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Nietzsche'S Philosophy Of Education: A Critical Exposition

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Nietzsche'S Philosophy Of Education: A Critical Exposition

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Content This dissertation has baan
mlcrofllmad exactly as received
HILLESHEIM, Jam es W alter, 1933-
NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION:
A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.
U niversity of Southern C alifornia, Ed.D., 1968
Philosophy
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Q Copyright by
James Walter Hillesheim
NIETZSCHE*S PHILOSOPHY OP EDUCATION
A CRITICAL EXPOSITION
by
James Walter Hllleshelm
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OP THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OP SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OP EDUCATION
(Philosophy)
January 1968
This dissertation, written under the direction
of the Chairman of the candidate's Guidance
Committee and approved by all members of the
Committee, has been presented to and accepted
by the Faculty of the School of Education in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Education.
Date. JANUAR? 1$68
Dedicated to
my Mother and Father
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the members of my doctoral
committee for their willingness to take time out from
their numerous academic affairs to read and comment upon
this lengthy dissertation. My particular gratitude goes
to Committee Chairman, Dr. William F. O’Neill, both for
his encouragement to pursue this study and for his many
constructive criticisms concerning the form and sub
stance of the exposition.
A word of appreciation is due Mrs. Donald Marshall
for her careful job of typing and proofreading. A kind
word is also due my wife Reiko for her patience during
my many hours of self-imposed solitude.
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE................... 12
Writings on Nietzschers Philosophy
Nietzsche's Writings
III. NIETZSCHE'S LIFE....................... 56
Birth and Ancestry
Tripartite Division of Nietzsche's
Philosophical Development
Early Period (1869-1876)
Middle Period ( 1 8 7 6-1 8 8 3)
Late Period ( 1 8 8 3-1 8 8 9)
Insanity and the End (1889-1900)
IV. NIETZSCHE'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART I: EPISTEMOLOGY................ 90
The Limits of Knowledge
A New Theory of Truth
V. NIETZSCHE'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART I Is ONTOLOGY................. . . 132
Will-to-Power
Eternal Recurrence
VI. NIETZSCHE'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART Ills AXIOLOGY.................. 170
The Doctrine of Self-Surpassing
The Ontological Foundations of
Self-Surpassing
Radical Nihilism
VII. NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION,
PART Is ENDS AND MEANS.............. 232-
Nietzsche and the Future of Education
Self-Surpassings The Aim of Education
Challenge-and-Re spor.se
iv
Chapter
The Order of Rank
The Paradox of Challenge
VIII. NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OP EDUCATION,
PART II: SOME APPLICATIONS . . . .
Two Movements In Modern Education
Work, Commercialism and Freedom
The Use and Abuse of History
The University Scholar
Books and Reading
Teachers and Disciples
XI. NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OP EDUCATION,
PART III: THE SUPERMAN ..........
Three Images of Man
Self-Knowledge as a Prerequisite
to Self-Perfection
Action
Courage
Reason, Passion and Self-Discipline
Pleasure and Pain
X. SUMMARY ............................
APPENDIX ..................................
LIST OP WORKS CITED
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
2
Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most influential
and widely quoted nineteenth-century philosophers* His
impact is easily seen in contemporary existentialism,
aesthetics and theology* However, his philosophy of
education has received little or no scholarly attention*
That Nietzsche's diagnosis of educational ills, followed
by some rather drastic prescriptions, has been passed
over is surprising when one considers that Nietzsche
himself delivered a series of lectures (The Future of Our
Educational Institutions) as well as publishing an entire
book (Schopenhauer as Educator) on the means and aims of
education*
Statement of Purpose
Nietzsche and Educational Historiography
Historiographers who have attempted to trace the
development and influence of educational ideas have
tended to focus their attention either on thinkers whose
reputations rest primarily on their pedagogical ideas
(men such as Comenius, Pestalozzi, or Froebel), or on
great philosophers whose reputations are assured for work
outside of education but who nevertheless devoted con
siderable explicit attention to educational matters (men
such as Plato, Luther, or Rousseau). However, one might
well argue that in a larger historical perspective suoh
3
revolutionary Intellectual figures as Darwin or Marx (both
of whom wrote relatively little about education per se)
may have an even greater Influence on both formal and
informal education than those writers who are generally
classed as pedagogical theorists. Lawrence Cremin, In a
footnote to his The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson
Cubberly: An Essay on the Historiography of American
Education, suggests that a new approach to educational
historiography may be In order :
Cubberley's comments on the Influence of
European thought--notably the pedagogical Ideas
of Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel— call to mind
the need for a radical revision in our under
standing of Western educational history, one that
would bring education back into the mainstream of
more general developments. Thus, in place of
Cubberley's emphasis on the "pedagogical1 1 greats
of the nineteenth century. . . one might Inquire
Into the broader educational Influence of such men
as Marx, Darwin* Hegel, Comte, Nietzsche, Ruskin,
Fichte, Goethe, Arnold, and Mill.1
A basic difficulty confronting any historian,
attempting to trace the Influence of a great thinker on
his times, is to determine to what extent the influence
Is a reflection or distortion of the ideas actually
entertained by the thinker. In order to make this judg
ment one must first have a thorough grasp of the man's
philosophy. That is one purpose of this dissertation.
1(New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1965), p. 70.
Nietzsche and Educational Philosophy
The major objective of this study Is to bring
Nietzsche*s philosophy of education to the attention of
contemporary educational philosophers— and Indeed to any
one whose work or personal Interests touch upon the
theoretical and foundational aspects of education.
Nietzsche, like Dewey, not only occupies an Important
position In the history of educational philosophy, he also
offers contemporary man a viable world-view, a philosophi
cal framework In which one can approach educational
problems with perspective and direction.
Nietzsche's philosophy Is not so much to be
studied as It Is to be encountered. The reader, If he Is
but willing to "risk" himself, to let Nietzsche's ideas
interact with his own, will soon discover that he Is
being challenged to engage in the exciting game of doing.
not studying, philosophy.
If the reader is bored by the detailed history of
philosophy, if he has a distaste for the quaint and the
obscure, If he has the honesty and courage to come to
grips with the major dilemmas that face twentieth-century
man, if he has the strength and will to transcend his
present self, to climb mountain tops and breathe rare and
exhilarating air— if the reader can say "yes" to the
above, he is ready for the challenge of Nietzsche.
Some Hypotheses
5
A non-experimental study such as this does not
lend Itself to formulation In terms of a testable
2
hypothesis* If this were an historical study we could
postulate suoh hypotheses as: "Nietzsche's doctrine of a
'master' and 'slave' morality was used by Nazi leaders to
Justify physical brutality toward the Jews." Inquiry
would then attempt to support or falsify this hypothesis.
The objective of this dissertation, however, Is not to
raise hypotheses about Nietzsche's Influence, but rather
to explicitly formulate Nietzsche's own hypotheses about
the world and man's place In It,
A person's philosophy or outlook on life consists
of innumerable hypotheses of varying degrees of general
ity, The philosophy of an intellectual giant.such as
Nietzsche, who devoted a lifetime to a sustained attempt
to see the world clearly and deeply, cannot be reduced to
any one testable hypothesis. Some of the "low level"
hypotheses may be subject to empirical test, but the
philosophy as a whole is not so easy to Judge.
Any study of Nietzsche's philosophy and
2
"In some research carried out In education,
especially descriptive studies, It Is more appropriate for
the research worker to list objectives rather than hypo
theses," Walter R, Borg, Educational Research: An
Introduction (New York: Dav'id McKay Company, 1963)# p, 36,
educational theory must necessarily deal with hundreds of
hypotheses, most of which cannot be directly tested by
current scientific procedures. An example of a "high-
level" hypothesis Is Nietzsche's assertIon-that all
phenomena, whether Inorganic or organic, are but manifes
tations of the will to power. At a more concrete level we
have such assertions as, "No true philosopher ever
concerned himself with the history of philosophy."
Some Assumptions
A statement of the assumptions underlying a study
such as this— which is already concerned with rather
high-level assumptions— would require a good deal of
philosophical analysis and would be a separate study in
itself. However, to provide a start, we can say that the
following pages assumes (1) that society, including
education, can be improved; (2) that there is a functional
relationship between what a person believes and the
decisions he makes; (3) that reason and experience are
better methods of settling opinion than is the appeal to
authority.
Delimitations
Nietzsche was a prolific and creative writer.
During his life he experimented with such literary forms
as poetry, aphorisms and essays* Nietzsche has had con
siderable Influence on twentieth-century writers, and a
number of studies have been done on Nietzsche as a stylist,
literary critic and poet. In this dissertation we shall
not be especially concerned with Nietzsche as a writer or
stylist, but rather as a thinker and philosopher: we
shall pursue his Ideas, not his skill at handling the
German language,
A further delimitation is that, even though we
shall be examining Nietzsche*s general philosophy, we
shall not deal with the applications of this philosophy to
areas other than education. For example, Nietzsche dis
cusses political philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of
history, etc., but we shall explore these sub-divisions of
philosophy only to the extent that they shed light on the
more specific problems of education or on his general
philosophical position.
The reader should keep In mind that Nietzsche was
one of those rare seminal minds who— regardless of the
topic at hand— lead others on to fruitful explorations.
To whatever topic Nietzsche turned his attention— which
excludes very little— he sheds light and opens new
avenues of thought. Therefore, any single study, such as
this one, must limit itself considerably to remain
manageable. The topics selected for Inclusion in this
study and the weights assigned to them have been deter
mined on the basis of the degree to which they serve the
end of explicating Nietzsche's philosophy of education.
The following discussion of Nietzsche's epistemology,
ontology and axiology, although not dealing directly with
education, will nevertheless emphasize those doctrines
which have the greatest Import for Nietzsche's educational
philosophy.
Review of Literature
A considerable number of books and articles have
been written about Nietzsche (there are some 4,000
references listed in the International Nietzsche Bibliog
raphy » published by the University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, in 1 9 6 0),^ but few of these have been
concerned with Nietzsche as a philosopher (books by
Kaufmann, Jaspers, and Danto are noteworthy exceptions)
4
and none with Nietzsche as an educational theorist.
Although certain select, secondary sources will be
of some help, particularly in terms of possible interpre
tations of Nietzsche's rather esoteric doctrines of the
will to power and the eternal recurrence, this study will
^Ed. by Herbert W, Reichert and Karl Schlechta,
Bibliographical information provided in the
following chapter.
rely almost completely on primary material* There is no
problem here, for Nietzsche's complete published works
are available in English, and his letters, notes and
Juvenilia are readily available in German* The following
chapter will offer a more detailed survey and analysis of
the literature.
Procedure
For this study the task is essentially that of
selecting and arranging Nietzsche's ideas in a systematic
and meaningful order. The first half of the dissertation
will consist of a reconstruction of Nietzsche's general
philosophy, subdivided into the areas of epistemology,
ontology, and axiology. The second half will deal with
the goals of education that emerge from Nietzsche's
general philosophy, and the means which Nietzsche believed
would best serve these goals* The study will conclude
with Nietzsche's vision of the truly educated man: the
superman*
The primary goal of this study is to examine
critically Nietzsche's philosophy of education. However,
in order to reach this goal, we must first familiarize
ourselves with Nietzsche's general philosophical position,
for it is only in the light of the entire world-view that
the specific doctrines take on their full meaning. There
10
can be little doubt that "Nietzsche's thought Is a living
whole, and the whole Is not complete until he settles
matters with the principles of knowledge, the universe,
and the place of values In the universe • "** To fulfill
this three-fold requirement we will devote separate chap
ters to Nietzsche1s epistemology (Chapter IV), ontology
(Chapter V), and axiology (Chapter VI).
The order of the following chapters on epistemol
ogy, ontology and axiology is somewhat arbitrary. In
terms of logical order epistemology would seem to come
first* i.e., one must first decide upon and Justify the
criteria that are to be employed in describing reality
before one actually makes claims as to its nature. We
have here adopted this order, even though a good case
could be made for a reversed order on the grounds that
implicit, ontological commitments determine the
epistemological criteria adopted.^ Axiology is dealt
^George Allen Morgan, What Nietzsche Means.
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & how, 19&5), P« 24l.
^A provocative discussion of the difficulties
involved in using epistemology as the starting point in
philosophy is found in James K. Feibleraan, Ontology
(Baltimore* Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 5 1 ), pp. 11-IT.' To
cite but one difficulty*
"We cannot begin our.inquiry with an
examination of the reliability of the knowledge
process, for the knowledge process is taken for
granted by the inquiry at its beginning. Since
we can examine the process of knowledge only by
means of the process of knowledge, to declare it
11
with last--not because of the rather prevalent attitude
that values somehow follow from or are even the strict
logical consequence of ontological premises, but simply
because It offers the smoothest transfer to educational
philosophy, which Is largely an axiological enterprise.
Invalid would be to declare our Inquiry into its
validity invalid, and thus to validate it by
allowance.”
(p. 12.) In contrast to Felbleraan most modern philoso
phers (Descartes and after) begin with eplstemologlcal
inquiries. Priorities may be uncertain, but it is
certain that in philosophical discourse one must begin
somewhere. It is impossible to say everything at once.
In keeping with much contemporary writing in philosophy
we shall begin with epistemology.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
13 I
It Is the purpose of this chapter to provide the j
research and bibliographical framework within which the
i
present study finds Its place* The chapter will be j
divided into two major sections, dealing respectively with I
I
secondary and primary source materials.
i
Writings on Nietzsche's Philosophy'1 '
Writings on Nietzsche's General Philosophy
Books
There are several excellent, comprehensive studies !
i ;
■ of Nietzsche's general philosophical position. Each of
i 1
1
these studies, even when critical, treat Nietzsche as a
major philosopher of our times, as an innovative thinker j
2
whose ideas are to be taken seriously. The following
paragraphs are Intended to indicate the relevance of these j
j
studies to an understanding of Nietzsche's educational !
philosophy.
i !
An invaluable guide to books, articles, disserta- j
tions and other secondary source materials is the ;
International Nietzsche Bibliography, ed. by Herbert W.
Reichert and Karl Schlechta (Chapel Hill: University of j
i North Carolina Press, I960). Entries (numbering close tc j
four thousand) are listed alphabetically by author under |
each country (some twenty-six countries are included, from 1
Bulgaria to Vietnam). A letter to this writer from Herbert,
| W. Reichert, Chairman, Department of Germanic Languages,
! University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, May 15, 1967,
! states that the bibliography Is "presently being revised
I and will probably be published next fall."
i i
1 2
j This remark would be unnecessary except that for
; a long time Nietzsche's thoughts were often dismissed as
| the fantasies of a "madman."
14 !
A premise on which the subsequent chapters of this
}
study are based is that to fully comprehend the educational!
i
philosophy of a great philosopher-one must have at least j
a general knowledge and a feeling for the philosopher's
I
Weltanschauung. The books now to be mentioned aim at a !
comprehensive exposition of Nietzsche's world-view; from j
the rather unstructured Nietzsche materials they attempt j
I
to construct a philosophical framework within which one
I
may meaningfully fit Nietzsche's ideas on any particular j
i
subject, including education.
The chances are that most American readers will be :
i
introduced to Nietzsche's philosophy through the writings
of Walter Kaufmann.^ Kaufmann's scholarly translations,
including his extensive commentaries, have deservedly
become something of a "best-seller" in the domain of
i
philosophical writings. Kaufmann's interpretative study
i
of Nietzsche's philosophy, Nietzsche: Philosopher, j
Psychologist. Antichrist. first published in a hard cover i
4 i
edition by Princeton University Press in 1950, was re
issued in a popular paperback edition in 1956.** In the
^Kaufmann is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton
University. His writings include not only translations
but also numerous philosophical essays, articles and j
books,
4The book is based on Kaufmann's 19^7 doctoral j
dissertation at Harvard University, "Nietzsche's Theory
of Values."
• ’ Meridian Books (New York: World Publishing Co., I
15
preface to the paperback edition Kaufmann remarks: "I
still do not agree with him [Nietzsche], but more than
ever he seems to me one of the most Interesting thinkers
of all time. Pew If any, since Plato can match the
breadth, depth, and passion of his mind."*’ Kaufmann may
not "agree" with Nietzsche, but the book is nevertheless
very sympathetic toward its subject* The congenial
atmosphere is explained in part by Kaufmann's conscious
attempt "to buck the current prejudice against Nietzsche,"'
The main value of Kaufmann's book is that it
offers, in addition to much historical information, a
systematic analysis of Nietzsche's key epistemological,
ontological and axiological concepts. Especially signi
ficant is the attempt to show the interdependence and
consistency of the Nietzschean doctrines of the will-to-
power, eternal recurrence and the superman. The entire
book is pervaded with scholarship, insight, and
perspective. However, the reader may well want to ask
himself whether Kaufmann, in his effort to "buck the
current prejudice," has not pictured Nietzsche as more of
1956). Hereafter cited as Kaufmann, Nietzsche. This
paperback edition is a minor revision of the hard cover
version (which is now out of print). Excluded from the
paperback edition are the original edition's bibliography
and appendix of selected poetry.
^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 7*
‘Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 7*
a humanist and rationalist than he really was.
i
As a corrective to Kaufmann's "enlightenment" !
i
version of Nietzsche, the reader should at the same time j
consult Karl Jaspers' monumental work. Nietzsche: An
I
Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical j
Q
Activity. Jaspers' aim is to encourage in the reader a
j willingness to appropriate, digest and react to "the
I 9
j totality" of Nietzsche's "intellectual experiences. • • *" ,
! In Jaspers' opinion "Nietzsche is perhaps the last of the
i i
i 10 1
great philosophers of the past. ..." The demands
! j
j which this places on those who would write about j
I
Nietzsche are emphasized by Jaspers In the preface to the J
first edition (the paragraph is quoted in full, for it !
i
expresses an ideal which inspired and hopefully guided
this writer's study of Nietzsche's educational philosophy):|
| i
! Every philosopher of rank requires such study
I as is commensurate with his stature. Nothing less ;
I than this can provide the soil for an inner activity !
that is the essence of true understanding. Books I
1 8 1
Translated by Charles P. Wallraff and Frederick
J. Schmitz (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965)*
Hereafter cited as Jaspers, Nietzsche. The work was |
| originally published in Germany in 1^35* English readers
j owe a debt of gratitude to the translators for their j
I excellent rendering of this important treatise. One
serious flaw, however, is the translators' decision to
omit Jaspers' "foot-noting" of his citations from j
Nietzsche's works. Thus the reader has no possible way of|
knowing from what work Jaspers is quoting. j
, Q
j ^Jaspers, Nietzsche. p. xi.
j ^Jaspers, Nietzs'ohe, p. xiii. j
! 17
about a philosopher are intended to promote this
inner activity. Instead of providing mere super
ficial contact, passive enjoyment of linguistic
felicities, and an initial misunderstanding that
leads to arbitrary emphases, they should afford
direct access and point the way. What concerns
the philosopher in question should be brought out
so clearly that we learn what is involved by
| dealing with the very thoughts that we had in mind.H
| As is perhaps the case with most books on great
j philosophers which are written by men who are themselves
philosophers of some stature, Jaspers' study tells us at
i least as much about his own philosophy as it does about
j
* ] O
j Nietzsche's. Nevertheless, Jaspers1 book stands as a
j monument to those who would attempt to appropriate
I
! Nietzsche's thought. Jaspers, like Kaufmann, says little
| about educational matters per se, but Nietzsche's life,
basic thoughts and way of thinking are explored with the
! clarity and perspicuity that characterize Jaspers'
I 13
j encounters with the "great thinkers."
I
j The writings of Kaufmann and Jaspers have helped
11
j Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. xi.
I no
! For an insightful as well as entertaining
! polemic against Jaspers, see Ch. 15* "Jaspers' Relation
j to Nietzsche," of Walter Kaufmann's From Shakespeare to
I Existentialism. Anchor Books (New York: boubieaay i t So.,
j Ind7,"lfW *y,"pp. 283-319.
! i^
I JThe reader may wish to consult "Kierkegaard and
| Nietzsche," the first chapter of Jaspers' Reason and
i Existenz. trans. by William Earle (New Yorlci Farrar,
Straus, 1 9 5 7 ). This selection is also to be found in
Walter Kaufmann's anthology, Existentialism from
Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York! Meridian Books, Inc.,
! 19^6//pp. l¥d-lBu.
prepare the way for those who would directly confront
Nietzsche's philosophical Ideas* Kaufmann's work abounds
In historical and biographical detail, and we can be
14
thankful to him for "setting the record straight."
However, the time Is now ripe for non-historical and non-
blographical approaches• One such approach is Arthur C.
Panto's Nietzsche as Philosopher.^ Danto remarks: "I
have written a book which treats of Nietzsche merely as a
philosopher, whose thought merits examination on Its own,
independent of the strange personality and the special
16
cultural, circumstances of its author." Panto's book is
the first, to this writer's knowledge, to approach
Nietzsche's philosophy from the standpoint of contem
porary Anglo-American linguistic analysis. "Nietzsche has
seldom been treated as a philosopher at all, and never,
I think, from the perspective, which he shared to some
degree, of contemporary analytical philosophy. In recent
years, philosophers have been preoccupied with logical
and linguistic researches, pure and applied, and I have
14
As a prolegomenon to the serious study of
Nietzsche, the reader should survey "The Nietzsche Legend"
as outlined by Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 15-28.
■^(New York: The Macmillari Co., 1965). Here
after cited as Panto, Nietzsche as Philosopher,
1(^Panto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 13.
19
not hesitated to reconstruct Nietzsche's arguments In
17
these terms." Danto's study can thus serve as a
countercheck to Kaufmann and Jaspers— neither of whom who
are especially congenial to linguistic analysis.
The primary value of Danto's work Is the direct
philosophical attention It gives to Nietzsche's central
Ideas. Of particular Interest is Danto's endeavor to
construct Nietzsche's philosophical "system" around the
18
pivotal concept of nihilism. Chapters on "perspectiv-
ism" and "philosophical psychology" shed light on
Nietzsche's epistemology.
Two other studies of Nietzsche's general
philosophy deserve mention here. First, there is the
long out of print and widely overlooked work, Nietzsche
the Thinker, by William Mackintire Salter.1^ Salter
prefaces his lengthy and brilliant study with these
observations:
Criticism of Nietzsche is rife, understanding
rare; this book is a contribution to the under
standing of him. At the same time I have tried not
merely to restate his thoughts, but to re-think
them, using more or less my own language. To enable
those interested to Judge of the correctness of the
17
'Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 13.
iQ
Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 22. "I
shall take Nihilism as the central concept in his
[Nietzsche's] philosophy."
"^(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917).
Hereafter cited as Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker.
' 20
interpretation, the original passages are referred
to almost constantly, I limit myself to his
fundamental points of view— noting only in passing
or not at all his thoughts on education, his later
views of art and music, his conception of women,
his interpretation of Christianity and attitude to
religion,20
Salter, like other writers dealing with the
"fundamental points" of Nietzsche*s philosophy, was
forced, for the sake of space and manageability, to ex
clude numerous topics— among which was education. The
sound judgment exercised by Salter when discussing
Nietzsche's moral, political and social philosophy makes
it hard to believe that the book was published under the
climate surrounding World War I, when Nietzsche scholar
ship was at its lowest ebb,
A second study deserving our attention is George
21
Allen Morgan's What Nietzsche Means, First published
in 19^1 by Harvard University Press it was reissued as a
paperback edition in 1965, Morgan, like the previous
authors mentioned, chooses to concentrate on communicating
certain of Nietzsche's basic concepts, such as the will-
to-power, and the application of these concepts to the
areas of morality, art and cultural history. Education
is again excluded from consideration,
20
Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p, v,
21
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row,
1 9 6 5), Hereafter cited as Morgan, What Nietzsche Means,
21
A survey of other systematic full-length studies
of Nietzsche's philosophy— e.g., M. A. Mugge's Friedrich
Nietzschei His Life and Work.22 Willard Huntington
21
Wright's What Nietzsche Taught J and Georges Chatterton-
Hlll's The Philosophy of Nietzschet An Exposition and an
oh
AppreclatIon— leads to the conclusion that those writers
who have treated Nietzsche's philosophy In a systematic
fashion have, for one reason or another, passed-over
Nietzsche's views on education.
The same observation holds true for unpublished
doctoral dissertations. Nietzsche's views on education
are simply not mentioned. Also, dissertations on
Nietzsche are frequently written from the perspective of
literature rather than philosophy, thus further limiting
their value for our purposes. One dissertation deserves
mention here for the light it sheds on Nietzsche's con
cepts of the superman, eternal recurrence and amor fatli
"Nietzsche's Concept of Amor Fati" by Charles Raymond
2*5
West, Jr. ^ West discusses Nietzsche's philosophy, using
22(3rd ed.j London* T. Fisher Unwin, 1911)*
2^(New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1915)*
2**(New York* D. Appleton and Co., 1914).
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1957).
22
amor fatl as the central doctrine.
Another group of works which help to establish a
general understanding of Nietzschefs philosophy, but which
tend to be more historical and biographical in orientation
and therefore do not quite merit inclusion with the pre
ceding studies, will now be briefly discussed* The first
work is Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* by
R. J. Hollingdale. This biography, which is based on
the most recent Nietzsche scholarship, is without doubt
the best "life" of Nietzsche to appear in the English
language, superseding the best previous biography, P. A.
Lea's The Tragic Philosopher: A Study of Friedrich
Nletzsohe.2^ The author1 s stated purpose was to outline
Nietzsche’s life "factually and concisely in the light of
28
all the available evidence." Fortunately Nietzsche's
"philosophy is considered as a part (the most important
part) of his life."2^ The result is an "intellectual"
biography of the first order. Of particular interest
to students of Nietzsche's educational views are
Hollingdale's chapters describing Nietzsche as
26
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1965). Hereafter cited as Hollingdale, Nietzsche.
2^(New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).
2®Hollingdale, Nietzsche* p. viii.
30
"schoolboy," "student" and "professor.I | J
31
A second work Is Crane Brinton*s Nietzsche.
Originally published by Harvard University press in 1941,
Brinton*s study proved popular enough to be reissued in a
new paperback edition in 1965. Brinton*s critique is
often exciting and challenging, but it suffers from both
a lack of philosophical rigor in Its analyses and a lack
of empathy with its subject. As to the former, we need
only note Brinton*s own comment in the preface: "I wish
to make quite clear that this study of Nietzsche does not
attempt to analyze his work from the point of view of a
professorial philosopher."3^ As to his lack of empathy,
Brinton frankly states: "I find Nietzsche as a human
being unpleasant and his influence on the whole regret
table."^ Kaufmann dismisses Brinton’s study as "an
34
undistinguished book by a distinguished historian,
However, for those idolaters who uncritically swallow
Nietzsche's ideas in toto, Brinton may well be prescribed
^Hollingdale, Nietzsche, pp. 22-67.
^Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row,
1965).
32
J Brinton, Nietzsche, p. vii.
3 3Ibld., p. ix.
34
J The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner,
trans. by Walter kaufmann, Vintage books (New Vorfc:
Random House, 1967), p. 207.
2k
as a proper antidote*
A third study Is Rudolf Steiner*s fascinating
Friedrich Nietzschet Fighter for Freedom.which is
based on a series of essays originally published at the
turn of the century. Steiner concentrates on the
"psychopathological" aspects of Nietzsche*s thought and
personality,
Ned H. Cassem, S.J., in a Journal article titled
"The Way to Wisdom: A Biodoctrinal Study of Friedrich
Nietzsche, " 5 attempts to combine biography and doctrine
and to discuss the strength and weaknesses of such a
method,
Journal articles
Innumerable Journal articles and chapters of
books have been written on Nietzsche, his Influence and
his ideas* There are two groups of articles and chapters
that are pertinent to a study of Nietzsche*s educational
philosophy* the first group consists of articles and
chapters treating of one or more of Nietzsche's basic
philosophical ideas— i.e* those ideas which provide the
groundwork for Nietzsche's educational philosophy; the
■ 3 C
“ ^Translated by Margaret Ingram de Ris (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Rudolf Steiner Publications, Inc.,
I960)*
36The Modern Schoolman, XXXIX (May, 1962), 335-58.
25
second group consists of articles or sections of books
dealing directly with Nietzschefs educational views. Let
us briefly consider each In turn.
Heading the list of the first group Is an essay
v r
by the American Idealist, Josiah Royce, ' This essay,
which was "found among the posthumous papers of Professor
Royce, " 38 argues that Nietzsche was motivated by the
desire to solve man’s "moral problem"— i,e,, the problem
of "the perfection, not of society, not of the masses of
men, but of the great Individual," Royce finds much in
Nietzsche that Is congenial to his own self-realization
theory of morals. However, Nietzsche’s preoccupation
with the Individual and his constant attacks on the
environment restricted the full development of his
philosophical system:
There is no doubt that, from the point of view
of a more systematic Idealism, Nietzsche appears as
entirely failing to see the organic character of the
true life of cooperating individuals. The great
problem of reconciling the unique individual with
the world-order is simply not Nietzsche's problem.
One must not go to him for light upon that subject.
Therein lies his perfectly obvious limitation, 1 ’0
Royce*s article does not dwell on Nietzsche’s
3 7"Nietzsche." Atlantic Monthly, CXIX (March,
1917), 321-331.
3 8Ibld.. 3 2 1. 3 9Ibid., 322.
lin
Ibid.. 328.
26
"limitation,” but on his positive contributions to
philosophical thought* It is a sympathetic view of
Nietzsche's general philosophy as seen through the lens of
objective idealism*
The basic concept in Nietzsche's ontology is the
will-to-power. Any discussion of this concept raises the
question of the possible influence of Schopenhauer, whose
metaphysics was based on the primacy of "will." From the
fact that Nietzsche stressed the volitional aspect of life,
and that he wrote a panegyric on Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer
as Educator), critics have been tempted to draw the pre
mature conclusion that Nietzsche and Schopenhauer held
similar world-views*
The relationship between these two philosophers is
41
explored in an early article by Grace Neal Dolson*
Dolson convincingly argues that outside of the fact that
both men employed the term "will," their philosophical
systems had little in common; Indeed, on most major points
they were diametrically opposed. Yet there is no doubt
that Nietzsche greatly admired Schopenhauer* Nietzsche's
admiration was not for Schopenhauer's philosophy, but for
Schopenhauer as a man, as a fighter against his times*
Dolson concludes:
4l
"The Influence of Schopenhauer upon Friedrich
Nietzsche," Philosophical Review, X (No. 3. 1901), 24l-
250.
27
What seems especially to have attracted
Nietzsche to Schopenhauer was a radical indepen
dence of tradition and public opinion, and where
he praises the latter’s work it is usually for
this freedom from outside influence, Schopenhauer
was a man who gloried in disagreeing with estab
lished authority, living or dead; . • . His manner
of expressing his criticisms was often person in
its tone and could hardly fall to be offensive. . • •
It was exactly the intellectual attitude that
appealed most strongly to him [Nietzsche]]. He
controverted many of Schopenhauer1s views with
great bitterness, but he always recognized that
here was an enemy worthy of him. 1 *2
Two recent articles dealing with the difficult
notion of the eternal recurrence of all things deserve
careful attention when attempting to reconstruct
Nietzsche’s ontology and to show the relationship between
his ontological concepts and his axiology. The first
article, by Rose Pfeffer, appeared in the Review of
Metaphysics for December, 1965. Pfeffer prefaces the
article with the following summary:
I contend that the idea of the eternal
recurrence is of central importance and represents
a vital and essential unity in which the various
aspects of Nietzsche’s thought are synthesized.
The idea expresses Nietzsche’s critique and repu
diation of the Platonic-Christian tradition and
accomplishes a revaluation of values. It grows
out of his conception of nihilism as a dialectical
movement and basic law of the history of being and
leads to an apotheosis of life. The timeless
eternity of a supernatural God is replaced by the
eternity of the ever creating and destroying powers
in nature and man.**3
4 2Ibid.. 249-250.
•'"Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche’s Philosophy, 1 1
Review of Metaphysics. XIX (December, 1965), 276-300.
28
A second article on the doctrine of eternal
recurrence, by Giles Driscoll, appeared In the Autumn,
44
1966 Issue of The Personallst. Driscoll approaches
Nietzsche's doctrine In the light of Carl Jung's arche
types and Mircea Eliade's studies on the primitive myth
of the ternal return. Both Pfeffer and Driscoll, In
contrast to all-too-many Nietzsche critics, recognize the
Importance and centrality of the eternal recurrence to
Nietzschefs philosophy.
On Nietzsche’s epistemology the following articles
are helpful. Roger Hazelton's "Nietzsche's Contribution
to the Theory of Languageattempts to analyze
Nietzsche's theory of language in terms of modern develop
ments in linguistics. Rose Pfeffer's "The Problem of
46
Truth in Nietzsche's Philosophy" views Nietzsche's
entire epistemological position, in both its negative and
positive aspects. Pfeffer contends:
Nietzsche's philosophy represents a
passionate search for truth, with conclusions that
do not at all destroy truth itself, but only the
traditional conceptions of it. His revolt against
traditional systems does not lead to radical
nihilism, but to a new conception of knowledge
44
"Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence," The
Personalist. XLVII, No. 4 ( 1 9 6 6), 461-474.
^ Philosophical Review. LII (January, 19^3), 47-60.
46The Personalist. XLVII, No. 1 (1967), 5-24.
29
which becomes fundamental for twentieth century
thought and makes Nietzsche a precursor of con
temporary epistemological theories in their
pragmatic and existential significance.^
There has been a great deal of material written
on Nietzsche's critique of morality. A well-balanced but
brief introduction to Nietzsche's moral philosophy is the
recently published article by Robert Rogers, "The Moral
48
Philosophy of Nietzsche." Rogers interprets Nietzsche
as an ethical naturalist akin to Spinoza and Dewey.
"Self-transcending" is emphasized as a leading idea in
the Nletzschean ethic.
A fresh approach to Nietzsche's way of thinking,
especially to his theory of value, is Eric Bentley's
49
A Century of Hero-Worship. Nietzsche is interpreted
as an exponent of what Bentley calls "Heroic Vitalism."^
4 7Ibid., 5.
48The Personalist, XLVI, No. 1 (1965), 18-38.
4^(2nd ed.j Boston: Beacon Press, 1957)* The
subtitle reads, "A Study of the Idea of Heroism in
Carlyle and Nietzsche, with Notes on Wagner, Spengler,
Stefan Qeorge, and D. H. Lawrence."
^°Bentley first proposes the term as a label for
Carlyle's views: "For Carlyle's outlook I propose the
name Heroic Vitalism, a term that is meant to embrace
both a political theory, Aristocratic Radicalism, and a
metaphysic which, inverting Carlyle's expression 'Natural
Supernaturalism,* we might call Supernatural Naturalism."
A Century of Hero-Worship, p. 73. The same label is used
to describe Nietzsche's views.
30
Carlyle and Nietzsche, both of whom Bentley sees as
"Inverted Christians, " ^ 1 are discussed as outstanding
proponents of nineteenth-century hero-worship,
A concise account of Nietzsche's ethics is con
tained in the contribution by Walter Kaufmann to the
Encyclopedia of Morals, ^ 2 Also relevant is Kaufmann1s
essay, "How Nietzsche Revolutionized Ethics," in From
Shakespeare to Existentialism,which includes the cen
tral passages from the encyclopedia article.
Educational philosophers who wish to establish
some general lines of cultural continuity here in America
between current Nietzsche studies and earlier attempts
54
should consult Ludwig Marcuse's "Nietzsche in America,"
Nietzsche, like most European thinkers, paid little
serious attention to America, However, among his scattered
references to America one finds both positive and negative
comments. Of the latter are the observations that
Americans are always in a hurry, thoughtlessly rushing
after some unseen goal. But more often than not,
5 1Ibid., p. 1 6 6,
•^Walter Kaufmann, "Nietzsche, Friedrich,"
Encyclopedia of Morals. ed. by Vergilius Ferm (New York:
philosophical Library, 1 9 5 6), pp, 390^* 3 9 9*
* * ^Anchor Books (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
I960).
54
J Trans, by James C, Fleming, South Atlantic
Quarterly. L (July, 1951)* 330-339. The article
31
Nietzsche cites America as a land of healthy-minded prag
matists free from the morbid depressions or the German
romantics, Marcuse remarks that for Nietzsche "America
was the radiant healthiness which would overcome European,
Christian, romantic, melancholy dejection,
The paradox is that it seems to be this very
healthy-mindedness that has prevented Nietzsche from
having truly serious and understanding exponents in this
country, Marcuse surveys not only the superficial
Nietzschean fanatics (who were rather evenly divided
between lovers and haters, depending in large measure upon
their sympathies in the two World Wars), but also the
sincere interpreters of Nietzsche's philosophy, such as
the American Idealist, Josiah Royce. However, it was
H. L. Mencken who gave Nietzsche his greatest boost in
America, Mencken, like Nietzsche, was an ioonolast and
non-conformist, and "he was the first to publicize the
importance of Nietzsche In this country and to continue
here the fight of the greatest German proponent of
originally appeared in German as "Nietzsche In Amerika,"
Neue Sohweizer Rundschau, XVIII (1950), 222-231,
^Marcuse, South Atlantic Quarterly. 331«
56
^ George Bernard Shaw performed the same service
in England. Shaw "rated Thus Spake Zarathustra higher
than the Psalms of David, 1 1 Marcuse, 331 *,
32
57
enlightenmentMencken was no doubt the best early
disciple of Nietzsche in this country. Yet Mencken
possessed some very non-Nietzschean traits. As Marcuse
rhetorically asks:
What would this most unrelenting critic of
Germany have said had he learned that a picture
of Wilhelm II, whom he would have shot, ornamented
Mencken's bedroom? What would he have said had he
learned that Mencken spoke of an "intelligent
fascism? during the reign of Hitler? What would
he have thought of an apostle who declared boldly
in 1908 that Nietzsche reigned as king of the
German universities where, since the days of
Luther, more intensive thinking had been done than
anywhere else in the world? Nietzsche would un
doubtedly have unleashed one of his most biting
apterous against this idolatry of Germany, For, in
the first place, the followers of Kant, Fichte,
and Hegel had not permitted Nietzsche to enter the
hallowed halls of German universities. Secondly,
has there been no thought outside of Germany—
nothing by Pascal, Descartes, Spinoza, and above
all, by Nietzsche's brilliant predecessors, La
Rochefoucauld, Vauvenargues, and Chamfort? Nor
would Nietzsche have been in accord with the para
doxes of his adherent. When Mencken assures us
that the only thing which Nietzsche really believed
in was his Polish ancestry, the observation is not
Nletzschean, but rather in the style of a German
literary cafe. Occasionally Mencken practically
identified himself with those pocket-sized bar
barians whom the master had foreseen and rejected
in 1 8 8 4 .5 8
What Mencken and other Nietzsche critics in America have
generally lacked was a sense of crisis and meaningless
ness. Unless one is sick, unless he is suffering from a
“ ^Marcuse, 336.
**®Marouse, 336,
33
loss of values and feels nihilism engulfing him,
Nietzsche's full import will remain hidden*
The grounds of the paradox just mentioned would
seem to be disappearing in recent years* Since the
nineteen-fifties, America has Increasingly turned to the
thoughts of Kafka, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Nietzsche* The
time would thus seem ripe for studies of the educational
thought of these truly modern thinkers*
Writings on Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy
We turn now to material dealing specifically with
Nietzsche's views on education* Very little of any sub
stance has been written on Nietzsche’s educational ideas*
A quaint article by Walter S. McNutt [Florida State
College for Women, Tallahassee] titled "Some Implications
of the Origin of the Nordic Tendency” appeared in
CQ
Education in 1925. The article consists primarily of
a string of quotations (nowhere in the article does the
author attempt a single "argument") from Thus Spoke
Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil* These quotations
serve the purpose of presenting "the plain facts about
the Superman in Nietzsche's philosophy, as a basis for the
modern Nordic tendency* "^ 0 The author concludes that
59XLV (March, 1925), 399-406.
6 0Ibld>, 3 9 9.
34
Nietzsche’s philosophy is built around the concepts of the
superman and victory over the weakt
He [Nietzsche] holds that man’s evolution
comes about through mental development, spiritual
development, and the cultivation of the will to
power. To do this, man must climb over the pros
trate forms of his weaker brothers* , * , He must
let the superfluous go the way of the weak and
let swift death overtake them,°l
McNutt’s final paragraph reads*
Nietzsche had a mental breakdown before he
worked out his system of education by which the
Superman was to make a Super-race* We are looking
for this solution to be achieved through the Nordic
I*Q* advocates. However, we are going to expect a
more sympathetic approach than was intended by
Nietzsche, the master of our Nordic friends*°2
An article of an altogether different caliber
appeared in Educational Review of January, 1909*
"Nietzsche's Educational Ideas and Ideals,” by J,
go
Broene. ° Broene views Nietzsche's educational ideal of
the genius and superman as a restatement of the aristo
cratic ideal of the Renaissance. Nietzsche, himself,
"beyond a doubt belongs to the milieu of the Renaissance,
His homocentricism, his Individualism, his enthusiasm,
his devotion to the humanities, his manner, the fertility
of his genius— all combine to make him one of the
coryphaei of the Renaissance who appears on the stage
6lIbid., 40 6. 6 2Ibid*. 40 6.
63LVI (January, 1909), 55-70*
35
64
Just as the curtain apparently is about to fall," After
a brief but admirable exposition of some of Nietzsche’s
educational ideas, Broene concludes that despite a few
positive elements
the fact remains that Nietzsche's educational
ideal is wholly impracticable and, what is more,
undesirable. The main purpose of education never
has been, excepting possibly during the Renaissance,
and never ought to be the production of the rare
genius. The main purpose of education should be
the uplifting of the masses.6*
Thus for Broene there is little of educational value to
be derived from Nietzsche’s philosophy. Broene*s con
clusion is no doubt partly due to the fact that he
unfortunately limits himself to a consideration of
Nietzsche’s earliest writings, focusing primarily on
Nietzsche's lectures: The Future of Our Educational
Institutions. Broene Justifies his approach on the
grounds that "it is only during this period that
Nietzsche interested himself in the more restricted
66
sense." However, this limitation of scope limits the
article’s value to students of Nietzsche's educational
philosophy because Nietzsche’s greatest contribution to
educational thought is to be found In his reflections on
education in the widest sense: and for this one must
proceed beyond his early works.
6^Ibid., 5 7. 6 5Ibid., 7 0. 6 6Ibid., 5 8.
36
Less philosophical in content is A, W. G.
6 7
Randall*s "Nietzsche and German Education,n Randall
attempts to show the extent to which Prussian education
was made to serve the narrow interests of the state,
Randall argues that despite Nietzsche*s warnings and pro
tests, Prussian education continued to be a slave to
political interests, Randall is one of the first writers
to stress the importance of the ideas formulated in
Nietzsche*s early essay, Schopenhauer as Educatori it is
"the halfway house between the lectures on education and
the poetic philosophy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.* The
complete man as the sole aim of education--this is
Implicit in all that Nietzsche had to say upon the
subject,"88
Another non-philosophical but relevant article is
69
"Nietzsche and the Academic Mind" by T, Moody Campbell,
Campbell treats of Nietzsche*s own scholarly training,
his relationship with three of his colleagues— Overbeck,
Rohde and Burckhardt— and his final break with the
scholarly tradition, Campbell notes that Nietzsche*s
basic criterion of even the best scholars is that they do
67Quarterly Review, CCXXIV (July, 1915), 124-135.
68Ibid,, 128,
69PMLA, LXII, Supplement (1947), 1183-1196.
37
70
not convert learning into a "personal imperative," they
do not "live" their thoughts.
If one relied solely on journals of education for
one's source of educational ideas, one would never so
much as get a hint from the content cf these journals
over the past decade--with two minor exceptions— that
Nietzsche ever existed. The two minor exceptions are:
first, a brief article by this writer titled "Nietzsche
on Education,"7^ The purpose of the article was to bring
to the general educator’s attention several of Nietzsche's
central educational ideas, such as self-perfection and
self-knowledge. The nature of the Journal and its
audience precluded any extensive analysis.
The second exception occurs in an article titled
"Existential Philosophers on Education" by Bruce F,
Baker. 72 Baker argues, contra George F. Kneller and
Van Cleve Morris, that existentialism has, or at least
various existential philosophers (Nietzsche, Ortega y
Gasset, Jaspers) have had, explicit philosophies of
education. Baker concludes, however, that the educational
views of these thinkers are not especially "existential,"
7° I b l d . . 1192.
71
James W, Hillesheim, "Nietzsche on Education,"
Education. LXXXIV (December, 1963), 226-230.
7 Educational Theory, XVI (July, 1966), 216-224.
38
and that one must turn to the writings of Martin Buber for
73
an existential philosophy of education. J That the
coverage of Nietzsche* s educational philosophy is some
thing less than adequate is evidenced by the mere two
pages devoted to it.
Summary of Review of Secondary Sources
Having surveyed the literature, we are now in a
position to draw several conclusions of a summarizing
nature. First, we have seen that there are several full-
length, scholarly, philosophically perceptive studies of
Nietzsche's fundamental philosophical position, including
its historical setting and influence on later thought
(notably books by Kaufmann, Jaspers, Danto, Morgan and
Salter), Secondly, adequate biographical information is
now available to the English reader (the, not likely to
be soon superseded, work of Hollingdale), Thirdly,
Nietzsche's various eplstemologlcal, ontological and
axiological doctrines have elicited scholarly attention in
the form of Journal articles (e.g, the analysis of eternal
recurrence by Pfeffer).
From the above observations we may safely conclude
that for anyone wishing to pursue the basic thought of
73Ibid,, 222,
39
Nietzsche there Is almost a plethora of excellent second
ary source material. Parenthetically, we may remark that
the picture is also fairly bright for those who would
pursue Nietzsche's ideas on certain select topics: e.g.,
aesthetics, Wagnerfs music, or Christian ethics. On the
topic of educational practice and theory we have seen
that, except for a few articles (which are severely limited
either by lack of space, the editorial policy of the Jour
nal, or the author's understanding of his subject), and a
few pages in books concerned with other aspects of
7 l i
Nietzsche's thought,' there has been unwarranted silence.
There is thus a serious gap in Nietzsche studies
and, more Importantly, an almost total Ignorance of
Nietzsche's educational philosophy on the part of educa
tional theorists and philosophers. It is the purpose of
this dissertation to fill the present gap in the
Nietzsche literature and to bring to the educator's
attention a significant and challenging educational
philosophy.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
systematizing and discussing the primary source materials.
74
' S e e "Nietzsche's Criticism of Education, Present
and Past," in Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The
Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought. trans. by David
E. Green.(New Vork: iHolt, kinehart and Winston, 1964),
PP. 303-305.
Mo
These materials demand our close attention for it is upon
them, rather than upon secondary sources, that this study
is based.
Nietzsche^ Writings
715
Chronology of Nietzsche's Works J
I, Early Period
Die Qeburt der Trapodle aus 'deni Geiste der
Music (The Birth of Tragedy Out of the
Spirit of Music), A new Preface is added
in 1886, and the last part of the title is
replaced by the new subtitle! Grlechentum
und Pesslmlsmus (The Greek Spirit and
Pessimism),
I, David Strauss, der Bekenner und
Schrlftsteller (bavld Strauss, the Confessor
and Writer),
II, Vom Nutzen und Naohteil der Historie
fflr dai Leben (Of* the tJse and bisadvantage
of History for Life)•
III, Schopenhauer als Erzieher (Schopen
hauer as Educator),
IV, Richard Wagxer in Bayreuth
II, Middle Period
Menschllohes, Allzumensohliches (Human,
All-t0 0-Human), A new' Prefaceadded in
1886,
715
1^This chronology is based on the date of publica
tion, Most of Nietzsche's books were written during the
year preceding publication; exceptions are noted In
parentheses. Only those works actually published or
clearly intended for publication by Nietzsche are Included,
For a more detailed listing, see Kaufmann, The Portable
Date of
Publication
1872
1873
I8 7M
1 8 7M
1876
41
Date of
Publication
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
II* Middle Period
I, Part One
II. Part Two
a. Vermischte Melnungen und Spruehe
(Mixed Opinions and Maxims;
b. Per Wanderer und seln Schatten
(The Wanderer and his Shadow;
Die Morgenrote (The Dawn)
Die FrShllche Wissenschaft (The Gay
Science). (Book Five. Sphorisms 343-383,
and an Appendix of poems were added in
1887.)
III. Late Period
Also Sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke
Zarathustra).
Parts I and II.
Part III.
Part IV. (First public edition of Part IV
published in 1 8 9 2.)
Jenseits von Gut und Bose (Beyond Good and
Evil).------------------
ZUr Genealogie der Moral (Toward a
Genealogy o? Morals) .
Per Fall Wagner (The Case of Wagner).
Dis Gotzen-Dammerung (The Twilight of the
idols).--------
Nietzsche. pp. 20-23J and Hollingdale, Nietzsche, pp. xi-
xvi.
42
Date of
Publication III* Late Period
1895 Per Antichrist (Written in 1888).
Nietzsche contra Wagner (Written in 1888 )*
1908 Ecce Homo (Written in 1888),
76
Nietzsche in German*
This study is directed toward an English-speaking
audience who will in most cases be reading Nietzsche in
translation* For this reason the section immediately
following this one, titled "Nietzsche in English,"
attempts to provide an exhaustive coverage of current
translations and editions. Our task in this section, how
ever, is to identify the German editions that have been
utilized in this study (they are also the editions most
widely used by contemporary Nietzsche scholars),
Nietzsche’s Werke (works) were published in an
77
edition known as the Grossoktavausgabe. edited by
various hands under the general supervision of
Nietzsche’s sister, Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche. The
first edition of fifteen volumes was published between
1895 and 1901 by Naumann Verlag in Leipzig. A revised
7 6
* For an annotated list of Nietzsche’s works in
German see the Bibliography appended to Kaufmann's trans
lation of The Birth of Tragedy* esp. pp. 199-204,
77
11 Hereafter cited as Grossoktavausgabe *
43
and enlarged second edition of nineteen volumes was
Issued by Alfred Kroner Verlag, Leipzig, between 1901 and
1913, A listing of the contents of each volume of the
second edition Is to be found in Table One of the Appendix
of this study. Since many libraries in the United States
do not have a complete set of either edition, but often a
mixture of the two, disparities in pagination can be a
problem.
A later edition of Nietzsche's Gesammelte Werke
7 8
(collected works) is the Musarionausgabe, published in
twenty-three volumes by Musarion Verlag in Munich between
1920 and 1929. The volumes are arranged in chronological
order— except for volume XXI which contains autobio
graphical material from all periods— and the final three
volumes which contain Richard Oehler's name and subject
index. The contents of each volume are listed in Table
Two of the Appendix attached to this dissertation.
A convenient and inexpensive collection of
Nietzsche's complete works is titled Werke in drei
• * 7 Q
Banden (Works in Three Volumes), edited by Karl
Schlechta and published by Carl Hanser of Munich, 1954-
1956. A fourth volume, the Nietzsche-Index. was added
in 1965.
78
Hereafter cited as Musarionausgabe.
70
^Hereafter cited as Werke. in drei Banden.
44
A fourth collection used in this study is Werke
und Briefe: Historlsh-Kritische Qesamtausgabe. edited by
Wilhelm Hoppe, Karl Schlechte, et al.. nine volumes
[five volumes Werke and four volumes Brlefe] (Munich:
C. H. Beck Verlag, 1932-1940) . 80
Nietzsche in English
English translations of Nietzsche*s writings may
be conveniently grouped under three main headings: first,
the translation of Nietzsche’s complete works made under
the supervision of Oscar Levy; second, the recent trans
lations of Walter Kaufmannj third, other recent trans
lations.
The Oscar Levy Translations
Under the editorship of Dr. Oscar Levy, shortly
after the turn of the century, Nietzsche’s works were
translated by diverse hands (none of the translations
were by Levy himself). The translations were published
in eighteen volumes between the years 1909 and 1911 under
the title, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche.
London and New York: The Macmillan Company. These
volumes have recently been reissued in a limited edition
80
Hereafter cited as Historish-Krltische
Oesamtausgabe.
45
81
by Russell & Russell, Inc*, New York, 1964. Included
in these volumes are all of Nietzsche's works Intended by
him for publication, plus numerous notes, lectures and
essays drawn from the posthumous remains. The final
volume In the set contains a 3 61 page, alphabetically
arranged, name-subject volume compiled by Robert Guppy.
Table Three appended to this study contains a volume by
volume index of the writings included in The Complete
Works.
A number of the "Levy translations" have appeared
over the years as separate volumes or as parts of
anthologies. Of the separate volumes the following are
currently available: The Use and Abuse of History,
second edition, translated by Adrian Collins (with minor
corrections of spelling and punctuation by the publisher),
Introduction by Julius Kraftj New York: The Liberal Arts
82
Press, 1957. Joyful Wisdom, translated by Thomas
Common, Introduction by Kurt P. Reinhardt} New York:
Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, i9 6 0. Of the
anthologies, three of the Levy translations are included
in the popular collection titled The Philosophy of
Nietzsche, Introduction by W. H, Wright; New York: The
8l
Hereafter cited as The Complete Works.
8 2
Hereafter cited as The Use and Abuse of History.
46
Q o
Modern Library, 1954. 0 The three reprinted translations
are: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. translated by Thomas Common;
Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Helen Zimmern; The
Genealogy of Morals, translated by Horace B. Samuel.
(Two other translations, which are not "Levy transla
tions," are included in the Modern Library anthology:
Ecce Homo and The Birth of Tragedy, both translated by
Clifton P. Fadiman.)
The recent Walter Kaufmann translations
More than any other individual in the English-
speaking world, Walter Kaufmann, through his numerous
articles, books and translations, has stimulated the
serious study of Nietzsche as a major philosopher. His
translations include the following:
An anthology titled, The Portable Nietzsche. New
York: The Viking Press, 1958. This volume contains four
complete works: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight of the
Idols, The Antichrist and Nietzsche Contra Wagner; it
also Includes selections from Nietzschers other writings,
84
as well as extensive commentary by Kaufmann. Thus Spoke
Zarathustra has also been published as a separate volume
8 ^
Hereafter cited as The Philosophy of Nietzsche.
84
Hereafter cited as The Portable Nietzsche.
by The Viking Press, New York, 1966.
Other Kaufmann translations, which include his
commentaries, are: Beyond Good and Evil, Vintage Books,
New York: Random House, 1966.®** The Birth of Tragedy^
and The Case of Wagner.^ published together in one
volume, Vintage Books, New York: Random House, 1967.
Kaufmann, in collaboration with R. J. Hollingdale,
has Just completed new translations of: On the Genealogy
of Morals and Ecce Homo, bound in one volume, Vintage
Books, New York: Random House, 1967, and The Will to
88
Power. New York: Random House, 1967.
Other recent translations
The following works, listed after the names of
their translators, have appeared in the past few years
and are currently in print.
Marianne Cowan, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of
the Greeks. A Gateway Edition, Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1962.®^ Beyond Good and Evil, A Gateway Edition,
gc
•'Hereafter cited as Beyond Good and Evil.
Hereafter cited as The Birth of Tragedy.
®^Hereafter cited as The Case of Wagner.
88
The latter hereafter cited as The Will to Power,
Kaufmann translation.
®^Hereafter cited as Philosophy in the Tragic Age
of the Greeks.
48
Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955«
Francis Golffing, The Birth of Tragedy and The
Genealogy of Morals. Anchor Books, New York: Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1956.
James W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson,
Schopenhauer as Educator. Introduction by Eliseo Vivas,
A Gateway Edition, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965.
R. J. Hollingdale, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Harmondsworth and Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961.
Kurt F. Leidecker, Nietzsche: Unpublished
Q1
Letters, New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
Nietzsche’s Posthumous Writings
Every interpreter of Nietzsche’s philosophy faces
the problem of whether it is legitimate to draw sub
stantially from the Naohlass [posthumous notes]. And if
so, to what extent? How much authority can be assigned
to the Nachlass in comparison to the published works?
This is especially crucial in a consideration of the
Wlll-to-Power. for the Nachlass contains numerous notes,
aphorisms and extended prose passages dealing directly
with the will-to-power. This material was gathered
qn
^ Hereafter cited as Schopenhauer as Educator.
Q1
* Hereafter cited as Unpublished Letters.
49
together after Nietzsche's death and published by his
sister, Prau Forster Nietzsche, under the title The Will
to Power. However, since the material was not published
by Nietzsche himself, and since It Is almost certain that
92
he would not have published it as it now stands, con
siderable discretion In its use would seem to be in
order* Indeed, Integrity demands that the interpreter
explicitly inform the reader as to what stand 13 being
taken in regard to published versus unpublished material*
It may be useful to preface the position here
adopted toward the Nachlass by a brief survey of the
variety of views taken by contemporary Nietzsche scholars.
At one extreme is the argument that it is only in the
Nachlass that the true Nietzsche is to be found. Eric
Bentley, in his A Century of Hero-Worship, maintains that,
"in his published works, Nietzsche wore a mask which only
the discerning could pierce. It is possible to see
Nietzsche without his mask only in the various collec
tions of posthumously published notes .. . of which The
Will to Power is the only well-known extract. These
notes not only provide more direct statements of
Nietzsche's philosophy: they enable us to discredit the
division of Nietzsche's career , . , and to establish
^Hollingdale, Nietzsche. ch. 14, "The Revalua
tion," pp. 2 6 0-2 7 2.
50
not merely continuity but consistency throughout
Nietzsche*s literary life."^ At the other extreme is
R. J. Hollingdale who argues that the true Nietzsche is to
be found only in the published works, that the Nachlass
from the l8 8o*s (sometimes referred to collectively as
the Revaluation of All Values), ’ ’ has played a part in
Nietzsche studies out of proportion to its importance;
indeed, discussion of his later philosophy has been
haunted by the shadow-existence of the Revaluation, and
the practice of quoting from it side-by-side with the
finished works as if both possessed equal validity as
1 Nietzsche’s opinions* has blurred the distinction
between what he himself published, or prepared for publi-
qii
cation, and what he rejected for publication.”^
The stand taken throughout this study regarding
the Nachlass is that this posthumous material— valuable
though it is— is not to be given the same priority as
Nietzsche's published works. Nietzsche’s published
writings are accepted as authoritative, as representing
his considered views and as a touchstone by which we one
may Judge and interpret the Nachlass. It would indeed be
strange if a thinker's published writings were not granted
^Bentley, A Century of Hero-Worship, p. 137.
^Hollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 260.
51
priority over his notebooks (we are here speaking of a
person*s ideas and philosophical concepts; if we were to
focus on his personal life or psychological problems the
notebooks might assume primary importance).
Having made this caveat, it is safe to assign two
important functions to the posthumous materials: first,
they may be used to elaborate, extend, clarify or deepen
ideas contained in the published works. On several of
Nietzsche’s ideas (e.g., the will-to-power) we shall use
the Nachlass for this purpose. The criterion for
employing any particular note is consistency with pub
lished views. If a note is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s
published ideas it will not be used (for the simple reason
that Nietzsche's notebooks, and perhaps most writer’s
notebooks, contain numerous ’ ’ experiments’ ’ and ideas
ultimately rejected), A seoond legitimate function is
that Nietzsche's unpublished materials may be used as
suggestive of possible directions that Nietzsche’s
thought may have taken— had he not collapsed at a rela
tively early age* In the notebooks one finds
attempts— often speculative, tentative, or maliciously
playful— to think-through the implications and inter
relationship of previously expanded ideas.
Reference Style
52
This study will utilize the following reference
stylei Roman and Arabic numerals immediately following
the title of Nietzsche’s works refer to chapter (or a
similar division, such as ”book”) and aphorism numbers,
respectively. This two-number sequence is necessary
where Nietzsche begins renumbering his aphorisms at the
start of a new chapter: for example, The Genealogy of
Morals» III, 15 refers to Chapter Three, aphorism fifteen.
Only one number is needed to cite those works in which
Nietzsche numbers his aphorisms consecutively throughout
the entire work: for example, Beyond Good and Evil. 129
refers to aphorism 129. Some works are divided only into
rather lengthy sections: thus a reader searching for
lines quoted from Schopenhauer as Educator. 6 may have to
read most of section six before finding the relevant
passage. There are other works in which Nietzsche begins
renumbering aphorisms under new ohapter headings, but
with no number given to the chapters themselves. In these
cases we shall cite the complete heading, followed by the
aphorism number: for example, Twilight of the Idols.
"The Problem of Socrates,” 7 allows the reader, by con
sulting the table of contents of Twilight of the Idols,
to readily locate the passages. A final case is that of
53
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this work Nietzsche assigned
numbers to the major divisions or parts, headings to the
aphorisms or sections and, in places, numbers to sub
divisions of aphorisms. Thus a typical citation might bet
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. IV, "On the Higher Man," 5*
The method of citation just outlined follows the
accepted tradition of Nietzsche scholarship. In addition,
exact page numbers will also be cited, so that readers
with the same edition may go directly to the specific
source. A complete list of editions cited in this study
may be found in the Bibliography* The editions used for
citation have been selected on the basis of the quality
of the translation and the availability to the general
reader. In some Instances, mainly when quoting from
The Complete Works, minor changes in spelling, punctuation
and wording have been made.
Nietzsche’s Writings on Education
A major difficulty is that Nietzsche did not
expound his mature philosophy of education in any one
book or work. Nor does he have a "system" In the sense
that a Kant or Hegel does. If a student of Nietzsche’s
philosophy relies on only one or a few of Nietzsche's
works he is bound to be misled on some point or other—
and probably on a major point at that. In order to
understand Nietzsche one must be familiar with the entire
corpus of Nietzschefs writings, because an understanding
of each particular work contributes to an understanding
of Nietzsche's thought as a whole. Much of Nietzsche's
most valuable thought is expressed in the form of
aphorisms, with each aphorism touching upon a particular
problem. Nietzsche does not make any overt or sustained
attempt to bind his scattered thoughts together into a
visibly connected or uniform system. This is not to say
that Nietzsche's philosophy is without order or unity— but
it is not readily apparent, and one must be willing to
ferret it out for himself.
This writer would suggest that the best place to
begin the study of Nietzsche's educational philosophy is
Schopenhauer as Educator. Where one goes from here is
largely a matter of what aspect of Nietzsche's educational
thought one wishes to pursue. References in the ensuing
chapters of this study should provide a convenient guide.
The reader may also wish to consult the indices in the
various German and English collected works.
CHAPTER III
NIETZSCHE»S LIFE
Birth and Ancestry
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born In the little
town of Rocken, near Leipzig on October 15, 1844.
"Friedrich Wilhelm" was selected by Nietzsche's parents in
honor of the current ruler of Prussia* Upon the chris
tening of his son, Nietzsche's father exclaimed, "Bring
me, then, this my beloved child, that I may consecrate
him unto the Lord! My son, Friedrich Wilhelm, thus shalt
then be named on earth, in honor of my royal benefactor
on whose birthday thou wast born."'L Nietzsche himself
later dropped the "Wilhelm,"
The Protestant tradition surrounded Nietzsche from
the beginning: not only were both grandfathers Lutheran
ministers, but his father was also. Nietzsche's father
died in 1849, leaving young Friedrich surrounded by
female relatives: his mother, sister, grandmother and
two maiden aunts.
In light of Nietzsche's later philosophy it Is
tempting to speculate as to whether his attacks against
Christianity, his caustic remarks concerning women, his
"immoralism" and other unpopular ideas are but a reaction
1Elisabeth FSrster-Nietzsche, The Life of
Nietzsche, Vol, It The Young Nietzsche, trans. by A. M.
Ludovici and P. V. Cohn (London: n.p., 1912-1915),
p . 12.
57
against the overly protective, feminine, bourgeois, com
fortable, hard working, pious, eoht deutsch atmosphere
that surrounded Nietzsche as a child. The attempt to
explain Nietzsche’s philosophy by appealing to details of
his personal life, or by applying the conceptual apparatus
of psychoanalysis, may be a profitable exercise, and would
no doubt enrich our understanding of Nietzsche as a man.
However, when one is concerned with Nietzsche as a
thinker, as we are here, it is the logic of his ideas—
2
not their origin— that matters, Nietzsche himself
complains: ’ ’ Where my critics are concerned, I am often
under the impression that they are scoundrels. Not what
is said, but that I say it and what should have made me
in particular arrive at it— only that seems to interest
them . * . they Judge me in order to ignore my work:
they explain its genesis, and thereby consider it
adequately disposed of.”^
Much scholarly energy has gone into the question
of Nietzsche’s family lineage. In later life Nietzsche
liked to fancy himself a descendant of the Polish
aristocracy. In a letter to his friend, Georges Brandes,
2
For support of the approach taken in this
dissertation see Jaspers, Nietzsche, pp. 7-8; and
Kaufmann, Nietzsche. pp. 30-31.
• a
JQuoted in Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 7.
58
in 1888, Nietzsche claims, "My ancestors were Polish
noblemen (Niezky); it seems the type has been well main-
4
tained, in spite of three generations of German mothers."
Despite Nietzsche's claims, there is little or no evi-
5
dence to support either Polish ancestry or noble blood.
Regardless of ancestry, Nietzsche was by all
accounts a bright, talented, and studious young man. He
applied himself rigorously to his school work, and
apparently was a model student. Perhaps the best approach
to Nietzsche's intellectual development is to follow a
convenient chronological scheme that divides Nietzsche's
productive life into three major periods.
Tripartite Division of Nietzsche's
Philosophical bevelopment
It has been customary to divide Nietzsche's
development as a philosopher into three periods. Although
there is a disagreement as to the exact nature of those
three divisions and especially the dates that are to be
assigned to the transitions between the periods, few
reject the tripartite division itself,^ But the division
4
George Brandes, Friedrich Nietzsche, trans, by
A, G, Chater (London: William Peinemann, 1915), p. 8 0.
^Brinton, Nietzsche, p. 4,
^Among the secondary souroes which accept the
tripartite division are: Kurt F, Reinhardt, Introduction
59
into periods is not to be taken too rigidly, for something
of each period is to be found in every other* However,
for purposes of analysis it is a useful distinction*
provided that we do not allow it to obscure the basic
continuity and over-all unity of Nietzsche's thought.
Nietzsche himself indicated that he had gone through
three stages on his r t road to wisdom"t
The first step* Revere (and obey and learn) better
than anybody. Collect in oneself all things worthy
of veneration and let them struggle together.
Carry everything heavy. . . . Period of community.
The second step. Break the revering heart when one
is most tightly bound. Independence. Period of
wilderness. Criticism of all that is revered
(idealization of the unrevered), attempt to inverse
valuations.
The third step. Qreat decision whether fit for the
positive position, for affirmation. No god, no man
above me any longer I The instinct of the crea
tor . , . . Give oneself to the right act.'
The parable of the "three metamorphoses" in the first
part of Zarathustra also points to three periods in
to Nietzsche's Joyful Wisdom (New Yorki Priederick Ungar
Publishing Company, 19bO), p. 1; Morgan, What Nietzsche
Means, pp. 8-9, 26-29} P. A. Lea, The Tragic Philosopher^
A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Philosophical
Library. 19%V). p. 7: Mlgge. Nietzsche: His Life and
Work, pp. 289-29M} W. D. Williams. Nietzsche and the
French (Oxfordt Basil Blackwell, 19^2), p. xi; Salter,
Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 31} and Dolson, Philosophical
RevTew.n gT^ b' r i . -ISTtT: ----------------
^Quoted by Morgan in What Nietzsche Means, p. 27.
60
Nietzsche's development* Zarathustra preaches that first
one must become a ’ ’ camel" and take upon himself the burden
of tradition; then he becomes a "lion" who challenges all
traditional values; and finally he must become a "child"
o
in order to make a new beginning and create new values.
The "early" or "first" period extends from about
1869, when Nietzsche was appointed Professor of Classical
Philology at Basel, to 1 8 7 6, when he published Richard
Vagner in Bayreuth as the last of the Untimely Meditations*
The "middle" or "second" period extends from 1876 to
1883, from Human* All-too-Human to The Gay Science* The
"third" or "late" period begins in 1883 with the publi
cation of the first two parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra
and continues until Nietzsche's mental breakdown in
January of 1 8 8 9, The final period is one of "insanity,"
and it extends from Nietzsche's sudden collapse in 1889
until his death eleven years later in August of 1900.
Let us now consider these periods in greater detail,
noting their relevance to Nietzsche's philosophy of
education*
Early Period ( 1 8 6 9-1 8 7 6)
Nietzsche's appointment as Professor Extraordinarius
Q
Thus Spoke Zarathustra* I, r t 0n the Three
Metamorphoses." The 'Portable toletzsche* pp, 137-1^0.
61
of Classical Philology at Basel at the surprisingly young
age of twenty-four Is Indicative of his great achievements
even as a student, Nietzsohe*s brilliance as a child had
enabled him to enter the Landes-Schule at Pforta, "an
institution then noted for its fostering and promotion
q
of scientific studies," After graduating from the
"venerable Schulpforta" ^ 0 Nietzsche went on to receive a
rigorous education in classical philology at the
universities of Bonn and Leipzig, One of the best
vignettes of the student Nietzsche is to be found in a
recommendation written by Friedrich Ritschl, one of
Nietzsche1s philology professors at Leipzig, to the
university as Basel, Ritschl*s remarks are worth quoting
in full:
However many young talents I have seen develop
under my eyes for thirty-nine years now, never yet
have I known a young man, or tried to help one
along in my field as best I could, who was so
mature so early and so young as this Nietzsche,
His Museum articles he wrote in the second and
third year of his triennium* He is the first per
son from whom I have ever accepted any contribution
at all while he was still a student. If— God
grant— he lives long enough, I prophesy that he
will one day stand in the front rank of German
philology. He is now twenty-four years old; strong,
vigorous, healthy, courageous physically and mor
ally, so constituted as to Impress those of a
similar nature. On top of that, he possesses the
enviable gift of presenting ideas, talking freely,
as calmly as he speaks skillfully and clearly. He
^Wright, What Nietzsche Taught, p. 24,
^ Unpublished Letters, p, 133,
62
Is the Idol and, without wishing It, the leader
of the whole younger generation of philologists
here In Leipzig who— and they are rather numerous—
cannot wait to hear him as a lecturer. You will
say I describe a phenomenon. Well, that Is Just
what he Is— and at the same time pleasant and
modest. Also a gifted musician, which is
Irrelevant here.11
Because Nietzsche had not yet received a doctorate
(he had not even fulfilled the residence requirement),
Ritschl was not very hopeful, "although In the present
Instance I should stake my whole philosophical and
academic reputation that the matter would work out
12
happily." Ritschl, upon hearing the good news of
Nietzsche’s appointment, Jubilantly remarks: "In Germany,
that sort of thing happens absolutely never," J The
University of Leipzig immediately awarded Nietzsche his
Doctor of Philosophy degree, waiving the dissertation
requirement. Ritschl continues his description:
Nietzsche is not at all a specifically politi
cal nature. He may have in general, on the whole,
some sympathy for the growing greatness of Germany,
but, like myself, no special tendre for Prussianismj
yet he has vivid feeling for free civic and spiri
tual development, and thus certainly a heart for
your Swiss institutions and way of living. What
more am I to say? His studies have so far been
weighted toward the history of Greek literature
(of oourse, including critical and exegetical treat
ment of the authors), with special emphasis, it
■^Quoted by Kaufmann In his Introduction to The
Portable Nietzsche, pp, 7-8.
12Ibid. 13Ibid.
63
seems to me, on the history of Greek philosophy.
But I have not the least doubt that, if con
fronted by a practical demand, with his great
gifts he will work in other fields with the best
of success. He will simply be able to do anything
he wants to do,l^
In 1869 Nietzsche moved to Basel and became a
Swiss citizen. However, when the Franco-Prussian war
broke out in 1 8 7 0, he took leave from his university
position to serve as a medical orderly in the Prussian
army, Nietzsche*s health was such that he could not take
part in more active combat, and his experience as an
orderly only served to further weaken his own not-too-
rugged constitution! "While ministering— in a boxcar1 ,
and unrelieved for three days and nights— to six men who
were severely wounded and moreover sick with dysentery
and diphtheria, Nietzsche caught both diseases and, after
delivering his charges to a field hospital, required
ic
medical attention himself." Unpleasant psychological
consequences accompanied the affair: "The atmosphere of
my experiences had spread around me like a gloomy fog;
for a time I heard a sound of wailing which seemed as if
it would never end."^ Within a few months, Nietzsche
returned to his university position, but one cannot help
■^Ibld. ^^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p,
^From a letter to Nietzsche*s friend, Carl von
Gersdorff, Quoted in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 31 *.
64
but wonder to what extent the recurring headaches and
stomach complaints which caused Nietzsche much suffering
during the following ten years were due to his war-time
illness*
In 1872 Nietzsche published his first book, The
Birth of Tragedy* It was Immediately apparent that
Nietzsche was not just another conventional philologist:
"Philosophic earnestness is too deeply rooted in me, * • ,
I would like to be something more than a drlllmaster of
17
competent philologists*" ' Nietzsche kept his position
as a professor of philology for ten years, until 1 8 7 9,
when he was forced to retire because of ill health; but
he was without doubt a most unusual philologist* He did
not view antiquity as mere subject matter served up to
satisfy the Intellectual curiosity of pedantic scholars*
Instead, he saw antiquity as a real living alternative
to contemporary German culture: that is, to modern,
industrial civilization~we must first reach the level of
the Greeks before we can talk of surpassing them, "Let
us try to live in the manner of the ancients— and we
shall constantly come a hundred miles closer to them than
with all our learnedness. Our philologists nowhere
demonstrate that they somehow strive to vie with antiquity
17
Unpublished Letters, pp. 50-51.
65
that is why their antiquity is without any effect on the
schools.1, 1 ®
Nietzsche was indeed harsh with his fellow
philologists, as the records from his early period indi
cate. In his notes for a book which never was finished,
We Philolegists. he attacks his professorial colleagues
as slaves to imitation, inertia, and livelihood, and
concludes that "99 out of 100 philologists ought not to
be such,"1^ Nietzsche, of course, did not limit his
attack to his fellow philologists. He attacked everything
that he thought was hindering individual development and
thereby retarding culture. His Untimely Meditations are
a sustained attack against the decadence of the times,
against the anti-cultural trends that he found in con
temporary German society, against "Empire," "Culture,"
20
"Christianity," "Bismark," and "Success." Thus we see
that the metamorphosis of the receptive "camel" into an
attacking "lion" began for Nietzsche at an early age.
It is in this early period that Nietzsche arrives
at his doctrine of self-perfection— a doctrine which he
maintains and develops throughout his entire philosophical
18
Quoted by Marianne Cowan in her Introduction to
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, p. 6,
^ Werke in drei Banden. Vol. Ill, pp. 323-324.
*^Cf. Ecoe Homo. "Untimely Meditations," 1.
66
career. In Schopenhauer as Educator. Nietzsche presents
his first full statement of the self-perfection doctrine
and thereby lays the foundation for later views of the
superman and the will to power. Any reader who is not
able to sympathize with the problems with which Nietzsche
deals in this essay will probably never be able to come
to terms with Nietzsche’s later views, for "he to whom
it says nothing personal h£s in all probability nothing
in common with me. Basically the scheme according to
which I have ever lived is drawn up in it. It Is a
21
rigorous promise."
Nietzsche’s early pedagogical experiences— both
as a student and as teacher— were to provide him with the
advantages of an "inside" acquaintance with school theory
and practices. Thus Nietzsche's critique of education
cannot be dismissed as the ill-informed ramblings of an
outsider, as the idealistic reforms of someone who has
not known the hard realities of the classroom. As a
student, Nietzsche progressed from the elementary school
at Naumburg to the boys' Gymnasium at Pforta to the
University at Bonn and finally to receive his doctorate at
the University of Leipzig. As a teacher Nietzsche was for
ten years on the faculty of the University of Basel. In
^Werke In drei Banden. Vol. Ill, p. 1284.
addition to his duties as professor of classical lan
guages at Basel, he also taught Greek to high school
students six hours a week at the Pedagogical Institute
(Padagogium) attached to the University, That Nietzsche
was not just a subject matter specialist but an educator
preoccupied with the problems of how best to educate our
youth was clearly established with his delivery of five
lectures On the Future of Our Educational institutions
while at Basel In 1872.
Anticipating the possible attempt to discredit
Nietzsche’s views on education by maintaining that
Nietzsche’s attacks are merely the resentful ravings of
someone who felt neglected or mistreated during his stu
dent days, it is well to emphasize that not only was the
young Nietzsche a model student, but also one who found
little to complain about, then or later, in terms of his
own personal experiences in school. At no point does
Nietzsche seem to have thought that he was unjustly
treated or abused or subject to undue humiliation or
punishment. Nietzsche’s scholastic talents were recog
nized by his teachers, who in turn encouraged and aided
the development of this promising youth. Nietzsche
studied hard and generally received high grades (except
for mathematics). Thus It is highly unlikely that
Nietzsche’s attack on education was motivated simply by
68
"sour grapes"; although, even If It were, it tells us
nothing as to the possible "truth value" of Nietzsche’s
position— which Is the primary concern of this study.
It Is helpful, In terms of perspective, for the
student of Nietzsche’s educational philosophy to keep in
mind that not only had Nietzsche attended some of the
finest schools in Germany, but that these schools were
themselves part of the late nineteenth-century Prussian
school system— perhaps the most envied and emulated
education system in modern times. In order to fully
appreciate the force, originality, and "untimeliness" of
Nietzsche’s criticisms it is well to remember that they
are directed not against debilitated or backward institu
tions, but against an educational system considered by
even many non-Germans as the finest and most advanced
system in the world.
Middle Period (1876-1883)
With Human. All-too-Human. Nietzsche plunges into
the study of science. Not, of course, as a scientist,
but as a philosopher, a philosopher who was learning the
rigor and discipline of careful analysis. Instead of the
grandiose approach of the metaphysician, Nietzsche limited
himself to manageable problems, and "the humblest fact,
definitely ascertained, now seemed fairer than the
loftiest theory* " 22
Along with the change in method we also find a
change in style: Nietzsche became a master of concise,
controlled, epigrammatic expression* The aphorism
became for Nietzsche, as it had for two of his German
predecessors, Goethe and Lichtenberg, a potent form for
transmitting a maximum of meaning in a minimum number of
words* Compared with Nietzsche's earlier works, which
"are written in the more or less traditional style of
the philosophic essay, those of the second period bear
the form of the brilliantly glittering aphorism, a style
of writing which Nietzsche had adopted from some of his
favorite French and German freethinkers of the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries . • • and which typifies
what has become known as Nietzsche's 'experimentalism' in
thinking and writing* Each individual aphorism . . . is
an experiment in thought, reflecting Nietzsche's ardent
desire to emulate the 'exact' sciences in an attempt to
make philosophy strictly 'sclentific.1" That it was
Voltaire tells us something about both style and content.
Human, All-too-Human, a "monument of rigorous
self-discipline . . . put an abrupt end to all the humbug
22
Lea, The Tragic Philosopher, p. 106.
23
JReinhardt, Introduction to Joyful Wisdom.
pp. 1-2.
of superiority, 'idealism,' 'beautiful feeling,* and
oil
other effeminacies I had absorbed*'' Nietzsche was leav
ing behind forever the Romantic and Idealistic tendencies
of his earlier period. One by one he singles out for
rigorous examination the ideas and Ideals that he had
been employing or assuming up to this time: "Lonely now
and miserably self-distrustful, I took sides, not without
resentment, against myself, and for everything that hurt
me and was hard to me,"2" 5 "Now I am engaged in shaking
off what does not belong to me, be it people, friend or
foe, habits, conveniences, books. I shall live in soli
tude for years until, as a philosopher of life, fully
matured and finished, I allow myself to (and then,
2 6
perhaps, must) go again amongst men*" Nietzsche was
finding that knowledge of one's self, which is a
prerequisite to perfecting one’s self, is much more
difficult to come by than he had first assumed, and also
that the suffering which it entailed could become almost
unbearable, Nietzsche no longer restricts himself to the
dissection of university scholars (as is to be found in
oil
Eoce Homo. "Human, All-too-Human," 5* The
Philosophy of WieVzsche. p, 8 8 3.
2**Humah, All-10 0-Human. Second Book, Preface, 4.
The Complete Works, Vol. 7. P. 6,
26
Unpublished Letters, p. 77.
71
Section six of the essay on Schopenhauer); he now extends
his scalpel to the genius himself. The results are that
the genius Is found not to be as far removed from the
academic scholar as he thought when he wrote the Untimely
Meditations. Witness Nietzsche's reference in Human, All-
too-Human to the Schopenhauer essay; "For, if it be true
that for the making of a scholar ’a number of very human
impulses and desires must be thrown together, 1 that the
scholar is indeed a very noble but not a pure metal, and
'consists of a confused blending of very different motives
and attractions,' the same thing may be said equally of
the making and nature of the artist, the philosopher and
the moral genius— and whatever glorified names there may
be in that list."^ If the production of genius is to be
a goal of education, we must know what it is that sets
/
the genius apart from the average person, and this
requires ruthless and precise analysis.
Nietzsche's middle period is above all to be
characterized as a period of growing independence,
independence of thought and expression. Nietzsche had for
some time inwardly felt that he had a special mission to
perform in life (he was later to call himself a "destiny"),
but his duties and responsibilities as a university
27
Human,'All-too-HUman, "Signs of Higher and
Lower Culture, 2^2, ^he Complete Works, Vol. 6, p. 23^.
72
professor and resident of the city of Basel seem to have
kept him from discovering his true genius. Perhaps
Nietzsche's bad health was a blessing in disguise, for it
was the recurring attacks of incapacitating illness that
finally forced Nietzsche out of the university life into
solitude. In a letter to his friend Overbeck, dated
August 1 8 7 6, Nietzsche confesses that his physical condi
tion will not allow him to continue for long in his
present occupation: "One thing I can see now with perfect
clarityj in the long run an academic existence is
28
impossible for me," With the forced separation from
the academic life Nietzsche gained the advantages of
distance, detachment, seclusion and stillness; from this
new environment Nietzsche was stimulated to bring forth
revolutionary Ideas clearly of his own creation.
Intimately related to the new ideas and "experi
mental" methodology was the aphoristic style mentioned
above. In addition to Human. All-t0 0-Human. Nietzsche's
other books of his middle period, The Dawn and The Gay
Science, were collections of aphorisms (or rather,
Nietzsche's special form of aphorisms, varying in length
from a single brief sentence to a short essay of several
pages). In all likelihood it was Nietzsche's withdrawal
from the pressures of social life that allowed him to
pQ
Hollingdale, Nietzscher p, 133,
discover this unique form of expression. Indeed, writing
was for Nietzsche a compulsion, closely linked to the
nature of the ideas that were forcing themselves upon
him: both thought and expression seemed to pour forth
according to laws of their own, beyond Nietzsche's
volitional control. That the new form was congenial to
him can be seen in the fact that all future works are
either collections of aphorisms (for example, Beyond Good
and Evil) or works heavily influenced by aphoristic
expressions (for example, Thus Spoke Zarathustra or Ecce
Homo)• One commentator has calculated that "altogether he
[Nietzsche] must have produced at least 5,000 'aphorisms,'
long and short, between the summer of 1876 and the winter
of 1 8 8 8— a rough average of one every day for twelve and
a half years."2^ How do we explain this prolific yet rich
output? Nietzsche may well have been right when he
attributed his "health" as a writer and thinker to the
lonely and prolonged battles he fought against physical
illness and pain.
Friendship with Wagner
Another circumstance that contributed to
Nietzsche's independence and development as a philosopher
2^Hollingdale, Nietzsche. p. 1^3.
74
was the collapse of his intimate friendship with Richard
Wagner, Of the men who Influenced Nietzsche's life,
Wagner Is of prime importance* No other acquaintance
made such an Impact on the future course of Nietzsche's
thinking. During his student days at Leipzig, Nietzsche
had heard Wagner's new music. In a letter to his friend
Rhode In 1868 Nietzsche expresses his newly awakened
enthusiasm: "I find It impossible to keep a critically
cool head where this music is concerned. I am quivering
in every fibre, every nerve, and I have never experienced
such lasting feeling of ecstasy as I did when listening to
the last-named overture (i.e. the Meistersinger prel
ude). "3° The young Nietzsche soon came to feel that
Wagner's music-dramas belonged among the few great artis
tic creations since the age of Goethe,
The two men met each other personally in 1869,
and a friendship quickly ensued. The relationship was
intimate and evidently of psychological and emotional
complexity. The friendship developed to the extent that
Nietzsche actually lived for awhile with the Wagners at
their home in Tribachen.
Nietzsche's close friendship with Wagner was not
3 0Ibid*. p* 48.
3^Por a discussion of Wagner as a "father sub
stitute" see Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 40,
\
to last. Signs of coolness begin to appear In Nietzsche’s
correspondence, and numerous notebook entries dated 1874
are highly critical of Wagner and Wagnerianism. By 1876
the break with Wagner was virtually complete. Some
writers have Interpreted the broken friendship as being
the result of differences over music, as the Inevitable
parting of the way of two self-willed and self-centered
artists. However, as Jacques Barzun rightly warns in his
critical study Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a
Heritage1 "No greater mistake can be made than to con
sider Nietzsche1s break with Wagner as a personal quarrel
resulting from a difference of opinion about music. It
is much more. It is the first critical repudiation of
the second half of the nineteenth century by a herald of
the twentieth. " ^ 2
It is of course well known that as Nietzsche
matured he found much to criticize in Wagner’s music-
dramasj their heaviness, lack of gaiety, dependency on
non-musical props, Romantic expression, etcetera. Never
theless, as Barzun states, the break was due to "much
more" than differences in musical taste; it was due,
rather, to a fundamental disagreement over questions of
value. Wagner was committed— in theory and in
op
Anchor Books (2nd ed. revised; New York:
Doubleday & Co,, Inc., 1958), p. 297,
practice— to the very goals that, if fulfilled, Nietzsche
believed would be the ruin of European culture. Foremost
among these decadent values were German nationalism and
anti-Semitism. Wagner had become a symbol, a rallying
point for all that was decadent in nineteenth-century
society. Nietzschefs violent attacks are directed not so
much against Wagner personally as they are against a
growing mode of thought and values among his contempor
aries that could only lead to cultural catastrophe.
Nietzsche’s philosophical development was greatly
stimulated by Wagner in two ways: First, as a positive
model to be emulated; second, as an embodiment of
decadence to be repudiated and overcome* The youthful
Nietzsche saw in Wagner (or at least in his idealized
image of Wagner) not only a genius for music but a heroic
soul fighting for true culture. Nietzsche had already
"appropriated” one genius— Schopenhauer— but this was
only through a book. Wagner, on the other hand, was a
genius "in the flesh," and Nietzsche gave himself, with
some reservations, to the Wagnerian cause. The last ten
chapters of The Birth of Tragedy, published in 1872, bear
witness to his high hopes for the cultural and artistic
revolution to evolve from Wagner’s genius. In this sense
Wagner was a positive educating force In Nietzsche’s
life, for the friendship provided Nietzsche with first-
hand knowledge of a really great man; It also provided
Nietzsche with a living model of creativity with whom he
could Identify and attempt to equal. It was not long,
however, before the student was wiser— outside the realm
of musical composition— than his master. As previously
mentioned, a period of disillusionment ensued, ending with
the two men going their own ways. After this, Wagner was
to serve as a negative stimulus, as someone who optimized
all that was wrong In the modern world* Nietzsche was
now forced Into the position not only of analyzing the
Wagnerian "disease," but of developing his own remedy.
It Is with the Middle Period that the true beginning of
Nietzsche's life-long struggle against his two prime
enemiesi physical Illness (of unknown origin) and
ideological decadence (as expressed by Wagner) can be
seen. And, if Nietzsche is correct, perhaps his "enemies"
have had a greater influence on his education than have
his "friends"! "What does not destroy makes me
stronger.Need we add that the line between strength
and destruction Is, and was for Nietzsche, a thin one?
Late Period (I8 8 3-I8 8 9)
Nietzsche was now completely on his own. In 1879*
^ Twilight of the Idols. "Maxims and Arrows," 8.
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 467.
due to ill health, he had been retired with a pension
from the University of Basel, leaving him free to devote
himself to a relentless life of meditation and writing.
His books, like Humefs Treatise, fell stillborn from the
press; yet he continued to pour his energy into them
until his mental collapse in 1 8 8 9. This third period of
Nietzsche*s philosophical development opens with the
writing of his most famous work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
•all
This "Manifesto," as Nietzsche later called it,
represents the most complete statement of Nietzsche*s
mature philosophy, as well as the height of his poetic
imagination. In Nietzsche’s own unabashed words: "As
concerns my Zarathustra I believe that it is just about
the deepest book that exists in the German language, also
the one linguistically most perfect.
Nietzsche wrote seven more books after Zarathustra.
Two of these— Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of
Morals— are of major philosophical importance, for they
provide a sustained prose commentary of the ideas buried
beneath the poetical symbolism of Zarathustra. This
period of Nietzsche’s development contains such a wealth
of unique philosophical speculation, and on such a wide
variety of topics, that it is easy to see why Nietzsche
•aii
Unpub'l 1 shed Letters, p. 99.
35lfcl&.» PP. 139-140.
79
has been so influential on twentieth-century writers.
This period is also the one with which Nietzsche is
usually identified, and it contains his most contro
versial doctrinesi that of the superman, the will-to-
power, and the eternal recurrence. The development of the
doctrine of the superman has particular relevance to the
doctrine of self-surpassing and the aim of education.
Nietzsche’s life during this fruitful period was
essentially one of solitude— a solitude filled with
inspiration and creation, resulting in the publication of
one book per year until his final collapse in 1889.
Despite the dangers of frequent periods of loneliness and
depression, Nietzsche was convinced that to be a true
pathfinder one must live apart from the crowd. Nietzsche
was well aware that such a life is in a sense "inhuman”:
"To live alone one must be a beast or a god, says
Aristotle. Leaving out the third case: one must be
both~a philosopher,"
In search of good health Nietzsche traveled from
place to place, spending the summers in Sils-Marla and
the winters in Nice, attempting to find the climate best
suited to his weak condition. Sometimes he visited
friends or briefly sallied forth into social life.
^ Twilight of the Idols, "Maxims and Arrows," 3.
The Portable Nietzsche, p. **577
80
Primarily, however, his life consisted of periods alter
nating between incapacitating illness and obsessive
writing* In times of health, ideas and insights poured
forth in streams of violent clarity, as though a demonic
force were guiding their course. If not a demon--and
Nietzsche reports that at times it felt as though a
supernatural force were working through him— something
within his mental constitution drove him on relentlessly.
Nietzsche describes his passion to excel in the following
wordsi
To create things on which time tests its
teeth in vaint in form, in "substance", to
strive for a little immortality— I have never
yet been modest enough to demand less of myself.
The aphorism, the apothegm, in which I am the
first among the Germans to be a master, are the
forms of "eternity"; it is my ambition to say
in ten sentences what everyone else says in a
book— what everyone else does not say in a
book,37
It is during these final productive years that
Nietzsche becomes thoroughly convinced of his own destiny
as the prophet of the modern age, as a major force in the
decades to come. In a letter of 1884, Nietzsche pro
claims: "My task is tremendous; but my determination no
less so. ... I want to compel men to decisions which
n O
will be decisive for the whole human future.In
^ Twilight of the Idols, "Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man,* 5l. *The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 555-556.
o Q
Quoted in Hollingdale, Nietzsohe, p. 216.
81
self-admiration bordering on megalomania, Nietzsche writes
to a friend in 1888: "Between ourselves— it is not
impossible that I am the first philosopher of the age,
perhaps even a trifle more than that, • • • something
decisive and fateful standing between two
-3Q
millenia, • . , "j ; 7 For the Greeks such hubris would
surely have brought forth the wrath of the godsj for many
modern critics it is a portentous sign of the coming
tragedy in Nietzsche’s life.
Insanity and the End (1889-1900)
Nietzsche died on August 25, 1900 In Weimar— the
city of Goethe and Schiller. The tragedy is not that
Nietzsche died at the relatively early age of fifty-five,
but that his mind had already been in darkness of eleven
and one-half years— ever since his collapse on the
streets of Turin on January 3, 1 8 8 9.^® As a creative
thinker Nietzsche was dead by the age of forty-five, for
with his mental breakdown came complete and unremitting
insanity, "a steadily increasing and unrelieved dullness
of mind, a spreading darkness which envelops Nietzsche’s
39Ibid.. p. 232.
Shortly after the collapse Nietzsche was taken
to Wille's clinic in Basel. The diagnosis was "paralysis
progressive"— a diagnosis which proved to be accurate.
82
ill
mind in hopeless night*1 1 Even though Nietzsche was to
have a few lucid hours in which he could engage in simple
conversation, "at no time could he be induced to discuss
4 2
any of his works or ideas."
Nietzsche’s illness has occasioned an enormous
literature, revolving around two central questions:
First, what was the cause of Nietzsche’s insanity?
Second, were Nietzsche’s extreme philosophical expres
sions merely the result of a diseased mind? Let us
examine these two questions and some possible answers.
The answers that have been suggested in reply to
the first question, although varying greatly in detail,
may be classified as belonging to either "psychosomatic"
or "somatopsychic" explanatory hypotheses; that is, some
Nietzsche critics would maintain that the etiology of
Nietzsche’s insanity and accompanying paralysis is
basically psychological in nature, while others attribute
Nietzsche’s difficulties to physical or biological
causes.
The psychosomatic hypothesis may take on two
forms: (1) The Freudian psychoanalytic approach that
interprets Nietzsche’s illness— and, indeed, his entire
41
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 59.
4 2
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 58.
philosophy— as the outcome of unsuccessful struggles
with the early loss of a father, a female-dominated home,
a sexually attractive but taboo sister, etcetera. The
unresolved psychic oonfllots are then believed to have
been "converted" unconsciously into physical manifesta
tions. (2) The "moralistic" approach that interprets
Nietzsche*s insanity aB the "inevitable outcome of his
ii o
thought." J This position is based on the premise that
to expound such dangerous ideas as the death of God,
will-to-power, "immorality," etcetera, is to invite the
wrath of God, or at least the unconscious revenge of the
psyche upon the body.
The psychosomatic approach— especially the
"moralistic" version— is generally pursued by those who
would like to discredit Nietzsche as a philosopher. On
the other hand, an equally interesting and extravagant
interpretation of events is provided by those extreme
Nietzsche disciples who view Nietzsche's collapse as the
ultimate martyrdom of a great prophet at the hands of a
vulgar, bourgeois world. Insanity is thus seen not as
an absurd or unfortunate event but as a glorious
lio
JA brief discussion of this view is to be found
in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 59. The position that
Nietzsche's insanity is the inevitable result of explor
ing the unknowable is developed by Harry Pock, "Nietzsche,
A Mad Philosopher," Bookman. VIII ( 1 8 9 8), 25-32.
84
transfiguration of existence. A disciple who takes this
approach is Ernst Bertram, who romantically pictures
Nietzsche's insanity as a final "ascent into the mystic,"
44
a "proud transition" to a superior state of being.
There can be little doubt that Nietzsche1s life
long battle with illness was at least aggravated, if not
caused by, psychological conflict. However, no contem
porary Nietzsche scholar seems willing to go beyond this
and claim that the final collapse can be attributed
solely to psychological factors. This brings us to our
second hypothesis, which holds that the etiology of
Nietzschefs mental breakdown is to be found in the realm
of the soma, not the psyche.
The somatopsychic hypothesis— some version of
which most current Nietzsche critics entertain— maintains
that Nietzsche's mental collapse was the result of an
organic, physiological disorder that affected the nervous
system and eventually damaged the brain. Karl Jaspers,
for example, finds it necessary to counter the older but
still prevalent psychosomatic view by reminding the
reader that "it is essential to know . . . that the
mental illness at the end of 1888 is an organic brain
44
Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer
Mythologie (Berlin: Bondi, PP« 361 f f ' . '
85
disease, which derives from an external cause and not
from an inner disposition*There is no conclusive
data as to the exact nature of the disease, but after
several decades of careful biographical and medical
research, nall sober and unsensatlonal medical treatments
of the subject seem agreed on this— that Nietzsche very
46
probably contracted syphilis.”
The "syphilitic” hypothesis has of course excited
all kinds of speculation, for how, it is asked, could our
great philosopher contract such a lowly disease? Whence
came the spirochete to the superman? It seems doubtful
that we will ever know the answer to this question.
Current opinion is divided between two points of view.
Some hold that Nietzsche contracted syphilis through
sexual relations (although as far as we know he led a
45
Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 100.
46
Kaufmann, Nietzsche. p. 58* Also see Brinton,
Nietzsche, p. 72 and Holllngdale, Nietzsche, pp. 36-38.
The’ now classic study of Nietzsche's collapse and its
possible cause is Erich P. Podach's Nietzsches Zusammen-
brucht Be it rage zu elner Blographie auf Prun'd
unvero^fentllonter bokumente (Heidelberg! Kampmann, 1930)
[.English translation by ! p. A. Voigt, The Madness of
Nietzsche (London: Putman, 1931)]. todach records in
detail and analyzes all known information relevant to
Nietzsche's collapse— hospital and clinical records,
physician consulted, drugs prescribed, etcetera. The
comprehensive and exhaustive nature of Podach's study
makes It highly unlikely that anything more than minor
corrections or additions will be necessary in the
future.
86
very ascetic life), probably by visiting a brothel during
his student days. Others maintain that Nietzsche was
exposed to syphilis not through sexual relations but
through contact with syphilic soldiers while serving as
a medical orderly during the Franco-Prussian War.
Nietzsche's insanity has been a popular theme
among those who would discredit or dismiss Nietzsche's
books as the incoherent ravings of a demented recluse.
For example, a recent writer asserts that Nietzsche's
entire philosophy is "the product of an unbalanced mind,"
that "Thus Spoke Zarathustra is one of the most fantastic
i l * 7
dreams ever recorded by an insane mind, , . ' "Such
was the evil dream of the philosopher who had lost his
48
mind." The argument here is that even though
Nietzsche had not yet collapsed he was nevertheless
"mad," and thus his writings are not to be taken seriously.
It is the position of this writer, as well as of
contemporary Nietzsche scholars (e.g. Kaufmann, Jaspers,
Heidegger) that Nietzsche's thought has a life of its
own, that it demands our attention on its own terms,
independently of the life and foibles of the man who gave
47
Henry Thomas, Living Adventures in Philosophy
(New York: Doubleday & Co., 105^)* pp. 240-24^, Chapter
xxlv, "Nietzsche— Superman or Madman" argues that
Nietzsche's thought may be dismissed as "madness."
118Ibid.. p. 246.
87
it birth*^ This is not to deny the values that might
accrue from inquiry into the relationships between
illness— mental and physical— and genius* It is an
enterprise which has psychological and historical merit,
certainly in the case of tracing Nietzschefs philosophical
development* However, there is the real danger of con
fusing the origin and growth of an idea with its
epistemic status. To take a hypothetical case: if it
could be shown that Kepler*s laws of planetary motion
were the expressions of a diseased mind, surely no one
would proceed to suggest that this has any bearing on the
truth or falsity of Kepler*s laws. The same principle
applies to Nietzsche*s doctrines: even if it could be
established that Nietzsche was "mad” at the time of their
formulation, it tells us absolutely nothing about their
validity or truth.
We conclude this brief sketch of Nietzsche's life
with a reminder that his books found no audience, that
his ideas were ignored by his contemporaries, that he was
isolated not only physically but also intellectually. In
a letter to his friend Overbeck in I887 Nietzsche
j l Q
Jaspers warns that "the value of a creation may
be regarded and Judged only in terms of its spiritual
substance} the underlying casual factors are Irrelevant
to the value of the product* A speech will not be re
garded as either worse or better when it becomes known
that the speaker customarily drinks a bottle of wine
beforehand* . . *** Nietzscher p. 101*
88
painfully reflects on the silence that followed the
publication of his masterpiece Thus Spolce Zarathustra:
"Not to hear the sound of an answer after such an appeal
from my innermost soul, that is a terrible
experience, . . . It lifted me out of all bonds with
living men," And again, Nietzsche writes it "hurts
frightfully that in these fifteen years not one single
person has 'discovered' me, has needed me, has loved
«50
me."-'
It was not until the last decade of Nietzsche's
life— a decade of insanity— that Nietzsche became
famous, Nietzsche of course knew nothing of this nor
that it rested on an almost complete perversion of his
philosophy. It is true that a few serious men of
intellectual integrity— e.g, Georg Brandes— took note,
but they exerted little influence. Instead, the public
image of Nietzsche rested on the writings of a new
Nietzsche cult, whose members were guided by interests
quite different from those of Nietzsche. The incredible
account of the forgeries, suppressions, mythologizing,
deifying and demonizing, the fantastic ingredients that
went into what Walter Kaufmann has called "The Nietzsche
*50 «
Quoted in Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 85.
89
Legend," constitute a fascinating If tragic chapter In
*51
the history of twentieth-century thought.
^See the "Prologue" to Kaufmann's Nietzsche,
pp. 15-28.
CHAPTER IV
NIETZSCHE*S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART I: EPISTEMOLOGY
91
Epistemology may be defined as that branch of
philosophy which deals with the origin, structure and
nature of knowledge* The major task of epistemology is
to establish the limits of human perception and cognition.
Down through the ages, all philosophers of any
note have had to devote time and effort to epistemologi-
cal considerations. However, it is only in modern times,
beginning with Descartes, that epistemological matters
have been given priority— both temporal and logical— over
metaphysics and axiology. Educational philosophers, in
particular, dealing as they do with the learning
relationship, lean heavily upon epistemological analysis.
Indeed, it would seem as though it is often the attempt to
solve a practical pedagogical problem that leads one into
more general considerations of epistemology. Since
pedagogical theory and the more abstract considerations
of epistemology are so closely related, it is difficult
if not impossible to grasp the former without the latter.
For example, it is impossible to grasp the educational
theory of Plato or Dewey without also comprehending their
general theory of knowledge. The same can be said for
Nietzsche.
Epistemological reflections occur throughout the
corpus of Nietzsche's works. Although he published no
single work devoted entirely to epistemology, almost
92
every work contains aphorisms or sometimes entire sections
on epistemological questions, A comprehensive of
Nietzsche's epistemology can be gained only through a
thorough reading of all of Nietzsche's writings. Anything
less than this is likely to result either in incomplete
ness or distortion.
The purpose of this chapter is to present in
systematic fashion the basic elements of Nietzsche's
epistemology. Our major concern will be with those
aspects of his epistemological theory which are pertinent
to his educational history.
The Limits of Knowledge
Language
Trust in Language
There is little agreement among philosophers— past
or present— concerning the adequacy of language (or any
other symbolic system) to provide man with a reliable
description of the world or to serve as a faithful medium
of human communication. On the one hand are those
thinkers who have a seemingly unshakable faith in the
ability of language to grasp and to convey the world of
reality. The ancient Greeks, as well as the medieval
schoolmen, generally trusted language as a tool of
communication. They recognized, of course, that language
could be consciously employed by one party to the end of
misleading and deceiving another party, as in the case of
many a sophistical argument; this, however, is not the
fault of language, but of the user. The same trust is
manifested In nineteenth-century Hegelianism. Hegel
maintained that reality, because of its fundamental
rationality (whatever is real is rational and vice versa),
can be completely and adequately expressed in words, for
the logical nature of language fortunately parallels the
logical nature of reality.
Distrust in Language
On the other hand there are those thinkers who
display a fundamental distrust of the communicative
function of language. Numerous modern philosophers,
especially the British "empiricists"--Bacon, Hobbes,
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume— charge that men are unwittingly
deceived by certain errors inherent in the nature of
language itself. They contend that previous philosophers,
especially the medieval scholastics, had been led into
serious philosophical errors through their tenacious
trust in verbal systems.
The Paradox of Symbolic Systems
Nietzsche is to be placed among those philosophers
who hold language responsible for a good deal of the
metaphysical silliness and moral perversity that has
plagued philosophy through the centuries. This is not to
deny, however, the positive contributions of languages:
without the invention of symbolic systems man would not
have progressed beyond the level of the brutes. The
paradox of symbolic systems is that they are responsible
both for man's greatest achievements (e.g., mathematics,
science, literature, poetry), and for man's greatest
errors (e.g., "otherworldly" ontologies, dogmatic
theologies, rigid moralities). Hobbes, in the Leviathan.
gives expression to this paradoxical potential of
language: "as men abound in copiousness of language; so
they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary. Nor
is it possible without letters for any man to become
either excellently wise or , . . excellently foolish. For
words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon with
them: but they are of the money of fools.It is to
counteract the negative potential of language, the per
nicious tendency of words to become the "money of fools,"
that Nietzsche repeatedly admonishes: "Be distrustful
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Vol. 23 of Great
Books of the Western ed. by Robert M. Hutchins
(54 vols.; Chicago: William Benton, publisher, 1955),
p. 56.
95
of all words."2
The Hidden Axioms of Language
Nietzsche anticipated recent developments In
philosophy when he argued that language Itself contains a
hidden set of ontological axioms. The syntax, the gram
matical straight-Jacket of subject-predicate— the very
structure of language has led philosophers to presumptuous
conclusions concerning the substantive existence of the
"ego," "free-will," "consciousness," and numerous other
■ a
"entitles,” "Language and the prejudices upon which
language Is based very often act as obstacles In our
paths when we proceed to explore Internal phenomena and
4
impulses,"
It was during Nietzsche’s "positivistlc" period,
with Its critical analyses of specific philosophical
problems, that language was frequently found to be the
source of error. For example, in an analysis of "free
will," Nietzsche concludes:
2
Human. All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 213. The Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 301.
o
J"I am afraid we are not rid of God because we
still have faith in grammar." Twilight of the Idols,
"’Reason1 in Philosophy," 5. The Portable Nietzsche,
p . 483.
4
The Dawn of Day, 115. The Complete Works, Vol.
9, p. 119.
96
We are still constantly led astray by
words • « • that are Induced to think of things
as simpler than they are, as separate, Indivisible,
existing in the absolute. Language contains a
hidden philosophical mythology, which, however
careful we may be, breaks out afresh at every
moment. The belief in free-will— that is to say,
in similar facts and Isolated facts— finds in
language its continual apostle and advocate.5
By the time of his mature period, Nietzsche was
convinced not only that specific philosophical problems
can be traced to language but that entire philosophical
systems and world-views can be traced to remote, pri
mordial language patterns and racial habits.** In Beyond
Good and Evil Nietzsche writes:
The strange family resemblance of all Indian,
Greek, and German philosophizing is explained
easily enough. Where there is affinity of
languages, it cannot fall, owing to the common
philosophy of grammar— I mean, owing to the
unconscious domination and guidance by similar
grammatical functions— that everything is pre
pared at the outset for a similar development and
sequence of philosophical systems; Just as the
way seems barred against certain other possibili
ties of world-interpretation. It is highly
probable that philosophers within the domain of
the Ural-Altaic languages (where the concept of
the subject is least developed) look otherwise
"into the world,” and will be found on paths of
~ * Human» All-too-Human, ”The Wanderer and His
Shadow, ” 11. The Complete Works. Vol. 7* P. 192. Cf.
Beyond Good and Evil. 19, P» "Willing seems to me to
be above all something complicated, something that is a
unit only as a word,"
^Nietzsche comments that "philosophizing is to
this extent a kind of atavism of the highest order."
Beyond Good and Evil. 20, p. 27.
97
thought different from those of the Indo-Germanic
peoples and the Muslims: the spell of certain
grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell
of physiological valuations and racial conditions.«
The Static Nature of Language
The static, antiseptic nature of language forces
an artificial restraint on a world— inner as well as
outer— that is dynamic and alive. No sooner does an
experience or insight come to man than he discovers, as
he attempts to capture it in words, that it has died in
Q
these dry words "and no longer resembles the original."
If words thus kill the original thought or feeling, there
remains only a corpse or shadow to be conveyed from one
person to another via language. Perhaps this partly
explains an epigram in Beyond Good and Evil: "One no
longer loves one's insight enough once one communicates
it."^ Two years later in Twilight of the Idols (1888),
Nietzsche develops the same theme:
We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently
when we communicate ourselves. Our true experiences
are not at all garrulous. They could not communi
cate themselves even if they tried. That is because
they lack the right word. Whatever we have words
^Beyond Good and Evil. 20, p. 27.
8
The Joyful Wisdom, 298. The Complete Works,
Vol. 10, p . 2 ? 2 . ------- ------ ----------
^Beyond Good and Evil, 160, p. 91.
98
for, that we have already got beyond. In all
talk there Is a grain of contempt. Language, it
seems, was Invented only for what Is average,
medium, communicable. With language the speaker
Immediately vulgarizes himself.10
The Seduction of Language
language Is a man-made symbolic world which stands
betweei man and the world of direct experience. Man has
been so Impressed by the power and beauty of language
that he has been seduced Into believing that language
actually reflects the world as It really Is. In a lengthy
aphorism titled "Language as a Presumptive Science,”
Nietzsche reflects:
The Importance of language for the development
of culture lies In this, that through language men
erect a world of their own alongside the real world,
a position they hold to be so fixed that from It
they hope to hoist the other world off Its hinges
and make themselves master of it. « . . Man really
thought that In language he had knowledge of the
world. The language-maker was not modest enough to
realize that he had only given designations to
things. Instead, he believed that he had expressed
through words the highest knowledge of things.11
Language circumscribes, limits and distorts man's
3,0"Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 26. The
Portable Nietzsche, pp. 530-531*
^ Human, All-too-Human, "First and Last Things,"
11. Translated by Panto. Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 84.
99
12
attempt to know the world. ”We always express our
thoughts with those words which lie nearest to hand. Or
rather, if I may reveal my full suspicion; at every
moment we have only the particular thought for the words
13
that are present in our minds.” J Not only the external
world but our very thoughts are determined by the dictates
of grammar. Each of us is imprisoned in the linguistic
fictions of his particular culture. If language thus
restricts us in our pursuit of knowledge, is there any
other means by which we can approach the truth? Let us
examine the possibilities of reason and sense experience.
Logic and Fact
Logic and Nature
Logic and mathematics, as well as language, are
commonly believed to mirror the world. Indeed, it is
doubtful whether these symbolic systems would have
developed without this belief. For example, in the case
of mathematics, it ”would certainly not have arisen if it
had been known from the beginning that in Nature there are
12
Nietzsche's epistemological and ethical skepti
cism was reached largely with the aid of his denial of
correspondence between words and things. Roger Hazelton,
”Nietzsohe's Contribution to the Theory of Language,”
The Philosophical Review. LII (January, 19^3), 5^-55.
13Th e Dawn of Day, 257* The Complete Works, Vol.
9, P. 247.--------------- ------- ------------
100 .
no exactly straight lines, no real circle, no absolute
standard of size.” Yet, despite their origin, these
"languages” of reason have created a world of their own
"beside the other.”1* ’ Nietzsche asserts that only now
are men awakening to the fact that they have been
propagating a tremendous error in their naive belief in
"languages."
Tautological Nature of Logic
Nietzsche*s view of verbal and other symbolic
systems— i.e., of reason in its explicit and structured
forms— is similar to that held by contemporary logical
empiricists. "Matters of logic," in contrast to "matters
of fact," are purely analytical and tautological in
nature; their "truths" are strictly formal, based on
stipulation or convention. There is no necessary
correspondence between the axioms and postulates of logic
and the empirical world. Nietzsche states that logic is
actually "founded upon suppositions to which nothing in
the actual world corresponds,— for instance, on the
supposition of the equality of things, and the identity of
the same thing at different points of time."^
14
Human. A11-too-Human. "First and Last Things,"
11. The Complete Works, Vol. 6, p. 22.
15Ibid. l6Ibid.
The Testimony of the Senses
Nietzsche wages war against the ancient and
venerable prejudice of philosophers concerning the human
senses as a source of error. From the time of Socrates
Western philosophy has elevated reason over the senses
(and for some perverse reason those thinkers who did
emphasize sense experience, such as the British Empiri
cists, concentrated on vision to the neglect of the other
senses). The senses have been held responsible for the
"world of appearance,1 1 the veil of deception hiding the
true world of being. Traditionally the philosopher has
said: "Let us free ourselves from the deception of the
senses, from becoming, from history, from liesj history
is nothing but faith in the senses, faith in lies.
Moral: let us say NO to all who have faith in the senses
to all the rest of mankindj they are all 'mob,' Let us
be philosophers IYet is is precisely through the
senses— indeed, only through the senses— that we gain
experience of the world: "All credibility, all good
conscience, all evidence of truth come only from the
18
senses," Furthermore, the senses are much better
•^Twilight of the Idols. 11'Reason1 in Philosophy,
1, The Portable Nietzsche, p. 480,
Beyond Good and Evil. 13^, p. 88.
instruments of observation than philosophers have
thought— to the truth of which the physical sciences can
bear witness. Indeed, "we possess science precisely to
the extent to which we have decided to accept the testi
mony of the senses— to the extent to which we sharpen
them further, arm them, and have learned to think them
through."1^ The so-called "deception" of the senses
(e.g, the straight stick which appears to be bent when
held in water) can be eliminated, or at least minimized,
simply by a further application of the senses: either by
extending and refining the senses through instrumentation
or by applying more than one sense organ at the same time
to correct and balance the message coming from one sense
by itself. In addition to vision, we must utilize the
other senses. For example, the nose, "of which no
philosopher has yet spoken with reverence and gratitude,
is actually the most delicate instrument so far at our
disposal: it is able to detect minimal differences of
20
motion which even a spectroscope cannot detect,"
The Senses do not Lie
The senses supply us with the raw data of
1^Twilight of the Idols. "'Reason1 in Philosophy,
3, The Portable Nietzsche, p. A8l,
20Ibid,
103
experience) as such it is impossible for the senses to
deceive or liei "What we make of their testimony, that
21
alone introduces lies." It is when we apply "reason"
to the testimony of senses, when we make interpretive
statement about what the senses reveal, that the possi
bility of error arises.
Limitations of the Senses
Nietzsche is not here claiming, as the naive,
epistemological realist does, that the senses provide us
with a faithful copy of external reality. Each of our
sense organs imposes limiting horizons beyond which we
cannot go. Taken together "our senses confine each of us
22
within prison walls." Other organisms with different
sensory receptors may receive an entirely different image
23
of things. The point is that not only are the senses
^ Twilight of the Idols, 2, p, 480,
22The Dawn of Day. 117. The Complete Works. Vol.
9, p. 122.
2^In an early (1873) unpublished essay on "truth
and falsity" Nietzsche reflects that It costs man "some
trouble to admit to himself that the insect and the bird
perceive a world different from his own, and that the
question, which of the two-world perceptions is more
accurate, is quite a senseless one, since to decide this
question it would be necessary to apply the standard of
right perception, i.e., to apply a standard which does not
exist," On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense'.
The Complete Works, Vol. 2, p,‘ 184.
104
limiting, but there is no means of escape! "We are like
spiders in our own webs, and, whatever we may catch in
them, it will only be something that our web is capable
24
of catching,"
It may at first appear that we have a paradox
here: that on the one hand Nietzsche is encouraging the
use of the senses, and on the other telling us that we
are imprisoned by them, Nietzsche*s position, which
eliminates the paradox, is that even though we cannot
transcend the senses we may nevertheless make the most of
sensory knowledge: that is, granted that we are
imprisoned, to date we have only begun to explore our
prison— and now, thanks to the development of science we
may get to know our prison somewhat better.
Science
Despite Nietzsche’s strong positivistic and pro
science attitude he was far from believing that science
and logico-empirical investigation could solve all of
life’s problems or unravel the mysteries of the universe.
This is in contrast to the two most popular positions in
regard to science, both of which Nietzsche rejects. The
first holds that science is man’s salvation, that, when
24
The Dawn of Day, 117* The Complete Works. Vol.
9, P. 123.
105
fully developed and applied, the evils of existence will
2 R
be but a topic of historical curiosity. ^ Nietzsche
rejects this position on epistemological grounds; science
is but a refinement of man’s senses and Intellect and
thus, as we have seen in the previous sections of this
chapter, forever bounded by the limits imposed by these
human organs. The second popular position in regard to
science is that since science has not been able to bring
about millennium it ought to be rejected in favor of some
other method, such as intuition, revelation, mystical
insight, etcetera, Nietzsche rejects this view on the
grounds that limited though the logico-empirical methods
are, they are best means at our disposal for the pursuit
of knowledge and intelligent action. Thus Nietzsche
opposes both the easy optimism of much nineteenth-century
"scientism" as well as the self-indulged pessimism of a
concomitant antl-intellectuallsm.
OK
^Science, conceived of in the widest possible
sense, is the dialectical pursuit of cognitive knowledge;
its first great spokesman was Socrates, Nietzsche
states, "I understand by the spirit of science the faith
that first came to light in the person of Socrates— the
faith in the expllcabllity of nature and in knowledge as
a panacea," The Birth of Tragedy. 17, p, 106,
2 6
"Optimism, with its delusion of limitless
power , , ," is "the germ of destruction in our society."
The Birth of Tragedy. 18, p. 111.
106
Questions of knowledge and truth are to be
settled— If th^y are to be settled In conventional
epistemologioal terras at all— by applying the twin
criteria of reason and experience, logic and fact. This
Is not to say that all or even most human concerns are to
be Judged In logico-empirical terms. There are other
dimensions of life than that of ' ’ knowing"— despite the
long cognitive tradition in Western education and philos
ophy. Man relates to the world primarily through
affective, asthetic and volitional modes of awareness.
These modes constitute a large part of man's experience
throughout life; however, they are completely outside the
realm of knowledge and therefore cannot be judged as
"true" or "false," "Truth" and "falsity" may be assigned
only to statements, not to experiences or feelings.
Perspectlvlsm
We have seen that neither language, nor logic, nor
sense experience can bring man face-to-face with reality.
Nietzsche was finally forced to conclude that man lives in
a world of "fictions," a world of falsifications and lies,
27
and that there is no way to escape this world. Religion
27
'An excellent discussion of Nietzsche's theory of
fictions is to be found in Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy
of "As If"» A System of the Theoretical. Practical ana
Religious frictions of Mankind, trans. by C. K. Ogden
107
art, science, common sense, philosophy Itself are but
Interpretative fictions. One cannot say that one system
of interpretation is closer than another to the "real
world," for to speak of the "real world" is simply to
present another interpretative system:
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—
"There are only facts"— I would say: No, facts is
precisely what there is not, only interpretations.
We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps
it is folly to want to do such a thing,
"Everything is subjective," you say; but even
this is interpretation. The "subject" is not some
thing given, it is something added and invented and
projected behind what there is,— Finally, is it
necessary to posit an interpreter behind the
interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any
meaning, the world is knowable; but it is lnter-
pretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind', it,
but countless meanings,--"Perspectivism,"28
The result of Nietzsche’s critique of the knowing
process is "perspectivism": "There is only a seeing
29
from a perspective, only a ’knowing1 from a perspective."^
It is upon this foundation that Nietzsche must construct
his new theory of truth.
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952), pp. 3^1-
362: "Nietzsche and His Doctrine of Conscious Illusion."
28
The Will to Power, 481* Kaufmann translation,
p. 267.
2^The Genealogy of Morals, III, 12. The Complete
Works. p. 153. ~(/f. beyond Good and Evil, "Preface,"
p . '3.
108
A New Theory of Truth
Truth in the Service of Life
The "Value" of Truth
In Nietzsche's epistemology, as In all other
areas of his thought, there Is both a destructive and a
constructive phase. Nietzsche's relentless criticism of
the knowledge process leads him Into a position of
nihilism, a position in which truth itself loses meaning
•an
and value. Yet, rather than despairJ or seek the com
forts of faith, Nietzsche responds to the challenge of
nihilism by developing a new conception of truth, a con
ception that reestablishes the "value" of truth.
^Despair of truth is a danger which awaits every
sensitive and noble soul upon exposure to the epistemo-
logical skeptics of Kant. Nietzsche cites the experience
of Heinrich von Kleist (undoubtedly the experience was
also Nietzsche's):
"Recently," he [Kleist] once wrote in his
gripping manner, "I became acquainted with Kantian
philosophy— and I must now pass on to you one of
its ideas, since I have no reason to fear it will
move you as deeply and painfully as it did me. We
cannot decide whether what we call truth is really
truth, or whether it merely appears as such to us.
If the latter is the case, the truth which we col
lect here dies with us, and all effort to acquire
a possession which would follow us to the grave is
in vain. If the point of this thought does not
pierce your heart, do not smile at another who feels
himself wounded by it in the innermost recesses of
his soul [helligsten Innern]. My highest, my only
goal has disappeared, and l l have no other."
Schopenhauer as Educator. 3, p« 24.
109
An outstanding characteristic of Nietzsche as a
philosopher Is his attempt to call Into question those
items which traditional philosophy has either ignored or
taken for granted. Perhaps an unconscious fear of the
consequences has kept otherwise brilliant and honest minds
from questioning certain basic eplstemologlcal and
axiologloal assumptions. To this writer's knowledge
Nietzsche is the first philosopher to seriously call into
•ai
question "the value of truth,Truth, along with
beauty and goodness, has been assumed by philosophers to
be a thing of great value to man.
Nietzsche began his inquiries with a psychological
probing of how to account for man's desire to seek truth,
for man's "will to truth,"32 What is it that motivates
man in this direction? "What in us really wants
'truth'?"33 attempting to answer the question about
the cause of the will to truth:
We [Nietzsche politely speaking in the
plural] finally come to a complete stop before
a still more basic question. We asked about the
value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why
not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even
ignorance? 3
•31
J Beyond Good and Evil. 1, p. 9,
32Ibid. 33Ibid. 3^Ibid.
110
The Moral Prejudice of Two Worlds
Nietzsche's new conception of truth requires that
one realize that "truth" and "falsity" as previously
conceived rested on a moral prejudice that hypostaslzed
a true world of Being standing over and against this mere
world of Becoming, Thus conceived the pursuit of truth
becomes inimical to life, for life is necessarily part of
the world of becoming— indeed, there is no other world
except in the imagination of some philosophers. The
collapse of the Being-Becoming dichotomy entails the
collapse of the truth-falsity dichotomy. Truth is now
seen as degrees of appearance and likelihood in the
service of life. Concerning the traditional view of the
basic opposition of "true" and "false" Nietzsche argues:
It is no more than a moral prejudice that
truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is
even the worst proved assumption there is in the
world. Let at least this much be admitted: there
would be no life at all if not on the basis of
perspective estimates and appearances; and if,
with the virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of
some philosophers, one wanted to abolish the
"apparent world" altogether— well, supposing you
could do that, at least nothing would be left of*
your "truth" either. Indeed, what forces us at
all to suppose that there Is an essential opposi
tion of "true" and "false"? It Is not sufficient
to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were,
lighter and darker shadows and shades of appear
ance— different "values," to use the language of
painters? Why couldn't the world that concerns us—
be a fiction?35
35Ibid.. 34, pp. 46-47.
Ill
Aa la frequently the caae in phlloaophlcal dis
cussions, we are apt to be led aatray by the lmpoaltlons
of language, To apeak of appearancea and flotIona sug
gests that there must be a "something” which is appearing
and being fictionalized, Nietzsche anticipates the usual
criticism:
And if somebody asked, "but to a fiction
there surely belongs an author?"— couldn't one
answer simply: why? Doesn't this "belongs"
perhaps belong to the fiction, too? Is it not
permitted to be a bit ironical about the subject
no less than the predicate and object? Shouldn't
philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in
grammar? All due respect for governesses— but
hasn't the time come for philosophy to renounce
the faith of governesses?36
A failure to take language seriously, combined
with an uncritical moralism, has produced such vitiating
dualisms as that between truth and error. Things are rare
and noble as the true, the good and the beautiful must
have an origin of their own, for surely "'they cannot be
^ Beyond Good and Evil, p. 47. Concerning
"governesses,w Kaufmann appends the following citation
from a contemporary philosopher:
"It might be amusing, perhaps even instruc
tive, to oompare Ryle on ordinary language with
W. D. Ross on prima faoie duties. There is a
close resemblance between Oxford deontology and
Oxford linguistlcism, not least in the assumption
that duties, like verbal habits, are 'learnt in
the nursery' [Ryle's phrase], and that what
nurse has told us goes for the rest of the world,
too" (John Passmore, "Professor Ryle's Use of 'Use'
and 'Usage,'" The Philosophical Review. LXIII
[January, 1954j, b2).
112
derived from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry
world, from this turmoil of delusion and lust. Rather
from the lap of Being, the intransitory, the hidden god,
the "thing-in-itself1 1 — there must be their basis, and
37
nowhere else.1" Thus the metaphysicians have argued
through the ages— from Plato to modern times. "The
fundamental faith of the metaphysicians Is the faith In
opposite values. It has not even occurred to the most
cautious among them that one might have a doubt right
here at the threshold where it was surely most necessary—
even if they vowed to themselves, *de omnibus dubltandum1
["all Is to be doubted," Descartes]."38 Nietzsche
suggests that this doubt could take two forms: first,
one may doubt whether there are any ultimate opposites at
all; secondly, one may doubt "whether these popular
valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians
put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground esti
mates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from
some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it
39
were, to borrow an expression painters use,"J7
Questioning the status of popular dualism,
Nietzsche tentatively speculates:
3^Beyond Good and Evil. 2, p. 10.
38Ibid. 39Ibid.
113
For all the value that the true, the truthful,
the selfless may deserve, It would still be possible
that a higher and more fundamental value for life
might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness,
and lust. It might even be possible that what
constitutes the value of these good and revered
things Is precisely that they are Insidiously re
lated, tied to, and Involved with these wicked,
seemingly opposite things— maybe even one with them
In essence* Maybe I
As a philosopher of the dangerous "maybe" Nietzsche
ventures forth with his own attempt to reconcile "oppo
sites" In terms of a new perspective on truth*
Science and Truth
Since man is Imprisoned by the "fictional" nature
of the sensory and thinking processes, since he has no
special access to the world as It really is, he must look
elsewhere for a criterion of truth* During Nietzsche’s
middle or positivistic period we find a rather optimistic
outlook on the possibilities of science: "Through science
one really does approach the real essence of the world and
in
a knowledge of it," Nietzsche never abandons his
approval of the logico-empirical methods of science*
Throughout his life he praised the discipline, rigor,
clarity, restraint and self-corrective nature of
^°Tbid.
4l
Human, All-too-Human, 29* The Complete Works.
Vol. 6, p.TPTT-^ -------------- ------ ----------
114
scientific methodology* Nevertheless, by the time of his
mature or third period writings he had come to realize the
science as well as metaphysics rested on a series of
fictions and errors* This did not result in any condem
nation of science, but it did necessitate a search for a
standard that would make sense and give value to man's
fictions and errors* The new standard, the new criterion
of truth is to be life.
Life and Truth
In Nietzsche1s notebooks from the l880’s we find
the following definitions and observations:
Truth is the kind of error without which a
certain species of life could not live. The
value for life is ultimately decisive,^2
That a belief, however necessary it may be
for the preservation of a species, has nothing
to do with truth, one knows from the fact that,
e*g*, we have to believe in time, space, and
motion, without feeling compelled to grant them
absolute reality*^3
However habitual and indispensable this
fiction [belief in the ego] may have become by
now— that in itself proves nothing against its
42 .
The Will to Power, 493. Kaufmann translation,
p. 272*
^ The Will to Power, 487. Kaufmann translation,
p, 269. Note that Nietzsche frequently shifts, without
warning, from the conventional to his new definition of
truth, or vice versa.
115
Imaginary origin* a belief can bg.a condition
of life and nonetheless be false.^
Nietzsche made public his new theory of truth in the
opening paragraphs of Beyond Good and Evil:
The falseness of a Judgment is for us not
necessarily an objection to a Judgment; in this
respect our new language may sound strangest.
The question is to what extent it is life-pro
moting, life-preserving, species-perserving,
perhaps even species-cultivating. And we are
fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest
Judgments (which include the synthetic Judgments
a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that
without accepting the fictions of logic, without
measuring reality against the purely invented
world of the unconditional and self-identical,
without a constant falsification of the world by
means of numbers, man could not live— that
renouncing false Judgments would mean renouncing
life and a denial of life. To recognize untruth
as a condition of life— that certainly means
resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous
way; and a philosophy that risks this would by
that token alone place itself beyond good and
evil.45
We have seen that according to Nietzsche’s
perspectivism each of man’s symbolic languages that claim
to describe the world is but an analytic fiction.
Universality and necessity are to be found only within the
particular symbolic system, not within the empirical
world. Therefore, to ascribe universal, synthetic
Judgments to nature is an error, but the question still
remains as to their possible harmfulness or usefulness in
liji
The Will to Power. 483. Kaufmann translation.
p. 2 6 8. -----------------
^Beyond Good and Evllr 3, pp. 11-12.
116
the service of life. Prom this vantage point Nietzsche
suggests a fresh approach to the famous Kantian query:
"How are synthetic Judgments a priori possible?”:
It is high time to replace the Kantian ques
tion ... by another question, "Why Is belief
in such Judgments necessary?"— and to comprehend
that such Judgments must be believed to be true,
for the sake of the preservation of creatures like
ourselves; though they might, of course, be false
Judgments for all that I Or to speak more clearly
and coarsely: synthetic Judgments a priori should
not "be possible" at all; we have no right to them;
in our mouths they are nothing but false Judgments.
Only, of course, the belief in their truth is
necessary, as a foreground belief and visual evi- h(.
dence belonging to the perspective optics of life.^°
Some Difficulties
Nietzsche’s pragmatic definition of truth presents
certain difficulties in the light of other statements
which he makes concerning the nature of truth. In
Human, All-too-Human, Nietzsche asserts that "there is no
pre-established harmony between the promotion of truth and
ii7
the welfare of mankind." 1 The same thought is developed
In Beyond Good and Evil (which contains Nietzsche's
mature and well-considered philosophical position):
Nobody is very likely to consider a doctrine
true merely because it makes people happy or
46
Beyond Good and Evil. 11, p. 19.
47
Human, All'-t_oo-Human» "Man Alone by Himself,"
517. The Complete Works, Vol. 6, p. 362.
117
virtuous— except perhaps the lovely "idealists"
who become effusive about good, the true, and the
beautiful, • « • Happiness and virtue are no
arguments. But people like to forget— even sober
spirits— that making unhappy and evil are no
counter-arguments. Something might be true while
being harmful and dangerous in the highest degree.
Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of
existence that those who would know it completely
would perish, in which case the strength of a
spirit should be measured according to how much
of the "truth," one could still barely endure— or
to put it more clearly, to what degree one would
require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened,
bTuntScT, falsified.^
It might at first seem that Nietzsche is here contradic
ting himself, for has he not previously argued that truth
is what is useful to life? And now he asserts that truth
may harm or even destroy life! An astute a critic as
iio
Danto fails to see that this is a "basic inconsistency"
only if one fails to take into account what Nietzsche
means by being "useful to life."
Throughout his entire productive career Nietzsche
consistently opposed narrow utilitarianisms and pruden
tial pragmatisms, on the grounds that by "useful to life"
they meant maintaining existence for as many as possible,
being happy and comfortable and secure, removing all that
is painful, ugly and disturbing, and in general urging
that the goal is to provide man with physical and
J l o
Beyond Good and Evil, 39* p# ^9.
49
^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 79.
118
emotional well-being and peace of mind, "What they would
like to strive for with all their powers is the universal
green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack
CQ
of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone."*^
In direct contrast with this view Nietzsche’s employment
of the term "useful to life" denotes that which promotes
self-surpassing and the furthering of individual great
men. In Nietzsche’s philosophy if something is said to
serve or be useful to life it means that it stimulates
and challenges man to new levels of thought and expres
sion, Thus, that which is harmful to life in a
utilitarian sense may be exactly that which strengthens
and promotes life in a Nletzschean sense.
It would be foolish, however, to maintain that
Nietzsche is always consistent in his use of the terms
"true" and "truth," As Danto correctly observes:
Although he [Nietzsche] had developed a
pragmatic theory of truth, he often spoke in an
idiom more congenial to the Correspondence Theory
of Truth which he was trying, not always and
perhaps not ever in the awareness that he was
doing so, to overcome. The inconsistency is not
in his thought so much as in his language. Like
many innovators, he was not quite sure of the
theory he invented, or perhaps that he had even
invented a new theory,51
Beyond' Good and Evil. 44, p, 54,
•^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p, 80,
119
Knowledge of the External World
An Unknown "X"
Despite Nietzsche's extreme phenomenalism and
perspectivism, despite his emphasis on the active role of
the subject In the knowing process, he does seem to
assume— or at least his language Implies— that there Is
some sort of reality outside of an over-and-agalnst the
perceiving subject, the knowledge of which would be
truth. The fictional world In which we are forced to
live stands In contrast to the "true constitution"
52
[wahre Beschaffenhelt] of things. Sensations and per
ceptions are formed by man's mind and as such are human
creations, but they are generated in response to
stimuli— stimuli which come from without. Yet these
stimuli do not come from the external world as we normally
conceive it: for this "external world" is but another
human fiction. J The stimuli appear to be an inexpli
cable surd, generated by an unknown (and unknowable?)
"X".
• * 2The Will to Power. 583* Kaufmann translation,
p. 313.
^Salter comments that "the perceptions . . . are
to be distinguished from the stimuli (Relze) that give
rise to them— the former we do produce, but the latter
we receive." Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 497.
120
Solipsism
Concerning the sollpslstlc tendency In Nietzsche,
a contemporary philosopher concludes:
Nietzsche could not quite bring himself to
the point of becoming an idealist, for whom there
is no world outside of the articulations of the
mind. Nor could he quite become a phenomenallst,
believing that whatever Is finally meaningful can
be expressed in terms of our own [sense] experience.
He could not do this because he felt, and not so
differently from either Kant or Spinoza, that there
was a world which remained over, tossing like the
sea, chaotic relative to our distinctions and
perhaps to all distinctions, but there nevertheless.
To some extent he was seduced by his own arguments.
Because he wanted to say that all our beliefs are
false, he was constrained to introduce a world for
them to be false about; and this had to be a world
without distinctions, a blind, empty, structureless
thereness. In fact he never surrendered this
residual belief,54
Attempted Refutation of Solipsism
Solipsism appears to be the logical consequence
of subjectivist epistemologies. Yet no philosopher,
including Nietzsche, seems willing to adopt solipsism as
his final position. In Nietzsche's case this is
especially true when It comes to the existences of other
persons. Throughout Nietzsche's writings we find the
doctrine of the reality of unique, independent, self-
willing, self-determining human beings. The doctrine Is
•^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p, 96.
121
not so much proved as it is asserted. In Nietzsche’s
posthumous notes, however, we do find the following tenta
tive attempt at a formal argument:
For a single man the [independent] reality of
the world would be without probability, but for
two It becomes probable. That Is, the other man
is an imagination of ours, entirely our ’ ’ will"
our "idea”: and we are again the same in him.
But because we know that he deceives himself about
us [in thinking that we are simply his imagination]
and that we are a reality despite the phantom—
picture of us which he carries in his head, we
conclude that he too is a reality despite our
imagination of him: in short, that realities
outside of us exist.55
Verbal Confines
Nietzsche was constantly tormented by the fact
that however desperately he longed for knowledge of
reality, his eplstemologlcal analysis indicated that such
knowledge was forever beyond man's reach. Language, as
we have seen, distorts that which it attempts to describe,
and it is language that stands between man and reality.
Nietzsche fully realized the dilemma, yet his own
convention-breaking use of words suggests an attempt on
his part to liberate himself from traditional verbal
confines and thereby come closer to the true constitution
of things. This writer concurs with Danto that
Nietzsche's "frenzied employment of poetic diction, his
^Quoted in Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 192.
122
Intentionally paradoxical utterances, and his deliberately
perverted use of terms might be taken in the spirit of the
Zen koan, calculated to crack the shell which linguistic
habit has erected between ourselves, and reality and to
expose us to open seas
Nietzsche and Mysticism
There is certainly some affinity between Nietzsche
and the mystic temperament. Like the mystic Nietzsche
struggles with the "double-bind” imposed by language:
to communicate an experience man is forced to ”talk” about
it, yet in talking he necessarily distorts that which he
wishes to communicate. Like the mystic Nietzsche also
recognizes the importance of the non-cognitive dimension
of human existence. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche
spoke of the Dionysian union with the undifferentiated
Ur-Eine [primal oneness] and Its role in the creation of
Greek Tragedy. In the same work he maintains that "it is
only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the
world are eternally Justified.
Granted these affinities, Nietzsche was neverthe
less unwilling to follow the mystic's advice of losing
eg
J Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 97.
*^The Birth of Tragedy. 5. The Philosophy of
Nietzsche. p. 9^4. Aiso see section 5^1, p. lOtA.
123
oneself In Being, of merging personal Identity with the
Absolute or Ultimate Ground of Existence. Nietzsche
favored a multl-dlmensional interaction with the world—
as long as this did not require any sacrifice of one's
ego and Independent self-hood. To sacrifice one's
uniqueness Is to move away from the goal of Individual
self-perfection. Mystical union is a method of escape,
not of transcendence.
Tentativeness
Lack of Certainties
A logical corollary of Nietzsche's perspectivism
58
is that man must forego belief in certainties. This is
not to say that man is to give up the quest for truth, or,
to speak more correctly, the quest for those fictions
which best promote life. But man's drive for the comforts
of certainty has been so strong that he has tended to
"prefer even a handful of 'certainty* to a whole carload
of beautiful possibilities."*^ One need not look far to
find those "puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer
even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie
eft
J Certainties may be obtainable within the
artificial framework of symbols and their relationships.
However, these certainties, based as they are on man-made
stipulations, are analytic and empty and tell us nothing
about the world.
^ Beyond Good and Evil. 10, p. 16.
124
down on— and die."**0
Importance of Inquiry
One outcome of perspectlvlsm and tentativeness Is
that since we can never be absolutely sure that we have
found a truth, or a good fiction, the process of constant
Inquiry Is more Important than any particular "truth,”
In contrast to those who would die for the Truth,
Nietzsche suggests! "We should not let ourselves be
burnt for our opinions— we are not so certain of them as
all that. But we might let ourselves be burnt for the
right of possessing and changing our opinions."^1 In a
similar vein the youthful Nietzsche, in a letter to his
sister, asked rhetorically: "The true seeker, does he
not rather treat the result of his search as something
6 2
to be considered almost with indifference?" Needless
to say, the schools have usually been more concerned with
the "results" than with the search.
The tentative mind is one that remains flexible
and open to change. "The snake that cannot oast its skin
60Ibid.
^ Human, All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 335• The Complete Works. Vol. 7, p. 358.
6 2
Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche, Bonn, June 11,
1865* Unpublished Letters, p. 34.
125
perishes* So too with those minds which are prevented
6 ^
from changing their views: they cease to be minds." J
To prevent mental atrophy man must be particularly
suspicious of his convictions. In Nietzsche's notebooks
of the l88o*s we find the following epigram: "A very
popular error: having the courage of one's convictions;
rather it is a matter of having the courage for an
6k
attack on one's convictions I!I"
Religion and Inquiry
Religions by their very nature are antithetical to
independent, honest inquiry. "God" serves man as an
over-simplified answer to life's complexities; he offers
an escape, a refuge from the labors of thinking; He is
the Truth, and man need only submit. In Ecce Homo
Nietzsche describes his own attitude: ”1 am too Inquisi
tive, too skeptical, too arrogant, to let myself be
satisfied with an obvious and crass solution of things.
God is such an obvious and crass solution; a solution
which is a sheer indelicacy to us thinkers— at bottom. He
is really nothing but a coarse commandment against us:
^The Dawn of Day, 573* The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p."F. ----- ------ ----------
6k
Quoted by Kaufmann in a footnote to Beyond Good
and Evil, p. 36.
ye shall not think!
Tentativeness does not require that an Individual
have no strong beliefs or convictions. It most certainly
does not require that one adopt an attitude of false
humility concerning oneself or one's accomplishments.
The goal Is not to eradicate all strong beliefs, but
simply to introduce the possibility that one may be
wrong. This allowance for error (notably lacking in
religion) enables one to discard discredited beliefs,
replace them by new and hopefully better beliefs, and thus
to grow and move closer to self-perfection.
In his own life Nietzsche always entertained a
degree of skepticism and tentativeness concerning his
beliefs. Even late in his career, when he passionately
believed in his own greatness, and did not hesitate to
call this to the reader's attention (especially in his
autobiographical Eoce Homo), he allowed that he may
indeed be in error. In a personal letter to Georg
Brandes, written during Nietzsche's last productive year
(a year of heightened "megalomania”) before his collapse,
the tentativeness is still present.
I myself sun conceited enough to believe that
I have given the "new Germans" the richest, most
experienced, and the most independent books they
^ Ecae Homo. "Why I Am So Clever," 1. The
Philosophy of ‘ Nietzsche, p, 83^.
127
have, barring none. And so far as I personally
am concerned, I believe that I am a tremendous
happening In the crisis of value Judgments,
However, this could be an error and, moreover,
even stupidity, I wish I did not have to believe
anything regarding myself,
Knowledge for Its Own Sake
Those who would put forth the argument that, In
the spirit of objectivity, man should pursue "knowledge
for Its own sake," forget that all "knowledge" (i.e.,
"fiction"), Is based on prior valuations, "The question
of values is more fundamental than the question of cer
tainty,"^ for behind every problem of knowledge stands a
value Judgment concerning what Is worth being considered
as knowledge. To fully comprehend epistemological claims
one must uncover the valuations upon which they rest,
Nietzsche finds that all-too-frequently even the noblest
claims to truth and knowledge rest upon insidious moral-
ism: "fKnowledge for its own sake*— that is the last
snare of morality: With that one becomes completely
68
entangled in it once more," Like most of Nietzsche's
epigrams this one is suggestive of several different lines
^Nice, February 19» 1888, Unpublished Letters.
p. 129.
^The Will to Power, 588, Kaufmann translation,
p. 322.
6ft
Beyond Good and Evil. 64, p. 79,
128
of thought* One such line of thought, which illustrates
the point being made here concerning the priority of
values and which is also consistent with what Nietzsche
says elsewhere, is that those who advise "knowledge for
its own sake” do so because they wish to protect the
vital areas of life from the scalpel of inquiry. "Know
ledge for its own sake" isolates and channels inquiry,
generally into "scientific" problems, thus protecting
morals and religion. The first snare of morality was
knowledge for the sake of a particular set of moral and
religious dogma. This snare worked for centuries, but
when, through the rise of science, inquiry achieved an
independent status of its own, morality was forced to
invent a new snare. If knowledge could no longer be
compelled to directly serve the ends of morality, perhaps
it could do so indirectly by being encouraged to withdraw
69
into itself and thus become harmless.
^Nietzsche's attitude toward "harmless" inquiry
is expressed in the following polemic against academic
philosophy:
"It is clear why our academic thinkers are
not dangerous; for their thoughts grow as peace
fully in the fields of tradition as any tree ever
bore its apples. They do not scare, they do not
turn things upside down; and one could apply to
all their strivings and efforts the words Diogenes
used when someone praised a philosopher: 'What
great achievements has he to show, he who has been
philosophizing so long and has never hurt anybody?1
The epitaph of university philosophy should read:
'It never hurt anybody.' But this is more the
praise one gives to an old woman than to the goddess
The Relevance of Eplstemology
129
Questions as to the eplstemologlcal status of
subject and object, synthetic judgments, scientific laws,
etcetera, are viewed by most philosophers as belonging to
a rather technical branch of philosophy, with little
Import for how one actually lives his life. Nietzsche has
no patience with this attitude, for in his view it is such
eplstemologlcal matters that actually determine the kind
of world in which we live and thereby the quality of
human life. But philosophers, of whatever temperament, as
well as the common man, have adopted a stance "before
life and experience . . . as though before a painting
which is once and for all time unrolled,"^® thus
commiting themselves to the prejudice that there is a
fixed world which is "given” to man, that philosophical
theories about the given may vary but that the given is
nevertheless permanent. Against this popular stance
Nietzsche urges the possibility that
of truth, and it is not surprising that those
who know the goddess c-.ly as an old woman are
themselves hardly men and therefore are
justifiably no longer taken into consideration
by men of power."
Schopenhauer as Educator, 8, p. 109.
*^° Human. All-too-Human. 16. This and the
following citation translated by Danto and quoted in his
Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 73.
130
this painting— which we call human life and
experience—-evolved gradually, and Is Indeed
still In process of evolving— and should not
therefore be regarded as a fixed quantity. .. .
We have, through millennia, gazed Into the
world with blind Inclinations, passions, and
fears; with moral, religious, or aesthetic
demands; and have so wallowed in the bad manners
of Illogical thought that the world has become
amazingly variegated, fearsome, rich in spirit
and meaning. It has acquired color, but we were
the colorists. The human intellect has allowed
the world of appearance to appear, and exported
its erroneous presuppositions into reality. • • . ' • * ■
Man Creates His Own World
The metaphor of the world as a "painting" and man
as the "colorists" is telling, for it conveys the
Nletzschean belief that we create, not discover, the
universe in which we live. By selecting the colors or,
in his later language, the fictions, with which we work
as artists we determine the given after our own image.
With innumerable colors and fictions at his disposal man
must choose which he will utilize. This choice demands
that man have a criterion by which intelligent decisions
can be made. Such a criterion is 1 ife.
Llfe-Den.vlng Fictions
•phe failure to recognize fictions as fictions has
resulted in the perpetuation of life-denying fictions, for
71Ibid.
not only are these fictions not recognized for what they
really are, they are even turned into Truths and sancti
fied by the authority of religion. The life-denying
fiction of punishment after death, blessed by Christian
ity, has persisted largely because it was elevated to the
status of being an absolute truth. Man's behavior has
been negatively influenced by such dogmas, and these
dogmas are the result of faulty eplstemologlcal claims.
The first step toward creating a better world is to
accept Nietzsche's epistemology of perspectivism,
recognizing that all statements about the world are
fictions and in a sense "false." Once this step has
been taken and man has freed himself from "absolutes," he
is then ready for the second step, which is to subject
each fiction to the test of life: i.e., those fictions
which promote self-overcoming and the enhancement of
human creativeness should be cultivated; those which
hinder or retard this process should be weeded-out and
left behind as historical curiosities.
CHAPTER V
NIETZSCHE*S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART IIJ ONTOLOGY
133
Ontology Is the study of the nature of ultimate
reality: the attempt to discover and explain In syste
matic fashion the fundamental "stuff" out of which the
universe Is constituted, to comprehend the principles
upon which all being and becoming depend, Jeremy Bentham
defines ontology as "the field of supremely abstract
entitles,"1 that Is, of the widest possible categories in
which we can arrange the data of experience. Through the
centuries the term "metaphysics" has frequently been
employed in a sense roughly synonomous with that of
"ontology," Unfortunately, however, "metaphysics" has
taken on vague and mystical overtones, suggesting
theosophical and occult concerns. In the following pages
the terms "ontology" and "metaphysics" will be employed
interchangeably, denoting "the study or theory of
ultimate reality," with no intended suggestion of occult
matters. The two terms are to be understood in a sense
wide enough to Include cosmological problems, that is,
questions relating to the origin and structure of the
universe.
It is the purpose of this chapter to present a
critical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s ontology, for only
with these theoretical foundations behind us will we be
1Quoted in Peibleman, Ontology. p. 4,
able to fully understand Nietzsche's axiology and, more
particularly, his educational philosophy* Two doctrines
are central to Nietzsche's mature ontological position:
the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all things, and
the doctrine that the world Is the will-to-power and
nothing else. The former Is, among other things, "a
physico-cosmological hypothesis” which Nietzsche believed
to be of utmost Importance because of Its consequences for
those who committed themselves to It. The latter of the
two doctrines forms "an elemental concept in Nietzsche's
thinking, a concept In whose terms everything Is to be
understood and to which everything Is finally to be
reduced. It Is a metaphysical, or better, an ontological
concept, for 'Will-to-Power* is Nietzsche's answer to the
question 'What is there?T,f^
In the following pages we shall outline the
historical development and final ontological function of
the will-to-power concept In Nietzsche's philosophy. Then
we shall examine the puzzling concept of eternal recur
rence, which, to fully comprehend, will lead us into the
axlological considerations of the next chapter.
2
Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 363.
■^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 215.
135
The Wlll-to-Power
Origins of the Concept
The concept of the will-to-power arose out of
Nietzschefs attempt to account for individual human
behavior. That is, the will-to-power has its origin as
a psychological principle. Perhaps the best way to
understand the will-to-power as an ontological postulate
is to trace its development in Nietzsche*s thinking from
a psychological to a cosmic concept.
The term "will-to-power" is not introduced into
any published work before Thus Spoke Zarathustra. However,
the notebooks reveal that Nietzsche had been experimenting
with the idea for several years prior to Zarathustra’s
proclamation. "The phrase ’will-to-power’ makes its first
appearance in the notes of the late eighteen-seventies,
not as the basic force of a monistic metaphysics but as
one of two cardinal psychological phenomena: ’Fear
(negative) and will to power explain our strong consider-
i i
ation for the opinions of men,1" "Power" is here used
in the sense of "worldly power" and, in harmony with
Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations, is seen as a regretable
tendency of man to conform and "get ahead" in the world.
In his early period, when Nietzsche speaks of power, it
4
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 75.
136
Is always with disapproval, as In his description of
Wagner1s "sullen personal will, Insatiably demanding
power and splendor." •* Thus, we might say that Nietzsche’s
early use of "will-to-power" was much the same as we
would expect to find in any moral philosopher criticizing
his times.
It is during Nietzsche's "middle period," the
period of scientific dissection and analysis, that the
will-to-power concept begins to take on a new meaning.
The aphorisms of Human, All-too-Human and The Dawn develop
the notion that psychological phenomena such as pity or
gratitude may be explained in terms of a drive for power.
Nietzsche does not yet postulate the will-to-power as a
universal drive, nor does he seem to especially invoke it
as an explanatory principle. Except in the note referred
to above, the actual phrase "will-to-power" is not used;
instead, Nietzsche speaks of "power," "powerlessness,"
etcetera. At this point in Nietzsche's career one may
well agree with Walter Kaufmann that Nietzsche used
"power" as a "principle to explain behavior and did not
picture it as a virtue. In fact, he used it generally to
explain behavior which he happened to dislike* He did
not exhort people to develop a will to power, nor did he
5Ibld., p. 154.
137
speak of It as anything glorious
Further aphorisms from the pre-Zarathustra
period— scattered throughout the notebooks and in The Gay
Science— increasingly invoke the "power” principle to
account for individual and even social behavior. Un
doubtedly the idea of the will-to-power was gaining
momentum in Nietzsche*s mind when suddenly in the poetic
ecstascy that gave birth to Zarathustra, it burst forth
on the printed page as the universal expression of life.
Explicit mention of the will-to-power is to be found on
not more than a couple of pages of Zarathustra, Neverthe
less, these few references are important for several
reasons* First, they mark the first public statement of
the will-to-power; second, Nietzsche considered
Zarathustra his most creative work, and thus not to be
lightly dismissed; third, even though the overt references
are few, much of this enigmatic book falls into place
when the will-to-power concept is grasped,
Zarathustra*s Proclamation
The will-to-power is introduced in the section of
Zarathustra titled "On the Thousand and One Goals." The
problem being considered is moral relativism!
6Ibid., p. 159.
138
Zarathustra saw many lands and many peoples:
thus he discovered the good and evil of many
peoples. And Zarathustra found no greater power
on earth than good and evil.
No people could live without first esteeming;
but If they want to preserve themselves, then they
must not esteem as the neighbor esteems. Much
that was good to one people was scorn and Infamy
to another: thus I found It. Much I found called
evil here, and decked out with purple honors there.
Never did one neighbor understand the other: ever
was his soul amazed at the neighbor's delusion and
wickedness.
A tablet of the good hangs over every people.
Behold, It is the tablet of their overcomings;
behold, it is the voice of their will to power.7
Here the moral standards of a people are seen as expres
sions of the will-to-power, measured in terms of
difficulty and the effort required to overcome difficulty.
Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to
a people; whatever seems indispensable and diffi
cult is called good; and whatever liberates even
out of the deepest need, the rarest, the most
difficult— that they call holy.8
Nietzsche proceeds to give four historical
examples. The peoples referred to are, in the order pre
sented, the Greeks, the Persians, the Jews, and the
Germans:
"You shall always be the first and excell all
others: your Jealous soul shall love no one,
unless it be the friend"— that made the soul of
the Greek quiver: thus he walked the path of his
greatness.
"To speak the truth and to handle bow and
arrow well"— that seemed both dear and difficult
7
'Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I. The Portable
Nietzsche, p. 1/0.
139
to the people who gave me [Zarathustra] my
name. • • •
"To honor father and mother and to follow
their will to the root of one’s soul”— this was
the tablet of overcoming that another people
hung up over themselves and became powerful and
eternal thereby.
"To practice loyalty and, for the sake of
loyalty, to risk honor and blood even for evil
and dangerous things"— with this teaching another
people conquered themselves; and through this
self-conquest they became pregnant and heavy with
great hopes,9
The second and lengthier discussion of the will-
to-power occurs In the section of part two titled "On
Self-Overcoming." The emphasis shifts from society to
the individual. (Parenthetically one may note that
Nietzsche, like Plato, frequently sees the same general
forces at work in the state and the individuals thus,
"self-overcoming" is found, not surprisingly, to operate
at both levels.) To begin, Zarathustra proclaims that
the "will to truth" is but man's attempt "to make all
being thinkable," to force reality to "yield and bend"
before the mind. "That is your whole will, you who are
wisest: a will to power."10 Thus, the pursuit of truth,
that "lustful" and "impelling" drive, is anything but
objective and detached; it is rather the will-to-power
The Portable
9Ibid.. pp. 170-171.
10Thuoke Zarathustra, II, "On Self-Overcoming,"
a b l e - zVcVie. p . 2 ST.
140
expressing Itself through the Intellect’s demand to
conquer and overcome*
Zarathustra next develops the Idea that moral
values are expressions of the will-to-power. The argument
Is similar to the one previously presented under the
heading "On the Thousand and One Goals," except that the
emphasis is now on the individual rather than on society.
"Values," like "truths," are but the result of the
individual’s will-to-power asserting itself. Zarathustra
proclaims: "You still want to create the world before
which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and
intoxioation.n11 Not all individuals, however, are
equally powerful; those individuals whose wills are
strongest are the ones who determine the goals for
others: the weak masses bow to the will of the few power
ful ones, to the "wisest":
The unwise, of course, the people— they are
like a river on which a bark drifts; and in the
bark sit the valuations, solemn and muffled up.
Your will and your valuations you have placed on
the river of becoming; and what the people believe
to be good and evil, that betrays to me an ancient
will to power.
It was you who are wisest who placed such
guests in this bark and gave them pomp and proud
names— you and your dominant will.-*’ *
It is at this point in Zarathustra that Nietzsche
announces the will-to-power as a monistic principle
1; L Ibid. 12Ibid.
141
extending to all of life. Behind the diverse phenomena
of truth-seeking and valuing Nietzsche discovered a
unitary but dynamic force. In the words of Zarathustra,
this unity force is nothing other than ’ ’ the will to
13
power— the unexhausted procreative will of life,"
But to make you understand my word concerning
good and evil, I shall now say to you my word
concerning life and the nature of all the living*
I pursued the living: I walked the widest
and the narrowest paths that I might know its
nature. . • .
But wherever I found the living, there I
heard also the speech on obedience. Whatever
lives, obeys.
And this is the second point: he who cannot
obey himself is commanded. That is the nature
of the living.
This, however, is the third point that I
heard: that commanding is harder than obeying;
and not only because he who commands must carry
the burden of all who obey, and because this
burden may easily crush him. An experiment and
hazard appeared to me to be in all commanding;
and whenever the living commands, it hazards
itself. Indeed, even when it commands itself, it
must still pay for its commanding. It must become
the ^dge, the avenger, and the victim of its own
law.
But how, Zarathustra asks, does it happen that whatever
lives wants "to obey and command, and to practice
1*5
obedience even when it commands?" In his answer to this
question Zarathustra [Nietzsche] believes that he has
"crawled into the very heart of life and into the very
roots of its heart,
13Ibid. . p. 226. 1/1 Ibid
15Ibid. l6Ibid
142
Where I found the living, there I found will
to powerj and even In the will of those who serve
I found the will to be master.
That the weaker should serve the stronger, to
that It is persuaded by Its own will, which would
be master over what Is weaker still: this Is the
one pleasure It does not want to renounce. And
as the smaller yields to the greater that It may
have pleasure and power over the smallest, thus
even the greatest still yields, and for the sake
of power risks life.1'
Lines of Continuity
It is perhaps well to pause for a moment in
Zarathustra1s exposition to indicate some lines of con
tinuity with Nietzsche's earlier writings. The very
terms used by Zarathustra to describe the workings of the
will-to-power— terms such as obeying, commanding, over
coming, yielding, etcetera— are reminiscent of ideas
developed in previous works. As early as 1872, in a
posthumous fragment titled Homer's Contest. Nietzsche
suggests that the on-going nature of life and culture is
due to man's "uncanny dual character." "Those of his
abilities which are terrifying and considered inhuman may
even be the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity
18
can grow in impulse, deed, and work," The vitality and
health of the Creek state were due to struggle and contest,
because high culture depends upon the stimulation that
17Ibid., pp. 226-227.
l8The Portable Nietzsche, p. 32.
occurs when geniuses spur each other to action* The note
of conflict Is sounded again in Schopenhauer as Educator
(1874), when Nietzsche speaks of the necessary struggle
between the philosopher and his times. Great thinkers
are dangerous: they scare, hurt, and "turn things upside
down,"^ Culture advances only through those men who
fight against their times. In The Dawn (1881) philosophy
itself is seen as , f a kind of supreme struggle for the
20
tyrannical co?nmand of the spirit.” The Gay Science
(1882), Nietzsche1s last work before Zarathustra. develops
the notion that evil often plays a positive role In human
affairs: ”The strongest and most evil spirits have so
far advanced humanity the most. ... The new is always
the evil, as that which wants to conquer, to overthrow
21
the old boundary stones and the old pieties." What
Zarathustra does is to bring together these diverse mani
festations of conflict into one unifying power.
Zarathustra speaks: "And life Itself confided this secret
to me: behold,' it said, 11 am that which must always
overcome itself.1" "Whatever I create and however much
Schopenhauer as Educator. 8, p. 109.
20The Dawn of Day. 547. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p. 3?b.
2^The Gay Science. 4. The Portable Nietzsche,
P. 93.
144
I love It— soon I must oppose It and my love; thus my
will wills it."22
Zarathustra argues against those philosophers who
maintain that man's basic drive Is self-preservation or a
"will to existence." Existence is simply a pre-condition
for willing to take place, not the goal of willing:
Indeed, the truth was not hit by him who shot
at it with the word of the "will to existence":
that will does not exist. For, what does not exist
cannot will; but what is in existence, how could
that still want existence? Only where there is
life is there also will: not will to life but—
thus I teach you— will to power.
There is much that life esteems more highly
than life itself; but out of the esteeming itself
speaks the will to power.2’
Nietzsche's critique of "life-preserving" evolutionary
theories is discussed in more detail in the ensuing
chapter on axiology.
After having proclaimed the doctrine that life is
nothing but the will-to-power manifesting itself through
constant "overcomings," Zarathustra concludes his sermon
on self-overcoming by arguing that good and evil are both
necessary ingredients in the on-going process:
Verily, I say unto you: good and evil that
are not transitory, do not exist. Driven on by
themselves, they must overcome themselves again
22Thus_Spoke Zarathustra. II, "On Self-Over
coming." The Portable' Nietzsche*, p. 227.
23Ibid.. pp. 227-228.
145
and again* With your values and words of good
and evil you do violence when you value; and this
Is your hidden love and the splendor and trembling
and overflowing of your soul. But a more violent
force and a new overcoming grow out of your values
and break egg and eggshell.
And whoever must be a creator In good and evil,
verily, he must first be an annihilator and break
values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the
highest goodness: but this Is creative.24
It Is Important to note that, In contrast to the
earlier writings, the will-to-power has become not only
an explanatory principle but a virtue. To maximize the
will-to-power, to overcome one’s self— these are activi
ties that Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, recommends and
even exhorts his readers to emulate.
Post-Zarathustra Writings and the Nachlass
The creation of Zarathustra left Nietzsche with a
working hypothesis— the will-to-power— a hypothesis which
was to serve a unifying and systematizing function in
Nietzsche’s post-Zarathustra period. Writing in a prose
style quite different from the dithyrambic cadences of
Zarathustra, Nietzsche develops the will-to-power concept
in a series of three major works: Beyond Good and Evil
(1886), Toward a Genealogy of Morals (1887), and Twilight
of the Idols (1888). As the titles of these works
suggest, their content is devoted primarily to moral and
2* * Ibid.. p. 228.
146
axlologlcal problems; that Is, Nietzsche’s concern Is to
explore the operation of the will-to-power In value
situations. The axlologlcal implications of the will-to-
power are considered in the appropriate section of this
dissertation. What needs to be emphasized here is that
with the publication of Beyond Good and Evil the doctrine
of the will-to-power becomes an all-encompassing
ontological principle. In Zarathustra the will-to-power
was extended from a psychological principle to a force
explaining all of life; in Beyond Good and Evil the
will-to-power is extended even further to account for the
non-living as well as the livings
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining
our entire instinctive life as the development and
ramification of one basic form of the will— namely,
of the will to power, as my proposition has itj
suppose all organio functions could be traced back
to this will to power and one could also find in it
the solution of the problem of procreation and
nourishment— it is one problem— then one would have
gained the right to determine all efficient force
univocally as— will to power. The world viewed
from inside, the world defined and determined
according to its "intelligible character"— it would
be "will to power" and nothing else,25
It Is at this point that the student of
Nietzsche’s ontology must turn to the Nachlass (unpublished
notes) of the 1880's— that is, if he wishes more insight
into "the world viewed from the inside." Except for a
2^Beyond Good and Evil. 36, p. 48.
few scattered passages, including the paragraph Just
quoted from Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche, in his pub
lished works of the l880fs, does not explicitly discuss
the will-to-power as a cosmological concept. To a
reader well-immersed in Nietzsche*s philosophy, it is
apparent that the will-to-power ontology lies behind the
published worksj indeed, a knowledge of the will-to-power
as an ontological concept is a definite aid in making
sense of Nietzsche’s books. Even a brief glance at the
posthumous notes, published by Nietzsche's sister under
the title The Will to Power, dispels any doubts about the
importance of the will-to-power to Nietzsche's mature
philosophy. Page after page of the notes is devoted to
"thinking-out" the will-to-power as a metaphysical
doctrine.
As long as one keeps in mind that we are now
drawing upon material neither published nor authorized for
publication by Nietzsche himself (although much of the
material would possibly have found its way into published
books), the pitfalls of interpretation pointed out by
2 6
Walter Kaufmann can perhaps be minimized.
26
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 18-19, 60-65, 227,
148
Nietzsche as System-Builder
It would appear that at least some of the debate
over the notes that comprise The Will to Power hinges on
whether or not one wishes to view Nietzsche as a syste
matic metaphysician. Those who have an antipathy toward
metaphysical speculation, who experience "dizziness,
27
headaches and nose-bleeding" In such rarlfied air, ' are
apt either to ignore or to deprecate The Will to Power
notes, for the simple reason that it Is here that
Nietzsche systematically extends the will-to-power "to
2 8
the furthest heavens." On the other hand, interpreters
such as Karl Jaspers, who are anxious to "complete"
Nietzsche’s ontology, rely heavily upon The Will to Power
collection of aphorisms.
Critics of an "anti-metaphysical" disposition are
pa
quick to cite the many passages ^ in which Nietzsche
vehemently denounces the system-building tendency in
Western philosophy. True, they admit that in his early
period Nietzsche did look upon the great "systems" with
some indulgence. But listen to the strident tones of his
Schopenhauer as Educator, 8, p. 101.
p Q
Hollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 272.
20
^See for example, Human, All-too-Human, "Miscel
laneous Maxims and OpinionsT" tfne Complete Works, Vol. 7,
pp. 10, 12, 17, and 31*
149
mature attitude: "The will to a system Is a lack of
Integrity";^ "building systems is childishness";
■ai
etcetera. Granted, system-building may have educational
value:
The different philosophic systems are to be
considered as educational methods of the spirit:
they have always developed one particular force
of the spirit best by tneir one-sided demand to
see things just so and not otherwise,32
Nietzsche distrusted systems because their authors were
guilty either of attempting to rationally Justify pre
viously held moral prejudices, or of constructing a
world-view on unexplained premises:
The will to a system: in a philosopher,
morally speaking, a sly corruption, a sickness
of character; amorally speaking, his will to
appear more stupid than he is, • • • I am not
narrow-minded enough for a system— and not even
for m^ system,33
Critics who are more friendly to ontology will
point to Nietzsche’s own candid reference in the above
quotation to "m^ system," The centrality of the will-to-
power concept in Nietzsche's later works, as well as the
extensive ontological speculation in The Will to Power.
would seem to indicate that Nietzsche belongs to the
^°Twilight of the Idols, "Maxims and Arrows," 26,
The Portable Nlefczsche, p, 4? 6,
^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 66, ^2lbid,, p. 67,
^ Musarlonausgabe, Vol, XIV, p, 313,
tradition of metaphysical systematizing in the "grand
style." Given Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the evils of
system-building it would seem that Nietzsche was violating
his own principles. Indeed, the anti-metaphysical but
pro-Nietzschean interpreters are embarrassed by
Nietzsche’s speculations on the will-to-power. It is
doubtful that the paradox can be completely resolved, but
Nietzsche’s position is not quite as contradictory as it
first appears to be. In the first place, Nietzsche's
violent attacks against system-building are usually
directed at specific systems— Platonism, Aristotelianism,
Hegelianism, etcetera— which he felt were either outright
errors or had at least degenerated into dogmatisms re
tarding the advancement of philosophy. It is possible,
then, that Nietzsche’s arguments are primarily directed
against previous systems rather than against systems in
general. One often receives the impression while reading
Nietzsche that it is the dogmatism of metaphysics that
upsets him most and that if the dogmatic element could be
removed, if metaphysics could adopt the hypothetical and
tentative methodology of science, then Nietzsche's
attitude would be much more friendly. In the second
place, even if Nietzsche distrusted all system-building,
he was forced, as many other philosophers have been, to
be a metaphysician in spite of himself. Nietzsche’s very
151
conception of a philosopher as one who creates required
that he fill the vacuum that was left after his demolition
of previous systems.
Whatever onefs attitude toward ontology and
metaphysical systems, he will probably agree with
Nietzsche that the study of philosophical systems has at
least one minimal, irreducible value— albeit not a
"truth" value. In the preface to an early essay titled
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (an incomplete,
posthumously published study of the Pre-Socratic
philosophers), Nietzsche cautions that "philosophical
systems are wholly true for their founders only. For all
subsequent philosophers they usually represent one great
mistake, for lesser minds a sum of errors and truths.
Taken as ultimate ends, in any event, they represent an
Oil
error, hence are to be repudiated."J Having thus dis
missed any epistemic claims that systems may make upon
truth, Nietzsche allows that "on the other hand, whoever
rejoices in great human beings will also rejoice in
philosophical systems, even if completely erroneous. They
always have one wholly incontrovertible point: personal
mood, color."3* * A system presents us with "a slice of
Oil
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.
p. 23.
35Ibid.
152
personality,1 1 a "way of life"; it shows us a possibility,
a "way of looking at the human scene."J Perhaps, to
apply Nietzsche’s dictum to the study of Nietzsche him
self: "The task is to bring to light what we must ever
love and honor and what no subsequent enlightenment can
37
take away: great individual human beings,"For, as
Nietzsche observed in an early (1867) unpublished critique
of Schopenhauer, "the errors of great men are venerable
because they are more fruitful than the truths of little
men,"^ With these observations in mind, let us turn to
Nietzsche’s notebook speculations on the will-to-power,
Nachlass Speculations
Nietzsche asserts that the introduction of the
concept of will-to-power is necessary to "make sense" of
the mechanistic world-view of modern science. Granted
that "of all the interpretations of the world attempted
heretofore, the mechanical one seems today to stand most
• 3 0
prominently in the front," ^ it is nevertheless at a loss
36Ibid., pp. 23-24. 37Ibid.. p. 24.
3^The Portable Nietzsche, p. 30.
3^The Will to Power, 6l8. The Complete Works,
Vol. 15, p. W .
153
40
to explain its own laws and operational "fictions.1 1
Basic terms of modern physics, such as "stress" and
"thrust," cannot be explained. "The belief even in the
ability to explain is now lost, and people peevishly admit
41
that one can only describe," But the language of des
cription is empty, it is aimed merely at supplying order,
at allowing us to reckon up the world; it does not provide
us with an empathic feeling of how the world functions:
The possibility of calculating the world,
the possibility of expressing all phenomena by
means of formulae— is that really "understanding?"
What would be understood of a piece of music, if
all that were calculable in it and capable of
being expressed in formulae, were reckoned up?—
Thus "constant causes," things, substances,
something "unconditioned," were therefore inven
ted;— what has been attained thereby?42
Hardly a single term of mechanistic physics
escapes Nietzsche’s analysis and criticism. Here, to
illustrate the general trend of his criticism, are his
comments on "force" and related terms:
Has anybody ever been able to testify to a
force? No, but to effects, translated into a
completely strange language. Regularity in
ilQ
For example, Nietzsche argues that the
physicists’ "true world" of atoms is but a "subjective
fiction." See The Will to Power, 636. The Complete
Works, Vol. 15, p. 12b.
4lThe Will to Power, 6l8. The Complete Works,
Vol. 15, p. IT57 “
42Ibid., 624. p. 112.
154
sequence has so spoilt us9 that we no longer
wonder at the wonderful process.43
A force of which we cannot form any Idea, Is
an empty word, and ought to have no civic rights
in the city of science: and the same applies to
the purely mechanical powers of attracting and
repelling by means of which we can form an Image
of the world— no more I44
Even the concept of "energy,w as it is employed in
mechanistic physics, is found wanting:
The triumphant concept "energy," with which
our physicists created God and the world, needs
yet to be completed: it must be given an inner
will which I characterize as the "Will to Power"—
that is to say, as an insatiable desire to
manifest power; or the application and exercise
of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists
cannot get rid of the "actio in dlstans" in their
principles; any more than they can a repelling
force (or an attracting one). There is no help
for it, all movements, all "appearances," all
"laws" must be understood as symptoms of an inner
phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be used
for this purpose,45
Neither man nor the universe can be adequately
understood in terms of abstractions that exclude the
worldfs dynamic quality. In order to fully explain the
dynamic nature of the universe we need to draw upon our
own inner experience of "willing," and, arguing from
analogy, postulate that the world is also driven by an
"inner will." Nietzsche does not conceive of this will as
43Ibid., 620. p. 111.
^ Ibid.. 6 2 1. p. 111.
45Ibid., 619. p. 110.
155
a Schopenhaurian all-pervading monistic substance, but
rather as innumerable discrete centers of energy or
46
"quanta of power." Each quantum of power exists in a
state of dynamic tension with other quanta of power.
Each quantum of power is known by "the effect it produces
47
and the Influence it resists*" Nietzsche stresses again
and again that the universe is not static but dynamic
(although a static condition would be more "thinkable"),
that "the'adiaphoric state which would be thinkable in
itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to
violence and a will to defend one's self against
48
violence." Neither the organic nor the inorganic world
Is to be characterized by the static, inward concept of
self-preservation; rather, "every atom exercises its
influence over the whole of existence— it is thought out
of existence if one thinks this radiation of will-power
away. That Is why I call it a quantum of 'Will to Power;'
with this formula one can express the character which
cannot be abstracted In thought from mechanical order,
4 9
without suppressing the latter Itself in thought."
Nietzsche Is to be counted among those philoso
phers who are not willing to accept a bifurcation of
nature, who refuse to rest in any kind of ultimate
146Ibid.. 634, p. 117* 47Ibid.. pp. 117-118.
48Ibid.. p. 118. l|9Ibid.
156
metaphysical dualism. The will-to-power is Nietzsche's
attempt at metaphysical monism. To arrive at such a
monism was perhaps all the more difficult for Nietzsche
because his early analytical attempts had produced some
rather sharp dualisms— such as that between the Apollinian
and Dionysian creative forces.
The basic difference between Nietzsche's earlier
and later theories is that his final philosophy is
based on the assumption of a single basic principle,
while the philosophy of his youth was marked by a
cleft which all but broke it in two. When Nietzsche
introduced the will to power into his thought, all
the dualistic tendencies which had rent it pre
viously could be reduced to mere manifestations of
this basic drive. Thus a reconciliation was finally
effected between Dionysus and Apollo, nature and
value, wastefulness and purpose, empirical and true
self, and physis and culture.5°
Nietzsche's ontological monism may be seen as the
consequence of a methodological assumption: that given
two or more explanatory principles one should select the
least complex principle that will account for the data.
Traditionally known as Ockham's razor, or the principle
of parsimony, it demands that one employ the simplest
theory that will explain the facts. Simple theories, of
course, abound; the difficulty is to discover a theory
that does Justice to all relevant phenomena. Otherwise
the result is a "nothing but" reductionism. The razor
must not cut too closely! In Nietzsche's words, "the
*50
J Kaufmann, Nietzsche. p. 152.
157
morality of method,” that is, "the economy of principles,"
requires that we do not settle for "several kinds of
causality" until "we have driven to the utmost limit
(to absurdity, I might say) the effort to get along with
only one."**1
Numerous contemporary writers have noted that
Nietzsche’s ontological doctrine of the will-to-power,
with its stress on dynamics, is close to the energy
52
theories of twentieth-century physics. In this, as in
so many things, Nietzsche was ahead of his times. Howeveij
we must note that Nietzsche was not "doing physics"! the
will-to-power is not offered as a replacement for
Newtonian mechanics, but as a replacement for the mechan
istic, "block" universe ontology that had been constructed
from Newtonian physics. Since modern physics was not yet
born, we cannot say that Nietzsche was simply supplying
an updated ontology to close the gap between the develop
ments of science and the speculations of philosophy;
rather, Nietzsche seems to have intuitively anticipated
the course that physics was to take in this century.
Nietzsche performed no laboratory experiments; he
51
• ^ Quoted in Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher, p.
216.
•^Pfeffer, Nietzsche as Philosopher, "Eternal
Recurrence in Nietzsche*s Philosophy,* p. 277. Also see
Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher. p. 221; and Kaufmann,
Nietzsche, p. 2lo. ~ '
conducted no empirical research involving the apparatus
of scientific measurement* Nevertheless, he was a criti
cal observer of nature and man— especially of the inner
psychic processes of man and how these inner states
manifested themselves in behavior* Nietzsche is to be
counted among those philosophers— such as Aristotle,
Loche, James, Dewey— who were influenced by the biological
rather than the mathematical sciences, Nietzsche builds
his analogies and conceptual models upon the world of
living organisms (minus the usual teleology) rather than
upon the world of machines or geometric constructs.
Given this general mental framework, plus a compulsive
desire to explain what he observed and experienced,
Nietzsche was led to postulate the ontological principle
of the will-to-power. This was an inductive inference
from particular observations and low-order theories of
behavior to an explanatory abstraction of the highest
order. Inductive "leaps" such as this are more prone to
be in error than are statistical generalizations, but
they are also the means to fruitful hypotheses, as mere
numerical generalizations are not.
It should be clear, from the above discussion,
that the doctrine of the will-to-power is the outcome of
Nietzsche’s attempt to answer the fundamental ontological
questions: What is there? As "matter" was to the
159
atomists, "idea" to the idealists, "monads" to Leibniz—
indeed, as "substance" was to traditional metaphysics, so
the will-to-power is to Nietzsche's philosophy. And, as
will be shown later in the section on axiology, the
will-to-power is intimately related to Nietzsche's entire
system of values, especially the ideal of the superman.
CO cji
That is, as Heideggerand Jaspers^ have argued,
Nietzsche's ontology must be taken seriously, for if it is
not, if it is seen as some sort of tooth and claw
philosophy of ruthlessness, then it is doubtful whether
one could ever come to terms with Nietzsche’s practical
philosophy, including his philosophy of education.
Eternal Recurrence
Zarathustra's Vision of Eternal Recurrence
One of Nietzsche's most puzzling ideas is that of
the eternal recurrence of all things (die ewlge
Wiederkehr des Gleichen): all events that have taken
place will eternally occur again and again in exactly the
same form. Many interpreters of Nietzsche's philosophy
either ignore or quickly pass over this portion of
•^Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche's^ Metaphyslk, in
Nietzsche. II (Pfullingen: Gunther Heske, 1 9 6 1), pp.
25Y-3!33. See especially the section titled "Der Wille
zur Macht," pp. 263-272.
•^Jaspers, Nietzsche, pp. 287-330.
160
Nietzsche's thought* It is easy to understand why. The
notion that all things eternally recur would seem to
belong to Indian metaphysics, not nineteenth-century
German philosophy— especially Nietzsche's "tough-minded,"
critical naturalism. One is tempted to discuss the
doctrine as being nothing more than an aberration: one of
those numerous, playfully speculative flights in which
Nietzsche took such great delight but which are actually
tangential to the main structure of his philosophy. Even
though relatively few pages of Nietzsche's works are
devoted to the idea, he himself considered it, along with
the will-to-power and the superman, as central to his
final philosophical position.
Prior to Zarathustra the doctrine of eternal
recurrence receives only one serious elaboration. This
occurs in a cryptic "if" speculation that concludes The
Gay Science:
The greatest stress. How, if some day or
night a demon were to sneak after you into your
loneliest loneliness and say to you, "This life
as you now live it and have lived it, you will
have to live once more and Innumerable times
more; and there will be nothing new in It, but
every pain and every Joy and every thought and
sigh and everything immeasurably small or great
in your life must return to you— all in the same
succession and sequence— even this spider and
this moonlight between the trees, and even this
moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of
existence is turned over and over, and you with
It, a dust grain of dust," Would you not throw
yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the
demon who spoke thus? Or did you once experience
161
a tremendous moment when you would have answered
him, "You are a god, and never have I heard any
thing more godly," If this thought were to gain
possession of you, It would change you, as you
are, or perhaps crush you. The question In each
and every thing, "Do you want this once more and
Innumerable times more?" would weigh upon your
actions as the greatest stress. Or how well
disposed would you have to become to yourself and
to life to crave nothing more fervently than this
ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?55
The doctrine of eternal recurrence receives its
fullest treatment in Zarathustra, As befits this rather
strange concept its introduction is delayed by a prolonged
56
series of mysterious allusions and obscure hints,
Zarathustra trembles at the very thought of the idea and
does everything he can to postpone confronting it face to
face. Finally, in part three of Zarathustra. Zarathustra
relates a nightmarish vision in which he and a dwarf stand
before a gateway:
"Behold this gateway, dwarf!" I [Zarathustra]
continued, "It has two faces. Two paths meet
herej no one has yet followed either to its end.
This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And
the long lane out there, that is another eternity.
They contradict each other, these paths; they
offend each other face to face; and it is here at
this gateway that they come together. The name of
the gateway is inscribed above: ♦Moment. 1 But
whoever would follow one of them, on and on,
farther and farther— do you believe, dwarf, that
~^The Pay Scienoe. 3^1. The Portable Nietzsche,
pp. 101-1027
*^See Thus Spoke Zarathustra. II, "The Stillest
Hour." The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 257-259.
162
these paths contradict each other eternally?”
"Behold," I continued, "this moment! Prom
this gateway, Moment, a long eternal lane leads
backward! behind us lies an eternity. Must not
whatever can walk have walked on this lane before?
Must not whatever can happen have happened, have
been done, have passed by before? And If every
thing has been there before— what do you think,
dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too
have been there before? And are not all things
knotted together so firmly that this moment draws
after it all that Is to come? Therefore— itself
too? For whatever can walk— in this long lane out
there too, It must walk once more.
"And this slow spider, which crawls in the
moonlight, and this moonlight Itself, and I and
you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering
of eternal things— must not all of us have been
there before? And return and walk in that other
lane, out there, before us, In this long dreadful
lane— must we not eternally return?"57
Toward the end of part three Zarathustra gathers
together enough courage to face the doctrine again. This
time it is Zarathustra's animal companions— a serpent and
an eagle who proclaim the details of the doctrinei
"0 Zarathustra," the animals said, "to those
who think as we do, all things themselves are
dancing: they come and offer their hands and
laugh and flee— and come back. Everything goes,
everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel
of being. Everything dies, everything blossoms
again; eternally runs the year of being. Every
thing breaks, everything is Joined anew; eternally
the same house of being is built. Everything parts,
everything greets every other thing again; eternally
the ring of being remains faithful to himself. In
every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the
sphere There. The center is everywhere. Bent is
the path of eternity."
"For your animals know well, 0 Zarathustra, who
you are and must become! behold, you are the teacher
57Ibid.. Ill, "On the Vision and the Riddle," 2.
The Portable Nietzscher pp. 269-270.
163
of the eternal recurrence— that Is your destinyJ
That you as the first must teaoh this doc
trine. ..."
"Behold, we know what you teach: that all
things recur eternally, and we ourselves too;
and that we have already existed an eternal number
of times, and all things with us. You teach that
there is a great year of beooming, a monster of a
great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn
over again and again so that It may run down and
run out again; and all these years are alike In
what is greatest as In what Is smallest; and we
ourselves are alike In every great year, In what
Is greatest as in what Is smallest."
n,Now I die and vanish, 1 you would say, 'and
all at once I am nothing. The soul is as mortal
as the body. But the knot of causes in which I
am entangled recurs and will create me again. I
myself belong to the causes of the eternal recur
rence, I come again, with this sun, with this
earth, with this eagle, with this serpent— not to
a new life or a better life or a similar life:
I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life,
in what is greatest as In what Is smallest, to _
teach again the eternal recurrence of all things."5°
These all-too-brief passages contain all the important
elements of the doctrine of eternal recurrence that
Nietzsche saw fit to publish,
A few additional references are to be found in
eg
the concluding sections of Zarathustra^ as well as in
works published after Zarathustra,8^ but nothing of any
significance is added to the doctrine as pronounced
58Ibid., Ill, "The Convalescent," 2. The
Portable Nleizsohe. pp. 329-333.
•^See Ibid., IV, "The Drunken Song," 10 and 11.
The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 435—^36.
8°See, for example, Beyond Good and Evil, 56,
p. 68.
by Zarathustra’s animals.
164
The Impact on Nietzsche’s Thought
The strangeness of the doctrine, as well as the
sparsity of published references to It, may tempt the
reader to dismiss the entire Idea as the product of
temporary Insanity or perversity— or at least as not
central to an understanding of Nietzsche’s Weitanschauung.
Yet, a careful study of his correspondence and the records
of his conversations reveal that he felt the doctrine of
eternal recurrence to be "his most Important teaching,
and a terrifying Idea, so terrifying, in fact, that he
was reluctant to disclose It at all. Overbeck [one of
Nietzsche’s close friends] tells us that Nietzsche spoke
of it in whispers • • • and alluded to it as an unheard
of revelation, Lou Salome tells of the ’unforgettable
moment* when Nietzsche confided this teaching to her
'in a low voice, In Ecoe Homo Nietzsche tells the
reader that the idea of eternal recurrence is the
6 2
"fundamental conception" of Zarathustra,
Nowhere in the published works does Nietzsche
*^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p, 203*
62
Ecce Homo, "Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book
For All and None,* 1, The Philosophy of Nietzsche,
p. 8 9 2.
165
attempt to support, through logic or empirical data, the
notion that all things eternally return: it is simply
announced and offered to the reader as a terrifying con
cept. However, in the Nachlass we see that Nietzsche was
very much preoccupied with the idea throughout the l88ofs,
and the notes reveal his attempt to supply evidential
support for eternal recurrence. Indeed, in the Nachlass
we learn that Nietzsche viewed his doctrine not as an
ontological principle but as a scientific hypothesis,
"the most scientific of all possible hypotheses." His
notebook Jottings indicate that he planned a book titled
Eternal Recurrence: A Prophecy, which was to include a
theoretical exposition of the doctrine, its place in
history, proof, and the "probable results which will
<2i
follow from its being believed." So concerned was
Nietzsche with the scientific foundations of his doctrine
that at one point in his career he even contemplated
returning to school to study the natural sciences, in
65
hope of finding empirical support. ^ However, it is not
our purpose here to reconstruct Nietzsche's highly
involved and fragmentary attempt at a scientific "proof."
^The Will to Power, 55. The Complete Works,
Vol. 14, pTT5T
64
The Will to Power, 1057. The Complete Works,
p. 423.
65See Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 204.
166
Moreover, since the scientific aspects of the doctrine are
not mentioned In Nietzsche’s published work, but only In
the Nachlass, it is difficult to know how much weight to
give them. Suffice it to say that as the notes now stand
the doctrine of eternal recurrence is supported by "such
a melange of metaphysical and scientific theorems"^ that
one may safely conclude that Nietzsche had not yet
67
achieved the scientific rigor for which he had hoped. '
If the adequacy of Nietzsche’s scientific proof
is of little concern to us here, the reasons for his
frantic attempt to find such a proof are of great concern.
The question that needs to be answered is why did
Nietzsche feel that the doctrine of eternal recurrence is
’ ’ terrifying," "fundamental," "most scientific" and "most
oppressive"?— why the preoccupation with such a bizarre
notion?
It sometimes happens that the discoverer of a new
idea is blinded by his own insight} that, having seen
further than others, he loses perspective. We know that
the concept of eternal recurrence that went into
Zarathustra came to Nietzsche in a sudden moment of
66Ibid.. p. 2 0 8.
67
For a discussion of eternal recurrence as a
scientific hypothesis the reader is referred to Danto,
Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 203-2091 Kaufmann,
Nlet^sdne, pp. 281-2831 rfeffer. "Eternal Recurrence in
Nietzsche's Philosophy," pp. 277-282,
mystical experience while on a walk in the mountains 1 1 six
68
thousand feet beyond man and time." However, this line
of argument is interrupted by the fact that the idea of
eternal recurrence was by no means new to Nietzsche. As
a classical philologist he had found the idea in the
writings of the Pre-Socratics. For example, in an early
essay titled The Use and Abuse of History (1873),
Nietzsche discusses "the Pythagorean theory that when the
heavenly bodies are in the same position again the events
on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail; so when
the stars have a certain relation, a Stoic and an
Epicurean will form a conspiracy to murder Caesar, and a
different conjunction will show another Columbus discover
ing America.Although Nietzsche immediately proceeds
in the same essay to refute the Pythagorean theory of
recurrence by maintaining that "nothing quite similar
could ever be cast again from the dice-boxes of fate and
the future,"7® it does establish that he had given serious
68
Ecoe Homo. "Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book For
All and None.w 1. The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 892.
^ The Use and Abuse of History. 2, pp. 14-15.
Another early reference may be £ound in the Nachlass:
"Lectures on the Pre-Platonic Philosophers,"
MUsarlonausgabe. Vol. IV, p. 352.
70Ibid.. p. 15.
168
thought to eternal recurrenoe (at least recurrence within
the compass of known history) many years before his
visions of 1881 "six thousand feet beyond man and time."
Even after the ecstatic proclamations of Zarathustra,
Nietzsche admits, "I have come across this thought in
71
other thinkers before me." And in Eooe Homot
The doctrine of the "eternal recurrence,"
i.e. of the unconditional and infinitely repeated
circulation of all things— this doctrine of
Zarathustra might in the end have been taught
already even by Heraclitus. At least the Stoics,
who inherited almost all their principal ideas
from Heraclitus, show traces of it.'^
Therefore, it would seem reasonable to conclude
that since Nietzsche cannot and, indeed, did not claim to
have made an original discovery of the doctrine of eternal
recurrence, the reasons for its vital importance to him
must lie elsewhere.
In the concluding pages of this chapter we have
examined the doctrine of eternal recurrence from the per
spective of ontology. Its real import, however, is to be
found not in ontology per se, but in the crucial role it
plays in Nietzsche's quest for value in a world of fact.
The question of why Nietzsche considered the thought of
eternal recurrenoe to be "terrifying" and "fundamental"
^The Will to Power. 1066. The Complete Works.
Vol. 15, p7T2$'.
Quoted in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 275.
169
will be answered when we explore Nietzsche's theory of
value.
The various Individual doctrines which collec
tively constitute Nietzsche's philosophy acquire their
full significance only when seen as coherent parts of
a whole; to take any one doctrine in isolation— even as
central a doctrine as the will-to-power— is necessarily
to distort and truncate. The demands of clarity in
exposition require that we discuss each doctrine in serial
order, thus imposing an artificial, cinematographic
sequence. Whatever the order of presentation the reader
must remember that Nietzsche's total vision of man and
nature will become clear only when each individual doc
trine is seen in the light of the complete philosophy,
where epistemology, ontology, and axiology merge. Thus
the doctrines of will-to-power and eternal recurrence
remain fragmentary until they are grasped as integrated
parts of a larger matrix. This integration will be the
task of the following chapter on axiology.
CHAPTER VI
NIETZSCHE* S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY,
PART III: AXIOLOGY
171
Axiology Is that branch of philosophy which
studies the origin, nature and structure of value* Man
not only wants to know about the knowing process
(epistemology) and the nature of reality (ontology), he
also wants to know what Is right and wrong, good and bad.
Man, by his very nature, Is both a "knowing" and a
"valuing" organism.
Man's valuing, moreover, is perhaps an even
more decisive characteristic of his behavior than
his knowing. This is the view, for instance, of
many people who believe that the quality of a
person's life, i.e., what he cherishes, what he
truly wants out of lif®» Is a better measure of
his humanness than the "quantity" of his life,
i.e., how much he knows, how widely read he is or
how knowledgeable or learned he may be. We all
know people who are highly educated and conversant
on a great many topics but whose life values leave
them, in our eyes, short of attainment of the
humane and cultivated life.1
Axiology is a broad field of inquiry, for it
covers the many specific value-disciplines that have
engaged the interest of philosophers for centuries. A
contemporary axiologist, Stephen C. Pepper, writes*
"Theory of value" is the name for a set of
problems common to a group of studies known as
the value sciences. These include ethics,
aesthetics, some phases of logic and theory of
knowledge, economics, political science, anthro
pology, and sociology. Specialization has more
and more separated and insulated these studies
from one another. Theory of value is a movement
in the opposite direction, drawing out a core of
^an Cleve Morris, Philosophy and the American
School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin to., 1961), p. 219.
172
problems In which they all share. The movement
Is relatively recent, but the problems It deals
with are very old. They are the problems of the
good and the bad.2
Of the three major areas of philosophy— episte-
mology, ontology and axiology— Nietzsche, like Socrates,
Is primarily concerned with axiology, with the problems
of human value. Nietzsche's early Inquiries Into specific
value areas (e.g., aesthetic values In The Birth of
Tragedyt moral, religious, political and social values in
Human, All-too-Human, etcetera) led him, willy-nilly, into
the task of formulating a general theory of value.
The purpose of this chapter is to present, as
systematically as possible, Nietzsche*s general theory of
value. It Is from this general theory of value that
Nietzsche derives his educational goal of individual self
surpassing and his view of the truly educated man, the
superman. Unfortunately Nietzsche nowhere provides us
with an orderly, sustained treatment of the subject.
Here, as elsewhere, the student of Nietzsche's axiology is
faced with a mass of scattered aphorisms, notes, chapters
and epigrams, written at different times, in different
contexts and with different purposes in mind. The sheer
quainty of the material, the provocative nature of almost
every sentence and the enumerable, unexpected, often
2
The Sources of Value (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 19*fa), p. 7.
173
disturbing sorties in every direction present almost
Insurmountable obstacles to a coherent, orderly exposition
of Nietzsche's views.
The principle danger awaiting the student of
Nietzsche's axiology is loss of perspective, to lose sight
of the forest for the trees. The temptation is to follow
Nietzsche into the labyrinthine structures of morality,
ethics and religion, thus losing sight of the general
theory of value which stands above, or rather arises from,
each of the particular value fields. This chapter will
attempt to maintain perspective by focusing on Nietzsche's
summum bonum, which gives meaning and structure to the
entire field of values. This focus will hopefully serve
as our Ariadne's thread, to save us from the Minotaur of
detail as we are forced to explore certain specific
applications and examples.
Since ethics and morals have been, throughout
history, the crucial axiological areas, and since
Nietzsche's value theory is primarily an outgrowth of
moral inquiry, our own discussion will be based to a
large extent on ethical considerations.
The Doctrine of Self-Surpassing^
174
Early Indications of the Doctrine
Importance of Early Works
There Is a tendency for students of Nietzsche’s
ethics to concentrate on Nietzsche's later books,
especially The Genealogy of Morals. Beyond Good and Evil,
and, of course, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, since these books
are not essentially concerned with moral values,
Nietzsche’s earlier period is often dismissed by ethical
theorists as the period of aesthetic, philological and
historical interests exclusively. Yet Nietzsche himself
warns the reader that in his later writings he assumes
"that the reader has first read my previous writings and
has not spared a certain amount of trouble in doing
] i
this." The former method of approaching Nietzsche’s
ethics has unknowingly led to the neglect of an early
^The German word is Selbstuberwlndung. Nietzsche
critics have variously translated this crucial term as
"self-perfection," "self-overcoming," "self-transcen
dence," and "self-surpassing." Each translation has its
strengths and weaknesses. What one term gains in
idiomatic ease it loses in dualistic or religious
connotations, and vice versa. The final selection is thus
somewhat arbitrary. "Self-surpassing," because of its
dynamic and "striving" connotations, will generally be
used in the following discussion. However, the other
renderings will sometimes be employed, and should be
taken as synonymous.
^The Genealogy of Morals, "Preface," 8. The
Philosophy of Hletzscne. p. 6ffi7
175
essay In which Nietzsche formulates his axlologlcal
doctrine of self-surpassing, a doctrine which he was to
maintain throughout his philosophical career. This essay
is titled Schopenhauer as Educator; however, as we shall
see, its content is not devoted to the teachings of
Schopenhauer, As Nietzsche himself later suggests, per-
c
haps a better title would be ''Nietzsche as Educator."
A Chronological Approach
A chronological approach to Nietzsche's philosophy
is especially rewarding, since the early essays "pose the
problems and announce the major themes which Nietzsche
later developed."^ This is particularly true in the case
of the Schopenhauer essay, for not only does it represent
"nothing less than the consummation of Nietzsche's early
philosophy,""^ but it also announces an ethics of self
surpassing, an ethics which is to determine to a large
extent the future direction of Nietzsche's thought. The
importance which Nietzsche himself attached to this early
essay can be seen in this passage from a letter written
late in his career to Georg Brandes: "He to whom it
[Schopenhauer as Educator] says nothing personal has in
- * Eece Homo. "Untimely Meditations," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 877.
6 7
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 103« Ibid.. p. 133.
176
all probability nothing in common with me. Basically the
scheme according to which I have ever since lived is
0
drawn up in it. It is a rigorous promise." It is the
plans of this chapter to examine Nietzsche's doctrine of
self-surpassing, with particular emphasis on its formula
tion in Schopenhauer as Educator.
Apollo and Dionysus
i
Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Tragedy, is
concerned with aesthetic values: "It is only as an
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are
eternally justified. B u t it does contain a principle
which could lead to the Idea of self-surpassing: the
principle that greatness depends on the amount of suffer
ing and pain that one can endure, or rather that one can
overcome. The great artist feels "the terror and horror
of existence."1® He partakes of the dark Dionysian
forces, yet at the same time he overcomes these primal
urges by transforming them through the Apollonian form-
giving principle: "Just as much of this basis of all
existence— the Dionysian substratum of the world— is
^Werke in drel Banden, Vol. Ill, p. 1284.
^The Birth of Tragedy. 5. The Philosophy of
Nietzsche, p. $74. ~
10Ibid.. 3. p. 962.
177
allowed to enter into the consciousness of human being,
as can be surmounted again by the Apolllnian trans
figuring power, so that these two art-impulses are
compelled to develop their powers in strictly mutual
proportion, according to the law of eternal Justice.”^1
This provides us with a standard by which creative
capacity can be measured, i.e., the amount of suffering
we can transform (cf. the last paragraph of The Birth of
Tragedy).
12
Apolllnian and Dionysian— these two categories
are among the widest known of Nietzsche’s many innova
tions* Taken together they form a useful typology, not
only for the understanding of art— for which they were
originally created— but also for the light they shed on
Nietzsche’s later ideas, especially those of self
surpassing, challenge-and-response and the superman. In
the opening paragraph of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche
announces his revolutionary explanation of the origin of
Greek tragedy and the development of arti
11Ibid.. 25. p. 1087.
12
Apolllnlsch has been translated over the years
both as "Apollonian" and as "Apolllnian.M We shall here
follow the tradition of George A. Morgan, Crane Brinton
and Walter Kaufmann in rendering the term as "Apolllnian."
The English ear and eye would no doubt feel more comfor
table with an "o" rather than an "i": but Nietzsche did
not, after all, write Apollonlsh.
178
We shall have gained much for the science of
aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by
logical inference, but with the immediate cer
tainty of vision, that the continuous development
of art is bound up with the Apolllnian and
Dionysian duality— Just as procreation depends on
the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual
strife with only periodically intervening recon
ciliations, The terms Dionysian and Apolllnian
we borrow from the Greeks, who disclose to the
discerning mind the profound mysteries of their
view of art, not to be sure, in concepts, but in
the intensely clear figures of their gods.
Through Apollo and Dionysus, the two art deities
of the Greeks, we come to recognize that in the
Greek world there existed a tremendous opposition,
in origin and aims, between the Apolllnian art of
sculpture, and the nonimagistic, Dionysian art of
music. These two different tendencies run parallel
to each other, for the most part openly at
variance; and they continually incite each other to
new and more powerful births, which perpetuate an
antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the
common term "art*1; till eventually, by a metaphysical
miracle of the Hellenic "will,” they appear coupled
with each other, and through this coupling ulti
mately generate an equally Dionysian and Apolllnian
form of art— Attic tragedy,
"Be What You Seem!"
The next suggestion of an ethics of self-surpass
ing is found in Nietzsche's third book, The Use and Abuse
of History, Nietzsche here evaluates history in terms of
its value for life: "to study history as a means to
ili
life!" Again, as in The Birth of Tragedy, we have the
1^The Birth of Tragedy, 1• The Philosophy of
Nietzsche, p, 53.
lli
The Use and Abuse of History, 1, p, 11,
standard of health, or the overcoming of suffering!
"Only strong personalities can endure historyj the weak
are extinguished by it."1^ "The unhistorical and the
historical are equally necessary to the health of an
individual, a community, and a system of culture."1* ’ But
in addition to the notion of health, we also find
Nietzsche talking in terms of some sort of self-develop
ment or improvement. He looks at modern man and sees a
mere "puppet show," and he cries out: "Off with your
17
jackets, or be what you seem!" ' The individual has
buried within him certain capacities which are capable of
development. Just as "the Greeks gradually learned to
organize the chaos of taking Apollofs advice and thinking
back to themselves, to their own true necessities, and
letting all the sham necessities go," so each one of us
"must organize the chaos within himself by 1thinking
18
himself back1 to his true needs." But the notion is
not developed and it is only when we come to the essay on
Schopenhauer that we see Nietzsche explicitly coming to
15Ibid., 5, p. 32.
1^Ibid.. 1, p. 8. For a detailed exposition of
Nietzsche’s analysis of history, see ch. VIII of this
study.
17Ibid.. 5, p. 30.
18
Ibid.. 10, p. 72. Cf. Zarathustra*s "One must
still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a
grips with the concept of self-surpassing.
180
Self-Surpassing in Schopenhauer as Educator
The Individual as Something Unique
The Schopenhauer essay begins with an assertion
that eaoh human being is unique, "that he is only on earth
once, as something unique, and that no play of chance,
19
however strange, will twice concoct this unity. . • • "
The individual is "as novel and incredible as any work of
20
nature." Because of our laziness we may not at the
moment be aware of our true individuality, but "the man
who does not wish to belong to the mass needs only to
cease being self-satisfied; let him follow his conscience
which calls to him: 'Be yours elf I All that you now do,
21
think and desire is not really you,'" Thus we can be
led to discover our particular uniqueness if we would dare
to break away from the comforts of conformity. Once we
have done this we recognize that "everyone carries within
himself a productive uniqueness as the nucleus of his
22
being." Because human beings are unique and differ from
one another in important respects, it is only natural that
dancing star." Thus Spoke Zarathustra. "Prologue," 5.
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 159.
19
Schopenhauer as Educator. 1, p. 1.
20Ibid., 1, p. 2. 21Ibid.
22Ibid.. 3, PP. 28-29.
181
our own theory of values must be stated in terms of the
individual.
"Extenzphllosophle"
Nietzsche asserts that we must "live according to
our own law and standards," we must "not permit our
existence [Exlstenz] to resemble an unthinking product of
chance."23 The term Nietzsche uses here, Exlstenz. is
reason enough for many to claim him as at least a fore-
oll
runner of Existentialism. But the thought that is
behind the term is also very close to what we find in the
writings of modern Existentialists. Witness such state
ments as: "One must be bold, must be ready to take risks
with it [i.e., Exlstenz]. especially as one will
25
eventually lose it in any event." "There is in the
world a unique way along which no one except you may
2 6
pass: Where does it lead? Do not ask, follow it,"
The Schopenhauer essay abounds in such intimations of the
"live dangerously" aspect of modern Existenzphilosophie.
23Ibid.. 1, p. 4.
24
Excerpts from Schopenhauer as Educator, as well
as from other of Nietzschefs books, are included in
Walter Kaufmann's anthology, Ex1stentlalism from
Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York:' Meridian Books, 1956),
pp. loO-llS.
?r pi
?Schopenhauer as Educator, 1, p. 4. Ibid.
182
Another quality which Nietzsche shares with
Existentialists Is his distrust of philosophical systems:
The will to a system: in a philosopher,
morally speaking, a sly corruption, a sickness
of character; amorally speaking, his will 4jo
appear more stupid than he is, . . . I am not
narrow-minded enough for a system— and not even
for m j r , system*2'
The only usefulness that Nietzsche could see in philosoph
ical systems Is that they can serve us as guides to the
personality behind the system. They indicate a "personal
mood, color," and one can use them to capture the
28
"philosophic image." But a system in itself is simply
a "one-sided demand to see things exactly so and not
2Q
otherwise." ^ Nietzsche himself did not wish to be con
fined to the straight-Jacket of a closed system. He
chose instead "an unfinished system with free, unlimited
on
views." Most Existentialists— certainly Kierkegaard—
would agree with Nietzsche when he says, "I mistrust all
systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is
a lack of integrity."^1
27
1Musarlonausgabe, Vol. XIV, p. 313* Also see
section on"~I T Couragelrin~ch. IX of this study.
28
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.
"Preface," p. 23,
^ MusarlonaUsgabe, Vol. XVI, p. 76* ^°Ibld.» p. 51*
^ Twilight of the Idols* "Maxims and Arrows," 26.
The Portable Nietzsche* p. 4 7 6*
183
Closely connected with the distrust of
systematization in Nietzsche’s suspicion of any kind of
abstraction which does not have a firm foundation in the
concrete, Nietzsche attacks again and again the presump
tions of human reasoning (this does not make him an
irrationalist, however, since reason is still asserted as
32
one of the highest manifestations of the will-to-power),
and he emphasizes the role played by the volitional,
subconscious, and even the physiological aspects of human
nature on philosophical thinking.
Many, if not most, philosophers have been con
cerned with the individual, and most philosophers have
themselves been radical individualists in their own life,
and thought, Nietzsche is hardly unique in this respect.
But Nietzsche, as well as the majority of those philoso
phers who have been labeled "Existentialists," is not
only a radical individualist but is also one who makes a
point of it. To characterize existentialists by their
individualism is, in this writer’s opinion, misleading,
since this they have in common with other philosophers,
A more relevant characteristic would be that they are
individualists who point to their individuality as a
distinctive trait, and frequently remind the reader that
32
J For further discussion of Nietzsche’s "irra
tionalism" see section titled, "The Role of Reason" in
ch, IX,
184
this Is the case. This applies less to Nietzsche than It
does to men such as Kierkegaard or Sartre. Nietzschers
opposition to academic philosophy, his repudiation of
established schools of thought, and his scornful attitude
toward problems that are remote from life, indicate
further themes that are central to Existentialism. But
let us move on to what Nietzsche considers to be the
essential nature of the individual self.
The Philosophy of Two Selves:
frhe False and the True s e l f
Nietzsche characterizes man as possessing two
selves: an ordinary external self and a real or true
self. That which we usually take to be our true self is
actually only the peripheral, accidental, fleeting, and
unessential aspect of our relation to the everyday
affairs around us. One's true self cannot be discovered
by considering the opinions of others, nor can it easily
be discovered by digging deeply into one's psyche, for
even our "true being does not lie hidden deep inside. . .
but immeasureably high aboveus. An understanding of
this theory of the two selves is essential to the study
of Nietzsche's philosophy, since it is to be found
throughout his works, and is emphasized again and again.
Schopenhauer as Educator, 1, p. 5.
185
For example, we find this remark In The Gay Sciencei
"What does your conscience say?— *You shall become who
you are* [Du sollst der werden. der du blst ]. " And the
subtitle of one of Nietzschefs last books, Ecce Homo,
reads: "How One Becomes What One Is [Wle man wlrd, was
man 1st].’ 135
Nietzsche*s philosophy on the two selves may at
first sound like the traditional dualism of a natural or
empirical self which is pitted against a spiritual or
divine self. Josiah Royce characterizes this position as
holding that "the fleshy Self is the root of all evil.
The spiritual Self belongs, by origin and by destiny, to
36
a higher realm."
Thus have most religions taught. The real self
is somehow akin to the divine and is grounded in the
Godhead. Nietzsche of course does not speak in these
religious terms. This writer would maintain that not
only is Nietzsche*s view of the two selves secular, but
also that it is free from any sort of rigid dualism.
Walter Kaufmann, in order to emphasize Nietzsche’s
Oil „
J Aphorism 270. Werke in drei Banden. Vol. II,
p. 159*
^ Werke in drei Banden, Vol. II, p. 1063*
■^Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual
(New York* Dover Publications, 1 9 5 9 Vol. t ! £ , p. 249.
186
later monistic principle of the will-to-power, tends to
overstate the dualistic tendency of Nietzsche*s early
philosophy,^ There are certain "clefts" in Nietzsche's
early philosophy, much as that between the Apolllnian and
Dionysian, which were in need of a unifying principle, but
it is doubtful whether the two selves can be construed as
forming such a cleft. And if "cleft" is understood to
mean an unbridgeable gap, then of course no realization
could take place. The essence of Nietzsche's doctrine of
two selves can be more clearly seen if we pause to
analyze the key Nietzschean injunction of "Be yourselfI"
or "Become who you are J"
Analysis of "Become Who You Are I"
The meaning of the command "Become who you arel"
is far from being self-evident, yet nowhere does Nietzsche
explicitly state what he intends the phrase to convey.
In a broad sense we might say that his entire philosophy
is but a commentary on this basic theme. When the phrase
is considered in relation to Nietzsche's writings as a
whole, it would seem that the following meanings can be
legitimately attached to it: in the first place, to tell
someone "Be yourself!" or, more rhetorically, "Become who
^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 152,
you are I1 ’ or "Be true to thyself," implies that he is
acting out of character, that he is not behaving according
to his usual pattern, that his performance is not in line
with our expectations. Whether from conscious or uncon
scious motives, the aim of such action is generally to
deceive or fool others— or even ourselves. Nietzsche
has nothing but scorn for all such pretension and
hypocrisy.^® Imposture has its place on the stage only.
Indeed, to be a philosopher, in Nietzsche*s sense of the
term, required that one be, above all, honest. Nietzsche
praises Schopenhauer, and even more so, Montaigne, as
persons who are honest both as men and as writers.
Nietzsche laments that honesty is no longer in fashion,
that it is no longer even considered a virtue: it
"belongs, it is true, to those private opinions which are
30
forbidden in this age of public opinions.Thus,
"Become who you are!" can be understood as an admonition
to be honest, both to ourselves and to others.
In addition to the above meaning, "Become who you
are I” can also be understood as a command to realize our
nature as human beings. However, to fulfill such a
^Nietzsche recognized that a type of "hypocrisy"
is involved in self-surpassing. See "The Paradox of
Becoming," in oh. VIII.
30
Schopenhauer as Educator. 2, p. 15.
command requires that we first know what human nature is.
"Be thyself" implies "know thyself," The success of our
task would seem to be, if not proportional, at least
restricted to our knowledge of the human organism. This
knowledge must be twofold, for "man" is both a general
type and a specific individual. A science of man must
uncover those qualities which men have in common, those
general features which we share with one another. But
since each man is "something unique," we must also uncover
the peculiar qualities which set one individual apart from
others. To get at the bottom of what makes the human
animal operate as it does is no easy task, and it is
certainly more difficult than most previous philosophers
had thought. Nietzsche found that not only do our sense
organs and instincts mislead us, but so does consciousness
and reason itself. Nietzsche devoted a lifetime to the
investigation of human nature, particularly of those
qualities which distinguish one individual from another.
"Become who you are!" can thus be taken as an injunction
to learn what our true nature is, and to realize it to the
best of our abilities.
Nietzsche's concentration on man as an individual,
and not as a social or political animal, Indicates a third
meaning of "Become who you are!" It is a command to free
oneself from the pressures of public opinion and stagnant
189
morality. Man fails to realize his individuality as long
as he merely drifts along in "borrowed manners and
ii o
superimposed opinions," and as long as he remains
lil
"imprisoned by the shackles of opinion and fear."
Nietzsche’s call here is to be "untimely," to liberate
oneself from the mediocrity of the masses, to be, like
Schopenhauer, one who "holds aloof, and strives after
42
independence of State and society." In modern terms it
is a call to cease being "other-directed," to be rather
an "autonomous" person who is "capable of choosing his
4 3
goals and modulating his pace," A call to "Become who
you are I" is thus a call to be autonomous, to internalize
our freedom, and to be true individuals.
In addition to the above meanings there is yet
another which calls for some attention, especially since
it is this meaning which has the most bearing on
Nietzsche’s doctrine of self-surpassing. We have seen
above that "Become who you are!" requires that we first
have a knowledge of human nature. Nietzsche concluded
from his investigations that human nature was anything
but universal or unchangeable. Indeed, Nietzsche thought
40
Schopenhauer as Educator, 1, p. 2.
4lIbid. 1<2Ibld.. 3, p. 19.
40
JDavid Riesman, et al.. The Lonely Crowd
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University tress, 19tl)» p. 250.
190
that the evidence indicated that a variation within the
species called "man” was so great that the difference
between the average man and the genius was greater than
that between animals and the average man. Thus, to know
human nature, at least as it is expressed in the great
majority of human beings, is to know what Nietzsche calls
the all-too-human qualities of man, the qualities which
are barely above the animal level. Such qualities are
hardly worth emulation. Indeed, human nature, as we
usually find it, is not something to be copied, but
rather to be overcome.
The objection may be raised that Nietzsche is not
really doing away with the concept of human nature, but
simply substituting one of his own. This writer believes
that this is exactly the case, and that the important
thing is to notice the new concept which Nietzsche is
offering in place of the traditional view. The essential
characteristic of man, according to Nietzsche, in his
44
"productive uniqueness," is his potential for growth and
creativity, Man has the capacity to overcome and trans
figure his present self. Thus, the real essence of human
nature is for Nietzsche in its power of self-overcoming,
not in any set of fixed characteristics. This is of
4 4
Schopenhauer as Educator, 3, p. 28.
course the very core of the doctrine of self-surpassing
upon which this study is based, and is the major meaning
behind the phrase ’ ’ Become who you aret” For Nietzsche to
speak of two selves is his forceful way of saying that
man is capable of improving himself. And to speak of the
completely perfected self as the real self is not to
split man’s psyche, but is rather to portray the goal
toward which the developing self aims. If ”x" is the
empirical all-too-human self, and ”y” the ideal or higher
self, then as a psychological fact 1 am identical with
"x.” The ”y” always symbolizes a potential stage of
perfection and harmonization beyond the present condition,
however high the present condition may be. Once ’ ’ y” is
attained it automatically becomes ”x” and a new "y” takes
its place. We must also be on guard not to let the
rhetorical device of speaking of two selves mislead us by
taking it literally. After all, Nietzsche is not only
stating the empirical fact that man can develop his
capacities, but he is also trying to persuade him to do
so. It is a dramatic device to prompt us into action.
Let us now consider how one is to go about discovering
his true self.
lie
The Discovery of the True Self J
192
One's first thought might be that we should pro
ceed by means of introspection. But Nietzsche is somewhat
skeptical of this approach, since the self is such "a dark
and hidden thingj whereas the hare has seven skins, man
can take off seven times seventy and still not be able to
say: 'That is you as you really are, that is no longer
46
mere external appearance.'" In addition, Nietzsche
warns us that such introspective methods can have dangerous
and harmful results: "It Is a painful and dangerous under
taking to dig down into one's self in this way and to
descend violently and directly Into the shaft of one's
being. How easy he could Injure himself doing this, so
47
that no doctor could cure him." 1 If introspection Is not
the method to use, what other way is there?
Nietzsche suggests that we direct our gaze out
ward rather than inward, that we look back on life and
ask ourselves: "What have you really loved up to now,
what has drawn on your soul, what has dominated it and made
48
It joyful at the same time?" In particular, we should
4c
Cf. "Self-Knowledge as a Prerequisite to
Self-Perfection" in ch. IX.
46
Schopenhauer as Educator, 1, p. 5.
^Ibid. 48Ibid.
193
look back on our true educators and molders, those few
great men from the past who have Influenced our lives,
and from them we can discover the true meaning and basic
material of our being* These educators cannot actually
change or mold our true selves, but they can provide the
proper conditions for our own growth and self-perfection
by "a rooting out of all weeds, rubbish and vermin from
around the buds of the plants." "Your educators can be
49
nothing more than your true liberators." There are
other ways of finding one’s self, but Nietzsche claims
that there is "no better way than to think of one’s
SO
educators and molders," and Nietzsche singles out
Schopenhauer as his influential "educator."
Nietzsche has neither noticed nor accounted for
the problems involved in advising us to look back on what
we have loved and on those who have influenced our lives.
How are we able to decide who our "true" educators are?
Surely some criterion must be employed, for perhaps we
have loved or admired those very persons who have
hindered our self development. Nietzsche would undoubt
edly agree with Samuel Johnson that "example is always
more efficacious than precept."^ But all too often our
49Ibid.. p. 6 5°Ibld.
51
J Samuel Johnson. Rasselas (New York! Barron’s
Educational Series, 1962), p. 11b.
194
souls have been drawn on and dominated by other than
elevating examples. The men who have Influenced our
lives have often Influenced it for the worse.
It seems to the author that Nietzsche is
implicitly assuming several factors— factors which are to
be found throughout his works whenever he is appraising
other men. In the first place, when Nietzsche talks of
a "true educator" he is speaking for a very small class
of individuals, those "philosophers, artists and saints"
who have proven themselves to be creative geniuses.
Secondly, to be admitted to the ranks of "true educators"
or "real philosophers" requires that one live his
philosophy, and that his actions as a man be worthy of
emulation. Therefore, Nietzsche's suggestions in section
one of the Schopenhauer essay for choosing a model
educator are highly misleading unless we make the above
qualifications.
The Impact of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche
It was in the autumn of 1865 that the twenty-one
year, old Nietzsche accidentally discovered a book that
was to influence him for the rest of his life. While
browsing in a second-hand bookstore in Leipzig, Nietzsche
picked up a copy of Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung [The World as Will and Representation]. He
195
took it home with him that evening, not to put it down
again until the next day, letting "that energetic and
50
gloomy genius take his effect on me."^ The result was
immediate* "I belong to those readers of Schopenhauer
who know quite definitely after reading the first page
that they will read every page and will listen to every
word he had to say."*^ Nietzsche’s notes from this
period reveal that it was not merely a cerebral, but also
a psychological, or as Nietzsche himself later called it,
almost a "physiological” impression which Schopenhauer
cZl
made on him. "The need for self-knowledge, indeed
self-dissection [Se1b st zernagung3 seized me powerfully.
Nietzsche read The World as Will and Representation as
though it had been written especially for him: "Here
each line cried out renunciation, denial, resignation;
here I saw a mirror in which the world, life, my own mind
were reflected in fearful grandeur. Here the wholly
disinterested and heavenly eye of art looked at me, here
I saw illness and salvation, banishment and refuge, hell
52
Historish-Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke.
Vol. 3, p.
53
^ Schopenhauer as Educator. 2, p. 13.
54Ibid., pp. 16-17.
55
Historish-Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke,
Vol. 3, p.“ "2 9 B" :
196
and heaven.In one respect, at least, Schopenhauer
was to Nietzsche what Hume was to Kant— a sudden call to
the world of philosophical doubt and Inquiry.
It must not be assumed, as It often has, that
Nietzsche merely took over Schopenhauerlan philosophy,
modified It slightly, and presented it as his own.
Nothing could be further from the truth, Nietzsche's own
later works contain criticism after criticism of
Schopenhauer's philosophy. And if one is inclined to
believe that the criticism of Schopenhauer was only a
late development, he need only to look at Nietzsche's
57
early notes to be convinced that this was not the case.
The essay on Schopenhauer is not especially con
cerned with Schopenhauer's philosophy, but rather with an
image of Schopenhauer as a man. Nietzsche's interest, of
course, is never to present a blow-by-blow account of any
philosophy: "It does not seem to me to be so important,
as is maintained nowadays, to get at the bottom of and
to bring to light that which some philosopher or another
actually taught in the strictest sense and that which he
didn't teach: such knowledge is not suited to those who
are seeking a philosophy for their lives and not a new
56Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 298.
57Ibld., pp. 352-361.
197
erudition for their monument."*' But even this statement
is possibly misleading since it could lead one to expect
a biographical sketch of Schopenhauer* If one is looking
for a sound historical presentation of Schopenhauer, he
had best search elsewhere* The essay is really more
autobiographical than it is biographical* Nietzsche’s
later comments in Eoce Homo on his Schopenhauer and
Wagner essays bear this outi ’ ’Plato made use of Socrates
in the same way— that is to say, as a means of expressing
his own ideas,” "I cannot deny that at bottom they refer
solely to me." "Schopenhauer as Educator is the record
of my most personal history and development." "It is not
’Schopenhauer as Educator,’ but his opposite, ’Nietzsche
cq
as Educator,’ who is speaking.Thus the reader is
warned not to expect an accurate portrait of Schopenhauer.
For our purposes here, we need to ask how
Schopenhauer fits into Nietzsche's doctrine of self
surpassing. The essential connection seems to be
twofold. First, Schopenhauer served Nietzsche as an
ideal of inner perfection. The genius of Schopenhauer
became the ideal goal which the young Nietzsche placed
high above himself, and towards the attainment of which
58
Musarlonausgabe, Vol. X, p. 317.
^ Ecqe Homo, "Untimely Meditations," 3. The
Philosophy of Uletzsche, pp. 876-877#
198
he directed his own growing genius (Chapter IX deals In
more detail wJth the Schopenhauerlan Ideal). Secondly,
besides serving as an example, Schopenhauer also con
vinced Nietzsche that certain external conditions are
necessary in order to be assured that self-perfection can
take place without hindrance. Schopenhauer repeatedly
warns that the great man must be free from the control
and influence of the state, the universities, the common
man and public opinion and that he must work out his own
problems for himself: "Great, genuine and extraordinary
work can be done only in so far as its author disregards
the method, the thoughts, the opinions of his contem
poraries, and quietly works on, in spite of their
criticism."^0
Nietzsche and Dewey
Nietzsche’s position regarding the summum bonum
is similar to that adopted by John Dewey. Both men wanted
to avoid the static moral philosophies that were the
outcome of adopting fixed ends and principles. Dewey
asserts that the Greeks, in their attempt to ground ethics
on a more rational basis than mere custom, demanded that
^°Arthur Schopenhauer, "On Genius," Essays of
Arthur Schopenhauer. selected and translated by T. bailey
Saunders (taew tfork: A. L. Burt Company, n.d.), pp. 369-
370.
199
reason itself should supply permanent moral standards:
"Ethical theory ever since has been singularly hypnotized
by the notion that its business is to discover some final
end or good or some ultimate and supreme law*" Teleo-
logical as well as deontologlcal theories have been
guilty of upholding rigid and static standards of value.
But what label shall we attach to the non-static goals of
our new value system? Nietzsche and Dewey display con
siderable consternation on this point, for the very
categories of language mislead us into viewing the world
as constituted of frozen "bits and pieces." Dewey,
somewhat reluctantly, settles for the term "growth." "Not
perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process
of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in
c o
living. . . . Growth itself is the only moral ’end*1"
Nietzsche, like Dewey, was hesitant to attach a
label to his summum bonum, for fear that the word itself
would create a false identification with traditional
moralities and their static goals. Nietzsche suggests
that the goal might be called "self-overcoming," if we
are mindful that the true philosopher "has no love for
^1John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 161.
62Ibid.. p. 177.
200
go
moralists* Neither does he love pretty words.” J
One would not normally think of Nietzsche and
Dewey as having much in common, and indeed their style
of philosophizing is quite different. Nevertheless,
working within a naturalistic framework, both philosophers
attempted to construct a dynamic ethic which would give
impetus to creativity rather than righteousness. A
contemporary critic writes:
There is perhaps only one other man among
the great moral philosophers who has insisted
upon creativity in morals to anywhere near the
extent that Nietzsche does. That man is John
Dewey. Dewey’s "Growth is the only end" is but
a more pedestrian way of stating what Zarathustra
tells us when he has life say "I am that which
must always overcome itself."6^
Nietzsche, like Dewey, was a philosophical
naturalist. He had no patience with "otherworldly"
speculations or ethical ideals based upon a "beyond."
"I am much more interested in another question— on which
the ’salvation of humanity’ depends much more than upon
any piece of theological curiosity: the question of
nutrition. For ordinary purposes, it may be formulated
thus: ’How precisely must you nourish yourself in order
to attain to your maximum of power, or vertu in the
^ The Case of Wagner. "Preface," p. 155.
Rogers, "The Moral Philosophy of Nietzsche,"
p. 32.
201
Renaissance style— of virtue free from moralism?* The
question of nutrition, of how one cultivates the superman
(i.e., the self-surpassing man who has attained maximum
power), becomes Nietzschefs life-long obsession and the
focal point of his educational philosophy.
The Ontological Foundations of Self-Surpassing
The Search for a Basis of Value
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Nietzsche has argued that a man can become some
thing better than what he now Is: man is capable of
self-surpassing. However, the result of the essay on
Schopenhauer, and of Nietzsche’s early philosophy as a
whole, is negative rather than positive— that is, he
centered his attentions on the conditions which hinder or
prevent men from realizing themselves. The State, the
promoters of current "culture,” the pedantic scholars and
the stagnant educational systems— all these stand between
man and his perfection. On the whole, it would appear
that Nietzsche’s analysis is sound, and to the point. He
has shown that certain conditions are necessary for the
elevation of man: such conditions as ’ ’ freedom and
virility of character, early knowledge of human nature, an
^ Eooe Homo, "Why I Am So.Clever," 1. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 834.
202
absence of scholarly education, of patriotic restrictions,
of compulsion to earn one's bread, of connections with
the State,But are these conditions sufficient?
That is, once we have freed ourselves from the fetters of
the State, the pretentions of "art lovers," and the
pettiness of the scholars, will man thus automatically
rise to new heights? It would be naive to think so. We
have simply cleared the way. We need, in addition, a
positive guide or basis of values by which we can direct,
measure and control the courses which self-perfection is
to take.
W. M. Urban has stated that "the notion of per
fection is vague and meaningless until we know what it
is to be perfected. The notion of self-realization is a
mere word until we know what are the concrete ends, the
realization of which includes or involves self-realiza
tion. The theory is both theoretically vague and
6 T
practically useless until it is made more concrete."
Nietzsche attempts to supply this concreteness.
A Hint from Nature
What ultimate standard or criterion does Nietzsche
66
Schopenhauer as Educator, 8, p. 92.
^Wilbur Marshall Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930)* p. 129.
suggest that we use to determine these values? And on
what basis Is this criterion founded? This, It would
seem, is the major unsolved question with which we are
left at the conclusion of Schopenhauer as Educator. It
is one, if not the, major question which Nietzsche trie-
to solve in his later philosophical investigations and
which leads him to formulate the metaphysics of the
will-to-power, The essay on Schopenhauer does give us
a hint as to what this value basis might be. It is a
value basis which is suggested by the world of nature:
we ’ ’learn from the observation of any species in the
animal or plant world, that it is only concerned with the
individual higher specimen, the more unusual, more power-
68
ful, more complicated, and the more fruitful specimen,"
Furthermore, Nietzsche argues that if this is the goal of
nature, it is reasonable to demand that humanity also be
concerned with the development of higher specimens, i.e.,
69
with great men, ^ The argument here is that (1) from
the observation of plant and animal nature we can dis
cover the goal toward which life strives, and (2) since
man is part of life he too should strive toward this goal,
Nietzsche seems to be telling us that the realm of organic
life can furnish us with the positive values which we need
^ Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 59, ^ Ibid,
204
if we are to give content to the notion of self-perfec
tion, But before we pursue this further, let us make some
general remarks about Nietzschefs search for values.
Nietzsche regarded the problem of value as
central to life and to philosophy. "To see and show the
problem of value— that seems to me to be the new task
and the principle thing. I deny that this has ever been
70
done by previous moral philosophies." For Nietzsche,
physics, psychology, mathematics, and biology were of
real importance only in so far as they could serve as
clues to the solution of the problem of value. "The
question of values is more fundamental than the question
of certainty."71
Making Room for New Values
It must be emphasized that Nietzsche did not deny
the existence of all values. Such phrases as "beyond
good and evil" or "nature is amoral" have frequently been
taken to mean that Nietzsche envisioned or suggested a
world without values. This is not at all the case, and
we will try to indicate in the following sections exactly
what Nietzsche was trying to do. But let it suffice for
7QMUBarionausgabe. Vol. XVIII, p. 193.
7lIbid., Vol. XIX, p. 85.
for now to say that his refutation of traditional morality
was to make room for a new set of values. The "trans-
valuation of all values" is not an annihilation of all
values, but the substitution of one set for another,
"We must free ourselves from morality, in order to
be able to live morally."72 "I was forced to destroy all
70
morality in order to carry through my own moral will.",J
The Christian scheme of values is so deeply embedded in
Western culture that Nietzsche found that nothing less
than an all-out attack would be able to root it out. But
this is not to say that Nietzsche was trying to completely
eliminate all signs of Christian values. As he stated
late in his life, "I have declared war against the anemic
Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to
it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put
an end to its tyranny and clear the way for new ideals,
74
for more robust ideals."
Terminology
It'is important to note Nietzsche*s usage of such
terms as "value," "morality," "good," "virtue," etcetera,
because he often uses the same term to denote very
72
* Musarlonausgabe, Vol. XVI, p. 163.
73Ibid., p. 241. 74Ibid., Vol. XVIII, p. 254.
206
different things. For example, "value" [Wert] may mean
what Nietzsche himself regards as having high worth, or
"value” may mean what society has traditionally regarded
as being of high worth, but which Nietzsche regards as
of low worth. The meaning is usually clear from the
context, but at times one must read very carefully and
also be aware of Nietzsche’s general style of expression
if misunderstanding is to be avoided. One must also
remember that Nietzsche often uses these words in an
unusual way for their "shock" effect.
Nietzsche attempts to ground his values in
empirical fact, in the natural world studied by the
empirical sciences. All traditional attempts to justify
such moral distinctions as "good" and "evil" in them
selves, without grounding them in the natural world, have
been a failure. Examples of this are the "categorical
imperative" and various notions of a "moral feeling."
"No matter what we may say about the innate moral
sentiments— the history of these moral sentiments shows
clearly that no moral code, no ultimate end has yet re-
75
mained fixed; all have been refuted."'-' "Life rests upon
7 6
foundations which are non-moral."
7 5 lb id.. Vol. XIV, p. 120.
76Ibid., Vol. XVIII, p. 329.
207
We must now examine Nietzsche's analysis of this
"non-moral” world. We will show that for Nietzsche the
world of nature has as Its basis an ontological principle
combining the facts of biology with a modified
Schopenhauerian will.
The Will-to-Power^
To briefly recapitulate, with slightly different
emphasis, what was said in the previous chapter, the
universe is composed of individual ”wills," that is,
"quanta"^® of force or energy, distributed and arranged
in an endless number of ways. Each quantum is charac
terized by the fact that as energy or force, it must be
active, and active all the time. The world does not
consist of "dead matter" obeying mechanical laws, but
rather of pulsating units of energy operating under
dynamic laws of constant radiation and absorption. These
"units" or "parcels" are continually striving to give out
some of their energy, and to take in the energy of other
quanta, even though it may be at the expense of the other
quanta,
77
A more extensive account of the will-to-power
is provided in chapter V,
7 8
' For Nietzsche’s use of the expression "quantum
of power" Cf, Musarlonausgabe, Vol, XIX, pp, 103-105.
208
It is well to note that Nietzsche does not pretend
to have demonstrated, in any rigorous sense, the will-to-
power as a metaphysical principle; moreover, "he attempts
no demonstration even of the primacy of will in man, he
has not unsaid his old criticism of Schopenhauer to the
effect that we have no real first hand knowledge of will:
it is all, whether as regards man or as regards lower
beings, hypothesis, a view without pretense to certainty,
speculation, as perhaps any kind of metaphysics must
be."79
Nietzsche's inductive "leap” leads him to con
clude that, "the will to accumulate energy is
characteristic of all phenomena of life, for nourishment,
reproduction, heredity— for society, State, custom,
authority. Should we not assume that this will is also
the active principle in chemistry?— and in the whole
8 0
cosmic order?" "Where I found the living, there I
8i
found will to power." "All movements, all 1appearances^1
all 'laws' must be understood as symptoms of inner
^Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 196; Cf. also
MusarionauBgabe, Vol. Xfx, pp. 141-143*
80
Musarlonausgabe. Vol. XIX, p. 142,
8l
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. II, "On Self-Over-
coming." The Portable NletzsoHF, p. 226.
occurrence, and the analogy of man must be used for this
..82
purpose,"
With this universal, all-pervasive ontological
principle, upon which all of life Is based, we now have
a basis for a new axiology— a value system founded on the
will-to-power, Before we examine the specific relation
ship between the will-to-power and axiological concept of
self-surpassing, let us look briefly at Nietzsche's
attitude toward evolution and the transvaluation of
values.
Evolution
Nietzsche never questions the evolutionary thesis
that new and more complex types of organisms have
gradually developed through the ages. However, Nietzsche
has often been interpreted as also holding to the view
that the improvement of man was the inevitable outcome
of the evolutionary process, or that a new species of
man~the superman— was the pre-established goal toward
which nature was automatically progressing. Nietzsche,
however, is quite clear in his repudiation of the idea
of necessary progress: "Mankind does not represent a
development toward something better or stronger or
8 2
Musarlonausgabe. Vol. XIX, p, 97.
210
higher* , * * ’Progress* Is merely a modern Idea, that
Is, a false Idea* Further development Is altogether not
according to any necessity In the direction of elevation,
enhancement, or strength."®^ "The aim of mankind cannot
84
lie in the end, but only in its highest examples,”
Ant i-Darwini sm
Nietzsche does not want his position to be
identified with that of Darwin* Nietzsche’s criticism of
the Darwinian interpretation of evolution is perhaps best
expressed in a maxim from Twilight of the Idols titled
’ ’ Anti-Darwin.” Nietzsche arguesi ”As for the famous
* struggle of existence*’ so far it seems to me to be
asserted rather than proved. It occurs, but as an
exception} the total appearance of life is not the
extremity, not starvation, but rather riches, profusion,
even absurd squandering— and where there is a struggle, it
is a struggle for power. One should not mistake Malthus
Qr
for nature.” Nietzsche does not deny that the struggle
®^The Antichrist, 4. The Portable Nietzsche,
p . 571.
84
The Use and Abuse of History, 9. Werke in drei
Banden, Vol. 1, p. 270: *bas %iel der Mensch'elt' kann
nicht am Ende liegen, Sondern Wur in lhren hbchsten
Exemplaren.” The unfaithful Levy translation reads: ’ ’ The
aim of mankind can lie ultimately only in its highest
examplest” p. 59*
^ Twilight of the Idolsr "Skirmishes of an
211
for existence occurs, but he does deny that It is the
only, or even the major force which operates In nature.
Nietzschefs attack on Darwinism goes even further, for
not only Is the struggle for existence not a predominant
force, Its results, when It does occur, are not what the
Darwinians would like to think: "Assuming, however, that
there is such a struggle for existence— and, indeed, it
occurs— its result is unfortunately the opposite of what
Darwin*s school desires, and of what one might perhaps
desire with them— namely, in favor of the strong and
privileged, the fortunate exceptions. The species do
not grow in perfection: the weak prevail over the strong
86
again and again, for they are the great majority."
Contrast this with Darwin’s statement that "natural
selection works solely by and for the good of each being;
all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress
toward perfection . . . thus, from the war of nature,
from famine and death . . . the production of the higher
animals directly follows."8^ The facts spoke otherwise
to Nietzsche: "I see everywhere those surviving and
Untimely Man," 14. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 522*
86Ibid., p. 522-523.
87
See chapter on Evolution in Great Books of the
Western World (Chicago: William Benton, Publisher.
1955)', Vol. S, p. 956.
212
triumphant who compromise life and the value of life.
88
This error of the school of Darwin becomes my problem,"
We find Nietzsche asserting In the notes from his
last period that "Physiologists should bethink themselves
before putting down the 1Instinct of self-preservation1
as the cardinal Instinct of an organic being. A living
thing seeks above all to discharge Its strength: 'self-
89
preservation* Is only one of the results thereof,"
Notice that Nietzsche's stress here Is on the
action of the organism, not the environment. One of his
criticisms of Darwin Is that "the Influence of environ
ment Is nonsensically overrated in Darwin: the essential
factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous
inner power to shape and create forms, which merely uses
90
and exploits 'environment, ' Nietzsche here is
attacking those who, like Herbert Spencer, would reduce
the peculiarities of an individual entirely to environ
mental factors. Nietzsche nowhere denies the influence
of environment on the living organism, but he does deny
that it is the only influence. An organism, especially
the human organism, by its own action and expression of
power alters its environment to a much larger extent than
88
Mu a air lonaus gab e» Vol. XIX, p. 139,
"ibid., p. 112. 90Ibid., pp. 111-112.
213
the nineteenth-century social evolutionists were willing
to admit.
Two Important Questions
There are two Important questions that need to be
answered by the student of Nietzsche's evolutionary
doctrines: First, how do the variations within the
species come about? Or, more particularly, how do those
variations occur which produce the genius? Secondly, how
are these variations transmitted from one generation to
another?
Mutations
In answer to the first question Nietzsche replies
that variations have generally been the result of chance,
and that through the ages great men have simply been
accidental occurrences. Against the Darwinian maxim that
natura non faclt saltUm— "Nature does nothing by
leaps''^— Nietzsche asserts that the appearance of the
^In The Origin of Species (ch, VI, "Difficulties
of the TheoryDarwin refers to "that old, but somewhat
exaggerated, canon In natural history of 'Natura non 'faclt
salturn,1" That is, nature does nothing by leaps. But,
might not one ask, "Why should not Nature take a sudden
leap from structure to structure?" Darwin's reply is that,
"On the theory of natural selection, we can clearly under
stand why she should not; for natural selection acts only
by taking advantage of slight successive variations; she
can never take a great and sudden leap, but must advance
214
genius Is proof that nature does make occasional Jumps,
and, In the case of the philosophers, artists and saints,
It Is "a Jump for Joy."^ Nietzsche*s position here Is
closer to that of the Dutch botanist Hugo de Vries than
It Is to Darwin. Prom his experiments with plants
de Vries found that sudden changes took place and created
new and unusual forms. He named these sudden changes
"mutations," And a "mutation" is exactly what the genius
or superman is In Nietzsche’s theory, for he never tired
of stressing that compared with the species "man" the
superman differed not Just in degree but in kind.
Although recognizing the accidental character of
mutations, Nietzsche believed that man could control, to
some extent, the occurrence, or at least the survival, of
desirable mutations. The production of the genius need
not be left solely to blind chance. Again Nietzsche
differs from the Darwinians in his emphasis on the role
that man’s mind plays in the course of evolution: Man
can, and does, control the direction of his own develop
ment— for better or for worse. The problem is:
by short and sure, though slow steps," Vol. XLIX of
Great Books of the Western World, ed. by Robert M,
Butchins ($4 vols.; Chicago: William Benton, Publisher,
1955), p. 92.
^2Schopenhauer as Educator, 5, p* 54.
215
What type of man shall be bred, shall be
willed, for being higher in value, worthier of
life, more certain of a future? Even in the past
this higher type has appeared often— but as a
fortunate accident, as an exception, never as
something willed. In fact, this has been the
type most dreaded— almost the dreadful—-and
from dread the opposite type was willed, bred,
and attainedt the domestic animal, the herd
animal, the sick human animal— the christian,93
Lamarkianism
In answer to the second question, Nietzsche, like
Lamark, believed in the inheritance of acquired charac-
oli
teristics, But we may easily be misled if we think
only in physical or biological terms, for Nietzsche was
primarily concerned with the '•spirit," with art, philoso
phy, and culture. It is difficult to decide Just how
Nietzsche thought that such "spiritual" growth was
transmitted from generation to generation. It Is not
clear whether he thought that besides transmission via
oral and written instruction there was also a transmission
via biological factors, Nietzsche uses the word
"Zuchtung," which means training or breeding or culti
vating, But he uses the term "in a large sense and
comprehends under it all the means, physical, social,
^The Antichrist, 3. The Portable Nietzsche,
pp. 570-571:
Oil
• See Morgan, What Nletzsche Means, p, 70; and
Kaufmann, Nletzsche, pp, 5^4-25^•
216
spiritual, that may be used for producing the great re
sult at which he aims."^ Nietzsche also speaks of
"blood" and "birth," but in Kaufmann's opinion "blood"
was not for Nietzsche "a biologistic conception any more
9 6
than 'breeding,' Such terms are generally employed
by Nietzsche as metaphors standing for "culture" or
"tradition," Many of the Nietzschean critics have inter
preted the superman as being a new biological species.
Admittedly there are passages, especially in Zarathustra.
where Nietzsche sounds like he is arguing for a new
species to evolve, "But there is reason to doubt whether
Nietzsche had anything so definite as this in mind. The
view that seems to me most reasonable is that he finally
settled down to thinking of supermen simply as extra
ordinary specimens of man, who, however, if favored,
instead of being fought as they commonly are, might lead
to a considerable modification of the human type— one so
great that, speaking in literary and fluid rather than
scientific fashion, the result might be called a new
97
species,"^' Nietzsche himself says, in one of his last
works, that those who have suspected him of Darwinism,
^Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p, 404.
^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 265,
^Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p, 404,
217
because of his use of the term superman, are nothing but
"learned cattle*"^®
In summary we might say that even though Nietzsche
was very much a man of the nineteenth century and greatly
under the Influence of evolutionary thought, he neverthe
less was opposed to much of what was being promulgated
by its exponents. Nietzsche believed that man could
improve himself and that this would occur not through any
process of natural selection but rather through conscious
volitional selection— if it was to occur at all. This,
of course, is what many a traditional moralist and
philosopher has taught, and it is a far cry from the
nineteenth-century social evolutionism. One last stum
bling block to those who would interpret Nietzsche
Darwinistically is Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal
occurrence, the doctrine "of the absolute and eternal
cyclical repetition of all things,for if the world
does repeat itself (some "tender" Nietzsoheans, however,
argue that the return is spiral, not cyclical) then
linear development is simply an illusion— at least In the
long run.
^ Ecce Homo. "Why I Write Such Excellent Books,"
1. The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 856,
^ Ecce_Homo. "The Birth of Tragedy," 3, The
Philosophy oi* Nietzsche. p. 869*
The Transvaluation of Values
218
All value Judgments must be ultimately Justified
in terms of certain natural, i.e., biological conditions.
The only possible moral Justification of any action must
be grounded in some natural condition. One of Nietzsche*s
best known items of philosophical analysis is his account
of how natural standards of value came to be replaced by
artificial standards. In The Genealogy of Morals.
Nietzsche has posed the questions, "Under what conditions
did Man invent for himself those Judgments of values,
•Good’ and 'Evil*? And what intrinsic value do they
possess in themselves? Have they up to the present
hindered or advanced human well-being?"100 It is well to
note at this point that Nietzsche clearly distinguishes
between questions of origin and questions of worth or
Justification. In his notebooks, Nietzsche writes: "The
inquiry into the origin of our evaluations and tables of
the good is in absolutely no way identical with a critique
of them, as is so often believed: even though the insight
into some pudenda origo [shameful origin] certainly brings
with it a feeling of a diminution in value of the thing
that originated thus and prepares the way to a critical
100The Genealogy of Morals, "Preface," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 624,
219
mood and attitude toward it.w^'L In 'live Genealogy of
Morals Nietzsche offers both a historical and a psycho
logical account in answer to these value questions. For
our purposes here we will not be concerned with the
details of Nietzsche's analysis, but only with the final
outcome.
The result of Nietzsche's study is the conclusion
that the biologically or naturally higher type of man
has lost out to the numerical superiority of the bio
logically inferior man. The biologically weak have
managed to protect themselves against the biologically
strong by inverting the natural order of "good" and "bad."
This has enabled them to call morally evil what is
naturally good and vice versa. And the worst part of
this reversal of values is that it has gone unnoticedi
No one has, up to the present, exhibited the
faintest doubt or hesitation in the judging the
"good man" to be of a higher value than the "evil
man," of a higher value with regard specifically
to human progress, utility, and prosperity gener
ally, not forgetting the future. What? Suppose
the converse were the truth! What? Suppose there
lurked in the "good man" a symptom of retrogression,
such as a danger, a temptation, a poison, a
narcotic, by means of which the present battened
on the Future 1 More comfortable and less risky
perhaps than its opposite, but also pettier, meaner!
So that morality would really be saddled with the
101The Will-to-Power, 25**• Kaufmann translation.
P. 148. ----------------
220
guilt, if the maximum potentiality of the power
and splendour of the human species were never to
be attained? So that really morality would be
the danger of dangers?102
Thus the standards of traditional morality are but the
consequences of the reversal of the natural scale of
values by the biologically inferior type of man. Even
though they are individually impotent, the biologically
inferior men have been able, by uniting their forces, to
amass great power and to thereby overthrow the values of
the individually superior men,
Nietzsche's revaluation of all values is the
10?
"restoration of nature in morality," This revaluation
is not quite as revolutionary as it might first appear.
In fact, Nietzsche simply wants to set upright a system
of values which has been turned upside down by
Christianity, It is not so much an argument for the new
as it is for a return to the old, a return to the value
standards of the pre-Socratics. The major point here is
that the basically "natural" values of antiquity have been
replaced by the artificial (i.e., not in tune with the
creative process of life) values of Christianity, and that
a second "reversal" is now necessary,
102
The Genealogy of Morals, 6, The Philosophy of
Nietzsche, p.
1°^Musarlonausgabe, Vol. XIX, p. 394.
221
One may object that Nietzsche has no right to
classify Christian values as ’ ’ unnatural” or "artificial,"
since they are a product of human beings, and humans are
certainly part of nature. How can the effects of the
actions of a natural organism be called unnatural?
Nietzsche's answer rests on his ontology: that which is
"natural" is simply that which maximizes the will-to-
power, or, in personal terms, it is that which promotes
self-perfection. If Nietzsche meant by "natural" all
that is in the world, then the objection would be rele
vant, for "natural" could no longer be used as a
discriminating term# And since for Nietzsche there was
no realm outside the so-called realm of nature we must
understand his use of "natural" and "unnatural" in the
more limited sense of promoting or hindering the develop
ment of life.
The Relationship Between Self-Surpassing
and the Will-to-Power
Now that we have presented Nietzsche’s doctrine
of self-perfection, as well as his ontological orienta
tion, let us examine the relationship between the two.
It is not our purpose in this chapter to question or
examine Nietzsche’s will-to-power in all of its
ontological aspects, but only insofar as it bears on the
axiological principle of self-surpassing. There are
several problems which Nietzschefs ontology raises in
this connection. For example, Nietzsche tells us that
"value" is to be measured in terms of poweri "According
to what standard is the objective value measured?
According to the quantity of increased and more organized
1 f l j l
power alone," And again, "Value is equal to the
highest quantum of fpower1 which the individual can
assimilate."10' * Mitchell states that "so far as I know
this is the only objective measure of value that had ever
been proposed. The utilitarians suggest a quantitative
standards the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
each to count as one. But this quantitative measure is
in terms of happiness, a purely subjective state which
defies measurement. Energy, power, on the other hand,
lends itself to physical measurement and is as objective
as anything can be in the realm of physics and biology,"10^
An assertion of this sort requires further examination,
for if it turns out to be true, ethics will have to be
given a place along side of the physical sciences. We
might first ask what kind of power does Nietzsche have in
mind? If it is physical power and strength, then it is
10^Mitohell, "Nietzsche on Ideals," 331.
10 * * Mu sar lonaus gabe. XIX, p. 157.
10^Mitchell, "Nietzsche on Ideals," 331.
fairly easy to think of ways in which this could be
measured and tabulated, such as the number of times one
could press a hundred pound weight in ten minutes* This,
along with similar tests, would then provide us with an
accurate measure of value, capable of mathematical
formulation* Even though Nietzsche does sometimes speak
of power in physical terms, it is the exception rather
than the rule, unless one reads his military metaphors
in a literal manner* The ’ ’ power" that Nietzsche gener
ally speaks of seems to refer to some sort of emotional,
psychological, or mental force, which is closely connected
to the process of self-overcoming and creation* If this
is the sort of thing Nietzsche means by power— and I do
not think that any of the contemporary Nietzsche scholars
would challenge this— then we are left with the problem
of how one could possibly quantify such power* It does
not seem to be open to the direct sort of measurement that
physical power is, although we could not rule it out as a
theoretical possibility. A genius like Goethe represents
one of the highest manifestations of power, and if this
kind of power could be quantified then we could assign a
numerical value to the greatness of Goethe* Perhaps the
degree of power could be determined by the new works
which one produced, e,g*, maybe we could measure the
power of a poet by his poems. This, however, seems
224
highly impractical unless we could remove the qualitative
aspect of judging poetry, or were able to reduce the
qualitative to the quantitative, both of which are
highly unlikely at the present time. Admittedly, we have
made advances in this direction (e.g., the thermometer),
but in the field of the creative arts we seem to be as
far away from this goal as ever.
It seems to this writer that the problem of
quantifying the will-to-power is, contrary to Mitchell's
assertion, almost identical with the problem of quanti
fying pleasure. Nietzsche often speaks of the "feeling"
of power in terms similar to those used by hedonists, and
the will-to-power seems to be Just as slippery a concept
as is "hedonic tone," "affectivity," or "pleasure."
About the most we can do in either case is to give an
ostensive definition, pointing to that common charac
teristic of pleasure or power which is felt in certain
experiences. With pleasure this is not too difficult,
since it is a feeling with which most people are familiar,
and it is fairly easy to get some sort of agreement as
to what it is like to feel pleasure. After all, hedonism
is an old position and has received a great deal of
attention. But with the "will-to-power" we are
confronted with an entirely new doctrine, and Nietzsche
does not paint a very clear picture for us of what the
225
Mfeeling of power" is. And unless we know something more
specific about this feeling, it is rather presumptuous
to talk about its quantification. To summarize this
particular objeotion, we have found that not only are we
left without the proper psychological correlates by which
the feeling of power might be measured, we are also left
without any clear notion of how this feeling itself is
experienced.
Radical Nihilism
Eternal Recurrence and Value
Philosophical analysis had led Nietzsche, step-
by-step, to the position that man lives in a world of
fictions, that what man traditionally had assigned to the
universe existed only as an invention of human
imagination. Under Nietzsche's scalpel the universe was
divested not only of physical properties, but of values
and meaning. The cosmos becomes a chaos "full of sand
and fury, signifying nothing,"
Nietzsche's nihilism was not the nihilism which
is nothing more than the superficial rejection of
established morality by "angry, young men," Nietzsche's
epistemological inquiries resulted in complete, radical
nihilism*
Radical nihilism is the conviction of an
absolute untenabiliiy of existence when it comes
226
to the highest values one recognizes; plus the
realization that we lack the least right to
posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that
might be "divine'1 or morality Incarnate,10'
The feeling of valuelessness was reached
with the realization that the overall character
of existence may not be Interpreted by means of
the concept of "aim," the concept of "unity," or
the concept of "truth," Existence has no goal
or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality
of events is lacking: the character of existence
is not "true," is false. One simply lacks any
reason for convincing oneself that there is a
true world. Briefly: the categories "aim,"
"unity," "being" which we used to project some
value into the world— we.pull out again; so the
world looks valueless.10”
Radical nihilism was the frightful, terrifying
conclusion of Nietzsche's investigations. The thought of
a valueless [Wertlos] world was almost more than the
human mind could bear.10^ Indeed, is human life possible
without meaning? Standing on the edge of this terrible
abyss, Nietzsche courageously pushes his nihilism to its
most violent consequences;
Let us think this thought in its most terrible
form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim,
yet recurring inevitably without any finale of
nothingness: "the eternal recurrence."
10^The Will-to-Power, 3. Kaufmann translation,
p. 9.
108Ibid.. 12. p. 13.
^8^Cf. Nietzsche's ironic epigram: "The thought
of suicide is a powerful comfort: it helps one through
many a dreadful night." Beyond Good and Evil, 157, p. 91*
227
This is the most extreme form of nihilism:
the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally!110
We indicated in the previous chapter that
Nietzsche had known of the idea of eternal recurrence
through his study of Greek philosophy* Nevertheless,
when the idea burst upon him with blinding force in 1881,
he felt that a new message had been revealed to him*
Several years after the "revelation," in a letter to
Overbeck, Nietzsche writes "it is possible that there has
come to me for the first time the idea which will cleave
the history of mankind into two halves. . . . If it is
true, or rather: if it is believed true— then everything
changes and revolves and all previous values are
devalued."111 Not only is Nietzsche cautious about making
any "truth" claims for the doctrine, he also chooses not
to emphasize its purely ontological aspect at all, but
rather the bearing it has on values.
We can be sure that the concept of eternal
recurrence was not the dispassionate outcome of scientific
or even metaphysical curiosity. The very language which
surrounds the concept indicates that it has Its origin in
the affective depths of Nietzsche's soma and psyche.
110The Will-to-Power, 55. Kaufmann translation,
pp. 35-36.
111Quoted In Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 285.
228
Nietzsche's involvement with eternal recurrence would tend
to confirm his autobiographical remark: "I have written
my works with my whole body and life: I do not know what
112
purely mental [gelstige] problems are."
There are several ways that one may respond to
extreme nihilism, the usual ones (excluding suicide)
being either an otherworldly faith (e.g., Pascal) cr a
pessimistic life-denying philosophy (e*g., Schopenhauer).
Nietzsche's own response to nihilism serves to illustrate
his challenge-and-response theory of creativity: "What
11^
does not destroy me, makes me stronger." J If there is
no meaning in the external world then man must create his
own meaning. Extreme nihilism was the propaedeutic to a
new creation. Having destroyed everything man must build
anew.
A pessimistic teaching and way of thinking,
an ecstatic nihilism, can under certain conditions
be indispensable precisely to the philosopher— as
a mighty pressure and hammer with which he breaks
and removes degenerate and decaying races to make
way for a new order of life, or to implant into
that which is degenerate and desires to die a
longing for the end.H^
^■^Notes from 1880-1881. Musarlonausgabe. Vol.
XXI, p. 81.
Twilight of the Idols. "Maxims and Arrows," 8.
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 4 6^.
114
The WlTl-to-Power, 1055. Kaufmann translation,
p. 5^4.
229
It Is only against this background that one can
fully understand Nietzsche's goal of self-surpassing.
Out of chaos man creates order and value. The paradox is
that man may create values which either hinder or promote
further creation, Nietzsche's vision of those values
which keep the process of self-surpassing open and
promote continuing growth culminates In the Image of the
superman. Indeed, If It were not for the possibility of
the superman, extreme nihilism would Immerse man In total
darkness. Nietzsche Jots down In his notebook: "After
the vision of the superman In a gruesome way the doctrine
115
of the recurrence: now bearable!"
Eternal Recurrence and Being
We have seen why It was that the vision of eternal
recurrence made Nietzsche tremble and how he responded to
it creatively. But does this completely account for its
attraction? One possible interpretation is that the
doctrine satisfied Nietzsche's search for being. Mircea
Ellade, in his study Cosmos and History: The Myth of the
Eternal Return, argues that throughout history numerous
people, Including the later Greeks, believed in the theory
that all things eventually repeat themselves, Eliade
11^Quoted in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 282-283.
230
also argues that the myth of eternal return Is used to
satisfy the "metaphysical thirst for the ’ontic’ and the
static," to provide "an ontology uncontaminated by time
and becoming."11* * Eliade is concerned with the beliefs
and practices of archaic, traditional societies, not with
modern societies or the sophisticated reinterpretation
of the myth by Nietzsche. A recent critic, however, has
taken Eliade*s arguments and extended them to cover
117
Nietzsche’s position. The major arguments are as
follows: First, all men crave being, a home in eternity.
"Eternity is one of those ’truths of the blood,’ the
silhouettes of which are indelibly struck upon the very
i i Q
soul of man." One might well" question whether all
men seek eternity, whether a thirst for being is "deeply
119
and ineradicably rooted in the unconscious." However,
the argument would seem to hold for most, if not all,
philosophers} it most certainly holds for Nietzsche, whose
quest for eternity reaches religious intensity (best
exemplified in Thus Spoke Zarathustra).
This brings us to the second step of the argument,
ll8Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of
the Eternal Return (New York': Harper and how, Harper
Itorchbooks, 1959), p. 8 9.
11^Drisooll, "Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence,"
pp. 461-474.
ll8Driscoll, Ibid.. p. 467 119Ibid.
231
which asserts, correctly, that Nietzsche was unable to
accept any of the traditional "otherworldly" eternities.
Nietzsche felt that intellectual integrity precluded his
commitment to either Christian or non-Christian versions
of eternity, which split the world in two and offered
weak or dishonest men an escape from the painful demands
of life. Any concept of being or eternity, to be accep
table to Nietzsche, would have to limit itself to this
natural world in which we live, the only world of which
we have any knowledge.
We are now ready for the third and final argument,
which holds that the doctrine of eternal recurrence
120
provided Nietzsche with an "ersatz eternity," a
respectable this-worldly form of ultimate being. Stabil
ity, uniformity, unity, permanence— the very items
prized so highly by metaphysicians down through the
ages— were now granted to Nietzsche without the cost of
otherworldliness. A chaotic, nihilistic world is forced
to yield the demand for being.
120Ibid.. p. 468.
CHAPTER VII
NIETZSCHE*S PHILOSOPHY OP EDUCATION,
PART I: ENDS AND MEANS
233
The previous sections of this study have been
concerned with the systematic exposition of Nietzsche's
general philosophy, divided into the three traditional
areas of ontology, epistemology and axiology* With this
as a background we are now in a position to focus our
attention on Nietzsche's philosophy of education. This
will envolve three separate stages! first, drawing upon
ideas expressed in earlier chapters, we shall see how
Nietzsche integrates the concepts of self-surpassing,
contest and rank into a meaningful means-end relationship
for educational theory (chapter VII); second, we shall
follow Nietzsche's application of these concepts to
specific areas of education and society— such as the
teaching of history, the role of work and leisure, the
place of books in education, etcetera (chapter VIII);
third, we shall attempt to capture maximum depth and
concreteness by portraying Nietzsche's image of the truly
educated man— the superman (chapter IX).
Nietzsche and the Future of Education
Nietzsche must have discovered early in his career
that he was not fitted for a life of action, that
physically and temperamentally he was best suited for a
life of contemplation and reflection. What might at first
have seemed a limitation (and it probably was a limitation
234
In terms of Nietzsche's personal happiness) turned out to
be a blessing for future generations of philosophers and
educators* By withdrawing from the arena of immediate
reform and political action, and thus gaining the advan
tage of perspective, Nietzsche learnedt first, that the
ills of the present institutions of education were so
serious and deep-rooted that mere tinkering with
curricula and organization would but palliate, not cure*
Second, Nietzsche learned that his own contribution to
education (like most great philosophers Nietzsche was
desperately concerned with the creation of a better world
in which to live) would be greater if he concentrated on
laying the foundations upon which future men of action
could build*
New Perspective Needed
The general approach that Nietzsche adopted in
regard to education was announced early in his career
in his unpublished essay» On the Future of Our Educa
tional Institutions (presented as a series of five
lectures at the University of Basle, 1872)* "I do not
propose to furnish formulae or new plans of study for
gymnasia or other schools. Should any reader demur and
suggest that all that is required is prompt and bold
reform; should he imagine that a new 'organization'
235
Introduced by the State, were all that Is necessary, then
we fear he would have misunderstood not only the author
but the very nature of the problem under consideration,
In order that intelligent pedagogical decisions may be
made in the future Nietzsche withdraws from specifics
and modestly statest "I shall be content if only I can
ascend a tolerably lofty mountain, from the summit of
2
which * , , I may obtain a general survey of the ground,”
Nietzsche has left us numerous passages, both in
his published work and more particularly in his post
humous notes, pregnant with speculative Ideas concerning
the political and educational institutions of the future.
He occasionally entertains specific proposals of reform
that seem at best bizarre and completely unworkable,
Nietzschefs aim, however, Is not to provide a detailed
blueprint for a Great Society, but to indicate the
general direction in which we must move and the guide
lines it would be wise to follow) in addition to this
Nietzsche sees his task and the task of all educators in
terms of stimulating in others the desire to create a
better society. In the Nachlass Nietzsche notes!
^The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"Preface,^he Complete Works, Vol. 3» pp» 3-5»
2Ibld., p. 3.
236
Men must first learn the new desire— and for
that there must be someone who exesites It In
them, a teacher: I trust that they will then
become subtle and Inventive enough to find for
themselves the ways to satisfy the desire—
step by step and experimentally, as they are
accustomed.— It does not matter If my proposals
are "impracticable"— they are only meant to
tempt the appetite.3
The troubles and ills of the schools are but a
reflection of the surrounding culture; to diagnose and
cure the ills of the schools one must first do the same
for society as a whole. (This is why one must survey
the entire scene from the distance of a "mountain top.")
The interdependence of school and society explains why
many educational philosophers spend more time dealing
with the surrounding culture than they do with the schools
themselves. This is certainly true in the case of
Nietzsche.
The educational philosopher must free himself
from the limitations of present alternatives, he must
open himself to novel and undreamt of possibilities. This
is no easy task:
It demands an unusual degree of reflection to
be able to look away from the present educational
institutions and to look beyond to the institutions
of a different and alien kind which the second and
third generations will perhaps find necessary.
The difficulty lies in changing onefs way of
thinking and setting oneself a new goal. It will
take unspeakable toil to replace the guiding
O
JGrossoktavausgabe. Vol. 12, p. 218.
237
thought of our present educational system which
has Its roots In the Middle Ages and sees as Its
educational Ideal the medieval scholar. One must
even consider It probable that the next millennium
will hit on a few ideas which would make the hair
of any of our contemporaries stand on end,^
The Coming Revolution
Nietzsche hopes that a revolution on the level of
theory and the formal Inquiry Into values (I.e., a con
ceptual and axlologlcal renaissance) will bring about—
Indeed, Is the only way to bring about— a revolution
on the level of concrete practice. Although we cannot
be certain what form this revolution will take, Nietzsche
predicts!
I see a time coming when serious men, working
together in the service of a completely rejuvenated
and purified culture, may again become the direc
tors of a system of everyday instruction, calculated
to promote that culture; and they will probably be
compelled once more to draw up sets of rules: but
how remote this time now seems I And what may not
happen meanwhile! It is Just possible that between
now and then all Gymnasia [academic secondary
schools]— yes, and perhaps all universities, may
be destroyed, or have become so utterly transformed
that their very regulations may, in the eyes of
future generations, seem to be but the relics of
the cave-dwellers' age.5
As an educator Nietzsche had his eye on the
well-being of generations yet to be born. The enactment
^Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, pp. 79-80.
^The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"Preface," frhe Completa Works. Vol. 3» P>
238
of "patchwork" educational programs may temporarily
ameliorate unfavorable conditions, but they are not
likely to bring about any permanent improvement. Con
versely, programs based on a thorough, systematic
rethinking of ends and means, which are likely to have
the greatest effect in the long-run, tend to have little
impact on the present. Despite the frustration of not
being able to see Immediate results, Nietzsche opts for
the latter course of action*
Nietzsche was a philosopher of the future: not
only in the sense that his greatness was not to be fully
recognized until after his death, but also in the sense
that his Intellectual powers were focused on analyzing
and solving the problems which he saw coming over the
horizon to bear down on future generations.
Nietzsche calls to his fellow contemplatives and
intellectuals to come join the battle for a better cul
ture and a better educational environment for our future
generations: "You lofty thinkers, of whom Aristotle said
that you wander through life vacillating and inactive so
long as no great honor or glorious cause calls you to
deeds I It is you I summon! Refrain this once from
seeking refuge in your lairs of solitude and dark mis
givings."^
6Ibld.. P. 6.
239
Nietzsche’s own battle for a revolution in
education is based on three major concepts: self-surpas
sing* challenge and response, and order of rank. It is
the purpose of this chapter to develop and relate these
three concepts.
Self-Surpassing: The Aim of Education
Based on the explication offered in the preceding
chapter, let us briefly recapitulate the salient features
of Nietzsche’s key axiological concept of Selbstuber-
wlndung (’ ’self-overcoming,” "self-surpassing” and "self-
• 7
perfection" have been suggested as English equivalents).
It was found that self-surpassing, rhetorically expressed
as "Become who you are!" serves as the summum bonum in
Nietzsche's philosophy* Similarities were noted between
Nietzsche’s concept of self-surpassing and Dewey’s concept
of "growth": both concepts emphasizing, in contrast to
traditional summum bonums, an open-ended and dynamic
quality.
Self-surpassing is the touchstone and standard by
which one is to determine what is of value and what is of
disvalue, what is good and what is bad, what is to be
7
For a detailed discussion of the limitations
and possible distortions in rendering this crucial
Nietzschean term into English see ch. VI of this study.
240
promoted and what Is to be hindered. This standard,
however, Is not restricted to the realm of morals;
Instead, It pervades and gives direction to all dimensions
of life, Nietzsche's summum bonum of self-surpassing
thus becomes the ultimate aim of education, the final
criterion by which one Judges questions of curriculum,
teaching methods, school organization, etcetera.
In the following pages It will become clear how
self-surpassing actually functions as an educational
aim. Perhaps Its full significance can only be grasped
when we discuss In a later chapter the highest form of
self-surpassing— that found In the superman,
Challenge-and-Response
If self-surpassing Is conceived as the ultimate
aim of education, "challenge-and-response" is the pri
mary means by which this aim is realized. In the
hierarchy of ends and means challenge-and-response
serves as the proximate end In educational decision
making. Self-surpassing, as an ultimate principle and
criterion, Is necessarily abstract and general; a more
concrete and operational "end-in-view" Is needed for the
educator. This "end-in-view" is challenge-and-response.
This doctrine is crucial to Nietzsche's philosophy of
education, for In Nietzsche's view it is only through an
241
organism's response to challenge that growth can take
place; or, in ontological terms, it is through
challenge-and-response that an organism's will-to-power
strengthens and gives form to itself.
The Greek "Agon”
Heredity and cultural traditions provide each
individual with certain natural talents and potentiali
ties, But talent by itself is not enough: "Every
o
natural gift must develop itself by contest," Nietzsche
develops this idea of contest in an early (1872) post
humous fragment titled Homer's Contest: Preface to an
Unwritten Book, It deserves our careful attention here,
for in a few brief pages Nietzsche not only offers a
suggestive theory to explain greatness of the Greeks but
he also sows the seeds of his own mature educational
philosophy based on the will-to-power.
The ancient Greeks developed a competitive event
or "contest" called the agon, in which prizes were
awarded in various events, including drama, music,
poetry, painting and athletics. In addition, according
to Nietzsche's thesis, the agonistic spirit also per
meated other areas of Greek life, including disputation
Q
Homer's Contost. The Complete Works, Vol, 2,
p. 58.
and philosophical discourse. Rivalry and contest Is
found not only In the Olympic games, but In the dialec
tics of Socrates as well.
Manfs Twofold Nature
A contest Is a struggle for victory or superior
ity, and, as such, It requires at least two participants.
But why, one might well ask, would anyone ever want to
engage In a contest? Nietzsche thinks that the answer Is
to be found in the twofold tendency within human nature
Itself:
When one speaks of humanity, the idea is
fundamental that this Is sometning which
separates and distinguishes man from nature.
In reality, however, there is no such separa
tion: "natural" qualities and those called
truly "human” are inseparably grown together.
Man, in his highest and noblest capacities, is
wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual
character. Those of his abilities which are
terrifying and considered inhuman may even be
the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity
can grow in impulse, deed, and work.9
Out of the tension created by the opposition of man’s
"noblest” capacities to his most "terrifying” instincts
arises the urge for contest.
Human beings have in themselves "a trait of
cruelty, a tigerish lust to annihilate."10 If this trait
^Homer’s Contest. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 32.
10Ibid
243
is left to Itself, uncontrolled, man Is plunged into the
"abysses of hatred"^ and bloodshed* Ancient Greek
history and mythology offer us a glimpse of man living
12
such a life. In Homer the "voluptuous cruelty" of the
early Greeks is softened by his artistic ability to pro
ject a "colorful warm lighton these men and make them
14
appear "better and more sympathetic" than they really
were»
But what do we behold when, no longer led and
protected by the hand of Homer, we stride back
into the pre-Homeric world? Only night and terror
and an imagination accustomed to the horrible.
What kind of earthly existence do these revolting,
terrible, theogonic myths reflect? A life ruled
only by the children of Night: strife, lust,
deceit, old age, and death.*5
Dealing with Man’s Evil Impulses
A world filled with murder, cruelty and war was
so frightening to man that he was stimulated into
"civilizing" the barbaric Impulses. One way of dealing
with evil impulses is to attempt to deny and suppress
them, to escape to the "goodness" of an "otherworld."
11Homer,s Contest. The Complete Works, Vol. 2,
p. 52.
12Homer,s Contest. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 33.
13Ibid. l4Ibid., pp. 33—31 *•
15Ibid., p. 34.
244
This answer is to be seen in the "mystery cults" of
ancient Greece (the Greeks here borrowed from India and
the Orient). This approach may lead to salvation, but
it does not lead to creativity.
There is another answer to the problem of evil
impulses, an answer which the "Hellenic genius""^ dis
covered and which is responsible for Greek culture:
"To understand it, we must start with the point that the
Greek genius tolerated the terrible presence of this
urge and considered it justified; while the Orphic move
ment contained the idea that a life with such an urge as
17
its root was not worth living." The first and most
important step is that one fully accepts these impulses
and urges for what they are. One is not to suppress them
or attempt to escape from them— that is, if one wants
ever to attain anything of Greek greatness.
The second step is to realize that the dark and
aggressive impulses may find release in two ways, one
destructive, the other creative. Nietzsche illustrates
these two ways by citing a story from Hesiod concerning
18
Eris, the ancient Greek goddess of discord, Nietzsche
16Ibid. 17Ibid., p. 35.
iO
According to legend she threw the apple of
discord among the guests at the wedding of Feleus and
Thetis; Identified by the Romans with Discordia.
245
thinks that Hesiod's treatment of Erls (discord) Is
"one of the most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy
to be Impressed on the newcomer Immediately at the
entrance— gate of Greek ethics. "^ Here Is Hesiod's tale
as recounted by Nietzsche:
Two Erls goddesses are on earth. One would
like to praise the one Erls, Just as much as to
blame the other, if one uses one's reason. For
these two goddesses have quite different disposi
tions. For the one, the cruel one, furthers the
evil war and feud! No mortal likes her, but
under the yoke of need one pays honor to the
burdensome Erls, according to the decree of the
immortals. She, as the elder, gave birth to
black night. Zeus the high ruling one, however,
placed the other Erls upon the roots of the
earth and among men as a much better one. She
urges even the unskilled man to work, and if one
who lacks property beholds another who is rich,
then he hastens to sow In similar fashion and to
plant and to put his house In order; the neighbor
vies with the neighbor who strives after fortune.
Good is this Erls to men. The potter also has a
grudge against the potter, and the carpenter
against the carpenter; the beggar envies the
beggar, and the singer the singer.20
A Lesson from the Greeks
Nietzsche thinks that there Is a lesson in this
tale— a lesson that modern man could well learn from the
ancients~a lesson in the value of "questionable"
Impulses:
IQ
Homer's Contest. The Complete Works, Vol. 2,
p. 54.
20Ibid.. pp. 54-55.
246
And not only Aristotle but the whole of Greek
antiquity thinks differently from us about hatred
and envy* and Judges with Hesiod, who in one
place calls one Eris evil— namely, the one that
leads men into hostile fights of annihilation
against one another— while praising another Erls
as good— the one that, as Jealousy, hatred, and
envy, spurs men to activity: not to the activity
of fights of annihilation but to the activity of
fights which are contests. The Greek is envious,
and he does not consider this quality a blemish
but the gift of a beneficent godhead. What a
gulf of ethical Judgment between us and himI21
It is always wise for the educator in any age to
look carefully and analytically at ancient Greek culture,
for if he could uncover the secret of their enormous
success, perhaps he would then have the knowledge neces
sary to improve his own culture, including its schools.
This is precisely the approach that Nietzsche, as an
educator, adopted toward the Greeks. He uncovered the
fact that when the spirit of contest was encouraged Greek
culture flourished, when it was allowed to decline Greek
culture degenerated into superficial, cosmopolitan
"Hellenism."22
Contest in the Schools
There are two specific applications of the spirit
21
Homer's Contest. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 35.
22Homer,s Contest. The Complete Works, Vol. 2,
p. 62.
247
of contest in the schools: first in reference to stu
dents, secondly, to teachers. Hellenic pedagogy was
built upon the notion of contest, and since the impulses
which lead to contest are egoistic and selfish (such as
ambition, envy, Jealousy, etcetera), students were
encouraged to pursue these impulses and "cultivate his
Ego in contest."23 Modern educators, by and large,
"fear nothing as much as the unchaining of the so-called
ambition. Here one fears selfishness as the *evil in
oil
itself,1" An interesting modern exception, Nietzsche
believes, are "the Jesuits, who agree with the Ancients
and who, possibly, for that reason, are the most
25
efficient educators of our time."
A contest between individuals, however refined
and civilized a form it may take, is the expression of
one egoistic impulse attempting to dominate another. The
student who excels in his class assignments does not do
so out of a disinterested desire to please his teacher
but to exert his power over him:
Even when he who strives for excellence . . .
wanted to make a delightful . . . impression, he
did not enjoy this success insofar as he thus
delighted his neighbor but insofar as he impressed
himself on the soul of another, changed its form
and ruled [waltete] over it according to his will.
The striving for excellence is the striving to
23Ibid.. p. 58. 211 Ibid. 2 5Ibid.
248
overwhelm [uberwaltlgen 3 one's neighbor, even if
only very indirectly or only in one's own feelings
or even dreams. There is a long line of degrees
of this secretly desired overwhelming, and a
complete list of these would almost amount to a
history of culture from the first still grimace-
like barbarism to the grimace of • • • over
refinement,2®
If students develop the spirit of contest it will
probably be due to teachers who themselves have this
spirit. Among the Greeks we find that
Just as the youths were educated through contests,
their educators were also engaged in contests with
each other. The great musical masters, Pindar and
Simonides, stood side by side, mistrustful and
Jealous; in the spirit of contest, the sophist, the
advanced teacher of antiquity, meets another sophist;
even the most universal type of instruction, through
the drama, was meted out to the people only in the
form of a tremendous wrestling among the great
musical and dramatic artists. How wonderful1
"Even the artist hates the artist."2?
26
The Dawn of Day, 113. Quoted in Kaufmann,
Nietzsche, p. 168.
^ Homer's Contest. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 37*
Nietzsche applies the agonistic principle to explain
Plat o' s ere at ivit y:
"What, for example is of special artistic signifi
cance in Plato's dialogues is for the most part the
result of a contest with the art of the orators,
the sophists, and the dramatists of his time, in
vented for the purpose of enabling him to say in
the end: 'Look, I too can do what my great rivals
can do; Indeed, I can do it better than they. No
Protagoras has Invented myths as beautiful as mine;
no dramatist such a vivid and captivating whole as
my Symposlon; no orator has written orations like
those in my Gorgias— and now I repudiate all this
entirely and condemn all imitative art. Only the
contest made me a poet, a sophist, an orator,"
pp. 37-38.
Contest Guided by Self-Surpassing
To prevent the educator from Jumping to the
dangerous conclusion that Nietzsche is recommending un
bridled and immeasurable ambition, we must emphasize that
contest is a means, not an end. The Jesuits, for example,
hold that selfishness is a powerful agent, but that "it
obtains its character as ’good’ and 'evil' essentially
2 8
from the aims toward which it strives," In similar
fashion Greek youth directed his ambition toward the glory
of his native city, "Every Greek from childhood felt
within himself the burning wish to be in the contest of
the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town;
in this his selfishness was kindled into flame, by this
29
his selfishness was bridled and restricted,"
In contest and opposition the individual is
challenged and stimulated to make a response. The nature
and value of the response will be determined by the goal
toward which the contest is aimed, A good, disciplined
contest will have beneficial results even if the goal
leaves something to be desired (e,g,, the God of the
Jesuits or the native city of the Hellenic youth). If we
28
Homer’s Contest, The Complete Works, Vol. 2*
p . 5 8. --------------- -------
29Ibid., pp. 58-59.
250
place agonistic stimulation under the guiding aim of
Individual self-surpassing then we have the combination
that will lead to a renaissance In education*
The Love of War
Militaristic Metaphors
My brothers In war, I love you thoroughly;
I am and I was of your kind*
You should love peace as a means to new
wars— and the short peace more than the long.
You say it is the good cause that hallows
even war? I say unto yout it is the good war
that hallows any cause.
Thus live your life of obedience and war.
What matters long life? What warrior wants to
be spared?^0
The passages just quoted would seem sufficient to
condemn Nietzsche as a proponent of ruthlessness, blood-
shed and war* This is especially true if we isolate
these passages from their contextual relationships.
Frequently, however, a statement which sounds brutal by
itself will be qualified or interpreted by Nietzsche him
self to the point that it takes on quite a different
3°ThUB Spoke Zarathustra* I, "On War and
Warriors." ffhe Portable Nietzsche, pp. 158-159.
31
J In reference to these lines from Thus Spoke
Zarathustra* Crane Brinton argues that "Nietzsche approved
wars in principle, and wrote flowingly in praise of war
and warriors." Nietzsche * p. 127. For an alternative
interpretation see Kaufmann, Nietzsche* pp. 330-33^.
251
meaning. The militaristic and brutal sounding passages
are sometimes explicitly transformed Into metaphors
within the same aphorism or paragraph; at other times,
the metaphorical nature of the "warfare" passages are
apparent only to those readers who have an overall grasp
of Nietzsche's philosophy.
An example of a war-like passage being qualified
within the same aphoristic paragraph occurs In Nietzsche's
notes Jotted down during the time Zarathustra was com
posed. Speculating on the nature of a higher form of
society Nietzsche remarks: "A new form of community
would be one in which we should assert ourselves martial
ly."^ Taken by itself it could certainly be used to
"prove" Nietzsche's militarism and proto-Nazi thinking.
Nietzsche continues, however, with this important
qualification: "War (but without powder) between
different thoughts and the hosts who support them!"-*-'
Nietzsche's rather low opinion of conventional
military virtues can be seen in his discussion of what
does and does not constitute true culture: "Severe
military discipline, natural bravery and sustaining
32Notes on "Thus Spake Zarathustra." 5^. The
Complete Works. Vol. 16. p. 2^1.
33Ibid.
252
power • . • superior generalship, unity and obedience in
the rank and file— in short, factors which have nothing
Oil
to do with culture.The "moral qualities of severe
discipline, of more placid obedience, have nothing in
oc
common with culture.
When Nietzsche speaks of war he is speaking of
the contest of ideas, thoughts and values. He is no
more recommending military battle than was Jesus when the
latter preached! "Think not that I am come to send peace
O g
on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword., , J
Nietzsche as Warrior
The type of activity Nietzsche had in mind when
speaking of war is best illustrated by his own life and
writings, for he considered himself a warrior par
excellence. The following passage from Nietzsche’s
autobiographical essay, Ecce Homo, outlines his own rules
of battle:
My war tactics are comprised in four princi
ples: First, I attack only things that are
triumphant— if necessary I wait until they become
so. Secondly, I attack only those things against
which I stand alone— against which I compromise
only myself. ... I have never publicly taken a
single step which did not compromise me: that
'ail
David Strauss: The Confessor and Writer. 1.
The Complete Works, Vol. 4, p. 4,
35Ibid., pp. 7-8. 36Matt. 10:3^.
253
Is my criterion of the proper mode of action.
Thirdly, I never attack persons— I make use of
a personality merely as a powerful magnifying-
glass, by means of which I render a general, but
elusive and hardly tangible, evil more visible.
In this way I attacked David Strauss, or more
exactly the successful reception given to a
senile book by the cultured classes of Germany—
thereby catehlng this culture red-handed. In
this way I attacked Wagner, or more exactly the
falsity or mongrel instincts of our "culture"
which confounds super-refinement with abundance,
and decadence with greatness. Fourthly, I attack
only those things from which all personal dif
ferences are excluded; in which any background of
disagreeable experiences is lacking. Indeed,
attacking is to me a proof of good-will and, in
certain circumstances, of gratitude. By means of
it, I honor a thing, I distinguish a thing; it is
all the same to me whether I associate my name
with that of an institution or a person, whether
I am against or for either. If I wage war against
Christianity, I doso because I have met with no
fatalities and difficulties from that quarter— the
most earnest Christians have always been favorably
disposed to me. I, personally, the severest
opponent of Christianity, am far from holding the
individual responsible for what is the inevitable
outcome of long ages.3'
In the light of this passage— and many others could be
cited^®— it would seem unnecessary to remark, except that
Nietzsche has so often been misunderstood in this point,
that the "war" which Nietzsche approves is not military
^ Ecce Homo. "Why I Am So Wise," 7. The Philoso
phy of Nietzsche, p. 829.
og
For example, Nietzsche refers to his early
Untimely Meditations as "thoroughly warlike in tone,
they prove . . . that I can find joy in drawing the sword
-and perhaps, also, that I have a perilously supple
wrist." Eoce Homo. "Thoughts Out of Season," 1. The
Philosophy ot Nietzsche, p. 872.
25M
but ideological. Nietzsche's warfare is but the Greek
agon in the arena of ideas.
Opposition and combat lead to increased strength
and self-perfection— and the greater the opponent is
(e.g., Christian slave-morality) the stronger and
healthier the victor will emerge (i.e., if he is
victorious]). The self-overcoming person who is reaching
for the greatest heights of achievement— and who is
willing to risk himself— will seek out the most awesome
opponents:
To be able to be an enemy, to be an enemy—
this, perhaps, presupposes a strong nature; in any
case it is bound up with all strong natures. They
need resistance, accordingly they seek for it:
the pathos of aggression belongs of necessity to
strength as much as the feelings of revenge and
rancor belong to weakness. The strength of the
aggressor is in a manner determined by the opposi
tion he needs; every increase of strength betrays
itself by a search for a more formidable
opponent— or problem: for a philosopher who is
combative will challenge even problems to a duel.
The task is not to overcome opponents in general,
but only those against whom one must pit all one's
strength, skill, and swordsmanship— opponents who
are one's equals. ... To be the equal of the
enemy— this is the first condition of an honorable
duel. Where one commands, where one sees something
beneath one, one ought not to wage war.39
The Order of Rank
The Natural Hierarchy
If all persons within a society were arranged in
^Eoce Homo, pp. 828-829.
255
an order of rank [Rankordnung], or hierarchy of talent
and Intellectual capacity, the resultant structure would
be pyramidal in shape, with only a few individuals at the
vertex. Nietzsche*s primary concern is the education of
these few rare individuals. Through the education of
such a select group Plato hoped to produce Quardians and
Philosopher-Kings capable of maintaining a well-ordered
and functionally harmonious state; in similar fashion
Nietzsche hopes to produce the geniuses and supermen who
will give direction and meaning to existence.
The pyramid of ability indicates that "by the
very nature of things only an exceedingly small number of
i|0
people are destined for a true course of education."
It is our task as educators to see that nothing hinders
the development of these most valuable specimens. An
example of such a hindrance is the expansion of higher
education, which, in its attempt to bring "culture" to
the masses, ignores the exceptionally bright individuals
in favor of the mediocre majority. In lieu of the rapid
expansion and therefore dilution of higher education,
Nietzsche suggests that actually "a much smaller number
4l
of higher educational establishments would suffice,"
40
The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
"Third Lecture,^* p. VS.
41Ibid.
256
for the training of the elite.
The greatness of a culture depends not on how
well it educates its masses, but on how well it educates
its intellectual elite. "We well know that a Just
posterity Judges the collective Intellectual state of a
time only by those few great and lonely figures of the
period, and gives its decision in accordance with the
manner in which they are recognized, encouraged, and
honored, or, on the other hand, in which they are snubbed,
i i 2
elbowed aside, and kept down." Periclean Athens and
Renaissance Italy illustrate Nietzschefs point.
Equality and Justice
Nietzsche has nothing but scorn for those
ho
"education-mongers" who would violate "the sacred
44
hierarchy of nature" by proposing equal education for
all. These "blatant heralds of educational needs, when
examined at close quarters, are suddenly seen to be
transformed Into zealous, yes, fanatical opponents of
true culture, i.e. all those who hold fast to the aristo-
|1C
oratlc nature of the mind." J The fundamental goal of
equalltarlan educators is the "emancipation of the masses
' t2Ibld.. p. 75. i|3Ibld.. p. 7*.
«Ibid. “Slbid.
257
from the mastery of the great few; they seek to overthrow
the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the
intellect— the servitude of the masses, their submissive
obedience, their instinct of loyality to the rule of
genius. "4^
Nietzsche is most emphatically not suggesting a
return to those social pyramids of the past at the vertex
of which one found men of military, political and
economic strength. The "great few" in the new pyramid
are to be the supermen of the passionate but controlled
mind (Dionysius and Apollo working together). Modern man,
in his haste to escape the oppressions of an old order,
is forgetting that some sort of order (i.e., rank) is
absolutely essential. Like Aristotle Nietzsche holds
that some men are born to obey, others to command. Some
people are natural slaves, others rulers. However, no
society to date has ever been so organized that the
"natural slaves" were always recognized and allowed to
function in their appropriate social roles. Likewise,
legal rulers have been, as often as not, "natural
217
slaves." The laws of a country have not coincided with
46Ibid.
217
! l The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling
classes has been' the cause of all the great disorders in
history! Without the Roman Caesars and Roman society,
Christianity would never have prevailed." The Will to
258
the laws of nature* For Nietzsche, as for Plato and
Aristotle, a "Just" society Is one In which those who
are fitted to command are allowed to command, and those
fitted to obey are allowed to obey.
Throughout his writings Nietzsche Is consistently
anti-egalitarian. His reasons are that men are born
unique— that Is, no two people are the same, no two
people are Identical or "equal." Therefore, given dif
ferent capacities, talents, strengths and limitations,
to accord everyone equal rights or equal treatment would
48
be the height of injustice. "The doctrine of equality I
There is no more poisonous poison anywhere! for it seems
to be preached by Justice itself, whereas it really is
the termination of Justice. 1 Equal to the equal,
unequal to the unequal *— that would be the true slogan of
justicej and also its corollary! 1Never make equal what
4q
is unequal.1" 7
Power. 8 7^. The Complete Works. Vol. 15, p. 312.
48
Similarities of course exist, and members of
groups based on these similarities may in relevant
circumstances be treated as equals without violating
Nietzsche's conception of Justice. An example would be
"ability grouping" in the classroom.
^Twilight of the Idols. 48, The Portable
Nietzsche.' ' p . ' "553"
Rank and Challenge
259
Rank and hierarchy are necessary in society not
only to satisfy the demands of Justice but also to
stimulate that Interplay of challenge-and-response which
Is essential to health and creativity. Egalitarian
movements tend to eliminate the very challenges upon which
growth depends, the result being that the entire culture
will cease to grow and eventually decline. It Is
difficult to say whether egalitarian movements cause
cultural decline or are merely a symptom of the decline.
Nevertheless, the point being stressed here is that
variety, contest, struggle and distance are absolutely
essential to cultural greatnessi
"Equality," as a certain factual increase in
similarity, which merely finds expression in the
theory of "equal rights," is an essential feature
of decline. The oleavage between man and man,
status and status, the plurality of types, the
will to be oneself, to stand out— what I call the
pathos of distance, that is characteristic of every
strong age. The strength to withstand tension,
the width of the tensions between extremes, becomes
ever smaller today; finally, the extremes them
selves become blurred to the point of similarity.50
The Distanoe Between Men
Nietzsche argues with cold logic that from the
37. The
Twilight of the Idols» "What the Germans Lack
Portable Nietzsche. pT 5^0.
260
fact that men are not born equal, that they can be
arranged in a hierarchy of ability— i.e. that some men
are "higher" than others— we must conclude that there
51
is a "difference of value among men"^ — that some men are
worth more than others. Indeed, in Nietzsche's vision
the gap between top and the bottom of the hierarchy is
so great that those at the bottom, at least when viewed
from the top, seem relatively "worthless." One superman,
however, may bring meaning to the wastelands of humanity:
"I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a
single individual may under certain circumstances Justify
whole millenniums of existence— that is to say, a
wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more complete man,
as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary
men."52
Nietzsche’s attitude toward the relative worth of
a few great individuals as compared to a nation or mankind
collectively is expressed in the following epigram: "A
people [eln Volk] is a detour of nature to get to six or
CO
seven great men.— Yes, and then to get around them."-'-'
51The Will to Power. 988. The Complete Works.
Vol. 15, pV 382.
52Ibid.. 997, p. 386.
5^Beyond Good and Evil, 126, p. 87. In a footnote
on the same page Walter kaufmann comments: "The polemical
and sarcastic thrust of this epigram depends on the heavy
261
In the Naohlass Nietzsche proclaims* "Not ’mankind,’
ejx
but Superman is the goalIIn praising the higher type
of man Nietzsche seldom misses the chance to express his
disgust and contempt for the average man: Nietzsche is
filled with loathing and nausea at the sight of the
teaming herds of the human race. The superman is the end}
the people are merely a means*
An Optimistic Note
Despite Nietzsche’s strong language he was any
thing but misanthropic. What seemed to pain him most was
that man so rarely realized the creative potentials that
lie within each individual. Nietzsche frequently employs
strident language to Jolt, disturb, shake, anger— anything
to prod the reader along the path of self-perfection.
That Nietzsche did have hopeful moments concerning
the rationality and possible enlightenment of mankind is
cc
expressed in an "ever-recurring vision"- ^ of the future in
which he sees "hours of instruction and meditation for
reliance of German nationalism— both in Nietzsche’s time
and in the twentieth century— or the mystique of the
Volk."
•^The Will to Power, 1001. The Complete Works.
v o l. 15, p.' 3BTT ----------- ------------ -------------------
^ Human, All-too-Human, "Miscellaneous Maxims and
Opinions," lb6. frhe Complete*~Vorks, Vol. 7, p. 97.
262
adults, even the most mature, and such Institutions
visited without compulsion but in accordance with the
moral injunction of the whole community . • * at the same
time daily festivals in honor of the reason that is
56
attained and attainable by man,”'
That the doctrine of self-perfection could be
extended to all men, and not just to those of exceptional
ability, would seem to follow from Nietzsche’s claim that
"everyone carries within himself a productive uniqueness
as the nucleus of his being.It is true that this
productive uniqueness does not find expression in most
people, for it is fettered and chained by custom, dogmas,
pedantry and pressure to conform to the opinions of the
moment. And it is here that education finds its oppor
tunity— not education conceived as molding or
conditioning but education as liberation of one’s unique
capacities. Indeed, Nietzsche advises the young man
that j
Your educators can be nothing more than your
liberators. And that is the secret of all educa
tion: it doesn't provide artificial limbs, false
noses or eye-glasses— on the contrary, what could
provide these gifts is merely pseudo-education.
Education is rather liberation, a rooting out of
56Ibld., p. 96.
•^Schopenhauer as Educator, 3, pp. 28-29.
263
all weeds, rubbish and vermin from around the
buds of the plants,5°
The Paradox of Challenge
Favorable Social Conditions
The prevailing thought In Schopenhauer as
Educator Is that the philosopher, artist, and saint are
more likely to develop if the proper favorable social
conditions are provided, Nietzsche1s Judgment of his age
was that "the conditions for the genesis of the genius in
modern times have not; improved, and the aversion to
original men has increased to the extent that Socrates
could not have lived among us, and in any case would not
have lived to be seventy,Nietzsche's severe indict
ment of his times is certainly open to question,
especially when one considers that Nietzsche, despite his
vehement and relentless attacks against all that was dear
to his contemporaries, was quite free to travel, teach
and above all to publish what he pleased. If the German
gadfly suffered at the hands of society it was through
silence, not censorship.
The notion of favorable social conditions is
also to be found throughout Nietzsche's other writings.
But there is another key idea that runs throughout
58Ibid,. 1, p, 6. 59Ibid,, 6, p. 79.
Nietzsche's works, and that is that greatness depends on
the existence of dangerous opposition— on the presence of
unfavorable social conditions! "The highest type of free
men should be sought where the highest resistance is
constantly overcome! five steps from tyranny, close to
the threshold of the danger of servitude.Nietzsche
comments that this is true not only psychologically, but
politically. "The peoples who had some value, attained
some value, never attained it under liberal institutions;
it was great danger that made something of them that
merits respect. Danger alone acquaints us with our own
resources. One must need to be strong— otherwise one
will never become strong.1 1 ^1
A Contradiction
These two views seem to contradict one another:
On the one hand evil conditions should be removed} on
the other hand they are necessary as a stimulus to
creativity. As is the case with a great deal of
Nietzsche's thought, at first blush it does indeed appear
to involve a contradiction. But perhaps it is a paradox
on the surface only, perhaps a more careful analysis of
^ Twilight of the Idols. "Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man, ^ 3b. The Portable Nietzsche, p, 542,
61Ibid.
265
the terms in question will lead to a resolution. Let us
examine the position more closely.
Earlier in this chapter we outlined Nietzsche*s
theory of contest and opposition, Nietzsche's position
here is similar to that expressed by Toynbee under the
label of "Challenge and Response," According to
Toynbee's theory a culture or civilization, if it is to
achieve any creative development, must be stimulated by
certain environmental hardships. These hardships, when
responded to, stimulate the culture to overcome them and
thereby to attain new heights, Toynbee concludes "that
the most stimulating challenge is one of mean degree
between excess of severity and a deficiency of it, since
a different challenge may fail to stimulate the challenged
party at all, while an excessive challenge may break his
6 2
spirit." And the immediate response is also to be
balanced against the long term response* "The real
optimum challenge is one which not only stimulates the
challenged party to achieve a single successful response
but also stimulates him to acquire momentum that carries
him a step farther: from achievement to a fresh struggle,
62
Arnold J, Toynbee, A Study of History. abridge
ment of Vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (London: Oxford
University Press, 19^7), p* 187.
266
from the solution of one problem to the presentation of
another, from Yin to Yang again.1 1 Nietzsche condenses
the same general idea into an aphorism in Twilight of the
64
Idolst "What does not destroy me, makes me stronger.”
A Resolution
Self-surpassing can thus be viewed in terms of
successful responses to various challenges. And the
paradox is resolved when we recall that Nietzsche is
directing his attention to the perfection of a particular
class of men, i.e., the artists, philosophers, and other
creative individuals, whom we may loosely label as
geniuses or supermen. Conditions which may be judged by
the masses as ’ ’ unfavorable" or "undesirable" for the
advancement of their own immediate ends might very well
be those which are most "favorable" for the development
of the genius! "The same causes which tend to bring
about the diminution of man, force the stronger and
6*5
rarer individuals upwards to greatness," The initial
apparent contradiction between favorable and unfavorable
63Ibid.. p. 187.
Twilight o f the Idols. "Maxims and Arrows," 8.
The Portable NletzsoYie, p. 467.
65
The Will to Power, 109. The Complete Works,
Vol. 14, pT^i:
267
social conditions as both being necessary vanishes when
we answer the question: Favorable for whom? Nietzsche
clearly means favorable for the development of the
potentials of the Intellectual and artistic elite, how
ever unfavorable such conditions may appear to the
general public.
A Further Difficulty
The argument that Nietzsche's position is not
self-contradictory is not meant to imply that there are
no difficulties or problems connected with it. Indeed,
it raises one of the most perplexing problems which all
students of Nietzsche's educational philosophy must face:
What price is one willing to pay for the creation of the
genius or superman? Leaving aside all the political
nonsense that has been written on the topic, there are
still those intellectually respectable "tough''
Nietzscheans who emphasize that Nietzsche frequently
stresses the hardship, suffering, pain, and even death
that the superman will unavoidably cause the masses.
There are times when Nietzsche seems to support the
genesis of the genius at any cost. The "tender"
Nietzscheans, on the other hand, point out that
Zarathustra does come down from the mountain to preach to
the people, and that there is really no basic conflict
268
between the creative elite and the rest of mankind,
Nietzsche's overall position would seem to
Incorporate and reconcile both the tough and the tender
elements. That there will always be conflict, misunder
standing, and 111-feellng between the creators and the
masses— this, It seems, Nietzsche takes as the natural,
even necessary, state of affairs. And an Inevitable
result of this conflict will be a great deal of suffering
for both parties involved. However, the tender
Nletzscheans also hint at the truth when they argue that
basically there is no fatal conflict. That is, one could
well maintain that it Is Nietzsche's view that in the long
run the creators and the masses advance together, that in
a culture based on the order of rank the geniuses and the
rest of mankind unite in the common goal of self-perfec
tion. The people, of course, are not enlightened enough
to see that the advancement of society depends upon a few
rare creative individuals, that their own welfare is
ultimately linked with the production of the genius.
Nietzsche makes no attempt to smooth over the antagonism
which exists between the two classes, even in a well-
ordered culture; indeed, he sees that this antagonism
functions as a stimulus to creativity, Just as the
Homeric contest provided a necessary stimulus for the
development of the Greeks.
CHAPTER VIII
NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OP EDUCATION,
PART II: SOME APPLICATIONS
270
It is not the intention of this study to provide
the reader with a comprehensive chronicle of all of
Nietzsche's observations on items of educational import.
Since there is scarcely a topic upon which Nietzsche does
not have something of value to say, such a chronicle
would fill several volumes. Rather, our intention is to
provide a working knowledge of Nietzsche's educational
philosophy by: first, outlining systematically its key
concepts (attempted in the preceding chapters); second,
showing specifically how these concepts are applied to
certain selected areas of education (to be attempted in
this chapter).
It is this writer's conviction that more is to
be gained by grasping the particular way in which
Nietzsche sets about analyzing and solving educational
problems than by listening to an enumeration of Nietzsche's
comments on virtually everything pertaining to education.
Therefore, it has been decided to select relatively few
aspects or areas of education and to explore these
thoroughly enough that the reader will feel confident
that he could then make his own applications to other
areas.
There is a general style, attitude, direction,
tone— a "spirit," If you will— that characterizes the way
in which the Nletzschean educator approaches educational
271
problems: It Is hoped that the following pages convey
something of this spirit.
Two Movements In Modern Education
The health and creativeness of an Individual, a
school, or a nation depend on the ever-present influence
of the ultimate goal of individual self-perfection. If
this axiological yardstick is not frequently used to
measure cultural practices and policies, the forces of
society— as manifested In customs, habits and
institutions— will be diverted by false or inferior goals
to the inescapable deterioration and destruction of the
culture— or at least to the unproductive rigidity of a
Sparta or the tranquil stability of a Samoa.
There are two movements, two forces, at work in
modern society which, in Nietzsche^ view, indicate that
we have lost sight of the ultimate goal of self-perfection
and which, if not corrected, will lead to disaster or
stagnation: the first movement is seen in the "striving
to achieve the greatest possible expansion of education;
the second is seen in the "tendency to minimize and
weaken" education,'1 ' Let us examine these two movements in
turn,
• ^ The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"First Lecture,T frhe complete Works, Vol. 3, pp. 35-36.
Also see "Introduction," pp. 12-15.
The Movement to Expand Education
272
The first of the above movements desires to
p
’ ’spread learning among the greatest number of people,"
Today we would simply call it the movement for "universal"
3
higher education. The contemporary educator in the
United States would no doubt be shocked by Nietzsche’s
seemingly "reactionary" attack on universal education.
After all, is it not true that all progressive, civilized,
industrial societies are following the lead of Prussia
and the United States in extending the availability of
education to all? It must be stated, at the outset, that
Nietzsche does not attack universal education per se
(although he is always suspicious of it) but rather the
j i
"various reasons" which are used, implicitly or
explicitly, to support it. This is not to soften
2Ibid,. p. 3 6.
3
It is not at all clear exactly what grade levels
Nietzsche has in mind. In the introduction to his lec
tures he explains that the title refers to the future of
German elementary (Volksschule). general secondary
(Realschule), and classical secondary schools (Gymnasiums,
or what the English call "public schools") and the
universities, Musarlonausgabe, Vol, 4, p, 4, However,
his specific remarIcs coneerning reform are usually aimed
at the Gymnasiums and universities, i.e, at what might be
best called "higher education,"
i ;
The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
P* 36,
273
Nietzsche*s attack; for some of the "reasons” which
Nietzsche challenges are among the most cherished by
modern man.
Promotion of the Economy
The loudest cry for universal education comes
from proponents of economic prosperity and material con
sumption, The expansion of education "belongs to the most
beloved of the dogmas of modern political economy. As
much knowledge and education as possible; therfore the
greatest possible supply and demand— hence as much
happiness as possible:— that is the formula,"^ Individual
self-perfection is bound to suffer under these conditions,
for now utility, in the sense of pecuniary gain, "is made
the object and goal of education,"^ Throughout his life
Nietzsche opposed an education— universal or otherwise—
aimed at enhancing the national economy. Universal
education simply makes it possible to corrupt more people
more efficiently than the old aristocratic system.
Fear of Religious Oppression
7
In addition to the "beloved economical dogma"
• * The Future of Our Educational Institutions, p,
Nietzsche*s criticism of this "formula*1 will be examined
in more detail later in this chapter,
6Ibid. 7Ibid.f p. 38.
274
there is a second, less pervasive reason for universal
education: "In some countries the fear of religious
oppression is so general, and the dread of its results so
marked, that people in all classes of society long for
culture and eagerly absorb those elements of it which are
Q
supposed to scatter the religious instincts,"
It might at first seem strange to hear Nietzsche
questioning any movement that has as its aim the
scattering of religious instincts, Nietzsche himself is
little help here, for he offers no comment whatsoever
concerning his suspicion of this "reason," In the light
of Nietzsche's other analyses it would seem that he would
question this kind of supporting reason if for no other
reason than that it is a negative reaction based on fear.
Universal "knowledge" is wanted, not to promote self-
perfection, but merely to break up and weaken religion
instincts which might be mobilized, as they have been in
the past, to the possible peril of those who do not share
the same instincts. As Nietzsche has emphasized again and
again, religious instincts have been the source of
inspiration as well as oppression: there Is nothing
Inherently oppressive in religious feelings, even If
shared by large numbers of people. To propose as a
8Ibid,
275
reason for universal education the scattering of religious
instincts, because they might lead to oppression, would be
as ludicrous as to propose the scattering of scientific
ideas because they might lead to painful consequences.
"The traces of some former religious tyranny must still
be felt for a people to be driven to such desperate
remedies,"9
Preservation of the State
A third reason offered by proponents of the
universal extension of education is that it serves the
needs and helps preserve the state.
The State ... strives . • • after the
greatest possible expansion of education, because
it always feels strong enough to bring the most
determined emancipation, resulting from culture,
under its yoke, and readily approves of everything
which tends to extend culture, provided that it be
of service to its officials or soldiers, but in
the main to itself, in its competition with other
nations.10
Nietzsche views the modern state as perhaps the
greatest single enemy to individual self-perfection. If
service to the state is made the summum bonum of
education, the individual will have to be sacrificed to
9The Future of Our Educational -Institutions.
p. 38.
27 6
whatever the state conceives as being its needs. Univer
sal education in the service of the state or nation is
but an invitation to slavery, barbarism and despotism,
Nietzsche summarizes in a few words his skeptical
attitude toward the modern movement to extend education:
Whenever I hear the masses raise the cry for
an expansion of education, I am want to ask myself
whether it is stimulated by a greedy lust of gain
and property, by the memory of a former religious
persecution, or by the prudent egotism of the
State Itself,^-1
The Movement to Diminish the Autonomy
of Education
The second movement or force at work in modern
society, although "not so clamorous, perhaps, but quite
12
as forcible" as the movement to expand education,
"would compel education to renounce its highest and most
independent claims in order to subordinate itself to the
service of the State," Just as the state finds it to
its advantage to support universal education so, at the
same time, it discovers that it may turn scholarship and
scientific research to its own advantage— to the ruin of
true culture and individual growth. As we outline
11Ibid,, pp. 38-39.
12Ibld,, p. 39.
13Ibid.. "Introduction," p. 13.
277
Nietzsche^ analysis of this movement— an analysis made
a century ago when the movement was but In Its embryonic
stage— Its relevance to contemporary society will becoipe
apparent•
Goals Determined by the State
The seductive formula behind the movement consists
of the following ingredients: the state benefits, in
terms of power and prestige, by the advancement of
science and scholarship [Wlssenschaft], To promote the
advancement of science the state exploits or, to speak
more kindly, rewards those who dedicate themselves to
this end. The education of scientists requires concen
trated specialization,
for the study of science has been extended to such
interminable lengths that he who, though not excep
tionally gifted, yet possesses fair abilities, will
need to devote himself exclusively to one branch
and ignore all others if he ever wish to achieve
anything in his work,11*
The specialization required for success in science leads
to a dehumanized fragmentation similar to what we find
in modern industry:
Thus, a specialist in science gets to resemble
nothing so much as a factory workman who spends
his whole life in turning one particular screw or
14
The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"First Lecture," p, 39, “
278
handle on a certain Instrument or machine, at
which occupation he acquires the most consumate
skill,15
This movement lessens the autonomy of education
In two wayB. In the first place, the state, not the
scholar, determines what problems are worthy of atten
tion* Students, teachers and administrators thus become
mere means to whatever ends the government has set. in
the second place, by concentrating on select scientific
and scholarly problems, other areas of life— the more
Important areas— are neglected, much to the relief of
the state, which generally does not like its values and
goals scrutinized*
Specialization as Exploitation
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of this
situation Is that "at present the exploitation of a man
for the purpose of science is accepted everywhere without
the slightest scruple."1^ Specialization itself exploits
^The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
p. 39• These lines come fr o m a man who had devoted much
of his own early life to the specialty of philology.
Reflecting on his university days Nietzsche writes to
his friend von Gersdorff the day before departing for his
professional appointment at Basle: "I have come close to
a kind of Philistinism, the species 1 specialist.1"
(April 11, 1 8 6 9). U npub1 1shed Let tors, p. 50.
l6The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
p. 40.
279
man by fostering talent in one narrow area at the expense
of general cultivation. If an individual manages to
"elevate himself above the herd by means of his specialty,
he still remains one of them in regard to all else,— that
is to say, in regard to all the most important things in
life."*7 Not only are we blind to the fact that the
"division of labor in science" is moving "towards the
l8
decrease and even destruction of learning," we go so
far as to actually praise the movement. Nietzsche
describes in the following terms the climate of science-
orientated nineteenth-century Germany:
This narrow specialization on the part of our
learned men is even admired, and their ever greater
deviation from the path of true culture is regarded
as a moral phenomenon. "Fidelity in small things,"
"dogged faithfulness," becomes expressions of
highest eulogy, and the lack of culture outside the
specialty is flaunted abroad as a sign of noble
sufficiency.
Work. Commercialism and Freedom
Work has perhaps been man’s chief means of finding
purpose and meaning in life. The desire to accomplish a
difficult task, even at the expense of much hardship and
anxiety, often takes precedence over immediate comfort
and happiness. Wisdom teaches the paradoxical truth that
17Ibld.. p. 39. l8Ibid., p. 40.
19Ibld.. pp. 39-40.
280
real happinfcss (or what Nietzsche prefers to call Joy)
20
conies only when man ceases to seek after it.
Zarathustra replies to an Inquiry with: "'What matters
happiness? I have long ceased to be concerned with
21
happiness; I am concerned with my work.'" Zarathustra's
work provides nleanlng and direction to his life because
It is guided b^ the goal of self-perfection. But not all
work adds significance to life, because not all work is
guided by a meaningful goal. Let us briefly examine
several ways in which work can actually block the path to
individual growth.
The Misuses of Work
Work as Escape
In the first place, work and "busyness" in
general may simply be a means of escape from life and
from oneself, an often unconscious technique by which man
tries to avoid the difficult task of coming to terms with
himself. Work in this sense is nothing less than the
22
blind path of "low Nirvana," to spiritual death, to the
20
This is the so-called "hedonistic paradox,"
which argues that to aim at pleasure or happiness is to
miss it,
2^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. IV, "The Honey Sacri
fice," The Portable Nietzsche, p. 3^9*
22
Maslow's term for regression, in contrast to
"high Nirvana" (growth and transcendence). Abraham H.
Maslow, ed,, "Psychological Data and Value Theory,"
281
life-denying dogmas of an otherworldly religion.
Zarathustra speaks:
And you, too, for whom life Is furious work
and unrest— are you not very weary of life? Are
you not very ripe for the preaching of death?
All of you to whom furious work Is dear, and
whatever Is fast, new, and strange— you find it
hard to bear yourselves; your Industry Is escape
and the will to forget yourselves. If you
believed more In life you woulJl fling yourselves
less to the moment. But you do not have contents
enough In yourselves for waiting— and not even
for Idleness.
Pascal observed that "nothing Is so unbearable
to man as to be at a standstill. fTls then he feels his
oh
nothingness." Prom this condition issues boredom,
dissatisfaction and ennui. The all-too-human tendency
of man Is to do anything to escape ennui. If one doubts
this Pascal suggests: "When a soldier complains of his
hard work, or a laborer, etc.— try leaving them with
nothing to do!"2' * Nietzsche maintains that a major dif
ference between the unenlightened and the enlightened Is
that the latter have discovered the value of ennui:
New Knowledge In Human Values (New York: Harper and Row,
1$59), p7 12 j>.
2^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I, "On the Preachers of
Death," The Portable Nietzsche, p. 158.
2^Blaise Pascal, Pensees [selections], trans* by
H. P. Stewart, in Readings for discussion: Second Year
Course. VI (Chicago! Great books foundation, 1955]*
p. 15.
25Ibid.
282
"Indeed they require much ennui, if their work is to
succeed with them. For the thinker and for all inventive
spirits ennui is the unpleasant fcalmf of the soul which
precedes the happy voyage and the dancing breezes; he
must endure it, he must await the effect it has on him:—
it is precisely this which lesser natures cannot at all
experience! It is common to scare away ennui in every
i*26
way."
Man runs away from himself and at the same time
is dimly aware that he is running away, which only adds
to his restlessness and anxiety. "There are moments when
all know that the most extensive arrangements of our own
life are made only to escape our real task; we would like
to bury our heads somewhere, as if our hundred-eyed
27
conscience could not find us." From fear of deep
experience, from fear of discovering who he really is,
man resorts to the crudest of expedients:
We are quick to sell our souls merely in
order not to be troubled by them any longer; we
are slaves- even to hard daily work— more fervently
and unreflectively than is necessary to live,
because it seems to us more necessary not to reach
the stage of reflection. The haste is general
because everyone is running away from himself.
General too is the furtive hiding of this haste,
2^The Joyful Wisdom, 42. The Complete Works,
Vol. 10, pp. 79-80.
27
'Schopenhauer as Educator, 5, p. 53.
283
because one wishes to appear satisfied and
would like to deceive the more perspicacious
spectators about his misery.2®
Insofar as work Is being employed as a means of
escape the Nletzsohean educator must oppose (or expose) it
as a danger to the goals of education, to self-knowledge
and self-perfection— both of which require relentless
self-reflection and mediation.
Work as Security
In the second place work may be a subtle but
dangerous means by which society achieves uniformity and
security. A recurrent theme in Nietzsche’s writings is
that modern democratic society has surrendered the goal
of cultivating individual excellence to that of "smoothing
down every sharp edge and corner in life, utilizing the
best means of turning mankind into sand I Small, soft,
20
round, infinite sand!" * To turn people into harmless
grains of sand society preaches such dogmas as the sacred
ness of selfless action or the "blessing of labor."
Society does this out of fear that without these "moral"
4
restraints "dangerous individuals" may arise, who will
28 Ibid.
2^The Dawn of Day. 17^. The Complete Works.
Vol. 9* p. 1?8.
284
threaten the general security. In an aphorism titled
"The Flatterers of Work" Nietzsche comments on the
present-day glorification of work:
At the sight of work— that is to say, severe
toil from morning till night— we have the feeling
that it is the best police, viz. that it holds
every one in check and effectively hinders the
development of reason, of greed, and of desire
for independence. For work uses up an extra
ordinary proportion of nervous force, withdrawing
it from reflection, meditation, dreams, cares,
love, and hatred; it dangles unimportant alms
before the eyes of the worker and affords easy
and regular gratification. Thus it happens that
a society where work is continually being perfor
med will enjoy greater security, and it is
security which is now venerated as the supreme
deity.30
Work under the direction of the "flatterers" thus
yields security, but only at the price of uniformity and
slavery— slavery not only to "unimportant aims," but also
to the very means used by modern societies to achieve
these aims— i.e. the machine, which brings us to a con
sideration of a third misuse of work.
Work and the Machine
Germany, like the United States, experienced its
most rapid industrial expansion in the latter half of the
31
nineteenth century. The Industrial Revolution was
30Ibid.. 173, Vol. 9, pp. 176-177.
31
See "Industrial Revolution," Encyclopaedia
Britannica (Chicago (Chicago, I960), XI1, 369.
changing the face of Europe, yet no one was sure what the
final outcome would be* Living at the height of Germany*s
Industrial expansion, Nietzsche sensed that the world
was embarking on a new era with an uncertain future.
What would be the long-range effects of the machine age?
Nietzsche expresses his concern In the aphorism:
"’Premisses of the Age of Machinery.’— the press, the
machine, the railway, the telegraph are premisses of which
no one has yet dared to draw the conclusions that will
32
follow in a thousand years." A glance at the passages
which Nietzsche devotes to this topic reveals that he is
not much concerned with predicting the outcome in terms
of production— consumption, national product, individual
income or other such economic categories; his concern is
rather with discovering the new set of values implicit in
a world dominated by machines and their ultimate influence
on the inner life of man*
Man is not free to develop himself as a human
being as long as he suffers from hunger, disease and
material necessities* Nietzsche agrees with Aristotle
that the basic physical needs must be satisfied before
self-realization can commence. Without the aid of
machines a large class of workers or slaves will be
32
Human* All-too-Human* "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 2 7b. The Complete Works* Vol. 7, p. 332.
286
necessary to support society, including a small leisure
class of rulers, thinkers and artists. In an interesting
hypothetical sentence Aristotle speculates: "If every
instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or
anticipating the will of others • . • if . . . the shuttle
would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a
hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants,
nor masters slaves." J Nietzsche also observes that many
workers and slaves (when Nietzsche speaks of "slavery"
he does not usually mean its legalized form) are neces
sary to keep society going "so long as machines cannot
- 3 4
do it in their stead."J What was mere fantasy in ancient
Greece was becoming a reality in modern Europe: "Ever
less physical force is necessary: wisely we let machines
work."3' *
We wisely let machines work because we thus gain
leisure and the freedom to become "stronger and more
spiritual."3^ The machine "unfetters a fast quantity of
37
force which would otherwise lie dormant." Machines,
33Aristotle Politics 1. 1253b, In Great Books of
the Western World, IX (Chicago: William Benton, Publisher,
T ^ 5 7 7W t --------
^ Grossoktavausgabe, XI, 1^3. 3^Ibld., XIV, 97.
36Ibid.
37
Human. All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 22b. The Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 310.
287
however, are a mixed blessing for with their power to
liberate man from centuries-old drudgery they also bring
a new form of enslavement: the dehumanization of man by
a machine-dominated economy.
Modern factory workers— or "slaves,” as Nietzsche
calls them— are being utilized and exploited "as the
screws of a machine and the stopgaps, as it were, of the
human spirit of invention."The machine, itself a
product of the highest mental powers, sets in motion
hardly any but the lower, unthinking forces of the men
who serve it*"^ The tempo of the machine is not the
tempo of the human organism. A recent writer notes that
"anyone who has used a power lawn mower will be aware
of the ease with which the machine can take over from
man the task of setting the pace of work and of imposing
40
on him the demands inherent in its own nature." The
rigid, artificial rhythms of the machine interfere with
the fluid, organic rhythms of self-surpassing man* The
machine "does not communicate the impulse to climb
higher, to improve, to become artistic. It creates
^ The Dawn of Day, 206. The Complete Works. Vol.
9, p. 214.
^ Human. All-too-Human. "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 22d. The Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 310,
40
Paul Nash, Authority and Freedom in Education
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, l9b6), p*"14.
288
activity and monotony, but this in the long run produces
a counter-effect, a despairing ennui of the soul, which
through machinery has learnt to hanker after the variety
lil
of leisure.” It would thus seem that the rhythmic
patterns of the machine are infusing themselves into the
minds of men.
Commercialism
We have discussed three ways in which ”work" may
prevent man from perfecting himself. These difficulties,
however, are not an isolated phenomena; they are the
necessary result of an inverted value system— a value
system that places money and material affluence higher on
the axiologlcal hierarchy than self-knowledge and self-
perfection, Modern society is dominated by ”the
selfishness of the money-makers [die Selbstsucht der
lip
Erwerbenden],” who desire to promote a psuedo-culture
to serve their own ends. The pervasiveness of this
lil
Human, All-too-Human. "The Wanderer and His
Shadow,” 2Z&1 The Complete Works. Vol. 7, p. 310.
ii o
Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 63. "Money
makers” is not an altogether happy rendering of
Erwerbenden. Something of the term's meaning and
general flavor can be surmised from the definition given
the noun from which it is derived: "Erwerb. acquisition,
gain; earnings; profit, returns; industry, business,
livelihood, living." The New Cassell's German Dictionary,
ed. by Harold T, Betteridge tfoew York: f c ’ unk & Wagwalls
Co., 1958), p. 136.
289
perverted value-system can be seen in Industry* where it
Is assumed that dehumanization can be compensated for by
higher wages, Nietzsche admonishes:
Shame on the thought that merely by means of
higher wages the essentlal part of their [factory
workers] misery, I.e. their impersonal enslavement,
might be removed! Shame, that we should allow our-
selves to be convinced that, by an Increase of this
impersonality within the mechanical working of a
new society, the disgrace of slavery could be changed
to a virtue! Shame, that there would be a regular
price at which a man should cease to be a personality
and become a screw Instead! Are you accomplices in
the present madness of nations which desire above
all to produce as much as possible, and to be as
rich as possible?^
Civilizations may be distinguished from one another
by their differing focal values and ideals: "Personal
rivalry was the soul of culture among the ancient Greeks,
44
and war, conquest, and law among the ancient Romans."
In modern society a pseudo-culture is arising with
commerce as its soul and the tradesman as its prophet.
In the following aphorism Nietzsche describes the func
tioning of the new scale of values— values that are
antithetical to the goal of individual self-surpassing:
The Dawn of Day, 206. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p. 2l4. This passage adumbrates one of l4ietzschefs
main criticisms of socialism: that in pressing for
equality in Income and distribution of national goods
socialism is commiting itself to the same Inverted value
system as lalssez falre capitalism.
44
The Dawn of Day, 175* The Complete Works
Vol. 9, p. 17H. ---- ----- --------
290
"How many and what olass of people will con
sume this?" Is his [the tradesman's] question of
questions* Hence, he Instinctively and Incessantly
employs this mode of valuation and applies It to
everything, Including the productions of art and
science, and of thinkers, scholars, artists,
statesmen, nations, political parties, and even
entire ages: with respect to everything produced
or created he Inquires Into the supply and demand
In order to estimate for himself the value of a
thing. This, when once It has been made the
principle of an entire culture, worked out to Its
most minute and subtle details and Imposed upon
every kind of will and knowledge, this Is what you
men of the coming century will be proud of,— If the
prophets of the commercial classes are right in
putting that century into your p o s s e s s i o n ! ^
Commercialism and the Schools
Immersed In society as the schools are it Is no
surprise that here too we find the debilitating Influence
of commercialism* Business and trade have a vested
interest In "economic" manj to protect this interest it
is necessary to see that the methods and alms of educa
tion correspond to those of the business world:
Prom this quarter comes that popular proposi
tion and chaln-sylloglsm which runs something
like this: A maximum of knowledge and education,
therefore a maximum demand, therefore maximum
production, therefore maximum gain and happiness—
this Is the seductive formula* Education would be
defined by the adherents of this formula as the
insight with which one, in his needs and their
satisfaction, becomes thoroughly timely, and with
45Ibid.. p p . 1 7 8 - 1 7 9 .
291
which one Is also best In command of all ways . .
and means of making money as easily as possible.4&
Here we have an educational philosophy based not
on man the creator but on man the consumer. The greatest
good Is to satisfy the artificially stimulated desire for
material objects. The fulfillment of these "needs" will
deliver man Into the arms of eternal happiness— so the
prophets of commercialism promise. To Insure maximum
happiness education must focus on utility:
The goal would then be to form as many "current"
men as possible, "current" In the same sense as one
speaks of a coin's currency} and according to this
view a people will be happier the more "current"
men It possesses. Therefore, the intention of
modern places of education Is said to be to further
everyone as far as he has a natural aptitude for
becoming "current," and accordingly to develop
everyone to the extent that he derives the maximum
of happiness and gain from his own level of know
ledge. It Is demanded here that the Individuals be
able, through the help of such a general education,
to assess himself exactly In order to know what he
has to demand from life. And finally, it is main
tained that there Is a natural and necessary
connection between "Intelligence and possessions,"
between "wealth and culture," and further that this
connection Is a moral necessity.47
The purveyors of this narrowly utilitarian
education may be recognized by their opposition to those
very conditions and values that make self-perfection
possible:
^ Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, pp. 63-64.
47
'Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 64.
292
These people hate every kind of education that
makes one solitary, that sets goals beyond money-
making, that takes up much time; they are In the
habit of referring slightingly to these more
serious kinds of education as "refined egoism,"
as "Immoral cultural Epicureanism." Admittedly,
according to the morality valid for these people,
the opposite Is valued, namely, a rapid education
In order to become a money-making being as soon as
possible, and yet an education thorough enough
that one can make a great deal of money. Man Is
allowed only as much culture as Is In the Interest
of general commerce and the world market, but this
much Is also demanded from him* In short, "man has
a necessary claim to earthly happiness, therefore
education is necessary, but only for that reasonl"
Education for Freedom
The slavery and dehumanization of the machine age,
founded as they are on an inverted hierarchy of values,
cannot be corrected until society has "revalued" its
entire system of values. Nothing less will get at the
root of the problem. All institutions, especially the
educational institutions, must be guided by the mutually
supporting goals of freedom, individual self-surpassing
and the cultivation of great men.
In addition to the general revaluation of all
values— towards which Nietzsche*s total philosophy is
directed— there are several specific suggestions in regard
« * *
to work and commercialism that are relevant here. The
first suggestion concerns the desirability of finding
J|8Ibld., pp. 64-65.
293
pleasure In one's work.
Work and Pleasure
Almost all men In modern societies treat work as
a distasteful but necessary means to earn money, "on
which account they are not very select In the choice of
4 9
the work, provided It yields an abundant profit.” * From
this point of view work Is seen as a means and not an
end In Itself; that Is, work in Itself Is not a pleasure
but rather a means to earn the money necessary to purchase
the goods which will hopefully yield pleasure. Over and
against this view, which drives an undesirable wedge
between work and play, Is the attitude of the self
surpassing Individual:
There are rarer men who would rather perish
than work without delight in their labor: the
fastidious people, difficult to satisfy, whose
object Is not served by an abundant profit, unless
the work Itself be the reward of all rewards.
Artists and contemplative men of all kinds belong
to this rare species of human beings; and also the
idlers who spend their life In hunting and
travelling, or in love-affairs and adventures.
They all seek toll and trouble In so far as these
are associated with pleasure, and they want the
severest and hardest labor, if it be necessary.50
Work, including school-work, degenerates into
^The Joyful Wisdom, 42. The Complete Works,
vol. io, p. ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
50Ibid.
drudgery when It is seen as a means or alternative to
play and delight, Nietzsche Is not one to minimize the
rigorous and painful self-discipline and self-sacrifice
that must go Into creative work} at the same time,
however, the pleasure derived from surpassing one's
previous performance more than compensates for the painful
components. For a student who has caught fire with the
love of learning (hopefully from the example set by the
teacher) It would be unwise to tell him that he must take
"time out" from his labors In order to enjoy himself, for
this would be to establish the very dualism that takes
the pleasure out of learning. Meaningful work Is nothing
less than self-surpassing: the on-going process of
creativity surmounting new difficulties. This is the
highest form of free activity of which human beings are
capable. It Is of this process that Jacques Barzun has
written:
That is the sense in which work is 'fun,1 with
an irresistible appeal to man's love of difficulty
conquered— a pleasure altogether different from
that for which educators have turned school subjects
into activities and play. Under the habit of play,
drudgery, when it comes, remains drudgery, instead
of an accepted purgatory close to the heaven of
work,51
Learning is not all "sweetness and light," and in any
•^Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect, Harper
Torchbooks (New York: Harper & kow, 1^9), p, 125,
295
attempt to make it so one may manage to avoid purgatory—
but only at the expense of losing heaven.
Awareness of Inner Freedom
A second suggestion offered by Nietzsche to help
counter the spirit of commercialism is that we should
show Individuals and nations "what large sums of internal
value are wasted in the pursuit of such an external
object."32 The schools, in particular, must insure that
the student has been made aware of the inner potentiali
ties of man, has been given a taste of the blessedness of
psychological freedom and the excitement and Joy of
self-surpassing, "But where is your internal value when
you no longer know what it is to breathe freely; when you
have scarcely any command over your own selves, and often
CO
feel disgusted with yourselves as with some stale food?"^J
When the student reaches this stage of unrest and longing
he is then ready for any suggestion that will help him
overcome his enslaved condition. This brings us to
Nietzsche's third recommendation.
3 2 The Dawn of Day, 206. The Complete Works.
vol. 9, p/tpt:--------- ------------------
53Ibid.. p. 215.
Simplicity
In order to achieve the freedom necessary for
personal growth man must simplify his life, he must not
let himself be bound by a craving for an excess of
material goods. Perhaps the danger of a commercial
society Is that It tends to indefinitely extend manfs
basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, etcetera. As
one writer comments: "We seem able to persuade ourselves
that we cannot possibly do without the most refined
developments of these fundamental requirements. All the
needs that we consider basic serve to reduce our freedom,
cjl
because we become bound by what we cannot do without."-'
In an affluent society, argues Nietzsche, people have
"accustomed themselves to many wants merely because It
was easy to gratify them— It would be sufficient to un
learn some of these wants I"'’ * ’
Amidst an acquisitive society it is not easy to
"unlearn" the excessive "wants," A teacher, perhaps more
than any single person, can help initiate the unlearning
process— not only by discussing the subversive yet
seemingly innocent ways by which material wants enslave,
^ Nash, Authority and Freedom in Education, p, 9.
•^The Dawn of Day. 206. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p."21T . ----- ------ ----------
but by himself serving as an example of one who has
gained "the freedom of spirit of a man who has few
needs*"**8 The degree of simplicity and freedom necessary
for maximum self-perfection will vary according to indivi
dual talent and aspiration* Those rare persons with
extraordinary creative capacities will require a propor
tionate increase in freedom and simplicity* The
intellectually inclined may adopt "a voluntary and idyllic
C7
poverty without profession or marriage,The thinker is
one who can "live cheaply," for "he is easily pleased and
has no desire for any expensive pleasures • • • his days
and nights are not wasted by remorse; he moves, eats,
drinks, and sleeps in a manner suited to his intellect, in
order that it may grow calmer, stronger, and clearer • • •
he takes pleasure in his body and has no reason to fear
it; he does not require society, except from time to time
in order that he may afterwards go back to his solitude
with even greater delight,"**®
The Use and Abuse of History
Nineteenth-century Germany was the center of the
newly developed "scienoe" of historical analysis and
56Ibid*, p, 215* 5 7Ibid.
58Ibid.* 566, p. 392.
criticism* Scholars and students from around the world
came to Germany to learn the new techniques of scientific
scholarship. Nineteenth-century Germany was also under
the Influence of the Hegelian philosophy, which clarified
history as "God’s sojourn upon earth,Hegelianism,
under semi-official approval by the state, had exerted
enormous Influence on the philosophical climate In
Germany, These two developments— history as a science
and Hegelian philosophy— combined to produce a general
cultural climate, an "historical sense," which was to
encourage the view that history was the new queen of the
sciences and the source of salvation,^0 The schools and
universities not only reflected the new climate but
became its defenders and propagators. Nietzsche lived
and worked within this atmosphere: he Inhaled deeply— and
almost suffocated. An excess of history, he concluded Is
inimical to life. Modern society and its schools suffer
The Use and Abuse of History, 8, p. 52. "Germany
has beoome the breedlng-place of this historical optimism;
Hegel is perhaps to blame for this." We Philo1og1sts,
155, The Complete Works. Vol. 8, p, 170. Nietzsche
places most of the blame on the disciples of Hegel rather
than on the master himself.
^°"When I look at this age with the eyes of a
distant future, I find nothing so remarkable In the man of
the present day as his peculiar virtue and sickness called
’the historical sense*»" The Joyful Wisdom. 337* The
Complete Works. Vol. 10, d. 263, Also see Beyond Good and
Evil, 2'S T,' pp. 151-153.
from the "malady of history."**1
299
Three Approaches to History
Nietzsche proposes that It Is possible to dis
tinguish three kinds of history: "the monumental» the
62
antiquarian, and the critical,1 1 These three approaches
to history are "necessary to the living man In three
ways: In relation to his action and struggle, his con
servatism and reverence, his suffering and his desire for
d e l i v e r a n c e . " * ^ Let us briefly examine these three
categories of history and indicate how they may be
beneficially employed in education.
Monumental History
Monumental history is the contemplation and study
of great men and their actions, of heroes and heroic
deeds, of the high points of human civilization. Monu
mental history bears witness to the struggles, conquests
and sufferings of the giants of the past:
The great moments in the individual battle form
a chain, a highroad for humanity through the ages,
and the highest points of those vanished moments
are yet great and living for men; and this is the
fundamental idea of the belief in humanity that
finds a Voice in the demand for a "monumental"
history.®^
^ The Use and Abuse of History. 10, p. 69*
62Ibid., 2, p. 12. 63Xbid. 64Ibid.. p. 13.
300
Monumental history is necessary for "the man of
action and power who fights a great fight and needs
examples, teachers, and oomforters*"^ The promising
students, the young "fighters— that Is to say, those who
66
still have hope" but who need help and encouragement—
must look to past "monuments," for they are usually at a
loss to find such noble exemplars among their contempo
raries. When the great man dies, "one thing will live,
the sign manual of their inmost being, the rare flesh of
light, the deed, the creation; because posterity cannot
do without it*"^
"What 1b the use to modern man of this
*monumental * contemplation of the past, this preoccupation
with the rare and classic? It Is the knowledge that the
great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so
68
may be possible again." The self-surpassing man,
whether he be artist, philosopher, scientist or saint,
will more than likely find himself at odds with his con
temporaries, if not actually attacked and persecuted. In
such precarious circumstances he needs the vitalizing
65Ibld., p. 12.
^ The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
"Introduction," p. li.
*^The Use and Abuse of History. 2, p. 14,
301
spark that can oome only through his Identification with
someone else who has suffered through the same experi
ences, Nietzsche Illustrates the life-serving function
of "monumental" Identification and reflection:
He [the young fighter for culture] Is
heartened on the way; for his doubt In weaker
moments, whether his desire Is not for the
Impossible, Is struck aside. Suppose one should
believe that no more than a hundred men, brought
up In the new spirit, efficient and productive,
were needed to give the deathblow to the present
fashion of education In Germany; he will gather
strength from the remembrance that the culture of
the Renaissance was raised on the shoulders of
such another band of a hundred men.®*
There Is nothing objective or scientific about
monumental history. In Its attempt to construct an Image
worthy of emulation it distorts the facts to suit its own
70
purposes and "the past Itself suffers wrong."' Monumen
tal history may often partake of mythology and "sometimes
there is no possible distinction between a ♦monumental*
past and a mythical romance, as the same motives for
71
action can be gathered from the one world as the other."'
Nietzsche does not advocate distortion, but he sees that
it very likely will occur: "As long as the soul of
history is found in the great impulse that it gives to a
powerful spirit, as long as the past is principally used
69Ibid. 70Ibid., p. 15.
71Ibid.
302
as a model for Imitation, It Is always In danger of
being a little altered and touched up and brought nearer
to fiction."72 Monumental history, even If it resorts
to a bit of "romance," is Justified on the grounds that
it serves the higher goal of individual growth and
perfection.
The educator must be cautious in the use of
monumental history, for it is not meant for all types of
individuals. Each of the three types of history "will
flourish only in one ground and climate: otherwise it
•70
grows to a noxious weed."'-* Monumental history is only
for the productive person, for the individual who is
striving to create something new. In the hands of some
one who is already very strong, such as a powerful man
of action, monumental history may lead to harmful
consequences: "It entices the brave to rashness, and the
enthusiastic to fanticism by its tempting comparisons.
Imagine this history in the hands— and the head— of a
gifted egoist or an inspired scoundrel; kingdoms would be
overthrown, princes murdered, war and revolution let
7 2 l
loose."' Even worse than this, in Nietzsche1s mind, is
the effect that monumental history has in the hands of
72The Use and Abuse of History. 2, p. 15.
73Ibld.. p. 17. 721 Ibid., p. 16.
303
the "weak and inactive," the "inartistic and half-
artistic natures," the "dancing crowd"— i.e. the
"democratic" masses• 7' i Throughout the ages, argues
Nietzsche, the masses of mankind have always resented the
presence of anyone who made them look as they really
are— i.e, small and inconsequential. As a result, anyone
who looks as though he may deviate from the norm, who may
"stand out" as a convention-breaker and originator is
abused and suppressed by the envious mob. Weak persons
adopt monumental history as a weapon by which to defeat
contemporary genius; they invoke the weight of past
authority to slay the up-and-coming artist or thinker,
"for they do not want greatness to arise; their method
7 6
is to say, *See, the great thing is already here!’"'
Thus runs their argument, but "in reality they care as
little about the great thing that is already here as that
which is about to arise. Monumental history is the cloak
under which their hacred of present power and greatness
77
masquerades as an extreme admlnltion of the past."11
Their real motto is: "fLet the dead bury the— living.*"78
Ibid
Ibid
7gIbld.. p. 17.
78Ibid.. 3, p. 17.
Antiquarian History
Antiquarian history is concerned with the
preservation of our ancient and venerable past. It
appeals to "the man of conservative and reverent nature
who looks back to the origins of his existence with love
and trust.With devotion and loving care the
antiquary uncovers the furniture of past generations.
"All that Is small and limited, moldy and obsolete, gains
a worth and Inviolability of its own from the conserva
tive and reverent soul of antiquary migrating into it and
B n
building a secret nest there." With the perspicuity of
someone who has himself experienced what he is describing,
Nietzsche tells how the antiquary "surveys the marvelous
individual life of the past and identifies himself with
the spirit of the house, the family, and the city. He
greets the soul of his people from afar as his own,
across the dim and troubled centuries; his gifts and his
virtues lie in such power of feeling and divination, his
scent of a half-vanished trail, his instinctive correct-
81
ness in reading the scribbled past. ..." The
antiquarian spirit at its best is to be seen among the
poets and scholars of the Italian Renaissance, whose
^ The Use and Abuse of History, 3, p. 17.
80Ibid., p. 1 8. 81Ibid.
305
reverence for the past has perhaps never been equaled,
nor put to such good use.
The educator might well ask, of what use or value
Is antiquarian history? The greatest value, replies
Nietzsche, "of this antiquarian spirit of reverence lies
in the simple emotions of pleasure and content that It
leads to the drab, rough, even painful circumstances of
Op
a nation’s or individual's life," Another value of
this type of history is that it produces a stabilizing
effect on the community. "How could history serve life
better than by anchoring the less gifted races and
peoples to the homes and customs of their ancestors, and
keeping them from ranging far afield in search of better,
8 ^
to find only struggle and competition?" 0 Antiquarian
history has the value of providing lines of continuity
between the past and the present: "The feeling of the
tree that clings to its roots, the happiness of knowing
one’s growth to be not merely arbitrary and fortuitous
but the inheritance, the fruit and blossom, of a past
that does not merely Justify but crowns the present— this
is what we nowadays prefer to call the real historical
h84
sense."
®2Ibid., 3, p. 18. 83Ibld.. pp. 18-19.
811 Ibid.. p. 19.
306
Given Nietzschefs rather condescending tone when
discussing the merits of antiquarian history It Is not
surprising to discover that he also ascribes to It several
limitations and dangers. In the first place, like monu
mental history, It often distorts and colors the past.
The antiquary, by paying close attention to the details,
frequently misses altogether the Items of substance and
significance; his vision Is restricted by a lack of
distance. "Many things are not noticed at all; the others
are seen In Isolation, as through a microscope. There Is
no measure: equal Importance is given to everything, and
85
therefore too much to anything."
The loss of perspective degenerates Into the view
that everything that is ancient is equally venerable, with
the concomitant view that by comparison everything modern
Is inferior. Piety of the past thus becomes the enemy of
the new. "Antiquarian history degenerates from the moment
that It no longer gives a soul and Inspiration to the
8 6
fresh life of the present." Pursued without measure
8 7
the "spring of piety" ' may dry up, leaving nothing but
the scholarly habit: "The horrid spectacle is seen of the
mad collector raking over all the dust heaps of the past.
8^The Use and Abuse of History. 3, p. 19.
86Ibid.. p. 20. 87Ibid.
307
He breathes a moldy air; the antiquarian habit may degrade
a considerable talent, a real spiritual need in him, to a
mere insatiable curiosity for everything old; he often
sinks so low as to be satisfied with any food, and
greedily devours all the scraps that fall from the
O Q
bibliographical table."
Even if antiquarian history does not degenerate to
this lowly condition it still presents a danger, for at
its best "it only understands how to preserve life, not
to create it; and thus always undervalues the present
growth, having, unlike monumental history, no certain
8q
instinct for it." ? The educator must be cautious in his
zeal for this kind of history, lest he completely stifle
a student’s initiative and impulse to new thought and
action. An excess of piety for the past paralyzes the
ambitious youth and prevents him from braving the
perilous path to self-perfection.
Critical History
The aim of critical history is to analyze, judge
and ultimately destroy that part of the past which
deserves destruction. Man "must bring the past to the
bar of Judgment, interrogate it remorselessly, and finally
condemn it."90
88Tbid, "ibid. 90Ibid., p. 21.
308
Critical history serves the special needs of "he
whose heart is oppressed by an Instant need and who will
91
cast the burden off at any price* . « The man who
suffers from the sight of an unjust social practice may
find it necessary, in order to advance his cause, as well
as to relieve his conscience, to attack and demolish the
historical foundations that are cited in support of the
practice, "The same life that needs forgetfulness some
times needs its destruction; for should the injustice of
something ever become obvious— a monopoly, a caste, a
dynasty, for example— the thing deserves to fall. Its
past is critically examined, the knife put to its roots,
and all the ,pieties* are grimly trodden under foot."92
And thus our man is free to promote a new and better life
for the future.
No less than monumental and antijuarian history,
critical history distorts the past, "for its sentence is
always unmerciful, always unjust, as it never flows from
go
a pure fountain of knowledge."1 7 J However, the major
limitation and indeed danger of critical history is its
almost naive assumption that something better will
necessarily be at hand to replace what has been destroyed.
9^The Use and Abuse of History. 2, p. 17.
92Ibid.. 3, p. 21. 93Ibid.
309
The haste of denial and the fervor of reform frequently
results in the replacement of an old error by a new, more
pernicious error, Nietzsche recognizes, of course, that
this danger is the price we must pay for advancement of
culture and the furthering of man, for what is now
considered "old” was once itself "new.”
Let the educator remember that great care must be
exercised in encouraging or cultivating any or all of
these three kinds of history, "There is much harm wrought
by wrong and thoughtless plantings the critic who need
not be one, the antiquarian without reverence, he who
knows the great but cannot attain it, are plants that
have grown to weeds— they are torn from their native soil
Gil
and therefore degenerate,
Three Attitudes Toward Life
Historical
We have examined three specific types of history
and how they may be used to promote or hinder the
development of life. All three categories, however, are
but subdivisions of the general "historical" outlook,
which is itself but one of three attitudes which man may
adopt toward life: the "historical," the "unhistorical"
94Ibid., 2, p. 17.
and the supra-historical.
The historical attitude, exemplified in the three
categories just discussed, has Its basis In man's ability
to remember, In the mind's capacity to retain the past in
conscious awareness* Educators by and large have been
guided by the premise that memory Is an unqualified good,
and that the greater one's power of memory the greater
will be his happiness, health and success In life.
Forgetfulness is an unfortunate human trait that inter
feres with the process of education and growth. Nietzsche
directly challenges the soundness of this venerable
premise by refuting its empirical claims to happiness,
health and success. Let us consider each In turn.
Unhlstorlcal
Nietzsche contends that, on the psychological
level, pleasure and happiness depend on an element of
"timelessness," of the intellect's freedom from its
self-awareness as a being existing in time. "In the
smallest and greatest happiness there is always one thing
that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting, or, in
more learned phrase, the capacity of feeling
^ The Use and Abuse of* History, 1, pp. 8-9. In
the Levy translation Uberhlstorischen 1s rendered as
"super-historical." Since Nietzsche clearly means "above"
or "outside" the historical process of "becoming," "supra-
historical" would seem to be less misleading.
311
'unhistorically' throughout its duration. One who cannot
leave himself behind on the threshold of the moment and
forget the past, who cannot stand on a single point, like
a goddess of victory, without fear or giddiness will never
9 6
know what happiness is."?
It is the "weight of the past" that presses down
97
on man and "bows his shoulders." This dark and invisi
ble burden, commonly praised as memory, oppresses man
with the feelings of melancholy, satiety, regret and
remorse. Man "looks enviously on the beast1s
98
happiness,"^ living as it does in the present moment,
oblivious of past and future. "The beast lives
unhistorloally; for it 'goes into' the present, like a
99
number, without leaving any curious remainder." ^ It is
similar with a child, who "has nothing yet of the past to
disown and plays in a happy blindness between the walls of
the past and the future."100 Unlike the animal, the
child's happiness will not last, its play will be distur
bed, it will be summoned all-too-soon from "its little
kingdom of oblivion."101 That is, the child is socialized
into the adult world, "it learns to understand the words
9^The Use and Abuse of History. 1, p. 6.
97Ibid.. p. 5. " ibid. " ibid.
100Tbid., p. 6. 101Ibid.
312
'once upon a time,' the 'open sesame' that lets In battle,
suffering, and weariness on mankind and reminds them what
their existence really Is— an imperfect tense that never
102
becomes a present*" From the example of animals and
children, as well as adults experiencing pleasure,
Nietzsche concludes that "a happy life Is possible without
remembrance,"103 ^n excess of memory will actually
decrease not Increase human happiness.
The physiological, emotional and mental health of
man depends on periods of rest and lseep— I.e. on forget
fulness. This Is the means by which an organism's
tensions are resolved and health maintained. "One who
wished to feel everything historically would be like a
man forcing himself to refrain from sleep or a beast who
104
had to live by chewing a continual cud." An excess of
memory will upset the organic balance necessary to health.
"There is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of
'historical sense,* that injures and finally destroys the
living thing, be it- a man or a people or a system of
culture."10^ 5
Man is by nature not only a reflective animal,
but an active one as well. To live a successful and
102Ibid. 103Ibld., p. 7*
104Ibid. 105Ibid.
313
rewarding life man must not be hindered in his powers of
action. Yet an excess of "remembrance" has precisely
this negative effect: "The extreme case would be the man
without any power to forget, who Is condemned to see
becoming* everywhere. Such a man no longer believes in
himself or his own existence; he sees everything fly past
In an eternal succession and loses himself In the stream
of becoming."10^ In order to act man must be able to
free himself from the past: "forgetfulness is the pro
perty of all action."^-07
The tendency of modern man is to become too
"historical." "It is a dangerous symptom when the mind
of a nation turns with preference to the study of the
" I f i f t
past.” For this reason Nietzsche upholds the impor
tance in man»s life of the "unhistorical" attitude. But
this is not to argue for one attitude at the expense of
the other: "The unhistorical and the historical are
equally necessary to the health of an individual, a
109
community, and a system of culture." * Since history is
106Ibid.. p . 6. 107Ibld.
i nf)
Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. 3. The Complete
Works. Vol. 4, p. II9T
•^^The Use and Abuse of History, 1, p. 8. That
Nietzsche is Just as opposed to a lackof historical sense
as he is to an excess can be seen in his criticism of
philosophers who "think that they show their respect for
a subject when they de-historicize it." Twilight of the
quite useless unless It serves life, and since life
consists of a changing continuity of dynamic tension, it
Is to be expected that the two historical attitudes will
themselves exist in such a state of dynamic tension, a
dialectical Interplay of two mental sets. On the one
hand, "It Is true that man can only become man by first
suppressing this unhistorical element In his thoughts,
comparisons, distinctions, and conclusions, letting a
clear sudden light break though these misty clouds by his
power of turning the past to the uses of the present."11^
On the other hand, "an excess of history makes him flag
again, while without the veil of the unhistorical he
would never have the courage to begin. What deeds could
man ever have done if he had not been enveloped in the
ill
dust-cloud of the unhistorical."
Supra-Hlst oric a1
A third attitude that one may adopt in viewing
life is that of the "supra-historical.1 1 From a vantage
point above the flux of histqry one looks upon the
historical process with calm, philosophical detachment; he
sees that "the past and the present are one and the same,
Idols. '"Reason* in Philosophy," 1. The Portable
Nietzsche, p. 479.
^•^The Use and Abuse of History. 1, p. 8. 111 Ibid.
315
typically alike In all their diversity and forming
together a picture of eternally present imperishable
-112
types of unchangeable value and significance."
Men have resorted to the supra-historical atti
tude for a variety of reasons, for escape, for peace of
mind, for "wisdom," for aesthetic contemplation, etcetera.
But we are here concerned with the supra-hlstorlcal only
in reference to how it may serve life, how it may help
H , a
us go forward within the "Western prejudice" J of living
an active life in the dimension of history. Let us
briefly discuss two ways in which the supra-historical may
serve life: first, as an antidote to an excess of his
tory; second, as supplying a meaning to existence.
We have seen that modern man suffers from the
malady of history: "Excess of history has attacked the
plastic power of life that no more understands how to use
the past as a means of strength and nourishment. It is
Hii
a fearful disease." One remedy or antidote to history
is the "unhistorical," which allows man to "forget." The
other antidote is the supra-hlstorlcal, which teaches man
not to take history too seriously. "The unhistorical and
the supra-historical are the natural antidotes against the
112Ibid.. p. 11. 113Ibid.
m ibid.. 10, p. 69.
316
over-powering of life by history; they are the cures for
the historical disease. We who are sick of the disease
may suffer a little from the antidote. But this is no
proof that the treatment we have chosen is wrong.
The real significance of the supra-hlstorlcal
attitude in Nietzsche's own philosophy is not that it can
be used as an antidote to excess historicism, but that it
suggests an answer to the question of the meaning of
existence. When "historical men" contemplate the past it
"turns them toward the future, encourages them to per
severe with life, and kindles the hope that justice will
yet come and happiness is behind the mountain they are
climbing. They believe that the meaning of existence will
become ever clearer in the course of its evolution; they
look backward at the process only to understand the
present and stimulate their longing for the future."11^
In contrast, for the supra-historical man "the world is
complete and fulfills its aim in every single moment;" he
117
"sees no salvation in evolution."
The supra-hlstorlcal perspective taught Nietzsche
that great individuals appear from time to time and give
meaning to existence; "The aim of mankind can be
115The Use and Abuse of History. 10, p. 70.
llgIbid.. 1, p. 10. 117Ibid.
317
i i Q
ultimately only in its highest examples.” These
superior men are not the result of evolution or progress,
for they are just as rare, if not rarer, in modern times
as in the past* Great individuals ”form a sort of bridge
over the wan stream of becoming*” ”They live out of time,
as contemporaries, . • • they live as the Republic of
geniuses of which Schopenhauer speaks* One giant calls
119
to the other across the waste space of time.”
History in the Schools
The Paradox of the Greeks
It is probably impossible for contemporary man to
think of education without thinking of courses in history.
If not an Integral dimension of one’s specialty (e.g. the
natural sciences are currently being taught in most
United States schools from a non-historical perspective)
historical surveys and in-depth period studies neverthe
less dominate the general curriculum* A man lacking in
historical sense simply is not an educated person— or so
we feel— and to guarantee this we make sure that every
student is exposed to at least United States and World
HJstory* But are we correct in assuming that historical
studies are necessary to education? Nietzsche thinks not.
Let us imagine an ancient Greek surveying our schools
118Ibid*. 9, p. 59. 119Ibid*
318
and universities'
He would observe that for modern men "education”
and "historical education” seem to mean the same
thing, with the difference that the one phrase Is
longer * And If he spoke of his own theory, that a
man can be very well educated without any history
at all, people would shake their heads and think
they had not heard aright. The Greeks, the famous
people of a past still near to us, had the "unhis-
torlcal sense” strongly developed In the period of
their greatest power* If a typical child of his
age were transported to that world by some enchant
ment, he would probably find the Greeks very
"uneducated.”12^
Nietzsche*s point Is that the Greeks were too
busy creating their own unique and challenging culture to
be concerned about what happened In the past. And who are
we to say that the goal of an educated man should be to
live in the past rather than to create in the present!
"For we moderns have nothing of our own. We only become
worth notice by filling ourselves to overflowing with
foreign customs, arts, philosophies, religions, and
sciences; we are wandering encyclopedias, as an ancient
Greek who had strayed Into our time would probably call
121
us.” The moral here Is not that historical knowledge
Is necessarily detrimental, but that there is the danger
of becoming so preoccupied with the past that we begin to
treat It as an end rather than as a means to the higher
goals of critical thinking and self-perfection, "many a
120Ibld., 4, p. 24. 121Ibid.
man falls to become a thinker for the sole reason that
122
his memory Is too good.”
The great historians, ironically, have frequently
been the ones most aware of the undue emphasis given to
historical studies In modern education. They have seen,
through their own study of the past, that a culture's
greatness in no way depended upon the development of an
historical sense, in or out of the schools. "One finds
that the greater and more developed ♦historical men* are
conscious of all the superstition and absurdity In the
belief that a people's education need be so extremely
historical as it is; the mightiest nations, mightiest In
action and Influence, have lived otherwise, and their
123
youth has been trained otherwise."
The paradox is that "history must solve the
12ii
problem of history." We moderns live in an historical
age, we conceive of ourselves as eplgoni, followers,
latecomers on the world's stage. The pressing question
thus becomes, Which cultural period shall we take as our
model? The best we have been able to do to date Is to
imitate the second-rate Alexandrian culture, which was
122
Human, A11-too-Human, "Miscellaneous Maxims
and Opinions," 122. The flompleve Works, Vol. 7, p. 66.
l^The Use and Abuse of History, 8, pp. 47-48.
12^Ibid.. p. 50.
320
but a "fading antiquity"; "we might go on to place before
us, as our noblest prize, the still higher task of
striving beyond and above this Alexandrian world; and
bravely find our prototypes in the ancient Greek world,
125
where all was great, natural, and human*" • ' And now the
paradox becomes clear, for "it is Just there that we find
the reality of a true unhistorical culture— and in spite
of that, or perhaps because of it, an unspeakably rich
and vital culture* Were we Germans nothing but followers,
we could not be anything greater or prouder than the
1 nfC
lineal inheritors and followers of such a culture."
The wise teacher will thus utilize the historical
approach to lead students to an unhistorical culture
(i*e* Greek culture), with the result that the students
will see for themselves that creativity and self-surpas-
sing has little relationship to scholarly knowledge of the
past.
Digestive Limitations
Every teacher has probably asked himself: "How
much historical information should I expect my students
to learn?" Nietzsche’s answer is that the limit should
always be determined by one’s ability to digest the
125Ibid., pp. 50-51. 126Ibid.. p. 51.
information and utilize it in the service of life and
self-surpassing. By digestion Nietzsche does not mean
retention and recall, but the organism's ability to act
upon the "input" and to convert it into something new and
productive. Depending on their position in the order of
rank, individuals vary a great deal in their ability to
digest. Those rare individuals who stand at the top of
the hierarchy— a Goethe, for example— may be able to
digest an enormous quantity of historical information.
However, the teacher must always be on guard not to demand
historical knowledge beyond the student's digestive
capacity.
In the hands of the self-surpassing individual
"history becomes yielding clay," something which "he may
fashion" to his own purposes, not the purposes of learned
127
scholarship, 1 The antiquarian spirit will not be
entirely lacking, for "he will naturally do this with
love and a certain becoming reverence, but with the
sovereign right of the creator notwithstanding,"
One must not let reverence for the past— i.e. the
antiquarian spirit— hinder the appropriation of the past
by the present. One can test an age for an excess of
127
'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, 3* The Complete
Works, Vol, 4, p. 117T
128ibid.
322
historical sense by observing to what extent It feels
free to make "translationsw and to attempt "to embody In
12Q
Itself past periods and literatures*"
The educator must be constantly aware of the
dangerous temptation that historical studies present for
the Intellectual and sensitive student: the temptation
to withdraw Into the sedantary comforts and smug happiness
of a bookish world. To be a complete man, and certainly
to be a creative, self-surpassing man, one must be
equipped to act* Yet by their very nature historical
studies "tend to paralyze action," "to soften a man
unduly," and to hinder the expression of "his construc
tive powers. " 1 ^ 0
True to Nietzsche's general axlologlcal position
that opposition and danger are necessary Ingredients In
the process of self-surpassing, we discover that the
"historical sense," for one who is strong enough to
incorporate its findings as part of "his own history,"1^
may prove to be the key to undreamt of Joy and spiritual
nobility. To have personally felt all the grief and
129The Joyful Wisdom, 8 3, The Complete Works,
Vol. 1 0, p. “I I S ' . ------ ------ ---------
130
Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, 3. The Complete
Works. Vol. 4, p. 11“*
131rphe Joyful Wisdom, 337. The Complete Works.
Vol. 10, p • ' " £ ( > 4*
323
suffering of past ages, to have relived the passions and
ecstasies of the ancients,
to take all this upon his soul, the oldest, the
newest, the losses, hopes, conquests, and victories
of mankind: to have all this at last in one soul,
and to comprise it in one feeling— this would
necessarily furnish a happiness which man has not
hitherto known— a God’s happiness, full of power
and love, full of tears and laughter. This divine
feeling might then be called— humanity!132
The University Scholar
The university would seem to be the one institu
tion of society that is totally dedicated to the pursuit
of truth and the cultivation of genius* Since medieval
times the university has been recognized as the true
citadel of learning. The nineteenth-century German
university, with its world-famous scholarship, was
thought to be the faithful heir of the noblest traditions
of Western culture.
World-renown notwithstanding, Nietzsche maintained
that the creative spirit necessary for the furthering of
art, science and philosophy was fast disappearing from the
universities, that the ideal of the scholar was replacing
that of the productive thinker* Indeed, it has reached
the point that scholarship stands opposed to wisdom and
creativity]
132Ibid., p. 265*
324
Here and there I come Into contact with German
universities: what an atmosphere prevails among
their scholars, what desolate spirituality— and
how contented and lukewarm It has become I It would
be a profound misunderstanding If one wanted to
adduce German science against me— It would also be
proof that one has not read a word I have written.
For seventeen years I have never tired of calling
attention to the desplrltuallzlng Influence of our
current science-indusfcry. The hard helotism to
which the tremendous range of the sciences condemns
every scholar today Is a main reason why those with
a fuller, richer, profounder disposition no longer
find a congenial education and congenial educators.
There is nothing of which our culture suffers more
than of the .superabundance of pretentious Jobbers
and fragments of humanity; our universities are,
against their will, the real hothouses for this
kind of withering of the instincts of the spirit.133
In order to establish his case Nietzsche finds It neces
sary to dissect the Image of the academic scholar.
The Dissection of the Scholar
In the name of objectivity and scientific rigor
our professors and scholars consider it their duty to view
the world as a series of intellectual problems, carefully
divorced from the passions and instincts. Nietzsche ob
serves that "scholarship [Wlssensehaft] has the same
relationship to wisdom as righteousness has to holiness:
It is cold and dry, it Is loveless and knows no deep
1^ Twilight of the Idols. "What the Germans
Lack," 3. frhe Portable Nietzsche, pp.. 507-508.
325
1 qii
feelings of inadequacy or longing.”
The danger, as Nietzsche sees it, is that the
conditions which promote scholarship hinder self-
1 3c
perfection and the cultivation of superior men. A
young man who embarks on a scholarly career, who must
live and work among scholars, will soon ossify into
nothing more than a living skeleton. "If one accustoms
oneself to translating every experience into a dialectic
play of question and answer and into a purely intellectual
matter, it is astonishing in how short a time man can
wither up at such activity and become a bunch of rattling
1
bones.” But why, then, would anyone want to Join the
ranks of scholarship? To answer this question Nietzsche
suggests that we adopt the scholar1s technique of blood
less dissection— only in this case the scalpel will be
applied to the scholar himself, to discover what motives,
^ ^ Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, p. 71.
Zarathustra proclaims that Hif you seize them [the
scholars] with your hands they raise a cloud of dust like
flour bags, involuntarily; but who could guess that their
dust comes from grain and from the yellow delight of
summer fields?” Thus Spoke Zarathustra. II, ”0n
Scholars,” The Portable Nietzsche, p. 237.
^^^The terms "superior man,” "genius” and
"philosopher” are used by Nietzsche to indicate the
creative, self-surpassing individual. He later employs
the term "superman."
• ^ Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, p. 71.
326
values and desires chain him to the academic life. As we
proceed with the dissection it will become clear that the
scholar "consists of a confused tangle of very different
motives and stimuli,"137 that he possesses certain valu
able traits and skills but that these are usually wasted
or misemployed because of a distorted hierarchy of values.
Three General Traits
There are three general traits that are regularly
to be seen among scholars: first, "a strong and ever-
increasing inquisitiveness, the search for intellectual
adventure."138 In the scholar this impulse leads him to
whatever is "new and rare in contrast to the old and
boring."139 A second trait is "a certain inclination to
dialectical sleuthing, the huntsman's Joy in cunning,
foxy ways of thought, so that It is not actually truth
which is sought but rather the seeking itself, and the
chief pleasure is found In a cunning encircling and an
itoo
artful kill," A third general trait is "the compulsion
to contradict; the scholar1s personality will assert
Itself in opposition to all others; battle becomes a Joy,
and personal victory is the goal, whereas the fight for
137Ibid., p, 72. 138Ibid.
139Ibid. 11,0 Ibid.
327
ijii
truth is only the pretext,”
One might well remark that inquisitiveness,
dialectical sleuthing and contest are necessary qualities
of the educated man. But in the scholar these Impulses
lack direction! they are not being guided by the goal of
self-perfection. Instead of pursuing the truth wherever
it may lead, the scholar pursues only those particular
truths that he feels will bring him recognition, income,
security, promotion and other personal benefits. The
scholar inquires not out of a passion for truth, but
"out of servility to particular ruling people, castes,
opinions, churches and governments, because he feels that
he is advancing himself by bringing 1truth* to their
Bide."11*2
Twelve Additional Traits
In addition to the three general traits just
described there are other qualities to be found in
scholars. These qualities occur "less regularly, but
140
often enough," J First, there is respectability and a
reverence for old or accepted opinions. However, "this
respectability is of little worth and seldom fruitful
Schopenhauer as Educator, p, 72,
li|2Ibid. ^ 3 Ibid.
328
even for scholarship, since it is a slave to convention
and is in the habit of telling the truth only in simple
matters or in adlaphoris; for in these cases it is easier
i i ] i
to tell the truth than to keep it quiet.” The scholar
tends to resist anything that is really new, anything that
might upset established ways of thought, anything that
liic
"necessitates a re-learning." J Nietzsche argues that
"every generation of scholars has an involuntary standard
146
for permissible sagacity." If any scholar should be
imprudent enough to suggest an hypothesis which challenges
the current standard, the hypothesis is not only doubted
but "used as a basis for an attack on the scholar's
1JU7
reputation." ' A good example of this is the Copernlcan
hypothesis, which "was opposed by a respectability which
2 i > 3
had common sense and custom on its side."
l44Ibid.. pp. 72-73. l45Ibid., p. 73.
146Ibid. 147Ibid.
Tllft
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 73. Speaking
through the mouth of Zarathustra Nietzsche comments on his
own experience among scholars:
"I have moved from the house of the scholars
and I even banged the door behind me. My soul sat
hungry at their table too long} I am not, like them,
trained to pursue knowledge as if it were nutcracking.
I love freedom and the air over the fresh earth;
rather would I sleep on ox hides than on their
decorums and respectabilities."
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. II, "On Scholars." The Portable
Nietzsche, pp. 23b-237.
329
Secondly, the scholar has a highly developed
"sharpsightedness for near objects* . . , unfortu
nately this trait, which Is almost universal among
scientific workers, is "linked with a severe myopia for
distant and general objects*"1* ’0 If we look carefully we
find that:
The scholarfs field of vision is usually very
small, and his eyes must be held close to the
object. If he wants to move from one point which
he has Just investigated to another, he must move
his whole seeing apparatus. He analyzes a picture
into sections, like someone who uses opera glasses
to see the stage, and sees now a hand, now a piece
of clothing, but nothing complete. He never sees
those single sections connectedly, he only infers
their interrelationship; therefore, he has no
strong impression of anything general. For example,
he judges a piece of writing by single passages,
sentences or errors because he is incapable of
seeing it as a whole; he would be tempted to main
tain that an oil painting is a confused heap of
blotches.
Thirdly, the scholar is generally of a "sober and
152
conventional" disposition. This trait will express
itself as an interest in historical studies whereby the
scholar receives special delight in discovering his own
commonplace motives in the events of the past* "A mole is
happiest in a mole-hill."133 Because his own motives and
preferences are so commonplace he is usually "incapable of
Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, p. 73
150lbid. 151Ibid.
152Ibid. 153Ibld.. p. 74.
330
understanding and valuing what Is rare, great and uncommon,
l«5li
that Is, what Is Important and essential*"
Fourthly, the scholar has a detached, cold, hard,
even cruel quality which allows him "to perform vivisec
tions."'1 '^^ This enables him to venture Into "realms where
156
other*s hearts quake." J This may appear to be a sign
of courage, but In reality it Is simply an indication of
157
the scholar*s "poverty and dryness of feeling." The
emotions having been allowed to wither away, the scholar
has no idea of the suffering which accompanies many kinds
of knowledge."1'*® People may think that he "is audacious,
but he is not— not any more than the mule which does not
know dizziness."1' * 9
Another characteristic is that by and large
scholars are humble and modest. They show "little self
esteem"1^® or pride. "Even though they are condemned to
obscurity, they have no sense of sacrifice or wasted
x 6x
effort." There is no sense of sacrifice because they
"seem to know that deep down in them they are creatures
that crawl, not fly."1* * 2
Sixthly, scholars are followers, faithful
154Ibid. 155Ibid. 1 5*Ibid.
1 5 7 Ibid. 158Ibid. 159Ibid.
l6°Ibid. 161Ibid. 162Ibid.
331
i gg
Imitators of "their teachers and leaders*" Scholars
are thankful for guidance and desirous to help their
academic superiors, for they realize that "it is only
through them that they gained entrance into the worthy
halls of scholarship, into which they would never have
igji
come had they followed their own way," A curious con
sequence is that nowadays, with so many young graduates
pressing to be let into the academic ranks, "whoever
opens up a new field, where even lesser minds can work
16*5
with some success, becomes famous in a short time." J
However, this is a mixed blessing for the master, for in
the process of imitation "his faults appear immoderately
large and exaggerated. The master*s virtues are thus
correspondingly diminished because they occur in such
petty individuals,"1^
William James once remarked that habit is the
great flywheel of society. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the life of the scholar who, out of a lack of
ideas, routinely progresses in his career from sheer
"force of habit."^7
Such persons are collectors, explainers and
compilers of indices and herbaria; they study
and do research in the field for the simple reason
igg
^Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 74.
l6i*Ibld. l65Ibid., pp. 74-75.
166Ibid.. p. 75. l67Ibid.
332
that it does not occur to them that there are
other fields. Their industry has something off l
the huge stupidity of the forces of gravity,1®0
Eighthly, the scholar pursues his work out of a
fear of boredom. While the self-surpassing man desires
nothing so much as leisure, "the common scholar avoids it
169
because he does not know what to do with it." The
170
scholarTs primary means of escape is the printed page.
Ninthly, the scholar is faced, as are most
laborers, with the problem of earning a living, "that is,
171
the famous fborborygraus of an empty stomach.™ However,
It is difficult to set limits to oneTs material needs, and
soon the scholar knows no higher goal than that of his own
economic advantage. His life and studies are then con
trolled by his desire to earn as much money as possible:
Truth is served when it is able to promote
one quickly to good salaries and higher positions,
or at least to win the favor of those who have
bread and honors to confer. But only this truth
is served. Therefore, a line can be drawn between
the profitable truths, which are served by many,
and the unprofitable truths, to which very few are
devoted.1**
A "rarer but higher motive than the last, yet not
168Ibid. 169Ibid.
^"^The temptation and danger of books are dis
cussed later in this chapter.
171
1 Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 75.
172Ibid.. pp. 75-76.
333
uncommon,"173 is the scholar's respect for his colleagues
and his willingness to abide by the rules of the academic
game:
All the members of the guild most jealously
watch over each other so that the truth, on which
so much hangs— bread, office and honor— might be
baptized in the name of its discoverer. One pays
strict tribute to the other man for the truth that
he has found in order to demand the tribute back
in case one should discover a truth himself. Mis
takes and errors are noisily exploded so that the
number of competitors does not become too large;
yet sometimes even the real truth is exploded, so
for a short time at least the way is cleared for
stubborn and brazen errors.174
Somewhat less frequent is vanity. The vain
scholar "wants, if possible, to have a field all to him
self, and for this reason he chooses curiosities,
especially when they involve unusual expenditures,
travels, excavations and numerous connections in various
17 c
countries." His satisfaction comes not from financial
remuneration but from the honor and recognition given
173ibid., p. 7 6. 174Ibid.
17** Schopenhauer as Educator. p. 76. Scholars may
stick olosely together, but it is not without suspicion
and malice. In the words of Zarathustra:
"They watch each other closely and mistrust
fully. Inventive in petty cleverness, they wait
for those whose knowledge walks on lame feet:
like spiders they wait. I have always seen them
carefully preparing poison; and they always put
on gloves of glass to do it. They also know how
to play with loaded dice; and I have seen them
play so eagerly that they sweated."
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, "On Scholars." The Portable
Nietzsche.' ’ p’ p ' . " 237-23B. ---------
him as an expert and specialist.
A twelfth characteristic to be found In the
scholar Is the play-instinct• "He finds delight In
looking for and solving knotty problems In the sciences,
taking care not to exert himself too much lest he lose the
spirit of the game.."'*'7^ It is true that the scholar’s
"playfulness" is a device for avoiding depth, but it does
have the saving virtue of allowing him to perceive things
that the overly somber, "professional scholar, with his
177
laboriously creeping eyes, never sees."
What the Scholar Lacks
Considering this motley collection of desirable
as well as all-too-human traits that characterize the
scholar, what judgment are we to make as to his worth?
Nietzsche’s conclusion is that the scholar at his best is
a "harmless drudge" (to borrow a term from Dr.. Johnson)
and at his worst a corrupter of youth. The reason for
the unfruitful nature of the scholar is not that he
possesses all-too-human traits and animalistic impulses
(for the genius and superman also possess these) but that
he lacks the axiologlcal orientation which would lead him
176
' Sohopenhauer as Educator. 6, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 .
177Ibid., p. 77.
335
on to more creative endeavors. The scholar's life is not
being guided by the ultimate aim of self-surpassing. He
has given up or never Joined in the struggle to produce
conditions of challenge favorable to the genesis of genius.
If the scholar heeds the call, "Become who you are!" he
will cease to be a scholar and become a philosopher. As
it stands the scholar is simply "too Ignorant of the goal
of culture."178
Pedagogically the scholar lacks the one trait
most necessary to learning— i.e, passion. To be effective
as a teacher or as a learner one must be on fire with the
passion to know and the desire to create a Just culture
(i.e, a culture which values individual great men).
Nietzsche asserts that "a spark from the fire of Justice,
when it falls into the soul of a scholar, is enough to
enflame his whole life and aspirations, to consume and at
the same time to purify them, so that he has no more rest
and is driven out for good from the luke-warm or frosty
179
mood in which most scholars do their daily work."
Nietzsche believes that it is of utmost importance
not to confuse the scholar with the self-surpassing man.
If we fail to keep the two types of men distinct we are In
danger of elevating the scholar to the position of serving
178Ibid., p. 78. 179Ibid., p. 77.
336
as our educational Ideal. Nietzsche argues that we should
not make the error of thinking that one can be both a
scholar and a creative person: "Geniuses and scholars
180
have at all times been at war." Indeed, history
teaches us that "very fortunate times neither needed nor
knew the scholar} sick and decadent times valued him as
l8l_
the highest and most worthy man and ranked him highly,"
The reaction of the productive thinkers to the
passionless scholar Is expressed In the metaphors of
Zarathustra:
I am too hot and burned by my own thoughts;
often It nearly takes my breath away. Then I
must go out Into the open and away from all dusty
rooms. But they [the scholars] sit cool In the
oool shade: in everything they want to be mere
spectators, and they beware of sitting where the
sun burns on the steps. Like those who stand In
the street and gape at the people who pass by,
they too wait and gape at thoughts that others
have thought.1“2
The Scholar and the Teaching of Philosophy
Perhaps the best illustration of the corrupting
effect of the scholarly ideal can be seen in the teaching
of philosophy. Both the professor and the students suffer
< 1 O A
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 78.
181Ibid.
^8^ThUs Spoke Zarathustra, II, "On Scholars."
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 257.
337
when philosophy makes concessions to scholarship* Let us
examine each In turn*
When the ideal of the scholar rules, the philoso
phy professor Is not expected "to be a thinker but at the
most an lntellectuallzer and cerebrater, and above all a
learned connoisseur of all early thinkers; he will always
be able to tell something about them which his students
did not know*”1®^
At the hands of the scholar, with his narrow
historical interests, his lack of passion and his
withered Imagination, philosophy prostitutes itself to
the history of philosophy* Erudition is substituted for
Nietzsche counters this scholarly ideal by arguing
that "the learned history of the past was never the
Schopenhauer as Educator* 8, p* 97.
18 a
That Nietzsche is speaking from personal ex
perience can be seen in the following reflections made
late in life on his past academic careen
"I saw that it was high time for a little
introspection. At once it became appallingly
clear to me how much time I had already wasted—
how useless, how willful my whole existence as a
philologist appeared by the side of my life-task.
I was ashamed of this false modesty* . « , Ten
years were behind me, during which I had received
absolutely no spiritual nourishment, during which
I had acquired no useful knowledge, but had for
gotten countless things in the pursuit of a
hotch-potch of dry-as-dust scholarship. To plow
through old Qreek metricians, meticulously, half-
blind— that was what I had come to!"
Eoce Homo, "Human, All-too-Human," 3. The Philosophy of
338
business of a true philosopher, either in India or in
Greece; and a philosophy professor, if he concerns him
self with such things, must be content with people saying
of him at best: ’He is an excellent philologist,
antiquary, linguist, historian1— but never: fHe is a
philosopher,* By this criterion much that passes for
philosophy in our institutions of higher learning and in
our scholarly Journals is not philosophy at all, but
merely a display of the academician*s delight in "wallow-
186
ing in strange and twisted opinions,"
If one doubts the extent of the inroads made by
the pedants Nietzsche suggests that one look at the recent
scholarly works dealing with Greek philosophy, Nietzsche
cites several reputable nineteenth-century German
scholars— Ritter, Brandis and Zeller— as examples of
university professors who have nothing better to do than
write "horribly boring" texts which spread a "soporific
haze" over the genius of the Greeks,'1 '®^ Nietzsche goes
Nietzsche, p. 88l,
•^^Schopenhauer as Educator, 8, p. 9 8,
18*md.
^ ^ Ibld. Of the three historians cited only
Eduard Zeller (1814-1908) is still widely read today.
Zeller*s major writings on the Greeks are currently in
print— some even in paperback editions. His Outlines of
the History of Greek Philosophy is "recommended reading"
in most philosophy classes In this country.
339
so far as to say that! "I at least prefer reading
Diogenes Laertius to Zeller, because In the former at
least the spirit of the ancient philosophers lives, In
the latter, however, neither that nor any other spirit
188
lives*" A professor who Is more concerned with accur
ate historical Information than with recreating a living,
passionate image of a great thinker has no right to be
called a philosopher*
When we turn to the plight of the philosophy
students we see to what extent the scholarly Ideal has
pervaded the colleges and universities* Nietzsche's
remarks deserve quoting in their entirety:
For heaven's sake, what business have our
youths with the history of philosophy? Shall the
confusion of opinions discourage them from having
opinions of their own? Shall they be trained to
Join in the Jubilation of our wonderful progress?
Shall they even learn to hate and despise philosophy?
One would almost think the latter was the case if
one knew how students have to torture themselves
for their philosophy examinations in order to cram
into their brains the craziest and sharpest ideas
of the human mind together with the greatest and
l88
Schopenhauer as Educator* p. 98* Diogenes
Laertius, who probably lived in the early third-century
A,D,, was the author of an extant work titled Lives of
the Philosophers» This work contains much fascinating
information about the private lives of the ancient Greek
philosophers (including the content of Aristotle's will)*
The full thrust of Nietzsche's comparison can only be
understood in light of the fact that Diogenes' Lives is
considered to be unreliable, uncritical, perhaps largely
fictional, and of no real philosophical value in Itself
(as Nietzsche was well aware!)*
340
most difficult. The only criticism of a philoso
phy which is possible, and which also proves
something— that of seeing if one can live by it—
has never been taught at the universities: but
always criticism of words by words* And now let
one imagine a youthful and inexperienced mind, in
which fifty verbal systems and fifty criticisms
of the same are stored next to each other in
confusion— what wilderness, what chaos, what
mockery of the philosophical educationI In fact,
one is not educated for philosophy, as is admitted,
but for a philosophy examination: the usual result
being, as is well known, that the person taking the
test— an all too severe test]— says to himself with
a heavy sigh: "Thank God that I am no philosopher,
but a Christian and a citizen of my State!"189
The most harmful consequence of scholars masquerading as
philosophers is that "they make philosophy something
ridiculousand thereby insure that students will look
with scorn on the highest goal of culture: "the produc-
191
tion of philosophical genius," *
Books and Reading
The Danger of Books
Printed materials, especially books and scholarly
Journals, present a particular danger to those engaged
in the academic life. Scholars, surrounded as they
necessarily are by the sine qua non of their trade— the
printed word— all too frequently succumb to the temptation
of letting books do the thinking for them; that is, they
Schopenhauer as Educator, pp. 98-99.
190Ibld., p. 103. 191Ibid.. p. 99.
341
become passive receivers Instead of active thinkers.
The scholar who actually does little else than
welter In a sea of books— the average philologist
may handle two hundred a day--finally loses com
pletely the ability to think for himself. He
cannot think unless he has a book In his hands.
When he thinks, he responds to a stimulus (a
thought he has read)— and finally all he does Is
react. The scholar devotes all his energy to
affirming or denying or criticizing matter which
has already been thought out— he no longer thinks
himself,1*2
Speaking with the authority of someone who had himself led
the scholarly life, who had immersed himself In original
research in that most "bookish" of all fields—
philology— Nietzsche sadly observes:
With my own eyes I have seen gifted, richly-
endowed, free-splrlted natures already "read to
pieces" at thirty— nothing but matches that have
to be struck before they can emit any sparkB— or
"thoughts," To read a book early in the morning,
at daybreak, in the vigor and dawn of one’s
strength— this is sheer v i c i o u s n e s s 1
Eode Homo, "Why I am so Clever," 8, The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p, 849* Nietzsche experienced a
"new birth" in his own life when he liberated himself from
books:
"That essential self, which had been buried,
as it were, which had lost its voice under the
pressure of being forced to listen to other selves
continually (which is what reading means!),
awakened slowly, timidly, doubtfully— but at last
it spoke again."
Ecce Homo, "Human, All-too-Human," 4, The Philosophy of
NletzscKe. pp. 882-883,
^^Eoee Homo, "Why I am so Clever," 8, The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 849, While a student at the
University of Leipzig', Nietzsche had devoted considerable
time to the detailed study of three ancient Creek philoso
phers: Theognls, Diogenes Laertius and Democritus, Out
342
A Positive Use
On the positive side Nietzsche credits books with
the virtue of providing relaxation from the arduous tasks
of creativity employing the mind. When tensions become
unbearable one turns to a book for refreshment. Reading
a book is the comic relief in the drama of productive
thinking.
In my case, reading in general is one of my
methods of recuperation; consequently it is a
part of that which enables me to escape from myself,
to wander in strange sciences and strange souls— of
that, about which I am no longer in earnest. Indeed,
reading allows me to recover from m^ earnest
ness . . . The periods of work and productivity are
followed by periods of recuperation: to me, ye
pleasant, intellectual, intelligent books
A few carefully chosen books is all that is necessary, at
least in Nietzsche's own case, to fulfill the purpose of
"escape": "I almost always take refuge in the same books,
few in number, books exactly fitting my needs. Perhaps
of these studies came a monograph titled Zur Qeschlchte
der Theognideisohen Spruchsammlung [Toward a History of
the Collected Aphorisms of Vheognis], which was published
by a leading Journal of classical philology. Following
this, Nietzsche wrote, at the age of twenty-three, a
prize-winning essay on Diogenes Laertius titled De
fontlbus Dlogenis Laertli [On the Sources of Diogenes
Laertius], wnich was later published in the soholarly
Rhelnisohes Museum. For Nietzsche's reference to this
essay see Ecoe teomo, "Why I am so Clever," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 840.
^ ^ Ecce Homo. "Why I am so Clever," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp. 839-840.
343
it is not in my nature to read much, or variously: a
igc
library makes me ill,"
Nietzsche is not giving blanket approval to the
use of books as a means of "escape," For the self
surpassing individual it is an integral part of the
dialectic of growth; for the pedant it is merely a flight
from ennui:
While the real thinker longs for nothing so
much as leisure, the common scholar avoids it
because he does not know what to do with it. Books
are his consolation; that is, he listens while
someone else thinks and in this way passes the long
day. In particular, he chooses books which in some
way excite his personal participation, which can
make him feel likes or dislikes; books, that is,
which deal with himself, or his class, or his
political, aesthetic or grammatical dogmas. If
he has his own special field of study, then he is
never lacking means of entertainment or fly-swatters
to combat boredom,19o
External "Noise"
The student must learn that creative thought and
expression cannot take place if his mind is being dis
tracted by outside stimuli. To give birth to a new idea
requires complete concentration of purpose and strength.
At such a moment books must be avoided, for they too are
^Eooe Homo, p, 840, With Nietzsche*s poor eye
sight, at times approaching blindness, it is little wonder
that libraries made him 1111
Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p, 75*
344
but distracting external "noise," In Eoce Homo Nietzsche
describes his own protective procedure:
When I am deep in work, no books are to be
seen near me; I carefully guard against allowing
any one to speak or even to think in my presence.
For that is what reading amounts to,.. • . Has
any one ever actually noticed, that, during that
profound tension to which the state of pregnancy
condemns the mind, and fundamentally, the whole
organism, accident and every kind of external
stimulus acts too vigorously and penetrates too
deeply? One must avoid accident and external
stimuli as far as possible: a sort of self-cir-
cumvallation is one of the first instinctive
precautions of spiritual pregnancy. Shall I
permit a strange thought to climb secretly over
the wall? For that is Just what reading would
mean.1^'
Those individuals who find themselves being
seduced by the printed page had best try
temporary isolation, with severe seolusion , . .
a kind of profound introspection and self
recovery . . . a stepping out of the daily round
of onefs environment . . . a detachment from the
tyranny of stimuli and external influences, which
condemns us to expend our power only in reactions,
and does not allow it to gather volume until it
bursts into spontaneous activity (let anybody
examine our scholars closely: they only think
reflectively, i.eAothey must first read before
they can think).
^ Eooe Homo, "Why I am so Clever," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp. 839-840, During the period
that Nietzsche penned these thoughts— a very productive
period in Nietzschers life— he was evidently following
his own strictures, for he writes: "I must go back six
months to catch myself with a book in my hand." Ecce
Homo, p. 840.
^®The Will to Power, 916. The Complete Works.
Vol. 15, P .T 3 T T ------------- ------------ --------------------
3^5
Books and Teachers
An anachronism noted by Nietzsche— and which is
even more obvious in our own day— is that teachers con
tinue to conduct themselves in the classroom as though
the mass media did not exist, as though the printing
press had not yet been invented. In an age when books
were scarce and expensive— and certainly out of the reach
of most students— the teacher legitimately served as a
sort of peripatetic textbook, repeating to pupils the
contents of precious volumes. But today, "now that
self-education and mutual education are becoming more
widespread, the teacher in his usual form must become
almost unnecessary. Friends eager to learn, who wish to
master some branch of knowledge together, find in our age
of books a shorter and more natural way than School'
and 'teachers. * The lesson would seem to be clear:
if teachers do not take advantage of the opportunities
offered by the new mass media they are indeed dispensable.
Censorship
On the question of censorship of "dangerous" books
and ideas Nietzsche falls within the liberal tradition of
•^^Humari. All-too-Human. "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 180, Tne Complete Works, Vol. 7* p, 283.
Milton, J. S* Mill and Bertrand Russell* Truth Itself Is
better served If false and harmful opinions are allowed
In the arena, for it is only through contest and strife
that knowledge and life are furthered, "Even if we were
mad enough to consider all our opinions as truth, we
should nevertheless not wish them alone to exist." Truth
"must meet with opposition and be able to fight, and we
must be able to rest from it at times in falsehood—
otherwise truth will grow tiresome, powerless, and insipid,
and will render us equally so."200 Of a person who
judges a book dangerous and harmful, Nietzsche suggests:
"Let him but wait, and perhaps one day he will confess
that the book did him a great service by thrusting for
ward and bringing to light the hidden disease of his
soul;" if the reader's opinions are altered it may well
have the advantage of bringing to light "individual facets
of his personality, which hitherto, in another constel
lation of opinions, had remained dark and unrecogniz
able,"201
Nietzsche's attitude toward freedom of expression
is consistent with and derives Justification from his
general philosophical position: if man's goal is
200The Dawn of Day, 507* The Complete Works.
Vol. 9, pp. 352-353;----- ----------
201
Human, All-to o-Human. "Miscellaneous Maxims
and Opinions.w 5o. Wie Complete Works. Vol. 7, p. 38.
347
self-surpassing, and if the clash of ideas is a necessary
ingredient of self-surpassing, then it would be wrong to
censor any of the elements which constitute, or may
someday constitute, the opposition* Furthermore, to take
a positive stand, as long as self-surpassing is served,
it is manfs duty to encourage the free expression of
dangerous ideas: the great educators are those who, like
Socrates, "corrupted the youth."
The Art of Reading
If a book is worth reading at all— and most are
not— it is worth reading well. This places certain
demands on the reader, for it is an art that must be
cultivated, and it is anything but a passive process.
We will briefly discuss a few of these demands.
Contribution of Philology
One requirement of being a good reader is the
ability to see exactly what it is the author has written.
This is not as easy as it first appears, for the natural
tendency of the reader is to "read into" the work at
hand his own ideas and views. Nietzsche maintains that
the science of philology has helped man overoome his
all-too-human tendency to interpret and criticize before
he has understood:
348
The whole of the Middle Ages was absolutely
lneapable of a strictly philological explanation,
that Is, of the simple desire to comprehend what
an author says— It was an achievement, finding
these methods, let it not be undervalued! Through
this all science first acquired continuity and
steadiness, so that the art of reading rightly,
which Is called philology, attained its summit.202
Reading as Rumination
The fundamental lesson that philology has to offer
the educator is that it teaches the virtue of slow read
ing.
Philology Is that venerable art which exacts
from Its followers one thing above all— to step
to one side, to leave themselves spare moments,
to grow silent, to become slow— the leisurely out
of the goldsmith applied to language: an art which
must carry out slow, fine work, and attains nothing
if not lento.2
In an age of undue haste and frantic tempo It Is all the
more important that the schools provide an atmosphere
congenial to "slow reading," for If it is not learned
here it is doubtful that it ever will be learned, except
through accidental exposure. The teacher might well
study and adopt the basic methodological procedure of
philology, not because it is required of professional
scholars, but because "it teaches how to read well:
^02Human, A11-too-Human, "Signs of Higher and
Lower Culture.* 2 7 6. The Complete Works. Vol. 6, p. 249.
^°^The Dawn of Day. "Author’s Preface," 5. The
Complete Works. Vol. 9. p. 8.
349
i.e. slowly, profoundly, attentively, prudently, with
inner thoughts, with the mental doors ajar, with delicate
204
fingers and eyes."
In the "mad headlong rush of our hurry-skurrying
age,"2®^ it is especially difficult to practice an art
that requires calm reflection and patient thinking.
Modern man is in the habit of estimating "the value of
everything according to the amount of time it either saves
or wastes." This attitude extends to the realm of
207
reading. Modern students are more apt to complain of
being slow readers than non-comprehending readers; they
look to "speed-reading" techniques in an effort to mini
mize wasted time; when they do speak of increasing
"comprehension" they are generally referring to rather
low-order factual information— the sort of material that
is all-too-often called for on examinations I One can
hardly blame students for adopting expedient measures.
204Ibid., p. 9.
20^The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"Preface," The Complete Works. Vol. 3, P» 4.
206Ibid.
207
'Nietzsche attempts to frustrate this tendency
through his own style of writing: "At present it is not
only my habit, but even my taste— a perverted taste,
maybe— to write nothing but what will drive to despair
every one who is 'in a hurry.'" The Dam of Day.
"Author's Preface," 5. The Complete Works. Vol. 9, p. 8*
350
The real danger Is that these ad hoe measures become
permanent mental sets, preventing the student from coming
to terms with all great writing.
The sine qua non of becoming a good reader Is
time, lots of timel "In order to practice reading as an
p/iQ
art . . . it is necessary to be a cow" — i.e. one must
ruminate, not only while one is reading but "perhaps long
after he has laid the books aside. And he does this, not
because he wishes to write a criticism about it or even
another book; but simply because reflection is a pleasant
209
pastime to him." ^ It is only by freeing oneself from
ulterior motives, by ignoring the ticking of the clock,
210
by becoming a "frivolous spend-thrift" with time that
one can be "patient enough to accompany an author any
distance, even though he himself cannot yet see the goal
at which he is aiming."211
The reason that reading takes time is that
thinking takes time. To understand and internalize what
a great writer has said requires the active employment
of one’s total mental powers. One must think not only
Pf l fi
The Genealogy of Morals, "Preface." The
Complete Works, Vol. 13. P> 13>
209The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
"Preface." The Complete Works. Vol. 5. p. 5.
210 Ibid. 211Ibid.
351
about what the writer has said, but also about what he
has left unsaid. That Is, the reader must be able to
read between the lines. As an example of this art
Nietzsche cites his own experiences with the Greek his
torian, Thucydides: "One must follow him line by line
and read no less clearly between the lines: there are
212
few thinkers who say so much between the lines,” Pew
thinkers except, of course, Nietzsche himself!
Sensitivity to Style
Readers frequently fail in their task of coming
to terms with an author through their insensitivity to
his style of writing, for style is not merely a form of
beautification but a means of conveying the deepest
feelings and the almost physiological rhythms of creation:
To communicate a state, an inner tension of
pathos by means of signs, including the tempo of
these signs— this is the meaning of every style;
, , , Any style is good which really communicates
an inner state, which does not blunder over the
signs, over the tempo of the signs, or over gestures—
all rhetoric is merely the art of gesture.21*
In the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil
Nietzsche admonishes his fellow Germans for their
212TWllight of the Idols, "What I Owe to the
Ancients," 2. ffne Portable Nietzsche.- p* 558.
2^ Eooe Homo, "Why I Write Such Excellent Books,"
The Philosophy~of Nietzsche, p, 860,
352
insensitivity to *he nuances of style, Nietzsche undoubt
edly has his own style In mind, and the entire passage
Illustrates why Nietzsche Is himself considered to be a
master of concise, epigrammatic expression and a headache
to translators:
How many Germans know, and demand of themselves
that they should know, that there is art in every
good sentence— art that must be figured out if the
sentence is to be understood! A misunderstanding
about Its tempo, for example— and the sentence It
self is misunderstood.
That one must not be In doubt about the
rhythmically decisive syllables, that one experiences
the break with any excessively severe symmetry as
deliberate and attractive, that one lends a subtle
and patient ear to every staccato and every rubato.
that one figures out the meaning in the sequence of
vowels and diphthongs and how delicately and richly
they can be colored and change colors as they follow
each other— who among book-reading Germans has
enough good will to acknowledge such duties and
demands and to listen to that much art and purpose
In language? In the end one simply does not have
"the ear for that"; and thus the strongest contrasts
of style go unheard and the subtlest artistry Is
wasted as on the deaf.
" tfhese were my thoughts when I noticed how
clumsily and undiseemingly two masters in the art
of prose were confounded— one whose words drop
hesitantly and coldly, as from the celling of a
damp cave— he counts on their dull sound and
resonance— and another who handles his language
like a flexible rapier, feeling from his arm down
to his toes the dangerous delight of the quivering,
over-sha^p blade that desires to bit, hiss.
21i|Beyond Good and Evil, 246, pp. 182-183.
353
Experlentlal LimitatIons
Before dismissing a book as empty or condemning
it as foolish, the reader had best reflect on whether the
trouble might not be with him rather than the book. Per
haps he has not had the experience necessary to know what
the author Is actually talking about:
After all, no one can draw more out of things,
books included, than he already knows. A man has
ears only for such things to which experience has
given him access. Let us take an extreme case:
suppose a book speaks only of experiences which lie
entirely outside the range of general or even
exceptional knowledge— suppose it to be the first
expression of an entirely new series of experiences.
In this case nothing it contains will really be
heard at all, and, by an acoustic delusion, people
will assume that where nothing is heard there is
nothing to hear.215
The Sedentary Life
In harmony with Nietzsche*s belief in the insep
arability of body and spirit, and the physiological basis
of consciousness, is his warning that the sedentary life
presents a real danger to the life of the mind:
Remain seated as little as possiblej trust no
■ thought that is not born in the open, to the
accompaniment of free bodily motion— nor one in
which your very muscles do not celebrate a feast.
All prejudices may be traced back to the intestines.
^Eooe Homo, wWhy I Write Such Excellent Books,"
1. The Philosophy ""of Nietzsche, p. 856* Nietzsche
applies these observations to the reception of his own
work: since no one understood it, this "indicates, if
you will, its originality."
354
A sedentary life, as I have already said else
where, Is the real sin against the Holy Ghost,21®
We know virtually nothing about the relationship
between physical activity and creative thinking. It is
therefore especially interesting to note the experiences
of creative men In this regard. For example, Nietzsche
offers the following description of the fruitful days in
which he composed Zarathustra:
When my creative energy flowed most freely,
my muscular activity was always greatest. The
body is inspired: let us leave the "soul" out of
consideration, I might often have been seen
dancing; I used to walk through the hills for
seven or eight hours on end without a hint of
fatigue, I slept well, laughed a good deal— I
was perfectly vigorous and patient,21'
The Challenge of Books
Nietzsche*s attitude toward books— i,e, writing
and reading— is the product of his belief that the printed
word is a means by which a superior mind may engage the
heads and hearts of others. Books must ultimately serve
the end of self-surpassing. To do this they must stimu
late and challenge the reader: "I consider useless every
written word behind which no challenge to action
216
Ecce Homo, "Why I am so Clever,” 1, The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp, 836-387,
21^Ecoe Homo. "Thus Spake Zarathustra," 4, The
Philosophy ot Nietzsche, pp. 898-899,
355
218
stands," The best books are those written In blood
and whloh perhaps demand blood from the reader.
Most books, Including those produced by scholars,
are not worth the paper on which they are printed. Sur
veying the flood of useless, passionless, shallow books
Nietzsche reflects:
I delight in imagining that one day soon men
will grow tired of books and their authors, that
one day the scholar will reflect, make out his
will, and make arrangements for his corpse to be
cremated in the midst of his books, especially his
own writings. And If the forests were to become
increasingly sparse, might it not be time to treat
libraries as wood, straw and brushwood? After all,
most books are born In the smoke and vapors of the
brain: and to smoke and vapor may they return.
And if they had no fi?*e in them, then fire shall
punish them for it.2**
The reason for the proliferation of worthless
books Is that under the modern spirit of journalism and
bread-winning a person first decides that he wants to
write, that he wants to become an author, then he attempts
to find enough ideas to fill the need. The process
should be reversed: "The book should demand pen, ink,
and desk, but usually It Is pen, ink, and desk that
demand the book. That is why books are of so little
220
• account at present." In light of the current mass
21Q
Schopenhauer as Educator. 8, p. 94,
219Ibid., 4, p. 34.
220
Human, All-too-HUman, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 133:— TM UbBtoT6tg"ff6Wcs. Vol. 7, p. 262.
356
production of expediently planned books Nlet2sche
publicly proclaims: "I will never again read an author
of whom one can suspect that he wanted to make a book,
but only those writers whose thoughts unexpectedly became
a book.1,221
Fortunately not all books are born In the smoke
and vapors of the brain. Schopenhauer, for example gave
birth to a noble and fiery work— a work which had dramati
cally challenged the young Nietzsche to face the problems
of existence. Perhaps it is something of a paradox, but
if Nietzsche had not been awakened from his dogmatic
slumbers by a book he might never have developed into the
222
brilliant critic of books that he was.
Teachers and Disciples
Teachers as Leaders
"Enlightened” teachers may feel that their first
and last duty is to urge the student to Independence, to
force him to trust in his own powers of reason and Judg
ment. In contrast, Nietzsche— that strident exponent of
freedom and self-perfection— argues that it is a great
221Ibid., 121, p. 255.
222
Through "an accidental reach of the arm in a
bookstore” Nietzsche discovered not only Schopenhauer
(Nietzsche*s twenty-first year) but also Stendhal
(thirty-fifth year) and Dostoevski (forty-seoond year).
Letter to Overbeck, February 23, 1887. The Portable
Nlefc.aa.ghg> p. 454.
357
mistake for teachers to encourage students prematurely to
venture forth "on their own." Freedom can only be gained
through years of rigorous thinking and discipline. If one
sets a student free too soon the result will be "merely a
barbarian believing himself to be free. . • , "223
If human beings knew by Instinct how to educate
themselves we would need neither teachers nor schools: we
could then allow eaoh youth complete Independence to train
himself. However, since such instinct Is totally lacking,
education must begin by complete dependence— dependence on
cultural traditions. But not all cultural traditions are
of equal value, and for this very reason teachers are
necessary to help guide the student in the right direc
tion.
A young person, because of Inexperience and
immaturity, cannot independently differentiate between
present diversions and long-range needs. An inquisitive
224
student "feels the need of a guiding hand." He wants
someone to help him face and understand a complex and
frightening world; he is not ready to be saddled with
"the unbearable burden of standing alone.f|22* ’ "One of the
most natural and peremptory needs of youth is, so to
22^The Future of Our Educational Institutions.
"Fifth Lecture,w The Complete Works. Vol. 3. p. 131.
224Ibid., p. 133. 225Ibid., p. 13*».
358
speak, a self-surrendering to great leaders and an
enthusiastic following in the footsteps of the
masters.”22^
The Student Adrift
Nietzsche urges that modern educational institu
tions have failed to provide the inspiring leaders and
enthusiastic exemplars necessary to stimulate and guide
our youth. In the following words Nietzsche paints a
grim but realistic portrait of the inner experiences of
a sensitive and intelligent university student:
During his university term, when he is appar
ently the only free man in a crowd of servants
and officials, he atones for this huge illusion
of freedom by ever-growing inner doubts and con
victions. He feels that he can neither lead nor
help himself; and then he plunges hopelessly into
the workaday world and endeavours to ward off such
feelings by study. The most trivial bustle fastens
Itself upon him; he sinks under his heavy burden.
Then he suddenly pulls himself together; he still
feels some of that power within him which would
have enabled him to keep his head above water.
Pride and noble resolutions assert themselves and
grow in him. He is afraid of sinking at this
early stage into the limit3 of a narrow profession;
and now he grasps at pillars and railings along
side the stream that he may not be swept away by
the current. In vain! for these supports give way,
and he finds he has clutched at broken reeds. In
low and despondent spirits he sees his plans vanish
away in smoke. His condition is undignified, even
dreadful: he keeps between the two extremes of
work at high pressure and a state of melancholy
226ibid.
359
enervation. Then he becomes tired, lazy, afraid
of work, fearful of everything greatj and hating
himself. He looks Into his own breast, analyses
his faculties, and finds he Is only peering Into
hollow and chaotic vacuity. And then he once more
falls from the heights of his eagerly-desired
self-knowledge Into an Ironical soeptlclsm. He
divests his struggles of their real Importance,
and feels himself ready to undertake any class of
useful work, however degrading. He now seeks
consolation In hasty and Incessant action so as to
hide himself from himself. And thus his helpless
ness and the want of a leader towards culture drive
him from one form of life Into anotheri but doubt,
elevation, worry, hope, despair— everything flings
him hither and thither as a proof that all the stars
above him by which he could have guided his ship
have set,22'
This vacillating, undisciplined, directionless, alienated
student Is the almost inevitable outcome of a school with
out true leadership. Potentially creative individuals are
turned into "degenerate and shipwrecked men of culture,
driven by Inward despair to violent ennuity against cul
ture, when, in a moment of desperation, there was no one
opQ
at hand to show them how to attain It."
Emulation of Great Men
We have seen that a student must first look to
his teachers for guidance and support; then, through his
teacher he is led to the appreciation and emulation of
227
'The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
pp. 132-133.
228Ibid.. p. 134.
great thinkers and artists. Indeed, due to the natural
Impatience of youth, "he confidently accepts another
picture that lies ready to his hand and Is recommended to
him, and pins his faith to that, as If it must give him
at once the lines and colors of his own painting. He
presses a philosopher or a poet to his bosom, and must
from that time forth perform long stretches of forced
229
labor and renounce his own self." * This Is a necessary
and valuable stage In the process of self-perfection.
Yet, like most good things, it has its danger. By focus
ing his attention on a great person the student may forget
"what is most worth learning and knowing— his self. He
230
remains all his life a partisan," J Eventually one must
"get beyond" great men and discover oneself. Nietzsche
impresses on the "growing man" that "a vast amount of
tedious work has to be done before you find your own
colors, your own brush, your own canvas!— Even then you
are very far from being a master in the art of life, but
231
at least you are boss in your own workshop."
Many educators have recommended in-depth study
of great artists and thinkers. Nietzsche, however, feels
that it is a mistake to conclude that the real value of
22^Human, A11-too-Human. "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 26b. TOe Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 324,
230Ibid. 231Ibid., p. 325*
361
such study lies In an accurate understanding of the
particular writer being Investigated. The value of the
study of, and Identification with, a great mind varies
directly with the degree to which the student Is stimu
lated to look more carefully at himself and to pursue his
own philosophy of life. Nietzsche realized this from his
own experience with Schopenhauer. Among Nietzsche's
notes, dating from the period in which he wrote
Schopenhauer as Educator (1874), we find the following
observation:
I am far from believing that I have rightly
understood Schopenhauer, but rather, I have
learned to understand myself a little better
through Schopenhauer; this is why I owe him the
greatest gratitude. But, all In all, It does not
seem important to me that one goes to the depths
of a philosopher and brings to light exactly what
he has taught In the fullest sense of the word,
and so on; such an understanding Is least of all
suited to human beings who are looking for a
philosophy of life» not for a new scholastic
aptitude for their memory. and in the end it
remainsimprobable that such knowledge really
can be f o u n d .*32
The Teacher as Middleman
The teacher must remember that he is but a
middleman, "a necessary evil" standing between the
2^2Quoted in Steiner, Fredrich Nietzsche, p. 158.
2^ Human, All-too-Human. ’ ’ The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 2 8 T I frne Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 335.
362
truly "productive minds and the hungry and recipient
minds,The task of the teacher Is to make himself
dispensable as quickly as possible. At his worst the
"middleman" adulterates the food and, In order to live
well by his trade, exploits the helplessness of the con
sumer. At his best the "middleman" strives for the
direct confrontation of producer and consumer, thus
making himself unnecessary. It Is hoped that through this
direct confrontation the consumer will himself become a
producer, "By cautioning his pupils against himself the
teacher shows his humanity."
The Animal Impulses
The skillful teacher is one who, remembering the
principles of self-perfection through challenge-and-
response, utilizes rather than condemns the destructive
and aggressive side of man's nature. If a person's vir
tues are not grounded In the soil of his nature, however
"evil" his nature may be, he will be but a "weak, unsatis
factory"2^ specimen. "The most unskilful teacher" is
234Ibid.
i — — —
23^The Dawn of Day, 447. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p. w :
23^Human, All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 70, frhe Complete Works, Vol. 7, P* 233.
363
"the moral fanatic, who thinks that the good can only
237
grow out of the good and on the soil of the good."
If a teacher is to devote his life to maximizing
self-perfection in himself and in others he must rise
above the moral prejudices that have pervaded western
civilization since the time of Christ (or at least Paul):
"To teach the contempt of the primal life-instincts; to
set up fraudulently a 'soul,1 a ’spirit,' in order to
overthrow the body; to teach man to find impurity in the
prerequisite of life— in sex; to look for the principle
of evil in the profound need for expansion— that is to
say, in vigorous self-love."23® To teach such doctrines
and attitudes has severely handicapped man in the pursuit
of greatness. Traditional Christian morality "is the
idiosyncrasy of decadents, actuated by a desire to avenge
themselves successfully upon life."239 The Nietzschean
teacher is one who is wise enough to build upon the life
instincts, however unruly, erotic or aggressive they may
appear.
Moralizing is not only inimical to the enhancement
of life, it is also poor pedagogical practice. Nietzsche
23®Ecoe Homo, "Why I Am a Fatality," 7. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 930,
239Ibid.. p. 931.
364
suggests that "a healthy and vigorous little boy" will
merely "look up sarcastically" If he Is asked: "Do you
want to be virtuous?" But "he Immediately becomes eager"
If he Is asked: "Do you want to be stronger than your
friends?"^0
The Paradox of Becoming
The paradox of self-surpassing Is that It requires
that an Individual pretend to be what he really Is not;
i.e. to transcend o n e 1a present state of existence demands
that one Imitate and play the role of someone who has
achieved a higher state of existence. In an aphorism
pill
titled "How Appearance Becomes Actuality," Nietzsche
describes how "the hypocrite, who always plays one and
the same part, ceases at last to be a hypocrite. If any
one long and obstinately desires to appear something, he
242
finds it difficult at last to be_ anything else." A
student who admires and respects or who, for other
reasons, habitually imitates his teacher will actually
become the kind of person the teacher is (or at least
adopt certain of the teacher!s traits). Imitation and
2i*0The Will to Power, 918. The Complete Works,
Vol. 1 5, p.“3 I T .
p4i
Human, All-too-Human, "The History of Moral
Sentiments." 51. flhe Complete Works. Vol. 6, p. 70.
2l , 2ibid.
365
role-playing are In themselves mental processes; It is
the task of education to Insure that models (teachers)
are provided that are worthy of imitation.
Boredom and Grinding
The routine demands of class meetings, student
advisement, paper grading, lecture preparation, research
reports and numerous other academic duties have the effect
of turning teachers and scholars into automata.
Zarathustra says of the scholars:
They are good clockworks; but take care to
wind them correctly I Then they indicate the hour
without fail and make a modest noise. They work
like mills and like stamps: throw down your seed-
corn to them and they will know how to grind it
small and reduce it to white dust.2l*3
When teachers and students work like mills the atmosphere
of the school is reduced to that of the factory:
enthusiasm and passion is replaced by boredom and routine.
Nietzsche imagines the following questions addressed to a
doctoral candidate:
From a doctoral examination, "What is the task
of all higher education?n 1o turn men into machines.
"What are the means?" Man must learn to be bored.
"How is that accomplished?" By means of the con
cept of duty. "Who serves as the model?" The
philologist: he teaches grinding.2^4
2^ Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, "On Scholars."
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 257T
2^ Twilight of the Idols. "What the Germans Lack,"
29. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 532.
366
To combat this situation the teacher must be a
model not of boredom but of enthusiasm and commitment to
vital Issues. In this new atmosphere we might Imagine
the following doctoral examination: "What Is the task of
all education?" To cultivate self-surpassing Individuals.
"What are the means?” Man must be challenged. "How Is
that accomplished?" By means of self-discipline, "Who
serves as the model?" The Philosopher: he communicates
the excitement of creativity.
Teachers and Their Disciples
Nietzsche1s comments on disciples, although
generally directed toward his own readers (present or
future), are of particular Interest to us here, for they
Indicate the relationship which he felt was desirable to
establish between pupil and teacher.
"Pluck at My Wfreath"
Nietzsche expresses his fear that readers will
mistake Zarathustra for a religious zealot seeking
"believers." Commenting on Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche cautions that "no fanatic speaks to you here;
this is not a Sermon1; no faith is demanded.
^^Ecce Homo. "Preface," 4, The Philosophy of
Nietzsche. p."BT4"— ---
367
Nietzsche suggests that any doubts as concerning his
Integrity will be dispelled if the reader but recall what
Zarathustra says the first time he returns to his soli
tude, for Zarathustra says "Just the opposite of what any
*Sage,* ’Saint,* 'Redeemer,1 or other decadent would
say. Not only his words, but he himself is different
from them,**2^
Part One of Thus Spoke Zarathustra concludes with
the following lines, spoken by Zarathustra, which clearly
indicate that Nietzsche does not want blind followers,
that a true teacher does not want unreflective obedience:
Now I go alone, my disciples. You too go
now, alone. Thus I want it. Verily, I counsel
you: go away from me and resist ZarathustraI
And even better: be ashamed of hlml Perhaps he
deceived you.
The man of knowledge must not only love his
enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends.
One repays a teacher badly if one always remains
nothing but a pupil. And why do you want to pluck
at my wreath?
You revere me; but what if your reverence
tumbles one day? Beware lest a statue slay you.
You say you believe in Zarathustra? But what
matters Zarathustra? You are my believers— but
what matter all believers? You had not yet sought
yourselves: and you found me. Thus do all
believers; therefore all faith amounts to so little.
Now I bed you lose me and find yourselves; and
only 'jjhen you have all denied me will I return to
247I, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue," 3. The Por
table Nietzsche, p, 190,
368
No Pity
The teacher must not succumb to the temptation of
being too gentle and kind to his disciples. This Is
especially true In the case of those Individuals who
truly have great potentials and are headed for great
things. These individuals need severe challenges—
challenges that may well destroy weaker Individuals,
Within a framework of love the teacher must nevertheless
hope that his disciples meet with, and overcome, cruelty
of the highest orders
Type of my disciples. To those human beings
in whom 1 have a stake I wish suffering, being
forsaken, sickness, maltreatment, humiliation— I
wish that that profound self-contempt, the torture
of mistrust of oneself, and the misery of him who
is overcome, not remain unknown to them* I have
no pity for them because I wish them the only
thing which can prove today whether one has worth
or not— that one holds out.^B
Nietzsche does not recommend "cruelty" for its
own sake, but because it is the means by which the student
is forced to work out his own path to self-perfection.
The true teacher does not want to produce "copies," but
rather independent, self-surpassing individuals. Zara-
thustra has the final word for disciples: "This is my
olio
■ way; where is yours?"
2 lift
The Will to Power, 910. The Portable
Nietzsche, p. 45b,
249rphus Spoke Zarathustra, III, "On the Spirit
Perhaps the best way to conclude a study of
Nietzsche*s philosophy of education is to re-create
Nietzsche’s image of the truly educated man. The purpose
of the following chapter is to give concreteness and
depth to Nietzsche’s educational philosophy of focusing
on the kind of being that Nietzsche hopes his philosophy
would help produce. Let us now turn to Nietzsche’s
vision of this new being, the superman.
of Gravity,” 2. The Portable Nietzsche, p, 307,
CHAPTER IX
NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION,
PART III* THE SUPERMAN
371
An image of the Nietzschean "ideal man" should
have begun to take shape in the reader’s mind. In our
examination of Nietzsche's philosophical position, and
especially of his social and educational analyses, we
have seen a number of the attitudes and dispositions
which Nietzsche would like to have become part of the
cultured man's character. It is the purpose of this chap
ter to complete the image.
Nietzsche attaches several different labels to
his ideal man. Just as Plato found it necessary, or
rhetorically expedient, to speak variously of the philoso
pher, the philosopher-king, the guardian and the virtuous
man, so Nietzsche speaks of the genius, the Schopenhauerian
man, Dionysus and the superman. The term used depends on
the context, the style of writing, the date of composition
and other similar factors. The term which would seem to
be most fitting, and which has attracted the greatest
critical attention, as well as having captured the popular
imagination, is "superman," It is this label, then, that
we shall assign to Nietzsche's new image of the educated
man.
A recently published anthology titled The Educated
Man: Studies in the History of Educational Thought,^
^Paul Nash, Andreas M. Kazamlas, and Henry J.
Perkinson, eds., The Educated Man: Studies In the History
of Educational Thought C^ew York; John Wiley & Sons,
372
approaches the history of educational philosophy by focus
ing on some of the major images of man that Western
culture has produced. Among the fifteen chapters we find
such visions of the educated man as Plato's Guardian,
Locke's Gentleman, Rousseau's Natural Man, Dc - . - y ' s
Reflective Man, Buber's Existential Man and Skinner's
Planned Man, To this list we would like to add Nietzsche's
vision of the superman.
Three Images of Man
Nietzsche selects three psychological types or
"images of man [das Bild des Mensohen]." "from the con
templation of which mortals will presumably, for a long
time to come, derive the incentive to transfigure their
P
own lives." The three images are Rousseauian man,
Goethian man, and Schopenhauerian man. Each of these can
serve as a model for our own self-perfection. But let us
consider each one in turn, for there are important
differences between them and Nietzsche himself opts for
one above the others.
Rousseauian Man
The first image is that of Rousseauian man. It
p
Schopenhauer as Educator, 4, p. 40.
373
is the image which "has the greatest fire and is certain
of the greatest popular effect,"** Rousseauian man makes
himself heard, regardless of the consequences* He ex
presses his feelings with an explosive force "which
incited wild revolutions and, for that matter, still does;
for behind all socialistic tremors and earthquakes is
Rousseauian man, mcving like old Typhoeus under Mount
Etna.
Nietzsche's attitude toward Rousseau is an ambiv
alent one; for on the one hand he found himself attracted
to this man of passion, perhaps because one side of
Nietzsche’s personality was so close to Rousseau's, while
on the other hand Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for
Rousseau’s lack of self-control and undisciplined
emotional outburst s. * * It is difficult to see how
Nietzsche himself could escape this charge, especially
3Ibid. Sbld.. p. ill.
^Nietzsche sees Rousseau as the epitome of
unbridled passion, as the instigator of ill-conceived
revolutions, as the corruptor of the Enlightenment:
"All the half-insane, theatrical, bestially
cruel, licentious, and especially sentimental and
self-intoxicating elements which go to form the
true revolutionary substance, and become flesh and
spirit, before the revolution, in Rousseau— all
this composite being, with factitious enthusiasm,
finally set even 'enlightenment' upon its fanatical
head, which thereby began itself to shine as in an
illuminating halo."
Human. A11-too-Human. "The Wanderer and His Shadow," 221.
The Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 310.
If we take into account the frantic polemics of his later
books. In any case, Rousseauian man, by pointing out to
us the unnaturalness of our lives, and thereby causing
us to be dissatisfied with ourselves, stimulates us to
self-perfection. Once one becomes aware that in his
present state he is "oppressed and half crushed by
arrogant castes and by pitiless wealth, spoiled by
priests and bad education, humiliated before himself by
ridiculous customs," he longs to throw away "all gaudy
finery, which shortly before seemed to be his most human
possessions, his arts and sciences, the advantages of his
refined life," In his distress he now "bangs his fists
on the walls, in whose shadow he degenerated, and cries
for light, sun, forest, and cliff," He is thus led by
Rousseauian man to self-perfection, for "when he cries,
•Only nature is good, only the natural man is human!*
then he is despising himself and longing beyond himself;
a mood in which the soul is ready for terrible decisions,
but which also calls up what is most noble and rare in
its depths,"^
It is well to note here that Nietzsche is not
giving his unqualified approval to a "return to nature."
All that he is saying is that by viewing nature as
^Schopenhauer as Educator, p, 4l,
375
something "beyond" the present condition of man, one can
be led to strive toward this goal and thereby to perfect
himself, Nietzsche had little patience with the "noble
savage" concept that is popularly associated with the
Rousseauian "return to nature," Such a "return" would
truly be a backward step since it involves a destruction
of the socially necessary hierarchies of those who rule
and those who obey, resulting in revolutionary mobs,
7
socialistic earthquakes, and unnecessary bloodshed,'
Goethian Man
Goethe provides us with the second image of man.
In contrast to the explosive Rousseau, "Goethian man is
no such threatening force; in a sense, he is actually the
corrective and sedative for Just those excited states to
o
which Rousseauian man is subject," While the
Rousseauian image has great popular appeal, the Goethian
image "is only for the few, namely for those contemplative
natures in the grand manner, and it is misunderstood by
the mob."^ Nietzsche is careful to point out the
difference between Faust and Goethe, "Goethe himself
70f. Aphorism 48 of Twilight of the Idols. The
Portable Nietzsche, pp. 552
Q
Schopenhauer as Educator, 4, p. 41,
9Ibid.
376
adhered in his youth to the gospel of the goodness of
nature with all his heart; his Faust was the highest and
most daring image of Rousseauian man, at least in as far
as he was to portray the former’s lust for life, his
dissatisfaction and longing, and his intercourse with the
demons of the heart."1® Given this similarity between
Faust and Rousseauian man, "one would think that Faust
would be led through life with its oppressions as an
insatiable rebel and liberator, as the denying force out
of goodness, as the really religious and equally demonic
spirit of revolution in contrast to his altogether un-
demonic companion, although he could not rid himself of
this companion and had to use and, at the same time,
despise the latter*s skeptical evilness and denial— as in
the tragic lot of every rebel and liberator."11 Here
Nietzsche comes to the important contrast, for "one is
mistaken if he expects something of this sort; Goethian
man diverges here from Rousseauian man, for he hates
12
anything violent, any sudden leap." But this fear of
any sudden leap also leads to a fear of any action, "and
thus the world liberator Faust becomes a mere world
traveller."13
10Ibid.. pp. 41-42. 11Ibid., p. 42.
12Ibid. 13Ibid.
377
The strength and the weakness of Qoethlan man can
now be seen* On the one hand he provides the corrective
for the extremes of the Rousseauian man, he is the "con-
14
serving and conciliatory force” which counteracts and
protects us from unpredictable Catilinarian tendencies*
Nietzsche1 s admiration of Goethe’s harmonizing and creative
powers lasted throughout his life* ”As a stylized human
being [stilisirter Mensch] he has reached a higher level
than any other German* One should read Eckermann and ask
himself whether any man in Germany has achieved such a
noble form.”1* * Nietzsche even goes so far as to call
Goethe’s Conversations with Eckermann "the best German
book in existence."1^ Perhaps Walter Kaufmann has best
characterized the relationship between Goethe and
Nietzsche when he states that "the Olympian embodiment of
harmony and measure--the Apollinian perfection which is
here pictured as Goethe’s most decisive feature--is so
utterly beyond the reach of Nietzsche that he could admire
Goethe all his life long without being able to equal him.^
^ Schopenhauer as Educator* p. 43.
^ Musarlonausgabe * Vol* 6, p. 340,
^ Human. All-too-Human* "The Wanderer and His
Shadow,” 169* The Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 250.
^Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 143.
378
On the other hand, the major weakness of Goethian
18
man is that he tends to "degenerate into a Philistine*"
His contemplative nature leads him away from action of
any significance, and his life often becomes a series of
petty desires and their fulfillment. The result is a
"Biedermeier" culture of superficial frills and distrac
tions. To counteract this tendency Nietzsche argues that
19
"a little more muscularity and natural wildness" is
necessary. Goethe, with his usual perspicacity, seemed
to know "where the dangers and weaknesses of this may lay,
and he indicates this with the words of Jarno addressing
Wilhelm Meister: "fYou are annoyed and bitter, that is
all well and good. If you would only get really angry
[there is a play here on the German word "bose." which
means both "anger" and "evil"] for once that would be
better still.f" "Thus, to be quite frank, it is neces
sary that we should get really angry for once in order
20
that things might improve." With the strengths and
weaknesses of both Rousseauian and Goethian man in view,
we are led to the third image of man, that of Schopen
hauer ian man.
l8
Schopenhauer as Educator. 4, p. 43.
19Ibid. 20Ibid.
379
Schopenhauerlan Man
Schopenhauerlan man, as one might well Imagine,
Is a distillation of those qualities which Nietzsche
admired in Rousseau and Goethe, Here they come together
In one man, achieving a synthesis of the best that Is to
be found In the two polar types of creative man.
Goethian man provides the Apollinian ideal of harmony and
self-control, so that in ”personal matters” the
Schopenhauerlan man will be ’ ’ detached and remarkably
21
calm.” Rousseauian man, on the other hand, provides
the passion which is necessary for the pursuit of know
ledge, so that here the Schopenhauerlan man will be ’ ’ full
of a strong consuming fire and far removed from the cold
and contemptible neutrality of the so-called scientific
m22
man, ...
A trait that is especially characteristic of the
Schopenhauerlan man is his recognition of the amount of
suffering that is involved in the pursuit of knowledge
and self-perfection. As Nietzsche states in italics:
”The Schopenhauerlan man voluntarily takes the pain of
truthfulness [Leiden der Wahrhaftlghelt] upon himself.1,23
The Schopenhauerlan man puts truth above all else, even
21Ibid.. p. 44. 22Ibid., pp. 44-45.
23Ibid., p. 43.
380
though he is "deeply conscious of the suffering which
ok
necessarily arises from his truthfulness." In order to
achieve self-perfection and to give his life a metaphysical
meaning, the Schopenhauerian man must deny and destroy all
that is false and superficial. Such activity will, of
course, be hostile to many people, including those he
loves, but "he may spare neither people nor things, how-
25
ever much it hurts him." ^
As Nietzsche’s description of the Schopenhauerian
man proceeds it becomes clear— to anyone familiar with
Schopenhauer’s life— that although some of the qualities
ascribed by Nietzsche to Schopenhauer legitimately derive
from Schopenhauer, others seem rather far removed.
Nietzsche is attempting to construct a new image of man
and he has simply used Schopenhauer as a convenient
starting-point and stepping stone. Commenting later in
life on his treatment of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche admits
that "Plato made use of Socrates in the same way— that is
to say, as a means of expressing his own ideas."
Nietzsche grants that "at bottom, it is not 'Schopenhauer
as Educator,1 but his opposite, 'Nietzsche as Educator,'
oil ,
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 45.
25Ibid.
2^Ecce_ Homo, "Thoughts Out of Season," 3. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 876.
381
27
who Is speaking." ’ Nietzsche was soon to drop
"Schopenhauerlan man" In favor of a new label: the
••
Ubermensch.
The "Ubermensch"
The term "Obermensch," which Is usually translated
Into English as "superman" or "overman," Is used by
Nietzsche in a few places in his earlier works, but with
the writing of Zarathustra it becomes a central part of
Nietzsche’s philosophy. "’Superman’ is a poetic designa
tion for great individuals carried to their utmost human
28
limit, ’persons* in the full sense of that term." It
has been much debated as to whether the superman is an
unrealized ideal or an actuality, i.e., has there ever
been a superman? Are Nietzsche's heroes, such as
Spinoza, Montaigne, and Goethe, to be classified as
examples of the superman? The texts can be made to yield
either conclusion. It is beside the point to argue which
is the "true" interpretation, since it is simply a matter
of stipulation. Whether- ene prefers a narrow or wide
definition the central point remains the same: man can
surpass his all-too-human self and become (or approximate)
27Ibid.. p. 877.
pO
Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 400.
■i
382
a higher type of human being.
The superman becomes the vehicle through which
Nietzsche expresses his views of what man Is, and what he
believes man can and should become. But we must not be
misled by the tendency of critics to equate the origin of
the term with the origin of the idea that It represents—
that is, to assume that the Idea of the superman did not
occur until Nietzsche employed the term. The "genius,”
the "artist,” "philosopher," and "saint," the "Schopen
hauerian man," the "Dionysian man"— all these have self
surpassing as their key concept, which was put forth by
Nietzsche at the beginning of his philosophical career in
his essay on Schopenhauer. The "superman" of Nietzsche’s
mature position is simply the "genius" of his earlier
period, spelled out in greater detail and depth. "That
which he here [in Schopenhauer as Educator] calls
genius,1 making it the supreme type of human aims and
aspirations, he later characterized as the Superman.1" p
The superman is a reinforcement and continuation of a line
of thought that runs through the entire corpus of
Nietzsche’s works. We might almost say that the concept
29
^Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, ed., The Nietzsche-
Wagner Correspondence, trans. by Caroline V. Kerr, with
an introduction by H. L. Mencken (London: Duckworth &
Co., 1922), p. 219.
383
of the superman already existed unconsciously and
30
instinctively in the early Nietzsche.
Self-Knowledge as a Prerequisite
to Self-Perfection
Self-knowledge, which is essentially an awareness
of one's limitations and inadequacies, as well as one's
unique capacities, is a prerequisite to self-perfection;
it is the first step on the way to becoming a superman.
It is only after one has realized that he is not perfect
that he may— given the proper model or "educator"— feel
compelled to do something about it. Let us briefly note
the two major approaches to self-knowledge, as well as
how one may be used to complement and correct the other,
recalling Zarathustra’s caution that "man is hard to
31
discover— hardest of all for himself.”
Self-Knowledge by Looking Inward
Historically, in both the East and the West, the
best-known technique for gaining self-knowledge has been
that of contemplation and introspection. Nietzsche,
following this tradition, frequently emphasizes the need
^°Cf. Steiner, Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for
Freedom, p. 127.
^ Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III, "On the Spirit of
Gravity," 27 The Portable Nietzsche, p. 306.
384
of periodical withdrawal into one’s psyche, into the realm
of dark and hidden thoughts, feelings, and instinctual
urges* Only by plumbing the depths of one’s self can one
discover the unique elements of one’s subjective being.
Necessary though introspection may be, Nietzsche cautions
the neophyte that "it is a painful and dangerous under
taking to dig down into oneself in this way and to
descend violently and directly into the shaft of one’s
being. How easily he could injure himself doing this,
32
so that no doctor could cure him.
Self-Knowledge by Looking Outward
In contrast to the method of introspection, the
safest way to self-knowledge, a way frequently overlooked,
is through the study of the external world of objects and
events. It is easy enough to see that by understanding
the motives, drives, inspirations, weaknesses, etcetera,
of others we are led, by analogy, to a better under
standing of ourselves. Not as obvious is the truth that
man is what he is because of his relations to the things
which surround, limit, and define him: to understand
these things and their relations is thus to understand man.
On these grounds we may proclaim that "’Know Thyself’
32
Schopenhauer as Educator. 1, p. 5.
385
Is The Whole of Science,— Only when man shall have
acquired a knowledge of all things will he be able to
33
know himself. For things are but the boundries of man." J
Nietzsche urges that both methods must be
utilized, that maximum self-knowledge is only to be gained
through a balance of inward and outward awareness: the
dangers of introspective subjectivity being offset by the
detached study of external events. The pursuit of self-
knowledge demands that equilibrium be maintained; for
introspection at the expense of detachment leads to
insanity, and detachment at the expense of introspection
leads to shallowness.
From Self-Knowledge to Self-Transcendence
In order to proceed from self-knowledge to self
surpassing one must become dissatisfied with his present
level of existence. This can be accomplished by giving
oneself to the thoughts and life of a great man, as
Nietzsche did to Schopenhauer. It is necessary to engage
in such a commitment since "it is impossible to teach
love,” and yet Min love alone the soul gains not only a
clear, analytical and contemptuous view of itself, but
also gains that desire to look beyond the self and seek
33The Dawn of Day. 48, The Complete Works.
Vol. 9, P.T3T
386
with all Its might a higher self which Is hidden some-
that, compared with great Individuals, one is Incomplete
and inadequate. The task of the educator is not to make
the student comfortable or to help him adjust to the
opinions of the majority, but rather to assure that the
student confronts "the rarest and most valuable speci
mens"^ of humanity, that the student realizes that it is
the production of creative men that gives life its
O £
"highest value" and "deepest significance."J The teacher
should see to it that this attitude is "planted and
cultivated in every young person so that he will look
upon himself as a miscarried work of nature, but at the
same time as evidence of the greatest and most wonderful
intentions of this artist,"3^ When the student awakens
to the fact that he is part of nature’s attempt to pro
duce great men he will say to himself: "She made a bad
Job of it, but I will respect her great intentions by
being at her service so that she may succeed better in the
Q Q
future." This inner state of mind, consisting of self-
knowledge and a desire to transcend one’s present self,
oil
where•"
Education begins with the fearless self-knowledge
Schopenhauer
Ibid., p. 60
Ibid
Ibid.. p. 60. 36Ibid,
Ibid. 38Ibid.
Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 6l.
387
39
Nietzsche calls "the first consecration of culture?
The role of the educator at this stage is not to
convey any specific information but to stimulate an
affective psychological state composed of dissatisfaction
and the urge to transcend: this is the beginning of
Kultur, which is nothing else than the process of culti
vating, growing, nurturing— that is educating oneself and
others. "Everyone who possesses culture is, in fact,
saying: 'I see something higher and more human than
myself above me. Help me, all of you, to reach it, as I
will help every person who recognizes the same thing and
suffers from the same thing, so that finally the man may
again come into being who feels himself infinite in
knowing and loving, in seeing and ability, and who with
all his being is a part of nature, as judge and criterion
iin
of things.'"
Action
We have seen that education must begin with self-
knowledge and a longing to attain a higher level of
existence. Something else is still needed, however, to
transform this internal, psychological change into an
39 .
•^Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 61.
388
external, public reality; that "something else” is
nothing other than action. Culture demands "not only
Inner experience, not only the Judgment of the exterior
ill
world of flux, but finally, and chiefly, action,” This
4 2
second "consecration of culture" requires that one first
pass Judgment on conditions in society— in terms of
whether they hinder or promote self-perfection and the
production of great men— and then that one translates his
Judgment into action, "This means fighting for culture
and being hostile to the influences, laws, and institu
tions in which he does not recognize his goal: the
in
production of genius,” J
Theory and Practice
A dominant theme throughout the history of
Western philosophy— from the ancient Greeks to the
Kantians— has been that life may be neatly divided into
the "theoretical" and the "practical," In the Nachlass
Nietzsche observes that philosophers "behave as if pure
intellectuality presented them with the problems of
science and metaphysics;— they behave as if practice
should be Judged by a measure of its own, whatever the
AlIbid., 6, p. 6 2.
1 *2Ibid. 43Ibid.
389
aii
Judgment of theory may be." Against this pernicious
albeit venerated divorce, Nietzsche raises the question
"whether we know another method of acting correctly,
besides that of thinking correctly; the last case is
action, the first presupposes thought. Are we possessed
of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method
of life differently from the value of a theory: through
iic
induction or comparison?" ^ The answer of course is no.
The analytic distinction between "theoretical" and
"practical" has not only outlived its usefulness, it has
also contributed to the bifurcation of man. To counter
this bifurcation Nietzsche urges: "One should not live
according to two standards! One should not separate
46
theory and practice!"
Passion and Action
Somewhere Hegel remarks that nothing great is
done without passion. With this Nietzsche agrees. It
must be remembered, however, that although passion is a
necessary condition for great deeds it is not a
sufficient one. The educator must recall the limitations
of the Rousseauian man: limitations caused by the fact
h ] i
The Will to Power, 458. The Complete Works,
Vol. 14, pT S T T .----------- ------------------
45Ibid., p. 376 46Ibid., p. 377.
390
that passion by itself is blind, stupid, and without
direction. The Rousseauian man is too easily carried
away by a cause, acts impulsively, even violently, and
in the end becomes a fanatic, doing more ill than good.
It is the desire of the self-surpassing man to improve
the world in which he lives. Our schools, however, must
be careful not to give the impression that all a person
needs is the desire. Without the tempering force of
intelligence passion acts too suddenly.
Youth, and those who have strong passions, are
particularly prone to act without thinking. Yet, "if we
wish a change to be as deep and radical as possible, we
must apply the remedy in minute doses, but unremittingly
for long periods.Political movements, such as the
French Revolution, incite the emotions, inspire great
hopes, and yield little more than chaos and bloodshed.
As anxious as we may be to overthrow the old order, to
implant a new set of values, great actions are simply not
performed all at once. "Let us therefore be careful not
to exchange violently and percipitately the moral condi
tions with which we are familiar for a new valuation of
things,— nay, we may even wish to continue living in the
^ The Dawn of Day, 53^. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, p. 3 ' 6 ' £ .
391
48
old way for a long time to come.” While we are living
in the old way we continue to introduce to others and to
4q
ourselves* in "minute doses," the new valuations. It
is more efficient as well as more humane in the long run
to proceed in the spirit of the Enlightenment* to silently
"transfigure individuals alone* and thus only slowly
transfiguring national customs and institutions as
well.
The Superman and Action
The superman is the heroic man, the man who is
willing to strive for the goal of perfection, even in the
face of profound suffering. The goal of self-perfection,
although it is beyond one’s present self, is not a
Platonic idea or abstract ideal forever beyond man's
reach. The superman recognizes that the goal can be
attained, or at least asymptotically approached, through
his own regular activity [regelmasslge Selbsttatlgkeit].
Nietzsche is here trying to avoid the Scylla of idle
contemplation and the Charybdis of blind activity. The
48Ibid., p. 363. 49Ibid.
Human. All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," The Complete Works. Vol. 7, p. 310.
*51
^ Schopenhauer as Educator, 5, p. 50.
392
superman strives for an integration of knowledge and
action, for "an unlimited capacity to learn without any
52
corresponding diminution of capacity for action."^ It
is thus necessary that one discover the duties and means
that are implied or required by the goal, so that one may
actually proceed to advance along the path of self-
perfection. Without such a "chain of dutiesone is
forced either to live by a double standard or by no
standard at all.
Since the superman wants actually to attain his
goal of self-perfection, he is necessarily involved in
practical activity, which also involves him in relations
with his fellow men. The duties of the superman "are not
the duties of the isolated individual; rather, one belongs
to a mighty community which is held together . . . by a
cli
fundamental idea." The fundamental idea of course is
individual self-perfection. The embodiment of this idea
in society is for Nietzsche the essence of "culture." The
realization of this idea is the task of the superman. In
summary: "Culture demands from him not only inner
experience, not only the judgment of the exterior world
^ Ecce Homo. "The Birth of Tragedy," 4, The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 870.
•^Schopenhauer as Educator, 5, p. 51.
54Ibid., p. 56.
393
of flux, but finally, and chiefly, action. This means
fighting for culture and being hostile to the influence,
laws and institutions in which he does not recognize his
goal: the production of genius,
Action and Solitude
Nietzsche sometimes finds it necessary to argue
for solitude, at other times for action, depending on
whether he is addressing men of affairs, or academicians.
To men of affairs he addresses the following admonition:
0 you poor fellows in the great centers of
the world»s politics, you young and talented men,
who, urged on by ambition, think it your duty to
propond your opinion of every event of the day,—
for something is always happening,— who, by thus
making a noise and raising a cloud of dust, mistake
yourselves for the rolling chariot of history; who,
because you always listen, always suit the moment
when you can put in your word or two, thereby lose
all real productiveness. Whatever may be your
desire to accomplish great deedsft,the deep silence
of pregnancy never comes to you!5®
The weakness of the man of action is not that he wants to
change the world, but that he lacks patience and perspec
tive and is thereby ineffective in producing significant
change.
A vicious aspect of modern education, encouraged
•^Schopenhauer as Educator. 6, p. 62.
*^The Dawn of Day, 177. The Complete Works,
v o l. 9, p ---------------- ------------ -------------------
by the mass media (in Nietzsche^ day the daily newspaper)
is its growing attitude that all people should keep up
with political and economic matters from day to day and
should be busy doing something about them. The vicious
ness lay in the fact that in so doing they "neglect their
own work,"*^ they neglect the development of their own
unique capacities, they prostitute themselves for the
sake of being "timely," The problem is not with the young
people themselves, for they "are lacking neither in
58
character, nor talent, nor zeal," but with a society
and an educational system which does not allow them
"sufficient time to choose their own path.""*9 With an
unhealthy haste our youth are directed into careers and
the hurly-burly of practical affairs and petty politics.
If educators honestly reflect on the history of most
young men, they will recognize that at a time when youth
"were ripe enough to be sent into the ^desert,1 something
else was done with them. They were turned to account,
estranged from themselves, and brought up in such a way
that they became accustomed to be worn out by their daily
toil. This was imposed on them as a duty, and now they
-^The Dawn of Day, 179. The Complete Works.
Vol. 9, p. 181.
58Ibid., 178, p. 180.
59Ibid.
395
60
cannot do without it.”
Rather than make a hasty effort to turn students
”to account," the schools should provide a climate con
genial to solitude and reflection. Yet in our modern
world, including our educational institutions, an
appreciation of solitude is sorely lacking, Nietzsche
expresses his concern in an aphorism titled "On
Education": "I have generally come to see daylight in
regard to the most general defect in our methods of
education and training: nobody learns, nobody teaches,
nobody wishes to endure solitude."^1
The reason that Nietzsche recommends solitude
to the man of affairs is not to deprecate action. Quite
6 2
the contrary. To carry out "superior actions," to do
great deeds— in short, to change the course of human
events— this requires that one discover who he really is,
what his capacities are, and then strive to become who he
really is; it is only by acting in accord with one’s
potentials that one can achieve maximum effect in the
world. Solitude provides the opportunity for young men
to come to terms with themselves and thus to become more
60Ibid., pp. 180-181.
6lIbid., 443, p. 319.
6 2
Human, All-too-Human, "Miscellaneous Maxims and
Opinions," 1B3> ^he CompleteWorks, Vol. 7, p. 98.
396
effective men of action. Properly understood, solitude
does not undermine action, but deepens and strengthens it.
Our age, in contrast to the Medieval period, is
one which places a premium on industriousness, activity,
busyness and all kinds of "doing." For this reason
Nietzsche finds it necessary to emphasize the importance
of solitude and contemplation. Meaningless, unflective
activity is the vice of modern times. A contemporary
economist, J. K. Galbraith, has said: "One of the best
ways of avoiding necessary and even urgent tasks is to
seem to be busily employed on things that are already
6 ^
done." J However, there is another, opposite vice which
besets those who are, by nature or training, "intellec
tuals"— this is the vice of inaction, of becoming a mere
64
world "traveler" instead of a "world liberator."
Apart from the noises of society, in the seclusion
of academic and intellectual coteries, one finds "the
highly gifted, who think themselves too dignified to be
of service by modest activity, and are too lazy for real,
self-sacrificing work."^ It is not enough to entertain
^John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958) , p. 3.
^ Schopenhauer as Educator, 4, p. 42.
gc
^Human, A11-too-Human, "Miscellaneous Maxims and
Opinions," 169. frhe CompleteTWorks. Vol. 7, p. 84.
397
ideas and opinions: these must be translated and tested
in personal commitment and action. This holds true for
matters of minor as well as of major importance. Counter
to those who argue that in small affairs one should do
what custom dictates, even if one knows that the custom is
irrational or based on superstition, Nietzsche maintains:
To act occasionally in matters of custom
against our own better judgments; to yield in
practice while reserving our own intellectual
liberty; to behave like everybody else and thus
to show ourselves amiable and considerate to all,
to compensate them, as it were, even if only to
some extent, for our unconventional opinions— all
this among many tolerably liberal-minded men is
looked upon not only as permissible but even as
"honourable," "humane," "tolerant," and "unpedantic,"
or whatever fine words may be used to lull to sleep
the intellectual conscience. So, for example, one
man, although he may be an atheist, has his Infant
baptized in the usual Christian fashion; another
goes through his period of military service, though
he may severely condemn all hatred between nations;
and a third runs into the Church with a girl because
she comes from a religious family, and makes his
vows to a priest without feeling ashamed of it.
"It is of no importance if one of us does what every
one else does and has done"— so says ignorant pre
judice! What a profound mistake I«o
The need for reflective men of action is particu
larly great in the field of education. All-too-frequently,
we find either "the sober practical men" who "have no ideas
6 7
and thereby fall short in practice," or the contemplative
^ The Dawn of Pay, 1^9. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, pp. 161-162.
67
The Future of Our Educational Institutions,
"Second Lecture." ^h'e Complete Works, Vol. 3,' p. ' 4 * > .
398
scholars who display "a sad want of spirit" and a lack of
68
"real initiative" and thereby accomplish nothing,
Nietzsche urges that before significant educational change
can take place the "real genius and the real practical
mind must necessarily come together in the same indivi-
6q
duals." ? Action, of course, can take many forms; it is
not limited to such gross physical manifestations as
attending committee meetings or running for public office
it is not so much physical busyness as it is a state of
mind, an incentive and drive to fight for change. For
Nietzsche, himself, action meant taking up that mightiest
sword, the pen.
Withdrawal and Return
The pattern of withdrawal (isolating oneself from
fellow men) and return (reestablishing human contacts) is
commonly seen in the lives of creative men, for solitude
and contemplation are contingent upon withdrawal—
psychologically and/or physically— and effective action
is contingent upon return. We may therefore expect to
find this pattern in NietzscheTs image of the superman.
The withdrawal-return theme is sounded in the
opening lines of Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
g8Ibid., p. 44. 69Ibid., p. 45.
399
When Zarathustra was thirty years old he left
his home and the lake of his home and went into
the mountains* Here he enjoyed his spirit and his
solitude*'0
Prom the "sun" Zarathustra absorbes energy and wisdom
until he is overflowing and longing to "give away and
distribute*"7' L One morning Zarathustra rose with the dawn
and spoke to the sun:
"Like you, I must go under— go down, as is
said by man, to whom I want to descend.
So bless me then, you quiet eye that can look
even upon an all-too-great happiness without envy!
Bless the cup that wants to everflow, that the
water may flow from it golden and carry everywhere
the reflection of your delight.
Behold, this cup wants to become empty again,
and Zarathustra wants to become man again."
Thus Zarathustra began to go under.72
7(^Thus Spoke Zarathustra* "Prologue," 1, The
Portable Nle'tzscne* p. 12l.
71Ibid., p. 122.
72Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The Portable Nietzsche,
p. 122, Nietzsche takes advantage of the possibilities
of "over" and "under" words in the German language, inclu
ding his own coinages. These words are employed not only
for their poetic and rhythmic qualities— no one took more
delight than Nietzsche in "playing" with words— but also
to convey such important philosophical concepts as
Obermensch (overman or superman) and Selbstuberwindung
(self-overcoming). Walter Kaufmann comments on the diffi-
culty of translating an "under*1 passage such as the one
just quoted:
"Of the many ’underT words, the German
untergehen poses the greatest problem of trans
lation! it is the ordinary word for the setting
of sun, and it also means ’to perish; ’ but
Nietzsche almost always uses it with the accent
on ’under*— either by way of echoing another
’under* in the same sentence or, more often, by
way of contrast with an ’over’ word, usually
400
No sooner does Zarathustra descend than he meets
a holy man dwelling in the forest. The saint wants to
know why Zarathustra, having achieved enlightenment, now
wants to go among men. Isn’t It enough to remain In the
forest and worship God? But for Zarathustra there Is no
otherworldly realm, "God is dead,"^ and the meaning of
life is to be found in self-surpassing, in the creation
of the superman— and to accomplish this task Zarathustra
must ’ ’ return1 1 to the all-too-human world.
The cyclic process of withdrawal— return is to be
found again and again throughout the pages of Zarathustra.
Nietzsche’s hero periodically withdraws from human inter
course, climbs to the solitude of mountain tops, refreshes
and deepens his wisdom, and finally descends again to the
crowds. Part Two of Zarathustra opens with this theme:
"Then Zarathustra returned again to the mountains and to
the solitude of his cave and withdrew from men, waiting
like a sower who has scattered his seed. But his soul
grew full of impatience and desire for those whom he
overman. Again and again, a smooth Idiomatic
translation would make nonsense of such passages,
and *ge under’ seemed the least evil."
The Portable Nietzsche, p. 115.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. "Prologue," 2. The
Portable Nletzscne, p. 124.
401
74
loved, because he still had much to give them.1 , 1 After
many lovely days away from others "his wisdom grew" until
7C
It "caused him pain with its fullness."'*^ The tortuous
transformations of the soul that are the fruit of solitude
are incomplete until they are shared with mankind. Prom
the heights Zarathustra proclaims:
I may go down again to my friends, and to
my enemies too. Zarathustra may speak again and
give and do what is dearest to those dear to him.
My impatient love overflows in rivers, downward,
toward sunrise and sunset. From silent mountains
and thunderstorms of suffering my soul rushes into
the valleys.7°
These passages, symbolic though they are, leave little
doubt that Nietzsche conceived of withdrawal— return as
a dynamic process of energy— gathering and energy—
dispersing, as polar forces in the recurring cycle of
creative growth.
The educator might well ask, should the self
surpassing person who has discovered a new happiness, a
fresh insight, or a key to one of life^ problems go to
the trouble of revealing his discovery to others? A
notable example of this dilemma is to be found in the life
7 * * Thus Spoke Zarathustra. II, "The Child with the
Mirror." The Portable Nietzsche*, p. 195. Terms such as
"mountain,b wcave,r i "river,w etcetera, are often employed
by Nietzsche to symbolize mental and psychological states.
75Ibid. 76Ibid., p. 196.
402
of the Buddha: meditating under the Bo tree, the Buddha
found enlightenment (Nirvana) and peace of mind for him
self; but, tradition tells us, he hesitated over whether
or not to rest content with his own salvation or attempt
to teach his new insights to a public that would probably
greet his teachings with scorn and hostility or at best,
with disinterest.^ The course of human history would
undoubtedly have been different had the Buddha not decided
to "set the wheel in motion" by teaching his doctrine to
others. But what prompted him to act as he did? The
Buddhist scriptures tell us that the Buddha acted out of
compassion, out of the disinterested love of mankind
(hence the designation "The Compassionate One").
Nietzschefs response to the dilemma is not unlike
the Buddha's. Nietzsche has Zarathustra return to the
unenlightened people, "the sleepers," to preach his
7 8
wisdom, out of a love for man.' Since God is dead, man,
or rather that which man can become, is for Nietzsche the
77
1'This is precisely what happened to Zarathustra
who, when he spoke to the crowds, was greeted with
laughter, derision and animosity. He is told: "'You are
hated by the good and the Just, and they call you their
enemy and despiser; you are hated by the believers in the
true faith, and they call you the danger of the multi
tude."' Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Prologue," 8. The
Portable Nietzsche, p. 133.
78
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. "Prologue," 2. The
Portable Nletzscne, p. 123.
403
highest object of love.^ It is to be noted that
Zarathustra does not return out of a feeling of moral
obligation, or religious duty, or Christian pity. He
returns rather as the result of an overflowing soul, a
love that issues from abundance. The self-overcoming
person Involves himself out of love for a nobler future,
for the elevation of man, for the creation of the super
man.
However much the educator may wish to encourage
the young scholar's "freturn," he should guard himself
against any overt attempt to persuade the contemplative
to become Involved, The educator must resist the
temptation of wanting to convince students that it is
"a good thing" to try to help others, for he will fall
prey to moralizing, which has never been an effective
means of change. Meaningful and fruitful return can take
place only If motivated by love, and "it Is impossible
Q Q
to teach love" at least In the usual sense of "teach,"
The educator will have done his task If he can
but instigate within each student the dynamics of self-
surpassing, for with this the student begins to grow in
^ Thus Spoke Zarathustra. "Prologue," 2, 3.
The Portable tolefczsche, pp. 12^-126.
8 o
Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 6l.
4o4
strength, and it is only from a surplus of strength that
fruitful love will flow. The individual, out of his
newly gained strength, through the almost physiological
dictates of his expanding power, will return to aid man
kind, with a superman*s love. There is nothing the
educator can do directly to bring this about except,
perhaps, for he himself to serve as a model. Love may
not be teachable, but it is contagious.
Courage
Man may indeed be born unique, but few individuals
ever fully realize this fact. Prom birth onward man is
conditioned by the standardized conventions and rituals
of his social environment. Most men live a life of
"idle drifting along in borrowed manners and superimposed
81
opinions.” Society teaches each young person "to fear
his neighbor" and "to think and act with the
82
herd. ..." Nietzsche argues that the demands to con
form are especially strong in modern times, for we live
in an "era which puts its salvation in public opinion,"
in a "period which is ruled not by living people but by
8 ^
public opinion polls."
81
Schopenhauer as Educator. 1, p. 2.
82Ibid., p. 1. 83Ibid.. p. 3.
405
Nietzsche believes that every young man has an
intimation of his uniqueness, that he has an inner feeling
84
that life is "hopeless and senseless" unless one liber
ates himself from mass opinion: "The man who does not
wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease being
self-satisfied; let him follow his conscience which calls
to him: *Be yourselfl All that you now do, think and
85
desire is not really you.™
It requires both strength and courage to obey the
command, "Be yourself!" The fundamental source upon which
one can rely for strength and courage is awareness of the
mystery of human existence: "Our wondrous existence
precisely is this Now, the inexplicable fact that we live
precisely today, and yet had the infinity of time in
which to come into being, that we possess only a brief
today and in it are to show how and for what purpose we
came into being Just at this time— this gives us courage
in the highest degree to live according to our own law
86
and standards." From an awareness of the inexplicable
fact that one lives here and now, that one has come into
being at Just this time and not another, that one "is
only on earth once, as something unique, and that no play
84
Schopenhauer as Educator. 1, p. 2.
85Ibid. 86Ibid., pp. 3-4.
40 6
of chance, however strange, will twice concoct this unity
out of such a wonderful diversity"87— from this awareness
arises the conviction that "we have to account for our
88
own existence," that we must "be the actual bookkeepers
of this existence and not permit our existence [Existenz]
8q
to resemble an unthinking product of chance."
One's educators, teachers and "significant
others" may promote the conditions which encourage youth
to seek liberation, but eventually one must strike out
for himself, for there is no one path to self-perfection.
The superman realizes that to break the bonds of conven
tion he must risk himself and venture into the unknown:
One must be bold and ready to take risks with
his existence, especially as he will inevitably
lose it in any event. Why stick to this piece of
earth, to this trade, why strain the ears to hear
what the neighbor is saying? It is so provincial
to commit oneself to views which a few hundred
miles further on are no longer binding. East and
West are chalk marks which someone draws before
our eyes to tease our timidity. The young soul
says to itself: "I will make the attempt to
attain freedom"; should he then be hindered by
the fact that by chance two nations hate each
other and are at war, or that an ocean lies between
two continents, or that a religion is taught around
him which a few thousand years ago did not exist?
"All that is not really you," he says to himself.
"No one else can build a bridge on which you must
cross the river of life, no one but you alone."
It is true that there are numerous paths, bridges
and demigods that wish to carry you across the
87Ibid.. p. 1.
89Ibid.
88tk.j i.
Ibid., p. 4
407
river, but only at the cost of your self: you
would pledge yourself and therefore lose yourself.
In the world there is a unique way along which no
one but you may pass: where does it lead? Do not
ask, follow it. Who was it that said: "A man
never rises to greater heights than when he does
not know where his way may lead him"?9°
At the very minimum the superman must have the
courage to follow his own path. There is perhaps no more
pervasive theme throughout Nietzsche's writings than the
necessity of freeing oneself from the opinions of others.
Nietzsche would undoubtedly concur with Emerson that:
91
"Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist."^ But
in addition to the courage to stand alone the superman
must also have the courage to pursue the truth, however
painful it may be.
The Courage to Pursue Truth
The superman is courageous and honest enough to
submit his own beliefs to constant testing. He knows
that it is only through the contest of ideas that truth
^ Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 4. Nietzsche's
reference is probably to a remark of Cromwell's, quoted
by Cardinal de Retz to M. Bellievre: "He [i.e., Oliver
Cromwell] was one day telling me that men never mounted
so high as when they did not know whither they went."
Memoirs of the Cardinal de Retz, translated from the
French (3 vols.; Philadelphia: Eduard Earle, 1817), II,
iii, 302.
^Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," Essays:
First and Second Series (Boston: Houghton Mifflin do..
1883), pp. 51=52- . --------
408
can be found. In an aphorism titled, "To What Extent
the Thinker Loves His Enemy," Nietzsche exhorts:
Make it a rule never to withold or conceal
from yourself anything that may be thought against
your own thoughts. Vow it! This is the essential
requirement of honest thinking. You must under
take such a campaign against yourself every day.
A victory and a conquered position are no longer
your concern, but that of truth— and your defeat
also is no longer your c o n c e r n 192
Nietzschefs admonition invites comparison with the
Socratic maxim that it is better to be refuted ‘ than to
refute someone else, just as "it is a greater boon to be
delivered from the worst of evils oneself than to deliver
another.The goal in both cases is to discover and
eliminate error. Disputation and contest are the means
not to vainglorious victory but to unpretentious truth.
An individual's strength and courage can roughly
be determined by examining the way in which he treats the
ideas of his opponents. The weak and fearful individual
must first distort and dilute opposing views before he
wages war on them. The superman, on the other hand,
"involuntarily idealizes his opponent and frees his
inconsistencies from all defects and accidentalities: he
only takes up arms against him when he has thus turned
^The Dawn of Day, 370. The Complete Works,
Vol. 9, pp. 290-291.
^Plato, Gorglas. 458a.
409
94
his opponent into a god with shining weapons."^
Truth and Friendship
It may be well for the educator to warn youth of
the alteration in personal relationships that inevitably
result when we take the decisive step to follow our own
path and pursue truth as we honestly see it. As soon as
we embark on our way to self-perfection we discover that
"all those who had hitherto been friendly to us and on
intimate terms with us Judged themselves to be superior
QC
to us, and are now offended.Our friends react in
various ways: "The best among them are indulgent . . .
others make fun of us, and pretend that we have been
seized with a temporary attack of mild insanity, or
spitefully point out some seducer . • .the more malicious
say we are vain fools, and do their best to blacken our
motives . . . while the worst of all see in us their
96
greatest enemy . . . and are afraid of us."' Perhaps
it is only when we become courageous enough to seek
passionately inner and outer truth that we discover who
our real friends are.
^The Dawn of Day. 431. The Complete Works
Vol. 9, p.“3T4‘ . ------ -----------------
95Ibid. 96Ibid.
410
Truth and Faith
The superman can expect to be faced with a life
long Internal struggle with the temptation to give up the
pursuit of truth in favor of the comforts of faith. In
moments of distress, disappointment, weariness and
suffering it calls for considerable courage to resist the
human propersity to seek refuge in religion. For example,
even the heroic Richard Wagner, who began his career as
a revolutionary spirit, who seemed to promise so much—
this all-conquering warrior ended as "a decayed and
despairing romantic, suddenly collapsed, helpless and
broken, before the Christian Cross.As a young student
at Bonn, Nietzsche had written to his sister: "Faith does
not offer the least support for a proof of objective
truth. Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive
for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish
o8
to be a devotee of truth, then inquire."^
The superman*s attitude toward the pursuit of
truth (i.e., philosophy) is condensed in an autobiograph
ical passage from Ecce Homo:
^ Human, All-too-Human, "Preface," 3* The
Complete Works, Vol. 7. P. 4.
9 8
* Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche. Bonn, June 11,
1865* The Portable Nietzsche, p. 30.
411
Philosophy, as I have understood and experi
enced It hitherto, Is a voluntary retirement Into
a region of Ice and mountain-peaks~the search for
all that Is strange and questionable in existence,
everything upon which, hitherto, morality has set
its ban. How much truth can a mind endure? How
much truth will it dare? These questions became
for me more and more the essential criterion.
Error (the belief in the ideal) is not blindness;
error is cowardice. Every conquest, all progress
in knowledge, is the result of courage, of hardness
towards one’s self, of cleanliness towards one’s
self.99
The Courage to Pace Consequences
The most stubborn form of dishonesty and cowardice
is perhaps to be found in man’s tendency to hide not just
from others but from himself the logical implications and
practical consequences of his ideas and beliefs. A good
example of this timid hypocricy occurs in connection with
the problem of the belief in a personal, transcendent God.
The rise of the physical sciences, the newly
advanced Darwinian hypothesis, the refinement of histori
cal and textual criticism of the Scriptures— the general
spread of a rational, secular Weltanschauung— made it
difficult for an intellectually honest man, in the
nineteenth century, to retain belief in a Supreme Being.
In one of the most powerful passages in modern literature
^ Ecoe Homo. "Preface," 3. The Philosophy of
Nietzsche, pp. Bl2-ol3•
412
Nietzsche had himself announced the "death of God."100
For someone deeply concerned with the religious dimensions
of life this proclamation is no doubt not an easy one to
make. But atheism was hardly a novelty in the nineteenth
century. Moreover, Nietzsche's concern is not to dispose
men to disbelief: rather, Nietzsche directs his charge
of dishonesty and cowardice to those who have already
given up belief in the Christian God, but who have not
been willing to accept the consequences of this act.
One cannot consistently disbelieve in the
Christian God and at the same time retain Christian
morality; the latter depends on the former, Nietzsche's
criticism is clearly and forcefully stated in the follow
ing aphorism directed against nineteenth-century English
moralists:
They are rid of the Christian God and now
believe all the more firmly that they must cling
to Christian morality. That is an English
consistency. In England one must rehabilitate
oneself after every little emancipation from
theology by showing in a veritably awe-inspiring
manner what a moral fanatic one is.
We others hold otherwise. When one gives up
the Christian faith, one pulls the right to
Christian morality out from under one's feet.
This morality is by no means self-evident: this
point has to be exhibited again and again, despite
the English flat-heads. Christianity is a system,
a whole view of things thought out together. By
100See the two-page aphorism titled "The Madman"
in The Gay Science. 125. The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 95-
96.
413
breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in
God, one breaks the whole: nothing necessary
remains in one’s hands, Christianity presupposes
that man does not know, cannot know, what is good
for him, what evil: he believes in God, who alone
knows it. Christian morality is a command; its
origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism,
all right to criticism; it has truth only if God
is the truth— it stands and falls with faith in
God,101
The English are not the only "flatheads" in this regard.
The Germans, in Nietzsche’s view, are never to be outdone
in theological and moral stupidity or, in this case, in
outright cowardice, Nietzsche’s contempt for this type
of mentality is expressed in his early polemic against a
102
fellow German scholar, David Strauss. Strauss’s book,
The Old Faith and the New, was very popular both among
the lay public and the acadamicians; it proclaimed
Strauss's disbelief in revealed truth and a personal
Twilight of the Idols, "Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man,H £>7 The portable Nietzsche, pp. 515-516.
The aphorism is headed "G. Eliot.1 1 George Eliot was the
pen name of Mary Ann Evans (1819-1880), the author of
The Mill on the PIoss. Silas Marner and other works. Her
literary career began with a translation of David
Strauss’s Life of Jesus. This is the same Strauss that
Nietzsche violently attacked in the first of his Untimely
Meditations.
102David Strauss (1808-1874) died the year follow
ing the publication of Nietzsche's vehement attack. In a
letter to his friend, von Gersdorff, dated February 11,
1874, Nietzsche expresses concern lest he has caused the
old Strauss needless suffering: "David Strauss was buried
yesterday in Ludwigsburg. I strongly hope that I have not
troubled his final years and that he has died without
knowing anything of me." Historlsc h-Kris t i sc he
Qesamtausgabe. Briefe, Vol. 4, p. 49.
4l4
transcendent deity; it also upheld the rationality of the
universe and man's duty to live in peace with fellow man.
A recent biographer of Nietzsche remarks: "Nineteenth
Century rationalism was characterized by a keen insight
into the difficulty in accepting revealed religion, and
singular obtuseness regarding the consequences of rejec
ting it."10^ The following words, although addressed to
Strauss, are really directed against the smug ease of
nineteenth-century rationalism:
With admirable frankness, he announces that
he is no longer a Christian, but disclaims all
idea of wishing to disturb the contentment of
anyone. With a certain rude self-satisfaction,
he swathes himself in the hirsute garment of our
Simian genealogists, and extols Darwin as one of
mankind’s greatest benefactors; but our perplexity
is great when we find him constructing his ethics
quite independently of the question, "What is our
conception of the universe?" In this department
he had an opportunity of exhibiting native courage;
for he ought to have ... boldly established a
moral code for life out of bellum omnium contra
omnes and the privileges of the strong.104
If Strauss had had the intellectual integrity of
Hobbes, then instead of venting his emotions in "explosive
outbursts against parsons, miracles, and the 'world-wide
humbug' of the Ressurection,1 1 he would have set about
constructing a new ethics "based upon Darwin's
^■°%ollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 120.
104
David Strauss, 7» The Complete Works. Vol. 4,
p. 50.
415
1QC
teaching.” The superman must not be like the glib
atheist who takes out his watch and challenges God to
strike him dead within a quarter of an hour (thus dis
playing the superficial courage of a cultural Philistine)
but who also continues to have faith in the moral truth
of the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule (thus display
ing the abject cowardice of a cultural Philistine to
accept the consequences of his thinking). The superman
has the courage to face a world stripped of its value, a
world of nihilism and nothingness, and to attempt to
create a new set of values to replace the old.
The Courage to Live Dangerously
The superman views life as an adventure, a
dangerous adventures ’ 'Zarathustra was a friend of all
who travel far and do not like to live without danger."10^
Concerning his own life, Nietzsche remarks: "In reality
is a journey, an ocean Journey. It is not for nothing
that I lived for years in the city of Columbus. The
superman is willing to risk himself, to leap into the
105Ibid., p. 51.
10^ThUs Spoke Zarathustra, III, "On the Vision and
the Riddle," I. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 267.
^^Unpubllshed Letters» p. 106. Letter to Erwin
Rohde (Nice, February 22, lbiM).
416
midst of the unknown and the terrible. Life's deepest
secrets remain hidden unless we approach them with a
courageous spirit of adventure. Zarathustra, about to
reveal his vision of the eternal recurrence to aspiring
supermen, speaks of hazardous voyages: "To you, the bold
searchers, researchers, and whoever embarks with cunning
sails on terrible seas— to you, drunk with riddles, glad
of the twilight, whose soul flutes lure astray to every
whirlpool, because you do not want to grope along a
thread with cowardly hand; and where you can guess, you
hate to deduce— to you alone I tell the riddle that I
n nR
saw, the vision of the loneliest."
The superman risks himself not for the sale of
others, not as a "virtuous” act, but simply as an over
flow of his own will-to-power, as a challenge which tests
his strength and courage. In Nietzsche's notes from the
late 1880's we find the following observation: "That one
stakes one's life, one’s health, one’s honor, is the
consequences of high spirits and an overflowing, prodigal
will: not from love of man but because every great danger
challenges our curiosity about the degree of our strength
10^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Ill, "On the Vision
and the Riddle,” 1. tfhe Portable Nietzsche. pp. 267-268.
417
10Q
and our courage." *
In Nietzsche's notes we also find speculations on
two types of men— one seeking the danger of adventure,
the other the safety of belief:
If one has the temperament, one Instinctively
chooses what Is dangerous; e.g., adventures In
speculation if one is a philosopher; or in immor
ality if one is virtuous. One kind of man will
risk nothing, another wants risks. Are we others
despisers of life? On the contrary, we seek life
raised to a higher power, life lived in danger—
But that, to repeat it, does not mean we want to
be more virtuous than others. Pascal, e.g., wanted
to risk nothing and remained a Christian: perhaps.
that was virtuous.— One always makes sacrifices.11
Our society, including its schools, is permeated
by an atmosphere of safety, security and comfort— an
atmosphere inimical to the preparation of the superman.
To counteract this state of affairs, Nietzsche advises:
The secret of the greatest fruitfulness and
the greatest enjoyment of existence is: to live
dangerously I Build your cities under Vesuvius 1
Send your ships into uncharted seasl Live at war
with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and
conquerors, as long as you cannot be rulers and
owners, you lovers of knowledge! Soon the age
will be past when you could be satisfied to live
like shy deer, hidden in the woods! At long last
The Will to Power. 949. Kaufmann translation,
p. 499* Cf. nA man can approach truth only in so far as
his courage and his strength will permit him to do so."
Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," 2. The Philosophy of
NietzscHe- , pp. 867-868.
“ ^^The Will to Power, 929* Kaufmann translation,
p. 491* Nietzsche is herie alluding to Pascal’s famous
"wager" as to whether or not God exists.
418
the pursuit of knowledge will reach out for its
duet it will want to rule and own, and you with
« i i n —
The universe is not lacking in uncharted seas and
unexplored regions. However, admldst all the world's
puzzles and enigmas the superman turns to man as the
greatest mystery of all:
For if the world is like a dark jungle and a
garden of delight for all wild hunters, it strikes
me even more, and so I prefer to think of it, as
an abysmal, rich sea— a sea full of colorful fish
and crabs, which even gods might covet, that for
their sakes they would wish to become fishermen
and net-throwers: so rich is the world in queer
things, great and small. Especially the human
world, the human sea: that is where I now cast
my golden fishing rod and say: ’ ’ Open up, you
human a b y s s I
Reason, Passion and Self-Discipline
The Role of Reason
A philosopher who attempts to assert the rights
of the instinctual and non-conscious levels of man's
being, who even goes so far as to claim that the highest
functions of the intellect have a physiological basis, is
often accused of being an irrationalist. Critics who have
not taken the time to read Nietzsche thoroughly have
all-too-often jumped to the conclusion that since
^■^The Gay Science, 2 8 3. The Portable Nietzsche,
pp. 97-98.
^Thus Spoke ZarathUstra, IV, "The Honey
Sacrifice." frhe Portable Wletzsche, p. 350.
Nietzsche was "for" the instincts (and this in itself is
a dangerous over-simplification) he must be "against"
the intellect (which is patently false). It is true that
Nietzsche attacked the numerous presumptions of the
intellect, Just as Hume and Kant had, but he also attacked
the blindness and folly of passions that are not mediated
or guided by the intellect. Nietzsche indeed asserts the
rights of the non-rational, but not at the expense of the
rational. To recognize modes of being other than the
rational— such as the aesthetic— is not to condone anti-
rational behavior. At no time, to this writer's knowledge
does Nietzsche approve of acting contrary to the dictates
of logic and intellectual integrity. Indeed, it is the
dictates of the intellect that prevent Nietzsche from
acquiescing to such irrational arguments as Tertullian's:
"It is believable, because it is absurd; it is certain,
113
because it is impossible."
Reason, cognition, intellect, logic, inference—
the rational processes in general— belong to the highest
114
manifestation of the will-to-power. It is through the
^■■^Quoted in B. A. G. Fuller, ed., A History of
Philosophy (3rd ed.; New York: Henry Holt & Company,
1$5'5‘ ) , p. 351.
Ull
Cf. Kaufmann:
"Nietzsche's doctrine differs from 'irra
tionalism' inasmuch as it does not oppose reason
to the basic principle of his philosophy: instead
reason is pictured as the fulfillment of the will
420
application of the cognitive powers that mankind has
advanced. "The greatest progress men have made lies in
115
their learning how to draw correct inferences." But
the art of reasoning and drawing correct inferences "is
by no means something natural."11^ In terms of the long
history of man's evolution, logic Is a recent phenomenon:
"It has been learned only late, and it still has not
gained dominance. False inferences are the rule In
earlier times; and the mythology of all peoples, their
magic and their superstition, their religious cults, their
laws, are inexhaustible mines of proof for this
117
proposition.”
Nietzsche maintains that the ability and willing
ness to give reasons for what one believes— a sure sign
of rationality— accounts for the rise of science in the
to power; and the irrational is not envisaged as
something that is adverse to rationality but only
as a weak form of rationality: it lacks the force,
the rigor, and the power to be rational."
Nietzsche, p. 203* For a less "rationalistic" interpre
tation see Thomas Hanna, The Lyrical Existentialists
(New York: Atheneum, 1962), pp. Ibb-I7d. In a lengthy
anti-Kaufmann footnote Hanna remarks:
"Mr. Kaufmann seems to be in such haste to
save Nietzsche for the history of philosophy that
he runs roughshod over the insurmountable evidence
of Nietzsche's a-ratlonallsm and his strong anti-
rationalistic attitude." (p. 1 6 8.)
Human, All-too-Human, "Signs of Higher and
Lower Culture," 271. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 57*
116Ibid. 117Ibld.
421
West, Nietzsche cites, with approval, the theory of a
contemporary scientist:
The great scientist von Baer sees the superi
ority of Europeans over Asiatics in their trained
ability to give reasons for what they believe—
something of which the latter are wholly incapable.
Europe has gone through the school of consistent,
critical thinking; Asia still does not know how to
distinguish between truth and poetry, and is not
conscious of whether its convictions are derived
from personal observation and methodical thinking
or from fantasies.
Europe was made Europe by reason in the schools;
in the Middle Ages Europe was on the way to becoming
a piece and an appendix of Asia again— by losing the
scientific sense that it owed to the Greeks.11
Regardless of the accuracy, or lack of accuracy, of the
above theory as an explanation of the discrepancy in the
scientific development of Europe and Asia, Nietzsche is
ennunciating two crucial points: first, that critical
thinking is a virtue of no little importance; second,
that since it doesn't arise spontaneously it must be
cultivated. This leads us to the role of the schools:
Reason in the schools♦ The schools have no
more important task than to teach rigorous think
ing, cautious judgment, and consistent inference;
therefore they should leave alone whatever is not
suitable for these operations: religion, for
example. After all, they can be sure that later
on man's fogginess, habit, and need will slacken
the bow of an all-too-taut thinking. But as far
as the influence of the schools reaches, they
118
Human, All-too-Human. 265* p. 57. Von Baer
(1792-1876) was a pioneer in comparative embryology and
the discoverer of the human ovum. T. H. Huxley and
Herbert Spencer were greatly influenced by von Baer's
work.
422
should enforce what Is essential and distinctive
In man— "reason and science, man's Y£?y highest
power"— so Goethe, at least Judges.11*
Our educated man, I.e., the superman, must have a sharp
Intellect. Consistent with principles developed in our
previous chapter on eplstemology, the superman must
exercise his powers of analysis and critical thinking—
which Includes a realization of the limits of analysis.
Scientific Objectivity
There Is a close psychological relationship
between contemplative withdrawal from society and
scientific "objectivity" (that methodological desideratum
of all science). Gratitude is due science and the
scholarly disciplines (Wlssenschaft) for their substitu
tion of disinterested knowledge in place of subjectivity
and personal interest. Nietzsche's philosophizing,
especially during his middle period, bears witness to
his own attempt to achieve scientific objectivity even
in those areas of life— such as art, morals and
religion— which do not easily lend themselves to neutral
and objective treatment. Knowledge has clearly been
advanced by the dedicated labors of the "objective
Human, All-too-Human, 265, pp. 56-57.
423
120
spirit." "The objective person who no longer curses
and scolds like the pessimist, the ideal scholar in whom
the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and
semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end,
is certainly one of the most preolous Instruments there
are."121
Valuable though the objective person may be, he
is still "only an instrument1 1 — "he is no *end in him-
122
self1." This is a crucial distinction in terms of
establishing priorities in education. The "objective
spirit," as Nietzsche here uses the term, refers to
someone who has elevated objectivity to the position of
the suramum bonum, forgetting that it is but a means,
although an important means, to the higher end of self-
perfection. The educator, while encouraging the stance
of objectivity, must see to it that it plays the role of
servant, not master.
The objective spirit, like the skeptic (in the
120Beyond Good and Evil. 207, P« 126.
^21Ibid. By "objectivity" Nietzsche is not
referring to a knowledge of things-as-they-are
(Nietzschefs perspectivist epistemology prohibits any
such reference), but to a willingness to honestly examine
and criticize the "subjective" area of human values,
including the influence of these values on seemingly
non-valuational Judgments.
Beyond Good and Evil, p. 126.
424
sense of one who "sits back" and suspends Judgment), will
stagnate and die, will be unable to develop to the level
of the superman, because he has not committed himself to
life and action. He Is a poor leader and model for
students, for Mhe places himself too far apart to have
123
any reason to take sides for good or evil.” J "His
habit of meeting every thing and experience halfway, the
sunny and impartial hospitality with which he accepts
everything that comes his way, his type of unscrupulous
benevolence, of dangerous unconcern about Yes and No"
124
leaves him superficial and uncommitted.
Commitment requires emotion, passion, power of
will— what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian forces. This
is not in place of, but in addition to, objectivity, for
objectivity is necessary in determining the relationality
of onefs commitment. The "objective spirit," the
123Ibid.. p. 128.
124
Ibid., p. 127* Nietzsche repeatedly criticizes
his fellow-countrymen for their failure to take a stand
on important issues.
"The German people . . . with enviable
appetite, persist in nourishing themselves with
contradictions, and gulp down rFaith' together
with science, Christian love together with anti-
Semitism, and the will to power (to the ’Empire*)*
together with the gospel of humility— all this
without the slightest sign of indigestion! They
take no sides amid all these contradictions!
What stomachic neutrality!"
Ecoe Homo. "The Case of Wagner," 1. The Philosophy of
NietzscKe, p. 916.
425
skeptical spirit, has the Intellect but not the passion:
he is an Incomplete and therefore Inauthentic man, "If
love and hatred are wanted from him— I mean love and
hatred as God, woman, and animal understand them— he will
do what he can and give what he can. But one should not
be surprised if it is not much— if Just here he proves
inauthentic, fragile, questionable, and worm-eaten. His
love is forced, his hatred artificial and rather un tour
de force, a little vanity and exaggeration. After all,
125
he is genuine only insofar as he may be objective."
The new skeptic, the skeptic of the future, the
superman, is one who overcomes the "paralysis of the
will" which has been the crippling disease of
skepticism. The new virile skepticism "despises and
nevertheless seizes; it undermines and takes possession;
it does not believe but does not lose itself In the
process; It gives the spirit dangerous freedom, but it is
127
severe on the heart."
Nietzsche's new skepticism becomes "a decisive
trait, now, for example, as an intrepid eye, now as the
courage and hardness of analysis, as the tough will to
undertake dangerous Journeys of exploration and
1 ^ Beyond Good and Evil, p. 127.
126Ibid., 208, p. 130* 127Ibid., 209, p. 132.
426
spiritualized North Pole expeditions under desolate and
1 oft
dangerous skies."
Analytic Philosophy
The middle period of Nietzschefs life Is some
times referred to as the period of "positivism," for it
was during these years that Nietzsche developed his
powers as analyst and critic. His early training in the
rigors of philology (he studied under some of the best
classical philologists in Germany and received his
doctorate in this field) stood him in good stead when he
turned to philosophy, for he soon discovered that
philosophers had a habit of getting themselves into
unnecessary predicaments through their carelessness with
language, and that the only remedy was a strict applica
tion of linguistic analysis. Indeed, an essential trait
of the superman is his drive toward conceptual clarity
and precision, both in daily life and in the sciences.
The superman as positivist is concerned with dissection,
12Q
with "applying the knife vivesectionally" * to all
beliefs, dogmas, assumptions, convictions, virtues,
truths— to all statements, arguments, Judgments and
reasons•
Beyond Good and Evil, 209# p. 133.
129Iki&., 212, p. 137.
427
The "task of clearing up the meanings"13®repre-
sents the prevailing attitude of contemporary Anglo-
American philosophy. It is commonly referred to as
critical or analytical philosophy (in contrast to
speculative and systematic philosophy). The analytic
spirit, which is now gaining ground in educational
philosophy, has been described by one proponent as:
A willingness to tackle single problems in
piecemeal fashion, and a subjection of general
assertions to the twin tests of fact and logical
clarity. There is a unanimous distrust of large
generalizations about the universe, of attempts
to interpret all of human life in terms of a
single idea, of systems whose air of profundity
and deductive strength is bought at the expense
of a disparagment of common experience. In
addition, there is hostility not alone to
philosophizing that in practice reveals impatience
with evidence or that, in its haste to edify,
substitutes rhetoric for reasons, but also, and
above all, to philosophies that scorn reasoned
discourse in principle, that glory in the vague
and the subjective, and make a virtue of paradox.131
Nietzsche is to be counted among those philosophers
who welcome and applaud the techniques of critical
analysis, who demand of themselves and others "critical
discipline and every habit that is conducive to cleanli-
132
. ness and severity in matters of the spirit."
130C. D. Broad. Scientific Thought (New York:
Humanities Press, 1952), p. lb.
131
J Israel Scheffler, Philosophy and Education
(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1958), pp. o-y.
132Beyond Good and Evil. 210, p. 135.
428
Nevertheless, Nietzsche is not to be classed as an
"analytic philosopher," for analysis is merely a means,
not an endt
They [the true philosophers] consider it no
small disgrace for philosophy when people decree,
as is popular nowadays: "Philosophy itself is
criticism and critical science— and nothing what
ever besides," This evaluation of philosophy may
elicit applause from all the positivists of Prance
and Germany (and it might even have pleased the
heart and taste of Kant— one should remember the
titles of his major works)j our new philosophers
will say nevertheless: critics are instruments
of the philosopher and for that very reason,
being instruments, a long ways from being philoso
phers themselves. Even the great Chinese of
Konigsberg [Kant] was merely a great critic.— 133
Nietzsche insists that people should "stop con
founding philosophical laborers, and scientific men
134
generally, with philosophers." J Analysis is but a
step on the path to the philosophical goal of a continu
ous creative synthesis. The truly educated man is one
who strives to see life in its totality, to reconstruct
both inner and outer worlds, and to create new order and
value out of the fragments of analysis. Through strength
of will, through "the capacity for long-range
decisions,"13- * the superman is one who transcends the
past, who determines, through his value Judgments and
actions, the future of man. In Nietzsche's own forceful
133Ibid. 13^Ibid., 211, p. 135.
135Ibid., 212, p. 137.
429
terms: "Genuine Philosophers . . . are commanders and
legislators! they say, ’thus it shall bel’ They first
determine the Whither and For What of man. With a
creative hand they reach for the future, and all that
is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument,
a hammer. Their fknowing1 is creating, their creating
is a legislation, their will to truth is— will to
power.
Sooratlsm
When Nietzsche speaks harshly of reason, intel
lect, or mind— which he frequently does— he is not
attacking the rational nature of man but those who
conceive of reason as separate from and antagonistic to
man’s instinctual and biological nature. This dualism,
which has dominated Western philosophy and religion,
received its initial impetus in Socrates. Despite
Socrates' greatness, which Nietzsche never really
137
questions, he is the source of a narrow intellectualism.
In Eoce Homo Nietzsche reflects back on what he considers
136Beyond Good and Evil. 211, p. 136.
137
Cf. Kaufmann, Nietzsche. Ch. 13, "Nietzsche’s
Admiration for Socrates," pp. 334-352.
430
to be the major innovations of his early book The Birth
of Tragedy, One of these innovations "lies in the
interpretation of Socratism— Socrates being recognized
for the first time as the instrument of Greek decline, as
the type of decadence, Reason* versus Instinct. 1Reason?
at any rate, as a dangerous, life-undermining force."'1 ' 38
Nietzsche’s attitude toward excess rationality is
summarized in the following passage from Twilight of the
Idols:
When one finds it necessary to turn reason
into a tyrant, as Socrates did, the danger cannot
be slight that something else will play the tyrant.
Rationality was then hit upon as the savior; neither
Socrates nor his "patients" had any choice about
being rational: it was de rigeur. it was their last
resort. The fanaticism with which all Greek reflec
tion throws itself upon rationality betrays a des
perate situation; there was danger, there was but one
choice: either to perish or— to be absurdly rational.
The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato on
is pathologically conditioned; so is their esteem of
dialectics. Reason-virtue-happiness, that means
merely that one must imitate Socrates and counter
the dark appetites with a permanent daylight— the
daylight of reason. One must be clever, clear,
bright at any price: any concession to the instincts,
to the unconscious, leads downward.139
That Nietzsche was not an irrationalist, that he
did not deprecate the intellect, is evident not only in
his early and middle period writings, but also in his very
138Eooe Homo. "The Birth of Tragedy," 1. The
Philosophy ot Nietzsche, p. 866.
139"The Problem of Socrates," 10. The Portable
Nietzsche, p. 478.
431
last works. For example, in Ecce Homo (written in 1 8 8 8,
immediately prior to his mental collapse), Nietzsche
reflects on his Human. All-too-Humani
It was really the hundredth anniversary of
Voltaire’s death that, in a way, furnished an
excuse for publishing the book as early as 1878.
For Voltaire, as opposed to all those who wrote
after him, was preeminently an Intellectual
aristocrat— which is precisely what I am also.
To place Voltaire’s name on one of my writings—
this was really a step forward— towards me,1,0
Here is the Dionysian, mature, passionate exponent of the
will-to-power identifying himself with Voltaire, the
intellectual aristocrat I
The Passions
Moral Dualism
All human beings are faced with the problem of
the passions. What attitude should one adopt toward his
animalistic impulses? The entire Western tradition,
including both the Judeo-Christian and the later Greek
philosophical elements, adopted the duallstlc attitude
that the passions (evil) are in opposition to reason or
spirit (good). Without too great a distortion one might
argue that Nietzsche’s entire philosophy is a sustained
attack on this attitude. The title of one of Nietzsche’s
140
Ecce Homo. "Human, All-too-Human," 1. The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, p, 878.
432
most profound books is Beyond Good and Evil, indicating
that the goal of the superman is to rise above the
decadent value system that has dominated Western culture
for the past two-thousand years.
The expression nbeyond good and evil" has some
times left the impression that Nietzsche was suggesting
that one thing is as good as another, that there is no
difference among values. However, as Nietzsche himself
warns, "beyond good and evil" does not mean "beyond good
lUl
and bad." The superman rids himself of the supersti
tions and life denying concepts of "sin" and "evil" in
favor of a value system that judges the relative worth
of people, actions and attitudes in terms of whether they
serve or hinder individual self-perfection.
It is but a brief logical step from the theologi
cal and metaphysical dualism of body and spirit to the
moral attitude that the "good" man is the one who has
conquered, subdued, extirpated or repressed his animalis
tic impulses, Nietzsche's argument Is that even if the
killing of the passions were desirable, it is impossible;
the passions— the energy modes which constitutes man's
sensual nature— cannot be oanceled; if they cannot
141
For a discussion of the origins of the con
cepts "good and evil" and "good and bad" see The
Genealogy of Morals. I, The Philosophy of Nietzsche.
433
express themselves in one form, they will do so In
another, usually more harmful, form. In almost Freudian
language Nietzsche maintains that the Christian who sets
out to be a "good" man "and thinks he has killed his
sensuality, is wrong, for his sensuality still lives in
an uncanny, vampire form, and torments him in hideous
l i t p
disguises,"
Eros
Erotic feelings are among the strongest of the
passions and are the source of great pleasure. The super
man accepts them as such: no more and no less. Sexual
impulses are not evil, neither are they the be-all and
end-all of existence, Christian morality has subverted
the role of sex in human life in two ways: first, it has
blasphemed against life by labeling one of its most
harmless instincts "evil"; second, in its attempt to
supress sexual Impulses it has actually created a morbid
obsession for things erotic. The following passages from
The Dawn of Day summarizes Nietzsche's critique of the
Christian attitude toward sex. The aphorism is titled
"If You Think it Evil, You Make It Evil":
1 i i p
Human, All-too-Human, "The Wanderer and His
Shadow," 83^ IPhe Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 240,
434
The passions become evil and malignant when
regarded with evil and malignant eyes* It Is In
this way that Christianity has succeeded In trans
forming Eros and Aphrodite— sublime powers,
capable of Idealisation— Into hellish genii and
phantom goblins, by means of the pangs which
every sexual Impulse was made to raise In the
conscience of the believers* It Is not a dreadful
thing to transform necessary and regular sensations
Into a source of Inward misery, and thus arbitrarily
to render Interior misery necessary and regular
in the case of every ma.nl Furthermore, this misery
remains secret, with the result that It Is all the
more deeply rooted; for It is not all men who have
the courage, which Shakespeare shows in his sonnets,
of making public their Christian gloom on this
point.
Must a feeling, then, always be called evil
against which we are forced to struggle, which we
must restrain even within certain limits, or, In
given cases, banish entirely from our minds? Is It
not the habit of vulgar souls always to call an
enemy evill and must we call Eros an enemy? The
sexual feelings, like the feelings of pity and
adoration, possess the particular characteristic
that, In their case, one being gratifies another
by the pleasure he enjoys— it is but rarely that
we meet with such a benevolent arrangement in
nature. And yet we calumniate and corrupt it all
by our bad conscience! We connect the procreation
of man with a bad conscience!
But the outcome of this diabolization of Eros
is a mere farcei the "demon” Eros becomes an object
of greater interest to mankind than all the angels
and saints put together, thanks to the mysterious
Mumbo-Jumboism of the Church In all things erotic:
it is due to the Church that love stories, even In
our own time, have become the one common interest
which appeals to all classes of people— with an
exaggeration which would be incomprehensible to
antiquity, and which will not fail to provoke roars
of laughter In coming generations. All our poetis
ing and thinking, from the highest to the lowest,
is marked, and more than marked, by the exaggerated
importance bestowed upon the love story as the
principal item of our existence. Posterity may
435
perhaps, on this account, come to the conclusion
that its entire legacy of Christian culture is
tainted with narrowness and insanity,
"Castratism"
Perhaps the best summary statement of Nietzsche’s
attitude toward the passions is found in the section of
1 UlJ
Twilight of the Idols titled "Morality as Anti-Nature*”
Admitting that uncontrolled passions are blind and stupid,
Nietzsche nevertheless takes issue with those who would
be so foolish as to want to do away with the passions
altogether:
All passions have a phase when they are merely
disastrous, when they drag down their victim with
the weight of stupidity— and a later, very much
later phase when they wed the spirit, when they
"spiritualize” themselves. Formerly, In view of
the element of stupidity in passion, war was
declared on passion Itself, Its destruction was
plotted; all the old moral monsters are agreed of
this: 11 faut tuer les passions [one must kill
the passions!. The most famousformula for this
is to be found in the New Testament, In that Sermon
on the Mount, where, incidentally, things are by no
means looked at from a height. There it is said,
for example, with particular reference to sexuality:
"If thy eye offend thee, pluck it out," Fortu
nately, no Christian acts in accordance with this
precept. Destroying the passions and cravings,
merely as a preventive measure against their
stupidity and the unpleasant consequences of this
stupidity— today this itself strikes us as merely
^^The Dawn of Day, 76, The Complete Works
vol. 9, pp. 77-7H . ------- ------------ -------------------
~^^The Portable Nietzsche, pp, 486-492,
436
another acute form of stupidity. We no longer
admire dentists who "pluck out" teeth so that
they will not hurt any more.145
Against the view that the passions should be extirpated,
146
Nietzsche coins the term "castratism," for "an attack
on the roots of passions means an attack on the roots of
Self-Discipline
In light of this analysis what attitude is the
superman to adopt in regard to his passions and animalis
tic impulses? The guiding principle will be
self-surpassing: whatever the superman wills to do with
the passions it must be in the service of self-surpassing
— i.e., in the service of increasing life and the will-
to-power. First, t .e superman must reject the view that
man should simply follow his passions, for this would be
to remain on the level of the brutes. Second, the
superman must reject any philosophy that would advise
some form of "castratism," for this would be an attack
on the very basis of self-surpassing.
The superman knows that man is driven by animal
instincts. These instincts are egoistic and aggressive;
^ ^ Twillght of the Idols. "Morality as Anti-
Nature," 1. tthe Portable Nietzsche, pp. 486-487,
li|gIbid.. 487. l47Ibid.
437
if left uncontrolled they lead to excess and brutality.
The animalistic side of man’s nature is considered to be
evidence, by orthadox Christianity, that man was born in
sin. The doctrine of the Pall, as expressed in the
Psalms (51:5) "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; And in
sin did my mother conceive me," has served as the pre
dominant view of human nature in the Western tradition.
The view that a child is, if left to himself, basically
evil, that his natural propensities will lead himself and
others astray, produced educational philosophies which
stressed the necessity of a moral training based on
rigorous discipline, self-denial and submission to
authority.
The superman rejects the theological doctrine of
original sin. He also rejects the Rousseauian view that
man is basically good (but corrupted by institutions).
The superman accepts the view that man is driven by
morally neutral, animalistic forces (the will-to-power)
148
and he refuses to believe that these forces are evil.
The passions are perhaps best called "dangerous" and
"noble," for without them nothing great is done, and no
148
The reader must remember that although
Nietzsohe frequently refers to and recommends the instincts
as "evil," he is purposely doing so for the resultant
"shock" effect on conventional moralists. Admittedly,
though, there are times when it is difficult to decide
whether or not Nietzsche is "speaking with the vulgar,"
great deed is accomplished without risk.
438
Sublimation
Anticipating Freud, Nietzsche occasionally
employs the term 1 1 sublimation" to refer to the process by
which the passions can be most creatively regulated and
liiq
controlled, ^ The passionate, egoistic, aggressive and
cruel instincts~which, if left to themselves, lead to
rape, brutality, torture and bloodshed— can be channeled
into the creative activities of the artist and
philosopher.
One brings about a dislocation of one's quanta
of strength [Kraftmengenj by imposing on oneself
an especially difficult and exacting task or by
subjecting oneself intentionally to a new stimulus
or delight and thus diverting one’s thoughts and
the play of physical forces into other channels,
Spiritualization
Another term used by Nietzsche to describe the
151
same process is "spiritualization." One can
Cf. Human, All-too-Human. "Miscellaneous
Maxims and Opinions," 95. ^he Complete Works, Vol. 7*
pp. 49-50. The Dawn of Day^ 202. frhe QompTete Works,
Vol. 9, p. 205. beyond Good and Evil. 189. p. 162.
The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation, 677* pp. 358-359.
^°The Dawn of Day. 109. Quoted in Kaufmann,
Nietzsche, p. l£l.
151
From the German Geist, which can be translated
not only as "spirit," but as "mind," "wit," "intelligence^"
"soul," "genius," etcetera.
439
spiritualize and thereby transform the various animalis
tic drives. For example, in regard to cruelty:
Almost everything we call "higher culture”
is based on the spiritualization of cruelty, on
its becoming more profound: this is my proposi
tion. That "savage animal" has not really been
"mortified"; it lives and flourishes, it has
merely become— divine.1”
Spiritualization has been responsible for
creating all that is noble in our culture. However, it
has never been fully utilized or encouraged. To encourage
spiritualization (in the Nietzschean, not Christian
sense) is part of Nietzsche’s program for the trans
valuation of values.
The spiritualization of sensuality is called
love: it represents a great triumph over Chris
tianity. Another triumph is our spiritualization
of hostility. It consists in a profound
appreciation of the value of having enemies: in
short, it means acting and thinking in the opposite
way from that which has been the rule. The church
always wanted the destruction of its enemies; we,
we immoralists and Antichristians, find our
advantage in this, that the church exists.153
Challenge-and-Response
The intimate connection between spiritualization
and Nietzsche’s theory of challenge-c ^-response is now
apparent. Unqualified hostility and hatred are
1^2Beyond Good and Evil. 229, p. 158.
^•^Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-
Nature," The Portable NietzscheT p. 488.
440
transformed by the appreciation of the value of having
enemies: not to destroy, but to respond to the enemy.
For example, even nations need enemies:
In the political realm too, hostility has now
become more spiritual-much more sensible, much
more thoughtful, much more considerate. Almost
every party understands how it is in the interest
of its own self-preservation that the opposition
should not lose all strength; the same is true of
power politics. A new creation in particular— the
new Reich, for example— needs enemies more than
friends: in opposition alone does it feel itself
necessary, in opposition alone does it become
necessary.154
From external opposition we move to the internal
realm of conflict:
Our attitude to the "internal enemy" is no
different: here too we have spiritualized
hostility; here too we have come to appreciate
its value. The price of fruitfulness is to be
rich in internal opposition; one remains young
only as long as the soul does not stretch itself
and desire peace. Nothing has become more alien
to us than that desideratum of former times,
"peace of soul," the Christian desideratum; there
is nothing we envy less than the moralistic cow
and the fat happiness of the good conscience. One
has renounced the great life when one renounces
war,!55
1514Ibid., 3. p. 488.
155ywiiight of the Idols, pp. 488-489. The seeds
of this doctrine of opposition are to be found very early
in Nietzsche!s life. As a schoolboy Nietzsche had
written "Strife [Kampf] is the perpetual food of the
soul." Quoted in li'ollingdale, Nietzsche, p. 31.
441
Man*8 animalistic impulses are Justified on the
grounds that without them the process of challenge-and-
response would collapse for lack of stimuli, and without
challenge-and-response, there would be no self-surpassing.
In the words of Zarathustra: "Man needs what is most
156
evil in him for what is best in him.’ 1 J As a concrete
example of spiritualization and inner contest, Nietzsche
cites the case of Plato:
Plato goes further [having already made the
claim that beauty is linked to sexuality]. He
says with an innocence possible only for a Greek,
not a "Christian," that there would be no Platonic
philosophy at all if there were not such beautiful
youths in Athens: it is only their sight that
transposes the philosopher’s soul into an erotic
trance, leaving it no peace until it lowers the
seed of all exalted things into such beautiful
soil. Another queer saint I One does not trust
one’s ears, even if one should trust Plato. At
least one guesses that they philosophized differ
ently in Athens, especially in public. Nothing
is less Greek than the conceptual web-spinning of
a hermit— amor intellectualls del [intellectual
love of GodJ after the fashion of Spinoza.
Philosophy after the fashion of Plato might rather
be defined as an erotic contest, as a further
development and turning inward of the ancient
agonistic gymnastics and of its presuppositions.
What ultimately grew out of this philosophic
eroticism of Plato? A new art form of the Greek
agon: dialectics. Finally, I recall— against
Schopenhauer and in honor of Plato— that the whole
higher culture and literature of classical France
too grew on the soil of sexual Interest;. Every
where in it one may look for the amatory, the
^^Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III, "The Convales
cent," 2. The Port'able Nietzsche*, p. 330.
442
senses, the sexual contest, "the woman”— one
will never look in vain.^/
Disciplining the Will
Throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy there is an
emphasis on the importance of the volitional side of
man’s nature. The inner strength to stay with a task
and to get something done is as necessary to life as the
knowledge of what it is we want to do. In the vernacular
we call this inner strength ’ ’will-powerNo one denies
its importance, yet "our ridiculous world of
education . . . believes that it has completed Its duty
when it has instructed or trained the brain; it never
even suspects that something else is first of all
necessary— the education of will-power; tests are devised
for everything except for the most important thing of
all: whether a man can will, whether he can promise;
the young man completes his education without a question
or an inquiry having been made concerning the problem of
left
the highest value of his nature.” J
Nietzsche suggests self-discipline in the form of
a new non-Christian "asceticism” as one way to help shape
will-power:
Twilight of the Idols. "What the Germans
Lack," 23. The Portable Nietzschef pp. 528-529.
^•^The Will to Power, 916. The Complete Works,
443
It is my desire to naturalize asceticism: I
would substitute the old intention of asceticism,
"self-denial," by my own intention, "self-
strengthening": a gymnastic of the will; a period
of abstinence and occasional fasting of every kind,
even in things intellectual. We should try our hand
at adventure and at deliberate dangers. Tests ought
also to be devised for discovering a man*s power in
keeping his word.1^
Self-surpassing can be maximized only when one
has learned to discipline his passions. Discipline,
however, does not automatically spring from within; its
initial impulse is external. Ideally, one learns self-
mastery during his youthful years at school. If one has
missed the advantage of attending a demanding school, he
may nevertheless, through pure accident, be challenged to
self-discipline "by means of periods of sickness, perhaps,
which exact the utmost will-power and self-control; or by
means of a sudden state of poverty, which threatens his
wife and child, and which may force a man to such
activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons,
and a tough spirit to his will to life."^^
Self-mastery may thus occur fortuitously. How
ever, the raison d'etre of Nietzsche's educational
philosophy is that self-mastery need not and indeed should
not be left to the niggardly dictates of chance:
Vol. 15, pp. 336-337.
159Ibld.. 915, p. 336. l6°Ibld., 912, p. 334.
444
The most desirable thing of all . . . is,
under all circumstances to have severe discipline
at thd~ r lah t time. i.e. at that age when it makes
us proud that people should expect great things
from us. For this is what distinguishes hard
schooling, as good schooling, from every other
schooling, namely, that a good deal is demanded,
that a good deal is severely exacted; that good-
ju v 9
Despite his distaste for militarism, Nietzsche
never tires of military analogies. This is especially
true when he is arguing the case for the virtues of self-
control (the reader must keep in mind that when Nietzsche
uses such terms as "obey" or "command" he is frequently
referring to internal rather than external relation-
The same discipline makes the soldier and
the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely,
there is no true scholar who has not the instincts
of a true soldier in his veins. To be able to
command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion;
to keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be
ready at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to
comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and what is
forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more
hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than
to wickedness. What is it that one learns in a
hard school?— to obey and to command.1o2
The Hardest Combat
As we have seen, Nietzsche often speaks of self
overcoming in terms of internal warfare, as a combat
required as
ships):
l6lIbid., pp. 334-335* l62Ibid., p. 335.
445
between opposing forces. One part of one's self— the
healthy part— takes up arms against that other part of
one's self that is sick, weak and decadent. It is a
"special self-discipline" in which the self-surpassing
i go
man takes "sides against everything sick" in himself. 3
One great disease against which the self-surpas
sing man must struggle is that of a decadent culture.
Man indiscriminately absorbs the "values" of the society
in which he lives: that is, he becomes "timely." Unless
this uncritical assimilation is resisted the victim
suffers a spiritual death. "What does a philosopher
demand of himself first and last? To overcome his time
in himself, to become timeless.' With what must he
therefore engage in the hardest combat? With whatever
164
marks him as the child of his time."
The educator must have an understanding eye for
that internal combat which is the true sign of engage
ment, of productive interaction between the student and
his times. In order to pass judgment on his times— that
is, to determine that which ought to be promoted and that
which should be allowed to perish— the student must be
encouraged to rise above his times. Only through "a
^^The Case of Wagner, "Preface," p. 155.
profound estrangement,” followed by a ”cold, sobering
up” can one view the world objectively, beholding "the
whole fact of man at a tremendous distance"1^ — and it is
only from this hard-won distance that the student can
become a superman and begin to shape his destiny and
perhaps the destiny of the world.
The Whole Man
Specialization versus generalization is a problem
confronting education at many levels. For example, at the
level of the individual: is our ideal man to be a person
who had disciplined and developed some extraordinary power
in a particular direction— perhaps even at the expense of
other capacities— or is he to be the well-rounded man of
general culture? William Barrett, in his study of
existentialism titled Irrational Man. argues that at this
point a "fatal ambiguity" is introduced into Nietzsche's
concept of the superman:
Is the superman to be the extraordinary man,
or the complete and whole man? Psychological
wholeness does not necessarily coincide with
extraordinary powers, and the great genius may
be a crippled and•maimed figure, as was Nietzsche
himself. Will the superman, then, be the titani
cally striving individual, dwelling on the
mountaintop of the spirit, or will he be the man
who has realized within the world his own individual
l65Ibid.
447
capacities for wholeness? The two ideals are
in contradiction— a contradiction that is
unresolved in Nietzsche and within modern culture
itself.156
Contrary to the implications of Barrett's remarks,
Nietzsche did not take the matter for granted; early in
his career he not only explicitly stated the issue, but
concluded that there was no inherent contradiction and
that the two ideals were actually interdependent. Here
is Nietzsche's description of the two supposedly contra
dictory maxims of education:
One maxim demands that the educator recognize
the real strength of his pupils at the outset and
then direct all his skill, all the nourishment and
sunshine, to the goal of helping that one excellence
to attain real maturity and fruitfulness. On the
other hand, the other maxim says that the educator
should cultivate all existing abilities, tend them
and establish a harmonious relationship between
them.157
Nietzsche's argument against this popular peda
gogical dichotomy is that in order to be well-rounded one
must also have a central strength around which other
talents may be organized, Nietzsche agrees that
"psychological wholeness" is a desirable attribute of the
educated man:
■'■^William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in
Existential Philosophy, Anchor books ^New "York: EouETe’ -
day 1 Co.“^ 5 B T , ”, p."l92.
167
'Schopenhauer as Educator. 1, pp. 7-8.
448
But where do we find harmonious wholeness and
polyphonic consonance In one nature, more than In
a man such as Cellini In whom everything— perception,
desire, love, hate— tends toward a central point of
focus toward a center of energy? [I.e., Cellini*s
skill as a goldsmith.] And it is precisely through
the compulsive and dominating supremacy of this
living center that a harmonious system of move
ments in all directions is formed. Perhaps, then,
these two maxims are in no way opposites? Perhaps
the one says only that man shall have a center, the
other that he shall also have a periphery?16®
Several years after the above remarks in
Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche again warns of the
dangers of asymmetrical development: if a person throws
all his energy and strength into one talent the result
will be "a monstrous organ,” a grotesque caricature of a
person, for ”every talent is a vampire which sucks blood
and strength from other powers, and an exaggerated
production can drive the most gifted almost to madness.1
It is true that the masses are captivated and awed by
these distorted natures, but for the sake of happiness
and productivity man must strive for "an equal development
of all his powers.n1^ Nowhere in his published works
l68Ibid., p. 8.
l8^Human, All-too-Human, 260. "Signs of Higher
and Lower Culture," tfhe Complete Works, Vol. 6, p. 239.
170
' Human. All-too-Human, "Signs of Higher and
Lower Culture," 260. The CompTete Works, Vol. 6, p. 239.
Cf. the following reflections from Nietzsche’s notebooks
of 1887-1888:
"Most men represent pieces and fragments of
man: one has to add them up for a complete man
449
does Nietzsche maintain that man should, or need,
sacrifice one ideal for the sake of the other; rather,
Nietzsche's position is that it is doubtful whether man
can have the one without the other.
It follows, then, that if these two ideals
complement and reinforce each other, it is the task of
the educator not only to "discover the central strength,"
but to "prevent it from disrupting the other forces,"
to "transform the whole man into a living, animated system
of suns and planets and to discover the laws of this
171
higher mechanism." Perhaps Nietzsche would concur
with A. N. Whitehead that "what we should aim at
producing is men who possess both culture and expert
172
knowledge in some special direction."
Barrett1s argument that the two ideals— the
"extraordinary man" and the "whole man" represent the
unresolved contradiction in Nietzsche*s philosophy rests
upon a simple but common error of logic known as the
to appear. Whole ages, whole peoples are in
this sense somewhat fragmentary; it is perhaps
part of the economy of human evolution that man
should evolve piece by piece. But that should
not make one forget for a moment that the real
issue is the production of the synthetic man."
The Will to Power, 88l. Kaufmann translation, pp. 470-
vnr.— -----------
Schopenhauer as Educator, 1, pp. 8-9.
172Ibid., p. 1.
450
"fallacy of false opposition" or "false disjunction."
The error committed here is the assumption that if X is
Y it cannot also be true that X is Z, that if the super
man is "extraordinary" he cannot also be "well-rounded."
Goethe as a Whole Man
The image of Goethian man which Nietzsche created
in Schopenhauer as Educator represented the contemplative,
intellectual side of Goethe's character. Granted that
the intellectual and prudential tendency in Goethe was
strong, especially in his old age, Nietzsche knew that
Goethe transcended these boundries and perhaps came
closer than anyone else to fulfilling Nietzsche's image
of the superman. The following passages portray
Nietzsche's admiration of the self-disciplined man who
can contain and utilize both reason and passion:
He [Goethe] did not retire from life but put
himself into the midst of it; he was not faint
hearted but took as much as possible upon himself,
over himself, into himself. What he wanted was
totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of
reason, senses, feeling, and will (preached with
the most abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the
antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to
wholeness, he created himself.1''’
Goethe conceived a human being who would be
strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily
matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself,
^^Twilight of the Idols. "Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man,” The Portable Nietzsche, p. 554.
451
and who might dare to afford the whole range and
wealth of being natural, being strong enough for
such freedom; the man of tolerance, not from
weakness but from strength, because he knows how
to use to his advantage, even that from which the
average nature would perish; the man for whom
there is no longer anything that is forbidden— unless
it be weakness, whether called vice or virtue.1™
Pleasure and Pain
Pain is generally considered to be an evil aspect
of life. In hedonistic philosophies pain is by definition
the evil. Hedonists, of whatever school, agree that the
summum bonum. is to experience maximum pleasure and
minimum pain. Pain always weighs on the negative side of
the balance when evaluations are being made. Of this view
Nietzsche asks: "But what if pleasure and pain should
be so closely connected that he who wants the greatest
possible amount of the one must also have the greatest
possible amount of the other,— that he who wants to
experience the ’heavenly high jubilation,* must also be
175
ready to be ’sorrowful unto death’?’ 1 1
Pleasure and Pain Not Opposites
It is characteristic of Nietzsche's writings,
Vol. 10, p.TFT
1 7 1 1 ibia.
^^The Joyful Wisdom. 12. The Complete Works.
from The Birth of Tragedy to the last notes, that pain
and suffering are pictured as necessary adjuncts to man’s
pursuits. This is especially true of the creative genius.
Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that the degree of creativity
can almost be measured by the amount of suffering that one
can overcome. It is noteworthy in this connection that
not only is pain a partner to the creative processes but
also to happiness itself. Pain is ”a normal feature, a
natural ingredient of every organic phenomenon; man does
not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in need
of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every
176
event presuppose an obstacle overcome.” ”In all
pleasure pain is understood. If the pleasure is to be
very great, the pains preceding it must have been very
long, and the whole bow of life must have been strained
to the utmost.”177
A Conceptual Error
Nietzsche argues that a great deal of the con
fusion that one finds in the philosophical discussions of
pleasure and pain is the result of assuming that pleasure
and pain are opposites of one another. But the truth of
17^Musarionausgabe. Vol. XIX, p. 149.
177Ibid., pp. 115-116.
453
the matter is that , ! pain is something different from
178
pleasure~I mean it is not the latter’s opposite."
Nietzsche’s point is that it is a conceptual error to
classify pleasure and pain as being of the same order.
To do so would be to commit what Gilbert Ryle has called
a ’ ’ categorial mistake," a conceptual "misclassifica-
tion."^^ In support of the contention that pleasure
and pain are false contrasts Nietzsche points out that
in many cases of pleasure a number of painful stimuli are
necessary:
This is the case, for instance, in tickling,
also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the
coitus: here we see pain acting as an ingredient
of happiness. It seems to be a small hindrance
which is overcome, followed immediately by another
small hindrance which once again is overcome— this
play of resistance and resistance overcome is the
greatest excitant of that complete feeling of over
flowing and surplus power which constitutes the
essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in the
feeling of pain through small intercalculated
pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and
pain are not opposites.1®0
The universe is simply not so constructed as to
allow man both to minimize pain and to maximize pleasure
at the same time. Man is faced with a basic choice:
^^Musarionausgabe. Vol. XIX, pp. 146-148.
■^^Gilbert Ryle, "Pleasure," In Dilemmas
(Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University tress, 1954),
ch. iv.
l8QMusarionausgabe. Vol. XIX, pp. 146-148.
45**
Either the least possible pain, in short
painlessness— and after all, socialists and
politicians of all parties could not honorably
promise more to their people,— or the greatest
possible amount of pain, as the price of the
growth of a fullness of* refined delights and
enjoyments rarely tasted hitherto 1 If you
decide for the former, if you therefore want to
depress and minimize man’s capacity for pain,
well, you must also depress and minimize his
capacity for enjoyment
Second-Rate Valuations
Not only does the superman realize that pain is
a necessary ingredient of pleasure, he also realizes that
pleasure and pain are ’ ’second-rate valuations derived
1 Qp
from a dominating value.” That is, the superman Is in
pursuit of self-perfection; pleasure and pain are mere
accompanying factors or phenomena. It just so happens
that In the pursuit of self-perfection man will
experience, as a byproduct, a great deal of pleasure—
which Includes, of course, a great deal of pain.
The Challenge of Pain
The superman recognizes that pain necessarily
accompanies Joy— and the greater the joy the greater the
pain; he also knows that pain can actually serve as an
l8^The Joyful Wisdom, 12. The Complete Works,
Vol. 10, p.'
l82Musarlonausgabe, Vol. XIX, pp. 148-149.
455
internal stimulus and challenge: "It is great pain only
which is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit . • .
great pain only . . . that compels us philosophers to
descend into our ultimate depths.The superman has
learned to confront pain with his pride, scorn, and
l f t li
"strength of will." "One emerges from such long,
dangerous exercises in self-mastery as another being . . .
with the will to question more than ever, more pro
foundly, more strictly, more sternly, more wickedly,
i Or
more quietly than has ever been questioned hitherto."
Out of this confrontation with pain comes, paradoxically,
"a new happiness.
The Hedonistic Paradox
The superman knows the truth of the so-called
"hedonistic paradox": i.e., to pursue happiness directly
is usually self-defeating. When Zarathustra is asked:
"Are you . . . looking out for your happiness?" he
replies: "What matters happiness? I have long ceased
to be concerned with happiness; I am concerned with my
l83ijhe joyful wisdom, "Preface," 3. The Complete
Works, Vol. 10, pp. b-7.
184t. .. 7 185Tv,^
lb id.. p. 7. ^Ibid.
l86Ibid., p. 8.
456
work,"1®^ The pursuit of happiness is like the pursuit
of love: it is best to let it come when it will.
Zarathustra mockingly proclaims: "Happiness runs after
me. That is because I do not run after women. For
188
happiness is a woman."
Hedonistic philosophies— especially utilitarian
ism— suffer from their prudential demands upon human
energy. Nietzsche has nothing but scorn for an ethic
which would require that man employ his mind in the
calculation of pleasures and pains. A creative, self
surpassing individual is concerned with his work, not
with the quantity of pleasure he may expect to secure.
Against the social hedonists (which Nietzsche generally
identifies with nineteenth-century British moralists)
Nietzsche offers the caustic epigram: "Man does not
189
strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does."
Peak Experiences
Overlooking the Abyss
The superman is the self-surpassing man who has
^^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. IV, "The Honey
Sacrifice." The Portable Nietzsche, p. 349.
188
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III, "On Involuntary
Bliss." The Portable Nietzsche, p. 275.
•^Twilight of the Idols. "Maxims and Arrows," 12.
The Portable NleEzscher p." 468.
457
reached the heights of sensitivity and Joy, who has
"lived" in the fullest sense of the term. Through the
ages there have been occasional rare individuals who have
developed the temperaments necessary for such "peak-
experiences. Dostoevsky,1^1 who shared Nietzsche1 s
Dionysian capacities, was a man of not infrequent peak-
experiences. A recent critic describes Dostoevsky (it
might Just as well have been Nietzsche or Nietzsche's
190
The term is borrowed from Abraham H. Maslow,
"Psychological Data and Value Theory," New Knowledge in
Human Values, ed. by Abraham H. Maslow (New Yorks Harper
& Row, 1959), pp. 119-136. Maslow applies the term to
those precious moments of individual self-transcendence.
This convenient expression will here be employed to
denote the superman’s ecstatic vision, cognizant of a
crucial difference between Maslow's and Nietzsche's
conception: namely, that for Maslow the "peak" includes
only the positive, cheering and suflny dimensions of life,
while for Nietzsche it includes this and the negative,
nauseating and dark dimensions as well. The anxiety and
torment experienced by Nietzsche’s superman are exactly
what Maslow hopes his self-actualizing man has outgrown.
191
^ Nietzsche did not discover Dostoevsky until
late in his career. On February 23, 1887, Nietzsche
writes to Overbeck: "Until a few weeks ago, I did not
even know Dostoevsky's name. An accidental reach in a
bookstore. ..." Nietzsche compares this discovery
with his previous accidental encounters "with Schopen
hauer when twenty-one years old and Stendhal when thirty-
five." (Werke in drei Banden, III, p. 1250.) In his
last works Nietzsche devotes several passages to
Dostoevsky which show his admiration: "Dostoevsky, the
only psyohologlst• • . from whom I had something to
learn; he ranks among the most beautiful strokes of
fortune in my life. This profund human being. ..."
(Twilight of the Idols. "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,"
4FI frne Portable Nietzsche, p. 5^9.)
superman) as possessing "an apocalyptic temperament, a
constitution living on the edge of chaos, open almost
always to the extremes of human experience, capable of
receiving raw those horrifying and ecstatic impulses and
192
visions most of us sense only dimly in ourselves."
The superman experiences the bliss of Heaven and the
torment of Hell in one existential movement: he dwells
on the mountain top— but at the same time stares into the
abyss— and sometimes the abyss stares back. Nevertheless,
there is greater Joy in failure— if the task has been
noble— than in mere success— if the task has been petty.
The exhilaration of having reached great heights, if
only for a moment, more than compensates for the imminent
fall.
The Significance of Pain
The superman is committed to a style of life
directed by the ultimate goal of self-surpassing. He has
discovered that pain enters into this style of life in
two ways: first, as an ingredient or component of the
joy that comes as a byproduct of self-surpassing; second,
as a psychological stimulant to further self-surpassing.
"^^Harvey Mindess, "Freud on Dostoevsky," The
American Scholar, XXXVI (Summer, 1967), ^51.
459
Pain is thus not without meaning; man's suffering is
transfigured by the knowledge that it serves a purpose
ful end. It is the awareness of this end that enables
the superman to remain optimistic in the face of great
pain, to continue to strive toward his goal, to say "yes"
to life despite the suffering it imposes.1^ Indeed, the
superman not only does not complain or give up when
confronted by pain, he goes further and welcomes it— not
to wallow in, but to utilize and transform in the internal
agonistic drama of self-overcoming.
Joy and Eternity
The highest internal test of the superman's
strength is not just the experience of severe pain, but
the additional realization that these pains will be
repeated as part of the cosmic cycle of the eternal re
currence of all things. The superman asks himself,
confronted by his suffering, would he be willing to say
"yes" not just to this life but to this life over and
over again? But the question here becomes rhetorical,
for there is something in the peak-experiences of
self-surpassing— a something which Nietzsche labels "joy"
1^^Something of this relationship is compressed
into the aphorism: "The Formula of My Happiness: a Yes,
a No, a Straight Line, A Goal." Twilight of the Idols.
"Maxims and Arrows," 44. The Portable Nietzsche, p. T73«
460
[Lust] that justifies human existence. It is in these
rare moments of supreme self-transcendence that man
touches eternity. Prose description breaks down at this
point and Nietzsche is driven into the rhapsodic,
Dionysian dithyrambs of Zarathustra*s "Drunken Song":
0 Man! Attend!
What does deep midnight*s voice contend?
"I slept my sleep,
"And now awake at dreaming*s end:
"The World is deep,
"Deeper than day can comprehend.
"Deep is its woe,
"Joy-deeper than heart*s agony"
"Woe says: Fade! Go!
"But all Joy wants eternity,
"— wants deep, deep deep eternity! "194
^ This translation is by R. J. Hollingdale,
Nietzsche, p. 202. These lines express Nietzsche's poetic
powers at their highest level, and the Drunken Song has
had an enormous influence on twentieth-century poetry and
literature. In German the song reads:
0 Menschl Gib acht!
Was spricht die tiefe Mitternacht?
"Ich schlief, ich schlief— ,
Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht:—
Die welt ist tief,
Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht.
Tief ist ihr Weh— ,
Lust— tiefer noch als Herzeleid:
Weh spricht: Vergeh!
Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit—
— will tiefe, tiefe EwigeitI"
Werke in drei Banden. Vol. 2, p. 558. The song is to be
found twice in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: III, "The Other
Dancing Song," 3j IV, "the brunken Song." 12. See The
Portable Nietzsche, pp. 339-340 and p. 436. In part
three of Zarathustra the lines of the song are separated
by a sounding of the hours. Kaufmann translate*!
One!
0 man, take care I
Two I
What does the deep midnight declare.
Three I
nI was asleep—
Four I
"From a deep dream I woke and swear:
Five 1
"The world is deep,
Six!
"Deeper than day had'been aware.
Seven!
"Deep is its woe;
Eight!
"Joy— deeper yet than agony:
Nine!
"Woe implores: Go!
Ten!
"But all joy wants eternity—
Eleven!
"Wants deep, wants deep eternity."
Twelve I
The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 339-340.
CHAPTER X
Summary
463
The function of the following pages is to provide
the reader with a synoptic overview of the contents of
this dissertation. Since the aim of this chapter is one
of summary, not further explication, no new material or
arguments are introduced. However, it is hoped that
through selective emphasis, dictated by the demands of
brevity, proportion and perspective will be gained.
The Problem
Although Nietzsche is a major figure in
twentieth-century philosophy and theology, his educational
philosophy has not received the attention it deserves. A
study of Nietzsche1s educational philosophy would be of
value to educational historiographers, who need to know
what a philosopher actually said and thought before they
can Judge his relationship to others and his influence on
his times. Such a study would also be welcomed by those
who are searching for insightful and challenging ideas
in educational foundations. Educational philosophers
should find that Nietzsche o.fXers .^viable theory of
education for contemporary man.
The major problem confronting any study of
Nietzsche*s educational philosophy is that in no one work
does Nietzsche systematically expound his educational
views. This study attempts to resolve this problem
464
through an organized, critical reconstruction of
Nietzsche’s educational philosophy, based on a thorough
examination of the entire.corpus of Nietzsche’s published
and posthumous writings.
Review of Literature
Bibliographic orientation was provided in Chapter
II: "Review of Literature." The first section of the
chapter covered secondary source material, divided into
(1) books and articles dealing with Nietzsche’s general
philosophical position, and (2) articles and sections of
books dealing specifically with Nietzsche’s educational
philosophy.
The conclusions derived from the review of
secondary sources were as follows: (1) There is a
general body of scholarly material on Nietzsche’s life and
on his major epistemological, ontological and axiological
concepts, (2) There are a few full-length studies con
centrating on a specific area of Nietzsche’s philosophy
or life— such as the young Nietzsche’s relation to Wagner,
(3) There are several brief articles which treat of
isolated aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy of education,
(4) There is therefore a clear gap in the research
material: a complete lack of any concentrated, systematic
attempt to present Nietzsche’s philosophy of education.
465
It is the aim of this study to fill this unfor
tunate gap in Nietzsche research.
The second section of Chapter II covers the
primary source materials— i.e. Nietzsche’s own writings.
For the reader’s convenience a chronological list of
Nietzsche’s published works is provided. There is also
a brief discussion of the main editions of Nietzsche’s
works, both in German and in English. The English
editions are grouped under the headings oft (1) the Levy
translations; (2) the recent Kaufmann translations; and
(3) other recent translations.
The Review of Literature chapter closes with
(1) a listing of Nietzsche’s lectures, essays, chapters
and aphorisms which deal directly with pedogogical
matters; and (2) an overview of Nietzsche’s works,
indicating those which are particularly relevant to an
understanding of Nietzsche as a philosopher.
Nietzsche’s Life
Chapter III offered a biographical sketch,
dividing Nietzsche’s life into three major periods of
philosophical development, followed by a period of insan
ity and death. The ’ ’ early period” ( 1 869-1 8 7 6) records
Nietzsche’s life as a student, his doctorate in philology,
his appointment to the chair of classical philology at
466
the University of Basel in Switzerland, and his first
publications. Nietzsche's early interest in education is
evidenced by his series of lectures On the Future of Our
Educational Institutions and his essay Schopenhauer as
Educator.
Nietzsche's "middle period" ( 1 8 8 3-1 8 8 9) witnessed
a change in style from the conventional essay to the
aphorism and epigram. Along with Nietzsche's development
as a writer, we noted his friendship and final break with
Wagner, as well as his forced retirement— because of ill
health— from the position at the University of Basel
(1879).
The "late period" ( 1 8 8 3-1 8 8 9) begins with the
publication of Nietzsche's best-known work, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. These years are Nietzsche's most prolific,
both in terms of books and ideas. It is during this
period that Nietzsche develops the controversial doctrines
of the superman, will-to-power and eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche’s productive life is brought to a sudden and
tragic end at the age of forty-five.
Nietzsche's collapse on the streets of Turin in
1889 ushered in a long period of total insanity and
darkness. He died in Weimar in 1900 at the age of
fifty-five. Chapter III concludes with a survey of the
psychosomatic and somatopsychic explanations of
467
Nietzsche's Illness and collapse.
Nietzsche's General Philosophy,
IPart I: fepistetiology
In this chapter we examined Nietzsche's critique
and ultimate rejection of authoritarianism, rationalism
and mysticism as primary sources of knowledge. Intuition,
although serving as a method of discovery, was seen to be
inadequate as a principle of verification. Granted
numerous limitations, a combination of intellect and
experience is the best means we have of approaching truth.
Adopting Nietzsche's own term "perspectivism,"
man's pursuit of truth was described as being circum
scribed by contextual, tentative and "fictional"
boundries. Further limitations are imposed by the
implicit philosophy of language, by the unavoidable dis
tortions of semantics and syntax.
Rather than despair over man's inability to
achieve objective truth, his imprisonment within the
narrow confines of reason and sensory experience,
Nietzsche offers a new epistemological approach, a radical
instrumentalism which defines truth as that which serves
life and maximizes the will-to-power.
468
Nietzsche's General Philosophy,
frart II: Ontology
Chapter V presents a critical reconstruction of
Nietzsche's ontological doctrines of the will-to-power
and the eternal recurrence of all things. The chapter
traces the development of the will-to-power from a
psychological to a cosmic concept. The will-to-power is
seen to be Nietzsche's ultimate explanatory hypothesis,
whether in the realm of values, truth, life or even the
inorganic. The will-to-power manifests itself in struggle,
conflict and self-overcoming.
The discussion of the will-to-power leads to a
consideration of the value one is to place on Nietzsche's
unpublished notes [Nachlass]. This in turn leads to a
discussion as to whether or not Nietzsche was a system-
builder and to what extent he falls within the
metaphysical tradition. The position taken in the chapter
is that although Nietzsche was not a systematic philosopher
in usual sense of the term, he nevertheless had an open-
ended and tentative system: the systematic element
deriving primarily from the concept of the will-to-power.
The remainder of Chapter V is devoted to
Nietzsche's puzzling doctrine that all things repeat them
selves in exactly the same form over eons of time. It is
argued that the real import of the doctrine is not its
469
claim to scientific status but the role It plays in the
quest for values.
Nietzsche1s General Philosophy,
Part III: Axiology
Chapter VI explores Nietzsche1s general theory of
values. With the death of God and the collapse of
traditional values, Nietzsche views modern man as being
confronted with total Nihilism. The ultimate task is to
discover the value of existence, to give meaning to a
seemingly meaningless world. In the will-to-power
Nietzsche finds a new standard of value.
The will-to-power manifests itself in man in the
process of self-overcoming, which thus becomes the new
summum bonum. Organisms, through challenge-and-response,
arrange themselves ’ .n a natural order of rank. At the
apex of the hierarchy is the superman. The goal of
culture is the cultivation of the superman and the
encouragement of individual self-overcoming. The superman
will net automatically be produced by the process of
evolution: man must consciously strive to create these
great exemplars of self-surpassing.
The doctrine of eternal recurrence performs two
main functions in the quest for value: (1) by accepting
this doctrine one has clearly accepted a meaningless
world. With all previous values destroyed the slate is
**70
clean for man to develop a new set of values; (2) the
doctrine of the repetition of all things, if deeply
internalized, offers man the greatest inernal challenge
imaginable. To respond creatively to abysmal thought of
eternal recurrence is the ultimate test of onefs strength
and courage.
Nietzschefs Philosophy of Education,
Part h tends and Means
Drawing upon the general philosophical ideas
expressed in the three preceding chapters, Chapter VII
attempts to integrate the concepts of self-surpassing,
contest and rank into a meaningful means-end relationship
for educational theory.
Self-surpassing is conceived as the ultimate aim
of education, while challenge-and-response is the primary
means by which this aim is realized. Contest, strife,
and evil stimulate the human organism to respond and
grow. Nietzsche illustrates his concept by an analysis
of the Greek agon (competitive events in drama, sports,
poetry, etcetera). Nietzsche argues that the creative
achievements of classical Greece were the outcome of
agonistic impulses. Modern education should learn from
the Greeks and reintroduce self-surpassing through
contest.
471
Nietzsche argues that men are born unique, with
different talents, capacities and strengths. Based on
these differences men can be arranged In a hierarchy or
order of rank. Indeed, Justice demands that differences
are recognized and that men are not treated as equals.
The chapter concludes with an examination of the
paradox that if social and educational conditions are
improved, perhaps the challenges necessary for creativity
will be diminished. An attempt is made to resolve the
paradox by distinguishing between what Is "favorable” for
the masses and what Is "favorable" for the superman.
Nietzsche<8 Philosophy of Education.
Part ll: Some Applications
The task of Chapter VIII was to provide a working
knowledge of Nietzsche^ philosophy of education by
showing how Nietzsche applies his general concepts to
specific problem areas. It was decided to select rela
tively few areas but to explore these thoroughly enough
that the reader would feel confident that he could then
make his own applications to other areas.
Of the topics considered, some were primarily
social— e.g. work, commercialism, the state— others were
more directly educational— e.g. scholarship, historical
studies, books, teachers and disciples. But whatever the
472
topio at hand It was seen that Nietzsche approached It
with his threefold categories of self-surpassing,
challenge-and-response and order of rank. If an educa
tional or societal practice does not pass the test of
these three criteria, then "war” must be waged and reform
Instigated. Having finished Chapter VIII the reader
should have a feeling of the general attitude and style
with which the Nietzschean educator approaches his work.
Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education.
Part III: The Superman
Chapter IX attempts to bring added depth and
meaning to Nietzsche’s philosophy of education by concen
trating on his image of the truly educated man: the
superman. The way is paved for an understanding of the
superman by first examining Nietzsche's early typology of
the Rousseaulan man, the Qoethlan man and the Schopen-
hauerian man. We then trace how the Schopenhauerian man
(who incorporated the best elements of the other two)
evolves into Nietzsche’s mature image of the Obermensch
[superman]•
Self-knowledge, dissatisfaction and longing are
seen to be necessary early steps in the process of
self-surpassing, Challenge-and-response and order of
rank now become internal criteria for the individual's
473
encounter with psychological events. By showing how the
superman responds to solitude, action, adventure, pain,
anguish and Joy, Nietzsche establishes a style of life
and mode of being that he believes should serve as the
new model of the educated man.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
475
For the readerTs convenience the following two
tables offer a condensation of the table of contents of
the two major collections of Nietzsche’s works in German
referred to in this dissertation. 1 A third table lists
the contents of the only complete collection of
2
Nietzsche’s works in English.
TABLE 1
GROSSOKTAVAUSGABE3
Volume Pages
Title in German
and English
Approximate
Date of
Writing
I 1 -1 7 2
179-589
Die Geburt der Tragodie 1870-71
(The birth of Tragedy) (Pref.*8 6)
Unzeitgemasse beVracntungen
(Untimely Meditations) 1 8 7 3 -7 6
II 3-418 Menschliches.
Allzumensehllches. I
(Human, All-too-human)
1876-78
(Pref. ’ 8 6)
III
3-183
Menschl. 11: Verm. Mein
ungen u. Spr»
(Mixed 6pinions and
Maxims;
1878-79
(Pref. ’ 8 6)
^or further bibliographical data see Ch. II:
Review of Literature. "Nietzsche in German."
2
For further bibliographical data see Ch. II:
Review of Literature. "Nietzsche in English."
3
The following table Is based on the 2nd ed. of
TABLE 1— Continued
476
■
Approximate
Title in German Date of
Volume Pages and English Writing
III 187-375 Menschl, II: Per Wan-
^erer u» s. ScTu
(The Wanderer and His
Shadow)
IV 3-372 Morgenrote (The Dawn)
V 3-362 Die Frohllche Wlssenschaft
(I f he Gay Science-)
VI 9-476 Also Sprach Zarathustra
T^hus Spoke Zarathustra)
VII 3-279 Jenselts von Gut und Bose
(heyond (Stood and' iBviin
287-484 Zur Genealogle der Moral
T^oward a Genealogy ot Mor
als) 1
VIII 1-51 Der Pall Wagner
T^rhe Wagner Case)
59-177 G5t zendammerung
(twilight of tne Idols)
183-209 Nietzsche contra Wagner
213-314 Umwertung aller Werte.
feuoh iT ber Antichrist
(Revaluation of All Values,
~6ook I: The SnFlchri'sTT
315-322 Disposition und Entwurfe
zum drltten BucTT
(Plans and Outline for a
T ’ hTrd, ™Book)-----------
1879
1 8 8 0 -8 1
(Pref, »8 6)
1881-82,
1886
1 8 8 3 -8 5
1885-86
1887
1888
1888
1888
1888
1888
19 vols. In the earlier edition of 15 vols. Vols. I-VIII
contained Nietzsche’s published works, Vols. IX-XV the
posthumous writings.
477
TABLE 1— Continued
5-92
Approximate
Title In German Date of
Volume Pages and English Writing
333-443 Dichtungen (Poetry) 1869-88
IX Nachgelassene Werke 1869-72
TFosthumous Works')
297-430 Dber die Zukunft unserer
Blldungsanstalten 1871-72
(On the Future o t Our
" "Educational Institutions)
X Nachgelassene Werke 1872-76
TEoathumous Works)
Die Phllosophle lm tragl-
schen Zeltalter der
Qrlechen 1873
(Philosophy In The Tragic
Age of the Creeks)
189-207 flber Wahrhelt u. Luge lm
aus se rmoralIschenSlnne 1873
(On Truth and Falsity In
"an Extra-Moral Sense)
XI Nachgelassene Werke 1875-81
TEbsthumous Works')
XII Nachgelassene Werke 1881-86
TFosthumous Works7~
XIII, Nachgelassene %r erke 1 8 8 2 -8 8
XIV I Posthumous Works)
XV 1-127 Ecce Homo 1888
137-489 Der Wllle zur Macht,
"T T T T -------- 1885-88
(The Wlll-to-Power)
XVI 3-402 Der Wllle zur Macht,
- ' T I T I TV-------- I8 8 5 -8 8
(The Wlll-to-Power)
TABLE l~Continued
478
Volume Pages
Title In German
and English
Approximate
Date of
Writing
XVII-
XIX
403-467 Der Wll’ l ' e ' zur Macht,
Nachtrage uv PISne
(The Will to' Po'wer'.' '
Addenda and plans)
Philologica
1885-88
1866-77
XX Index by Richard Oehler
added In 1926
479
TABLE 2
MU SARIONAUSGABE
Approximate
Title In German Date of
Volume Pages and English Writing
I 1-448 Jugendschrlften (Juvenilia) 1 8 5 8 -6 8
II 1-388 Klelnere Schrlften (Minor 1869-74
Writing 51
III 1-165 Die Qeburt der Tragodle 1870-71
(The Birth of Tragedy) (Pref. *86)
169-392 Aus dem Gedankenkrelse der
hfreburt der Tragodlew 1869-71
(Thoughts and outlines‘ Prom
~ ~the Years of "The Birth of
Tragedy"**)
IV 1-137 Ober die Zukunft unserer
blldungsanstalten 1872
(On the Future of 6ur
"Educational Institutions)
139-147 tJber das Pathos der
"HJSKrKelF--------- 1872
(On the bathos of Truth)
149-243 Die Phllosophle lm tragl-
schen feeltalter der
Qrlecheri 1873
(Philosophy In the Tragic
Age of the Greeks)
245-364 Die vorplatonlschen
Philosobhen 1872-76
(The Pre-Platonic
^Philosophers)
365-443 Elnleltung in das Studlum
der platonlschen blaloge 1871-76
(Introduction to the Study
of the Platonic dialogues)
1-476 Vorlesungen (Lectures [on 1872-76
Greeh Literature, fthetoric,
etc.])
480
TABLE 2~Continued
Approximate
Title In German Date of
Volume Pages and English Writing
VI
VII
1-344 Unzeit gemasse Betrachtungent 1872-75
Er8tes und Zweltes stuck
(Untimely Meditations: Books
one ana flwo Lplus pre-
limlnary writings and notes
from this period])
129-220 Book Onei David Strauss, der
Bekenner und der Schrlft-
atelier ~ 1873
(David Strauss, The Confessor
and writer)
227-326 Book Two: Vom Nutzen und
Nachthell der Hlstorle Fur
das Lehen ~ 1873-74
(On the Use and Disadvantage
of Blstory For Life)
1-408 Unzeltgemasse Betrachtungen:
Drltres und VlerteB stuclc 1872-76
(Untimely Meditations:
Books and Bour [plus
minor writings])
Book Three: Schopenhauer
als Erzleher
(Schopenhauer~as Educator)
Book Four: Richard Wagner
In BayreutF
VIII
35-136
245-333
1-408
IX 1-482
Menschliches,
sohllches, _
frele GeTster,
Band,
Allzumen-
Ein Buch Fvlr
Erster
(Human, All-too-Human. A
Book For frreeSplrlts.
Volume One)
Menschi1ches, Allzumen-
scinches, zweiter Band
1874
1875-76
1876-78
1875-79
481
TABLE 2— Continued
Volume Pages
Title In German
and English
Approximate
Date of
Writing
13-175
177-355
1-354
355-437
XI
1-317
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
1-344
1-374
(Human, All-too-Human.
Volume frwo Lplus notes
from thisperiod])
Section One: Vermischte
Meinungen und Spruche
(Mixed Opinions and Maxims)
Section Two: Der Wanderer
und sein Schatten
(The Wanderer and His
Shadow]
Morgenrothe (The Dawn of
Pay)
Gendanken uber Moral aus
der Zelt der MorgenrbThe
(Thoughts on Morals !From
the Period of "frhe faawn
of1 Day"
Nachlasst Aus Per Zelt Per
Morgenrbthe und der iFroh-
llchen Wissensohaft
1875-79
1880-81
1880-81
(Posthumous Writings iFrom
the Period of *T'ie Dawn Of
1880-82
bay1 * and "The Gay Science")
Die FrOhllohe Wissensohaft—
* La Gaya ScTenza^ 1882
(The Gay Science)
Also Sprach Zarathustra 1 8 8 3 -8 5
C^hus Spoke Zarathustra)
Aus Pern Nachlass 1882-88
tPosthumous WrlFlngs)
1-265 Jenseits von Gut und B&sei
Vorsplel Einer Philosdphie
Der TukunTt ------------ 1885-86
482
TABLE 2— Continued
Approximate
Title in German Date of
Volume Pages and English Writing
267-449
XVI
XVII 1-49
51-163
165-261
263-271
273-300
301-370
(Beyond Good and Evil:
Prelude To a Philosophy
of the fruture)
Zur Qenealogie Der Moral;
^ilne St re it sc hr lft
(Toward a
Morals:
of
A Polemic)
Aus Dem Naohlass
(Posthumous Writings)
Per Pall Wagner, Ein
Muslkanten problem
(The Case of Wagner7 A
Musician?s Problem)
Got z en-Dammerung, Oder Wle
Man Mit ftem Hammer
yhnosoBMrF----
(Twilight of the Idols or
How fine" Phil os op h jg es
With a hammer)
Der Antichrist
(The Antichrist)
Disposition und Entwurfe
sum Written Buch: ber
pnmoralist
(Plan and outline For a
ffhlrl Book: The
moralist)
Nietzsche Contra Wagner
Aus Dem Naohlass: Kunst
und kdnstler
(Posthumous Writings:
and Artist)
1 8 8 6 -8 7
1882-88
1888
1888
1888
1888
1888
1888
Art
TABLE 2~Continued
483
Volume Pages
Titles In German
and English
Approximate
Date of
Writing
XVIII 1-361
XIX
XX
XXI
1-402
1-250
1-108
109-163
165-286
303-372
XXII-
XXIII
Per Wllle Zur Macht:
Ver3U0h_ £3- ner Umwerthung
All'er Wert he"
(The Will to Powert
1884-88
An
Attempt at a Revaluation
ofAli Values [.Books One
and twoj)
Der Wllle Zur Macht
(The Will to Power [Books
Qne and Twoj)
Dlohtungen (Poetry)
1884-88
1859-88
Autoblographlsohe Schrlften 1844-1883
(Autobiographical Writings;
Die Vorreden des Jahres 1886 1886
(Ere^aceB of the ¥ear 1886)
Wle Man Wlrd.
Be-
Ecoe Homo:
Was Man 1st
(Ecoe !komo» How One
comes What One Is)
Namen-Reglster zu den
"' lanaeh^-m--------
(Name Index to Volumes
1 u m i ------------------
Saohreglster (Subject Index)
1888
484
TABLE 3
THE COMPLETE WORKS IN ENGLISH
EP'I TES' BY S'gCAR LEW ----------
Volume Pages Title1
1-187 The Birth of Tragedy2
1-18 The Greek State (Preface to an
unwritten book, 1 8 7 1)
19-26 The Greek Woman (Fragment 1871)
27-48 On Music and Words (Fragment 1871)
49-62 Homer*s Contest (Preface to an
unwritten book, 1 8 7 2)
63-70 The Relation of SchopenhauerTs
Philosophy to a German Culture
(Preface to an unwritten book.
1872)
71-170 Philosophy During the Tragic Age of
of the Greeks (1073)
171-192 On Truth and Falsity In Their Ultra-
inofral Sense (lbt3J
1-142 The Future of Our Educational
Institutions (Five Lectures. 1872)
145-170 Homer and Classical Philology (1 8 6 9)
Thoughts Out of Season? Part I
1-97 David Strauss. The Confessor and the
Writer
Approximate dates of composition are given after
the titles of Nietzschefs unpublished works, essays,
collections of aphorisms, etc. For the dates of
Nietzsche*s published works refer to the section of this
study titled "Chronology of Nietzsche*s Works."
2
Volume One also contains a Biographical Intro
duction by Nietzsche*s sister, Elisabeth Forster-
Nietzsche, pp. vii-xxix.
48 5
TABLE 3~Continued
Volume Pages Title
99-204 Richard Wagner in Bayreuth
5 Thoughts Out of Season: Part II
1-100 The Use and Abuse of History
101-201 Schopenhauer as Educator
6 1-410 Human. All-too-Human. Part I
7 Human, All-too-Human, Part II
1-178 Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions
181-366 The Wanderer and His Shadow
8 1-52 The Case of Wagner
53-82 Nietzsche Contra Wagner
8 3 -1 0 2 Selected Aphorisms (From NietzscheTs
retrospect of his years of friend
ship with Wagner, 1878)
103-190 We Philologists (1874)
9 1-395 The Dawn of Day
10 1-370 The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gava Scienza")
11 1-402 Thus Spake Zarathustra
12 1-268 Beyond Good and Evil
13
1-211 The Genealogy of Morals
213-229 Peoples and Countries (A Fragment,
circa 1886)
14 1-384 The Will to Power: Vol. I (Notes
" i*om, , W e “lHW»'s")......
^Nietzschefs sister contributes an Introduction,
pp. ix-xxvi, and Anthony M. Ludovici provides over fifty
pages of commentary, pp. 405-458.
TABLE 3— Continued
486
Volume Pages Titles
15
1-432 The Will to Power: Vol. II (Notes
from the lbtiO's;
16 1-120 The Twilight of the Idols
121-231 The Antichrist
237-256 Eternal Recurrence (Unpublished notes
from the lblJO’s)
257-281 Notes on "Thus Spake Zarathustra"
(lU80»s) ' ......
17 1-143 Ecce Homo
147-214 Poetry, Songs, Epigrams. Fragments,
Music
18 1-416
i i
Index to Nietzsche
i i
The editor of The Complete Works. Dr. Oscar Levy,
includes his own Introductory Essay: the Nietrnche
Movement in England, pp. ix-xxxvi.
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Creator Hillesheim, James Walter (author)

Core Title Nietzsche'S Philosophy Of Education: A Critical Exposition

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor O'Neill, William S. (committee chair), Georgiades, William (committee member), Martin, David W. (committee member), Pullias, Earl Vivon (committee member)

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