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The Anthropological Basis Of Kant'S Philosophy

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The Anthropological Basis Of Kant'S Philosophy

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Content This dissertation has been
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VAN DE P IT T E , J r ., F r e d e r ic k P a trick , 1 9 3 2 -
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASIS O F KANT'S
PHILOSOPHY.
U n iv e r sity o f Southern C a lifo rn ia , P h .D ., 1966
P h ilosop h y
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Copyright by
Frederick Patrick Van De Pitte,
1966
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASIS OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY
by
Frederick Patrick Van De Pitte, Jr.
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Philosophy)
June 1966
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
T H E G R A D U A T E S C H O O L
U N IV E R SIT Y PA RK
L O S A N G E L E S . C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
under the direction of his....Dissertation C om
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
' # ? ■ ■ 2 ...
Dean
Date Jme. .. .l9 .6 .6 ...........
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman J
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1
Chapter
I. THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY............. 11
II. KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGY . 32
III. ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE .... 54
IV. ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY .... 71
V. ANTHROPOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD
CRITIQUE................................... 114
VI. KANT'S RATIONAL RELIGION ..................... 140
VII. THE ROLE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF KANT . 166
CONCLUSION............................................ 197
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................... 213
INTRODUCTION
The writings of Immanuel Kant are one of the most
fertile grounds available to the student of the history of
philosophy. They contain profound insights in every major
field of philosophy, and provide revolutionary concepts in
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Moreover, the
influence of Kant's thought on succeeding generations of
philosophers makes a thorough understanding of his work
essential to the mastery even of the most recent writers.
In fact, it may be said that few men have enriched the
western tradition, or influenced its direction so greatly,
as has Kant. Consequently, an enormous body of literature
has been developed, which centers around Kant— either
analyzing and interpreting his own works, or tracing the
lines of his influence into the works of others.
In view of these facts, it is surprising to note
the neglect which certain of Kant's works have suffered
since his own period. As one might expect, there are minor
works--such as De Igne (1755), and Versuch einiger Betrach-
tungen ttber den Optimismus (1759)— which are of no great
interest today, and to which little attention is likely to
be paid. But there are more significant works, as well—
notably his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. At
present there is no complete English translation of the
Anthropologie, and no comprehensive study of this work has
yet appeared. A partial translation, covering Part I,
Book I, of the Anthropologie appeared in the Journal of
Speculative Philosophy, beginning in 1875; and there are a
number of works in epistemology and aesthetics which draw
upon the Anthropologie for incidental material. But these
exceptions only emphasize the general neglect of this
important work.
From the standpoint of science, this neglect may be
justifiable, since the period of Kant produced much more
significant contributions in both physical and cultural
anthropology than Kant was able to make."*- The work of
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840),2 who is recognized
^This is not meant to imply that Kant produced
nothing of importance. Benno Erdmann maintains that the
work Bestimmung des Begriffs der Menschenrasse assures for
Kant an honorable name in the history of modern anthropol
ogy . Reflexionen Kant's zur kritischen Philosophie
(2 vols.; Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1882-84), I, p. 55.
Cited hereafter as Reflexionen.
2
Most important was his De Generis Humani Varietate
Nativa, Gflttingen, 1775.
3
3
as the father of physical anthropology, and the multitude
of travel literature, such as the Voyages (1773) of Captain
James Cook, will suffice to remind one of the wealth of
material produced at that time.
But from a philosophic standpoint, such neglect
seems unwarranted. It is true, of course, that even the
student of Kant's work may be inclined to neglect the
Anthropologie, since Kant gives anthropology a relatively
minor role in the general scheme of science. In his expli
cit references to anthropology, Kant customarily mentions
it as an empirical science which, with physics, makes up
empirical philosophy. The latter, in turn, is distinguished
from pure philosophy, which is comprised of logic and meta
physics.^ And while Kant is not unconcerned with empirical
philosophy, it is well known that the most important aspects
of his work lie in the realm of pure philosophy.
Nonetheless, the technical position which Kant gives
to anthropology as an empirical science should not mislead
one to conclude that anthropology plays no other role in his
3
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1961 ed.. Vol. II.
^This division, which seems to express Kant's
mature view is mentioned, e.g., in the preface to the
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals.
4
work. We find, for example, that the concern of contempor
ary philosophy with philosophical anthropology derives
directly from the Kantian tradition. It may be said, in
fact, that it was Kant's famous formulation of basic ques
tions which gave philosophical anthropology its distinctive
ly modern character.
These questions were first raised in his lectures
on Logic, wherein he was attempting to provide an integrated
view of the entire field of philosophy in a modern context.
The field of philosophy, in this sense, may be
reduced to the following questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man?
The first question is answered by Metaphysics,
the second by Morals, the third by Religion, and
the fourth by Anthropology. In reality, however,
all these might be reckoned under anthropology,
since the first three questions refer to the last.5
Here we have the first clear formulation of the problem of
anthropology in a philosophic context, with an explicit
statement of its relation to other areas of philosophy.
^Kant's Introduction to Logic, trans. Thomas
Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1885), p. 15.
It is not our intention, of course, to maintain
that all aspects of philosophical anthropology find their
origin in Kant; such a position would ignore a great deal
of evidence to the contrary. We cannot even credit Kant
with originating the term 'philosophical anthropology,1 for
in Baumgarten's Metaphysica (third edition, 1749), which
Kant used as the basis for his lectures on metaphysics, we
find mention of a study of man which he called anthropologia
philosophica et mathematica sive anthropometria.®
But Kant was the first to introduce anthropology as
a branch of study in German universities,7 and he took
pride in the fact that these lectures were read in no other
school.8 That the course was more than an analysis of
scientific data is indicated in a description of it given
by one of Kant’s students:
^See discussion of this point by Friedrich Delekat,
Immanuel Kant; Historische-Kritische Interpretation der
Hauptschriften (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1963), p. 171.
The present reference is to section 747 of the Metaphysica.
Erdmann maintains that Kant took the name for his lectures
from Platner's "scholastischen" Anthropologie, but in view
of the fact mentioned above, this seems unlikely.
7Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 48.
Q
Fr. Ch. Starke [Johann Adam Bergk], I. Kants
Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie (Leipzig:
Die expedition des europSischen Aufsehers, 1831), p. 5.
6
Anthropology signifies in general the experi
mental doctrine of the nature of man; and is
divided, by Kant, into
(1) theoretical or empirical doctrine of mind,
which is a branch of Natural Philosophy;
(2) practical, applied, and empirical Philosophy
of Morals; Ethics— the consideration of the moral
law in relation to the human will, its inclinations,
motives, and to the obstacles in practising that
law. ^
Here, then, we have a complete anthropology: one that is
pursued in depth, and from every aspect open to the scholar
of the period. . Both as an empirical science, and as a
philosophic discipline, the investigation of the nature of
man took on new life and vigor in the work of Kant.
From what has been said, it should be clear that
there are two distinct conceptions of anthropology to be
found in Kant's work. As an empirical science, anthropology
is relegated to a mi^nor position in the system, though it
played an important part in Kant's teaching career. It is
primarily the empirical aspect of anthropology which is
presented in the Anthropologie itself. The second concep
tion of anthropology is that which we find in Kant's four
questions: a discipline which can encompass the other
^A. F. M. Willich, Elements of the Critical
Philosophy (London: N. T. Longman, 1798), p. 140.
Willich attended Kant's lectures between the years 1778-
1781, and again in 1792, iii.
7
aspects of philosophy— a general philosophical conception
of the nature and destiny of man.
Both the empirical and the philosophical treatments
of anthropology in Kant's work are worthy of further study,
we feel, and one of the purposes of the present work is to
understand them more fully. However, it is not our purpose
merely to remedy the neglect of a minor aspect of Kant's
thought— however worthy the aspect may be in its own right.
We believe that there is another reason— one which is far
more important--for promoting a thorough understanding of
Kant's anthropology. Since a strong interest in anthropol
ogy was manifest in the early years of Kant's teaching
career, and since it remained one of his primary interests
for the rest of his life, we may see in this discipline an
important influence on the thought of Kant, both before and
during the period in which the Critical Philosophy was com
posed. His lectures in anthropology began in the winter of
1772-73, and continued yearly until 1796-97.10 We have
evidence, as well, that Kant included anthropological
lORants gesammelte Schriften, ed. KiJniglich
Preussische Akadamie der Wissenschaften (23 vols.; I-VIII,
XIV-XVI; Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1905-1914; IX-XIII, XVII-
XXIII; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1922-55), VII,
pp. 354-56. Cited hereafter as Schriften.
8
elements in his lectures as early as 1765-66.^ We are
assured that this was not merely a casual, or purely academ
ic interest, by the fact that Kant was extremely well read
in current literature on the topic, and lectured with great
enthusiasm in his early years, providing anecdotes and
incidents from all corners of the globe to spark the inter
est of his listeners . - * - 2
In view of this concern with anthropology, it seems
likely that Kant's other writings would be strongly influ
enced, both in their elements, and in their conclusions, by
his thoughts on this topic. It is our purpose in the
following study, therefore, to point out ways in which
Kant's anthropological interests influenced the methods
chosen for his investigations in other areas of philosophy,
and even predisposed him to certain conclusions in these
investigations.
In one sense this thought is not novel, since it
is well known that Kant included anthropological data in
l^See Kant's announcement of lectures, Schriften,
II, p. 311.
h . W. Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1882), pp. 75-76, 146-47, and
457, n. 65.
his lectures on other topics, especially ethics and meta
physics. 13 Also, the temporal antecedence of the anthro
pology lectures leads one to suspect that it may imply
causal priority as well; and one occasionally encounters
an explicit statement that the anthropology is essential
to the later development of Kant's thought.^ But no one
has taken the trouble to elaborate upon this thought, or to
document it. It is far more common, in fact, to encounter
comments which disparage the anthropology as merely a series
of popular lectures, or, even worse, to find it completely
ignored.
It will be our purpose, then, to establish clear
relations between the anthropological interests of Kant and
his work in other areas, and to determine to what extent a
causal influence was exerted by these interests on the
Critical Philosophy in particular, and on Kant's system in
general. In order to determine this correctly, it will be
necessary to provide enough information about the develop
ment of Kant's concern with anthropology to establish it as
l^See Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, Introduction.
l^See, e.g., Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant; His
Life and Doctrine, trans. J. E. Creighton and A. Lefevre
(New York; Charles Scribners Sons, 1902), p. 39.
10
prior to the critical period, and then to examine specific
anthropological works in order to follow the lines of
influence through each of the critical works in turn.
Undoubtedly, this will at times provide a rather sketchy
format— perhaps more like a collage than a picture of
Kant's work. In order to give unity to the whole work,
therefore, we shall conclude with an analysis of basic
themes which flow through all the works, and bind them
together in an anthropological framework. Our work will
proceed, then, at two distinct levels. Textual analysis
and correlation will be employed to show direct lines of
influence between anthropological works and critical
works; but the more significant project will be to display
the synthetic unity of Kant's work as a whole, when viewed
from the standpoint of his general concern with the nature
and destiny of man.
CHAPTER I
THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY
It is always dangerous in a philosophic context to
relate the work of an individual to the events and details
of his biography. Too often this kind of liaison results
in a genetic account involving pure conjecture, or a form
of reductionism which loses the significance of the work in
question. It is precisely this sort of analysis which has
reduced Aristotle to a "treason complex," Descartes to a
moral coward, and Martin Heidegger to a Nazi sympathizer.
Obviously, such thinking is far more likely to distort,
than to clarify, the content and value of a man's work.
At the same time, however, it is impossible to
ignore completely the circumstances and events which seem
genuinely to contribute to the development of a body of
thought. In attempting to build a background against which
Kant's anthropology developed, therefore, we shall try to
give only what seems clearly pertinent and necessary for
the presentation ahead.
11
12
Probably the single most important factor in the
early formation of Kant's character and personality is the
pietistic orientation of his parents. Actually, this
influence must first be attributed to his mother, who was a
member of the Pietist group within the Lutheran Church.
His father, while less religiously inclined, laid a strong
emphasis on morality, and took particular pains to impress
upon his children a love for the truth.1
The impression which Kant's homelife made upon him
was both profound and lasting. Later, in contemplating the
work which he had done as a tutor in the home of a count not
far from KOnigsberg, he said that "he had often thought,
with deep emotion, of the incomparably more excellent train
ing which he had received in his home, where, as he grate
fully boasted, he had never seen or heard anything that was
immoral." Even in later years, when he had no sympathy
for Pietism, Kant felt it necessary to distinguish between
its good and bad forms. He maintained that those who sin
cerely adopted pietistic principles were often extraordinary
people. They displayed a kind of rest, cheerfulness, and
1Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 6.
^Ibid., p. 9.
inner peace which no passion could disturb. "No need and
no persecution disheartened them; no contention could
excite them to anger and enmity. In a word, even the mere
observer was involuntarily inspired to respect.That
this characterization was applied to his parents is also
quite clear. Kant tells of remembering how a quarrel about
their rights broke out between the guilds of the harness-
makers and of the saddlers, from which his father— a
saddler— suffered a great deal. In spite of personal
suffering, however, a proper spirit of charity was always
maintained. Even in the conversation of the family home,
Kant reports, "this quarrel was mentioned with such for
bearance and love toward the opponents, and with such firm
confidence in Providence, that the thought of it, though I
was only a boy then, will never leave me."^ The purity of
this influence is staggering when we find that Kant, the
strict— even severe--moralist, could say: "Never, not even
a single time was I permitted to hear anything improper
from my parents; never did I see in them anything that was
wrong.Such an influence was clearly an important force
3Ibid., pp. 9-10.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 10.
14
in molding Kant's character.
But Pietism was not merely a part of Kant's home-
life. In the spring of 1732 Kant entered the Collegium
Fridericianum. The rector of this school, Dr. F. A. Schulz,
was also the pastor of the family church, and he was
undoubtedly responsible for this educational opportunity.
Stuckenberg tells us that the rector was much occupied with
other matters, and left the business affairs of the gymna
sium to a man named Schiffert— also a zealous Pietist and
a good scholar. But Schulz remained the ruling spirit in
the school, and his power was especially felt in its reli
gious atmosphere. "The spiritual element was the most
prominent in the institution, and everything had a Pietistic
hue.Each day much time was devoted to devotional exer
cises, and these were chiefly emotional, or intended to
arouse religious emotion; their purpose was to promote a
conviction of sin, and to effect conversion. Unfortunately,
Kant had no taste at all for such forms of piety, and no
sympathy for emotional religion.^
It is important to realize that Kant spent eight
Q
and one-half years at the gymnasium. Even if, as a
6Ibid., p. 22.
®Ibid., p. 20,
^Ibid., pp. 22-23.
15
consequence, he later rejected the external trappings of
religious observance, he could hardly have failed during
this time to cultivate a deep and lasting awareness of the
moral dimension of reality. As Stuckenberg expresses it:
"Pietism did not win his heart, but it moulded his consci-
g
ence."
The importance of this period becomes especially
clear when we recall that the young Kant was very sensitive,
and had early been encouraged to perceive the world through
reverent eyes. In speaking of his mother in later years,
he clearly recalled her efforts in that direction. He told
how she had often taken him outside the city, directed his
attention to the works of God, spoke with pious rapture of
His omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, and impressed on
his heart a deep reverence for the Creator of all things.
Kant felt that his mother had planted and nourished in him
the first good seed, and opened his heart to the impressions
of nature. She aroused and enlarged his thoughts, and her
instruction had an abiding and blessed influence on his
life.10 We must add to this intellectual stimulus, also,
the fact that Kant was never of a very strong physical
9Ibid., p. 24. IQlbid., pp. 7-8.
16
constitution. This is not, of course, to say that he was
predetermined to a life of speculative philosophy; but it
is important to realize that he did not have the option of
a life of robust physical activity.
While at the gymnasium, Kant studied Latin, Greek,
Hebrew, French, history, logic, mathematics, and geography.
German was studied at that time in connection with rhetoric
and poetry, but not as a separate discipline. No natural
history or physics was taught.H Apparently only one
instructor sparked the interest of Kant at that time, a
Latin scholar named Heydenreich. But through this man Kant
acquired a good Latin style, and a broad foundation in the
classics. As Stuckenberg points out, the diligent study of
the classics was of great and permanent value to Kant. It
enabled him to use the Latin language easily and grace
fully, as we see in his later dissertations in that langu
age; "but it also laid the basis for that broad humanistic
culture which was so noticeable in his conversation and
lectures."12 it is perhaps here that we catch the first
glimpse of Kant's later interests.
At the University of K&nigsberg, which he entered
•^Ibid. , p. 26 . ■^Ibid., p. 28.
17
in 17 40, Kant again attached himself to the courses of a
particular instructor. In Martin Knutzen, he found a
replacement for Heydenreich, and his interests changed to
the subjects Knutzen was teaching. These included the
whole field of philosophy, as well as mathematics and
natural science.13 After finishing his coursework, Kant's
specialties were mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and
morals, though metaphysics was almost certainly the least
important of his current interests.
But Knutzen was important in Kant's development for
another reason. Apparently Kant entered into closer per
sonal relations with Knutzen than with his other teachers.
In addition to hearing his lectures and taking part in his
reviews and discussions, he also consulted him about his
studies, and conversed with him on learned subjects.
Knutzen was pleased with Kant's abilities and thirst for
knowledge, and placed his library at Kant's disposal. He
also gave him directions in his reading, "and it was in
this way that the eager student became acquainted with the
works of eminent scholars, including those of
l^paulsen, op. cit., p. 32.
^■^Stuckenberg, op. cit., pp. 44 and 46.
18
Newton."^5 This was the first time that Kant was able to
satisfy his intense desire to read extensively, and he took
advantage of it.
It was during these university years, also, that
Kant brought into focus the intellectual tendencies which
were apparent in his earlier years. Stuckenberg tells us
that, in Kant, intellectuality almost amounted to a
passion.His mind was in complete command of his being,
and he was able to subject his physical states to this
mental power. It was in this way that he overcame the dis
advantage of his frail physical condition. In a letter to
Dr. Hufeland, he tells how his flat and narrow chest had
always restricted his internal organs to the point of
causing a deep feeling of oppression at times. But realiz
ing that this oppressive feeling was probably only mechani
cal, and could not be removed, he soon brought it to pass
that he paid no attention to it. Thereafter, while he felt
oppressed in his chest, his head was clear, and he pos
sessed a cheerfulness which he could voluntarily communicate
in society. "The oppression in my chest remained, for its
cause lies in the structure of my body," Kant informed the
15Ibid., pp. 44-45. 16Ibid., p. 106.
19
doctor. But he added, "I have become master of its influ
ence on my thoughts and actions, by turning my attention
away from this feeling altogether, just as if it did not at
all concern me."17 it is, of course, this great intellec
tual power which dominates the structure of his later work.
While there is always a practical aspect to the work of
Kant, there is also a paradoxical inability to work at the
practical level. The intellect must satisfy this defici
ency as each new problem is grasped.
Now it takes a purely speculative turn, then it deals
with physics or with mathematics; now it contemplates
theology, then morality; but whatever the subject may
be, he lifts it into the region of the intellect, and
there disposes of it. In the ordinary sense, he was
certainly not a practical man; but it may be said
that he was speculatively practical, or if it did not
seem too paradoxical, that he was theoretically prac
tical .
This is an interesting aspect of Kant's character and
thought, and one to which we shall have occasion to return.
Manifestations of Anthropological Interests
The first nine years after his university training
Kant spent as a tutor in various homes. Little is known
1 7
-■-'Quoted by Stuckenberg, op. cit. , pp. 102-103.
18Ibid., pp. 107-108.
20
about this period, but from the early works which he pro
duced, it seems clear that he continued to pursue the areas
of study on which he had already concentrated. The three
dissertations which he presented and defended when he began
lecturing at the University of KOnigsberg in 1755-56, were
in the areas of physics, metaphysics, and mathematics, and
demonstrated real competence in all three.
But his avid curiosity and continuous desire for
more information had taken him in other directions as well.
In 1757, Kant began lecturing oh physical geography. The
series proved to be popular, in both senses, and in these
lectures Kant displayed the broad knowledge that he had
already accumulated in this a r e a . 19 But along with the
geographical information in the strict sense, he included
details concerning "the inclinations of men which flow from
the climate in which they live, the variety of their preju
dices and manners of thinking," and "a brief conception of
o n
their arts and sciences." His anthropological interests,
then, can definitely be traced back to the early years of
19Ibid., pp. 70-71.
^Schriften, II, p. 9. The announcement of the
lectures on physical geography in which this quotation
appears, was distributed in 1757. It clearly indicates the
breadth of Kant's perspective at that time.
21
lecturing at KiJnigsberg. Paul Schilpp, dealing with this
same period, suggests that the early lectures in ethics
were instrumental in promoting anthropological interests.
"Beginning his third semester in the university in 1756,
Kant found himself called upon to offer a course of lec
tures on ethics." This fact, Schilpp feels, "had much to
do with Kant's rapidly growing interest in man and in human
relationships and activities. But in what sense Kant,
as a privat-docent, was "called upon to offer" such a
course is not at all clear. It could well be that these
lectures were a product of such interests, rather than
instrumental in furthering them. Such a view would more
readily fit in with Erdmann's findings. He shows that
Kant's anthropological interests played a significant role
in furthering the geographical studies, and that the con
ception of the lectures on geography, and the collection of
basic materials for them, goes back to the years when he
was still tutoring.22
It is after 1760, however, that we notice a real
burgeoning of Kant's concern with anthropology. As Paulsen
O 1 ,
Kant's Pre-Cntical Ethics (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University, 1938), pp. 20-21.
2 9
Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, pp. 40-41.
22
expresses it: "In the sixties a transformation begins to
be apparent in Kant's thought, which we may call the Socra-
tic tendency." Through this change, "the inner world, the
realm of man and his moral nature, gains an importance at
the cost of the mathematico-scientific, and even of the
scholastico-metaphysical.”2^ Paulsen sees this development
in Kant as connected with a general trend of the period,
and to some extent that is undoubtedly true. Because he
was reading current works as fast as they became available,
there is every reason to see Kant's intellectual develop
ment in this period as stimulated by the scientific, politi
cal, and cultural ferment of the times.
The validity of this position is borne out by
Herder, who was a student of Kant from 1762-17 64. In later
years, he left us a description of the philosopher as lec
turer. The character of Kant is clearly indicated by the
description: "He had at his service jest, witticism, and
humorous fancy, and his lectures were at once instructive
and most entertaining." But it is the content of Kant's
lectures which most interests us.
With the same spirit in which he criticized Leibniz,
Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Hume, and pursued the
23paulsen, op. cit., p. 38.
natural laws of Kepler, Newton and the physicists,
he also took up the currently appearing works of
Rousseau, his fSmile, and his H^loJse, as well as
any new discovery with which he was acquainted in
the natural sciences, and estimated their value,
always returning to speak of the unbiased knowledge
of nature, and the moral worth of m a n . 24
Both the extent of Kant's knowledge and its emphasis are
worth noting, but it is especially important to understand
his interest in Rousseau at this time.
As Herder mentions, some of Rousseau's most signifi
cant works were published during this period. Julie ou la
nouvelle H^loise appeared in 1761,^ the Contrat social ou
Principes du droit politique in 1762, followed in the same
year by fsmile ou de 1'Education. With his earlier essay on
the arts and sciences, Si le retablissement des sciences et
des arts a contribue a gpurer les moeurs (1750), these pro
vided his full conception of human nature, and it is cer
tain that these views profoundly impressed Kant. We are
told that Emile so engrossed his attention that the rigid
schedule which he kept was interrupted for several
24
Herders Sflmmtliche Werke, ed. Bernard Suphan
(Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1881), XVII, p. 404.
^It was first published under the title Lettres
de deux amants, habitants d'une petite ville au pied des
Alpes (1761).
24
days.^ But Kant's own words in later life are our best
certification here. He tells us that he was always an
investigator by inclination. He had a keen thirst for
knowledge, a deep unrest to advance further in it, and a
great sense of satisfaction with each bit of progress. In
fact, Kant felt in his early years that knowledge was the
most important thing in the world. Regarding his own pur
suit of knowledge, he says:
There was a time when I believed that all this con
stituted the real worth of mankind, and I despised
the rabble who know nothing. Rousseau set me right.
This dazzling advantage vanishes; I am learning to
honor men, and I would regard myself as of much less
use than the common laborer if I did not believe
that this speculation can give a value to everything
else to restore the rights of m a n k i n d . 27
It was precisely during this period, then, with the reading
of Rousseau, that Kant attained his most important personal
revelation. For hereafter science and speculative knowledge
could not be valued for their own sakes, but must be used as
a means to a higher end— they must serve the moral destiny
of man.
^^stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 147.
^ Immanuel Kant's s&nmtliche Werke, ed. G.
Hartenstein (8 vols.; 2d ed.; Leipzig: Leopold Voss,
1868), VIII, p. 624.
25
The most immediate result of this influence is seen
in Kant's short works "An Inquiry into the Distinctness of
the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals" (written
1763), and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by Dreams of
Metaphysics (1766). In both of these works Kant has obvi
ously changed from his previous scientific orientation; now
man and morality assume central importance. The influence
of Rousseau is seen in both essays, but neither mentions
him explicitly.
Another result of Kant's contact with Rousseau is
seen in Kant's lectures on ethics in the years 1765-66.
In the announcement of these lectures, he says that he will
set forth the method by which man must be studied, not only
in the varying forms in which man's accidental circumstances
have molded him, or in the distorted form in which even
philosophers have almost always misconstrued him, but what
is enduring in human nature, and the proper place of man in
creation.2* * While Rousseau is not explicitly mentioned
2**". . . So werde ich die Methode deutlich machen,
nach welcher man den Menschen studiren muss, nicht allein
denjenigen, der durch die verflnderliche Gestalt, welche ihm
sein zufSlliger Zustand eindrttckt, entstellt und als ein
solcher selbst von Philosophen fast jederzeit verkannt
worden; sondern die Natur des Menschen, die immer bleibt,
und deren eigenthtlmliche Stelle in der Schdpfung. ..."
Schriften, II, p. 311.
26
here, Kant speaks of this new method of investigation as a
"brilliant discovery of our time, which, when considered
in its full scheme, was completely unknown to the
ancients.
It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of
the work of Rousseau on Kant. Passages from La nouvelle
H^lorse, for example, are extremely suggestive. We find
Rousseau's characters saying:
Since the character and the love of the beautiful
are imprinted by nature in the depths of my soul, I
shall have my rule as long as they are not disfigured.
But how can I be sure that I shall always preserve in
its purity that inner image which finds among sensible
things no model with which it may be compared? Do we
not know that the disordered affections corrupt the
judgment as they corrupt the will? . . . For the heart
deceives us in a thousand ways and acts only by a
principle always suspect, but reason has no other end
than what is good, its rules are certain, clear, and
easy in conduct, and it never goes astray save in the
useless speculations that are not made for it.30
Whether Rousseau intended this to be taken seriously, we
may doubt; but apparently Kant took it very seriously, for
much of this thought is structured into his later works.
We shall examine the influence of Rousseau in
greater detail later. For the present, it is sufficient to
29Ibid., p. 312.
^Part III, letters 18 and 20.
27
eitfjphasize that at a particular time, about 1762, Kant's
whole life took on a different meaning. "The moral and
anthropological interest, rather than cosmological and
metaphysical speculation, assumes the central position. On
the basis of this anthropocentric direction of thought, the
critical philosophy grew up."^ If we can demonstrate the
truth of this assertion, it will prove to be a vital
aspect of our argument.
Kant's Actual Work in Anthropology
If a drastic reformation of Kant's orientation can
be found in the period mentioned above, the actual formula
tion of his anthropology did not occur until somewhat later.
As we have already pointed out, his lectures on anthropology
did not begin until the winter -of 1772-73. By that time,
we may assume, the material had been sufficiently struc
tured to provide a unified pattern of instruction. But
there is good reason to believe that this organization had
taken place somewhat earlier.
Apparently Kant had planned to publish a manual on
anthropology and had already begun to segregate the materiaJs
■^Paulsen, op. cit., p. 39.
28
from that of his other lectures. The lectures on meta
physics, which he began with a discussion of empirical
psychology, and those on physical geography were sifted
for materials which were more specifically appropriate to
anthropology. The process seems to have been completed by
the summer of 1772, since Erdmann tells us that notes from
Kant's lectures on physical geography in that year show as
little anthropological content as the manual later edited
by R i n k . This is clearly in contrast with the earlier
lectures mentioned above.
Unfortunately, however, Kant found himself too
busy to complete the organization of the material for pub
lication, and it was not until 1798 that the actual publica
tion took place. This was unfortunate for two reasons.
First, Kant was past the peak of his intellectual powers by
the time the material was finally edited. As Erdmann
expresses it, more candidly, the work was "completed in the
toilsome compilation of the seventy-four year old man, as
he stood on the threshhold of decrepitude."^ The richness
and vitality which the younger man had given to the material
32gchriften, II, p. 309.
33Reflexionen, I, p. 48.
3^Ibid., p. 37.
29
in his lectures is no longer discernible in the publica
tion. ^5
The second reason for regretting the late publica
tion of the Anthropologie, however, is more important for
our discussion. For if Kant had published a complete
presentation of his anthropological thoughts in 1773, or
shortly thereafter, there would be no need for this discus
sion. Establishing a connection with later works would be
unnecessary, since Kant himself would have referred his
reader to the Anthropologie whenever he found himself deal
ing with related material. Because the Anthropologie was
published so late, however— it was the last work of any
length edited by Kant himself— it would seem possible to
maintain that it was the fruit of Kant's critical period,
rather than its ratio seminalis.
P a r t o f o u r t a s k , t h e n , w i l l b e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t
i d e a s w h ic h o c c u r b o t h i n t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y and i n w o rk s
o f t h e c r i t i c a l p e r i o d , b e l o n g p r e - e m i n e n t l y t o t h e e a r l i e r
w o r k . We s h a l l be a s s i s t e d i n t h i s t a s k b y t h e f a c t t h a t
3^In an able discussion of this point, L. A. F. von
Baczko speaks of the volume as "wol nur eigentlich das
Skelet von Kants Vorlesungen." "Probe eines Commentars
zu Kants Anthropologie," Vesta (1807), p. 179.
several students have left extensive notes taken while
attending Kant's lectures on anthropology in the earlier
years. Naturally, these notes will have varying degrees
of value, depending upon their content and their dates.
We shall discuss them in greater detail in the following
chapter. Another useful source of information will be
those early writings of Kant which, while not an integral
part of his formulated anthropology, are discussions of
anthropological problems, or at least evidence of anthro
pological interests. Such works will help in establishing
more clearly the relation between earlier and later portions
of his thought.
With these remarks our preparatory considerations
are complete. For purposes of our investigation, the points
of emphasis are four. First, we find that Kant was sub
jected to a rigorous moral training until he was sixteen
years old (1740). Secondly, even as a youth Kant was
intellectually inclined, and this tendency developed almost
into a passion in later years. Thirdly, while Kant's uni
versity training prepared him primarily for work in mathe
matics, science, and philosophy, he demonstrated an
explicit interest in anthropology soon after he began
lecturing at the university in 1755, and experienced a real
conversion to such interests when he encountered the
thought of Rousseau about 1762. Finally, his anthropology
was well-formulated by the winter of 1772-73, and it is
perfectly reasonable, therefore, to search for ways in
which it may have influenced the later work. With these
points in mind, we shall now turn to a detailed examina
tion of the Anthropologie itself.
CHAPTER II
KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGY
The only extensive work on anthropology actually
published by Kant was a summary of his lectures on the
topic, printed in 179 8: Anthropologie in pragmatischer
Hinsicht. Since he was no longer giving the lectures,
there was a great demand that he provide a work on the
topic that would be available to the general public. In
September 179 7, one correspondent wrote: "The reading
world will receive your anthropology with the greatest
joy; it is excellent that you are delivering it to the
printing office this year."! And in November, Tieftrunk
wrote: "The public hopes for an Anthropology from you,
will it appear soon?" There can be little doubt, then,
that the anthropology lectures were well received and
^Oswald Kttlpe1s Introduction to the Anthropologie,
Schriften, VII, p. 354.
2Ibid.
32
33
appreciated, even in Kant's later years.
The content of the Anthropologie, even though it is
merely a summary of the lectures, provides a clear indica
tion of the reasons for this popularity. Far from being the
intense analysis of difficult material which might be
expected in some other lectures, the Anthropologie presents
a light and varied fare, which would be enjoyable, even
entertaining, for a person of normal intelligence. We
find a discussion of various peoples, their customs and con
tributions to world culture; a consideration of such things
as dreams and prophecy; maxims for clear thinking; and sug
gestive aphorisms, such as: "The most important revolution
in the inner heart of man is his exit from self incurred
3
minority." It is the more rigid, underlying structure of
these lectures, however, which gives us an indication of
their importance to Kant, and their potential value to a
worthy listener. It is this core of material with which we
shall be concerned in the Anthropologie.
The title, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht,
clearly indicates the intended scope of this work, since
Kant tells us in the preface that anthropology can be done
3Schriften, VII, p. 229.
34
either in a physiological or a pragmatic manner. "Physio
logical knowledge of man lends itself to the investigation
of what nature makes of man, the pragmatic to what he makes
of himself, or can and should make, as a freely acting
agent."4 Here the influence of Rousseau discussed in the
last chapter is clearly seen. Man is treated as a moral,
rather than as a merely physical entity. Not that Kant will
concern himself with the spiritual aspects of man, for he
explicitly states that anthropology prescinds from the
question of whether man has a soul, as a separate, immate
rial substance.^ But he will present man as a being caught
up in activities which demand moral consideration.
In his investigation, as one might expect, Kant
follows a pattern of rational inquiry.^ But he also adopts
man's rational capacity as the object of his inquiry. The
opening passage of the Anthropologie begins: "That man is
4Ibid., p. 119. 5Ibid., p. 161.
^Cassirer points out in this regard: "For [Kant],
reason is of and through its own powers certain of its own
inherent logic. In this logic reason possesses once and
for all its surest guiding star, which it can trust at
every step in the realm of experience, in the general phil
osophy of nature and in the special doctrine of man,
philosophical anthropology." Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau-
Kant-Goethe, trans. James Gutmann, Paul Oskar Kristeller,
and John Herman Randall, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1945), p. 5.
35
able to have among his conceptions the notion 'I,1 lifts
him infinitely over all other beings on earth."7 It is
this power to objectify the self which constitutes him as
a person, and provides the unity of consciousness so neces
sary in a moral agent. At a certain stage in the develop
ment of a child, perhaps a year after he begins to speak,
this objectification manifests itself in speech, and from
that point on, man is pre-eminently concerned with the
O
self, "der Egoism schreitet unaufhaltsam fort."
It is in terms of this "egoism" that Kant estab
lishes the format for his Anthropologie. Since, as he
points out. this self-interest has three different aspects,
"that of the understanding, that of taste, and that of
practical interest,"^ the study of man may be followed at
each of these levels, as a logical, an aesthetical, or a
7Schriften, VII, p. 127.
8Ibid., p. 128. It should be noted that the term
'egoism' is not employed by Kant in the popular sense car
ried by the term today. It means, rather, the awareness
and concern of the individual for himself as the center of
his own world of experience— that objective self-awareness
which is specifically characteristic of human knowledge.
^"Der Egoism kann dreierlei Anmassungen enthalten:
die des Verstandes, des Geschmacks, und des praktischen
Interesse, d. i. er kann logisch Oder Ssthetisch oder
praktisch sein." Schriften, VII, p. 128.
36
practical investigation. In order to be complete, the
Anthropologie must concern itself with all three forms, and
we find, therefore, that Kant has divided Part I into three
books dealing with these respective topics. Part II is
devoted to a summary of the anthropological characteristics
of the person, the race, the species, et cetera.
Book One deals with the intellect, and man's powers
of perception in general. Here Kant discusses the various
aspects of the intellect, the five senses, and imagination.
The role of the imagination is a significant one, since
Kant understands it to be a creative power, and the seat
of originality or "genius" in man.10 But it is the intel
lect proper, composed of understanding, judgment, and
reason, which receives the most attention in this section
of the book.
In Book Two, Kant turns to the aesthetic aspect of
man. The discussion is brief, and rather sketchy, with
sensuous pleasure, taste, and the sublime receiving primary
attention. "Pleasure," he asserts, "is the feeling of
furthering, pain that of hindering, life."H When pleasure
is taken in the apprehension of the beautiful, it is as the
lOgchriften, VII, pp. 172 and 224.
11
Schriften, VII, p. 231.
37
object of the faculty of taste.12 When the sublime is
involved, however, pleasure is experienced through the
emotions rather than through taste.1^ The section concludes
with "anthropological remarks on taste," in which Kant con
siders taste in fashions, taste in art, and the excesses
in good living, or luxuries.
The third book is on the appetitive faculties. The
affections, such as timidity and bravery, are discussed
briefly, but passion is given a more thorough analysis.
Under this heading Kant considers the inclination toward
freedom, the desire for vengeance, and the desire for
influence over other men. This last passion is divided
into the search for honor, the desire for power, and the
problem of avarice. The most significant social aspects of
Kant's thought are contained in this portion of the work.
Part Two of the Anthropologie is important because it treats
specifically the notions of the person and of the species.
But the discussion is cluttered with unnecessary complexi
ties. The portion entitled "The Character of the Person,"
for example, includes sections on the sanguine, the melan
choly, the choleric, and the phlegmatic temperaments,
12Ibid., p. 241. 12Ibid., p. 243.
38
together with an introduction to the science of Physiog
nomy.^ It is clear, however, that Kant intends the person
to be understood as a moral agent, rather than simply as a
conglomeration of physical and mental characteristics.15
In a similar fashion, the notion of the species is developed
in its social and cultural aspects, in addition to the
implications of the specific properties of its members.
It is with the consideration of the consequences of this
characterization that the Anthropologie ends.
With this brief outline of the work in mind, we may
now proceed to examine the specific details of Kant's con
ception of man. As might be expected, each section of the
Anthropologie makes an essential contribution to the final
view. The first book provides the basic notion of man as a
rational animal.15 After a lengthy discussion of Under
standing, Judgment, and Reason— to which he refers as die
drei oberen Erkenntnissvermflgen17— Kant gives the following
^It must be understood, of course, that in Kant's
period all of these were generally accepted as "scientifi
cally" established aspects of anthropological knowledge.
15Schriften, VII, p. 285.
^6Man, in this section, is classed as animal ration-
abile, or a mit Vernunftfclhigkeit begabtes Thier, not yet as
animal rationale, or a vernunftiges Thier. See Schriften,
VII, p. 321.
17
Ibid., p. 197.
39
summary:
The understanding is positive, and scatters the
darkness of ignorance; the power of judgment is more
negative, for the avoidance of errors which arise
from the dim light in which objects appear. Reason
stops the source of errors (prejudices), and thus
makes understanding secure, through the universality
of principles.
But Kant does not concentrate exclusively on the higher
faculties. The lower faculties of cognition are also care
fully analyzed. Kant explicitly defends the senses against
three customary charges: that they confuse, that they rule
the understanding, and that they deceive. In concluding
the section, Kant insists on the necessary cooperation of
the higher and lower cognitive powers. He points out that
the inner perfection of man consists in having all his
faculties under his control, in order that he be able to
submit them to his own arbitrary direction. But to achieve
this end, understanding would have to govern sensibility
without weakening it. For, while sensibility has an aspect
of unruliness about it, since it does not reflect, nonethe
less, without sensibility there would be no material to
which the understanding could apply its legislative
l^ibid., p. 228.
40
19
power. Cooperation of both levels of his cognitive powers
is thus necessary if man is to attain his inner perfection.
In the second book, we find that taste neatly relates
the animal rationabile of the previous section to the social
man of Book Three. For taste, Kant tells us, is "the power
of aesthetic judgment to choose with universal validity."2®
Taste is therefore a power of the social judgment of exter
nal objects in the imagination. "Here the mind feels its
freedom in the play of imagery (therefore of sensibility);
for sociality with other men presupposes freedom— and this
feeling is delight." But the universal validity of this
delight for everyone carries the conception of law in
itself; for only in this way can the validity of the delight
be universal for those judging.2- * - When we recall that, for
19"Die innere Vollkommenheit des Menschen besteht
darin: dass er den Gebrauch aller seiner Vermflgen in seiner
Gewalt habe, urn ihn seiner freien Willktir zu unterwerfen.
Dazu aber wird erfordert, dass der Verstand herrsche, ohne
doch die Sinnlichkeit (die an sich PObel, weil sie nicht
denkt) zu schw&chen; weil ohne sie es keinen Stoff geben
wtirde, der zum Gebrauch des gesetzgebenden Verstandes
verarbeitet werden kflnnte." Ibid., p. 144.
20Ibid., p. 241.
21
"Er ist also ein Vermdgen der gesellschaftlichen
Beurtheilung Susserer GegenstSnde in der Einbildungskraft.
— Hier ftlhlt das Gemttth seine Freiheit im Spiele der
Einbildungen (also der Sinnlichkeit); denn die SocialitSt
mit andern Menschen setzt Freiheit voraus,— und dieses
41
Kant, the faculty for the representation of the universal is
R e a s o n , 22 we begin to see the relation between the various
powers of man which he is displaying for our view. Reason
in the first book is connected through taste with the social
dimension of man treated in Book Three.
It is in this third book, undoubtedly, that we
obtain the best understanding of man according to Kant.
For while man has a rational capacity, Kant tells us, we
cannot at all credit him with full rationality. In order
to develop all his natural powers to the point of perfec
tion, i.e., in order to become animal rationale, he must
overcome emotion and passion which obstruct reason. When
considered from the standpoint of perfection, the passions
are regarded as comparable to drunkenness, and the emotions
to chronic illness.23 gut nature has provided a method by
which men may overcome these difficulties. For each man
has three great passions which urge him on to self-
Geftlhl ist Lust. Aber die AllgemeingUltigkeit dieser Lust
ftlr Jedermann, durch welche die Wahl mit Geschmack (des
SchiJnen) sich von der Wahl durch blosse Sinnenempfindung
(des bios subjectiv Gefallenden), d. i., des Angenehmen,
unterschiedet, ftihrt den Begriff eines Gesetzes bei sich;
denn nur nach diesem kann die Gtiltigkeit des Wohlgefallens
fdr den Beurtheilenden allgemein sein." Ibid., p. 241.
22Ibid. 23Ibid., p. 252.
42
fulfillment. These are desire for gain, desire for power,
and desire for glory--passions which are appropriate to man
only as animal sociale.24
Because of these inner promptings, man desires not
merely to exist, but to live with others in order to enjoy
the gratification of attaining superiority over them. The
will to live, proper to the individual, becomes in this new
context a will for power, and this is the basic tendency of
man as a social being. He is driven on to perfect his
powers of mind and body in order to establish and improve
his position in society. As a necessary consequence of this
tendency, man is led to establish a political and judicial
system which will limit the activity of others, and ward
off the destruction which their attacks would bring about.
It is antagonism in society, therefore, which brings man
unwittingly nearer to perfection. An artificial condition
of peace and security is attained through the creation of a
state. Antagonism and competition are not thereby destroy
ed, but they are limited, and prevented from degenerating
into violence and deception.2^
Kant points out, however, that the process which
24Ibid., p. 267. 25Ibid., p. 252.
43
provides stability for society cannot at the same time
provide for the happiness of the individual. Rather, the
passions proper to the individual as such— die Freiheits-
und Geschlechtsneigung26— are curtailed in the process of
satisfying the passions of the social order. But the
forces of nature, or Providence, are justified by the course
of history, and it is in the species, rather than in the
individual, that fulfillment is to be achieved by man.
Kant completes his analysis of the species with a considera
tion of this fulfillment, and man's development toward it.
Three aspects of that development are pointed out:
the technical (mit Bewusstsein verbunden mechanische), the
pragmatic (andere Menschen zu seinen Absichten geschickt zu
brauchen), and the moral (nach dem Freiheitsprincip unter
Gesetzen gegen sich und andere zu handeln).^ With respect
to the first of these Kant says: "The characterization of
man as a rational animal is immediately to be found in the
form and organization of his hand, his finger and fingertips,
part of which is for construction, part for delicate feel
ing.” It can readily be seen, therefore, that nature has
not made man merely for one manner of handling objects, but
26xbid., pp. 267-68. 27xbid., p. 322.
44
in a more clever fashion has made him indeterminately compe
tent to handle all objects, and, consequently, fit for the
use of reason. Thus Kant finds that the technical organiza
tion or aptitude of the species has designated man as a
9 o
rational animal.
Concerning the pragmatic aspect of man's develop
ment Kant points out that among all other animals, each
individual of the species achieves his full determination.
With respect to man, however, perhaps only in the species
will full determination be achieved. "Thus the human race
is able to work itself up to its determination only through
progress in a line of incalculably many generations."
Actually, however, Kant sees this as an endless process,
since he says that the goal remains always in prospect,
though the tendency to this ultimate object, while very
often checked, can never be completely retrograde.29
28»Die characterisirung des Menschen, als ein
verntinftigen Thiers, liegt schon in der Gestalt und
Organisation seiner Hand, seiner Finger und Fingerspitzen,
deren theils Bau, theils zartem Geftthl, dadurch die Natur
ihn nicht ftir Eine Art der Handhabung der Sachen, sondern
unbestimmt ftir alle, mithin ftir den Gebrauch der Vernunft
geschickt gemacht und dadurch die technische oder
Geschicklichkeitsanlage seiner Gattung als eines verntinfti
gen Thieres bezeichnet hat." Ibid., p. 323.
9 Q
"Zuvfirderst muss man anmerken, dass bei alien
ubrigen, sich selbst tiberlassenen Thieren jedes Individuum
seine ganze Bestimmung erreicht, bei den Menschen aber
45
Finally, with respect to man's moral aspect, Kant
raises the question as to whether man is by nature good,
bad, or equally susceptible to both. In the last instance,
he feels, the species itself would be without character, for
it would be morally neither good nor bad. But such a condi
tion is not possible for man, Kant maintains, for man is
a being equipped with the power of practical reason
and consciousness of the freedom of his absolute will
(a person), [and] sees himself in this consciousness,
even in the most obscure presentation, under a law of
duty, and with the feeling (which is called moral)
that for him, or through him, right or wrong occurs
to another.30
This consciousness of duty is an aspect of the intelligible
character of mankind in general, and to this extent man may
be said to be good according to his innate design, or by
nature.
We should not conclude from this statement, how
ever, that Kant considers man to be naturally good. There
is another aspect of man which must be taken into consider
ation. Kant reminds us that experience also shows that
allenfalls nur die Gattung; so dass sich das menschliche
Geschlecht nur durch Fortschreiten, in einer Reihe
unabsehlich vieler Generationen, zu seiner Bestimmung
emporarbeiten kann; wo das Ziel ihm doch immer noch im
Prospekte bleibt, gleichwohl aber die Tendenz zu diesem
Endzwecke, zwar wohl 6fters gehemmt, aber nie ganz
rttcklSLufig werden kann." Ibid. , p. 324.
30Ibid.
31ibid.
46
there is in man an inclination toward the active desire of
the illicit, which he plainly knows to be illicit, i.e.,
toward evil. And this aspect of man must also be considered
a part of his very nature, for "this inclination stirs so
inevitably, and so early, while man is only beginning to
make use of his freedom," that we must certainly consider
it innate. Judged according to his sensible nature, then,
man may be said to be naturally evil.3 2
One might feel that Kant has involved himself in a
contradiction, since he finds both good and evil as natural
ly present in man. But he points out that these two aspects
of human nature are not attributed to man in the same way.
It is as an individual that man is seen as naturally evil;
it is as a race that he is considered naturally good.33
Kant goes on to show that in spite of the inadequacies of
the individual, man is unwittingly involved in a process of
development which promises eventual fulfillment. Man is
seen as good, not in terms of his essential nature, but
in the perspective of his destiny. In this sense, then,
history can be seen as the education of the human race, an
education that is "wholesome, but harsh and severe."34
32ibid.
34Ibid., p. 328.
33ibid., p. 324f.
47
Gradually, through this process, the moral nature of man
will become free from the natural impulses, and morality,
as the free determination of the will through the moral law,
will become possible. Only in this way can human nature be
fulfilled and perfected.-*5
These are the important aspects of Kant's anthropol
ogy as it appeared in published form. But, as we have
already seen, the Anthropologie is little more than an out
line of his actual lectures on the topic. It will prove
useful, therefore, to consider whatever other material is
available which might shed light on these lectures as they
were delivered in full.
Anthropology Lectures and Notes
There are several manuscripts which provide knowl
edge of the lectures from the student's point of view.
Fortunately, they are from different periods. The most
recent of them to be discovered is a notebook containing a
record of several of Kant's courses which were attended by
35Ibid., p. 328ff.
48
Graf Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlacken.3® of these courses, two
at least are of interest to us: the Anthropology, and the
Metaphysics. The notes on anthropology were taken in the
course which Kant delivered in the winter of 1791. This is
rather late, of course, but still seven years before the
Anthropologie appeared. The notes on metaphysics are use
ful because, as was mentioned earlier, Kant habitually
began this course with a discussion of rational psychology.
Unfortunately, however,the notes were taken even later, dur
ing the winter of 1792-93, and reveal little for the analy
sis of Kant's development.
Another, and earlier, set of lecture notes was pub
lished under the pseudonym Fr. Ch. Starke some years after
Kant's death.3? The source of these notes is not entirely
clear, but Erdmann refers to them as "on the whole, includ
ing Kant's own edition, the most valuable and most
detailed presentation which we possess of his
36pje philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel
Kants; Nach den neu aufgefundenen Kollegheften des Grafen
Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlacken, ed. Arnold Kowalewski
(Munchen: RiJsl & Cie., 1924).
[Joh an n Adam B e r g k ] , I . K a n ts M en sch en k u n d e o d e r
p h i l o s o p h i s c h e A n t h r o p o l o g i e , 1831.
49
anthropology."3® An analysis of the content of these notes
has established their period as sometime between 1779, when
Lessing's work Nathan der Weise first appeared, and 1788,
when the French naturalist, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte
de Buffon, died. The most probable date has been estab
lished as 1784 by Paul Menzer.^ This would make the work
of greater interest than the manuscript from 1791, provid
ing an additional seven-year step back into the development
of Kant's thought. But it would not yet take us back to the
pre-Critical period.
There is one final manuscript, however, which does
take us back at least to the period before the Critique of
Pure Reason was published in 1781. This is Kants Vorles-
ungen ttber die Metaphysik, which was published anonymously
in 1821. The material was edited by K. H. L. PiJlitz, who
had not been a student of Kant, but had come into possession
^Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 58. At the time
Erdmann published this evaluation, he was under the impres
sion (based on internal evidence) that the notes were from
Kant's first lectures on anthropology in 1772-73. While
this opinion later proved incorrect, his statement concern
ing the value of the lectures, as a detailed account of
Kant's thought, does not seem to depend upon the date
involved.
39"Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in der
Jahren 1760-1785," Kantstudien, III (1899), pp. 67-68.
50
of two sets of notes. Erdmann at first felt that these notes
were from the eighties: one from 1788-90, the other "from
the same decade."40 Later, however, he decided that only
one of the manuscripts was from this period; the other, he
felt, was from the early seventies, approximately 1774.41
This would make the notes of unparalleled significance in
the investigation of the evolution of Kant's thought.
Finally, however, it was determined by Max Heinze that the
earlier manuscript would have to be from the period between
the winter of 1775-76, and the winter of 1779-80.42 This
reduces its value somewhat, but the material is still suffi
ciently early to provide an insight into the period we wish
to examine.
The work of Erdmann to which we have already
referred, Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, will
4®Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 28.
41"Eine unbeachtet gebliebene Quelle zur Entwick-
lungsgeschichte Kants," Philosophische Monatshefte, XIX
(1883), p. 130f.
42
"Vorlesungen Kants tlber Metaphysik aus drei
Semestern," Abhandlungen der kflniglisch sclchsischen
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, Philosophisch-historische
Klasse, XIV (1894), 481-728. Note especially 516f. There
is one serious objector to this dating. E. Arnoldt, in his
Kritische Exkurse im Gebiet der Kantforschung (1894) , would
place the date in the period 1778-84.
51
also prove useful, since it contains the notes which Kant
wrote in the margins and on blank pages interleaved in his
copy of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. But these notes were
jotted in during the course of many years, and it is not
always clear to what period a particular reflection should
be assigned.
The uncertainties mentioned in connection with all
of these works make a critical examination of such sources
essential to a precise analysis of Kant's development— and
fortunately we have been provided one. The Royal Prussian
Academy edition of Kant's works, noted above, devotes
eight volumes (XIV-XXI) to the presentation and critical
analysis of Kant's notes, reflections, and fragments, as
they are found in various materials gathered after his
death. Volume XV is devoted entirely to notes on anthropol
ogy. The editors have indicated clearly where there is
reason for doubt, but in all cases they have attempted to
determine the exact date of each entry. Certainly this
effort should prove invaluable for establishing the
temporal relationships between various works.
52
Other Sources
Besides the works directly connected with Kant's
lectures on anthropology, there are a variety of others
which provide an insight into his thoughts on anthropologi
cal topics--some explicitly so, others less directly.
Among the former are Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Mensch-
enrasse (1785), and Vom radikalen BOsen in der Menschen-
natur (1792); among the latter, Idee zu einer allgemeinen
Geschichte in weltbttrgerlicher Absicht (1784), Mutmasslicher
Anfang der Menschengeschichte (1786), and Das Ende aller
Dinge (1794). But again we have a special interest in
Kant's early writings, since they give an indication of the
influence of various elements on his thought during its
formative period. For that reason, we are particularly
interested in such writings as the Allgemeine Naturges-
chichte dnd Theorie des Himmels (1755), Beobachtungen tiber
das Geftihl des Schdnen und Erhabenen (1764), Disputatio de
mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis
(1770), and Von den verschiedenen Racen des Menschen (1775).
We shall feel free to draw upon material from any of these
works in our attempt to clarify the formation of Kant's
thought as it evolved into the Critical Period.
53
The consideration of the many sources with which we
must deal should, by now, have made it evident that there
is some ambiguity in speaking of Kant's anthropology. In
part, his thought is clearly defined, namely, that doctrine
which centers around the Anthropologie in pragmatischer
Hinsicht, and the anthropology lectures. Other aspects of
his thought, however, are widely scattered, and yet are
essential to the full understanding of his teaching. More
important for our purposes, they are essential to the reali
zation of the pervasive influence which the anthropology
exerted on the whole Kantian philosophy. It should be
clear, of course, that we are not attempting to show the
influence of one volume, the Anthropologie, on other
volumes of Kant's work; rather, we shall attempt to demon
strate that the entire framework around which the later
philosophy is structured is essentially anthropological
in nature, i.e., concerned with the nature and destiny of
man. For this purpose, we turn now to a consideration of
the Critical Philosophy.
CHAPTER III
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE
Those who criticize the Anthropologie as the least
philosophical of Kant's works, and as merely a series of
popular lectures,^ seem consistently to ignore the very
special organization given to the popular content. It is
no accident, for example, that the three aspects of self-
interest discussed in its opening pages— that of understand
ing, of taste, and of practical interests— correspond exact
ly to the studies involved in the three Critiques. And one
immediately recognizes in the first Critique a complete
analysis of man as animal rationabile, the first division of
the formal anthropology.
It has often been held that the first Critique does
not lend itself readily to a demonstration of Kant's anthro
pological tendencies. As Forrest Williams points out,
^A good example of this attitude is to be found
in J. H. von Kirchmann's forword to his edition of the
Anthropologie (Berlin: L. Heimann, 1869), p. vii.
54
55
the principles of Kant's philosophy in the first
Critique, although resting on a certain analysis
of subjective functions, take no concrete human
nature for their foundation in any philosophically
significant sense, but only the abstract structure
of a transcendental reason and a formal sensibility.^
But while Kant's analysis of cognition provides little
occasion for the introduction of anthropological elements,
it would be incorrect to maintain the same position with
respect to the Critique as a whole.
Erdmann mentions, for example, that there are
occasional observations in the first Critique which are
psychological in nature, and seem to be a lapse of formal
ity into the more casual style of the anthropology lec-
3
tures. But these minor references hardly merit our notice
when we recall the statements made by Kant in later portions
of the Critique. The "Canon of Pure Reason" gives a clear
presentation of the role of happiness as an integral aspect
of man's highest good— a determining ground of the ultimate
end of pure reason.^ in the closing passage of the
2"Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment," Kant-Studien, XLVI (1954-55), p. 173.
•^Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 55. He mentions
especially the note on page 172 of the second edition.
^A 806ff, B 834ff. Immanuel Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan
Co., 1958), 636ff. Cited hereafter as NKS.
56
"Architectonic of Pure Reason" we find emphasized again
that the "supreme end" of science is "the happiness of all
mankind.Kant is dealing here not with an abstract sub
ject of possible experience, but with concrete man and
his goals.
The whole orientation of this final portion of the
first Critique is clearly practical. Kant discusses the
g
practical application of pure reason, the relation between
the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace,7 and the
Q
question of belief (especially pragmatic belief) — all of
which are unmistakably concerned with man as an active
participant in the world of his experience.
It is not difficult, therefore, to demonstrate that
there is an anthropological content to the first Critique.
But we are interested in establishing more than the
presence of anthropological material; we are concerned to
demonstrate that it was Kant's anthropological interest
which originally prompted the writing of the Critique.
5A 851, B 879. NKS, 665.
6A 804ff, B 832ff . NKS, 635ff.
7A 812, B 840. NKS, 640.
8A 842, B 852. NKS, 648.
57
That will be quite a different task.
In order to understand properly the relation between
Kant's anthropological work and the first Critique, it will
be necessary to establish their chronology. It has already
been mentioned that the formation of Kant's anthropological
doctrine preceded his critical work. But in precisely what
sense is this meant? If, for example, we wish to establish
that Kant had formulated the major portion of his anthropo
logical thought prior to the publication of the Critique of
Pure Reason (1781), the task would be simple enough; but
the priority thus established would be insignificant for our
study.
The fact is well established that the problems for
mulated in the Critique of Pure Reason had occupied Kant for
many years before its publication (as early as 1766), and
we would have to consider at what point in this period his
thought became crystalized, before establishing the temporal
relation of another work to the Critique. Thus, a brief
examination of his thought in this period will prove useful
to our study.
The inaugural dissertation of 1770 (De Mundi Sensi-
bilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis) certainly
contains the germs of the Critical Philosophy, and it might
58
be said that this work actually marks the beginning of the
critical period.^ But it is in the following years that we
see the specific problems begin to take shape in Kant's
thought, and the solutions begin to reorganize his concep
tion of philosophy. In a letter to Lambert in September
1770, Kant mentioned his new epistemological and practical
system.10 In 1771 he wrote to Marcus Herz that he was work
ing on a volume which would appear under the title The
Boundaries of Sensibility and of Reason. It would involve
a discussion of the nature of taste, of metaphysics, and of
morality.The first mention of a "critique of pure
reason" occurred in a letter to Herz, February 21, 1772.
Kant spoke of having laid out a plan for the new work which
was still unfinished.
Without explaining at length here the whole range
of the investigation, which was continued to the
very end, I can say that I have succeeded in my
essential intent, and am now ready to supply a
critique of pure reason, containing the nature of
^The position represented by the dissertation is
commonly referred to as a "semi-critical" position. See,
e.g., Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique
of Pure Reason1 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1918), p. xx.
Cited hereafter as Commentary.
l^Schriften, X, 93.
Hjbid. , p. 117.
59
theoretical as well as practical knowledge, insofar
as it is purely intellectual. Of these I shall first
work out the first part, concerning the sources of
metaphysics, its methods and limits, and thereafter
the pure principles of morality. That concerning
the first part will be published in about three
months.^
But, of course, it was many years before this work was put
into final form, and a great many changes occurred in Kant's
thought during that interval.
The complexity of Kant's project demanded all his
concentrated effort, and left him little time for lesser
matters. In 1776 he mentioned in a letter to Herz that he
was receiving objections from all sides about his apparent
inactivity. Yet he had never been more systematically and
perseveringly busy than during the years since they had last
seen each other. Nonetheless, his work was far from
finished. Rather, the work seemed to grow under his hands--
a thing which often happens, as he points out, "when one
gains possession of some fruitful principles."13
^ Schriften, X, pp. 126-27.
1 " 3
Ich empfange von alien Seiten vorwtlrfe wegen der
UnthStigkeit, darin ich seit langer Zeit zu sein scheine,
und bin doch wirklich niemals systematischer und anhalten-
der beschaftigt gewesen, als seit den Jahren, da Sie mich
gesehen haben. Die Materien, durch deren Ausfertigung ich
wohl hoffen kflnnte, einen vortibergehenden Beifall zu erlan-
gen, hSufen sich unter meinen HSnden, wie es zu geschehen
pflegt, wenn man einiger fruchtbaren Principien habhaft
geworden." Schriften, X, p. 185.
60
Kant looked forward to the completion of this
project which had caused him so much labor: "After finish
ing this work, which I am only now really beginning, after
having overcome the last hindrances just this last summer,
I shall have a free field, the cultivation of which will be
just pleasure. But he realized that much work was yet to
be done: "I do not expect to be finished with this work
before Easter, but to dedicate a portion of next summer to
it, as much as my continually interrupted health will per
mit me to work. . . ."15 And then, the following August,
he reported to Herz that he hoped to have the work fully
1 6
completed that winter. Finally, the work was completed
in 1780, when Kant spent four or five months correlating the
materials and getting them ready for publication.I?
We may safely say, therefore, that Kant's thought
concerning the problems of the first Critique was in con
tinual ferment between 1771 and 1780. In fact, Kant himself
speaks of a twelve year period of incubation, which would
take his original consideration of these problems back to
14Ibid. 15Ibid., p. 186.
16Ibid., p. 198.
17
Kemp Smith, Commentary, pp. xix-xx.
61
18
1769. But, regardless of which date we acknowledge, the
Pfllitz and Starke manuscripts (discussed in the previous
chapter) which give us the earliest detailed presentation
of Kant's anthropology, appear extremely late by compari
son. Our concern at this point, then, is to determine what
relation, if any, existed between the anthropology and the
burgeoning critical thought of the early seventies.
One of Kant's letters is interesting in this con
nection, since it mentions both works under consideration.
Again it is a letter to Herz, this time late in the year
1773. The main body of the letter is a discussion of the
progress of his critical analysis of pure reason, and a
consideration of the enormous amount of time the work was
consuming. Then Kant turns to a discussion of Platner's
Anthropologie which had just been published, and expresses
his own interest in the subject. "I am teaching for the
second time this winter a private course in anthropology,
1 9
which I now intend to make a regular academic discipline."
Because of the pressure of his critical work, Kant could
hardly spare time for a proper treatment of this second
discipline. Yet he says:
18Ibid. •^Schriften, X, p. 138.
62
I am working in between times on this project, which,
in my opinion, is a very agreeable study of observa
tions, a preliminary exercise of skill, of cleverness,
and even of wisdom, for academic youth to perform,
which, with the physical geography is distinguished
from all other instruction, and can be called
knowledge of the w o r l d .20
This second work was the Anthropologie, of course, but as
we saw in Chapter I, the proposed volume was not completed
until much later. We can be sure from Kant's statements,
however, that his work in anthropology was very significant
to him at that time, and that only the tremendous task of
completing the first Critique prevented him from bringing
the Anthropologie to publication.
We can see, therefore, that these two projects,
while clearly divergent in purpose and content, were both
important factors in Kant's life during this period. And
it is significant for our purposes to note that they were
both in progress at the same time. The implications for
our current investigation are clear. The anthropological
material to be found in the first Critique is evidence of
Kant's interest in man at the time the Critique was
composed; but this material would be insufficient to estab
lish the causal priority of the anthropology if the
20Ibid., pp. 138-39.
63
projected volume on anthropology and the first Critique
were both competing for his attention at once. It might
be maintained with equal validity on the basis of such
evidence that the progress in Kant's critical thought
prompted his interest in anthropology.
There is, then, little point in attempting to estab
lish a causal relation between the projected Anthropologie
and the Critique of Pure Reason on the basis of the material
which they contain. Consequently, any discussion of a
causal relationship between these two works will have to be
based on something other than their content. Thus, if we
wish to demonstrate the influence of Kant's anthropology on
his other works, we must find another perspective from which
to consider this thought in relation to the first Critique.
The form, or structure, of the Critique certainly provides
no basis for comparison, and we are left with a considera
tion of its purpose as the only significant aspect for
examination.
The Purpose of the First Critique
There has been a great deal of disagreement among
scholars as to what Kant meant to be the purpose of the
64
first Critique. Paulsen, for example, spends several pages
discussing Schopenhauer's interpretation, the difference
between his own and Erdmann's conception, and defending his
own position against the objections of Volkelt and
21
Vaihinger. The analyses consequent upon such polemics
are, unfortunately, often more confusing than enlightening.
In order to avoid such confusion, we shall attempt to view
Kant's intentions through his own statements on the subject,
rather than accept the opinions, however documented, of
later commentators. There are occasional remarks in works
which he intended for publication, but the most important
source of information on the subject is in letters published
after his death.
There can be no question concerning the fact that
Kant viewed the Critique of Pure Reason as a part of a com
plete system, rather than as an isolated tour de force, or
an entire system in itself. There could be a misunderstand
ing of this point in one connection, however. In a letter
to Christian Garve, on August 7, 1783, Kant agreed that the
first Critique was not well formulated for general consump
tion, and explained that it was hurriedly brought together
21-Paulsen, op. cit. , p. 118ff.
65
because he was beginning to fear that further delay would
find him incapacitated while he still had "the entire sys-
tem" in his head.22 This could be taken as a reference to
the first Critique as a complete system in itself; but a
more careful consideration of Kant's letters quickly obvi
ates such an error.
There is another letter, for example, written to
Marcus Herz on August 20, 1777. Kant writes:
Since the time that we were separated from each
other, my investigations, which were formerly related
to all sorts of objects of philosophy, have achieved
systematic form, and conducted me to the idea of the
whole, which first of all makes possible the judgment
concerning value, and the reciprocal influence of the
parts. All executions of these works, meanwhile,
depend upon that which I call the critique of pure
reason, like a stone in the path, with whose removal
alone I am currently occupied, and with which I hope
to be completely finished this winter.23
From this statement it is clear that the Critique is a pre
liminary study which must be completed before other elements
of the system can be brought to completion. The position of
the Critique as a means to this end is clear even four years
earlier. In a letter to Herz, Kant says that he will be
glad when he has completed his transcendental philosophy,
which is really a critique of pure reason. "Then I will go
22Schriften, X, p. 316.
23Ibid., p. 198.
66
on to metaphysics, which has only two parts: the meta
physics of nature, and the metaphysics of morals, of which
I will publish the last part first, and I rejoice over it
in anticipation."24 There can be no doubt, then, that the
transcendental philosophy is intended to clear the way for
the other works to follow, and in Kant's thought the most
important of these must deal with morals.
Kant's emphasis on morality is clear in the first
Critique itself. There he points out that "essential ends
are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of
reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can
be so described." Therefore, we may distinguish two kinds
of essential ends: the ultimate end itself, and subordinate
ends which are necessarily connected with the ultimate end
as means. The ultimate end, Kant tells us, "is no other
than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which
deals with it is entitled moral philosophy."25 it is easy
to see in this context, also, that the first Critique is a
subordinate end— necessarily connected with moral philosophy
^The letter is undated, but the Academy edition
lists it as "gegen Ende 1773." Schriften, X, pp. 136-38.
25A 840, B 868. NKS, 658.
67
as means.
We can see a double meaning, then, in Kant's term
"transcendental philosophy." While it is usually used to
mean an analysis of the conditions necessary for the possi
bility of human knowledge as such, we can also see that,
insofar as it is embodied in the Critique of Pure Reason,
it clearly constitutes the necessary condition for the
possibility of true philosophy. In this negative sense, the
first Critique is a destruction of the previous illusions
which metaphysics had fostered, in order to make way for the
proper employment of reason in a true metaphysics. But Kant
clearly maintains that the Critique has a positive function
as well,26 an< j it. is in this positive aspect that we find
the most important relation between Kant's anthropological
interests and the first Critique.
The passages cited make it clear that the philosophy
which deals with the whole vocation of man is moral philoso
phy, and the first Critique is the necessary step which
makes possible this philosophy of the highest end. Or, to
express the thought in another manner, Kant's conception of
man as essentially a moral agent required him to place moral
26B xxv. NKS, 26.
68
philosophy at the peak of his philosophic hierarchy, and
his incredible speculative powers required him to undertake
the first Critique as a ground-clearing operation which
would at the same time provide a solid foundation upon
which to build this moral structure. 'Required' is, of
course, a strong word, but it seems perfectly justified
here. Kant was equally competent as a logical, mathemati
cal, speculative technician, and as a practical moralist
concerned with the "whole vocation of man." Therefore, his
conception of man, drawn, as we have seen, in large part
from Rousseau, imposed upon him the task of objectively
formulating a system in which a true morality was possible.
And this morality had to be rationally founded and accept
able to men of intellect who had rejected traditional
morality. In the letter to Herz last cited, Kant wrote
that he hoped to establish philosophy on a new and more
durable foundation, one which would be more advantageous
for religion and morality, and "at the same time to give to
it a form which is able to tempt the disdainful mathemati
cian to consider it fit for and worthy of his treatment."27
Our point, then, is simply that, for Kant, it was
^Schriften, X, p. 137.
69
not sufficient merely to publish the conception of man,
reality, and, consequently, philosophy which he had gained
through the insights of Rousseau. Rather, as a moral agent
and a moral philosopher, he found himself faced with the
task of justifying it and, if possible, even of demonstrat
ing it as necessary. This is the positive purpose of the
first Critique.
Kant was totally convinced of the importance of his
contribution to humanity. As early as 1765 we find him
saying: "If there is any science which man really needs,
it is the one I teach, of how to fulfill properly that posi
tion in creation which is assigned to man, and from which
he is able to learn what one must be in order to be a
m a n . "28 remark is, of course, appropriate to the
period shortly after his most fruitful encounter with the
work of Rousseau (c. 1762), but it expresses, as well, the
essential orientation of Kant throughout his career. It is
appropriate, then, that in moving on to a consideration of
Kant's practical philosophy, we should examine more
closely his relation to Rousseau, who seems to have
28
Hartenstein edition, VIII, pp. 624-25.
influenced it so strongly. With this as point of departure,
we should find easy access to the thought of the second
Critique.
CHAPTER IV
ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The study of the Anthropologie is fascinating to
one interested in Kant's thought, because it provides an
opportunity to encounter, at least in a fragmentary fashion,
the personality of Kant as it was manifest in the lecture
hall. The breadth and depth of his insights, and his abil
ity to draw constantly upon a great variety of illustrative
material to establish the validity of each position, made
him an extraordinary teacher in addition to his undoubted
competence as a technical philosopher. That the richness
of his thought was fostered by voracious reading we have
already seen, and his curiosity and scholarly bent found
him equally at home in both the light novels and the scien
tific speculations of the period. He had a deep love for
the classics, yet kept abreast of the most advanced thought
of his day. It was this constant search for greater knowl
edge that brought Kant into contact with one of the most
powerful and permanent sources of inspiration that he would
71
72
ever encounter--the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
The depth of the impression made on Kant can be
realized fully only if we recall that his early work was
concentrated primarily in the neat, orderly world of sci
entific and mathematical thought. That he was also
interested in man and in questions of morality we may be
quite certain, but, as these latter areas were understood
by Kant at the time, they could in no sense satisfy his
craving for precision and order in intellectual matters.
His encounter with the thought of Rousseau, however, pro
vided the basis for a very changed perspective.
During his years as a student, Kant had--through
Knutzen— acquired a great respect for the scientific
insights of Newton. In his own words: "Newton was the
first to discern order and regularity in combination with
great simplicity, where before him men had encountered
disorder and unrelated diversity. Since Newton, the comets
follow geometric orbits."^- In similar fashion, Rousseau
provided the key which would permit a neat and orderly
philosophy of man. "Rousseau was the very first to dis
cover beneath the varying forms which human nature assumes
•^Hartenstein Edition, VIII, p. 630.
73
the deeply concealed nature of man and the hidden law in
accordance with which Providence is justified by his
observations."2
Naturally, since Rousseau and Kant were so extra
ordinarily different, both in their lives and in their
works, the precise manner in which the former might influ
ence the thought of the latter is not immediately apparent.
But a second consideration quickly brings the essential
factor to light. In the work of Rousseau, there is a pri
mary distinction between primitive man, and the conventional
man of civilization— l1homme de la natur and 11homme de
11homme— and Kant saw in this distinction a contribution to
ethical and social criticism, a distinction of true and
false values.
As Cassirer rightly observes: "What Kant prized
in Rousseau was the fact that he had distinguished more
clearly than others between the mask that man wears and
his actual visage."^ Civilization has added many dimensions
to human experience which are apparently good, but which
actually add nothing to man's moral worth, and, at times,
*
2Ibid.
3
Cassirer, op. cit., p. 20.
74
even detract from it. "There is a great deal that man has
absorbed in the course of time and learned from his cul
tural heritage, which is really in conflict with his 'true'
character and his proper and original vocation."4 Realiz
ing this, Kant took up the idea of 1'homme nature1, but in
an ethical and teleological sense, rather than as a scien
tific or historical concept.
It is not, therefore, in a descriptive sense that
Kant accepted Rousseau's theory, but in a normative sense.
He saw this conception of man "not as a retrospective elegy,
but as a prospective prophecy."-’
What is truly permanent in human nature is not any
condition in which it once existed and from which it
has fallen; rather it is the goal for which and toward
which it moves. Kant looks for constancy not in what
man i_s but in what he should be. And Kant credits
Rousseau the ethical philosopher with having dis
cerned the "real man" beneath all the distortions and
concealments, beneath all the masks that man has
created for himself and worn in the course of his his
tory. That is, Kant esteems Rousseau for having recog
nized and honored man's distinctive and unchanging
end. 6
For Kant, then, the work of empirical philosophers, those
who base their doctrine on experience, and derive their
knowledge of human nature from the history of man's
4Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 20.
^Ibid., p. 10.
75
previous development, must necessarily prove inadequate.
Such work would deal only with the accidental and changing
aspects of man, rather than with the essential and perman
ent. But through the work of Rousseau, Kant did grasp the
essential element in man— his ethical and not his physical
or speculative-intellectual nature. It was for this reason
that Kant hailed Rousseau's position as marking a new age
in man's intellectual development, a great discovery totally
unknown to the ancients.^
But while Kant accepted the insights of Rousseau,
he found it necessary to reject his method. For Rousseau
did not follow a strict form of rational inquiry, the
essential mode of investigation for the rigorous mind of
Kant. In fact, the excellence of Rousseau's literary style
troubled Kant, and he felt that he must learn to ignore it.
"I must read Rousseau until the beauty of expression no
longer distracts me, and only then will I be able to survey
him with reason."® Such rational purity is difficult to
comprehend, but it clearly indicates the significance which
Kant attributed to the work of Rousseau, and the frame of
^Schriften, II, p. 312.
8Hartenstein Edition, VIII, p. 618.
76
mind in which he approached it.
Because of this distrust of the method employed, it
is clear that Kant accepted only the core of Rousseau's
thought, rather than the details of its presentation. He
felt, also, that Rousseau was incorrect in starting with an
assumed natural man, and proceeding synthetically. Kant
felt it necessary to begin with man as we know him,
civilized man, and to proceed analytically.^ It is appro
priate in studying animals to begin with their wild state,
but in studying man it is necessary to observe him in his
creative endeavors, i.e., in civilization.^-^ "This begin
ning is indicated because, in the concept of man, civiliza
tion constitutes no secondary or accidental characteristic,
but marks man's essential nature, his specific character."H
This becomes perfectly clear when we realize that civiliza
tion constitutes the social and ethical context which alone
reveals the essential and permanent aspects of man.
In working out his thought, Kant employs at the
9Ibid., p. 613.
10Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 205.
1 1
Cassirer, op. cit., p. 22.
77
moral level a principle which, for Rousseau, was a principle
of the social order. In the Contrat social, Rousseau dis
cusses the superiority of man's position in the ideal civil
state, pointing out that, in addition to all other advan
tages, in this context man achieves "moral liberty, which
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere
impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law
which we prescribe to ourselves is freedom."12 Kant singles
out this unique quality of man, that of self-legislation, as
the key to the full understanding of the moral order— and
upon this point his whole practical philosophy rests.
In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant
1 1
provides the basis for his moral philosophy. J In setting
about this task, he follows a procedure very similar to
that employed in the first Critique,^ and at the same time
l^Book x, Chapter VIII.
13y?hile the Grundlegung zu Metaphysik der Sitten had
already been published in 1785, Kant felt that it did not
properly clear the way for the metaphysic of morals which he
still proposed to write. For a discussion of Kant's reasons,
see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of
Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), p. 15f.
■^The structural relation between the first and
second Critiques has been the subject of much controversy.
Paulsen, for example, considers Kant to be "enslaved" by
his format (op. cit., p. 300f.), while Beck feels that it
is essential to Kant’s purposes (Commentary, p. 55).
78
makes clear the relation between "pure" and "practical"
reason. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the distinction
had been clearly drawn between sensible and intelligible
worlds: between the world of phenomena reported by the
senses, and the noumenal world which the intellect is forced
to posit but can say virtually nothing about. In the first
Critique, also, it was established that, while a strict
order of causality reigns in sensible reality, it is at
least not contradictory to conceive of the possibility of
freedom from this order in the intelligible world. But,
again, nothing positive can be said of freedom except that
it is possible.15 in the realm of speculative reason, then,
there is an area of human interest which cannot be satis
fied, a "vacant placewhich crowns our pursuit of
knowledge.
The second Critique, however, can shed more light
on these matters. For in this new context Kant is dealing
^~>Kant does mention in the first Critique that
practical freedom can be proved through experience, but
the question of transcendental freedom remains unanswered.
A 801ff, B 829ff. NKS, 633f.
^ Schriften, V, p. 49. Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans.
Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949), p. 159. Cited hereafter as Beck trans.
with morality rather than with nature. Here, he points out.
reason imposes a fundamental law of conduct upon suin. The
consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact
of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent
data of reason, such as the consciousness of freedom (foe
this is not antecedently given). "I7 This law, which man
experiences as universal, is therefore "an imperative com
manding categorically because it is unconditioned.*^® It is
this categorical imperative which is called the moral law,
and the relation of man's will to this law is one of
dependence under the name of obligation. "This term implies
a constraint to an action, though this constraint is only
that of reason and its objective law."^-^ The will, there
fore, is constrained, but not compelled, and man is ulti
mately free to accept or reject the moral law.
It is here that we encounter Rousseau's principle
of self-legislation or, as Kant calls it, Autonomie. "The
autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral
laws and of the duties conforming to them. . . . The moral
^•^Schriften, V, p. 30f. Beck trans., p. 142.
^ Schriften, V, p. 32. Beck trans., p. 143.
19
Schriften, V, p. 30f. Beck trans., pp. 143-44.
79
with morality rather than with nature. Here, he points out,
reason imposes a fundamental law of conduct upon man. "The
consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact
of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent
data of reason, such as the consciousness of freedom (for
this is not antecedently given). This law, which man
experiences as universal, is therefore "an imperative com
manding categorically because it is unconditioned. "-*-® It is
this categorical imperative which is called the moral law,
and the relation of man's will to this law is one of
dependence under the name of obligation. "This term implies
a constraint to an action, though this constraint is only
that of reason and its objective l a w . "19 The will, there
fore, is constrained, but not compelled, and man is ulti
mately free to accept or reject the moral law.
It is here that we encounter Rousseau's principle
of self-legislation or, as Kant calls it, Autonomie. "The
autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral
laws and of the duties conforming to them. . . . The moral
l^Schriften, V, p. 30f. Beck trans., p. 142.
l8Schriften, V, p. 32. Beck trans., p. 143.
19
Schriften, V, p. 30f. Beck trans., pp. 143-44.
80
law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure
practical reason, i.e., freedom."20 Thus, while it is
impossible to formulate a theoretical proof that rational
beings are free, the moral law compels us to assume
freedom, and therefore authorizes us to assume it. We are
compelled to assume it because the concept of freedom and
that of the supreme principle of morality "are so inextri
cably bound together that practical freedom could be
defined through the will's independence of everything
except the moral law."21 In consideration of this insever
able connection, the moral law is said to postulate free
dom . ^ ^
Thus we find that, as in the first Critique the
pure intuitions of space and time make possible our knowl
edge of sensible reality, so in the Critique of Practical
Reason the moral law makes possible our knowledge of the
^Schriften, V, p. 33. Beck trans., p. 144.
^ Schriften, V, pp. 93-94. Beck trans., p. 200.
22
It is in this sense— the necessary assumption of
freedom in the practical order— that Kant speaks of freedom
as "proved." He is careful to distinguish this from
speculative knowledge, but affirms that "with the pure
practical faculty of reason, the reality of transcendental
freedom is also confirmed." Schriften, V, p. 3. Beck
trans., p. 118.
81
intelligible world. "This law gives to the sensible world,
as sensuous nature (as this concerns rational beings), the
form of an intelligible world, i.e., the form of super-
sensuous nature, without interfering with the mechanism of
the former.if, then, we accept Kant's definition of
"nature," in the broadest sense, as "the existence of
things under laws,"2^ it becomes clear that man shares in
two different worlds, and that there are two distinct
aspects to his nature.
The sensuous nature of rational beings in general
is their existence under empirically conditioned
laws, and therefore it is, from the point of view
of reason, heteronomy. The supersensuous nature
of the same beings, on the other hand, is their
existence according to laws which are independent
of all empirical conditions and which therefore
belong to the autonomy of pure reason.2 5
The moral law is the law of this autonomy, and it consti
tutes "the fundamental law of supersensuous nature, and of
a pure world of the understanding, whose counterpart must
exist in the world of sense without interfering with the
laws of the latter."2^ While, therefore, man is con
strained in the order of the sensible world, he is free
^ Schriften, V, p. 43. Beck trans., pp. 153-54.
^ Ibid. 2^Ibid.
26Ibid.
82
in the intelligible world, in the world of morality. It is
for this reason that Kant tells us that the moral order
alone shows man in his proper perspective.
What was for Rousseau a principle of the political
order is thus developed by Kant into a moral and metaphysi
cal doctrine which is essential to his critical philosophy.
For self-legislation, or autonomy, is freedom, and "the
concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by
an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of
the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and
even of speculative reason."^
It is interesting to note, also, that the system of
moral philosophy which Kant built upon this foundation was
necessarily marked by other characteristics of Rousseau's
thought. It had been common, for example, for philosophers
of the Enlightenment to assume that a sound ethics must
depend upon rational knowledge, and that moral progress
could only be expected when progress in knowledge had been
achieved. In fact, the latter was seen as almost the
guarantor of the former. The Gnostic implications of such
a system are obvious. However, even philosophers of this
school recognized that until a true morality could be
2 7
Schriften, V, pp. 3-4. Beck trans., p. 118.
83
achieved, a temporary system of philosophically untenable,
popular morality, based on religion, would have to be
adopted as a necessary evil, and be at least tolerated.
But, for Kant, popular morality had a much different sig
nificance.
Kant, more than any other philosopher of his age,
respected the "ordinary moral consciousness" of the
ordinary man; under the influence of his early
pietism and of Rousseau, he came to regard the
unshakable moral convictions of the simple and hum
ble as the proper starting point for philosophical
analysis; and philosophy, so far from being the moral
teacher of mankind, is given the task of defending it
from its outward enemies— the philosophers of heterono-
mous ethics— and its internal dangers— moral fanati
cism and mysticism.28
Just as the natural freedom of man serves as the basis of
Rousseau's political order, the object of that freedom, the
moral law, forms the basis of Kant's practical philosophy.
We even find that the fundamental law of pure
practical reason, the categorical imperative, strongly
reflects the thought of Rousseau. Cassirer points out that
the formulation which Kant gives to this law in the
Critique of Practical Reason— "so act that the maxim of
your will could always hold at the same time as a principle
establishing universal law"— coincides with what Rousseau
regards as the really fundamental principle of every
2 8
Beck Commentary, p. 235.
84
legitimate social order. "And we may surmise that Rousseau
not only influenced the content and systematic development
of Kant's foundation of ethics, but that he also formed its
language and style."29
If we consider another formulation of this law,
which Kant suggests in the Grundlegung, the influence of
Rousseau is even more obvious. After pointing out the
special nature of the person, and the fact that national
nature exists as an end in itself, Kant gives the practical
imperative in this form: "So act as to treat humanity,
whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in
every case as an end withal, never as means o n l y . "30 a s
usual, Kant has given his own particular form to the
thought, but, surely, we cannot fail to see reflected here
the thoughts of Mme de Wolmar in sections of La Nouvelle
H^loise: "It is never right to harm a human soul for the
advantage of others."31 And later: "Man is too noble a
being to serve simply as the instrument for others, and he
29Cassirer, op. cit., p. 32.
3QFundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Chicago: Great
Books Foundation, 1949), p. 53.
31part IV, letter 22.
85
must not be used for what suits them without consulting
also what suits himself. . . ."32 in the work of Kant, the
principle that each person constitutes an end in itself is
seen as the basis for developing a perfect society in which
each man would act, and be treated, as an end. This "king
dom of ends" bears a striking resemblance to the social
structure envisioned by Rousseau as the voluntary coopera
tion of free men in the ideal state. Once again, there
fore, we find that Rousseau has provided the elements which
Kant intensified, restructured, and proclaimed as the
necessary path which man must follow if he would better
himself.^3
It is possible, of course, to doubt that there was
so direct an influence upon Kant as the passages cited
would imply; after all, Kant had read the works of Rousseau
•^Part v, letter 2.
^Accused of merely giving a new formulation,
rather than a new principle of morality, Kant replied in
the Critique of Practical Reason; "Who would want to
introduce a new principle of morality and, as it were, be
its inventor, as if the world had hitherto been ignorant
of what duty is or had been thoroughly wrong about it?
Those who know what a formula means to a mathematician, in
determining what is to be done in solving a problem without
letting him go astray, will not regard a formula which will
do this for all duties as something insignificant and
unnecessary." (Schriften, V, p. 8n; Beck trans., p. 123n.)
The statement indicates how precise and complete Kant
thought his moral formula to be.
86
about 1762, and the second Critique was not written until
twenty-five years later. Yet, we need only recall the
extraordinary powers of memory which Kant exercised in
matters which seemed to him important;^ surely, then, he
would remember passages as vital to his thought as these
on morality. It is safe to say that Kant did not exagger
ate when he expressed his indebtedness to Rousseau— we may
even feel that there was more influence involved than even
Kant was aware of.
The Distinctive Morality of Kant
While we have considered the general structure of
Kant's morality as it flowed from his contact with Rousseau,
we have not as yet viewed it in relation to the moral agent
himself. Precisely to what kind of being is this morality
appropriate, and to what end will it direct him? Paulsen
gives an excellent capsule view of Kant's thought on the
first point. The characteristic position of man in reality
is that of a being in whom sensibility and reason are
34stuckenberg reminds us that "even in old age,
when his memory for recent impressions had become very weak,
he was still able to quote easily and correctly numerous
passages from Latin writers." Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 28.
Note also his discussion of Kant's ability to retain detail,
pp. 109-10.
87
united. With respect to knowledge, at least, this is cer
tainly clear in Kant's work: human knowledge requires both
perception and understanding. "Understanding without sensi
bility is a description of the divine intelligence, while
sensibility without understanding is the condition of the
brutes."35 Man, of course, is directly between these
extremes. "In like manner, the human will is character
ized by the fact that reason and sensibility are always
united in action, the former determining the form of the
will, and the latter furnishing the object of desire."36
We can conceive of reason without sensibility, but this
could only characterize the divine will, "whose nature is
expressed in the moral law, which alone determines its
activity."37 on the other hand, "sensible impulses without
reason result in the animal will, made up of lawless and
accidental desires, subject to the natural course of
events."38
The very nature of morality rests upon the distinc
tive character of man in which reason and sensibility are
joined. For with respect to the divine will as one extreme.
35Paulsen, op. cit., p. 303.
36ibid. 37Ibidt
38Ibid.
88
and animal sensibility as the other, there can be no obli
gation and, consequently, no morality. Because the divine
will corresponds exactly to the divine reason, it is not
moral, but holy. Because the will of the lower animals is
made up of passive excitation of impulse, it does not act
but remains passive as a part of nature, and therefore is
entirely outside morality. "In the case of man, morality
rests upon the control of the sense impulses by the reason.
Through the fact that man as a rational being prescribes a
law to himself as a sensible being, obligation first
arises."39
In man, according to Kant, inclinations are all
drawn ultimately from sense impulses, while the concept of
duty proceeds from reason— the only source of universal
principles. It is the opposition between these two aspects
of man which sets up a conflict within him and requires him
to struggle for moral rectitude. But Kant makes it clear
that true morality must be carefully distinguished from
mere legality. To act in accordance with moral law is not
enough. The concept of duty demands of action that it
objectively agree with the law, but it also demands of the
maxim of the action subjective respect for the law as the
39jbid., p. 304.
89
sole mode of determining the will through itself.
And thereon rests the distinction between conscious
ness of having acted according to duty and from duty,
i.e., from respect for law. The former, legality,
is possible even if inclinations alone are the deter
mining grounds of the will, but the latter, morality
or moral worth, can be conceded only where action
occurs from duty, i.e., merely for the sake of law.4^
For Kant, then, morality requires the complete dominance
of sense and inclination by reason, not only in order to
bring action into accord with the law, but also to determine
its motivation— pure, selfless reverence for the law itself.
Only in this way can self-interest and self-love be avoided
as undermining forces of morality.
Although Kant explicitly repudiates the moral prin
ciples of the Stoics,it is not extraordinary that his
conception of human perfection has been compared to the
rational ideal which they sought. In discussing this ideal
of a totally rational man, Paulsen maintains that "it was
the Stoic type of human perfection that Kant had before his
^Qschriften, v, p. 81. Beck trans., p. 188.
41Ibid.
4^This topic is thoroughly discussed in Part I,
Chapter III, of the Critique of Practical Reason, "The
Incentives of Pure Practical Reason." Schriften, V,
p. 71ff. Beck trans., p. 180ff.
^Schriften, v, p. 40f. Beck trans., p. 151f.
90
mind. The complete sovereignty of reason, and complete
freedom from the passions, constitute the status perfec-
44
tionis." Emotions could have no power over the perfect
man, for he would act according to principles rather than
feelings. "Emotions are only provisional springs of action
with which the wisdom of nature endowed man, as it endowed
animals, until reason is sufficiently developed to assume
the guidance of life."4' * But Paulsen carries his argument
too far.
In criticizing Kant's moral thought, he feels con
strained to call it "negativism," centered in the notion
that "to act morally is to do what one does not want to
do."4* * He maintains that, according to Kant,
even the virtuous man might really always prefer to
follow his sensuous inclinations to luxury, ease, etc.
But the 'idea of the law,' with its 'thou shalt not,'
or 'thou shalt' interposes. And so, practicing the
hard virtue of repression, he does what he does not
want to do.47
44Paulsen, op. cit. , p. 289.
^ Ibid. in another place, Paulsen mentions of Kant
himself: "Stoic apathy, independence of things and mastery
over them is his personal ideal. It is obvious how strong
an influence this exercised upon his moral theory." Ibid.,
p. 335.
4**Ibid. t p. 332.
47Ibid., pp. 332-33.
91
This is what is referred to by some writers as the "sour
duty" conception of Kant's thought, and Beck vigorously
defends Kant against such an interpretation. He points
out, to begin with, that Kant considers it a duty to
establish and cultivatp a moral feeling, a sense of satis
faction in the consciousness of virtue.48 That alone would
make it difficult for the virtuous man "really always [to]
prefer to follow his sensuous inclinations."
In another context, however, Kant tells us that we
have at least an indirect duty to provide for our own hap
piness, though this is for the purpose of ensuring the ful
fillment of d u t y . 49 But a further statement clearly under
mines the "sour duty" interpretation. Kant tells us that
man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to
the world of sense, and to this extent his reason
certainly has an inescapable responsibility from
the side of his sensuous nature to attend to its
interest and to form practical maxims with a view
to the happiness of this and, where possible, of
a future life.50
Kant is only concerned that man should not make his intel
lect subservient to his senses, for that would make man
simply another form of animal rather than a higher form of
48schriften, V, p. 38. Beck trans., p. 150.
^^Schriften, V, p. 93. Beck trans., p. 199.
^Qschriften, v, p. 61. Beck trans., p. 170.
92
life.
We can see, therefore, that while the notion of
"sour duty" is too strong an accusation to level against
Kant's moral thought, Kant is nonetheless suspicious of the
sensible aspect of man, and is careful to guard against its
blandishments. It would seem, then, that Kant's moral doc
trine has been strongly influenced by his rather unflatter
ing conception of the nature of man. Because Kant under
stood the rational powers of man to constitute man's dis
tinctive characteristic, he would necessarily propound an
ethic in which the rational capacity is supreme. But the
extreme effort to purify motivation of all taint of sense
and inclination cannot help but remind us of the passages
in the Anthropologie where he likens the passions to
drunkenness, and the emotions to chronic illness.^ Such
an emphasis reflects not only the logical relationship
between reason and sense in a rational animal; it implies,
as well, the clear understanding of man in his concrete
particularity, as seen through the empirical data of the
anthropological investigations. The connection between
Kant's ethical position and his broader conception of man
is important for us to consider.
51Schriften, VII, p. 252.
Morality and Anthropology
There are various ways in which we might consider
the relation between Kant's anthropology and the moral doc
trine which he advanced, but perhaps, again, it would be
best at least to begin with his own statements on the
matter. In the introductory remarks to his lectures on
ethics,52 Kant takes up the point in order to make clear the
role of ethics in philosophy. He gives a brief analysis of
a rational agent, showing the relation between the under
standing and the will, and pointing out that if the will is
free, then it is necessary to have principles or rules for
the use of that freedom. To provide these rules is the
task of general practical philosophy, and the rules which
it provides must be objective. But there are also subjec
tive practical rules, and these are the concern of anthro
pology. "An objective rule lays down what ought to occur,
even though it never actually occurs. But the subjective
^We employ here the notes of Kant's students,
compiled and edited by Paul Menzer from three notebooks
dated variously 17 80-1782. This work was first published
in 1924. The material from this source is excellent for
our purpose, since it provides a clear view of Kant's
thought on the subject just a few years before the writing
of the second Critique. There is no reason to believe that
his conception of this relation changed.
rule deals with actual happenings."53 The distinction is
necessary, since, as Kant points out, even the wicked have
rules of conduct; but they usually have little to do with
what ought to be. The role of anthropology in this scheme,
then, is to observe the actual behavior of human beings, and
to formulate the practical and subjective rules which that
behavior obeys. But moral philosophy "seeks to formulate
rules of right conduct, that is, of what ought to happen,
just as logic comprises the rules for the right use of the
m i n d . "54 But, while moral philosophy and anthropology are
distinct, they are not entirely independent. Not only are
they closely connected, but we may even say that moral
philosophy "cannot subsist without" anthropology; "for we
cannot tell whether the subject to which our consideration
applies is capable of what is demanded of him unless we
have knowledge of that subject."^5 It would be possible,
of course, to pursue the study of practical philosophy with
out knowledge of the subject gained through anthropology,
^ Lectures on Ethics, ed. Paul Menzer, trans. Louis
Infield (London: The Century Co., no date), p. 2.
^4Ibid. From Kant's statement, it seems likely that
the distinction which he intends between these two sciences
is precisely that established in current philosophic thought
between the descriptive and the normative levels of dis
course.
55
Ibid.
95
but then we would be engaged in a merely speculative
endeavor. "We therefore have to make at least some study
of man. "56
Apparently then, in Kant's scheme, anthropology
provides the framework for the practical philosophy, and
the testing ground for "objective rules" derived from
reason. But this statement provides only the logical rela
tionship between the two disciplines as separate elements
of a system of philosophy. We are interested, as well, in
the relation between them as they were actually formulated
by Kant.
With respect to the Critique of Practical Reason,
we have already suggested one connection: the mistrust of
sensibility discussed in such detail in the Anthropologie.
But Erdmann maintains a much more explicit relation between
the two works. Everything in the second Critique that
belongs to empirical psychology, he feels, is directly
drawn from the anthropology lectures— for they had become
the repository for such material after it had been separated
from the lectures on physical geography.57 Erdmann
56Ibid., p. 3.
57Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 55.
96
particularly emphasizes the material employed in the dis
cussion of the appetitive faculty.
There is, then, a definite relation between the
anthropology and the second Critique, and it can be seen at
two distinct levels. Formally, the science of anthropology
is seen as a prerequisite to the formation and validation
of the practical philosophy. Then, as this formal relation
would lead us to expect, we find that some portion of the
content of the practical philosophy was literally drawn
from the lectures Kant had been delivering on anthropology.
We do not mean to imply that the relation between these two
aspects of Kant's thought came into existence at the time
of the second Critique; for we have already seen that he
had included anthropological material in his lectures on
ethics as early as 1765. But our examination of the later
work permits us to conclude anew, and with greater assur
ance, that there is a strong and direct influence exerted
on Kant's moral thought by his anthropology.
There is one additional point, however, which
should be discussed in relation to Kant's practical
philosophy: the question of the ultimate source of his
doctrine. Many works dealing with Kant assume an obvious,
and rather facile, answer to this question, and the matter
97
is worthy of comment. It is not uncommon, for example, to
encounter suggestions that Kant's moral theory is a direct
product of his pietistic background. Stuckenberg quotes
favorably the comment that "Pietism forged that brass logi
cal chain whose last link is the Categorical Imperative."58
Beck, in the introductory note to his translation of the
second Critique, tells us that "Pietism's deeply ethical
orientation and singular lack of emphasis on theological
dogmatism became a part of Kant's nature and a determining
factor in his philosophy."59 &nd Schilpp, after discussing
the strictness and rigor of Kant's early childhood, and the
enforced routine and self-discipline of his later life,
concludes: "These facts combined give a natural setting for
what has since come to be almost universally spoken of as
the 'rigor' of Kant's philosophic theories."®® He goes on
to raise an objection to the interpretation of Kant's work
as rigorous, but not because it is an incorrect evaluation
of the sources of Kant's thought. Rather, Schilpp is con
cerned because the interpretation gives an unjust impression
of Kant himself: "These influences, none the less, have
®®Lewis White Beck, "Sketch of Kant's Life and Work,"
A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. xxi.
^°Schilpp, op. cit., p. 3.
98
been over-estimated by Kant scholars. The Pietistic up
bringing of Kant offers a comparatively easy explanation for
certain rigoristic features of his philosophy, but hardly
justifies a caricature of Kant's personality that falsifies
his real character. To balance this error, Schilpp pro
ceeds to establish that Kant was actually a man of deep
feeling, and even of profound emotion. He concludes that
the rigor of Kant's ethics may have been due in part to what
we would today call a "defense mechanism." "Having once
seen the need for an universally valid foundation for moral
ity, Kant may have been afraid that his own emotional
nature might obstruct the discovery and formulation of such
a law. It is conceivable that he came to distrust his own
emotions."^2 schilpp concedes that Kant may not have been
aware of this process. "This fear probably was more sub
conscious than conscious, but if it was a defense-reaction,
as we may assume, it is a vital factor in accounting for
the vigorous onslaught which Kant directs against any merely
emotional determinant of morality."63 The passage requires
little comment. We see here a prime example of the logical
61Ibid. 62Ibid., p. 7.
G^Ibid. First italics added.
99
and psychological vagaries which seem to abound in investi
gations of the origin and development of Kant's moral doc
trine .
The questionable nature of such hypotheses comes to
light when we realize the incongruity which they impose
upon the various aspects of Kant's work. On the one hand,
we are presented a man of incredible speculative powers,
working out with great precision the details of the Critique
of Pure Reason. Then we are asked to believe that the same
man was the blind pawn of social and religious condition
ing, or psychological forces, in working out his moral
doctrine. If the case is somewhat overdrawn, the point is
clear enough. Kant explicitly acknowledges the pietistic
influence of his early life, but this should not lead us to
conclude that this influence dictated the development of
his moral thought. Is there not some more reasonable inter
pretation of the relation between Kant's background and
character, and the practical philosophy which he formulated?
One significant possibility suggests itself.
There is no point in attempting to maintain that
there is no connection whatever between Kant's background
and the formulation of his later thought. Such a position
would be impossible to prove, even if it were true. The
100
question we are concerned with is, rather, in precisely
what manner might the various forces present in Kant's life
have conjoined to influence his moral thought, without hav
ing determined it completely? Because of our context, the
answer is perhaps obvious.
Kant himself tells us that in his home the dignity
of man was a living fact, and even a vigorous dispute could
not rob an opponent of this proper regard. We have seen,
also, that in his home the moral character of man was both
emphasized and exemplified. Is it not reasonable to suggest
that so thoughtful a child as Kant would have formed a very
strong and vivid conception of what it means to be a man?
To be sure, as he tells us, his own enthusiastic excursion
into the world of the intellect misled him for a while. But
when Rousseau set him right— i.e., reoriented Kant's think
ing in man as opposed to science— was it not merely a re
affirmation and clarification of the conception of man he
had long-since possessed? The suggestion is simple enough,
but, if accepted, its consequences are significantly dif
ferent from those of the positions previously mentioned.
It seems clear that, for Kant, morality could only
be the means by which man uses properly the powers which he
has been given, and thereby achieves the end for which he
101
was ordained. The statements of Kant concerning practical
philosophy certainly support this view. It would then be
reasonable to assert that, given a certain conception of
the nature of man, and a particular notion of the destiny
for which he was created, the precise, speculative mind of
Kant could hardly have avoided the rigorous ethical system
which finally resulted from his long and arduous delibera
tions .
It is easy enough to establish that Kant's thought
worked itself out slowly with respect to the content of the
Critique of Practical Reason, just as it did in the case of
the first Critique. The principle of autonomy was not
fully realized as the key to morality until about 1785.64
The pieces fell into place slowly, and with deliberate pre
cision. Thus, the gradual nature of its development makes
it extremely unlikely that Kant's moral doctrine was a
direct result of his early moral conditioning, or that its
form was the product of some personal, psychological
defense-mechanism. Rather, we can see that his early forma
tion need only have provided him with a profound awareness
of the nature and destiny of man. His encounter with
Rousseau would then be seen as a re-affirmation and
64Be.ck, Commentary, p. 14.
102
purification of his convictions. And the consequent deter
mination and specification of the details of his system of
morality would follow as a natural result of critical
analysis.
This interpretation is, of course, only an hypothe
sis, but it seems a much more natural and adequate explana
tion of Kant's development than is normally given. And
while the interpretation adds weight to our general thesis,
it should not be felt that we suggest it on that account.
For there is no need of such emphasis in establishing our
point. By Kant's own admission, the anthropology is an
essential condition for the elaboration of a truly practi
cal philosophy, and we find that the influence of Rousseau,
who most forcefully roused him from his neglect of man, per
meates the Critique of Practical Reason. There can be no
doubt concerning the influence of the anthropology on this
aspect of Kant's thought. In fact, we may be tempted to
generalize and assert that every aspect of Kant's moral
doctrine centered around his conception of human nature, and
his vision of human destiny. But a consideration of Kant's
other ethical works should provide a sounder basis for that
conclusion.
103
Additional Works on Morality
Only a brief acquaintance with the work of Kant is
necessary to realize that his thought on morality is not
to be found in one neatly organized body. We have already
seen that the Critique of Practical Reason was preceded by
the Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), which
only temporarily satisfied Kant.- Later, in 1779, he pub
lished the Metaphysical Principles of Law, and the Meta
physical Principles of Virtue. In the following year, these
two works were published together as the Metaphysic of
Morals. But even if the second Critique, the Foundation,
and the Metaphysic are grouped together, they still con
stitute only a portion of Kant's thought on morality. For
there are numerous observations on the topic scattered
throughout his work, and an especially significant portion
is to be found in his works on religion. In order to estab
lish, therefore, that our findings in connection with the
Critique of Practical Reason are true also of Kant's
general moral doctrine, we shall examine briefly some of
these other sources.
The lectures on ethics have already contributed to
our awareness of the relation between Kant's anthropological
104
and ethical thought, and we need say little more about them.
Also, since the material contained in the Foundation was,
for the most part, revised and presented again in later
works, we may be permitted to neglect it here. Both the
lectures, and the Foundation, of course, are from a period
with which we are already sufficiently familiar. It will
be more to our purpose, then, to extend our consideration
to the earlier and later works, which might present dif
ferent aspects of Kant's developing thought.
The essay, "An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the
Principles of Natural Theology and Morals" (written 1763,
published 1764), gives a clear indication of Kant's concern
with morality at that time, and his mention of the concept
of 'moral feeling,1 which he had encountered in the work of
\
"Hutcheson and others,"65 gives evidence of wide reading in
moral philosophy. But perhaps the best example of Kant's
ethical position in the pre-critical period is his essay,
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime
(1764). The work may be called primarily anthropological,
^5Schriften, II, p. 300. Beck trans., p. 285.
®®In the introduction to his translation of Observa
tions , Goldthwait expresses the opinion that this work is
"the epitome of Kant's pre-Critical thought." Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans.
John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1960), p. 1.
105
since it deals with this particular feeling as it is related
to men generally, as it differs iri the two sexes, and as it
may concern national characteristics. But Kant takes up
questions of morality as well. Schilpp points out that, in
its handling of moral problems, this work "shows the great
est influence of the British moralists and especially of
Rousseau,He demonstrates also that, in Observations,
Kant grounds morality, on its material side, upon the feel
ing for the beauty and dignity of human nature.68 it is
interesting for our purpose to note that Kant's personal
copy of the essay was interleaved with blank pages, on which
he jotted a great many notes of both moral and anthropologi
cal interest.69 But we have already been led to expect that
these two disciplines were strongly related in Kant's early
thought.
With respect to his later thought we certainly can
not ignore the Metaphysic of Morals, for this work fulfills
the promise of Kant to his correspondents some twenty-five
67Schilpp, op. cit., p. 45.
68Ibid., p. 59.
^These notes constitute the important Fragmente of
the eighth volume of the Hartenstein edition of Kant's work,
reprinted in volume twenty of the Prussian Academy edition.
They are given an approximate date of 1764-65.
106
years before. It is the second portion of his proposed
metaphysic, which entailed a metaphysic of nature and a
metaphysic of morals.The work is obviously a product
of Kant's old age,7^ and we might wish that it had been
possible to complete the project earlier. But, for our
purposes, the work is ideal.
There are several sections of the Metaphysic of
Morals which bear an explicit resemblance to the
Anthropologie. We find that Section Ten of the "Meta
physical Principles of Virtue," which discusses avarice
("Vom Geize"), has much the same content as Section 85c of
the Anthropologie ("Habsucht"). Section Thirty-six of the
former deals with the vices springing from hatred of our
fellowman, and which are opposed to the duties of philan
thropy. Here we see a reflection of Section Eighty-three
of the Anthropologie ("Von der Rachbegierde als Leidens-
chaft"). Section Forty-two, dealing with pride ("Der
7t^The Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science had
been published in 1786, as the first part of Kant's meta
physic of nature. The second part, which Kant considered
the culmination of his system, was apparently never com
pleted. See Stuckenberg's discussion of the problem,
op. cit., pp. 304-305.
7-*-The first indication of Kant's dissolution is in
the Preface, which degenerates into a polemical and self-
satisfied diatribe.
107
Hochmuth"), is clearly related to Anthropologie 85a
{"Ehrsucht"). And finally, Section 23, on the duties of
charity ("Von der Liebespflicht gegen andere Menschen")
reminds us of those portions of Section Eighty-five in
which the Anthropologie deals with das gute Gemttt in its
analysis of the person. We find that where these sections
are not simply repetitions of the same material, they
provide complementary aspects of the same topic.
Perhaps even more significant than these specific
points of similarity is the general pattern of the work
referred to by Erdmann. He mentions that a considerable
amount of material concerning the psychology of the will
and of feeling is to be found in the Metaphysic of Morals,
but that, above all, its manner of execution betrays its
anthropological o r i g i n s . ^2 Again, therefore, we find that
the moral philosophy of Kant was closely related with, and
strongly influenced by, his work in anthropology.
Since we are completing our consideration of Kant's
moral thought, it seems appropriate to discuss briefly its
essential character as seen in relation to human nature.
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of Kant's moral position
is its concentration on duty, and reverence for the moral
7 2
Reflexionen, I, p. 56,
108
law, as the only acceptable motive for Virtuous action.
Moral feeling, or sentiment, is rejected, and emotion is
deliberately avoided— as we saw in the second Critique.
Other men have felt that emotion is essential to ethical
theory,73 £>ut Kant maintains that this facet of human nature
can stand neither as a basis for ethics nor as a determining
factor in ethical decisions. Respect for moral law alone
can stand as the necessary and sufficient criterion for all
human acts. It is this "rigorous" formula which has caused
many writers to search deeply into Kant's past for hidden
sources of pessimism or scrupulosity.
A proper understanding of the work of Kant demands
that such genetic accounts of his ethics either be ignored
or explained away. Better still, a more thoughtful evalua
tion of the way in which Kant's position developed would
obviate such considerations altogether. The following
thoughts may serve that purpose.
There can be no doubt about the accomplishments of
the first of Kant's great works, the Critique of Pure
^Both the well known emotive theory of ethics, and
the ethical theory of Edmund Husserl demand a consideration
of the emotional aspect of man. A discussion of Husserl's
critique of Kant, involving this point, is presented in
Alois Roth's Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen (Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 37-51.
109
Reason. In laying the foundation for the metaphysical works
to follow/ it clearly established the limits of reason,
demonstrating that much which had formerly passed for
knowledge really had no objective claim to be called such.74
Human reason was restricted to knowledge of possible objects
of experience; but the moral order could not be contained
within this limit. It was the role of the second Critique
to demonstrate that pure practical reason, through the
recognition of the moral law as a fact of experience, could
establish the basis for an ethical system. But in the
given context, precisely what structure could the ethics
have, and how much certainty could it be accorded?
If the first Critique had sorely limited the powers
of reason, the second had similarly restricted the possi
bility for kinds of ethical system— for the only fact of
pure practical reason is the moral law itself.75 If, there
fore, Kant desired an ethical system in which one could have
7^we are concerned here not with what Kant actually
achieved, but rather with what he believed to be the accom
plishment of the work, and thus its role within his system.
75"m order to regard this law without any mis
interpretation as given, one must note that it is not an
empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason, which by
it proclaims itself as originating law (sic volo, sic
iubeo)." Schriften, V, p. 31. Beck trans., p. 143.
110
complete assurance, he could not use any other foundation
than the moral law itself. The addition of any empirical
(e.g., psychological) element would immediately deprive the
system of total validity.
There can be no doubt that Kant desired such
absolute certainty. Could his labor over the Critique of
Pure Reason possibly be regarded as anything other than the
demand of an intellect for complete precision and unity in
its investigation on the one hand, and apodictic certainty
with respect to its conclusions on the other? And his
intent to produce a system of morality which would tempt
even the mathematician surely implies that he would accept
nothing less than absolute validity. If the moral law is
the sole fact of pure reason, as we have just seen, then it
must also be the sole basis for Kant's ethical system.
But then we come to the question of motivation.
Christian moralists have often accused Kant of lacking a
true sense of morality because he did not recognize love
as a sufficient ethical motive. And there does seem to be
some truth in the notion that he regarded respect or esteem
more highly than love. In the Observations on the Feeling
of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant states that beauty
stimulates love, while the aublime engenders esteem
Ill
(Hochachtung). Then he goes on: "People in whom especially
the feeling for the beautiful rises seek their sincere,
steadfast, and earnest friends only in need, but choose
jesting, agreeable, and courteous companions for company.
He points out that there are many people whom we esteem too
highly to be able to love. For they inspire admiration, but
are too far above us for us to dare approach them with the
familiarity of love. And finally, "friendship has mainly
the character of-the sublime, but love between the sexes,
that of the beautiful. While nothing derogatory is said
regarding love, it seems clear that in the mind of Kant it
was always second best, and we can immediately realize why.
If what we have already said concerning the moral
law in Kant's thought is true, then it is just as impossible
for Kant to accept love as a moral motive as it was for him
to base his ethics on something other than the moral law.
For all forms of love are grounded in sensibility, and sensi
bility cannot provide an absolute morality. All sensibility
involves self-interest and, therefore, distracts the will
from the strict moral law.
^ S c h r i f t e n , n f p. 211. Goldthwait trans., p. 51.
^Ibid.
112
It will be recalled from the Anthropologie that
man's primary characteristics, from childhood on, lie in
some form of concern with the self. It is precisely this
self-interest which the moral law must overcome. In the
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant discusses the problem
at length, and concludes that the moral law deprives self-
love of its influence and self-conceit of its delusions.
By that means, "it increases the weight of the moral law
by removing, in the judgment of reason, the counterweight
to the moral law which bears on a will affected by the
sensibility."78 por this reason, Kant is able to conclude
that "respect for the law is not the incentive to morality;
it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an incentive
inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the
rival claims of self-love, gives authority and absolute
sovereignty to the l a w . "79
What Kant is saying in his system, then, is that,
given the restrictions of the first Critique, and the
realization that the moral law is the sole fact of pure
reason, if man wishes to be absolutely certain that he is
acting from pure motives, then the moral law must be the
7®Schriften, V, pp. 75-76.
basis, the incentive, and the guarantee of his morality.
It seems clear that such a guarantee is what Kant sought
all along— and within his system he could have come to no
other conclusion. The real source of Kant's rigor, then,
lies not in some obscure psychological influence, but in the
fact that he accepted human reason as the sufficient and,
in fact, the only satisfactory source of moral doctrine.
For reason alone provided the source and guide of his devel
oping system, and it alone was judged competent to estab
lish the destiny of man. Thus, man is seen as essentially
rational, in the strongest sense, and as we shall see later,
this conception of man dictated Kant's thought even with
respect to supernatural aspects of reality. But first we
must complete our consideration of the Critical Philosophy.
CHAPTER V
ANTHROPOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THIRD CRITIQUE
As the structure of the Critical Philosophy took on
a more mature form, Kant became concerned with a problem
which had not been fully realized at the time of the first
Critique— the necessity of a critical examination of the
faculty of judgment.^ It seems likely, in fact, that the
full measure of this flaw in the proposed system did not
become clear in Kant's mind until he began to work out the
details of his practical philosophy. For then Kant saw
that there was a gap between the speculative philosophy of
natural necessity and the practical philosophy of human
freedom. He therefore proposed a third critique, one which
would serve "as a means of combining the two parts of
1-Kant spoke earlier (1771) of his intention to
include in his work an investigation of "die Natur der
Geschmackslehre," but he could not then have realized the
full significance of the task. See Schriften, X, p. 117.
114
115
philosophy into a whole."2 That Kant should identify a
gap in the system with his own failure to consider suffi
ciently the specific nature of the powers of the mind, and
that the problem should be solved by a third critical
examination, the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790),
is again an assurance that Kant understood the mental
powers of man to constitute the most essential element of
human nature, and that he trusted completely the power of
reason to analyze human experience— even those aspects
which consist in its own activities and limitations.
Actually, it is rather obvious that Kant would
have realized the need for such a critique in an earlier
period. For, as he now makes clear, the faculty of judg
ment has to do with the feeling of pleasure and pain, and
the third Critique carries him into an analysis of the
beautiful and the sublime as they are related to cognition.
It seems, then, that at a certain point in his analysis of
cognition, Kant became fully aware of the intimate connec
tion between his current interest and the anthropological
investigations of an earlier period, such as the Observa
tions . We can be certain that much of the material
2Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 176.
Translation by J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1914), p. 14.
116
contained in the third Critique was not new to Kant.
Besides the Observations itself, we find that many particu
lars in the discussion of feeling, as well as all the
remarks on taste as it is related to genius, art, the
agreeable and the beautiful, et cetera, are taken directly
3
from the lectures on anthropology. Obviously, then, the
new critique implies that Kant achieved new insights into
the role of feeling and taste in human experience.
Various discussions of the Critique of Judgment
(as it is more commonly called) have attempted to determine
the precise implications of this work for Kant's Critical
Philosophy and, in particular, its significance with
respect to his conception of man. A consideration of the
findings of some of these commentators on the third
Critique should help us to establish its exact relation to
Kant's anthropology.
As we mentioned in Chapter III, Forrest Williams
has done a study which attempts to show an undercurrent in
Kant's work which implies a growing awareness on the part
of Kant of the role of anthropology in the Critical
Philosophy. Williams' discussion centers on the third
3Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 55.
117
Critique, and particularly on the "Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment." Several interesting points are raised in his
study.
To begin with, Williams distinguishes between the
"classical" interpretation of the role of the Critique of
Judgment in Kant's thought and a second view, which he
calls the "anthropological" interpretation. With refer
ence to the former, he says: "The Critique of Judgment,
on this view, is a link between the too-hastily severed
phenomenal and noumenar of the first Critique, between the
determinism of categorised nature and the freedom of ration
al activity of the second Critique." But in connecting
these two realms it does not "effect any radical transfor
mation of the initial Kantian philosophy. The anthro
pological view, on the other hand, would maintain that the
third Critique does constitute a radical change in the
Critical Philosophy, because of the introduction of the
notion of reflective judgment. Williams maintains that
"the emergence of reflective judgment in the philosophy of
Kant is not now the addition of a new mediating faculty,
but the transformation of a whole philosophy."^
^Williams, op. cit., p. 177.
^Ibid., p. 180.
118
Williams, of course, supports the anthropological
view, as the title of his article would lead us to expect
("Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment"). But when we recall what Kant said concerning
the function of the Critique of Judgment, and realize that
in his thought it provided not a radical transformation but,
rather, a necessary link, we are forced to conclude that Kant
must be placed among the "classicists." We cannot be cer
tain that Kant saw fully the importance of reflective judg
ment for his system, but neither can we dismiss his opinion
lightly. We must demand that Williams provide strong
support for his position.
As we have seen, Williams' chief concern is with the
reflective judgment, and in the system of Kant this is a
very special concept. "Judgment in general," Kant says,
"is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained
g
under the universal." That judgment which subsumes the
particular under a universal (rule, principle, or law) which
is already given is determinant. If, on the other hand,
only the particular is given for which the universal has to
^Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 179.
Bernard trans., pp. 17-18.
119
be found, the judgment is reflective.7
The reflective judgment, which is obliged to ascend
from the particular in nature to the universal
requires on that account a principle which it can
not borrow from experience, because its function is
to establish the unity of all empirical principles
under higher ones, and hence to establish the pos
sibility of their systematic subordination. Such a
transcendental principle, then, the reflective judg
ment can only give as a law from and to itself.8
Thus, the reflective judgment plays a unique role in the
Kantian scheme. It must derive its principles not from
experience, but from itself, and must impose them upon
experience.
In a detailed and scholarly analysis of reflective
judgment in the Critical Philosophy, Michel Souriau traces
the development in Kant's thought of this special kind
of judgment. Souriau points out that the Analogies of
Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason contains the first
indication of the significance of a discovering judgment.
For in the Analogies, judgment brings what are otherwise
merely temporal modes--those of permanence, succession, and
coexistence— into categorial form— inherence, causality,
and community— by means of schemata.9 These principles are
7Ibid. 8Ibid.
Q
Le Jugement Reflechissant dans la Phrlosophie
Critique de Kant (Paris: Alcan, 1926), pp. 15-16.
120
regulative rather than constitutive, and Souriau feels that
this constitutes an implicit appeal to the faculty of judg
ment in preference to the understanding. He suggests,
therefore, that this development is a foreshadowing of the
reflective judgment.^ In the same way, Souriau points to
the regulative character of the Modal principles in contrast
to the principles of Quantity and Quality.
After thus showing certain implications for his
analysis in the relation of elements in the first Critique,
Souriau goes on to show the gradual development of the func
tion of judgment as the Critical Philosophy progresses.
Judgment is found to take upon itself functions which had
at first been connected with reason's service to the under
standing, while reason becomes progressively purified of
dialectical activities for the sake of effective moral
activities. The faculty of judgment is gradually enhanced
and, finally, in the third Critique, reflective judgment
turns out to be precisely the acquisition by judgment of
the hypothetical, regulative, and teleological functions
which, in the first Critique, reason had exercized with
10Ibid., pp. 25-26.
121
respect to the principles of the understanding.H
Our brief summary of Souriau's thought in no sense
does justice to his work— it especially loses the impact
of his argument through neglect of its carefully detailed
presentation. But even so inadequate a summary reveals the
significance of Williams' claim that the anthropological
implications of Kant's thought, which center in the
Critique of Judgment, can be seen as an undercurrent which
moves through the development of the entire Critical Philo
sophy .
Williams centers his attention almost entirely on
the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," and we shall follow
him through his analysis. Consequent upon the two inter
pretations of the third Critique— the classicist, and the
anthropological— Williams finds that there are "two senses
in which it contains or implies a philosophical anthro
pology. "12 The classicist, he feels, would be forced to
admit that there is a sense in which the Critique of
Judgment brings into focus the nature of the Kantian Sub
ject. "This is clear merely from the general context in
ll-For the full presentation of this argument, see
pages 15-34 of Souriau's work.
l^williams, op. cit., p. 183.
122
which a reflective judgment is even c o n c e i v a b l e . " ^ For
the transcendental subject of the first Critique "neither
needs, nor is capable of, judgmental reflection, since it
merely determines the form and type of experience. Its
only reflexivity lies in empty analytic procedures." In
turning to the third Critique, however, the classicist must
find that "Kant has now turned his gaze away from forms and
categories exhibited in actual knowledge, and toward the
character of the knowing subject."!4
Williams' basis for this statement is presented very
briefly, but it has merit. "The context of reflective
judgment in the third Critique," he finds, "is that of
bringing the particular intuitive manifold into specific
conceptual unity." Therefore, the notion of reflective
judgment expresses, in the third Critique, precisely the
a priori possibility of knowledge which the determinant
judgment expressed in the first Critique. But now judgment
functions in an anticipatory context, rather than in the
retrospective context of the earlier work. However, given
this new context of reflective judgment, what are the
implications for its subject-matter?
l^Ibid.f p. 184.
14Ibid.
123
Certainly we are not now talking about the phenome
nally conceived empirical ego of the first Critique, for
such a conception is by definition incapable of validating
an a priori faculty. Nor can our subject be the trans
cendental ego of the first Critique, for a bare unity of
apperception cannot explain the concrete process in which
it is achieved. "We conclude that we are talking about the
Kantian Subject in the third Critique in a sense which com
bines both the concreteness of the empirical ego and the
transcendental nature of reason."^ Therefore, Williams
concludes, because of its significance for every human
being, "this new context of reflective judgment seems to
demand the title: universal human nature.
Even the classicist must follow him this far,
Williams feels, but contemporary views of philosophical
anthropology demand a great deal more. "The 'philosophical
anthropology' which emerges from the classicist interpreta
tion, in short, is an insight into the pattern of the
'normal thinker' whose judgmental capacity is identical
with the perfect functioning of his sensibility and under
standing." In other words, the human subject of the third
15Ibid. 16Ibid., p. 185.
124
Critique reveals our essential humanity when everything is
going well, "when we are successfully occupied in acquiring
knowledge and practising morality with the aid of reason."I7
More than that the classicist view cannot support.
A true philosophical anthropology, on the other
hand, "would afford a concrete insight into human nature
which is normative rather than psychological without being
limited to the mere acknowledgement of a certain minimum
interrelationship of a priori capacities. And this con
crete, normative concept of human nature, Williams main
tains, is rather obvious in the third Critique, if one
considers the proper sections. The classicist must shift
his view from the "Analytic of the Beautiful" to the "Cri
tique of Aesthetic Judgment." For in the former, reflective
judgment is merely regulative— is nothing more than an
enlargement of the determinant judgment: "Instead of sub
suming this or that intuition of sense under a concept of
the understanding, reflective judgment places the entire
faculty of sensibility in the service of the entire faculty
of understanding."19 However, the Critique of Aesthetic
17Ibid.
■^Ibid,
18Ibid.
125
Judgment provides a much richer context for reflective
judgment, and a more satisfactory conception of human
nature. "Reflective judgment, by its association with the
sublime, with art, and finally with the aesthetic ideas of
the genius, brings a transforming vitality into the com
paratively abstract, mechanical Subject of the earlier
philosophy.
The beginning of the development of Kant's radically
new position, Williams points out, is evident in the dis
satisfaction which Kant manifests toward the "Deduction of
the Beautiful" and the "Exposition of the Sublime" as final
answers to the problem of the valid ground of aesthetic
predication. As evidence of this dissatisfaction, Souriau
notes that the third Critique is structurally different
from the other two. In the first and second Critiques,
Kant first provides an Exposition to present the facts,
then a Deduction to establish the facts and the limits of
their intelligibility, and finally a Dialectic in which
antinomies are resolved by means of the distinctions now
available. In the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant
returns after the Exposition and Deduction to a new set of
^Ibid. , p. 181.
126
facts— those of art— which finally refer the proper solution
to the Dialectic, after the development of the essential
notions of "genius," and "aesthetic idea."21
Williams see this change in structure as indicative
of a significant shift in Kant's whole position.
Kant adopted the course of viewing reflective judg
ment concretely and non-theoretically, that is, as
constitutive of feeling, rather than merely regula
tive for knowledge. This is tantamount to introduc
ing an anthropological postulate, for constitutive
for feeling which is universal implies a depth-
structure of humanity which is, let us not forget,
an individual possession or potentiality and not
merely an abstract presupposition of s c i e n c e .22
Kant begins to reveal the elements of this universal struc
ture of the human subject in his discussion of taste as a
kind of sensus communis. There he tells us that we must
include under the sensus communis "a faculty of judgment
which, in its reflection, takes account (a priori) of the
mode of representation of all other men in its thought."
By this means, the faculty is able "to compare its judgment
with the collective Reason of humanity," and thus avoid
subjective i l l u s i o n . 23 Developing out of this sensus
communis, Williams sees a chain which leads to the concrete
21souriau, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
^Williams, op. cit., p. 185.
23schriften, V, p. 293. Bernard trans., p. 170.
127
Kantian subject.
Kant's reason for introducing fine arts into his
investigation, Williams maintains, is perfectly clear if we
accept the theory that his thought is now oriented toward
the human subject. For "if satisfaction of taste is con
sidered in the context of the arts, which are human crea
tions, its origin cannot be regarded as merely gratuitous
or as a matter of 'natural teleology.'" Rather, we see that
satisfaction of taste in this context "must indicate a
normative ground in humanity of a sort no less intricate
and subtle than art itself."2^ in other words, we are
referred by art to a "fundamentum of nature," but not to
the nature of Newton. Rather, we are referred to "a human
nature with its own ways of functioning which attains uni
versal significance apart from conceptual understanding.
This new philosophical acquisition is summed up under the
title of genius. "25
Next, Williams points out that the aesthetic ideas
of genius preserve the hybrid character— of concrete pleni
tude and universal significance— which the Kantian subject
2^Williams, op. cit., p. 186.
25Ibid.
128
assumes as genius, or as human nature functioning as artis
tic creator. Because its universality consists "precisely
in the distinctions which i_t spontaneously makes between
valid and invalid determination of materials," the faculty
of aesthetic ideas cannot be merely "a spacio-temporal
sensibility receiving the impress of transcendental cate
gories."^ Thus aesthetic ideas provide an extraordinary
combination of concrete particularity with respect to mate
rial, and universality with respect to form. It is on the
basis of the faculty of aesthetic ideas that the final links
are formed in Williams' chain of thought. For it is within
that framework that Kant presents his antinomy of taste,
and resolves it on the basis of "the supersensible sub-
o 7
strate of humanity." This substrate, which serves as the
determining ground of aesthetic judgment, is the concept
toward which Williams had been working, and it provides an
impressive culmination to his argument.
On the basis of his findings, Williams feels justi
fied in concluding that Kant would have to look to various
forms of art for the data required to fill out this
26Ibid.
2^Schriften, V, p. 340. Bernard trans., p. 233.
129
incomplete conception of the concrete subject. Not that
philosophy would take on an artistic form, but it would
gather from art the basic material indicative of "expres
sive normative structures," by which a truly philosophic
anthropology could be enriched.
The argument which Williams presents is actually
insufficiently developed. One feels that he has done
little more than outline the form which the argument would
have to take in pursuing the subtle thread of thought
through the works of Kant. However, if, with Williams, we
prescind from the question of whether Kant was aware of the
new direction which his thought had taken, and the implica
tions which the change might involve,2® we must certainly
agree that his point is worth serious consideration. If
Kant, in his later work, was actually moving away from the
abstract subject of the first Critique, which was hardly
more than the bare unity of apperception, and toward a more
concrete conception of man as necessarily involving a rich,
aesthetic dimension, there would certainly be implications
for our investigation of the influence of anthropology on
2®Williams explicitly avoids involvement in the
controversy which such considerations would necessitate.
Williams, op. cit., p. 174.
130
his work. And it seems clear, even from Williams abbrevi
ated presentation, that Kant's concept of man was enriched
in the Critique of Judgment. Our problem, then, will be to
relate the work of Williams to our own investigation.
It will prove useful to our argument to set aside
briefly the line of thought which Williams has provided,
and to consider the three major works of the Critical
Philosophy in their mutual interrelations as parts of an
entire system. We have already seen that the Critique of
Pure Reason, while of monumental significance in its own
right, is nonetheless a propaedeutic to other aspects of
the system, and, as such, could not be expected to trans
gress the boundaries of its own purpose. If, then, we find
that the first Critique provides "only" an abstract trans
cendental subject, we can hardly raise an objection, since
that is precisely what the context demands.
In moving to the Critique of Practical Reason, we
find that the subject has been expanded to include a moral
dimension. The moral subject of the second Critique is, of
course, still an abstraction— but again we find that the
limits of the work could permit no other. The second
Critique is an examination of pure practical reason, and
it would be out of place to include the empirical aspects
131
2Q
of the subject, even with respect to the moral order. 3
Nonetheless, the entire presentation of this work makes it
clear that, for Kant, the moral dimension increases tre
mendously the value of the subject which is gradually
emerging from the critical maze. In fact, the moral law
alone can provide the context within which man stands as
an end in himself. Without morality, man would have to be
seen as an insignificant aspect of the phenomenal world, or
an abortive and self-contradictory postulate of the
noumenal order. The essential contribution of the second
Critique to the Kantian subject is, therefore, incontest
able .
The Critique of Judgment, in turn, provides an
element which was appropriate to neither of the first two
Critiques. Here we find the presentation of the intellec
tual framework within which man can function as an aesthe
tic entity. We have not entirely lost our abstract sub
ject, because Kant is still dealing with the critical
analysis of pure cognitive faculties, and the third
Critique must be recognized as an examination of the pure
2^Kant does discuss the role of happiness in the
highest end of man, but it should be noted that even in this
context he is careful to restrict himself to the abstract
consideration of man in general.
132
power of judgment, i.e., that aspect of judgment which is
legislative a priori.30 Again, however, it is necessary to
realize that the technical analysis which Kant pursues is
only for the purpose of establishing the rational foundation
which will permit the presentation of man as an aesthetic
subject. This dimension opens up to the subject— previously
restricted to factual knowledge and a moral imperative--the
entire world of value experience which makes human existence
rich and meaningful.31
What we have said in this brief consideration of
the three Critiques undoubtedly accords roughly with what
Williams has called the anthropology of the classicist
interpretation of Kant's work. Therefore, his objection at
this point would have to be identical to that which he
raised concerning the classicist view. He felt that the
Kantian subject as it could be formulated under such an
interpretation would only be an ideal subject, neatly
^ Schriften, v, p. 179. Bernard trans., p. 17.
O 1
AWe must admit, of course, that moral value had
already entered Kant's scheme in the Critique of Practical
Reason, but the analogy which he draws between the judgment
of taste and the moral judgment (Critique of Judgment,
Schriften, V, p. 301; Bernard trans., pp. 179-80) leads us
to believe that he saw the third Critique as confirming the
second, just as he saw the second Critique as confirming
the first (Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V, p. 6;
Beck trans., p. 121).
133
structured, but lacking real content— in short, insuffi
ciently concrete.
The first response which must be made to Williams'
objection should now be quite obvious. As a result of the
three Critiques, each of which deals with an aspect of the
pure cognitive faculties, no conception of a concrete sub
ject could possibly be formulated. Empirical content of any
sort would have to be restricted to an inessential role in
this three-fold investigation of pure reason. While the
subject was gradually given new dimensions as the Critical
Philosophy progressed, these were the dimensions of a
critically founded rational subject— fit for the reception
of concrete determinations, but not as yet so specified.
Our first response to Williams' objection, then, is that to
look for a concrete subject emerging from the third Critique
is to seek in it what Kant, by definition, has specifically
excluded from its purview.
But we cannot be content with so negative a
rejoinder, for Williams' work involves an intricate pattern
of thought which is extremely suggestive. It deserves a
more positive consideration. In fact, whatever shortcomings
we find in the work may be seen to stem from one essential
difficulty: the perspective from which Kant's anthropology
134
is viewed. From the analysis which we have provided of
Williams' article, it should be clear that nothing of
Kant's work has been considered by him except the three
Critiques. What Williams has done, therefore, is to write
an article on Kant's conception of human nature without
considering any of the anthropological works in which Kant
explicitly deals with the topic. Consequently, his accusa
tion that Kant failed to achieve a conception of a concrete
human nature is based on a neglect of those works in which
Kant presented the empirical details of human existence.
It would be extremely interesting to see what additional
conclusions might have been forthcoming if Williams had
broadened his perspective, and considered Kant's work as
a whole.
It might be suggested, for example, that Kant did
provide the appropriate development of his conception of
human nature after the three Critiques had established the
theoretical basis for such a presentation. The Anthropolo-
gie would, of course, constitute the primary contribution
toward that end. But we have already noted the inadequacy
of the Anthropologie, even as a representation of Kant's
earlier lectures. It would not be unreasonable, then, to
assume that whatever significance the work should have
135
embodied for the Kantian system was lost through the
incapacity of the aging philosopher.
If we are correct in seeing a gradual development
of Kant's conception of man as a well-defined entity in
the Critical Philosophy as it unfolded, it would then be
extraordinary if Kant did not complete the project by add
ing empirical aspects, such as a political or social view
of man— areas with which Kant was very much concerned.
Several of his later works must certainly have been intended
to serve that purpose. On the other hand, since Kant does
not take up the line of thought which Williams sees implied
in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, we can only conclude
that Kant failed to grasp the implications of his work, or
that he explicitly repudiated them.
In either case, it would be legitimate to assume
that if Kant was interested in anthropology— and we have
seen that he certainly was— then he must have had a differ
ent conception of anthropology than that proposed by
Williams, and must have followed a procedure in working it
out which Williams does not recognize. The distinction
between the views of Kant and those of Williams is worth
noting.
It must be clearly seen that there is an important
136
difference between the purpose and implications of
Williams' work, and that in which we are currently engaged.
For the major thesis of Williams' work seems to be that
there is a certain view of man implied by the material of
the third Critique, and that this conception of the human
subject is the product of a growing awareness on the part
of Kant of the role of anthropology in his work. On this
view, anthropology is a subtle force which moves as an under
current through the work of Kant, and finally emerges as a
conscious concern only very late in the development of the
Critical Philosophy.
The present study, on the other hand, presumes— on
the basis of sound evidence— that Kant was explicitly con
cerned with anthropology throughout the period in which the
Critical Philosophy took form. In fact, we feel that
anthropology should be seen as the motivational element
behind the critical works, and the stabilizing force which
guided their development. Certainly we have seen that each
of the three Critiques was strongly influenced by Kant's
anthropological work. But we must leave the elaboration
of this theme to its proper place in our conclusion. Our
concern here is with the difference between Williams'
conception of anthropology, and that of Kant.
137
Because Williams views Kant's anthropology as an
emerging awareness, it is easy for him to identify Kant's
thought— or at least its implications— with contemporary
analyses of human subjectivity. He sees the Kantian subject
as taking on depth and character, and beginning to resemble
the complex, creative subject of existentialist anthropol
ogy. In his article, Williams maintains that an investiga
tion of creativity holds the key to the awareness of man's
ultimate structure which the philosophical anthropologist
is seeking.
There is good reason to believe that Kant would be
amused with such an inquiry, though he would undoubtedly
have recognized it as useful in its own way. As a philoso
phical anthropology, however, it could only prove grossly
inadequate. We may be sure that Kant felt his critical
work to constitute the foundation for an analysis of human
subjectivity— he was not humble in his conception of his
own achievements. And any additional elaboration of the
basic subject would have to be an elaboration of the three
Critiques. To that extent he would commend Williams'
efforts. But he would find it incomprehensible to confine
one's investigation of man to subjectivity, when the over
arching perspective of man's position in reality is so much
138
more important. Kant's view of reality is essentially
hierarchical, and his understanding of man is vitally con
nected with the position man holds in this hierarchy. A
complete awareness of man, Kant would maintain, must involve
the objective, as well as the subjective, side of his
nature. A truly normative anthropology must consider not
merely what capacities man displays, but rather the role
which he has been given in reality, and the consequent
capacities which he must exercise to fill that role.
Whether he was right or wrong in his view, that is
certainly the conception of anthropology to which Kant sub
scribed. We need only recall the passage quoted above:
"If there is any science which man really needs, it is the
one I teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in
creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able
to learn what one must be in order to be a man." Emphasiz
ing his point, Kant continues:
Granted that he may have become acquainted with
deceptive allurements above him or below him, which
have unconsciously enticed him away from his distinct
station, then this teaching will lead him back again
to the human level, and however small or deficient he
may regard himself, he will suit his assigned station,
because he will be just what he should be.32
■^Hartenstein edition, VIII, pp. 624-25.
139
From this statement, we may conclude two things concerning
Kant's anthropology. There can be no doubt, first of all,
that Kant felt himself to have developed a complete view of
man, one which could serve to orient man properly in rela
tion to all aspects of experience. But, secondly, it is
clear also that Kant's anthropology involves more than a
subjective analysis of man's various faculties. It includes,
as well, a complete, hierarchical view of reality, in which
man's place is clearly defined. For a proper perspective on
this complete conception of man, we must include Kant's
religious thought, and that shall be our next consideration.
CHAPTER VI
KANT'S RATIONAL RELIGION
The extent to which Kant's awareness of the powers
and limitations of man molded his thought is strikingly
brought to light in his works on religion. As we have
already seen, religion does not provide Kant with the
foundation of his moral theory. In typical unorthodox
fashion, Kant has reversed the ordinary relation of these
disciplines, and has based his entire religious position
on his moral doctrine and, in particular, on the moral
nature of man.
In several of his works, and especially in the
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had occasion to discuss
possible proofs for the existence of God. In every case,
he found it necessary to reject any proof from the natural
order-*- and, in spite of his personal religious convictions,
1-With respect to the teleological proof, of course,
he says: "This proof always deserves to be mentioned with
respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most
accordant with the common reason of mankind." Critique of
Pure Reason, A 623, B 651. NKS 520. But we will discuss
this matter further in Chapter VII.
140
. . - 141
such rejections troubled him not at all. In fact, as he
points out in one place, such a proof would be of little
value. For even if the concept of an original Being could
be established by a purely theoretical path, i.e., the
concept of it as a mere cause of nature,
it would afterward be very difficult— perhaps
impossible without arbitrary interpolation— to
ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs a
causality in accordance with moral laws; and yet
without this that quasi-theological concept could
furnish no foundation for religion.2
Kant, therefore, approaches the matter from the aspect of
morality.
Our earlier investigation of Kant's ethics leaves
no room for doubt that consciousness of moral law is a most
vital element in his thought— it is an absolute fact of
pure practical reason upon which we can base the entire
3
system of morality. And it is on this same base that Kant
builds the framework of his religious thought. The corner
stone of this additional structure is the concept of the
2
Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 481.
Bernard trans., p. 423. Kant defines religion here as
"the recognition of our duties as divine commands."
^Because of the seminal position of morality in
Kant's thought, one might say with equal validity that it
is on the consciousness of the moral law that Kant builds
his whole philosophy.
142
highest good: the morally rational ideal of the complete
and perfect goal of human life.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant points
out that man as an individual is unable to attain perfec
tion in this world; for the supreme condition of the highest
good is the complete fitness of intentions to the moral law,
and this involves a degree of perfection which is impossible
for a rational being in the world of sense. But if this
condition cannot be satisfied, then the highest good cannot
be attained, and that would be absurd; for the moral law
commands us to promote the highest good. It must therefore
be possible to meet this condition. But we can conceive
it as possible "only in an endless progress to that complete
fitness; on principles of pure practical reason, it is
necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real
object of our will."^ But such a progress is possible only
if we presuppose the infinitely enduring existence and per
sonality of the same rational being— what is normally
referred to as the immortality of the soul. "Thus the
highest good is practically possible only on the supposition
of the immortality of the soul, and the latter, as insepar
ably bound to the moral law, is a postulate of pure
4
Schrrften, V, p. 122. Beck trans., pp. 225-26.
143
practical reason."5 Kant finds it possible, then, through
the concept of immortality, for man to achieve virtue— but
that would still not be the full realization of the highest
good.
In order to achieve that ultimate state (the shar
ing in the summum bonum in the intelligible world), both
virtue and happiness are required: the former is moral
worth attained through obedience to the moral law; the
latter, "the condition of a rational being in the world in
whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and
/ ■
will." Virtue, of course, is the more important of the
two. Kant still maintains that man must do his duty out of
pure respect for the moral law rather than from an inclina
tion toward satisfying the self or attaining happiness.
But, while virtue is the supreme good, it is not the com
plete and perfect good. For man's conception of the highest
human good requires happiness as well as virtue. Such hap
piness would, in a rational moral world, correspond to the
degree of virtue— always being subordinate to virtue— and
at the same time would constitute a perfect whole with
5Ibid.
^Schriften, V, p. 124. Beck trans., p. 227.
Man requires this conception of the highest good in
order that he be assured of the systematic order of the
universe in accordance with moral purposes. As T. M.
Greene expresses it:
Unless man can be assured by faith in the Summum
Bonum that he is living under a just moral order and
can thus be saved from inhibiting fear that virtue
itself may in the end be of no avail, he has not the
heart to exert himself to the performance of duty.8
But how is this combination of virtue and happiness
to be attained? Virtue is attained by acts of the will, but
happiness depends upon the order of things in the world of
nature as well. And the causality of nature is of a
different order. "Hence there is not the slightest ground
in the moral law for a necessary connection between the
^"Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together consti
tutes the possession of the highest good for one person, and
happiness in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a
person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a
possible world, the highest good means the whole, the per
fect good, wherein virtue is alwasy the supreme good, being
the condition having no condition superior to it, while hap
piness, though something always pleasant to him who possesses
it, is not itself absolutely good in every respect, but
always presupposes conduct in accordance with the moral law
as its condition." Schriften, V, pp. 110-11. Beck trans.,
p. 215.
O
See Greene's introduction to Kant's Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M.
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (Chicago: Open Court Publish
ing Co., 1934), lvii.
145
morality and proportionate happiness of a being which
belongs to the world as one of its parts and as thus
dependent on it."^ But in the practical order of things,
in which man is commanded to strive for the highest good,
such a condition is a necessary postulate: we should seek
to further the highest good, therefore it must at least be
possible. "Therefore also the existence is postulated of a
cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature,
which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happi
ness with morality."-*-®
In Kant's view, then, the highest good is possible
only on the supposition that there is a supreme cause of
nature in which there is causality corresponding to the
moral intention. But that would imply two things: A
being which is able to act in accordance with the idea of
laws is an intelligence, or a rational being; and secondly,
in such a being, the causality according to laws is his
will. "Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, in so far as
it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being
which is a cause (and consequently the author) of nature
^Schriften, V, p. 124. Beck trans., p. 228.
•^Schriften, V, p. 125. Beck trans., p. 228.
146
through understanding and will, i.e., God."11 Thus, if we
accept the dictates of the moral law, and the possibility
of their fulfillment, we must accept the existence of God.
Kant completes his argument: "As a consequence, the
postulate of the possibility of a highest derived good
(the best world) is at the same time the postulate of the
reality of a highest original good, namely, the existence
of God."12
For Kant, then, the concepts of immortality and
of God are necessary in order to guarantee, respectively,
virtue and happiness, the two ingredients of the highest
good. Kant is careful to point out here that, on the
basis of this argument, it is morally necessary to assume
the existence of God, and thus it is a subjective need
rather than an objective duty.11 But moral necessity is
quite sufficient for Kant's purpose— establishing the
reality of God and of the immortality of the soul for the
moral order.
Kant affirms strongly that this moral proof for the
existence of God is superior to any other possible form.
11Schriften, V, p. 125. Beck trans., p. 228.
12Ibid. 13Ibid.
147
And he gives good reasons to support his contention. He
points out, for instance, that if a theoretical argument
were to be used to establish the existence of God, it would
then be necessary to adjust morals in accordance with
theology. ^ We can readily see that such a state of
affairs would be impossible for Kant to accept, since it
would undermine the internal, necessary legislation of
reason, and completely upset the Kantian system of morality.
But the reason which Kant gives for rejecting such a proce
dure is that it would ultimately undermine religion itself.
He points out that, in such a system, "whatever is defec
tive in our insight into the nature of this Being must
extend to ethical precepts, and thus make religion immoral
and perverted."15
Since Kant's efforts in the first Critique were
explicitly directed toward convincing us that man's knowl
edge is restricted to the realm of possible sense experience,
it is not surprising that he expresses very little opinion
concerning the nature of God, or of the future state of man.
^ Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 460.
Bernard trans., p. 394.
15Ibid.
148
Regarding the latter, he said at one time: "We know nothing
of the future, and we ought not to seek to know more than
what is rationally bound up with the incentives of morality
and their end."16 In his lectures on the philosophy of
religion, however, Kant indicated that he did not think that
man should expect a radical change in the next life.
"Rather, experience of his state on earth and the ordering
of nature in general gives him clear proofs that his moral
deterioration . . . as well as his moral improvement . . .
will continue endlessly, i.e., eternally."1^ But Kant
makes no attempt to extend this observation.
Because of the manner in which he arrives at the
postulation of the existence of God, however, Kant is able
to say slightly more about the nature of God. In order to
fulfill the role of guarantor of the highest good, He must
be moral, so as to make the coordination of virtue and
happiness possible; He must be intelligent, or capable of
conceiving laws, both natural and moral; He must be endowed
with a will capable of acting according to an ideal, both
^ Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
Schriften, VI, pp. 161n. Greene-Hudson trans., p. 149n.
-^Vorlesungen fiber philosophische Religionslehre
[ed. K. H. L. Pfllitz] (Leipzig: Carl Friedrich Franz,
1817), p. 150.
149
for the creation of the world, and for the achievement of
the highest good. On the basis of these properties,
necessary to the concept of God as postulated, other
properties can be determined as logically implied corre
lates. For in considering the concept of God in relation
to the object of practical reason, we find that the moral
principle admits the highest good as possible only under
the presupposition of an author of the world having the
highest perfection.
This Being must be omniscient, in order to be able
to know my conduct even to the most intimate parts
of my intention in all possible cases and in the
entire future. In order to allot fitting conse
quences to it, He must be omnipotent, and similar
ly omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law,
by the concept of the highest good as the object
of a pure practical reason, defines the concept of
the First Being as that of a Supreme Being.18
And this awareness of a supreme being, Kant emphasizes
again, cannot be achieved through .a consideration of
physical causality, or any of the speculative procedures
of reason.
Kant sees great value in the fact that reason can
not attain to ideas of the supersensible except through its
18Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V,
p. 140. Beck trans., p. 242.
150
practical, moral application. For this limitation prevents
man from carrying theology into theosophy— "transcendent
concepts which confound reason"— or from falling into
demonology--"an anthropomorphic way of representing the
highest being." At the same time, it prevents religion
from becoming theurgy--"a fanciful belief that we can have
a feeling of other supersensible beings and can reciprocally
influence them"— or degenerating into idolatry— "a super
stitious belief that we can please the Supreme Being by
other means than by a moral sentiment."19
But while practical reason guards us against such
distortions, man is ever subject to the tendency to give
content to his conception of God, and this tendency, if
not carefully guarded, can also undermine morality. There
fore, Kant carefully defines the few properties which must
be posited of God in His relation to man. Naturally,
Kant's choice is of strictly moral properties. God, he
tells us, "is the only holy, the only blessed, and the only
wise being, because these concepts of themselves imply
unlimitedness. By the arrangement of these He is thus the
19Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 459.
Bernard trans., p. 393.
151
holy lawgiver (and creator) , the beneficent ruler (and
sustainer) , and the just j u d g e . " ^ 0 These attributes, Kant
assures us, contain everything in virtue of which God is
the object of religion. Naturally, he feels that man
should not concern himself with attributes of God which are
not appropriate to God as the object of religion; for such
properties can have no practical significance for man, and
speculation concerning them is useless.
The strictness of Kant's position is moderated some
what in his lectures on religion. We find him saying that
while we should "in theory" carefully purify our conception
of God of all anthropomorphic encrustations, "one may,
from a practical consideration, think to oneself and repre
sent to others such predicates (as God's immortality, i.e.,
His eternity) in human fashion, if the idea of God thereby
attains to a greater power and strength for our morality."21
Human motivation thus takes on more significance when Kant's
statements are directed to an actual audience. We even find
him saying to his students that the postulate of God is
essential to morality, "for otherwise all the subjectively
20
Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V,
p. 131n. Beck trans., p. 233n.
^ Vorlesungen uber die philosophische Religions-
lehre, p. 156.
152
necessary duties which I am under obligation as a rational
being to perform lose their objective reality." Here,
morality for its own sake is temporarily forgotten. "Why
should I make myself worthy of happiness by means of moral
conduct if there exists no Being who can secure me this
happiness?"22 And, at another time, "if morality can offer
me no prospect that my need to be happy will be satisfied,
neither can it command me."23 These remarks are very much
unlike the more cautious formulation of the written works.
Yet, on the basis of these explicit statements in his lec
tures, Kant has been accused of hedonism for placing virtue
in a merely instrumental relation to h a p p i n e s s .24 such a
conclusion does not seem warranted.
If, however, we are interested in mentioning excep
tions to Kant's customary pattern of thought, we certainly
must consider the Opus Postumum. For in his closing years,
Kant went precisely to the opposite extreme. He then
decided that his ethical proof for the existence of God was
unsatisfactory, and took up the difficult task of redefin
ing his faith in God, and of attempting to establish it on a
22Ibid., p. 129. 23Ibid., p. 199.
2^See T. M. Green's accusations, op. cit.,
p. lxiii.
153
firmer foundation.25 Adickes maintains that Kant's primary
reason for making this radical change was the desire to
eliminate from his ethical system whatever elements of
heteronomy and hedonism had come into it through his doc
trine of the highest g o o d . 26 t 0 achieve that end, Kant
returned to a strict interpretation of man's relation to the
moral law, emphasizing that man must act solely out of
regard for the categorical command of practical reason, and
for no external end whatever. Man may, however, as a reli
gious person, recognize "that the ideals and ends which he
has himself chosen, and the laws which he has himself
imposed, are also God's ideals, ends, and laws, and through
this recognition his motives to do good are appreciably
strengthened."27 Any mention of happiness, however, would
be out of place in Kant's later work. Thus, we see him
reacting in the Opus Postumum to errors which may have
arisen from the rather lenient formulation of his position
in a few exceptional statements in the lectures. But
2^see Appendix C, Kemp Smith Commentary (2nd ed.,
1923), for a summary of Kant's various attempts in the
Opus Postumum to relate God to the moral law. This appen
dix is not in the first edition.
26see Adickes' discussion of Kant's changed posi
tion, Kant's Opus Postumum, ed. Erich Adickes, Kant-Studien,
L (1920), pp. 846-49.
27ibid.
154
neither of these two extremes represent the more widely
recognized moral teaching of Kant.
It is safe to say that Kant's general conception of
the relation between God and man is essentially expressed
in the passage from the Critique of Practical Reason cited
above: God is the holy lawgiver, the beneficent ruler, and
the just judge. Here the relationship is perfectly
expressed in neat, legalistic language which, better than
anything else, aptly characterizes Kant's religious thought.
For in this relationship man can only be the receiver of
laws, the ruled, and the judged. Because God is for Kant
solely a postulate of practical reason, there is no basis
for adopting toward Him an attitude of worship or love, as
between persons.28 Religion, therefore is almost reduced
to morality.
The word 'almost' is important here, for many
authors blatantly accuse Kant of completely identifying
religion and morality. Rosenkranz, for example, says that
"Kant fell into the one-sidedness of absorbing religion in
^The term 'awe' which Kant employs in this context
is undoubtedly the best to express his attitude of religion.
155
morality."2^ And somewhat later: "Now if religion is
entirely absorbed by morality, then the relation of man to
God as a personal Being ceases. He may believe in God;
morality does not forbid this. But it is superfluous. It
is not necessary." According to Rosenkranz, then, Kant
has deprived man of God in the traditional sense. "Consci
ence is his God. The most essential thing is the conception
of the highest good, of the categorical imperative, of the
maxim.But this kind of statement only emphasizes the
degree to which Kant's thought can be misinterpreted; for
while part of what is said here is true, more is either
misleading, or explicitly false.
Kant leaves himself open to such criticism when he
speaks of religion as "morals in reference to God as legis
lator.""^ If the statement is taken literally, it would
reduce religion to a sub-category of morality— an appropri
ate arrangement for a system in which the very existence of
^ Immanuel Kant's sammtliche Werke, ed. Karl
Rosenkranz and Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert (12 vols.;
Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838-42), XII, p. 202.
3QIbid., p. 253.
2^-Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 460.
Bernard trans., p. 394.
156
God is a postulate based on the fact of morality. At the
very least, it is clear in Kant's discussion of ethics that
morality depends solely upon man's consciousness of the
moral law, never in any sense upon r e l i g i o n . 32 But the
emphatic statements of Rosenkranz fail to take into con
sideration many other aspects of Kant's thought.
The error in Rosenkranz' position is made obvious
by an examination of any of Kant's major works. The con
cluding chapters of each of the three Critiques deal
explicitly with man's religious aspirations, and it is
clear from Kant's discussion in each work that he is
vitally concerned to establish religious values on a firm
foundation. Nor can it be consistently maintained that
these religious values are reducible to pure morality.
In many places it is clearly expressed that reli
gion is something added to morality— something which adds
greatly to the significance of morality. In the second
Critique, Kant says that morality is not really the doc
trine of how to make ourselves happy, "but of how we are to
be worthy of happiness. Only if religion is added to it
can the hope arise of someday participating in happiness in
32por an especially clear and uncompromising state
ment of this position, see Lectures on Ethics, p. 81.
157
proportion as we endeavored not to be unworthy of it."33
In the Lectures on Ethics, , he says: "Morality as such is
ideal, but religion imbues it with vigour, beauty, and
reality."34 Kant makes it clear, moreover, that the rela
tion between morality and religion is not merely one of
convenience to make the former palatable. Wherever he dis
cusses the two disciplines, he emphasizes that morality
leads necessarily to religion.33
Kant's conception of religion, then, is vital to
his thought— but it is never permitted to assume importance
apart from morality. It seems obvious to Kant that nothing
glorifies God more than that which is most treasured in the
world: "respect for His command, the observance of sacred
duty which His law imposes on us, when there is added to
this His glorious plan of crowning such an excellent order
with corresponding happiness."33 The rigor of Kant's per
sonal ethic is clear as he concludes: "If the latter, to
^ Schriften, V, p. 130. Beck trans., p. 232.
34
Lectures on Ethics, p. 81.
33Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
Schriften, VI, p. 6. Greene-Hudson trans., p. 5.
36Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V,
p. 131. Beck trans., p. 234.
158
speak in human terms, makes Him worthy of love, by the
former he is object of adoration." Love, therefore, has
its place in Kant's thought, but adoration, based on
respect for God's law, must retain its primacy.
The religious position of Kant becomes more under
standable when we realize what it was he was attempting to
combat. The kind of religion which he repudiated was
entirely deserving of his criticism. Two aspects of reli
gion are mentioned in the lectures on ethics: piety and
bigotry. Obviously, these two categories contrast Kant's
own conception of religion with what he sometimes observed
in others. "Piety, which is practical, consists in obeying
the divine laws for the reason that God wills it; bigotry
is zeal in the worship of God which uses words and expres
sions of devotion and submission in order to win God's
favor."38 Certainly the latter cannot be construed as
worship of God, for it implies that morality is unnecessary
and that we can win God over to our side by flattery. "We
imagine God to be like an earthly lord and we treat him as
^ Lectures on Ethics, p. 89.
38Ibid.
159
such; we seek to please Him with flattery, praise, and
obsequious servility."39
But by this attack Kant does not mean to undermine
the devoutness of a truly religious man. "Devoutness," he
says, "is an indirect relation to the heart of God, which
seeks to express itself in action and to make the knowledge
of God work effectively upon the will."40 Thus, it is not
action in itself, but rather a method of securing readi
ness for action. And the action for which it prepares us,
"the putting into practice of the moral law, the doing of
what God wills us to do," is what constitutes true reli-
41
gion. Devoutness, therefore, is seen as providing the
drill through which we acquire the skill necessary for such
action. "By means of it we seek to have the knowledge of
God so impressed upon us that it acts as an incentive to
us to give effect to and practice the moral l a w . "42
To clarify his position, Kant employs the example
of a person interrupted in prayer by someone in need of
assistance. Since devotional exercises are intended for
the acquisition of good habits, i.e., performing proper
deeds, this opportunity would provide an occasion for
39Ibid.
^Ibid.
4QIbid.
^Ibid.
160
fulfilling the purpose of devotion. It would be foolish,
therefore, to refuse to aid the supplicant because one
should not be disturbed while at prayer. "Devotion as a
separate pursuit, as an occupation in itself, has no
point.1,43
The point is well taken, and the serious student of
religion finds little to quarrel with in this version of
Kant's morality. True, he completes the discussion by
stating that, because devotion is geared to action, we no
longer need it when we have established the habit of doing
good. But this observation is merely the logical implica
tion of the thoughts already expressed, and not at all a
suggestion that devotion is unnecessary in achieving virtue.
It seems legitimate to conclude, therefore, that those,
like Rosenkranz, who claim that religion holds no real
significance for Kant are engaged in special pleading or,
at the very least, they are grossly oversimplifying Kant's
religious position.
There is no need for us to consider in detail
Kant's thoughts on revealed religion, or to examine his
attitude toward specific churches. It will suffice to
43Ibid.
161
mention that, in general, he favored the Christian reli
gion. 44 He was thoroughly familiar with the Bible and
employed its basic concepts in both his written works and
his lecture. Nonetheless, shortly before his death he
said: "Were the Bible not already written, it would prob
ably not be written anymore.With respect to churches,
he applied one rule. Insofar as they advance morality,
they are good; to the extent that they substitute mechani
cal observance for morality, they are e v i l . 46
Kant's lack of interest in revealed religion is
explained by some writers as a result of his ignorance of
theology. While he had been familiar with the Bible and
the catechism from the time of his early youth, he did not
continue his studies in later years. Stuckenberg mentions
that "although he subjected theology to severe criticism,
he did not make it a subject of careful study."4^ Kant's
44In Religion Kant mentions that "of all the public
religions which have ever existed, the Christian alone is
moral." Schriften, VI, pp. 51-52. Greene-Hudson trans.,
p. 47.
4 5
Stuckenberg, op. ext., pp. 340, n. 139.
^^Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
Schriften, VI, p. 167ff. Greene and Hudson trans.,
p. 156ff.
47Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 359.
162
biographer, Borowski, also remarks on this deficiency in
Kant's background, contrasting it with the otherwise univer
sal character of his learning. "Theological investigations
only, of whatever kind they might be, especially exegetics
and dogmatics, he never touched."^ The point is well
emphasized by his remark that Kant, before writing Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone, "carefully read one of
our oldest catechisms, namely, the Basis of Christian Doc
trine, which appeared in 1732 or 1733."^9
It is difficult to conceive of Kant as being quite
so narrow with respect to a discipline which he considered
vital, but the testimony of his friends cannot be ignored.
And, of course, it must be admitted that, if Kant were
really rather badly informed on theological matters, it
would go a long way toward explaining his obstinate stand
on some religious issues. But while these considerations
are enlightening, they bear no important relation to Kant's
anthropology, and we must return to our central theme.
There is no difficulty in establishing a connection
between Kant's thought on religion and his anthropological
work. In the first part of Religion Within the Limits of
^Ibid.
163
Reason Alone,50 for example, we find a discussion of the
conflict of good and evil in man, which is a clear reflec
tion of conclusions in Anthropologie, Part II, Section E:
"The Character of the Species." In Religion, also, we find
constant allusion to the customs and religious practices
of peoples around the world, and a discussion of the merits
and shortcomings of these practices in relation to morality.
On the whole, we are inclined to agree with Erdmann that the
entire work has an anthropological form which is only
slightly obscured by the external protestations of its
rational religious purpose.^1
But there is a more interesting aspect to Kant's
religious thought: it contains the first presentation of
man as both a subjective and an objective phenomenon. The
"complete conception of man," which we mentioned at the end
of Chapter V, begins now to take on significant form. In
earlier works we have seen an analysis of man's rational
capacity, and— in relation to morality--the internal
struggle of his sentient and rational powers. But only in
^"Uber das radicale Bdse in der menschlichen
Natur," which had already appeared separately in the
Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1792.
C 1
J Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 56.
164
Kant's religious doctrine do we find the subjective analysis
of man combined with the explicit analysis of man's objec
tive position in the order of reality. In this context we
see man as related to nature, to his fellowman, and to God.
Kant presents man as superior to nature— indeed, as the pur
pose of nature— because he shares in a moral realm which
transcends nature. Man stands in a social, and thus a moral,
relationship with other men, directed toward the realization
of the kingdom of ends. And finally, man is seen as related
to God in the order of reality, with this Supreme Being as
the object of his respect and adoration, and the hope of his
ultimate attainment of the highest good.
In a sense, then, we might be inclined to feel that
Kant's religious thought is the key to his anthropology,
since only in the religious context does man take on full
dimension. But Kant would be extremely dissatisfied with
such an interpretation. For anthropology deals with facts.
It is basically an empirical discipline which has to do
with the events of human experience. Religion, on the
other hand, is a postulate of practical reason, based on
the moral law which i£ a fact of human experience. There
fore, because the concepts of religion are derived from
human experience, they cannot serve as the logical basis
165
for the investigation of man. Rather, it is necessary for
Kant to find that religion, through morality, is based upon
a conception of human nature as a part of a logically
ordered reality. Religion can crown human experience, and
add significance to it, but it can never serve as a founda
tion upon which anthropological conclusions could be based.
It is important to note, finally, that the relation
between Kant's anthropology and his religious thought can
provide an insight into the perspective which Kant had in
regard to his work as a whole. He was very much concerned
to show an integrated pattern of reality, man's position
within that pattern, and the knowledge which man could
attain of his relation to other aspects of the pattern.
The last point, man's knowledge of his relation to reality,
is especially important, since only after it is attained can
man properly establish the criteria in terms of which he
must seek fulfillment. That Kant was vitally concerned
with man's fulfillment— the attainment of the summum bonum—
and that this concern strongly influenced the structure of
his thought, is the final point which we shall attempt to
establish.
CHAPTER VII
THE ROLE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF KANT
While the individual writings of Kant each provide
some contribution to the development and continuity of his
thought, it is only in viewing his work as a whole that we
begin to notice the particular aspects which so clearly
mark the system as a product of Kant's distinctive charac
ter. As we saw in considering the early progress and
development of the young scholar, there was always a ten
sion between the speculative and the practical in his
thought: a constant concern with practical ends, and a
constant employment of speculative means to achieve them.
In a sense, this dual characteristic became the hallmark
of Kant's entire system.
There are particular examples which stand out as
excellent illustrations of this interesting dichotomy in
Kant's thought. The most obvious, perhaps, is to be found
in the attitude which Kant had with respect to man's his
torical development, and the particular conception which
166
167
he had of history itself. Our brief analysis of the
Anthropologie, in Chapter III, made clear Kant's notion of
man's fulfillment. Unlike other species, man does not
achieve his full determination in the individual; rather,
he must progress gradually through many generations to the
point where he has attained perfect social, cultural, and
political stability through reason. On this view, the pro
cess of history is seen as the gradual education of man to
rational ends, and his further development in slowly
attempting to implement his knowledge. The final result
would be a community of people living entirely in accord
ance with the moral law, and employing in friendly rivalry
all the powers of reason— in short, a state of everlasting
peace.
Since the process of history is an essential aspect
of Kant's vision of human perfection, therefore, we would
expect him to be very much interested in the discipline.
And, in a sense, he was. But while he read works of an
historical nature, and included the events of history in
his lectures, the discipline played no major role in his
thought. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant,
Adamson felt justified in saying that "the historical
element in its widest sense never received its full due at
168
the hands of Kant, whose deficiency in the historical inter
est was remarkable."*- The point, then, is not that Kant
was ignorant of the facts of history, but that he had a
peculiar conception of the nature of history, and its role
2
in the general scheme of academic disciplines.
Kant was not concerned with the details of history,
but rather with their significance. He felt that "critical
study of the reason, of history and historical books, a
largeness of mind which goes into human knowledge en gros
and not merely en detail, will constantly make the extent
smaller without diminishing its content."-* New methods for
dealing with such disciplines would put old knowledge into
a more compact form, and enable us to do without the multi
tude of books. By means of these new methods, also, we
would be able, without burdening the memory, to find out
everything ourselves as we wish. "Therefore, he displays
true genius with respect to history who groups it under
^■Robert Adamson, Lectures on the Philosophy of
Kant (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1879), p. 25.
^Stuckenberg excuses this deficiency in Kant's
perspective by pointing out that "his education belonged
to a period when there was but little taste in Germany for
general history and when there were no attractive histori
cal books." Stuckenberg, op. cit., pp. 150-51.
*Kant's Introduction to Logic, p. 34.
169
ideas which can endure."4 Apparently what Kant had in mind
was not history in the proper sense, but the philosophy of
history. Contemporaries noted Kant's tendency to recon
struct history on speculative lines, and were concerned
about it. For example, Herder once wrote to Hamann: "It
is strange that metaphysicians, like your Kant, even in
history want no history, and as much as boldly banish it
from the world.Such would be the accusation of the his
torian, for Kant wanted to eliminate from history the
clutter of details in order that its true significance might
be discerned.
In the same fashion, it is interesting to note,
Kant considered the notion of an a priori history of
philosophy. Among his notes we find a discussion of whether
a history of philosophy can be written mathematically,
meaning dogmatically, or from concepts. In other words, is
it possible to show how dogmatism must have arisen, and from
it scepticism, and that this necessarily leads to criticism?
From what has already been said, we may anticipate the
answer: "Yes, if the idea of a metaphysic inevitably
presses on human reason, and the latter feels a necessity
4Ibid.
^Quoted by Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 151.
170
to develop it; but this science lies entirely in the mind,
although only outlined there in embryonic form."^ It would
be difficult to ignore the abstract dialectic in this neat,
conceptual ordering of history.
But if Kant's views on history provide an excellent
example of his tendency to conceptualize, or make specula
tive, things of the practical order, it is by no means an
exceptional case. We need only recall that in matters of
religion Kant concerned himself not with the alleged facts
of revealed religion, and established denominations, but
only with the a priori dictates of reason. And after our
consideration of the relation between the first and second
Critiques, it is hardly necessary to point out that the
first constitutes the speculative base upon which alone the
practical philosophy could be established. Moreover, the
practical philosophy itself is erected solely on the
a priori postulates of the moral law.
In a sense, the problem which we isolate here is an
oversimplification, since it is merely one phase of a more
pervasive tension which permeates the work of Kant. It may
^Lose Blatter aus Kants Nachlass, ed. Rudolf Reicke
(3 vols.; KOnigsberg, Ferd. Beyer, 1889), II, p. 285ff.
171
be seen clearly in the contrast between the purely intellec
tual aspect of philosophy and the moral aspect; between the
mechanistic necessity of nature and the moral freedom of
human acts; and, most important, in the dual nature of man
himself as a participant in both the physical and the
intelligible worlds. We believe, however, that the general
problem can best be understood through the perspective of
the relation between the speculative and the practical
aspects of Kant's work.
In examining this relation, it is certainly safe to
begin with the fact that Kant was vitally concerned with
practical matters.^ His original predisposition toward
science gives an indication of such interest, and we may
recall that some of his last writings were on political and
educational topics. The Critique of Practical Reason, and
his constant reference to questions of morality merely com
pound the obvious, and compel us to consider Kant as pri
marily a man of practical orientation. But precisely what
does it mean to speak of Kant as practical?
^The term 'practical' has more than one meaning,
of course. In the context of Kant's work it could refer
either to the pragmatic order or the moral order. We shall
see, however, that Kant was vitally concerned with both
orders, and that ultimately the two were reduced to one—
the moral order.
172
Certainly Kant did not concern himself with the
petty details of daily living. Such matters were strictly
ordered, and placed in the hands of the cook, or the ser
vant, Lampe. The practical matters which concerned Kant
were of another order. In the letter to Herz in which he
described the new course in anthropology, we find the
statement: "The intention which I have is to unfold by
means of this course the sources of all the sciences, those
of morals, of skill, of social intercourse, of the methods
of forming and ruling men, and consequently all things
practical."® In the Critique of Pure Reason, on the other
hand, we find the statement: "By 'the practical' I mean
everything that is possible through freedom."® It seems
clear, therefore, that, for Kant, the practical order was
the order of important purposeful activity, and particular
ly the level of human conduct which involves freedom, i.e.,
the moral order. But a purely speculative concern for
practical affairs would be fruitless indeed; it was with
the achievement of significant ends that Kant was concerned.
The question then arises, how were these ends, or purposes
to be achieved?
®Schriften, X, p. 138.
9A 800, B 828. NKS, 632.
17 3
There was no possibility of Kant himself becoming
involved in practical affairs--even a political career
would undoubtedly have proved too much for his frail con
stitution. Nor would Kant have chosen such a career if it
were open to him. He saw his mission as one of a higher
nature— that of clearing the ground, and of laying a
proper foundation, so that a correct ordering of practical
affairs might take place in society. The attempt to give
to philosophy a new and more durable foundation was not
merely a speculative game, as we have seen. It was to give
philosophy the authority needed to proclaim rules for
practical affairs. The application of philosophic prin
ciples to society came relatively late in Kant's work, but
only because the critical foundation was a necessary step
which had to be accomplished before practical matters could
be validly pronounced upon.
In the general development of Kant's system, then,
we may look for an increasing integration of speculative
and practical principles. There seems little need to
emphasize again how perfectly this system reflects the
dual nature of man in Kant's thought. We are concerned
here rather to point out the precise element in Kant's work
which most perfectly displays this gradual integration of
174
principles: the notion of teleology. It is important to
realize that, for Kant, teleology provides the rational
justification and the systematic presentation of the
interrelation of physical and moral reality— the final
conjunction of the speculative and the practical in Kant's
work.
The first important use of teleology by Kant is in
the Critique of Pure Reason, where he deals with it on two
levels: in the teleological proof for the existence of
God, and as a regulative principle for the unification of
knowledge. In the case of the former, we have a clear
statement of Kant's own view of reality. It is mentioned
with obvious approval, but must be denied ultimate validity
as a proof of God's existence. The teleological proof, Kant
tells us, "always deserves to be mentioned with respect."10
Besides being "the oldest, the clearest, and the most
accordant with the common reason of mankind," it is also
extremely useful in the study of nature.
It suggests ends and purposes, where our observation
would not have detected them by itself, and extends
our.knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept
of a special unity, the principle of which is outside
nature. This knowledge again reacts on its cause,
10A 623, B 651. NKS, 520.
175
namely upon the idea which has led to it, and so
strengthens the belief in a supreme Author that the
belief acquires the force of an irresistible convic
tion. H
Because the tendency to accept the teleological proof is so
strongly entrenched in man's mind, Kant maintains that it
would not only be discomforting, but "utterly vain to
attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this argu
ment. "12 Subtle and abstruse speculation has no power to
counter the ever increasing evidence of the senses, and the
wonders of nature silence all doubts. Kant c_early favors
this argument, but finds it technically deficient. While
he has "nothing to bring against the rationality and util
ity" of the argument, and would rather "commend and further
it," he must still deny it apodictic certainty.1^ In the
context of the first Critique, even the teleological argu
ment is insufficient to establish the existence of God.
The second use of teleology— as a regulative prin
ciple for the unification of knowledge— is based upon the
first. The highest formal unity which we can impose upon
nature is that of the purposive unity of things, and thus
the speculative interests of reason make it necessary to
H lbid.
13Ibid.
l^ibid.
176
consider all order in the world as though it had originated
in the purpose of a supreme reason. As applied to the field
of experience, such a principle opens up to our reason
"altogether new views as to how the things of the world
may be connected according to teleological laws, and so
enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity."14
Kant views this teleological principle as extremely useful,
and always beneficial, provided only that it be relegated
to a regulative function and never considered to be consti
tutive of reality. As regulative, it helps us to find
connective elements which assists us in subsuming events
under natural laws. As constitutive, the principle of
teleology could only assume the total connection of all
elements of nature— thus presuming the unifying factors of
nature which the scientist is attempting to establish.
Only the regulative use of the principle of teleology is
permitted by Kant, therefore, and we can see that teleology
in the first Critique has a very precise, and very limited
use. It is a useful tool, but must be employed with
caution.
14A 687, B 715. NKS, 560.
177
In the second Critique, however, we see a totally
different employment of teleology. For Kant does not raise
the issue of teleology as a tool at all. In fact, we find
that in his works on morality Kant is careful to omit
teleology as a speculative concept as in appropriate to the
context of practical philosophy. In the Foundation of the
Metaphysic of Morals, he explicitly mentions this distinc
tion: "Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics
views a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature."!-*
The distinction here lies in the different employment of
the concept "kingdom of ends." "In the first case the king
dom of ends is a theoretical idea used to explain what
exists. In the second case it is a practical idea used to
bring into existence what does not exist but can be made
actual by our conduct— and indeed to bring it into existence
in conformity with this idea."!^ To employ teleology in
this context, therefore, would be to use it in a constitu
tive, rather than in a regulative sense, and Kant has
already determined such usage to be
!^Schriften, IV, p. 436n. The Moral Law or Kant1s
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1950), p. 104n.
16Ibid.
178
illegitimate.17
But if teleology is not permitted as a tool in
Kant's ethical works, it would be incorrect to maintain
that it plays no part at all. In fact, when one considers
the foundation of Kant's ethical system, it becomes clear
that teleology is the absolutely necessary presupposition
in order that the system come together at all. A brief
resume of Kant's thought in this area should serve to estab
lish the point.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant provides
a short summary of the basic elements of his moral system.
He points out that a need of pure reason leads only to
hypotheses, but "a need of pure practical reason, on the
other hand, is based on a duty to make something (the
highest good) the object of my will so as to promote it
with all my strength."18 In order to promote the highest
good, I must presuppose its possibility, and also its con
ditions: God, freedom, and immortality; for speculative
reason can neither prove nor disprove these conditions.
Kant is careful to assure us that the duty to promote the
17
Paulsen criticizes Kant strongly for having eli
minated teleology from his ethical system. Paulsen, op.
cit., p. 324ff.
18Schriften, V, p. 142. Beck trans., p. 244.
179
highest good is based on apodictic law— the moral law—
which is completely independent of such presuppositions,
"and thus needs no further support from theoretical opin
ions on the inner character of things, on the secret final
end of the world order, or on a ruler presiding over it in
order to bind us completely to actions unconditionally
conformable to the law."19 But the intention which this
law imposes on me as a subjective effect— to promote the
practically possible highest good--must at least presuppose
the latter as possible. "Otherwise it would be practically
impossible to strive for the object of a concept, which, at
bottom, would be empty and without an object."2^
The postulates of God, freedom, and immortality
concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the
possibility of the highest good, and "not for the sake of
some arbitrary speculative design, but only for the sake of
a practically necessary end of the pure rational will,
which does not here choose but rather obeys an inexorable
command of reason."21 This command of reason is not, of
19Ibid.
2^Schriften, V, p. 143. Beck trans., pp. 244-45.
21Ibid.
180
course, based upon inclination, which would by no means
justify us in assuming the means possible or the object
real for its fulfillment. Rather, "this command of reason
has its ground objectively in the character of things as
they must be universally judged by pure reason.The
need created by this command is, therefore, "an absolutely
necessary need and justifies its presupposition not merely
as an allowable hypothesis but as a practical postulate." J
It is important to realize that, for Kant, while
this practical postulate is denied apodictic certainty, it
is nonetheless completely established. Since it is based
upon the apodictic moral law, it is far more certain, for
example, than the laws of science which are merely empiri
cal. It is nothing less than complete assurance which
permits Kant to draw the conclusion:
Granted that the pure moral law inexorably binds
every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence),
the righteous man may say: I will that there be a
God, that my existence in this world be also an
existence in a pure world of the understanding out
side the system of natural connections, and finally
that my duration be endless. I stand by this and
will not give up this belief, for this is the only
case where my interest inevitably determines my
judgment because I will not yield anything of this
interest; I do so without any attention to sophis
tries, however little I may be able to answer them
22
Ibid. ^Ibid .
181
or oppose them with others more plausible.^
There can be little doubt that Kant, as a righteous man,
does make such a proclamation.
Now this summary makes clear Kant's effort to avoid
teleology, or any other purely speculative consideration,
in formulating his argument. But it would be difficult to
ignore the fact that the entire argument is based on a neat,
rationally organized, teleological conception of reality.
It is quite true that God, freedom, and immortality must be
postulated if the moral need of reason is to be fulfilled—
but to give to this postulate such complete acceptance is
equivalent to asserting that reason is perfect in its order,
and perfectly reflects reality; there can be no absolute
need of reason which is not proportioned to an aspect of
reality which can fulfill it. Kant's position is clear,
and there can be no doubt concerning the interpretation of
reality which would be necessary to support the postulate
of practical reason. Teleology is not permitted within the
system, but the system is impossible without presupposing
it.
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant gives us his most
24jbid.
thorough explication of teleology. Encountering purposive
ness as an essential quality of aesthetic judgment, Kant
then devotes the final portion of the work to a discussion
of teleology. In the context of nature, he finds, teleol
ogy presents a significant problem: organisms seem to
possess an internal purposiveness and principle of self
development which cannot be reduced by the mind to merely
mechanical causality. Yet, the rigorous mechanistic chain
of the natural order is an important aspect of Kant's
thought. In order to account for this conflict, Kant brings
into the argument the power of reflective judgment. As he
points out, our judgment that all nature must conform to
mechanical causal principles is a determinant judgment,
while that by which we infer purposive causality is merely
reflective. The latter, then, is not a judgment concerning
the structure of nature, but a judgment required by the par
ticular structure of the human mind. In this way, we
recognize teleology not as a rule of nature, but as a rule
of our judgment, by which nature is made intelligible and
assimilable to our cognitive faculties. Our intellect can
attempt to explain nature without the employment of
teleological principles, of course, but not in a manner
183
r
which would be satisfactory to reason.25 For reason wishes
to do more than merely explain experience. It attempts
also to make it a unitary system; and the principles of
teleology, although not principles constitutive of experi
ence, are nonetheless principles which regulate systematiz
ing r e a s o n . 26 with this foundation clearly established,
Kant begins to build the notion of teleology into a more
imposing structure.
In the third Critique Kant is no longer concerned
with the need to maintain his moral system pure of all
involvement with speculative principles. The entire basis
of his system of morality has already been established, and
he is able to consider objectively the relation between the
speculative and practical aspects of his work in terms of
the current analysis of judgment. Thus, we find a recon
sideration of the speculative notion of physical teleology,
and a discussion of it in relation to moral teleology--a
2^Kant maintains that "absolutely no human reason
. . . can hope to understand the production of even a blade
of grass by mere mechanical causes." Critique of Judgment,
Schriften, V, p. 409. Bernard trans., p. 326.
^Elements of this summary are borrowed from
Vleeschauwer's excellent brief exposition of Kant's analy
sis of teleology. See Herman-J. de Vleeschauwer, The Devel
opment of Kantian Thought, trans. A. R. C. Duncan (London;
Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1962), pp. 133-35.
184
conception of the final purposiveness of the natural order
as derived from the implications of moral law.
We recall from earlier statements that, while
physical teleology is not credited with apodictic certainty,
nonetheless, because of the weight it carries for the mind
of man, it demands the greatest respect. But now Kant gives
this thought a more favorable formulation: "There is a
physical teleology which gives a sufficient ground of proof
to our theoretical reflective judgment to assume the being
of an intelligent world cause."27 Together with this form
of teleology, "we find also in ourselves, and still more in
the concept of a rational being in general endowed with
freedom (of his causality), a moral teleology."28 But in
the case of this moral teleology, the purposive reference,
together with its law, is determined a priori in ourselves,
and can therefore be cognized as necessary. Such internal
conformity to law requires no intelligent cause external to
us, any more than we need look to a higher understanding as
the source of the purposiveness that we find in the geome
trical properties of figures. However, this moral
27schriften, V, p. 447. Bernard trans., p. 377.
28Ibid.
185
teleology has to do with our role as beings in the world,
"and therefore as beings bound up with other things in the
world, upon which latter, whether as purposes or as objects
in respect of which we ourselves are final purpose, the
same moral laws require us to pass judgment."29 Thus,
moral teleology has to do with the reference of our own
causality to purposes, and even to a final purpose, which
we must aim at in the world. It concerns as well the
reciprocal reference of the world to that moral purpose,
and the external possibility of its accomplishment. This
final concept, Kant assures us, is one "to which no physical
teleology can lead u s . "30 we find, therefore, that, while
no aspect of teleology was permitted in the development of
the moral argument, in a later context moral teleology is
fully developed and becomes a useful tool.
The usefulness of moral teleology is seen immedi
ately after the presentation just outlined. Kant finds
that when both physical and moral teleology are employed in
a continuous argument, the value of this argument for the
existence of God is greatly enhanced. Kant summarizes the
29Ibid.
•^Schriften, V, p. 448. Bernard trans., p. 377.
186
argument briefly. From the purposes of nature, physical
teleology proves an intelligent world cause sufficiently
for the theoretical reflective judgment.31 In addition,
moral teleology establishes an intelligent world cause for
the practical judgment by the concept of a final purpose
which it is forced to ascribe to creation from a practical
point of view. And, while the objective reality of the
idea of God as moral author of the world cannot be estab
lished by physical purposes alone, nevertheless, the aware
ness of these purposes, when combined with that of the moral
purpose, is of great importance for the practical reality
*3 2
of the idea of God. The maxim of pure reason bids us seek
unity of principles so far as possible, and the combination
of the concept of physical purposiveness with that of moral
purposiveness adds credence to the idea of God by bringing
in the reality which this idea has for the judgment from a
theoretical point of v i e w .33 Thus, in the context of the
third Critique, a more thorough analysis of teleology, and
the application of the concept at a new level, adds signifi
cantly to Kant's argument for the supersensible goal of
31schxiften, V, p. 458. Bernard trans., pp. 388-89.
3^lbid. 331^^
187
human endeavors.
Three distinct kinds of teleology are explicitly
employed by Kant in his work— organic teleology in nature,
the speculative conception of physical teleology, and moral
teleology— and each contributes something to his ultimate
portrayal of a well-ordered system of reality. It does not
seem too much to say at this point that the work in which
Kant had been engaged from 1770 until 1790 is open to
another interpretation than those which are commonly pro
vided from a consideration of the apparent evidence. He
was, of course, developing a critical examination of pure
speculative reason at three levels— understanding, judgment,
and reason itself. And in formulating this critical system,
Kant was careful to maintain strict logical order, and a
rigorous deduction of principles. The result, then, was a
brilliant, well-integrated system of technical philosophy—
the speculative monument for which Kant is rightly famous.
At the same time, however, Kant was providing a
sound basis for moral philosophy: limiting knowledge in
order to make room for faith, as he expressed it. This
second level of Kant's work has also received much atten
tion, and it has already been useful in our present investi
gation. For, following the ethical aspect of Kant's work,
188
we find that he was so concerned with the moral dimension
of man that his whole system may be seen as directed to
that end. Seen in this perspective, Kant's moral thought
is the pivot upon which the Critical Philosophy turns, with
the first Critique as its propaedeutic, and the third as
its confirmation and elaboration. But even this level of
interpretation does not exhaust the complexity of Kant's
thought.
We have seen that in his work Kant gradually
develops a conception of teleology as the principle through
which man can attain an integrated awareness of all the
levels of reality open to him. The third Critique employs
the notion of teleology to link together the speculative
dimention of the first Critique and the practical dimension
of the second. A teleological conception of reality is
thus the factor which completes and integrates the total
structure of Kant's system.
Based on these findings, we would suggest still
another level of interpreting Kant's work. The thought
suggests itself that the gradual unfolding of the Critical
Philosophy was Kant's slow and labored exposition— or
justification— of a certain conception of reality. Accord
ing to this interpretation, each work, as it was produced,
189
was an additional step in drawing the structure of Kant's
technical system more closely into alignment with reality
as he conceived it: a well-integrated, teleologically
ordered system. The final product, then was a neat, logi
cally valid philosophic structure, reflecting an ordered,
rational universe. It was as though Kant had joined the
physical order of Newton to the moral order of Rousseau,
and expanded the combination into a full-blown philosophic
system encompassing all levels of reality. For the first
time, man had a scientifically sound, completely unified
perspective on reality, incorporating the physical, intel
lectual, and moral aspects of his experience. It would
require little awareness of Kant's thought to realize that
such a philosophic system is precisely that which he had
envisioned in his letters to various correspondents.
In a sense, of course, such an interpretation of
Kant's work is nothing more than a simple statement of what
he was attempting to do in constructing his system. But
there is another sense in which the teleological conception
of Kant's work would take on a more controversial nature,
namely, if one were to maintain that teleology, rather
than reason, is the ultimate tool and criterion which Kant
190
employed in his system.^ Certainly this would provide a
novel conception of Kant's philosophy. And yet, we believe
that such an interpretation of Kant's thought would be seen
as necessary, if all the evidence were closely examined.
Because our concern is with other matters, however, we
shall restrict ourselves to a single example of how Kant
permits teleology to assume the superior position. The
problem arises in the context of the anthropology— Kant is
finally faced with a choice between reason and teleology.
In the last book of the Anthropologie, Kant con
siders the goal of the human species, and the progress
which man is making toward that goal. Throughout the rest
of his system Kant has time and again found human reason
competent to settle its own problems. But the attainment
of the perfect state of man upon earth is not to be
approached through reason. The process toward that ideal,
ultimate condition is governed not by reason, but by nature.
Kant speaks of the development of man toward full
^We do not mean to imply that there is a real
incompatibility between reason and teleology in Kant's
thought. As we saw in Chapter V, reason itself is
teleologically oriented. But Kant does seem to make a
distinction. The problem is discussed further below.
191
rationality as the "education" of mankind— animal ration-
abile becoming animal rationale. By education, in this
case, he means not an intellectual process so much as the
gradual unfolding of all man's powers in an atmosphere of
moral rectitude. This state will involve a development of
man's rational powers in assuming dominance over the
passions and emotions; but apparently Kant does not see this
as a rational process in the sense of being directed by
reason. He maintains that achievement of this ideal state
will not follow upon man’s intention, but rather in spite
of it. Kant tells us that the education of man is whole
some, but harsh and severe. It requires many efforts and
transformations of nature, which extend almost to the des
truction of the whole race, to produce from the disunited
and self-contradictory evil a good that man did not intend,
but which, once present, preserves and maintains i t s e l f . ^5
Because of man's moral weakness, his rational
direction is insufficient to produce real progress. But
35"Diese Erziehung . . . ist heilsam, aber rauh und
strenge, durch viel Ungemach und bis nahe an die
ZerstOrung des ganzen Geschlechts reichende Bearbeitung
der Natur, n&mlich der Herverbringung des vom Menschen
nicht beabsichtigten, aber wenn es einmal da ist, such
ferner erhaltenden Guten aus dem innerlich mit sich selbst
immer sich veruneinigenden Bdsen." Schriften, VII, p. 328.
192
enlightened self-interest keeps him in the right path. It
is not man's rational intent, therefore, but a kind of
natural, anthropological teleology which directs human
progress. If, therefore, we are interested in determining
the ultimate principle upon which Kant's philosophy depends,
it would seem that in the context of his anthropology— a
theme which pervades his entire work— the answer would be
not reason, but teleology.
It seems strange and unnecessary that Kant should
choose between reason and teleology in discussing man's
end. Strictly speaking, there is no conflict between the
two principles in his thought as it is presented in the
Anthropologie. Rather, the conflict seems to be in Kant
himself. When he is faced with the decision as to whether
man is competent to achieve perfection under his own power,
Kant seems arbitrarily to opt for a teleological explana
tion which would hardly do justice to reason— an unexpected
compromise which seems inconsistent with his other work.
One might attempt to explain away the problem by
pointing out that, in a sense, Kant has not abandoned reason
as such, but rather has found it necessary to assert the
supremacy of divine reason as expressed in a teleological
conception of reality. However, it is human reason which
193
Kant seems constantly to champion, and to submit human
reason to divine reason in this context would be to abandon
what apparently is his customary stance.
The only obvious way to eliminate the inconsistency
here would be to assert that teleology is actually the
mainspring of Kant's thought all along, and that it is only
in the consideration of man's ultimate end that Kant feels
it necessary openly to declare his position. Such an inter
pretation might prove unpopular among Kant scholars, for
there is often a tendency to emphasize the rigorous, logi
cal analysis of reason as the primary concern or central
theme of Kant's work. But opposition to a teleological
interpretation of Kant's system on that basis would involve
a critical error. The rigorous investigation of reason—
indeed, the whole critical enterprise— is essential to
Kant's thought, and can in no sense be degraded. But it
would be a misconception of Kant's philosophy to consider
the critical method as more than a means. Kant himself
makes that clear enough. On the other hand, our emphasis
on teleology has to do not with means, but with the purpose
Kant had in mind for his work, and the relation of his
means to that end.^®
It might readily be maintained that it is unneces
sary to argue for the acceptance of a teleological inter
pretation of Kant's work. For, if we properly understand
the third Critique, it would seem that Kant himself pre
sented the case. Did he not take great pains to establish
that the mind necessarily follows a teleological interpreta
tion of reality? Certainly the critical philosopher would
not be exempt from this tendency. And does he not use the
teleological principle itself as the linking factor
(through reflective judgment) of his whole philosophic
system? We certainly must find that the Critical Philoso
phy is permeated with an atmosphere of teleology, and to
interpret Kant's thought with an emphasis upon this prin
ciple seems more than justified.
But the justification of a teleological interpre
tation of Kant's work is not really our purpose here.
Rather, we are interested in teleology only because it
helps us to understand the full significance of Kant's
anthropological commitment, and the systematic development
^^We may care to draw a distinction between what
Kant intended to achieve, and his actual accomplishments
as viewed through the perspective of the history of
philosophy. But that is an entirely different level of
criticism.
195
of his work in which this commitment is fulfilled. It is
impossible to separate anthropology and teleology in deal
ing with Kant, and perhaps a passage in the Critique of
Practical Reason shows most clearly why this is so. Kant
points out that it is not the fact that man has reason which
elevates him above the brutes. For if that reason only
enables him to do for himself what instinct does for the
animal, then it would indicate for man no higher aim or
destiny than that of the brute, but only a different way of
attaining the same end.37 Rather, Kant sees man as ele
vated above the’ animal because he has an aim which it
cannot have. As Stuckenberg phrases it, "reason dis
tinguishes between good and bad, and it can make morality
the ruling purpose of life; this is man's prerogative and
glory."38
The point is well worth emphasizing. In Kant's
view, theoretical reason is man's most important tool, we
might even say his most essential attribute; but it is not
in itself sufficient to establish man's dignity. We may
recall Kant's remark that it was precisely on this point
37schriften, V, p. 61. Beck trans., p. 170.
■^Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 315.
196
that Rousseau set him right. After Rousseau's revelation,
Kant always remembered that it is man's moral destiny that
sets him apart, and gives him his true worth.
It is appropriate to conclude with the recollection
of that revelation, for in it we find that the three most
important motivational aspects of Kant's thought come
together. The moral destiny of man is, of course, a teleo-
logical concept. Thus, we find Kant's moral, teleological,
and anthropological interests inextricably bound together
in a central theme. And again we find how essential his
conception of man and human nature is to his philosophy,
for it constitutes the core around which this important
theme is developed.
CONCLUSION
The various arguments with which we have been con
cerned in the preceding chapters provide, we believe, more
than sufficient evidence to establish our thesis: that
Kant's work as a whole is based upon his anthropology in
the broad sense, i.e., on his conception of the nature and
destiny of man. But, in a sense, the very quantity of
material is a disadvantage in formulating a convincing
pattern of thought. Because the evidence is necessarily
presented in many different contexts, the rigorous connec
tion of detail so important to argumentation may fail to
become evident as the conglomeration of material gradually
takes form. It is appropriate, therefore, to provide at
this point a summary of the major elements of our argument
in a clear, cogent pattern that should remove all doubt
concerning our thesis.
To begin with, to recall the statement made in our
introduction, our presentation takes place in two distinct
levels: The demonstration of anthropological influence on
specific works, and an exposition of the synthetic unity of
197
198
Kant's work as a whole, when viewed from the standpoint of
anthropology. A brief resume of evidence at each of these
levels will perhaps best set the stage for our concluding
remarks.
The textual relation between the anthropology lec
tures and Kant's other works has been mentioned briefly in
each chapter. With respect to the Critique of Pure Reason,
we found that a comparison of textual passages could not
serve as a basis for establishing anthropological influence,
since both the Critique and the proposed volume on anthro
pology were under preparation at the same time. But pre
cisely because he was working on both projects at the same
time, we may rest assured that Kant was vitally concerned
with anthropology as he prepared the first Critique.
Therefore, if we establish an anthropological interpretation
of this speculative endeavor on other grounds, there is no
reason to believe that a distortion of Kant's thought is
involved.
The other works that we have examined require no
elaborate justification of our position. Each of them
contains material which is either explicitly anthropologi
cal in nature, or which clearly reflects the findings of
Kant in an earlier anthropological investigation. We find
199
that the Critique of Practical Reason makes use of various
elements of empirical psychology drawn from the anthropol-
ogy— particularly with respect to the appetitive faculties.
The Critique of Judgment draws liberally from the anthro
pology lectures for its discussion of feeling, of taste,
and of genius. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
employs the anthropological analysis of good and evil traits
in human nature, as well as general information concerning
the mores and religious customs of various peoples. The
Metaphysic of Morals borrows anthropological material with
respect to the psychology of the will and of feeling.
Indeed, without providing a complete inventory, one feels
justified in asserting that few, if any, of Kant's works,
beginning with the Critical period, could be found free of
anthropological data.
Emphasis for this assertion is provided by
Erdmann. It will be recalled from our findings in Chapter
II, that the Anthropologie is recognized as merely an out
line of the lectures which Kant had been delivering for
twenty-five years. It was suggested that Kant elaborated
on this outline in the lecture hall, but that later, when
he finally reached the point of editing the material for
publication, he was too old and tired to do more than
200
o r g a n i z e t h e l e c t u r e n o t e s . S i n c e we h a v e am ple e v i d e n c e
from h i s s t u d e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i c h n e s s and v a r i e t y o f
t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l e c t u r e s , i t w o u ld seem r e a s o n a b l e t o
assu m e t h a t K a n t ' s a d v a n c in g a g e and w e a k n e s s — o f w h ic h he
made no s e c r e t — w as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p a u c i t y o f t h e
A n t h r o p o l o g i e a s i t a p p e a r e d . B u t Erdmann a t t r i b u t e s a
d e e p e r s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e same f a c t s . A f t e r e x a m in i n g a t
l e n g t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e tw e e n t h e A n t h r o p o l o g i e and s e v e r a l
o f K a n t ' s o t h e r w o r k s , Erdmann c o n c l u d e s t h a t K ant d i d ,
i n d e e d , b o rro w l i b e r a l l y from t h e a n t h r o p o lo g y l e c t u r e s f o r
t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f h i s o t h e r w o r k s — s o l i b e r a l l y , i n f a c t ,
t h a t when h e came t o p u b l i s h t h e A n t h r o p o l o g i e i t s e l f , t h e r e
w as v e r y l i t t l e m a t e r i a l l e f t t o d e a l w i t h . l
I t i s d i f f i c u l t , o f c o u r s e , a f t e r n e a r l y tw o c e n
t u r i e s t o f o r m u l a t e a c o n c l u s i v e argum ent f o r t h e s u p p o r t
o f E rdm ann's a s s e r t i o n . B u t f o r o u r p u r p o s e s , i t i s
u n n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e . I t i s s u f f i
c i e n t t h a t Erdmann, a f t e r e x a m in in g t h e f a c t s , i s a b l e t o
m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y l e c t u r e s w ere s e r i o u s l y
d e p l e t e d by t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o o t h e r o f K a n t ' s p r o j e c t s .
The e v i d e n c e w h ic h Erdmann m a r s h a ls i n s u p p o r t o f h i s
■ ' ‘ Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, pp. 55-57.
201
contention, while not conclusive, is certainly adequate to
establish the credibility of the position. Surely, we need
no further discussion at the textual level to support our
claim that Kant's anthropological interests were influen
tial in the formation of his other works.
B u t o u r s e c o n d l e v e l o f i n q u i r y , t h a t c o n c e r n i n g t h e
p a t t e r n o f K a n t ' s w ork a s a w h o l e , i s much m ore i n t e r e s t i n g
t o d e a l w i t h . A t t h i s l e v e l , we may b e g i n w i t h K a n t ' s
e a r l y i n t e r e s t i n a n t h r o p o l o g y , and h i s c o m p l e t e " c o n v e r
s i o n " t o a c o n c e r n w i t h m an kind when h e e n c o u n t e r e d t h e
2
work of Rousseau in 1762-63. From that time forward, Kant
was keenly aware of the distinction between what man is and
what he ought to be— between what man has made of himself
in the course of history, and the perfection which is his
ultimate destiny. According to Kant's own statement quoted
above, Rousseau destroyed Kant's intellectual conceit, and
his purely intellectual evaluation of man. Thereafter, Kant
*In a work which deals primarily with Rousseau,
Hfiffding maintains that Rousseau actually effected Kant
twice: the first time through Emile in 1762, and "the
second about 1783, when not only the 'Confession of Faith
of the Savoyard Vicar,' but especially Rousseau's concep
tion of society, and the distinction between 'bonte' and
'vertu' made an impression on him." Harald Hdffding, Jean
Jacques Rousseau and His Philosophy, trans. William Richards
and Leo E. Saidla (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930),
p. 119n.
202
was primarily concerned to place philosophy on a new and
firmer foundation which would both justify a correct view
of man's place in reality, and assist man in his progress
toward fulfillment.
The first Critique was the foundation for the new
structure. In Chapter III we saw that Kant understood the
Critique of Pure Reason as a propaedeutic to his projected
metaphysic of nature and metaphysic of morals. It was
necessary to eliminate man's speculative delusions before
providing what Kant felt to be a true interpretation of
reality, based on practical reason. We understand, there
fore, why Kant says in one of his reflections that the
first Critique is "a cure for a disease of the reason which
has its roots in our nature." This disease is the "longing
to wander beyond our proper sphere and establish relations
with other worlds."3 Kant felt that once this longing was
eliminated by the argument of the first Critique, man would
be more receptive to the less speculative, but more accurate
and efficacious interpretation of reality supplied by prac
tical reason.
We do not mean to ignore the fact that Kant's specu
lative bent kept him working at problems on a rational,
Erdmann, Reflexionen, II, p. 59.
203
logical level. But it cannot be emphasized too strongly
that the solutions which his speculation produced were
always consonant with his view of man as essentially a
moral being, teleologically ordered to God and immortality,
through his own freedom as a moral agent. Even after the
completion of the Critical Philosophy we find that Kant
continued to affirm the foundational role of the first
Critique. In his essay "On the Progress of Metaphysics
Since Leibniz and Wolff" (1791), Kant asserted that the
transcendental philosophy, as embodied in the Critique of
Pure Reason, had for its object the founding of a meta
physic whose purpose, as the chief end of pure reason, was
intended to lead reason beyond the limits of the sensible
to the field of the supersensible.^ The supersensible,
or intelligible, world is, of course, the moral order in
which man shares as a free moral agent.
It is a generally recognized fact, and one which is
clearly established throughout our presentation, that Kant
was vitally concerned with working out a sound practical or
moral philosophy. Many writers, in fact, have concluded
from similar arguments that Kant was primarily a moralist.
4
Hartenstein edition, VIII, p. 533.
204
But we must keep in mind the very special kind of moral
doctrine which Kant proposed. His view of human nature and
its ultimate perfection form an essential part of his ethics.
Moreover, the whole purpose of his moral philosophy is to
explain and justify a particular conception of human des
tiny, and to present the means for its attainment. We must
certainly conclude, therefore, that anthropological con
siderations determine Kant's moral doctrine. As he expli
citly states, morality is the "whole vocation of man."
The later works of Kant again fit neatly into our
anthropological interpretation. The Critique of Judgment
synthesized and confirmed the findings of the first two
Critiques. Then Kant began to bring the speculative cri
tical work down to a more practical level. Many of the
works which followed provided a concrete application of his
thought to the practical problems of human existence.
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793) brought
the Critical Philosophy into direct conflict with estab
lished religious practices— and provoked government cen
sure. "On Everlasting Peace" (1795) presented some of
Kant's conclusions on political matters. The Metaphysic of
Morals provided the basis for a concrete ethical system by
dealing with the two main categories of morality: virtue
205
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l , and j u r i s p r u d e n c e w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a t e . "The C o n t r o v e r s y o f t h e F a c u l t i e s "
a p p l i e d K a n t ' s t h o u g h t t o e d u c a t i o n , and f i n a l l y , t h e
A n t h r o p o l o g i e c o m p l e t e d h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f human a f f a i r s .
It has been suggested that the order of Kant's works
followed precisely the pattern which he desired— that, e.g.,
the Anthropologie was intentionally placed last, in spite
of the earlier thoughts for its publication in 1773. Would
it not be appropriate for Kant to withhold the practical
anthropology until after the appearance of the Metaphysic
of Morals, just as he planned to present his empirical
physics only after a metaphysic of nature?^ Certainly this
ordered descent from the speculative to the practical level
fits well with our interpretation of Kant's work as a
gradual revelation of man in relation to reality. The
Anthropologie serves its purpose well as the final portrayal
of man in the setting of nature and society, while at the
same time reminding him of the destiny which he must
achieve.
I t m u st b e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e v e r y s i m p l i c i t y o f a
^Erdmann suggests the appropriateness of this
order. Reflexionen, I, p. 51.
206
teleological and anthropological interpretation of Kant's
work seems to argue against its acceptance. Kant's thought
is notoriously intricate and complex. It is almost trite
to suggest that his entire system can be reduced to a
theoretical justification of its foundation, and a gradual
revelation of man's position, and destiny, in a teleologi-
cally oriented moral universe. However, we must remember
that Kant himself portrays reason as a cognitive power which
attempts to reduce reality to a single unified system.
Should we not, then, expect his own work to display pre
cisely that simplicity of unity and integrity which his
speculative genius would demand?
One might object to an anthropological interpreta
tion of Kant's work on the basis that it would take little
account of Kant's work in mathematics and science. Such an
objection would seem to be legitimate, since we can be cer
tain that Kant was vitally interested in these disciplines
during the first decade of his teaching career. But, as
Schilpp points out, there is actually no reason to feel
that, because a man devotes himself to a study of physical
nature, he must necessarily lack interest in man. With
^Schilpp, op. cit., p. 16.
207
respect to the early period in question, then, we might
very well determine that both scientific and humanistic
interests held Kant's attention.
It should be noted, however, that Kant did little
work in science and mathematics once the critical spirit
had grasped him--or perhaps we should say, after Rousseau
had enlightened him. The fact is important because the
neglect of these disciplines was not accidental, and it
cannot merely be attributed to Kant's activity in other
areas. Rather, we find that Kant tended to reject his
scientific works as unworthy to be set beside his later
critical writings. When Tieftrunk discussed with him the
possibility of publishing a collection of shorter works,
Kant explicitly requested that all works published prior
to 1770 be omitted from the collection.^ That would
exclude all of the early scientific and mathematical works,
and, therefore, we need not be concerned if the anthropolo
gical interpretation of Kant's thought attributes no great
significance to these projects. The fact may even be seen
as additional evidence for the validity of our position.
Another objection to our interpretation might be
^Hartenstein edition, VIII, p. 812.
208
raised by one who has paid close attention to the nature of
Kant's anthropology, and noted the statements concerning
anthropology which occur in his moral works. The Anthro
pologie is primarily an empirical work, "an interesting
observation study," as Kant remarked in his letter to Herz.
Can we really extend the significance of such a discipline
to the point of seeing in it the roots of speculative and
practical philosophy alike? Would Kant not think it absurd
to base so much upon an empirical discipline?
In his introductory remarks to the Foundation of a
Metaphysic of Morals, Kant mentions that we must have
experience with human nature before we can work out the
details of particular human duties. He refers to this
experience as "practical anthropology."® But he emphasizes
also that such an empirical study cannot serve as the
essential foundation for ethics. Only a priori principles
can provide a base sufficiently solid for the ethical struc
ture . Thus it would seem that anthropology could not serve
as the basic principle of all Kant's work.
®Schriften, IV, p. 388ff. A similar line of
thought is mentioned in the Critique of Pure Reason,
where Kant says that "the metaphysics of morals is really
pure moral philosophy with no underlying basis of anthro
pology or of other empirical conditions." A 841-42,
B 869-70. NKS, 659.
209
To arrive at this conclusion would be perfectly
justified— even necessary— if Kant's conception of anthro
pology were restricted to that of an empirical science.
But as early as our introductory remarks we became aware
that, for Kant, anthropology extended far beyond such
limitations. We need only recall the four questions which
he raised to indicate the proper divisions of philosophy
when considered in its full significance:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man?
The first question is answered by Metaphysics,
the second by Morals, the third by Religion, and
the fourth by Anthropology. In reality, however,
all these might be reckoned under anthropology,
since the first three questions refer to the last.^
Certainly anthropology here is not merely a descriptive
analysis of empirical data. One might almost imply from
Kant's statement that the whole of philosophy is reducible
to anthropology, when the latter is fully comprehended.
Such a conception of anthropology would be perfectly suited
to our interpretation of Kant's work as primarily anthro
pological in character.
^Kant's Introduction to Logic, p. 15.
210
But how seriously did Kant take the division of
philosophy suggested by these four questions? Could the
questions not be considered as simply a foil employed by
Kant for the purpose of working neatly into the material
of his logic lectures? By no means. Kant was not the
type of person to employ deceptive pedagogical techniques
in the lecture hall. And, fortunately, we have his own
statement as evidence that this fourfold division of
philosophy was important to him. In a letter to C. F.
StSudlin (May 1793), Kant mentions the same four questions
as his own plan of organization according to which he was
working out the fields of pure philosophy.10
But the letter suggests additional evidence for our
cause. Kant speaks of the plan as having been formulated a
long time before. We have reason, then, to believe that
he had been following out a plan for many years which would
ultimately culminate in the Anthropologie. It takes little
"Mein schon seit geraumer Zeit gemachter Plan der
mir obliegenden Bearbeitung des Feldes der reinen Philoso-
phie ging auf die AuflOsung der drei Aufgaben: (1) Was
kann ich wissen? (Metaphysik) (2) Was soli ich thun?
(Moral) (3) Was darf ich hoffen? (Religion); welcher
zuletzt die vierte folgen sollte: Was ist der Mensch?
(Anthropologie; tiber die ich schon seit mehr als 20 Jahren
jclhrlich ein Collegium gelesen habe)." Schriften, XI,
p. 429.
211
insight to project this sketch of philosophy upon the work
which Kant had completed by 179 3. The first two questions
(What can I know? What ought I to do?) are perfectly
answered by the three Critiques, each supporting and con
firming the others. And Kant himself tells us that, with
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, he has completed
his answer to the third question.H The Anthropologie at
that time was yet to be published, but the answers to the
first three questions, as related to anthropology, had cer
tainly provided a significant insight into the matter of
human nature and human destiny. We may conclude, therefore,
that Kant had consciously projected a system of philosophy
which explored man through reason, established the prin
ciples for the moral and practical concerns of society, and
culminated in a complete analysis of man in his world.
Anthropological interests took hold of Kant as a young man,
and governed the major aspects of his philosophic develop
ment. They determined the plan for his system, and the
form which it finally attained.
We e m p h a s iz e a g a i n t h a t i t w as n o t s u f f i c i e n t , i n
Hlbid.
Kant's thought, merely to present to the world the concep
tion of man which Rousseau had revealed to him. Rather,
it was necessary for him, as a moral man and a speculative
philosopher, to devise a complete system which would
justify that view of man, and, if possible, establish
it beyond doubt. In a sense, then, our entire project
has been nothing more than an extensive explication and
clarification of the plan which Kant presents to us in
his four questions. And our conclusion can only be that,
in the system of Kant, the first three questions are indeed
related to the fourth.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
I®
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Creator Van De Pitte, Jr. (frederick patrick)

Core Title The Anthropological Basis Of Kant'S Philosophy

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Advisor Werkmeister, William H. (committee chair), Belle, Rene F. (committee member), Long, Wilbur H. (committee member)

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