University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Group Problem-Solving In The Metropolitan Community

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Group Problem-Solving In The Metropolitan Community

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Content This dissertation has b een m icrofilm ed exactly as received 6 7 — 2 1 0 4 CHITWOOD, Stephen Reed, 1940- GROUP PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY, U n iversity of Southern C alifornia, Ph.D ., 1 9 6 6 P olitical S cien ce, public adm inistration University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan C Copyright by Stephen Reed Chitwood 1967 GROUP PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY by Stephen Reed Chitwood A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Public Administration) June 1966 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCH O O L UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, C A LIFO RN IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ...................STEPHEN REED _ _ G H IT W O 0 D...................... under the direction of hX?—.Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y .... Dean Date J u n .? I 2* * g g G p M M IT T E E Chairman / 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 Statement of the Problem Theoretical Framework of the Study Study Objectives, Methods of Research, and Data Collection II. THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL .... 21 Introduction The Evolution of Problem-Solving Roles Roles Related to the Problem-Solving Activities Roles Arising from the Dynamics of the Problem-Solving Process Problem-Solving Roles and Problem-Solving Action Factors Related to Group Role Assumption, Role Behavior, and Role Fulfillment Summary III. PHASE I: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND Introduction Part I: The Birth of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Part II: The Metropolitan Transit Authority Becomes an Operating Agency Part III: The MTA Enlarges Its Powers Part IV: The Origin of the Southern California Rapid Transit District SOLUTION GENERATION 46 ii Chapter Page IV. DETERRENTS TO PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND SOLUTION GENERATION ......................... 154 Introduction Problem-Related Environmental Factors Group Factors Group Interaction Factors Summary V. SOLUTION RATIFICATION ......................... 182 Introduction Part I: The Establishment of the MTA Part II: The MTA Becomes an Operating Agency Part III: The MTA Enlarges Its Powers Part IV: The Origin of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Aftermath VI. DETERRENTS TO THE COMPLETION OF PHASE II: SOLUTION RATIFICATION ....................... 421 Introduction The State Legislature and Metropolitan Problem-Solving in California Legislative Action and Metropolitan Group Consensus Deterrents to Positive Group Consensus on Problem Solutions Deterrents Related to the Nature of Groups Enacting the Solution-Ratifier Role Summary VII. PHASE III: SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION- ADMINISTRATION ................................ 467 Introduction Solution I: The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 Solution II: The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 iii Chapter Page Solution III: The Enlargement of MTA Powers— Assembly Bill 264 3 Solution IV: The Southern California Rapid Transit District VIII. DETERRENTS TO SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION- ADMINISTRATION ............................. Introduction Phase III Deterrents Arising from Character istics of the Implementing Group Deterrents Arising from the Activities of Groups External to the Implementing Group Deterrents Arising from Various Environ mental Conditions and the Nature of the Problem Summary IX. ROLE STRATEGIES IN THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS ........................... Introduction Group Strategies for Enacting Roles Related to the Problem-Solving Activities Group Strategies for Enacting Roles Arising from the Dynamics of the Problem-Solving Process Summary X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .................... Problem-Solving in the Metropolitan Community The Nature and Continuing Pattern of Metropolitan Problem-Solving: Some Observations Recommendations for Increasing the Group Effectiveness of Metropolitan Problem- Solving Role Accomplishment BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... iv 598 648 722 749 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Statement of the Problem Since the early 1920's and particularly following World War II, the Los Angeles metropolitan area has wit nessed an intense and dynamic urbanization unique in the history of the United States. Los Angeles has come to typify the concept of urban sprawl— a metropolitan area of vast geographical area, encompassing numerous and varied political jurisdictions and entities, possessing an inter dependent economy but competing commercial districts, and containing a myriad of self-identifying communities. Accompanying this phenomenon, and in great part arising therefrom, have been a host of social, political, and economic problems affecting the entire metropolis. These problems, if they are to be solved at all, require the concerted attention, thought, and action of the metropoli tan area as a whole. One such problem has been passenger transportation. 1 2 Preliminary indications of the Los Angeles Regional Transportation Study, conducted under the general coordina tion of the California Division of Highways, revealed in 1965 that completion of highway construction scheduled for the 1970's and 1980's would fail to provide the necessary facilities required to meet the transportation demands of those periods. If the Los Angeles area were to meet the challenge of its required transportation needs and achieve its growth potential, plans and action were needed to con front the challenge. One proposal to reduce the pending transportation dilemma had been recommended by the now defunct Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority and its successor organization, the Southern California Rapid Transit District. This proposal involved the introduction and development of rail rapid transit as a primary mover of persons within the Los Angeles area. It was the belief of this organization that a mass transit system was mandatory if the economic, commercial, and industrial potential of the city and region was to be approached. Why, then, if this is an accurate appraisal of the situation, has rapid transit in the Los Angeles area not proceeded in its devel opment at a faster pace? The essence of this question is indicative of a 3 still broader question facing Los Angeles and other metro politan communities. What impedes action directed toward the solution of metropolitan problems in general? The character of metropolitan problems will be discussed later in this chapter. However, certain observations on their general nature need to be made at this time. The first notable feature of these problems is that they tend to affect many groups within the metropolis, both public and private. The second item of importance is that the majority of past studies and analyses of such metropolitan problems as smog control, juvenile delinquency, and transportation primarily have emphasized the economic and technical aspects of these matters. As a consequence, the totality of the metropolitan problem-solving process including the many vital and relevant political, organizational, and adminis trative factors surrounding these questions have been neglected. In the pages to follow, the theoretical frame of reference used in this study will be set forth. It will readily be seen that the emphasis has been placed upon those factors which the author believes have been neglected in past studies of metropolitan problem-solving. The impor tance of these factors and the framework in which they have 4 been studied reflect certain assumptions made by the author. First, the metropolitan problem-solving process comprises a series of activities having enough independent identity to be studied. Each metropolitan problem-solving experience does not constitute a unique incident but contains elements in common with one another. Second, the metropolitan prob lem-solving process may be divided theoretically into three basic phases of activity: (1) Problem Identification and Solution Generation, (2) Solution Ratification, and (3) Solution Implementation and Administration. Furthermore, these activities are undertaken by groups rather than by isolated individuals. Finally, the factors which impede groups in the successful enactment of these problem-solving activities may be identified, thus increasing the probabil ity that they may be avoided through their anticipation or more readily eliminated through immediate identification. These assumptions underlie the theoretical framework of this study and are the basis for the empirical study of the metropolitan problem-solving process as it has been applied to the question of rapid transit in the Los Angeles metro politan area. 5 Theoretical Framework of the Study A social concept of metropolitan areas A metropolitan area can be conceived as a social system only when the geographical space comprising that area is a site for social interaction. And such an area can be considered a metropolitan community only when those who exist side-by-side share in some respects a common fate; only when the maintenance of the common scene and its necessary facilities is a requirement for all and its ne glect has repercussions on the constituent groups within that area. When this situation is reached, the various actors will share a common fate in the degree to which each is dependent upon some of the neighboring groups, whether as necessary conditions for continued operation or as pos sible blocks to the ongoing activities of the groups.*- Urbanization and its companion, the metropolitan area, have been propelled onto the American scene primarily through the process of increase in societal scale— the extension of the network of interdependence with a conse- *"Scott Greer, The Emerging City (New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 169. 6 quent coordination of behavior and resources and with increasing control over the environment. The organization al transformation of the society from a dispersed, rural population to highly concentrated population centers has followed the advancement of specialization and differentia- tion in our social and economic institutions. As society developed a higher degree of specification of purpose among its social units, it became increasingly necessary for these units to aggregate geographically to secure for their constituent members the needs and amenities of life. The process of specialization and differentiation and its cor responding process of social aggregation have produced an increasingly interdependent society. The organizational transformation of society which binds a metropolitan area in large networks of interdepend- ■ m ence makes possible and requires social control centers. At the same time, changes in the social organization which rest upon this interdependence produce drastic modifications of urban settlement and their corresponding control cen ters. Although the sheer size of metropolitan populations is impressive, two other trends carry equal significance: ^Ibid., p . 175. 7 (1) the increasing dispersion of population in space, and (2) the increasing dispersion and multiplication of control centers formulating the dominant decisions that affect an 3 area's order and shape. It is clear that increase in scale is apt to con tinue. The web of interdependence continues to grow with increasing specialization and differentiation of behavior and with increasingly complex mechanisms for integrating human behavior, but the organizational necessities that once produced spatial density and a high degree of local autonomy are no longer coercive. Innovations in communica tions and control make possible even further increase in scale and further conquest of geographical space. The growth and structure of the metropolitan area now becomes a dependent variable. Rather than the generator and limiting condition of increasing scale, the metropolitan area is simply the convenient spatial location for centers of con- 4 trol, work, and residence. Even though a metropolitan community is highly interdependent as a result of social and economic factors, it tends to be highly differentiated in other respects. 3Ibid., pp. 194-5. ^Ibid., pp. 195-6. Visually, this differentiation may be seen in the great variety of land uses present within the community. Even within one category of land use, residential, a great variety of neighborhoods may be detected. The various metropolitan populations, however, are differentiated on grounds other than just the geographical subareas estab lished for their residential neighborhoods and places of employment. They are also integrated within common schemes 5 of action. Of major importance in the latter is the organization for political action. The major characteristics of political organization within metropolitan areas are the multiplicity and over lapping of political jurisdictions. In some instances urbanized areas that once were separate and distinct have grown together and coalesced, while the legal limits of the governmental units have changed less rapidly. At other times, the population of an area has simply outgrown the boundaries of the local governmental jurisdiction estab lished to provide certain facilities and/or controls for that population. Such incongruence between governmental units and the citizenry which contributes to the need for ^Ibid., pp. 35-36. 9 and finances their services has been widened further by the the increased mobility of urban people. The automobile and the freeway have made it possible for people to criss cross governmental boundaries for work, shopping, and social activities. Thus, the social and economic inter dependence of various parts of the metropolitan area are no longer paralleled by linkages or close interrelationships among governments functioning within the area.^ Interdependent populations have, therefore, been divided into separate governments exhibiting a wide dis crepancy between the jurisdiction's electorate and its clients, its allocated tasks and its legal rights. When burdens affect the populations of many legal units there does not exist a ready means of ordering the relationships between the interested groups. As a result of this frag mentation, the processes of arbitrating differences between the basic functional groups of the metropolitan community, of maintaining and enforcing order, and of selecting and executing public policy is carried out in an extremely complex fashion. 6Winston W. Crouch, and others, California Govern ment and Politics (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren- tice-Hall, Inc., 1960), pp. 288-89. 10 Although political fragmentation has existed within the metropolitan community, social action of vast impor tance and sizable magnitude has continued to be forthcom ing. Social differentiation and specialization in the community has been integrated through social groups that, based upon the interdependence of many actors, have coor dinated their behavior through the flow of communication. A group, as the term is used here, does not simply refer to any aggregation of people. It refers to an aggregation existing in a state of interdependence, with a stable flow of communication and a consequent ordering of behavior. Thus, the group is a structure among individuals; its members may change while it persists, and it may disappear though its members may continue to exist in other group structures. Furthermore, the group must not be reified— no single group controls all of any person's actions, and some control very little. The bonds of a group are determined by the compliance of individuals with their duties as defined by the role system and the normative order of the group. One must then approach a social group through the aggregation of persons, not through the single individual. Therefore, in studying the organizational structure of a metropolitan area it is beneficial to translate uniform 11 behavior, that is, patterns persisting through time, into 7 the vocabulary of group analysis. Groups that make up the organizational system of a metropolitan area may be classified as (1) exclusive mem bership groups, and (2) inclusive spatial groups. Member ship in the latter groups is a function of a social unit's spatial location with all units coming within a given geographical area being included within the same spatial group. Members of exclusive groups, on the other hand, are selected on the basis of qualifications separate from geographical location. These latter groups require both an internal order and a predictable relationship with their external environment. Problems may arise at either point, but in this study problems deriving from a group's external relationships have been considered more crucial since they are more closely related to a discussion of the spatially inclusive group. This is because membership groups must locate somewhere and the localization of their activities means that (1) they automatically have neighbors, and (2) ^Greer, op. cit., pp. 36-37; and George Belknap, "A Plan for Research on the Socio-Political Dynamics of Metropolitan Areas," Working Papers on Metropolitan Affairs in California (California Conference on Metropolitan Affairs, August, 1957), pp. 24-44. 12 Q they are within the borders of an inclusive spatial group. Metropolitan problems; a definition The spatial arrangements of social groups necessi tate order. In the first place, the sheer contiguity of action creates, from overlapping sites, a common interest in the overall scene since the activities of one group may retard the goal accomplishment of another. In the second place, contiguous groups become necessary conditions for others' existence. Finally, certain necessary facili ties are allocated only to the spatially defined groups in our society: the streets, sewers, parks, and public docks are major bases for interdependence among diverse groups Q within the metropolis. Under these circumstances the division of labor in the metropolitan community is integrated not only through norms applying to all citizens of the community or through orders internal to the exclusive membership groups but also, and more importantly to our study, through the order be tween these groups (whether by market, law, mutual Q Greer, op. cit., pp. 38-39. ^Ibid., p . 39. 13 agreement, or other means). The media through which this integration proceeds are the communications systems allow ing for the movement of information, influence, and orders, and the transportation system which allows the movement of energy in the form of persons and goods. No physical as pect of the metropolis is more crucial them these media, for they make possible the combination of the heterogeneous activities of populations scattered over space. They per mit one group's output to be another’s input. They allow the complex social structure of the metropolis to perpetu ate itself. Ultimately, they set limits upon potential metropolitan integration— integration based upon a network of interdependence and a resulting mutual modification of behavior extending over space through time.^0 With this background, let us proceed to a definition of a metropoli tan problem. A problem has been defined as a question proposed for solution. In attempting to define a metropolitan prob lem, the nature of the question proposed for solution becomes of basic importance. To be a metropolitan problem, the emerging question must center in some way around the ^Ibid. , p. 40. 14 interdependence of groups contained within the metropolitan community. The interdependence and contiguity of the urban area demand a degree of coordination of behavior which is not always forthcoming. The cause, and at the same time the resultant, of this lack of coordination is often a break down in the communication and transportation systems serv ing the metropolis. This breakdown thereafter leads to a reduction in the integrative potential of the community. Metropolitan problems are given expression for the most part through groups within the community. Their ex pression often is correspondingly related to the mainte nance and enhancement needs of the articulating group. Due to this origin the metropolitan problem usually raises questions of a specific nature, e.g., concerning highways, airports, regional recreation, hospitals, and utility systems. Metropolitan change derived from the metropolitan problem-solving process is, therefore, usually problem- oriented change rather than opportunity-oriented change. It is change arising from the needs of the immediate present rather than change based upon predicted or planned needs for the future. This situation is enhanced by the differ entiation and specialization of the metropolitan society and the fragmentation of the metropolitan polity. Because 15 of the former only a few groups tend to be concerned with a given problem, although these groups may change over time. Due to the latter, there does not exist one given political jurisdiction which can weigh, balance, and ultimately determine the solution to a given metropolitan problem. Both of these factors contribute to the increasing complex ity of the metropolitan problem-solving process.H In summary, metropolitan problems can be said to result from both the interdependence and contiguity of the metropolis and the fragmentation of that social entity. The widening of the radii of interdependence and contiguity means that, whether men know it or not, they become mutual means to other individuals' ends and that the coordination of behavior must be secured to achieve those ends. Frag mentation, differentiation, and specialization, on the other hand, often hinder the required coordination of behavior, thereby frustrating groups and organizations in their goal seeking. The end result is the creation of the metropolitan problem. ^William L. C. Wheaton, "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decision Process," The Integration of Political Communities, Phillip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano, eds. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964). 16 The metropolitan problem solving process The ensuing delineation and description of the problem-solving process must suffer, just as past formula tions of the decision-making process, from the criticism of overemphasizing the rational aspects of human behavior. Nonetheless, much advantage would appear to be gained from assuming a series of activities to be included within the problem-solving process when surveying the behavior of groups attempting to cope with their metropolitan problems. It is recognized that the groups actively involved in this process do not necessarily consciously follow these steps in deriving a solution to a problem. Nevertheless, this schema has proved of great analytical value in determining those factors which reduce the effectiveness of group ac tivities directed toward the solution of metropolitan problems. The analysis in this study has assumed that the metropolitan problem-solving process involves four primary activities: (1) problem-identification, (2) solution-gener- ation, (3) solution-ratification, and (4) solution-imple- mentation. These four activities are included in three basic phases. In Phase I the concerned groups identify the 17 nature of the problem and develop solutions or goals by which the problem may be resolved— activities one and two. These goals may be interpreted as the desired outcomes of actions which will "solve the problem." Included in activity two, and also activity four, may be additional behaviors which attempt to operationalize the solutions by providing rather detailed means for their accomplishment. In Phase II the affirmative decisions required to bring about the enactment of goal-directed activities are obtained and the solution is thereby ratified— activity three. Finally, in Phase III the goal-directed activities are initiated, further operationalized where necessary, 12 and followed through to fulfillment— activity four. Just as the above activities need not be conscious ly identified by the metropolitan groups accomplishing them, it is unnecessary for analytical purposes that all these activities be undertaken by a single group. Neither is it required that these steps be undertaken in their 12 George K. Zollschan and Robert Perrucci, "Social Stability and Social Process: An Initial Presentation of Relevant Categories," Explorations in Social Change, Walter Hirsch and George K. Zollschan, eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964) . 18 given order to be of value in analyzing the impediments to the metropolitan problem-solving process. Study Objectives, Methods of Research, and Data Collection In accordance with the foregoing conceptual scheme, this study has attempted to answer three basic questions: 1. What are the primary orientations or roles which groups involved in the metropolitan problem-solving process may take in relation ship to the resolution of the problem itself and/or the behaviors of other groups involved in this process? 2. What are the strategies used by the involved groups to fulfill their problem-solving roles? 3. What are the factors which retard group endeavors to accomplish successfully the activ ities contained within the three phases of this metropolitan process? To generate at least some partial answers to these questions, an intensive study was made focusing upon the problem-solving process as it has been made manifest in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy from 1949 to 1965. Data for this study came from a review of pertinent 19 California legislative hearings, statutes, and other docu ments; the files, records, memoranda, and so forth, of the groups which have been most intimately involved in the transit questions; and from news media, technical reports, and various scholarly and professional journals, The data for this study were collected to reflect to the extent possible a total perspective of the group activities that took place in this problem-solving experi ence. Once this was done, the data were arranged so group behaviors and their related variables were segregated ac cording to the three basic phases of the problem-solving process. These behaviors and their related variables were then analyzed and a categorization was made of (1) the strategies employed by the various groups to fulfill their chosen roles, and (2) those factors which retarded the groups in the successful achievement of the activities within the basic phases. Having accomplished this, the factors and strategies within the various phases were com pared to see if any were common to more than one phase of the problem-solving process. Having thus introduced the problem here under study and the theoretical framework to be utilized, let us con clude this chapter with a brief sketch of what is to 20 follow. Chapter II presents the metropolitan problem solving model and discusses the basic roles which groups may assume in the metropolitan problem-solving process, the interrelationships of these roles, and their importance in the process as a whole. Chapters III, V, and VII describe in narrative the three phases of the metropolitan problem solving process as they were exemplified in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy. Chapters IV, VI, and VIII pro vide an analytical study of those phases and identify fac tors which deter groups from successfully completing the activities within each phase. Chapter IX is devoted to a discussion of the strategies which the involved groups em ploy to fulfill their chosen problem-solving roles. The final chapter then summarizes the findings of this study and draws some conclusions therefrom as to what factors must be accounted for in the metropolitan problem-solving process if the metropolis is effectively to meet its chal lenges and develop the potential it possesses as a stimulat ing environment for social interaction. CHAPTER II THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL Introduction In the preceding chapter, we found that a metro politan area can be conceived as a social system when the geographical space within that area is a site for social interaction. This metropolitan social system, like other social systems, undertakes various processes which are directed toward its own maintenance and enhancement. As factors either within or without the system arise to en danger its existence or cause discomforting effects to its functioning, responses of varying immediacy are elicited from it. The conscious process by which these discontinu ities are detected and remedied by a metropolitan social system are defined in this study as the metropolitan prob lem-solving process. The problem-solving process of the metropolitan community is activated when a question is posed for 21 22 solution by that social entity. As has previously been seen, the process by which such a question is resolved may theoretically be divided into four basic activities in cluded within three primary process phases. Within the metropolitan community this process and its assumed activ ities tend to be undertaken either by exclusive membership or inclusive spatial groups. Three primary factors account for this phenomenon. The first factor is reflected in the definition of a metropolitan problem. This type of problem has been defined as a question posed for solution which centers in some way around the interdependence of groups contained within the metropolitan community. Not all problems which affect individuals within the metropolitan social system become metropolitan problems, but only those which in some way center around the interdependence of groups in that system. Individual problems, however, begin to assume the nature of metropolitan problems when they become group problems. This transition to the group problem is made when a formally-organized group accepts the responsibility for resolving a question which previously had been the concern of a single individual. When several different groups within the metropolis become involved in the 23 resolution of what was formerly an individual problem, or when a group's proposed solution to a problem affects other metropolitan groups, one of the central characteristics of the metropolitan problem has taken form. A second factor which has contributed to making group behaviors predominate in importance over individual behaviors in metropolitan problem-solving is the magnitude of metropolitan problems. Metropolitan problems, by their nature, tend to encompass a large geographical area contain ing a multitude of political jurisdictions and special interest groups. The complexity and size of a problem growing out of this environment requires activities neces sitating legal authority and the expenditure of financial, material, and human resources far in excess of any pos sessed by a single individual. Thus, the scarcity of resources and legal authority available at the individual level for extended metropolitan problem-solving tasks makes it imperative that these tasks be undertaken at the group level if they are to produce any significant results what soever. A third and final reason why this metropolitan process involves groups rather than individuals is that the ratification or approval of any solution to a metropolitan 24 problem usually must be obtained from a number of groups rather than a single group or individual. As was noted previously, the metropolitan area is composed of a plethora of separate political jurisdictions. If a proposed solu tion to a metropolitan problem in any way requires a viola tion of the powers and authority legally vested in those jurisdictions, the solution may be implemented under the existing laws only with the consent of the involved politi cal jurisdictions. If that permission is not forthcoming, the solution may be implemented only if the powers and authority of those jurisdictions are changed. These legal alterations may be obtained through the structures of the state legislatures, the courts, or through a referendum of the people. Usually the first of these structures is used; and, whereas, the state legislative process is highly sus ceptible to the influence of organized groups, group behav ior once again becomes a critical element in metropolitan problem-solving. Although it is contended in this study that an understanding of group problem-solving behavior provides the key to the analysis of metropolitan problem-solving, a qualification must be made to this statement. It is con ceded that in certain instances and under certain circum 25 stances the behavior of specific individuals may have a greater influence on the resolution of a given problem than have group behaviors. In these instances, the dominant individual has usually secured his influence by virtue of his position in a given group or social structure which has become involved in the resolution of that problem. How ever, if an understanding of the metropolitan problem solving process were to be founded upon an analysis of the behavior of individuals, it would become necessary to know the general characteristics and variables affecting the behavior of a multitude of men, occupying a profusion of positions in numerous groups over a vast number of years. Such an analysis would be extremely time-consuming, expen sive, and possibly productive of little information which could be generalized to the problem-solving process occur ring in different metropolitan communities. Group behavior, on the other hand, when used as a unit of analysis, tends to reduce the complexity involved in analyzing phenomena in a social system containing thou sands of separate individual units. The observations of such a system are further reduced in complexity when the researcher limits himself to an analysis of those group behaviors which are directed toward a single process within 26 that system. One method which has been devised to study separate aspects of a social element's behavior is role analysis. It is this mode of analysis which has been applied to the study of group behaviors in the metropolitan problem-solving process. The Evolution of Problem-Solving Roles In Chapter I it was observed that the metropolitan problem-solving process could theoretically be divided into three phases. Phase I, Problem Identification and Solu tion Generation, includes the activities of identifying the problem and developing potential solutions to it. Phase II, Solution Ratification, involves the activity of decision making by which a potential solution is approved and be comes the formally accepted solution to the problem. Phase III, Solution Implementation and Administration, encom passes those activities by which the formally approved solution is put into operation and thereafter sustained. To comprehend the dynamics of this metropolitan social system process, attention must be focused upon the behavior of groups which become involved in this process. However, in this endeavor it is not necessary to study the totality of a group's behavior, but only that behavior 27 which is directly related to a specific metropolitan prob lem-solving activity. To accomplish the objectives of studying only a segment of a group's behavior, while still ensuring that that segment is the most essential to an understanding of the metropolitan problem-solving process, a modified version of role analysis may be used. As applied in this study, a role is defined as a collection of patterned behavior which is thought to con stitute a meaningful unit and deemed appropriate to a social entity occupying an informally defined position in certain metropolitan intergroup relationships.^- The roles which groups within the metropolitan community may fulfill as they become involved in the metropolitan problem-solving process develop first from the four basic activities of that process and second from the behavioral dynamics of group interactions arising from that experience. Seven roles are specified in the following pages as germane to this social process. The first four roles are derived from 1Ralph H. Turner, "Role Taking and Reference Group Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, LXI (January, 1956), p. 361. Turner’s definition of role parallels that used in this study, with the exception that he applied it to the individual rather than the group. 28 the four basic activities and the other three roles from the process' behavioral dynamics. An underlying assumption in describing the various dimensions of the metropolitan problem-solving roles has been that each role is a part of an inclusive set of roles all related to a given process and having no meaning apart from that process. Therefore, in analyzing these roles, it has been necessary to include in their descriptions their relationships to one another as well as the functions per formed by them. The behaviors or strategies which groups may use to fulfill these roles have not been included in this chapter. Due to the importance and complexity of these behaviors, their description and analysis will be expounded at some length in Chapter IX. Roles Related to the Problem-Solving Activities Problem identifier The basic function of this role is to define a metropolitan problem and to make its existence in the defined terms known to various segments of the metropolitan community. This role is of primary significance since its fulfillment produces the foundation from which all other 29 roles must grow. Only when a metropolitan problem has been identified may solutions for that problem be developed, approved, and implemented. Only when this role has been fulfilled may groups oppose, concur, or attempt to mediate disagreements arising among groups concerned with a given problem. Thus, although the group fulfilling this role may cease thereafter its involvement with the problem-solving process, its actions will continue to have a major and lasting effect on the resolution of that metropolitan prob lem. Solution generator The role of solution generator is fulfilled by that group whose activities are directed toward establishing goals which will supposedly resolve the question at hand. These goals, or problem solutions, may be defined as future states of affairs which, upon attainment, will forward the alleviation of the problem. In analyzing this role, a differentiation may be made between behavior which estab lishes primary goals and that which establishes secondary goals. The former goal represents a specific state of affairs which, upon attainment, will finally resolve the problem. The latter goal is one in which the state of 30 affairs to be reached will merely provide the environment by which the primary goal may be achieved. In execution, one group may establish both goals or two separate groups may jointly fulfill this role. In either case, however, the concerned group is merely fulfilling one major problem solving role. This role is related to the one previously dis cussed in that it presupposes that a problem has been de fined and articulated. Only when this has been done is it possible for the solution generator role to be enacted. The output of this role will be a proposed problem solu tion, the nature of which will largely determine which groups will be compelled for legal and other reasons to fulfill the solution-ratifier role. The output of this role will also, by affecting directly the interests, activ ities, and goals of various groups, determine which groups ultimately are called upon to fulfill the implementor- administrator role or assume the dissenter, advocator, and possibly conciliator roles. Solution ratifier This role is fulfilled by any groups which must formally approve a given problem solution before it may be 31 implemented. The groups which fulfill this role will vary according to the problem and the proposed solution. When a government jurisdictional group is required to ratify a solution, the laws and constitution of the state will dic tate which jurisdictional groups must fulfill this problem solving role. In those instances where the laws or the constitution are unclear on this matter, either the state legislature or the courts may be called upon to resolve the question. The role of solution-ratifier is of central impor tance to the totality of the metropolitan problem-solving process. The group which fulfills this role brings together the output of the previously mentioned two roles, problem identifier and solution-generator, and determines the fate of those outputs. If this group chooses, it may even ignore the outputs of other groups fulfilling phase I roles and fulfill those two roles itself. On the other hand, not all groups capable of fulfilling Phase I roles are capable of assuming the Phase II role. This is especially true when a given problem and a proposed solution have resulted in the assumption of the solution-ratifier role by a governmental group. Only by altering the definition of the problem, the proposed solution, or the laws of the state, may the 32 groups carrying out the Phase I activities hope to change the group which will be called upon to fulfill the solution- ratif ier role. In the light of these relationships, the solution-ratifier role, especially when filled by a govern mental group, may be said to be the most powerful within the metropolitan problem-solving role set. The characteristics of the group fulfilling the solution-ratifier role do not tend to determine which groups will undertake the three auxiliary roles— dissenter, advo cator, and conciliator. Regardless of which group is chosen to fulfill the ratifier role, essentially the same groups will undertake these latter three roles. However, the means and activities by which these groups will attempt to fulfill their chosen roles will most intimately be affected and influenced by the characteristics of the ratifying group. For example, groups will develop their tactics and strategies differently depending upon whether a local, state, or federal governmental group occupies the solution- ratif ier role. Finally, this role produces the decision through which a group is chosen to fulfill legally the role of solu tion implementor-administrator. In making this decision, the solution-ratifier may create a new group or direct an 33 existing group to undertake the implementation and adminis tration of the adopted and approved metropolitan problem solution. By this action, the group fulfilling this role immediately contributes a charge to the nature of the existing problem and the potential for resolving that prob lem. At the same time, this decision may influence any future redefinition of the problem, proposed solutions to that redefined problem, or the groups that will oppose and concur with both the problem's definition and its proposed solution. Solution implementor-administrator The final activity of the problem-solving process brings into being the role of solution implementor-adminis trator. This role is fulfilled by any group possessing the responsibility for carrying out the problem solution which has been formally approved. In describing this role, it is assumed that the responsible group will direct its activi ties toward the accomplishment of the primary and secondary goals or problem solutions which have been approved by the ratifying group and will not substitute solutions of unof ficial design. In undertaking the function of solution implementa- 34 tion and administration, a group is put into the position of operationalizing a problem solution which has been formulated in varying degrees of specificity. The behavior of the group fulfilling this role produces the means by which the ends of the ratified solution are achieved. As with any attempt to differentiate between goal setting and the establishment of means to achieve these goals, it may appear that such a delineation is precarious, if not impos sible, to make. However, such a differentiation possesses substantial validity in the metropolitan problem-solving sphere where certain broad goals are often ratified in law by the legal jurisdictional groups of the state and the means by which these goals are realized are monitored only by future state legislative or regulatory agency action or rulings by the courts. Thus, this metropolitan social system process often provides a clearer differentiation than usual between groups which have basic roles either as problem solution generators, solution ratifiers, or solu tion implementor-administrators. The output of this final process activity-oriented role is a series of group behaviors which in some manner are directed toward altering existing states of affairs so as to resolve the problem in question. The means which the 35 group uses to implement the ratified solution has a direct influence upon which groups will continue or will become involved in this problem-solving process. To the extent that the means employed affect the vital interests of other groups, either adversely or beneficially, these affected groups may assume the roles of dissenter or advocator. If the means and solution employed by the solution implemen tor-administrator group do not succeed in resolving the problem, the behavior of this group will have an influence over what groups will thereupon assume the roles related to Phase I and Phase II activities. In this way, the final activity-oriented role is closely interrelated with the others of the metropolitan problem-solving role set. Roles Arising from the Dynamics of the Problem-Solving Process Advocator Fulfilling this role are all groups which formally concur in their perspectives of some aspect of the problem solving process. This agreement may include the definition of the problem, proposed solutions to the problem, or means for implementing a given solution. The role itself may be divided into two parts: (1) the active advocator role in 36 which a group employs its resources to forward the position which it supports, and (2) the passive advocator role in which a group provides vocal or other nonresource utilizing recognition of its support or agreement. Dissenter This role encompasses behavior illustrating a group's opposition to a stated perspective of some aspect of the problem-solving process, e.g., problem identifica tion, problem solution, and so forth. As with the advoca tor role, this role is assumed to be filled only when a group has formally asserted its opposition to one of the stated perspectives. This role may also be divided into two parts. There is the active dissenter role in which a group employs its resources to retard the adoption of the perspective which it opposes on a broad metropolitan basis. In the passive dissenter role, on the other hand, the group gives only vocal recognition to its opposition or under takes only those activities which do not require the ex penditure of its limited resources. Conciliator A group assumes this role when it directs its behavior toward ameliorating differences and disagreements 37 which various groups exhibit with respect to the various phases of the metropolitan problem-solving process. The objective of this action is to reduce the conflict level among these groups, thereby providing a basis upon which they may work toward the resolution of the question posed for metropolitan solution. Problem-solving Roles and Problem-solving Action Having isolated the roles assumed by groups in the problem-solving process, the relationship among these roles and concrete problem-solving action may now be identified. When definite action is taken and a metropolitan problem resolved, each of the three phases of the problem-solving process must have been completed. If these phases are completed, the activities within the phases also must have been completed. Since these activities are included within four role sets, it therefore follows that the roles included within these phases have been enacted by some group or groups. Thus, the enactment of the four roles included within the three phases of the metropolitan problem-solving process is a necessary condition for the development and implementation of solutions directed toward the resolution of metropolitan problems. The three remaining auxiliary 38 roles, however, are not necessary conditions for the de velopment and implementation of these solutions. Neverthe less , their high frequency of appearance and ultimate in fluence on the final product of this process make their inclusion in any study of this process mandatory. Once the centrality of the relationship between role enactment and the metropolitan problem-solving process is recognized, a significant contribution is made to both the theoretical and practical understanding of this metro politan process. Theoretically, the behaviors of the groups concerned with metropolitan problems need no longer be viewed as unstructured, random, and unrelated either in relationship to the problem or to one another. Instead, these behaviors may now be analyzed in relationship to the necessary conditions or activities required for solution development and implementation and the group dynamics involved in that process. Practically, this mode of analysis may lead to a description of factors deterring the problem-solving process and the various group strategies which have been used to overcome these deterrents. From this description such deterrents may possibly be antici pated or avoided and the alternative strategies employed to overcome them. 39 Factors Related to Group Role Assumption, Role Behavior, and Role Fulfillment Utilizing the above concepts, the study of the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy moved forward with two major objectives in mind: (1) to determine with reference to the metropolitan problem-solving model those factors which deter the accomplishment of the three phases of the metropolitan problem-solving process, and (2) to set forth the strategies used by various groups to fulfill their chosen problem-solving roles. As these objectives were carried out, it became evident that three additional ques tions pertaining to the nature of the metropolitan problem solving process could be raised. First, what causes a group to assume a given role in the metropolitan problem solving process? Second, what factors influence the manner in which a group fulfills the role which it assumes? Third, what contributes to a group's ability to enact its chosen role? Although the objectives of this study did not in clude answering these questions, the data utilized in the study did suggest three broad sets of factors which appeared to influence the roles which groups assumed, the manner in which these roles were fulfilled, and groups' abilities to 40 enact their roles. Because it is believed that these data offer fruitful ground for future research, and inasmuch as several factors within these sets also appear in the later discussions of deterrents to the accomplishment of the various phases of the problem-solving process, they are set forth at this time. However, they will not be pursued in the chapters to follow. Internal group variables The first group of variables may be categorized under the heading of internal group variables. These variables may be defined as those factors which contribute to a group's uniqueness and thereby condition the role which it will play in the problem-solving process, the manner in which that role is performed, and possibly the group's success in role fulfillment. These variables are essentially similar to those described by John S. Ellsworth, Jr. in his study, Factory Folkways, as factors characteris tic of any social institution. They include a group's charter, the composition of its membership and the struc turing of group behavior, the material apparatus used by the group— physical environment, both natural and artifi cial, including wealth and instruments— the group activities 41 or actual behavior of the members through which the group attempts to achieve its goals, and the group's functions— the results of activities as reflected in the satisfaction 2 of group or societal needs. Group interaction variables The second grouping of factors may be described as group interaction variables. These include those variables which influence and condition the interaction behavior of groups as that behavior is related to the assumption and enactment by those groups of problem-solving roles. Among these factors are: (1) the extent to which internal group variables are similar for various groups and this similar ity is perceived by them; (2) the extent to which groups share perspectives on problem identification, problem solutions, and means for solution achievement; (3) the ex tent to which groups possess the same knowledge concerning the problem and its solution and the degree to which their interpretation of this knowledge coincides; (4) the extent to which groups are interdependent and are cognizant of their interdependence, either in terms of maintaining their 2 John S. Ellsworth, Jr., Factory Folkways (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). 42 basic uniqueness or in securing the adoption of a problem- solution if they desire; (5) the power or influence which one group may have over another group; (6) the past exper iences groups have had in working with one another; and (7) the communications and information exchange taking place between groups.3 Problem-oriented variables Problem-oriented variables, the third and final grouping, refer to those factors which exist independently of the groups which are engaged in any specific problem solving experience, but which are related directly to that experience and condition group role assumption, role behav ior, and role accomplishment. This category of variables includes: (1) the specific subject matter of the problem, e.g., rapid transit, smog control, juvenile delinquency; (2) the cultural beliefs and practices of the area which bear directly upon the problem; (3) the political environ ment, including formal state organizations and political 3 Phillip E. Jacobs and Henry Teune, "The Integra tive Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Power," in The Integration of Political Communi ties , Phillip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano, eds. (Phila delphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964). 43 organizations which become involved with the problem; (4) the general organizational character of the area encompass ing the types of organizations present and their internal group variables and group interactions; and, finally (5), the factual data and technological skills available in the metropolis with which to cope with the problem and its solution. As the metropolitan community continually adjusts to the changing conditions of its existence, the above three sets of factors are incessantly at work influencing the role behavior of various groups involved in the metro politan problem-solving process. As these factors inter act, first one and then another will predominantly influence a group's role at different time periods and with respect to different metropolitan problems. To know exactly which factors influence the various aspects of a group's role under given circumstances would greatly improve the predic tion of group behavior in specific metropolitan problem solving experiences. It would also enable the groups interested in the resolution of certain problems to under stand better why progress toward their goals is being thwarted or succeeding. However, information and analysis of these matters must await the efforts of other research- 44 ers, for the focus of this study is upon deterrents to the metropolitan problem-solving process. Summary In this chapter the behavior of groups involved in the metropolitan problem-solving process was interpreted in terms of various roles. Four roles— problem identifier, solution generator, solution ratifier, and solution imple- mentor-administrator— were seen to evolve from the four major activities of the problem-solving process. Three auxiliary roles— advocator, dissenter, and conciliator— were described as evolving from the behavioral dynamics of groups involved in this process. These seven roles, which were seen to represent an inclusive metropolitan problem solving role set, were then discussed in terms of their functions and interrelationships. Having examined the functions and interrelation ships between the seven roles, their relationship with concrete problem-solving action was identified. This rela tionship was seen as following from the fact that the com pletion of the four basic problem-solving activities and their assumed roles were necessary conditions for the completion of this metropolitan process. By utilizing 45 these analytical categories and relationships, a means was developed for relating a specific group's behavior to the necessary conditions of metropolitan problem resolution and to the behavior of other groups involved in that process. Theoretically, this model divided the metropolitan problem-solving process into three basic phases. In the next six chapters each of these three phases and their respectively contained roles will be given empirical con tent by drawing upon data compiled from the analysis of the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy. In the narrative which relates the actual behavior of groups involved in these phases, Chapters III, V, and VII, the roles which groups assume at a specific time are not specified, although these identifications are frequently made in the analytical chapters. This procedure was followed in the belief that the continual restatement that a group was fulfilling one role at one time, another role at another time, and a third role at still a different time would soon prove both tedious and useless. A quick review of the role descrip tions found within this chapter should allow the reader to identify readily the roles being played by the various groups, thereby negating the need for their formal identi fication as the case unfolds. CHAPTER III PHASE I: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND SOLUTION GENERATION Introduction In retrospect it is not difficult to see why the late 1940's and particularly the early 1950's witnessed an intensified concern among various metropolitan groups with the problem of mass rapid transit. The astronomical growth of this metropolitan region, which had begun with a doubling of the population from 1920 to 1930, once again exerted itself after the termination of World War II. The arrival of the 1950's found the population of the Los Angeles metropolitan region approaching five million, with over 84 per cent of it concentrated in Los Angeles County. This region extends along 165 miles of Pacific Ocean shore line and inland an average of 55 miles. In all, it comprises about 9,000 square miles of the area lying between Santa Barbara and San Diego Counties and the western, more highly developed sections of San Bernardino and Riverside 46 47 Counties. Included within this area, and accounting for over 90 per cent of its population, are three urbanized areas: Los Angeles-Long Beach, Pomona-Ontario, and San Bernardino-Riverside.1 The concern with urban transportation is further understandable when it is noted that by 1960 the metropoli tan population had expanded to 7,597,000. Within this population there were 3,437,000 automobiles which made approximately 12,342,000 daily trips, averaging 6.1 miles, and 409,000 trucks which made about— 1,803,000 daily trips, averaging 5.2 miles. To complicate matters further, the growth was continuing. Every six days another 5,000 people arrived requiring the use of 2,500 more vehicles which would 2 be driven a total of 59,000 additional miles each day. As these circumstances developed, what action did the metropolitan community take to keep pace with them? How did the metropolis identify the nature of this growing transportation problem? What procedures were utilized to ^•Los Angeles Regional Transportation Study, Vol. I, Base Year Report, Summary Addition (Los Angeles: Cali fornia Division of Highways, December, 1963), pp. 6, 17. 2Ibid. 48 develop solutions to this problem? To what extent were the solutions that were implemented effective? These are some of the questions with which this study will be concerned. In this and the following chapters, the account of the rapid transit controversy has been divided into four parts. Each part corresponds to a period of time preceding the passage of specific state legislation related to the development of rapid transit in the Los Angeles metropoli tan area. The first part began in 1949 and ended with the passage of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951. During that period groups were primarily concerned with the establishment of an organization which could cope effectively with the problem of metropolitan transportation. The second part of the account follows the activities of the organization established for this purpose, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), as it attempted to wrestle with this metropolitan problem. This part terminated with the passage of the Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority Act of 1957 which provided for the purchase by the Metropolitan Transit Authority of the two major and privately owned mass transportation systems in the metropolitan area. The third part of this account concentrates upon that period in which the Metropolitan 49 Transit Authority tried to create certain conditions which would permit the construction of a rail rapid transit sys tem. This part of the problem-solving experience came to an end with the passage of further MTA enabling legislation by the State Legislature in 1961. The final segment of this account is also concerned with the Metropolitan Transit Authority's attempts to provide further conditions favor able to the construction of a rail rapid transit system. These additional attempts culminated in the dissolution of the Metropolitan Transit Authority and the establishment of the Southern California Rapid Transit District. This seg ment of the problem-solving account continued through the establishment of the Transit District and its operations to the summer of 1965. With this brief introduction to the chronology of the transit experience, let us begin our dis cussion of Phase I of the metropolitan problem-solving proc ess as it was exemplified in this endeavor. Part I: The Birth of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority The transit district— an unacceptable solution By 1949 the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce had determined on the basis of independent investigations 50 carried out by the membership of that group that the establishment of some form of rail rapid transit was neces sary to resolve the transportation dilemma of the metro politan area. To this end the Chamber had caused to be introduced into the State Legislature a bill providing for the establishment of a rapid transit district in the Los Angeles area. This district was to be financed by general obligation bonds approved by residents of the district and secured by property taxes. The bill introduced into the State Assembly was sent to committee where it failed to receive enough votes to be brought to the floor. However, the defeat of this measure did not hinder the 1949 Assembly from passing a resolution providing for an interim commit tee study of the Los Angeles rapid transit problem.^ The reasons why the proposal for a transit district had failed to generate little enthusiasm in the Los Angeles area were reflected in the 1950 Assembly interim hearings. From the testimony accumulated in those hearings, the committee concluded the following. First, there was no opportunity to build subways or rail rapid transit in any Ralph P. Merritt, statement made to the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, September 14, 1955 (in the files of the Committee). 51 direction from the central business district which would have any indication whatsoever of being an economically profitable investment. Second, there were no centers of high population density nicely spread over the county, as had occurred in the cities that followed street railway lines for their development. Finally, society in the Los Angeles metropolitan area had found that everywhere was a satisfactory place to live since, even without rail rapid transit, shopping, amusement, banking, finance, markets, and governmental facilities were all available.^ The principal participants in these hearings included officers and members of what is now the Los Ange les Metropolitan Traffic Association; Jesse Haugh, presi dent of the San Diego Transit System and member of the California Transportation Association; and various officials from cities surrounding the City of Los Angeles. These individuals emphasized that the unique decentralized nature of the Los Angeles area, the trend of the public throughout the United States to rely less and less on public transpor tation, the preference of Los Angeles citizens for 4 California Assembly Interim Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations of the California State Legis lature , Preliminary Report on Rapid Transit for the Los Angeles Area. This was a product of hearings held in Los 52 automobile travel, and the growth and development of the freeway system, all combined to make rail rapid transit both impractical and unnecessary. They also expressed their doubts about obtaining a positive vote from the people to finance a transit district by property taxes, since these taxes were already seen as being at the saturation point. Other witnesses concerned about the organization of the district stated that membership by cities on the perimeter of Los Angeles should be at the option of those cities. These views reflected unequivocally the opinions of the participants and were rooted in their experiences as transit operators, members of associations devoted primar ily to facilitating the flow of wheeled vehicles, and local government officials concerned with street and highway problems. Thus, the information contributed to this inter im committee discussion on rapid transit came, with but one exception, not from studies conducted with the solution of this problem in mind, but from the past experiences and existing beliefs which certain individuals within the Los Angeles area held with respect to this matter. Angeles on September 8, 1949, October 12, 13, 14, 1949, and December 5, 1949. 53 The one exception to this was a pilot study of pub lic opinion on rapid transit in the Los Angeles area made expressly for the interim committee by the John Knight Com pany. The findings of this study appeared to substantiate completely all verbal testimony relating to the trend toward decentralization in the Los Angeles area, the unacceptabil ity of property taxes to finance rapid transit development, the declining use of public transit, and support for busses on freeways instead of fixed rail facilities for the metro- C politan area. Upon this evidence, the committee concluded that the extension of the planned freeway system adapted to the use of express busses through the building of adequate bus turnouts would be the most practical mass transit plan possible and would meet with the approval of at least three times as many people as any other single plan. The commit tee also found that those engineering studies previous to 1950 were of limited value for the reason that the freeway system under construction pursuant to the 1947 Burns-Collier Act had made and would continue to make an even more 5Ibid., pp. 9-15. This study was made in March, 1950. 54 material change in the traffic and transportation picture in the Los Angeles area. Finally, the committee concluded that the representatives of the cities and towns in the outlying sections of the Los Angeles area were not in favor of any program which would require an additional tax burden without their specific acceptance thereof. Inasmuch as the freeway program would not involve such a burden, the com mittee believed that the cooperation of those cities and towns could be obtained automatically with a transportation program calling for the extension of the freeway system. The University Presidents' Advisory Committee While the Chamber of Commerce was concerning itself with its transit proposal and the State Legislature was conducting its hearings, three other groups were also directing their attention to the identification and solu tion of the transit dilemma. The first of these groups was the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Upon the suggestion of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Board of Supervisors created on July 12, 1949, the Univer sity Presidents' Advisory Committee on Los Angeles County Transportation Problems. Once this committee had been organized, it proceeded to analyze all past studies of 55 transportation in the county, to conduct hearings on pres ent conditions, and to make a nationwide search for an organization that could implement the recommendations developed by the committee. In May, 1950, this committee presented its final report to the Board of Supervisors.** This report maintained that the rapid change occur ring in the metropolitan area since the beginning of World War II had made all studies prior to 1950 largely out of date. Because of this and because of the greatly divergent opinions on what rapid transit facilities were needed in the Los Angeles area, the Presidents' Committee recommended that a comprehensive county-wide study be made by one of several private firms recommended and that this study include all types of transit. The report further recom mended the establishment of a Citizens' Advisory Committee and an Engineering Advisory Board to assist the private firm conducting this study in order to obtain public sup- port.' ^University Presidents' Report on "Los Angeles Transportation Problems," presented to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on May, 1950 (in the files of the County Clerk). 7Ibid 56 Private efforts to resolve the transit dilemma Two other groups which engaged in transit studies at this time were the Monorail Engineering and Construction Corporation and the Southern California Monorail and Transit System, Inc. The first of these two companies was inter ested primarily in building a monorail line in the Los Angeles area in the hope that its success would bring addi tional orders to build the system elsewhere. This group had been in existence since 1947 and had secured numerous patents for the monorail. The second organization had developed from a group called the Citizens of San Fernando Valley— an area lying primarily within the City of Los Angeles. This group had long been interested in providing adequate transportation for that section of the metropoli tan region. To that end, it had taken several cases before the California Public Utilities Commission in attempts to keep the Pacific Electric Railroad from discontinuing rail services to that area. This group had also backed a "Rails on Freeways" program before the State Legislature, only to see it defeated for essentially the same reasons as the Los Angeles Chamber bill.8 Q Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1951, Sec. 1, p. 4? and 57 Through its experiences in fighting the Pacific Electric and having its legislation defeated in the State Legislature, this group determined that the only way to build a mass transit system would be through private action requiring neither public monies nor bond issues. It also decided, from acquaintance with the information available on the monorail transit system, that this system was the most practical means for solving the transit problem. Thus, this group formed the Southern California Monorail and Transit System, Inc., to promote the development of a privately financed rapid transit line.9 Shortly after this latter organization was formed, it joined forces with the Monorail Engineering group, which was then engaged in attempting to obtain monorail rights- of-way along the Los Angeles River from San Fernando Valley to the City of Long Beach. These two groups were united in their efforts through the energies of Ralph P. Merritt, who served in the capacity of vice-president for each group. August 12, 1950, Sec. 2, p. 1. Hereinafter this newspaper will be cited as Times, and the first number after the date will refer to the section and the second number to the page. 9Ibid. 58 This union was made during the early part of 1950.^® By September, 1950, these two groups were under taking preliminary engineering studies to determine loca tions for the stations on the proposed line extending along the Los Angeles River. At the same time, they were working with the Corps of Engineers and Los Angeles County offi cials to secure the authority to use this area for their monorail system. Both of these programs were proceeding upon studies which the Monorail Engineering Company had made with respect to the engineering of the monorail system itself and the construction of a line along the Los Angeles River.^ A solution is proposed— The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 After further analyzing the data from these studies, these two groups concluded that the magnitude of financial and material resources needed for construction purposes required them to negotiate with the federal government for permission to begin construction. Permission to utilize vast amounts of critical resources was mandatory during 10Ibid. 11Ibid. 59 this period due to the state of national emergency existing as a result of the Korean War. Therefore, during the lat ter part of 1950, Merritt proceeded to Washington, O. C., and began initial discussions with government officials 12 concerning these matters. While these discussions were taking place, Merritt personally decided that if the Los Angeles transit problem were to be resolved the State Legislature would have to create a transit authority. Acting upon this assumption, he visited the Long Island Transit Authority and the Chi cago Authority to determine what organizational and legal arrangements were required to create such an organization. From this background he construed a broad concept of coordinated transit including street cars, buses, subways, and monorail operating throughout an entire metropolitan area. Following discussions with members of the Federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation and other government 12 Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting, March 25, 1952, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. Hereinafter the Minutes of the meetings of this group will be referred to as Minutes. All Minutes are in the files of the Southern California Rapid Transit District. 60 agencies, Merritt became completely convinced that his groups should attempt to persuade the State Legislature to create a transit authority which would be given authority to build a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles area. This belief was reinforced by the knowledge that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had said it could loan, on a revenue bond basis, up to 100 per cent of construction costs for transit systems built and operated by a public body. On the other hand, it could loan only up to 50 per cent of costs if the system was built by a private corpora tion. These low cost Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans seemed to Merritt the most logical source from which 13 to finance the proposed monorail system. When Merritt returned to Los Angeles and informed the monorail groups of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora tion suggestion, he was immediately directed to develop the appropriate legislative proposal and seek its passage through the Legislature. This directive was made approxi mately three weeks before the close of the 1951 Legislative Session. Merritt, therefore, proceeded to San Francisco where he enlisted the aid of the legal firm that had 13 . Ibid. 61 handled the revenue bonds for the San Francisco Bay Bridge and which had been recommended by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Together they prepared over the week end the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951. Later Merritt was to state that, because of the short time remaining for developing and introducing the necessary legislative program, he and the members of the monorail groups had not discussed their legislative proposals with 14 any public or private groups within the Los Angeles area. The close of the 1951 Legislative Session witnessed the passage of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Author ity Act. This act created a new organization known as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), which was empowered to build a monorail line along the Los Angeles River from San Fernando Valley to the City of Long Beach. The formal authority of the MTA was restricted to the operation of a monorail transit system within a four mile area on either side of the river. In addition, the fares, routes, and other operating procedures of the Authority were subject to California Public Utilities Commission control, and taxes were to be paid in the same manner as Ibid. 62 private companies. This represented a significant change in the program Merritt had proposed and which, if it had been passed, would have given the MTA power to operate all types of transportation throughout Los Angeles County and would have exempted it from Public Utilities Commission control and taxation.15 Following the passage of this measure, the monorail companies continued to seek financing for their monorail lines from the federal government. Once the bill had been passed, the monorail promoters predicted that the money could be obtained in about four months.15 As events un folded, this money was never forthcoming. Part II: The Metropolitan Transit Authority Becomes an Operating Agency The MTA develops its initial programs Under the provisions of the Los Angeles Metropoli tan Transit Authority Act of 1951, the governor was to appoint seven individuals to serve as the Authority's Board 15Ibid. ^Times, July 25, 1951, 1-4. 63 of Directors. Although the act was approved in May, 1951, the directors were not appointed until March 2, 1952. Included in this group were B. 0. Miller, past president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce; Walter Brunmark, form er member of the Los Angeles Chamber traffic and transit committee; James Wilson, former Los Angeles City Councilman and past director of the Southern California Monorail and Transit System, Inc.; Lloyd Whaley, member of the Long Beach Chamber of Commerce; Martin E. Pollard, director of the San Fernando Valley rapid transit committee and former member of the Southern California Monorail and Transit System, Inc.; H. G. McClellan, a director of the Los Ange les Chamber of Commerce; and Fred S. Dean, past president of the Long Beach Chamber of Commerce. Martin Pollard was chosen president of the new Authority.^ From the beginning, the majority of the directors of the MTA believed that four changes in the 1951 Act were necessary to bring rapid transit to Los Angeles success fully. These changes included freeing the Authority from Public Utilities Commission control and taxation and extending the MTA's jurisdiction to include all of Los ^Times, March 4, 1952, 1-1. 64 Angeles County and the operation of all types of transit vehicles.*® The MTA justified its desires for the expansion of powers on the need to develop an adequate system of mass transit for the entire metropolitan area at the cheapest price. The above two demands were rooted in the belief that Public Utilities Commission control and taxation would make it impossible for the MTA to issue revenue bonds; and revenue bonds were the only means of financing for which the monorail groups had asked and which the Legislature had provided. The Board also felt that it was unconstitutional for a state-created authority to be placed under the juris diction of another state agency and be required to pay state and local taxes. To remove these odious limitations, Marritt proposed, and the Board approved in October, 1952, that these four measures become the basis for the MTA's 19 1953 legislative program. A few Board members did not believe that the MTA should be exempted from taxation and Public Utilities Com mission control. There was, however, unanimous agreement *®Minutes, October 24, 1952. *®Minutes, January 9, 1953. 65 that the area of jurisdiction and the types of transit vehicles should be expanded.20 This difference was to cause concern and dissent among the Board members for some time to come, but it was not to result in a shift of Board policy away from requesting these four basic legislative changes. Although the Board decided at an early date that it wanted to have the limitations on its actions removed, there was also a desire to proceed with an action program at the same time. Merritt, who in August, 1952, was chosen as the general manager of the MTA, told the Board that he believed that a monorail line following the route provided in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act could serve as the initial link in a rapid transit system for the entire Los Angeles area. To obtain data which would give some definite and detailed information on whether or not such a system would serve as an initial link, the MTA in April, 1953, contracted with the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts of New York to make an $85,000, eight-month study. This study was to determine: 1. Will monorail solve the Los Angeles transit 20Minutes, December 29, 1952. 66 problem? 2. Is it financially feasible? 3. Will it pay? 4. Is another type of rapid transit system than 21 monora.l the answer to the problem? The MTA's attempts to overcome what it believed to be the factors hindering the solution of the transit prob lem in Los Angeles did not take place within a vacuum. Members of the Board of Directors had continuous contact with the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Men's Association, and to a lesser extent the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. The Supervisors, at that time, were providing the financial support for the MTA. Although the MTA was meeting with these other groups, it was not greatly influenced by their alternative views on this subject. In fact, with the acknowledged opposition of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Downtwon Busi ness Men's Association, the MTA proceeded to ask the 1953 State Legislature to exempt the Authority from Public ^ Times, April 21, 1953, 2-1. 67 2 2 Utilities Commission control and taxation. The MTA also submitted in its legislative program a request for a $400,000 appropriation. When these measures were defeated in legislative committee, the MTA attributed defeat not to the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association but to the opposition of the California Transit 2 3 Association. The action of the 1953 Legislature was not totally negative with respect to transit matters, however. The Senate passed a resolution calling for an interim study to determine how the Legislature could help the transit situation in Los Angeles.24 In late 1952 and early 1953, while the MTA was pre paring its legislative program, the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association were contending that a thorough study covering the entire Los Angeles County area and all types of transportation was needed to resolve the problem. They maintained that before any con struction program could be undertaken a conclusive study setting forth the nature of the problem and the respective 22Minutes, October 24, 1952, and December 29, 1952. 2^Times, May 14, 1953, 1-16. 24Minutes, June 11, 1953 68 means by which the problem could be resolved had to be made. Thus, under these conditions the Los Angeles Chamber had called upon the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to allocate $100,000 to the MTA to conduct a study following these guidelines. And from the money provided by the Super visor, the MTA financed an $85,000 study of the feasibility 25 of placing a monorail line within its jurisdictional area. The Assembly interim hearings of 195326 The major groups that were involved in the transit controversy during the latter part of 1953 and early 1954 can be identified easily by directing attention to the hearings of the Assembly and Senate interim committees on rapid transit held in Los Angeles during the fall and spring of these two years respectively. At the hearings, the private owners and operators of the mass transit lines appeared and advocated the use of 25Times, February 4, 1953, 2-1. 2 6 Unless otherwise stated, all data under this heading have been drawn from the Joint Hearings of Subcom mittees on Rapid Transit, California Assembly Interim Com mittees on Transportation and Commerce and Public Utilities and Corporations, November 30 and December 1, 1953. 69 buses on freeways as the most convenient, inexpensive, and satisfactory system of rapid transit for residents of the Los Angeles area. They recommended a series of measures which would have reduced the tight control exercised over their operations by the California Public Utilities Commis sion and which would have lessened their taxes, thereby allowing them to resolve the present transit dilemma. They attacked all plans to utilize rail rapid transit by allud ing to the unsuccessful rail ventures in New York City. They emphasized their plans to improve the existing facili ties and stated that they had opposed the MTA legislation because its passage would have forced them out of business. They said that they were not opposed to an unbiased study of the transit needs of Los Angeles County but thought that some local government should make the study rather than the MTA. However, in spite of advocating the improvement of conditions for the operation of the private lines, they indicated a desire to be relieved of their present burdens. The president of one company stated that unless the oppres sive conditions under which the private companies labored were removed, there might be no alternative to public ownership and operation. In the 1951 annual report of that same company, it had offered its assets for purchase by 70 the City of Los Angeles in return for nontaxable revenue bonds. Appearing at this same hearing was the secretary- manager of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association. The Association was a private group supported by contribu tions from various public and private organizations and was concerned historically with advancing the cause of street, highway, and freeway improvement and expansion. By the time of the hearing, the Association had reached a final conclusion as to how the transit problem should be re solved. This conclusion was based on an analysis of past transit surveys of the Los Angeles area, discussions of traffic problems with individuals representing the construc tion, engineering, and operating phases of the transit industry. Association experience in the field of transpor tation since the 1920's, and special studies undertaken by that group. From the data derived from the above sources, the Association concluded that buses on freeways would be the solution to the problem. Holding this belief, it pro ceeded to downgrade rail rapid transit by pointing to the low densities of population and the high cost of construc tion and maintenance of such a system. Instead of rail rapid transit, the Association advocated the construction 71 of bus turnouts for loading and unloading passengers on the freeways and the development of an integrated system of bus feeders to supply passengers for the freeway flyers. Representing the City of Los Angeles at these hear ings was the president of the Public Utilities and Trans portation Commission, Councilman L. £. Timberlake, and the Traffic Engineer. Each of these men contributed a differ ent input to the hearings. The Public Utilities and Transportation Commission president stated that inasmuch as several studies were then being made but were not completed, the December Assembly hearings were somewhat premature. Timberlake said he believed that the Council would agree to facilitate the use of buses on freeways by building bus turnouts if some arrangement with the State could be made for sharing the expenses of their construction. In the past the City alone had paid for these turnouts, but he did not feel that this would continue in the future. As for rail rapid transit, the Traffic Engineer maintained that any such system would have to be subsidized. Further, once it was built, it would not recentralize community activities around the downtown area. The MTA did not appear at the December hearing. Earlier, an agreement had been reached by the chairman of 72 the Assembly and Senate interim committees that the MTA officials would appear only at the Senate hearings in February, 1954. By then the Authority would have received the completed transit studies of Coverdale and Colpitts, and could present the findings of those studies.^ Nevertheless, the MTA position was presented at these 1953 hearings. Its position was explained by the president of the Monorail Engineering and Construction Corporation. He stressed that if the MTA were given the powers sought earlier that year, it could almost immediately begin to construct a rapid transit system capable of reliev ing the transit problem. He accused the Los Angeles private transit operators of engineering the defeat of the 1953 bill to provide the MTA with $400,000 for a comprehensive transit study. He pointed out that during that same ses sion the San Francisco transit group was given an identical appropriation. The Senate interim hearings of 1954 In February, 1954, the MTA made its presentation of the Coverdale Report before the Senate interim committee. 27 Minutes, December 2, 1953. 73 The report stated that if the MTA were released from taxa tion and Public Utilities Commission control, the construc tion and operation of a monorail system running within the limits of the MTA jurisdiction might be economically feas ible. The study was cautiously phrased and appeared appre hensive about the use of monorail rather than conventional duo rail transit facilities. The route proposed for the monorail deviated rather extensively from the Los Angeles River, and if followed would cause certain problems with respect to rights ci way. Overall, the report made the situation look less than favorable.2® Regardless of how the Coverdale study was inter preted by some groups, the MTA directors saw it as an en couragement to continue agitating for the release of the MTA from Public Utilities Commission control and taxation. They even demanded that a special session of the Legislature be called, but because of the controversial nature of this topic Governor Goodwin Knight did not include it in the special session agenda. Even the MTA's offer to rescind the request that buses and streetcars be included in its 2 8 From "Summary of Conclusions," contained in Economic Engineering Report of the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts presented to the MTA and dated January 15, 1954. 74 areawide study could not reverse this gubernatorial deci- 29 sion. In June, 1954, the MTA adopted as a basic policy the intention to undertake ultimately a study of the entire Los Angeles area and all types of transit. Merritt urged the directors to remain in the lead in forwarding rapid transit action in Los Angeles. To implement this sugges tion the directors approved his recommendation for holding talks with Mr. Leland Kaiser, a San Francisco investment broker, pertaining to the requirements for obtaining revenue bonds for the construction of the proposed system. At the same time, Merritt was told to employ Coverdale and Colpitts to make a study of buses on the freeways as the answer to the rapid transit problem in Los Angeles. This study would allow the MTA to provide opposition to Supervisor Roger Jessup and others who believed that this was the solution to the problem.^0 The transit picture changes Two events took place in September, 1954, which ^Minutes, March 2, 1954. ^°Minutes, June 30, 1954. greatly changed the transit problem and its solution in the minds of the MTA members. The first event was the accep tance by the Authority of a policy which stated that its jurisdiction should include the four counties previously served by the old Pacific Electric Railway. Also included in this statement was the MTA’s traditional policy which provided that it should be able to studyr acquire, and 31 develop any and all types of passenger transit.A The second event arose from a meeting arranged upon the sugges tion of Mr. Kaiser between several MTA directors and the private owners of the two major public transportation operations in Los Angeles County. At this meeting the dis covery was made that the private companies would continue to oppose MTA plans undet the existing circumstances. However, they acknowledged that they would support the nec essary MTA legislation, if the MTA would agree to acquire the properties of the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines should this legislation be passed. Upon learning of this change in the position of the private companies, the MTA undertook preparations to have Coverdale and Colpitts appraise the properties of these lines with ^Minutes, September 14, 1954. 76 the objective of purchasing them. As the Coverdale repre sentative began this appraisal, he told the directors that the purchase of these companies could provide an important step in the development of an integrated transit system for 3 2 the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Later that month Merritt appeared before an Assem bly interim committee to explain the MTA policy statements. No opposition to these measures was made evident. The fact that the MTA was in the process of having the private bus companies appraised with the intention of purchasing them was not mentioned, however. Sometime after this hearing, Merritt was ordered by the directors to begin negotiations with the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines for the sale and management of the lines. About this same time, the MTA was notified by the County Counsel that it could not use funds appropriated for Authority use by the Los Angeles County Board of Super- 33 visors to pay for the appraxsals. ■^Minutes, October 7, 1954. ■^Minutes, November 18, 1954. 77 The 1955 Legislative Session By the beginning of 1955, the MTA viewed the major hurdle in the development of a rapid transit line as being the passage of its legislative program. Having been prom ised the backing of the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines for this program, the Authority felt reasonably certain that it could obtain the passage of the necessary measures. The proposals were formulated rather fully by January 25, 1955, and provided for: (1) giving the MTA authority to purchase the private lines with revenue bond issues which the companies would take in pay ment for their assets, (2) allowing the MTA to broaden its powers by taking over the present public transportation system and seeking new systems that would work better, and (3) authorizing the MTA to operate both interurban and intercity transit services.^4 In March the Board of Directors planned its legis lative strategies. One director was given the assignment of interviewing the editors of various metropolitan papers in order to acquaint them with the plans of the MTA and to enlist their support in accomplishing public interest in 34 Minutes, January 25, 1955. 78 the necessary legislation. In April this director reported that this had been done and that he had received a friendly reception from each of the publishers. Director Pollard reported on his meeting with the mayor of Los Angeles, Norris Poulson, at which time he had informed him of the proposed legislative and administrative plans of the MTA. The mayor had indicated his interest and concurrence in the plan by which the legislation was to be introduced at the earliest possible date. Pollard also mentioned that he was then in the process of contacting members of the County 35 Board of Supervisors to gain their support. By May an official announcement still had not been made that the MTA would attempt to purchase the private companies. This fact was brought out, however, at a County Board of Supervisors meeting at which additional funds were voted for MTA use by that Board. When this happened the Los Angeles Times immediately attacked the proposal con tending that the type of system envisioned by the MTA was not needed in the automobile-oriented Southland and that this could be readily determined by holding a plebiscite on ■^Minutes, March 8, 15, and 22, 1955, and April 5, 1955. 79 the question.^ Even though no official proposal had been made by the MTA to purchase the private transit systems, a bill had^been introduced in January of the ongoing legislative session which provided for this action. However, the MTA's revised and official legislation, Senate Bill 1308, provid ing for this purchase, was not introduced until May 6th by Senator Richard Richards. During the news conference at which Richards announced this action, several newsmen remarked that they believed the MTA was seeking too much 37 power. Soon after this news conference, Merritt, at the request of Richards, softened this legislation by suggest ing that the following amendment be added to the MTA bill. Within ninety days of the effective date of this act, there shall be created a Transit Advisory Council of twenty-one members to meet at least monthly, to be fully informed by the MTA of all progress and policies of the MTA and to advise the MTA with respect to all matters of public interest in the development of public transit. All members shall be appointed for two year terms. Four members shall be appointed by the Supervisors of Los Angeles County, one member each by the Supervisors of Riverside, Orange, and San Bernardino Counties. Seven members shall be ^ Times, April 27, 1955, 1-1, and May 4, 1955, editorial. ^Times, May 6, 1955, 1-1. 80 appointed by the Council of Mayors of the Metro politan Area, and seven by the MTA. All members shall be citizens of high standing who shall serve without pay.^® When this measure came before the Senate Committee on Transportation for consideration on May 10th, a large contingent of individuals requested that it be held over until May 17th. This request was granted. During this seven-day period, the Los Angeles newspapers and a number of private and public groups in the county vigorously attacked the MTA proposal. Merritt concluded that under the existing circumstances, the MTA measure would not fare well in the Legislature. Therefore, the MTA requested that Senators Richards and Randolph Collier join in recommending that the measure be submitted to an interim committee for 39 study. This recommendation was followed. Prior to requesting that the measure be sent to an interim committee for further study, the MTA had agreed to a change in the management contract proposed by investment broker Kaiser involving the operation of the transit sys tems when purchased by the MTA. The proposal envisioned ■^Minutes, May 7, 1955 ^Minutes, May 19, 1955. 81 the establishment of a private management corporation, formed from management personnel of the lines to be pur chased, which would provide the daily management of the transit system under the policy control of the MTA. Kaiser believed that this procedure offered innumerable benefits. It would provide for continuity in operations procedures. The private corporation would provide political protection to the Authority. The combination of private business management and public agency control would promote the maximization of decisions in the public interest. Finally, this combination and preservation of the values of private enterprise and public ownership would increase the salabil ity of the Authority's revenue bonds. One objection voiced by various groups in the Los Angeles area with respect to the MTA legislative program of 1955 was that it had been drawn up too late in the session for them to study it carefully. For this reason, the Los Angeles Chamber, the Downtown Business Men's Association, and the Citizens Transportation and Traffic Committee said that they had requested the Senate committee to postpone ^Minutes, April 12, 1955. 81 the establishment of a private management corporation, formed from management personnel of the lines to be pur chased, which would provide the daily management of the transit system under the policy control of the MTA. Kaiser believed that this procedure offered innumerable benefits. It would provide for continuity in operations procedures. The private corporation would provide political protection to the Authority. The combination of private business management and public agency control would promote the maximization of decisions in the public interest. Finally, this combination and preservation of the values of private enterprise and public ownership would increase the salabil ity of the Authority's revenue bonds.4® One objection voiced by various groups in the Los Angeles area with respect to the MTA legislative program of 1955 was that it had been drawn up too late in the session for them to study it carefully. For this reason, the Los Angeles Chamber, the Downtown Business Men's Association, and the Citizens Transportation and Traffic Committee said that they had requested the Senate committee to postpone 40 Minutes, April 12, 1955 82 41 action on the measure. As these three groups began their study of the MTA proposal, they were joined in their efforts by the County Board of Supervisors and Los Angeles City officials. Ulti mately this study brought opposition and questions from all these groups pertaining to: (1) the management of the lines after they were taken over by the MTA, (2) the price which would be paid for the lines, and (3) the fact that the in lieu taxes to be paid local governments by the MTA were permissive rather than mandatory. A fear was also expressed that the city or county might eventually be required to assume the debts of the system if the Authority should default.*2 In anticipation of these attacks, the MTA had al ready taken steps to justify its position. Prior to May 6th, Director Emmett E. Doherty had announced that the monorail plan was not the total answer to the Los Angeles transit problem. What was needed, he had said, was an 41Minutes of Meeting of the Parking and Transpor tation Committee, May 12, 1955, Downtown Business Men's Association; Times, May 2, 1955. *2Times, May 7, 1955, 1-1, and May 11, 1955, 1-2. 83 integrated system. By having the MTA purchase the private lines, such a system could be provided at less cost to the citizenry by eliminating transit system duplication and by reducing cost through tax exempt operations. The MTA, after acquiring the lines, would probably make a two and a half year, one and a half million dollar study of all types of transportation before deciding what type of system to build.43 Following the 1955 Senate resolution for an interim study, the MTA began preparations for those hearings. These preparations included the revision of the management contract with the private companies. This change had been made when the MTA was informed by its lawyers that the terms of the old contract might have been unconstitutional. The revised agreement provided for the offering of revenue bonds for public sale with the proceeds of these bonds to be used to conclude the purchase. If the bonds could not be sold, however, the old method of purchase would be used. In addition, all contracts and negotiations were agreed to be null and void as of December 31, 1957, if no legislation was passed in the Legislature by that time. In September 43Times, May 6, 1955, 1-1. 84 the agenda for the January Senate hearings was established, and the MTA adopted the position that it would attempt to 44 sell its program through these hearings. The Senate hearings of 1956 and subsequent actions The Senate interim hearings in January, 1956, brought to light the multiple interpretations of the metro politan transit problem and the vast variety of solutions that were then being proposed. Of major importance among these versions was that of the Citizens Traffic and Trans portation Committee. This group had been formed from a meeting between Los Angeles Mayor Norris Poulson and H. G. McClellan, who at the time of that meeting was both a director of MTA and chairman of the Los Angeles Chamber Traffic and Transportation Committee. At this meeting in 1953, McClellan had convinced the mayor that a citizens' committee should be created to look at the Los Angeles metropolitan area transportation problem in its totality— freeways, air travel, rapid transit. These two individ uals, in collaboration with three others, decided that the County Board of Supervisors should also be involved in the 44 Minutes, August 17, 1955. 85 creation of this committee. Thus, in October, 1953, the initial members of the Citizens Transportation and Traffic Committee were appointed by Mayor Poulson and Supervisor John Ford.^ This committee began work in earnest in 1954. It was composed of forty-one Los Angeles County citizens who, for one reason or smother, were closely allied with the transportation industry or groups affected by that industry. This group included in its membership two members of the MTA Board of Directors, an officer of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, officials from cities and county traffic and engineering offices, officials of the Automobile Club of Southern California, and others. The group divided itself into four basic committees of which the most important for this account was the rapid transit committee. A Panel of Consultants was also chosen by the Citizens Committee to aid each of the special subcommittees in their work. Serving on the rapid transit subcommittee were the secretary-manager of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association and the executive secretary of the 4 5 Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee of Metropolitan Traffic and Transportation Committee, Septem ber 23, 1953, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. 86 Automobile Club. No MTA officials were on this subcommit tee.46 Drawing upon data provided by the state, county, and local governments and by numerous private organizations concerned^ with particular aspects of metropolitan transpor tation, the Panel of Consultants produced a plcin for the resolution of the Los Angeles traffic dilemma. The plan offered by this group for the development of a rapid transit system was essentially identical to that offered by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association at the 1953 Legis lature interim hearings. This plan called for the use of buses on freeways as a system of rapid transit. Following the same reasoning used in 1953, the chairman of the rapid transit committee, Walter R. Lindersmith of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, outlined the procedures which should be followed in implementing this plan. In a manner similar to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association action of 1953, the Panel of Consultants A 7 opposed the plans of the MTA. 46 Minutes of Meetings of April, 1954, and August, 1954, Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. 47 Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, Panel of Professional and Expert Consultants, "Traffic and 87 At the hearings held in January, 1956, the Citi zens Traffic and Transportation Committee explained that it opposed the MTA program for the reason that no study had been made that definitively indicated a rail rapid transit system and public ownership of the mass transit system was the best way to solve the transit problem. This group advocated the development of a Master Plan to be made by a new authority as proposed in legislation it had had intro duced in the 1955 Legislature Session. The Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association upheld the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee position and stood fast in their opposition to the MTA proposal.^® The City of Los Angeles was represented at these hearings by Mayor Poulson and Councilman Timberlake. The Mayor feverishly opposed the MTA measure and called for a general study similar to the one made in San Francisco. He asserted that the plan to buy the private lines included Transportation Plan,” submitted on December 15, 1954. ^Committee Representing the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Men's Association, and the Citizens' Traffic and Transportation Committee, "Adopted Statement Concerning Senate Bill 1308, and Alternative Steps Recommended, January 5, 1956." 88 payoffs; that the plan envisioned having the same incompe tents running the lines that then were causing all the problems; that the deal might hurt Los Angeles City bonds; that the MTA powers should not be broadened until a county- wide survey was made; that the city might have to subsidize the MTA eventually; and that the people should vote on whether or not a multimillion dollar transit system should be built. Councilman Timberlake concurred in the opinion that much additional study should be made before any other 49 plans were approved. The Los Angeles Times also supported the position of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. The Times called for the suspension of MTA activities, the reshaping of the Authority to provide for local control, and the need for a San Francisco type study. It stated that the MTA was not responsive to the local community and its needs. Further, it charged that the MTA had bypassed the local community and had gone over it to Senator Richards and the State Legislature.^® In answer to its critics, the MTA explained that a ^ Times, January 18, 1956, 1-1. 50 Times, January 18 and 24, 1956, editorials. 89 new form of purchase had been developed and that the price of the two lines would be reduced, due to depreciation, from $43,000,000 agreed upon in September, 1954, to $37,- 000,000 as of December 31, 1955. Merritt attacked Assem blyman Augustus Hawkins' 1955 appropriations measure to finance a transit committee study of Los Angeles and Orange Counties as a ploy to hold up action and a delaying tactic on the part of the Los Angeles Chamber, the Downtown Busi ness Men's Association, and the Citizens Traffic and Trans portation Committee. MTA Director Hayden P. Jones, who had been elected Chairman of the Board in April, 1955, said in his formal statement that the MTA needed the additional powers to implement the intended purpose of the 1951 legis lation creating the MTA. He said that careful study and consultation with qualified engineers indicated that the transit problem could be effectively handled only by includ ing Orange County and those portions of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties once serviced by the Pacific Electric Railway Company, as well as Los Angeles County. Another conclusion was that in order to develop a mass rapid transit system for the metropolitan area, the existing facilities then serving the area would first have to be brought into a single entity. From that entity, a system of mass rapid 90 transit, limited to no single type of facility, could then be developed. ^ Acting upon this information, the MTA had proceeded to determine the feasibility of acquiring the existing facilities necessary to make a start in the development of a mass rapid transit system and whether this could be done by revenue bonds financed without recourse to subsidy from the tax base. In brief, he said that this could be and should be done. Jones stated that MTA studies and consul tations with investment banking services indicated that revenue bonds would be economically feasible to finance the necessary transactions provided the MTA had complete juris- 52 diction in fixing rates and routes. Merritt defended the actions of the MTA in extend ing its study to areas outside the MTA jurisdiction and undertaking an appraisal of the private lines on the grounds that the consideration of a $165,000,000 monorail 51 California, Assembly and Senate, Subcommittee of the Joint Interim Committee on Transportation Problems, Transcript of Proceedings, January 17, 18, 19, 1956. Unless otherwise stated, all data under this heading have been drawn from this source. See also Times, January 18, 1-1? 19, 1-1; 20, 1-1; and 21, 1-1, 1956. 91 system would be ineffectual without discussing other dis tribution systems which would make it workable. He said the MTA, to that time, had never used state money, but if it did not receive a source of income for fiscal 1956 it would 53 no longer be able to exist. Following these hearings, Chairman Jones wrote a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times in reply to an editorial in that paper. In that letter he argued that the purchase of the private lines was needed to serve as a nucleus for a future integrated system. He maintained that the price being offered for the lines was not inflated and that the only alternative would be for the city to condemn the property and take it over itself. This would create a system that would serve only the city, while the MTA was offering a system that would serve the entire metropolitan region as the problem dictated. He said that the MTA could finance the system out of revenue bonds and that this was the only way it could be done since there existed no evi dence that the voters would approve general obligation bonds with taxes on private property. He closed his argument by saying that the MTA had not overstepped the local community 92 in attempting to resolve this problem and that it was not an irresponsible group. It was responsible to the State Legislature, the Governor, and the Courts. Furthermore, the MTA recommendation that this matter be put before the 1956 Legislature was not hysterical but was the product of many, many months of study by several public and private 54 groups. In February, 1956, the MTA directed Merritt to approach state officials with the objective of securing from the 1956 Legislature an appropriation which would allow the MTA to study the transportation problem on a county- wide basis and include all types of transit facilities. Merritt conducted these consultations but was informed by the Legislative Counsel that further substantive legisla tion would have to be enacted before an appropriation could be made. Thus, the MTA directed Merritt to forego this proposal and request Assemblymen Patrick McGee and Charles Wilson of Los Angeles County to present only an amendment to the budget seeking funds sufficient to cover all admin istrative expenses of the MTA and an additional amount to pay the balance of the contractual obligation to Coverdale 54Times, February 6, 1956, Letters to the Editor. 93 and Colpitts. An appropriations request of $95,000 was made, but by the time the measure had cleared both houses of the Legislature it had been cut to $70,000. Neverthe less, the MTA had managed to obtain its first appropriation 55 from the state. In June of that year, the MTA board agreed to have Coverdale prepare a study of (1) the defects in the present law setting up the MTA, (2) the economic necessity of ex panding the area under the MTA to include the four counties in the metropolitan area, and (3) all types of transit facilities which might be appropriate for use in an inte grated transit system. Before this contract was finally confirmed, the MTA was informed by the County Counsel that it did not have the legal right to expend county funds for the education of the public. Upon learning this, the MTA cancelled plans to have Coverdale undertake this study. The remainder of 1956 was filled with finalizing the details of the contracts with the private lines and carrying on a running battle with the Citizens Traffic and 55Minutes, February 28, March 20, and April 10, 1956. ^Minutes, June 12 and July 10, 1956. 94 Transportation Committee. This group, by that time, had prepared final recommendations which proposed that the operations of the WTA be curtailed while a state-created Transportation Authority, fully representative of the public jurisdictions of the entire Los Angeles basin area, undertook the development of a master plan for the overall transportation of goods as well as people in that area. This authority would have broad and vast powers over all traffic and transportation movement in the Los Angeles basin and after preparing a master plan would then begin to undertake the implementation of that plan.^ The MTA described this proposal as an attempt on the part of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Com mittee to become the total dictator of transportation in the metropolitan region. As far as the MTA was concerned, it did not want the police powers which the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee was advocating and was merely interested in the movement of people, not goods. By August the MTA was saying that the private lines could be pur chased for a cost of only $33,000,000. This was down from ^Minutes, June 28, July 10, and August 2, 1956. 95 $43,000,000 as of September, 1954.®® Early that fall the MTA began to prepare the legis lation it would have introduced in the coming legislative session. This legislation had been approved by the Legis lative Counsel at the request of Assemblyman Wilson. Mer ritt said that the proposed transit bill incorporated all the basic sections of the original act of 1951, but created a new act which would also include all the amendments which had been developed and approved since that time. During the fall, members of the MTA met with repre sentatives of the Los Angeles Chamber, the Downtown Busi ness Men's Association, the Citizens Traffic and Transpor tation Committee, and other groups. Copies of the proposed legislation and plans for the downtown area were sent to the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Associ ation, and these groups were asked to criticize, propose alternatives, but most importantly support the MTA's efforts in the 1957 Legislature. The Authority also tried to obtain the support of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Com- 59 mittee but to no avail. ®®Minutes, August 2 and 14, 1956. Minutes, December 11, 1956. 96 The 1957 state legislative session During 1957 the MTA changed neither its definition of the transportation problem nor its proposed solution. Neither, for that matter, did the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. The Los Angeles Chamber, on the other hand, presented another story. In an effort to determine just what its position should be with respect to the MTA proposal, the Los Angeles Chamber Traffic and Transportation Committee undertook a study of the rapid transit problem. This committee deliv ered its final recommendations to the Chamber Directors on March 1, 1957. These recommendations proved to be far- reaching. They called for the establishment of a four- county jurisdictional transit district with power to issue general obligation bonds specifically approved by the voters and secured by property taxes. The governor would appoint an eleven member transit board with the Los Angeles Supervisors recommending six, the city two, and one each from the other three counties.60 The district was to develop integrated mass rapid 60Times, March 1, 1957, 3-1, and March 13, 1957, 3-1. 97 transit for the movement of people, and as related thereto, to make recommendations to governments, after a district study, on the movement of goods and vehicular traffic. While the district was to issue general obligation bonds secured by property taxes, it was to look for other revenue sources on which to place most of the burden. It was pro posed that the district at this time not be given revenue bond issuing power. The district was to be given the power of eminent domain or contract which would extend over sys tems as well as land. The district was recommended as being a more responsible tool than the authority because it would be controlled by the local voters. The committee members expressed the belief that no adequate rapid transit system could be financed by revenue bonds. Finally, the committee proposed that other areas be permitted to join the district by citizen vote.^^ The directors of the Chamber tabled this recommen dation for three weeks. When they returned to it, it was rejected. In its place the directors proposed to support the MTA bill, if it was amended to provide that the people of the Los Angeles area would be called upon to vote on any 61Ibid. 98 future plan to establish a transit district, to be financed 62 through the issuance of general obligation bonds. Both the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Com mittee and the Los Angeles Times continued their opposition to the MTA plan. The chairman of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee said that the Los Angeles area had only a downtown traffic problem which could be resolved by the mayor, if he so desired. He said that there was really no great problem which called for the exaggerated action 6 ^ then being considered. The Los Angeles Times maintained that if the MTA bill were passed it would be only a short time before that group reappeared before the State Legisla ture appealing for taxing power. The Times supported the Los Angeles Chamber Traffic and Transportation Committee measure which called for the establishment of a transit district but which had been turned down by the directors.64 In April, while the MTA measure was being consid ered by the Legislature, Riverside, Orange, and San 6 3 Times, March 15, 1957, 1-2. The chairman at this time was Roy Hagen. 64 Times, March 17, 1957, editorial. 99 Bernardino Counties decided that their best interests would be served by withdrawing from the proposed new transit authority. They felt that the costs of this system would be greater than the benefits their respective counties would receive and that the program would ultimately burden the taxpayers. They also claimed that they were unfamiliar with the MTA's operational methods and that they were far from receptive to the proposed representation that would be used in staffing the Authority's Board of Directors.^ Even with the opposition and lack of support of these various groups, the MTA measure was passed in May, 1957. With the approval of this measure, the MTA directed the Coverdale firm to update its appraisals of the private companies and begin the final preparations for the issuance of the bonds which would be used to purchase the private lines. The purchase date was set for the spring of 1958. The only setback in the sale of these bonds came when Moody's Investors Service, in February, 1958, failed to give the MTA issue a rating of favorable for bank invest ment. Two other analytical firms, nevertheless, gave them 6^Times, April 16, 1957, 1-24, and April 18, 1957, 1-18. 100 a satisfactory rating. When the bonds were issued for sale in February, they attracted no buyers. The issuing firm of Bear, Sterns, and Company, however, had provided in its contract with the MTA an option to purchase the bonds if no other investors made an offer. The firm chose to exercise this option and, on March 3, 1958, the MTA took formal possession of the private lines and the MTA became an oper- 66 atxng agency. Part III: The MTA Enlarges Its Powers The Coverdale and Colpitts studies Before the MTA had taken over the bus operations in March, 1958, it had announced that monorail, even if feasible, could be only a partial answer to the Los Angeles transit problem. What had been proposed as the solution— an integrated transportation system covering the entire metropolitan region— was now partially within its grasp. The private bus lines had been secured to serve as the nucleus of the integrated system. The Authority had the jurisdiction to operate lines within most of the Los ^^Times, February 20, 1958, 3-1, and March 1, 1958, 3-1. 101 Angeles County and several interurban lines to the surround ing counties. But before action could proceed furtherr answers to several vital transit questions had to be an swered. Depending upon these answers was the future of the MTA. In late March, 1958, the MTA began negotiations with the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts to undertake a study to determine answers to several questions. Is there a need for rapid transit? If there is a need, where does this need exist and how grave is it? Once these questions were answered it would be possible to determine whether there was any reason to conduct studies to answer the question. What type of facility is best suited to each situation in the metropolitan area? To provide these answers, Coverdale began a series of origin and destination studies. By September the indications of the study encour aged the MTA to set aside $350,000 from operating expenses for additional engineering studies to estimate the cost per mile for construction and operations of various types of 6*7 rapid transit equipment. Times, May 2, 1958, 3-1, and September 24, 1958, 3-1. 102 About this time the MTA expressed its interest in having others join with it in the resolution of the transit problem. Executive Director Merritt mentioned that the MTA would like to see the other three counties assume member ship in the Authority. In addition, at a meeting of the Southern California Association of Chambers of Commerce, Merritt called upon the individual members of that group to provide suggestions for the solution of local travel prob- . 68 lems. While the MTA waited for the full Coverdale report to be completed, attention was focused for the remainder of 1958 on the operating problems of the Authority. On the basis of interim studies, however, the MTA declared in December that the proposed transit system would probably be a combination monorail, surface, and elevated. The Author ity was hopeful that the monorail could be developed for primary use, but preliminary indications suggested that it would require too much right of way and, therefore, would 69 be too expensive to construct in all property areas. The year 1959 saw one major step completed and ^®Times, September 27, 1958, 1-2. k^Times, December 18, 1958, 3-14. 103 another taken by the MTA in the quest for a definition of the metropolitan transit problem and the generation of pos sible solutions thereto. The completed step involved the receipt and publication in May of the Coverdale report on the origins and destinations of transit passengers in the Los Angeles area. Merritt termed this the first step in the development of the rapid transit system. This study outlined the main corridors of traffic which travelers within the Los Angeles area followed and provided a basis for predicting the number of potential passengers which a 70 rapid transit facility might expect. This report provided only two surprises. One sur prise was the recommendation that the line reaching from San Fernando Valley to downtown Los Angeles go through the heart of Hollywood and then swing into Los Angeles over Wilshire Boulevard from the vicinity of Highland Avenue rather than proceeding directly from Hollywood to downtown Los Angeles. This was suggested following the discovery that many Valley residents went to the Wilshire area. The second surprise was the recommendation that the entire sys tem be uniform rail transit and not a combination of several ^Times, May 6, 1959, 3-1. 104 transit facilities. With the presentation of this report, the MTA expressed the hope that within a year the transit system would be off the drawing boards. However, before this could be realized, the Authority explained that several expensive studies would have to be undertaken to determine more precisely the potential revenues and operating costs of various types of transit facilities. These studies would provide the information required to sell the revenue bonds which would be used to finance the construction of 71 the system. The MTA’s second major step toward the development of rapid transit was made when the MTA contracted with the firm of Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall to review all rapid transit system proposals submitted to the Authority and make technical evaluations and recommendations on them. In addition, the firm was to study the four corridors out lined in the Coverdale report for conditions which would affect the selection of any special type of rapid transit system. The implications of eventually extending transit lines to the outer ends of each corridor were also to be ^ Times, May 6, 1959, 3-1; May 8, 1959, 3-1 or 1-13; and April 15, 1959, 1-3. 105 72 considered. The Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall studies By March, 1960, Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Menden hall had released the first part of its study. From the thirty to forty transit systems proposed, three had been selected which were believed to be worthy of further study. Two of these were monorail systems and the other was a duo rail system. The remaining parts of the study, which were to be completed later that year, would furnish data on the location, type, and cost of the initial line. After that report was made, another study would have to be made to provide economic and engineering feasibility data to satis fy the requirements of the purchasers of the revenue bonds. As the first findings were being made public, the County Board of Supervisors was querying the MTA's newly appointed executive director, C. M. Gilliss, as to whether those findings might indicate that the MTA would require taxing power to build its system. Gilliss replied that the ^ Times, August 19, 1959, 1-20. ^Times, March 9, 1960, 3-1. 106 MTA had never considered any financing plan other than revenue bond financing. However, he stated that the Authority recognized that if it possessed the power to tax, bonds could be sold more readily and at a lower rate of interest because of the security provided for the investor. Not long thereafter the Los Angeles Times edi torialized against giving the MTA taxing power, especially 74 since its members were not elected officials. In April a Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall progress report recommended that the initial phase of the rapid transit system running along the four corridors radiating from central Los Angeles be forty-three and one- half miles in length. The study proposed the addition of one hundred and ten miles over eight routes by 1980. The majority of this system would be above ground but part 75 would be subway. When the high cost of these studies was criticized, Gilliss defended them on the grounds that they were neces sary to the eventual sale of any revenue bonds. He said 7^Times, March 9, 1960, 3-1, and March 12, 1960, editorial. 7^Times, April 6, 1960, 1-1. 107 that unless these studies were made and the revenue bonds purchased, it would become necessary to finance the con struction of the system through taxation. In order for the revenue bonds to be salable, the economic-engineering study would have to show that the revenue of the system would be 100 per cent above costs in a forty-year period. If this was not feasible, he continued, the revenue bonds might still be salable if the county or the state would guarantee them.76 A few weeks after making these statements, Gilliss appeared in Washington, D. C., before a Senate Banking and Currency Committee where he testified in behalf of federal aid to urban transportation. He described the $1,000,000 federal loan proposal as completely inadequate and requested that the federal government really help the Los Angeles situation by assisting in floating the Authority's bonds. Following this proposal, the Los Angeles Times once again criticized the MTA and suggested that it try to obtain aid from local governments and the state government before 77 going to the federal government for assistance. 7 * * Times, April 11, 1960, 1-4. 77Times, May 25, 1960, 1-5, and May 26, 1960, edi torial. 108 In May, I960, Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall made a rather definitive recommendation for a 74.9 mile transit system comprising 51 miles of overhead, 20.6 miles of grade level, and 2.3 miles of subway. It was proposed that the system be built at one time rather than in stages, and the construction time was predicted at four to five years. Before the MTA acted on this recommendation, Gilliss stated that MTA wanted to obtain the views of all inter ested parties. Also, he said that nothing should be done until all avenues for financing the project had been re viewed. On the other hand, he recommended at that same time that an effort be made to have the Legislature convert the Authority to a transit district similar in powers to a flood control district. This would make it unnecessary for the MTA to obtain permission from the many utilities to cross their lines and communities to use their streets as 7 8 rights of way for the transit system were developed. In July the MTA's chief engineer stated that duo rail Metro system would be cheaper to employ than the monorail systems. This did not, however, ihhibit the MTA from voting to hear the monorail promoters. These promoters ^Times, May 28, 1960. 109 had loudly vocalized their belief that they had been unfairly discriminated against, and local government pres sures from Los Angeles County and City officials demanded 79 that the MTA hear the cases of these individuals.' The following month the MTA approved a contract with Coverdale to conduct an economic feasibility study of the Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall proposal to determine if the system could be supported from revenue generated by system fares. The MTA also decided to seek new powers similar to those possessed by county road depart ments and the State Division of Highways at the hearings of the Assembly Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations on September 28 and 29. These powers would allow the WTA to move ahead with the construction of a rapid transit system without having to obtain the legal permission of local government units and public utilities whose property QQ might have to be used in route construction.0” In September Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall presented its final report which was an alternative to the ^Minutes, July 5, 1960. ®°Minutes, August 2, I960; Times, August 24, 1960, 1-2. 110 June route plan. This plan differed very little from the first in route placement, but varied significantly in design, recommending approximately ten additional miles of subway over those found in the first plan. Gilliss said that all this material would be sent to the cities and counties for their engineering staffs to study and that the MTA wanted the views of these groups before any final 81 decisions were made with regard to these matters. The MTA1s initial 1961 legislative proposal On September 9th the MTA announced its proposed legislative program for 1961 involving the extension of MTA powers in the field of eminent domain and condemnation. The Authority had decided to wait until the Coverdale economic feasibility study was completed before developing proposals related to system financing. Therefore, this go matter was not contained in the program. Nevertheless, these proposals met immediate and severe criticism from almost all quarters. 81 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, September-October, 1960. 82 Times, September 9, 1960, 3-1. Ill At the Assembly hearings held that same month, the MTA justified its request for the proposed powers on the assumption that various engineering, financial, and other factors demanded that they be provided to that organiza tion. It was asserted that granting an agency such powers was not revolutionary, for similar powers had been given to the telephone companies. Further, only if the MTA were given these powers could the Los Angeles area be assured of 83 ever obtaining a rapid transit system. At this hearing and in the days that followed the MTA* s position was attacked by the Los Angeles City Coun cil, the operators of various public bus companies through out the Los Angeles area, the League of California Cities, and numerous city councils from cities within Los Angeles County. Included in these attacks were charges by the Los Angeles City Council that the MTA plan would ruin property values through the construction of elevated railways; that the program would delegate powers to investment bankers and bond buyers; and, that the program did not provide any local checks and balances for the people to express their ®^Times, September 29, 1960, 3-2. 1X2 • 84 desires. The municipally-owned bus companies saw the MTA proposals as a death blow to their operations. They said that should this legislation be passed, the MTA could enter into competition with them on their most lucrative lines and within a short time drive them out of business. The smaller cities and their representative, the League of Cali fornia Cities, opposed the MTA measures on the grounds that their passage would provide a dangerous inroad on the home- QC rule principle. In an attempt to resolve this conflict and develop legislation more amenable to these parties, Gilliss, in October, suggested that the MTA reduce the demands so as to ask for no more authority in its own domain than the State Highway Commission had in the area of road building. Further, he favored giving the cities a chance to be heard on their route preferences but not giving them a veto power over the MTA's ultimate decisional authority. In reply to the Los Angeles City Council's criticisms, Gilliss said 84Ibid.; Times, November 1, 1960, 3-3. 85Times, September 29, 1960, 3-2, and October 27, 1960, 1-28 or 4-7. 113 that the real question was whether the City or the Author ity could build a rapid transit system. He said that if the Authority built the system this would not mean that the cities would have to be turned over to the Authority. On the other hand, the Authority would have to have power to acquire rights of way and build the system in the streets 86 where it desired. Shortly after the City Council's criticisms were made, the Los Angeles Times came out supporting the Council position. The Times said that, at this juncture, the MTA did not need the powers it was requesting. It further pointed out that, to that time, the MTA had not said how the system was to be financed or from where the customers 87 would come to pay the mortgage on the system. Early in December, Coverdale reported to the MTA the results of its economic feasibility study. The study showed that revenue from the proposed seventy-five mile system would not provide enough to pay the interest and principle on revenue bonds of the necessary size for the 86 Times, October 27, 1960, 1-28 or 4-7, and Novem ber 1, 1960, 3-3. 87 Times, November 3, 1960, editorial. 114 system, even if the system became operable in 1965 as planned. On the heels of this report, the MTA begem to develop a new set of recommendations for proposed legisla tion which would be presented to the Senate Fact-finding Committee meeting on December 16 and 17. This set of recommendations was to propose ways to reduce the costs of the system and might, if necessary, include shortening the DO length of the proposed lines. At these hearings, the MTA told the committee that it had come to report on the studies it had commissioned and not to recommend a specific financing plan. The Au thority stated that this would be left to the Legislature, with the presentation of the Authority report, a consensus began to develop that some form of subsidy to support the MTA rapid transit program was entirely likely. Gilliss agreed with Senator Richards that, with a total subsidy, should come the removal of the MTA's power to determine its own fares. However, he asserted that a complete subsidy would not be required since about 50 per cent of the $529,700,000 rapid transit operation could come from cur rent revenues of the system based on rates comparable to ®®Times, December 8, 1960, 1-24 or 1-2. 115 those then in existence. Gilliss also stated that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act should be rewritten since, under the existing legal situation, any city, county, or public agency could hold the MTA at a standstill by refusing the use of its property for right of way purposes. Following this hearing, several MTA Board members questioned the validity of certain Coverdale findings. They said that the report on traffic and revenue for the proposed seventy-five mile system failed to take into account several factors relating to financing the project. In answer to these charges, the MTA chief engineer supported the report and said that some of the information which the board members thought was missing had actually come to the q n MTA from Coverdale in the form of informal reports. u As 1960 drew to a close, the MTA continued under fire because of its initially proposed 1961 legislative program. In December the cities of Pasadena and South Gate endorsed the Los Angeles County Division of the League of California Cities' opposition to the MTA proposals. During oq Times, December 17, 1960, 1-10. on Times, December 21, 1960, 3-1 or 4-7. 116 that same period the City Council of Monrovia went on record as opposing the MTA proposal. Thus, with few sup porters and a vast multitude of opponents, the MTA entered Q 1 the new year and the 1961 Legislative Session. A The MTA's revised 1961 legislative program Immediately following the September Assembly hear ings , the MTA had begun a series of discussions with the opponents of its proposals. These discussions and the economic feasibility report from Coverdale led eventually to the adoption in January, 1961, of the MTA's modified legislative program. This new program provided that: 1. The MTA could locate rapid transit lines within the four proposed corridors following Highway Commission hearing procedures. 2. The MTA would be permitted to construct rapid transit facilities above or below public streets after hearings had established the proper loca tions and provision had been made for the pay ment of relocation or other costs. 3. Private bus companies could not establish new 91 Ibid.? Minutes, December 20, 1960. 117 competing lines with the MTA. 4. The MTA could reroute, change, or abandon lines as communities grew and changed, so long as they provided adequate substitute service. 5. National Labor Relations Board rules would govern union jurisdictional elections. 6. The MTA would be permitted to use railroad rights of way for rapid transit, providing the railroad could continue operations on the same right of way.^2 Gilliss said that the MTA's 1960 legislative pro posals had been developed in the belief that a rapid transit system could be paid for from revenue bonds. However, once the discovery was made that some type of subsidy or tax base would be required, the MTA no longer needed to request the overriding powers in property condemnation, route loca tion, and line construction that once were believed essen tial. Thus, the MTA had devised a modified program which contemplated a higher degree of cooperation between the 93 local levels of government and the MTA. 92Times, January 11, 1961, 1-18. 93 . Ibid.; Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, February, 1961. 118 On January 24th the MTA adopted the four principal rapid transit corridors as those which would be followed in establishing rapid transit for the Los Angeles area. This was done to give the cities involved some advance idea of where the precise routes were likely to be located. At the same time, the MTA chief engineer noted that recent plans to develop the downtown area would influence rapid transit revenues and that this had not been shown in the Coverdale study. Nevertheless, he said that, even with this probable impetus to higher revenues, a subsidy of some type would be needed.94 By March the MTA had found a sponsor for its legis lation. This legislation did not touch upon the topic of financing but remained concerned only with operating mat ters and the extension of various powers of the MTA. The Authority maintained that the passage of this legislation was a prerequisite to financing the system. This was be cause that matter could be discussed only after the system had been precisely located and its cost determined; and the MTA's revised legislation provided the MTA with powers to 94Times, January 25, 1961, 3-1. 119 95 accomplish this route location and cost determination. In May the MTA unveiled the twenty-three mile Back bone Route. This route was formulated and made possible by the work completed the previous year by Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall. After their report was made, groups and individuals were invited by the MTA to come forward with new rapid transit ideas. Kaiser Industries was among those who offered their services. Through volun teer technical and engineering work, it had developed the Backbone Route Plan. The estimated cost of this route was $192,000,000, and the MTA Board chairman suggested that it might be financed from passenger fares. In addition, he said that it could be constructed in part to provide fall out shelters for certain areas of the metropolitan commu nity.96 The Backbone Route Plan had been devised by Kaiser Industries and the MTA without the cooperation of the cities or other governmental jurisdictions that would be affected. This was reflected in a newspaper account in which the city 9~ * Times, March 14, 1961, 1-2; Minutes, May 2, 1961. QfT Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, February, 1962; Times, May 15, 1961, 1-1. 120 manager of one of the cities at the terminus of the line was quoted as saying that he knew nothing about the MTA's announced surface-and-subway Backbone Route. The account further related that officials of a city which no longer would be served by the new rapid transit plan had not been 97 included in the discussions leading to that decision. The MTA now argued that its proposed legislation was a necessary condition for enacting the Backbone Plan. This legislation, however, was continuing to generate heavy opposition from local government groups. In order to obtain the final passage of a measure which the Authority believed would allow the construction of the Backbone Route, it finally accepted a compromise bill approved by the local groups. This bill introduced several significant changes into the MTA bill. Included in these amendments were some concerning the use of railroad rights of way for rapid transit vehicles, competition from private bus lines, and, most importantly, one which allowed the MTA to construct rapid transit facilities in subways below public streets provided there was no interference with streets or highways, however, under this last amendment the MTA was still ^Times, May 18, 1961, 1-5. 121 required to obtain municipal or county consent if the subway 98 interfered with the use of the thoroughfares involved. With the passage of this measure, the third part of the rapid transit controversy came to a close. The MTA was now in a position to initiate talks with the federal govern ment concerning low-interest, long-term loans to construct the proposed Backbone Route. In anticipation of eventually seeking federal legislation to aid in the construction of this route, the MTA had begun earlier that year to work with Senator Clair Engle and several California congress men. Supposedly these men had already established a favor able climate in Washington for the beginnings of these dis- 99 cussions. Part IV: The Origin of the Southern California Rapid Transit District The MTA and the federal government With the passage of the amended state legislation, the MTA began to work in earnest with Senator Engle and various congressmen. This work culminated in the introduc ^ Times, May 23, 1961, 3-1, and June 2, 1961, 3-1. ^Times, June 24, 1961, 1-11. 122 tion of the Transit Revenue Bond Insurance Bill into Con gress by Senator Engle and Representative Chet Holfield. Gilliss said that this action had proved necessary inasmuch as no transit system could be built from revenue bonds supported solely by fares. Both Gilliss and Albert J. Eyrand, chairman of the MTA Board, said that should Congress fail to pass the bill, the Authority would be forced to ask the State Legislature for taxing power, which might cause a seven-year delay in building the rapid transit system.100 While the MTA was carrying on this federal legisla tive program, it was also allowing two monorail firms to prepare proposals for the construction of the Backbone Route. These two firms had told the MTA that they could build this line for considerably less than the MTA had estimated it would cost. Because these firms had lobbied with the County Board of Supervisors, the MTA decided that it would be advantageous to allow them to go ahead and pro pose their plans.101 During this time the MTA was also having additional engineering studies made on the Backbone Route. The 100Times, March 7, 1962, 1-27. 101Times, July 18, 1961, 3-1. 123 Authority had learned that the 1961 Congress was unlikely to act upon the proposed Transit Bond Insurance Bill, but that favorable action would be forthcoming during the 1962 Session. With these thoughts in mind, the MTA had ordered engineering studies to be undertaken which would provide data to prove conclusively that the federal government would be assuming no risk in supporting the Los Angeles 102 Transit program. The month of December, 1961, was a most active one for the MTA. When the Alweg Monorail Company presented its proposal for building the Backbone Route, the MTA promptly turned it down. The Authority contended that the financial proposal was faulty, the length of the line shorter than initially proposed, and that the design included elevated structures where such structures were completely unaccept able to the public. If alterations were made to correct these deficiencies, the MTA said that the monorail proposal would cost more to build than the duo rail system. Further more, that system would always cost more to operate since 10 3 its facilities did not contain standardized parts. Minutes, December 19, 1961. *°^linutes, December 19, 1961, C. M. Gilliss, Staff Report and Recommendations of LAMTA Rapid Transit Construe- 124 Having rejected this proposal, the MTA voted to go forward with the duo rail, federally financed plan. The Authority believed that this was the only system which was unanimously accepted by the communities and in accord with the existing law. In addition, the MTA then held the position that the Backbone Route would have to be construct ed before any extensions to other areas of the community 104 could be made. Later that month, the MTA for the first time for mally adopted the Backbone Route. This was done to acquire data to present at the February hearings of Congress. An outlay of $925,000 for engineering and financial services was approved as the first step in the construction of this route. Gilliss said that if the federal legislation was passed, these services would become the first step toward marketing the bonds and financing the system— the first stage in construction. He said that the MTA had been given assurances that its bonds would be purchased by the Bank of America and the First Boston Corporation, if and when Congress approved the guarantee bill. Gilliss concluded by tion Program. See also Minutes, December 5, 1961. 125 saying that if something happened to this plan, the Los Angeles taxpayer would have to pay for the system in whole or in p a r t . 105 With these plans laid, the MTA had the Transit Bond Insurance Bill introduced at the opening of the 1962 Con gressional Session. From the very first, this proposal found little support and eventually the MTA was forced to admit defeat. It then attempted to have a $350,000,000 federal loan proposal passed from which the MTA could draw for construction purposes. This, too, went down to defeat. Nevertheless, the MTA was given reason to believe that this legislation might find a better reception in the 1963 Session of Congress. This came about when Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey, who had herded the Administra tion's 1962 transit legislation through Congress, told Senator Engle that the MTA plan would receive a full hear ing at the next session of Congress. He attributed the defeat of the plan to the lack of time available for con gressmen to analyze the proposal.Thus, although things looked bleak for the MTA, there still was hope that the 105Ibid. 106Times, October 16, 1962, 1-25. 126 Authority would be able to avoid the subsidy financing alternatives suggested by its Board chairman when the situation had looked hopeless in August. Those alterna tives were to ask the State Legislature either to (1) give the MTA taxing power, (2) guarantee MTA bonds itself as the federal government had been asked to do, or (3) provide matching funds that would make the MTA eligible for grants provided under the federal administration's transportation bill.107 During this time, the MTA had suffered another defeat in its attempts to secure financing for its inter- urban lines from the federal government. At the request of the mayors of Long Beach and Los Angeles, the MTA had sub mitted an application to the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency applying for funds to construct a Los Ange les-Long Beach line. This grant was supposed to be given for a demonstration project. Even at the time this was done, MTA officials thought that the application would be denied on the grounds that such a program represented a capital project rather than a demonstration project. These fears proved true in October of that year when the MTA 107Times, August 6, 1962, 2-1. 127 received a letter from the Assistant Administrator of Transportation saying that for exactly those reasons no 108 grant could be extended for that project. The construction of one interurban line did, how ever, appear to be economically feasible at that time. This was a line proposed by one of the monorail companies. It would stretch from central Los Angeles to the Interna tional Airport and would run nonstop. This proposal was given lengthy consideration by the financial and construc tion committees of the MTA Board. They finally concluded that this line would be financially feasible if the cooper ation of the involved local governments could be obtained and the necessary rights of way secured. However, such 1 0 9 cooperation proved unobtainable. The MTA turns to the State Legislature; 1963 In January, 1963, the MTA was informed by Senator Engle that Congress was unlikely to give the bond guarantee proposal a favorable reception that year. Having been thwarted at the national government level, the MTA on ^■®®Minutes, October 23, 1962. 109Times, September 12, 1962, 1-2. 128 January 8th turned to the state for a solution to its prob lem. It was announced that the Authority would now request the 1963 Legislature for the power to levy a property tax. This was believed to be the only remaining way to pay for the proposed rapid transit system. Funds from this tax source would be supplemented by far revenues earmarked to retire the proposed $649,000,000 revenue bond which would finance the capital cost of the project. The MTA antici pated that fare-box revenues would pay for all maintenance and operation of the new system and two-thirds of its capi tal cost. The following day the MTA presented this propo sal to the Los Angeles County legislative delegation at a luncheon in Sacramento. When an avalanche of disapproval met this MTA pro posal , the MTA attributed the criticism to the fact that it had not had time to discuss the plan with other groups before offering it to the Legislature. Gilliss admitted that the MTA was guilty of a bad public relations move and said that the property tax was actually only a suggestion. He still felt, however, that there was not enough time to ^ ^ Times, January 8, 1963, 2-1, and January 16, 1963, 2-1. 129 put the property tax to a popular vote, due to the five per cent annual inflationary increase in construction costs. Such a popular vote, he said, might take more than three years and could make construction costs so high as to rule out the possibility of a rapid transit system forever. The MTA taxation plan caused the rebirth of a pro posal which had been suggested in one form or another since the discussions of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. This proposal called for the organ ization of a transit district which would have the power to tax and would be responsible to the local citizenry. Although the district would have taxing power, no tax could be levied without a vote of the people in that district. This proposal took concrete form as a legislative bill proposed by State Senator Thomas Rees. This bill was sub sequently passed by the Senate but defeated in the Assembly where it died in the Ways and Means Committee. Although this bill was pigeon-holed, it was to have a profound ef- 112 feet upon later events. ^•^Times, January 24, 1963, 1-29. 112 Times, June 7, 1963, 2-1, and June 21, 1963, 1-1 or 1-13. 130 Having received such a bitter reception to its taxation proposal, the MTA decided not to propose any legislation whatsoever during the 1963 Session. Instead, activities were limited to (1) opposing the Rees legisla tion on the grounds that two transit organizations were neither necessary nor desirable within the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and (2) working with numerous state, county, and local officials in an attempt to devise an acceptable scheme for financing a transit system. Following a meeting between members of the County Board of Supervisors, the Los Angeles Chamber, the MTA, the Mayor of Los Angeles City, and Governor Edmund Brown, a special committee was formed to seek methods of financing a rapid transit system. President Norman Topping of the University of Southern California was named to this commit tee by Mayor Samuel Yorty and subsequently became chairman. This group worked from February to April, when the final report was issued. The report recommended financing a transit system by supplementing fare-box revenues with a one-half cent sales tax. A Citizens' Rapid Transit Action Committee was appointed by the governor to review this recommendation and report its appraisal of the measure to In combating the Rees proposal, MTA Board Chairman Eyraud acknowledged that the suggestion to finance a transit system through a property tax was probably a mistake. Nevertheless, he maintained that the core of the contro versy lay not with the type of tax to be levied but with whether an appointive board should have taxing power. If the Authority was given this power, Eyraud said that he would favor reconstituting the membership selection pro cedures of that group. As the 1963 Legislative Session progressed, the MTA found a financing measure which it concluded would resolve the present quandary. This legislation, the Collier-Unruh Bill, would allow the supervisors of a county to levy an in lieu tax on automobiles for the purpose of supporting the construction and operation of rapid transit in that county. Thus, if the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors were to utilize this measure, a rapid transit system could be built. The consensus of discussions the MTA had had with investment bankers indicated that with the $15,000,000 1 1 3 Times, April 24, 1963, 2-2; Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, September, 1963. ^^Times, February 17, 1963, C-l or G-5. 132 which could accrue annually from the vehicle tax increase, a revenue bond of $390,000,000 could be issued to build the Backbone Route. While the search for financing continued, the MTA instituted a series of community conferences devoted to the consideration of rapid transit routes within the four pro posed corridors. These conferences were held during August and September to allow the voicing of opinion on proposed routes for the fifty-eight mile system. They resulted in the enumeration of a multitude of specific problems related to the establishment of specific routes in each corridor. But no concrete decisions regarding these matters were made on the basis of these discussions. In August MTA officials announced that they would meet with state and local government officials to consider the reconstitution of the MTA and alternatives to financ ing a rapid transit system. They did not believe that the MTA should have a political board but said the Board would agree to such a plan or step aside if they were requested to do so. As for having the Supervisors levy the in lieu 115Times, June 30, 1963, C-5, and June 21, 1963, 1-1 or 1-13. 133 tax, Gilliss said that this should not be done until the communities in the Los Angeles area had agreed on specific transit routes and the type of system that should be built.116 During 1963 a rebirth of the previous monorail proposals took place. In June the Alweg Company proposed a plan to build a forty-two mile system which would exceed by twenty-eight miles the size of its system offered in 1962. This system envisioned a main monorail line adjacent to, but not on, Wilshire and Santa Monica Boulevards, plus several branch lines. The total project would be financed by revenue bonds to be repaid from fares. The second pro posal came from the Goodell Monorail firm and proposed a line to the airport from downtown Los Angeles. This was given to the MTA staff for evaluation. This evaluation was to include the reactions of the various cities which would 117 be affected by the plans of these two companies. In July the Goodell firm submitted an expanded sixty-mile system which would cover the four major corridors 11^Times, August 2, 1963, 2-1. 11^Times, June 3, 1963, 2-1, and June 5, 1963, 2-1. 134 set forth in the 1959 Coverdale report. Although several cities and communities had already informed the MTA of their opposition to overhead transit structures in their neighborhoods, the MTA proceeded to request that the County Supervisors consider the use of public rights of way as a step toward the development of the monorail system pro posals.^^® In September the MTA chairman informed the Super visors that the Alweg proposal had not met the specifica tions and conditions its sponsors had promised and was therefore invalid. The Goodell airport line, he said, was worthy of more consideration but not its proposed area-wide system. He once again asserted that any mass rapid transit system could be built only with tax money and that the mem bers of the MTA agreed that if taxing powers were given to that group, it should be reconstituted and made more re sponsible to the local electorate. In addition, he urged the Supervisors to levy the in lieu tax provided by the Collier Unruh Act. If that were done, he said, the MTA 119 could begin immediately to build the system. 118Times, July 4, 1963, 2-1. 1 1 9 Times, September 11, 1963, 2-1. 135 About this same time, MTA Chairman Eyraud called for the participation of the Supervisors, officials of the City of Los Angeles, and members of the League of California Cities to join with the MTA in drafting a bill acceptable to all parties. He proposed that once such a bill were developed it be considered at a meeting of all interested parties and then submitted to the Legislature at the budget session in 1964.^® While this was taking place, certain Supervisors were calling for an interim committee hearing to sift the conflicting claims of the monorail companies and the MTA. The MTA had notified these companies that their systems were not acceptable to the communities and therefore were not acceptable to the MTA. Because of the furor which was aroused by this action, the MTA invited both monorail firms to resubmit their proposals and to provide routes that would be acceptable to the communities, including a subway 121 in the Wilshire corridor. At the interim committee hearing held in October, *20Times, September 12, 1963, 2-1. 121 Times, September 25, 1963, 2-1, and September 30, 1963, 2-1. 136 the MTA declared that private financing was not feasible and that the area's transit needs could best be met by a duo rail Metro system financed by a combination of fare revenues and increased motor vehicle taxes. If a deficit occurred, property taxes would be levied to supplement the subsidy. The Authority proposed the construction of a sixty-four mile, $669,000,000 system operating in subway, surface, and elevated. This network was both more costly and larger them that which the MTA had proposed earlier in the year. The change came from the inclusion of a Los Angeles to Long Beach line. The decision to include this line in the system had arisen from the positive popular support and concern expressed by people within that corridor during the community hearings conducted by the MTA that fall. Throughout the interim hearings, the MTA maintained that the monorail systems would be more costly them the Metro system with the extra expense amounting to about $40,000,000. The Alweg people were forced to admit that their lower cost estimates for monorail construction versus Metro system construction were based on an entirely ele vated system. If a subway were to be included, the monorail system could not be paid for from fare revenue 137 alone.122 Thus, as 1963 came to a close it appeared that the MTA had finally convinced the metropolitan community that any rapid transit system would have to be financed by some form of subsidy. On the other hand, whether the various metropolitan groups were convinced of the soundness of the MTA program was not certain. That program proposed that (1) the MTA Board structure be changed to allow for the local appointment of its seven members, (2) power be given to the MTA to issue general obligation bonds with voter approval, (3) powers of condemnation be broadened, and finally (4) a change be made in the Collier-Unruh Act to allow the newly reconstituted MTA to levy the in lieu tax 123 rather than the County Board of Supervisors. During January and February, 1964, the MTA tried to have its legislative program written into the transit bill then being prepared by Senator Rees and Assemblyman Thomas Times, October 29, 1963, 2-1, and October 30, 1952, 2-1; California, Assembly, Interim Committee on Transportation and Commerce, Transcript of Proceedings of Hearings on Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit, Vol. I, October 28, 1963, Los Angeles, California. 123 Times, December 29, 1963, G-l. 138 Carrell. These two men, by virtue of their past concern with transit in Los Angeles, had been singled out by state legislative leaders to develop the bill designed to help resolve the Los Angeles transit problem. The efforts of the MTA in getting these two men to forego the creation of a new district and the disbandment of the MTA were totally unsuccessful. Even a radio and newspaper campaign waged by the MTA to sell itself to the Los Angeles public managed 124 only to arouse its wrath. In the end, the MTA Board members were reduced to expressing the hope that those who replaced them would not throw away the years of work which they had completed. By April the MTA chairman was even praising the bill that would put the Board out of business. He said that it pro vided for the issuance of general obligation bonds and the right of eminent domain, both of which were needed to build a rapid transit system. The one flaw which he continued to see in the measure was the lack of a provision to provide 12 5 the District with a means of independent financing. (In Chapter V we will learn why this factor was not provided in ^2*Times, March 3, 1964, 1-20. ^2^Times, April 1, 1964, 2-1. 139 the Southern California Rapid Transit District Bill.) The birth of the Southern California Rapid Transit District On May 13, 1964, Governor Brown signed the bill that replaced the MTA with the Southern California Rapid Transit District. The new organization possessed most of the powers which its predecessor organization had thought necessary to build a rapid transit system. The exception was the absence of independent financing. Besides the changes in organizational authority, however, the most significant alterations were seen in the methods used to select the members serving on the Board of Directors of the District. Instead of gubernatorially appointed direc tors, the District had a completely locally appointed board. Five members were to be appointed by the Los Ange les County Board of Supervisors, two by the Mayor of Los Angeles, and four by cities lying within each of the four major traffic corridors which had been drawn by Coverdale and Colpitts. The cities in each corridor were formed into a selection committee composed of the elected councilmen of those cities. These men then came together and chose from among themselves an individual to represent their corridor 140 on the District's Board. Thus, all the major local govern ment jurisdictions within the District were provided repre sentation on the Transit District's policy-making body, which now had the power to t a x . ^ 6 The formal take-over by the Transit District offi cials took place on November 6, 1964. From the moment of this take-over, the behavior of the Board indicated a belief that the accomplishment of two primary tasks should be its basic concern. This dichotomization was reflected organizationally in the division of the Board's activities into an Operations Division, which was to oversee the day- to-day operation of the entire district and to review major bus route and fare changes, and the Rapid Transit Division which was to devote its time to the consideration of mat ters directly related to the development of a metropolitan rapid transit system. A suggestion for such an organiza tional arrangement had been made by MTA Executive Director Gilliss in May of that year. The fact that this officer, and the other top staff of the MTA, had been rehired by the 1 2 6 Southern California Rapid Transit District, The RTD Memo, November, 1964, Vol. I, No. 1; Times, May 14, 1964, 2-1. 141 District may have reflected his influence on that deci- 127 sion. The major concern of the new Transit District offi cers from the very first was how to obtain the financing required to begin construction of a rapid transit facility. During the remainder of 1964, following their formal instal lation, the various board members carried on discussions with numerous public and private groups as to what might be a feasible plan for transit financing. In January the fruit of these discussions was revealed in the Board's unanimous agreement to ask the State Legislature for the authority to levy a minimum property tax of one-half cent per $100 assessed valuation and a one-half per cent in lieu tax on 128 motor vehicles. It was estimated that the property tax would bring in $600,000 which would be used for detailed engineering and public information work on the twenty-three mile Back bone Route and other features of the proposed sixty-four ^■2^Times, May 14, 1964, 2-1, and November 6, 1964, 2- 1 . 128 Minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, January 20, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit Dis trict. 142 mile system. The money from the in lieu tax, which would increase this levy to two and one-half per cent, would be used to support a $300,000,000 revenue bond issue to build the system's first line, the Backbone Route. This inde pendent financing would also make the District eligible for federal loans for mass transit construction.-*-29 In interpreting the District's decision to go to the State Legislature for the securance of independent financing, the Los Angeles Times said that the District did not believe that Los Angeles' automobile-oriented voters were yet ready to back a sizable general obligation bond. This lack of voter backing, said the Times, and the result ing lack of funds for financing transit construction had been the underlying cause of repeated failures to develop a comprehensive rapid transit system in this area since the first studies were begun forty years previously .^0 The proposed combination of property and in-lieu taxes immediately caused an uproar among several metropoli tan groups. The South Bay cities, lying within one of the four traffic corridors, expressed extreme disfavor with the 129Ibid. ^•^Times, February 1, 1965, 2-1. 143 property tax idea and stated that any proposed tax levy would be opposed until the Transit District had come up with a suitable rapid transit program for the entire area. The Automobile Club of Southern California violently op posed the measure, saying that the people should have the final control over such a tax through a bond referendum. The Automobile Club further stated that it did not believe a rail rapid transit system would alleviate the transporta tion situation even if implemented. And as the MTA Board was initially announcing its tentative legislative program, a key state legislator was being quoted as saying that he saw little chance that the Legislature would go along with 1 3 1 the District's proposal. In anticipation of strong opposition, the District Board had announced simultaneously with the tentative financing plan its intention to meet with the League of California Cities before any final plan was developed to present to the State Legislature. Besides initiating this and other meetings with similarly concerned groups, the 131Times, January 22, 1965, 1-1, and February 1, 1965, 2-1. 144 District took another step to reduce resistance to its plans. In March the District Board adopted a Master Plan of rapid transit which was 160 miles in length and served virtually every community in the Los Angeles metropolitan region. The cost estimates for the plan were missing, but the District's chairman, Harry A. Faull, said that it would probably surpass $1,000,000,000. The Backbone Route was still to be the first route constructed, but while it was in the construction phase engineering would begin on the Long Beach and San Fernando Valley lines. This plan was to be presented to the metropolitan communities by District 1 ^3 members during the weeks to come. At the District Board meeting held on April 7th, a summary of Board activities during the previous eight weeks described the events which had caused the Board to modify its January legislative program. On the basis of confer ences, meetings, and informal discussions with civic and community leaders throughout the County with respect to the District's proposed Master Plan and methods for financing 132 Times, March 4, 1965, 2-1; Southern California Rapid Transit District, RTD Memo, March 3, 1965. 145 133 the same, four basic conclusions had emerged: ^ 1. There was a broadly recognized need for rapid transit and a pressing desire for immediately improved bus services, even before rapid tran sit was built. 2. The people demand the opportunity to vote on taxes to build any rapid transit system. 3. A comprehensive rapid transit system must be the immediate objective, not merely a first stage or showcase line. 4. The people demand and are entitled to know precisely how rapid transit and improved bus transportation will benefit them and their specific communities before they are called upon to decide the financing issue at the polls. In recognition of these conclusions, the District revised its legislative program to provide for the follow ing: 1. A one per cent in-lieu tax on motor vehicles would be placed on the ballot and, if approved 133 Minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, April 7, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit Dis trict. 146 by the voters, levied to help finance rapid transit. Once approved, this tax (which would cost an average of $8.00 per year per automo bile) would remain levied county-wide until the transit bonds were satisfied. Together with the revenues produced by the system itself, this tax would support up to $850,000,000 in bonds, which would build four of the eight legs in the Master Plan and provide expanded feeder bus service. The four most critically congested routes in the Master Plan would be built initially. These were the lines to West Los Angeles, to El Monte, to Long Beach, and to the Valley, with connecting feeder busses to the remainder of the county. The Legislature would authorize the District itself to levy for one year only the Collier- Unruh one-half per cent in-lieu tax now on the books. This one-time levy would cost the aver age motorist approximately $4.00 per automo bile. These funds would enable the District to a. Increase existing bus service immediately. 147 b. Complete the hard-core engineering and development work necessary for construction of the initial four rapid transit lines. c. Provide the mechanism for working with the communities for final and exact route de termination . d. Develop specific information on economic and service effects and benefits of rapid transit and expanded bus service on each and every community in the county. e. Communicate these critical facts to the citizenry so that they could be in a posi tion to make an informed and intelligent decision when they voted on rapid transit. In April Senator Rees introduced the Southern California Rapid Transit District measure. This took place, however, only after another transit district bill had been introduced. This bill proposed the establishment of an Orange County Rapid Transit District. The Orange County Supervisors said that this legislation had been introduced to block any immediate possibilities of being swallowed up by the Southern California Rapid Transit District. They expressed the belief that it might be best 148 for each of the counties in the Los Angeles metropolitan area to work out its own system and then bring them togeth er for consolidation. They felt that rather than having a system which reached wheel-like from central Los Angeles to the other sections of the region, as proposed by the Southern California Rapid Transit District, a better system would envision a grid pattern which they believed would be more suitable for taking people to their desired destina tions . As the 1964 Legislative Session moved on, the Southern California Rapid Transit District bill ultimately came to rest in the Senate Transportation Committee, headed by Senator Randolph Collier. Collier believed that any rapid transit taxing measure should be put to a vote by the people of the district involved, even a tax which would be levied for one year. As a result, the measure died in this committee. The defeat of this bill launched the Transit District Board on a new course of action.135 Realizing now that it would not be given the 134Times, April 5, 1965, 2cR2-8, and April 9, 1965, 1-3. 135 Times, May 19, 1965, 1-3. 149 authority to levy any taxes without voter approval, the District sought a new solution to its dilemma. Such a solution was finally found through the cooperation of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. This latter group agreed under certain conditions to levy for one year the in lieu tax provided by the Collier-Unruh Act. The money from this tax would be used by the District to conduct the engineering and public information studies and programs leading to an eventual bond election. The condition under which the Supervisors would levy this tax was that the State Legislature first pass a bill allowing the voters of the District to determine, through the ballot, whether or not they favored levying the proposed one per cent in lieu tax to support a bond for financing rapid transit construction , .. 136 and operation. Although this proposal, which was made with but a few weeks remaining in the legislative session, was eventu ally to win the support of the mayor and City Council of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities, it was never acted upon by the Legislature. However, the Legis- l-^Times, May 26, 1965, 2-1; Minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, May 26, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit District. 150 lature did, in the waning days of the session, pass an act providing for the creation of the Orange County Rapid Transit District.137 With the conclusion of the 1965 Legislative Ses sion, the Southern California Rapid Transit District was still confronted with the same problem besetting it at the beginning of that session. How was the District to finance the construction of its proposed rail rapid transit system? In addition to the continuation of this problem, the ac tions of the 1965 Legislature had produced what might well prove to be an equally difficult problem. With the estab lishment of the Orange County Rapid Transit District, a potential impediment was created which might retard the Transit District's ability to resolve the transit problem on a metropolitan-wide basis. Should the Southern Califor nia Rapid Transit District ever desire to serve parts of Orange County with a rapid transit system, negotiations with the newly created agency would now be necessary. And if the Orange County Rapid Transit District became 137Times, June 4, 1965, 1-28, and June 12, 1965, 1-1. 151 operative before that time arrived, the vested interests of the officials of that district might significantly hinder efforts to coordinate the transit operations of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. This potential problem, however, had not achieved recognition by the Board. For at the time of its creation, the Board was preoccupied with its own district woes. In the face of its legislative defeats, the Dis trict Board announced that there would have to be sharp cutbacks in the bus service and a curtailment of the rapid transit efforts. Now, it seemed, both the present bus service and the future rapid transit system were endangered as a result of the lack of subsidies needed to overcome the deficits which had begun to fall upon the District's oper ations during 1965. The District was no longer faced with just the problem of developing a rail rapid transit system to improve transportation in the Los Angeles area. Added to this was the problem of how to maintain the bus opera- 138 tion at the present level of service. In the minds of the District Board members, both these problems could be solved if only the State Legisla- ^**Times, June 17, 1965, 2-1. 152 ture would allow the citizens of the District to vote upon the financing proposals. However, since the Legislature would not accept these proposals in their present form, new ones would have to be developed. Thus, the District Board members began working with various metropolitan groups and state legislators in hope of developing new proposals which could be discussed at the Assembly Transportation Commit tee's interim hearing on rapid transit financing to be held 139 in Los Angeles that fall. As the District undertook efforts to generate an acceptable rapid transit financing plan, numerous undercur rents were indicating that there were still some groups in the community that were not yet convinced that rail rapid transit was necessary or desirable. The Automobile Club of Southern California was continuing to imply that such a system would not relieve the congestion of the freeways. The District Engineer of the California Division of High ways was also questioning the extent to which such a system would aid transportation. To make matters worse, some members of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce Traffic and *39Times, June 24, 1965, 1-3, and July 13, 1965, 2 —8. 153 Transportation Committee were also indicating second thoughts on the matter.140 Nevertheless, as the summer of 1965 drew to a close, with the exception of but a few groups, a community consensus appeared to have developed to the effect that a rail rapid transit system posed the best solution to the metropolitan traffic dilemma. On the other hand, the problem of how to finance such a system was far from resolved. 140 Times, September 16, 1965, 1-3. CHAPTER IV DETERRENTS TO PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND SOLUTION GENERATION Introduction As we begin an analysis of the behavior of the vari ous groups described in Phase I of the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, it must be recognized that this study examines but a single case in the annals of metropolitan problem-solving experiences. Nevertheless, when this total experience is viewed throughout its fifteen-year expanse from the frame of reference advanced in Chapter II, many significant insights may be gained into the nature of that process. The analyses of the three phases of the metropolitan problem-solving process advanced in this and following chapters have proceeded from a concern with those factors which deter the completion of the various activities within this process. This orientation, rather than a concern with 154 155 the factors which promote the completion of these various activities, was taken for two reasons. First, there was the pragmatic reason that the particular problem-solving experience herein described provided a wealth of data on activity deterrents. Second, the author believed that by increasing the awareness and understanding of the factors which could impede the completion of this process's various activities and phases, the groups involved in the process could better prepare for those contingencies and work toward their elimination. Therefore, with these objectives in mind, let us being our discussion of metro politan problem-solving deterrents by analyzing certain problem-related environmental elements. Problem-Related Environmental Factors Lack of problem-related data In order for Phase I to be completed and problem identification and solution generation to take place, the groups which fill the roles associated with this phase must have in their possession data and information related to the problem. Only when these data have been obtained— though they may represent merely personal beliefs as to the nature of the problem and possible solutions— may groups 156 proceed to carry out Phase I activities. For this reason, both the degree to which these activities are completed and the form taken by their end products are determined largely by the information available to the role-playing groups and the methods used by those groups to interpret those data. Although this implies that group possession of problem- related data is a necessary condition for the completion of Phase I activities, it does not mean that the possession of such data is a sufficient condition. As this discussion of deterrents continues, other factors will be identified which must operate in conjunction with data possession to produce problem identification and solution generation. Lack of technical skills for data collection While the lack of problem-related data is a major deterrent to metropolitan problem-solving, it may actually be indicative of yet another more fundamental deterrent. Often, metropolitan problems present a phenomenon new to mankind, either in their scope or nature. The provision of water and highways and the prevention of crime have always been problems vexing metropolitan areas. Today these prob lems continue to exist, but they gain originality from their magnitude. Smog control, on the other hand, is a 157 relatively unique problem facing modern urban man. When these problems arise, the lack of data to provide for their solution may be due to a cause other than the absence of group effort to obtain such data. This void of knowledge may result from the lack of technical skills capable of providing the data necessary to cope with the problem. Or it may be that the cost of employing the existing skills needed to resolve a problem has been deemed prohibitive by the groups concerned with that problem. When this is the case, new technical skills must be created by which the problem may be identified and solutions generated for which the costs of employment are not deemed beyond the means of the groups that would use them. In the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, the impact of the possession of problem-related data on the extent to which groups completed Phase I activities and the end results of those activities is readily apparent. Prior to the establishment of the MTA in 1951, the private mono rail companies had reason to believe that a monorail system developed by a transit authority would best serve to alle viate the metropolitan transit problem. In part, their identification of the problem and proposed solutions were derived from data those groups had pertaining to past 158 legislative actions defeating proposed tax-empowered transit districts, their knowledge of potential loans from the federal government, and their specific knowledge about the construction of monorail systems. Further examples of this interaction among group-possessed data and proposed group solutions and problem definitions were displayed in the behavior of the private bus companies and their eventual willingness to back the MTA legislation of 1955, the activ ities of the Citizens Transportation and Traffic Committee between 1954 and 1957, the decision of the MTA to revise its initial 1960 legislative program so as to account for the fact that its proposed transit system could not be financed from fare revenue, and the Southern California Rapid Transit District's decision to search for new financ ing proposals following the defeat of its 1965 legislative program. At the same time that the possession of data tended to promote the completion of problem identification and solution generation in the rapid transit controversy, the lack of data tended to inhibit those activities. The 1950 University Presidents' Report found that the absence of data prohibited positive action toward the resolution of the transit problem and at the same time contributed to the greatly divergent opinions on what rapid transit facilities were most capable of coping with that problem. In 1955, when the MTA attempted to introduce and have passed legis lation which would have allowed it to purchase the private bus lines, a multitude of groups opposed the measure on the basis that they had not known of the proposal in advance and therefore were not familiar enough with the data con tained therein to make a decision at that time. Once these data came into the possession of some of these groups and they had time to study them, their opposition to the meas ure diminished. However, even then a large number of groups maintained that the MTA should not be allowed to purchase the private bus companies until a comprehensive and detailed study had been made of the transportation problems of the entire Los Angeles basin. A final example illustrating the deterring nature of the lack of data on the activity of solution generation is expressed succinctly in the difficulties experienced by the Southern California Rapid Transit District following the defeat of its proposed subsidy program of 1965. The Dis trict believed that before any financing proposal could be brought before the public for a vote, engineering and eco nomic studies would first have to be undertaken which would 160 indicate the total cost of the transit system, the position of the transit stations, and other relevant facts. Only by providing these data did the District believe that there was a chance that a favorable vote would be forthcoming by the electorate. But the legislative proposals which would have provided funds to undertake these studies had been defeated. Thus, the District could not begin these studies and the information could not be used to produce a final solution to the transit problem. Prohibitive costs of data collection techniques In the case of the Los Angeles rapid transit exper ience, the absence of problem-related data could not be attributed to the lack of technical skills with which to secure the data. Instead, the major problem lay with the tremendous expense which would be involved in bringing those existing skills to bear upon the entirety of the met ropolitan transportation problem. There were many reasons why no group, prior to the MTA in 1958, would assume the responsibility for expending the hundreds of thousands of dollars required to collect specific data regarding the possible use of rail rapid transit as the solution to the metropolitan transit problem. However, let us consider at 161 this time one particular set of environmental factors which influenced groups to shy away from devoting their resources to exploring the problem-solving potential of rail rapid transit. These factors were the cultural beliefs and prac tices of the metropolitan community which directly impinged upon that problem. Cultural beliefs, practices, and past experiences Within the Los Angeles community there had been, since the termination of World War II, an increasing reli ance upon the automobile as the major means of urban and interurban passenger transportation. At the same time there was a corresponding decrease in the use of public transportation by the metropolitan citizenry. Within the public transportation industry then servicing the community, the privately-owned companies were retiring their rail transit lines in favor of the more flexible and economical bus lines. Even this, however, did not stem the tide of continual company deficits. As these two trends came together during the late 1940's, numerous groups concerned with the transit problem began to believe that rail rapid transit was a thing of the past rather than a promise for the future. Under those conditions the groups did not feel 162 that it would be prudent to expend their limited resources on any studies concerned with rail rapid transit. Besides these factors, others prevailed to turn the attention of groups away from the belief that a rail transit system could solve the metropolis's transit problems. As the Los Angeles community grew in population, it failed to develop dense population pockets. The absence of such areas and the continuing trend toward community decentrali zation indicated to many groups that a fixed rail transit system would not adequately serve the needs of the area. Furthermore, many felt that such a system would be unable to compete in service, convenience, and even economy with automobile transportation once the proposed freeway system was completed. As a result of these factors, many groups completely ignored rail transit as a possible method of resolving the transit problem, and focused their attention solely upon systems related to wheeled vehicle transit. Accompanying the cultural biases against rail trans it and in favor of solutions employing wheeled vehicles was the knowledge of past experiences of metropolitan areas which had utilized rail rapid transit. In those metropo lises where rail transit had been employed, the systems had always required some form of subsidization in order to 163 continue operations. Many of these systems, which had been constructed early in the twentieth century, also contained features which were repulsive to the automobile-oriented Southern California public. These features included crowded rush-hour conditions, unpleasant surroundings, and reduced property values when the system used elevated lines. When these past experiences were joined with the belief that a fixed rail system could not blend with the geographic find demographic nature of the Los Angeles area, a rather for midable block to the development of new variations of rail transit as possible solutions to the transit problem was formed. Group Factors In order for a metropolis to overcome the problem solving impediments described above, groups concerned with the problem must display both the willingness and the capacity to undertake the problem-solving roles contained in Phase I. If these two roles are not undertaken and com pleted, the problem will continue to plague the metropoli tan community. If groups do come forward to assume these roles, however, it may be certain that they have been influenced in their behavior by one or more variables 164 within the three sets of variables discussed in Chapter II. In the next few pages we will discuss a few of the group factors which may influence the willingness and capacity of a group to complete a problem-solving activity which it has chosen to undertake. To the extent that these group fac tors retard a group's willingness or capacity to assume and complete these activities, they may be identified along with the problem-related environmental factors as deterrents to the metropolitan problem-solving process. In the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy there was never a lack of willingness among the community's groups to assume the Phase I roles. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Men’s Club, the Automobile Club of Southern California, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, and the Southern California Rapid Transit District, all assumed these roles at one time or another during the fifteen-year period. Regardless of their willingness to undertake these roles, these groups were still unable to bring about a final solution to the transit problem. For this reason, let us turn our atten tion to those factors which might have limited the capacity of these groups to complete successfully the roles which they so willingly undertook. 165 Group resource utilization decisions Groups within a metropolitan community have only a limited amount of resources— human, financial, material, and political— available for achieving the goals for which they exist. Therefore, when a group decides to become involved in the problem-solving process, it must make a decision as to the share and type of its resources which will be devoted to the enactment of its chosen problem solving role. Among the factors influencing this decision are: (1) the centrality of the problem to the group's self- interest, (2) the total amount of resources at the disposal of the group, (3) the specific role chosen for group-ful- fillraent, and (4) the nature of the metropolitan problem itself. Once this resource decision is made, it will in fluence the strategy used for role fulfillment, the spe cific content of problem definition, and the solution pro posed for resolving the problem. An example of this influ ence is readily discernible in the previous account of the transit controversy. During the early 1950's, the private bus companies fulfilled the major roles of Phase I. In fulfilling these roles they did not employ additional group resources for that specific purpose. Instead, they drew 166 upon data and findings of other studies tangentially related to the overall metropolitan transit problem but which had not been specifically collected to enhance the understand ing of that problem. Thus, they defined the problem in terms of developing procedures through which the private transit companies could render more and better bus service. They also recommended the selective use of freeways and the reduction of Public Utility Commission control and taxation as the solution to this problem. Limited group resources When groups are limited in the amount and type of resources they can devote to the fulfillment of the Phase I roles, an additional barrier is placed in the path of prob lem resolution. Since most governmental groups are of a multipurpose nature, they tend to have only a limited amount of resources which they can set aside for any one problem area. When a metropolitan problem affects a gov ernmental jurisdiction, that governmental group must deter mine if it desires to use its limited resources in an effort to resolve the problem. In the Los Angeles transit contro versy, only the county government expended substantial funds in an attempt to resolve the transit dilemma. 167 However, the sum of money which that group released could not even begin to cover the costs of developing a specific solution. From this experience it can readily be seen that the amount of resources a group has to devote to the reso lution of a given metropolitan problem can greatly influ ence the contribution that group makes to the problem solving endeavor. When groups assume more responsibilities than their resources will allow them to fulfill, the more fundamental responsibilities will tend to be met first. In the Los Angeles rapid transit experience, the Los Angeles County government through its budgetary appropriations soundly expressed the position that the resolution of the transit problem was far from a fundamental responsibility of that government. Thus, it was not until the establishment of the MTA, a group whose primary concern was the development of rail rapid transit in the Los Angeles area, that signif icant sums of money began to be expended in an effort to discover a solution tothe transportation muddle. And it was only then that solution proposals began to be generated in concrete, specific form. 168 Narrow group interests, goals, and objectives Another factor influencing the capacity of a group to complete the activities of Phase I is the specific inter ests , goals, or functions which the group holds as central to its existence. As has been noted before, a metropolitan problem encompasses a vast geographical area and a multi tude of groups. As the problem grows, it will affect the special interests, goals, or functions of these groups in varying degrees. The willingness of these groups to assume the roles of the problem-solving process will be directly influenced by the extent to which the metropolitan problem affects their interests. At the same time, the interests of these groups will influence their approach to defining the problem and developing solutions thereto. If the groups' interests are narrowly defined, due to the geograph ical smallness of a spatial group or the limited concerns of a mutually inclusive membership group, it becomes diffi cult for those groups to envision the totality of the metropolitan problem and the vast number of possible alternatives to its resolution. When these last two condi tions are not met, the ultimate resolution of the metropol itan problem tends to recede. 169 The impact of group interests on group metropolitan problem-solving efforts was one of the most outstanding features evolving from the description of the rapid transit controversy in this study. The specific interests of the monorail companies, the private bus companies, the League of California Cities, the Automobile Club, and the MTA continually influenced their definitions of the problem and their proposed solutions to that problem. At the same time, the limited geographical interests of different cities, the Downtown Business Men's Club, and various chambers of commerce produced a limiting factor to a total perspective of the problem and its resolution by these groups. In both cases, these groups were influenced in their behavior by their limited interests, and as a result they frequently produced definitions of the problem and proposed solutions which were drawn up in isolation from the other groups. This often led to the exclusion of many vital factors essential to the eventual ratification of any solution and thereby caused either the defeat or the extreme modifica tion of those proposals. Restricted group jurisdiction The jurisdictional authority which a group pos sesses remains a final factor which may affect the strategy, 170 end results, and capacity of a group to complete the prob lem-solving activities of Phase I. The jurisdictional authority of a group is defined and limited in legal terms by the formal rules and regulations under which it was formed. Private groups have their jurisdictions established through by-laws, incorporation papers, and other official documents approved by their governing bodies. Governmental groups find their jurisdictions set forth in constitutions and the laws of the land. Therefore, if a group wishes to enact a problem-solving role with respect to a problem extending beyond either its geographical or subject matter jurisdiction, a change must first be made in the group's jurisdictional authority. This change is usually provided for through a formal change process, but its execution tends to be extremely time-consuming and difficult to bring about. In the rapid transit controversy, the difficulties encountered by groups with limited geographical and legal jurisdictions in their endeavors to surmount the transit problem and fulfill the roles of problem identifier and solution generator were continually recurring. Because the problem overlapped a multitude of city, county, and special district jurisdictions, no one group possessed the 171 authority to deal with the problem on its own. When the MTA was created in 1951, its jurisdiction was confined to building a monorail down the Los Angeles River from San Fernando Valley to Long Beach. The transit problem, how ever, was not relegated to this area. Therefore, it neither could be defined adequately nor resolved by the actions of a group whose behavior was so restricted. Once the MTA was recreated in 1957, its operating jurisdiction was enlarged to most of Los Angeles County and all types of transit facilities. Its jurisdiction, however, was not extended to the condemnation of public property. Since the rapid transit rights of way would necessitate the use of public properties but the MTA could not have the use of these without the consent of the public jurisdictions own ing them, the circumscribed jurisdiction of the MTA once again limited its capacity to define the problem and gener ate solutions. When the MTA became the Southern California Rapid Transit District, some of these condemnation restric tions were altered. However, the District continued to have a number of financial limitations place on its operations which restricted its efforts to resolve the transit prob lem. In each of the above instances, the MTA was 172 influenced in its definition of the problem and the formula tion of proposed solutions by the nature of the restrictions placed upon its jurisdictional authority by the State Legislature. With each change in its jurisdictions, the MTA made a corresponding alteration in the definition of the problem and its resolution. Thus, the interrelationship between this variable. Phase I role behavior, and the re sults of that behavior persisted through time. And the conclusion was reaffirmed that when a group's jurisdictional authority does not coincide with the boundaries of a metro politan problem, another deterrent to the problem-solving process tends to arise. Group Interaction Factors All of the preceding factors are closely interre lated and impinge upon the final set of elements which may impede the enactment of the problem-solving activities of Phase I. This final set of elements may be classified as group interaction factors. The dynamics of enacting the problem identifier and solution generator roles are extremely complex. These com plexities are multiplied in accordance with the size of the metropolis in which the problem exists, the number of groups 173 brought into the problem-solving process, the newness or originality of the problem, and the amount of resources needed to surmount the problem. Inevitably no one group possesses both the data or the resources necessary to resolve a given metropolitan problem. As a result, the concerned groups are forced to interact in an attempt to aggregate the necessary conditions for Phase I completion and consummate that phase of the problem-solving process. Absence of a feeling of group interdependence As groups initiate behavior directed toward obtain ing the resources and data necessary to define the problem and develop a solution thereto, they are frequently thwarted in their endeavors by uncooperative groups. This coopera tion may be denied for a multitude of reasons, but most of them may be reduced to the belief on the part of the nonco operative groups that they are relatively independent entities which will benefit more from following their own problem-directed resolution objectives rather than cooper ating in this endeavor with other groups. When this hap pens , there may exist a plethora of groups, all working toward the resolution of the same problem, but proceeding toward their goals in relative isolation. 174 Examples of noncooperation among groups appeared all too frequently in the rapid transit experience. It occurred in (1) the behavior of the monorail groups immedi ately preceding the introduction of the 1951 MTA Act, (2) the behavior of the Citizens Transportation and Traffic Committee when it was formulating its proposals for the establishment of a Los Angeles Basin Transportation Author ity, and (3) the behavior of the MTA when it was negotiat ing to purchase the private bus companies and later when it developed legislative proposals asking for condemnation powers over public lands (1960) and taxing power (1963) . In each of these instances noncooperation resulted in the development of problem solutions which, once publicized, became the center of conflict and dissension. This conflict and dissension further reduced the energies available for group efforts directed toward the completion of the Phase I roles. Absence of shared data or shared data interpretations A product, as well as a cause, of groups working in isolation toward metropolitan problem-resolution rests in the fact that different groups often do not share or inter pret in a like manner certain problem-related data. In the 175 above examples, the cause of group conflict usually arose from the lack of shared data among the different groups. However, several times during the fifteen-year period covered in this study, group disagreements arose from dif ferent group interpretations of the same data. Working from data contained in the engineering study produced in 1954 by Coverdale, the MTA maintained the position that it could build a monorail line from Long Beach to the San Fernando Valley and finance that line from revenue provided by the system. The Citizens Transporta tion and Traffic Committee, working from the same data, said that the proposed monorail line would not be financial ly self-sufficient and would certainly not provide a solu tion to the metropolitan transit problem. Both of these groups formed their interpretations of this study in rela tive isolation from each other. Thus, there was no means by which they could question each other's assumptions, findings and conclusions and eventually arrive at similar interpre tations of the same data. It was also unlikely that they would ever be able to coordinate their actions and re sources to arrive at consensus on a definition of the prob lem and proposed solutions to it. 176 Absence of methods to coordinate Phase I activities of different groups Another factor impeding the enactment of Phase I activities involved the absence of an organization or process by which different groups concerned with the problem of rapid transit could coordinate their various activities. Until the establishment of the MTA in 1951, there was no one group which could even attempt to bring together the divergent views held on the transit issue. There was also no structure, e.g., an interlocking directorate of economic notables or a centralized political machine, through which the groups concerned with this problem could work with one another toward its solution. As a result, each group tended to work toward its own definition of the problem and the development of a solution thereto. Although the establishment of the MTA provided an organization around which groups could direct their transit problem-solving endeavors, this group through its own behavior tended to discourage such actions. Early in their organization, the MTA directors took the position that they would listen to the proposals of other groups, but they would not be persuaded to bargain with them. It did not take the various metropolitan groups long to learn that 177 their suggestions were going unheeded and were not being incorporated into the programs of the MTA. Once this was recognized, these groups retreated to their isolated approaches toward the development of proposals for resolv ing the transit prohlem. Only when the MTA found that the opposition of these other groups was forcing the defeat of its own proposals did it include these groups in the prob lem identification and solution generation activities it undertook. Periodically, the MTA would fall back on its past practice of conducting the Phase I activities on its own. Only the defeat of plans developed in this way would cause the Authority to change this pattern and utilize its potential as a structure for centralizing transit problem solving activities of the various metropolitan groups. A series of past unsuccessful group interaction experiences A final factor which constantly worked against the coordination and cooperation of groups concerned with the transit problem was the fact that past relationships among these groups had been less than successful. As we noted above, when the MTA was first founded it would listen to, but not necessarily accept, the transit suggestions of other metropolitan groups. During the Legislative Sessions 178 of 1955, 1961, and 1963, the MTA introduced legislation which had been openly opposed by a large majority of metro politan groups. Even the Los Angeles County Board of Super visors, as well as certain state legislators, accused the MTA of withholding, or at least not completely presenting, information regarding the operations of that group. On the other hand, the MTA had occasion to doubt the sincerity of cooperative gestures made by other metro politan groups. Had not the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Los Angeles City Council once opposed the MTA plan to purchase the private bus companies? Had not the Cali fornia Division of Highways' District Engineer and the Automobile Club of Southern California stated that rail rapid transit would not resolve the congested conditions of the Southern California traffic arteries? And had not the State Legislature defeated its proposals for independ ent financing? From these experiences it is not difficult to see why feelings of antipathy and suspicion were held among and toward all groups involved in the transit problem-solving process. It is not difficult to understand why each of these groups might believe that it could not expect the cooperation of the others. But it was just this cooperation 179 and coordination of group effort that was required to develop a potential solution to the transit problem; and the lack of this cooperative, coordinated effort had been a major deterrent to the completion of the problem-solving process. Summary This chapter has identified from a study of the rapid transit controversy three broad categories of factors which may impede the completion of the problem identifica tion and solution generation activities of Phase I. The first category consists of problem-related environmental variables. These include the lack of problem-related data, the absence of technical skills for obtaining such data, the prohibitive cost to groups of using the present tech nical skills to carry out the Phase I activities, and the cultural beliefs, practices, and past experiences which limit the perspectives groups employ in undertaking the Phase I activities. The second set of factors retarding the accomplish ment of Phase I is discussed in terms of variables which influence a group's willingness and capacity to fulfill the roles of problem identifier and solution generator. Only 180 when these two roles are fulfilled will the problem-solving process be capable of completion. Therefore, those group factors which influence a group's willingness and capacity to complete successfully these two roles represent possible deterrents to the completion of this process. Those fac tors which were identified as possibly deterring a group's successful enactment of these roles included: narrow group interests, goals, and objectives? limited group resources available for problem-solving activities; and restricted formal group jurisdiction. The final set of variables influencing the comple tion of Phase 1 were contained under the heading of group interaction variables. It was noted that during the enact ment of the two basic activities of Phase I, groups were called upon to interact in an attempt to obtain the re sources and data necessary to define the problem and develop a solution thereto. Those factors which reduced the effectiveness of group interaction efforts directed toward the attainment of these resources and data were seen as retarding influences to metropolitan problem resolution. Included in this group of problem-solving deterrents were: (1) the absence of a feeling of interdependence of efforts among groups attempting to resolve the same problem, (2) 181 the absence of shared data upon which groups base their definitions of the problem and their proposed solutions, (3) the absence of consensus on interpreations of shared data, (4) the presence of past intergroup experiences which have proven highly unsuccessful, resulting in the development of a feeling of mutual distrust and antipathy among the vari ous metropolitan groups, and (5) the absence of structures or processes for coordinating the Phase I activities enacted by different metropolitan groups. Having discussed and anlyzed the Phase I activities and impediments to the accomplishment of those activities by groups involved in the Los Angeles rapid transit contro versy, we may now proceed to Phase II of the metropolitan problem-solving process. Before the narration of this phase of the transit controversy begins, however, it is recommended that the reader review the various problem solving roles described in Chapter II. In so doing, special attention should be focused upon the dissenter and advocater roles, for it is in Phase II that these roles appear most frequently and with the greatest influence. CHAPTER V SOLUTION RATIFICATION Introduction The focus of this chapter will shift from group behaviors directed toward problem identification and solu tion generation to those behaviors aimed at securing the ratification or adoption of a particular solution to a problem. In this endeavor it will be necessary to draw upon certain facts and happenings alluded to in the preced ing chapter. However, these elements will be discussed in terms of their use, influence, and importance as factors in solution ratification rather than variables influencing Phase I activities. In the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, the majority of solutions proposed to resolve the transit dilem ma required ratification by the State Legislature. There fore, most of the data on this phase are drawn from group interactions related to and influenced by the state legisla- 182 183 tive process. At the same time, it must be realized that although Phase II of the metropolitan problem-solving process, as a general rule, involves some governmental legislative group, this group need not necessarily be a state legislature. It could be a county, city, or combina tions of local and state legislative groups. Whichever it is will be determined largely by the nature of the solution posed to the problem and the existing legal frameworks within which these legislative groups maneuver. Part I: The Establishment of the MTA As early as 1949, bills had come before the Cali fornia State Legislature which called upon that group to ratify proposed solutions to the transportation problem. Foremost among these measures was that proposed by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. That plan provided for the establishment of a transit district in the Los Angeles area to be financed through the issuance of general obligation bonds supported by property tax levies voted by the elec torate . For reasons which became evident in legislative hearings held later that year, this legislation could not garner enough votes to be brought from committee to the 184 Assembly floor. The Assembly was convinced, nonetheless, that the State Legislature should investigate the Los Angeles transit problem. Therefore, it authorized an in terim committee study to be made of the problem with the results of that study to be reported at the 1951 Legisla tive Session.1 In 1951 the interim committee report was made to the Assembly. The report recommended the use of buses on freeways as the most practical system for rapid transit in the Los Angeles area. The assertion was made that the un ique population configuration of the Los Angeles metropoli tan area made any form of rail rapid transit totally un profitable. Therefore, the private bus companies, which operated the preponderance of mass transit facilities in the area, could not be expected to build such a system. At the same time, the committee expressed the belief that the residents of the area would not be inclined to approve a property tax by which a transit district could be estab lished to build a rail rapid transit system.2 ^■Ralph P. Merritt, Statement made to the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, September 14, 1955 (in the files of the Committee). 2 California Assembly Interim Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations of the California State 185 Against this background of concern over the Los Angeles traffic predicament and the legislative opinion that the electorate would not approve tax-financed public action for its resolution, two private monorail groups pro posed their unique solution to the problem. The bill in which the monorail proposal was incorporated had been drawn up by Ralph C. Merritt, vice-president of both mono rail organizations, and the San Francisco legal firm which had handled the revenue bond issues for the San Francisco Bay Bridge Authority and which had been recommended to Merritt by officials of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora tion. This bill had been written in four days and reflected the past revenue bond experience of the legal firm and the conditions for successful transit authority operation which Merritt had inferred from his brief observations and analyses of the Chicago and Long Island Transit Authori ties . ^ Legislature, Preliminary Report on Rapid Transit for the Los Angeles Area. This report was a product of hearings held in Los Angeles on September 8, 1949, October 12, 13, 14, 1949, and December 5, 1949. 3 Minutes of the Board of Directors meeting, March 5, 1952, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. Hereinafter the Minutes of the meetings of this group will be referred to in the footnotes as Minutes. All Minutes 186 When Merritt arrived in the State capital on June 7, 1951f there were but sixteen days left in the legisla tive session. The time had since expired for the introduc tion of appropriation measures, but substantive legislation could still be introduced for consideration in that session. To this end, Merritt succeeded in obtaining the cooperation of Assemblyman Everett Burkhalter of the San Fernando Val ley, who agreed to amend completely his previously intro duced transit district bill and substitute therefore Merritt's Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Bill.4 This Assembly Bill, 3112, provided for the estab lishment of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, whose policy-making body would compose a seven-man Board of Directors appointed by the Governor. The Directors would have the right to issue revenue bonds for the construction of a transit system or the purchase of any transit system in Los Angeles County. The Authority would have no power of taxation of private property. This organization would serve all of Los Angeles County and would have the right are in the files of the Southern California Rapid Transit District. 4Ibid. 187 to operate or coordinate all types of public transportation including urban or interurban streetcars, buses, monorails, subways, etc. The Authority was not to be given the right of condemnation of public transit systems except on mutual agreement to such legal action, but it was to be made exempt from control of the state Public Utilities Commis sion and from taxation.^ Primary backing for the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act came from the monorail groups them selves, and Assemblyman Burkhalter and his legislative assistant, and Russell Quisenberry of the San Fernando Valley Times newspaper. Active and pronounced opposition to the measure came from the California Transit Association, whose membership included the privately owned public trans portation companies operating in the Los Angeles area, several railroads, and some allied public utilities. The governmental groups within the Los Angeles metropolis, who should have been vitally interested in this matter, did not become involved with the activities leading to the bill's final approval.** The apparent indifference displayed by these groups might have reflected either a lack of knowledge 5Ibid. **Ibid. 188 or a lack of interest in the monorail proposal. Those in opposition to the MTA bill found occasion for dissent in almost all aspects of the legislation* They disapproved of the establishment of an authority which would have the power to issue unlimited revenue bonds and con struct a public transportation system, but provided for no local public control over the membership of its governing board. They argued that if an authority were created which would be allowed to operate throughout the entire county, using any and all types of transit facilities, and being exempt from taxation and Public Utilities Commission con trol over rates, all the existing private transportation companies could be forced out of business in a short time. To prevent the Authority from being in a position to reduce or ruin their public transportation business, the opponents of the MTA bill successfully introduced measures amending that bill on four basic accounts. First, the Authority would be made subject to Public Utilities Commission control over routes and fares. Second, the MTA 7 Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1951, Sec. 1, p. 1. Hereinafter this newspaper will be cited as Times, and the first number after the date refers to the section and the second number to the page. 189 would be required to pay taxes similar to private operators. Third, the Authority would be limited to the construction and operation of a monorail transit system with service- feeder bus lines. Finally, the jurisdiction of the MTA was confined to approximately 500 square miles within Los Ange les County, including the San Fernando Valley and a strip of land eight miles wide following the general path of the Los Angeles River to Long Beach. This area contained about 2,000,000 people and 75 per cent of the war production Q potential of the area. The basic argument which the opposition to the MTA bill had used in forwarding the acceptance of these amend ments was contained in a statement made by Stanley Lanham, president of the Los Angeles Transit Lines, when the MTA was agitating for the removal of these limitations in 1953. He indicated that he believed the objective of the MTA was to provide monorail interurban rapid transit service extend ing from the San Fernando Valley to Long Beach. Since this was the objective, he said, it would appear unnecessary and unwarranted to provide the Authority with the broad and ^Minutes, March 5, 1952. 190 Q extensive powers which it sought. Several factors may have prompted Lanham's inter pretation of the objective of the monorail groups. Before the introduction of the MTA legislation, these groups had considered only the construction of a monorail line within the area eventually included within the Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority Act of 1951. Reports on the activities of these groups appearing in the local papers also alluded only to these rather limited group interests. Thus, when Merritt proposed the creation of an authority which would conceivably compete with the private lines and would operate throughout the entire county using all types of transit facilities, the private transit companies could validly complain that these powers overextended the an nounced objectives. To combat this opposition and increase the proba bility that the MTA would be created, the proponents of the measure emphasized two major factors. First, there was the pressing and urgent need for a modern, fast transportation system for the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Second, g Minutes, May 5, 1953. Director McClellan report ing on a conversation with Stanley Lanham. 191 there was the fact that such a system could be constructed without public funds through the issuance of revenue bonds. By offering to construct a transit system which supposedly would be faster than existing bus facilities and would carry more passengers faster than the freeways at comparative time intervals, the backers of the proposal hoped to over come those factors which the interim committee of 1949 had put forth as deterrents to solving the problem through a district and rail rapid transit. To counter the opposition of the California Transit Association relating to the types of facilities the MTA could operate and its jurisdictional area, the proponents pointed to the nature of other transit authorities, stating that the resolution of the Los Angeles problem required that the MTA have these broad powers. The advocators of the Authority program argued their last case for exemption from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control on the grounds that under California law other public corporations, like the MTA, did not pay taxes and their rates and routes were not fixed by the Public Utili ties Commission.*® 10Minutes, March 25, 1952; Times, July 25, 1951, 1-4. 192 In the final analysis the MTA bill was signed into law by Governor Earl Warren on July 24, 1951. The propo nents of the measure had successfully gotten the state to create the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, whose seven-man board was appointed by the governor and which had the power to condemn private property for transit purposes. They had been unsuccessful, however, in obtain ing exemption from taxation and the right to operate all types of transit facilities. Their successes appeared to have hinged on their proposal to resolve a most bothersome metropolitan problem without requiring the assistance of public funds. Their failures seemed to have developed from recommending methods of solution implementation which ran directly counter to the interests of powerful and effective groups within the metropolitan community— the private trans portation operators, the railroads, and the public utili ties. Inasmuch as the MTA had neither the political influ ence of their opposition nor the active support and backing of other groups within the metropolitan area, they were unable to repeal the limitations placed on their proposals by their opponents. 193 Part lit The MTA Becomes an Operating Agency The Legislative Session of 1953: The MTA Strives for expanded powers Once the MTA Board was appointed in March, 1932, and Ralph Merritt became executive director, the Board immedi ately concerned itself with developing ways and means by which to work more effectively toward the solution of the transit problem. At the first meeting of the Board, Mer ritt advised that although the 1951 Act called for the use of a suspended overhead monorail system, the Authority should listen to individuals who might offer alternative systems. He also stated that the taxation of the Authority was contrary to state law and should be deleted from the act. If this were not done, he maintained, it would be impossible to build any transit system. For, at the rate of taxation then existing, the aggregate taxes over forty years, the usual life of a bond, would exceed the capital cost of the entire system. Merritt attributed both of these limitations to actions of the California Transit Associa tion lobby and the desire of Lanham to prevent competition 194 between the MTA and his Los Angeles Transit Line.^1 In the months following the initial meeting, the MTA Board devoted many hours to the discussion of what legislation should be introduced at the 1953 Legislative Session to enable it to deal better with the rapid transit problem. On October 24, 1952, Merritt proposed and the Board approved four amendments to the Authority's founding legislation.^ One amendment provided for expanding the MTA juris diction to include all of Los Angeles County. Another expanded the scope of transit facilities to cover all types. A third eliminated the requirement for the payment of eith er direct or in lieu taxes upon property of the MTA. The last struck down provisions making the MTA subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. The Board recommended that Merritt give further study to his proposed amendment for the Authority to issue bonds for the purchase of component parts of an overall transit system for either urban or interurban facilities as well as selling the bonds to private buyers and then purchasing the facilities with ^Minutes, March 25, 1952. ^Minutes, October 24, 1952. 195 13 the money so obtained. In order to determine the opposition which the proposed amendments might produce, the MTA Board maintained numerous contacts and held both formal and informal confer ences with various groups within the metropolitan area. The Board's interaction with these other groups was primar ily informational in character and represented an attempt to obtain their reactions to the MTA proposals. In combined meetings with the traffic committee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Authority learned that the Chamber would support the proposal for widening the MTA's scope of transit facilities and jurisdictional area but not the request for examption from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control. This position was also taken by the Los Angeles Downtown Business Men's Asso ciation. At this same joint meeting, the Los Angeles Chamber group recommended that in the interest of public relations and in accordance with the recommendations of the University Presidents' Report, a citizens' advisory commit tee and an engineering advisory board should be appointed to counsel with the MTA in an advisory capacity. The MTA 196 agreed to this proposal, but no definite guidelines were provided for a working relationship between the MTA and 14 these committees. In January, 1953, the MTA had had introduced into the Assembly a bill eliminating the Authority from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control and expanding the jurisdictional authority of its operational area and the types of transit facilities it could utilize. That this action would be taken in the face of known opposition by the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association does not seem strange when viewed in the light of various statements made by certain directors of the Authority Board. At a meeting on December 29, 1952, the directors agreed that other groups within the metropolis should be allowed to explain their views on rapid transit to the Authority, but that any final legislative program should be designed by the MTA without negotiations with these groups. With specific reference to the Los Angeles Chamber, two directors expressed their belief that the MTA should set the pattern for rapid transit action and then 14 Minutes, November 11, 1952, and January 9, 1953. 197 notify the Chamber as to that program. They reasoned that whether the support of the Chamber was sought before pro gram development or after, the results would be the same. Chamber backing for the Authority's plans was therefore not seen as being influenced by Chamber participation in pro gram development.^ Realizing that the Authority was alone in support of its legislative proposals, the Board set out in the early months of 19 53 to garner additional adherents to its posi tion. The chairman of the Board was directed to contact Los Angeles City officials and attempt to secure their backing. This attempt proved futile. The Authority next approached the private transit owners to see if they would support or at least not oppose the MTA legislation. This resulted in the discovery that the proposals were totally unacceptable to the private owners. Both Lanham, president of the Los Angeles Transit Lines, and Jesse Haugh, presi dent of the Metropolitan Coach Lines and of the California Transit Association, refused to back the amendments. They asserted that the MTA should continue under the control of the Public Utilities Commission with respect to securing public certificates of convenience and necessity for ^Minutes, December 29, 1952. 198 operations and fare schedules. Also, the MTA should con tinue to be required to obtain local franchises or permits (pay taxes), as the Act then stated. Furthermore, the ex isting Act should define rapid transit as interurban rapid transit, and the MTA should be allowed to provide its own feeder lines only if private lines would not serve as feeders to the rapid transit facility. In the face of this opposition, the MTA more adamantly than ever maintained that it required area-wide authority and the power to operate all types of transit facilities. Further, since revenue bond financing was the only means available to the MTA for constructing the sys tem, elimination of the taxation and Public Utilities Com mission control sections of the 1951 Act were imperative to make the issuance of these bonds possible. The Authority continued in its belief that these latter two limitations were contrary to state law and the practices of the state with respect to other public agencies.^ The opposition to the MTA amendments was too great to be overcome in the Assembly. The Governmental Efficiency ^Minutes, April 7, 1953, and May 5, 1953. ^Minutes, January 9, 1953. 199 and Economy Committee, after hearing testimony from Haugh of the California Transit Association and the Metropolitan Coach Lines, declined to send the measure to the Assembly floor. To surmount this setback, the Board directed Mer ritt to see State Senator Randolph Collier and ascertain what alterations might allow the amendments to be passed by the Senate and the Assembly. The directors agreed that any amendments which Collier indicated might be acceptable to the legislative committees should be adopted as the Author ity program. In addition to this action, the Board tried to arrange a meeting with Stanley Lanham. This attempt failed when Lanham declined to meet with them because of a tight time schedule.*” When Senator Collier finally introduced the MTA measure into the Senate, it met a fate similar to that it had found in the Assembly. It was assigned to a Committee where no further action was taken on it. Nevertheless, the Senate did proceed to pass a resolution which called for the Senate Committee on Highways, Streets and Brdiges, Senator Collier chairman, to conduct interim hearings on the matter. The results of these hearings were to be reported ^®Minutes, May 15, 1953. 200 to the Senate during the 1955 Legislative Session.^ A second measure which the MTA had advanced at the 1953 Legislative Session also met defeat. This proposal called for an appropriation by the state to the MTA which would help finance an area-wide study of the metropolitan transit problem. After introduction, the measure had been amended to provide that the MTA would attempt to obtain from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors a supple mental appropriation in an amount at least equal to $350,000 and this amount was to include the $100,000 which the Super visors had already appropriated to the MTA for use in such studies. The 1953 Assembly interim hearings: An airing of transit opinions2J As a prelude to the 1955 Session of the State Legis lature, both the Assembly and the Senate conducted interim hearings on the rapid transit controversy in Los Angeles. 1!*Minutes, June 11, 1953. ^Minutes, June 11, 1953, and May 5, 1953. 21 California, Assembly, Subcommittees of the Com mittees on Transportation and Commerce and Public Utilities and Corporations, Joint Hearings, Rapid Transit, November 30 and December 1, 1953. Unless otherwise stated, all data under this heading have been drawn from this source. 201 At the Assembly hearings in November and December of 1953, the Interim Committee on Transportation and Commerce con cluded that the construction of bus turnouts in future freeways, changes in the taxing system applied to the pri vate transit companies, and alterations in the procedures of the Public Utilities Commission related to the determina tion of transit fares of the private companies would allow these companies to provide a rapid and inexpensive resolu tion to the transit problem. These findings evolved from testimony given at these hearings by representatives of the Los Angeles Transit Lines, the Metropolitan Coach Lines, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, the Los Angeles City Council, and administrative officers of the City, and George D. Roberts, president of the Monorail Engineering and Construction Corporation. The latter witness, speaking informally for Merritt of MTA, presented the case for monorail rapid transit and attempted at the same time to present the position of the MTA. He noted that the MTA had not appeared at the hearings because the Coverdale and Colpitts engineering and economic studies on the use of monorail in the Los Angeles River area were not yet completed. When these studies were com pleted, early in 1954, they would be presented before the Senate interim committee at that time. In his testimony, Roberts accused the private transit companies of emascu lating the 1951 bill to a point where the MTA could not effectively deal with the problem of transit in the metro politan area. The changes presented to the 1953 Legisla ture, he said, were sorely needed in order for the MTA to resolve successfully the transit problem. He also charged that the private companies had been responsible for the legislative defeat of a $400,000 state appropriation which would have allowed the MTA to conduct a series of compre hensive transportation studies. At the same session, he recalled, the Legislature had provided the San Francisco Bay Area Transit Commission with a similar $400,000 grant. These complaints were countered by the accusation of one Assemblyman that neither he nor anyone else in the Legislature knew what the MTA had been doing. All they knew was that MTA representatives had turned up at the 1953 Session asking for more authority and more money for addi tional studies. Furthermore, the MTA appeared to be spend ing substantial sums of money on all types of studies and nobody was told their results. Finally, he stated, the Bay Area Transit Commission had received the appropriation only after the nine Bay Area counties had agreed to supplement 203 this amount with $350,000 from their own sources. The fact was not brought out at these hearings, however, that MTA representatives had met with the chairmen of both the Sen ate and Assembly interim committees prior to the November Assembly hearings, and that they had decided that the Authority would appear before the Senate interim committee in 1954 only after the Coverdale report had been completed. The 1954 Senate interim hearings: The presentation of the monorail report At the 1954 hearings, the MTA presented the find ings of the Coverdale studies on the possible construction of a monorail line within the MTA jurisdictional area as the initial line of what would later become a metropolitan rapid transit network. This report concluded: 1. The monorail route as proposed in this report and located within the area described in the act creating the MTA would, if adopted, be a proper beginning of mass rapid transit through out Los Angeles County. 2. Action should be taken at this time by appro priate agencies exempting the MTA from control by the Public Utilities Commission and exempting the property as well as the bonds of the MTA from taxation to conform with the established policy of the state in order to accomplish public acceptability of the revenue bonds proposed to be issued for the financing of the rapid transit system. 204 3. Appropriations should be made by the appro priate agencies of the state or county for the further steps in engineering, financing, and administration which necessarily must supplement the accompanying feasibility re port. 4. Provided the appropriate legislative action is taken and further reports are completed as required, the development of a mass rapid transit system by monorail for Los Angeles as herein described, appears to be feas ible.^ Working from the data in this report, the MTA prior to the Senate interim hearings had concluded that the governor should be asked to call a special session of the Legislature in March, 1954, to amend the 1951 Act. These amendments would eliminate the requirements that the MTA be subject to taxation and to regulation as to rates and route schedules by the Public Utilities Commission. To gain support for this plan, copies of the Coverdale report were to be made and sent to public and private groups with in the county who might be interested in the transit prob lem. 2 3 22 From "Summary of Conclusions," contained in "Economic Engineering Report of the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts," presented to the MTA and dated January 15, 1954. 23 Minutes, February 1, 1954. 205 The reaction to the findings of this report, as they were expressed at the Senate interim hearings and in the months thereafter, were less than favorable. The pri vate transit companies continued to press for changes in taxation and the Public Utilities Commission procedures affecting them, and for facilitating the use of buses on freeways. Mayor Norris Poulson of Los Angeles announced that he would defer his opinion until he had received a report from the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Com mittee which he and the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors had named to conduct an extensive study of all transportation needs within Los Angeles County. The state legislators from Los Angeles County were uncertain as to whether or not a special session of the Legislature should be called. And the County Board of Supervisors had de clined to hear the Coverdale engineers present their report, attend the meetings of the Senate interim committee, or respond to an invitation by the Los Angeles Chamber to attend a luncheon devoted to a presentation of the report. Merritt accounted for this unfriendly reception by saying that he felt these organizations had been significantly influenced by the campaign of the California Transit 206 24 Association. Whether or not Merritt was correct in his analysis, the total opposition was sufficiently strong to persuade the governor not to put the matter on the agenda of the 1954 Special Legislative Session. He based this action on the belief that the matter was too controversial, and he suggested that groups within the metropolitan area work with the MTA toward the development of solutions to the problem which could be offered at the 1955 Legislative 25 Session. In hope that the governor would put the MTA legis lation on the agenda of the Special Session, the Authority had tried to reduce part of the controversiality of the measures by confining attention solely to the taxation and Public Utilities Commission matters. The Authority's pre vious requests to be allowed to extend its area of study to the entire county and all types of transit facilities were excluded from the 1954 proposal. Although this proposal failed to achieve the desired results, the Board agreed to still another measure aimed at reducing opposition to its 24Minutes, March 2, 1954. 25Minutes, March 2, 1954, and April 27, 1954. 207 i 26 plans. Merritt told the Board that the main opposition to its plans came from groups who thought the MTA would have too much authority if the proposed amendments were passed. He had suggested that the wording of these amendments could be changed so as to reduce their authority-grabbing stature. This change was, therefore, agreed to in principle by the Board and the tax proposal altered to read: "Tax exemption refers to exemption from all taxes on securities and all taxes on any new facilities created by the MTA, such as a monorail system." Real property purchased by the MTA and presently on the tax roll would thereby continue to pay taxes. These would include parking and station facilities. Exemption from Public Utilities Commission control was to be defined as exemption from control of securities and rates of fares. Certificates of Public Necessity and Con venience, requirements for standard safety devices, standard accounting, etc., would continue to be under the Commis sion's control. In granting the certificates, the transit companies and. others would have the right of protest and such protection as the state law provided, with the final ^Times, February 17, 1954, 2-1. 208 decision in the hands of the Public Utilities Commis sion.27 Disagreement with the Coverdale report came from the private transit companies, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, and the Citizens Traffic and Trans portation Committee. These groups opposed the recommenda tions of this report on numerous grounds. They said that the MTA legislation would mean public ownership of trans portation, since the private lines could not possibly com pete with an organization possessing such broad powers. In addition, the studies and planning for the rapid transit plan were only in the groundbreaking stages. Before these activities would be completed, about $2,000,000 would have to be spent for further studies, and this money would have to come from the taxpayer. Also, the cost of the monorail system would be significantly high, approximately $165,000,000 for the proposed long line and $134,000,000 for the shorter line, and the system would not be in opera tion for about six years. Another complaint was that since the proposed monorail line did not follow the Los Angeles River, but would occupy city and county streets, at least ^Minutes, March 2, 1954. 209 one and possibly two traffic lanes in those streets would 28 have to be closed. As to the report itself, these groups expressed doubt in many of its estimates. 1. Passenger estimates were seen as too high. The entire San Fernando Valley had been estimated as a contributary to the system, but these groups saw doubt in believing that the popula tions of Valley cities lying ten miles from the line would utilize it. If these passenger estimates were wrong, then so would be the revenue, equipment, cost, and other estimates. 2. By using the report's own figures on running time, headways, mileage passenger volume, etc., these groups estimated that 300, rather than the estimated 131, monorail cars would be needed. This would invalidate all estimates for operation and maintenance. 3. Fare estimates did not contemplate transfer privileges to or from feeder lines. Thus, fares might not be as cheap as they were made 28 Letters from officials of private companies and various metropolitan groups (available from author). 210 to seem. 4. They disagreed that the monorail would cost less per mile than freeways. A Metropolitan Traffic Association report had recently shown that the cost per mile of the Santa Ana and Ramona freeways— including rights of way which the monorail report did not include— was only half of the estimated monorail cost. 5. The estimated parking facilities would take care of only about three per cent of the pro- 2 9 jected monorail passengers. These groups felt that another flaw in this report lay with the factors it had omitted in its estimates. No allowance was made for the costs of rights of way. No allowance was made for damage costs in claims by those whose property would be affected by the monorail. Some reputable authorities, they said, believed that such damage costs would be extremely high and possibly could equal the total construction costs. Lastly, time and expense re quired in approaching and leaving the monorail were Analysis of Coverdale Report by officials men tioned in preceding footnote. 211 overlooked. With these elements of the problem in mind, these groups concluded that for the present motor coaches on freeways would be cheaper, more readily available, and, in many respects, better than monorail as a system of 30 rapid transit. In spite of the opposition to its program, the MTA continued to plan for the eventual broadening of its powers by the State Legislature. On the suggestion of a repre sentative from Coverdale, the MTA adopted a resolution which stated: The policy of the MTA is to devise a study of public transportation systems for all the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and including all types of transit, to serve the present and future public transportation needs of the area in the most economical ways and to the best advantage of the community. Although the MTA, at this time, has neither the legal powers nor the funds with which to undertake the county-wide transit study, it is the considered conclusion of the MTA that the policy as set forth in the adopted resolution should be stated wherever appropriate as the objective upon which general agreement throughout the metropolitan area should be sought.3* Two other policy statements were added later in the year. One read: 3QIbid. ** Minutes, June 30, 1954, and July 30, 1954. 212 The jurisdiction of the MTA should be ex tended to cover all of Los Angeles County and consideration should also be given to the inclu sion of such portions of the counties of Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino as are now, or have heretofore, been served by the Pacific Railway Company's system of transportation. The second policy read: The MTA should have the right to study, survey, develop, acquire, construct and operate, by private contractor or by its own organization, in the public interest, any and all types of appropriate passenger transit, including busses, surface lines, subways, street cars and all raij. facilities, including elevated, overhead, sus pended transit, surface-free or grade-separated surface line, or any combination thereof.^2 In an attempt to reduce opposition to its plans from those who thought that buses on freeways would pro vide the cheapest rapid transit for the metropolis, the Authority directed Merritt to proceed with the implementa tion of his suggestion to have Coverdale do a study on, "Are busses adequate and sufficient as the sole transit facility to meet the needs of the Los Angeles County area for mass rapid transit?" This report would then be used to convince certain Los Angeles County Supervisors and others within the area that buses on freeways were not the solu- 22Minutes, September 14, 1954. 213 33 tion to the problem. In June, 1954, the MTA, on the recommendation of Coverdale, had employed Leland Kaiser of San Francisco as its financial advisor on bond sales. Discussions between Kaiser and MTA Board members led to the idea that the MTA and the Los Angeles Transit Lines might be able to work out a plan to coordinate their interests. To this end, Kaiser arranged a meeting between the majority shareholders of the Los Angeles Transit Lines, the president of the Lines, and MTA Board members. This meeting was held on September 10, 1954. There the Authority learned that under certain condi tions the Los Angeles Transit Lines would support the legislation the MTA was attempting to have passed. The condition was that MTA would agree, in the event of passage of that legislation, to acquire the assets of the Los Ange les Transit Lines. These assets would then become a part of an integrated system of transit for the Los Angeles 34 metropolitan area. This plan was reported back to the Board. The Coverdale representative characterized the plan as a valu able step in developing an integrated rapid transit system 33Minutes, July 30, 1954. 34Minutes, October 7, 1954. 214 for the area. Merritt contended that, as long as the area's private companies were against MTA proposals, Los Angeles County legislators would never approve their passage. Thus, with the provision that the Los Angeles Transit Lines pay $5,000 of the cost of having Coverdale make an appraisal of the assets of that line, the Board approved the plan. In the following month, the MTA requested that the Los Angeles Transit Lines prepare the type of legislation which would be satisfactory to the private transit lines for passage by the 1955 Legislature. In that same month, Merritt was told to undertake negotiations with the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines looking toward the acquisition of their properties through revenue bonds and the management of the properties by a new corporation which would be formed from the present 35 operating personnel of those lines. The year 1954, therefore, came to an end with the MTA negotiating for the purchase and management of the two major private lines within the Los Angeles region. In having reached agreement with these groups, which the Authority had come to see as its basic antagonists, the MTA ■^Minutes, October 7, 1954, and November 18, 1954. 215 believed that the 1955 Legislative Session would finally bring into being an organization capable of effectively developing rapid transit in Los Angeles. Its optimism had been slightly dampened by the refusal of the County Counsel to allow the use of county funds to appraise the assets of the private lines, but negotiations with the Coverdale firm had ended in an agreement that the appraisal would be made on a deferred "if and when the lines are purchased" basis. The 1955 Legislative Session: The MTA's startling proposal The legislative program, which the MTA approved at its first meeting of 1955, reflected the changed relation ship between that group and the private transit operators, and was almost unrecognizable from the legislative proposal of two years before. This program called for the enlarge ment of MTA territorial jurisdiction to include most of Los Angeles County and parts of San Bernardino, Riverside, and either all or part of Orange County. As before, the MTA was to be authorized the use of all modes of transportation, but more importantly, the power to operate these facilities over any public street within any municipality or any 36 Minutes, November 18, 1954. 216 county in the jurisdiction. Public Utilities Commission supervision was to be eliminated and the properties of the MTA were to be tax exempt, although in lieu payments were to replace the ad valorem taxes. The program requested that the MTA be authorized to exchange revenue bonds for property and to approve management contracts for the opera tion of any system. The Authority later agreed that, should other counties come into the MTA, the size of the Board of 3 7 Directors would be increased from seven to eleven members. These amendments were justified in a paper entitled "An Outline of a Pattern for Integrated Transit Systems for the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area," prepared by Merritt. A key point of the paper was contained in the statement: . . . the frequency of movement of persons within the metropolitan area makes the construction of a rapid transit system based on academic origin and destination studies projected for years into the future very risky. Because of this frequent movement of persons, the best course of action would appear to be one which allowed the immedi ate construction of that segment of the transit system already deemed feasible. From the excess of bond sales to undertake such construction, future studies could be made for extending the system. In this way, the system could grow with 37 Minutes, January 4, 1955, and February 15, 1955. 217 38 the changing needs of the area. This position was not adopted formally by the Board, but the Board authorized Merritt to use that material whenever he felt it was appropriate and in whatever manner he deemed necessary. During April the final appraisal of the Los Angeles Transit Lines was made. Thereupon, the Board authorized Merritt to begin negotiations with that line, using a pur chase price of approximately $29,000,000 less depreciation at the rate of $170,000 per month from September, 1954, to the time of take-over, with adjustments of capital assets from September 30, 1954, to include $1,250,000 of working capital. On the advice of bond counsel Kaiser, the Board voted to employ for the operation of the purchased lines a private management company formed from the top staff mem bers of those very same lines. However, the MTA Board would continue as the policy-making body of the Authority. Furthermore, all major changes in operation would require MTA approval, and the Board would have veto power over proposed changes or substitution in routes or services. This management plan was described by Merritt as essential 38Ibid. 218 to the success of the proposed program to create integrated transit under revenue bond financing. By this organiza tion, the MTA could provide for continuity and coordination of operation procedures. By having a private corporation handle the operations of the system, it could provide polit ical protection to the Authority. The teamwork between the MTA, a public agency, and the management corporation, a private operation, could provide the advantages of both public control and private business efficiency and would, therefore, be in the public interest.^ During the early part of 1955, the MTA had numerous formal and informal meetings with Mayor Poulson of Los Angeles, the County Board of Supervisors, members of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee,the Downtown Business Men's Association, the Los Angeles Chamber, and other metropolitan groups. These meetings usually were devoted to a discussion of the legislation which the MTA proposed to have introduced at the 1955 Legislative Session, but no mention was made of the MTA activities which were leading up to the purchase of the private lines. The arrangement for operating those lines through a private ■^Minutes, April 5, 1955, and April 12, 1955. 219 management corporation, correspondingly, was not brought out. Thus, not until a hearing before a budget session of the County Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles on April 26th, did the MTA find occasion to mention this possibil- •4. 40 xty. A week before the initial public release of the MTA's plan for purchasing the private lines, Merritt had gone to Sacramento to gain support for the MTA legislation. After the meeting with the Supervisors, the Authority determined that May 1st would be the day when the purchase 41 plans would be made public. On May 10, State Senator Richard Richards, who in January had introduced a bill dealing with the issuance of revenue bonds by the MTA, formally presented the MTA legislation as amendments to his initial bill. The MTA's program was defended by Board members, who stated that a $245,000 study had shown that monorail was not the answer to the Los Angeles transit problem. What was needed was a comprehensive, integrated transit system using all types of transit facilities and covering the entire 40 Times, April 27, 1955, 1-1. 41 Minutes, April 19 and 22, 1955. 220 metropolitan area. By using the private lines as a nucleus for the integrated system, substantial savings on the existing bus operations could be achieved through the elim ination of presently duplicated administrative procedures, the integration of the present services, and the elimination of taxes now paid by the private lines. All this could be achieved by the passage of the proposed legislation.*^ The Board attributed the presentation of these amendments on such short notice and at such a late date in the legislative session to the fact that before that time there had been nothing concrete to report. Merritt added that because there had been nothing concrete to report, the public had not been informed of the pending purchase until that time. On the other hand, the Board of Supervisors had known about the appraisals because the County Counsel had once denied the MTA the use of county funds to make them. Merritt also denied that the Authority plan would saddle the taxpayers with a system that was losing money. No provision anywhere in the law or the proposed amendments provided that, if the revenues failed to cover the indenture requirements, real assets in the county or transit district *^Times, May 6, 1955, 1-1. 221 would be security. The 1955 legislative program of the MTA generated more dissension them any of the preceding proposals of that group. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce called for an interim committee study of the proposed amendments, con tending that not enough time was available in the 1955 Session to give these amendments careful consideration. Too, the Chamber had some serious questions about the broad powers that would be given the MTA, the management contract, the payment of in lieu taxes instead of ad valorem taxes, and several other matters. Likewise, the Downtown Business Men's Association called for an interim study of these pro posals. A third group, the Citizens Traffic and Transpor tation Committee, opposed the Richards' bill on the follow ing grounds: 1. There was no Master Plan which would guide the MTA in the construction of an integrated trans it system. 2. It had not been demonstrated conclusively that operation of mass transit facilities could be handled more effectively and efficiently by ^Times, May 7, 1955, 1-1. 222 public rather than private companies. 3. The expenditure of large sums of money and/or the incurring of large debt through the sale of revenue bonds appeared to be an unsound and untimely idea in the absence of any Master Plan to guide transit planning. 4. There appeared to be many organizational, ad ministrative, and regulatory matters which displayed definite deficiencies. This committee recommended that an interim study be made to determine what legislative and administrative action could be taken to relieve the private transit companies of cer tain taxation, regulation, and other restrictions whereby they could immediately improve their public transit serv ices. At the same time the committee resolved that it would begin at once to develop or to assist in the development of a Master Transportation Plan for the Los Angeles basic, part of which would include an efficient and effective mass 44 rapid transit system. When the MTA amendments came before the Senate 44 Letters from officials of the private companies and various other metropolitan groups (available from the author). 223 committee on May 10th, an agreement was made to delay hear ings on the matter until the 17th. During that seven-day period, several groups made their views on the legislation evident. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors came out in opposition to the Richards' bill; but, after a request from the MTA, added that they believed an interim committee study should be made of the proposal. The Mayor of Los Angeles asked Richards to table the proposals and call an interim hearing on them. The Los Angeles City Council described the plan as potentially detrimental to the taxpayers of the City, and the City Attorney pointed out that the City might lose all its transit taxes since the in lieu payments were to be permissive and not mandatory. The MTA altered this provision to make the in lieu amounts mandatory, but this failed to change the position of the Council which still found fault with the private management contract concept for system operation. During this entire period, the Los Angeles Times was bombarding the MTA pro posal, indicating that the type of transit system envisioned by the MTA was not needed; that the City would lose valuable revenue if the plan were enacted; that the price offered for the lines was too high; that the MTA would be responsi ble to its bondholders and not the public; and that the 224 interest payments the MTA would have to make on bonds would just about equal the taxes the private companies were pay ing, thus decreasing the probability that the MTA could run the lines as cheaply as it suggested. As a result of the strenuous opposition to the MTA legislation, the Senate agreed to withhold action on the Richards bill and conduct an interim hearing on the transit problems of the entire Los Angeles metropolitan area. The report that was to come from this interim com mittee was to focus upon the entirety of the transit prob lem and not just the MTA proposals. Thus, witnesses at these hearings were to include those public agencies, indi viduals, or civic organizations which had any practical proposals whatsoever to make with regard to the resolution of the problem. However, the hearings would also allow the examination of all questions which had been raised by the public and the press in earlier discussions of the MTA proposals. Preceding this action, the MTA had determined that 45Times, May 7, 1955, 1-1; May 11, 1955, 1-2, and editorial; and May 14, 1955, 2-1. 4®Times, September 22, 1955, 1-2. 225 the opposition to its legislation by the press and various agencies of Los Angeles County made public acceptance of the proposals impossible. Merritt, with Board approval, had therefore requested that Senators Richards and Collier assign the proposals to an interim committee for study. Copies of the Board resolution called for this action and were sent to various groups throughout the Los Angeles 47 area and, as was seen above, this suggestion was followed. In order to make more palatable the MTA proposals, immediately following the 1955 Legislative Session the Board began a review of its legislative program. This review prompted two major revisions which were agreed to in August of that year. The first revision changed the method of purchase and allowed the MTA to sell revenue bonds to the public and use the proceeds therefrom in payment for the properties of the private lines. The MTA would then be free to select whatever management it desired to operate the acquired properties, subject to the terms of the inden ture. In the event that the public offering of revenue bonds was not successful, the MTA would then, as a temporary situation, transfer its bonds in the agreed amount of the 47 Minutes, May 19, 1955. 226 purchase price of the assets to the National City Lines, majority stockholders of the Los Angeles Transit Lines. Under those conditions the MTA would enter into a super visory contract with the top staff of the two lines, but with those amendments necessary to preserve the constitu tionality of the contract and to secure the greatest pos sible degree of public acceptance. At the time a public market developed for the revenue bonds, the issue could be sold either by action of the MTA or the holders of the bonds. Within a reasonable period thereafter, the manage- 48 ment contract could be canceled. The Board members were assigned certain individuals whom they were to contact with the objective of clarifying for them the position the MTA would take at the Senate interim committee hearings. Those to be contacted by the Board included the Mayor of Los Angeles; the County Board of Supervisors; the City Council; city officials in Bur bank, Glendale, and the San Gabriel Valley area; and the Public Utilities Commission commissioners. The Board agreed that the policy of the Authority would be to sell its program through the coming Senate interim committee 48 Minutes, August 30, 1955. 227 49 hearings. One of the last actions of the MTA Board during 1955 was to adopt three additional amendments which were to be proposed for incorporation in the Richards bill. The first amendment provided for the operation of urban and interurban service in any part of the metropolitan areas and the counties of Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino. Another enlarged the MTA Board to eleven members, with the governor appointing two from Orange County and one each from Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. The final amendment eliminated the creation of citizens' advisory council to the MTA since the appointment of the members from the other counties would provide a more effective com munity representation plan.^® The 1956 Senate interim hearings; steps retraced^1 The Senate interim hearings began on January 17th. 50Minutes, December 13, 1955. 51 Unless otherwise stated, all data under this heading have been drawn from "Reporters' Transcript of Proceedings" of the Subcommittee on Mass Transit of the Joint Interim Committee on Transportation Problems, Janu ary 17, 18, 19, 1956; see also Times, January 18, 1-1; 228 Before these proceedings had even begun, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Men's Associa tion, and the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee issued a joint statement giving notice of their opposition to the Richards measure. The statement advised that the bill was premature since it contemplated the immediate acquisition and operation by a public authority of existing surface transportation systems in advance of a comprehen sive and detailed study or plan of the transportation needs of the people within the area. Before such action was taken, they recommended that some organization other than the MTA be created by the state to make a comprehensive study of the problems of the movement of persons and, in relation thereto, goods within, into, and out of the Los Angeles basin, which would include private automobiles, trucks, and mass rapid transportation by any and all _____ 52 means. As the Senate hearings unfolded, the above three organizations were seen to be only a few of many which opposed the MTA's program. Mayor Poulson of Los Angeles 19, 1-1; 20, 1-1; and 21, 1-1, 1956. 52 Committee Representing The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Men's Association, and 229 found a myriad of faults with the proposed measure. He began by complaining that the price being offered for the two private lines was exorbitant and that he had heard rumors of a payoff. He felt that should the MTA buy these private companies and then fail to cover its debts, the City would be required to resolve the Authority's financial difficulties. Furthermore, should the MTA default in its payments, this might cause the interest rates on City bonds to rise higher in the future. The Mayor also doubted that the system would be improved if the management of the existing firms was retained under the management contract. , Further, he believed that the people should be allowed to vote on whether or not a multimillion dollar rapid transit system should be built. Finally, he recommended that the Los Angeles area be submitted to an intensive transporta tion study, such as had been carried on in San Francisco, and that the MTA not be given broader powers until such a survey was made.53 The Los Angeles City Council opposed the MTA plan the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, Adopted Statement Concerning Senate Bill 1308, and Alternative Steps Recommended, January 5, 1956. 53Times, January 18, 1956, 1-1. 230 for essentially the same reasons as the Mayor, and it too called for more study. The Downtown Business Men's Asso ciation suggested that the governor call a special session of the Legislature to consider the making of a Master Sur vey of Los Angeles Transportation Needs. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce suggested that the Legislature create a new organization to undertake the master survey. The final criticism of the MTA measure came from the Los Angeles Times. The Times recommended that the Legislature suspend the activities of the MTA and create an agency subject to local control which would undertake the recommended master survey. The Times condemned the MTA for bypassing the local community in its search for ways to build a rapid transit system and agreed with the Mayor that a San Francisco type study should be undertaken and the people should be allowed to vote on any rapid transit sys tem proposal. In the final analysis, said the Times, the fallacy of the MTA position lay in its belief that it could build a rapid transit system without tax subsidization. The truth of the matter was that any transit system would have to rely on some type of subsidy and, therefore, the organization operating the system should be under local 231 54 control and subject to the control of the voters. In response to these criticisms, Merritt maintained that the Los Angeles Chamber's position was inconsistent with past actions of that group. He said that the Chamber had recommended the creation of a transit district in 1949 without first undertaking a comprehensive transportation study. Merritt believed that further studies under the existing circumstances would merely be a waste of money. What was needed now was action on the MTA proposals. He explained that what the Mayor thought might be a payoff could actually be a legitimate commission to the investment bankers who would handle the proposed $40,000,000 revenue bond issue. He explained that the management contract had been revised so that if the revenue bonds were sold out right to the public, no private management corporation would be employed to operate the purchased system. On the other hand, should the bonds not be pur chased immediately by the public, there were provisions for the temporary operation of the system by a private manage ment corporation to be selected by the MTA. Merritt also defended the purchasing price which the MTA had offered to 54 Times, January 18, 1956, editorial. 232 pay for the private lines, emphasizing that the appraisals had been made by a highly recognized firm in the transpor tation field and had followed guidelines suggested by the California Public Utilities Commission for appraising trans it company assets. He felt that a whispering and shouting campaign, completely unfounded in fact, was being conducted against the MTA and its members. Further, he characterized the 1955 legislative proposal introduced by Assemblyman Augustus Hawkins as being a scheme of delay and waste developed in an organization known as Town Hall and spon sored by the Chamber, the Downtown Business Men's Associa tion, and the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. That bill had provided for a $500,000 state appropriation to create a committee to study transit and traffic prob lems in the Los Angeles and Orange Counties. In answer to the accusation that the MTA had overstepped its legal author ity by negotiating for the purchase of the private compan ies, Merritt reported that the MTA would have been foolish to consider a $165,000,000 monorail system without discuss ing other transit systems which would make it workable. A further defense of MTA actions came from Board Chairman Hayden Jones. In his formal statement before the interim committee, he said that careful study and consulta- 233 tion with qualified engineers, including the general mana ger of the Cleveland Transit System whom the MTA brought to the hearing to testify in its behalf, indicated that the problem of transit in the Los Angeles area could be handled effectively only by an authority including not only Los Angeles County, but Orange County and those portions of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties once served by the Pacific Electric. A further conclusion was that in order to develop a mass rapid transit system for the metropolitan area, the existing transit facilities would first have to be brought into a single entity. Such a system, he said, could not be brought into being by private firms, subject to legal controls on their operations. Since there was no evidence that voters would approve general obligation bonds to finance the development of a rapid transit system, the MTA had proceeded to determine the feasibility of acquiring the existing facilities necessary to begin the development of such a system through revenue bond financing without recourse to subsidy from the tax base. The MTA studies and consultations with investment banking services indicated that revenue bonds would be economically feasible, provided the MTA had complete juris diction in fixing rates and routes. He said the MTA had 234 never proposed to buy the transit companies outright but only the properties that could be used in developing a mass rapid transit system. He added that in this connection he felt that whenever a public agency took property from a taxpayer, the least the taxpayer could expect was the price of his cost to replace what he was selling. On all of these counts, Jones was supported by the previous testimony of the presidents of the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines. The opinion of the legislators attending these hearings on the MTA proposals was somewhat mixed. Several of the legislators were opposed to the public ownership of mass transportation in the Los Angeles area. The chairman and vice-chairman of the interim committee, Senators Collier and Richards, on the other hand, expressed the opin ion that the MTA had done a good job, considering its leg islative limitations. They also felt that what was needed, at this juncture in time, was not additional studies but action. Following these hearings, the Authority Board directed Merritt to initiate legislation for a state appro priation to the MTA to conduct area-wide engineering studies and pay administrative expenses. Merritt was told 235 by the Legislative Counsel that further legislation would be required to effectuate an appropriation for an area-wide transit study. Since such legislation could not conceiv ably be passed in the 1956 Legislative Budget Session, the MTA modified its requests and asked only for funds suffi cient to cover all administrative costs of the Authority and an additional amount to pay the balance of the contrac tual obligation to Coverdale and Colpitts. Although the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee sent a letter of opposition to this appropriation to all members of the Legislature, the MTA was still granted a $70,000 appropria tion. Merritt attributed the success of this measure to the efforts of Senator Collier; Assemblyman Patrick McGee, Chairman of the Los Angeles delegation in the Assembly; and Assemblyman Charles Wilson, Secretary of the Los Angeles CC delegation. The Senate interim hearings had given the MTA Board notice that any plans for introducing legislation in 1957, which would allow it to complete the purchase of the two private transit companies, would meet certain and ^Minutes, February 14 and 28, 1956, and March 20, 1956. 236 absolute opposition unless existing attitudes among various metropolitan groups were changed. This fact had been brought clearly into focus, and the Authority proceeded to respond to the imperatives of that situation. MTA efforts to gain community support To overcome the dissent which had arisen over its proposals, the MTA initiated a series of actions designed to increase interaction with the opposing groups. The pub lic relations officer of the Authority was told that any public information releases given to the newspapers were also to go to the forty-seven mayors of the cities in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Meetings were arranged between the MTA and the chief administrative officers of Los Angeles County, the chairman of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, the Executive Committee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the Downtown Business Men's Association.^^ Finally, the Board agreed to have Coverdale and Colpitts prepare a study of (1) defects in the present law setting up the MTA, (2) economic necessities for expanding 56 Minutes, April 10, 1956. 237 the area under the MTA to include the four county metropol itan communities, and (3) all types of transit facilities. Unfortunately, this last action could not be undertaken. The County Counsel said it would constitute the expenditure of funds to educate the public and would, therefore, be an 57 inappropriate use of county monies. In July the Board agreed to make its meetings open to the public and the press. As the public meetings devel oped, the MTA explained the rationale for its disagreement with the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee's proposals and presented the advantages of the new contract which had been developed for the purchase and management of the private lines. These advantages were used to reduce opposition to the MTA and gain adherents to its cause. They included: 1. The assets of the companies would be purchased for cash and not the exchange of revenue bonds. 2. The use of a private management corporation to operate the lines would be eliminated. 3. The MTA would set aside approximately $350,000 a year for administrative expenses and 57 Minutes, June 12, 1956 and July 10, 1956. 238 engineering studies incurred in developing a plan for rail rapid transit. These studies could therefore be made without any recourse c o to public funds. In September the MTA approved, as to purpose and content, Merritt’s proposed Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. This was submitted to the State Attorney General and Legislative Counsel for study and approval as to form. In November Merritt presented to the Board the MTA legislation, as modified and approved by the Legislative Counsel at the request of Assemblyman Charles Wilson. This proposed bill incorporated the basic sections of the original act of 1951, but created a new act which included all the amendments which had been developed and approved since that time. This included the clarification of the MTA as a public corporation and public agency and the disengagement of the MTA from control by the State Department of Finance and all other state departments. This measure was then submitted to the Attorney General for 59 revision and recommendation. ^®Minutes, July 10, 1956. 5Q Minutes, September 11, 1956, and November 13, 1956. 239 Once the legislation had been approved by the Board, copies of the proposed program were sent to the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown Business Men's Association, along with a statement of the MTA's plan for the downtown area. Each organization was requested to indicate whether it was in support of the measure and the plan for downtown development, and if it were not, to designate the specific points of contention and provide alternatives to remedy the matter. Opposition by the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee As the MTA moved toward the offensive in its cam paign to generate support for its 1957 legislative program, the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee was ac tively working to reduce MTA influence and forward its own cause. As was previously indicated, this group had been appointed through the combined efforts of Mayor Poulson and the chairman of the County Board of Supervisors, John Ford. The idea for such a committee, however, had not been born in the minds of either of these men. The idea had 60Minutes, December 11, 1956. 240 come from H. G. McClellen, who, at the time this committee was appointed in 1953, was chairman of the Los Angeles Chamber Committee on Transportation and also a member of the MTA Board. In a series of three meetings held with Mayor Poulson, Councilman L. E. Timberlake, and others in 1953, McClellan convinced these individuals that they should invite the County Board of Supervisors to join them in creating a blue-ribbon citizens' committee to conduct an area-wide study of pressing traffic and transportation problems of the entire metropolitan area.**1 At the time of its creation, the Mayor emphasized that the Committee would not be in competition with any existing organization promoting freeways, rapid transit, or other proposed solutions, and it would not be a stumbling block to the plans of such groups.^ Certain members of this committee began working together well in advance of its formal creation in February, 1954. This was made evident when, at the first meeting, a ®^Minutes of meeting of Executive Committee of Metropolitan Traffic and Transportation Committee, Septem ber 23, 1953, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. 62Times, February 19, 1954, 2-1. 241 ten-point statement of facts was presented as a guide to the committee's comprehensive study. Included within these facts were such statements as: 1. The traffic and transportation problems of the Los Angeles area are of such a nature that the entire metropolitan region, rather than a seg ment of the region, must be included in any study directed toward resolving those problems. 2. The mere fact of ownership, whether by private operation or by municipalities, does not in itself determine the effectiveness of public transportation. 3. Experience of transit carriers, both privately owned and operated and publicly owned and operated, demonstrates the need for an examina tion of the economic factors involved before any final recommendations are made. 4. Any program undertaken at this time to solve the traffic problems should be an area-wide community program, not merely an activity of a single organization, association, or civic group. 5. Numerous limited studies of traffic and 242 transportation problems in the Los Angeles area have been made in the past, but the failure to agree on appropriate remedies has heretofore paralyzed action. 6. Inasmuch as no comprehensive area-wide trans portation study has been completed since 1938, new information should be sought through a comprehensive study. 7. In the light of past experience, it is essen tial that preliminary to the accumulation of needed data the leaders among those concerned with these problems reach agreement among them selves as to the steps which should be taken at this time.**3 This last fact, the need to reach agreement as to the objectives of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, caused the group much consternation during its formative period. Considering that the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee included numerous individuals with many competing and conflicting interests— members of the MTA, the Automobile Club of Southern California, the 63Ibid. 243 Division of Highways, the private transit operators, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, and others— the difficulties which the group experienced in defining its objectives are not surprising. Thus, although Pollard of the MTA attempted to get the Citizens Committee to make its objective the study and solution of the mass rapid transit problem, the Committee chose not to be tied to such 64 a restricted area of concern. Instead, a Panel of Pro fessional and Expert Consultants was created to advise, counsel, and guide the Committee in its work. The Panel was chosen on the basis of professional knowledge and ex perience in the field of traffic and transportation and included representatives from the Los Angeles Department of Traffic, the Los Angeles Public Utilities and Transportation Commission, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Down town Business Men's Association, the State Division of Highways, the Automobile Club of Southern California, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, and the Motor Truck Association of California. Conspicuous in their absence from this Panel were officials of the MTA who had 64 Times, February 19, 1954, 2-1, and March 25, 1954, 2-1. 244 not been invited into membership.66 This Panel was divided into three task forces. The task force most relevant to the rapid transit controversy was the one charged with developing a "Master Program for Providing Facilities for the Movement of Persons and Goods throughout the Los Angeles Area." This task force was headed by Walter R. Lindersmith of the Los Angeles Traffic Association. Lindersmith had once presented, at the 1953 Assembly interim hearings on the problems of rapid transit in Los Angeles, a proposal to use buses on freeways as the solution to the rapid transit problem.66 The task forces worked throughout 1954, drawing upon the experience of Panel members and upon the data which these persons could obtain from their respective organizations. By December they made their first formal report to the committee. The Panel stated that its study indicated a serious need for the formulation and area-wide adoption of a traffic and transportation plan, based upon a sound and adequate factual investigation of the area-wide 66Minutes of meetings of April, 1954, and August, 1954, of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. 66Ibid. 245 movement requirements of people and goods. ^ As to the need for a comprehensive study of mass transportation alone, the position taken by the task force headed by Lindersmith would seem to be accurately reflected in a memorandum he sent to members of the Panel regarding this matter. In this memorandum he said that he did not believe such a study was necessary to find an acceptable solution to the problem. Furthermore, he did not believe that funds should be expended merely to prove to advocates of rail rapid transit that such plans were not economically justi fiable. He maintained that the solution to the problem was 6 8 still express buses on freeways. In 1955 the Citizens Traffic and Transportation committee continued activities which affected both the MTA programs and the solution of the transit problem. The Panel of Consultants approved the introduction of what later was Assemblyman Hawkins1 bill to provide for the creation of a committee on transit and traffic problems in Los Angeles 67Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, Panel of Professional and Expert Consultants, "Traffic and Transportation Plan," submitted on December 15, 1954. ®^Memorandum from Walter R. Lindersmith dated August 12, 1954. 246 and Orange Counties. Joseph E. Havenner, chairman of the Panel and Manager of the Public Safety Department of the Automobile Club of Southern California, asked Lindersmith, then secretary-manager of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, to be chairman of a committee to 69 follow the progress of that bill through the Legislature. In March the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee adopted the following objectives for the group: 1. To encourage surveys and the making of a com prehensive study of the traffic and transporta tion problems of the area. 2. To work toward a traffic and transportation plan and program for the long-range solution to the metropolitan transit problems. 3. To support traffic and transportation projects which can be accomplished in the immediate future. 4. To suggest administrative and operational poli cies concerning the management of traffic and transportation for adoption throughout the ^Minutes of meetings of January, 1955, and March, 1955, of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. 247 metropolitan area. 5. To encourage improved coordination of the multiplicity of political jurisdictions and other agencies concerned with these problems. 6. To disseminate information to the general pub lic alerting the community to the needs of the area so that stronger public support for the proposed solution to the problems may be devel oped, as well as to encourage the public to use public transportation facilities.70 With these objectives guiding the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee's actions, it becomes clear why the Committee so rabidly opposed the 1955 proposal of the MTA to purchase immediately the private transit companies, and why at the same time it called for state creation of an organization to undertake a comprehensive transportation survey. This opposition to the MTA continued throughout 1955. Although the MTA was later to present its case before the Citizens Committee and the Panel of Consultants, these latter groups did not change their opinions of the MTA proposal. In October, 1955, the Panel of Consultants 70 Ibid. 248 adopted a policy stating that there was an urgent need to develop at the highest possible degree of efficiency and effectiveness a modern mass rapid transit system in the Los Angeles basin area as a part of an integrated "Master Transportation Plan." In order to achieve this result, the Panel recommended the creation of an agency which had a jurisdiction cutting across or through all political sub divisions and which would be properly constituted. The first and primary responsibility of such an agency would be the development of a "Master Transportation Plan" which would integrate all types of transportation, including mass transit and highway facilities then existing, and which would include such additional facilities as necessary to provide the proper transportation system.^ Havenner indicated that the Panel of Consultants felt that the adoption of Richards Senate Bill 1308 was premature since an Authority should be created first to develop an overall transportation plan before operational 7 2 matters were finalized. Acting from this background, the ^Minutes of Meeting of October 12, 1955, the Citi zens Traffic and Transportation Committee. 249 Citizens Committee in November, 1955, voted to oppose the MTA plan at the Senate interim hearings scheduled for the following spring. As has been indicated before, this oppo sition took the form of a joint statement of opposition to Senate Bill 1308 signed not only by the Citizens Committee, but also by the Los Angeles Chamber group and the Downtown Business Men's Association. On the basis of the Panel of Consultants policy statement and recommendations made in 1955, the Citizens Committee in February, 1956, adopted in modified form those recommendations. Copies of these rather detailed recommen dations were then sent to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the Los Angeles City Council, the Mayor of Los Angeles, and the chief administrative officers of the 7 3 City and County of Los Angeles. A by-product of this action was the appropriation of $10,000 by the City of Los Angeles to help the Committee in the continuance of its 74 work. The plan was also presented to the MTA, but it was 7 3 Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, "Recommendations for Development of a Transportation Pro gram for the Los Angeles Basin Area," February 8, 1956. 74 Los Angeles City Council action of March 21, 1956. See Proceedings for meeting of that day in City Clerk's Office. 250 rejected as a basis of action on the grounds that the Authority was interested only in passenger transportation and that an organization enacting the programs envisioned in this plan would require police powers presently exer cised by state and local agencies of government. The MTA 75 did not desire, and would not ask for, such powers. As the end of 1956 approached, the differences in philosophies and programs of the MTA and the Citizens Com mittee had been very precisely drawn. While the Citizens Committee thought that further study was necessary, the MTA believed that immediate action followed by later stud ies was demanded. The Committee desired the creation of a new organization having at first only the power to make a comprehensive transportation study of the Los Angeles metropolitan area and being composed of representative segments of that population, locally controlled. The MTA, on the other hand, felt that the answer to the transit problem lay with bringing together, under the aegis of a newly empowered MTA, the two private transit lines that then carried approximately 75 per cent of the public transit passengers. Once this was done, further studies could be Minutes, June 28, July 10, and August 2, 1956 251 undertaken and plans laid for the development of the rapid transit system.^6 A further difference between the positions of these two groups existed in their interpretations of the nature of the metropolitan area itself. The MTA believed that the downtown business area of the City of Los Angeles was the core of the metropolis that encompassed portions of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties. It believed that the separate communities were not only interdependent, but were in a very large measure dependent on the core of the metropolis. Therefore, a mass rapid transit system, in order to serve the entire metropolis, should be a combination of rail lines radiating out from the core and bus lines that would not only travel the freeways of the metropolis, but would also serve as cir cumferential lines connecting the five or more rail lines that would radiate from the core of the metropolis and 77 link together the urban communities of the area. The chairman of the Citizens Committee, however, 76 Memorandum from Robert L. Gordon, Chairman of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, October 5, 1956. ^Ibid. 252 was of a different opinion as to the nature of the metro politan community. He thought that the Los Angeles metro politan area was decentralized to the point that no mass rapid transit system was needed. Inasmuch as people could find business, governmental, and administrative facilities in close proximity to their residences, there existed no reason to promote or perpetuate a centralization of these activities. Inasmuch as these functions were not central ized, there was no justification for developing rail rapid •*. 78 transit. In a last effort to subdue the conflicts between these two groups, the chairman of the MTA Board approached the Citizens Committee and suggested that if it would back the MTA legislation, the MTA in turn would support the Committee's legislation aimed at creating a Transportation Study Commission for the Los Angeles area. The Committee would not agree to this proposal, and thus the antagonisms 79 continued into the 1957 Legislative Session, J ^Ibid.; Minutes, November 13, 1956. 253 The Legislative Session of 1957: Passage of the MTA Act On January 17, 1957, Assemblyman Charles Wilson introduced Assembly Bill 1104, which embodied the proposed MTA program. This bill provided for the enlarging of the MTA membership to include the three additional counties in the area and the increase of the Board membership from seven to eleven— eight from Los Angeles County and one each from neighboring counties. All Board members would be appointed by the governor. The Authority would be empow ered, in developing a mass rapid transit system, to acquire the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines at a negotiated price. It could issue revenue bonds to meet the cost of these lines and to provide working capital. The MTA could employ for one year the existing management and other personnel of the two lines and would be able to set fare rates, since it would not be under Public Utilities Commission control. In addition, the MTA would not be responsible for the payment of taxes previ- 80 ously paid by the private transit owners. A few days after the introduction of the MTA ®®Times, January 15, 1957, 1-13. 254 measure, the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee had its legislation introduced by Assemblyman Augustus Hawkins. This bill called for the state to create a Transportation Planning Commission for the Los Angeles metropolitan area. This Commission would have fifteen mem bers appointed by the governor from the citizenry of the counties in this area— including two from the City of Los Angeles and five from the County of Los Angeles. The Com mission would be charged with the preparation of a Master Transportation Plan for the construction and coordination of an area-wide transportation system, including the neces sary facilities, methods of financing, governmental and administrative structures, and, in general, the overall program for Master Plan implementation. This plan had the backing of the Los Angeles Times, which used in its defense the major arguments forwarded by the Citizens Committee's 81 chairman throughout 1956. In an effort to win the support of the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association, the MTA directed specific members of the Board to work with these two groups and provide them with any additional data 81 Times, January 29, 1957, editorial. 255 that they might desire in determining their position on the MTA bill. This action ultimately achieved the assurance of the Downtown Business Men's Association's backing, but the 82 Los Angeles Chamber's support took longer in coming. In addition to studying the material provided by the MTA liaison man, the Los Angeles Chamber had also ordered its Transportation and Traffic Committee to make a study and recommendation on this issue. On March 1st this Committee made its report. The report recommended the establishment of a transit district, which could be expanded by citizen vote, with power to issue general obligation bonds specifically approved by the voters and secured by property taxes. The members of the governing board for the district were to be appointed by the governor, six being nominated by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, two by the City of Los Angeles, and one from each of the other three counties to be included within the district. The district was to develop integrated mass rapid transit for the movement of people and, as related thereto, to make recommendations to governmental jurisdictions, after inten sive study, on the movement of goods and vehicular traffic. ®2Minutes, February 13, 1957. 256 Although the district was to have its general obligation bonds secured by property taxes, a search was to be made for other sources on which to place the financial burdens of these bonds. The district was not, however, to have the power to issue revenue bonds. Finally, the district was to have the power of eminent domain or contract over other transit systems. The consensus of this report was that the district provided a better organizational arrangement than the authority for the public ownership of mass transit because it provided for more control by the local voters. Further, the report expressed the doubt that an adequate rapid transit system could be financed through revenue bonds.8 3 The Board of Directors of the Los Angeles Chamber postponed action on this report for three weeks. During this period, the Chamber had numerous consultations with the MTA. At the end of this period, the Directors voted to reject the committee's recommendations. At the same time, the Directors voted support of the MTA proposal, provided the plan was amended whereby the people of the Los Angeles area would have to vote upon the creation of a transit 83March 1, 1957, 3-1, and March 13, 1957, 3-1. 257 district from the resources of the MTA which would be supported financially through general obligation bonds.®4 The MTA had thus been able to subdue much of the opposition to its legislation and had even been able to turn some of that dissent into positive support. However, the complete and unqualified backing of Mayor Poulson was still unobtainable. The Mayor, although he continued to maintain that the price being offered for the two lines was too high, had nonetheless reduced his antagonism toward the MTA proposal. In a letter to Senator Richards, he called for a compromise between the MTA and the Citizens Committee measures, saying that he thought the acquisition of the 85 private lines was acceptable, although the price was not. The major criticism of the MTA program continued to come from the Los Angeles Times. The Times editorialized the issue widely. It stated that the Wilson bill put the cart before the horse, action before thought. It maintained that the 1956 Senate interim hearings did not justify the MTA action, that there was too much haste, and that the private companies were trying to unload unwanted transit OC Times, February 22, 1957, 3-1. 258 systems on the public. In addition, the present MTA Board, which had its mind bent on monorail construction, would continue to hold its position for the next four years. The Times also predicted that should the MTA Bill pass, the Authority would be back at the Legislature in a short time asking for taxing power. For the Times, the Los Angeles Chamber's Traffic and Transportation Committee's proposal for a transit district presented the most adequate solution 8 6 to the problem. As the MTA bill moved through the Legislature under the Senate sponsorship of Senator Collier and the Assembly leadership of Assemblyman Wilson, various legislators were heard echoing the fear that if the measure were passed the MTA would soon be back asking for taxing power. Proponents of the bill did not quiet these rumors when they acknow ledged that, should operating revenues not meet the costs of the bonds, the taxpayers would be forced to provide some tax support. However, this argument did not develop into sizable proportions and was, therefore, of little influence 87 on the final outcome of the MTA proposal. 86Times, January 23, 1957, and March 17, 1957, editorials. ®^Times, March 29, 1957, 1-1. 259 The Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee provided the only other major opposition to the MTA legis lative program. In February this group adopted a "Report and Resolution" which stated its opposition to this legis lation. This same "Report and Resolution" had been tabled at the Committee's January meeting, following the recom mendation of Committee member and MTA Director Hayden Jones. He had maintained that the Citizens Committee's recommendation for the formation of a Transportation Plan ning Commission would put another organization into opera tion which would duplicate and retard the progress then being made by the MTA. However, at the February meeting the tabled "Report and Resolution" had been able to find enough favorable votes to gain approval in spite of the 8 8 objections of the MTA members. In a letter to the members of the Citizens Commit tee, its chairman, Montgomery Phister, said that although the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association had endorsed the MTA program, the action of the Chamber had not been unanimous. Phister continued to feel 88 Times, February 14, 1957, 1-2; Minutes of meet ings of January 9, 1956, and February 13, 1956, of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. 260 that haste was putting the metropolitan area on an irre trievable and dangerous course in the transit matter.88 In another letter to Senator Collier, dated April 19th, Phister told the senator that limited funds made it impossible for the Citizens Committee to send personal representatives to Sacramento to appear before the Senate Transportation Committee. Therefore, his letter was being sent to present the Committee's position in opposition to the MTA legislation and in favor of its own proposals. Phister pointed out that the 1957 MTA bill was a complete departure from the Authority's original objective to build a monorail line for interurban transit in the Los Angeles area. He said that the new bill did not even provide for the purchase of the existing lines which had not been ade quately proven to be an essential step in the development of a rapid transit system. In fact, the findings and rec ommendations of the traffic and transportation authorities who had worked with, and advised, the Committee had clearly indicated that a change in ownership would not speed the existing buses more rapidly to their destinations. OQ Letter from Montgomery Phister, chairman of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee to members of that group, February 27, 1956. 261 Included within this group of authorities was none other than Mr. Edward T. Telford, Assistant State Highway Engi neer, Los Angeles. Phister then proceeded to discuss the advantages of the Committee's plan for a comprehensive metropolitan transportation survey conducted by a newly 90 formed Transportation Planning Commission. As a final barb against the MTA's legislation, the chairman of the Citizens Committee made the statement that an authority of the MTA's design was not actually necessary because the transportation problem was not as great as it was made out to be. He felt that in actuality there was only a downtown traffic and transportation problem, and if Mayor Poulson so decided, he could clear it up himself. Otherwise, the situation was nowhere serious enough to call 91 for the exaggerated action planned by the MTA. In the final analysis, the arguments of the Citi zens Committee and the advocates of its plan failed. By May 27th the Citizens Committee bill had died in the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. With its termination 9 0 Letter from Montgomery Phister to Senator Collier, April 19, 1957. 91 Times, March 15, 1957. Chairman of the Citizens Committee at this time was Roy Hagen. 262 also came the termination of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. The MTA bill, on the other hand, was then in the hands of the governor, and was soon to be signed into law. With the passage of this measure, the MTA was destined to become, in 1958, the sixth largest bus 92 operation in the United States. Its jurisdictional scope, however, was significantly reduced from that which had been requested in the original MTA legislation. Instead of having a four-county jurisdiction, the MTA area included only the majority of Los Angeles County, though it was allowed to operate commuting lines to the other three counties. This limitation of scope was one of the final changes in the MTA bill. It had come at the request of county officials within the other three counties who felt that they had not been adequately included in the discus sions leading to the proposed legislation and that their needs and desires had not been given full consideration. They did not feel that they had been sufficiently informed as to the operational methods of the MTA, and they were quite dissatisfied with the representation of their ^Times, February 16, 1958, 1-1. 263 respective jurisdictions on the MTA Board. For these reasons, they had decided that the disadvantages of joining the Authority greatly outweighed any foreseeable benefits. Thus, they had requested that their counties be excluded Q *3 from the original jurisdiction of the MTA. Part III; The MTA Enlarges Its Powers A period of consolidationt 1957-1958 Following the passage of the 19 57 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, the Authority did not submit any further legislation to the State Legislature until 1960. During this time, however, the Authority was having constant interaction with members of that body. In October, 1958, only a few months after the MTA had taken control of the operations of the private companies, the Authority was called before a Senate subcommittee on trans portation. This subcommittee hearing was held to analyze the progress the MTA had made toward the resolution of the Los Angeles transit problem since the enactment of the 1957 Act. ^Times, April 16, 1957, 1-24, and April 18, 1957, 1-18. 264 At this hearing Merritt reported that the MTA had taken in approximately $3,000,000 over expenses in the first six months of operation. This figure was stated after Senator Collier had accused him of giving the subcommittee the run-around. Regardless of this amount, the MTA counsel maintained that the Authority was living from hand to mouth every month. This was because the requirements for depre ciation for that period exceeded the amount available for both depreciation and the general fund. In answer to a criticism leveled at the amount of funds the MTA devoted to advertising, the MTA reported that it had budgeted only $119,000 that year for both public relations and advertis ing, as compared to $240,000 which the two private lines combined had spent the year before. The MTA stated that the tax and Public Utilities Commission exemptions had made this financial record possible and that they must be main tained. To that time, the MTA had saved some $750,000 in 94 taxes while paying out on its own accord $1,844,484. The MTA also informed the subcommittee of its ac tions directed toward the development of a rapid transit 94 Times, October 17, 1958, 3-18, and October 18, 1958, 3-1. 265 system. The Authority explained that Coverdale and Col- pitts had been hired to make an origin-and-destination sur vey of the MTA jurisdiction, and that it would be finished early the following year, providing the first step in the construction of a rapid transit system. As to other rela tionships with Coverdale and Colpitts, the MTA stated that the employees of that firm served the MTA only in an advis ory capacity and reported only to the MTA Board. The rumors which had circulated, saying that Coverdale and Colpitts was directly responsible to MTA bond holders, were said to 95 be completely false and without foundation. From the viewpoint of the legislative members of this subcommittee, the rapid transit program of the MTA was moving along satisfactorily. The operational policies of the organization, however, were another question. The most critical point, as seen by Senators Collier and Richards, was that the MTA had not made a policy of giving advance public notice when service reductions or fare increases were to be considered at Board meetings. They saw this as a serious weakness in the MTA. For without public discus sion of these matters, the MTA would in effect be 95Ibid. 266 establishing itself as the sole judge of the public inter est. The subcommittee thus recommended that such public notice be given in the future. Other than this specific criticism, Richards appeared to sum up the committee's perspective of the MTA by stating that it was too early to 9 6 deem the MTA experiment either a success or a failure. The Legislative Session of 1959: The MTA fights a holding action As the 1959 Legislative Session unfolded, four bills directly affecting the MTA were introduced. Of these four bills, two were principally authored by Assemblyman Charles Wilson. In the first one, pertaining to labor relations, the MTA found only one objectionable feature. The second bill, which prohibited the MTA from operating charter and sightseeing bus services, was totally unacceptable to the Authority. Of the other two bills, one dealt with the issuance of revenue bonds and the more important one, as seen by the Authority, provided for the enlargement of the 97 Board and the reappointment of its entire membershxp. Wilson, who had authored the Authority's 1957 Act, 97 Times, May 8, 1959, 1-13 or 3-5. 267 said that the MTA should be prohibited from operating in the charter and sightseeing field because the tax-exempt status had placed the Authority in a position to threaten the lives of private charter bus operators. He added that when the MTA was created every effort had been made to guard against the granting to this agency of an unfair com petitive advantage over private enterprise in competing fields. Since then, in the area of charter service, the tax advantage and vast financial resources of the MTA had given it the power to drive the private competitors out of business. Several months after this legislative proposal was introduced, Wilson said that he planned to seek a legisla tive inquiry into the operations of the MTA. He also said that he would in the near future join with others in intro ducing legislation which would prohibit the MTA from issu ing revenue bonds without legislative approval. This latter action would bring that group under some degree of public control. He realized, however, that this could affect the value of the MTA bonds outstanding; and, before he followed through on this matter, he anticipated asking for a legal Q Q Times, January 30, 1959, 1-1. 268 99 ruling on the matter. The MTA reactions to the Wilson measures were var ied. They ranged from thoughtful criticism of his charter and sightseeing proposals to the accusation that his call for a legislative inquiry was a punitive measure, resulting from the refusal of the MTA to contribute to his campaign fund. Merritt expressed surprise at the suggested legisla tive inquiry, but said that he and the MTA welcomed any investigation that a legislative committee might make. He felt that the MTA had a full and complete understanding with the Legislature on various MTA accomplishments during the past year and was certain that that relationship could be continued with any inquiry. In April, 1959, the Senate Committee on Transpor tation considered the Wilson MTA labor legislation. During this period, the committee was informed that the MTA held four monthly meetings, two of which were open public meet ings and two of which were closed. An amendment was pro posed to the committee that in the future all MTA meetings 99 Times, March 27, 1959, 1-1. ^ ^ Times, March 27, 1959, 1-1, and March 28, 1959, 1-4. 269 be made public. Before acting upon this proposed amend ment, the committee contacted the MTA. ^ ® ^ In response to this inquiry, the committee learned that the two private bimonthly meetings had been used to plan the agendae of the regular sessions and as executive sessions to discuss matters of personnel, labor negotia tions, or the purchase of property. Furthermore, the State Attorney General had ruled that under the Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority Act of 1957, the Authority was not subject to the Brown Act which made private meetings of state bodies illegal. Regardless of this, the MTA had decided that its regular sessions should be made public. Now, with respect to the proposed amendment to ban closed meetings, the MTA Board had unanimously passed a resolu tion which was forwarded to the Senate Transportation Com mittee stating the henceforth all Board meetings would be open to the press with the exception of those times in which matters mentioned above under the heading of execu tive session business were discussed. As far as the MTA was concerned, there was no objection to the proposed 101Times, April 22, 1959, 1-25. 270 1 0 2 amendment. In relation to the Wilson charter amendment, the MTA took a stronger and more active stance. The Board took the formal position that the MTA at that time did not conduct any sightseeing activities and that it did not in tend to in the future. Therefore, it did not have any objection if the bill were amended to apply solely to sight seeing activities. By sightseeing activities, the MTA meant the recognized sightseeing tour with a guide and loudspeaker system wherein certain members of the public wished to be transported on a per capita basis without con cern for expeditious travel, but with primary concern with becoming informed about and seeing certain points of pleasure and culture. The MTA's predecessors had, and the MTA did, how ever, conduct a charter service and desired to continue it in competition with other systems. In continuing those charters, the MTA agreed to refrain from engaging in any rate-cutting practices. The MTA maintained that it had not 102 Times, April 22, 1959, 1-25; Minutes, April 21, 1959. 103 Minutes, May 26, 1959. 271 engaged in such practices in the past and did not intend to do so in the future. As the MTA's costs were greater be cause of the tremendous expense in servicing its bond issues, it charges could not be less than the charges of the private operators as those latter charges were set by the City Department of Public Utilities and Transportation. Were the charter business terminated, the MTA would suffer serious financial hardships, since it would deprive the Authority of an important source of income which then came from utilizing buses that would otherwise have remained idle during off-peak hours. As the session moved along, the above bill was amended to apply to sightseeing and eventually passed. The measure was vetoed by the governor, however, and this veto was upheld by the Assembly by a vote of forty-five to seven teen. Wilson attributed this veto not to the efforts of the MTA, but primarily to the governor's fear that changes in any state authority's operations, which could possibly affect its income potential, might also have an adverse effect on the interest rate of bonds which the governor 104 Ibid. 272 planned to issue for his water program.*05 The other major bill which could have affected the MTA involved the enlargment of the Board's size from seven to nine members. The bill provided that the terms of pres ent directors would expire in sixty days after passage of the measure. They would then be replaced by five members appointed by the governor on his own recommendation and four on the recommendation of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. Assemblyman Lester A. McMillan, who introduced the bill, said that he had done so as a result of the dis satisfaction which had been expressed over the operations of the Authority. He denied that the measure was an admin istration bill, but the Los Angeles Times stated that it was understood the have the administration's backing.*0* * When this legislation was introduced, C. M. Gilliss, the executive director who had succeeded Merritt, was quoted as saying on May 19th that, as far as he knew, McMillan neither had contacted the MTA nor had had any discussions 107 or disagreements with anyone on the MTA staff. When *^5Times, June 20, 1959, 1-9. *06Times, April 25, 1959, 1-1. 273 this legislation was approved by the Assembly in June, Gilliss launched another attack on the measure, saying that it was being backed by the labor unions within the MTA organization. He said that these union groups hoped that this bill would pass and that the Democratic governor would replace the existing MTA Board, all of whom had been appointed by the preceding Republican governor, with men more favorably disposed toward labor. Gilliss made a trip to Sacramento immediately, where he lobbied in opposition to the measure. The end result of his trip was the defeat of the McMillan plan. The measure died in the Senate Trans portation Committee. Upon his return, Gilliss reported to the Board that he had found many legislators who were badly informed as to the record and present status of the MTA and that this area of communications should be vastly im proved.108 Following the passage of the Wilson labor relations legislation and the defeat of those measures concerned with MTA charter services, bond issues, and the enlargement of the MTA Board and reappointment of the members thereto, the 108 Times, June 11, 1959, editorial, and June 12, 1959, 4-14. 274 Authority had no occasion for significant contact with the State Legislature until March, 1960. At that time, Assem blyman Wilson introduced a resolution into the Assembly which urged the MTA to submit to arbitration the nine-month labor dispute which it had been having with one of the three unions representing employees within the MTA organization. The chairman of the Assembly Rules Committee refused to act on this resolution, calling on Wilson to write such arbitration procedures into law in the 1961 Legislative 109 Session. Wilson was not to be thwarted in his efforts, how ever. When his resolution became bottled up in the Assem bly Industrial Relations Committee, as well as the Rules Committee, he enacted legislative procedures which allowed him to have the resolution taken from committee and brought tothe Assembly floor where it was passed by a voice vote. In defending his proposal prior to the adoption, Wilson said that arbitration was necessary to prevent a one-sided situation between the MTA and its employees. ^•^Times, March 24, 1960, 1-18. ^•^Times, April 7, 1960, 1-1. 275 Once the resolution had been passed, Gilliss reported that the MTA did not intend to abide by the As sembly's recommendation. He pointed out that the MTA was the only public agency in California where employees had the advantage of collective bargaining through union repre sentatives. He did not plan to recommend giving employees the added advantages provided by enforced arbitration, especially when the union promoting the dispute did not even represent one-fourth of the MTA employees The transit studies are completed About the same time that Gilliss was saying the MTA would not accept the enforced arbitration recommended by the State Assembly, the Authority was receiving a progress report on a second series of rapid transit studies commis sioned earlier that year. The first series of studies had established four major corridors in the Los Angeles area which could be utilized for rapid transit. The second series of studies had recommended the initial construction of forty-three miles of line down the four corridors from central Los Angeles, with an additional 110 miles over 276 eight routes by 1980. The report stated that duo rail rapid transit, as opposed to monorail, would provide • the 112 most economical mode of transit. Commenting upon this second series of studies, Gilliss said that there would now have to be a third series of studies to determine whether or not such a system could be financed from the sale of revenue bonds. To be salable, bonds for such a system required that revenue from the sys tem during the period of the life of the bond issue be greater than 100 per cent of the initial costs of such a system. If this were not feasible, Gilliss added, it would be necessary for some form of taxation to be employed to build the system. On the other hand, if the county or state would agree to guarantee the revenue bonds, such bonds could still be used to finance the construction of 113 the system. In September, 1960, the second series of studies was completed and a final report made. The report provided two alternatives for constructing a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles metropolis. Both alternatives employed the 1^2Timea, April 6, 1960, 1-1. 113Times, April 11, 1960, 1-4. 277 duo rail transit facility, the Metro, and followed essen tially the same geographical path, but they differed in the length of line to be constructed as subway. The first alternative provided for 2.3 miles of subway and 21.6 miles at grade level, while the second alternative used 12.3 miles of subway and 4.6 miles at grade level. The second alternative also called for 5.7 miles more of overhead than the other proposal. The MTA sent these studies to the cities and counties in its jurisdiction to allow their engineering staffs to go over them and make recommendations thereon.114 The initial MTA legislative program In August the MTA announced that it would present, at the September hearings of the Assembly Interim Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations, a proposed legisla tive program for 1961. These hearings were being held to carry out Assemblyman Wilson's resolution calling for a review of MTA operations and its progress in providing a rapid transit system. The program which the MTA presented provided for the following: 1. The MTA would be permitted to cross existing i i j Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA 278 public utility lines on its rapid transit routes, provided the utility was compensated for necessary alterations. 2. The MTA would be able to use public streets and highways for its rapid transit routes, without the local municipality having veto power. 3. The MTA could extend its system into areas served by other transit systems. This was presently prohibited unless the MTA bought the competitive system at a price based on a formu la which Gilliss claimed would require paying exorbitant amounts. 4. The price of purchasing a competitive system would be based on an impartially established fair market value. 5. The MTA would be given the power to take over condemned property immediately, rather than waiting until the end of lengthy litigation to determine the price. Two other possible legislative measures had been Newsletter, September-October, 1960. 1 1 e c Times, August 24, 1960, 1-2. 279 discussed at that time but no decision had been reached. The first involved the financing of the transit system. The second pertained to having the Legislature convert MTA employees to civil service status. The Board agreed that the former matter would not be acted upon until later that year, after an economic feasibility study of the proposed system had been made to determine whether that system could be financed from revenue bonds. The proposal for enabling legislation to place MTA employees under civil service status would not be acted upon until the State Supreme Court had ruled on an appeal by one of the MTA unions regarding its right to strike against that public agency. Opposition to the MTA proposals In introducing the proposed 1961 MTA legislative program, Gilliss expressed the belief that there would be strong opposition to it from some municipalities and private bus companies. But he could never have predicted the momentous size to which that opposition soon grew. The Los Angeles City Council immediately called for a thorough study by the City of the MTA proposals. The Council president Ibid. 280 charged the MTA with seeking an absolute transit dictator ship, while Councilman Ransom M. Callicott described the agency as a monster created by the state Legislature. Councilman L. E. Timberlake was quoted as saying that the proposals raised grave questions of local autonomy and municipal home rule and the basic philosophy of the respon sibility of public officers of the electorate. Under the Council1s direction the City's technical coordinating com mittee on streets and highways, made up of leading munici pal officials including members of the Council's Industry and Transportation Committee, officials of the major City departments, and under the chairmanship of the Chief Admin istrative Officer, Samuel Leask, Jr., was directed to make 117 a report on the Authority's proposals. In response to various Councilmen's charges that the MTA was seeking legislation which would empower it to grab gasoline taxes, levy assessments against private property, and burden the area served with general obligation bonds, the chairman of the MTA wrote a letter of denial to the president of the Council. Upon receipt of this letter, 117 Times, September 15, 1960, 3-2, and September 20, 1960, 1-22. 281 Councilman Timberlake countered by accusing the MTA of making misleading statements in regard to its future plans. Reading from what he said was an MTA report issued earlier that year, he noted that MTA officials were then planning a study focusing upon the possibilities of issuing general obligation bonds and seeking state, county, or city finan cial aid or subsidies. Timberlake said that the City had nothing in the way of a rapid transit system, though the people's money was continuing to subsidize the operation. He believed that if the MTA should succeed in gaining the broader powers it sought from the Legislature, the City would have no right to protest any MTA action whatso ever.118 Once the Assembly hearings had begun in September, the MTA program was immediately attacked. The hearings began with committee member Charles Chapel reading a letter from the Inglewood City Council. The Council admitted that a rapid transit system was needed, but it denied the belief that the broad powers sought by the MTA were either neces sary or proper. Such powers, the letter said, would make 118 Times, September, 1960, 3-3, and September 23, 1960, 3-2. 282 the MTA a near dictator being able to seize even public property for its own uses. The proposals were especially repugnant because the MTA could make the property seizures without the consent of the city councils and without the 119 payment of any fees. Particularly full-throated opposition to the transit proposals came from the South Bay communities of the Los Angeles area— Santa Monica, Culver City, El Segundo, Man hattan and Redondo Beaches, Gardena, Torrance, and others. The city attorney of Santa Monica, speaking in behalf of Gardena and Culver City as well, questioned the good faith of the MTA in seeking broader powers. The Director of Transportation of the Santa Monica municipal bus lines con tended that one of the aims of the MTA was to put small bus operations such as Santa Monica's out of business. Private bus operators complained that because the MTA was not under the supervision of the Public Utilities Commission, it offered unfair competition in areas outside Los Angeles County, such as Riverside and Costa Mesa. Private charter and sightseeing bus operators also charged that the MTA 119 Times, September 29, 1960, 3-2. 283 was presenting damaging competition to that field. In support of its position, the MTA stated that the authority it sought was not revolutionary because similar authority had been given to telephone companies many years before. The MTA said that it sought only powers similar to those of the State Division of Highways when it adopted freeway routes through various communities and other areas. Gilliss, who was a former director of the State Department of Public Works, reminded the committee that the Division of Highways was not bound by the veto of its plans by any local city councils. True, the Division worked with the local officials and held public hearings about its plans, but the MTA, Gilliss said, would be happy to do the same. One important difference between the Division and the Authority, however, was that the former had a continuing source of funds from gas taxes. The MTA, on the other hand, had no such source. Therefore, when it put up more than $500,000,000 to build a transit system, it could not afford, because of the inflationary rise in building costs, to have construction delayed. Once the money from the bond issues was gone, there would have to be a system by which 284 revenues could meet bond indentures immediately. Thus, the MTA could not wait for ten years, as the Division sometimes was forced to do, to begin the construction of a rapid transit system, just because one community could not be satisfied. 12^ The MTA defended its specific proposals in numerous ways. The Authority stated that, if the proposed seventy- five mile, $529,200,000 initial mass rapid transit system were to be built, it would have to have the authority to remove and change facilities of any public or private utilities in its path. The abutments supporting the over head rails of the system had to be 100 feet apart in order to take advantage of the great financial savings of pre fabrication. Consequently, there would undoubtedly be interference with existing utility and sewer lines. These lines would have to be changed, but the MTA would pay for 122 the costs of the changes. As for the relations of the MTA to other bus com panies , the Authority said that under present regulations the MTA could not expand unless it paid the private or municipally operated transit company a price equal to the 121Ibid. 122Ibid. 285 seller's total annual gross Income and purchased the com pany's equipment at a price equal to its initial value. The MTA requested that this be changed to allow it the right to negotiate for the purchase of other transit system equipment at market value.123 The MTA also lamented the fact that under existing conditions, any other transit system could file an injunc tion against the MTA if it even thought that the MTA might be competing with it and whether there actually was any competition or not. The Authority denied that the proposed changes would allow the purchase of only the profitable lines of the private and municipally owned transit systems, thereby leaving the sellers only with the money-losing lines. The MTA asserted that if it were ever to buy other 124 lines, it would be all or nothing. Originally, the MTA had asked for the right to purchase the lines of private or publicly owned bus lines that were in competition with the MTA. Other transit com panies said that this policy would allow the MTA to buy the lucrative lines and leave them with the poorer ones. Calling this an inadvertency in drafting the proposed U L . , 124 Ibid. Ibid. 286 legislation, Gilliss and MTA attorney Gerald Kelly conceded that such a proposal would be unfair and unreasonable. Thus, the MTA had the draft corrected, thereby enabling the Authority either to buy specific competitive lines operated by private or municipally owned companies or purchase the entire company, the choice being left entirely to the com- 125 panies affected. As the hearings ended, the committee members urged the MTA officials and private and public bus companies to get together and work out legislation suitable to all, which could then be presented when the Legislature convened in January. During the month immediately following the Assem bly hearings, several other groups joined in the chorus against the MTA. The City Council of Beverly Hills sent a letter to the Assembly interim committee denouncing the MTA proposals. The City of San Fernando asked the League of California Cities to oppose the MTA. This request became an actuality on October 26th. At the concluding session of the League's Sixty-second Annual Conference, a resolution was passed which took the MTA to task for trying to ^■^Times, September 30, 1960, 3-1. 287 "override the regulating authority normally vested in municipalities." A spokesman for the League said that the proposals would give the MTA more power than the Highway Commission in the establishment of freeway routes. He said that the League was also critical of the power the MTA would have under the proposals in establishing bus stops throughout the area. These actions by the League were instantly protested by Gilliss, who said that the League had taken these steps without first giving the MTA a chance to be heard. The Los Angeles Times was also taking a hand in the criticism of the MTA. The Times stated that everyone was not in agreement that the $500,000,000 system should be constructed in the first place. In the second place, it was felt that the MTA, as usual, was moving too swiftly. The MTA proposals would have been more palatable if a proviso had been included making them operative only if the rapid transit system were built. The Times suggested that the MTA would be wiser to invest excess funds in the improvement of the existing bus service instead of rapid 126 Times, October 23, 1960, 3-12, and October 27, 1960, 1-28 or 4-7. 288 transit ventures. On the positive side, however, the Times thought that the MTA had done a fairly efficient job in its bus operations and that the proposals directed toward facilitating the bus operations should be given careful consideration. In November the Los Angeles City Council adopted a report issued by its Industry and Transporation Committee and State, County and Federal Affairs Committee. The report criticized the MTA legislative program in the harsh est terms and noted the following undesirable features: 1. The MTA plan for an elevated system and other changes in the MTA Act would damage property values and cause potential loss of revenue for the city, county, and schools. 2. The program would delegate governmental powers to investment bankers and bond buyers. 3. The plan did not provide local checks and bal ances by which the people could express their desires. This position was also held by the Times which contended that the MTA did not need the powers which it was 127 Times, October 1, 1960, editorial. 289 requesting. Further, it said that the MTA had not explained how the system would be financed, or from where the custom- 128 ers would come to pay the mortgage on the system. Upon hearing of this Council action, Gilliss ex pressed surprise. He said that the real question was whether the City or the Authority could build a rapid trans it system. If the Authority built the system it would not mean that the cities would have to be turned over to the Authority. The Authority would, however, have to have power to acquire the necessary rights of way and to build 129 the system in the streets where it proved most essential. As far as Gilliss was concerned, most of the opposition to the MTA proposal was based on different interpretations of the proposal language, misunderstandings of intent, and inadvertent omissions in the proposal. On December 6th, just ten days before the Senate Transportation and Public Utilities Fact Finding Committee was to hold hearings to delve into the operating procedures followed by the MTA since its creation in 1957, the MTA 12 8 Times, November 1, 1960, 3-3, and November 3, 1960, editorial. Times, November 1, 1960, 3-3. 290 received the Coverdale economic feasibility report on the proposed seventy-five mile rapid transit line. The report showed that if the system became operative in 1965 as planned, the total revenue would not be enough to pay interest and principal on a revenue bond of the magnitude required to construct the system. Once this was known, the MTA undertook a rush study to develop recommendations on cheaper financing which could be presented to the Senate Fact Finding Committee. Among the cost reduction possibil ities the MTA planned to investigate was the obvious one of shortening the system itself. Gilliss said that the MTA would then present a report on these studies to the Senate committee but would not propose a financing plan. The MTA would leave it to the Legislature to recommend a solu- tion.130 Prior to the December Senate hearings. Senator Collier had said that he felt changes in the 1957 Act were needed in several areas. He said that he believed the employees' right to strike, which had shortly before been upheld by the State Supreme Court, was necessary but that compulsory arbitration should be considered as a possible 130 Times, December 8, 1960, 1-24 or 1-2. 291 solution to the problems connected with this right. He also thought that the time had come to evaluate the MTA* s performance, look at its finances, and see if it needed ad 131 valorem taxing power. With this setting, it came as no surprise when, after the testimony of MTA Executive Director Gilliss, Chairman Albert J. Eyraud, and General Manager E. R. Gerlach, both Collier and Richards agreed that subsidiza tion of the MTA was a probable situation. Richards stated, though, that there would have to be certain conditions connected with any total subsidy. One of these would be that the MTA relinquish the power to set fares. Gilliss agreed that should a total subsidy become necessary, this was a reasonable request. However, he pointed out that a total subsidy would not be required since 50 per cent of the cost of the $500,000,000 system was expected to be 132 financed from the potential revenues of the system. As the hearing continued, Gilliss moved on to other matters of concern to the MTA. He said that if the MTA was to build a rapid transit system, the 1957 Act would have to 131 Times, November 18, 1960, 1-6. 1 32 Times, December 8, 1960, 1-24 or 1-2. 292 be rewritten. Under the existing act, any city, county, or public agency could keep the Authority at a standstill by prohibiting the use of its property. In addition, the MTA believed that having its employees represented by three different unions was incomprehensible and that this problem should be corrected to provide for only one employee bar- 133 gaining agent. The revised MTA legislative program for 1961 By the beginning of the 1961 State Legislative Session, three other city councils had endorsed the Los Angeles Division of the League of California Cities' oppo sition to the MTA legislative program. In an effort to retard such increased opposition, the MTA had, after the September Assembly interim committee hearings, undertaken a series of discussions with the opponents of its proposals. These discussions and negotiations in some instances pro duced mutually agreeable amendments, removing certain objectionable features of the MTA proposal. In other instances, modifications at least partially satisfied the opposition. In still other cases, the only positive result Times, December 17, 1960, 1-10. 293 was a clarification of the parties' differences* Neverthe less, the consultations and discussions in conjunction with the findings of the Coverdale and Colpitts economic feasi bility study, which showed that the seventy-five mile sys tem could not be financed through revenue bonds, allowed 134 the MTA to develop a modified legislative program. This modified program, formally adopted on January 10th, excluded the call for the overriding powers previ ously requested by the MTA. Such powers, the Authority said, had been predicated on the belief that the seventy- five mile system could be financed through revenue bonds and that those powers were required for the successful issuance of such bonds. Since these conditions no longer existed and a new financing plan would have to be developed, these powers were no longer viewed as necessary. The new modified program called for five basic changes to the 1957 Act: 134 Jack R. Gilstrap, "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority and the State Legislative Process: A Case Study" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 1963), p. 51. This study provided a detailed account of MTA activities during the period from fall, 1960, to the end of the 1961 Session of the State Legislature. 135 Times, January 11, 1961, 1-18. The MTA was to be permitted the use of railroad rights of way for transit lines, provided the railroad could continue operations on the same right of way. It was to be permitted to locate rapid transit lines within the four designated corridors, after holding California Highway Commission hearing procedures to the extent applicable. It was to be permitted to construct rapid trans it facilities above or below public streets (except freeways) only after a. Highway Commission type hearings had estab lished the location, and b. Provision had been made for the MTA to pay relocation and other costs resulting from the construction of such facilities. The MTA was to be allowed to reroute, change, or abandon lines as communities grew and changed, so long as substitute service adequate to serve the demand for transit in the same communities was provided. Private bus companies were to be prohibited from establishing new competing lines with the 295 MTA. An additional proposal, not related directly to rapid trans it development itself, called for the establishment of National Labor Relations Board Rules to apply to union jurisdictional elections held within the MTA organiza tion. ^ Once the modified legislative program had been adopted, the MTA employed it to reduce the tensions which were continuing to build up with respect to its initial program presented in September, 1960. Authority personnel contacted the city of San Gabriel, which was then consider ing a resolution condemning the MTA legislative proposals, and told the city council that a revised program had been developed. The new program provided for route consultations with cities through which the rapid transit system would be constructed. Furthermore, the new legislation set forth the four major corridors in which the rapid transit system would lie, thus allowing the cities that would be affected to have an advance idea of where the precise routes were likely to be placed. With these overtures, the San Gabriel City Council postponed adoption of the resolution and later i36 Ibxd. 296 defeated it.1^7 The acceptance of this hearing method of route determination following interaction between the MTA and city jurisdictions is further reflected in statements made by the chief administrative officer of the City of Covina. In reference to the Covina rapid transit corridor, he said that the starting point of the corridor had been approved by the city officials working with MTA personnel. The MTA's chief engineer had labored with the Planning Commis sion and with the transportation and planning committees of the Covina Chamber regarding the route. Although this was a slow method of determining route locations, the chief administrative officer felt that it was certainly the best since it allowed all facts and opinions on the matter to be brought to light. Another note of hope for the building of the rapid transit system was sounded by the chief engineer of the MTA. He noted that the Coverdale and Colpitts economic feasibility study had failed to take into account certain 1 37 Times, January 18, 1961, 4-6. •^8Times, January 29, 1961, San Gabriel Valley Section, 1-8. 297 recently announced plans to develop the downtown area. These plans would most certainly influence transit revenues; and, although a subsidy would still be needed, it might not be as great as originally anticipated. This optimistic note was softened somewhat, however, when the Los Angeles Times pointed out that there would be absolutely no way to anticipate the amount of subsidy that would be needed until the exact route of the rapid transit system was speci fied.139 In February an additional amendment was added to the MTA's 1961 legislative program. With three of the seven Board members absent, the Board voted to include in the program a proposal to bring MTA employees under civil serv ice. The MTA stated that in no way was this intended to affect the employees' right to strike over labor disputes, and denied that employees would be deprived of their pres ent union representation. This would simply reinstate a provision that was in the original 1957 Act but which had been repealed in 1959.14® ^•^Times, January 25, 1961, 3-1, and January 30, 1961, 3-1. l^Times, February 8, 1961, 1-1. 208 The Board believed that this action would accom plish two goals. First, employees would be given the same rights and privileges enjoyed by other state employees under civil service. Second, their status would be clari fied and thus enable the MTA to attract adequate bond financing for future projects.^* The unions, however, did not agree with this inter pretation. Upon hearing of the acceptance of these new proposals, they denounced the action as irresponsible, since it had been taken without their consultation. They stated that their intended support of other MTA legislation was thereby withdrawn, and they would fight that legisla- tion.142 Several days after the MTA Board decided to place the civil service proposal in its legislative program, Assemblyman Wilson proposed legislation which would have put the MTA under Public Utilities Commission control, except for fixing fares and other charges. If this measure were passed, important matters like route expansions and changes could be made only by the MTA with the expressed ^^Times, February 9, 1961, 3-1. 299 consent of the Public Utilities Commission. Wilson said that he would have liked to include fares within the con trol sphere of the Public Utilities Commission, but that he had been advised by Legislative Counsel that this might be unconstitutional. ^43 Wilson also said that the unions were preparing legislation that would put the MTA under Public Utilities Commission control, call for the election of the MTA direc tors by districts, and require the State Attorney General to act as legal counsel to the MTA instead of permitting the MTA to hire its own legal counsel. Wilson added that until the MTA was ready to start the mass rapid transit program, he would fight any move to broaden that agency's 144 powers. March found the MTA exceptionally busy on the state legislative scene. Assemblyman Augustus Hawkins introduced a bill to put the MTA under Public Utilities Commission control in all matters, even those pertaining to fares and other charges. He said that a second opinion from the Legislative Counsel had indicated that this control would 143Times, February 27, 1961, 1-12. 300 not be unconstitutional. Hawkins explained that he was not in a fight with the MTA but that he believed the organ ization should be properly and adequately regulated. He further expressed his support for the Wilson bill in its present form and said he, too, opposed granting the addi- 145 tional powers requested by the MTA. At this same time, Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh introduced a bill which would have prohibited the MTA from signing contracts with management level employees for annual salaries of $10,000 or more. He said that this measure would make the management more responsive to the needs of the MTA. Under the present system the MTA Board might change, but because of the long-term management contracts the new board would have the same top-level management. Such a situation could impede changes in policy. In addi tion, Unruh said he knew of no other quasi-state agency using long-term contracts. He stressed the fact that he was not against any high salaries then being given to the MTA's top level management, but that he was against the 146 long-term contracts. ^ ^ Times, March 2, 1961, 1-1. ^S i m e s , March 10, 1961. 301 Several days after these measures were introduced, the MTA was able to get Assemblyman Wilson, who only a month before had opposed any extension of the MTA's author ity, to sponsor its legislation. Wilson explained this change of position by stating that, after he had introduced his first bill, he had learned that the MTA was already under Public Utilities Commission control in many of the areas he had recommended. Also, he had learned that none of the other publicly owned bus companies in Los Angeles County were subject to commission regulations in some of the areas he proposed. Gilliss contended that these find ings and a closer examination of the MTA legislation had convinced Wilson that the MTA proposals were beneficial and conformed to the intent of the 1957 Act. Wilson and the MTA agreed that the civil service legislation would be handled as a separate measure and would go to the Legisla ture in about ten days. The omnibus MTA bill, on the other hand, would be introduced immediately. As these events were taking place in California, Senator Collier, who was appearing before Congressional 147 Times, March 11, 1961, 3-2, and March 14, 1961, 1-12 302 hearings in Washington, was quoted as saying that the MTA would be the subject of inquiry by the State Interim Com mittee on Transportation that coming summer. These hearings would center upon the development of methods for financing the MTA and the possibility of giving the MTA the right of property condemnation and the right to levy ad valorem taxes. The inquiry would also look, into the possibility of giving the City and County of Los Angeles representation on the authority and a voice on such problems as condemna tion and subsidy. As far as Collier was concerned, the Los Angeles area needed rapid transit by 1970.^8 The Los Angeles City Council opposes the MTA program In April the MTA was heartened in its efforts by the backing of Governor Edmund Brown. This optimism was short-lived, though, as on the twenty-fifth of that month the Los Angeles City Council approved a report developed by City Administrative Officer Samuel Leask, Jr., which totally and unconditionally condemned the MTA proposals. The report urged Los Angeles and other southern cities to fight the MTA proposals. It stated that, should the MTA ^^^Times, March 16, 1961, 1-1. 303 build its $316,600,000 system, those expenditures would represent 40 per cent more than had already been spent to build existing freeways in Los Angeles. Furthermore, the rapid transit cost figures would undoubtedly have to be enlarged to account for inflation. A bond of at least $625,000,000 would have to be issued. If the MTA were allowed to levy property taxes to pay for such a bond, the rate could range between 8.62 and 2 3.3 cents per $100 of assessed valuation. If a sales tax were levied, it would cost as much as one-third of one per cent of all the money earned by taxpayers. If gasoline taxes were used, it would mean about two cents a gallon. The bonded indebtedness of the County was already at $674,700,000, and any further indebtedness could cause serious hardships on the property 14 9 owners and taxpayers. The Council further opposed the MTA proposals on the grounds that the MTA Board was appointed by the gover nor and was not locally controlled. This meant that should the MTA proposals pass, one step would thereby be made toward the construction of a multimillion dollar rapid transit system upon which the people had not voted. This 149 Times, April 1, 1-2 or 1-3; April 25, 1-2; and April 26, 1-20, 1961. 304 would amount to taxation without representation. The Council's Industry and Transportation Committee asserted that the proposed system would serve only 3 per cent of the population, yet every taxpayer would be required to sub sidize it. Councilman Timberlake pointed out that the tax payer would pay a subsidy of thirty-two to seventy cents in addition to the twenty-five cent fare each time he rode the system. On April 27th the Council voted to send the Leask report and its formal objection to the MTA's proposed leg islation to the State Legislature. Enclosed with this material was the Committee's suggestion that the issue be settled by posing three questions on a ballot: 1. Should the MTA be overhauled to be managed by elected officials accountable to the people of the area instead of the governor by the present state-appointed Board? 2. Should such an elected group be permitted to levy taxes on property, income, gasoline, retail sales, or other revenue producing sources? 1S0ibid. 305 3. Should a revamped MTA be given the power to issue bonds which would be paid off through taxation? The Leask report had proposed that the MTA not be allowed to levy a tax to support a general obligation bond without a two-thirds vote of the people.^ 1 The MTA's response to the Leask report came at its May 2nd meeting. The board said that the report, which was well calculated and well timed for its purpose, at best confused the issue, and at worst might delay and perhaps even destroy the plan to provide Los Angeles with a bal anced transportation system. The report, so said the Board, was ostensibly an analysis of the MTA's legislative proposals incorporated in Assembly Bill 2190. However, the report discussed at great length, and placed great emphasis on, the granting of taxing powers to the MTA and the power to issue general obligation bonds. This was completely misleading because Assembly Bill 2190 did not propose the right to tax, nor did it propose that the MTA be given the right to issue general obligation bonds, nor did it even ^^Ibid. ; Times, April 27, 1961, 3-6. 306 152 speak of the question of financing. The Board noted that there had been a technical and legal analysis of the bill attached to the report, but that it had been lost in the protest against an appointed board being given the right to tax. This had naturally occurred since the newspaper headlines and the radio and TV news casts took their lead lines from the heated discussion which had formed a part of the Council smoke screen. Nevertheless, even this technical report would have proved misleading if it had been read. Although the analysis utilized competent figures from the Coverdale and Colpitts and Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall studies, these figures were then developed on nebulous assumptions which provided conclusions for hypothetical situations which formed the basis for the financial discussion in the report.153 The Authority said that its proposal did not request the power to tax at all. The Legislature was merely asked to determine whether or not the MTA could use publicly owned properties and railroad rights of way to Minutes, May 2, 1961. 153Ibid. 307 build the rapid transit system. Only when this was known could any group developing the rapid transit system, be it the City of Los Angeles, a regional authority, or the state, precisely locate and determine the costs of the system. These last steps would have to be taken whether an elective 154 board or an appointive board headed the agency. The Authority had continued the defense of its proposals by saying that there was a good reason why the bill had not asked for taxing powers or the right to issue general obligation bonds. That reason was that no financing plan was presently ready to be offered to the people. Such a plan could be developed only when the Authority knew what lands would be made available to it for use as rights of way. Only then could a plan be developed which would allow the people to compare the costs of the system with the benefits which would be provided. Only then would it be possible to know whether the system would pay its own way or whether a low interest federal loan, or other financial assistance would be needed. At some point, contended the Board, the metropolitan community would have to decide whether or not a mass rapid transit system was going to be 308 built. However, that decision could not be made without the facts. And the facts could not be developed without the tools provided by the MTA bill then before the Legis- lature.155 Drawing upon an address made to the Los Angeles Chamber by James M. Landis, assistant to the President of the United States, the MTA maintained that rail surface transit provided the cheapest and swiftest means of urban transit for metropolitan areas, and that such systems are most expeditiously developed by regional organizations. Thus, the City of Los Angeles could not control the devel opment of a transit system which would ultimately affect hundreds of separate communities. In other areas, said the Board, the Los Angeles City Council had shown outstanding leadership, but this was not true in the field of rapid transit. The Leask report could be seen as nothing more than an argument for city control of the development of a transit plan which in reality affected the entire metropol itan area and not just the City of Los Angeles.156 Although the MTA legislation had not proposed any specific financing plans and the Board had somewhat rightly 155Tw Ibid. Ibid. 309 accused the City Council of setting up straw men which they then proceeded to tear down, there was actually a basis for the Council's discussion of MTA financing proposals. In February, 1961, the MTA Newsletter carried a series of sug gested means which might be used to finance the building of a rapid transit system. These were only suggested and not formally adopted by the MTA Board. However, from a review of these suggestions it becomes clear where the Council initiated the starting point of its attack. Fol lowing are the proposals found in the Newsletter as to possible ways in which to finance the rapid transit system: 1. A guarantee, from an ad valorem base, of the interest charges on revenue bonds. 2. A guarantee for the difference between the revenue and the amount necessary to service bonds sold for the system's construction. 3. State-wide general obligation bonds, such as were issued for school and veteran loans, on the premise that the metropolitan areas are essential to the total well-being of the state. 4. A county tax within the jurisdiction of the Board of Supervisors. 5. A district type tax voted by the people. 310 6. Direct state aid, there being precedent in the Senate bill which provided $115,000,000 of the Bay Bridge tolls toward the construction of a transit tube under the San Francisco Bay on a contingency basis. 7. Federal aid. 8. A one-cent sales tax for the Los Angeles County area, which would permit construction of the system on a pay-as-you-go basis, program- 15 7 ming completion within five or six years. ' Later in May, Assemblymen Augustus Hawkins and John S. Gibson introduced bills to provide that the term mass rapid transit not include transportation of passengers by means of chartered sightseeing or school bus or by any other vehicle except on an individual-passenger fare-paying basis. The bill was introduced at the request of Tanner Gray Lines, Inc., a major sightseeing and charter bus 15fi enterprise in the metropolis. This bill, like a similar one introduced earlier in 157 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, February, 1961. ^58Times, May 14, 1961, D-7. 311 the year, was opposed by the MTA. The Authority had just purchased the Cross Town Suburban Bus Lines, Inc., whose existing contracts obligated the MTA to provide school bus service as part of the acquisition agreement. If this act were passed, it would lead the MTA to litigation and a sub stantial decrease in revenues and eventually necessitate an increase in the rates charged to individual fare-paying 159 passembers. The MTA was also opposing several other legislative proposals at this time. The contents of the opposed bills would have accomplished the following: 1. Limited the Authority's ability to hire people on long-term contracts at salaries over $10,000 a year. 2. Brought the MTA under stricter Public Utilities Commission control. 3. Prohibited the MTA from hiring its own lawyers and required the utilization of the services of the state attorney general. 4. Required the MTA to bargain collectively re specting retroactive pay increases. 159Minutes, April 4, 1961. 312 5. Changed the composition of the Board from seven members appointed by the governor to five mem bers elected by the voters from each of the supervisorial districts of Los Angeles County and increased the compensation of the members from $200 a month to $21,000 a year.'*'®® This last proposal was opposed on the grounds that this would create a Board which would be a political body of men who were not chosen on the basis of their ability and experience. This, the Board said, would reduce the ability of the MTA to solve the transit problem. The money which would be used to raise the salaries of the members would be better employed for the purpose of improving mass rapid transit facilities and operations in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The present system, and this would not be true of the suggested one, assured appointment of mem bers representing the various geographical sections of the Los Angeles metropolitan area and men with various technical and business backgrounds necessary and desirable to the operation of a large transit system.1®1 160 . _ i6i Ibid. Ibid. 313 The Backbone Route: An opportunity for compromise Since the September, 1960, hearings, the MTA had been conducting studies to determine how the costs of the rapid transit system might be reduced. These studies pro duced on May 15, 1961, the proposal for the Backbone Route. This plan would combine two parts of the four major routes suggested in the original $529,000,000 plan and would be 22.7 miles in length. The MTA guaranteed that the system would be self-supporting, assuming a 3 per cent loan were available for initial construction. In addition, the Authority indicated that talks with legislators and admin istration officials in Washington, D. C., had produced 162 favorable reactions to such a low-interest federal loan. This plan alleviated many objections to the MTA bill. The system now would be self-supporting and would require no tax assistance or general obligation bonds. It would serve the most densely populated route from El Monte in the San Bernardino Valley to Century City, near Beverly Hills. It could be constructed so as to serve as a civil defense shelter. Also, the initial construction would not disturb the public streets since the use of subway and 162Times, May 15, 1961, 1-1. 314 freeway rights of way were proposed. This proposal did not, however, reduce the antago nism of the City of Los Angeles, and as a result the MTA bill was defeated by one vote in the Assembly Public Util ities and Corporations Committee. At the same time, the State Senate was passing a bill which could have forced the MTA from the charter and sightseeing business. After these actions were taken, Gilliss said that, on the face of it, it looked as though the state did not want city streets used for mass rapid transit. That being the case, there appeared to be no benefit in asking the federal gov ernment for help in building a rapid transit system not wanted by the State Legislature. For that reason he can celed his appointment with Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges. While the City of Los Angeles opposed the MTA bill, the County Board of Supervisors supported the measure. But while supporting the Backbone Plan, the Supervisors urged the MTA to give realistic consideration to serving other 16-*Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, February, 1962. 164Times, May 18, 1961, 1-1 315 areas as well. In an effort to reach an accord on the mass transit matter, the Supervisors went so far as to appoint Supervisor Ernest Debs to intercede between the City and the MTA. Assemblyman Charles Wilson was also urged to withdraw his bill from the Public Utilities and Corporations Committee and bring it directly to the floor of the Assem bly for debate, discussion, determination, and vote by that House On May 23rd Assemblyman Wilson successfully amended the Hawkins legislation concerning MTA exclusion from the charter bus business to include most of the MTA's original legislative proposal. Parts of the original program ex cluded from the revised legislation were the sections per taining to the combined use of railroad rights of way by the MTA and the section dealing with the prohibition of private bus lines from competing against the MTA. The next day the MTA Board also rescinded its opposition to the charter amendment. As will shortly be seen, the above actions aroused bitter feelings among certain members of the County Board 165 Ibid., and Times, May 19, 1961, 1-27. ^66Times, May 23, 1961, 3-1. 316 of Supervisors. Nevertheless, the changes in the legisla tion and the Backbone Route proposal reduced some of the opposition to the MTA program. The Chairman of Los Angeles Chamber's reactivated Traffic and Transportation Committee was optimistic about the Backbone Route. He still wanted the system to be financed from fares, but he thought that some type of subsidization would unfortunately be neces sary. Councilman Timberlake expressed the belief that the Backbone Route might be used to determine if the rapid transit system would pay for itself and if a rapid transit system were really needed. He still maintained that the city needed such a system, but at the same time felt that the MTA did not need the powers for which it was asking. He suggested that the MTA could accomplish its goals by working with the City instead of asking powers superceding the City. The City merely wanted to be consulted and be a part of the MTA plans. On May 25th the Assembly passed the amended Haw kins measure. The vote was fifty-four to nineteen, with the Los Angeles delegation splitting its votes fourteen for, fifteen against, and two not voting. Some of the dissenting 167, ,, Ibid. 317 votes came from legislators who felt that the MTA had not told them the whole truth in 1957 and was not telling them the truth now. The affirmative votes came from such per sons as Speaker Jesse Unruh, who had called for the passage of the measure and had attacked the City of Los Angeles and those who opposed the MTA bill, saying that it violated home rule. While giving his support, Unruh expressed his belief that some day gasoline tax funds and property taxes would have to be used for rapid transit so as to force 168 people into riding such facilities. Shortly after the passage of the MTA bill by the Assembly, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors with drew its support of that measure. This action was taken after the Board heard complaints about the bill from the mayor of Santa Monica. However, hostility had begun to develop toward the MTA in the preceding month. This hos tility had come about when Assemblyman Wilson succeeded in amending the Hawkins legislation to include the MTA pro posals. Supervisor Debs had been able to arrange a meeting between the MTA and City officials, but he had been forced to cancel it when the MTA included its previously defeated 168 Times, May 25, 1961, 3-1. 318 amendments in the charter bus legislation. Debs had ac cused the MTA officials of sabotaging the peace talks with the City, and he predicted that unless the MTA improved its public relations, the people of the county would never accept any of its transit plans. Now Debs stated that the bill passed by the Assembly should be altered in one or two ways before it would be acceptable to the County. Thus, the Cotinty Board of Supervisors joined the City of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and the League of California Cities, as well as the Santa Monica bus lines in opposition to the 16 Q MTA proposals. Although conflict existed between the MTA and these other groups, discussions and conferences were still being carried on. Even after Debs had accused the MTA of sabo taging the peace talks with the City, MTA Board Chairman Albert Eyraud attempted to insure that room for discussion was available. Eyraud said that he was ready to meet with Debs and City officials at any time. He denied any part in canceling the Debs meeting and said that he was in San Francisco until late in the evening of the proposed meeting ^ ^ Times, May 4, 1961, 3-2, and June 1, 1961, 3-1. 319 and could not possibly have attended. Meetings had been held prior to Debs' remarks with representatives of the League of California Cities. Councilman Timberlake was saying in late May that he was trying to develop some amendments to the MTA bill which could be acceptable to both the MTA and the City. He said that he would like the City Council to put its stamp of approval on the plan, but that in the present form it gave too much power to the MTA I 7 A and was therefore unacceptable to the City. By early June, numerous meetings had been held between the MTA, City, and county officials. These meetings culminated in concurrence in two amendments to the MTA legislation, which were then endorsed by the two City Council committees concerned with the transit proposals. Timberlake said that the amendments would permit the MTA to build its proposed Backbone Route with the City's bless ing. The changes, which were later adopted by the entire Council, provided that, first, the MTA could construct without the consent of the involved public jurisdictions rapid transit facilities in a subway under public streets or highways, provided there was no interference with surface 170 Times, May 24, 1961, 3-1, and May 25, 1961, 3-1. 320 traffic. If the subway facilities were to interfere with the use of thoroughfares involved, the MTA would be required to obtain municipal or county consent. The second change provided a tool for municipalities or the county to cooper ate with the MTA in making engineering surveys and studying transportation problems. It also allowed municipalities or the county to assist in the construction of a transit route if their governing bodies requested the line. Both the City Council and the County Supervisors acknowledged the cooperation of the MTA in drafting the amendments.1^1 In commenting upon these accepted changes, the Los Angeles City attorney said that if the state Senate accepted the amendments, the objections of the League would be removed, though certain cities operating their own munici pal bus lines would probably not be appeased. The County Board of Supervisors once again changed its position and fully supported the MTA measure. The Supervisors also denied Santa Monica’s request to oppose that part of the bill which prohibited public transit companies from compet ing with the MTA. MTA Board Chairman Eyraud stated that he was gratified that a legislative program agreeable to the Times, June 2, 1961, 3-1. 321 Los Angeles Council had been formulated, and that a new era of relationships with the City Council appeared to be developing. Eyraud also said that another amendment, which would eliminate descriptions of the MTA's proposed rapid transit corridors after route alignments were adopted, would be added to the legislation at the request of the cities of Gardena, Montebello, Culver City, Santa Monica, and Tor- 172 ranee. With the close of the 1961 Legislative Session, the MTA could look back on a session in which sixteen or more proposals had been introduced bearing directly upon its activities. Some of the proposals had been punitive bills intended to discredit or to put roadblocks in the way of MTA programs because the Authority had asked the Legislature to establish civil service for MTA employees. All but one of these measures had been killed or amended so that they were constructive and acceptable to the Authority. The approved bills, including Assembly Bill 264 3 containing the Authority's major proposals, were as follows: Assembly Bill 1738, which placed the MTA under the Public Utilities Commission with respect to safety rules. Assembly Bill 2014, which forced the MTA to give 322 public notices of any MTA hearings at which an increase of fares would be considered. Assembly Bill 2174, which made MTA bonds legal in vestments for savings banks, retirement fluids, and other investment funds. This had been spon sored by the MTA. Assembly Bill 2414, which would permit retroactive pay to be a part of collective bargaining be tween the MTA and the unions. Because of the mechanical difficulty— a conflict between the major MTA bill and this bill— the provisions of this measure were placed in the principal MTA bill, Assembly Bill 2643. There was thought to be a serious constitutional question as to wheth er the MTA could agree to retroactive pay. However, the passage of 2414 served to establish legislative intent, assuming the constitutional question could be answered. Assembly Bill 2643, which contained the MTA's major proposals. These were: 1. The MTA would henceforth be prohibited from operating charter buses and sightseeing buses. All parts of the 1957 Act which would permit the MTA to employ a superintending corpora tion were deleted. Public agencies were authorized to grant easements to the MTA for mass rapid transit purposes. This section covered all public property except streets— and the section left the decision up to the public agency concerned. Other publicly owned bus companies were prohibited from establishing new competitive services with the MTA. The MTA was authorized to make certain changes in the routing of existing service so long as "service adequate to serve the demand for mass rapid transit in the same community as such demand then exists" was maintained. The MTA was also allowed to make some service improvements and consolidations. The County and/or cities were authorized to make transit studies and otherwise cooperate with the MTA. The MTA was authorized to construct a subway 324 system without the consent of the cities through which a route was located, so long as neither the subway nor the construction of it interfered with or diminished the existing surface or subsurface uses of the street or highway. The MTA was prohibited, however, from constructing any mass rapid transit structure on or over the surface of any street, highway, freeway, or other public place without the consent of the pub lic agency having jurisdiction thereover. Prior to constructing any new mass rapid transit structures on any streets or high ways, the MTA was required to hold highway commission type hearings to locate the lines and stations. To the MTA, the significance of the passage of the latter bill lay with the fact that it represented the cooperative conclusion of the many conflicting problems that naturally arose between the MTA, the agency charged Minutes, June 23, 1961, Legislative Report for the 1961 Regular Session. 325 with resolving the regional transportation problems, and the local jurisdictions, the cities and the county, whose elected officials had to be sincerely concerned about the preservation of the home rule principle. The Board said that the language of the bill was worked out among the MTA attorney, the city attorney, and Councilman Timberlake. As it finally developed, the measure preserved local control of the system's construction insofar as it might interfere with the surface streets. This change had allowed the City, the County, and the League to support the MTA measure 174 and thereby forward its legislative success. The MTA stated that this bill would permit the construction of the Backbone Route to begin when, and if, financing could be arranged. It would also produce a sys tem which would be sponsored and supported by the communi ties to be served. The bill itself reflected a firm founda tion of mutual understanding which the discussions of the last several months had established between the County, City, the MTA, and other communities. Its passage had to be attributed primarily to the efforts of its authors, Assemblymen Wilson and Hawkins; Supervisor Debs, who helped reconcile the conflicting views held by the City and the 326 MTA; Senator Richards, who carried the MTA program through the Senate after helping to work out the compromise to eliminate the objections raised by the cities of Los Ange les County and Los Angeles itself; Rex Cunningham of the Assembly Public Utilities and Corporations Committee; and 175 Senator Collier of the Senate Transportation Committee. Part IV: The Origin of the Southern California Rapid Transit District The MTA seeks aid from the federal government: the 1961 Congressional session Following the passage of its 1961 legislative pro gram, the MTA immediately turned to addressing the question of financing the Backbone Route. As was noticed earlier, the MTA had been conducting talks with Congressmen and administration officials in Washington, D. C., for some time. Now these efforts were intensified. MTA Chairman Eyraud announced early in July that the MTA planned to seek special legislation at the federal level to cover not only the cost of the Backbone Route but an additional $40,000,000 to retire the MTA's outstanding revenue bonds. The MTA had 175 Ibid. 327 abandoned plans to build the project with funds that might have become available through existing Congressional bills and was meeting with the California Congressional delega tion to draw up a measure which would be more suitable to 176 the Los Angeles situation. The initial response of the California delegation to the MTA proposal was less than optimistic. The legis lators saw as one of the biggest stumbling blocks the fact that the MTA said it could not afford to pay more than three per cent interest on any loan. If this were the interest that was paid on a federal loan to construct the Backbone Route, the loan would amount to a government sub sidy rather than a loan, since the federal government could not even borrow money for that small an interest rate. On the whole the delegation doubted if federal assistance of the magnitude sought by the MTA could be 177 engineered in the immediate future. One legislator said that the federal government could not undertake such a plan for Los Angeles unless it did so for other cities as well. MTA Chairman Eyraud said 176Times, July 18, 1961, 3-1. ^77Ibid. 328 that there was no reason why other cities should not be included in the program if they could meet the standards for the loan as could Los Angelas. He said that at three per cent interest the MTA could repay the loan in thirty- five years through revenue from the transit system alone. He continued by saying that the $232,000,000 figure was the estimate of two independent firms which pegged the maximum construction cost of a 22.7 mile subway and surface system at $192,000,000. The balance was needed to retire $40,000,000 in revenue bonds now outstanding. Eyraud main tained that the federal government would benefit from the transit subway since provisions could be made for including fallout shelters with but little additional cost. When asked why the MTA did not try to raise the needed funds from local sources, the Authority stated that revenue bonds could not be raised locally and therefore the federal gov ernment had to help.^® Late in July, Representative Gordon L. McDonough of Los Angeles proposed amending the Housing Act of 1961, which had become law the month before, to provide an addi tional $300,000,000 in federal loans to develop mass 329 rapid transit systems. His proposal set the interest rate at 4.75 per cent for forty years. The funds for this program would come from a transfer of $300,000,000 from the $650,000,000 that was provided in the law for financing various community facilities but of which only $50,000,000 was earmarked for mass transit loans. Thus, his proposal would not increase the total funds of the Housing Act but would provide a means for helping to finance modern rapid transit system in large metropolitan areas. When the Senate Banking and Currency Committee eliminated this pro vision from pending legislation the following month, the MTk hinted that it might have to turn to the state or the counly for lielp in financing the proposed Backbone Route. This would come only after renewed efforts had been made to 179 resurrect the loan in Congress. The next month Senator Clair Engle and Representa tive Chet Holifield introduced the Transit Revenue Bond Insurance Bill into Congress. This legislation provided for a total of $500,000,000 for the development of mass rapid transit in qualified metropolitan areas, including Los Angeles. Under this bill loans of fifty-year duration 1 7Q Times, July 26, 1961, 1-2, and August 4, 1961. 330 with interest rates equal to that paid by the federal government would be administered by the Housing and Home Finance Agency and would go to state, county, or local transit authorities.^-88 Engle said that the measure contained several sec tions which would make the MTA eligible for the loans. On applying for funds, the agency would have to show that it had been unable to secure money from other sources and that the system proposed was an entirely new project. In addi tion, the agency would be required to make any underground facilities available for civil defense purposes. The MTA 181 could meet all of these requirements. w By the end of August, 1961, several dissident voices were being raised in question of the MTA rail rapid transit proposals. Robert McClure, a member of the Cali fornia Highway Commission, said that the use of gasoline taxes to subsidize the development of the MTA rapid transit system would pose a threat to the entire freeway system in the Los Angeles area. He said that several freeway comple tions were scheduled for 1964 and 1965 and that this would ^80Times, August 10, 1961, 3-1. 331 bring a noticeable improvement in traffic conditions. However, he contended that he was not opposed to the rapid transit experiment if it could be financed through some source other than gasoline taxes. On the other hand, he felt that the Los Angeles residents preferred to use their automobiles and would do so if the freeways continued to be adequate.^82 Edward Telford, District Engineer for the State Division of Highways, opposed a rail rapid transit system, saying that the area already had a public transportation system that was much more flexible than a system limited to rails. He, like McClure, said that he was not opposed to 18 any transit system, provided that it could pay for itself. Siding with these opposing forces was the general manager of the Los Angeles Traffic Department. In a study made by that office, a comparison was made between home to office travel speeds on two freeways and those estimated speed figures for the MTA's proposed rail system outlined in 1960 and revised in 1961. From the San Fernando Valley 182Times, July 26, 1961, 1-2. 18 3 Times, August 13, 1961, Opinion Section Article by Ray Herbert, Times Urban Plan Editor. 332 to downtown Los Angeles an automobile then averaged thirty- three miles per hour while rail rapid transit would average thirty-five miles per hour. On the Long Beach line the rail rapid transit would average thirty-eight miles per hour. Presently, an automobile averaged thirty-seven miles per hour on the Long Beach Freeway and forty-two miles per hour on the Harbor Freeway. Besides these rather small differences in average speeds between rail rapid transit and automobiles, the general manager said that he had talked to only a few people who said they would ride the 184 rapid transit system if it were established. A final source of opposition to the MTA plans was heard in December. This voice came not from within the jurisdictional areas of the MTA but from a county outside that jurisdiction. Herbert Coffey, a member of the trans portation committee of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Orange County, called upon county officials not to join the proposed MTA plan to sell general revenue bonds to finance the interurban transit system. He said that the MTA was controlled with Los Angeles interests in mind and that the subway system was not the best way to solve the 184 Ibid. 333 rapid transit problem. He maintained that what was needed was a perimeter system of transportation in which people would drive to a given urban perimeter and from there take a transit system that would operate fully within that perimeter. He proposed that a research committee composed of representatives of the four county region, plus appoint ees by the governor and the State Division of Highways, be 185 created to study this problem. To gain more visibility and possible support for its federal legislation, the MTA held a civic luncheon at which the Engle bill was discussed. The Authority asserted that the new plan would require neither a direct loan nor a grant-in-aid. Rather, private financing, through the medium of low-interest bonds with the government insuring the payment of principal and interest would become possible. Governor Brown spoke in favor of this measure and suggested that enabling legislation be included as a part of the rapid transit measure. This would allow the revenue bonds to be sold at interest rates not to exceed 3.625 per cent per annum and repayable over a period of up to fifty years. 185 Times, December 3, 1961, Orange County Section, 6-4. 334 log making private financing of the system possible. Senator Engle welcomed this proposal and said that it provided an effective way to strike at both the smog and the rapid transit problems. Under this legislation, a federal administrator would evaluate applications for in surance of revenue bonds. If a default occurred, the ad ministrator would authorize payment of the amount necessary to cure such a default rather than assume payment for the entire debt.^®^ As 1961 came to a close, the MTA undertook prepara tions for the 1962 Congressional hearings of the Engle bill, which had been pigeon-holed in the 1961 session. The MTA Board approved an outlay of $925,000 for engineering and financial studies on the Backbone Route. The data from these studies were to be used as supporting evidence before Congressional committees as to the need and advanced status of the MTA rapid transit plans. If the legislation were then passed, these studies would become the first step toward marketing the bonds and financing the system, the ^®®Times, October 24, 1961, 3-1 187ibid, 188 first stage in construction. 335 The 1962 Congressional Session: activity but no successful results Prior to April, 1962, the MTA carried on numerous discussions of its proposal with Congressmen and adminis tration officials— Robert C. Weaver, head of the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency; and Luther Hodges, Secre tary of Commerce. The effects of these discussions, the MTA believed, were manifest in President Kennedy's April Transportation Message to Congress. In this message the president called for a $500,000,000 three-year program of federal grants to help local authorities finance the pur chase of rights of way and rolling stock and other mass rapid transit facilities. The federal money would pay two- thirds of the total cost and local funds the remainder. He also said that there might be highly specialized situations in which alternative programs, for example, loan guarantees under stringent conditions, would be better suited to par ticular needs and the Congress might, therefore, wish to consider such alternatives. Administrative officials ^®®Minutes, December 19, 1961; Times, December 20, 1961, 3-1. 336 acknowledged that the better part of the message had been tailored expressly to fit the Los Angeles situation. These officials said that the administration was not united in support of the idea and that the language would never have appeared in the message if President Kennedy had not been influenced by the intensive backstage maneuvering of Sena tor Engle. This lack of administration consensus was cited as one reason the bond guarantee provision had not been incor porated in the draft legislation on transportation that the administration sent to the Hill. The introduction of the measure, however, was already assured by Senator Engle. Nevertheless, most observers were quoted as foreseeing only trouble for the measure in the economy-minded House if, and ] QA when, xt were able to pass through the Senate. ^ As the Senate subcommittee handling of the Transit Bond Guarantee Bill began its deliberations, the fact that administration officials were no longer backing the measure became immediately apparent. Robert C. Weaver appeared as a witness and proceeded to suggest that it was a question- ^89Times, April 6, 1962, 1-1 or 1-18. 337 able practice for the federal government to back bonds for the construction of facilities for which no local contribu tion to capital costs or debt service had been made. Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillion further amplified this doubt by saying that the plan would create a new category of highly marketable long-term debt issues, substantially more attractive to investors than Treasury bonds them selves. The bond guarantees would gain this favorable status since they would be exempt from federal taxes and yet guaranteed by the federal government. Thus, difficul ties might be created for the orderly management of the national debt.^* The later testimonies of Governor Brown and Cali fornia Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, in favor of the Bond Guar antee bill, did not seem to dispel completely the doubts of the subcommittee members, which had been planted by the administration officials. Nonetheless, the Senate subcom mittee recommended legislation providing for $300,000,000 in loans but required such stringent requirements for obtaining them that only the Los Angeles MTA could comply. ^•^Times, April 25, 1-1; May 2, 1-28; and May 12, 1-8, 1962. 338 It was thought that this loan provision had come about only after a special White House conferencer for now Weaver, while still opposing the bond guarantee measure, backed the loan proposal. The other loans for transit financing which the subcommittee provided could not be obtained by the MTA. They required matching funds from the transit agency from sources other than fare revenues, and the MTA did not have 1 9 2 other revenue sources. In the House, the MTA proposed measures were re ceiving the same negative reception. Both the bond guar antee proposal and the federal loan proposal providing for the lending of $300,000,000 at 3.625 per cent interest for transit construction and system building, were discussed before the House Subcommittee on the Banking and Currency Committee. After hearing testimony from administrative officials and California representatives, the subcommittee defeated both of these measures. When an effort was made to revive the measures in the full House Banking Committee, i q 3 both proposals again met defeat. ^■^Times, May 28, 1962, 2-1, and June 14, 1962, 1-5 or 1-30. ^■^Times, June 20, 1962, 1-1, and June 27, 1962, 2-1. 339 By the time the Senate Banking and Currency Commit tee began deliberations on the proposed $300,000,000 rapid transit loan program, the House counterpart committee had already defeated the measure. Thus, few individuals were surprised when, in August, the Senate Banking Committee eliminated the Los Angeles earmarked loan from the adminis tration's transit bill. At the same time the committee rejected this proposal, it authorized the expenditure of $450,000,000 in grants and $50,000,000 million in loans. However, due to the financial restrictions placed upon the MTA and its operations, the Authority could not qualify for 194 these funds. As the 1962 Congressional Session drew to a close, the administration's transit bill, even with the exclusion of the MTA proposals, was still bogged down in committee. However, the author of the measure, Senator Harrison A. Williams (Democrat from New Jersey) was already making plans for submitting similar legislation at the 1963 Ses sion. In preparing for the introduction of that legisla tion, he promised Senator Engle that the bond guarantee proposal would receive further consideration at that time. ^94Times, August 6, 1962, 2-1. 340 Senator Williams felt that the bond guarantee proposal had not been given careful consideration because of the short age of time in that session. He felt that the measure might receive a more favorable reception the second time, but added that it would be premature to judge the merits 195 of the proposal the MTA would initiate in the coming year. Thus, by the end of 1962, the federal government had re fused to provide the MTA with the necessary funds for financing its Backbone Route. Nevertheless, there was still hope that such financing would be forthcoming from that source during the next year. The MTA turns to the state legislature; The 1963 Legislative Session In August, 1962, when hopes were looking bleak for the passage of any federal legislation beneficial to the MTA, Authority Board Chairman Eyraud said that the State Legislature might have to provide financing for the Los Angeles rapid transit system either (1) by giving the MTA taxing power, (2) by guaranteeing its bonds as the MTA had asked Congress to do, or (3) by providing matching funds that would make it eligible for grants provided under the ^^Times, October 16, 1962, 1-25. 341 pending administration transit legislation. Shortly after Eyraud made the above statement, Assemblyman Wilson said that his subcommittee on revenue resources, an arm of his Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation, would conduct a hearing in Los Angeles addressing the problem of financing a rapid transit system. He said that events in Washington, D. C., pointed up the need to develop sound financial planning for rapid transit at the local and state levels. Upon hearing of the plans to hold these hearings, Eyraud said that he felt that the Legisla ture generally concurred with the MTA belief that any requests for changes in the MTA Act should come from the MTA itself. Thus, he said, the MTA and not the Legislature had the responsibility to find new revenue sources.1**7 When these hearings were held, no new proposals for financing the system were made. The reason later given by the MTA for failing to make such proposals was that at that time there was reason to believe that the bond guar antee proposal was likely to gain Congressional acceptance 196 Times, August 6, 1962, 2-1. 197 Times, August 24, 1962, 1-22. 342 in 1963.198 On January 7, 1963, Eyraud announced that the MTA expected to ask the 1963 State Legislature for the power to set a property tax to support the construction of a rapid transit system. He said that it was felt that this was the only way to pay for the transit system. The tax funds would supplement fare revenues and together they could re tire the proposed $649,000,000 revenue bond issue that would be needed to finance the cross country project's capital cost. If this measure were passed, Eyraud predicted that the system could be in operation by 1966.^" MTA Executive Director Gilliss said that the Authority anticipated that fare revenues would pay for all maintenance and operation of the rapid transit system and two-thirds of its capital cost. The tax the Authority was seeking would allow the MTA to levy an amount not to exceed fifteen cents per $100 of assessed valuation. Gilliss maintained that this was the best proposal made by the MTA to date. He said that the plan was not carelessly or quickly conceived but was the result of four or five years ^®Times, January 16, 1963, 2-1. Times, January 8, 1963, 2-1. 343 of careful and thoughtful planning. He concluded by saying that the MTA would present its proposal to the Los Angeles County legislative delegation on January 9th.2®0 This proposal met with instant and almost complete opposition from every segment of the metropolitan community. The Los Angeles City Council voted unanimous approval of Councilman Timberlake’s committee recommendation to oppose the plan. Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty accused the MTA of buying a worthless system and said that, although a sub sidy would be required to develop a transit system, it should not consist of property taxes. San Gabriel Valley community leaders, the Gardena City Council, the Norwalk City Council, and numerous other cities joined in voicing 201 their opposition to the measure. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors came out vehemently against any property tax to support a rapid transit system. Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli maintained that the people would not ride the system even if it were built. He proposed the construction of double-deck free- 200Times, January 13, 196 3, A-l. 2Plu m e s , January 10, 1963, 2-1 or 2-8, and January 11, 1963, 1-2. 344 ways as the solution to the transit problem. He further asserted that the MTA had not yet exhausted all possible methods of private financing. Supervisor Burton W. Chase suggested that a sales tax might be more appropriate than a property tax for financing the transit system. Supervisor Kenneth Hahn advocated the use of monies from gasoline taxes to build a transit system. All the supervisors joined with Supervisor Warren Dorn in reminding Governor Brown, who had come out in favor of the MTA proposal, that the 1957 Act creating the Authority had specifically indicated that if the MTA should ever be required to seek financing through property taxes, approval could come only through a majority vote of the people. Joining this dissent at the county level was the Orange County Board of Supervisors, who passed a resolution opposing any plan by the MTA to levy a property tax to finance a rapid transit system. This reso lution was forwarded to the Orange County state legisla tors.202 The reception which the MTA proposal met at the state legislative level mirrored its reception at the local 202 Times, January 11, 1-2; January 16, 2-1; Janu ary 17, 1-2 or 2-2; and January 18, 1-12, 1963. 345 level. The Speaker of the Assembly, Jesse Unruh, voiced the fear that, even if the transit system were built, there was no guarantee that people would ride it. Some legisla tors accused the MTA of having failed in its responsibili ties to develop rapid transit for the Los Angeles area. Now, they said, it was trying to transfer to the state the burden of developing a solution to the problem. The chair man of the Los Angeles County legislative delegation stated that the MTA would have a most difficult time finding a sponsor for its legislation. The truth of this statement was supported by the opposition which county legislators in general had toward the proposal. Finally, the Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation reported that during its 1962 interim hearings, the MTA had not indicated an intention to seek the legislative changes which were now being proposed. In fact, the Authority had said that the existing legislation was quite satisfactory. However, the present proposals seemed to negate this position. Therefore, the committee recommended that the Legislature carry out a study to determine if the MTA should be replaced by a similar agency to be under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Board of S u p e r v i s o r s .2 0 ^ 203 Times. January 19, 1963, 1-1, and January 23, 346 MTA officials first attributed the cool reception their plan received to the fact that its details had had to be worked out quickly in order to be submitted for consid eration in the 1963 Legislative Session. The Authority said that this program had been developed only after Sena tor Engle informed the MTA that Congress was unlikely to give the bond guarantee proposal favorable consideration. This had occurred after the Assembly interim committee hearings in 1962, and explained why the MTA had not recom mended any legislative changes to the committee at that 204 txme. As more opposition to the MTA program developed— the Republican Assembly of Los Angeles County opposed the measure because the MTA Board was not composed of elected officials and thus should not have taxing power— Gilliss conceded that the MTA had been guilty of an untimely public relations blunder. He contended that the property tax proposal had been merely a suggestion. He defended the suggestion by arguing that there was not enough time to put the tax proposition up to a popular vote because of the 1963, San Fernando Valley Section, 2-9. on a Times, January 16, 1963, 2-1. 347 five per cent inflationary increase in construction costs and the fact that such a ballot probably could not take 205 place for three years. As has already been noted, Governor Brown had given his support to the MTA's proposal. This support had been included in his Joint Legislative Inaugural Address. When opposition began to arise with respect to this taxing measure, Brown called for a meeting of the Los Angeles County, City, and MTA officials. He said that it was important that this or some financing measure be passed, since the construction of a rapid transit system would greatly reduce the smog problem. To this end he advocated the development of a consensus bill, but if no such bill was forthcoming he said he would continue to support the MTA plan.206 As the month of January wore on. Governor Brown came more and more into conflict with the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. He said that when he was appointing members to the MTA Board he had offered to let 20^Times, January 25, 1963, 1-23, and January 24, 1963, 1-29. 206Times, January 29, 1963, 2-1. 348 the Supervisors name two members to that body. Supervisor Dorn said that Brown had never made such an offer. Fur thermore, he accused Brown of skirting the issue with his talk of smog reduction. Dorn stated that the real issue was the flagrant violation of the home rule principle, wherein the MTA proposal would allow a nonelected board to levy a fifteen-cent property tax on the people of the county without a vote.^®^ After the Assembly interim committee had made its recommendation for a Legislative study of the MTA, Governor Brown was asked to comment upon the possible reconstitution of the MTA Board. In stating his position on this matter, Brown said that he would support the replacement of the MTA with a similar agency to be under Los Angeles City and County control if the local officials would ever agree on what they wanted. However, he feared that these officials were against things rather than for them. He felt that with respect to the issue of rapid transit, the Los Angeles 208 officials had definitely showed a lack of leadership. Following numerous verbal exchanges, a meeting of 208Tjmes t January 30, 1963, 2-1. 349 MTA, Los Angeles City and County officials, and Governor Brown was planned for February 11th. This meeting ended with a joint statement in support of the present makeup of the MTA as being adequate. The MTA readily accepted this vote of approval and stated that it realized that in the future it would be necessary to have the support of the County Supervisors and other Los Angeles officials if any legislative measure was to be passed by the Legislature. Another product of this meeting was the creation of a special committee to seek methods of financing a rapid transit system. This committee was composed of representa tives of the interests attending the February 11th meeting and was headed by Dr. Norman Topping, Mayor Yorty's repre sentative.^^^ Shortly after the February 11th meeting, State Senator Thomas Rees of Los Angeles County announced that he was drafting legislation to be introduced later which would permit the expansion of the MTA boundaries to cities, coun ties, and parts of counties surrounding Los Angeles County if residents in those areas approved. Provision would also 2®^Times, February 12, 196 3, 2-1, and February 15, 1963, 1-20. 350 be made for the withdrawal of areas that might wish to secede from the MTA jurisdiction. The most vital part of his bill, however, would provide for new methods of select ing the MTA Board patterned after that used by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District in which elected city and county officials comprised the membership. Pro vision would also be made in his bill guaranteeing equal representation on the Board and equal sharing in the finan cial burden by all areas within the MTA jurisdiction. Rees emphasized that the drafting of the legislation was in the preliminary stages.210 April brought three major events in the continuing transit controversy. The first event was the Assembly's approval of a measure introduced by Assemblyman Thomas Carrell calling for an interim committee study of financing and establishing a jurisdictional authority which would implement and coordinate a rapid transit system for the Los 211 Angeles area. The second event was the report of the Topping Committee, which recommended a one-half cent sales tax to finance the rapid transit system. The committee 210Times, February 13, 1963, 2-1. 211 Times, April 5, 1963, 1-7. 351 further recommended that a Citizens Rapid Transit Action Committee be formed to review this proposal. The MTA, City Council, and County Supervisors appointed this committee, chaired by Ferdinand Mendenhall, which later reported that the financing proposal would be unacceptable to the commu- 212 nity. The third event was the introduction of the Rees transit district bill. The Rees measure contained the seeds of destruction for the MTA. This bill called for stripping the MTA of total responsibility in the rapid transit field and leaving it solely a bus operating agency. Rees said that this action was necessary because the present laws governing the MTA hindered it from moving toward the orderly development of rapid transit. Thus, the responsibility for developing rapid transit would be delegated to a newly-created rapid transit district which would have taxing and bonding powers. Financing for any system developed by the district would be done with the approval of 60 per cent of the voters, either through a tax rate election or a general obligation bond election. The Board of the district would be composed of 2^2Times, April 24, 1963, 2-2; Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority, MTA Newsletter, September, 1963. 352 at least one council member from each of the county's seventy-four cities and a member of the County Board of Supervisors. Each member would cast one vote for each $10,000,000 of assessed valuation he represented. In no case, however, would a city or the county be entitled to a majority of the district's votes. Because of Los Angeles County's geographical pattern, certain areas of the county would be exempt from participation— Antelope Valley and 213 Santa Catalina Island. x The Rees proposal was introduced into the Senate on April 9th. By June 5th the measure had successfully negotiated the hurdles of the Senate and was sent to the Assembly where it was to have a difficult time. These difficulties were almost instantaneously manifest, while various interests opposed the bill because of labor and property condemnation clauses, the MTA's opposition was based on the belief that it was incongruous to have another state agency created to do the same job. The MTA attempted to get Rees to withdraw his bill. When he refused, they importuned Governor Brown to kill the measure. At the same time, the Authority asked Brown to give consideration during 213Times, April 9, 1963, 2-1. 353 the following year to strengthening a section of the 1957 Act which pertained to financing a rapid transit system. During the same period that the Rees bill was gen erating such a controversy in the Assembly, an administra tion sponsored tax measure directed toward providing funds for the construction of rapid transit systems was being approved by both the Assembly and the Senate. This bill, introduced by Senator Randolph Collier and signed into law in July, 1963, gave to the boards of supervisors of the state's fifty-eight counties the right to impose an addi tional one-half of one per cent fee on motor vehicles to be used solely for rapid transit development. The measure was so written that the in lieu fee could be levied only by the county boards of supervisors and no referendum by residents in the counties could be held to determine whether or not the fee should be levied. From the moment the in lieu tax measure was intro duced into the Legislature, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors opposed it. Supervisor Dorn accused the state 214 Times, June 7, 2-1; June 16, A-12; June 19, 2-1; and June 21, 1-1 or 1-13, 1963. 354 officials of a breach of faith with Los Angeles officials and community leaders in attempts to develop a rapid trans it system. He said that he had understood that there would be no further action, such as the reported compromise be tween the governor, Assembly Speaker Unruh, and certain senators leading to the in lieu bill, taken on transit financing plans until the Citizens Rapid Transit Action Committee had had an opportunity to review the one-half cent sales tax proposal. The full Board of Supervisors stood with Dorn in demanding that any legislative bills requiring public financing for rapid transit should provide for voter approval. Dorn maintained that the MTA had not been constituted with the thought of public financing in mind, and therefore the Authority should not be financed 216 by that means. When the Assembly Municipal and County Government Committee cleared the Rees Bill on June 17th, the MTA came forward opposing the measure on the grounds that it would only duplicate past rapid transit efforts. The Authority pointed to the Collier in lieu tax measure mentioned above, 2^6Times, May 18, 1963, 1-18, and May 29, 1963, 3-7. 355 and said that if funds from that source were forthcoming, the MTA could fulfill its rapid transit development respon sibilities. Rees, on the other hand, maintained that the MTA could not use funds from that source because of legal technicalities. Prelude to the 1964 State Legislative Budget Session As the 1963 Session drew to a close, the Rees bill was taken into consideration by the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. The chairman of this committee moved to take the bill under submission. Following the vote, the chair man said that the motion had carried. This in effect tabled the bill and killed it for that session. Rees said that he did not have time to revive the measure because of the pressure of matters pending in the closing hours of the Senate. Thus, the MTA successfully defeated the proposal which it claimed would have set back rapid transit planning 218 at least five years. Once the in lieu tax proposal had been passed in July, 1963, the MTA began sounding out a number of invest- 21^Times, June 17, 1963, 2-1. 218Times, June 21, 1963, 1-1 or 1-13. 356 ment bankers as to the effect of that measure on financing a transit system. The consensus of its findings indicated that the $15,000,000 that would accrue annually from the vehicle tax would permit the marketing of more than $390,000,000 in revenue bonds. This could have allowed the MTA to build the Backbone Route. However, all these plans were contingent upon securing the consent of the Los Ange les County Board of Supervisors to levy the in lieu fee, and this, the Authority knew, would be difficult. Nonethe less, in an effort to win this consent, the Authority began in July to arrange a meeting with the Supervisors to dis- 219 cuss this prospect. At this time, the reputation of the MTA with the County Board of Supervisors was probably at its lowest. In June Supervisor Dorn had said that he believed the confi dence of the Los Angeles County tax paying public had been so shaken by the MTA’s schemes that any proposal involving public financing of that organization's activities would 220 first have to be submitted to a vote of the people. By late July, this opinion had not seemed to change. As for 21^Times, June 30, 1963, C-5. 357 levying the in lieu tax, Dorn said that the Collier-Unruh bill was a farce and served only to confuse an already unbelievably confused impasse. Supervisor Hahn said that he would not vote to impose the fee increase without first knowing what the MTA planned to do with the money. The MTA had never really shown that it was exerting all its efforts to establish a rapid transit system. Supervisors Debs and Bonelli both saw no need to give the MTA the money from such a tax. Both of them favored further explorations to find ways to finance the system from fare revenues. Even with this pessimism, the door for compromise and change was left open. Supervisor Dorn continued to say that he be lieved that the confused impasse could be solved if City, county, and MTA officials would only get together and work out a sound and acceptable program. Should that be done, the legislation based on such a program could then be con sidered by the Legislature at the budget session early in 1964 and then referred to the voters at the June, 1964, primary election. In July, 1963, MTA Executive Director Gilliss announced that beginning in August the MTA would hold route ^^Times, July 28, 1963, B-l. 358 conferences in the corridor areas for which rapid transit was planned. This would be done to allow the cities and other involved jurisdictions to voice their opinions on the proposed routes for their corridor. These conferences allowed the MTA to draw several conclusions. In the San Gabriel Valley conference, community leaders strongly opposed the use of the major traffic artery, Valley Boulevard, for rapid transit construction. Instead, the cities in this area favored a rapid transit right of way down the San Bernardino Freeway. At this time the Valley Boulevard route was being proposed by two private monorail firms then attempting to persuade the MTA to build 222 their transit systems. At the second conference held within the Wilshire Boulevard corridor, the spokesmen for interests in that area clearly indicated that any type of overhead structure would be completely unacceptable. Upon the completion of this conference, Gilliss stated that the reactions of resi dents within this corridor and subsequent actions by the State Legislature in 1961 demonstrated that even though the 222 Times, August 1, 196 3, San Gabriel Valley Sec tion, 1-7. 359 cost would be greater, the Wilshire rapid transit line would 223 have to be a subway. At the conference bringing together the interested parties along the Hollywood rapid transit route, numerous persons opposed the proposed transit route, believing that it would bisect their community. They called for a rerout ing of the line so as to traverse the community in an east- west direction, thereby serving as much of the Hollywood 224 area as possible. The San Fernando Valley conference did not bring forth any conflict over an elevated system for that area. Concern was expressed, however, over the fact that none of the proposed routes extended to the northern and western sectors of the Valley. Los Angeles City Councilman Louis R. Nowell of the Valley area appeared at this conference and said that although he did not believe a monorail or other transit system extending into the valley would be self-sustaining, such a system should be built, even though subsidization was needed. 223 Times, August 8, 1963, 2-1. 224 Times, August 14, 1963, 2-1. 225 Times, August 20, 1963, 2-1. 360 A fifth conference was held with cities in the Long Beach corridor in September, 1963. The favorable response and enthusiasm with which the transit proposal was met prompted Gilliss to say that a revision would be made of line priorities and the Long Beach line would be constructed sooner than previously planned. Officials of the nine com munities in this corridor had approved unanimously the early construction of either of the two alternative routes pro- 2 2 6 posed by the MTA for that area. As these route conferences were beginning, Gilliss made a statement which reflected a change in attitude on the part of the MTA toward having the County Board of Super visors levy the in lieu tax. He stated that MTA believed that the supervisors should not levy the in lieu tax until communities in the Los Angeles area had agreed on transit routes and the type of system that should be built. Most important, he said, was that the supervisors become con vinced that the people of the metropolitan community actu- 2 2 7 ally wanted a transit system. This attitude was further reflected on August 30th ^ ^ Times, September 5, 1963, 2-1. ^^Times, August 2, 1963, 2-1. 361 when Gilliss gave three conditions which he felt should exist before the supervisors levied the in lieu tax. These were: 1. The supervisors must be convinced that the route locations have been accepted by the com munities . 2. They must be confinced that the best possible system has been selected. 3. They must be convinced that none of the private proposals then being offered were in fact self- supporting. Gilliss said that the MTA had already determined what sys tems were available and where they should be built to serve the communities involved best. Now, he said, the Authority was in the process of holding community conferences to establish precise routes. In September Senator Rees announced that he would ask the governor to include a special item for the consid eration of his rapid transit district proposal when the Legislature convened for the 1964 Budget Session. Rees said that he planned to resubmit his bill, which had been ^^^Times, August 30, 1963, 2-8. 362 delayed in the Assembly at the closing of the 1963 Session. Rees maintained that certain remarks made by the MTA relat ing to the need for taxing power and the need to reconsti tute the MTA Board to make it more responsive to local con trol actually brought that group into the position of sup porting the proposal which it had opposed in the previous legislative session. The Rees bill called for the creation of a transit district having the power to issue general obligation bonds, which would be backed by a property tax. Property taxes would only be used as a back up to the bonds, however, and in lieu tax funds in combination with fare revenue would provide financing for the rapid transit 229 system. As Senator Rees was announcing his plans, MTA Board Chairman Eyraud was inviting the League of California Cities to join with MTA, City, and county officials in drafting a consensus bill which would be submitted to the Legislature at the coming session. Such a meeting was held on September 30th, but in addition to these groups. Sena tor Rees and representatives of the Los Angeles Chamber of 229 Times, September 12, 1963, 2-1. 363 Commerce and the Southern California Automobile Club were also present. According to Senator Rees, two accomplishments came from the meeting. First, the participants agreed that any board charged with developing a rapid transit system should be more responsive to the people of the Los Angeles area than was the existing MTA. Secondly, a consensus was reached that the financial base of any rapid transit organ ization should be substantially strengthened, but only by a vote of the people. The exact manner in which these two 231 goals should be achieved, however, was not decided. In the month following the above meeting, Assembly man Thomas Carrell's Committee on Transportation and Com merce held hearings in Los Angeles to sift conflicting claims between the MTA and the private monorail firms over whether or not a transit system could be built with private funds. The committee was also to be concerned with an exam ination of the most suitable routes and rapid transit facil ities that would best serve the Los Angeles area. These hearings had been suggested by the Los Angeles County Board 230 Ibid.; Times, October 1, 1963, 2-3. 231Times, October 1, 1963, 2-3. 364 of Supervisors, but Assemblyman Carrell had said they were 2 32 planned prior to the Supervisors' request. Of primary importance at the October hearings was the presentation of the MTA rapid transit financing plan. The Authority stated that the area's transit needs could best be met by a duo rail Metro system. This system would cost approximately $40,000,000 less than the monorail sys tem proposed by the Alweg firm. The financing of the Metro system could be accomplished by a combination of fare reve nues and the automobile in lieu tax with the deficit, should one appear, being covered by property taxes. MTA Board Chairman Eyraud said that the Authority favored the con struction of the initial sixty-four mile, $669,000,000 subway, surface, and elevated system rather than just the construction of the Backbone Route. Such a system would include the Los Angeles-Long Beach branch which had not originally been anticipated in the initial construction 233 program. 232 Times, September 30, 1963, 2-1, and September 18, 1963, 2-1. ^ ^ Times, October 29, 1963, 2-1, and October 30, 1963, 2-1; California, Assembly, Interim Committee on Transportation and Commerce, Transcript of Proceedings of Hearings on Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit, Vol. I, October 28, 1963, Los Angeles, California. 365 Appearing at the same hearings was Los Angeles Supervisor Bonelli. Bonelli defended the proposals of the private monorail firms, which the MTA had rejected, and charged that the MTA had a negative attitude, believing that only the Backbone Route requiring tax subsidy was feasible. He said that anything short of a complete recon stitution of the MTA would not give Los Angeles the rapid transit system it needed. He said that he would ask the County Board of Supervisors to approve a motion that the MTA Board be reconstituted. On the basis of these hearings and the preliminary work already undertaken by Rees, Assemblyman Carrell and Senator Rees assumed the responsibility for developing the rapid transit legislation that would be presented to the 1964 Legislature. Governor Brown had agreed to put rapid transit on special call at the budget session, if officials in Los Angeles County could agree on the type of legisla tion they wanted. Assemblyman Carrell had been told by Assembly Speaker Unruh that he would support the rapid transit legislation developed from Los Angeles metrocon- 235 sensus. 235 Times, December 1, 1963, C-l. 366 As Rees and Carrell came together to develop con sensus legislation, two concrete alternatives lay before them. One was the Rees proposal, essentially unchanged from the 1963 measure except for Rees's consent to accept a seven to nine member transit district board rather than a seventy-seven member board. The alternative was the MTA proposal. While agreeing that the structure of the MTA Board should be reconstituted, the Authority was anxious to avoid a reorganization which could prove detrimental to the cause of mass rapid transit and the accomplishments made to that time by the MTA. The MTA believed that the 1957 Act should be amended in four major ways: 1. The seven member Board should be locally ap pointed. 2. The Authority should be given the power to issue general obligation bonds with voter approval. 3. The Authority should be given broader powers of condemnation. 4. A change should be made in the Collier-Unruh In-Lieu Tax Law to allow the MTA rather than the Los Angeles County Supervisors to levy 367 the tax.2**® Rees said, with respect to these two proposals, that general agreement existed that the organization con cerned with rapid transit should be reconstituted, prefer ably as a district. Its members should be appointed locally, and it should have the power of eminent domain. He did not believe, however, that this could be accomplished by amending the MTA Act. What was needed was a completely new concept. The MTA had served its purpose, and now a new organization should be created to develop a rapid transit system. He maintained that if the metropolitan community could agree on one given proposal, there would be no diffi- 237 culty in getting it through the Legislature. Both Assemblyman Carrell and Speaker Unruh thought that the Rees measure had significant merit. Unruh said that, by and large, the proposal was one which most every one could support. Carrell also thought that the district approach was the answer to the problem, but he favored a compromise between the Rees and the MTA proposals. As the new year approached, both Rees and Carrell were optimistic 236 Times, December 29, 196 3, G-l. Times, December 1, 1963, C-l. 368 about the developing legislation, saying that the matter should be ironed out by January 15th.^ 8 The 1964 Legislative Session: The Demise of the MTA During the closing days of 1963, Rees, Carrell, and Unruh called upon the Topping Committee to reconvene and aid them in producing a consensus rapid transit bill. This committee was composed of Dr. Norman Topping; County Chief Administrative Officer L. S. Hollinger; County Counsel Harold W. Kenney; City Attorney Roger Arnebergh; MTA coun sel Gerald Kelly, and Executive Director Gilliss; Mayor Harry Faull of Pomona, representing cities other than Los Angeles; and Don Sheets of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the primary MTA union. The committee members agreed to reconvene only after the three legislators assured them that the committee's recommendations would be care fully weighed and probably followed. To begin its work, the committee asked Rees to draft a new transit bill, pre sumably simply a rewriting of his 1963 measure, and submit that bill to the committee by January 15th. This would be studied and reworked and the final recommendations then 238Ibid. 369 sent to the Los Angeles County Supervisors, the Mayor, the City Council of Los Angeles, and various civic groups 2 39 before going to Sacramento. By January 28th the committee had not received the new draft of the Rees bill. As a result, Topping notified the Los Angeles County legislators that it was probably too late for local agreement to be reached on the proposal during the 19 64 Legislative Session. Rees angrily insisted that there was plenty of time to review the bill before it was introduced to the Legislature. At the same time, apparently prompted by the Committee's warning, he released a memorandum outlining the provisions for a locally con trolled rapid transit district.2^0 On February 5th a summit conference on rapid transit was held at the expressed call of Supervisor Dorn. Invited to this conference were Governor Brown, Mayor Yorty, the other Supervisors, MTA officials, Los Angeles County state legislators, and representatives of civic and labor groups interested in the transit problem. At this meeting, an 239Times, January 12, 1964, B-3, and January 19, 1964, F-3. 2^Times, January 29, 1964, 2-1. 370 agreement was reached among those present that by amend ing the MTA Act, the Authority could be given the necessary powers and financial tools with which to break the transit stalemate. Dorn said that this seemed to be the unanimous feeling of all attending the conference.24^ Senator Rees and Assemblyman Carrell, who had been in Sacramento and had not attended the summit conference, were both surprised and disappointed at the outcome of the conference. Both said, however, that they had no personal animosity toward the MTA. Carrell went so far as to say that he did not believe the MTA should be completely reno vated. Carrell said that he would reconvene his committee in Los Angeles for a hearing sometime in February. If local feelings had fully crystallized by that time in favor of extending the powers of the MTA, he indicated that he would sponsor legislation to that effect.242 The proposal supported by the MTA at this time still provided for the previously named four amendments. The proposal relating to the local appointment of MTA Board 241 Times, February 5, 1964, 2-3, and February 6, 1964, 2-1. 242 Times, February 6, 1964, 2-1. 371 members, however, had been made more specific. The seven members would be named in the following manner: five by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, one by the Mayor of Los Angeles with the concurrence of the City Council, and one by the remaining cities in Los Angeles County. Mayor Yorty supported this plan as did Supervisors 243 Dorn, Debs, and Hahn. Senator Rees maintained that most of the ideas advanced at the February summit meeting had been incorpor ated into his proposal which he believed represented a syn thesis of opinion throughout the county and was now being given consideration by public and private groups and indi viduals directly concerned with rapid transit. He said that the only new proposal to come from that conference involved empowering the MTA to levy the in lieu tax. He termed this proposal sound and said that it could easily be incorporated in any legislation on the subject. He echoed Supervisor Dorn's statement that a general consensus on the principal features of the legislation appeared to exist and he hoped that the parties could get together on the specific language of a proposal which could go before 372 the Legislature the first week in March. A few days after the summit conference, Rees announced that he would introduce legislation creating a new rapid transit district. He said that his proposed district bill probably would be changed several times be fore its formal introduction to incorporate the attitudes of city and county officials and civic groups. He said that a lack of public confidence in the MTA necessitated this completely new start. Further, he stated that the summit conference constituted an endorsement of the most important principles of his bill, including local appointment of the governing board and authorization to issue general obliga- m c tion bonds with voter approval. The district concept had the backing of the Los Angeles County Division of the League of California Cities. At a division meeting some 150 officials, representing sixty-five of the county's seventy-four cities, had en dorsed a nine point transit program. This program recom mended that the MTA either be dissolved or reconstituted and that a new nine member board be locally appointed, four 245 Times, February 8, 1964, 1-8. 373 by cities other than Los Angeles, three by the Los Angeles 246 County Supervisors, and two by the City of Los Angeles. As the month of February progressed, both the Board of Supervisors and the City Council passed resolutions supporting a transit program which could be incorporated in either the transit district proposal or the proposal to amend the 1957 Act. Their programs called for the estab lishment of an authority having the power to issue general obligation bonds upon voter approval, the power of eminent domain, authority to levy an increase in the in lieu tax on motor vehicles, and a provision for a locally appointed governing board. Neither recommended a specific number of members or how they should be named. The City Council stated that the principle of local autonomy was basic and a regional authority should be answerable directly or indi rectly to the electorate. In addition, the Council felt that a 60 per cent majority of voters should be required O A *7 for the issuance of general obligation bonds. As the battle between the Rees and the MTA proposals 246Ibid. 247Times, February 12, 1964, 2-1, and February 14, 1964, 2-1. 374 became more bitter, Rees accused the MTA of not having the public's confidence. He asserted that the Authority had bought a worthless operation in 1957 and that it had done nothing more since that time. He said that as a result only a new agency created from the district concept could 7AO ever get a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles area. In response to these statements, Assembly Speaker Unruh said that some of Rees's charges were unfounded and inflammatory. He believed that a change in the image of the MTA might be beneficial but not necessarily a change in the Board members. This, he said, could be done simply by rewriting the 1957 Act to give the MTA new operating pow ers. Mayor Yorty, the City Council, and the Downtown Business Men's Association also favored the amendment route. MTA Director Pollard came forth with the accusa tion that Rees and the League of California Cities merely had an axe to grind with the MTA. Pollard said that if Rees would admit that the MTA had a good image and that the League wanted their version passed so they could have four members on the Board, rather than one as the MTA would 248Times, February 14, 1964, 2-1. 375 24 9 like, there would be no reason for the Rees legislation. ^ In an effort to bolster its image, the MTA under took a short but concentrated publicity campaign toward the end of February. This campaign consisted of a full page ad in the Los Angeles Times which told "The MTA's $40,000,000 Success Story," radio commercials on 600 radio radio spots, and 90,000 brochures which told the same story and which went out to commuters who rode the MTA's 1,539 buses. The cost of the newspaper and radio campaign alone was more than $20,000 and the final cost of the 2 50 entire campaign was estimated to reach possibly $30,000. In essence the "Success Story" brought out four primary facts about the MTA. First, the MTA had not cost the taxpayer any money, and, in fact, management had been so good that its bonds had actually appreciated in value. Furthermore, the MTA contributed substantially to the economy of the area and was far from a community freeloader. Secondly, the MTA had been created with the public in mind. The system moved 700,000 people a day and its services provided convenience, monetary savings, reduction from smog, 24Q Times, February 18, 1964, 2-1, and February 19, 1964, 2-1. ^^Times, March 1, 1964, C-l. 376 etc. Third, the MTA had already completed one-half of the rapid transit system. Finally, the backgrounds of the pres ent Board members illustrated that they were sound business men and outstanding civic leaders. The story concluded by outlining the amendments to the MTA Act which these men believed were necessary to allow the MTA to accomplish its job.251 The criticism of this campaign was immediate and severe. Senator Rees called the campaign a propaganda move to save a dying organization and voiced criticism of spend ing MTA funds on such a maneuver. Assemblyman Carrell joined Rees in this condemnation. Supervisor Bonelli, who had constantly opposed the MTA for the past year, said that nothing the MTA could possibly do would restore the public's confidence in it. He said that this campaign proved that the MTA itself realized that it had a bad i m a g e . 2 5 2 In answer to these criticisms, the MTA Board said that the campaign had been aimed at Rees and other people who had made misstatements of fact concerning the Authority. 251 Times, February 19, 1964, full page advertise ment. 252 Times February 29, 1964, 3-2, and March 4, 1964, 2-1. 377 Eyraud said that the Board had decided to launch the cam paign because there was a woeful lack of knowledge on the public's part about that organization. Director Pollard said that Rees's and others' criticism was incongruous with previous actions which had denounced the MTA for having a poor public image. He said that when the MTA attempted to improve that image, these individuals found something else to complain about. Director N. R. Dumont denied that the campaign was intended to influence either the legislation suggested by the MTA or that proposed by certain legisla tors.253 In the midst of this flurry, Senator Rees intro duced into the Senate his transit district bill. The measure provided that the directors would be chosen by elected officials of local governments in Los Angeles County, although the exact representation on the Board had not yet been worked out. The first responsibility of the Board would be to review the MTA's planning of the last six years. The second duty would be to prepare a general obligation bond issue for submission to the voters of the district to see if they wished to assume the bonded 253 Times, March 4, 1964, 2-1. 378 indebtedness required to finance construction of the rapid transit system. Assemblyman Carrell co-authored the meas ure but planned to offer amendments when the bill reached the Assembly. These amendments, it was assumed, would involve such differences of opinion with Rees's plan as having the new transit district absorb the MTA's bus opera tions immediately instead of at a later date. Rees felt that the bus operation and the rapid transit operation should be kept separate until the rapid transit program was developed and approved. The financing of the rapid transit district would come from funds provided by the in lieu tax ^ C i which Rees anticipated the Supervisors would levy. By March 2 3rd the bill was being examined by the Senate Transportation Committee. Two changes had been made in the proposal by that time. One provided for the immedi ate absorption of the entire MTA bus operation by the new transit district rather than allowing this to take place in two stages. This would supposedly provide the new district with excess funds from bus revenues which could then be utilized for the rapid transit effort. In this way the ^S^Times, March 1, 1964, C-l, and March 3, 1964, 1-20. 379 in lieu tax would not have to be levied for the preliminary rapid transit development work. The second change saw the 2 55 size of the district board enlarged from nine to eleven. By April 1st the bill had been approved by the Transportation Committee. In committee several amendments were added to the bill. The first provided that the dis trict would have to obtain an agreement with the city or county concerned to close streets permanently for transit routes. The second provided that if relocation or altera tion of streets or public utilities were required, such changes would be done at district expense with reimburse ment for the involved parties. A third stipulated that the MTA could not sign any major long-term contracts which might put the new district in jeopardy if it were created. A last prohibited the new district from operating charter or sightseeing buses and allowed five directors to be named by the Los Angeles County Supervisors, two by the Mayor of Los Angeles with the concurrence of the City Council, and four by the cities in Los Angeles County other than the City of Los Angeles. ^55Times, March 23, 1964, 2-1 ^^Times, April 1, 1964, 2-1. 380 As the bill passed successfully through the various Senate committees, the MTA added its praise to the measure along with numerous other metropolitan groups. MTA Chair man Eyraud said that the measure should certainly be passed because it provided an organization with the authority to issue general obligation bonds subject to a popular elec tion and the right of eminent domain. The one fault which he saw in the bill was that no means were provided by which 257 the district could be independently financed. In the Assembly Transportation Committee, an at tempt was made to provide a means of independent financing for the new district. An amendment was proposed which would have allowed the district to use property taxes for the repayment of a $750,000 loan used to launch the new district. These funds would be used to develop a master transit plan for Los Angeles County. Although the Committee approved unanimously the Rees bill, on a split vote it failed to pass the amendment allowing the District to levy 258 the property tax. Following the prohibition of the new transit 258Times, April 15, 1964, 2-1. 381 district to use the property tax for short-term financing of transit studies, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Los Angeles Times came out in support of such financing. MTA Executive Director Gilliss appeared before the League of California Cities and explained to that group that there was not enough excess money from bus revenues to finance the engineering studies and costs of a bond election needed 2 59 to provide long-term financing for a transit system. With this prompting, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee passed the Rees proposal with no opposition and restored the property tax short-term financing proposal. Even after this proposal had been passed, Carrell was able, through procedural maneuvering, to have the action nulli fied. Eventually the Ways and Means Committee deleted the measure from the bill which it approved and sent to the Assembly floor. When the measure came to the floor, a Los Angeles legislator tried but failed in an attempt to amend the bill to require a 66.66 per cent rather than a 60 per cent 259Times, April 19, 1964, editorial. 2t*°Times, April 21, 1-2; April 22, 1-4; and April 23, 1-13, 1964. 382 affirmative vote to approve a general obligation bond. This higher figure was being promoted as in the public interest by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Automobile Club of Southern California. After this amend ment was defeated, the Assembly voted sixty-seven to three in favor of the Rees bill and sent it back to the Senate for approval of Assembly amendments. On May 5th the Senate concurred in these amendments and sent the bill to Governor 261 Brown for his signature. Another measure was also pending in the Legislature which was directly related to the Los Angeles transit dilem ma. Assemblyman Tom Bane of North Hollywood had introduced a bill which would have allowed the County Board of Super visors to contract with a transit district or authority to distribute all or part of local vehicle in lieu taxes to pay off the principal and interest of revenue bonds re quired to build a transit network. With the amendment that a majority vote of the electorate would be needed before such a contract could be confirmed, the Assembly passed this bill.262 261Times, April 29, 1964, 1-1. 262 Times, April 22, 1964, 1-4, and May 8, 1964, Cl-15. 383 Some assemblymen thought that this measure conflict ed with the Rees bill. Assembly Speaker Unruh, on the other hand, said that he was not convinced that the voters would approve a general obligation bond to support the rapid transit project, and he believed that the Bane financing proposal would be a good alternative method of financing the proposed new transit system. As the bill entered the Senate, Bane stated that he would amend his measure to provide that the contract would have to be adopted as an ordinance by a four-fifths vote of the Board thus making it subject to a later referendum by petition. As events later proved, this amendment did not cause the measure to be passed by the Senate. The bill proceeded to the Senate 263 Transportation Committee, where it died. As the governor was signing the Rees bill into law, Gilliss of the MTA was predicting a double existence for the new district organization. He thought that the new agency would probably be divided into two divisions— one to oversee the bus lines and the other to be devoted strictly to rapid transit. He also predicted a break in the metro politan area's search for rapid transit with the passage of 263Times, May 8, 1964, Cl-15. 384 this new bill. However, he said that the new district lacked the one vital element which had to be provided before a system could be built. This element was funds to educate the public. Without this education, the passage of a 264 $1,000,000,000 bond proposal would not be likely. Aftermath The transit district's initial 1965 legislative program On November 6, 1964, the formal changeover took place when the Southern California Rapid Transit District Board of Directors approved a technical merger which ended the existence of the MTA after thirteen years as a transit planning and operating authority. The District proceeded to follow the Gilliss prediction and divided its operations into a bus division and a rapid transit division. The MTA's Executive Director, Gilliss, treasurer-auditor, and secre tary were all reappointed to their positions. The new District Board was chaired by Harry Faull, the Mayor of Pomona. Other Board members included Gordon R. Hahn, brother of a Los Angeles County Supervisor, Kenneth Hahn; 264Times, May 14, 1964, 2-1. 385 Martin Pollard, a former member of the MTA Board; Dr. Norman Topping; Don C. McMillian; Howard P. Allen; Kermit M. Bill; Mark Boyer; Dr. Robert F. Brandon; Leonard Horwin; 265 and Douglas A. Newcomb. The last few months in 1964 were devoted by the new Board members to familiarizing themselves with the dis trict's bus operations and the present status of the rapid transit effort. The Board was organized according to com mittees and by mid-January the Board's legislative commit tee, headed by Martin Pollard, had developed a legislative program for the 1965 Legislative Session. The program, as approved by the District Board on January 20th, was predi cated on two fundamental conclusions. First, the job of the Board was to build a comprehensive area-wide rapid transit system which would meet the needs of all sections of the Los Angeles County community as it existed at that time and as it would exist in the future. Second, the construction of a rapid transit system to serve the area of 266 greatest need should begin as soon as possible. 265 Southern California Rapid Transit District, Annual Report, 1964. 266 Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting, Janu ary 20, 196 5, Southern California Rapid Transit District. 386 In accordance with these conclusions, the Board's program made two basic recommendations. First, funds should be made available to complete the engineering and public information work on the total area-wide system, the master plan. Second, changes should be made in the 1963 Collier-Unruh law to make the in lieu tax available to the 2 6 7 District to begin construction early in 1966. In developing the three specific legislative pro posals included in the 1965 legislative program, The Dis trict's Legislative Committee had held discussions with members of the County Board of Supervisors, the Mayor of Los Angeles, the president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the chairman of the Chamber's Transportation Committee, officials of the League of California Cities, Senator Rees and Assemblyman Carrell, and leaders of the District's labor unions. From these discussions three basic proposals were derived. First, it was recommended that the District be authorized to levy a one-half cent per $100 assessed valuation ad valorem tax on property within the District. This tax would produce approximately $600,000 a year and would finance detailed engineering and public 387 information work with the communities required by the District Act prior to the building of an area-wide master rapid transit system. The tax was not to be permanent but would be levied only until other funds either from the in 268 lieu tax or from bond proceeds became available. The second proposal recommended that the Collier- Unruh Act of 1963, authorizing a one-half of one per cent in lieu tax for rapid transit development, be amended as follows: 1. To permit these funds to be used to back up bonds issued to build a rapid transit system by continuing the tax as long as the transit bonds were outstanding. 2. To provide that the District Board, as well as the Board of Supervisors, be allowed to levy the in lieu tax. 3. To change the boundaries of the District to be co-terminus with the County of Los Angeles in order to alleviate the mechanical problem in collection of such a tax. Funds received from the areas of the County not then included in 388 the District would be returned to their local governments for use in developing local transit 269 in those areas. The third recommendation of major importance did not pertain directly to rapid transit development but involved the District's prohibition from operating bus charters. In the 1965 legislative program, the State Legis lature was requested to restore to the District its right to engage in the charter bus business. At that time the District was the only public transportation agency in the county excluded from this field. Therefore, District offi cials reasoned, because of this, and since there was a growing need for availability of additional charter serv ices, the request should be granted. Furthermore, the District maintained that both public and private transit 270 operators supported the initiation of this request. ' In justification of these proposals, District Director Pollard said that the property tax funds would be earmarked for detailed engineering and public information work on the twenty-three mile Backbone Route and other features of the proposed sixty-four mile transit system. 269Ibid. 389 The in-lieu tax, which would bring in about $15,000,000 annually, would be combined with fare revenue and would support a $300,000,000 revenue bond issue to build the system's first line, the Backbone Route. Director Topping said that with construction costs increasing 5 per cent each year, each year's delay added another $30,000,000 to the total cost of the rapid transit system. Director Horwin, mayor of Beverly Hills, argued that the in lieu tax was an equitable way to make the major 272 cause of rapid transit— the automobile— pay for it. Further justification for the Southern California Rapid Transit District plans was to be found in the Dis trict's Memo. Edward T. Telford, Study Director of the Los Angeles Regional Transportation Study, Metropolitan District Engineer for the Division of Highways, and princi pal builder of freeways in Southern California, was quoted as saying that the Study pointed to certain critical areas where there could be expected to be a greater demand for transportation than the presently planned freeway system could handle. The Memo stated that the transit problem 271 Times, January 21, 1965, 1-1. 390 would undoubtedly get worse as the population of the metro politan area grew. For example, the population was ex pected to climb from the present six and one-half million to eight and one-half million by 1975. By 19 85 the popula tion would exceed the ten million mark. At present there were three and two-tenths million registered automobiles traveling the county’s streets, while by 1985 the number 27 3 was expected to exceed five million. By establishing a rapid transit system along the eight vital arteries developed through past transit stud ies, the Memo stated, numerous benefits would be provided to the metropolitan community. Traffic and transit circula tion would be improved by eliminating traffic congestion. Streets and highways would be made safer for everyone. By making all areas of the metropolis more accessible, business in all areas of the county would be improved. The above changes would promote the growth of already established communities, and the county’s ever-growing number of citi zens could live and work where they wanted with the promise that they could travel anywhere within the county swiftly, 273 Southern California Rapid Transit District, SCRTD Memo, January 20, 1965. 391 economically, and safely. The Memo continued by stating that studies had shown that cities which had adopted a similar rapid transit system had experienced increased levels of business activ ity in areas immediately adjacent to the system's corri dors. Such activity, it maintained results in more jobs and produces property taxes which, in turn, expand the tax resources to the benefit of all community residents. By shrinking the size of the county through saving travel time to all points within it, the county's residents, enhance the capacity of the community to provide living space and employment opportunity for the ever-growing popu lation. This, also, leads to even greater tax resources for the benefit of homeowners. Finally, fewer cars on the freeways and highways mean fewer accident risks, less loss of life, and resultant insurance premium savings of from $13 to $62 annually per commuter. Add to this amount the savings incurred in gasoline, maintenance, and parking, simply by leaving the car at home and riding effortlessly and comfortably via rapid transit, and there existed suffi cient reason to provide the metropolitan area with a transit system such as that proposed by the District. 392 Opposition develops to the District's program Reaction to the District's proposals of January were mixed. Mayor Yorty said that he thought the District had done its best to come up with a good plan. Any plan to use a tax, he predicted, would meet opposition. Before he passed final judgment on the proposal, however, he wanted to devote more time to their study. Supervisor Debs com mented that inasmuch as the automobile was the villain, it should pay for some of the transit costs. However, he maintained that no property tax should be imposed without a vote of the people. Supervisor Bonelli said that he was opposed to the Legislature's granting the District either of the two taxes without the approval of county voters. Supervisor Hahn said that automobile owners were taxed to death and that he did not think they could afford an in creased in lieu tax. He believed that any rapid transit system should be financed from the fare box with support from low interest bonds guaranteed by the federal govern ment. City Councilman Timberlake stated that he opposed any property tax which was not put to a vote of the people, while Councilman Harold W. Henry, chairman of the Council's Industry and Transportation Committee, said that he favored 393 274 the taxes in principle. The Automobile Club of Southern California was much more direct in its opposition to the District's measures than any of the above individuals. Joseph E. Havenner, executive vice-president of the Club, said that the Dis trict's plan avoided any opportunity for a vote by the people on a tax which would be imposed on them for the many years that bonds would be outstanding. He said that it would be unfair to the motorist to levy such a tax since the proposed Backbone Route would carry less than 1 per cent of the total number of per capita trips in the metro politan area. With these estimates of patronage indicating but little benefit to automobile owners, there seemed small justification for assessing any part of the cost of rapid transit facilities against those individuals.275 By February certain cities in the South Bay area were beginning to generate increased opposition to the District's legislative proposals. Redondo Beach Councilman David K. Hayward encouraged the council to instruct the city attorney to draw up a resolution asking the eleven 274 Times, January 22, 1965, 1-1. 394 cities of the South Bay Intercity Highway Committee, of which Hayward was vice-president, to consider withdrawing from the District. Hayward told the council that the interest in the South Bay area was in transportation and not rapid transit. He said that the South Bay cities were likely to be taxed to support a rapid transit system which would not benefit them in this century, while an immediate improvement in surface transportation was needed in their area. At a recent meeting of the District, he said, the only system discussed was an overhead system, and such systems had only brought blight to Chicago and New York City.276 The mayor of another South Bay City, James Wedworth of Hawthorne, invited officials of the District to discuss their plans with him and other South Bay residents. He said that this should be done before any official action was taken by the cities regarding the District's proposals. However, he thought that whatever these discussions pro duced, the District should still have a thorough house- cleaning and real experts in rapid transit should be brought into membership on the Board. He thought that the 276Times, February 17, 1965, 2-1. 395 proposals represented the same old plans which had spelled the death of the MTA. His city, together with several other South Bay cities, had already gone on record as op posing a proposed tax levy by the District until that or ganization had a suitable rapid transit program for the entire area. Wedworth further said that residents of his area should not be taxed for a route that would not even begin to serve them. Not all South Bay officials agreed with the Redondo Beach and Torrance suggestion that they withdraw from the District. Many urged that these cities retain their membership but attempt to influence the activ- 277 ities of the District through their concerted action. In response to the Redondo Beach resolution, Direc tor Horwin, who represented the transit corridor including that city, said that Redondo Beach officials were actually desperate for improved bus service and that the condemna tion of the rapid transit plan as a whole was just an at tempt to obtain improved bus transportation. It was a threat, he said, for the officials of that city actually realized the need for rapid transit development. To alle viate this opposition, Horwin suggested, and the Board 277 Times, February 28, 1965, 1-8. 396 approved a request, to have District's chief engineer, E. R. Gerlach, look into adjustments which could be made 278 in the bus service to and in Redondo Beach. At the state legislative level, Senator Rees planned a fight for the District's proposals. While he favored the in lieu tax as a starting tool, he objected to this revenue as an excuse or substitution for general obligation bond financing. He thought that the District should present a long-range plan for financing not only the first phase Backbone line but the follow-up arteries. The District, on the other hand, thought that once the Backbone Route was built, it would serve as a motivation for the county's citizenry to build more lines. Even though Rees thought that changes should be made in the District's plans, he still believed that the in lieu taxing powers should lie with the District rather than the County Board of Supervisors. Even with Ree's support, a key state legis lator was quoted by the Times as saying that he saw little chance that the District's legislative program would be 279 approved by the Legislature. ^ 8Times, February 18, 1965, 2-3. 2 79 Times, February 1, 196 5, 2-1. 397 The District revises its program By the end of March, two fundamental changes had emerged in the District's rapid transit planning and legis lative proposals. One change took place on March 3rd. This was the adoption by the Board of a Master Plan for a 160-mile rapid transit system serving virtually every com munity in the Los Angeles metropolitan region. This plan was an extension and revamping of the familiar four-corri- dor system and the Backbone Route proposed by the Dis trict's predecessor, the MTA. In addition to an eight- artery network of rapid transit lines, the plan called for a new "Feeder Flyer" bus system of more than fifty routes, and expanded connecting local bus services. This new pro posal provided for expanded lines in the San Fernando and San Gabriel Valleys with arteries terminating at San Fer nando, Monrovia, La Mirada, and Redondo Beach. Cost esti mates of the plan were not given, but they were expected to exceed $1,000,000,000. Board Chairman Faull said that the engineering would begin on the Long Beach and San Fernando Valley lines while the Backbone Route was under construc tion. In adopting this plan, the Board made clear that it would continually be updated in the light of information as to changing conditions and needs. When explaining why most 398 of the mass movement of the population passed through the central section of Los Angeles City, the District's chief engineer emphasized that the geography of the area was a 280 primary controlling factor of such movements. On March 26th the Board announced that through meetings held over the past three months with local offi cials and civic and community leaders, four basic conclu sions concerning the rapid transit situation had emerged. 1. There was a broad recognized need for rapid transit and a pressing desire for immediately improved bus services, even before rapid trans it could be built. 2. The people demanded the opportunity to vote on taxes to build rapid transit. 3. A comprehensive rapid transit system had to be the immediate objective, not merely a first stage or showcase line. 4. The people demanded and were entitled to know precisely how rapid transit and improved bus transportation would benefit them and their ^ ^ Times, March 4, 1965, 2-1; Southern California Rapid Transit District, SCRTD Memo, March 3, 1965. 399 specific communities before they could be called upon to decide the financing issue at the polls.281 The District, therefore, responded to this expressed will of the people by revising its legislative program which was introduced by Senator Rees on April 9th. Instead of providing for the in lieu tax at one- half per cent to be used to back up revenue bonds, the District now recommended that the Legislature allow the residents of the District to vote on a proposal to levy a one per cent in lieu tax to be used directly to finance a rapid transit system. Once approved by the voters, this tax would remain levied county-wide until the transit bonds were satisfied. Together with the revenues produced by the system itself, this tax would support up to $850,000,000 in bonds which would build four of the eight legs in the mas- 2 82 ter plan and provide expanded feeder bus service. Rather than levying a property tax to pay for 2 81 Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 7, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit District. 282Times, March 25, 1965, 2-3, and March 28, 1965, C-l. 400 initial engineering and public information costs preceding a transit bond election, the District now recommended that it be authorized to levy, for one year only, the Collier- Unruh one-half per cent in lieu tax. This one-time levy would cost the average motorist approximately $4 per automobile. These funds would enable the District to: 1. Increase existing bus service immediately. 2. Complete the hard-core engineering and develop ment work necessary for construction of the initial four rapid transit lines. 3. Provide the vehicle for working with the commu nities for final and exact route determination. 4. Develop specific information on economic and service effects and benefits of rapid transit and expanded bus service on each and every com munity in the county. 5. Communicate these critical facts to the citi zenry so that they would be in the position to make an informed and intelligent decision when they voted on rapid transit.^®'* At the same time that the Board was approving this 401 revised legislative program, it assured Director Gordon Hahn that the District would continue to seek federal sup port for the District's program, contact members of the county congressional delegation, develop plans for financ ing and constructing the remaining four legs of the Master Plan, and prepare plans for grants under the Federal Urban Mass Transportation Act when matching funds became avail able to the District. The Board also stated that the transportation problems of Antelope Valley, Palmdale, and Lancaster along with Catalina Island, if and when they be came part of the District, would be considered in the same 2 84 manner as had been other areas of the District. In commenting upon the District's legislative pro gram, the Los Angeles Times stated that the decision to go to the Legislature apparently hinged on the growing belief that Los Angeles' automobile-oriented voters were not yet ready to back a sizable general bond issue, and that with out a subsidy of substantial size, no rapid transit system could ever be developed in the metropolitan community. As for the revised legislative program, the Times interpreted it as arising from the District's recognition of the need O Q A Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 7, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit District. 402 for improved bus service, an initial transit system of greater size than the Backbone Route, and the necessity of taking any subsidy program before the District elector- ate.285 Group reactions to the revised program As with the District's first legislative program, the revised proposals met with mixed receptions. Offi cials from various Chambers of Commerce in San Fernando Valley stated that the system offered little attraction to Valley residents for the amount of money they would have to pay. They contended that what the Valley needed was a transportation system which linked Valley communities with one another and the Valley with the Santa Monica-Wilshire- West Los Angeles districts. These officials maintained that Valley residents traveled to these districts rather than to downtown Los Angeles, where the proposed rapid 286 transit lines would take them. Opposed to the positions of these Valley residents, were the opinions of two City Councilmen from that area. ^~*Times, February 1, 1965, 2-1. ^®6Times, February 7, 1965, 2-1. 403 Councilman James Potter, a long-standing champion of rapid transit, said that the route to and from the Valley would be augmented by connecting bus routes, and that parking near transit stops would be facilitated by parking stations. Councilman Thomas Shepard also voiced support for the 287 District's program. Strong opposition to any and all District proposals continued to come from Automobile Club officials. Harry V. Cheshire, Jr., Club vice-president and general counsel, said that the District's proposal actually contained two taxes, one with a vote and one without. He said that by now suggesting a vote of the people on the second tax, the District had obscured its proposal to levy without a vote the $15,000,000 one-half per cent tax. No agency, he con tended, should have the authority to impose a special tax of this magnitude without first obtaining approval from the electorate. He charged that these funds, if received, would be used to mount a massive promotional campaign to support the second tax proposal.28® Indirect opposition to a strengthened and possibly 288Times, April 1, 1965, 2-9. 404 enlarged District had also developed in one of the counties adjacent to Los Angeles County. Orange County Supervisor William Phillips said in April that legislation had been introduced in the State Legislature to allow that county to establish a rapid transit district and block any immediate possibilities of being engulfed by the Southern California Rapid Transit District. He said that the County would rather work to solve its own transit problems and have its own district which, if necessary at a later date, would thereby put Orange County in a position to bargain with the District. He said that he believed that the Southern Cali fornia Rapid Transit District was Los Angeles oriented. Although he was not opposed to a regional mass transit net work, he felt that any such solution should be designed to serve all of Southern California. Thus, it might be best to work out a system in each county, and then put them together. He further objected to the fact that the proposed Los Angeles based system was laid out like a wheel with spokes radiating out from downtown Los Angeles. He person ally felt that a grid system would be better for the over all area. Then passengers would get where they wanted to 405 289 go with a minimum of effort. Orange County officials said that at that time they did not have any plans as to the type of system, equipment, routes, or other details of such an operation. The bill then in the Legislature had been introduced by all three of the county's assemblymen. It maintained that an Orange County district was necessary to provide an interim solu tion to the transportation problems of the area. Eventually that district could unify with the Southern California Rapid Transit District, but such a link-up could be made only after an election. The proposed district would have the right to levy a five cent tax rate for each $100 as sessed valuation, if necessary to defray expenses. How ever, acquisition of equipment, routes, and other items 290 primarily would be through the sale of revenue bonds. Even with the changes in the District's legislative proposals, substantial opposition to the measures persisted. Supervisor Hahn continued to be against any property tax on homeowners or industry, or any automobile tax, in lieu tax, or other motor vehicle tax to finance or subsidize rapid ^®9Times, April 5, 1965, 2cR2-8. 406 transit. Edward T. Telford, district engineer for the State Division of Highways, said that even if a rapid trans it system were built in the Los Angeles area. Southern Californians would always turn primarily to their automo biles for transportation. He said that only 1.5 per cent of the trips in the Los Angeles area would be carried by the Backbone Line. He said that today's citizens expect flexibility, and people had responded by buying automo biles. A rapid transit system might supplement the freeways where they could serve people with definite origins and destinations, but they simply could not meet changing living patterns. By the time of this statement, the Automobile Club, the Motor Car Dealers Association, and a mobile home owners' league had all joined in opposition 29? to the District plan. Legislative action and District reaction As the District proposal went before the Senate Transportation Committe, it was not without support. The 29*Times, April 13, 1965, Letter to the Editor from Supervisor Hahn, and April 21, 1965, 2-1. 292Times, May 19, 1965, 1-3. 407 County Board of Supervisors, on a three-to-two vote, had given approval of the measure. The Board of Directors of the League of California Cities had voted unanimously to back the legislation.293 And as has already been shown, several City Councilmen had also given their support to the program. Thus, while support for the District's legisla tion was not unanimous among all metropolitan groups, it was still substantial. On the first day the Senate Transportation Commit tee was to hear testimony on the Southern California Rapid Transit District proposals, Committee Chairman Randolph Collier postponed the hearings for one week. Senator Rees objected to this postponement, saying that numerous persons had come from Los Angeles to testify. However, his argu ments were to no avail as Chairman Collier said that he had received a large number of petitions protesting the bill and that further committee study of the measure was neces sary before a hearing was held.29^ When the Committee finally met, Collier soon made 293 Times, May 5, 1965, 1-26, and May 11, 1965, 1-21. 294 Times, May 19, 1965, 1-3. 408 it apparent that he would not support the measure. He stated that the license tax boost should go to a vote of the people and that an appointed District Board should not be allowed to levy the in lieu tax. Collier pointed out that the County Supervisors presently had the authority to levy the in lieu tax for rapid transit development, but instead they merely sent resolutions to the Legislature asking that taxes be raised so the county could get more money. He said that if the transit problem were of the magnitude the proponents of the District bill maintained, the people should vote on its resolution. Collier ended his discussion of the measure by stating that it was prema ture.295 When the Committee finally voted on the bill, it was defeated. Collier's opposition to the measure was seen by many as leading to this action. As customary in that committee, Collier took only a voice vote. With the bill's defeat, Rees contended that it would be difficult to ask the voters for approval of transit bonds without engineer ing studies to determine specific projects. He said that he did not see much hope for reviving the bill but that he 295 „ . Ibid. 409 would continue to try, possibly through persuading assem blymen to amend his proposal in a measure before the lower house.6 The defeat of the District proposal brought varied responses for action from the District Board members. One director called upon the Board to initiate new actions through which its existing legislation might be revived. Chairman Faull believed that what was needed for achieving legislative success in passing the measures was a mobility crusade through which the District would urge all county citizens to write and wire their legislators to act favor ably on the District's program. Director Pollard and the District's financial consultant, Walter Braunschweiger, maintained that the District should call upon the County Board of Supervisors for assistance. Pollard placed the blame for the defeat of the District's legislation on the shoulders of Senator Collier. He said that Collier, as father of the California freeway system, could not care less about rapid transit and that the senator would do everything he could to protect the freeways from any auto mobile tax. However, he continued, even if Collier had not 410 killed the bill in the Senate, he had been told that the legislation would have died in the Assembly. Thus, stated Pollard, the District must turn to the Supervisors. Al though the Supervisors could not solve the entire problem facing the District, they could at least make funds avail- 297 able to keep the District going. Joining the other directors in their lamentation for the defeat of their legislative proposals was Director Howard P. Allen. Allen said that without the subsidy which the defeated measure would have provided, the metropolitan community could not expect to continue the luxury of the existing bus service. The pay increases, which were due District employees the first of June, coming on top of dwindling revenues, could lead within eighteen months to higher fares, a further loss of patronage, and poorer serv ice. Thus, unless the financing legislation were revived, the bus service would undoubtedly suffer and, in addition, 29 8 rapid transit would be set back ten years. Los Angeles City and County officials varied in their reactions to the defeat of the District's legislation. 297Ibid.; Times, May 20, 1965, 2-1. 411 Mayor Yorty was quoted as saying that the Senate action indicated that a tax levied solely on the driver to support rapid transit development would never be approved. Accord ing to Yorty, this meant that a plan for subsidizing rapid transit must involve a broader based levy. In order to develop such a plan which could be sold to the people, he offered to meet with the Supervisors and the District directors. 299 At the County level, the Supervisors' chairman, Burton Chase, said that the action of the state Senate presented a tremendous set-back for rapid transit develop ment in Los Angeles. As far as he was concerned, from this point on, the Supervisors would be governed in their atti tudes and actions with respect to rapid transit by the recommendations of the District's Board of Directors. Supervisor Hahn, on the other hand, did not subscribe to this last statement and said that he had asked the County Counsel if the Supervisors could put the Collier-Unruh motor vehicle tax plan before the county voters at the June, 1966 primary election.300 As events developed, the District recommended a 299Ibid. 300Ibid. 412 program which was accepted by the County Supervisors as a logical and acceptable plan for bringing action on the transit question. On May 25th the Directors proposed and the Supervisors, by a vote of three to two, approved a resolution providing as follows: If and when the California Legislature ap proves legislation permitting a county-wide elec tion on a proposition to finance a much-needed rapid transit system for the metropolitan area of Los Angeles involving sales tax, or a levy of 1% motor vehicle license fee (in-lieu) tax upon the approval of 60% of those voting on the proposition, be it resolved that this Board of Supervisors does agree that it will levy as soon as legally possible a one-half per cent motor vehicle license fee tax for the purpose of rapid transit engin eering, support of existing bus service, and election preparation so as to be able to place this urgent question properly before the voters of this county.-*^ While support for this resolution came from the Los Angeles Times, which emphasized that the tax should be levied for only one year, several other persons and inter ests opposed it. Supervisor Bonelli described the action as providing a means for exploiting and selling rapid transit. He said that it was not in the best interest of the people, who should be given an opportunity to express ^01Times, May 26, 1965, 2-1; Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, May 26, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit District 413 themselves on this matter. In concert with Bonelli's opposition was that of the Automobile Club. The Automobile Club maintained that the measure might actually lead to an improper use of public funds. Further, it could cause motorists to register their automobiles outside the county and thus reduce the county's allocation of the gasoline sales tax.^®^ By June 4th the District had obtained the endorse ment of the Los Angeles City Council for the revised legis lative plan involving the cooperation of the Board of Supervisors. However, the District had failed in its bid to gain the backing of the Automobile Club and the Califor nia Motor Car Dealers Association with whom they had scheduled "peace talks.n3^3 To combat the opposition of the Automobile Club, Director Faull attempted on June 5th to set forth the position of the District. Faull said that there were three steps to rapid transit in Los Angeles and that the Rees bill, which created the District, provided for these: 302Times, May 26, 1965, 2-1. 303 Times, June 4, 1965, 1-28, and May 27, 1965, 2-9. 414 1. The Legislature must permit the people to vote on the financing of a rapid transit system. 2. The people must be given much additional infor mation about the rapid transit system so they could cast an intelligent vote. 3. The third step was the election itself. Faull argued that next to the transit rider him self, who would pay his share in fares, the most direct benefit of a transit system would accrue to the automobile driver. Therefore, the driver should pay for the system also. Although the Automobile Club argued that motor ve hicles pay their way while a transit system could not, Faull stated that this was an inaccurate statement. Quoting Dr. Lyle Fitch, of the Institute of Public Administration, he said that it was estimated that the tax on gasoline burned on the freeway at peak hours would have to be increased by seventy-five cents a gallon to cover the cost of the free way. In addition, Professor William Vickery claimed that the subsidy to rush hour motorists on a typical urban expressway was about ten cents per mile per automobile. Thus, the older roads in the state were producing the •*^Times, June 5, 1965, 3-4. 415 the gasoline taxes which subsidized the freeways. These roads in turn were largely subsidized in their construction, having been built from general funds of cities and coun ties, from general obligation bond issues offered by the state, and by subdividers and home owners and dedicated to the public.3®3 Another argument against rapid transit offered by the Automobile Club, continued Faull, was that the system would carry only one per cent of the person trips of metro politan travelers. However, Faull pointed out, none of the existing freeways then carried more than one per cent of the rush hour person trips, but their expensive construc tion was justified because of the critical need in the con gested areas at commuter times. These were the same fac tors that now justified a rapid transit system, he said, except that such a system, costing approximately the same per mile of construction, would have three times the capa city of the San Bernardino freeway and more than double the capacity of Cahuenga Pass. A final point, said Faull, was that as far as he knew, neither the membership nor the Board of Directors of the Automobile Club had agreed to the 416 opposition of the District's program which the officials of the Club were showing. The District receives a second legislative rebuff The new District legislative proposal was intro duced into the Assembly and proceeded to the Transportation Committee. Here it received rather stiff opposition. Sev eral members of the fourteen member committee indicated dis pleasure with the proposed plan to levy the one-year-only one-half per cent in lieu tax on automobiles. Assembly Speaker Unruh said that he was opposed to this revised measure because he felt it was incongruous for the Super visors to levy part of the tax while a vote was required on the other phase. When final action was taken on the bill, 307 it was held in committee by a split voice vote. Reaction to this defeat was instantaneous. Senator Rees called it the death knell for rapid transit in South ern California. District Executive Director Gilliss and Supervisor Dorn termed the action tragic. Gilliss said that the major part of the rapid transit effort would now 306Ibid. 307Times, June 11, 1965, 1-12, and June 12, 1965, 1-1 417 have to be curtailed due to lack of funds. All the Dis trict officials agreed that this action would mean the cut back of bus service for the commuters of the four-county area or higher fares to keep the system operating at its present level. There was also a high degree of consensus that the blame for the bill's defeat lay squarely on Unruh's shoulders."*®® By June 17th Gilliss was saying that the rapid tran sit effort would be cut from $125,000 annually to $50,000. As for bus service, the directors ordered sharp cut-backs. Gilliss stated that during the first part of 1965, the bus operation had a deficit of about $500,000 to $750,000, and the bright picture of District operations, which had been shown to that time, really was not an accurate appraisal of the situation. Director Allen predicted that the reduced service would mean the loss of jobs for many District work ers and that there would have to be adjustments in fares. However, a change in the basic twenty-five cent fare would 309 be only a last resort. At about the same time these events were taking •*®®Ibid.; Times, June 13, 1965, A-B. ■*°®Times, June 17, 1965, 2-1. 418 place, the Assembly Transportation Committee revived the rapid transit bill with an amendment to put short-term, as well as long-term, financing to a vote of county residents. Rees, who was not enthusiastic about this revision, antici pated that too little time remained in the session for a revival of the measure. His prognostication was correct, for although the bill passed the Assembly Ways and Means Committee and the Transportation Committee, it died on the Assembly floor without further action. By the close of the 1965 Legislative Session, two measures had been passed which could ultimately affect the District. The first measure was an Assembly resolution, authored by Unruh and co-authored by Carrel1, which called for an interim committee study on methods of financing the District. The report of this committee was to be presented to the 1967 Legislature with recommendations. The sec ond measure was the passage of a bill creating the Orange 312 County Rapid Transit District. Although this latter 310Times, June 18, 1965, 1-3, and June 19, 1965, Fl-4. 31lTimes, June 18, 1965, 1-3. 3 ^ Times, June 16, 1965. 419 measure would not immediately affect any District transit plans, the probability that it would have long-range impli cations would continue to grow with the increasing inter dependence of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. As the Rapid Transit District moved into the fall of 1965, it was faced with the prospects of once again having to prepare for state legislative hearings in an attempt to develop a program capable of providing the necessary funds to begin rapid transit development in metro politan Los Angeles. The failure to secure passage of the District's 1965 legislative program was not interpreted by Executive Director Gilliss as a legislative defeat. He viewed the experience simply as a proposal which had not passed, having been caught up in the budget and reappor- 313 tionment controversies of that legislative session. To cope with this problem more readily, the District Directors requested that Assemblyman Carrell convene his interim hearings at the earliest possible date. If this were done, they reasoned, the study might be completed in time to sub mit to the special session of the 1966 Legislature. This could save several million dollars on system construction, 313 Times, June 28, 1965, 2-2. 420 should a system ultimately be built. As the District entered the second year of exist ence , many metropolitan groups were wondering if it could ever resolve the transit problem which its predecessor, the MTA, had found irreconcilable. The answer to this question seemed to depend significantly upon the degree to which the District directors understood the factors involved in acquiring solution ratification from the State Legislature and the extent to which that knowledge was employed. In the next chapter, various factors which served as impedi ments to solution ratification in the metropolitan problem solving process will be discussed. Many of the factors enumerated there have served in the past, and will continue to function as stumbling blocks to group behaviors attempt ing to bring a solution to the transit dilemma of the Los Angeles metropolis. 314 Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors, June 16, 1965, Southern California Rapid Transit District. CHAPTER VI DETERRENTS TO THE COMPLETION OF PHASE II: SOLUTION RATIFICATION Introduction In Chapter II an explanation was given as to why the successful enactment of the solution-ratifier role was a necessary condition to the ultimate resolution of any metropolitan problem. It was further explained that fed eral and state laws and constitutions were a primary influ ence in determining which groups would be called upon to fulfill this role in the metropolitan problem-solving process. In this chapter a basic objective will be the identification and elaboration of the deterrents to the successful completion of this necessary phase of the prob lem-solving process as exemplified in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy. A second objective will be the exploration of the reasons explaining why, in California, 421 422 the State Legislature has consistently been required to fulfill the solution-ratifier role, and the determination of whether or not this may be attributed to legal factors. As the analysis leading to the accomplishment of these objectives was undertaken, a positive relationship was found to exist between the action taken on a proposed solution by the solution-ratifier group, the State Legisla ture, and the degree of metropolitan group consensus exist ing toward that solution. When a positive group consensus developed toward a proposal, the proposal would tend to be ratified. Thus, those factors which reduced the develop ment of a positive group consensus toward a given solution, also served as deterrents to solution ratification. To take the above into account, the discussion of deterrents to the completion of Phase II will be divided into two parts. The first part will be concerned with those factors which inhibit the development of a positive group consensus toward a given problem solution, and which there by tend to deter the ratification of the solution by the State Legislature. The second part will be devoted to a discussion of the deterrents to solution ratification related to the nature of the group which fulfills the solu tion-ratif ier role. Inasmuch as the State Legislature 423 enacted this role in the rapid transit controversy, the deterrents mentioned here will refer to the characteristics and activities of that body. However, to the extent that similar features carry over to groups fulfilling this role in other states and with respect to other metropolitan problems, these elements may be considered as possible impediments to the successful completion of the metropoli tan problem-solving process in general. The State Legislature and Metropolitan Problem-Solving in California Historical involvement of the Legislature in metropolitan problem-solving As the preceding description of Phase II unfolded, one of the first characteristics of that experience to make itself known was the vast multitude of groups which indicated an interest in the resolution of the transit problem. A force contributing greatly to this situation was the legal foundation of the state, which allowed the development of myriad local government jurisdictions lying within the same metropolitan community. The predominant political jurisdictions of the Los Angeles metropolitan community, and those most concerned with the transit 424 question, may be divided into three basic categories: 1. The city of Los Angeles. 2. The counties of Orange, Riverside, San Bernar dino, and most significantly Los Angeles. 3. The suburban cities, especially Long Beach, Pasadena, Glendale, and Torrance, all having over 100,000 in 1960. These jurisdictions represent spatial groups which attempt to provide collectively for the mutual needs and desires of their included constituents. Each jurisdictional group is inclusive in that all persons within its boundar ies are classified as constituents of that jurisdiction. However, the development of these jurisdictions occurred in such a manner that an individual might simultaneously be the constituent of several jurisdictions. Thus, when a jurisdiction endeavored to undertake activities or enhance its power and authority for the benefit of certain constit uents, both jurisdictional groups and exclusive membership groups often found their interests in conflict with those activities and opposed them. Among the jurisdictional groups, this conflict has tended to pit the City of Los Angeles against the counties and suburban cities of the metropolitan community. 425 Initially, the City of Los Angeles subdued this conflict by annexing the areas surrounding the City's boundaries. However, as the City grew to increasingly unmanageable size and as municipal incorporations became more attractive, more innovative means were required to resolve the competi tion and conflict arising among the members of the metro politan community. The State Legislature has provided California with three major methods for resolving conflicts and problems arising among metropolitan political jurisdictions. These are: (1) negotiated intergovernmental contracts, (2) the joint exercise of powers between two or more jurisdictions, and (3) the establishment of special districts whose opera tional jurisdictions overlap those of the various political entities. With the latter method, featuring the employment of special districts to overcome various collective metro politan problems, the Legislature provided itself the oppor< tunity to become once again directly involved in the arena of local government activities, for only the Legislature could provide the enabling legislation for the creation of special districts or the alteration of existing ones.1 ^Winston W. Crouch and Beatrice Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 100-112. 426 The State Legislature and the Los Angeles transit controversy The Legislature provided for the majority of spe cial districts in California to be organized under general enabling statutes that relate to particular subtypes of districts, e.g., water districts, which could be organized upon the initiative of local groups. A small number of special districts, having legislatively-specified boundar ies and serving particular purposes, however, were created by the Legislature through special acts. Although the ini tiative in these instances came from local groups, the formal process of creating the district was accomplished fully by the Legislature. Usually these districts were created when no existing enabling acts covered precisely the situation identified with a problem and when the set of facts involved appeared unique to the particular area. Inasmuch as the California Constitution did not prohibit special acts for districts, except school districts, the 2 Legislature had full discretion in these matters. It was these circumstances which brought the Legislature into the role of solution-ratifier when various groups within the 2Ibid., pp. 99-107. All Los Angeles area proposed rapid transit districts and transit authorities as the organizational solution to the transit dilemma. From the introduction of the rapid transit bills of 1949, to the consideration of financing legislation for the Southern California Rapid Transit District in 1965, every regular session of the Legislature witnessed the in troduction of numerous measures related to the Los Angeles transit dilemma. Even during the budget sessions and spe cial sessions of the Legislature, occurring on the even numbered years, there often appeared either bills or reso lutions pertaining to the transit problems. As a result of these legislative proposals, there was a continuous inter action between the Legislature and metropolitan groups which had interests in these matters. In addition to the interaction occurring between the Legislature and the metropolitan groups at the legisla tive sessions, these groups also came together during the intervals between these sessions. During each of the years between regular legislative sessions from 1949 to 1965, either a Senate and/or Assembly interim committee hearing was held in Los Angeles to discuss the transit dilemma. On three or more occasions, similar hearings were held even 428 in the years in which regular sessions occurred. The frequency of these interactions suggests that the Legislature had an integral involvement in the resolu tion of the metropolitan transit problem. Furthermore, to the extent that groups in the metropolitan area of Califor nia will continue to rely upon the establishment of special districts as arrangements for the solution of their prob lems, this legislative interaction and involvement will by necessity endure. Therefore, it would appear profitable for metropolitan groups attempting to resolve their joint problems in this manner to have an understanding of cer tain relationships existing between their actions and those of the Legislature. To further this understanding, the next few pages are devoted to an identification of some of these relationships as they were expressed in the transit controversy. Legislative Action and Metropolitan Group Consensus Legislative action and metropolitan group consensus During the sixteen year span from 1949 to 1965, over forty separate measures were introduced into the California Legislature pertaining directly to the 429 transportation dilemma of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. From this number nine were eventually approved by both houses of the Legislature. Seven of these became law, and two were vetoed by the governor. In the case of the latter measures, the reasons provided for the governor's vetoes were unrelated to the transit question, and the bills themselves would have had but minor influence on the transit situation had they been approved. Therefore, only seven of more than forty transit proposals were ratified by the Legislature, and, of these seven, only four had a major impact upon the nature of that controversy. In analyzing the various legislative actions taken on proposed solutions to the transit problem and certain characteristics of metropolitan group behaviors evident at the time of those actions, a relationship was found to exist between the type of action taken and the degree of positive consensus existing among the metropolitan groups toward the proposed solution. In the next few pages this relationship will be discussed at length, and certain conclusions derived from the relationship will then be used to extend our recognition of factors operating as deter rents to the problem-solving process. The presence of a high degree of consensus against 430 a given transit solution on the part of groups in the Los Angeles metropolitan area inevitably led to the nonratifi cation of that solution by the Legislature. On the other hand, the absence of group consensus against a proposal or the presence of a high group consensus in favor of a pro posed solution tended to correspond with the ratification of that solution. These tendencies become readily apparent after a brief recounting of examples from the previous chapter. Each of the four major proposals providing solu tions to the transit dilemma were ratified only when the majority of the groups concerned with the proposals had come to support their ratification or did not express sig nificant opposition to them. The 1951 Act was enacted with only the private transportation companies asserting opposi tion. However, prior to its passage, the opposition of these groups had been softened when they successfully in troduced amendments to the initial bill which insured that their continued operations would not be endangered. In 19 57 only the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee and the Los Angeles Times opposed the final pas sage of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of that year. Similarly, only minor opposition from 431 certain smaller suburban cities was displayed with respect to the final passage of the 1961 measures relating to the HTA. Lastly, the passage of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964 took place with the approval of all metropolitan groups, excluding minor reservations by both the Automobile Club of Southern California and the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce over a few particulars of that act. In contrast to the ratification of these proposals was the action taken by the Legislature with respect to over thirty remaining proposals which did not have the consensus backing of the metropolitan groups. Three legislative actions tended to predominate with proposals falling into this category. Some were held in committee without a rec ommendation for further action. Others were held in com mittee but with the recommendation that the appropriate house of the Legislature pass a resolution calling for an interim study of the measure. Still others were approved by one house, only to be held in a committee of the other house with one of the two preceding actions occurring. However, the transit proposals seldom followed the latter course. If the proposal were passed by one house, it would usually be approved by the other. These latter courses of 432 legislative action, and their relationship to the degree of metropolitan group consensus surrounding the involved pro posals, may also be seen by briefly reviewing examples from Chapter V. A decided lack of positive group consensus surround ed the transit district proposals of the Los Angeles Cham ber of Commerce in 1949 and was accompanied by the holding of these measures in committee without further action. The interest shown by metropolitan groups in the resolution of the transit dilemma, however, prompted the Assembly to schedule interim committee hearings to be conducted on the problem in 1950. Other interim committee hearings were called by the Legislatures of 1953, 1955, and 1963. In each of these years, a positive consensus had failed to develop around any given proposal to the transit dilemma and the proposals had been held in committee. In 1953 the MTA proposal calling for the repeal of taxation and Public Utilities Commission control had prompted passage of a resolution providing for interim hearings on the problem. In 1955 the MTA's plan to purchase the private bus com panies had brought a similar legislative response. In 1963 the Rees proposal for the establishment of a rapid transit district, which was passed by the Senate but held 433 in the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, had resulted in the call for another interim hearing. Most of the transit measures, nevertheless, were simply assigned to committees where, because of the lack of interest in them by the groups concerned with this problem, they died and were never rein troduced. This experience would indicate that to the extent positive metropolitan group consensus tends to be related directly to the ratification of problem solutions by the State Legislature, those factors which hinder the develop ment of this consensus may also deter the completion of the metropolitan problem-solving process itself. By identify ing those factors which inhibit the development of a posi tive consensus around problem resolutions, it becomes pos sible for groups attempting to build this consensus to understand more fully the forces which they must overcome to achieve this goal. At the same time, by improving the potential of groups to overcome consensus atrophy, a further step is taken toward promoting solution ratification and the resolution of metropolitan problems. With this thought in mind, let us turn to the analysis of those factors which appear in the rapid transit controversy to have retarded consensus development. 434 Deterrents to Positive Group Consensus on Problem Solutions Proposed solutions seen as contrary to group interests The history of Phase II is replete with instances in which metropolitan groups would not support a proposed solution because they believed that it was in opposition to their perceived self-interests. As long as this condition remained, the dissenting group would not contribute its backing to the measure and thereby deterred the development of a positive group consensus with respect to that proposal. On the other hand, once that aspect of the solution which was seen as being in opposition to the group's interests was removed, the group often joined in the support of that measure. Examples of group behaviors displaying this deter rent to the development of group consensus occurred with almost every proposal made to resolve the transit problem. However, let us consider only the most obvious of these examples. The first significant instance in which a solu tion was seen as being in direct opposition to a group's self-interest was in 1951. When the monorail groups pro posed the creation of a transit authority exempt from 435 taxation and Public Utilities Commission control and having the power to operate all types of transit vehicles through out Los Angeles County, the private mass transportation companies interpreted this as an immediate threat to their continued existence. As long as the monorail groups, and later the MTA, attempted to secure the ratification of these measures by the State Legislature, without making the concessions demanded by the private transit companies, a positive group consensus on this solution never developed. However, when the MTA met with the representatives of these companies and devised a solution which these groups inter preted as in their best interests, the private companies joined with the MTA in support of the newly devised solu tion. The beginning of a consensus was born. Additional examples of this behavior were reflected in the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee's opposition to the MTA Act of 1957; the opposition of the City and County of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities to the initial 1961 legislative program announced by the MTA in September, 1960; and, the opposition of the MTA to the Rees rapid transit district proposals of 1963 and 1964. In the first instance, the Citizens Committee never joined in the positive consensus backing the purchase of 436 the private lines by the MTA. To an extent, this probably reflected the belief of this group that, should that pro posal be ratified, the committee's raison d'etre would cease. In contrast, the groups mentioned as being in oppo sition to the MTA's initially announced 1961 legislative program later joined with the MTA in supporting the same legislative proposals. This consensus developed, however, only after that program was altered in such a manner that these groups no longer believed it a threat to their tradi tional authority and their self-interest. In the final case, the MTA opposed the establishment of Rees's conception of a rapid transit district until it became completely obvious that its opposition was useless. Having reached that position, the MTA joined half-heartedly with the group consensus which had developed around the Rees legislation. The further presentation of examples representing this group tendency to inhibit the development of a positive group consensus toward a solution it perceives as foreign to its self-interests would be redundant. If, however, the reader should desire further examples, a quick review of Chapter V should provide him with an ample supply. 437 Proposed solutions fail to provide for continuing group control over their implementation In several instances during Phase II of the transit experience, groups failed to reach a positive consensus toward a given problem solution until the solution provided for an acceptable method of continuing control over its implementation. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce would not join in consensus support of the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act until an amendment was made providing that the people of the Los Angeles area would have to vote upon any plan to establish a transit district from the resources of the MTA which would be supported financially through general obligation bonds. For similar reasons, the City and County of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities opposed the initial 1961 MTA legislative program. When that program was amended to require the MTA to secure local jurisdictional consent to utilize public streets for rapid transit rights of way if that use interfered with surface traffic, these groups joined in the support of the MTA program. Finally, metro politan groups would concur in granting taxing powers to a metropolitan transit agency only after two provisions were made. First, officials of that agency were to be made 438 indirectly responsible to the electorate by being chosen from among the elected local government officials already holding office or by being appointed by such elected offi cials. Second, if tax-supported bonds were to be used to finance the efforts of that agency, those bonds would have to be approved by a vote of the district electorate. Thus, the absence of means by which groups may exercise even a limited degree of control over the implementation of a given problem solution may result in the absence of support from those groups and bring a corresponding lack of posi tive metropolitan group consensus with respect to that solution. Proposed solution developed without the knowledge or participation of various groups On numerous occasions during the rapid transit controversy, a positive group consensus toward a given solution failed to materialize immediately because the var ious metropolitan groups had no prior knowledge of that solution or had not participated in its development. Oppo sition of this nature occurred with respect to each of the four major proposals presented by the MTA group in 1951, 1955, 1960, and 1963. 439 During the closing days of the 1951 Legislative Session, Ralph Merritt, at the direction of the monorail companies, had introduced a transit bill which had been written solely by himself and members of a San Francisco legal firm. As a result, the various groups of the Los Angeles metropolis knew little or nothing of this proposal before its introduction into the Legislature. Thus, when the private transit companies opposed this legislation, there existed no positive metropolitan group consensus on which Merritt could draw in attempting to persuade the legislators to endorse the controversial portions of his measure. In contrast, once the private transit companies joined with the MTA in devising a compromise proposal in 1954, the groundwork for the growth of a metropolitan con sensus was laid. Although the MTA included the private transit com panies in the development of its revised 1954-55 legisla tive program for resolving the Los Angeles transit dilemma, other important groups were neither informed nor asked to participate in this process. As a consequence, these groups opposed the proposal of the MTA, announced during the clos ing days of the 1955 Legislative Session, which would have allowed that group to purchase the assets of the private 440 lines as the initial step in the development of a rapid transit system. This opposition was based on the belief that the sudden introduction of the measure did not allow the various groups sufficient time to consider its impli cations, that it had been developed in relative secrecy and therefore required more scrutiny than otherwise might be required, and that the proposal assumed certain facts which these opposing groups either did not believe or wanted to review, or failed to reflect certain information they be lieved should have been considered. A third example in which the MTA presented a pro posed legislative program developed without the extensive participation or knowledge of other metropolitan groups occurred in 1960. By this date the MTA had in its posses sion a number of studies and reports prepared by its trans portation engineers. From this information the MTA had drawn a series of conclusions about the powers and authority it needed to build a rapid transit system for the metropol itan area. From these conclusions, the MTA developed its initial 1961 legislative program requesting the Legislature to give that group extensive powers relating to the con demnation of public lands, the construction and operation of transit facilities that would compete with existing 441 public transit companies, and other more technical matters. The reactions of various governmental groups and public transit companies toward these proposals were vo ciferous and completely negative. They complained that they had not been notified of the intention of the MTA to develop proposals such as these and that they had not been invited to participate in their actual development. The opposition of these groups continued until a consensus proposal was drawn up through the combined efforts of the numerous groups. Only after all these groups had been informed of the final proposal and had been given an opportunity to present their views and contribute their part to the solu tion's development was a positive consensus ultimately achieved. In 1963 the MTA presented its last major proposal in much the same manner as it had announced its previous three. Without the consultation of other groups, and without first notifying them of the Authority's intentions, the MTA stated that it planned to ask the 1963 Legislature for property taxing powers. The storm of protest which this proposal brought from metropolitan groups forced the MTA almost immediately into abandoning this financing plan. As events came about, agreement on the final financing 442 proposal developed only after numerous meetings, confer ences, and group interactions. This final consensus meas ure also provided for the termination of the MTA as a rapid transit organization. Although the data do not permit the conclusion that the demise of the Authority was the result of the tendency to present legislative proposals drawn up without the advice and participation of other metropolitan groups, they do suggest that this mode of solution develop ment did retard the acceptance of those proposals and the development of a positive consensus in their favor. Proposed solutions premised on some aspect of Phase I activities with which groups do not agree A fourth condition which often hindered groups from joining a consensus on the merits of a given proposal was derived from their disagreements with various aspects of the Phase I activities by which the solution was generated. When this condition existed, a group might refuse to sup port a proposed solution on many grounds. The group might charge that the problem had been defined incorrectly. Therefore, the solution was not one which would solve the real problem— the problem as that group defined it. On another occasion, a group might agree with the manner in 443 which the problem had been defined, but it would assert that there were better solutions to that problem than the one proposed. The manner in which this deterrent operates was extremely well displayed in the opposition of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee toward the MTA bill of 1957. The MTA proposal was premised on the belief that downtown Los Angeles was the core of a metropolis that en compassed portions of a four-county metropolitan area. Not only were the separate communities of that area interde pendent, they were in a very large measure dependent on the core of the metropolis. Therefore, a mass rail rapid transit system that would adequately serve this area should be constructed so that its lines would radiate from this core and so bus lines could be used as connecting systems to the major rail rapid transit lines. Thus, in developing this sytem, asserted the MTA, the purchase of the private lines could provide the essential first step. The chairman of the Citizens Committee, however, was of a different opinion as to the nature of the metro politan community. He believed that the metropolitan area was decentralized to the point where a mass rapid transit system radiating from downtown Los Angeles was neither 444 necessary nor desirable. This belief was reflected in his committee’s opposition to the MTA purchase proposal and in its own proposal for the creation of a Transportation Authority which would undertake a comprehensive study of the Los Angeles basin's total transportation needs. Inas much as these two groups never reached an agreement on the basic definition of the transit problem, it never became possible for them to join in a positive consensus toward a solution to that problem. When groups failed to agree to a proposed solution because they felt that it was not the best solution pos sible to the problem, a number of different factors could be identified which led to that action. One of the reasons the Citizens Committee, the Los Angeles Chamber, and the Downtown Business Men's Association opposed the 1955 legis lative program for the public purchase of the private transit companies was because they did not believe any specific data had been developed which showed that a change in ownership could improve the area's transit service. On the other hand, it was something more than the lack of data that caused the Times to oppose the passage of the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. The Times contended that all past experiences in which a public agency 445 had assumed the responsibility for public metropolitan transportation had resulted in the need for a public sub sidy to that agency. Thus, said the Times, past experience would indicate that the data used by the MTA to prove that it could operate the private lines without a tax subsidy were inaccurate. Finally, groups tended to oppose solu tions which they believed would not accomplish all they claimed. This, among other reasons, was why the Times opposed the MTA's purchase of the bus lines in 1955 and 1957, and why the MTA opposed the creation of a transit district which would have replaced the MTA organization in 1963 and 1964. In summary, positive group consensus will fail to develop toward a given proposal when groups believe one of the following conditions exist. 1. The solution represents one which has been developed around an inaccurate definition of the problem. 2. The problem has been defined correctly, but a better solution than the one proposed may be found. 3. The solution has not been developed upon the basis of factual or sufficient data. 446 4. Past experience suggests that the solution will fail in its objectives. 5. The solution will not achieve all that it claims it is capable of achieving. 6. The solution is viewed as contrary to the best interests of the concerned groups. Groups attempting to develop a positive consensus around a solution do not have the resources to accomplish that objective A final factor retarding the development of a posi tive consensus toward a given solution arises from the fact that groups attempting to build consensus often do not have the resources with which to accomplish that objective. In the sense used here, resources refer to anything which may be employed to eliminate the preceding retarding factors to the generation of positive group consensus. To give this term more specific content, let us examine a few resources employed during the transit controversy to overcome some of the aforementioned consensus deterrents. When the monorail groups introduced into the legis lature the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951, the private transit companies of the metropolitan 447 area opposed that measure because they felt that it was anathema to their self-interests. As long as these groups continued to conceive of the MTA proposals in this light, they refused to support those proposals. However, after consultations were held between the private companies and the MTA, a compromise solution was developed which had the support of the private groups. The resource which allowed the MTA to overcome the deterrent in this instance was its willingness and ability to alter its proposals in such a manner that the private transit groups came to feel that their best interests were served by supporting the MTA proposal. Only when the MTA employed this resource did these latter groups join the Authority in support of its solution to the transit dilemma and prepare the way for the generation of a positive group consensus toward that pro posal . A more tangible resource was needed to overcome the opposition of those groups which, during 1956, did not believe that the solution to the transit problem required the creation of an organization having the extensive powers requested by the MTA. The resource which the MTA attempted to obtain to surmount this deterrent to group consensus was financial in character. The Authority believed that a 448 study by Coverdale and Colpitts explaining (1) the defects in the present law setting up the MTA, (2) the economic necessity for expanding the area under the MTA to include the four-county metropolitan area, and (3) the need to con sider and utilize all types of transit would go far in alle viating the opposition of various metropolitan groups. The Board therefore directed that such a study be carried out; but, when it was informed that county monies could not be used for this purpose, the proposal was forced to be tabled. As a result, the primary resource needed to help overcome this deterrent— a specific economic and engineering study-- was not procured because the Authority did not have the financial resources to support its completion. In the first example, the group resource required to be utilized in aiding the development of a positive con sensus toward a given solution was somewhat intangible in character. In this respect it possessed the same charac teristic of another resource used by groups during the transit controversy. This was a group's willingness to communicate its intentions to develop a proposed solution to the transit problem and to allow other groups to join with it in that development. When the MTA failed to employ this resource, 449 actually a technique for solution development, its proposed solutions were met with immediate hostility from other groups. On the other hand, once the Authority consulted and compromised with these groups in the development of joint proposals, the formation of a positive group consensus around those solutions became plssible. This experience held true in 1957, 1961, and in certain respects in 1964. From this brief discussion, both the complexity and difficulty involved in identifying properly the deterrents to positive group consensus and then securing and employing the resources required for their elimination may be seen. To accomplish this task, a group must employ a considerable amount of its time, energy, and resources. Unfortunately, these group factors tend to be in short supply. As a re sult, when a multitude of deterrents inhibit the generation of a positve consensus toward a given proposal, groups of ten will possess neither the desire nor ability to bring together the resources needed to subdue those deterrents. Thus, the lack of these resources becomes another deterrent to the generation of a positive group consensus toward a metropolitan problem solution. Although the Los Angeles rapid transit experience generally supported the tendency of the solution-ratifier 450 group to approve proposed solutions having the consensus backing of the metropolitan groups, one exception to this general rule must be noted. The exception occurred when Congress refused to ratify the Transit Revenue Bond Insur ance Bill. This bill had the backing of all the major groups within the Los Angeles metropolis. Nevertheless, Congress would not ratify the measure. The refusal of this ratifying group to approve a proposed solution, which had the consensus support of the community groups, would indi cate that other factors, in addition to the lack of a posi tive group consensus, tend to retard the ratification phase of the problem-solving process. Deterrents Related to the Nature of Groups Enacting the Solution-Ratifier Role The additional factors which appeared to retard solution ratification in the rapid transit controversy arose from the characteristics and activities of the group fulfilling the solution-ratifier role. Because of this, the final discussion of deterrents to this phase of the problem-solving process must center around the specific characteristics and activities of the groups that fulfilled this role in the transit experience. Although this will limit the generalization of these deterrents to other 451 solution-ratifier groups operating under different circum stances, the identification of these factors will direct attention to certain general characteristics of all groups which might assume this role and from which similar deter rents may arise. Solution ratification may be undertaken only at periodic intervals In California the State Legislature convenes for regular sessions on the odd numbered years and for budget and special sessions, called by the governor, on the even numbered years. During the regular sessions, bills per taining to any subject may be introduced for consideration into either house of the Legislature. During the year between regular sessions, however, only budget matters or those matters put on the special session agenda, formulated by the governor, may be considered. Within the fifteen-year period discussed in this study, only the 1964 Special Session saw the consideration of rapid transit on the agenda. As a result, any ratifica tion of proposals for resolving the transit dilemma had to be, and was, made at two-year intervals. Furthermore, within these regular-session years, the Legislature was 452 convened for only about six months. The result of these circumstances was that any group concerned with having the Legislature ratify a solu tion to the transit dilemma had to insure that the solution was developed by some date falling within the first six months of each odd-numbered year. If the group's solution were developed before or after that period, the solution could not be considered for ratification until the next regular legislative session or until the measure was put on the budget or special session agenda. The difficulties which can beset groups as a result of the intervals between the meetings of the ratifying group were frequently displayed in the transit controversy. When the MTA introduced its 1955 legislative proposal pro viding for the purchase of the private transit companies, there remained but a few weeks in the legislative session. For this reason, many groups asserted that they did not have time to give this proposal adequate consideration and could, therefore, not support it. When the measure was not passed at that session, it became necessary for the ratifi cation of the proposal to be delayed for two years. A similar problem arose in 1963. Early in January, the MTA was informed by Senator Clair Engle that Congress 453 would probably fail to give the Transit Revenue Bond Insurance Bill its favorable approval. Upon learning of this, the MTA was faced with either introducing a financing measure into the 1963 State Legislative Session on short notice, or probably being forced to wait until the 1965 Session to make such a proposal. This knowledge prompted the Authority to announce its intention to request property taxing power from the 1963 Legislature. The data of this study do not provide an insight into the reasons the MTA failed to allow other metropolitan groups to participate in discussions leading to the deci sion to request property taxing power. Possibly, one fac tor was the pressure to develop the proposal in time to present it to the 196 3 Legislature. However, the data do indicate that the speed with which the MTA decided to in troduce the legislation was directly related to the pres sure which the Authority felt to meet the 1963 legislative deadline. The combination of the suddenness with which the MTA announced its intended actions, the fact that other groups had not been allowed to participate in the develop ment of the proposed financing plan, and the metropolitan area's opposition to property taxes in general all combined 454 to defeat that proposal. Had the State Legislature met at shorter intervals, the MTA might have taken more thought before making its proposal. If this had been done, many of the factors which later contributed to the proposal's defeat might have been avoided. The circumstances, however, did not provide for this contingency. In both of these examples, the influence of the time interval available for group solution ratification activities upon numerous aspects of that phase of the prob lem-solving process may be detected. That factor may affect the strategy used for solution generation, multi lateral or unilateral group development. It affects the speed with which a solution that has been developed may be implemented. Finally, as will be seen in the next section, it may influence whether or not the proposed solution is ever considered for ratification. Other roles fulfilled by the solution-ratifier group may influence the ratification of proposed solution When state legislatures or other legislative groups fulfill the solution-ratifier role, they continue at the same time to fulfill a multitude of other roles. In enact ing these other roles, they are called upon to utilize 455 their limited resources of time and energy. Under certain circumstances, these groups may find it impossible to ful fill all their roles. As a result, they may have neither the desire nor the capacity to undertake the additional role of solution-ratifier with respect to a specifically proposed metropolitan problem solution. If this happens, the proposed solution will have failed to be ratified through no fault of its own, but for reasons related to the character and activities of the solution-ratifier group. The pressure of other impending matters and limited time were given by Senator Harrison Williams as the reasons why the 1961 Congress failed to give serious consideration to the MTA proposal for federally guaranteed transit bonds to finance the development of rapid transit systems in metropolitan areas. At the state legislative level, C. M. Gilliss, the MTA's executive director, attributed the fail ure of the 1965 Legislature to pass the Transit District's financing program to the fact that the Legislature was com pletely engrossed in matters of the budget and reapportion ment. He said that the financing plan had not actually been defeated; it had just not been passed. 456 The influence of individual members on group enactment of the solution-ratifier role Throughout this study the unit of analysis has been the group. As a result of this methodological focus, the individuals comprising the groups have not been taken into account. However, in describing the deterrents to solu tion-ratif ication arising from the nature of the groups fulfilling the solution-ratifier role, the individual can not be overlooked. This is especially true in the case of the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy. The procedures of the California Legislature pro vide that only members of the Legislature may introduce measures into that body for its consideration. For this reason, any proposed solution to a metropolitan problem originating with an external group can only come before the Legislature for consideration if and when a member of that group so desires. The implications of this procedure for the ratification of proposed solutions to metropolitan problems were reflected in two instances in the transit controversy. In early 1963 the MTA announced that it planned to prepare legislation which would request the Legislature to permit the Authority to impose a tax on property within its 457 jurisdiction. After this announcement was made, the chair man of the Los Angeles County legislative delegation pre dicted that the MTA would have a difficult time finding anyone to introduce that legislation. As events turned out, the opposition to the MTA proposal was so great that the Authority decided to undertake no legislative program during the 1963 session. Although evidence is not avail able on this subject, the mere threat that the property tax measure would have no official sponsor from the Los Angeles legislative delegation may have motivated the Authority to rescind its intended action by creating the belief that any effort to forward the proposal would be met with defeat. Besides choking off proposed solutions for legisla tive consideration, the bill introduction procedure also opens the door for the ratification of metropolitan problem solutions which have originated with individuals, rather than groups. In the same 1963 Legislative Session in which the property tax proposal was suggested by the MTA, Senator Rees introduced a bill calling for the creation of a transit district in the Los Angeles area. This bill was drawn from, and largely patterned after, the act creating the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. It had been developed by Senator 458 Rees without the active participation of groups within the Los Angeles metropolitan community. Therefore, it repre sented the efforts of one individual rather than the prod uct of an organized group. Although the Rees proposal failed to pass the 1963 Legislature, it provided the basis for the amended and re vised transit bill approved during the 1964 Special Legis lative Session. This alone could serve to show the influ ence which one individual within the legislative group can have upon the final ratification of the solution to a metro politan problem. Nevertheless, one additional example will be presented to illustrate how individuals may deter an aspect of a solution, as well as promote a solution. During the development of the 1964 rapid transit legislation, Senator Rees and Assemblyman Carrell disagreed sharply over whether or not the transit district should have access to independent financing. When an amendment was introduced in the Assembly Transportation Committee allow ing the new district to use property taxes for the repay ment of a $750,000 loan to launch the new district, Carrell was able to exert his influence as committee chairman to have the amendment defeated. Later, when the Assembly Ways and Means Committee restored this amendment, Carrell was 459 able to use parliamentary procedures to have the amendment again eliminated. Because of these efforts, the Southern California Rapid Transit District was forced to begin oper ations without the benefit of independent financing. Since the revenues of the MTA bus system incorporated into the District provided no surplus funds, various engineering studies and public relations work which the District Board believed to be essential to securing a favorable public vote on long-term transit financing could not be under taken. Thus, once again, the influence of a single indi vidual on the final solution ratified by the Legislature had far-reaching implications for the future resolution of a metropolitan problem. From these examples, it becomes clear that indi viduals within the legislative group may have a significant influence upon the solution ratification phase of the metro politan problem-solving process. However, these individual influences do not contradict the general relationship between legislative action and metropolitan group consensus mentioned earlier in this chapter. In each case where individuals exerted an influence on solution ratification, the solution finally ratified had the consensus backing of the metropolitan groups. While the individuals were 460 influential in initiating the proposals and determining their particulars, the general outlines of those solutions were supported by the metropolitan groups. Thus, although it becomes necessary to consider the individuals of the legislature as influences and possible deterrents to the ratification of specific solutions to a metropolitan prob lem, the legislature as a group may still be used as a unit of analysis within the metropolitan problem-solving model. Absence among concerned groups of types and/or magnitude of resources needed to move the solu tion-ratifier group to positive action The group fulfilling the solution-ratifier role comes to ratify a proposed solution only when it has been influenced into so doing. In the transit controversy, it was seen that the active efforts of various legislators in combination with a positve group consensus tended to be a sufficient influence to produce legislative ratification of the group-supported solutions. On the other hand, even when the metropolitan groups fully supported the Transit Revenue Bond Guarantee Bill and a majority of the groups supported the Transit District and County Board of Super visors' 1965 financing proposals, Congress and the State 461 Legislature respectively would not ratify these proposals. To see why the active efforts of legislators and substan tial metropolitan group support for these proposals were not of sufficient influence to gain their ratification, let us briefly review the legislative opposition to the pro posals . In the case of the Transit Revenue Bond Guarantee Bill, Congress appeared to oppose this measure for three basic reasons. 1. It believed that the proposal would create a government security of such value that the sale of federal government securities would suffer from the competition. 2. It did not believe that the federal government should finance a local project in which local funds were not also invested. This, Congress believed, would set an unfavorable precedent. 3. Congress did not believe that the Backbone Route could be financed from fares alone; and, if this were the case, the federal government would have to subsidize its operation. Some of the reasons given by the State Legislature for refusing to ratify the District and Supervisorial 462 proposal of 1965 paralleled the above. As will be remem bered, this proposal stated that if the Legislature would allow the electorate of the District to vote on a long term rapid transit financing plan, the Supervisors would levy for one year a one-half per cent in lieu automobile tax which would provide funds for the District to use in preparing for the long-term financing ballot. The Legisla ture gave the following reasons for not ratifying that proposal. 1. If the electorate were to vote on the long-term financing proposal, they should also be allowed to vote on the short-term financing proposal. 2. If the transit problem were as critical as the District and the supervisors stated, the super visors could levy the in lieu tax without requiring that the Legislature first provide for a vote of the electorate on new long-term financing proposals. 3. The local groups should use the resources they had available to them to combat the transit problem (the automobile in lieu tax) before requesting the Legislature to provide them with more resources. 463 In both instances, the deterring factor to ratifi cation appeared to be the belief on the part of the legis lative groups that their best interests would be served by not ratifying the proposed solution. In the case of Con gress, the ratification of the Bond Guarantee might have eventually proved financially costly. In the case of the State Legislature, the ratification of the solution might have proved politically costly. For example, had the leg islators approved the District proposal, which did not have the support of all the metropolitan groups, they could have been accused of forcing an unwanted solution on the metro politan community. Also, if the Legislature had approved the District and Supervisorial bill, it would have been put in the position of actually levying the one-half per cent in lieu automobile tax on Los Angeles County automobile owners itself. This was because if the proposal were passed, the in lieu tax would be levied; but if the proposal were not passed, the tax would not be levied. Possibly to avoid being put in the position of levying such a local tax, the Legislature refused to ratify the proposed solu tion. In each of these cases, different resources than those employed by the groups to influence the Legislature 464 would have had to have been used in order to elicit from them the ratification of their proposals. Whether or not these groups knew what resources were needed to accomplish this objective cannot be deduced from this study. Further, whether these groups possessed the required resources may not be determined. What may be inferred from these exper iences, however, is that different influencing resources were required, and if the groups had not been able to ac quire those resources, they would not have been able to exact from the legislative groups the responses they de sired. Summary In the Los Angeles rapid transit experience, there existed a positive relationship between the action taken by the State Legislature on proposed solutions to the metro politan transit problem and the degree of favorable consen sus existing toward that solution among the metropolitan groups. Those solutions which possessed a favorable group consensus tended to be ratified by the Legislature. Those solutions which failed to generate a positive group consen sus were either held in committee without further action or were relegated to interim committee study. 465 From this finding, the conclusion was drawn that those factors which tend to retard the development of a positive group consensus toward a given problem solution could also be said to retard solution-ratification. By identifying these factors and providing for their success ful elimination, the probability that the State Legislature would ratify the proposed solution might thereby be in creased. An analysis of the rapid transit controversy pro duced five broad factors which tended to inhibit groups from forming a favorable consensus toward a given problem solution. These were: 1. The proposed solution was believed to be con trary to group interests. 2. The proposed solution failed to provide for continuing group control over its implementa tion. 3. The proposed solution was developed without the knowledge or participation of the groups. 4. The proposed solution was premised on aspects of Phase I activities with which groups did not agree. 5. The groups attempting to develop a positive 466 consensus around a solution did not have the resources to accomplish that objective. A second series of factors was identified in this study which tended to impede the ratification of proposed solutions to metropolitan problems. These factors were not related to metropolitan group consensus, but arose from the nature of the groups which were called upon to enact the solution-ratifier role. These factors included: 1. The time intervals during which the solution- ratifying group could ratify proposed solutions. 2. The influence of other roles fulfilled by the solution-ratifier group upon its problem-solu- tion ratification activities. 3. The influence of individual members on group enactment of the solution-ratifier role. 4. The absence of resources by which groups con cerned with the ratification of specific solu tions might influence the solution-ratifier group to take positive action on that solution. CHAPTER VII PHASE III: SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION- ADMINISTRATION Introduction In this chapter the final phase of the problem solving process as experienced by the groups involved in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy will be discussed. This discussion will focus primarily around the behaviors of those groups which were entrusted with the responsibil ity of implementing the solutions to the transit problem ratified by the State Legislature. Thus, between 1951 and 1964 the analysis will be concerned basically with the behavior of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and from 1964 to 1965 with that of the Southern Cali fornia Rapid Transit District. During the period with which this study is concerned the above two groups were created and called upon to imple ment and administer four solutions to the Los Angeles 467 468 transit dilemma. The first solution was contained in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951. The second solution took the form of the Los Angeles Metro politan Transit Authority Act of 1957. The third was embodied in Assembly Bill 264 3, approved by the Legislature in 1961. The final solution was derived from the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964. In the following pages, the objective has been to provide an insight into the behavioral dynamics surrounding the endeavors of the MTA and the Transit District to implement and administer each of the ratified solutions for which it was responsible. Solution I; The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 In 1951 the California State Legislature initiated its first efforts to surmount the problems of metropolitan transportation. This effort was manifested in the specific action taken by the Legislature to facilitate the movement of people within the Los Angeles metropolitan community. The act incorporating this new legislative position began with the following policy statement: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of California to develop interurban rapid transit systems in the various metropolitan areas within the State for the benefit of the 469 people. A necessity exists within a portion of Los Angeles County for such a system. Because of the numerous separate municipal corporations and unincorporated populated areas in that portion of Los Angeles County within the area of the entire San Fernando Valley west of the west boundary of the City of Glendale, and within four (4) miles on each side of the main channel of the Los Ange les River from San Fernando Valley to the mouth of the river at Long Beach, only a specially created authority can operate freely in said por tion of that county. Because of the unique prob lem presented by that portion of the county and the facts and circumstances relative to the estab lishment of an interurban rapid transit system therein, the adoption of a special act and the creation of a special authority is required.^- Provision of the solution The group given responsibility for implementing the above policy was the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, which was created by this same act. Although the Authority was designated as a public corporation of the State of California, it was subject, nevertheless, to the same regulations, restrictions, and restraints as privately owned and operated carriers and was under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission and all other laws appli cable to privately owned and operated carriers. 1 California, Statutes and Amendments to the Code, 1951, Chapter 1668, "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act," p. 3084. 470 The act limited the powers and activities of the Authority to the County of Los Angeles. The Authority was to be composed of seven members, all appointed by the governor to four-year terms. Provision was made for the appointment by the Authority of a general manager, who could be a member of the Authority, and who was to be a man of recognized ability and experience. The general manager was to have management of the properties and business of the Authority and the employees thereof, subject to the general control of the Authority, and was empowered to en force all resolutions, rules, and regulations and perform such other duties as might be prescribed by the Authority. The act stated that a majority of the members of the Author ity constituted a quorum for the transaction of business and could therefore act for the Authority. The offices of that group were to be maintained in the City of Los Ange les . ^ The means by which the Authority was to accomplish the objectives set forth in the policy statement were described in the act's definition of rapid transit. ^Ibid., pp. 3806-08. 471 "Rapid transit" means transportation of pas sengers, mail and hand baggage in, through or between any two or more municipal corporations or unincorporated populated areas, within the area of the entire San Fernando Valley west of the west boundary of the City of Glendale, and within four (4) miles on each side of the main channel of the Los Angeles River from San Fer nando Valley to the mouth of the river at Long Beach, by means of suspended overhead monorail on routes which the California Public Utilities Com mission has first determined are required by pub lic convenience and necessity, together with any supplemental feeder bus lines which established common carriers of passengers serving the area decline to provide after that commission has determined that they are required by public con venience and necessity.^ Thus, the ratified solution to the transit problem limited the Authority in jurisdictional area, in operation al flexibility, and in the choice of transit systems which it could employ to overcome the transportation dilemma of the Los Angeles metropolitan community. An additional restriction on the means available to the Authority for overcoming this problem lay in the area of finances. The act provided that the Authority could accept contributions or appropriations from the United States of America, the State of California, or any depart ment or agency of either thereof, or from any county, city 3Ibid., p. 385. 472 and county, city, political subdivision, agency, district, or other public corporation of the state. However, the Authority was to have no taxing powers, and any additional funds, other than those coining from the contributions of other groups, were required to be raised through the issu ance of revenue bonds.4 A final restriction on the means by which the Authority was to proceed in attacking the transit problem lay in its powers of condemnation. The Authority was given the right to exercise eminent domain over privately owned property, but no publicly owned property was to be taken, or condemnation proceedings instituted therefor, without the consent of the public agency or public corpora tion owning or controlling that property, nor was any pri vately owned public utility to be taken or condemned with out consent of that utility.^ Solution implementation begins: initial MTA programs The first full meeting of the newly created Author ity took place on March 25, 1952. Although the act had 4Ibid., pp. 3811, 3820. 5Ibid., p. 3809. 473 been passed the preceding year, the governor had not made the appointments to that organization until March, 1952. At this meeting, Ralph Merritt, the vice-president of the two monorail firms which had prompted the passage of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, presented an historical account of the proceedings leading to the approval of that measure. In concluding his comments on the transit situation in Los Angeles, he said that he believed that the law was workable even with the amendments included by the private transit operations. He asserted that, within the framework of that law, a monorail system could be financed and constructed which would serve as the essential first step in a new type of transit system for the new kind of metropolitan area Los Angeles represented. Nevertheless, Merritt contended that the Authority should not be subject to taxation, since it was a public corpora tion, and that it should consider utilizing other types of transit systems even though it was legally limited to the construction of a monorail transit line.6 ^Minutes of the Board of Directors meeting, March 25, 1952, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. Hereinafter the Minutes of the meetings of this group will be referred to in the footnotes as Minutes. All Minutes are in the files of the Southern California Rapid Transit District. 474 One of the first problems facing the new Authority was that of finances. When the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 was introduced, the period in which appropriation legislation could be submitted had already passed. Furthermore, in response to a letter sent by the Authority in March, 1952, concerning the securing of state funds to support its endeavors, the governor had replied that no funds could be made available at that time. With these setbacks at the state level, the Authority had turned to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for assistance.^ After various contacts with the Supervisors, county funds amounting to $50,000 were set aside for use by the Authority. An additional $50,000 was appropriated for coun ty departmental use and administration for the purpose of aiding the MTA and other groups in making the surveys nec essary for the construction of rapid transit lines in Los Angeles County. By March, 1953, the MTA had been able to obtain the use of the second $50,000 appropriation, thereby bringing its financial resources in the first year to a ^Minutes, March 25, 1952, and April 15, 1952. 475 total of $100,000.8 Besides undertaking the quest for finances by which to support the work of the Authority, the Board also began an action program directed toward the central goal of con structing a rapid transit system. On July 18, 1952, Ralph Merritt was unanimously chosen as the first of two general managers which the organization would have during its thirteen years existence. Shortly after his appointment, Merritt was directed to journey to the East Coast to ascer tain what types of engineering and transit surveys would be required by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and/or other loaning institutions, in order to establish a sound basis on which revenue bonds might be issued and sold. He was also to interview such engineering firms as might be acceptable to those groups to see if some arrangements might be made whereby local engineering firms would be g employed to make the required surveys. As a result of the above activities, the MTA entered into a contract with the New York firm of Coverdale and Colpitts to undertake a $85,000, eight-month transportation 8Minutes, June 20, 1952, and March 3, 1953. ^Minutes, July 18, 1952, and August 5, 1952. 476 survey and study to determine if the route described in the 1951 Act would be a correct point from which to begin the development of a metropolitan rapid transit system, which could later be integrated with future plans. Accord ing to Merritt, the study would select the best route for the project, estimate the probable number of passengers, determine fares to be charged, determine the locations of stations, estimate the extent and cost of providing feeder bus services to these stations, evaluate monorail relative to other transit, estimate the probable annual revenue and operating expenses, and estimate the amount of revenue bonds that could be supported from this operation. The plan for this study had the backing of the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association. As was noted pre viously, financing for this study came from the Los Angeles Supervisors. Even as negotiations were taking place with Cover- dale to conduct the study leading to the possible construc tion of a rapid transit system within the Authority's ^°Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1953, Sec. 2, p. 1. Hereinafter this newspaper will be cited as Times, and the first number after the date refers to the section and the second number to the page. 477 limited jurisdiction, the MTA was planning efforts to alter the limitations placed upon its range of alternative means for resolving the metropolitan transit problem. These plans called for amending in numerous respects the original 1951 Act. Amendments to the solution are proposed The act which the Legislature had passed, and therefore the solution which had been provided for the Los Angeles metropolitan transit problem, had been drastically changed from the bill and solution which Merritt had ini tially presented for ratification. Now, as general manager of the MTA, Merritt once again voiced the opinion that the original measures he had proposed must be incorporated into the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act to suc cessfully bring rapid transit to Los Angeles. He asserted that the solution provided by the 1951 Legislation was not a sufficient one to overcome the transit dilemma. To revise the 1957 Act so as to enable the Author ity to accomplish the objective of developing a rapid transit system for the metropolitan area, the MTA believed that four measures contained in the original legislation would have to be restated. First, the MTA should have the 478 authority to operate all types of transit facilities throughout the entirety of Los Angeles County. This was required if the total transit problem of the area was to be resolved in the most economical and efficient method pos sible. Second, the MTA should be removed from the control of the Public Utilities Commission and made exempt from taxation. The Authority called these steps prerequisite to any rapid transit construction. Only if the MTA were freed from Public Utilities Commission control over its rates, routes, and other operating affairs would it be possible to find investors to purchase the revenue bonds needed to con struct the system; and, only if it were relieved from the burden of taxation would there be sufficient funds remain ing after costs to finance the interest payments on the revenue bonds. Inasmuch as none of these provisions existed in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951, the officials of the MTA termed the solution offered by that measure incapable of actually resolving the prob lem. For that reason the MTA decided to present for ratifi cation by the 1953 Legislature the above amendments to that solution.** ^Minutes, January 9, 19 53. 479 The 1953 Legislative Session did not prove a boon to the future plans of the MTA. The Authority's legisla tive proposal calling for an extension of its powers and freedom from taxation and Public Utilities Commission con trol had been held in committee in both houses of the Legislature. In addition, the request for an appropriation of $400,000 had also been declined. The only benefit which deemed to have come from the Authority's legislative efforts was a Senate resolution calling for an interim 1 ) committee study of the Los Angeles transit problem. * After this rebuff from the State Legislature, the Authority once again turned to the county government for assistance. This action produced the assurance that money would be forthcoming to cover the expenses of the Coverdale study, and that $2,500 would be provided monthly to the Authority for administrative and other expenses. These latter funds, however, could be discontinued whenever the 13 Supervisors so desired. Following the adjournment of the 1953 Legislative Session, the MTA devoted its energies to securing the above ^Minutes, June 11, 1953. ^Minutes, August 4, 1953. 480 funds from the county and to explaining its objectives and plans to the various groups of the metropolitan community. Also, during this period, the transportation studies were carried out and periodic reports were made to the Authority. These actions culminated in the MTA's presentation before the Senate interim committee in February, 1954, of the find ings of the Coverdale and Colpitts study and the recommen dations following therefrom made by the MTA. The findings of the Coverdale study indicated that if the MTA were relieved from taxation requirements and from Public Utilities Commission control, and if the route proposed in the report were followed, it could feasibly construct a monorail line in its jurisdictional area. The report further stated that such a monorail line, serving as an interurban railroad rather than an urban distribution facility, could be integrated appropriately with any future plan of rapid transit that might be adopted for the metro politan area of Los Angeles County. The findings of this study caused the MTA to revise the legislative program it had recommended in 1953. Upon 14 From "Summary of Conclusions," contained in Economic Engineering Report of the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts, presented to the MTA and dated January 15, 1954. 481 discovering that the construction of a monorail line within its jurisdictional area would be economically feasible, the Authority called upon the governor to put the matter of rapid transit on the special legislative agenda for that year, 1954. If this were done, the MTA pledged to intro duce a bill which called only for the exemption of the MTA from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control. The matters of expanding the jurisdictional area and the types of transit facilities which the Authority could operate would not be included. If this bill were approved, nego tiations could begin with the local governmental groups whose public streets would be needed for use as rights of 1 * 5 way for the monorail line. The reaction of metropolitan groups to the proposal of the MTA to amend the original 1951 Act spanned a con tinuum from lukewarm to actively hostile. At various inter vals on this spectrum were the County Supervisors, the Mayor of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles and Long Beach Cham bers, the private transit operators, and the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. Because of the con- troversiality of the MTA proposal, the governor declined Times, February 17, 1954, 2-1. 482 the MTA's request to put the measure on the agenda of the 1954 Special Session. Instead, he called upon the metro politan groups to work with the MTA in preparing legisla tion to be presented at the 1955 regular Legislative Ses- The transit picture changes The adverse reception given the MTA's 1953 propos als did not lessen its belief that the 1951 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act failed to provide the essential tools to overcome the transit problem in Los Angeles. The extent to which the Authority continued to hold to the elements of its 1953 proposals was made evident in a resolution adopted by the Board at the suggestion of George Burpee, an official of Coverdale and Colpitts. The resolution read as follows: The policy of the MTA is to devise a study of public transportation systems for all the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and including all types of transit, to serve the present and future public transportation needs of the area in the most economical ways and to the best advantage of the community. Although the MTA at this time has neither the legal powers nor the funds with which to undertake the countywide transit study. ^**See Chapter V. 483 it: is the considered conclusion of the MTA that the policy as set forth in the adopted resolution should be stated wherever appropriate as the objective upon which general agreement throughout the metropolitan area should be sought. ^ As for the MTA proposals requesting the Legislature to relieve it from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control, the behavior of the Authority suggested a belief that these requests would ultimately be granted. Otherwise, it is improbable that the Board would have agreed to a second suggestion made by Burpee that Merritt begin discus sions with a San Francisco investment consultant, Leland Kaiser, concerning the requirements for floating a bond for the Authority.^® Thus, by June, 1954, the MTA appeared to have decided definitely that the 1951 Act would not solve the Los Angeles metropolitan transportation problem. Accordingly, as the official group entrusted with the responsibility for developing a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the Authority expressed the belief that it also had the responsibility for devising changes to the Act which would allow the legislative intent of the original measure to be achieved. This sense of responsibility for developing rapid transit in the Los 17 Minutes, June 30, 1954, and July 30, 1954. 1 8m . 484 Angeles community led the Authority to make a significant alteration in its legislative objectives by the beginning of the 1955 Legislative Session. As the 1955 Fiscal Year began, the MTA was contin uing to rely on the county for financial support. The bud get established for the Authority that year provided $40,000 for engineering studies and $49,770 for administrative expenses.'*’ 9 These funds could not, however, be expended in whatever manner the MTA might desire. The control which the county exercised over the expenditure of these funds was made painfully evident to the Authority later that year. Once the MTA had obtained financial support for 1955, it was free to devote time to devising ways and means of overcoming the obstacles blocking the passage of its legislative proposals. In the course of these delibera tions, Mr. Kaiser introduced the idea that the MTA and the private transit companies, the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines might be able to work out a plan to coordinate their interests. This suggestion led to a meeting between MTA officials and LeRoy Fitzgerald, ^Minutes, July 30, 1954. 485 whose company owned 58 per cent of the Los Angeles Transit 20 Lines. As was discussed at some length in Chapters III and V, the consultations with the private companies resulted in a joint agreement which called for the MTA to consider purchasing the assets of these companies. These assets would form the nucleus of what would later become an inte grated rapid transit system for the entire metropolitan area. This area, as envisioned by the Authority, had been expanded beyond the boundaries of Los Angeles County to include those portions of Orange, Riverside, and San Ber nardino Counties which were once served by the Pacific Electric Interurban Railway Company. As it happened, the bus operations of the Pacific Electric had been purchased by the Metropolitan Coach Line in 1953. Therefore, should the MTA purchase that company, it would automatically take over bus lines connecting those very areas.^ This plan had the favorable support of George Burpee, whose firm of Coverdale and Colpitts was chosen to ^°Minutes, October 7, 1954. 21 Minutes, January 4, 1955, and January 25, 1955. 486 conduct the appraisal of the private companies leading to their eventual purchase by the MTA. The contract for this appraisal was approved by the Board with the provision that the Los Angeles Transit Lines pay $5,000 of its cost. Problems arose for the MTA, however, when it was informed by the County Counsel that expenditures for the appraisal would constitute an improper use of county funds. This situation led to a contract which allowed the MTA to reim burse Coverdale for the appraisal only "if and when the 22 final purchase was made." The 1955 Legislative Session As the 1955 Legislative Session drew near, the MTA developed a new legislative program reflecting the changed conditions arising since its 1953 legislative program had been formulated. The four major elements of the earlier legislation remained in the program but to these were added several additional sections. These sections called upon the Legislature to authorize the MTA to exchange revenue bonds for the property and authorize management contracts for a period of years by which a private management company 22Times, May 13, 1955, 2-1 or 2-3. 487 could operate the private lines. This program had been largely developed by the beginning of the 1955 Legislative Session. However, the bill encompassing these amendments was not introduced into the Legislature until May, after the final appraisals of the private lines had been made. As the various activities leading to the introduc tion of the MTA legislation were being undertaken, internal changes were taking place in the MTA Board. Upon the resig nation of Walter Brunmark, the Board requested, and the governor concurred in, the appointment of Merritt to fill the vacancy. Once this was done, Marritt held the posi tions of both general manager and Authority member. When this was accomplished, the Board then delegated to him the responsibility of representing the MTA before state offi cials and the members and committees of the Legislature in all matters which, in his opinion, were desirable and necessary to accomplish the policies and purposes of the 2 3 MTA legislation to be presented later in the session. By May 1st the MTA was in a position to make public its intentions to purchase the private lines. To that time these intentions had not been formally stated, although Minutes, March 8, 1955. 488 mention of this possibility had been made at an April meet ing of the County Board of Supervisors. Two factors con tributed to the decision to make the purchase plan public at that time. First, the appraisal of the two lines had been completed and the report accepted by the MTA Board. Second, a contract for the operation of the lines, once they were purchased, had also been approved. This contract called for Transerv, a private management company formed from the existing management of the private lines, to operate the system for the Authority under the policy guid ance of the MTA Board. Thus, the Authority knew the spe cific price which would be paid for the lines, including the $1,250,000 of working capital, and the management sys tem that would be employed.24 With this knowledge, the time was right to approach the Legislature. The opposition to the MTA legislative proposals, which would have provided for the enactment of the above, was so great that the Authority requested the Legislature to refer the proposals to an interim committee for discus- 2 5 sion and consideration. 3 When this action was completed. ^Minutes, April 5, 1955; Times, May 10, 1955, 1-2. ^Minutes, May 19, 1955. 489 the MTA and the Los Angeles Transit Lines amended their letter of agreement for purchase to revise the section calling for the termination of their legislation. The 26 termination date was moved forward to December, 1957. By September 21, 1955, a number of changes had been made in the purchase contracts between the MTA and the private lines. These changes reflected the fluid conditions in which negotiations between these various groups were taking place. Under the new agreements, provisions were made by which the MTA could purchase the assets of the private companies directly with the funds provided from the public sale of the revenue bonds, rather than making that purchase by an exchange of revenue bonds. Furthermore, the purchasing price was to be lower than was set forth during the 1955 Legislative Session. Finally, if the purchase were made with cash rather than the exchange of bonds, the MTA would be free to use any system of management it de sired and would not be required to employ the Transerv 27 group. The alterations in the original purchase agreements came about for several reasons. The value of the lines had 26 Minutes, August 30, 1955. 490 naturally decreased since the beginning of the year, due simply to depreciation. Added to this, however, was the fact that the Los Angeles Transit Lines had experienced a thirty-two day strike. The decision to revise the manage ment contract portion of the agreement, on the other hand, had come after the MTA's lawyers had expressed the opinion 2 8 that such an arrangement might be unconstitutional. Finally, the decision to purchase the assets of the com panies for cash, rather than the exchange of bonds, was related to the elimination of the Transerv contract agree ment and the fact that this procedure had met rather strong opposition by various groups in the community. The MTA devoted its administrative efforts during the remainder of 1955 to revising the contracts with the private transit companies and working with the firm of Bear, Stearns & Co. in preparing bond indentures and other matters concerned with issuing the revenue bonds. Meet ings were also held with the labor unions of the two com panies, with the objectives of determining the labor amendments they would require before supporting legislation ^®Minutes, August 9, 1955. 491 29 bringing them within a public corporation. The Senate interim hearings of 1956 and subsequent actions As the MTA moved toward the opening of the Senate interim hearings, the Board approved three additional amendments to the 1951 Act which it had decided to present at that time. The first provided for the operation of urban and interurban service in any part of the metropoli tan area and the Counties of Los Angeles, Orange, River side, and San Bernardino. The second called for the enlargement of the Board to eleven, with the governor appointing two from Orange County and one each from the other two counties. The final amendment provided for the elimination of an MTA Advisory Council, proposed in the 1955 legislation, inasmuch as the appointment of the members from the other counties was a more effective method of repre sentation.^0 The Senate interim hearings of 1956 seemed to re solve but few of the issues then causing the lack of 29 Minutes, October 11, 1955, and December 13, 1955. 30 Minutes, December 13, 1955. 492 positive group consensus as to the best solution to the transit problem. When the hearings were over, the metro politan groups appeared to have retained essentially the same attitudes on the subject which they had brought with them. The only significant contribution of those hearings was the clarification of the position which Committee Chair man Randolph Collier held with respect to the resolution of the transit problem. His position was that there had been enough studies done on the matter, and what was needed now was action. He believed that the MTA had done an accept able job, given the restrictions under which they were forced to operate, and that community groups and individ uals, if they were going to criticize the MTA's proposals, should offer constructive criticism or none at all. Although the 1956 interim hearings had produced no visible benefit to the program of the MTA, the Authority fared admirably well in that year's legislative budget session. Up to that time, the Legislature had passed no further legislation pertaining to the operations of the MTA. Therefore, the financing of the Authority's activi ties had always depended upon the generosity of the County Supervisors. The last appropriation from this group had been for Fiscal 1956 and amounted to $55,700. Provision 493 had been made to allow part of this to go for payment of the Coverdale appraisals. However, there were growing signs of unrest among the supervisors, and the possibility existed that the 1956 appropriation might be the last. Thus, the MTA had decided once again to request a state appropriation to carry on its endeavors. For the first time, this request was granted, and the MTA was provided with the sum of $70,000 to carry on its program for the year beginning July, 1956. Throughout the summer and fall of 1956, the MTA devoted a majority of its time to countering the arguments against its proposals and stressing the objectivity with which the proposals had been formulated. At the same time, the Authority continued to refine, revise, and solidify its contracts with the firm of Bear, Stearns & Company, looking toward the eventual marketing of its revenue bonds. These activities ultimately produced an arrangement with the investment bankers servicing the bonds which provided that the MTA would receive approximately $350,000 a year for administrative expenses and for engineering studies of rail mass rapid transit.33 Minutes, August 14, 1956. 494 By September, 1956, the proposed 1957 MTA legisla tive program had been approved by the Board and referred to the Attorney General for study and approval as to form. This version of the legislation had received the approval of the officials and various labor leaders of the two com panies. It was seen as incorporating all of the basic sec tions of the original Act of 1951, and also including all the amendments which had been developed and approved since that time. At the time this measure was approved by the Board, Chairman Hayden Jones was quoted as saying that the Authority would eventually purchase the transportation systems in Long Beach, Pasadena, Glendale, and other sec tions of the metropolitan region. The prices to be paid for these lines, however, would be significantly less than the $33,000,000 to be paid for the purchase of the Los 32 Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines. The Legislative Session of 1957 The bill containing the MTA's 1957 legislative pro posals was introduced in January by Assemblyman Charles Wilson. As this measure proceeded through that session of 32 Minutes, September 11, 1956, and November 13, 1956; Times, September 12, 1956, 1-2. 495 the Legislature, two major changes were made. One altera tion eliminated the Counties of Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino from the jurisdiction of the MTA. The other amendment related to union membership regulations and was described by Wilson as containing potential for internal labor problems between the Brotherhood of Railway Train men, the major union of the Metropolitan Coach Lines, and the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees Division 1277, the major union of the Los Angeles Transit Lines. Regardless of these two amend ments, however, both Wilson and the MTA said that the measure should be passed.^ Their wish was granted, and the act was signed into law on May 30, 1957. With the passage of this bill, the MTA once again began working with Bear and Stearns to complete the details for issuing the revenue bonds, with coverdale and Colpitts for final appraisals of the assets of the private lines, and with the officials of the two transit companies to complete the final details of the purchase contracts. During this period the Board discussed whether or not additional lines 33 Times, May 1, 19 57, 1-1; Minutes, April 4 and May 10, 1957. 496 should be purchased at that time by the MTA. The consensus was that such action should not take place, since it would delay the sale of the present bond issue. The delay would result from the need for additional engineering and ap praisal work required to include other properties in the existing trust indenture. Further, the existing purchase contracts contained deadlines by which the MTA was required to tender payment, and these might not be met if other properties were bought at that t i m e . 34 As the finishing touches were being made on the procedures by which the MTA would take over the private operations, labor problems erupted in one of the two com panies. In December, 1957, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen struck the Metropolitan Coach Lines. The princi pal issue in the strike was said to be the conversion of the present six-day, forty-eight-hour week to a five-day, forty-hour week. Later, however, that issue appeared to have been settled rather rapidly and the problem actually centered around labor's request for a forty-four cent an hour wage increase. The Metropolitan Coach Lines offered Times, September 13, 1957, 1-2; Minutes, June 21 and August 1, 1957. 497 ten cents that year and eleven cents in the coming year, and this was unacceptable to the union. At the time of the strike, the Metropolitan Coach Lines had already negotiated contracts with seven of its eight labor unions. Only the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen had held out and refused to submit the company's offer to a secret ballot of the mem- bership. J The action by the Brotherhood was described by the Los Angeles Times as having an ulterior motive. The Times hypothesized that the Brotherhood desired to come within the framework of the MTA with a stronger contract than Amalgamated of the Los Angeles Transit Lines. If this could be done, reasoned the Times, it might be possible for the Brotherhood to become the dominating union in the MTA 36 operation. In the final analysis, the Metropolitan Coach Lines granted the five-day work week and higher wages than had originally been offered. This produced two basic results. First, the strike was ended after fifty-three days on 35 Times, December 5, 1-1; December 11, 1-1; and December 22, 1-1, 1957. 36 Times, January 7, 1958, editorial. 498 March 4th. Second, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen was to come into the MTA organization with the best labor con tract of all the unions being absorbed into that opera tion. Shortly after the settlement of the strike, the MTA1 s bond consultants issued the revenue bonds for pur chase. When no bids were made on the $40,000,000 bond issue, two reasons were given for their absence. In the first place, the bonds had received an unsuitable rating for bank investment by Moody's Investors Service. In the second place, the rating had been announced immediately before the issue was to be sold and had not allowed the MTA's consultants. Bear, Stearns & Company, to counteract this rating.'*® Upon finding that no bids had been made, the MTA extended the time limit under which it might serve Bear & Stearns with a demand to purchase the bonds. A provision calling on this firm to purchase the bonds, if no bids were received from other parties, had been included in the 37Ibid. 3®Times, February 20, 1958, 3-1, and March 1, 1958, 3-1. 499 contract between it and the MTA. This option was exercised toward the end of February, and on March 3, 1958, the MTA purchased and became the operators of the two major bus lines in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Solution II; The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 When the MTA took over the private lines, it had under its control the sixth largest transit operation in the United States, either publicly or privately owned. Its operations included 721 motorbuses, 109 trolley coaches, and 207 streetcars from the Los Angeles Transit Lines; and 711 motorbuses and 71 rail cars from the Metropolitan Coach Lines. Added to this were 51 motorbuses from the Asbury Rapid Transit Company, a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Coach Lines, which was also included in the purchase. Together these three companies had operated this equipment over 1706 one-way miles within Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange, and San Bernardino Counties.^ 39 Times, March 1, 1958, 3-1, and March 4, 1958, 3-1. 40 Times, February 17, 1958, 3-1. 500 Provisions of the solution The policy statement of the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act was similar to that of the original 1951 measure, except that the MTA was not restricted in the types of transit vehicles which could be operated nor was it confined to operating facilities along the Los Angeles River. The organization of the Authority was not to be altered significantly, either. It would continue to be composed of seven members appointed to four- year terms by the governor. The general manager's title was to be changed to executive director, but his management functions were to remain the same. The new MTA was to con tinue to be financed through the issuance of revenue bonds, support from other governmental groups, or from internally produced revenues. One difference from the 1951 Act, how ever, lay in the fact that the new Authority could exchange revenue bonds for real and personal property of every kind and nature whatsoever necessary for the full exercise, or convenient or useful for the carrying on of any of its powers pursuant to the provisions of the creating act. As in the 1951 Act, the Authority would have neither taxing powers nor the right of eminent domain over public 501 41 property. The basic differences between the 1951 and the 1957 acts derived from the fact that the latter measure included numerous sections discussing operational procedures to be followed by the newly created Authority. Among these sec tions were those pertaining to the area of labor relations. The fundamental elements of these provisions were as fol lows : Employees shall have the right to self-organ ization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza tions , to bargain collectively through representa tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro tection. If there is a question whether a labor organ ization represents a majority of employees or whether the proposed unit is or is not appropriate, such matters shall be submitted to the State Con ciliation Service for disposition. The State Conciliation Service shall promptly hold a public hearing after due notice to all interested par ties and shall thereupon determine the unit or units appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.*^ 41 D. F. Pegrum, "The LAMTA,” Land Economics, XXXVII (August, 1961), 248-53. 42 California, Statutes and Amendments to the Code, 1956-57, Vol. I, Ch. 547, "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957, Sec. 3.4(c), p. 1613. 43Ibid., Sec. 3.4(d), p. 1614. 502 The State Conciliation Service shall provide for an election to determine the question of representation and shall certify the results to the parties.** In addition to these sections relating to labor relations and management, the 1957 Act provided the Author ity with broad powers for operating the transit services it might secure. The authority may fix rates, fares, tolls, charges, rents or other charges for the use of the system acquired, constructed, operated or maintained by the authority and may alter, change or modify the same, all subject to the covenants in any revenue bond indenture pursuant to which revenue bonds have been issued and are outstanding which contains covenants entered into by the authority with respect to the fixing of such rates, fares, tolls, charges and rents.*^ The authority shall be resolution make all rules and regulations governing the use, opera tion and maintenance of the system and shall determine all routings and change the same when ever it is deemed advisable by the authority; provided, however, that any revenue bond indenture may place limitations and conditions upon the exercise of such powers or any thereof.*^ Thus, three of the major subject divisions of the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act per- 44Ibid., p. 1615. 4^Ibid., Sec. 4.9, p. 1618. 4^Ibid., Sec. 4.16, p. 1620. 503 tained to labor relations, operation of the purchased trans it facilities, and the rapid transit development effort. By using these three broad areas of concern, it becomes possible to provide a frame of reference in which to place the various activities and problems faced by the MTA from the time of its formal purchase of the private lines in 1958 to the convening of the 1961 legislative session. Let us begin our discussion of this period, then, by focusing attention upon the internal labor relations of the MTA. Labor difficulties; 1959-1961 The labor problems which were to confront the MTA for most of the first three years of operation began in January, 1959. At that time Amalgamated, the union which had represented the majority of the workers in the Los Angeles Transit Lines, requested that the MTA re-open wage negotiations. This request was denied, and Amalgamated threatened to call a strike to enforce its demand for a twenty-five cent an hour wage increase.47 The walkout, which would have pulled 2,400 bus and streetcar operators off the job, was not allowed to take *7Times, January 28, 1959, 1-5. 504 place. The MTA was able to secure a temporary restraining order on this action. The court agreed that time was needed for the completion that spring of a representation election at which the MTA's 3,600 operating employees would choose a single collective bargaining agent. Until after that elec tion, MTA asserted, it should not be required to re-open wage negotiations with any of the existing unions.48 Amalgamated then proceeded to ask Judge Ellsworth Meyer, who had issued the restraining order, to instruct the MTA officials to negotiate with the union on its wage demands. Inasmuch as the MTA had offered to increase by two cents an hour the wages of the Amalgamated bus and streetcar operators, and since this would bring their wages to the level of those of the Brotherhood of Railway Train men, Meyer held that the MTA had negotiated sufficiently with the union. On the basis of this ruling, he had con tinued the temporary restraining order through February and March.48 Shortly after the jurisdictional election held in May, 1959, the MTA announced that it desired to discuss a 48Ibid. 49Ti m e st March 1, 1959, 2-1. new contract with the selected bargaining agents. The Authority maintained that the election of the new agents had voided all old contracts.50 The general chairman of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, Don Sheets, stated that his union took the posi tion that the existing Brotherhood contract, which covered 1,300 bus and streetcar operators, was valid until Decem ber 1st. Furthermore, he stated that the contract and its pay rates and working conditions should apply to the 1,500 workers the Brotherhood had picked up during the elections, at the expense of Amalgamated. He said that the Brotherhood would go to court if necessary to protect its new members. Nevertheless, he asserted that the Brotherhood was willing to negotiate a new contract as long as the present terms applied to all operators while the talks were in progress.5^ A sharp difference of opinion also existed between the MTA and the Brotherhood over whether the unions had a right to strike to enforce contract demands. Sheets said that a recent legislative amendment to the 1957 Act, which gave the unions the right to take "concerted action," 50 Times, May 16, 1959, 3-1. 506 implied the right to strike. The MTA, on the other hand, said that employees of a public corporation, such as the e 9 MTA, were barred from striking. In April a bill was introduced into the Legislature calling for the MTA membership to be enlarged to nine mem bers and for the terms of the incumbent directors to expire in sixty days after passage of this measure. These members would then be replaced by five individuals appointed by the governor on his own recommendation and four on the recom mendation of the Los Angeles County Supervisors. Upon learning of this bill, the MTA's executive director said that it was being pushed by the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen in hopes that the Democratic governor would name members to the MTA Board who were more favorably disposed 53 toward labor. As negotiations on a new contract began between the MTA and the Brotherhood, two central problems immediately came forward. First, the MTA desired to do away with the old railroad-type contract under which the Brotherhood had been operating and substitute a more flexible contract 53 Times, June 11, 1959, editorial. 507 suitable to bus operations. The Authority asserted that the old type contract did not provide flexibility in changing schedules and filling extra runs, and therefore required a larger force to operate the same schedules than would be required under other types of contracts. The Brotherhood, however, believed that the railroad-type contract was to its advantage and did not want a change. The other problem arising in these negotiations evolved from the union's £ A demand that the MTA operate a closed shop. By August, 1959, the negotiations had gone so poor ly that the Brotherhood scheduled a strike for the 20th. The MTA once again secured a temporary restraining order on this action, and on September 11th, Superior Judge Charles R. Thompson ruled that the MTA operators had no legal right to strike against a public agency.^5 During the months of November and December, MTA and Brotherhood officials, engaged in the contract negotiations, came to agreement on two separate contracts. When these contracts were voted upon by the membership of the Brother hood, they were turned down. In both instances Sheets, the Times, August 24, 1959, 3-1. ^Times, September 11, 1959, 1-1. 508 general chairman of the Brotherhood, had recommended that the membership approve the contracts. The leaders of Amalgamated, however, had advised the Brotherhood member ship to defeat the contract proposals. When the second contract was defeated, Sheets asked for state government intervention and for the appointment of a citizens' fact-finding committee. He maintained that such action was required, inasmuch as the MTA refused to arbitrate and the unions had been denied the right to strike. Earlier that year Amalgamated had called upon the governor to intervene in the matter, but no reply had been 57 received by December. The reaction of the MTA to the second defeat by the membership of the Brotherhood to a contract approved by its officers was one of disgust. The Authority said that the problem was a union jurisdictional fight which made Amal gamated confuse the issues and thus cause the Brotherhood membership to vote down a "fair" offer from the MTA. The MTA expressed doubt that any agreement could be worked out Times, December 10, 1959, 1-2 or 1-12, and Decem ber 19, 1959, 1-3 or 3-1. 57Times, December 25, 1959, 1-4. 509 through negotiations as long as the jurisdictional problem existed. In fact, from the last membership action, the Authority surmised that the Brotherhood negotiating com* mittee lacked the power to conclude any contract agree- C Q ment. A Los Angeles Times editorial was later to say that the governor thought that, under the terms of the 1957 Act, he could have intervened in this problem. However, he had declined to do so when he had noted that the act stated that the MTA was to have a degree of independence from the governor. Therefore, he had told the two groups to continue 59 thexr bargaining. In January, 1960, the Brotherhood came to terms with the MTA and a new contract providing for an increase of forty-six cents an hour was signed. At the same time the MTA offered the members of Amalgamated, about 900 mechanics and maintenance men, a thirty cents an hour increase. The officials of that union rejected the offer, saying that it had been arbitrarily determined. In answer to Amalgamated1s charge that the MTA would not negotiate with the union, the MTA's executive director, Gilliss, 58 Times, December 19, 1959, 1-2 or 3-1. 59 Times, January 14, 1960, editorial. 510 denied the truth of that statement. He said that the MTA was in fact willing to negotiate but Amalgamated was not. He believed the union wanted to cause problems in hopes of making a better contract than the Brotherhood. In this way Amalgamated could hope to regain the members it had lost at the union jurisdictional election in 1959.^® In April Assemblyman Charles Wilson introduced a resolution into the Assembly calling for the MTA to submit the dispute with Amalgamated to arbitration. This resolu tion was pigeon-holed in the Ways and Means Committee and the Industrial Relations Committee, but finally Wilson was able to bring it to the floor of that house for a voice vote. Here, with Wilson declaring that this action was necessary to prevent a one-sided situation between the MTA and its employees, it was approved.6^ " When the MTA was notified of this action, Executive Director Gilliss said that he did not intend to recommend arbitration to the Board even though the resolution had been passed. He explained that the MTA was the only public agency in California where employees had the advantage of 60Times, October 13, 1960, editorial. ^Times, April 7, 1960, 1-1. 511 collective bargaining through union representatives, and he did not plan to recommend giving the added advantage of enforced arbitration to a union which represented only a minority of MTA employees. If the union representing three- fourths of the 4,000-member MTA staff had been able to reach a labor agreement with the MTA, Gilliss believed that Amalgamated should be capable of reaching a similar agree ment.^ The running feud between Amalgamated and the MTA continued without noticeable change until October. In that month the State Supreme Court ruled that a strike against the MTA by any of its unions would not be contrary to law. Shortly after this announcement was made, the members of Amalgamated voted to go on strike. The initial date of the strike was set for October 25th. A temporary restrain ing order secured by the MTA prohibited the walkout at that time. However, negotiations occurring after that deadline did not produce agreement, and a five-day strike took place 6 3 from November 16th through the 20th. £ 3 Times, October 13, editorial; October 27, 1-1 or 1-28 or 4-7; November 3, 1-1; and November 18, 1-6, 1960. 512 The shutdown of the MTA was ended when a new con tract boosting the wages of the members of Amalgamated by forty-five cents an hour was accepted by both parties to the dispute. Although beneficial to the union in financial terms, the strike caused some adverse political reactions. One such reaction was the declaration of intent made by one legislator to submit to the 1961 Legislative Session a bill prohibiting employees of the MTA from striking and compell ing the Authority to accept arbitration of labor disputes. Both Amalgamated and the Brotherhood stated that they would use all their energies to defeat such a measure if it were 64 introduced. In December the MTA was faced with another labor demand. The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks proposed that their members be granted the same forty-five cents hourly wage and bene fits boost which Amalgamated had won through its five-day strike. After consultations between Authority Board members and representatives of these two unions, the MTA refused this demand. Leaders from both Brotherhoods charged that 64Tiraes, December 21, 1960, 3-1 or 4-7, and Pebru ary 9, 1961, 3-1. 513 the MTA officials had reneged on previous pledges of equal treatment, but that they would refrain from calling a strike during the New Year's week end then approaching. The MTA, on the other hand, said that it had neither made nor broken any pledges in connection with wages and bene fits for employees. Nothing, the MTA contended, had ever been said which would have implied that the mechanic, the clerk, and the operator would be paid the same dollar and cents wages.65 As 1960 drew to a close the MTA made one last at tempt to reduce the labor discord which had developed in its ranks. Gilliss proposed, and the Board approved, the conduction of a continuing survey to establish prevailing wage scales for all MTA employees, whether union-represented or not. Along with this, a statement was read which said that the MTA was duty bound to pay the prevailing wage scales in the Los Angeles area, and at the same time to keep transit fares to the minimum needed to cover all necessary 66 expenses. 65Times, December 21, 1960, 3-1 or 4-7, and Decem ber 31, 1960, 1-1. 5X4 With the approach of the 1961 Legislative Session, the MTA believed that the time was right to introduce a labor amendment to the 1957 Act, which would reduce many of the causes of the recent labor difficulties. The first thoughts of the Authority brought forth the suggestion that the amendment require that a single union be chosen to represent the MTA's employees as bargaining agent. However, when the revised MTA legislative program was announced on January 10th, a different procedure was approved by the Board. The proposed MTA labor amendment would have changed the 1957 Act to require that National Labor Relations Board rules apply in any labor jurisdictional contests involving MTA employees. If this plan were adopted, Amalgamated would have a much more difficult time in conducting any "raid" on the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. This was because the National Labor Relations Board rules required a labor organization to sign up at least 30 per cent of the employees it sought to represent before an election could be held. The May, 1959, representation election, which had caused Amalgamated to lose a majority of its members, had not been conducted under the rules of the National Labor 515 Relations Board. As the Legislative Session moved along, the MTA once again changed its approach to the labor problem. At a February meeting, where three of the seven members were absent, the MTA voted to include in the 1961 legislative program a proposal that would permit the MTA to request civil service status for its employees. The Board stated that this proposal was not an attempt to deprive MTA employ ees of their present union representation or to affect their right to strike over labor disputes. Rather, the measure would lead to the accomplishment of two goals: 1. Employees would be given the same rights and privileges enjoyed by other state employees under civil service. 2. The clarification of the employees' status would enable the MTA to attract adequate bond financing for future projects.**® The MTA labor unions were unanimous in their oppo sition to the civil service amendment. Both the Brother hood of Railway Trainmen and the Brotherhood of Railway **^Times, January 25, 1961, 3-1. Times, February 8, 1961, 1-1. 516 Clerks said that they would do everything possible to have the MTA plan defeated. The chairman of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks said that his union had been prepared to support the other MTA legislation introduced at that ses sion, but now it was forced to oppose those measures. Leaders of both unions said that the MTA Board had acted irresponsibly since there had been no previous consultation with the unions before this measure was approved, and that it had been taken when there appeared to be labor peace in 69 the organization. As the legislative session progressed, the unions arose in concerted opposition to the MTA civil service bill. At the same time, they presented legislation of their own to counteract that proposal. Assembly Bill 351 provided that employees of the MTA could join unions and strike. Assembly Bill 2414 required the MTA to bargain collectively respecting retroactive pay increases. Final ly, Assembly Bill 2439 would have changed the composition of the MTA from seven members, who were appointed by the governor, to five members elected by the voters of the County of Los Angeles, one such member to be elected from 69 Times, February 9, 1961, 3-1. 517 each supervisorial district in the county, and would have increased the compensation of the members from $200 a month to $21,000 a year. Each of these proposals was opposed by 70 the MTA. When the 1961 Legislative Session drew to a close, only the above measure requiring the MTA to include retro active pay in collective bargaining had passed; and, there was a serious constitutional question about whether this could be enforced. To avoid union antagonism against the Authority's major legislative proposals of that session, the MTA had introduced the civil service measure as a separ- 71 ate bill. Whether or not this had reduced the hostili ties of the MTA unions against the major proposals cannot be ascertained from the data of this study. However, there is ample evidence that the union's position with respect to the civil service amendment itself never changed, and that its opposition was a major factor leading to the defeat of that proposal. This concludes the description of the MTA's labor 70 Minutes, April 4, 1961. 71 Minutes, June 23, 1961, "Legislative Report for the 1961 Regular Session"; Times, March 11, 1961, 3-2. 518 management activities during the implementation of the second solution developed to resolve the Los Angeles metro politan transit problem. In the discussions of the MTA's attempts to implement the last two solutions developed to cope with this problem, there will be cause to return to brief analyses of that group's labor relations. However, these will be minor references inasmuch as the primary problems in this area developed within the period immedi ately following the purchase of the private lines by the Authority. With these concluding remarks on the MTA's labor relations, the discussion may now turn to the consid eration of the MTA's endeavors to maintain and operate the ongoing transit services which it received on March 3, 1958. Management of the acquired transit services Once the MTA acquired the properties of the private ly owned transit companies, it began immediately to make operational changes in the management of those lines. In March the Board voted higher fares, explaining that four wage increases had been granted transit employees since the last adjustment was made in local fares, and two wage boosts had been made since the last raise in interurban 519 72 fares. In May the Authority voted to scrap forty out moded trolley cars and replace them with newer models. At the same time, a decision was made to replace the inter- urban electric rail lines running from the City of Los Angeles to Bellflower with buses. During that same month, the MTA and the City of Los Angeles became entangled in a fracas over where the Authority would be allowed to put its bus stops on a major boulevard in the City and who 73 would paint those stops. Additional interaction between the City of Los Angeles and the MTA took place in August. The Authority's attorney appeared before the City Council Industry and Transportation Committee and presented two ordinances which he said the MTA desired to have passed. The first would repeal the old franchises formerly granted to the Los Angeles Transit Lines and various bus companies that oper ated in the City and had gone out of business when the MTA began operations. Formerly, these local carriers had paid the City approximately $1,000,000 a year in franchise taxes. 72 Times, March 7, 1958, 1-1; Minutes, March 6, 1958. 73 Times, May 2, 1958, 3-1, and May 30, 1958. 520 Now, however, the State Legislation creating the MTA per mitted it to pay taxes in lieu of the franchise payments only if the Authority so desired. The attorney explained that at that time all excess monies were being used to buy new buses and other equipment; and, although the door was not closed for future payments, none could be paid at that time.^4 The second ordinance for which the MTA sought pas sage would have permitted the Authority to pay the city $1,250,000 over a seven-year period to cover future removal of ninety-one miles of streetcar tracks then in use but which were planned for abandonment. This plan was eventu ally accepted by the City Council. Its acceptance was recommended by Councilman Timberlake, who advised that the City was unlikely to obtain an increased amount through litigation. In recommending the acceptance of this pro posal, Timberlake bemoaned the fact that the City had lost substantial revenue from the demise of the private transit companies. He further complained that when the City had paid $1,500,000 for bus turnouts on the freeways, the Met ropolitan Coach Line had agreed to repay that expense 74 Times, August 22, 1958, 3-3. 521 through its franchise fees. The MTA, however, was under no 7 5 legal obligation to accept this agreement. In October, Senate interim committee hearings were convened to review the progress of the MTA since the pas sage of the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. During these hearings Merritt stated that the MTA had taken in $2,825,309 over expenses in the first six months of operation. Of this, $1,434,758 went into debt service charges and the remainder for depreciation and the general fund. Regardless of this, the MTA's general counsel said that the Authority was living from hand to mouth every month. Requirements for depreciation during the first six-month period, he said, had exceeded the amount avail able for both depreciation and general fund demands. According to Merritt, the MTA was then operating at about the level of the two private systems combined, prior to 76 the sixty-day strike which had occurred in 1956-57. As these hearings continued, the MTA met with severe criticism from both Senators Randolph Collier and 7^Times, February 4, 1959, 1-24, and February 6, 1959, 3-3. ^ Times, October 17, 1958, 3-1, and October 18, 1958, 3-1. 522 Richard Richards. These legislators criticized the Author ity's policy of not giving advance public notice when serv ice reductions or fare increases were to be considered at a Board meeting. They saw in this policy a weakness, for in effect the MTA was allowed to become the sole judge of the public interest. As a result of these hearings, the inter im committee proposed that the MTA approve a policy provid ing for advance notice of meetings at which these subjects would be discussed. The MTA acknowledged that the policy 77 would be considered at its next Board meeting. The month following the October hearings saw the Authority under attack for several actions. In early Novem ber the Board had decided to abandon the rail line to San Pedro and replace it with freeway flyer bus service. The Authority asserted that this would not decrease substantial ly the running time between Los Angeles and San Pedro, while the costs of operating a service to that area would be greatly reduced. The magnitude of protest with which this decision was met caused the MTA to delay the decision for further study. However, the decision was only delayed, since the rail service was later abandoned and replaced 523 7 8 with buses. Conversion of the Los Angeles to Long Beach Rail Line.— Around this same time, the MTA was having complaints about the quality of rail service between Long Beach and Los Angeles. To that time the MTA had operated this rail line under a contract with Pacific Electric which allowed the Authority to use the same tracks for passenger transit the Pacific Electric used in freight movements. Following the expiration of that contract on October 31st, the MTA had attempted to negotiate a new four- or five-year con tract. No contract had yet been completed, but the Author ity said that once it had been, plans would be implemented by which better and faster electric trolley cars would be used on the line.^ The final complaint against the operational pro cedures of the MTA during its first year of operation came from the Los Angeles Times. In an editorial the Times derided the MTA for the manner in which it conducted a public review of its 1959 budget. The editorial stated 78Times, November 5, 1958, 3-6. 79 Times, November 15, 1958. 524 that in support of a $40,101,000 budget the MTA had pre sented a three-page document and conducted a twenty-minute hearing. This might indicate, continued the Times, that the Authority was much more concerned with what the bond holders thought about the operations than what was in the public interest.8^ The prototype of the operational problems facing the MTA during the next two years, continuing through the 1961 Legislative Session, could often be found in the problems dealt with by the Authority in the first year of operation. One continual problem was the interurban rail service from Los Angeles to Long Beach. In January, 1959, the MTA received a six-month extension on the Pacific Electric track lease and thereafter began studies to deter mine if the line should be continued or buses substi tuted. 8 X On may 7th Merritt informed the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors that the Pacific Electric line to Long Beach would never be able to carry passengers on speed schedules. This was because the Pacific Electric owned the 80 Times, November 21, 1958, editorial. 81Times, January 7, 1959, 3-2. 525 right of way and desired to keep the property for its freight business. Therefore, he explained, the MTA's only hope was to obtain leased rights for elevated or monorail tracks which would not interfere with the freight operations on that line.82 Shortly after this presentation before the County Supervisors, Merritt resigned from his position as execu tive director of the MTA. He was replaced by C. M. Gil- liss, then Los Angeles County Road Commissioner. Thus, it was Gilliss who received a resolution passed by the Long Beach City Council which called on the MTA to improve its service to that city. Gilliss had the receipt of this resolution acknowledged by the Board, and then had informa tion pertaining to the Los Angeles-Long Beach service for- o 3 warded to the Long Beach City Council. Throughout the remainder of 1959 and until October, 1960, the MTA continued to conduct studies and negotiations with the Pacific Electric whereby a final decision could be reached as to the continuation of the Long Beach rail line. In October, 1960, the city councils of Long Beach and 82 Times, May 8, 1959, 1-13 or 3-1. 83 Minutes, May 19, 1959, and June 30, 1959. 526 Compton, a city situated on the Long Beach line, adopted resolutions once more calling on the MTA to improve the services offered to those areas. These cities took further action to improve the service by arranging a hearing before the Public Utilities Commission, at which they planned to request the Commission to require the Pacific Electric to 84 grant the MTA a long-term lease on the lines. In December the city attorney of Long Beach re quested that the MTA keep the rail cars in operation until a decision by the Public Utilities Commission had been made. An MTA Board member from Long Beach moved that the Authority approve this request; but, when a vote was taken, this request was rejected. In fact, the Authority voted to 85 terminate the Long Beach line as of April 1, 1961. The MTA's decision to terminate this line was based first upon a report by the Authority's chief engineer and second, upon a letter received from the Pacific Electric. The chief engineer's report stated that between 1946 and 1960 there had been a 78 per cent decline in revenue pas sengers on that line. As a result, the costs of operating 84 Minutes, October 11, 1960; Times, February 6, 1961, 3-1. 85 Minutes, December 6, 1960. 527 the facility had not been covered by the revenues produced from the line. By converting to coach, it was asserted, this cost drain could be eliminated and there would be only a five- or ten-minute increase in running time over the 86 present rail schedule. The letter from the Pacific Electric explained that when the passenger operation had been sold to the Metropol itan Coach Line in 1953, the company had stated that no further rail passenger service was desired over its tracks. For the most part, the Metropolitan Coach Lines had observed that request, and between 1953 and 1958 it had converted to motor coach operations, abandoning the use of the freight lines. By 1960, after the MTA had taken over the Metropol itan Coach Line services, the Long Beach line was the only one which had passenger services over its tracks. The letter continued by saying that the Pacific Electric had taken a tolerant attitude toward the slowness with which the use of its lines had been abandoned for passenger serv ices. However, this attitude had continued in the belief that eventually the public would realize that this system 86 Ibid. 528 was uneconomical. Unfortunately, that realization had not materialized; and, at the same time, the continued use of the lines for passenger services had caused increased prob lems for freight movements. For these reasons, the Pacific Electric emphasized that it did not believe a long-term contract for the use of the Long Beach line was in the best interest of the company, and would, therefore, not be granted.®^ Thus, the combination of the chief engineer's report and this letter brought about the MTA's decision to convert the transit service to Long Beach from rail to buses. In February, 1961, the Public Utilities Commission held hearings on the Long Beach rail line controversy. At these hearings, the MTA presented the conditions under which it would lease the tracks from the Pacific Electric, should the Public Utilities Commission require that company to make the lease. At the same time, however, the MTA's chief engineer asserted that, while the introduction of buses would cause the loss of passengers, there would still be a 87 Letter from D. R. Lewis, Vice-president of Pacific Electric, October 25, 1960 (in Minutes, December 6, 1960). 529 $755,000 annual gain since operating costs would be lower.®® In the final analysis, the Pacific Electric did not agree to the lease terms demanded by the MTA, and the rail service to Long Beach was ended on April 6, 1961. The charter bus amendment.— The MTA was confronted with another potential operating problem in 1959. At that year's legislative session an amendment was introduced to the 1957 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act which would have prohibited the MTA from operating sight seeing or charter buses. The author of the measure, Assem blyman Wilson, said that the amendment was necessary to insure that the MTA, operating from its tax-exempt status, did not force the private charter bus services out of QQ business. In opposition to this bill, the MTA informed the Legislature that it did not then, and did not intend to, operate a sightseeing bus operation. On the other hand, it did operate a charter business and desired to continue those activities. The Authority said that in continuing to 8 8 Times, February 6, 1961, 3-1, and February 25, 1961, 1-11. 89 Times, January 30, 1959, 1-1. 530 conduct those charter services, it would refrain from engaging in any rate-cutting practices just as it had done in the past. The MTA explained that the burden of its bond service charges was so great that it could not afford to place its charter prices at a figure less than the charges levied by the private operators, whose fares were set by the City Department of Public Utilities and Transporta- 90 tion. As the charter amendment moved through the Legis lature, it was amended merely to prohibit the MTA from operating a sightseeing bus service. The measure in this amended form was eventually passed by the Legislature, but it was vetoed by the governor for reasons unrelated to the 91 impact of the act on the operations of the MTA. The reduction of decentralized ticket offices.— In an economy move, the Authority had decided in 1959 to reduce the number of its decentralized ticket offices in areas where passenger volume had been declining. One of the areas to be affected by this action included the cities 90 Minutes, May 26, 1959. 91Times, June 20, 1959, 1-9. 531 of Fontana and Colton in San Bernardino County. At the news that these ticket offices might be closed, the San Bernardino Board of Trade, the County Board of Supervisors, the city manager of Fontana, and represen tatives of Colton petitioned the Authority to reconsider that decision. This petition achieved a reprieve for that area. At the August 11th Board meeting, Gilliss requested that the decision to close the Colton and Fontana agencies be deferred until March 1, 1960. During this time, the Authority's Business and Information Division would work with the local government groups. Chambers of Commerce, and newspapers of the affected area to encourage patronage on the involved lines. The MTA's Operations Department would propose changes or improvements in the service which these lines offered, if such might encourage patronage and in creased revenue. A reappraisal of the proposal to close these agencies would then be made subsequent to January 1st and before March 1, 1960, to determine whether or not the efforts to increase patronage or use of the services had go been successful. 9 2 Minutes, August 4 and August 11, 1959. 532 Additional operation activities.— Along with these major operational problems and activities, there were added a host of other similar, but somewhat smaller, tasks with which the Authority was compelled to deal during its first three years of existence. As the operational costs con tinued to mount, the Authority was forced to raise fares. Thus, the Board at its last meeting in December, 1959, voted to raise fares a second time in two years. The increase was to become effective on January 1, 1961, and was of sufficient size to allow the MTA to finance the Q O proposed budget for that year. Another continuous task facing the Authority was that of ending and inaugurating various transit services. In addition to curtailing the Bellflower and Long Beach rail lines, the MTA also terminated the rail service to the Watts area of the city of Los Angeles. As in the previous two cases, this action brought forth a strong round of criticism. Foremost among the critics of this decision was County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn. Regardless of the opposi tion to this move, however, the Authority was not to 93 Minutes, December 29, 1959. 533 94 reconsider its action. Although the MTA was consistently criticized for ending certain types of transit service to certain areas, it was often attacked for continuing certain lines. In the city of Riverside, the Authority operated a service along the city’s principal street. The locally-owned Riverside City Lines opposed the service and attempted to persuade the city to influence the MTA to end it. However, Gilliss asserted that the service could not be ended inasmuch as the law under which the MTA was organized forbade dropping a line which was making a profit; and profits were accruing 9 5 on that particular line. The Authority was also called upon from time to time to reorganize activities within its own structure. One such reorganization took place in March, 1959. At that time the MTA replaced its Public Relations Division with the Business Development and Information Division. This Division was to have four sections: Advertisement and Promo tion, Community Relations, Public Information, and Internal Communications. This restructuring of Authority activities ^ Times, October 14, 1959, 4-12. 95Times, February 1, 1960, 4-8. 534 appeared to result from external as well as internal sources. Prior to this reorganization, the Authority had borne the brunt of considerable criticism over its public Q £ relations expenditures. A final example of the multitude of smaller tasks required to be undertaken by the Authority is mirrored in a study done by the MTA for the Los Angeles City Council. The Council requested that the Authority make an inquiry into the cost of converting existing rolling stock to elec tric trolley coaches and the cost of air pollutant factors as to gas and diesel fuel, and then advise the Council as to the findings. This study was agreed to by the MTA, and shortly thereafter the Council was provided with the infor- 97 mation which it sought. From this brief review of the operational matters facing the MTA during its first three years as a transit carrier, the fact becomes readily evident that the energies of the Authority could no longer be assigned solely to the development of a rapid transit system. Both the labor difficulties and the bus service problems required Authority 96 Minutes, March 4, 1959. 97 Minutes, February 2, 1960. 535 attention and received it. However, the primary goal of the Authority, the creation of a rail rapid transit system, was not forgotten. To see how the Authority proceeded toward this goal under the conditions provided by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957, the discussion will now move to a description of MTA behaviors directed toward the accomplishment of this goal, within the framework provided by the 1957 "transit solution." MTA efforts to develop rail rapid transit The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 provided at last an organization with suffi cient funds to initiate engineering and economic studies of the magnitude needed to begin to comprehend the nature of the Los Angeles transit dilemma. The Trust Indenture under which the bonds were issued established a fund of $350,000, whose monies were to be used specifically for the develop ment of a rapid transit system by the MTA.9® The availa bility of these funds allowed the Authority to contract at once for the studies required to develop such a system. 9 8 Minutes, August 14, 1956. 536 The Coverdale and Colpitts Studies.— The first series of studies was conducted by the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts, which had undertaken the MTA's monorail stud ies in 1953-54. The contract covering these studies ran for two years at an annual cost of $150,000, with an addi tional $200,000 provided for the employment of part-time engineering consultants. The data from these studies were to provide origin and destination information on the intra- and interurban passenger transportation movements in Los Angeles County. From this information, a determination could be made of the major travel corridors within the county and therefore those areas in which rapid transit 99 facilities would best be located. The contract with Coverdale was approved by the MTA in May, 1958. In September MTA Executive Director Merritt announced that the Coverdale studies would be completed in May, 1959, almost a year ahead of the MTA's anticipated schedule. At the time of this announcement, Merritt stated that $350,000 had been set aside from the current MTA oper ations for studies of all types of future transit possibil ities by a firm other than Coverdale, which would be "Times, April 18, 1958, 1-4. 537 appointed within a few weeks. Merritt pointed out that the $350,000 set aside from current operations was less than 1 per cent of gross revenues, and the expenditure would not cause the Authority to raise its fares.^-0® As the MTA moved ahead with the rapid transit ex penditure program, it met sharp criticism from the Los Angeles Times. The Times attacked the Authority for hiring expensive engineering consultants to undertake studies which it believed could be managed by the MTA employees. It chided the Authority for approving a $100,000, three-month advertising budget, and a $20,000 appropriation for a press agent. Finally, it said that the MTA should concentrate on solving present problems first, for the visions of future monorails and subways were little solace to those who then were dependent upon public transportation.^"^ The findings of the Coverdale studies were made public on May 5, 1959. The only surprise produced by the studies was one pertaining to the route which the line from San Fernando Valley to downtown Los Angeles should follow and another calling for a uniform system of rail transporta- ^•^Times, September 24, 1958, 3-1. 10*Times, May 3, 1958, editorial. 538 tion, rather than several types within the same system. Following the public presentation of these findings, the chairman of the Authority set forth the next three steps to be taken in the development of the rapid transit system: 1. The Authority would study carefully the Cover dale recommendations. 2. Engineers would be engaged to service these recommendations and study the various types of facilities that would be available to the MTA to meet the transportation needs in the metro politan area. 3. The Authority would study potential revenues 102 within the corridors set forth in the report. As was noted previously, shortly after the presen tation of the Coverdale studies, Merritt resigned as execu tive director of the Authority. Therefore, the responsi bility for guiding the Authority's activities in fulfilling the necessary steps leading to the establishment of a rapid transit system changed hands only a year after the 1957 transit solution had been ratified. 102Minutes, May 5, 1959. 539 The Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall studies.— In August, 1959, the Authority treasurer reported to the Board that if engineering fees incurred in connection with the MTA's rapid transit development program continued to reach $350,000 annually, consideration would have to be given to increasing revenue. This would be mandatory if the MTA were to meet future transit needs and to execute existing plans for the orderly rearrangements of activities and maintain the present cost levels for goods and serv- ices.103 In spite of the warning that increased revenues would be required for theAuthority to continue its existing momentum in rapid transit development, the decision was made on August 18th to have the firm of Daniel, Mann, John son, and Mendenhall conduct a six-month study of the civil engineering and structural aspects of the local transit problem and report its findings. The firm was also to probe the advantages and disadvantages of suitable types of trans portation and estimate the cost.^®^ The New York firm of Gibbs and Hill, Incorporated, 103Times, August 5, 1959, 3-30. Times, August 19, 1959, 1-20. 540 was subcontracted to study and report on the technical and operating side of the question. Victor Gruen Associates of Beverly Hills, California, was to be similarly employed as architect-planners and pulse-takers of community accept ance of proposed routes and various types of mass transpor tation. Once these studies were done, the MTA would make a decision as to exactly what type of rapid transit equipment 105 it would install and where. Although Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall was to review personally all the transit systems presented to the MTA for consideration, the Authority Board also had occasion to review first hand some of these proposals. One of the first of these was a monorail plan presented by Thomas J. Lupo. This plan provided for a 600 to 800 mile overhead system which would be privately financed and under written by the European interests of Wenner-Gren. In return for the franchise rights to the system, the opera tors would pay a percentage of passenger revenues to the MTA, which would retain supervisory control over the trans portation network. The initial five main lines would follow freeway routes, with a pilot link connecting 105 Ibid. 541 downtown Los Angeles with the Los Angeles International Airport. Shortly after this presentation, Dr. Wenner-Gren notified the MTA that Sixten Homquist was his representa tive in the United States and not Thomas J. Lupo. Hom quist, managing director of Alweg International, contacted the MTA and made known that he would gladly work with the Authority engineers, and at the proper time present a pro posal to the MTA. This arrangement proved acceptable to the MTA.107 Upon hearing of the above statement by Dr. Wenner- Gren, Lupo told the MTA that he would build the pilot line if, should that line be a failure, he would be allowed to offset that failure, by being allowed to complete the rest of his proposed 600 to 800 mile system. As president of the Transit Development Company, Incorporated, which had built the Disneyland and Texas State Fair monorails, he said that his company stood instantly ready to finance construction of the pilot line with its own capital. This request was rejected by the Authority for a number of 106 Times, September 1, 1959, 1-1. 107 Times, September 8, 19 59, 1-4. 542 reasons. Among these was the MTA counsel's advice that the MTA would have to own and operate any system under its supervision, and therefore could not grant a franchise to 108 any private corporation, as Lupo desired. In April, 1960, Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Menden hall presented to the Authority a progress report on the first three months of its study. This report indicated that the initial phase of the rapid transit system should be forty-three and one-half miles in length and stretch along four corridors from central Los Angeles. An addi tional 110 miles should be added by 1980 over eight routes. Also included in the report was an indication that the line should be primarily above ground with only limited sub- 109 way. The final results of the Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall study were presented to the Authority on Septem ber 6, 1960. The report provided two alternative transit system construction designs, each using standard duo rail transit equipment. The first alternative would involve 51 ^•^Times, September 9, 1959, 1-4, and September 11, 1959, 3-1. ^•°^Times, April 6, 1960, 1-1. 543 miles of overhead route, 21.6 miles at grade, and 2.3 miles of subway. The cost would run approximately $529,700,000. The second alternative system involved 56.7 miles of over head route, 4.6 miles at grade, and 12.3 miles of subway. This system would cost approximately $614,400,000. The report anticipated that construction would take from four to five years, and it recommended that the entire 74.9 mile 110 system be constructed at once rather than in stages. Follow-up to the Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Menden hall studies.— Before the Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Menden hall studies were made public, the firm had recommended that the MTA's chief engineer make an estimate of both the initial cost and maintenance costs for the duo rail system and the two monorail systems. This study was made, and in July the chief engineer had recommended to the Board that he be authorized to negotiate a contract with Coverdale and Colpitts for the purpose of conducting economic feasibility studies pertaining to the duo rail system recommended by Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall. This suggestion was deferred throughout July but was approved in August. Times, September 7, 1960, 1-2. 544 The contract resulting from these negotiations was not to cost over $25,000. On the basis of the earlier Coverdale studies and the Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall studies, the MTA determined that if it were to build a rapid transit system the State Legislature would have first to expand its legal powers. Upon the basis of this assumption, the Authority announced that it would seek from the 1961 Legislature power to condemn public property and the property of public util ities for rapid transit rights of way. As was seen earlier, this announcement brought extremely unfavorable reactions from almost all groups within the Los Angeles metropolis. From September to December, while the MTA worked to eliminate opposition and general support for its legislative proposals, Coverdale conducted economic feasibility studies of the rapid transit system proposed by Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall. On December 7th, Coverdale pre sented the findings of these studies to the MTA. The report advised the Authority that should the proposed sys tem become operative by 1965 as planned, the total revenue would not provide enough to pay interest and principal on a ■^^Minutes, July 5 and 11, 1960. 545 revenue bond of the size necessary to finance that system. After receiving this report, the MTA ordered a detailed study of its findings, a study of financing alternatives other than revenue bond financing, and an investigation of 112 how to reduce the costs of the system. As was seen in Chapter V, the announcement that the proposed transit system would not be self-supporting from fares alone had allowed the MTA to reduce certain of its more extreme 1961 legislative proposals. Besides this action, the report also prompted the MTA to invite various engineering and construction firms to recommend methods by which the costs of the transit system could be reduced to bring them within the level of anticipated fare revenues. One of the firms answering this call was Kaiser Industries. Throughout the first four months of 1961, Kaiser Industries contributed volunteer technical and engineering services directed toward reducing the costs of the proposed transit system to bring it within the boundaries of fare revenue. On May 15th the results of these efforts were manifest in the form of the MTA's proposed Backbone Route. This plan called for the construction of a twenty-three 112 Times, December 8, 1960, 1-2. 546 mile rail rapid transit system reaching from Century City on the west to downtown Los Angeles, and from there east along the San Bernardino freeway to the city of El Monte. The establishment of the line would serve the areas of highest population concentration in the Los Angeles area; and, there was speculation that, if a low-cost loan could be obtained, fare revenue could support construction of the 113 system. The formulation of the Backbone Route plan allowed the MTA to alter again the substance of its 1961 legisla tive program. Inasmuch as the Backbone Route required essentially only subway and freeway rights of way, the Authority was able to eliminate its demand for the power to condemn public property and the property of public utili ties. The reduction of its demands, plus the attractiveness of the Backbone Route plan, permitted the MTA to appease most of the groups in opposition to the proposed legisla tion and to attract adherents to its plans; and, the com bination of these factors helped to promote the passage of the MTA's 1961 amended and revised legislative program. 113 Times, May 15, 1961, 1-1. 547 Summary of the implementation of Solution II The second solution to the Los Angeles traffic dilenana was contained within the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. This act established an organization possessing many of the characteristics essen tial for any group hoping to cope successfully with that metropolitan problem. However, as the group undertook activities to overcome the transit problem, the fact that it did not possess all the characteristics needed to resolve the dilemma soon became evident. This discovery was made through the findings of a series of transit engineering and economic studies. Therefore, an attempt was made to correct the existing organizational deficiencies through the State Legislature. The first deficiency in the solution provided by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 came into focus when the Coverdale studies indicated that if the rapid transit lines followed the major traffic cor ridors, they would have to deviate from the freeway routes. Thus, if the MTA were to construct a rail rapid transit system, the system would undoubtedly have to cross publicly owned property and the property of public utilities. Under 548 the 1957 Act, however, the Authority could not condemn either of these two categories of property for transit rights of way. In effect, this meant that any public juris diction or public utility which did not want to grant the use of its property for Authority transit use could com pletely stymie the construction of the transit line. To remove this impediment to the transit effort, the MTA sought to obtain from the Legislature the power to condemn these categories of land. The Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall studies, which established the routes and types of transit facili ties that should be used in the metropolitan rapid transit system, led to additional Coverdale economic feasibility studies of the proposed transit facilities. These economic studies produced the finding that the proposed transit lines could not be self-supporting from fare revenue alone. This discovery induced the Authority to conduct further studies to determine how the costs of the system might be reduced and therefore covered by the fares which it would produce. The final series of studies produced the Backbone Route plan. This plan envisioned the construction of a twenty-three mile, duo rail transit system within that area 549 of the county having the highest population concentration. The routing of the system allowed construction to be pri marily under the surface of publicly and privately owned property or on freeway rights of way. These construction conditions did not require the extreme powers of condemna tion which the Authority originally had requested. There fore , the MTA reduced these condemnation demands. This action, and the fact that the system might be financed by fare revenue alone, enabled the Authority to secure the eventual ratification of its 1961 legislative program. From this program evolved the third solution to the Los Angeles transit dilemma. Solution III; The Enlargement of MTA Powers— Assembly Bill 2643 Provisions of the solution The provisions of the third solution to the Los Angeles transit dilemma were spelled out for the Authority in Executive Director Gilliss' "Legislative Report for the 1961 Regular Session." The report discussed the content of Assembly Bill 2643, which contained the MTA's major pro posals, introduced at the 1961 Legislative Session. In commenting upon the passage of this measure, Gilliss stated 550 that the act would permit the MTA to begin construction of the Backbone Route when and if financing could be arranged. Furthermore, the positive metropolitan group consensus which surrounded the approval of the measure insured that the Backbone Route would be a system sponsored and sup- 114 ported by the communities which it was designed to serve. Assembly Bill 2643 provided a number of amendments to the 1957 Act, of which four exerted a significant influ ence upon the operations and rapid transit planning of the MTA. 1. The act prohibited the MTA from operating char ter and sightseeing buses. 2. It deleted all parts of the 1957 Act which would have permitted the MTA to employ a superin tending corporation. 3. It authorized the MTA to make certain changes in the routing of existing service, so long as "service was adequate to serve the demand for mass rapid transit in the same community as such demand then existed" was maintained. ^■^Minutes, June 23, 1961, "Legislative Report for the 1961 Regular Session." 551 4. It authorized the MTA to construct a subway system, without the consent of the cities through which a route was located, as long as neither the subway nor the construction activ ities would interfere with or diminish the existing surface or subsurface uses of the street or highway. 5. The MTA would be prohibited from constructing any mass rapid transit structure on or over the surface of any street, highway, freeway, or other public place without the consent of the public agency having jurisdiction thereover. 6. Prior to constructing any new mass rapid transit structures on any streets or highways, the MTA was required to hold highway commission type hearings to locate the lines and sta tions . Although Assembly Bill 2643 had opened the doors for cooperation between the MTA and local governmental jurisdictions through which the rapid transit routes might pass, means still were not provided by which such a system 552 could be financed. Thus, the Authority continued to be confined to revenue bond financing as the sole means of supporting the construction of a rapid transit system. The Transit Revenue Bond Guarantee Act The studies producing the concept of the Backbone Route had indicated that if the Authority could float a revenue bond issue having a minimum interest rate, approxi mately 3.0 to 3.75 per cent, the system might possibly be built from fare revenues. Discussions between Authority officials and California delegates to the United States Congress had resulted in the development of an idea by which the federal government could aid the Authority in obtaining low interest bonds. This idea was contained in the Transit Revenue Bond Guarantee Act introduced in Con gress in the fall of 1961.^® The act called upon the federal government to guar antee revenue bonds issued by metropolitan transit author ities, and like transit organizations, provided the proposed transit systems met certain engineering and economic qualifications. Essentially, these qualifications would 116 MTA Newsletter, October 31, 1961. 553 insure that the systems would be self-supporting from fare revenues, given low interest rates on the revenue bonds. The knowledge that the federal government would guarantee the bonds issued to build a given system would induce investors to purchase these bonds at a lower interest rate than if the bonds were not secured by income sources other 117 than fare revenue. The inducement to the federal government to approve this bill was seen by the Authority to lie in the fact that the systems, whose bonds the government would guarantee, would have been proven beforehand to be capable of support ing themselves. Thus, the federal government could allow these systems to be built with low interest loans, while at the same time there was little danger that payments of defaulted bonds would actually have to be assumed. If, however, the federal government were called upon to pay an installment of the principal and interest of the issued bonds, the public agency would repay to the federal govern ment at a later date the amount of that payment plus one- quarter per cent interest. These guarantee terms were also to apply to the financing of extensions and additions 117 Times, October 24, 1961, 3-1. 554 118 to the new systems. This bill was not approved by the 1961 Congress, but California's Senator Clair Engle told the Authority that prospects for passage in 1962 were quite good. In order to aid in pushing this bill in the January, 1962, Congress, and in order to assure the earliest possible qualification of the MTA's revenue bonds for a guarantee thereunder, the MTA approved on December 19, 1961, an out lay of $925,000 for engineering and financial services, as the first step in construction of its Backbone Route. Of this sum, $150,000 was to go to the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts for a study of passenger and revenue data on the Backbone Route necessary for the offering of revenue bonds to private investors and testimony before Congress. The remaining $750,000 was to go to Kaiser Industries for the first stage of design engineering. The money for these projects was to come from the construction fund established 119 from the sale of the original MTA bonds of 1958. These two firms were chosen for these studies because they had been working on the system for some time ^18MTA Newsletter, February, 1962. 119 Minutes, December 19, 1961, "Staff Report and Recommendations of LAMTA Rapid Transit Construction 555 and as a result would be able to complete the project in four years, rather than six and one-half years. Gilliss said that the bulk of the work these two firms would under take would be completed by February 15, 1962, in time to meet the deadlines for Congressional hearings. If these data could convince Congress to approve the Bond Guarantee Bill, the MTA had already received assurances that its revenue bonds would be purchased by the Bank of America and the First Boston Corporation. w In anticipation that the Bond Guarantee proposal would be accepted, Gilliss had developed a four-phase rapid transit construction program. The first phase con sisted of the previously-mentioned contracts with Coverdale and Kaiser Industries and the presentation of the data from their studies to Congress. This was to continue through February, 1962. The second phase included the work which had to be done before July 1, 1962. By then, hopefully, the Bond Guarantee would have been signed into law. This phase called for conducting public hearings on the final Program," C. M. Gilliss. See also Minutes, December 5, 1961. ^20Times, December 20, 1961, 3-1. 556 alignments of the Backbone Route, and the decision on the exact locations of these alignments. By that date, too, the MTA was to have decided on the general design for the system, as well as on specifications for rolling stock and other equipment in sufficient detail to support the system cost estimates submitted when the MTA applied for the fed eral loan guarantees. The final phase encompassed the actual construction period during the three years between 121 January 1, 1963, and December 31, 1965. The Monorail proposal When Gilliss presented the "Staff Report and Recommendation of LAMTA Rapid Transit Construction Pro gram," he informed the Authority that the program had not been presented sooner because the staff had been waiting for a construction proposal for the Backbone Route which had been offered by a monorail firm. This firm, the Wegmatic Corporation, had approached the MTA in July, 1961, and related that it could build the Backbone system for well under the $192,000,000 figure that had been estimated. The representative for this company said that there were 121 MTA Newsletter, January, 1962. 557 favorable signs that it could provide the MTA with 3 per cent financing from private sources and that the MTA would not have to wait on the uncertain federal funds. On the basis of this information, the representative called for a conference within ninety days, at which time a definite 122 proposal would be made. On October 3rd the Wegmatic Corporation said that its proposal to construct and privately finance an Alweg monorail system would not be ready until November 15th. A request for a delay in the presentation of this proposal was granted. At the same time, however, Gilliss said that features of the proposal indicated that when the plan was finally presented it would not comply with the standards which the MTA's staff had been using in approaching the TO-j problem of constructing and financing the Backbone System. On November 28th, the Wegmatic Corporation made its presentation. It offered to build and finance a fourteen- mile monorail line which would be placed in the middle of Wilshire Boulevard and which would cost approximately $63,000,000. There was an alternate route, generally 122 Times, July 1, 1961, 3-2. 123 Minutes, October 3, 1961. 558 paralleling the major one, which ran intermittently south and north of Wilshire Boulevard. This proposal met with stiff opposition from Wilshire Boulevard and Miracle Mile property owners and from the Los Angeles City Councilman of that district, who said that an overhead structure would never be acceptable in that area. As for the MTA members, they expressed a concern about the legal and bonding implications of the proposal and indicated that they con- 124 tinued to favor the duo rail Metro system. On December 5, 1961, a joint report of the Author ity finance and engineering committees recommended that the Wegmatic proposal be rejected. The report stated that the proposal was inadequate because: 1. It did not provide an interest rate below 3.75 per cent which MTA financial consultants had emphasized the total system would require in order to be economically feasible. 2. It did not provide a route of sufficient length to bring in the number of passengers needed. 3. It did not provide for subways, and the MTA could not build above the ground without the 124 Times, November 29, 1961, 1-2 559 consent: of the involved public jurisdictions. For these reasons the Authority rejected the Wegmatic pro posal.125 By December 19th, at the meeting of the Authority Board, enough criticism had been leveled against the rejec tion of the Wegmatic proposal that Gilliss felt compelled to defend that action once more. In justifying this ac tion, he asserted that the Backbone Route would have to be constructed first, since no line in the Los Angeles area could hope to be self-liquidating without being connected to the downtown area of Los Angeles, the Civic Center, and the concentrated high rise Wilshire Boulevard district. Once this was built, the corridors which would be nearly self-liquidating, if connected to the Backbone Route, could be built. Therefore, the basic problem with the Wegmatic offer was that it did not provide a workable plan for con- 126 structing the Backbone Route itself. 125 Minutes, December 5, 1961, "Joint Report of the MTA Finance and Engineering Committees." 126 Minutes, December 19, 1961. 560 The final years of the MTA; 1962-64 During the two and one-half years preceding the passage of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964, the energies of the Authority were devoted to coping with five major problem areas. 1. There were the labor problems that developed in 1962 and 1964. 2. The MTA was called upon to review two additional monorail rapid transit proposals, even though that type of system had been classified as unsuitable and uneconomical. 3. There was the problem of Public Utilities Com mission supervision of MTA safety procedures and equipment. 4. There was the continuing problem of securing financial sources from which to finance the proposed Backbone Route. 5. There was the problem of inhibiting the State Legislature from terminating the Authority and creating another transit organization. Although many of these activities were taking place simul taneously, the following discussion will analyze them as 561 separate subject areas, extending over the final period of the MTA's existence. Labor problems erupt again.— In March, 1962, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen again requested wage in creases for its members. When these demands were not met, the Brotherhood voted authorization to strike. However, the chairman of the union, Donald Sheets, said that no strike was planned at that time; but, if a strike were called, the Authority would receive only forty-eight hours' notice. The MTA countered by demanding that sixty days' 127 notice be given before any strike was staged. As negotiations continued over the wage dispute, the Brotherhood negotiators agreed to a solution which in turn was submitted to the union members for a vote. When this contract was rejected, the union again threatened to strike. This strike was avoided when Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles requested a delay to allow further time for ne gotiations. These negotiations eventually paved the way for an agreement between the Authority and the union which averted a strike altogether. On the other hand, the 127Times, March 2, 1962, 2-1. 562 resulting increase in wages caused the MTA to make a cor- 128 responding increase in transxt fares. The final labor problems faced by the MTA occurred in June, 1964, shortly before that group was replaced by the Transit District. A demand for higher wages for MTA drivers was not immediately met by the Authority. As a result, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen called a strike which lasted for one week. During the strike period, the Authority and the Brotherhood were able to reach an agree ment, which was later ratified by the union members. The new contract called for a 35.7 cents per hour wage increase to be spread over a three-year period. Although this would cost an estimated $5,670,000 in three years, the Authority said that an immediate increase in fares was not antici pated.129 The June strike took place just prior to the imple mentation of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act, which would have prohibited the union from striking without a minimum of seventy days' notice. This provision 128 Times, March 14, 1962, 1-1, and May 15, 1962, 1-1. 129 Times, June 20, 1964, 1-1. 563 in the new act called for a compulsory seventy-day cooling off period before a strike. During this time, the dispute would be submitted and considered by a three-member fact finding commission appointed by the governor. This commis sion could then recommend settlement terms for the dispute. If these terms were not satisfactory to both parties, the union could then proceed with its strike. Thus, had the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act been in effect in June, 1964, the week-long strike occurring at that time might possibly have been avoided. Authority conflict with the Public Utilities Com mission.— The Authority had always been opposed to submit ting any aspects of its operations to the supervision of other state agencies. Thus, when the Public Utilities Com mission attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the safety of MTA operations as provided in the 1957 Act, the Authority opposed these actions. In March, 1962, the MTA was accused of having refused Public Utilities Commission safety 130 Musxck, Peeler and Garrett, Attorneys at Law, compilation of the Southern California Rapid Transit Dis trict Law (Part 3 of Division 10 of the Public Utilities Code) with Corresponding Provisions of the LAMTA Act of 1957 (As Amended), August 10, 1964, Ch. V, article 10, pp. 140-48. 564 inspectors access to Authority equipment. Gilliss replied that no such refusal had ever been made and that the MTA would comply with all provisions of the Public Utilities Commission's orders regarding equipment specifications.^l In June, 1962, the Public Utilities Commission announced that hearings would be opened into the operations and safety practices of the MTA. The Commission's presi dent said that this would be the opening technical move intended to culminate in a friendly court test on the con stitutionality of that section of the 1957 Act which gave the Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over the MTA. These hearings were held in August and concluded with the Public Utilities Commission maintaining that its jurisdic tion over the MTA still prevailed. October found the Public Utilities Commission deny ing the MTA a rehearing on the August ruling and ordering the Authority to comply with the Commission's safety rules and regulations for buses. The MTA contended that the Commission did not have authority over its operations, and to prove this point the Authority petitioned the State 131 Times, March 17, 1962, 1-27. 132 Times, June 12, 1962, 1-28. 565 Supreme Court for a writ to settle the legal argument.^ 3 This conflict was settled in June, 1963. At that time the Supreme Court concurred unanimously in the opinion that a 1961 amendment to the 1957 Act expressly and spe cifically gave the Public Utilities Commission regulatory powers over the safety aspects of the MTA's operations. l The Authority had lost its battle. The monorail proposals.— Although the MTA had rejected a monorail proposal to build a system of elevated rapid transit along the Backbone Route in December, 1961, Goodell Monorail Systems, Inc., presented a plan six months later to construct a sixty-mile rapid transit monorail system for the metropolitan area. The line followed the proposed Backbone Route, and was to be financed by a $338,000,000 revenue bond offered by the Authority. The firm also offered to construct a second line routed from 135 downtown Los Angeles to the International Airport. This proposal was taken under consideration by the 133Tjmes, October 4, 1962, 1-26. 134Times, June 21, 1963, 1-13. 135Times, July 3, 1962, 2-1. 566 Authority. In September Gilliss announced that the line to the airport might be financially feasible. However, construction would be contingent on obtaining rights of way and a promise of cooperation by city and county governments. To determine whether or not the necessary cooperation and rights of way could be obtained, the Authority began discus sions with the government groups that would be affected by 136 the airport line. A second monorail proposal was announced during the first half of 1963 by Alweg Rapid Transit Systems of California, Incorporated, a concern associated with the Wegmatic Corporation. Following the MTA's rejection of its fourteen-mile Backbone Route proposal in December, 1961, Alweg had begun to develop a second proposal. While devel oping the second plan, Alweg had notified the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors of its activities. Following this notification, a series of circumstances had prompted the Supervisors to arrange a meeting at which the proposal 137 could be presented. The meeting was held in June, 1963. At the June meeting Alweg made an offer to finance ^ ^ Times, September 12, 1962, 1-2; Minutes, Sep tember 18, 1962. ^ 7Times, June 5, 1963, 2-1 or 1-33. 567 and build a $105,000,000 rapid transit network linking the communities along the Backbone Route. The system would be approximately forty-two miles in length, instead of four teen as proposed in 1961. Alweg's financial underwriters said that they would be willing to head a syndicate to pur chase MTA bonds in the amount necessary to construct the system and would sell them to private investors. If this offer were accepted, Alweg stated that similar studies would be conducted to determine the feasibility of exten sions to Long Beach, San Bernardino, and the International 138 Airport. As had occurred at the presentation of the original monorail proposal in 1961, the property owners and politi cal representatives of the Wilshire and Beverly Hills dis tricts strongly opposed any monorail overhead structures in their areas. Nevertheless, the Authority, later that month, authorized its staff to proceed with evaluations of the two monorail plans. In the evaluation the staff was to deter mine, among other things, the reactions to the proposals of various cities that would be affected by their 138 Ibid.; Minutes, June 18, 1963. 568 139 implementation. Not until three months later did the MTA make public its decisions on the monorail proposals. In a statement delivered before the County Supervisors, Albert J. Eyraud, chairman of the MTA, said that the Alweg proposal was invalid and designed only to make the company a profit. He asserted that Alweg, in fact, had not offered private financing for its $187,500,000 system. It had merely sug gested that public bonds be issued to build the system, with the hope that the bonds could be paid for out of reve nues of the system. In this way, Alweg could not fail to benefit from the city and county's gamble. Another reason the Alweg proposal had been rejected the second time was that it did not provide for a subway, which was required along the Backbone Route in the Wilshire district. In addition, the proposal called for constructing the system along specific routes which had been rejected by all but one of the cities that would be affected. Finally, the state ment that Alweg had made about financing the Seattle World's Fair line from fare revenue alone was incorrect. The truth was that the line had been supported from a 139 Times, September 11, 1963, 2-1. 569 twenty-five cent surcharge on every ticket to the Fair in addition to the fare revenue itself. As for the Goode11 line to the International Air port, Eyraud said that it was worthy of additional study but would have to be considered separately and apart from any consideration of am area-wide system. That the Author ity had thought the Godell proposal might be a financial possibility for some time was reflected in a request it had made to the County Supervisors in July. At that time the MTA had asked the supervisors to consider the use of public rights of way as a step toward the development of the air port line. The reception to this request had not been par ticularly enthusiastic. Supervisor Debs said that he would not give the Authority a blank check for monorail routes, and other Board members expressed their opposition to any piecemeal solution to the rapid transit problem. Ultimately the lack of community support for the airport line prohib ited its construction.'*'40 The second rejection of the monorail proposal caused the monorail firms to notify Supervisor BoneHi that the MTA presentation and statements concerning their systems 140 Ibid.; Times, July 4, 1963, 2-1. 570 were inaccurate. Upon receipt of these challenges to the MTA position, Bonelli said that he would request a state legislative interim hearing to allow the monorail firms to document and defend officially their offers to provide a nonsubsidized medium of rapid transit. This action did not prove necessary, however, for the chairman of the Assembly Transportation Committee, Thomas Carrell, had already intended to hold hearings on the Los Angeles transit prob- i 141 lem. Prior to the Assembly hearings, the MTA formally notified the monorail firms that their networks were unac ceptable because of community objections. This action brought a bitter response from the County Supervisors. Supervisor Debs stated that he saw no reason for the hasty decision, and he believed that type of public relations by the Authority was not conducive to building a rapid transit system. Supervisor Bonelli was even more incensed and called the action a factor that would trigger the MTA's reorganization. These criticisms of its actions caused the MTA to invite both monorail companies to resubmit their proposals, but with the qualification that the accepted 141 Times, September 17, 1963, 2-1. 571 routes and included subway in the Wilshire corridor be followed.142 At the October Assembly interim committee hearings, the MTA asserted that the Alweg monorail line would cost approximately $40,000,000 more than the Authority's duo rail network. Alweg disagreed with the statement, saying that the cost would actually be about $444,000,000 less. Alweg was forced to admit, however, that the less expensive system would comprise a completely overhead facility. If a subway were employed, this would add to the cost, and fare box revenues alone would not provide the necessary financ ing. Thus, with the completion of the interim hearings in October, 1963, the MTA was finally and formally on record as rejecting all previous monorail proposals and favoring 143 the duo rail rapid transit system. The financial barrier.— Throughout 1962-1964, the MTA attempted to secure financing for elements of a mono rail rapid transit system through a variety of means. Foremost among these was the attempt to secure the passage 142 Times, September 25, 1963, 2-1. 143 Times, October 30, 1963, 2-1. 572 by Congress of the Transit Revenue Bond Guarantee Act. In addition to the political maneuvers described in Chapter V, the Authority tried to influence Congress into approving the guarantee measure by providing the Congressional com mittees with expert economic and engineering data gathered by the firms of Coverdale and Colpitts and Kaiser Indus tries. Both of these companies had completed their con tracted studies by July, 1962. However, the information provided by those studies was not sufficient to induce Congress to pass the Bond Guarantee Act. Thus, the Author ity was forced to pay for engineering and economic studies, whose results it was never able to utilize. Not only that, the Board was forced to authorize the expenditure of revenue from the general fund to pay for the expenses of these 144 studies when the construction fund was depleted in 1963. In September, 1962, the MTA attempted to secure funds from the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency to construct a rapid transit line from Los Angeles to Long Beach. The demonstration grant under which these funds were given would have provided two-thirds of the cost of the project. However, the money was never forthcoming. 144 Minutes, January 22, 1963. 573 The Authority was notified by Washington that the size of the project indicated a capital grant and not a request for a demonstration grant. Thus, money could not be made 145 available for the project. Another source of federal funds available for trans it construction was provided in loans under a congression- ally approved Urban Mass Transportation Act. When queried about securing a loan from this source for developing rapid transit in Los Angeles, the Authority stated that it would not be eligible for these loans, since matching funds from 146 sources other than the fare box were required. Once the MTA had been rebuffed in all the above searches for means to finance the proposed Backbone Route, it decided to approach the State Legislature for a solution to its monetary problems. The proposal which the Authority made to the 1963 Legislature requested that it be allowed to levy a property tax which, in conjunction with the fare revenue of the line, could be used to support the $649,000,- 147 000 revenue bond required to build the Backbone System. 145 Minutes, October 23, 1962. 146 Times, August 6, 1962, 2-1. 147 Times, January 8, 1963, 2-1. 574 The property tax proposal met with such strong opposition that the Authority decided to introduce neither it nor any other legislation in the 1963 Legislature. Nevertheless, the MTA continued to stress the fact that no rapid transit system could be constructed from private capital alone, and that some form of tax support was essen tial. Under these conditions, the passage of the Collier- Unruh Act took place in July, 1963. This measure was imme diately described by the MTA as the answer to the financial dilemma it then faced. The Collier-Unruh Act provided that the County Boards of Supervisors of the State could levy a one-quarter per cent in lieu tax upon the motor vehicles of their respective counties and use the money therefrom for the construction of rapid transit systems within their jurisdic tions. Following consultations with investment bankers, the Authority stated that, from the $15,000,000 that could accrue annually from the in lieu tax source, more than $390,000,000 in revenue bonds could be marketed. This would provide sufficient funds to construct the Backbone Route. Unfortunately for the MTA, the Supervisors could never be persuaded to levy the in lieu tax, and the Author ity continued to be without a means to finance its Backbone 575 Route. The termination of the MTA.— Several cross-currents came together In 1963 and 1964 to bring about the final demise of the MTA. Principal among these factors was the final realization that no rapid transit system could be constructed to serve the Los Angeles area without some type of subsidy. With the recognition that subsidization would be required to develop rapid transit, numerous groups and individuals began to question whether the Authority, whose members were appointed by the governor, should be provided with taxing powers. The consensus on this question was that any transit organization possessing taxing power should be responsive and responsible to its local constituency. The question that followed from this conclusion was: what should be the nature of a transit organization susceptible to local checks and balances? Another question which arose during these discussions was: what forms of taxation should be used to support the transit effort? In Chapter V a description was given of the activ ities by which the MTA attempted to gain support for its re modeled, locally responsive Transit Authority. As will be remembered, several committees were formed to consider both 576 the reorganization question and the method of financing question. Nevertheless, a bill developed by Senator Rees and Assemblyman Carrell, rather than the MTA or any of the various committees, finally became the basis for the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964. As the Rees bill began to gain support from the various metropolitan groups, the MTA made one last attempt to salvage its existence and reputation as a transit devel oper. This attempt consisted of a short but concentrated radio and newspaper campaign in which the Authority de scribed its past activities, the qualifications of the Authority members, the past achievements of the Authority, and the MTA's future plans for establishing rapid transit in the Los Angeles area. Although the Authority claimed that the campaign was not intended to influence the state legislators in their views of the Rees measure or the MTA proposal, the campaign did come only a short time after the Authority had been described as having a tarnished public image.^ 8 When community reaction to the Authority's campaign 148 Times, February 19, 1964, full page advertise ment, and March 1, 1964, C-l. 577 indicated that it had failed in its bid to continue as the rapid transit developer for the Los Angeles metropolitan community, the MTA reversed its position and supported the Rees measure. However, the Authority said that the bill still did not contain all the tools required to cope with the transit problem. True, the new transit district would have the power to issue general obligation bonds and would have the right of eminent domain over public property, which the MTA did not have. At the same time, it did not possess a means of independent financing, and this was actually the primary factor hindering the efforts of the MTA in developing the Backbone Route. Nevertheless, the Authority continued to urge the Legislature to pass the Transit District Act; and, as the fourth solution to the Los Angeles transit dilemma was approved, even the organi zation that would be replaced in the process concurred in 1 4 9 its ratification. Solution IV: The Southern California Rapid Transit District Provisions of the solution The Southern California Rapid Transit District Act 149 Times, April 1, 1964, 2-1. 578 of 1964 provided that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority would be merged into the Southern California Rapid Transit District. Upon that merger the separate existence of the Authority ceased, and the district suc ceeded, ipso facto and by operation of law and without other transfer, to all the rights and property of the Au thority, and was subject to all the legally enforceable debts and liabilities of the Authority, in the same manner 150 as if the District had itself incurred them. Several changes were made in the nature of the new metropolitan transit organization which were described as strengthening its capacity to deal with the transit problem. First, the District was made more responsible to local con trol. The board of directors [of the district] shall consist of eleven (11) members appointed as follows: Five (5) by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, who, in the discretion of such board of supervisors, may or may not be members of such board of supervisors, but each of whom shall be a resident of a different super visorial district. Two (2) by the Mayor of the City of Los Ange les, subject to confirmation by the City Council 15®Musick, Peller, and Barrett, op. cit., p. 184. 579 of the City of Los Angeles, who may or may not be members of such city council, but each of whom shall be a resident of such city. Four (4) by the city selection committee, who, in the discretion of such committee, may or may not be members of such committee, but each of whom shall be a resident of a different city and none of whom shall be residents of the City of Los Angeles. The city selection committee may adopt rules and regulations grouping or combining the area of the cities within the district except the City of Los Angeles into corridors based on existing or proposed transit lines or in any other manner regardless of contiguity. The rules and regulations may provide that members of the board of directors to be selected by the city selection committee shall be residents of the corridors or other groupings so determined. At the same time provisions were made which allowed a degree of local control over the annexation or exclusion of areas within the District's jurisdiction. The governing body of any city, which is not within the district may apply to the board of directors of the district for consent to annex the corporate area of such city to the district. The board of supervisors of the County of Los Angeles and any other county may apply to the board of directors of the district for consent to annex any unincorporated county territory to the district. Any city whose corporate area is a part of the district and any county with regard to any unincorporated territory which is a part of the district, may apply to the board of directors of ^^Ibid,, Ch. 3, Art. 1, Sec. 30201, p. 18. 580 the district for consent to exclude such area from the district.^-52 In each of these instances, however, the Board of Directors of the District was given the final power to grant or deny the group's request, and in granting the same was empowered to fix the terms and conditions thereof. In addition to making the District responsible to the local constituency through the selection of the District Board, the act also provided for local control over the financing of future transit system construction through the issuance of general obligation bonds. Whenever the board deems it necessary for the district to incur a general obligation bonded indebtedness for the acquisition, construction . . . it shall, by ordinance, adopted by a vote of two- thirds of all members of the board, so declare and call an election to be held in said district for the purpose of submitting to the qualified voters thereof the proposition of incurring in debtedness by the issuance of general obligation bonds of said district. If 60 per cent of the electors voting on the proposition vote for it, then the board may, by resolution, at such time or times as it deems proper, issue bonds of the district for the whole or any part of the amount of the indebtedness so authorized . . 152Ibid., Ch. 9, pp. 190-98. 153Ibid., Ch. 7, Secs. 30900, 30903, pp. 158-60. 581 This section, therefore, provided the District with a new source of potential funds from which to finance rapid transit construction. At the same time, the District retained the power to issue revenue bonds, without voter approval. As will be remembered, this had been the only means of financing available to the Authority. In conjunction with granting the District the authority to issue general obligation bonds, the 1964 Act 154 conferred a further, more far-reaching power. The board may provide for the levy and collec tion of taxes by the district. If from any cause the revenues of the dis trict are or are expected to be inadequate in any year to pay the principal of, interest on or sinking fund payments for general obligation bonds of the district . . . the board shall . . . levy for district purposes a tax sufficient . . . to pay the interest on the bonds . . . Thus, the District was provided with a power described by its predecessor, the MTA, as being essential for the organization entrusted with the responsibility of developing rapid transit in the Los Angeles Community. Another power which the Authority had said was needed by any group wishing to cope with the problem of 154 Ibid., Ch. 6, Secs. 30800, 30802, p. 150. 582 rapid transit was that of eminent domain over publicly owned property and public utilities. This power was granted to the District. The district may acquire, construct, own, operate, control or use rights of way, rail lines, monorails, bus lines, stations, platforms, . . . and any and all other facilities necessary or convenient for the access of persons and vehicles thereto, and may acquire or contract for any interest in or rights to the use or joint use of any or all of the foregoing; provided, that installations in state freeways shall be subject to the approval of the State Department of Public Works and installations in other state highways shall be subject to . . A final change in the operational procedures of the new district was to be found in the provisions govern ing labor relations. As discussed earlier in this chap ter, the Transit District Act provided for a minimum seven ty-day cooling off period before a strike could be called. Furthermore, a provision was made whereby the governor could appoint a three-member commission to study the dis pute and suggest a solution thereto. However, the accept ance of the committee's recommendations was not mandatory, and should the union desire, a strike could take place after the cooling-off period. 155 Ibid., Ch. 5, Art. 5, Sec. 30631, p. 96. 156 Ibid., Ch. 5, Art. 10, pp. 140-48. 583 In summary, the 1964 Act created the Southern California Rapid Transit District to replace the MTA cre ated in 1957* The act provided the new transit organiza tion with a majority of the powers which the MTA had lacked but which had been described by that organization as essen tial to the resolution of the transit dilemma. These included: 1. An organizational structure which was respon sible to the local metropolitan community. 2. The power to issue general obligation bonds. 3. The power of eminent domain over public property provided certain qualifications were met. 4. A means of lessening the probability of labor strikes which could force the shut-down of the transit system and a corresponding lack of in come during that period. The formative period of the Southern California Rapid Transit District During August and September, 1964, the Board of Supervisors, the City of Los Angeles, and the City Selec tion Committees chose their representatives for the District Board of Directors. This process was completed by 584 September, and the first meeting of the District was held on the 30th of that month. At that meeting, Harry Faull, a representative of the suburban cities, was chosen as tem porary presiding chairman and a Merger Advisory Board was established to advise the District of ways to facilitate the take-over of the Authority. Included on this Merger Board was Martin Pollard, then a member of the MTA and also a newly appointed member of the District representing the 157 City of Los Angeles. The formal changeover came when the District Board of Directors approved, on November 5, 1964, a technical merger which terminated the MTA after thirteen years as a transit planning and operating authority. The changeover was accompanied by the appointment of District members to the chairmanships of the District's five committees: (1) operations, (2) rapid transit financing, (3) rapid transit planning, (4) legislation, and (5) property and casualty insurance. This structuring of responsibilities allowed the District Board to consider the functioning of its operations as being divided into a bus operations division 157 Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors, September 30, 1964, Southern California Rapid Transit District (hereinafter cited as Minutes of District Meet ing) . 585 and a rapid transit division. To facilitate the continuity of effort in these two areas, the Board reappointed to their respective positions in the District the executive director, Gilliss, the treasurer-auditor, and the secre tary. Having taken these actions, the new District was prepared to direct the operations of the inherited bus system and to begin a campaign to rectify the deficiencies which it believed existed in the creating legislation.1®® Defects in the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964 One of the first defects in the 1964 Act was described not by a District member but by a state assembly man from Long Beach. In October, 1964, Assemblyman Joseph M. Kennick stated that the Southern California Rapid Transit District appeared to have been the subject of discrimina tion in the charter bus field. The 1961 amendment to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957, which had prohibited the MTA from operating charter buses had carried over in the Transit District Act. However, to Kennick's knowledge the District was the only California l Times, November 5, 1964, November 6, 1964, 2-1, and October 20, 1964. 586 municipal system that was legally prohibited from conduct ing such services. Since the charter service served a revenue-producing function which helped most transit com panies offset their losses in the straight passenger bus line business, Kennick said that he intended to have the Assembly Interim Committee on Public Utilities look into this matter and make recommendations to the 1965 Legisla ture.159 The second defect of the 1964 Act, noted by the MTA when the act was still in its formative stages, derived from the absence of any sources of independent financing for the District. In January, 1965, the District's legis lative committee, chaired by Martin Pollard, proposed, and the Board approved, a legislative program designed to over come this defect. This program requested that the Legisla ture provide the District with the authority to levy a minimum property tax and an in lieu tax on motor vehicles which would increase registration fees by one-half of one per cent. The property tax funds would be earmarked for detailed engineering and public information work on the twenty-three mile Backbone Route and other features of the 159 Times, October 16, 1964, 1-21. 587 originally proposed sixty-four mile transit system. The property tax would be continued only until monies became available from the in lieu tax as a bond guarantee. By providing this means of independent financing to the Dis trict, funds would be made available not only for construc tion purposes but also for matching grants which could then be obtained from the federal government. In addition to the financing proposals, the initial 1965 legislation called for the Legislature to restore the District's charter bus business, clarify the language of the 1964 Act relating to the transportation of communication material, and make other technical changes. The District's taxing request brought reactions of strong disapproval from several groups, particularly the South Bay cities of Los Angeles County. Public officials and civic leaders of these cities questioned the advisabil ity of taxing the entire county for a transit system which would serve only a part of the metropolitan community. However, before making a final decision with respect to the District's proposal, these cities requested that members of the District meet with them for a discussion of the ^°Minutes of District Meeting, January 20, 1965. 588 proposed plan. In response to the opposition of Redondo Beach, one of the South Bay cities, the District member representing the transit corridor in which that city was located, described the opposition to the District's proposal as a threat stemming from the city's desire for improved bus service. He, therefore, recommended that a study be made to determine if adjustments could be made to improve the bus service in that area. This recommendation was accepted and the District engineer stated that the study would be undertaken immediately.161 In a second move to reduce the opposition to its proposals, the District adopted a master plan for a 160- mile rapid transit system serving virtually every community in the Los Angeles metropolitan community. This plan was an extension and revamping of the familiar four-corridor system and Backbone Route proposed by the District's pre decessor, the MTA. In addition to an eight-artery network of rapid transit lines, the plan called for a new "Feeder Flyer" bus system of more than fifty routes and expanded connecting local bus service. The cost estimates for this 161Times, February 18, 1965, 2-3. 589 plan were not provided, but it was expected that they would exceed $1,000,000,000.162 Eight weeks after the original District financing proposal had been made, a revised financing program was offered as the basis for the District's 1965 legislative program. The new program had been developed following dis cussions with various groups and individuals in the Los Angeles area. It called for the Legislature to authorize a county vote to be taken on whether or not a transit system should be financed through revenue produced by a one per cent increase in the motor vehicle registration in lieu tax. In addition, the plan requested that the Legislature levy for one year a one-half of one per cent motor vehicle in lieu tax to provide funds for completing engineering work and public information work necessary before a vote could be taken on the financing proposal. If these two proposals were approved and the taxing measure passed by the county voters, the District asserted that sufficient funds could be generated to permit the construction of four principal corridors providing relief to the most critically congested traffic routes in the Los Angeles basin and providing 162Times, March 4, 1965, 2-1. 590 service by connecting buses to the remainder of the com munity . - I - 6 3 Prior to the legislative introduction of the second financing proposal by Senator Rees in April, several ac tions were taken by the District which might be interpreted as attempts to reduce the opposition to that proposal. First, on April 5th a Freeway Flyer bus service was inaugu rated to one of the South Bay cities. Second, during the report and adoption of the legislative program by the Dis trict, Director Gordon R. Hahn asked, and received assur ances from the Board, that the District continue to seek federal support for the District's program, contact members of the County Congressional delegation, develop plans for financing and constructing the remaining four legs of the Master Rapid Transit Plan, and prepare plans for grants under the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act when match ing funds became available.16* As was seen in Chapter V, the District's financing bill was ultimately killed in the Senate Transportation Committee. An attempt was made to revise the measure when 161Minutes of District Meeting, April 7, 1965. 591 the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors announced that it would levy, under certain conditions, the one-half of one per cent in lieu tax for one year. The condition was that the Legislature pass an act allowing the county elec torate to vote on an in lieu tax on motor vehicles as the means to support the construction of a rapid transit sys tem in Los Angeles County. The Legislature would not ap prove this proposal; and, as a result, the 1965 Legislative Session ended with the District still possessing no source of independent financing from which to construct a transit system. The impace of the 1965 legislative defeat on the District The continuing absence of independent financing, as a result of the refusal of the 1965 Legislature to approve the District's legislative program, affected both the District's bus operations and its rapid transit develop ment efforts. Although the fact was not widely publicized, the District's bus operations had been faring poorly for some time. During 1964 the bus operation had lost both passengers and revenue. This decline had continued into the first five months of 1965. With these trends, Director 592 Howard P. Allen was prompted to state that the metropolitan community could no longer afford the luxury of the existing extensive bus service without some form of subsidy. He predicted that pay increases to District employees, coming on top of dwindling revenues, could lead to higher fares, 165 with a loss of patronage and poorer service. Following the final defeat of its revised legisla tive program, the District, on June 16th, fulfilled some of Allen’s predictions by ordering a sharp cutback in the bus service. A week later, the District staff presented a plan to operationalize the cutback order. This plan verified that during the first five months of 1965 there had been a 3.5 per cent decline in passengers, as compared to the same period the preceding year. Vehicle mileage, however, had dropped only 1.66 per cent. Service changes could be enacted to reduce this variance and at the same time effect a savings of $600,000 a year. However, this action would mean the elimination of some buses, discontinuence of some service in off-peak hours, and the elimination of some Saturday and Sunday service. The report concluded by stat ing that a change in the District's fare structure. 165Times, May 20, 1965, 2-1. 593 including the elimination of transfers and preferential fares for students, should come only as a last resort. The defeat of the District's legislative program also strongly affected its rapid transit efforts. On June 17th, C. M. Gilliss, making one of his last presentations before his resignation took effect at the end of the month, said that paring the rapid transit effort would require cutting engineering and public information programs from about $125,000 to $50,000 annually. By June 24th Gilliss* successor. Cone T. Bass, estimated that $100,000 could be saved annually by reducing engineering, public information, and administrative costs related to rapid transit develop ment. Thus, all phases of the District's operations appear to have been intimately influenced by the failure of the 1965 Legislature to approve the financing proposals sub- 16 7 mitted by the District. The future course of District action As the District entered the second half of 1965, it continued the pursuit of an independent means of financing ^6^Times, June 24, 1965, 1-3. ^67Ibid.; and Times, June 17, 1965, 2-1. 594 its transit activities. To this end, the District urged an acceleration of the rapid transit financing study authorized by the Assembly. This authorization was made in the form of an approved resolution, authored by Assembly Speedier Unruh and co-authored by Assemblyman Carrell, which called for an interim committee study of methods of financ ing the District. If the study could be made in time, the District hoped that findings could be produced which would enable the question of rapid transit to be placed on the agenda of the 1966 Special Legislative Session. If this procedure could be followed, the District would not have to wait until the 1967 Regular Session to have its financing 16 8 dilemma resolved by the Legislature. When the Assembly Transportation Committee convened interim hearings on rapid transit financing, the District immediately indicated the future course of action it intended to follow in developing rapid transit for the Los Angeles metropolitan community. At those hearings District Board chairman, Faull, said that for long-term financing a one-half of one per cent increase in motor vehicle fees in combination with a one-quarter of one per cent county- 168 Minutes of District Meeting, June 16, 1965. 595 wide sales tax provided the best approach. In addition, the District needed $2,500,000 in preliminary funds to complete some engineering work on the transit project be fore the long-term financing proposal was submitted to a county-wide vote. He suggested that these funds could come from a one-half of one per cent property tax, loans from state fuel taxes the District paid, or a flexible plan to permit the county to levy a smaller motor vehicle in lieu tax than was then allowed. He said that a one-tenth of one per cent in lieu tax could produce enough money for the necessary engineering work. The important matter, however, was not the form in which rapid transit financing would be provided; it was when the financing would be provided and its magnitude.^9 Summary of Phase III activities occurring in the Los Angeles Rapid Transit controversy The statement has been made repeatedly in the Los Angeles community that between 1949 and 1965 much anguish was expressed about the existing transit dilemma, but noth ing was done about it. Ho rapid transit lines were laid, 169 Times, September 16, 1965, 1-3. 596 and the freeway system was becoming more congested them ever. Although the final two statements are quite valid, the conclusion that much was said but nothing was done about developing a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles metropolitan area is grossly inaccurate. Beginning with the State Legislature's ratification of the first solution to the Los Angeles transit problem in 1951, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of that year, a foundation was laid upon which a multitude of significant efforts were spawned which brought the com munity ever closer to a resolution of this vital metropoli tan problem. These efforts were generated primarily by groups established by the state to cope with the problem of passenger transportation in Los Angeles County. As these groups endeavored to implement the solutions to this dilem ma ratified by the Legislature, they were often confronted with conditions and circumstances which thwarted the suc cess of their ventures. Thus, the energy of these groups was often dispelled in seeking means to overcome the bar riers to the implementation and administration of transit problem solutions with which they were provided. The objective of the following chapter will be to identify those factors which tended to impede the imple- mentation and administration of the solutions to the Los Angeles transit dilemma ratified by the State Legislature. In pursuing this objective, an identification will be made of (1) those recurring factors which appeared to retard the implementation and administration of all ratified solutions and (2) those factors which appeared to impede the imple mentation and administration of specific solutions. From such an analysis, certain general factors may possibly be detected which tend to deter the implementation and adminis tration of solutions to other types of metropolitan prob lems or different solutions to those problems. CHAPTER VIII DETERRENTS TO SOLUTION I IMPLEMENTATION- ADMINISTRATION Introduction As groups assume the role of solution implementor- administrator and initiate the behaviors necessary to enact that role, they are frequently confronted with numerous factors which retard the successful implementation of the ratified solutions. Many of the factors which can arise to deter the completion of the final phase of the metropolitan problem-solving process may be identified from an analysis of the preceding chapter. In the following pages the find ings of such an analysis will be discussed. In this chapter the factors which acted as deter rents to the implementation and administration of ratified solutions to the Los Angeles transit dilemma will be cate gorized under three broad headings: (1) deterrents arising from characteristics of the implementing group, (2) 598 599 deterrents arising from the activities of external groups, and (3) deterrents related to the nature of the problem and various environmental conditions. As has been illustrated, many solutions to metro politan problems are generated and ratified but fail to be enacted. These failures are often attributable to a direct lack of foresight concerning factors which may hinder the implementation of the solutions. When such foresight is absent, the resulting burdens will in all probability fall upon the public. Not only must the public continue to live with the metropolitan problem, but it may also be forced to pay the costs of attempting to implement the abortive solution. This study, therefore, was in part undertaken to contribute to the enhancement of foresight in metropolitan problem-solving. By identifying the deterrents to the final phase of the metropolitan problem-solving process, groups attempting to overcome various metropolitan problems may be able to achieve a more complete understanding of the forces they must surmount to achieve their goals. Thus, by more fully comprehending the factors retarding the enact ment of the final phase of this metropolitan process, groups fulfilling the basic roles of solution-generator and 600 solution-ratifier may enhance their abilities to provide solutions more capable of implementation than would other wise be the case. Phase III Deterrents Arising from Characteristics of the Implementing Group Of the three sets of deterrent factors to be dis cussed in this chapter, the largest number of factors come within the category here under scrutiny. In addition to encompassing the most numerous deterrent factors to Phase III activities, this category also appeared to possess the factors wielding the most significant impeding effects upon these activities. In the Los Angeles rapid transit contro versy, six separate factors fell within this category. The absence of financial resources necessary to imple ment the solution Three separate solutions to the Los Angeles transit dilemma failed to be implemented as originally proposed because the implementing group had not been provided with the financial resources required for their implementation. These were the solutions contained in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951, Assembly Bill 2643 passed in 1961, and the Southern California Rapid 601 Transit District Act of 1964. The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951.— The 1951 Act created as its implementing organization of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. The Authority was to finance the implementation of the transit solution provided by this act either through the sale of revenue bonds or through contributions from other public jurisdictions. However, when the MTA organized its operations in March, 1952, no contributions had been tendered by any public jurisdictions, and it possessed no income-producing activities from which revenue bonds could be sold. Thus, one of the first tasks facing the new Authority was to secure financial resources through which to sustain its existence. During the period from 1952 to 1956, the MTA suc ceeded in obtaining financial support for its activities from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors; and, in fiscal 1956, the Authority obtained its first state appro priation. Although these sources provided sufficient funds to carry on a number of economic and engineering studies, they never contributed the magnitude of funds required to fulfill the objective of the 1951 Act— the construction of 602 a monorail system within the MTA's prescribed jurisdic tional area. Thus, since the necessary funds were neither contributed by public jurisdictions nor provided through revenue bonds by private investors, the MTA was unable to enact successfully the first state legislative solution to the Los Angeles transit problem. Assembly Bill 2643.— The MTA was confronted with a similar problem when it was called upon to implement the transit solution provided by Assembly Bill 2643. Under the conditions of that bill, the Authority could construct a rapid transit line from Century City on the west, through Los Angeles to El Monte on the east, if a low-interest loan to finance the project could be secured. Due to certain financial factors, the line could not be financed through revenue bonds. Therefore, the Authority turned to the federal government in an attempt to induce Congress to provide a bond guarantee or low-interest loans from which financing could be obtained to build the system. When Congress rejected this request, the MTA's inability to implement the solution contained in Assembly Bill 2643 continued because of insufficient funds from which to construct the Backbone Route system. 603 When the Authority realized that federal assistance could not be secured to construct a rapid transit system, it finally turned to the State Legislature for financial support. In this endeavor the MTA recommended a number of sources from which the Legislature could draw to provide sufficient funds to construct a rapid transit system for the Los Angeles area. As a result of these requests and changes which had occurred in the circumstances surrounding the Los Angeles transit controversy, the State Legislature was provoked to action and approved the Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964. In this act, the Legis lature provided both a new solution and a new organization to cope with the transit problem. Furthermore, it estab lished for the new organization additional potential sources of revenue from which to finance transit development activ ities . The Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964.— The basic objective of the Transit District Act was to promote the construction of a system of rapid transit for Los Angeles County. The Legislature had pro vided the District with several sources from which to draw the financial assistance needed to reach this goal. First, 604 financial surpluses accruing from the MTA bus operations taken over by the District could be utilized. Second, the District, as was true with the MTA, was empowered to finance activities through the sale of revenue bonds. Finally, unlike the MTA, the District was given the power to incur, upon a 60 per cent affirmative vote of the electorate, a general obligation bonded indebtedness secured from proper ty taxes. Two factors appeared to reduce the effectiveness of the last measure as a realistic means for providing the District with the financial resources needed to construct a rapid transit system. First, the District did not possess the funds needed to complete certain economic and engineer ing studies which it believed would be needed to persuade the public to approve a subsidy for transit construction. Second, it did not believe that, even if the above studies were made, the electorate would approve financing a transit system through general obligation bonds supported solely by property taxes. Thus, the District developed a new financ ing program which called upon the Legislature to provide different revenue sources from which to finance the imple mentation of the 1964 legislative solution to the transit dilemma. 605 Even after the District asserted that a rapid trans it facility could not be constructed from the financial resources it then possessed, the 1965 Legislature refused to grant the group additional sources of revenue. Inasmuch as the District was in no position to issue revenue bonds to secure additional financial resources, and since its bus operations were in fact showing a deficit, and thereby draining the financial reserves of the District, this legis lative rebuff forced the District to curtail rapid transit efforts and reduce the bus services. As in the previous two instances, another solution to the Los Angeles transit problem had been developed and ratified which was inoper able because the implementing group did not possess the financial resources to effect its accomplishment. The absence of legal authority necessary to implement the solution A second element which may retard a group's efforts to implement a given solution derives from the group's limited legal authority to conduct the activities by which the solution may be enacted. This factor retarded the efforts of both the MTA and the District in implementing the solutions to the transit problem for which they were 606 responsible. Legal limitation retarding MTA solution implementa tion.— The first occasion on which the MTA was thwarted in implementing a solution to the transit problem occurred in 1954. Following the Coverdale studies of 1953, the MTA learned that the construction of a monorail line within its jurisdictional area might be economically feasible if it were given certain legal powers. These included exempting the MTA from Public Utilities Commission control over fares, routes, and other operating matters and freeing it from local taxation. Neither of these powers was granted at that time, and as a result the monorail system was not constructed. When these powers were later given to the Authority, in 1957, the line was not constructed because other conditions had altered. Nevertheless, had these powers been possessed by the Authority in 1954, a monorail line might possibly have been constructed and the solution to the transit problem contained in the 1951 Act enacted. In 1960-61 the MTA was again faced with the dilemma of not possessing the legal authority to implement a rati fied solution. The 1957 Act required the MTA to provide a system of rapid transit for practically all of Los Angeles County. To accomplish this goal, the Authority had com- 607 missioned numerous engineering and economic studies which had produced a plan to construct a seventy-five mile rapid transit system operating within four traffic corridors within the county. The major feature of this plan which prohibited its implementation was its demand that rights of way be placed on land owned by public jurisdictions and public utility companies. The 1957 Act did not give the MTA authority to condemn properties coming within these two categories. Therefore, the construction of this system could be blocked by any public jurisdiction or public utility company which refused the use of its land for transit purposes. Since the MTA was never able to secure the expansion of its con demnation powers, this deficiency in legal authority was always to remain a deterrent to its resolution of the trans it dilemma. Legal limitations retarding Southern California Rapid Transit District solution implementation.— As was previously noted, the District was granted the power to issue general obligation bonds secured by property taxes to finance rapid transit construction, if 60 per cent of the voting public gave its approval. However, the District did 608 not believe that the voters would agree to financing a transit system from property taxes. Unfortunately for the District, the organic legislation did not provide any addi tional means whereby, under the existing conditions, the magnitude of funds needed to implement the solution to the transit problem for which it was responsible could be obtained. As a result of the legal limitations placed upon its income sources, the District was unable to implement successfully the Legislature's 1964 solution to the transit problem. Thus, the absence of legal authority to avoid taxation and Public Utilities Commission control had inhib ited the MTA's implementation of the 1951 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. The absence of legal authority to condemn property owned by public jurisdictions and public utilities had retarded the implementation of the 1957 Act. And the absence of legal authority to secure funds for rapid transit construction from sources other than revenue bonds, general obligation bonds, and excess revenue from the bus service contributed to the failure of the District to implement the solution to the Los Angeles transit dilemma contained in the Transit District Act of 1964. 609 Resource deficiencies hinder the procurement of prerequisite conditions to solution imple mentation If a group lacks the resources to implement a metropolitan problem solution, or if the conditions neces sary for implementing that solution do not exist, the group must attempt to alter those conditions. The means by which the group attempts to achieve this alteration usually re quires the utilization of group resources. As was seen in Chapters IV and VI, group resources as used in this study refer to both tangible and intangible factors upon which a group may draw to elicit the behavior it desires from other groups or individuals or to secure human, material, or financial resources for group use. For example, the good will a group develops with the public it serves may be as much a group resource as the income derived for services rendered. A multitude of examples could be drawn from the rapid transit experience to illustrate how both the MTA and the District lacked, at one time or another, the resources required to alter existing conditions so as to be able to implement a given solution to the transit problem. How ever, let us consider only a few of these instances. 610 In 1954 the MTA discovered that it did not have the resources required to influence the governor to place the issue of rapid transit on the agenda of that year's special legislative session. Furthermore, until the Authority had reached a compromise with the private transit companies over the issue of purchasing the assets of those companies and had developed a plan acceptable to the majority of the groups in the metropolitan area, it did not have the re sources needed to influence the Legislature to approve a measure exempting the MTA from Public Utilities Commission control and local taxation. In both of these instances, the Authority lacked initial resources required to secure additional financial and legal resources necessary for solution implementation. Had the governor put the transit issue on the special legislative session agenda, and had the Legislature exempted the MTA from Public Utilities Commission control and local taxation, the Authority might have been able to sell its revenue bonds and thereby con struct the monorail transit system from the San Fernando Valley to Long Beach. Before investors would purchase MTA revenue bonds needed for constructing a rapid transit system, studies would have to indicate that the system would produce a 611 specified amount of revenue within a given time period. Unfortunately, neither the Authority nor the District possessed the resources to alter the amount of revenue the system would produce or the amount of system income invest ors required before construction bonds would be purchased. Thus, they displayed a deficiency of resources required to secure the conditions necessary for solution implementation financed through revenue bond sales. A final example of this deterrent factor to solu tion implementation is found in the case of the District and its financing dilemmas. Although the District could finance a rapid transit system through general obligation bonds, it requested that the Legislature provide alterna tive means for financing the system. This request would tend to indicate that the District did not believe it had the resources, financial or otherwise, necessary to influ ence 60 per cent of the electorate to support a general obligation bond issue for rapid transit construction. This interpretation gained fuller validity when the District requested that the Legislature provide both short-term and long-term financing. The long-term financing would be provided by a vote of the District's electorate, while the short-term financing would be provided without such a vote. 612 Furthermore, the funds from the latter source would be used to undertake studies and public information work which would provide resources to influence the public's approval of long-term financing capable of providing the magnitude of resources needed to build the transit system. Thus, in each of these examples, the MTA and the District lacked the resources required to secure additional resources or alter various conditions necessary for solution implementa tion. So long as these resources were absent from these implementing groups, the solution failed to be enacted and the problem continued. The impact of multiple objectives on group resource utilization and solution implementation Once the MTA purchased the private bus companies in 1958, it assumed the dual functions of operating the bus lines and advancing the development of a rapid transit sys tem in accordance with the guidelines established in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. These multiple objectives proved to be both a blessing and a problem to the Authority. The bus operation benefitted the MTA at first by providing a fund of surplus revenue over costs. This 613 situation gave the Authority a source of funds which it would otherwise not have had and which could be used for financing studies leading to the development of a rapid transit system. However, this financial advantage eventu ally created problems for the Authority. The studies financed from the surplus revenues of the bus operation led the MTA to the conclusion that a specific transit system could be constructed if only a low interest loan could be obtained. This conclusion prompted the Authority to expend additional sums of money in an attempt to secure further information which could be used to persuade the federal government to provide the required low-interest loans. When the federal government failed to provide the loans, the MTA was still forced to bear the costs incurred by the studies designed to dispose the fed eral government favorably toward the loan proposal. Unfortunately for the MTA, these costs had to be paid at a time when bus revenue surpluses were declining. As a result, the Authority had to draw upon reserves to honor its financial commitments and to increase fares to maintain the bus operation at acceptable public levels of service. Thus, the original financial surpluses, provided by the bus operations, enabled the MTA to carry on activi 614 ties directed toward the accomplishment of its second ob jective, the establishment of a rapid transit system. However, the transit development activities, which the bus revenue surpluses promoted, ultimately had repercussions on the administration of the bus operation itself. At the same time, the continuation of activities required for transit solution implementation was hindered by the reduc tion of revenue surpluses derived from the MTA's metropoli tan bus service. With assumption of the responsibility for conducting the affairs of the major bus operation in the Los Angeles area, the time and energy available to the MTA for consid ering the problems of implementing a solution to the transit dilemma could not help but be reduced. No longer could the Authority be solely concerned with rapid transit systems, financing, routes, and other such questions. Now it also had to consider questions of labor relations, bus fares and routes, the organization and administration of the bus operations, and a multitude of matters concerning the expansion and change of the bus system. Partly to reduce this burden of division of effort, Senator Rees called upon the Legislature in 1963 to estab lish a Los Angeles Transit District that would initially be 615 divorced from the operation of the metropolitan bus facil ities. A transit district of this nature, however, was not ultimately established. Instead, another multipurpose transit organization, the Southern California Rapid Transit District, was created. As a result, many of the same dif ficulties which confronted the MTA in implementing its solutions to the transit problem continued to confront the District. After the MTA had taken control of the private bus operations, a number of operational decisions were made which brought strong protests from various metropolitan groups. When the decision was made to convert existing rail and trolley facilities to bus operations, the affected areas, such as Long Beach, Compton, and Watts, opposed those actions and expressed the belief that the Authority was not operating in the best interests of the metropolitan community. They complained that the Authority had been established to provide a system of rapid transit, and that in effect it was replacing an existing rapid transit system with slower moving buses. These actions produced a degree of alienation between the communities and the MTA. This alienation may possibly have gained expression in a later period when these communities opposed various proposals of 616 the MTA which called for the extension of its powers to implement certain solutions to the transit problem. Fur thermore, similar Authority actions may have contributed to the fact that no communities in Los Angeles opposed the Legislature's approval of the Rees Transit District Act of 1964 which terminated the existence of the MTA. Other decisions made by the Authority with respect to the bus operations also tended to reduce its stature in the eyes of the Los Angeles metropolitan community. When the MTA first took over the bus services, changes in fares and route schedules were often made at monthly Board meet ings without first giving advance public notice that such matters would be discussed. This procedure produced the belief among various metropolitan groups that the Authority had established itself as the sole judge of the public interest. In fact, this feeling was verbalized during a 1958 Senate hearing by Senators Randolph Collier and Richard Richards, and at that time these individuals called upon the Authority to alter its procedures with respect to these affairs. Each of the above activities enacted by the Author ity in providing bus services for the metropolitan area resulted in the development of a degree of distrust and 617 concern toward its good faith on the part of various indi viduals and groups within the metropolitan community. As bus fares continued to increase, but bus services did not correspondingly seem to improve, many groups began to ques tion whether the Authority could be depended upon to develop a rapid transit system. More importantly, some groups began to question whether the MTA should be the group to develop a rapid transit system. Although the MTA was finally replaced by the Southern California Rapid Transit District as the Los Angeles rapid transit development group, the cause of this change could not be attributed solely to the dissatisfac tion which metropolitan groups felt toward the Authority's administration of the bus operation. However, had the Authority been able to administer and provide a bus system capable of gaining the respect and satisfaction of the metropolitan community, it might have been far more success ful in eliminating many of the barriers hindering the implementation of the solution with which it had been pro vided for resolving the Los Angeles transit controversy. 618 The inability of the imple menting group to control elements within its own boundaries In order for a group to implement a solution to a metropolitan problem efficiently, it needs to be capable of controlling and structuring the behavior of its internal elements. In this way the group may reduce friction which might otherwise retard successful solution implementation and administration. In the Los Angeles rapid transit exper ience, the lack of internal group control frequently con tributed to the retardation of the MTA's efforts to imple ment solutions to the transit problem. The element within its organization which the Authority could not continuously control was the labor unions. On numerous occasions, the MTA found the activities of its labor unions running directly counter to certain of its own activities directed toward the establishment of a rapid transit system. With each pay raise granted to the union membership, the Authority was eventually compelled to raise its fares. With the increase in fares usually came a corresponding decrease in passengers, a decrease in excess bus revenues, and less funds to employ in forwarding the rapid transit effort. Two separate instances found the unions causing the 619 MTA to lose revenue more directly than through the decline of passengers due to increased fares. This occurred when the unions called for strikes against the Authority which completely halted bus operations. While no significant amounts of income were produced during these strike peri ods, the Authority's payments of principal and interest on bonds and certain administrative costs continued. Thus, these unilateral actions reduced the resources available to the Authority for enacting solutions to the transit problems. The unions' power to strike further impeded the rapid transit effort by reducing the attractiveness of revenue bonds which the MTA would need to sell for transit construction purposes. To eliminate this deterrent to the sale of its bonds, the Authority attempted to have the 1961 Legislature place its employees in a civil service status. This would have prohibited the unions from striking, there by stabilizing income and making Authority revenue bonds more attractive to investors. When the MTA made the above request to the State Legislature, it also requested an extension of its powers to include the condemnation of public property and property owned by public utilities. The Authority stated that such 620 condemnation powers were essential if it were to construct a rapid transit system. Prior to the Authority’s announce ment that civil service status would be requested for its employees, the MTA unions had indicated support for the extension of MTA condemnation powers. However, after the civil service proposal was made, the unions' support turned to opposition. Furthermore, the unions caused to be intro duced several legislative proposals of their own which would have created additional deterrents to the MTA's rapid transit effort, had they been given legislative approval. Thus, unable to control the labor elements within its own organization, the MTA was frequently thwarted in efforts to implement and administer solutions to the trans it problem. Indirectly, the transit effort was reduced when raises in labor costs brought higher fares, decreases in patronage, and a reduction in surplus bus revenues to finance rapid transit studies. The solution implementation effort was directly retarded when the labor unions opposed specific changes in the Authority's legal authority needed to establish a transit system. 621 Community disapproval of the implementing group's governing body The creation of the MTA had not been accompanied by a complete consensus as to the way in which members of the Board of Directors, the governing and policy-making body of that group, should be appointed. Many local metropolitan groups believed that the directors should be locally ap pointed, rather than being chosen by the governor. How ever, the latter method of appointment prevailed and was contained in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. So long as the Authority proposed to construct a rapid transit system without relying upon local tax sub sidies, only a few minor objections were raised to the gubernatorial appointment process by which the directors were chosen. However, when the MTA suggested in 1961 that some form of subsidy would be needed to construct a transit system, a plethora of metropolitan groups attacked the Authority for not being a locally-appointed and, therefore, locally-controlled organization. When the Authority failed in its final efforts to obtain transit financing from other than local tax sources, and announced that it would seek property taxation powers 622 from the State Legislature, a fatal step was made toward its ultimate demise. Having itself acknowledged that sub sidization would be required to construct a rapid transit system, the Authority was in no position to counter the argument of groups who claimed that any transit organiza tion having local taxing power should be locally appointed. This argument in the final analysis prevailed, and the MTA was replaced by the Southern California Rapid Transit District. Had the Authority possessed a locally-appointed and controlled governing body, it might have continued as the group chosen to implement the State Legislature's 1964 1 solution to the transit problem. However, it did not pos sess such a characteristic, and therefore it was unable either to sustain its existence or implement a solution to the transit problem relying on local tax subsidies. Deterrents Arising from the Activities of Groups External to the Implementing Group The means for implementing a solution to a metro politan problem are often only vaguely set forth in the document formally ratifying that solution. When this is the case, the implementing group must utilize its own resources to operationalize the solution to a level where 623 it may be put into practice. As this procedure takes place, the group may discover that under the existing circumstances the ratified solution may not be operationalized. If thi3 happens and the group finds itself unable to alter the existing circumstances, the only alternatives of action for the implementing group are to seek changes in some aspects of the ratified solution or to design a completely new solution to the problem and seek its ratification. In the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, the above solution implementation and administration activities generated numerous reactions from groups external to the implementing bodies. Not infrequently, these responses proved to have a negative effect on the implementation or administration of the ratified solutions to the transit problem. On several occasions, these activities prompted various metropolitan groups to initiate the role of dis senter and thereafter further deter the completion of those activities. In the following pages four external group activities which tended to deter the accomplishment of Phase III, as it was enacted in the Los Angeles rapid trans it problem-solving experience, will be identified. 624 External group control of implementing group's resources In the previous discussions of internal group factors, the inability of the implementing group to control elements within its own boundaries was seen as being able to retard the accomplishment of Phase III activities. The elements referred to in that discussion were the human resources of the organization. However, if the implement ing group is unable to control the utilization of its other resources, e.g., financial, material, its efforts to com plete the final activities of the problem-solving process will also tend to be deterred. In the Los Angeles transit experience, numerous external groups were often able to exercise a decisive influence over the manner in which the MTA employed its resources for solution implementation and administration. As a result of this lack of control over its own resources, the MTA was not always in a position to administer the rati fied solutions to the transit problem in precisely the desired manner. To the extent that the MTA had to expend time and resources in attempts to wrest control from these external groups, the initial absence of this control proved a deterrent to its efforts to complete the Phase III 625 activities for which it was responsible. To understand more fully how external groups may achieve positions of influence over the resources of solution implementing groups, we proceed to an analysis of the way in which external groups gained this advantage in the transit con troversy . County control of MTA expenditures.— From 1952 to 1956, the MTA financed its transit planning operations from funds appropriated by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. During this period the Authority was con fronted with numerous instances in which the Supervisors or county counsel limited the uses for which those funds could be employed. Principal among these occasions was when the county counsel prohibited the MTA from utilizing county- appropriated funds for undertaking an appraisal of the as sets of the private bus companies in anticipation of their purchase. Had the Authority not been able to make arrange ments for a deferment of appraisal payments with the com panies and the appraising firm of Coverdale and Colpitts, the purchase of those assets might not have taken place as early as it did. Eventually the county provided the Authority with 626 funds from which payment of the appraisals could be made. However, because these funds had not been forthcoming imme diately, the MTA had had to utilize both time and effort to overcome their absence and secure another method of payment for the appraisals. As a result of the control which the county possessed over the financial expenditures of the Authority, a deterrent had arisen to the efficiency of MTA efforts to administer its ratified solution to the transit problem. Control over the Los Angeles-Long Beach Line by the Pacific Electric.--When the MTA assumed control of the services of the private bus companies, the major transit line between Los Angeles and Long Beach operated on rail rights of way owned by the Pacific Electric. The lease on this line expired shortly after the Authority gained pos session of the private services. Following this expira tion, the Pacific Electric granted several extensions of the lease which allowed the continuation of the rail service to Long Beach. However, the Pacific Electric would not agree to a long-term lease which the Authority desired. Between 1959 and 1960, the MTA conducted a series of studies to determine if the rail service to Long Beach 627 over the Pacific Electric lines could be made economically profitable by introducing new equipment and different run ning schedules. The findings of these studies indicated that the improvements could make the line profitable, if the service could be continued for a substantial period of time. Unfortunately for the Authority, the Pacific Elec tric would not grant the long-term lease which was required to make the interurban service improvements economically feasible. Thus, the Authority’s plans to improve the pas senger service between Los Angeles and Long Beach could not be implemented, due to an external group's control of cer tain facilities required to put that service into opera tion. Control of MTA resources by the State Legislature.— Throughout its entire existence, from 1951 until 1964, the MTA remained under the control of the State Legislature. Although the Legislature was content to establish rather broad legislation under which the Authority could seek to resolve the Los Angeles transit dilemma, it could, and did on occasion, make specific laws restricting that group's actions and activities. When these specific restrictions and limitations were included in the organic legislation 628 of the Authority, the following activities of that group necessarily were premised on the knowledge of their exist ence. However, when these specific elements were added to the legislation at a later date, they sometimes created problems to the operations of the Authority. One such instance occurred with the passage of a 1961 amendment to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. The approval of Assembly Bill 2643 in 1961 provided am amendment to the 1957 Act which prohibited the MTA from thereafter conducting a charter bus service. Until that time the Authority had engaged in the charter business and had derived substantial revenues from that endeavor. Fur thermore, that business had provided a means of profitably utilizing transit equipment which would otherwise have been left idle during the off-peak commuting hours. Neverthe less, with the passage of the amendment the MTA was forced to accept the loss of a source of income on which it had always relied. In addition, the Authority was faced with having to release or find different jobs for employees formerly concerned with charter bus matters. In each of these three examples, external groups were able to come into control of some factor of the MTA's activities. This control allowed them to affect adversely 629 that group's implementation or administration of a solu tion to the transit problem. The diverse reasons for which the county, the state, and the Pacific Electric were able to gain control of the MTA's resources illustrate the complex forces which a group must overcome to maintain continual control of its own resources. In fact, because of the increasing interdependence among the various groups of the metropolitan area, groups implementing solutions to the problems of the metropolis will probably always find their resources somewhat under the control of external groups. Therefore, in order effectively to implement and administer the solutions to metropolitan problems for which they are responsible, the implementing groups will be compelled to struggle continually to keep external group control at a minimum. Group opposition to the alteration of ratified solutions As groups, such as the MTA, initiate action to implement solutions to metropolitan problems, they often discover that existing circumstances prohibit them from executing the solutions in their given form. When this happens, the groups may first attempt to alter the deterring 630 circumstances; or if that fails, changes may be sought in the basic solutions themselves, allowing the forces retard ing implementation to be counteracted. If these changes are not developed and ratified, the groups will continue to find their efforts at solution implementation blocked unless, for one reason or another, the retarding circum stances are altered. The period from 1951 to 1965 is replete with in stances in which the groups responsible for implementing solutions to the Los Angeles transit problem were required to seek changes in various aspects of those solutions so as to make them operable. For example, the MTA sought to change the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 to provide the Authority with a tax exempt status and to free it from Public Utilities Commission control. Later, this same group called upon the Legislature to change the 1951 transit solution in such a manner as to allow the Authority to purchase the assets of Los Angeles' two major transit companies. Similar examples were reflected in the Authority’s attempt in 1961 to alter the 1957 Act and the District’s attempt in 1965 to amend the Transit District Act of 1964 to provide it with additional financing powers. While this period was one in which implementing 631 groups attempted to remold ratified transit solutions to make them more operable, it was also one in which various metropolitan groups assumed the role of dissenter and attempted to obstruct changes in the ratified solutions. The reasons why groups may assume the role of dissenter have been given previously. In addition, the factors which tend to impede the ratification of solutions and amendments to solutions to metropolitan transit problems have also been discussed. Thus, to comment upon these matters with re spect to the opposition of the private bus companies to the MTA's 1953-54 attempts to alter the 1951 Act, or the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee's opposition to similar MTA actions in 1955 and 1957, would appear un necessary. Nor is an explanation needed as to why the Los Angeles City Council, the League of California Cities, and other groups opposed the MTA's 1961 amendments to the 1957 Act, or the Automobile Club of Southern California opposed the District's proposed amendments to the 1964 Transit District Act. What is essential to emphasize with respect to the actions of the above dissenter groups is that their actions not only retarded the ratification of those proposals, but that at the same time they retarded the implementation of 632 the original solutions. Because the MTA was not granted exemption from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control in 1954, it was inhibited from proceeding with studies which might have produced a monorail line from Long Beach to the San Fernando Valley as described in Coverdale's 1953-54 studies. Inasmuch as Authority efforts failed to secure the amendment of the federal Urban Mass Transporta tion Act of 1961, it was unable to obtain low interest loans which would have allowed the construction of the Backbone Route. Finally, when the District was unable to obtain amendments to the 1964 Transit District Act, provid ing for financing measures which it believed would be more acceptable to the voting public, the construction of a rapid transit system continued to be beyond its grasp. Therefore, it was in no position to provide a solution to the metropolitan transit problem as it was called upon to do by its creating legislation. To the extent the behav iors of the groups fulfilling the dissenter roles contrib uted to the defeat of alterations in the basic solutions to the transit problem, which would have made those solutions more operable, those actions may be categorized as deter rents to solution implementation and administration. 633 Group opposition to means used for solution operationalization As was stated earlier, the document formally rati fying a solution to a metropolitan problem may only vaguely set forth the means by which that solution will be imple mented or operationalized. When the means of operational ization are not specifically set forth, a great latitude of action becomes available to the implementing group. Such a range of action was provided to the MTA under the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. Under the 1957 Act, the Authority was permitted to use any type of transit facilities it desired to establish rapid transit in the metropolitan area. Following numer ous studies, the MTA concluded that a duo rail transit system would conform best to the transportation demands of the Los Angeles area. Once this had been determined and the MTA's 1961 legislative program had been approved by the State Legislature, the Authority began activities directed toward influencing the federal government to provide low interest loans for the construction of a duo rail system along the Backbone Route. These activities included dis cussions and conferences with California congressional delegates and the preparation of engineering and economic 634 data to be used at the Congressional hearings on the porposed bill. As the MTA began to initiate these activities, a private monorail company informed the Authority that it could build the proposed Backbone Route for substantially less than the duo rail system could be constructed. In fact, this firm asserted that it could build the line with out government financial support. Therefore, it requested that the MTA withhold action on its Congressional legisla tive plans until the monorail proposal had been heard. This proposal, however, could not be made for approximately six months. In view of this request, the Authority during the latter half of 1961 proceeded rather slowly in the develop ment of its federal legislative proposal. When the mono rail proposal was finally made, the Authority rejected it for a variety of reasons. In announcing the rejection of the monorail plan, the Authority stated that valuable time had been lost during the preceding six months while waiting for that proposal. Therefore, the MTA ordered a stepped-up program of engineering and economic studies which would enable it to defend the proposed federal legislation before the Congressional committees which were scheduled to meet 635 approximately two months later. Besides retarding the speed with which the MTA's federal legislative program was developed in 1961, the mono rail companies' opposition to the use of duo rail rapid transit systems again hindered the Authority's implementa tion and administration activities in 1962 and 196 3. Dur ing this period, two monorail firms made offers to construct transit lines for the Authority which they contended would help to alleviate the transit problem. In both of these cases the Authority was compelled to give careful consider ation to the proposals and thereby utilize resources which might have been better utilized elsewhere. When these proposals were again rejected, the mono rail firms claimed that the MTA had been unfair in the appraisals of their systems. This agitation brought con siderable criticism toward the MTA from various groups within the metropolitan community. This criticism ulti mately caused the Authority to devote further time to the analysis of the monorail proposals and to the development of a sound defense which could be used to justify their rejection. In the process of consideration and rejection, the Authority was hindered in implementing and administering 636 the solution to the transit problem by virtue of the fact that this process drained resources which might have been better expended elsewhere. At the same time, the Author ity's activities related to the handling of this matter caused numerous metropolitan groups to become somewhat dis illusioned with the Authority. This disillusionment may have accounted for the fact that some of these groups were later to place impediments in the way of other Authority implementation and administration activities. Group advocation of the dissolution or alteration of the implementing group Factors which entice implementing groups to employ their resources toward objectives other than the implemen tation and administration of the problem solution for which they are responsible tend thereby to retard the completion of the problem-solving process. Among the factors which may prompt such a diversion of resources are those which arise to threaten the continued existence of the implement ing group. Faced with the prospect of its own dissolution, the group will often respond by immediately transferring resources from solution implementation and administration activities to those which are seen as contributing directly 637 to group sustenance. Twice during the period from 1951 to 1965f an imple menting group was faced with a challenge to its existence which it opposed. This occurred in 1963 and 1964 when the State Legislature considered proposals which would have created a transit district to replace the MTA as the Los Angeles rapid transit planning group. In 1963 the Authority successfully combated this challenge. In 1964, on the other hand, the MTA efforts met defeat and the group was eventually merged into the Southern California Rapid Transit District. In both these years the Authority consumed sub stantial amounts of energy, time, and, in 1964, money to defeat these proposals and retain its position as transit developer for the metropolitan community. Thus, as when it had been called upon to overcome external group control of its resources, to surmount group opposition to the amend ment of previously ratified transit solutions, and to com bat group dissent over its operationalization of transit solutions, the Authority once again was deterred in imple menting and administering a solution to the transit prob lem. 638 Deterrents Arising from Various Environmental Conditions and the Nature of the Problem Besides the internal and external group factors which arise to impede the implementation and administration of solutions to metropolitan problems, factors related to certain existing environmental conditions and the nature of the problem may also serve as impediments to the final phase of metropolitan problem-solving. Under this cate gory of deterrents to the completion of Phase III activi ties, three separate factors were identified from the study of the Los Angeles transit experience. First, there are the environmental conditions which prohibit the imple mentation of the formally ratified means by which the solu tion is to be implemented and administered. Second, there are the cultural beliefs and practices which hinder the solution's implementation and administration. Finally, there are the deterrents which arise from a change in the nature of the problem itself. Environmental conditions prohibit implementation of solution by formally ratified means Under the solutions to the transit problem provided by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Acts of 639 1951 and 1957, the MTA was to finance the construction of rapid transit lines through the sale of revenue bonds sup ported from revenues produced by the transit system itself. For revenue bonds to be saleable, investors require that the project, which those bonds finance, produce a specific revenue within a certain period of time. This meant that the Authority would have to present to the investors engineering and economic data provided by a reputable firm which indicated that these financial conditions could be met. If this could not be done, the revenue bonds would go unpurchased. As the MTA received the findings of its transit studies, the conditions required for the sale of revenue bonds to finance the rapid transit system were discovered not to exist. If the Authority were to construct a transit system, it would either have to change the financial requirements for the sale of revenue bonds or find another source of income to supplement system revenue. Since the Authority did not possess the means to manipulate the forces which set the financial requirements for the sale of revenue bonds, it had to seek other ways in which to secure resources from which to pay the 640 principal and interest on loans to construct a rapid trans it system. Thus, an existing environmental condition, over which the implementing group had no control, was able to deter the implementation of two solutions ratified by the State Legislature for the resolution of the Los Angeles transit dilemma. The Transit District Act of 1964 furnished the District with an additional source of potential income from which to support a revenue bond or to finance independently a transit system. The act allowed the District to issue, with a 60 per cent affirmative vote of the electorate, general obligation bonds secured by property taxes. Al though this new potential source of revenue was made avail able in 1964, the District had not, as of September, 1965, attempted to utilize it. The District appeared to agree with a majority of the Los Angeles citizenry that the property owner had absorbed about all the taxation he could or would take. Further, the District did not seem to believe that it could persuade the community to alter what it felt to be a sub stantial opposition to supporting a transit system through property taxes. Therefore, it proceeded to request the State Legislature to grant it the authority to draw upon 641 other tax sources to subsidize rapid transit. When this request was not granted, the District continued to be with out funds with which to implement the solution to the trans it problem. Thus, existing environmental conditions again deterred the implementation of a solution to the transit problem by prohibiting the enactment of the formally rati fied means for operationalizing that solution. Cultural beliefs and practices retarding solution implementation Certain cultural beliefs and practices also oper ate to impede the completion of the Phase III activities of the metropolitan problem-solving process. In 1926 there existed in the Los Angeles community one of the most exten sive and effective urban and interurban transit systems in the world. Its tracks stretched for 1,164 miles and con nected every principal city in the Los Angeles Basin. Nevertheless, during the years following 1926 that system began to degenerate as a means for resolving the transit problems which were even then considered by many groups as acute.^ ^“ Spencer Crump, Ride the Big Red Cars: How Trolleys Helped Build Southern California (Los Angeles: Crest Pub lications, 1962), pp. 17-18. As automobiles gained favor with the public as a mode of passenger transportation, the system's lines began to be incessantly crossed by highways and roads. This slowed the speed of the rail lines and, along with the convenience of the automobile, further decreased the desir ability of traveling by urban or interurban electric. The decline of passengers, in conjunction with increasing oper ating costs, ultimately caused the electric railways oper ating on tracks intersected by highways and roads to fail as the solution to the metropolitan transit problem. At one time, this system had served admirably as a solution to that problem, but changing cultural patterns had made inoperable the implementation of that solution to the problem. Besides specifically undermining solutions to metro politan problems, cultural beliefs and practices may retard the acceptance of alterations in ratified solutions which could make the solutions capable of implementation. Until 1958, the passenger transportation needs of the Los Ange les area had been fulfilled primarily by privately-owned transit companies. These companies had operated without governmental subsidization. In fact, through their tax payments they had even contributed to the activities of the 643 local governments. As a result, many groups and individ uals found repugnant the idea of subsidizing an organiza tion to provide transit services which were then being pro vided through private enterprise. The cultural bias against subsidizing a public corporation to construct a rapid transit system, and the lack of a tradition of publicly subsidized transit appeared to contribute significantly to the opposition metropolitan groups displayed toward subsidization proposals. In fact, an official of the Authority stated that the tradition of publicly subsidized transit in the San Francisco Bay area had enabled rapid transit efforts there to proceed faster than in Los Angeles. This was because the battle for “public ownership of transportation" and the need for sub sidizing transit efforts under public ownership had not had to be fought; it had already been decided. Thus, from these two examples, a partial understanding may be grasped of the way in which cultural beliefs and practices may retard the completion of Phase III activities. Changes in nature of the problem which reduce group effectiveness in solution implementation As was previously mentioned, solutions to the 644 transit problems of the metropolitan area had been imple mented by privately owned transit companies prior to 1958. From the time these companies first began to provide trans portation for the Los Angeles area until 1926, their urban and interurban electrics provided the fastest, cheapest, and most convenient means possible for passenger transit. However, as the automobile became more popular, roads and highways more numerous, operating costs higher, and passen ger volume lower, the private companies began to lose their effectiveness as implementors of the solution to the grow ing transit problems. All these factors combined to make it difficult for the companies to move large groups of peo ple throughout the metropolitan area to their desired des tinations at the times they wished to arrive. As a result, more people took to their automobiles, and the transit problem became worse instead of better. The changing nature of the Los Angeles transit problem had prohibited the private companies from providing a solution. The financial demands and legal authority involved in implementing a solution to the problem had taken this task beyond the scope of the group's resources. Thus, a new group had to be created to cope with the changed nature of the metropolitan problem, and that group 645 was the MTA. Summary The objective of this chapter has been to identify, from an analysis of the implementation and solution activi ties of groups involved in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, those factors which arise to retard the com pletion of Phase III of the metropolitan problem-solving process. Those factors were categorized under three major headings. Included in the first category were deterrents arising from characteristics of the implementing group. These included: (1) the absence of financial resources necessary to implement the solution, (2) the absence of legal authority required to implement the solution, (3) the absence of resources by which to secure either of the above or other conditions seen as prerequisites to the implementation of the solution, (4) the influence of the implementing group's other activities upon its ability to implement the problem solution, (5) the inability of the implementing group to control and structure the behavior of its internal elements, e.g., labor unions, and (6) the characteristics of the group's governing and policy-making body which cause other groups to call for its dissolution 646 or reorganization. The second category of deterrent factors arose from the activities of groups external to the implementing group. Among these deterrents were: (1) external group control of implementing group's resources, (2) group oppo sition to the alteration of ratified solutions, (3) group opposition to means used for solution operationalization, and (4) group advocacy of the dissolution or alteration of the implementing group. The final category of factors retarding the accom plishment of Phase III activities derived from various environmental conditions and the nature of the problem itself. Three factors fell within this group: (1) environ mental conditions prohibiting the implementation of the solution by the formally ratified means, (2) cultural be liefs and practices, and (3) changes in the nature of the problem which reduce group effectiveness in solution imple mentation. With the completion of this chapter, two of the three objectives of this study as set forth in Chapter I have been addressed. First, the roles which groups may assume in the metropolitan problem-solving process have been described and given concrete form through the 647 narration of the Los Angeles rapid transit experience. Second, the factors which may arise to deter the comple tion of the three phases of the problem-solving process have been identified and discussed. Thus, only one ques tion remains. What behaviors or strategies may metropolitan groups use to fulfill their chosen metropolitan problem solving roles? This subject provides the focus of concern for the next chapter. CHAPTER IX ROLE STRATEGIES IN THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS Introduction Chapter II explained in some detail the functions and interrelationships of the roles forming the role set of the metropolitan problem-solving process. In this chapter we will examine the specific, concrete behaviors whereby groups in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy at tempted to fulfill those various roles. The pattern which the behaviors took will be defined as behavioral strategies for role accomplishment. Although the strategies analyzed in this study represent only a limited number of the total possible strategies for role accomplishment, their descrip tion will still provide a significant insight into this added dimension of metropolitan problem-solving roles. The sequence of discussion to be followed in describing the strategies of role fulfillment will be 648 649 patterned after that found in Chapter II. First, atten tion will be turned toward the four roles related to the specific problem-solving activities: problem-identifier, solution-generator, solution-ratifier, and solution imple- mentor-administrator. Once these strategies have been illustrated, the group behaviors employed to fulfill the advocator, dissenter, and conciliator roles will be exam ined. To facilitate relating the strategies to the nature of each specific role, a brief description of the functions of each role will also be provided. Group Strategies for Enacting Roles Related to the Problem-Solving Activities Problem-identifier and solution-generator roles Role functions.— The function of the problem-iden tifier role is to define a metropolitan problem and to make its existence, in the defined terms known, to various seg ments of the metropolitan community. Once this has been accomplished, the solution-generator role may be fulfilled. The function of this second role is to establish solutions or goals which will supposedly resolve the questions at hand. The goals established by the groups fulfilling this 650 role may be primary or secondary. The primary goal repre sents a specific state of affairs which, upon attainment, will finally resolve the problem. The secondary goal, on the other hand, is one in which the state of affairs to be reached will merely provide the environment by which the primary goal may be achieved. In the Los Angeles transit controversy, the group that chose to fulfill the role of problem-identifier tended also to fulfill the role of solution-generator, with respect to the problem it identified. Thus, within the period from 1949 to 1965, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the pri vate monorail groups in 1949-1951, the privately-owned public transit companies, the Citizens Traffic and Trans portation Committee, the MTA, and several other groups assumed both the roles of problem identifier and that of solution generator. However, the University Presidents' Committee, which labored during 1949 and 1950, primarily assumed the problem-identifier role and merely recommended that a solution to the problem be developed along the general guidelines which it had set forth. In addition, the Topping Committee, which was appointed in February, 1963, basically fulfilled only the role of solution-gener ator, and in that capacity, attempted to develop an 651 acceptable approach to financing the construction of a rapid transit system. Data from the Los Angeles transit experience would therefore indicate that metropolitan groups, which have a continuing existence, tend to assume both problem-solving activity roles, when they become involved in Phase I of the metropolitan problem-solving process. This may very well be attributed to the fact that the maintenance and enhance ment needs of these groups could be intimately affected by both the manner in which the problem is defined and the way in which it is resolved. To the extent that the problem in question affects these needs of the metropolitan groups, they may be expected to assume both of the activity-oriented Phase I roles. However, the objective of this chapter is not to explain why groups assume one or several roles, but to describe the behaviors they employ to fulfill the roles they do assume. Nevertheless, the tendency is interesting, and possibly significant, to note that with the exception of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, the other ad hoc groups involved in the transit controversy, i.e., Topping Committee, University Presidents' Committee, Citizens' Rapid Transit Action Committee, primarily ful filled only one activity-oriented role in Phase I. 652 Role strategies via other groups.— In analyzing the strategies used by groups to fulfill the roles related to the problem-solving activities of Phase I, groups were dis covered to develop their role strategies in relationship to other groups within the metropolitan community and with respect to methods for gathering problem-related data. Thus , in our examination of these strategies two major categories of a given role strategy will revolve around group behaviors directed toward other groups and, secondly, group behaviors directed toward securing data necessary for role decisions. To begin our discussion of Phase I role strategies, let us consider problem-identifier and solu tion-generator strategies via other groups. Three basic strategies for role fulfillment via other groups were displayed by the groups fulfilling the two Phase I problem-solving activity roles. First, the groups might unilaterally define the problem or develop a solution without interaction with other groups. The second approach found the role-fulfilling groups unilaterally accomplishing the objectives of the two roles, but simul taneously providing for interaction with other metropolitan groups. This interaction allowed the role-fulfilling groups to obtain additional information about the problem 653 I i jand possible solutions. Insight was also provided into the attitudes other groups held toward the manner in which the groups were defining the problem or the solution they were proposing. The interaction did not, however, include negotiating and compromising the final definitions or solu tions which the role-fulfilling groups ultimately proposed. The third, and last, strategy via other groups involved the cooperative interaction of the role-fulfilling groups with other metropolitan groups. This interaction provided a basis from which a mutually acceptable definition of the problem or a solution to that problem could be developed. This strategy differed from the second one mentioned above in that the final decision on problem definition and solu tion generation was a jointly produced, mutually accepted, product, rather than one which had been unilaterally deter mined. i Each of these three strategies appeared during the transit experience one or more time. In these instances, certain circumstances tended to follow their implementation. Although the data of this study do not allow the conclusion that the employed strategies caused the circumstances which followed their enactment, trends of relationships may be observed from these data. 654 The MTA employed the strategy of unilateral enact ment of role activities on three occasions, and in each instance the metropolitan group reaction was the same. In 1955 the Authority announced its intention to purchase the private lines to use as the nucleus for a proposed metro politan transit system. In 1961 the MTA asserted that the nature of the transit problem demanded that the Authority be given extreme powers of condemnation over public property and other powers with respect to the operation of its transit system in the metropolitan area. Finally, in 1963 the Authority maintained that the transit dilemma could be rectified only by granting that agency property taxing pow er. On each of these occasions, the MTA unilaterally defined the problem and developed a proposed solution to overcome it. The reaction to this strategy by other metropolitan groups tended to be consistently negative. Since, as was seen earlier, the State Legislature would not approve a solution to the transit problem, which did not have the almost unanimous approval of all metropolitan groups, the initial MTA solutions were never accepted by that body. Thus, this strategy would appear to have extreme liabili ties as a method of obtaining group concurrence in solution 655 generation. Its effect on consensus toward problem identi fication, however, would not appear to have been as great. As will be seen later, group agreement on the nature of the problem tends to be related to factors other than whether the problem has been unilaterally or otherwise defined. The strategy involving the unilateral enactment of role activities following a degree of group interaction was followed by the MTA in 1953 and the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee in 1957 and 1957. In 1953 the Authority proposed that it be released from Public Utilities Commission control and local taxation require ments and have its jurisdictional powers expanded to include the operation of all types of transit vehicles throughout Los Angeles County. This solution to the transit problem was not entirely unilaterally determined. The Authority had held numerous meetings with the Los Angeles Chamber and other groups and individuals in an attempt to develop am agreeable proposal which all could support before the Legis lature. These meetings had produced agreement with the idea of extending the MTA's jurisdiction, but not with releasing it from Public Utilities Commission control and taxation. With the knowledge that other metropolitan groups opposed 656 these latter measures, the Authority proceeded to request the Legislature to provide them. The result was the denial of this request. Thus, unilateral role enactment, follow ing metropolitan group interaction, would appear to hold similar disadvantages to unilateral action without that interaction. In both cases, group consensus does not tend to be formed, and the solution remains unratified. The Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee also developed a unilateral interpretation of the transit problem and a proposed solution, following a series of group interactions. Although the Committee was composed of per sons from numerous groups, the preponderance of members came from groups with a vested interest in highway and wheeled vehicle transportation. This led the Committee to listen to the positions of other groups whose interests were different, but not to compromise its position to accommodate those interests. For this and various other reasons, the 1955 and 1957 requests of the Committee for state appropriations to conduct a transit study of the Los Angeles basin area failed to generate support from the majority of other metropolitan groups. Once again, uni lateral action, even though framed in the picture of ostentatious group interaction, produced a negative 657 reaction from concerned metropolitan groups. Following the failures to obtain group consensus on the initial solutions it proposed in 1955, 1961, and 1963, the MTA turned to the strategy of role enactment through cooperative group interaction as a means of solu- tion-generation. This strategy required that the Authority meet with representatives of other metropolitan groups, concerned with the transit problem, for the purpose of developing a transit solution which would satisfy the demands of all the involved parties. No longer could the Authority dictate the solution to the problem, although it could continue to emphasize the pros and cons of various solutions and refuse to support certain solutions. Under this strategy, the Authority, if it were to fulfill the role of solution-generator, was forced to compromise aspects of its initial proposal in order to promote the development of a consensus solution. Thus, the group behaviors re quired to enact this strategy of role fulfillment may be seen to differ greatly from those required in the prior two described strategies. The outcomes of the cooperative group interaction strategies employed by the MTA in 1955-57, 1961, and 1963 were the development of mutually-acceptable solutions to 658 the transit problem. Although, in each case, the final solution was significantly altered from what the Authority had first proposed, the solution did have the backing of a majority of the metropolitan groups and was ultimately approved by the Legislature. As a result, this strategy aided in furthering the completion of the problem-solving process in the transit experience and provided a basis from which the implementing group could extend efforts to resolve the transit dilemma. Strategies related to data collection.— In addition to group interaction aspects of strategies for role ful fillment, groups carrying out the functions of the basic Phase I roles must also make strategic decisions as to the methods they will employ to collect the data necessary for role accomplishment. Decisions on methods of data collec tion are extremely significant, since they will largely determine the nature and quality of the groups' definitions of the problem and problem solutions. When this discussion moves to an analysis of the dissenter and advocator roles, group strategies for data collection will be seen to play a central part in the arguments attempting to produce or retard a positive group consensus with respect to problem 659 identification and solution generation. One basic strategy for data collection involved having external groups, possessing recognized technical skills, undertake expert studies to provide problem-related data for role accomplishment. In the rapid transit exper ience, the MTA was required to employ this strategy, as a result of having to finance the construction of its proposed transit system through revenue bonds. In order to issue revenue bonds, data first had to be provided by a recog nized economic and engineering firm which could give evi dence that the project would pay its own way. when the studies were finally completed, the Authority used the findings as expert evidence and testimony to support its definition of the problem and its proposed solution. In a like manner, it used further studies by Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall and by Kaiser Industries to provide additional data for accomplishing the functions of the activity-oriented Phase I roles. In the case of the privately owned mass transpor tation companies, their definitions of the problem and solutions thereto came almost totally from their past experience in the transit field and from data which they had secured during their transit operations. They did not 660 undertake specific studies to gather data related to the nature of the transit problem, and they did not employ outside firms to make such studies. Thus, as could be expected, they tended to discuss the problem and its solu tion mainly in terms of changes which could allow them to increase their bus services and, supposedly, thereby resolve the transit dilemma. The Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee used a third approach to data collection. As was mentioned earlier, the Committee was composed of representatives from numerous groups concerned with the transit problem. In developing its definition of the problem and a solution to that problem, the Committee brought together data which its member groups possessed and which related to the prob lem. In this way the Committee utilized data collected by the Automobile Club of Southern California, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association, and the California State Division of Highways. These data were analyzed by the com mittee members, and the Committee's definition of the prob lem and its solution to that problem were then developed. A final method of data collection was displayed by the behavior of the MTA, when it began a search for specific transit vehicles to serve the proposed system. The 661 Authority notified various groups that it would consider any and all transit vehicles as possibilities for the new transit system. This announcement brought forth proposals for thirty to forty transit vehicles. In this way, the MTA was not required to make an extended search for these vehicles, but merely had to review and evaluate their po tentials once they had been proposed. Numerous combinations of strategies for Phase I role accomplishment may be developed from the three afore mentioned strategies employed via other groups and from the four strategies for data collection. In fact, many com binations may be found in the transit experience. While an investigation of these combinations and their effects might be highly advantageous in forwarding a more complete under standing of the metropolitan problem-solving process, these matters must be left for later study. With both the Phase I roles and the other roles encountered in this process, our concern will be merely with the nature of specific strategies and not the combination of such strategies. Solution ratifier Role function.— The function of the solution-rati- fier role is to approve a given problem solution formally, 662 thereby allowing that solution to be implemented. The groqp which fulfills this function brings together the outputs of the previously mentioned two roles, and determines the fate of those outputs. If the group fulfilling this role chooses, it may even ignore the outputs of other groups fulfilling the Phase I roles and enact those roles itself. In the Los Angeles rapid transit experience, the California State Legislature continuously fulfilled the role of solution-ratifier. In this capacity, the Legisla ture was called upon to make two strategic decisions. First, the decision on whether or not to ratify the pro posed solutions had to be made; and, if the solution were not ratified, the decision on whether to reject it complete ly or to continue to give it further consideration had to be made. If the solution were not rejected outright, a decision had to be made on the methods that would be used to give that solution further consideration. The group behavior possibilities surrounding these two decisions will form the basis of our analysis of strategies for group enactment of the solution-ratifier role. Decisional strategies in solution ratification.— Once the California Legislature had been presented with a 663 proposed solution to the transit problem, several courses of action could be followed with respect to handling the measure. First, the Legislature could approve the proposal in its initial form. Second, it could reject the pro posal. Third, it could, by various procedures, simply take no final action on the proposal. In addition to these fundamental strategies for accomplishing the solution- ratif ier role, several variations of strategies could also be employed. The form of the initial proposal could be altered by the Legislature, and, thereafter, either be approved, rejected, or simply not acted upon. Finally, after approving, rejecting, or refusing to act upon a pro posed problem solution, either in its initial form or in an altered form, the Legislature could decide to study the so lution further or not to study it. In the transit experience, the Legislature tended always to alter the initially proposed solution to the transit problems and, thereafter, either approve the pro posals or fail to act upon them but provide for their further consideration. This was the pattern followed in 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1961, 1964, and 1965. When a decision was made to give proposals further study, the Legislature had access to several strategies to employ in 664 such a study. Strategies of solution analysis employed by solu tion-ratif iers .— To gain a fuller insight and understanding of the proposed problem solution, the Legislature utilized various legislative procedures available for accomplishing that task. Primary among these were the regular legisla tive committee hearings, conducted by both the Assembly and the Senate, and special interim committee hearings held during the years in which the Legislature met only for the budget and special sessions. These hearings provided the Legislature with the opportunity to hear advocators and dissenters of the proposed problem solutions present their positions and also permitted the questioning of these groups with respect to those petitions. Through this means, the Legislature was given a broad base of knowledge from which to make the ultimate ratification decision. If the Legislature thought that aspects of a solu tion appeared unclear or uncertain, it might authorize special studies to clarify the questions. This procedure was followed in 1950, when a pilot study of public opinion on rapid transit in the Los Angeles area was made expressly for the use of the Assembly Interim Committee on Public 665 Utilities and Corporations. The findings of this study and the subsequent testimony of persons appearing at hearings conducted by the committee led this group to recommend to the Assembly the use of buses on freeways as the most appropriate method of rapid transit in the Los Angeles area. The Legislature also called upon the services of ad hoc groups to facilitate the making of solution ratifica tion decisions. Thus, following a meeting of Legislature members and other public officials from the Los Angeles area, the ad hoc Topping Committee was first developed in 1963 to investigate methods of financing a rapid transit system. Later that year, with the prompting of various state legislators, the Topping Committee agreed to recon vene to analyze proposals for the creation of a transit district for Los Angeles County. Although the efforts of both Topping Committees failed to make a significant con tribution to the final outcome of transit solutions, their efforts did provide the Legislature with further informa tion which was utilized in reaching final decisions on the transit matters. A final method employed by the Legislature to study proposals to the transit solution involved meetings with 666 metropolitan group officials and members. These meetings took place periodically from 1953 to 1965 among various legislators and officials from the City and County of Los Angeles, and metropolitan groups such as the League of California Cities, the MTA, and the Los Angeles Chamber. From such meetings arose the Topping Committee in 1963 and, ultimately, the Southern California Transit District Act of 1964. Phase I activity roles assumed by the solution- ratifier.— Under certain conditions, the group fulfilling the solution-ratifier role may decide to assume the activ ity roles of Phase I, and thereby go beyond merely studying solutions proposed by other groups. When this happens, the group may continue to utilize the above methods for studying proposed solutions as one means of gathering the data required to undertake the Phase I activity roles. At the same time, it may use the four strategies of data col lection described earlier. In adopting Phase I role strategies via other groups, the Legislature, during the rapid transit contro versy, employed each of the three aforementioned strate gies. The Collier-Unruh in lieu tax bill, approved by the 667 Legislature in 1963, was developed primarily by the Legis lature without consultation with the Los Angeles metropoli tan groups. Similarly, the Rees rapid transit district measure of 1963 was developed almost entirely unilaterally within the Legislature. The Southern California Rapid Transit District Act of 1964, however, while basically the product of past interactions between the Legislature and numerous metropolitan groups, still contained unilaterally determined aspects which had not been compromised to meet certain group criticisms. Finally, two bills were passed by the Legislature which had been developed through cooper ative group interaction, involving the Legislature and concerned metropolitan groups. These bills were the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 and Assembly Bill 2643 approved in 1961. From this brief discussion of the strategies em ployed by the State Legislature in fulfilling the role of solution-ratifier in the Los Angeles rapid transit experi ence, the group fulfilling this role may be seen to have a multitude of behaviors from which to draw for role accom plishment. A vast number of factors could undoubtedly intervene to influence the solution-ratifier group to fol low one strategy rather than another. In the transit 668 controversy, the Legislature appeared to follow the strate gy of no decision and further study toward problem solutions which did not have a positive metropolitan group consensus. On the other hand, when a positive consensus existed, the strategy usually entailed the passage of the measure, but in some altered form. The correlation of solution-ratifier strategies and factors which might conceivably lead to the selection of those specific strategies goes beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, for those groups concerned with ultimately achieving solutions to various metropolitan problems, the mere knowledge of strategies of action avail able to solution-ratifier groups might enable them to cope better with the vicissitudes of those groups and possibly promote the ratification of their proposed solutions. It has been with the belief that this is, in fact, the case that the strategies for the completion of the solution- ratifier role have been set forth. Solution implementor-administrator Role function.— The solution implementor-adminis trator role functions to put into practice the problem solution which has been formally approved by the solution- 669 ratifier. In undertaking this function, a group is put into the position of operationalizing a problem solution which has been formulated in varying degrees of specifi city. The output of this role is a series of group beha viors which in some manner are directed toward altering existing states of affairs so as to resolve the problem in question. During the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Southern California Rapid Transit District were authorized by the State Legislature to serve as the implementor-ad- ministrators of the four solutions which were provided for the transit dilemma. Thus, as we proceed with our discus sion of the strategies for enacting this role, the fact that these strategies were devised by only two groups must be remembered. As a result, there may exist several other possible strategies which the limited innovative powers of these two groups overlooked. Nevertheless, an insight into the strategies they utilized in fulfilling this role will still provide a basis from which to look at different strategies other groups might devise for the fulfillment of this role in future metropolitan problem-solving experi ences . 670 Role strategies in solution implementation-admin- istration.— In carrying out the functions of this role, a group may develop strategies for role enactment along lines similar to those employed to fulfill the problem-solving activity roles of Phase I. Thus, the solution implementor- adrainistrator group may develop strategies via other groups and in relationship to the methods used to collect the data necessary to operationalize the approved solution. At the same time, however, the group may be required to make a strategic decision not called for in the Phase I roles. When the solution-implementor-administrator group finds that the implementation of the ratified solution is impossible under the existing circumstances, it must either attempt to alter those circumstances or seek a change in the nature of the solution to make implementation possible. If the group is unable, under its given jurisdictional powers, to alter the existing circumstances, then the only remaining alternative is to have the solution changed. This produces the demand for the strategic decision unique to the implementor-administrator group. The decision which the group enacting this role must make in this situation is whether to undertake the roles of problem-identifier and solution-generator itself 671 or call upon some other group to fulfill these roles. In the transit experience, the MTA and the Transit District tended to assume the Phase I roles when their efforts at implementing and administering the ratified solutions be came impeded. However, on two occasions these groups announced that they would allow another group to fulfill these roles. Shortly after the MTA was informed in December, 1960, that the proposed seventy-five mile transit route could not be financed through fare revenues, it ordered a series of studies to be made to determine how the costs of that system could be reduced. These studies, however, were not to lead to a specific financing plan which the Author ity would recommend to the Legislature. Instead, Executive Director Gilliss asserted that the findings of these stud ies would be given to a Senate interim committee, and then the Legislature could be responsible for recommending a solution to the problem. Again in 1965, following the defeat of its 1965 legislative program, the District called upon the Assembly interim committee, scheduled to meet in the fall of that year, to develop a solution to the transit financing prob lem. Inasmuch as its proposals for financing the system 671 or call upon some other group to fulfill these roles. In the transit experience, the MTA and the Transit District tended to assume the Phase I roles when their efforts at implementing and administering the ratified solutions be came impeded. However, on two occasions these groups announced that they would allow another group to fulfill these roles. Shortly after the MTA was informed in December, 1960, that the proposed seventy-five mile transit route could not be financed through fare revenues, it ordered a series of studies to be made to determine how the costs of that system could be reduced. These studies, however, were not to lead to a specific financing plan which the Author ity would recommend to the Legislature. Instead, Executive Director Gilliss asserted that the findings of these stud ies would be given to a Senate interim committee, and then the Legislature could be responsible for recommending a solution to the problem. Again in 1965, following the defeat of its 1965 legislative program, the District called upon the Assembly interim committee, scheduled to meet in the fall of that year, to develop a solution to the transit financing prob lem. Inasmuch as its proposals for financing the system 672 had not been approved by the Legislature, the District urged the interim committee to convene at the earliest possible date in order to generate a solution to the problem which could be considered by the 1966 Special Legislative Ses sion. Aside from these two occasions, the Authority and the District took it upon themselves to define the problems and generate solutions to the impediments retarding their efforts at solution implementation and administration. Examples of these efforts were the MTA proposal in 1953 to expand its jurisdictional area and scope of transit opera tions, the 1955 and 1957 proposals to purchase the private transit lines, and the District's 1965 financing proposals calling for the levying of in lieu vehicle taxes. Having thus outlined briefly the courses of action the implementor-administrator group may take in making the unique strategic decision falling upon that role, let us now turn our attention to the strategies by which groups fulfilling this role attempt to implement and administer the solutions to the transit problem with which they are provided. As in the case of the Phase I roles, we will begin the discussion with strategies via other groups and then move to an examination of strategies directed toward 673 producing the information necessary to consummate solution implementation and administration. Role strategies via other groups.— The strategies which the MTA and the District followed in fulfilling the implementor-administrator role paralleled exactly the strat egies found in this same category as in the Phase I roles. Thus, we will be concerned with three strategies: 1. Implementation through unilateral enactment of role activities. 2. Implementation through unilateral enactment of role activities but with a degree of group interaction. 3. Implementation through cooperative group inter action . The MTA utilized the unilateral enactment of role activities strategy to fulfill the implementor-administra tor role on numerous occasions. In 1954-55 the MTA decided unilaterally that to accomplish the intent of the Los Ange les Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 the purchase of the private transit companies then servicing the major ity of the Los Angeles area would be necessary. Similarly, in February, 1961, the Authority decided to request that 674 the Legislature place its employees in a civil service status. This unilateral action was also carried over into the discontinuance of decentralized ticket offices in August, 1960, although this matter was later given coopera tive group consideration. Another example of solution implementation and administration efforts, carried out without consulting other groups, involved the substitution of buses for rail services to the City of Bellflower and the Watts area of Los Angeles. When in November, 1959, the Authority decided unilaterally to substitute buses for rail service to the San Pedro area of Los Angeles, the storm of protest was so great that the MTA was forced to hold hear ings on the matter before deciding to proceed with its initial decision. The results of this implementation-administration strategy were usually highly negative via the other metro politan groups. When the administrative decisions produced by this strategy proved disadvantageous to particular groups, these groups would attempt to have the decisions rescinded or would in some manner attempt to modify the results of those decisions. In certain instances the nega tive reaction of various metropolitan groups forced the MTA either to rescind or delay the implementation of its 675 administrative decisions. However, when these decisions were allowed to take effect against the wishes of various groups, they often caused these groups to become hostile toward the Authority and thereafter to oppose, or at least fail to support, the Authority when it became embroiled in other controversies. Thus, this strategy of implementation- administration tends to have essentially the same defi ciencies and disadvantages as when applied to the accom plishment of the Phase I problem-solving activity roles. In accomplishing the implementor-administrator role, the Authority utilized, only infrequently, the strategy of unilateral enactment of role activities following a degree of group interaction. It was followed, to an extent, in 1953. At that time, the Authority decided that, to imple ment the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951, the Legislature would have to expand the scope of its jurisdiction and operating powers. This decision followed consultations with various metropolitan groups, but it encompassed a request for powers over and above those recommended by the metropolitan groups. Again in 1954, following the Coverdale report stating that a monorail within the MTA's jurisdiction might be economically feas ible, the Authority requested that the Legislature expand 676 its powers beyond those believed necessary by other metro politan groups. Finally, after labor discussions with the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks in December, 1960, the MTA decided to meet none of the demands of those two groups. In each of these instances, the implementing group first counseled with other groups and then proceeded to decide on its own what course of action would be followed. As with the preceding strategy, this strategy tended to alienate the groups which had been brought into the discus sion of an operating matter, but whose advice and contribu tions appeared to have been ignored in the implementing group's final decision. As a result, this strategy tends to carry the same liabilities it contained when employed in the fulfillment of the problem-identifier and solution- generator roles. The final strategy for Phase III role enactment, cooperative group interaction, brought the implementing group into a concordant relationship with other metropoli tan groups. Following consultations and discussions con cerning the undertaking of a transit study within its juris dictional area in 1952 and 1953, the MTA was able to gain the support of numerous metropolitan groups for this 677 project. This backing helped the Authority to gain the financial support needed to accomplish the study. Working with the labor unions, the owners of the private transit companies, and various metropolitan groups, the Authority was able to develop the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 which eliminated many of the problems then hindering the implementation of the 1951 Act. In a like manner, once the MTA had rescinded its decision to close immediately the decentralized ticket agency in the Colton-Fontana area, it decided to work cooperatively with various groups in that area in an effort to bolster patron age and thereby eliminate the need for closing that office. Several other examples of this strategy of behavior could be given; but, since all tended to have the same ultimate result, an extension of our list would appear to be unnecessary. In each instance, this strategy appeared to develop a positive attitude toward the MTA within the groups with whom they had chosen to work in implementing solutions to the transit problem. Furthermore, this strategy tended to enable the MTA to implement its adminis trative decisions with a minimal amount of conflict and dissension. Thus, of the three strategies used to fulfill the implementor-administrator role, that of cooperative 678 group interaction would appear to have been the most suc cessful . Strategies related to data collection.— The use of special studies undertaken by external groups provided one of the basic strategies for collecting data from which to make numerous implementing and administrative decisions. Expert studies made by Coverdale and Colpitts led to the determination of the four traffic corridors in which the rapid transit lines should be placed. Studies made by Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall led the MTA to con sider only two monorail transit systems and the duo rail Metro system, as potential rapid transit systems for the Los Angeles area. Finally, expert studies conducted by Kaiser Engineers produced the plan for the Backbone Route, which later resulted in large Authority expenditures de signed to promote the construction of that route. Each of these studies, therefore, had a significant impact upon the MTA's implementation of the solution to the transit problem which existed at the time the study was undertaken. In several instances the MTA chose to rely upon its internal resources to produce the data from which to make important administrative and implementing decisions. 679 Through the utilization of Authority engineering personnel, the decision was made to convert the Bellflower and Watts rail lines to bus service. Studies conducted by the Au thority's chief engineer led to the decision to employ the duo rail Metro system, rather than the monorail systems, as the rapid transit system for the Los Angeles area. And through the use of internal resources, data were collected to aid the Authority in arriving at the initial decisions to discontinue certain decentralized ticket agencies and convert the San Pedro rail line to bus service. The MTA used a third strategy to obtain information deemed vital to the determination of various administrative decisions. This strategy was employed in Authority inter actions with its labor unions, with the groups concerned with the termination of the ticket agency in the Colton- Fontana area, and with various groups that became concerned with the MTA's recommendations for altering the basic solu tions to the transit problem provided by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Acts of 1951 and 1957. In this strategy the implementing group made an overt effort to obtain specific information possessed by other groups, which would enable a more appropriate decision to be made on the matter of common concern. This strategy is similar 680 to the one we will discuss next, in that both strategies are directed toward obtaining information held by other groups. However, a distinct difference does exist between these two strategies. The final strategy for data collection in Phase III is also directed toward providing the implementing group with data possessed by other groups. In this strategy, however, the implementing group does not actively seek these data by directly requesting specific information from select groups. Rather, the implementor-administrator merely requests that any and all groups possessing informa tion germane to the question at hand provide that informa tion for utilization. Thus, when the Authority was contem plating a raise in fares, a change of routes, or the conversion of a rail line to bus service, a specific time was set aside at which any group or individual possessing information which might bear upon those changes could pre sent that information to the Board of Directors. This procedure was followed in the conversion of the San Pedro rail line and the Los Angeles-Long Beach rail line to bus service. A similar procedure was followed when the Author ity allowed two monorail firms to present their transit system proposals to the Board, even after the MTA had 681 decided that the duo rail Metro system would be used. Thus, this strategy differs from the one previously dis cussed in that the implementing group passively seeks information from other groups by providing the opportunity for the reception of information should those groups desire to provide it. One basic difficulty with this strategy is that the information that is voluntarily provided may not be specifically germane to the problem at hand; and, as a result, the implementing group may discover that the time devoted to the analysis of that information might have been devoted to more advantageous ends. Furthermore, the implementing group may discover that a strategy of data collection which does not focus upon obtaining specific information may result in the failure to obtain the infor mation that is needed. Probably for these reasons, in the transit experience this strategy tended to be used in com bination with other information gathering strategies, rather than in isolation from them. The analysis of strategies used by groups in the Los Angeles rapid transit experience to enact the solution implementor-administrator role brings to a close the dis cussion of strategies for accomplishing roles related to the problem-solving activities. As we proceed to the 682 investigation of the strategies used by groups to fulfill the roles of dissenter, advocator, and conciliator, we will see how these strategies are intertwined and related to the previously discussed roles. Group Strategies for Enacting Roles Arising from the Dynamics of the Problem-Solving Process The three roles to be discussed in this section are the advocator, dissenter, and conciliator roles. Of these three, only the first two displayed a prominent and con sistent appearance during the rapid transit experience from 1949 to 1965. Furthermore, when the conciliator role was fulfilled, it tended to be undertaken by specific individ uals, rather than groups. Thus, although passing concern will be given to the conciliator role, a discussion of the advocator and dissenter roles will occupy the majority of attention in the following pages. Advocator, dissenter, and conciliator roles Role functions.— The functions of the three roles arising from the dynamics of the problem-solving process are quite fundamental. The advocator role functions to develop a positive consensus toward a given perspective of 683 an aspect of the problem-solving process among metropolitan groups and the solution-ratifier group. The dissenter role, on the other hand, operates to develop a negative consensus toward the adoption of a particular perspective on an as pect of the problem-solving process on the part of the metropolitan groups or the solution-ratifier group. Final ly, the conciliator role functions to ameliorate differences and disagreements which various groups exhibit with respect to the different phases of the problem-solving process. The objective of this behavior is to reduce the conflict level existing among the groups and provide a basis upon which to work toward the resolution of the question posed for metropolitan solution. The similarity in each of these three roles is that they all attempt to influence other groups to adopt a specific mode of behavior. Although each role attempts to elicit different behaviors from other groups, the same influence process operates in each of the three roles. The rudiments of the process by which the behavior of a group is influenced are as follows. A group tends to elic it a given behavior, when it is motivated so to do. The bases for motivation to comply with external groups' requests are many. They may include: 684 1. A group's sense of obligation to follow the requests of the external group arising from an authority or respect relationship with that group. 2. A group's desire to gratify the requesting group because of a sense of friendship or bene volence toward that group. 3. A group's belief that logic and available information indicate that the requested behav ior is the most advantageous to follow. 4. A group's belief, developed from a change in its perception of the available behavior alter natives or its evaluation of those alternatives, that the requested behavior is the most advan tageous to follow (this may result from sug gestion, fraud, or deception). 5. The fact that through coercion the group is absolutely precluded from adopting an alterna tive behavior, other than that requested by the external group, or is induced to select the behavior pattern desired by the external group.^ ^Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: 685 The determining condition as to whether the groups fulfilling the advocator, dissenter, and conciliator roles will be able to influence other groups in favor of their perspectives of aspects of the problem-solving process will depend upon two factors: first, the source of motivation or compliance required to elicit the desired behavior from the appropriate groups; and secondly, whether the resources available for employment by the role fulfilling groups cor respond to the sources of compliance by which the other groups may be influenced. When there is a congruence between these two factors, the probability is high that the role fulfilling groups will be successful in their influ encing ventures. If congruence is not present, however, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 4. This categoriza tion was used by Banfield to describe the means used by one individual to influence the behavior of another on an interpersonal level. Group behavior represents in part the sum total of individual behaviors of group members. Fur thermore, group behavior may be the resultant of individual behaviors which have proceeded from different motivations. As a result, to elicit a given group behavior, it may be necessary to employ different means to influence individuals within a group to produce the desired group behavior. In the transit experience, however, groups tended to use the same means to influence all the members of a group to pro vide the group response it desired. This made it possible to speak of one of the above means of influence as being the primary one used by one group to influence the behavior of another. 686 the probability of influencing the other groups is quite low. In the rapid transit experience, groups fulfilling the three dynamic roles of the problem-solving process attempted to influence groups toward the adoption of their perspectives, primarily through the strategies of rational persuasion and through altering groups' perceptions of the available behavior alternatives or their evaluations of those alternatives. Since these three roles appeared in each of the three phases of the problem-solving process, the groups occupying these roles could draw upon elements found in any of these three phases to accomplish their role functions. Included among the elements they could employ were: (1) group interaction methods and data collection and interpretation methods used in accomplishing Phase I activ ities, (2) the definition of the problem, (3) the proposed solution to the problem, (4) methods of solution ratifica tion, and (5) means for solution implementation and admin istration. The manner in which these elements were involved in the accomplishment of the dissenter and advocator roles will become evident as the analysis of the dynamics of these roles within the three problem-solving phases of the rapid transit experience unfolds. 687 Advocator and dissenter role strategies in Phase I Advocator and dissenter strategies used inter changeably in problem identification and solution genera tion efforts.— In attempting to secure a positive group consensus around either a specific definition of a metro politan problem or a solution thereto, three strategies were used interchangeably. In the first strategy, the advocator group attempted to gain adherents to its position by stressing the fact that its perspective on the problem had been developed on an objective, expert, and unbiased basis. Thus, the MTA relied upon the expert studies of consulting engineers to provide purportedly rational argu ments to substantiate its evaluations of the problems and 2 its proposed solutions. Under the second strategy, the advocator group attributed the problem to a specific environmental condi tion and asserted that the solution which it supported was 2 Ashley L. Schiff, Fire and Water (Cambridge: Har vard University Press, 1962) . Throughout this study the author makes numerous references to the use of this strate gy by groups concerned with decisions in forest conserva tion. 688 the only one which could overcome that condition. Follow ing this course of action, the Transit District attributed the transit problem to the fact that vehicles were multi plying in the Los Angeles area at a rate faster than the freeways could accommodate them. Therefore, the District maintained that the only solution to the problem was a sys tem of rail rapid transit. The third strategy found the group enacting the advocator role confronted with substantial criticism and having to make a strategic decision as to how to handle that criticism. One alternative, used by the MTA when, in 1957, the opinion was expressed that the Authority might one day require tax subsidation, is essentially to ignore the criticism and not answer it. On the other hand, the advocator group may choose to answer practically all of its criticisms as the MTA chose to do in 1956, following the Senate hearings of that year. Finally, the group may draw selectively from among the criticisms and answer only those it chooses. This appeared to be the course of action fol lowed by the District when it was being accused of request ing legislative approval of two taxes in 1965— one to be voted on by the electorate and one that would not be voted upon. 689 The dissenter groups will counter these strategies in various ways. The first strategy may be attacked by the dissenter group with the charge that the problem was iden tified or the solution developed on a subjective, biased basis. Furthermore, the charge may be made that not enough "real data" have been collected to support the conclusions formix<g the perspectives of the advocator groups. This strategy was represented in the behavior of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee and its opposition to the MTA's proposal to purchase the private lines from 1955 to 1957. When a problem is identified and a solution devel oped with reference to a specific environmental condition, the dissenter group may attempt to reduce positive consen sus around those perspectives by asserting that the condi tions are changing and therefore the problem will soon be eliminated, or by stating that better solutions exist than the one being advocated. This strategy was used by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Traffic Association which, in 1950, stated that the freeway program would eventually reduce the transit problem and that buses on freeways, rather than rail transit, was the better means of mass public transportation. Finally, the dissenter group may attempt to develop 690 a negative consensus around a definition of the problem or a solution to a problem by discussing factors which are not directly related to those matters. In 1961 the Los Angeles City Council opposed the MTA's 1961 legislative program, requesting eminent domain over public property and the extension of other powers, on the basis that the program would lead to the levying of tax subsidies to finance Au thority activities. There was nothing in the legislative program that addressed itself to financing, but the Council used the subsidy concept to reduce community acceptance of the Authority's proposal. These, then, are three strate gies which may be used for building either a negative or positive consensus around problem identification or solu tion generation efforts. Advocator and dissenter strategies used in solution generation efforts.— Besides the above strategies, the grotpa assuming the advocator and dissenter roles with respect to particular solutions to the transit problem devised numerous other means to forward the accomplishment of their chosen roles. For instance, several groups maintained that their solutions to the transit problem were the best because only they could actually be put into practice or be operation 691 alized. On the basis of just such an argument, the chairman of the MTA sought support for that group's proposal to pur chase the private transit companies in 1956. He stated that since there was no evidence that the voters would approve general obligation bonds with taxes on private property to support a transit system, such a system could only be constructed from revenue bonds which the Authority could issue after it had taken over the private lines as a nucleus for its area-wide transit system. The groups fulfilling the dissenter role with respect to the above proposal refuted that proposal and asserted that past experience in other large metropolitan cities indicated that no rapid transit system could be built from revenue bonds supported solely from fare revenue. Other groups enacting the dissenter role suggested that there existed better solutions to the transit problem, other than the creation of a transit authority. A commit tee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce recommended, instead of an authority, the creation of a transit district which could be more closely controlled by the citizens of the metropolitan area. Thus, by denying that a solution is, in fact, capable of being put into practice or by sug gesting that a better alternative solution exists over 692 those being forwarded, the groups fulfilling the dissenter role may employ additional strategies for role completion. Another strategy employed by solution advocators was to stress the advantages and benefits which would ac crue from implementing the solution they supported. Thus, in 1961 the Transit District emphasized that the acceptance of its financing plan by the Legislature would allow it to complete a rapid transit system which would: (1) improve traffic and transit circulation by eliminating traffic congestion, (2) advance business volume throughout the area by making all areas of the metropolis more accessible, (3) raise property valuation along the transit lines thus pro ducing more property taxes, and (4) produce numerous other beneficial side effects now absent due to the lack of a transit system. The dissenter groups, however, utilized a strategy just the reverse of the above. They emphasized the disad vantages of the proposed solutions and thereby attempted to discourage a positive group consensus around them. For example, the arguments in opposition to the MTA's plan to extend its powers in 1961 included: (1) the plan would lead to the construction of an elevated rail line which would ruin property values, (2) the program would delegate powers 693 to investment bankers and bond buyers, (3) the program did not provide any local checks and balances for the people to express their desires, and (4) the plan could eventually force other municipally owned bus companies in the metro politan area out of business. Advocator groups often forwarded the adoption of the solutions they supported by illustrating how those solutions were compatible with the nature of the environ ment in which they were to be implemented. In the early 1950's, the Los Angeles Traffic Association, which was put ting forth the idea of buses on freeways as the logical solution to the transit problem, used this strategy. The Association maintained that the decentralized nature of the Los Angeles area, its low levels of population concentra tion, and the planned freeway program were environmental factors which made buses on freeways a more favorable solu tion to the transit problem than rail rapid transit. In fact, in assuming the dissenter role toward the rail solu tion to the transit problem, the Association emphasized that the existing environmental conditions made that solu tion impractical and impossible to implement. Thus, these experiences indicate that the strategy of relating a pro posed solution to existing environmental conditions may be 694 used either by the solution advocator or dissenter groups depending upon the nature of that relationship. As was noted earlier, solutions which groups sup port with respect to resolving a particular problem may be either of a primary or secondary nature. During the trans it experience, the MTA developed a plan to build a 22.7 mile system known as the Backbone Route. This plan was developed when the Authority discovered that the proposed seventy-five mile system could not be financed from fare revenue alone. However, the Authority believed that the Backbone Route could possibly be financed from fares, if a low cost loan could be adopted. While the MTA continued to hold as its primary goal the construction of the seventy- five mile system, it asserted, for various reasons, that the construction of the Backbone Route was essential to the construction of the larger system. Thus, the construction of the smaller system was a secondary solution to the prob lem, since it merely created conditions whereby the primary solution could be implemented. As the transit controversy continued and the Authority began the defense of its proposed Transit Bond Guarantee Act before Congress, the Backbone Route appeared to become a primary goal rather than a secondary goal. No 695 longer was the construction of the route deemed essential solely because it could lead to the construction of the larger route, but it began to take on intrinsic value in itself. When this occurred, the advocator of this solution to the transit problem was given an additional factor upon which to capitalize in its efforts to gain a positive con sensus around that solution. The advocator strategy of forwarding a secondary solution by elevating it to a primary status has its coun terpart in a dissenter strategy. In the dissenter strategy, the group fulfilling this role stresses that the solution it opposes is, in fact, not a solution that will rectify the problem. In other words, although the supporters of that solution classify it as a primary solution, the dis senters attempt to show that it is not. This strategy was followed by the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Commit tee in 1957, when it opposed the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of that year. That group claimed that the 1957 Act did not, in fact, provide any provision for the construction of a rapid transit system in the Los Angeles area, and that it merely allowed the two major pri vate lines to become publicly owned and operated. In a like manner, the MTA asserted in 195 3 that its exemption 696 from taxation and Public Utilities Commission control was part of a primary solution to the transit problem, but the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Associa tion did not agree and opposed those exemptions. Four additional strategies have, therefore, been added to the previous three used by the solution advocator and the dissenter groups attempting to achieve the func tions accompanying their chosen roles in Phase I. As the analysis shifts to the advocator and dissenter strategies used in Phase II, an important relationship among these seven strategies and those employed by the advocator and dissenter roles in Phase II should be acknowledged. In Chapter VI a positive relationship tended to exist between the ratification of a problem solution by the State Legis lature and a high degree of positive metropolitan group consensus toward that solution. As a result, one means used by the dissenter and advocator groups to promote or retard the ratification of a given solution to the transit problem was to employ the seven strategies discussed in this section either to develop or deter the establishment of a positive metropolitan group consensus toward that solution. Thus, during the solution-ratification phase, these strategies were utilized extensively by the advocator 697 and dissenter groups. However, other strategies were also employed, as will be seen in our analysis of Phase II. Advocator and dissenter role strategies in Phase II Further strategies related to the development or retardation of positive metropolitan group consensus toward given problem solutions.— Along with the seven strategies mentioned in the preceding section, advocator and dissenter groups developed other strategies to use in forwarding or retarding positive metropolitan group consensus development toward solutions proposed for ratification by the State Legislature. One strategy, used by both advocator and dissenter groups, was to increase group interactions so as to provide opportunities for persuading other groups to become supporters of their perspectives. This strategy was used extensively by the MTA as, for example, when it had the various directors of the Authority contact editors of the metropolis' newspapers, members of civic groups, and local government officials in an attempt to align these groups in support of its legislative proposals of 1953, 1957, and 1961. A similar strategy was used by the Citi zens Traffic and Transportation Committee when it opposed the MTA's 1955, 1956, and 1957 legislative proposals to 698 purchase the private lines. Through consultations with the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Asso ciation, the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee was able to gain their support in opposing the MTA's plan to call a special legislative session on rapid transit in 1956. Another strategy, which may be used by both advo cator and dissenter groups, is to appeal to the general public to support a given position with respect to a pro posed problem solution. This appeal usually requests mem bers of the public to contact their representatives in the solution-ratifying group and acknowledge their support of the given position. This strategy was used by the MTA in 1964 when a concentrated newspaper and radio campaign was undertaken, calling on the public to support its proposed transit district solution to the transit problem, in this episode, the Authority also attempted to gain support from its constituency by distributing pamphlets to patrons explaining the transit district proposal and requesting that they contact their state legislators. This strategy was also used by the Transit District in 1965. At that time, the District mailed to residents of the Los Angeles area copies of editorials from the Los Angeles Times, 699 favoring its financing proposal for rapid transit then before the Legislature, and included with those copies a 3 further discussion of the proposal. Groups, which opposed the proposals for which the MTA and the District were attempting to secure public sup port, attacked the use of that strategy by claiming that public funds were being used inappropriately. Whether or not the claim was well grounded, it did produce negative feelings within some groups and individuals which the dis senter groups could use to their advantage. Therefore, a general appeal to the public through the use of public funds may often prove more disadvantageous than beneficial to a public organization attempting to generate support for a metropolitan problem solution it favors. Besides forwarding or reducing a positive group consensus toward a proposal by increasing interaction with specific groups, advocator and dissenter groups may advance their causes by forming separate ad hoc groups composed of leading citizens, who may or may not be members of these 3 Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 254-59. Similar strategies are described as they are used by various line agencies in the City of New York. specific groups. The objective of these groups may be that of formulating a definition of the problem, as in the case of the University Presidents' Committee, or of defining the problem and developing solutions which may later be rati fied, as in the case of the Citizens Traffic and Transpor tation Committee and the second Topping Committee, which was to be concerned with developing a Los Angeles rapid transit district proposal. The creation of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee represented the use of this strategy by a dissenter group which opposed the plans of the MTA for rail rapid transit development. It was created and promoted by H. G. McClellan of the Los Angeles Chamber, and was staffed with individuals, who at that time favored a system of wheeled vehicles for resolving the transit dilemma. The second Topping Committee, on the other hand, was created at the request of certain state legislators who believed that that committee would forward the Rees-Carrell rapid transit district concept over that concept advanced by the MTA. Although this committee never became fully reactivated, the data would suggest that the proposal for its reactivation represented a strategic decision to bolster community acceptance of a given 701 solution by employing an ad hoc group of community lead- 4 ers. A final strategy, used by advocator groups attempt ing to win other groups to the support of their proposed solution and to forward its eventual ratification, is either to reduce the demands of the proposed solution or to change the nature of that solution. The objective of this strat egy is to eliminate those parts of the solution that cause groups to oppose its ratification or to change the nature of the solution so as to cause other groups to favor its ratification. This strategy was used by both the MTA and the District. In 1961 the MTA agreed to delete from its legisla tive program the request for the power of condemnation of public property and to include the discontinuance of its charter bus business. This was done in order to achieve metropolitan group consensus toward other aspects of its ^Banfield, op. cit. For an example of the use of an ad hoc committee in Chicago, see Chapter II, p. 29, the "Committee of 49." £lbid., p. 314. Banfield discussed a similar idea in terms of power which arises from the sacrifice of a proposal. He classified this as a proposal-costly power. 702 legislative program which it felt would allow the eventual construction of the Backbone Route rapid transit system. In a similar manner, the District changed the nature of the transit system which would be built if its legislative financing proposal of 1965 were approved by the Legisla ture. Prior to the introduction of that proposal, many metropolitan groups opposed it on the grounds that the sys tem they would be called upon to support would not benefit them. Following these criticisms, the District developed a $1,000,000,000 system which would serve practically all of Los Angeles County. This change in the nature of the solu tion to the transit problem tended to produce a higher degree of group consensus toward the financing proposal which would lead to the construction of that system. In reply to this advocator strategy, dissenter groups may argue that the changes in either the demands or the nature of the proposed solution have not been great enough. This was the point emphasized by the Santa Monica Municipal Bus Lines as the reason for its opposition to the MTA's legislative program of 1961. Another answer to this advocator strategy, however, is simply for the dissenter group to develop its own solution to the problem and then use the various advocator strategies to have the solution 703 ratified over the one it opposes. This strategy was used, unsuccessfully, by the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee against the MTA legislative proposal of 1957 and by the MTA against the Rees rapid transit district proposal in 1964. Finally, the dissenter group may employ this advocator strategy directly to the accomplishment of its own goals. The dissenter may be able to get the demands of solution so changed that those aspects which it opposed are no longer potent. This strategy was followed by the private bus companies when they successfully amended the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951 to the point that it could not be injurious to their busi nesses . Advocator and dissenter strategies via the solution- ratifying group.— The strategies available to the advocator and dissenter groups, to persuade the State Legislature to approve or reject proposed solutions to the Los Angeles rapid transit problem, are best covered in studies con cerned specifically with the politics of the California legislative process.6 Therefore, this section of the study 6See Henry A. Turner and John A. Vieg, The Govern- ment and Politics of California (New York: McGraw-Hill 704 will describe only the more visible strategies used by these groups to secure their desired responses from the Legislature. Both the advocator and dissenter groups attempted to influence the Legislature as a whole by first working to influence individuals within that group. These groups had available to them several sources from which to draw in attempting to gain compliance to their desires on the part of individual legislators. Sources which could be drawn from included authority, respect, or friendship rela tionships among members of the advocator and dissenter groups and individual legislators as well as rational per suasion, suggestion, fraud, or deception. This does not imply that all these factors were used to influence state legislators in the transit experience; but, they were avail able for use, and therefore some were in fact used. Exerting influence on the Legislature as a whole by initially influencing individual legislators was Book Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 82-129; Joseph Allan Beek, The California Legislature (Sacramento: The California State Printing Office, 1957); and Winston Crouch and John C. Bollens, California Government and Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2nd ed., 1963), pp. 71-105. 705 necessary/ since only members of the Legislature could in troduce proposals for legislative consideration. However, in the transit experience, attempts were also made to influence subgroups of legislators. This occurred when the MTA attempted to enlist the support for its 1961 legisla tive program from the Los Angeles County delegation to the State Legislature, and when it sought to persuade the various Senate and Assembly interim committees to back the proposals it made to those groups from 1953 to 1964. Thus, advocator and dissenter strategies sought the accomplish ment of their objectives through influencing both individu als and subgroups of the solution-ratifying group. Advocator and dissenter strategies were also devel oped with respect to the legislative process which must be followed in order for a solution to be officially ratified. For example, through the use of parliamentary procedure and political maneuvering, the dissenter group would attempt to have the proposal it opposed held in committee so that neither house of the Legislature, acting as a whole, would be able to vote upon the passage of the measure. The advo cator group, on the other hand, would attempt by various means to have the matter released from committee with a do-pass recommendation. If the matter did come to the 706 floor of either house, the dissenter group would attempt, through various means, to have the proposal defeated while the advocator worked for its approval. If the dissenter group succeeded in having one house reject a proposal it opposed, the group advocating passage of that proposal could attempt to have the meas ure approved in the other house with the hope that the house originally opposing it would reconsider the matter. Another alternative for the advocator group to follow, if its initial proposal were defeated, was to have the pro posal amended into another bill related to the same ques tion. In both these instances, the dissenter would attempt to stymie these maneuvers. A final strategy which the advocator group employed, when it became apparent that its proposal would not be approved by the Legislature, was to have either the Senate or the Assembly pass a resolution calling for sin interim committee study of the proposal. When this strategy was successful, it allowed the advocator group to keep the Legislature from completely rejecting the proposal and provided additional time in which to work toward gaining a greater metropolitan group consensus in favor of the proposal. The dissenter group would, of course, attempt 707 to have the resolution defeated. If that failed, it would use the additional time in mounting a further campaign against the proposal. In review of the Phase II narrative of the rapid transit experience will show that each of the above strate gies was employed at one time or another during the period from 1949 to 1965. Inasmuch as these strategies may readily be detected, no examples of them will be given. However, the last advocator strategy we will discuss is less easily discerned and therefore requires further clarification. Under this strategy, the advocator attempts to defeat the opposed proposal by having the nature of that proposal altered so that another group, in addition to the original solution ratifying group, must ratify the solution before it may take effect. Hopefully, the second ratifying group will be one which will oppose the solution's ratification.^ This dissenter strategy is best exemplified by the behavior of the Automobile Club of Southern California in 1965. At that time, the Automobile Club opposed the Dis trict's proposal to have the Legislature pass a measure ^Banfield, op. cit., p. 317. A similar strategy was used by dissenter groups opposing the construction of an Exhibition Hall in Chicago. that would allow the voters of Los Angeles County to vote on a long-term transit financing proposal, while allowing the County Board of Supervisors to levy, without a vote, a one-year tax to support District engineering and public relations efforts leading to the long-term financing vote. The Automobile Club demanded that the voters, and not the State Legislature, be the final group ratifying the short term taxing proposal. Thus, it recommended that, if the proposal were ratified by the Legislature, it be amended to allow for a vote on both long- and short-term financing. The underlying hope of the Club appeared to be that the voters would not approve the short-term financing proposal and thereby would almost automatically defeat the long-term proposal. This discussion of advocator and dissenter role strategies found in Phase II of the problem-solving process has by necessity been somewhat short. Nevertheless, it can provide a significant insight into the strategies groups may follow with respect to other groups and to the legisla tive ratifying process itself. To the extent that this has been accomplished, a further contribution may be made to our understanding of the complex nature of the metropolitan problem-solving process. 709 Advocator and dissenter role strategies in Phase III The objective of the advocator role in this phase of the metropolitan problem-solving process is to generate a positive group consensus toward the means the implementor- administrator group uses to implement the ratified solu tion, or at least to reduce the opposition that is directed toward those means. The group fulfilling the dissenter role, on the other hand, attempts to build a negative group consensus toward the implementing, administrative activities with the objective of curtailing those activities or chang ing their nature. A basic strategy used by dissenter groups to accom plish their objectives is to charge that the implementing group is exceeding its jurisdictional authority or violat ing the intent provided within the ratified solution. Once this charge has been made, the dissenter group may follow one of a number of courses of action. One course of action is to indicate to the ratifying group that violations are being made and recommend that the ratifying group take action to prohibit further violations. This strategy was used by several groups which felt that the MTA had over stepped its authority in ordering the appraisal of the 710 private transit companies and requested that the Legisla ture create a new group to replace the Authority as the rapid transit development group in the Los Angeles area. This strategy was also used by the charter bus companies which stated that they believed the Legislature desired to protect private enterprise from the publicly operated MTA, and that this protection could be exercised only if the MTA were relieved of the right to operate a charter bus serv ice . A second course of action dissenter groups may follow, if they believe the implementor group has overstep ped its jurisdictional authority, is to take their case before the courts of the state. This procedure was used by the MTA's labor unions when they were informed by the Authority that they could not strike a public agency. It was also employed by the Public Utilities Commission when the Authority refused to allow that organization to exer cise control over the MTA's safety procedures and equip ment . ® o Banfield, op. cit., p. 317. This strategy and the one preceding were classified by Banfield as power derived from having autonomous actors take positions with respect to the question at hand. 711 The third course of action finds the dissenter group attempting to gain support from other groups against the implementing or administrative practices it opposes, with the objective of having those groups apply additional pressure to have the practices curtailed. The Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee employed this strategy when it enlisted the support of the Los Angeles Chamber and the Downtown Business Men's Association in opposing the MTA's plans to purchase the private bus companies in 1956. Assemblyman Charles Wilsaialso used this strategy when he successfully secured a resolution from the State Assembly calling upon the MTA to submit its labor problems with Amalgamated, one of its many unions, to arbitration. The groups fulfilling the advocator roles counter these strategies by emphasizing that the actions of the implementing group do not, in fact, surpass the jurisdic tional powers or the intent of the ratified solution. Thus, the MTA asserted that the appraisal of the privately owned transit companies was a necessary step in accomplish ing the intent of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1951. With this declaration, the Authority proceeded to combat the ratification of the proposals the dissenter groups were making to the Legislature with 712 respect to restricting the MTA's implementing powers. In combating these restrictive proposals, the Authority employed many of the dissenter strategies mentioned under Phase II. The advocator group opposed the court actions of the dissenter groups by directing their own lawyers to present their cases before the court. The MTA fought both the labor case agitating for the right to strike against the Authority and the Public Utilities Commission demand that it had control over the safety procedures of the MTA. The Authority ultimately lost both of these cases, but its own use of court restraining orders and the length of time which was required for these cases to be heard must classify court action as a strategy for accomplishing the objectives of the advocator role as well as the dissenter. The dissenter groups may further accomplish their goals by emphasizing the disadvantageous results derived from the implementing or administrative practices which they oppose. For example, the monorail groups, during the early 1960's, asserted that the Authority's plan to use public financing and the duo rail transit systems was a waste of the taxpayers' money. These groups maintained that they could devise a better transit system than the 713 duo rail, which would be both more attractive to the citi zenry and more economical. In following this strategy, the monorail groups were able to retard the adoption of the duo rail transit system concept by the Authority for almost two years. The advocator retort to the above dissenter strat egy requires that proof be given of the superiority of the proposal it supports over that the dissenter recommends. The MTA met the challenges of the monorail groups by under taking expert studies which eventually illustrated that the dissenter proposals could not accomplish what they calimed and that, in fact, the proposals were not superior to the duo rail transit concept. Thus, although the advocator group was able to overcome the opposition of the dissenter group in this matter, it still had been required to expend a significant amount of time and resources to achieve that victory. The final dissenter strategy in Phase III takes the form of concentrated group effort aimed at having the implementing group replaced by another group. This action may follow from the dissenter group's belief that the implementing group has failed in carrying out the intent of the solution for which it was responsible, from the belief 7X4 that another group would implement the solution more satis factorily, or for any number of other reasons. Thus, this strategy was used by the Citizens Traffic and Transporta tion Committee in 1955 and 1957, when it recommended to the Legislature that a Transportation Authority be created to replace the MTA which, it contended, had failed in its responsibility to rectify the Los Angeles transit dilemma. This course of action was also followed by the MTA's labor unions which advocated the reconstruction of the Authority's Board of Directors in such a manner that directors more favorably disposed toward labor might be selected. Final ly, this argument was used by Senator Thomas Rees, in 1963 and 1964, when he supported the creation of a rapid transit district to replace the Authority as the rapid transit development group in the Los Angeles area. The groups advocating the continued existence of the implementing groups followed a number of strategies in their attempts to inhibit the dissolution of those groups. In one strategy, the advocator recommended that the imple menting group be continued, but that either its jurisdic tional authority or the nature of the solution it was charged with implementing be changed. Thus, when the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee recommended 715 the termination of the MTA and the creation of a Transpor tation Authority, the MTA countered by saying that it could resolve the transit problem if its powers were enlarged and if the nature of the solution to the problem were al tered to allow that group to purchase private transit com panies to serve as a nucleus for an area-wide transit sys tem. Likewise in 1963 and 1964, the Authority asserted that if its members were chosen on a local basis, and if it were given local taxing powers, there would be no reason to create a new group to replace the Authority. Another strategy used by the advocator group was to improve the image of the implementing group with the public at large. This strategy was utilized by the MTA in 1964 when it launched an intensified newspaper and radio cam paign. In that campaign, the Authority enumerated the vari ous accomplishments of the Authority since its creation in 1951, explained the steps which had been taken toward the development of rapid transit, and emphasized the quality of leadership represented by the membership on the Board of Directors. Another strategy used by the Authority at this time in the role of advocator was the attempt to gain sup port for its programs from among its constituency. This plan was carried out by circulating brochures among the 716 transit passengers which described the nature of the MTA, Q its work, and its service in the public interest.7 The final strategy used by the advocator groups in Phase XII found those groups attempting to nullify their opposition through the establishment of a truce. In 1957 the MTA attempted to reach an agreement with the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee whereby it would sup port that group's proposal for an area-wide survey of transportation needs in the Los Angeles basin if the Citi zens Traffic and Transportation Committee would support the MTA's Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. In 1963, the MTA attempted to make a truce with Senator Rees whereby he would withdraw his rapid transit district act of that year and allow the Authority to work with him toward the development of a transit proposal which it could support. Both of these attempts at estab lishing a truce failed, but they, nevertheless, represented concrete strategies for fulfilling the advocator role in Phase III. Sayer and Kaufman, loc. cit. 717 Conciliator role strategies The conciliator role became evident in only three instances in the Los Angeles rapid transit experience. In each of these occasions, the role was fulfilled by indi viduals rather than groups. This role first appeared in 1954, during the solution-generation activities of Phase I. Leiand Kaiser, a San Francisco bond consultant, brought representatives of the MTA and the private transit compan ies together to discuss a mutually acceptable means to resolve the stalemate then existing in the ratification of the MTA's legislative proposals to rectify the transit dilemma. The only strategy Kaiser used in accomplishing this conciliation was to indicate to both parties that a mutually agreeable solution to their differences could possibly be achieved, with benefits accruing to both par ties . The second time this role was fulfilled was during the 1961 Legislative Session. At that time the Los Angeles City Council was in opposition to the MTA's legislative program of that year. In an attempt to reconcile the dif ferences between these two groups, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors appointed one of its members to act as a mediator between the two groups. In this role Supervisor 718 Ernest Debs arranged for a meeting between the MTA and Council representatives. Although this prearranged meet ing was eventually canceled, the role of conciliator had at least been fulfilled for a short time. The final occurrence of the conciliator role took place in 1962 when Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles called upon the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen to delay a strike against the MTA which had been voted by the union's member ship. The Brotherhood agreed to this delay in order to allow further time for negotiations. As events turned out, the delay paved the way to successful negotiations which averted a strike altogether. These examples clearly indicate that the concilia tor role played only a minor part in the rapid transit experience. Since this is the case, an analysis of the many strategies which might conceivably be used by individ uals or groups endeavoring to fulfill this role has not been possible. However, because the conciliator role did not play a central part in the problem-solving process employed in resolving the transit experience, the conclu sion should not be drawn that the significance of that role will always remain minimal. Nevertheless, since this study does not provide the data necessary to describe the 719 strategies capable of enacting the conciliator role, this project must be left for the efforts of future research ers. Summary Although many strategies exist for enacting the roles of the problem-solving process, several tend to have a greater frequency of employment than others. In this chapter the objective has been to describe and discuss the more prominent strategies used by groups in the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy to fulfill their chosen problem solving roles. Thus, in the accomplishment of the problem- identifier and solution-generator roles, groups were seen to develop their basic strategies in relationship to other groups and with respect to available methods of data col lection by which information could be gathered for making role decisions. Furthermore, the data indicated that many of the strategies used to accomplish the different func tions of these two roles could be used interchangeably. In enacting the solution-ratifier role, a number of strategies were found to exist by which the group fulfill ing that role could dispose of the solutions to metropoli tan problems which had been given them for ratification. 720 These strategies included approving, rejecting, or withhold ing action on the solutions, either in their original or amended form, while at the same time recommending further study of the proposals* If the decision were made to give the solutions additional study, the solution-ratifying group could employ, for this purpose, the strategies used by the problem-identifying and solution-generating groups or certain strategies unique to its own nature. The strategies used to enact the solution imple- mentor-administrator role were often similar to those used to accomplish the problem-solving activity roles of Phase I. However, this role required that a unique strategic decision be made if, for some reason, the ratified solu tion could not be implemented. When this situation arose, the implementing group had to decide whether it would at tempt, on its own, to determine the nature of the problem impeding solution implementation and develop a solution to resolve that problem, or whether it would request that another group undertake these problem-solving activities. When the implementing group decided to undertake these activities, it was able to utilize the strategies described earlier for fulfilling the problem-identifier and solution- generator roles. 721 The discussion of the roles related to the dynam ics of the problem-solving process indicated that, in the rapid transit controversy, the role of conciliator was seldom present. Furthermore, when it did appear, it was fulfilled by individuals rather than groups. As a result, this study did not provide a description of strategies employed in enacting the conciliator role. The roles of advocator and dissenter, however, were most prevalent in the transit experience, and the strategies used to fulfill these roles as they appeared in each of the three phases of the problem-solving process were described and discussed at some length. With the conclusion of this chapter, our analysis of the problem-solving model comes to a close. However, much would be left unsaid unless an attempt were made to draw some inferences as to the importance of this model as a guide to future metropolitan problem-solving endeavors. Thus, in the final chapter, the relevance of this model as an aid to overcoming the evergrowing problems of the metrop olis will be discussed, along with the findings of other studies which appear to be related to the model and metro politan problem-solving in general. CHAPTER X SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Problem-Solving in the Metropolitan Community The metropolitan problem solving model The impetus for this study grew from the author's belief that to understand the forces deterring the resolu tion of metropolitan problems, factors besides those of an economic or engineering nature must be considered. To provide a frame of reference from which to make this de parture and, thereby, analyze a broad range of variables capable of influencing metropolitan problem-solving, e.g., political, organizational, and administrative, a metropoli tan problem-solving model was developed. In the problem-solving model, a metropolitan com munity is conceived as a social system whose functioning or existence may be threatened by external and internal fac tors. The conscious process by which the discontinuities 722 723 produced by these factors are detected and remedied by a metropolitan social system is defined as the metropolitan problem-solving process. This process is divided into three basic phases. Phase X, problem identification and solution generation, contains the process activities of identifying the nature of the problem and developing solutions by which it may be over come. Phase II, solution ratification, involves the activity of formally approving or ratifying the solution for implementation. Phase III, solution implementation and administra tion, contains the activity of implementing and administering the ratified solution. Associated with each of these activities is a problem-solving role, and within the model the assumption is made that these roles are enacted by groups rather than individuals. As groups undertake various behaviors to accomplish the activity oriented roles, their actions give rise to three additional roles: dissenter, advocator, and conciliator. Together these seven roles comprise the role set of the metropolitan problem-solving model. 724 Once the model was developed, it was applied to the analysis of a concrete problem-solving experience to determine what deterrents might arise to retard the comple tion of the problem-solving process. The experience chosen for this purpose involved the efforts of groups in the Los Angeles metropolitan community to overcome the problem of passenger transportation by developing a system of rapid transit. The product of this analysis was the identifica tion and categorization of various factors which tend to impede metropolitan problem-solving. Deterrents to the completion of the metropolitan problem solving process The analysis of the Los Angeles transit experience produced three broad categories of factors which may impede the completion of the problem identification and solution generation activities of Phase I. The first category con sisted of problem-related environmental variables: the lack of problem-related data; the absence of technical skills for obtaining such data; the prohibitive cost to groups of using the present technical skills to carry out the Phase I activities; and, the cultural beliefs, practices, and past experiences which limit the perspectives groups employ in 725 undertaking the Phase I activities. The second set of fac tors was discussed in terms of variables which influenced a group's willingness and capacity to fulfill the roles of problem-identifier and solution-generator. These variables included: narrow group interests, goals, and objectives; limited group resources available for problem-solving ac tivities? and restricted formal group jurisdiction. The final set of factors came under the heading of group inter action variables: the absence of a feeling of interdepend ence of efforts among groups attempting to resolve the same problems; the absence of shared data upon which groups base their definitions of the problem and their proposed solu tions; the absence of consensus on interpretations of shared data; the presence of past intergroup experiences which have proven highly unsuccessful, resulting in the development of a feeling of mutual distrust and antipathy among the various metropolitan groups; and the absence of structures or processes for coordinating the Phase I activities enacted by different metropolitan groups. During the rapid transit experience, a direct relationship was seen to exist between the ratification of a proposed metropolitan problem solution by the State Legislature and the existence of a positive consensus among 726 metropolitan groups in favor of having the solution rati fied. From this finding, the conclusion was drawn that those factors which tend to retard the development of a positive group consensus toward a given problem solution could also be said to retard solution ratification. Five broad factors were identified as tending to inhibit groups from forming a favorable consensus toward a given problem solution, thereby retarding the completion of Phase II. These included: 1. The proposed solution was believed to be con trary to group interests. 2. The proposed solution failed to provide for continuing group control over its implementa tion. 3. The proposed solution was developed without the knowledge or participation of the groups. 4. The proposed solution was premised on aspects of Phase I activities with which groups did not agree. 5. The groups attempting to develop a positive consensus around a solution did not have the resources to accomplish that objective. A second series of factors, unrelated to 727 metropolitan group concensus, was also identified as tending to impede the ratification of proposed solutions. These factors, arising from the nature of the groups called upon to enact the solution-ratifier role, included: the time intervals during which the solution-ratifier group could ratify proposed solutions, the influence of other roles fulfilled by the solution-ratifier group upon its problem solution ratification activities, the influence of individual members on group enactment of the solution- ratifier role, and the absence of resources by which groups concerned with the ratification of a specific solution might influence the solution-ratifier group to take positive action on that solution. The factors deterring the completion of Phase III, solution implementation-administration, were categorized under three major headings. First, there were the deter rents arising from the characteristics of the imple menting group: the absence of financial resources necessary to implement the solution, the absence of legal authority required to implement the solution, the absence of resources by which to secure either of the above or other conditions seen as prerequisites to the implemen- 728 tation, the influence of the implementing group's other activities upon its ability to implement the problem solu tion , the inability of the implementing group to control and structure the behavior of its internal elements, and the characteristics of the group's governing and policy making body which cause other groups to call for its disso lution or reorganization. The second category of deterrent factors to Phase III arose from the activities of groups external to the implementing group. Among these deterrents were: external group control of implementing group's resources, group opposition to the alteration of ratified solutions, group opposition to means used for solution operationaliza tion, and group advocation of the dissolution or alteration of the implementing group. The final category of factors retarding the accom plishment of Phase III activities was derived from various environmental conditions and the nature of the problem itself. Three factors fell within this group: environment al conditions prohibiting the implementation of the solu tion by the formally ratified means, cultural beliefs and practices, and changes in the nature of the problem which reduce group effectiveness in solution implementation. 729 Strategies for role fulfillment In the course of identifying and categorizing the deterrents to the completion of the problem-solving process, numerous recurring behaviors were detected by which differ ent groups attempted to fulfill their chosen roles. These behaviors were described as strategies for role fulfill ment. From the rapid transit experience, various strate gies for enacting each of the four activity-oriented roles and two of the three roles arising from the dynamics of the problem-solving process were identified. However, inasmuch as the conciliator role was enacted by individuals rather than groups in this experience, no strategies for the completion of this role were identified. The Nature and Continuing Pattern of Metropolitan Problem-Solving: Some Observations Resolution of metropolitan problems will continue to require multiple group efforts Although in this study the problem-solving model was used to analyze deterrents to the resolution of a metropolitan transit problem, there would seem to be no reason why the model could not be used to analyze deter rents to the resolution of other metropolitan problems. 730 Whether or not the model could be used to analyze problem solving in other metropolitan communities, however, would appear to be another question, and one which would depend upon whether problem-solving in those communities was a group process or not. Some readers will undoubtedly argue that the decentralized nature of the political power structure in Los Angeles is the principal factor causing problem-solving in that metropolitan community to be a group process. These individuals will probably reason that in metropolitan communities where the power structure is more centralized, the problem-solving process will not require concentrated group efforts. Within a more centralized metropolitan political power structure, individuals may tend to exert a signifi cant influence on the problem-solving process. Neverthe less, four factors tend to be in force in all metropolitan communities, regardless of the existing power structures, which contribute to making metropolitan problem-solving a group process. First, as more and more people congregate within the metropolitan areas of the country, problems such as the securance of water, housing, and sewage treatment, which at one time concerned only a few groups, will tend 731 to encompass increasing numbers of groups. Thus, as action is mounted to resolve these problems, many groups will come to believe that their interests would best be served by becoming involved in these actions. Second, with the exceptions of Dade County, Flor ida, Toronto, Canada, and Davidson County, Tennessee, metropolitan areas have been hesitant in developing metro politan- are a general-purpose governments. This would tend to indicate that the conglomerate, overlapping nature of metropolitan area governments may be expected to continue a situation in which not one but numerous governmental groups are involved in the process of rectifying problems which know no governmental boundaries, e.g., smog and transportation. Thus, a second condition arises to promote the continued existence of a metropolitan-problem-solving process calling forth multigroup efforts for successful completion. Third, with the continued expansion of the metro politan areas and the unceasing rise in the cost of living index, the magnitude of resources needed to identify metro politan problems, develop solutions thereto, and implement those solutions will always surpass the resources available to one individual or group for those purposes. Thus, the 732 combination and utilization of numerous groups' resources, both private and public, will tend to be required to ame liorate problems of a metropolitan scope. Finally, as the severity of metropolitan problems increases and local governmental units find themselves continually unable to reduce their adverse effects, state legislatures may be expected to assume an increasingly important role in the resolution of those problems. Fur thermore, as the federal government becomes more concerned with the problems of urban areas, Congress, too, will become engaged in making decisions relating to the resolu tion of metropolitan problems. Since both of these legis lative bodies provide a major point of contact for the influencing efforts of numerous private and public groups, the future solutions to metropolitan problems generated by these bodies may be expected to reflect the influencing activities of large numbers of groups working at each of these levels of government. Necessary conditions for the completion of the metropolitan problem-solving process The metropolitan problem-solving process is generic to all metropolitan social systems and therefore will 733 always be activated when efforts are made to reduce the burdens of future metropolitan problems. As a result, certain conclusions about that process, reflected in the analysis of the rapid transit controversy, may serve as guideposts to groups concerned with completing the three phases of that process. Foremost among these conclusions is recognition of the fact that many metropolitan problems will fail to be resolved simply because there will be no groups with the capacity or desire to fulfill the four problem-solving activity roles. The accomplishment of these roles, and the activities they subsume, are necessary con ditions for the completion of the metropolitan problem solving process. Unless groups exist which are capable and willing to undertake the activities accompanying these roles with respect to the resolution of given problems, those problems will continue to vex the metropolitan com munities. Deterrents to metropolitan problem-solving: multiple factors Not many years ago, the vogue was to attribute the failure of metropolitan communities to overcome their problems to the absence of metropolitan area governments. 734 In fact, the statement has been made that the metropolitan problem is actually the lack of such metropolitan institu tions. Although the present study substantiates the deterrent power to problem resolution of the lack of metro politan area governments, it also demonstrates quite pre cisely that this is but one of many deterrents, and in certain instances may be one of the lesser impeding fac tors. Thus, the creation of such government institutions would not appear to be the panacea for the correction of metropolitan problems it once seemed. As groups attempt to fulfill the problem-solving activity roles, they tend to be confronted with innumerable factors of varying intensity which work to impede the accomplishment of their chosen roles. The perceptions of these groups as to the factors which are deterring their quests for role completion will be influenced by both in ternal and external elements. To the extent these groups are able to comprehend the existing sources of these deter rents, they may anticipate a greater probability of over coming the obstacles. However, if they are unable to grasp the breadth of the deterrent factors which may arise to hinder their role accomplishment, or if they are inaccurate in determining the factors which are impeding their role 735 activities, the accomplishment of these necessary roles becomes precarious. Thus, groups attempting to fulfill the Phase I activity roles of problem-identifier and solution-generator need to possess a broad understanding of the multitude of factors which may develop to retard their problem-solving efforts. If they become dogmatic in at tributing the failure to resolve a metropolitan problem to a specific factor— e.g., the absence of a metropolitan-wide government— they may find that once resources have been expended to overcome that factor, they have not in actual ity moved noticeably closer to the resolution of the prob lem. Role imperatives in solution ratification In the Los Angeles rapid transit controversy, the State Legislature was continually placed in the position of the solution-ratifier group. As a result, this group's operating procedures and dynamics and its institutional characteristics all combined to influence the solutions ultimately provided for rectifying the Los Angeles transit problem. Since these elements of the ratifier group may have a significant influence upon the final resolution of metropolitan problems, a familiarity with them on the part 736 of groups enacting the solution-generator and advocator roles becomes essential. When the groups are cognizant of these elements and understand how to cope with their vicis situdes, they will be in a more advantageous position to prompt favorable actions from the ratifier group. In practice this requires that groups promoting solutions to metropolitan problems be familiar with the dynamic nature, processes, and characteristics of local and state governments and the federal government. In addition, these groups need to be knowledgeable about relationships which may exist between favorable actions toward a proposal by the ratifying group and the amount of positive group consensus existing toward the approval of the proposal at the metropolitan level. In the Los Angeles experience, there tended to be a direct relationship between the action taken by the State Legislature upon a proposed solution to the transit problem and the amount of positive group con sensus that existed toward that proposal. Although this relationship may not hold true in the case of other problems other state legislatures or Congress, it is, nevertheless, a relationship which should be investigated and understood by all groups attempting to secure the ratification of a solution to any metropolitan problem. 737 Solution implementation and problem resolution Only with the completion of Phase III, solution implementation-administration, does it become possible to know the extent to which a ratified solution will ameliorate a metropolitan problem. If the intensity of the problem is not significantly reduced, factors among those previously discussed as deterrents to implementation may be promoting this condition. However, if implementing groups recognize these factors as potential deterrents to their implementing activities, they may be able to adjust their behaviors accordingly and avoid or reduce the full force of these impediments. On the other hand, if they proceed with the accomplishment of the solution-implementor role without giving thought to these possible impediments, they may find that when these adverse factors arise they are not in a position to cope with them. Furthermore, as in the two activity roles of Phase I, if groups fulfilling the solu tion-implementor role become dogmatic and attribute their failures at implementation to a single overriding cause, they may fail to see other impediments which might be equal ly deterring. This could conceivably produce a misutiliza- tion of group resources in attempts to remove the 738 impediments and simultaneously result in the failure to eliminate the barriers to solution implementation. Recommendations for Increasing the Group Effectiveness of Metropolitan Problem-Solving Role Accomplishment From the analysis of the Los Angeles rapid transit experience and the observations on the nature and continu ing pattern of metropolitan problem-solving, several recom mendations may be developed for increasing the effective ness of groups in promoting the completion of the problem solving process. These recommendations are not principles, requiring rigorous observance, but represent guidelines for action by groups engaged in the metropolitan problem-solv ing process. Although groups may choose to depart from these recommendations, and rightly so under certain circumstances, they should be aware of the possible consequences which may follow from that course of action. Some of the conse quences have been depicted in the description of the rapid transit experience. Thus, even though prevailing environ mental conditions, the nature of the ratifying or metro politan groups, or the problem itself may dictate a depar ture from these recommendations, the author believes that 739 these suggestions, when followed, could contribute greatly to facilitating group problem-solving in the metropolitan community. Phase 1 recommendations First, groups fulfilling the role of problem- identifier should endeavor to identify all other groups possessing a vital interest or pertinent information per taining to the problem with which they are concerned. Once this has been accomplished, the problem-identifier group should attempt to obtain from these groups the information, perspectives, and other inputs which might provide for facilitating an accurate identification of the problem. These external groups should be kept continuously informed of the progress of the problem-identifying group. Further more, if they should indicate a desire to participate in the problem-identifying experience, this request should be given serious consideration and the benefits and disadvan tages of including them within the problem-identifying activities carefully weighed. If the decision is made to exclude them from participation in these activities, they should be notified and an explanation given as to why that action was taken. 740 Second, in fulfilling the solution-generator role, groups must recognize that a solution to a metropolitan problem will be effective only if three conditions are met. 1. The solution must be technically capable of reducing the adverse effects of the problem. 2. The solution must be formally ratified by the appropriate group or groups. 3. The solution must be implemented. Only when these three conditions have been met may the magnitude of a metropolitan problem be reduced. Thus, in developing solutions to metropolitan problems, groups must take into consideration numerous factors other than purely technical ones. The solutions must also reflect the groups' knowledge of factors which may impede their ratifi cation and future implementation. If the solution-generator groups are unaware of the interrelatedness of their activ ities with those of the solution-ratifier groups and the solution-implementor groups, their efforts to develop solutions to metropolitan problems will tend to lack ef fectiveness . As a result of the above, groups fulfilling the solution-generator role should endeavor to identify all other groups possessing a vital interest or pertinent 741 information pertaining to the solution of the problem with which they are concerned. Included in these groups should be those which may be called upon to ratify or implement the solution which is ultimately developed. The informa tion, ideas, and other inputs of these groups should be obtained by the solution-generator groups. In addition, these groups should be continuously informed of the progress being made in solution development and thoughtful consider ation should be given to bringing them into the solution development activities. As in the case of the problem identifier activities, the group fulfilling the solution- generator role should make the decision of including or excluding other groups from participation in the solution development process, only after balancing the benefits and disadvantages which might accrue from those alternative patterns of action. Similarly, if groups should request to be included in the solution generation activities but their requests are denied, they should be informed of the reasons for such actions. Phase II recommendations As was indicated in the previous recommendation, a solution to a metropolitan problem will be of little value 742 unless it is ratified and thereby given official sanction for implementation. Thus, the groups that propose a solu tion to a problem and assume the advocator role with re spect to that solution should endeavor to develop an under standing of the ratification process through which the solution must pass. By acquiring a u n t insight into the pro cedures and nature of the ratifying group, its alternative methods of disposing of proposals, and the methods of securing from that group desired responses, the advocator group may develop a greater potential for securing the rati fication of that proposal than groups which do not have such insights. In addition to developing an understanding of the institutions and processes of solution ratification, groups advocating the formal approval of a solution to a metropol itan problem should undertake other activities to forward the probability of obtaining the solution's ratification. The advocator groups should attempt to generate and devel op, on the largest possible scale, positive support for their proposals among various metropolitan groups. These actions should be directed toward motivating other groups to become active advocators before the ratifier group of the desired solution. At the same time, the advocator 743 groups should attempt to reduce the opposition to their proposed solutions. The achievement of either of these goals may require bargaining, compromise, or other methods of conflict resolution. But whichever goal is sought, group interaction should be promoted since it, rather theui isolated group behaviors, tends to be a more effective manner in which either to generate positive group support or to eradicate group opposition to a given proposal. Phase III recommendations Once a solution has been developed and ratified, it must still be implemented before a problem is resolved. To assure successful implementation of ratified solutions, the findings of this study suggest that implementing groups should provide for extensive interaction possibilities with other groups which tend to be affected by their solution implementation methods and results. These interactions should lead to implementing decisions which reflect a cog nizance of the interests, wishes, and requests of other groups. These decisions become extremely critical since they must balance external group demands, and their poten tial dangers to the existence and operations of the imple menting group, with the needs of the latter group, legal 744 restrictions, and an implementation of the solution which will reduce the adverse effects of the problem. Metropolitan problem-solving and cooperative group interac tion The common link in each of these recommendations is the emphasis placed upon cooperative group interaction. The development of this type of group interaction will undoubtedly appear to many individuals as an impractical, if not impossible, step to attain in forwarding metropoli tan problem-solving. In fact, some may say that such interaction will retard rather than promote concrete prob lem solving. Others may suggest that the product of such a pattern of problem-solving will be of a lower quality than if the process were undertaken unilaterally by groups. The retort to this position, as reflected in the Los Angeles transit experience, must be that the dangers of overextending both the number and complexity of group interaction in any problem-solving endeavor are exceedingly less than the dangers of insufficient group interaction. Four findings in this study would appear to substantiate this belief. First, without the concerted efforts of groups to 745 provide for interaction directed toward overcoming metro politan problems, the necessary problem-solving activity oriented roles probably will not be undertaken. This re sults from the fact that presently there exist few formal structures or processes for bringing together the groups necessary to carry out the four activities of the metropol itan problem-solving process. Second, without group inter action solutions will not tend to have the support of a broadly based spectrum of groups in the metropolitan com munity. Therefore, ratifier groups will be hesitant to ratify the proposed solutions. Third, without the required interaction and subsequent solution ratification, a delay in problem resolution will occur thereby increasing the burdens of the problem to the metropolitan citizenry. This comes about as a result of the continuing detrimental effects of the problem and the increasing costs, due to rising costs of living, of eradicating it at a later date. Finally, if this interaction is stifled, important human values and significant information may be excluded from consideration by the groups fulfilling the activity roles of the problem-solving process. Although increased group interaction may lead to a degree of conflict by requiring the consideration of disparate values and information, 746 this conflict need not be detrimental. In fact, it may even contribute to the development of a more effective and efficient solution to the metropolitan problem. If metropolitan groups possessed a full comprehen sion of the metropolitan problem-solving process and the factors retarding the completion of that process, and even complied with the recommendations for conducting that process, the complete elimination of specific metropolitan problems could still not be expected. Metropolitan problems by their very nature tend not to be resolvable once and for all. Their adverse effects are only lessened during a specific period of time. As environmental conditions alter, the nature of metropolitan problems tend to change. Another facet of the problem evolves, and solutions to that problem, which once were satisfactory, begin to fade in their ability to reduce the adverse effects of the problem. As the discontinuities of a metropolitan problem again fall upon a metropolitan social system, the function ing and existence of that system once more are threatened. To reduce the threat, the problem must be redefined, new solutions must be generated, appropriate groups must ratify select solutions, and the solutions must be implemented. To the extent that metropolitan problems are actually 747 recurring by their nature, metropolitan problem-solving must therefore be conceived as a circular rather than a linear process. As a problem is reborn, the problem solving process is reactivated and the activities of Phase I are renewed. If the detrimental effects of the problem are to be reduced, group problem-solving in the metropoli tan community must begin anew. B I B L I O G R A P H Y 748 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Banfield, Edward C. Political Influence. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1961. Beek, Joseph Allan. The California Legislature. Sacra mento: The California State Printing Office, 1957. California. Statutes and Amendments to the Code, 1951, Chapter 1668, "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act." _________. Statutes and Amendments to the Code, 1956-57. Vol. I, Chapter 547, "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957. Crouch, Winston W,, and Others. California Government and Politics, 2d edition. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. _________, and Dinerman, Beatrice. Southern California Metropolis. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 196 3. Crump, Spencer. Ride the Big Red Cars, How Trolleys Helped Build Southern California. Los Angeles: Crest Publications, 1962. Ellsworth, John S., Jr. Factory Folkways. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Greer, Scott. The Emerging City. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1962. 749 750 Kaufman, Herbert, and Sayre, Wallace S. Governing New York, City. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965. Schiff, Ashley L. Fire and Water. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Turner, Henry A., and Vieg, John A. The Government and Politics of California. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960. Articles and Periodicals Belknap, George. "A Plan for Research on the Socio- Political Dynamics of Metropolitan Areas," Working Papers on Metropolitan Affairs in California. California Conference on Metropolitan Affairs, August, 1957. Jacobs, Phillip, and Teune, Henry. "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Power," The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Phillip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964. Pegrum, D. F. "The LAMTA," Land Economics, XXXVII (August, 1961). Perrucci, Robert, and Zollschan, George K. "Social Stabil ity and Social Process: An Initial Presentation of Relevant Categories," Explorations in Social Change. Edited by Walter Hirsch and George K. Zollschan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964. Turner, Ralph H. "Role Taking and Reference Group Behav ior," American Journal of Sociology, LXI (January, 1956). Wheaton, William L. C. "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decisions Process," The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Phillip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano. Phila delphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964. 751 Public Documents California, Assembly, Interim Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations. Preliminary Report on Rapid Transit for the Los Angeles Area. A product of hearings held in Los Angeles on September 8, 1949, October 12, 13, 14, 1949, and December 5, 1949. _________, Subcommittees on Rapid Transit of the Committees on Transportation and Commerce and Public Utilities and Corporations. Joint Hearings, Rapid Transit. November 30 and December 1, 1953. , Interim Committee on Transportation and Commerce, Transcript of Proceedings of Hearings on Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit, Vol. I, October 28, 1953, Los Angeles, California. _________, Assembly and Senate, Subcommittee of the Joint Interim Committee on Transportation Problems. Transcript of Proceedings. January 17, 18, 19, 1956. Reports Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee, Panel of Professional and Expert Consultants. "Traffic and Transportation Plan: A Plan Presented by the Panel to the Citizens Committee." December 15, 1954. Economic Engineering Report. A report prepared by the firm of Coverdale and Colpitts and presented to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. January 15, 1954. Los Angeles Regional Transportation Study. Vol. I. Base Year Report, Summary Addition. Los Angeles: California Division of Highways, December, 1963. Music, Peeler, and Garrett, Attorneys at Law. "Compilation of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Law (Part 3 of Division 10 of the Public Utilities Code) with Corresponding Provisions of the LAMTA Act of 1957 (As Amended)." August 10, 1964. 752 University Presidents Report on Los Angeles Transportation Problems. Presented to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in May, 1950, and in the files of the County Clerk. Unpublished Material Gilstrap, Jack R. "The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority and the State Legislative Process: A Case Study." Unpublished Master's thesis, Depart ment of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 1963. Newspapers Los Angeles Times, November, 1949 to July, 1965. Other Sources Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. Minutes of meetings of April and August, 1954. Committee Representing the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, The Downtown Business Men's Association, and the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. "Adopted Statement Concerning Senate Bill 1308, and Alternative Steps Recommended." January 5, 1956. Downtown Business Men's Association. Minutes of meetings of the Parking and Transportation Committee, May 12, 1955. Gordon, Robert I. "Memorandum to Members of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee." October 5, 1956. Letters written by officials of the Los Angeles Transit Lines and the Metropolitan Coach Lines. Lewis, D. R. Letter dated October 25, 1960, and sent to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. 753 Lindersmith, Walter R. "Memorandum to Members of the Panel of Professional and Expert Consultants, Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee." August 12, 1954. Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Minutes of meeting of the Executive Committee of the Metropolitan Traffic and Transportation Committee. September 23, 1953. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. Minutes of official board meetings from March, 1952, to Aug ust, 1964. _________. MTA Newsletter, September-October, 1960, to September, 1963. _________. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority. Personal interview with John L. Curtis, Senior Transportation Engineer. December 14, 1964. Merritt, Ralph P. "Statement made to the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. September 14, 1955. Phister, Montgomery. Letter dated February 27, 1956, and sent to members of the Citizens Traffic and Transportation Committee. Southern California Rapid Transit District. Minutes of official board meetings from September, 1964, to August, 1965. _________. The RTD Memo, November, 1964, to March, 1965.

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Creator Chitwood, Stephen Reed (author)

Core Title Group Problem-Solving In The Metropolitan Community

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Storm, William Bruce (committee chair), Mars, David (committee member), Rigby, Gerald (committee member), Sherwood, Frank P. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-107159

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