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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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Representation Theory And Apportionment Models: A Study Of California Constituencies
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Representation Theory And Apportionment Models: A Study Of California Constituencies
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This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 6 7 -1 3 ,0 4 3 SOHNER, Charles Paine, 1928- REPRESENTATION THEORY AND APPORTIONMENT MODELS: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CONSTITUENCIES. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, general University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan REPRESENTATION THEORY AND APPORTIONMENT MODELS: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CONSTITUENCIES by Charles Paine Sohner A D i s s e r t a t i o n Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In P a r t i a l F u l f i l l m e n t of the Requirements 'for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ( P o l i t i c a l Science) June 1967 UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ............................................ under the direction of h.\s— Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y ................. Dean Date J u n e 5___l?67 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairman CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES..............................................................................................................vi ii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION, SETTING, AND RATIONALE ........................ 1 Some Research Foundations ................................................... 2 i Assumpti ons Hypotheses The Context of Apportionment .. .. . . . . 7 E g a l i t a r i a n i s m Urbani zati on Judicial activism Cond itioni ng Factors .............................................................. 12 The i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework The p o l i t i c a l framework The h i s t o r i c a l framework Forces and Terminology ........................................................ 15 T h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s Empirical and t e x t u a l l i m i t a t i o n s D e f i n i t i o n of c o n s t r u c t s i O r g anization .................................................................................... 20 B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l Motes .............................................................. 22 Textbooks P e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e Court d e c is io n s Empirical a n a l y s i s T h e o r e t i c a l t r e a t m e n t s Government p u b l i c a t i o n s Personal o b s e r v a t i o n s Page I I . DEMOCRACY AS A REPRESENTATIONAL GOAL: ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS ............................................. 30 Normative Assumptions of Democracy ....................... 31 Equali ty Freedom Majorit y rule Implementational Requirements of Democracy . 48 Compromi se Competi ti on E f f i c i e n t machinery Competent o f f i c i a l s I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ................................................................... 54 Compromise and c o m p eti ti o n Requirements and assumptions E q u a l i t y , freedom, and m a j o r i t y rule E f f i c i e n c y and competence Seven R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l Goals ........................................ 62 I I I , REPRESENTATION FUNCTIONS AND THE ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE IMPERATIVE ......................................................................... 64 The Nature of L e g i s l a t i v e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . 66 The h i s t o r y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n The f u n c t io n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n The One-Man, One-Vote Model . . . ............................ 77 B o ss-ru le The f e d e ra l plan Reduction of e x p e r t i s e D i s t r i c t anonymity M ajo rit y r u le and m i n o r i t y r i g h t s Rural o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Diminution of r a c i a l i n e q u i t i e s Divided government Dependence upon n a t i o n a l government Final assessment IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS IN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 121 The Functional M ajo rity Model ........................................ 122 i i i Page Gerrymanderi ng Minority r i g h t s Uni camerali sm Final assessment The Vigorous M in ority Model 138 Bi came r a l i sm P r o p o rt i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Final assessment The Informed Membership Model 149 The l e g i s l a t o r as agent The l e g i s l a t o r as t r u s t e e The l e g i s l a t o r as " p o l i t i c o " Final assessment The Experienced Membership Model 166 The r a t e of t u r n o v e r The problem of d i l i g e n c e Final assessment The Accommodation of I n t e r e s t s Model . . . . 176 Legi s l a t i v e c o m p r o m i s e Concurrent m a j o r i t y Marginal d i s t r i c t s Final assessment ' The R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s Model . . . . 184 I n t e r e s t - d o m i n a t e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s Safe d i s t r i c t s Functional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Final assessment The Local R e p r e s e n t a t i o n Model .............................. 204 Communities of i n t e r e s t D i s t r i c t o r i e n t a t i o n Com petitiveness r e v i s i t e d Final assessment The Party R e s p o n s i b i l i t y Model........................................ 230 - n i Party cohesion P a r t i e s as p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s i Page P a r t i e s as c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power Final assessment Conclus i ons 247 The p r e f e r r e d models A normative assessment V. THE MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS OF REAPPORTIONMENT . 254 The fed e ra l system Sep aratio n of powers Bi camerali sm Personal ambition P a r t i s a n l o y a l t i e s Demographic D e m a n d s ........................... 312 S e c t i o n a l i sm Urbani sm Press ure groups Publi c o p i n ion Methodological Resources ................................................... 360 Academic ad v iso r s Computers C o n c l u s i o n s .................................................................................................367 The courts The p a r t i e s I n t e r e s t groups The f e a s i b l e models VI. THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE: A CONSTITUENCY Legal Compulsion 254 The j u d i c i a l f in d i n g s Controversy and compliance The case of C a l i f o r n i a P o l i t i c a l P re ss u re s 275 TYPOLOGY 375 M e t h o d o l o g y ........................... . D i s t r i c t c a t e g o r i z a t i o n 375 v Page D i s t r i c t a n a l y s i s Rol1 c a l l analys i s Personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Apportionment Models 386 Party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Informed membership One-man, one-vote Vigorous m i n o rity Experienced membership Functional m a j o r i t y Accommodation of i n t e r e s t s Local government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s D i s t r i c t Types .............................................................................. 417 Safe d i s t r i c t s Marginal d i s t r i c t s Heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s Homogenous d i s t r i c t s H et ero g en eo u s-safe d i s t r i c t s Homogenous-marginal d i s t r i c t s Other t y p o l o g i e s Hypotheses: The Empirical Tests ............................ 430 Bicameral j u s t i f i c a t i o n Gerrymanderi ng Safety and p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Homogeneity and s a f e t y Homogeneity and ex pe rie nce H e t e ro g en e ity and edu cation H e t e ro g en e ity and accommodation C o n c l u s i o n s ................................................................................................433 Democratic theory R e p r e s e n ta tio n goals P r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s Cons ti tu en cy typology The d i a l e c t i c of democracy BIBLIOGRAPHY 444 APPENDIX A 463 APPENDIX B 465 vi Page 467 469 471 473 475 477 480 482 484 486 C . D . E . F . G . H . I . J . K . L . LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Size and P a r t i s a n Composition of L e g i s l a t i v e C a t e g o r i e s .........................................................................................380 2. B i p a r t i s a n O p p o s i ti o n , P a r t i s a n D e v i a t i o n , and Exremism as Refle c te d in Roll Call Votes . . . 387 3. Median Income and Population D i s p a r i t y ........................ 392 4. Expe rience, E d u c ation, and L e g i s l a t i v e Tenure . 400 I v i i i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION, SETTING, AND RATIONALE When the Supreme Court in 1962 proclaimed j u d i c i a l custody over the apportionment of s e a t s in s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , a noted p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t c a l l e d i t the "most importan t d e c is io n sin ce Marbury v. Madi so n " (1 803). 1 When Congress in 1964 s e r i o u s l y c o n s id e re d a c tio n to c h a lle n g e the C o u r t 's p r e r o g a t i v e s in t h i s m a t t e r , a United S t a t e s Senator viewed i t as "a b a t t l e f o r the p o l i t i c a l c o n tro l of the n a ti on . . . which will a f f e c t the l i v e s and w e lfa re of every l i v i n g person for the g e n e r a t i o n s to come."2 Although, as is of te n the c a s e , the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t approved what the Sen ator d e p l o r e d , they were agreed on the c e n t r a l importance of app ortion men t to the American system of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government. This is a study of s e v e ra l p o s s i b l e systems of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and the app ortion men t p a t t e r n s most conducive xRuth C. S i l v a , quoted in C. Herman P r i t c h e t t , "Prayers and P o l i t i c s : The Supreme Court, 1961-1962," 1963-1964 American Government Annual, ed. Jack W. Pelt aso n CN. V.: Holt, Rin eh art and Winston, 1 963), p. 14. 2Sen. George D. Aiken ( R - V t . ) , quoted by David Lawrence, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 4. 1 to t h e i r a t t a i n m e n t . It is an a tte m p t to r e l a t e the vast bulk of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e o ry to the a s c e r t a i n a b l e e f f e c t s of l e g i s l a t i v e ap p o rtio n m en t. No such e f f o r t can be s i g n i f i c a n t w ithout a source of em p irica l d a t a , d erived in t h i s study from the C a l i f o r n i a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . Some Research Foundations Like most r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s , t h i s one is based upon a kind of i n v e s t i g a t o r y b l u e p r i n t which in volves both b e l i e f and s p e c u l a t i o n . I t seems a p p r o p r i a t e to make each as c l e a r as p o s s i b l e . Assumptions. --The b e l i e f in the importance of apportionment is s u s t a i n e d by four assumptions which are perhaps s e l f - e v i d e n t but which, n o n e t h e l e s s , should be affirm ed e x p l i c i t l y . F i r s t , l e g i s l a t i v e bodies c o n s t i t u t e " p o s s i b l y the most v i t a l branch of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democratic gov ern m e n t . " 3 This would seem e s p e c i a l l y t r u e to the e x t e n t t h a t they are r e s p o n s i b l e to and r e f l e c t i o n s of p u b l i c op in io n. 3C. C. Young, The L e g i s l a t u r e of C a l i f o r n i a (San F r a n c isc o : Commonwealth Club of Cal i f o rm ’a',' 1 943), p. 1. Young served as Speaker of the Assembly, L i e u t e n a n t Governor and Governor of C a l i f o r n i a . L e s l i e Lipson w r i t e s , in the same v e i n , :i0f a l l branches of government, t h i s is the one in which democracy occupies the prid e of p l a c e . . . Locke con sid e re d i t the supreme organ of the s t a t e . The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the United S t a t e s l i s t s the Congress f i r s t when e s t a b l i s h i n g the t h r e e b ra n ch e s. Mill l i k e w i s e a s s e r t e d the primacy of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e chamber." The Democratic C i v i l i z a t i o n (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P re ss, t mr: p"T"435": ----------------- 3 Second, the " p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of a p p o r t i o n ment is t h a t the next e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s may d i f f e r because of i t . " 4 So to o, l o g i c a l l y , may the kind of l e g i s l a t i o n s u b seq u e n tly e n a c t e d . 5 T h ird , the d e t e r m in a ti o n by the c o u r ts t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s should be of equal p o p u la tio n does not re so lv e the sometimes acrimonious d i s p u t e s over t h e i r sha pe , demoaraphic composition or p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l i c o m p l e x i o n . 6 Fourth, s ta n d a r d s by which d i s t r i c t boundaries might be determined may be m utually e x c l u s i v e in im p le m e n ta tio n : e . g . , re sp o n s i v e n e s s to s h i f t s in p u bli c opinion may preclud e the a t t a i n m e n t of l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e rie n ce and s e n i o r i t y . 7 4Baker v. C a r r , 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962). J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r in d i s s e n t at 768. i 5The au thors of a p io n e e rin g study of four s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s a f f i r m t h a t " l e g i s l a t i o n and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . " John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legi s 1a t i ve System : E x p lo r a tio n s in L e g i s l a t i v e Behavior ( N . Y.: John W i 1ey & Sons, I n c . , 1962), p. 267. They go on to s u g g e st t h a t the " r e l a t i o n s h i p between the process of s e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s and the modes and consequences of l e g i s l a t i v e b ehavior . . . o f f e r wide and f e r t i l e f i e l d s f o r em p irica l r e s e a r c h . " I b i d . , p. 269 . ( 6"A s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e could make every . . . d i s t r i c t ap proximately equal in p o p u l a t i o n , but s t i l l carve up the s t a t e (so) . . . t h a t some d i s t r i c t s remain h o p e l e s s l y n o n - c o m p e t i t i v e . " James M. Burns and Jack W. P e l t a s o n , Government by the P e o p l e , f i f t h ed. r e v i s e d (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : Prenti c e - H a l 1, I n c . , 1 963), p. 379 . 7In c o n firm a tio n of t h i s assumption, Alfred 4 Subsequent pages w ill c i t e data r e l a t i v e to th ese as sum ptions, but i t wi ll s u f f i c e now to note only t h a t they p r o j e c t an obvious paradox: appo rtionmen t is im p o rtan t but i t s problems are not y e t solved . Hypotheses. — This paradox c r e a t e s an e x c i t i n g l y ric h r e p o s i t o r y f o r s p e c u l a t i o n . The hypotheses which follow seem e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and p a r t i c u l a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e of the e m p iric a l t e s t i n g r e p o r t e d in subsequent c h a p t e r s . 1. The more in c om pati ble the s ta n d a rd s by which d i s t r i c t bo undaries are ju d g ed , the g r e a t e r is the i u s t i f i c a t ion fo r a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e in which d i f f e r e n t s ta n d a rd s might be a p p r o x i mated in each of the two houses. 2. The more p a r t i s a n the gerrymander!'ng a t l e a s t of some d i s t r i c t s , the g r e a t e r is the assu ran ce t h a t t h e r e wi ll be both a workable m a j o r i t y and a s u f f i c i e n t l y s tr o n g m i n o r i t y . 3. The s a f e r the d i s t r i c t s for incum bents, the s t r o n g e r are the fo rc e s which make f o r p a r ty respons i b i 1i t y . de Grazia p o i n t s out t h a t " s u c c e s s f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . by i t s very n a t u r e must have d i s p a r a t e elements in i t : one, f o r i n s t a n c e , to compose . . . a community s p i r i t t h ro ughout the s o c i e t y , and a n o th e r to c a r r y out s p e c i a l ized ta s k s of g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t to p a r t s of s o c i e t y than to the whole." Public and Republic (N.Y.: Al fred A. Knopp, 1951), pp. 2 5 T -Y 5 T : 5 4. The more economically and e t h n i c a l l y homogenous the d i s t r i c t s a r e , the s a f e r the d i s t r i c t s become, and the more d e s t r u c t i v e to e f f e c t i v e i n t e r - p a r t y c o m p e titio n . 5. The more homogenous the d i s t r i c t s a r e , the g r e a t e r is the expe rie n c e accumulated by the i ncumbents. 6. The more heterogeneous the d i s t r i c t s a r e , the hig h er is the e d u c a tio n a l level of the i ncumbents. 7. The more heterogeneous the d i s t r i c t s a r e , the g r e a t e r are the c o n f l i c t i n g p r e s s u r e s upon the incumbents f o r the accommodation of group i n t e r e s t s . / While r e s e a r c h is borne of devotion to e m p iric a l f a c t , i t is r a i s e d in d e d i c a t i o n to c e r t a f n value j u d g e ments. The hypotheses j u s t enumerated b e t r a y th ese normative committments. I m p l i c i t in them is a s e r i e s of b e l i e f s b e t t e r e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged than s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y c o n c e a le d . These b e l i e f s are not only acknowledged but r a t i o n a l i z e d in Chapter I I . N o n eth e le s s, t h e i r re l e v a n c e to the s t a t e d hypotheses seem to r e q u i r e an immediate en um eration. I t is b e lie v e d t h a t d i v e r s e goals should be r e c o n c i l e d when p o s s i b l e , t h a t m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n are each d e s i r a b l e , t h a t p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is g e n e r a l l y good, t h a t ex perienced incumbents are u s u a l l y able l e g i s l a t o r s , and t h a t a l au d a b le system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n should produce educated incumbents motivat ed to harmonize and accommodate c o n f l i c t i n g group i n t e r e s t s . ' These b e l i e f s not only d i c t a t e d the s e l e c t i o n of the above hypotheses but a l s o provided the t h e s i s upon which the v a l i d i t y of t h i s e n t i r e p r o j e c t r e s t s : t h a t normative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a n d a r d s , s u s c e p t i b l e of im ple mentation within the C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t , can be useful guides in the appo rtionmen t of l e g i s l a t i v e di s - t r i c t s . This work, t h e n , has two major o b j e c t i v e s : The d e t e r m in a ti o n of ideal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ta n d a rd s and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e apportionm ent models which wi ll produce incumbent beh av ior most n e a r l y in accord with those ideal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a n d a r d s . The f i r s t is norma t i v e ; the second e m p i r i c a l . Hopefully, the r e s u l t will a lso be p r u d e n t i a l , i . e . , w ith in the realm of f e a s i b i l i t y , a t l e a s t in C a l i f o r n i a . If so, one might modestly hope t h a t Riemer's ideal of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y - - t h e u n i t i n g of what ought to be, what i s , and what can b e - - w i l l have been approached, w i t h i n a very l i m i t e d scope, j u s t a l i t t l e more i c l o s e l y than b e f o r e . 8 8Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1962), p. v i i i . The Context of Apportionment An act r e a l l o c a t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s is but a component of a l a r g e r drama, c o n d i t i o n e d by the whole s o c ia l play of which i t is a p a r t . I t is a f f e c t e d by the h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n g , i n f l u e n c e d by the p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s , modified by the i d e o l o g i c a l ba ck-dro p, and a l t e r e d by the demographic, i n s t i t u t i o n a l and legal props which f i l l the e l e c t o r a l s t a g e . And j u s t as the a ct is determined by the p la y , so the whole p r oductio n is i r r e v o c a b l y a l t e r e d by the q u a l i t y of the a c t . To abandon the metaphor, rea pportio nm ent is a f f e c t e d by the whole fo rc e of governmental and s o c ia l i n f l u e n c e s . And i t , in t u r n , has a s i m i l a r and r e c i p r o c a l e f f e c t . The c u r r e n t c o n t r o v e r s i e s in t h i s f i e l d , sparked by r e c e n t Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , have an e s p e c i a l l y d i v e r s e ar ra y of causes and c o n d i t i o n i n g i n f l u e n c e s which must be a s s e s s e d in ord e r to understand the i s s u e s at s ta k e . Eg a 1i t a r i a n i s m . - - I t is wise, p erhaps, to begin with a d i s c u s s i o n of e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , an i d e o l o g i c a l force which has done much to mold the form in which the ap portionment problem is now found. The h i s t o r y of American government is l a r g e l y one of the expansion of the p o l i t i c a l b a s is of power. The e l e c t o r a t e , in o t h e r words, has been s t e a d i l y broadened. Pro p erty ownership and the payment of poll taxes g r a d u a l l y have been e l i m i n a t e d as voting r e q u i r e ments. The s u f f e r a g e has been slowly extended to Negroes, women, and, in four s t a t e s , those under 21 ye a rs of age. Not only have more people become v o t e r s , but the v o te rs have been p e r m it t e d to e l e c t an i n c r e a s i n g l y large perc e n ta g e of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . Thus, p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e has tra nsf orm ed the e l e c t o r a l c o l l e g e from a major i n s t r u ment of e l i t e e x c l u s i v e n e s s i n t o a mere minor impediment to m a j o r i t y r u l e . S i m i l a r l y , the s i x t e e n t h amendment has t r a n s f e r r e d a u t h o r i t y fo r the s e l e c t i o n of United S t a t e s Senators from s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s to the whole e l e c t o r a t e . These changes r e p r e s e n t nothing l e s s than the metamorphosis of our p o l i t i c a l system from an a r i s t o c r a c y to a democracy, from m i n o ri t y to m a j o r i t y r u l e . In C a l i f o r n i a , t h i s tre n d has been even more pronounced than in most of i t s s i s t e r s t a t e s , as evidenced by i t s penchant f o r " d i r e c t democracy" d e v i c e s , such as the i n i t i a t i v e and referendum. And t h e r e is one p e r v a si v e t e n e t which u n d e r l i e s all th e se changes: J e f f e r s o n ' s dictum t h a t a l l men are c r e a t e d equal and hence should possess equal p o l i t i c a l power. The contemporary potency of t h i s dictum, of c o u r s e , is most ap p aren t in the l a r g e l y s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k of the c i v i l r i g h t s movement upon s e g r e g a t i o n and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 9 9For a commentary on the analogy between the s e g r e g a t i o n and apportionment d i s p u t e s , see C. Herman P r i t c h e t t , "Equal P r o t e c t i o n and the Urban M a j o r i t y , " APSR, LVIII (Dec., 1 964), 869-875. Cf. Alfred de G ra z ia , If t h i s creed of e q u a l i t y is to be f u l l y im p le mented, i t means t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s must be ap p o rtio n e d so t h a t a l l men have an equal vo te. In t h i s way, e g a l i t a r i a n words are given p o l i t i c a l meaning. I t is a l o g i c a l f u l f i l l m e n t of a long and r e p u t a b l e p h i l o s o p h i c committment. Without cognizance of t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l impulse toward e q u a l i t y as an im po rtan t element of the appo rtion men t c o n t e x t , the p r e s e n t c o n tr o v e rs y is i ncomprehensi b 1e . U r b a n i z a t i o n .--A second i n g r e d i e n t of the a p p o r tionment con te x t is demographic in c h a r a c t e r and i t s most d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e may be s ummari zed as u r b a n i z a t i o n . As the p o p u l a t i o n has moved from ru ra l to m e t ro p o l i t a n a r e a s , r e f l e c t i n g the economic s h i f t from farms to f a c t o r i e s , i d e o l o g i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n i s m has r e q u i r e d t h a t the bo unda ries of l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s be changed to provide more c o n s t i t u e n c i e s in the c i t i e s and suburbs and fewer in the " c o u n t r y . " This tre n d in r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n is as old as the government i t s e l f , r e f l e c t i n g the impact, no doubt, of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . "When the United S t a t e s became a n a t i o n , more than n i n e - t e n t h s of the people l i v e d in the c o u n t r y ; . . . now, about t w o - t h i r d s l i v e in Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i ve Government (N.Y.: F r e d e ric k A. P r a e g e r , 1963), pp. 1 E >1 -153. 10 c i t i e s . " 10 I f a n y t h i n g , the tre n d has a c c e l e r a t e d in re c en t y e a r s , with i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t r u r a l - f a r m p o p u la tio n dropped by ten per cent between 1950 and 1960, while the t o t a l n a t i o n a l p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d about s i x t e e n per c e n t . 11 The s i t u a t i o n in C a l i f o r n i a p a r a l l e l e d n a t i o n a l developments. "By 1910 . . . the flow of p o p u la tio n to urban areas had become e v i d e n t , " 12 and what was then merely obvious is now co m pel ling. Between 1950 and 1960, ru ra l p o p u l a t i o n in C a l i f o r n i a had in c r e a se d by 4.8 per cent: while the t o t a l s t a t e grew by ten times t h a t r a t e . 13 Other demographic changes~are i m p o r t a n t , a l s o , i n c lu d in g the d r i f t from " c e n t r a l " c i t i e s to sub’u rb s, the growing po p u latio n advantage of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , and the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s . These wi ll be t r e a t e d in subsequent c h a p t e r s , but they occupy a su b o r d i n a t e p o s i t i o n to the c e n t r a l f a c t of u r b a n i z a t i o n . Few phenomena have p e r s i s t e d so c o n ti n u o u s l y in the h i s t o r y 10Thomas R. Carskadon arid George Sou le, USA in New Pi mens i ons (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1 957), p. 81k 1 1 I b i d *» P • 12 • 12Ca1i f o r n i a , Report of the Assembly In te rim Committee on E l e c t i o n s and Re a p p o rtio n m en t, C a l l f o r n i a Assembly, 195T, p. Z 1 T . 13Adolf Stone, e d . , C a l i f o r n i a Informat ion Almanac (Lakewood, C a l i f . : C a l i f o r n i a Information Almanac C o . f Inc. , 1 964), p. 114. / of both state and na tio n9 and few are so essential to an understanding of apportionment. 14 Judicial ac tiv ism . - - L i ke many p o l i t ic a l phenomena, l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t i n g takes place within the confines of constitutional and legal requirements as enunciated by th a ^ ^ -, courts. But courts may be either oblivious to the sweepingC currents of modern l i f e (such as egalitarianism and urbanization), or they may launch their judicial craft upon the mainstream, and even attempt to a lter or accelerate its flow. The Supreme Court, in recent years, has chosen the la t t e r a lt e r n a t i v e , and this choice, commonly labeled judicial activism, has come to characterize the legal con text of present-day apportionment. 15 Indeed, apportionment problems probably would not e x is t today, mid-way between federal censuses, had not reapportionment demands been sanctioned by Baker v. Carr, 16 Wes berry v. Sanders, 17 14"The es sence of the app ortionm en t problem . . . is simple. We l i v e in a r a p i d l y changing s o c i e t y with a h ig h ly mobile p o p u l a t i o n . L e g i s l a t i v e c ontrol by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of ru ra l ar eas was t h r e a t e n e d by the growth of modern c i t i e s and l a t e r of m e t r o p o l i t a n c e n t e r s . " Malcolm J e w e l l , The S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e (N.Y.: Random House, 1962), p p . 17-i t :--------- --------- 15The l i t e r a t u r e on the d i s p u t e between " j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s t s " and the proponents of j u d i c i a l " s e l f - r e s t r a i n t " is too vast to permit c i t a t i o n her e. See, e . g . , John P. Roche and Leonard W. Levy, e d s . , The J u d i c i a r y (N.Y.: H a rc o u rt, Brace & World, I n c . , 1964), pp. 77-107. 160p. c i t . , 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962). 1 7376 U.S. 1 (1964). 12 Re.yno1 ds v. Sims18 and the o t h e r d e c i s i o n s stemming from these leading c a se s. As long as judges were w i l l i n g to indulge the various s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s by viewing c o n t r o v e r s i e s a r i s i n g under t h e i r apportionment laws as " p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s , " immune from j u d i c i a l rev iew, old d i s t r i c t i n g systems might be p e r p e t u a t e d i n d e f i n i t e l y , impervious to i d e o l o g i c a l or demographic t i d e s . But when, in the e a r l y 1 9 6 0 's , a Supreme Court m a j o r i t y was w i l l i n g to e l e v a t e i t s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n (and e s p e c i a l l y of the equal p r o t e c t i o n c la use of Amendment Fourteen) above the d i s c r e t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e , reap p o rtio n m en t of l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s became mandatory. More will be s aid l a t e r about the le ga l r e s t r i c t i o n s now imposed upon the ap p o r tionment p r o c e s s , but i t must be noted here t h a t the wi 11 ingness of the c o u r ts to assume j u r i s d i c t i o n over the m a t t e r is a v i t a l component of the s u b j e c t under d i s c u s sio n . Cond ition ing Factors The fore going d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t a p p o r t i o n ment c o n t r o v e r s i e s now p r e v a l e n t stem from the co nfluence of t h re e developmental s t r e a m s , the i d e o l o g i c a l committment to e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , the demographic s h i f t to urban a r e a s , 1884 S. Ct. 1362 (1964). 13 and the ro le of j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m r e c e n t l y embraced by a I Supreme Court m a j o r i t y . Important as th e se f a c t o r s may be to a compre hension of c u r r e n t c o n t r o v e r s i e s , any system of r e p r e s e n t a ti o n is a f f e c t e d by a number of a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. --Apportionment is a phenomenon un iquely l e g i s l a t i v e in c h a r a c t e r , y e t i t should be s t u d i e d in r e f e r e n c e to the o t h e r agencies of government as w e l l . The s t a t e e x e c u t i v e , f o r example, headed by a governor u n i v e r s a l l y chosen by a s t a t e - w i d e e l e c t o r a l m a j o r i t y , is a form idab le o b s t a c l e to any l e g i s l a t u r e , however g r e a t l y i t may be weighted in favor of m i n o r i t i e s , ru ra l or o t h e r w i s e . 19 The c o u r t s , whatever the degree of a c t i v i s m which impells t h e i r r u l i n g s , have been viewed as b a s ti o n s of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t even the most power ful l e g i s l a t i v e a s s a u l t s . O f f i c i a l b u r e a u c ra c y , p r o t e c t e d by i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r i n g e n t c i v i l s e r v i c e b a r r i e r s , c o n s t i t u t e s s t i l l an o th er impediment to lawmakers' p r e s s u r e s . And l e g i s l a t o r s , in C a l i f o r n i a and a dozen o t h e r s t a t e s , must share s t a t u t o r y power with an e l e c t o r a t e empowered to make i t s own laws through the i n i t i a t i v e 19For an a n a l y s i s of the importance of the e xecu t i v e as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of m a j o r i t y opinion see de G razia , Apporti onment . . . , op. ci t . , pp. 1 75-1 84. In somewhat tne same v ein , Carl J . Fri edri ch p o in ts out t h a t "in the United S t a t e s the s e p a r a t i o n of powers presupposes a v a r i e t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1946), p. 265. 14 process.^ American s o c i e t y is one with many i n t e r e s t s , and the l e g i s l a t u r e , however i t may be a p p o r t i o n e d , is not the only agency " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " of a l l i t s l e g i t i m a t e con c e rn s. T h e r e f o r e , to change l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y to j e o p a r d i z e whatever balance had p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e d among a r a t h e r i n t r i c a t e complex of m o r e - o r - l e s s c o o r d i n a t e governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l framework. --No view of l e g i s l a t i v e appo rtion men t can ignore the power s t r u g g l e which i t so c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s . J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r faced the m a t t e r c andidly when he wrote t h a t "In every s t r a n d of t h i s c o m p lic a te d , i n t r i c a t e web of values (which surrounds l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t) meet ( s i c ) the contend ing forc es of p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c s . " 20 As documentation will subse- i q u e n tly show, t h e r e are s e c t i o n a l , economic, e t h n i c , p e r s o n a l , and p a r t y r i v a l r i e s which determine the l o c a t i o n of d i s t r i c t b o u n d a r ie s. These d i v e r s e f a c t o r s sometimes r e i n f o r c e one a n o th e r and on o t h e r occasio ns c o n f l i c t . They are s t i f l e d with varying degrees of success by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and j u d i c i a l s t i p u l a t i o n s , b u t , however muted, they are always p r e s e n t . Yet a l l is not s e l f i s h n e s s nor a v a r i c e in t h i s a r e n a , and r e a l i s m must not be mistaken f o r cynicism. For with c o n f l i c t , American p o l i t i c s produces compromise and 20Baker v. C a r r , op. ci t . , 768. 15 cohesion as w e l l . Both may be d i s c e rn e d in the a p p o r t i o n ment p ro c e ss. The h i s t o r i c a l framework. - - H i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s is r e q u i r e d by s t a r e d e c i s i s no m a t t e r how bold the in n o v a t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r t may be. Population changes compel a look a t previous demo graphic c o n d i t i o n s . A Republican d i c t a t e d " gerrymander" of 1951 is a l l e g e d to be the p rovocatio n f o r a Democratic " r e d i s t r i c t i n g " ten y e a r s l a t e r . Empirical data on the e f f e c t s of p r e s e n t appo rtionmen t plans are so meager as to n e c e s s i t a t e the a n a l y s i s of prev ious c o n d i t i o n s . To c o n s id e r appo rtionmen t i n t e l l i g e n t l y , th en , r e q u i r e s a m u l t i - d i m e n s io n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , u r b a n i z a t i o n and j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m seem to loom l a rg e in the c u r r e n t p i c t u r e , and thus emphasize the importance of i d e o l o g i c a l , demographic and legal f a c t o r s r e s p e c t i v e l y . But they must not be p e r m it t e d to obscure the c o n t i n u i n g and p e r v a siv e e f f e c t s of long-term i n s t i t u t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l , and h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s . Focus and Terminology This study seeks to r e l a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n th eo ry and apportionm ent a l t e r n a t i v e s . I t s a r e a , however, has been narrowed in the r e s p e c t s summarized below. T h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s .--Emphasis here is not so much on general r e p r e s e n t a t i o n th eo ry as on t h a t which is 16 a s s o c i a t e d most commonly with democratic p o l i t i c a l p h i l o sophy. Within the realm of democr atic t h e o r y , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of contemporary p e r t i n e n c e have forced an emphasis upon r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t r e f l e c t i o n on the n a t u r e of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e s s . F i n a l l y , s c a n t a t t e n t i o n has been given those t h e o r i e s , however m e r i t o r i o u s , which are u n f e a s i b l e in the near f u t u r e because pragmatic p o l i t i c s i n d i c a t e s they stand no chance of being t r i e d . Empirical and t e x t u a l 1 i m i t a t i o n s . - - E x c e p t for general background m a t e r i a l s , t h r e e data l i m i t a t i o n s have been s e l f - i m p o s e d . G e o g r a p h i c a l l y , the p r e s e n t work c o n c e n t r a t e s on appo rtionmen t in C a l i f o r n i a . In time, i t s t u d i e s the n a t u r e and e f f e c t s of the 1961 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t , with some a t t e n t i o n devoted to those of 1951 and 1965 as well. I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , i t p r e c lu d e s a n a l y s i s of c o n g r e s siona l app ortion men t in favor of an e v a l u a t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e a t s in both houses of the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , Senate and Assembly. D e f i n i t i o n of c o n s t r u c t s . --An a tt em pt has been made to avoid e s o t e r i c language whenever p o s s i b l e and to e l i m i n a t e u s e le s s d i s t i n c t i o n s . N o n e th e le s s, a few c l a r i f i c a t i o n s are in order re g a rd in g c e r t a i n terms and concepts which have been employed f r e q u e n t l y through out the work. "Constituency" may be d e f in e d as "the v o te r s in a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i s t r i c t ; a l s o , the d i s t r i c t 17 r e p r e s e n t e d . " 21 The word appears th roughout t h i s e f f o r t in usual p r e fe r e n c e to " d i s t r i c t " f o r sev eral re a so n s. It tends to emphasize the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the po p u lati o n of an a r e a , r a t h e r than the area i t s e l f , e s p e c i a l l y in terms of the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of such demographic f a c t o r s . I t s t r e s s e s , a l s o , the r e p r e s e n t a t i ve o b l i g a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t o r , which seems e s p e c i a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e in a study of appo rtio nmen t. F i n a l l y , c o n s t i t u e n c y is a more s p e c i f i c word than d i s t r i c t , and is l e s s f r e q u e n t l y used as a synonym for such non-governmental u n i t s as "region" or " a re a ." " R e p r e s e n t a t io n theory" is used here in r e fe r e n c e to ideas re g a rd in g the fu n c tio n of e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t o r s . "To r e p r e s e n t " is "to serve with d e l e g a t e d or deputed a u t h o r i t y , as in a l e g i s l a t i v e body," and " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " i s the r e p r e s e n t i n g of a c e r t a i n number, c l a s s or i n t e r e s t in a l e g i s l a t i v e body; a l s o , the system of choosing d e l e g a t e s to r e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u e n t s , as in a l e g i s l a t u r e . 22 21 Web ster's C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y , f i f t h ed. ( S p r i n g f i e l d , Mass.: 5"! C\ Me r r i am Co. , 1 941 ) , p. 217. Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg also observe t h a t a l e g i s l a t o r ' s d i s t r i c t "is sometimes r e f e r r e d to as the member's c o n s t i t u e n c y . " The American P o l i t i c a l D ic tio n a r y (N.Y.: H olt, R inehart and Winston, 1 962), p". 128. 22Webster* s , op. c i t . , p. 845 . F r i e d r i c h p r e f e r s Robert von Mohl's d e f i n i t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which he quotes as "the process through which the i n f l u e n c e of . . . the e n t i r e c i t i z e n r y . . . upon governmental action i s , with t h e i r ex pressed a p p ro v al, e x e r c i s e d on t h e i r b e h a l f by 18 In one s p e c i a l i z e d d i c t i o n a r y , the " R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Govern ment" e n t r y is followed by the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t one th eory holds t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should e x e r c i s e his own i n t e l l i g e n t d i s c r e t i o n in reach ing d e c i s i o n s ; an o th e r views the ro le of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e as an agent of the people who is expected to vote according to t h e i r wishes and i n t e r e s t s . 23 "Theory," alone or in c o n t e x t , wi ll be used in the d e s c r i p t i v e sense upon o c c a s i o n , with r e f e r e n c e to an e x p l a n a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s . More commonly, i t wi ll ca rry normative or p r e s c r i p t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s , as in the c o n t e x t j u s t quoted re g a rd in g what the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "should" d o . 24 Very broadly s p e a k in g , "theo ry" in Riemer's u s a g e 25 is i t s e l f the o b j e c t i v e of t h i s e n t i r e work. Care wil l be taken to avoid the p i t f a l l s of ambiguity which are i n h e r e n t in the word through c o n te x tu a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n each time i t is used. Why has so p o t e n t i a l l y d e c e p t i v e a term been employed a t a l l ? In p a r t , as an almost i n e v i t a b l e con- I cession of i t s general c u r re n c y , in equal measure because i t s very v e r s a t i l i t y gives i t n e a r l y i n v a l u a b l e l i t e r a r y a small number among them, with binding e f f e c t on those r e p r e s e n t e d . " Op. ci t . , p. 260 . 23Plano and Greenberg, op. c i t . , p. 13. 24For an a n a l y s i s of va rious " t h e o r i e s " of * " t h e o r y , " see Thomas P. J e n k in , The Study of P o l i t i c a l Theory (N.Y.: Random House, 1 955 ) , e s p . pp. 1 - 1 2. 25Supra, p. 6. 19 u s e f u l n e s s , and p r i m a r i l y because so g e n e r i c a word is of te n uniquel y f u n c t i o n a l in i t s very bre ad th . "Apportionment" means, f o r p r e s e n t p u r p o se s , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e a t s in a l e g i s l a t i v e body among the component elements of a t e r r i t o r i a l or demographic u n i t . In most i n s t a n c e s , i t r e f e r s to the d e t e r m in a ti o n of geo gr ap hic boun daries from which l e g i s l a t o r s are to be e l e c t e d (o fte n c a l l e d d i s t r i c t i n g ) as we 11 as to the a l l o c a t i o n of s e a t s to the var iou s geographic d i s t r i c t s thereby c r e a t e d . Some confusion in t h i s r e s p e c t is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , f o r , as Z e l l e r po in ts o u t, in some s t a t e s the terms "apportionment" ( a l l o c a t i o n of s e a t s to d i s t r i c t s ) and " d i s t r i c t i n g " (. . . d r a f t ing of d i s t r i c t l i n e s ) are used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ; for example, the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n uses the term "ap po rtion men t" f o r the c r e a t i o n of single-member d i s t r i c t s . F r e q u e n t l y , both the l e g i s l a t u r e s and the c o u r t s r e f e r to e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i s t r i c t s as "ap portionmen t a c t s . " 26 The term "models" is used to denote a " p a t t e r n f o r something to be m a d e ." 27 Its use will be r e s t r i c t e d to schemes or plans d e a l i n g with ap portionm ent o b j e c t i v e s . "Models" should be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from " s t a n d a r d s " or I " g o a l s , " which are words used h e re in to d e s c r i b e the 26Belle Z e l l e r , e d . , American S ta te L e g i s l a t u r e s : Report of the Committee on American L e g i s l a t u r e s . A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n (N.V.; Thomas V. Crowe 11 C o . , 1954). p. 31. For a more d e t a i l e d d e f i n i t i o n , see Alfred de G r a z ia, Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Govern m ent, op. c i t . , p p . l8-19. 27W eb ster1s , op. ci t . , p. 642. 20 normative t h e o r i e s embodying ideal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a g a i n s t which the apportionm ent schemes or "models" are to be measured and e v a l u a t e d . I f the t i t l e of t h i s study were e x p l i c a t e d w ith in the co nfin es of a r a t h e r long s e n t e n c e , i t could perhaps be accomplished as fo llo w s : t h i s is an examination and a n a l y s i s of C a l i f o r n i a s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , and t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s , with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the ways in which p a t t e r n s f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s might conform to normative p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to gove rn ments in which power r e s t s l a r g e l y with persons whose a u t h o r i t y is d e l e g a t e d to them by some l a r g e r number of people. Orqani z a t i on This study is m o tiv ated by the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t app or tionm en t plans or models should be measured a g a i n s t c e r t a i n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s , and t h a t th e se goals or s ta n d a r d s should be d e riv e d from the e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e of dem ocr atic government. I t is t h a t c o n v i c t i o n which has determ in ed , q u i t e l a r g e l y , both the c o n t e n t and o r g a n i z a ti o n of the study. Thus, Chapter II c o n s t i t u t e s an examination of the p h i l o s o p h i c assumptions of democracy and the f u n c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s n e c es sa r y f o r i t s e f f e c t i v e im ple m e n tatio n . \ 21 From t h i s examination seven goals of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n have been deduced as c r i t e r i a f o r va rious apportionment models. The f i r s t such model, based on e q u a lly po pulat ed d i s t r i c t s , is the only one decreed by j u d i c i a l mandate. I t is e v a l u a t e d in Chapter I I I , a f t e r a b r i e f survey of the h i s t o r i c a l and f u n c t io n a l development of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Chapter IV at tem pts to measure e i g h t o t h e r app or tionm en t models a g a i n s t the goals of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , much as the preceding c h a p t e r t e s t e d the one-man, on e-vote p a t t e r n . These nine apportionment models are then a s s e s s e d in terms of t h e i r r e l a t i v e d e s i r a b i l i t y . The a b s t r a c t v i r t u e s of d i s t r i c t i n g plans e x e r t l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on the l e g i s l a t i v e bodies to which appo rtion men t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s have been e n t r u s t e d , how e v e r , u nle ss they f a l l w ith in the realm of p r a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . Chapter V is devoted to an a n a l y s i s of e m p iric a l r e s t r i c t i o n s upon a l t e r n a t i v e app ortion men t models, p r i m a r i l y as r e v ea led in a study of C a l i f o r n i a politics. In c o n c l u s i o n , Chapter VI r e p o r t s some o r i g i n a l r ese ar c h on the p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p of c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u e n c y types with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s m a n i fe s t e d by t h e i r e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t o r s . C a l i f o r n i a Senate and Assembly d i s t r i c t s are c l a s s i f i e d on the b asis of t h e i r c o m p e t i t i v e ness in a p a r t i s a n c o n t e s t and t h e i r socio-economic d i v e r s i t y . The incumbents from the se d i s t r i c t s are then / 22 compared in terms of r o l l c a l l v o t e s , l e g i s l a t i v e t e n u r e , previous governmental e x p e r i e n c e , and formal e d u c a t i o n . I t is hoped t h a t r e s u l t s of such an a n a l y s i s shed some a d d i ti o n a l l i g h t on the probable e f f e c t s of c e r t a i n a p p o r t i o n ment models on the goals i m p l i c i t in the theo ry of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l Notes While the methodology employed will be d i s c u s s e d in g r e a t e r d e t a i l in the l a s t c h a p t e r , i t seems a p p r o p r i a t e to comment here on the w r i t t e n sources which may be u t i l i z e d in a study such as t h i s . The ric h d i v e r s i t y of these sources is i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o o tn o t e s and b i b l i o g r a p h y . 28 It seems ha rdly an ex a g g e r a tio n to say t h a t the scope of apportionment l i t e r a t u r e is as broad as t h a t de a lin g with 28Malcolm Jewell is of the opinion t h a t " a p p o r t i o n ment is one of the few a s p e c ts of the l e g i s l a t i v e process t h a t has been adeq u a te ly s t u d i e d by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . " Op. c i t . , p. 12. This is a n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t i v e a s s e s s ment but is supp orted by the o b s e rv a t i o n t h a t a "thorough search of p e r i o d i c a l s and monographs would show over a hundred s t u d i e s of l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionm en t in the s t a t e s . " I b i d . , p. 4. N o n e th e le s s, de Grazia a s s e r t e d in 1951 t h a t ’*despi te the general esteem . . . fo r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government . . . s y s t e m a t i c r e se a r c h i n t o i t s most im p o rtan t i n g r e d i e n t , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , (has) been n e g l e c t ed ." Public and R e p u b l i c , op. c i t . , p. x. Twelve y ea rs l a t e r James E. Larson wrote t h a t "we know . . . too l i t t l e about r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " and t h a t "much more r e sea r c h is needed" in c e r t a i n ar eas of appo rtio nmen t. "Awaiting the Other Shoe," National Civic Review ( A p r i l , 1953), r e p r i n t e d in Russell W. Maddox, J r . , e d . , Issues in S t a t e and Local Government ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : D. Van Nostrand C o . , 1955), p^ 103. 23 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government, for there are few f a c e t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government u n a f f e c t e d by the apportionment of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s . Te x tb o o k s .-- G e n e r a l textbooks on government should provide a t l e a s t an i n d i c a t i o n of the importance p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s a t t a c h to a p r o b le m . 29 If t h i s is t r u e , t h re e o b s e r v a t i o n s seem in o rd e r. F i r s t , concern with l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t has been h e i g h te n e d enormously by the Supreme C o u r t 's d e c i s io n i n Baker v . Carr in 1 962 . Second, s t a t e government t e x t s give r e l a t i v e l y more space to i t than those dea lin g with the American n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . 30 This is due to the f a c t t h a t s t a t e l e g i s l a t u re s have d i s t r i c t i n g power over both the U.S. House of R e o r e s e n t a t i v e s and s e a t s in t h e i r own chambers as w e ll. 29L. J . R. Herson contends t h a t "tex tbooks c o n s t i t u t e the w e l l s p r i n g s of any stream of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . " "The Lost World of Municipal Government," APSR, Vol. LI, No. 2 (June, 1957), p. 331. 30It is not s u r p r i s i n g , in view of the long p u b l i c debate over C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate a p p o rtio n m e n t, t h a t C a l i f o r n i a government t e x t s s t r e s s t h i s general t o p i c r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g l y . Bernard L. Hyink, Seyom Brown and E. W. Thacker, f o r example, devote e i g h t of 271 t e x t u a l pages to t h i s s u b j e c t in t h e i r P o l i t i c s and Government in Cali f orn i a , t h i r d ed. (N.Y.: Thomas Y. CroweTT Co’.”, 1963) , and Henry A. Turner and John A. Vieg a l l o c a t e to i t nine of 277 pp. in The Government and P o l i t i c s of C a l i f o r n i a , second ed. (McGraw-Hi11 Book Co., 1964). Duane Lockard gives twelve of 543 pp. to apportionment in his general t r e a t m e n t of The P o l i t i c s of S ta te and Local Government (N.Y.: The Macmi 11 an Co. , 1963), and Danie 1 K ~ , Grant and H. C. Nixon d i s c u s s i t on e i g h t of 439 pp. in t h e i r S ta te and Local Government in America (Boston: Allyn 24 Th ir d , t e x t s designed to in tro d u c e the s t u d e n t to the whole f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , ex tending f a r beyond the co nfines of American i n s t i t u t i o h s , o f f e r , u n d e r s t a n d ab ly , l e ss on app or tionm en t problems but more, and exce edingly v a l u a b l e , in fo rm a tio n on r e l e v a n t h i s t o r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l t r e a t m e n t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 31 . P e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e .-- S u b s e q u e n t c h a p te r s will reveal q u i t e amply the q u a n t i t y and c o n t e n t of newspaper and magazine coverage of r e c e n t apportionment c o n t r o v e r s i e s . Comment should now be made p r a i s i n g the d i v e r s i t y and general c a l i b e r of the work of the Los Angeles Times, both in terms of i t s r e p o r t o r i a l thoroughness and i t s and Bacon, 1963). The p r e - Baker v. Carr t e x t by Robert S. Babcock, S t a t e and Local Government and P o l i t i c s (N.Y.: Random House, T9 66) a l l o t s to i t four of 386 pp. Of the t e x t s d e a lin g with n a t i o n a l government, random sampling d i s c l o s e s the fo llo w in g number of pages devoted to appor tionment problems: John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry, The American System of Government, seventh ed. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hi11 Book Co. , 1963), 5 pp. of 728; P e t e r H. Odegard and H. H. Baerwald, The American Republic (N.Y.r Dodd, Mead & Co., 1964), ll ppl of 909; James M. Burns and Jack W. P e l t a s o n , op. c i t . , 8 pp. of 914; Robert K. Carr, M. H. B e r n s te in and W. F. Murphy, American Democracy in Theory and P r a c t i c e , f o u r t h ed. (N.Y.: H o lt, Rineh ar t and Winston, V?'6'3) , 7 pp. of 1 ,052 . 31See, e . g . , Carl J. F r i e d r i c h , op. c i t . , 695 p p . , esp. pp. 109-1 1 8, 1 54 , and 156; Robert Rienow, I n t r o d u c t i on to Government, t h i r d ed. (N.Y.: Alfred A. KnopTJ 1964), 625 p p . , esp. pp. 388-409; Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), 614 p p . , esp. pp. 235-282; Herman F i n e r , Theory and P r a c t i c e of Modern Government, r e v i s e d ed. (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1949), 978 p p . , esp. pp. 219-230 and 551-568; L e s l i e Lipson, The Democratic C i v i l i z a t i o n , o p . c i t . , 614 p p . , esp. pp. 439- 456 ; and Carl 71 F r i e d r i c h . Man and His Government (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1 963 ), 737 pp. , es p'. ppT 301-314. 25 am plitude of s u b j e c t i v e commentary. I t has emerged, to challe n g e the New York Times, fo r example, as a r e l i a b l e and a l e r t source of p e r t i n e n t i n fo r m a t i o n . S t a f f r e p o r t e r Ray Zeman deserves p a r t i c u l a r commendation f o r his coverage of the appor tionmen t c o n t r o v e rs y in 1965. The p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l s , of c o u r s e , c o n s t i t u t e the most p e n e t r a t i n g and s c h o l a r l y source of p e r i o d i c a l commentary on various f a c e t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review is e s p e c i a l l y o u t s t a n d i n g in t h i s r e g a r d , but the Journal of P o l i t i c s and Wes te rn P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y a lso w a rra n t r e c o g n i t i o n . Popular magazines, as w e l l , have given e x t e n s i v e and informal commentary on t h i s i s s u e . 32 Court d e c i s i o n s . --The e r u d i t i o n and s c h o l a r l y r e s e a r c h c a p a c i t y of men such as Supreme Court J u s t i c e s Felix F r a n k f u r t e r , P o t t e r S t e w a r t , and John M. Harlan ca n not be e x a g g e r a t e d . The ir j u d i c i a l opinions are t h e r e f o r e v a l u a b l e , not only as primary sources in c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but as r e l i a b l e secondary summations of h i s t o r i c a l and s p e c i a l i z e d s t u d i e s in the app ortion men t a r e a . 3 3 32See, e . g . , "How Supreme Court is Changing U .S .," U.S. News & World R e p o r t , Vol. L V111, No. 3 (Jan. 18, 1965), pp. 56-62, and Trevor A r m b r i s t e r , "The Octopus in the S t a t e House," The Saturday Evening P o s t . Feb. 12, 1966, esp. pp. 28, 29, and 70. 330f p a r t i c u l a r value are the d e c i s i o n s in Baker v. Carr, op. c i t . , WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 S. Ct. 1418 (195T77 ----------- --------- 26 Empirical a n a l y s e s . - - V a r i o u s examinations of ap p o r tionment stand out because of t h e i r unique or s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r . D ef erring documentation u n t i l l a t e r , i t should be noted t h a t the works of Malcolm J e w e l l , Gordon Baker, Glendon Sch ube rt, and Andrew Hacker are p a r t i c u l a r l y p r aisew orthy among the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of r e c e n t w r i t e r s . Empirical l i t e r a t u r e on o t h e r p e r t i n e n t a sp ects of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has been e n ric h e d by the works of William Buchanan, Charles L. Clapp, Lewis A. Froman, J r . , Duncan MacRae, J r . , and John C. Wahlke, along with many e a r l i e r s c h o l a r s . T h e o r e t i c a l t r e a t m e n t s . --Again o m ittin g for a time s p e c i f i c c i t a t i o n s , i t is im p o rta n t to pay t r i b u t e not only to those who have engaged in app ortionmen t r e s e a r c h , but a lso to the p h i l o s o p h e r s and statesmen whose s p e c u l a t i o n s on the n atu re of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s have sown the seeds w ith o u t which the o rch ard s of em pirica l l e g i s l a t i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n would have remained barren w a s t e l a n d s . These t h i n k e r s inc lu d e Locke, Burke, J e f f e r s o n , Calhoun, and John S t u a r t Mill as well as such modern c o n t r i b u t o r s as Alfred de Grazia, Joseph Tussman, A. D. Lindsay, and Neil Ri emer. Several f i e l d s of p o l i t i c a l scie n c e seem almost e q u a lly f e r t i l e in the p r o d u c tio n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e o ry , both d e s c r i p t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e . Discussions of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n s i g h t and m e r i t may be found in tre a tm e n ts 27 of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , f e d e r a l i s m , and 1e q i s i a t u r e s , as well as in the general works on p o l i t i c a l philosophy or democratic th eo ry . Government p u b ! i c a t i o n s . — This study would have been im poss ib le w i t h o u t r e c o u rs e to o f f i c i a l rec ords and documents. Various r e p o r t s and h earing t r a n s c r i p t s of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e re ap p o rtio n m en t committees have been e s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e , and a r e p o r t of the Advisory Commis sion on Intergove rnmen tal R e l a t i o n s 34 has been q u i t e u s e f u l . Records of the C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e and various e d i t i o n s of the semiannual Handbook of the C a l i f o r nia L e g i s l a t u r e have been e s s e n t i a l source s f o r s t a t i s t i c a l d a t a . An i n t e r e s t i n g and perhaps unique Legi s i a t i ve Sourcebook, s u b t i t l e d The C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e and Reapportionment, 1849-1965, has been compiled by former Assemblyman Don A. A l l e n , S r . 35 I t c o n s t i t u t e s a remark ably e x c e l l e n t and d i v e r s i f i e d compendium of b i b l i o g r a p h i e s , t a b l e s , committee r e p o r t s , and s u b j e c t i v e commentary which is sometimes a s t u t e , o c c a s i o n a l l y p e t u l a n t , f r e q u e n t ly n o s t a l g i c , and seldom b orin g. 34Apportionment of S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962),'"78 pp. (mimeo graphed) . 35( Sac ra m e n to : Assembly of the S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , 1965), 487 pp. 28 F i n a l l y , c o n s t i t u e n c y a n a l y s i s has re q u i re d e x t e n s i v e use of data c o l l e c t e d by the United S t a t e s Census Bureau and compiled in va rio u s p u b l i c a t i o n s by census t r a c t s , c i t i e s , c o u n t i e s , and c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t s . Personal o b s e r v a t i o n s . --To see the t o t a l i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n systems r e q u i r e s many vantage p o i n t s . Q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s e s , case s t u d i e s , and the examination of t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s all c o n t r i b u t e to he ightene d p e r c e p t i o n and broadened u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet s u b j e c t i v e im pressions can add s t i l l an o th e r p e r s p e c t i v e which, in c o n ju n c tio n with the o t h e r s , makes the p i c t u r e c l e a r e r . Some r e l i a n c e has been p l a c e d , t h e r e f o r e , upon the opi ni ons of those who have "been th e re" --w h o have ex perienced p e r sonnaly the pull and p r e s s u r e of e x p e r i e n c e . T. V. Smith, Clem M i l l e r , Stimson B u l l i t t , Richard Neuberger and John F i t z g e r a l d Kennedy are among them. To supplement the w r i t t e n o b s e r v a t i o n s of these men, and to gain a d d i t i o n a l viewp oints on apportionment as i t r e l a t e s to C a l i f o r n i a ' s p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u , a number of personal i n t e r v i e w s were employed. Among those whose opinions were ob tain ed in t h i s fashion were Ivan Hindera- ker , Leroy Hardy, and Steven E. Smith, the c h i e f c o n s u l t a n t s to the Assembly E l e c t i o n s and Reapportionment Committee in 1951, 1961, and 1965, r e s p e c t i v e l y . I t was in th e se years t h a t the t h r e e most r e c e n t reap p o rtio n m en ts have been accomplished in the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e . In 29 a d d i t i o n , in t e r v i e w s were conducted with Assemblyman A llen , to whom r e f e r e n c e was made above, var ious l e g i s l a t i v e s t a f f members employed by both the Senate and Assembly, and a number of Sacramento l o b b y i s t s . 36 Other types of l i t e r a t u r e have been employed in a d d i t i o n to those c a t e g o r i z e d above. Although no useful ourpose would be served in enumerating all the sources s u b se q u e n tly c i t e d in f o o tn o t e s and b i b l i o g r a p h y , i t should be noted t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e voting s t a t i s t i c s have been T derived from r o l l c a l l records of the AFL-CIO, the Merchants and Man ufacturers A s s o c i a t i o n , and the Friends Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n . 36This study has been f a c i l i t a t e d , a l s o , by the personal and p o l i t i c a l c o n t a c t s t h i s w r i t e r has e x p erien ced over a ten y e a r pe rio d with Assembly Speaker J e ss e M. Unruh, L i e u t e n a n t Governor Glenn M. Anderson, former Democratic S ta te Central Committee Chairman Eugene Wyman, and va rious members of Governor Edmund G. Brown's e x e c u t i v e s t a f f . Such c o n t a c t s have e n t a i l e d app or tionm en t d i s c u s sions only s p o r a d i c a l l y , but may have c o n d i t i o n e d to some e x t e n t p e r c e p t i o n s r e f l e c t e d in the follow ing pages. CHAPTER II DEMOCRACY AS A REPRESENTATIONAL GOAL: ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS Since app ortionmen t a f f e c t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the type of apportionment p r e f e r r e d depends upon the kind of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n d e s i r e d . This t h r u s t s the i s s u e i n t o the area of moral choice where the t e r r a i n is always hazardous unl ess t h e r e are beacons of e t h i c a l commitment to illu m in e i t . Even th en , the most a l l u r i n g goals may l i e u n a t t a i n - ably beyond the imposing b l u f f of pragmatic p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . Compromise becomes i n e v i t a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , both with those who covet o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s , and with the tough, sometimes impersonal l i m i t a t i o n s of I e m p i ri c a l r e a l i t y . Compromise is i m p o s s i b l e , however, i f one has nothing to compromise, and t h i s emphasizes again the importance of e t h i c a l p r e f e r e n c e s . Tussman warns t h a t the p o l i t i c a l is always in danger of s i n k i n g i n t o the "merely p o l i t i c a l " and t h a t our p o l i t i c a l arrangements need to r e f l e c t more than whim. They s t a n d , in f a c t , f o r the denial of the autonomy of p o l i t i c s and for the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l to the m o r a l . 1 J o s e p h Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n and the Body P o l i t i c (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ), p. 144. 30 31 The d e s i r a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s to be p o s i t e d here are d isc o v e re d in the moral p r e f e r e n c e f o r democracy and the i m p e r a ti v e s of a t t i t u d e , machinery, and s u b s i d i a r y values which t h i s e n t a i l s . Normative Assumptions of Democracy The p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r democracy s p rin g s from the dominance of t h a t idea in the American p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I t has been said t h a t "no o t h e r term is more common to the language of American p o l i t i c s , no o t h e r concept is c o n s id e re d to be more b a s ic to our n a t i o n a l i d e a l s . " Yet, i t is admitted t h a t "democracy is not an easy word to defi n e . " 2 P o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e r e f l e c t s t h i s d i f f i c u l t y almost e n d l e s s l y . Saul Padover, one of the most c a r e fu l s t u d e n t s of our p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , acknowledges t h a t " i t has never been easy to say with p r e c i s i o n and i n c l u s i v e n e s s what democracy i s , p r i m a r i l y because one of i t s s a l i e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is i t s lack of r i g i d dogma or s t r u c t u r e d f o r m . " 3 T. V. Smith, p h i l o s o p h e r , ac adem ician, and former 2Robert K. Carr, M. H. B e r n s te in and W. F. Murphy, American Democracy in Theory and P r a c t i c e , f o u r t h ed. ( N . Y .: H olt, Rineh ar t and Winston, 1963), p. 25. 3The Meaning of Democracy (N.Y.: F r e d ri c k A. P r a e g e r, 1963), p. 9^ See also Austin Ranney, The Governinq of Men (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. T 7 T . ---------------------- 32 Congressman, a s s e r t s t h a t i t is "a way of l i f e " 4 and again "a s t a t e of m i n d . " 5 With c h a r a c t e r i s t i c B r i t i s h p r a c t i c a l i t y , however, John Plamenatz, an Oxford s c h o l a r , i n s i s t s t h a t although "democracy is more than a system of go vern ment, i t is also a system of g o v e r n m e n t ." 6 With un d e r s ta n d a b le impa tien ce E. E. S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r complains t h a t the " g r e a t d e f i c i e n c y of American democracy is i n t e l l e c t u a l , the lack of a good usable d e f i n i t i o n . " 7 Yet, for a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s e n t a i l e d in communicating the meaning of democracy, t h e r e are many who have made the a tte m p t. Several of th e se d e f i n i t i o n s will be drawn upon below, but i t is c l e a r t h a t they provide a b r e a d t h - - n o t to say d i s p a r i t y - - w h i c h compels each new study to s e l e c t those components of the de moc ratic f a i t h d i c t a t e d by the a u t h o r ' s own p r e f e r e n c e s . The v a l i d i t y of the kind of democracy embraced here r e s t s upon t h re e more or l e ss a p r i o r i assumptions which have d i r e c t and obvious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : e q u a l i t y , freedom, and m a j o r i t y r u l e . 4With Eduard C. Lindeman, The Democratic Way of Li fe (N.Y.: Mentor, 1951), p. 7. 51 b i d . , p . 10. 6"C u ltu ra l P r e r e q u i s i t e s to a S u c c e s s f u l l y Func t i o n i n g Democracy: A Symposium," APSR, Vol. L, No. 1 (March, 1956), p . 115. 7The Semisovereign People (N.Y.: H o lt, Rin eh ar t and Winston \ 1960), pp. 130-131^ / Equal i t.y . --The fundamental t e n e t of the democr atic i f a i t h may be found in the concept of e q u a l i t y . T h i s , in t u r n , r e l a t e s c l o s e l y to the importance of l i f e and the i n t e g r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l . Indeed, e q u a l i t y may be viewed as the l o g i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e s y n t h e s i s of th ese two e l e m e n t s . I t seems nonsense to t a l k about e q u a l i t y except with r e f e r e n c e to the elements which, when compared, are found to be e q u a l. The most obvious and im p o rtan t p o s se s si o n of l i v i n g human beings is l i f e i t s e l f . This is acknowledged by Locke in a s s e r t i n g l i f e as the f i r s t of man's u n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s ; 8 i t was r e a f f i r m e d by J e f f e r s o n when he wrote t h a t the e a r t h "belongs to the l i v i n g " and t h a t laws and c o n s t i t u t i o n s should hence be s u b j e c t to review by every new g e n e r a t i o n . 9 Evidence of i t abounds in c a p i t a l punishment viewed as the s e v e r e s t of all s e n t e n c e s , in the B i b l i c a l opinion t h a t no man has g r e a t e r love than to lay down his l i f e f o r o t h e r s , in the C a th o lic o p p o s i t i o n to a b o r t io n and c o n t r a c e p t i o n as a denial of 8Second T r e a t i s e of Government, e x c e r p t e d by Fran cis VI. Coker, e d . , Readinqs in P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , r e v i s e d ed. (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co. , 1938), FI 583. 9L e t t e r to James Madison, 6 S e p t . , 1789, r e p r i n t e d in Alpheus T. Mason, e d . , Free Government in the Making, t h i r d ed. (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ‘1965 ), pp. 374- 375. 34 l i f e , and in A lb ert S c h w e i t z e r 's i n s i s t e n c e upon Reverence f o r L i f e . 10 i The t r a n s c e n d e n t importance of l i f e is denied less f r e q u e n t l y than i t s i n h e r e n t e q u a l i t y . Too o f t e n , e s p e c i a l l y among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , one finds admissions t h a t l i f e d i f f e r s in c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as s t r e n g t h , v i r t u e , am b itio n , s k i l l , and i n t e l l i g e n c e , followed by a s s e r t i o n s t h a t , n o n e t h e l e s s , th er e e x i s t s in democracy e q u a l i t y before the law and t h a t t h e r e should e x i s t e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . 11 Thi.s implies no more than t h a t men are equal because democracy t r e a t s them e q u a l l y . I t is a t a u t o l o g y r e m i n i s c e n t of P l a t o ' s wry c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of democracy as a charming form of government " d i s p e n s i n g a s o r t of e q u a l i t y to equals and unequals a l i k e . " 12 What is needed is some dem onstration t h a t men deserye to be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . That, p e rh ap s, r e q u i r e s a 10Qut of My Life and Thought (N.Y.: Mentor Books, 1 953), pp. 1 710-1 88. An e l o q u e n t s t a t e m e n t of the C ath o lic p o i n t of view is co n ta in e d in Pope Paul V i's remarks before the United Nations on Oct. 5, 1965. "You must s t r i v e to m u l t i p l y bread so t h a t i t s u f f i c e s f o r the t a b l e of man kind, and not . , to diminish the number of g uests at the banquet of l i f e . . . ( I ) t is n e c e s sa r y also to a s su re to each man a l i f e conformed to his d i g n i t y . " Excerpted in The New Re p u b l i c , Vol. 153, No. 16 (Oct, 16, 1965), p. 14. n See, e . g . , Padover's d i s c u s s i o n , op. c i t . , pp. 50-53. 120uoted in William E b e n s t e i n , Today' s I sms , fo u rth ed. (Enqlewood C l i f f s , N . J . : Prenti c e - H a l 1, I n c . , 1964), p. 141. 35 r e c o g n i t i o n of " e q u a l i t y " or " i n e q u a l i t y " as " q u a l i t i e s " a t t r i b u t a b l e to a group of e n t i t i e s which r e p r e s e n t s a t o t a l as sessment of t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s . If t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s predom in ate , they are said to be e q u a l; i f t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s are most i m p o r t a n t , they are p r o nounced unequal. I f , among snow f l a k e s f o r example, emphasis is placed upon t h e i r c o l o r and chemical composi t i o n , they might be said to be "e q u al". But i f s i z e and shape c o n s t i t u t e the c r i t e r i a , they are " u n e q u al." For many democrats, the co n v i c t i o n t h a t the l i v e s of human beings are in t h i s sense equal is a compelling one. No one asked for the i n f u s i o n of l i f e , and none, u l t i m a t e l y , can s ta y i t s c e s s a t i o n ; in impotence to a l t e r the circum stances of b i r t h and the f i n a l i t y of death all are profoundly s i m i l a r . 13 In the i n t e r i m between th e se two c a t a c l y s m ic milestones of l i f e , moreover, i n d i v i d u a l s are s i m i l a r in i m p r e s s i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t ways. They a l l feel b i o l o g i c a l impulses toward food, d r i n k , and sex; a l l need s h e l t e r and warmth; all have emotional needs f o r approba t i o n and r e s p e c t ; a l l must endure whatever i n f a n t e n v i r o n ment, g e n e t i c a t t r i b u t e s , and r a c i a l i d e n t i t y have been t h e i r g r a t u i t o u s endowment. I n c r e a s i n g l y , each is e q u a l l y dependent upon the othei— b u t c h e r , m o r t i c i a n , plumber, and 13"The hour has s t r u c k f o r a h a l t , . . . a moment to th ink anew of our common o r i g i n , our h i s t o r y , our common d e s t i n y . " Pope Paul VI, 1o c . c i t . t e a c h e r - - i n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s demanding ever more r e f i n e d d i v i s i o n s of l a b o r . Most c l e a r l y of a l l , t h e r e is s i m i l a r i t y in membership in the s i n g l e b i o l o g i c a l s p e c i e s c a l l e d human. The communicants of the democratic f a i t h can a s s e r t with c o n s i d e r a b l e reason, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t l i f e is not only the u l t i m a t e value but t h a t in i t s impo rtan t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s human s i m i l a r i t i e s are so numerous and s i g n i f i c a n t as to w arran t the f i n a l assessment which a ffirm s man's e s s e n t i a l e q u a l i t y . He may do so w ith o u t denying t h a t l i f e e n t a i l s o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s - - i n t e l 1igence , w eig h t, manual d e x t e r i t y , e t c e t e r a --wi th regard to which men are very d i f f e r e n t indeed. And he may even r e s t his case w ith o u t n e c e s sa r y r e s o r t to the t h e o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t men are equal in the s i g h t of God or equal in the i n f i n i t e worth of the-i-r- i mmortal s o u l s . 14 Nor is i t i m p e r a t i v e - - d e s p i t e the p r o f e s s i o n s of c l a s s i c a l democratic t h e o r i s t s - - to demonstrate an e q u a l i t y of r a t i o n a l i t y , e i t h e r a c tu a l or p o t e n t i a l . J u s t as the importance of l i f e thus b o l s t e r s the b e l i e f in e q u a l i t y , so too does the i n t e g r i t y and d i g n i t y of the human person. Most commentators upon democracy have reco gn ized what T. V. Smith c a l l s " the f i n a l i t y of the 14There is no i n t e n t here to degrade the r e l i g i o u s l y o r i e n t e d case for democracy. For a b r i e f and able e x p o s i t i o n of i t , see Erne st S. G r i f f i t h , " C u ltu r a l Pre r e q u i s i t e s . . . , " op. c i t . , pp. 101-115. 37 i n d i v i d u a l , " 15 Plamenatz a s s e r t s t h a t "hardly anyone will d i s a g r e e . , . t h a t ' r e s p e c t for i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y is e s s e n t i a l to d e m o c r a c y . ' " 16 Neil Reimer has e n u n c iate d t h i s t h e s i s e l o q u e n t l y . In defending his "primary e t h i c a l commitment" h e (deserves to be quoted at some l e n g t h . Democracy a l o n e , he a r g u e s , can b e s t advance the c e n t r a l value of i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n within the framework of the common good. . . B r i e f l y , t h i s e t h i c a l judgement e x p re ss e s c i v i l i z e d man's dominant and wise c o n v i c t i o n t h a t l i f e . . . is . . . p r e f e r a b l e to d e a t h , l i b e r t y to s l a v e r y , love to h a t e , f u l f i l l m e n t to f r u s t r a t i o n . . . I n d iv id u a l r e a l i z a t i o n means the f u l f i l l m e n t of man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s in l i f e . I t t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s l i f e . . . and freedom to use and o p p o r t u n i t y to develop ( i t s ) f a c u l t i e s . . . I t must, moreover, be compatible with the common good. By good, I mean t h a t which p r e s e r v e s , n u r t u r e s . . . and advances human l i f e . . . This case r e s t s u l t i m a t e l y on our commitment to the goodness of l i f e , the i n t e g r i t y of man, and o p p o r t u n i t y for c r e a t i v e development for each and a l l . Our primary value judgement is thus u l t i m a t e l y a f a i t h ; but i t is a reasoned f a i t h t h a t can be su p po rte d by l o g i c a l and e t h i c a l a n a l y s i s . . . I t is not absurd. . . I t is deeply rooted in the d e s i r e - f o r - 1i f e of all men and in the h e a l t h y psyche of Western c i v i l i z e d man. 1 7 Life and i n d i v i d u a l d i g n i t y are thus i n e x t r i c a b l y r e l a t e d . For only i n d i v i d u a l s possess l i f e , and only they are the r e p o s i t o r i e s of the sympathy, w i l l , wit and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which u l t i m a t e l y determine how l i f e is used. 15The Democratic Way of L i f e , o p . c i t . , p. 18. 16"C u ltu ra l P r e r e q u i s i t e s . . . , " o p . c i t . , p. 117. 17Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory (N.Y.: Ap pi e ton - Century - C r o f t s ", 1 962 ) , pp. 7 T- 19. 38 I f i t is e s s e n t i a l l y e q u a l , then each i n d i v i d u a l imbued with i t must be of paramount importance. Such s i g n i f i c a n c e is augmented by the f a c t t h a t each l i f e p o sse sse s a t t r i b utes a b s o l u t e l y unique. Men are not i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e p a r t s on an en d less demographic assembly l i n e . In our s i m i l a r i t i e s l i e our sense of t r a n s c e n d e n t b ro th e rh o o d ; in our d i f f e r e n c e s the p e c u l i a r and i n f i n i t e worth of each of us. For the t ru e democrat, both evoke a profound c o n v i c tio n of human e q u a l i t y . This commitment to e q u a l i t y is one which must be examined with s p e c i a l care in a study such as t h i s , because i t obv iously l i e s a t the core of the d i s p u t e re g a rd i n g apportionm ent of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on an e q u a l - p o p u l a t i o n b a s i s . The r i s k s of redundancy are perhaps worth t a k i n g , t h e r e f o r e , and the prec ed ing conceptual a n a l y s i s may deserve to be supplemented with a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l survey. As s e v e ra l prominent s c h o l a r s have pointed o u t , . . . the concept of human e q u a l i t y has ro o ts deep in the r e l i g i o u s , e t h i c a l , and p o l i t i c a l su b stra tu m of Western C i v i l i z a t i o n . . . (T)he f r o n t i e r pr ovided a unique environment f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t ideal and helped r e l e a s e the i n f l u e n c e of e q u a l i t a r i a n i s m with e x p l o s i v e f o r c e . Our p o l i t i c a l . . . h i s t o r y is pock-marked with the s h e l l holes of e q u a l i t a r i a n a t t a c k and c o u n t e r - a t t a c k : the f r o n t i e r r e v o l t s a g a i n s t the power of royal governors and of seaboard w e a l t h , the supremacy of p o p u l a r ly e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e s during the Re v o lu tio n , the p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t t i t l e s of n o b i l i t y in our C o n s t i t u t i o n . . . The Granger movement a g a i n s t the r a i l r o a d s ; the P o p u l i s t r e v o l t of the 1 8 9 0 's ; the P r o g r e s s i v e movements of the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ; . . . the New and F a ir D e a l s - - a l l 39 th ese r e f l e c t e d in p a r t the e q u a l i t a r i a n p r e s s u r e s of a s o c i e t y whose memories of f r o n t i e r e q u a l i t y were s t i l l vi vi d . 18 While t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e q u a l i t y impulse may e x a g g e r a te the Turner t h e s i s of f r o n t i e r i n f l u e n c e , i t a t l e a s t acknowledges more venerable a n t e c e d e n t s . One of t h e s e , the C h r i s t i a n , is emphasized by the English p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t , A. D. Lindsay. He observes t h a t while . . . e q u a l i t y and l i b e r t y are both ' n o t e s ' of democracy in a n c i e n t Greece, C h r i s t i a n i t y produced a new conc ep tion of e q u a l i t y which was d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e by the u n i v e r s a l i t y dem onstrated in the s c r i p t u r a l com mentary t h a t 'There is n e i t h e r Greek nor Jew, . . . bond nor f r e e . ' 19 In our indigenous l i t e r a t u r e Americans have a t t e s t e d , g e n e r a t i o n a f t e r g e n e r a t i o n , to a compelling devotion to the b e l i e f in e q u a l i t y . In one of the most p e r s u a s i v e e x p o s i t i o n s of t h i s c r e e d , Henry A. Myers c i t e s J e f f e r s o n , M e l v i l l e , Emerson, Whitman and Twain as e l o q u e n t p r e c u r s o r s of the contemporary e g a l i t a r i a n f a i t h . 20 The documentation is f a m i l i a r but p e r s i s t e n t l y im p re s siv e in i t s cumulative impact. How a u d a c io u s ly c o n f i d e n t is J e f f e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of equal c r e a t i o n as s e l f - e v i d e n t ! How impassioned is M e l v i l l e ' s a f f i r m a t i o n of 18Stephen K. B a i l e y , Howard D. Samuel, and Sidney Baldwin, Government in America (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1957), pp. 11-12. 19A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic S t a t e (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 947), pp. 251-252. 20Henry A. Myers, Are Men Equal ( I t h a c a , M.Y.: Cornell U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1945), p . 51. human worth: Thou s h a l t see i t sh in in g in the arm t h a t wields a pick or d r iv e s a s p i k e ; t h a t democratic d i g n i t y which . . . r a d i a t e s w ith o u t end from God; . . . The c e n t r e and c ircum fe rence of a l l democracy! His omnipresence our d iv in e e q u a l i t y ! No less im pressive is Emerson's detached e x h a l t a - t i o n of "the i n f i n i t u d e of the p r i v a t e m a n ," 21 and Twain's po igna nt odyssy in which Huck and Jim, boy d e l i n q u e n t and run-away s l a v e , fin d mutual r e s p e c t and a f f e c t i o n . But t r a n s c e n d i n g a l l t h e s e , p erh ap s, is Whitman's unabashed egoism, p r o j e c t e d upon a l l his s p e c i e s : I c e l e b r a t e m y self , and sing m y self, And what I assume you s h a ll assume, For every atom belonginq to me as good belongs to y o u . 22 Our p r e s e n t c entury r e a f f i r m s th ese d e d i c a t i o n s to e q u a l i t y , in s p i t e of the demurrers e n t e r e d by men so d i s t i n g u i s h e d as j o u r n a l i s t H. L. Menken and j u r i s t O l i v e r Wendell Holmes,23 and the d e c is io n by Henry B. Mayo to a bjure such a r g u m e n t . 24 Carr, B e r n s te in and Murphy,25 Burns and P e l t a s o n , 26 and Rodee, Anderson, and 210uoted i b i d . , p. 38. 22Quoted i b i d . , p. 58 23See Charles F rankel, The Democratic P ro sp ect (N.Y.: .Harper & Row, 1 962), pp"! 130-13l . 1 “ 24H. B. Mayo, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Democratic Theory (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1910), p. 243. 2 5Loc. c i t . 26Loc. c i t . 41 C h r i s t o l 27 all endorse e q u a l i t y as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the l i v i n g dem ocratic creed. The case for human e q u a l i t y , the most im p o rtan t of the presumed s ta n d a rd s by which to measure democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t e r n a t i v e s , can be concluded c o n c i s e l y . I t emerges l o g i c a l l y from b e l i e f s in the s u r p a s s i n g importance of l i f e and i n d i v i d u a l worth. I t stems from the assumption t h a t human s i m i l a r i t i e s in b i o l o g i c a l and emotional ne ed s, in i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , in c o ntr ol over c o n d i t i o n s of b i r t h and d e a t h , and in s p i r i t u a l value f a r outweigh human di f f e r e n c e s . It is c o n s i s t e n t with the p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s and l i t e r a r y h e r i t a g e of our c u l t u r e . F i n a l l y , s t a t e d n e g a t i v e l y , the b e l i e v e r s in i n e q u a l i t y can never agree on what i n e q u a l i t i e s are most s i g n i f i c a n t and t h i s leads to what Myers c a l l s the "anarchy of c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s . " 28 To be m ea n in g fu l, e q u a l i t y must not only be of_ so m e t h i n g - -i n t h i s c o n t e x t , e q u a l i t y of l i f e , of i n d i v i d u a l d i g n i t y - - b u t i t must a lso be f o r something. I t must have some i m p l i c a t i o n s for the a c t i o n s of the humans a s s e s s e d as 27Carlton C. Rodee, T. J. Anderson, and C. Q. C h r i s t o l , I n t r o d u c t i o n to P o l i t i c a l Science (N.Y.: McGraw- Hill Book Co. , 1957), pp. 86-68. 280p. ci t . , p. 159. 42 e q u a l , or for the way in which they are t r e a t e d by o t h e r s . I t is here t h a t one c o n f ro n ts a second assumption upon which to r e s t the dem ocratic f a i t h . Freedom.'--Equali ty e n t a i l s , most i m p o r t a n t l y , the freedom of each in d i v i d u a l to use his l i f e as he sees f i t . I t follows t h a t each may s e t his own goals and pursue them in his own way, with the lone r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t he not thereb y impinge upon the e s s e n t i a l freedom of his fellow e q u a l s . In t h i s s e n se , freedom is l i b e r a t i o n from as many impersonal d e te r m in a n ts as p o s s i b l e . I t is a freedom from p o l i t i c a l tyranny through s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , freedom from ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o n through e d u c a t i o n , freedom from economic re g i m e n ta ti o n through oc cu p a tio n al c h o i c e , freedom from c l e r i c a l c o ntr ol through r e l i g i o u s d i v e r s i t y , and freedom from s o c i a l d i s d a i n and i n d i g n i t y through c l a s s m o b i l i t y . Yet th ese freedoms, phrased n e g a t i v e l y as the absence of r e s t r a i n t s , have obvious c o r r o l a r i e s in terms of p o s i t i v e p r o v i s i o n s f o r expanded o p p o r t u n i t y . They e n t a i l f a i r e l e c t i o n procedures f o r p o l i t i c a l freedom, p u b l i c schools for i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom, v o c a tio n a l and p r o f e s sio n a l t r a i n i n g for economic freedom, and a p l u r a l i s m of group a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r the p u r s u i t of p r e f e r r e d r e l i g i o u s and s o c ia l o b j e c t i v e s . We may concl ude, as J e f f e r s o n put i t in his f i r s t inau gu ral a d d r e s s , t h a t freedom e n t a i l s "our equal r i g h t to the use of our own f a c u l t i e s , " and we 43 may agree with contemporary authors t h a t although freedom is "a s l i p p e r y word," i t means " t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l should have the maximum o p p o r tu n i t y to s e l e c t his own p u r pose in l i f e and to choose the means to accomplish those p u r p o s e s . " 2 9 But although e q u a l i t y implies t h a t no man should d i c t a t e the b ehavior of a n o t h e r , freedom has i t s own i n t r i n s i c m e r i t s . I t is an autonomous good, not merely a l o g i c a l d e r i v i t i v e e i t h e r of de mocracy--although i t is u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with i t - - o r of e q u a l i t y as i t s fu nda mental component. The case f o r freedom may c i t e l i b e r t y as a n a t u r a l r i g h t , p r e - p o l i t i c a l l y s a n c t io n e d in Locke's s t a t e of n a t u r e . I t may r e s o r t to Old Testament s a n c t io n in the admonition of L e v i t i c u s : "Proclaim l i b e r t y t h r o u g h out the land to all i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . " 30 More p e r s u a s i v e l y , i t may defend freedom of e x p r e ss i o n as a c a t a l y s t of i n t e l l e c t u a l endeavor and i n d i v i d u a l development. William 0. Douglas, perhaps our mo/St p r o l i f i c modern j u r i s t , puts i t with almost epigrammatic t e r s e n e s s : "Once l i m i t s are put on d i s c u s s io n people do not develop t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s . 29James M. Burns and Jack W. P e l t a s o n , Government by the P e o p l e , f i f t h ed. r e v i s e d (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l 1, I n c . , 1963), pp. 20-21. 30L e v it i c u s 25:10. They cease to le a r n and become s a t u r a t e d with the p r e v a i l ing orthodox c r e e d . " 31 Yet freedom, in i t s s u r p a s s i n g s o c ia l s i g n i f i c a n c e , stands not as a law of n a t u r e , or Divine commandment, or p r e s c r i p t i o n for personal s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . I t i s , i n s t e a d , most valu ab le as a p r e r e q u i s i t e in the search for t r u t h , in the qu est f o r the b e s t s o l u t i o n to s o c ia l problems. This p r i n c i p l e is expressed most e l o q u e n t l y by J u s t i c e Holmes32 and John S t u a r t M i l l , 33 but Burns and Peltaso n have summarized i t s u c c i n c t l y . From the viewpoint of s o c i e t y , freedom is d e s i r a b l e because . . . l i b e r t y is the key to s o c ia l p r o g r e s s . . Where men enjoy freedom of i n q u i r y and e x p r e s s i o n , they are more l i k e l y to d e t e c t e r r o r and uncover t r u t h . 31t That th ese arguments are c u r r e n t l y e n d o r se d , and t h a t freedom is f u r t h e r defended as a n e c e s s i t y in pro v id in g the choice and c h a l l e n g e i m p l i c i t in democrati c procedures is affirm ed by o t h e r r e c e n t c o m m e n t a r i e s . 35 31William 0. Douglas, An Almanac of L i b e r t y (Garden C ity , N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1 954), p . 363. 32". . . the u l t i m a t e good d e s i r e d is b e t t e r reached by f re e t ra d e in i d e a s - - t h e b e s t t e s t of t r u t h is the power of thought to get i t s e l f accepted in the Competi tion of the m ark e t." Abrams v. U.S. , 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 330n L i b e r t y (Chicago: Henry Regenery Co., 1955). 3 0 p . c i t . , p . 21. 35Robert K. Carr, M. H. B e r n s te in and W. F. Murphy, American Democracy in Theory and P r a c t i c e , f o u r t h ed. (N.Y. Ho lt, Rinehart ana Winston , 1 963), p. 26. 45 M ajo rity r u 1 e . - - E . B. White wrote t h a t democracy is "the r e c u r r e n t s u sp i c i o n t h a t more than h a l f of the people are r i g h t more than h a l f of the t i m e . " 36 E t y m o l o g i c a l l y , i t indeed s p rin g s from the Greek demos, l i t e r a l l y meaning "the people" and i m p l i c i t y (in response to the i n e v i t a b l e , "which pe op le?") s p e c i f y i n g the m a j o r i t y of t h e m . 37 It is in t h i s sense t h a t J e f f e r s o n l i s t s as one of "the e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s of our government," in his famous F i r s t Inaugural Address, " a b s o l u t e acq u iescen ce in the d e c i s io n s of the m a j o r i t y - - t h e v i t a l p r i n c i p l e of r e p u b l i c s from which t h e r e is no appeal but to f o r c e . " de Grazia d i s p e l l s u n c e r t a i n t y by his a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t "democracy is a s o c i e t y in which the p u b l i c f u n c t i o n a r i e s give a maximum r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to a maj ori ty of the po p u la t i o n . " 38 We approach the i r r e d u c i b l e core of democracy, th e n , when we d e fin e i t as m a j o r i t y r u l e . Yet m a j o r i t y ru le is not only a d e f i n i t i o n of democracy; i t is also an i n e v i t a b l e d e r i v a t i v e of e q u a l i t y and freedom, d i sc u s s e d above as i t s n e ce s sa r y components. It is a kind r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , an amalgam, of th e se i n g r e d i e n t s . As Grimes r e c e n t l y ob served , 360uoted i b i d . , p. 27. 37Burns and P e l t a s o n , o p . c i t . , p. 19. 38Alfred de G ra zia , Pub!i c and Republi c (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopp, 1951), p. 4“ A u th o r 's emphasis. 46 E q u a l i t y , l i k e freedom, in v olves a r e l a t i o n s h i p . If every man seeks to be f r e e , every freedom-seeking man becomes in some way an o b s t a c l e in the path of someone e l s e ' s freedom. . . (W)ere a b s o lu t e freedom p o s s i b l e , i t would have c o n s i s t e d of nothing l e s s than a b s o lu t e power. . . Because of the d i f f i c u l t y of a r r i v i n g at a s a t i s f a c t o r y s ta n d a rd for d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between people whose claimed freedoms were in c o n f l i c t , the measure of e q u a l i t y has taken on e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e as a l e g i t i m a t e s o l u t i o n to the problem. E q u a li ty has thus provided a s ta n d a rd fo r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s over freedom. . . The . . . m a j o r i t y is proving to be a l i b e r a t i n g fo rc e in p o l i t i c s , r e d i s t r i b u t i n g freedom by e q u a l i z i n g the claims of the c o n t e s t a n t s . 39 So i t is t h a t m a j o r i t y ru le gains d i s t i n c t i o n from i t s c e n t r a l place in d e f i n i t i o n s of democracy, as well as from i t s p o t e n t i a l ro le in r e c o n c i l i n g e q u a l i t y and f r e e dom. Yet, s e t a p a r t from a b s t r a c t democracy, and t r a n s c e n d i n g i t s u t i l i t y in r e c o n c i l i n g o t h e r v a l u e s , m a j o r i t y ru le b oasts i t s own r a t i o n a l e in the record of i t s p e r fo r m a n c e . As Commager has observ ed, m a j o r i t i e s have not taxed wealth out of e x i s t e n c e ; they have not been h o s t i l e to ed u cati o n or to s c i e n c e . The p u l p i t , the p r e s s , the s c h o o l, the forum, are as fre e here as anywhere in the w o r ld -- w ith the p o s s i b l e e x c ep tio n of t h a t o t h e r g r e a t m a j o r i t y r u le c o u n t r y - - B r i t a i n . h0 This e m p iric a l c a s e , based on h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , is b o l s t e r e d by a t h e o r e t i c a l one. Riemer, i n s i s t i n g t h a t unanimity is d e s i r a b l e , although u n a t t a i n a b l e , a s s e r t s t h a t 39Alan P. Grimes, E q u a li t y in America (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964), p p . v i i - x . 40Henry S. Commager, M ajo rit y Rule and Minority Rights (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1943), pp. 80-81. I 47 m a j o r i t y r u le is the best a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e sin c e t h e re must always be "the d i f f i c u l t y of a s c e r t a i n i n g which m i n o ri t y is to r u l e . 1,1+1 Senator J. William F u l b r i g h t , chairman of the Forei gn Relati ons Commi t t e e , while acknowledging the l i m i t a t i o n s and d e f e c t s of m a j o r i t y wisdom, quotes two proponents of m a j o r i t y r u l e with a p p ro v a l. Democracy, Winston Chu rch ill once s a i d , is the worst form of government men have ever d e v i s e d - - e x c e p t for every o t h e r form. Or in J e f f e r s o n ' s words: "Sometimes i t is s a id t h a t man cannot be t r u s t e d with the government of h i m s e l f . Can he, th e n , be t r u s t e d with the government of o t h e r s ? Or have we found angels in the form of kings to govern him?"42 S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r seems to answer the q u e s t i o n , a century and a h a l f l a t e r : There is no escape from the problem of ignorance because nobody knows enough to run the government. P r e s i d e n t , s e n a t o r s . e d i t o r s and tne l i k e are only a l i t t l e l e s s i g n o r a n t than the r e s t of u s . 43 And so one is l e f t with dem ocr acy--not because a ll men are r a t i o n a l and informed and b e n e f i c i e n t , but because no b e t t e r system has ever been d ev ise d . C e r t a i n l y none c o n t r i b u t e s so much to the a t t a i n m e n t of a fre e s o c i e t y of equal men and women, with a l l the advantages accruing t h e r e i n . 41Reimer, o p . ci t . , p. 123. 42The E l i t e and the E l e c t o r a t e (Santa Barbara: Center f o r the Study of Democratic I n s t i t u t i o n s , 1963), p. 4. 43E. E. S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r , The Semisovereign P e o p l e , o p . ci t . , p. 136. A uth o r's emphasis. Implementational Requirements 6f Democracy 48 Once democracy, d e fin ed in terms of e q u a l i t y , freedom and m a j o r i t y r u l e , has been p o s i t e d as a moral p r e f e r e n c e , a t t e n t i o n should be d i r e c t e d toward i t s p r a c t i c a l require m ents in a v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l system. These would seem to be f o u r - f o l d : a p r o c l i v i t y toward compromise; c o m p e t i t i o n ; e f f i c i e n t governmental machinery; and competent o f f i c i a l s . Compromi se. In a d i c t a t o r s h i p , compromise is not only un ne cessary but a l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . In a government c o n t r o l l e d by more than a lone a u t o c r a t , i t is i n e v i t a b l e . Because i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t two or more persons share i d e n t i c a l views, i t is n e c e s s a r y t h a t they compromise with one a n o th e r when they share p o l i t i c a l power. This i m p e ra ti v e becomes a l l the more compelling when c o n s i d e r i n g a democratic governmental s t r u c t u r e which attem pts to r e f l e c t the views of a p o pula r m a j o r i t y . Riemer poin ts out t h a t in any m a j o r i t y ru le system c a n d i dates and p a r t i e s "seek to maximize p o l i t i c a l s upport . . . (and) harmonize d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s " so t h a t an agreement is reached which "more n e a r l y approximates s u b s t a n t i a l consensus or unanimous consent than a mere m a j o r i t y vote . . . i n d i c a t e s . " 44 4 40 p . c i t . , p. 127. 49 The same p o i n t is made e lse w h e re . Three d i s t i n guished au thor s a s s e r t , f o r example, t h a t the "Need for Compromise" is a fundamental t e n e t of democracy and af fi r m t h a t No one s e t of b e l i e f s or i n t e r e s t s can eve r be allowed to dominate a l l o t h e r s on a permanent b a s i s . Thus, democracy assumes the need f o r a good deal of compromise in human a f f a i r s . 45 Walter Lippman, c o n c u r r i n g , phrased his s i m i l a r se n ti m e n ts more n e g a t i v e l y when he wrote t h a t in a "sound democracy the c e n t r a l mass of the v o t e r s . . . are not d o c t r i n a i r e s and ideolo gues but moderate and p r a g m a t i c a l l y - minded men and women."46 But the case f o r compromise need not r e s t only upon some lamentable n e c e s s i t y to accommodate the d i v e r g e n t views of those who compromise e i t h e r a m a j o r i t y or an e n t i r i t y of the body p o l i t i c . I t has i t s own i n t r i n s i c m e r i t , reco gn ized e x p l i c i t l y by George H. Sabine, the eminent h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t. The " e t h i c s of democracy," he w r i t e s , regard mutual concession and compromise not as d e f e c t i o n s from p r i n c i p l e but as ways of reaching agreements which on the whole were more s a t i s f a c t o r y than any t h a t could be reached by the dominance of one i n t e r e s t or one p a r ty over a l l the o t h e r s . 47 45Carr, B e r n s te in and M orriso n, o p . c i t . , p. 27. 460uoted in Burns and P e l t a s o n , op. c i t . , p. 38. 47A H isto ry of P o l i t i c a l T h e o ry , r e v i s e d ed. (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), p. 908. 50 Compromise, whether or not a t t a i n i n g "more s a t i s f a c t o r y " agreements about p u b l i c p o l i c y , and d i s r e g a r d i n g , t o o , i t s n e c e s s i t y as a common denominator for m a j o r i t y r u l e , makes o t h e r claims upon the p r o fe s s e d demo c r a t . I t provides the cement of s o c ia l co h e s io n , holding t o g e t h e r in peace, i f not t r a n q u i l i t y , the d i v e r g e n t egoisms of a p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y . I t is the ransom with which c i t i z e n s buy o f f b l o o d s h e d - - t h e v i s i b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of an unseen h u m i l i t y , a t a c i t admission of i n d i v i d u a l f a l l i b i l i t i e s . Compromise is the dues demanded by the u n iv e r sal f r a t e r n i t y of mutual i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . 1+8 F i n a l l y , compromise provides the l a s t b e s t hope for l o g i c a l l y i n t e g r a t i n g two concepts i d e n t i f i e d above as i n t e g r a l to the democratic i d e a l : i t pr ovides m a j o r i t y r u le and freedom (implying m i n o ri t y r i g h t s ) an area of accommodation based upon mutual r e s p e c t . Competi t i on. - - 11 is almost a xiom ati c t h a t a democratic p o l i t i c a l system must be one c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o m p e t i t i o n . M ajo rit y r u l e is mean ingless u nless the m a j o r i t y has chosen one c a n d i d a t e or p o l i c y or p ar ty in p r e f e r e n c e to a competing a l t e r n a t i v e . Freedom, n e c e s s i t a t i n g a l i b e r a t i o n from d e t e r m i n i s t i c co mpu lsions , e n t a i l s the a v a i l a b i l i t y of choices which can be l u c i d l y propounded and i n t e l l i g e n t l y e v a l u a t e d only when they are advanced 48See Smith and Lindeman, op. c i t . , Ch. 2, "The F r a t e r n i t y M otif." / 51 with the f e r v o r s p r i n g i n g from c o m p e t i t i v e d i s c o u r s e . F i n a l l y , e q u a l i t y is incomplete unless i t embraces the equal r i g h t of a l l to submit i n f i n i t l y d i f f e r e n t and hence c o m p e titiv e p r e f e r e n c e s for a n e c e s s a r i l y f i n i t e number of a u t h o r i z e d p u blic p o l i c i e s . E. E. S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r e l e v a t e d co m p eti tio n to a commanding h e ig h t in the democratic' process when he wrote t h a t The people are involved in p u b l i c a f f a i r s by the c o n f l i c t system. C o n f l i c t s open up q u e s ti o n s for p u b l i c i n t e r v e n t i o n . Out of c o n f l i c t the a l t e r n a t i v e s of p u b l i c p o l i c y a r i s e . . . Above e v e r y t h i n g , the people are powerless i f the p o l i t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e is not c o m p e t i t i v e . . . Democracy is a c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i cal system in which competing l e a d e r s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s d e fin e the a l t e r n a t i v e s of p u b l i c p o l i c y in such a way t h a t the p u b l i c can p a r t i c i p a t e in the de cis io n-m aking proces s . 4 9 Other informed ob se rv e rs agree t h a t democracy e n t a i l s such elements as a "choice by the v o t e r from among c a n d i d a t e s who are gen uinely competing for o f f i c e , " 50 or "a s tr o n g o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y or c o a l i t i o n " 51 engaged in a " c o m p e titiv e c o n t e s t f o r the p e o p l e ' s v o t e s . " 52 E f f i c i e n t machiner.y. - - A l t h o u g h , as many s t u d e n t s have been t o l d , democracy "is more i n t e r e s t e d in making i t **9The Semi sov erei gn P e o p l e , op. c i t . , pp. 138-144. 50Charles R. Adrian and Charles P r e s s , The Ameri can P o l i t i c a l Process (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , I 96b), pp. w .---------------------------------- 51Riemer, op. ci t ., p. 103. 52Burns and P e l t a s o n , op. ci t . , p. 19. 52 p o s s i b l e f o r the c i t i z e n to govern h im se lf than i t is in providing ' e f f i c i e n t ' government," the authors who to ld them t h i s are quick to p o in t out t h a t dem ocratic govern ments have " b u i l t in checks a g a i n s t mistakes (which) help to produce e f f i c i e n t r e s u l t s in the e n d . " 53 P a t r i c i a Wirt, d e s c r i b i n g the " t e s t s " which demo c r a t i c l e g i s l a t i v e bodies must meet, places c o n s i d e r a b l e emphasis upon f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g to the u t i l i t y or e f f i ciency of i n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery. L e g i s l a t u r e s , she w r i t e s , must be "endowed with s u f f i c i e n t power to form ulat e ne cessa ry p o l i c y , " have " r u l e s (which) permit m a j o r i t y ru le while p r o t e c t i n g a g a i n s t a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n , " and possess " s u f f i c i e n t time and r e so u rc e s f o r informed d e l i b e r a t i o n . " 54 These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f i ciency c o n s t i t u t e t h re e of her s ix c r i t e r i a f o r judging democratic l e g i s l a t u r e s . The importance of e f f i c i e n t governmental o r g a n i z a tion and procedure to the conduct of democracy is given high p r i o r i t y , too, by Hyneman. In o u t l i n i n g what he c a l l s 53Carr, B e r n s te in and Morrison, o p . ci t . , p. 33. 54P a t r i c i a Shumate Wirt, "The L e g i s l a t u r e , " S a l i e n t Issue s of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R e v i s i o n , National Municipal League, 1961. Reprinted in Russel W. Maddox, e d . , Is sues in S t a t e and Local Government, o p . ci t . , p. 81. I t is a m a t t e r of some i n t e r e s t t h a t among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s stu dyin g l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and a p p o r t i o n m e n t , women occupy a r a t h e r prominent p o s i t i o n . In a d d i t i o n to Wirt, Ruth S i l v a , Belle Z e l l e r , and Helen Hill M i l l e r have made s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 53 democracy's " e s s e n t i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and ways," he a s s e r t s t h a t " t h e r e must be a s t r u c t u r e of government which enables the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s r e a l l y to run the g o v e r n m e n t ." 55 Without a t t e m p t i n g to e v a l u a t e all the s p e c i f i c components of " e f f i c i e n t machinery" as an implementational r eq uirem en t of democracy, i t is v i r t u a l l y ax iomatic t h a t they in c lu d e the p o s s i b i l i t y of speedy a c t i o n coupled with adequate s tu d y , s u f f i c i e n t although l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y , and c o n t i n u i t y w ith o u t r i g i d i t y . These e n t a i l d e l i c a t e l y balanced i n s t i t u t i o n s and p rocedura l devices of s k i l l e d r efinem ent. Should t h e i r value be doubted, i t is well to r e c a l l S i r Henry Maine’s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t "L ib e rty is s e c r e t e d in the i n t e r s t i c e s of p r o c e d u r e . " 56 Competent o f f i c i a l s . --A1exander Pope wrote: 55Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy (N.Y.: Harper & B r o t h e r s , 1950), p . 15. The a u t h o r ' s conception of democracy has been i n f l u e n c e d s u b s t a n t i a 1ly by the ideas and b e h a v io r of Prof. Hyneman. His k i n d n e ss , candor, w i t , i n s i g h t and u t t e r lack of p r e t e n s e embody the essence of the democ ratic p e r s o n a l i t y . Much of t h a t b e labored e a r l i e r in t h i s c h a p t e r is s t a t e d more s u c c i n c t l y by Hyneman: "The es se nce of democracy . . . is r e s p e c t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . The measure of a man's devotion to demo cracy is determined by the s t r e n g t h of his c o n v i c t i o n t h a t men and women should be able to get what they want. The person who b e l i e v e s in democracy ac cepts the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t everybody cou nts. In a democracy, any man who manages to get born is e n t i t l e d to c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . (He) is e n t i t l e d to c o n s i d e r a t i o n because he is a human being. That is the ro ot idea of de moc ratic t h e o r y , as I see i t . " Ibid. , p. 11. 56Herman F i n e r , Theory and P r a c t i c e of Modern Government, r e v i s e d ed. ( N. Y . : Henry Holt and Co., 1 949 ), p. 83. 54 For forms of government l e t f ools c o n t e s t , Whiche'er is b e s t a d m i n i s t e r e d is b e s t . Pennock and Smith, q u o ting t h e s e l i n e s , observe t h a t they are "never b e t t e r than a h a l f - t r u t h ; but t h a t h a l f is i m p o r t a n t . " 57 Even though e f f i c i e n t government machinery e x i s t s , and r e g a r d l e s s of how much i t may mani f e s t com pet ition and f a c i l i t a t e compromise, i t wi ll f a i l i f the men and women who hold o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s are s t u p i d , i g n o r a n t , i n e x p er ie n c e d or depraved. Writing a f t e r the d i s p u t e over un equally populated l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s had been i g n i t e d by j u d i c i a l d e c r e e , James E. Larson observed t h a t I t is u n l i k e l y . . . t h a t the problem of e q u a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can be divorced from the problem of q u a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . P la to advised on the n e c e s s i t y of s e c u r i n g "competent judgement" in those who must hold p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . 58 And Wirt, con firming the o b v io u s, l i s t s as one of the te sts' of democratic l e g i s l a t u r e s a c o n d i t i o n in which "competent c i t i z e n s are a t t r a c t e d to and honored by l e g i s l a t i v e s e r v i c e . " 59 I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i ps Several general o b s e r v a t i o n s seem p e r t i n e n t in con c luding t h i s a n a l y s i s of democracy as the normative goal of 57J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith, P o l i t i c a l Science (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 440. 58Larson, op. c i t . , p. 103. ( A u th o r's emphasis) 590p. c i t . , p . 81. 55 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e systems. Compromise and c o m p e t i t i o n , the f i r s t two r e quirem ents of democracy d isc u s s e d as e s s e n t i a l to i t s p r a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n , have a r a t h e r i n t r i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p with one a n o t h e r . From one p e r s p e c t i v e , they are mutually e x c l u s i v e . When compromise occurs on any given i i s s u e , the c o m p e t i t i v e process r e g a rd i n g i t s r e s o l u t i o n has been t e r m i n a t e d . Yet, from a d i f f e r e n t vantage p o i n t , the two are not i n c o m p a tib le but supplementary. Compromise and c o m p e t i t i o n . --Compromise p r e supposes two or more d i v e r g e n t and c o m p e titiv e p o s i t i o n s which are to be accommodated. I t also assumes t h a t the c o m p e t i t i v e forc es which vie with one a n o t h e r 'h a v e some common i n t e r e s t , i d e o l o g i c a l or m a t e r i a l , on the b a s is of which compromise is p o s s i b l e . There must be a common ground, a general area of p r e - e x i s t i n g agreement which permits e x i s t i n g d i s p u t e s to be r e so lv e d in accordance with mutually a c c e p t a b l e p r e c e p t s . Such p r e c e p t s provide a con sensus which serves both as a s o c i a l cohe sive in f u n d a mental r e l a t i o n s h i p s and an implied l i c e n s e p e r m i t t i n g r e l a t i v e l y harmless c o n f l i c t in less s a l i e n t m a t t e r s . I t is the common i n t e r e s t of la b o r and management in c o n t i n u ing p r o d u c t i o n , f o r example, which permits them to d i f f e r on a d e s i r a b l e wage s c a l e and even to r e s o r t to temporary i n t e r r u p t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n , w ith o u t permanently d e s t r o y i n g the man ufac turing p r o c e s s . So, to o , i t is the r e c i p r o c a l love of husband and wife which permits them to q u a r re l on 56 v a c a tio n plans or c h i l d d i s c i p l i n e w ith o u t d e s tr o y i n g t h e i r m arriag e. Lip s et makes the p o in t t h a t a s t a b l e democracy r e q u i r e s the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of con f l i c t or cleavage so t h a t t h e r e w ill be s t r u g g l e over r u l i n g p o s i t i o n s , c h a l l e n g e s to p a r t i e s in power, and s h i f t s of p a r t i e s in o f f i c e ; but w ith o u t concensus- -a p o l i t i c a l system allowing the peaceful "play" of power, the adherence by the "outs" to d e c i s io n s made by the " i n s , " and th e r e c o g n i t i o n by the "ins" of the r i g h t s of the " o u t s " - - t h e r e can be no democracy. The study of the c o n d i t i o n s en couraging democracy must t h e r e f o r e focus on the source s of both cleavage and c o n s e n s u s . 60 The consensus upon which democratic compromise r e s t s - - t h e p o l i t i c a l analogue of manufacturing in l a b o r- management r e l a t i o n s or love in family r e l a t i o n s - - i s adherence to the p r i n c i p l e s of democracy i t s e l f , a shared b e l i e f in the i d e a l s of e q u a l i t y , freedom and m a j o ri t y r u l e . I f c o n s e r v a t i v e s and l i b e r a l s , Republicans and Democrats, rura l farmers and urban o f f i c e w orkers, agree on th ese t h i n g s , they may compete v ig o ro u s ly on a l l o th e r iss u e s w ith o u t r u p t u r i n g the f a b r i c of democratic s o c i e t y . Indeed, i f they do not compete v i g o r o u s l y , e q u a l i t y is tra nsform ed i n t o a dull and muted u n i f o r m i t y , freedom is r e p la c e d by c h o i c e l e s s sh a c k le s and m a j o r i t y r u le is rende red i n o p e r a b l e by the absence of any i d e n t i f i a b l e option for the m a j o r i t y to choose. Requirements and a s s u m p t i o n s . --T here is an im p o rtan t and complex r e l a t i o n s h i p , not only between 60Se.ymore L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 1. 57 compromise and c o m p e t i t i o n - - b o t h requirem en ts of democracy--but also between th e se dem ocratic requirem en ts and the dem ocratic assumptions of e q u a l i t y , freedom and democracy on which they r e s t . Without general 'agreement on the equal value of human b e i n g s , and the r e c i p r o c a l r e s p e c t t h i s e n t a i l s , t h e r e would be l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of compro mise when humans d i s a g r e e . Without a r e s p e c t f o r i n d i vidual freedom, the i n t i m i d a t i o n of en forc ed co nf orm ity would s i l e n c e the e n u n c i a t i o n of competing views. Acquiescence to m a j o r i t y r u l e , in t h i s frame of r e f e r e n c e , is n ecessary as a kind of l a s t r e s o r t . Should freedom succeed in promoting the c o m p e t i t i o n (or clea vage or c o n f l i c t ) so nec e s sa ry to democ rat ic c h o i c e , but should the b e l i e f in e q u a l i t y prove i n s u f f i c i e n t to encourage compromise or the development of c o nsensus, then only acceptance of the m a j o r i t y ' s p r e f e r e n c e can avoid the t r a n s f e r of the c o m p etitio n from the arenas of p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t a t i o n ( l e g i s l a t i v e chambers, campaign rostrums and cour ts of law) to the b a t t l e grounds of p h ysic a l v i o l e n c e . So f e r t i l e is the s o i l of democratic c o n c e p t u a l i z a tion t h a t s t i l l o t h e r co nc eptu al r e l a t i o n s h i p s have c o n s i d e r a b l e r e l e v a n c e . Some comments above p o in te d to the role of m a j o r i t y ru le as an i n t e g r a t o r , r e c o n c i l i n g agent, of e q u a l i t y and freedom. But the area r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n . E q u a l i t y , freedom, and m a j o r i t y r u l e .--As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , freedom is a l o g i c a l d e r i v a t i v e of the e q u a l i t y maxim t h a t none should d i c t a t e the c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e f o r an o th e r . Yet t h i s absence of r e s t r a i n t or d i c t a t i o n leads to freedom which c o n t i n u a l l y impinges upon the l i v e s of o ne's f e l l o w s , e s p e c i a l l y in an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , ov er- p o p u l a t e d , highly urban ized s o c i e t y . M ajo rity r u le is a tech n iq u e of s o c i a l c o ntrol which l i m i t s t h i s l i b e r t y , at l e a s t to the e x t e n t t h a t the advantages of sh e er power, w e a l t h , or ch ic a n e ry are s u b o r d i n a t e d to the a u t h o r i t y of s u p e r i o r numbers. Lest t h i s be viewed simply as the s u b s t i t u t i o n of one kind of tyranny f o r a n o t h e r , i t should be p o inted out t h a t m a j o ri t y c ontrol holds out the hope, at l e a s t , of more r e s t r a i n e d , moderate and i n d u l g e n t r u le than t h a t which a m i n o ri t y might impose. T h is , e s s e n t i a l l y , is because c o n s i d e r a b l e compromise, accommodation and d i l u t i o n of s e l f - i n t e r e s t is ne c es sa ry b efo re any c o a l i t i o n of a numerical m a j o r i t y can p o s s i b l y be formed. Majorit y r u l e , th e n , is almost i n e v i t a b l y a r u l e based upon a very l i m i t e d number of agreements and the im p o sitio n of only a few r e s t r a i n t s upon the m i n o r i t y . I t may be no more be n e v o le n t or e n l i g h t e n e d than r u l e by l e s s than a m a j o r i t y , but i t at l e a s t is l e ss r e s t r i c t i v e and hence le ss dangerous to i n d i v i d u a l freedom. 59 In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , however, t h e r e is no t h e o r e t i c a l formula which can co mpletely accommodate the c o n f l i c t i n g demands of m a j o r i t y r u l e and m in o rity r i g h t s , order and l i b e r t y , governmental power and i n d i v i d u a l f r e e dom. Yet j u s t as m a j o r i t y r u le can m i t i g a t e to some e x t e n t the c la s h e s which may a r i s e between freedom and e q u a l i t y , so a profound and g e n e r a l l y shared c o n v i c t i o n of human e q u a l i t y may ren der the m a j o r i t y more compassionate in i t s t r e a t m e n t of the i n d i v i d u a l and the i n d i v i d u a l , in e x e r c i s i n g his personal freedom, more s o l i c i t o u s of the f e e l i n g of the m a j o r i t y . But t o t a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n is w ell- nigh i m p o s s i b l e . 61 When the two are in c o n f l i c t , the odds favor m a j o r i t y r u l e . Freedom, e s p e c i a l l y in a democracy, never is c h a l l e n g e d s e r i o u s l y u n le ss i t is the freedom to d i s s e n t , the freedom of the m i n o r i t y to espouse unpopular id e as . I t is a sad paradox t h a t those whose l i b e r t y is ch alle n g e d most o f te n are those whose numbers are few est, and whose c a p a c i t y to defend i t is t h e r e f o r e most l i m i t e d . If freedom and m a j o r i t y r u l e are to some degree n a t u r a l a n t a g o n i s t s , they are also equal p a r t n e r s in the e n t e r p r i s e of democratic government. The ir clash may be muted somewhat by a g e n e r a l i z e d commitment to e q u a l i t y . I t can be abate d ofte n by sha red dev otion to the idea l of 61Carr, B e r n s te in and Morrison remark t h a t " th e re is a c e r t a i n l o g i c a l dilemma to overcome" in the b a la n c in g of m a j o r i t y power and m i n o ri t y r i g h t s . Op. c i t . , p. 28. 60 love, or s i m i l a r e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s . But a t ru c e between the two is perhaps most l i k e l y when i t is recognized t h a t w ith out freedom to espouse, inform, and d i s p u t e , m a j o r i t y r u l e w i l l be u n e n l i g h t e n e d and hence s t u p i d l y i n e f f e c t u a l . Whatever t h e i r h o s t i l i t i e s , they need each o t h e r . Freedom is menaced l e a s t by the m a j o r i t y , d i l u t e d by compromise and accommodation. Majority r u le will f a l l of i t s own i g n o r a n t im p u lsiv e n e ss unless n u rtu re d by the wisdom and s t i m u l a t i o n de riv e d from fre e d i s c o u r s e and advocacy. M ajo rity r u l e enjoys a r e l a t i o n s h i p with e q u a l i t y which is s im p l e r than t h a t with freedom. If one assumes human e q u a l i t y , m a j o ri t y r u le is a w e l l - n i g h i n e v i t a b l e mathematical d e r i v a t i o n . If p u b l i c p o lic y is to be made w ith o u t d ef ere n c e to wealth or c l a s s or r a c e , i f each voice counts for one and none f o r more than one, then p o lic y can be made only by adding the d e s i r e s of each human be in g, and ad opting the p o l i c y p r e f e r r e d by the n u m e r ic a lly g r e a t e r group. Yet the r u l i n g m a j o r i t y may, of c o u r se , make p o licy which s u b ju g a te s the m i n o ri t y to i n d i g n i t i e s which deny equali t y . No mention has y e t been made of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between e f f i c i e n t governmental machinery or competent o f f i c i a l s and the o t h e r f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h above. This is because a t t e n t i o n thus f a r has been focused upon values or p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s which ha’ve l i t t l e d i r e c t relevance to 61 i n s t i t u t i o n a l or personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as e f f i ciency or competence. Yet democracy r e q u i r e s a l l t h r e e - - v a l u e s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , and p e o p l e - - t o work e f f e c t i v e l y . E f f i c i e n c y and c o m p e t e n c e I t is the t h e s i s of t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t a working democratic o r d e r r e q u i r e s , for p r a c t i c a l implem en tat ion, a b e l i e f in the value of both compromise and c o m p e t i t i o n , plus e f f i c i e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery and a b l e , i n t e l l i g e n t p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . But the l a t t e r two are not so much d e r i v a t i v e s of democracy as u n iv er sa l i m p e ra ti v e s of any v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l system. No government can f u n c t io n e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h o u t an e f f i c i e n t s t r u c t u r a l and procedural mechanism. None can surv ive without o f f i c i a l s who pass and e nforce wise laws. Although the values of democracy make i t a moral i m p e r a ti v e , and hence c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r own s u b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t may be argued h o p e f u l ly t h a t they als o make for e f f i c i e n c y and competence. Freedom, f o r example, s u s t a i n s i m ag in ativ e d i s c u s s i o n from which more r e f i n e d and durab le i n s t i t u t i o n s may emerge than from the i n t e l l e c t u a l t i m i d i t y induced by imposed co nformity of e x p r e s s io n . M ajo rity r u le has the same e f f e c t i f one assumes t h a t , as two heads are b e t t e r than one, a m a j o r i t y is b e t t e r than a m in o rity . Freedom and m a j o r i t y r u le may l i k e w i s e be espoused as valu ab le devices for improving the c a l i b e r of p u b l i c s e r v a n t s . I t is not unrea sona bl e to assume t h a t people 62 nouris hed in an atmosphere of u n i n h i b i t e d i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s course may bring to p u b lic o f f i c e more a l e r t and c r e a t i v e minds than those s u b j e c t e d to dogmatic conform ity. S i m i l a r l y , i t seems proba ble t h a t i f government o f f i c i a l s are s e l e c t e d from a m a j o r i t y of the whole p o p u l a t i o n , with r e l a t i v e l y equal chance f o r advancement, more competent men and women may be chosen than would be the case were the choice l i m i t e d to some a r b i t r a r i l y d e s ig n a te d e l i t e . Seven R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l Goals What kind of l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is p r e f e r r e d , and what system of appor tionmen t is b e s t c a l c u l a t e d to get i t ? An answer to the f i r s t h a l f of the q u e s ti o n seems i m p l i c i t in the normative assumptions and implementa- t i o n a l requ ireme nts of a dem oc ratic p o l i t i c a l system. It appears t h a t the most d e s i r a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : 1. r e f l e c t s the p r i n c i p l e of human equali t y ; 2. p r o t e c t s and encourages i n d i v i d u a l fre e d o m ; 3. permits p o l i c y f o rm u l a t i o n by m a j o r i t y r u l e ; 4. acknowledges the value of compromi s e ; 5. p reserv es p o l i t i c a l competi ti on ; 6. complies with the r equirem ents of s t r u c t u r a l and procedural e f f i ci ency ; 7. produces l e g i s l a t o r s p o s se s si n g co mpeten ce. That the f i r s t t h r e e of th e se goals are based on normative assumptions of democracy and the l a s t four on i t s 63 im plem en tation al require m ents is of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l importance. That they a f f e c t one an o th e r in a b a f f l i n g d i v e r s i t y of ways i s , for p r e s e n t p u rp o se s, of only a c a demic i n t e r e s t . What seems v i t a l is t h a t th e se seven o b j e c t i v e s of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government are minimal ones, a d m itting augmentation but s c a r c e l y p e r m i t t i n g d e l e t i o n . They wil l s u b se q u e n t l y be used as goals a g a i n s t which the app ortionm en t p a t t e r n s o u t l i n e d in Chapters III and IV w ill be measured. These apportionm en t models w i l l , in t u r n , provide a b a s i s f o r e v a l u a t i n g p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e methods by which l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s may be a c t u a l l y a l 1o c a t e d . CHAPTER III REPRESENTATION FUNCTIONS AND THE ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE IMPERATIVE The c a r e l e s s use of words so lamentably i n h e r e n t in p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e r e q u i r e s unusual p r e c i s i o n in the d e f i n i t i o n of terms. This study assumes, as i n d i c a t e d in Chapter I, t h a t modern democracy n e c e s s i t a t e s some system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t i s , in p a r t , a numerical i n e v i t a b i l i t y . Government "by the people" becomes im p o ssib le when there are too many people to meet, d e b a te , n e g o t i a t e and decide t o g e t h e r . "The people" must t h e r e f o r e s e l e c t a s m a ller group to " r e p r e s e n t " them. Let i t be c l e a r , then, t h a t dem ocratic government and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government a re , for p r a c t i c a l p r e s e n t purpose s, synonomous. The second d eriv es from, and is an implem entation s u b s t i t u t e f o r , the f i r s t . I t is obvious, moreover, t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e n t a i l s the e x i s t e n c e of multi-membered p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s known o c c a s i o n a l l y as s e n a t e s , a s s e m b l i e s , or p a r l i a m e n t s , but most f r e q u e n t l y and g e n e r i c a l l y as l e g i s l a t i v e bodi es. In America l e g i s l a t u r e s are viewed as so i n t e g r a l a p a r t of the concept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t the "House of 64 65 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " has gained g e n e r a l - - a l t h o u g h not uniform-- ac ceptance as the name given to the lower chamber in a l e g i s l a t i v e body. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , hence, shquld be taken to mean l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n unless o therw ise s p e c i f i e d . 1 Two re sp e c t e d s c h o l a r s have r e c e n t l y concluded t h a t the l e g i s l a t i v e process and the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system are linked i n s e p a r a b l y in all democratic p o l i t i c a l o r d e r s . L e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n . . . is the u l t i m a t e e x p r e s s i o n of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e . 2 This c h ap ter and the next one atte m p t to enumerate the most p l a u s i b l e ways in which s e a t s in a l e g i s l a t i v e body may be a p p o r t io n e d . Much hangs in the b a la n c e . Democracy, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system i t e n t a i l s , the l e g i s l a t u r e which embodies t h a t s y s t e m - - a l l th ese i n e x t r i c a b l y r e l a t e d concepts depend in turn upon a p p o r t i o n ment, upon the u l t i m a t e d e c i s io n t h a t c e r t a i n groups are a l l o c a t e d a p r e s c r i b e d number of s e a t s . Each p r i n c i p l e of government can be served by a method of ap portio nm ent. Each fu n c t io n (of the x0n t h i s p o i n t , F r i e d r i c h u t t e r s a p a r t i a l demurrer. While a d m ittin g t h a t " p a r li a m e n t s have, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , been the i n s t i t u t i o n a l core of modern r e p r e s e n t a t iv e government," he i n s i s t s t h a t c u r r e n t l y "the e x e c u t i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y when r e p r e s e n t i n g a m a j o r i t y p a r t y , is . . . ten ding to become the h e a r t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " Carl J. F r i e d r i c h , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Co., 194 6 T ~ > p . 414. 2 W i 11i a m J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul , The American L e g i s l a t i v e Process (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - Hall , Inc. , 196T Y7~p. 60. 66 l e g i s l a t o r ) can be f a c i l i t a t e d by some method of ap por tionment. Each major problem can be approached by a method of a p p o r t i o n m e n t . 3 The "methods of ap portionmen t" o u t l i n e d below are e v a l u a t e d p r i m a r i l y in terms of the degree to which they conform to the i m p e ra ti v e s of dem ocr atic government de s crib e d in Chapter I I . But before these apportionment a l t e r n a t i v e s are l i s t e d , i t might be wise to sketch b r i e f l y the e v o l u t i o n and purpose of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a concept i n t e g r a l to the de moc ratic i d e a l . The Nature of L e g i s l a t i v e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n As sev eral eminent p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have r a t h e r i r r e v e r e n t l y p oin te d o u t , t h e r e is a "good deal of vague n e s s , even of m eaningless nonsense . . . p o p u l a r ly a s s o c i a t e d with t h i s n o t i o n " of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Yet they admit t h a t "in a system in which 't h e p e o p l e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' e x e r c i s e s i g n i f i c a n t powers i t is not lacking in importance. An examination of i t s importance should b e g in , p erh ap s, with a b r i e f r e f e r e n c e to i t s h i s t o r i c a l development. The h i s t o r y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . --Whatever s i g n i f i cance l e g i s l a t i v e bodies may now have in e i t h e r the realm 3Al fred de G r a z i a , Apporti onment and R e p r e s e n t a t i ve Government (N.Y.: F r e d e r i c k ” Xt P r a e g e r , 1963), pp. 151-15 3. ^Emmette Redford, e t a l . , P o l i t i c s and Government in the United S t a t e s (N.Y.T R a r c o u r t , Brace & World, I n c . , 1365) , pp. 374-375. 67 of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s or the domain of democ ratic t h e o r y , i t is probably t r u e , as the l a t e Sen ator Richard L. Neuberger observ ed, t h a t " i t is p a r t of the American t r a d i t i o n for p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r s . . . to begin in s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . " 5 P a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t is imparted to Ne uberger's comment by W i r t ' s more r e c e n t a s s e r t i o n t h a t "few American p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s today enjoy as l i t t l e p r e s t i g e as s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . " 6 This s i t u a t i o n is viewed with some alarm, at l e a s t in a r e p o r t of an Oklahoma C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Survey Committee which s t a t e s t h a t "(u)pon the success or f a i l u r e of the l e g i s l a t i v e branch depends the f u t u r e of r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n m e n t ." 7 5"I Go To The L e g i s l a t u r e , " Survey G r a p h i c , J u l y , 1941, r e p r i n t e d in Robert L. Morlan, e d . , Capi tol , Court house, and City Hall (Boston: Houghton Mi fTl'in Co. , 1^54), p ~ . 100. Neuberger (D., Oregon), was a p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l i s t who served in the Oregon Senate p r i o r to his e l e c t i o n to the U.S. Sena te. Upon his d e a t h , he was s u c ceeded th e r e by his w i f e , Maureen. 6P a t r i c i a Shumate Wirt, "The L e g i s l a t u r e , " S a l i e n t Iss ues of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R e v i s i o n , National Municipal League, 196T. Reprinted in Russell W. Maddox, e d . , Issues in S t a t e and Local Government ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : D. Van Nostrand Co., 1965), p. &0. This view is a common one, and is o c c a s i o n a l l y broadened to in c lu d e a l l l e g i s l a t u r e s . Thus, one e x p e r t f e e l s t h a t " i t is a p p a r e n t t h a t l e g i s l a t u r e s . . . have d e c l i n e d in c e r t a i n im p o rta n t r e s p e c t s . " K. C. Wheare, Leqi s 1a t u r e s (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963), p. 221. See a l s o , "The Sick S t a t e of the S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s , " Newsweek, April 1 9 , 1965 , r e p r i n t e d in Issues 6 5 - 6 6 , Sidney Wise, ed. (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1 965 ), pp. 29-32. 7Quoted by Advisory Commission on In te rg overnm enta l R e l a t i o n s , Apportionment of S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), p . 35. 68 The c a ta lo g u e of d e f e c t s to which l e g i s l a t i v e d e c l i n e is a t t r i b u t a b l e is v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s , but c e r t a i n f a u l t s are more f r e q u e n t l y l i s t e d than o t h e r s . Keefe and Ogul r a t h e r t y p i c a l l y enumerate " i n o r d i n a t e m i n o ri t y power," " u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s , " " i n e f f i c i e n c y and t r i v i a l i s m , " and "the f a i l u r e to r e p r e s e n t the unorganized pu b lic" as major f a u l t s . 8 How did l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n descend to such a s o r r y s t a t e ? The answer, p e rh a p s, l i e s in the f a c t t h a t l e g i s l a t u r e s were i n i t i a l l y designed to d i sc h a rg e f a r more l i m i t e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s than are now expected of them. As more d u t i e s are t h r u s t upon an i n s t i t u t i o n , i t s performance of them almost i n e v i t a b l y become more p e r f u n c t o r y and hence s u b j e c t to g r e a t e r c r i t i c i s m . 9 Perhaps the b e st summary of e a r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s s t a t e s t h a t the " s t a r t i n g point" of n a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was in Europe during the Middle Ages and t h a t the " f i r s t p a r l ia m e n ts were c a l l e d by monarchs p r i m a r i l y f o r the purpose of vo ting t a x e s . . . ' (They) did not r e p r e s e n t people . . . but . . . two 8Keefe and Ogul, o p . ci t . , pp. 458-475. Newsweek , 1o c . c i t . , l i s t s "Loss of Independence: . . . Chronic p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n . . . Atroph ied c r e a t i v e powers. . . Sporadic incompetence. . . (and) P a r a l y z i n g p a r o c h i a l i s m . " 9Wheare says of l e g i s l a t u r e s t h a t "the a ttem pt to be and to do a l l th i n g s . . . has r e s u l t e d . . . in a d e c l i n e . . . in e f f i c i e n c y . " Op. ci t . , p. 234. 69 e s t a t e s , i . e . , land and commerce."10 G r a d u a l l y , the concept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n became b roader in sco pe, d i f f e r e n t in emphasis, and more s i g n i f i cant in i t s t o t a l impact. Liber al t h e o r i s t s of the E ighteenth Century were to a t t r i b u t e to i t a dominant place in the t o t a l c o n t e x t of government. As Grant and Nixon have observed: The s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , with i t s c o l o n i a l o r i g i n , is the o l d e s t American i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . . . The f i r s t h a l f - d o z e n s p e c i f i c g r ie v a n c e s s e t f o r t h in the D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence concerned the d i s a l l o w a n c e of c o l o n i a l laws and the d i s s o l u t i o n or d i s r u p t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n s and p r o c e e d i n g s. . . I t was only n a t u r a l t h a t the idea of l e g i s l a t i v e supremacy would p r e v a i l in the e s t a b l i s h ment of the C o n tin e n ta l Congress and l a t e r of the . . . Confederati o n . 11 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s s e m b l i e s , f i r s t designed to levy taxes and o c c a s i o n a l l y provide m i l i t i a f o r medieval monarchs, had by the time of the American Revolution y i e l d e d r e l u c t a n t l y and p a r t i a l l y , to what Beard and Lewis c a l l e d "rumblings b e l o w . " 12 Freed from e x c l u s i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the landed a r i s t o c r a c y and the asce nd an t 10Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis, " R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government in E v o l u t i o n , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Revi ew, Vol. 26, No. 4 ( A p r i l , 19 3 £ ), p p . 224-226. i:iDaniel R. Grant and H. C. Nixon, S t a t e and Local Government in America (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1963), p . 159. See, a l s o , Wheare, o p . ci t . , pp. 232-233. 120p. ci t . , p. 225 . The "rumblings" r e f e r r e d to r e l a t e to such phenomena as the P e a s a n t s ' Revolt and the w r i t i n g s of Rousseau. 70 bourgeoi s i e , p a r l ia m e n ts . . . have i n h e r i t e d four major r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l e g a c i e s from p a s t c e n t u r i e s - - t h e power of the p u r s e , v e n t i l a t i o n of g r i e v a n c e s , law-making, and c a b i n e t - m a k i n g . 13 Of th ese r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the one which is most commonly emphasized has l i t t l e to do with the o r i g i n a l p r e o c c u p a tio n with revenues and r if l e m e n . I n s t e a d , the "Modern role of the l e g i s l a t u r e " is the " d e c l a r i n g and . . . l e g i t i m a t i z i n g of the l a w . " 14 T h e r e f o r e , ac co rding to Wheare, " i t remains j u s t i f i a b l e to speak of p a r l ia m e n ts and Congresses and the l i k e as l e g i s l a t u r e s . " 15 The f u n c t i o n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . --P e rh a p s a d i s c u s sion of l e g i s l a t i v e apportionm ent r e q u i r e s more than a general i n d i c a t i o n of the growth of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Before any d e c i s io n is reached on how r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s should be ap p o r tio n e d i t should be s t a t e d in more d e t a i l what r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are supposed to do. These o b l i g a t i o n s are enumerated by a v a r i e t y of commenta t o rs under varying numbers of c a t e g o r i e s . For purposes of b r i e f summation they are summarized in the seven areas d e s c r i b e d below. 13L e s l i e Lipson, The Democratic C i v i l i z a t i o n (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964), p . 466. 14Charles R. Adrian, Governing Our F i f t y S t a t e s and Their Communities (N.Y.: McGraw-Hi11 Book Co., I n c . , 1963) , p T T T . --------------------------- 150p. c i t . , p. 3. 71 1. L e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are r e s p o n s i b l e for the "Control of F i n a n c e . " 16 This is among t h e i r e a r l i e s t f u n c t i o n s , as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , and e n t a i l s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of revenue, or t a x a t i o n , as well as e x p e n d i t u r e s , or a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . 2. Democratic l e g i s l a t u r e s have enormous p o l i c y making a u t h o r i t y . To l e g i s l a t e i s , acco rding to Webster, to "make or enact a law or l a w s , " 17 and, as Adrian has a s s e r t e d , 18 t h i s is the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the contempo rary r e p r e s e n t a t i v e assembly. To make laws, i t seems e v i d e n t , is to decide the course of government p o l i c y , to determine what is to be done. 3. L e g i s l a t u r e s possess a primary i n f l u e n c e upon b a s i c government s t r u c t u r e through t h e i r a u t h o r i t y in " p l a n n i n g , p r o p o sin g , or p e r f e c t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . " 19 Such 16Dell G. H itchner and William H. Harbold, Modern Government, second ed. (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1965 ) , n . m : — 17W ebste r' s C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y , f i f t h ed. ( S p r i n g f i e l d , M a s s . : 6. C. Merri am C o . , 1941) , p. 573. 18S u p r a , p. 70. Grant and Nixon say t h a t the " c h i e f f u n c t io n of the l e g i s l a t u r e is to l e g i s l a t e . " Op. c i t . , p. 182. 191bi d . , p. 178. 72 commentary is somewhat s u p e r f l u o u s , however, in view of such obvious primary sources as the amendment p r o v i s i o n s in the C o n s t i t u t i o n s of the United S t a t e s 20 and C a l i f o r n i a . 21 4. L e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y commonly extends to some r o l e , normally a co n f irm atio n power possessed by the upper house, in the s e l e c t i o n of o t h e r government o f f i c i a l s . In p a r l i a m e n t a r y s.ystems--England, I t a l y , e t c . - - s u c h l e g i s l a t i v e d i s c r e t i o n in volves no less than the choice of the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e . But even in America, the p r o to t y p e " p r e s i d e n t i a l " system, the n a t i o n a l and s t a t e Senates have an e f f e c t i v e "veto" over c a b i n e t p o s t s . 22 One need only mention the r e f u s a l of the U.S. Senate to confirm the I appointment of Lewis S t ru s s as S e c r e t a r y of Commerce during the Eisenhower a d m i n i s t r a t i o n or the f i g h t in the C a l i f o r n i a Senate over the renomination of Thomas Braden as head of the S t a t e Board of Education to i l l u s t r a t e such power. 20A r t i c l e V. 21Arti cle IV, Sec. 1. 22Grant and Nixon, o p . ci t . , p. 179. I 73 5. The l e g i s l a t u r e is supposed to check the a u t h o r i t y of the e x e c u t i v e branch. In Riemer's words, i t can "serve as a 'watchdog* over o t h e r s who wield power, e i t h e r f o rm a lly or i n f o r m a l l y . " 23 This extends beyond the co n f i rm a t i o n or even the s e l e c t i o n of e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s . I t e n t a i l s , as Odegard and Baerwald p o i n t o u t, i n v e s t i g a t o r y a u t h o r i t y 24 the t h r e a t of which helps to in su re r e s p o n s i b l e govern ment. The whole concept of s e p a r a t i o n of powers, indeed, u s u a l l y e n t a i l s a system of checks and balances f o r c i n g l e g i s l a t o r s to r e c i p r o c a t e t h e i r s u s p i c i o u s s u r v e i l l a n c e by o t h e r government branches toward the end t h a t no o f f i c i a l agency p o ssesse s s u f f i c i e n t power to impose t y r a n n i c a l r u l e . 6. There is a n o th e r f u n c tio n of o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t t a t i v e bodies which is more widely endorsed than any of the preceding f i v e . But i t is also more nebulous than any of them, and i t is s t a t e d , as a r e s u l t , in a wide d i v e r s i t y of ways. To r i s k a general and hence q u e s t i o n a b l e s t a t e m e n t of t h a t f u n c t i o n , l e g i s l a t u r e s should 23Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1962 ) , p. 111. 24Op. ci t . , p. 336. 74 r e f l e c t the i n t e r e s t s of those f o r whom they l e g i s l a t e ; 25 t h a t is to say, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s should r e p r e s e n t . They should e s t a b l i s h a l i v i n g l i n k , or c o n s t i t u t e a kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p , between qovernment- - t h a t t a x i n g , sp en d in g , ru le -m a k i n g , p u n i t i v e , p r o t e c t i n g , a 11 - too -r em ote p a t t e r n of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e h a v io r by " o f f i c i a l s " - - a n d the people whom a l l such b e w ild e r in g and complex a c t i v i t y is designed to s e rv e . In a somewhat m y stic a l s e n s e , l i k e a v i s i b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of an unseen g r a c e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s not only r e p r e s e n t the p e o p le , they become the peo ple. Tussman h i n t s a t t h i s when he w r i t e s t h a t the verb " r e p r e s e n t , " among i t s many c o n n o t a t i o n s , "means to ' s t a n d for* or to symboli ze, as a f la g r e p r e s e n t s . . . But in a n o th e r sense ' t o re p re s e n t * is not ' t o stan d f o r ' but ' t o a ct f o r ' . " 26 Larson comes even c l o s e r : "In simple terms r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in volves making p r e s e n t something or somebody t h a t is not p r e s e n t . " 27 25H itc h n e r and Harbold l i s t "The R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Opinion and I n t e r e s t s " as a major ro le of l e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s . Op. c i t . , p. 392 . 260p . ci t . , p. 61. 2 7 Op. ci t . , p. 103. de Grazia makes the same p o in t a l i t t l e l e s s c o n c i s e l y . He d e f i n e s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as "a 75 For one to be e l e c t e d a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , " t h e n , is to be tra n s f o rm e d , as the bread and wine, i n t o the body and blood of those who e l e c t e d him. But t h i s implied ide al is only t h a t - - a goal im poss ible of a t t a i n m e n t but in the plac e of which most p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s would expect a re a so n a b ly cl ose a f f i n i t y b e tween t h a t which l e g i s l a t o r s do and t h a t which the people they r e p r e s e n t would do i f they had the s k i l l and the o p p o r t u n i t y to do i t . 28 F r i e d r i c h a s s e r t s t h a t A person holding an o f f i c e ac t s . . . in accordance with the w ill of a n o th e r person or body of p e r s o n s - - t h a t i s , p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y is conceived in terms of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between human b e in g s. . . This means t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y always im plies communication between human beings. 29 de G r a z ia , a g r e e i n g , says t h a t r e p r e s e n t a tio n is " p r i m a r i l y a s t a t e of mind, r e f l e c t i n g a process of s o c ia l communication. . . ( I ) t c o n d i t i o n t h a t e x i s t s when the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and ac ts of one v este d with p u b l i c f u n c t io n s are in accord with the d e s i r e s of one or more persons to whom the f u n c t i o n s have o b j e c t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e im p o rtan ce ." Public and R e p u b l i c , op. c i t . , p . 4. 280degard and Baerwald say t h a t to r e p r e s e n t "must mean in some measure to r e f l e c t the image of the p e o p l e . " Op. c i t . , p. 343. Edmund Burke is perhaps the most famous exponent of an opposing c o n c ep tio n . His views are d i s c u s sed in Chapter IV, in fra* 29Op. ci t . , p. 398. 76 concerns the agreement p r e v a i l i n g between r u l e r and r u l e d . " 30 7. F i n a l l y , a survey of e x p e r t opinion re g a rd in g the prope r f u n c t io n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n must place some emphasis upon compromise. Riemer c a l l s t h i s the " f o r e n s i c " f u n c tio n of the l e g i s l a t u r e and e l a b o r a t e s by w r i t i n g t h a t i t can provide a forum for debate and d e c i s i o n , thus f a c i l i t a t i n g the e x a m in a tio n , c o n f r o n t a t i o n , c l a r i f i c a t i o n , re fin e m e n t and compromise of the claims of contend ing i n t e r e s t s . 31 F r i e d r i c h c a l l s t h i s " p o l i t i c a l fu n c t io n " the " i n t e g r a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s and v i e w - p o i n t s . " 32 These seven task s which r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is supposed to accomplish have im p o rta n t i m p l i c a t i o n s for the ap p o r tionment a l t e r n a t i v e s d i s c u s s e d below. All seven are r e l a t e d , a l s o , to the d i c t a t e s of a democratic f a i t h examined in the preceding c h a p t e r . A d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of th e se r e l a t i o n s is pr obably s u p e r f l u o u s , but an obvious example is the f a c t t h a t competent l e g i s l a t o r s , demanded of 30oj P * ci t . , p. 3. Amona Riemer's " th re e main func- t i o n s " of Tlle 1egi s 1a tu r e , is to " r e p r e s e n t " in a way which c e r t a i n l y implies communication. " I t can," he w r i t e s , "give voice to the p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c ia l and geo g r a p h ic i n t e r e s t s of the community's p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . " Op. ci t . , p. 111. 31 L o c . c i t . 320p. ci t . , p. 415. 77 e f f e c t i v e democracy, are r e q u i r e d also f o r the p o l i c y making, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n , and e x e c u t i v e s u r v e i l l a n c e f u n c t io n s expected of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e bodies. I t is s t r i k i n g , to o , t h a t compromise, as a democratic i m p e r a t i v e , is a ro le which the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e is expected to play. The One-Man, One-Vote Model I t is c l e a r both from the heated debate which co u rt re a p porti onm ent d e c i s io n s have p r e c i p i t a t e d , and from the v a r i e t y of e x i s t i n g methods of l e g i s l a t i v e a p p o rtio n m e n t, t h a t n e i t h e r democratic th eo ry nor r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f u n c t io n s a f f o r d a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of a s i n g l e , " b e st" method of a l l o c a t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s . Somewhat r e s i g n e d l y , de Grazia concludes t h a t in s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t " p o l i t i c a l theo ry c o n t a i n s numerous i n q u i r i e s " i n t o the n a t u r e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " t h e re is no agreement as to i t s e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s . " 3 3 Yet t h i s r e s e a r c h e f f o r t is d i r e c t e d toward the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of j u s t such " e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s " as s ta n d a rd s or c r i t e r i a by which to judge va riou s a p p o r t i o n ment models. I t was assumed, at the beginning of the p r e ceding c h a p t e r , t h a t the most i n d i s p e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e s t e d in the t h re e b a s ic i n g r e d i e n t s of 330p. c i t . , p. 4. 78 democratic t h e o r y - - e q u a l i t y , freedom, and m a j o r i t y r u l e . From th e se components sprang four implemental require m ents --compromise, c o m p e t i t i o n , i n s t i t u t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y , and competent l e g i s l a t o r s . T o g e th e r, th e se seven c o n c e p t s 34 orovide the measures by which may be a s s e s s e d the nine appo rtion men t models soon to be e n u m e r a t e d . 35 The p r e ceding d i s c u s s i o n of the h i s t o r y and f u n c t i o n s of l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n serve s only to provide f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the l e g i t i m a c y of th e se seven s t a n d a r d s in e v a l u a t i n g the apportionment p a t t e r n s d i s c u s s e d here and in Chapter IV. The only ap portionm ent model which the c o u r t s have held to be i m p l i c i t in the C o n s t i t u t i o n is t h a t based upon e q u a l l y po pulated d i s t r i c t s . It is a p p r o p r i a t e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a t t e n t i o n be f i r s t d i r e c t e d to t h i s so c a l l e d one-man, on e- vote formula. A d i s c u s s i o n of i t s j u d i c i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n is delayed u n t i l Chapter V, but i t s conf ormity to the sta n d a rd s of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o u t l i n e above is ex plored below. There seems l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s app ortionmen t model is c o n s i s t e n t with and indeed n e a r l y demanded by the concept of e q u a l i t y which has been found to be so i n t r i n s i c 34L i s t e d s u p r a , p. 62, a t the con c lu sio n of Ch. I I . 35de Grazia agrees t h a t "appo rtionm ent cannot be und erstood without a l a r g e r comprehension of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government." Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p. 10. 79 a component of democracy. Even before the Supreme Court e d i c t , Ranney wrote t h a t each "member of the community must be able to have his vote counted and given equal weight with every o t h e r vote c a s t , " 36 and Wirt i n s i s t e d t h a t an " id eal democ ratic l e g i s l a t u r e " must make sure " i t s s e a t s are d i s t r i b u t e d acco rdi ng to the p r i n c i p l e of 'one man, one v o t e ' . " 37 The Minnesota L e g i s l a t i v e Research Committee concluded in 1954 t h a t : The idea on which democratic government is based is t h a t the people should govern th em selves. In o rd e r t h a t each person may have an equal voice in his govern ment, i t is n e c e s s a r y t h a t every p e r s o n ' s vote have equal i n f l u e n c e in forming government p o l i c y . 38 The Advisory Commission on Intergover nm ental R e l a t i o n s c o n c lu d e s , s i m i l a r l y , t h a t "from the s t a n d p o i n t of . . . p o l i t i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c needs of the n a t i o n , " t h e re is a demand t h a t "the apportion men t of both houses in the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e be based s t r i c t l y on p o p u l a t i o n . " 3 9 Few would a s s e r t t h a t the a b s t r a c t concept of e q u a l i t y can produce p o l i t i c a l progeny of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y . The assumption is made h erein t h a t the one-man, one-vote formula is an i n e v i t a b l e d e r i v a t i v e of e q u a l i t y as 360 p . ci t . , p. 178. 370p. c i t . , p. 01. 38L e q i s l a t i v e Rea p p o rtio n m en t, p . i . Quoted by Advisory Commission on In te rg overnm ental R e l a t i o n s , o p . c i t . , p . 35. 39Ib id . , p. 67. ( A u th o r's emphasis) 80 a de moc ratic component. I t also seems to be d e d u c t i v e l y im p e ra ti v e in r e l a t i o n to m a j o r i t y r u l e . I f one assumes, as is common, t h a t " m a jo rity " is a numerical c o n cep t, i t s c o r r o l a r y must be a q u a n t i t a t i v e c r i t e r i o n in which each is to count f o r one, and none f o r more than one. Simply a s s e r t e d , m a j o r i t y ru le is impo ssible i f a m i n o r i t y of the vo te rs can e l e c t a dominant l e g i s l a t i v e bloc. Equally pop ulated d i s t r i c t s harmonize not only with d emocratic th eo ry but with h i s t o r i c a l judgement as w e ll, de T o c q u e v i l l e , the Frenchman to whom Americans so of te n turn in a tte m p tin g to und er stan d t h e i r own v a l u e s , wrote more than a c entury ago t h a t a love of e q u a l i t y was the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the democratic a g e . 40 Perhaps, as de Grazia s u g g e s t s , e q u a l l y pop ulated e l e c t i o n d i s t r i c t s were f i r s t demanded by the mid-17th Century English L e v e l l e r s . 41 C e r t a i n l y t h e r e is m e r it in L a r s o n ’ s admonition t h a t "no good p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t will begin an e x p o s i t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w ith o u t a formal s a l u t a t i o n to the D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence, to Thomas J e f f e r s o n and perhaps to John S t u a r t M i l l . " 42 At r i s k of 40Demiocracy in America (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945 ), Vol. 11, Book II p a ssfm . See a l s o , Beard and Lewis, op. c i t . , p . 25. 4A p p o r t i o n m e n t and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p . 26. 42Qp. c i t . , p. 102-103. 81 i n c u r r i n g t h i s i m p l i c i t condemnation, i t must be acknow ledged t h a t the D e c l a r a t i o n a s s e r t s e q u a l i t y as " s e l f - ev id en t" and t h a t J e f f e r s o n wrote elsewhere t h a t "Equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . is so fundamental a p r i n c i p l e in a tru e r e p u b l i c t h a t no p r e j u d i c e s can j u s t i f y i t s v i o l a t i o n . " 43 And l e t M i l l ' s opinion be noted a l s o . Unless a m a j o ri t y of the e l e c t o r s . . . always have a m a j o r i t y of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , (and) a m in o rity of the e l e c t o r s . . . a m in o rity of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . t h e r e is not equal government, but a government of i n e q u a l i t y and p r i v i l e g e (which is) c o n t r a r y to a ll j u s t government, but above a l l , c o n t r a r y to the p r i n c i p l e of democracy.44 Whatever the e x a c t sequence and genesis of the "one-man, one-vote" formula might have been in terms of i t s t h e o r e t i c a l advocacy, i t is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the demand for i t s implementation long preceded the Supreme Court d e cis io n r e q u i r i n g i t . Even in England, as Finer p o in ts o u t, one of the six demands of the C h a r t i s t movement in the 1 830' s was "th re e hundred c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , divided as e q u a lly as p o s s i b l e on the b asis of the l a s t census; to be amended a f t e r each c e n s u s . " 45 That t h i s demand e x er te d in f l u e n c e 43Quoted by de G ra z ia , o p . c i t ., p. 26. J e f f e r s o n ' s views on the m a t t e r had s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n when he opposed a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n in Maine because i t allowed towns the same number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w ith o u t rega rd to t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n . Op. c i t . , p. 107. 44John S t u a r t M i l l , C o n s i d e ra ti o n s on R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government (Chicago: Henry Regenery Company! 1 962 ) , pp. 141-42. Reprinted from the o r i g i n a l 1861 e d i t i o n . 45Finer, op. c i t ., p. 89. 82 at l e a s t among the community of American a c adem icians, is i n d i c a t e d by Z e l l e r n e a r l y a decade before i t s j u d i c i a l confi rmati o n : Since c o n s t i t u e n c i e s of equal p o p u la tio n and p e r i o d i c and f a i r reap p o rtio n m e n t <5f s e a t s seem most c o n s i s t e n t with our democratic t r a d i t i o n , i t would be well f o r a l l s t a t e s to a d j u s t t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e arrangements to comply with th e se fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . 46 I t seems well e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t e q u a l l y populated d i s t r i c t s are r e q u i r e d by e q u a l i t y and m a j o r i t y rule as dem ocratic p r i n c i p l e s and s a n c t io n e d by p e r s i s t e n t h i s t o r i c a l demand. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h i s apportionment c r i t e r i o n to o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ta n d a rd s summarized at the end of Chapter II (freedom, c o m p e t i t i o n , e t c e t e r a ) will be the s u b j e c t of e x t e n s i v e subsequ en t d i s c u s s i o n . What is im portant now is an acknowledgement t h a t "one man, one vote" follows de moc ratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ta n d a rd s with the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of the n i g h t , the day. T h e r e f o r e , some of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s should be ex p lo re d . Boss r u l e .--One d isa d v a n ta g e a l l e g e d a g a i n s t t h i s s o r t of app ortionm en t is "boss r u l e . " Since j o u r n a l i s t s have a ten d en cy , induced by l i m i t a t i o n s of time and s p ace, to be more e x p l i c i t than s c h o l a r s , i t would be well to consign the argument to a r e p o r t e r : 46Z e l l e r , op. c i t . , p. 45. 83 I In an amorphous and r a p i d l y changing area such as Los Angeles, i t would be f a r more e a s i l y c onceivable for men of dubvious c h a r a c t e r and a b i l i t y to be 1 e l e c t e d than from the small d i s t r i c t s where everyone ( s i c ? ) knows the c a n d i d a t e . . . ( E)xperience has shown t h a t g r e a t c i t i e s have g e n e r a l l y been the places most s u s c e p t i b l e to the o r g a n i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l machines and boss r u l e . 47 One of the g r e a t i r o n i e s of the apportionment c o n t r o v e r s i e s in the 1960's is t h a t opponents of the e q u a l i t y sta n d a rd can quote the judge who decreed i t . Thus, Chief J u s t i c e Warren, while i n s i s t i n g upon equal p o p u l a t i o n as the b asis f o r apportionment of a l l s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , is d o u b t l e s s l y embarrassed by the comments he u t t e r e d in 1948, while he was Governor of C a l i f o r n i a , and s t i l l hau nting him from the pages of the Los Angeles Times more than s ix t e e n y e a rs l a t e r . There was a time when C a l i f o r n i a was completely dominated by boss r u l e . . . Any weakening of ( a p p o r tionment laws which) have l i b e r a t e d us from such domination . . . would i n v i t e a r e t u r n of boss rule which we are h appil y r id of. Our s t a t e has made almost u n b e l i e v a b l e p ro g re ss under our p r e s e n t system of l e g i s l a t i v e a p p ortio nm ent. I b e l i e v e we should keep i t . 48 Boss r u l e , of c o u r s e , can occur in any local p o l i t i c a l u n i t , but although " th ere can be a county c o u r t house gang . . . a Chicago or New York machine might 47E l l i s L. Spackman, " S k i l l e d Con su lta n ts Aid L e g i s l a t o r s on Problem," San Bernardino Telegram, April 16, 1 965. ^ Q u o t e d e d i t o r i a l l y , March 7, 1965, Section G, p . 6. 84 dominate a whole s t a t e i f given the c h a n c e . " 49 The "chance" f o r m e t r o p o l i t a n boss domination is a f f o r d e d , o b v i o u s l y , when s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s are s u b j e c t e d to r u l e by an urban m a j o r i t y . In C a l i f o r n i a , as in many o t h e r s t a t e s , t h i s f e a r has h i s t o r i c a u t h e n t i c i t y . Hiram Johnson was e l e c t e d governor acco rdin g to a mimeographed document procurr ed from a s t a t e Senate s t a f f a s s i s t a n t in Sac ramen to, l a r g e l y on the b a s is of the name he had made p r o s e c u ti ng the n o t o r i o u s Abe Reuf machine which had . . . c o n t r o l l e d not only the c i t y ' s government, but through the San Francisc o d e l e g a t i o n in the L e g i s l a t u r e , m an ipulated s t a t e government. This unsavory era in C a l i f o r n i a h i s t o r y c u r i o u s l y f a l l s w ith in the same period (1879-1926) which saw the L e g i s l a t u r e organized wholly on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s . . . (T)here is much to be s aid f o r r e t a i n i n g one house on a d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i c t i n g b a s is than the o t h e r . From time to time newspapers . . . wi ll tag a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e as "the boss" . . . in C a l i f o r n i a . Be they r i g h t or wrong in naming the man, t h a t boss would l o g i c a l l y l o c a t e his powe-r base in the m e t r o p o l i s so as to maximize the p r o d u c t i v i t y of his organi z a t i on. 50 The boss r u le c r i t i c i s m is not simply a disembodied a b s t r a c t i o n in the contemporary c o n tex t of C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s . A m a n i f e s t a t i o n of i n c i p i e n t bossism is some times seen in the i n c r e a s e d power of J esse M. Unruh. This , 49Alfred de G r a z i a , Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p . 43. 5°The Case for Balanced R e p r e s e n t a t i o n in C a l i f o r n i a , n . d . , pp. 4 - b . Although t h i s pamphlet c o n t a i n s no i n d i c a t i o n of a u t h o r s h i p , i t was prep ared by S tanley Evans, Senior A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A n a l y s t, C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate Fact Finding Committee on Revenue and Taxat ion. 85 at l e a s t , is the view of Assemblyman Gordon H. Winton, J r . , Democrat of Merced County. In a speech before Modesto J u n i o r College s tu d e n t s on March 30, 1965, he s a id t h a t Assembly Speaker Unruh has the basis of his power in the f a c t t h a t 31 out of the 80 assemblymen come from Los Angeles County. He c o n t r o l s the County Democratic Committee and now he c o n t r o l s the l e g i s l a t u r e . 51 Unruh is also a Democrat, and Winton, who opposed him in his race f o r the Assembly Speaker p o s t, admits to "a t h re e y e a r b a t t l e " with him. As a newspaper account indicates, Winton b e l i e v e s re apportionm ent would give complete co ntr ol of both houses to Unruh s o l e l y on the b a s is of the Los, Angeles County po p u latio n "and we could probably have a r e t u rn to boss r u l e . " 52 I t would seem, however, t h a t t h e r e is no convin- ing e m pirica l evidence t h a t m a j o r i t i e s - - urban or r u ra l -- produce a g r e a t e r or more c o r r u p t c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o l i t i cal power than m i n o r i t i e s . But, i f the majorit.y-bossism argument is v a l i d , then hopes for an approach to p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y are doomed to f r u s t r a t i o n by some m y st e r i o u s l y i n e x o r a b l e u s u r p a t i o n of power by demagogic d e s p o ts . The argument des erve s more c a r e fu l ex am ina tion . Assuming t h a t " m a j o r i t a r i a n " movements do in f a c t co n c e n t r a t e more power in the hands of fewer p e ople, "bosses" 51Quot.ed by Ben Shore, "Winton Fears P o s s i b i l i t y of Boss Rule," Modesto Bee, March 31, 1965. 5 2 L o c . c i t . 86 •nay be simply the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n s of the amassed a u t h o r i t y i n d i s p e n s i b l e to an expanding, p o s i t i v e , w e lfa re s t a t e . The " m a j o r i t y , " in modern p o l i t i c a l ter ms, is u s u a ll y a s s o c i a t e d with the groups wishing expanded s o c ia l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s and a more vigorous governmental r o le in the s o l u t i o n of economic problems g e n e r a l l y . I t seems r e a s o n able t h a t a Franklin Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson would accumulate more power than a Herbert Hoover or Dwiqht Eisenhower, simply because the m a j o r i t y wants those Democratic p r e s i d e n t s to accomplish more than was exp ec te d of t h e i r Republican c o u n t e r - p a r t s . I f , as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t h e o r i s t s s u g g e s t , power should accompany r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , then perhaps i t is u n d e r sta n d a b le t h a t government l e a d e r s oossess more power when government is ex pected to perform more t a s k s - - t h e p ro v is i o n of the " g r e a t s o c i e t y , " bread and c i r c u s e s , the conquest of space, or the c o n f r o n t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g g r e ss i o n . This concept provide s a r e l e v a n t p e r s p e c t i v e on •government at the loca l level as w e l l . If c i t y "bosses" do have more power than rura l o f f i c i a l s the e x p l a n a t i o n might be found as r e a d i l y in the more d i f f i c u l t and d i v e r s i f i e d f u n c t io n s they are expected to perform ( e . g . , the c o n tro l of smog and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of mass ra pid t r a n s i t ) as in more profound d e p r a v i t y or g r e a t e r g r a f t . Tecause c i t i e s are r e p o s i t o r i e s of the immigrants and the r e c e n t ru ra l m i g r a n t s , they must cope with a p opulation 87 p o s ses sin g more p e rp le x in g problems than ru ra l government u n i t s . I t is hard ly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t urban p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs are co nseq uen tly p e r m it t e d more power. In such ci rcu m stan ces i t would seem u n f a i r to a t t a c h moral opprobrium to t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power through r e f e r e n c e s to such repugnant concepts as "the crushing weight of vast c i t y voting blocs . , . ofte n led by bossed m a c h i n e s . " 53 The fe d e ra l p l a n .--The "boss" issue is the o b j e c tio n to "one-man, one-vote" which seems to have been l e a s t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y c h a l l e n g e d , but the " fe d e ra l plan" argument deserves c o n s i d e r a t i o n as the one most f r e q u e n t l y voiced. It is simply s t a t e d : the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s the Senate to d e p a rt d r a s t i c a l l y from equal p o p u la tio n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; s t a t e s should be p e r m itte d the same d i s c r e t i o n with regard to t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e composition. Thus, before he changed his mind, Chief J u s t i c e Warren s a i d , as C a l i f o r n i a ' s governor: 53William S. White, "Senate Minority Wins a Deci sion Over the C o n s t i t u t i o n of U .S .," Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. The b e s t and most balanced d i s c u s s i o n of "bossism" in r e c e n t times is perhaps found in Duane Lockard, op. c i t . , pp. 218-226. In a note on p. 220, Lockard quotes Roscoe C. Martin ob serving t h a t "the supply of ru ra l bosses (in c o n t r a s t to the d e c l i n e of those in c i t i e s ) . . . c o n t i n u e ( s ) in f u l l p r o d u c t i o n - - a n d often in f u l l command of t i g h t l y organized . . . machines. There must be, and t h e r e must always have been, a hundred name less g r a s s - r o o t s bosses fo r every big c i t y boss who found his way i n t o the h e a d l i n e s . " 88 They (the 58 c o u n t i e s ) are more im portant to our s t a t e than t h e i r p o p u la tio n bears to the e n t i r e p o p u la tion of the s t a t e . In t h i s r e s p e c t they are comparable to some of th e _ Je ss populous, but i m p o r t a n t , s t a t e s of the Union. I t is f o r t h i s reason I have never been in fav or of r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in our S ta te Senate to a s t r i c t l y p o p u la tio n b a s i s . I t is f o r the same reason t h a t the founding f a t h e r s of our country gave balanced r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to the s t a t e s of the Union--equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in one house and . . . r e p r e s e n t a t i o n based upon popu latio n in the o t h e r . 5t+ A C a l i f o r n i a p r e s s u r e group f i g h t i n g the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e u t i l i z e d t h i s as i t s major c o n t e n t i o n . In a red, white and blue p r i n t e d l e a f l e t imploring the re a d er to "w rite your congressman," the o r g a n i z a t i o n a s s e r t s t h a t the Federal two-house c o n g r e ss , pro v id in g for r e p r e - s e n t a t i o n ba 1anced as between p o p u la tio n and a r e a s , and the fe d e ra l plan as a p p l i e d in many s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g C a l i f o r n i a ' s , are i m p o r t a n t , hig h ly n e c e ssa ry p a r t s of our b a s ic "checks and ba lances" system of democratic s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . 55 R e f u t a t i o n s of t h i s argument are almost as numerous as the people who propound i t . When Senator E v e re t t Dirksen (R. 111.) i n t ro d u c e d a proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to n u l l i f y the Supreme Court re quirem ent t h a t s t a t e upper-chambers be ap p o rtio n e d on a p o p u l a t i o n b a s i s , opponents of the amendment recognized the f e d e ra l analogy 54Quoted in the Los Angeles Times , March 7, 1965, 1o c. cit. 55N . a ., If I t ' s Good for the Nation I t ' s Good for our S ta te (San Franci s c o : C i t i z e n s Committee f o r Balanced Leg i s 1a t f v e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , n . d . ) 89 as i t s major defense and a t t a c k e d i t with im pre ssive J h i s t o r i c a l and a n a l y t i c a l e v id en ce. Perhaps the f i n e s t s t a t e m e n t in b e h a l f of the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e to be made on the f l o o r of the United S t a t e s Senate was made by a freshman s e n a t o r , Joseph D. Tydings (D., Md.), in his maiden speech. Tydings a s s e r t e d t h a t those fa v o rin g (the Dirksen Amendment) . . . argue t h a t t h e r e is "a f e d e ra l analogy" between the S t a t e s and the United S t a t e s on the one hand and c o u n t i e s and s t a t e governments on the o t h e r . I b e l i e v e a study of the proceedings of our C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention c l e a r l y shows t h a t such an analogy is i n a c c u r a t e and decep ti v e . 56 He contended t h a t the composition of the U.S. Senate was an e x p e d i e n t . compromise designed only to p l a c a t e the small s t a t e s whose approval was n e c e s sar y to c r e a t e the union. By c o n t r a s t , he quotes Sen. Proxm ire's o b s e rv a t i o n t h a t c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s "are c r e a t u r e s of the S t a t e . . . t h a t can be a b o l i sh e d or c r e a t e d by the S t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , " and concludes t h a t "the Federal analogy is a f a l s e a n a l o g y . " 57 Tydings b u t t r e s s e s his p o i n t of view by p o i n t i n g out t h a t most of the le a d in g p e r s o n a l i t i e s at the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention were c a t e g o r i c a l l y committed to the p r i n c i p l e of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Franklin proposed 56U.S., Congressional Rec ord , 89th Cong., 1st S e s s . , June 2, 1965, 98527. The speech was i n t e r r u p t e d by s e v e ra l o t h e r Sen at ors who were u n u s u a ll y l a u d a t o r y , even for the e f f u s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h a t body. 57Loc. c i t . i t in his " A r t i c l e s of Confed eration and P erp e tu a l Union" in 1775, Madison had a p r e f e r e n c e f o r i t , and even Hamilton c r i t i c i z e d the A r t i c l e s of Conf ed er at ion in The F e d e r a l i s t because i t s Congress " c o n t r a d i c t s t h a t fundamental maxim . . . which r e q u i r e s t h a t . . . the m a j o r i t y should p r e v a i l . " 58 Tydings f u r t h e r dem onstrates the f a l l a c y of any comparison between Congress and the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s by invoking J e f f e r s o n ' s plea fo r county r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in l e g i s l a t u r e s according to "the number of q u a l i f i e d e l e c t o r s , " the p r o v is i o n s of the Northwest Ordinance of 1737, the apportionment of most of the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the o r i g i n a l t h i r t e e n s t a t e s , and the f a c t t h a t e ig h te e n of the 20 S t a t e s which j o i n e d the Union between the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n and the Civil War c o n s id e re d p o p u la tio n to be the sole b a s i s f o r . . . r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in both houses of t h e i r . l e g i s l a t u r e s . 5 9 Such ev id e n c e, i n d i c a t e d above in a fragmentary fashion only, c r e a t e s a frame of r e f e r e n c e w it h in which a s t a t e m e n t by de Grazia can be viewed only with i n c r e d u l i t y . He w r i t e s t h a t se v e ra l proponents of e q u a l - p o p u l a t i o n d i s t r i c t s have fumbled f o r a l o g i c t h a t would prove t h a t S t a t e Senates are not analogous to the f e d e r a l Senate. H i s t o r i c a l l y t h e i r argument is g roundle ss and unworthy of a t t e n t i o n . 60 58Quoted, 1o c . c i t . 59Loc. c i t . 6 °Apporti onment . . . , op. c i t . , p. 92. 91 de Grazia indeed gives t h i s argument no a t t e n t i o n . His a s s e r t i o n t h a t i t is " g r o u n d l e s s , " in s p i t e of such documentation as t h a t c i t e d above, is i n c r e d i b l e c h i e f l y because of his s t a t u r e as the n a t i o n ' s le a d in g academic c r i t i c of one-man, o n e - v o t e , and as a man, t h e r e f o r e , who could s c a r c e l y be w r i t i n g from i g n o r a n c e . 61 Reduction of e x p e r t i s e . --A t h i r d c r i t i c i s m of the e q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d , again phrased as an undocumented assumption by de G raz ia, is t h a t i t "probably reduces the e x p e r t n e s s of the l e g i s l a t u r e as a w h o l e . " 62 While t h i s argument will be d i s c u s s e d in d e t a i l in the n_ext c h a p t e r , i t is a p p r o p r i a t e to observe here t h a t t h i s is a p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e c r i t i c i s m over a s h o r t perio d of time a f t e r re a p p o rtio n m e n t takes p l a c e . Reapportionment i n e v i t a b l y leads to the compulsory r e t i r e m e n t of some l e g i s l a t o r s and t h e i r replacem en t with l e g i s l a t i v e "fres hm en ." I f , as C a l i f o r n i a Assemblyman Don Allen has o b s e rv e d , a " l e g i s l a t o r with a vast amount of e x p e r ie n c e is l i k e l y to be more e f f e c t i v e than one who does not have such e x p e r i e n c e , " 63 61de G r a z i a ' s work was the f i r s t d e t a i l e d s y s t e m a t i c t r e a t m e n t of the one-man, one-vote d e c i s i o n . Exonerated of i g n o ra n c e , he s ta nds i n d i c t e d ( c o n v i c t i o n s are d i f f i c u l t in t h i s realm) a t l e a s t f o r d i s t o r t i o n and c a r e l e s s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . 620 p . ci t . , p. 110. 6 30 p . ci t . , d. 210. Assemblyman Allen was the chairman of the Assembly Committee on E l e c t i o n s and Reapportionment in 1965 when the l e g i s l a t u r e complied with a c o u r t order to r e a p p o r t i o n both i t s houses. I t is a 92 reapportio nm ent does decr ease l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r t n e s s u n t i l the newly e l e c t e d members have served s e v e ra l terms. But the claim of " e x p e r t n e s s " u s u a l l y implies more than s e n i o r i t y or e x p e r i e n c e . Joseph A. Beck, s e c r e t a r y of the C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate since 1919 and a firm defen der of the "fe d e ra l p l a n , " b e l i e v e s t h a t s p a r c e l y populated d i s t r i c t s e l e c t more able men than hea v ily po pu lated ones. He is quoted by Robert M. Blanch ard, c h i e f of the Los Angeles Times Sacramento Bureau, as contending t h a t " ru ral d i s t r i c t s tend to e l e c t as t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e i r most widely known and hig h ly regarded c i t i z e n s , whereas r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the m e t r o p o l i t a n areas too ofte n are e l e c t e d as a r e s u l t of expensive a l l - o u t radio and t e l e v i s i o n campai g n s . " 6l4 If t r u e , t h i s would c o n s t i t u t e a more permanent claim to e x p e r t n e s s than t h a t based on e x p e r i e n c e . But i t r e s t s upon the premise t h a t a h i g h er perc e n ta g e of the e l e c t o r a t e in 1ow -population rural d i s t r i c t s have a real f a m i l i a r i t y with l e g i s l a t i v e c a n d i d a t e s than in densely populated urban ones. This hypothesis seems p l a u s i b l e because of the h i g h er mobi1i t y of m e t r o p o l i t a n r e s i d e n t s but seems not to have been t e s t e d or proved. most va luable c om pilation of h i s t o r i c a l documents, b i b l i o g r a p h i e s , and commentaries r e l e v a n t to the s u b j e c t . 64May 6, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 4. 93 It is of i n t e r e s t to note t h a t i f ru ra l r e s i d e n t s do indeed know t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s b e t t e r than c i t y ones, then d i s t r i c t s which are g e o g r a p h i c a l l y large a r e , in a s e n se , e a s i e r to r e p r e s e n t than those which are very populous. This c o n s i d e r a t i o n is p e r t i n e n t because p r o ponents of the f e d e ra l plan have long defended un equally po pulated d i s t r i c t s on the grounds t h a t " i t is p h y s i c a l l y e a s i e r to r e p r e s e n t people densely c o n c e n t r a t e d . . . than the same number s c a t t e r e d th ro ughout the c o u n t r y s i d e . " 65 Such commentators, l o g i c a l l y , c a n ' t have i t both ways. E i t h e r ru ra l areas know t h e i r c an d id a te s well and hence e l e c t b e t t e r men ( i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i r geographic d i s p e r s i o n does not r e a l l y make i t so d i f f i c u l t to r e p r e sent them) or they are h a r d e r to r e p r e s e n t (in which case i t would seem u n l i k e l y t h a t they could learn enough about the c a n d i d a t e s to e l e c t good l e g i s l a t o r s ) . The opponents of one-man, one -vote have f a shio ned the very horns of the dilemma on which they are impaled. The " e x p e r t n e s s " of a l e g i s l a t o r may be judged best in terms of e f f e c t i v e n e s s , p erh ap s, but t h a t is hard to measure. N o n e t h e l e s s, Stanley Evans, vet er an l e g i s l a t i v e s t a f f member, produced a p h o t o s t a t i c copy of a column prepared f o r the Oakland Tribune r e p o r t i n g the r e s u l t s of a poll of ten c a p i t o l newsmen. I t r a t e d the performance 65de G r a z ia , Apportionment . . . , op. c i t . , p. 47. 94 of both Senators and Assemblymen. Senato r George M i l l e r , J r . (D., Martinez) was ranked as the most e f f e c t i v e s e n a t o r , b e s t a l l - a r o u n d s e n a t o r , and h a r d e s t working s e n a t o r . Sen ator Hugh M. Burns ( D. , Fresno) ranked second in a l l - a r o u n d a b i l i t y and t i e d for second in e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Sen ator Stephen P. Teale (D., Calaveras Co.) ranked t h i r d b e s t and second h a r d e s t working. In a composite ranking Sen ator J. Eugene McAteer (D., San Francisco) a p p a r e n t l y won f o u rth s p o t , t i e i n g with Burns as the second most e f f e c t i v e Sen at or but f a i l i n g to place in the b e s t or h a r d e s t working c a t e g o r i e s . By c o n t r a s t , Sen ator Jack Schrade (R., San Diego) was voted worst a l l - a r o u n d s e n a t o r and the second l e a s t e f f e c t i v e . Senator John R. Schmitz ( R. , Orange Co.), the only avowed member of the John Birch So ci et y in the l e g i s l a t u r e , was named the very l e a s t e f f e c t i v e and second worst. Sen ator Clark L. Bradley (R., San Jose ) f i n i s h e d t h i r d in both r e s p e c t s . 66 These r e s u l t s , although s u b j e c t to severe method ological c r i t i c i s m , 67 are p r o d u c t iv e of many 66Ed Salzman, "Newsmen Rate Lawmakers," June 11, 1 965. 67The ten Sacramento correspondents' are perhaps o o l i t i c a l l y bia se d in favor of Democrats. Richard Nixon thought so and Seymore L i p s e t , op. c i t . , pp. 339-340 , p r o vides s t a t i s t i c a l veri fi c a t i on Moreover, they are lamen- t a b l y few in number and u n f o r t u n a t e l y rendered assessmen ts only on the b a s is of performance in one s e s s i o n . No a ttem pt was made to account for such v a r i a b l e s as e x p e r i ence. Schrade, Schmitz, and Brad le y, f o r example, were a l l in t h e i r f i r s t term. 95 i n t e r e s t i n g hypotheses when s u b j e c t e d to a n a l y s i s in terms of the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which s e n t th ese seven men to the Senate. I t is r a t h e r remarkable t h a t the t h r e e Sen at or s a s s e s s e d most unfav orably all came from d i s t r i c t s which rank among the six l a r g e s t in p o p u la tio n ou t of a t o t a l of 40 d i s t r i c t s . M i l l e r and Burns, the two s e n a t o r s most fav o ra b ly ranked, come from the two d i s t r i c t s , among a l l 40, n e a r e s t to the ideal p o p u la tio n of 392,930 in terms of the one-man, on e-vo te t e s t . 68 Rankings of Assemblymen, e l e c t e d from d i s t r i c t s of r e l a t i v e l y equal p opulation e l i c i t less s p e c u l a t i o n in t h i s r e g a r d . 69 The realm of " e x p e r t n e s s " is l a r g e l y a s u b j e c t i v e one, and so i t is not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the issue can be r a i s e d with r e l a t i v e imDunity by the c r i t i c s of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 70 But p e r h a p s, in r e l a t i o n to c o n s t i t u e n c y 68The 1960 p o p u l a t i o n s of th e se c o n s t i t u e n c i e s were: S c h r a d e ' s , 1,0 3 3 ,0 1 1 ; Schmitz, 703,925; B r a d le y , 642,315; M i l l e r , 409,030; and Burns, 365,945. Teale and McAteer, ranked t h i r d and f o u r t h , r e p r e s e n t 740,316 and 29,757 people r e s p e c t i v e l y and hence r e p r e s e n t n o t a b l e e x c e p tio n s to any ru le of t h i s s o r t . These f i g u r e s are drawn from Table 11 - L , A l l e n , op. c i t . , p. 167. i 69I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t the two wo rst and l e a s t e f f e c t i v e Assemblymen were i d e n t i f i e d as Charles Edward Chapel ( R. , Los Angeles County) and William F. Stanton ( D. , San J o s e ) . N e i t h e r were in t h e i r f i r s t term and they each are regarded as r e p r e s e n t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l e x t r e m e s , Chapel of the r i g h t and Stanton of the l e f t . 70Allen notes the argument t h a t "small d i s t r i c t v o te r s are in a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to judge q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and make d e c i s i o n s about men a t the p o l l s . " Proof of t h i s often takes the form of a r e c i t a t i o n of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of 96 s i z e , the advantage of a populous d i s t r i c t , from which th e r e are more persons to choose f o r e l e c t i v e o f f i c e , o f f s e ts the p o s s i b l e advantage of a l i g h t l y pop ulat ed d i s t r i c t , in which the vo te rs may know the c a n d id a te s b e t t e r and thus e l e c t the most competent one more o f t e n . D i s t r i c t anon ymity. - - A f o u rth o b j e c t i o n to e q u a l l y populate d d i s t r i c t s is even more nebulous than the qu esti o n of e x p e r t n e s s . However, i t deserve s a h earing and again de Grazia is a f o r t h r i g h t spokesman. L e g i s l a t o r s l i t e r a l l y do not know what they are rep resen t i n g . . . Merely person al c l i q u e s are helped to come to a focus in the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s of e q u a l- p o p u l a t i o n d i s t r i c t s or of d i s t r i c t s t h a t are voided of i n t e g r i t y owing to the common compromises of com munity bou nd ar ies with t h a t d o c t r i n e . In a d d i t i o n , very l a r g e p r e s s u r e groups can ope ra te e f f e c t i v e l y and w ith o u t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y owing to the anonymous c h a r a c t e r of the d i s t r i c t s , 71 This o b j e c t i o n may be l a b e l e d a r b i t r a r i l y as the anonymity argument. I t is o f f e r e d in undoubted honesty and has an a i r of p l a u s i b i l i t y to recommend i t . But i t must be e v a l u a t e d in terms of i t s i m p l i c i t assumptions. F i r s t , i t is p o s i t e d upon the view t h a t e q u a l l y po pulated d i s t r i c t s are "anonymous" in c h a r a c t e r because they are not n e c e s s a r i l y c ote rm in a l with "community b o u n d a r i e s . " The phrase "community b oundarie s" is i t s e l f "cow county" l e g i s l a t o r s . Senator James A. Cobey, e . g . , r e p r e s e n t i n g Merced and Madera Co u n tie s, has an A.B. from P r i n c e t o n , an LL.B. from Yale and worked f o r the N.L.R.B. in Washington, D.C. Op. ci t . , p. 212. 71 Op. ci t . , pp. 166-1 67. 97 vague. I t might r e f e r to the l i m i t s of "communities of i n t e r e s t " defined in terms of such demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as income, e t h n i c background or e d u c a t i o n . Or i t might r e l a t e to such loca l government s u b d i v i s i o n s as c i t i e s and counti e s . What seems c e r t a i n is t h a t , in many s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s , i t cannot convey both of these meanings. I f , f o r example, the c i t y of Torran ce, C a l i f , (p o p u la tio n 10 0,991), is viewed as a "community," one must ignore the vast o c c u p a tio n a l and income chasm which s e p a r a t e s "north" Torrance from "Hollywood Riv ie ra " in i t s souther n s e c t o r . I f one p e r c e iv e s an area of demographic homogeneity as a community, then Torrance and the a d j a c e n t c i t i e s of Redondo, Hermosa, and Manhattan Beach must be severed by d i s t r i c t boundaries which s la s h along S t a t e Hi ghway 1. The re l e v a n t q u e s t i o n , of c o u r s e , i s : Which is the community most s a l i e n t to i t s members? The answer must be re so lv e d in the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the proponents of geographic as opposed to f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , to be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . It is probably t ru e t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should know who he is r e p r e s e n t i n g in the l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y . Is i t - - o r should i t b e - - t h o s e v o t e r s wi thin a local p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n , such as a c i t y or a county? Or those with common r e l i g i o n s , e t h n i c o r i g i n s , o c c u p a t i o n s , and t a s t e s ? Should the l e g i s l a t o r r e p r e s e n t a community 98 of l e g a l , geographic d e f i n i t i o n , or a community of i n t e r e s t s ? The c e n t r a l p o i n t , q u i t e c l e a r l y , is t h a t one 's sense of f r a t e r n i t y , of community, is determined by an i n t r i c a t e complex of values varying in terms of s p e c i f i c economic, p o l i t i c a l , and geo gr ap hic i s s u e s . No s i n g l e apportionment plan can s a t i s f y such d i s s i m i l a r and ofte n c o n f l i c t i n g clai ms. Perhaps i t is u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t so much s t r e s s has been placed upon community as de fined in terms of c i t y and county b o u n d a r ie s. Tha t, at any r a t e , has been the emphasis in C a l i f o r n i a . S t a t e Senator Stephen T e a l e , the committee chairman who bore c h i e f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for re- d i s t r i c t i n g in conformity with c o u r t o r d e r s , put i t t h i s way . Vie found in d i s c u s s i o n with members of the Senate t h a t county l i n e s seemed to be the one thin g t h a t the members wanted to p r e s e r v e . . . (Counties have) been the u n i t ( s ) around which we b u i l t our d i s t r i c t s . . . (C)o u n ties did not want to be d i v i d e d . 72 Thomas Rees, S t a t e Senator from Los Angeles County, placed as much emphasis upon c i t i e s as Teale did upon c o u n t i e s . In c o n s i d e r i n g p o s s i b l e new s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t b o u n d a r i e s , Rees p o inted out t h a t he s e n t " l e t t e r s to all 76 c i t i e s of Los Angeles C o u n t y , " 73 and found t h a t " i t was 72Ca 1i f o r n i a , Assembly Committee on E l e c t i o n s and Reapportionment, Hearings on Senate Re a p p o rtio n m en t, May 17, 1965, p. 22. (Mimeographed) 73I b i d . , p. 42. 99 almost unanimous . . . t h a t they did not want to be s p l i t " 71* by S t a t e Senate b o u n d a r ie s. Since sen at e d i s t r i c t s , more often than n o t , had to inc lu de more than one i n c o r p o r a t e d c i t y ac cording to j u d i c i a l d e c r e e , a q u esti o n arose reg a rd in g the formula by which d i f f e r e n t c i t i e s were placed in the same d i s t r i c t . I t was p r e c i p i t a ted by Senator Rees' r e f e r e n c e s to "community of i n t e r e s t . " 75 Assemblyman F e r r e l l : S e n a t o r , what is your i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "community of i n t e r e s t ? " I never heard i t so much b e f o r e . . . Senator Rees: Oh, I th in k a community t h a t is more or l e ss bound t o g e t h e r in terms of groups of c i t i e s or communities wi th in the . . . county which t ra d e somehow t o g e t h e r and the school d i s t r i c t s more or l e ss come t o g e t h e r . 76 Thus, the "community" held in such high esteem by some t h e o r e t i c i a n s , while a c o n c e p t u a l l y p r o v o c a t i v e i d e a , is reduced by the cauldron of p r a c t i c a l , p o l i t i c a l d i s t r i c t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , to the vapid vagueness of "somehows" and "more or l e s s e s , " to f l e e t i n g r e f e r e n c e s to " t ra d e " and " s c h o o l s . " The concept of community w ill be d i sc u s s e d l a t e r , h o p e f u l ly to impart some sense of focus and p r e c i s i o n . But before t h i s t o p i c is t e m p o r a r i l y abandoned, i t should be observed t h a t i f "community" is d efined in terms Ibi d . , d . 43. The only ex c ep tio n was Long Beach. 75 Ibi d . , pp. 57-58. 76I b i d . , p. 59. 100 of i n c o r p o r a t e d m u n i c i p a l i t i e s on ly , i t is not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with a one-man, on e-vo te appo rtio nmen t. The S t a t e Senate Subcommittee on Reapportionment notes "with some pride" t h a t in con formity with "the b a s ic c r i t e r i o n " of equal p o p u l a t i o n , i t was able to divi de Los Angeles County (in a b i l l never passed) i n t o 12 d i s t r i c t s which s p l i t "only" six of the 76 c i t i e s . 77 To r e t u r n to de G r a z i a ' s i n d i c t m e n t , the anonymity arqument assumes t h a t , in the absence of some sense of community, c o n s t i t u e n c i e s are a f f l i c t e d by an "anonymous c h a r a c t e r . " Th is , at b e s t , is d e b a t a b l e . The c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s h i p n e c e s sa r y to form a "personal c l i q u e , " which anonymity a l l e g e d l y e l e v a t e s to power, may also form a cohesive i d e n t i t y as s i g n i f i c a n t and meaningful as i t is t r a n s i e n t . 78 Or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , adherence to and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with "a very la r g e p r e s s u r e group" might provide a cement among the s e p a r a t e c i t i z e n s of a c o n s t i t u e n c y s u f f i c i e n t to form an e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e c i v i c p e r s o n a l i t y . 79 The e t h n o c e n t r i s m i m p l i c i t in such l y r i c s as 77Ca 1i f o r n i a , S e n a te , Senate Subcommittee on Reapportionment, Statement of I n t e n t and J u s t i f i c a t i o n in Formulating . . . Senate Reapportlonment . . . in Senate Bill No. 6 , 1965, p . 2TT The bo undaries were those a d vanced by Senato r Rees. 78See Max Weber, P o l i t i c s as a V o c a t i o n , e x c e r p te d in The Great P o l i t i c a l T h e o r i e s , Vol. I I , Michael C u r t i s , e d . ( Pi. Y. : Avon kooks , n . d. ), pp. 378-391 . 79V. 0. Key, J r . w r i t e s : "At bottom, group i n t e r e s t s are the animating forces in the p o l i t i c a l 101 " s o l i d a r i t y f o re v e r " and "we s h a ll overcome" a t t e s t to the powerful un ifying e f f e c t s of a kind of p r e s s u r e group i d e n t i f i c a t i o n which shows no regard for such con ventional bound ar ies as c i t y l i m i t s , r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n s , or n a t i o n a l o r i g i n s . A personal cliq u e or a powerful p r e s s u r e group, th e n , can p reclude a sense of anomie or a l i e n a t i o n even in d i s t r i c t s which are o th e rw ise "anonymous" in t h e i r h e te ro g e n e i t y . So can p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . There may be c o n s i d e r able s i g n i f i c a n c e in the f a c t t h a t the a r i s t o c r a t i c Sir S t a f f o r d Cripp s, former miner Aneurin Bevan, and middle- c l a s s s o c i a l worker Clement A t t l e e were all bound by a common l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h Labor P a rty . Nor need one go f a r from home to fin d a p a r a l l e l . One of the g r e a t enigmas of American p o l i t i c s has been the u n l i k e l y c o a l i tio n from which Fran klin Roosevelt fashion ed the modern Democratic P a r ty : southe rn p l a n t e r s , n o rth e rn wo rkers, e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s and big c i t y machines. There is no sense of l o s t i d e n t i t y in a d i s t r i c t where p o l i t i c a l t i e s are s t r o n g , f o r p o l i t i c s , as the p l a t i t u d e has i t , makes str a n g e b e d - f e l l o w s . A defense of personal c l i q u e s based on c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s h i p , or the dominance of or gan ized i n t e r e s t s , or o r o c e s s . " P o l i t i c s , P a r t i e s and P ressu re Group s, f i f t h ed. (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowel1 Company, 1964), p. 1/. In sup p o r t of t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , Key quotes from The F e d e r a l i s t , No. 10, i b i d . , pp. 17-18. 102 even the primary importance of p a r ty cohesion is not i n te n d e d . It is s u g g e s t e d , simply, t h a t the power of a p e r s o n a l i t y , or p r e s s u r e group, or p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , can fuse an ot her wise amorphous and d i s p a r a t e c o n s t i t u e n c y based on equal popu latio n i n t o one with an obvious i d e n t i t y based on un ifying f a c t o r s . "Anonymity" and "community" are not i n e v i t a b l e antonyms. Recognizing the presumpt iousnes s e n t a i l e d in a running b a t t l e waged a g a i n s t so e s t a b l i s h e d a s c h o l a r as de G razia, i t is n o n e t h e l e s s n e c e s sa r y to d i s a g r e e with a nother of his arguments a g a i n s t the e q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d , and one c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to his anonymity in d i c t m e n t d i s cussed above. With what seems almost c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i s d a i n f o r r e s t r a i n t or documentation he d e s c r i b e s the "equal p o p u l a t i o n s numerology" as "a dangerous f l i r t a t i o n with mass n e u r o s i s " which reduces man to "naked, a b s t r a c t number . . . devoid of group t i e s and human r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . " 80 80Apporti onment . . . , op. ci t . , p. 130. P r o f e s s o r de G r a z i a , i n c i d e n t a l l y , seems as i n a c c u r a t e in p r o g n o s t i c a tio n as he is r e c k l e s s in g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . In 1963, one y ear before the Supreme Court extended the Raker v. Carr r u l i n g to both houses of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s in Reynolds v. Sims, he wrote t h a t the "Court w ill be s t r o n g l y impelled to l i m i t s e v e r e l y the scope of Baker v. C a r r . " I b i d . , p. 162. He added, with more c o n f i d e n c e , t h a t '*The c o u r ts can also be brought to see t h a t . . . any e x t e n s io n of Baker v. Carr w i l l be a shocking a s s a u l t on the l e g i s l a t i v e compe te n c e of the S t a t e s . " Ib id . , p. 164. 103 de G r a z i a ' s a c c u s a t i o n is as movingly e l o q u e n t as i t is devoid of s u b s t a n t i a t i o n . I t is a p p r o p r i a t e l y answered by an Englishman, whose county can view the issue from a long er h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Viscount Hailsham observes t h a t : The es sense of democracy i s , of co u r se , one man, one v o t e , and i t is the p e rp e tu a l t e r r o r of i t s c r i t i c s t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e will swamp the ed u c a te d , pull down s t a n d a r d s , s e t as id e m o r a l i t y , devalue c i v i l i z a t i o n . As a mere m a t t e r of h i s t o r y , t h i s has seldom happened at the b a l l o t box. The real i n s t a n c e s of mob rule have been the r e s u l t of vi olence or u s u r p a t i o n , not manhood s u f f r a g e . 81 Four a l l e g e d d isa d v a n ta g e s of one-man, one-vote a p p o rtio n m e n t--b o ss r u l e , su b v ersio n of the f e d e ra l system, a red u c t i o n of e x p e r t i s e , and the. "anonymity" of d i s t r i c t s nave now been d i s c u s s e d . Before examining the advantages of such a formula, i t would be well to look at those admitted e f f e c t s which some view as a s s e t s and o th e r s as l i a b i l i t i e s . There are two t h a t are noteworthy: the iss u e s of m a j o r i t y r u le and ru ra l domination. M a jo rity r u le and m i n o r i t y r i g h t s Rather oddly, both s id es on the one-man, one-vote issue have r a t i o n a l i z e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s in terms of m a j o r i t y r u l e . The proponents contend t h a t e q u a l l y populated d i s t r i c t s are n e c es sa r y p r e r e q u i s i t e s for i t . F i r s t among Senator Joseph D. Tyding's " P h ilo so p h ic O bjections to 81The E l i t e and the E l e c t o r a t e , op. ci t . , p. 20. 104 Mala pp ortionm en t," is t h a t i t " f r u s t r a t e s m a j o r i t y r u l e . " 82 And i t is und eniable t h a t unless each person has an equal vote on a given i s s u e , th e r e is no g u arantee t h a t a m a j o r i t y will be able to decide i t . On what grounds, th e n , can those who favor unequal votes invoke the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e ? Simply on the b asis t h a t m a j o r i t i e s of te n have s a n c t io n e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on an unequal b a s i s . The m a j o r i t y of the v o t e r s , in o t h e r s words, f r e q u e n t l y has endorsed m i n o r i t y l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l . Senator E v e r e t t M. Dirksen (R., 111.) has observed t h a t the v o te rs of Colorado, "voting pu rel y on a 'one man, one vote' b a s is " favored a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n formula in t h e i r s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e based not on p o p u latio n but on a " fe d e ra l formula . . . by a vote of two to one!" The f i n a l outcome on s i m i l a r is s u e s was the same, he added, in " M is so u ri, Ohio, C a l i f o r n i a , and I l l i n o i s . " 83 Even more r em arkable, the Oklahoma s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , newly r e a p p o r t i o n e d on an equal p o p u la tio n b a s i s , "voted to p e t i t i o n Congress f o r a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to permit each s t a t e to ap p o r tio n one house of i t s l e g i s l a t u r e on the b a s is of f a c t o r s o t h e r than p o p u l a t i o n . " 81* 82Conqressional Rec ord , 1o c . c i t . 83Statement before Senate Subcommittee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendments, March 3 , 1 965. D i r k s e n 1s ■ remarks are r e p r i n t e d in Issues 16 5 - ' 6 6 , Sidney Wise, ed. (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowe 11 Co. , 1965), p. 3. 841bi d . , p. 4. 105 When Sen ator Dirksen heeded the e n t r e a t i e s of Oklahoma and o t h e r s t a t e s by i n t r o d u c i n g Senate J o i n t Resol ution 2, allow ing s t a t e s to ap p o rtio n s e a t s in one house of a l e g i s l a t u r e "on the b a s is of f a c t o r s o t h e r than p o p u l a t i o n , " i t passed the U.S. Senate 57 to 39, but was thereby d e f e a t e d because i t was designed to amend the C o n s t i t u t i o n and thus lacked the r e q u ire d t w o - t h i r d s approval by seven v o te s. This "Dirksen Amendment," favored by a Senate m a j o r i t y , s t i p u l a t e d t h a t n o n - p o p u la tio n l e g i s - l a t i v e apportionment could be approved only "by a m a j o r i t y of those voting on the is s u e " in a referendum in a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e . Here, s a i d colum nist James J. K i r k p a t r i c k , "Dirksen is reaching to the very roots of s o v e r e i g n t y , to the people t h e m s e l v e s . " 85 William S. White, a u t h o r , c o n f i d a n t of P r e s i d e n t Lyndon B. Johnson, and c o l u m n i s t , was se iz e d with v i t u p e r a t i v e i n d i g n a t i o n . In "30 ye a rs of o b s e r v a t i o n , " he wrote, "no Senate group . . . has ev er acted more i r r e s p o n s i b l y " than t h a t which voted a g a i n s t D i r k s e n . 86 To summarize such an i n t r i c a t e l y para d o x ic a l development, a m a j o r i t y of the m i n o r i t y c o n t r o l l e d U.S. 85Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. 86Los Angeles Times, August 10, 1965 , Pt. I I , p. 5. Speaking of the same Senate m i n o ri t y (those f a v o rin g one- man, one-vote and opposing D ir k se n ) , William F. Buckley, J r . , wrote t h a t "tyranny by a m i n o ri t y " is a " p a r a l y z i n g " and "dangerous i n s t i t u t i o n . " Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 6. 106 Sen at e, voted to allow a po pular m a j o r i t y to vest s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e power in a pop ular m i n o r i t y . The i s s u e , however, becomes even more confused. Not only do the opposing fo rc e s both claim s u ste n a n c e from the m a j o r i t y ru le d o c t r i n e , but they also c o n t e s t for the t i t l e of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s champion. Speaking a g a i n s t the Dirksen amendment, Senator Tydings i n s i s t e d t h a t Equally im p o rtan t as the concept of m a j o r i t y rule is the p r i n c i p l e of m i n o ri t y r i g h t s . . . I b e l i e v e t h a t the r i g h t of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a fundamental r i g h t , j u s t as fundamental as the r i g h t of free speech or t r i a l by j u r y . I t should not be abridged by m a j o r i t y v o t e . 87 Approvingly, the American Civil L i b e r t i e s Union / quotes Mr. J u s t i c e J a c k s o n ' s 1943 c o n t e n t i o n t h a t o n e's " r i g h t s may not be su b m itted to vo te; they depend on the outcome of no e l e c t i o n s . " 88 Beneath a p i c t u r e of Negro c i v i l r i g h t d e m o n s t r a t o r s , the ACLU caption a s s e r t s t h a t "The P r e s i d e n t ' s vo ting r i g h t s l e g i s l a t i o n w ill give all c i t i z e n s the r i g h t to v o te , but the Dirksen Amendment will make the vote m e a n i n g l e s s . " 89 The c o n t e n t i o n , while a gross e x a g g e r a t i o n , r e s t s upon the undeniable f a c t t h a t s t a t e s en ates f r e q u e n t l y have been ap p o rtio n e d to give 87Conqressional Record, 1o c . ci t . 88American Civil L i b e r t i e s Union, Open Forum, A p r i l , 1965. 8 9 L o c . c i t . 107 o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to areas where Negro p o p u la tio n is l i g h t e s t . I t is such an ap portionment which the Dirksen amendment would p e r p e t u a t e . The opponents of one-man, o n e - v o te , a group with which those s u p p o rt i n g the Dirksen amendment is g e n e r a l l y assumed to be i d e n t i c a l , a lso claim to be s upporting m i n o rity r i g h t s . But they are t h i n k i n g p r i m a r i l y of an other m i n o r i t y - - r u r a l , not r a c i a l , bound to t r a d i t i o n a l values and not r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s . One of the most e l o q u e n t , and c o n s e r v a t i v e , of the j o u r n a l i s t i c spokesmen f o r the " f e d e r a l system" is Holmes Alexander. He observ ed, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h a t in i t s Latin and French forms, "the d i g n i f i e d word we have a n g l i c i z e d as Senator has the co n n o tatio n of age and s a g a c i t y - - a wise old c o u n s e l l o r . " 90 He then noted t h a t Senators Dirksen, Lausche (D., Ohio), Holland (D., F lo rid a ) and Simpson (R., Wyoming), the " c e n t r a l f i g u r e s " of the forc es arguing for the Dirksen amendment, had an ag gregate age of 278 y e a r s . They were p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t what Alexander c a l l e d a "callow" i s s u e - - " t h e f a l l a c y t h a t Raw Democracy is the American way." Hanging in the b a l a n c e , he wrote, is a d e l i c a t e checks and balance system which is th e r e to p r o t e c t m i n o r i t i e s a g a i n s t the tyranny of m a j o r i t y r u l e . . . I f the (Supreme C o u r t ' s ) plan were a p p l i e d to the Federal Government, New York S t a t e would get 90 South Bay Daily Breeze (Redondo Beach, C a l i f . ) , August 10, 1965, p. 47 108 nine U. S. S e n a t o r s , while Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado would have to share t h re e U. S. Senators between t h e m . 91 William S. White a greed, more i n t e m p e r a t e l y , t h a t the one-man, one-vote c o u r t decree for both houses of a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e e l i m i n a t e d a " c heck-and-b ala nc e" and is the agent of a c o l o s s a l m i s c h i e f . . . which f o r power- grabbing i n t e r f e r e n c e has r a r e l y been e q u a lle d in American l i f e . " 92 He contended t h a t t h i s ch eck-an d-bal an ce has mai nta in ed . . . a t ru e democracy as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a mere mobocracy in which every i s s u e , however c o m p lic a te d , can be s e t t l e d with i n s t a n t non-tho ught on the sole and simple q u e s t i o n : "Who has got the most votes?" . . . Thus, the tru e iss u e here is whether the e f f e c t i v e r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s . . . to at l e a s t delay overpowering m a j o r i t i e s is going o u t . 93 The i s s u e s invo lved in p u t t i n g s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s e n t i r e l y on a p o p u la tio n b asis are m u l t i - f a c e t e d ones, but they begin to emerge a b i t more c l e a r l y from such e d i t o r i a l comment. The p a r t i s a n s r e p r e s e n t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n of age ( D irksen, e t a l .) vs. youth (Tydings, Proxmire, the Ke nnedy's) , change vs. the s t a t u s quo. They also i l l u m i n a t e the tendency to equate equal voting s t r e n g t h in the e l e c t i o n of s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s with "the 'm ob-rule ' te n d e n c ie s of a pure dem o c ra cy ." 94 91Loc. c i t . 92Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1964. 93Loc. c i t . 94E d i t o r i a l , Torrance ( C a l i f . ) , P r e s s - H e r a l d , May 23, 1965, p. 4. There has been heavy r e l i a n c e , in t h i s I 109 I n s o f a r as the Dirksen Amendment involves the q u e s tio n of m i n o ri t y r i g h t s , the most p e n e t r a t i n g com mentary comes from the academic community. Royce Hanson, Asso ciate P r o f e s s o r of Government at American U n i v e r s i t y , contended t h a t the " e s s e n t i a l point" of the Dirksen Amend ment is t h a t i t permits a_ m a j o r i t y to pick the m i n o ri t y i t p r e f e r s - - a kept or pet m i n o ri t y congeni al to the system as i t has been. . . In my s t a t e (Maryland), 14 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n r e s i d e s in the s m a l l e r c o u n t i e s and e l e c t s a m a j o r i t y of the s t a t e s e n a t e . Seventeen per cent of our people are nonwhite. Both m i n o r i t i e s have r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s . Why should the m a j o r i t y have the power to assign c o n tro l of the s enate to one of them or to e i t h e r of them? The t r u t h is t h a t unequal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o t e c t s no m i n o r i t y r i g h t s . I t may p r o t e c t a s p e c i a l m i n o r i t y ' s i n t e r e s t s . 95 What emerges with s p e c i a l c l a r i t y is the s i g n i f i cance of the m a j o r i t y - r u l e , m in o rity r i g h t s c o n t r o v e r s y , both for apportionm en t purposes and f o r general democratic i th eo ry . Rural o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . --Both s id es of the appo rtion men t c o n t r o v e r s y acknowledge t h a t a p e r p e t u a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s e n t a i l s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of rura l s e c t i o n , upon p e r i o d i c a l sources because they r e p r e s e n t the kind of argument to which the general p u b l i c is most f r e q u e n t l y s u b j e c t e d . Such an approach is most s u i t e d to a d i s c u s s i o n of the one-man, on e-vo te c o n t r o v e rs y because i t deals with t h a t p o r ti o n of the appor tionmen t problem which was most immediate and p r e s s i n g in terms of pending p r o po sals such as the Dirksen Amendment. 95Statement on b e h a l f of the National Committee for F a ir R e p r e s e n t a t i o n sub m itted to the Senate Subcommittee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment, r e p r i n t e d in Issues 1 65- 166 , op. c i t . , p . 7. no farm i n f l u e n c e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to i t s popu latio n s t r e n g t h . This is defended l a r g e l y on t h re e grounds. The f i r s t , b l a t a n t l y p r e j u d i c e d , is the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t urban r e s i d e n t s are e s s e n t i a l l y i n f e r i o r to ru ra l ones. Such an a t t i t u d e i s , in p a r t , a r e f l e c t i o n of America's a g r a r i a n o r i g i n s and the t r a d i t i o n a l s e n t i m e n t a l i t y toward the s o il so e v i d e n t in J e f f e r s o n and many of his c o n te m p o ra rie s . In 1894, a d e l e g a t e to a New York s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention s aid "without f e a r of c o n t r a d i c t i o n " t h a t "the average c i t i z e n in the ru ra l d i s t r i c t is s u p e r i o r in i n t e l l i g e n c e , s u p e r i o r in m o r a l i t y , s u p e r i o r in s e lf - g o v e rn m e n t to the average c i t i z e n in the g r e a t c i t i e s . " 96 In c re a s e d s o p h i s t i c a t i o n makes such a d e n u n c ia tio n p o l i t i c a l l y i n e x p e d i e n t in the 1 9 6 0 's , but i t is probab le t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e r u ra l m is giv in gs s t i l l e x i s t reg a rd in g the r a d i c a l i s m , c o r r u p t i o n and o t h e r u n p a l a t a b l e t r a i t s o c c a s i o n a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to " c i t y s l i c k e r s . " Burns and Peltaso n p o in t out t h a t a small town Michigan l e g i s l a t o r opposed equal p o p u la tio n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for D e t r o i t by quoting Roger Babson's 1949 a l l e g a t i o n t h a t large c i t i e s are the main sources of . . . immorality . . . ru ra l people have much b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r and more time to think . . . than do large c i t y people . . . (and t h e i r votes) should count more than the votes of the o r d in a ry c i t y m an.97 960uoted, 1o c . c i t . 970uoted, op. c i t . , p. 743. A second argument in favor of rural dominance is based upon the economic importance of s p a r s e l y populated a r e a s . Part of The Case for Balance R e p r e s e n t a t i o n in Ca1i forni a r e s t s on the f a c t t h a t Almost 90% of C a l i f o r n i a ' s farm products are produced in 53 of the 58 c o u n t i e s , c o n t a i n i n g only 40% of the s t a t e ' s p o p u l a t i o n . And 75% of our most v i t a l n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e , w a t e r , o r i g i n a t e s in the f a r north where only 5% of our people l i v e . 98 The au th o r quoted above argues t h a t the adequate p r o t e c t i o n of these v a luable commodities r e q u i r e s a " s t a t e wide p e r s p e c t i v e " which only geography-based apportionment can pr ovid e . F i n a l l y , i t is contended t h a t the v i r t u e s i n h e r e n t in "home ru le " f o r loca l government u n i t s can best be s a f e guarded by a r u r a l - c o n t r o l 1ed Senate, even when the local governments a re in c o r p o ra ted c i t i e s . 99 In i t s Legi s 1ati ve [ Review of July 18, 1961, the League of C a l i f o r n i a C i t i e s made t h i s c o n t e n t i o n e m p h a t i c a l l y . Both o f f e n s i v e l y and d e f e n s i v e l y the s o - c a l l e d ru ra l Senate . . . showed more u n d e rsta n d in g of and sympathy toward b i l l s of i n t e r e s t to c i t i e s than did the urban Assembly. Contrary to po pula r b e l i e f , t h i s is not unusual. This y e a r , more than e v e r b e f o r e , 980p. c i t . , p. 2. " F o r an example of a good p r e s e n t a t i o n of the case for home r u l e , see Rodnev L. Mott, Home Rule f o r America's C i t i e s (Chicago: American Muni ci pal A s so c ia ti on , 1 940), pp. 7 ~ t TT-13. Reprinted in Capi to! , Courthouse and City H a l l , Robert L. Morlan, ed. ( B o s t o n : Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1954), pp. 60-64. 112 the Assembly showed an alarming d i s r e g a r d f o r the p r i n c i p l e s of home r u le and the needs of c i t i e s . 100 Agreeing, with u n d e r sta n d a b le enthusiasm , the C a l i f o r n i a Senate subcommittee w r e s t l i n g with j u d i c i a l re a pportionm ent e d i c t s , extended s t i l l f u r t h e r the scope of the S e n a t e ' s claim to preeminence as the defender of the c i t i e s . "Turning from the p o s i t i v e to the n e g a t i v e , " i t m a in ta in e d , the record wil l show t h a t the la r g e m a j o r i t y of p roposals t h a t would have i n f r i n g e d upon the r i g h t s of c i t i e s to c o ntrol t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and t h a t would have weakened the concept of home r u l e , have o r i g i n a t e d in the Assembly, and . . . have been d e fe a te d in the Sen a t e . 1 0 1 But whatever the v a l i d i t y of such claims may be in regard to the C a l i f o r n i a Sen at e, and they will be examined more c r i t i c a l l y l a t e r on, i t seems t h a t ru ra l l e g i s l a t i v e dominance is a source of more condemnation than p r a i s e by c i t y spokesmen throug hout the n a tio n as a whole. Two of the n a t i o n ' s b e st known p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have poi nte d out t h a t " r e s p e c t a b l e " o p p o s it i o n to urban un d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s has been voiced by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and by the National Municipal League. In 1949 at a crowded meeting of the Conference of Mayors, the cry " t a x a t i o n w ith o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is tyra nny!" was 100Ouoted in Senate Subcommittee on Reappo rtion- mer,t» Statement of I n t e n t and J u s t i f i c a t i o n . . . , o p . c i t . , pp. 23-24. 101Loc. c i t . The b i l l of p a r t i c u l a r s c i t e d inc lu d e proposed s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g to t a x a t i o n , p o l i c e power, and land use. 113 f r e q u e n t l y heard. . . (A) p r e s i d e n t of t h i s conferen ce once s t a t e d t h a t unl ess the c i t i e s re c e iv e d a f a i r e r share of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " t h e re wi ll be a tea pa rty which w ill make a big g er smash than the o r i g i n a l one in Boston." The mayors summarized t h e i r views by d e c l a r i n g "Equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . a fundamental f e a t u r e of democracy." 102 Rather s c a t h i n g l y , e r s t w h i l e p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t Wilbert L. Hindman urged t h a t while nothing can be done about i t in many c a s e s , l e t ' s not p r e t t y up ru ra l machine domination of c i t i e s by pre te n d in g t h a t i t is e i t h e r benevolen t or d i s - i n t e r e s t e d . 10 3 Having noted the e f f e c t s of a one-man, one-vote apportionment which have provided grounds f o r c r i t i c i s m , and then those which are lauded by some and denounced by o t h e r s , i t is now n e c e s sa r y to examine those which are viewed with most p r id e by the champions of e q u a l l y pop ulat ed d i s t r i c t s . Diminution of r a c i a l i n e q u i t i e s .--As i n d i c a t e d in Chapter I, the f i g h t f o r e q u a l l y po pulated d i s t r i c t s has been waged c o n c u r r e n t l y with the b a t t l e f o r r a c i a l e q u a l i t y . This has been f a r more than a c h r o n o lo g ic a l c o in c id e n c e . As James Farmer, once head of the Congress of Racial E q u a lity (CORE), q u i t e b l u n t l y a s s e r t e d , "the denial of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to urban dw ellers is most 102Burns and P e l t a s o n , op. c i t . , pp. 742-743. 103" Roadblocks to Conv en tions ," National Municipal Review, March, 1948, p. 131. 114 d i r e c t l y a denial of f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p to the N e g r o . " 104 As i f to confirm such an a s s e r t i o n , Keefe and Ogul p o in t out t h a t Negroes, with ten per ce nt of the I l l i n o i s p o p u l a t i o n , hold only nine of 177 lower house s e a t s . In Pennsylvania they have e i g h t of 210 members r e p r e s e n t i n g a s t a t e whose p o p u la tio n w a rra n ts about 14 Negro l e g i s l a t o r s . 105 One may r e a c t with u n d e r sta n d a b le i n c r e d u l i t y , th en , when con f r o n t e d with de Gr^t-zia's a s s e r t i o n t h a t on "the q u e s ti o n s of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , i t would appear t h a t S t a t e appo rtion ments are un iformly f re e from b i a s . " 106 Divided go vernment. --A f r e q u e n t e f f e c t of a p p o r tionment based on n o n - p o p u la ti o n f a c t o r s is a party s p l i t in which a governor of one party is faced with the d i f f i c u l t ta sk of c o n f r o n t i n g a l e g i s l a t u r e in which a t l e a s t one house is c o n t r o l l e d by the o t h e r p a r t y . The s e p a r a t i o n of powers p r i n c i p l e , i n v o lv in g the semi autonomous i n t e g r i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e branches p r e s e n t s f r e q u e n t problems in s e c u r i n g the c o o p e r a t i o n n e c e s sa r y to in su r e the e f f e c t i v e im plem en tation of p u b l i c p o l i c y . When t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l or f u n c t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n is e x a c e r b a t e d by 104Quoted by John H. A v e r i l l , Los Angeles T i mes , June 26, 1965, p. 9. P o i n t i n g to the e l e c t i o n of ten Negroes to the Georgia S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e "as a r e s u l t of the . . . r e a p p o rtio n m e n t r u l i n g , " NAACP c h i e f Roy Wilkins agreed. Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. 10 5Op. c i t ., p. 123. 106Apporti onment . . ♦ , o p . c i t ., p. 112. 115 the p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s f r e q u e n t l y m a n i fe s t e d by r iv a l p a r t i e s , the r e s u l t i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n is l i k e l y to end in s t a l e m a t e and governmental p a r a l y s i s . Between 1930 and 1950, acco rding to one i l l u m i n a t i n g s tu d y , more than o n e - t h i r d of the Democratic governors who secured s i x t y per cent or more of the vote (eleven of t h i r t y ) had to face a t l e a s t one house which was in c ontr ol of the R e p u b l i c a n s . 107 Since s t a t e governors are e l e c t e d a t l a r g e , they are i n e v i t a b l y chosen l a r g e l y in conformity with the wishes of i n c r e a s i n g l y urban m a j o r i t i e s . Because l e g i s l a t u r e s have been chosen c h i e f l y by d i s t r i c t s ofte n based on a n o n - p o p u la tio n c r i t e r i a n , the p r o b a b i l i t y of r u r a l , o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y deadlock is th er eb y e n h a n c e d . 108 Dependance upon n a t i o n a l gove rnmen t. --As e a r l y as 1955, seven y e a rs before the reap p o rtio n m en t of even one house of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s was ordered in Baker v. C a r r , P r e s i d e n t Eisen ho we r's Commission on Intergov er nm en ta l R e l a t i o n s noted t h a t The problem of r e a p p o rtio n m en t is im p o rtan t . . . because l e g i s l a t i v e n e g l e c t of urban communities has led more and more people to look to Washington fo r more and more of the s e r v i c e s and c o n t r o l s they d e s i r e . . . One r e s u l t of S t a t e n e g l e c t of the r e a p portionm ent problem is t h a t urban governments have bypassed the S t a t e s and made d i r e c t c o o p e r a t i v e arrangements with the National Government in such f i e l d s as housing and 107Keefe and Ogul , o p . c i t ., pp. 92-93. 108Ibi d . , p. 95. 116 urban development, a i r p o r t s , and defense community f a c i 1i ti e s . 10 9 Ten y e ars l a t e r , U.S. Sen ator William Proxmire (D., i Wise.), f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t S e n a to r D i r k s e n 's a ttem pt to negate c e r t a i n c o u r t r e a p p o rtio n m en t f i n d i n g s , made the same p o i n t . In response to a Los Angeles Times e d i t o r i a l A/hich had chided him fo r presuming to defend the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e on the b a s is of s t a t e s ' r i g h t s , he a s s e r t e d t h a t s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s are "much less l i k e l y to act in c oncert" on the s o l u t i o n of urban problems such as housing i f one house is based on p o p u la tio n and one house "on some o t h e r c r i t e r i a . " This, he e x p l a i n e d , is why I say t h a t those who favor the Dirksen amend ment . . . are i r o n i c a l l y the same people who are complaining most loudly about f e d e ra l i n t e r v e n t i o n in s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s and demanding t h a t problems be l e f t to the s t a t e s . 110 Final a s s e s s m e n t . - -The one-man, o ne-vote model, as observed e a r l i e r , is an i n e v i t a b l e c o r r o l l a r y to the p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l i t y and m a j o ri t y r u l e . I t has less obvious e f f e c t s in the a t t a i n m e n t of the o t h e r f i v e of the seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals l i s t e d at the end of Chapter I I , 109A Report to the P r e s i d e n t , Mayer Kestnbaum, Chairman (Wash i n g t o n , D. C. , 1 955), p p . 39-40. 110L e t t e r to the e d i t o r , Los Angeles Tim es, March 20, 1965, Pt. I l l , p. 4. For f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of th is viewpoint see Roscoe Drummond's column in the Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1 965 , Pt. I I , p. 6. Drummond q u o t e s , with ap p ro v a l, Charles S. Rhyne, former p r e s i d e n t of the Ameri can Bar A s s o c i a t i o n , who makes e s s e n t i a l l y the same p o i n t . 11 7 but r e q u i r e s some measurement a g a i n s t them to complete t h i s a n a l y s i s . I t is e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t to e v a l u a t e i t s e f f e c t upon the p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r i n c i p l e l i s t e d second in the enumeration j u s t mentioned. The c r i t i c s of one-man, on e- vote contend, as we have seen, t h a t i t encourages boss r u l e , or perhaps even d i c t a t o r s h i p , by e l e v a t i n g m a c h i n e - c o n t r o l l e d urban m a j o r i t i e s to peaks of dominance in s t a t e p o l i t i c s . The c o n t e n t i o n has y e t to be proved to the w r i t e r ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n . 111 But even i f i t had been dem onstrated, i t s adverse e f f e c t s would perhaps be bal an ced by the s a l u t a r y e f f e c t on freedom f o r r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s of e q u a lly popu lat ed d i s t r i c t s . 112 Negro l e a d e r s h i p , at l e a s t , is almost unanimous in t h i s o p i n i o n , but the evidence is as y e t i n c o n c l u s i v e . I t seems f a i r to say t h a t i f one t r u s t s a numerical m a j o r i t y to r e s p e c t the i n t e g r i t y and l i b e r t y of the m i n o r i t y - - r a c i a 1 , ru ra l or o t h e r w i s e - - t h e r e is l i t t l e to f e a r . I f one does n o t, fo rebodings are j u s t i f i e d . An acknowledgement of the value of compromise is a goal of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which the one-man, on e-vo te p r i n c i ple does l i t t l e to advance. By e l i m i n a t i n g one house of a l e g i s l a t u r e as a power b a s t i o n f o r p a r t i c u l a r economic or 11xS u p r a , p p . 21 -22 . 112S u p r a , pp. 37-42; 45-46. 118 g eographic, or a n t i - g u b e r n a t o r i a l f o r c e s , i t t e n d s , i n s t e a d , to diminish the n e c e s s i t y for moderation and qui d-pro-guo agreements. The p r e s e r v a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l com pet ition is an o b j e c t i v e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n upon which the e f f e c t s of the one-man, one-vote app ortionmen t are r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n . A p a r t i s a n "gerrymander" may r e s u l t in o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for the m a j o r i t y p a r t y i f the m i n o r i t y ' s c o n s t i t u e n t s are grouped in a few i n o r d i n a t e l y l a rg e and g r o te s q u e l y shaped d i s t r i c t s . Yet i t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t a reapportionm ent based on e q u a l l y - p o p u l a t e d d i s t r i c t s may have l i t t l e e f f e c t in i n c r e a s i n g m i n o ri t y s t r e n g t h unless more rigorous stan d a rd s than those now imposed are placed on such boundary f a c t o r s as compactness and c o n t i g u i t y . I t does seem safe to contend t h a t the one-man, on e- vote formula will not de c rea se party c o m p e t i t i o n . A dem ocr atic system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n - - a n y system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n d e e d - - s h o u l d conform to s ta n d a rd s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y and personnel competence. These l a s t two of the s e v e n - f o l d c r i t e r i a enumerated in the preceding c h a p t e r are t e s t s which e q u a l l y populate d d i s t r i c t s have not met, simply because t h e re is too l i t t l e em piric al evidence y e t an aly zed from the r e p o s i t o r y of American l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . In subsequent e v a l u a t i o n , t h i s work a s p i r e s to a meager, but m ean ingf ul, c o n t r i b u t i o n in f i l l i n g t h i s void. 119 For now, i t is am bitious enough to s u g g e st t h a t co u rt ordered rea p p o rtio n m e n t should improve governmental e f f i c i e n c y by reducing the p r o b a b i l i t y of div id e d l e g i s l a t i v e - e x e c u t i v e c o n t r o l . As pointed out a b o v e , 113 t h e r e is some evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the two houses of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s are f r e q u e n t l y c o n t r o l l e d by d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s , and t h a t s t a t e governors must t h e r e f o r e contend with o p p o s it i o n dominence in a t l e a s t one l e g i s l a t i v e chamber. I n s o f a r as a Repu blica n-Dem ocratic d i v i s i o n of government machinery tends to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e p a r t i s a n c o n f l i c t , s t a l e m a t e , or d e l a y , i t is probably s a fe to assume t h a t t h i s makes f o r i n e f f i c i e n c y . To the degree t h a t reap p o rtio n m e n t p laces the ex e c u t i v e and a l l of the l e g i s l a t u r e on the same r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b a s i s , i t would seem to minimize the p o s s i b i l i t y of d ivided p a r ty government and hence promote e f f i c i e n c y . D i f f i c u l t as i t may be to measure s t r u c t u r a l or proced ural e f f i c i e n c y , i t is even h a rd er to d e fin e compe tency as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of l e g i s l a t o r s . The one-man, one-vote system has been c r i t i c i z e d , as noted above, for i t s tendency to reduce l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r t i s e . Although such an i n d i c t m e n t was found lacking in con vincing s u b s t a n t i a t i o n , 114 i t is d i f f i c u l t , on the b a s is of p r e s e n t 113Supra , pp. 46-47. 114Supra , pp. 26-29. 120 e v id e n c e , to prove t h a t e q u a l l y - p o p u l a t e d d i s t r i c t s enhance l e g i s l a t i v e a b i l i t y . A major problem in t h i s kind of a n a l y s i s is the vague i m p re c is io n of the concepts under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The "competence" or " e x p e r t i s e " of l e g i s l a t o r s is con sid e re d in the next c h a p ter in terms of such rea so n a b ly s p e c i f i c components as the i n f o r m a t i o n , e x p e r i e n c e , and d i l i g e n c e which they p o s s e s s . When the one-man, on e- vote model is judged by the e v i d e n t i a r y requirem en ts of the seven c r i t e r i a of demo c r a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n d i s c u s s e d above, one may t e n t a t i v e l y conclude t h a t i t is v i r t u a l l y mandated by e q u a l i t y and m a j o r i t y r u l e , s t r o n g l y endorsed by the e f f i c i e n c y t e s t , n e i t h e r s a n c t io n e d nor preclude d by the i n d i v i d u a l freedom, p o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n , or competence measurements, and found wanting only in terms of the value i n h e r e n t in compromise. Such an as sessment may j u s t i f y a c cep tan ce of one-man, on e-vote as a t h e o r e t i c a l app ortion men t s ta n d a r d . As a j u d i c i a l command i t r e q u i r e s no p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l e . I t is an i m p e r a ti v e . Each of the app ortionmen t schemes d i s c u s s e d , i n the next c h a p t e r must t h e r e f o r e be viewed in terms of the equal p o p u la tio n mandate. I t is the f ix e d s t a r in the firmament of j u d i c i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s . CHAPTER IV ALTERNATIVE MODELS IN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT Of all the app ortionmen t p o s s i b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to a l e g i s l a t i v e body, only the one-man, one-vote model d i sc u s s e d in the pr eceding c h a p t e r is a j u d i c i a l l y p r e s c r i b e d i m p e r a t i v e . But t h i s equal p o p u latio n plan permits p o l i t i c i a n s much d i s c r e t i o n in drawing d i s t r i c t boundaries and i t is t h e r e f o r e n e ce s sa r y to c o n s id e r o t h e r a l t e r n a t e app ortionmen t models. These have been s e l e c t e d e i t h e r because they are c a l c u l a t e d to a t t a i n c e r t a i n r e p r e s e n t a ti o n goals endorsed above, or because they have re c eiv e d wide s upport as i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e c r i t e r i a in appo rtion men t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Each of the f o llo w in g a l t e r n a t i v e models w i l l be examined f i r s t in terms of whatever r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e o r i e s , l e g i s l a t i v e systems and d i s t r i c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are commonly a s s o c i a t e d with them. Second, each a p p o r t i o n ment model wi ll be e v a l u a t e d b r i e f l y on the basis of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals p r e v i o u s l y i d e n t i f i e d as e s s e n t i a l d e r i v a t i v e s of democratic t h e o ry . 121 The Functional M ajo rity Model 122 J u s t as the one-man, one-vote requirement seems i n e v i t a b l y d e r i v a t i v e from the general p r i n c i p l e of human e q u a l i t y , so the f u n c t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y model sp rin g s in e sc a p a b ly from commitment to a policy-making m a j o r i t y . 1 Since i t has been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t people should have equal votes in democratic e l e c t i o n s , i t is well to o bserv e, with l i p s o n , t h a t The prime purpose of an e l e c t i o n is to . . . see i f there is a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of c i t i z e n s who wish t h e i r government to a c t in a c e r t a i n fash ion. . . (T)he l e g i s l a t u r e . . . has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to s u s t a i n and support a government. It is not only a d e l i b e r a t i v e body but also one whose d e l i b e r a t i o n s are supposed to end in a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e c i s i o n s . Hence i t s i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , while c o n t a i n i n g a d i v e r s i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t v i e w p o i n t s , should f o s t e r . . . the m o b i l i z i n g of a m a j o r i t y . 2 Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n assumes t h a t the primary purpose of government is to govern: i . e . , to take a c t i o n . It assumes, f u r t h e r , t h a t the p o t e n t i a l f o r a c t i o n should r e s i d e in a m a j o r i t y , f o r t h a t , as Lincoln o b serv ed , is the only tru e sovere ign of a f re e people. . . Unanimity is i m p o s s i b l e ; the rule of a m i n o ri t y . . . is wholly i n a d m i s s i b l e ; so t h a t , r e j e c t i n g the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e , anarchy or despotism in some form is all t h a t is l e f t . 3 1 Supra , pp. 45-47. 2L e slie Lipson, The Democratic C i v i l i z a t i o n ( N . Y . : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1964), pp. 445-447. 30uoted by Henry S t e e l e Commager, M a jo rity Pule and Minori ty Ri ghts (N.Y.: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1943), pp.' 80-81. t h i s work is e x c e r p te d in Hillman M. Bishop and i 123 The c r u c i a l q u e s tio n is how big a m a j o r i t y should be re q u ire d in ord e r to r u l e . I t is f irm ly e s t a b l i s h e d in American p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e , i f not in t h e o r y , t h a t more than a 51 per cent vote is to be r e q u i r e d f o r c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s . A t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y is normally ne c e s sa ry to propose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments, both n a t i o n a l and s t a t e . In the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e , such a margin is also r e q u i r e d to enact urgency measures and a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l s . 4 The e f f e c t of such r e q u i r e m e n t s , as Ranney c o r r e c t l y p o in ts o u t, is t h a t a "person who votes 'No' counts f o r two . . . times as much as a person who votes ' Y e s ' , " thereb y v i o l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of m a j o r i t y r u le and p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y , 5 If one acce p ts t h i s c o n d i t i o n as a f i x e d , al though perhaps u n d e s i r a b l e , c o n s t a n t , then one may re a so n a b ly argue t h a t conformity to dem ocratic theo ry demands t h a t e l e c t o r a l m a j o r i t i e s be magnified by the app or tionm en t system i n t o even l a r g e r l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t i e s i f they are to be f u n c t i o n a l . In p a r t i s a n terms, t h i s means t h a t i f the l e g i s l a t o r s chosen Samuel Hendel , e d s . , Basic Is sues of American Democracy (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1 965) , f i f t h ed. The q u o t a t i o n appears on p. 95. 4C o n s t i t u t i o n of C a l i f o r n i a , A r t i c l e IV, S e ctions 1 and 34a, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The m i n o r i t y may r e fu s e concurrence on a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l s , e s p e c i a l l y , as a l e v e r to gain o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e c o n c e s s i o n s . 5Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. 182. 124 by vo te rs f a v o rin g the m a j o r i t y pa rty are to be p e r m itte d to a c t u a l l y determine government p o l i c y , then the pe rce nt ag e of m a j o ri t y party law makers u s u a l l y must be s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a r g e r than the perc e n ta g e of t o t a l votes c a s t by the voter s who e l e c t e d them. Gerrymander i n g . - - I n order to obta in these r e s u l t s , d i s t r i c t boundaries are of te n drawn according to t h a t p r i n c i p l e , long s a n c t i f i e d by h i s t o r i c usage, known as the gerrymander. By such p a r t i s a n l y i n s p i r e d m a n i p u l a t i o n , the l e g i s l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of the s t a t e - w i d e m a j o ri t y pa rty may be enhanced s u b s t a n t i a l l y - - e v e n w ith in the l i m i t a t i o n s of the one-man, one-vote r u l e . 6 At l e a s t p a r t i a l v e r i f i c a t i o n of such an a s s e r t i o n comes from the l a b o r a t o r y of C a l i f o r n i a e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . In Assembly d i s t r i c t s drawn by the Democratic c o n t r o l l e d l e g i s l a t u r e in 1961, Democrats won 65 per cent of the s e a t s in the 1962 general e l e c t i o n but r e c e iv e d only 53.9 per cent of the t o t a l s t a t e - w i d e Assembly v o t e . 7 Although t h i s r a t h e r im pre ssive f e a t of p o l i t i c a l aggrandizement did not take place in the c o n t e x t of d i s t r i c t s s u f f i c i e n t l y 6Assemblyman Don A. Allen po ints out t h a t g e r r y mandering "can be accomplished without regard to the degree of equal p o p u l a t i o n . " L e o is l a t i v e Sourcebook (Sacramento: C a l i f o r n i a Assembly, 1965^7 p. 26. Keefe and Ogul agree. The American L e g i s l a t i v e - Process (Englewood C l i f f s , N .J.: P r e n t i c e - N a l l , I n c . , 19 6 4 ) , p . 83. 7Table 1 - A, A ll en , op. c i t . , p. 30. For a s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s based upon 1966 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s in Los Angeles County s t a t e Senate r a c e s , see i n f r a , pp. 309-310, note 137. 125 equal in p o p u la tio n to meet the e x a c tin g s t a n d a r d s of the s t a t e c o u r t s , i t came very clo se to i t . Based upon the minimum s t a t e p o p u la tio n p e rc e n ta g e n e c essa ry to e l e c t a m a j o r i t y of the l e g i s l a t i v e body, the C a l i f o r n i a Assembly r e g i s t e r e d 44.7 per cent (with 50 per cent r e p r e s e n t i n g p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y ) , or s i x t h among 49 s t a t e lower h o u s e s . 8 These e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s take on g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e when compared with those of 1952 which came in the wake of the Republican d i c t a t e d r ea p p o rtio n m e n t of the preceding y e a r . In 1951, " t h e r e were f o r t y - o n e Assembly d i s t r i c t s . . . (over h a l f ) which exceeded a 10 per cent p o p u la tio n d e v i a t i o n , " while in 1961 only 31 (38 per c ent) did s o . 9 In the 1952 e l e c t i o n s , Republican c a n d id a te s won 67 per c e n t of the t o t a l Assembly vote and 70 per cent of the Assembly s e a t s . Thus, the Democrats in 1962 were able to i n f l a t e t h e i r e l e c t o r a l m a j o r i t y by 11.1 per cent when co nver ted to a l e g i s l a t i v e p rep o n d eran ce, while the Republicans ten years e a r l i e r , with d i s t r i c t s f a r less equal in p o p u l a t i o n , had been able to i n c r e a s e t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y only 8Glendon S c h u b e rt, Reapporti onment (N.Y.: Charles S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1965), p. 81. Deduced from data in Table B. The Nebraska unicameral l e g i s l a t u r e was excluded. 9H. Frank Way, " C a l i f o r n i a , " in Malcolm E. d e w ell, e d . , The P o l i t i c s of Reapportionment (N.Y.: Atherton P r e s s , '1 9 " 6 T J " rp T " 2 5 9 . 126 t h re e per cent over t h e i r e l e c t o r a l m a r g i n . 10 This data i n d i c a t e s only t h a t i t is p o s s i b l e , with a given s e t of p o l i t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , for gerrymandering to r e s u l t in p a r t i s a n advantage even wit hin the co nfines of r e l a t i v e l y equal d i s t r i c t p o p u l a t i o n s . To the degree t h a t a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y , i . e . , one n e c e s sa r y to get s i g n i f i c a n t l e g i s l a t i o n e n a c t e d , r e q u i r e s something g r e a t e r than a simple a r i t h m e t i c m a j o r i t y , gerrymandering can be defended as an e f f e c t i v e a s s e t in o b t a i n i n g i t . P r o f e s s o r de G r a z i a , while agreeing t h a t ap p o r tionment "can f a c i l i t a t e m a j o r i t y r a t h e r than m i n o ri t y g o v e r n m e n t ," 11 p r e d i c t a b l y does not b e l i e v e t h a t i t is n e c e s s a r y for i t to do so. "Majority ru le does not need much e n c ouragem ent," he w r i t e s , and t h e r e is "some evidence t h a t a so c a l l e d 'cube-1 aw' of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s ho lds. . . Thus, i f a p a r ty wins 53 per cent of the popular 10Allen , op. ci t . , p. 30. Table 1-A. Keefe and Ogul i d e n t i f y the most common gerrymandering t e c h n i q u e s . One is "to c o n c e n t r a t e the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y ' s voting s t r e n g t h in as few d i s t r i c t s as p o s s i b l e , conceding the o p p o s i t i o n these d i s t r i c t s by wide margins but p r e v e n tin g i t from winning o t h e r n eighborin g d i s t r i c t s . . . (Another) c a l l s f o r the m a j o r i t y to draw d i s t r i c t l i n e s in such a way as to di f f u s e the m i n o r i t y ' s s t r e n g t h , making i t d i f f i c u l t for i t to bring i t s popular s u p p o rt to bear e f f e c t i v e l y in the e l e c t i o n . " Op. ci t . , p. 82. Both may be used s im u l t a n e o u s l y in d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of a s t a t e . ^ A l f r e d de G r a z i a , Apportionment and Rep res en ta- t i v e Government (N.Y.: Frederick A. P r a e g e r , 1 §6 3) , p . T W .--------------------------- 127 v o te, i t is l i k e l y to gain 59.2 per ce nt of the s e a t s . " 12 Without a thorough a n a l y s i s of such a "cube-law ," i t may be assumed to be v a l i d w i t h i n a kind of p o l i t i c a l l y s t e ^ ' 7e vacuum. But i t should be p o inted out t h a t the p a r t i s a n arena is seldom s t e r i l e and t h a t , in c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the m a j o r i t y needs c o n s i d e r a b l e a p p o r t i o n ment s u p p o r t . In the 1956 Assembly races in C a l i f o r n i a , for example, the Democrats re ceived 53.5 per cent of the t o t a l vote but cap tu red only 47.5 per cent of Assembly s e a t s . 13 The most p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s anomaly would seem to be the f a c t the Republicans had done the d i s t r i c t i n g fiv e y ears e a r l i e r . Minority r i g h t s . - - I t is obvious t h a t t h e r e is a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the rule "of the m a j o r i t y . . . will come i n t o c o n f l i c t with the r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s . " 14 From t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y th e r e has sprung a vigorous c o n t r o v e r s y between two groups of t h e o r i s t s , e q u a l l y r e p u t a b l e . One contends t h a t the power of the m a j o r i t y to ru le must be i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y l i m i t e d in o rd e r to p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . The o t h e r claims t h i s to be un n ecessary . To e xplore the argument f u l l y would t ra n sc e n d by f a r the scope of t h i s 1 2 lbi d . , p. 127. 13Table 1 - A, A lle n , o p . ci t . , p. 30. 14Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (N.Y.: H olt, Rinehard and Winston^ I n c . , 1962), p. 151. 128 s t u d y . 15 I t must s u f f i c e to observe here t h a t one can a s s e r t a b e l i e f in the importance of a b s o l u t e , or f u n c t i o n a l l y u n l i m i t e d , m a j o r i t y ru le in s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s wh ile acknowledging the p o s s i b l e value of o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s upon such r u l e . An e x e c u t i v e ve to , a l i m i t a t i o n upon the number of e x e c u t i v e ter ms, f e d e r a l i s m , equal s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the U.S. S enate , and most i m p o r t a n t l y , j u d i c i a l r e v i e w - - a l l th e se c o n s t i t u t e f o r midable and in some cases impregnable b a r r i e r s to a po pular m a j o r i t y i n t o x i c a t e d with b i g o t r y and obsessed by megalomani a . I t is t h i s w r i t e r ' s view t h a t m i n o r i t i e s are well enough p r o t e c t e d by o t h e r f a c e t s of our p o l i t i c a l system to j u s t i f y the e x i s t e n c e of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s in which 15Among the le a d in g works s t a t i n g the case f o r l i m i t e d m a j o r i t y r u l e are: H erb ert McClosky, "The Fallacy of Absolute M a jo rity Rule," The Journal of P o l i t i c s , Vol. XI (November, 1949), pp. 637-654; and J. Roland Pennock, " R e sponsiveness, R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and Majority Rule," APSR, Vol. XLVI (September, 1952), pp. 791-796. See also the s k i l l f u l l y s e l e c t e d e x c e r p t s from s i x t e e n works of Reinhold Niebuhr ap pearing under the t i t l e "The P o l i t i c s of C o u n t e r v a i l i n g Power," Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel , e d s . , Basic Issues of American Democracy, f i f t h ed. (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y -C ro f t s , 19 6 5) , pfK 77-92. For the opposing p o i n t of view, see Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (N.Y.: H a rc o u rt, Brace & Co., 1956); Henry S t e e l e Commager, op. c i t .; and James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy ( Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : Pre n ti c e - H a l 1, Inc . , 1 963). For i n t e r e s t i n g e x p o s i t i o n s of the c o n t r o v e rs y c o n s u l t : Robert A. Dahl, A P reface to Modern Democratic Theory (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1956); and T h o rs o n , 1o c . ci t . 129 f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t i e s are given u n o b s tr u c t e d d o m inance.16 Lipson b e l i e v e s t h a t m i n o r i t y l e g i s l a t i v e s t r e n g t h should be s u f f i c i e n t to voice an o p p o s i t i o n poin t of view, but t h a t to do t h a t th e re is no s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e whether they hold two hundred s e a t s or two hundred and e i g h t y . In f a c t , in any debate a ll major p o in ts are l i k e l y to be s t a t e d and answered by the f i r s t ten speakers on each s i d e . 1 7 How l a r g e a m a j o r i t y , t h e n , is a f u n c t io n a l m a j o r i t y ? Considering the frequency with which American l e g i s l a t o r s " c r o s s - o v e r " to vote with the o p p o s it i o n p a r t y , and in view of the l o p - s i d e d margin in Congress which P r e s i d e n t Johnson r e q u i r e d to e n a c t the Kennedy programs so long f r u s t r a t e d with a s m a l l e r Democratic m a j o r i t y , 18 and in the c o n t e x t , f i n a l l y , of the t w o - t h i r d s 16This , too, is the view of the Advisory Commission on In te rg overnm ental R e l a t i o n s . Apportionment of S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s (Washinaton, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962) , p. 71. 17Lipson, op. c i t . , p. 448. 18In the 1962 e l e c t i o n s , Democrats won 59.3 per cent of House s e a t s and 67 per ce nt of Senate s e a t s . Yet Democrati c programs such as those e s t a b l i s h i n g a Department of Urban A f f a i r s and p ro v id in g medical care through the s o c ia l s e c u r i t y system were not e n a c ted u n t i l a f t e r the 1964 e l e c t i o n s in which Democrats i n c r e a s e d t h e i r hold on the House to 67 per cent and on the Senate to 68 per cen t. In the House r a c e s , i t is of i n t e r e s t t h a t Democratic ca n d i d a t e s won 52.5 per cent of the t o t a l n a t i o n a l vote in 1962 and 57.2 per cent in 1964. Data de riv e d from S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t of the United S t a t e s , i s s u e d September, 1965, U.S. Bureau of the Census, r e p r i n t e d in unabridged form in The U.S. Book of F a c t s , S t a t i s t i c s and Informat ion (N.Y.: Pocket Books , Inc. , ) 9b5 ), pp. 379-380. 130 vote r e q u i r e d to pass many s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o s a l s , i t would seem d e s i r a b l e t h a t the m a j o r i t y p a r ty possess from 60 to 70 per cent of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s . I t seems doubtful t h a t even such heavy m a j o r i t i e s would i n t r u d e s e r i o u s l y on the r i g h t s and w elf are of a m i n o r i t y . Large m a j o r i t i e s , by t h e i r very n a t u r e , must accommodate a broad and d i v e r s e group of i n t e r e s t s in a s o c i e t y so heterogeneous as the American (or C a l i f o r n i a ) p o l i t i c a l community, and the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of v aried i n t e r e s t s can take place only on the b a s is of programs so mild and moderate, so d i l u t e d and compromised, t h a t they are more l i k e l y to be i n c o n s e q u e n t ia l than i n te m p e ra te or i n t o l e r a n t . That, a t l e a s t , is the th eo ry Madison espoused in The F e d e r a l i s t , Number 10, and which provides a b a s i s , i r o n i c a l l y , f o r Burns' c r i t i c i s m of the "Madi(sonian model of g o v e r n m e n t ." 19 U nicam eralism .- - T h e r e are many o b s t a c l e s which upon occasion p re v e n t a l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y from working i t s w i l l . Some, l i k e undemocratic committee s t r u c t u r e s or t w o - t h i r d s vote r e q u i r e m e n t s , have l i t t l e to do with ap p o r tio nm ent. But o t h e r s , such as the numerical siz e of a i m a j o r i t y , are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t . There is a t l e a s t one o t h e r major app ortionmen t f a c t o r which can e i t h e r 19Burns, op. c i t . , pp. 1-23. 131 f r u s t r a t e or f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of m a j o r i t y - supported p r o p o s a l s : the number of l e g i s l a t i v e chambers. The rele v an c e of t h i s is s u e was s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d by Los Angeles Times s t a f f w r i t e r Don Thomas: " I f both houses of C a l i f o r n i a ' s l e g i s l a t u r e must be ap p o rtio n e d on a p opulation b a s i s , why have two h o u s e s ? " 20 An answer which would meet with the approval of those opposing a large volume of s t a t u t o r y changes, is t h a t i t i n c r e a s e s the time and "the e f f o r t n ecessary to pass l e g i s l a t i o n j u s t as a rough road impedes the passage of an a u t o m o b i l e . " 21 Agreeing, Lipson observes t h a t bic a m era lism , in making i t h a rd e r to get new laws p assed, has been " j u s t i f i e d by elem enta ry arguments of a c autious con s e r v a t i s m . " 22 Although i t may be assumed t h a t i t is e a s i e r to get laws enacted when both houses are ap por tioned on the same b a s is than when ap p o rtio n e d d i f f e r e n t l y , i t is s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t than would be the case i f only one house e x i s t e d . Thus, bicam eralism has i m p l i c a t i o n s of a c o n s e r v a t i v e n a t u r e and unicameralism of a l i b e r a l one; the former impedes change, the l a t t e r f a c i l i t a t e s i t . 20Don Thomas, "One House L e g i s l a t u r e ? The Question A r i s e s , " Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1965, Sec. G, p. 6. 21Charles A. Beard, e t a 1. , Committee of the National Municipal League, quoted in W. F. Willoughby, P r i n c i p l e s of L e g i s l a t i v e O rg a n iz atio n (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1934), p . 2"33. 22Lipson, op. c i t . , p. 450. 132 There is l i t t l e doubt t h a t the one-man, one-vote e d i c t of Re.ynol ds v. Sims has e l i c i t e d more i n t e r e s t in unicameralism than has e x i s t e d in many y e a r s . The reason is t h a t the C o u r t 's r u l i n g e l i m i n a t e s one of the major arguments in b e h a l f of bica mer al ism: t h a t i t p r o v id e s , in the words of former Governor Young, "a means of providing adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for d i f f e r e n t groups and geo g raphic a r e a s . " 23 Z e l l e r , too l i s t s t h i s as one of the c h i e f "claims" made in defense of the s y s t e m . 24 Yet, in America at l e a s t , even the most ardent opponents of bicam eralism must confess t h a t the h i s t o r i c record is d i s h e a r t e n i n g . During the l a t t e r p a r t of the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , Pennsylvania and Delaware had one house l e g i s l a t u r e s and Georgia and Vermont adopted them a f t e r independence had been d e c l a r e d . The ad option of the f e d e ra l C o n s t i t u t i o n in 1789 re pla ced a unicameral Congress with a bicameral one, and at the s t a t e level unicameralism l a s t e d l o n g e st in Vermont, where i t su rv iv e d u n t i l 1 8 3 6 .25 For more than t h r e e q u a r t e r s of a century the one house l e g i s l a t u r e seemed dead. 23C. C. Young, The L e g i s l a t u r e of C a l i f o r n i a (San F ra n c isco : Commonwealth Club of C a l i f o r n i a , 1943) , p. 89. 24Belle Z e l l e r , ed. , American S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s : Report of the Committee on American L e g i s l a t u r e s , American Poli ti cal Science A s so c ia tio n (N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowel) Co., 1 3 5 4 7 ,' p V T ? -:----------------------- 25 Ibi d. , pp. 47-49. 133 Then, in the i n v i g o r a t i n g p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of the P r o g re s s i v e E r a - - t h e epoch of such l i b e r a l reforms as d i r e c t e l e c t i o n of the U.S. Senators and the i n i t i a t i v e i and refe ren d u m --u n ic a m e ra lism rose from the p o l i t i c a l graveyard. Between 1912 and 1930 the one house idea was proposed in 15 s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s and advocated by four go vernors . Between 1931 and 1933 i t was c onsid e red in six s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s ( i n c l u d i n g C a l i f o r n i a ' s , fo r the t h i r d time) and in 1934 i t triumphed in Nebraska. Although Willoughby had p r e d i c t e d rap id adoption of unicameralism should even one s t a t e "make the b r e a k , " 26 the wish had f a t h e r e d the thoug ht. To be s u r e , i n t e r e s t quickened and hopes rose as b i l l s p ro v id in g for unicameralism were in tro d u c e d in approximately 12 s t a t e s in 1935-36. In 1937 the movement reached i t s peak as the change was debated in 21 of the 43 s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s which were in s e ss io n during t h a t y e a r . From t h a t d a t e , in s p i t e of app a re n t success in Nebraska, i n t e r e s t d e c lin e d r a t h e r s t e a d i l y u n t i l the 1964 reap p o rtio n m e n t d e c i s i o n . 27 The unicameral idea has had a p e r s i s t e n t appeal in C a l i f o r n i a . It has been i n c o r p o r a t e d in b i l l s i n t ro d u c e d in nine d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n s between 1913 and 26Wi11oughby, op. ci t . , p. 234. 2 7 T h i s h i s t o r i c a l survey is taken p r i m a r i l y from Young, op. ci t . , pp. 84-88. 134 1941, more f r e q u e n t l y than in any o t h e r s t a t e . 28 Yet even with the renewed i n t e r e s t in r e a p portionm ent compelled by the c o u r t s , s u r p r i s i n g l y few p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s in the n a t i o n ' s most populous s t a t e have spoken s e r i o u s l y in b e h a l f of a one house l e g i s l a t u r e . Early in the 1965 r e g u l a r s e s s i o n , Sen. Frank S. Pet er sen (D., Ukiah) in t ro d u c e d such a p r o p o s a l , but i t never got out of committee. Senate P r e s i d e n t pro-tempore Hugh M. Burns (D., Fresno) was quoted as saying "I doubt whether the members of the L e g i s l a t u r e , in i t s p r e s e n t makeup, would approve a one-house system f o r C a l i f o r n i a . . ." Assembly Speaker J ess e Unruh (D., Inglewood) adm itted " toying" with a plan f o r unicameralism but " sa id he had found l i t t l e s upport f o r the i d e a . " 29 In view of t h i s general coolness to the i d e a , i t was with some s u r p r i s e t h a t informed readers l e a r n e d t h a t Governor Brown, some seven months l a t e r , s a id " C a l i f o r n i a might be well served with one house with about 60 f u l l - t i m e l e g i s l a t o r s who are well p a i d . " The Asso cia ted Press d i s p a t c h c a r ry i n g t h i s q u o t a t i o n po inted out t h a t Brown 28I b i d . , p. 88. 29Robert M. Blanch ard, "Leaders Reject Idea of One- House L e g i s l a t u r e , " Los Angeles Times , February 25, 1965, p. 4. Only two weeks e a r l i e r , the Times c a r r i e d an Asso ciated Press d i s p a t c h r e p o r t i n g t h a t N eb raska 's u n i cameral l e g i s l a t u r e had been r e c e i v i n g more a t t e n t i o n from o t h e r s t a t e s than at any time since 1937. "1-House L e g i s l a t u r e of Nebraska in S p o t l i g h t , " i b i d . , February 11, 1965, P a rt IV, p. 5. 135 " s t r e s s e d t h a t he was not advocating the idea" but b e l i e v e d " C a l i f o r n i a might do well to ex plore the p o s s i b i l i t y . . . before the next rea p p o rtio n m e n t in 1 9 7 0 . " 30 As in C a l i f o r n i a , renewed i n t e r e s t in unicameralism in o t h e r s t a t e s has done l i t t l e thus f a r to advance i t toward ado p tio n . Even in C o n n e c ti c u t , where a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention provided the most a p p r o p r i a t e p o s s i b l e occasion f o r l e g i s l a t i v e o v e r h a u l , a unicameral proposal was r e j e c t e d by an overwhelming vote of 71 to 4 . 31 Final a s s e s s m e n t . --The seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals enumerated at the end of Chapter I I , with which each ap po r tionment model wi ll be compared, must again be examined. As i n d i c a t e d at the o u t s e t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y is i m p l i c i t in and n e a r l y synonomous with the t h i r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e : a system which allows the m a j o r i t y to make p o l i c y . This may n e c e s s i t a t e a l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y l a r g e r than an e l e c t o r a l one, but t h a t is p o s s i b l e wi thin the l i m i t a t i o n s of the e q u a l i t y goal (ob j e c t i v e number 1) due to the i n v e n t i v e n e s s with which p a r t i s a n gerrymanders can be employed. 30 Ibi d . , September 24 , 1 965 . In co n g ru o u s ly , the C a l i f o r n i a Young R ep u b lican s, with whom Gov. Brown has seldom a greed, urged the adoption of a unicameral l e g i s l a tu re " u n t i l such time as the s t a t e s regain t h e i r r i g h t to e s t a b l i s h upper houses on f a c t o r s o t h e r than p o p u l a t i o n . " I b id . , December 7 , 1964. 31A ssoci at ed Press d i s p a t c h , Los Angeles Tim es, September 23, 1965, p. 6. 136 The impact of a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y on i n d i v i d u a l freedom is d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s . C e r t a i n l y a l a rg e m a j o r i t y may be more emboldened to r e s t r i c t the freedom of i t s o p p o s i t i o n than a small one. N o n e t h e l e s s, i t is prudent to observe t h a t a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y is perhaps l e s s hazardous to l i b e r t y than the m i n o ri t y r u le which may be i t s r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e . Compromise may be promoted by a b a r e , minimal m a j o r i t y in t h a t i t probably e n t a i l s co nc es sions to m i n o r i t i e s to get th in g s accomplished. But compromise is also i n h e r e n t in a much l a r g e r , f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y , i'n t h a t i t s c r e a t i o n presupposes the accommodation of many d i v e r se m i n o ri t y i n t e r e s t s which c o n s t i t u t e the component p a r t s of an imposing m a j o r i t y . The s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r to a comparison of m u l t i - p a r t y and tw o-party systems. In the former, analagous to a bare m a j o r i t y , compromise takes place in l e g i s l a t i v e chambers a f t e r the e l e c t i o n ; in the l a t t e r , i t occurs in the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s be fore the e l e c t i o n . In e i t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e , compromise is n e c e s sa r y i f government is to t r u l y govern. It would be less than f o r t h r i g h t to argue t h a t a f u n c t io n a l m a j o r i t y promotes p o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n . I t is no e x a g g e r a t i o n to i n s i s t t h a t i t need not d e s tr o y i t . It is tem per at e to admit t h a t i t has an adverse e f f e c t upon i t. 137 If the e f f i c i e n c y goal is i n t e r p r e t e d in the i n e s c a p a b l e s p e c i f i c s of l e g i s l a t i v e ac tio n which is quick and d e c i s i v e , the f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y concept is i t s i n v a l u a b l e a d j u n c t . The bi gger a m a j o r i t y , the g r e a t e r is the p r o b a b i l i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t a c tio n in a given l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n . The f i n a l goal of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the r e c r u i t m e n t of competent lawmakers, may or may not be a t t a i n e d more e a s i l y with an ap portionment system designed p r i m a r i l y to procure a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y . This s u g g e s t i o n w ill be explo red more f u l l y below, but the answer may well remain in doubt. In concluding the e v a l u a t i o n of the one-man, one- vote s ta n d a rd at the end of Chapter I I I , i t s impact upon each of the seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s was c l a s s i f i e d in terms of four implied c a t e g o r i e s : mandated, endorsed, n e u t r a l ( n e i t h e r s a n c t io n e d nor p r e c l u d e d ) , and disc ouraged (found w a nti ng). Using the same a r b i t r a r y a s sig n m e n ts, the follow ing assessment of the f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y s ta n d a r d seems w a r ra n te d . 1. Mandated: policy-making m a j o r i t y ( o b j e c t i v e number 3). 2. Endorsed: e f f i c i e n c y ( o b j e c t i v e number 6). 3. N eu tra l: e q u a l i t y , compromise, and competence ( o b j e c t i v e s 1, 4, and 7, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 138 4. Discouraged: com peti ti on and freedom ( o b j e c t i v e s 2 and 5). The Vigorous Minority Model A vigorous m i n o ri t y voice in a l e g i s l a t i v e body is the p o t e n t i a l a n t i t h e s i s of a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y , and the most f u n c t i o n a l of a l l m a j o r i t i e s would be one commanding unanimous a s s e n t to a l l pro p o sa ls and hence one in which there was no m i n o ri t y voice whatever. Yet Jewell a s s e r t s t h a t " i f the o p p o s it i o n lacks a s tr o n g l e g i s l a t i v e v o ic e , c o n f l i c t will be muted and the v o t e r wi ll lose s i g h t of the i s s u e s . " 32 Moreover, the p r e s e r v a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l com pet ition has been p o s i t e d as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goal i n d i s p e n s a b l e to democratic g o v e r n m e n t . 33 There i s , h e r e , a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in apportionmen t c r i t e r i a of the s o r t which will c o n s t i t u t e a r e c u r r e n t theme in t h i s s tu dy. In the value system of American s o c i e t y t h e r e appears to be a s e t of p e r s i s t e n t t e n s i o n s , of mutual ly e x c l u s i v e o b j e c t i v e s , which comprises what might be c a l l e d a de mocr atic d i a l e c t i c . Before th ese i d e a l s can be r e c o n c i l e d , before some s o r t of t h e o r e t i c a l s y n t h e s i s (or a t l e a s t a pragmatic accommodati on) can be 32Malcolm J e w e l l , The S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e (N.Y.: Random House, 1962), p. 7. 33Supra , pp. 50-53. 1 39 a ch iev ed , they must a t l e a s t be reco gnized as n a t u r a l a n t a g o n i s t s . Having d e a l t with some i m p l i c a t i o n s of a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y , an a n a l y s i s of a vigorous m i n o r i t y is now in o r d e r. Bi camerali sm. - - I t has been a s s e r t e d t h a t u n i cameralism c r e a t e s fewer l e g i s l a t i v e roadblocks to a i m a j o r i t y determined to l e g i s l a t e than does a two-house system. I t is not s u r p r i s i n g , th e n , t h a t defend ers of m i n o ri t y r i g h t s ofte n have taken refuge in the b a s ti o n of bica mer al ism . John Adams, f o r example, was f e a r f u l t h a t "the m a j o r i t y . . . would invade the l i b e r t i e s of the m i n o r i t y , sooner and o f t e n e r than any a b s o l u t e m o n a r c h , " 34 and co n seg u en tl y favored bicameralism on the ground t h a t "a s i n g l e assembly is apt to grow a m b i t i o u s . " 35 Yet the o r i g i n s of b icamer al ism r e s t , p erh a p s, on grounds c u r r e n t l y l e ss r e p u t a b l e than an a b s t r a c t defense of m i n o ri t y r i g h t s . Young s uggests t h a t the two house 340uoted by Henry S t e e l e Commager, Majority Rule and Minority R i g h t s , e x c e r p te d in Bishop and Hendel , op. c i t . , p . 96. 350uoted in Z e l l e r , op. c i t ., p. 48. de T o c g u e v ill e shared the same s e n t i m e n t s . " I f i t be ad mitted t h a t a man, p o s se s sin g a b s o lu t e power, may . . . (wrong) his a d v e r s a r i e s , why should a m a j o r i t y not be l i a b l e to the same reproach?" Democracy in America, e x c e r p t e d in Bishop and Hendel, op. ci t . , p. 101. He, to o , fa vore d bic am e ra lism , c a l l i n g i t "an axiom in the p o l i t i c a l s c ie n c e of the p r e s e n t age." Quoted by Ferguson and McHenry, op. c i t . , p. 619. 140 l e g i s l a t u r e was adopted in America because i t was " f a m i l i a r " due to "the bicameral o r g a n i z a t i o n of the B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t . " 36 Keefe and Ogul observe t h a t i t s Mew World o r i g i n s can be t ra c e d to the Mass achusetts Bay Colony which e s t a b l i s h e d a bicameral body in 1644 because of a d i s p u t e over one "Goody Sherman and her s t r a y s o w . " 37 Willoughby a s s e r t s , f i n a l l y , t h a t although the example of the English p a r l ia m e n t "was due in l a r g e p a r t to h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t , " 38 i t was of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e in s u p p o rt i n g a bicam eralism endorsed l a t e r , in the 182012 , as a defense f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s a g a i n s t the a s s a u l t s of u n iv e r sa l s u f f r a g e . 39 Yet i t would be u n f a i r to judge the c u r r e n t e f f i c a c y of a two-house l e g i s l a t u r e s o l e l y in terms of i t s o r i g i n s . Regardless of why i t was i n s t i t u t e d , i t s t i l l act s as a brake upon the p o t e n t i a l r e c k l e s s n e s s of m a j o r i t y power and may serve o t h e r purposes as w e l l . Finer c o n t e n d s , f o r example, t h a t " any second chamber . . . has some u t i l i t y where l e g i s l a t i o n is co mplicated and only time and many minds can secure the 35Young, op. c i t . , p. 8. 37Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t . , p. 53, quoting a 1943 r e p o r t of the M as sachusetts Senate. 380 p . c i t . , p. 215. 39Op. c i t . , pp. 217-218. In t h i s r e g a r d , Willoughby c i t e s Ch an c e llo r Kent and Chief J u s t i c e Spencer of New York. 141 soundness of i t s substance and the e x c e l l e n c e of i t s d r a f t i n g . " 40 Lippmann confirms t h i s assessm en t in r e f e r r i n g to i a s t o r y a t t r i b u t e d ( i n c o r r e c t l y , i t appears) to George Washington. He is s a id to have poured his hot tea i n t o the s a u c e r in o r d e r to cool i t , i l l u s t r a t i n g the p o in t t h a t the fu n c t io n of the Senate is to moderate the im pulsiveness of the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . This f u n c t io n may c o n s i s t in proposing and r e view in g, in i n i t i a t i n g or r e w r i t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n . 41 The argument which seems to emerge is t h a t two chambers are b e t t e r than one, much as two heads are b e t t e r than one, in t h e i r a n a l y t i c a l and d e l i b e r a t i v e a b i l i t i e s . Such a p o s i t i o n is at odds with Z e l l e r ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t i f "bi ca mer al ism is to have any v i t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , the two houses should have fundam entally d i f f e r e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n bases or they serve no useful purpose as a check on each o t h e r . 1,42 In what seems an almost d e l i b e r a t e r e f u t a t i o n of t h i s view, Chief J u s t i c e Warren, for a Supreme Court m a j o r i t y , wrote t h a t : We do not b e l i e v e t h a t the concept of bicam eralism is rendered a n a c h r o n i s t i c or meaningless when the 40Herman F i n e r , Theory and P r a c t i c e of Modern Government, r e v i s e d ed. (!\l. Y.: Hen ry Holt and Co. , T949), p." T IT .------ 41Walter Lippmann, "The One-Man, One-Vote Rule," Newsweek, May 10, 1965, p. 33. Rather i m a g i n a t i v e l y , Li ppmann s u ggests t h a t upper chambers might be l i m i t e d to the power to d e l a y , but not d e f e a t , measures passed by lower houses. Loc. c i t . 42Zeller, op. c i t .. p. 35. 142 predominant basis of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the two s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e bodies is r e q u i re d to be the same-- p o p u l a t i o n . A prime reason for bic a m era lism , modernly c o n s i d e r e d , is to assure mature and d e l i b e r a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f , and to p re v e n t p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n on, proposed l e g i s l a t i v e m e a s u r e s . 43 Whatever the m e r it s of bic a m era lism , they seem to have commanded such c o n s i s t e n t l y prep o n d eran t endorsement t h a t the unicameral a l t e r n a t i v e remains well beyond the realm of p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . A 1934 doII in volving 4 , 0 0 0 q u e s t i o n n a i r e s showed t h a t a one house s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e was favored by only 24 per cent of the members of the U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 34 per cent of s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 31 per cent of members of the American Bankers A s s o c i a t i o n , 34 per cent of the American Bar A s so c ia tio n and 45 per cent of bu s in e s s e x e c u t i v e s . The American P o l i t i c a l Science A s so c ia tio n stood in s t a r k but impotent c o n t r a s t , with 85 per cent of i t s members endorsing unicam eralism , jo i n e d only by such o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l l y - o r i e n t e d groups as the League of Women Voters (73 per cent) and the American A s so c ia tio n of U n i v e r s i t y Women (52 per c e n t ) , plus the American Federa tion of Labor (64 per c e n t ) . 44 No comnarable poll appears to have been made in the follow ing twenty y e a r s ; but the f a c t t h a t the unicameral 4 3Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1 362 ( 1 964) at 1 389 . 44Young, op. ci t . , p. 93. Results appear to give some s u p p o rt to tHe "1i b e r a l " vs. " c o n s e r v a t i v e " h y p o th esis re g a rd in g t h i s i s s u e . 143 movement seems to have g a t h e r e d s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e momentum from one-man, on e- vote d e c i s i o n s is noteworthy in i t s e l f . P r e s i d e n t pro-tem Hugh Burns of the C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate seems to have spoken f o r most of his c o l leagues and a vast m a j o r i t y of the n a t i o n a l p o p u la tio n when he s a i d , "I th ink by m a in ta in in g two houses you have a c e r t a i n element of checks and b a l a n c e s , even though they (the houses) are ap p o r tio n e d on the same b a s i s . " 45 One seems j u s t i f i e d in concluding t h a t bic ameralism r e t a r d s f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t i e s , is c o n s e r v a t i v e in i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s , tends to p r o t e c t m i n o ri t y i n t e r e s t s , and is so entr en ch ed in our p o l i t i c a l . t r a d i t i o n t h a t i t commands c o n tin u in g s upport from l e g i s l a t o r s , j u d g e s , and p r e s t i gious pu ndi ts of the p r e s s . P r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .--W hil e most defenders of a vigorous l e g i s l a t i v e m in o rity su p p o rt a two house l e g i s l a t u r e as a useful a d j u n c t to t h e i r cause, oth e rs plead f o r p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Such an e n t r e a t y has gone l a r g e l y unheeded b ecau se, to an even g r e a t e r degree than unicam er al ism , i t l i e s beyond the realm of p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y in the United S t a t e s . "PR" has been used in America, perhaps f o r the f i r s t time in the New York S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention 45Robert M. Blanchard, "Leaders Reject Idea . . . , " 1o c. cit. 144 of 1 867 . 4+6 But i t s use has been p r i m a r i l y in the e l e c t i o n of c i t y c o u n c i l s , beginning in A s hta bula , Ohio, in 1915, and exten ding l a t e r to perhaps 20 o t h e r c i t i e s . As Snyder has observ ed, the plan "never gained wide p o p u l a r i t y (and) has now been abandoned by v i r t u a l l y every m u n i c i p a l i t y t h a t adopted i t . 1+7 No semblance of i t is found in the n a t i o n a l Congress, and the I l l i n o i s House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s is "the n e a r e s t th ing to p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h i s c o u n t r y , although i t is not a p e r f e c t example of i t . " 48 The I l l i n o i s plan is de signe d to g u arantee m i n o rity r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by the c r e a t i o n of multi-member d i s t r i c t s in which v o te r s may c a s t t h r e e votes f o r one c a n d i d a t e , or one fo r each of t h re e c a n d i d a t e s , or two f o r one and one f o r a n o t h e r . In p r a c t i c e t h i s has a l l but guarante ed the m i n o ri t y p a r ty of a t l e a s t o n e - t h i r d of the s e a t s in the lower h o u s e . 49 46de G razia, Apporti onment . . . , o p . c i t . , p. 187. 47Clyde F. Snyder, American S t a t e and Local Govern men t, second ed. (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1 965 ) , pp. 392-393. The plan was used in Cleveland from 1921-31, in C i n c in n a ti from 1926-58, and New York from 1938-49. 48Z e l l e r , o p . c i t . , pp. 40-41. I t would a lso seem to be v i r t u a l l y the only example even f a i n t l y resembling PR a t the s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e l e v e l . N o n e t h e l e s s, Z e l l e r f e e l s i t is " a t l e a s t worthy of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , " 1o c . c i t . , and notes t h a t the Model S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n of the National Municipal League provides f o r i t . 49The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s I l l i n o i s i n n o v a t i o n has been brought to the a t t e n t i o n of the academic community 145 Despite t h e i r remarkably uniform r e j e c t i o n in the United S t a t e s , a wide v a r i e t y of p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n schemes have been u t i l i z e d with varying degrees of success in Germany during the Weimar Republic e r a , in France under the Fourth Rep ub lic, in the I s r a e l i K n e s s e t , the Belgian Chamber of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , some Scandinavian l e g i s l a t u r e s , the I r i s h Pail , and c e r t a i n A u s t r a l i a n l e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s . 50 The whole purpose of t h i s e l e c t o r a l scheme is to a s su r e to the most c e r t a i n p o s s i b l e degree t h a t the p r o p o r ti o n of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s a s sig n e d to a given p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n w ill be i d e n t i c a l to the p r o p o r t i o n of popular votes c a s t in i t s b e h a l f . I t e n v i s i o n s a p o l i t i c a l system in which each m i n o ri t y w i l l have l e g i s l a t i v e spokesmen in accordance with i t s r e l a t i v e numerical s t r e n g t h among the voting p o p u l a t i o n . 51 There is some t r u t h , t h e r e f o r e , in by George S. B l a i r , Cumulative Voting: An E f f e c t i v e E l e c t o r a l Device in P l l i n o i s P o l i t i c s (Urbana, 111.: Univ. of I l l i n o i s P r e s s , 1960 ). 50This l i s t is not e x h a u s t i v e . For summary, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and commentary upon p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system s, see Ranney, op. c i t ., pp. 275-282, and F i n e r, op. c i t ., pp. 551-560. 51Advocacy of the system reached i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l z e n i t h during the middle of the l a s t c e n t u r y . I t s c h i e f i n n o v a t o r was Thomas Hare, "a man of g r e a t c a p a c i t y " with a plan of " u n p a r a l l e l e d m e r i t , " acco rding to i t s most eminent spokesman, John S t u a r t M i l l , C o n s i d e ra ti o n s on R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government (Chicago: Henry Regenery Co., 1962), p . 148. The o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n of t h i s work was p u b lish ed in 1861. See a lso M i l l , i b i d . , pp. 1 49-164. 146 de G r a z i a ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the form of ap portionm ent " invo lved in p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . conforms most e x a c t l y to the lo g i c of the 'one-man, o n e - v o t e ' . . . d o c t r i n e . " But in view of the d e c r e a si n g p o p u l a r i t y of p r o p o r t i o n a l schemes in t h i s c o u n tr y , i t is hardly " s t r a n g e , " c o n t r a r y to his s u g g e s t i o n , t h a t they have been given l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l a t t e n t i o n . 52 Final a s s e s s m e n t . - -A vigorous l e g i s l a t i v e m i n o rity is a p o s s i b l e apportionm en t s ta n d a rd which must be judged in terms of the same r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals as the equal p o p u la tio n and f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y c r i t e r i a . I t seems most congenial to the o b j e c t i v e of main t a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l freedom. In a democracy, the most c h e r i sh e d freedom ever in s e r i o u s je o p a rd y is t h a t advo c a t i n g a m i n o ri t y view. T h e re f o re a s tr o n g l e g i s l a t i v e m i n o rity is a n e c e s s a r y , alt hough perhaps i n a d e q u a t e , concomitant to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of perso nal l i b e r t y . John S t u a r t M i l l , whose arguments seem to endure in cogency to a degree s u r p a s s i n g those of many men w r i t i n g a century i l a t e r , spoke in b e h a l f of a vigorous m i n o rity when he defended b ica mer al ism on the ground t h a t a " m a jo rity in a s i n g l e assembly . . . e a s i l y becomes d e s p o t i c and o v e r weening i f r e l e a s e d from the n e c e s s i t y of c o n s id e r i n g 52de G ra z ia , Apporti onment . . . , op. c i t . , p. 129. This study has re v e a le d no c o n s i d e r a t i o n of "PR" p roposals in any s t a t e in r e c e n t y e a r s . 147 whether i t s ac ts w ill be concurred in by a n o th e r c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t y . " 53 Since a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y has been p o s i t e d as r e q u i r i n g from 60 to 70 per cent of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s , i t might be concluded t h a t a vigorous m in ority e n t a i l s , c o n s e r v a t i v e l y , a t l e a s t a 20 per cent voice. This assumes t h a t m in o rity s t r e n g t h w ill continu e to enjoy such n o n - l e g i s l a t i v e s u p p o rt as j u d i c i a l review and the e x e c u t i v e veto. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c r i t e r i o n of e q u a l i t y is met by a vigorous m in o rity to the degree t h a t at l e a s t 20 per cent of the voting p o p u latio n opposes, to some e x t e n t , m a j o r i t y - determined p o l i c y . This seems at l e a s t probable in the l i g h t of American p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y . But, should 49 per cent oppose p r e v a i l i n g p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s , the requiremen t of a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y might reduce the m i n o rity to a l e g i s l a t i v e bloc less than the e q u a l i t y s ta n d a rd would seem to d i c t a t e . This i n e q u i t y must be borne, perhaps, because in Tussman's words, the work t h a t government must do takes s t r e n g t h , s u r e n e s s , v i g o r , c o n f id e n c e . Such power gone a s t r a y is a t e r r i b l e menace. But to atte m p t to sa fe g u a rd v i r t u e by the c r e a t i o n of impotence is to lose e v e r y t h i n g . 54 A f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y is a democratic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which may be ren d e re d , at b e s t , compatible with a 53Mi11 , C o n s i d e r a ti o n s . . . , o p . c i t ., p. 249. 54Tussman, op. c i t ., p. 103. 148 vigorous m i n o r i t y . The few must have the s t r e n g t h of unimpeded and e f f e c t i v e advocacy. But any p r e t e n s e t h a t such a m i n o r i t y enhances the m a j o r i t y ' s c a p a c i t y to ru le s w i f t l y and s u r e l y is a d e lu s i o n . Compromise, as a p r i n c i p l e o b j e c t i v e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is enhanced by a vigorous m i n o r i t y . Lacking i t , the m a j o r i t y w ill be forced to acknowledge fewer p o in ts of view and is r e q u i r e d to accommodate only to the wishes of those who comprise i t . Compromise is not i n e v i t a b l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of s o c i a l b e h a v io r ; i t is ofte n e l i c i t e d only when the hard n e c e s s i t i e s of a vigorous m i n o ri t y command i t . Without i t , the power holders may a ct with harsh and p r e c i p i t o u s c a l l o u s n e s s . With i t , may come a s p i r i t of t o l e r a n c e and s o l i c i t u d e . The importance of a vigorous m i n o rity to the main- i tenance of p o l i t i c a l c o m p etitio n is ax io m a tic . I t provide s the a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h o u t which t h e r e can be no choice and a c h o i c e l e s s democracy is no democracy at a l l . As Sen ator Goldwater im p lie d , echoes a r e not enough. I n s t i t u t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y may be aided or o b s t r u c t e d by m i n o rity s t r e n g t h . To the degree t h a t i t makes f o r more i thorough d e l i b e r a t i o n and more c a r e f u l a c t i o n i t is an a s s e t . To the e x t e n t t h a t i t causes i l l - a f f o r d e d delay or s t a l e m a t e , or saps the v i t a l i t y of government by weak e q u i v o c a t i o n , i t is a l i a b i l i t y . i 149 Whether or not a vigorous m i n o rity produces compe t e n t l e g i s l a t o r s is open to q u e s t i o n . I t depends, probably, upon which m i n o ri t y is made v igorous. I f i t is the m i n o rity of the i l l i t e r a t e s , the answer is c l e a r l y "no." I f i t i s , as seems more pr oba ble in a time of Demo c r a t i c Party dominance, the m i n o ri t y of the extremely a f f l u e n t and w e l l - e d u c a t e d , the answer is c e r t a i n l y "yes." The r e l a t i o n s h i p of a vigorous m i n o rity to the seven p o s i t e d goals of dem ocr at ic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , may be summarized as follows: 1. Mandated: freedom and c o m p etitio n ( o b j e c t i v e s 2 and 5, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 2. Endorsed: compromise ( o b j e c t i v e 4). 3. N e u tr al: e q u a l i t y , e f f i c i e n c y , and competence ( o b j e c t i v e s 1, 6, and 7, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 4. Discouraged: policy-mak ing m a j o r i t y ( o b j e c t i v e 3). The Informed Membership Model L e g i s l a t o r s should be competent persons capable of e n a c t i n g wise l e g i s l a t i o n . This is an a p p are n t t r u i s m , i n c o r p o r a t e d e a r l i e r in t h i s work as a goal of any r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system. A. D. Lindsay, moreover, i n s i s t e d t h a t i f "democracy is to s u r v i v e , i t w i l l have to employ . . . every b i t of s k i l l and knowledge and l e a d e r s h i p i t can get 150 hold o f . " 55 A leading American p o l i t i c i a n ex pressed a g r e e ment with the eminent English p h i l o s o p h e r when S e n a to r J. William F u l b r i g h t wrote t h a t the e l i t i s t theo ry of govern ment is " i r r e f u t a b l e i n s o f a r as i t r e s t s on the need f o r e x p e r t and s p e c i a l i z e d k n o w le d g e ." 56 Some e i g h t y y e ars e a r l i e r John S t u a r t Mill warned t h a t one of "the dangers i n c i d e n t to a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy" was "a low grade of i n t e l l i g e n c e in the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e b o d y . " 57 Q u a l i t i e s v a r i o u s l y i d e n t i f i e d above as knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r t i s e and i n t e l l i g e n c e are d i f f i c u l t to d e s c r i b e in terms of t h e i r component ele m en ts. This d i s c u s s i o n assumes, however, t h a t informed l e g i s l a t o r s are more l i k e l y to possess th e se a t t r i b u t e s than uninformed ones. But b efo re the informed law maker can be p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d and adeq u a te ly c h a r a c t e r i z e d , c o n s i d e r a t i o n must oe given to an im portant d i s p u t e reg a rd in g the l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n . Two r e c e n t s c h o l a r s have observed t h a t the " c l a s s i c problem of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " is t h i s : "are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r e e to follow t h e i r own judgements . . . or are they merely agents of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s ? " 58 There is an 55Lindsay, o p . c i t . , p. 261. 56F u l b r i g h t , o p . c i t . , p. 4. 57Mi11 , Consi d e r a t i ons . . . , op. c i t ., p. 139. 58Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t ., p. 62. 151 im pre ssive h e r i t a g e , both t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l , to s upport both po in ts of view. The l e g i s l a t o r as a g e n t .--The b e l i e f t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are simply d e l e g a t e s of those who s e l e c t e d them, and t h a t they may be i n s t r u c t e d by those whom they r e p r e s e n t to vote in a p a r t i c u l a r f a s h i o n , is perhaps the o l d e s t of these two c o n f l i c t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s . I t r e s t s upon a view of the l e g i s l a t o r as a legal agent of the e l e c t o r s and is known as e i t h e r the d e l e g a t e or agency th eo ry . de Grazia a s s e r t s t h a t the d o c t r i n e of i n s t r u c t i o n s , which maintains t h a t . . . a c l e a r e x p re ssio n of the wi ll of the m a j o r i t y of con s t i t u e n t s is binding on the a c t i o n of t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , appears with the very beginning of p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . I t was r evived in the Enlightenment as p a r t of the c o n t e x t of i n d i v i d u a l i s m and the con t r a c t u a l psychology of the r a t i o n a l d e m o c r a t s . 59 This agency th eo ry was espoused by the L e v e l le rs in the s e v e n te e n th century and e l o q u e n t l y defended by L i l b u r n e . 60 In the New World i t is not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t hacLgrea t i n f l u e n c e . Voters i n s t r u c t e d t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in Boston as e a r l y as 1661 and t h e i r r i g h t to do so was r e a f f i r m e d in the M ass achusetts c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1 780.61 Among the c h i e f American spokesmen f o r t h i s p o i n t of view were John Adams, James Otis and William 59de G ra z ia , Publi c and R e p u b l i c , o p . c i t ., p. 123. 6 0 Ibi d ., pp. 21-23. 61 I b i d . , p. 55. 152 P a t t e r s o n . The l a t t e r , on the f l o o r of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention viewed r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r "the in c o n v e n i e n t meeting of the people t h e m s e l v e s , " 62 and hence as one p e r m i t t i n g l i t t l e room f o r l e g i s l a t i v e independence or d i s c r e t i o n . Although e x p l i c i t a s s e r t i o n s of the r i g h t of i n s t r u c t i o n came with less frequency t h e r e a f t e r , i t was a r i g h t rec ognized in the s t a t e s which had comprised the Northwest T e r r i t o r y and by John T y l e r , l a t e r to assume the p r e s i d e n c y , in his maiden speech to the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Is the c r e a t u r e , T y le r asked, to s e t h im se lf in o p p o s i t i o n to his c r e a t o r ? Is the s e r v a n t to disobey the wishes of his master? How can he be regarded as r e p r e s e n t i n g the people when he speaks, not t h e i r language, but his own? He ceases to be t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e when he does so, and r e p r e s e n t s him self alone . 6 3 Various s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , which e l e c t e d United S t a t e s Senators u n t i l the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, a t t e m p t e d , with varying degrees of s u c c e s s , to " i n s t r u c t " t h e i r Senators on how s p e c i f i c votes were to be c a s t . 64 62Quoted in Ranney, o p . c i t ., p. 240. 63Quoted in John F. Kennedy, P r o f i l e s in Courage (N.Y.: Pocket Books, I n c . , 1957), p. 13. 64For an i n t e r e s t i n g account of one such i n c i d e n t , see Kennedy's d i s c u s s i o n of the Missouri l e g i s l a t u r e and Sen at or Thomas Hart Benton. I b i d ., p. 77. 153 Today, arguments in b e h a l f of the " r i g h t " of i n s t r u c t i o n are r a r e l y heard and are w ith out any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or s t a t u t o r y b a s i s . 65 Yet the b e l i e f t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s should vote as t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s wish them to not only p e r s i s t s but c o n s t i t u t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t motive d e t e r mining l e g i s l a t i v e behavior. In Charles L. Clapp's e x c e l l e n t study of The Congressman he quotes an u n i d e n t i f i e d member of the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as saying I take the p o s i t i o n t h a t "a p o l i t i c i a n ' s f i r s t duty is to get r e - e l e c t e d " and I thin k t h i s sometimes r e q u i r e s c a s t i n g votes you might p r e f e r not to c a s t . The a l t e r n a t i v e is the e l e c t i o n 6f someone who would be d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed in c o n v i c t i o n to what you stand f o r . 66 65de Grazia p o i n t s out t h a t Madison a s s i s t e d in d e f e a t i n g by a vote of 41-10 a proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment which would have p e r m itte d the c o n s t i t u e n c y to " i n s t r u c t " i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Public and R e p u b l i c , op. c i t . , p . 99. 66Quoted in Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees I t (Garden C ity , N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1964 ), p . 427. Tins is a study based on round t a b l e d i s cus sions in 1959 among two groups of Congressmen with a t o t a l of t h i r t y - s i x p a r t i c i p a n t s . See, a l s o , the s t a r t l i n g l y s i m i l a r ter minology of the anonomous Congress man "Emnhatic," in te rv ie w e d by Lewis A. Dexter: "My f i r s t duty is to get r e - e l e c t e d . I'm here to r e p r e s e n t my d i s t r i c t . . . This is p a r t of my ac tual b e l i e f as to the f u n c t io n of a congressman. . . What is good fo r the m a j o r i t y of d i s t r i c t s is good for the c o u n try . What s n a r l s up the system is th e se s o - c a l l e d sta tesm en--c ongressm en who vote for what they th in k is the c o u n t r y ' s i n t e r e s t . . . l e t the Senators do t h a t . " "The R e p r e s e n t a t i v e and His D i s t r i c t , " Human O r g a n i z a t i o n , Vol. 15, No. 1. Reprinted in L e g i s l a t i v e P o l i t i c s U.S.A. , Thodore J. Lowi , e d . , second ed. (B o s to n : L i t t l e Brown and Co., 1 965 ), p. 86. 154 A s i m i l a r study of l e g i s l a t o r s in four s t a t e c a p i t o l s re vealed s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e s . One solon s t a t e d t h a t "what the d i s t r i c t wants me to do is m.v most im portant job. I carry out t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . " 67 Another pointed out t h a t on "a c o n t r o v e r s i a l m atte r" he has voted "the way I think the m a j o r i t y want even i f I p e r s o n a l l y d i s a g r e e . " 68 There is some reason to b e l i e v e t h a t the one-man, one-vote dictum has had the e f f e c t of s t r e n g t h e n i n g the agency concept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . de Grazia notes at l e a s t a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two when he wrote t h a t he f e l t it unlikely t h a t a man who b e l i e v e s in the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l- p o p u la tio n d i s t r i c t s will also b e l i e v e in the freedom of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the mandate of the c o n s t i t u e n c y . 69 While t h i s may c o n s t i t u t e too sweeping a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , t h e r e a r e , n o n e t h e l e s s , two eminent bodies which orovide cases in p o i n t . A group of s c h o l a r s assembled by the Twentieth Century Fund both endorsed the e qual- o opulation p r i n c i p l e and also a s s e r t e d t h a t the "purpose of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government in a democracy is j u s t t h a t - - t o r e p r e s e n t . The l e g i s l a t u r e acts on b e h a l f of the 6 70uoted in Wahlke, e t . a l . , op. c i t . , p. 276 . 6 81bi d. , p. 277. 69de G ra z ia , Apporti onment . . . , o p . c i t . , p. 33. 155 v o t e r s . " 70 In defending ap portionment based on p o p u l a t i o n , the Advisory Commission on Inte rg overnm enta l R e l a t i o n s did so in words which also bestowed i t s endorsement on the agency ro le of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " L e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s , " i t concluded, "must m i r r o r the views of the c i t i z e n s within the j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 71 I t is not too much to say, p erh a p s, t h a t unless l e g i s l a t o r s do in f a c t heed the wishes of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s , the whole one-man, one-vote p r e c e p t is s u b v e rte d and rendered p r a c t i c a l l y i n o p e r a b l e . If the l e g i s l a t o r indeed should act as the agent of his c o n s t i t u e n t s , as the person to whom they have d e l e g a t e d the a u t h o r i t y to a c t in t h e i r b e h a l f as they would act themselves were i t f e a s i b l e , then t h i s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the kind of in fo r m a tio n he should p o s s e s s . He should know what they want. He should under stan d t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . He should s t r i v e for what Finer c a l l s a "wholesome c o n t a c t between c o n s t i t u e n t s and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " 72 and a t t e m p t , as F r i e d r i c h has s u g g e s t e d , to " p r e s c r i b e co n tin u in g i n t e r a c tio n between governors and g o v e r n e d . " 73 If the agent 70Anthony Lewis, conference r e p o r t e r , One Man--0ne Vote (N.Y.: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p . 71 Advisory Commission . . . , o p . c i t . , pp. 69-70. 72F i n e r, op. c i t . , p. 556. 73F r i e d r i c h , op. c i t . , p. 264. 156 th eo ry of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is to p r e v a i l , i f the l e g i s l a t o r is to follow the revered Sam Rayburn's advice to "vote your d i s t r i c t f i r s t , " 74 then he must f i r s t know his d i s t r i c t . The informed l e g i s l a t o r is one who does. The l e g i s l a t o r as t r u s t e e . --Yet no m a t t e r how f a m i l i a r the law maker may be with the problems of his d i s t r i c t or the wishes of his c o n s t i t u e n t s , t h i s is not s u f f i c i e n t . For the l e g i s l a t i v e process is a c o l l e c t i v e u n d erta k in g and the d i s c r e t i o n of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e is c o n d i t i o n e d and r e s t r i c t e d by t h a t of his c o l l e a g u e s , w r e s t l i n g with d i f f e r e n t problems and serv in g o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Tussman said i t well when he observed t h a t The a r t of common d e l i b e r a t i o n is not an easy one. It c a l l s on a l l the powers of the mind. I t demands h o n e s ty , courage, o b j e c t i v i t y , and s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e in the presence of p a s s i o n a t e commitment. It is a co o p e r a t i v e not a c o m p e t i t i v e a c t i v i t y . 75 As a r e s u l t of such demanding a t t r i b u t e s as (are r e q u i re d of the l e g i s l a t o r , to view him as merely the s e r v a n t of the c i t i z e n s is to i n s u r e , in Tussman's p h r a se , "the d i s a s t e r born of i g n o r a n c e . " 76 Democracy cannot be saved, he co ncl udes , by weakening or c o r r u p t i n g the co nception of the p u b l i c agent to l e s s than t h a t combination of wisdom, 740uoted by Clapp, o p . c i t . , p. 426. 75Tussman, op. c i t . , p. 117. 76 I b i d . , p. 98. 157 c h a r a c t e r , and power to which Pla to gave the name " P h i l o s o p h e r - K i n g " . 77 Such a co nception e n u n c i a t e s a n o th e r role for the l e g i s l a t o r , t h a t which r e q u i r e s not only in fo rm atio n about his c o n s t i t u e n c y but in fo rm a tio n which c o n t r i b u t e s to e n l i g h t e n e d judgement as w ell. Willoughby concludes t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to his own informed c o n v i c t i o n s should take precedence over c o n f l i c t i n g ones to his d i s t r i c t , 78 Nowhere, he s t a t e s , has t h i s been s t a t e d "more e l o q u e n t l y " than in the comments d i r e c t e d by Edmund Burke, as a newly e l e c t e d M.P., to the v o te r s of B r i s t o l in 1 7 7 4 .79 Burke conceded t h a t f o r the l e g i s l a t o r the opinions of c o n s t i t u e n t s should have "high r e s p e c t ; t h e i r busin ess u nrem itted a t t e n t i o n . " But he contended t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s "mature judgement, his e n l i g h t e n e d c o n s c i e n c e ," he "ought not to s a c r i f i c e . . . to any man, or to any s e t of men." This l e g i s l a t i v e independence, the g r e a t Whig argued, is j u s t i f i e d because l e g i s l a t i o n is a m a t t e r "of reason . . . and what s o r t of reason is t h a t . . . where those who form the co nclusio n are perhaps t h re e hundred 7 71b i d . , p. 100. 78Willoughby, op. c i t . , pp. 37-38. 791bi d . , p. 39. 158 miles d i s t a n t from those who hear the argu men t?"80 It may be of more than h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t to the incumbent l e g i s l a t o r t h a t Burke was d e f e a t e d for r e - e l e c t i o n from B r i s t o l six years a f t e r he an'nounced t h a t he would not be bound by his c o n s t i t u e n t s ' w i s h e s . 81 Yet his views, i t would seem, are endorsed by a m a j o r i t y of American law-makers. A 1938 survey of Congressmen con ducted by Fortune magazine i n d i c a t e d t h a t 37 per cent b e l i e v e d they should vote in accordance with c o n s t i t u e n c y d e s i r e s while 54 per cent f e l t they should act on the b asis of t h e i r own j u d g e m e n t . 82 A study of four s t a t e l e g i s l a t u re s more than f i f t e e n years l a t e r re v e a le d the same pre- nonderance to an even more marked degree. Eighty-one per cent of Tennessee law makers, 61 per ce nt of those in New J e r s e y , 56 per cent in Ohio, and 55 per cent (low est of the four) in C a l i f o r n i a Derceived themselves in the r e D re s e n ta - t i o n a l role of " t r u s t e e , " following the BuVkian example of the indep en dent d e c i s io n maker. By c o n t r a s t , only 20 per cent of C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t o r s , p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more than in the o t h e r t h re e s t a t e s , endorsed the " d e le g a te " con ception of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e as one who act s as the 80These p a s s a g e s , and most of the a d d r e s s , are quoted in Henry C. Emery, P o l i t i c i a n , Party and People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1913), pp. 104-106. 81de G r a z i a , Public . . . , o p . c i t . , p. 37. 821bi d . , p. 158. i n s t r u c t e d agent of a m a j o r i t y of his c o n s t i t u e n t s . 83 The r e s e a r c h e r s who conducted t h i s study o f / s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s make i t unmistakably c l e a r t h a t they are pleased with i t s r e s u l t s . Not only do they a s s e r t t h a t "modern c o n d i t i o n s " make the t r u s t e e role "more r e a l i s t i c , " 811 but they also contend t h a t since e x p e r t "judgement of what is n e c e s sar y r a t h e r than p u b lic opinion . . . makes f o r e f f e c t i v e performance of govern mental f u n c t i o n s , " i t is " a l l the more ne c e s sa ry f o r e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s to be t r u s t e e s . " 85 Tussman, tak in g note of the "ambiguity" i n h e r e n t in the conception of the l e g i s l a t o r as one who th in k s " l i k e us" y e t who r e p r e s e n t s "our b e s t , our w i s e s t and f a i r e s t , " reaches the d e c i s io n t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "had b e t t e r be us a t our b e s t , not at our most t y p i c a l . " 86 John F. Kennedy, when S e n a t o r , s t a t e d the case for an e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a c tin g as the i n s t r u c t e d agent of his c o n s t i t u e n c y with s ym path etic u n d e r s t a n d i n g . But he r e j e c t e d i t . He denied t h a t "the people of Massac hu setts s e n t me to Washington to serve merely as a seismograph to 83Wahlke, e t a l . , op. c i t . , p. 281. Ibi d . , pp. 285-286 . 85Ibi d . , p. 304. 86Tussman, op. c i t . , pp. 61-62. 160 to reco rd s h i f t s in p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " 87 I n s t e a d , he f e l t l e g i s l a t o r s were chosen because the people had co nfidence in our judgement and our a b i l i t y to e x e r c i s e t h a t judgement from a p o s i t i o n where we could determine what were t h e i r own best i n t e r e s t s . This may mean t h a t we must on occasion l e a d , inform, c o r r e c t and sometimes even ignore c o n s t i t u e n t o p in i o n , i f we are to e x e r c i s e f u l l y t h a t judgement for which we were e l e c t e d . 88 Clapp observes t h a t probably "most congressmen regard themselves as e d u c a t o r s to some e x t e n t , as something more than agents of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y . " 89 Senator Kennedy, a p p a r e n t l y , was not alone. The l e g i s l a t o r as " p o l i t i c o " . --The au thors of the study of l e g i s l a t o r s of four s t a t e s c l a s s i f i e d the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l r o le s " law makers play i n t o t h re e c a t e g o r i e s . As noted above, most p erc e iv e d themselves as " t r u s t e e s " and some as " d e l e g a t e s , " but some o t h e r s viewed themselves as " p o l i t i c o s , " who atte m p t to combine and s y n t h e s i z e the o t h e r two role s or mediate between them. One-fourth of the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t o r s f e l l w ith in t h i s g r o u p . 90 Perhaps the p o l i t i c o embodies an a p p r o p r i a t e , i f t h e o r e t i c a l l y ten u o u s, compromise. Few l e g i s l a t o r s can act 87Kennedy, op. c i t . , p. 14. 88Loc. ci t . The phrase "in my judgement" was to become h a u n t i n l y fixed in the memory of those who r e c a l l P r e s i d e n t Kennedy's respon ses to press conf eren ce q u e s t i o n s . 89Clapp, op. c i t . , p. 111. 90Wahlke, e t a l . , o p . c i t . , p. 281 and pp. 285-286. 161 always as d e le g ate d agents of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s simply because i t is often impossible to know what the c o n s t i t u e n t s want done. Clapp quotes one congressman as sa y in g , almost in d e s p a i r , I th in k i t is alm o st, i f not c o m p le te ly , impo ssible - - a t l e a s t in c i t y d i s t r i c t s - - f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to know what a m a j o r i t y of the people th in k . I d o n ' t th i n k t h e r e is anyway of f in d i n g o u t . 91 It should no t be assumed, however, t h a t t h i s problem is one c o n f ro n t i n g only the members of the n a t i o n a l House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in an age of urban ag glom eratio n. Abraham Lin co ln , when a c a n d i d a t e for r e - e l e c t i o n to the I l l i n o i s s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e in 1836 promised, in the eq uivoc al s t y l e of the p o l i t i c o , t h a t While a c t i n g as t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e I s h a ll be governed by (my c o n s t i t u e n t s ' ) w i l l on all s u b j e c t s upon which I have the means of knowing what t h e i r will i s , and upon a l l o t h e r s I s h a ll do what my own ju d g e ment tea ches me will best advance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . 92 J u st as even the l e g i s l a t o r s b e s t informed about the wishes of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s may sometimes be forced to vote on the b a s is of t h e i r own judgement, because such wishes are o b s c u re , so too r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s may have d i f f i c u lty in j u s t i f y i n g a vo ting record based upon independent judgement alon e. 91Clapp, o p . c i t . , p. 180. 920uoted in de G r a z i a , Publi c . . . , op. c i t . , p. 127. Cf_. the Kennedy remarks documented in note 68', s u p r a , p . 160. 162 This is l a r g e l y because of th re e f a c t o r s . The l e g i s l a t o r , as a lr ea d y n o ted , wants to get r e - e l e c t e d , and t h i s sometimes r e q u i r e s him to indulge his c o n s t i t u e n c y on a t l e a s t a few m a tters in o rd e r to r e t a i n his o f f i c e for / the purpose of e x e r c i s i n g his own judgement on o t h e r q u e s t i o n s . Senator F u l b r i g h t sug gests t h a t in s t r i k i n g such a compromise, "the a b i l i t y to d i s c r i m i n a t e between t h a t which is of fundamental importance and t h a t which is only s u p e r f i c i a l , is an i n d i s p e n s a b l e q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a good l e g i s l a t o r . " He i l l u s t r a t e s by p o i n t i n g to his / s u p p o r t of the poll tax in o r d e r to humor a p r e j u d i c e of his c o n s t i t u e n t s which is "danqerous to t r i f l e w i t h ," while at the same tim e, " r e g a r d l e s s of how s t r o n g l y opposed my c o n s t i t u e n t s may prove to be," s u p p o rt i n g all e f f o r t s to s t r e n g t h e n the U.N. because he b e l i e v e s t h a t to be of paramount i m p o r t a n c e . 93 Secondly, the t r u s t e e theo ry seldom a s su re s independent l e g i s l a t i v e judgement because Burke's view t h a t "government and l e o i s l a t i o n are m a t t e rs of reason and judgement, and not of i n c l i n a t i o n . . , " 94 is probably not t r u e . John Adams, a t l e a s t , took s tr o n g ex cep tio n to i t . He seems to defend e q u a l l y - p o p u l a t e d d i s t r i c t s as well as the agency the ory of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n when he contends 93The E l i t e and the E l e c t o r a t e , op. c i t . , p. 6. " Q u o t e d in Emory, op. c i t . , p. 105. I 163 Reason, j u s t i c e and e q u i t y never had weight enough on the face of the e a r t h to govern the c o u n c i l s of men. I t is i n t e r e s t alone which does i t , and i n t e r e s t alone which can be t r u s t e d . . . Therefore the i n t e r e s t s within ( l e g i s l a t i v e ) doors should be the mathematical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s without d o o r s . 95 T h i r d l y , even i f the l e g i s l a t o r were f r e e d 1 from c o n s t i t u e n c y compulsion in voting on a b i l l , his in d e p e n dent judgement might well be impinged upon by the demands of small but i n f l u e n t i a l i n t e r e s t groups or the admonitions of p ar ty l e a d e r s h i p . These will be co n s id e re d below. To r e t u r n to the crux of the problem pre se n te d e a r l i e r , what are the a t t r i b u t e s of the informed l e g i s l a t o r? The agency or d e l e q a t e theo ry i n s i s t s t h a t he be f a m i l i a r with the a t t i t u d e s and i n t e r e s t s of his c o n s t i t u e n t s . The t r u s t e e theory demands t h a t he possess i n t e l l i g e n c e , judgement and e x p e r t i s e . The p o l i t i c o c o n c e p t i o n , combining the two, r e q u i r e s t h a t he ba lance the wishes of his d i s t r i c t a g a i n s t the i n c l i n a t i o n of his own r e a s o n - - a f e a t r e q u i r i n g d isc e rn m en t, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and t h a t e l u s i v e q u a l i t y known as a sense of p r o p o r t i o n . I d e a l l y , the "informed" l e g i s l a t o r must meet a ll th ese s t a n d a r d s . T r a n s l a t e d in terms of more t a n g i b l e s p e c i f i c s , t h i s kind of law maker is one who shares at l e a s t a few of the s a l i e n t and common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of most of his c o n s t i t u e n t s (presumably a s s u r i n g f a m i l i a r i t y 9 50uoted in de G ra z ia , Pub lic . . . , o p . c i t . , p . 83. 164 with t h e m ) , 96 p ossesses occ u p atio n al expe rie n c e which p r e pares him to deal i n t e 11i q e n t l y with the problems of at l e a s t a few areas of p u b l i c p o l i c y . 97 and has the " l e g i s l a t i v e expe rie n c e and formal e d u c a t i o n " 98 which, h o p e f u l l y , will produce the more i n t a n g i b l e q u a l i t i e s of judgement, e x p e r t i s e , and discernment held in such uniformly high re gard . Final a s s e s s m e n t .--To the e x t e n t t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s should act as agents of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the informed l e g i s l a t o r sta n d a rd a s s i s t s in a t t a i n i n g e q u a l i t y as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goal. But to the degree t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s should employ t h e i r e n l i g h t e n e d judgements as ind ependent t r u s t e e s , i t does not. There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t some d i s t r i c t s may possess more wise and i n t e l l i g e n t c i t i z e n s than o t h e r s . An app ortionm en t system which ig n o re s t h i s f a c t in the i n t e r e s t of e q u a l i t y will dep rive the l e g i s l a tu re of at l e a s t a c e r t a i n kind of informed membership. 96Ethnic and economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t here. In f r a , pp. 195-1 96 . The d i s t r i c t r e s i d e n c y r e q u i r e ments which most s t a t e s impose as a p r e r e q u i s i t e to e l e c tion to the l e g i s l a t u r e rep re s e n t a t a c i t admission t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s should be informed re g a rd in g c o n s t i t u e n c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . See C a l i f . C o n s t ., Art. IV, Sec. 4. 97State l e g i s l a t o r s feel this to be their own most imDortarit l e g i s l a t i v e asset. Wahlke, et a l ., oo. cit. , p.' 204. 98These " are the f a c t o r s most c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to a t t r i b u t i o n of e x p e r t i s e " by o t h e r l e g i s l a t o r s . I b i d . , p. 206. 165 As Larson has observed, i much more re se arc h is needed to determine the e x t e n t to which d i f f e r e n t apportionm ent p a t t e r n s r e f l e c t the popular a t t i t u d e s on the n a t u r e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and to what degree t h e s e a t t i t u d e s have a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . " If informed membership is i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of a kind of e x c e l l e n c e , of s u p e r i o r a b i l i t y to cope with p o lic y c o m p l e x i t i e s in a s o p h i s t i c a t e d and detached f a s h i o n , i then i t should promote the cause of i n d i v i d u a l freedom in two r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , i t will possess a more l i b e r a l and i n d u l g e n t a t t i t u d e toward the r i g h t s of p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n t e r s . 100 Second, since "informed" p e r s o n s , the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , are themselves a m i n o r i t y , they may be exp ected to defend at l e a s t t h e i r own freedom a g a i n s t the o n s la u g h t of an a u t h o r i t a r i a n m a j o r i t y . There seems l i t t l e reason to b e l i e v e t h a t the a t t a i n m e n t of a p o lic y making m a j o r i t y , the t h i r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o b j e c t i v e held to be d e s i r a b l e , wi ll be a o p r e c i a b l y aided or o b s t r u c t e d by an informed l e g i s l a t i v e membership. It may be promoted to some e x t e n t i n s o f a r as in fo rm a tio n e n t a i l s a p r a c t i c a l knowledge conducive to the compromise which holds m a j o r i t y c o a l i t i o n s t o g e t h e r . Compromise, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goal f o u r , would seem to be f a c i l i t a t e d by l e g i s l a t o r s informed about p u bli c " L a r s o n , o o . c i t . , p. 103. 100Education and occu p atio n al s t a t u s both seem to be a s s o c i a t e d with g r e a t e r t o l e r a n c e . L i p s e t , op. c i t . , pp. 92-107. 166 p o lic y c o m p l e x i t i e s , while c o m p e t i t i o n , goal f i v e , would n o t . Improvements in the e f f i c i e n c y of government machinery might well r e s u l t from informed l e g i s l a t i v e membership and competence is a v i r t u a l l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e i n g r e d i e n t in the amalgam of a t t r i b u t e s which comprise "the informed" member, r e g a r d l e s s of the frame of r e f e r e n c e in which the term is used. Informed membership, as an apportionment model, r e l a t e s to the s e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals in the follow ing f a sh io n : 1. Mandated: competence ( o b j e c t i v e 7). 2. Endorsed: freedom, compromise and e f f i c i e n c y ( o b j e c t i v e s 2, 4, and 6 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . i 3. N e u t r a l : e q u a l i t y , a policy-making m a j o r i t y and c om petition ( o b j e c t i v e s 1, 3, and 5, r e s p e c t i ve1y ). 4. Discouraged: none. The Experienced Membership Model Experience in l e g i s l a t i v e o f f i c e is but one of a g r e a t many th in g s which c o n t r i b u t e to the background of a t r u l y competent l e g i s l a t o r . The Wahlke study re v ea led t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s a t t r i b u t e e x p e r t i s e in t h e i r c o lle a g u es 167 to t h e i r expe rie n c e and e d u c a t i o n . 101 The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t r e a t i n g e xperience as a s e p a r a t e c r i t e r i o n f o r app ortionmen t l i e s in i t s s p e c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r d i s t r i c t i n g p r a c t i c e s . I f i t is d e s i r a b l e f o r a t l e a s t some l e g i s l a t o r s to accumulate several terms in o f f i c e to a t t a i n maximum e f f e c t i v e n e s s , then t h i s should be promoted by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r e l a t i v e l y "saf e" d i s t r i c t s , i . e . , those t h a t a r e , in C a l i f o r n i a , over 58 per cent Democratic or over 50 per cent Republican in p a r ty regi s t r a t i o n . 102 That e x p e r ie n c e is indeed valuable to a l e g i s l a t o r has seldom been denied. Hyneman, perhaps the n a t i o n ' s f i r s t a u t h o r i t y on l e g i s l a t i v e t u r n o v e r , wrote: 101 Supra , p. 164, note 98. 102 Steven E. Smith, S t a f f D i r e c t o r , Assembly Com- m i t t e e on E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment, i n d i c a t e d these f i g u r e s in a personal i n t e r v i e w on October 26, 1965. Al though they seem to be a u t h e n t i c a t e d by most e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , in the 27th Congressional D i s t r i c t the Democratic c a n d i d a t e for the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s l o s t even with a Democratic r e g i s t r a t i o n edge of 59.7 per cent in 1964. The same e l e c t i o n saw Republican c a n d i d a t e s f o r the l e g i s l a t u r e win in the 39 th, 57th, 62nd and 64th Assembly D i s t r i c t s with only 45.7 per c e n t , 46.9 per c e n t , 40 per c e n t , and 44.8 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y of the r e g i s t r a t i o n . Wahlke and his a s s o c i a t e s draw a c o n clusio n which tends to modify some what the a s s o c i a t i o n of e x p e rie n c e with "safe" d i s t r i c t s . "The more c o m p e titiv e the s t r u c t u r e of a p o l i t i c a l party system, they r e p o r t , "the more l i k e l y i t is t h a t . . . l e g i s l a t o r s have had some p r i o r . . . e x p e rie n c e on a local level and in a l e g i s l a t i v e or g u a s i - 1 e g i s 1a t i v e c a p a c i t y . Op. ci t . , p. 120. 168 Each program of p u b l i c p o licy must root i t s e l f in a mass of e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n ; and . . . lawmakers . . . will p r o f i t from a thorough a c q u aintance with the procedures and ways of the a g e n c i e s , p r i v a t e and governm ental, t h a t put so much of l e g i s l a t i v e p o licy int o e x e c u t i o n . Old -tim er s in the l e g i s l a t u r e are more l i k e l y than newcomers to possess t h i s needed fami 1i ari t y . 10 3 B l a i r , defending cumulative voting in I l l i n o i s , says t h a t i t i n c r e a s e s s e n i o r i t y which is e s s e n t i a l , among o t h e r t h i n g s , to help the l e g i s l a t o r "develop the f a c i l i t y f o r compromise and b a r g a i n . " 104 Beek puts the case for l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e rie n ce in terms of such values as "a knowledge of procedure and D r a c t i c e , " f r i e n d s h i p s , and time needed to "become such an a u t h o r i t y on some c l a s s e s of l e a i s l a t i o n t h a t . . . removal would c o n s t i t u t e a genuine loss . . . to the s t a t e in q e n e r a l . " 105 Young emphasizes y e t a noth er advantage: Discovery of the i n t e r e s t s , p r e j u d i c e s , m otives, alignments and d e p e n d a b i l i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e c o lle a g u e s are among the b e n e f i t s der ived from l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . 106 103Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of L e g i s l a t i v e P e r s o n n e l , " The Annals, Vol. CXCV (.Jan., 1 938), p . '22. 104George S. B l a i r , "The Case f o r Cumulative Voting in I l l i n o i s , " Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Law Review, Vol. XLVII ( Ju l y - A u g u s t , 1952), p. 353“ 105Joseph A. Beek, The C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e (Sacramento: C a l i f . S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1947), p. 161. 106Young, o p . ci t . , p. 24. 169 F i n a l l y , Assemblyman Allen advances an a d d i t i o n a l argument f o r ex p erien ced l e g i s l a t o r s . "A r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e l e g i s l a t u r e , f e a t u r i n g a high degree of c o n t i n u i t y in membership," he w r i t e s , is b e t t e r , a b l e to check "the power . . . of both p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t groups . . . and the i n c r e a s i n g l y ponderous e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . " 107 To summarize, tenure as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e may hope f u l l y produce: (1) knowledge of p a s t l e g i s l a t i o n ; (2) a f a c i l i t y f o r compromise; (3) pr oc ed ural m astery ; (4) s p e c i a l i z e d e x p e r t i s e ; (5) a c c u r a t e assessment of c o l l e ag u e s ; (6) e f f e c t i v e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n f l u e n c e a g a i n s t o t h e r p o w e r - c e n t e r s ; and (7) va luable f r i e n d s h i p s . This l i s t omits the importance of s e n i o r i t y in a t t a i n i n g com m i t t e e chairmanships becaus e, u n like the s i t u a t i o n in Congress, t h i s plays a minor role in most s t a t e 1 egi s i a - t u r e s . 10 8 The r a t e of t u r n o v e r .--The values der ived from l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e rie n c e seem im p ressiv e both in number and s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t is im p o rtan t to n o t e , the r e f o r e , t h a t a "complex and p e r s i s t e n t problem of the American s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e is the e x c e s s i v e r a t e of t u r n o v e r . " 109 I t 107A l l e n , op. c i t . , p. 193. 108The ru le s of the C a l i f o r n i a Senate do s t a t e , however, t h a t " s e n i o r i t y , p r e f e r e n c e and e x p e r ie n c e " are to be c o n s id e re d in making committee a s sig n m e n ts. Keefe and Og ul, op. ci t . , p. 164. 109B l a i r , 1o c . c i t . 170 would seem t h a t the problem is becoming somewhat less a c u t e , however, at l e a s t in C a l i f o r n i a . As Allen o b s e rv e s , "the p r o p o rt i o n of new members (in the Assembly) has d e c lin e d from 66.25 per cent in 1903-1911 to 20 per cent in 1953-1961; in the Senate from 38 per cent to 15.5 per c e n t . " 110 These s t a t i s t i c a l a v e r a g e s , however, can be m isleading in terms of the e f f e c t s of rea(ppo rti onmen t fo r t h i s f a c t o r , in i t s e l f , seems to assure g r e a t e r than usual change in l e g i s l a t i v e membership. Defining "usual" as the average number of new assemblymen f o r the f o u r general s e s s i o n s pr eceding r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t , t h e r e were 14 more than usual in the f i r s t s e s s i o n fo llo w in g the 1931 r e a p p o r t i o n ment, four more fo llo w in g t h a t of 1941; one l e ss follow in g the one of 1951; and 23 more f o llo w in g the most r e c e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d reap p o rtio n m e n t in 1961. The average number of new Assemblymen in the f i r s t s e s s i o n s follow in g the l a s t six rea p p o rtio n m e n ts was f iv e more (over 6 per cent g r e a t e r ) than those e n t e r i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s e r v i c e , on an a v erag e, fo llo w in g a l l o t h e r e l e c t i o n y e a r s , from 1904 to 1960 i n c l u s i v e . 111 Reapportionment causes l e g i s l a t i v e tu rn o v e r in a number of ways. F i r s t , the m a j o r i t y party uses i t to 110A lle n , op. c i t . , pp. 1 93-1 94. ^ C o m p u t a t i o n s d erived from data in Table IV-A, A llen , i b i d . , p . 195. 171 i n c r e a s e i t s m a j o r i t y by changing bound aries to f a c i l i t a t e the chance of d e f e a t i n g incumbent m i n o r i t y p a r ty members in general e l e c t i o n s . Second, t h i s p r o s p e c t leads to m i n o rity incumbents, e s p e c i a l l y i f p i t t e d a g a i n s t one a n o th e r in a newly formed d i s t r i c t , r e f u s i n g to seek r e e l e c t i o n . 112 T h ird , re a pportionm ent may r e s u l t in the a l t e r a t i o n of c o n g r e ss io n a l d i s t r i c t boun daries to enhance the chance f o r m a j o ri t y p a r ty s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s to be e l e c t e d to the n a t i o n a l House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 113 I t is not s u r p r i s i n n , in view of such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h a t de Grazia should have a s s e r t e d t h a t the average l e g i s l a t o r spends between f i v e and ten per cent of his time on "m atters of e l e c t i o n s and a p p o r tio n m e n t," in a d d i t i o n to actu a l campaign commitments. Believing much of t h i s time to be m issp e n t, he su g g e sts t h a t : Limiting r e a p p o rtio n m e n t to once each 20 years would probably encourage more s t a b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s between l e g i s l a t o r s and c o n s t i t u e n t s . 114 112Thus Bruce Reagan, Republican, sensing d e f e a t in a bid for r e e l e c t i o n to the Assembly in a d i s t r i c t whose, boundaries had been changed by a Democratic gerrymander, decided to seek the o f f i c e of S t a t e C o n t r o l l e r in 1962. Simi1a r l y , 'Joseph Shell l e f t his post as Assembly m i n o ri t y l e a d e r to seek, the same y e a r , the Re publican nomination for Governor. N e ith e r was s u c c e s s f u l . 113In 1963 a l o n e , four Democratic Assemblymen from Los Angeles County, George Brown, Ronald Cameron, Charles Wilson, and Augustus Hawkins, won e l e c t i o n to Congress in newly formed d i s t r i c t s . 114de G r a z i a , Apportionment . . . , op. c i t . , p. 133. 172 Population m o b i l i t y , however, e s p e c i a l l y in an age of ra pid u r b a n i z a t i o n , probably would render t h i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y im p erm issib le d e p artu re from the equal popu latio n re q u ire m e n t. J u s t as i t is im po ss ibl e to lengthen the period between re apportionm ent i t is p o l i t i c a l l y u n r e a l i s t i c to expect the p o l i t i c a l p a r ty which c o n t r o l l s a re apportionm ent to be s o l i c i t o u s of the s e n i o r i t y of l e g i s l a t o r s s i t t i n o "across the a i s l e . " But i t would be i l l - a d v i s e d to conclude t h a t re a pportionm ent has a uniformly adverse e f f e c t upon the development of l e o i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . The m a j o r i t y p a r t y , i f i t w ishes, can gerrymander d i s t r i c t s in such a way as to enhance the s e c u r i t y of i t s own incumbents. I f i t does so, w ithout attem p tin g to win a d d i t i o n a l s e a t s , i t will also decrease the p o l i t i c a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y of m i n o ri t y party incumbents in a d j a c e n t d i s t r i c t s . Smith s t a t e d t h a t t h i s kind of c o n s i d e r a t i o n was compelling in the 1965 r e a p p o r tionment measure passed by the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y as i t r e l a t e d to the 66th Assembly D i s t r i c t . 115 The m a j o r i t y pa rty is co nfro nte d with a r e d i s t r i c - tinq choice: i t may c o n te n t i t s e l f with se c u rin g an e x i s t i n g ad vanta ge, and thereby promote lo nger ten ure in o f f i c e by i n c r e a s i n g the " s a f e t y " margin of e x i s t i n g 115Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . ci t . In the 1964 e l e c t i o n , Democratic incumbent Joe Gonsalves, with 57.5 per cent of the voters r e g i s t e r e d as Democrats, had re ceived only 52.6 per cent of the vote. 173 incumbents; or i t may atte m p t to gain new s e a t s by c r e a t i n g doubtful d i s t r i c t s in all of which i t possesses only a s l i q h t ad vantage , and thereb y i n c r e a s e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a hig h er r a t e of l e g i s l a t i v e t u r n o v e r . As Andrew Hacker has ob served , Doubtful d i s t r i c t s . . . have a high t u r n o v e r in incumbents, and such r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are not l i k e l y to have the time or the r e so u r c es with which to b u i l d up l e g i s l a t i v e f a v o r. The r e s i d e n t s of such d i s t r i c t s , t h e r e f o r e , are l i k e l y to s u f f e r from u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . 11 6 Althouah reap p o rtio n m en t may indeed a f f e c t the accumulation of l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , i t should not be assumed t h a t i t is the on ly , or even the most im portant f a c t o r , a f f e c t i n g the r a t e of t u r n o v e r . Commenting on the g r e a t e r membership s t a b i l i t y in the C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate than in the Assembly, Allen observes t h a t t h i s is c l e a r l y r e l a t e d to "the g r e a t e r length of i t s t e r m s , " 117 and sugge sts t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s also d e c l i n e to seek r e e l e c t i o n due to inadequate "reimbursement . . . and . . . l e g i s l a t i v e s e r v i c e s . " 118 Keefe and Oaul a s s e r t t h a t sta g g e re d terms of o f f i c e help reduce the p ercentage of l e g i s l a t o r s 116Andrew Hacker, Congressional D i s t r i c t i n g (Wash i n g t o n , D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 156 3), pp. 7,5-76. 117All en, op. c i t . , p. 194. 1 1 8 1bi d . , d . 196. Allen notes t h a t of the 892 persons who have served in the Senate only 86 were d e f e a te d when seeking r e e l e c t i o n . Of 3,055 Assemblymen in the s t a t e ' s n i s t o r y , "only 131 met d e f e a t at the p o l l s . " I b id . , d . 195. / 1 74 w ith o u t previous e x p e r i e n c e . 119 The problem of d i 1i g e n c e . --A1though "saf e" d i s t r i c t s may c o n t r i b u t e to the development of l e g i s l a t i v e t e n u r e , with a l l i t s a t t e n d e n t ad v a n ta g e s, i t may have l e ss s a l u t a r y e f f e c t s as w ell. I t is c o n c e i v a b l e , for example, t h a t an incumbent ensconced in a d i s t r i c t which his p a r t y f ir m l y dominates will become lazy in the performance of his r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . S e c u r i t y may breed l e t h a r g y and i n d i f f e r e n c e as well as e x p e r i e n c e and e x p e r t i s e . Two Assemblymen ranked among the t h re e "worst" in a poll of Sacramento newsmen were among those with g r e a t e s t l e g i s l a t i v e s e n i o r i t y . 120 I t is at l e a s t p l a u s i b l e , i f not dem o n strab le , t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s from "marginal" d i s t r i c t s , those most v u l n e r a b l e to d e f e a t , will work h a r d e s t to s e r v i c e t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s e f f e c t i v e l y . There is l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s is indeed a major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l - - much as i t may be dep lo re d . A member of the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s remarked, speaking fo r his c o l l e a g u e s , t h a t We spend f a r too much time on the e r ra n d boy a c t i v i t i e s . . . . But the real q u es tio n is how we can help doing t h a t . I thin k t h a t . . . we c a n n o t . 121 119Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t . , pp. 46-47. 120Ed Salzman, "Newsmen Rate Lawmakers," Oakland T r i b u n e , June 11, 1965. D i l l s is among the, t h r e e with l o n g e s t l e g i s l a t i v e s e r v i c e and Chapel among the top t h i r teen in an 80 member body. A llen , op. c i t . , Table IV-D, p. 198. Both r e p r e s e n t "safe" d i s t r i c t s as d efin e d above. Supra , p . 16 7. 1210uoted by Clapp, op. c i t . , p. 118. 175 Addressing h i m s e l f to the same phenomenon, Tussman observed t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r "who once thundered as the omnipotent f a t h e r now comes d i s g u i s e d as Mr. Smith the er ran d boy. A h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c s might well be w r i t t e n on t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . " 122 The ta s k s performed f o r c o n s t i t u e n t s - - g e t t i n g them j o b s , f a c i l i t a t i n g d r a f t d e f e rm e n ts , procuring tre a t m e n t at v e t e r a n s ' h o s p i t a l s , or a l t e r i n g by a few blocks the route of a proposed f r e e w a y - - a l l the se are d o u b t l e s s l y im p o rta n t and f r e q u e n t l y of j u s t i f i a b l e l e g i t i m a c y , even though they may d e t r a c t from the time a v a i l a b l e for a s s e s s i n g the m e r it s of proposed l e g i s l a t i o n . To the degree t h a t the s e c u r i t y of p u b l i c o f f i c e d e t r a c t s from the prompt and s o l i c i t o u s performance of such s e r v i c e f u n c t i o n s , the l e g i s l a t o r serves democracy, and his pe o p le , p oorly . Cahn put i t s u c c i n c t l y : Whatever the d u t i e s in (the p u b l i c o f f i c i a l ' s ) as sign ed f u n c t i o n , we do not c o n s id e r him a J u s t O f f i c i a l unl ess he is a l e r t and vigorous in performing them. 12 3 Yet whether one views the l e g i s l a t o r ' s job as t h a t of e r ra n d boy or p o l i c y maker, d i l i g e n c e is an i n d i s p e n s i - ble a t t r i b u t e of i t s e f f e c t i v e performance. If safe d i s t r i c t s d e t r a c t from the a l e r t and a t t e n t i v e disch a rg e 122Tussman, o p . ci t . , p. 58. 123Edmund Cahn, The Predicament of Democratic Man (N.Y.: A Delta Book, 1962) pp. 178-179. 176 of o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , years of e x p e rie n ce can ha rdly compensate f o r the l o s s . Final a s s e s s m e n t .--We are again co nfro nted with r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals which may be m utually e x c l u s i v e . Safe d i s t r i c t s are conducive to expe rie n c e but probably d iscourage d i l i g e n c e . Marginal d i s t r i c t s have the r e v e rs e e f f e c t . If one gives e x p e r ie n c e a s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r weight than d i l i g e n c e in the h i e r a r c h y of l e g i s l a t i v e v a l u e s , the follow in g asse ssm ents seem d e f e n s i b l e . 1. Mandated: competence. 2. Endorsed: compromise and freedom. 3. N e u t r a l : e q u a l i t y and a policy-making m a j o r i t y . 4. Discouraged: c om petition and e f f i c i e n c y . The Accommodation of I n t e r e s t s Model In a het er ogen eo us s o c i e t y i t is probable t h a t c i t i z e n s w i l l d i s a g r e e s h a r p l y and t h a t groups of c i t i z e n s wi ll possess i n t e r e s t s which are s h a r p l y d i v e r g e n t , i f not a n t i t h e t i c a l . The r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of opin io ns and l i f e - r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e r e f o r e , appears to be a major o b l i g a t i o n of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system a s p i r i n g to e o u i t y and committed to the peace ful accommodation of c o n f l i c t i n g aims. This o b l i g a t i o n can be b e s t d i sch a rg e d by a l e g i s l a t i v e body committed to the p r e c e p t s of compromise, f o r as F r i e d r i c h 177 s u g g e s t s , the " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e must be a master in the a r t of compromise."124 Legi s i a t i ve compromi s e . --There are some, to be s u r e , who view the ex e c u tiv e as one who "is or ought to be p e c u l i a r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the people as a w h o l e . " 125 But c o n t r a r y views seem predominent. Riemer a s s e r t s : In c o n t r a s t to the Executive . . . ( t ) h e Legi s i a - t o r ' s g r e a t e r power in formal p o l i c y making, as t h i s inv olves the accommodation of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , is j u s t i f i e d in view of i t s s e n s i t i v i t y to p ublic o p in i o n , i n t e r e s t groups and p a r t y s t r a t e g y . 126 Two p r o l i f i c w r i t e r s , both v e te ra n s of Congres sional and s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e s e r v i c e , have s t a t e d the primacy of compromise in e s p e c i a l l y lu c i d and commendatory terms. Richard L. Neuberger wrote t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e is as f u l l of compromise as the P a c i f i c Ocean is of w ater. Yet I wonder how e l s e laws could be en acted at al l . . . We must be able to give and t a k e . 127 The o t h e r , T. V. Smith, is perhaps t h i s c e n t u r y ' s most el o q u en t and f r e q u e n t l y quoted spokesman f o r t h i s poin t of view. His conception of compromise, which de Grazia admiringly e n d o r s e s , is t h a t which p r e s e r v e s "the 124F r i e d r i c h , op. ci t . , p. 415. See, a l s o , his comments on pp. 256-258. 125Theodore R oosevelt, quoted in de G ra z ia , Appor t i o n m e n t . . . . , op. ci t . , p. 21. 1 2 6 G p . c i t . , p. 112. T. V. Smith agreed. " L e g i s l a t u r e s are the r e a d i e s t examples of the process of compromise." Quoted in de G raz ia, Apporti onment . . . , op. c i t . , p . 170. 127Neuberger, op. c i t . , p. 102. 178 peace by c o n s t r u c t i n g a j u s t i c e a g a i n s t the j o i n t r e c a l c i t r a n c e of e q u a l l y good c i t i z e n s . " 128 Beek, lo n g time s e c r e t a r y of the C a l i f o r n i a Sen at e, p r e f e r s to c i t e yet anoth er passage. Smith wrote t h a t I f (the l e g i s l a t o r ) f r e q u e n t l y is driven to dubious w o r d s - - q l i t t e r i n q g e n e r a l i t i e s , weasel words, . . . ambivalent words, even lying w o r d s - - i t is to be r e g r e t t e d but p e r m i t t e d . . . His compromises c o n s t i t u t e the democratic process in i t s l i v i n g r e a l i t y . Seen from the sh in in g c l i f f s of p e r f e c t i o n (the vantage of ignorance and the source of u n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g c r i t i ci sm ), i t is a thing poor enough indeed; but seen in the p e r s p e c t i v e of i t s only l i v i n g a l t e r n a t i v e - - d i c t a t o r s h i p - - l e g i s l a t i v e maneuvering becomes b l e s s e d , b l e s s i n g those who give and those who g e t - - b l e s s i n g indeed all a l i k e with the p e r p e t u i t y of a proc ess t h a t p e a c e f u l l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e s the very p r i n c i p l e of vi olence i t s e l f . 129 Concurrent m a j o r i t y .--Assuming t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e should compromise c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , i t must be d e t e r mined how the a t t a i n m e n t of t h i s o b j e c t i v e may be f a c i l i t a t e d through appo rtionmen t p r o c e s s e s . One answer l i e s in the p r i n c i p l e of c o n c u r re n t m a j o r i t y . This concept was propounded in 1851 by John C. Calhoun, U.S. Sen ator from South Car olina and e r s t w h i l e Vice P r e s i d e n t . I t has survive d the i n s t i t u t i o n of s 1 avery--which i t was designed to p r e s e r v e - - i n a s i n g u l a r l y im pre ssive f a s h i o n . 130 1280uoted in de G ra z ia , 1o c . c i t . 1290uoted in Beek, op. c i t . , p. 163. The r e c i t a t i o n of all s u b s t a n t i a t i n g testimony is p r o h i b i t i v e l y long. I t would e n t a i l c i t a t i o n of remarks by Thomas J e f f e r s o n , Edmund Burke and G. B. Shaw, among o t h e r s . See, a l s o , su p ra, pp. 48-5.Q. 130Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t . , pp. 477-478. 179 The es sence of Calhoun's d o c t r i n e v/as a d i s t i n c t i o n between a numerical m a j o r i t y of the e n t i r e p o p u latio n and a m a j o r i t y of each and a l l of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t " i n t e r e s t s , o r d e r s , c l a s s e s , or p o r t i o n s i n t o which the community may be d i v i d e d . " 131 A government based on the former lacks the r e s t r a i n t n ec e s sa r y to exempt i t from c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as a b s o l u t e . The l a t t e r , based upon c o n c u r re n t m a j o r i t y , is the only kind w a r r a n t i n g d e s i g n a t i o n as " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " Although t h e r e is nothing in the American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system which e x p l i c i t l y embodies the c o n c u r re n t m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e , F i s c h e r may be r i g h t in a s s e r t i n g t h a t i t is c e n t r a l to our p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . I t m a n i fe s t s i t s e l f , he a s s e r t s , in the i n f l u e n c e of l o b b i e s , the d i v e r s i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e committees and e x e c u tiv e d e p a r t ments, can d id a te r e c r u i t m e n t , and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . All these can be i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of a r e c o g n i t i o n of the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n t r i n s i c to the body politic. 132 The id eal of i n t e r e s t accommodation may indeed be f u r t h e r e d by l e g i s l a t o r s fav o ra b ly disposed toward compromise and committed to an informal acknowledgement of 131John C. Calhoun, A D i s q u i s i t i o n on Government, e x c e r p te d in Carl Cohen, e d . , Communism, Fascism, and' Democracy ( i\’. Y . : Random House"! 1 962 ), p . 51 8". 132John F i s c h e r , "Unwritten Rules of American P o l i t i c s , " r e p r i n t e d in Bishon and Hendel , o p . c i t . , d p. 386-395. 180 the c o n c u r re n t m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e . But i t can be a d d i t i o n a l l y f a c i l i t a t e d by a knowledge of what kinds of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s produce r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s po s se s sin g these a t t i t u d e s . Marginal d i s t r i c t s . - -One way of c l a s s i f y i n g d i s t r i c t s is based upon t h e i r degree of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . Those in which r iv a l ca n d id a te s are evenly matched, with the e l e c t i o n outcome in c o n s i d e r a b l e doubt, may be c a l l e d c o m p e titiv e or marginal ones. Evidence seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g such c o n s t i t u e n c i e s are more s u s c e p t i b l e to p r e s s u r e s for compromise than t h e i r c o l leagues from "safe" d i s t r i c t s . Froman has disc o v e re d on the b a s is of his study of the U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h a t Congressmen "from more c o m p etitiv e d i s t r i c t s ( f o r both Democrats and Republicans) were shown to be l e s s extreme in t h e i r voting than r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from safe d i s t r i c t s . " 133 A study of the lower house of the Massachusetts l e g i s l a t u r e produced a s i m i l a r c o n c lu s io n : "the moderating i n f l u e n c e . . . (among) a wide v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s . . . is most pronounced in those c o n s t i t u e n c i e s where p o l i t i c a l c o m p etitio n p r e v a i l s . " 134 133Lewis A. Froman, J r . , Congressmen and Their C o n s t i t u e n c i e s (Chicaqo: Rand McNal1y & C o . . 1963), pp. 117-Tra:---------- 134Duncan MacRae, J r . , "The Rel at ion Between Roll Call Votes and C o n s t i t u e n c i e s in the Massac hu setts House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , " APSR, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (December, 1 952), 181 Such em pirical evidence serves to v i n d i c a t e Madison's p r e f e r e n c e f o r large d i s t r i c t s in which there are "so g r e a t a number of i n t e r e s t s . . . t h a t . . . a m a jo rity w ill not be l i k e l y at the same moment to have a common i n t e r e s t s e p a r a t e from t h a t of the w h o l e . " 135 Large d i s t r i c t s may be presumed to be more com p e titiv e than small ones simply because they wi ll probably embrace more d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s . Froman, for example, found t h a t " c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s tend to be more heterogeneous than safe d i s t r i c t s . " 136 To produce l e g i s l a t o r s attuned to the need of compromising d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s , then , i t might be assumed t h a t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s should be m ar g in a l, heterogeneous and 1a r g e . That such l e g i s l a t o r s are to be found in r e l a t i v e abundance is i n d i c a t e d by Wahlke and his a s s o c i a t e s , who w r i te t h a t a c e n t r a l fu n c t io n of the American s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e is the accommodation of i n t e r e s t group demands in the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e ss . . . . Our data . . . poin t to r e l a t i v e l y wide acc ep ta nce of t h a t f u n c tio n as an p. 1 055. C a l i f o r n i a f in d i n g s are i ri l i m i t e d accord with t h i s view. Inf r a , p . 387. 135Quoted in de G razia, Publ i c and Republ i c , o p . c i t . , p . 98. 136Froman, op . c i t . , p. 123. In C a l i f o r n i a , how e v e r , t h e r e is reason to b e l i e v e th,at safe d i s t r i c t s are more heterogeneous than highly c o m p e t i t i v e , marginal ones. I n f r a , pp. 428-429. 182 e m p iric a l f a c t . . . and emphasize the e x t e n t to which l e g i s l a t o r s . . . seek accommodation of group i n t e r e s t s not by d i r e c t embodiment of group demands . . . but by at tem pts to c o n c i l i a t e and harmonize them into an a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e c is io n meeting l e g i s l a t o r s ' c r i t e r i a of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 137 I t is of some i n t e r e s t t h a t th ese i n v e s t i g a t o r s found t h a t sympathy toward p r e s s u r e groups was most p r e v a l e n t among l e g i s l a t o r s with the most ed ucation and l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . 138 If we assume t h a t f r i e n d l i n e s s toward pressure groups is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to a p r o c l i v i t y toward compro mise, t h i s c o n f ro n ts us with evidence which c a s t s doubt on the hyp o th esis t h a t marginal d i s t r i c t s are most conducive to compromise. For the accumulation of l e g i s l a t i v e experien c e r e q u i r e s the rep eated r e e l e c t i o n of an incum bent. This is d i f f i c u l t to assure unless the d i s t r i c t is more safe than m a r g in a l. Yet Adrian and Press also a s s o c i a t e e xperience with a s p i r i t of mod er ation . Service in a l e g i s l a t i v e body, they t e l l us, grows on a man and g r a d u a l l y changes some of his o p in i o n s . . . (H)e must a s s o c i a t e and c o n t i n u a l l y l i s t e n to people he p a r t i a l l y or wholly d i s a g r e e s wi th. . . The e x p e rie n c e g e n e r a l l y leads to a s l i g h t 137Wahlke, e t a l . , o p . c i t . , p. 342. The au thor s r e p o r t in the same work t h a t 38 per cent of C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t o r s " F a c i l i t a t e " p r e s s u re group a c t i v i t y and only 20 per cent " r e s i s t " i t . Twenty-seven per c e n t , moreover, have a "purposive ro le o r i e n t a t i o n " of " b r o k e r , " c o n s t r u ing t h e i r major f u n c t io n as i n t e g r a t i n g the demands of various i n t e r e s t groups. I b i d . , p. 259. 1381bi d . , pp. 131-141. 183 s h i f t to the c e n t e r , whether the l e g i s l a t o r ' s p o s i t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y on the r i g h t or l e f t . 139 A paradox seems to have developed. Although re se a rc h data i n d i c a t e s s t r o n g l y t h a t marginal d i s t r i c t s produce l e g i s l a t o r s i n c l i n e d to accommodate c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , informed opinion holds t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e ex p e r i e n c e , bes t a ssu red by safe d i s t r i c t s , has the same e f f e c t . Both views may have some m e r i t . The t r u t h may be t h a t th e r e are s tro n g and c o n s t a n t f a c t o r s in the American p o l i t i c a l system which c o n t r i b u t e toward a s p i r i t of compromise. In marginal d i s t r i c t s , i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t they ope rate most s t r o n g l y before an e l e c t i o n , f o r c i n g the winning c a n d i d a t e to forge a m a j o r i t y through the accom modation of d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s w ith in his c o n s t i t u e n c y . Candidates coming from safe d i s t r i c t s may find the n e c e s s i t y to make compromises most compelling a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , in t h e i r a ttem pts to gain passage of favored meas u r e s . A r e s o l u t i o n of th e se two p o s i t i o n s seems to favor the marginal d i s t r i c t . I f we assume compromise to be d e s i r a b l e , i t should be encouraged both w ith in a s i n g l e c o n s t i t u e n c y ( b e s t accomplished in a highly c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t ) as well as in the l e g i s l a t i v e body i t s e l f (a , process o c c u r ri n g r e g a r d l e s s of the kinds of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s from which i t s members come). 1 390p . c i t . , pp. 411 and 415. 184 Final a s s e s s m e n t . --A plan of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n designed to secure the accommodation of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s seems most reaso nably s u s c e p t i b l e to the f o l l o w ing e v a l u a t i o n In terms of various r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s : 1. Mandated: compromise. 2. Endorsed: a policy-making m a j o r i t y . 3. N eu tra l: competence, e q u a l i t y , e f f i c i e n c y . 4. Discouraged: freedom and c o m p e t i t i o n . The R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s Model I f d i v e r se i n t e r e s t s should be accommodated in the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s , i t is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t each s i g n i f i cant one should be r e p r e s e n t e d and e f f e c t i v e l y e s p o u s e d . 140 Unless they a r e , th e r e is nothing to accommodate. A d u a l i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e fu n c tio n is i m p l i c i t her e: varying i n t e r e s t s must be compromised but they must a lso be l e g i s l a t i v e l y e n u n c i a t e d . Such a o o i n t of view e n t a i l s a d i s t i n c t i o n between " i n t e r e s t s , " on the one hand, and both geo graphic ar eas and i d e o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s on the o t h e r . In America, l e g i s l a t o r s are e l e c t e d from a r e a s , and u s u a l l y are i d e n t i f i e d 140"At minimum the idea of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n implies t h a t the government, and e s p e c i a l l y the l e g i s l a t u r e , will be so c o n s t r u c t e d t h a t no s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t in the s o c i e t y will be ex clu d ed , in the sense of f a i l i n g at l e a s t to get a h e a r i n g . " Emmette S. Redford, e t a l . , P o l i t i c s and Government in the United S ta te s ( N. Y. : H a r c o u r t , Brace "& World, In c . , 1 965 ), p . 375 . 185 by a pa rty label which ofte n denotes c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l I a t t i t u d e s . Yet the re is no formal r e c o g n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t s in the l e g a l l y p r e s c r i b e d government s t r u c t u r e . Lipson i c o n te n d s, fo r example, t h a t the "o ccupati ons through which we earn our l i v e l i h o o d c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d i n t e r e s t , " and po in ts out t h a t fi. D. H. Cole and o t h e r g u ild s o c i a l i s t s in England shared t h i s b e l i e f . 141 Such an occu p atio n al i n t e r e s t has l i t t l e to do with geographic r e s i d e n c e , as a j o i n t committee of the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e acknowledged in 1950. Community of i n t e r e s t with r e s p e c t to the v a s t m a j o r i t y of l e g i s l a t i v e iss u e s is determined by occu p a t i o n , s o c ia l s t a t u s , r e c r e a t i o n a l h a b i t s , and so on, and not by where one l i v e s . A sportsman, a union , mechanic, a p r o f e s s i o n a l man, or a t e a c h e r , each l i v i n g in San F r a n c i s c o , . . . has more of a common i n t e r e s t with his r e s p e c t i v e c o l l e a g u e s l i v i n g in Eureka or San Diego t h a t with his next door neighb or l i v i n g in San F r a n c i s c o . 142 / Since one may fin d sportsmen or mechanics or t e a c h e r s who are S o c i a l i s t s , Democrats, and Rep u b lic a n s, i t is c l e a r t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s may be as l i t t l e r e l a t e d to t h e i r i d e o l o a i c a l p r o p e n s i t i e s as to t h e i r place of res i d e n c e . 141 Lips on, op. c i t . , p. 441. 142"Report of the J o i n t In te rim Committee I n v e s t i g a tin g Lobbying A c t i v i t i e s , " Assemblyman Thomas M. Erwin, Chairman, Assembly Daily J o u r n a l , March 20, 1950. Ex c e r p t e d in David F a r r e l l y and Ivan H in d e r a k e r, e d s . , The P o l i t i c s of C a l i f o r n i a (N.Y.: The Ronald P r e s s , 1951), p. 162. 186 While these i n t e r e s t s are r e l a t i v e l y u n r e l a t e d to both geo graphic area and g e n e r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s , and hence lack leg al r e c o g n i t i o n , they do fin d u n o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the p o l i t i c a l system in two ways. F i r s t , they are o rg an ized f r e q u e n t l y in groups which in Truman's p h r a s e , are p o l i t i c i z e d . 143 They e x e r t o r e s s u re through l o b b y i s t s in r a t h e r hig hly s t r u c t u r e d attempts to i n f l u e n c e government p o l i c y and, in the p r o c ess , "perform a fu n c t io n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " which serves to "supplement the system of geog rap hi ca l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " 144 In a d d i t i o n to the lobbying tech n iq u es employed by o r e ss u re groups, a second way in which va rious i n t e r e s t s gain access to the i n s t i t u t i o n s of government is through the e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s from c o n s t i t u e n c i e s in which these var ious i n t e r e s t s c o n s t i t u t e dominant c e n t e r s of oower. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of such c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f o r ap por tionment purposes is a pparent. 143David B. Truman is perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l of modern group t h e o r i s t s . See The Governmental Process (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). Key e s t i m a t e s t h a t "500 o r g a n i z a t i o n s have a c o n tin u in g i n t e r e s t in . . . l e g i s l a t i o n . " V. 0. Key, J r . , P o l i t i c s , P a r t i e s and P ressu re 3rou ps, f i f t h ed. (N.Y.: Yhomas Y. C rowel 1 Co. , 1564)', p. 129. 14 41b i d . , p. 143. E. Pendleton Herring agrees with Key, con tendi ng t h a t lobbying is " p a r t of the American system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " Ouoted in de G r az ia, Pub!i c and Repub 1i c , o p . c i t . , p. 213. 187 I n t e r e s t - d o m i n a t e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .-- Alt hough most American l e g i s l a t o r s are e l e c t e d from single-member geo gr ap hic d i s t r i c t s , p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e abounds with at l e a s t t a c i t r e c o g n i t i o n s of t h e i r f re q u e n t obeisance to some s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . The l e g i s l a t o r , says one l o b b y i s t , may belong to a s o - c a l l e d "bloc" composed of members of l i k e occupati ons or i n t e r e s t s , such as a ru ra l or farm b l o c , an American Legion or o t h e r u l t r a p a t r i o t i c i n f l u e n c e , a r e l i g i o u s or r a c i a l group, a la b o r or employer or s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t group, any of which will cut across party l i n e s . 145 Perhaps the most d i r e c t a s s e r t i o n of the lin k between c o n s t i t u e n c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i n t e r e s t - i r e p r e s e n t a t i o n comes from Willoughby. An i n t e r e s t , he argued, may c o n s t i t u t e a m a j o r i t y in p a r t i c u l a r e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s , o r , at l e a s t , have s u f f i c i e n t power to . . . secu re the e l e c t i o n of members f a v o ra b le to i t . . . (Although) e l e c t e d nominally as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s (they) may deem i t to t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t to hold themselves out as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . 146 It is assumed, h e r e , t h a t 'Willoughby is r i g h t . At l e a s t some l e g i s l a t o r s p e rc eiv e c o n s t i t u e n c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as r e q u i r i n g advocacy r a t h e r than compromise, s i n g l e 145Gertrude L. S cher merho rn, "Lobbies and P re ss u re Groups: A L o b b y i s t 's Point of View," Annals of the Ameri can Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Science ( J a n u a r y . 1 938), r e p r i n t e d in C a p i t o l , Courthouse an~d City H a l l , Robert L. Morlan, edT ( B o s t o n : Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1 954) , p. 121 . 146W. F. Willoughby, P r i n c i p l e s of L e g i s l a t i v e O rga n iz a tio n and A d m i n i st r a t i o n (Washington, D. C.: The Brooki ngs I n s t i t u t i on , 1 934) , p. 51. / group r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t h e r than m u l t i - g r o u p accommodation. This assumption r a i s e s two q u e s t i o n s : (1) is t h i s d e s i r a b l e ; and (2) what kind of c o n s t i t u e n c y is most l i k e l y to e l e c t t h i s kind of l e g i s l a t o r ? The case f o r l e g i s l a t i v e compromise has been s t a t e d above with r e f e r e n c e to i t s p o s i t i v e a d v a n t a g e s . 147 The a t t a c k upon l e g i s l a t i v e i n t r a n s i g e n c e in espousing some s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t is s i m i l a r and p e r s i s t e n t . E. E. S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r contends t h a t no p u b l i c p o lic y could eve r be the mere sum of the demands of the organiz ed s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . . . f o r t h e r e are v i t a l common i n t e r e s t s t h a t cannot be o r g a n i z e d . 148 Riemer, t o o , urged a p r o c l i v i t y to compromise when acknow ledging "the pre se nce of im p e rf e c t men s t r u g g l i n g f o r power in an im p e rf e c t s o c i e t y . " He went on to a s s e r t t h a t "competing, c o n te n d in g , c l a s h in g c o n f l i c t i n g claims . . . must of te n be h a r m o n i z e d . " 149 In such s ta t e m e n t s t h e r e are echoes of Rousseau's c l a s s i c a l i n s i s t e n c e upon the d i f fere nce between "a p a r t i c u l a r w i l l " or the even "the will of a l l " and the "general w i l l . " 150 1 47S u p r a , pp. 1 76-1 77. 148Par tv Government (N.Y.: H o lt, Rinehart & Winston, 1 942 ), pp. 30-3 I . 149Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory (N.Y.: Appleton, C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1962), p. 182. 150Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social C o n t r a c t , Book I I , Chs. i - i i i . 189 But th ese arguments do not lack a ttem pted r e f u t a t i o n . Tussman, e s p e c i a l l y , is d i s d a i n f u l of such "mis c o ncepti ons" as the b e l i e f " t h a t compromise is a reaso nable and democratic way of d e a l i n g with c o n t r o v e r s y . " 151 Almost as though he were answering Riemer's plea for indulgence I toward " i m p e rf e c t men," he a s s e r t s t h a t although we are all c o g n i t i v e and moral s e c u r i t y r i s k s . . . i t does not follow from the r e c o g n i t i o n of our f a l l i b i l i t y and p a r t i a l i t y t h a t our s a l v a t i o n l i e s in the compromise or the b a r g a i n . . . (D)oes s c ie n c e move by compromise? Is g r e a t a r t the product of compromise? Has compromise given Socrate s or Jesus to the w orld-- Crito and the Compromise on the Mount?152 The r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s seem i r r e l e v a n t . Govern ment is not s c ie n c e or a r t , and i f compromise has done l i t t l e f o r the l a t t e r , i t has given the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the United S t a t e s to the former. Science and a r t c r e a t e v a l u e s ; government p r e s i d e s over t h e i r a l l o c a t i o n . The f i r s t endeavors a re p r o d u c t i v e ; the l a t t e r is d i s t r i b u t i v e and s u p e r v i s o r y . So, to o , Tussman's analogy in volving philosophy or r e l i g i o n or 1i t e r a t u r e - - t h e r e f e r e n c e does not make c l e a r wh ic h --a p p e a rs to miss the p o i n t . To be s u r e , creeds are seldom produced by compromise. I n s t e a d , t h e i r m u l t i p l i c i t y ofte n r e q u i r e s t h a t they b_e compromised, and many go v ern ments have f u l f i l l e d t h a t requir em ent through i n s i s t e n c e 151Tussman, op. c i t . , pp. 110-114. 1 5 21 b i d . , p. 115. Tussman's prose is e l o q u e n t . See a l s o , p p ~ . Tl 6 - 11 7. 190 on r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n . I t might even be argued t h a t the Sermon on the Mount is a plea for compromise, fo r redemptive love is a kind of compromise with e v i l , a l b e i t for l a r g e r o b j e c t i v e s . The case f o r staunch l e g i s l a t i v e advocacy of a s p e c i a l group i n t e r e s t is not b o l s t e r e d by a de ni al of the e f f i c a c y of compromise. I t would 'seem to r e s t b e s t , as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , on the premise t h a t t h e r e is nothing to compromise unless e l o q u e n t spokesmen f i r s t have a r t i c u l a t e d di ver gen t i n t e r e s ts and viewpoi n t s . Assuming t h a t i t is d e s i r a b l e t h a t at l e a s t some l e g i s l a t o r s acts as spokesmen f o r c o n s t i t u e n c y i n t e r e s t s , i t is n e c e s sar y to determine what kind of d i s t r i c t s are most i n c l i n e d to e l e c t them. This poses a complex problem with regard to which em p irica l evidence is c o n t r a d i c t o r y . As a r e s u l t of his study of r o ll c a l l votes in the Mass achuse tts l e g i s l a t u r e , Mac Rae concluded t h a t Those r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s whose previous e l e c t i o n margins were clo se tend to r e f l e c t c o n s t i t u e n c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . more c l o s e l y than do those with wider m a r g i n s . 153 A study of t h r e e o t h e r s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s reaches the same e s s e n t i a l c o n clusio n on the b a s is of personal in t e r v i e w s with law makers. I t found t h a t 1 5 30 p . c i t . , p. 1 ,055. See, however, Mac Rae's comments quoted on p. 192, s u p r a . 191 53 per cent of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from c o m petitive d i s t r i c t s (in C a l i f o r n i a , New J e r s e y and Ohio) are d i s t r i c t o r i e n t e d . . . while only 33 per cent of those from o n e - p a rt y d i s t r i c t s are so c l a s s i f i e d . 154 Clapp found, in his c o n v e r s a t i o n s with Congressmen, some co n f irm a tio n of t h i s a ssessm en t. A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who comes from a d i s t r i c t in which the dominant p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n is p a r t i c u l a r l y s tr o n g may enjoy s p e c i a l advantages ov er more hard- p ressed c o lle a g u e s whose d i s t r i c t s are marginal p o l i t i c a l l y , in t h a t he may have g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y in voting what he c o n s id e r s to be "the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t " as opposed to the more paro ch ial local i n t e r e s t s , provided of course the o r g a n i z a t i o n permits the f l e x i b i l i t y . 155 The foreg oi ng data i n d i c a t e s t h a t m a r g i n a l , i n t e n s e l y com p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s are the ones from which l e g i s l a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g primary c o n s t i t u e n c y i n t e r e s t s are most l i k e l y to be e l e c t e d . Yet impressive evidence from o t h e r sources c a s t s grave doubts on t h i s as sessm ent. As noted e a r l i e r , Froman found Congressmen from marginal d i s t r i c t s to be less extreme than o t h e r s , i . e . , less c o n s i s t e n t l y l i b e r a l or c o n s e r v a t i v e in t h e i r voting r e c o r d s , and t h i s i n d i c a t e s they could be l e ss c o n s i s t e n t l y r e l i a b l e in espousing a group i n t e r e s t . Moreover, evidence e x i s t s t h a t c o m p e t i t i v e d i s t r i c t s produce a g r e a t e r p r o c l i v i t y toward compromise than safe ones, and t h i s 154Wahlke, e t a l . , o p . ci t . , p. 293. 155Clapp, o p . ci t . , p. 164. He quotes one Congressman as saying the " s t r o n g e r the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n in your d i s t r i c t the more in d ependent and s t a t e s m a n l i k e you can be." Loc. c i t . 192 could r e s u l t in the s a c r i f i c e of d i s t r i c t i n t e r e s t s on c e r t a i n i s s u e s . 156 M i l l e r has r e p o r t e d f in d i n g s v/hich seem to prove t h a t "congressmen from safe d i s t r i c t s are more l i k e l y to r e p r e s e n t d i s t r i c t opinion than congressmen from c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s . " 157 When c onfronted with such d i a m e t r i c l y o p p o s ite e v i d e n c e , s e v e ra l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e . F i r s t , one might a t t r i b u t e d i f f e r e n c e s to d i s s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in the l e g i s l a t i v e bodies s t u d i e d . Competitive d i s t r i c t s may produce d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s in the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , for example, than in s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . Second, methodo logical te ch n iq u e s employed by various i n v e s t i g a t o r s may be assumed to d i f f e r both in type and v a l i d i t y . T h i r d , one may be j u s t i f i e d when c o n fro n te d with i n c o n c l u s i v e d a t a , in acc e p tin g the evidence which conforms most c l o s e l y to d e d u c t i v e l y re a so n a b le i n f e r e n c e s . Following the l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y , i t seems most te n a b l e t h a t safe d i s t r i c t s are the kind most l i k e l y to be dominated by a s i n g l e i n t e r e s t group and hence most d isposed to e l e c t a l e g i s l a t o r who w ill act as i t s ad vocate. 156S u p r a , p. 180. 157Cited by Froman, op. c i t . , p. 117. Froman h i m s e l f adopts t h i s view. P o inting out t h a t s afe d i s t r i c t s are homogenous ones, he concludes t h a t " t h i s . . . homo g e n e i t y is l i k e l y to r e s u l t in a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p r e f e r e n c e s of the c o n s t i t u e n t s and vo ting by the Congressman." I b i d . , pp. 123-124. 193 Safe d i s t r i c t s . --A1though the revers e is not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , most e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e s t h a t a safe d i s t r i c t i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , a homogeneous one. A l e g i s l a t o r e l e c t e d from such a c o n s t i t u e n c y might be ex pected to be c onfronted with fewer p r e s s u re s from incom p a t i b l e i n t e r e s t s and to be able to speak with g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y , c l a r i t y and conf ide nce in b e h a l f of those who e l e c t e d him. This, at any r a t e , is the p e r su a s i v e view of Gus Hawkins, former C a l i f o r n i a Assemblyman and the f i r s t - - in 1966 the only--Hegro Congressman e l e c t e d from west of the M i s s i s s i p p i River. His testimony before the Assembly Interim Committee on E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment in 1960 deserves to be quoted at some l e n q t h . To place "groups with common economic problems and s o c ia l i n t e r e s t s " in the same d i s t r i c t with groups p o s se s sin g q u i t e d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , he s a i d , is to c r e a t e i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s which impose on the ( l e g i s l a t o r ) . . . the im possible job of r e p r e s e n t i n g the wi ll of his c o n s t i t u e n t s . The reason ing employed in mixing d i v e r s e elements in the same d i s t r i c t is t h a t . . . such balance is the c o r n e r s t o n e of the g i v e - a n d - t a k e process of democratic government. Such rea soning . . . is f a l l a c i o u s in t h a t i t assumes t h a t all viewpoints co ntained in such a d i s t r i c t w ill gain adequate e x p re ss io n from a s i n g l e spokesman. A c t u a l l y , such a s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e s r i v a l r i e s . . . t h a t the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l is supposed to r e c o n c i l e . An Assem blyman or Congressman r e p r e s e n t i n g such a hodgepodge becomes l i t t l e more than a r e f e r e e . Reapportionment based on t h i s reason ing r e s u l t s in the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo w ithout . . . any a d a p t a t i o n to new i d e a s . 158 15 8T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , Dec. 15-16, 1960, p. 172. 194 Congressman Hawkins, in asking for homogenous d i s t r i c t s of common i n t e r e s t s , is in r e a l i t y r e q u e s t i n g d i s t r i c t s "safe" in the sense t h a t they are guar an teed to e l e c t a l e g i s l a t o r of the same e t h n i c stock as the m a j o r i t y of c o n s t i t u e n t s . What is i m p l i c i t in Hawkins' remarks may be found e x p l i c i t l y in the testimony of Wendell Green, e d i t o r of the Los Angeles S e n t i n e l , C a l i f o r n i a ' s l a r g e s t Negro newspaper. Green said he is "ob viou sly i n t e r e s t e d in e l e c t i n g Negroes to o f f i c e , " 159 and p o i n t e d l y observed with regard to housing d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h a t "the f a c t t h a t the Negro community is a homogenous and ge ographic al f a c t is not of our m a k i n g . " 160 Mexican-Americans seem l a r g e l y of the same frame of mind. Edward R. Roybal, former Los Angeles City C ouncil man, noted in 1960 t h a t "no one of Spanish d escent has r e p r e s e n t e d . . . C a l i f o r n i a in . . . C o n q r e s s , " 161 in s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t "the Span ish -sp eak in g people . . . c o n s t i t u t e about 10 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n . " 162 15 9 I b i d . , p. 216. 1 6 01bi d . , p. 217. 16 11bi d . , p. 237. 162Ibi d . , p. 239 . Such m i n o ri t y u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t a tion in l e q i s l a t i v e bodies is not the unique a f f l i c t i o n of Mexican-Americans, of co urse. Keefe and Oaul have po inted out t h a t C a th o lic s c o n s t i t u t e 36 per cent of the p o pula t i o n , but have only 19 per cent of Congressional member s h ip . The d i s p r o p o r t i o n is 5 per cent to 2 per cent for Jews. If Negroes were r e p r e s e n t e d p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e i r 195 Roybal, a c tin g on his a s s e r t i o n t h a t "the time must now come when members of m i n o r i t y groups should d e f i n i t e l y be r e p r e s e n t e d in the various l e g i s l a t i v e bodies of our g o v e r n m e n t ," 153 ran s u c c e s s f u l l y for Congress in 1962. His remarks are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to anyone i n t e r e s t e d in e t h n i c group l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n because he t e s t i f i e d before the Assembly committee as "Chairman of the i'iex i can-Ame ri can P o l i t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , " 164 i d e n t i f i e d five years l a t e r by Assemblyman Alfred H. Song, a Korean-American r e p r e s e n t i n g large numbers of Mexican- Americans, as "the most unreasonably n a t i o n a l i s t i c and r a c i a l i s t i c group t h a t I have ever encountered in a ll of my p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . " 165 As these q u o t a t i o n s i n d i c a t e , the f! e n r o and Mexican-American communities have attempted to gain d i s t r i c t s from which members of these m i n o r i t i e s can be e l e c t e d to l e g i s l a t i v e b o d ie s. This claim to r e p r e s e n t a tio n by e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s ;is ba sed, as Hawkins s a i d , on a numbers in the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , t h e r e would be 43 Nenro Cong ressmen. I n s t e a d , the re we re five in 1965. Op. ci t . , pp. 1 22-1 23. 1 6 30p. ci t . , p. 238. Henry P. Lopez, Democratic can d id a te f o r S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e in 1958, put i t more s u c c i n c t l y . "I think i t ' s time we had demographic as well as democ ratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " I b i d . , p. 244. 1 641bi d . , p. 237. 165Sacramento , C a l i f o r n i a , Assembly Committee on E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionm ent, Hearings on Senate Reappor- t i o n m e n t , May 17, 1965, p. 63. 196 "common i n t e r e s t . . . based on such is s u e s as c i v i l r i g h t s , housing and o t h e r p r o b l e m s . " 166 I t i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , the same kind of plea f o r appo rtionm en t based on "community of i n t e r e s t s " as t h a t d is c u s s e d e a r l i e r , 167 and made with g r e a t frequency in b e h a l f of m a in t a i n i n g the u n ity of c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s . The c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e is t h a t a community i n t e r e s t based upon e t h n i c background is more l i k e l y to c o n s t i t u t e a s a fe d i s t r i c t than one based on c i t i e s or c o u n t i e s . The t w e n t y - f i r s t Congressional D i s t r i c t , f o r example, from which Congressman Hawkins was e l e c t e d in 1962, is one in which Negroes c o n s t i t u t e 62.9 per cent of the p o p u la tio n and which Hawkins c a r r i e d by 73,465 votes to only 13,371 c a s t f o r his o p p o n e n t . 168 Its margin of s a f e t y is exceeded by none in the s t a t e . This probably is r e l a t e d to the f a c t t h a t i t is the f i f t h s m a l l e s t of the s t a t e ' s t h i r t y - e i g h t Congressional D i s t r i c t s in p o p u l a t i o n , 169 and thus has a n a t u r a l tendency 166T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , 1960 , o p . ci t . , p. 173. 16 7S u p r a , pp. 98-105. 168U.S. Bureau of the Census, Congressional D is t r i c t Data Book ( D i s t r i c t s of the 88th Congress)--A S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t Supplement (U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1963), p. 55. Eighty-two per cent of the vo ters are r e g i s t e r e d Democrats. C a l i f o r n i a Report of R e g i s t r a t i o n , compiled by Frank M. Jordon ( n . p . : C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1963), p. 8. 169A llen , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, od . c i t . , Table 11-M , p. 168. 197 to g r e a t e r homogeneity than l a r g e r d i s t r i c t s encompassing more d i v e r s e popu latio n groups. Froman s t a t e s t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p c a t e g o r i c a l l y : "lack of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s is a sign of g r e a t e r homogeneity w ith in the d i s t r i c t . " This, he b e l i e v e s "is r e f l e c t e d in more l i b e r a l or c o n s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n s taken on is s u e s (depending upon the d i r e c t i o n of homogeneity) by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s through t h e i r r o l l call v o t i n g . " Aside from t h i s , he c o n c lu d e s , "the e f f e c t of c o m p e t i t i v e n e ss of d i s t r i c t s appears to be q u i t e l i m i t e d . " 170 The ba sic assumption upon which the forego ing d i s cu ssion r e s t s is t h a t the e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s is f a c i l i t a t e d by s a fe d i s t r i c t s which are dominated by a r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous group sh a rin g common problems and l e g i s l a t i v e co n cern s. This has two i m p l i c a t i o n s which w a rran t some d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t , i t bears w i t n e s s to a t a c i t endorsement of the agency or d e l e g a t e th eo ry of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I f the l e g i s l a t o r is to give voice to p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s 170Froman, op. c i t . , p. 121. Willoughby s t a t e s t h a t democracy co n str u ed as re sp o n s i v e n e s s to po pular demand, "may be expected to give the b e s t r e s u l t s in p r o p o r t i o n to the degree of . . . homogeneity of i n t e r e s t s of the p o p u la tio n a f f e c t e d and i n v e r s e l y in p r o p o r t i o n to the . . . s i z e of the p o p u l a t i o n . " Op. ci t . , p. 45. S t a t i s t i c s regard ing the a p p a r e n t impact of c o n s t i t u e n c y s a f e t y and homogeneity in the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e may be found in Chapter VI, i n f r a . They do not conform, g e n e r a l l y , to Froman's as sumpt io ns. 198 in the community, he must vote as they would want him to vote; he cannot compromise too much, or indulge too f r e q u e n tly his own autonomous j u d g e m e n t . 171 The b e s t way, moreover, of g u a r a n te e in g t h a t an e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l is to act in t h i s f a s h i o n , is to make sure t h a t he shares the needs and d e s i r e s , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the p o i n t of view, of his c o n s t i t u e n t s . This is the b asis on which many Negroes and Mexican-Americans plead unabashedly for the e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s who are Negroes and Mexican- A m e r i c a n s.172 Tussman, i n s i s t i n g t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s be "our best" would s u r e l y be d i s t u r b e d by s afe and homogenous d i s t r i c t s which c o n t r i b u t e to the e l e c t i o n of "our most typi c a l . " 17 3 Keefe and Ogul have s p e c u l a t e d t h a t safe d i s t r i c t s may m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t the e l e c t i o n of "our bes t" because each p a r ty in o n e - p a r t y j u r i s d i c t i o n s has l ess p r e s s u r e on i t to pick c a n d i d a t e s with s u b s t a n t i a l formal e d u c a t i o n - - t h e dominant p a r t y because i t s v i c t o r y is a s s u r e d , the (o th e r) because i t s cause is h o p e l e s s . 174 171See the d i s c u s s i o n of the " l e g i s l a t o r as a g e n t , " s u p r a , pp. 150-156. 172de Grazia c a l l s t h i s "a p r i m i t i v e form" of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n but notes t h a t i t p e r s i s t s in America through the "unacknowledged q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of name, n a t i o n a l i t y , o c c u p a t i o n , and ed u catio n for many o f f i c e s . " Public and R e p u b l i c , o p . ci t . , p . 5. 1 73Supra , p . 159. 17u0 p . ci t ., pp. 117-118. See, however, i n fra , p. 400. In C a l i f o r n i a , l e g i s l a t o r s from safe d i s t r i c t s have had more ed u ca tio n than those from marginal d i s t r i c t s . 199 Moreover the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s i n s u r e d by a m u l t i p l i c i t y of safe d i s t r i c t s in cu rs the r i s k i n h e r e n t in l e g i s l a t o r s who know the needs of the d i s t r i c t s , but, because of t h e i r v i r t u a l i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y at the p o l l s , are lazy in t h e i r devotion to them. This problem, d i sc u s s e d above in r e l a t i o n to the d i l i g e n c e of e x p e rie n ce l e g i s l a t o r s , 175 deserves r e i t e r a t i o n . In a d i s c u s s i o n of Congressional voting during the 1960 s e s s i o n , Clapp c a l l s a t t e n t i o n to a case in p o i n t . The l e g i s l a t o r with the p o o r e s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n rec ord . . . had been p r e s e n t f o r only 17 per cent of the r o l l c a l l s , a f i g u r e f a r below t h a t of any of his c o l l e a g u e s . Ele cte d from a "saf e" d i s t r i c t , . . . he is a c hronic a b s e n t e e , but . . . he has been r e t u r n e d many t i m e s . 176 F i n a l l y , s afe d i s t r i c t s may e l i c i t n e g lig e n c e from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , not "oirTy in defending group i n t e r e s t s on b r o a d p o l i c y m a t t e r s , but a l s o in performing the i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e s ex pected of our l e g i s l a t o r s . Two o b s e rv e r s of Congressmen have concluded t h a t The as su rance t h a t his Congressman is a p o in t of c o n t a c t with the maze of government a c t i v i t y is of c o n s i d e r a b l e importance to the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n and to the h e a l t h of our . . . f r e e government. The c i t i z e n ' s b e l i e f t h a t an appeal to his Congressman will e l i c i t a t l e a s t a s y m p a th e tic answer and perhaps brin g . . . a c t i o n helps to p r e v e n t his . . . a l i e n a t i o n from a seemingly d i s t a n t . . . government. The v o t e r is helped to m ain ta in his f e e l i n g s of s e l f - r e s p e c t and d i g n i t y . . . E rrand-r unning may be a more 175S u p r a , pp. 1 73-1 76. 176Clapp, o p . ci t ., p. 163. 200 noble form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n than has h e r e t o f o r e been recogni z e d . 177 For b e t t e r or—worse, the g u arantee of the en u n cia- i t i o n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s may be at a co st of both l e g i s l a t i v e independence and d i l i g e n c e . Functional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . --The s t r u c t u r e of e a r l y l e g i s l a t i v e bodies r e f l e c t s the powerful p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of oc c u p a tio n a l i n t e r e s t groups. The t h re e e s t a t e s in the French " t r i c a m e r a ! " p a r l ia m e n t were designed to r e p r e s e n t the c l e r g y , the landed a r i s t o c r a c y , and the r i s i n g commercial i n t e r s t s . In England, the Houses of Lords and Commons comprised a p a r l i a m e n t a r y m i r r o r of broadly d i v e r gent economic c l a s s e s . Madison, in the most famous of the F ederali s t P a p e r s , reco gni zed the primacy of group i n t e r e s t in de fending the new c o n s t i t u t i o n as a device which would "break and c o n tro l the v i o l e n c e of f a c t i o n . " He defined f a c t i o n as a group " u n i t e d . . . by some common impulse of passion or i n t e r e s t " and b e l i e v e d t h a t "the most common 177Norman C. Thomas and Karl A. Lamb, C o n g re s s , P o l i t i c s and P r a c t i c e (N.Y.: Random House, 1 964) , p . 46. Rep. Clarence D. Long (D., Md.) has ex p ressed his a g r e e ment. He w r i t e s t h a t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "can do a l o t fo r the o r d in a r y f e llo w . . . S e p a ra te the s e r v i c e from the o f f i c e and I s u s p e c t i t w o n 't get done." The New York Tim es , Western E d i t i o n , Dec. 6 , 1963, p. 9. Keefe and Ogul a s s e r t t h a t the s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r , l i k e the Congressman, spends much of his time "running e rra nds f o r c o n s t i t u e n t s . " They b e l i e v e t h a t "no f u n c t i o n exa ct s a g r e a t e r t o l l on his en e rg y ." Op. ci t ., p. 20. 201 and d urable source of f a c t i o n s has been the . . . unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y . " 178 In t h i s r e s p e c t he seems to have a n t i c i p a t e d Marx in emphasis upon the importance of economic groups and, in many ways, exceeded him in the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of his a n a l y s i s of them. Both l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y in o t h e r n a tio n s and t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s in America seem to s a n c t io n the p e r c eption of the p o l i t i c a l process in e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t group t e r m s . I t is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a system of d i r e c t l e g i s l a t i v e membership f o r the spokesmen of d i v e r g e n t economic and s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s might a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n even of those not di sposed to favor such a plan . This system, known as f u n c t io n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , was not only propounded by c e r t a i n English s o c i a l i s t s in the 1 9 2 0 's , but was implemented in varying forms and degrees in l e g i s l a t i v e bodies in I r e l a n d , Portugal and I t a l y during t h i s c e n t u r y . 179 Because i t was so prominently a s s o c i a t e d with a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes in the l a t t e r two n atio n s i t has l o s t fa v o r in r e c e n t times. E a r l i e r , however, a number of eminent American p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s , in c l u d i n g Mary P. F o l l e t t and Arthur N. Holcombe, had embraced the i d e a . 180 178"No. X," The F e d e r a l i s t (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, L t d . , 1911), pp. 42-43. 179For a b r i e f summary, see Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), pp. 243-246. 180de G r a z ia , Pub!i c . . . , o p . ci t . , p. 214. 202 Functional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has never been employed in any s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . The reasons are manifold but may be b r i e f l y summarized. There would be i n s u p e r a b l e a p p o r tionment problems in determ in in g how many l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s should be a l l o t t e d to f a r m e r s , doct or s and innumerable o t h e r groups. I t would be d i f f i c u l t to i n s u r e democratic e l e c t i o n procedures in the s e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s from p r i v a t e groups. The stigma of fascism is f a t a l . Problems of m u l t i p l e and o v e r lap p in g group membership ( e . g . , the v e teran-1aw yer or the C a th o lic - p lu m b e r) would be i n d i genous. All th e se are m e c h an ic a l, p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i o n s . The t h e o r e t i c a l ones are perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t . The Z e l l e r committee of the American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n f e e l s the major one is t h a t "a c i t i z e n ' s i n t e r e s t in p o l i t i c s is not co nf ined . . . to . . . his occu pation or b u sin ess c o n c e r n s . " 181 F i n a l l y , i t might be argued t h a t t h e r e is l i t t l e need to c o n s i d e r a system of formal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s when they are so well advanced by such informal mechanisms as the l o b b y . 182 181Z e l l e r , op. c i t . , pp. 39-40. 1 8 2 T h i s is the view of Fordham, op. c i t . , p. 39, and de G ra z ia , Apporti onment . . . , op. ci t . , p. 28. Dayton D. McKean a g r e e s. I n t e r e s t groups, he s ay s, " s u p e r impose upon geo graph ic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a rough kind of f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; the p a r t i e s , r e s t i n g upon a r e a s , are i n s u f f i c i e n t l y r e f i n e d in stru m e n ts to r e p r e s e n t the m u l t i t u d e of i n t e r e s t s in s o c i e t y . " The F o r t y - E i g h t S t a t e s (N.Y.: The American Assembly, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1955), r e p r i n t e d in Russel W. Maddox, J r . , e d . , Issues in S t a t e I 203 That which is most s a l i e n t for p r e s e n t purposes is not the f e a s i b i l i t y of f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , nor i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y , but i t s u l l u s t r a t i v e value as an i n d i c a t i o n of i n t e r e s t group im portance . As de Grazia has a s s e r t e d , " a s s o c i a t i o n s , uni ons, c o r p o r a t i o n s , c h u rch e s, . . . and f a c t i o n s are the most im porta nt f a c t o r s in the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s ." I f t h i s is t r u e , th ese f a c t o r s must have vigorous proponen ts. That is a p r e r e q u i s i t e for a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system which should "be viewed as accommodating them through i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . " 183 Final a s s e s s m e n t . - -The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s model, judged by the goal c r i t e r i a employed in t h i s s tu d y , is most f u n c t i o n a l in promoting c o m p e t i t i o n . I n s o f a r as p o l i t i c s in volves the a u t h o r i t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of v a l u e s , i t is c l e a r t h a t a s o c i e t y as heterogen eous as t h a t in t h i s country e n t a i l s a p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e among many competing i n t e r e s t s , each b e s t r e p r e s e n t e d by a f r i e n d in the l e g i s l a t u r e and each determined to maximize the values i t p r o c u r e s . Freedom for i t s own members is one of the values which each competing i n t e r e s t group s t r u g g l e s to in su r e f o r i t s e l f and i t is a s s i s t e d in t h i s endeavor by a dependable champion in the arena of l e g i s l a t i v e combat. and Local Government ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : D. Van Nostrand Company, I n c . , 1 965) , p. 145. 1 8 30 p . ci t ., p. 35. 204 The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s s ta n d a r d seems to be one p e r m i t t i n g few u n c e r t a i n or equivocal e f f e c t s ; i t encourages co m pet ition and freedom, seems n e u t r a l in i t s impact on none of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l g o a l s , and d i s courages the o t h e r s . This summary seems most a c c u r a t e . 1. Mandated: c o m p e t i t i o n . 2. Endorsed: freedom. 3 . N e u t r a l : no n e . 4. Discouraged: e f f i c i e n c y , policy-mak ing m a j o r i t y , e q u a l i t y , competence, and compromise. The Local R e p r e s e n t a t i o n Model Whatever l e g i s l a t i v e t h e o r i s t s may w r i t e about the n a t u r e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' o b l i g a t i o n s , American legal require m ents d i c t a t e t h a t they be e l e c t e d , in most s t a t e s , from geographic u n i t s which are u s u a l l y based on c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s . Indeed, second "only to p o p u l a t i o n , the p o l i t i cal s u b d i v i s i o n s of the s t a t e are the most common f a c t o r used in a p p o r t i o n m e n t . " 184 This is defended f r e q u e n t l y on the grounds t h a t local governments c o n s t i t u t e meaningful communities of i n t e r e s t . The concept des erves more a n a l y t i c a l t r e a t m e n t . 184Advisory Commission on Inte rg o v ern m e n tal R e l a t i o n s , o p . ci t ., p. 27. 205 Communities of i n t e r e s t . --One of the c r i t i c i s m s of the one-man, on e- vote ru le has been based upon i t s probable tendency to c r e a t e d i s t r i c t s with no u n i f y i n g i n t e r e s t s . This a l l e g e d lack of i d e n t i t y , the a s s e r t e d sense of d i s t r i c t anonymity, was d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , 185 and a t t r i b u t e d mainly to the f a c t t h a t e q u a l l y po pulat ed d i s t r i c t s would cut across c i t y and county b o u n d a r ie s. Any d e t a i l e d examination of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals must deal more c a r e f u l l y with the claims of such local government u n i t s to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in l a r g e r l e g i s l a t i v e bo d ie s. In apportionment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , such claims have been advanced with remarkable t e n a c i t y by an im pre ssive number of spokesmen. Lt. Governor Glenn Anderson, a p p e a r ing before the C a l i f o r n i a Assembly committee c o n s id e r i n g r e a pportionm ent in 1960, voiced his b e l i e f t h a t wherever p o s s i b l e . . . you should t ry to keep at l e a s t the s m a l l e r c i t i e s w ith in the same assembly d i s t r i c t . . . City Councilmen thro ughout the s t a t e , -- t h e y ' r e o f te n concerned with keeping t h e i r communities t o g e t h e r as a c i t y , ( s i c ) as much as p o s s i b l e . 186 S p e c i f i c recommendations be fore r e a p p o rtio n m e n t bodies in both 1960 and 1965 r e f l e c t t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n of c i t y i n t e g r i t y with the more general "community of i n t e r e s t " c o n c e p t . 187 185S u p r a , pp. 96-103. 186T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , op. c i t ., p. 89. 187See, e . g . , Floyd 0. Gwinn of Pasadena urging t h a t "City bound aries should be l e f t i n t a c t . " Hearings on 206 S t a t e Senator Stephen T e ale, as noted e a r l i e r , views c o u n t i e s , i n s t e a d of c i t i e s , as the paramount u n i t s around which d i s t r i c t boundaries should be d r a w n . 188 The c o u n t i e s , indeed, serve the same r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l purposes in the upper houses of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s organized on the " f e d e r a l " system as s t a t e s do in the United S t a t e s Senate. Impressive evidence has accumulated over many years to j u s t i f y the claims f o r county r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Snider a ffirm s t h a t the county "is the most n e a r l y u n i v e r s a l of a l l u n i t s of local g o v e r n m e n t ." 189 The C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senate committee stu dying r e a p p o rtio n m e n t found, in 1965, t h a t Although c o u n t i e s do not bear the same sovereign r e l a t i o n to the s t a t e as the s t a t e s bear to the Union, c o u n tie s in C a l i f o r n i a are governmental e n t i t i e s of s u b s t a n t i a l s t a t u s . . . . (they) are the b a s ic u n i t s f o r Senate . . . , May 1 7 , 1 965 , o p . ci t . , p. 98; S c o t t E. Temple, Mayor of Downey, proposing t h a t "no c i t i e s should be divided . . . in the new s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t , " i b i d . , May 18, 1965, p. 5; and Dorothy LeConte, Democratic S t a t e Central Committeewoman, recommending " t h a t the c i t i e s (in Southwestern Los Angeles County) be held t o g e t h e r in one d i s t r i c t . " T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g s , op. ci t ., p. 267 . James A. Doherty, A s s i s t a n t City Att orn e y of Los Angeles, r e f e r r e d in his testim ony before the Assembly re app ortionmen t commit- tee to the Los Angeles City Council r e s o l u t i o n asking t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e "re co gnize and provide f o r the community of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t i n g w ith in the urban a re as . . . in a manner substanti'a 11 y equal to t h a t provided f o r the communities of i n t e r e s t s i t u a t e d in r u r a l areas of the S t a t e . " Hearings on Senate Rea p p o rtio n m en t, May 18, 1965, op. c i t . , p. 9. 188S u p r a , d, 98. 189Clyde F. S n i d e r, American S t a t e and Local Govern ment (N.Y.: A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y -C ro f t s , 1 965 ) , p. 342. 2 0 7 p o l i t i c a l party o r g a n i z a t i o n , f o r s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , f o r p la n n in g , zoning, and regiona l arra ngem ents , for c i v i c f e d e r a t i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n , . . . and f o r b usin ess and i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n in most i n s t a n c e s . . . 190 These s e n a t o r s , many f i g h t i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l in the face of c o u r t - o r d e r e d re a p p o rt i o n m e n t , went on to poin t out t h a t county governments in C a l i f o r n i a "are f a r from mere a d j u t a n t s of (th e ) s t a t e , " but have " a t t r i butes of home r u l e . " This n e c e s s i t a t e s , they concluded, a close working r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s t a t e and i t s co unties to i n s u r e on the one hand t h a t s t a t e programs wi ll be a d e q u a te ly a d m i n i s t e r e d at the local l e v e l , and on the o t h e r hand to pre v e n t the ero sio n of the home r u le concept. That . . . r e l a t i o n s h i p . . . has p r e dominantly been one between the c o u n tie s and the S t a t e Senate . . . because . . . the c o u n tie s have been regarded by the Senate as the m i rro rs of and spokesmen f o r numerous i n t e r e s t s . . . w i t h i n t h e i r b o u n d a r i e s . 191 The a s s o c i a t i o n of c i t i e s and c o u n tie s with "com m u n ities of i n t e r e s t " is o f te n an i n a r t i c u l a t e assumption by those who advocate r e s p e c t fo r t h e i r boundaries in d i s t r i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s . But when1 d i s t r i c t s must encompass sev eral s e p a r a t e u n i t s of lo ca l government the d e c i s io n to 190Subcommittee on Reapportionment, Statement of I n t e n t . . . In . . . Adopting . . . Senate Bill No. 6 ( S acram ento : C a l i f o r n i a S e n a t e , 1965), p. TIT 1 9 11bi d ., p. 17. The Advisory Committee on I n t e r governmental R e l a t i o n s opposes "county r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a l e g i s l a t u r e " because i t "impedes county c o n s o l i d a t i o n where such a c tio n might be n e ce s sa r y to r e so l v e new problems or to provide more e f f e c t i v e lo c a l government." Op. ci t ., p. 27. N o n e th e les s, i t concedes t h a t "with the spread of municipal and county home r u l e , loc al u n i t s of government are becoming r e s i d u a r i e s of 's o v e r e i g n t y * in a fashi on somewhat comparable to the F e d e r a l - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p . " I b i d . , p . 44. 208 inclu de some but not o th e r s is u s u a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d in more e x p l i c i t terms of common i n t e r e s t s . In 1960, for example, Arnold Klaus, a s s i s t a n t manager of the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, ex p ressed a p r e f e r e n c e for d i s t r i c t alignment with Orange r a t h e r than R iv e r sid e or Imperial c o u n t i e s . The l a t t e r two, he e x p l a i n e d , should be grouped t o g e t h e r because they "have many common problems. T e rr a in f e a t u r e s , water and d e s e r t , as well as a h i s t o r i c a l a lig n m en t, are binding t i e s . " 192 This r e f e r e n c e to geographic and h i s t o r i c f a c t o r s as components of a community of i n t e r e s t help to give s i g n i f i c a n c e and p r e c i s i o n to a concept all too ofte n mentioned in terms e i t h e r t r i v i a l or v a g u e . 193 Other f a c t o r s , both t a n g i b l e and s a l i e n t , are the economic ones c i t e d by S enator Teale in j u s t i f y i n g the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of co u n tie s in proposed s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s . 192T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , o p . ci t . , p. 207 . J. 6. McSweeney of Imperial County agreed . I b i d . , p. 277. Five y ea rs l a t e r , Boyd P. Welin, Vice Mayor of Pasadena advo cated t h a t c i t i e s of the San Gabriel Valley be placed in the same Senate d i s t r i c t on s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same grounds. He contended t h a t they were "communities of s i m i l a r i n t e r e s t , background, and geography." Hearings on Senate Reap- p o r ti onment,. May 1 7 , 1 965 , o p . ci t ., p. 87. 193Cf. Sen. Rees' remarks, s u p r a , p. 99. Another example of community of i n t e r e s t s defined i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l l y is found in the remarks of the former 46th Assembly D i s t r i c t County Central Committee Chairman. He advocated "a d i s t r i c t with people who are c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d . . . in . . . t h e i r shopping areas and in t h e i r mode of t r a v e l . " T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , o p . ci t . , pp. 270-271. 209 We have t r i e d to keep . . . a g r i c u l t u r a l with a g r i c u l t u r a l , mountain and r e c r e a t i o n a l groups t o g e t h e r , i n d u s t r i a l groups t o g e t h e r . . ' . We did not develop any b a s ic c o n f l i c t s between people t h a t would l i e w it h in the same s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t . . . You will note t h a t . . . the long mountain d i s t r i c t . . . does have community ' i n t e r e s t in . . . animal husbandry. I t has . . . the w at er producing d i s t r i c t , and one of the reasons t h a t we did not couple i t with the v a l l e y c o u n t i e s was . . . a b a s ic c o n f l i c t . . . in the very im p o rta n t m a t t e r of w a t e r . 194 S t i l l a n o th e r f a c t o r which binds local governments t o g e t h e r in a common l e g i s l a t i v e c au se, apportionment p e r m i t t i n g , is c o o p e r a t i v e ac tio n in the s o l u t i o n of common problems. O f t e n ' t h i s takes the form of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s p e c i a l d i s t r i c t encompassing sev eral m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . Guy Smith, Vice-Mayor of Lynwood, c i t e s an impressive example of t h i s s o r t of community of i n t e r e s t . The c i t i e s of the " S outh east" or "East C entral" region were the f i r s t ones in Los Angeles County, he a s s e r t s , to e s t a b l i s h a mutual aid and a s s i s t a n c e program for f i r e and p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n . . . Another example (of j o i n t a c t i o n ) is the v o l u n t a ry r e d u c tio n of the pumping of underground w ater to f o r e s t a l l s a l t w at er i n t r u s i o n . . . c o o r d i n a t e d through our m utually e s t a b l i s h e d . . . Central Basin Municipal Water D i s t r i c t . Cooperation in land use planning (among) the c i t i e s in the d i s t r i c t is in su r e d through . . . the East Central Area Planning Committee . . . Civil defense (and) c o o p e r a t i v e storm dr ai n c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . are i n d i c a t i o n s of mutual i n t e r e s t s , . . . c o o p e ra tio n and . . . i n t e r d e p e n dence . 1 9 5 194Hearings on Senate R ea pportionm ent, May 17, 1 965 , op. c i t . , pp. 25-26 . 19 51 bi d . , pp. 108-109. Mr. Smith, u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , wished the ci t i es in q u e s ti o n placed in the same s e n a t o r i a l district. 210 / S u f f i c i e n t testimon y has been c i t e d to i n d i c a t e at l e a s t the p l a u s i b i l i t y of arguments, in b e h a l f of a p p o r t i o n ment based in p a r t on local government bo u n d a rie s. Such I c o n t e n t i o n s seem most te n a b l e when t h e r e is some em p irica l evidence t h a t the p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s in q u e s tio n are u n i t e d not only by l e g a l l y de fined g eographic l i m i t s but also by a genuine community of i n t e r e s t s . Evidence c i t e d above seems to c o n s t i t u t e proof t h a t such common concerns do e x i s t , and may be demonstrated in such s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s as h i s t o r y , geography, economic s i m i l a r i t y , shared problems, and le a a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Without such t a n g i b l e t i e s , the local r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ta n d a r d is i n d e f e n s i b l e . Because of them, i t is easy to understand why de Grazia c a l l s the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of communities . . . one of the g r e a t e s t i n v e n t i o n s of the l a t e Middle Ages" and i t s p e r s i s t e n c e in modern times " e f f e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l . " 196 I t is of p a r t i c u l a r p e r t i n e n c e to note t h a t even w ith in the one-man, one-vote apportionment c o n t e x t , the Supreme Court has acknowledged t h a t a s t a t e may l e g i t i m a t e l y d e s i r e to maintain the i n t e g r i t y of various p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s , i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e . . . Valid c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may u n d e r l i e such aims. I n d i s c r i m i n a t e d i s t r i c t i n g , w ith o u t any regard f o r p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n or n a t u r a l or h i s t o r i c a l boundary l i n e s , may be l i t t l e more than an ooen i n v i t a tion to p a r t i s a n g e r r y m a n d e r i n g . 197 196Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p . 4T. 197Reynolds v. Sims, o p . c i t . , pp. 578-579. 211 Although no c o n s i d e r a t i o n o t h e r than equal p o p u la tio n has r e c e i v e d so c l e a r a j u d i c i a l endorsement, i t is not w ith o u t i t s c r i t i c s . Z e l l e r a s s e r t s t h a t the local government u n i t has not proved s a t i s f a c t o r y as a b a s i s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , perhaps because i t tends to a c c e n t u a t e local r i v a l r i e s , and make the s t a t e assembly the arena f o r local d i s p u t e s . 198 The commun i t y of i n t e r e s t s idea is almost u b i q u ito u s in appor tionmen t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Reference to i t has been i n e v i t a b l e in the foreg o in g d i s c u s s i o n s of the one-man, one- vote r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a n d a r d s , and i t is r e l e v a n t to oth ers as w e l l . As a r e s u l t , the co nclusio n seems i n e s c a p a b l e t h a t a p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t community of i n t e r e s t s may be formed around almost any concern which has some l e g i s l a t i v e s a l i e n c e to a s u b s t a n t i a l number of v o t e r s . I t is perhaps most commonly a s s o c i a t e d with local government u n i t s and t h a t is why t h i s f i n a l assessm en t of i t s conceptual imDli- c a t i o n s has been postponed to t h i s s t a t e of app ortion men t commentary. de Grazia has s t a t e d his b e l i e f t h a t the geo graphic l o c a l i t y should be the focal p o i n t of i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with adm irable c l a r i t y and elo q u en ce. The communities of America c o n s i s t of all those c l u s t e r s of human r e l a t i o n s - - n e e d s , hopes, work and s o c i a b i 1i t y - - t h a t form in the course of s o c ia l l i f e . I f th ese forms mean an ything . . . a system of appo r tionm ent must seek to promote th e se . . . a s s o c i a t i o n s . I f p o s s i b l e , the v i l l a g e s . . . and c i t i e s in themselves should be aided to ex press t h e i r ways of l i f e in the h i g h e r c o u n c i l s . I f they cannot be accommodated 1 980 p . c i t . , p. 37. 212 d i r e c t l y , they should be served by co u n tie s t h a t are themselves m e a n i n g f u l . 199 Although communities of i n t e r e s t may be r e f l e c t e d in c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s , they also may be so g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i s p e r s e d or so d i l u t e d in a given area by contending i n t e r e s t s , as to r e q u i r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from d i s t r i c t s based on f a c t o r s o t h e r than local government b o u n d a rie s. The most s i g n i f i c a n t i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s is in the i n t e r e s t s common to e t h n i c groups. Negroes and Mexican- Americans are most numerously c o n c e n t r a t e d in C a l i f o r n i a c i t i e s and c o u n tie s so l a r g e as to deny them the l e g i s l a t i v e s t r e n g t h they might possess of r e s i d i n g in more s p a r s e l y i n h a b i t e d p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s . That t h e i r s is a s i g n i f i c a n t community i n t e r e s t has been a ffirm ed by testim ony of Congressman Hawkins and o t h e r c i t e d a b o v e . 200 I t is v e r i f i e d by s c h o l a r l y r e s e a r c h . Wolfinger r e p o r t s t h a t although mass immigration ended f i f t y years ago, . . . n a t i o n a l o r i g i n s continue to be a s a l i e n t dimension in many p e o p l e ' s p e r c e p t i o n s of themselves and of o t h e r s . . . E t h n i c i t y is often an im p o rtan t ind ependent v a r i a b l e in voting b e h a v i o r . 201 19A p p o r t i o n m e n t and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p . 16 7. Sen. flees attem pted to ap p ortio n the s t a t e s enate on the b a s is of "a concept of c i t i e s put t o g e t h e r because they had a c e r t a i n community of i n t e r e s t s . " Hearinos on Senate Reapportionment, May 17, 1965, op. c i t . , p . 4 3. 20° Supra , pp. 193- 1 95 . 201Raymond E. Wolf in ger, "The Development and 213 I f ap portionment is to be based on communities of i n t e r e s t , then d i s t r i c t bo undaries must sometimes be c o terminal with those of the s o - c a l l e d " g h e t t o s" of e t h n i c r e s i d e n t i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n . This , of c o u r s e , has long been acknowledged in the p o l i t i c a l world. In proposing what he c a l l e d " p r i m a r i l y a Negro ( s e n a t o r i a l ) d i s t r i c t , " Senator Rees fixed i t s e a s t e r n boundary at Alameda S t r e e t , which he c h a r a c t e r i z e d as "a B erlin w a l l , r e a l l y , in Los Angeles County, in terms of r a c i a l m i x t u r e . " 202 Acknowledging a d d i t i o n a l e t h n i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , Rees i n d i c a t e d he would not oppose c e r t a i n changes in the proposed 29th D i s t r i c t to enhance the p o s s i b i l i t y of the e l e c t i o n of a Mexican- Ame ri c a n . 2 0 3 Besides local government and e t h n i c g r o u p in g s , a t h i r d im p o rta n t b a s is for community of i n t e r e s t a p p o r t i o n ment is economic homogeneity. I t s importance has been P e r s i s t e n c e of Ethnic Voting," APSR, Vol. LIX, No. 4 (December, 1965), p. 896. 202H e a r i n g s o n S e n a t e Rea p p o rtio n m en t, op. c i t . , p . 52. Mayor Milo Dell man of South Gate a f fir m e d t h a t Alameda S t r e e t is " s o r t of a B erlin Wall," and "a very, very phys ica l one," with "very few cross s t r e e t s , " and a r a i l r o a d t r a c k running next to i t . In a d d i t i o n to p r o v i d ing a de f a c t o s e g r e g a t i o n b a r r i e r , he pointed out t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s also a water d i s t r i c t boundary and a demarca tion between two high school a t t e n d a n c e a r e a s . I b i d . , p. 106. In a m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a , even a s t r e e t can have c o n s i d e r a b l e apportionment s i g n i f i c a n c e . 203As o r i g i n a l l y proposed, Rees r e p o r t e d a Spanish surname p o p u la tio n of 176,000 out of a t o t a l of 473,000 in the d i s t r i c t . I b id . , p. 56. 214 acknowledged in the testimony of Sen at or Teale quoted e a r l i e r 204 and has r e c e i v e d t a c i t r e c o g n i t i o n by l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionme nt committees in compiling data for p r o posed d i s t r i c t s from census t r a c t f i g u r e s . W itnesses, too, have r e f e r r e d to such f a c t o r s as the per centage of persons in various income b r a c k e t s and the per cent age of owner- occupancy in dwelling u n i t s w it h in p o t e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s . 205 I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t although c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of economic homogeneity may often r e q u i r e c i t i e s to be d ivided by the appo rtion men t p r o c e s s , c i t y bo undaries themselves are o c c a s i o n a l l y based on economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 206 An a n a l y s i s of the community of i n t e r e s t s concept can produce few firm c o n c l u s i o n s . At b e s t , p e rh a p s, i t w a r ra n ts se v e ra l t e n t a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e r e are many types of communities of i n t e r e s t , the most ^important of which seem to be local government u n i t s , e t h n i c t i e s and economic s i m i l a r i t i e s . Second, th e se se v e ra l types are not n e c e s s a r i l y coter minal in geo gr ap hic scope. Th ird , the t h re e mentioned all possess s u f f i c i e n t s i g n i f i c a n c e to j u s t i f y an ap portionment system designed to give them 204S u p r a , p. 209 . 205See, e . g . , the testim on y by Mr. Perry Par ks, T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , o p . c i t ., pp. 219-221. 206Comments by Sen. Rees in t h i s regard c i t e d the City of I n d u s t r y as a s p e c i f i c example. Hearings on Senate Reapporti onment, May 1 7 , 1 965 , o p . c i t . , pp. 4 5 - 46'. 215 l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Fourth , i t is e a s i e s t to a f f o r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of those communities of i n t e r e s t based upon c i t i e s and c o u n tie s because t h ere is g r e a t e r precedence for i t , the local government u n i t s are more r e a d i l y d i s c e r n i b l e , and t h e i r more e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n gives them g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e over ap portionment p r o c e d u re s . D i s t r i c t o r i e n t a t i o n . --Having accepted the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t local governments may c o n s t i t u t e communities of i n t e r e s t s worthy of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the q u e s ti o n of how t h i s may be assured i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e s . The obvious answer, i m p l i c i t in the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , is to draw d i s t r i c t bound ar ies in a way which avoids s p l i t t i n g c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s . Yet no study has been de sig n e d , to t h i s w r i t e r ' s knowledge, which t e s t s the d i s t r i c t l o y a l t i e s of l e g i s l a t o r s chosen from a s i n g l e loca l government u n i t a g a i n s t those of l e g i s l a t o r s chosen from c o n s t i t u e n c i e s not based on c i t i e s or c o u n t i e s . E x i s t i n g s t u d i e s do show, however, t h a t before co u r t re apportionm ent d e c i s i o n s , in January of 1962, 19 s t a t e upper houses and seven lower houses were ap p o rtio n e d p r i m a r i l y on a b a s is of a r e a , and t h a t a t o t a l of 23 s t a t e s a l l o c a t e d l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s in one or both houses to give r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c h i e f l y to local government u n i t s . 207 In the absence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence or a d d i t i o n a l 207C a lc u la te d from da ta p r e se n t e d by S c h u b e rt, op. c i t . , p . 67. 216 r e s e a r c h , i t is p l a u s i b l e t h a t d i s t r i c t s drawn around local l government u n i t s produce l e g i s l a t o r s who defend t h e i r i n t e r e s t s more r e l i a b l y . J u s t as the c h i e f o b j e c t i o n to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of group i n t e r e s t s comes from those who g r a n t hig h er p r i o r i t y to the importance of accommodation and compromise, so the major argument a g a i n s t loc al government i n t e r e s t s comes from those convinced of the paramount need f o r a s t a t e - w i d e (or n a t i o n a l ) o r i e n t a t i o n . There are a few who b e l i e v e t h e r e is no real c o n f l i c t here. Emery s t a t e s t h e i r a r g u ment c l e a r l y . Let each d i s t r i c t be r e p r e s e n t e d in the n a t i o n a l council and l e t each r e p r e s e n t a t i v e work s o l e l y f o r the i n t e r e s t of his p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i c t , and . . . i n e v i - t a b l y the r e s u l t of m a j o r i t y a c tio n must mean the adoption of . . . l e g i s l a t i o n . . . for the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of the communi ty as a whole. I once heard t h i s theo ry s t a t e d very f o r c i b l y by Thomas B. Reed of Maine, one of the g r e a t e s t spea ke rs the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ever h a d . 208 But most o b s e rv e r s shun such easy r e s o l u t i o n of what they p e r c e iv e to be genuin ely contending claim s. One eminent group acknowledged the problem f r a n k l y : The members of the Commission, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of us coming from ( l e g i s l a t i v e bodies) are p a i n f u l l y aware of the f r e q u e n t dilemma f acing a l e g i s l a t o r in r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s . . . between his d i s t r i c t on the one hand and the whole . . . s t a t e or n a t i o n on the o t h e r . 209 2 0 8Emery, op. c i t . , p. 110. 209Advisory Commission on Inte rg overnm enta l Rela t i o n s , o p . ci t . , p . 77. 217 Those who take the broad view t h a t the d i s t r i c t i n t e r e s t should be submerged by the general one s t i l l find in Burke t h e i r most p e r s u a s i v e spokesman. In a d d re ss in g the v o te rs of B r i s t o l whom he made famous, he announced his o p irri-o n t h a t p a r lia m e n t is a deli b e r a t i ve assembly of one n a t i o n , with one i n t e r e s t , t h a t of the whole; where not local p rej udi ces ought to guide, but the general good. . . You choose a member ind ee d, but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of B r i s t o l , but he is a member of p a r i i amen t . 2 1 0 Yet in American o r a c t i c e , i f not in t h e o r y , the Burkian d i s c i p l e s are f i a h t i n g an a p p a r e n t l y lo sin g b a t t l e . Adrian and Press a s s e r t t h a t "United S t a t e s l e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s , to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t than those in o th e r n a t i o n s , have a 'back-home' o r i e n t a t i o n . " 211 Keefe and Ogul agree t h a t t h e r e is an "unflaggin g p a r o c h i a l i s m of l e g i s l a t u r e s , " bred by powerful i n t e r e s t groups and weak p a r t i e s , d i s t r i c t re sid e n c y r e q u i r e m e n t s , s h o r t terms of o f f i c e , and "the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of American p o l i t i c s . " 212 I t is probable 210Ouoted in Emery, op. c i t . , pp. 104-106. This view was given c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a n c t io n in France in 1793. de G r az ia , Apporti onmen t . . . , o p . ci t . , p. 19. 211Charles R. Adrian and Charles P r e s s , The American P o l i t i c a l Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1565j , p. 408. A study of the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e in 1957 r ev e a le d t h a t 55 per cent of i t s members perceived one of t h e i r "purposive r o le s " as t h a t of " t r i b u n e , " a c t i n g as the voice of the people in t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r d i s t r i c t s . Wahlke, e t a l . , op. c i t . , p. 259. 212Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t . , p. 471. 218 t h a t the conformity of d i s t r i c t boundaries to those of local government u n i t s is s t i l l an o th e r cause of p r o v i n c i a l i s m . There is much evidence of t h i s d i s t r i c t o r i e n t a t i o n . The study of four s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s r e p o rted t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s "perceive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " of the i n t e r e s t s of some geog rap hical area as a proper f u n c t io n of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . " 213 One lawmaker voiced a commonly held s e t of p r i o r i t i e s when he remarked t h a t "You should take care of your own backyard f i r s t , but thin k about the whole s t a t e , too."214 Yet D e x te r 's study of Congress, while r e v e a l i n g t h a t "on most i s s u e s , out of a d e s i r e to serve the d i s t r i c t or from i n d i f f e r e n c e , many congressmen do go along with any view which they b e l i e v e ' t h e d i s t r i c t ' h o l d s , " 215 i n d i c a t e s t h a t the compuls ions of d i s t r i c t p r e s s u r e may be more imagined than r e a l . A vet er an congressman expressed t h i s view p e r s u a s i v e l y . I am sure . . . a congressman can do p r e t t y much what he decides to do and he d o e s n ' t have to b o t h e r too much about c r i t i c i s m . I 'v e seen p l e n t y of cases . . . where a guy will hold one economic or p o l i t i c a l p o s i tio n and get along all r i g h t , and then h e ' l l die or 213Wahlke, e t a l . , op. c i t . , p. 288. Dexter found the same thin g to be t ru e of Congressmen, op. c i t . , pp. 87-88. 214Ibi d . , p. 290. See als o the s i m i l a r views of o t h e r legi s i a t o r s quoted s u p r a , p. 154. 215Dexter, o p . c i t . , pp. 84-85. 219 re sig n and a guy comes in who holds q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t . . . p o s i t i o n and he gets along all r i g h t t o o . 216 Dexter b e l i e v e s t h i s r e l a t i v e i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y to d i s t r i c t i n f l u e n c e is due in p a r t to the f a c t t h a t " th e re is no d i s t r i c t viewpoint . . . on the overwhelm!na m a j o r i t y of is s u e s " and t h a t , in a d d i t i o n , "only a f r a c t i o n of the v oters know the name of t h e i r congressman, l e t alone how he voted on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e . " 217 More g e n e r a l l y , Milbrat h confirms p r e v a i l i n g v o t e r ig nora nce. "Even i f one looks simply f o r accuracy of in form ation about p o l i t i c s , " he c o n clu d es, "most s t u d i e s find t h a t only 10 to 20 per cent of the p o p u la tio n know t h e i r p o l i t i c s w e l l . " 218 2160uoted i b i d . , p. 85. 2171b i d . , p. 88. See, a l s o , de G r a z ia , Apporti on- ment . . . , o p . c i t . , p. 108, in p a r t i a l s u b s t a n t i a t i o n . "A s p e c i a l l y s e l e c t e d , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c r o s s - s e c t i o n " of the American people re v e a le d t h a t 34 per cent could name both United S t a t e s Senators r e p r e s e n t i n g them, 25 per cent could name only one, and 41 per cent could name n e i t h e r . Av Westin, e d . , The National C i t i z e n s h i p Test (N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1965), p . 5 and p. 108. Another survey found t h a t even among those who vote only about a h a l f had heard or read anything about e i t h e r Congressional c a n d id a te and the in fo r m a tio n pos sessed by those who had was o f te n only a vague impression such as " h e 's a good man." Warren M i l l e r and Donald S to k e s, " Cons tituen cy In fl u e n c e in Congress," APSR, Vol. LVII, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 50-51. George Gallup r e p o r t e d in 1966 t h a t his poll found only 46 per ce nt of all U.S. a d u l t s and 50 per cent of those who had voted in the l a s t e l e c t i o n were able to i d e n t i f y t h e i r Congressman. " P o l i t i c a l Awareness Logs," Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1966, Pt. I I , p. 5. 218L e s t e r W. M il b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p . 64. 220 Yet even though many l e g i s l a t o r s may be f re e from o b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c y p r e s s u re of a g e n e r a l i z e d n a t u r e , those e l e c t e d from d i s t r i c t s drawn along c i t y or county l i n e s may be expected to feel the i n f l u e n c e of th ese local governments. Not only do i n d i v i d u a l c i t i e s sometimes employ l o b b y i s t s to r e p r e s e n t them before s t a t e l e g i s l a ture s but o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the League of C a l i f o r n i a C i t i e s are among "some of the most a c t i v e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . " 219 Each level of government tends to i n f l u e n c e the o t h e r s , and t h i s tendency is augmented and i n c r e a s e d when i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d by d i s t r i c t s based upon p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n b o u n d a rie s. The average v o te r may not know the name of his s t a t e s e n a t o r , but a c i t y manager or county s u p e r v i s o r i n v a r i a b l y does, and his i n f l u e n c e upon him wi ll probably be s i g n i f i c a n t i f he is e l e c t e d from a d i s t r i c t b u i l t p r i m a r i l y around t h a t p a r t i c u l a r un it of local government. 219Bernard L. Hyink, S. Brown and Ea rn est W. Thacker, P o l i t i c s and Government in C a l i f o r n i a , f o u rth ed. (N.Y.: Thomas Y. CroweTI Co. , 1965), p . 88^ The ro le of local u n i t s of government as e f f e c t i v e p r e s s u re groups has been ex p lo re d by Totten 0. Anderson. "Whether the p u b l i c l o b b y i s t r e p r e s e n t s a c i t y mayor (or) a c h i e f county a d m i n i s t r a t o r , he o b t a i n s the b e s t coo p era tio n from the l e g i s l a t o r whose d i s t r i c t l i e s w ith in the boundaries of the governmental u n i t he r e p r e s e n t s . " " P ressu re Groups and Inte rg overnm ental R e l a t i o n s , " Harry W. Reynolds, J r . , e d . , The Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social S c i e n c e , No."l39 (Mav. 1 965 ) . p 1 26 221 But t h e r e are only a l i m i t e d number of a r e a s , im p o rtan t as they undoubtedly a r e , with regard to which c i t i e s and c o u n tie s have a d i r e c t i n t e r e s t in s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n . Dexter, the re f o r e , is probably c o r r e c t in a s s e r t - ing t h a t " p r e s s u r e is how you see i t " 220 and t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r ofte n makes unwarranted i n f e r e n c e s reg a rd in g the e x t e n t and s a l i e n c e of d i s t r i c t i n f l u e n c e . This he a t t r i b u t e s to the f a c t s t h a t the Congressman tends to hear "most often from those who agree with him"221 and ofte n p e r c e iv e s his d i s t r i c t p r i m a r i l y within the c o n te x t of his own p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , one is i n c l i n e d to l i s t e n with some r e s e r v a t i o n s to the lament of an I l l i n o i s Congressman. My people are up in arms. . . They do not mind me voting f o r worthy p r o j e c t s all over the United S t a t e s , but I can t e l l you . . . unless I get some money to be spen t down in southern I l l i n o i s . . . you may not be seeing me here next y e a r . 222 Two r e s e a r c h e r s found t h a t t h e r e was a marked agreement between c o n s t i t u e n c y p r e f e r e n c e s and c o n g r e ss io n a l voting on c i v i l r i g h t s and s o c ia l w elfare l e g i s l a t i o n but not on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This i n d i c a t e s e i t h e r t h a t the accuracy of p e r c e p t i o n of d i s t r i c t opinion v a rie s from iss u e to i s s u e , o r , as the r e s e a r c h e r s b e l i e v e , t h a t 220Dexter, o p . c i t . , p. 91. 221Ibi d. , p . 89. 222Congressional Record, May 22, 1956, quoted by Keefe and Ogul , op. c i t . , p. (TJ. 222 congressmen ignore d i s t r i c t opinion in m a tte rs r e l a t i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 223 It now seems war ranted to conclude t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s take geogr ap hi cal d i s t r i c t s i n t o account in de termining t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y when these d i s t r i c t s are coterminal with local governments whose e x p e r t i s e and o r g a n i z a t i o n enable them to e x e r t more e f f e c t i v e p r e s s u re than l e ss i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n t e r e s t groups. A second c o n c l u s io n , m i t i g a t i n g the f i r s t to some e x t e n t , is t h a t d i s t r i c t i n f l u e n c e is a c t u a l l y less stron g than i t is p e rceived to be by l e g i s l a t o r s . But i t is perhaps the p e r c e p tio n which is most i m p o r t a n t , for t h a t is what determines l e g i s l a t i v e b e h a v io r . As M i l l e r and Stokes p o in t o u t , "the Congressman is a d e a l e r in increments and m a r g i n s , " 224 and i f he can pick up only the votes of those few c o n s t i t u e n t s who watch his record c l o s e l y , they mean the d i f f e r e n c e between v i c t o r y and d e f e a t . Regardless of how s tro n g or weak d i s t r i c t p r e s s u r e may be, and no m a t t e r how real or i l l u s o r y , Keefe and Ogul r i g h t l y p o in t out t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r who c a t e r s to i t "is follow in g the s u r e s t route to r e e l e c t i o n . " 225 Nor do they b e lie v e t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e , f o r lo c a lism in moderation is 223M i l l e r and S to k e s, o p . c i t . , pp. 45-46. 2241 b i d . , p. 55. 225Keefe and Ogul, o p . c i t . , p. 472. 223 n e i t h e r harmful nor u n d e s i r a b l e . "Local i n t e r e s t s r e q u i r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ," they a s s e r t , and i n s i s t t h a t " t h e r e are obvious values to keeping ' d i s t a n t ' government responsiv e to the people at home."226 Compe titiven es s r e v i s i t e d . - - C o n t r a d i c t o r y r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s , as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , make i t d i f f i c u l t to determine whether re sp o n s i v e n e s s to d i s t r i c t needs is more probably m anif e sted by l e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d from safe d i s t r i c t s or those chosen in marginal o n e s . 227 These c o n t r a d i c t i o n s were a t t r i b u t e d to d i f f e r e n c e s in e i t h e r the l e g i s l a t i v e bodies s t u d i e d or the met hodological te chniques u t i l i z e d . Another more s i g n i f i c a n t e x p l a n a t i o n now seems worthy of a n a l y s i s . A study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i s t r i c t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and r e s p o n s i v e n e s s to d i s t r i c t p re ssu re should acknowledge the f a c t s t h a t t h e r e are both d i f f e r e n t kinds of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and d i f f e r e n t sources of d i s t r i c t p r e s s u r e . The i n t e g r a t i o n of such a r e c o g n i t i o n in to re s e a r c h techniques r e q u i r e s a m u l t i p l e methodology and one more r e f i n e d than appears to have been employed in the s t u d i e s undertaken by Clapp, Froman, MacRae, and o th e rs whose works have been c i t e d in t h i s c h a p t e r . 2 2 6 I b i d . , pp. 472-473. 2 2 7S u p r a , pp. 1 90-192. 224 These s t u d i e s , f o r the most p a r t , i m p l i c i t l y def in e c o m p e titiv e n e ss e i t h e r in whatever s u b j e c t i v e frames of r e f e r e n c e were employed by l e g i s l a t o r s who were i n t e r v i e w e d , 228 or they def ine i t in terms of the cl ose ness and c o n s is t e n c y of e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . 229 As a r e s u l t , all d i s t r i c t s which incumbents s a id were "clo se " or " m a rg in a l," or which had been c a r r i e d by l e s s than 55 per cent of the vo te , presumably would be c o nsid ered marginal and, i f q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s were un d e rta k e n , would be e v a l u a t e d col 1e c t i v e l y . Yet d i s t r i c t s e q u a l l y marginal by these c r i t e r i a might d i f f e r enormously in ways which could have the most profound e f f e c t upon the r e sp o n s iv e n e ss of l e g i s l a t o r s to p r e s s u re from the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . D i s t r i c t "A," for example, might be marginal because i t c o n s i s t s almost e x c l u s i v e l y of middle-income v o t e r s , while D i s t r i c t "B" might be marginal because i t c o n s i s t s of o n e - t h i r d upper, o n e - t h i r d middle and o n e - t h i r d lower-income v o t e r s . I t is s t a t i s t i c a l l y c o n c e i v a b l e , moreover, t h a t th ese two d i s t r i c t s might appear to be v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l i f com pared in terms of such commonly employed v a r i a b l e s as / median income, p a r ty a f f i l i a t i o n , owner-occ up an cy , or p o p u la tio n d e n s i t y . Yet i t is p l a u s i b l e to assume t h a t the 228E . q . , r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of p ar ty o r g a n i z a t i o n . 229E. a . , MacRae, o p . c i t . , pp. 1 ,048-1 ,049 , and Froman, op. c i t . , p. 112. 225 l e g i s l a t o r r e p r e s e n t i n g D i s t r i c t "A" w ill more f a i t h f u l l y do the bidding of his c o n s t i t u e n t s than the one e l e c t e d from D i s t r i c t "Bf " simply because the v o te r s in D i s t r i c t "A" wi ll speak with a s i n g l e , and hence c l e a r e r voice in " i n s t r u c t i n g " t h e i r d e l e g a t e . 230 J u s t as t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t kinds of marginal d i s t r i c t s , so, more o b v i o u s l y , t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t sources of d i s t r i c t p r e s s u r e . Two have been d i sc u s s e d at some l e n g th : t h a t coming from i n t e r e s t groups and t h a t emanating from local government u n i t s . The two d i f f e r in many r e s p e c t s , some of which have been noted in the f o r e going d i s c u s s i o n . The most s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , f o r p r e s e n t p u r p o se s , is in the degree of p a r t i s a n co h e s iv e n e s s : most im p o rtan t socioeconomic i n t e r e s t groups have a dominant p a r t y l o y a l t y while most c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s , a p a r t from t h e i r socioeconomic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , do not. Bone and Ranney r e p o r t f i g u r e s showing t h a t in the 1960 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n , an i n t e r e s t i n g one fo r purposes of comparison because each p a r ty receiv ed app roxima te ly 50 per cent of the t o t a l v o t e , the Democratic 230The example has employed income f o r i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes because of i t s c lo se a s s o c i a t i o n with p a r t i s a n a f f i l i a t i o n . Bernard R. Berelson a s s e r t s t h a t , "put c r u d e l y , r i c h e r people vote Republican more than poo re r p e o p le ." B e r e ls o n , e t al . , Voting (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1954), p. 56. 226 c a ndidate re c e iv e d the follow ing vote p e rcentages among var io us " s o c i a l g ro u p s:" c o l l e g e e d u c a te d , 38; p r o f e s s io n a l and e x e c u t i v e , 37; P r o t e s t a n t s , 39; manual workers, 61; t ra d e union members, 65; Negroes, 62; Roman C a t h o l i c s , 73; and dews, 8 1 . 231 Each of th ese is a secondary group formed on the b a s is of a shared t r a i t , a community of i n t e r e s t with normally high s a l i e n c e . It is of c o n s i d e r able s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t i f all members of each group were placed in the same l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , a l l would c o n s t i t u t e safe d i s t r i c t s ; the f i r s t thre e groups would comprise s a f e l y Republican d i s t r i c t s , the l a s t f iv e s a f e l y Democratic o n e s . 232 Such f i g u r e s help to v i n d i c a t e and e x p lain the assumption made above t h a t s a fe d i s t r i c t s are most condu cive to the e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p l u r a l i t y of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , 233 and f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t e the s t a t u s of Negro Rep. Hawkins' d i s t r i c t as the s a f e s t in the s t a t e . 234 One a d d i t i o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n is p e r t i n e n t : those groups most p r e p o n d e ra n t l y p a r t i s a n in t h e i r voting be h a v io r tend also 231Hugh A. Bone and Austfn Ranney, P o l i t i c s and Voters (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., I n c . , 1963), p . 21T. The f i g u r e s are from The American I n s t i t u t e of Public Opinion, Oct. 11, 1960. 232Safe d i s t r i c t s are d efined here as those in which the winning c a ndidate r e c e i v e s over 60 per cent of the vote. 2 3 3Supra , n . 197. 234Supra, p. 196. Ill to be among those most e f f e c t i v e l y orga nized f o r purposes of e x e r t i n g lobbying p r e s s u r e . Thus, s e v e ra l f a c t o r s in the p o l i t i c a l system r e i n f o r c e one a n o th e r through cumulative impact. Safe d i s t r i c t s are ofte n produced by attem pts of the dominant p a r ty to in c r e a s e i t s m a j o r i t y through gerry mandering . These safe d i s t r i c t s in tu rn tend to encompass c o n s t i t u e n t s of the same socioeconomic groups, whose i n t e r e s t s then are given added c o n s i d e r a t i o n because of t h e i r c o n c e n t r a t i o n and are f u r t h e r e d more s k i l l f u l l y by l e g i s l a t o r s b e n e f i t i n g from the g r e a t e r tenure and e x perience which s a fe d i s t r i c t s produce. These socioeconomic i n t e r e s t groups thereby gain added e f f e c t i v e n e s s by s k i l l f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ij^ l e g i s l a t u re s which supplements the p r e s s u r e they e x e r t upon l e g i s l a t u r e s by orga nized lobbying a c t i v i t y . But, as i n d i c a t e d above, d i s t r i c t p r e s s u re from socioeconomic groups is s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which c i t i e s and co u n tie s can e x e r t . Whereas the former tend to be p r e p o n d e r a n t l y Republican or Democratic, the l a t t e r do not. Of the 58 co u n tie s in C a l i f o r n i a , f o r example, l e ss than h a l f might be con sid e red safe fo r one pa rty or the o t h e r on the basis of the 1960 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s . 235 I f i t is d e s i r a b l e t h a t local 235Compiled from Frank M. J o rd an , Statement of Vote, 1960 General E l e c ti o n (Sacramento: C a l i f o r n i a S tate Pri n ti ng O f f i c e , n . d . ) , pp. 2-5. t 228 p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s not be s p l i t by apportionment for purposes of e f f e c t i v e rep r e s e n t a t i o n in the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , then i t is c l e a r t h a t e l e c t i o n d i s t r i c t s , l i k e the c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s , w ill be p r i m a r i l y m a r g in a l, r a t h e r than s a f e . When local governments ask l e g i s l a t i v e appor tionment committees to r e s p e c t the i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r b o u n d a r i e s , 236 they often w ill r e c e i v e , i f t h e i r r e q u e st s are g r a n t e d , c o m p e titiv e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s in which n e i t h e r pa rty has a s i g n i f i c a n t ad vantage, no economic lobby will lend su p p o rt to d i s t r i c t demands, and incumbent l e g i s l a t o r s have but dim hopes of accumulating the ten ur e and e xperience which make f o r maximum l e g i s l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e . Such is the p r i c e of d eferen ce to county and c i t y bo u n d aries. Pressure s coming from socioeconomic i n t e r e s t s may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from those e x e r t e d in b e h a l f of local governments by the kind of l e g i s l a t i o n they are designed to i n f l u e n c e , as well as by the c lo se n ess of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n with one p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . The socioeconomic p r e s s u r e s tend to be most i n s i s t e n t l y e x e r t e d in r e l a t i o n to such m a t t e rs as c i v i l r i g h t s , p u b l i c m o ra ls , open shop, and minimum wage l e g i s l a t i o n . These is s u e s may be s a id to involve government p o1i c y . P ressu re coming from c i t i e s and c o u n t i e s in d i s t i n c t i o n , attempt to i n f l u e n c e such things as the a l l o c a t i o n of government c o n t r a c t s , the l o c a t i o n of 2 36S u p r a , pp. 205-208. 229 e d u c a t i o n a l and penal i n s t i t u t i o n s * the e x p e n d itu r e of funds to f i g h t water and a i r p o l l u t i o n , and s t a t e sub ve n tions to local governments. These iss u e s may be s a id to involve not so much government p o l i c y as government servi c e . The foreg o in g d isc u s s io n e n t a i l s sev eral g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s which appear to be at l e a s t c o n c e p t u a l l y rewarding in e v a l u a t i n g c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s of d i s t r i c t s . F i r s t , safe d i s t r i c t s are r e l a t e d to highly p a r t i s a n app ortionmen t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , long incumbency, e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of socioeconomic i n t e r e s t qroups, and the enactment of p o l i c y l e g i s l a t i o n . Second, marginal d i s t r i c t s are r e l a t e d to l e g i s l a t i v e d i l i g e n c e , accommodation of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of local governments, and the enactment of s e r v i c e l e g i s l a t i o n . Th ird , d i s t r i c t co m p e t i t i v e n e s s has only i n c i d e n t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i f any at a l l , to d i s t r i c t h e t e r o g e n e i t y , the agency the ory of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Final a s s e s s m e n t . --The sta n d a rd of local government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in s p i t e of i t s outspoken champions, is not r e q u i r e d by any of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals acce pted as app ortionmen t o b j e c t i v e s . I t is e ndorsed, however, by concepts of competition and f reedom --the f i r s t because d i s t r i c t s based on c i t y or county boundaries tend to be more marginal than o t h e r t y p e s , and the second because many 230 d i s t r i c t s are l i k e l y to have m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s of s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h to at l e a s t p re se r v e t h e i r own l i b e r t i e s . City and county r e p r e s e n t a t i o n n e i t h e r c o n t r i b u t e s to nor d e t r a c t s from the goals of e f f i c i e n c y , competence, and compromise to any a p p r e c i a b l e e x t e n t . Eq u a lity and a policy-mak ing m a j o r i t y would not n e c e s s a r i l y be s a c r i f i c e d by local government-based d i s t r i c t s , but such c o n s t i t u e n c i e s c r e a t e o b s t a c l e s to t h e i r a t t a i n m e n t . C i t i e s and c o u n t i e s are not e q u a l l y popu lated and i t is d i f f i c u l t to group them i n t o d i s t r i c t s which a r e , i f t h e i r boundary i n t e g r i t y is to be m a in ta in e d . The probab le m a r g i n a l i t y of such d i s t r i c t s is also a f o r e s e e able impediment to the maximization of m a j o r i t y s t r e n g t h in the l e g i s l a t u r e . This appears to be a r ea so n a b le f i n a l as sessm en t. 1. Mandated: none. 2. Endorsed: c o m p etitio n and freedom. 3. N e u t r a l : e f f i c i e n c y , competence, and com- promi s e . 4. Discouraged: e q u a l i t y and a policy-making majori t y . The P arty R e s p o n s i b i l i t y Model In a d d i t i o n to a l l the claims made upon the l e g i s l a t o r by i n t e r e s t groups and local governments, by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u e n c y advantage and s t a t e w e l f a r e , 231 those of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y also r e q u i r e e xam ination. P a r t i e s , F r ie d r i c h w r i t e s , "are of g r e a t importance in any system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " 237 Many p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s would l i k e to see them play an even more v i t a l r o l e , and plea f o r a s i t u a t i o n in which the m a j o r i t y p a r t y , as such, can be held l e g i t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the conduct of g o vernm ent.238 This would seem to r e q u i r e , in t u r n , at l e a s t th re e c o n d i t i o n s . F i r s t , the same p a r t y should c on trol both the l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u tiv e b r an c h e s; second, the vast m a j o r i t y of o f f i c i a l s belonging to the r u l i n g p a r ty should a c t i v e l y co o p erate in implementing the pa rty program; and t h i r d , each party should c l e a r l y p r o j e c t to the e l e c t o r a t e a l t e r n a t e programs on the b a s is of which the voters may make a c l e a r p o l i c y choic e. 2 37C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government and Democracy, op. ci t . , p. 255T Lipson observes t h a t i f "you want . . . to 1 earn . . . about . . . government, observe (th e ) party ' system. For here l i e s the h e a r t of the m a t t e r . " Op. c i t . , p. 394. 238See, e . g . , Committee on P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s of the American Poli t i cal Science A s s o c i a t i o n , Toward a More Re s p o n s i b l e Two-Party System (N.Y.: R i n e h a r t , 1950), and F. Ti S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r . P arty Government (N.Y.: F a r r a r & R i n e h a r t , 1942). McKean speaks s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y of the "wish t h a t the p o l i t i c s of the s t a t e s could be p r ese n te d to the busy v o t e r as a s e r i e s of broad and meaningful choices between p a r t i e s , so t h a t w ithout having to know the names and records of thousands of o f f i c i a l s , he could make an i n t e l l i g e n t choice between p a r t i e s and then hold answerable the p ar ty t h a t did or did not do what he wanted. Op. c i t . , p. 137. 232 Each of these th re e components of party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r apportionment s t a n d a r d s , but only the f i r s t seems c l e a r l y p r e d i c t a b l e . Court ordered re a p portio nm ent, as i n d i c a t e d in Chapter I I , should reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of divided p a r t y government by giving each v o te r the same weight in the e l e c t i o n of both l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s , thus c r e a t i n g more s i m i l a r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s for the two b r a n c h e s . 239 Party c o h e s i o n . --The re is c o n f l i c t i n g evidence r egarding the methods by which to in su r e agreement and co operation among o f f i c i a l s of the same p a r t y , and such disag reem en t, l i k e so many o t h e r s , is r e l a t e d to d i s t r i c t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . The m a r g i n a l i t y or s a f e t y of e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s is e s s e n t i a l l y a f u n c tio n of p a r t y r e g i s t r a t i o n r a t i o s . The q u e s ti o n r a i s e d , th en , can be phrased simply: are o n e - p a rt y c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ( i . e . , safe ones) conducive to party co hesiveness in l e g i s l a t i v e voting? There is c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence to support MacRae's Massachusetts f in d i n g t h a t those " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s with wide e l e c t i o n margins . . . tend more to be p a r ty r e g u l a r s than 239S u p r a , p. 114. A term of o f f i c e for l e g i s l a t o r s c o n c u rre n t with t h a t of the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e would have the same e f f e c t . J e w e l l , a ffirm s t h a t a " s i n g l e pa rty should co nt rol both the govern o rsh ip and both l e g i s l a t i v e b r a n c h e s . " Malcolm J e w e l l , The S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e , op. c i t . , p. 7. It is para d o x ic a l t h a t in the f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r Senate reap p o rti o n m en t based on p o p u l a t i o n , C a l i f o r n i a v o t e r s chose a Republican governor and Democratic l e g i s l a ture in 1966. 233 those with cl ose e l e c t i o n m a r g i n s . " 240 Studi es of Wisconsin241 and P e n n s y lv a n i a 242 l e g i s l a t i v e bodies c o r r o b o ra te t h i s c o n c l u s io n . On the basis of votes in the n a t i o n a l House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , however, Froman finds the r e l a t i o n s h i p between safe d i s t r i c t s and par ty r e g u l a r i t y t o t a l l y la ckin g among Democrats and only p a r t i a l l y p r e s e n t among R e p u b l i c a n s . 243 Other evidence i n d i c a t e s a r e v e rs e r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h a t i s , one between marginal d i s t r i c t s and p ar ty s u p p o rt . On the bas is of a comparative study of four s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , i t was concluded t h a t both " party c om petition and m a j o r i t y s t a t u s . . . make p a r t y - o r i e n t e d ro le s more c r i t i c a l as in f l u e n c e s on b e h a v i o r . " 244 Keefe and Ogul 2 4 °0p . c i t . , d. 1,051. 241Samuel C. P a t t e r s o n , "The Role of the Deviant in The S tate L e g i s l a t i v e System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. XIV, No. 2 (June, 1951), pp. 4 6 0 - 4 7 2 ; ----------------- 242Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Con stituen cy In flu e n c es in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e , " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. XIV, No. 2 (June, 1961), pp. 473-480. 24 30p. c i t . , pp. 115-116. Jewell agrees t h a t t h e r e is no close c o r r e l a t i o n between the i n t e n s i t y of tw o -p arty c o m p etitio n in s t a t e p o l i t i c s and the importance of p a r t y alignments in the l e g i s l a t u r e . " The S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e , op. c i t . , pp. 48-49. 244Wahlke, e t a 1. , o p . ci t . , pp. 385-386 . These w r i t e r s s u g g e s t , also t h a t i t is a " v i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n " t h a t p a r ty competition c r e a t e s s i t u a t i o n s in which " s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s will p e r c e iv e the p o l i t i c a l p a r ty as a sponsor of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e c a r e e r s . . . (and) will not (so) 234 a g r e e : The model of a r e s p o n s i b l e tw o-party s ystem -- d i s c i p l i n e d and u n i f i e d p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g genuine p o lic y a l t e r n a t i v e s - - i s met more n early in c e r t a i n Northern s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s than in Congress. . . These s t a t e s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a high degree of u r b a n i z a t i o n , impressive i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , and c o m p e titiv e tw o - p a rty s y s t e m s . 245 If more c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s a c t u a l l y do produce l e q i s l a t o r s more prone to p a r t y - l i n e v o t i n g , the e x p l a n a tion for t h i s may l i e more in the s t r o n g e r party o r g a n i z a tion which tends to p r e v a i l in com p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s than in c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s per s e . Decrying the lack of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h in safe Democratic d i s t r i c t s , Eugene Wyman, former chairman of the C a l i f o r n i a Democratic S t a t e Central Committee, remarked t h a t in " j u s t those areas where the v o l u n t e e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s are the weakest . . . we have the h i g h e s t p r o p o rt i o n of Democratic r e g i s t r a n t s . " 246 p e rceive i n t e r e s t groups an d /o r f r i e n d s or a s s o c i a t e s . " I b i d . , pp. 119-120. 24 50p. c i t . , p. 286 . 246Taped i n t e r v i e w , February 4, 1963, p r i n t e d in Bernard L. Hyink, e t al . , P o l i t i c s and Government in Cali forni a , f o u rth ed. ( N. Y . : Thomas Y. Crowell Co . , 1965), p. 262. Wyman's view has been s t a t i s t i c a l l y sub s t a n t i a t e d . "Democratic club s t r e n g t h tends to be con c e n t r a t e d in Republican a r e a s . In Los Angeles, the th re e most h e a v ily Democratic assembly d i s t r i c t s had an average of 1.0 CDC (the s t r o n g e s t Democratic v o l u n t e e r o r g a n i z a ti o n ) members while the four most h e a v i l y Republican areas had an average of n e a r l y 17.2 CDC members." James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press", 1962), pp. 21T9-260 . 235 In 1950, Lt. Governor Glenn M. Anderson made the p o i n t t h a t d i s t r i c t s which are "too safe for an incumbent . . . are not good for e i t h e r par ty" because the apathy bdrn of a campaign whose outcome is a foregone con cl usion i n h i b i t s e f f e c t i v e v o te r t u r n o u t d r i v e s . 247 Agreeing, a spokesman f o r the chairman of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee spoke of safe d i s t r i c t s producing " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l w e a k n e s s . " 248 I t is re a so n a b le to assume t h a t pa rty i n f l u e n c e over incumbent l e g i s l a t o r s is g r e a t e r in marginal d i s t r i c t s than in s a fe ones, b ecau se, in the former, p a r ty o r g a n i z a tio n is more e f f e c t i v e and i t s s u p p o rt more e s s e n t i a l to e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y . But, e s p e c i a l l y in p o l i t i c s , the p l a u s i b l e is not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , and re se arch summaries are f r a u g h t with c a u t i o u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Malcolm E. de w e ll, f o r example, s t a t e s r a t h e r i n c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t in " s t a t e s with two s tr o n g p a r t i e s , those with the most i n t e n s e p a r ty com p e titio n are not n e c e s s a r i l y those with 24 7T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , o p . c i t . , p. 88-89. Stephen E. Smith a f fi r m e d t h a t safe d i s t r i c t s m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t e f f e c t i v e g e t - o u t - t h e - v o t e d r i v e s , e s p e c i a l l y im p o rtan t in s t a t e - w i d e campaigns, and c i t e d the d i s t r i c t s r e p r e s e n t e d by Assemblymen D i l l s , Thomas and, p r i o r to 1962, Hawkins as i l l u s t r a t i o n s . Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . 248Allen S i e r o t y , T r a n s c r i p t of H e a r i n g , op. c i t . , p. 137. John K r e h b i e l , in 1 960 Chai rman of the Cali forni a Republican S t a t e Central Committee, also expressed a p r e f e r e n c e f o r marginal d i s t r i c t s to the degree compatible with "community i n t e r e s t " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I b id . , p. 166. the h i g h e s t l e v e l s of p a r t y v o t i n g . " 2149 However equivocal , such an as sessment is most prud en t. Par ty co hes iven ess in l e g i s l a t i v e voting is probably i n f l u e n c e d by d i s t r i c t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , but seems a f f e c t e d also by o t h e r more or less independent v a r i a b l e s . One of th ese may be the s t r e n g t h of party o r g a n i z a t i o n . Others are the degree to which Democratic-Republican d i v i s i o n s are r e i n f o r c e d by u r b a n - r u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s , the a b i l i t y of the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e to "induce u n i t y in his p a r t y , " and the type of iss u e on which the l e g i s l a t u r e is voti ng. 2 50 To the degree t h a t party cohesiveness may be in fl u e n c e d by c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , t h i s depends most, p e r h a p s, upon the kind of c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t . I f i t is co mpeti t i v e because of i t s h e t e r o g e n e i t y , i t may produce c o n f l i c ti n g c o n s t i t u e n c y p r e s s u r e s which the l e g i s l a t o r will re so lv e by voting with his p a r t y . But i f the d i s t r i c t is c o m p e titiv e because of an homogenous, moderate, middle- c l a s s p o p u l a t i o n s u b j e c t e d to socioeconomic impulses about e q u a l l y s tr ong toward each of the two p a r t i e s , then the l e g i s l a t o r may be tempted to vote f r e q u e n t l y with the 249"party Voting in American S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s , " APSR, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 791. 250Loc. c i t . As demonstrated in Chapter VI, p a r t y cohesion i n the Cali forni a Assembly seems r e l a t e d to d i s t r i c t s a f e t y . I n f r a , p. 387. 237 o p p o s i t i o n p a r ty in o r d e r to p r o j e c t a moderate i m a g e . 251 P a r t i e s as p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s . --T here is as much disagr eemen t about what kind of d i s t r i c t s produce c l e a r cut p o lic y d i f f e r e n c e s as about the kind which produce party co h esiveness in l e g i s l a t i v e v o tin g . On the one hand, s t u d i e s by Samuel P. H u n t i n g t o n 252 and J u d i t h A. S t r a i n 253 i n d i c a t e t h a t members of the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from h i g h ly c o m p e t i t i v e , marginal d i s t r i c t s show the most marked i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s - - t h e Republicans from such d i s t r i c t s voting the most c o n s e r v a t i v e l y and the Democrats vo tin g l e a s t so. On the o t h e r hand, Froman's a n a l y s i s found t h a t "the more c o m p e titiv e the d i s t r i c t , the less l i k e l y are s t r a i g h t c o n s e r v a t i v e or l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n s , " 254 and MacRae's study of the 251See the d i s c u s s i o n of th e se two types of com p e t i t i v e d i s t r i c t s , s u p r a , p. 225 . Note a lso Froman's somewhat s i m i l a r d i s c u s s i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e voting m o t i v a t i o n , op. c i t . , p. 115. The e t h n i c composition of d i s t r i c t s is also s i g n i f i c a n t . See, f o r example, the discus sion of Jewish predominance in Wilson, op. c i t . , pp. 263-267. In C a l i f o r n i a , t h e r e seems to be a r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and homogeneity which conforms to t h i s h y p o t h e s i s . I n f r a , pp. 429-430. 252"A Revised Theory of American P arty P o l i t i c s , " APSR, Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (September, 1 950), pp. 669-677. 2 5 3The Nature of P o l i t i c a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . , B.A. t h e s i s , c i t e d in Keefe and Ogul, op. c i t . , pp. 288-289. 2540p. c i t ., p. 117. 238 M assachu setts lower house seems to a g r e e . 255 There are many f a c t o r s o t h e r than c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , of c o u r s e , which might c o n s t i t u t e v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g the d o c t r i n a l and p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between l e g i s l a t i v e p a r t i e s , and which might account p a r t i a l l y for th e se d isc r ep an eies in r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s . P e r s o n a l i t i e s of incumbents, p r e s s u r e group i n f l u e n c e , and the c h a r a c t e r and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of f l o o r l e a d e r s h i p are obvious examples. I t is worth no ti ng t h a t the h e t e r o g e n e i t y or homo g e n e i t y of c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t s prov ides a p o t e n t i a l l y useful key to the mystery of c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence in t h i s ar ea as well as o t h e r s p r e v i o u s l y noted. The h y p o th e sis is t h a t a hig h ly heterog eneous c o m p etitiv e d i s t r i c t w i l l permit the incumbent to take a more extreme s t a n d - - a t e i t h e r the l e f t or r i g h t of the p o l i t i c a l co ntinuum --then a homogenous c o m p e titiv e d i s t r i c t . A heterog en eo us c o n s t i t u e n c y will c ontain some p o pular c o u n t e r p a r t s to almost any p o lic y p o s i t i o n i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e may wish to esp o u se; he can seldom a l i e n a t e every p o s s i b l e power base w ith in his d i s t r i c t . But a homogenous y e t c o m p e t i t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c y is by i t s very n a t u r e mod er at e, and p r e c lu d e s extremism of any s o r t as a p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r i t s e l e c t e d 1egi s i a t o r . 2 5 5C ited s u p r a , p. 180. 239 I t should be n o t e d , f i n a l l y , t h a t t h e r e are two p o s s i b l e although d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed r e l a t i o n s h i p s between party co hes iveness and the p a r ty as an embodiment o f a c l e a r l y d e l i n e a t e d p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e . F i r s t , i f l e g i s l a t o r s b o l t t h e i r p a r t y to vote with the o p p o s it i o n party in s i g n i f i c a n t numbers, t h i s ob viously obscures meaningful i n t e r - p a r t y p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s . Yet, as J u l i u s Turner has p e r s u a s i v e l y warned, t h i s may be the p r i c e of m a in ta in in g e f f e c t i v e t w o -p arty co m p e titio n in c e r t a i n a r e as: Only a Democrat who r e j e c t s at l e a s t a p a r t of the F a i r Deal can ca r ry Kansas and only a Republican who moderates the Republican platfo rm can c a r r y Massachu s e t t s . 2 56 Second, i f l e g i s l a t o r s b o l t t h e i r p a r t y to vote in o p p o s i t i o n to a b i p a r t i s a n co nc ensus, t h i s i l l u m i n a t e s and e x a g g era te s meaningful p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between the two p a r t i e s . For Sen at or Goldwater to vote a g a i n s t the Civil Rights Act or for Senator Morse to oppose a u t h o r i z a t i o n of conti nued m i l i t a r y a c t i o n in Vietnam tends to sharpen r a t h e r than b l u r the d i s t i n c t i o n between the p a r t i e s and thus has q u i t e the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t of a vote by Sen at or Lausche in fav or of the open shop or one by S en a to r J a v i t s in favo r of r e n t s u b s i d i e s . Party cohesion tends to promote i n t e r - p a r t y p o licy d i f f e r e n c e s when i t p r events 2 56 " Res p o n s i b 1e P a r t i e s : A D is sent from the F l o o r , " APSR, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (March, 1951), p. 151. 240 d e f e c t i o n in the i d e o l o q i c a l d i r e c t i o n of the o t h e r p a r t y ; i t undermines them when i t p r events d e f e c t i o n in the i d e o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n o p p o s ite from the o t h e r p a r t y . P a r t i e s as c o u n t e r v a i l i n g power.--The case for p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t s most s e c u r e l y , p e rh a p s, on the p o l i t i c a l p r o p e n s i t i e s of the people. Few v o te rs are aware of s p e c i f i c iss u e s or are f a m i l i a r with i n d i v i d u a l p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . Yet most of them have f i x e d , a l b e i t vague, p e r c e p t i o n s of the two major p a r t i e s and a s s o c i a t e a general p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n with each of them. They vote f o r c a n d i d a t e s p r i m a r i l y on the b a s is of t h e i r party a f f i l i a t i o n 257 and i t is t h e r e f o r e a cogent argument t h a t a l e g i s l a t o r b e t r a y s his e l e c t o r s when he votes more in accordance with the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y ' s p l atfo rm then in pursuance of his own. Other advantages of powerful p a r t i e s are almost e q u a l l y compelling. They may r e c r u i t competent p e r s o n n e l , provide a li n k between l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e b ra n c h e s, help c o o r d i n a t e n a t i o n a l and s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , educate the e l e c t o r a t e , a s s i s t in p o lic y f o r m u l a t i o n , provide a 257Lewis A. Froman, J r . , People and P o l i t i c s (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1 962) , p. 96. Jewell a s s e r t s t h a t the " b e s t means of making the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e r e s p o n s i b l e to the v o t e r s is a v ia b le tw o - p a rty system . . . because the p a r t i e s have t r a d i t i o n s , r e c o r d s , and programs t h a t are . . . meaningful to the v o t e r . The p a r t i e s stand f o r something . . . (and) provide c o n t i n u i t y while c a n d i d a t e s come and go." The S t a t e Leqi s 1a t u r e , op. c i t . , pp. 6-7. 241 loyal o p p o s i t i o n , and fa sh io n a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y . 258 The p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , moreover, has been p r a i s e d as "one of the heroes of modern democracy" l a r g e l y because i t f u n c t i o n s "as an extremely v a lu a b le broker in the process of accom m o d a t i o n . " 259 Although these s e r v i c e s which p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are capable of performing are not c o l l e c t i v e l y synonomous with p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , they are ones from which g r e a t e r b e n e f i t might be de rived i f a h i g h e r degree of p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y were a t t a i n e d . But i m p re s s i v e , or even i n v a l u a b l e , as these p o s i t i v e a s s e t s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t y power may be, the case f o r s tro n g p a r t i e s d e r i v e s a d d i t i o n a l force from the role of the p a r ty as a c o u n te rw e ig h t a g a i n s t o t h e r a l l e g e d l y l e ss b e n e f i c e n t i n f l u e n c e s . Thus Willoughby contends t h a t "the most e f f e c t i v e way of ( c o n t r o l l i n g the i n f l u e n c e of) s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . . . l i e s in the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of p a r t y government as a c o n tro l of l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n . " 260 258Most of the se f u n c t io n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and a d d i t i o n a l ones as w e l l , are d isc u s s e d in Clinton R o s s i t e r , P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s in America ( I t h a c a , N.V.: Cornell Urn vers i ty T r e ss , I 960 H 2 5 9Riemer, op. c i t ., pp. 109-110. 2 6 0 0 p. c i t . , p. 56. Wahlke and his a s s o c i a t e s conclude t h a t t h e i r study of the C a l i f o r n i a , New J e r s e y and Ohio l e g i s l a t u r e s confirms "the o f t - s t a t e d h y p o th esis t h a t the i n f l u e n c e of p r e s s u r e groups is weakened by a s tr o n g p a r t y system." Op. c i t . , p. 323. Keefe and Ogul ag ree. Op. ci t . , pp. 305 and 474. 242 S i m i l a r l y , Emery b e l i e v e d t h a t one of the "most e f f e c t i v e causes lead in g . . . to a r e l a t i v e l e s s e n i n g of the demands of p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i c t s is the i n c r e a s e d n e c e s s i t y of s t r i c t p a r t y l o y a l t y . " 261 Perhaps th e r e is no o t h e r c o n t e n t i o n commanding such wide and e n t h u s i a s t i c agreement among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s as t h a t which a s s e r t s the i n d i s p e n s i b i 1i t y of p a r t i e s to modern government and the ge neral d e s i r a b i l i t y of p a r ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s e f f e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i n g . But t h e r e is profound disagreem ent as to the e x t e n t of power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which p a r t i e s a c t u a l l y p o s s e s s . I r o n i c a l l y , at a time when s t u d e n t s of p o l i t i c s are s t r i v i n g for e m p iric a l e x a c t i t u d e more a s s i d u o u s l y than ev e r b e f o r e , they are fin d in g agreement on t h i s m a t t e r only in the area of normative commitment. Most noteworthy among the works which lament the e x i s t i n g lack of p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in American p o l i t i c s is the r e p o r t a u t h o r i z e d by the American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n . This recommended, among o t h e r suggested r efo rm s, t h a t p a r t i e s s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e over members by denying p o l i c y d i s s i d e n t s s e a t s in the National Conventions and im p o rta n t committee po sts in C o n g r e s s . 262 261 Op. ci t . , pp. 101-102. 262Committee on P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , op. c i t . , p. 23. See, a l s o , the recommendations of Stephen K. B a i 1e y , The Condition of Our National P a r t i e s (N.Y.: The Fund f o r the Rep u b lic, 1 959 ), pp. 12-16 . Other o b s e r v e r s , however, see a d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l panorama when they view the American p a r t y system. From t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e , p a r t i e s are i n f l u e n t i a l , r e asonably cohesive and undeniably d u r a b l e . J u l i u s Turner a t t a c k e s most v i g o ro u s l y the assumption t h a t Democrats and Re p u b li cans are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e in program and a s s e r t s t h a t , c o n t r a r y to m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n , t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t between our major p a r t i e s . While i t is t ru e t h a t American d i s c i p l i n e f a l l s s h o r t of t h a t in some European democracies . . . evidence of g r e a t p a r t y i n f l u e n c e can s t i l l be found. Party p r e s s u r e seems to be more e f f e c t i v e than any o t h e r p r e s s u r e on co n g r ess io n a l v o t i n g . 263 Although in C a l i f o r n i a " p a r ty i n f l u e n c e is not judged to be i m p o r t a n t , " even t h i s s t a t e produced evidence t h a t "Democratic and Republican l e g i s l a t o r s d i f f e r q u i t e sh a rp ly in i d e o l o g i c a l t e r m s . " 264 Of the s i x t e e n party groupings in the e i g h t s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e chambers in New J e r s e y , Ohio, C a l i f o r n i a , and Tennessee, i t was d is cove red t h a t the Golden S t a t e ' s Assembly Democrats were most l i b e r a l of a l l , i t s Senate Democrats second in l i b e r a l i s m , 26 3Part,y and C o n s titu e n cy : P re ss u res on Congress ( B a l t i m o r e : The Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1951), p. 23. S e e , a l s o , Edward C. B a n f i e l d , "In defense of the American Par ty System," Robert A. Goldwin, e d . , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , U.S.A. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), pp. £1-39. Party l o y a l t y is confirmed as a dominant Congressional i n f l u e n c e by David B. Truman. He a s s e r t s t h a t the " p a r t y lab el is the s i n g l e most r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of . . . voting be h a v i o r . " "The S t a t e Deleg at ions and the S t r u c t u r e of Par ty Voting in the U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , " APSR, Vol. L, No, 4 (December, 1956), p. 1,023. 264Wahlke, e t a l ., op. ci t . , p. 354. 244 and i t s Republican Assemblymen and Sen at ors nin th and t h i r t e e n t h r e s p e c t i v e l y . 265 The comparative study from which th ese f i g u r e s were drawn was conducted in 1957. Six ye a rs l a t e r C a l i f o r n i a Assembly Speaker J e ss e Unruh i n d i c a t e d t h a t p a r t i e s were s t i l l in t h e i r ascendancy by a l l e g i n g t h a t p r e s s u r e group i n f l u e n c e was d e c l i n i n g , in p a r t due to the development of more able party l e a d e r s h i p . 266 U n q u a lif ie d c o n c lu s io n s are always d i f f i c u l t re g a rd in g phenomena c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s c h o l a r l y di sa greem ent. But i t seems j u s t i f i e d to end t h i s a n a l y s i s by a c a u t i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n of the b e l i e f t h a t p a r ty s t r e n g t h looms i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e as at l e a s t a p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e c o u n te r b a la n c e a g a i n s t the i n f l u e n c e of p r e s s u r e grou ps, p r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s and o th er source s of l e g i s l a t i v e c o e r c i o n . N a t i o n a l l y , Democrats led by P r e s i d e n t Johnson have demonstrated t h e i r c a p a c i t y , given the lar g e Congres sio nal m a j o r i t y won in 1964, to e n a c t a l e g i s l a t i v e program consonant with the p r i n c i p l e s which have s e p a r a t e d t h e i r p arty most ob viously from the Republicans ev er sin c e the days of the New Deal. In C a l i f o r n i a , p a r t y d i f f e r e n c e s have seemed i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r cut since Republicans d r a m a t i c a l l y r e p u d i a t e d the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of Governors 2 6 5 1 b i d . , p. 372 . 2 6 6Taped i n t e r v i e w , March 1 , 1 963 , Hyink, e t a l . , op. c i t . , pp. 266-269 . 245 Johnson and Warren with the nomination of Sen at or William Knowland to succeed Governor Knight in 1958. Yet i f t h e r e is s t i l l doubt as to the presence of party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as an e m p iric a l f a c t , t h e r e are p r e s c r i p t i o n s in abundance designed to assure i t s enhan ce ment in the f u t u r e . Final a s s e s s m e n t .--The i n f e r e n c e t h a t par ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has a s a l u t a r y e f f e c t on most r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals is i n e v i t a b l e from the fore going d i s c u s s i o n . Some e x p l i c i t l y d e fin e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s are now in o r d e r . Although e q u a l i t y and i n d i v i d u a l freedom seem to have l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p to p a r ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , m a j o r i t y rule seems v i r t u a l l y synonomous with i t . Our p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s co nfer only upon a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for b u i l d i n g a m a j o r i t y out of the dozens of i n t e r e s t s , i d e a s , s e c t i o n s , and d i s t r i c t s t h a t are u b i q u ito u s in the d i v e r s i t y and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of American p o l i t i c s . To o b ta in a m a j o r i t y , compromise is e s s e n t i a l among these heterogen eo us f o r c e s , and the p a r ty is f i t t e d by both p r o c l i v i t y and e x p e rie n c e to s t r i k e those kinds of com promise which are the most reasonable and en during. The complement of p a r ty r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y is p a r ty c r i t i c i s m in the t r a d i t i o n of loyal o p p o s i t i o n . This i n s u r e s i n t e r - p a r t y c o m p eti tio n which, of a l l the v a r i e t i e s 246 of c o m p e t i t i o n , is perhaps most v i a b l e and e f f e c t i v e . I t a s s u r e s choice and r e a l i s t i c a c c o u n t a b i 1i t y . S t r u c t u r a l and procedural e f f i c i e n c y is probably promoted by party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , s in c e the p a r t y prov ides an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l framework through which c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y imposed blocks and checks among va rious governmental u n i t s may be p a r t i a l l y overcome and o f f s e t . F i n a l l y , l e g i s l a t i v e competence may well be enhanced by p a r ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because p a r t i e s a ct as brokers of p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t , encouraging t h e i r b es t and s m a r t e s t to seek o f f i c e in o rd e r to maximize t h e i r p r o s p e c t of v i c t o r y . Moreover, as Stimson B u l l i t t has observ ed, t h e r e i s , f o r good men a s t r o n g e r i n c e n t i v e to jump i n t o the fray when the two major p a r t i e s are s h a r p l y d ivid ed by i s s u e s . . . A c l e a r - c u t d i v i s i o n r e c r u i t s not only more p o l i t i c i a n s but b e t t e r o n e s . 267 The fo llo w in g c o n c lu s io n s seem w arra n ted r e g a rd i n g party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s. i 1. Mandated: a policy -m ak ing m a j o r i t y . 2. Endorsed: compromise, c o m p e t i t i o n , e f f i c i e n c y , and competence. 3. N e u tr al: e q u a l i t y and freedom. 4. Discouraged: none. 267To Be A P o l i t i c i a n (N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, I n c . , 1959), p. 23. This is a s u b j e c t i v e , i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c , even i n t u i t i v e account of the p o l i t i c a l process as seen by a b r i l l i a n t former p a r t i c i p a n t . 247 Conclusi ons This survey of app ortionmen t models, t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s and the degree to which they advance or r e t a r d the a t t a i n m e n t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals is one which y i e l d s s everal t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s io n s . The p r e f e r r e d m odels. --Most i m p o r t a n t l y , per hap s, the in fo rm a tio n thus f a r examined i n d i c a t e s some r e l a t i o n sh ip s between the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals i d e n t i f i e d in Chapter II and the app or tionm en t models d isc u s s e d in t h i s c h a p t e r and the preceding one. These r e l a t i o n s h i p s su ggest t h a t c e r t a i n appor tionm ent plans c o n t r i b u t e to the f u l f i l l ment of s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system more than o t h e r s . Yet they dem onstrate also t h a t no s i n g l e app ortionmen t model can f u r t h e r all th ese o b j e c t i v e s . The "best" ones are t h e r e f o r e those which aid the a t t a i n m e n t of the most goals while impeding the r e a l i z a t i o n of the fewest. In de term in ing the r e l a t i v e d e s i r a b i l i t y of a p p o r tionment p a t t e r n s , the number of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals which disc o u ra g e each one was s u b t r a c t e d from the number of goals which seem to mandate and endorse each one ( i . e . , mandated plus endo rsed, minus d i s c o u r a g e d ) . When t h i s r e s u l t e d in a numerical t i e in the ranking of models, p r e f e r e n c e was given to those which seem mandated r a t h e r than merely en dorsed, by the most g o a l s ; i f t h i s f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h a p r e f e r e n c e , those models were p r e f e r r e d which seem most 248 congenial to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals 1-3 r a t h e r than 4-7. Such a methodology produces the r a n k - o r d e r i n d i c a t e d below. 1. Par ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This model seems r e q u ire d or mandated by m a j o ri t y ru le and endorsed by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of compromise, c o m p e t i t i o n , e f f i c i e n c y and competence. I t is disc ouraged by none of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s 268 and thus may be assig n ed a numerical value of f i v e . 2. Informed membership. Competence mandates t h i s model, which is a l s o endorsed by freedom, compromise and e f f i c i e n c y . No r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals seem to disc o u ra g e i t , 259 r e s u l t i n g in a sco re of fo u r. 3. One-man, o n e -v o te . Any ranking of t h i s e qual- p o p u la tio n model among var ious apportionment p a t t e r n s i s , in a s e n se , an e x e r c i s e in p e d a n t i c f u t i l i t y because i t is the only one to which the Supreme Court has compelled co m p li ance. I t is i n t r i g u i n g , however, t h a t what has been adjudged as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i m p e ra tiv e is l e ss im p o rta n t in terms of the t o t a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals employed in t h i s s tu d y , 2 6 8S u p r a , pp. 245-246. 2 6 9 1 bi d . , pp. 164-1 66 . 249 than the two app ortionmen t models enumerated above. I t remains, n o n e t h e l e s s , more s i g n i f i cant than most of the nine a l t e r n a t i v e ones examined h e r e , mandated by e q u a l i t y and m a jo r i t y r u l e , endorsed by e f f i c i e n c y , and d i s couraged only by compromise.270 Like a vigorous m i n o r i t y , t h i s one-man, on e-vote model produces a score of two, but is ranked above the m i n o ri t y model because the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l goals which mandate i t are i n t r i n s i c demoera t i c assumptions r a t h e r than implemen tation al requi r e m e n t s . 4. Vigorous m i n o r i t y . This is mandated by freedom and c o m p e t i t i o n , endorsed by compromise, but d isc o u rag e d by m a j o r i t y r u l e , y i e l d i n g a ne t score of t w o . 271 5. Experienced membership. This model is an i n e v i t a b l e d e r i v a t i v e of the competence g o a l, and is endorsed by d e d i c a t i o n to both freedom and compromise. I t r e p r e s e n t s an o b s t a c l e to co m p etiti o n and e f f i c i e n c y , n o n e t h e l e s s , and w a r r a n t s , t h e r e f o r e , a value of o n e . 272 2 70 Ibi d ., pp. 116-120. 2 711b i d . , pp. 1 47-1 50. 2 72 1 bi d ., p. 177. I 250 6. Functional m a j o r i t y . This apportionmen t p lan , l i k e the two d i s c u s s e d immediately below, is scored zero because i t d iscourages the a t t a i n ment of as many goals as i t f a c i l i t a t e s . Yet i t must be accorded a h i g h e r r a t i n g than those which fo llo w , because i t is mandated by a policy-making m a j o r i t y asse s sed here as a more i n d i s p e n s i b l e component of democracy than those which seem to r e q u i r e the appor tionmen t models d i sc u s s e d below. A f u n c t i o n a l m a j o ri t y f a c i l i t a t e s e f f i c i e n c y but has a s l i g h t l y adverse e f f e c t upon freedom and c o m p e t i t i o n . 273 7. Accommodation of i n t e r e s t s . While mandated by compromise and endorsed by the need f o r a policy-making m a j o r i t y , t h i s model is d i s couraged by goal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of c om petition and freedom. I t thus has a score of z e r o . 274 8. Local r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Apportionment based on loca l government boundaries seems mandated by none of the seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals and endorsed by freedom and c o m p e titio n . Eq u a li ty 2 7 31bi d . , pp. 1 35-1 38. 27HIbi d . , pp. 184-186. and a policy -m aking m a j o r i t y d iscourage i t , with a r e s u l t i n g s c o re of z e r o . 275 9. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system a p p o r tio n e d in a way which g u a ra n te e s the e f f e c t i v e advocacy of the i n t e r e s t s of economic or e t h n i c i n t e r e s t s seems d iscouraged by fiv e of the e s t a b l i s h e d g o a l s - - a policy-making m a j o r i t y , e q u a l i t y , competence, compromise and e f f i c i e n c y . Since i t is mandated and endorsed only by co m p e titio n and freedom r e s p e c t i v e l y , i t is a s sig n e d a score of minus t h r e e . This makes i t the l e a s t d e s i r a b l e of the nine a p p o r tionment s ta n d a r d s examined h e r e i n , at l e a s t in terms of the c r i t e r i a which have been employed. 276 A normative a s s e s s m e n t . --The major import of the l a s t two c h a p t e r s may be s t a t e d b r i e f l y : none of the nine app or tionm en t models appear to enhance the a t t a i n m e n t of a l l seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s . I t might be t e n t a t i v e l y con cluded , th en , t h a t a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e in which a t l e a s t two d i f f e r e n t apportionm en t systems may be employed wi ll f u r t h e r the advance toward a broad range of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t than a unicameral one. P a r t i c u l a r 2 751 b i d . , pp. 229-230. 2 76 Ibi d . , pp. 203-204. 252 emphasis, moreover, should be placed on those types of apportionment which encourage the development of party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and an informed l e g i s l a t i v e membership, for i t is these t h a t seem most conducive to the a t t a i n m e n t of the most r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a ls. Three r e s e r v a t i o n s must be noted at t h i s p o i n t . I t must be acknowledged, f i r s t of a l l , t h a t ap portionment alone is an inadequate and of te n i n a p p r o p r i a t e means to a t t a i n many of the ends e n v isio n e d in democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . No m a t t e r how s e a t s are a l l o c a t e d or boundaries drawn, in all p r o b a b i l i t y appo rtionmen t can accomplish l i t t l e i f i t s o b j e c t i v e s are thwarted by p u b l i c apathy , o f f i c i a l v e n a l i t y , or i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a r r i e r s o u t s i d e the l e g i s l a t u r e . Apportionment can less change the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e than be changed by i t . I t should be conceded, s e c o n d l y , t h a t the a s s e s s ment of the r e l a t i v e value of appo rtion men t models in terms of c e r t a i n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals e n t a i l s obvious p i t f a l l s . The s e l e c t i o n of both the models and the goals by which they were judged might be q u e s t i o n e d . The goals were s u b j e c t i v e l y deduced from a l a r g e r body of democratic theory. The models were i n d u c t i v e l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d from r e se a r c h data and personal o b s e r v a t i o n s which r e p r e s e n t a l a r g e but not i n c l u s i v e mass of e m pirical apportionment evi den ce. The judgements of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a given app ortionmen t model and va rious r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals 253 were sup ported by e x p e r t testim on y and s t a t i s t i c a l evidence to as g r e a t a degree as p o s s i b l e , but a degree which f a l l s s t i l l s h o r t of the cannons of c o n c lu s iv e proof. The scholai— his values and emotional p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s - - m a y have i n t r u d e d too much upon his s c h o l a r s h i p . F i n a l l y , assuming even t h a t apportionm en t is capable of a t t a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals and t h a t the s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them are as s t a t e d , the r e a l i t i e s of the p o l i t i c o - l e g a l environment of the mid- 1960' s in C a l i f o r n i a may pre c lu d e the kind of apportionment which is most d e s i r a b l e . I t is to t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which the next c h a p t e r is ad d ressed . -c: / CHAPTER V THE MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS OF REAPPORTIONMENT The l a s t two c h a p t e r s e s t a b l i s h e d a h i e r a r c h y of t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e apportionment models. These must be a s s e s s e d , however, w ith in the l i m i t a t i o n s of what is f e a s i b l e in terms of a p a r t i c u l a r l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t e x t . As C a l i f o r n i a faced the concluding years of the 1960's i t was con fro n ted with l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l , and demographic l i m i t a t i o n s in i t s app ortionm en t d e l i b e r a t i o n s . Legal Compu1sion Few i s s u e s have e l i c i t e d so large a body of j u d i c i a l l i t e r a t u r e in so s h o r t a time as appor tionm en t. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court decided in Colegrove v. Green1 t h a t the whole q u e s ti o n was a " p o l i t i c a l t h i c k e t " w ith in the e x c l u s i v e domaine of the l e g i s l a t i v e branch. Yet J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r , w r i t i n g fo r a four to th re e m a j o r i t y in t h a t c a se, had his a u t h o r i t y undermined by a c oncurring opinion of J u s t i c e Rutledge f i l l e d with s i g n i f i cant q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . J 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 254 255 I t is r a t h e r unusual t h a t such a c lo se vo te, dea lin g with a m a t t e r so v i t a l to the whole p o l i t i c a l system, should have p r e v a i l e d so long. Through MacDougal1 v. Green , 2 South v. Peters , 3 and Gomi I l i a n v. Li g h t f o o t 1 * apportionment cases were decided on grounds narrow enough to preclude a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Co leg ro v e. In 1962 in the t w i l i g h t of his h i s t o r i c a l l y memorable c a r e e r , the d i s t i n g u i s h e d F r a n k f u r t e r found him s e l f speaking a g a i n s t a six man m a j o r i t y determined to re v e rs e his s ix t e e n y e a r old apportionm ent d o c t r i n e . The case was Baker v. C a r r 5 in which J u s t i c e Brennan denied t h a t apportionment was a n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e q u e s t i o n . Such was the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the iss u e and the p u n c t i l i o u s n e s s of the co urt t h a t f iv e o t h e r judges wrote co ncurrences and d i s s e n t s in the course of pronouncing a f i n a l six to two v e r d i c t . J u s t i c e W hitac er , in i l l h e a l t h and less than a week away from r e t i r e m e n t , f a i l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e , but his b r e t h r e n wrote e i g h t y - n i n e pages of comment in six d i f f e r e n t o p in io n s. Baker was decided on the narro w est of grounds and held only t h a t s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t was not 2335 U.S. 281 ( 1948). 3339 U.S. 276 (1950). 4364 U.S. 339 (1960). 581 S. Ct. 691 (1962). 256 immune to j u d i c i a l cognizance in the l i g h t of the 14th Amendment's equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e . P r e d i c t a b l y , i t opened the l i t i g a t i o n f l o o d - g a t e s to s i m i l a r c a s e s. I t was c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d by lower c o u r ts to r e q u i r e t h a t at l e a s t one house of a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e had to be ap p o r tioned on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s , and was met by " o v e r whelmingly f a v o ra b l e " p u b l i c and press r e a c t i o n . Within fiv e months, cases had been i n s t i t u t e d in h a l f the s t a t e s , appo rtion men t laws had been i n v a l i d a t e d in 14 s t a t e s and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s had been voided in s i x . 6 "More p r o g r e s s , " one w r i t e r observed , "has been made in six months than had occurre d in the p a s t 60 y e a r s . " 7 In B a k e r , only J u s t i c e Black and Chief J u s t i c e Warren had thwarted impulses to comment on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of apportionm en t. Their r e s t r a i n t was s h o r t - l i v e d . Two years l a t e r Black wrote f o r a 6-3 m a j o r i t y t h a t c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t s had to be ap p o r tio n e d on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s 8 and Warren made the most s i g n i f i c a n t pronouncement of a l l in Reynolds v. Si ms, 9 a lso in 1 964, in which he proclaimed t h a t both houses of s t a t e 6C. Herman P r i t c h e t t , "Prayers and P o l i t i c s : The Supreme Court, 1961-1962," 1963-1964 American Government Annual , Jack W. P etaso n , ed~ ( N. Y. : Holt, Rinehart and Winston , 1963), p. 14. 71 b i d . , pp. 21-22. 8Wesberry v. S a n d e r s , 376 U.S. 1 ( 1964). 984 S. Ct. 1362. 257 l e g i s l a t u r e s had to honor the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e . On June 15 of t h a t y e a r the c o u r t ru le d on six d i f f e r e n t apportionment c a s e s , of which Rey n o l ds was c l e a r l y the leading one, consuming 126 pages of o p i n i o n s , and r a i s i n g to 215 pages the o f f i c i a l Supreme Court commentary on s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e ap portionment w r i t t e n in l e ss than 27 months. Of the 12 judges on the high c o u r t from 1962 through 1966, only W hitacer , White, Goldberg and Fortas f a i l e d to f i l e an opinion in such c a s e s . 10 The j u d i c i a l f i n d i n g s . --The net impact of th ese d e c i s i o n s has been, most i m p o r t a n t l y , to r e q u i r e t h a t all s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s must be e l e c t e d from d i s t r i c t s ap prox imately equal in p o p u la tio n to those from which all t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s in the same chamber are e l e c t e d . In the six cases decided in 1964, t h i s r u le commanded the un- d e y i a t i n g commitment of six j u s t i c e s - - W a r r e n , Brennan, Douglas, Black, White and Goldberg. There is no reason to doubt, as y e t , t h a t Fortas wil l vote o t h e r w i s e . Only J u s t i c e Harlan has defended the i n i t i a l F r a n k f u r t e r p o s i tio n t h a t the whole i s s u e is a n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n . Clark and S t e w a r t , however, have not endorsed the one-man, one-vote dictum. The former s t a t e d in Baker t h a t app ortionmen t need only be on a " r a t i o n a l b a s i s , " avoiding the "crazy q u i l t " p a t t e r n s he d e t e c t e d in 10White and Goldberg were appo inted a f t e r Baker and Fortas re p la c e d Goldberg a f t e r Reyn olds. 258 Tennessee d i s t r i c t i n g . "Not b e l i e v i n g t h a t numerical e q u a l i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n thro ughout a s t a t e is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d , " he wrote, "I would not apply such a s t a n d a r d . " 11 In WMCA v. Lomenzo, 12 decided the same day as Reyno 1d s , Clark r e a ff i rm e d his o p p o s it i o n "to the a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of the 'one-man, o n e - v o t e ' p r i n c i p l e for both houses of a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . " To hirn, the only a p p o r t i o n ment denying equal p r o t e c t i o n in v i o l a t i o n of the Fourteenth Amendment is t h a t which is " e s s e n t i a l l y a r b i t r a r y . " 13 J u s t i c e Stewar t has ex p ressed e s s e n t i a l l y the same views. To him the co u rt m a j o r i t y is "woefully wrong" and i t s a s s e r t i o n t h a t equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r equal numbers c o n s t i t u t e s the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of re p u b lic a n g o v er n ment "is not c o r r e c t , simply as m a t t e r of f a c t . " 14 The equal p r o t e c t i o n c lause demands but two ba sic a t t r i b u t e s . . . . The (appo rtionmen t) plan must be a r a t i o n a l one. Secondly, . . . the plan must . . . not . . . permit the s y s t e m a t i c f r u s t r a t i o n of the w ill of a m a j o r i t y of the e l e c t o r a t e . 15 As the c o u r t was c o n s t i t u t e d in 1966, only Harlan denied j u s t i c i a b i l i t y and he was j o i n e d only by Clark and 1 10p . ci t . , at 733. 1284 S. Ct. 1 41 8 ( 1 964). 131 bi d ., a t 1441. 14Ib_ld • » at 1 430 . 1 51 b i d . , a t 1 434. 259 Stew art in r e j e c t i n g p o p u la tio n e q u a l i t y as a mandatory c r i t e r i o n in a p p o r t io n i n g both houses of bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e s . Even the opponents of the Reynolds dictum, in seeking a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to n u l l i f y i t , are giv in g t a c i t admission t h a t the p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s j u d i c i a l r e v e r s a l is n e g l i g i b l e . How n e a r l y equal must the p o p u l a t i o n s of l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s be? No p r e c i s e answer has y e t emanated from the Court, although J u s t i c e Black acknowledged t h a t "mathematical p r e c i s i o n " may not be p o s s i b l e 16 and J u s t i c e Douglas a s s e r t e d t h a t " u n i v e r s a l e q u a l i t y is not the t e s t ; th e re is room f o r w e i g h t i n g . " 17 But i t is to Chief J u s t i c e Warren t h a t one must turn for the f u l l e s t t r e a t m e n t of the s u b j e c t . "Mathematical n i c e t y is not a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i s i t e , " 18 he wrote in Rey n o ld s, but then went on to i n s i s t t h a t the Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause r e q u i r e s t h a t a S t a t e . . . c o n s t r u c t d i s t r i c t s in both houses . . . as n e a r l y of equal p o p u la tio n as is p r a c t i c a b l e . . . . For the p r e s e n t we deem i t e x p e d i e n t not to . . . s p e l l out any p r e c i s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e s t s . What is m a r g in a ll y p e r m i s s i b l e in one s t a t e may be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y in a n o t h e r . . . . Developing a body of d o c t r i n e on a c a s e - b y - c a s e b a s is appears . . . to p r o vide the most s a t i s f a c t o r y means of a r r i v i n g at d e t a i l e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l re q u i re m e n t s . . . . 16Wesberry v. S a n d e r s , 1o c . ci t . 1 7Banker v. Carr , op. ci t . , at 724, 1 8Re,ynol ds v. Sims , o p . ci t . , at 1 385. 260 A s t a t e may l e g i t i m a t e l y d e s i r e to mai nta in the i n t e g r i t y of var io us p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s , i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e , and provide f o r compact d i s t r i c t s of con tigu ous t e r r i t o r y . . . . Valid c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may u n d e r l i e such aims. I n d i s c r i m i n a t e d i s t r i c t i n g , w ith o u t any regard f o r p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s or n a t u r a l or h i s t o r i c a l boundary l i n e s , may be l i t t l e more than an open i n v i t a t i o n to p a r t i s a n g e r r y mandering. . . . (S)ome d e v i a t i o n s from the equal p o p u la tio n p r i n c i p l e are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e . 19 Such d e v i a t i o n is s p e c i f i c a l l y s a n c t io n e d in only one o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e , and t h a t is a h y p o t h e t i c a l one condoned in a f o o t n o t e . " D e via tions from a s t r i c t p o p u la tio n b a s i s , " the Chief J u s t i c e wrote in a companion c a se, may be u t i l i z e d to ba lance a s l i g h t o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r area in one house with a minor un d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h a t area in the o t h e r h o u s e . 20 The Court has c l e a r l y chosen to eschew s p e c i f i c numerical rule s in d e f i n i n g the p e r m i s s i b l e l i m i t s of p o p u l a t i o n v a r i a t i o n . I t is of s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, t h a t two measurements have been used in d em onstrating c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y repugnant a p p o rtio n m e n ts : the r a t i o of the most to the l e a s t populous l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s and the s m a l l e s t perc e n ta g e of the s t a t e p o p u l a t i o n capable of e l e c t i n g a l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y . Three p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s employed as c o n s u l t a n t s by the E l e c t i o n s and Reapportionment Committee of the C a l i f o r n i a Assembly ventured the b e l i e f t h a t an app ortionmen t would have "a 19Ibi d . , pp. 1 390-1 391 . 20Lucas v. F o r ty - F o u r th General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, at 735 n. 27 (1964). good chance" of co u rt approval i f d i s t r i c t s v a rie d by no more than 1.7 to 1 by the f i r s t t e s t , and i f a t l e a s t 45.1 per ce nt of the p o p u la tio n were re q u i re d to e l e c t a m a j o r i t y by the second, s o - c a l l e d D au er-K elsay , t e s t . 21 The S t a t e Supreme Court imposed more demanding req uirem en ts than t h e s e , however, when i t re q u i re d the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e to r e a p p o r t i o n both the Senate and Assembly. On September 1, 1965, i t decreed t h a t "a m a j o r i t y of the members of each house must be e l e c t e d from d i s t r i c t s c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t 48 per cent of the S t a t e ' s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n " and t h a t no d i s t r i c t may d e v i a t e by more than 15 per cent (a r a t i o 1.3 to 1) from the a v e r a g e . 22 The co urt-im pose d boundaries w ith in which ap por tionment plans are p e r m i s s i b l e are s u s c e p t i b l e to at l e a s t the t e n t a t i v e enumeration which fo llo w s. 1. L e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s must be a l l o c a t e d in conformity with the s p i r i t and i n t e n t of s a l i e n t j u d i c i a l r h e t o r i c . Five a s s o c i a t e s endorsed Chief J u s t i c e Warren's Reynolds 21Wi11i am P. G e rberding, Edward M. Goldberg, and Douglas S. Hobbs, Reapportionment in C a l i f o r n i a : Consul t a n t s ' Report to the Assembly, Assembly Committee R ep o rts, Vol. 1, No. 9 ( S a c ra m en to : S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 965 ), p . 29. 22J e r r y Burns, " S e n ate , Assembly Must R e a p p o rtio n ," San F ra n c isco C h r o n i c l e , September 2, 1965, pp. 1, 12. The 15 per cent ru le was i n c o r p o r a t e d in a b i l l r e g u l a t i n g Congressional d i s t r i c t s which was passed by the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1965, p. 1. 262 opinion in which he wrote t h a t the b a s ic p r i n c i p l e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government remains . . . un changed--the weight of a c i t i z e n ' s vote cannot be made to depend on where he l i v e s . Population is . . . the c o n t r o l l i n g c r i t e r i o n . . . in l e g i s l a t i v e appo rtionm en t. . . . The Equal P r o t e c t i o n cla use demands no less than s u b s t a n t i a l l y equal s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for a l l c i t i z e n s , of all places as well as of all r a c e s . We hold t h a t , as a b a s ic con s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d , . . . s e a t s in both houses of a bicameral s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e must be ap p o rtio n e d on a popu latio n b a s i s . . . . People, not land or t r e e s or p a s t u r e s , v o t e . 2 3 2. D i s t r i c t s must f a l l w ith in the mathematical l i m i t s sugg ested above. 3. Within such numerical re s t r i c t i o n s d e v i a t i o n s are p e r m i s s i b l e when j u s t i f i e d by (a) bounda r i e s of p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s , (b) n a t u r a l and h i s t o r i c b o u n d a r i e s , (c) c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of compactness and c o n t i g u i t y , and (d) b alan cin g d e v i a t i o n s in the o t h e r house of a bicameral system. C o n s i d e ra ti o n s which the co u rts have e x p l i c i t l y rule d i r r e l e v a n t inc lu d e th ese f a c t o r s . 1. S t a t u t o r y and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s at the s t a t e level are e q u a l l y and uniformly a f f e c t e d 2 30 p . ci t . , at 1 384-1 385 and 1391. Note t h a t two years e a r l i e r a d i s t i n g u i s h e d group of s c h o l a r s wrote "Acres do not v o te, nor do t r e e s . " Anthony Lewis, Con ference R e p o rte r, One Man - One Vote (N.Y.: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1 962 ) , p . T ~ . 263 by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the Four teenth Amend ment. 24 2. I t makes no d i f f e r e n c e whether apportionm ent r u le s are approved by a vote of the e l e c t o r a t e or determined by the l e g i s l a t u r e . 25 3. A t - la r g e e l e c t i o n s are not " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f e c t i v e , " per s e t c o n t r a s t e d with e l e c t i o n from single-member d i s t r i c t s . 26 4. Occupational c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are im perm issible in app ortionm en t d e c i s i o n s . 27 5. The geo graph ic s i z e of l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s does not permit d e v i a t i o n s in p o p u l a t i o n , in p a r t because of "modern methods of e l e c t r o n i c communication, modern highways . . . and a i r - p l a n e s . " 2 8 24"With r e s p e c t to the o p e r a t i o n of the Equal Pro t e c t i o n Clause, i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e whether a S t a t e ' s app or tionm en t scheme is embodied in i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n or in s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s . " Chief J u s t i c e Warren, Reynolds v. Sims , o p . ci t . , at 1486. 25"An i n d i v i d u a l s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t . . . cannot be denied even by a m a j o r i t y of a S t a t e ' s e l e c t o r a t e . " Warren, Lucas v. F o rty -F o u rth General Assembly, op. c i t . , at 1478-1479 , n. 8. 26 Ibi d . , at 1483. 2 7 D a v i s v. Mann, 84 S. Ct. 1442 ( 1964). See e s p e c i a l l y Chief J u s t i c e Warren's remarks a t 1460. The case involved large numbers of m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . 28Lucas v. F o r ty - F o u r th General Assembly, op. c i t . , a t 1 478-1 479,"n". 8. 264 From 1962 through 1964 the United S t a t e s Supreme Court thus gave b i r t h to apportionment s ta n d a rd s so novel , at l e a s t in t h e i r contemporary c o n t e x t , as to p r e c i p i t a t e a major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Controversy and Compliance. --The tumultuous r e c e p tion which c o u r t d e c i s io n s met in the p o l i t i c a l world were at l e a s t matched by the i n t e r n a l s t r i f e apparen t w ith in the high t r i b u n a l i t s e l f . The importance of th ese d e c i s i o n s , and perhaps the i n t e n s i t y of j u d i c i a l f e e l i n g r egarding them, was h ar b in g e re d by the f a c t t h a t the Baker case "had over six hours' argument ( t h r e e times the o r d in a ry case)" and had been before the Supreme Court " fo r two y e a r s . " 29 The r ea p portionm ent cases c l e a r l y s tr u c k a t the v i t a l core of American government, e s p e c i a l l y i n s o f a r as the p r i n c i p l e s of f e d e r a l i s m , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and j u d i c i a l review are a p a r t of t h a t n u c l e u s . "These d e c i s i o n s " Harlan wrote in his Reynolds d i s s e n t , "cut deeply in to the f a b r i c of our f e d e r a l i s m . " 30 Stewart i n d i c a t e d j u s t how deep when he noted t h a t " t w o - t h i r d s of the S t a t e s have given e f f e c t to f a c t o r s o t h e r than popu latio n in a p p o r t i o n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in both houses . . . and over fou r- f i f t h s . . . give e f f e c t to no n -p o p u la tio n f a c t o r s in at 2 9 B a k e r v. C a r r , op. c i t . , C l a r k 's conc ur ring o p i n i o n , at 732. 30Qp. ci t . , at 1414. 265 l e a s t one h o u s e . " 31 He quotes J u s t i c e Brandeis to observe t h a t " i t is one happy in c id e n c e of the f e d e ra l system t h a t a s i n g l e courageous s t a t e may . . . t r y novel . . . e x p e r i ments w ith o u t r i s k to the r e s t of the c o u n t r y . " 32 J u s t i c e Harlan i n d i c a t e d the profound n a t u r e of the issue at stake when he wrote t h a t "what l i e s at the core of t h i s c o n t r o v e rs y is a d i f f e r e n c e of opinion r e g a rd i n g the n a tu re of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t ." 33 He f e l t t h a t the q u e s ti o n s t r u c k at the h e a r t of American p o l i t i c a l t h e o ry . Those who c o n s i d e r t h a t c o n t i n u i n g n a t i o n a l r e s p e c t for the C o u r t 's a u t h o r i t y depends . . . upon i t s wise e x e r c i s e of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t and d i s c i p l i n e in c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n , will view t h i s d e c i s i o n with deep conce r n . 3^ S tewart j o i n e d in t h i s a t t a c k on j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m - when he ex p ressed his f e a r t h a t the c o u r t m a j o r i t y had taken "a long ste p backward" to the day when judges rendered d e c i s io n s based upon " t h e i r own n o t i o n s of wise p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . " 35 31WMCA v. Lomenzo, op. ci t . , at 1438. 321bi d . , at 1434. 3 3Baker v. C a r r , op. c i t . , at 772 . 3 * * I b i d . , at 776. Two y ears l a t e r Harlan e l a b o r a t e d by w r i t i n g t h a t "the v i t a l i t y of our p o l i t i c a l system is weakened by r e l i a n c e on the j u d i c i a r y f o r p o l i t i c a l reform; in time a complacent body p o l i t i c may r e s u l t . " He a t t a c k e d the "mistaken view" t h a t "every major s o c ia l i l l . . . can fin d a cure in some c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' p r i n c i p l e ' " and denied t h a t the Court was "a general haven f o r reform movements." Reynolds v. Sims, op. c i t . , a t 1414. 35WMCA v. Lomenzo. op. c i t ., at 1 431-1 432, The j u s t i c e s i n c l i n e d not only toward a p e r c e p t i o n of apportionmen t in terms of fundamental government p r i n c i p l e s , however; they t r a n s l a t e d t h e i r views i n t o language which bordered on intempe rance. F r a n k f u r t e r , perhaps defending too vehemently his Colegrove p r e c e d e n t , condemned the d e p a r t u r e from i t in Baker as "a massive r e p u d i a t i o n of the e x p e r ie n c e of our e n t i r e pas t" which a s s e r t e d a " d e s t r u c t i v e l y novel j u d i c i a l p o w e r . " 36 Clark, noted f o r his moderate p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e , took umbrage at the F r a n k f u r t e r d i s s e n t and denounced i t as " b u r s t i n g with words t h a t go through so much and conclude with so l i t t l e . " 37 Harlan found i t " d i f f i c u l t to imagine a more i n t o l e r a b l e and i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e " than t h a t which the Court m a j o r i t y made, in Rey n o ld s, with "the ind ependent l e g i s l a t u r e s of the s t a t e s . " 38 S t e w a r t , f i n a l l y , thought his b r e t h r e n to have i ss u e d a "draconian pronouncement" which had "no b a s is in the C o n s t i t u t i o n and no root in r e a s o n . " 39 In s p i t e of the d e c i s i v e Supreme Court m a j o r i t y commanded by the proponents of the one-man, on e-vote r u l e , the vigor with which opposing views were propounded may 360p. ci t . , at 737 . 371 b i d . , at 728. Clark found H a r l a n 's c o n c lu s io n s " e n t i r e l y f a n c i f u l " at 732. 380 p . ci t . , at 1409. 39WMCA v. Lomenzo, at 1431. 267 have helped to p r o j e c t the c o n tro v e rs y in to the l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l community. The most im p o rta n t o p p o s it i o n to the rea pportionm ent d e c i s i o n s came from E v e r e t t M. Dirkson, Republican of I l l i n o i s , who served as m i n o ri t y l e a d e r of the United S t a t e s Sen at e. In what appeared to be a d e c i s i v e t e s t of s t r e n g t h , the Senate r e j e c t e d a proposed amendment which he had i n t ro d u c e d in Congress to allow the apportionment of one house of a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e on some b asis o t h e r than p o p u l a t i o n . 40 Although the equal p o p u la tio n p r i n c i p l e met vigorous o p p o s it i o n both w ith in the Court and the n a t i o n g e n e r a l l y , compliance with i t occu rred with unexpected a l a c r i t y . In his Baker d i s s e n t , J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r had observed t h a t We are s o o t h i n g l y t o l d . . . l e g i s l a t u r e s would heed the C o u r t 's adm onition. This is . . . a eu phoric hope. I t im plies a s o r r y c o n fe ssio n of j u d i c i a l impotence. The m a j o r i t y d e c i s io n is merely empty r h e t o r i c , sounding a word of promise to the e a r , sure to be d i s a p p o i n t i n g to the h o p e . 41 In the same c a s e , J u s t i c e Harlan sounded a s i m i l a r l y p e s s i m i s t i c n o te. He thought i t an " o p t i m i s t i c p r e d i c t i o n " t h a t s t a t e s would conform to the C o u r t 's d e c is io n "with a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . " 42 Yet the 40The v o te, taken on August 4, 1965, was 57 to 39 in favor of the amendment. This was seven votes s h o r t of the r eq u ire d t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y . Los Angeles Times, August 5 , 1 965 , p . 1. 410p. ci t . , at 739 . 421bi d . , a t 775 . 268 next y e a r a r e p u t a b l e s c h o l a r was j u s t i f i e d in observing t h a t the chaos J u s t i c e s F r a n k f u r t e r and Harlan p r e d i c t e d would flow from Baker v. Carr have not y e t occu rred . . . and more progre ss has been made in six months than had occurred in the past 60 y e a r s . 43 Moreover, in Chief J u s t i c e Warren's Reynolds opinion in 1964, two ye a rs a f t e r B a k e r , he observed t h a t L i t i g a t i o n c h a l l e n g i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t schemes had been i n s t i t u t e d in a t l e a s t 34 s t a t e s p r i o r to the end of 1 9 6 2--w ithin nine months of our d e cis io n in Baker v. C a r r . 44 By the middle of 1966 the f u l l dimensions of what J u s t i c e Har lan, four y e a r s b e f o r e , had l a b e l l e d "an adventure in j u d i c i a l e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n " 45 had become a p p a re n t. Of the 99 s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e chambers, 85 houses in 45 d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s had been r e a p p o r t i o n e d as a r e s u l t of course d e c i s i o n s , and e f f o r t s were underway to r e d i s t r i c t fiv e o t h e r s in t h r e e s t a t e s . 46 That so sweepingly s i g n i f i c a n t a j u d i c i a l decree would have met with such s u r p r i s i n g l y prompt implementation c o n s t i t u t e s high t r i b u t e 43P r i t c h e t t , op. c i t . , pp. 21-22. 440p. ci t . , a t 1 378, n. 30. 45Baker v. C a r r , op. ci t . , at 775 . 46George B. Merry, "How Your Vote May Count f o r More," The C h r i s t i a n Science M o n it o r , March 26, 1966, p. 9. Only the M ass ac husetts S e n ate , The South Car ol ina House and both Chambers of the Oregon l e g i s l a t u r e appear to have been ap p o rtio n e d e q u i t a b l y enough to r e q u i r e no changes as a r e s u l t of the Baker and Reynolds d e c i s i o n s . The s i t u a t i o n was u n c e r t a i n in the remaining fiv e chambers. to the rule of law and the s e c u r i t y of i t s place in the value h i e r a rc h y of America's l e g i s l a t o r s and judg es. Students of the apportionment cases c i t e d above will be rewarded by more than an i n c r e a s e d comprehension of the nat ure of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government. They will be r i c h l y r e p a i d , in i n s i g h t s not d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to the issu es under c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e , by a he ightened p e r c e p tio n of the h i s t o r y of American l e g i s l a t u r e s , 47 the n a tu re of English r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 48 the j u d i c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of academic s t u d i e s , 49 s o c i o l o g i c a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , 50 and the 47See F r a n k f u r t e r ' s d i s s e n t in Baker v. C a r r , op. c i t . , esp. a t 759-762 . 48E. g . , " I n e q u i t i e s among (House of Commons) d i s t r i c t s run, in o rd in a ry c a s e s , as high as two to one and, in the case of e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , t h r e e to one." I b i d . , pp. 757-758. For an i n t e r e s t i n g survey of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n systems in o t h e r n a t i o n s see Herman F i n e r, Theory and P r a c t i c e of Modern Government, r e v i s e d ed. (N.Y. Henry Holt and Co., 1949), pp. 551-560. 49J u s t i c e S t e w a r t, e . g . , c i t e s twelve works by nine a u t h o r s , i n c lu d in g Dahl and de G r a z ia , to s upport his un d e rsta n d in g t h a t "no one theory (of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government) has ever commanded unanimous a s s e n t among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , h i s t o r i a n s or o th e r s who have con s i d e r e d the problem." WMCA v. Lomenzo, op. ci t . , a t 1432. See, a l s o , F r a n k f u r t e r ' s d i s s e n t in B a k e r , l o c . ~ c i t . 50F r a n k f u r t e r c i t e s with approval an e a r l i e r c o u r t d e c i s io n s t a t i n g t h a t i t "would be a narrow co nception of j u r i s p r u d e n c e to confine the notion of 'law' to what is found w r i t t e n on the s t a t u t e books, and to d i s r e g a r d the gloss which l i f e has w r i t t e n upon i t . . . . Deeply em bedded ways of c a r r y i n g out s t a t e p o l i c y . . . are ofte n toughe r and t r u e r law than the dead words of the w r i t t e n t e x t . " Baker v. C a r r , op. c i t . , at 769 . 270 importance of i n t e r e s t group t h e o r y . 51 The case of C a l i f o r n i a . J u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n in to the ap portionment arena did n o t, a t f i r s t , seem to j e o p a r d i z e l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in C a l i f o r n i a . Baker v. Carr had d i r e c t r e le v a n c e to only one chamber and the C a l i f o r n i a Assembly seemed to meet the equal pop ulat ion s t a n d a r d . But when the Supreme Court ruled in Reynolds v. Sims t h a t both houses had to be ap p o rtio n e d on a one-man, one-vote b a s is t h e re was no doubt t h a t the C a l i f o r n i a Senate would re q u i re a reap p o rtio n m e n t of unprecedented p r o p o r t i o n s . The i n e v i t a b l e command came within six months, on December 3, 1964. I t was then t h a t a Federal Court in Los Angeles r e q u i r e d the l e g i s l a t u r e to r e a p p o r tion i t s Senate be fore July 1, 1965. The c a se, S i l v e r v . J o r d o n , 52 was decided by a s p e c i a l thre e judge panel headed by Judge Stan ley Barnes of the North C i r c u i t Court 51 Harlan observed t h a t " i t is s u r e l y . . . obvious . . . t h a t people are not c i p h e r s and t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s can r e p r e s e n t t h e i r e l e c t o r s only by speaking f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s - - e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l . " Reynolds v. S i ms , op. ci t ., a t 1413-1414. S t e w a r t , acknowledging the n e c e s s i t y to accommodate group i n t e r e s t s , a s s e r t e d t h a t "most l e g i s l a t i o n is the prod uc t of compromise between the var ious fo rc e s a c t i n g f o r and a g a i n s t i t s en actm ent." W MCA v * Lomenzo, op. ci t ., at 1 442. 52No . 62-953 MC Per Curiam Order. The d e c is io n is r e p r i n t e d in "Assembly I n te rim Committee on E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment, Final R eport," (Sacramento: C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1965) Vol. 7, No. 8, pp. 304-315, along with the f u l l t e x t s of Co l e g r o v e , B a k e r , Reynolds and o t h e r major r e a p p o rtio n m e n t ca ses. 271 of A p p e a l s , 53 and marked a s i g n i f i c a n t m ilesto ne in an apportionment c o n tro v e rs y which began nearly 40 years e a r l i e r . The o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s study are not advanced s i g n i f i c a n t l y by a d e t a i l e d legal resume of C a l i f o r n i a Senate appo rtio nm en t. I t will s u f f i c e to note t h a t the p r e s e n t S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n , adopted in 1879, provided i n i t i a l l y f o r a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e with both houses ap p o rtio n e d on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s . In 1926, an i n i t i a t i v e p ro v is i o n amended A r t i c l e IV, S ection 6, of the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n to provide t h a t no county was to have more than one S t a t e Sen ator and t h a t no more than t h re e c ounties should be combined to e l e c t a s e n a t o r . This s o - c a l l e d "Federal Plan" was r e t a i n e d by the voters in the face of proposed changes d e f e a te d in the e l e c t i o n s of 1928, 1948, and 1 962 . 54 The r e s u l t was t h a t the C a l i f o r n i a Senate became a c l a s s i c arch type of "malap po rtionmen t," c i t e d f r e q u e n t l y in both p r o f e s s i o n a l and popular l i t e r a t u r e . 55 53Perhaps the only s u r p r i s i n g f e a t u r e of the d e c i s io n was t h a t i t was reached with apparent r e l u c t a n c e and decided by a s p l i t vote. Barnes and D i s t r i c t Judge Myron D. Crocker concurred in an opinion which la b e le d the Reynolds holding a "novel and r e v o l u t i o n a r y legal t h e o r y . " I b i d . , p. 307. D i s t r i c t Judge Charles H. Carr d i s s e n t e d . 5 ^ I bi d ., pp. 305-306 . 55See, e . g ., Gordon E. Baker, Rural v. Urban P o l i t i c a l Power (Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, I n c . , 1 955 ), p7 11; Baker v. C a r r , op. ci t . , at 767 ; Richard L. Neubergerl "Rotten Boroughs and Our Lawless Law makers," The P r o g r e s s i v e , December, 1951, p. 22; Kenneth Crawford, "One Man, One Vote?", Newsweek, March 22, 1965, p. 24. Ill In S i l v e r v. Jordon i t was noted t h a t the Twenty-Eighth S e n a t o r i a l D i s t r i c t , Inyo, Mono and Alpine Counties, had a p o p u la tio n of 14,294 according to the 1960 Federal Census, c o n t r a s t e d with the 38th S e n a t o r i a l D i s t r i c t , Los Angeles County, with a p o p u l a tio n of 6 ,3 8 0 ,7 7 1 . The d i s p a r i t y here is almost 450 to 1. I t is i n v i d i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . . . and is d e b a s e ment of (th e ) r i g h t to vote and de prives (Los Angeles County r e s i d e n t s ) of the Equal P r o t e c t i o n of the Laws as g u a ranteed by the Fourte e nth Amendment.56 On June 1, 1965, n e a r l y six months a f t e r S i l v e r and e x a c t l y one month b efo re the d e a d lin e which i t had imposed f o r s enate r e a p p o rt i o n m e n t , the United S t a t e s Supreme Court summarily a ffirm ed the lower co u rt d e c r e e . J u s t i c e Harlan, the lone c o n s i s t e n t foe of j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n in a p p o r tionment cases then on the Court, f i l e d a c oncurring o p in i o n , in which J u s t i c e s Clark and Stew art j o i n e d . "I r e l u c t a n t l y a c q u i e s c e , " Harlan w ro te , only because t h e r e is not "the s l i g h t e s t b a s is f o r optimism" t h a t the high co u rt m a j o r i t y might modify the p o s i t i o n e n u n c i a t e d in Reynolds and companion c a s e s . 57 56Reprinted in "Assembly I n te rim Committee . . ., Final Rep ort," op. c i t ., p. 309 . 57The complete t e x t of H a r l a n 's o p i n i o n , with the Court o r d e r , is r e p r i n t e d in the Los Angeles Times , June 3, 1965, pp. 16-17. Less than t h re e weeks l a t e r colum nist James K i l p a t r i c k p u b l i c l y shared t h i s s k e p t i c i s m . As Harlan had fors ak en hope of j u d i c i a l r e v e r s a l , so K i l p a t r i c k voiced r e s i g n a t i o n and d e s p a i r about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment r e v e r s i n g c o u r t a c t i o n being p r o posed e i t h e r by Congress or the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . Such a c t i o n s , he w ro te , "simply a r e n ' t in s i g h t . " Los Angeles Times, June 22 , 1 965 , Pt. I I , p. 5. 273 On June 18, almost two weeks before the dead lin e s e t by co u r t o r d e r , the l e g i s l a t u r e ad journed, with senate r e apportionm ent the vi ct im of i n t r a n s i g e n t i n t e r - h o u s e di sa greem ent. "Senate re apportionm ent l e a d e r Stephan P. Teale ( D. , West Point) s a id of the m a t t e r : 'S h e 's dead, dead . . , ' " 58 But Senator Te ale, a phy sic ian in p r i v a t e l i f e , was unaware of the r e v i v i f y i n g p o t e n t i a l of a legal medicine soon to be p r e s c r i b e d by the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court. Upon the f a i l u r e of the l e g i s l a t u r e to conform to j u d i c i a l d e c r e e , the th re e judge fed e ra l c o u r t panel s e t a hearing f o r August 16 to c o n s id e r the appointment of a s p e c i a l master to d r a f t a sen at e reap p o rtio n m e n t plan. This hearing was s u b se q u e n tly postponed when the S tate Supreme Court assumed apportionment j u r i s d i c t i o n in an un expected and, as the fo llo w in g th re e months proved, d e c i s i v e f a s h i o n . On July 14, 1965, the h i g h e s t t r i b u n a l of the s t a t e ordered the Governor and the C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y of S ta te to show cause why the 1966 e l e c t i o n s should not be postponed pending reap p o rtio n m en t of both the Senate and the A ssembly. 59 58Robert M. Blanchard, " L e g i s l a t u r e Ends 6-Month S e s s i o n ," Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1965, p. 1. 59The p e t i t i o n asking j u d i c i a l cognizance of Assembly apportionment was f i l e d by Los Angeles Attorney Phil S i l v e r , a p a r ty to the Federal Court Senate a p p o r t i o n ment s u i t . He p r e se n t e d s t a t i s t i c s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t although Assembly s e a t s were a pportio ne d p r i m a r i l y on an 274 S tate Supreme Court i n t e r v e n t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t to the Assembly, had a c a t a l y t i c e f f e c t . On July 26 twelve members of the Assembly r e queste d permission to in t e r v e n e in the c o u r t ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s and on the same day Senators met "in an unusual between s e ss io n c a u s u s " 60 which r e s u l t e d in a d e c i s io n to ask the c o u r t t h a t the re apportionm ent o b l i g a t i o n be re turned to the l e g i s l a t u r e . Senator Teale ex p lain ed t h a t at the r e g u l a r 1965 s e ss io n the Senate had a gun at i t s head. The Assembly s a t th e r e big, f a t , dumb and happy and d i d n ' t have to worry about anything except g e t t i n g Senate s e a t s f o r i t s members. This time th e r e will be a bo nafide t r a d i n g s i t u a t i o n . 61 This time, a l s o , Senator T e a l e ' s d ia g n o sis seemed c o r r e c t . On September 1, 1965, the S tate Supreme Court equal po p u latio n b a s i s , 24 of the 80 v a r i e d by more than 15 per cent from the ideal average and the l a r g e s t was over four times as populous as the s m a l l e s t . Daryl E. Lembke, "Supreme Court Issues Reapportion O rders," Los Angeles Times, July 1 5 , 1 965 , pp. 3 and 9. 60Robert M. Blancha rd, "Senato rs Seek Second Chance on R e a p p o rtio n ," Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1965, p. 3. 610uoted, 1o c . c i t . Senate P r e s i d e n t Pro-Tern Hugh M. Burns thought chances ""excellent" f o r the passage of a re a pportionm ent measure because "we are now able to nego t i a t e with the Assembly on a b e t t e r b asis than we could when only the Senate was co nfro nted with the problem." Assemblyman Don A. A llen , Sr. (D., Los A ngele s), chairman of the Assembly Committee on E l e c t i o n s and Reapportionment, was in e s s e n t i a l agreement. Jackson Doyle, " S e n a t e 's Hand Is S t r o n g e r , " San Francisc o C h r o n i c l e , September 2, 1965, p. 12. Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh (D., Inglewood) remained p e s s i m i s t i c , however, t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e could agree on a b i l l . Jack Walter, "Unruh Is Doubtful on Re- d i s t r i c t i n g , " San F ran ci sco Examiner, September 4, 1965, p. 6. 275 gave the L e g i s l a t u r e a r e p r i e v e . I t ordered the r e a p p o r tionment of both chambers by December 9, and announced t h a t a sweeping r e d i s t r i c t i n g plan of i t s own would take e f f e c t , f o r both houses, i f the L e g i s l a t u r e again abnegated i t s res pons i b i 1i t y . 6 2 I t did n o t . Governor Brown c a l l e d a s p e c ia l s e ss io n f o r September 20 , 6 3 the L e g i s l a t u r e passed a b i l l r e a p p o r t i o n i n g both houses on October 2 1 , 64 i t was signed October 2 7 , 65 and the C a l i f o r n i s Supreme Court unanimously affirmed i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y on January 11, 1 966 . 66 The C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e , a l b e i t with tumult and r e l u c t a n c e , had p leased the Court. P o l i t i c a l Pressure s The sequence of events r e l a t i n g to the r e a p p o r t i o n ment of the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e in 1965 r e p r e s e n t s an l 62Loc. c i t . 63Los Angeles Times , September 8, 1965, p. 3. 6l4Los Angeles Heral d-Exami n e r , October 21 , 1 965 , p . 1 . 6 5 Ibi d . , October 28 , 1 965 , p. 3. 6 6 Ibi d . , January 1 2 , 1 966 , p. 1. The w i l l i n g n e s s of c o u r ts in o t h e r s t a t e s to i n t e r v e n e in appo rtionmen t m a tte rs had not always depended on p r i o r f e d e ra l j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . Even before B a k e r , " n e a rly h a l f of the S t a t e Supreme Courts had e x e r c i s e d the r i g h t to review s t a t u t e s a p p o r t io n i n g s e a t s in the S ta te l e g i s l a t u r e . " Commission on In te rg overnm enta l R e l a t i o n s , Apportionment of S ta te Leqi s i a t u r e s (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g Offlce , 1962), p. 1. / 276 i n t r i g u i n g p o l i t i c a l v i g n e t t e in which both c o n s ta n ts and v a r i a b l e s may be examined in microcosm. This is not to contend t h a t the C a l i f o r n i a expe rie n c e was t y p i c a l , for an a n a l y s is of the apportionment process on a nat io n -w id e basis may y i e l d the conclusion t h a t " t h e re are f i f t y d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l systems, o f f e r i n g no b asis for compari s o n . " 67 But although the f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e the apportionment process may be found in en d le ss combinations and t h e i r impact in i n f i n i t e l y v aried i n t e n s i t y , the com ponent elements themselves seem remarkably u b i q u i t o u s . 68 Some may be exposed more c l e a r l y in the follow ing case s t u d y . Perhaps the most c r u c i a l qu esti o n r e garding the 1965 apportionm ent in C a l i f o r n i a is t h i s : why was the L e g i s l a t u r e unable to agree on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permis- s i b l e plan in i t s r e g u l a r s e ss i o n but able to do so four months l a t e r in a s p e c i a l s e s s i o n ? Some of the answers have a lr e a d y been s u g g e s t e d , but a more complete enumera tion might be f r u i t f u l . In the p r o c e s s , an atte m p t will be made to d i s t i n g u i s h between the permanent and the t r a n - s i e n t , the c o n s ta n ts and v a r i a b l e s in apportionment politics. 67Malcolm E. J e w e l l , e d . , The P o l i t i c s of Reappor tionment (N.Y.: Atherton P r e s s , 1 96 27, p. 2 ~ . 68I b i d . , pp. 2-8. Ill The f e d e ral s y st e m . - - A 1 1 s t a t e a c t i o n s in America are s u b j e c t to p o t e n t i a l n a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , apportionment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were i n f l u e n c e d e a r l y in 1965 by the glimmering hope t h a t Congress would propose a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment o v e r - r i d i n g Reynolds v. Sims and p e r m i t t i n g the s t a t e s to a n portio n one house of the l e g i s l a t u r e on a non -p o p u la ti o n b a s i s . Such a p o s s i b i l i t y , f a i n t as i t was, remained a l i v e during the 1965 general se ss io n but died less than two months l a t e r when the so- c a l l e d Dirksen Amendment f e l l seven votes s h o r t of approval in the U.S. S e n a t e . 69 During the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n , Northern C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e Senators had r e l i n q u i s h e d hope and accepted i n e v i t a b i l i t y . What is c o n s t a n t here is the p o s s i b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l in f l u e n c e on s t a t e d i s c r e t i o n . The v a r i a b l e is i t s p r o b a b i l i t y . Sep aratio n of power s.--The role of the j u d i c i a r y in a t r i - p a r t i t e government s t r u c t u r e remains, a century and a h a l f a f t e r Ma rb u ry v. Madison, c u r i o u s l y u n c e r t a i n . Si 1ver 69John H. A v e r i l l , "Senate K i l l s Dirksen Plan on D i s t r i c t i n g , " Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1965, p. 1. Assemblyman Don A. A lle n , S r . , Chai rman of the E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee in 1965, e x p re ss e d the b e l i e f t h a t the S ta te Senate re fu s ed to compromise on a p p o r t i o n ment because many Senators f e l t t h a t to do so would c o n s t i t u t e a "stab in the back" f o r those working f o r the Dirksen Amendment in Washington. Personal i n t e r v i e w , Sacramento, August 31, 1965. The committee s t a f f d i r e c t o r , Steven E. Smith, agreed. Personal i n t e r v i e w , Los Angeles, October 26, 1965. 278 v. Jordon was i n t e r p r e t e d by the l e g i s l a t u r e as a d e f i n i t e command to r e a p p o r t i o n the Senate, but c a r r y i n g no s p e c i f i c consequence i f i t did not. The r e g u l a r general s e ss io n f a i l e d to heed the command, a p p a r e n t l y p r e f e r r i n g to take a chance on j u d i c i a l l y imposed a l t e r n a t i v e s . When the S t a t e Supreme Court assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over the i s s u e , a f t e r the general s ess io n had adjou rne d, a major s h i f t oc cu rred both g e o g r a p h i c a l l y and f u n c t i o n a l l y , in the locus of u l t i m a t e reap p o rtio n m en t power. In a r e v e a l i n g example of " c o o p e r a t i v e f e d e ra lis m " in a c t i o n , the fe d e ra l c o u r t s , having confirmed the n e c e s s i t y of S e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t r e v i s i o n , d e f e rr e d to the s t a t e co ur ts the o p p o r t u n i t y to determine remedial measures. When the S t a t e Supreme Court e x e r c i s e d t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by drawing up i t s own appo rtionmen t plan to take e f f e c t i f the L e g i s l a t u r e remained de ad lock ed , i t added f o r the f i r s t time an "or e l s e , " a plan pe rc eiv e d as a t e r r i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to l e g i s l a t i v e i n a c t i o n . The r e s u l t of t h i s j u d i c i a l l y devised app ortionm en t scheme was t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e ac te d . Senate P r e s i d e n t Pro Tempore Hugh Burns e x p la ined t h a t i t was im p era ti v e t h a t we draw a s a t i s f a c t o r y b i l l and not s t a l l around u n t i l Dec. 9 f o r the S t a t e Supreme C o u rt's plan. . . . (T)he plan . . . is not good sense. . . . I t ' s not good l e g i s l a t i o n . 70 70Ray Zeman, "Burns Warns of D r a s t i c R e d i s t r i c t i n g Ac tio n ," Los Angeles Ti mes, October 3, 1965, p. B. The c h i e f l e g i s l a t i v e o b j e c t i o n to the C o u rt's plan was i t s I 279 The c o n s ta n t in t h i s t u r b u l a n t apportionment c o n t e x t is j u d i c i a l s u r v e i l l a n c e . The v a r i a b l e is the p r o b a b i l i t y and type of s p e c i f i c a l l y decreed d i s t r i c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s . Bicameral ism .--Laws are seldom passed by bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e s unless they conform to the pe rceiv ed i n t e r e s t s of both chambers. During the 1965 general s e ss io n only the Senate was under co urt order to r e a p p o r t i o n ; but by the time the s p e c ia l s e s s i o n was convened the same compulsion had been imDosed upon the Assembly. A s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g a u n i l a t e r a l ultimatum had been re p la c e d by one r e q u i r i n g the b a r t e r and c o n c i l i a t i o n of b i p o l a r i z e d i n f l u e n c e . 71 A t r a d i t i o n had developed in C a l i f o r n i a which p e r m it t e d each house of the l e g i s l a t u r e complete d i s c r e t i o n re garding i t s own r e a p p o rtio n m en t. In the 1965 general s e ss i o n the Assembly amended the S e n a te - p a ss e d b i l l by changing the boun daries of proposed Senate d i s t r i c t s in Los Angeles County, and thus broke the t r a d i t i o n . Accord ing to two Senate s t a f f members, i t was t h i s which c r e a t e d c r e a t i o n of many a t - l a r g e , multi-member d i s t r i c t s . Jack W el ter , "Unruh Is Doubtful On R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," San Fran cisco Examiner, September 4, 1965, p. 6. 71 S u p r a , pp. 273-275 . In the general s e s s i o n the Assembly had attem pted to change c e r t a i n p r o v is i o n s r e l a t i n g to new Senate boundaries which had emanated in the Senate. But four days before the f i n a l passage of the r e app or tionm en t b i l l , during the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n , th in g s appeared to have changed. "Each house will handle i t s own remapping with no tampering by the o t h e r . " Ray Zeman, "Senate Expected . . . , " Los Angeles Times, p. B, Oct. 17, 1 965. 280 the deadlock t h a t prev en ted the passage of a r e a p p o r t i o n ment b i l l during t h a t s e s s i o n . 72 As long as t h e re are bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e s , each is l i k e l y to r e s e n t a s i t u a t i o n in which an apportionm ent law a f f e c t i n g only one chamber r e q u i r e s the consent of the o t h e r f o r enactment. This is a c o n s t a n t . The degree to which both houses are r e q u i r e d to change t h e i r e x i s t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e a t s - - d r a s t i c a l l y or m o d e r a t e l y - - i s a v a r i a b l e of r e l a t i v e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e . Personal a m b i t i o n . - - I t is g e n e r a l l y reco gn ized t h a t apportionm ent is determined by s e c t i o n a l , p a r t i s a n , i d e o l o g i c a l , and r u r a l - u r b a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . But these impersonal f a c t o r s are ofte n of s u b s i d i a r y importance to the i n f l u e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l incumbents s t r u g g l i n g with one a nother for l e g i s l a t i v e advancement from lower to upper houses, for l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s , for promotion from s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s to Congress, or simply f o r s u f f i c i e n t l y safe d i s t r i c t s to ensure r e e l e c t i o n . 72Personal i n t e r v i e w s with Stan Evans, a six y e a r veteran of l e g i s l a t i v e employment on the s t a f f s of Sen. Thomas Rees, then an Assemblyman, Assemblyman James K i l l s and Sen. George M i l l e r , Sacramento, Aug. 30, 1965, and Arthur D. Johnson, S t a f f C onsultant to the Senate Reappor tionment Sub-Committee, 1o c . ci t . Assembly Speaker Unruh had d isp u te d t h i s view contendi ng t h a t the Senate p r e r o g a t i v e to ap p o rtio n i t s own membership e x t e n d s , even i n f o r m a l l y , only to the p r o t e c t i o n of incumbents, not to the c r e a t i o n of e n t i r e l y new d i s t r i c t s . KNBC t e l e v i s i o n news c o n f e r e n c e , Los Angeles, 6:30 P.M., Sept. 11, 1965. 281 This personal element is so im portant t h a t the Commission on Inte rg overnm enta l R e la tio n s has l a b e l l e d the d e s i r e "to p r o t e c t incumbent s e a t s " as perhaps the "most im p o rta n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n " in apportionment d e l i b e r a t i o n s . 73 Agreeing, two l e g i s l a t i v e s c h o l a r s quote a study of I l l i n o i s apportionment which observes t h a t " N e ith er party nor p r i n c i p l e nor region are more im p o rtan t than a l e g i s l a t o r ' s col 1 eagues ." ?1+ This view has receiv ed j u d i c i a l cognizance in J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r ' s mention of " r e s p e c t for proven incumbents of long e x p erien c e and s e n i o r s t a t u s " as one of many f a c t o r s in volv in g a p p o r t i o n ment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 75 Personal attachm ents a r e , i f a n y th in g , more p r o nounced in the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e than in s i m i l a r bodies. I n t e r a c t i o n between members is more f r e q u e n t and more s u s t a i n e d in C a l i f o r n i a than in o t h e r s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . Strong l o y a l t y to the l e g i s l a t i v e in-group is p r e d i c t a b l e . 76 7 A p p o r t i o n m e n t of S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s , op. ci t . , pp. 18-19. ?1+G i l b e r t Y. S t e i n e r and Samuel K. Gove, The L e g i s l a t u r e R e d i s t r i c t s I l l i n o i s (Urbana, 111.: Univ. of I l l i n o i s I n s t i t u t e of Government and Public A f f a i r s , 1956), p. 17. In P e n n s y lv a n ia , the same s i t u a t i o n a p p a r e n t l y p r e v a i l s . Alfred de G r a z ia , Apportionment and R ep resen ta - t i v e Government (N.Y.: Frederi ck A. P r a e q e r, 1 963) , p. 104. 75Baker v. C a r r , op. ci t . , at 767. 76William Buchanan, L e g i s l a t i v e P a r t i s a n s h i p : The Deviant Case of C a l i f o r n i a ( Be r k e l e y , C a l i f . : Uni v. o? 282 S p e c i f i c examples of the personal dimension in apportionment m a tte rs are numerous. A Democratic con t r o l l e d l e g i s l a t u r e , f o r example, r e v i s e d i n i t i a l c o n g r e s sio nal r e a p p o rtio n m e n t plans to allow H. Allen Smith and G. P. Lipscomb, both Republicans, to r e t a i n t h e i r s e a t s in the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in 1 9 6 1 .77 At the same time, i t was "widely rumored" t h a t Assemblyman J esse M. Unruh "was using r e ap portionm ent as a means of i n s u r i n g his e l e c t i o n as s p e a k e r . " 78 Although t h i s 1961 r e d i s t r i c t i n g was b i t t e r l y a t t a c k e d for i t s b l a t a n t p a r t i s a n s h i p by the chairman of the Republican S t a t e Central Committee and o t h e r p a r ty l e a d e r s , a m a j o r i t y of Republican Assemblymen voted f o r the b i l l , in many i n s t a n c e s in r e t u rn fo r safe d i s t r i c t s for t h e m s e l v e s . 79 C a l i f . P r e s s , 1963), n. 10. This a s s e r t i o n is b o l s t e r e d by the f a c t t h a t 12 per cent of C a l i f o r n i a lawmakers def ined " r u l e s of the game" in terms o f ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l l o y a l t y and a defense of the l e g i s l a t u r e and i t s members a g a i n s t o u t s i d e r s . Comparable f i g u r e s in thre e o t h e r s t a t e s were Mew J e r s y , 1 per c e n t ; Ohio, 3 per c e n t ; and Tennessee, 0 per c en t. Wahlke, e t . a l . , The Legi s 1 a t i ve Sy s tern (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons"] Inc. , 1 962), pp. 1 46-1 47 . 77H. Frank Way, "Brutal Butchery of the Two-Party System" in Malcolm J. J e w e l l , e d . , The P o l i t i c s of Reappor t i o n m e n t , op. ci t . , p. 254. 781bi d . , p. 252 . Unruh was e l e c t e d . 7 91 b i d . , pp. 252-253. Assemblyman Allen a s s e r t e d t h a t 1961 reap p o rtio n m e n t r e s u l t s "seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t incumbents in a s t a t e with C a l i f o r n i a ' s r e l a t i v e l y weak p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n e x p e r ie n c e e f f e c t i v e p r e s s u r e s to sup p o r t a r e d i s t r i c t i n g b i l l , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r p a r t y , i f i t is to the advantage of t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g in o f f i c e . " Leg i s - l a t i v e Sourceb ook, o p . ci t . , p. 23. 283 Dr. Ivan Hin deraker, c h i e f c o n s u l t a n t to the Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee at the time of the Re p u b l i c a n - c o n t r o l l e d 1951 re d i s t r i c t i n g , b e l i e v e s t h a t p r o t e c t i o n of incumbents, r e g a r d l e s s of p a r t y , was then the most im p o rtan t s i n g l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 80 The immediate concern is the way in which such personal f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d to the passage of a r e a p p o r tionment b i l l in l a t e 1965 which had been stymied e a r l i e r in t h a t same y e a r . An u n derstandin g of t h i s change must focus upon S ta te Sen. Thomas Rees (D., Los Angeles) and Assembly Speaker Unruh. I t must be r e c o g n i z e d , moreover, t h a t s everal Assemblymen wanted to be S e n a t o r s . Only four days a f t e r the new Senate re a pportionm ent had been signed by the go v ern o r, the Los Angeles Times r e p o r t e d t h a t five Assemblymen had alre a d y decided to seek newly c r e a t e d Senate s e a t s in Los Angeles County and t h a t nine more probably would do s o . 81 80Personal i n t e r v i e w , R i v e r s i d e , February 8, 1966. 81Ray Zeman, "Five Assemblymen Decide to Seek New Senate S e a t s , " Los Angeles T i mes, October 31 , 1 965 , p. B. P o l i t i c a l co lumnist Richard Bergholz a s s e r t e d t h a t "th e re are zigs and zags in the ( s e n a t e and assembly) l i n e s for the sole purpose of accommodating o f f i c e - h o l d e r s an d/o r o f f i c e s e e k e r s . " Los Ange1es Times , December 1 2 , 1 965 , Sec. G, p. 6. L a t e r , Bergholz was more co n c re te in sp e a k ing of s p e c i f i c senat e d i s t r i c t s . "27th d i s t r i c t - - Assemblyman George Danielson (D., Los Angeles) had t h i s one drawn f o r h im se lf . I t ' s 62.6 per cent Democratic r e g i s t r a t i o n . . . . 29th d i s t r i c t - - . . . is marked out for Assemblyman Mervyn Dymally. . . . 33rd d i s t r i c t - - T h i s is made to order for Assemblyman Joseph Kennich." Los 284 The Rees-Unruh c o n f l i c t appears to be c e n t r a l to an u n derstandin g of the 1965 Senate apportionment because the p a r t i s a n s of each claim t h a t the o t h e r attempted to d e t e r mine d i s t r i c t boundaries in a way which would enhance the e l e c t o r a l p r o sp e c ts of his s u p p o r t e r s . On May 10, 1965, the Senate passed a b i l l to r e a p p o r t i o n i t s e l f (S.B. 6) which provided f o r twelve s e n a t o r s for Los Angeles County. As o r i g i n a l l y i n t r o d u c e d , th e se s e n a t o r s were to be e l e c t e d at l a r g e , but an amendment c r e a t i n g s p e c i f i c d i s t r i c t s was sub mitted by Sen. Rees, then the lone Senator from Los Angeles County, and adopted by the Senate before i t was s e n t to the Assembly. Assemblyman A llen , chairman of the E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee, viewed t h i s as an a ttem pt by Rees to get six or seven f o ll o w e r s e l e c t e d to the Senate " l i k e Jess (Unruh) use to have in the Assembly," so t h a t he might i n f l u e n c e committee assignments and o th e r c r u c i a l Senate d e c i s i o n s . 82 Angeles Times, Jan. 18, 1966, Pt. I I , p. 4. Zeman, a f t e r the June, 1966, p r i m a r i e s , saw the p a r t i a l f r u i t i o n of his e a r l i e r p r e d i c t i o n when he was able to r e p o r t t h a t nine Los Angeles County Assemblymen had been nominated f o r new Senate s e a t s . Moreover, only th re e of the twenty Assembly men who ran for the Senate ( o n e - f o u r t h of the t o t a l members of the lower house) f a i l e d to be nominated. "The Results of R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," Los Angeles Times, June 23 , 1 966 , Pt. I I , p. 4. General e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s showed 14 Assemblymen e l e c t e d to the Senate. Ray Zeman, "Southland Control of L e g i s l a t u r e S e t , " Los Angeles Times, Nov. 13, 1966, p. B. 82Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , Allen spoke of Los Angeles City Councilman Thomas Bredley as one for whom Rees had drawn Senate D i s t r i c t l i n e s conducive to probable e l e c t i o n . The comments about Rees 285 The Assembly amended S.B. 5 by redrawing the bo unda ries of all twelve Los Angeles County Senate Dis t r i c t s . While t h i s was the work of A l l e n ' s Reapportionment Committee, i t was widely regarded as a r e f l e c t i o n of < Speaker Unruh's i n f l u e n c e , and the amendment was r e j e c t e d by the Senate. Rees a t t r i b u t e d the s ta l e m a t e to "Unruh's ' a r r o g a n t ' attempt to draw new Senate d i s t r i c t l i n e s . " 83 A former Republican Assemblyman and S t a t e Central Committee chairman saw i t as a s a c r i f i c e to Unruh's " p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s . " 84 I t was commonly assumed t h a t the Assembly v e r sio n of Los Angeles County Senate bound aries was p e r s o n a l l y were at b e s t d e r i s i v e and sometimes contemp tuo us. A b u r l y , ex pansive man, Allen r e f e r r e d to him, ha 1f - h u m o r o u s l y , as "the kid" and "Baby Snooks." Unruh, more g e n e r o u s l y , r e f e r r e d to Rees as a good f r i e n d and good l e g i s l a t o r , but "impet uous." KNBC, 1o c . ci t . 83Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1965, p. 13. Allen was g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d to be Unruh's puppet in his ro le as committee chairman in charge of r e a p p o rt i o n m e n t . This is r e f l e c t e d in Rees' comment quoted above as well as in con v e r s a t i o n s t h i s w r i t e r has had with S tanley Evans, 1 1 oc. c i t . , and Dr. Leroy Hardy, personal i n t e r v i e w , Los An g e 1e s , March 22, 1966. A l l e n , u n d er sta n d ab ly s e n s i t i v e about t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , admits only t h a t he accepted the committee chairmanship as a personal favor to Unruh who wanted him to take the job because only he had "the guts" and the e x p e r i e n c e , d a tin g back to the 1941 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t , to handle the problem. He is fond of Unruh but i n s i s t s he was given f u l l a u t h o r i t y and a fre e hand s u b j e c t only to the S p e a k e r 's admonition t h a t he "maintain harmony" with the Senate "at a l l c o s t s . " Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . ci t . 84The Speaker was charged with wanting "to r e a p p o r tion the Senate in his own image." Caspar W. Weinberger, "One-Man Rule Ruined L e g i s l a t i v e S e s s i o n ," Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. 286 designed to e l e v a t e Assemblymen C a r r o l l , Dymally, Harvey Johnson, and Cusanovich, plus Assembly Reapportionment Committee s t a f f c h i e f Steven Smith, to the upper house. 'All were known to be f r i e n d l y to U nr uh .85 In r e t r o s p e c t , a c a r e fu l study of the varying boundaries of the twelve Los Angeles County Senate d i s t r i c t s as proposed in the Senate and the Assembly give some credence to the charges t h a t both Rees and Unruh were a tte m p tin g to enhance the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e i r f r i e n d s might win Senate s e a t s . In any e v e n t , n e i t h e r chamber would accept the boundaries proposed by the o t h e r and the b i l l went to i t s b u r ia l in a j o i n t con feren ce committee in the waning hours of the general s e s s i o n . The co nference committee was no more able to reach agreement than had been the e n t i r e l e g i s l a t u r e . Each house blamed the o t h e r . The Los Angeles Times chose to place the onus on the Assembly, charging t h a t i t s l e a d e r s "decided to play games in carving up Senate d i s t r i c t s . " 86 The g a u n t l e t thus t h r u s t down was s e i z e d by Assemblyman Allen. The next day in a l e t t e r to the Times he a n g r i l y defended the house in which he had served fo r more than two decades. The Senate b i l l was one with which the Assembly could compro- 85S ta nley Evans, 1o c . ci t . Cussanovich is a Republican. All ex cept Johnson were S e n a t o r i a l c a n d i d a t e s in 1966 and all o t h e r s but Smith, who was d e f e a t e d in the June pr im ar y, were e l e c t e d . 86E d i t o r i a l , August 2, 1 9 6 5 , Pt. I I , p. 4. 287 mi s e no f u r t h e r , he i n s i s t e d , because of t h re e f a c t o r s . F i r s t , i t c o n s t i t u t e d a "shortc ha ng e" for Los Angeles County by giving i t only 12 s e a t s i n s t e a d of the 15 and one h a l f which was i t s "mathematical e n t i t l e m e n t . " Even S enator Teale, the au th o r of the o r i g i n a l Senate measure, adm itte d , acco rding to Allen , t h a t t h i s was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Second, the Los Angeles d i s t r i c t s were " c a r e l e s s l y drawn," o m ittin g the c i t y of B e l l f l o w e r from any d i s t r i c t and pro v id in g for f a r g r e a t e r p o p u la tio n d i s p a r i t i e s than the Assembly amendment. This, Allen im plied, was Rees' f a u l t . Third, and most damagingly, Senate n e g o t i a t o r s conceded t h a t no form of S.B. 6 was going to be approved by the Senate and t h a t such would have been the case whether or not we (th e Assembly) had made any s u b s t a n t i v e changes in the b i l l . 87 This l a s t p o in t is one to which c o n s i d e r a b l e credence must be given. Even though the Assembly had passed S.B. 6 w ith o u t any amendments of i t s own, i t would have had to be r e t u r n e d to the Senate because of the passage of some " t e c h n i c a l " amendments which the Assembly had adopted at Sen ator T e a l e ' s r e q u e s t . 88 Whether t h i s was 87Don A. Allen, S r . , L e t t e r , E d i t o r s , Los Angeles Ti mes, August 3 , 1 965. Mimeographed d u p l i c a t e in p o s s e s sion of the w r i t e r . 88Ca1i f o r n i a , T r a n s c r i p t of P ro c e ed in g s, He a rin g s on Senate Re a p p o rtio n m e n t, Assembly Committee on E le c tio n s and Reapportionment, May 17, 1965, p. 16. (Mimeographed.) 288 an i n t e n t i o n a l ruse to force the r e t u rn of the b i l l to a Senate determined to k i l l i t is d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n . A l l e n ' s b e l i e f t h a t t h i s was the case is b o l s t e r e d by Assemblymen M o r e t t i , Ryan and Bagley who r e p r e s e n t e d the lower house in the a b o r t iv e co nference committee d e l i b e r a t i o n s on the eve of the general s e ss io n adjournment. Moretti a s s e r t e d t h a t In co nference with the Senate we were t o l d . . . t h a t the Senate was not i n t e r e s t e d in . . . any reap p o rtio n m en t plan. The reasons given were the Dirksen Amendment and the f a c t t h a t the C a l i f o r n i a Senate had been lea di ng the nationwide b a t t l e to o v e r come the Supreme C o u r t 's d e c i s i o n . 89 Ryan was more s p e c i f i c . He a t t r i b u t e d to Sen. George M i l l e r , one of the Senate c o n f e r e e s , the f l a t d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t " I f you (the Assembly) had s e n t S.B. 6 back to us in the same language we sen t i t to the Assembly, we would have k i l l e d i t . Our only hope is C o n g r e s s . " 90 Assemblyman William T. Bagley, the only Republican a t t e n d i n g the conferen ce committee meeting at which M i l l e r made his a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t , gave support to his lower house c o l l e a g u e s . Contending t h a t the Assembly had done " B o b M o r e t t i , l e t t e r to Don A. A lle n , S r . , Aug. 3, 1965. Dup licate in po s se s sio n of the w r i t e r . " L e o Ryan, telegram to Don A. A ll en , S r . , Aug. 3, 1965. Du plicate in p o s se s sio n of the w r i t e r . M i l l e r has n e i t h e r confirmed nor denied the v a l i d i t y of t h i s q u o t a t i o n , i t seems, but S tanle y Evans, his c h i e f Senate aide contends t h a t he did not make the s ta t e m e n t and had given up hope of Congressional approval of the Dirksen Amendment a f t e r a t r i p to Washington, D.C. in A p r i l , 1965. Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . 289 "as f a i r and square (a reap p o rtio n m en t job) as could be," he agreed t h a t "the Senate was c e r t a i n l y not i n t e r e s t e d in the passage of any . . . b i l l . " 91 At the end of the 1965 general s e s s i o n , th e n , the Assembly seemed to view the d i s t r i c t i n g impasse as the r e s u l t of Sen. Rees' personal a m b ition, the S e n a t e ' s hope of fe d e ra l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l i e f through the Dirksen Amend ment, and the t e c h n i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s u f f i c i e n c y of the S e n a t e 's proposed b o u n d a rie s. In the upper house, i f Senator Rees is to be acknowledged /as i t s spokesman on t h i s m a t t e r , the issue was viewed in more e x c l u s i v e l y personal terms. " I f the Senate was to su rv iv e as an ind ependent ho use," Rees a s s e r t e d , " i t c o u l d n ' t take the Unruh l i n e s . " 92 S e c o n d a r i l y , i t a p p e a r s , Rees defended the Senate b i l l on the grounds t h a t i t kept c i t i e s in t a c t and preserv ed communities of i n t e r e s t . 9 3 91Telegram to Don A. A l l e n , S r . , August 4, 1965. D u p licate in p o s se s si o n of the w r i t e r . Hardy tends to b e l i e v e t h i s is t r u e . Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1oc. ci t . 92Quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 5, 1965, p. 13. 93P.ees' s enate d i s t r i c t l i n e s s p l i t only six of Los Angeles County's 76 c i t i e s ' boundaries whereas the Assembly version divided 25 and was "nothing more than a pure p o l i t i c a l gerrymander. . . . Speaker Unruh t h e n , in e f f e c t , to ld the S e n a te, 'You e i t h e r take our l i n e s or you w o n 't get your b i l l . ' This type of ultimatum . . . would have extended the s p e a k e r ' s dominance to the Senate. The Senate n a t u r a l l y r e f u s e d . . . . The m a j o r i t y of the Senate wanted a r e a p p o rtio n m en t b i l l . But they c e r t a i n l y 290 If Rees and Unruh are c a s t as the l e a s i n g p r o t a g o n i s t s of the s i t u a t i o n , some f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e i r antagonism, i t s b asis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s u p p o r t , and i t s broa de r r a m i f i c a t i o n s may be d e s i r a b l e . The two men e n te r e d the Assembly t o g e t h e r in 1954 and were once consid e re d to be p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s . The r i f t between them might be a t t r i b u t e d to Rees' resentment of Unruh's i n c r e a sin g i n f l u e n c e , Unruh's d isd a in f o r the v o l u n t e e r C a l i f o r n i a Democratic Council, e s p e c i a l l y s tr ong in Rees' d i s t r i c t , and Rees' e l e c t i o n to the Senate in 1962. In the upper house, Rees proved to be q u i t e popu l a r , e x p e c i a l l y in c o n t r a s t to Richard R ichards, his Los Angeles County p r e d e c e s s o r , whose p e r s o n a l i t y conveyed the impression of a l o o f remoteness. Coinciding with the r i f t between Unruh and Rees was a growing d i s a f f e c t i o n between Unruh and Governor Brown. Because of Unruh's dominance as Speaker of the Assembly, the Senate gave the Governor more s upport than the lower house and Rees' e l e c t i o n to the Senate c o n s equently drew would not take a b i l l which r e p r e s e n t e d complete s u r r e n d e r . " Thomas M. Rees, l e t t e r to the e d i t o r , Los Angeles Tim es, July 17, 1965, Pt. I l l , p. 4. Dr. Leroy Hardy, c h i e f of the Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee s t a f f during the 1961 re apportionmen t and s p e c i a l a d v i s o r to the Governor during the comparable 1965 s t r u g g l e , is i n c l i n e d to b e l i e v e t h a t Rees was l e s s i n t e r e s t e d in m a in t a i n i n g c i t y boundary i n t e g r i t y than in th w ar tin g Unruh's attem pt to c r e a t e d i s t r i c t s in which his s u p p o r t e r s might gain Senate s e a t s . Personal i n t e r v i e w , Los Angeles, March 22, 1966. 291 him f u r t h e r from the Speaker f o r t h i s reason as w e ll. In a d d i t i o n to his personal p o p u l a r i t y and his r e l a t i v e a f f i n i t y for the Governor, the Senate as a whole supported Rees in his f i g h t over s p e c i f i c Los Angeles Senate boundaries because he had s upported an amendment to the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n p e r m i t t i n g one house of a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u re to ap p o rtio n i t s s e a t s on a b a s is o th e r than p o p u l a t i o n . 94 One o t h e r f a c t o r , i n t e n s e l y personal in n a t u r e , was involved in the s t r u g g l e . Unruh, himself, t h r e a t e n e d to f o r sake the Assembly to run f o r a new Senate s e a t . 95 This meant t h a t he probably would seek, sooner or l a t e r , the post of P r e s i d e n t Pro-Tempore held by the popular and i n f l u e n t i a l Sen. Hugh Burns of Fresno. Senate r e j e c t i o n of the Assembly reap p o rtio n m e n t amendment thus meant a v i c t o r y for Rees, i m p l i c i t a s s i s tance f o r the Governor, de fe re n c e to the p o s s i b l e passage of the Dirksen Amendment, an endorsement of c i t y boundary i n t e g r i t y , and a s i l e n t vote of conf ide nc e f o r Sen. Burns. Conversely, the Assembly's r e f u s a l to acce pt Senate d i s t r i c t s bespeaks a triumph f o r Unruh, d e d i c a t i o n to the equal 9 4 Los Angeles Ti mes, February 8, 1965, p. 4. 95A fte r Senate r e a p p o rtio n m e n t was f i n a l l y com p l e t e d , Unruh s a id of his new Senate d i s t r i c t : "I h a v e n ' t made up my mind, but on the b a s is of what I have seen, i t is a d i s t r i c t I could win." Ray Zeman, Los Angeles Times , October 31, 1965, p. B. He s u b se q u e n t l y decided to seek r e e l e c t i o n to the Assembly i n s t e a d . 292 p o p u la tio n p r i n c i p l e and a d e s i r e of several Assemblymen to advance to the upper h o u s e . 96 This s t a l e m a t e c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the 1965 general se ss io n was broken in the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n . The Dirksen Amendment had met d e f e a t in the United S t a t e s Sen at e, the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court had devised an unpopular ap p o r tionment plan to be imposed on both Senate and Assembly i f the l e g i s l a t u r e refu sed to a c t , and, to r e t u rn to the personal el em en t, Sen. Rees had announced his candidacy in a s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n f o r the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Governor Brown c a l l e d the s p e c i a l s e ss io n to meet on September 20. Although Speaker Unruh had p r e d i c t e d t h a t the Assembly could r e a p p o r t i o n i t s own s e a t s w ith in the f i r s t w e e k , 97 i t took n e a rly thre e to accomplish t h a t o b j e c t i v e . The delay was a t t r i b u t a b l e to incumbency pro- t e c t i on. One (Assemblyman) w ill t e l l me h e ' l l vote for our p l a n , Unruh r e p o r t e d , i f w e ' l l make j u s t one l i t t l e change, to add a good area to his d i s t r i c t . . . . We'll do almost anything li k e t h a t j u s t to get one vote for a b i l l , but r i g h t away we have to t e l l the o t h e r assemblyman whose d i s t r i c t would be a f f e c t e d . . . . He may be i n f u r i a t e d by the proposal and t h r e a t e n to vote a g a i n s t the b i l l i f we tamper with t h i s d i s t r i c t . 98 9 6 Th i s a n a l y s i s is based upon personal o b s e r v a t i o n , the sources c i t e d above and, to a g r e a t e x t e n t , the i n t e r views with Evans and Smith, 1o c . c i t . 97Jack W elte r, "Unruh is Doubtful on R e d i s t r i c t - i n q ," San Francisco Examiner, September 4, 1965, p. 6. 980uoted by Ray Zeman, "Burns Warns of D r a s t i c R e d i s t r i c t i n g A c tio n ," Los Angeles Ti mes, October 3 , 1 965 , 293 On the Senate s i d e , Stephen P. T e ale, chairman of the Reapportionment Committee, r e p o rt e d the i n a b i l i t y of his group to reach agreement on a b i l l a f t e r n e a r l y two weeks of d e l i b e r a t i o n and P r e s i d e n t Pro Tempore Burns t h r e a t e n e d to "ask the e n t i r e Senate to take over the r e apportionment as a committee of the w h o l e . " 99 Dr. Leroy Hardy, then se rv in g the governor as a reapp ortio nmen t c o n s u l t a n t , provided an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the importance of keeping incumbents happy with proposed d i s t r i c t s . Not only are t h e i r votes of te n n ec e s sa r y to the passage of the reap p o rtio n m e n t b i l l , but m a j o r i t y par ty l e a d e r s h i p assumes, c o r r e c t l y perhaps, t h a t known m i n o ri t y members are more p r e d i c t a b l e and hence e a s i e r to work with than the unknown men who might re p l a c e them in a l t e r e d d i s t r i c t s . There were at l e a s t e i g h t Assembly Republicans, he o b serv ed , whose votes on most m a t t e r s Speaker Unruh had found he could count on i f needed. In r e t u r n , the Democrats wished to p r o t e c t the s a f e t y of the d i s t r i c t s for th e se men, most of whom were c o o p e r a t i v e in p a r t because of t h e i r lack of l u c r a t i v e o ccu p ati o n s o u t s i d e the l e g i s l a t u r e . 100 p. 23. Burns and Pel tason observed t h a t , g e n e r a l l y , no m a t t e r how safe an incu mb en t's s e a t may be, "he p r e f e r s i t to be even s a f e r . The r e s u l t i n g n o n - c o m p e titiv e s e a t s are in many ways more s i g n i f i c a n t than t r a d i t i o n a l g e r r y mandering." Op. ci t . , p. 379 . " Z e m a n , "Burn's Warns . . . ," o p . ci t . , p. B. 100Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . ci t . 294 F i n a l l y , on October 5, Assemblyman A l l e n ' s Reappor tionment Committee approved a b i l l "designed to keep incumbents in o f f i c e . " The b i l l proposed changes in 58 of the 80 assembly d i s t r i c t s , and in 19 of the 31 d i s t r i c t s in Los Angeles County. But only 24 d i s t r i c t s in the s t a t e and none in Los Angeles County had exceeded the 15 per cent d e v i a t i o n from average p o p u l a t i o n which the s t a t e Supreme Court had s e t as a maximum p e r m i s s i b l e l i m i t , leading to charges from Republican Assemblyman William Bagley t h a t the b i l l was an "A11enmander," not a gerrymander, and t h a t i t provided more d r a s t i c changes than those re q u i re d by the c o u r t . This a l l e g a t i o n , and a s i m i l a r one by Assemblyman Houston I. Flournoy of Claremont, als o a Rep ublican, was answered by Steven E. Smith, s t a f f d i r e c t o r for the Allen committee. All Assemblymen had agreed e a r l i e r in the y e a r , he e x p l a i n e d , to p r o t e c t incumbents. He s a id he saw nothing "immoral or i l l e g a l " about t h a t . Allen and Unruh both contended t h a t the r e ap p o rtio n m e n t would not a l t e r the e x i s t i n g p a r t i s a n balance in the Assembly. I t is c l e a r , however, t h a t with 49 Democrats and 31 Republicans then in the Assembly, the Democrats, co n te n t with the s t a t u s quo, stood to p r o f i t by s t r e n g t h e n i n g i t . Personal and p o l i t i c a l m o t i v a t i o n s seemed to o p e r a t e , fo r them, in happy c o n v e r g e n c e . 101 101This account is based c h i e f l y on the r e p o r t of Ray Zeman, "R eapportioning Bill Passed by Assembly U n it," 295 On October 7, two days a f t e r the b i l l had c l e a r e d the committee, i t was approved, 58-18, by the e n t i r e Assembly, but i t was not u n t i l two weeks l a t e r , October 21, 1965, t h a t the Senate approved i t s own r e a p p o rt i o n m e n t , added as an amendment to the Assembly B i l l , by a 28 to 9 vote. The lower chamber promptly con c u rre d , and the Los Angeles Herald Examiner proclaimed in a f r o n t page banner he adlin e "STATE CONTROL WON B Y ! . A . , SOUTH."102 The announcement was as a c c u r a t e as i t was flamboyant. The passage of the b i l l by the Senate was an agonizing p r o c e s s , sin ce i t assured the l e g i s l a t i v e r e t i r e ment of at l e a s t 14 of i t s 40 members. Burns, a 23 y e a r Senate v e t e r a n , said he in tro d u c e d the b i l l "with the g r e a t e s t r e l u c t a n c e I have ever p r e s e n t e d any b i l l to t h i s h o u s e . " 103 I ts major a t t r i b u t e , from the p o i n t of view of most s e n a t o r s , was t h a t i t might reduce by four the number of incumbents doomed to p o l i t i c a l death by the Supreme Court plan which seemed i t s only a l t e r n a t i v e . By c o n t r a s t , the Assembly r e a p p o rtio n m e n t r e q u i r e d the l e g i s l a t i v e Los Angeles Times, October 6, 1965, pp. 3 and 26. Zeman po inted out t h a t the new d i s t r i c t s served the purpose of incumbency p r o t e c t i o n i n f a l l i b l y w e l l , at l e a s t through the primary. Of the 51 Assemblymen who ran for r e e l e c t i o n , all were renominated. "The Results of R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," 1o c . ci t. 1O20 c to b e r 21, 1965, p. 1. 103Quoted by Ray Zeman, "Senate Unveils R e d i s t r i c t inq B i l l , " Los Anqeles Times, October 19, 1965, pp. 3 and 18. demise of only one member, Republican Milton Marks of San F r a n c i s c o , and he had been assured of a Municipal Court appointment by Governor Brown.104 As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , passage of the r e a p p o r t i o n - I ment package in the s p e c i a l s e s s i o n was eased by an im portant f a c t o r not p r e s e n t e a r l i e r in the y e a r . Because the Assembly was under co u r t o r d e r f o r the f i r s t time, the o ld e r t r a d i t i o n which allowed each house to r e a p p o r t i o n i t s own s e a t s was, for the most p a r t , t a c i t l y r e e s t a b l i s h e d . The only importa nt e x c e p t i o n , and evidence here in in c o n c l u s i v e , was t h a t Unruh was p e r m i t t e d , i n f o r m a l l y , to determine Senate boundaries in Los Angeles County. Rees, then v i r t u a l l y assured of e l e c t i o n to Congress, made an unsuccess fu l and a p p a r e n t l y p e r f u n c t o r y atte m p t to make "minor changes" in t h re e proposed s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s "in the c e n t r a l p a r t of Los Angeles C o u n t y . " 105 He voted fo r f i n a l passage of the b i l l anyway. I t is known t h a t Unruh had approved the Senate d i s t r i c t s a t l e a s t t h re e days p r i o r 104Ray Zeman, "Reapportion Bill Adopted by Assembly," Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1965, p. 3. The governor had also appoin te d former Sen. Edwin Regan to a j u d i c i a l post and was c o n s i d e r i n g s e v e ra l o t h e r "lame duck" Senators for o th e r p o s i t i o n s . Almost a y e a r e a r l i e r , i t was re p o rt e d t h a t f i v e n o r th e rn C a l i f o r n i a Democratic S e n a t o r s - - A r n o l d , R a t t i g a n , C h r i s t e n s e n , Cobey and F a r r - - were being con sid e re d f o r o t h e r j u d i c i a l appointm ents. Los Angeles Ti mes, Nov. 22, 1964, p. 10. 105Ray Zeman, " L e g i s l a t u r e to Vote Today on Appor t io n m e n t," Los Angeles Times , October 21, 1965, p. 28. Hardy shares t h i s general p o i n t of view. Personal i n t e r view, op. c i t . 297 to f i n a l Senate a c t i o n 105 and the approved boun daries seem somewhat c l o s e r to those which had received Assembly approval during the general sessio n than those proposed by Rees in S. B. 6 . 10 7 If th e r e are any p o l i t i c a l c o n s t a n t s , one of them is s u r e l y p o l i t i c a l ambition and i f t h i s m a n ife sts i t s e l f anywhere, one place is c e r t a i n l y in the reapportionm ent p ro ce ss. Analysis of t h i s phenomenon is p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t , however, f o r t h e r e are l i t e r a l l y as many, and perhaps more, v a r i a b l e s as there are incumbent l e g i s l a t o r s . A few of the more im p o rtan t c o n d itio n s which shaped the 1965 s t r u g g l e in C a l i f o r n i a were the r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n of personal i n f l u e n c e in the Assembly (in Unruh's hands) than in the Senat e, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a Congressional s e a t f o r Rees, one of the leadi ng f i g u r e s in 106Ray Zeman, "Senate Unveils . . . , " op. ci t . , p. 3. 107There were a c t u a l l y two Los Angeles County Senate D i s t r i c t plans approved by the Assembly in the general s e s s i o n . One s e t , providing f o r 12 s e a t s , was an amendment to S.B. 6, and was the s u b j e c t of b r i e f and f u t i l e conference committee d e l i b e r a t i o n . The o t h e r , en compassed in A.B. 1778 i n t ro d u c e d by A llen , provided for 153-2 s e a t s and was passed "as a sla p a t the upper house" less than an hour before the mandatory adjournment of the s e s s i o n . Robert M. Blanchard, " L e g i s l a t u r e Ends . . . , " op. ci t . , p. 1. The plan was based c h i e f l y on e x i s t i n g Congressional d i s t r i c t boundaries and was probably intended as a b a s is for an amicus c u r ia e court b r i e f r e q u e s t i n g j u d i c i a l appo rtio nmen t, flaps of the proposed d i s t r i c t s may be found in Don A. Allen, S r . , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. ci t . , pp. 1 2 1 - 1 2 6 . A map of Senate di s t r i cts for Los Angeles County, as f i n a l l y adopted, appears in the Los Anqe1es Ti mes, October 24 , 1 965 , p. B. 298 the e a r l y sta ges of the re d i s t r i c t i n g b a t t l e , and the c r e a t i o n of an unpre c e d e n te d ly lar ge number of new Senate s e a t s f o r a s p i r i n g Assemblymen. There were no doubt f a c t o r s o t h e r than those which have been mentioned which were o p e r a t i v e during the 1965 apportionment f i g h t . But one of the f u n c t io n s of a b r i e f case study is to i d e n t i f y and a b s t r a c t those of s u rp a s s i n g i n f l u e n c e . The four enumerated a b o v e - -th e p o s s i b i l i t y of f e d e ra l i n t e r v e n t i o n , the im po sitio n of a j u d i c i a l l y d e t e r mined a l t e r n a t i v e , the ex te n s io n of c o u r t decrees from one to both Chambers, and the s h i f t i n g f o rt u n e s of personal a m b i t i o n - - a p p e a r to have been paramount. P a r t i s a n 1o y a l t i e s . --One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the reap p o rtio n m e n t j u s t d e s c r i b e d was the r e l a t i v e l y minor role played by the l e g i s l a t i v e p a r t i e s during most of the p ro c e ss. This may mean only t h a t the Republican-Democratic f r i c t i o n had r e l a t i v e l y low v i s i b i l i t y , obscured as i t was by the more obvious s p l i t s between senate and assembly, l e g i s l a t u r e and j u d i c i a r y , Unruh and Rees. / But whatever the s i t u a t i o n may have been in 1965, and t h i s will be ex plored l a t e r , i t seams i n d i s p u t a b l e t h a t party c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are u s u a ll y im p o rtan t to apportionm ent d e l i b e r a t i o n s . The r o le of p a r t i e s in t w e n t i e t h century C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s has been u n s t a b l e . As the Wahlke study po in ts out, 299 Until 1910 C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s were not s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t from those of o t h e r s t a t e s . E le c tio n -1 aw reforms i n tro d u c e d at t h a t time by Hiram Johnson P r o g r e s s i v e s - - n o n - p a r t i s a n local e l e c t i o n s , over r e g u l a t i o n of s t a t e p a r t i e s , easy d i r e c t l e g i s l a t i o n , and above a l l c r o s s - f i 1i n q - - t e n d e d to v i t i a t e the pa rty system in C a l i f o r n i a . In the l a t e 1940's as many as t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the l e g i s l a t o r s gained o f f i c e by . . . c r o s s - f i l i n g . 108 The importance of p r e s s u re groups in C a l i f o r n i a probably has reduced the s t r e n g t h of p a r t i e s even more. Buchanan has observed t h a t the " s t r e n g t h of lo b b ies in C a l i f o r n i a , c o i n c i d i n g with the weakness of p a r t i e s , gives s upport to the f a m i l i a r p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e i r s t r e n g t h v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y . " 109 Perhaps Buchanan has been the most assiduou s s t u d e n t of l e g i s l a t i v e p a r t i s a n s h i p in C a l i f o r n i a . He has concluded t h a t party s t r e n g t h , weakened by the Johnson refo rm s, enjoyed a temporary resurgen ce during the d e p r e s sion p o l i t i c s of the 19 3 0 ' s , waned again the in 1 9 4 0 's , and "then grew s t e a d i l y s t r o n g e r during the 1 9 5 0 ' s . 1,110 This i n c r e a s e d p a r t i s a n i n f l u e n c e in the l a s t decade is e x p l i c a b l e p r i m a r i l y in terms of thre e 108Wahlke, e t a 1. , op. ci t . , p. 43. Joseph Beek, u n o f f i c i a l h i s t o r i a n f o r the CaIi forn i a Senate and i t s employee f o r more than f o r t y y e a r s , w r i te s r a t h e r n o s t a l g i c a l l y t h a t party a f f i l i a t i o n "played a small p a r t in the o r g a n i z a t i o n and conduct of the l e g i s l a t u r e from the s e s s i o n of 1913 to the s e ss io n of 1935." Beek, op. c i t . , p. 148. 109Buchanan, o p . ci t . , p. 143. 11 01 b i d . , p. 1. See also Beek, op. c i t . , p. 151. 300 developments. F i r s t , in 1954 the party a f f i l i a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e s appeared on primary b a l l o t s for the f i r s t time. This r e p r e s e n t e d the f i r s t and most durable n a il in the c o f f i n of c r o s s - f i l i n g . In 1956 only one f o u rth of all c a n d id a te s we re able to win the nomination of both p a r t i e s and t h i s was l e ss than h a l f as many as those who had gained r e e l e c t i o n in t h a t fashion ten ye a rs e a r l i e r . 111 Cross f i l i n g was p r o h i b i t e d e n t i r e l y in 1959 with the r e s u l t t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e c a n d i d a t e s could no longe r a s p i r e to dual primary v i c t o r i e s by the easy e x p e d i e n t of r e p u d i a t i n g p a r t y p o l i c i e s and c a t e r i n g to both s id e s of the p o l i t i c a l fence. Secondly, "the growth of Democratic clubs t h a t are i s s u e - o r i e n t e d and endorse c a n d id a te s in the p rim a rie s (was a f a c t o r ) r e s t o r i n g p a r t i s a n s h i p to the l e g i s l a t u r e . " 112 It must be n o te d , however, t h a t Assembly Speaker Unruh e s ti m a t e d in 1963 t h a t of the 52 Democratic Assemblymen " t h r e e , or at most fiv e" are o r i e n t e d to the C a l i f o r n i a Democratic Council ( i . e . , club) movement."113 v_ T h i r d l y , the Democratic v i c t o r y of 1958 which ca p tu red control of both houses of the l e g i s l a t u r e as well as the g overnors hip for the f i r s t time in t h i s c entury was 111Wahlke, e t a l . , 1o c . ci t . 112J e w e l l , S t a t e Leqi s 1 a t u r e s , o p . ci t . , pp. 55-56 . 113Taped i n t e r v i e w , p r i n t e d in Hyink, e t a 1. , op. ci t . , p . 266 . / 301 a triumph for p a r t i s a n s h i p as well as p a r t y . A y e a r before t h e i r e l e c t o r a l triumph the Wahlke study showed t h a t Democrats ranked 7th and 11th and the Republicans 15th and 16th among the 16 l e g i s l a t i v e p a r ty d e l e g a t i o n s in four s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s in terms of t h e i r a f f e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s toward p a r t y . 1114 Moreover, of 103 C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t o r s in 1957, 42 per cent of the democrats and only 22 per cent of the Republicans perc e iv e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r s as p a r t y - s p o n s o r e d . 115 The e f f e c t s of i n c r e a s e d p a r t i s a n s h i p are e a s i e r to demonstrate than i t s ca uses. In 1951 when the Assembly changed i t s ru le s to r e q u i re each p ar ty caucus to e l e c t three members of the Rules Committee, p a r t i e s were form ally rec ognized in the l e g i s l a t u r e for the " f i r s t time since Hiram J o h n s o n . " 116 The most s i g n i f i c a n t evidence of pa rty l o y a l t y , however, comes in r o l l c a ll v o t e s . In t h i s r e s p e c t evidence i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e c e n t l y e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t o r s we re more p a r t i s a n than those with g r e a t e r s e n i o r i t y 117 and t h a t the p e rc e n ta g e of r o ll c a l l s in the Assembly which saw m a j o r i t i e s of the two p a r t i e s opposed to one a nother 114Wahlke, et a l . , op. ci t . , p. 353 . 115I b i d . , p. 93. 116Buchanan, op. ci t . , p. 51. 11 71bi d . , p. 128. 302 i n c r e a s e d from 31 in 1 949 , to 34 in 1 957 , to 49 in 1 959. 1 1 8 Analysis of r o ll call votes i n c lu d in g those c a s t in 1961 rev ealed t h a t p a r ty d i f f e r e n c e s had i n c r e a s e d sin c e 1957 in the Assembly but not in the Senate and t h a t in the lower house t h i s p a r t i s a n s p l i t was more im p o rta n t than any o t h e r voting alignmen t. In the S enate , p a r t y disa greem ent ranked second in frequency behind n o r t h - s o u t h d i v e r g e n c i e s but ahead of u r b a n - r u r a l d i c h o t o m i e s . 119 This data is of no value f o r p r e s e n t purposes unl ess r e l a t e d to apportionment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Such a r e l a t i o n s h i p is p l a u s i b l e but not c o n c l u s i v e , e s p e c i a l l y i f employed to t e s t the degree of p a r t i s a n s h i p apparent in the 1951 and 1961 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t s . I t seems c l e a r t h a t both were p a r t i s a n l y i n s p i r e d . In the e a r l i e r one, Republicans drew d i s t r i c t s so c o n t r i v e d as to give them a l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y as l a t e as 1957 in the face of 1956 e l e c t i o n s which produced a s t a t e - w i d e e l e c t o r a l m a j o r i t y f o r 118 Ibi d . , p. 127, 119Charles M. P r i c e , Voting Alignments in the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e ( U n i v e r s i t y of Southern Cali forn i a , unpu blished d o c to r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , 1965), pp. 190-193. Buchanan's a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t between 1957 and 1960 s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e c o n f l i c t by C a l i f o r n i a law-makers themselves had changed to the degree t h a t the North-South s p l i t , ranked f i r s t in 1957, had been re p lac e d by a 1i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n . Republican- Democratic d i f f e r e n c e s , ranked s i x t h and l a s t by l e g i s l a t o r s in 1957 had i n c r e a s e d most d r a m a t i c a l l y , to t h i r d most i m p o r t a n t , in 1960. Buchanan, o p . ci t . , p. 129. The p e r ception of voting alignments appears to change more slowly than voting p a t t e r n s as a c t u a l l y m a n ife ste d . 303 Democratic Assembly c a n d i d a t e s . 120 Moreover, more Assembly and Congressional d i s t r i c t s d ep arted from popu latio n norms in the 1951 than in the 1961 a p p o r t i o n m e n t s . 121 F i n a l l y , the Republican m a j o r i t y i n c r e a s e d by six Assembly s e a t s in the f i r s t e l e c t i o n follow ing t h e i r 1951 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t , while the Democrats boosted t h e i r margin by only fiv e a f t e r the r e d i s t r i c t i n g they determined ten years l a t e r . 122 This e v id e n c e , p e r s u a s i v e as i t i s , does not prove the Republicans more n e f a r i o u s than t h e i r opponents. In 1961, the Democrats, although a p p a r e n t l y e x e r c i s i n g more r e s t r a i n t in m a n ip u la tin g Assembly d i s t r i c t s , indulged t h e i r p a r t i s a n s impulses f r e e l y with regard to Congres s io n a l D i s t r i c t s . They b o l s t e r e d t h e i r p l u r a l i t y in the C a l i f o r n i a House Delegation by e i g h t in the 1962 e l e c t ions while Republicans i n c r e a s e d t h e i r margin by only 5 ten y ea rs e a r l i e r . More c o n v i n c i n g l y , the p a r t i s a n s h i p of the 120Way, op. ci t . , p. 255 . 1 211 b i d . , p. 259 . Pop ulat ion d i s p a r i t i e s c r e a t e d by the 1951 reap p o rtio n m e n t tended to be u n n e c e s s a r i l y high with regard to Congressional d i s t r i c t s and to in c r e a s e l a t e r in the decade as a r e s u l t of p o p u la tio n s h i f t s with regard to Assembly d i s t r i c t s . Democratic c o n t r o l l e d Con g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t s in Los Angeles County averaged 425,000 people while ones with a Republican advantage c o n ta in e d about 225,000. As a r e s u i t , even though Democratic c a n d i dates r e c e i v e d 60 per cent of the t o t a l county vote in 1958, Democrats won only f iv e of the twelve House s e a t s . Hardy, The P r a c t i c e and Theory of Reapportionment (mimeo graphed paper d e l i v e r e d at meeting of American Poli ti cal Science A s s o c i a t i o n , September, 1960), pp. 3 and 6. 122A ll en , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. c i t . , pp. 276-278. 304 Democratic gerrymander is i n d i c a t e d by the f a c t t h a t i t c r e a t e d g r e a t e r (altho ugh fewer) d i s t r i c t p opulation v a r i a t i o n s than could be a t t r i b u t e d to the Republicans in 1951. Whereas the Republican apportionment c r e a t e d a maximum Assembly d i s t r i c t d e v i a t i o n of - 52.8 per cent from the average, the Democrats in 1961 were r e s p o n s i b l e for a d i s t r i c t 63.3 per cent below a v e r a g e . 123 Visual impres sions i n d i c a t e t h a t d i s t r i c t shapes dep ar ted from the sta n d a rd of compactness to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t , a l s o , than the Republican ones fash ioned p r e v i o u s l y . In the j u d i c i a l l y compelled 1965 r e v i s i o n s , no Congressional l i n e s were redrawn and no changes in the p a r t i s a n composition of the l e g i s l a t u r e were expected to r e s u l t from e i t h e r the Assembly or Senate r e d i s t r i c t i n g . 124 Republican gains in the 1966 e l e c t i o n s a re p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t , however, in view of the f a c t t h a t the Demo crat!' c-con t r o l 1 ed reap portio nm ent of the preced ing year co ntain ed p o l i t i c a l advantages which were less a pparent but perhaps j u s t as profound as those in the 1951 or 1961 r e a p p o r t i onments. One of the o b j e c t i o n s to the Senate d i s t r i c t s proposed in the r e g u l a r s e ss i o n by Sen. Rees, f o r example, was t h a t i t did not guarantee enough safe Democratic s e a t s , 12 3Way, 1o c . ci t . 124Zeman, "Reap po rtioning B i l l , " October 6, 1965, op. ci t . , p. 26. 305 nor provide s u i t a b l e d i s t r i c t s for Assemblymen wishing to move to the upper h o u s e . 125 These a l l e g e d d e f e c t s were a p p a r e n t l y remedied in the f i n a l apportionment approved in the s p e c i a l s e ss io n l a t e r in the y e a r . Moreover, by e n tr e n c h in g Assembly incumbents, among whom Democrats were most numerous, the f in a l r e a p portionm ent probably was assumed to i n h i b i t implementation of the Rep u b lican -d ev ised " C a l i f o r n i a P la n ." This c o n c e p t i o n , g e n e r a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to S ta te Committee Chairman Gaylord P ark in so n , c a l l e d for the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of GOP Assembly campaign re so u rc e s in two or three d i s t r i c t s in each e l e c t i o n so t h a t a Republican Assembly m a j o r i t y might emerge in time to c o n tro l the 1971 decenn ial re apportionm en t. 126 The p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 1965 d i s t r i c t changes were re veale d in highly emotional terms when 125Seven of the twelve R e e s-d e sig n a ted Los Angeles County d i s t r i c t s would almost c e r t a i n l y have gone to Demo c r a t s , but Speaker Unruh a s s e r t e d t h a t some Democratic Assemblymen a s p i r i n g to Senate s e a t s were unhappy with the b o u n d a rie s. Rees, who is s aid to have made one of the twelve "sa fe " for h i m s e l f , s a id the Assemblymen he ta lk e d with were s a t i s f i e d with the new l i n e s . J e r r y G i l l i a m , "Senate Vote Due Today on Reapportionment Measure," Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1965, p. 3. See also Robert B1anchard, 'HTeapportion Plan Hits Snag in Assembly," Los Angeles Ti mes, May 1 6 , 1 965 , p. 4. Blanchard found t h a t " d i s s i d e n t s " claimed the plan "does not provide enough ' s a f e ' Democratic d i s t r i c t s . " 126Steven E. Smith, s t a f f d i r e c t o r for the Assembly reap p o rtio n m e n t committee, a s s e r t e d t h a t Assembly d i s t r i c t boundary changes in Los Angeles County were " s u b s t a n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r . " This was in response to a Republican o b j e c t i o n . Zeman, "Reappor tioning B i l l , " o p . ci t . , p. 26. 306 physica l a l t e r c a t i o n s seemed t h r e a t e n e d by Assemblymen Robert T. Mon agan (R., Tracy), m i n o ri t y l e a d e r , and Robert W. Crown (D., Alameda), chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, over the p a r t i s a n i m p l i c a t i o n s of the r e a p p o r tionment b i l l . 127 Comprehension of the importance of l e g i s l a t i v e p a r t i s a n s h i p in the reap p o rtio n m en t process is not enhanced by an attempt to decide whether t h a t p a r t i s a n s h i p was most s i g n i f i c a n t in the re d i s t r i c t i n g of 1951, 1961 or 1965. What seems im porta nt is t h a t i t e x e r t e d some i n f l u e n c e in all t h r e e . In 1951, i t was m a n ife ste d in the number of d i s t r i c t p o p u la tio n d e v i a t i o n s and the d i s p a r i t y between po pular vote p e rc e n ta g es and the perc e n ta g e s of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s won. In 1961 i t appeared most c l e a r l y in the degree of p o p u la tio n d e v i a t i o n and the shape of d i s t r i c t bounda r i e s . F i n a l l y , in 1965 p a r t i s a n s t r a t e g y seemed to be d e f e n si v e in n a t u r e , designed to c o n s o l i d a t e the Democratic l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t i e s a lr e ad y e x i s t i n g . 128 Party alignm en ts were c l e a r e r o u t s i d e l e g i s l a t i v e chambers than i n s i d e . On the broad one-man, one-vote 127A sso cia te d Press d i s p a t c h , Sacramento, South Bay Daily Breeze ( T o r ra n c e , C a l i f o r n i a ) , October 8, 1965, p . 37 Crown had charged t h a t Republicans who had r e c e i v e d safe d i s t r i c t s and then a t t a c k e d the re a pportionm ent b i l l were "a l i t t l e b i t phony." 128Hardy and Hinderaker are agreed t h a t p a r t i s a n ship in the l e g i s l a t u r e i n c r e a s e d between 1951 and 1961. Personal i n t e r v i e w s , 1o c . c i t . 307 i s s u e , most Democrats endorsed the p e r t i n e n t court orders while most Re pu blicans voiced o p p o s i t i o n . On August 19, 1964, for example, when the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s passed a b i l l s t r i p p i n g the Federal Courts of j u r i s d i c t i o n in s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment c a s e s , C a l i f o r n i a Democrats li n e d up twenty to th re e a g a i n s t i t , but the s t a t e ' s Republican d e l e g a t i o n voted twelve to th re e in favo r of i t . 129 P a r t i s a n v o l u n t e e r groups r e f l e c t e d t h i s s p l i t , and, to a l e s s e r d egree, so did the v o t e r s . In i t s 1965 s t a t e convention the C a l i f o r n i a Democratic Council opposed the Dirksen Amendment l i m i t i n g one-man one-vote r u l i n g s , 130 but a week l a t e r the C a l i f o r n i a Republican Assembly en dorsed i t . 131 A p u b l i c opinion poll i n d i c a t e d t h a t 129Reported in Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1964, Sec. G, p. 3. The most d e c i s i v e vote in the U.S. Senate on the Dirksen Amendment showed a s i m i l a r ar ra y of p a r t i s a n ship r e f l e c t i n g n a t i o n a l p a r ty p r o c l i v i t y . Democrats, up holding the p o p u la tio n s t a n d a r d , voted 36-28 a g a i n s t the Amendment, but Republicans, in c l u d i n g Ses. Kuchel and Murphy of C a l i f o r n i a , favored i t by a margin of 29-3. Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1965, p. 12. 130Carl Greenberg, "CDC Wants Viet Peace Nego t i a t e d , " Los Angeles Times , March 22, 1965, pp. 3 and 28. 131"CRA Urges Repeal of Federal Income Tax," Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1965, p. 24. The United Re p u b li- cans of C a l i f o r n i a passed a s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n a l i t t l e over a month l a t e r . "UROC Res olution Hit Rea p p o rtio n m en t," Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1965, p. 15. The following October, the CPA board of d i r e c t o r s went so f a r as to ask fo r the impeachment of Chief J u s t i c e Rogert Traynor of the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court because of his role in o r d e rin g l e g i s l a t i v e re a p p o rtio n m e n t. Carl Greenberg, "CRA Seeks 308 Republicans opposed l e g i s l a t i v e ap portionm ent for both houses on a p o p u la tio n b asis by 45 to 31 per c e n t , but t h a t Democrats favored i t by a narrow margin of 36 to 34 per c e n t . 132 Vet the views of some im p o rtan t s t a t e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s were more d i f f i c u l t to c a t e g o r i z e in terms of pa rty a f f i l i a t i o n . Republican Ronald Reagan, soon to become a g u b e r n a t o r i a l c o n t e n d e r , "lashed r e ap portionm ent d e c i s io n s by the U.S. Supreme C o u r t , " 133 and Governor Brown, a i Democrat about to seek r e e l e c t i o n , urged the Congress to approve a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to m i t i g a t e some of those d e c i s i o n s . 134 B i p a r t i s a n s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e support concurred in t h i s view to such an e x t e n t t h a t C a l i f o r n i a became the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r in the attem pt to gain support for the Dirksen Amendment. E s p e c i a l l y i n t r i g u i n g was the f a c t t h a t , s t r a n g e l y enough, one of the most crusad ing m i s s i o n a r i e s is Sen. Thomas M. Rees (D., Los Angeles) who is sad dled with the burden of r e p r e s e n t i n g almost 7 m i l l i o n r e s i d e n t s in the most populous county in the s t a t e . He not only has made a couple of t r i p s to Impeaching of Tr ay nor," Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1965, p . 3. 132The r e s u l t s were r e p o r t e d by The S t a t e P o l l , "Civil Rights Seen as Issue in *66 E l e c t i o n , " Los Angeles Times, September 1 5 , 1 965 , p. 28. 133"Reagan Talks Like Can d id ate," South Bay Daily Breeze (T o rra n c e , C a l i f . ) , November 12, 196 6, p . 2. 134"Brown Asks f o r Amendment," Sacramento Union, March 12, 1965. 309 Washington seeking su p p o rt fo r (the Dirksen) amendment . . . but v e r b a l l y , and by l e t t e r , c o n t a c t e d lawmakers he knows in o th e r s t a t e s in b e h a l f of the p r o j e c t . 135 The long -range p a r t i s a n e f f e c t s of reapportionm ent on a popu latio n ba sis are d i f f i c u l t to determine. The n a tio n a l chairmen of both the Democratic and Republican National Committees expressed approval and p a r t i s a n ........... o p t i m i s m , 136 and both might find em pirica l evidence to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r a s s e r t i o n s . A p o p u l a t i o n - b a s e d r e a p p o r tionment was followed by g e n e r a l l y unexpected Republican gains in the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e , 137 and i t s impact in 135Robert M. Blan ch ard, " C a l i f o r n i a Leads Fight to R e d i s t r i c t ," Los Angeles T i mes, March 21 , 1 965 , Sec. F, p. 7. Several C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t o r s t r a v e l l e d e x t e n s i v e l y in b e h a lf of the Dirksen Amendment. Sen. John Begovich (D., J a c k s o n v i l l e ) , appeared b efo re a South C arolina Senate committee and r e p o rte d he was "one of many C a l i f o r n i a Senators v i s i t i n g s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . " The S t a te, Columbia, S .C ., February 10, 1965. The importance of the incumbency f a c t o r here seems to overshadow p a r t i s a n con s i d e r a t i o n s . In what seems now to have been a p r e d i c t i o n of Sen.' Rees' a t t i t u d e , Hobbs observed t h a t "in some s t a t e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of g r e a t l y u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d c o u n t i e s work in c o l l u s i o n with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from g r e a t l y o v e r r e p r e sented co u n tie s to block i n c r e a s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The reason being t h a t so long as a small number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are e l e c t e d in t h e i r d i s t r i c t s , the more importa nt they become. I t is a t ru is m t h a t power s h a r i n g is not often e a g e r ly sought by p o l i t i c i a n s . " Edward H. Hobbs, " L e g i s l a t i v e Apportionment," quoted by Advisory Commission on In te r-g o v e rn m e n ta l R e l a t i o n s , op. c i t . , p. 21. 136Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), pp. 12-13. The r e f e r e n c e is to s ta te m e n ts by John M. Bailey and William E. M il l e r . 137The 1966 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t e d in a loss of seven Democratic s e a t s in the Assembly and f i v e in the Senate. Zeman, "Southland Control . . . , " Los Angeles Ti mes , 1o c . c_i_t. I t is t r u e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t th ese lo sses would have been even g r e a t e r had Democrats not c o n t r o l l e d the 310 o t h e r s t a t e s has been i n c o n c l u s i v e . In Vermont, New York, and Georgia Republicans seemed to be the i n i t i a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the most re c e n t r e d i s t r i c t i n g ; the Democrats have i n c r e a s e d t h e i r power in New J e r s e y , Michigan, Iowa, and Del aw are. 138 Which par ty wil l p r o f i t n a t i o n a l l y seems to depend upon whether urban or suburban areas p r o f i t most from the one-man, one-vote c r i t e r i o n . If i t is the former, the Democrats are obvious h e i r s to power; i f the l a t t e r , the Republicans seem to hold an advantage. The is s u e may be in doubt f o r at l e a s t a d e c a d e . 139 The c o u r t s , whatever the Senate rea p p o rtio n m e n t a y e a r e a r l i e r in which Los Angeles County gained 13 new s e a t s , plus a n o th e r shared with Orange County. In the 14 Senate d i s t r i c t s in Los Angeles County and the one shared with Orange County, Republicans receiv ed ap pr oximately 52 per ce nt of the t o t a l Senate vote but were able to e l e c t only 40 per c e n t , or s i x , of t h e i r 15 c a n d i d a t e s . Figures compiled by t h i s w r i t e r from u n o f f i c i a l f i n a l r e t u r n s . Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1966, p. 26. 138For r e c e n t summaries, see Donald P. Zoc ha rt, "Reapportionment Means Demo C o n t r o l ," South Bay Daily Breeze (Torra nce , C a l i f . ) , January 13, 1966, p. 22; Raymond J. Crowley, "Reapportion Begins to Show r e s u l t s , " Los Angeles Times, March 13, 1966, Sec. F, p. 6; and George B. Merry, 1o c . ci t . 139For s l i g h t l y varying i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , note David I. Wells' "guess" t h a t "re a p p o rtio n m e n t sh o u ld , in the long run, be more h elpful to the Democrats," and Joseph A lsop's su g g e stio n t h a t "in theory at l e a s t , the Republicans have a f a r big g er come-back chance than most people supp ose." Wells, "One Man, One Vote," New Republic (Vol. 152, No. 26), June 26, 1965, p. 12; and Alsop, "Reapportionment Can Help GOP, If Connec ticut Is Any Example," Los Angeles Ti mes , December 24, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. An A s socia ted Press d i s p a t c h , based on a 1965 Census Bureau study e n t i t l e d Americans at Mid-Decade, r e p o r t e d t h a t "Americans are s t i l l f l o c k i n g to m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s . But the f l i g h t 311 p a r t i s a n outcome may be, are a p p a r e n t l y i n d i f f e r e n t to the e n t i r e m a t t e r . The C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court, a t l e a s t , made i t c l e a r when i t ordered l e g i s l a t i v e reapportionm ent ' t h a t the whole is sue inv olves " p e c u l i a r l y p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s " which are not a p p r o p r i a t e for j u d i c i a l d e t e r mination but are i n s t e a d " f a r b e t t e r e n t r u s t e d to the c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l wisdom of the L e g i s l a t u r e s u b j e c t to the power of i n i t i a t i v e and r e f e r e n d u m . " 140 It is not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s same high t r i b u n a l took no note of the b r i e f f i l e d by the chairman of the San Fran ci sco County Republican Central Committee contending t h a t the 1965 reap p o rtio n m en t t h r e a t e n e d to d i s e n f r a n c h i s e his p a r t y . 141 The t h r e a t was proved i l l u s o r y in the next e l e c t i o n . P a r t i s a n s h i p , l i k e o t h e r ap portionment c o n c e rn s, is c o n s t a n t l y p r e s e n t in forms which vary both in purpose and i n t e n s i t y . In the chronology of C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s , i t appears as an a g g r e s s i v e , aggra n d iz in g force in both 1951 and 1961 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t s , but as a kind of holding action to the s u b u r b s - - t h e tren d t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d 1940's and 1950‘s--may be l o sin g some of i t s momentum." "City Popu l a t i o n s Grow But Suburb Tide Eases," Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1966, p. 20. 140J e r r y Burns, " R e d i s t r i c t : Supreme Court Order," San Francisco C h r o n i c l e , September 2, 1965, p. 12. 141"San F ran ci sco Republicans Ask Gerrymandering Ban," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 4, 1966 , p. 4; Daryl E. Lembke"j " S t a t e High Court OK's Redi s t r i cti ng ," op. c i t . , January 12, 1966, p. 1. 312 / h o p e f u l ly designed to stem a back-wash, c o n s o l i d a t e e x i s t i n g ad v an tag es, and p re se rv e the s t a t u s quo in 1965. In the changing potency of i t s f o r c e , i t seems to f l u c t u a t e i n v e r s e l y with the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t e r b r a n c h , i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l , i n t e r h o u s e , and i n t e r p e r s o n a l r i v a l r i e s . The only c e r t a i n t i e s are i t s obvious u b i q u i t y and i t s a p p a r e n t l y i n c r e a s i n g s a l i e n c e . Demographic Demands Any typology of ap portionment f a c t o r s must be e s s e n t i a l l y a r b i t r a r y . " P o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s " has been employed in the preceding s e c t i o n as a term embracing l e g i s l a t i v e - j u d i c i a l , n a t i o n a l - s t a t e , s e n a t e - a s s e m b l y , p o l i t i c i a n - p o l i t i c a n , and Repub 1ican-Dem ocratic c l e a v a g e s . But o t h e r p o l i t i c a l l y - t o n e d r i v a l r i e s a f f e c t the process under c o n s i d e r a t i o n which might be corrsidered demographic in c h a r a c t e r . These include f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g to s e c t i o n a lism , urbanism, p r e s s u re groups, and p u b l i c o p inion. Secti on a!i sm. - - S e c t i on a! c o n f l i c t is a long- e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t in American p o l i t i c s . The Civil liar a t t e s t s to the unique s i g n i f i c a n c e of "the South" and common p o l i t i c a l p arlan ce is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r e f e r e n c e s to "the Eastern E s ta b lish m en t" or "the Mid-West." 313 American s t a t e s , as well as the n a t i o n , are often torn by regional d i s p u t e s . 142 This seems e s p e c i a l l y tru e of C a l i f o r n i a , 143 where the d i v i s i o n between nor th and south c o n s t i t u t e s a p o l i t i c a l f a c t of major consequence. The au thor s of a n a t i o n a l l y renouned work observe t h a t C a l i f o r n i a s t r e t c h e s for n e a r l y 1,000 miles from Oregon to Mexico; and c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , Northern C a l i f o r n i a and Southern C a l i f o r n i a - - r o u g h l y above and below the Tehachapi M ounta ins-- are two s t a t e s . 144 I t is not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t C a l i f o r n i a has e x p e r i - enced many b a t t l e s , t h e r e f o r e , to s p l i t i t governmentally between the north and the south. The f i r s t of these began in 1849, at the time of the f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conven t i o n , and co ntinued through out the 1850‘s . 145 The Civil War, i r o n i c a l l y , muted the n o r t h - s o u t h c o n f l i c t wi th in the s t a t e and i t did not reach acute p r o p o r t i o n s again u n t i l the 1 9 2 0 's . P r i o r to t h a t time, under both the o r i g i n a l s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n adopted in 1849 and the c u r r e n t one 142See de G r a z ia , Apporti onment . . . , o p . ci t . , p. 105, for comment on North Caroli n a . 143J e w e l l , op. c i t . , p. 65. See also Assembly Inte rim Committee, "The Design of a D i s t r i c t . " Eugene C. Lee, E., The C a l i f o r n i a n Governmental Process (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1 9 66 ), p. T09. 144P e t e r H. Odegard and H. H. Baerwald, The Arneri- can Republic (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1964), ppT 111- 11 2 . 145Senate Subcommittee, Statement of I n t e n t . . . , op. ci t . , pp. 26-27 . 314 r a t i f i e d in 1879, both houses of the l e g i s l a t u r e were to be apportio ne d on a popu latio n bas is followin g each decennial c e n s u s . A fter the 1920 census r e v e a l i n g t h a t Southern C a l i f o r n i a had in c r e a se d i t s share of s t a t e - w i d e p opulation by over e i g h t per cent in the preceding ten y e a r s , no re a pportionm ent b i l l mustered the n ecessary l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y in the 1921, 1923, or 1925 s e s s i o n s . This f a c t , combined with the d e f e a t of water and highway b i l l s favored by the South in the 1925 s e s s i o n , led to renewed s ugges t i o n s fo r the c r e a t i o n of two s e p a r a t e s t a t e s , 1'46 and to the c i r c u l a t i o n of two i n i t i a t i v e p e t i t i o n s q u a l i f y i n g a l t e r n a t i v e reap p o rtio n m e n t plans for submission to the v oters on the November, 1926 b a l l o t . One, r e t a i n i n g a p o p u la tio n b a s is for both houses, was d e f e a te d overwhelm i n g l y , while the o t h e r , embodying the "Federal Plan" which remained in e f f e c t through 1966, was adopted through m a j o r i t i e s in every county except Los Angeles. Voters in San Fran cisco and Alameda Co u n tie s, " f e a r i n g the domination of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , " gave the "Federal Pla n," which l i m i t e d each county to one s e n a t o r , a 55 per cent p l u r a l i t y , "even though i t meant a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c tio n in t h e i r own 146A lle n , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. ci t . , p. 10. 315 r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the S e n a t e . " 147 The next y e a r the l e g i s l a t u r e passed a r e a p p o r t i o n ment b i l l in conformity with the i n i t i a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n approved: in 1926, but i t s implementation was blocked by a referendum measure which q u a l i f i e d for the 1928 b a l l o t . The v o t e r s , however, r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r f a i t h in a county- based s e n a t e , although urban s o l i d a r i t y t h i s time o v e r weighed s e c t i o n a l l o y a l t i e s as San Francisc o j o i n e d Los Angeles as the only c o u n t i e s combined in f u t i l e p r o t e s t a g a i n s t n o n - p o p u la ti o n a p p o r t i o n m e n t . 148 S e c tio n a l d i f f e r e n c e s did not m a n i fe s t themselves in an o th e r reap p o rtio n m e n t b a t t l e u n t i l 1948, and then they were of less importance than economic r i v a l r i e s . The i n i t i a t i v e me as ure which appeared on the b a l l o t t h a t year would have r e t u r n e d the Senate to an apportionment based e s s e n t i a l l y on p o p u l a t i o n , but f a i l e d to ca rry a s i n g l e county and was d e f e a t e d by more than a two to one margin in the e n t i r e s t a t e . 149 In 1960, twelve y e a r s l a t e r , a n o th er i n i t i a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n appeared on the b a l l o t which r e f l e c t e d the North-South d i v i s i o n more e x p l i c i t l y than any ever 147Young, op. c i t . , p. 55. San F ran cisco l o s t six se a t s and Alameda t n r e e . A lle n , L e g i s l a t i v e Source bo ok , op. ci t . , p . 13. 1 4 81b i d . , pp. 13-14. 1 4 9 I b i d . , pp. 17-18. 316 proposed. I t would have d ivided the S e n a t e ' s f o r t y members i n t o twenty e l e c t e d from t h i r t e e n southern c o u n tie s and twenty from the remaining f o r t y - f i v e in the North. This p r o p o s a l , l a r g e l y the work of Frank G. B o n e l l i , Chairman of the Los Angeles County Board of S u p e r v i s o r s , was g e n e r a l l y known as the "Bonelli P la n ." Arguments, both f o r and a g a i n s t i t , made e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of s e c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Prop one nts, for example, contended t h a t the e x i s t i n g Senate gave members from Southern C a l i f o r n i a , r e p r e s e n t i n g 61 per cent of the s t a t e ' s p o p u l a t i o n , only 25 per cent of upper house committee s e a t s and 19 per cent of committee cha irm a n sh ip s. I t s d e t r a c t o r s claimed i t would i n t e n s i f y n o r t h - s o u t h c o n f l i c t . 150 Although the measure was narrowly approved in Los Angeles County, i t f a i l e d to c a r ry any o th e rs and was d e f e a t e d , almost as d e c i s i v e l y as the 1948 p r o p o s a l , by a margin of almost two to one. 15 1 1 5 01 b i d . , p. 21. For p i c t u r e s of b i l l b o a r d s employed in the campaign, see Bernard L. Hyink, Seyom Brown and E. W. Thacker, P o l i t i c s and Government in Cali - f o r n i a , t h i r d ed. ( N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowel1 Co. , 1 963) , p. T i l . 151Gordon E. Baker, "The C a l i f o r n i a S e n a te ," Malcolm E. J e w e l l , e d . , The P o l i t i c s of Re a p p o rtio n m e n t, o p . ci t . , p. 57. Even in San Diego County, at the souther n border of the s t a t e , the vote was two to one a g a i n s t r e a p p ortionm ent. In San F ranci sco i t was d e fe a te d by a margin of f iv e to one. Frank M. J o rd a n , Statement of Vote (Sacramento: S tate P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , November 8, 1960), p . 30. 317 In the 1960 campaign Governor Brown opposed the Bonelli Plan as extreme and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d but acknowledged the need of a d d i t i o n a l Senate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r h e a v ily po pulat ed co u n tie s and promised to ask the L e g i s l a t u r e to c r e a t e a " b lu e -r ib b o n " commission to d r a f t a more d e s i r a b l e plan . In 1961 the commission sub se q u e n tly c r e a t e d urged t h a t c o u n tie s of over 1,500,000 i n h a b i t a n t s r e c e i y e an a d d i t i o n a l s e n a t o r fo r each a d d i t i o n a l 1,500,000 or p o r ti o n t h e r e o f . This proposal would have had the immediate e f f e c t of giving Los Angeles t h re e a d d i t i o n a l Senators but none to any o t h e r county. I t c a r r i e d the r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t no county would be p e r m it t e d over ten per cent of the t o t a l sen at e membershio. Although the Commission's recommenda tio n was endorsed by the Governor and passed in an amended form by the south ern dominated Assembly, i t "died a q u i e t death" in a committee of the no rth e rn c o n t r o l l e d S e n a t e . 152 Incensed by Senate r e f u s a l to so much as c o n s id e r even t h i s minor change in a p p o r tio n m e n t, Los Angeles p o l i t i c a l and c i v i c l e a d e r s c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r fo rc e s f o r what perhaps was a f i n a l attem pt to c a r ry t h e i r case to the v o t e r s . Another i n i t i a t i v e campaign q u a l i f i e d a new reap p o rtio n m en t p r o p o s i t i o n for the 1962 general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t which was less d r a s t i c than those r e j e c t e d in the 1948 and 1960 v o tin g . In s p i t e of more u n i f i e d southern 152I b i d . , pp. 59-60. 318 support which cut across t r a d i t i o n a l economic sch ism s, the r e s u l t was the same. While amassing a th re e to one m a j o r i t y in Los Angeles County and passed by neighb oring Orange County as w e l l , i t went down to d e f e a t by a narrow e i g h t to seven margin in the s t a t e wide v o t e . 153 Thus the opponents of Senate re a p p o rtio n m e n t, drawing most of t h e i r s upport from no rth e rn v o t e r s , have r e a ff i rm e d t h e i r p r e fe r e n c e for the s o - c a l l e d fe d e ra l pla n, although by d im inishing m a j o r i t i e s , on five s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s - - i n 1926, 1928, 1948, 1960 and 1962. When these v i c t o r i e s won at the b a l l o t box and in L e g i s l a t u r e were rendered u l t i m a t e l y Pyhric by co u rt d e c r e e , the r e a c t i o n in the North was extreme, a l b e i t p r e d i c t a b l e . I t took the form of a revived proposal to s p l i t the s t a t e in two. Perhaps less s e ri o u s than a s i m i l a r move ment in the 1 8 5 0 's , i t was c e r t a i n l y more e a r n e s t than the i d l e d i s c u s s io n of the 1920' s . Advance warning of the d i v i s i o n attempt came from the Northern C a l i f o r n i a County S u p e r v i s o r ' s A s so c ia tio n which a s s e r t e d on October 12, 1964, t h a t " i f re a pportionm ent becomes a r e a l i t y , we promise an a l l - o u t e f f o r t to divi de C a l i f o r n i a i n t o two s t a t e s . " 154 Early in the 1965 l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n Sen. Richard J . 153Alien , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. c i t . , pp. 35-39. 154"North Rebels on Reapportion Try," Oakland T r i b u n e , October 13, 1964, p. 1. 319 Doliwig (R., San Mateo) introduce d S.B, 109 to accomplish th i s very purpose, and on dune 4, 1965, the measure passed the Senate 22 to 16, only to be k i l l e d ten days l a t e r by the Assembly Committee on I n t e r s t a t e C o o p e r a t i o n . 155 Doliwig, however, continued to p e r s i s t and on November 29 f i l e d i n c o r p o r a t i o n papers f o r an o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l e d Founders of the S t a t e s of C a l i f o r n i a which he said would r a i s e money fo r a 1967 campaign to a f f e c t the s e p a r a t i o n . The s p e c i f i c plan would cut the s t a t e at a t r a d i t i o n a l d em arcatio n , the Tehachapi Mountains; thereb y s e v e rin g seven southern c o u n t i e s - - V e n t u r a , Los Angeles, San Ber nar din o, Orange, R i v e r s i d e , San Diego and Imperia 1 - - from the remaining 51. The proposal was j u s t i f i e d in p a r t as a bulwark a g a i n s t growing s t a t e bureaucracy and exe c u tiv e i domi nati on. 156 Reactions conformed to p r e d i c t a b l e s e c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Lt. Governor Glenn M. Anderson of Los Angeles County said t h a t to s p l i t the s t a t e in h a l f would be "a d i s a s t e r , " and p r a i s e d C a l i f o r n i a as "the most dynamic, 155A lle n , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. ci t . , p. 56. 156Doliwig pointed out a l s o , t h a t C a l i f o r n i a has a l a r g e r p o p u la tio n than t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the w o r l d 's n a t i o n s , t h a t p o l i t i c a l p ar ty o r g a n i z a t i o n is already div ided in to no rth ern and southern branches and t h a t both bu s in e s s and government have o f f i c e s in San Francisc o and Los Angeles. "We have two s t a t e s now," he s a i d , "but with a s t a t e bureau cracy on to p ." Robert M. Blanchard, "Senate Approves B ill to Divide C a l i f o r n i a , " Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1965, p. 1. 320 b e a u t i f u l and p r o g r e s s i v e governmental e n t i t y in the wo rld ." Senate P r e s i d e n t Pro Tern Hugh M. Burns of Fresno County conceded t h a t the plan "has a l o t of merit" but termed i t "wishful t h i n k i n g " due to o p p o s itio n from Southern C a l i f o r n i a n s "because we in the North have the w a t e r , timber and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s . " He also r e f e r r e d to f i s c a l problems such as bonded indeb ted ness as b a r r i e r s to the proposa 1. 157 When Doliw ig's o r i g i n a l b i l l was in tro d u ced i t e l i c i t e d s c a t h i n g d e n u n c i a t i o n as an " h y s t e r i c a l answer" to se n a t e reap p o rtio n m e n t by Assembly Speaker J e ss e M. Unruh of Los Angeles. Unruh observed t h a t "Southern C a l i f o r n i a has paid the l i o n ' s share of b u i l d i n g up the s t a t e c a p i t a l and its. s e r v i c e s . " Most i m p o r t a n t l y , per hap s, Governor Brown, a San F r a n c i s c a n , voiced prompt o p p o s i t i o n . He p r e d i c t e d t h a t a d i v i s i o n would probably wreck the economy and termed a d u p l i c a t i o n of s t a t e f u n c t io n s " f o o l i s h . " 158 Whatever i t s m e r i t s , the plan seems h o p e l e s s l y beyond the realm of p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . Senate apportionm en t is not the only d i s t r i c t i n g problem which has caused North-South f r i c t i o n , however. As e a r l y as 1911 the r e a p p o rtio n m en t of Assembly s e a t s was 157Ray Zeman, " 2 - S t a t e Plan for C a l i f o r n i a S t i r s Storm," Los Angeles T i mes , December 1 , 1 965 , pp. 3 and 27. 158Robert M. Blanchard, "The Plan for Two Cali - f o r n i a s - - D i s a s t r o u s or Only S o l u t i o n , " Los Angeles Times, January 31, 1965, Sec. G, p. 1. 321 accomplished to the advantage of Southern C a l i f o r n i a because of a p o r t i o n of the Los Angeles l e g i s l a t i v e d e 1 eg a- tion d e f e c te d from t h e i r m e t r o p o l i t a n bloc a l l i a n c e with San F r a n c i s c o . 159 Again in 1931 and 1941 Assembly re ap por tionment was marked less by u r b a n - r u r a l and Republican- Democratic c o n f l i c t s than by N orth-South, San Francisco-Los Angeles c o m p e t i t i o n . 160 The p a t t e r n changed somewhat in the 1951 r e a p p o r tionment because p o p u latio n growth in the pr eceding ten years had been p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y equal in the no rth e rn and southern s e c t o r s of the s t a t e . I n s t e a d , suburban areas around both San F ran cis co and Los Angeles demanded i n creased r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the expense of the c e n t r a l c i t i e s . This tended to mute the s e c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t to some e x t e n t , as did the p a r t i s a n and personal incumbency m o t i vati o n s p r e s e n t in the Assembly r e a p porti onm ent d e l i v e r a - t i o n s of botli 1951 and 1 9 6 1 . 161 However, even when the L e g i s l a t u r e found i t s e l f under c o u r t compulsion to r e d i s t r i c t both houses on a p o p u la tio n b asis in the 1965 s p e c i a l s e s s i o n , i t did not 159Allen, L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. ci t . , pp. 7-9. A Tidelands Bill favored by Los Angeles was involved in Assembly re app ortion men t b a t t l e s of 1911. 160I b i d . , pp. 14-16. In the 1931 s e s s i o n , r e a p p o r tionment was e n ta n g le d with a s p e a k e rs h i p f i g h t between San Fran ci sco and Los Angeles Assemblymen. 1 6 1 Ibi d. , pp. 18-19 ; 22-23. 322 fo rsa k e s e c t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Quite to the c o n t r a r y , i t gave Northern C a l i f o r n i a as much o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y in the S enate , as the c o u r t ' s f i f t e e n per cent 'd e v ia ti o n from average popu latio n l i m i t would allow. Most new north e rn s enate d i s t r i c t s came very close to being f i f t e e n per cent s m a l l e r than the ideal norm and southern ones we re p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y l a r g e . 162 Yet the most s i g n i f i c a n t as p e c ts of s e c t i o n a l cleavage are in p u b lic p o licy d i f f e r e n c e s r a t h e r than in ap portionment d i s p u t e s . Here, evidence reg a rd in g the importance of n o r t h - s o u t h h o s t i l i t y is c o n t r a d i c t o r y as to degree and i n t e n s i t y but reasona bl y c o n s i s t e n t as to p resen ce. On the basis of s t u d i e s of the 1957, 1959 and 1961 general l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n s , Price concluded t h a t "North-South d i f f e r e n c e s are more im p o rtan t in the Senate than in the Assembly" and are e q u a l l y as c r u c i a l as p a r ty s p l i t s . " 163 In the lower house, he found s e c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s "few and i n f r e q u e n t , " c e n t e r i n g p r i m a r i l y on " t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , w a t e r , and f is h and game l e g i s l a t i o n . " 164 162Smith, personal i n t e r v i e w , o p . ci t . Southern C a l i f o r n i a was given only 22 of 40 Senate s e a t s but 46 of 80 Assembly members in the 1965 "equal p o p u l a t i o n " r e a p p o r tionment of the two houses. Zeman, "The Result s of R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," 1oc. ci t . 1 6 30p . ci t . , p. 187. 1 641bi d . , p. 171. 323 On the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i s s u e , the major d i f f e r e n c e of opinion has c e n te red on the "Mayo-Breed formula" whereby t h i r t e e n south ern c o u n t i e s r eceiv e 55 per cent of s t a t e gas tax r e c e i p t s f o r highway c o n s t r u c t i o n even though m o t o r i s t s in those c o unties pay 63 per cent of gas tax revenue. In 1960 Senator Richard Richards of Los Angeles County sponsored a measure to give southern c o u n tie s 60 per cent of the in'come from t h i s s o u r c e , but r e p o r t e d to his con s t i t u e n t s t h a t he was not c e r t a i n of su cc e ss. The n o r th e rn m a j o r i t y in the S t a t e Senate has thus f a r s u c c e s s f u l l y blocked a ll previous e f f o r t s to re v ise the p r e s e n t formula, and t h i s is a s e c t i o n a l iss u e t h a t is not l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by any change in p a r ty majorities. 165 According to the Los Angeles Tim es, mass rap id t r a n s i t for the South as well as highway c o n s t r u c t i o n , has been ad v e rse ly a f f e c t e d by no rth e rn s e n a t o r s . The paper bemoaned th'e s p e c t a c l e of a committee c h a ir e d by a n o r t h e r n e r , Sen. Randolph C o l l i e r (D., Ureka) k i l l i n g a b i l l by Sen. Thomas 1 1 . Rees (D., Los Angeles) which would have opened a door toward p r e l im i n a r y f in a n c i n g of rapid t r a n s i t in . . . Southern C a l i f o r n i a . 166 In a f i e l d r e l a t e d to t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , n o rth e rn C a l i f o r n i a lawmakers k i l l e d an Assembly-passed auto smog- contr ol b i l l in the c lo sin g minutes of the 1965 s p e cia l 165Irv ing E. Fang, " C a l i f o r n i a ' s Government Rigged by Rural S l i c k e r s , " Fronti e r , March, 1 960 , p. 7. 166" REAPPORTION: Rower Pendulum Swings South," Los Angeles Times, January 2, 1966, Sec. G, p. 7. 324 s e s s i o n . Assembly Speaker Unruh c o n f i d e n t l y p r e d i c t e d , however, t h a t the measure would pass "when we get some more s e n a t o r s from Los A n g e l e s . " 167 In a s e n se , the l e g i s l a t i v e y e a r ended much as i t had s t a r t e d . For even as the Senate began i t s agonizing reapportionm ent s t r u g g l e during the r e g u l a r 1965 s e s s i o n , a n o th e r s e c t i o n a l b a t t l e seemed to be emerging on a t r a n s p o r t a t i o n b i l l . In an attem pt to p r o vide emergency funds to r e b u i l d Northern C a l i f o r n i a h i g h ways d e str oyed by the floods which ravaged t h a t region e a r l i e r in the y e a r , the Senate approved, 30 to 3, a temporary one cent i n c r e a s e in the s t a t e gas ta x . But the t h re e n e g a tiv e votes were c a s t by Southern C a l i f o r n i a n s , prompting the San Francisc o Chronicle to ask e d i t o r i a l l y , "Is a Penny Too Much fo r Them?"168 Lest such sarcasm be thought un warranted, the e d i t o r i a l r e c a l l e d an occasion seven years e a r l i e r when a " c a l l o u s d i s p l a y of s e c t i o n a l i s m in the face of demon s t r a t e d p e r i l " t h r e a t e n e d v i t a l n o r th e rn i n t e r e s t s . The issue at sta ke on t h a t o c c a s i o n , as has been the case so often in C a l i f o r n i a , was water resources development. The Chr o n i c l e recounted the i n c i d e n t . 1670uoted by J e r r y G i l l i a m , "Senate K ills Car- Device Smog B i l l , " Los Ange1es Ti me s , October 5 , 1 965 , p. 1. The s t o r y c a r r i e d the s u b - h e a d l i n e , "Northern Sen at ors C o n trib u te to Blow Against Sou th lan d ." 168March 7, 1965, p. 24. 325 In 1958, when North-South co n tro v e rsy developed over the a l l o c a t i o n of water under the Feathe r r i v e r plan , Southern Assemblymen coal es ce d in to a s o l i d bloc and t h r e a t e n e d to block passage of the S t a t e budget unless t h e i r formula was a c c e p te d , or unless a p p r o p r i a t i o n s for c o n s t r u c t i o n of the O r o v i ll e dam were d e l e t e d . Three years e a r l i e r , the lack of such a dam had r e s u l t e d in floods t h a t took the l i v e s of 38 C a l i f o r n i a n s - - N o r t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a n s - - a n d caused damage in excess of $40 m i l l i o n . 169 Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t water f i g h t in s t a t e h i s t o r y came in 1960 over a bond issue to fin a nce pumps and aqueducts to t r a n s p o r t water from Northern to Southern C a l i f o r n i a . In the general e l e c t i o n of t h a t ye ar s o u t h e rners approving the measure b a re ly mustered enough votes to o f f s e t heavy no rth e rn o p p o s i t i o n . In San Francisc o and Alameda c o u n t i e s , f o r example, the proposal was d e fe a te d by margins of th re e to two and th re e to one r e s p e c t i v e l y . 170 Enough evidence has been c i t e d , perhaps to demonstrate the importance of North-South s e c t i o n a l r i v a l r y in C a l i f o r n i a government. I t may be found in preeminent 1 6 9 L o c . c i t . I t should be noted t h a t the proposed gas tax i n c r e a s e , which the Ch roni cle thought j e o p a r d i z e d by p o s s i b l e Southern C a l i f o r n i a s e l f i s h n e s s , was passed by the souther n c o n t r o l l e d Assembly. This was c i t e d by Los Angeles County S u p e rv is o r Frank G. Bonelli as evidence t h a t the North had nothing to f e a r from a re a p p o rt i o n e d Senate. Ray Zeman, " L e g i s l a t i v e Hopes, Fears Voiced on S o u t h ’s C o n t r o l ," Los Angeles Times , October 24, 1965, p. 26. 170A good account of t h i s campaign along with the h i s t o r i c a l background of the water i s s u e may be found in Clyde E. Jacobs and John F. G a lla g h er , Cali f o r n i a Govern ment (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1 966 ) , pp. 1 53-1 63. The bond issue could not have appeared on the b a l l o t at a l l , of course, had i t not been for the s upport of a m a j o r i t y of Northern C a l i f o r n i a S e n a to r s. 326 p ro fu sio n in the long p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e over Senate r e a p p o r tio nm ent, i t is d r a m a t i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d in p roposals to divide the s t a t e and i t is r e f l e c t e d in both l e g i s l a t i v e and c i t i z e n voting beh av ior on such s i g n i f i c a n t p o licy ma tte rs as t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and water. J u s t as i m p o rt a n t , although perhaps more s u b t l e and less s u s c e p t a b l e to easy e x p l a n a t i o n , is evidence i n d i c a ting a pronounced d i f f e r e n c e between the two s e c t i o n s in t h e i r general c u l t u r a l m i l i e u . This d i f f e r e n c e seems to have in fu s e d the p o l i t i c a l p e r c e p t i o n s of the s t a t e ' s i n h a b i t a n t s on a wide spectrum of i s s u e s , t ra n s c e n d i n g the normal c o n f l i c t s of s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i s a n alignments a l i k e . In the 1964 Republican p r e s i d e n t i a l prim ar y, Governor R o c k e f e l l e r c a r r i e d large n o rth e rn cou n tie ;s such as San F r a n c i s c o , Alameda, Santa Clara and Sacramento by d e c i s i v e margins. By c o n t r a s t , Senator Goldwater accumulated even more im pre ssive leads in the h e a v i l y popu lat ed southern c o u n tie s of Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange and San Ber nar dino. This p a t t e r n of r e t u r n s , with the north fav o rin g the " l i b e r a l " can d id a te and the south the " c o n s e r v a t i v e " one, has t y p i f i e d many o t h e r races in r e c e n t y e a r s , and ro o ts s e c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t in sources more profound and p e r v a si v e than mere d i s c r e p a n c i e s in c l i m a t e ' o r t o p o g r a p h y . 171 171See voting r e t u r n s compiled by S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Frank M. J o rd a n , p u b lish e d by the S t a t e P r i n t i n g 327 The S t a t e S e n a t e ' s Subcommittee stu dying r e a p p o r tionment in 1965 seems j u s t i f i e d in concluding t h a t n o r t h - s o u t h d i f f e r e n c e s in C a l i f o r n i a is a m a tte r of h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , and t h a t th ese d i f f e r e n c e s will always e x i s t is i n h e r e n t in our geography and demography.172 They may a lso be i n h e r e n t in the p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s of the peop1e . Although i t seems c l e a r t h a t the n o r t h - s o u t h cleavage is a c o n s t a n t in appo rtionm en t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as well as in o t h e r f a c e t s of C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s , i t is d i f f i c u l t to p r e d i c t whether i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e w ill i n c r e a s e or diminish in the f u t u r e . Although the one-man, one-vote dictum may f u r t h e r c o n s o l i d a t e n o rth e rn bloc voting in an atte m p t to p a r t i a l l y compensate for n u m er ic a lly decreased r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , four f a c t o r s may serve to diminish the lon g-term a f f e c t s of n o r t h - s o u t h r i v a l r y . F i r s t , the completion of the Central Valley P r o j e c t , a u t h o r iz e d by the v o t e r s in 1960, should e l i m i n a t e s e c t i o n a l water co m peti t i o n . Second, the equal p o p u la tio n appor tionmen t s ta n d a rd O f fic e in various e d i t i o n s of Statem ent of Vote. Note, in a d d i t i o n to the R o c k e fe l1e r-G o ld w a te r c o n t e s t , the Christopher-Reagan and Brown-Yorty g u b e r n a t o r i a l p rim aries in June, 1966. For a r a t h e r thorough but f r u s t r a t i n g a tte m p t to e x p la in t h i s phenomenon, see a comparison of Santa Clara and Orange Counties. Daryl F.. Fembke, "Why Do Two S i m i l a r Areas Vote D i f f e r e n t l y ? " Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1964. I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t in the 1966 general e l e c t i o n Governor Brown and L i e u t e n a n t Gover nor Anderson, c o n s t i t u t i n g the " l i b e r a l " t i c k e t , c a r r i e d only t h r e e and s i x c o u n tie s r e s p e c t i v e l y , all in Northern C a l i f o r n i a . Los Angeles Ti mes , November 10, 1966, p. 26. 172Statement of I n t e n t . . . , op. ci t . , p . 29. 328 places a b s o lu t e l i m i t s on the degree to which e i t h e r north or south can maneuver f o r a d d i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s . T h ird , the i n c r e a s i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e of par ty a lig n m e n t s , i f c o n t i n u e d , will f u r t h e r tend to mute c o n f l i c t s based on o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . And f i n a l l y , p o p u la tio n trends may g r a d u a l l y s h i f t in a way which no longer b e n e f i t s the South. Southern C a l i f o r n i a ' s popu latio n i n c r e a s e r e l a t i v e to t h a t of the North alr e a d y has been diminish ing for seve ral decades a t a r a t e which may h a r b i n g e r a complete r e v e rs a l of the tre n d and a f u t u r e in c r e a s e in north e rn r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . In the t h i r t y years between 1903 and 1933, f o r example, 23 Assembly d i s t r i c t moved, with the p o p u la tion p r eponderance, from North to South. But in the next t h i r t y y e a r s , from 1933 to 1963, only six d i s t r i c t s were t r a n s f e r r e d to the s o u t h . 173 Moreover, between 1950 and 1960 San J o s e , in Northern C a l i f o r n i a , e xperienced a g r e a t e r perc e n ta g e i n c r e a s e in p o p u la tio n than any of the o t h e r nine s ta n d a rd m e t r o p o l i t a n s t a t i s t i c a l areas in the s t a t e , with Sacramento, also in the North, ranking t h i r d . 171* As the r a t i o of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s between the 173A ll en , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. c i t . , Table 111- A , p. 182. 171+Adolf Stone, ed. , Cal i forni a Informati on Almanac ( n . p . : C a l i f o r n i a Almanac Company, 1 964), p . 108. For p o p u la tio n p r o j e c t i o n s to 1 980 , see A llen , Legi s 1 a t i ve S our cebook , op. c i t . , p. 163. A 1 965 study snowed, how- e v e r , t h a t Orange County, newly d e s ig n a te d as a s e p a r a t e SMSA, was the f a s t e s t growing area in the n a tio n sin ce 329 North and South e q u a l i z e s , or even s t a b i l i z e s , p r e s s u r e s f o r compromise between the two should i n c r e a s e . A c a r e fu l a n a l y s i s of a v a i l a b l e in fo rm a tio n would seem to warra nt the assessment of s e c t i o n a l f a c t o r s in appo rtion men t as a m a t t e r of co ntin u in g although diminished importance in C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s . 175 Urbani sm.--Thomas J e f f e r s o n once wrote t h a t those who la bor in the e a r t h are the chosen people of God, i f ever He had a chosen peo ple, whose b r e a s t s He has made His p e c u l i a r d e p o s it o r y f o r s u b s t a n t i a l and genuine v i r t u e . . . . The mobs of g r e a t c i t i e s add j u s t so much to the s upport of pure government, as sores do to the s t r e n g t h of the human b o d y . 176 , A century and a h a l f l a t e r , when the C a l i f o r n i a l e o i s l a t u r e had r e a p p o r t i o n e d i t s e l f on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s , Senate P r e s i d e n t Pro Tem Hugh M. Burns (D., Fresno) s a id d o n ' t f o r g e t t h a t all the "funny money" i d e a s , all the s o c i a l i s t i c p r o p o s a l s , emanate from the big c i t i e s , not 1960, with San B e r n a r d i n o - P i v e r s i d e - O n t a r i o ranking second. That region had been only f o u r t h in the s t a t e in 1950-60 growth r a t e . "City P o p u la tio n s Grow . . . , " 1o c . c i t . 175I t is recognized t h a t s e c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s o th e r than t h a t between North and South may be s i g n i f i c a n t . Hardy de plores the f a c t t h a t th ese have not receiv ed ad e quate c o n s i d e r a t i o n in ap portionment d e l i b e r a t i o n s . "Geo g r a p h i c a l f e a t u r e s and r e g i o n a l is m also have p e r t i n e n c e in a m e t r o p o l i t a n a r ea . . . . ( P ) a i l r o a d t r a c k s , . . . i n d u s t r i a l zones, . . . freew ays, p a r k s , . . . and h i l l s . . . can break community l i n e s . . . . ( I )n the . . . r e a p p o r tionment of 1951, although geography was s e g r e g a t e d as an im p o rtan t f a c t o r in the s t a t e , . . . less emphasis was placed upon geography . . . within m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s . The Theory and P r a c t i c e . . . . op. c i t . , p. 12. 1760uoted in Baker, Rural versus Urban P o l i t i c a l Power, op. c i t . , p. 1. 330 the r u ra l r e a s . . . . (T)he c i t i e s are where the f r e e lo aders are g a t h e r e d . 177 This rura l a n t i p a t h y has of te n met a s i m i l a r response from urban spokesmen. In 1928, H. L. Menchen r e f e r r e d to the a g r i c u l t u r a l o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of "yokels" in the Maryland s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e as "barnyard go vern m e n t , " 178 and in 1951 Richard L. Newberger, then an Oregon s t a t e s e n a t o r , wrote s c a t h i n g l y of " l e g i s l a t i v e o p p r e s s i o n , " and " ru ra l tyranny" p e r p e t r a t e d by the " c o r n s t a l k brigade " in control of s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . 179 A year before his e l e c t i o n to the p r e s i d e n c y , Sen. John F. Kennedy complained, in terms both more moderate and s p e c i f i c , t h a t our s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , s t i l l r u r a l - d o m i n a t e d in most s t a t e s , will n e i t h e r expand municipal ta x i n g powers nor d i s t r i b u t e to our c i t i e s and suburbs a f a i r share of the tax d o l l a r s c o l l e c t e d w ith in t h e i r b o u n d a r i e s . 180 Few could d i s p u t e t h a t be fo re the c o u rts e n te r e d the ap portionm ent c o n t r o v e rs y r u ra l groups u t i l i z e d 177Zeman, " L e g i s l a t i v e Hopes, Fears . . . , " o p . c i t . , p . 26 . 178Mencken warmed q u ic k ly to his s u b j e c t . "The yokels hang on because old ap po rtionm ents give them u n f a i r adv an tages. The vote of a malariou s pe a s a n t on the lower Eastern Shore counts as much as the votes of twelve B a l t i moreans. But t h a t c a n ' t l a s t . I t is not only u n j u s t and undemocratic; i t is a b s u rd ." J. Anthony Lucas, "Barnyard Government in Maryland," R e p o r t e r , XXVI (April 1 2 , 1 962 ), p . 31 . 179"Rotten Borough and Lawless Lawmakers," The Progre ssi v e , December, 1951, pp. 22-24. 180Grant and Nixon, op. c i t ., p. 205. 331 whatever l e g i s l a t i v e advantage they po ssessed to t h e i r own advantage. Burns and Peltaso n observe t h a t as long ago as 1905, George Washington P l u n k i t t , "the Tammany Hall P a t r i o t , " wished to see "New York City withdraw from the r e s t of the s t a t e , " because of u p - s t a t e , ru ra l domina t i o n . 181 In 1959, Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan t o l d the National A s s o c i a t i o n of County O f f i c e r s t h a t "o x cart l e g i s l a t u r e s " r e s u l t i n g from ru ra l o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a - tion c o n s t i t u t e a s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e to s t a t e and local p r o g r e s s . 182 S p e c i f i c charges of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t urban areas by r u r a l - d o m i n a t e d l e g i s l a t u r e s , ac cording to de G r a z i a , " a r e , in vast m a j o r i t y , m a tte rs of f i n a n c e . " In over 20 s t a t e s , rura l areas get more than t h e i r share of t a x e s ; in e i g h t s t a t e s , more than t h e i r share of highway and br idge c o n s t r u c t i o n ; in s i x , more than t h e i r share of p u b l i c school m o n i e s . 183 P r o f e s s i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e a f f o r d s s p e c i f i c documenta tion of t h i s rural f i n a n c i a l advantage. In C o n n e c ti c u t , where 33.4 per cent of the p o p u la tio n could e l e c t a 181P l u n k i t t is quoted as charging t h a t "the down trodden people of I r e l a n d have more real freedom and home rule than t h i s grand and im perial c i t y . . . . (T)he Republican government . . . says r i g h t out in the open: 'New York City is a nice big f a t Goose. Come along with your c a r v i n ' knives and have a s l i c e . ' " Op. c i t . , p. 742. 182tlnited Press I n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p a t c h , "Gov. Williams Hits Bad Apportionment," Los Angeles Herald and Exoress, July 28, 1959. 183de G r a z ia , Apportionment . . . , op. c i t . , pp. 114-115. 332 m a j o r i t y of the s t a t e s e n a t e , towns with p o p u la tio n s of 10,000 to 1,000,000 re c e iv e d a per c a p i t a average of $5.70 for schools and $2.17 for highways from the s t a t e in 1948-49, while c i t i e s of over 100,000 re ceived only $3.95 and $0.51 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 184 In New York City, n e a rly a h a l f centu ry a f t e r P l u n k i t t had bemoaned i t s e x p l o i t a t i o n , the s i t u a t i o n had not improved. In 1953, the g r e a t m e tro p o lis cont ai ne d 53.2 per cent of the s t a t e ' s p o p u l a tion and paid 55.3 per cent of a l l s t a t e revenue, but re c eiv e d only 44.8 per cent of s t a t e aid to c i t y go v ern m e n t s . 185 In Los Angeles, Mayor Samuel W. Yorty made the complaint of o t h e r urban areas f a m i l i a r to his c o n s t i t u e n t s as w e ll. "City t a x p a y e r s , " he ch arged , "have been deprived of t h e i r f a i r share of s t a t e s u b v e n t i o n s . " This he a t t r i buted to u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the s t a t e s e n a t e . 186 184Duange Lockard, New England S t a t e P o l i t i c s ( P r i n c e t o n : P r in c e to n Univ e rs i ty P res $ , 1 9 54) , pT 2~7 5 . Lockard does not seem e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t , however. In The P o l i t i c s of S t a t e and Local Government he p r a i s e s the rural dominated Connec ticut l e g i s l a t u r e fo r p e r m i t t i n g more municipal home ru le than the e q u i t a b l y ap p o rtio n e d one in M ass a c h u se tts . Yet he concludes with perhaps a p p r o p r i a t e i n d e c i s i v e n e s s , "Do s t a t e s with f a i r apportionmen t respond to urban appeals more r e a d i l y ? I f anyone has made a s y s t e m a t i c study of t h i s , I am unaware of i t . " (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1963) p. 319. There may be no p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between the degree of home r u l e and the amount of f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e which s t a t e s a l l o c a t e to c i t i e s . 1 8 5 B a k e r , Rural versus Urban P o l i t i c a l Power , op . 186Los Angeles Times , February 26, 1965, Pt. I I , p . 1 . 333 The Los Angeles City Council a p p a r e n t l y sh a rin g the same view, voiced i t s s upport of p o p u l a t i o n -b a s e d l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t less than t h r e e months l a t e r . 187 A study of s t a t e monetary support for local go v ern ments in C a l i f o r n i a i n d i c a t e s t h a t th e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence s u p p o rt i n g Mayor Y o rty 's charge of u n f a i r n e s s . In 1963-64, seven of the ten l e a s t populous c o u n tie s in the s t a t e were among the ten c ounties t h a t re c e iv e d the l a r g e s t amount of s t a t e aid r e l a t i v e to taxes paid. By c o n t r a s t , fiv e of the ten most populous c o u n tie s were among the ten t h a t receiv ed the l e a s t a s s i s t a n c e . 188 Figures such as th ese help e x p la in the p r e v a i l i n g level of agreement among urban le a d e rs in s upport of the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e as a basis for s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e a p p o r t io n m e n t . The United S t a t e s Conference of Mayors passed r e s o l u t i o n s en dorsing t h i s p r i n c i p l e in June of 1965, over the o p p o s i t i o n , i n t e r e s t i n g l y , of 18 C a l i f o r n i a m a y o r s . 189 Yorty, of c o u r s e , was not among the d i s s e n t e r s . 18 71 bi d. , May 4 , 1 965 , p. 26. The Council was so committed to the equal p o p u l a t i o n p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t voted 9 to 1 to condemn the 1965 Senate re a pportionm ent championed by Los Angeles Sen at or Rees because i t gave the county only 12 s e a t s i n s t e a d of the 15 to which i t b e l i e v e d i t to be e n t i t l e d . "Council Opposes Rees Senate D i s t r i c t P la n ," Los Ange1es Times, May 5 , 1 965 . 188Computed from A llen , L e g i s l a t i v e S o urcebook, Tables 11 - 0 and II-Q , op. c i t . , p'p i 1 72 , 174-175. 189Asso ciate d Press d isp a tc h " S t a t e Mayors Rebuffed on R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," Los Angeles Ti mes, June 3 , 1 965 , p. 15. Lockhard, however, has observed t h a t mayors, " a n n u a lly 334 Two c o n c lu s io n s seem w arra n te d r egarding r u r a l - urban p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s . F i r s t , as i n d i c a t e d above, s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s a c t p r e f e r e n t i a l l y in b e h a l f of farm r e g i o n s. This is most c l e a r l y the case with regard to f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s , but a l l e g e d l y extends to such s u b je c ts as smog co ntrol l e g i s l a t i o n as w e l l . Assemblyman Allen has a s s e r t e d t h a t c i t r u s growers have opposed e f f e c t i v e a i r p o l l u t i o n abatement measures because of t h e i r p o s s i b l e i n t r u s i o n upon a n t i - f r o s t smudging o p e r a t i o n s n ecessary to t h i s kind of f a r m i n g . 190 Second, i t is beyond d i sp u t e t h a t p r i o r to Baker v. Carr r u r a l areas were o v e r r e p r e s e n t e d in most s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . An a n a l y s i s of the most extreme examples of t h i s f a c t r e v e a l s t h a t in January of 1962 less than 30 per cent of s t a t e p o p u l a t i o n s could e l e c t m a j o r i t i e s in 24 upper houses and 14 lower c h a m b e r s . 191 P a r a d o x i c a l l y , however, i t is by no means c e r t a i n t h a t the l e g i s l a t i v e u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of urban areas has been the major cause of l e g i s l a t i v e f a v o r i t i s m for rural assembled at t h e i r co n v e n tio n , are not u n w illin g to use inad e q u a te l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a general excuse f o r a l l municipal d i f f i c u l t i e s . " Such lam en ts, he say s, should be taken "with the p r o v e r b i a l grain of s a l t . " The P o l i t i c s of S t a t e . . . Government , op. c i t . , pp. 320-321. 190Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . An urban C a l i f o r nia response to a National Municipal League q u e s t i o n n a i r e r e p o r t e d , in a d d i t i o n , t h a t "Assembly w e lf a re measures are ofte n d e f e a t e d in the S e n a t e . " de G razia, Apporti onment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p . 106. 191Derived from f i g u r e s c i t e d in S c hubert, Reappor- ti onment, op. c i t ., pp. 80-82 . 335 r e g i o n s . During the 1 9 5 0 's , four s t a t e s with among the most m ath e m a tic a lly e q u i t a b l e apportionm en t sy ste m s-- M a ss a c h u se tts , Oregon, Washington and W i s c o n s i n - - a l 1ocated funds f o r schools and roads in a way which r e s u l t e d in obvious advantages to rura l a r e a s . 192 The e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s phenomenon is t h a t many n o n -ru ra l l e g i s l a t o r s , div ided by f a c t i o n a l , p a r t y , and c i t y - s u b u r b d i s p u t e s , vote f r e q u e n t l y with t h e i r f a r m - o r i e n t e d c o l l e a g u e s . 193 In at l e a s t f iv e o t h e r s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g C a l i f o r n i a , r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the c e n t r a l c i t y - s u b u r b a n d i v i s i o n s are more profound in s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e voting than any o t h e r type. 194 Although u r b a n - r u r a l o p p o s i t i o n has been a c o n s t a n t of somewhat u n p r e d i c t a b l e v a r i a b i l i t y in pas t r e a p p o r t i o n ment d e l i b e r a t i o n s , 195 most i n d i c a t i o n s p o i n t to a diminu tio n of i t s f u t u r e importance. In C a l i f o r n i a , at l e a s t , 192Advisory Commission on I n te rgovernm ental R e la t i o n s , op. c i t ., p. 48. 193David R. Derge, " M etropolitan and O u t s t a t e Alignments in the I l l i n o i s and Missouri L e g i s l a t i v e D el e g a t i o n s , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, LII (December, 1958), pp. 1051-1065. 194Advisory Commission on I n te rgovernm ental Rela- t i o n s , op. c i t ., p. 47. 195"While no a b s o l u t e dichotomy of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t s between urban and ru ra l r e s i d e n t s , t h e r e are a p p a r e n t l y enough d i f f e r e n c e s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s to say t h a t some type of c o n f l i c t e x i s t s . . . . There is no doubt t h a t the c o n f l i c t e x i s t s in the a c tu a l appo rtionmen t p r o c e s s . " I b i d . , p . 23. 336 u r b a n - r u r a l voting d i v i s i o n s are a l r e a d y l e ss f r e q u e n t than p a r t i s a n or s e c t i o n a l ones in t o t a l r o ll c a ll a l i g n m e n t s 196 and i t is r e aso n ab le to expect t h i s r e l a t i v e l y low g e n e r a l i z e d s a l i e n c e will be r e f l e c t e d in d i s t r i c t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Senator Rees of Los Angeles announced his o p p o s i t i o n to a p o p u l a t i o n - b a s e d reap p o rtio n m e n t fo r example, on l a r g e l y p a r t i s a n grounds. I f the one-man, one-vote rule is f o llow e d, the C a l i f o r n i a Senate wi ll lose the r e a l , tough s t r e n g t h of the Democratic Party . . . in the s e n a t e . The Senate s t r e n g t h will s h i f t to the suburbs and what does the suburb r e p r e s e n t ? A card-ca rr 'ying John Birch S ociety member was e l e c t e d r e c e n t l y from one of these suburban a r e a s . 197 The s i m p l e s t and at the same time the most re as on - able e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the absence of high u r b a n - r u r a l ap por tionment r elevance in C a l i f o r n i a is t h a t t h i s venerable anim osity has not been as cumulative in r e l a t i o n to o th e r l e g i s l a t i v e d i v i s i o n s as in many o t h e r s t a t e s . 198 In 196P r i c e , o p . c i t . , pp. 190-193. 197"Reapportioning to Hurt C i t i e s , Rees Contends," Los Angeles Times , March 1 4 , 1 965 , Sec. A, p . B. This w r i t e r ~ r e c a l 1s a c o n v e r s a t i o n with J esse !i. Unruh, Speaker of the Assembly and an u r b a n - o r i e n t e d l e g i s l a t o r , in the summer of 1961 in which Unruh expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with the e x i s t i n g Senate app ortionm en t on the grounds t h a t i t was s a f e l y Democratic. Grant and Dixon o b s e rv e , more g e n e r a l l y , t h a t the "urban push f o r reap p o rtio n m e n t often loses steam when i t is d i sc o v e re d t h a t the p r i n c i p a l b e n e f i t s w ill go to the o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . " Op. c i t . , p . 207 . 198Por a d i s c u s s i o n of cumulative c o n f l i c t in a n o th e r c o n t e n t , see Robert A. Dahl, Modern P o l i t i c a l Analysis (Enolewood C l i f f s , N . J . : Prenti c e - H a l 1 , I n c . , 1963), pp. 78-79. 337 I Michigan, New York and I l l i n o i s , for example, the urban- rural s p l i t r e i n f o r c e s and p a r a l l e l s the u p - s t a t e , down- i s t a t e s e c t i o n a l s p l i t because h i s t o r i c a l l y each of these s t a t e s has possessed but one major urban c e n t e r l o c a t e d at a geographic boundary e x t r e m i t y . In C a l i f o r n i a , by con t r a s t , no s t a b l e urban a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t ru ra l fo rc e s has been formed because of two major urban c e n t e r s , San Fran ci sco and Los Angeles, p o s se s sin g d i s p a r a t e i n t e r e s t s and s i t u a t e d in d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the s t a t e . 199 Urban s o l i d a r i t y is weakening s t i l l more as a r e s u l t of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of newly emerging m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s , each po s se s sin g unique p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Uhile the p r o p o r tion of the s t a t e ' s urban p o p u la tio n remained f a i r l y c o n s t a n t between 1930 and 1960, Los Angeles' p ercentage of the t o t a l p o p u la tio n was dropping from 21.8 to 15.6 and San F r a n c i s c o ' s from 11.2 to 4 . 7 . 200 As a r e s u l t , i t has been e s ti m a t e d t h a t s e n a t o r s from at l e a s t 18 c o u n tie s in 1960 were e l e c t e d from d i s t r i c t s in which " c i t y p o p u l a t i o n s were la rg e enough to make t h e i r Senators highly s e n s i t i v e to urban p r o b l e m s . " 201 Other s t a t i s t i c s dem onstrating the d i s p e r s i o n of urban c o n c e n t r a t i o n show t h a t C a l i f o r n i a 199Lockard, The P o l i t i c s of S ta te and Local Govern m e n t , op. c i t . , note 54, p. 316. 200Allen , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, o d . c i t . , Table 11 - F , p. 67. 20 1 I b i d . , p. 21. 338 ranked e le v e n th among the s t a t e s in the p r o p o rtio n of i t s p o p u la tio n l i v i n g in c e n t r a l c i t i e s , but f i f t e e n t h in t h a t l i v i n g in the th re e l a r g e s t c o unties and t w e n t y - f i f t h in t h a t resi ding in the th re e l a r g e s t c i t i e s . 202 J u s t as the u r b a n - r u r a l s p l i t does not co inc ide with s e c t i o n a l d i sp u t e s in t h i s s t a t e , n e i t h e r is i t cumu lative in r e l a t i o n to par ty a lignm ents. While in many p a r t s of the c o u n t r y ,. r u r a l areas c o n s t i t u t e Republican s t r o n g - h o l d s and urban regions are overwhelmingly Demo c r a t i c , 203 C a l i f o r n i a , as Senator Rees sugg ested in com ments c i t e d above, d ep arts from t h i s p a t t e r n . In 1965 the Assembly, ap p o rtio n e d on a popu latio n b a s i s , showed only a 5 to 3 r a t i o fav o rin g the Democrats while the S en a te , r e p r e s e n t i n g county u n i t s , y i e l d e d a Democratic edge of 2 to l . 204 The e x p l a n a t i o n for t h i s may l i e in the p e c u l i a r e t h n i c d i s t r i b u t i o n de sc rib e d by Eugene Burdick. The Anglo-Saxons, who in the Midwest are the back bone of the small farming communities, in C a l i f o r n i a went s t r a i g h t into the anonymity of the big c i t i e s . The r e s u l t is t h a t the g r e a t . . . v a l l e y s . . . are d o t t e d with towns of extremely mixed n a t i o n a l i t y and background and one finds Roman Cath o lics in l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n s in rura l a r e a s - - a phenomenon t h a t occurs 202Figures computed from Advisory Commission on In te rg overnm ental R e l a t i o n s , op. c i t . , Appendices D-F, pp. A11 - A16. 203Lockard, op. c i t . , p. 317. 204A lien , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, op. c i t . , p . 278. 339 nowhere e l s e in the United S t a t e s . 205 I t seems safe to assume, th en , t h a t u r b a n - r u r a l apportionment r i v a l r y in C a l i f o r n i a , unsupported by s e c ti o n a l or p a r t i s a n re i n fo r c e m e n t and s e v e re l y r e s t r i c t e d by c o u r t d e c r e e s , will d e c l i n e in s i g n i f i c a n c e . To be s u r e , Senate o r a t o r y on the eve of a r e a p p o r tionment vote in the 1965 general s e ss i o n r e f l e c t e d some misgivings about i n c r e a s e d urban s t r e n g t h . Sen ator Hugh Donnelly (D., T u r l o c k ) , who had spent 23 of his 74 years in the upper house, remarked in one of his rare f l o o r speeches t h a t i t was "a sad s i t u a t i o n indeed to take the rura l people and put them in a m i n o ri t y p o s i t i o n . " Even his c i t y c o l l e a g u e , Senator d. Eugene McAteer (D., San F r a n c i s c o ) , e x p r e ss in g " f e a r for the n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , " admitted f e e l i n g "a g r e a t deal of anguish" because " t h i s body will be dominated by the urban d w e l l e r . " 206 Yet the bulk of commentary from C a l i f o r n i a o f f i c i a l s has tended to s t r e s s t h a t which u n i t e s urban and rura l i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r than t h a t which d iv id e s them. Sen ator Rees of Los Angeles has denied the e x i s t e n c e of any group of " w i l l f u l rura l Senators" undermining b i l l s 2 0 5 "From Gold Rush to Sun Rush," The flew York Times Magazine, April 1 4 , 1 963 , r e p r i n t e d in The CalifornTa Governmental P r o c e s s , Eugene C. Lee, ed^ ( B o s t o n : LT ttle Brown and Company, 1*966 ), p. 4. 206Long Beach I n d e p e n d e n t , May 11, 1965, n. 3. 340 im p o rtan t to his c i t y , 207 and Governor Brown of San F ran ci sco has confirmed t h a t the Senate is not "a bloc of r u ra l r e a c t i o n and r e s i s t a n c e to p r o g r e s s . " 208 Assembly Speaker Unruh paid t r i b u t e to both camps, noting t h a t farm i l e g i s l a t o r s have promoted urban causes and t h a t " c i t y d w ellers have supported c o u n t l e s s b i l l s c a r r y i n g forward r u ra l i n t e r e s t s . " !le observed t h a t even Los Angeles County had s e n t rura l l e g i s l a t o r s to Sacramento, no ta b ly Joe A. Gonsolves, a dairyman, and concluded t h a t in his ex pe rie nce i t has not been p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t the q u a l i t y of performance or the p r o v i n c i a l i s m of mind of a l e g i s l a t o r merely by his place of r e s i d e n c e . The re are howling l i b e r a l s from small towns and th e r e are c i t y - dwelling l e g i s l a t o r s of a r u s t i c frame of m i n d . 209 Pressure g r o u p s . - - P e r h a p s modern man is a f f e c t e d by government a c tio n more as a r e s u l t of his socioeconomic s t a t u s than as a f u n c tio n of his place of r e s i d e n c e or p arty a f f i l i a t i o n . I t is not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 207Richard Podda, " S ta te Senate Group Will Air Problem of R e d i s t r i c t i n g . . . , " Sacramento B ee, June 23, 1964, p. 4. 208"Brown Says Apportion Amendment N ecessary," Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1965, p. 5. 2 0 9Ra.y Zeman, op. c i t . , Los An gel es Tim es, October 24 , 1 965 , p. 26. Unruh 1 s' o'pi n i on fin d s c o n firm a tio n and e x p l a n a t i o n in the judgement of an academician. " C a l i f o r nia is such an overwhelmingly urban s t a t e t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y a ll l e g i s l a t o r s must deal with urban problems in t h e i r home c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Also, sin c e many . . . urban c o u n t i e s are importan t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e r s , t h e re is seldom a f a c t o r y versus f a r o r i e n t a t i o n in the l e g i s l a t u r e . " P r i c e , o p . c i t . , p p . 143-145. 341 orga ni ze d i n t e r e s t groups should a ttem pt to e x e r t l e g i s l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e in b e h a l f of v o te rs u n ited by t i e s of common r a c e , e t h n i c o r i g i n , r e l i g i o n , income, and o c c u p a tio n . Any d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of ap portionm ent dynamics must c onsequently acknowledge the impact of t h i s kind of lobby ing a c t i v i t y . In C a l i f o r n i a , s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s mentioned 125 i n t e r e s t groups and 55 s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s ig n a te d o r g a n i z a t i o n s as sources of p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u re in numerous i n t e r views conducted in 1 9 5 7 .210 These groups played a role p erceiv ed with c o n s i d e r a b l y more appr oba tion by the C a l i f o r n i a lawmakers than t h a t with which l e g i s l a t o r s viewed the lobbying process in the th re e o t h e r s t a t e s s t u d i e d in t h i s comparative a n a l y s i s . In C a l i f o r n i a 81 per cent of the l e g i s l a t o r s agreed t h a t i n t e r e s t groups were h e lp f u l in e n l i s t i n g s u p p o rt for t h e i r b i l l s , compared with p e rc e n tag e s of 58, 69, and 66 in New J e r s e y , Ohio and Tennessee r e s p e c t i v e l y . 211 210In New J e r s e y l e g i s l a t o r s mentioned 101 groups and 38 o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In Ohio comparable f i g u r e s are 144 and 68, and in Tennessee 102 and 40. Wahlke, e t a l . , op. c i t . , p . 313. 211In C a l i f o r n i a , moreover, only 5 per cent b e l i e v e d t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e would f u n c tio n b e t t e r without the i n f l u e n c e of lo b b ie s while f i g u r e s for the o th e r thre e s t a t e s were 15, 10 and 21. Buchanan, op. c i t . , p. 106. 342 Both the amount and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p r e s s u r e group a c t i v i t y vary according to the type of measure pending, the p a r t i c u l a r lobby in q u e s ti o n and the time period c o n s id e re d . Ethnic groups, long recognized as p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s of c o n s i d e r a b l e magnitude, only r e c e n t l y have seemed to e x e r c i s e p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e in the apportionment f i e l d . Although i t may be t r u e , as a l l e g e d by a Negro spokesman before a senate r e ap portionm ent committee in 1965, t h a t m i n o r i t i e s have for years been "gerrymandered out" of o p p o r t u n i t i e s for e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y , 212 t h i s nega t i v e r e s u l t may be i n t e r p r e t e d e i t h e r as a v a r i e t y of s u b t l e racism or the absence of s u f f i c i e n t l y e f f e c t i v e m i n o ri t y p r e s s u re to dislodge the in c u m b e n t -p r o t e c t e d s t a t u s quo. "Nov;," said the committee w i t n e s s , "we are asking to be gerrymandered i n . " 213 A v ailab le evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t no co ncerted attem pt was made to group e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s in to s p e c i f i c d i s t r i c t s u n t i l the 1951 r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t . As a r e s u l t of the b i l l en ac te d t h a t y e a r , a s t a f f member of the Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee has a s s e r t e d t h a t some d i s t r i c t s became " l a r g e l y Negro, Mexican or Jewish in 212k'endell Green, of the Committee for R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, " R e d i s t r i c t Plan Taken To Hawaii," Oakland Tribune, March 6, 1965. 213 L o c . c i t . 343 m a k e- u p ." 214 Although such a system seems to have been urged by many m in o rity l e a d e r s , th e r e was no concensus in t h i s regard . A Negro f i e l d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of then Congressman Samuel Yorty i n s i s t e d he was "not i n t e r e s t e d in the r a c i a l a n g l e , " and San Fran cisco a t t o r n e y Irv in g ^Rosenblatt opposed " g h e t t o i z a t i o n of m i n o ri t y groups." D i s t r i c t l in es should be drawn, he s a i d , "without regard to r a c e , c o l o r , or c r e e d . " 215 In 1951, as i n d i c a t e d in the e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n of "safe" d i s t r i c t s , 216 re ap portionment was accomplished in the face of growing demands for c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which would in su re the e l e c t i o n of flexican-American and Negro l e g i s l a t o r s . Edward Roybal, Los Angeles Councilman and l a t e r Congressman., spoke for the former when he contended t h a t " d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would f u r t h e r the p o l i t i c a l aware ness" of the Spanish surname p o p u l a t i o n . I n f l u e n t i a l Negroes, at the same time, advocated a "tw o-f our plan" to gu a ra n te e the e l e c t i o n from Los Angeles County of two Negroes to Congress and four to the Assembly. The im mediate r e s u l t s of the re a pportionm ent f i n a l l y enacted 214Hardy, The P r a c t i c e and Theory of R e a p p o rt i o n m e n t , op. c i t . , p. 15. 2 1 5 I bi d. , p. 17. Evidence i n d i c a t e s , however, t h a t the 19 51 r e a p p o rtio n m e n t c r e a t e d a Los Angeles County Assembly d i s t r i c t , the 5 9 th , which was 52.6 Jewish. James 0. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press , 1962) , p. £66. 216Supra , pp. 1 93-200. 344 i n d i c a t e t h a t i t was based on a kind of one-two plan i n s t e a d . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t the o r i g i n a l m inorit y proposal was r e j e c t e d in p a r t because the recommended d i s t r i c t s "would have encompassed the homes of f iv e incumbent Democrats, in cl u d i n g J esse U nr uh ."217 The t e m e r it y of t h i s su g g estio n can be a t t r i b u t e d to p o l i t i c a l n a i v e t e , but i t seems more p l a u s i b l e to assume t h a t Negroes had learned t h a t , in p o l i t i c s , one must ask f o r the globe to get a hemi s p h e r e . The demand f o r e t h n i c group r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in Sacramento which emerged in 1951 and i n t e n s i f i e d ten years l a t e r reached even g r e a t e r vehemence in 1965. A group of Mexican-Americans from Los Angeles t r a v e l l e d to the c a p i t a l to oppose the Rees-proposed Senate reap p o rtio n m e n t on the grounds t h a t i t d i f f u s e d t h a t group's numerical power among t h re e d i s t r i c t s . Martin C a s t i l l o , t h e i r c h i e f spokesman, said We want an a r e a , a s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t , where the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of Mexican-American people will be s i g n i f i c a n t enough so the e l e c t e d s t a t e s e n a t o r . . . will have to l i s t e n to our community v o i c e . 218 Two months e a r l i e r , two Negro Los Angeles City Council men, B i l l y G. Mills and Thomas Bradley, a n t i c i p a t e d such a r e q u e st by urging a Mexi can-Ameri can s e n a t e d i s t r i c t , 2 1 7 T h i s account is taken from Allen, op. c i t ., p . 25. 218"Latin Group to Push R e d i s t r i c t i n g P lan ," Los Angeles Times, May 1 7 , 1 965 , p. 3. 345 in a d d i t i o n to asking for two Los Angeles County Negro s e n a t o r s . 219 Although the c i v i l r i g h t s movement undoubtedly accounts for much of the in c r e a s e in m i n o rity group demands fo r l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i t is the one-man, one-vote co urt r u l i n g which has placed those demands at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y within the realm of p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . The l e g i s l a t i v e re a pportionm ent ordered by the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court in 1965, for example, seemed to have insured the e l e c t i o n of the f i r s t two Negroes and the f i r s t person of O rie n ta l a n c e s t r y ever to serve in the S ta te S e n a te , on the b asis of a 1966 p o s t- p r im a r y a n a l y s i s . 220 It a p p e a r s, however, t h a t Negroes again got less than they had hoped, but more than they had ever had b e f o r e . Mexican-Americans will have to wait s t i l l long er before the f i r s t of t h e i r number p e n e t r a t e s the upper house. 219"Voice for L.A. Negroes in S tate Senate Urged," Los Angeles Times , March 6 , 1 965 , p. 7. 2 2 0 Ray Zeman , "The Results of R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," Los Angeles Times, June 23 , 1966, Pt. I I , p. 4. Of the two Negroes, one is from Northern C a l i f o r n i a , Assemblyman Byron Pumford of Berkeley , and the o t h e r , Assemblyman Mervyn Dymally is from Los Angeles. The Orien ta l-A m erican is Assemblyman Alfred H. Song of Monterey Park. On the b as is of a d d i t i o n a l primary r e s u l t s Mrs. March K. Fong, an Assembly c a n d id a te from Alameda County, showed promise of becoming the f i r s t Chinese-American to serve in e i t h e r house of the L e g i s l a t u r e , and Mrs. Yvonne Matson Brath- w a i t e , Los Angeles Assembly nominee, of becoming the f i r s t Negro woman. All persons mentioned are Democrats, and all but Rumford were e l e c t e d . 346 In Georgia, Negro gains as a r e s u l t of c o u r t - compelled reapportio nm ent are more dramatic than the modest ones in C a l i f o r n i a , although they nay foreshadow f u t u r e developments in many o th e r s t a t e s as w e ll. In June of 1965, e i g h t Negroes were e l e c t e d to the Georgia House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , becoming the f i r s t to serve th e r e since 1 907 . 221 The f a c t t h a t all but one came from the A tlan ta region i n d i c a t e s t h a t the s h i f t of r e a p p o r t i o n e d s e a t s to urban areas co in cid es with end co nfers p o l i t i c a l power upon the growing Negro p o p u la tio n s in the n a t i o n ' s leading cities. 222 As a r e s u l t of a c c u r a t e l y p r o j e c t e d gains in the number of m i n o ri t y group l e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d to o f f i c e under court-impo se d reap p o rtio n m en t c r i t e r i a , i t is not surprising that the n a t i o n ' s lea d in g lobbying group f o r c i v i l r i g h t s l e g i s l a t i o n . . . agreed to spearhead . . . e f f o r t s a g a i n s t circumventing the c o u r t ' s . . . reap p o rtio n m en t r u l i n g . . . . A (L eader ship Conference on Civil Rights) spokesman s a id . . . " re a p p o rtio n m en t is so much of a c i v i l r i g h t s issue t h a t we c a n ' t ignore i t . " 223 221 Los Angeles Times , June 17, 1965, pp. 1 and 20. 222For an i n t e r e s t i n g commentary, see Joseph Alsop, "When C i t i e s Become ' G h e t t o s ' --Then What?" Los Angeles Times , June 23, 1965, Rt. I I , p. 6. 223John H. A v e r i l l , "Rights Lobby to Defend Courts' Apportion Rule," Los Angeles Times , June 22, 1965, p. 7. This view was shared by Burke M a rs h a l l , former A s s i s t a n t Attorney General in charge of the J u s t i c e Departments c i v i l r i g h t s d i v i s i o n , and many o t h e r i n f l u e n t i a l f i g u r e s . "Foes of Amendment Point to Rights I s s u e , " Washington P o st, May 15, 1965. 347 Court d e c i s i o n s , th e n , have b e n e f i t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s , perhaps i n a d v e r t e n t l y , by r e q u i r i n g t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s be a p p o rtio n e d on a p o p u la tio n b a s i s . On at l e a s t one occasion they also have i n v a l i d a t e d an apportionment plan which met the one-man, on e- vo te sta n d a rd but appeared to f a l l s h o rt of j u d i c i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s re g a rd in g e x p l i c i t l y e t h n i c and sexual c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . On April 28, 1965, the Federal D i s t r i c t Court in Hawaii quoted a s t a t i s t i c i a n ' s testimony t h a t a proposed s e n a t o r i a l d i s t r i c t in t h a t s t a t e which met o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s ta n d a rd s might be o b j e c t i o n a b l e because i t "encompassed a highly heterogeneous area c o n t a i n i n g a m u l t i t u d e of Caucasian widows in the upland a r e a , and an overabundance of F i l i p i n o males in the seaward p o r t i o n . " 224 Ethnic p r e s s u r e group i n f l u e n c e on apportionment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may be summarized in terms of t h re e broad c o n c l u s io n s : (1) i t has gained en thusiasm from the optimism engendered by co u rt a c t i o n ; (2) i t has i n c r e a s e d ; (3) i t has focused to a growing e x t e n t upon the c r e a t i o n of bo undaries which f a c i l i t a t e not merely the e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s s e n s i t i v e to m i n o ri t y w ishes, but i n s t e a d upon d i s t r i c t s which v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n te e the e l e c t i o n of m in o rity 224Don A. Allen , S r . , MEMORANDUM TO: All Members of the L e g i s l a t u r e , July 13, 1965 (mimeographed). This is p a r t of what Allen contemptuously d e s c r i b e s in his l e t t e r as a "cute l i t t l e phase" of the " i n s i d e low-down on Hawaii." 348 group members. This l a s t p o i n t e l i c i t s v aried r e a c t i o n s , even from among those s ym patheti c to m i n o rity i n t e r e s t s . Hardy, academician and former reap p o rtio n m en t t e c h n i c i a n , f e e l s t h a t Negro i n t e r e s t s could be f u r t h e r advanced through many d i s t r i c t s with s i g n i f i c a n t Negro m i n o r i t i e s than through a few with Negro m a j o r i t i e s , even though they e l e c t e d Negro l e g i s l a t o r s . 225 Yet i t might be reasonab ly contended t h a t d i s t r i c t boun daries which fragment m in o rity vo te rs are ofte n i n s p i r e d by a d e s i r e to minimize Negro p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h through i n t e n t i o n a l d i s p e r s i o n . As Allen observed, The claim of Negro l e a d e r s t h a t not much can be accomplished f o r t h e i r people ex cept by d i r e c t ( i . e ., Negro) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was not d i f f i c u l t to u n derstand; i t was a l e g i s l a t i v e committee with an 8-2 Democratic margin which (in 1961) had k i l l e d an a n t i - h o u s i n g - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b i l l . 226 For b e t t e r or worse, e t h n i c p r e s s u r e must be assumed to be a powerful and growing influe nc e, in b e h a l f of s p e c i f i c a l l y sugg ested d i s t r i c t boundaries as well as the g e n e r a l l y e n u n c ia te d equal p o p u la tio n p r i n c i p l e . Although p r e s s u r e group a c t i v i t y by e t h n i c i n t e r e s t s has been i n t e n s e , lobbying a c t i v i t y is h i s t o r i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d in the p u b l i c mind with var ious economic j i n t e r e s t s . One of the most obvious c o n f l i c t s between such i n t e r e s t s , the u r b a n - r u r a l r i v a l r y , has been explored 225Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . 226L e g i s l a t i v e S ou rce bo ok , op. c i t ., p. 25. 349 above. But the f a c t o r y - f a r m r e l a t i o n s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y on apportionment m a t t e r s , has been more complex than one of simple c o m p e t i t i o n , and has seldom appeared in e x a c t l y the same form. In the r e g u l a r l e g i s l a t i v e se ss io n of 1911, rura l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f e a re d t h a t an a l l i a n c e between San F ran ci sco and Los Angeles on a t i d e l a n d s measure might be extended to such issues as r a c e t r a c k gambling and local l i q u o r c o n t r o l . Such f e a rs must have been d i s s i p a t e d c o n s id e r a b l y when the Los Angeles ' 1e g i s 1a t i v e d e l e g a t i o n s p l i t to gain v i c t o r y for a ru ra l suppo rted re a pportionm ent l a t e r the same y e a r . 227 By the mid-1920's the p o s i t i o n of s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s became more d i s t i n c t . Although farm groups all wanted to in su r e a r u r a l - d o m i n a t e d Sen at e, the S t a t e Grange and Farm Bureau had advocated d i f f e r e n t a p p o r tionment formula to g u aran tee t h a t r e s u l t . These a g r i c u l t u r a l forc es jo i n e d with an urban a l l y , the San Fran ci sco Chamber of Commerce, in the s u c c e s s f u l 1926 i n i t i a t i v e campaign to gain adoption of the "Federal Plan" for l e g i s l a t i v e a p p o r t i o n m e n t . 228 I The 1931 and 1941 r e d i s t r i c t i n g s t r u g g l e s in the L e g i s l a t u r e were p r im a r i l y s e c t i o n a l , p a r t i s a n and p e r s o n a l , but in the 1948 r e a p p o rtio n m e n t i n i t i a t i v e 2 2 7 1bi d . , p . 8. 2 2 8 1 b i d . , pp. 10-11 . 350 campaign the contending fo rc e s were c l e a r l y economic in n a t u r e , with i n d u s t r i a l workers showing marked i n t e r e s t in the s u b j e c t f o r the f i r s t time. That y e a r the C a l i f o r n i a Feder at ion of Labor placed P r o p o s i t i o n 13 on the b a l l o t to re t u r n the s t a t e Senate to a more n e a rly p o p u l a t i o n - b a s e d a l l o c a t i o n of s e a t s , but chambers of commerce througho ut the s t a t e e a s i l y e n l i s t e d r u r a l s upport to d e f e a t i t ove rw h e lm in g ly .229 Twelve y ears l a t e r , however, in the 1960 i n i t i a t i v e campaign on the "Bonelli Plan" f o r Senate r e a p p o rt i o n m e n t , union forc es d isp la y e d l i t t l e u n i t y . The s t a t e AFL-CIO remained n e u t r a l but the C a l i f o r n i a Chamber of Commerce, farm groups and m anuf acturing a s s o c i a t i o n s were again u nited a g a i n s t the proposal in what had become a common economic a l l i a n c e . Although the 1959 d e f e a t by the Senate of a possesso ry i n t e r e s t tax b i l l which would have been of p a r t i c u l a r b e n e f i t to s o u th e rn C a l i f o r n i a loc al governments was one of the f a c t o r s which prompted the renewed r e a p p o r tionment a t t e m p t , i t was f e l t by many souther n C a l i f o r n i a n s t h a t a vigorous campaign f o r more Senate s e a t s would 229Gordon E. Baker, "The C a l i f o r n i a S e n a t e , " The P o l i t i c s of Rea p p o rtio n m en t, o p . c i t . , p. 52. Baker c i t e s with sympathy the views of o t h e r observers t h a t the f i n a l vote t o t a l s "gave meager s u p p o rt for the dogma t h a t man is a r a t i o n a l being" and c o n s t i t u t e d an "amazing s p e c t a c l e of a people approving t h e i r own d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t . " Loc. ci t . Lang notes t h a t in a d d i t i o n to b usin ess and a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s , even the League of C a l i f o r n i a C i t i e s opposed the plan. Op. c i t . , p. 11. 351 j e o p a r d i z e needed no rth e rn support f o r the water bond i s s u e appearing on the b a l l o t at the same time. The water measure passed; the Bonelli Plan did n o t . 230 In 1962, the renewed f i g h t over a f i n a l Senate re ap p o rtio n m e n t i n i t i a t i v e saw the b a t t l e - l i n e s drawn on a s e c t i o n a l b a s i s . Both the p r e s i d e n t of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r y of the Los Angeles County Fed eratio n of Labor (AFL-CIO) were members of the seven person s t r a t e g y group to c o o r d i n a t e e f f o r t s in b e h a l f of P r o p o s i t i o n 23, designed to give urban, and p r i m a r i l y s o u t h e r n , areas g r e a t e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Although Los Angeles bu s in e s s i n t e r e s t s , perhaps dismayed by the r e l a t i v e l y new 1 i beral-Democrat!' c m a j o r i t y in the Senate, had been at l a s t persuaded to s upport upper-house r e a p p o r tion ment, the bulk of the f i n a n c i a l e l i t e remained m o n e ta rily wedded to the s t a t u s quo. As Allen po in ts o u t, Campaign expense record s . . . showed t h a t t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of o p p o s i t i o n funds (expended a g a i n s t P roposi- t i o n 23) were c o n t r i b u t e d by 16 c o r p o r a t i o n s , composed of oil i n t e r e s t s , the r a i l r o a d s , a n o r th e rn u t i l i t y , several n o r th e rn banks, and out of s t a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s . 231 2 3 0 Ibi d . , pp. 53-57. 231Allen, op. c i t ., p. 36. Almost twenty years e a r l i e r , Dean E. McHenry had observed t h a t " u t i l i t i e s , banks, in su ra n c e companies and o th e r s . . . have disc o v e re d some 'cow c o u n t y 1 l e g i s l a t o r s more r e sp o n siv e to t h e i r demands . . . than are urban r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ." "Urban vs. Rural in C a l i f o r n i a , " National Municipal Review ( J u l y , / 352 In s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the Se n ate , from a popu l a t i o n p o i n t of view, was so badly ap p o r tio n e d t h a t measures r e q u i r i n g a t w o - t h i r d s vote . . . (such as the . . . budget and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments) could be bloced by fo u rt e e n s e n a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g . . . fiv e per cent of the p e o p l e , 232 reap p o rtio n m en t was again d e f e a t e d , although by a more narrow margin than ever b e f o r e . On the bas is of in fo r m a tio n about the r e a p p o r t i o n ment c o n t r o v e r s i e s c i t e d above, two g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s seem warranted re g a rd in g the r o l e played by economic i n t e r e s t groups. F i r s t , t h e r e is a n a t u r a l a f f i n i t y of farm o r g a n i z a t i o n s and b u sin ess groups which is u s u a l l y r e f l e c t e d in common o p p o s i t i o n to p o p u l a t i o n - b a s e d a p p o r t i o n ment p l a n s . Charles Hyneman i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s was not a unique C a l i f o r n i a phenomenon when he commented on a s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g in I l l i n o i s . There is evidence t h a t a good many men of i n f l u e n c e who l i v e or do busin ess in Chicago would p r e f e r r u r a l , small town and small c i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to o u tvote the Chicago d e l e g a t i o n s . . . . They see the Chicago l e g i s l a t o r as agent f o r an urban p r o l e t a r i a t with which they have l i t t l e sy mpathy.233 de Grazia a f f i r m s the presence of t h i s b u s i n e s s - ru ra l r e a p p o rtio n m e n t a l l i a n c e in Arizona, as w e l l , 1946), p. 350. Quoted in Burns and P e l t a s o n , op. c i t . , p. 739. 2 32 Baker, "The C a l i f o r n i a S e n a t e , " o p . c i t ., p. 52. 2 3 3 I11in ois Law Review, XLV1 , 544, quoted in Keefe and Ogul , o p . c i t ., note 39, p. 89. 353 s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t i n g banks, p r i v a t e l y owned u t i l i t y companies, and in surance c o m panies.234 Baker, ob serving t h a t urban p o p u la tio n s embrace many groups of d i v e r se i n t e r e s t , notes the b u s i n e s s - r u r a l alignm en t, a l s o , 235 and Keefe and Ogul quote the contemptuous r e f e r e n c e s to urban r e s i d e n t s by a former p r e s i d e n t of the National A s so c iatio n of Real E s ta te Boards to make the same p o i n t . 236 The reasons f o r the busin ess p r e fe r e n c e f o r rura l l e g i s l a t o r s seem p r i m a r i l y i d e o l o g i c a l and p a r t i a l l y t a c t i c a l . I d e o l o g i c a l l y , busin ess i n t e r e s t s p e rc e iv e rural r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as c o m fo rtin g ly c o n s e r v a t i v e , as Hyneman implied above. Such a p e r c e p t i o n is given some s t a t i s t i c a l v a l i d a t i o n by a c o n g r e ss io n a l r o ll c a ll study re p o rt e d in Odegard and B a e rw ald ,237 but must be modified to some degree in terms of the p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 2 34Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, o p . c i t . , p . 105. 235The Reapportionment R e v o l u t i o n , o p . c i t ., p. 106. S t a t e Senator Richard J. Doliwig, in proposing t h a t C a l i f o r n i a be s p l i t in to two s t a t e s , v e r b a l i z e d the s i m i l a r i t y of farm and b u sin ess i n t e r e s t s when he spoke of a g r i c u l t u r e as a b i l l i o n d o l l a r " i n d u s t r y . " Zeman, "2- S t a t e Plan . . . , " op. c i t . , p. 3. 2 3 60 p . c i t ., p. 88. 2 3 70 p . c i t . , pp. 342-343. Columnist Drew Pearson seems to group the Farm Bureau, the U.S. Chamber of Com merce and the American Bar A s so c ia tio n as " b a s t i o n s of Conservative power." " R i g h t i s t s , L i b e r a l s Find Selves Together on Reapportionment," Los Angeles Ti mes, May 24, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 6. See a l s o , "Bar Delegates . . . , “ Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1965, p. 4. 354 C a l i f o r n i a ru ra l p o p u la tio n c i t e d by Burdick e a r l i e r . T a c t i c a l l y , i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t busines s groups wish to maintain rura l l e g i s l a t i v e prep ond eran ce, as Allen has s u g g e ste d , because t h e i r l o b b y i s t s can i n f l u e n c e the e l e c t i o n of ru ra l l e g i s l a t o r s with the e x p e n d itu re of sm a l l e r campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n s than are re q u i re d in urban c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 238 While h i s t o r i c a l evidence confirms t h a t C a l i f o r n i a has shown the same economic c o a l i t i o n s as the r e s t of the nat ion on apportionment m a t t e r s , co nclusio ns in t h i s r e s p e c t must be tempered by a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t these a l l i a n c e s (as in 1952) are o c c a s i o n a l l y tempered by un u s u a ll y stron g s e c t i o n a l , Los Angeles-San Fran cisco r i v a l r i e s and a r a t h e r a t y p i c a l rura l p o p u l a t i o n . Whether the C a l i f o r n i a experien c e is predominantly normal or dev ia n t r egarding the b u s in e s s - f a r m alignment is d i f f i c u l t to determine. The former assessment may w arran t somewhat g r e a t e r c r e d i b i l i t y in terms of the f i g h t to o v ertu rn the c o u r t - d e c r e e d one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e . Allen points out t h a t "the ' r u r a l - o r i e n t e d ' C a l i f o r n i a County Super viso rs A s s o c i a t i o n " 239 opposed any change in Senate ap p o r tionment as i t e x i s t e d in 19G4 and t h a t in e a r l y 1965 2 3 8 Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . Pearson a g r e e s , p o i n t i n g out t h a t ru ral l e g i s l a t o r s are "more e a s i l y i n f lu e n c e d ; sometimes bou ght," than c i t y ones. "Dirksen Amendment B a t t l e Lin e s," Los Angeles Ti me s , August 4, 1965. 2 3 l e g i s l a t i v e Sou rcebook, op. c i t . , p . 43. 355 C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t i v e attem pts to ove rturn the Supreme Court equal p opulation d e c i s io n were fin a nced by " s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s from major oil and p r i v a t e u t i l i t y compan i e s . " 2 4 0 A second conclusion re g a rd in g economic i n t e r e s t group in f l u e n c e on ap portionment processes is t h a t , unlike e t h n i c a s s o c i a t i o n p r e s s u r e , i t is not focused on d i s t r i c t i n g d i s p u t e s . While Negroes and Mexican-Americans are concerned with ex act b o u n d a r i e s , busin ess and farm forces are i n t e r e s t e d only in general geo graphic a l l o c a t i o n of s e a t s . 241 Thus, e t h n i c i n f l u e n c e has been marked during decennial app ortionmen t con t r o v e r s i es in the l e g i s l a t u r e , and economic forces a s s e r t themselves c h i e f l y in the course of i n i t i a t i v e campaigns designed to a l t e r the fundamental b a s is of appo rtio nmen t. 2 4 0 I b i d . , p. 50. The S t a t e Chamber of Commerce was r e p o r t e d l y su p p o rtin g the f i g h t f o r the Dirksen Amendment, designed to overtu rn the C o u r t 's one-man, one-vote d e c i s i o n , and the San F ran cisco p u b lic r e l a t i o n s firm of Whitaker & Baxter was r e p u t e d l y the major v e h i c l e f o r such e f f o r t s . Los Angeles Times, April 20, 1965, p. 24. None t h e l e s s , a former p r e s i d e n t of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, James L. Beebe, r e f l e c t i n g s e c t i o n a l schis ms, f i l e d a legal b r i e f , c i r c u l a t e d p u b l i c l y by t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n , endorsing c o u r t - o r d e r e d rea p p o rtio n m e n t. I b i d . , p. 3. Farm groups seemed u n ite d a g a i n s t the j u d i c i a l cTecree, "Farmers Union Votes to Fight R e d i s t r i c t i n g ," The S a c r a mento Bee, March 18, 1965, p. 22, while Charles B a r t l e t t observed t h a t " l a b o r unions are the only im pre ssive lobby on the sid e of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 5. 241Stephen E. Smith, personal i n t e r v i e w , lo c . ci t . The same is t r u e , Smith a s s e r t e d , of l a b o r groups. 356 Public o p i n i o n . - - S i q n i f i c a n t as the whole q u e s tio n of l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment may be to the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , to l o b b y i s t s , p o l i t i c i a n s , and r e p o r t e r s , i t has aroused r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e i n t e r e s t among the general p u b l i c . This pe rv a siv e apathy is one of the most im p o rtan t f a c t s r e l e v a n t to the whole i s s u e , and permits wide d i s c r e t i o n to the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , de Grazia has e s t i m a t e d t h a t no more than a thousand people in any s t a t e are aware of app ortion men t d e t a i l s , 242 and S t a t e Sen ator Stephen P. T e ale, whose committee s e n t a r e a p portionm ent b i l l to the upper house, re p o rt e d t h a t even a f t e r e x t e n s i v e press coverage of the proposed measure, he had r e c e i v e d only six l e t t e r s re g a rd in g i t . 243 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Alphonzo Bell of the 28th Congressional D i s t r i c t in Southern C a l i f o r n i a i n d i c a t e d to his c o n s t i t u e n t s in monthly n e w s l e t t e r s t h a t " s t a t e rea p p o rtio n m en t" ranked fourth among s u b j e c t s which drew the h e a v i e s t volume of mail during Janu ary of 1965, when the l e g i s l a t u r e f i r s t began g r a p p l in g with c o u r t - imposed r e q u i r e m e n t s , but t h a t by April before any a c t i o n had been ta k e n , t h i s s u b j e c t a lr e a d y had s l i p p e d to t e n t h . 244 242Apportionment and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government, op. c i t . , p. 140. 243"Reapportionment D i s a s t e r , " Ontario-Upland ( C a l i f . ) Daily R e p o r t , April 30, 1965. 244"Your Capital R eport," February, 1965, and May, 1965, i s s u e s . 357 Public opinion poll r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e general inr d i f f e r e n c e toward r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t . In September of 1965 The S t a t e Poll r e p o r t e d t h a t 36.8 per cent of C a l i f o r n i a n s d i d n ' t know when asked whether they b e lie v e d t h a t the c o u r t o rd er r e q u i r i n g senate reap p o rtio n m en t was " c o r r e c t . " 245 The preced ing J a n u a ry , Mervyn D. F i e l d ' s C a l i f o r n i a Poll showed t h a t 30 per c ent of the p o p u l a t i o n ex pressed "no opinion" when asked i f they thought the s t a t e should ask Congress to propose a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment p e r m i t t i n g one house of a l e g i s l a t u r e to be a p p o rtio n e d on a geo g raphic b a s i s . 246 Other than t h i s high degree of p u b l i c apathy, the p o l l s reveal two co n c lu sio n s re g a rd in g p r e v a i l i n g s t a t e opinion on app ortion men t m a t t e r s . As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , Republicans showed more o p p o s i t i o n to the one-man, one-vote sta n d a rd than Democrats. This conforms to the general p a t t e r n of p u b l i c opinion in the whole n a tio n as d i s c l o s e d by an August, 1964, Gallup p o l l . 247 This p a r t y d i v i s i o n is m a n i fe st e d even more c l e a r l y in the p o s i t i o n s of p r e ss u re 245"Civil Rights Seen as Issue in '66 E l e c t i o n , " loc. c i t . The same survey showed t h a t only 3.9 per c e n t of the publi c b e l i e v e d t h a t reap p o rtio n m en t would be an im p o r t a n t iss u e in the campaign culm in a tin g f o u rte e n months l a t e r . This placed i t e i g h t h among is s u e s c i t e d . I b i d . , p. 3. 246San F ran cis co C h r o n i c l e , January 26, 1965. 247Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1964, p. 13. Speci fi c a l l y , the Republi c a n ' s approved c o u r t a c tio n 47 to 35 per ce nt and the Democrats 49 to 28 per c e n t. 358 groups and p r o p a g a n d i s t s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with the a t t i t u d e s of the two major p a r t i e s th em selv es . Thus, rig h t - w i n g - s p o k e s m e n , u s u a l l y b e lie v e d to su p p o rt the Republican P a r t y , have been vehement in t h e i r d en u n c i a t i o n of c o u r t reap p o rti o n m en t o r d e r s , 248 and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p o l i t i c a l l e f t , normally Democratic in p a r t i s a n s h i p , have been e q u a l l y e n t h u s i a s t i c in p r a i s e . 249 Opinion surveys make i t c l e a r , also t h a t t h e r e is a decided s e c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e re g a rd in g apportionm ent. A poll i n d i c a t e d in April of 1965 t h a t Southern C a l i f o r n i a n s wished sen a te r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on a p o p u la tio n b a s is by a 61 to 25 margin, while r e s i d e n t s of the n o r th e rn p o r ti o n of the s t a t e favored a geo grap hic apportionment by a r a t i o of 57 to 3 3 . 250 The n o r t h e r n e r s had made i t c l e a r th re e months e a r l i e r , however, t h a t even though the c o u r t s had 248See, e . g . , The Dan Smoot R e p o r t , Vol. 11, No. 12, March 22, 1965, p p . 93-94 and Vol. 11, No. 15, April 12, 1965, pp. 115-117. 249A t t e n t i o n should be d i r e c t e d to the p o s i t i o n of c i v i l r i g h t s and l a b o r groups p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d . Note a l s o , The New Dirksen Amendment (Pasadena: Friends Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n , n . d . ) , Mimeographed in 1965, See a l s o , AFL- CIO Dept, of L e g i s l a t i o n , Labor Looks at Congress 1965 (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, n . d . ) , pp. 16-18. One of the lea d in g advocates of a p o p u l a t i o n - b a s e d app ortionmen t has been Gus T y l e r , a s s i s t a n t p r e s i d e n t of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ladies* Garment Workers' Union. Most r e l e v a n t is his "Court versus L e g i s l a t u r e : The S o c i o - P o l i t i c s of Reappor t io n m e n t," Law and Contemporary Proble m s, XXVII, Pt. II (Summer, 1962), pp. 390-407. 250Mervyn D. F i e l d , "Pub lic Backs Court A p p o r tio n ment Rule," Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1965, p. 2. 359 preclude d the continued implementation of t h e i r wishes in t h i s r e g a r d , they opposed s p l i t t i n g the s t a t e in two by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y of 69 to 1 7 . 251 Whatever concensus the "general pu b lic" may reach in th ese m a t t e r s , i t seems r e a l i s t i c to conclude t h a t i t is of l i t t l e consequence. With regard to general a p p o r t i o n ment formulae, the co u rts have preempted po pular d i s c r e t i o n ; with r e f e r e n c e to s p e c i f i c d i s t r i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s , p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s such as p a r t i s a n advantage and incumbent p r o t e c t i o n are predominant. There is no ap p aren t evidence to r e f u t e Hardy's c o n c l u s i o n s , based l a r g e l y on the 1951 re a p p o rt i o n m e n t , t h a t t h e r e is seldom community agreement on d i s t r i c t i n g m a t t e r s , t h a t when p u b l i c h e arings are held i t is u s u a l l y a f t e r d i s t r i c t s a l r e a d y have been de ci ded , and t h a t even when communities reach a concensus on t h e i r d e s i r e s , i t is seldom heeded by the l e g i s l a t u r e , 252 I t seems probab le t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s place more importance on p u b l i c opinion in c a s t i n g t h e i r votes on o t h e r measures than on r e a p p o rtio n m e n t b i l l s . There have been few a ttem pts to q u a n t i f y t h i s f a c t o r , perhaps the b e st known of which showed c o n s t i t u e n t s ' views ranking behind independent judgement and p a r t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s but ahead of 251F i e l d , "Large Majorit y Opposes Dividing S t a t e in Two," Los Angeles Times , January 31, 1965, Sec. G, p. 1. 252"The P r a c t i c e and Theory of Rea pportionm ent," op. cit. , p. 19. 360 s e v e ra l o t h e r f a c t o r s in i n f l u e n c i n g votes on a 1939 con g r e s s i o n a l r o l l c a l l . 253 Methodological Resources The apportionment process is a f f e c t e d not only by the e x t e r n a l environment of l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l , and demo graphic f a c t o r s but als o by what might be c a l l e d the i n t e r n a l l i m i t a t i o n s of procedural methodology. Two new developments in t h i s area should be mentioned. Academic a d v i s o r s . - - I n 1951, the Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee employed the s e r v i c e s of members of the academic community f o r the f i r s t time in C a l i f o r n i a . Subsequent e x p e rie n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t they have become a permanent p a r t of t h a t p ro c e ss. Perhaps i t is too e a r l y to draw u n a s s a i l a b l e con c l u s i o n s about the a f f e c t s of t h i s inno v atio n but c e r t a i n o b s e r v a t i o n s are un av oidab le. Whereas Dr. H inderaker, the c h i e f reap p o rtio n m e n t c o n s u l t a n t in 1951, viewed his role as t h a t of a t e c h n i c i a n and i n f l u e n c e d the d e t e r m in a ti o n of few a c tu a l boundari e s , 2 5tf Dr. Hardy in 1961 played a more a c t i v e r o le as an a d v i s o r on s u b s t a n t i v e q u e s ti o n s and drew 253L. E. Gleeck, "96 Congressmen Make Up Their Minds," Public Opinion Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. IV (1940), pp. 3-24. Cited in Ranney, op. c i t . , p. 255. 254Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . 361 se v era l bo undaries in regio ns where incumbents were not i n v o l v e d . 255 The value of both men is i n d i c a t e d by t h e i r l a t e r re-employment in s i m i l a r c a p a c i t i e s , Dr. Hinderaker by the 1961 Senate Reapportionment Commission and Dr. Hardy by the Governor as his 1965 re apportionm ent c o n s u l t a n t . 256 Not only have p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s played an i n c r e a s i n g l y large ro le in t h i s m a t t e r , but an i n c r e a s i n g l y p a r t i s a n one as w e l l . Although Dr. Hinderaker did not c o n s tru e his s e r v i c e s as d e d i c a t e d to party advantage during the 1951 r e a p p o rt i o n m e n t , i t is perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t he is a Republican, employed i n i t i a l l y by a Republican dominated committee. S i m i l a r l y , Dr. Hardy is a Democrat, employed by Democrats. Moreover, he was aware, in 1961, of the i n t e n s e l y p a r t i s a n n a t u r e of his r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and dis ch a rg e d them with such enthusiasm t h a t Speaker Unruh, p a r t l y in j e s t , has suggested t h a t the Assembly committee had to r e s t r a i n his more f l a g r a n t gerrymandering im p u l s e s . 257 255Personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . c i t . 256Hardy was l a t e r asked by Assembly Speaker Unruh to serve as a lower house c o n s u l t a n t , much as he had four years e a r l i e r , but had a lr e a d y committed his s e r v i c e s to Governor Brown. Loc. c i t . 257Unruh made the comment in a c o n v e r s a t i o n with t h i s w r i t e r and although Hardy does not acknowledge i t s v a l i d i t y , he admits having heard Unruh make a s i m i l a r s ta t e m e n t . Personal i n t e r v i e w , loc. c i t . 362 The Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Commit tee employed Stephen E. Smith as i t s s t a f f d i r e c t o r in 1965. Unlike Hinderaker and Hardy, he was not a p r o f e s sio n a l p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t , al though he c o o rd in a ted the work of eleven o t h e r s t a f f members and s p e c i a l c o n s u l t a n t s , in c l u d i n g a p r o f e s s o r of law, Edward L. B a r r e t , J r . , and fiv e p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . 258 In the meantime, the Senate was handicapped by a s m a l l e r s t a f f c o n s i s t i n g of only four p e rso n s, none of whom was d e s ig n a te d as a d i r e c t o r . The four incl ud ed a lawyer, Harry K. Grafe, and a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t , Bernard Teitel bau m, i d e n t i f i e d as a s t a t i s t i c i a n and r e s p o n s i b l e , as a n o th e r s t a f f member put i t , for " p a r t i s a n " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 259 Hardy, as noted above, was s im u l t a n e o u s l y s e r v i n g as a c o n s u l t a n t to the Governor, a f a c t to which the S enate, acco rdi ng to A llen , "took umbrage" as a p o t e n t i a l i n f r i n g e m e n t upon i t s t r a d i t i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e to determine i t s own r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t . 260 258The p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s were J. A. C. Grant, William P. Gerberding, Edward M. Goldberg, Douglas S. Hobbs, and Charles G. B e l l , a l l se rv in g on c o l l e g e or u n i v e r s i t y f a c u l t i e s and r e s i d i n g , with one e x c e p t i o n , in southern C a l i f o r n i a . S t a f f D i r e c t o r Smith, Committee Chairman Allen and S t a t i s t i c a l Research A n a ly s t, Madale L. Watson are all Democrats, Southern C a l i f o r n i a n s and c lo se p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s of Speaker Unruh. 259Artnur D. Johnson, Senate Committee C o n s u l t a n t , personal i n t e r v i e w , loc. c i t . 260The Senate d i s p l a y e d equal a n t i p a t h y to Assembly i n t r u s i o n in t h i s r e s p e c t . A llen , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, o p . c i t ., pp. 44-45. 363 i Governor Brown had i n s t r u c t e d Hardy to co nfer with Lt. Gov. Anderso(n and S t a t e C o n t r o l l e r Cranston who were members of a Reapportionment Commission provided by the S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n to e f f e c t re apportionm ent when the l e g i s l a t u r e was unable to f u l f i l l i t s own o b l i g a t i o n in t h i s r e s p e c t . Although the group has never been u t i l i z e d in C a l i f o r n i a , there e x i s t e d the remote p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t in the event of l e g i s l a t i v e deadlock i t might be a c t i v a t e d by j u d i c i a l decree. This o p p o r t u n i t y , of co u rse, never came. While Hardy per ceive d the general coolness of the Senate toward his r o l e , he observed t h a t Sen. Rees, whom the upper house allowed f u l l d i s c r e t i o n in drawing proposed s enate d i s t r i c t boundaries in Los Angeles County, was very c o o p e r a t i v e . 251 The 1965 r e ap p o rtio n m e n t d e l i b e r a t i o n s , th en , are noteworthy in p a r t because p r o f e s s i o n a l academic advice was s o l i c i t e d f o r the f i r s t time by both houses of the l e g i s l a ture and the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e as w e ll. Because the employ ment of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , l i k e t h a t of all l e g i s l a t i v e s t a f f members and c o n s u l t a n t s , is dispen sed e s s e n t i a l l y on a patronage b a s i s , t h e r e is l i t t l e reason to doubt t h a t t h e i r advice was put to p a r t i s a n use in the m u l t i p l e c o n t e x t s of p a r t y , p e r s o n a l , s e c t i o n a l , and l e g i s l a t i v e chamber a d v a n t a g e . 262 261Personal i n t e r v i e w , loc. c i t . 2 6 2 CjL- s u p r a , note 258 , p. 362 . 364 Computers. A development even more r e c e n t than the use of academicians is the emergence of the e l e c t r o n i c computer as a data p r o ce ss in g tool f o r the a n a l y s i s of proposed d i s t r i c t changes. F i r s t used in 1965, these machines make s t a t i s t i c a l computations on the b a s is of census f i g u r e s , e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s and vo ter r e g i s t r a t i o n f i g u r e s . The r e s u l t is t h a t work which p r e v i o u s l y would have re q u i re d many days may now be completed in a manner of mi n u t e s . Among the s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s which were s u b j e c t e d to computer a n a l y s i s with r e f e r e n c e to each proposed Assembly and Senate d i s t r i c t were the Negro and Spanish surname p e r c e n t a g e s , t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n , p a r ty r e g i s t r a t i o n , p o p u la tio n m o b i l i t y , vo ter t u r n o u t , p a s t e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , and " a b s o l u t e l o y a l t y " f i g u r e s compiled by comparing the number of votes c a s t f o r the l a s t Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i date with the number of r e g i s t e r e d Democrats. S t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s , some of whom know even the bound aries of church p a r i s h e s w ith in t h e i r d i s t r i c t s , asked f o r computer a n a l y s i s of as small an area as o n e - t e n t h of a census t r a c t . 263 One Assemblyman, John F. Foran (D., San 263Ray Zeman, "Machines Turn From Freeways to P o l i t i c s , " Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1965, Pt. I I , p. 4. The t i t l e is der ived from the f a c t t h a t the Assembly used computers belonging to the Cali form'a Division of Highways for reap p o rtio n m e n t a n a l y s i s . "These co mputers," sa id Stephen E. Smith, "are t e a c h in g ( l e g i s l a t o r s ) p l e n t y . " Quoted, loc. c i t . 365 F r a n c i s c o ) , proposed seven s e p a r a t e boundary changes to gain a d i s t r i c t more fa v o ra b l e to h i m s e l f . 261* I n c i d e n t s such as these underscore the importance of tirne and e f f i c i e n c y advantages i n h e r e n t in an age of e l e c t r o n i c politics. Valuable as these computers are g e n e r a l l y acknow ledged to be, they a l r e a d y have provided an a d d i t i o n a l source of c o n t r o v e r s y , or at l e a s t a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n for p o l i t i c a l antagonisms. Assemblyman Allen, for example, has denied a charge by Senator Rees t h a t the Assembly was r e l u c t a n t to co operate with the upper house on i t s r e a p p o r tionment. He e x p la in e d t h a t the only p o s s i b l e b a s is for such an a l l e g a t i o n was the t i g h t e n i n g up of "admission" procedures a f t e r a v i s i t o r to "the bunker" had u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y manipulated a computer keyboard, d e s t r o y i n g . . . se v e ra l days of work. This i n t e rc h a n g e r e f l e c t e d an a n t i p a t h y between the two houses which pervaded the e n t i r e s e s s i o n . 265 The p o s s i b l e importance of t h i s i n c i d e n t is confirmed by the f a c t t h a t while the Assembly s t a f f was employing a s o p h i s t i c a t e d computer, the Senate was working l a r g e l y with adding machi n e s . 266 Whatever importance advanced technology may have had on Assembly-Senate r i v a l r y , i t s p a r t i s a n e f f e c t was 264A lle n , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook, o p . c i t . , p. 54. 26 50 p . c i t . , note 87, p. 53. 266Smith, personal i n t e r v i e w , loc. c i t . 366 perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t . As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , the 1965 re apportionm ent in C a l i f o r n i a was inten de d to entrench Assembly incumbents, most of whom were Democrats. Although computeres were being used in o t h e r s t a t e s for r e a p p o r t i o n ment purpose s, Smith has p o inted out t h a t t h i s was for the primary purpose of complying with c o u r t - o r d e r e d equa l- p o p u la tio n mandates. Only in C a l i f o r n i a , a t l e a s t in 1965, were they used as t o o l s of party a d v a n t a g e . 267 The advent of these two highly r e f i n e d in str u m e n ts - - t h e t r a i n e d i n t e l l e c t of the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t and the programmed data fed to the e l e c t r o n i c c o m p u t e r - - r a i s e s a number of i n t r i g u i n g q u e s t i o n s . The foremost one, per hap s, is e s s e n t i a l l y moral in n a t u r e , enmeshed in the venerable dilemma of ends versus means. Should the academician use his p r o f e s s i o n a l knowledge to p a r t i s a n (and hence p e rso n a l) advantage? Hinderaker has spoken of p ro v id in g only t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e in l e g i s l a t i v e app ortionmen t as the only way to avoid the c o n f l i c t of l o y a l t i e s i m p l i c i t in the dual role s of pa rty member and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t . 268 Hardy, more v u l n e r a b l e to charges of p a r t i s a n s e r v i t u d e , n o n e t h e l e s s may p o i n t to an admirably c a t e g o r i c a l t e sta m e n t of atonement. " P o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , " he has w r i t t e n , "are o b s t a c l e s to< e q u i t a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and should not be 2 6 7 L o c . c i t . 2 6 8personal i n t e r v i e w , 1o c . ci t . 367 given an acknowledged l e g i t i m a t e ro le in r e a p p o rtio n m en t, d e s p i t e the r e a l i t y of the p r a c t i c a l . " 269 A second iss u e somewhat more pragmatic in c h a r a c t e r , is whether modern methodology gives an i n d e f e n s i b l e ad- I vantage to the m a j o ri t y p a r ty and the i n d i v i d u a l incumbent. C lea r ly i t is they who have e a s i e r access to th e se sources of new knowledge. What, i f a n y t h i n g , should be done about t h i s s i t u a t i o n ? Can i t , or should i t , evoke r e t a l i a t o r y responses from the o p p o s it i o n p a r t y , lo bbie s and o th er c o n s t i t u e n c y groups? The answers to such q u es ti o n s l i e beyond the purview of t h i s study. Conclusions This c h a p t e r has been devoted to the a c tu a l c ontext wi thin which app ortionmen t must take p l a c e . Such r e a l i t i e s have p e r t i n e n c e to the e x t e n t t h a t they impose p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s upon the f e a s i b i l i t y of variou s appo rtionmen t models, e s p e c i a l l y with r e f e r e n c e to C a l i f o r n i a . These p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s may be summarized r a t h e r b r i e f l y . The c o u r t s . - - J u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m , s t i l l a p p a r e n t l y on the ascendancy, places r e l a t i v e l y new and r i g i d r e s t r i c t i o n s on the apportionment p r o c ess . Not only have the co urts decreed t h a t d i s t r i c t s must be of equal p o p u la tio n 2 6 9 The P r a c t i c e and Theory of R e a p p o rtio n m e n t, o p . ci t . , p . 2 3. 368 but they have a lso shown c o n s i d e r a b l e a g g r e s s i v e n e s s in drawing s a t i s f a c t o r y boundaries themselves should the l e g i s l a t u r e abnegate t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . To the degree t h a t the U.S. co urt system has i n i t i a t e d such a c t i o n , t r a d i t i o n a l f e d e r a l i s m is a l t e r e d by the t r a n s f e r of a u t h o r i t y from the s t a t e to the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Yet even though s t a t e courts assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the s e p a r a t i o n I of powers concept is a f f e c t e d by j u d i c i a l i n t r u s i o n i n t o what was p r e v i o u s l y held to be a realm e x c l u s i v e l y l e g i s l a t i v e in n a t u r e . The p a r t i e s . - -As long as s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s are given the i n i t i a l o p p o r t u n i t y to r e d i s t r i c t , i t seems probable t h a t t h i s will be done to enhance or at l e a s t c o n s o l i d a t e the advantage of the party with a l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y . Because the i n f l u e n c e of Republican or Demo c r a t i c a f f i l i a t i o n upon app ortion men t will probably vary in accordance with changes in g e n e r a l i z e d l e g i s l a t i v e party s a l i e n c e , co nclu sio ns in th is regard are n o n e th ele s s hazardou s. Although both major p a r t i e s have undoubtedly i n c r e a s e d in orga nized p o l i t i c a l importance in the l a t e 19 5 0 ‘s and e a r l y 1 9 6 0 's , l a r g e l y because of the demise of c r o s s - f i 1i n g , t h e re are sig ns t h a t t h e i r power apogee may have been alre a d y a t t a i n e d . Most e s p e c i a l l y , the v o l u n t e e r e x t r a - l e g a l groups have been b eset by i n t e r n a l s t r i f e and fr a g m e n t a t i o n . The C a l i f o r n i a Democratic Council, for example, has l o s t i n f l u e n c e as a r e s u l t of the i n t e r n a l 369 c o n f l i c t which s u c c e s s f u l l y deposed Simon Cassidy as i t s p r e s i d e n t in 1966 and the emergence of the Democratic V o lu n te e r s' Committee as an i n t r a - p a r t y r i v a l . S i m i l a r l y , the C a l i f o r n i a Republican Assembly has been b e s e t by s t r i f e which has r e s u l t e d in d e f e c t i o n to both the r i g h t (by the United Republicans of C a l i f o r n i a ) and the l e f t (by the C a l i f o r n i a Republican League). In s p i t e of a l l t h i s , both p a r t i e s seem to have developed a f ir m , long -range base of f i n a n c i a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h , g e n e r a l l y ab sen t in the decade of the 1 9 5 0 's , which should a f f e c t s everal appor tionments y e t to come. I n t e r e s t q r o u p s . - -Whi1e the c o n clusio n seems warranted t h a t the c o u r t s , p a r t i e s , and, most o b v i o u sl y , incumbent i n f l u e n c e impose f a c t o r s to be reckoned with in the f u t u r e a l l o c a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e s e a t s , an a n a l y s i s of i n t e r e s t group p r e s s u r e r e q u i r e s a kind of s u b - c a t e g o r i z a tion borne of c auti on and y i e l d i n g a more r e f i n e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . A study of C a l i f o r n i a ' s p o l i t i c a l h e r i t a g e re v e a ls n o r t h - s o u t h and u r b a n - r u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s as being of s i g n i f i c a n t but d e c l i n i n g i n f l u e n c e , su rp a s se d in impor tance by the elements j u s t d i s c u s s e d . Yet economic alignments t e n a c i o u s l y re t a i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c rele v an c e and e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n s are c l e a r l y enjoying an unpara lei led ascendance of i n f l u e n c e . With regard to the l a t t e r two, i t seems t h a t economic groups e x e r t a powerful impact upon general appo rtionmen t p r o p o s a l s , l i m i t e d r e c e n t l y by co u rt 370 r e q u i r e m e n t s , and t h a t e t h n i c groups to some degree are able to a f f e c t p r e c i s e d i s t r i c t b o u n d a rie s. The general " p u b l i c , " unorganized ex cept by county or c i t y r e s i d e n c e , and u n d i f f e n t i a ted except by p r e s s u re group membership, is l a r g e l y impotent and hence ignored in apportionment deli be r a t i o n s . The f e a s i b l e m ode ls . - - I n the immediately preceding c h a p t e r s , nine apportionment models were ranked in terms of t h e i r s a l u t a r y or d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s r e l a t i v e to va rious goals of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t now seems ap p ro p r i a t e to disc u s s th e se in r e l a t i o n to e m piric a l evidence re g a rd in g t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of implem en tation. 1. Party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The lo ng-term s t r e n g t h e n i n g of party-pow er in C a l i f o r n i a should serve to f a c i l i t a t e app ortionments consonant with t h i s model. 2. Informed membership. This apportionment p a t t e r n is r e a l l y a two -fo ld one. I t e n t a i l s 1 the e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s informed about the problems and p r e f e r e n c e s of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s as well as those p o s se s si n g the e r u d i t i o n and i n t e l l e c t u a l s k i l l s re q u i re d f o r the enactment of e n l i g h t e n e d p u b l i c p o l i c y . Perhaps the r e l u c t a n c e of some l e g i s l a t o r s to lose f a m i l i a r p o r t i o n s of t h e i r d i s t r i c t s or to gain areas with which they are u n f a m i l i a r may c o n t r i b u t e to the e l e c t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s informed about the needs of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s . C e r t a i n l y the e t h n i c p r e s s u r e s for "Negro" or "Mexican- American" d i s t r i c t s have the same e f f e c t . But t h e r e seem to be few f a c t o r s in the world of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s which f a c i l i t a t e the e l e c ti o n of c an d id a te s "informed" in the broad sense of p o s se s si n g sound judgement. Indeed, campaign money, p a r t y - r e g i s t r a t i o n r a t i o s , and general s t a t e or n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l tre n d s are d e c i s i v e f a c t o r s in most s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e campaigns and ones which f a l l to the advantage of ca n d i d a t e s both wise and f o o l i s h with a p p a l l i n g i m p a r t i a l i t y . One-man, o n e - v o t e . This is an apportionment model which enjoys both t h e o r e t i c a l endorsement in terms of dem ocr atic t h e o ry and compulsory adherence through the r e a l i t y of j u d i c i a l command. Vigorous m i n o r i t y . From the s t a n d p o i n t of p a r t y d i v i s i o n s w ith in the l e g i s l a t u r e , ap p o r tionment p o l i t i c s c o n t r i b u t e to assured but minimal m i n o ri t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . However, because reap p o rtio n m en t is c o n t r o l l e d by the m a j o r i t y p a r t y , the m i n o rity l e g i s l a t o r s who are b e s t p r o t e c t e d may be, perhaps u n f o r t u n a t e l y , those most t r a c t a b l e and l e a s t vi g o r o u s . Experienced membership. The almost o v e r whelming incumbent p r e s s u re in b e h a l f of s a f e , n o n - c o m p e t it i v e d i s t r i c t s v i r t u a l l y as su re s the implementation of t h i s apportionment s t a n d a r d . F unctional m a j o r i t y . P a r t i s a n l e g i s l a t i v e g e r r y m a n d e r i n g , a g a i n , leaves l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s model w i l l be t r e a t e d with s o l i t i t o u s a d h e r e n c e . Accommodation of i n t e r e s t s . Although l e g i s l a t o rs seem l a r g e l y amenable to the ro le of broker among d i v e r s e groups, t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e fo r safe d i s t r i c t s e n t a i l s a tendency to e s t a b l i s h c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w ith in which a p r o c l i v i t y to accommodate to o t h e r i n t e r e s t s may j e o p a r d i z e r a t h e r than enhance e l e c t o r a l s u c c e s s . Local r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Despite the p e r s i s t e n c e with which c i t y and county spokesmen have pressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of m a in t a i n i n g local government boundary i n t e g r i t y in drawing l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , t h e i r e n t r e a t i e s seem d e s t i n e d to i n c r e a s i n g f u t i l i t y . County boundaries had been i n v i o l a b l e in drawing both Senate and Assembly d i s t r i c t s by decree of the 373 C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n u n t i l the co u rts ordered e q u a l l y po pulat ed d i s t r i c t s . City boundary i n t e g r i t y has lacked not only c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n but also the d eferen ce of l e g i s l a t o r s a p p a r e n t l y more concerned with such f a c t o r s as e t h n i c o p p o s it i o n and p a r t i s a n 1o y a l t y . 9. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . The degree to which e m p irica l p r e s s u r e s f a c i l i t a t e adherence to t h i s appo rtionmen t model v a r i e s with the type of i n t e r e s t in v olved. In g e n e r a l , l e g i s l a t o r s seem disposed to favor d i s t r i c t s which are s a f e , with which they are f a m i l i a r , and those which embrace i d e n t i f i a b l e "communities of i n t e r e s t . " These p r o c l i v i t i e s r e i n f o r c e one an o th e r in i n c r e a s i n g the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t most l e g i s l a t o r s wi ll p erc e iv e t h e i r r o l e s in lar ge measure as spokesmen f o r p a r t i c u l a r popu latio n g r o u p s - - o c c u p a t i o n a l , e t h n i c or even geo- g r a p h i c - - w i t h unique i n t e r e s t s . In summary, i t seems r e a so n a b le to conclude t h a t the p r e s s u r e s which are e x e r t e d upon the apportionm en t process in C a l i f o r n i a tend to have the fo llo w in g e f f e c t s . The one-man, o n e - v o t e , .e xperienced membership, and f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y models (numbers 3, 5, and 6 above) are v i r t u a l l y as su red of im p lem entati on. The party 374 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s models (numbers 1 and 9) are given s u b s t a n t i a l d e f e r e n c e . The informed membership and vigorous m i n o ri t y models (numbers 2 and 4) seem to be a f f e c t e d in c o n t r a d i c t o r y or at l e a s t i n d e c i s i v e ways. F i n a l l y , the accommodation of i n t e r e s t s and local r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ta n d a rd s (numbers 7 and 8) are l a r g e l y ignored or impeded by the r e a l i t i e s of c u r r e n t apportionment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . This summary i n d i c a t e s l i t t l e c o r r e l a t i o n between those app or tionm en t models which are most d e s i r a b l e in terms of dem ocr atic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n the ory and those most f a c i l i t a t e d by the p r e s s u r e s of em p irica l i n f l u e n c e . N o n e t h e l e s s , p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s do not p reclu d e at l e a s t the p a r t i a l im plem entation of most ap portionm ent i d e a l s . I i I CHAPTER VI THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE: A CONSTITUENCY TYPOLOGY In order to e v a l u a t e more f u l l y the p o s si b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between va rious r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s produced by ac tual l e g i s l a t i v e a p p o r t io n - ment, a study of c e r t a i n f a c e t s of the C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u re was und ertaken . Methodology Two v a r i a b l e s s u s c e p t i b l e of r a t h e r e f f e c t i v e i s o l a t i o n were employed in t h i s p r o j e c t : the r e l a t i v e s a f e t y or m a r g i n a l i t y of Senate and Assembly d i s t r i c t s , r e f e r r e d to below as the c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s f a c t o r , and the e t h n i c and economic h e t e r o g e n e i t y or homogeneity of th ese d i s t r i c t s , her ei n termed the d i v e r s i t y f a c t o r . D i s t r i c t c a t e g o r i z a t i o n .-- The c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s of d i s t r i c t s was determined by the perc e n ta g e of voters r e g i s t e r e d with each p a r t y . Unlike many o t h e r s t u d i e s , actual e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s were not employed because of the d e s i r e to exclude the e l e c t o r a l impact of i n d i v i d u a l c a n d i dates and focus i n s t e a d on the n a t u r e of t h e i r 375 376 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . The r e g i s t r a t i o n data employed was t h a t based upon the vo ters a c t u a l l y c a s t i n g b a l l o t s in the 1962 general e l e c t i o n and c o n s t i t u t i n g "a most im p o rta n t piece of p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e * p r e s e n t i n g a f a i r l y a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e f o r e v a l u a t i n g p a r ty t u r n o u t . " 1 Competitiveness was measured by the p ercentage of p a r ty r e g i s t r a t i o n above or below 58 per cent Democratic and 50 per cent Rep ublican, f i g u r e s assumed here to r e p r e s e n t minimum d i s t r i c t s a f e t y f o r each p a r t y . 2 ^ h e q u o t a t i o n is from Frank M. Jordon , C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , c i t i n g the opinion of a " p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t " o th erw ise u n i d e n t i f i e d . C a l i f o r n i a Report of R e g i s t r a t i o n T Ja n u a ry , 1 963 ( Sac ram en to : C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1§63), p . 1. Figures employed are from the same p u b l i c a t i o n , pp. 10-20. If r e g i s t r a t i o n f ig u r e s had been employed upon the b a s is of the 1964 gen er al e l e c ti o n t u r n o u t , f iv e of the 20 most co m peti ti ve Assembly d i s t r i c t s in 1963 would have been r e placed as well as two of the 20 s a f e s t Assembly d i s t r i c t s . 1962 f i g u r e s were employed i n s t e a d of the l a t e r ones because they r e f l e c t p a r ty s t r e n g t h follow ing the f i r s t p o s t - r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t e l e c t i o n and e n t a i l an a n a l y s i s of a more n e a r l y equal number of Republicans and Democrats. See C a l i f o r n i a Report of R e g i s t r a t i o n , January 1 , 1 965 ( Sacram en to: Cali forni a S t a t e P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1965), pp. 11-20. Par ty r e g i s t r a tio n f i g u r e s were not compiled by Assembly or Senate d i s t r i c t s p r i o r to the 1961 r e a p portionm ent. 2The Democratic f i g u r e r e p r e s e n t s a kind of con census. Stephen E. Smith, former S t a f f D i r e c t o r of the Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Reapportionment Committee c i t e d the 58 per cent f i g u r e in a personal i n t e r v i e w c i t e d e a r l i e r . S u p r a , n. 112, p. 171. James I. Wilson, a l s o , has w r i t t e n t h a t "No one c o n s id e rs a d i s t r i c t . . . safe . . . unless i t is 58 per cent or more Democratic." The Amateur Demo c r a t (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago P r e s s , 196?), note 9, p. 266. Wahlke and his a s s o c i a t e s l i s t 58 per ce nt as the minimum f i g u r e f o r "Sem i-co mpetitive Democratic" d i s t r i c t s . Op. ci t . , pp. 472-473. The 50 per cent f i g u r e f o r Repub li c a n safe d i s t r i c t s is based on personal a n a l y s i s of 377 The measurement of d i s t r i c t d i v e r s i t y is a somewhat more complex t a s k . It was undertaken upon the assumption t h a t both economic and e t h n i c f a c t o r s are im p o rta n t in determ in ing p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and i n t e r e s t s 3 and c o n s i s t e d of a composite ranking of fiv e s e t s of p e r c e n t a g e s : Spanish surname p o p u l a t i o n , Negro p o p u l a t i o n , f o reig n stock p o p u la tio n ( f i r s t or second g e n e r a t i o n ) , f a m i l i e s e arning under $3,000 plus those e arnin g over $10,000, and the d i f f e r e n c e between the perc e n ta g es earning under $3,000 and over $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 4 The v a l i d i t y of t h i s s o r t of income a n a l y s i s was checked by comparing i t with f ig u r e s compiled for census t r a c t s in Los Angeles, San Fran ci sco and Alameda e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s . There have been a few r a re e x c e p t i o n s of Republicans e l e c t e d from "saf e" Democratic d i s t r i c t s and Democrats e l e c t e d from " sa f e " Republican ones. 3S u p r a , pp. 184-215 and 340-355. ‘♦These perc e n tag e s are based upon f i g u r e s derived from the 1960 census. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Conqres- sional D i s t r i c t Data Book ( D i s t r i c t s of the 88th Congress) --A S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t Supplement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1963), pp. 40-64; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1962--A S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t Supplement (Washington, D. C. : O'.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), pp. 32-51. Non-white p o p u la tio n p ercentage was used in the a n a l y s i s of Senate d i s t r i c t s because of the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of Negro f i g u r e s f o r t h a t purpose. I t should be noted t h a t f i g u r e s reg a rd in g the economic and e t h n i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Senate d i s t r i c t s are exact ones, sin c e such d i s t r i c t s were based on county b o u n d a r ie s. Comparable f i g u r e s f o r a l i t t l e less than h a l f the Assembly d i s t r i c t s are e s t i m a t e s , b e l i e v e d g e n e r a l l y r e l i a b l e , based upon Congressional d i s t r i c t and county census f i g u r e s . 378 c o u n t i e s . These s t a t i s t i c s , in con ju n c tio n with 1961 Assembly d i s t r i c t reap p o rtio n m e n t maps, made i t p o s s i b l e to determine the median income d i f f e r e n c e s between the fiv e most a f f l u e n t and f i v e l e a s t a f f l u e n t census t r a c t s in each of 36 Assembly d i s t r i c t s as another means of q u a n t i f y i n g d i s t r i c t economic d i v e r s i t y . This methodology could not be employed f o r all Assembly d i s t r i c t s because small towns and rura l ar eas are not d ivided i n t o census t r a c t s . 5 In an attem pt to shed f u r t h e r l i g h t on the n a t u r e of the d i s t r i c t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , e s t i m a t e s of median income f o r c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s have been made on the b asis of 1960 census f i g u r e s . D i s t r i c t a n a l y s i s . - - A f t e r d i s t r i c t s had been s e g re g a t e d on the b a s is of both c o m p e t i t i v e n e ss and d i v e r s i t y , e i g h t b asic c a t e g o r i e s were e s t a b l i s h e d for more i n t e n s i v e s t u d i e s . These were the 20 most m a r g in a l, the 5U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Censuses of Popu l a t i o n and Housing: T960. Census Tracts (Washington, D. C. : U. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , T9 6 2 ). These s t u d i e s are accompanied by census t r a c t maps which were supplemented by o t h e r commercially prepared maps. Note, e s p e c i a l l y , The "Spanish White" Pop ul at ion . . . of . . . Los Angeles Cciurtty, and Los Angeles County . . . family Income, both a u t h e n t i c a t e d and i n t e r p r e t e d by Wilbur McCann (Los Angeles, Brewster Mapping S e r v i c e , 1963). See also the map of Los Angeles County Assembly and Congressional Pi s t r i cts (Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 1 962 ), and maps in Don A. A lle n , S r . , L e g i s l a t i v e Sourcebook (Sacramento: C a l i f o r n i a S ta te P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1965), pp. 136, 139, and 144. A ppre c ia tio n is hereby expressed fo r the v a luable help given by J. William S t i n d e , formerly of the C a l i f o r n i a Assembly E l e c ti o n s and Re apportionment Commi t t e e s t a f f , in a s s i s t i n g in the c om pilation of economic d i v e r s i t y d a t a . 379 20 s a f e s t , the 20 most h ete r o g e n e o u s, and the 20 most homo genous Assembly d i s t r i c t s , and the 10 most m a r g in a l, 10 s a f e s t , 10 most heterogeneous and 10 most homogenous Senate l districts. With regard to l e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d from the d i s t r i c t s in each of these c a t e g o r i e s , six areas of i n v e s t i g a t i o n were e x p lo re d : 1. Republican-Democratic p a r t y r a t i o s ; 2. Educational a t t a i n m e n t ; 3. L e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , or t e n u r e ; 4. Previous government e xperience p r i o r to e l e c t i o n to the Senate or Assembly; 5. Roll c a l l a n a l y s i s of votes a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s in the 1963 and 1965 general s e s s i o n s ; 6. Roll c a l l a n a l y s i s of votes a g a i n s t m a j o r i t i e s of the l e g i s l a t o r s ' own p a r t i e s and with m a j o r i t i e s of the o p p o s i t i o n . I t is in the a n a l y s i s of the votes in which l e g i s l a t o r s d e s e r t t h e i r own p a r t i e s t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s in the Senate and Assembly are most ap p a r e n t . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , as in the few o th e r s in which evidence from the two houses seems c o n t r a d i c t o r y , prudence would i n d i c a t e t h a t g r e a t e r c r e d i b i l i t y be given data from the lower chamber. There are t h r e e reasons f o r t h i s . F i r s t , although t h i s study has c o n c e n t r a t e d on the same p ercentage of d i s t r i c t s in TABLE 1 SIZE AND PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE CATEGORIES 380 381 Category, 1963-65 N 1 s Per Cent Total Per Cent R1 s a Per Cent D' sb Assembly S a f e s t d i s t r i c t s 20 25.0 17.4 82.6 Most marginal d i s t r i c t s 20 25.0 62.5 37.5 Most heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s 20 25.0 39.7 63.3 Most homogenous d i s t r i c t s 20 25.0 43.5 56.5 Safe-Heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s 10 12.5 30.0 70.0 Marginal-Homogenous d i s t r i c t s 6 7.5 57.1 42.9 Democratic Assemblymen 52 62.7 00.0 100.0 Republican Assemblymen 31 37.3 100.0 00.0 All Assemblymen 83 100.0 37.3 62.7 Senate S a f e s t d i s t r i c t s 1 10 25.0 9.1 90.9 Most marginal d i s t r i c t s 10 25.0 72.7 27.3 Most heterogenous d i s t r i c t s 10 25.0 40.0 60.0 Most homogenous d i s t r i c t s 10 25.0 15.4 84.6 Democratic Senators 28 66.7 00.0 100.0 Republican Senators 14 33.3 100.0 00.0 All Senators 42 100.0 33.3 66.7 R e p u b l i c a n s among incumbents in 1963 and 1965 sess i o n s . d e m o c r a t s among incumbents in 1963 and 1965 sessions. 382 each house, the Senate is only h a l f as l a rg e as the Assembly and the s m a l l e r number of d i s t r i c t s makes f in d in g s more s u s p e c t f o r t h a t house than the o t h e r . Second, the n o r t h - s o u t h s e c t i o n a l imbalance in the S enate, with i t s enormous a t t e n d a n t d i s p a r i t y in d i s t r i c t p o p u l a t i o n s , c r e a t e s p e c u l i a r v a r i a b l e s d i f f i c u l t to co ntrol and of i n d e term in a te i n f l u e n c e . F i n a l l y , voting a n a l y s i s f o r the Senate was based on 16 r o l l c a l l s while t h a t for the Assembly employed 44. Roll c a l l a n a l y s i s . --The method of choosing the r o l l c a l l s to be s t u d i e s was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the u t i l i z a tio n of a l a r g e r number of Assembly than Senate votes. This method r e l i e d upon the s e l e c t i o n process employed by thre e lea d in g p r e s s u r e groups which t o g e t h e r r e p r e s e n t d i v e r s e shades of p o l i t i c a l opinion and have m a n ife ste d i n t e r e s t in a wide v a r i e t y of l e g i s l a t i o n . Each of these t h r e e , the C a l i f o r n i a Labor F ederation AFL-CIO,6 the Merchants and Manufacturers (M. & M.) A s s o c i a t i o n , 7 and the 6N . a . , The Sacramento Story: Labor and the L e g is l a t u r e (San Franci s c o : C a l i f o r n i a Labor F e d e r a t i o n , AFL- CIO, 1 966), 41 pp. plus two f o l d - o u t s h e e t s . William L e slie of the United Aerospace Workers, Local 887, AFL-CIO, was most h e lp fu l in p ro c u rin g t h i s work and o t h e r p e r t i n e n t i nformati o n . 7The Merchants and Manufacturers A s s o c i a t i o n d i s seminates voting records on mimeographed s h e e ts w ith o u t t i t l e s or even o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I t s Los Angeles o f f i c e is lo c a t e d at Suite 2300, 1150 So. Olive, Los Angeles, and i t s c h i e f l e g i s l a t i v e advocate is Grant H. Kenyon. 383 Friends Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n , 8 compiled l e g i s l a t i v e voting records on s u b s t a n t i a l l y more b i l l s in the Assembly than in the Senate. The f i r s t two o r g a n i z a t i o n s , of c o u r s e , r e p r e s e n t g e n e r a l l y d i v e r g e n t and q u i t e powerful economic i n t e r e s t s and the t h i r d is a r e l i g i o u s l y o r i e n t e d and widely r e s p e c t e d group with a long h i s t o r y of concern f o r moral iss ues and those i n v o lv in g c i v i l r i g h t s and c i v i l l i b e r t y . All r o l l c a l l votes for the 1963 and 1965 general s e ss io n s of the L e g i s l a t u r e which have been recorded by these o r g a n i z a t i o n s have been u t i l i z e d in t h i s s tu d y , ex cept for those on t e c h n i c a l amendments and on b i l l s passed unani- i mous1y . Whereas the F r ie n d s ' Committee r e p o r t e d no approval or disa pproval of the votes on any i s s u e , the o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s did. The M. & M. l a b e l e d each vote i t recorded in 1963 as " c o n s e r v a t i v e " or " l i b e r a l " and in 1965 switched i t s d e s i g n a t i o n s to " c o n s t r u c t i v e vote f o r f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , fre e e n t e r p r i s e , sound government p o l i c y , " and " o t h e r w i s e . " The AFL-CIO was s t i l l more e x p l i c i t ; i t s assessmen ts were "Right" and "Wrong." 8The Friends Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n p r i n t s an u n t i t l e d , undated n e w s l e t t e r which c o n tain s r o ll c a l l vote records at the co nclusio n of every general s e s s i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e . Its source is i d e n t i f i e d and copies may be procured from i t s o f f i c e at 984 North Fair Oaks, Pasadena, C a l i f o r n i a . I t s Executive S e c r e t a r y , the Rev. Henry S c h r o e rl u k e , has been of g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e . 384 These c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of voting beh av ior were t a b u l a t e d f o r each l e g i s l a t o r whose d i s t r i c t was s tu d i e d by comparing the " C o n s e r v a t i v e , " " C o n s tru c tiv e . . and "Wrong" votes with the " L i b e r a l " and "Right" votes to coh- s t r u c t a rough measure of vo ting "extremism." I f a l e g i s l a t o r , for example, voted " c o n s e r v a t i v e " and "wrong" twice and " l i b e r a l " and " r i g h t " e i g h t t i m e s, or the r e v e r s e , he would be accorded an "extremism" score of 80 per c ent. This te chniq ue was u t i l i z e d with r e s p e c t to r o l l c a l l s on 35 b i l l s in the Assembly and 11 in the S e n a te , with t h re e r o l l c a l l s included twice because they were c h a r a c t e r i z e d , in o p p o s ite f a s h i o n , by both o r g a n i z a t i o n s . As is i n d i c a t e d below, t h i s "extremism" s c a le has not been employed as a s e p a r a t e measuring device but as an a n a l y t i c a l tool to e v a l u a t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e of votes c a s t a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s . Personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .-- B e c a u se of the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s might e l e c t l e g i s l a t o r s p o s se s sin g c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t r a i t s with some degree of c o n s i s t e n c y , i t was decided to e v a l u a t e the e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t s , l e g i s l a t i v e t e n u r e , and previous governmental e x p erien c e of l e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d from the d i s t r i c t s under s c r u t i n y . The source of t h i s in fo rm a tio n is the o f f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e han dboo k.9 This c o n t a i n s b r i e f 9Handbook C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e , p u b lish e d in odd- numbered y e a r s and p r i n t e d , presumably, by the S ta te 385 b io g ra p h ie s submitted by a l l Senators and Assemblymen and which c o n s e q u e n t l y , r e p r e s e n t varying l e v e l s of candor and comp letene ss. As a r e s u l t , the data used in t h i s study is incomplete f o r some of the l e g i s l a t o r s whose background c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are included in the t a b u l a t i o n s . 10 Although only those Assemblymen who served from the d e s ig n a te d d i s t r i c t s during the 1963 or 1965 s e s s i o n s are included in t h i s a n a l y s i s , the personal h i s t o r i e s of all Senato rs from s e l e c t e d d i s t r i c t s during the 1957-1965 period have been examined. This has been p o s s i b l e because Senate d i s t r i c t s remained unchanged from the 1951 r e a p p o r tionment u n t i l the c o u r t - o r d e r e d changes ta kin g e f f e c t in the 1966 e l e c t i o n s , whereas the Assembly was r e a p p o r t i o n e d in 1961. In s p i t e of t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l in tim e, the s e l e c t e d Senate d i s t r i c t s have been r e p r e s e n t e d by only 47 persons and those in the Assembly by 70 perso n s. I t is these groups which c o n s t i t u t e the u n iv e rse s t u d i e d in t h i s a n a l y s i s of d e s ig n a te d perso nal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . P r i n t i n g Office in Sacramento. 10Certain assumptions have been made re g a rd in g the e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t s of some l e g i s l a t o r s . If a man is an a t t o r n e y , f o r example, i t is assumed he p o s ses se s at l e a s t a b a c h e l o r ' s d e g r e e , and i f he is no t, but i n d i c a t e s t h a t he has a t t e n d e d a c e r t a i n c o l l e g e or u n i v e r s i t y , i t is assumed t h a t he p o sse sse s no degree. Also, un less previous government e x p e rie n ce is claim ed, i t is assumed not to e x i s t . 386 Apportionment Models The r e s u l t s of the s t u d i e s j u s t d e s c ri b e d appear to be most s i g n i f i c a n t in r e l a t i o n to the apportionment models which have been ranked ac cording to t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to various r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals a t the co ncl usion of Chapter IV. Research f in d i n g s are r e p o rte d below w ith in t h i s frame of r e f e r e n c e . Party r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y .--The apportionment model assumed to be most consonant with the goals of dem ocratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is t h a t which produces the g r e a t e s t degree of party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This c o n d i t i o n , allowing the e l e c t o r a t e to hold the m a j o r i t y pa rty l e g i t i m a t e l y a c c o u n t able for the conduct of government, e n t a i l s two a d d i t i o n a l assumpti o n s . 11 F i r s t , l e g i s l a t o r s belonging to the same party should vote the same way most of the time on s i g n i f i c a n t l e g i s l a t i o n . This study examined 30 Assembly and 8 Senate r o l l c a l l s in which m a j o r i t i e s of the two p a r t i e s opposed one a n o t h e r , y i e l d i n g th e se f i n d i n g s . 1. As i n d i c a t e d in Table 2, assemblymen voted with a m a j o r i t y of t h e i r own p a r t i e s somewhat more than Senators (86.6 per cent to 83.6 per c e n t ) . 11For a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n , see s u p r a , pp. 230 - 2 4 6 . TABLE 2 BIPARTISAN OPPOSITION, PARTISAN DEVIATION, AND EXTREMISM AS REFLECTED IN ROLL CALL VOTES I 387 I 388 L e g i s l a t i v e Incumbents by D i s t r i c t and Party C a t e g o r i e s , 1963-65 Per cent c a s t a g a i n s t a b i p a r t i s a n m a jori ty*3 Per cent cast w i t h 9 other party and against own pa rty majori t y c Union and busin ess extremism p e r centage^ Assembly S a f e s t d i s t r i c t s 23.8 8.0 89.9 Most marginal d i s t r i c t s 13.7 17.5 77.4 Most heterog eneous d i s t r i c t s 22.3 12.7 84.7 Most homogenous d i s t r i c t s 12.1 16.5 79.8 S a f e -h e ter o g e n e o u s d i s t r i c t s 27.1 6.7 89.3 Marginal-homogenous d i s t r i c t s 9.2 23.8 78.5 Democrats 16.2 13.3 86.1 Republicans 18.7 13.5 80.7 All Assemblymen 17.2 13.4 84.0 Sen ate S a f e s t d i s t r i c t s 19.0 17.9 69.5 Most marginal d i s t r i c t s 25.4 9.6 75.3 Most heterogeneo us d i s t r i c t s 16.9 27.3 78.9 Most homogenous d i s t r i c t s 1 5 .*2 14.7 63.1 Democrats 21.5 17.2 64.6 Republi cans 23.4 14.7 73.9 All Senators 22.2 16.4 68.0 a The p ercentage of votes with b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s or a g a i n s t a m a j o r i t y of the o t h e r p a r ty may be ob tain ed by s u b t r a c t i n g th e se p e r c e n ta g e s from 100. ^Based upon 14 r o ll c a l l s for Assemblymen and e i g h t f o r S e n a t o r s . i cBased upon 30 r o l l c a l . s for Assemblymen and e i g h t fo r S e n a to r s. ^Based upon 41 r o l l c a l l s for Assemblymen and 11 f o r Senators as c l a s s i f i e d by s e l e c t e d p r e s s u r e groups. 389 This is c o n s i s t e n t with e a r l i e r c o n c l u s i o n s . 12 2. In both houses t h e r e was l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between Democrats and Republicans in p a r ty l o y a l t y . Assembly Democrats voted with t h e i r party on 86.7 per cent of the combined r o l l c a l l s , Assembly Republicans 86.5 per c e n t , Senate Republicans 85.3 per c e n t , and Senate Democrats 82.8 per c e n t. I t should be noted t h a t the Democrats possessed a m a j o r i t y in both houses during both the 1963 and 1965 s e s s i o n s . A t o t a l of 52 Democrats and 31 Republicans served in the Assembly in those s e s s i o n s , and 28 Democrats and 14 Republicans in the Senate. 3. In the Assembly, the 20 s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s p r o duced l e g i s l a t o r s d e m onstrati ng 9.5 per cent more p a r ty cohesion than l e g i s l a t o r s from the 20 most marginal d i s t r i c t s (92.0 per cent to 82.5 per c e n t ) . This would tend to suppo rt c o n c lu sio n s based on s t u d i e s of the Massachu s e t t s , Wi scons i n , and Pennsylvania l e g i s l a t u r e s c i t e d above, and to c o n f l i c t with c o n clusio ns based upon an a n a l y s i s of the U.S. House of 12See, e . g . , Charles M. P r i c e , Voting Alignments in the C a l i f o r n i a L e g i s l a t u r e , unpublished d o c t o r a l d i s ' s e r t a - t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1965. 390 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 13 This f in d i n g also r a i s e s doubts as to the wisdom of c e r t a i n pa rty l e a d e r s who have advocated marginal d i s t r i c t s . While highly com p etitiv e d i s t r i c t s may indeed produce s t r o n g e r party o r g a n i z a t i o n , as is ofte n argued, t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e which r e s u l t s from such organi zat-j onal s t r e n g t h is a p p a r e n t l y n e g l i g i b l e . 14 4. In the Assembly the 20 most heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t o r s voting with t h e i r p a r t y 3.8 per cent more often than l e g i s l a t o r s from the 20 most homogenous d i s t r i c t s (87.3 per cent to 83.5 per c e n t ) . This may be e x p la in e d by a tendency on the p a r t of the l e g i s l a t o r to r e s o l v e the dilemma c r e a t e d by c o n f l i c t among d i v e r s e c o n s t i t u e n c y groups by voting with his p a r t y ' s m a j o r i t y , or in accordance with the i n t e r e s t s of t h a t c o n s t i t u e n c y group most c l e a r l y s ym pathetic with the program of his p a r t y . Such an h y p o th e sis seems p l a u s i b l e in view of the f a c t t h a t heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s c o n t r o l l e d by each p a r ty seem to includ e an unusually high p r o p o r t i o n of those groups most 13S u p r a , pp. 232-233. 1 4 I b i d . , pp. 233-234. 391 t r a d i t i o n a l l y loyal to t h a t p a r t y . Thus, as i n d i c a t e d in Table 3, Republican heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n s i d e r a b l e wealth and Democratic ones by a high p ercentage of e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s . The seven c o n s i s t e n t l y Republican heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s had an average median family income of $7,786, compared with an average median of only $6,643 f o r the seven c o n s i s t e n t l y Republican homogenous d i s t r i c t s . S i m i l a r l y , the 12 c o n s i s t e n t l y Demo c r a t i c d i s t r i c t s among the 20 most h e t e r o geneous also rank among the 20 d i s t r i c t s with the h i g h e s t p e rce n ta g e of Negroes, Mexican- Americans, and persons of f o re ig n s t o c k . 15 5. In the Assembly, d i s t r i c t s a f e t y and d i s t r i c t h e t e r o g e n e i t y tend to r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r to 15This is simply an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t h e t e r o g e n e i t y in Democratic d i s t r i c t s is more a fu n c t io n of e t h n i c than of economic d i v e r s i t y . On the s c a l e s of e t h n i c d i v e r s i t y , the hig h er the perc e n ta g e s of the m in o rity group po p u la t i o n s , the h i g h e r a d i s t r i c t was p l a c e d , except with regard to the 55th, 53rd, and 17th Assembly d i s t r i c t s , which were over 50 per cent Negro in p o p u l a t i o n . P o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l r e a l i t i e s , i t was f e l t , made th ese d i s t r i c t s r e f l e c t a kind of Negro homogeneity inim ic al to a heterogeneous c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . The 53rd d i s t r i c t , moreover, p o s se s sin g the second h i g h e s t Negro p ercentage in the s t a t e , had the second lowest per centa ge of persons of f o r e i g n s to c k . Had these t h r e e d i s t r i c t s been in cluded among the most h e t e r o g e n e o u s, the p a r ty l o y a l t y score of t h a t category would have been even h ig h e r. / TABLE 3 i MEDIAN INCOME AND POPULATION DISPARITY / / 392 393 D i s t r i c t c a t e g o r y , 1963-65 +J 4 - > < u C c in E C U C O < U + - > o o + - > o o o o •r— c S _ -r- u s- •r- a> v. Q J + - > Q -+-> c l m C . in • r— t o co m *r- cn X 3 •r- s- C \J X 3 C M XI T O d > i — ' D1+-) co co E • — c co C C U O O Q J O I— cn x j E Co E 1 in T O S- T O T O cn c: ro E I — *r- ■ Z Z . r— z z m S ta te average 6700 Assembly Safes t Most marginal Most heterogeneous Most homogenous S afe-h etero g en eo u s Marginal-homogenous 7 Rep. heterog eneous d i s t r i c t s 3 Rep. s a f e - h e t e r o g e n e o u s d i s t r i c t s 4 Rep. safe d i s t r i c t s 6 Dem. marginal d i s t r i c t s 7 Rep. homogenous d i s t r i c t s 11 Rep. marginal d i s t r i c t s 11 Dem. homogenous d i s t r i c t s 12 Dem. heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s 16 Dem. safe d i s t r i c t s 3 Rep. marginal-homogenous d i s t r i c t s 7 Dem. s a f e - h e t e r o g e n e o u s d i s t r i c t s 2 Dem. marginal-homogenous d i s t r i c t s Senate Safes t Most marginal Most heterogeneous Most homogenous 6420 6685 6890 6515 6520 6380 7785 7465 7275 6885 6645 6635 6580 6535 6205 61 35 6114 6750 a a a a 2 9 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 5 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 4 5 1 8 2 8 3 5 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 6 8 0 5 0 4 1 0 5 aSenate d i s t r i c t median incomes are of l i t t l e value because of the u n u s u a ll y l a r g e number of predo minantly ru ra l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . produce g r e a t e r party l o y a l t y than each produces i n d i v i d u a l l y . The ten d i s t r i c t s which are among the 20 s a f e s t and the 20 most h e t e r o geneous have e l e c t e d Assemblymen voting with t h e i r p a r t i e s and a g a i n s t the o p p o s i t i o n 17.1 per cent more ofte n than Assemblymen from the six d i s t r i c t s which are among the 20 most marginal and the 20 most homogenous (93.3 per cent to 76.2 per c e n t ) . In the Se n a te , comparisons between the ten s a f e s t and ten most marginal d i s t r i c t s and between the ten most heterogeneo us and the ten most homogenous d i s t r i c t s y i e l d r e s u l t s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed to those r e p o r t e d above f o r the Assembly. Figures f o r the upper chamber show t h a t both m a r g i n a l i t y and homogeneity tend to produce p a r t y cohesion to a degree i n d i c a t e d in Table 2. I t is d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n the reasons for th ese d i s c r e p a n c i e s , although some e x p l a n a t i o n s have been mentioned in the d i s cu ssion of the methodology employed. Buchanan's study r e f l e c t e d some degree of f r u s t r a t i o n in stu dyin g the upper house when he wrote t h a t 395 All s o u r c e s , and press and r o l l c all a n a l y s i s in p a r t i c u l a r , seemed to be less r e v e a l i n g when d e s c r i b i n g the Senate than when d e s c r i b i n g the Assembly.16 Party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would seem to r e q u i r e , in a d d i t i o n to l e g i s l a t i v e vo ting c o hesion, a second p r e r e q u i s i t e . The two p a r t i e s should r e p r e s e n t d i s t i n c t p o lic y a l t e r n a t i v e s . This study included an a n a l y s i s of 14 r o ll c a l l s in the Assembly and e i g h t in the Senate on which the p a r t i e s f a i l e d to p r e s e n t such a l t e r n a t i v e s and i n s t e a d passed l e g i s l a t i o n by b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s . An a n a l y s i s of th ese r o ll c a l l s shows t h a t 86.6 per cent of the d i s s e n t i n g votes c a s t a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s in the Assembly was c a s t in the i d e o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n of the p a r t i e s of the l e g i s l a t o r s who c a s t them. More simply, d i s s e n t i n g Democrats voting a g a i n s t a b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t y u s u a l l y were voting in b e h a l f of a p o s i t i o n more " l i b e r a l " than t h a t of the m a j o r i t y and d i s s e n t i n g Republicans were normally en d o rsin g a view more " c o n s e r v a t i v e " than t h a t of I the m a j o r i t y . The comparable f i g u r e f o r d i s s e n t i n g votes in the Senate was 89.3 per c en t. 16William Buchanan, L e g i s l a t i v e P a r t i s a n s h i p : The Deviant Case of C a l i f o r n i a ( B e r k e le y , C a l i f . : Un i ve r s l t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 19(53), p. 6. Perhaps Senate-Assembly d i s c r e p a n c i e s in the comparison of safe and marginal d i s t r i c t s are in fl u e n c e d by the f a c t t h a t in the Senate such comparisons are muted by a f a r lower degree of s a f e t y which is m a n ife ste d by even the s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s . The s a f e s t Senate d i s t r i c t is l e ss safe than seven Assembly d i s t r i c t s and the 20th s a f e s t Assembly d i s t r i c t is s a f e r than the seventh s a f e s t Senate d i s t r i c t . 396 The s p e c i f i c co n c lu sio n s c i t e d below, t h e r e f o r e , are p r e d i c a t e d upon the assumption t h a t the kinds of d i s t r i c t s from which l e g i s l a t o r s c a s t the l a r g e s t numbers of d i s s e n t i n g votes are the kinds which c o n t r i b u t e most to the p r o c l i v i t y of the two major p a r t i e s to provide genuine p o lic y a l t e r n a t i v e s . 1. In the Assembly, the l e g i s l a t o r s from safe d i s t r i c t s c a s t 10.1 per cent more votes d i s sen tin g a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s than l e g i s l a t o r s from marginal d i s t r i c t s (23.3 per cent to 13.7 per c e n t ) . This f i n d i n g , r e p o rt e d in Table 2, seems to co incide with those of Froman and MacRae t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the p a r t i e s are most a p p aren t in l e g i s l a t o r s from safe d i s t r i c t s , but appears a t va riance with the conclusio ns of Huntington and S t r a i n . 17 2. In the Assembly, l e g i s l a t o r s from heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s c a s t 10.2 per ce nt more d i s s e n t i n g votes than l e g i s l a t o r s from homogenous d i s t r i c t s (22.3 per cent to 12.1 per c e n t ) . In the S enate, a s i m i l a r comparison y i e l d s the same r e l a t i o n s h i p , although to a n e g l i g i b l e degree. 1 7Supra, pp. 236-238. In the Assembly, the s a f e t y and h e t e r o g e n e i t y of d i s t r i c t s r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r as c o n t r i b u t o r s to the i d e o l o g i c a l divergence of the p a r t i e s . L e g i s l a t o r s from the ten safe and het er og en eo us d i s t r i c t s c a s t 17.9 per cent more, d i s s e n t i n g votes than l e g i s l a t o r s from the six marginal and homogenous ones (27.1 per c ent to 9.2 per c e n t ) . When voting records are examined on the b asis of the approval and d i s approval of the AFL-CIO and the Merchants & Manufac turer s A s s o c i a t i o n , using the te c h n iq u e s d e s c r i b e d in the d i s c u s s i o n of methodology, somewhat s i m i l a r co n c lu sio n s seem w a r ra n t e d . As may be seen in Table 2, l e g i s l a t o r s from s a fe Assembly d i s t r i c t s evidenced more extremism than t h e i r marginal c o u n t e r p a r t s by 12.5 per cent (89.9 per cent to 77.4 per c e n t ) , and those from heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s exceeded those from homogenous ones by 4.9 per c e n t in the Assembly (84.7 per cent to 79.8 per cent) and a r a t h e r s t a r t l i n g 15.8 per cent in the Senate (78.9 per cent to 63.1 per c e n t ) . The AFL-CIO and M. & M. f i g u r e s also i n d i c a t e t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r s from the ten s a f e - h e t e r o g e n e o u s Assembly d i s t r i c t s a t t a i n a 10.8 per cent h i g h e r extremism score than those from the six 398 marginal-homogenous ones (89.3 per ce nt to 78.5 per c e n t ) . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , however, the c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and d i v e r s i t y f a c t o r s do not combine to produce more marked d i f f e r e n c e s than the c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s f a c t o r alone. 4. In the Assembly, the same d i s t r i c t c a t e g o r i e s t h a t produce the h i g h e s t degree of party l o y a l t y on votes on which the p a r t i e s are in o p p o s i t i o n , a lso produce the h i g h e s t degree of d i s s e n t , or i d e o l o g i c a l d i v erg e n c e , on votes c h a r a c t e r i z e d by b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s . 5. In the S e n a te , marginal d i s t r i c t s , q u i t e unl ike those in the Assembly, produce 6.4 per cent more d i s s e n t i n g votes than safe ones (25.4 per cent to 19.0 per c e n t ) . S i m i l a r l y , AFL-CIO and M. & M. extremism computations show marginal d i s t r i c t s exceeding safe ones by 5.8 per cent 75.3 per cent to 69.7 per c e n t ) . On the b a s is of the em p irica l evidence c i t e d above, i t seems f a i r to conclude t h a t a t l e a s t two of the f a c t o r s which c o n t r i b u t e to p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in C a l i f o r n i a , p a r ty l o y a l t y and i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y d i v e r g e n c e , are encouraged by s a fe and heter ogen eo us d i s t r i c t s . Senate f i n d i n g s c o n t r a r y to th e se may be d i s c o u n t e d , in p a r t f o r the reasons c i t e d e a r l i e r , and in p a r t because the 1965 c o u r t - o r d e r e d r e a p p o rtio n m e n t will produce Senate 399 d i s t r i c t s based on p o p u la tio n and hence f a r more s i m i l a r to those from which Assemblymen have been e l e c t e d than those which have e x i s t e d in the p a s t . Informed membership.--Any system of e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by l e g i s l a t o r s who are aware both of the n a t u r e of t h e i r d i s t r i c t s , as b e f i t s the "agent" r o l e , and the c o m p le x itie s i n h e r e n t in the fo rm ula tio n of wise p u b l i c p o l i c y , so s t r o n g l y emphasized by proponents of the Burkian conception of " t r u s t e e . " 18 There are no exact y a r d s t i c k s by which to measure how "informed" a l e g i s l a t o r is in t h i s dual and broadly encompassing sense. This s tu d y , however, has e v a l u a t e d previous e x p e r i e n c e in government and formal ed u catio n as two f a c t o r s which might r e a so n a b ly be r e l a t e d to im portant kinds of l e g i s l a t i v e a s s e t s . These are the r e s u l t s , also r e p o r t e d in Table 4. 1. In both the Assembly and the S e n a t e , l e g i s l a t o r s from marginal d i s t r i c t s have had more previous governmental e x p e r i e n c e than those from safe d i s t r i c t s . In the lower ho use, they have had a 41.2 per cent advantage in t h i s r e s p e c t (45.5 per cent to 4.3 per c e n t ) , and in the upper one a 15.7 per cent advantage (80.0 per cent to 64.3 per c e n t ) . This expe rie n c e 18Supra , pp. 151-160. TABLE 4 EXPERIENCE, EDUCATION, AND LEGISLATIVE TENURE 400 401 Legi s i a t i ve Incumbents by D i s t r i c t Category 1 to cu s- o u 1 - s- c a> o <u JC CU • I — » r — o i- S- J- fO 4- =J Q- CU CO o c CL CU CU r x co H- +-> LU +-> O i- • r — •r- s: io cu s CU > c t- >-. T— +-> cu 4J O +-> c £ C <u <a CU c CU CU CT>r— o s- u <u (0 CO O) s- $- -r- S- > $- c: 01 Ol CU o CU CU > cu a. cs CL O < _J Assembly, 1963-65a Safes t 4.3 73.5 10.3 Most Marginal 45.5 72.7 4.3 Most Heterogeneous 15.0 81.8 10.4 Most Homogenous 73.3 55.6 6.9 S af e-Heterogeneous 00.0 72.7 12.1 Marginal-Homogenous 85.7 71.4 4.7 S e n a te , 1957-65^ Safes t 64.3 78.6 11.5 Most Marginal 80.0 50.0 4.8 Most Heterogeneous 75.0 72.7 9.6 Most Homogenous 64.7 52.9 6.7 aSeventy Assemblymen served in the l e g i s l a t u r e from the d e s ig n a te d d i s t r i c t s du ring t h i s p e r i o d . ^F o rty -sev en Senators served in the l e g i s l a t u r e from the d e s ig n a te d d i s t r i c t s during t h i s p e r i o d . 402 u s u a ll y takes the form of s e r v i c e on c i t y c o u n c i l s , school b o ard s, boards of s u p e r v i s o r s and, in the case of S e n a t o r s , pr ev io us s e r v i c e in the Assembly. A few l e g i s l a t o r s also had p r i o r employment as p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y s or t r i a l c o u r t ju d g e s. I t is d i - f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n the reasons why marginal d i s t r i c t s should have t h i s e f f e c t , although i t has been noted in an e a r l i e r study in v o l v i n g the l e g i s l a t u r e of C a l i f o r n i a and t h re e o t h e r s t a t e s as w e l l . 19 Perhaps in safe d i s t r i c t s n e i t h e r pa rty nominates c a n d i d a t e s as well known or as well q u a l i f i e d , on the b a s is of t h e i r past p u b lic r e c o r d s , as in marginal ones because the m a j o r i t y p a r t y can win anyway and the m i n o ri t y p a r ty sometimes has d i f f i c u l t y f in d i n g any can d id ate to run a race he is doomed to lo s e . 2. In the Assembly, homogenous d i s t r i c t s produce l e g i s l a t o r s with 58,7 per cent more previous e x p e rie n ce than heterogeneous ones (73.3 per cent to 15.0 per c e n t ) . This, to o , is somewhat e n i g m a t i c ; the same kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p does not e x i s t in the Senate. Perhaps the e x p l a n a tio n may l i e in the n a tu re of heterogeneous 19S u p r a , note 112, p. 171. 403 d i s t r i c t s . They tend to inc lu d e many persons of a h i g h e r than average income who may have a tendency to f o re s a k e p o l i t i c a l endeavors in loc al government f o r more l u c r a t i v e ones in bus ines s or the p r o f e s s i o n s , but who may be unable to r e s i s t the a l l u r e of s t a t e o f f i c e . 20 Ad ditional r e se a r c h is c l e a r l y n e c e s s a r y to provide a b e t t e r und erstan d in g of t h i s phenomenon. 3. In the Assembly, d i s t r i c t m a r g i n a l i t y and homogeneity have a cum ulative impact demon s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t 85.7 per cent of the l e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d from the six d i s t r i c t s among the most marginal and most homogenous had previous government e x p e r i e n c e , whereas none of those e l e c t e d from the ten d i s t r i c t s among the s a f e s t and most heterogen eo us had such e x p e r i e n c e . 4. In both ho u ses, Table 4 i n d i c a t e s t h a t safe d i s t r i c t s produced more l e g i s l a t o r s with at l e a s t a b a c h e l o r ' s degree than did marginal d i s t r i c t s . In the Assembly the d i f f e r e n c e was 20The average median income of the 20 most h e t e r o geneous d i s t r i c t s , as r e p o r t e d in Table 3, was $6,890 in 1959, the s t a t e average was $6,700, and the average median of the 20 most homogenous was $6,515 ac co rding to computa ti o n s based on 1960 U.S. Census Bureau r e p o r t s . an i n f i n i t e s i m a l .8 per ce nt (73.5 to 72.7) and in the Senate 28.6 per cen t (78.6 to 5 0 .0 ). Reasons for t h i s cannot be found in d i f f e r e n c e s e i t h e r in income or pa rty a f f i l i a t i o n . Fu rth e r a n a l y s i s based on o th e r data might prove i n t e r e s t i n g . In both houses, l e g i s l a t o r s from heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s more commonly had at l e a s t a b a c h e l o r ' s degree than those from homogenous ones. In the Assembly, the d i f f e r e n c e was 26.2 per cent (81 .8 to 55,6) and in the Senate 19.8 per ce nt (72.7 to 5 2 . 9 ) . This seems p l a u s i b l e in terms of the degree of average median income d i f f e r e n c e s noted above which is f r e q u e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t . There is no cumulative impact ap p aren t in the area of e d u c a tio n when one compares safe and h e t e r o geneous d i s t r i c t s with marginal and homogenous o n e s . The above f i g u r e s i n d i c a t e t h a t i t would be very d i f f i c u l t , in terms of e i t h e r c o m p e t i t i v e ness or d i v e r s i t y , for l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t i n g to produce l e g i s l a t o r s with both a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of previous ex perience and a high level of e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t . Indeed, i t seems 405 t h a t d i s t r i c t s which encourage one tend to d iscourage the o t h e r . One-man, o n e - v o t e . --The evidence re vealed in t h i s study shows to some e x t e n t the degree t h a t unequally po pulated d i s t r i c t s have a f f e c t e d the n atu re of C a l i f o r n i a c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Although the co u rts have re q u i re d sub s t a n t i a l r e d u c tio n in such i n e q u a l i t i e s , the 30 per cent p o p u latio n d e v i a t i o n between the l a r g e s t and s m a l l e s t d i s t r i c t s which s t i l l seems p e r m i s s i b l e would allow at l e a s t some of the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d in the c o n clusio ns enumerated below to p e r s i s t in the f u t u r e , a l b e i t to a diminished e x t e n t . 1. The 1960 census f i g u r e s , which formed the bas is of the Assembly r e a p portionm ent the following y e a r , show a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the safe d i s t r i c t s and those of r e l a t i v e l y small po p u la t i o n . Of the 20 s m a l l e s t d i s t r i c t s , e i g h t were among the 20 s a f e s t , while only two were among the 20 most m a r g in a l. Even though the Senate had been r e a p p o r t i o n e d ten years e a r l i e r , by a Republican r a t h e r than a Demo c r a t i c m a j o r i t y , the same tendency is apparent t h e r e . As may be seen in Table 3, of the ten s m a l l e s t Senate d i s t r i c t s , four were among the ten s a f e s t and one among the ten most 406 m a r g i n a l . 21 I t seems p r o b a b l e , on the b a s i s of these f i g u r e s , t h a t the implementation of the one-man, one-vote p r i n c i p l e w i l l make many of the s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s d i s c e r n a b l y more m a rg in a l. 2. In the Assembly, e i g h t of the 20 s m a l l e s t d i s t r i c t s were among the 20 most h e te r o g e n eo u s, while only t h r e e were among the most homo genous. Senate f i g u r e s are n o tab ly at v a ria n c e with t h e s e , with f iv e of the ten s m a l l e s t d i s - i t r i c t s f a l l i n g also among the ten most homogenous and none among the ten most h e t e r o geneous. The s t a t i s t i c s of the upper house are in c l o s e r conformity to p l a u s i b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s , sin c e one might n a t u r a l l y assume t h a t s m a l l e r p o p u l a t i o n s would be l e ss d i v e r s e in composi tio n than l a r g e r ones. That small Senate d i s t r i c t s should be r e l a t i v e l y more homogenous than small Assembly ones is e x p l i c a b l e by the f a c t t h a t all ten of the s m a l l e s t Senate d i s t r i c t s had p o p u l a t i o n s exceeded by the s m a l l e s t of all Assembly d i s t r i c t s (72, 105 in 1960). I t must be remembered, in t h i s r e g a r d , t h a t Senate d i s t r i c t s were p r o h i b i t e d from encompas sing more than t h re e co u n tie s by the s t a t e 21These f i g u r e s are based in p a r t on data found in Tables 11 - L and II-N in A llen , op. ci t . , pp. 167 and 169. 407 c o n s t i t u t i o n . In the Assembly, where median d i s t r i c t popu latio n was almost 25 per cent more than for Senate d i s t r i c t s (147,000 to 195 ,000), i t would seem t h a t the degree of economic and e t h n i c d i v e r s i t y was more a product of geo- / gra p h ic and s o c ia l m i l i e u than of numerical s i z e . 3. The c r e a t i o n of d i s p a r i t i e s in Assembly d i s t r i c t p o p u l a t i o n s has b e n e f i t e d the m a j o r i t y p a r t y . In the 1965 general s e ss i o n the 20 l a r g e s t d i s t r i c t s were r e p r e s e n t e d by 11 Republicans and nine Democrats, while the 20 s m a l l e s t had chosen 15 Democrats and only fiv e Repub licans. Moreover, of the e i g h t d i s t r i c t s among both the 20 s a f e s t and 20 s m a l l e s t , all had e l e c t e d Democratic Assemblymen. Such a s i t u a t i o n is p r o t o t y p i c a l of the t r a d i t i o n a l gerrymander. Vigorous m i n o r i t y . --No firm co n c lu sio n s can be drawn r egardin g the kind of d i s t r i c t producing an e f f e c t i v e m i n o r i t y voice unless some s p e c i f i c a t i o n is made re g a rd in g the kind of m i n o r i t y - - p a r t i s a n or i d e o l o g i c a l - - which one wishes to maximize, and the r e l a t i v e importance of numerical s i z e and c o h e s i v e n e s s . 22 The f in d i n g s l i s t e d 22A r a t h e r a b s t r a c t d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s concept may be found s u p r a , pp. 1 38-149. 408 below may i l l u m i n a t e such d i s t i n c t i o n s . 1. If m i n o r i t y s t r e n g t h is measured in p a r t i s a n terms, and t h i s a n a l y s i s a s s e s s e s p a r t y con s i d e r a t i o n s as paramount, the 20 most marginal Assembly d i s t r i c t s produced 45.1 per cent more m i n o r i t y members (Rep ublican s) than the 20 s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s (62.5 to 1 7 . 4 ) . The Senate ev iden ces t h i s same f i n d i n g even more con c l u s i v e l y , as i n d i c a t e d in Table 1. 2. The numerical advantage which marginal d i s t r i c t s gave to the m i n o ri t y p a r t y in the Assembly was diminished p a r t i a l l y by a lower degree of p a r t i s a n l o y a l t y or cohes ion . Members from marginal d i s t r i c t s , as i n d i c a t e d by Table 2, d e s e r t e d a m a j o r i t y of t h e i r own p a r t y to vote with a m a j o r i t y of the o p p o s i t i o n 9.5 per cent more f r e q u e n t l y than members from safe o n e s . 23 3. If m i n o r i t y s t r e n g t h is conceived in i d e o l o g i c a l terms, safe Assembly d i s t r i c t s produce g r e a t e r m i n o r i t y s t r e n g t h than marginal ones, whether measured by votes c a s t a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s or by the extremism scores d e riv e d 23The four m i n o ri t y Republicans who served from the 20 s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s c a s t only f iv e of 112 p a r t y d e v i a t i o n votes f o r a p a r ty l o y a l t y score of 95.5 per c e n t , the h i g h e s t of any c a te g o r y u t i l i z e d in t h i s s tu d y . 409 from AFL-CIO and M. & M. r o ll c all c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s . 4. Senate f i g u r e s , although in accord with ' Assembly f in d i n g s on l a r g e r m i n o rity party r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from marginal d i s t r i c t s , d i f f e r from lower house evidence in showing t h a t marginal d i s t r i c t s also produce more party cohesion and g r e a t e r i d e o l o g i c a l e x t r e m is m . 21* 5. Findings with rega rd to the e f f e c t s of d i s t r i c t economic and e t h n i c d i v e r s i t y on m i n o ri t y party numerical s i z e and p a r t y l o y a l t y are i n c o n c l u s i v e . Assembly f i g u r e s i n d i c a t e t h a t the m i n o ri t y enjoys a s l i g h t numerical advantage in homogeneous d i s t r i c t s but a somewhat g r e a t e r c o hesiveness in heterog eneous ones. Senate r e s u l t s show an o p p o s i t e t e n d e n c y . 25 6. In i d e o l o g i c a l terms, f in d i n g s based upon an a n a l y s i s of both chambers show t h a t h e t e r o geneous d i s t r i c t s encourage m i n o ri t y votes a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s as well as a hig h er extremism s c o r e . 26 21tS u p r a , pp. 398-399 . 25See Table 1 f o r p r e c i s e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n summaries. 26Loc. c i t . 410 7. Assembly d i s t r i c t s which are both marginal and homogenous produced 27.1 per cent more m in o rity p a r ty members than safe and heterogeneous ones, but l e g i s l a t o r s from the former d i s t r i c t s showed 17.1 per cent l e ss pa rty l o y a l t y and l e ss i d e o l o g i c a l d e v i a t i o n as w e ll. Experienced membership. --The co n c lu sio n s of t h i s study reg a rd in g the e f f e c t s of vario us d i s t r i c t s on ex per ie nc e gained from l e g i s l a t i v e ten ur e are i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and do not c o n f l i c t , i n s o f a r as is known, with e a r l i e r r e se a r c h f in d i n g s of a s i m i l a r n a t u r e . 1. Safe d i s t r i c t s , as r e v e a le d in Table 4, were r e p r e s e n t e d by l e g i s l a t o r s with 6.0 years lo nger average s e r v i c e in the Assembly and 6.7 y e a rs more in the Senate than marginal districts. 2. Assemblymen from heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s had 3.5 years more tenure than those from homo genous ones. Corresponding Senate f i g u r e s show a 2.9 y e a r d i f f e r e n t i a l . 3. Assemblymen from the s a f e s t - m o s t heterogenous d i s t r i c t s had served 7.4 y e a rs lo n g er than those from the most m argin a l-m ost homogenous ones. This i n d i c a t e s t h a t the c o m p e t i t i v e n e ss and d i v e r s i t y f a c t o r s have a cum ulative impact upon the a c c r e t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e t e n u r e . 411 Functional m a j o r i t y . --The maximization of m a j o r i t y s t r e n g t h , l i k e the enhancement of a vigorous m i n o r i t y d i s cussed e a r l i e r , may be analyzed in terms of the numerical s t r e n g t h of l e g i s l a t i v e p a r t i e s , t h e i r cohesiveness when m a j o r i t i e s of the two p a r t i e s oppose each o t h e r , and the size of b i p a r t i s a n ( u s u a l l y moderate) m a j o r i t i e s in r e l a tion to d i s s i d e n t , c o m parativ ely e x t r e m i s t m i n o r i t i e s . Such an a n a l y s i s re v e a ls conclusio ns summarized below. 1. As i n d i c a t e d in Table 2, the m a j o r i t y p ar ty was 45.1 per cent l a r g e r in safe d i s t r i c t s than marginal ones on the b a s is of Assembly f i g u r e s . I t should be noted t h a t during the 1963 and 1965 s e s s i o n s Democrats, while c o n s t i t u t i n g 66.7 per cent of all Assemblymen and 82.6 per cent of those from the 20 s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s , a c t u a l l y were in a 37.5 per cent m i n o ri t y among r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 20 most marginal d i s t r i c t s . A s i m i l a r but more pronounced s i t u a ti o n p r e v a i l e d in the Senate. 2. In the Assembly, the numerical advantage of the Democrats from safe d i s t r i c t s was enhanced by a hi gher degree of p a r ty cohesion than e x i s t e d in marginal d i s t r i c t s . Assemblyman William Dannemeyer ( D. , F u l l e r t o n ) provides an extreme example of the r e l a t i v e party d i s l o y a l t y found in marginal d i s t r i c t s . He voted with o p p o s it i o n p a r ty m a j o r i t i e s on 22 occasions and with his own party only six times on r o l l c a l l s on which the two p a r t i e s opposed each o t h e r . I t is of some s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t safe d i s t r i c t s produce g r e a t e r party cohesion than marginal ones among both m a j o r i t y and’ m i n o ri t y Assembly men. In the Sen at e, however, t h i s is not t r u e . If m a j o r i t i e s are viewed in an i d e o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than p a r t i s a n frame of r e f e r e n c e , Assembly evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t marginal d i s t r i c t s produce more moderate, m a j o r i t y votes on r o l l c a l l s on which the p a r t i e s agree than do safe d i s t r i c t s . Once a g a in , Senate f i g u r e s are not in accord with t h i s f i n d i n g . As is tru e with r e f e r e n c e to m i n o r i t y s t r e n g t h , a heterogeneous-homogenous comparison r e v e a l s no s u b s t a n t i a l basis f o r an as sessment of m a j o r i t y advantage in e i t h e r the number of p a r ty members or t h e i r voting cohesion. In t h e i r p r o c l i v i t y toward a moderate m a j o r i t y p o s i t i o n , however, Assembly and Senate evidence both i n d i c a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s from homogenous d i s t r i c t s take a l e ss extreme p o s i t i o n than those from heterogeneous ones. Assembly d i s t r i c t s which are both s a f e and heterogeneous e l e c t e d 27.1 per cent more 413 m a j o r i t y p a r ty members than marginal and homo genous ones, and d isp la y e d more p a r ty l o y a l t y by a 17.1 per ce nt margin. L e g i s l a t o r s from the m a r g i n a l , homogenous d i s t r i c t s showed a 17.9 per cent g r e a t e r frequency in voting with b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s , however. Accommodation of i n t e r e s t s . --The adjustmen t or accommodation of group i n t e r e s t s , whether such i n t e r e s t s are d efined in economic, e t h n i c , geo graphic or oth er ter ms, is presumed here to m a n i fe st i t s e l f in a tendency toward compromise. Compromise, in t u r n , may be evidenced by voting with a m a j o r i t y of the o p p o s it i o n p a r t y , j o i n i n g with b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s , or b alan cin g votes in terms of i d e o l o g i c a l extremes. The fo llo w in g c o n c l u s i o n s , based on f i g u r e s in Table 2, seem w arra n te d . 1. Assemblymen from marginal d i s t r i c t s are more i n c l i n e d to compromise than those from safe ones. This is i n d i c a t e d by t h e i r 9.5 per cent more f r e q u e n t votes with o p p o s i t i o n par ty m a j o r i t i e s , t h e i r 10.1 per cent more f r e q u e n t votes with b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s and, perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e i r 12.5 per cent lower score on the extremism s c a l e compiled from p r e s s u r e group a s se s sm e n ts . With r e s p e c t to all th ese i n d i c e s , however, Senate f i g u r e s reveal o p p o s it e f i n d i n g s . Assemblymen and Senators from homogenous d i s t r i c t s are more prone to accommodation or compromise than those from heterogeneous ones. This con cl usion is based on the 10.2 per cent more f r e q u e n t b i p a r t i s a n support given by homogenous d i s t r i c t assemblymen, the 1.7 per cent more b i p a r t i s a n s u p p o rt of corre sponding s e n a t o r s , the 4.9 per cent lower extremism score of such Assemblymen and the 15.8 per cent lower score of comparable s e n a t o r s . This assessment is s t r e n g t h e n e d by Assembly f i g u r e s r e v e a l i n g t h a t homogenous d i s t r i c t s are r e l a t e d to a 3.8 per cen t g r e a t e r p a r ty d e v i a tio n in voting with a m a j o r i t y of the o p p o s i t i o n , but Senate expe rie n c e in t h i s r e s p e c t is co n tr a d i c t o r y . In the Assembly, m a r g i n a l i t y and homogeneity f a c t o r s r e i n f o r c e one a n o th e r to the e x t e n t t h a t d i s t r i c t s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by both f a c t o r s have e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t o r s d e v i a t i n g from t h e i r party 17.1 per cent more ofte n than those r e p r e s e n t i n g safe and heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s . Moreover, Assemblymen from marginal and homo genous d i s t r i c t s have a 17.9 per cent h i g h e r record in s u p p o rt of b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s . 415 Local government r epresen t a t i o n . --The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c i t i e s and c o u n tie s is the most d i f f i c u l t apportionment model to r e l a t e to the d i s t r i c t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s employed h e r e i n . The Senate d i s t r i c t s on which the p r e s e n t f in d i n g s are based were co terminal with county bo undaries as r eq u ire d by the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n before c o u r t - o r d e r e d r e a p p o r tionment. | I t is r e a so n a b le t h a t c o u n t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , had more e f f e c t i v e voices in the upper house than the lower one. Other than t h i s i n t e r - h o u s e comparison, the previous governmental e x p e rie n c e of l e g i s l a t o r s provides the only b a s is in t h i s study f o r a s s e s s i n g the degree to which Assemblymen and Senators p e rc e iv e d t h e i r r o le s as e n t a i l i n g the a r t i c u l a t i o n of the wishes of local government u n i t s . Most of the p u b lic s e r v i c e claimed by l e g i s l a t o r s p r i o r to t h e i r e l e c t i o n to the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e was in c i t y or county government. The refore i t might be argued t h a t a man who has served as a mayor, or county d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y would be more s e n s i t i v e to loc al government d e s i r e s than one who has not. If one equates p r i o r e x p e rie n ce with e f f e c t i v e local r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and t h a t is an a d m i t t e d l y tenuous e q u a t i o n , f i n d i n g s p a r a l l e l those q u a n t i f i e d e a r l i e r in the d i s c u s s i o n of informed membership;27 th e se are summarized below. 2 7Supra , pp. 399-404. 416 1. Marginal d i s t r i c t s in both houses produce more l e g i s l a t o r s with local government o r i e n t a t i o n than do safe d i s t r i c t s . 28 2. Homogenous d i s t r i c t s , in the Assembly, have the same e f f e c t . 3. Such r e l a t i o n s h i p s are most s t r i k i n g in the i case of Assembly d i s t r i c t s both marginal and homogenous. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . --As i n d i c a t e d above, i t has been assumed t h a t the re are t h re e p o s s i b l e in d ic e s of a l e g i s l a t o r ' s p r o c l i v i t y to accommodate di ve rgent i n t e r e s t s : the frequen cy with which he d e s e r t s his own p a r t y m a j o r i t y to vote with a m a j o r i t y of the o p p o s it i o n p a r t y , the frequency with which he s u p p o rts b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s , and an extremism score i n d i c a t i n g the r a t i o of " l i b e r a l " to " c o n s e r v a t i v e " votes as l a b e l l e d by the AFL- CIO and M. & M. The e f f e c t i v e and c o n s i s t e n t r e p r e s e n t a tio n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s , r e s i s t i n g the blandishments of compromise and c o n c e s s i o n , may be co n s tr u e d as the e x a ct o p p o s ite of the accommodation of i n t e r e s t s . If such an i n f e r e n c e is made, then the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s is promoted by d i s t r i c t s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by f a c t o r s 28I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t d i s t r i c t s which would follow c i t y and county b o u n d a r i e s , as has been so v i g o ro u s l y advocated by proponents of local government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , are also those ten ding to be more marginal than s a f e . S u p r a , pp. 227-228. 417 a n t i t h e t i c a l to those which promote accommodation. On the b asis of t h i s assumpt ion, th e se c o n c lu s io n s r e s t . 1. Safe d i s t r i c t s promote vigorous and e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s in the Assembly. 2. Heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s have a g e n e r a l l y s i m i l a r e f f e c t in both the Assembly and the S e n a t e . 3. Assembly d i s t r i c t s which are both safe and het erogeneous f a c i l i t a t e i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a tion to the most marked degree in c o n t r a s t to those which are marginal and homogenous. D i s t r i c t Types The f o re g o in g d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , at l e a s t in the Assembly, conform roughly to f iv e of the nine apportionm en t models which have been assumed to be i m p l i c i t in the goals of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s t h a t p a r ty r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , e x p e rie n c e d l e g i s l a t i v e membership, and the e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r g e n t group i n t e r e s t s is f a c i l i t a t e d by safe and heterog eneous d i s t r i c t s . S i m i l a r l y , the accommodation or compromise of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s and the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of local go v ern ment viewpoints may be f u r t h e r e d by marginal and homogenous d i s t r i c t s . 418 Three o t h e r appo rtionm en t models, informed member s h ip , a vigorous m in o rity and a f u n c t io n a l m a j o r i t y , seem to be a f f e c t e d in c o n t r a d i c t o r y ways by the d i s t r i c t types p o s i t e d in t h i s stu dy. Informed membership is promoted b e s t by marginal and homogenous d i s t r i c t s i n s o f a r as t h a t e n t a i l s prev ious p u b l i c s e r v i c e , but is advanced most by s afe and heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s to the degree t h a t the informed l e g i s l a t o r should possess an e x t e n s i v e e d u c a t i o n a l background. I f a choice must be made between p r i o r p u b lic s e r v i c e and formal e d u c a t i o n , perhaps i t should be educa t i o n , and the s a f e , heteroge neous d i s t r i c t s which are r e l a t e d to i t . Such a p r e f e r e n c e may be j u s t i f i e d by the assumption t h a t ,extensive s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e rie n c e or t e n u re can compensate, e v e n t u a l l y , f o r the lack of local government s e r v i c e . With re gard to m i n o r i t y - m a j o r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s a fe and heterog en eo us d i s t r i c t s seem to promote e n l a r g e d p a r ty m a j o r i t i e s and more cohesive p a r ty l o y a l t y f o r both m a j o r i t y and m i n o ri t y p a r t i e s , as well as enhanced s t r e n g t h f o r i d e o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d , e x t r e m i s t m i n o r i t i e s . Conv er sely, marginal and homogenous d i s t r i c t s appear to be r e l a t e d to n u m e r ic a l ly g r e a t m i n o r i t y party s t r e n g t h , but a lso to p a r ty r o l l c a ll d e v i a t i o n and i d e o l o g i c a l l y moderate p r o c l i v i t i e s to s upport b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s . Any e x p r e ss i o n of p r e f e r e n c e in t h i s regard would seem to c o n f r o n t a dilemma the horns of which are almost e q u a l l y u n a t t r a c t i v e . 419 The one-man, one- vote sta n d a rd is the only one recommended by dem ocratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals which seems u n r e l a t e d to the d i s t r i c t t y p o l o g i e s u t i l i z e d in t h i s stu dy. All t h a t is a p p a re n t in t h i s regard is t h a t the c o m p e titiv e n e ss and d i v e r s i t y f a c t o r s are e q u a l i z e d to a g r e a t e r degree in d i s t r i c t s of n e a rly average p o p u la tio n than in e i t h e r the l a r g e s t or s m a l l e s t ones. By c o n t r a s t , o v e r - p o p u l a t e d d i s t r i c t s s t r o n g l y tend to be marginal and homogenous, while u n d e rpopulated ones are prone to s a f e t y and h e t e r o g e n e i t y . When l e g i s l a t o r s are c o n fro n te d with the n e c e s s i t y to r e a p p o r t i o n and r e d i s t r i c t themselves , evidence r e p o r t e d in Chapters IV and V i n d i c a t e s t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of personal and p a r t i s a n advantage tend to r i v e t a t t e n t i o n on d i s t r i c t models, ofte n p r e c l u d i n g conscious concern with a b s t r a c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals and t h e o r e t i c a l apportionment s t a n d a r d s . This means t h a t d i s t r i c t ty pology, e v a l u a t e d below, appears to be of paramount s a l i e n c e to the people who a c t u a l l y draw the b o u n d a rie s. Safe d i s t r i c t s . - - I n s t r i v i n g to keep t h e i r s e a t s , l l e g i s l a t o r s are perhaps most concerned with e s t a b l i s h i n g , or p e r p e t u a t i n g , safe d i s t r i c t s . For Democrats, voting s t u d i e s dem onstrate t h a t such d i s t r i c t s are those with a g r e a t Democratic r e g i s t r a t i o n advan tag e, high m inority group c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and low per c a p i t a income. The s a f e s t Democratic d i s t r i c t in 1963 (the 55th) had a 420 Democratic r e g i s t r a t i o n of 83.2 per cent and even the s i x t e e n t h s a f e s t (the 65th) of 64.4 per c e n t . 29 Republican v i c t o r i e s under such circu mstan ces are v i r t u a l l y im p o ss ib le. In terms of e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s , i t is s i g n i f i cant t h a t the four d i s t r i c t s e l e c t i n g Negro Assemblymen during the 1963-65 p e rio d ranked f i r s t , second, e ig h th and t h i r t e e n t h among the s a f e s t in the s t a t e . In economic terms, Table 3 re v e a ls t h a t the 16 s a f e s t Democratic d i s t r i c t s had an average median income of $6,206, almost $500 l e ss than the s t a t e average. Creation of a maximum number of Democratic safe d i s t r i c t s , in su red by the Democratic l e g i s l a t i v e m a j o r i t y when the 1961 app ortionmen t o c c u r re d , gu ar an tee d t h a t a few of the remaining d i s t r i c t s would be s a f e l y Republican. Thus, of the 20 s a f e s t _ch' s t r i cts in 1 963 , four were se c u r e l y in c o ntrol of the m i n o rity p a r t y . These safe Republican c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ranged from 58.3 to 63,5 per cent in Republican r e g i s t r a t i o n and had an average median income of $7,275, or almost $600 more than the s t a t e average and over $1,000 more than in Democratic safe d i s t r i c t s . None were among the 20 d i s t r i c t s with the h i g h e s t m i n o ri t y group c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . / A composite p o r t r a i t of Assemblymen from th ese d i s t r i c t s , r e g a r d l e s s of p a r t y , d e p i c t s a l e g i s l a t o r with 2 C a l i f o r n i a Report of R e g i s t r a t i o n , Ja n u a ry , 1963, 1o c . ci t . 421 r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e governmental s e r v i c e p r i o r to his e l e c tion to the l e g i s l a t u r e but with long ten ure in the Assembly, and a s l i g h t l y h i g h e r than average level of e d u c atio n a l a t t a i n m e n t . He is more w i l l i n g than most to m a n i fe st i d e o l o g i c a l extremism, in p a r t by voting a g a i n s t b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s , and demonstrat es g r e a t l o y a l t y to his party when opposed by a m a j o r i t y of the o t h e r p a r t y . As i n d i c a t e d above, he approximates the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of th re e apportionment models in t h e i r e n t i r e t y ( p a rt y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , e x p e r i e n c e , and the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s ) . He a lso c o n t r i b u t e s to the implementation of t h re e o t h e r s : the informed membership model i n s o f a r as educati on is concerned, the f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y when t h a t is co nstrued in p a r t i s a n te rms, and vigorous m i n o r i t i e s when r e l a t e d to i d e o l o g i c a l d i s s e n t . Such f i n d i n g s may c o n s t i t u t e a more el o q u en t defense of safe d i s t r i c t s than seems common among a n a l y s t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e o ry . Marginal d i s t r i c t s .--While safe d i s t r i c t s g u aran tee a la rge m a j o r i t y p a r ty r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and an almost e q u a l l y / secure but u s u a l l y s m a l l e r m i n o ri t y pa rty bloc in the l e g i s l a t u r e , marginal d i s t r i c t s tend to have o p p o s it e e f f e c t s . They give the m i n o ri t y p a r ty a v a s t l y magnified l e g i s l a t i v e membership but allow the incumbents of n e i t h e r party any s u b s t a n t i a l degree of job s e c u r i t y . 422 I t is d i f f i c u l t to c h a r a c t e r i z e marginal d i s t r i c t s in terms of un iquely s t r i k i n g a t t r i b u t e s . Economically, t h e i r average median income is $6,685, j u s t $15 below the s t a t e average, and t h e i r e t h n i c d i v e r s i t y seems almost e q u a l l y t y p i c a l of C a l i f o r n i a as whole. This "n o rm a lity " is a p p a re n t whether one c o n s id e rs marginal s e a t s held by Demo c r a t s or Republicans. P a r t i s a n r e g i s t r a t i o n advantages are nomi n a 1. The personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l e g i s l a t o r s from the most c o m p e t i t i v e d i s t r i c t s r e v e a l , on the whole, men with n o ta b ly e x t e n s i v e government e x p e rie n c e at the local l e v e l , but who have been in s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e o f f i c e f o r a r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f pe riod and who d i s p l a y l e ss p a r ty l o y a l t y as well as l e ss i d e o l o g i c a l extremism than most of t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s . As po in te d out e a r l i e r , they seem to make u n q u a l i f i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the appo rtion men t models of i n t e r e s t accommodati on and local government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Moreover, they qive l i m i t e d a s s i s t a n c e to informed member ship i n s o f a r as prev ious government s e r v i c e is concerned, to vigorous m i n o r i t i e s in terms of p a r ty s t r e n g t h (although not p a r t y l o y a l t y ) , and to f u n c t io n a l m a j o r i t i e s in r e l a t i o n to i d e o l o g i c a l l y moderate, b i p a r t i s a n agreement. Marginal d i s t r i c t s a i d , th e n , in at l e a s t p a r t i a l implementation of f iv e ap portionment models. Although such s e r v i c e is somewhat l ess im pressiv e than the six ( i n c l u d i n g f i r s t ranked party r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y ) to which safe d i s t r i c t s 423 c o n t r i b u t e , i t is a s s i s t a n c e which democratic government can ignore only at c o n s i d e r a b l e r i s k . Heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s .--W hile the l e g i s l a t o r s who draw d i s t r i c t bounda ries are most concerned with party r e g i s t r a t i o n r a t i o s producing the safe and marginal c a t e g o r i e s d i s c u s s e d above, they are i n t e r e s t e d als o in f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g to socioeconomic d i v e r s i t y . The reasons are l a r g e l y p o l i t i c a l ; as i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , 30 high income groups u s u a ll y vote Republican and e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s g e n e r a l l y vote Democratic. I t is p a r t i a l l y because of these p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s t h a t t h i s study has c o n s t r u c t e d a d i s t r i c t typology on the b a s is of a h e t e r o g e n e i t y -h o m o g e n e i t y d i v e r s i t y continuum, u t i l i z i n g both income and e t h n i c d i s t r i b u t i o n s in i t s f o r m u l a t i o n . D i f f e r e n t and d i s t i n c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f (e . g . , wealth and race) were i n t e n t i o n a l l y combined to determine the ways in which c o n s t i t u e n c y d i v e r s i t y per se was r e l a t e d to apportionm en t models. I t should be acknow ledged t h a t had i t been f e a s i b l e to include more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in the d i v e r s i t y a n a l y s i s , such as length of re sid e n c e and o c c u p a t i o n , the v a l i d i t y of the f in a l d i s t r i c t c a t e g o r i z a t i o n probably would have been i n c r e a s e d . An a n a l y s i s of the most het er oge ne ou s c o n s t i t u e n cie s i n d i c a t e s t h a t they d i f f e r from homogenous ones n e a r l y 3QS u p r a , pp. 223-229. / 424 as much as the s a f e s t d i s t r i c t s d i f f e r from those which are most m a rg in a l. Moreover, they d i f f e r in e x a c t l y the same ways, although to varying d e g r e e s, and hence have the same general r e l a t i o n s h i p to apportionment models as safe d i s t r i c t s . This is not s u r p r i s i n g , since 10 of the 20 most heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s are also among the 20 s a f e s t and only two are among the 20 most m arg in a l. J u s t as he terogeneous d i s t r i c t s inc lu de two marginal d i s t r i c t s and ten safe ones, they also embrace d i s t r i c t s of g r e a t economic and e t h n i c v a r i a t i o n . The average median income of the seven heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s held by Republicans in both 1963 and 1965 was $7,786, or over $1,200 more than the average mean income of the twelve heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s held by Democrats during t h a t time. S i m i l a r l y , among the e i g h t d i s t r i c t s p o s se s si n g the l a r g e s t p e rc e n ta g e s of m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n s (and inclu ded among the 20 most h e t e r o g e n e o u s ) , only one e l e c t e d a Republican. The six o t h e r heterog eneous Republican d i s t r i c t s ranked within the middle h a l f of Assembly d i s t r i c t s c l a s s i f i e d on the basis of e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s . The r e s u l t s of t h i s study may lead to a more thorough u n d e rsta n d in g of the h e t e r o g e n e i t y c o n cep t, and i t s p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . Economically, the h e t e r o geneous d i s t r i c t seems to e n t a i l p r i m a r i l y the i n c l u s i o n of a few very high income areas r a t h e r than very low ones. The reason fo r t h i s is t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between no 425 income a t a l l and the s t a t e median ($6,700 in 1959) is not n e a r l y so g r e a t as the d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a t e median and incomes of a t h e o r e t i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d amount. Thus, in g e n e r a l , the g r e a t e r the income h e t e r o g e n e i t y , the h i g h e r the median income, and the more l i k e l y the e l e c t i o n of a Republi c a n . I f economic h e t e r o g e n e i t y b e n e f i t s the Rep ub lica ns , e t h n i c h e t e r o g e n e i t y favo rs the Democrats. The h i g h e r the per centage of Negroes, persons with Spanish surnames, and those of fo reig n s t o c k , the g r e a t e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of a Democrat being e l e c t e d . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the r a t i o of Re publican to Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s was only .6 per cent d i f f e r e n t in heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s than in the Assembly as a whole. This is a s m a l l e r d i f f e r e n c e than occu rred in any o t h e r d i s t r i c t c a te g o r y . Homogenous d i s t r i c t s . --A r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between homogenous and marginal d i s t r i c t s s i m i l a r t o , although not as pronounced as, t h a t between heterogeneous and safe ones. Of the 20 most homogenous d i s t r i c t s , six were a lso among the 20 most marginal and only one among the 20 s a f e s t . D i s t r i c t homogeneity, c o n s e q u e n t l y , d isp la y ed the same r e l a t i o n s h i p to apportionment models as d i s t r i c t margi n a l i t y . The 20 most homogenous c o n s t i t u e n c i e s do not demonstrate n e a r l y so much v a r i e t y as heterog eneous ones. 426 Not only do fewer f a l l i n t o extreme c o m p etitiv e c a t e g o r i e s ( s a f e - m a r g i n a l ), but they all d i s p l a y w h i t e , Anglo-saxon e t h n i c dominance as w e ll. Th is, of c o u r s e , was to be expected because e t h n i c homogeneity was d efined in terms of a low percentage of m i n o ri t y groups. What is somewhat s u r p r i s i n g is t h a t d i s t r i c t homogeneity in economic terms is v i r t u a l l y synonomous with lower-middle c l a s s incomes. While ten of the 20 most heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s had median incomes of over $7,000 in 1959, t h a t was tru e of only th re e of the 20 most homogenous. At the o t h e r ex treme, the most heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s incl ud ed two with median incomes below $5,000, whereas the most homogenous included none below $5,500. These f i g u r e s , when e v a l u a t e d in c o n ju n c tio n with voting r e c o r d s , have some i n t e r e s t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for apportionment s t a n d a r d s . F i r s t , t h e r e are very few c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which are economically homogenous at e i t h e r the high or low income l e v e l s . I f the very ric h or the very poor are to be given l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as i d e n t i f i a b l e economic i n t e r e s t s , t h i s u s u a ll y must be done in heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s in c l u d i n g s u b s t a n t i a l middle-income p o p u l a t i o n s . In C a l i f o r n i a , t h i s may be a f u n c tio n of r e l a t i v e l y la rge Assembly d i s t r i c t s r e s u i t i n g from a smal 1 membersh i p in the 1ower house. C a l i f o r n i a , with the l a r g e s t p o p u la tio n 427 of any s t a t e , ranked 40th in the s i z e . o f i t s lower c h a m b e r.31 Second, the l e g i s l a t o r from a heterogeneous d i s t r i c t , perhaps r e c ognizing the d i f f i c u l t y of r e p r e s e n t i n g d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , will u s u a l l y vote in accordance with t h a t i n t e r e s t most commonly a s s o c i a t e d with his p a r t y ; i . e . , Democrats w ill vote in the i n t e r e s t s of low income and e t h n i c m i n o ri t y groups and Republicans in b e h a l f of high income and Anglo-saxon groups. This means t h a t heterogeneous d i s t r i c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s evidence r e l a t i v e l y high p a r t y l o y a l t y and s u b s t a n t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l c leavage. Th ird, homogenous d i s t r i c t s , with somewhat below average median incomes and low m i n o ri t y group c o n c e n t r a t i o n s , are those to which one must look in s e a rc h i n g f o r a p r o c l i v i t y to compromise and i d e o l o g i c a l m ode rat ion. Since these t r a i t s are commonly a s s o c i a t e d with the accommodation of d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s , t h i s is somewhat s u r p r i s i n g , because homogenous d i s t r i c t s contain r e l a t i v e l y few d i v e r gent i n t e r e s t s . Perhaps the e x p l a n a t i o n for such a phenomenon l i e s in the l a r g e l y marginal n a tu re of th ese d i s t r i c t s and the assumption t h a t the incurnbents, p e r c e i v i n g a n e c e s s i t y to win votes from both Democrats and R e p u b li cans, tend to j o i n b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s more f r e q u e n t l y 31Robert S. Babcock, S t a t e and Local Government and P o l i t i c s (N.Y.: Random House , 1956) , pp. 176-177. 428 than most l e g i s l a t o r s and to show less pa rty l o y a l t y on i s s u e s d i v i d i n g the two p a r t i e s . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , i t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note also t h a t the lower-middle income, Anglo-saxon group, dominant in homogenous d i s t r i c t s , co n s t i t u t e s a s i n g l e demographic bloc but possesses dual a t t i t u d e s . On economic i s s u e s , i t tends to be opposed to high s t a t u s , Republican p o l i c i e s , but on e t h n i c and c i v i l r i g h t s q u e s t i o n s , i t is i n c l i n e d to oppose low s t a t u s , Democratic programs. The most homogeneous d i s t r i c t s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , con t a i n fewer c o n s t i t u e n c i e s of s u b s t a n t i a l p o p u la tio n d i s p a r i t y than any o t h e r type examined h e r e i n . H e te ro g e n e o u s-s a fe d i s t r i c t s .--As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , t h e r e were ten d i s t r i c t s which were among both the 20 most heterogeneous and the 20 s a f e s t . As a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y , l e g i s l a t o r s from th ese d i s t r i c t s c o n s t i t u t e an i n t e r e s t i n g group, c o n s t i t u t i n g 12.5 per cent of the Assembly and topping all o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s in average l e g i s l a t i v e t e n u r e , o p p o s i t i o n to b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s ( c o n sid e r e d here as an index of i d e o l o g i c a l ext rem ism), and party l o y a l t y . The t h r e e Republican d i s t r i c t s in t h i s group had an average median income of $7,467, or more than $1,300 h i g h e r than t h a t f o r the seven Democratic d i s t r i c t s . No o t h e r type of d i s t r i c t seemed to a c c e n t u a t e party d i f f e r e n c e s in such a marked and d i v e r s e f a s h i o n . 429 Homogenous-marginal d i s t r i c t s . - - S i x d i s t r i c t s were among both the 20 most homogenous and 20 most m argin a l. They were n o ta b le in t h a t they exceeded all o t h e r d i s t r i c t types in the amount of pr ev iou s governmental ex pe rie nce possessed by Assemblymen chosen from them, and the tendency of t h e i r incumbents to compromise by j o i n i n g b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s and by d e v i a t i n g from t h e i r pa rty m a j o r i t i e s on iss ues d i v i d i n g the two p a r t i e s . Other t y p o l o g i e s . - - I t would have been of c o n s i d e r able t h e o r e t i c a l value to e v a l u a t e Assemblymen from d i s t r i c t s both safe and homogenous and those from d i s t r i c t s combining m a r g i n a l i t y and h e t e r o g e n e i t y . This was not f e a s i b l e because only one d i s t r i c t f a l l s in the former c ate gory and two in the l a t t e r . Yet i t may be of s u b s t a n t i a l p r a c t i c a l importance to have demonstrated the r a r i t y of th ese co mbinations. T h e o r e t i c a l l y , as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , 32 a l e g i s l a t o r from a safe-homogenous d i s t r i c t would be s u b j e c t to fewer a n t i t h e t i c a l p r e s s u r e s , e i t h e r from p a r t i s a n or i n t e r e s t group s o u r c e s , than those from any o t h e r kind of d i s t r i c t . He would, c o n s e q u e n t l y , be able to r e f l e c t most a c c u r a t e l y the wishes of the g r e a t preponderance of his c o n s t i t u e n t s , with l i t t l e need to compromise or e q u i v o c a t e . But such d i s t r i c t s seldom e x i s t . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t 32S u p r a , p. 224. 430 Assemblyman Clayton D ills (D., Gardena), from the 67th D i s t r i c t , the only one f a l l i n g in t h i s safe-homogenous c a t e g o r y , does not seem to f u l f i l l t h i s e x p e c t a t i o n and t h a t his d i s t r i c t would not have been con sid e re d so homo genous had the pe rc entage of Japanese-Americans been i ncl ud ed as a component of the e t h n i c d i v e r s i t y s c a l e . S i m i l a r l y , m a r g in a l- h e ter o g e n e o u s d i s t r i c t s might be expected to s u b j e c t a l e g i s l a t o r to i r r e s i s t a b l e demands I f o r moderation and accommodation. But of the two Assembly men from d i s t r i c t s matching t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , only one, Milton Marks (R., San F r a n c i s c o ) , from the 21st D i s t r i c t , has a voting record which f u l f i l l s the reaso n ab le a n t i c i p a t i o n . The o t h e r , Charles Warren ( D. , Los A nge le s), from the 56th D i s t r i c t , has shown u n d e viati ng party l o y a l t y and s u b s t a n t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l extremism. It was p a r t i a l l y because of t h i s , p e rh a p s, t h a t he was e l e c t e d chairman of / his p a r t y ' s S ta te Central Committee in the Summer of 1966. Hypotheses: The Empirical Tests In Chapter I c e r t a i n hypotheses were s e t f o r t h which, i t was hoped, might be t e s t e d by the type of study undertaken h e r e i n . The following assessment r e p r e s e n t s the r e s u l t s of such t e s t s . Bicameral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . --The f i r s t h y p o th e sis was t h a t the more inco mpatible the s ta n d a rd s by which d i s t r i c t boundaries are judg ed , the g r e a t e r is the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 431 a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e . This is by f a r the most complex of the hy potheses. Nine apportionment models were s e t f o r t h in Chapters I I I and IV as the b a s is f o r judging d i s t r i c t bo u n d a rie s. Of t h e s e , two seem p o t e n t i a l l y incom patib le with two o t h e r s ; s p e c i f i c a l l y , a vigorous m i n o ri t y may preclude a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y and the accom modation of d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s may i n h i b i t the e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of group i n t e r e s t s . These a n t i t h e t i c a l f a c t o r s , along with o t h e r apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n s noted in the conc lus ion of t h i s c h a p t e r , seem to confirm the hypothes i s . Gerrymanderi n g . --A second h y p o th e sis was t h a t the man ip u latio n of d i s t r i c t boundaries for p a r t i s a n purposes a s su r e s both a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y and a vigorous m i n o r i t y . This h y p o th e sis is confirmed. Assuming t h a t Assembly d i s t r i c t s , r e a rr a n g e d by a Democratic m a j o r i t y in 1961^ r e p r e s e n t a p a r t i s a n gerrymander, v o t e r s t a t i s t i c s i n d i c a t e t h a t the Democrats c o n s t i t u t i n g 55.9 per cent of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s , e l e c t e d 62.7 per cent of the Assemblymen chosen in the 1962 and 1964 e l e c t i o n s , 33 This gave s t r e n g t h to both the m a j o r i t y and m i n o ri t y p a r t i e s s u f f i c i e n t to perform t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s . 34 33C a 1ifornia Report of R e g i s t r a t i o n , o p . ci t . , p. 20. See a l s o , Table 1. / 34S u p r a , p. 130 and p. 147. 432 Safety and party respons i bi 1 i t.y . --Assembly voting s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between safe d i s t r i c t s and party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This is t ru e whether the l a t t e r is viewed in terms of pa rty l o y a l t y on votes which divide the two p a r t i e s or in terms of i d e o l o g i c a l cleavage on votes which do n o t . 35 The hypoth esis is confi rmed. Homogeneity a nd s a f e t y .--The hy pothesis l i n k i n g homogeneity to s a f e t y is d i s p r o v e d , 36 c o n tr a ry to Froman's f i n d i n g s . 37 I t is het erogeneous c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which tend to produce the most secu re pa rty m a j o r i t i e s in C a l i f o r n i a Assembly d i s t r i c t s . Homogeneity and e x p e r i e n c e .--The hypothesi s con necting these two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is c o r r e c t i n s o f a r as previous s e r v i c e , e s p e c i a l l y in local government p o s i t i o n s , is concerned. The r e v e rs e r e l a t i o n s h i p is tru e r e gardin g t e n u re in the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . Such c o n t r a d i c t o r y f in d i n g s are i n c o n c l u s i v e . H e te r o g e n e ity and e d u c a t i o n . --The hypothesis s u g g e s t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p between h e t e r o g e n e i t y and education is confirmed by a n aly se s of both the C a l i f o r n i a Senate and Assembly. In the l a t t e r , h e t e r o g e n e i t y a f f e c t s the 35S u p r a , pp. 390 and 398. See, a l s o , Table 2. 36S u p r a , p. 425. 37S u p r a , p. 192. 433 e d u c a tio n a l a t t a i n m e n t of l e g i s l a t o r s more than any o t h e r f a c t o r . H e te ro g e n e ity and accommodation. - - S t a t i s t i c s r e v e a le d in t h i s study show a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between homogeneity and the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of group i n t e r e s t s , thereby d i sp r o v i n g t h i s h y p o t h e s i s . In both the Senate and Assembly, homogenous d i s t r i c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s compiled a lower score on i d e o l o g i c a l extremism than heterogeneous ones, and also voted with b i p a r t i s a n m a j o r i t i e s more f r e q u e n t l y . In the Assembly, f i n a l l y , they d e v ia te d from m a j o r i t i e s of t h e i r party more ofte n than l e g i s l a t o r s from heterogeneous d i s t r i c t s . Of the seven hypotheses s e t f o r t h at the o u t s e t of t h i s s tu d y , t h e r e f o r e , four have been confirmed by the a n a l y s i s of the data u t i l i z e d h e r e i n , two have been d i s proved, and the v a l i d i t y of the remaining one lacks s u b s t a n t i a t i o n . Conclusions This work i s , in p a r t , an e x e r c i s e in a b s t r a c t i n f e r e n c e . America's p o l i t i c a l h e r i t a g e , p h i l o so p h i c commitments, and p r e v a i l i n g i d e o l o g i c a l themes were examined, f i r s t of a l l , for the purpose of e x t r a c t i n g con cepts v i t a l to democratic t h e o ry . From th ese concepts were de rived seven goals or o b j e c t i v e s of a system of democratic 434 i r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , which were employed as a b asis for e v a l u ating nine su ggested models for l e g i s l a t i v e apportion ment. I These models were then examined in the con te x t of p r a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y c r e a t e d by the r e a l i t i e s of C a l i f o r n i a p o l i t i c s and, f i n a l l y , were employed as c r i t e r i a f o r a s s e s s i n g the d i s t r i c t t y p o l o g i e s c o n s t r u c t e d from actual c o n s t i t u e n c i e s cr e a t e d by the l e g i s l a t i v e apportionment in e f f e c t in C a l i f o r n i a in 1965. In each of the areas of endeavor r e p o r t e d in t h i s stu dy, c e r t a i n t e n t a t i v e c o n c lu sio n s seemed to commend themselves for c o n s i d e r a t i o n and a d d i t i o n a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . Democratic t h e o r y . - - E q u a l i t y , freedom and m a jo rity r u le were i d e n t i f i e d as normative values i m p l i c i t in t h a t which Western c u l t u r e views as a democratic s o c i e t y . The implementation of these values in p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s was b e l i e v e d to r e q u i r e compromise, c o m p e t i t i o n , e f f i c i e n t governmental machinery, and competent o f f i c i a l s . Relevant commentary on dem ocratic t h e o r y , whether d efined in these terms or o t h e r s , is v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s . The follow ing o b s e r v a t i o n s seem most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, w i t h i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . 1. The b e l i e f in the s u p e r i o r i t y of democracy r e s t s u l t i m a t e l y upon a f a i t h rooted in the e s s e n t i a l l y a p r i o r i assumption of human e q u a l i t y . I t is l a r g e l y t h i s s i n g l e , awesome assumption which admonishes each person to 435 r e s p e c t the freedom of his fellows and which d i c t a t e s t h a t human d i f f e r e n c e s be r e c o n c i l e d by def eren ce to the d e s i r e s of a numerical m a j o r i t y . 2. The im plem en tat iona l requirem en ts of democracy are more s u s c e p t i b l e to em p irica l dem onstration than i t s normative as sumpt io ns. To a degree, however, some of these are not unique to demo cr acy, but e s s e n t i a l to any v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l system. 3. Both the assumptions and require m ents of democracy c r e a t e moral and i n s t i t u t i o n a l / t e n s i o n s . How can i n d i v i d u a l freedom be main t a i n e d , f o r example, i f a m a j o r i t y wishes to c u r t a i l i t ? What o r g a n i z a t i o n a l machinery can b e st i n s u r e the promulgation of competing ideas and i n t e r e s t s while a t the same time f a c i l i t a ti n g t h e i r accommodation and s a t i s f a c t o r y compromi se? R e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s .--The seven r e p r e s e n t a t i o n goals enumerated h e r e i n , i n f e r r e d from the t e n e t s of democracy, were used to judge nine appo rtionmen t models: party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , informed l e g i s l a t i v e membership, a vigorous m i n o r i t y , e q u a lly popul at ed d i s t r i c t s , expe rien ced membership, the accommodation of i n t e r e s t s , a f u n c t i o n a l m a j o r i t y , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of local communities and the 436 r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s . This enumeration e l i c i t s s ev e ra l o b s e r v a t i o n s . 1. Judged by democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o a l s , these apportionment models are of varying importance. They are enumerated above in the ord e r in which they seem to correspond most c l o s e l y to the c e n t r a l concepts of t h a t t h e o r y . 2. The emulation of one or more of th ese models is the c h i e f r a t i o n a l e f o r sev eral proposed i n s t i t u t i o n a l ar rangem en ts. For example, u n i cameralism has been defen