of a menschllche Moral.
Dejanelra of Herakles reflects Wedekind's dis
appointment at his failure to find in Woman an adequate
panacea for an ailing morality: "Zur Freude wllhrt ich
Unglflckselige mich/ Mit Huld begabt, und bringe Mord und
Tod!" (VII, 228).
A consideration of the role that women play in
Wedekind's exploration of Qefflhl, as a possible aid in the
search for morality, must Include a statement on Lulu, the
most enigmatic female of them all. Though from the start
one is tempted to agree with Schlgolch of the fragment
Biins Erweokung» when he comments on his "adopted" daughter
121
Ella, a forerunner of Lulu— ” . . . Junge Welber/ Sind
unkenntlich wle kein Tier. Man muss das/Erfahren haben”
(IX, 36)— It Is nevertheless Important to understand Lulu
as a key to the larger problem of Woman not only as a
symbol of instinctive force, but also as emotional being,
as a manifestation of Qefflhl.
In a discussion of Lulu it is Important to empha-*
size the difference between emotion and instinct (Qefflhl
and Instinkt). Instinct, for Wedekind, is directly
related to the procreative process; emotion may or may not
support instinctive drives. Fechter discusses the differ
ence between emotion and instinct in terms of eros and
sexus;
Man hat Frank Wedekind Zelt seines Lebens einen
Erotlker genannt. FasBt man den Begrlff erotlsch
im landlflufigen Slnne als Beziehung zwlschen den
Qeschlechtern tiberhaupt betreffend, so trifft diese
Charakterlstik.zu: fasst man lhn schfirfer, so
verliert er seine Anwendbarkeit auf das Werk
Wedekinds. Denn vom Eros, von der Liebe, 1st
letzten Endes in dleser Olchtung sehr wenig die
Rede— desto mehr aber vom Sexus, vom Qeschlecht
als dem einzigen, was die Taten der Menschen
bestlmmt.
Theoretiker der Liebe haben versucht, dieses
Oeftthl in zwel wesentlich voneinander geschiedene
Bestandteile zu zerlegen, die trlebhafte
Sexualneigung und von ihr vSllig gesondert,
entstanden dberhaupt erst in spaten, verfelnerten
Jahrhunderten, die psychische Liebe, den Eros, der
in seinen letzern Subliralerungen von dem
phy8iologl8chen Ausgangspunkt bereits unabhflngig
wird. Unausgesprochen beherrscht diese Dlchotomle
sowohl die durchschnittliche Literatur, wie die
allgemeine BlldungsvorBtellung, wobei der Eroi das
positive, das Sexualgeftthl das negative Vorzeiohen
122
in der Bewertung bekam. Zum Ersatz pflegt es In
der Realitflt umgekehrt zu seln.
Ftir Frank Wedekind 1st diese Betrachtungswelse die
tlefste Sflnde gegen den helllgen Qelst des Lebens,
well sie das Einheitliche, Lebendlge zerrelsst um
eines begrlfflichen Idols wlllen und Natdrllches
durch Kflnstliches zu knechten versucht (Fechter,
21) .
While insisting on the Indivisibility of eros
and sexus, Wedekind realized that there were different
aspects of the love experience. He differentiated between
the feelings which a man might have for a person of the
opposite sex, and the feelings which one has for one’s
own sex. To the former he ascribes both erotic and sexual
overtones; with the latter there is only erotic love. In
a letter to Adolph Vogtlin, the young Wedekind wrote
(1885), "Ich wenigstens kenne keinen Unterschied zwischen
der Liebe unter gleichen und derjenigen unter versch-
iedenen Geschlechtern, als den, dass letzterer Liebe noch
der kflrperliche Geschlechtstrieb zu Hilfe kommt"
(Briefe, I, 25). Generally speaking, Fechter is right in
his insistence that for Wedekind it is primarily sexus
(i.e., "der kflrperliche Geschlechtstrieb") which is
important, but for some of Wedekind's characters eros
(Liebe) also plays a role even in their relationships
with members of the opposite sex. Lulu is such a
character.
i
Although Wedekind (and particularly Burldan)
123
resented the attempt of art critics and theorists to
divide Liebe into physical and non-physical components,
he was not able to avoid the same transgression in his
own work. Lulu is a clear example of a character, con
ceived as the emobdiment of Instinkt, but destroyed
because of her capacity for Qefflhl. Lulu's violent death
results from the conflict between eros and sexus.
Sexus, for the female, demands submission and
receptive acceptance' of the male's overture. Eros,is a
non-physical or spiritual aspect of love, demanding, even
for the female, active and demonstrative emotional com
mitment. Bros cannot be Indulged in indifferently, but
forces upon those who feel its power a desire to partici-
pate actively in an exchange of affection which may or
may not become a physical experience. While sexus remains
an impersonal, instinctive force determined by the laws
of nature, eros implies an Intensely personal emotional
experience arising from the Innermost recesses of one's
own spirit.
Much has been written in the secondary literature
on Lulu as the embodiment of the sexual drive, as an
earth-spirit whose presence recalls the Undines and the
Lorelels of an earlier period. Nowhere, however, Is men
tion made of Lulu as active, loving female with a oapaolty
for eros as well as for sexus.
124
Incredible as It may seem, her insistence that
she loved her patron and third husband Dr. SchiJn (despite
the fact that only a moment before she had pumped five
shots into his body) deserves full belief. Before making
her escape, she takes his head in her lap, kissing it
and crying, nIoh habe keinen Menschen auf der Welt
geliebt als ihn” (III, 97).
Because of her earlier dependence on Schdn for her
livelihood, Lulu still cherishes feelings for him which
exceed the bounds of sexual attraction. She admits to
him,
Wenn loh elnem Menschen auf dieser Welt gehSre,
gehflre ioh Ihnen. Ohne Sle wflre ich— ich will
nicht sagen wo. Sle haben mioh bel der Hand
genommen, mir zu essen gegeben, mich klelden
lassen, als loh Ihnen die Uhr stehlen wollte.
Glauben Sie, daB vergisst slch? Jeder andere
hfltte den Schutzmann gerufen. Sie haben mioh
zur Schule gesohlckt und mich Lebensart lernen
lassen. Wer ausser Ihnen auf der ganzen Welt •
hat Je etwas fflr mich dbrig gehabt? (Ill, 47).3
^Judged on the basis of his relationship with the
various characters of Erdgeist, it is difficult to believe
that Schdn ever did a benevolent act without some sort of
devious motive. Lulu's love for Sch8n is undeserved,
but— as was already established--the merits of a particu
lar love object is unrelated to the Intensity of the love.
The proto-figure of Lulu— Ella, of the fragment Blins
Erweckung— had also found a master in the original^
Sohigolch, prototype and namesake of Lulu's acquired
father. The development of the Ella-Sohigolsh relation
ship may have served as a basis both for the Lulu-
Sohigolch relationship, as well as for the Lulu-Schdn
relationship in Erdgeist. The first meeting is described
by the earlier Sohigolch,
. . . loh nahm sle von
125 ,
Lulu's feeling for both Schigoloh and Sch6n is
an example of eros. Her loyalty to both men suggests
Wedekind's ooncept of religious love. It is like the
fidelity of the dog toward his master, as described in
the 1884 letter to Amy Barte:
Was Oott dem Menschen 1st, 1st der Mensoh dem
Hunde. Dleser lflsst sich von lhm schlagen,
misshandeln, liebkosen, und hflngt dabei immer
mit glelcher Ehrfurcht, gleicher Liebe,
unwandelbarer Treue an seinem Herrn. Soviel
dber die Religion der Thiere (BrieferI. 4l).
Just as the animal shows his master a love which
transcends the basic instinctive demands for survival
of either the organism or the species, so does Lulu
feel genuine gratitude as an aspect of eros.
It would be pointless to Insist on Lulu's capacity
for eros as greater than her capacity for sexus. The
important point is that she manifests both aspects of
love: the basic, sexual, instinctive urge, as well as
the complex, emotional demand for personal involvement in
life.
Until Schdn decides to break with Lulu in favor
Der Strasse auf. Sie war nloht sehr verwdhnt . .
War sue dem Bodenloch hervorgekrochen . . . Erst*
hat's gewelnt, sich an die Wand gedrdckt.
Wie's mir dann aber so ins Aug' gesohaut
Und auf die Finger, drln das Brot geborgen,
Kommt's zur Vernunft, fasst mein Qewand. Darauf
Ist's bebend mir gefolgt in meine Hdhle (IX, 34-35).
of "das schuldlose Kind" (III* 77)» there Is no real
conflict for Lulu. As a sexual object she even allows
herself to be handed around among Schdn's intimate circle
of friends--but only so long as her basic status (as the
personification of sexual power) remains intact. She is
cooperative and obedient until Schdn inadvisedly decides
to have her removed as a threat to his bflrgerliche Moral.
At that moment it becomes necessary for her to become
something more than simply his favorite paramour. She
becomes suddenly aggressive in her plot to retain him as
the object of an affection which is more than purely
physical.
Sexually, Lulu is a passive figure. As long as
her presence alone is sufficient to Insure Schdn's con
tinuing attention, she submits to his tyranny without
protest. In both Erdgeist and Pandora Lulu is the
center of activity, a poisonously seductive flower upon
which unsuspecting (though not innocent) Insects light
and perish. As the symbol of sexual love she radiates
a compelling attractiveness while remaining, with the
exception of her last relationship with Schdn, a passive
figure. Bnotionally (i.e., non-sexually) Luly becomes
aggressive at that moment when she finds herself incap
able of holding her prey by the sheer Inertia of her being.
127
The problem of the active versus the passive role
In the love relationship occurs with regularity In
Wedekind. Whereas sexus implies passivity for the female
and aggressiveness for the male, eros implies active com
mitment for both male and female. lulu's troubles begin
when ahe assumes the aggressive role of the male, not
only as an emotional force, but also as a sexual force.
Her assault against Schttn marks the awakening of emotion
(eros) and the beginning of her decline as Instinktwesen.
Wedekind envied the passive role of the woman
in the sex experience. Convinced that the aggressive
role of the male is less fulfilling than the role of
the female, he would gladly have changed places with the
prostitute. In the poem Konfession (1904) he writes,
Lleben?— Nein, das bringt keln Gtlttck auf Erden
Lieben bringt Entwttrdigung und Neid.
Heiss und oft und stark gellebt zu werden
Das heisst Leben, das 1st Seligkelt (I, 43-44).
The problem of active versus passive love impulses
had already been touched upon in a conversation between
Melchior and Moritz in Frtthlings Brwaohen. Moritz desires
an experience which, as a part of sexual activity, proper
ly rests with the woman.
Unrecht lelden zu mttssen 1st sttsser, denn Unrecht
tun. Unverschuldet eln so sttsses Unrecht ttber
sich ergehen lessen zu mttssen, scheint mir der
Inbegrlff aller irdisohen Seligkelt . . .
Das Mttdchen geniesst wle die sellgen Otttter.
Das Mfldchen wehrt sich dank seiner Veranlagung.
Es httlt sich bis zum letzten Augenblick von jedem
128
Bltternls frei, um mlt elnem Male alle Hlmmel
flber sleh hereinbrechen zu sehen. Das Mfldchen
fdrchtet die Hfllle noeh In dem Moment, da es eln
bltihendes Paradles wahrnimmt. Seln Bnpfinden 1st
so frisoh wle der Quell, der dem Fels entspringt.
Das Mfldchen ergrelft elnen Pokal, dber den noch
kein Irdlscher Hauch geweht, elnen Nektarkelch,
dessen Inhalt es, wle er flammt und flaokert,
hiinunterschlingt . . . Die Befrledlgung, die
der Mann dabel flndet, denke Ich mir schal und
abgestanden (II, 124).
Moritz, In refusing to respond to Ilsa when she appears
to him just before his suicide, shows his Inability to
play the aggressive part of the male. He suffers In part
from an androgynlc confusion which he Is Incapable of
resolving.
/
Gregor of the fragment Sonnenspektrum voices
a similar desire when he remakrs to one of the prosti
tutes, "Wflre Ich als hflbsches Mfldchen zur Welt gekommen,
ich hfltte vorausslchtlich auch delnen Beruf erwflhlt”
(IX, 136).
Lulu's development from sexus to eros, from
passive to active female, is a reversal of the tendency
so marked in Moritz. She cannot be satisfied by playing
the traditional female role of receiving the advances of
the male. Her problems begin at that point where it is
no longer possible for her to find satisfaction by the
simple fact of her being. By becoming an active agent
desiring a more complex emotional experience than simple
feminine instinct demands, she becomes humanized, more
129
masculine, and potentially tragic.
By Insisting that Lulu personifies the forces of
sexus alone, Fechter Ignored an Important aspect of Lulu,
In whom Wedekind attempted to unite sexus and eros:
Wedekind kennt nur elne Liebet die zeuaende,
empfangende, kOrperllch bedlngte, vom Korper
empfundene, auf den Kflrper gehende. Dleser
angebllche Erotiker 1st 1m letzten Orunde der
bltterste Antlerotlker, den es Je gegeben hat
(Fechter, 21).
In der elslgen Glut, mlt der Frank Wedekind das
Abblld des Lebens glbt, 1st fdr Erotlsches letzten
Endes kelne Atmosphere mehr; sle stlrbt an der
Kfllte, wenn sle je gelebt haben sollte (Fechter,
25).
Lulu exemplifies Wedekind's Insistence that
Leldenschaft constitutes the basis of his dramatic person
ages. Although she comes closer than any of the other
major female characters to personifying pure sexual
Instinct, she is not spared the pain of emotional Involve
ment (eros) In life.
As the personification of sexus Lulu's actions
are the direct and Immediate response of Instinct. She
Is a vivid representation of procreative nature, Indif
ferent to Nan's hope of achieving menschllohe Moral.
Sexus makes her unscrupulous, unsentimental and thoroughly
self-centered. With the exception of the affair with
SchSn, which showed her capacity for eros, Lulu is as
Impersonal as nature itself. In his discussion of the
Lulu dramas, Kutscher describes her role and function as
130
the manifestation of instinctive power:
Die VerkSrperung dleser KLementargewait stellt
er [Wedekind] in den Mittelpunkt seiner Handlung.
Die Schlange bedient sich der Eva belm Stfndenfall,
die Schlange 1st in Eva, Slnnblld elner weibllchen
Kraft. Der Qeschlechtstrleb als solcher 1st
zerstSrend. Lulu 1st als stetlger Anreiz zu
dleser Leldenschaft, Prlnclp der Zerstdrung.
Sie 1st keln Mensch, keln Individuum . . . Sle
1st elne ttberwlrkllche Erscheinung, ein
Phflnomen, ein Qleichnis, aber nlcht etwa 'das'
Weib, auch etwas anders als ein Typus, sondern
eine Naturgewalt, ein mystlsches Wesen wle die
Nixe, etwas Bestlmmteres noch als das blosse
Instinktwesen: Personlfikation des weibllchen
Geschlechtstrlebes, der im Zentrum des Lebens
steht, Oelst der ETde, der herabzieht, ein
vernlchtender Dfimon. Der Egolsmus 1st ihr
Fundament und findet gerade hier seinen hflrtesten
Ausdruck (Kutscher, I, 362-363).
To the extent that Lulu is the embodiment of
sexus, she is spiritually self-sufficient. It is eros,
the desire to become emotionally Involved in the lives
of others, which makes the Individual dependent upon
society. Kutscher's insistence that Egolsmus is the
basis of her personality emphasizes Lulu's role as a
phenomenon apart from society. Just as she personifies
sexus instinctively, she is also instinctively egoistic.
She is the antonym of society, for she harbors the only
reason for her existence within herself.
lulu's Egolsmus is Important for a perspective
on Wedekind's search for morality, for it contradicts all
that the search implies. In the first place, Lulu does
not search. She aspires toward nothing, for she is
131
complete within herself. In the second place she Is un
related to morality because she is asocial. Her instinc
tive knowledge of the world and of herself— she uses the
word Erkenntnls— needs no further affirmation. Mensch-
llohe Moral, pursued in an atmosphere of freedom and
empirical inquiry, is something which she would not under
stand. In Erdgeist she tells Schdn, "Es 1st mir auch
vollkommen gleichgdltig, was man von mir denkt. Ich
mttchte um alles nlcht besser sein als ich bln. Mir 1st
wohl dabei" (III, 73).
The inherent knowledge of herself (Erkenntnls),
which is the basis of Lulu's Egolsmus, is what makes her
Independent and immune to the corrupting Influence of
society. As has been shown, Lulu is destroyed, not by
the force of an external enemy (society), but by the
conflict within herself. Jack is only the visible symbol
of that conflict. Lulu is oblivious to the demands of
society. She does not exist for its benefit. In the laBt
dialogue with Schfln, Just before she murders him, she
appraises her role with sobering objectivity:
Wenn sich die Menschen um melnetwlllen umgebracht
haben, so setzt das meinen Wert nioht herab . . .
Ich habe nle in der Welt etwas anders soheinen
wollen, als wdfur man mich genommen hat, und man
hat mioh nle in der Welt fflr etwas anders genommen,
als was ich bln (III, 95).
Lulu seeks no external Justification for herself
in society because, as the self-sufficient embodiment of
132
instinct, she is close to the divine source from which
all life springs. Her link with eternal creation
(Erkenntnls) is an inherent knowledge through which she
is prevented from profaning her inviolate spirit. Lulu's
Erkenntnls is primeval, as eternally valid as the myster
ious, mythological, nameless entity she represents—
Eva-Mignon-Nelli-Kathi. Instinctive knowledge of her own
role in the great scheme of creation relieves her of the
necessity of searching for identity and meaningfulness.
Lulu always knows without being concerned with how she
knows. Her intuitive perception of life is a major force
for self-preservation, a force which protects her only
as long as she remains loyal to that perception. Lulu
remains aloof, self-centered, and somehow perennially
chaste, no matter how many men fall prey to her. She
speaks of Erkenntnls as an inherent reflex which protects
her from self-desecration: "Wenn ich mich gegen meine
Erkenntnisse versdndige, dann ftihle ich mich am nfichsten
Tage an Leib und Seele besohmutzt und brauche Wochen, um
den Ekel, den ich vor mir empfinde, zu ftberwinden"
(III, 149).4
4
As a part of her Erkenntnls she senses intuitive
ly isolation and alienation aB the basic condition of
man. In a dialogue with Aiwa she says:
Lulu: Keiner ahnt was vom andern. Jeder melnt,
er sei allein das ungltickliche Opfer.
133
Lulu’s Erkenntnls supports her Egolsmus. The
knowledge which she personifies radiates from a course
more absolute than all the "truths" which Man acquires
through his frantic search. No other character from
Wedekind’s work was ever so unencumbered by the need
for self-justification.
The Africa-adventurer, Prince Escerny, engaged
by Dr. Schfln to offer himself as a prospective mate to
Lulu, thus removing her as a possible temptation and
threat to the doctor's forthcoming marriage, says of
her, "Wohltuend berflhrt es an der Kdnstlerin, dass das
Publikum ftfr sle gernicht vorhanden 1st . . . Wenn sie
Ihr Solo tanzt, berauscht sle sich an ihrer eigen
Schdnheit— in die sie selber zum Sterben verliebt zu
seln schelnt" (ill, 66).
Supported by her Erkenntnls, Lulu can even live
in subjugation without violating her Egolsmus. The need
for confrontation with a force more powerful than herself
Is a compulsion for Lulu. As the embodiment of the de
structive and chaotic impulse in nature, she reaffirms
her right to prevail through her ever-recurring conteats
Aiwa: Wie kflnnen Sle denn das ftihlen?
Lulu: Es l&uft elnem so ein eislger Schauer
am Kflrper herauf.
Aiwa: Sie slnd unglaubllch (III, 64).
134
with the aggressive male sexual spirit. The problem lies
with the dearth of males who are capable of sustaining
their mastery over her.
Wedekind conceives of female sexus as the longing
for confrontation with a force more powerful than herself.
The Instinctive appetites of the Woman, and particularly
Lulu, manifest themselves as a desire to be mastered.
Lulu shares with a large and impressive group of Wedekind
women— Effie, Elfriede, Lisiska, Larissa, etc.,— a desire
to be subjugated by masculine brute force. For Lulu
that desire is satisfied first by Sohigolch, then by
Dr. Schfln, and finally by Jack. She Is bored by the
freedom and Indulgence allowed her as the wife of all
but her first husband Goll. To Dr. Schfln's accusation,
"Du sehnst dich nach der Peitsche zurtlck!" she replies
listlessly, "Mag seln. Ich tanze nicht mehr" (ill, 46).
Lulu, the wild beast promised to the audience in the
prologue of Erdgeist— "Das wahre Tier, das wilde schdne
Tier . . . die Urgestalt des Weibes"— bored by freedom
and longing for subjugation, is unable to find a force
or personality stronger than herself.
Her three later mates all become restless, banal
and dissipated once their desire to possess her is satis
fied. Speaking of Schwarz, she tells Dr. Sch6n, "Er
liebt mich . . . Er kennt mich nicht aber er liebt mich!
135
Hfltte er nur eine annflhernd richtige Vorstellung von mir,
er w&rde mir elnen Stein an den Hals binden und mich lm
Meer versenken, wo es am tlefsten 1st! (Ill, 46).^
Lulu shocks her mates In the same way that all
Wedekind women flaunt propriety— Helene, Kadidja, Larissa,
Lisiska, etc. Like the young prostitute of Der erste
Sohritt she is a classic example of "Die Lasterhaftlg-
kelt, die vom Herzen kommt und zu Herzen geht." (VIII,
270). When put to the test, It takes a Jack to equal her,
for the other masculine personalities have all been
softened and diverted by the inconsequential preoccupa
tions of society.
Lulu's longing for subjugation remains unrequited
because her mates, with the exception of Goll and Schdn,
are all inferior copies of what men, according to Wedekind,
were intended to be. They have squandered both their
instinctive and their emotional capacity to participate
6
In life. They are all dwarfs compared to Lulu. Each
5
She is wrong, but only in her prophecy of the
form which the reaction of the unappreciative Schwarz
will assume, for Instead of drowning Lulu where the water
runs deepest, the painter, upon learning of her past,
ohooses to slash his own wrists.
^It Is ironic that Lulu, longing for subjugation
as an aspect of her instinctive will to survive, should
become the source of livelihood for a sizeable crowd of
international rabble. Though she can hardly be commended
for supporting all those who parasitioally depend on her
for their existence— Schigoloh, Schwarz or Aiwa Schdn—
136
of them deserves his fate. Lulu is incorrigible in so
ciety because society itself is incorrigible. She is not
a denial of life, but only a refutation of the institu
tionalization of life with its callous, Impersonal
standards and its functionalistic basis.
Lulu’s guilt, if the term is at all applicable,
has nothing to do with her relationship to society, but
depends rather upon the awakening of an emotional capacity
(eros— Gefflhl) within herself which is counter to her
destiny as the personification of Instinct (sexus).
In the Lulu-dramas taken as a whole, the murder
of Schdn is the turning point in her career. A rising
curve of fortune which has brought her comfort and
abundance up to that point, begins to descend with her
arrest in the closing scene of Erdgeist. With little
relief, the whole course of her final devastation is a
downhill path throughout Pandora. It is more than coin
cidental that the one relationship precipitated by active
participation and desire on Lulu's part, is also the
relationship which heralds her defeat. Though she never
sinks to the level of meeting society on its own terms,
at the same time it is Irrelevant to think of her as
guilty. Neither promiscuity nor lack of sympathy for her
victims make her culpable. Of all the many admirers who
find their way to her chamber, not one deserves sympathy.
137
she nevertheless succeeds In corrupting that element of
her nature which had originally made her oblivious to
social forces— her instinctive appetite for life, for the
dance, for grace and beauty. Against her own better
(instinctive) Judgment, she sins against herself, and
pays for that transgression with her life. Her capacity
for eros (particularly her love for Schdn) ultimately
succeeds in destroying that which had made her irresist
ible to the world about her.
Arthur Kutscher describes not only Lulu’s guilt,
as it develops from the beginning of her active role
in coercing Dr. Schdn, but also the course of her fate
and her own ultimate end, with the lines,
Sie will gar keine Opfer, die fallen ihrer
Sdttigung von selbst, und darum 1st sie auch
unschuldlg. Ein Bdses an sich 1st in ihr
nicht vorhanden, es entsteht elgentllch erst
durch den Mann, das helsst durch des Mannes
UnzulAnglichkeit und SchwAche . . .
Sie aber welss nicht, was sle tut. Mit grossen
runden Kinderaugen folgt sie unbekdramert ihrer
Natur: "Ich tue melne Schuldigkelt." Sle kennt
keine Sdnde. Sie hat keln Qewlssen, keine Seele.
Ihre Schuld 1st, dass sle sich selber untreu wlrd,
dass sie ihre eigne Wahrhelt verleugnet, die
tfahrheit, deren dAmonlsche Kraft sle hob und
hielt. Das wilde, schdne Tier beugt sich ins
Joch" (Kutscher, I, 364-365).
The preceding chapter examines Wedekind's attempt
to find in Woman support for his concept of menschliche
Moral. Unlike Man, who personifies the irreconcilable
conflict between instinct and emotion, Woman is by nature
138
a harmonious whole. Wedekind sees her as the personifi
cation of both Instinct and emotion. As long as her
emotions re-enforce her Instincts, she does not share
Man's need to justify her life externally. Unless corrupt
ed by society, she Is closer to the original harmony of
nature than Man. Wedekind vainly solicits her aid In his
search for morality.
Wedekind divides Woman Into two categories: die
Frau, who succeeds In harnessing the forces of emotion,
that— Instead of supporting instinctive drives— she
works to destroy them,* and das Welb, who never learns to
differentiate between emotion and Instinct, and continues
to support Instinctive longings by her emotional partici
pation in life. The first group— counterparts to the
men of brutale Intelligenz— are successful in society
but they are inadequate as human beings. The second
group falls In society, and is destroyed by the tyranny
of bttrgerliohe Moral. Anna of Keith and Mrs. Grant of
Hidalla are examples of the first type; Katharina of
Liebestrank and Fellssa of Neufundland are examples of
the second type.
Instead of aiding Man in his search for morality,
as Wedekind had hoped, Woman (das Welb) actually compli
cates and impedes the search. Her presence threatens Man
as an Individual, just as it threatens society and the
139
bflrgerllche Moral. She threatens the Individual by
emphasizing his capacity for chaos. She threatens society
by her overt disregard for its institutions (marriage,
family, etc.).
Wedekind also approaches the problem of Woman
as the personification of sexus and eros. Sexus is
aboriginal. It is directly related to the procreative*
drive. . Eros is an aspect of love which is the result of
civilization. It is spiritual and Intellectual, and may
exist with or without the help of sexual drives. Eros
is to Qefflhl as sexus is to Instlnkt.
Fechter's description of Lulu as the embodiment
of sexus alone is inadequate, for Lulu is both sexus and
eros, both Gefflhl and instinct. Both her love for Schdn
and her loyalty to Schlgolch are examples of her capacity
for eros. Eros, unlike sexus, demands active and willful
participation in life. It is a capacity for love which
differentiates Man from lower animals, although— like the
’ 'Religion der Tiere"— its source cannot be fully explained
in terms of conscious volition.
Erkenntnls and Egolsmus are important aspects of
lulu's inherent knowledge of herself. Her indifference
to society emphasizes her own special heritage as a part
of divinity. Despite Lulu's destructive effect on society,
Wedekind emphasizes her right to prevail at itB expense.
140
Her "guilt" Is the result, not of transgressions against
society, but against her own person. Lulu's ability to
endure subjugation suggests the validity of her convic
tion that she carries her freedom within herself as a
part of her Erkenntnls. Her Erkenntnls Is as much a
part of her as sexus. Both are Instinctive and defy
refutation.
The women of Wedekind, taken individually or
collectively, offer no help in the poet's attempt to
substantiate his belief In Instinct as the basis of the
menschliche Moral. Their emotional capacity, not only
Impedes his search, but is also a destructive force for
the Woman herself. Both rational and irrational approach
es to truth and meaning fail. The search continues.
CHAPTER V
THE FUNCTION OF DEATH IN THE SEARCH FOR MORALITY
I
Der Tod eines unbedeutenden Menschen 1st keln Ver-
lust, well der unbedeutende Mensch leleht zu br-
setzen let, Der Tod elnes bedeutenden Menschen
1st keln Verlust, well ffir hundert Menschen Raum,
Luft und Yerdlenst daduroh geschaffen wlrd.
Inwlefern 1st es ein Unglttck, wenn Ich heute
sterbe?
FQr aloh 1st es kelns (IX, 271).
Death, for Wedekind, Is no more than the termina
tion of life. Its only function is that It lends to life
a sense of urgency. His hope of formulating a morality
through which life can become a meaningful experience does
not extend to death. Vedeklnd does not seek to overcome
the grave, but rather to glean a sense of purpose and
meaning from finite life. Sentimentality and grief, as a
part of Man*8 accomodation to death, Is completely foreign
to him. He Is unimpressed by religious beliefs which en
visage a Jenseits as reward for the faithful and damnation
for the unfaithful. Fechter remarks, "Der Tod 1st bel
Vedeklnd • • • Schicksal, verhingt vom elgnen oder vom
stirkeren Villen und hSohstens Erldsung vom Trleb, d.h.
vom Leben, nicht mehrn (Fechter, 20).
l4l
142
Unless precipitated by violence, death Is both phi
losophically and dramatically insignificant. Only If a
man Is killed or if he takes his own life may his death
become meaningful for the living.
The occurence of non-violent death (death which
has not followed from willful acts of human beings),
whether as murder or suicide, is almost non-existent in
Wedekind's work. There is no mention made of non-violent
death in any of the dramas, and only in a few Isolated in
stances Is non-violent death Important in the narrative
prose. In Rabbi Esra there are two brief references to
the passing of his wife Lea: "... sie mir 1st sic
verschwunden wle der Schnee in der Rand" (I, 224); and:
" . . . sie mir hfttte sic sollen schenken ein Kn&blein
und hatte nicht Raum dafttr, und es dem Herrn hat gefalien
sic , dass er sie hat von mir genommen, samt meinem Kind"
(I, 227). In the short story Marianne her sister's death
is mentioned once, and the author infers that her husband
may have died from natural causes, but he gives no details,.
Of all the fictional prose writings, only the short
story, Per areise Freler. is more than casually ooncerned
with non-violent death. Leonie Fischer's vicarious ex
perience with death helps her to overcome her own moral-
sexual conflict, which is the central theme of the story.
Through the death of her sister, Leonie comes to acknowl
edge an irresistible magnetic force between human beings.
Klara's fatal heart disease, affects neither her
physical appearance nor her sexual appetite. She retains
her rosy complexion to her last breath. The final scene,
In which her love for Rudolph Is consummated. Is a defiant
act of life In the face of death. The act Is, for both
parties, completely compulsive. It Is as Inevitable as
Klara's death, which follows It. Klara's life Is like
that of the one-day fly. It Is terminated before time,
age and encroaching boredom have marred Its beauty. Kla
ra's whole being Is her capacity to love. Even her fatal
Illness is a symptom of that capacity. The doctor had
diagnosed her attack as the result of her enormous sexual
agitation: "der ganze Anfall rtihre liberhaupt nur von der
entsetzlichen Aufregung her, In der sle sich beflnde"
(I, 42). From the time of her first attack, there is
never any acceptable alternative for Klara. It Is not a
question of choosing between life and death, for life
without fulfillment Is already death— as symbolized In the
figure of the ugly old man who had already twice visited
her In her dreams. Beoause Klara will never be strong
again, any real chance of prolonging her life is never
offered. Hfcr flushed complexion, a manifestation of her
sexual predilection, belies the weakened condition of her
heart. Her death Is triumphant— a climactic moment of
Joyous fulfillment.
144
Der grelsc Preler Is Wedekind's only attempt in
prose to develop the oarpe diem theme. It portrays the
sense of urgency which the Inevitability of death gives
to life. Wedekind's quarrel Is never with death, but
only with the superstitions surrounding death, supersti
tions nurtured by the religious tenets of bflrgerllche Mo
ral.
The force which binds the two lovers, like the
death which follows from their union, has its origin In
the Immutable laws of nature. Resistance to physical at
traction is ultimately as futile as resistance to death,
for the compelling force which has brought the lovers to
gether constitutes the spiritual-physical unity, which Is
the basis of life. Leonie describes the first moment of
Intimacy between Klara and Rudolf. "Er hatte sich auf die
Lippen geblssen und lhr In die Seele hinuntergesehen; sle
hatte es ebenso mlt lhm gemacht, womdgllch noch lelden-
• * »
schaftlicher ..." (I, 239).
The tension of the story is centered in the inter
nal struggle of Leonie Fischer, praying for guidance as
she haltingly compiles with Klara's wish, that she allow
Rudolf to enter her death bed. Barkening to the pangs of
her conscience, she argues with herself: "Neln,sagt ich
mir, das darfat du nicht tun. Klara war bis Jetzt ein
anst&ndiges Mftdehen, und wenn sie das tut, dann 1st sle
145
das nleht mehr" (I, 247). The conflict la finally re
solved when the deity, with whoa Leonie pleads for a sign,
does not Interfere with her growing resolution to allow
Rudolf entrance to her slater's room. She even prays that
any necessary vengeance for her decision be Incurred
against herself, not against Klara. Her complete self
lessness is unparalleled In Wedekind.
Leonie's resolution to allow the physical consum
mation of the love relationship between her sister and
Rudolf, despite the absence of the sacramental blessing of
the Qhuroh, Is Justified by her interpretation of the com
ments made by the school chaplain during religion classy
when he had explained that in heaven there would be no
differentiation between the sexes. Using this teaching to
the practical advantage of all, Leonie had formulated a
course of action. "Wenn es 1m Hlnrnel weder Frauen noch
Mflnner gab, dann kdnnte es nlchts ausmachen, ob Klara noch
einmal mlt ihm zusammen war Oder nicht" (I, 248). Leonie's
decision, painfully arrived at because of the conflict be
tween bttrgerliche and mensohllche Moral. Is made possible
because of the threatening shadow of death.
Leonie Fischer, having known as a young girl the
rapturous consummation of life and death, as It was ex
perienced by her sister, becomes exalted and sanotlfled.
Wedekind writes of her.
146
Der Menschenkenner, der sie sab, musste oloh aber
aagen, daaa das keine vergingllchen Relze waren,
sondern dass die alts Frau In welssem Haar noeh
ebensosshr dadurch auffallsn werde, wie es Jetzt
das Jungs Midehen tat; • • . Lsonle genoss Ihr
Junges Olttek ohne Ziererel, In absoluter Hinge-
bung, aber auoh ohne Urteil, ohne Jedes Ansehen
der Person. Sle liebte vorderhand nur die Liebe
(I, 233-231 *).
More than any other female personality in all of
Wedekind, Leonie Fischer stands out as a healthy and posi
tive affirmation of life. She has gained stability and
clarity through her encounter with the love-death. She
/
has come to accept obedience to the demands of instinct
as the prerequisite of life. She triumphs through sub
mission.
Klara Fischer's death is doubly meaningful, for
not only does it contribute to the edification and aware
ness of the surviving sister, but Wedekind is careful to
also justify the death in Klara's own terms. Following
Rudolf's final departure from her, Leonie enters the
sickroom: "... Sle war so hoffnungssellg, wie ich sle,
sowelt ich zurttckdenken konnte, nle gesehen" (I, 250).
Klara's thoughts following the act of union are centered
on her recovery as a symbol of physical-spiritual resur
rection, a renewal of life. She plans to arise the next
day; she will marry Rudolf and they will travel to Italy
together. Her death, a reward for her affirmation of
life, follows during sleep.
For Klara tha act was instinctive, even compul
sive, which removes It from the realm of ethloal consi
derations. Unlike the victims of the first category of
suicides (to be discussed In the next chapter), who glad
ly let themselves be destroyed for the amusement of the
gods and the salvation of society, there Is no element of
conscious sacrifice In Klara's act. If the act was mean
ingful to Klara, then It was the single moment of personal
fulfillment which made It so. Hers is a voluntary sur
render to a mightier force from which all life flows and
Is again recalled. It Is purely coincidental that Leonie
profits and develops from her exposure to Klara's love-
death, for Klara loves and dies to the glory of self and
the almighty gods.
The theme of non-violent death In Der grelse
Freler (as opposed to any of Wedekind's dramatic works)
has a very real function. With this single treatment of
death as the result of natural eauses (as opposed to the
suicides and murders which animate the dramatic works),
Wedekind suggests symbolically that not only life, but
also the termination of life, is a meaningful experience.
Klara's death, which marks the temporal conclusion of an
individual exlstenoe. Is also the culmination of that
existence. Time, as an extension of life, becomes mean
ingless. The celebration of a single sexual aot
148
transforms ths Isolated moment Into Infinity, the indi
vidual into humanity.
In addition to Wedekind's concern with the love-
death, and his belief that life demands total, voluntary
and Joyous submission to the forces of creation and de
struction, he sometimes uses the death motlv ironically,
particularly through the graveyard setting, to suggest
the folly of much of human striving. In the early dra
matic fragment Elina Brweckung a scene designated as
Prledhof lm Sonnenschein Introduces Sohigolch, who later
becomes Lulu's retainer and guardian. Schlgolch appears,
like the vermummter Herr, from behind a tombstone. The
death motlv. symbolic of final submission and ultimate
fatalism, suggests an ironic contrast to the practloal
ability of both figures to manipulate life and circum
stances to their own advantage.
In Bllns Krweckung. the graveyard is the setting
for a discussion between Elias and his friend. Oskar, a
medical student and spokesman for all who advooate a
practical and realistic adaptation to life. Oskar's in
sistence on the difference between fantasy and reality,
between dream-experlence and llfe-experlence, between
healthy egotism and unhealthy altruism, makes him an ar
ticulate exponent of the full life. He calls a large
gravestone, from behind which Sehleoloh resurrects
149
himself, "Jenes stolze Lebenszelehen menschlicher Eltel-
kelt" (IX, 31)* Men's endeavor to immortalize himself,
to build monuments to his own eternal glory is, for
Oskar, a last futile attempt to give at least permanence,
if not meaning, to an otherwise pointless life. The wish
to triumph over death proceeds, for those of little un
derstanding, from a misconception of what Oskar feels to
be the basic fact of existence: life is for the living.
Builders of monuments sentimentally hope to perpetuate
their own vanity, by achieving in death what they could
never achieve in life. The gravestone, for them, is an
attempt to have the last word, a demand for recognition
even after the voice has been silenced. For Oskar it is
a monstrosity— he calls it an "Ungetttm" (IX, 31). Man's
hope for a life eternal in terms of a separate and indivi
dual continuation of the earthly state is an Irreverent
conceit. Oskar is critical of Elln's hope that an abso
lute standard for good and evil does actually exist over
and above the scholastic claims of the theologians. Elln
insists, "UhbekOmmert richtet / Der ewlge Lenker zwisohen
Bbs und Out/ Und keine Forme1, die ihn Vfeg beweise" (IX,
30). Oskar has little patience with such superstition
and tries, by a parallel syllogism to demonstrate the
foolishness of Elln's olaim.
As in Ellns Brweckung. the graveyard setting with
its ominous walls and headstones lends a bizarre atmos-
phere to two Important scenes In Prtthl-lngs Brwachen. The
first Is the grotesque burial scene for Moritz Stlefel,
victim of the conflicting demands of bflrgerllche and
menschliohe Moral, He is unnerved by Internal compulsions
which conflict with his acquired sense of obligation to so
ciety. The second Is the final scene, of the play in which
the forces of affirmative existenoe (vermummter Herr) con
front the individual (Melchior) who has freed himself,
though not as irretrievably as Morita, from the destruc
tive and perverted morality of the older generation. The
grim background of headstones and crosses helps to empha
size the difference between the two boys. Moritz could
only look to death for the final resolution, whereas Mel
chior turns away from the temptation to destroy himself.
He hopes to find in life, as described by the vermummter
Herr, justification for his own existence. For Moritz
there was only despair; for Melchior there is a glimmer of
hope which offers just cause to continue. He refuses Mo
ritz' tempting invitation to follow him to the grave,
though he realizes that suicide will always remain a pos
sible alternative to life. In bidding his friend a last
farewell, Melchior admits, " . , . und wenn ich einmal eln
alter Mann in grauen Haaren bln, dann stehst gerade du mir
vielleloht wleder nflher als alle Mitlebenden" (II, 174).
The unlikelihood of ever ooapletely dispelling the
death wish Is echoed on at least two occasions In Wede
kind' s lyrics. In both Instances the wish focuses on a
cessation of pain and a longing for nothing store than nlr-
vanlc peace. Proa Elnkehr— the first of these poems— the
first, the second* and the last of six short stanzas are
particularly significant:
Du stllle Priedhofaauer*
Scheu tret* ich bei dir eln.
Wlllst du nicht aelner Trauer
Schiraende Helaat selnT
In delnem tiefen Prieden*
In deinea kUhlen Schoss
Wlrd alie Ruh' beschleden*
Die krank und ruhelos.
Entflohn dea Weltgetriebe
Tret' gern loh bei dir eln;
Wlllst du begrabener Llebe
Schiraende Helaat sein?
(I, 52-53).
The second poem, Trost. uses the death motlv to
strike an even deeper pessimistic chord. The central Idea
of the poea Is again death as the terainatlon of earthly
pain* not as a reward for a virtuous life:
Der Tod koaat bald und slcher*
Hilt stets slch In der Nth*
Er 1st eln fttrohterllcher
Trdster la Erdenweh.
Ich hasse lhn nlcht aus Llebe*
loh llebe lhn nicht aus Hiss.
Wenn nan unsterblieh bliebe*
Wie grauenvoll wire dasI
152
Des Fresaens und Weitergebaas
Urewlee Wlederkehr
Als hochsten Srtrag des Lebens
Brtrag' Ich nicht l&nger mehr
(I. 109).
Wedekind's conventional use of the death motlv in
the lyrics contrasts sharply with his ironic use of death
Bymbols in both Blins Erweckung and Frtthllngs Erwachen.
though the poems reflect what must have been in Melchior's
mind when, after his break from reform school, he had
sought refuge among the tombstones and finally stumbles on
to Wendla's grave. "Ich httnge fiber dem Abgrund— alles ver-
sunken, verschwunden— . . . Warum sle urn meinetwillenl
Warum nicht der Verschuldete2 ... So nelderffillt 1st
noch keln Sterbllcher fiber Orfiber gewandelt" (II, 166).
Melchior's desire for death is short-lived. His
resistance to maudlin thoughts and shabby sentimentalism
reflects Wedekind's refusal to seek in the phenomenon of
death an answer to moral questions which must be pursued
in life. Melchior's desire to seek the narrow path be
tween Sollen and Wollen— described by the vermummter Herr
as the way to morality— is a desire which can only be sa
tisfied by continuing to confront and to oppose a bfirger-
llche Moral contrived by society to destroy the indivi
dual. Melchior's decision against death is a tacit af
firmation of life.
153
II
In his prose writings, with the exception of Per
greise Preier. Wedekind was unconcerned with both violent
and non-violent death. In the lyrics the death motlv re
flects a pessimistic death wish uncharacteristic for Wede
kind. In the dramas he uses the graveyard setting on
several occasions to suggest the senselessness of death
as a voluntary alternative to life. It is also to the
dramas that one must look to examine the one aspect of
death which remained important to Wedekind throughout his
life: suicide.
Suicide and murder both represent violent death.
Of the several instances of murder in the plays, best
known is the final act of Lulu in which both the Countess
and Lulu meet a violent end. In Schloss Wettersteln
Leonora's first husband is murdered in a duel with Rtt-
dlger. In Herakles the murder of the innocent page boy
contributes to the hero's deepening sense of guilt. More
important in a formulation of Wedekind's search for moral
ity is not death inflicted by one individual on another,
but rather death inflicted against one's own person.
Uhlllce death which follows as the simple and non
violent termination of life— either from illness or from
the failure of bodily organs— suicide is basically a moral
phenomenon. Whether committed in support of, or in
154
protest against, an external (social) reality, suicide is
always a comment on the individual's relationship to the
world about him. Unlike non-violent death, it is aore
than simply a conclusion to life. It is an alternative to
it, the most extreme alternative of which Han is capable.
Emile Durkheim, in his Suicide: A Study in Sociology.
insists that the high incidence of suicide in the latter
half of the nineteenth century is dependent, not so much
upon the economic complexltlea of modern life, but upon
the fact that morality has become an ineffective force.
Society has failed to provide Man with spiritual Justifi
cation for his life:
The maladjustment from which we suffer does not
exist because the objective causes of suffering
have increased in number or Intensity; it bears
witness not to greater economic poverty, but to
an alarming poverty of morality (Durkheim,
386-87)•
The abnormal development of suicide and the ge
neral unrest of contemporary societies spring
from the same causes. The exceptionally high
number of voluntary deaths manifests the state
of deep disturbance from which civilised so
cieties are suffering, and bears witness to
1The original work appeared as Le Suicide (1897).
The English translation by John A. Spaulding and George
Simpson first appeared from The Free Press (Glencoe, Illi
nois) in 1950. It is from that edition that the quota
tions used in this paper have been taken. It is curious
to note that Wedekind's Kammersinaer. with the suicide of
Helene, was written in the sane year in which Durkheim* s
Le Suicide first appeared.
155
Its gravity. It may even be said that it mea
sures it (Durkheim, 391)*
For Wedekind, as for Durkheim, suicide is the consequence
of the individual's conflict with the society in which he
finds himself. Men at the close of the nineteenth century
shared with men of previous centuries the desire to iden
tify with social Ideals which reflected rational and irra
tional forces within themselves. When society failed to
provide a basis for individual life, they sought the cause
of the difficulty either within that society or within
themselves. Wedekind's characters realize the demands of
both individual and social morality but find themselves
Incapable of resolving the conflict which those demands
create. Of the characters already mentioned Moritz, Mel
chior and Blln are all caught in the same dilemma. Moritz
succeeds in escaping through suicide. Melchior only
flirts with the possibility of suloide. Elln, absorbed in
the affairs which he simultaneously oarrles on with both
Nettohen and the Church, has no penchant for suicide what
soever. In response to Oskar's question, "Kein Hang zur
Selbstentlelbung?N, he had answered, nOott bewahr' miohi/
Das fehlte nooh" (IX, 24).
Among those who flounder on the brink of an out
moded morality without being able to establish a new sys
tem capable of supporting the individual within society,
is a list of characters who either successfully or
156
unsuccessfully attempt to terminate their own lives. The
majority succeed in their attempt. The list of unsuccess
ful suicides includes (in addition to Melchior) also the
aspiring artist Frldolin and his beloved Johanna of the
Schnellmaler. and Rlcarda of Kinder und Narren— both plays
from the early period. The list continues with the Count
ess Oeschwitz (Lulu) who hangs herself with a piece of
cord too frayed to serve the purpose. When the cord
breaks she is left prey to Jack* at whose hand she then
shares Lulu's fate. The Jump from the bridge, an attempt
by the deposed monarch of K&nig Nlcolo to resist the re
strictions Imposed upon him, may be partly understood as
his desire to terminate his life, partly as a carefully
calculated risk to effect his escape. Karl Hetmann of the
Hidalla drama tries on two occasions to have himself mas
sacred by the raging mob before finding relief at the end
of a rope, not as a martyr to his own cause, as he had
hoped, but rather in humiliating defeat and resignation.
Kadidja of Zensur had already prior to the opening of the
play made one attempt against her own life. She is more
successful in her second attempt. Leonore and Rtidlger of
Schloss Wetterstein toy with thoughts of a suicide pact.
In like manner both Scholz and Keith of Der Marquis von
Keith consider suicide before choosing in favor of the un
certainties of life. Finally Veit Kunz of Franzlska. at
157
his failure to win the heroine for himself, makes an un
successful attempt against his own life*
Particularly noticeable Is the persistence of
several characters In their attempts until success finally
rewards their efforts: Oeschwltz, Hetmann, Kadldja, and
even Nicolo— to the extent that he Invites death each time
he sets his foot on Umbrian soil, from which he has been
twice banished*
Longer and more conclusive Is the list of success
ful attempts by Wedekind's characters to terminate their
lives. Besides Moritz of Frtihllngs Brwachen we must men
tion Helene of the Kammers&nger* Kadldja of Zensur* and
Karl Hetmann of the Hldalla drama, both the artist Egon
Schwarz and the gymnaslast Hugenburg of the Lulu dramas,
Molly of the Marquis of Keith* Castl Plan! of Tod und
Teufel* Luckner and Effle of Schloss Wetterstein. Sophie
and Gtlstid of Franzlska* and finally the poet Pustekohl
and the Kaiserln of the pantomime Die Kalserin von
Neufundland. In the prose writings suicide causes the
death of Alois, the stepson in the short narrative
Marianne.and the princess In Die Fflrstln Russalka.
Because attempted suicide— both successful and un
successful— occurs in Wedekind's work with almost predic
table regularity, It suggests the possibility of grouping
those who attempt self-destruotion into categories
according to tholr reasons for choosing this ultimate so
lution to their problems.
If the Individual cannot adapt to external circum
stances without terminating hla own life, then--according
to both Wedekind and Durkheim— society Is partly to blame.
i
It has either so minimized the Individualistic Impulse
within Nan, encouraging him to sacrifice himself altruis
tically for the good of the group; or it has failed to
check his Individualistic impulse by providing him with
an Ideal or an authority In harmpny with the promptings
of his own spirit. In the first Instance suicide Is the
result of an underdeveloped Individualistic spirit; in the
second Instance it Is the result of an over-developed In
dividualistic spirit. The former Is an example of the
predominance of the bflrgerllche Moral; the latter Is an
example of the predominance of the menschliche Moral.
When experience falls to provide sufficient proof for the
validity of individual life, men aspire toward heroic sa
crifice as an endorsement of bflrgerllche Moral. When ex
perience fails to provide sufficient reason for the Indi
vidual (Wollen) to acquiesce to the group (Solien). he be
comes so entangled In his protest against the monolithic
power of society, that he destroys himself in sheer de
spair.
Although any attempt to classify Wedekind's
159
victims of suicide into categories according to their Mo
tivation nust be arbitrary, there Is one classification
which lends Itself particularly well to the total problem
of the poet's search for morality. This classification Is
built on a division Into three groups, according to their
relative position In regard to society: the altruists,
the penitents and the desperate. The first two groups
share their acceptance of society as the final measure of
all human endeavor. They surrender their individualism
to the mightier force of the collective enterprise. The
third group insists on the validity of the Individual
(menschllche Moral) even though their resistance to so
ciety forces them to forsake their hope of continued life.
The first group surrenders Its Individualism to
society from the very beginning. Their sacrifice Is the
result of convictions which society has Instilled in them,
either as religious or as moral tenets of faith. The
second group resists conforming to the demands of society
until the tension becomes so unbearable that they are fi
nally forced to acquiesce. Their sacrificial death Is a
public acknowledgement of their transgressions against so
ciety. The third group remains first, last and always in
dividualistic. They share neither spiritually nor physi
cally In the corporate society. They vainly seek to Jus
tify themselves in harmony with a spirit which Is neither
160
social nor collective, but emotional and instinctive. Be
fore discussing in detail the three categories of suicide
and the place that each assumes in Wedekind's search for
morality, it is necessary to determine first the charac
ters which should be included in each category.
The first group is made up of those who, like Het
mann in his unsuccessful attempts to sacrifice himself to
the unruly mob, hope to martyr themselves for another hu
man being, for an ideal or for an institution. In the
case of the youths of Die grosse Llebe. it is a mystical
god, as revealed to man through the religious institution
of the primitive cult, which is the ideal. The members of
this category hope, through their demise, to give concrete
form to a spiritual ideal which only the ultimate sacri
fice of individual life can bring about.2 Both Leonore of
Schloss Wetterateln and Elfrlede of Tod und Teufel aspire
toward death in a rapturous moment of sacrificial deliri
um, though each of them is deterred from the final act by
an intervening circumstance. Leonore, alarmed at the pos
sibility of her husband's being imprisoned for grand lar
ceny, is willing to sacrifice herself to save him. She
2Kutscher quotes from the notebooks to the novel-
fragment of Die grosse Llebe. (ca. 1906) n'Der Begriff des
Wollttstigen opfertoaes genort wie der Oottesbegriff, wle
die Begrlffe von Raum und Zeit zu den dem Mensohen ange-
borenen Begrlffen und 1st deshalb gdttliohen Ursprungs' * 1
(Kutaoher, II, 138).
l6l
tells him, "Ich bln zum Attssersten bereiti loh tbte mloh
hler sofort, wenn es dir etwas hilftl" (VI, 42). Elfrlede
Is prevented from sulolde by the suicide of Castl Pianl,
the procurer whose Ironic fate It Is to be comforted In
death by a virgin. He destroys himself to escape El
frlede 1s amorous advances. Even Leonie Fischer might be
Included in this category of suicides, for she conscious
ly tempts death through her willingness to sacrifice her
self for her sister. As a consequence of her naive be
lief in a wrathful god, the object of her primitive
Christianity, she fully expects to be struck dead for
having made the decision to allow Rudolf to enter her
dying sister's bedchamber.3 she is, fully aware that the
Individual must be willing to accept total responsibility
for his own actions, and she awaits final destruction
with great trepidation. Because its members are able to
^Aslde from this one Instance In which Leonie Is
willing to risk a sudden and horrible death, she is In no
way a melancholy spirit, nor does she lean toward sulolde.
She is a spirit bursting with the fullness of life, yet
capable of a sacrifice to those she loves. Leonie Flsoher
Is one of the few Instances in all of Wedekind's work where
an essentially altruistic spirit appears as a desirable
personality. The author writes of hert
Leonie Flsoher war elne von jenen Naturen . . .
die nlemals anstossen. Dank einem angeborenen
feinen seellchen Takt und elner selbstlosen
Denkungsartj elne von Jenen Naturen, die inmer
mlt anderen empflnden, und die nur glflcklich
sein kdnnen, wenn es lhre Oagebuni 1st (I, 233)*
162
completely Identify with an absolute.ideal beyond them
selves, the first category of suicides is the least tragic
of the three groups. Wholly imbued with the significance
of the ideal, they long for permanent association with it.
Bach of the altruistic suicides bases his concept of the
meaningful life on an external value which is either reli
gious, social or personal. For the youths of Die grosse
Liebe the ideal is both religious and social. Their reli
gious education, designed to prepare them for the selfless
sacrifice, is perpetuated through ritualistic forms trans
mitted to the Individual by the society. Hetmann1s goal
is social, but is concerned with only a small and select
group within society, not with society at large. El-
frlede's and Leonora's altruism is directed toward one in
dividual who personifies the ideal. With the awakening of
love feelings, each forsakes her former belief (as Frau)
in the validity of the bttrgerllche Moral and moves (as
Weib) toward the acceptance of a goal which is closer to
the demands of menschllche Moral. But with each of them
the wish to sacrifice herself depends more upon a need to
Identify with an external love-object, than upon a desire
to explore the essential character of her own personality.
The second group includes those who consider self-
destruction as payment of their own private debt to a so
ciety against which they have transgressed. They are
163
among the few individuals in all of Wedekind's work who
feel a sense of guilt. Sulolde la for them an act of
atonement, of expiation for the omissions and inadequacies
of their past. The most Important representative of this
group Is Kbnlg Nlcolo, but Moritz of FrQhllngs Brwaohen
I I
should also be Included. His act of self-destruction,
committed In the hope of sparing his parents the anguish
qf future humiliations, Is a conscious endorsement of a
society In which he never feels at home. His guilt Is his
Inability to become an Integrated and productive member of
society. His last act is Inspired by the devout wish that
society (his parents) might continue to function once the
obstacle (himself) has been removed from Its path. He
dies the death of a penitent.
The masochistic Lisiska of Tod und Teufel belongs
squarely in the second category, though her suicidal ten
dencies are limited to frantic entreaties to the young
Herr Kbnlg that he beat and bruise her until she expires.
The lines— "Vor mlr hab Ich mein drab/ Uhd hoffe nur noch,
^Melchior is a penitent to the extent that he
feels guilt as he sees the proof of Wendla's death— "Warum
sle urn meinetwlllen! Warum nicht der Verschuldete! . . .
So nelderfAllt 1st noch keln Sterblicher Aber Griber ge-
wandelt. - - Pah - - Ich briohte ja den Nut nicht aufi"
(II,166). In Wedekind's own terms he Is not guilty and
should not be considered responsible for Wendla's death.
In the same graveyard scene he repeats three times, "loh
war nloht sohlechtl - Ich war nicht schlechti - Ich war
nicht schleoht!" (II, 166).
164
aus dieser Welt/ Mdglichst vlel mlt hinabzunehmen (V,
26) . . . . Mir 1st als hdchste Wollust 1Angst eln Land/
Uretr'ger niegestdrter Euh bekannt.— / Acli, dass loh unter
delnen F&usten stfirbei" (V, 32-33)— express vividly her
erotic death-wlsh. LIsiska has all the markings of the
penitent suicide, although flagellation— not death— is her
actual punishment. Death will then follow as a release.
Once LIsiska had felt the compulsion of "der hUlllsche
Trieb/ Aus dem an Preude nichts Qbrlg blieb" (V, 32), she
remained the helpless victim of Instinctive appetites.**
Her insatiable lust, no longer capable of satisfaction
through any but the most outrageous practices, is a grass
shirt which her own nature forces her to wear. Like the
penitent whose only transgression is "original sin,"
Llsiska seeks penance for her own unalterable nature.
There is a substantial difference between the mem
bers of the first group and those of the second, aside
from defining them as either altruists or penitents.
Through suicide each member of the first group hopes to
merge his separate existence with an ideal which, in reali
ty, either has no basis in fact, or whose real existence
^Llsiska personifies Wedekind's recognition of the
impossibility of aohleving final satisfaction and meaning
through sensory experience. In Was ich mir dabel daohte.
he writes, "In der Plgur der Llsiska suonte Ion die ment-
lgkelt odor vlelmehr die absolute Unmftgllohkelt elnes
rohen Slnnengenusses, insofern es slch urn die unglttck-
lichen Opfer handsIt, darsutun" (IX, 432).
is vastly different from the victim's concept. The object
of the sacrifice is always indifferent to the altruistic
effort made in its behalf. In every instance the suicide
is prompted as much by internal compulsion as by any ex
ternal force. Especially for Leonore and Elfriede the
wish to surrender their lives is based on subjective im
pulses within themselves, which operate independent of the
love-object. The members of this group are equivalent to
the trapeze artists of Zlrkusgedanken whose faith is sus
pended from a distant point high above their heads. As
long as they can project themselves toward that point they
retain their equilibrium. If for any reason their faith
in the existence of that point is shaken, their whole pur
pose in life collapses and they are incapable of sustain
ing the shock. Such was clearly the case with Hetmann.
His ideal was a projection from the deepest recesses of
his own being and had no real existence in fact.
The members of the second category of suicides, on
the other hand, accept the reality of the social ideal as
an already accomplished fact which they can observe and
measure through sensory perception. The difficulty of the
unfortunate members of this group is that they perceive a
reality in which they do not share. They believe in it.
They aspire to support it. But they have transgressed
against it. Release through death, it is hoped, may
166
mystically enable a union of the otherwise disharmonious
forces separating the penitent from his ideal.
The members of the second group share with the
first the wish to achieve something worthwhile through the
sacrifice of their own lives. They differ in general from
the first group by accepting guilt as the basis for the
act of self-annihilation. Both groups share the belief
that there is a supra-personal ideal or institution be
yond the meager confines of the individual self, a con
cept or master plan of creation which can be furthered by
the sacrifice of human life.
The third category— the desperate suicide— forms
the largest and most conspicuous group. It includes not
only Hetmann, whose two attempts at self-destruction for
altruistic reasons proved unsuccessful, but also all those
characters considered in the discussion on Man's capacity
for rational or irrational experience— (Chapters III and
IV)• Desperate suicide is always a de facto recognition
of the power of society. It is not a question of which
has the right to prevail, society or the individual, but
rather of which does, in fact, prevail. For Wedekind it
is always society. The suicide of desperation is the in
dividual's final acceptance of that triumph. The members
of the third category of suicides terminate their searoh
for menschliche Moral, not because they recant (like the
167
penitents of the second category), but because they con
clude that the individual's claim to life and meaning is a
fiction. Their search is the path from hope to despair.
Their death confirms the folly of trying to build a life
based on faith in the sacred and Inviolate nature of the
individual. Dr. Puslowsky of the fragment Sortnenspektrum
expresses the despair of the victim of desperate suicide
who has failed to justify life as a manifestation of "the
highest of which man is capable": "Wenn ich nochmal von
vorne anfangen k&nnte, wUrde Ich Pastor. Da darf man's
den Leuten doch wenlgstens sagen, dass nlchts zu machen
1st" (IX, 137)* The victims of desperate suicide share
with the altruistls of the first category the misfortune
of trying to force themselves upon individuals unrespon
sive to their affection. Like the members of the first
group they are misled by their conception of the ideal
more than by the ideal itself. Unlike the members of the
first group, their focal point is within themselves. In
stead of trying to accommodate themselves to the bttrger-
llche Moral, they try to coerce the bUrger11che Moral to
accommodate Itself to them. Their failure— in contrast to
the sensation of fulfillment whioh accompanies the sui
cides of the first group— constitutes their tragedy.
The group Includes three characters from the Lulu
plays s the Oountess, the painter Sohwarz and the student
Y
168
Hugenberg. Helene of Per KamnersMnger and Kadldja of pie
Zensur. Nolly of the Hldalla drama and the Empress Fellaea
of the pantomime Die Kalaerln von Heufundland all follow
the same basic pattern of the highly emotional woman
caught up In a complex of Involuntary erotic emotions di
rected at objects essentially unworthy of their affection.
Castl Piani, the Incurable moralist of Tod und Teufel.
shoots himself at that moment when he comprehends the ex
tent to which he has been the victim of a false doctrine
of sensuality. Luckner of Schloss WetterateIn destroys
himself when Leonore makes his masculine aggressiveness
superfluous to the occasion of seduction. Karl Hetmann,
falling to become the martyr of his own cause, hangs him
self to terminate his anguish.
Particularly Important are also the protagonists
of the Marquis von Keith— Keith himself and the Ill-fated
Scholz. Soholz Is one of the most articulate examples of
despair In all of Wedekind; Keith Is Important as the ul
timate antithesis of despair. (Both are discussed in con
siderable detail in Chapter VIII.)
In the three remaining chapters of this study the
concepts which determine the three categories of suicide—
altruism, penitence and despair— are discussed in consi
derable detail. In each category one Important figure has
been selected for particular emphasis: altruism, Hetmann;
penitence, Nicolo; despair, Keith. The three dramas most
vitally concerned In this last examination of Wedekind's
search for morality were all written within a period of
three years: Keith (1900), Wloolo (1901) and Hldalla
(1903)* All follow the major crisis of the poet's life—
his internment at the fortress at Kttnlgsteln— and repre
sent the mature Wedekind's most productive period. Be
cause all three of these major plays were written during
the same period of the poet's life, they form a fair basis
of comparison for examining Wedekind's attitude toward one
fundamental aspect of morality: suicide.
It is necessary to examine each of the three
groups In greater detail in order to pursue the problem
of the conflicting demands of menschliohe and bttrgerliche
Moral. Only after an examination of this sort is It pos
sible to place Wedekind's attitude toward suicide— whether
it is a suicide which affirms or rejects society as an
absolute judge over all human destiny— Into proper per
spective within the total problem of the present study,
the problem of Wedekind's search for morality.
CHAPTER VI
HETMANN*S CONCEPT OP MORALITY— THE ALTRUISTIC SUICIDE
I
With his Hldalla drama Wedekind concentrates his
efforts more intensely on the problem of the professional
moralist, the crusading Weltverbesserer, than at any other
time In his career. As the chief exponent of the first
category of suicides, Hetmann demonstrates that altruism—
a basic tenet of Christianity— is untenable as the basis
of menschllche Moral. Wholly independent of the cause for
which the sacrifice is made, the altruistic deed and the
altruistic death can never lead Man to a deeper under
standing of himself. Measured in terms of the society he
had hoped to Inspire, Hetmann1s Intended suicide would
have been as pointless as his life.
Using Wedekind's own contention that it is vir
tually impossible to escape from one's self, and citing
examples from the dramas of both selfless and self-
centered characters, the present chapter contrasts the
conflicting philosophies of altruism and egoism. Hetmann
is considered as an Impractical theorist who forgets to
keep one eye on reality. In trying to base his own
search for menschllche Moral on the principle of altruism,
he ignores the demands of his own spirit for life and
170
171
love. The "Hbtmann-Lehre"— a basically altruistic philo
sophy— is explored both in terms of the special group
(the rich) and in terms of the purpose (the aesthetic
perfection of mankind) for which it was conceived.
By examining the society in which Hetmann lives,
it is shown that each individual of that society— in
cluding Fanny— is incapable of altruism. Hetmann1 s .
planned suicide, the supreme example of selflessness,
falls. Society cannot tolerate self-appointed prophets.
Only Fanny, had Hetmann bean able to appreciate her heal
thy spirit of egoism, might have saved the Zwergrlese
from ultimate despair.
A brief consideration of the youths of Die grosse
Llebe, an example of altruistic sacrifice in the primi
tive society, shows that they share with Klara Fischer
(Per grilse Freler) the compulsion to destroy themselves
to the glory of the gods of procreation. The modem so
ciety, by contrast, suppresses instinct and natural reli
gion, making the human sacrifice a manifestation of an
Idealism which has no basis in fact. Oskar of Kilns
Brweckung exemplifies Wedekind's paciflstic belief that
the sacrifice of human lives in nationalistic wars is a
total waste. In the modern society there is no basis for
the altruistic deed, nor for the altruistic death.
The problem of the altruistic deed and the
172
altruistic martyrdom is basic to a study of Hetmann. His
obsession to sacrifice himself for the benefit of humanity
poses the question: Is there any such thing as a self
less act?
The question had been seriously considered by the
young Wedekind even as a school boy. In a summary of
Wedekind's thinking during the period prior to 1880,
Kutscher compiled some of the poet's thoughts on Egolsmus—
the antithesis of Altrulsmus:
Der Haupttrieb des Nenschen 1st der Egolsmus.
Es glbt kelne andere Ursache fflr unser Tun und
Lassen. Sobald unserm Handeln eine Vergeltung
hier Oder lm Jenseits in Aussicht ateht, ver-
llert sle ihren moralischen Wert. Aber auch
wenn das nlcht der Fall 1st, llegt In dem Be-
wusstsein einer afltzlichen Handlung eine Be-
lohnung, die wir wohl zu berechnen und zu
schJLtzen vrlssen. Wen das Qewissen nlcht solche
Belohnung gew&hren kann, wer nlcht den inneren
Genuss von elner Wohltat hat, der verttbt auch
kelne (Kutscher, I, 40).
Conscience (das Qewissen) emerges in the young Wedekind's
thoughts on Egolsmus as a regulatory organ of sensory per
ception. Experiences perceived through conscience are
transposed into sensations of pleasure or pain. To act
in such a way as to provide the organism with a pleasant
sensation, is to act according to one's conscience. The
possibility of a moral deed is ruled out completely, for
at the moment when one acts with thoughts of reward— and
such thoughts cannot be suppressed— there is no morality.
At that moment when one Is not influenced by thoughts of
173
reward, there Is no action.
The young Wedekind's belief In the tyranny of
Egolsmus reduces all social Intercourse to a sum of the
separate and Isolated actions pursued by Individuals to
enhance their own pleasure. Society, according to this
theory, Is not a collective organism with prerequisites
for a life of Its own, but rather a composite of frag
mented pieces each pulling In Its own direction with no
concern for the oommon good.
In the poetic works It Is the Kraftmenschen and
the men of brutale Intelligenz who exemplify Egolsmus.
Their success 1b the result of their accurate perception
of the objective nature of society as an Inhumane and In
different social organism. Those who exemplify Egolsmus
stand In opposition to those who participate In the search
for menschllche Moral. The basis of both for Wedekind Is
the Individual, but with the egoists the measure of the
man begins and ends with the self. For them the satis
faction of their own needs and desires justifies their
actions. In the case of the searchers of menschllche
Moral, behavior is also measured by the Individual, but
the Individual is aware of and sensitive to the needs and
desires of others. Altruism, as a response to the equally
legitimate claims of other men to the moral life, Is an
Important element of the mature Wedekind's continued
174
search for menschllche Moral.
Society and the btirgerllche Moral are favorable to
the egoist but hostile to the Man In search of the
menschllche Moral. The egoist Is rewarded in the pursuit
of his selfish gains. The person in search of the
menschllche Moral is chastized for his efforts. The ego
ists escape unscathed from the pain of life, but bring
pain to those who are near them— a pain to which they re
main insensitive. Ifelene, Kadidja, the Countess Qeschwltz
and Klara (Muslk) are all vicarious victims of individuals
absorbed in egoistic pursuits.
In all Wedekind there are no more than three or
four examples of individuals whose actions are motivated
by reasons which are not, at least in part, egoistic.
Even Leonle Fischer, whom Wedekind described in very posi
tive terms, has only herself to thank for the fullness of
her life. Iter apparent altruism is, in fact, the result
of a healthy variety of Egolsmus: "Sie hatte slch 1m
Stlllen das Versprechen gegeben nle Jemand andera als nur
slch selbst dafttr verantwortllch maohen zu wollen, ob sie
gllicklich werde Oder nlcht" (I, 235)*
Of all Wedekind's women the Countess Qeschwltz of
Lulu stands alone in her capacity for a love relationship
which seeks to find expression in a selfless act. Her
perversion— the Lesbian love which she feels for Lulu—
175
according to Wedekind's introduction to Pandora, is a
trick of destiny and an aspect of her personality over
which she has no control. Her apparent capacity for self
lessness is an attribute of this perversion. Paul Fechter
writes of the Countess, maintaining that, of all the cha
racters which Wedekind created, she is, " . . . der eln-
zlge Mensch, der zur Llebe im menschllchen Sinn von Hel-
fen, von slch Elnsetzen und Opfern fkhlg 1st" (Fechter,
57)* It is a cruel irony that she alone may be capable
of genuine selflessness, as Fechter comments, "nur auf
Orund [ihrer] wldernatUrllchen Veranlagung" (Fechter, 57).
But even with the Countess, it might be argued,
the apparently selfless deed is not truly selfless at all,
but designed to win Lulu's favor and to satisfy her own
longing for unnatural affection: "... Geschlechta-
und Freundesliebe [entsprlngen] von vorn herein schon nur
dem Egolsmus" (Brief©, I, 29).
From the early period the most persistent example
of an individual who aspires toward altruism is Elin of
Elins Erweckung. Prior to his rebirth as a Qenussmensch.
Elin tries desperately to make altruism the basis of his
own particular search for the menschllche Moral:
• • . Keln blttrer Flush
Der elgenen Dttrftlgkelt, als die Entbehrung
Des sUsaen Glttokes, andem wohlzutuni
. . • Wem Mitleld Blind'ge Schwiehe wird.
Die klelnste Wohltat Leichtsinn, wem ea Pflleht,
Seln wftrmstes Ftthlen ruohlos zu erstlcken.
176
Dem reloat lm Innem ein verblssner droll,
Der nlcht von Helligtfimern welas und mordend
Die beaaern deleter meuchllnga flberfMllt
(IX, 38).
Ernat Scholz of Der Marquis von Keith, created a
decade after Elin, 18 poaaeaaed with the Idea of sacrl-
flclng himself to mankind In a dramatic outburat of al
truism. Referring to the train wreck in which nine men,
three women and two children met their death— a wreck
which he had cauaed by forcing hia services on an unrecep-
tive society— Scholz remarks, "Aufrichtig gesagt, bln lch
selt Jenem Ungltickstag erst recht davon ttberzeugt, daas
lch mlr melne Lebensfreude nur durch Selbstaufopferung
zurttckkaufen kann" (IV, 23).
Even Burldan of Zensur is not spared the pain of
the desire to Justify hlmaelf In terms of his service to
humanity: "Du begrelfst nlcht, daas man slch aelbat zu
elnem Qegenstand des Abacheus wird, wenn man nur urn seiner
aelbat wlllen last und trinkt und liebt" (V, 136).
Of all Wedekind's characters concerned with the
possibility of baaing life on altruism— Elin, Scholz,
Burldan and Hetmann— not one of them succeeds. Hetmann1a
failure la the moat calamitoua of all. Though the con
cept of Eaolamua. so important to the early Wedekind,
i ulam. Wedekind'a
inalatenoe on Egoiamua complicates the search for morality
loaes its savour through the years, It
i i
proves to be a
177
a search which must be conducted In terna of Nan's rela
tionship to other men, but it offers a basis for survival
more tangible than that offered by altruism.
There are countless examples in Wedekind of his
belief that the path to individual survival and success
lies within the camp of the egoists. In a poem entitled
Melnem Lleben Oskar (1882-83?) Wedekind points the way in
which one must look for authority and the substantiation
of one's own actions. In a particularly rebellious state
of mind, he lashes out against the traditional concept of
a revealed (tod, calling him die allgemelne Schablone:
Sel du dir selber der hbchste Gott
Und geh* auf eigenen WegenI
Die Welt 1st dein ouf geraume Zelt;
Bntschllesse die Sonne zu deinem Geleit
Uhd donn're hlnab in die Nlchtlgkelt
Nit hellaufleuchtenden Blltzen!
(VIII, 29).
Deeds of rescue, the young Wedekind contends, are
performed, not from a truly altruistic spirit of compas
sion, but because the act of rescue relieves the res
cuer's sense of identification with the sufferer.
Egolsmus, writes Wedekind, is the "Sttttze der menschllehen
Oesellschaft • • • Quelle aller sohbnen Thaten" (Briefe,
I# 30).
In a letter to his mother (l887)« apparently
written in answer to accusations that he had been wasting
his time, the young poet retorts with spirit: "lch stehe
178
jetzt auf elgenen Fdssen und muss Egoist seln, urn auf
elgenen Fttssen vorwirts zu kommen. Der Erreichung melnes
Zleles bln lch gewlss, denn lch trage mein Zlel In mlr,
und das 1st mehr als Novelien schrelben" ( Briefe. I, 166).
At times the poet's emphasis on Egolsmus reached
an Intensity which must have caused suffering to those
about him. Any vestige of conscience In the traditional
sense, which might have motivated Wedekind to an aware
ness of the needs and wishes of others had vanished when
he wrote In the Jungfrau fragment:
Dabei habe lch mlch nie geschdmt, Jemanden an-
zupumpen Oder mlch zu prostltuleren. Warum?
Well lch dabel immer mlt elner kfinstlerischen
Aufgabe beschAftigt war, in der lch melne per-
sdnliche Elgenart am stArksten zum Ausdruck
brachte und zu deren Oellngen das Anpumpen und
Prostltuleren geschah. Ich rechnete mlr dlese
Prostitution lmmer auch direkt zur Ehre an
(IX, 204).
The passage reflects his dedication to his artistic call
ing to such a degree that the unscrupulous demands he
makes on those about him lose all moral significance. At
this point art becomes both anti-moral and anti-social.
Hetmann is the antonym of Egolsmus. His Insistence
on sacrifice as the means through which humanity is to be
elevated to a higher morality Is a mandate both to his
followers and to himself. The only selfish act of his
whole life is his final desperate suicide. Of all his
followers only Fanny realizes the extent of Hetmann's
179
selflessness. Even after her discovery that she Is per
sonally ill-equipped to personify the spirit of the orga
nization, she still maintains:
Karl Hetmann 1st die grttsste Menschenseele, die
selt langer Zelt geatmet hat, Hetmann steht nlcht
wle— du und lch In dlesem Leben. Jeder Oedanke,
den er hegt, jeder Sehrltt, den er tut, zlelt
liber die Orenzen unseres Ds&elns hlnaus, Selnem
elgenen Wohlergehen gegentiber 1st er von elner
Oleichghltigkeit, von elner Tellnahmsloslgkeit,
die lch bel dem nledrlgsten Tier nlcht ftir mS-
glich halts, Aber das Feuer, das ihn beseelt
lm Kampf urn das, was er der Mensohhelt erkMmp-
fen will, ward unter Mlllionen nur elnem ver-
llehen! (IV, 223).
Hetmann is so selfless that he would never have
accepted the success of his scheme as a personal triumph.
If the plan had succeeded, then humanity alone would have
deserved the credit. He was only the humble servant of
humanity and the vehicle of cultural development. He
describes both the course of his life and the selfless
ness of his philosophy with the lines:
Mlch stless die menschllche Oesellschaft einst
als unbrauehbar aus ihren Krelsen aus, lch glng
nlcht zugrunde, kam zurflck und bot ihr wleder
melne Dienste an. Die menschllche Oesellschaft
stless mlch wleder als unbrauehbar hlnaus, lch
glng wleder nlcht zugrunde, lch kam wleder zu-
rlick, lch bot Ihr wleder melne Dienste an. An
ein Dutzendmal in meinem, Leben hat slch dieser
Vorgang wiederholt. Nlemanden kann es wundem,
dass mlch der Kampf draussen mit den Elementen
auf andere Oedanken brachte, als man In der
bttrgerllohen Oesellschaft hegt, Sind melne Oe
danken unriehtlg, dann beseltigt mlch die Welt
In lhrer Unerbittlichkeit, ohne slch nach mlr
umzusehen. Nlnat aber die Mensehheit melne
Oedanken auf, dann gebflhrt der Mensehheit das
Verdlenst, nioht mlr, Dann 1st meine Lehre
180
so wahr Kulturentwlcklung wie neine Elnsicht
nur ein glttcklleher Zufall war (IV, 216).
Although Hetmann 1b a veritable symbol of sacrifice,
society reacts to hla with chagrin. Not only are his
teachings theaselves outrageous (when measured In socie
ty's terms), but the principle of altruism itself, through
which he hopes to achieve his dream for a new morality, is
the product of his own twisted brain and has no basis
whatsoever In reality. Hetmann1s failure results from
his insistence on the principle of altruism, despite all
evidence to the contrary. The fact that he relies on a
theory, any theory, instead of on life, to support his
vision of Seelenadel and Rasseschdnheit, suggests a basic
flaw in his nature. The Zwergriese betrays Wedekind's
distrust of selfless acts, a distrust born of a liberal
education and perpetuated by his painful awareness that
an ungrateful society had rejected him. Fechter believes
that both Hetmann's successful and unsuccessful attempts
at suicide result from his inability to move out of the
role of the theorist:
Karl Hetmann stirbt ja nlcht wie er elgentllch
wollte, den Tod fttr sein Lebenswerk, sondern
geht an der LAcherllehkelt zugrunde, die er
nlcht ertragen kann. Br wlrft sein Leben fort
aus Hilflosigkeit, nlcht in Kampf urn seine ttber-
zeugung • . . der Zwergriese stirbt vielleloht
doch daran, dass er im allerletzten Grunde eben
ein Zwergriese, ein Theoretlker, wenn auch ein
schioksalshafter, ein besessener 1st (Fechter,
98).
181
Inspired by a powerful Impulse to proselytize, Het-
mann is wore persistent than any of Wedekind's other cha
racters in trying to realize his scheme for a new morali
ty. Whereas Scholz accepts the traditional standards of
bdrgerliche Moral as a reliable measure for human beha
vior, Hetmann is a revolutionary. His desire to found a
new morality for the rich Is based upon principles which
offend the status quo of existing society. Unlike Scholz,
who would have been willing to settle for something con
siderably beneath Olympus— the consummation of his love
for Anna would have been a happy compromise— Hetmann Is
completely Incapable of accommodating himself to the de
mands of life. His predilection for theoretical specula
tions rises from his general fear and apprehension.
Incapable of finding satisfaction in the diversions
which entertain the masses, Hetmann has become masochis
tic, seeking pleasure from the pain Inflicted upon him as
an outcast. Each successive failure only makes him more
determined. Like Molly of Keith and Lisiska of Tod und
Teufel, like Moritz of Prtthlings Erwachen or Elin of Bllns
Erweckung. Hetmann is at his best when the world about him
is most hostile, at his worst when that world becomes
friendly. He suffers beatings and Insults with far great
er composure than he can endure entreaties of love. He
Is disillusioned and feels defeated when the mob heralds
182
him as their benefactor• He la unsettled by all displays
of affection. The more demonstrative the declaration, the
greater his discomfort. He is frightened and disgusted
by the adoring women who surround him. Bertha says of
him:
Er 1st ein Mensch, dem das Bewusstseln, geliebt
zu werden, die furchtbarsten Qualen bereltet!
. . . War Ihm ein Oeschenk brlngt, wlrd ihm zum
Abscheu. . . . Herr Hetmann entsetzt slch vor
Frauen, die ihn lieben. Er sehnt slch nach
Dimen, die ihn mlsshandelnl (IV, 239).
The selflessness and sacrifice to the ideal which Hetmann
demands of his followers is an extension of his masochism
elevated to a general principle.
Hetmann differentiates sharply between members and
promoters of the society. Only Noroslnl, appointed by
Hetmann to the position of Qrand Master, and Fanny, who
Joins following her broken engagement to Oelllnghausen
are bona fide members. Launhart is disqualified by Het
mann: "Ihr Wesen maeht lhre Mitgliedschaft von vornherein
unm&glloh" (IV, 209). Berta is too ugly; Oelllnghausen
too prudish. Both the Flirstin and Mrs. Grant, momentarily
fascinated by Hetmann1 s lack of orthodoxy, are, however,
primarily Interested in finding suitable husbands.
Hetmann demands from the loyal followers of the
movement financial assistance and moral support. From the
actual members for whom the new philosophy has been formu
lated he demands the revocation of all marital ties. The
183
Hetmann-Lehre. he Insists, will beoone a reality, not
through the external pressures of antiquated Institutional
forms, but through the spirit of dedication essential to
both members and followers. It offers a challenge to the
privileged few through Its demand for Spartan obedience
to the new Bthlk.1
The chief stipulation of the Hetmann ideology Is
that all members must freely enter into physical union
with anyone of the society who seeks their favor. Not
free-love but obllgatory-love is to be the cardinal prin
ciple.
Die Miglleder des Bundes mfissen durch ein feler-
llches Oelflbde auf das Recht verzlchten, elnander
die Bezeugungen lhrer Qunst zu verweigern . . . .
Jedes Verelnsmitglied hat ein unverbrttehllches
Recht auf die Ounstbezeugung des anderen. In der
Liebe sind unter den Mitglledern des Bundes alle
Frauen alien M&nnera und alle Mftnner alien Frauen
untertan. In der Llebe haben unsere Mitglieder
kelne Frelheit. Die Llebe 1st ein Recht aller
an alle, und wer slch dagegen auflehnt, ge-
hSrt dem Bunde nlcht an (IV, 207-208).
The standard ritual of courtship, with all Its
overtones of passion, personal preference, seduction, and
surrender, Is an anachronism no longer to be tolerated.
Hetmann explains his mission to Launhart1s little circle:
Unsere blsherlge Moral war auf das menschllche
^Hetmann*s desire to appeal to the rich Is closely
related to Nletzsohe's concept of Herrenmoral. Christian
ethics (Nletzsohe's Sklavenmoral). concerned primarily
with providing sustenance tor the poor, are inappropriate
as a guide to the behavior of the aristocrat.
184
Wohl gerichtet; ale war dazu bestimmt, das Un-
glttck zu bekimpfen und hatte In erster Llnle
die Ungllicklichen ins Auge gefasst. An dleser
Moral wird— auch sowelt sie slch an die Opfer-
freudigkelt der Relchen wendet— keln Wort ge-
Andert. Flir die Relchen aber habe lch, liber die
alte Moral hlnaus, eine neue geschaffen, deren
htichstes Oebot die Schttnheit 1st ....
Urn Vergnligen . . , 1st es uns nlcht zu tun. Un
sere Moral fordert Opfer, wie sie noch kelne for-
derte. Die allgemelne Moral steht in Dlenet des
hdchsten menschlichen Ollickes. der Famllle.
Dieses hdchste nenschllche OlUck fordern wir von
den Mltglledern unseres Bruders als erstes Opferi
(IV, 205-206).
Hetmann emphasizes repeatedly the need for strict obser
vance of basic dogma. He Insists that the will of the In
dividual be ruled by the Ideal of the perfection of the
race.
The means to the goal Is altruistic; the goal Itself
aesthetic. Man must voluntarily subject himself to the
pursuit of physical and spiritual beauty, to the pursuit
of Rasseschbnhelt and Seelenadel. The mature Hetmann
(like the mature Wedekind) tends to emphasize spiritual
beauty at the expense of physical beauty, but insists that
the two are inextricably related. Physical beauty, for the
ex-convlot Hetmann, Is not "its own excuse for being." It
Is contingent upon a spiritual condition (Seelenadel). an
aspect of menschllche Moral.
The original emphasis of the Hetmann morality was on
physical appearance. External beauty was considered a re
flection of unspoiled nature, the epitome of creation.
185
The aim of the new morality was to make "perfect speci
mens of humanity" aware of their procreative obligation.
Despite their disturbing effect on the defenders
2
of traditional morality, the teachings of Karl Hetmann
were never Intended to offend the status quo. Hetmann is
no anarchist. He insisted rather that morality be appro
priate to the needs of the group it was intended to serve.
His Lehre was meant as an Inducement to superior indivi
duals to lead superior lives. Hfe had not insisted that
the individual is the final measure of all deeds, but
rather that the individual should live in such a way as to
strengthen and ennoble society. Even though he rejected
traditional morality as Inapplicable to exceptional human
beings, his emphasis was basically social and an affirma
tion of bttrgerliche Moral.
sMoroslnl, typical of the insensitive crowd,
voices their indignation:
Eine Moral will er grttnden und 1st zu zart, einen
Rippenstoss zu erwidern. Ich frage Sie, h&tte
der Mensch nicht wlrklloh verdlent, totgeschlagen
zu warden? i Das eherne Fundament der Famille,
maoht er zum Oegenstand seines Spottes! Neln,
nlcht die Famille1 Die UnberUhrthelt des
Jungen Velbes! Die nennt der Zwergriese eine
schmaohvolle Spekulation! (IV, 253).
^Although both Hetmann and Wedekind are unconcerned
with the lives and thoughts of the common man, they real
ize that existing bttrgerllohc Moral is necessary to give
the unexceptional person a reliable standard by whloh to
live. Hetmann even borrows a part of the old morality for
his new Bthlki Qpferfreudigkeit, so necessary to the com
mon man, as an indispensable aspect of his teaching.
186
Following his prison tens there Is a re-focusing
of Hetaann's values. Though beauty (Sohdnhelt) is still
recognized as the supreme moral value, Hetnann no longer
regards It as the product of genetic factors alone.
Schdnhelt, for the ex-convlct Hetmann, Is the product and
the essence of health (Oesundhelt) and strength (Tatkraftb
lch kann air Ja auch kaua verhehlen, dass all
aelne ttberzeugungen auf IrrtUaern beruhten.
tiberall wo Tatkraft und Oesundhelt Lebens-
zlele slnd, gedelht die Schdnheit ganz von
selbst, als die verlookende BlQtenpraoht,
deren schdnste Fruoht wleder Tatkraft und Oe
sundhelt sind! Ioh wollte die Mensohen ver-
leiten, Erntfeste zu felern, ohne dass Ernten
eingebraoht waren. Ich wollte sie verlelten,
Rlchtfeste zu felern, ohne dass Hiuser gebaut
waren . . . Uhd fflr diesen Irrtua 1st air nun
auch ein so trostloses, so eines jeden Schim-
aers von Sohdnhelt entbldsstes Daseln be-
schleden, wie es der bescheidenste Tageldhner
kaua ertrOge (IV, 234).
This oonoept of beauty, not as "its own excuse for being,"
but as a dynamic force which is the direct manifestation
*
of a natural way of life, is not new to Wedekind. It re
flects his belief that aesthetic and spiritual values are
mutually Independent. Beauty does not derive Its validi
ty from Its mare presence. Beautiful nen and woaen re
flect and generate health and strength as a part of the
Interminable (divine) process of creation. The superfi
cial beauty of aen like Morosinl and Launhart does not
as
deserve to be propagated.
Although Hetmann is forced to endure increasing
187
humiliation, both from Launhart and from the corrupt and
callous followers of his teachings, his concept of beauty
as a dynamic force which inevitably perpetuates Itself
does not change. His belief in an aesthetic ideal is so
much a part of his nature, that all the sordid and squalid
details of reality are insufficient to make him forsake
that ideal.
The theory of "moral aesthetics" which Hetmann
preache8 in the early scenes of the play has only histori
cal significance in terms of Wedekind's own development.
It does not accurately reflect Wedekind's philosophy of
beauty at the time of writing the Hldalla drama (1903) —
the least tendentious of all his major works. The origi
nal Hetmann-Lehre is rather the poet's formulation in per
spective, of previous tenets of his belief. It is not
that Wedekind has recanted, but only that he has taken an
objective look at the poet of several years before.
Kutscher comments:
Er verkftrperte den Standpunkt, den er selbst mlt
Bntsohledenheit eingenommen hatte, er bereltete
dem frtiheren Wedekind ein ironisch-tragisches Fro-
phetenschloksal. Damit legte er seine Utopie in
den deist und Wlllen elner Persdnlichkelt und den
klelnen Umkreis seiner Jfinger (Kutscher, II, 159)*
Although Hetmann's teachings refleot the young Wede
kind's own beliefs and preachments— attacking the civilized
world's notion of chastity, promoting selective breeding
among humans, and regarding physical beauty alone as a
188
valid yardstick for ascertaining the worth of the Indivi
dual— the Important Issue In a consideration of Hetmann
as an altruistic suicide is not what he preaches, but
rather the fact that he preaches at all. Hetmann's
preaching Is the direct result of his altruistic concern
for humanity. The Intensity of his plea is evidence of
the intensity of his altruism. No other character of
Wedekind can rival Karl Hetmann1s selfless concern for
the betterment of society.
Hetmann's new concept of beauty makes his own role
as teacher, crusader and propagandist superfluous. Nature
needs no helping hand. Because of his extreme ugliness,
Hetmann cannot personally exemplify his doctrine. It
would be a sodomy, a crime against nature, to allow his
own blighted person to become a love object for Fanny,
the supreme example of beauty. The Zwergriese realizes
that. In accordance with his own aesthetic beliefs (his
menschllche Moral) his life cannot justify itself. The
temptation of the sacrificial death becomes irresistible.
If through life he cannot endorse the high aims of
Bassesohdnhelt and Seelenadel. then his death, as the ul
timate example of abstinence, may accomplish what his
life never could. The principle of human perfection must
be sustained by voluntary, self-imposed abstinence on the
part of all who are ill-equipped to participate, as well
I
189
as by aotlva allegiance and participation on the part of
those chosen by nature as heirs and agents of the new mo
rality.
Even If the plan for the betterment of mankind had
been founded on a more realistic basis, it would have
been squandered on an undeserving world. All Hetmann's
disciples, with the exception of Fanny, do not deserve the
sacrifice which the Zwergriese Is willing to make. Every
one but Fanny uses the organization to promote himself,
hoping to reap the rewards of success and social posi
tion, the rewards of an Incurably philistine society.
Several of Hetmann1s followers find their reward In the
security of the marital contract— Mrs. Grant and Moroslnl,
Berta and von Brtthl. Some find happiness in the lucrative
rewards of a successful business venture— Leonhart, Oel
llnghausen, Moroslnl, who makes his fortune through his
choice of a rich wife, and von Brtthl who achieves profes
sional success through the publication of his dissertation
on Hetmann*s philosophy.
Hetmann's supreme example of selflessness, both in
life and in his plan for the martyr's death, Is designed
to appeal particularly to women and to youth. Both camps
disappoint him. The very young, instead of asserting the
force whloh they embody, Instead of sacrificing them
selves to the ooncept of perfecting mankind, prefer to
190
stifle all natural Impulses which affirm the divine spir
it within them. He laments, "Die Jugend kennt keln er-
habeneres Zlel, als vor alledem, was die Wogen des Lebens
aus unergrDndliehen Tlefen aufwerfen, mdgllohst rasch In
slcherer Behausung geborgen au sein" (IV, 239)*
Disillusioned by his experiences with the women
who surround him, the defeated Hetmann deplores what he
feels to be a complete absence of Idealism In Woman. He
distrusts her because of her tendency for seeking expedi-
I
ent and selfish solutions to problems. She lacks the al
truistic capacity required of a devout disciples "Das
Welb steht slttllch so tlef, dass SchSnhelt bel Ihm lmmer
nur als Mlttel zum Zweck in Betracht kommt. SchSnhelt
urn ihrer selbst willen, 1st dem Welb ein Greuel" (IV,
238). Woman has lost the capacity for cultivating beauty
as the manifestation of divine strength and perfection.
Even Fanny Is incapable of the selfless sacrifice
which characterizes true dedication to the movement. Her
confession of love Is almost unbearable to Hetmann, not
because he feels repulsed by her personally, but because
she— who more than anyone else personifies the high Ideal
of human perfection— can allow her noble calling to be
come debased by emotion. For Fanny, as for all the
others, the Joys of self-negation wear thin after a very
short time. Her real loyalty is to Hetmann the man, not
191
to Hetmann the philosopher.
Her outburst of emotion Intensifies his feeling of
futility And gives Impetus to his decision to destroy
himself In the service of humanity. The person whom he
hoped to Influence most has been the least receptive.
More than anyone else, Fanny proves the fallacy of the
theory of altruism,
A less dedicated prophet than Hetmann might have
seen In Fanny's love cause for relinquishing all claims
to knowledge of what constitutes or perpetuates beauty.
Hetmann, however, blindly continues to hope that through
the martyrdom of his own person— the antonym of beauty—
he may yet provide an example of supreme courage and
self-discipline. Not In words, but through the actual
deed of self-inflicted sacrificial death, does he hope to
promote the realization of his dream for the perfection
of mankind.
Only after his release from the mental asylum does
Hetmann, In his rejection of all society, reject the pos
sibility of service to humanity by making his own life an
example of altruism. The reformer becomes a recluse. He
Is angered by society's insistence that he is one of them.
He protests vehemently against the medical examination
which declared him "normal":
Wie kann ieh mlch als normaler Mensoh selt
frfihester Klndheit In elnea so abgrundtlefen
192
unUberbrdckbaren Oegensatz zur normalen Welt be-
flnden? ...
Bel melner Jetzigen Selbsterkenntnls muaa mlr Jede
Anerkennung, konrae sie von wem ale wolle, von
vomhereln verdMchtig sein! lch welse ale zur lick!
Ioh verfolge von heute ab nur noch das eine Ziel,
mlr melne Preihelt zu wahren! (IV, 260-261).
Determined to become the scapegoat of his own cru
sade, he has finished with organizations, apostles, and
converts. The final step must be taken alone. To the
young university professor, Freiherr von Brlihl, he says,
"Oehen Sie, wenn Sie ein Zlel errelchen wollen, Ihren
elgnen Weg! Oehen Sie nlcht melnen Weg! Ich mbchte von
heute ab melnen Weg alleln gehen" (IV, 261j.
Hetmann belongs to that large group of Irrational
Wedekind characters, destroyed because they fall to con
tain their enormous capacity for Qeftthl:
Ioh gehttre nlcht zu den Menschen, die slch mlt
dreisslg Jahren von lhren TrJtumen und Erwartungen
verabsehieden; Ioh bln vierzlg und melne Trftume
slnd kindllcher, melne Erwartungen Bind anspruehs-
voller, melne Hbffnungen slnd herrllcher als Je
vorheri (IV, 232).
Like the pubescent youths of more than a decade before—
e.g., Melchior of Frtthllnga Erwachen and Rlcarda of Kinder
und NSrren— Hetmann. In the early scenes of the play, pas
sionately seeks a menschllche Moral to counteract the en
croaching fear that life Is meaningless and human striving
futile. He confesses that a childish longing for NplayN
as an antidote to boredom had spurred him to formulate
193
the Hetmann-Lehre:
Mein Oeschick klage lch nlcht deBhalb an, well
mlr nlcht gelang, was auch sonst keinem gellngt.
Aber lndea slch ergibt, dass alles in dleser Welt
gar nlcht anders sein kann, als es elnmal 1st,
wftohst Ins Gtlgantlsche die Langewelie— Kinder
ergdtzt es SeerAuber und Oefangene zu spielen,
well ihnen das Treiben der Brwachsenen Achtung
abndtigt. Aber uns, die wlr erwachsen slnd,
was ndtlgt uns noch, Achtung ab?— Was sollen wlr
spielen? (IV, 239).^
Hetmann1s attempted suicide Is not only the result
of his belief in martyrdom as the supreme example of an
altruistic philosophy, but also the inevitable conse
quence of his passionate nature:
Mein Lebenstrleb Hess slch von jeher nur durch
die ausserordentlichsten Relzmlttel noch er-
halten; und so bln lch nur folgerichtig bei
dem aller&ussersten angelangt. Wie soil lch
mlch ttber Selbstverst&ndllches wundern: der
Tod wird zur unerl&ssllchsten Lebensbedlngung
(IV, 241-242).
Hetmann1s final and successful attempt at suicide
follows his loss of altruism. Unable to sustain his be
lief In beauty as Man's highest Ideal, he Is equally in
capable of Justifying his existence without the comfort
of believing in something beyond himself. Altruism, for
the Zwergriese. Is based on a philosophy of hope. When
4Pourteen years before Ricarda of Kinder und
Narren had lamented, "Sagen Sle mlr, warum uns gerade die
zeltin elner Fttlle zu messen, die alles frlsche Leben
erstloktl Warum kelne Eintagsfllegenl — Alle Seligkeit nur
ein geringer Gtrad Langeweile" (quoted by Kutscher from the
notebooks: Kutscher, I, 219).
194
altruism is unvalldated, hope is destroyed. Egoism, con
versely, is both cause and effect of Man's alienation.
Once Hetmann is forced to look within himself, he becomes
the victim of despair. He has no choice but to accept the
futility of human striving as the basic condition of life.
Death comes to him as a symbol of his submission to high
est truth, as a moment of recognition that his life has
been little more than a grotesque comedy. He dies from
wounds inflicted in the struggle to assert his passionate
nature in a world of overwhelming practical forces. A
final resolution between personal and Impersonal forces,
between menschllche and bflrgerliche Moral, is denied him.
With the exception of Fanny, his world was void of all
genuine compassion and feeling.
Of all the characters who count themselves as Het
mann' s followers, only Fanny comes close to the ideal.
Her sensitivity to the forces which attract human beings
to each other makes her realize the weakness of his teach
ing. More than anyone else she is aware that it is Het
mann' s insistence on a mensohliohe Moral stripped of in
stinct and the capacity for emotional response which is
to blame for his failure. Having failed to meet the harsh
demands of the Hetmann philosophy, she is repulsed by his
one-sided concept of beauty and human perfection:
So verfluche ich alles, was du Sohdnhelt nennst,
well lch vor der Missgestaltung beslnnungslos
195
auf den Knlen liege1 Lass dleh aus delnen Him-
neln vollends zu mlr herab, nachdem du mlch aus
der Welt, In der andere leben, halb zu dir
emporhobst! Uhter delnem atelnernen Mantel von
Selbstloslgkelt schl> ein Herz, das eleh kind-
lich freuen kann, ein Herz, dem Trlnen Wohltat
slnd! 01b Ihm sein Tell, dann blst du vor
Hllfloslgkelt geslohert! . . • Jeder grosse
Mensch hatte zwel Naturen, deren kelne ohne
die andere sein konnte (IV, 258-259).5
Fanny is the most genuinely human, the most ap
pealing woman in all Wedekind. Not only is she physical
ly attractive, but she Is also understanding, sympathetic,
and enlightened. Her love for Hetmann is the most force
ful single contradiction to his scheme. She Is the only
one who sincerely tries to personify Hetmann1a dream of
the selfless, dedicated spirit. It Is the fault of the
doctrine, not the fault of Fanny— personification of the
spirit of life and love— that she falls to assist Hbtmann.
She admits openly her lack of talent for altruism: "lch
glaubte Herrin tiber mlch zu sein, und bln es so wenig wie
^Fanny's appeal to Hetmann is reminiscent of the
school drop-out Use of Frflhllnga Erwachen. who had of
fered herself as a life-spint to the morbidly inclined
Moritz Just before he shot himself. Fanny tells Hetmann:
Ihnen fehlt ein voller Pokal aus dem erfrisehenden
Quell, den nur das wirkliche Leben spendet ...»
Sie brauohen elnfdltlge, hiibsche M&dchen, und nur
nlcht eine alleln, sondem gleloh ein halbes
Dutzend, in deren Krels^Sie wleder Leichtfertig-
kelt und Dummhelt und Harmloslgkelt als unsere
unentbehrliehsten Freunde sehlltzen lernen
(IV, 238).
196
lrgend eln Welbi ..." (IV, 219). True to her oath, but
against the dictates of her heart, she forces herself Into
an alliance with von Brfihl. Luckily for her, the latter
backs off when he senses her love for Hetmann. During
Hetmann's second attempt at self-destruction at the hands
of the mob, Fanny is also wounded, hit by a chair leg as
she— in defiance of Hetmann's wishes— tries to defend him
from the rabble.
Her final resistance to Launhart in the closing
lines of the play lends a note of transcendent hope
through the power of love.. She alone refuses to profit
from Hetmann's final sacrifice. Feohter refers to Fanny's
capacity for love in his concluding remarks on the play:
Die Elnsicht des Herakles taueht hler zum er-
sten Mai auf: dass alle Elnsicht und Erkennt-
nis (hler des Hannes) unwesentlloh und be-
deutungalos neben dem Erlebnis (der Frau) wird.
Eln femer Olaube an die Liebe dfimmert fiber dem
Qlauben an die Wlohtlgkelt der elgnen Moral auf
(Fechter, 97-98).
Unfortunately, Hetmann (like Moritz) is so preoccupied
with a vision of idealized life, that he is incapable of
comprehending the reality of perfection when it confronts
him.
At the beginning of the drama, Hetmann accuses the
rich of having borrowed a standard of morality from the
unfortunate and down-trodden masses, a morality not ap
plicable to their circumstances. His demoralizing
197
experience with the rich benefactors of his society, how
ever, shows how very wrong he had been In his first as
sumption. Far from being the victims of a morality de
vised for the masses, the rich have profited by that mo
rality:
Ich nenne die alte Moral begrenzt, well sle fUr
den Armen erdacht 1st und Islt unzweldeutlger
Klarhelt den Relchen ausschllesst. Unzweifel-
haft bedarf der Helene, bel Wahrung seiner
Stiter, anspruchsvollerer Gesetze als der Arme.
Purch dieses Axiom hoffte loh den Stolz der
begflterten Menschhelt zu entflammen una zum
ltampfgenossen zu gewinnen. Jeder, so glaubte
lch, dem seln Gllick es vergdnnt, wlrd das Wag-
nls, slch elner neuen Denkungsart anzuvertrauen,
dem Bewusstseln elnes geslcherten Besltzes
vorzlehen. Die Rechnung war falsch. Der Relche
hat die fUr 3en Armen erdacTTte Moral usurpiert
und zleht grttsseren Vortell daraus als der Arme,
fUr den sle erdacht wurde. Der Relche setzt
eher seln Leben fUr seinen Relchtum als selnen
Reichturn ftir seln Leben aufs Spiel (IV, 237).
Lacking the moral conviction, imagination and the desire
to formulate a morality more appropriate to their station
in life, the rich use middle class standards to their own
advantage. The btirgerliohe Moral becomes an Instrument
for increasing their own wealth and position in society.
They exemplify the Egolsmus and the brutale Intelllgenz
of the Kraftmensohen. the ability to find fortune in an
accomodation to reality.
Unlike the rich for whom It was intended, Hetmann
takes his newly formulated morality seriously. He lives
198
strictly according to the exclusion clause of the society
he has founded for the affluent. By adhering to those be*
llefs which he had formulated as a guide for the life of
the aristocrat, he commits the same error of Irrelevancy
of which he had earlier accused the rich; for he— Het
mann— Is neither rich nor handsome. He Is only moral.
Though he Is fully aware of the relative basis of
all morality, aware that morality Is meaningful only In
terms of a particular person within a particular context,
he Is Incapable of submission to the one moral value which
might have offered him happiness and personal fulfillment.
His rejection of Fanny Is the result of trying to live
according to an Irrelevant morality. Fechter remarks:
. • . er [like Gerardo] of Per KammersMngerl 1st
von dem Glauben an seine Mission besessen: er
darf nlcht leben und lieben, wle die anderen,
sondem muss slch, selnen erkannten Gesetz treu
bleiben. Wer die Schdnhelt predigt, darf nlcht
die eigne HlLssllchkeit vergeseen: darf slch
nlcht dem Leben Uberlassen, sondem 1st Sklave
der elgenen Berufung (Fechter, 96).
The simplest, most genuinely human solution-—refuge and
absolution on Fanny's bosom— does not exist for Hetmann.
The foregoing discussion, concerned primarily with
Karl Hetmann, shows that Wedekind regarded philosophies
based on selflessness as thoroughly unreliable. Man can
not search for the deeper Implications of life and of his
own existence by suppressing his Identity. His claim to
199
existence is best served, not by selfless sacrifice in the
name of humanity, but by the pursuit of his own desires
and needs for affection and recognition. Not only is the
bttrgerliche Moral best served when each individual thinks
first and foremost of his own interests, but even the
quest for menschliche Moral must be conducted in a spirit
of self-esteem and reverence for the selfish demands of
one's own spirit.
HOtmann subjects his Instincts and emotions to the
tyranny of an altruistic philosophy, thereby destroying
his capacity for responding to life. He is caught up in
the web of his own theories, theories as irrelevant to his
own person as the bflrgerllche Moral is Irrelevant to~the
needs of the superior person.
Hetmann is Incapable of persuading society to re
spond to the mandate of the Hetmann-Lehre. The fault is
partly Hetmann1s— as the unrealistic critic of society—
and partly society's. The rabble with which he surrounds"
himself demonstrates conclusively that it is incapable of
acting out of enthusiasm for the ideal. With the excep
tion of Fanny, each member of the Hfetmann circle is an
example of opportunism. Even Fanny personifies the vali
dity of Esoismus. Not the Hetmann philosophy, but Het
mann the man, is the real subject of her affection.
Fanny is the only one who might have saved Hetmann
200
from his own theories. Her attempt to reopen Hetmann's
heart suggests a faint glimmer of hope for Nan's salva
tion. The cause of her failure Is not hers, but Hetmannts.
Fanny's capacity for love suggests a tenable alternative
to the altruistic deed and the altruistic suicide.
II
Wedekind maintains that the sacrificial death has
at all times and in all cultures been regarded as a means
of re-establishing the destroyed harmony which Nan had
once maintained with a deity. The pain of death, endured
for sacrificial purposes, cleanses and liberates both the
individual and the society seeking union with their god:
"Der Begrlff des Wollttstigen Opfertodes gehdrt wie der
Gottesbegriff, wie die Begriffe von Raum und Zeit zu den
dem Nenschen angeborenen Begrlffen und 1st deshalb gfltt-
llchen Ursprungs" (Kutscher, II, 138)*
The young temple wards of Die grosse Liebe learn
to overcome their natural fear of death by transforming
that fear into the desire for sacrificial death. Temple
ritual demands the dally repetition of a hymn in praise
of the cruel god whose vengeance they must appease by sa
crificing themselves:
• • • deinen grausamen Augen zur Freude lechz'
ich zu sterben, deinen [sicl grausamen Ohren zur
Wonne erllsoht melne Faeke1. Todeswollust soil
Jedes Oiled melnes Kttrpers ftthlen. Todeswollust
Hater miri ttber mir Todeswollusti Todeswollust
201
belebe mloh, bis nlch der Tod lhr entrelsst.
Ach lass doch endllch, aoh lass dooh endlieh
mich [aloj delner gdttllchen Grausaakelt gtttt-
llchea Opfer seinj (Kutscher, II, 139).
Rigid Indoctrination by the society has taught the
youths that the highest moral value is sacrifice. Their
death Is to be the ultimate consumatlon of their life.**
Death as Opfertod. as sacrificial rite performed
for the amusement and pleasure of an insatiably sadistic
creator, Is made both bearable and desirable through
bliss (Wollust) — a mystic flowing together of spiritual
and physical, of infinite and finite forces. Death as an
expression of Wollust, like the act of procreation itself,
is an act of submission to divine power.
Wedekind's interest in the periodic demands of the
^In his discussion of Die grosse Liebe. Kutscher
quotes from the notebooks of tne period beginning 1906 and
ending with the poet's death (l91o). Included 1b a poem
of seven irregular stanzas, Die 60 Zeilen oder die 7 Worte
[sic], whioh describes the being and the power of the god
Oehoda. The first and fifth stanzas read, respectively:
Ich, der Ich Ich bln Ich, der Ich Ich bln,
der Allgewaltlge, Ich schuf den Nenschen
Ich bln der Verborgene, damit er stirbt.
der dlch zu seiner Ich, der Ich Ich bln,
Lustgeschaffen hat. schenkte dir Wollust,
Denn meine Freuden auf dass du den Tod
slnd delne Schmerzen, nlcht fbrohtest,
denn mein Leben der du an deinem Tod
1st deln Tod. delne Wollust siittigest.
(Kutscher, II, 135-136).
202
primitive cult, to rejuvenate itself through the love-
death sacrifice, reflects his own Dionysian view of life.
Klara Fischer of Der grelse Freler. even though she Is not
indoctrinated by society to offer herself as a love sa
crifice, feels a compulsion within herself to yield to the
divine force of procreative power. She is herself exalted
by the act. In Die grosse Liebe. it is not the temple
wards themselves, but society, that gains from their sa
crifice. Unlike Klara's sacrifice, their death is truly
altruistic.
The worshippers of Oehoda believe that their death
will glorify their god and their society. To society,
the function of the sensual death is a mystical renewal of
the forces of life. The individual is sacrificed to the
well-being of the community. The primitive cult is de
pendent upon the successful execution of ritualistic
forms— the seeds of which have been planted and nurtured
in the hearts of the very young— in order to replenish
and sustain itself. To have born witness to the love-
death sacrifice, to have experienced even vicariously the
presence of a spirit whose whole being exists only for the
veneration of the god of creation, is to become purified
?Bven little HKnschen Rilow of Frflhllngs Brwaohen
believed, as a part of his erotic hallucinations, that tne
sacrifice of the love object was neoessary for his own
purification. As he acts out the murder of Bluebeard's
203
In spite of his irrational glorification of the sa
crificial death in both Der grelse Freier and Die grosse
Llebe, Wedekind is generally more concerned with the pre
servation of the individual than with his destruction.
The society, he feels, has no right to demand the sacri
fice of lives in the defense of ideals which have no
existence in fact. Despite his predilection for violence
and chaos, he is opposed to war as a means of settling
disputes. He is disturbed by waves of nationalism which
swept across Europe at the turn of the century. Idealism
based on altruism is a destructive force in society when
used as a political weapon.
Evidence of Wedekind's rejection of the altruistic
death cam be seen in the lines of Oskar, who— in the al
ready discussed graveyard scene from Ellns Erweckung—
protests against the sacrificial expenditure of young
lives through senseless wars:
Unsere Zelt braucht Unkraut, brauoht Nenschen,
die nichts elnzubQssen haben,
Katlllnarler, zwischen Heck und Oraben
Oeworfen auf der Hatz noch Position.
Ihr seld das treffllche Kanonenfutter
im grossen Feldzug, die Frelwlll1 genschar,
Die an dem Sohanzwerk unsrer Wldersaoher
Die bllnde Wut des Tollen Stlers erprobt.
Der junge Kflmpfer sinkt beim ersten Anprall,
seventh wire, he declaims, "Du stlrbst nlcht um delner, du
stlrbst um melner Sttnden willen” (II, 130).
204
... Die Kugel, die
Flir mlch gegossen, wird mlch nloht verfehlen.
Bis dann Jedooh verricht' leh bees're Dlenste
Fern dem Getlimmel, dem Qeeehdtz zur Selte,
Dem bllnden Werkzeug Hand und Aug' zu leihen
(IX, 39).
The death of the soldier who falls In defense of society
Is a contradiction of the purpose of life. Death on the
battlefield glorifies, for OBkar, not the god of life and
creation, but rather the corruption of that life. Not
idealism and altruism, but selfish purpose, personal am
bition and a sense of one's own potential is what society
needs.
Durkhelm, in his description of the altruistic sui
cide, includes a passage on the morality of the military:
"This the soIdler's death is the suicide of lower so
cieties, in survival among us because military morality
itself is in certain respects a survival of primitive mo
rality" (Durkhelm, p. 238). According to Durkhelm, when
ever a society so emphasizes the ideal— honor, valor,
patriotism, etc— that the individual is completely sub
verted to that ideal, the result is a high incidence of
altruistic suicide. Even modern societies share this
phenomenon with the primitive society.
It is as much Oskar's intention to undermine the
glorification of the altruistic death as it is to shatter
Elin's belief in the altruistic life. Without specifi
cally stating what the good life must be, Oskar is very
205
specific about what it is not: it is neither the hero's
death nor selfless dedication to the hollow platitudes
of the bttrgerliche Moral.
To endorse a society or an ideal to the extent
that one destroys oneself is an action which, for Wede
kind, cannot be seriously entertained. A truly moral so
ciety must allow for fuller development and exploration
of the Individual, not demand his suppression or extinc
tion.
CHAPTER VII
NICOLO'S CONCEPT OF MORALITY— THE PENITENT SUICIDE
I
Those individuals who choose suicide as a final act
of repentance make up the second category of suicides.
Because Moritz and Melchior (Frtthllngs Erwachen). Llslska
(Tod und Teufel), and the deposed monarch of K&nlg Nlcolo
all play an important role in Wedekind's examination of
penitent suicide as a part of the search for morality,
they belong in this group.1
Uhllke the altruists of the first group who had
hoped through their martyrdom to bear witness to the
ideal— Hetmann's vision of a moral society, or the reve
rence of the youths of Die grosse Liebe for their god
Oehoda— the penitents of the second category of suicides
recognize and accept the fact that their very existence
is an affront to the society in which they find them
selves. Their wish for death is an attempt to atone for
lives lived in defiance of the moral imperative.
Members of the second group learn to accept the su
perior validity of a social ideal (bttrgerliche Moral) in
whose existence they do not share. Their desire for death
^Slmson, to the extent that he recognizes his
guilt, might also be included in the oategory of penitent
suicides, for his destruction of the temple is an act of
suicide as well as an act of mass-murder.
206
207
affirms the indisputable right of society to prevail. As
the victims of the first category of suicides had sacri
ficed themselves in a positive spirit of altruism, so the
victims of this group remove themselves to liberate so
ciety from their negative influence. Feelings of guilt
make self-destruction the only feasible means of atone
ment.
Guilt, for Wedekind, has two aspects. It is the re
sult of both voluntary and involuntary transgressions
against a higher power (God, social institutions, one's
own "better self"). On the whole, when the poet writes
of guilt, he is concerned with Han's plight as the victim
of emotions over which he has no real control. The pas
sionate person, though his existence may be an affront to
society, is Incapable of changing his basic nature, ac
cording to Wedekind. His passion is his fate.
Because it precedes Man's desire for repentance,
guilt has a positive function. When Man accepts guilt as
an integral part of his nature, he senses the discrepancy
between what he is and what he might have been. He feels
the gap which separates him from the Innocence and faith
of his childhood. He can only come to know "goodness"—
i.e., God— by having transgressed against it. Just as1
surely as he is compelled by his own nature to defy the
gods, society or his own "better self," he is also
208
destined to seek repentance.
Nan has no real choice, for he has no reliable way
of determining what Is "right" or "wrong." For the indi
vidual in search of morality, struggling for knowledge of
himself and his role in life, there Is only "wrong."
The very fact that he senses himself as something other
than a part of God attests to his guilt. In a state of
Innocence he was inseparable from his source; as an Inde
pendent being he Is antagonistic to that source. Because
the search for morality must be conducted on an individual
basis, the individual concerned with that search is ob
liged to acknowledge his guilt. He senses his present
inadequacy and aspires toward an ideal which will Justify
his life. The pursuit of that ideal, in moral terms, is
comparable to the religious quest for grace.
Wedekind was curious about the Old Testament legend
of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden. In
November, 1884, when the poet was just twenty years old,
he wrote to his mother describing Alexander Kabanel's
painting of the Expulsion, which he had Just seen at the
Maxlmllllaneum:
Der Satan schlHgt slch seltwflrts in die Bttsche,
Adam, eln schttner dunkler Jtingling von stranmem
Kbrperbau, kauert ttber dem Baum der Erkenntnls.
Auf seinem dflsteren Antlitz, spielen in wilder
Verwlrrung alle Zttge, die eln bdses Gewissen
und elne fluehbeladene Seele charakterisleren
kbnnen. Aberin welcherem tleferem Sehmerze
209
welnt zu selnen FOssen seln bezaubemdes Welb,
und die Entrhstung des Besehauers wendet sich
ab von den unglfickllchen, schuldlosen Sllnden-
paare (ale] auf den, der von drei Engeln ge-
tragen aus hohen Lttften herabflhrt, untilgbaren
stlllen Zorn, In erhabenen Angeslcht, und dessen
gezttoktes Flammenschwert wie eln Blltzstrahl dureh
die sehwarzen Wolken des Horlzonts brleht
(Briefe. I, 74).2
A troubled conscience (das bttse Ctewlssen) and the
curse of expulsion (die fluchbeladene Seele) torment the
fallen Adan. The anger of the Old Testament God lacks
the quality of forgiveness which characterizes the Chris
tian God. His vengeance is as swift as it Is powerful.
The poet does not question the inexorable source of power
nor the Inevitable justice of the divinity. Retribution
is as sure as the transgression which makes it necessary.
An unfeeling deity stands in opposition to the life force
he himself has set In motion.
Central to Wedekind's concept of guilt as Nan4s
response to appetites over which he has no control, Is
his insistence on Erkenntnls. A part of the search for
morality which insists that Han discover for himself the
forces which make him do what he does, Erkenntnls demands
that nothing be accepted on face value. Everything must
be questioned. That person who finds solace and comfort
^The young Wedekind is very sensitive to the pain
endured by the evicted pair, the victims of "original
sin." His concern for the "guiltlessly guilty" antici
pates a concept still important to prose writers of the
twentieth centuryi Musll, Kafka, Brooh, etc.
210
In dogma has no use for Erkenntnls. His life la lived in
the innocence of childhood, in the simplicity of hia un
challenged faith.
According to the Jungfrau fragment (1908), which
again takes up the question of the origin of evil as for
mulated in the story of Genesis, the authors of the Old
Testament blamed all human afflictions on Man's desire
for Erkenntnls:
Der Mensch lMsst sich durch die Schlange ver-
ftihren. Dadurch 1st als Wldersaoher Gottes
die Schlange elngefUhrt. Das Wesen der
Schlange 1st schon die Klughelt .... Damlt
1st gleich von Anbeglnn die Klughelt (Vemunft)
als Gegensatz Gottes festgestellt, und zwar
auf Grund der Tatsache, dass sle gottflhnllch
1st und deshalb fttr glelchwertlg mlt Gott ge-
halten werden kann. Um aber den Menschen gegen
die Klughelt aufzuhetzen, wlrd der Erkenntnls
dann auch gleich die Ursache all seiner Leiden
zur Last gelegt, also eine vollendete Um-
kehrung der Wirkllchkeit (IX, 190).
Erkenntnls. i.e., Man's knowledge of good and evil,
is the result of reason. To rely on reason, however, is
to oppose God and to invite eternal punishment.
In the eyes of God, who reflects the total unity of
all being, Man is guilty because he reduced a harmonious
whole to a collection of fragmented parts. In order to
remain the center of absolute knowledge and power, God
had forbidden Man knowledge of good and evil by denying
him access to the trees at the center of the Garden (the
second tree was the tree of eternal life). Wedekind
211
argues that Man would not die, Indeed did not die, as God
had warned, after he had disobeyed. Instead, his sense of
unity, security and comfort In the protective shadows of
the Garden were eternally shattered as a result of his
act of defiance:
Qott, das Qesetz. verleugnet und verdammt
seinenTTgenen ursprung, die Erkenntnls.—
Warum? — Well Glaube an Gott und dehorsam
gegendber dem Gesetz zu Vertrauen, zur Be-
hagllchkelt und zum Lebensgenuss ftthren.
Die fortgesetzt frele Erkenntnls, die Herr-
schaft der Klughelt, das Urtell von Fall
zu Fall slnd glelchbedeutend mlt Mlsstrauen,
Unslcherhelt und Ruheloslgkelt (IX, 199)*
Wedekind Insists that God, not the serpent, de
ceived Man by trying to deprive him of the Erkenntnls
which would set him free. The serpent spoke the truth:
"Ihre Prophezelung liber das Erkennen von gut und bdse geht
genau In Erftillung" (IX, 198).3
Reference to the doctrine of original sin, to the
legend of Man's original fall from grace as the result of
his having eaten from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge
3The biblical passage reads, "Ye shall not surely
die: For God doth know that In the day ye eat thereof,
then your eyes shall be opened and ye shall be as gods
knowing good and evil" (Genesis 111, 4-5). The closing
lines of the story support Wedekind's contention that the
serpent spoke the truth. According to the Old Testament
author, the Lord said, "Behold the man is become as one
of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth
his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat and
live forever ... God sent him forth from the Garden of
Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken (Genesis
ill, 22-23).
(Baum der Erkenntnls) occurs again and again In Wedekind.
The Joy of pre-knowledge was like the Joy of a child in a
sheltered garden. Man knew no pain, for he experienced
no conflict. The encounter with the serpent, which cost
Man his innocence and his happiness, also gave him the
first taste of intellectual freedom by suggesting to him
the possibility of disobedience. The serpent (Man's own
awakening spirit) lured him into an act of defiance
against his maker. For all the abundance which the Garden
had provided, that which then came to be most desirable—
namely, the expression of Individual will and the possibi
lity of conducting one's own search for truth— was not
provided for; at least it could not be obtained in an ac-
i i
ceptable way.
Although Erkenntnls destroys the simple spiritual
harmony of the parent-child relationship between Man and
his creator, the possibility of a new profounder harmony
has replaced the lost innocence. Wedekind has no patience
with society's insistence on prolonged innocence as a vir
tue. The full life must be lived in conscious exploration
of one's own potential. In a similar manner, Wedekind
k
To borrow the terminology of the vermummter Herr.
Erkenntnls forms the legendary basis of the searoh tor
morality pursued as the path between Wollen and Sollen.
Wollen is Man's awakened sense of personal and individual
identity; Sollen his awakened consciousness of his de
pendence upon and obligation to forces beyond himself.
213
believes that chastity, the Innocence of the pair in
earlier days in the Garden, is only possible as long as
the Individual spirit remains dormant. Non-sexual man Is
an anomaly. Chastity, for Wedekind, is a state of non
physical being which cannot be defended in terms of the
individual's quest for spiritual-physical unity. It Is
symbolic of pre-knowledge and innocence, and is meaningful
only in the innocuous setting of the original garden. A
life spent in search of morality cannot be a chaste one.
The poet's struggle to shake off the bonds of
childish belief— reminiscent of the faith which had sus
tained Adam in the Garden before the visit of the serpent—
is described with bitter irony in a poem called Selbst-
zersetzung. The poet portrays the liberation of his spi
rit from its former confinement by comparing his imagina
tion with a temple being cleansed of profane images. The
lines show the poet as both the god in whose name the mur
derous deed is committed, and as the victim of that deed:
Hbchheil'ge Gebete, die fromm ich gelernt,
Ich stellte sle frech an den Pranger;
Mein klndlicher Himmel, so herrllch besternt,
Ward wQsten Gelagen zum Anger.
Ich schalt meinen Gott elnen schl&frigen Wicht;
Ich schlug ihm begeistert den Stempel
Helllosen Betrugs ins vergrttmte Geslcht
Und wies ihn hinaus aus dem Tempel.
Da stand ich allein im erleuchteten Haus
Und lies mlr die Seele zerwlihlen
Von grausiger Wonne, von wonnlgem Graus:
214
Als Tier und als Qott mloh zu ftthlen.
Auch hab' Ich, den mbrdrlschen Kanpf In der Brust,
Am Altar gelehnt, ttbernachtet,
Und hab' mir, dem Qotte, zur Kurzwell und Lust,
Mlch selber zum Opfer geschlachtet (I, 76).
The concluding lines strike a familiarly tragic
chord. Once Man has freed himself from the superstitions
of his childhood, he Is fragmented within himself by the
knowledge that he is both Qott and Tier. That knowledge,
by making him vulnerable to a relentless despair, offers
suicide as a tempting alternative to life.
When Man perceives as a separate and independent
force, making Judgments which challenge, not the final
authority, but the revealed truth of Qod, he becomes him
self God-like. Through his initial act of disobedience,
he has gained wisdom, but lost faith. That loss of faith
not only makes him vulnerable to despair and self-destruc
tion, but it also marks the beginning of his awareness of
guilt.
Closely related to Man's capacity for guilt, ac
cording to Wedekind, is-his awareness of Schamgeftthl.
Both Schuld and Schamgeftthl are concerned with an irra
tional perception that one's life is lived In defiance of
an absolute Ideal. Though the Ideal Itself cannot be
directly perceived, Man senses Intuitively when he has
acted in opposition to that ideal. His intuitive percep
tion of guilt or shame is the counter-force which checks
215
his awakening capacity for both Erkenntnls (based on
reason, Vernunft/Klughelt) and Leldenschaft (based on
passion, Instlnkt/Qefflhl).
The development of Wedekind's own sense of shame
parallels the awakening of Erkenntnls in him. Tempted to
resist the mounting sensation of guilt and shame which
knowledge (Erkenntnls) brings In Its wake, the poet Is
overcome by the Immensity of his own helplessness. His
perception of the intensity of guilt feelings forces him
to concede, "Liesse slch der Widerspruch bek&mpfen, wire
die Ndglichkeit elnes Sieges denkbar, dann wUrde Ich den
Kampf mlt Stolz aufnehmen. Das SchamgefUhl wlrd also er-
hbht durch das Oefdhl der eigenen Ohnmacht" (IX, 204).
Resistance to the fact of one's own guilt is as pointless
as resistance to the fact of one's own being.
In the Jungfrau fragment nakedness (die Nackthelt)
is the symbol of Schamgefflhl. Nan's uncomfortable aware
ness of his own nakedness cannot be explained logically
In terms of a cause-effeot relationship. Nakedness, for
Wedekind, Is a supreme example of Irrational truth. In
his analysis of Creation,^ he asks:
' ’"And the eyes of them both were opened, and they
knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves to
gether and made themselves aprons" (Genesis ill, 7).
When God appears Adam comes out of hiding saying, "I was
afraid because I was naked, and I hid myself”(Genesis
ill, 10).
216
Warm aah der Mensch, daes er naekt war? Er
eollte erkennen, was gut und b&se 1st. Die
Nackthelt 1st das absolut B&se, das unerklir-
lich Bdse, das Bbse an sleh. Von alien an-
dern AbeIn veraoohte der Mensch nehr oder
wenlger die Orllnde zu erkennen. Bel der Nackt
helt war das unmdgllch, da
1.er Ja eben nackt von Qott geschaffen war,
2. der Zusamnenhang zwlsohen seiner Nackt
helt und den UnglQck dem Nenschen damals
ebenso unverstftndllch, unerkennbar war,
wie er das heute 1st. An die Bdsartlg-
keit, Sohlechtlgkelt der Nackthelt
musste der Mensch glauben, da er sle
unmttglleh verstehen konnte.
Somlt 1st das Nacktseln das Unerklfirllch-B5se,
das Dttnonisch-Bdse, das B&se, an dessen Exiitenz
der Mensch voraussetzungslos glauben nuss
(IX, 199). ------
Wedekind thus supports his view biblically that It
Is not nakedness per se, but rather Man's awareness of his
nakedness which Is the basis of Schamgeftthl.
Though Wedekind explains the legendary origin of
shame In terms of the Individual's confrontation with
the deity, It Is Man's confrontation with society which
Is of particular Importance in the search for morality.
In the Jungfrau fragment Wedekind discusses briefly the
social consequences of Schamgefbhl as an Inhibiting force
in society. Society shares with the deity a quality of
absolute and indisputable power which cannot tolerate
outbursts of Individualism. Just as Man vies with Qod
for knowledge of good and evil, so does he vie with so
ciety for a ooneept of moral truth. If his conclusions
217
concerning moral truth do not support bttrgerllche Moral,
then Schamgeftthl may help him to redefine his own concept
of morality.
Although Wedekind regards Schamgeftthl as a re
straining force in the control of sexual activity,^ in
the poem Konfesslon, he insists that he is personally In
capable of feeling shame In connection with the human
body:
Schamgeftthl? — Ich hab es oft empfunden;
Schamgeftthl, nach manoher edlen Tat;
Schamgeftthl vor Klagen und vor Wunden;
Scham, wenn endllch slch Belohnung naht.
Aber Schamgeftthl des Kttrpers wegen,
Der mit Wonnen ttberrelch begabt?
Solch eln Undank hat mlr fern gelegen,
Selt mlch elnst der erste Kuss gelabtl
Welt, wenn Ich von solchem Zauber tr&iime,
Dann zerstlebt zu nlchts, was Ich getan;
Dann preis' ich das Daseln und ich b&ume
Zu den Sternen mlch vor Qrflssenwahni
(I, 44).*
6"Schamgeftthl 1st in geschlechtlicher Hlnsicht
eine Stauungsvorrlchtung (eln Wehr), die bei schlechtem
Olelohgewicht zur Hemmungsvorrichtung, zum Hemmschuh, zum
unttberwindllchen Hlndernls wlrd" (IX, 200).
Tpeohter believed that Wedekind's concern with
Schamgeftthl Is the result of his inability to probe the
emotional appths of his own being:
Hinter dem Dichter, der den Nut hat, alias aus-
zuspreohen, was andere schamvoll verbergen, ver-
birgt slch eln Mensch, ttber dem inner eine Soham
blelbt, selnen letzten Ernst, das Innerste seiner
Seele unverhttllt zu geben. Er hat den Wlllen
218
Consistent with the conclusion of Konfession that
Wedekind's own perception of Schamgeftthl is unrelated to
the performance of sexual functions are the lines from
Die Jungfrau:
Ich soh&me mlch, der Welt Jemals das einzuge-
stehn, was ich deshalb hler auoh nlcht nider-
schreibe.
Warum schttrae ich mich dessen?
Well dlese Tatsache dass ich mlch schflme lm
gr&ssten Wlderspruoh mit mir selber stand, und
zwar von dem Augenbllck an, wo ich selbst&ndlg
zu denken begann. Ich empfand die Tatsache im-
mer nur als Fehler und Schwiohe.
Mit dem Oeschlechtsleben hat dlese Scham nlcht
das Oerlngste zu tun (IX, 201).o
The mature Wedekind dates the awakening of
Schamgeftthl within himself from the moment when he began
to think as an individual— i.e., from the beginning of
dazu; aber der Wlderspruch 1st zu stark m lhm (Fechter,
64).
^Wedekind does not commit himself as to whether
Nan's feelings of guilt and shame constitute a legitimate
basis for his desire to atone through an act of personal
sacrifice. From a rational point of view it is a contra
diction for the person who has pursued an instinctive
desire for knowledge or emotional experience to Indulge
in the luxury of afterwards longing for forgiveness and
redemption. If (tod allowed the serpent, as the harbinger
of truth, to co-habit the earth with him, then there is
no rational basis for Nan's feeling of shame because he
desires either knowledge or sexual experience. The Hadame
of the dramatic fragment Sonnenspektrum remarks, "Wenn ich
was mitzureden htttte, ich llessejedem in der Welt sein
Vergnttgen umsonst. Han kann dooh auoh nicht dafttr, dass
man es in sioh hat" (II, 156).
219
Erkenntnla. Man's desire for Erkenntnls— like his capaci
ty for emotional involvement in life and his need to sa
tisfy his instinctive appetites— is something over which
he has no control. It is an essential aspect of his fate.
Though other men may feel the same compulsions, according
to Wedekind, his own commitment to life is in no way re
duced by his awareness of their desires. He cannot learn
from them. His life is his own, his Erkenntnls is his
own; guilt and Bhame are his alone to bear.
II
Turning to Kflnlg Nlcolo as an example of the peni
tent suicide, the concepts— Schuld, Erkenntnls and Scham-
gefflhl— become particularly significant. The foregoing
remarks defined guilt as the awareness of one's own sepa
rate existence apart from the creative source of all life.
In religious terms, guilt is incurred when Man insists on
exploring his capacity for rational and irrational experi
ence, instead of accepting without question the "truth" of
an infallible deity as revealed through religious institu
tions (Church, Bible, etc.). In a social sense, guilt re
sults from Man's refusal to accept the injunction of bflr-
gerllche Moral that he judge his actions in terms of what
is beneficial to society, Instead of in terms of his own
pleasure or pain. In both Instances— religiously and so
cially— guilt inhibits the individual and prevents him from
destroying institutions of public morality (Church, fami
ly, educational systems, etc.) with which he cannot iden
tify. Though guilt is a completely subjective awareness
of the extent to which one has fallen out of favor with
collective forces, it still exerts an actual and objective
Influence on the Individual, thus contributing to the
security and permanence of organized life. In social
terms, a life without guilt would be either one in which
menschliche and btirgerllche Moral were synonymous, or one
in which the conflict between the two moralities succeeded
in destroying one of them.
With Kflnlg Nlcolo, Wedekind explores the Internal
ramifications of his concept of guilt. Nicolo becomes
aware of transgressions, not only against society, but al
so against a higher spirit within himself. He sins
against both menschliche and bttrgerliche Moral. He suffers
from his awareness that he has defamed, not only the pub
lic image of the monarch, but also the king within him
self. When he curses his own nobility for having pre
vented him from becoming a part of the common herd (die
niedrlge Menschheit), he commits the greatest blasphemy of
which Man is capable: the defamation of his own soul.
The irresistible attraction which Nlcolo feels for
a country which offers him nothing but suffering, suggests
the persistence of his desire to stone for the sins of his
past. His struggle for atonement is compulsive. He is
Incapable of turning his back on his own guiltHis re
peated public performances are an open invitation to his
pursuers. He is not overtly suicidal, but his need for
atonement prevents him from leaving the kingdom from which,
under penalty of death, he was banned three times. His
insistence on tempting his pursuers is the result of his
feelings of guilt. The pain which he feels as an exile in
his own country is a part of the atonement he seeks. He
is completely defiant in the face of death. When told for
the first time that he has been banned from re-entering
Umbria, Nlcolo answers:
Verbannen, hahahai Wer in der Welt will den
Kttnig verbannen! Aus einem Lande, dessen Be-
herrschung lhm vom Himmel verliehen 1st, soil
ihn die Todesangst femhalteni Nur eln Hand-
werker kann slch das Leben so teuer und die
K&nigskrone so wohlfell ausmalen! (IV, 113-
114).
Nicolo's persistence in remaining in Iftnbria cannot
be explained in terms of his desire to be re-instated as
king. There is also never any indication that his sub
jects would take him back. Rather he is motivated by the
^Kutscher emphasizes the extent to which Wedekind
identified with the penitent monarch of Umbriax "Wedekind
hat hier wle in keinem frttheren Werke Schicksale seiner
Person und seiner Diohtung behandelt, Bekenntnisse gege-
ben, seiner hteilung zur Welt und Menschen" (Kutscher, II,
222
desire for atonement, a desire which demands that he con
tinue to expose himself to situations which eventually
must destroy him. He laments to Alma, "Darin eben liegt
mein Verh&ngnls. VermSchte ich dieses Land zu verlassen,
dann h&tte ich auch seine Krone nicht verloren" (IV, 117).
Nicolo's love for his country cannot be changed by a sim
ple resolution. Umbria is his fate, his cross to bear as
best he can.10
Either suicide or permanent exile at the time of
his jump from the bridge would have been less painful than
seeking atonement in a land which had rejected him. At
the time of his jump from the bridge, he still lacked the
capacity for recognizing his own guilt. By saving his
life he lost his crown, thereby forcing himself to suffer
indignities and degradations from which self-inflicted
death could have spared him. Yet the wish for atonement
had to be satisfied. The impending death penalty only
challenges and Intensifies his desire to remain In
Umbria.11
10The allegorical significance Is obvious; Wede
kind was unable to remain in exile and returned to Germany
to face censorship and Internment at Kdnlgssteln. For him,
as for Nleolo, his country was an Inseparable part of his
whole being, both in a geographical and in a cultural
sense. Severed from the theater atmosphere and from the
theater public, he could not survive. Self-imposed ba
nishment meant for him spiritual suicide, a process more
painful than the humiliation of Imprisonment.
11A1though Nicolo's jump from the bridge might be
223
Nlcolo moves from an external concern for social
recognition (bttrgerllche Moral) to an internal concern for
his own sacred nobility— as personified in Alma ("soul"),
the incarnation of his own menschllche Moral. Nlcolo's
demand for recognition in the closing scenes of the play
reflects his hope, not of a return to power, but of se
curing a permanent position of honor for his daughter.
The painful experience of his banishment was made bearable
by her loyalty— i.e., by the steadfastness of his own in
destructible menschllche Moral. The greater the reality
of approaching death, the less the possibility of personal
gain from his claim to the throne. He admits to himself,
"Kdnig Pietro 1st der wttrdigste Fdrst, der Je elnen Thron
lnnehatte, und ich bin in all Belnen Staaten der Letzte,
der mlt ihm tauschen mbchte" (IV, 173)•
Having atoned— not through one sudden act of self-
destruction, but through the suffering of many years— for
the indiscretions of his reign, Nlcolo makes a last des
perate attempt to gain recognition for the king within
considered as an act or desperate suicide— "Warum ver-
schlanaen mioh an Jenem Abend die tobenden Vogen niohtl
Dann wire alles lflngst vorbeij (IV, 117)— the fact is
that he does not perish. He is saved by an instinctive
will to live and to atone, as much as by a favorable force
in nature which prevented the jump from becoming an aot
of self-destruction. At the moment he found himself in
the swollen stream, Nlcolo realized that he could only
atone through life— never through death.
224
himself. His request that Alma be accepted as worthy of
marrying Filipo symbolizes his hope that his own soul has
been restored to a position of honor. Ironically, he is
denied knowledge of whether his request is granted be
cause of the failure of his heart. He recognizes with a
sense of panic the unlikelihood of proving in death what
12
he has been unable to prove in life. His death follows
just after the moment in which the death penalty is re
moved from his head, and just before the moment when his
daughter receives the official royal blessing as Pietro's
future daughter-in-law.
Although Nlcolo never knows that atonement has
been granted, Pietro's decision to allow his son to marry
Alma is symbolic of the ultimate recognition of Nicolo's
claim to menschllche Moral. The king within himself has
regained for all time its rightful position of prominence.
The impending marriage suggests that succeeding genera
tions may benefit from Nicolo's struggle for atonement.
Pietro's decree that Nicolo's remains be removed to the
royal crypt symbolizes public recognition of the deposed
king's claim to bttrgerllche Moral. The aspirations of the
ailing Nlcolo have not been in vain. He has fully atoned
12The line, "Wer kann duroh seinen Lelchnam be-
welsen, dass er Kdnlg war!" (IV, 180), reflects Wedekind's
contention that death is simply the termination of life,
devoid of any special significance of its own.
225
and his honor is restored to him forever.
It is Ironic that Nicolo's reinstatement as ac
knowledged sovereign over the Mledrlge Menschhelt should
come about through the efforts of Pietro, the "butcher-
klng." Though Pietro Is not sure that Nlcolo was his
predecessor, he admits that It Is possible: "Die Ge-
schlchte soil von mir nicht melden, dass ich einen Ktinig
zu meinem Hofnarren gemacht habei" (IV, 181). From
Pietro's point of view, burial honors are granted as much
to protect his own future reputation as defender of bUr-
gerllche Moral, as to venerate Nicolo's claim to royalty.
The Implication is that atonement is not earned, but
rather, like guilt, is doled out according to the whims
of fate.
Pietro is a benevolent monarch. He is sensitive
to the needs of his subjects, even as he exhorts them
for coarse behavior. He is one of the rare examples in
Wedekind of a man whose life reflects the best of both
menschllche and bttrgerliche Moral. He epitomizes Man's
individual struggle for dignity and morality in obedience
to external and Internal laws.
In Kflnlg Nlcolo the concepts of menschllche and
bUrgerllche Moral are expressed in different terms than
in any of the other dramas. Kdnlg symbolizes menschllche
Moral: Mensch symbolizes bttrgerliche Moral. To be a
226
Kflnig is to honor the noblest qualities within oneself.
During his reign Nlcolo had never really been Kflnlg. In
the prologue of the play-within-a-play, Alma refers to
those years when she speaks of the "Kdnlg, der in Wirk-
lichkelt/ Nle Kttnig war . ..." (IV, 161). Nicolo's
greatest sin was not the callous way in which he misused
his subjects for his own superficial pleasures, but
rather the fact that he cursed the king within himself,
his own menschllche Moral.
In the final scenes of the play, the terms Kttnlg
and Tor are synonymous. Only as an outcast, as the fool—
"rechtlos und machtlos" (IV, 172)— does he become a true
king, tragically helpless and ridiculous in his moment
of highest truth. As court Jester he achieves a new in
sight into his own person, a deepened knowledge (Er-
kenntnis) pf himself and of humanity .!3 Before Nlcolo
lost his throne, he never doubted his claim to royalty.
He never asked why he, of all men, had been chosen to
personify an aristocratic ideal. As outcast he becomes
painfully aware of the difficulty of gaining truth about
^Though the penetrating knowledge of the wlse-
fool makes Nlcolo a true king, it does not help him to
face the day-to-day problems of life with any greater
equanimity: "Mir ward vom Himmel elne Herrliehkelt ttber-
antwortet, wle sle unter Millionen Msnsohen nur elnem zu-
tell wird! TJhd ich kann nicht einmal melnem Kinde zu es-
sen geben" (IV, 119-120).
227
himself. In the opening monologue of Scene ix, he asks
himself: "... sollte Ich wleder der Oenarrte seln? .
• • wer dffnet mlr die Augen ttber mlch?l Blind wle Ich
kam, soil Ich geheni” (IV, 174). Wisest of all is the
fool who doubts his own knowledge, the fool who has
learned to question every step, the fool for whom no deed
Is sure and no decision final.
To know that one cannot know, to perceive that
there Is neither knowledge nor recognition to be attained
through human endeavor— this is the very substance of
Wedekind's tragic view of life. To become the consum
mate fool Is to become the consummate king.
Unlike the concepts Kdnlg and Tor, the concept
Mensch— as It Is used In Kdnlg Nlcolo—-Implies life as It
Is lived by the bulk of humanity. When Nlcolo curses the
fate which designated him as king he Is protesting
against the division of roles which outs him off from the
Innocence and pleasures of other men:
0 Fluch ttber den Kdnlg. der mlch hindert, mlch
von diesem Schurken prttgeln zu lasseni 0 Fluch
ttber den Kdnlg, der mlch hlndert, diesen Schurken
zu zersehmettem, da Ich lhn besser begrelfe, ale
er mlch begrelftl 0 Fluch ttber den Kdnlg, der
mlch hlndert, ein Mensch zu seln, wle Jeder an-
derei 0 drelmal Fluch ttber den Kdnlg1 (IV, 128).
He curses the obligations of the higher form of life and
aspires toward the simplicity of the lower form. His
desire to become like other men is a longing to return to
228
the carefree revelries of his days In power, a longing to
again share in their diversions and to live the kind of
life that needs no Justification.
Because Nlcolo is both Kdnlg and Mensch. he finds
himself in the early scenes of the play grudgingly bearing
the responsibilities of nobility, while longing for the
baubles of the common herd. He is both attracted and re
pelled by the lusts which control other men. Even while
longing to be a part of the great masses of humanity who
are insensitive to the aspirations of a king, he is re
volted by much that he sees. As an alien in his own
country he Judges himself and his subjects harshly. He
realizes that in his association with the nledrlge Mensoh-
heit he not only shared their pleasures, but also their
capacity for lust and inhumanity. While recognizing and
abhorring the need for violence within his subjects, he
knows that he too shares in their bestial appetites.
Nowhere in all of Wedekind does his representation
of Man in a less than spiritual state assume a more vivid
form than in the playlet of the eighth scene. Telling of
the ferment and unrest of the people, Alma (playing the
role of court chancellor) dismisses with oold calculation
the possibility of quieting popular discontent by shooting
into the mob. She suggests, instead, directing their
bloodlust against a neighboring state:
229
Nlcht anders lttsst sich mehr der Aufruhr dimpfen,
Ala wenn der Herrscher kurzweg sloh entschllesst,
Statt date er auf die drohende Horde schiesst,
Mlt lhr die Nachbarftirsten zu bek&mpfen!
Das Volk will Taten, aelnea OlUckea mfidei
Zur Qual ward lhm der lange goldne Frlede.
Blut will ea trinken, tlerlach wle ea 1st!
So gtinnt den Rauach lhm, unter Todessttihnen
Verr&chelnd Such zum Sieger noch zu krttnenl
(IV, 165).
The need for bloodletting— one'a own or the "ene
my1 a"— seems to be a fact of life.1* * The king of the
little "farce" presented for Pietro la forced to recognize
the need for violence within himself and In others. He
learns that he must either satisfy the violent appetites
of his subjects or be destroyed by them.
In a spirit of altruism suggesting the martyrs of
the first category of suicides, the Possenkdnlg (played
by Nlcolo) Is willing to sacrifice himself, In the hope
that his subjects recognize reason (Verstand) as the high
est expression of human life:
... Eh1 sle durch melne Schuld verderben.
Nag lieber loh durch lhren W&hnwltz sterben1
Dann warden sle in kttnftiger Zelt, befleckt
Nit melnem Blut, sich setose eln richend Qrauen,
Anbetend des Verstandee Sonne sohauen,
Und tausendfach hat sich mein Tod gelohnt!
(IV, 165).
^The little playlet of Kftnlg Nlcolo. written more
than a decade before World War I, reflects Wedekind's re
action to the political tensions of the time. He had no
Illusions regarding the btiraerllche Moral of a post-Bis
marck era. He is profoundly siceptical of society's capaci
ty for Idealism. The basis of the patriotism which prompts
men to engage In war Is not ldeallstlo at all, but rather
the result of Nan's incurable penchant for blood lust.
230
In a moment of supreme idealism, he expels his chancellor.
Alma then reappears as the king's alter-ego, the
animal half of his own nature, triumphing over his ideal
istic spirit of selflessness and his will to self-saorl-
flce. Like a nagging conscience, she taunts him by re
minding him that he too has revelled in the painful cries
of a man whose body had been torn and mutilated by a wild
beast. Nlcolo recalls, "Seln Vehgekrelsch war mir Musiki"
(IV, 168). He bares his tortured spirit, pleading for
repentance. He asks that his alter-ego grant him mercy
because of the hours spent 1a* crying to rid himself of the
desire to witness the blood sacrifice of his subjects. He
protests, "In Reue schwelgend rauft* ich mir die Haarel/
Des Herrsohers Macht verftihrte michl" (IV, 168). Un
abashed, the alter-ego continues to probe the wounds of
the tortured monarch:
Klnderleiber, hold und blUhend,
Der zarten Qlleder Zucken zu betrachten,
Wirst Deiner Vfollust du zum Opfer schlachtenl
Die Qual Unsehuldlger stillt dein eigenes Leideni
(IV, 169).
After the alter-ego (Nicolo's bestiality) has
forced the Possenkdnlg to confess his guilt, she is trans
formed into a personification of his aspiration to rise
above the violent appetites of common men: "Erwaeh' aus
melnem Bann, zu htfhrem Streben/ OelAutert, dloh vom Lager
231
zu erheben!" (IV, 170). The alter-ego becomea the "con
science of the king."
In full recognition of the powerful Influence
which his daemon exercises over his life, tempting him
into acts of sadism, whetting his appetite for voluptuous
deeds of terror and torture, his newly evolved conscience
(an organ of the menschllche Moral) appeals for relief.
Not for himself, but for the sake of future victims, the
king implores the bestial half of his nature to grant him
respite:
Wohl blst du Tier der Stfirkre von uns beiden;
Mein bessres Selbst, das ich an dlch verlor,
Beschwdrt dlch, meme Ohnmacht nicht zu nUtzen!
Wohl langt, nach neuen Opfem ausgereckt,
Mein Arm — die Zunge, die schon Blut geleckt,
Fleht brttnstlg, sie vor meinem Grimm zu schtttzen!
(IV, 170).
Even as he prayerfully appeals to his higher self for the
power to restrain himself to save his subjects from his
own blood lust, he is forced to acknowledge the ultimate
power of the animal impulse within himself which binds him
inextricably to the rest of humanity. A victory over base
15
anlmallty is at best a temporary triumph. While paying
^The same kind of fear of animal and sensual ap
petites within the self are expressed in the lines from
the little poem, Am Scheldeweg, in which the poet prays
for extinction:
0 Oott, o Welt, erbarmt such meiner Not;
232
homage to the stronger force, he nevertheless Implores his
Dttmon to support and sustain his desire for temperance
that he might, If only for a moment, be spared the ulti
mate torture of guilt-lncurrlng action.
Broken by the tension of the conflict, the king,
In his closing speech of the playlet, again acknowledges
the omnipotence of the eternal gods of sensuality and
chaos:
Denn unterm Schleler der versch&mten Nacht,
Da flammt die Fackel aufi Da lodert wild
Verzehrend Feuer durch die helssen 01lederI
Da felern alle Laster Siegl Da Jubelt
Die geile Hftlle! Das Verbrechen schwelgt
Im Bberfluss! . . • (IV, 171).
Like the Possenkflnlg, Nlcolo Is torn by an Inevi
table opposition of forces. As a part of die nledrlge
Menschheit. he shares their sadistic appetites. He shares
their capacity for chaos and for violence. As Ktinlg. how
ever, he abhors bestiality in himself and In his people.
He realizes that as sovereign he must represent the no
blest emotions of which Man is capable. He detests Man's
Instinctive desire to tear his fellow men to pieces.
ihr wisst, weswegen, ich ihn angetastet. ....
Nehmt mlch hlnweg, solang' Ich Mensoh noch bln!
Bln Tier, eln Teufel ward1 Ich sonst auf Erden
(I, 110).
233
The blood lust which forces Nan to share the fate
of animals Is a force which threatens the realization of
all morality— be it menschllche or bttrgerllche Moral.
Just as Wedekind differentiates between the moti
vations of men (Menschen) and the motivation of kings
(Kflnlge), in terms of their ability to grasp the extent
to which Irrational appetites control their lives, he also
differentiates between them in terms of their relative po
sitions of power. Though the Judgments of the monarch
may effect the fate of his subjects, the process, accord
ing to Wedekind, cannot be reversed. He has no sympathy
with the republican movement to overthrow the monarchy.
Common man is too far beneath the monarch to effectively
criticize his actions. By attempting to discredit their
king, the insensitive masses succeed only in degrading
themselves.
Arguing in his own defense before the court which
is to condemn him to two years' solitary confinement, Ni-
colo compares the limited position and power of the nled-
rlge Menschhelt with the authority of the monarch. The
common person lacks the stature and wisdom to effectively
oppose either deity or royalty. Both gods and kings oc
cupy a position far above that of the nledrlge Menschhelt
and cannot be touched by the slurs and blasphemies of the
crowd:
Nach der Ms Je stilt (tottee eteht wohl die MAJest&t
dee Kdnlgs am hdchsten In dleeer Welt, So wenlg
wle (tottes MaJestAt Je unter den Flttohen der nled-
rlgen Menschhelt gelltten, so wenlg leldet woGI
die hajestfct dee Kdnlgs darunter. Kttnnte die Ma-
jestttt Oottes dadurch verrlngert werden, dass die
nledrlge Menschhelt erkldrt: Wlr glauben nlcht
mehr an dlch?/ . . , Uhd so mag die nledrlge
Menschhelt glauben, den Kdnlg zu ver.1agen. er
WmICTV"i» er war (IV, 131).
The true king, like the true god, remains unmoved
by the machinations of a fickle humanity.1* * At the time
of his forced abdication he had stubbornly desisted arrest
and execution: "... wer als Kdnlg geboren 1st, stlrbt
nlcht als Mensch" (IV, 113)* With his dying breath he
still supports his belief In the divine origin of kings:
"Ich danke ab — aber nlcht als Kdnlg — sondern nur —
als Mensch . . ." (IV, 180).
Nicolo's death Is a symbolic representation of the
inability of the human heart to sustain the conflicting
demands of Man's nature— the claims of both Mensch and
Kdnlg. He moves from a low point, where he had cursed his
nobility and aspired toward the simplicity of ordinary
mortals, to a high point where he welcomes death as the
termination of his being as Mensch, while Insisting, at
the same time, on the Indestructible nature of the nobility
^Although blasphemies in no way threaten the ele
vated position of the king, they degrade the position of
those who utter them: "In ihrem Kdnlg erkennt die—
nledrlge Menschhelt das Abbild des eignen Glllckes, und
wer dieses Abblld befleckt, der raubt lhr den Mut zur
Arbeit und die Ruhe der Nacht" (IV, 132-133).
235
bestowed upon him by destiny as a permanent attribute
transcending even death.
Nicolo's growing awareness of having sinned
against himself has very real significance for Wedekind.
The poet had come very close to sacrificing his own king
dom, his own highly revered art, through his failure to
temper the doctrine of sensuality. His voice of protest
could not be stilled despite the opposition of society—
the theater public, the critics and the censors— which
demanded moderation as the price of success. His rev
erence for his own particular menschllche Moral made
genuine penance extremely difficult. Submissiveness in
any form was foreign to his nature. For Nlcolo, as for
Wedekind, the only effective defense against society was
their capacity for protest and rage. Michele, one of the
tailors of the third scene, says of Nlcolo:
Tut der aber seln Maul einmal auf, dann kommen
Flttche aus ihm heraus von elner Ruchloslgkelt.
dass sich uns drelen der Magen umkehrt1 Dann
schHmt sich die Erde, dass sle den Uhhold her-
vorgebraoht hat; dann schflmt sich der Hlmmel,
dass er ihn beschlenen hat; dann sohftmt sich
die Hdlle, dass sie ihn noch nioht verachiungen
hatl (IV, 127).
Nlcolo1 s former neglect of the Kdnlg within him
self had made him insensitive to the deplorable condition
of his subjects. By profaning himself he had Jeopardized
the security of the society entrusted to his care. Be
cause he lacked the sensitivity for appreciating the true
>
236
implications of what it means to be a king— the personi
fication of menschllche Moral— he also failed to recog
nize his obligations as defender of bttrgerllche Moral.
Als Kttnlg glaubte ich mlch slcher genug vor der
Welt, urn ohne Oefahr melnen Trfiumen leben zu
kbnnen. Ich vergass, dass der Kbnlg, wie auch
der Bauer und Jeder andere Mensch nur der
Wahrung seines Standee und der Verteldlgung
seines Besltzes leben darf, wenn er nicht
beldes verlleren will (IV, 117)*
Both Nlcolo and Wedekind are subjected to intol
erable pain because of their inability to communicate
their guilt. As they haggle over the price to be paid
for Nicolo's performance, the two theater owners laugh
at his contention that he is better suited to tragedy.
One of them insists, "Zum Tragtiden [sic] fehlt dir Jede
Spur von Begabung; als Charakterkomiker kann es dir ttber-
haupt nicht mehr schlecht ergehen in dleser Welt. . . .
Von TragSdle hast du keinen Begriffi (IV, 153). Nicolo's
protest— "Was ich euch soeben vortrug, 1st mir das
Teuerste, das Heillgste, was ich bis Jetzt in den Tlefen
meiner Seele versohlossen hielti'1— is met with a raucous
round of applause and the words, "Bin grossartlger Ko-
raikeri Eln unbezahlbarer Charakterkomiker!" (IV, 150).
The scene reflects Wedekind's bitterness which resulted
from the inability of the German theater to accept and to
237
produce convincing performances of his tragedies.^
Though Nlcolo is acutely aware of the insensi
tivity of the crowd, he realizes that the fault is largely
his own. The protest of both Nlcolo and Wedekind against
society has been unworthy of them, for it has been di
rected against superficial opponents. Both king and poet
allowed themselves to become diverted from the high task
of exploring and comprehending the demands of menschllche
Moral because of pettiness within themselves. Their pleas
for truth degenerate into selfish grumblings and com
plaints. Pettiness saps their creative strength. Both
come to accept the necessity of re-dedlcatlon to the puri
fying principles of the highest morality of which Man is
capable. Nicolo's acceptance of the true nature of his
guilt makes him cry out in protest against himselfi
"Die 8er Untat [jbhe defamation of the noble spirit within
himself] bin ich in welt h&herem Masse sohuldlg, als es
menschllche Oerechtigkeit ermisst. Unm&glich kann die
^There is a peculiar irony in the fact that Kdnlg
Pietro, a butcher by trade before becoming Nicolo's suc
cessor to the throne, is the only one capable of sensing
the gravity and profundity of Nicolo's words. Pietro
sheds an honest tear of sympathy, and brings Nioolo to
his court, not only to profit from his wisdom, but also
to protect the performer from the callousness of the
orowd. Pietro asks, when told that the act is always
taken as a farce, "Sollten meine Uhtertanen so rohen
Oemtttes seln, Oder wie erklArst du mir das? • . . dann
soil mein Volk dich nlcht eher wieder hdren, als bis es
dlch auch versteht . . . ." (IV, 171)*
238
Strafe, die man ttber mlch verhttngt, der Schwere melnee
Verbrechens glelchkommen" (IV, 133).
Kttnlg Nlcolo is more directly concerned with the
problem of guilt, the problem of personal responsibility
to both public and private morality, than any other major
drama of Wedekind's. On the one hand Nicolo's remorse Is
rooted In an awareness that he could have handled dif
ferently: "Durch melne Schuld zwar welss In melnem
Reich/ Keln Mensch von mir" (IV, 131)* He Is aware that,
had he behaved differently, he could have brought credit
and honor to the high station into which he was born.
Even as he blames fate for the adversities which plague
him— "Das Oeschlck trelbt selnen Spott mlt mir,’nlcht ich
mlt lhmi" (IV, 125)— Nlcolo never fully abandons himself
to the devastation of unconcerned and malicious gods.
His capacity for protest and defiance, even though It may
sometimes be directed against the wrong opponents, never
wanes. Nlcolo refuses to yield.
To persist in the act of defiance is to reject
the fatalistic view of life. If Man has a share in de
termining his own destiny, then he must also share the
blame of failure. To fail in thought, in decision, In
action, is for Wedekind not only the mechanical conse
quence of the forces of blind oircumstanoe, but also— and
simultaneously— the result of one's own weakness and
239
Insensitivity. Nan Is thus caught In the paradox of being
simultaneously responsible and not responsible for himself
and his actions.
If there is any way out of the dilemma, then that
way— according to the conclusions of Ktinlg Nlcolo— is to
be found not in death, but In life. Despite his convic
tion that he too shared in the total guilt of mankind,
Wedekind rejected suicide as a means of atonement. His
growing awareness of guilt and the desire to seek In life
the atonement necessitated by the excesses of his past
caused him to continue his search for morality. Fechter
describes Wedekind's need to continue the search:
Vergangenes 1st nicht aufhebbar und aufldsbar
durch nachtrilgliche Ordnung und Entwlrrung:
es 1st nur zu rechtfertlgen durch Weiterleben
im Slnne des Oesetzes .... Der Tod 1st bei
Wedekind nicht, wle In der Bibel und In alteren
Dramen der Sttnde Sold .... Die einzige
Sttnde, die Wedekind kennt, 1st die Sttnde gegen
den Helllgen oder unhelligen deist, des elgnen
Lebens: dessen Sinn lebend zu verwlrklichen,
1st der einzige Sinn, den das Leben
ttberhaupt hat (Fechter, 20).
Nowhere Is Wedekind more keenly aware of the na
ture of guilt; nowhere does he attempt to explore more
fully the problem of the man who transgresses against him
self and society; nowhere is the irreconcilability of
forces stated more definitively than in the tragic story
of Kdnlg Nlcolo. The intricacies of the problem of moral
ity, complicated by the conflict of higher and lower
240
Impulses within the human organism, Is the devastating
picture which this drama presents within the total frame
work of Wedekind's dramatic literature.
As truth-seeking wanderer and penitent, Nlcolo
occupies a unique position in Wedekind's search for mo
rality. The paradox which mars Nicolo's struggle for re
cognition and acceptance— his loyalty to the furies of
the flesh, coupled with a sense of guilt for having ne
glected the high office and noble duties of the monarch—
Is the same paradox responsible for the great Inconsis
tencies in Wedekind's art and thought. Both poet and
monarch feel that they have transgressed In two signifi
cant respects— against society and against themselves.
The awakening of conscience is the beginning of awareness
that, despite the forces of circumstance and destiny which
determine their lives, there are brief moments (like those
for which the king of farce had prayed) when conscience
may guide Man to nobler action. Whoever ignores the po
tential of such moments is guilty of transgressions
against himself and humanity.
Contrary to Fechter's contention— "Wedekinds
Menschen sehen nlemals naeh rUckw&rts In die Vergangen-
helt, sondern nor nach vorwflrts" (Fechter, 20)— Nlcolo
does look back, does acknowledge guilt for the shameless
way in which he has neglected his social responsibility.
Although Wedekind Is not particularly Interested In the
ravaged women or homeless orphans of Utobrla, victims of
Nicolo's revelries, he Interprets Nicolo's misuse of power
as a sin against both the menschllche and the bdrgerllche
Moral, Nicolo's awareness of his guilt makes him a better
king, though he has been stripped of his power. Should
he be allowed to return to the throne he no longer covets,
tftnbrla would be the epitome of enlightened monarchy. His
suffering has made him sensitive to the suffering of other
men. The play-within-a-play demonstrates a deepened sense
of humanity, a newly-awakened public conscience, which is
the result of his own suffering. His responsibility to
his daughter is the only concern of his last moments of
life. With Kdnlg Nlcolo. Wedekind comes closer to accept
ing a traditional view of the Christian concept of re
demption through carltas than ever before.
In addition to Nlcolo, two other characters should
be mentioned In the second category of suicides: Moritz
of Prflhllngs Brwachen and Scholz of Der Marquis von Keith.
To the extent that he feels shame at the awakening
of his sexual power, Moritz— like Adam of the Jungfrau
fragment— transgresses against the gods of creation. Be
cause of his loyalty to the tenets of bbrgerllohe Moral,
he cannot understand that the stirring of physical desire
within himself is a natural and necessary part of life.
242
According to Wedekind at the time he wrote FrUhllngs
Erwachen, Nan's greater loyalty is to his own personal
instinctive appetites, an aspect of divine revelation.
The pursuit of social morality was considered an affront
to menBchllche Moral. Moritz' feeling of shame, Instead
of leading him to a higher concept of truth (as It does
for Nlcolo) misleads him to pay homage to the wrong gods.
In his belief that he has transgressed against society, he
is Insensitive to the greater transgression against his
own unfolding spirit. His friend Melchior, had he will-
fulJLy reached out to touch the extended hand of the de
ceased Moritz, would also have done so because he felt
guilty toward society.
Moritz stands somewhere between the second and the
third category of suicides; his desire to destroy himself
is partly the wish for penitence, partly a flight from
despair. His suicide affirms the right of society to pre
vail, for it acknowledges the inability of the individual
to overcome the corrupting influence of well-meaning pa
rents and teachers. Though both boys consider the
18
Actually it was not Melchior at all, but the
midwife whose task it had been to Induce abortion, a wo
man referred to by Wendla's mother as Frau SchmidtIn, who
was directly responsible for the girl's death. Even Frau
Bergman, whose lack of Judgment had persuaded her to use
the socially acceptable, but physiologically dangerous
Abortlvmlttel. is more to blame for her daughter's death
than lielohior.
243
possibility of atonement through the voluntary sacrifice
of their own lives, that possibility presents Itself as
but one of several alternatives to Melchior. His fate Is
the less tragic, for he has been endowed by nature with a
strong capacity for opposition and defiance. His sense
of menschllche Moral does not demand the ultimate sacri
fice of his person to the insistent powers of the btirger-
liche Moral. His nature resists the paralyzing Influence
of Schamgeftthl. In the contest between a healthy appetite
for life (the essence of his menschllche Moral) and the
inhibiting Influence of society, in whose presence the
fire of lesser spirits is often smothered, Melchior emers.
ges triumphant as apostle of the serpent.
Ernst Scholz of Keith (to be considered In greater
detail In the third category of suicides) is also an
example of a character in search of penitence. He is
keenly aware that his presence Is an affront to the so
ciety in which he lives. His earlier attempt at suicide,
as well as his final decision to have himself committed
to an asylum— also a form of death-wlsh. In that It sug
gests voluntary withdrawal from society— were both de
cided upon in the hope of atoning for the damage and dis-
19
order which he had caused in the world..
^^Keith's refusal to join Scholz in the insane
asylum parallels Melchior's refusal to join Moritz In the
grave of the penitent suicide. Both Keith and Melchior
2kk
The fatalistic Scholz is destined to fall from the
outset. His feelings of guilt reflect Wedekind's belief
that Man is pre-destlned to sin. Scholz Is guilty, not
because he has willfully violated any particular law or
because he has made a wrong choice at any given time, but
rather through the very fact of his existence. His trans
gressions against society are like original sin; they are
beyong his power to change. His very presence is an of
fense against nature. He Is destined to bungle with
every move. Everything he touches is destroyed or be
comes ridiculous. Even his attempt at suicide fails.
With his treatment of Scholz as a classic example
of the moralist In search of atonement through death (not
through life, as with Nlcolo), Wedekind explores and ex
plodes the dream of the penitent suicide.
The foregoing remarks, concerned with Man's de
sire for penitence, explain his guilt as the result of an
inherent capacity for evil. His defiance of both the de
ity and society is an unavoidable aspect of his search
for knowledge (Brkenntnis) of himself and his world. Be
cause God, according to Wedekind's interpretation of Gene
sis, had denied Man knowledge, Man was forced to disobey
are protected by their inherent optimism from falling
prey to the destructive power of guilt.
If he was to experience good and evil, Erkenntnla is
therefore Nan's conscious awareness of his own capacity
for evil. It Is his perception of his own guilt and the
beginning 6f his search for penitence.
Wedekind believes that Man's capacity for feelings
of guilt and shame are not only negative. They assist hisi
in his search for morality, for they make him conscious
of the extent of his defiance of religious and social for
ces. The ability to feel guilt or shame presupposes the
existence of a perceptive organ (Qewlssen) capable of
sensing the nature of one's transgressions. There is not
always a rational explanation for one'B feeling of guilt.
For no apparent cause, Man in the Garden was ashamed of
his nakedness. Just as Man Is destined to explore the na
ture of his own existence, he is also destined to feel
guilt as the result of that exploration.
In religious terms, Man's capacity for guilt Is
essential to his continuing awareness of an omniscient
god. In moral terms, guilt describes the tension which
marks the conflict between menschllche and bttrgerllohe
Moral. The person who cannot feel guilt, cannot aspire
toward a higher level of life and meaning. In his at
tempt to identify with social morality he neglects the de
mands of personal morality or vice versa.
For the young Wedekind, those individuals most
246
tortured by feelings of guilt are those who believe they
have sinned against bttrgerllche Moral: Elin, Moritz,
Scholz, etc. Their greater transgression, however— ac
cording to the poet— was their inability to recognize the
demands of a menschllche Moral within themselves. It is
not until Nicolo that Wedekind portrays, for the first
time, an Important dramatic character who Is aware of his
injustice to the nobler spirit within himself. Nicolo's
desire for penitence— if not through life, then through
death— is his admission of guilt for having defamed the
kingdom of his own soul.
With Kttnlg Nicolo the struggle between menschllche
and burgerllohe Moral becomes Internalized. Both types of
morality stand in opposition to the protagonist. By
transgressing against the king within himself (menschllche
Moral), he also falls to serve the Interests of society
(bflrgerllche Moral). Nicolo's life, prior to his forced
abdication, had been spent In the pursuit of unworthy
goals. He dishonored his own nobler nature and the re
publican attempt of society to live In dignity as a free
people. Following his abdication, he Is pained by awaken
ing sensitivity (Erkenntnls) to his own capacity for
guilt. The remainder of his life Is spent in pursuit of
atonement.
Nicolo Is granted In death the forgiveness he
247
desired In life. He Is restored to a position of honor
In terms of both menschllche and bUrgerllche Moral. The
Intercession of Pietro In his behalf has all the authority
of a last Judgment.
More (thaiT any other work of Wedekind's ‘ Kttnlg Nico
lo Is a confessional drama. Wedekind's awakening to his
own capacity for profaning the nobler part of his nature
Is represented in the tragedy of the exiled King of
Umbria. Wedekind's own guilt— his transgressions against
bflrgerllohe Moral, as a result of his Inability to recog
nize and honor the true significance of menschllche Mo
ral— Is formulated In the story of Nicolo.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MORALITIES OF SCHOLZ AND KEITH—
THE SUICIDE OF DESPERATION
The last category of suicide is made up of those
who, falling in their struggle to Identify with the ideals
of society, are equally Incapable of sustaining life on
an Individual basis. They are defeated by the visible
reality of an external world which they can neither
support nor defeat. Their resolution to die is not a
protest, but an admission of defeat. The victims of this
group suffer, not from a single reversal of fate, but
from a chronic condition within themselves. In every case
they are passionate individuals forcing themselves on an
unreceptlve world.
The group Includes the female characters (dis
cussed in the chapter on Wedekind's women) who try through
emotion to substantiate the instinctive forces at work
within themselves: the Countess Gesohwltz (Lulu), Helene
(Kammersflnger), Kadldja (Zensur), and Felissa (Kaiserin).
It Includes Molly (Keith)and the elderly matron Hidalla
(Mine Haha). The men of the group include Schwarz and
248
Hugenberg (Lulu), Castl Pianl (Tod und Teufel), Karl
Hetmann, and Ernst Scholz (Keith).
Each member of the third category of suicide
succumbs to the tyranny of bflrgerliche Moral. Palling In
their attempt to identify with an external ideal— society,
religion or a particular individual— and unable to find
within themselves sufficient reason to continue living,
these victims of despair lose all faith in themselves
and in the world about them. In every instance the mem
bers of the final category of suicides lack the ability
to see and to develop the latent power within themselves
as a bastion against the whims of external circumstance.
Their despair is partly the result of their own faulty
concept of menschllche Moral— often more an-obsession
with the phantasies of their own imaginations, than a
realistic plan for a fuller and more meaningful life—
and partly the failure of society to offer them a reliable
bflrgerllche Moral. Their suicide reflects their belief
in the futility of human striving.
Durkheim describes the suicide of despair in a
category which he calls the anomic suicide. According to
him, suicide in modern life is the result of the inability
of the individual to find meaning beyond himself. By
falling to provide a morality in harmony with the demands
of the individual spirit, society likewise falls to give
250
Man justification for continuing his life (see Appendix).
Durkheim believed the loss of cohesive force
exercised by society to be responsible for the suicides
which characterized the fin de siecle. He felt that to
cure the epidemic of self-destruction, one must go to the
source of the morbidity— to the pessimistic philosophies
which engender despair:
The formation of such great systems (like
Epicureanism] is an indication that the current
of pessimism has reached a degree of abnormal
intensity which is due to some disturbance of the
social organism. We well know how these systems
have recently multiplied. To form a true idea of
their number and importance it is not enough to
consider the philosophies avowedly of,this nature,
such as those of Schopenhauer, Hartmann, etc. We
must also consider all the others which derive
from the same spirit under different names. The
anarchist, the aesthete, the mystic, the socialist
revolutionary, even if they do not despair of the
future, have in common with the pessimist a single
sentiment of hatred and disgust for the existing
order, a single craving to destroy or to escape
from reality (Durkheim, 370).
Wedekind too is infected by the malaise of the
time aB described by Durkheim. It is little wonder that
he should repeatedly turn to desperate suicide as the
only possible termination of conflict.
Most of the members of the third category of
suicides have already been discussed in another part of
this study— either because they had made an earlier
attempt at suicide as a martyr or penitent, or because,
through the failure of rational or irrational forces, they
251
found It Impossible to live with the conflicting demands
of menschllche and bflrgerllche Moral. In the present
chapter, therefore, attention Is focused on two charac
ters— one with a capacity for despair, the other without
a capacity for despair— In an attempt to Isolate the
factors which contribute to moral bankruptcy.
Scholz and Keith: Wedekind describes them
respectively (in the essay Was lch mlr dabel dachte) as
the "Don Quljote der Moral" and the "Don Quljote des
Lebensgenusses." The two protagonists of the Marquis von
Keith are contrasted to show that Man's capacity for
despair Is directly dependent upon the extent to which he
becomes absorbed In the search for morality.
Scholz Is a classic example of the moralist in
search of a morality. With his altruistic dedication and
his compulsive desire for penitence, he courts pessimism
and despair from the very beginning. His attempt to
justify himself in terms of an external morality
(bflrgerllche Moral) cannot help but end in failure. Scholz
had already attempted suicide out of desperation before
the beginning of the first act. He has himself committed
to an insane asylum at the close of the last act, repeating
symbolically his earlier attempted suicide. Scholz has
no conception of the menschllche Moral. Instead, he tries
to force his concept of what he believes to be the
252
substance of the bflrgerliche Moral on an unwilling world.
Keith is the confirmed egoist, opportunistic and
cynical in his appraisal of society. He has no illusions
in regard to the men who sustain bflrgerllohe Moral. He
is undisturbed by his own position as an outcast as long
as he is successful in his manipulation of society for
selfish purposes. He scoffs at the bourgeois virtues
of charity and compassion. His final resistance to
despair is the result of his belief from the beginning
that society is only valuable to the extent that it func
tions in his favor. Keith does not search for truth, or
meaningfulness or self-Justification. He stands apart
from those two try to justify their lives in terms of the
bflrgerllche Moral, without, however, falling prey to the
obsession of the menschllche Moral. More than any other
major character from the plays, Keith is amoral as the
term is used in this study. His healthy resistance to
the search for morality protects him from the devastation
of total despair.1
Whereas Scholz despairs of making life a
^It would be wrong to assume that Keith is in
capable of despair. The Important point is that Keith's
despair is not suicidal. He comes very close to the sui
cide of desperation when— revolver in one hand, money in
the other— he chooses in favor of life with the words,
"Das Leben 1st eine Rutsohbahn--" (IV, 98).
253
meaningful and a moral experience, Keith despairs of mak
ing It a lucrative one. Each falls, at least In part,
through the forces of fate, to fulfill the demands of his
own particular claim on life. The position which each
takes In regard to fate determines whether he accepts or
rejects suicide as a feasible alternative to life.
Neither Scholz nor Keith Is a child of fortune.
Both are subjected to adversities over which they have
no control. Significant Is the fact that Scholz Is
destroyed through his final resignation and pessimistic
acceptance of fate as a destructive force, whereas Keith
Is buoyed up by a nature that Is Incurably optimistic.
In order to better understand both Scholz and Keith In
their relationship to fate as the cause of despair, It
Is necessary to consider each of them separately.
In the case of Scholz, an Inherent propensity for
fatalism makes him unfit for life. He blames his lack
of success In the world on the tension which marked his
childhood home. The painful conflict which he feels
within himself Is the result of discord which had existed
between his parents— "Mir fehlt eben das seellsche
Olelchgewlsht, das dem Menscheh aus elnem menschenwdrdlgen
Pamlllenhelm erwttchst" (IV, 22). Despite his frantic pro
test against fate, and his self-conscious attempts to
become the master of his own destiny, Scholz blames his
254
misfortunes— first, last and always--on the injustice of
an indifferent god.
Whether Scholz' failure is in reality the fault
of the gods, or the result of a flaw in his own nature
which an act of will might correct, the fact remains he
erroneously believes fate has destined him to fulfill a
useful function in life. According to the motto which
was bestowed upon him at his confirmation--"Viele sind
berufen, aber wenlge sind auserwflhlt" (IV, 82)— Scholz
counts himself among the "chosen." He cannot accept the
concept of "original sin:"
Hfltte lch auch die untrdglichsten Bewelse dafflr,
dass lch selber nicht zu den Ausgew&hlten gehdre,
das kdnnte mlch immer nur in meinem unerschrockenen
Kampf gegen mein Qeschick bestflrken! . . .
Ich schwdre Ihnen, dass lch lleber auf raelne
gesunde Vernunft verzichte, als dass ich mlch
durch diese Vernunft davon iiberzeugen lasse,
dass gewlsse Menschen ohne Jedes Verschulden
von Anfang an von allem Lebensgldck ausgeschlossen
sind! (IV, 82).
When Scholz finally breaks down, his concept of
morality shattered beyond repair, he is forced to accept
the faot that his very presence is offensive to society.
His collapse is complete as he recognizes "(in pldtzlicher
Versteinerung)— Ich trage das Kainzeichen auf der
Stirn ..." (IV, 83). The crowning blow for Scholz, as
for Keith, is Anna's refusal to return his affection.
In Spite of his attempt to ignore the conclusions
of "healthy reason" (die gesunde Vernunft), continued
255
adversity forces Scholz to concede. The decision Is a
rational one. The suspension of reason, which had allowed
him to continue his search for a path to personal salva
tion within the confines of society, Is at an end. His
final act Is his most rational act. It signifies his
capitulation In the face of overwhelming evidence that
fate had destined Scholz, not as guiltless, but as guilty.
He recognizes In the mark of Cain— visible symbol of the
omnipotent forces of adversity— that fate has won out
over his long struggle for morality.
The only possibility remaining for the afflicted
moralist, once he accepts the complete futility of human
striving, Is to voluntarily withdraw from society. Suicide
is no longer an alternative. Scholz had already tried
that possibility and bungled: "Das letzte Mittel, das
elnem selbst zur Lfisung des Rfttsels frelsteht, habe lch
umsonst versucht" (IV, 20).^
By comparison with Scholz, Keith has great rever
ence for life. He has no less reason than Scholz for
being pessimistic about fate, but Keith's fatalism is
limited to the acceptance of certain specific handicaps.
2
With the flourish of a man who has tasted life
at its root8, Keith replies unsentlmentally, "Urn so besser
ffir dloh, wenn du das hlnter dir hast ....
Verpflichtungen gehen wir bel unserer Oeburt nloht eln,
und raehr als dieses Leben wegwerfen, kann man nloht. Wer
nach seinem Tod welterlebt, der steht fiber den Qesetzen"
(IV, 20).
Adversity, for Keith, is an observable misfortune—
incompatible parents, unsightly hands, a crooked leg—
and not some vague force like Scholz' belief in the
Kainzelchen. Though he has never tried suicide, he sur
vived his own execution. The result is an optimism which
enables him to accept whatever fortune may offer. The
bare fact of <£ne's existence is sacred. Vhen told in the
final scene of Scholz' plan to have himself committed,
Keith protests vehemently, "Du kannst kelne nichtswtird-
lgere Schandtat begehen als den Verrat an delner eigenen
Person" (IV, 92). When in the final scene Scholz appoints
himself to the task of trying to console the distraught
Keith— "Ich weiss doch, dass du dir deln jammervoiles
Los ebenso wenig gewflhlt hast, wie lch mlr das melnige"
(IV, 95)— he underestimates the letter's ability to
triumph over the forces of adversity.
Keith's fatalism is always confined to a limited
area. His strength lies in his ability to accept mis
fortune without allowing it to jeopardize his whole person.
He realizes, for example, that the conflict of forces
■ a
within him is congenital. The relationship of his parents
had been built on the attraction of peculiarly hostile
^Like Thomas Mann's Tonio Krtfger, Keith is torn
between the cold lntellectualism of his father and the
emotionalism of his mother.
257
forces: "Ich bin Bastard. Mein Vater war ein geistig
sehr hochstehender Mensch, beBonders was Mathematik und
so exakte Dinge betrifft, und meine Mutter war eine
Zigeunerin" (IV, 10-11). He senses painful discrepancies
between his external appearance and his inner nature.
He is troubled by the ugliness of his large, churlish
hands which seem alien to his general physiognomy: "Ob
mein Benehmen so korrekt wie der Lauf der Planeten 1st,
ob lch mlch in die ausgesuchteste ELeganz kleide, das
Andert dlese Plebejerhand so wenig, wie es aus einem
Dummkopf Je eine KapazitAt machti Bel melnen Oeistesgaben
hAtte ich mich ohne diese HAnde auch 1Angst eines besseren
Rufes in der Gesellschaft zu erfreuen" (IV, 51) •
More successfully them any other major character
in Wedekind, Keith reconciles the conflicting philosophies
of fatalism and self-determination. While fully realizing
his own physical limitations— "Ich bin als Krdppel zur
Welt gekommen" (IV, id)— he nevertheless pursues his
dreams of glory and triumph with tireless determination:
"So wenlg, wie lch mlch deshalb zum Sklaven verdammt
fdhle, so wenlg wlrd mlch der Zufall, dass lch als Bettler
geboren bin, je daran hindern, den allergieblgsten Lebens-
genuss als mein rechtmAssiges Erbe zu betraohten" (IV,
18). Keith is convinced that by exerting sufficient
personal effort, he can triumph despite the obstacles
258
which fate has placed In his path. He bears with defer
ence the handicaps he cannot change. His hands, his limp,
his Illegitimacy are only details of his total personal
ity. Isolated flaws do not constitute the whole man, nor
can they serve as grounds for becoming resigned to one’s
fate. Keith is a dynamic personality despite the injust
ice of nature,
Keith strives heroically to reconcile his accept
ance of fatalism to his dreams of personal ambition.
Not only has he learned the difference between what can
be changed in life and what must be accepted, In terms
of physical realities, but he has also learned that
there are times when fate must dominate and times when
his own will can dominate. His life alternates between
periods of passivity and periods of activity, according
to the pressures of external circumstance. Keith be
lieves in the adage of "a time for fishing and a time
for drying the nets." It is a cardinal principle for
him not to promote his projects when there is no chance
of success. He allows himself to be carried along
resignedly to a point which appears to be familiar and
fertile ground. There he again becomes an active force,
building in the interest of his own future: "Ich lasse
mlch elnfach wlllenlos treiben, bis ich an ein Gestade
gelange, auf dem ich heimisoh genug ftthle, urn mir su
259
sagen: Hler lasat uns Hfltten bauenJ (V, 10).
Keith's so-called "Htftten bauen" Is nothing less
sacred than the salvation of his own earthly existence.
His belief In the effectiveness of human action combines
with his hunger for personal recognition. He tells Anna,
"Sets deln Vertrauen getrost In die Tatsache, dass ich
eln Mensch bin, der das Leben verteufelt ernst nlmmtJ
. . . Keine drel Tage 1st mlr aber mein Daseln ertrflglich,
ohne dass lch derwell melnen Zielen urn einen Schrltt nHher
komme! . . . Lass dir elnes sagen: Ich bin eln glflublger
Mensch. . . . Ich glaube an nichts so zuversichtlich, wie
daran, dass slch unsere Mflhen und Aufopferungen in dieser
Welt belohnen!" (IV, 62).
Keith never doubts that human striving will be
rewarded. Whatever we do will benefit, if not ourselves,
then at least our children. He wholly embraces a philos
ophy of progress. He hopes to build a house, to establish
a family with Anna as the mother of strapping offspring—
"Kinder mit raelnem Verstand, mlt strotzend gesundem
Kflrper und arlstokratischen Hflnden" (IV, 62). Even his
plan to make Munich a great cultural center Is.a part of
his belief in the effectiveness of his own labors and in
the future of the House of Keith.
It has been shown that Scholz' predilection for
despair is the result of his Inability to accept fate as
260
a major force over the lives of men. His complete de
fiance of fate at the beginning Is transformed Into a
complete acceptance of fate at the end. Keith, on the
other hand, while fully realizing the importance of accept
ing that which he cannot change, nevertheless pursues
forward with courage and optimism in the pursuit of his
own self-centered goals.
Although Keith lacks Scholz' capacity for despair
(as well as his capacity for suicide), in practical terms
he is no more successful in the realization of his goal
(Lebensgenuss) than Scholz is successful in the realiza
tion of his goal (Moral). The fault, with Keith, however,
cannot be defined in terms of an underlying pessimism
and a propensity for failure. Unlike Scholz— a caricature
of altruism, obsessed and monomanlc in his pursuit of
morality— Keith combines the most divergent qualities
into a harmonious whole. His resistance to suicide is
particularly remarkable, when considered in terms of the
conflicting forces at work within him.
Although Scholz and Keith represent two aspects
of the same problem--!.e., alter egos trying either to
subvert the individual personality to the demands of
bflrgerllche Moral (Scholz), or to exalt the individual
personality according to the demands of a menschllche
Moral based on Egoismus (Keith)— the role of Keith is
261
further complicated by the conflicting demands of antag
onistic forces. Keith is a composite, not only of the
conflicting concepts of fatalism and self-determination
(as already discussed), but also of rational and irration
al, of critical and romantic, of practical and theoretical
participation in life. Keith is the most schizophrenic
character in all Wedekind.
Keith 1b simultaneously both objective and sub
jective in his relationship with society. His objectivity
is the result of his ability to recognize and accept his
position apart from society: "Ich, der Marquis von Keith,
von dem ganz Mflnchen sprlcht, stehe heute bei melnem
europHisehen Ruf noch . . . ausserhalb der Gesellschaft"
(IV, 30). In the opening scene he had told Anna, "...
die bdrgerliche Gesellschaft, seit lch auf dieser Welt
bin, [hegt] ein geheimes Orauen vor mir" (IV, 11). But
the aversion which society feels for Keith (and which
he accepts with cold objectivity) is mutual. With the
acumen of a Gerardo (Kammersflnger), he attributes the
development of whatever talent he may have to the antagon
ism which he feels toward society: "Melne Begabung
beschr&nkt sich auf die leldlge Tatsache, dass lch in
btirgerlloher Atmosphere nicht atmen kann. Mag ich deshalb
errelohen, was ich will, ich werde mir nie das gerlngste
darauf einbilden" (IV, 10). Even though Keith is pained
262
by society' 8 hostility— particularly In the closing scene
of the play— he Is objective in his belief that that
hostility is not going to change. He has learned to accept
the hostility of society just as he had learned to accept
the physical handicaps with which he was born.
Keith's objectivity, his ability to view society
and its values unsentimentally, is made dramatic through
his relentless and caustic attack against the "sacred
cows" of society: truth, faith and morality. In the
style of Oscar Wilde, Wedekind, through Keith, pokes fun
at the standard virtues. Eplgrammatlcally the Marquis
refers to truth as "unser kostbarstes Lebensgut und man
kann nicht sparsam genug damit umgehen" (IV, 31). Sin,
for Keith, is not the scourge of mankind, but rather
"eine mythologische Bezelchnung ftir schlechte Gesch&fte"
(IV, 30). His own egoistic philosophy is bolstered by
what he regards as the identity of self and the deity:
"Die Liebe zu Oott 1st tfberall lmmer nur eine summarlsche,
symbolische Ausdruckswelse ftfr die Liebe zur elgenen
Person. . . . Wir wlssen, dass denen, die Gott lleben,
alle Dinge zum besten dlenen" (IV, 78). By loving and
caring for the self, through whom God has his only exist
ence, Keith serves both the deity and humanity. Keith's
ggoismus, the basis of his menschllche Moral, is char
acterized by a level-headed wisdom which only objectivity
263
can give.
MoBt characteristic of all as an example of
Keith's unsentimental objectivity, Is his attack on moral
ity— the "holy-of-holies" of society. He imparts the
summation of all his wisdom with appropriate solemnity
to young Hermann Casimir: "... Und nun dbermlttle
ich Ihnen den Stein der Weisen; das glttnzendste Geschflft
in delser Welt 1st die Moral. Ich bin noch nlcht so weit,
das Geschflft zu maohen, aber lch mtfsste nicht der Marquis
von Keith sein, wenn ich es mir entgehen Hesse" (IV, 84).
The dog-eat-dog struggle for survival manifests itself
in society in the name of morality. If Keith's life is
parasitic, it is at least openly and avowedly so. His
obedience to the law of survival reflects his conception
of the forces which oppose each other in society: graft,
greed and brutal ambition.
Despite Keith's remarkable objectivity in his
appraisal of society and in his appraisal of his own
physical limitations, he is completely subjective in
regard to his emotional capacity. As a passionate man,
Keith is blind to the demands of his own nature. He is
naive and sentimental, disposed to tantrumB and to tears.
It is Keith's tendency to romanticize--albeit involuntar
ily— which sets him apart from the Kraftmenschen. He
knows the path ta success which other men have taken, and
264
he possesses the ambition and the opportunistic spirit
of competition which have brought rewards to other men.
But he lacks their total capacity fibr objectivity, their
detachment in the manipulation of people and circumstances
to their own advantage.
Even though Keith is critical in his evaluation
of society, blind spots hamper his total vision of life.
In his affair with Anna, for example, he is completely
subjective. She tells him, "Du siehst und hflrst
Phanta8legebllde, sobald du mich vor Augen hast. Du
dberschfltzest meine Erschelnung geradeso, wie du msine
Kunst dberschfltzest" (IV, 6l). His preoccupation with
details of her ball gown (as recorded in the ledger in
tended for business entries), his childish Joy in the
colors and the spectacle of the garrish display of fire
works planned for her% debut— both indicate an extremely
passionate nature.
Keith is not always buoyantly optimistic. In
certain situations he behaves as if driven by demons. At
times he is restless, dissatisfied with himself. He is
tormented by the knowledge of his social ostracism.
Though unlike Scholz, he never loses his equilibrium, he
shareb with the seekers and prophets of morality the
Intense fervor which marks their search. In answer to
Anna's accusation, "Du kannst es nlemandem verdenken,
265
dass er dir mlsstraut, vrenn du Tag und Naoht wie eln
ausgehungerter Wolf hlnter delnem Gltfck herjagst,"
Keith replies, "Ich kann nlcht [sic] fflr melne
Uners&ttlichkeit" (IV, 78)
Angered by the success of the Munich citizens
to relieve him of his leadership in the building of the
Feenpalast, Keith visualizes— as a child might dream of
his own funeral— the dramatic effect which his suicide,
a Jump from the roof of the Feenpalast, would produce.
Even in failure he hopes to revenge himself against
those who, like authoritative parents have smashed his
childish dream of glory:
Sollte das mfiglich sein? — (Mit Tr&nen in den
Augen): Nach so viel FeuerwerkI — Ich soil
wieder wie ein Geflchteter von Land zu Land
gepeitscht werden?! — Nein! neini - Ich darf
mioh nlcht an die Wand drftcken lassenl I - Es
1st das letztamal in diesem Leben, dass die Welt
mit all lhrer Herrlichkeit vor mir llegtl . . .
[Ich] werde ganx Mdnchen durch meinen Sprung in
Erstaunen setzen . . . da fall'ich schon, unter
Pauken und Trompeten, lhm dlrekt auf den Kopf,
dass alles rings auseinanderstlebt, und schlage
alles kurz und klein. Dann wlrd sich's zeigen.
wer zuerst wieder auf die Beine kommtj (IV, 88).
Keith's cynicism in regard to bflrgerliche Moral
is the product of both rational and irrational forces
within himself. His critical insight into the immorali
ties which lie Just beneath the surface of society
conflicts with a romantic spirit which longs for the
dazzle of lights and the brilliance and exceitement of a
266
perennial opening night. His oynlolsm Is Incongruous with
the childlike joy surrounding his little dream of glory.
Keith' b aspirations have no basis In fact, for despite
his penetrating critical ability, he remains an Incurable
dreamer. His schemes are aborted, not because society
has any real Interest In destroying him, but because his
own romanticism makes a working relationship with reality
Impossible. Keith underestimates the extent to which his
own nature Is governed by Irrational forces and an
enormous capacity for emotional response. Kutscher says
of him, "Keith 1st bel aller praktlsohen Oewandthelt,
allem Wlrkllchkeltsslnn eln Romantlker, der mit elner
gewlssen Mustlk lmmer Ins Ungemessene sohwelft" (Kutscher,
II, 171).
In discussing Keith's resistance to tstal despair
and suicide— his optimism Is persistent In spite of the
lrreooncllable forces at work within him— one additional
Internal conflict should be mentioned. He Is an Incon
gruous mixture of the conflicting dictates of philosoph
ical (i.e., Intellectual) and Instinctive truths.
Philosophically Keith Is a confirmed disciple of
Egolsmus. His carefully reasoned doctrine of self-help—
an expression of his veneration for Individual spirit
and Initiative— conflicts with a natural and Instinctive
tendency to extend aid to suffering humanity. His heroic
267
intellectual effort to divest himself of all milk-of-
human-kindness is unsuccessful. His Insatiable appetite
for life does not allow him to act consistently according
to his philosophy of Bgolsmus.
Keith's attempt to live according to the principle
of Egoismus assumes that Man does not live to support
society, but that society exists to support Man. The
very basis of the bflrgerliche Moral is the unavoidable
exploitation of one Individual by another. The Important
point, for Keith, is to concentrate one's efforts on
the exploitation of the unprincipled and the ungifted
(Schurken and Dummkflpfen):
Das einzlg rlchtlge Mittel, seine Mitmenschen
auszuntitzen, besteht darln, dass man sle bei ihren
guten Selten himmt. Darln liegt die Kunst,
geliebt zu werden, die Kunst, recht zu behalten.
Je ergleblger Sie Ihre Mitmenschen (ibervorteilen,
urn so gewis8enhafter mtissen Sle darauf aohten,
dass Sle das Recht auf Ihrer Selte haben. Suchen
Sle Ihren Nutzen nlemals im Nachtell eines
ttichtlgen Menschen, sondern immer nur im Nachtell
von Scnurcken und Dummkflpfen. (IV, 84).
The possibility of seeking one's fortune without
exploiting someone is never considered. The only real
yardstick for judging whether cm action is justified is
reflected in the questions "What's in it for me?"
Keith has no comprehension of altruistic motivation. To
seek morality through "good" deeds is idle and academic
speculation:
Man kann seinen Mitmenschen nloht mehr in dieser
268
Welt ntitzen, als wenn man In der umfassendsten
Welse auf selnen elgenen Vortell ausgeht.
. . . Wer slch aber darauf, dass er Belnen
Posten ausfdllt und seine Kinder ern&hrt, etwas
elnblldet, der maoht sleh blauen Dunst vor. Die
Kinder danken ihrem Schflpfer, wenn man sle nloht
In die Welt setzt, und naoh dem Posten recken
hundert arme Teufel die Httlse!" (IV, 21).
Theoretically, philosophically and Intellectually
Keith riddles the fibre of traditional theories of
altruism. It Is Inconceivable to him that society could
be maintained on any basis other than personal profit.
According to him, the man of ability will unavoidably
promote social order by organizing the efforts of the
masses to work on his behalf. If the scheme falls, there
Is no one to blame but oneself. He protests against the
notion that man must be generally useful to society. He
feels no obligation to the world: "Warum soil man denn
durchaus eln ntitzllches Mltglled der menschllchen
Gesellschaft werden? . . . Ich brauohe kelne Existenz-
bereohtigungi Ich habe nlemanden urn melne Existenz
gebeten und entnehme daraus die Berechtlgung, melne
Existenz nach meinem Kopfe zu exlstleren" (IV, 75)•
In actual practice, however, Keith feels sympathy
for the suffering of other human beings In spite of him
self. Contrary to all his convictions, he extends aid
when he can 111 afford It, and when there Is no Immediate
possibility of capitalizing on his charity. Typical Is
the short sequence of dialogue between Keith and the
composer Sommersberg, who bears a strong resemblance to
Ddhrlng of Der Kammersflnger:
Ich bln der Verfasser der "Lieder
elnes Qlilcklichen. ” Ich sehe nlcht
danach aus.
So habe lch auch schon ausgesehen.
Ich hfitte auch den Mut nlcht gefunden,
mlch an Sle zu wenden, wenn lch nlcht
tatsflchlich selt zwel Tagen belnah
nichts gegessen hfltte.
Das 1st mir hundertmal passlert.
Wie kann lch Ihnen helfen?
Mit elner Kleinigkeit — fiflr eln
Mlttagbrot ...
Zu etwas Besserem tauge ich Ihnen
nicht?
Ich bin Invalide.
Sle haben aber das halbe Leben noch
vor slchi . . .
Kommen Sle doch heute In vlerzehn
Tagen zu unserer Ortindungsfeler
in der Briennerstrasse. Da kdnnen
sich Ihnen die nfltzllchsten
Bezlehungen ersohliessen (Gtibt
ihm Geld). Hler haben Sle hundert
Mark (IV, 46-47).
The Marquis displays expansive generosity and even an
element of sympathy In spite of himself. Nothing follows
In the subsequent action to suggest any practical motiva
tion for Keith's having helped Sommersberg.
Similar Is Keith's aid to Saranieff and to Hermann
Kasimlr, both of whom receive money from him when they
need It. Anna, In her climb to the top, takes advantage
Sommersberg:
v. Keith:
Sommersberg:
v. Keith:
Sommersberg:
v. Keith:
Sommersberg:
v. Keith:
270
of Keith's gullible and Involuntarily benevolent nature.
She plays according to Keith’s rules for life, but she
plays with greater consistency and with greater success
than Keith himself. She is a perfect match for the elder
Casimir. Both lack any capacity whatsoever for emotional
experience. They are void of all romanticism, of all
benevolence; they are protected by their natures from the
forces which all but destroy both Keith and Scholz. They
are immune to despair.
Keith's occasional lapse into charity contradicts
the philosophy upon which he has built his life. While
he recognizes in Scholz the altruistic moralist's major
flaw— refusal to accept the egoistic demands of one's own
nature— Keith is unaware of the fact that he has ignored
one aspect of his own nature. He does not consciously
perceive his own capacity for altruistic thought and
action. Keith says of Scholz, "Er ist nflralich wirklich
Moralist, von Natur und aus tfberzeugung. . . . Er lebt,
seit ich ihn kenne, in nichts als Aufopferung, ohne zu
merken, dass er zwei Seelen in seiner Brust hat" (IV,
44-45). Keith ignores the fact that he too has "zwei
Seelen in seiner Brust."
In ignoring the egoistic demands of his own spirit
Scholz lives for an altruistic ideal which defies reali
zation. Failing to make himself useful to humanity,
271
therefore, he fails according to the standards he has set
for himself, to justify his existence. The result is
total despair. In ignoring the altruistic side of his
nature, Keith is equally blind to an important aspect of
his own personality. His failure to recognize that a
philosophy based on egoism alone is as fallible as a
philosophy based solely on altruism, weakens his effort
to establish himself firmly in society.
In his concern for the suicide of desperation
Wedekind contrasts the apparent altruism of Scholz with
the apparent egoism of Keith. In terms of the individual's
ability to survive, Keith's philosophy emerges as super
ior to Scholz' philosophy, for it is able to withstand
the impact of irreconcilable conflicts without destroying
the individual. Scholz' philosophy, when confronted with
the realities of life, cannot sustain his continued
existence.
Measured in terms of the society in which Keith
and Scholz live, Keith's belief in Bgoismus is more pro
ductive than Scholz' belief in altruism. Kutscher
compares the contribution of each to society: "W&hrend
aber Keith, der unslttliche Selbstling, durch seine
Umtriebe Bewegung, Leben, ja auch Nutzen schafft, bringt
Scholz, der aus allzuviel Geftfhl allzu sittlich 1st, der
nach Menschenbegltiokung und Weltverbesserung strebt, im
272
Grande sich sowohi wie andern nur Ungldck" (Kutscher, II,
64-65).
In the concrete and practical terms of both the
society and the Individual, according to the conclusion
of Keith, the philosophy of Egolsmus emerges superior to
the philosophy of altruism. Theoretically, however,
Scholz' belief in altruism Is never successfully refuted.
Philosophically speaking, Scholz' theory of service to a
suffering humanity implies the observance of the rights
and feelings of other men. Whoever builds his life on
the principle of the exploitation of other men, argues
Scholz, buys his happiness at their expense: "Dir
[Keith] fehlt aber das Bewusstseln, dass andere ganz die
nflralichen Ansprtiche auf dem Genuss lhres Lebens haben
wie du. Das, worin die Menschheit ihre hSchsten
Brrangensohaften erblickt, was man mlt Fug und Recht
als Slttllchkelt bezelchnet, dafdr hast du nlcht das
geringste Verstflndnis" (IV, 7*0. For Scholz, morality
is the only defense which society has against the ego
maniac whose fortune Is bought at the price of the
happiness of other men. Keith does not reply, for indeed
there Is no reply. He has no comprehension of a society
built on the assumption that other men also have rights.
His inability to answer is a tacit affirmation of Scholz'
argument, a triumph for the forces of altruism.
273
Scholz' philosophy Is theoretically superior to
Keith's for it defends life on a much broader basis. If
one could live according to what Scholz sacredly cherishes
as the "hSchste Errungenschaften [der] Menschelt'1 — die
Slttllohkelt— a full and meaningful life would be possible
for all. If, however, everyone lived according to Keith's
tenets of belief, then society would cease to exist.
Keith's law Is the law of the jungle and as such is the
extreme opposite of Slttllohkelt.
The great irony of the drama is that, in practice,
Keith emerges as an individual superior to Scholz. He
has a natural flair for life, for love, for excitement
and involvement in spite of himself. Unlike Scholz, he
never bogs down in the mediocrity of the bflrgerllche Moral.
In terms of the overall problem of morality, the
basis of the present study, it is helpful to think of
Scholz as the defender of bdrgerllche Moral and Keith as
the defender of menschliche Moral. Scholz is not really
a part of the bflrgerliche Moral; he rather aspires toward
it. Keith's veneration for dynamic individualism con
stitutes his own particular morality, but his ideal does
not include the hope of human beings achieving anything
of value beyond the confines of their own separate exist
ence. Ultimately the tyranny of bttrgerllohe Moral
triumphs over the concepts of morality cherished by both
274
Scholz and Keith. Society will not tolerate the search
for morality on any basis except Its own.
The type of morality upon which Scholz Insists,
reflects Wedekind's thinking covernlng Idealism as ex
plained In the essay Zlrkusgedanken (1887), In which the
poet sincerely challenges the validity of selfless Ideal
ism and altruism as a way of life. He uses an extended
metaphor to establish the difference between the trapeze
artists or abstrakt-erhabene Ideallsten, and the tightrope
walkers or real-praktlsohe Ideallsten. Of the former he
writes,
Sle slnd so vollstflndlng von der Idee durchdrungen,
glelchsam besessen, dass sle slch selbst lm Mrgsten
Elend nooh hoch tiber der Mensohhelt fflhlen. — Sollte
Indes das Entsetzliche einmal elntreten, soilten
die Strlcke relssen, In denen das Luftschlff hflngt,
sollte Ihr alles, lhr Qlauben, Ihre Zuversloht
unter elnem nlcht mehr mlsszuverstehenden Streloh
des Sohlcksals zusammenbreohen, dann hilft Ihnen
weder Doktor noch Seelenarzt. Jflhllngs kopftiber
stflrzen sle aus der sohwlndelnden Xtherhdhe Ihrer
Hlmmelslelter hernleder und brechen das Genlok.
Dleser Vorgang kleldet slch nlcht selten In das
Oewand elner Selbstentlelbung (IX, 301-302).
In the same essay Wedekind speaks of the concept
of ELastlzltftt as a far more valid principle upon which
to build a moral and meaningful existence, free of the
tempting, but destructive alternative of suicide.
Elasticity, like the old Austrian adage biegen nlcht
brechen, Implies the ability of the individual to adjust
from within to the inexorable circumstances without, It
275
is a quality which the author himself must have possessed
to a large degree, for despite the humiliation and abuse
which he was forced to endure from a hostile press, de
spite a life-long struggle against economic failure, he
never lost his resiliency. He arose again and again to
meet the challenge which his work demanded. In the essay
he compares the fences of the steeplechase to the ob
stacles of life:
Jeder von uns sttirzt einmal zur Tiefe nleder.
Wem aber dann die ELastizitflt 1m Fussgelenk
fehlt, dem wlrd jene Perse zur Achillesferse;
sie zerreist, er bleibt liegen, und die wilde
Jagd geht Johlend und klflffend achtlos flber ihn
hln. Nensohenleben zu Tausenden werden so in
den Staub getreten (IX, 203)*
Wedekind has created several significant charac
ters who personify dramatically an alternative to suicide.
They are characters with no set goal in life. They shift
their values according to the climate in which they find
themselves. Unlike the Kraftmensohen discussed in an
earlier chapter, the members of this group are character
ized by both the quality of elasticity, and by the fact
that they are able to sustain themBelves without depending
upon a parasitic relationship.
Oskar of Elins Brweokung is such a character, but
because the work remained a fragment, he lacks the full
development of another real-praktischer Idealist created
in the same year— Fritz Schwigerllng of Liebestrank.
276
Schwigerling, like his prototype from life— the popular
performer Rudinoff, whom Wedekind knew during his early
days in Munich and Paris— makes a consumate adjustment
to external circumstance. Without forsaking the dictates
of his own individual spirit, Sohwigerllng is able to
create his own incentive for improving himself by develop
ing the power and the grace latent within himself. His
adjustment to life is an exploration of the talents
bestowed upon him at birth. He needs no goal beyond
himself. The obstacles along his path are functional,
for they give him the possibility of further exploring
and developing his own resources. Whatever he sets out
to do, he accomplishes. He is the master of every
situation:
Ich bin dreimal vom Turmseil gestflrzt, ich war
siebenmal verheiratet, ich war slebenmalslebzlgmal
zum sterben verllebt. Keln Qlied an meinem
Kflrper, das ich nlcht schon gebrochen. Aber
zeig mir die Situation, deren ich mlch nlcht zu
bemeistern wflsste! Das lernt slch 1m Zirkus,
slehst du. Ein entschlossener Sprung, und wenn
der Fuss die Erde berdhrt, elne grazidse
Kniebeuge, dass man nlcht auf die Nase fUllt.
Jeder sttfrzt mal in Nacht und Flnsternls, aber
wem es an Elastlzitflt gebricht, der blelbt 1m
Grase und die wllde Jagd saust johlend, klflffend,
achtloB tfber ihn hin (II, 197).
Sohwigerllng is a dramatic representation of the
invincible idealists of the circus essay. Whole phrases
have been lifted from the essay and put into his mouth.
He is not only tutor to Rogoschin's children; he is the
277
only acceptable educator In all of Wedekind. Repeatedly
affirming that life Itself Is the essence of all being,
a force sufficient unto Itself as both the path and the
goal of human striving, It Is not within his nature to
become disturbed by external circumstances over which
he has no control.
All the so-called Kraftmenschen of the later
dramas offer no better answer for the Individual to sus
tain life. With them It Is always a coldly calculated
triumph gained only through the sacrifice of their own
emotional capacity and at the expense of less aggressive
Individuals. Though they ostensibly endorse bflrgerllche
Moral, they are concerned only with those aspects of that
morality which promote their own careers. Gerardo of
the Kammersflnger fulfills society's needs for matinee
idols, but he Ignores the need of other human beings for
warmth, understanding and sympathy. He Is an Incomplete
human being to the extent that he is Incapable of emotion
al response. Every step is calculated to win. Every
move Is a part of his conquest over the weaker members of
society.
What has been said of Gerardo is true also of
the other Kraftmenschen: Rodrigo Quast, Dr. SchSn, Consul
Casimir, Launhart, Relssner, Dr. Sterner and the trio
from Schloss Wettersteln— Rtidlger, Tschamper and Luokner.
278
Sohwigerllng shares with the Kraftmenschen their
ability to survive despite the opposition of hostile
external circumstances. He shares their capacity for
adapting to, and even utilizing, the realities of life
which defy change. But having once accepted that which
cannot be changed, he dedicates his efforts to the full
exploration and development of a potential within himself,
a potential which Is a part of his creative spirit.
All the members of the third category of suicide,
before they became desperate, had believed In their own
ability to change and to influence the circumstances in
which they found themselves. Their lives had been
dedicated to the possibility of that change. Their
desperation is the result of their failure to bring it
about. Schwlgerling's belief in his ability to change his
relationship with the world does not depend on a change
in the world, but rather in himself. He believes in
the triumph of individual will-power over emotion, in
decision and fear:
Im Zirkus hat man andere Begrlffe von Erziehung.
Das Tier muss seinen Stolz darelnsetzen,
hinflberzukommen, mlt Anmut, mit Slcherhelt
tfber Jedes erdenklicke Hlndernls! Ich lflse die
Glleder, damit der Geist sle durchlebt, damit
Frelheit und Freude durch Jede Ader zittert,
bis die Faszlnation in hellen Funken aus beiden
Augen sprflht! — Das Tier muss seine Nuskeln
schwellen, seine Brust slch heben ftlhlen, wenn
es der Welt gegentibertritt! (II, 192).
279
The difference between Sohwigerllng and Scholz—
not to mention the other desperate suicide victims--is
that the former depends upon the utilization of a spirit,
a spark of life within himself, his pride, to overcome
the whims of fortune. For Sohwigerllng, the potential
within himself 1b infinite. No exterior force can counter
or defeat it. The greater the obstacle to success, the
greater the sense of pride within the individual to
triumph over that obstacle. His success is the result
of a conscious resolution to win and does not depend
upon a wistful desire to change the nature or the direc
tion of the external world.
Scholz lacks this spirit of pride necessary to
victory. He is Incapable of effecting change in whatever
opposes him. His ultimate despair, symbolized by his
belief that he has been marked by the sign of Cain, is
the result of his inability to grow in the face of ob
stacles which confront him. He is doomed to failure,
because he lacks the will to triumph. At the time of
writing the Marquis von Keith, Wedekind's optimism
concerning Man's ability to determine his own destiny
had weakened. There is no suggestion that Scholz— like
Moritz, when he refused to respond to Use in Frtlhllngs
Brwaohen— could have behaved any differently. He lacked
from birth the sense of pride in himself which might
280
have brought him success, and the possibility of formulat
ing a morality more adaptable to the ever-shifting demands
of the external world.
Schwigerling combats the bflrgerliche Moral of a
hostile world with a fully developed menschllche Moral
within himself, a menschllche Moral based on a positive
affirmation of his own worth, on the latent strength and
grace within himself as an organ of nature. Scholz has
no real sense of menschllche Moral, but only a static
impression of what he thinks the bdrgerliche Moral must
be. His desire to serve humanity had to end in a suicide
of desperation, for it lacked the solid foundation which
only pride in one's self can give.
According to a description by Wedekind's contempo-
/
rary, Emile Durkhelm, the foregoing remarks discuss the
motivation of the desperate suicide. Listing briefly
the members of the last category of suicide, reasons
are advanced for centering the discussion on the pro
tagonists of Keith: Scholz is a classic example of the
moralist whose altruism leads him to despair, Keith a
classic example of the egoist who, because he makes
himself the center of his own life, resists final despair
and suicide.
On the premise that despair is engendered or
resisted according to Man's understanding of the forces
231
over which he has no control, we compare the views of
both Scholz and Keith In regard to fate. Scholz defies
his fate at the beginning, but capitulates unconditionally
to It when his world collapses around him. The result Is
suicidal despair. Keith accepts the Inexorable from the
very beginning, but seeks opportunities, despite his fate,
for making his way in the world. Scholz's final accept
ance of fate is completely pessimistic. Keith is op
timistic. Fate for him can be good fortune as well as
bad.
Despite the conflicts in Keith's personality—
he is both objective and subjective, critical and romantic,
rational and emotional— he is an incurable optimist. His
optimism is not the result of a simple and uncomplex view
of life, but rather an aspect of his ability to affirm
life in spite of irreconcilable conflict within one's
own nature. Keith sees the shadows, but continues to
grope his way toward the light. Most incongruous of all,
in regard to Keith, is the fact that although he is
theoretically and philosophically an egoist, he is in
stinctively am altruist in spite of himself. The conflict
ing philosophies of altruism and egoism are contrasted in
terms of their practical benefits both for the society and
for the individual, amd in terms of the theoretical
superiority of the philosophy of altruism. Keith's egoism
282
saves him from despair, and Its ultimate effect on society
Is more positive than Scholz* altruism. Scholz* belief
in the value of service to humanity is responsible for
his own despair and for great social calamities.
The two types of idealists discussed in the
circus essay suggest a parallel between Scholz and the
trapeze artist, and between Keith and the tightrope
walker. The former tries to live according to an idea,
the basis of which is affixed to a point beyond himself
(altruism, in the case of Scholz). The latter lives
according to a fixed point within himself which shifts
with the change of external pressures (egoism, in the
case of Keith).
Fritz Sohwigerllng is an even clearer example of
an individual who looks only to himself for the success
or failure of his life. Whereas Keith fails in every
thing he attempts— although he never despairs of the
possibility of trying again--Sohwigerllng is a success
in life, a success in society, a success in every respect.
He is shown to be the most powerful antedote to despair
and desperate suicide in all Wedekind. He is the closest
Wedekind ever comes to a practical formulation of
menschllche Moral. Sohwigerllng can survive in society
without sacrificing that aspect of his own personality
which is a reflection of divine power.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing study, In its attempt to explore
I
Wedekind's concept of morality, was divided Into two main j
parts. The first part explored several aspects of the po- j
et's search for morality within the limitations of Man's !
i
life. The second part of the discussion focused attention
on Wedekind's concept of death, and particularly on the
role of suicide as a part of Man's total struggle for
meaning and purpose.
The study shows that Wedekind's belief In life as
the single common denominator which all men share with
equal Intensity, is a belief In one particular aspect of
life: Instinct. It shows that especially In his early
works Instinct constituted the basis of his search for mo
rality— a search based on the premise that through instinct
Man Is the recipient of divine knowledge and power. Wede
kind believed that Man Is the visible Incarnation of an in
visible god of creation. Because the source of life is ab-
i
solute, the closer Man remains to that source, the more re-|
liable his knowledge of himself and the more sensitive he
Is to the true demands of his own nature. Society, con
versely, is a corruption of divinely inspired instinct.
The more Man identifies with society's values, the greater
the threat to his faith In instinct as the basis for morality
284
In the early chapters of this study the attempt
was made to show how a morality based on Instinct fared In
a world of ant1-instinctive forces. Because Wedekind him
self viewed life dlalectically, a discussion of the op
posing forces Involved In his search for morality sug
gested Itself. In his work he persistently tried to de
termine whether morality based on Instinct was a concept
valid only for the Individual organism, or was It also
valid In terms of the collective life of the society. In
addition he tried to define his concept of morality In
terms of physical and metaphysical, and In terms of ra
tional and Irrational experience.
In the second part of the study It was shown that '
Wedekind's victims of suicide— affirming imlle Durkhelm's
thesis that self-destruction is a social (i.e., moral)
phenomenon— seek voluntary death because of their desire
to make their individual lives meaningful as a part of
collective humanity. Influenced by Durkhelm's classifi- j
!
cation of suicide, our discussion also divided Wedekind's j
victims of self-destruction into three distinct groups, |
j
according to their position in the search for morality:
the altruists, the penitents, and the victims of despera
tion. Each category, though composed of several members, j
was characterized by one important representative from the j
plays of the middle period of the poet's creative life
285
!
(ca. 1900-1907). Hetmann was considered as an example of |
the altruists, Nlcolo as an example of the penitents, and I
Scholz and Keith as examples of desperation. :
In re-traclng our course of Investigation, It
will be remembered, we began with Wedekind's belief that
morality, like religion, Is based on Man's faith In an
absolute source of all meaning and goodness. Though re
ligion and morality conflict In life, Ideally speaking
both aspire toward absolute truth based on the revelation
of metaphysical power.
The conflict which characterized Man's struggle
for religious and moral truth was characteristic of fur
ther conflicts which impede Man's desire to penetrate the !
ultimate nature of morality. The major source of moral
confusion, It was shown, stems from the conflicting de
mands of Individual and social concepts of morality.
i
Each claimed for itself the moral prerogative.
In his essayistlc and theoretical writings (e.g.,
Kunst und Slttllchkeit and Zirkuagedanken) Wedekind de
fended the contention that, although the individual Is the
final measure of good and evil, social morality exists to
confirm the convictions which the Individual has formula
ted on his own. The belletrlstic writings, however, in
variably show society, not as helpful, but as a detriment
and a liability in the individual search for morality.
286
The morality of collective life, because it is divested j
of the divine spirit which characterizes individual life,
rests on a firmer, more pragmatic basljB. In addition it
was also shown that, although in the theoretical writings j
I
Wedekind insisted that the individual not offend the te
nets of public morality, in his poetic work he repeatedly
demonstrated his belief that society is inadequate to the
task of providing a meaningful basis for personal morali
ty. Again and again he portrays society as the tyranni
cal oppressor of the individual in search of morality.
Having established and explored the irreconci
lable difference between private and public concepts of
morality, the study turned to a brief examination of We
dekind's belief that art and life cannot be divorced from
one another. His objection to contemporary writing was
viewed as the direct result of his belief that the art
ist must confront life squarely. The artistic form of
both Neo-Romanticism and Formalism was shown to be, in
Wedekind's terms, an evasion of moral truth. The study
contended that Wedekind's expanding use of the grotesque
i
as a stylistic device reflected his growing awareness
that the basic conflicts between instinct and the collec
tive forces of civilization could never be resolved.
Wedekind's concept of his own role as the artist j
i
t
in alienation is explained as a consequence of his
287
inability to serve two masters: menschliche and blirger-
llche Floral. He sees himself as caught between the
Scylla and Charybdis of morality. By responding to in
stinctive appetites, Man offends his desire for social
acceptance. 3y conforming to society, on the other hand,
he suppresses his need for instinctive participation in
life. »
The study shows that, despite his belief that
society dehumanizes the individual, Wedekind could not
suppress a growing need to subject himself to external
authority. The greater his apprehension in regard to in
stinct, the harder he tried to find meaning in society.
Wedekind's Inherent disapproval of social morali
ty, coupled with his growing but unrequited need for so
cial recognition, made him particularly sensitive to his
position apart from other men. He realized that he was
largely to blame for his ostracism. Not only did society
and literary movements keep their distance from him, but
he also contributed consciously and willfully to the ever-
widening gap which separated him from his contemporaries.
His dogged determination to force society to view its own
back yard was felt to be offensively tendentious. His
Justifiable pride in the necessity and Importance of his
personal search for morality became confused with an em-
i
blttered and biased attack on conventional morality. A
288 S
!
false pride, the product of his failure to gain literary i
i
recognition, cane dangerously close to destroying his
creative power as an artist.
In his attempt to justify his concept of morality |
based on Instinct, Wedekind tried through both rational
and Irrational means to comprehend the true nature of Man.
Reason, according to the study, was shown to be a capaci
ty for judgment and evaluation of one's self and one's
world, apart from the Instinctive drives which link Man
directly to nature. It was shown that only the alien and
the outcast— by dint of their inability to become a part
of the midstream of life— have access to rational knowl
edge. Reason proved Itself a mixed blessing In the search
for morality, for instead of leading to a deeper appreci
ation and understanding of life, it makes Man aware of his
own capacity for chaos and destruction.
i
Falling to satisfy his hunger for deeper knowl-
edge of the world and of life through rational means, We- |
I
dekind turned his efforts to an exploration of Man's emo-
1
tional capacity. The results were no less negative. In
contrast to his aspiration that feeling and emotion should
strengthen Man's instinctive capacity for life and his
awareness of a divine creative force at work within him
self, Wedekind came to distrust Irrational Impulses.
Dlihring and Helene of Der Kammersdnger were mentioned as
examples Illustrating the dire consequences of emotional
involvement in the pursuit of selfless, idealistic morali
ty.
As an important aspect of Wedekind's hope of
finding in emotion a reliable guide in his search for
menschllche Moral, the study discusses Wedekind's concept
of Woman as the personification of emotion. In his divi
sion of Woman into das Weib and die Frau, the former was
always portrayed as a threat to society. As a concentra
tion of both instinct and emotion, she Jeopardized Nan's
allegiance to traditional social institutions. Lulu was
shown to be a classic example of das Weib, the personifi
cation of raw procreative power and a devastating threat
to society. Die Frau, by contrast, was explained as a
product of civilization. Basing her personal struggle for
survival on the hope of finding a secure harbor within
acceptable social circles, she was shown to prostitute her j
i
natural capacity for emotional involvement in life. When ;
die Frau succeeded in establishing herself in a Man's
world of impersonal forces, she sacrificed the original j
reason for her existence as the personification of dyna
mic irrational power. Wedekind's women, relegated to the
secondary role of saving the male, instead destroy them
selves in one of two ways. Either they allow society to
t
stifle their capacity for emotional and instinctive
290
response, or they allow their own passionate appetites to
become an Incurable addiction. For all her sensitivity,
Woman Is of little help In Nan's attempt to justify his
existence In terms of menschllche Moral.
Having failed to support Wedekind's concept of
Instinctive morality as the key to a full life, the study
turned to his concept of death. Although It at first
seemed a paradox that a writer, absorbed In a penetrating
examination of life should be so concerned with death, It
became evident that Wedekind's Interest In death was con
fined to a violent termination of life, either as murder
or as suicide. Although murder Is admittedly significant
as a social phenomenon, the frequent occurence of self-
destruction in Wedekind'8 dramas suggested suicide as an
even more significant symptom of Nan's failure to find a
reliable moral basis for life.
In Its consideration of the three types of sui
cide prevalent among Wedekind's characters, the second
half of the study began with a consideration of Karl Het-
mann as a classic example of altruistic suicide. Het-
mann's altruism, according to Wedekind, is symptomatic of
his Inability to participate In life emotionally. He Is
an Impractical theorist, forcing his scheme for the per
fection of mankind on an unwilling, insensitive and un
grateful public. With Hetmann, the theoretical
possibility of establishing a morality based on altruism
suffers complete defeat. Though offered earthly salvation
through Fanny, the study showed that he was too pre
occupied with his own martyrdom to be able to respond to
i
her. Both his altruism In life and his desire for the !
martyr's death were considered as the product of a spirit
that is basically masochistic. His theoretical veneration
for life and beauty Is a hollow doctrine, not only be
cause society Is Incapable of selfless idealism, but be
cause the Zwergrlese himself is, in reality, Insensitive
to life.
The second category of suicides examined Wede-
kind's concept of guilt as the result of both involuntary j
and voluntary transgressions. The poet believed that Man
was destined by fate to sin. According to his interpreta
tion of the doctrine of original sin, Man is the victim
of his own awakening spirit. His need to question, to
experience for himself, and— if necessary— to refuse obe-
dience to the divine power from which he comes, was shown !
to be a part of his need to justify life, his life, in i
terms which are both rationally and irrationally satis
fying to him. The individual's search for morality, ac
cording to Wedekind, was the only alternative to a naive
acceptance of the absolute authority of religious or so
cial forces. He believed that from the time of Genesis
the desire to search had been an Irrepressible part of
Man's nature. Although that desire made primeval Man
guilty of a transgression against authority (i.e., Ood)
the awareness of guilt was Insufficient to restrain his
need to Justify his own life in his own terms.
In addition to Wedekind's belief that Man Is
"guiltlessly guilty," he also realized that— If morality
was to be at all meaningful— there must also be an area
of life where Man Is free to choose. Despite the power of
fate, Man is partly responsible for the consequences of
his own actions. Kdnlg Nicolo was discussed as an example
of a Man who seeks penitence for guilt Incurred as the re
sult of conscious and voluntary transgressions against his
own nobler spirit. By profaning the king within himself,
he blasphemies against his very reason for being. His In
difference to impending execution was considered a part of j
I
his realization that, not through a sudden act of self-
destruction, but through a life lived in recognition of
one's own guilt, does Man exonerate himself from the j
transgression of his past. Only after Nicolo has learned j
j
to revere the king within himself as his share of dlvini- j
ty, does he deserve the royal burial prepared by his j
usurper. Acceptance of his guilt, whatever the origin of
that guilt— either fate or his own will— is the prelude to
offiolal recognition and the prerequisite to an eternal
293
position of glory.
The final category of suicides, In Its considera
tion of despair as motivation for self-destruction, con
sidered Scholz and Keith as alter-egos. Scholz, the
Don Quljote der Moral, bases his philosophy of the moral
life on his determination to serve humanity. Totally un
fitted to the task, he forces himself upon an unwilling
humanity and leaves great havoc In his wake. Like Her-
i
mann, It was shown, he demonstrates Wedekind's belief
that It is Impossible to formulate a morality based on al
truism. Scholz was discussed as a victim of despair be
cause, In contrast to Keith, he lacks the ability to ac
cept the role which fate plays in the lives of men. By
pushing himself into situations for which he is ill-
equipped, he tempts the forces of fate and ultimately
destroys himself.
Keith's concept of himself as the Don Quljote dee
Lebensgenusses was considered as Wedekind's antidote to
despair. Keith Is able to accept the domination of fate
over his life, for he has learned to seek his fortune in
limited areas where Man has the power to act. He is saved
from despair by his optimistic faith in Man's ability to
triumph in spite of fate. Though from birth he has much
more reason than Scholz to curse the omnipotent gods of
creation, his opportunistic philosophy of life protects
\
294
him from total despair. Like Fritz Sohwigerllng of more
j
than a decade and a half earlier ( 1 8 9 1 ) , Keith is shown
to possess a certain elasticity which protects him from |
despair and self-annihilation. j
The study shows that Wedekind ultimately rejec- |
j
ted suicide in any form as an alternative to life. De
spite his feeling of futility in regard to the search for
morality, he could not accept self-destruction as a mean
ingful act. Neither altruism nor egoism, neither the
awareness of guilt nor the desire for penitence, neither
the utopian hope for a better society nor the pessimistic
despair of the disenchanted individual— none of these give
Nan the right to extinguish the spark of life with which j
his search for meaning and purpose began.
In conclusion, attention must again be directed
to Wedekind's hope of finding in life the purpose and
meaning of existence. A morality based on instinct, he
discovered, proved itself untenable when confronted with |
the "hard facts" of life. Yet, although rational and lr-
rational experience proved themselves Inadequate to the
i
task of bolstering the poet's faith in Instinct as an j
aspect of divine revelation, Wedekind never completely
forsook his hope that within the recesses of the human
spirit Nan possessed a capacity for goodness.
The greatest change in his concept of morality
295 j
between the earlier and the later works is the result of
an increased awareness that the demands of bttrgerliche
Moral do not remain an external phenomenon. Whether one
likes it or not, society does have a claim on the indivi
dual, and that claim becomes an increasingly Important '
part of the poet's personality.
In the early plays, it was shown, the conflict
between the individual and society was basically a sur
face conflict. Wedekind's hope that the individual may
adjust to the demands of social morality was still gene
rally optimistic. Typical of the early period was the
vermummter Herr of FrUhllngs Erwachen with his advice that
Melchior seek morality somewhere between the demands of
his own nature (Wollen) and the demands of society
(Sollen).
With the turn of the century, Wedekind's concept ,
of morality underwent a major^ohange. His growing aware- j
ness that instinctive desires cannot constitute the basis
of menschllche Moral leads him to seek for moral authority
!
elsewhere. Though his concept of society as an insensi- |
i
i
tlve and Impersonal collective force does not change (with
the possible exception of Kttnlg Nicolo), his concept of
the individual in search of morality becomes Increasingly
complex. In the plays of Wedekind's middle period, the
protagonist finds himself actively soliciting the sanction '
296 |
of.external authority (society), while continuing to In- j
!
slat that he must be allowed freedom to search according
to the compulsions of his own nature. The conflict which
In the early plays had remained external— I.e., between
i
society and the Individual— becomes an Internal struggle
within the confines of one Individual.
Typical of the Increased complexity of the Indi
vidual In search of morality Is Burldan of Zensur. who
feels within himself the conflict between menschllche and
bdrgerllche Moral. His desire to make his work accep
table to society reflects the Internal demands of his own
nature to gain the recognition and approval of society.
Not until Kadldja's suicide does he realize that there can
be no compromise between the conflicting demands of public
and private morality.
The mature Wedekind Is aware that the demands of
t
bdrgerliche Moral do not remain external, but become a
part of his own need for acceptance In society. Man is
born with instinctive appetites, but he acquires cultural i
appetites which are no less demanding. The Irreconcil
able internal conflict between Man's Inherent and acquired
appetites Is the basic theme of all the later plays.
The mature Wedekind questioned every facet of his
former belief. He questioned the validity of a morality
based on the premise that instinct makes Man divine. He
297
realized that, although the source of life nay be abso
lute, Nan is not identical with that source. He has been
cut off from the god of creation through the awakening of
his own independent spirit. The mature Wedekind accepted
the fact that everything Man cherishes has only relative
value within a given context. He became aware that Nan's
capacity to search and to question leads him, not to a
confirmation of his former naive beliefs, but to a con
scious refutation of those beliefs. Nan in search of
truth about himself is led from security to confusion.
He is tormented by the realization that there is no final
authority apart from the overwhelming force of prevailing
society. Society may be a corruption of life, but it is
stronger than the individual and ultimately must triumph
over him. Man's only chance of personal survival rests
with his ability to adapt to the demands of btirgerllche
Moral.
Wedekind's shift from belief to non-belief, from
idealism to resignation, from optimism to pessimism, is
the result of his experience with life. He falls to es
tablish a personal morality apart from the values of col
lective life.
As the poet matures, the search for morality
based on instinct gives way to a concept of morality based
on the search Itself, the act of searching, as a moral
298
Imperative. Not a pre-conceived notion of divine power
revealed through procreative drives, but an openly per
ceptive sensitivity to the world, must provide %he basis
of morality. Not Nan as he should conceivably be, but
Nan as he is: this is the object of the Intense search
which the poet pursues throughout his mature years.
To the very end, the quest for morality as a per
sonal mandate of life, continued with full intensity.
The search, though failing to produce answers in moral
terms, produced art— no small compensation for a man who
was first, not a moralist, but an artist.
APPENDIX
[It is] untrue that life is only possible by its
possessing its rationale outside of Itself.
Indeed, a whole range of functions concerns only
the individual; these are the ones indispensable for
physical life. Since they are made for this purpose
only, they are perfected by its attainment. . . . Inso
far as he [i.e., primitive man or the child] has no
other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live
happily with no other objective than living. This is not
the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has
many ideas, feelings and practices unrelated to organic
needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political
faith, science itself are not to repair organic exhaus
tion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All
this supra-physical life is built and expanded not be
cause of the demands of the cosmic environment but
because of the demands of the social environment. The
Influence of society is what has aroused in us the senti
ments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others
it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us
with religious, political and moral beliefs that control
our actions. . . .
Contrariwise, in the same measure as we feel
detached from society we become detached from that life
whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do
these rules of morality, these precepts of law binding us
to all sorts of sacrifices, these restrictive dogmas
exist, if there is no being outside us whom they serve
and in whom we participate? What is the purpose of
science itself? If its only use is to increase our
chances for survival, it does not deserve the trouble it
entails. Instinct acquits itself better of this role;
animals prove this. Why substitute for it a more hesi
tant and uncertain reflection; what is the end of
suffering above all? If the value of things can only be
estimated by its relation to this positive evil for
the individual, it is without reward and incomprehensible
This problem does not exist for the believer, firm in his
faith or the man strongly bound by ties of domestic or
political society. Instinctively and unreflectively
they ascribe all that they are and do, the one to his
299
300
Church and or his God, the living symbol of the Church,
the other to his family, the third to his country or
party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of
glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do hom
age to it. . . . But the more the believer doubts,,that
is, the less he feels himself a real participant in'the
religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he
is freeing himself, the more the family and community
become foreign to the individual, so much the more does
he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the
exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose?
If, in other words, as has often been said, man
is double, that is because social man superimposes him
self upon physical man. Social man necessarily
presupposes a society which he expresses and serves. If
this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and
action about and above us, whatever is social in us is
deprived of all objective foundation. All that remains is
an artificial combination of Illusory images, a phantas
magoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is,
nothing which can be goal for our action. . . . Thus
we are bereft of reasons for existence; for the only life
to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything
actual; the only existence still based upon reality no
longer meets our needs. Because we have been initiated
into a higher existence, the one which satisfies an
animal or a child can satisfy us no more and the other
Itself fades and leaves us helpless. So there is nothing
more for our efforts to lay hold of, and we feel them
lose themselves in emptiness. In this sense it is true
to say that our activity needs an object transcending
it. (anile Durkheim, Suicide, pp. 211-213)*
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Works
Wedekind, Prank. Qesammelte Werke. 9 vols.
Munich: Georg Mailer, 1921.
. Qesammelte Briefe. 2 vols. ed. Fritz
StrichT Munich: Georg Mflller, 1924.
_______ . Ausgew&hlte Werke. 5 vols. ed. Fritz
Strich" Munich: Georg Mflller, 1924.
. Selbstdarstellung: Aus Briefen und
anderen persOnllohen Dokumenten. ed. Willi
Reich. Munich: Langen-Mdller, 1954.
. Prosa, Dramen Verse, ed. Hansgeorg
Maier. 2nd ed., Munich: Langen-Mdller,
I960.
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Books and Dissertations about Wedekind
Baucke, Rudolf. "Bdrgerlichkeit, Anlmallt&t und
Existenz lm Drama Wedekinds und des
Expressionismus." Unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, University of Kiel, 1950.
Biel, Franz. Gber Wedekind und das Theater.
Leipzig: K.'Wolff, 1915.-------------
Dehnow, F. Frank Wedekind. Leipzig: 0. R.
Reisland, 1922.
Duwe, Willi. Die dramatische Form Wedekinds in
lhrem Verhdltnis zur Ausdruckskunst.
Munich: E. Haber, 193b.
Elster, Hanns Martin. Frank Wedekind und seine
besten Bdhnenwerke: ALne kinfunrung.
Berlin: Schneider, 1922.
Feohter, Paul. Frank Wedekind: Per Mensoh und
dasWerk. Jena, 1920.
301
302
Friedrich, Paul Otto. Frank Wedekind. Berlin:
W. Borngr&ber, 1913^
i
Oundolf, Friedrich. Frank Wedekind. Munich: !
Langen-Mflller, 195** • j
Herbst, K. Qedanken ttber Wedekinds "Frflhllngs I
Erwaohen", ' ’ Erdgelst" und J 'Die flflchsc der
PandoraT Leipzig: Xenien Verlag, 1919.
Hovel, Ralph Martin. "The Image of the Artist in
the Works of Frank Wedekind." Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California, 1965.
Jesch, Jdrg. "Stilhaltung im Drama Frank
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University of Marburg, 1959.
Kapp, Julius. Frank Wedekind. Berlin: Barsdorf.
1909.
Kempner, Hans. Frank Wedekind als Mensoh und
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0. Linser, 1911. !
i
Kerr, Hanns. Frank Wedekind: Eine Studie.
Berlin, l^GT.
Kdchler, Alfred Q. Wedekind-Mappe: 12 Original
Lithographlen aus Wedekinds Dramen.
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Kujat, Alfons. "Die spflten Dramen Frank Wedekinds:'
Ihre Struktur und Bedeutung." Unpublished I
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Jena, 1959. {
Kutsoher, Arthur. Frank Wedekind: Seln Leben
und seine Worked 3 vols. Munich: Qeorg I
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Wedekind: Leben und Werk: Zum 100.
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303
Lautensack, H. Wedekinds Qrablegung: Bin
Requiem, ed. A. Rlohard MeyerT Berlin:
A. R. Meyer, 1919*
Milkerit, Gertrude "Die Idee der Frelhelt lm
Werke von Frank Wedekind." Unpublished
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1957.
Pissin, Ralmund. Frank Wedekind. Berlin: Gose
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Schulte, H. L. "Die Struktur der Dramatlk Frank
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Vieweger, E. Wedekind und seln Werk. Glauchau:
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Frank Wedekind zum 100. Geburtstag. Munich:
5tad'tTIblIo§ieir,"T962r.-----
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Bab, Julius. "Grabbe, Wedekind und Shaw,"
in Der Mensoh auf der Buhne: Eine
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Oesterneld & Co., i9h T
Bnrich, W. "Die Lulu Tragddie," in Das deutsohe
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literarlsohen Bewegung. ed. Hermann
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304
Natan, Alex. "Frank Wedekind," In German Men of
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Kleine Prosa aus fflnf Jahrzehnten.
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Sokel, Walter H. "The Changing Role of Eros in
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XXXIX (March, 1966), 20T-207. ------
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_______. ttberwindung des NaturalIsmus. Dresden
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Creator Westervelt, William Osborne (author)

Core Title Frank Wedekind And The Search For Morality

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Advisor Spalek, John M. (committee chair), Berkey, Max Leslie, Jr. (committee member), Von Hofe, Harold (committee member), Waterman, John T. (committee member)

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