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A Method Of Inquiry For International Relations With A Special Application To The Study Of The Communicative Process

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A Method Of Inquiry For International Relations With A Special Application To The Study Of The Communicative Process

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received 6 7 -2 1 1 2
KNAPP, Ray Bronson, 1 9 2 8 -
A METHOD OF INQUIRY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
WITH A SPECIAL APPLICATION TO THE STUDY OF THE
COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1966
Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Ray Bronson Knapp
All Rights Reserved
1967
A METHOD OF INQUIRY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
WITH A SPECIAL APPLICATION TO THE STUDY
OF THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS
by
Ray Bronson Knapp
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
{Political Science)
August 1966
UNIVERFliY O F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
T H E G R A D U A TE S C H O O L
U N IV E R S IT Y PARK
L O S A N G E L E S . C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, •written by
&A7..J&QB&QK..KKAPP-...............
under the direction of hXB...Dissertatton Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y
Dean
Date .September. 3,.. .1966
COMMITTEE
4 k .
/S t Chairman f t
Chapter
I.
II.
I
III.
|
\
I
|
IV.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .................................. 1
Statement of the Problem
Purpose and Scope
Organization and Method
RECENT METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .................... 29
The Analytical Approach to the Subject
Matter
Contributing Theories and Studies
The Integration of Knowledge
The "Value” Problem in International
Relations
Conclusion
THE DEWEY-BENTLEY THEORY OF INQUIRY ......... 80
The Course of Epistemological Argumentation
The Dewey-Bentley Naturalistic Interpreta
tion of Inquiry
Inquiry as a Means of Resolving Problematic
Situations
The Use of Logical Forms in Scientific
Investigations
A METHOD OF INQUIRY FOR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS . . . ........................... 146
Analytical Procedures
Contributing Theories and Studies from
Other Disciplines
The Integration of Knowledge within the
Discipline
ii
Chapter
V.
VI.
iii :
Page j
j
The "Value" Problems in International
Relations Research
THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROBLEM WITH
RESPECT TO THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS . . . 195
Diverse Conceptions of the Problematic
Situation
Formulation and Evaluation of Propositions
The Formulation of the Problem
I
AN ANALYTICAL-INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE |
STUDY OF THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS .... 254 j
I
The International Perspective j
The National Perspectives
The Individual Policy-Maker Perspectives
Toward an Integrated Theory of the
Communicative Process I
Summary
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the many confrontations which have taken place
between the governments of the Soviet Union and the United
States in the postwar era, the threat of some sort of
violence has almost always been present. Still, with the
possible exceptions of the Korean war^ and the present war
in South Vietnam, neither nation has been involved in a
large-scale armed conflict during this period. Instead of
outright armed conflicts, the cold war up to the present
time has been marked more by a pattern of crises— a pattern
which seems to project ineluctably into the future. As
unattractive as this forecast first appears, it is not
nearly so unappealing as the realization that the crises of
the future may escalate into much higher levels of vio
lence— including perhaps, large-scale conventional wars,
^-Although the Korean conflict has been legally
defined as a "police action," it now is common usage
among the writers on the subject to refer to the conflict
as the Korean war.
1
I 2 ’
limited atomic wars, or even massive nuclear war.
That the two nations have not experienced higher
levels of violence during the cold war may be due, at
least in part, to the mutual inclination of their leaders
to avoid conflicts in which nuclear weapons might be used.
In fact, one can find in the statements made by both
American and Soviet policy-makers indications of a growing
awareness that they share a common objective in the preven
tion of these extremely destructive conflicts.
But in spite of this mutual caution shown by the
two sets of leaders, the people of both nations continue to
face the prospect that any crisis may erupt into an armed
conflict, that a limited war may escalate into a general
war, and that a general war may swell into an all-engulfing
nuclear holocaust. Particular anxiety has been aroused by
the realization that conflicts may expand, not only when
one or both parties so intend, but also because of acci
dents, miscalculations, misinterpretations, or even through
the actions of third states.
Notwithstanding all these risks of human and
! material devastation, it must be recognized that the prob
lems which these risks have created constitute only some of
j the contentious issues which have emerged within the
American-Soviet relationship. Almost every major crisis
of the cold war has revolved around a clash of national
objectives; each confrontation has thus reflected the
traditional pattern of international politics. The efforts
of one nation to expand the dimensions of its control and
the other nation's efforts to contain such expansion com
prise the actions which have largely structured the pattern
of the cold war.
The attitudes of each nation's people, of its mili
tary leaders, and even at times, of its political decision
makers toward these confrontations have often mirrored the
mode of thought which emerged early in the development of
international politics. Victory or defeat, the full appli
cation of one's military resources toward the achievement
of the objective-at-hand, the use of war as a legitimate
extension of diplomacy— all these ideas were meaningful
components within that traditional mode of thought.
What distinguishes the nuclear age from all previ
ous ages is the challenge which has been delivered to that
manner of thinking. Whereas in previous ages the applica
tion of a nation's military resources could be rationalized
in terms of some desired objective— even if such applica-
j tion required the sacrifice of the lives of some
individuals from that nation— the enormous scale of pos
sible human devastation in the nuclear age has rendered
this sort of rationalization absurd.
The extreme risks of human devastation which arose
during the nuclear age have driven some students of inter
national politics into a search for a means by which the
several possible levels of conflict might be controlled.
Most international relationists have turned away from the
loftier pursuit of permanent peace projects in order to
tackle the more immediate challenge of finding ways to
navigate from today's crisis to tomorrow's calm. The mush
rooming of the studies of the past few years on arms con
trol, deterrence problems, alliance policies, and military
strategies exemplifies this latter trend.
My own concern with the communicative process
follows this same direction. My interest in the communica
tive process was first stimulated by a seminar discussion
on the problems of limited war which was conducted at the
University of Southern California by Dr. Harvey A.
DeWeerd, a member of the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica.^
^Lecture and discussion by H. A. DeWeerd, "Effects
of Nuclear Weapons: Considerations of Limitations and
Control." Presented in the Seminar on American Foreign
Policy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
Nov. 14, 1957.
One question which was not fully answered within this dis
cussion was: How do competing nations, each possessing an
abundant supply of conventional and nuclear arms, manage
to establish and maintain limitations at various levels of
their armed conflicts? One of the partial answers sug
gested during this discussion was that the policy-makers of
the involved nations would "somehow" have to communicate
the limited nature of their objectives and their intentions
to employ only limited means in the pursuit of those objec
tives. It seemed to me that if limitations were to be
successfully applied to armed conflicts between nations
such as those of the United States and the Soviet Union,
then the communications between the opposing policy
makers might, indeed, play an important, if not a key
role. But what was still unsettled was the question of
how these communications could be used effectively to
establish such limitations.
When I reflected further upon this problem, I
recognized that the role of the communicative process
could be important, not only to the problem of limited
wars, but to all other potential forms of international
conflict. In other words, the communicative process might
be used as an instrument to control conflict within any one
of the following situations: the periods prior to the
emergence of crises, crises, "brush-fire" wars, limited
conventional wars, and total nuclear wars. Because of
this potentially widespread applicability of the communica
tive process as an instrument to control conflict, I tenta
tively decided to make the problem of the communicative
process the subject of my dissertation.
At this stage of my investigation I did not know to
what extent the subject of the communicative process had
already been explored within the discipline of internation
al relations. But a precursory review of the literature
soon indicated that very little had actually been written
which was directly pertinent to this subject, although I
did find that some authors had approached the communicative
process from somewhat different frames of reference. Thus,
soon after the termination of the above-mentioned seminar,
I found that Robert E. Osgood in his book, Limited War:
The Challenge to American Strategy, had confirmed the
importance of the communicative process in establishing
limitations in armed conflicts.^ of the several authors
■^Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to
American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1957), p. 24. Professor Osgood suggested the following
points in order to control the level of conflict:
who have since given attention to this problem, the one who
appears to have advanced the theoretical aspects the most
is Thomas C. Schelling.4 Although the main thrust of his
work was in the direction of formulating a theory of bar
gaining strategies for international politics, there is no
doubt that the bargaining behavior which he sought to
analyze was largely communicative behavior and that, con
sequently, many of his observations would be invaluable for
the formulation of a theory of the communicative process.
But in spite of the fact that Professor Schelling clearly
"1. Statesmen should scrupulously limit the
controlling political objectives of war and clearly com
municate the limited nature of these objectives to the
enemy."
"2. Statesmen should make every effort to maintain
an active diplomatic intercourse toward the end of terminat
ing the war by a negotiated settlement."
"3. Statesmen should try to restrict the physical
dimensions of war as stringently as compatible with the
attainment of the objectives at stake."
4The following are some of the principal works
which embody Professor Schelling's bargaining theories:
The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ-
Press, I960); "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957) , 19-37;
"The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation
of Game Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, II
(September, 1958), 203-63; "Experimental Games and Bargain
ing Theory," World Politics, XIV (October, 1961), 47-63;
"Nuclear Strategy in Europe," World Politics, XIV (April,
1962) , 421-32.
recognized both the competitive and cooperative aspects
to be found within the bargaining situation, his game-like
analyses did not fully probe the human processes which
would necessarily be involved in creating a more coopera
tive relationship between the bargaining individuals. It
was in this latter area that Anatol Rapoport's Fights,
Games, and Debates— particularly the third part— appeared
to me as most suggestive. In this third part Dr. Rapoport
presented an illustration of how Carl Rogers' non-directive
psychotherapy could be used to structure a more cooperative
relationship between the policy-makers of the United States
and the Soviet Union.^
Besides these three major contributions, I found
numerous books and articles which seemed to possess some
potential value for the understanding of the communicative
process. In particular, studies on game theory, communica
tion theory, decision-making, propaganda analysis, and
political gaming appeared to be relevant to the problem.
In addition, some of the studies and theoretical develop
ments in such disciplines as psychology, sociology,
^Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 285-
306.
anthropology, and economics, seemed to pertain to the sub
ject. And within the discipline of international relations
the many special studies on arms control, military strate
gies, and conflict resolution showed particular promise.
Most of these studies, as potential contributions, rest on
the assumption of comparability— that studies and theories
developed in reference to other situations and other prob
lems can be usefully applied to the analysis of actual
emerging situations and problems within international
politics. Studies such as these represented one of two
possible directions which inquiry into the problem of the
communicative process could take. The other direction lay
in the investigation of actual past conflict situations
within international politics.
When I first approached the subject of the communi
cative process, I was inclined to follow this latter direc
tion. Thus, the scope of inquiry which I first considered
would have encompassed an analysis of about twelve postwar
crisis situations in which Soviet and American policy
makers had utilized the communicative process. At that
time, it was my opinion that such a series of studies
could lead to the formulation of a set of guidelines
indicating how the communicative process might be used in
the prevention and control of conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Further reflection, however,
revealed several inadequacies in this approach. In the
first place, this type of historical study necessarily
rested upon the assumption that future confrontations
between the Soviet and American policy-makers would be so
similar to past confrontations that the formulated guide
lines could be readily applied. However, because of the
possibility that future confrontations could emerge in
novel forms— such as would be the case in limited or total
nuclear wars— such guidelines could prove to be seriously
deficient. In the second place, a study which was confined
to an investigation of historical events could make little
use of the many insights and suggestions from studies con
ducted in other disciplines and from theoretical studies
within the discipline of international relations. And in
the third place, no generally-accepted method of inquiry
was available within the discipline for systematically
analyzing such subject matter and for formulating and
ordering the propositions which were to constitute the
guidelines.
The second scope of inquiry which I considered
embraced the other major direction of inquiry— the analysis
11
and formulation of propositions derived from theoretical
studies within international relations and from theoretical
and empirical studies from other disciplines. My initial
attempts to relate propositions derived from these other
studies, however, soon became enmeshed in methodological
difficulties. For instance, from a survey of these other
studies, I found that I could formulate many suggestions as
to how the communicative process might be used effectively,
but a mere eclectic accumulation of such suggestions hardly
seemed to be adequate for the formulation of a set of
guidelines. Furthermore, this approach appeared to be as
narrowly conceived as the approach which would have been
based solely upon the historical studies: propositions,
which were derived only from theoretical studies or from
empirical studies of other disciplines, and which were thus
entirely foreign to the past pattern of international
events, were almost certain to reflect the limited nature
of their origins.
Statement of the Problem
As a result of repeated frustration in these early
attempts to formulate a coherently ordered set of
propositions concerning the communicative process, I even
tually concentrated my attention upon the methodological
problems involved in the study of this type of subject.
One of the first such problems which I had encountered in
attempting to investigate the communicative process was:
Which principles or guidelines should be used in approach
ing the subject matter for the purpose of analysis?
One part of this problem pertains to the selection
and use of terms as analytical categories. Since analysis
means the division of a compound subject matter into its
constituent elements, one of the first analytical steps
requires the naming or categorization of these elements.
The difficulty within the discipline of international rela
tions is that nearly all the terms or categories employed
within the literature are still shackled with the impreci
sion which is inherent in common sense characterization.
My first encounter with this terminological problem
occurred when I attempted to designate what was meant by
a "communication." From the common sense usage of the
term one could infer that "communication" refers to a mes
sage, either written or oral, which has been sent and
received between individuals. At first there seemed to be
little wrong with such a characterization. But even a
superficial survey of postwar crisis situations soon
revealed instances of actions taken on behalf of the
involved nations which were non-verbal but which, nonethe
less, performed a communicative function. In addition, it
often appeared that the contextual situation in which a
message was sent modified the meaning or intent of the
message. Thus, a warning statement made by a leading
policy-maker of one nation in the context of speech
delivered to a domestic audience seemed more likely to be
discounted by the other nation's policy-makers than a simi
lar statement which was included in a formal diplomatic
note. Because of such difficulties in the use of common
sense characterizations, I became aware that the discipline
was in serious need of a procedure for systematically nam
ing and classifying the various aspects of the subject
matter.
A second part of the problem concerning analysis
might be called the question of the "frame of reference."
What is meant by "frame of reference" is that each analyst
approaches the subject matter of his particular project
from a unique point of view. A part of the uniqueness of
the analyst's point of view will be found in the meanings
which he gives to the terms that he uses to name, classify.
and interpret the subject matter. These terms, whether
derived from common sense usage or from cautipus defini
tion, function both as selectors and blinders in the
analyst's perception of the subject matter. Another part
of the uniqueness of the analyst's point of view will be
found in his fundamental conception of the nature of
international politics. Some analysts may tend to see
international politics as "power" relationships; others
may see the same phenomena as the outcomes of national
policy-making processes; and still others may see the sub
ject matter from an institutional, or legal, or moral
point of view. If analyses within international relations
continue to be conducted from such differing frames of
reference, and if these frames of reference are not some
how inter-connected with one another, then the end results
of various research projects are bound to be disparate and
difficult to assimilate.
A third part of the problem pertaining to analysis
involves the question of whether to utilize a model and,
if so, which model or models are appropriate to the subject
matter of international relations. Whereas the analyst may
well adopt his basic terms and even his fundamental concep
tion of the subject matter with only the slightest conscious
reflection, he is much more likely to be deliberate in his
selection of an analytical model. Perhaps this is because
a model is by its nature a product of reflective and crea
tive thinking. The question of selecting a model is likely
to grow out of the analyst's perception and recognition of
a subject matter's complexity; it is likely to grow out of
a groping for some sort of investigative plan which will
save the researcher from analytical chaos. If the
researcher selects a model, he will either have to formu
late it from his own thinking or choose an existing one
from within the discipline or from some other area of study
In the early development of the discipline, the "balance of
power" became the popular model. But more recently,
equilibrium models from economics and the steady-state
model from general systems theory have drawn the attention
C .
of international relationists.
^For equilibrium models drawn from economics see:
George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1957) and George Modelski, A
Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Pub., 1962). For the use of the steady-state systems
model see: Charles A. McClelland, "The Function of Theory
in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolu
tion , IV (September, 1960), 303-36 and Morton A. Kaplan,
System and Process in International Politics (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1957).
A fourth part of the problem concerning analysis
might be called the question of "perspectives." In
approaching a specific subject matter, the analyst must
make a decision whether to assume a position which would
give him an overall view of the whole situation or whether
to assume a position which would allow him only a view of
a limited, but more detailed, segment of the situation.
For example, in regard to the communicative process the
analyst could assume a position which would allow him to
focus his attention upon the flow of communications among
national policy-making units as a pattern of international
interaction. Or he could assume a position which would
allow him to focus his attention upon the process by which
one (or more) national policy-making unit(s) receives,
formulates, and sends communications. Or he could assume
a position which would allow him to focus his attention
upon an individual policy-maker in the role of receiving,
formulating, and sending communications. (A comprehensive
plan for investigating the communicative process might call
for studies conducted from each one of these positions.)
"Perspective," as used in this dissertation, refers both
to the position which the analyst assumes in relation to
the subject matter and to the scope of inquiry which is
encompassed from that position. Used in this sense, "per
spectives" refers to the principal ways in which the
researcher divides his subject matter for purpose of
further analysis. International relations as a discipline
is still confused by this question of perspectives. This
confusion derives in part from the fact that no common
definition of the term has been adopted— nor, for that
matter, has the term "perspectives" won general acceptance.
As a result of this lack of a common definition, the
analyst has no guide which would indicate how he might use
"perspectives" in formulating a plan of investigation.
So far, these questions of terminology, frames of
reference, models, and perspectives have been considered
in relation to the problem of selecting principles or
guidelines for analyses of historical subject matter of
international politics in which the communicative process
was embedded. But what of the insights and suggestions
concerning the communicative process which might be
derived from areas outside these historical situations?
More specifically, how should studies and theories from
other disciplines and from non-historical studies within
international relations be used in the construction of a
theory of the communicative process?
The process of human communication, of course, has
been studied in many different contexts besides that which
has occurred between national policy-making units. Spe
cialists in other fields such as psychology, sociology,
anthropology, and political science have examined the pro
cess of communication as it has presented itself within
their specific areas of interest. The descriptions and
explanations of the process of human communication within
these other contexts may suggest insights which, in turn,
could contribute to the understanding of the communicative
process that transpires between national policy-making
units. In addition, other potential insights concerning
the communicative process can be derived from certain
recent theoretical works within international relations.
For example, decision-making theory, bargaining theory,
game theory, and propaganda analysis may each be a source
of such insights.
In order to make use of the insights derived from
these other disciplines and from non-historical studies
within international relations, the researcher investigat
ing a particular problem such as the communicative process
must make a series of selective judgments; he must decide
I which insights are relevant and which are irrelevant to
the problem under investigation. And in order to arrive at
intelligent and efficient judgments in this matter, the
researcher would seem to require a standard for admitting
these specific insights into his particular study. But at
the outset of inquiry into a subject such as the communica
tive process, the only standard which the researcher is
likely to possess is one that has been formulated from out
of common sense experience.
Beyond this problem of deciding which contributing
insights to include and which to reject, lies the broader
problem of integrating knowledge. There are actually two
questions included within this problem. First, how are
existential and conceptual propositions to be joined so as
to constitute a coherent theory of the communicative pro
cess? And second, how can a theory of the communicative
process be incorporated into a broader theory of inter
national politics?
The question of joining existential and conceptual
propositions grew out of my realization that a more com
plete theory of tne communicative process could be pro
duced by combining statements derived from empirical
studies with those derived from theoretical studies than
a theory which would be based upon only one of thes.e two
categories of statements. If it were possible to integrate
existential and conceptual propositions into one theory of
the communicative process, then such a theory should not
only be able to describe and explain the past functioning
of the communicative process, but it should also be able to
indicate how policy-makers could use the communicative pro
cess more effectively to obtain their objectives in future
situations.
The question of incorporating a theory of the com
municative process into a general theory of international
politics grew out of my recognition of these two conditions
of research. First, each researcher has the right to use
the past substantive and theoretical developments within
his discipline as the foundations of his own investiga
tions. And second, he has the corresponding responsibility
for ordering the results of his own investigation in such
a way so as to contribute to a coherent growth of knowledge
within the discipline. It is my position that researchers
working in a specific area of the discipline can play a
significant role in the development of a general theory
for the discipline if they conscientiously apply themselves
to the task of integrating their own work into the struc
ture of the discipline as a whole.
Thus far, the discussion in this section has large
ly centered around the question of how to handle empirical
subject matter during the process of inquiry. But inquiry,
especially inquiry within the social sciences, inevitably
contains a 'Value" component. Just how this "value" com
ponent should be handled during the course of inquiry poses
one of the most perplexing problems for social science
research. Some scholars have approached this problem by
drawing a sharp distinction between studies which describe
or explain existential situations and those which prescribe
solutions for problems which have been perceived to arise
with respect to these existential situations. In drawing
this distinction these scholars have created two separate
spheres of inquiry: the empirical and the normative. Per
haps one of the reasons they have drawn such a distinction
is that they may have adopted a peculiar presumption
regarding the nature of scientific inquiry in the physical
sciences. According to this presumption inquiry within the
physical sciences tends to be free from value considera
tions. And because the observational techniques of the
physical sciences so closely correspond to the techniques
which are employed within empirical investigations con
ducted within the social sciences, the inference is
sometimes suggested that if the scholar wishes to be truly
scientific, then he should confine his investigation to
the empirical sphere and leave the normative sphere to the
moral philosopher.
Other scholars have maintained that such a position
represents a narrow-sighted conception of the scientific
method. It has been their contention that even the "pur
est" research in the physical sciences contains a "value"
component, since such research is only undertaken with the
hope that, in some manner, its findings may ultimately
contribute to the fulfillment of human needs and desires.
According to these scholars, what has distinguished social
science inquiry from inquiry within the physical sciences
was not that one was value-laden and the other, value-
free, but that conflicts over value questions have declined
in the physical sciences; whereas, they have not signifi
cantly declined in the social sciences.^
On this latter point John Dewey made the follow
ing comment: "The impact of cultural conditions upon
social inquiry is obvious. Prejudices of race, national
ity, class and sect play such an important role that their
influence is seen by any observer of the field. We have
only to recall the story of astronomy and of more recent
incidents in the doctrine of evolution to be aware that in
the past institutional vested interests have told upon the
development of physical and biological science. If they
do not do so to anything like the same extent, it is in
23
I believe there are three aspects of the "value"
component in international relations research which are
likely to lead to methodological difficulties. Expressed
in the form of questions these aspects are: (1) How should
the researcher treat the value position of the actors
(policy-makers) during the course of inquiry? (2) How
should the researcher deal with his own value position dur
ing the course of inquiry? (3) How should the researcher
conceive of his role in relation to roles of the actors?
The question regarding the value position of the
actors arose from my realization that the behavior of the
actors could not be studied long before some account would
have to be taken of the objectives which they were pursuing
and of the values which they believed could be secured or
attained by such pursuit. Starting from this initial sug
gestion, I eventually reached the following conclusions:
(1) the value positions of the actors are inextricably
interwined within their overall patterns of behavior, and
large measure because physics has now developed specialized
subject-matters and techniques. The result is that to many
persons the 'physical' seems not only relatively independ
ent of social issues (which it is) but inherently set apart
from all social context. The appearance of absence of con
flict is to some extent function of this isolation. What
has actually happened, however, is that the influence of
cultural conditions has become indirect." Logic: The Theo
ry of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 488.
" 1
24
I
i
(2) the meaning of those patterns of behavior cannot be
grasped unless these value positions are somehow described
and explained. The methodological problem involved in the
investigation of the value positions of the actors lies in
the fact that "objectives" and "values" cannot be observed
in the same way that "entities" and "actions" can. From
this it would seem to follow that, if the value positions
of the actors are to be dealt with adequately during the
course of inquiry, then a special procedure will need to be
developed to account for this aspect of the subject matter.
The question pertaining to the value position of
the actor bears some resemblance to the question regarding
the value position of the researcher. Where one finds, in
reference to the question, that the value positions of the
actors are intertwined within their overall pattern of
behavior, he may find, in reference to the second question,
that the value position of the researcher is intertwined
with the "frame of reference" with which he approaches the
subject matter. Because each researcher's frame of refer
ence tends to determine what he will observe and the manner
in which he will observe it, his value position thus tends
to determine both the direction which his investigation
takes and the content of the reports which describe his
25
investigation. The methodological uncertainty in regard
to the value position of the researcher lies in the ques
tion of how inquiries can be regarded as reliable and com
parable to one another when each is undertaken from a dif
ferent frame of reference.
The third aspect of the "value" component concerns
the relationship between the role of researchers and those
of the actors. Here the question refers to the function
which the international relationist should perform relative
to the policy-making process. Should he conceive himself
as a passive observer? a critic? or an active adviser? Is
it his function to prescribe policies? to suggest policy
alternatives? or merely to ascertain and order the "facts?"
Purpose and Scope
Because the methodological problems which I had
encountered in attempting to investigate the communicative
process were, by their nature, the same sort of problems
which had been puzzling other students of international
relations in recent years, I concluded that my search for
an appropriate methodology could best be carried out by
starting with the methodological developments already
underway within the discipline. By adopting this proce
dure, I have conceived a scope of inquiry which embraces
two purposes. They are: (1) to formulate a general method
of inquiry for research within international relations and
(2) to construct an analytical-integrative framework spe
cifically designed for the investigation of the communica
tive process.
Organization and Method
In the following three chapters an attempt will be
made to formulate some general principles for conducting
research in international relations. Chapter II presents a
survey of recent writing on problems of research and theory
development within the discipline of international rela
tions. The discussion in this chapter is organized around
questions pertaining to analytical procedures, the role of
contributing theories and studies, the integration of
knowledge within the discipline, and the "value" problem in
international relations research and theory. The purpose
of this chapter is to reveal the extent to which each one
of these questions has been answered and to indicate the
areas of remaining uncertainty.
The third chapter summarizes John Dewey's and
Arthur F. Bentley's theory of inquiry; its purpose is to
suggest a theory of the scientific method for the con
sideration of the discipline. In the fourth chapter, the
principles derived from the Dewey-Bentley theory of
inquiry are applied to the four methodological questions
which were raised in Chapter II. Thus, the purpose of
this chapter is to indicate how the Dewey-Bentley theory
of inquiry can be used, along with the methodological pro
gress already achieved within the discipline, to formulate
the principles for a method of inquiry for international
relations.
The final two chapters are more directly concerned
with developing a procedure for investigating the communi
cative process. Chapter V attempts to formulate the "prob
lem" which is involved in the American-Soviet diplomatic
relationship with respect to the communicative process.
This problem is formulated by surveying and evaluating
what various international relationists have written
recently on the subject of American-Soviet relations. In
the final chapter this formulated problem is used, along
with the method of inquiry which was formulated in Chapter
IV, to construct an analytical-integrative framework
for the study of the communicative process.
CHAPTER II
RECENT METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The methodological uncertainties which I encoun
tered when I first attempted to study the communicative
process turned out to be, in many respects, the same
uncertainties which have troubled the leading theorists of
international relations in recent years. Although I found
that these theorists had by no means resolved all these
uncertainties, I recognized that they had explored the
implications of these uncertainties in considerable detail
and that in many instances they had offered ideas which
might be used in resolving some of the major methodologi
cal problems of the discipline. The purpose of this chap
ter is to survey the recent writings of the leading
theorists of international relations in order to reveal
how they had conceived the methodological problems of the
discipline and which proposals they have suggested for
resolving these problems.
29
The organization of this chapter is patterned
around the four methodological problems which were dis
cussed in the last chapter. The first part treats the
problem of approaching the subject matter for the purpose
of analysis. The second part discusses the problem of
utilizing studies and theories originating outside the dis
cipline for international relations research. The third
part explores the problem of integrating the results of
specific projects into the general body of knowledge
within the discipline. And the fourth part indicates how
various international relationists believe the "value"
problem should be handled in international relations
research.
The Analytical Approach to the Subject Matter^-
Most theorists of international relations have
recognized the importance of carefully constructed
^The term "analysis” in this dissertation shall be
used to mean the separation of the subject matter into its
constituent parts for the purpose of closer inspection of
those parts or elements and their interconnections. The
opposite process, the reconstituting of the parts and ele
ments into larger wholes, shall be referred to as "integra
tion." Admittedly, some writers use the term "analysis" in
the wider sense which would embrace both of these processes.
analytical procedures for carrying out empirical investi
gations , but they have often complained that these proce
dures are presently lacking within the discipline. For
instance, Richard Snyder concluded that "... there is no
commonly accepted, comprehensive frame of reference for
the study of international politics which systematically
defines the field and establishes categories for its
2
analysis." Herbert McClosky expressed a similar view
point when he wrote:
. . . a great part of the study of international
politics is given over to descriptive investiga
tions that do not begin with questions of any
sort, but only with topical headings under which
great masses of information are bunched. . . .
we need data ordered by questions and, preferably,
by theories and hypotheses those questions evoke.3
Charles McClelland suggested that what is needed is ". . .
a framework of guiding ideas which will accommodate one
analytic approach as well as another and which will allow
^Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burtin Sapin,
Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of Internation
al Politics (Monograph No. 3 of the Foreign Policy Analysis
Project Series; Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press, 1954), p. 15.
3Herbert McClosky, "Concerning Strategies for a
Science of International Politics," Foreign Policy Deci
sion-Making: An Approach to the Study of International
Politics, ed. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burtin
Sapin (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1962), p. 190.
the full application of perspectivist techniques."^
The terminological question
One of the first uncertainties which the researcher
in international relations confronts in attempting to
analyze his subject matter is the lack of precise meanings
for the terms which he employs and the absence of a classi
fication system which would designate the relationship
among terms. Richard Snyder asserted that: "Slipshod
categorization hinders analysis because it confronts the
investigator with multiple choices of interpretation with
out any clear guide to selection.""* In illustrating some
of the differences between research in the exact versus the
social sciences, Anatol Rapoport pointed out: "We agree on
the referent of cat but not democracy. The social scien
tist is still confronted by problems: of recognition, of
definition, of meaningful classification; whereas, the
exact scientist is not."® Professor Snyder believed that
^Charles A. McClelland, "The Social Sciences, His
tory, and International Relations," International Politics
and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 32.
^Richard C. Snyder, "Toward Greater Order in the
Study of International Politics," World Politics, VII
(April, 1955), 467.
^Anatol Rapoport, "Various Meanings of 'Theory,'"
International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N.
Rosenau, p. 49.
part of the difficulty of classification could be traced
to the fact that most of the terms used in the discipline
have been borrowed from common usage. He contended that:
. . . if systematic analysis and research are
desired, the common-sense terms must either be
clarified or be replaced. If they are replaced
by identical words so that the common-sense con
cept and the scientific concept are indistinguish
able, the ambiguity of the former tend to be built
into the latter.7
Concerning this question of classification, Stanley
Hoffmann declared that "... 'description of the anatomi
cal sort' and categorization may be as important as . . .
O
recurrence and prediction." In spite of the many expres
sions by the theorists about the significance of this ques
tion, one can find almost no specific proposals in their
writing for erecting a more adequate classification system
and only a few proposals for developing a more precise
terminology.
The quest for general theory and the selection
of an analytical model
Any survey of the theoretical debate which has
^Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . .," 468.
^Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), Contemporary Theory in
International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 178.
34
raged within the discipline in recent years will reveal
statement after statement to the effect that there is pre
sently no widely accepted general theory for the disci-
i
1 pline. Several theorists have pointed out that one of the
major tasks which such a theory would be called upon to
perform would be to provide the analytical procedures for
handling the subject matter. This position was well exem
plified by Kenneth Thompson when he wrote that theory
. . . makes possible the ordering of data. It is
a useful tool for understanding. It provides a
framework for systematic and imaginative hypothesiz
ing. It gives order and meaning to a mass of phenom
ena which without it would remain disconnected and
Q
unintelligible.
A similar interpretation concerning the role of theory in
relation to analysis was suggested by Stanley Hoffman:
A theory is primarily . . . a systematic effort at
asking questions which will allow us to organize
our knowledge, to orient our research, and to inter
pret our findings. . . . It should identify the
main factors or variables in the field and concen
trate our attention and research on the most impor
tant problems.
Although no general theory has won acceptance
^Kenneth Thompson, "Toward a Theory of Interna
tional Politics," Contemporary Theory in International Rela-
| tions, p. 19.
lOstanley Hoffmann, "International Relations as a
Discipline," Contemporary Theory in International Rela-
| tions, pp. 7-8.
within discipline, there has been no lack of proposals
concerning analytical models which could provide a basis
for such a general theory. One of the earliest— and by
far the most elaborate— analytical models was proposed by
Quincy Wright. He began by stating his thesis:
It is suggested that the study of international
relations be best approached through the concept
of a field, constituted by relations of relevant
entities, forces, sentiments, and processes.H
His concept of "field" embraced two approaches: the
geographical and the analytical. By the "geographical"
approach Wright seems to have been proposing an elaborate
mapping of the whole existential world. He pointed out
that the closest approximation of this sort of study can
be found in the present "social surveys" and "statistical
summaries," but he complained that these presently do not
include the most significant factors of international rela
tions.^ His conception of the "analytic field" represented
an attempt, through the process of abstraction, to order
the myriad of variables included in the geographical field:
1^-Quincy Wright, The Study of International Rela
tions (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 536.
12Ibid., 540.
36
The analytical approach to the study of interna
tional relations . . . implies that each interna
tional organization, national government, associa
tion, individual, or other "system of action" or
decision-maker may be located in a multi-dimensional
field. Such a field may be defined by co-ordinates,
each of which measures a political, economic, psycho
logical, sociological, ethical, or other continuum
influencing choices, decisions, and actions important
to international relations.13
In order to transform this static presentation into a
dynamic one, Wright suggested that vectors be added which,
by their location, would indicate "... the values moti
vating the policy and the capabilities underlying the
power of each important government in a given moment."-*-^
So far, the extreme complexity of Professor Wright's model
appears to have discouraged other students from trying to
use it either for actual empirical analysis or for the
construction of a general theory.
There have been proposals, of course, embodying a
much less complex model of analysis. Some theorists have
suggested that a central concept should be used in conduct
ing analysis. Thus, Hans Morgenthau has for years proposed
that the concept of power should be used in this fashion.
He contended that:
13Ibid., 543.
14Ibid., 545.
37 ;
i
By making power its central concept, a theory of
politics does not presume that none but power
relations control political action. What it must
presume is the need for a central concept which
allows the observer to distinguish the field of
politics from other spheres, to orient himself in
the maze of empirical phenomena which make up the
field of politics and to establish a measure of
rational order within it. A central concept such
as power then provides a kind of rational outline
of politics, a map of the political scene.
Politics is engaged in by rational men who pur
sue certain rational interests with rational means.
The observer . . . is able, by virtue of his own
rationality, to retrace the steps which politics
has taken in the past and to anticipate those it
will take in the future.15
Morgenthau summed up his position when he wrote: "The
truth of political science is the truth about power, its
manifestations, its configurations, and its laws."
James Rosenau also believed that inquiry in inter
national relations should be organized around a central
concept, but he rejected the "power concept" because he
felt that this concept diverted attention away from the
dynamics of international politics by focussing attention
l^Hans j. Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits of a
Theory of International Relations," Theoretical Aspects of
International Relations, ed. William T. R. Fox (South Bend:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 17, 21.
16Ibid., 22.
solely upon the capacities and the limitations of
nations.^7 In its place, he suggested the concept of
"calculated control." He stated that: "Control is opera
tive as long as behavioral modification is intended or
induced, irrespective of the direction and nature of the
changes that might or do result."!® He went on to define
foreign policy ". . . as a set of planned guidelines for
exercising as much control as possible over existing,
anticipated, or unforseen circumstances in the interna
tional environment."19
Another type of analytical model which has been
proposed is the central question. P. D. Marchant, for
17James N. Rosenau, Calculated Control as a Unify
ing Concept in the Study of International Politics and
Foreign Policy (Princeton University Research Monograph
No. 15, 1963), p. 44.
18Ibid., 21.
1 Q
Ibid., 22. One might question whether Rosenau
has really introduced a new concept or whether he has
merely substituted another word for "power." Hans
Morgenthau in his Politics Among Nations (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954), p. 14, stated: "Power may
comprise anything that establishes the control of man over
man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve
that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psycho
logical ties by which one mind controls another." If there
is a real difference between the "control relationship"
which Rosenau described and the "power" relationship which
Morgenthau described, I have been unable to discover it.
instance, proposed that the discipline (and hejrice its
analysis) should be organized around a central question
such as: "Why do states behave toward each other as they
do?"20 In making this suggestion he stated that
. . . we should be ready to point out that we have
been studying a certain aspect of something, be
able to say what that something is, to show that
there is a central question to the solution of
which all the special studies may contribute.21
Kenneth Waltz expressed almost the identical belief con
cerning the use of a central question to organize inquiry?
however, the particular question which he believed was
crucial to the discipline was one which centered around
the causes of war and the conditions of peace.22
Some writers have suggested analytical models
which would avoid both the problem of overcomplexity which
2^P. D. Marchant, "International Relations as an
Autonomous Discipline," International Politics and Foreign
Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, p. 22.
21Ibid.
22KenneLh N. Waltz, "Political Philosophy and the
Study of International Relations," Theoretical Aspects of
International Relations, ed. William T. R. Fox, p. 62.
Actually, the posing of a "central question" or the use of
a "central concept" would seem to amount to the same sort
of thing. In each case the theorist selects one important
factor or set of factors as the key elements to be
explained; or, in other words, he "pre-sets" his frame of
reference so that it is acutely sensitive to a single
factor.
was involved in Wright's field theory and the oversimpli-
city which was inherent in the use of a central concept or
question. One such proposal was made by Urban Whitaker.
He suggested that the analyst should approach the subject
matter using a "coarse-screen macro theory" as a frame of
reference. He believed that such a theory would provide
23
the analyst with a broad tentative outline of the field.
According to Whitaker, this theory could initially be
based upon an actors-ends-means framework:
In its simplest form the theory states that every
social situation may be conceived as one in which
actors (participants, units, entities) seek to
achieve their ends (interests, values, goals, and
objectives) by utilizing appropriate means (power).24
Richard Snyder et al. suggested the desirability of
erecting an analytical frame of reference in order to
systematically approach the subject matter of international
politics.25 Although the scope of their book was limited
to foreign policy decision-making, it represented one of
the most elaborate and punctilious efforts to define a
22Urban G. Whitaker, "Actors, Ends, and Means: A
Course Screen Macro-Theory of International Relations,"
International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James M.
Rosenau, p. 439.
24Ibid., 439.
05
Snyder, Decision-Making . . ., 12.
major portion of the field. Actually, it appears that the
authors, in the process of defining their major assumptions
and concepts, moved beyond a "coarse-screen macro theory"
toward a "fine-screen micro theory" of the decision-making
process. The map provided by the authors for this sector
of the field is undoubtedly the most inclusive which the
analyst of international politics now has available.
One other form of analytical model deserves men
tion. Several authors have suggested that the analyst
approach the subject matter by using a theoretical model
derived from other disciplines. For instance, both George
Modelski and George Liska have proposed equilibrium models
drawn from the field of economics. However, their respec
tive adaptations of the equilibrium model to international
relations varied considerably. For one thing, Modelski
confined his adaptation of the model to the foreign policy
making process; whereas, Liska applied the model to all
levels of the subject matter. In applying this model to
foreign policy analysis, Modelski stated:
A foreign policy may be said to be in equili
brium if all four of its elements [power-input,
power-output, interests, and objectives] are adjust
ed to each other (internally) and to the foreign
policies of other states (externally) .26
In making his adaptation of the equilibrium model to inter
national politics, Liska wrote:
I shall be using the concept of equilibrium in
both of the accepted ways— first, as a theoretical
norm or point of reference; second, as denoting an
actual tendency toward changing states of temporary
equilibrium in political institutions. In qualify
ing the tendency, I shall rely mainly on the ideas
of progressive, stable, and unstable equilibrium.
My central concept is that of institutional equili-
librium, applied primarily to international organi
zation with respect to its structure, the commitment
of its members, and its functional and geographic
scope.27
These authors apparently believed that the subject
matters of economics and international politics were simi
lar enough to permit the application of the same model to
both fields. On this point, however, Morton Kaplan and
Charles McClelland refused to agree. They rejected the
equilibrium model because they contended that such a model
would lead to a static conception of the subject matter and
would tend to present the international system as if it
were a closed system. In the place of such a model they
2®George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., 1962), p. 106.
2^George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), p. 13.
! 42 1
policies of other states (externally).26
In making his adaptation of the equilibrium model to inter
national politics, Liska wrote:
I shall be using the concept of equilibrium in
both of the accepted ways— first, as a theoretical
norm or point of reference; second, as denoting an
actual tendency toward changing states of temporary
equilibrium in political institutions. In qualify
ing the tendency, I shall rely mainly on the ideas
of progressive, stable, and unstable equilibrium.
My central concept is that of institutional equili-
librium, applied primarily to international organi
zation with respect to its structure, the commitment
of its members, and its functional and geographic
scope.2^
These authors apparently believed that the subject
matters of economics and international politics were simi
lar enough to permit the application of the same model to
both fields. On this point, however, Morton Kaplan and
Charles McClelland refused to agree. They rejected the
equilibrium model because they contended that such a model
would lead to a static conception of the subject matter and
would tend to present the international system as if it
were a closed system. In the place of such a model they
2^George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., 1962), p. 106.
^George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), p. 13.
43
propose^ the "steady state" model from General Systems
Theory. Kaplan explained that this model "... directs
attention to the mechanisms of the international social
2 8
system that maintains or undermines steady states." He
went on to explain that "... steady state analysis fol
lows from the fact that the states of some variables
remain within given limits as a consequence of changes in
other variables."2® Concerning his conception of an open
system, Professor McClelland stated:
An open system, within the limits of its organi
zation, tends to maintain itself, not in a state of
fine equilibrium (for that implies a cessation in the
flow of energy) but in a steady state. . . . The
steady state implies the inherent tendency to main
tain the organization of systems which man shares
with all organisms.
In order to use the steady state model, the analyst
is asked to conceive international politics in terms of
systems of action. In this sense, the whole international
political system, the foreign policy-making units, and
^Morton A. Kaplan, "Toward a Theory of Interna
tional Politics: Quincy Wright's Study of International
Relations and Some Recent Developments," Journal of Con
flict Resolution, II (December, 1958), 337.
29Ibid., 339.
3°Charles A. McClelland, "Applications of General
Systems Theory in International Relations," International
Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, p. 414.
the personality systems of significant decision-makers
could all be treated as systems of action. McClelland sug
gested that the analyst using the general systems approach
could pose these three sets of questions to each system
submitted to analysis:
1. What are the operating parts of the system
. . . what do they do, how are they arranged,
how are they coordinated, how do they fluctu
ate, change, or grow, and how are they replaced?
2. What are the boundaries between the system and
its environment, what functions do the boundaries
serve, how are they structured, maintained, and
changed?
3. What is the character of the influence of the
environment on the system and of the system on
the environment— how do these two hypothetical
complexes interact?31
Thus far, besides these two last models which have
been derived from General Systems Theory and economics, the
discussion has centered upon analytical models involving
the concept of a field, the central concept, the central
question, and the frame of reference. The various
authors who proposed these models intended them as maps
or guides into the subject matter of the discipline. Each
31Charles A. McClelland, "The Function of Theory
in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolu
tion, IV (September, 1960), 328.
theorist assumed that such a map was necessary because, on
the one hand, the subject matter was too vast and compli
cated to be understood as a whole and, on the other hand,
empirical analyses, conducted without the benefit of such
a map, were likely to remain disconnected and to prove
exceedingly difficult to integrate into the larger field.
The use of "perspectives" in analysis
Just what is meant by "perspectives" in interna
tional relations research? So far, there has been no
general agreement on usage. Actually, several other terms
have been used to refer to the same thing. For instance,
David Singer used the phrase "level of analysis,"32 where
as, Charles McClelland used the term "focus."33 Still
others have employed the terms "viewpoint" or "stand
point." Sometimes the theorists seem to have had the same
referents in mind when using these various terms, but there
are times when their conceptions seem to have differed.
For one group, the use of perspectives merely meant to
32 j. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Prob
lem in International Relations," World Politics, XIV
(October, 1961), 77-92.
^McClelland, "The Function of Theory . . . ,"
324-25.
“ 1
46
approach the subject matter from a wide variety of posi
tions. This is certainly the thought which Paul Nitze
had in mind when he wrote that
. . . a general theory of international relations
needs to permit a multiplicity of viewpoints, rang
ing from that of a particular member of a particular
group at a particular time to one that approximates,
as far as may be possible, to that of a hypothetical
observer from Mars. . . .34
But for most theorists "perspectives" has referred to the
question of whether the researcher concentrated primarily
upon the international political system or upon the foreign
policies of one or more nations.
Awareness of the "perspectives problem" thus
appears to have developed from a recognition by interna
tional relationists that most research within the disci
pline can be included within the categories of either
international political studies or foreign policy studies.
The difference between these two categories is that foreign
policy studies are concerned with that part of the nation's
governmental activities which involve problems which exist
beyond state boundaries; whereas, international political
studies are concerned with the inter-connection and
■*4Paul H. Nitze, "Necessary and Sufficient Ele
ments of a General Theory of International Relations,"
Theoretical Aspects of . . ., ed. William T. R. Fox,
p. 9.
interaction of the foreign policies of two or more nations.
Most theorists have rejected the idea that international
political studies are merely the sum of so many foreign
policy studies.
In the last several years, international relation-
ists have generally agreed that the discipline requires
studies which have been conducted with both perspectives.
For instance, McClelland stated that ". . .it should be pos
sible to find a common ground so that, figuratively speak
ing, the subject and its parts can be turned around and
looked at in different perspectives."^ And Stanley Hoff
mann asserted that the discipline requires the perspective
from the top (the international system) as well as the per
spective from below (the national-units), because: "Exces
sive emphasis on one perspective produces optical illu
sions."^6 Perhaps, David Singer offered the best defense
for studies utilizing both perspectives:
. . . we find that the systematic level produces a
more comprehensive and total picture of internation
al relations than does the national or sub-systematic
level. On the other hand, the atomized and less
coherent image produced by the lower level of analy
sis is somewhat balanced by its richer detail, greater
depth, and more intensive portrayal.37
•^McClelland, "The Social Sciences . . .," 32.
^Hoffmann, 182. - ^ S i n g e r , 89.
As more international relationists have accepted
the idea that "perspectives" can provide their basic analy
tical orientations, one finds that some of these theorists
have advocated that the researcher should not only be
conscious of the perspective which he is using, but that
he should also clearly indicate any shift from one level to
another. For example, Fred Sondermann stated that:
One of the many problems attendent to the study of
international politics has been referred to as the
problem of "shifting perspectives." Often without
being aware of doing so, we vacillate between two
perspectives.3 8
Adhering to the same idea, Professor Singer suggested that:
We may utilize one level here and another there,
but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in
the midst of a study. And when we do in fact make
an original selection or replace one with another
at appropriate times, we must do so with a full
awareness of the descriptive, explanatory, and
predictive implications of such a choice.^9
A few theorists have carried the problem even
further: they have suggested that studies utilizing these
two perspectives should be "linked" together. In his
article concerning the linkage between international
38Fred A. Sondermann, "The Linkage Between Foreign
Policy and International Politics," international Politics
and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, p. 16.
■*9Singer, 90-91.
politics and foreign policy, Sondermann wrote: "The nature
of the connection between these two fields of inquiry pre
sents problems which have not yet been faced by students of
international politics."40 Richard Snyder also recognized
this aspect of the problem when he stated: "These perspec
tives and analytical devices must somehow be connected
within a single frame of reference."^ James Rosenau made
the same point when he said that
. . . comprehension of both national action and
international interaction would presumably be
advanced if an analytic framework were developed
that served to link the two levels of a n a l y s i s . 42
In proposing his calculated control framework,
Rosenau intended to provide a means by which the two per
spectives might be linked. By having the study of interna
tional politics center around control acts (and modifica
tions in behavior caused by these acts) and relationships,
he believed that his framework would call "... attention
to behavioral and relational phenomena— to what actors do,
both independently, and in conjunction with other actors."43
40sondermann, 14.
^Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . .," 476.
42
Rosenau, Calculated Control . . ., 2.
43Ibid., 44.
50
A somewhat different scheme for linking the two perspec
tives was proposed by McClelland when he wrote: "The
study of data such as that of an acute crisis can be
focused according to one mode of analysis as well as the
other."44 He defended his position by stating:
The subject-matter of the acute international crisis
is almost ideal for the application of the inter
action approach. Prominent international crises are
complexes of events which can be dissected, up to a
point, to yield numerous sequences of related acts.45
He felt that international crises are also appropriate for
the foreign policy perspective since these inquiries could
probe ". . . into the finer detail of the 'internal' pro
cessing of the incoming streams of 'outputs" and of the
fabrication of new 'inputs' to the system."45 Another
method of linking studies conducted with these two perspec
tives was proposed by Harold Guetzkow:
The process of theory construction requires three
stages. First, using the nation as the primary
unit, propositions would be developed to explain
how national behaviors in the international scene
originate within the state. Then a general theory
of the relations between any two states might be
erected. Later, as one becomes more sure of his
44Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International
Crisis," World Politics, XIV (October, 1961),191.
45Ibid. 46Ibid., 194.
51 1
footing, this artificially restricted, binary
theory might be elaborated into a multi-nation
theory.^7
Although the problem of perspectives has received
widespread attention in recent years and although many
thoughtful suggestions have been advanced for handling
this problem, it has by no means been resolved. For one
thing, its very nature has yet to be defined. Without such
a definition it has not been possible to determine how
many perspectives should be employed. Thus, from the gen
eral gist of Professor Sondermann1s article I receive the
impression that there are two major perspectives, but in
the latter part of the article I find that the author has
suggested: "One may focus neither on foreign policy deci
sions nor on the dynamics of the process of interaction,
but rather on the environment which all international
politics take place."^® Was he proposing a third perspec
tive? If he was, then his position would appear to cor
respond to that of Charles McClelland when the latter
proposed three "foci":
The actor focus causes international relations to
be considered, as a whole, as the sum and product
^^Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A
Partial Theory of International Relations," Journal of Con
flict Resolution, I (March, 1957), 56.
A O
°Sondermann, 13.
52
of all the policies pursued by the separate actors—
be they states, economies, nations. [But from the
interaction focus] . . . pattern and configuration
in the relationships themselves, are the main objects
of attention. . . . A third focus has been identi
fied particularly well by Harold Sprout. He calls
it capability analysis. . .
George Liska also advocated these three perspectives:
An analysis of international relations can shift
emphasis among at least three complementary stand
points. First, it may stress individual states as
collective actors in the international political
process. . . . the second emphasis [may be] from
the viewpoint of the state system, or developing
international community. . . . [Finally, it may
stress] . . . the social, and material environment
in which states seek to maintain and improve their
position individually and in c o m b i n a t i o n . 50
Other theorists seem to have suggested even addi
tional perspectives. For example, Arnold Wolfers wrote:
. . . all events occurring in the international
arena must be conceived and understood from two
angles simultaneously: one calling for concentra
tion on the behavior of states as organized bodies
of men, the other calling for concentration on human
beings upon whose psychological reactions the behavi
or credited to states ultimately rests.51
In making the last part of this statement did he not, in
effect, suggest an entirely different perspective— one
49
McClelland, "The Function of Theory . . .," 324.
5®Liska, 15-16.
51-Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International
Politics,” Theoretical Aspects of . . ., ed. William T. R.
Fox, p. 89.
which would focus upon individual decision-makers? A some
what different, though related, area of concern has been
identified by Harold Sprout's concept of "cognitive
behaviorism." He explained this concept in this manner:
". . . a person reacts to his milieu as he perceives and
interprets it in the light of his previous knowledge."52
Singer described the same sort of idea when he discussed
the "phenomenological issue": ". . . do we examine our
actors behavior in terms of the objective factors which
allegedly influence that behavior, or do we do so in terms
of the actor's perceptions of these 'objective factors'?"55
These suggestions by Wolfers, Sprout, and Singer could be
interpreted to mean that two additional perspectives can be
added— both focusing on the individual actor.
If all of the suggested perspectives which have
been mentioned thus far are taken into account, there would
be a total of five: the international political system,
the foreign policy-making units, the environmental system,
the individual decision-makers as behaving units, and the
52Harold and Margret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relation
ship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics
(Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, 1956), p. 58.
"^Singer, 86.
54 1
i
individual decision-makers in their subjective frame of
reference. Without an adequate definition of the concept
"perspective" it is of course impossible to determine
which of these are really major avenues for research and
which are merely subordinate.
The Role of Contributing Studies and Theories
Writing in 1955, Quincy Wright stated:
International relations is today an emerging discipline
manifesting little unity from the point of view of
method, logic, and convenience, but much from that of
necessity and history.54
In outlining the development of the discipline, Wright
pointed out that:
At least eight disciplines (international law,
diplomatic history, military science, internation
al politics, international organization, interna
tional trade, colonial government, and the conduct
of foreign relations) have contributed to its
development.55
Many of these "root" disciplines have, themselves, grown
out of the field of political science; therefore, it is not
surprising to find that many of the concepts and ways of
thinking about international relations have been derived
^^Wright, 26. 55Ibid., 33.
55
from political science. Morgenthau exemplified this
tendency when he wrote:
A theory of international politics has the task,
in applying the general principles of politics
to the international sphere, to reformulate,
modify, and qualify these principles in the light
of that distinctive quality of international poli
tics . 56
In general, however, international relationists of
the postwar period have grown sensitive to the charge that
their discipline is but an outgrowth from political sci
ence; moreover, many now believe that greater autonomy for
the discipline can only be achieved by making it more
interdisciplinary. This seems to have been the view of
Richard Snyder when he reviewed five texts in interna
tional relations in the year of 1955, and drew these con
clusions :
. . . one has the feeling that the sociological
foundations of state action have been relatively
slighted. With some exceptions there is no system
atic outlining— to say nothing of detailed discus
sion of total societal organization and behavior
patterns of foreign policy.
But if— as these authors directly or indirectly
admit— the study of international politics requires
a wide variety of knowledge, then the question of
whether all potential sources have been tapped is
pertinent.57
56Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits . . 23.
57Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . 473.
56
Writing a year later, Harold Sprout explained:
At best the general student of international poli
tics cannot hope to attain much critical competence
in cognate fields. But the facts which cognate
specialists assemble, and the trends which they
deduce therefrom, include some of the most strategic
data of foreign policy a n a l y s i s . 58
Sprout maintained that the student of international politics
needs
. . . to acquire sufficient familiarity with the
vocabulary, basic concepts, and theories of these
cognate fields, so that he can draw with critical
selectivity what is most useful to his own calcu
lations . 59
In the late 1950's and early 1960's interdiscipli
nary borrowing by international relationists (and voluntary
contributing by scholars in other disciplines) increased
enormously. This borrowing has consisted of both the
results of studies conducted within other fields and of
theoretical constructs developed in other disciplines.
Snyder defended this borrowing of theoretical concepts with
the following reasoning:
If there are conceptual weaknesses which can be
remedied, perhaps something is to be learned from
those social scientists who are somewhat more
systematic than the average political scientist
is wont to be. It may be less important to borrow
the particular concepts and categories from other
5®Sprout, 101. 59Ibid>
57
fields than to learn about the most fruitful ways
of constructing analytic apparatus.60
For their own work in foreign policy decision
making Snyder et al. drew heavily upon the general theory
of social action (which had been developed by Parsons,
Shils, et al.), upon theories of organizational decision
making, and upon theories of communication. Their borrow
ings from the theory of social action was evident in their
definition of international politics:
. . . we believe that those who study international
politics are mainly concerned with the actions,
reactions, and interactions among political entities
called national states. Emphasis on action suggests
process analysis, i.e., the passage of time plus
continuous changes in relationships— including the
conditions underlying change and its consequences.61
The central analytical concept which these authors used to
organize their frame of reference was that of organization
al decision-making. They explained their choice of this
concept in these terms:
The type of social system with which we shall
be primarily concerned is an organization. There
fore , the definitions of the situation which we
consider to be central to the explanation of state
behavior result from decision-making processes in
an organizational context J*2
60snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . .," 475.
^Snyder, Decision-Making . . . , 32.
62Ibid., 54.
Their other major borrowing came from communication theory;
they explained how this theory was to add to their frame
of reference:
. . . the decisional system may be viewed as a
communication net. Through the channels of this
communication net is carried information of vary-
ing types and varying significance. Information
is stored in the net and new information enters
it. Within the net information is distributed
differently.63
As more students of international relations have
turned to other disciplines for theoretical constructs
and as more non-international relationists have made con
tributions to the field, a considerable controversy has
arisen over the relevancy of some of these outside con
tributions: some theorists have questioned the extent
and the manner in which they should be adopted by the
discipline. The sharpest criticism of this trend came from
Stanley Hoffmann. He complained:
. . . we find a multitude of contributions from
other fields, a conglomeration of partial approaches.
Most fields have something to offer. But a flea mar
ket is not a discipline.64
In registering his concern over this problem, McClelland
63Ibid., 85.
64Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Relations:
the Long Road to Theory," World Politics, XI (April, 1959),
347.
59 |
i
stated: "In a sense, we do not know enough about the
i
general 'mission' of the study of international relations
to determine what contributes to it."6^ perhaps Richard
Snyder made the most explicit statement of this problem
when he said:
To import uncritically the concepts and theories
from, say sociology and social psychology is to
listen to the call of the Sirens. On the other
hand, to reject the newer developments in methods
and techniques in other fields as 'jargon' or
'methodology,' or as irrelevant because they do
not deal with political phenomena per se, is fool
hardy.66
Several theorists have felt that the solution to
this problem lies in the development of a broad framework
which would establish the criteria for admitting these
contributions and which would suggest the most useful and
relevant questions for the field. This was the opinion of
McClelland when he wrote:
. . . there is a need for well-developed 'molar' or
'macrocosmic' approaches. Improvement in the field
ought to follow from applications of highly general
ized concepts which overarch the several social sci
ences and establish principles of selection and
priorities in using data transferred from other
fields to international relations.6?
65McClelland, "The Function of Theory . . .," 319.
6^Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . .," 475.
^McClelland, "The Social Sciences . . .," 33.
60
Snyder wrote that: "Before deciding that further inter
disciplinary efforts are unnecessary, more penetrating
questions should be asked.1,66 Hoffmann took a similar
position: "We must try to make these contributions rele
vant by asking the right questions. In other words, there
must be a core which is missing at present."69 He believed
that such a core could be provided only as a general theory
was developed:
Without theory, we will have to take whatever other
disciplines see fit to dump onto our plate, and we
will have indigestion from smorgasbord. With ade
quate theory, we will help ourselves more selec
tively . 70
Several theorists have actually made specific
suggestions embodying broad frameworks which could be used
to establish the criteria for the admittance of contribut
ing studies and theoretical constructs. Sondermann
believed that the two perspectives, foreign policy and
international politics, and the linkages between them
could form the basic framework for the field.71 Rosenau
felt that his calculated control model could fulfill the
66Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . 476.
69Hoffmann, "International Relations . . .," 347.
70ibid.
71sondermann, 15.
61 ]
same role. He stated that:
By treating international politics and foreign
policy as sequences of behavioral, attitudinal,
and structural modifications, we have moved closer
to the concern of other disciplines. . . . Calcu
lated control, in short, is a common threat that
weaves its way through all forms of human behavior
and that thereby ties international politics and
foreign policy to the other social sciences.7^
Kaplan believed that such a model could be provided by
General Systems Theory because such a theory would permit
the "... integration of variables from other disci
p l i n e s . " ^ He went on to explain that international rela
tions theory should provide a
. . . method for 'fitting' structural similari
ties from one type of subject matter to another.
In particular, systems theory permits a rapid
study both of similarities and differences between
otherwise completely different kinds of struc
tures. . . .74
Although there is still no general agreement con
cerning the resolution of this problem— perhaps consensus
on a general theory must precede this agreement— two trends
are noticeable. First, most theorists would use the two
major perspectives in the construction of a general
72Rosenau, Calculated Control . . ., 46.
72Morton Kaplan, System and Process in Interna
tional Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1957), p. xii.
74Ibid.
62 I
framework. And second, most theorists would use some sort
of generalized model which could be applied to both inter
national relations and to the contributing disciplines so
that the appropriate questions could be posed and so that
one could be assured that the contributions retained their
relevance after the process of transference.
The Integration of Knowledge
In the normal process of empirical inquiry, the
researcher is first of all interested in "taking the sub
ject matter apart" so that he can observe and describe its
constituent elements, their interconnections, and their
functioning. In the strict sense of the term, this is
what is meant by "analysis." But the researcher is
usually interested also in "putting the subject matter
back together." He does this by arranging the interpre
tations of his observations into a system of classifica
tion and by indicating how the results of his analysis
fit into the larger units of knowledge with his discipline.
This is the sense in which "integration" is used in the
following discussion.
Most theorists have conceded that the principal
63
problem in developing analytical and integrative proce
dures lies in the fact that there is no widely accepted
general theory within the discipline. For instance Charles
McClelland complained:
There is no unified theory; there is no general
acceptance of any broad approach or any discrimi
nating generalized explanation which would tell
us how to pick and choose.75
Snyder, writing in 1955, made almost the identical point
when he declared that:
No general theory of international politics exists
and there is no frame of reference which embraces
the phenomena or relates the major categories and
concepts regarded by the authors as important.75
Seven years later, Snyder again reported on the state of
the discipline:
. . . we do not now have a commonly accepted map
of the empirical terrain embraced by the term
international relations, . . . the point is that
we are presently groping for a "whole" as well as
a "core," and the former, though vague, indicates
a globilization of inquiry.77
He concluded this article by asserting that there is still
^McClelland, "The Function of Theory . . .," 317-
18.
^^Snyder, "Toward Greater Order . . .," 476.
7^Richard C. Snyder, "Some Recent Trends in Interna
tional Relations Theory and Research," Essays on the Behav
ioral Study of Politics, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana, 111.:
Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 108.
64 ' j
■'. . . a need for a meta-framework within which the accumu
lation of reliable knowledge can be guided and monitored."78
The lack of a general theory, and hence the lack of
well-designed integrative procedures, led McClelland to
conclude:
Like history, international relations, for most of
its academic existence, has been data-centered, des
criptive, and all but innocent of analytic and
generalizing development.79
Sondermann presented an even more pessimistic estimate
since he saw the projection of this problem into the
future:
Present trends in the field, which lead to concen
tration on ever narrower and more specific subjects
of study, make it likely that the student will be
swamped by masses of unintegrated facts, and that
the larger picture will be lost in the process, or
at least will become harder and harder to envisage
as more and more information demands absorption into
a general formula.80
Some theorists have stated that the best way to
develop a general theory for the field is to first con
struct a framework. Kaplan explained that:
A framework for a theory specifies the variables
which a theory will employ. It constitutes a con
ceptual scheme within which it may be possible to
78ibid., 170.
79McClelland, "The Social Sciences . . 31.
80
Sondermann, 16.
65
organize a theory.81
One of the most assiduous attempts to construct an
integrative framework was made by Charles McClelland. In
his view, the discipline is currently characterized by a
multitude of specific empirical studies and a few highly
generalized theoretical constructs— neither of which has
been related to the other. In the light of this situation,
he submitted:
Perhaps the only effective course of action is a
strategy which develops concurrently and coordinate-
ly from both ends of a "scale of abstraction-general-
ity." This is to conceptualize consciously, in a
broad pattern of relationships, what actually exists
in both highly empirical and in highly theoretical
research.82
In his opinion, ". . .a social science of international
relations may be expected to grow most effectively from
inquiries which ascend a 'ladder of abstraction-general-
ity' and by others which descend this ladder."88 In order
to illustrate what such a 'ladder' would imply, McClelland
sketched the following five stage scheme:
1. Formal statements without specific empirical
references; universal scope.
81Kaplan, System and Process . . ., xi.
82McClelland, "The Social Sciences . . .,"32.
83Ibid., 33.
66
2. Explanation conforming to Stage 1 but
"enriched" by additions of time or place
references or both; supra-cultural and semi-
universal statements.
3. Socio-cultural data added; non-universal but
still highly generalized explanations pertain
ing to specified cultures and societies.
4. Restricted generalization and interpretation
arising directly from particular data; ad hoc
principles; normal level of historical inter
pretation.
5. Concrete data— reports and accounts of particu
lar events, action, situations, d e v e l o p m e n t s .84
It was the contention of McClelland that greater coherence
could be achieved in the discipline if the researcherswere
to conduct their work with such a scheme in mind, if they
were to show the stage at which their problem occurred,
and if they were to demonstrate how the results of their
work could contribute to the stages below and above their
own.8 8
The "Value" Problem in International Relations
Probably the least settled problem within interna
tional relations is the "value" problem. One can glimpse
an aspect of this problem in Hoffmann's dynamic tirade
against what he calls "policy scientism." He explained that
84xbid. 85ibid.
the scholar's
. . . primary duty, . . . is to seek knowledge and
understanding for their own sake. This implies
that the main purpose of research should not be
"policy scientism." The fighting of crusades, the
desire to advise policy-makers, or the scholar's
dedication to national or international causes can
and perhaps even should be the occasion, but they
should not be the purpose of theoretical r e s e a r c h . 86
It would appear that the value problem in interna
tional relations research arose, on the one hand, because
of the realization that a scholar is likely to have an
intense personal interest in the achievement of certain
ends such as the promotion of national security, the resolu
tion of conflict, or the establishment of a world community;
and, on the other hand, because a significant amount of the
subject matter of international relations involves the
values, objectives, and goals of the actors.
As international relations theory has emerged in
recent years, the common practice has been to divide it
into two broad categories: the empirical and the norma
tive. One of the most explicit definitions of these two
types of theory was that of Charles McClelland:
Normative theory for international relations involves
the investigation and formulation of those sets of
^Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory . . ., 10.
ideas which, if they were put into full practice,
would be expected to lead to more ideal relation
ships among states, economies, societies, peoples,
and/or countries. . . . What goals should be pur
sued, how parts should be related and ordered to
the whole international system, and how means and
ends should be associated and realized are major
concerns in normative theories.
Empirical theory, on the other hand, in its "pure"
form, is not concerned with the questions of the
"ought to be's" but only with the explanation of
"what has been, what is, and what will be"?®?
Almost all the theorists of international relations
realize how acute the value problem is in social science
research. Quincy Wright expressed the general situation
in these terms:
While observing the past and formulating expecta
tions of the future, the social scientist cannot
ignore the desires men have for the future nor the
necessary relation between expectations and
desires.
Hoffmann touched upon another aspect of this problem when
he wrote "... the social scientist's selection of facts
is always subjective, and the broader the area he wants to
understand, the more he is guided by his own v a l u e s . " ® ^
There is a widespread recognition among the writers
that a large part of the data of international relations
^McClelland, "The Function of Theory . . .," 311.
88Wright, 119.
®9Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory . . ., 171.
69 !
relates to the values of the actors. For example, Hoffmann
stated that:
It is through men's values and institutions, through
the thoughts and acts of their leaders, that the
basic factors of the material environment affect
international politics.90
Raymond Aron made a similar point when he stated:
The policy-makers do their thinking with reference
to a certain system of values, a conception of
their community and of the world, which reflects
the special individuality of the nation.
Because policy-makers think and act on the basis of a cer
tain system of values, the theorists have drawn the conclu
sion that these values and their relation to behavioral
action form a proper area of investigation for the interna
tional relations analyst. For instance, Singer observed:
. . . the nation-as-actor approach demands that
we investigate the processes by which national
goals are selected, the internal and external fac
tors that impinge on those processes, and the
institutional framework from which they emerge.^
Snyder believed that the study of goals or objectives
implied motivational analysis. He stated:
90Ibid., 173.
91Raymond Aron, "Conflict and War from the View
point of Historical Sociology," Contemporary Theory in
International Relations, ed. Stanley Hoffmann, 196.
9^Singer, 85.
70
Since objectives reflect motives, the analysis of
objectives requires the analysis of motivation.
Indeed, motives are inferred from objectives which
are, in turn, inferred from sequences of behavior.93
The other side of the value problem concerns the
value system of the scholar. Morgenthau offered one of
the most apt statements in illustrating this facet of the
problem:
The "personal equation” of the political scientist
both limits and directs his scholarly pursuits. The
truth which a mind thus socially conditioned is able
to grasp is likewise socially conditioned. The per
spective of the observer determines what can be known
and how it is to be understood. In consequence, the
truth of political science is of necessity a partial
truth.94
Hoffmann suggested that one way in which the scholar could
help to avoid confusion engendered by his own values would
be to state openly these values in the works which he pub
lishes. Hoffmann believed that this practice would cause
the scholar to be more careful in the formulation of his
assumptions.95 Failure to clarify his value assumptions
has, at times, led the international relations scholar into
a most regrettable subjectivism. Singer called this sub
jectivism "Ptolemaic parochialism," which he described in
93snyder, Decision-Making . . ., 51.
^4Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits . . 21.
9^Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory . . ., 172.
71 1
this manner:
Thus, in overemphasizing the differences among
the national states, the observer is prone to
attribute many of what he conceives to be virtues
to his own nation and the vices to others, espe
cially the adversaries of the moment.96
Another aspect of the value problem involves the
question of what is the proper relationship between the
roles played by the scholar and the policy-maker. Wright
provided a broad framework for this type of situation
when he wrote:
The object of the study of international relations
is not only to understand the factors which account
for decisions and actions of governments, but also
to facilitate control in order to forward the most
generally accepted goals and v a l u e s . 97
The question which invariably arises at this point is:
How far should the scholar go in trying to "facilitate"
control? If the scholar clings too conservatively to the
area of "certainty" and "safe" prediction, the gap between
his world and that of the policy-makers may become
unbridgeable. But there is also danger in trying to be
too liberal with one's advice. Thus, William Fox has
warned: "If a first-class scholar tries too hard to be
^Singer, 82.
®^Wright, 552.
72'1
immediately useful, he may only succeed in becoming a
fourth-class journalist."^8 Hoffmann suggested that the
scholar's role should not be that of prescribing "good
policies," but it should be that of aiding the policy
makers in understanding ". . . the situations and the
alternatives among which they will have to choose."8^ Fox
also conceived of a similar role for the would-be theorist:
In delimiting the possible for those who must
select a course of action, the theorist may also
shed light on recently proposed policy alterna
tives and sometimes even direct attention to
courses of action previously unimagined or imagined
to be impossible.^®8
Although the value problem has been discussed
rather extensively in the recent theoretical literature
of the field, and although many convincing suggestions have
been made toward resolving the various aspects of this
problem, the overall relationship between empirical and
normative theory has yet to be resolved. It would seem
that Hoffmann came closest to defining this problem when
he observed:
^8William T. R. Fox, "The Uses of International
Relations Theory," Theoretical Aspects . . ., 32.
99
Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory . . ., 12.
100Fox, 31.
r
73
The two traditional tasks of political philosophy:
the search for the proper relations between the
individual, the communities in which he lives, and
the world, on the one hand, and concern for the
best method with which a desirable relation could
be realized, have not been well-performed in world
politics.101
Hoffmann envisioned a general theory of international poli
tics in which empirical and normative theories would merge.
In order to merge these theories, he has suggested that:
Our first problem is the clarification of the
values we would like to see promoted in the world. .
. . Secondly, we must relate these values to the
world as it is, far more closely than we usually
do.102
Later on he expanded upon this theme by proclaiming:
We must try to build relevant utopias. By spell
ing out our views on the purposes, the pre
requisites, the possibilities, and the procedures
of an ideal international order, we . . . would
meet the requirement of clarifying our personal
value positions. We would avoid the piecemeal
engineering approach of policy scientism.103
Conclusion
The four problems, which were presented at the
beginning of this chapter, have provided the framework
for this survey of the writings in international relations
theory. The purpose of this survey was to determine how
^iHoffmann, Contemporary Theory . . ., 184.
l°2Ibid., 187. l°3Ibid., 189.
the theorists of international relations have conceived
these problems and which proposals they have suggested for
resolving them. Two fundamental tasks should have been
performed by this type of survey: first, it should have
indicated the extent to which the theorists have resolved
the four problems and, second, it should have indicated
the areas of remaining uncertainty. What follows is a sum
mary of how these two tasks have been performed in regard
to each of the four problems:
1. Which principles or guidelines should be used
in approaching the subject matter for the pur
pose of analysis?
In general the theorists were well aware of the
need for improved analytical procedures. Some theorists,
for example, pointed to the ambiguity of key terms and the
absence of a logically ordered classification system within
the discipline. At least one theorist suggested that com
mon sense concepts, which are currently in use throughout
the discipline, should be replaced by scientific concepts,
but none of these theorists have provided the formula for
making this change. Also, the theorists have generally
agreed upon the need for some sort of widely-accepted
analytical model or framework which could be used to
direct analyses into the subject matter. But although
75 !
several different types of models were proposed by the
theorists, no standard or criterion was suggested that
would indicate which model or models should be selected
and which should be rejected.
There has also been considerable agreement among the
theorists that "perspectives" could provide the discipline
with its basic analytical orientations. Although this sur
vey indicated some confusion both in regard to the terms and
to their referents in the treatment of this subject, it also
revealed a general recognition by the theorists of at least
two major perspectives: one focusing upon foreign policy
studies, the other focusing upon international political
studies. This survey also demonstrated that at least one
theorist had discussed the problem of "shifting" perspec
tives and the "linkage" between perspectives. Moreover,
this survey has shown that a few theorists have suggested
that there are other perspectives which might be considered.
Unfortunately, the term "perspective" has not been rigorous
ly defined within the discipline and, as a result, the num
ber of perspectives appropriate to international relations
research has not been determined. Because of this lack of
definition, it would be very difficult to determine which
subject matters should be included within each perspective
1
76 i
and how to coordinate the results of analyses conducted
from different perspectives.
2. What place should studies and theories from
other disciplines have in inquiries conducted
within the discipline of international rela
tions?
Most theorists believed that the study of interna
tional relations could be enhanced by the interdisciplinary
approach; indeed, some theorists have already made exten
sive adaptations of theoretical constructs from other
disciplines into the study of international relations.
However, a heated controversy has arisen over the extent
and the manner in which outside contributions should be
admitted. Some theorists have suggested that a framework
or general theory could establish the criteria for admitting
outside contributions and a few have suggested how such a
framework could be used to establish the criteria. The two
trends which were noticeable in these suggestions for con
structing a framework were: the use of perspectives and
the use of some sort of a generalized model. But, here
again, no criteria have been established for selecting a
model or the perspectives for the construction of such a
framework. Until such a framework is adopted by the
discipline, the researchers will probably continue to be
77
unsure of how to use studies and theories from outside
international relations.
3. Which principles or guidelines should one use
in the integration of the results of analytical
research into the general body of knowledge?
Most theorists have pointed out that integrative
procedures will depend upon the development of a general
theory or framework for the field. At least one author
proposed such an integrative framework; however, there has
been no indication that it or any other has won general
acceptance. Here the problem is similar to the one faced
with respect to analytical procedures: since no criteria
have been developed which would prefer one integrative
framework over the others, the discipline has been unable
to select a framework. And until such a framework is
accepted by the discipline, the question regarding integra
tive procedures cannot be resolved.
4. How should the "value problem" be handled in the
process of inquiry?
The critical nature of the "value problem" in
international relations has been widely appreciated by the
theorists. They have discussed both of these major aspects
of the problem: (1) that the data of international rela
tions includes the values of the actors, and (2) that the
78 1
value system of the researcher is likely to be intimately
linked to the problems under inquiry. They have also
recognized that a part of the value problem involves
determining the role of the researcher in relation to that
of the policy-makers. A few of the theorists have made some
general observations as to how "values" should be handled
in the process of inquiry. But no standard or criterion
has been established for choosing among these suggestions.
Thus, until such a standard or criterion is established,
this problem will remain unresolved.
Although this survey of international relations
theory may have^ helped to clarify the issues and to spell
out the implications of these issues for the discipline, it
has, by no means, resolved the questions which were posed
at the outset. Underlying this failure of the discipline
to resolve each of these questions seems to be the absence
of a general theory or framework within the discipline.
The reason it seems that such a framework or general theory
has not won acceptance within the discipline is that the
criteria for the selection of such a framework or general
theory has not been established. In order to establish
such criteria, I believe it will be necessary for interna
tional relationists to clarify and agree upon their
79
conception of what constitutes good scientific method.
The chapter which follows proposes one theory of the
scientific method for the consideration of the discipline.
CHAPTER III
THE DEWEY-BENTLEY THEORY OF INQUIRY
As the previous chapter has shown, a widespread
uncertainty remains within the discipline of international
relations concerning how inquiries should be conducted.
Limited empirical studies, which have been conducted from
special viewpoints utilizing diverse methodologies, all too
often remain disconnected from one another and continue to
be isolated from the general theoretical development of the
field. Theorists, who have sought to bring greater order
to the field by proposing some sort of organizing device,
have been unable to agree on the criteria by which such
devices could be judged, and, as a result, no one of these
devices has been accepted as the nucleus for the develop
ment of a general theory of the discipline.
The last chapter was organized on the basis of four
major methodological questions dealing with the subjects of
analytical procedures, contributing theories and studies,
integrative procedures, and the "value" problem. The
80
concluding section of that chapter expressed the sense of
1 .
lingering uncertainty and lack of agreement which still
surrounds these questions. In the case of each one of
these four questions, the uncertainty was attributed to
the absence of a widely-accepted framework or general
theory within the discipline. It was suggested that the
reason why no framework or general theory had won accep
tance by the discipline was that the criteria for the
selection of a framework or general theory had not been
established. If such criteria are to be established in
the future, I believe that international relationists have
but one course of action: they must arrive at a consensus
as to what constitutes "good" scientific method.
The purpose of the present chapter is to present,
in brief form, one theory of inquiry for the consideration
of the discipline. The theory which I have selected is the
one developed by John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. It is
my judgment that their theory provides the most practical
and clearly-formulated account of the scientific method to
which the social sciences, such as international relations,
can have recourse.
In one sense the theory of inquiry described herein
was the work of two old men; in the most active phase of
their partnership Bentley was in his seventies, Dewey was
i
in his eighties. But perhaps it would be more accurate
to regard their theory as the culmination of two long
/
careers spent in philosophic experimentation and develop
ment .
Until the 19 30's, Dewey and Bentley had travelled
separate paths in the construction of their philosophies.
Ernest Nagel was the one who recognized that their respec
tive philosophical approaches tended to converge and who
called this fact to Dewey's attention. When the two
authors realized that they were headed on a similar course,
they began a philosophical correspondence which was to
continue until the last year of Dewey's life.^
In 1938, Dewey published a major treatise on the
scientific method entitled Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
Although Bentley had been in correspondence with Dewey for
some years prior to this date, their correspondence had been
too sporadic for one to infer that Bentley had had a prin
cipal role to play in its development. But it is clear
^■Sidney Ratner and Jules Altman (eds.) , John Dewey
and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence,
1932-1951 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1964), p. 3.
— ’-"I
^ 83 ;
I
!
from the letters addressed to Dewey after its publication
that Bentley heartily approved of the general import of
Dewey's work.2 Soon after the Logic was published, the
two philosophers formed a close intellectual partnership
and, during the early 194 0's, they drafted and published
several essays intending them as extensions of Dewey's
Logic. Finally, in 1949, the authors incorporated these
essays into a small book called Knowing and the Known.
Taken together the Logic and Knowing and the Known embody
the authors' latest and most complete formulation of their
theory of inquiry.
I believe it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to draw any sharp distinction between the ideas of these
two authors. It is clear, however, that each man approached
the subject matter with a different emphasis. Dewey was
definitely the generalist, the synthesizer, and the
teacher. His goal was to formulate the wholeness and con
tinuity of all inquiry and to communicate this formulation
with the utmost clarity to his audience. Bentley's purpose
was more exact. According to Sidney Ratner:
Bentley's major goal was the construction of a
language in terms of which a science of human
2Ibid.
84
behavior, comparable in accuracy and verifiabil
ity to the physical and biological sciences, could
be developed.^
In the preface to his Logic, Dewey had admitted that there
was still a ". . . need for development of a general theory
of language in which form and matter are not separated;
. . ." 4 Apparently, Bentley conceived his task as one of
fulfilling this need.
In Knowing and the Known the authors set out to
accomplish three tasks: first, they analyzed the works of
the leading logicians so as to determine some of the sources
of confusion in contemporary logical literature; second,
they advanced their view of inquiry from a transactional
frame of reference; and third, they formulated and speci
fied the meaning of a list of terms which they had derived
from the transactional frame of reference and which they
believed could form the basis for a general theory of
language.5
What most distinguished Dewey's Logic from previous
3Ibid., 35.
4John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1938), p. iv.
5John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the
Known (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960). The formulated
list of firm names are included in Chapter 11.
works on the subject was his insistence that logical forms
can be shown to have emerged from the natural process of
inquiry. In other words, Dewey believed that all logical
forms had emerged from a biological-cultural matrix and
that these forms served a purely instrumental function in
the resolution of problematic situations.
The survey presented in this chapter stresses four
main features of the Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry: the
theory of the knowing process conceived from a naturalistic
frame of reference, the transactional conception of the
subject matter, the explanation of inquiry as instrumental
in resolving problematic situations, and the description of
the use of logical forms in scientific investigations. A
separate section will be devoted to the treatment of each
one of these four features. But before presenting these
four sections dealing with the Dewey-Bentley theory of
inquiry, I have included an introductory section which out
lines some of the major epistemological arguments which
preceded the Dewey-Bentley interpretation of the knowing
process. I have included the following section on
epistemological argumentation for two reasons: first,
because the Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry was formulated
against the background of discourse known as historical
86 1
epistemology, I believe the reader can grasp more easily
the significance of their contribution if a sketch of this
background is presented at the outset; and second, since
the Dewey-Bentley theory represents only one out of several
possible interpretations, I believe the reader has a right
to be acquainted with the theories being rejected before
he is asked to select the Dewey-Bentley theory. It would,
of course, be beyond the scope of this particular work to
present more than a brief sketch of a few of these inter
pretations .
The Course of Epistemological Argumentation
Every theory of the scientific method or of
inquiry in general rests upon certain assumptions pertain
ing to the nature of the knowing process. When a theorist
lays bare his assumptions of the knowing process or attempts
to formulate them into a systematic statement, we can say
he is in the process of devising a theory of knowledge or
an epistemology. The problem which invariably confronts
the epistemologist is how he is going to account for and
relate to one another perceptual and conceptual subject
matters. Epistemologists throughout the course of history
87 1
have usually taken one of two positions: first, there is
the position which stresses conceptions as the important or
only source of knowledge; and second, there is the position
which stresses perceptions as the important or the only
source of knowledge. Those who have taken the first posi
tion have at various times been called realists, rational
ists, and idealists. Those who have taken the second posi
tion have been called either empiricists or positivists.
Several examples of epistemologists who have taken one or
the other of these two positions will be discussed below.
Theories stressing conceptual subject matters
Platonic realism. Of the philosophers who tended
to stress conceptual in relation to perceptual subject
matters, few have taken a more extreme position than Plato.
The Greek philosophers who had tried to explain knowledge
as the product of sensual experiences, during Plato's time,
actually had produced more confusion than enlightenment.
Plato set out to put the explanation of knowledge on a firm
foundation. He believed that the Greek empiricists had
failed to account for knowledge because they had tried to
derive their explanations from a subject matter which is in
a perceptual state of flux. Thus, Plato began with a
severe skepticism of all "knowledge" derived from sense
experience. For him, genuine knowledge could only be
derived through reasoning; the particulars of such knowl
edge would consist of a world of eternal ideas.
In order to sustain his explanation, Plato was
forced to posit a metaphysical being— a Reality— behind
the world presented to us by sense experience. For Plato,
this Reality was a logically ordered, changeless cosmos.
Lesser ideas were subsumed under higher ideas until an
apex of the hierarchy was reached; at this apex was the
idea of the Good. All the particular objects which a per
son perceives must be regarded as imperfect copies or
reflections of the eternal ideas. For a person to acquire
genuine knowledge, according to Plato, he must know the
permanent and unchangeable essence of things. And thought
alone can grasp these eternal essences.
Plato believed that these ideas already existed,
however obscurely, within the human mind. By using the
dialectic method, he believed that it was possible to
construct a firm knowledge of Reality. According to this
method a person would proceed inductively by gathering par
ticular ideas into general ideas and then deductively by
analyzing general ideas into particular ideas. Plato
89 •
admitted that the object which is revealed by our senses
somehow participates in its eternal idea, but he was never
able to give a convincing explanation of how this partici
pation takes place. After making such a sharp distinction
-!
between form and matter, the attempt to bring them together
again was bound to be artificial.^
Continental rationalism. In the era in which Rene
Descartes formulated his philosophy, epistemology faced a
double crisis; on the one hand, scholastic interpreters had
offered so many different opinions on the same subject that
epistemology had degenerated into confusion; and on the
other hand, the rise of modern science seemed to forecast
a new and reliable body of knowledge entirely outside the
traditional philosophy and theology. For Descartes, the
problem was how to bring order to epistemology and how to
reconcile the new sciences of nature with the spiritualis
tic philosophy which had been inherited from the Middle
Ages.
For the construction of his theory of knowledge, he
chose the mathematical model. In other words, he sought to
^Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (Revised by
Ledger Wood, Third edition; New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1961), pp. 73-83.
90 1
construct a system of thought which would possess the
certainty of mathematics. The only way to do this, he
believed, was to employ the mathematical method. Accord
ing to his conception of this method, one should first
begin by selecting axioms or simple principles which are
self-evident; then, he should proceed to deduce other
propositions which logically follow from these principles.
By applying such a method to nature, he believed that a
completely mechanistic explanation could be developed with
out reference to eternal forms or essences.
Like Plato, he denied that our knowledge of the
world was dependent on sense experience. He reasoned that
the senses cannot reveal the genuine nature of things, but
only how things affect us. In order to account for knowl
edge, he took recourse in the concept of innate or a priori
ideas. He argued that if real knowledge is produced by
reasoning from certain basic principles or axioms, then
these must be inherent in the mind itself. To ascertain
what these principles or axioms were, he believed that all
presently held opinions should be rigorously assaulted with
doubt. In applying this procedure to his own opinions, he
found that he was able to cast aside all propositions
except the proposition that he was doubting, i.e., thinking*
................ 91"]
From this last remaining proposition, he arrived at his
famous deduction: "I think, therefore, I am." By "I am"
he meant "I am a thinking thing" or a "mind." Using a
rather curious type of reasoning, he then deduced the
existence of God, whom he regarded as the Absolute sub
stance. And beneath this substance he maintained that
there were two relative substances— mind and body. Some
how these two substances exist independently of one
another, but both are dependent on God. Still, Descartes
felt the necessity of fusing together, in some way, the
two relative substances. But apparently, he had no
greater success in reconciling this dualism than Plato
had two thousand years earlier.7
The transcendental method. Immanuel Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason represented one of the most notori
ous attempts to achieve a fusion between conceptual and
perceptual subject matters. Although he firmly believed
in the superiority of the mind as the source of knowledge,
he found it impossible to cast out perceptual subject
matter altogether. Kant's philosophy was designed, on the
one hand, as a criticism of the rationalistic idealism
7Ibid., 302-13.
which had held that reason alone could provide reliable
knowledge, and, on the other hand, as a criticism of the
empiricism which had tried to account for all knowledge
by looking only to sense experience. Kant dismissed these
points of view with the dictum that: "Thoughts without
content are void; intuitions [perceptions] without concep
tions, blind."8 Thus what Kant sought to do was to unite
perceptions and conceptions as the source of knowledge.
In order to explain how perceptual and conceptual
subject matters both contribute to human knowledge Kant
employed what he called the Transcendental Method. At the
outset he contended that certain of our ideas arise within
the mind itself, not from nature. From an analysis of
Aristotlian logic, he deduced that there were twelve
a priori categories which constitute the structure of
thought.8 He believed that such ideas (categories) must
somehow be due to realities which exist independent of
human minds.It was Kant's contention that knowledge
was possible only if the data of the senses were actively
arranged (he used the term "synthesized") through the use
8Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New York: Wiley Book Co., 1943),
pp. 61-62.
9Ibid., 2-4. 10Ibid., 4-5.
of innate concepts or categories of the mind.^ He claimed!
that such synthesizing activity was due to a transcendental
self, of which one can know nothing except that it is the
condition that underlies the possibility of human knowl
edge . 12
Absolute idealism. Kant's philosophy was, in turn,
criticized by the Absolute Idealists— not because of his
attempt to unite perceptions and conceptions as a means of
achieving knowledge— but because they felt that his concep
tion of "Reality" and the function which he assigned to
thought was too narrowly conceived. George Hegel, for
instance, argued that the finite or limited being presup
poses an infinite, unlimited being.
Earlier in this section it was demonstrated that
both Plato and Descartes had conceived a metaphysical
Reality lying behind the world presented to us by sense
experience; George Hegel's conception of the "Absolute"
served a similar function— but with one exception: his
metaphysical Absolute was a process of historical evolution*
Instead of a structure of changeless eternal ideas, Hegel's
Absolute was a dynamic, moving process emerging from
11Ibid., 60-62. 12Ibid., 47-48.
94
something which is undifferentiated, passing through
opposing and contradicting forms, until at last it develops
into a concrete, particularized object, which in turn,
becomes a component of the Unconditioned Whole. Thus Hegel
believed that the ultimate destination of the whole process
of historical evolution, the movement of the Absolute, was
the Unconditioned Whole. ^ This Unconditioned Whole
includes within itself ". . .a complete interpenetration
and interfusion of the elements of immediate and of the
conceptual and reflective."I4 Genuine knowledge, accord
ing to Hegel, is only approached as the mind begins to
comprehend this Unconditioned Whole. It was Hegel's con
tention that the Absolute Idea, which encompasses the
Unconditioned Whole, includes and "synthesizes" all partial
ideas. Therefore, he maintained that knowledge progresses
from vague sense perceptions, through the categories of
common sense and science, to the unified knowledge that is
philosophy. Hegel also rejected Kant's conception which
had held that the function of thought was to impose ready
made categories upon given subject-matters and instead
^Henry S. Macran (trans.), Hegel's Logic of World
and Idea, Being a Translation of the Second and Third Parts
of the Subjective Logic (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
: 1929), pp. 188-89.
14Ibid., 190-91. 15Ibid.
contended that the real function of thought was to relate
". . . each particular experience with the infinite whole
of which it is an expression."16
Theories stressing perceptual subject matters
The epistemologies of Kant and Hegel had been
stimulated, in large part, by the attacks which the
empiricists had launched against traditional rationalism.
By the Transcendental Method Kant tried to reconcile
empiricism to rationalism; Hegel tried through his concepts
of the Absolute and the Unconditioned Whole to provide a
comprehensive framework in which empirical and rational
knowledge could be fused into a single unity. Compared to
these grand designs, it appears that the British empiricists
had grasped the small end of the problem of knowledge.
John Locke. The rationalists' beliefs in innate
ideas was the first target of Locke's attack. Such a
belief, he asserted, was clearly preposterous— for one had
only to question young children, uneducated persons, and
savages in order to discover many human beings who were
plainly ignorant of the ideas with which they were
16Ibid.
96 1
I
purportedly born. Careful observation, he contended, would:
certainly prove that the infant enters the world with a
blank mind— a tabula rasa.
According to Locke's theory, the mind receives
data through the five senses in the form of sensations.
These sensations, which are received in the form of reflec
tions, can be classified as either primary or secondary
qualities. Primary qualities, such as shape and size,
Locke regarded as belonging to the objects themselves;
secondary qualities, such as color and sound, he did not
consider as anything in the objects themselves, but merely
possessing the capacity to affect the perceiving subject.
From the inflow of sensations, the mind forms simple ideas.
The simple ideas are, in turn, organized by the mind into
complex ideas. Through such a process of organizing ideas,
the mind is able to discover relations among ideas and,
moreover, is able to formulate abstract ideas and to
imagine situations and entities having no correspondence
in the existential world. Thus, according to this theory,
there are two sources of all our ideas: there is sensa
tion through which the mind is furnished with sensible
qualities, and there is reflection through which the mind
is supplied with ideas of its own operations.
Despite Locke's repudiation of the innate ideas of
the rationalists, he readily accepted their mind-body
dualism. Locke maintained that all matter and all bodies
were passive and could be moved only by an active sub
stance. The pure spirit or God is thoroughly active, but
man's soul is both active and passive. Because the soul
has the power to move the body, it is active, but because
the soul is acted upon by the qualities produced by exis
tential objects, it is also passive. Exactly how this
interaction between the mind and the body or between the
external matter takes place, Locke did not say.l^
David Hume. Philosophers who followed Locke quickly
discovered loose connections in Locke's empiricism. Follow
ing Locke's account of sensations, Lord Berkeley derived an
idealism which held that ideas— perceptual and conceptual—
alone constitute our system of knowledge. Although he
believed we could know a spiritual Reality, he denied any
possibility of knowing that a world existed beyond our
senses. Carrying this line of analysis even further, Hume
asserted that, not only can we not deduce an existential
world from our sense experiences, we cannot deduce a
l^Thilly, pp. 334-72.
spiritual reality either. If we admit, Hume reasoned,
that all we can know are our own impressions and that our
knowledge results from the mind's compounding, transposing,
augmenting or diminishing the materials supplied by the
senses, then we have no right to project relations and
existences conceived by the mind onto either a material or
a spiritual world. Besides this, he maintained, we have
no right to infer that events are causally related. The
fact that we receive impressions in a sequence or pattern
gives us no right to infer that one event is necessarily a
cause and another an effect; this type of inference, he
asserted, is a mere operation— a habit— of the mind. The
only genuine knowledge must be self-evident and no knowl
edge meets this requirement except mathematics which merely
analyzes its own concepts. All other forms of knowledge
must be stated in terms of probability.1®
John Stuart Mill. The utter skepticism of Hume's
method had seemingly denied the possibility of genuine
knowledge about either a metaphysical or a physical world.
As to the conclusion concerning the metaphysical world,
18Ibid., 367-75.
Mill was in thorough accord, but to deny knowledge of the
physical world— this he could not do. In order to meet
this challenge, Mill took two steps: one, he postulated
the principle that the course of nature is uniform, and
two, he proposed that this principle could be demonstrated
by inductive investigation and reasoning. According to his
theory of induction, a conclusion is reached inductively by
extending (or generalizing) what is observed in certain
particulars to one or more similar particulars. If subse
quent observation verifies the conclusion which was
extended, then we have the right to infer a necessary con
nection— a cause-effect relation— within the subject mat
ter. Through such a process of inductive logic, Mill
believed that a rationalistic science could be developed
and that it was possible, in theory at least, to construct
an absolute body of knowledge, including the subject mat
ters of the social sciences.
In spite of Mill's efforts to escape Hume's skepti
cism concerning our knowledge of a physical world, one
could still use Hume's method to point out that Mill's
postulation of a uniform natural world was only an opera
tion of the mind and that the evidence gathered in support
of any deductive conclusion could never be conclusive.
Hence, no body of knowledge derived from induction, could
be regarded as absolute. But there was another important
flaw in Mill's inductive logic. A logic based solely on
an inductive reasoning process could not easily explain
the necessary truths embodied in deductive logic and
mathematics.
The logical positivists. The whole import of
Mill's inductive logic was to provide a reliable method of
inquiry for the social sciences. But while the physical
sciences made gigantic advances in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth,
progress in the social sciences was hardly perceptible.
Certain philosophers and physical scientists began to
explore the reasons why the social sciences had been so
reluctant to adopt the methods employed by the physical
sciences. When they investigated the contemporary works
pertaining to the social realm, they discovered that social
inquiry was permeated by metaphysical notions. Moreover,
they found that most schools of philosophy in Europe and
the United States still adhered to some sort of idealism,
many following the Absolute Idealism of Hegel.
19Ibid., 531-37.
" " "1
i o i j
For those who preferred to place social inquiry
on a scientific footing, it appeared obvious that the
first task was to rid the social sciences of their meta
physical notions. But any attempt to abolish metaphysical
notions through reasoned analysis always seemed to result
in protracted and fruitless argumentation. Finally in
1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus suggested a way to deal with metaphysical
propositions:
The correct method in philosophy would really be
the following: to say nothing except what can be
said, i.e. propositions of natural science— i.e.
something that has nothing to do with philosophy—
and then whenever someone else wanted to say some
thing metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he
had failed to give a meaning to certain terms in
his propositions.20
According to this view, a proposition's meaning is deter
mined by its method of verification. And if a proposition
is found to contain terms which cannot be verified through
sense experiences--and this is the nature of all meta
physical propositions— it must be regarded as meaningless.
Any attempt to argue its truth or falsity would be a sheer
waste of time.
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 151.
102 1
I
Logical positivism was a direct outgrowth of the
Wittgenstein thesis. Several philosophers and physical
scientists living in Vienna organized themselves into a
group, known as the Vienna Circle, and set about to reform
philosophy and to formulate a statement of the scientific
method on the basis of the actual practices of the physical
sciences. Later, some members of this group moved to
Germany while others eventually made their way to the
United States. In the last three decades, logical posi
tivism has become the dominant philosophy of science within
Great Britain and the United States.
At the very core of their philosophy, the logical
positivists erected Wittgenstein's verification principle.
At first it was applied absolutely: all propositions which
could not be directly verified by observation were rejected.
But this meant that universal statements about the inacces
sible past as well as certain leading scientific hypotheses
had to be cast out along with metaphysical propositions.
Some positivists, therefore, adopted a weakened principle
which held that to be meaningful a proposition requires
merely the possibility that some observation be relevant
to the determination of its truth or falsity.
In the course of its development, logical posi
tivism has taken several directions. But in general the
movement has tried to reduce philosophy to a critique of
language. By applying the verification principle it cast
out all value and metaphysical questions. And, all matters
of fact it relegated to science. All that was left for
philosophy was the analysis and clarification of language.
In Great Britain the common language of the community
became the subject of analysis. In the United States,
Rudolf Carnap invented a precise artificial language for
science. He also founded the Unity of Science movement
which maintained that all empirical statements could be
expressed in a single language— the language of physics.
In sum, the logical positivists have tried to
accomplish three principal objectives: first, they sought
to abolish metaphysical notions in philosophy and in social
inquiry; second, they sought to formulate a statement of
the scientific method; and third, they sought to clarify
the use of language. Their philosophy of science was
21Abraham Kaplan, The World of Philosophy (New
York: Random House, 1961), p. 65.
104 !
derived from a highly abstracted system of pure science
and mathematics. In their interpretation of science,
they made a sharp division between empirical and normative
statements and dismissed the latter as "emotive"— as having
no place in s c i e n c e .22 The problem for the positivist's
philosophy of science is whether it can dismiss questions
of value in social inquiries and still maintain its rele
vance for human problems which give rise to the need for
inquiry in the first place.
The Dewey-Bentley Naturalistic
Interpretation of Inquiry
A strong hint of the Hegelian "dialectic" appears
in the development of epistemological thought. Each of
the philosophies which have been discussed above tended to
stress either conceptual or perceptual subject matters. In
stressing one type of subject matter the philosopher
invariably tended to neglect the other type. This neglect
usually stimulated an opposing philosopher to defend the
type of subject matter which had been neglected. According
22"Logical Positivism," Encyclopaedia Britannica,
1963 ed., Vol. XIV.
to Dewey, each philosopher or philosophic movement was
guilty of making an one-sided selection of what takes place
in the context of controlled inquiry and then maintaining
that what was selected represented a comprehensive account
of the process of inquiry.^
In writing for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sci
ences Dewey saw the problem of knowledge in these terms:
We now oscillate between a normative and rational
istic logic in morals and an empirical, purely
descriptive method in concrete matters of fact.
Hence our supposed ultimate ideals and aims have
no intrinsic connection with the factual means by
which they must be realized, while factual data are
piled up with no definitely recognized sense of
their bearing on the formation of social policy and
the direction of social c o n d u c t .2 4
What Dewey believed was necessary was a theory of
inquiry which would account for the entire context in
which inquiry actually takes place and which would, there
fore, avoid an over-emphasis on either conceptual or per
ceptual subject matters. For the formulation of his theory
of inquiry, Dewey interpreted the process of inquiry as an
integral component of the process of biological evolution.
On this point, Thomas English Hill wrote:
“ Dewey, Logic, 514.
yl
John Dewey, "Logic," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol. IX, pp. 598-603.
106 '
Dewey and his associates were the first major group
of philosophers to place the cognitive processes
squarely in the midst of the evolutionary struggle
and to treat them unequivocally as moments in the
ongoing endeavor of intelligent organisms to adapt
to dynamic physical and biological settings.25
The naturalistic interpretation postulates a continuum of
inquiry from the lowest organic forms to the most sophisti
cated scientific endeavors.This implies that both com
mon sense and scientific inquiries have emerged from a
biological matrix. It was one of Dewey's fundamental pos
tulates that "... biological functions and structures
prepare the way for deliberate inquiry and foreshadow its
pattern."27
According to Dewey, all inquiry grows out of an
attempt by the organism to maintain itself in relation to
its environment. Organic life is to be conceived of as a
process of activity involving transactions which extend
beyond the spatial limits of the organism. Thus, Dewey
asserted:
An organism does not live in an environment;
it lives by means of an environment. . . . The
processes of living are enacted by the environment
25Thomas English Hill, Contemporary Theories of
Knowledge (New York: The Ronald Press, 1961), p. 353.
2®Dewey, Logic, 23, 25.
27Ibid., 23.
107 '
as truly as by the organism; for they are an
integration.2 8
Whenever the balance within a given activity is disturbed,
tension arises within the organism; there arises a felt
need; then, search and exploration are started and con
tinued until the means are found which will fulfill the
need. Living can therefore be thought of in terms of
". . . a continual rhythm of disequilibrium and recoveries
of equilibrium. The state of disturbed equilibrium con
stitutes need. The movement toward its restoration is
search and exploration."29
The equilibrium analogy, however, must not be
extended too far, for by its very nature the process of
living involves change both in respect to the organism and
environment. On this point Dewey commented:
In the behavior of higher organisms, the close of
the circuit is not identical with the state out
of which disequilibrium and tension emerged. A
certain modification of environment has also
occurred, though it may be only a change in the
conditions which future behavior must meet. On
the other hand, there is change in the organic
structures that conditions further behavior. This
modification constitutes what is termed habit.30
28Ibid., 25.
30Ibid., 31.
29Ibid., 27.
108
Referring specifically to the human organism, Dewey stated:
. . . organic retention (or habit-patterns) give
rise to recollection. Goals or consequences that
are even more remote in time and space are then
set up and the intervening process of search
becomes more seriated in temporal span and in con
necting links in the case of the simple presence
of distance-stimuli. Formation of an end-in-view,
or consequence to brought about, is conditioned by
recollection; it requires making plans in conjunc
tion with selection and ordering of the consecutive
means by which the plan may become an actuality.31
Dewey's naturalistic theory of inquiry rests on the postu
late that there is and has been a ". . . continuity of the
lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activi
ties and forms."32 Human inquiry, including the develop
ment and use of abstract logical forms, constitute an
integral part of the process of organic evolution.
What distinguishes human inquiry from other forms
of organic inquiry is the emergence of language and the
development of culture. According to Dewey, language
emerged out of previous forms of animal activity. Although
he did not believe that language originated human associa
tion in group activities, he did believe that language
". . . reacted to transform prior forms and modes of
associated behavior in such a way as to give experience a
31Ibid., 34-35. 32Ibid., 23.
109 |
new dimension.1,33 Language thus originated as ". . .a
medium of communication in order to bring about deliber
ate co-operation and competition in conjoint activi
ties. . . ."34 prior to the emergence of language the
results of past experience could be retained only through
organic modifications, but language provided a means of
transmitting patterns of learned behavior outside of
biological inheritance. Dewey explained that:
"Culture" and all that culture involves, as
distinguished from "nature," is both a condition
and a product of language. Since language is the
only means of retaining and transmitting to subse
quent generations acquired habits, it is the latter.
Since, however, meanings and the significance of
events differ in different cultural groups, it is
also the former.35
Dewey maintained that the symbols of a language
system could not be adequately understood if they were
analyzed in isolation from their functional location within
the cultural setting in which the language was actually
employed. He stated that:
A sound or mark of any physical existence is
a part of language only in virtue of its opera
tional force; that is, as it functions as a means
of evoking different activities performed by dif
ferent persons so as to produce consequences that
33Ibid., 56.
35Ibid.
110
are shared by all the participants in the con
joint undertaking.
He also believed that a symbol's meaning could not be
understood apart from considering the meaning of other
related symbols in the language system and the particular
position which the specific symbol occupied in that sys
tem. Meanings of a natural language system, Dewey main
tained, hang together "... because they are current in
the same set of group habits and expectations." He con
tinued: "They hang together because of group activities,
group interests, customs and institutions."37
The importance of the emergence of language and
culture for inquiry, Dewey believed, was that this
emergence provided the requisite conditions for the devel
opment of sophisticated procedures and logical forms. In
his explanation of how logical forms evolved, Dewey wrote:
The use of meaning-symbols for institution of pur
poses or ends-in-view, for deliberation, as a
rehearsal through such symbols of the activities
by which the ends may be brought into being, is
at least a rudimentary form of reasoning in con
nection with solution of problems. The habit of
reasoning once instituted is capable of indefinite
development on its own account. The ordered devel
opment of meanings in their relation to one another
may become an engrossing interest. When this hap
pens, implicit logical conditions are made explicit
36Ibid., 48. 37Ibid., 50.
Ill
and then logical theory of some sort is born.38
Such an interpretation of the origin of logical forms
stands in obvious contrast to the epistemologies which
resorted to such concepts as innate ideas, ultimate Real
ity, or the laws of nature in trying to explain this type
of conceptual subject matter.
Following this same line of reasoning, Dewey pro
jected a line of continuity from common sense inquiry to
scientific inquiry. He stated that:
(1) Scientific subject-matter and procedures grow
out of the direct problems and methods of common
sense, of practical uses and enjoyments, and
(2) react into the latter in a way that enormous
ly refines, expands, and liberates the contents
and agencies at the disposal of common sense.39
In several of the epistemologies there has been a tendency
to make a sharp distinction between what is done on the
common sense level of inquiry and what is done in science:
the former being regarded as practical— as occupied with
"doing"; the latter being regarded as theoretical— as
occupied with "knowing." By drawing such a distinction,
Dewey argued that these epistemologists had failed to
conceive of science as a distinctly human concern whose
ultimate function was to resolve problems involving human
38ibid., 57. 39jbid., 66.
uses and enjoyments.4® All too often, Dewey felt, philos
ophers of science have treated science as a self-enclosed
entity.
The basic distinction to be drawn between common
sense and scientific inquiry, Dewey reasoned, is the rela
tion which each endeavor bears to the other. Both arise
from a concern for problematic situations involving human
uses or enjoyments. Both involve acts of doing and know
ing. But where common sense inquiry is primarily con
cerned with resolving situations having a rather immediate
and practical connection with specific human uses, science
ranges outward— reaching for answers have a greater range
of applicability. Because of this generalizing tendency,
science becomes more theoretical and abstract: it special
izes in the knowing part of inquiry; its investigations
are carried on, in large part, "... for the sake of
advancing the system of knowings and knowns."^
Another difference between common sense and scien
tific inquiry lies in their respective treatments of
"facts" and concepts derived from earlier inquiries.
4®Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 279.
41Ibid., 281-82.
113 !
Whereas, common sense inquiry tends to take the findings
of previous inquiries for granted and to employ habits and
attitudes formed in previous experiences in a casual way,
science is much more skeptical of its foundations. Dewey
explained that science
. . . differs from common sense in the scrupulous
care taken to ensure both that the earlier conclu
sions are fitted in advance to be means for regula
tion of later inquiries and the care taken to ensure
that specific facts and conceptions employed in the
later ones are strictly relevant to the problem in
hand.42
He further points out that science deliberately questions
". . . the grounds upon which attitudes and habits are
entitled to operate causally in a given case."^
Dewey was also aware of the difference in the ways
in which common sense and science tend to regard "kinds"
and "ends." Thus common sense inquiries can often be
characterized by their assumptions of fixed kinds and
teleological ends. These assumptions of fixed kinds have
arisen in large part because meanings have been incrusted
in the cultural traditions and habits of a people, but in
addition, the ordinary use of nouns to name "objects" has
tended to impose an unwarranted staticity upon the subject
42oewey, Logic, 246-47. 43jbid.
matter. Moreover, common sense perception generally fails
to discriminate carefully, and thus gradually changing data
are often interpreted as constants. Once names are applied
to entities perceived to have similar qualities, the assump
tion often develops that all such entities ascribed to a
given kind are therefore homogeneous. Assumptions of
teleological ends have arisen partly because of culturally
derived habits of thinking of the cosmos in the sense of
an overall plan or in terms of some final cause; but they
have also arisen because of the close connection of common
sense inquiry to the fulfillment of the ends of human uses
and enjoyments. In contrast, science views kinds as flexi
ble and tentative. And in the place of final causes or
predetermined ends, science substitutes "... measured
correspondence of change."44
In addition to these differences, common sense
statements often take the form of qualitative assessments
of more-or-less; whereas, science endeavors to convert
these qualitative assessments into statements of exact
measurement. And where common sense classification systems
are developed upon the basis of perceived similarities and
44Ibid., 76.
differences, scientific classification systems are devel
oped on the basis of ability to promote and control exten
sive inference and discourse.45
Dewey had a firm faith that science was a potential
instrument for organizing common sense in controlling its
own subject matter and for resolving its problems, but he
felt that this potentiality was far from realization. In
particular, he felt that science had not significantly con
cerned itself with actually resolving the issues pertaining
to human uses and enjoyments. On this point, he stated:
The paths of communication between common sense
and science are as yet largely one-way lanes.
Science takes its departure from common sense,
but the return road into common sense is devious
and blocked by existing social conditions.
He believed that the present unnatural division which
exists between the concerns of science and common sense
could only be overcome through the use of ". . .a unified
logical method of attack and procedure." He concluded with
this statement: "The attainment of unified method means
that the fundamental unity of the structure of inquiry in
common sense and science be recognized. . . . "47
45Ibid.
47Ibid., 79.
46Ibid., 77.
The Transactional Conception of
116
the Subject Matter
Earlier in this chapter the statement was made that:
"Organic life is to be conceived of as a process of activ
ity involving transactions which extend beyond the spatial
limits of the organism."4® This statement was derived
from Dewey's Logic, written in 1938. For several years
following that date, Dewey and Bentley worked together
in order to refine the concept of "transaction" as the
basis for a naturalistic method of inquiry— especially as
regards inquiries within the social sciences.
According to the authors, conceptions of the sub
ject matter have progressed through three stages in the
course of scientific history. They describe these three
stages in the following manner:
Self-action: where things are viewed as acting
under own powers.
Inter-action: where thing is balanced against
thing in causal connection.
Trans-action: where systems of description and
naming are employed to deal with aspects and
phases of action, without final attribution to
"elements" or other presumptively detachable or
independent "entities," "essences," or "realities,"
and without isolation of presumptively detachable
"relations" from such detachable "elements.
^®See p. 106.
^Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 108.
117
The authors maintained that the physical sciences in the
twentieth century have approached their subject matters
from the transactional point of view; whereas, the social
sciences still use the self-actional or inter-actional
frames of reference. They believed that the transactional
conception offered the most accurate way of perceiving the
subject matters of the social sciences. They explained:
Our position is simply that since man as an organ
ism has evolved among other organisms in an evolu
tion called "natural," we are willing under hypothe
sis to treat all of his behavings, including his
most advanced knowings, activities not of himself
alone, nor even as primarily his, but as processes
of the full situation as one which is before us
within the knowings, as well as being the situation
in which the knowings themselves arise.^0
According to the authors the self-actional concep
tion was best illustrated by the ancient custom of regard
ing all behaviors as originating within the organism, not
by the organism itself, but by some inner actor such as
"mind," "psyche," or "person." More recently, this inner
actor has been named a "neural center."51 The interaction
al conception of the subject matter could be illustrated in
studies which assume that the "... organism and its
environmental objects to be present as substantially
50Ibid., 104. 5^Ibid. , 130.
118 ;
separate existences or forms of existence, prior to their
entry into joint investigation. . . ."52 (Suggestions of
treating the environment as a separate perspective in
international relations methodology would appear to follow
the interactional conception.)
The transactional conception of the subject matter
insists on seeing,extensionally and durationally, the
entire transactional situation before any attempt is made
to fragment it by analysis. During the process of inquiry,
it should be permissible to conduct specialized analyses
based upon "self-actional" or "interactional" conceptions;
however, the departure from and re-entry into the trans
actional frame of reference should be required, if a com
plete behavioral report is to be obtained by the inquiry.53
The failure by an observer to appreciate the transactional
situation means that he has imposed artificial separations
and isolations upon the subject matter which he seeks to
describe; this practice may easily result in a failure to
account for important relations within the subject matter
and perhaps even block relevant solutions to the problems
which gave rise to his investigation.
52Ibid., 123. 53Ibid., 135.
One of the principal applications which Dewey and
Bentley made with their transactional conception related
to the development of language. They believed that a
proper understanding of language development was crucial
to the development of a method of inquiry for the social
sciences.
The emergence of language
According to the transactional view, language
developed from transactions of organisms-environments.
Thus language is to be considered an integral part of the
full organic process; all naming and talking behavior are
to be oriented to this process; no separation if to be
made between that which is named, the naming behavior, and
the one doing the naming— all are to be held in close cor
respondence within the transactional situation.
In demonstrating how language behavior grew out of
pre-linguistic behavior, Dewey and Bentley devised a par
ticular set of terms and adapted them specifically for the
transactional conception. In regard to subject matters in
general they made three major divisions: physical pro
cesses, physiological processes, and behavioral processes.
Their analysis of language behavior falls entirely within
120 1
the latter category. They define "behavior" as ". . . all
the adjustmental activities of organism-environment."54
They went on to explain that: "Developing behaviors show
indirections of action of types that are not found in physi
cal or physiological processes."^ To characterize these
types of indirection they used the term "sign." In trying
to clarify their intended usage, the authors asserted that
". . . where sign is found we have behavior, and where
behavior occurs sign-process is i n v o l v e d . "56 According to
this definition, "sign-process" identifies the whole range
of perceptions up the entire scale of behavioral evolu
tion. 57 Or stated somewhat differently: "Sign is process
that takes place only when organism and environment are in
behavioral transaction.'^8
In their language classification scheme, the
authors placed all the earlier stages of sign (behavioral
processes) up to the advent of language in the one cate
gory of "signal." "Signal thus covers the full sensori-
54Ibid., 149. 55Ibid.
56Ibid., 150. 57Ibid.
58Ibid., 151.
121
manipulative-perceptive ranges of behavior, so far as these
are modified by linguistic behaviors."59 Each instance of
signal is to be conceived in terms of its full intercon
nectedness: of the organism to its present spatial environ
ment and of the present transactional (signalling) situa
tion to the temporal past and to the anticipated future.60
The authors placed that portion of sign in which
naming behavior occurs in the category of "designation."
"Designation develops from a basis in signalling."61 What
differentiates designation from signalling is that the
organism names and some aspect of the environment becomes
named. Thus the authors explained: "Naming does things.
It states. To state, it must both conjoin and disjoin,
identify as distinct and identify as connected."62
In the earliest stages of designation, naming and
the named can hardly be differentiated. The most primi
tive form of designation is called "cue":
Wherever transactional sign on the signal level
begins to show differentiation such that out of
it will grow a verbal representation of any sig
nal process we have the beginnings of cue.63
59Ibid., 152-53. 60Ibid., 153.
61Ibid., 147. 62Ibid., 147.
63Ibid., 156.
Cue is most likely to occur in face-to-face perceptive
situations and may take the form of a cry, expletive or
other single word sentence. In other words, ". . . cue is
signal with focal localization shifted from organism-object
to organism-organism, but with object still plain in
reach."64
"Characterization" develops from a clustering of
cues. In the beginning, each cue is unique to the aspect
of the transactional situation which is named. Later as
cues begin to overlap, a central cue is developed into a
representative of cues. When this occurs, characteriza
tion is present. As language develops, "... phrasings
develop around namings, and namings arise within phras
ing."66 Thus, characterization expands into "description."
Instead of a series of isolated single words, phrases and
sentences become predominant. In turn, new namings charac
terize descriptive phrasings.66 Thus, "Characterization"
and "description" are the processes by which kinds are
developed in the language of common sense.
64Ibid., 157. 65Ibid., 160.
66Ibid., 160-61.
Inadequacy of common sense naming and names
Because of the nature of the development of common
sense names, they are in many respects inadequate for
scientific inquiries. In the first place, these names
were assigned to serve the "here" and "now" convenience of
the users, and, as a result, a good deal of overlapping
between names occurred and, in some instances, gaps within
the language system were allowed to remain, thus permitting
certain portions of the existential cosmos to go unnamed.
In the second place, names, once given, tended to endure
even though their referents underwent considerable change.
And finally, because each language system was relative to
the experience of a particular cultural group, meanings of
names tended to differ in the proportion that communication
became broadened from within the relatively homogeneous
small group, such as the family, to within the relatively
heterogeneous large group, such as the nation.
It is a commonplace to find that the social sci
ences, where common sense terminology still prevails, are
arenas for conflicts over the boundaries of names. This is
particularly true with regard to narrative and descriptive
accounts which characterize much of social science report
ing. When terms used in discourse lack stable meanings,
124
confusions or "hitches" develop when they are employed in
relation to other terms. And whenever inquiry becomes more
abstract— and hence of a wider range of potential appli
cability— these hitches and confusions, which may have
been a trifling matter in regard to more concrete inquiries
become magnified intolerably. By way of contrast, the
physical sciences have long recognized the necessity of
developing a more systematic naming procedure than that
inherited from the language of common sense.
Specification and the development of
scientific language
Dewey and Bentley have used the term "specification
to identify the form of designation which takes place in
scientific naming. The authors explain that:
The passage from characterization to specification
is not marked by any critical boundary. Nor is the
passage from everyday knowledge to scientific knowl
edge, nor that from everyday language to scientific
language. Our attention is focused on lines of
development and growth, not on the so-called "nature"
of the subject-matter of inquiry.67
Unlike common sense characterization, specification is
marked by a notable inattention to the claims of fixed
kinds: one of its first tasks is to break down the
67Ibid., 166.
1 2 5 1
l
barriers determining common sense characterization of
kinds.68
Scientific kinds are determined with extreme dis
regard for immediate sensible q u a l i t i e s . The grounds for
determining kinds must be searched for: "... the traits
which descriptively determine kinds are selected and
ordered with reference to their function in promoting and
controlling extensive inference."78 In pointing out the
arduous process by which kinds are determined, Dewey wrote:
For scientific kinds, say that of metals, are insti
tuted by operations that disclose traits that are
not present to ordinary observation but are produced
by operations of experimentation, as a manifesta
tion of interactions that are taking place. For
only qualities that are capable of being treated as
signs of definite interaction facilitate and control
inference.71
Scientific kinds become determinate only as they
are related to other terms in both conjunctive and disjunc
tive inference. Dewey stated:
It is not enough to select traits which permit infer
ence within the limits of a specified kind directly
involved. The traits must be selected and ordered so
that as far as possible there will be a series of
kinds each included in another until the most inclu
sive kind is reached. Not only are barriers to
88Ibid., 162-63. 89Dewey, Logic, 268-69.
70Ibid., 270. 71Ibid.
126
special inference broken down, but the extension
of the range of inference depends upon formation
of kinds in systematic relation to one another.73
The goal of a scientific language is that of a closed sys
tem— in the sense that meanings of terms have been so
determined in relation to other terms that overlapping of
the boundaries and the gaps between boundaries have been
eliminated.73 But such a closed system of meanings does
not imply the reinstitution of fixed kinds; on the con
trary, a scientific language must possess flexibility so
as to enable change and grow as change and growth take
place within the subject matter.
Other advantages of moving from common sense char
acterizations to scientific specification in formulating
the terms of discourse include: first, the fact that the
scholar would not have to be concerned with the problem of
redefining his terms at the outset of each study and,
second, the fact that effective communication with other
scholars would be enhanced because of a common agreement
on meanings. Such a saving of effort should allow greater
concentration to be spent on what is still indeterminate
and, hence, problematic within one's discipline.
72Ibid., 294. 73Ibid., 115-16.
127 1
Inquiry as a Means of Resolving
Problematic Situations
The naturalistic interpretation of inquiry begins
by assuming that, at the most primitive level, inquiry
serves to rectify some disturbance within the life process.
Such a disturbance is at first experienced as "problem
atic," as confusing, perplexing, disturbed, indecisive. It
is experienced within the context of a particular "situa
tion"— a qualitatively undifferentiated whole. Inquiry
proceeds at this level, by moving from a completely inde
terminate situation, through intermediate searchings and
strivings until the original disturbance is in some way
resolved. John Dewey made this conception of inquiry the
basis for his entire theory of inquiry; consequently, he
defined inquiry in this manner:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transforma
tion of an indeterminate situation into one that
is so determinate in its constituent distinctions
and relations as to convert the elements of the
original situation into a unified w h o l e .74
The "indeterminate situation" refers to some disturbance,
uncertainty, or agitation occurring in the transactional
relationship of organism-environment which provokes doubt
74Ibid., 104.
on the part of the organism. The indeterminate situation
develops within an overall transactional situation which
may be, in itself, principally determinate. What makes
certain conditions within the transactional situation
indeterminate is their questionable significance— ". . .
what they import and portend in their interaction with the
organism."75 "Controlled or directed" in the above defini
tion refers to the operations (conceptual and existential)
employed which actually tend to establish ". . .an objec
tively unified situation."76 The disturbance experienced
by the organism within the transactional relationship is
satisfied when the indeterminate situation is rendered
determinate.
The institution of the problem
An indeterminate situation does not become prob
lematic merely because of its indeterminateness: it only
becomes problematic as the organism starts questioning and
thus recognizes the situation as problematic. Dewey
asserted: "To see that a situation requires inquiry is
the initial step in inquiry."77 At this stage of the
75Ibid., 107.
77Ibid., 107.
76Ibid., 105.
129 I
|
institution of the problem/ the questionings are likely to ;
be of this kind: "What is wrong here?" "What is to be
done?"
The institution of the problem is progressive.
At first, there are only vague and poorly stated question
ings. From the feeling that something must be done, the
organism becomes more precise as it questions: "What sort
of things must be done in order to resolve this problem?"
Only as the overall "facts" of the problematic situation
are ingested and digested does a clearly stated problem
emerge. Once inquiry has reached a stage where the prob
lem can be clearly stated, a partial transformation of the
problematic situation will have taken place. Already cer
tain observations will have been made; certain inferences
will have been drawn about the potentialities of the situa
tion; anticipations about possible futures will have been
entertained; and certain of these possible futures will
have been connected in conceptual form with the possible
solutions to the problematic situation.78 in fine, the
situation will have been rendered less indeterminate.
78Ibid., 107-110.
.. .. I
130 !
The rise of suggestions and ideas in inquiry
Dewey stated that "Observation of facts and sug
gested meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondency
with each other."79 Observations of the particulars within
the existential situation evoke suggestions. Suggestions
may become ideas, but they become ideas only when they are
examined as to their ". . . capacity as a means of resolv
ing the given situation."80 The source of such suggestions
lies both in the observations conducted with reference to
the existential situation and in recollections of past
experiences. Through the interaction of concepts drawn
from the past and of suggestions arising from observations,
new relationships are postulated and new ideas are thus
formed. 8^
The application of ideas in the reasoning process
Idea (or concept) formation provides an opportunity
to escape from the existential cosmos. This escape is
possible because ideas can be expressed in symbolic form,
that is, in propositions. The reasoning phase of inquiry
allows the consideration of the problem in considerable
79Ibid., 109.
81Ibid., 111.
80Ibid., 110.
131 1
!
abstraction from the existential situation; it permits a
comparison of alternative possibilities (ideas) in relation
to one another. From among these possibilities, one may
be selected as more plausible than the others. Dewey
explained:
An hypothesis, once suggested and entertained, is
developed in relation to other conceptual struc
tures until it receives a form in which it can
instigate and direct an experiment that will dis
close precisely those conditions which have the
maximum possible force in determining whether the
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected.82
Thus, the postulation of an hypothesis directs further
observations. Suggestions from these observations may
lead to the rejection of some possibilities, affirmation
of others, or the formulation of new possibilities. In
effect, there is a to-and-fro movement between observation
and concept formation in effective inquiry until the
problematic situation is finally resolved.
The Use of Logical Forms in
Scientific Investigations
Dewey vehemently denied that logical forms had
somehow arisen outside the actual process of inquiry. It
82Ibid., 112.
132 ]
was his position that "... logical forms accrue to sub
ject-matter in virtue of subjection of the latter in
inquiry to the conclusions determined by its end— the
institution of warranted conclusion."83 From the broadest
point of view, scientific inquiry can be regarded as a
search for knowledge. The selection of logical forms is
merely part of the problem of ". . . formulating the
best methods of observation, experimentation and conceptual
84
interpretation, . . ."in order to secure that knowledge.
Although the process of inquiry possesses an over
all unity and continuity, it employs two operational modes:
the existential and the conceptual. Logical propositions
emerge out of operations employing these modes and can
thereby be divided according to these categories. Proposi
tions of both categories can be regarded as instruments
which carry provisional meanings in symbolic form.85 The
functions of existential propositions are to ". . . locate
and circumscribe the problem set by an indeterminate situa
tion and . . . [to] provide evidence which tests solutions
that are suggested and proposed."88 The functions of con
ceptual propositions are to ". . . represent possible
83Ibid., 372.
85Ibid., 114.
84Ibid., 170.
86Ibid., 288.
133 !
solutions of the problem in hand, and . . . [to] prescribe
operations which, when performed, yield new data tending
in the direction of a determinate situation.1,87
Conceptual propositions
Once a problem has been instituted (that is, it
has been stated in existential propositions) the process
of inquiry can enter into a deliberative stage. Delibera
tion is conducted by means of conceptual propositions,
each expressing a possible mode of action. Because the
meanings of propositions can be carried in symbolic form,
the idea embodied within the proposition can be tested in
correspondence with other ideas. In other words, a process
of "mental" experimentation can take place as one hypotheti
cal proposition is tested (compared) in relation to other
propositions.88
Propositional statement expands an idea into rela
tion of meanings: that which was first suggested by the
proposition is analyzed and the relatedness of a proposi
tion's meaning to the meanings of other propositions is
explored and determined. The systematic statement and com
parison of propositions induces a more exhaustive search
87Ibid. 88Ibid., 301.
134
for alternative ideas; it also provides the basis for
delimiting the field of inquiry by the rejection of cer
tain propositions.89
This mental experimentation takes place through the
formulation and comparison of disjunctive propositions.
Disjunctive propositions state potential alternatives to
an original hypothetical (suggested) proposition; but in
order to fulfill the disjunctive role, propositions must
be stated in a form which induces comparison.98 As to the
establishment of meaning of these propositions, Dewey
states:
The meaning of each alternative mode of action
[proposition] is constructed in terms of the con
sequences which acting upon it will produce. The
development of this meaning takes place through
reasoning in the form "I_f such an alternative be
adopted, then such and such and such consequences
may be expected to follow."91
When the consequences are thus derived from alternative
propositions, these consequences can then be compared for
tentative acceptance or rejection. Through such an expli
cit statement and exploration of alternative propositions,
some alternatives may be rejected because of the develop
ment of contradictions or absurdities in their consequences;
89Ibid.
9lIbid., 172.
90Ibid., 171.
others may be strengthened and clarified by such a process;
or perhaps, the original hypothesis will have to be modi
fied. This whole process of mental experimentation is
directed toward ascertaining the most appropriate mode of
action (solution); therefore,
. . . from the standpoint of warranted final judg
ment as to what should be done, disjunctives should
be exhaustive, and the development of each disjunc
tive member of a system, as a hypothesis, should be
thorough.92
Existential propositions^
The whole process of testing and exploring the
consequences of conceptual propositions "... has ulti
mately the function of directing operations of observation
to the determination of existential data which will test
proposed possible solutions, . . ."94 Qne Qf the two basic
functions of existential propositions is to provide state
ments of evidence (existential data) to test these solu
tions.^ The conceptual proposition, stated in the if-then
form, which has been selected as the most plausible after
comparison with other alternative propositions, formulates
a rule and a method of experimental observation:
92Ibid. 93See quotation, pp. 132-133.
^Dewey, Logic, 303. ^ Ibid. f 288.
The criterion for the validity of such hypotheses
is the capacity of new data they produce to combine
with earlier data (describing the problem) so that
they institute a whole of unified existence.98
The procedure for testing a deduced consequence of
an hypothesis involves operations of exclusion and inclu
sion. "When . . . operations yield data which contradict
a deduced consequence, elimination of one alternative pos
sibility is effected."97 When, on the other hand, opera
tions yield data which agree with the deduced consequence,
the existential proposition can be said to have "indicative
force" concerning the verification of the conceptual pro
position. As existential propositions (each derived from
separate experimental observations) converge in their agree
ment with the deduced consequent, they can be said to have
"probative force." Finally, when operations are carried
out so far that all other conceivable modes of solution
have been eliminated, "indicative force" becomes "signify
ing force." Thus, the "... correlation of data is a
matter of convergence in significance, of cumulative evi
dential force."98
96Ibid., 427.
98Ibid., 318.
97Ibid., 319.
137
Warranted assertion
As an hypothesis is tested conceptually with
alternative propositions and in terms of the implications
of its consequences, and as it is tested existentially so
that data are produced which add cumulative evidential
force for the validity of the consequent the hypothesis
evolves into a warranted assertion. In this process of
evolution toward warranted assertion: "There is a con
tinued to-and-fro movement between the set of existential
propositions about data and non-existential propositions
about related conceptions.""
Both types of propositions are to be regarded as
"pragmatic" in that they are the means for conducting
inquiry: "... truth-falsity is not a property of pro
positions ."100 Dewey went on to explain:
Means are either effective or ineffective; perti
nent or irrelevant; wasteful or economical, the
criterion for the difference being found in the
consequences with which they are connected as
means.101
The fact that an hypothesis has evolved into a
warranted assertion does not, of course, mean that cer
tainty has been attained. "Certainty" cannot be attained
" ibid. , 427.
101Ibid.
1Q0Ibid., 287.
138
for two reasons: first, one never has the assurance that
all other alternative propositions (possibilities) have
been discovered; and, second, because of the indefinite
variety of circumstantial conditions surrounding all sub
ject matters, absolute control over all these outer condi
tions, which might possibly affect the evidential subject-
matter, can never be achieved.^ 2 Therefore, though
exhaustiveness in the comparison of disjunctive proposi
tions is the goal of demonstrative discourse, and though
a theory of a closed existential system is the goal of
experimental inquiry, neither of these goals can be com
pletely attained.Thus, it also follows that a war
ranted assertion must always be considered a probability
statement.
Inquiry begins with an indeterminate situation;
the object of inquiry is to transform this situation into
a unified whole. Where indeterminateness of the situation
is extensive, the overall inquiry may have to be divided
into a series of special inquiries. As each of these
special inquiries move toward warranted assertions, the
material becomes available out of which it is possible to
102Ibid., 319-20. 103Ibid.
139 ]
i
build toward this unified whole. Only as these warranted
assertions are interconnected with one another and with
previously determinate elements within the original situa
tion does a unified whole emerge. The settlement of these
interconnections may, in themselves, involve, other spe
cial inquiries.104
The possibility of prediction
Reliability of prediction depends on the degree to
which a problematic situation is rendered determinate. The
genesis of prediction is actually to be found in the
hypothesis: each conceptual proposition (in the if-then
form) is by nature a prediction. It states that if certain
operations are performed, then certain consequences will
follow. The predictive power of a hypothesis is determined
by the testing processes described above. Consequently, a
warranted assertion can be regarded as a proposition hav
ing high predictive power. Moreover, a series of ordered
warranted assertions can move a previously indeterminate
situation toward a unified whole making possible predic
tions of wide applicability and of high reliability. Such
predictions postulate solutions by which it may be possible
104Ibid., 122.
140 !
to resolve the problematic situation.
The continuity of inquiry
The process of inquiry is continuous. With regard
to a specific problematic situation, the whole process in
which hypothetical propositions are tested, can be seen as
a progressive movement toward clarification; as warranted
judgment evolves, the problematic features of the original
situation fade away. Another sense in which inquiry is
continuous can be found in the fact that "... the conclu
sions of any special inquiry are subordinate to use in sub
stantiation and maturation of methods of further inquiryJ'^^
The growth of knowledge in any field is cumulative; as
special inquiries yield warranted assertions, the "theory"
of the discipline "fills out." The process of inquiry also
continues in another direction: since the comparison of
disjunctive propositions is never entirely exhaustive, and
since controls over existential operations are never com
plete, warranted assertions are themselves always subject
to further testing.
Another point which already has been made is that
common sense and scientific inquiry form one experiential
105Ibid., 11. 106Ibid., 246, 270.
141 1
continuum. Dewey contends that
. . . there is no ground whatever upon which a logi
cal line can be drawn between the operations and
techniques of experimentation in the natural sciences
and the same operations and techniques employed for
distinctly practical ends. . . . Application of con
ceptions and hypotheses to existential matters through
the medium of doing and making is an intrinsic con
stituent of the scientific method.10?
As has been stated earlier, the transactional view
postulates a closed existential system. This postulate
constitutes
. . . a limiting ideal for experimental inquiry. It
is a logical ideal which points the direction in
which inquiry must move but which cannot be complete
ly attained.108
The ideal of science is a theory which systematically
states relations on the level of discourse that correspond
to the interconnections within the existential field. Such
a theory, by being able to state relations within the
existential field, would possess the widest possible capa
city for reliable prediction.
Summary
The starting point for Dewey and Bentley's theory
of inquiry is to be found in their assumptions of biological
107Ibid., 439. 108Ibid., 320.
142
evolution and the cultural development of man. According
to this view, all forms of human activity— including human
inquiries— have been conditioned by these origins. It
therefore follows that if one is to understand the nature
of human inquiry, then he must investigate human inquiry
in terms of the natural development of man from his biologi
cal and cultural matrices. It also follows that there is
no need to go beyond these matrices in order to explain how
man conducts his inquiries and how he acquires his knowl
edge; in other words, metaphysical postulations are to be
regarded as superfluous and without meaning.
According to this naturalistic interpretation of
inquiry, "names," "concepts," and "categories"— in fact,
the entire language system— have developed as part of the
biological and cultural development of man; the meanings of
terms have been determined by how these terms became
involved in the lives of the people. This naturalistic
interpretation also maintains that ideas, including logical
forms, have arisen from out of the actual processes of
inquiry. From this viewpoint, logical forms are conceived
to embody merely the most useful methods of observation,
experimentation, and interpretation.
Dewey and Bentley insisted that the subject matter
143 '
under investigation should be viewed transactionally? they
claimed "... the right to see together, extensionally
and durationally, much of what is talked about convention
ally as if it were composed of irreconcilable separates."10^
In asserting this right, they were referring especially to
inquiries conducted within the social sciences, for it was
here that inquiries were still based largely upon self
actional or inter-actional descriptions. They insisted
that behavioral inquiries
. . . fall into difficulties the very moment they
depart from the transactional, except for the most
limited minor purposes; their traditional unsolved
puzzles are indeed the outcome of their rejecting
the transactional view whenever it has suggested
itself, and of their almost complete failure to
allow for it in any of their wider constructions.110
The authors contended that the older epistemolo-
gists had been especially prone to making artificial separ
ations in their analysis of the knowing process. They
advocated, therefore, that the knowing process should also
be observed from the transactional viewpoint. In this
case, there would be no need to make an artificial separa
tion between the knower, his knowing behavior, and the
object known. In other words, dualisms such as mind-body,
109Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 69.
110Ibid., 130.
144 1
i
man-nature, mind-matter, and subject-object, should be
discarded. A basic postulate of the transactional view
point is ". . . that knowings are observable facts in
exactly the same sense as are subject matters that are
known."m The transactional viewpoint of the knowing
process thus refuses to place "knowing acts" beyond
behavioral inquiry, but insists on observing knowing-man
in his full natural situation.
Another basic postulate of the Dewey-Bentley theory
was that scientific inquiry and common sense inquiry repre
sent one continuum. Moreover, they believed that both
forms of inquiry grow out of problems involving human uses
and enjoyments. Accordingly, the ultimate object of both
forms of inquiry should be the resolution of human problems.
From such a point of view, knowledge is not to be regarded
as the end of inquiry, but as the instrument for resolving
actual problems.
It was the authors' position that propositions can
never attain the status of certainty; thus, the resolution
of a given problematic situation involves a process of
testing a hypothesis by conceptual and existential opera
tions until the researcher is satisfied that the hypothesis
111Ibid., 52.
can be stated in a conclusion whose assertability is
warranted by the thoroughness of the testing procedure.
Although the authors believed that the immediate object
of a specific inquiry was to resolve a particular problem
atic situation, they regarded the results of such an
inquiry, in the form of warranted assertions, as provid
ing the foundations for future inquiries. In this sense
they believed that knowledge was cumulative.
In the next chapter the discussion will return to
the methodological problems of international relations
which were previously surveyed in Chapter II. There an
attempt will be made to resolve the major methodological
uncertainties which still persist within the discipline
by combining some of the principal conclusions of the
Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry with the progress already
achieved by the theorists of international relations.
CHAPTER IV
A METHOD OF INQUIRY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The real significance of the Dewey-Bentley natural
istic theory of inquiry lies in the authors' recognition
of a common pattern or structure in all forms of inquiry.
Part of this recognition derives from their realization
that, from a historical point of view, the natural sciences
have grown out of common sense inquiries. Another part of
this recognition derives from their perception of similari
ties between the problem-solving activities of man and the
problem-solving activities of other forms of animal life.
Undoubtedly, Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolu
tion led the authors to perceive this biological connection.
The broad frame of reference provided by the theory of evo
lution meant that inquiry could be interpreted as a form
of problem-solving— as the instrument by which individual
organisms as well as entire species have been able to
survive and develop successfully. In this sense, the
Dewey-Bentley naturalistic conception of inquiry can be
regarded as the corollary to the conception which postu
lates the physiological evolution of organistic life.
For one to comprehend the theory of biological
evolution requires that he imagine an enormous time span
extending back to perhaps a billion years or more. From
a frame of reference encompassing such a span, one should
be able to appreciate the fact that species are not fixed
kinds, but merely represent stages of development which
are given names relative to a particular point of observa
tion. The development of life viewed from a frame of
reference encompassing such a span of time would of course
be perceived as a process— an emerging out of one form and
a becoming of a new form. From such a frame of reference,
entities— either organic or non-organic— would also be
perceived as processes: what is commonly referred to as
constants would be recognized as variables which merely
change at a slower pace. Furthermore, this conception of
such a time span and the evolution of life in the course of
that duration should alert one to the connections or rela
tions which have been involved in the process of develop
ment and should make one suspect the common sense tendency
to infer separations and isolations within an organic
subject matter.
148 1
I
l
The transactional conception of the subject matter, !
i
which postulates the organism living within and by means of
an environment, appears to me as the most accurate way of
conceiving the process of life. Common sense language and
thinking have the tendency of making separations between the
organism and its surroundings, but close observation can
reveal otherwise. For example, here is a description of a
part of the process by which an amoeba lives:
There is no mouth or anus; food may be taken in and
the undigested remains cast out at any point on the
surface. In feeding on algae and other protozoa,
extensions of the body flow out around the food
organism and finally coalesce, resulting in the
formation of a food vacuole. Digestion occurs in
the vacuole through the action of enzymes secreted
into it. Oxygen for respiration diffuses in from
the surrounding water and wastes of metabolism
diffuses from the amoeba to the surrounding water.^
From such a description, can the amoeba's living process be
thought of as distinct from its environment? Or, if a
comparison is extended, can man's living process be thought
of and described as if it were separate from his environ
ment?
In postulating the transactional conception of the
subject matter, Dewey and Bentley were criticising those
who either insisted on describing man in individualistic
^■"Amoeba," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I, p. 808.
terms or on describing man as interacting with other men or 1
with an environment. Those who conceive man in an individ
ualistic sense usually interpret his behavior in self
actional terms as if the source of his actions was entirely
a matter of inner will or power. Admittedly, those who
have adopted the inter-actional interpretation have made
greater progress toward a comprehensive statement of
behavior, for they have at least recognized some of the
influences affecting the individual which have emanated
from other individuals or from the environment; they have
also recognized those actions of the individual which affect
other individuals and the environment. But such a concep
tion still retains a tendency to posit unwarranted separa
tions— of individual entities acting and being acted upon.
In contrast to these two conceptions of the subject matter,
the trans-actional conception strives for a "holistic"
grasp of the situation— taking organism-environment as they
are, in full process, in their full temporal-spatial
spread— before our habits of analysis and language forms
have a chance to impose their artificial distinctions.
According to the naturalistic interpretation of
inquiry, all procedural techniques should be conceived to
have arisen out of the actual process of inquiry. All
150 1
logical forms, therefore, are to be regarded merely as the
most efficient means discovered so far for ordering our
perceptions of the subject matter. The same is true for
all other methodological techniques, whether these be con
cepts, models, frames of reference, or theories. Because
of their status as means, all techniques should be sub
jected to practical testing: Do they work? Can they be
modified so that they can perform their tasks more effici
ently? Are there other techniques which might work better?
The review of methodology within the discipline of
international relations, which was presented in Chapter II,
uncovered considerable uncertainty and confusion concerning
techniques and procedures. A large part of this uncertain
ty revolved around the question of which analytical proce
dures should be adopted and which should be rejected. Some
of these techniques pertained to the selection of appro
priate terms and concepts, to the selection of models, and
to the use of perspectives. Another source of uncertainty
was found to arise out of the question concerning the use
to be made of theories and studies undertaken in other
disciplines. It was also revealed that international rela-
tionists had not devised appropriate procedures for relat
ing various particular studies— especially those of either
a highly empirical or abstract nature— to one another or to
the discipline as a whole. Still another source of confu
sion arose out of the question of how to handle the "value"
problem or, more specifically, how to treat the values of
the actors, the value position of the observer, and the
role of the researcher in relation to the policy-making
process.
The purpose of the present chapter is to indicate
how the Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry can assist in
resolving some of these methodological uncertainties within
international relations. The purpose here is not to sub
stitute the Dewey-Bentley theory for all that has been
accomplished within the discipline, but to indicate how
this theory can build on the progress achieved thus far.
Analytical Procedures
Terminology
Probably few international relationists would deny
that the present use of terms and concepts constitutes a
major source of uncertainty and confusion within the disci
pline. The survey in Chapter II showed that many of the
key terms and concepts within the discipline had been so
vaguely or variously defined that their meanings remained
indefinite and confused. This survey also showed that no
classification system had been developed which could be
used to relate systematically different terms to one
another. As a result, one can quite confidently conclude
that terminology used within the discipline still possesses
the imprecision of common sense usage.
If the discipline is to reduce this imprecision, I
believe that one of two strategies will have to be selected
One strategy would call for the formulation of a system of
artificially-derived names; the other, the selection and
"firming-up" of names already existing in common sense
usage. The great advantage of the artificial name system
is that since meanings could be exactly specified for each
name and each name precisely related to the whole structure
of the name system, ambiguity could be avoided. The weak
ness of such a system lies in the danger that communication
between international relationists within the discipline,
on the one hand, and communication between international
relationists and the policy-makers, on the other hand,
might become seriously impeded— especially if only some of
the scholars of the discipline adopted the artificial name
system. The principal virtue of the strategy calling for
153 |
I
the selection of common sense names, by way of contrast,
lies in its preservation of communication. Its great weak
ness, of course, lies in the ever present possibility that
old ambiguities could creep back into the terms which have
once been "firmed-up." This possibility, compared to the
danger that an artificial name system could impede communi
cation, should be regarded, I believe, as the lesser risk.
This latter strategy was adopted by Dewey and
Bentley in their selection of a list of "firm" names for
their theory of the knowing process, which they developed
in the Knowing and the Known. It seems that the first step
in their procedure entailed the tracing of a term's usage
in historical and recent contexts. In order to determine a
term's historical usage they usually would first consult
the Oxford English Dictionary. And, in order to determine
a term's recent usage they would survey how the term was
defined and used within the recent literature of the field.
Where confusions in usage were too great or where the usage
departed too severely from the application that they
intended for the term, they would search for a substitute.
Their objective, in following this procedure, was to find
the most adequate term which was naturally available. After
locating a term that they believed was suitable, they would
154 j
then attempt to specify its meaning from a transactional
frame of reference. As part of this procedure, they would
also attempt to trace and specify the relation of this term
to other terms previously specified.2 This procedure, which
the authors used to formulate a list of firm names for inves
tigations pertaining to the knowing process, appears to
demonstrate Dewey's conception of how scientific specifica
tion and classification can develop from out of common sense
characterization.3 It is my opinion that the terminological
problem in international relations research can be resolved
best by adopting a similar procedure.^
Selection of a model
According to the survey presented in Chapter II, the
theorists of international relations have, in recent years,
proposed several analytical models for research within the
2Sidney Ratner and Jules Altman (eds.), John Dewey
and Arthur F. Bentley; A Philosophical Correspondence,
1932-1951 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1964). This volume reproduces the correspondence
in which Dewey and Bentley actually worked out their system
of "firm" namings.
3For the Dewey and Bentley's account of "specifica
tion," see Chapter III/ pp. 124-126.
4For an illustration of how this procedure might be
applied to terms in international relations see the treat
ment of "perspectives" below pp. 166-170.
discipline. The most elaborate models have included Quincy
Wright's concept of an analytical field and the frame of
reference, proposed by Richard Snyder, et al., for the
study of the decision-making process. The least complex
models were embodied in Hans Morgenthau's power concept,
James Rosenau's concept of calculated control, P. D. Mer
chant' s central question, and Urban Whitaker's coarse-
screen macro theory. Equilibrium models, derived from
economics, were suggested by George Liska and George
Modelski. Charles McClelland and Morton Kaplan proposed
the systems (steady-state) model which had been developed
by the General Systems Theorists. Although some of these
models have enjoyed a certain amount of popularity within
the discipline, not one was won the overwhelming endorse
ment of international relationists. This failure of the
scholars to agree upon an analytical model, I believe,
constitutes one of the principal sources of procedural
uncertainty within the discipline at the present time.
The nature of the model. In the most elementary
terms a model is a suggestion or an idea encompassing a
plan for comprehending a complex subject matter. According
to the Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry, a model would be
156
I
regarded as a conceptual proposition or set of such proposi-
tions. A proposition of this type could be formulated on
the basis of a suggestion or suggestions which an observer
has "received" by perceiving and contemplating a particular
situation located within the subject area of international
relations. But it is also possible that the source of the
suggestion could be located within some other discipline or
from the observation of some other subject matter. Whatever
the source of the suggestions and of the formulated proposi
tions, it is clear that each should be treated as a postula
tion; i.e., each proposition suggesting an analytical model
should be treated as a hypothesis to be tested— not as a
dogmatic assertion.5
Criteria for the selection of a model. Before
agreement can be had on an analytical model for the disci
pline, I believe that a prior consensus must develop regard
ing the criteria for the selection of the model. At this
point, I would suggest that at least the following three
criteria should be applied in testing any proposed analyti
cal model: (1) the model should correspond to the nature
5Compare this statement to Hans Morgenthau's state
ment about the power concept and politics in Chapter II,
pp. 36-37.
157
of the subject matter; (2) the model should facilitate the
investigation of both the empirical and conceptual aspects
of a problematic situation; and (3) the model should con
tribute to the resolution of the problems which have
occasioned inquiry.
If we start with the assumption that the subject
matter of our inquiry is going to consist of processes
transactionally conceived, then we should expect the model
to correspond to the nature of that assumption, or, if this
is not entirely possible, we should be able at any rate to
select the model which violates that assumption the least.
The correspondence of a model to a subject matter might be
more clearly conceived by thinking of a map in relation to
the particular territory it represents; both the model and
the map are abstractions designed to allow us to grasp the
salient features of a complex area or situation. But
because both are abstractions, they invariably cause us to
focus our attention on certain of our perceptions and,
consequently, to neglect others. In this sense, a model
or map acts as a filter for our perceptions. Whether we
are selecting a model or a map, therefore, we should be
concerned about what aspects of the total situation are
being given prominence and which are being filtered out.
For example, a static model imposed upon a dynamic process
may lead us to neglect subtle changes and relationships
within the situation. Or, if we adopt a self-actional
model to explore a behavioral situation, we may not recog
nize the interconnections which an inter-actional model
would reveal. And if we adopt an interactional model, which
postulates a series of separate entities acting and inter
acting upon one another, the integrity of the situation as
a "whole" may be obscured.
Whether a model helps us to perceive the actual
relationships within a situation or whether it leads us to
imagine artificial connections or separations is, of
course, a question which has to do with the model's corres
pondence to the subject matter. But at the same time, this
question suggests the second criterion, which lays down the
rule that a model should facilitate the study of the
empirical and conceptual aspects of a situation. In par
ticular, a model devised for behavioral inquiries should
help us to trace and organize the processes which occur
within the transactionally-conceived situation.
This criterion would also imply that a model should
avoid the extremes of complication or simplicity. For, on
the one hand, an overly-complex model can be likened to a
map containing too much detail; when an attempt is made to
represent everything, many of the significant features can
become obscured by the details. Then, too, if a model is
highly complex, investigators are likely to regard it as
too cumbersome an instrument for analysis. In my opinion,
this is the principal weakness of Quincy Wright's analytic
concept of a field and the frame of reference developed by
Richard Snyder, et al. A model that is extremely simple,
on the other hand, can be compared to a map containing only
limited detail; sometimes a map of this sort reveals so
little of what is significant to the problem at hand that
its usefulness is often trivial. This, I suspect, is one
of the main deficiencies which arises in attempting to use
a central concept or a central question as the model for
organizing the subject matter of the field.
This criterion also implies that a model should
lead to an improvement in communication— among the scholars
of the discipline and between these and scholars in other
disciplines. In the first place, this would seem to sug
gest that a proposed model should possess a better than
average chance of being accepted, not only by the scholars
of the discipline, but also by the scholars of other disci
plines. Should the various scholars within and outside the
160 1
J
discipline employ a similar model in constructing their
investigations, one should then anticipate that more sug
gestions and conceptual propositions will be transferred
from one area of investigation to another.
The third criterion lays down the rule that a model
should contribute to the resolution of the problems which
are the occasion of inquiry. Problems arising in the social
sciences generally pertain to the question of how human
needs and uses are to be met. I take the position that
models which embody a strong or narrow conception of human
needs and uses, only hinder us in our search for the most
appropriate solutions to our problems. For example, I
believe that this is the situation in regard to the use of
the power concept as a model for the discipline. When
politics are interpreted as a struggle for power, objectives
which could better be obtained through cooperative efforts
tend to be ignored. Narrowly or strongly held assumptions
concerning human needs and uses, not only tend to become
sources of contention between scholars of the discipline,
but they also tend to block-out possible alternative con
ceptions. Consequently, in order to avoid pre-judging a
situation, I believe that a model should be devised so
that its assumptions concerning human needs and uses are
held at a minimum.
"Systems” as an analytical model. Of the various
models which have been proposed within the discipline, I
believe that the "systems" (steady-state) model is most
likely to meet the criteria discussed above. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines "system" as:
A set or assemblage of things connected, associ
ated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex
unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrange
ment according to some scheme or plan; rarely applied
to a simple or small assemblage of things.
Two aspects should be noted concerning the common sense
usage from which this definition was derived. First, the
constituent parts of a system have usually been conceived
as entities. And second, the systems have usually been
taken to be natural. The conception of the parts of the
system as entities would not, of course, correspond to the
transactional conception of the subject matter. There is
also some question whether most systems which have been
regarded as "natural" are, in fact, natural. For example,
common usage takes it for granted that the circulatory and
respiratory systems are natural systems, i.e., having an
independent existence prior to being named. This appears
^"System," Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. X.
161 !
162
!
reasonable as long as we focus our attention either upon
the flow of blood or upon the air inhaled and exhaled.
But if we select as our focus the process by which oxygen
enters, travels through, and leaves the body, then we
might find an entirely different system more appropriate
for the purposes of our investigation. The suggestion here
is that what is sometimes assumed to be a natural system
in common sense usage merely reflects a habitual way of
conceiving a given subject matter.
Whether or not there are such things as "natural"
systems, I believe that inquiries in the social sciences
will find the systems model a more flexible analytical tool
if it is regarded as merely a conceptual device. Apparent
ly, David Easton shared this view when he wrote that "...
any set of variables selected for description and explana
tion may be considered a system of b e h a v i o r . it was his
opinion that the selection of a set of variables as a sys
tem depends on the question of whether they are interesting
or trivial from the standpoint of the problem with which
O
one is concerned.
7David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
{Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965),
p. 30.
8Ibid.
r 163 j
j
By treating the systems model as a conceptual tool j
j
and not as indicating natural systems, I believe that it cari
be used successfully in inquiries which are based upon the
transactional conception of the subject matter. For while
the application of the systems model to a given subject
matter involves the task of designating boundaries between
the system and its environment, this act of designation
does not imply that such boundaries are in any way "natur
al,” in the sense of describing actual separations within
the subject matter. In addition, I believe that the systems
model is particularly well-suited to the viewpoint which
conceives the subject matter as processes. Concerning this
last point, Easton wrote that the system model would allow
the researcher
. . . to pose questions with regard to the kinds of
exchanges that such a system has with its environment,
to the way in which the members of the system respond
to these exchanges, and to the determinants of these
dynamic processes.9
Because of its flexibility and adaptability as an
analytical tool, I believe that the systems model may be
the most useful means for exploring the empirical and con
ceptual aspects of problematic situations within the
9Ibid. , 34 .
T" ' “ T
164
discipline of international relations. For one thing, it
need not be either trivial nor complex. On the interna
tional level, for instance, it could be applied to all the
nations comprising the international political system or to
as few as two nations. The complexity of the model is,
therefore, determined by the nature of the problem sub
mitted to analysis. Where the variables seem to be too
numerous to be handled within a given system, the
researcher might profitably break down his analysis into
the investigation of several sub-systems.
In line with what has been discussed so far, I
believe that the systems model entails no assumptions con
cerning natural relationships, other than the assumption
that the subject matters are processes which tend to func
tion in a coherent manner. Instead of asserting the exis
tence of connections within the subject matter, the systems
model provides the means for directing our search for the
ways in which processes are actually linked together.
There is already some indications that the systems
model may become a principal instrument for analysis within
several disciplines and thus provide a new way for linking
the various sciences— at least, this is the hope of the
General Systems Theorists. On this point, Easton made this
comment:
General Systems analysis is perhaps an even more
ambitious effort than action theory to draw disci
plines into a common framework, for it spreads its
net over all of the sciences, physical and biologi
cal as well as social, and views them all as behav
ing systems.10
Among the theorists of international relations, there are
three— Morton Kaplan, Charles McClelland, and Kenneth
Boulding— who have already pioneered the systems model with
in the discipline.H Thus, there is a possibility that
systems analysis may be a means for enhancing communication,
not only among students of international relations, but
among international relationists and scholars in other dis
ciplines as well.
A final reason why I believe that the systems model
can be useful for research in international relations, is
that it incorporates only a minimal value assumption in its
application. What it assumes, at the most, is that the
survival of the system is the system's chief objective.
Hence, the systems theorist is interested in how a system
l^David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioral-
ism,1" The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science, ed.
James C. Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American Academy
of Political and Social Science, October, 1962), p. 18.
^Although Kenneth Boulding is primarily an econo
mist, his numerous writings which pertain to international
relations theory obviously qualifies him as an international
relations theorist.
maintains itself through a course of time, how it deals
with its environment, and how it utilizes information about
past performances in order to regulate its future behavior.
In other words, the attention of the systems theorist is
particularly attuned to how a system copes with stress
which emanates from both internal and external sources.
Toward a definition of "perspectives"
Those who have used the term "perspectives" appear
to have regarded it a means for making the major analytical
divisions within the subject matter of the discipline. The
greatest consensus, which seems to have developed in this
matter, lies in the growing recognition that most research
within the discipline falls into two categories: foreign
policy studies and international political studies. Of the
various terms which have been used for the function of mak
ing major analytical divisions, the term "perspectives"
appears to have been used most frequently. While this
developing usage constitutes a strong argument for the
adoption of this term, it might be useful to consider some
of the alternative terms for a moment. We can find, for
^2Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 25.
For a fuller treatment of the value problem see pp. 185-
192.
instance, that Charles McClelland has used the term
"focus." The connotation which I receive from the defini
tions of this term implies a "converging" or "centering"
upon. I do not feel that this is the meaning for which we
are searching; for, if we are looking for a device which
will allow us to make the major divisions within the sub
ject matter, then it would seem that we are not yet at a
stage where we want to narrow and concentrate our percep
tual attention. Perhaps the term "focus" could better be
reserved for "centering" our attention upon certain aspects
of the subject matter within a given "perspective."
Arnold Wolfers has used the term "standpoint." The
connotation of this term tends to stress the position at
which a person stands or assumes in order to view an object
The term "viewpoint" carries a similar connotation. J.
David Singer has used the phrase "level of analysis"; the
stress here seems to be on the subject matter. Both of
these latter connotations may prove useful in an attempt
to define "perspectives." It is clear that if the scholar
seeks to comprehend the major features of international
politics, then he must assume a point of observation at a
greater distance from the subject matter than he would if
he sought to study a single nation's foreign policy; thus,
168 |
the position he selects or assumes would seem to be an
important consideration. But it is equally important to
consider the boundaries or limits of the scope of observa
tion which is possible from a given point of observation.
While considering this problem of defining "per
spectives," I noticed a similarity between what interna
tional relationists were trying to do and what a photogra
pher does when he adjusts the zoom lens on his movie
camera. As the knob on the lens is shifted up and down,
the overall field of observation is widened or narrowed.
When the narrow range is under view, considerable detail of
the situation can be detected, but when the wider range is
under view, one can more easily identify the general con
figurations within the broader situation. The great
advantage of the zoom lens over previous set lenses is that
an infinite number of ranges can be selected instead of just
two or three. If "perspectives" were conceived in a simi
lar fashion— as "zomming in" on the subject matter— then
the number of possible perspectives would be almost
infinite.
While it is possible to conceive an infinite number
of separate perspectives for international relations
research, it would appear that all perspectives could be
subsumed under three broad ranges of perspectives: the
international, the national, and the individual. The
international range would be comprised of all scopes of
observation which embody two or more nations or interna
tional bodies. The national range would be comprised of
all scopes of observation which embrace significant group
ings of persons within a single nation. And the individual
range would be comprised of all scopes of observation which
center around single individuals.
Following the analogy drawn from the use of the
zoom lens on a movie camera, this conception of perspec
tives can be seen to imply that the narrower ranges of
perspectives would be included within the broader ranges.
In other words, the individual ranges would be included
within some national range, and the national ranges, in
turn, would be included in the international range.
This particular conception of "perspectives" sug
gests a means for making analytical divisions within the
subject matter that would be consistent with the trans
actional conception of the subject matter. For in the first
place, the divisions which have been contemplated here are
purely procedural; there has been no suggestion that the
lines of division represent natural boundaries. In the
second place, both the observer and the subject matter are
held in close correspondence; it should be possible to
specify both the position of the observer and his scope of
observation for each perspective. And in the third place,
in the case of each of the three ranges of perspectives
mentioned above, the scope of observation would encompass a
slice of the transactional situation which would include
both the organisms (human) and the environment; there would
be no need or justification for a perspective encompassing
the environment or the organism in isolation from the
other.
If "perspectives" could be defined in the manner
indicated above, then I believe that this conception could
be combined with the systems model so as to provide the basis
for an analytical framework for the discipline. Thus, the
particular perspective selected for a specific study could
be chosen in order to embody a single system. Thus, within
the international range, the boundaries of the system might
encompass all nations (or any lesser number, so long as at
least two were included). Within the national range, the
system selected might be a foreign policy-making body with
in one nation. And at the individual range, the system
selected might be the personality system of an individual
171 i
I
po1icy-maker.
As the boundaries of the analytical system are to
be determined by reference to the requirements posed by the
problem under inquiry, so too are the relevant perspectives.
The problem pertaining to the communicative process, as
presented in the introduction, may suggest, for example,
that an international perspective encompassing only two
nations would suffice within the international range; that
two national perspectives, each encompassing a relatively
small number of policy-makers, would suffice at the nation
al range; and that several perspectives, each encompassing
a personality system of an individual policy-maker, would
be sufficient at the individual range.
Consequently, the principal outlines of the analy
tical framework, which is being suggested here, would be
formed by the three ranges of perspectives. The systems
model would provide the means for studying the empirical
and conceptual subject matter within each perspective. And,
at the level of inquiry nearest to the concrete subject
matter and closest to the unformulated conceptual sugges
tions, the basic and most appropriate analytical instruments
would be a carefully specified set of terms. Again, it is
the problem under inquiry that would suggest which
perspectives, which systems, and which terms are likely
to be most relevant and useful.
This conception of the analytical framework tends
to neglect one aspect of the controversy concerning the use
of perspectives. That aspect concerns the individual
policy-maker's own perception of the problematic situation.
As indicated in Chapter II, J. David Singer referred to
this aspect of the problem as the "phenomenological"
issue.13 Kenneth Boulding treated the same aspect of the
problem by means of his "image" concept:
. . . we must recognize that the people whose
decisions determine the policies and actions of
nations do not respond to the "objective" facts
of the situation, whatever that may be, but to
their "image" of the situation. It is what we
think the world is like,not what it is really
like, that determines our behavior.
The "image," then, must be thought of as the
total cognitive, affective, and evaluative struc
ture of the behavior unit, or its internal view
of itself and its universe. ^
From a procedural point of view, the "phenomenological"
issue raises two questions: (1) should the policy-maker's
13ror the discussion of phenomenological issue
see Chapter II, p. 53.
14Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and the
International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
III (June, 1959), 120-21.
"image" be treated by means of a separate perspective, and
(2) should a separate systems model be used to account for
this subjective aspect of the problem. I believe the ans
wer to both these should be "No." The reason for this
answer lies in my inclination to abide with Dewey and
Bentley's thesis that a person's thinking behavior should
not be conceived and analyzed as if it were separate from
the rest of his behavior. A reconstruction of a policy
maker's "image," accordingly, should be regarded as an
interpretative investigation of one aspect of the policy
maker's total behavioral pattern. In order to make such an
interpretation, the observer may find it useful to employ
models drawn from such disciplines as psychology and social
psychology. In discussing a similar problem, but one in
which an observer attempts to interpret the behavior of
two actors in a process of interaction, Alfred Schuetz
observed:
But under all circumstances, it is merely the
manifest fragments of the actions of both partners
that are accessible to his observation. In order
to understand them the observer has to avail himself
of his knowledge of typically similar patterns of
interaction in typically similar institutional set
tings and has to construct the motives of the actors
from that sector of the course of action which is
174 |
patent to his observation.^
Because of these considerations, I believe that this type
of interpretative reconstruction of the "image" of the
policy-maker can be adequately subsumed under the investi
gation which begins by utilizing a perspective within the
individual range and which employs a systems model appropri
ate to the personality system of the individual policy
maker.
Contributing Studies and Theories
from Other Disciplines
Chapter II disclosed considerable uncertainty as
to how inquiries of an empirical or theoretical nature,
which have been undertaken in other disciplines, should be
used by students of international relations. Inquiries
pertaining to human behavior conducted in such fields as
psychology, sociology, and economics have especially
attracted the attention of international relationists.
Some students have already made considerable use of the
l5Alfred Schuetz, "Common-sense and Scientific
Interpretation of Human Action," Philosophy and Phenomeno
logical Research, XIV (September, 1953), 20.
results of these inquiries in their own work within inter
national relations. Moreover, some scholars of these other
disciplines have often directed their inquiries toward the
problems occurring within the subject area of international
relations.
While many theorists of international relations
have been aware of the increased borrowing by students of
international relations and of the contributions being made
by scholars of other disciplines, few have expressed con
fidence that the discipline has developed a procedure for
determining the relevance of each contribution. One
theorist expressed concern that some international rela-
tionists may be tempted to reject suggestions emanating
from other disciplines merely because they do not deal
directly with political phenomena.Another theorist felt
that too many suggestions had already been adopted by inter
national relationists without being carefully evaluated.1^
Some theorists believed that perspectives could be
used to help formulate a procedure for admitting outside
theories and studies; others suggested that a central
16See Richard Snyder's comment in Chapter II,
p. 59.
17
See Stanley Hoffmann's comment in Chapter II,
p. 58.
concept, a central question, or a generalized model might
prove useful. Still others contended that only a general
theory or framework could indicate which procedures should
be used for utilizing these contributions. It was appar
ently the position of these latter theorists that as long
as the discipline lacked a generally-accepted theory or
framework, the uncertainty surrounding interdisciplinary
borrowing and contributing was bound to persist.
If studies and theories from outside the discipline
are to have value for inquiries within international rela
tions, then, I believe that they should be regarded solely
as potential sources of suggestions or ideas; as such, they
should assist us in formulating and arranging our own con
ceptual propositions. At the preliminary stage of borrow
ing, I would suggest that the researcher pose certain
general questions. First, he should ask how well the idea
has worked in its original setting. Second, he should
inquire whether the original setting and the setting in the
new subject area are actually comparable. Where differences
in the two settings are perceived, the researcher should
try to determine whether these differences are significant
enough to invalidate the attempt to transfer the idea.
Third, the researcher should ask himself whether the idea
would likely have worked with regard to past events and
situations within international relations. The ultimate
testing for any idea, whether it has been derived from
other disciplines or from within international relations,
must, of course, come in the actual process of experimental
application.
But beyond these general questions, I believe the
discipline can be better organized in the future for
utilizing suggestions and ideas from other disciplines
than it has been in the past. An analytical framework,
for example, should provide many of the procedural rules
for determining which suggestions are relevant to research
within international relations. In my opinion, the analyti
cal framework which I proposed earlier in this chapter, can
provide three ways of making such a determination. In the
first place, each problem under inquiry should provide the
initial criteria. Many of the suggestions as to what is
likely to be relevant in resolving the problem will normal
ly grow out of the questions emerging from the problematic
situation. Taken in their entirety, these questions should
form a bill of requirements specifying what sort of informa
tion would be required and what sort of operations would
have to be conducted in order to resolve the problem. On
178 |
the one hand, this bill of requirements can be used by the
international relationist when he searches into other disci
plines and, on the other hand, it can be used to evaluate
1 contributions volunteered by the scholars of the other
disciplines.
In the second place, perspectives, by providing
a means for making the major analytical divisions within
the subject matter, could help channel outside contribu
tions into the discipline. It is to be noted that certain
disciplines tend to be naturally suited to one range of
perspectives rather than to otherst for example, psychol
ogy would be likely to contribute to the individual range,
while sociology would be more likely to contribute to the
national range.
In the third place, systems theory, because of its
flexibility as a model, may also help relate outside con
tributions to international relations. In this regard,
Kenneth Boulding suggested:
General systems theory is the skeleton of
science in the sense that it aims to provide a
framework or structure of systems on which to
hang the flesh and blood of particular disciplines
and particular subject matter in an orderly and
coherent corpus of knowledge.
At a low level of ambition . . . it aims to
point out similarities in the theoretical construc
tions of different disciplines, where these exist,
and to develop theoretical models having applicabil
ity to at least two different levels of study. At
a higher level of ambition . . . it hopes to develop
something like a "spectrum" of theories— a system of
systems.
Boulding believed that such a "system of systems" might
assist in pointing out gaps in theoretical models and in
suggesting the means for filling them. Besides this, he
believed that General Systems Theory, if it were applied to
two or more disciplines, could re-open some of the channels
of interdisciplinary communication.-^
In sum, I believe that an analytical framework,
such as the one proposed in this chapter, can indicate
some of the procedural rules for channeling suggestions
from contributing theories and studies into the discipline
of international relations.
The Integration of Knowledge
within the Discipline
One of the most acute problems of research in
international relations, according to the survey conducted
18
Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory— The
Skeleton of Science," Management Science, II (April, 1956),
198, 208.
19Ibid.
in Chapter II, has arisen because the ordering of knowledge'
within the discipline has been performed so haphazardly.
Many of the studies conducted during the early growth of
the discipline were merely descriptive-historical accounts
of what had occurred in the relations among nations; only
a few of these studies made more than a rudimentary
attempt to formulate generalizations. Where one finds
empirical studies within the discipline that have been
undertaken by utilizing a more systematic research plan,
he discovers that these have seldom been integrated into
the general development of the discipline. And, where one
finds highly abstract studies, he discovers that these have
rarely been connected to the studies which are closely
identified with the concrete subject matter. The most
serious attempt to overcome this lack of order within the
discipline seems to have occurred when Charles McClelland
suggested a five-stage ladder of abstraction-generality
for coordinating these studies to one another.2®
As a result of this haphazard accumulation of
knowledge within the discipline, each researcher must begin
2®For a description of McClelland's abstraction-
generality ladder see Chapter II, pp. 65-66.
his own project by plowing through a mass of heterogeneous
and largely unorganized materials. Given this state of
i
affairs, the researcher soon discovers the difficulty in
recognizing the areas where research is most needed and
in formulating guidelines for new projects. Perhaps better
indexing or an organizing scheme, such as the one suggested
by McClelland, could help to bring order to what has
already been done and is currently being done within the
discipline. But I believe that greater coordination could
be achieved were the researchers to make use of a common
analytical framework in approaching the subject matters of
their inquiries and were they to use this framework to
organize the results of their investigations.
In this regard, I believe that the analytical
framework which was described earlier suggests one possible
way for integrating the knowledge within the discipline.
(Perhaps it would be preferable, from this point onward,
to refer to this framework as an "analytical-integrative
framework.")
The analytical-integrative framework
As described earlier, the principal structure of
the analytical-integrative framework is provided by the
concept of perspectives and by the systems model. After
using such a framework to approach his subject matter, the
researcher should be able to specify which part of each
perspective and which time period his particular investi
gation covered. He should also be able to identify the
systems, the boundaries of such systems, and the general
location of each system in relation to each perspective and
to the problem under inquiry.
The linkage of perspectives. Whenever a project
includes two or more perspectives, the linkage between them
should be indicated. In order to do this, the boundaries
of each scope of observation must first be determined as
precisely as possible. Then the lines of continuity from
one perspective to another should be demonstrated.
Perhaps, this linking procedure can best be con
ceived as being analogous to the procedure of relating the
Ranger photographs of the moon, which were shot from varying
altitudes as the camera-equipped rocket approached the
moon's surface. Anyone, who studies these photographs,
can trace certain features throughout the series of photo
graphs, from the broadest to the most narrow range. But
some features observed at one end of the series of photo-
I
'graphs may not be conspicuous at the other end, either
because smaller details did not show up at the greater dis- j
itances, or because the photographs taken at low altitudes
failed to reveal the gross configurations which were easily
identifiable on the high altitude photographs. Most of the
apparent discontinuities can be resolved by tracing a given
feature across a whole series of photographs; such a care
ful comparison of photographs may lead to the perception of
a connection or continuity which was not grasped immediate
ly.
If perspectives in regard to international relations
research are thought of as representing "photographs" of
the subject matter taken at various distances, then the
process of identifying the interconnections between differ
ent ranges of perspectives should be similar to the identi
fication of features across the series of moon photographs.
Some features should be identifiable across all ranges of
perspectives: these can provide the landmarks for further
identifications. Discontinuity of a feature from one per
spective to another might be attributed to the difference
in the degree of abstractness between two perspectives. But
when this is not the case, the perceived discontinuity may
indicate the need for further observation or conceptualiza
tion. Contradictions which might arise in interpreting dataj
184]
from two or more perspectives should also be considered as
a sign of inadequate perception or conceptualization.
The integration of knowledge and the transactional
situation. What gives unity to the perspectives-systems
mode of investigation is, of course, the problem at hand;
each research project should have as its core a problem or
a set of problems. In order to obtain a general orienta
tion toward his problem and in order to be apprised of all
the factors which might significantly affect the resolution
of this problem, the researcher should attempt, as far as
possible, to grasp the full transactional situation which
surrounds it. And, although the researcher's problem may
lead him to investigate only specific aspects of the entire
transactional situation, it would be helpful to other
scholars if he were to formulate the results of his research
in such a way that the interconnections between the specific
aspects relating to his problem and the transactional
situation were demonstrated. By striving to embody the
warranted assertions, which should be the product of
empirical research within a transactional statement, the
researcher could be contributing significantly to the
emergence of a general empirical theory of the discipline.
Were the researchers within international relations
to organize their specific warranted assertions so as to
form a comprehensive statement of the transactional situa
tion, the interrelations among the various aspects of the
subject matter would be specified with greater accuracy.
And were the researchers to use the "systems" model and
"perspectives" to guide them in their approach to the sub
ject matter and to assist them in structuring their find
ings, the theoretical gaps relating to the knowledge within
the discipline could be progressively eliminated. It is my
opinion, therefore, that as this filling-out process pro
gressively takes place, the analytical-integrative frame
work could gradually emerge into a general empirical theory.
The "Value" Problem in International
Relations Research
For many international relationists the mention of
the "value" problem suggests the consideration of the norma
tive theory of the field as contrasted to empirical theory.
Because of the manner in which these two areas of theory
have been discussed within the discipline, one can receive
the impression that there are indeed two distinct kinds of
186 '
theory and that the two should best be relegated to
21
separate compartments. If this distinction is permitted
to become too pronounced, then the researcher, in order to
be regarded as objective, might assume that he should con
fine his attention solely to the empirical side of the
field. In this section, I will take the position that a
"pure objectivism" on the part of the researcher is neither
possible nor necessarily desirable.
As the "value" problem was discussed in Chapter II,
it can be stated in these three questions:
1. What procedures should be used to study the
values of the actors?
2. What procedures should be used to manage the
subjectivism of the researcher?
3. What procedures should be used in order to
insure the maximum usefulness of the researcher to the
policy-making process?
The purpose of this section will be to suggest solutions
to each of these questions. In suggesting these solutions
I will be taking the position that the objective of the
21see McClelland's definition of these two types
of theory in Chapter II, pp. 67-68.
187
researcher should lie in the development of both empirical
and normative theory, and, in fact, that no hard and fast
line should be drawn between these two concerns.
The value position of the actor
As far as methodic inquiry is concerned, the
actor's values should be considered as a part of the data
under inquiry. This appears to be the conclusion of both
the Dewey-Bentley theory of inquiry and General Systems
Theory. For one thing, the transactional viewpoint would
postulate the policy-maker as an organism-in-process— per
ceiving, conceptualizing, and formulating objectives within
one whole, qualitative situation. That part of the
organism's behavior in which objectives are formulated
would naturally be value-laden. Accordingly, every prob
lematic situation confronting the organism can be seen to
possess a value content; this refers to the projected ful
fillment of some need on the part of the organism, i.e., the
organism can be said to desire and, hence, value some end-
state. End-states are thus objectives as formulated, how
ever vaguely, by the organism; this formulation is a part
of the living (knowing) process of the organism and, as
such, is subject to the same sort of investigation as other
organism processes. Systems theory would appear to follow
the same trend of reasoning when it inquires: What are the
system's needs? How does the system perceive and interpret
these needs? In which actions does the system engage in
order to fulfill these felt needs?
The analysis and interpretation of the value posi
tion of the actor, which may be of crucial significance in
resolving a problematic situation, might be made by compar
ing one system's needs and objectives against other sys
tems' needs and objectives; such a comparison might well
signify both the areas of potential conflict and compatibil
ity. And perhaps, some areas which had been thought of as
areas of conflict, may even be discovered to be areas of
compatibility. Such a comparison of different systems'
needs and objectives may lead also to a more rational
evaluation of an actor's objectives. For instance, an
incompatibility between a formulated objective and an
actual need may be discovered, thus making it possible for
an actor to discard inadequate perceptions and interpreta
tions. And finally, such methodic comparisons of systems'
needs and objectives may permit the actor to make a more
accurate estimation of the costs of pursuing certain
objectives when these happen to be opposed to other systems
189
i 1
objectives or needs.
The problem of subjectivism on the part
i
of the researcher
There is no necessary reason to presume that the
researcher's view of a situation will more closely corres
pond to "objective" reality than that of the policy-maker.
Moreover, in a discipline such as international relations,
one can expect that the researcher will feel almost as much
involvement with the outcome of a problematic situation as
the policy-maker. In this sense, the scholar also has his
"image."
The answer to the researcher's subjectivism would
seem to require the same sort of treatment which has been
prescribed for the evaluation of the actor's needs and
objectives. This would mean that the researcher should
first reveal his own interest in, and interpretation of,
the situation by expressing his assumptions in the form of
propositional statements. Once this was done, the researcher
would be in a position to subject these propositions to the
same systematic process of comparison and contrast as he
would have subjected those of different policy-makers. In
particular, all statements concerning an end-in-view should
1901
be treated as hypotheses to be tested. Dewey was especial- '
ly vehement on this point:
Only recognition in both theory and practice that
ends to be attained (ends-in-view) are of the
nature of hypotheses and that hypotheses have to
be formed and tested in strict correlativity with
existential conditions as a means, can alter cur
rent habits of dealing with social i s s u e s . 22
The role of the researcher in relation
to the policy-maker
To a very large extent, the researcher and the
policy-maker will be involved with the same problematic
situation. They may tend to formulate the problems some
what differently and they may assign differing degrees of
significance to these problems; nevertheless, this basic
continuity of inquiry underlying their endeavors should not
be obscured. In one sense, this continuity compares to the
continuity between common-sense and scientific inquiry
which was observed in Chapter III.
Like the physical scientist, the researcher in
international relations occupies a position which permits
him to expand greatly his range of inquiry. Not only is he
22
John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 497.
able to abstract the problem to a much greater degree than
the policy-maker, but he can also subject his propositions
to a more systematic process of testing. In this process
of testing, he can make an explicit comparison of his own
and the policy-makers' propositions. He can test alterna
tive means of resolving a given problem through conceptual
and existential operations until hypotheses can be certi
fied as "warranted assertions." Then, on the basis of
such warranted assertions, he should be able to formulate
propositions of prediction possessing a high degree of
reliability.
As the researchers of international relations
become increasingly systematic in their procedures of
inquiry, they should, at the same time, be concerned that
the results of their labors reach the policy-maker. This
is not to advocate "policy-scientism," for as the term has
been used, this would amount to a premature advocacy of
policy in the sense that systematic research had not been
performed. Policy advocacy under these circumstances
could be regarded, at best, as educated guessing and a
reflection of a lack of science within the discipline. But
if research has been conducted systematically, its results
should be of considerable value to the policy-maker and to
the society which he represents. Moreover, if research
results are integrated into a generally recognized and
accepted framework, the screening task of the policy-maker
will have been facilitated and the possibility that he will
make use of such research should, thereby, be enhanced.
The Nature of General Theory
Earlier in this chapter, the discussion revolved
around the construction of an analytical-integrative frame
work which possibly could be regarded as the forerunner of
a general empirical theory. It is not my contention that
such a general empirical theory should be equated with the
general theory of the discipline. Since the position pre
sented in this chapter has stressed the point that the prob
lems which occasion inquiry in international relations (as
well as in the other social sciences) are related to the
fulfillment of human needs and uses, a general theory of
the discipline would necessarily encompass both empirical
and normative theory. By centering his research around a
problematic situation and by making the resolution of a
problem his chief objective, I believe that the scholar can
dispense with any dualism between empirical and normative
theory.
Although the researcher should have no need for a
strict separation between empirical and normative theory,
he may find it useful to conceptualize the results of his
research into various categories of propositions. The
first such category might be designated existential proposi
tions; these would include statements based upon observa
tions describing the actual nature of features within the
problematic situation. The second category might be called
predictive propositions; these would include statements
concerning developments which possibly could occur in the
future. The third category might be called desiderative
propositions; these would include statements expressing
objectives or end-states considered necessary or desirable.
The fourth category might be designated prescriptive pro
positions; these would include statements indicating the
operations to be performed within the problematic situation
in order to fulfill needs and objectives, and thus, to
resolve the problem under inquiry. A fifth and final cate
gory might be called administrative propositions; these
would include statements pertaining to the application of
specific means (prescriptive propositions) to the actual
problematic situations. In effect, this last category of
194
propositions could be regarded as feedback statements; their
use would imply a recognition that inquiry is continuous
and does not come to an end with the proposal of solutions.
It is my position that a general theory of international
relations, in the overall sense, would include all five
categories of these propositions.
These last three chapters have been largely devoted
to the problem of formulating a method of inquiry for
research in international relations. The following two
chapters embody an attempt to formulate a method of inquiry
specifically for the investigation of the communicative pro
cess. My objective in Chapter V is to develop a statement
of the problem which presently exists within the Soviet-
American relationship— as that problem has been understood
by recent writers on Soviet-American affairs. My objective
in the final chapter is to apply this formulated problem
and the method of inquiry developed in the present chapter
in order to construct an analytical-integrative framework
for the study of the communicative process.
CHAPTER V
THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROBLEM WITH RESPECT
TO THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS
According to the position taken in the previous
chapter, genuine inquiry should grow out of a problematic
situation involving human needs and uses. The object of
such inquiry should be the resolution of a problem that has
been formulated in the context of the problematic situation
The only reason for seeking to understand the communicative
process, for example, is that such understanding might
possibly aid in the resolution of a problem relating to
such needs as human security and survival. Because the
problem under inquiry possesses such a directive function
in research, efficient inquiry would appear to require a
relatively explicit formulation of the problem. The locus
of the problem which concerns the communicative process is
to be found in the American-Soviet relationship. This
problem relates to the way the two sets of foreign policy
makers attempt to implement their national objectives in
195
reference to one another within the larger context of world
politics. The purpose of the present chapter is to formu
late a statement of this problem. I anticipate that this
formulation will provide a guide for the construction of the
analytical-integrative framework for the study of the com
municative process.
The position taken here is that the formulation of
the problem within the contemporary American-Soviet rela
tionship can best be accomplished by developing and evaluat
ing alternative propositions relating to the various aspects
of this problematic situation. It is my opinion that the
best source of such alternative propositions can be found
in the writings of international relationists who have
been concerned with the above problematic situation. Con
sequently, the first section of this chapter presents a
review of the recent literature of international politics
that attempts to interpret that problematic situation.
Then, in the second section, alternative propositions are
formulated and evaluated. In the final section, those
propositions which have been evaluated as "warranted" in
the previous section are combined so as to form a statement
of the problem that is involved in the American-Soviet
relationship.
By considering the type of policy which each writer
on American-Soviet affairs recommends, it is possible to
group most writers into five conceptual positions ranging
from those who stress the objective of national security to
those who place greater emphasis upon the objective of
minimizing the danger of nuclear war. These conceptual
positions have been characterized by the phrases: pro
tracted conflict, rigid containment, flexible containment,
transition from containment to cooperation, and coopera
tion with the Communists.
In the section which immediately follows, the
opinions of writers of each of the five conceptual posi
tions will be reviewed through the use of an analytical
outline of five subheadings. The first subheading, the
overall problematic situation, summarizes opinions which
attempt to characterize the gross pattern of American-
Soviet relations in the postwar period. The next three
subheadings, the Communist threat, the nuclear danger, and
the American response and present position survey opinions
pertaining to these three aspects of the problematic
situation. The last subheading, policy suggestions, sum
marizes the writers1 opinions concerning the course of
action which should be taken in order to resolve the
198
problematic situation.
Diverse Conceptions of the Problematic Situation
Protracted conflict^
The overall problematic situation. One group of
writers view the American-Soviet relationship as a "pro
tracted conflict." They believe that the United States
and its allies are locked in an inexorable struggle with
the Communist bloc, the outcome of which will be victory
or defeat. For example, Gerhart Niemeyer wrote: "Its
battles and skirmishes are meant to add up to the victory
of one side and defeat of the other, but in a cumulative
2
way. . . . " The phrase "protracted conflict" can best be
associated with Robert Strausz-Hup£. He offers the
^Robert Strausz-Hup£ et al., Protracted Conflict
(New York: Harper and Bros. Publisher, 1959), p. 1. This
phrase has been used extensively by a group of writers at
the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of
Pennsylvania to designate both the Communist pattern of
expansion and the kind of policy which they have prescribed
for the United States. These writers readily admit that
they have borrowed the phrase from Mao Tse-tung's book, On
Protracted War.
^Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Political Requirements for
United States Strategy," National Security: Political,
Military, Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, eds.
David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1963), p. 248.
following definition:
"Protracted" conflict is a generic term describ
ing a world situation in which two power blocs are
fighting each other over a long period of time, one
to achieve global supremacy, the other to preserve
the basic freedoms of individuals and nations. The
strategy of protracted conflict aims at conclusive
victory by increments of subsidiary wars and non
violent campaigns. Yet, total war is an element
within protracted conflict. Sooner or later, one
protagonist in the protracted conflict will conclude
that he has been outmaneuvered decisively. He will
be left the option to launch a nuclear war and thus
spoil the victory of the opponent or to accommodate
himself to the latter’s design for a new order.3
According to this view, the ultimate and only hope for the
West lies in a concerted effort to remove all Communist
leaders from power.4
The Communist threat. These writers contend that
the Soviet leaders are following a strategy whose objectives
include the conquest of the world, the destruction of all
Western institutions, and the elimination of individual
freedom. Niemeyer wrote: "... the cause of the conflict
is the Communist determination to destroy and dismantle the
society of the West and subject the peoples of the earth to
3Robert Strausz-Hup^, William C. Kintner, and
Stefan T. Possony, A Forward Strategy for America (New
York: Harper and Bros. Publisher, 1961), pp. 4-5.
4Ibid., 11.
! 200~j
Communist control. . . . "■* Strausz-Hup£ concluded: "The ;
i
communists propose to 'bury us.' No matter how we inter
pret their intent, the intent is redolent of finality."**
! These writers have little perception of change in
regard to the Communist movement. In fact, they contend
that no basic change has occurred in Communist objectives
since the revolution in 1917, and that there is no prospect
for such change in the future.7 According to their view
point, any period of "relaxation" within the struggle must
be regarded as a mere change of tactics which the Communists
adopt in order to regroup their forces and consolidate their
o
position.
The nuclear threat. On the whole, this group of
writers devote little space to the discussion of the dangers
of nuclear warfare, although they do admit that ". . .a
large part of humanity could be wiped out in a few hours
q
. . ." in the course of such a war. Still, these writers
^Niemeyer, 261.
8Strausz-Hup£, A Forward Strategy . . ., 36.
7Ibid., 36-37.
8Ibid., 7.
9Ibid., 13.
apparently believe that the present mutual deterrence
postures of the two blocs render nuclear war highly improb
able.^0 Moreover, they tend to be quite optimistic about
keeping limited conflicts from escalating. Thus, Strausz-
Hupe wrote:
Protracted conflict, possibly including limited
war, would serve to carry on the struggle despite
mutual deterrence. Its purpose would be to change
the ’nuclear stalemate' in favor of one or the other
competitor. In such a situation, there is a good
chance that limited conflict would remain limited,
unless one or the other of the two camps was willing
to risk enlargement of the contest.11
In spite of their recognition of the potential devastation
of nuclear war, these authors still believe that a "win"
strategy is rational in the nuclear age:
. . . U. S. and Free World strategy must rest on
the people's will to face up to the possibility of
total war and their readiness to marshal the efforts
that will assure them victory in such a conflict.12
The American response and present position. Accord
ing to these writers, the American policy of containment
has been too narrowly conceived and has therefore left the
initiative to the enemy.1^ Niemeyer emphasized:
10Niemeyer, 260.
11Strausz-Hupe, f A Forward Strategy . . . , 18.
12Ibid., 39. 13lbid., 28.
| 202
As long as the United States conducts the Cold War
mainly as a defensive operation against the expan
sion of Russian power, with the overriding desire
to avoid a world war, the result is likely to be a
series of defeats for the United States rather than
j for the Soviets.14
I “
These writers are of the opinion that unless the United
States adopts an offensive counter-policy (they call it a
"forward strategy") against the Communist bloc, the Commun
ists will win the cold war.15 Moreover, they apparently
believe that such a forward policy would also win the sup
port of allied nations.
Policy suggestions. In order to meet the challenge
posed by Communist expansionism, these writers contend that
the United States should launch a strategy aimed at total
victory which would oust Communist leaders from power. It
is Strausz-Hupe's opinion that:
The West can hope to defeat the Communists only
by giving battle on its own chosen terrain. It must
carry the battle to the vital sectors of Communist
defense. To do this it must learn to counter the
strategy of protracted conflict— to manage conflict
in space and time.16
According to Strausz-Hup^, the ultimate purpose of such a
! ^Niemeyer, 254. ^Niemeyer, 256.
15Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Protracted Conflict,"
I American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, eds. Walter F. Hahn
land John C. Neff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Co., 1960), p. 30.
strategy should be
. . . to turn the tide of battle against the Commun
ists , to induce them to overextend themselves, to
exploit the weakness of their system, to paralyze
their will, and to bring about their final collapse.^
It is the contention of these writers that the West should
use all means in pursuing such a strategy including econom
ic, psychological, and military warfare.What these
writers demand is a more militant posture for America in
world affairs:
The requirements of foreign policy are to assert
authority, to enhance prestige, to stand firm, to
face down threats, to take risks, to stand by one's
allies, to punish one's enemies and, whenever pursu
ing these tasks calls for the use of force, to use
force.
Rigid containment
The overall problematic situation. The second
group of writers have been categorized under the phrase of
"rigid containment." These writers tend to emphasize that
the United States is locked in a military confrontation with
the Soviet bloc in which the Communists are seeking to
expand their area of control and the United States is trying
17lbid./ 31. 18Ibid.
19Ibid., 8.
i 9 n
to prevent such expansion.Their viewpoint in this j
i
i ;
|regard is only slightly more moderate than the writers
grouped under protracted conflict. What really distin-
|
guishes this second group from the first group is that
they do not advocate an offensive strategy. Instead, they
maintain that the best hope for the West lies in a firm
determination to maintain the present military balance and
thus to perpetuate the present stalemate into the future.21
They particularly believe that the United States should be
wary of Soviet tactics during a detente. Richard Lowenthal
writes: "The danger is that the Soviets might achieve, by
the warm sunshine of a policy of detente, what the cold
blast of their threats has been unable to accomplish. .
..22
• *
The Communist threat. This group of writers believe
20Kurt London, "Soviet Strengths and Weaknesses,"
and Stephen Kertesz, "Objectives and Priorities of American
Policy," in National Security: Political, Military, and
Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, eds. David M.
Abshire and Richard V. Allen, pp. 66, 215-216; Richard
Lowenthal, "The World Scene Transformed," Encounter, XXI
(October, 1964), 4, 7.
21London, 66; Lowenthal, 8; Kai-Uwe von Hassel,
"Detente through Firmness," Foreign Affairs, XLII (January,
1964) , 193.
22Lowenthal, 9.
that the overall Soviet expansionistic drive is as vigorous
as ever and that therefore any conciliatory moves by Western
leaders are likely to be regarded as signs of weakness and
thus an opportunity to make an advance.This attitude is
well represented by Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Minister of Defense
of German Federal Republic:
It is easy to understand why the Soviets foster
the project of a non-aggression pact as a political
argument. They hope that there might be potent
powers in the West which would consider a non-aggres
sion pact sufficient evidence that the danger of a
military conflict was thereby banished.
Any attempt to arrive at a detente by concluding
a non-aggression pact would probably only result in
Moscow winning the next round in world politics.24
Consequently, these writers hold out little hope that Soviet
leaders are likely to change their objectives, even though
they may be forced to postpone their actualization for long
periods of t i m e . 25 This view of the relatively unchanging
23council on Foreign Relations, "Basic Aims of
U. S. Foreign Policy," American Strategy for the Nuclear
Age, eds. Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, pp. 6-7;
Raymond Aron, "The Great Schism: A Reconsideration,"
Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), 7; von Hassel, 187;
Kertesz, 219; Lowenthal, 3.
^von Hassel, 194.
25Philip Mosely, "The Meaning of Coexistence,"
Foreign Affairs, XLI (October, 1962), 44-46; Aron, 6, 9;
Lowenthal, 3-4; Kertesz, 211, 223.
' 206 !
S
[
nature of Soviet objectives has been expressed particularly
well by Kurt London:
i
That there have been and will be further changes in
Communist theory and practice, no one can doubt.
That these changes will lead away from revolution
to evolution is highly unlikely during the next
decade.
. . . we should not anticipate radical changes in
the application of Marxism-Leninism except that
they will be handled by the Kremlin in a more
sophisticated m a n n e r . 26
The nuclear danger. While this group of writers
recognize the possibility of nuclear war, they tend to put
considerable faith in the "balance of horror" to keep the
peace. Von Hassel wrote:
The rational realization that war should no
longer be a means of policy must not obscure recogni
tion of the fact that the balance of horror, with its
deterrence from military risks and adventures, has
hitherto assured peace and will probably have to
assure peace in the future as w e l l .27
Evidently, these writers not only have confidence in the
mutual deterrence postures to prevent either power from
launching a first strike, but they must also believe that
such deterrence postures can prevent limited conflicts from
escalating into total war.
^London, 67-68.
27Von Hassel, 188.
The American response and present position. These
I :
writers are basically satisfied with the effectiveness of
the American containment policy in dealing with Soviet
expansionism and they see little reason for either increased
militancy or relaxation. These writers also believe that
American leaders can achieve more effective agreements with
the Soviet leaders if they adhere to a "hard-line" diplo
macy. Kurt London expressed this viewpoint in these words:
Our Cuba policy is not necessarily applicable to
other areas, but it has demonstrated that we suc
ceed in reaching working agreements only if we are
strong and let the Communists and the world know we
will not be bullied.29
Apparently, these writers believe that the support of the
allies can best be maintained by taking such firm stands.
Policy suggestions. This group of writers believe
that the West should strive toward the rigid containment of
Communist expansionism by achieving nuclear and convention
al arms superiority and by engaging in strong economic and
political programs.®® Stephen Kertesz wrote:
2®Council on Foreign Relations, 11-12; Lowenthal,
4.
London, 73.
®®Ibid.; Kertesz, 211; Mosely, 46.
[ 208 ]
' i
Since totalitarian leaders have little moral I
restraint, the ultimate deterrent for them is
American superiority in strategic weapons and
means of delivery, and American control of stra
tegic bases. In view of the conditions of our
time, there is no substitute for power.31
These writers maintain that the United States must be
extremely cautious in its dealings with the Soviet leaders
lest the Communists make another advance. This attitude
was exemplified by Raymond Aron when he wrote:
. . . the best way of confirming him [Khrushchev]
in his good intentions is not to give him the
impression that the West is prepared to disavow
itself for a few smiles from the master of the
Kremlin. We should not refuse a dialogue, but
should remember that it is incompatible with the
Berlin Wall and with Ulbricht's regime.32
Furthermore, according to these writers the West should be
prepared to use military force whenever containment calls
for it. Kertesz emphasized this viewpoint in this manner:
"But American policy toward the Communist governments must
be tough and prepared for a showdown at any time. This is
the only language they understand."33
31-Kertesz, 220. 32Aron# q.
-^Kertesz, 222. Stephen Kertesz's opinions appear
to be very similar to the opinions of the writers who
advocate a policy of protracted conflict, except that he
does stop short of advocating an offensive strategy.
Flexible containment
The overall problematic situation. Another group
of writers believe recent developments in Soviet-American
relations should be recognized as a definite shift away
from the rigidities of the cold war. These writers per
ceive that a distinct detente has occurred in the East-West
confrontation, partly because the Soviet leaders have
lessened their militancy and partly because of the growth
of pluralism within both blocs.34 Although these writers
do not believe that the bipolar alignment has been serious
ly transformed, they do maintain that the confrontation is
not likely to be so acute in the future, especially as the
Soviet leaders switch to non-military means to achieve
their goals.3^
The Communist threat. According to these writers,
the Soviet leaders have not relinquished their objective of
world revolution, but they are willing to forego a militant
34Roberto Ducci, "The World Order in the Sixties,"
Foreign Affairs, XLII (April, 1964), 384, 386; Grayson
Kirk, "World Perspectives, 1964," Foreign Affairs, XLIII
(October, 1964), 8, 11; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Coexis
tence vs. Peace," Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), 10-11.
3^Sir William Hayter, "The Meaning of Coexis
tence," Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), 23; Schlesinger,
11; Ducci, 384.
36 37
campaign at this time. ' The approach of these writers
in interpreting Soviet intentions is still cautious as
exemplified by Arthur Schlesinger's conclusion: "The
I
present detente offers no evidence that the Soviet regime
has abandoned the dream of a world where socialists and
all other dissenters would vanish as quickly as possible
before the winds of orthodoxy."38 These writers cite the
lack of success with a more militant policy, the schisms
within the Communist movement, the growing recognition of
the dangers of nuclear war, and domestic problems as fac
tors which may have led the Soviets to adopt a more moder
ate course.39
These writers suggest that this Soviet shift to a
moderate course may signal a long-term trend in Soviet for
eign policy rather than a mere tactical maneuver.40
Apparently this was the view of Roberto Ducci when he
wrote:
3^Hayter, 23-24. 37jfajd., 24; Kirk, 6.
38schlesinger, 15.
39George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western
Policy," Foreign Affairs, XL11 (January, 1964), 173;
Hayter, 23; Schlesinger, 10-11.
40j(irk, 6; Schlesinger, 10.
The insistence that war is not inevitable, the
recent emphasis on the sanctity of frontiers
. . . and above all the support given to the plan
for limiting the possession of nuclear weapons to
the "haves" reveal the Soviet interest in perpetuat
ing the present state of the world— one in which . . .
each of the two Great Powers would continue maintain
ing order in its third of the world, while the other
third remains the object of their mutual competition,
short of war.4^
The nuclear danger. These writers contend that
although the mutual invulnerability of deterrent forces
has made the deliberate initiation of nuclear war less
likely, the dangers of accidental and unintended nuclear
wars are still significant.42 Because these writers per
ceive the risks of mutual annihilation to be significant,
they tend to stress the common interest of all peoples in
averting nuclear war? it is their position that this com
mon interest transcends the national or ideological inter
ests of any particular state.4^
The American response and present position. This
group of writers are in basic support of American efforts
to contain Soviet expansion; however, they contend that
4lDucci, 383. 42Kirk, 7, 11.
4^Schlesinger, 11.
certain aspects of American policy transcend the require
ments of containment. For instance, George Kennan com
plains of ". . . the heavy extent of the Western commit
ment, and particularly American and German commitment, to
the eventual destruction of Communism generally."^
Grayson Kirk feels that this excess of militancy in Ameri
can policy results in part from "... the general anti-
Soviet temper of the American people. . . ."45
Policy suggestions. It is not surprising that one
of the first suggestions of these writers is that American
foreign policy be trimmed of its more militant and offen
sive aspects. In particular, these writers seem anxious
to discard statements of "roll-back" and "liberation of
captive nations" in East Europe. George Kennan believes
American leadership, instead of treating all Communist
states with common hostility, should "... shape its
policies in such a way as to create advantages and premiums
for efforts on the part of the satellite governments to
extend their relations with Western countries. These
writers are particularly anxious that the American policy-
44Kennan, 181.
46Rennan, 177.
45Kirk, 4.
213]
j
makers should be alert to possibilities during the detente
which might lead the Soviet leaders to engage in agreements
which might lower the risk of violent conflict.47 Grayson
Kirk advocates that while the United States should maintain
". . .an attitude of resolute firmness whenever neces
sary . . .," it should also approach international problems
with ”... greater flexibility, inventiveness, and realism
about the world as it is."4® And Arthur Schlesinger, while
warning that Americans should recognize the limitations of
Soviet co-existence policy ". . . as a means of bringing the
world enduring peace . . .," suggests a policy which would
tend to ". . . help coexistence to widen steadily and
imperceptibly into peace."4® In sum, while these writers
see little possibility that the basic pattern of the
bipolar confrontation can be transformed in the near term,
they do believe that some of the rigidities of the cold war
can be modified and that some of the risks of nuclear
devastation can thereby be eliminated.
Transitions from containment to cooperation
The overall problematic situation. This group of
47Schlesinger, 12. 48Kirk, 13.
4 9
Schlesinger, 12, 16.
writers, after looking back on the past two decades of the
cold war, perceive that both sets of leaders in the Soviet
Union and the United States have acted toward one another
on the basis of conceptions which are highly unrealistic.
John Strachey illustrated this point of view while dis
cussing the barriers to Russian-American cooperation:
It is hard to say which would prove the more intract
able obstacle, the violent, largely instinctive Ameri
can repugnance for communist Russia and all she stands
for, or the rigidly thought-out, doctrinaire, repug-
. nance of the Communists for capitalist America and
all she stands for.50
Eric Fromm discussed the same point of view from a broader
historical perspective:
Man, in each society, seems to absolutize the way
of life and the way of thought produced by his cul
ture and to be willing to die rather than to change,
since change, to him, is equated with death. Thus
the history of man is a graveyard of great cultures
that came to catastrophic ends because of their
incapacity for planned, rational, voluntary reaction
to challenge.51
This same pessimistic view of the overall problematic situa
tion was expressed by Norman Graebner:
Through eighteen years of almost unceasing tension
and arms expansion, powerful spokesmen of the great
5®John Strachey, On the Prevention of War (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 291.
C 1
Eric Fromm, May Man Prevail: An Inquiry into the
Facts and Fiction of Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 51.
215
cold-war rivals, anchoring their hopes and expec
tations to convictions of ideological superiority,
have predicted with disturbing regularity the total
collapse of their adversaries. They have framed
their external objectives on such illusions of omni
potence, demanding, on the most critical issues,
nothing less than the total capitulation of those
who oppose t h e m .
But in spite of their despair over the past conduct
of the cold war, they optimistically perceive the recent
detente as an excellent opportunity to modify previously
rigid bipolar positions. They base part of their optimism
upon internal developments within Russia and the Communist
bloc, but they also perceive that the common interest in
avoiding nuclear war is likely to gain appreciation among
both Soviet and American leaders, partly as an aftermath of
the Cuban crisis and partly because of the proliferation of
nuclear powers.^3
The Communist threat. This group of writers
generally interpret the detente to mean that the Soviet
leaders have relaxed their expansionistic drive. They per
ceive that part of this relaxation can be attributed to a
52Norman A. Graebner, "Can a Nuclear World War Be
Avoided?" Annals of the American Academy of the Political
Social Sciences, No. 351 (January, 1964), 133.
^Patrick Gordon-Walker, "The World Scene Trans
formed," Encounter, XXI (November, 1963), 61.
216 ’
growing preoccupation on the part of the Soviet leaders
with the internal development of the Russian state. Eric
Fromm actually contends that the present Soviet leadership
represents ". . . a conservative totalitarian managerial
ism. . . ."54 They also attribute this relaxation to the
fact that Soviet leaders have been increasingly faced with
failures in their attempts to expand their sphere of influ
ence and in their attempts to enforce unity within the
Communist movement itself. Denis Healy pointed out that
Soviet leaders have been forced to recognize that central
Moscow control over non-Russian communist states cannot
always be maintained and that they can no longer presume
"... that a communist revolution in a new country neces
sarily increases the international power of any existing
communist state.
Although these writers do not contend that the
Soviet leaders have given up their expansionistic objec
tives, they do believe that these leaders are most unwilling
to assume large risks in their pursuit.56 For example,
5^Fromm, 87.
55Denis Healy, "Strategy and Foreign Policy,"
Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), 17-18.
56Ibid., 19; Strachey, 218, 224.
Amitai Etzioni wrote:
While the Communist camp did, and in my judgment
does, seek to extend its way of life and form of
government to non-Communist peoples, it was and is
willing to attempt this only at low risks— which
is crucial— the level of violence considered "low
risk” has continuously declined over the year.57
Given this interpretation of the position of the Soviet
leadership, these writers believe that there is a good
chance that the Soviet leaders will gradually be willing
to expand the scope of coexistence and become more toler
ant of the status quo.58
The nuclear danger. This group of writers tend
to be extremely pessimistic concerning the prospects of
avoiding nuclear war indefinitely or the chances of human
survival should such a war occur. Although they are will
ing to grant that the mutual invulnerability of deterrent
forces has made the deliberate initiation of nuclear war
less likely, they believe that the dangers of accidental
or unintended nuclear war are still significant.59 For
instance, Strachey wrote:
57Amitai Etzioni, Winning Without War (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 13.
5®Ibid., 218; Healy, 18.
59Strachey, 5, 6, 84-85; Graebner, 134-39; Fromm, 6.
218
It was the broad, vague category of unintended war:
of war stumbled into by the dialectic of fallible,
emotional men acting, and reacting, under great
strain, to the chances and changes of a balance of
power situation, which seems the real danger.60
Their view of the nature of nuclear war portrays an almost
complete hopelessness: they specifically reject any sug
gestion that nuclear war should be conceived as analogous
to conventional war. According to Eric Fromm, a violent
nuclear conflict between the two blocs ”... will lead,
most likely to the physical destruction of most Americans
and most Russians now living and to a barbaric, dehumanized,
dictatorial regime for the survivors."^
In light of their beliefs concerning the danger of
nuclear warfare, it is not surprising to find that these
writers see the threat of nuclear war as a more decisive
issue than the threat of Soviet e x p a n s i o n i s m . what
especially grieves these writers is that the problem of
Soviet-American relations is usually posed in the tradition
al framework of thought which regards national security as
the prime objective and the most highly developed weapons
systems as the most appropriate means for pursuing this
60gtrachey, 85.
61Ibid., 3, 5, 6, 17; Fromm, 8; Graebner, 134.
f i 2
Strachey, Preface.
objective. On this point, Strachey contends . . that to
settle disputes between nation-states by the time-honored
method of war has become impossibly destructive." For
Strachey the advent of nuclear weapons poses a cruel
dilemma: "... the fact is that for our existing world
of fully sovereign states war remains inevitable, but it
has become intolerable.1,63
The American response and present position. These
writers feel that American foreign policy in regard to the
Communist nations has been unduly rigid and excessively
militant. They believe that to a large extent this policy
has been based upon a false conception of the Soviet Union
and the Communist movement, but they also contend that
American leaders have failed to comprehend the needs and
aspirations of other non-communist nations in formulating
policy toward the Communist world. They are especially
critical of American leaders who tend to approach other
nations with the two-valued orientation which assumes that
he who is not for us must be against us. Strachey demon
strates the perplexity which a Britisher might feel toward
American foreign policy.
220
American leaders who in their internal social and
economic policies seem to us extremely conservative,
still feel, to a varying degree, that they must lead
the world in "a crusade" for a certain set of values,
or as they often put it, for a "way of life"— the
American way of life . . . a large part of the rest
of the world— and not only that part which lies under
communist domination— regards the American crusade
for liberty as a crusade for the liberty to exploit.64
Not only do these writers believe that the rigidity
and the militancy of American policy has alienated allied
and uncommitted nations, but they also contend that it has
encouraged rigidity and militancy on the communist side.®5
Amitai Etzioni maintains that this mutual rigidity has
fostered
. . . a strategy of duopoly— one that seeks neither
monopoly of one power nor the free competition of
many powers, but the freezing of the existing divi
sion of spheres of influence between the two super
powers . 66
Policy suggestions. Because these writers believe
that the nuclear war danger represents a much greater threat
to the people of the world than does communist expansionism,
they place greater emphasis upon the means of controlling
conflict than they do upon containing communist expansion-
istic efforts. Accordingly, they advocate that Western
64Ibid., 264.
66Etzioni, 6.
®5Graebner, 136-37.
221 ’
strategy should forego the extremely rigid and hostile
policy positions, which have so often characterized the
cold war confrontations of the past, and seek to develop
areas of cooperation— especially in respect to human sur
vival in the nuclear age.**? On this point Strachey sug
gests that:
What is essential is that the super-powers, be
they two or several, should, either de facto or de
jure, progressively sink that aspect of their
sovereignty which enables them to wage nuclear war
independently.
These writers believe, that in order to overcome the rigid
and militant attitudes existing on both sides, the leaders
must be induced to shed their false conceptions of one
another and to accept a territorial settlement on the basis
of the status quo. Eric Fromm contends that such a settle
ment would imply
. . . that the West must give up any design to change
the present Russian possessions and spheres of inter
est in Eastern Europe, and that the Soviet Union does
the same with respect to the West.69
Still, these writers have no illusions that containment
could or should be abandoned in the present period. What
they do advocate is that a gradual transition should be
6^Ibid., 219; Gordon-Walker, 61; Healy, 19;
Strachey, 291; Graebner, 132.
®®Strachey, 302. ^Fromm, 215.
222
!
encouraged: they advocate a shift from a rigid containment
posture, based solely upon national security, to a posture
of potential conciliation— in order that the nuclear anni
hilation of the people throughout the world can be averted.
Cooperation with the Communists
The overall problematic situation. Denna F. Fleming
is one writer who tends to place the major responsibility
for the cold war upon the United States. He contends that
the cold war developed largely because the American leaders
refused to accept the consequences of the Second World War,
namely, the new Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe and the Communist revolution in China.70 Moreover,
he contends that many of the American cold war attitudes
are irrational since they derive from Western myths con
cerning the nature of the Communist movement. He believes
that as soon as the American and other Western leaders move
toward the acceptance of the consequences of the Second
World War and as they discard their false myths concerning
the Communist movement, a new era of peaceful cooperation
70Denna F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins,
1917-1960 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co.,
1961), p. 1055.
223
will emerge.
The Communist threat. Although Fleming admits that
Soviet ideology and even statements of Soviet leaders allude
to the inevitable Communist revolution, he observes that the
Soviet Union in its actual course of development has evolved
into a conservative and defensive nation-state.He feels
that part of this conservatism derives from the Soviet pre
occupation with internal developments, but he also believes
that the risks of nuclear war have caused the Russian
leaders to gravitate toward a more cautious position. Thus,
while he does not believe that the Soviet leaders have
given up their dream of a world communist state, he has
confidence that if they are unable to achieve their objec
tives through non-military means, they will eventually
become resigned to the status quo,^
The nuclear danger. According to Fleming, the risk
of nuclear war is the real problem of the nuclear age,
since both the United States and the Soviet Union have
^Denna F. Fleming, "The Turn Toward Peace," Annals
of the American Academy of the Political and Social Sci
ences , No. 351 (January, 1964), 166.
^ F l e m i n g , The Cold War . . . , 1059-64.
73Ibid., 1080.
224
already achieved national security. On the possibility of
nuclear war he ejaculated:
The gadgets of destruction have escaped all bounds
and they will infallibly destroy man unless he
pushes on to the making of peace and the organiza
tion of the world community. There is no road back
to power politics by way of a superior ability to
take carefully modulated risks in the use of the
smaller H-bombs. The clash of sovereign wills of
the great states can only go on to mutual annihila
tion. The acceleration in killing has long since
passed the point of control.74
Not only does Fleming have little faith in the ability of
the nuclear powers to maintain control over limited nuclear
wars, but he also believes that the leaders of the nuclear
nations are in danger of losing control over the spiraling
effect of new weapon developments.7- ^
The American response and present position. Fleming
takes the position that American policy towards the Soviet
Union has been based upon the American mania that the Com
munists are bent on world conquest. He explained:
Whatever the merits of our Soviet world con
quest belief, the reasons for it were seldom
stated. Very early in the cold war the idea became
a slogan, an axiom, our main article of faith. It
was simply asserted by virtually all of our leaders
74Ibid., 1109. 75Ibid., 1108-10.
225 '
so many thousands of times, and carried into every
mind by all the mass avenues of public information
so often, that only a few continued to question
it.76
He contends that the American attempts to encircle and con
fine the Communist nations have actually helped to gener
ate the power within the Communist bloc which was most
feared.77 This American zeal for containment combined with
a militant nuclear policy has, according to Fleming also
caused the United States to lose friends and to gain
7 R
enemies. Fleming maintains that with respect to Eastern
Europe the American crusades of "rollback" and "liberation"
". . . only made life very much harsher for the peoples in
the bloc and postponed their forward evolution.1,78 Thus,
from Fleming's point of view, the American containment pol
icy has not only greatly increased the nuclear danger, but
it has become increasingly unnecessary.
Policy suggestions. Fleming believes that it is
essential for the United States to begin cooperating with
the Soviet Union:
76Ibid., 1061. 77Ibid., 1073.
78Ibid., 1071-72.
7^Fleming, "The Turn Toward Peace," 163.
226
Since cold war methods are self-defeating,
there remains the much harder task of accepting
competitive coexistence with the communist world,
and of working into policies first of toleration
and then of friendliness and cooperation with all
peoples.
We can only go forward toward cooperation.®®
He feels that such a shift toward cooperation can only come
with great leadership which the President is capable.®^- He
suggests that the President should insist that the arms
race be ended and that he negotiate a drastic disarmament
treaty with the Russians.82 Moreover, he suggests that the
United States should be willing to accede to Communist
interests in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and on
Formosa.83
Formulation and Evaluation of Propositions
This last section has presented a survey of the
contemporary problematic situation existing within the
American-Soviet relationship, as it was perceived by vari
ous writers on American-Soviet affairs. This survey was
organized upon the basis of five subheadings pertaining to
®®Fleming, The Cold War . . ., 1074.
®^Fleming, "The Turn Toward Peace," 168.
®2Fleming, The Cold War . . ., 1112.
83Ibid,, 1103-04.
227
various aspects of the problematic situation as they
related to the objectives of national security and
minimizing the danger of nuclear war. The purpose of
the following section is to formulate and evaluate proposi
tions demonstrating the principal ways of conceiving the
first four of these aspects of the problematic situation.
(The fifth subheading, suggested policies, will not be
included since it projects beyond the actual perception of
the problematic situation.) This means that each of the
five conceptual positions (protracted conflict, rigid con
tainment, flexible containment, transition from contain
ment to cooperation, and cooperation with the Communists)
will be expressed in a set of four propositions. After the
statement of these five sets of propositions, each proposi
tion will be evaluated individually in comparison with
corresponding propositions of the other sets.
Propositions Relating to the Problematic Situation
Protracted conflict.
1. The West is locked in an inexorable conflict
with the Communist bloc for the domination of the world.
2. The Communist leaders have launched a
228
i
protracted conflict against the West in which they intend
to gain control over all territory, destroy all Western
institutions, and eliminate individual freedom.
3. The deterrence systems of the United States and
the Soviet Union render general nuclear war highly improb
able, but even if such a war should occur, the United
States would have the capacity to survive and win such a
conflict.
4. The American policy of containment has proved
an insufficient response to the Communist challenge and
has thereby left the initiative to the enemy.
Rigid containment.
1. The West continues to be locked in a military
confrontation with the Communist bloc which permits little
opportunity for significant change.
2. Because the pressure of Communist expansion is
unrelenting, any attempted reconciliation by the Western
leaders will be interpreted by the Communist leaders as a
sign of weakness and, hence, an opportunity to advance.
3. The deterrence systems of the United States and
the Soviet Union have assured general peace so far and can
probably be relied upon to do so in the future.
4. The American policy of containment has worked
relatively well in the past and will probably need little
modification in the future.
Flexible containment.
1. While the West is still locked in a struggle
for power with the Communist nations, recent developments
suggest that some of the militancy of this struggle can be
eliminated.
2. Soviet leaders have not relinquished their
objective of world revolution, but they appear to be will
ing to forego a militant campaign at this time.
3. Although the deterrence systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union have made the deliberate
initiation of nuclear war less likely, the danger of nuclear
devastation is still significant.
4. The American containment policy has worked rela
tively well in the past, but recent changes in the world
situation suggest a need for re-evaluation and adaptation.
Transition from containment to cooperation.
1. While the struggle for power between the
Western and Communist blocs continues, mutual perception of
areas of potential cooperation may make it possible for the
230 :
two sides to alleviate the competitive nature of the
struggle.
2. The Soviet leaders may eventually be willing
to stabilize relations with the West on the basis of the
status quo.
3. Although the deterrence systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union have minimized the risk of
nuclear war, the magnitude of nuclear devastation means
that even a minimal risk can be enormous.
4. Although the American containment policy has
worked in some respects, its implementation has, at times,
gone beyond the requirements of containment.
Cooperation with the Communists.
1. The struggle between the Western and Communist
nations has been highly competitive primarily because of
the militancy of American leaders.
2. Although Communist ideology and statements by
Soviet leaders have stressed the necessity of world revolu
tion, the Soviet Union has actually emerged as a conserva
tive and defensive nation-state.
3. Although the deterrence systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union may discourage the deliberate
231
initiation of general nuclear war, it would be almost
impossible to prevent a limited nuclear war from escalat
ing into a general one.
4. The American policy of containment, which was
based upon the mania that the Communists were bent on world
conquest, is no longer necessary.
Evaluation of Propositions
Although the foregoing propositions have been
derived from the conceptual positions of various interna
tional relationists, they may not exactly reflect the
opinions of any one writer included within the five
groupings. The purpose here has not been to reproduce
accurately a given international relationist1s position,
but rather to formulate alternative propositions pertain
ing to a problematic situation within international
politics. In the following pages each of these proposi
tions will be evaluated as to its warrantability as a
statement of one of the four aspects of the problematic
situation.
The overall problematic situation
The West is locked in an inexorable conflict with
232
the Communist bloc for the domination of the world. The
conception of the problematic situation as a protracted
conflict would necessarily require that at least one side
in the struggle perceived the situation in this way. At
the outset, it is quite clear that present American policy
makers do not hold such a conception of the situation. And
even though it could be argued that Stalin in his latter
years interpreted the situation in this way and that
Chinese leaders currently view the situation in this manner,
there is little evidence that the present Soviet policy
makers entertain this conception. As a matter of fact, the
Sino-Soviet rift itself confirms this difference in the
perception of the international situation. Soviet leaders
seem to be particularly suspicious of the Chinese leaders
when they maintain that protracted conflict can be carried
out without involving the world in nuclear war or that
nuclear war could be a rational means for conducting a
strategy of protracted conflict. Besides these considera
tions, leaders of both the United States and the Soviet
Union seem to be aware that the developing polycentrism
within the Communist bloc and the growth of pluralism in
the West militates against the view of two monoliths
locked in mortal combat. One must conclude, therefore,
that if neither the Soviet nor the American policy-makers
perceive the situation as a protracted conflict, then this
conception fails to correspond with reality.
The West continues to be locked in a military
confrontation with the Communist bloc which permits little
opportunity for significant change. This proposition
implies that the past pattern of the cold war will be pro
jected into the future. It thus rests upon the assumption
that the recent detente is merely a Communist tactic
employed so that the Soviet leaders can consolidate their
position while they induce the Western nations to disrupt
their alliances. Such an assumption might be defended by
pointing out that Soviet leaders have adopted a soft line
before only to be followed by a hard line when they deemed
that the time was appropriate. There are, however, cer
tain factors which suggest a more optimistic interpreta
tion of the detente. In the first place, the Soviet
experience in the Cuban crisis appears to have shocked the
Soviet leaders into a more pessimistic calculation of the
possibility of nuclear devastation. In the second place,
their rift with the Chinese leaders and the growing
independence of the East European satellite nations may
234
have caused them to re-evaluate their conception as well as
their anticipation of a world communist state. In the third
place, the growth of Western prosperity and military
strength may have enhanced Soviet pessimism concerning the
prospects for expansion; while at the same time, the growth
of Western pluralism has discredited the view that the
capitalist nations are conspiring for the destruction of
world Communism. Because of these factors, the view which
sees the future international situation as merely a projec
tion of the past pattern can not be regarded as adequate.
While the West is still locked in a struggle for
power with the Communist nations, recent developments sug
gest that some of the militancy of this struggle can be
eliminated. This proposition rests upon the assumption that
the recent detente may be more than a shift in Soviet tac
tics. The support for this assumption can be found in the
three factors interpreting the nature of the detente which
were noted in the preceding paragraph. Of course, the
development which pointed most dramatically toward a less
militant confrontation was the Soviet acceptance of the
limited test ban treaty. But if this were not evidence
enough, it can be noted that the Soviet government also
allowed their Berlin ultimatum to lapse after the Cuban
crisis. Given this sort of context, the Soviet statements
on peaceful coexistence and on the futility of waging
nuclear war can be granted more credence. Generally speak
ing, the American response to this reduction in Soviet
hostility has been one of receptivity. This was especially
the case during the last year of the Kennedy administration
And even though the conflict in Vietnam has been an occa
sion for increased tensions, neither the Soviet nor the
American leaders have used this occasion for a return to
the more militant pattern of the cold war.
While the struggle for power between the Western
and the Communist blocs continues, mutual perception of
areas of potential cooperation may make it possible for the
two sides to alleviate the competitive nature of the
struggle. This proposition goes beyond the prospect of
reducing hostility and militancy in interpreting the nature
of the detente. Instead of assuming that the perception of
the nuclear danger will merely lead the American and Soviet
leaders to conduct their struggle with greater caution, it
suggests that these leaders will recognize a positive
interest in assuring the survival of their peoples and,
hence, a need to cooperate in measures which would reduce
the prospects of nuclear war. Support for this proposition
would seem to lie in the psychological observation that
individuals tend to respond to hostility with hostility and
to cordiality with cordiality and that a similar set of
responses might be expected to occur in the American-Soviet
relationship. According to this interpretation, the relax
ation of tension which resulted because of the detente
could itself produce the psychological climate which would
be conducive to cooperation. And if cooperation were
successful in one area of the relationship, then the pos
sibility of cooperation in other areas would be enhanced.
Were such a process to develop, the chances would, indeed,
be increased that the competitive nature of the confronta
tion could be transformed.
The struggle between the Western and the Communist
nations has been highly competitive primarily because of
the militancy of American leaders. This proposition is
based upon the assumption that although the Western and the
Communist nations are locked in a struggle for power, this
struggle could be terminated whenever Western leaders
demonstrated a willingness to follow a cooperative policy
toward the Communist nations. it is also based upon the
assumption that the militancy of the American leaders is
founded almost wholly upon a system of myths concerning the
Communist nations. Both of these assumptions must be
regarded as highly dubious. While it is true that certain
aspects of American policy have been expressed in extremely
hostile language and although the conceptions which some
American policy-makers entertain with respect to the Com
munist movement do appear to be exaggerated, the actions
and statements of the Soviet leaders in recent years have
been too militant and aggressive to be interpreted as
expressing a keen desire for cooperation. Moreover, if it
be admitted that some American leaders do tend to act upon
a system of myths, the Soviet myth structure must be
regarded to be much more elaborate and omnipresent.
Because of this continuing hostility of the Soviet leaders,
there remains a real danger that they would take advantage
of the West if the Western leaders were to initiate a
cooperative policy unilaterally.
The nature of the Communist threat
The Communist leaders have entered a protracted
conflict against the West in which they intend to gain
control over all territory, to destroy all Western.
institutions, and to eliminate individual freedom. Although
Communist ideology is often expressed in a form which would
seem to vindicate this proposition, recent statements and
actions of the Soviet leaders suggest that this view of
Communist intentions is exaggerated. In the first place,
the Soviet disagreement with the Chinese interpretation of
protracted conflict indicates that the Soviet leaders have
rejected the militant path to world revolution. In the
second place, one can find numerous indications that the
revolutionary furor among the Russian leaders and people
has cooled considerably as the task of building and manag
ing a prosperous economy has absorbed their energies. In
the third place, the Soviet leaders have repeatedly modified
the means which they would use to foster the spread of com
munism. In the fourth place, the growing polycentrism
within the Communist bloc as well as the increasing scope
of individual freedom within the Soviet society, makes a
phantasy of the conception of a world-wide, monolithic,
communist state suppressing all human freedom.
Because the pressure of Communist expansion is
unrelenting, any attempted reconciliation by the Western
leaders will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and,
hence, an opportunity to advance. This proposition also
239
rests upon a static interpretation of Communist intentions.
Such an interpretation must be rejected since the Soviet
|leaders have already entered into certain settlements with
l
i
i
jthe West, as indicated by their acceptance of the Kennedy
i
!suggestions for ending the Cuban crisis and their signing
I
jof the limited test ban treaty, of which they have not
|taken unfair advantage. There is certainly no reason to
!believe that changes in Soviet objectives cannot take
i place and that the Soviet leaders would not welcome accom-
i
i
modations in some areas. This may be especially so if the
Soviet leaders come to recognize that all nations have an
interest in avoiding nuclear war.
i
j The Soviet leaders have not relinquished their
i
i
objective of world revolution, but they appear to be
willing to forego a militant campaign at this time. There
i
have been enough ideological statements in recent years
|by Soviet leaders to indicate that they still believe in
!
an ultimate world revolution, but, still, they have been
at some pains to explain that such a revolution need not
j
be a violent one. Moreover, there are some signs that the
growing affluence of the Soviet economy and the possibili
ties of further internal developments have caused Soviet
240
leaders to shift their attention away from foreign adven
tures. In addition to this, the favorable options for
direct Soviet military expansion are almost non-existent
at this time: most of the "soft" areas lie in the line of
the Chinese advance, not the Russian. If the Soviet
leaders come to realize that central Moscow control over
new communist states may not be inevitable, they may recon
sider the desirability of promoting world revolution. And
j
finally, as the Soviet leaders increasingly take the pos-
j
i
sibility of nuclear war into their calculations, they may
grow extremely reluctant to advance world revolution by
i
military means.
j
The Soviet leaders may eventually be willing to
stabilize relations with the West on the basis of the
!
status quo. In order for this proposition to be valid,
one would have to assume that the Soviet leaders would
I
someday abandon their enthusiasm for world revolution.
j
At the present time, certain Soviet actions do indicate
such a trend. For example, the Soviet leaders have
I
I
allowed the Berlin issue to lapse, they have refrained
from applying strong pressure upon other areas, and they
have not really rendered vigorous support to North
241
Vietnam and to the National Liberation Front in the latters'
|efforts to extend communism in South-East Asia. In the
I
I
I longer term, Soviet enthusiasm for world revolution may
i
j
jwaile because of developments now occurring within the Com-
t
I
munist bloc itself. For one thing, the schism in Sino-
j
|Soviet relations may make communist expansion in Asia far
|less attractive to Soviet leaders since such expansion woulc
undoubtedly be first sponsored and later exploited by China,
I
Besides this, the growing autonomy of the East European
regimes may suggest to the Soviet leaders that the nature
of a world communist state may be far different than early
I
revolutionaries had anticipated. Even the increasing con-
;trast between the Marxist-Leninist ideology and current
|developments within the Soviet Union may cause the Soviet
leaders to reassess the premises upon which the idea of
world revolution has been based. In addition to these inte::
nal factors, there are external obstacles which might cause
the Soviet leaders to lose their enthusiasm. In the first
I
place, the expense of attempting military expansion against
the Western nations has become prohibitive. In the second
i
I
j place, non-military attempts to increase the area of com
munist control have usually been repulsed. And in the
third place, the nuclearization of warfare means that the
242
existence of the Communist society may be thrown into
jeopardy should an attempted expansion get out of control.
Therefore, if the Soviet leaders perceive that military
jconquest is too risky and that non-military penetration
|is ineffective, they may have no rational course left save
j the acceptance of the status quo.
|
| Although Communist ideology and statements by
|Soviet leaders have stressed the necessity for world
'revolution, the Soviet Union has actually emerged as a
conservative and defensive nation-state. There seems to
be little evidence to support this proposition. For while
i
i
certain Soviet postwar moves may have served a defensive
function, such as establishing "friendly" regimes in
\
j
^countries along the Western Soviet borders; other moves,
j
such as the support given to Premier Castro's regime, to
the Congolese rebels, and to the North Korean Communists,
jean hardly be dismissed as defensive. Although it might
be admitted that the bureaucratic-managerial structure of
the Soviet state has tended to foster a conservative
j
|outlook, it must be remembered that the outlook of the
l
I
i
i Party remains radical.
243
The conception of the nuclear danger
The deterrence systems of the United States and
I the Soviet Unipn render general nuclear war highly improb
able/ but even if such a war should occur, the United
States would have the capacity to survive and win such a
i
conflict. Such extreme confidence in the "balance of
horror" as a means of preventing nuclear war appears to be
Unwarranted for several reasons. First, it is always
J
possible that some technological breakthrough could upset
the balance and thus render a first-strike advantageous
for one side. Second, accidents and miscalculations cannot
!
be ruled out, even though both sides have undoubtedly taken
I
precautions to avoid them. Third, the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by other nations introduces a new possibil
ity of an outbreak of nuclear war. In addition to these
dangers, one must also note that little systematic planning
i
has taken place which would assure that limited conflicts
will not escalate into general nuclear wars. As more
|tactical nuclear weapons are incorporated into the defen
sive armories of various nations, even the now prevailing
!
i
distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare may
!
ibecome obliterated: when this occurs, escalation from a
!
limited conflict into a general nuclear war may be most
244
difficult to prevent.
When an analyst writes optimistically about surviv
ing and winning a general nuclear war, it is difficult to
!
believe that he has actually considered the implications of
nuclear warfare. For instance, what meaning does he assign
to "survival?” The most generous survival estimates of the
nuclear physicists, which assume that a nation has
'installed an extensive civil defense system, are dire
[enough, but for a nation, which has done little in the way
I
I
of civil defense preparation, the percentage of survivors
should be reckoned as similar to the percentage of survivors
i
of aircraft tragedies. Or, what meaning does he assign to
I
j"winning?" If victory in a nuclear war means imposing
jone's will upon the enemy (presumably by occupying his
i
[territory), then the physical obstacles, which would lie
in the wake of mutually destructive nuclear war, would
!appear to be almost insurmountable.
i
i
j
The deterrence systems of the United States and
i
the Soviet Union have assured general peace so far and can
jprobably be relied to do so in the future. Even if the
i
!first part of this proposition were to be granted, this
|
would not be sufficient grounds for affirming the second
245
part. In fact, it is possible that in the future the very
presence of a nuclear stalemate may lead to more frequent
I limited wars. And because procedures for controlling the
!escalation of limited wars have not been perfected, the way
is still open for an outbreak of a general nuclear war.
i
|Besides this, the balance of horror is never so stable that
it could not be upset by technological breakthroughs, acci
dental firings, miscalculations, or the use of nuclear
|
iweapons by a third power.
i
Although the deterrence systems of the United
j States and the Soviet Union have made the deliberate
|
!initiation of nuclear war less likely, the danger of nuclear
devastation is still significant. Because of the possibil
ity of escalation in limited conflicts, of miscalculations,
of accidents, and of nuclear attacks by third states, the
risks of nuclear devastation must, indeed, be regarded to
!be considerable.
|
|
Although the deterrence systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union have minimized the risk of
nuclear war, the magnitude of nuclear devastation means
that even a minimal risk must be regarded as enormous.
The projection of possible blast and fallout damage, which
246
nuclear physicists have made in recent years, indicate that
human survival itself may well be placed in jeopardy in the
i
|event of a nuclear war; therefore, even relatively low
j risks of such a war breaking out should be treated with the
utmost concern. This proposition appears to be in direct
|opposition to an earlier proposition which suggested a
!
I"win" strategy for a nuclear conflict, since the scope of
!destruction in such a war would render such an objective
jmeaningless.
Although the deterrence systems of the United
|States and the Soviet Union may discourage the deliberate
initiation of general nuclear war, it would be almost impos- -
i
sible to prevent a limited nuclear war from escalating into
I
j a general nuclear war. Although the introduction of
nuclear weapons into a conflict which was originally carried
out by conventional arms may make the conflict more diffi-
j cult to control, since ever larger nuclear weapons could be
; employed in retaliation without encountering any mutually
i
|recognized qualitative limits, it is still conceivable that
!
limitations could be enforced. In the first place, the
threat of ever larger nuclear retaliation by one's adver
sary may induce a certain element of caution. And in the
247
second place, it is always possible that the nations
involved could arrive at agreements, either expressly or
j
:tacitly concerning the size of weapons, permissible tar
gets, means of delivery, etc. To maintain, in advance,
that such limitations would be impossible to achieve seems
|to prejudge the issue.
|The American response and present position
The American policy of containment has proved an
j
i
|insufficient response to the Communist challenge and has
thereby left the initiative to the enemy. This proposition
.makes a much too pessimistic judgment on the performance of
;the American containment policy. Containment has certainly
been successful in Western Europe, in the Middle East, in
|Korea, in India, and with respect to Formosa. Actual Com
munist gains in areas where containment was applied or
threatened have been meager. Besides this, the American
policy of containment has never implied that other methods,
such as assisting in the economic development of other
non-communist states, could not also be employed.
!
jTherefore, only in limited instances have the Soviets
|
;enjoyed an unhindered opportunity to initiate expansive
moves.
248
The American policy of containment has worked
relatively well in the past and will probably need little
modification in the future. This proposition cannot be
given much support because several recent developments may
make it necessary to modify the application of containment.
i
jFor one thing, the defense pacts, which were intended to
|
! be the main framework of containment, are now in various
i
!stages of deterioration. For another thing, the Sino-
i
Soviet dispute may make an accommodation between the Soviet
i
i Union and the United States a greater possibility. And
finally, the increased capacity for nuclear devastation
I
j suggests that the original objectives of containment should
i be reappraised and adapted to the age of nuclear parity.
i
The American containment policy has worked rela
tively well in the past, but recent changes in the world
i
!
situation suggest a need for a re-evaluation and adapta-
I
tion. Because of the factors cited in the preceding
paragraphs, this proposition appears to be warranted.
I
i
j Although the American containment policy has worked
in some respects, actual policy has, at times, gone beyond
the requirements of containment. If containment is inter
preted to mean a policy of preventing communist expansion,
249
then certain American actions do appear to have gone beyond
this policy. For instance, the invasion of North Korea,
the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the bombing of North Vietnam
j
i
j are extremely difficult to square with containment. More-
i
over, the statements by some American leaders a few years
ago which called for "roll-back" in Eastern Europe, the
bombing of China, and the launching of preventive war, were
I
I even more inconsistent with containment. These more offen-
I
isive aspects of American policy may have actually encour-
i
aged a greater militancy on the Communist side and caused
a loss of support among allied and non-committed nations
i
for the United States.
I
The American policy of containment, which was based
upon the mania that the Communists were bent on world con
quest, is no longer necessary. This proposition, of course,
j
rests on the assumption that the present Soviet policy is
i
I
purely defensive. Not enough evidence can be produced
which would tend to warrant this assumption. On the con-
I
i
trary, recent Soviet moves in regard to the Congo, Cuba,
i
Berlin, and South East Asia, all point to an opposite con
clusion. The recent policy of the Soviet Union can, of
course, be interpreted as being much less offensive than it
250
was in previous periods, but it may be possible, at least ir
|part, to explain this change as a result of an effective
i
\
containment policy by the United States. A complete relaxa
tion of American containment might very well stimulate a
revival of expansionism by the Soviet leaders.
i
The Formulation of the Problem
i
The evaluations which have followed each one of
i
the above propositions have necessarily been presented
I
from a subjective point of view. Because these proposi
tions have not been subjected to exhaustive existential
I
land conceptual testing, I am sure that many students of the
I
|
|discipline will find legitimate grounds for disagreement.
Nevertheless, I believe that this process of evaluating
j
propositions is what John Dewey was suggesting when he
wrote:
An hypothesis, once suggested and entertained, is
developed in relation to other conceptual struc
tures until it receives a form in which it can
instigate and direct an experiment that will dis
close precisely those conditions which have the
maximum possible force in determining whether the
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected.84
84John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 112.
251
The object of this last section, therefore, has not been
to prove any special point of view regarding the American-
i
Soviet relationship, but to select a set of the most
promising hypotheses and to reject those which seemed the
least promising.
All the propositions, which were judged to be
"warranted" within each of the four aspects of the problem-
jatic situation, were derived from writers whose views had
I
jbeen placed in the categories of "flexible containment"
|and "transition from containment to cooperation." in the
i
;following four paragraphs, these propositions will be
i
irestated in their original form (except where phrases
duplicated one another) in order to construct a hypotheti
cal statement of the problematic situation of the current
American-Soviet relationship.
While the West is still locked in a struggle for
power with the Communist nations, recent developments sug-
;gest that some of the militancy of this struggle can be
eliminated. Mutual perception of areas of potential cooper
ation may make it possible for the two sides to alleviate
the competitive nature of the struggle.
The Soviet leaders have not relinquished their
objective of world revolution, but they appear to be
252
willing to forego a militant campaign at this time. They
may eventually be willing to stabilize relations with the
West on the basis of the status quo.
Although the deterrence systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union have made the deliberate
|initiation of nuclear war less likely, the danger of
|
|nuclear war is still significant. The magnitude of nuclear
l
|
|devastation means that even a minimal risk must be regarded
|as enormous.
The American containment policy has worked rela
tively well in the past, but recent changes in the world
j
j situation suggest a need for a re-evaluation and adapta-
i
jtion. Actual policy, at times, has gone beyond the
I
|requirements of containment.
i
I
I
I
i
! Summary of the problem. This characterization of
;the contemporary problematic situation within the American-
Soviet relationship suggests that we are in a transitional
period: the traditional pattern of struggle between
i
i
,nations pursuing competitive national objectives has been
i
challenged by the imperative which demands that both
nations cooperate so as to avoid becoming embroiled in a
I
thermonuclear war. More than anything else, this danger
253
seems to have induced some of the policy-makers on both
sides to approach the situation with a greater degree of
caution. This increasing trepidation on the part of these
|leaders has created a marginal area in which some maneuver
I
i
jand compromise are possible. This trend, which has made
i
it possible for some observers to foresee an era of poten
tial cooperation, could continue in the years ahead; how
ever, its direction could as easily be reversed. In such
jan event, one should not be surprised to see traditional
inational and ideological objectives revived and pursued
|
with the abandon that characterized international politics
i
I
I in the pre-nuclear era. Such, I believe, is the problem of
i
American-Soviet diplomacy in the mid-nineteen sixties.
In the final chapter, I will try to indicate how
this formulation of the problem can be used in the con-
I
|struction of an analytical-integrative framework for the
i
|study of the communicative process.
j CHAPTER VI
I
i
i
AN ANALYTICAL-INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
; STUDY OF THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS
j
The manner in which a problem is conceived, in
large part, determines what will be considered as relevant
i
i
|within the problematic situation. As the problem of Ameri
can-Soviet diplomacy was formulated in the last chapter, I
i
i
would expect that the major policy-makers will attempt to
!follow policies that will advance the objectives of their
I
own nations, but, because of their perceptions of the
I
I
dangers of nuclear war, I would also expect that they will
j
increasingly modify the mode and pace with which they try
to implement these objectives. To the degree that the
I
problematic situation within the contemporary American-
j
Soviet relationship has been realistically characterized
and to the extent that the problem therein has been
I adequately formulated, a focal point for inquiry will have
I
I
jbeen established. My thesis in the present chapter is that
I
this focal point can help indicate how the general
: ________ 254______________ ______________
255
principles of a method of inquiry are to be applied to the
|investigation of one specific aspect within the problematic
|
jsituation: namely, the communicative process.
According to the position taken in Chapter IV, the
function of the concept "perspectives" was specified as:
the making of the analytical divisions within the subject
matter. I take the position in this chapter that the study
t
of the communicative process in relation to the problem of
I American-Soviet diplomacy requires perspectives within the
international, national, and individual ranges. Each of
the following three sections discusses one of these per-
I
spectives (or ranges of perspectives) in terms of (1) the
problem of American-Soviet diplomacy in relation to the
transactional situation, (2) the system in relation to the
problem and to the transactional situation, and (3) the
relation of each system to the communicative process. The
i
fourth section of this chapter indicates, first, which
I
j
directions research will have to take in order for an
I
I
integrated theory of the communicative process to develop,
i
j and, second, how a theory of the communicative process can
jbe integrated within, and, at the same time, contribute to
a general theory of international relations. The final
section presents a general summary of what has been
256
undertaken in this dissertation and describes the manner
in which this task was performed.
The International Perspective
i The transactional conception of the subject matter
i
postulates the existential world as one vast web of intri
cately connected processes: actors, actions, and environ-
i
|ment are all processes and all are interwoven into one
!
Ipattern of activity. Over half a century ago Arthur
Bentley proclaimed:
j We have one great moving process to study, and of
! this great moving process it is impossible to
state any part except as valued in terms of other
| parts. This is as true of talk activities as of
I any other activities.^
r
!The transactional conception of the subject matter means
j
that the observer should begin inquiry by applying a
|holistic frame of reference upon the existential reality
i
1 surrounding the problematic situation. It means that, in
|
order to comprehend the nature of this reality or some
l
problem arising within that reality, the observer must
1Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A
Study of Social Pressures (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1908), p. 178.
257
periodically relate his partial perceptions of the subject
matter back to the broader transactional frame of reference,
Without selecting a particular problem as a guide
to inquiry, one would have to say that the transactional
situation at the international level encompasses all
i
|nations, all peoples, all physical features, and all events
!
!
transpiring over an indefinite period of time. Such a con
ception of the transactional situation thus would be nearly
equivalent to Quincy Wright's idea of the "geographical
;field." In explaining what he meant by this concept,
Professor Wright wrote: "The geographical approach locates
i
i
the peoples and groups of the world and their characteris-
|tics, motivations, actions, institutions, and the conditions
I 2
jin actual time and space." Any actual attempt to con
struct a description of "reality" upon the dimensions of
the geographical field would surely founder upon the
‘enormity and indeterminateness of the task. The reason for
|
ithis indeterminateness can be found, I believe, in Profes-
i
sor Wright's failure to relate his concept of the geogra-
j
phical field to the actual problems arising within the
2
^Quincy Wrxght, The Study of International Rela-
i tions (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955) , p. 540.
258
subject matter of international relations.
By first formulating a problem, as was done in the
last chapter, it is possible to reduce greatly the size and
complexity of the transactional situation considered as
relevant to the purpose of analysis. In the first place,
the formulated problem signifies that the relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States are to be in the
central focus. Even within these relations, a further
delimitation applies: only those relations which are
t
crucial to such issues as national security, national expan
j
sion, and the prevention of nuclear war can be regarded as
pertinent to the problem; thus to be considered germane to
I
I
j the problem, a factor must be potentially related to it in
{an important way.
j
While it is the essence of the transactional con
ception to see all subject matters in all their inter
connectedness , efficient inquiry normally requires that
I judgments be made in terms of pertinence and that factors
j
jbe eliminated from description whenever they are judged to
I
i
be lacking in significance— significance to be determined
by the problem under investigation. This was also the con
clusion of Arthur Bentley when he wrote: "But where values
become too trifling we can profitably ignore them; rather
259
we must ignore them if we are to make any progress in sci
entific inquiry."3
According to the way in which the meaning of
1
"perspectives" was specified in Chapter IV, the number of
possible perspectives was held to be infinite, though for
international relations research it was suggested that all
perspectives could be included within the international,
national, and individual ranges of perspectives. The
international perspective in regard to the problem of
IAmerican-Soviet diplomacy would require the observer to
:assume a position with respect to the problematic situa
tion which would allow him to survey the behavior of the
Soviet and American policy-makers in their interrelation
ship with one another and with their environments. In
other words, the observer's scope of observation would be
equivalent to a two-nation "slice" of the entire trans
actional situation which encompasses all the nations of the
world.
I
i The international system. The problem of American-
Soviet diplomacy suggests that the appropriate system
within the above scope of observation should be conceived
3Bentley, 178.
260
so as to include only the actions of American and Soviet
leaders which are significantly related to the problem.^
Thus, only a relatively few policy-makers on each side
would need to be regarded as participants within the sys
tem. Moreover, only that portion of each policy-maker's
total behavior which is actually involved with some aspect
of the problem should be considered as constituting part
of the system. For example, a portion of a policy-makers
behavior might be principally concerned with some other
foreign or domestic problem bearing little or no connec
tion with the problem of American-Soviet diplomacy.
One can say, therefore, that the nature of the
problem provides the conceptual focus of inquiry. What
provides the observational focus at the international
perspective is the pattern of interaction between the
i
I policy-makers of the two nations. Thus, by using the
j
I problem as a conceptual instrument, it should be possible
to determine which part of the interaction pattern and which
part of the behaviors of the policy-makers should be
^Throughout the rest of this chapter, the word
"problem" will be underlined whenever it is used to refer
to the problem of American-Soviet diplomacy which was
formulated in Chapter V.
261 i
i
included within the international system.
The conception of international system boundaries
must, of course, take cognizance of the fact that these
boundaries are flexible. The overall dimensions of such
boundaries are almost certain to expand during periods of
acute crisis and to dilate during periods of relative calm.
Furthermore, over a course of time the actions of other
individual policy-makers are apt to enter the system while
the behavior of other policy-makers will cease to be a part
of the system. Moreover, at particular times, the behavior
of policy-makers of a third state or even of an internation
al organization may acquire such outstanding significance in
relation to the problem that the boundaries of the inter
national system under analysis will have to be temporarily
expanded to include such behavior. During the course of
the Korean War, for instance, the intervention of the
Chinese Communists into the conflict was so significant to
the overall issues of expansion, security, and avoidance
of nuclear war that it would be awkward to analyze this
problem solely in terms of an American-Soviet pattern of
diplomacy. But as far as the overall, long-run pattern of
the functioning of the international system is concerned,
the behavior of the Soviet and American policy-makers will
262
be consistently included within this international system;
whereas, the behavior of other policy-makers will not.
This conception of the international system implies
a set of boundaries which encompasses the behavior of both
the American and Soviet policy-makers— at least to the
extent that such behavior significantly pertains to the
problem. The actions of the two sets of policy-makers do
not transpire in isolation from one another. It is the
!
i ;
jessence of observation at the international perspective to |
! " j
ifocus upon the interrelatedness of these two patterns of
action: whenever these two patterns intertwine, they
become part of the interaction process. A considerable
portion of a policy-maker's behavior may be relevant to I
i
the problem without becoming a direct part of the inter-
I
jaction process. As an illustration of this point, one
! might consider the role of Robert Kennedy during the latter
l
i i
days of the Cuban crisis. On the day that Premier Khrush
chev had apparently negated previous trends toward settle- !
i ;
ment by proposing that American missile bases in Turkey be
jdismantled in exchange for the Soviet removal of missile
I bases in Cuba, Robert Kennedy suggested to the President
that the previous Soviet "offers" for settlement be j
i
accepted and that the Turkey-Cuba message be ignored.
263
When the President sent a message incorporating this sug
gestion, the Soviet leaders agreed to this arrangement.^
|Although the action of Robert Kennedy clearly constituted
I i
i ;
a part of the behavior of the American policy-making unit j
at the time, it only became a part of the interaction >
process indirectly.
j
It is not at all necessary for a policy-maker to j
I
i
intend that his behavior become a part of the interaction j
; I
process; it is even possible that the policy-maker may be
unaware that his actions have been interpreted by the other
jpolicy-maker as forming a part of the interaction process.
j !
i ( j
jThis may well have been the case in regard to the "peri-
j
meter" speeches made by General Douglas MacArthur and
i
Secretary Dean Acheson prior to the Korean War.® By draw
ing lines of defense which excluded Korea, these two leader^
i
imay have inadvertently encouraged the Soviet policy-makers
to conclude that the United States would not assist South
^Roger Hilsman, "The Cuban Crisis: How Close We
Iwere to War," Look, XXVIII (August 25, 1964), 19-20.
i
I For reference to General MacArthur's speech see:
iAllen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 39. For reference to Secretary
Acheson's speech see: U. S., Department of State, "Crisis
in Asia— An Examination of U. S. Policy," (Speech by
Secretary Acheson before the National Press Club, Washing
ton, D. C., January 12, 1950), Bulletin, XXII (January 23,
1950), 116.
264
Korea, if that country were attacked by communist forces. |
From this analysis, it would appear that for a policy
maker's action or the results of such action to become a
i
i
part of the interaction process it must affect in some way
the opposite set of policy-makers— even if such effect
i
consists merely of being heard or seen.7
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the core of j
a system at the international perspective is the on-going |
i |
process of interaction. Such a system is more than the
imere addition of the activity of two sets of policy-makers.
On this point, Bentley declared:
! We are not able to take up for consideration any
activity as complete in itself. If we attempt it
we have a corpse, or rather a fragment of a corpse, ;
in our hands, and that is poor material for study.
; The activities are interlaced.®
j
Although the thrust of analysis tends to spot-
; i
light each action separately, the analyst using the sys-
I
I
Items model at the international perspective must constantly
search out the relationship which the individual action
i |
bears to other individual actions as well as to the overallj
I pattern or process of developing action. Such an analytical
i !
I---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------H
7For a more complete explanation of this point see !
pp. 266-268. j
I 8 I
; ^Bentley, 177-178.
265
approach demands a certain circularity in perception and
interpretation; each action must be seen as a possible
stimulus and a possible response, as a potential cause and
a potential effect. More than anything else, the concep
tion of a system at the international perspective should
lead to a comprehension of the gross configuration of the
pattern of interaction surrounding the problem. ;
All actions which are not a part of the behavior of
I |
the two sets of policy-makers should be regarded as exter-
i
I
I
nal to the international system. This does not imply that
I the behavior of other national policy-makers such as those
1 I
j j
I of Great Britain or China cannot significantly influence j
i 1
I i
;the functioning of the international system. It does not j
i !
deny that the physical context sets certain limitations and
provides certain possibilities for the development of the
i I
!pattern of interaction. It does not even mean that private
individuals cannot have an important influence upon the
functioning of the international system. What this state-
! i
jment does imply is that all these other actions, conditions^
I and influences have their effect on the international sys- '
j 1
■tem by transversing the boundaries of the system. |
I Actually, the systems analyst must devote his
i '
!attention both to the internal process of behavior and to
266
the external exchanges which the system has with its envi
ronment. It is the conception of system boundaries which
j provides the focal point for the analysis of these
exchanges. Systems analysis should never be regarded as
positing an artificial dualism upon the existential world—
I 1
a dualism which would set the system apart from its environ-f
ment. One must always remember that the conception of
I
system is merely a tool of analysis which allows the j
researcher to approach the subject matter with a methodic ;
i
plan of investigation. !
! |
; j
The international system and the communicative
process. The pattern of interaction which lies at the core!
of the international system is_ the communicative process. j
i
|
jActions of the policy-makers which become part of the
I !
interaction process directly are inherently "communicative"j
i
in the common sense meaning of that term. In other words,
the actions of a policy-maker which become part of the
interaction process directly are usually found in the form j
i !
i
I of speeches, statements, notes, cables, or documents. Even
many of the policy-maker's actions which enter the inter-
j ]
!action process indirectly are "communicative" in the common!
| I
i
I
sense meaning of the term. Thus, Robert Kennedy's advisory
267
statements to the President during the Cuban crisis, which
were referred to above, were communicative acts.
A somewhat broader meaning of "communicative" must, !
I i
!
however, be prescribed if certain other indirect actions of ;
i
I
the policy-makers are to be covered by that term. Perhaps
i
the following illustration will help to clarify what is
implied here. In the early stages of the Cuban crisis,
Soviet ships headed in the direction of Cuba suddenly j
veered off course. Information reporting this action soon
I :
reached (was perceived by) the American policy-makers.
i
Undoubtedly, the American policy-makers inferred that the
I '
ships veered off course because their officers had receivedj
1 I
j i
jorders from Soviet policy-makers. In other words, the
i
|actions taken by the ships was considered to be evidence
|signifying that the Soviet policy-makers had communicated
some message to the officers on board the ship. The ori-
] j
Iginal actions taken by the Soviet policy-makers were almost;
! j
|certainly to have been in verbal form, although the actual j
;resulting actions perceived by the Americans were non
verbal in form. The conception of the communicative pro-
j cess which is presented in this dissertation encompasses
! • !
I both the direct and the indirect, verbal and non-verbal
i
actions which are taken by one set of policy-makers and
268
which are later perceived either in their direct or j
indirect form by the other set of policy-makers.
In order to achieve an overall comprehension of
the process of interaction within the scope of observation
j
provided at the international perspective, the analyst's
view must encompass both the actions which are obviously
; i
communicative and those which are only indirectly so. Any
analysis of the communicative process which only reports a
'description of those actions that are verbal in form or
I
that are non-verbal in form must be regarded as a trun
cated version of the communicative process.
i I
! To sum up, one can say that the problem of Ameri
can-Soviet diplomacy suggests a two-nation international
iperspective which provides a scope of observation encom- j
passing a transactional situation. Within this transaction-j-
I
ial situation, it is possible to use an international sys-
I
terns model to specify and study the behavior of the American
and Soviet policy-makers which is significantly related to
! j
|the problem. At the core of this international system, one:
lean locate a process of interaction; this process of inter-j
|
action has been named the "communicative process." j
I I
1 i
i i
| j
I
269
The National Perspectives
! The transactional situation. The scope of observa-
!
tion which was revealed from the international perspective
indicates the outer limits for the scopes of observation
jfrom the national perspectives. Had the international per
spective included all the nations of the world, then the
scopes of inquiry at the national perspective range would
|be in excess of one hundred; but where the international |
jperspective has been delimited so as to encompass only two
nations, then, of course, only two scopes of observation
jare necessary. One of these scopes of observation would '
I !
I j
I have as its focus the behavior of the American policy- j
|making unit; the other would have as its focus the behavior
I of the Soviet policy-making unit. Whenever an occasion
|arose where the behavior of other national policy-making
I !
|units became significantly involved with the problem, it
j
would probably be desirable to investigate such behavior
I
ithrough the use of additional national perspectives. The !
i
i
Korean War, as a problematic situation to be analyzed,
I
provides an illustrative example where analysis would prob
ably be aided if an additional national perspective were
i
jemployed so that attention could be focused upon the
270
behavior of the Chinese policy-making unit.
To some extent, the relevant transactional situa
tion at each national perspective would overlap the trans-
i
i
actional situation at the other national perspective. Thus*
if one conceives a transactional situation surrounding the
American policy-making unit and a transactional situation
surrounding the Soviet policy-making unit, certain features
would be common to both situations. Because each scope of I
J i
iobservation from the national perspectives incorporates a
I :
I !
more limited segment of existential reality than would the 1
I i
| |
scope of observation from the international perspective,
the analyst would undoubtedly wish to examine more detail
within this type of transactional situation. j
|
The national systems. Each national system con-
i
sists of the behavior of the policy-makers which pertain
to the problem. The attention of the researcher at this
scope of inquiry should be focused upon the process of
I i
;internal interaction which transpires within the national
!policy-making unit and which significantly relates to the
I
i problem under investigation. Although the international
jsystem would include the same data as would the two
'national systems, the researcher’s treatment of the data
271
at the national level would be different in two respects.
First, his focus of attention would shift from the inter
action process transpiring between the two policy-making
units to the interaction process transpiring between the
individual policy-makers who constitute the particular
j
policy-making unit. And second, because the focus of his
attention would be upon the interaction process between the
I individual policy-makers, he should be able to subject this
1 j
process to a more complete analysis.
Taken together, the two national systems are
exactly equivalent to the international system; or, in
other words, the international system (because it is a two-
i
|nation system) can be divided into two sub-systems. !
j
According to the above conception of the national system, j
!
one set of system boundaries would be located at the center!
I
I
of the international interaction process; in other words,
this would be the point of division between the two nation-j
I
!
al systems. On the other side, a set of system boundaries j
;would be located between the national system's actions and
[ its environment. (From the point of view of one national
| system, the other national system would also be considered ;
as part of its environment.) By including only the \
|
policy-makers' actions which pertain to the problem, all
272
their other actions would be considered as external to the
system. From the standpoint of the national system, all
|actions of a policy-maker which pertains to the problem
i
! I
and which affect some other policy-maker within the system
can be regarded as part of the internal interaction pro
cess; all the policy-makers' actions (whether these actions:
i
involve transmission or reception of messages) in reference j
i
to the system's environment are to be regarded as j
■ i
|"exchanges."
i
i
Whether or not an individual should be considered
I
|
as a participant within a policy-making unit cannot be
determined by reference to the formal organizational struc-I
! i
i
ture alone. During the Korean War, for instance, General
MacArthur played a major role, not only in the administra
tion of American policy, but also in its formulation.
Although it would be impossible to consider that he
j
I
belonged to any institutionalized foreign policy-making
organization, he would surely have to be considered as a
i
participant in the policy-making process. Consequently,
|for the purposes of this analytical framework, a person
j
ishould be regarded as a participant within the national i
I ' |
! I
|system if his behavior in regard to the problem constitutes|
i j
j a significant part of the internal interaction process
within that system.
To a considerable extent, a policy-making system
can be regarded as an information-handling system. Analyses
of the system processes at the national levels should
reveal several sub-processes which pertain to the handling
of information. First, there are acts of "perceiving":
such acts can be conceived of as involving little more than
focusing attention upon the message. Second, there are acts
of "interpreting": such acts can be thought of as assigning
meaning to the message itself and to ascribing significance
to the message in regard to the contextual situation in
which it was transmitted and received. Third, there are
acts of "deliberating": such acts can be regarded as
involving the consideration of the significance and meaning
of the message in relation to objectives and in relation to
possible modes of response. Fourth, there are acts of
"choosing": these acts involve the selection of an alterna
tive response and the rejection of others. Fifth, there
are acts of "transmitting": these acts involve the issuing
of some message which may be directed toward the other
national policy-making unit or to some other person or
group outside the national policy-making system.
274
All of these sub-processes take place within the
central nervous systems of the respective policy-makers.
I The only evidence of these processes which the analyst can
i
|possibly observe lies in the communicative acts of the
jpolicy-makers. Of these communicative acts, the preponder-
i
ant portion will constitute the internal system of inter
action. Unless the observer happens to be a member of the
policy-making system, his opportunities for observing this J
internal pattern of interaction directly are practically
nil; he will usually have to be content with second-hand
accounts which may not be available until years after the
i 1
|occurrence of the given events. But some of the communica-j
I i
tive acts of the policy-makers will be directed beyond the j
national policy-making system's boundaries. For instance,
!
|some messages will be directed to domestic audiences with
■ i
'merely the intent to inform, but other messages may direct
I
individuals or groups to take certain action, such as the
orders issued to military commanders. Still other messages
iwill be directed to non-domestic individuals and groups,
such as the allied and non-committed national policy-making
i
I ;
junits.
I I
j '
The national system and the communicative process. :
Of all the messages which are transmitted by^a national i
275
policy-making system beyond that system's boundaries, only
those messages which are actually perceived by some policy-
i maker within the opposite policy-making system can be
I
I
regarded as constituting a part of the communicative pro
cess. As it was pointed out earlier, some of these messages
j can become a part of the communicative process even if it
i
[were not the intent of the sender to direct these messages
|to the opposite policy-maker. Conversely, messages which
i
I
are transmitted to the opposite policy-making unit, but
I |
which are not, for some reason, perceived by some member of
j ;
that unit, cannot become a part of the communicative pro-
i
cess. |
I
I j
j Of the five sub-processes of the national policy- j
jmaking process, the international communicative process is j
! i
|manifest at the perception and transmission stages. The
i
i
[processes of interpreting, deliberating, and choosing are
j
jnot properly parts of the communicative process. However,
I
|because the messages which make up the communicative pro-
I !
cess are the product of all five stages of the policy-
i
[making process, an adequate theory of the communicative
i
!process would have to account for each of these sub-
!
!
processes within each policy-making unit.
276
The Individual Policy-Maker Perspectives
The transactional situation. The individual policy
maker perspectives should permit the analyst to focus his
attention upon the actions of each individual policy-maker--^
j
'to the extent that these actions actually pertain to the
problem. The relevant transactional situation from these j
i
perspectives should be indicated by the nature of this type j
j i
iof focus. To a considerable extent, the transactional
t
I
[situation surrounding each individual policy-maker will
i
[overlap the transactional situations of other individual
policy-makers constituting the national policy-making unit. 1
I
! I
Because of the narrower scope of observation which is pre- [
i !
sented from the individual policy-maker perspectives, the [
analyst should have the opportunity to consider the trans
actional situation more thoroughly than he would from eithet
I
the international or national perspectives. j
i
i
j
The individual policy-maker systems. The individ-
[ual policy-maker system consists of the behavior of an
individual which is significantly related to the problem,
jThe broadest possible extension of this system's boundaries
i
would be set by the overall breadth of his actions. But ;
because only a part of a policy-maker's overall actions are
277
likely to pertain to the problem/ there is a need to con
ceive of a boundary lying between his behavior which is
relevant to the problem and his behavior which is not.
The internal interaction process involved at this
i
perspective is equivalent to that part of the individual's
thinking process which is related to the problem. Direct
: I
observation of this process is of course impossible. Any
: J
attempt to reconstruct this process— such as the efforts i
j
i
|to describe a policy-maker's "world image"— can only be
!
!accomplished by making inferences from the policy-maker's
observed behavior in relation to his particular transaction-j-
al situation. Such reconstructions may be invaluable in !
i
trying to understand why a policy-maker has behaved in a
i
certain manner; however, the tenuous nature of this type of
!
explanation must always be kept in mind.
i The possible scopes of observation which are indi-
i j
cated at this perspective are quite numerous since each |
Soviet and American policy-maker could be a center of i
i !
|focus. Because of this, an account of the system at this
I level may be more useful if it were based on a more
generalized model. For example, a system's description ,
i
could consist of a set of generalizations describing the j
|
behavior of the "typical" Soviet and the "typical" Americani
278
policy-maker. Such generalized models may prove less
cumbersome whenever an attempt is made to relate accounts
!of the individual policy-maker systems to the descriptions
i
of the national and international systems.
The individual system and the communicative pro
cess . The individual policy-maker1s actions become part
of the communicative process only when they are perceived
j directly or indirectly by a policy-maker of the opposite
!
|national policy-making unit. It is quite conceivable that
a policy-maker may play a significant role in the policy
making process without any of his actions being directly
observed by the opposite set of policy-makers. The actions
of Robert Kennedy during the Cuban crisis, which were men
tioned earlier in this chapter, illustrate this point. A
somewhat similar situation is involved when a policy-maker
takes certain actions— issues orders— which in turn causes
non-policy-makers to perform other actions. If these
latter actions are perceived by the opposite policy-
|
makers, then it is reasonable to assume that they will
\infer that such actions are the result of the decisions
i
i
made by that nation's policy-makers. In these kinds of
situations, one can say that the policy-maker's actions
279
become part of the communicative process indirectly.
Toward an Integrated Theory of the
I
f
Communicative Process
! The analytical framework which has been described
thus far is intended as a plan of investigation for the
entire communicative process which transpires within the
iAmerican-Soviet relationship— as that relationship per-
i
i
|tained to the problem which was formulated in the last
chapter. This conception of the communicative process is
I clearly not intended to apply merely to the formal negotiat-*-
f !
i :
ling process nor is it intended to account for only the
direct and verbal communicative acts. All acts which are
perceived by either a Soviet or American policy-maker and
I
which the policy-maker can attribute as being caused by the i
I
opposite policy-makers can be a part of the communicative
process. J
My position at this point is that indeterminateness j
i ;
in this type of inquiry can be avoided only by relating
i
j i
|the results of investigation and theorization to some con-
I I
!crete human problem involving real human needs. A clearly
!
formulated problem should therefore be regarded as a
280
prerequisite to efficient inquiry. The manner in which a
problem is formulated is bound to shape the whole process
of inquiry, for its formulation provides the clues or
insights concerning what is to be done in accomplishing its
resolution.
In the construction of this analytical framework, the
concept of "perspectives" was one of the two major analyti
cal devices employed. This concept provided the method forj
i
outlining the major divisions to be made within the subject;
matter. The problem, as formulated in Chapter V, suggested'
the clues concerning which perspectives would be the most
appropriate. For instance, the two-nation international
perspective was indicated by the fact that the Soviet Union
and the United States have been the dominant nations with |
|reference to the problem. The two national perspectives, ;
which focused upon the foreign-policy making units, were j
I i
i selected because most foreign policy decisions within these
two nations have been formulated by individual men working
I ;
iwithin group situations. The individual policy-maker
!perspective was selected because of the realization that
I
j
j all communicative actions originate within the thinking
!
j processes of individual men; in order to comprehend the
meanings of a policy-maker's communicative acts, inferences'
281
must be made .concerning his thinking processes.
One of the first steps in the direction of an
integrated theory of the communicative process would be
the linking of these perspectives with one another.
jBecause all individual perspectives are included within
some national perspective, and all national perspectives
are included within the international perspective, and
because the inquiry centers around the same problem, the
linkage of these perspectives should not prove too diffi
cult. One task would involve the search for the continui
ties of one factor which could be traced from one perspec- j
tive to another. A second task would be to locate areas of |
~~ I
I 1
i
compatibility— that is, situations where no line of con- |
tinuity can be traced but where no conflict arises either, j
; j
The third task would involve a search for contradictions;
i
normally such contradictions will arise because of inaccur- j
I
ate observations or faulty conceptualization. |
i
I
The concept of "systems" was the other major j
janalytical device employed. Above all, this concept
'derives from idea that subject matters are processes. By
conceiving all the subject matter surrounding the problem-
jatic situation as processes, it was possible to think of an
! i
jinterlaced pattern which extended from the brain-processes
282
of the policy-maker to the actual messages which flowed
between the two nations. Similar to the concept of perspec
tives , the concept of system envisages the inclusion of
all individual policy-maker systems within some national
policy-making system, and all national policy-making sys-
I
terns within the international system. In regard to each
system, the formulated problem provided the clues for the
designation of system boundaries. J
"System" is to be distinguished from "perspective"
by the fact that "perspective" refers to a scope of obser
vation embodying an entire transactional situation; where
as, "system" refers to a particular process within the
transactional situation. Systems analysis is a means for
'
the investigation of some process apart from its contextual;
i
i
(or transactional) situation. An integrated theory of this
!process would necessarily require that the relationship
I
between that process and the other processes within the
i
transactional situation be established.
j My position is that an integrated theory of the
; communicative process can be developed through the applica-
i
!
jtion of this analytical framework. Its application can be
i
i ;
directed in two research directions. First, it can be
applied to empirical studies based on the actual pattern of
283
American-Soviet relations. Such studies should result in
sets of existential propositions which could be related to
one another through the use of this framework. One should,
of course, anticipate that enormous gaps will remain with
in this framework because it will be impossible to formulate
j
existential propositions in areas where governmental
secrecy prevails or where data is not available concerning J
i
the thinking processes of the individual policy-makers. To j
I
|some extent, these gaps can be filled through the use of
|what might be called the "comparative" approach. The
analytical framework can be applied with reference to the
;studies conducted and the theorizing performed in other
disciplines. Thus, from studies involving cultural,
sociological, and psychological factors in other problem
I :
|areas, it may be possible to derive insights which would
help the international relationist to realize the poten-
i
I . !
!tialities m his own subject matter. The analytical divi-
i
i
sions made through the use of the concept of perspectives
should signify at which level a particular contributing
-
study or theory might be applicable. Moreover, the use
of systems analysis should facilitate the comparison of
i
i the systems within international relations with systems in j
j
other areas. By integrating both existential and conceptual
284
propositions into the analytical framework, gaps should be
progressively eliminated, and, perhaps eventually, it
could develop into a comprehensive theory of the communica-I
tive process.
Such a theory of the communicative process should
provide a basis for prediction and control. It should be
possible to formulate hypotheses in the if-then form based
upon (1) the projection of trends suggested by the existen-
j
jtial propositions and by (2) the insights concerning pos
sible modes of action derived from the conceptual proposi
tions. The relevance of a particular hypothesis should be
determined by inquiring as to what extent it helps to
i
I
j resolve the problem. By combining "predictive" hypotheses j
i !
| !
j with propositions which state desired objectives (derived !
■ from the formulation of the problem) it should be possible
!to formulate sets of "prescriptive” propositions, the
| ;
I object of which would be the resolution of the problem. I
i
i
[Finally, should the policy-makers actually adopt some of
|these prescriptive propositions, then it would be possible i
to observe whether or not these propositions actually '
I
I
!"work.” Where modifications seem to be indicated in the j
! i
application of such propositions, "administrative" proposi-|
tions might be formulated. Quite obviously, such a
285
conception of a theory of the communicative process implies j
a continuity in the process of inquiry.
It is my contention that a theory of the communica- j
!
tive process formulated through the application of this
j
analytical-integrative framework can provide the nucleus
for the emergence of a general theory of international rela-*
tions. In the first place, this analytical-integrative
framework has been devised on the basis of a method of
inquiry whose scope was formulated with reference to
i
research within the entire discipline of international
I relations. If international relationists were to conduct
their inquiries using this or a similar method of inquiry,
then the integration of their findings into a coherent body|
of knowledge could possibly be accomplished. In the second
I
place, this analytical-integrative framework for the study
of the communicative process is directed toward the formu
lation of a theory which would embody both empirical and j
normative aspects of inquiry; this, I believe, should also
i
! !
|be regarded as a requirement for a general theory of inter-!
jnational relations. And finally, the problem of American-
|Soviet diplomacy as formulated in Chapter V is, I believe, ,
i
| one of the truly significant problems of contemporary inter-)-
i
national affairs. If a theory such as that of the
286
communicative process can be used as one means of resolving
the issues of security, expansion, and the prevention of
nuclear warfare within the American-Soviet relationship,
then a model will have been provided for the investigation
and possible resolution of other related problems. It is
I
through such a process of problem-centered inquiry that I
believe the growth of a general theory of international
relations can take place.
i
i
Summary
My attention was focused upon the communicative
iprocess because of the observation that communications
I
between opposing sets of policy-makers often appeared to
determine whether international conflict was to be pre-
i
i ;
.vented, controlled, or expanded. At the outset, the nature
j
of this subject indicated two possible avenues of research:
one pointed toward empirical investigations of past con-
I
i j
!flict situations; the other pointed toward an examination j
> 1
of theoretical studies that had been undertaken in inter-
i
!
national relations and related disciplines. But in my
j |
survey of the recent literature, X was unable to find a
systematic method of inquiry which could be used to conduct;
287
analyses within these two areas and which could be used to
integrate the results of such analyses into the general
body of knowledge within the discipline.
The absence of such a method of inquiry within
international relations suggested the problem for this
study. One part of this problem was whether a method of
inquiry for the discipline as a whole could be formulated
|in the course of developing a procedure for investigating
jthe specific subject of the communicative process. The
i
i
lother part of this problem was whether a procedure for the
j
investigation of the communicative process could be
developed which would be applicable to empirical and
! theoretical subject matters and which would provide a
formula for integrating a theory of the communicative pro-
jcess into a general theory of international relations.
The first part of this dissertation formulated a
t
method of inquiry for international relations. In the
second chapter the recent writings of selected theorists
of international relations were reviewed and evaluated with
! respect to four methodological questions. The first ques-
|
Ition was concerned with devising analytical procedures, or
i
more specifically, with constructing a classification
system, of selecting an appropriate model, and in utilizing
288
perspectives. The second question pertained to the use
to be made of theories and studies which had been conducted
i
|in other disciplines. The third question dealt with proce-
jdures to be used in integrating the results of particular
!studies into the general body of knowledge within the
discipline. The fourth question referred to the "value"
problem in international relations research— of how the
value positions of the actors and of the researcher are
I
to be treated during inquiry and how the functions of the
researcher are to be conceived in relation to the policy-
imaking process. Following this review, a statement of the
scientific method was summarized in the third chapter from
i
|the writings of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. Four
j
ifeatures of their theory of inquiry were stressed: the
|
1
;conception of the knowing process from a naturalistic
i
I frame of reference, the transactional conception of the
j J
|subject matter, the explanation of inquiry as instrumental
i
I
I in resolving problematic situations, and the description of
|the use of logical forms in scientific investigations. In
the fourth chapter, this statement of the scientific method
was applied to the four methodological questions that were
i
]
j posed within the second chapter in order to formulate a
J method of inquiry for the discipline of international
289
relations.
The purpose of the last two chapters' has been the
construction of an analytical-integrative framework for
the study of the communicative process. In the fifth
chapter, the problem of the communicative process involved
i
in the current diplomatic relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union was formulated. From a survey
of recent writings on the subject of Soviet-American rela
tions a select group of propositions was formulated
according to four aspects of the problematic situation:
i
the overall situation, the nature of the Soviet threat, the
nuclear danger, and the American response and present posi-
i
tion. Each of these propositions was in turn evaluated
and a statement of the problem was made from the proposi
tions retained after this evaluation.
In the last chapter the problem formulated in
Chapter V was used with the method of inquiry developed in
Chapter IV in order to construct an analytical-integrative
I framework. The principal concepts employed in constructing
(the analytical portion of this framework were perspectives,
I the transactional situation, and the systems model. In
I
I
|the section immediately preceding this summary, I have
explained how the analytical framework could be used to
290
integrate the results of analysis into a comprehensive
theory of the communicative process and how this theory of
the communicative process could contribute to the develop
ment of a general theory of international relations.
I
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
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294 j
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DeWeerd, Harvey A. "Effects of Nuclear Weapons: Consider
ations of Limitations and Control," Lecture and
discussion in the Seminar on American Foreign
Policy (University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, November 14, 1957).
Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Oxford English Dictionary.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Knapp, Ray Bronson (author)

Core Title A Method Of Inquiry For International Relations With A Special Application To The Study Of The Communicative Process

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Berkes, Rose N. (committee chair), Christol, Carl Q. (committee member), Hadley, Paul E. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-108832

Unique identifier UC11359851

Identifier 6702112.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-108832 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6702112.pdf

Dmrecord 108832

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Knapp, Ray Bronson

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA