University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Voting Alignments In The California Legislature: A Roll Call Analysis Of The 1957-1959-1961 Sessions

(USC Thesis Other)

Voting Alignments In The California Legislature: A Roll Call Analysis Of The 1957-1959-1961 Sessions

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE A ROLL CALL ANALYSIS OF THE 1957-1959-1961 SESSIONS by Charles Marshall Price A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE) September 1965 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by _________ under the direction of AAfi Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C TO R OF P H IL O S O P H Y *— ...... ■ Dtam . 19. 6. 5. DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PREFACE The purpose of this study is to describe, assess, land analyse voting behavior in the California legislature, jln doing this, three factors reported to be critical i determinants of this behavior are examined extensively: Republican-Democratic differences, rural-urban splits, and north-south divisions. Through the use of a roll call analysis of conflict votes, judgments concerning the impact i of these three dichotomies on the voting behavior of the legislature are made. This writer wishes to thank Dr. Totton J. Anderson, for guiding this study and offering a number of helpful suggestions, as well as Dr. T. Ruroda and Dr. Joseph I | Boskin, who gave generously of their time. Final responsi bility for the facts and interpretations of them, of | course, rests solely with the author. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i PREFACE............. ii LIST OF TABLES................................. vi i LIST OF MAPS................................... x | Chap ter I. INTRODUCTION: CALIFORNIA, A CRITICAL STATE . . 1 II. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH................. 10 Objectives of This Study Source Materials and Limitations III. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED...................... 33 Feasibility of Roll Call Vote Studies Roll Call Votes in This Study IV. POLITICAL PARTY VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY............................... 52 | Party Background: The Assembly Assembly Basic Party Disagreement Votes Assembly Moderate Party Disagreement Votes Assembly Basic Party Agreement Votes Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Votes Assembly Party Cohesion Conclusions Chapter Page V. POLITICAL PARTY VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE................................. 99 I ; i Party Background: The Senate Senate Basic and Moderate Party Disagreement Votes Senate Basic Party Agreement Votes Senate Moderate Party Agreement Votes Conclusions ! VI. RURAL-URBAN VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE . 116 Rural-Urban Academic Debate Rural-Urban Background: The California Senate Defining Rural and Urban Senate Basic and Moderate Rural-Urban Disagreement Votes Senate Basic Rural-Urban Agreement Votes Senate Moderate Rural-Urban Agreement Votes Conclusions VII. NORTH-SOUTH VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 148 North-South Background Assembly North-South History Defining North-South Assembly North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes Assembly North-South Basic Agreement Votes Assembly North-South Moderage Agreement Votes with Northern Minority Assembly North-South Moderate Agreement Votes with Southern Minority Conclusions VIII. NORTH-SOUTH VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE . 172 North-South Background Senate North-South History Extent of the Unrepresentatlveness Senate North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes iv Chapter Page Senate North-South Basic and Moderate Agreement Votes....................... 185 Conclusions IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................... 188 Comparison of the Three Dichotomies Analysis of Legislation Evaluation of Voting Trends BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................... 217 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Number of Republicans and Democrats In the California Legislature in the 1957-1959- 1961 Legislative Sessions ................. 55 2. Assembly Basic Party Disagreement Votes .... 61 3. Assembly Party Votes--Jewell Definition 90 Per Cent Level.......................... 62 4. Percentage of Party Votes and Ranking by State................................... 63 5. Comparison of the Types of Votes That Caused Assembly Basic Party Disagreement in Califor nia with the Other Eight States and Their Ranking........... 65 6. Assembly Basic Party Disagreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order...................... 67 7. Assembly Moderate Party Disagreement Votes . . 69 8. Assembly Moderate Party Disagreement Votes by Issue Category . . . ................... 70 9. Assembly Moderate Party Disagreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order............... 72 10. Assembly Basic and Moderate Party Disagreement Votes Combined and by Percentage Order ... 74 vi Y Table Page 11. Assembly Basic Party Agreement Votes........ 76 12. Assembly Basic Party Agreement Votes by Issue Category............................... 78 13. Assembly Basic Party Agreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order............. 79 14. Number of Times on Assembly Basic Party Agree ment Votes Two Parties Were Both Below and Above the 80 Per Cent Cohesion Level .... 81 15. Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Votes .... 83 16. Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Vote with a Small Minority of Republicans Voting Against the Republican Party Majority .... 85 17. Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of Republicans Voting Against the Republican Party Majority Ranked by Percentage Order ...................... 87 18. Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of Democrats Voting against the Democratic Party Majority............. 89 19. Assembly Moderate Party Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of Republicans Voting against a Republican Party Majority Ranked by Per centage Order........................... 90 20. Assembly Basic Disagreement Votes: Would Have Been Party Votes if Either Republicans or Democrats would have voted with Greater Unity................................... 92 21. Moderate Party Disagreement Votes: Would Have Been Basic Assembly Disagreement Votes if Either Republicans or Democrats Would Have Voted with Greater Unity...................... 94 vii Table Page ! 22. Assembly Overall Cohesion Scores for the Two Parties.............................. 96 23. Senate and Assembly Basic and Moderate Party Disagreement Votes................ 106 24. Senate Party Disagreement Votes Listed at Several Cohesion Levels ................... 107 25. Senate Party Disagreement Votes by Issue Category.............. 109 26. Senate Basic Party Agreement Votes Ranked by Category Compared to Assembly Ranking .... Ill 27. Senate Overall Cohesion Scores for the Two Parties.................................. 114 28. Leading Urban States In the Country Ranked by Urban Percentages........................ 130 29. Ten Leading California Counties Ranked by Cash Value of Agricultural Production......... 132 30. Urban Counties............................. 137 31. Senate Rural-Urban Disagreement Votes Listed at Several Levels of Cohesion ............... 138 32. Senate Rural-Urban Disagreement Votes........ 140 33. Senate Rural-Urban Basic Agreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order ......... 142 34. Senate Rural-Urban Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of Urban Legislators Voting Against an Urban Majority................. 144 35. Proportion of the State's Population in Four Southern California Counties ............. 153 will Table Page 36. Assembly North-South Disagreement Votes Listed at Several Cohesion Levels......... 37. Assembly North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes ...................... 38. Assembly North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order 39. Assembly North-South Basic Agreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order ............... : 40. Assembly Moderate North-South Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of the Northerners Voting Against the Northern Majority .... 41. Assembly Moderate North-South Agreement Votes with a Small Minority of the Southerners Voting Against the Southern Majority .... 42. Ranking of the Ten Most Malapportloned State Senates Using Varied Mathematical Tests . . . 43. Senate North-South Disagreement Votes Listed at Several Cohesion Levels ............... 44. Senate North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes ...................... 45. Senate North-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes Ranked by Percentage Order i 46. Comparison of the Three Dichotomies in the Assembly at Two Different Cohesion Levels . . ; 47. Comparison of the Three Dichotomies in the Senate at Two Different Cohesion Levels . . . I 48. Senate and Assembly Compared In Terms of the Average Percentage for Three Sessions That Each Dichotomy Received .................. is 161 162 165 i 167 169 170 180 183 184 186 189 192 194 LIST OF MAPS Page Southern Senatorial Districts ....... 101 Southern Assembly Districts................. 102 North-South Definitions..................... 158 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: CALIFORNIA, A CRITICAL STATE California ia criticized and praised, condemned and exhalted by more citizens than, perhaps, any other state in the union. Popular mass magazines have devoted entire issues to the topic of "California living." Tele vision shows and motion pictures produced and filmed in Hollywood and shown throughout the world visually describe the many attributes of the Golden State. Lured by these exciting visions, great waves of Americans have swept into the state yearly, seeking the "good life" of California— the sunny warm climate, the financial prospects, the new shopping centers, the orange groves, the back-yard barbe cues and, perhaps, just the chance to live near such exotic sounding communities as Bel Air, Beverly Hills, or Malibu. The popularity of this "good life" theme is obvious: Cali fornia during the past century has doubled its population 1 I every twenty years— a figure far outstripping the national growth rate. In addition to its admitted attractions, California has been newsworthy for other reasons. One aspect of California life which has drawn the frequent attention of the mass media of conmunication is the zany and eccentric actions of particular portions of the state's population. It seems quite likely that California, and especially Southern California, has as many crackpots per square mile as any other comparable area in the country.^ Food fad dists, beatnik poets, technocrats, physical culturalists, sun bathers, movie starlets, militant pensioners, and Pershing Square narcotics addicts are all numbered among its citizens. Southern California also appears to be a fertile area for the growth and development of extremist political movements— especially of the "far right" variety.2 For ^For an excellent description of the history of the development of some of these unusual cults, see John V. Caughey, California (Englewood Cliffs, H.J.: Prentlce- Hall, 1958), pp. 396-399; or a more popular treatment was given in Bruce Bliven, "How Did Southern California Get That Way?" Reporter. XXVI, (January 18, 1962), 39-40. 2Terms such as "far right" and "far left" are bandied about today in the newspapers or on television with --------------------------------------------------- J example, many authorities have cited Southern California as being one, if not the moat important, of the prime centers of John Birch Society activity in the country. Although this group's membership figures are not public knowledge, there is no question that in many Los Angeles suburbs the John Birch Society is an active, militant, and thriving organization. In the 1962 Congressional elections two declared members of the John Birch Society, Republican Congressman John Rousselot and Edgar Hiestend, were defeated in their re-election efforts. However, it appears that they lost their seats to their Democratic opponents primarily because the Democratically controlled state legislature had, through reapportioning, changed i their 1960 districts into 19€^2 Democratic strongholds. At present, only one admitted John Birch Society member is in very little attempt at predalon. Of course, a great deal Of time could be expended in attempting to define these words, but for the purposes of this dissertation, it was decided to use these terms as they are popularly used; i.e., "far right" referring to groups like the John Birch Society, and "far left" to groups like the Communist Party. ^See T. George Harris, "The Rampant Right Invades the GOP,” XXVII, Ho. 14 (July 16, 1963), 19-25; or Richard Vahan, The Truth about Birch Society (Hew York: Hacfadden-Bastell, 1962). i 4 the California legislature--Senator John Schmitz, repre senting Orange County. Other ultraconservative groups, such as the Chris tian Anti-Communist Crusade, the Mlnutemen, the Aaiericanism Educational League, the National Committee for Economic j Freedom, the Free Enterprise Bureau, the Committee for the Preservation of the Constitution, the Organisation for the Repeal of the Income Tax, the Network of Patriotic Letter Writers, the California Chapter of the Pro-America Organi zation, and more specialized community patriotic groups, sometimes formed on an ad hoc basis, also have a sizeable following in this area. While the the far left in California probably does not compare numerically or in influence with the far right, it still clings to a perilous but stubborn existence. The Communist Party's unofficial West Coast newspaper, the People's World, is sold weekly on newsstands, and the great majority of its subscribers live in California. This paradox of a flourishing far right existing alongside a ^According to the circulation and fund drive fig ures, California subscribers provided all but 2.4 per cent of the operating budget of the newspaper this year; see People's World. "Standings on PW Drive," July 17, 1965, p. 8. . y small but persistent far left minority seems to be typical of California. Juxtaposition of extremes has helped to make Cali fornia unique. In addition to its cranks and crackpots, the state has had an unusually large number of Nobel Prize winners, leading artists, eminent musicians, world-renowned authors, and articulate and influential Republican and Democratic leaders. It is the home of high-powered intel lectual research centers, such as the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, as well as Hollywood and the movie industry. It is In this state that Almee Sample McPherson decades ago founded the Four Square Gospel Church, and it is also here that other equally fundamentalist Protestant denominations have thrived and,at the same time, there are such secular paradises as Palm Springs, Malibu, and the Sunset Strip. It is a state noted for its commer cial fun palaces such as Disneyland, Knotts' Berry Farm, Jungleland, and Pacific Ocean Park; yet also within its borders one can locate a number of the country's finest universities and colleges. In this state, too, one can find great natural beauty— Tosemite National Park, Sequoia National Park, Mt. Whitney, Death Valley, and the Monterey : . — ? Peninsula— but also such man-made blight as concrete free ways criss-crossing decaying metropolitan centers, ugly new blacktopped shopping centers, and smog-enshrouded cities. The state has Its cosmopolitan elegance In cities like San Francisco, Carmel, and LaJolla; It has Its great middle- class suburban sprawl surrounding the important population centers; It has Its drab squalibr In the run-down areas of Its older cities; and, indicative of Its ultrarapid growth, It has its ghost towns. California Is newsworthy and colorful for a number of other reasons. Historically, the period of the Spanish occupancy of California goes back as far as the English colonial period on the East Coast. The lingering Latin influence can be attested to by the Spanish missions, the large Mexican-American population, city fiesta days, and even town and street names. Besides its important Mexican- American population, there are other sisable ethnic groups In California, such as the Japanese, Chinese, Jewish, and Negro minorities. Any kind of quick thumb-nail impression of Cali fornia must be selective and, obviously, much more could be said of the social setting of the state. Yet one point should be emphasized from the outset: California appears 7 today to be the pace-setter, the fashion leader, and to some extent the important opinion moulder for the rest of the country. Many of the popular writers, when describing California, refer to living there as the future way of life for the rest of the country--with all its vaunted assets and impressive liabilities An editorial In Eseuire perhaps best sums up this contention: California is more than Culver City now. It is the largest state in the union, my dear people. It has Steve Allen an^t SAME and Cal Tech and the Mixons and many Nobel Prilja winners in science and also Jack Kerouac and Poetry and JAZZ. California fur thermore leads the way in leisure, in backyard barbe cues, in new industries, in defense contracts, in the culmination of the American Dream and in the pur suit of happiness. From all over the nation come leading dtlsens in the upper-mobile strata to Join our migrant and our acting coaches• A new day is dawning, a day in which California will come to represent FULFILLMENT of a nation's aspirations— truly the best of all possible stages. Uhere else could Bishop Pike and Tab Hunter 'ufipe and prosper in the same warm climate? In what other area could Aldjpus Huxley and Tuesday Meld enjoy the same bene fit*? In what other state can you have a date-nut malted for lunch, bouef bourguignon for dinner, and a vagi-cut lefe for a midnight snack? . . • California will always Be the OPIATE of the people, but the drug has changed (not the dream factory of Hollywood). America demands a new fix in these troubled times of cold war and new frontier. How they look to California as the quintessence of life in a capital istic society. "California," Eseuire. February, 1963, p. 121. -----------— : ------- s California is a key state for another crucial rea son. In terns of political power, the Golden State is second only to New York In electoral votes, number of Con gressmen in Washington, D.C., and delegation strength at the presidential nominating conventions. If present popu lation trends continue, it is sure to be the most populous state in the union by the 1970 census when Congressional seats will be reallocated. The growing political power of the state is also evidenced in the number of presidential and vice-presiden tial candidates California has produced in the last few « years. In 1948 Earl Warren, then Governor of California, was nominated as the Republican vice-presidential candi date. At the 1952 Republican convention not only Earl Warren, but Senator William Knowland, the then Republican Senate minority leader, as well as the eventual designee of the party, Richard M. Nixon, were all Republican vice- presldential hopefuls. Political leaders such as Pat Brown, Governor of California, Thomas Kuchel, Senate Repub lican whip, and Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the Assembly, have national political reputations. The indications are clear: California has come of political age in national politics. — ------------------------------- - y Thus, for a number of political, social, and economic reasons, California is a critical state ax4 consequently, warrants the attention of scholars. In the next chapter the aims of this study will be formulated and a review of the literature dealing with the topics examined will be undertaken. CHAPTER II BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH Two basic points will be considered in the first half of this chapter: one, the objectives of the study and, two, the source materials that are available, including citations for California legislative politics, other legis lative roll call studies, and comparative state government data. Implicit in this chapter will be an attempt to justi" fy the undertaking of this dissertation topic. The re mainder of the chapter describes some of the highlights of California's political history. Objectives of This Study This study will focus upon one of the most vital institutions in the state government of California--the state legislature. It is in the state legislature, a microcosm of the State's population, that the major issues confronting the citizens are faced. The public record of 10 . TJr the discussions taking place In the corridors o£ the legis lature, in a Senate conmittee hearing room, or perhaps on the Assembly floor occur on what has been called the "moment of truth," when the legislator's roll call vote is recorded.1 Most texts and articles dealing with the voting behavior of California legislators cite three major con flict areas as being the most crucial and causing the most serious differences at the state capitol. According to this notion, when there is a disagreement among Sacramento solons, it will generally fall along one of three divisions: Republican-Democratic differences, rural-urban conflicts, - • " 1 or noi&h-south dichotomies. In this study, roll call votes from the 1957, 1959, and 1961 sessions of the legislature were examined. Votes ^Several California government documents were par ticularly helpful in this study: The Journal of the Assem bly (Sacramento: State Printing Office), Sessions 1957, 1959, 1961; The Journal of the Senate (Sacramento: Govern ment Printing Office), Sessions 1957, 1959, 1961. These volumes were used to secure the roll call breakdowns. ThT of Lealslatlva business (Sacramento: State Printing Office), Sessions 1957, 1959, and 1961, were useful in tracing the path of particular bills through the legislative maze. The California Blue Rook (Sacramento: State Printing Office), 1957, 1959, 1961, provided informa tion about the background of the state legislators. - . . . _ — on which 10 per cent or more of the legislators of a cham ber voted in opposition to a majority were separated from the rest of the roll calls for more careful study. The ultimate goal, of course, was an attempt to assess how cru cial each of the three predetermined divisions were in the legislative process. The questions that were of central concern throughout this study were: 1. Which of the three dichotomies appeared to be the most important? 2. How cohesive were these voting groups? 3. Which was the most cohesive and which the least cohesive voting group? 4. On what kinds of issues was the conflict most likely to be generated? 5. On what kinds of issues was there little if any divisiveness ? 6. On what kinds of issues did a particular sub group muster high cohesion— or low cohesion? 7. What were the trends in the voting patterns of the legislature? In the last chapter an attempt will be made to answer why more detailed description of this procedure may be found in Chapter 111.__________________________ ; _____ these voting alignments were manifested and what the find ings seem to indicate. It is hoped that through a consideration of these questions further insight into the nature of the legisla tive process and its ramifications for California state politics will be achieved. Additionally, an attempt will be made to compile significant data from which researchers in the area of comparative state governments will be able to draw. After surveying and tabulating data gathered from many states, generalizations and hypotheses could be formu lated, for example, on the importance of parties or the rural-urban split in our state legislatures. Political scientist H. Douglas Price has commented: Since each state is a system of "organized complexity" a relatively descriptive account of its system would permit higher-level generaliza tions to be drawn (and then tested) about particu lar aspects or theoretical questions (i.e., rural- urban conflict, two-party vs. one party, etc.)3 Douglas Price, "Comparative State Governments," (unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science national Meeting, 1962), p. 4. m Source Materials Llaitatiom California legislature source materials Fortunately, the researcher working in the area of California politics will find any number of books and articles dealing with this general topic. There are many fine secondary source texts devoted to California govern ment, each invariably having at least one chapter dealing with the topic of the "State Legislature." Among the authors of these California texts are Turner and Veig;* Hyink, Brown, and Thacker;^ Harris and Rowe;** Parrelly and Hinderacker;^ Crouch, McHenry, Boliens, and Scott;® and ^Henry A. Turner and John A. Velg, The Government and Politics of California (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960). ^Bernard L. Hyink, Seyom Broyn, and Ernest V. Thacker, Politics government in California (3rd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963). * * Joseph P. Harris and Leonard Rowe, California Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). ^Davld Farrelly and Ivan Hinderacker, The Politics of Cover——1 "«• 4 r % California (New York: Ronald, 1951). ®Vinston V. Crouch, Dean E. McHenry, John C. Bollens, and Stanley Scott, California Government and Politics (New York: Prentice Hall, 1960). 3 Hardy. Nor is this list of California governmant text writers complete: these are merely some of the more popu lar authorities in this area. Unlike the situation in many other states, analyses of the California political scene frequently receive na- tlonal attention. Articles such as those on the political career of Jesse Unruh, state elections, Republican Party feuds, bickering in the state legislature, and a myriad of other items relating to California's political milieu frequently appear in the newspapers and the popular mass national magazines. ^ Other more unique and specialized aspects of California's political system, such as the Q Leroy C. Hardy, California Government (New Tork: Harper and Roe, 1964). ^Seyeral analysts have been able to piece together certain factors ddch offer at least partial explanations for the imbroglio of California politics* For example, Totton J. Anderson, "California Enigma of National Poli tics," in Western Politics, edited by Frank H. Jonas (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah, 1961), pp. 69-136, offers some clues and insights into the California mael strom. Another writer, Cary He Williams makes a number of salient observations in California, the Great (New Tork: A. A. Wyn, 1949); as does Mary Ellen Leroy, "The Party System Comes to California," The Reporter. XVI (February 7, 1957), pp. 33-36. . ^ operation of the initiative and referendum,** the militant pensioners movement, ^ which has been a recurring phenom ena, the effects of cross-filing,*^ the power of the public relations firms managing political campaigns,*^ 0f the development of pre-primary endorsing extra-party organiza tions,*^ have been examined closely by political scientists and their articles on these topics have appeared in the leading scholarly journals. Yet not as much attention has been paid to the political nature of the California legislature as many of the other aforementioned topics. It is true that Young edited a volume, The Legislature of California: Its Member- **Wlnston Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in California (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1950); see also Wallace H. Best, "Initiative and Referendum Politics in California, 1912-1952" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Southern California, 1955). *2Robert E. Burke, Olsen1a Hew Deal for California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953). *^Robert J. Pltchell, "The Electoral System and Voting Behavior: The Case of California's Cross Filing," Western Political Quarterly. V (1959), 455-484. **Robert J. Pltchell, "The Influence of the Profes sional Management Firms in Partisan Elections in Califor nia," Western Political Science Quarterly. XI (1958', 278-300. *5Francis M. Carney, The Rise of Democratic Clubs — 17 ship. Procedure, *nd Work;1* * Otminus wrote The Legislature of California:^ and Beek published The California Legis lature. However, these authorities on the California legislature generally have concentrated their attention on the formal rules or on the legal history of the institu tion. There certainly has been very little concern about the motivating factors governing the voting process or, for that matter, any real concern about discerning the voting alignments or the power structure operating in the legis lature . Cresap, in Party Politics in the Golden State. dealt, as did the other California politics texts, with a description of the structural elements of California's in California (New Tork: Holt, 1958); James J. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chi cago: University of Chicago PreSs, 1962); and Karkell C. Ball, "The Story of the California Republican Assembly" (unpublished study by the Republican Assembly of Los Angeles County, 1955) (mimeographed). 1*C. C. Young (ed.), The Legislature of Califor nia: Its Membership. Procedure. and Work (San Francisco: • Commonwealth Club, 1943). ^Arthur A. Ohmlnus, The Legislature of California (Sacramento: State Printer, 1959). ^Joseph A. Beek, The California Legislature (Sacramento: State Printer, 1942). ----------------------— ------------------------------------------------n r govenntat, but greater attention was given in his volume to the political milieu of the state and, in partic- 19 ular, the voting blocs in the state legislature. 7 For example, Cresap devoted several pages to an analysis of the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic legislators through htfl use of selected roll call vote tabulations. Professor William Buchanan's Legislative Partisanship: The Dg-pianf Case of California^ is undoubtedly the most thorough and comprehensive study of the state legislature yet undertaken, and it has a further advantage in its cur rency. In this monograph Buchanan traced the political history of the legislature. Indicating some of the more important historic voting alliances, appraising the signif icance of several voting cleavages (especially the party division) and identifying through a cluster-type analysis various legislators' coalescing patterns in determining legislative voting behavior. Although a fairly adequate bibliography on the ^Dean R. Cresap, Party Politics in the Golden State (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1950). ^William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California (University of California Pub lications in Political Science, Vol. XIII; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). . ^ California legislature can be compiled, and one probably more complete than for most states, there is little doubt that a great deal more could be learned about the state legislature. Certainly most of the questions posed as the central problems of this study referred to earlier in this chapter deserve far more attention than they have been given up to this time. Roll call source materials Undoubtedly political scientists, for some rather obvious reasons, have been more interested in studying and writing about the United States Congress than they have been in examining the various state legislatures. The greater substantive importance of Congressional legislation, the immediate impact that the decisions make at the nation al level, the attention the mass media concentrates upon national happenings, and the gravity of international relations are all factors encouraging political scientists to focus most of their attention on the national level. In particular, there are a number of fine roll call analy ses dealing with Congress in contrast to a surprising paucity of this type of study of state governments. Most notable among these congressional roll call studies are 21 Turner's Pertv and Constituency: Pressures on Congress. Truman's Congressional Party.22 and McCrae1 ■ of Congressional Voting.23 Perhaps the most comprehensive state government roll call study is Jewell's comparative analysis of eight different state legislatures.2^ In addition, there are a number of roll call analyses which have concentrated upon particular specialized problem areas in state legislatures, for example, the rural-urban split. Therefore, although it is true that there are some outstanding exceptions to this general rule, for the most part analyses of voting patterns In the state legislatures using the roll call technique have not been given the attention by political scientists that they appear to warrant. 21Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures rm Coneraai ("The Johns Hopkins University Studies in His torical and Political Science," Series 69, Mo. 1; Balti more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951) 22David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (Mew Tork: Wiley & Co., 1959). 2^Duncan McCree, Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959). 2*Kalcolm Jewell, The State Legislature— Politics and Practice (Mew Tork: Random House, 1962). 21 Comparative state government source — The entire field of comparative state politics is an even more neglected area needing research. Political scientist V. 0. Key commented: Manuals on American government and politics commonly focus attention on the epic battle of Republicans and Democrats for control of the national govermaent, on the interests clustered around the national party banners, on the grand policy issues that preoccupy Congress. Scholars, like most citizens, pay less heed to the problem of political organization and leadership for the conduct of state governments. Tet state govern ments perform functions of no mean significance and determine policies of great concern to power ful social groups.25 Some attention has been focused on this area of research. For example, there were several important regional and state politics books, such as Key's Southern Politics.26 Lockhard's Hew England State P o l i t i c s .and a volume edited by Frank Jonas entitled Western State 25V. 0. Key, Politics. Parties, and Pressure Grouns (Hew Tork: Thomas T. Crowell Co.; 4th ed.; 1958), p. 310. 26V. O. Key, Southern Politics (Hew Tork: Knopf, 1949). 22Duane Lockhard, New Englf"** st1 *te Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). . 22 Politics..2® Little has been attempted on a fifty state comparative basis. The most notable pioneering works in the area of comparative state government are Zeller's 29 American State Lealslatures and Key's American State Politics..®® In these latter two volumes some of the first concerted attempts at comparing, for example, the legisla ture of Pennsylvania with the legislature of Louisiana, or the governors of Rhode Island and Wyoming, were undertaken. Stirring from their indifference in this area, in December, 1954, the Political Behavior Cosmittee of the American Political Science Association called for "the devotion of additional effort to the comparative study of state politics" as "an especially advantageous way to advance the margins of our knowledge of politics."®* An example of this renewed Interest in comparative state 28Frank Jonas (ed.), Western State Politics (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1961). 29 Belle Zeller, State Legislatures (Hew Tork: Crowell, 1952). 30 V. 0. Kev.American State Politics: An Introduc tion (Hew Tork: Knopf, 1956). ^"Report of the Political Behavior Committee of the American Political Science Association," American Po litical Science Review. XLVIII (1954), 716. 1 politics is Jewell's American State Legislatures.32 which dealt with party conflict and cohesion in eight selected states. Another important contribution is The Legislative System, in which state legislators from four states were interviewed and their role concepts examined.^3 Lockhard, in an impressive volume, focused his primary attention on the internal politics in state government,^ and Vines and Jacob were the editors of a new work in which important hypotheses were suggested. Articles in this latter book were enhanced by the imaginative statistical formulations found in the chapters.35 The coaments that have been made about the lack of research activity by political scientists in the state government area were not designed to disparage this profes sion or to be pejorative toward any Individuals for their ^Jewell, on. d t . ^^Sulau Heins, John Wahlke, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (Hew Tork: Wiley, 1962). 3*Buana Lockhard, The Politics of State and Local Government (Hew Tork: Macmillan, 1963). ^Kenneth Vines and Herbert Jacob (eds.), Compara tive State Politics (Hew Tork: Little, Brown, 1965). —z s r omissions, but merely to emphasize the fact that studies using the latest behavioral techniques are sorely needed In the area of state politics. Hopefully, this paper mill contribute one further piece to the jigsaw puzzle of com parative state politics. California's Polltleal Hlafcory California, In terms of presidential electoral politics, Is usually ranked with New Tork, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan as one of the Northech, urban, large electoral vote states. These states have a number of factors In common: (1) large urban con centrations populated by citizens from a number of ethnic minority groups; (2) heavily industrialized econoades; and (3) a multiplicity of metropolitan problems such as diffi culties surrounding the mass transit system, air polution, water polution, slums, crime, labor unrest, and the like. Presidential campaigns are waged primarily in these pivotal states because of their electoral vote power. Although each of these states has its individual political history, surely none is more dissimilar from the others than Cali fornia's. At the same time that citizens in the original . 25 colonies were fighting for their independence against the British during the American Revolution, California was part of the Spanish domain (later part of the Mexican empire), California was the last of the "northern" states listed above to be admitted to statehood. California's admittance in 1850 came some 32 years after Illinois became a state. Since statehood, there has been a prodigious in crease in its population. Certain periods stand out as being especially noteworthy in this respect. There was the gold rush period during the 1850's, the railroad boom during the 1870's, the oil discovery period at the turn of the century, tile dust bowl migration in the 1930's, and the return after World War II of servicemen who had been stationed in California, each bringing waves of new resi dents to the state. During the 1870's, one of the country's first workingmen's political parties was organized under the leadership of Dennis Kearney. This was no mere socialist splinter faction, but was the leading political party in 36 California during this time. Later, as in so many other 36John W. Caughey, California (Hew York: Prentlce- Hall, 1958), pp. 387-388. 2S states of that era, the politics and governing of the state caae, to a considerable extent, to rest upon the railroad magnates--nost notably Leland Stanford, Collins Huntington, Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins. Probably the most lasting and important political movement to form in California was the Progressive Party movement led by reform governor, Hiram Johnson. The Pro gressives were a middle-class reform movement carrying on to an extent some of the reformist traditions of the earlier Populists.^ The Progressives believed that the best way to achieve "good government" was to give the people the means and the power to decide important politi cal questions. The corruption of the Eastern big city bosses and their political machines Impelled the Progres sives to erect barriers against politicians and the polit ical party structure in California. The Progressive Move ment, of course, was not just a California phenomena, but was a national movement. However, it was in California that the Progressives achieved some of their most Important and lasting reforms. Although many reforms were Included Richard Hofstader, The Age of Reform (Hew Tork: Vantage Books, 1960). 27 in the Progressive platform, such as some important pro visions for welfare programs, the political reforms designed to curb the power of the professional politician were of particular significance. These were the "reforms" which have had such a negative Impact on the growth and development of California's party system. Among the political "reforms" introduced by the Progressives were the following: 1. The initiative 2. The referendum 3. The recall 4. Cross-filing 5. Nonpartisan local elections 6. No party designation on primary ballots 7. No easy way on the ballot to vote a straight ticket 8. The direct primary The goals of the Progressives were only partially achieved. It is true that these modifications tended to handicap the growth of political parties, but there is no clear evidence that having the people share directly in the running of the government led to improved efficiency or wiser decisions by the leaders of the state. Indeed, 28 b o m clain that these "reforms" had the opposite effect. However, the methods that they believed would attain these results were enacted and do shape California politics in the twentieth century. What appears to have developed In the absence of strong contending political parties was a power vacuum which was filled, in part at least, by a series of shifting business, agrarian, railroad, Hollywood, liquor, oil, and other powerful lobby interests. 7 There Is little doubt, too, that It was the Demo cratic Party in particular which was hurt more by these reforms. The unique cross-filing primary system was adopted when the Republican Party dominated the state's elective offices, and to it accrued the advantages of incumbency. This primary system allowed party candidates of one party to cross-file and run in the opposing party's primary as well as their own. Incumbents were able to For example, Crouch, et al., on. cit.. maintained that the initiative, referendum, and recall have worked to the advantage of wealthy special interests rather than to the great mass of California citisens. Most authorities point out the weakness of California's parties, the implicit theme being that a "strong viable two-party system" is the most desirable goal. ^Caughey, op. cit. . _ — capitalise on their greater none recognition, their posi tion on the ballot (at the head o£ the list), and their right to use their office as part of their titles (i.e., Representative John Smith). Thus, in the period from 1914 to 1954, when cross-filing was the rule, 70 per cent to 80 per cent of the state legislators were able successfully to cross-file and win in the primary, for all practical pur poses, their final election. The overwhelming percentage of those early winners were Republicans. Since voters had no easy wap of determining the partisan convictions in the primary elections, newspapers' endorsements were probably more important than is custom ary. The large influential newspapers In the important metropolitan centers are owned by publishers who are Republican oriented--newspapers such as the Los Angelas Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Diego Union. and the Oakland Tribune. Starting especially in the Hew Deal period of the 1930's, the Republican domination of California began to receive stiffer competition from the Democrats. Although elective positions were still generally won by Republican office-seekers, Demoeratlc registration figures rose steadily in proportion to Republican figures. A number of ^ experts looking at this period of Republican supremacy in elective offices and Increasing Democratic registration figures, in addition to cross'filing and newspaper influ ence, usually cite the following as reasons for this seem ing paradox: Republicans were better organised, ran smarter campaigns, had more money, had less intraparty strife, bought more billboard signs, and in general, outclassed the Democratic Party in candidates, strategy, and organiza tion. Also many of the new residents coming into the state were Democrats in name only. The typical Republican voter was far more likely to vote, participate in the cam paign* and urge fellow citizens to vote than the typical Democratic voter. Additionally, because of their superior resources, Republicans were able to buy the services of some of the leading public relations firms in California.^ By the early 1950's registered Democrats exceeded registered Republicans by over one million voters. Partial electoral success could no longer be denied the Democrats and the balance of power in the state began to shift. In 1954 the Democrats in the legislature were instrumental in changing the cross-filing laws. Candidates were still ^Harris and Rowe, on. cit.. pp. 15-19. 31 allowed to cross-file, but the designation "Dem" or "Rep" had to precede the office-seeker. The masher of successful cross-filers was cut noticeably, and the mmber of new Democrats elected to the legislature was appreciable. By 1959 cross-filing was discontinued entirely and Democratic Party fortunes have risen accordingly. Some authorities contended that another Important reason for the resurgence of the Democratic Party in Call- ' fornla could be attributed to the formation of the Califor nia Democratic Council and its series of local Democratic clubs. Proponents and opponents of the club movement, both within and outside the Democratic Party, disagree sharply as to how much effect the C.D.C. (as it is usually known) has had on Democratic resurgence. It is true that for the first time attempts were made in precincts considered hopelessly lost to the Republicans to get out Democratic Party voters and the Democrats now had a counterpart to the California Republican Assembly which had for so long had a monopoly on the preprimary endorsement for the Grand Old Party. Developing at approximately the same time as the amateur* Democrats in the C.D.C. was a revived regular Democratic Party organisation, under the leadership of . . Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh. Thus, Democrats have rapidly becosie the domlxiant party In the California legislature, and they also outnum ber their Republican colleagues by a sizable margin In California's congressional delegation. It would appear that the decisive changes In the nonpartisan, Republican-oriented political milieu in Cali fornia came with the change in the state's primary laws, coupled with a revived Desu>cratlc Party organization. The large number of Democratic aspirants successfully running for state and national offices and the gubernatorial vic tory of Pat Brown over challenger Richard M. Nixon in 1962 were Indications of a strong resurgent DesK>cratlc Party. Thus the time span of this study, 1957-1961, covers a critical transitional period In this state. First, It marks the end of the Republican Party's control over the state government. Second, since the Supreme Court has ruled that states must apportion both houses of their legislatures on an equitable population basis, it means that these are the last years In which the effects of mal apportionment— both rural-urban and north-south--were registered. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED This study is primarily a roll call analysis of the California legislature during the 1957, 1959, and 1961 legislative sessions. In the even-numbered year sessions the legislature is constitutionally limited to a considera tion of the budget, while during the odd-numbered year sessions the full gamut of issues ranging from agricultural pesticides control legislation to zoning regulations is considered. Since the kinds of issues causing legislative conflict are a major concern in this study, only the odd- numbered year sessions have been examined. In addition to an examination of roll calls, a number of interviews have been conducted with present and former state legislators, a few legislative aides, and several professional staff members of some of the state legislative committees. These interviews were undertaken for two ymasons: first, to provide further insights into 33 34 the California legislative process; and second, to help determine whether the conclusions reached by roll call study would collate with the impressions of those inter viewed. Tabulating legislative roll call votes is certainly not a new methodological approach. It is merely another attempt to quantify social science data in order to provide a more objective body of materials from which to draw con clusions about the legislative process. At present there is an acrimonious debate going on within the discipline of political science between the scientifically oriented behavioralists and the non- or antibehavioralists. This debate revolves to an extent around the desirability of employing statistical techniques in the analysis of polit ical phenomena. Nevertheless, basic statistical tabula tions are commonplace in many of the books and articles written in political science today. Although there is a tendency to think of these statistical applications as being a rather current prac tice, A. Lawrence Lowell worked with tabulated roll call data over sixty years ago in his study of party discipline . 53- in the United States and England.^ During the intervening years other political scientists have used roll call data in the analysis of legislatures, especially since the 1920*s. In 1925 Rice, in an article entitled "Heasuring Cohesion in Legislative Groups," extended the frontiers of political research by suggesting some refinements to roll call theory studies.^ In analyzing group voting patterns he developed two indexes: the index of cohesion and the index of likeness. For example, in his index of cohesion, he proposed that if all members of a group voted the same way, this would be 100; if they were evenly divided, this would be 0. Thus votes with 80 per cent of the northern senators voting together in opposition to 20 per cent of the southern senators would place the index of cohesion at 60 (i.e., 30/50 either way, 80-50*30 and 30/50 or 60-- 50-20*30 and 30/50 or 60). Later Rice was to point the way *A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," Report of the American Historical Association. X (1901), 321-542. ^Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," Political Science Quarterly. XL (1925), 60-72; reprinted in John C. Vahlke and Heins Eulau, Legislative Behavior (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 372- 377. ----------------------------------------------------- to further uses of statistics in political research by the publication of his landmark work, Quantitative Methods in Politics.^ More recently, there have been a number of roll call studies published by political scientists. Keefe, in his study of the Illinois state legislature^ and the Pennsylvania legislature,^ examined roll call votes, as did Lockhard in his study of the Connecticut legislature.^ Turner used roll call data in his analysis of party voting in Congress.7 Truman developed in his text, Congressional Party. a technique which he called cluster analysis, triiich is an elaborate pairing of all the legislators in a ^Stuart A. Rice, QimnMi-ative Methods in Politics (Mew York: Knopf, 1925). ^William J. Keefe, "Party, Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly," Northwestern University Law Review. XLVII (1952), 55-71. ^William J. Keefe, "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature," American Political Science Review. XLVIII (1954), 450-464. $£uane Lockhard, "Legislative Politics in Connec ticut," American Political Science Review. XLVIII (1954), 166-173. 7Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress f"The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Series 69, No. 1; Balti more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). 37 g particular chamber on a series of roll call votes. Jewell has used roll call votes to make cross comparisons of party voting In several state legislatures.^ Salisbury's analy sis of the urban-rural voting patterns in the Missouri legislature employed roll call data, as did Ogle in his study of the rural-urban dichotomy In Indiana,^ and Derge in his article on the Illinois legislature.^ The roll call study most germane to this thesis is Buchanan's thoughtful monograph on the California legislature in which he concentrated his attention upon "discovering" blocs of legislators through a pairing operation of all the assem- g David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (Hew Tork: Wiley and Co., 1959). Q Malcolm Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," American Pnll^tcal Science Review. XLIX (1955), 773-791. ^Robert H. Salisbury, "Rural-Urban Factionalism in Missouri Papers” (unpublished report to the Mid-West Political Science Association, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Spring 1958, p. 1). 11Marbury Ogle, "Rural-Urban Splits in Indiana" (unpublished report to the Mid-Wsst Political Science Association, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Spring, 1958, p. 1). ^David Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Align ments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review. LII (1958), 1065. — - ; -----JB blymen and senators In the state capltol. J Feasibility of Roll Call Vote Studies It is not possible within the scope of this study to comment extensively on the debate between the behavior- ali8ts and the nonbehavioralists concerning the application of statistical techniques In studying politics. Suffice it to say, this study is based upon the premise that sta tistical manipulations may contribute insights into the legislative process. The question that must be considered in this study is whether a roll call analysis is a valid methodological technique. Methodology is largely determined by what it is that is to be investigated. This dissertation focuses upon the determinants of legislative behavior through an examin ation of three variables: the legislator's party, the rural or urban nature of his constituency, and the section of the state he represents. Many other approaches have been used by behavior- ally oriented political scientists in studying legislatures l^Wllliam Buchanan, Legislative Partismaahln: The Deviant Case of California (University of California Publications in Political Science, Vol. nil) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). ----- 5 9 such as scaling legislative voting on particular Issue categories,1^ analyzing legislators In terns of role theory,1^ * describing the Interplay of group activity,1* * considering personality factors,1^ or using game theory.18 These methodological techniques and others have their advantages and disadvantages. In terms of the central concerns of this study, It was decided that the roll call method would provide the most meaningful data from which to derive hypotheses concerning the Importance of parties, the rural-urban question, and the significance of the north- south division. Louis Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analy sis," In Measurement and Prediction, ed. by Samuel A. Stouffer, et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). 15 Heinz Bulau, et al.. The Legislative Syfyf Explorations In Legislative Behavior (Hew Tork: Wiley, 1962). 160avld B. Truman, The Governmental Process (Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). 1^John B. McConaughy, "Some Personality Factors of State Legislators In South Carolina," Artr4ff1P Political Science Review. XLIV (1950), 897-903. 18 R. Duncan Luce and Arnold A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-Party System," Behavioral Science. I (1956), 83-95. 40 One political scientist, Professor Wilder Crane, has raised several thoughtful questions concerning the feasibility of using roll call data. His criticisms, as well as other deficiencies of the roll call approach could be summed as follows: 1. Measures are really decided in the legislative committees; most authorities are convinced that it is in these "miniature legislatures" that the real issues are thrashed out. The roll call vote is only a formality. 2. It would be possible, and it happens not infre quently, that a legislator may vote against a bill's passage in the secret committee vote, but vote for it in the public roll call in order to appease constituent sentiment. 3. Truly divisive bills are frequently "bottled up" in committee and are not even allowed out for floor action. Some crucial bills are "marked up" by committee or subcommittee so that final floor action on a virtually new compromise bill has little meaning. 4. Assume there are four legislators--legislators A, B, C, and D. A provision to Increase sick ---------------------------- leave pay for workers has been Introduced: a. A votes against the bill because it will cost too such. b. B votes against it because the watered down bill falls short of the amount of increase he feels is necessary. c. C votes against it because of his party's position. d. D votes against it because he shares his desk with a strong opponent of the bill. Since he has no firm convictions on the measure, he decided to vote along with his friend. These four individuals would be grouped together in the "nay" category with the implicit assumption that they were in agreement on this vote. Yet we know from these four separate situations that agreement was only superficial.^ Professor Heinz Eulau and his colleagues suggested some further limitations in roll call analysis: ^^Wilder Crane, "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting," Midwest Journal of Political Science. IV (1960), 1-26. The importance of recorded votes varies from one legislature to another. Where the Important decisions are made in caucus and followed by straight party line votes, these record votes would be a poor indication of any member's con tributions to the group's decisions. Other prac tices that diminish the relevance of roll call votes as an index of individual positions: auto matic unanimous ratification of committee deci sions; much time spent in committee of the whole, with heavy reliance on voice votes or standing votes; high rates of absenteeism; "carrying-over" roll calls from one bill to the next, thus record ing members as for or against who have actually left the chamber.20 It was also reliably reported to this writer by one Cali fornia Assemblyman's legislative aide that in order to have a good voting record sometimes desk mates will vote for absent partners. This is easily accomplished by merely pressing the absent member's voting button and thereby tallying his vote on the electric score board. Price, in an article dealing with voting behavior of southern Democrats in Congress, used a roll call anal ysis but admitted the limitations of this approach. He commented: How there are certain obvious limitations on the value of roll call votes as basic data. Cer tainly a simple "yea" or "nay" vote cannot express different degrees of intensity of feeling, doubts 20Eulau, op. cit.. p. 230. 43 about the different parte of a complex Measure nay coneeal the fact that the sane response nay cone fron two legislators for contradictory reasons (as In the not too frequent situation where two ex tremes join to defeat a conprood.se proposal). Further, there Is considerable evidence that a legislator's own personal opinion on the positions he takes within connlttee nay well differ fron the 8tend he takes on a record vote. One even hears rumors that votes are nore or less traded, as when Western Denocrats vote with the Southerners on civil rights in return for needed Southern support for a high federal dan in Hell's Canyon.21 Crane argued that tabulating the nunber of times majorities of Republican and Democratic legislators were in opposition to each other or supported each other told little about legislative behavior. Crane stated: The roll calls do not reflect the extent to which party may be a critical voting factor on Issues on which the majority in both parties vote on the sane side; it also reveals that party roll- calls alone do not necessarily provide a reliable index of the extent to which legislators respond artisan considerations in deciding Professor Crane also pointed out that different methodolog ical techniques in studying legislatures could lead to 21h. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Denocrats Differ ent?'' Politic* fnd Social Life, edited by Helson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 740. 22 Crane, op. cit.. p. 13. . Z t f T contradictory conclusions. For example, Jewell found that parties were important and clashed frequently in many of the state legislatures which he examined, while Keefe, after studying the Illinois and Pennsylvania legislatures, negated the significance of political parties. Crane con cluded: Accordingly, the differences between Jewell's insistence on the Importance of parties in state legislatures and Keefe's denial that parties pro vide genuine policy alternative in state legisla tures, a claim which Jewell criticised is based upon different methods of research which each have employed. Jewell counted party roll calls and found they occurred often, whereas Keefe analyzed the issues on which party roll calls occurred.23 The criticism of roll call studies are important and must be recognized, but there are a number of important arguments that can be offered in defense of this methodo logical technique. A discussion of why this approach was used in this study follows. The California legislature is better suited than many other states for a roll call analysis because of its P* 18* Another reason for the difference in conclusions of the two is that Jewell omitted all bills which passed the legislature with less than 10 per cent opposition. Keefe, on the other hand, included all roll call votes and discovered a much lower proportion of party votes. 55 weak party structure. There are no party caucuses in the Senate, and in the Assembly these meetings are still a relatively new phenomenon.^ Sanctions are seldom, if ever, Imposed by party leaders in either house, and pres sures for party unity are normally discreet and subtle. It would be helpful to scholars if legislative committees would publicly record their votes, but this is not the case. Most of the people interviewed for this study agreed that few important bills were kept "bottled up," at least in the Assembly. Buchanan also made the same point: In Sacramento, though the Buies committees are technically responsible for the agenda in their chambers, they seldom use this power for the pur pose of shaping policy. . . . Unless the author desires otherwise, bills are considered in the order they arrive at each point in the route: at the desk of the presiding officer, in committee, and on the floor. Except in rare Instances, every bill is given a hearing if the author requests, and comparatively few measures— less than one per cent--are lost at the end of the session because they have not reached the calendar .25 Some contend, however, that not infrequently bills are passed by the Assembly, sent over to the Senate, and then ^Senators are sometimes invited to the party caucuses of their Assembly colleagues. ^Buchanan, on. cit., p. 94. . 55- tab led by a Senate Committee. At least the voting align ments in the lower house will be public record, however. Professor Crane criticised roll call vote studies because they failed to indicate the importance of partisan ship, when both parties supported a measure. This criti cism is justified. However, through a consideration of these party agreement votes, the kinds of issues upon which the two parties were able to unite can be determined. Thus, although the extent of party influence on agreement votes cannot be learned, detecting those issues that were either nonpartisan or those where the two parties have been able to coalesce is important. Prominent members of the legislature interviewed for this study believed that the number of times parties had been instrumental in secur ing. unity internally on issues where there was little inter- party conflict was not great. Another criticism of the roll call method is that the researcher is attempting, in effect, to add fruits and nuts together and there is no way of measuring the signifi cance of a vote. Although there is a problem in assessing the Importance of a particular roll call in this type of 47 26 study, Riker suggested one solution. Professor H. Douglas Price stated that roll call studies would not reveal whv a legislator voted as he did or the intensity of his convictions. However, he concluded his discussion of roll call methodology with the following remark: "Despite these limitations roll call votes are of great Importance in the legislative struggle and properly used, are a very valuable source of data."^ In concluding this section on the usefulness of roll call votes, the authors of The Legislative System summed up the argument for using roll call data in this way: . . . the [roll call vote] is undoubtedly the authoritative decision. . . . And if one is Interested in the impact of authoritative deci sions on the life of a community, careful analysis of roll call votes can convey a great deal of the legislator's place in the political system as a whole. ^tfilllam Hiker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls In Voting Bodies," in Legisla tive Behavior, edited by Heins Bulau and John C. Wahlke (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959). 27 A/P*icm, on. cit.. p. 740. 28 Eulau, on. cit., p. 230. . . 2 & The arguments suggested above indicate a roll call analysis of the California legislature is reasonable. Roll Call Votes in This Study There are literally thousands of votes taken in the legislative sessions of the California legislature. For example, during the 1957 session 4,520 roll call votes were taken in the Assembly alone. The great majority of these roll'call votes dealt with relatively insignificant matters and were passed quickly by unanimous or nearly unanimous majorities. These votes have been omitted from this study. These bills were deleted for two reasons 1. There were over 2,000 roll call votes that were analyzed in the three sessions studied. Add ing these nonconflict votes would greatly com plicate the tabulation. 2. These votes had only negligible significance; they were passed quickly and quietly with lit tle debate or discussion. Because the rules require a roll call vote on the final passage of all bills, exclusion of unanimous and nearly Bills with less than 10 per cent opposition. _ 5? unanimous votes appears sensible. Every roll call vote with at least a 10 per cent opposition to a majority is considered a "conflict" vote. Votes recorded were limited to substantive matters, not adjournment motions or housekeeping votes. Assembly or Senate constitutional amendments were not tabulated because they require an absolute two-thirds majority for passage. A legislator absent on a constitutional amendment vote would, in effect, be casting a "no" vote. Problems of evaluating the significance of the absentee legislator on these constitutional amendments are obvious, and these votes have been omitted purposely from this study. Senate and Assembly bills require an absolute majority for pas sage, and the absentee factor does not weigh as heavily in the vote outcome. Resolutions were also excluded from this study. For the most part these resolutions are not nearly as im portant as the regular bills, and furthermore it was neces sary to keep the number of roll calls examined within certain limits. Hardy described the various resolutions in this way: Resolutions for the purpose of memorialising or of making requests of the federal government ^ and other state governments are termed joint reso lutions. Concurrent resolutions are employed to establish joint rules or committees, to indicate legislative intent, or to request action of admin istrative officers (members as well as ex-members) or to express sorrow on their death. Lesser per sonages are honored or have sorrow expressed by a single house resolution.30 In a few instances there was a series of successive roll calls on the same measure. If five per cent of the members shifted their position, the vote was included. If there was no change in a long series of successive roll calls, only the first vote was included. Each legislator's voting record on the conflict roll calls was punched on data cards.Card deck sub groups were then compiled. For example, rural senators in the 1959 session were one subgroup. The decks of data cards were prepared to fit into the proper format for the 32 Tab 2 Questionnaire Analysis Computer Program. This Leroy C. Hardy, California Cover™**"*- (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 49. 3*The 1957 and 1959 card decks were compiled by Professor William Buchanan with the assistance of William Johnston and Richard Wright, graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley. The 1961 Assembly and Senate decks were prepared by this writer. 32This computer program was written by Mr. Fred White, on the staff of the University of Southern Califor nia computer center. Mr. W. R. Larson wrote the descrip- 51 program was written especially for social science research projects and permitted the tabulation of the myriad numbers of computations necessary in this study. This program is set up in such a way that analyses may be made for complete groups or by subgroups, in terms of sorting categories. j The data derived from these computations will be examined in the following chapters. tion of the program and assisted this writer at several difficult stages of the computer application. CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PARTY VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY As has been noted, throughout the first half of the twentieth century the Republican Party dominated the political life of California. It captured most of the state-wide elective offices, elected majorities in the Congressional delegations which California sent to the United States Congress, and controlled both houses in the state legislature. Tuner and Veig siiesmrlzed the Republi can orientation of Califonia: For more than half a century prior to the 1958 election the Republican Party controlled the ma jority of the political offices of the state. The Republicans doidLnated the state Senate from 1891 until 1957, when the two parties divided the seats of the Upper House evenly. With the exception of the three elections of 1936 through 1940, the Republicans elected a majority of the Assembly from 1894 until 1958. For sixty years, beginning in 1898, every Callfonla governor was a Republi can, except Culbert L. Olson, who held the guber natorial office for one term beginning in 1939. To illustrate further the extent to which the 52 . 5T Republicans dominated the California political scene, It might be noted that from 1890 until 1958 the Democrats mere able to elect only two men to the office of attorney general and were unable to elect a single person to the position of secretary of state, treasurer, and controller. Although, on the one hand, the Republican Party con trolled the state elective positions, on the other hand, Democratic Party voter registration figures surged past the Republicans for the first time In 1934 and have remained ahead ever since. By 1952 Democratic Party registration exceeded Republican registration by more than one million voters, yet the Republicans that year had a 54-26 margin in the state Assembly and a 29-11 majority in the state Senate. Democrats through 1954, for the most part, were unable to turn their registration supremacy into state election victories.^ Thus most of the older text books on ipolitical parties usually categorised California either as being a pivotal state, or "leaning** toward the Republican ^Henry A. Turner and John A. Velg, The Government and Politics of California (Mew York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 38-39. ^Charles 6. Bell, "A Study of Four Selected Factors Which Have Contributed to the Inability of the Democratic Party to Successfully Mobilise Its Latent Majority in California" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1949). -------------------------------------------------------------------------3* Party.^ in fact, Schlesinger, in an article written aa recently aa 1955, 8tlll had California claaaified aa a Republican state.^ In another reapect, even though the Republican Party did dominate state elections, undaunted by adverse registration figures, the Democratic Party was able to compete effectively during preaidential elections for the 8tate*8 8late of presidential electora. In fact, since 1932 California, more often than not, has gone Democratic in presidential elections. A similar phenomena, although reversed, may be occurring in the South today, where the Republican party has scored impressive victories in the last several presidential elections, hut has failed, for the most part, to dent Democratic strength in state and Congressional elections. Dayton* David HcKean, Party and Pressure Group Politics (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1949), p. 96; and Austin Raimey and tfilmoore Kendall, Democracy and the a— Psrtv System (Hew York: Her court, Brace and Com pany, 1956), pp. 527-533. 4Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter- Party Competition," AT T t* * f l n Political Science Review. XLIX, Bo. 4 (1955). 55 With Che end of cross-filing end Che development of eCrong Democratic precincC organisations In California, elecClve victories could no longer be denied Che Democrats. In Che 1959 legislacive session Che Republicans lose con trol of Che sCaCe legislature and in Che 1960 and 1962 elecCions Che DenocraClc margin was widened. Therefore, Che years covered in Chis study (i.e., Che 1957, 1959, and 1961 legislacive sessions) are significanC for boCh parties because they are Che CranslClonal years of growing Demo cratic superiority in the Assembly and Senate. In Table 1 TABLE 1 NUMBER OF REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS IN THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE IN THE 1957-1959-1961 LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS Membership by Tear Assembly Senate Number Per Cent Number Per Cent 1957 Republicans 43 54 19 52 Democrats 37 46 21 48 1959 Republicans 35 44 12 30 Democrats 45 56 28 70 TABLE 1— Continued 56 Assembly Senate Number Per Cent Number Per Cent 1961 Republicans 33 42 10 25 Desiocrats 47 58 30 75 the numerical strength of the Republicans and Democrats in the state legislature is shown. The 1957 legislative ses sion was the last in which the Republicans controlled the Assesibly. It should also be noted that in two of the legislative sessions studied, the Democrats had clear majorities in both houses of the legislature— 1959 and 1961. Because of this shifting balance of power in the state legislature, certain questions inevitably arise: Is the legislature becosdLng more partisan now that the Demo crats have supplanted the Republicans as the majority party? Is partisanship not as important a factor in Cali fornia as in other comparable urban states? How frequently do the two parties oppose each other in the legislature? On what types of Issues, if any, are differences manifested' 37 One hypothesis frequently Mentioned is that the impressive election victories achieved by the Denocrats recently have helped create a more partisan atmosphere in Sacramento. Republicans, for various reasons, had been among the most enthusiastic supporters of a kind of modi fied nonpartisanship— so long as they remained in power. In a section of Eulau's book, Buchanan noted this hybrid Republican-nonpartisanship orientation in his interviews with California legislators in the following remarks: California, as we noted before, was characterised by a psrty politics in transition during the 1957 session. The situation was still ambiguous enough for a large proportion of the responses to give party influence a rather low or negative evalua tion. An Assemblyman who judged the parties to have little or no influence put it this way: "Some men come in here with considerable party spirit but it wears off. They find there isn't time for it--you have to get results right away and the job is too big. The luxury of playing at parties doubles the time you have to spend on a bill." Another legislator explained: "They wave the flag about party principles, write the platform— but we never see it during the session." Even some who reluctantly evaluated party influence as increasing were cautious: "To a degree you are a captive of your party because you have to depend on it for help— you go along when you can do It without hypocrisy. Party Background: The Assembly With the advent of Democratic supremacy several events have occurred In the Assembly which experts on Call* fornla politics believe are Indicative of a partisan in crease. These changes concerned the selection of commit tee chairmen and vice chairmen and also the election of the Speaker. Suffice It to say, the changes that were Insti tuted In the 1963 legislative session were designed to give the Democrats greater leverage over their Republican adver saries. 6111am reported the story of the battle over legis lative changes: Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh (D-Inglewood) plans to suggest a rule change at the 1964 legis lative session which could give minority Republi cans a sms11 voice in the election of a speaker. Assembly majority Democrats rammed through a rule change last week providing the speaker, histori cally elected by all 80 members, be chosen by a majority party caucus. The Democrats presently control the lower house by a 52-28 margin over the GOP. Adoption of the new rule, which also requires all Assembly committee chairmen and vice chairmen to be members of the majority party, caused a 5 He in* Eulau, John Wahlke, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System: Exwoloratlons in tayialatlve Behavior (Hew York: Wiley. 1962). 59 furor that almost blow the done off the capltol. Republican laadara claimed they were being "punished" because the GOP temporarily held up final passage of Gov. Brown's supplemental state budget by imposing a 24-hour no-vote blockade. Unruh denied this was true, explaining the major ity party was seeking protection against what he called "extreme partisanship" practiced by minor ity Republicans." Traditionally, the election of the speaker had been one of the most important votes taken in the entire Assem bly session. Election was from the floor of the Assembly with all Assemblymen eligible to participate. Various fac tions In the legislature contended either to get their candidate elected or, at the least, to gain an important bargaining position through supporting the eventual win ner. ^ Unruh argued that his suggested rule change would merely have the California Assembly do what the United States House of Representatives does. Voting for Speaker of the House of Representatives is strictly a partisan affair, but under the former California plan, Sacramento colons had frequently crossed party lines in order to gain ®Jerry Glllam, "Unruh to Ask Rules Change Affecting GOP," Los Angel** T<l— Tr August 5, 1963. 7Willlam Buchanan, Legislative P a r t i s a n s h i p g Thm Deviant Casa of California ("University of California Publications in Political Science," Vol. HII; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 85. a more advantageous position when the Speaker's coalition divided the spoils. The change in the selection of comadttee chairman also would make the California lower house like the United States House of Representatives. Unlike Congress, where accession to committee chairmanships depends upon senior ity, selection for these posts in California had usually gone to members of both parties— the major criterion being whether they had been members of the Speaker's coalition. Under the new plan, committee chairmen would come solely from the ranks of the majority party. These changes and other actions by the almost living symbol of the alleged growing partisanship, Speaker Unruh (e.g., "locking in" the Republican Assemblymen in the 1963 session over a budget dispute), indicate the growing strife between Republican and Democratic party legislators. Aasemblv Basic Party Disagreement Votes The first question then is: do the roll call votes also indicate a picture of growing party strife in the state legislature? In Table 2 partisan votes for the three sessions are listed. A partisan vote has been defined as one in which 75 per cent or more of the Democrats in the • TABLE 2 ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES 61 Tear Total Number of Conflict Votes Basic Party Votes Number Per Cent 1957 265 18 7 1959 430 60 14 1961 273 40 15 Total 968 118 Assembly voted In opposition to 75 per c'ent or more of the Republicans in the lower house. It is clear that there have been more partisan votes in the California legislature since the 1957 session, the last year of Republican control of the State Assembly. The 1959 session had over three times as many, and the 1961 session had over twice as many. However, in each of the sessions studied there were thousands of roll call votes. In 1957, for example, there were over 4,000 separate roll calls. Thus, on only a small fraction of votes did as many as three-quarters of the Republicans vote against three- . quarters of the Democrats.** Jewell In his studies of political parties In the state legislatures used a higher definition (90 per cent) for what he classified as a "party vote."9 TABLE 3 ASSEMBLY PARTY VOTES--JEWELL DEFINITION 90 PER CENT LEVEL Year Total Number of Conflict Votes Partisan Votes Number Per Cent 1957 265 2 .008 1959 430 2 .005 1961 273 10 .04 Total 968 14 It is quite obvious that only a few votes in the three sessions studied In California are able to qualify as ^Stuart A. Rice, On*nfciNative Methods in the Study of Politics (New York: Knopf, 1928), p. 209. Rice used a party index of cohesion of 80-100 if 90 to 100 per cent of the members were on one side; 40-79 if 70 to 89 per cent were on one side and 0-39 if 50 to 69 per cent were on one side. 9Malcolm Jewell, "Party Voting In American State Legislatures," Political Science Review. XLIX (1955), 773. 5T party votes using the Jewell definition. Of course, a discussion of California partisanship without some compari son to other analogous states would be highly sterile. In Table 4 the percentages of party votes in the eight state legislatures studied by Jewell are listed. TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE OF PARTY VOTES AMD RANKING BY STATE Rank State Percentage of Party Votesa 1 Pennsylvania 62 2 Massachusetts 40 3 New York 34 4 Illinois 17 5 Ohio 15 6 Washington 9 7 Missouri 9 8 Colorado 7 9 California 4*> •Votes were studied from the other eight states' 1947 legislative sessions. ^The California session compared was the 1961 ses sion— in which there were the largest number of party votes of the three sessions studied. . 65T It can be seen that California, even in a period of partisan upswing, does not c o m very close to Colorado, the least partisan of the eight legislatures. Tet these eight states should be somewhat comparable to California. They have mainly urban populations, competitive two-party structures, sizeable ethnic minority groups, and are all non-Southern. Therefore, because of the nonpartisan tradi tion of the state legislature, the weak party structure, and, undoubtedly, other factors which are as yet unknown, California's legislature has manifested only minimal par tisanship. It is much less partisan than Illinois, Ohio, Washington, Missouri, and Colorado, and the distance from the most partisan states studied by Jewell (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Hew York) would almost have to be meas ured in light years. Although there were not many basic disagreement votes in the three sessions studied, even with the Increase in the 1959 and 1961 legislative sessions, a good deal can be learned about partisan differences in California by looking at the kinds of Issues which caused the Republicans and Democrats to vote against and with each other. These issues have been divided into 17 different categories (see Table 5). The number of votes in each category and its U5 TABUS 5 COMPARISON OF THE TYPES OF VOTES THAT CAUSED ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY DISAGREEMENT IN CALIFORNIA WITH THE OTHER EIGHT STATES AND THEIR RANKING California Other Eight States Number Rank Issue of Rank Issue Votes 1 Elections--reappor- 1 Elections-reappor tionment 24 tionment 2 Labor 24 2 Labor 3 Law 19 3 Appropriations 4 Welfare 14 4 Legislative pro 5 Appropriations 12 cedure 6 Taxation 10 5 Taxation 7 State administration 9 6 Veterans affairs 8 Local administration 4 7 Welfare 9 Business 1 8 Civil service 10 Water 1 9 State administra tion 11 Legislative procedure 0 10 Local administra 12 Fish and game 0 tion 13 Transportation 0 11 Law 14 Education 0 12 Business 15 Liquor 0 16 Agriculture 0 17 Natural resources 0 Total 118 rank nay be compared to Jewell's ranking of issues com piled in his eight state study. There is a great deal of similarity between the types of issues that caused party differences in Califor- 55" nla and in the eight other states— elections and reappor- tionment, labor, and appropriations rank at the top of both lists. One category included by Jewell which has not been included in the California rankings is for votes on gover nors' appointments. Jewell's rankings are for both houses of the legislature, and it is the upper house in most states that votes on these appointments. Obviously, the California Assembly had no appointment votes and thus this category was omitted from Jewell's rankings. Another category ranking well up on the Jewell listing was veterans' affairs. It should be remembered that Jewell's study was undertaken in 1947 just after World War 11 at a time when veterans' activities were a critical matter; this concern with veterans' affairs had evidently dissipated by 1957. During the 1957-1961 period there were only a handful of votes dealing with this topic, and these have been listed under the miscellaneous category. Issue categories such as education, business, and agriculture rank near the bottom of both lists. Ranking Issues strictly in terms of the number of votes in a classification could be considered misleading. For example, if there are only six votes in the education category, and all are basic disagreement votes, would this ^ not be more significant than having ninety votes dealing with local administration in various categories with only six in the basic disagreement category? In Table 6 a TABLE 6 ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Percentage (of all votes Rank Issue on this issue falling into this category) 1 Elections and reappor- tlonment 43 2 Labor 29 3 Welfare 18 4 Appropriations 16 5 Law 14 6 Taxation 12 7 State administration 11 8 Local administration 6 9 Education 4 10 Legislative procedure 4 11 Water 2 12 Business 2 . . . gff readjustment is made with this consideration in mind. The percentage for each classification is derived by dividing the total number of votes one of the issue classifications has in the various categories into the number found in the basic disagreement category. The same general ranking of issues prevails with numerical or percentage ranking. Again, the most conten tious classification for the two parties appears to take place on votes dealing with the topic of elections and reapportionment, almost one-half of the votes on this topic being in the basic disagreement category. Votes on labor and welfare are also important classifications in this category. Assembly Moderate Party Disagreement Votes Of course, not all votes In which the two parties opposed each other are at the basic disagreement level. Therefore, another group of votes has been Included: the moderate disagreement category. There are two possible voting combinations which would qualify a vote for this category: 1. If both parties are in disagreement, but the level of disagreement Is below the 75 per cent 6* level but above the 60 per cent level. 2. If the two parties are in disagreement, and one is over the 75 per cent level and the other beneath it but still above 60 per cent. While there are 116 basic disagreement votes in the three sessions, there are more than twice as many In the moderate disagreement category--275 votes (see Table 7). TABLE 7 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES Number of Moderate Party Votes Year Conflict Votes _ _ _ ^ Number Per Cent 1957 265 58 22 1959 430 127 30 1961 273 90 33 Totals 968 275 It might be hypothesized that the same kinds of Issues which Ire prominent in the basic disagreement category would also be Important in the moderate disagreement cate gory. Besides the greater vote totals in the various classifications, there are few Important differences in the types of issues that are found sK>st frequently in the noderate disagreement category. Table 8 shows the ranking TABLE 8 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES BY ISSUE CATEGORY Rank Issue Nunber of Votes 1 Law 47 2 Labor 30 3 Appropriations 27 4 i Welfare 26 i | 5 Taxation 21 6 State administration 20 7 Local administration 18 8 Water 17 9 Education 14 10 Elections and reapportionment 13 11 Business 13 12 Transportation 12 13 Legislative procedure 5 14 Fish and gane 4 15 Liquor 4 rr TABLE 8--Continued lank Issue Number o£ Votes 16 Agriculture 2 17 Natural resources 1 Total 275 of Issues found In the noderate disagreement category. There appears to be a great deal of overlapping between the votes In the basic disagreement category and those in the moderate disagreement category. Categories such as law, welfare, labor, appropriations, and taxation rank high in both lists. Since such an overwhelming pro portion of the votes In the elections and reapportionment classification are In the basic disagreement list, this Issue does not rank too high in the moderate disagreement rankings. Table 9 shows the ranking of votes in the moderate disagreement category when the classifications are listed in percentage order. The same classifications that ranked high In Table 8 where ranking was by total number of votes are also high on the list In Table 9— labor, welfare, law, appropria tions, and taxation. It should also be noted that while 7 2 TABLE 9 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Percentage I Labor 37 2 Veter 36 3 Welfare 34 4 Law 34 5 Appropriations 33 6 Taxation 33 7 Business 33 8 Education 30 9 Local adminis tratlon 27 10 Legislative procedure 25 11 State administration 25 12 Elections and reapportionment 21 13 Fish and game 19 14 Liquor 17 15 Transportation 15 16 Agriculture 16 17 Natural resources — n the total number of votes dealing with the water question was not great, many votes on this topic did provoke sons partisan disagreement. By combining the percentages in the moderate and basic disagreement tables, it can be seen in Table 10 that approximately two-thirds of the votes dealing with the elections and reapportloneent measures and labor bills evidenced a majority of one party opposed to a majority of the other. Also on about one-half of the votes dealing with welfare and appropriations party dif ferences may be noted. It is also apparent that Republi cans and Democrats in the Assembly are seldom opposed to each other on issues dealing with education, fish and game, agriculture, and transportation. Assembly Basic Party Agreement Votes As was mentioned in Chapter III, Professor Wilder Crane contended that one serious deficiency in most roll call studies was the emphasis that is placed on the number of times various legislative subgroups are in opposition to each other. This neglects the importance a group may have in persuading its members to vote with an opposition group*. In this study a careful examination of kinds of 7* TABLE 10 ASSEMBLY BASIC AMD MODERATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES COMBINED AMD BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Percentage 1 Labor 66 2 Elections and reapportlomsent 64 3 Welfare 52 4 Appropriations 49 5 La# 48 6 Taxation 45 7 Water 38 8 State administration 36 9 Business 35 10 Education 34 11 Local administration 33 12 Legislative procedure 29 13 Fish and game 19 14 Liquor 17 15 Transportation 15 16 Agriculture 10 17 Natural resources 0 75 Issues in which various legislative subgroups were in agreement is considered, as well as the masher of tines they were in opposition to each other. Although the extent to which party was a factor in persuading, for an example, a Republican senator to follow his party's lead and vote to support the Democrats nay not be learned, at least the kinds of issues helping to manifest this type of behavior can be discovered. In general, two kinds of votes have been included in the basic agreement category, in addition to the two other categories in which the parties are in agreement which are included later in this chapter. A basic agree ment vote is defined as one in which the two parties voted overwhelmingly for or against a measure. For example, Assembly Bill 2561 in the 1959 session dealt with restrict ing the sale of liquor within a one-mile radius of the University of California at Berkeley. On this measure, 83 per cent of the Republicans and 91 per cent of the Demo crats voted for the bill, thus classifying it as a basic agreement vote. The other kind of basic agreement vote is one in which a similar percentage of Republicans and Democrats voted for or against a measure (within 20 per cent). An 76 example would be Assembly Bill 1745 of the 1961 session, a bill which would provide that "pretrial conferences in civil cases shall not be mandatory but rather they shall be held only on order of the court or on application of a party." On this vote, 50 per cent of the Republicans and 60 per cent of the Democrats supported the measure. This vote is also considered a basic agreement vote because the two parties' percentages of support on the vote were within the 20 per cent margin. In Table 11 the total number of votes in the basic agreement are tabulated. TABLE 11 ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES Year of B..ic Agr._at Vot«. Conflict Votes Number Per Cent 1957 265 127 49 1959 430 115 28 1961 273 61 23 Total 968 303 Although there were more basic agreeisent Votes than any other category, the sharp decline in the agreement 77 percentages in 1959 and 1961 is another clear indication of the growing partisan spirit in the lower house. Not surprisingly, the kinds of votes that are found most frequently in the disagreement tables are different, from the agreement tables, although votes dealing with law legislation and appropriation measures rank high numeri cally on both sides. In Table 12 the issues classifica tions are ranked in the basic agreement category. The issue which caused the least partisanship in the lower house occurred on votes in the transportation classification; speed limits, highway maintenance, trucking permits, and so on are the kinds of votes that are included in this classification. State administration measures frequently appear to be nonpartisan. In the basic and moderate disagreement categories, ranking issues by the number of votes resulted in only 8light changes from ranking issues in percentage order. However, with basic agreement votes there are some impor tant differences in the order of the rankings in the two tables. In Table 13 basic agreement votes are ranked by percentage order. Seldom are party differences manifested on issues dealing with transportation, state administration, fish 7 5 TABLE 12 ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES BY ISSUE CATEGORY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Transportation 50 2 State administration 29 3 Law 25 4 Appropriations 24 5 Water 22 6 Taxation 21 7 Local adsiinlstration 21 8 Business 17 9 Liquor 16 10 Welfare 15 11 Fish and game 15 12 Education 13 14 Agriculture 9 15 Elections 7 16 Labor 6 17 Natural resources 3 Total 303 7* TABLE 13 ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Per Cent 1 Transportation 70 2 State administration 62 3 Fish and gaae 58 4 Liquor 53 5 Water 45 6 Agriculture 45 7 Legislative procedure 43 8 Business 36 9 Local attainlstratIon 32 10 Appropriations 32 11 Education 29 12 Taxation 26 13 Law 19 14 Welfare 19 15 Elections 12 16 Labor 9 17 Natural Resources > 80 and game, and liquor. In each of these classifications over half of the votes on these issues are in the basic agreement category. There are only a few votes in the labor or elections classifications that found the two par ties in basic agreement. In order to get a better understanding of basic agreement measures, votes in this category have been divided into the two aforementioned designations: first, those votes in iriiich the two parties are below the 80 per cent level of agreement; and second, all the rest of the votes (i.e., those in which one or both of the two parties are above the 80 per cent level). This division was created in order to determine if votes— where there are considerable differences within both parties— differ markedly from basic agreement votes where the two parties voted with considerable unanimity and high cohesion. In Table 14 the issues topics falling in the basic agreement category are divided into the two divisions and are ranked by numerical order. In comparing the two rankings care should be taken not to derive too much importance from the relative rank ings of the issues in the two divisions. For the most part, the votes are bunched together in the rankings with 81 TABUS 14 NUMBER OF TIMES ON ASSEMBLY BASIC PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES TWO PARTIES WERE BOTH BELOW AND ABOVE THE 80 PER CENT COHESION LEVEL Both Parties Below One or Both Parties 80 Per Cent Level Above 80 Per Cent Rank Issue Votes Rank Issue Votes 1 Transportation 31 1 State administra tion 21 2 ApproprlatIons 14 2 Transportation 19 3 Law 12 3 Law 13 4 Water 11 4 Liquor 12 5 Local administra tion 5 Water 11 6 Fish and game 10 6 Local administra tion 11 7 Business 10 7 Appropriations 10 8 Taxation 9 8 Welfare 10 9 Education 8 9 Legislative pro cedure 7 10 State administra tion 8 10 Business 7 11 Agriculture 7 11 Education 5 12 Welfare 5 12 Fish and game 5 13 Elections 4 13 Labor 5 14 Liquor 3 14 Elections 4 15 Legislative pro cedure 3 15 Taxation 3 16 Labor 1 16 Agriculture 2 17 Natural resources 0 17 Natural resources 2 Totals 156 147 82 only a vote or two separating most of the classifications. It is possible to suggest several hypotheses after exam ining Table 14: 1. Transportation votes, although often stirring up legislative differences, seldom elicited sharp interparty controversy. The same might be said of many appropriations measures. 2. There are many votes on such issue classifica tions as state administration, transportation, law, and liquor in which the two parties voted with high cohesion together. 3. Essentially, the same types of issues iriiich caused the two parties to vote together with comparable cohesion are the same kinds of issues that saw the two parties vote together with high cohesion. Assembly Hoderate Party Aareement Votes There are a number of votes in which majorities in the two parties supported each other, but a sizable minor ity of Republicans or Itaeocrats opposed the majority of their own party. This kind of voting situation (see the figures for this category in Table 15) has been listed in 83 TABLE 15 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES Votes Year 1957 1959 1961 - Total Total number of conflict votes 265 430 273 968 Number of moderate agreement votes--Republican minority Number 21 81 56 168 Percentage 9 19 21 Number of moderate agreement votes--Democratic minority Number 41 38 15 94 Percentage 15 9 6 this study as a noderate agreenent vote. It would appear from this table that cohesion has certainly Improved for the Democrats since 1957, and that party disagreement votes were minimised because of Republican intraparty differ ences. -------------------------------------------------------------- — -------m Aa|— hiy moderate party — g— at with R.imbllc«n Minority First, votes will be examined where the two parties were in agreement, but a Sizable minority of Republicans opposed the Republican majority. For example, if 60 per cent of the Republicans vote the same way as 90 per cent or more of the Democrats, this vote would be included in this category because a sizable minority of Republicans opposed their party majority. In Table 16 are listed issues where a Republican minority of at least 20 per cent voted in opposition to the rest of its party and also a high percentage, 90 per cent or more, of the Democrats. Again, as in all the other tables, votes in the law classification ranked high on the list. Law votes concern 'Such topics as court room proceedings, civil liberties, or establishing penalties for particular crimes. Throughout the latter two sessions a number of highly contentious votes dealing with the death penalty were debated and voted upon. There also appears to have been Republican intra party strife on labor and welfare issues along with previ ously noted Interparty conflict on these issues. Republi cans frequently voted with high cohesion on such Issues as elections, transportation, water, appropriations, agricul- 85 TABLE 16 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY AGREEMENT VOTE RUTH A SMALL MINORITY OF REPUBLICANS VOTING AGAINST THE REPUBLICAN PARTY MAJORITY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Lav 30 2 Welfare 20 3 Labor 17 4 Local adminis tratlon 17 5 State adarinistratlon 6 Business 15 7 Education 14 8 Taxation 11 9 Elections 5 10 Transportation 5 11 Water 4 12 Appropriations 3 13 Agriculture 3 14 Liquor 3 *5 Fish and game 2 16 Legislative procedure 2 17 Natural resources — Total 168 gfr ture, and liquor. There seen to be indieationa that the Republican minority that emergea on some of the roll call votes can be classified as the arch-conservative wing of the party. Many of the votes included in this table which caused at least some of the Republicans in the Assembly to withhold their support from party majorities were votes for extending welfare provisions, or were votes supporting increased unemployment provisions. The substantive ideological differences between the parties will be ex plored in the concluding chapter. In Table 17 the issues in this category are ranked by percentage. It is interesting to note that the leading classi fications, at least in terms of percentages, are business and education. It seems rather remarkable that intraparty disagreement in the Republican Party appeared most fre quently on business legislation. However, over one-third of the votes concerning business legislation found a minor ity faction of the Republicans opposed to the majority of both parties. There was little intraparty conflict on appropriations measures, however. Votes on education, welfare, and local administration frequently found the Republicans with divided sentiments. J7 TABLE 17 * ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES WITH A SMALL MINORITY OF REPUBLICANS VOTING AGAINST THE REPUBLICAN PARTY MAJORITY RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Iaaua Percentage 1 Business 34 2 Education 29 3 Welfare 25 4 Local administration 25 5 Law 23 6 Labor 21 7 State administration 21 8 Agriculture 20 9 Taxation 16 10 Liquor 13 11 Water 10 12 Elections 10 13 Transportation 8 14 Fish and game 8 15 Legislative procedure 8 16 Appropriations 5 17 Natural resources B8" Assembly moderate party Mg— Mt with Baocftic Minority The last category of votes In this study are meas ures in which the two parties were in general agreement, but a sizable minority of Democrats was opposed to the party majority. While there are 182 votes in the category previously examined (i.e., majority agreement in both parties with a sizable Republican minority), there are only 94 votes in which Republican and Democratic majorities are in agreement opposed by a minority in the Democratic Party. In Table 18, the issues are ranked by the nuber of votes in the various classifications. Votes in the various classifications appear to be spread evenly over most of the issue topics. The law category again appears near the top of the list. Inter estingly enough, votes on fiscal matters— taxes and appro priations --ranked near the very top of the list in Table 18. The paucity of votes in all classifications points up the fact that the Democrats had better overall cohesion than Republicans. In Table 19 issues in this category are ranked by percentages. In terms of percentages in this category, the leading issue is agriculture. Since there are so few votes TABLE 18 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES WITH A SMALL MINORITY OP DEMOCRATS VOTING AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY MAJORITY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Taxation 13 2 Law 11 3 Appropriations 9 4 Transportation 7 5 Local administration 7 6 Education 7 7 Elections 6 8 Agriculture 6 9 Labor 5 10 Welfare 5 11 State administration 4 12 Water 4 13 Fish and game 4 14 Legislative procedure 4 15 Liquor 1 16 Natural resources 1 17 Business JL Total 94 w TABLE 19 ASSEMBLY MODERATE PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES WITH A SMALL MINORITY OP REPUBLICANS VOTING AGAINST A REPUBLICAN PARTY MAJORITY RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Per Cent 1 Agriculture 25 2 Taxation 17 3 Legislative procedure 16 4 Fish and game 15 5 Liquor 13 6 Appropriations 12 7 Education 10 8 Elections 9 9 Law 9 10 Local administration 9 11 Water 9 12 Transportation 7 13 Labor 5 14 State administration 5 15 Welfare 5 16 Natural resources -- 17 Business ; . ^ in this category any type of generalisation oust be offered with extreme caution. At the same time there are no votes concerning business activities which found the two parties in agreement opposed by a sizable Democratic minority. Since there are so few votes in this category, the per centages are also lower than in the other tables. Assembly Party Cohesion Before finishing the discussion of party voting in the Assembly, one last topic should be enlarged upon. This is the problem of determining the cohesiveness of the two party groups in the years studied. It has been noted that there were many more intraparty differences in the Republican Party in at least one voting category already examined. It might be hypothesized that because the Desz>crats had just taken an ascendant position in the 1959 legisla ture after a long drought that they would be more likely to vote together with high cohesion in order to capitalize on their elective victories. Table 20 was compiled as another test to measure party cohesion. In this table votes that would have been party disagreement votes using the 90 per cent Jewell definition, if one or the other party had 92 TABLE 20 ASSEKBLY BASIC DISAGREEMENT VOTES: MOULD SAVE BEEN PARTY VOTES IF EITHER REPUBLICANS OR DEMOCRATS MOULD HAVE VOTED MITH GREATER UNITY Number of Party Votes if Democrats Mould Not Have Been Divided Number of Party Votes if Republicans would Not Have Been Divided Banlt Issues Number Rank Issues Number 1 Labor 5 1 Labor 7 2 Law 4 2 Law 7 3 Water 2 3 Appropriations 5 4 State adminis tration 2 4 Election 4 5 Election 2 5 Taxation 2 6 Melfare 2 6 Local administra tion 2 7 Education 1 7 Melfare 2 8 Taxation 1 8 State adminis tration 2 9 Business 1 9 Liquor 1 10 Legislative pro cedure 1 Total 20 35 mustered higher cohesion, have been listed. It appears that the Democrats had somewhat better voting unity than did the Republicans. Nearly twice as many votes would have been qualified as "party votes" if the Republicans had attained higher cohesion scores. The same higher cohesion scores for Democrats can be seen in Table 21. In this table votes that would have been basic disagreement votes if one or the other party had voted with at least 75 per cent cohesion are included. Almost twice as many votes are tabulated on the Republican side. In order to verify further the hypothesis that the Democrats had higher cohesion scores than did the Republi cans in the 1959 and 1961 session, overall cohesion scores for the two parties are averaged out in the basic agree ment, basic disagreement, and moderate disagreement cate gories.1 * 0 These figures are presented in Table 22. It can be seen that in 1957 the Republicans had higher voting cohesion in the basic disagreement category and were about even in the moderate disagreement and basic l°It is obvious that cohesion scores in the Repub lican minority and Democratic minority categories would be meaningless, since there was always a minority in one party voting in opposition to the majorities, in both parties• to TABLE 21 MODERATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES: WOULD HAVE BEEN BASIC ASSEMBLY DISAGREEMENT VOTES IF EITHER REPUBLICANS OR DEMOCRATS WOULD HAVE VOTED WITH GREATER UNITY Number of Basic Disagreement Number of Basic Disagreement Votes If Democrats Would Votes If Republicans Would Not Have Been Divided Not Have Been Divided Rank Issue Number Rank Issue Number 1 Law 15 1 Labor 20 2 Business 7 2 Law 15 3 Education 7 3 Taxation 14 4 Taxation 5 4 State adminis tration 12 5 Labor 5 5 Water 11 6 Appropriations 4 6 Appropriations 11 7 Transportation 3 7 Welfare 10 8 State admlnls - tratlon 3 8 Local administra tion 8 9 Legislative procedure 3 9 Education 5 10 Welfare 3 10 Transportation 3 11 Local adminis 11 Business 3 tration 2 12 Fish and game 3 12 Water 2 13 Elections 2 13 Agriculture 0 14 Liquor 2 TABLE 21— Continued 95 Number of Basic Disagreement Votes if Deswcrats Would Not Have Been Divided Rank Issue Number Number of Basic Disagreement Votes if Republicans Would Not Have Been Divided Rank Issue Number 15 Agriculture 2 16 Legislative pro cedure 1 Totals 62 122 j TABLE 22 ASSEMBLY OVERALL COHESION SCORES FOR THE TWO PARTIES Year Republican Democrat Basic Disagreement 1957 889 852 1959 848 886 1961 890 908 Moderate Disagreement 1957 705 706 1959 708 770 1961 737 803 Basic Agreement . 1957 768 772 1959 733 770 1961 719 726 97 agreement scores. However, in 1959 and 1961 as was hypoth esized, the Democrats had higher cohesion in all three categories• There does seem to be evidence to support the contention that Democratic cohesion has increased at the same time that their numbers in the legislature have multi plied. Conclusions The following conclusions about party voting in the Assembly can be proposed after examining the roll call data: 1. Partisanship has definitely increased in the legislature during the years covered in this study. 2. This partisanship is still minimal when com pared with other northern urban states. 3. Issues involving elections and reapportionment, labor, and welfare most frequently spurred party disputes between Republicans and Demo crats . 4. Transportation, fish and game, and state and local administration were Invariably nonparti san type issues. — 98" 5. Democrats appear to have Improved their cohe sion vis-a-vis the Republicans over the ses sions studied. CHAPTER V POLITICAL PARTY VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE Observers of the California political scene have long noted important differences between the two houses of the state legislature. There are the obvious differences: the Senate is only half the sine of the Assembly; Senators serve four-year terms, while Assemblymen serve for two |years; the Assembly is based upon population for its repre sentation, while the Senate is based primarily upon area for its representation; and, in general, Senators are bet ter known and have more prestige than their Assemblymen |counterparts. ! Party The Senate There are contrasts far more important than these structural dissimilarities, however, which underlie the two houses. Hardy made the following observations: "Since 1927 r too the Assembly has, In effect, represented the southern, | urban stronghold, while the Senate represents more the northern rural forces. Los Angeles County alone con tributes 31 of the 80 state California Assemblymen, and the other southern urban counties also are well represented, i Consequently, the mainly rural nothem counties have a | smaller representation in the Assembly. Hyink and his i !co-authors emphasised the same point: Approximately 60 per cent of the state's population (concentrated in Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego counties) votes to fill only one- tenth of the state Senate seats, while the remain ing 40 per cent of the population has control over nine-tenths of the seats. The Senator from Los Angeles County represents more than 6 million constituents; but the Senator from District 28 (Alpine, Mono, and Inyo counties) represents less than 15,000— a ratio of 400 to one! This particu lar imbalance has the dubious honor of being more severe than exists in the upper house of any other legislature in the United States.2 State law requires the legislature to reapportion | Congressional and state legislative districts every ten xLeroy C. Hardy, California Government (Hew York: Harper Mid Row, 1964), p. 54. 2 Bernard L. Hyink, Seyom Brown, and Ernest V. Thacker, Politics and Government in California (3rd ed.; Hew York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), p. 105. ! 30 Senators 75 Per Cent 10 Senators 25 Per Cent Map 1.— Southern Senatorial Districts 35 Assemblymen 44 Per Cent 44 Assemblymen 56 Per Cent Map 2.— Southern Assembly Districts years after each census. The Assembly has been redis tricted several tines since 1927, the year that California adopted the "Federal Plan," in order to accnmmndate the igrowing, shifting population of the state. By 1961 8ohm of the new Assembly districts as drawn up by the state legis lature placed not just one or two counties, but in sose leases a number of counties, into new Assembly districts. i |For example, a northern Assembly district, the sixth, is an i amalgam of eleven different counties and the new second Assembly district includes eight counties. The Senate has grown Increasingly poorly appor tioned because the state constitution stipulates that no |Senatorial district can be composed of more than three | counties. Since California's population tends to be con centrated in a few areas of the state, and because many of the far-flung counties are populated mainly by cattle, rattlesnakes, and lizards, the Senate has become unrepre- j |sentative of the population of the state. A special reapportionment commission consisting of the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the controller, the secretary of state, and the superintendent of public instruction are empowered and obligated to act, if the legislature falls to carry out the reapportlon- iment. In addition to the above differences in the two i i Ichambers, there are other more subtle, but no less impor tant, distinctions. Many of the leading members of the California Senate were the successful cross filers not long i ago. These Senators, elected by both parties, were gener- I I ally Imbued with the traditions of nonpartisanship in the |state legislature. Also, Senators seem to be able to run j 1 on their personal records better than can Assemblymen; Assemblymen are more dependent upon the party for help. An Assembly candidate from highly populated Los Angeles County normally must seek his party's support, whereas a Senator, from a northern county in particular, can be more I indifferent to partisan blandishments. The sentiment for reviving cross-filing and depre cating partisanship is always much stronger on the Senate side of the state legislature, while the Assembly is the | arena at which thunderous charges of partisanship have been i i | leveled. Certainly there is no position in the Senate as i y ; powerful politically as the Assembly Speaker. In the lower i ! house the two parties meet separately in party caucuses, T plan their strategy, and attempt to present a united front in their deliberations on the Assembly floor. In the upper i i house there are no caucuses, no party meetings, no attempts _ ■ Rjy to Impose even nominal party discipline. Positions of | Senators on measures coming up for votes are fairly veil i established and known by the other members.^ In this atmosphere It Is not too surprising that party allegiance ? Is not as important in the Senate as In the Assembly and party voting is infrequent. i Senate Basic and Moderate Party Disagreement Votes This impression of nonpartisanship and unanimity can also be noted in the roll call votes of the three Senate sessions examined. In Table 23 party division votes, both basic and moderate, in the two houses may be compared. It can be seen that conflict votes and party disagreement votes were much more common in the state Assembly. There were over ten times as many party division votes in the Assembly as in the Senate during the 1957 j session, six times as many in the 1959 session, and eight times as many in the 1961 session. Even taking into ac count the smaller number of overall conflict votes in the 4This statement was made to this author by a Cali fornia Senator during an interview. Although not an actual quotation, it paraphrases in content the Senator's views on voting in the upper house. TABLE 23 SENATE AND ASSEMBLY BASIC AND MODEBATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES Year Number of _ _ _ Party Tote. P*r C*nt Nusdber of Conflict Votes Senate 1957 7 4 137 1959 24 15 189 1961 11 11 100 Total 42 426 Assembly 1957 s 76 ! 29 265 1959 187 43 430 1961 130 49 273 Total 393 968 ' | upper house, the Seqate Is still much less partisan as can 1 ;be seen in the percentage tabulations. As in the Assembly, there does seem to be increas ing partisanship in the Senate, although it is very slight. Both houses witnessed a gradual Democratic Party-take-over during the three sessions studied. By 1961 there were 30 Democrats in the upper house as compared to only 10 Repub licans. The change in party control very likely contribu ted to the awakening partisan feelings in the upper house. On only a few votes was even moderately high cohe sion attained by the two parties in the interparty battles. The handful of votes that did provike some decided party differences are tabulated in Table 24.^ TABLE 24 SENATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES LISTED AT SEVERAL COHESION LEVELS Year Number of Conflict _ Jewel la Basic Dis agreement^ Moderate Dis agreement6 Roll Calls Number Per Cent Number **r Cent Number Cent 1957 137 0 0 2 1 5 2 1959 189 0 0 6 2 18 9 1961 100 3 3 4 4 7 7 Totals 3 12 30 • - 90 b - 75 c - 60 per per per cent cent cent ^Because there were so few party conflict votes, the various cohesion levels were Included in one table. L..... .... 108 Observations of various authorities appear to be quite sound: there Is a very low level of party sentiment manifested In the California Senate. : Generalizations about the kinds of issues which ! night stimulate party conflict are difficult to formulate I ibecause of the paucity of votes. Certainly, there appears j to be no issue topic In the Senate which can automatically i |arouse party antagonism as there appears to be in the i Assembly. Table 25 has been compiled In order to determine ! i what Issues might stir party disputes • In order to have more data with which to work, all votes having the two parties in opposition are Included, no matter what the | cohesion might have been. I Not too surprisingly, in the Senate it is on wel fare measures that the two parties are found in most out spoken opposition. The Democrats in the upper house, for i the most part, sought to Include more citizens in new welfare programs, and also generally supported the exten- Ision of benefits in some of the already established pro- grams. Republicans in the Senate were certainly far less enthusiastic about promoting or extending the welfare programs of the state. Generalizations about the kinds of Issues causing party conflict most frequently in the 1 0 9 ! ! I TABLE 25 i SENATE PARTY DISAGREEMENT VOTES BY ISSUE CATEGORY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Welfare 12 2 Education 8 3 Law 8 ! 4 Water 8 5 Elections 7 6 Labor 6 7 Taxation 5 8 Local administration 5 9 Transportation 3 10 Agriculture 3 11 State administration 2 12 ■ Fish and game 1 : Total 68 ■ ' - — n o _ Senate oust be tentative and qualified because there were so few votes separating the various Issue categories In the rankings. It may be said, however, that the sane kinds of Issues causing party conflict In the Assembly caused inter- party disruption in the Senate, with one exception, Educa- I ;tion bills, which rank high on the Senate list of party :conflict issues, are far down on the Assembly list. Edu- i I cation's high rank in the Senate appears to have been |caused by several votes dealing with school district reor- I ganization. This aroused the opposition of some of the northern, rural, mostly Republican Senators. Senate Basic Party Agreement Votes In looking at the votes where the two parties were in basic agreement, a similar overlapping of issues between the Senate and Assembly is also manifested. In Table 26 basic agreement votes in the Senate are listed by issue | | category, along with the Assembly order of issues in the basic agreement classification. Votes in categories such as transportation, law, i i and state administration seldom elicited any partisan con flict in either the Assembly or the Senate. The two par- i ties were seldom in conflict on water roll calls either in i 111 TABUS 26 SENATB BASIC PARTY AGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY CATEGORY COMPARED TO ASSEMBLY RANKING Rank Senate Ranking Issue Number Assembly Ranking 1 Water 26 Transportation 2 Law 21 State administration 3 State administration 19 Law 4 Transportation 17 Appropriations 5 Education 14 Water 6 Liquor 12 Taxes 7 Business 10 Local administration 8 Taxation 8 Business 9 Local administration 8 Liquor 10 Welfare 8 Welfare 11 Elections 8 Fish and game 12 Labor 6 Education 13 Fish and game 6 Legislative procedure 14 Agriculture 5 Agriculture 15 Appropriations 2 Elections 16 Legislative procedure 0 Labor 17 Natural resources Total J2. 170 Natural resources --------------------------------------------------------------------- i n the Assembly or in the Senate. It ie true, however, that among the few party conflict votes in the Senate, votes on water roll calls were near the top of the issue rankings. I There were only two votes in the Senate dealing with appro- i priations measures while, in the Assembly, appropriation I bills were a major category, with 27 separate roll calls, i Why there should be so many more appropriation roll calls J ; in the Assembly than in the Senate is a matter for specula tion. This may verify a factor that other experts have suggested; in the Senate many of the crucial votes take place in committees instead of on the floor of the Senate. ;Bills finally clearing committees may be more likely to I receive strong or overwhelming nonpartisan support at the I £ 4;w--. - . „ open roll call stage. Senate Moderate Party Agreement Votes The number of votes in the Senate with a strong j Democratic majority voting in agreement with a Republican | majority opposed by a sizable Republican minority were few I and isolated. In all, 21 votes fell into this classifies- ^Perhaps this might be further evidence to support the hypothesis that the Senate is interested primarily in maintaining the status quo. m tion, with the leading issue categories being law, taxes, |and state administration--each with four roll calls. On the other hand, there were 37 votes with a Democratic i ' majority and a strong Republican majority opposed by a i i Democratic minority. This is one indication that the Republicans may have had slightly higher cohesion than did i the Democrats in the Senate. In the Assembly the Desiocrats i iappeared to have somewhat higher cohesion. In order to ;appraise this consideration better, cohesion scores of the | Republicans and Democrats were tabulated from the agreement and disagreement tables. The scores recorded are the average cohesion measure for all the roll calls in the !particular classification. In the Assembly, voting cohesion of the Democrats was noticeably high in the various vote classifications. How ever, in the Senate no readily ascertainable pattern of |cohesion is apparent. Cohesion scores for the two parties |are reasonably even in each of the three sessions studied. i !It might be suggested that when there is conflict in the j Senate on a roll call, Republicans seem to be more cohe sive and unified— especially as witnessed by voting in 1959 and 1961 on disagreement votes and on the number of votes with Republican or DesK»cratic minorities opposed to majorities in both parties. TABLE 27 SENATE OVERALL COHESION SCORES FOR THE TWO PARTIES 114 Tear Republican Democrat Disagreement Votes 1957 677 681 1959 731 707 1961 795 762 Agreement Votes 1957 766 774 1959 797 761 1961 777 786 Conclusions i 1. There were very few votes registering any kind of party dichotomy in the California Senate. } The Assembly had many more votes that showed party splits. 2. The few votes that did show some party dis harmony were sisdlar to the types of Issues causing conflict in the Assembly. Welfare measures were the most contentious party issue in the Senate. Cohesion of the two parties was similar, although there are indications that on the crucial conflict votes the Republicans, as the minority party, may have had the edge in party unity. There has been some increase in party votes in the Senate. CHAPTER VI RURAL-URBAN VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE The political party allegiance of a legislator is nonsally considered by experts to be one of the crucial factors helping to detensine voting behavior in two-party states. However, since party discipline is by no sieans complete in any state legislature, factors other than party must contribute to the voting decision of the representa- j tive. Factors in a state--such as its regional divisions, speaker's coalitions, or even personal factions--have all been considered Important in shaping voting and this is |true in California as well as in other states. Rural-Urban Academic Debate With the exception of party affiliation, the next most frequently mentioned factor helping to influence voting behavior in state legislatures is the rural or urban 116 ----------------------------- - n 7 nature of a legislator's constituency. In fact, some authorities contend that the rural-urban question Is su>re |significant than party membership in determining a legis lator's votes most of the time. Generally, the treatment of the rural-urban syndrome iq handled In the traditional ; state government texts In the following way: i v | 1. In most state legislatures rural solons are vastly over-represented and urban legislators, consequently, under-represented. 2. Rural legislators are able to have a decisive Influence on the legislative process due to this unfair advantage. 3. Rural legislators, therefore, are able to pass many measures favorable to their local inter ests, and help to kill legislation beneflttlug urban needs. | ) The recurring theme of most of these commentators j iis that rural and urban legislative blocs, transcending |party ties, wage frequent Internecine warfare in the state legislature on a wide range of issues. This viewpoint is found In most of the traditional government texts, both state and city, either implicitly or explicitly. In PtHmw Government. Baker made the following statemant about the i u rural-urban conflict: City dwellers are-In a majority. Tet in most states the rural Interests are overwhelmingly in control of at least one legislative house, and overwelghed, if.not dominant, in the other. | In MacDonald's Aimt*ran State Government and Admin istration. the author emphasized the same point: j These clauses serve to neutralize the effect of city growth and enable the rural districts to retain control of the state legislatures despite the decline of rural population.2 Zink, in his text, Government of Cities in the United i States. in similar fashion, wrote: | The opposition of rural legislators to any plan which would give cities their fair share of seats in the state legislature arises out of sheer selfishness and a general distrust of cit ies. Having tasted political power the rural sections of states are naturally loathe to sur render their dominance to cities.3 Other authorities on this topic stated in even bolder terms their belief that rural and urban blocs of i |legislators are in frequent conflict in state legislatures. ^Benjamin Baker, Urban Government (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1957), p. 326. 9 Austin F. MacDonald, ATP*1 Tinffr > Government and kArmirti gf-ration (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1960), p. 242. %tarold Zink, Government of Cities in the United States (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 125. 119 Gosnell and Holland, In State and Local Govrx^t the United States, for example, wrote: i i Rural areas effectively vote together to control state policy even though they nay be unorganized. . . . the collective feelings | against, urban areas are more than enough to coor dinate their efforts.4 Phillips, In the same vein, In State and Local j Governm*"*- America, stressed a similar conviction: i ! There Is considerable evidence that a very large percentage of legislative business Involves urban problems and that rural representatives are not equipped to deal adequately with these measures. Furthermore, it is frequently obvious that rural legislators approach such problems with prejudices that block efforts at municipal industrial im provement .5 Baker, one of the leading experts on the rural- urban controversy, stated in his book. Rural versus Urban ! Political Power: ... the conflict between urban and rural Inter ests Is, in fact, a far-reaching and Increasingly important struggle for power in American politics — national, state, and local.6 Cullen Gosnell and Lynwood Holland, State and Local Government In the United States (Hew York: Macmil lan Co., 1948), p. 50. * * Jewell Cass Phillips, State and 'Local Government in the Uhltod States (Hew York: American Book Co., 1954), p. 57. ! ^Gordon K. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political 1 Power (Garden City: Poubleday & Co., 1955), p. 27. 120 In explaining why this conflict had emerged, Baker said: Vhile urban areas have grown to a predominant position in terms of numbers, their political role has generally remained subordinate. Rural domi nance was natural and logical in the nineteenth century, so long as the nation was largely agrar ian. But the failure of state representative bodies to reflect the changing character of soci ety has resulted in a number of problems for a modern industrialised age. ... As a result of this situation a strategic political advantage is enjoyed by powerful groups in a position to profit | by a distortion of representation.' ! Other reasons for this rural-urban split are i |offered by Graves In State Government. He argued |that rural people tend to regard cities as places of vice and immorality where cynical political machines run by i powerful political bosses hold sway. Graves ended his » ] |argument as follows: The line-up is regularly the one or two largest cities against the rest of the state, the small and medium-sized cities lining up with the rural- itles against the big city.® The results of this rural domination, in the i opinion of many authorities, have had far-reaching effects ! on the shape of legislation which has emerged in the 7Ibid.. p. 3. ®W. Brooke Graves, AHTTl***r State Government (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1953), p. 326. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 151- states. In analysing the inpact of this rural domination l |on the legislative process Kneler argued: The limitation of urban representation appears in some states to be part of the liberal-conservative division over economic and social welfare legls- | lation. . . . The urban representative is more likely to be influenced by organised labor. . . . On labor legislation, minimum wage laws, a fair I employment practice act, and civil rights legisla tion, there is usually a division between the representatives from liberal urban districts and those from rural districts, who tend to look upon such legislation as "radical" or "left-wing."9 Jewell, in his excellent introduction to The i I I Politics of Reepportlrmwant. a volume he edited, cited a ! number of potential and real conflict areas dividing rural land urban legislators. A legislature dosdmated by members i from farm areas is not likely to be very responsive to the i needs of the cities, according to Jewell. Home rule legis- I letion, slum clearance projects, metropolitan transit, and • annexation are examples of legislation which have often |failed to pass state legislatures because of the intransi- i Igence of this farmer faction. Jewell argued that this i | !rural-urban schism is especially noticeable on fiscal |issues: ^Charles Kaeier, City Government in the United States (Hew York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 127. uz Cities are often seriously handicapped by the state legislatures in the type of taxes they can levy and the sice of the tax rates permitted. Perhaps the most direct evidence of discrimination against urban areas lies in the forsulas estab lished by state legislatures for the distribution of state aid or of certain proportions of state- collected taxes. When state aid is distributed in greater amounts to counties with lower total assessed property, urban areas sometimes suffer because their rate of assessment is generally higher. The distribution of school funds often neglects the needs of the urban areas, particular ly those school districts burdened by heavy con struction costs. Probably the most wide-spread discrimination is in the distribution of some proportion of the gasoline tax for road building. The formula used often favors rural counties because it gives little weight to population, while in some states none of the tax receipts are available to cities for their road needs. Perhaps De Grazla best summed up the emphasis that |many scholars placed on the rural-urban question. He i stated: . . • the struggles in this half century have been rural versus urban. Every American state with any considerable urban population has undergone pro tracted conflict between rural and urban blocs, often regardless of their party lines.H ^Malcolm Jewell (ed.), The Politics of Reappor- tionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 19. ^Alfred De Grasla, "The General Theory of Appor tionment," Contemporary Problems. XVII (1952), 126. < 123 Current evaluation Recently a growing number of scholars have begun i ! to question the theory that rural and urban blocs are fre quently at odds In state legislatures. Using modern sta tistical techniques, such as roll call tabulations or scale analyses, several of these authorities have raised serious i questions concerning the validity of the supposed rural- I i urban dichotomy. The major thesis of these writers is that the rural-urban split which supposedly divides country and j city legislators is not nearly as simple or clear-cut as was once believed. In fact, these authors suggest that the rural-urban conflict has been grossly overemphasized. Salisbury, in a paper presented to the Mid-West | Conference of Political Science meeting at Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958, dealing with voting patterns in the Mis souri legislature, pointed out: Missouri is a state which, according to image concerning American politics, should exhibit sub stantial cleavage between the rural and urban interests. • • • Tet the evidence seems to point the other way; rural-urban conflict is at most latent and is normally obscured by other politi cally more meaningful c o n f l i c t s . ! * Robert H. Salisbury, "Rural-Urban Factionalism in Missouri Parties" (unpublished report to the Mid-West !Political Science Association, Spring, 1958), p. 1. Marbury Ogle, in a study of the rural-urban con- i filet In Indiana, came to many of the same conclusions as | did Salisbury. Ogle summarised his conclusions In this manner: i f ! in summary, it appears that no clear-cut case for the existence of a rural-urban split can be found by examination of the econosilc structure of the state or by analysis of voting records of rural and urban areas.13 i > Derge, who did a roll-call study on the Illinois and Missouri legislatures, believed that there has been i ; too much attention given to the rural-urban question and I not enough to the conflict between the major metropolitan complex and the rest of the state. Derge's work is one of |the most comprehensive roll call voting studies of a state I legislature that has yet been undertaken. His study cov ered five biennial sessions of the Illinois legislature from 1949 to 1957, in which every roll call vote with at ; least a ten per cent opposition vote was tabulated. The |Chicago delegation to the Illinois legislature is consld- ( j ered the urban bloc; the other state legislators are classified as nonmetropolitan. Derge's findings included ^^Marbury Ogle, "Rural-Urban Split in Indiana" (unpublished report to the Mid-West Political Science Asso ciation, Spring, 1958), p. 23. 125 the following: 1. Neither the metropolitan bloc Of legislators, nor the nonmetropolitan bloc voted with high cohesion. s 2. Metropolitan legislators, when they voted with j high cohesion Invariably were victorious. 3. The urban delegation usually divided along i party lines as did the nonmetropolitan repre sentatives . 14 In addition to these surprising findings, seme other experts in their discussion of the rural-urban split have suggested that underlying this division is a party |conflict. Babcock, for example, stated: j The Republicans are traditionally stronger in the rural areas and the Democrats in the cities, but in the two-party states the legislators fear of increasing the strength of the opposition and lessening that of their own party by redistrictlng or reapportionment may be as compelling a reason j for the majority in the legislature to fail to I reapportion as is the maintenance of the power distribution between the city and the country.^ 14David Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Align ments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review. LII (1958), 1065. ^Robert Babcock, State and Local Government ^ Politics (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 161. ( . 126 Jewell, too, stressed the Idea that what appears to be a rural-urban dichotomy may actually be a Repub lican-Demo- I cratic clash. Jewell noted: Part of the confusion about the Importance of urban-rural difference arises from those states, like New York, Massachusetts, or Michigan, where the representation of metropolitan areas in the legislature is overwhelmingly Republican. This may result from the way district lines are drawn or from the strength and weakness of various party organizations. The result is that the metropoli tan legislators may appear to speak with a voice because some of the high-income, suburban areas may be swallowed up in larger districts and may lack a Republican spokesman. Likewise what looks like a unity of non metropolitan legislators may be fundamentally the unity of Republican legis lators. Moreover, in those states where each party represents a rather homogeneous group of voters, conflicts between the two groups over Issues may be intensified.16 By no means has this disagreement over the nature of the rural-urban conflict been settled. This is not a case where the empirically trained political scientist has demonstrated conclusively that rural-urban conflict is ! largely mirth. New, seemingly contradictory, findings have I been presented by several experts. The conclusions reached iwere quite different and the significance of the rural- ^Malcolm Jewell (ed.), The State Legislature: Politics Practices (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 19. urban conflict is still an open question. One team of political scientists operating on a grant from the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council interviewed state legislators in four separate states and found that in California 67 per cent of the members of the Assembly and 75 per cent of the members of the Senate felt that the rural-urban question was "important."1 -? Friedman argued that as i long as legislators consider the rural-urban conflict important, "it is incumbent upon political scientists to probe the role that these phenomena play in poli tics."*® Frost, in a critique of the Derge findings, claimed that the rural-urban conflict was crucial in state legis Heinz, Eulau, John Wahllce, William Buchanan, ! and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System; Explorations I in Legislative Behavior (Hew York; Wiley. 1962). p . 1425. 18 Robert Friedman, "The Urban Rural Conflict Revisited," Western Political Quarterly. XIV (June, 1961), 495. i 128“ latures.^ In his study of the New Jersey legislature he found that the fairly apportioned lower house was much wore !favorably Inclined to pro-city measures than the rurally dominated New Jersey Senate, After studiously examining the arguments pro and con on the rural-urban question in a current work on state government, Dye summarized his findings: i ... it is safe to say that legislators from large, central cities and those from rural areas and small towns differ over the following: housing and welfare measures, aid for urban renewal * * * * * mass transit, the division of the state's tax dollar, state aids to schools, the location of highways, and regulatory authority granted cities. In this chapter an attempt is made to analyze the extent to which any rural-urban split is operating in California and to suggest some hypotheses about this ques tion relevant to other states as well. Bural-Urban Background: The California Senate According to the 1960 United States census, Cali- ^Richard Frost, "On Derge's Metropolitan and Outstate Legislative Delegations," from Communications Section, American Political Science Review. LIU (1959), 792-795. 20 Kenneth Vines and Herbert Jacob (eds.), Compara tive State Politics (New York: Little Brown, 1965), p. 321. fornla had 2.1 per cent of its population classified as farm population, and another 11.5 per cent were classified as rural-non-farm. Thus, the total rural population of California was only 13.4 per cent. This makes California one of the most urban of the 50 states (see Table 28 for a list of the ten most urban states in the Union). It might appear, by looking only at the heavily i urbanized population figures, that farming and agricultural ;production and processing would be unimportant in Califor- i nia. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Even though California has a minuscule farm population in pro portion to the total state population, it leads all the other states in the cash value of its farm products. Farm- j lng in California is done frequently by large-scale, corporation farmers who are highly mechanized and auto mated. This accounts, in part, for the very small farm ! population, and also for the high productivity and profit- ! I I ability. Generally speaking, when one thinks of a rural | population, he thinks of farmers. Certainly, one of the tacit assumptions concerning the rural-urban imbroglio is that farm interests have a strangle-hold over most state ; legislatures. Yet, in California at least, most urban 130 TABLE 28 LEADING URBAN STATES IN THE COUNTRY RANKED BY URBAN PERCENTAGES* 1 Rank State Per Cent of Urban Population 1 New Jersey 88.6 2 New York 85.4 3 California 84.6 4 Rhode Island 84.6 5 Massachusetts 83.6 6 Illinois 80.7 7 Connecticut 78.3 8 Hawaii 76.5 9 Texas 75.0 10 Utah 74.9 . *Figures taken from U.S., Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census. Countv and Citv Data Book (Wash ington : Government Printing Office, 1962). ' ■ : ^ counties as well as the rural counties have a considerable |agricultural base. According to all the definitions of Iurban (with the Derge metropolitan thesis being an excep tion), Fresno County, with a United States census figure of 66.3 per cent urban, would be considered urban. In addition, the population of the city of Fresno would rank i lit as the 92nd most populous city in the country. On the ! other hand, Fresno County has led the country's counties in i the cash value of its agricultural production. In Table i 29, the top ten farm counties are listed in terms of the cash value of their total agricultural production. Six of the ten are classified as Standard Metro politan. District Areas, and it is also an interesting fact that the state's most populous metropolitan area, Los Angeles County, ranks first in the value of its dairy products. (Dairy products in Los Angeles County were ! valued at 55 million dollars; Stanislaus County ranked i jsecond with a total cash value of 24 million dollars for j its dairy products.) Los Angeles County also ranked second in the value of its poultry production. Thus, it appears likely that agricultural interests might have some access to these urban county representatives. Unlike some urban !representatives in other states, most of California's urban 1 3 2 TABLE 29 TEN LEADING CALIFORNIA COUNTIES RANKED BT GASH VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION* Rank County Cash Value in Terms of Millions •£ Dollars Per Cent Urban 1 Fresno** 213,000 66.3 2 Kern** 162,000 68.4 3 Tulare 145,000 44.0 4 San Joaquin** 97,000 73.3 5 Monterey 69,000 59.5 6 Riverside** 64,000 67.6 7 Los Angelefe 62,000 98.2 8 Ventura 62,000 61.9 9 Santa Clara** 60,000 95.5 10 Kings 58,000 41.7 *Flgures taken from U.S., Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Centus. Countv and City Data Book (Wash ington : Government Printing Office, 1962). bThese counties are considered Standard Metropoli tan Statistical Areas by the United States Census of California of 1960. delegation has the agricultural Industry as one o£ Its ! vested Interests. Any kind of legislation dealing with agricultural matters, such as use of imitation Ice cream or the color of oleomargerlne, would affect local Inter ests. In California, obviously, the supposed rural-urban I split would not likely fall along a city versus farm ; dichotomy, and If the pattern Is not farm Interests versus i ! city Interests, does this not greatly complicate any kind i of supposed rural-urban split? Defining Rural and Urban In addition to the aforementioned difficulties in delimiting rural and urban Interests and representation, i there are other problems Involved with defining rural and urban constituencies, such as: 1. What Is the proper cut off point In determining whether a community is rural or urban? (The United States Census Bureau used 2,500 popula tion.) 2. Should we consider a county urban if 51 per cent of the residents are classified as urban? Should this figure be higher? How much higher? 3. Should we think of urban solely In terms of . I35T the central core city or cities--the megalop- | oils? 4. Should we consider a population rural If the inhabitants live a particular distance away from the major urban center? How many miles away? Any definition of the terms, rural and urban, must | be arbitrary and no definition will be acceptable to all concerned. After considering the many definitions of « these terms used by various authorities, it was decided that, for the most part, the formula best suited for this paper was the classification used by the United States I Census Bureau called the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.^ The following explanation of this term (S#M.S«A.) is found in the Introduction of the United States Popula tion figures by the Census Bureau for California in 1960: f 21This definition is generally the one proposed by j Richard Frost. Frost argued that the Derge findings were ! biased by his definition of urban. Frost contended that when writers discussed the rural-urban split, they were thinking of conflict between cities of substantial slse and the other parts of the state. See Frost, op. cit.. p. 795. 135 It has long been recognised that for many types of social and economic analysis it is necessary to consider as a unit the entire popu lation in and around the city whose activities form an integrated social and economic system. see Except in New England, an SMSA is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 Inhabitants or more or "twin cities" with a combined population of at least 50,000. In addition to the county, or counties, containing such a city or cities, con tiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are essen- ! ttally metropolitan in character and are socially and economically Integrated with the central city.22 There is a long series of other qualifications, such as: 1. At least 75 per cent of the labor force of the county must be in the nonagricultural labor force. 2. If two or more adjacent counties each have a city of 50,000 inhabitants or more and the cities are within 20 stiles of each other (city ! - limits to city limits), they will be included in the saate area unless there is definite evidence that the two cities are not economl- ®U.S., Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1960 California (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. lx-x. cally and socially Integrated. In Table 30 the California counties that are included In j the urban classification as Standard Metropolitan District Areas and their urban percentages are listed. I In an inforsml check with members of the legisla- jture, most concurred that the above-indicated list of counties would be considered urban. With the exception of Fresno County, these urban counties in the California S.M.S.A. are all grouped around the two great metropolitan i centers, Los Angeles and San Francisco. The average urban percentage of these counties is 84.4. In addition to the above counties, three others were arbitrarily classified las urban: Tolo County, 69.1 per cent urban; Ventura County, 62.9 per cent urban; and Monterey County, 59.5 per cent urban. Two of the last three counties named, Tolo and Ventura, are satellite counties surrounding the large urban |centers of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Urban percent ages are high in these counties and they also have a high ! proportion of workers engaged in nonagrlcultural occupa tions. On this basis, twenty of California's Senatorial 23U.S., Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census, Countv and City Data Book (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962). TABLE 30 URBAN COUNTIES County Urban Percentage Alameda 98.6 Contra Costa 81.1 Fresno 67.3 Kern 68.2 Los Angeles 98.8 Marin 87.2 Orange 95.8 Riverside 67.6 Sacramento 84.8 San Bernardino 74.4 San Diego 88.9 San Francisco 100.0 San Mateo 97.5 San Joaquin 74.3 Santa Barbara 68.0 Santa Clara 95.5 Solano 79.1 districts are classified as "rural" and twenty as "urban.” Senate Basic and Moderate -iTt-han Disaareament Votes The most significant finding derived over the three sessions was the fact that very few votes showed any appre- ciable rural-urban cleavage. Since the rural legislators j I comprised half of the upper house and were in a position to | !defeat supposedly pro-city legislation, lack of disagree- jment between the two camps is significant. The number of i roll calls showing rural-urban differences is small, how ever, and votes for the three sessions, therefore, have been added together and the breakdown for the various !categories given in Table 31. TABLE 31 SENATE RURAL-URBAN DISAGREEMENT VOTES LISTED AT SEVERAL LEVELS OF COHESION Level Number Per Cent Jewell— 901 0 0 Basic disagreement— 75% 0 0 Moderate disagreement— 60% 6 1 Total Conflict Roll Calls 426 139 Although It seems clear that on only an infinites imal part of the conflict votes in the Senate were rural- 'urban voting patterns able to be discerned, it would be |helpful at least to recognize the issue topics which might | I potentially arouse rural-urban differences. In Table 32 j i I every vote which had a rural majority opposed to an urban majority is tabulated, regardless of the cohesion of the |two blocs. Because of the paucity of votes in this category i it would be hazardous to generalize about the kinds of issues causing rural-urban splits. It is obvious that there were very few votes in which majorities of rural and urban opposed each other. The few votes that did elicit some differences were predictable--a few on water, some on :local administration, a handful on transportation and roads for the state, and several votes dealing with school dis- !trlct boundary lines. This list is certainly not very i | imposing. It appears that even adjusting the definitions i i i of "rural" and "urban" would not change the main conclusion appreciably.* ‘' Because the rural side would be so vastly out numbered in the lower house, 17 members out of 80, and due to the advice of those interviewed, it was determined not to investigate rural-urban matters in the Assembly. If TABLE 32 SENATE BUBAL-URBAN DISAGREEMENT VOTES Category Number of Votes Water 8 Transportation 4 Education 4 Law 3 Local administration 3 Labor 2 Welfare 2 Business 2 Fish and game 2 Taxes 2 Agriculture 2 Elections 1 State administration 1 Total 36 _ hit Senate B««le Rural"Urban Agreement Votes Rural and urban legislators were in basic agreement on most of the legislation facing the upper house. In Table 33 basic agreement votes of the rural and urban blocs are listed, as well as the percentages of votes in the ibasic agreement classification for each of the issue cate- i igorles. (Percentages are not listed in those issue cate- j Igorles with less than 15 votes.) On most of the Issues there was substantial agree ment between the rural and urban factions. There does seem to be evidence, though, that on votes dealing with water legislation and, to a lesser extent, tax bills, some minor differences between the rural and urban blocs are manl- i | !fested.^5 rural-urban conflicts are to occur in the California legls- i lature, they would have to emerge in the Senate. j 91 a These findings are in accord with Jacob's con clusions. Using a Spearman rank order coefficient of correlation, Jacob found that malapportionment had no measurable effect on policy outcomes. He stated, "Policies seem to be formulated as a result of temporary coalitions constructed by interested pressure groups or molded by a particularly strong governor. Under these circumstances where legislators come from matters less than who they are associated with and to whom they are willing to listen." Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment," Social Forces. XLXII (1964), 256-261. ZABLE 33 SENATE SURAL-URBAN BASIC AGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Nuaber of Per Cent of Votes Votes in Category Law 47 85 State administration 44 95 Education 33 78 Liquor 30 81 Water 28 59 Local administration 22 78 Transportation 22 85 Elections 19 90 Business 17 85 Taxes 18 69 Labor 15 75 Fish and game 10 — Agriculture 6 «■ Natural resources 5 — Appropriations 1 Legislative procedure 0 - Total 317 ------------------------------------------------ Senate Moderate Rural-Urban I Agra— ant Votes There are just a few votes in which the two sides |are in agreement, but with a sizeable urban minority oppos ing an urban majority and an overwhelming rural majority. Table 34 lists the votes in this category. In a sense, these are the votes indicating differences within the urban |faction, and, hence, lower cohesion. During the three Senate sessions studied votes on water legislation were |the most contentious of the rural-urban questions. There were too few votes with a rural faction opposing a rural majority on votes where rural and urban ! majorities were in agreement to attempt to classify them, iIn the three sessions studied only 10 votes qualified for ithis category, three of th— being on legislation dealing with water. There thus seems to be evidence that the very Important split in the California Senate is not rural- urban, but rather intra-urban. The rural side showed I i remarkable unanimity. ! Conclusions 1. California is such an overwhelmingly urban state that practically all legislators must I deal with urban problems in their ho— 144 TABLE 34 SENATE RURAL-URBAN AGREEMENT VOTES WITH A SMALL MINORITY OF URBAN LEGISLATORS VOTING AGAINST AN URBAN MAJORITY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Water 8 2 Liquor 7 3 Taxes 6 4 Labor 3 5 Law 3 6 Education 3 7 Local administration 3 8 Agriculture 3 9 Appropriations 2 10 Elections 1 11 Welfare 1 12 Business 1 13 Fish and game 1 Total 42 constituencies. Also, since many California urban counties are important agricultural pro ducers, there is seldom a factory versus farm orientation in the legislature. 2. Those authors mho describe rural-urban con flicts in state legislatures with rural areas suppressing the legitimate interests of urban representatives, would have grave difficulty proving that this kind of situation exists in California. If the urban delegation is united and agrees on what needs to be done, there is no rural blockade. 3. Only a handful of votes showed a rural-urban voting pattern--most frequently on water (al though this may actually be more of a north- south division since many rural senators come from northern counties). Even on those few votes where there was a rural-urban cleavage the cohesion of the two sides was very low. Generally, urban bloc cohesion was lower than the rural delegation. 4. Hostility between the two giant metropolises, Los Angeles and San Francisco, contributes to , 146 low urban cohesion. 5. On the basis of the Interviews It might be speculated that competition among rural sena tors for road money might be keen. Urban sena tors might support these road funds because of pressures from constituent hunting and fishing interests. This Is Indicative of the complexity of the matter. 6. Intraurban distinctions will have to be made in order to understand the legislative process better. Do the urban legislators represent downtown slum districts, low-income working- class neighborhoods, new suburban tracts, or older established suburban communities? Sena tor Thomas Rees, Democrat of Los Angeles County, represented them all. 7. Those differences that do emerge are probably explained better by party differences or north- south differences than by the rural or urban nature of a legislator's constituency. ° A few decades ago there were real differences in 26See discussion on this point in Chapter VII. _ _ _ 1^7 rural and urban people, such as the way In which they dressed, their talk, their moral philosophies, and their ways of life, These differences are today minimal. Modern ! Communications, such as radio, television, and telephones, j 'mass circulation periodicals, Improved transportation, and ! | automobiles and roads have brought the farm to the city. i | There are few truly isolated communities today, even in the | lumense distances of California. The way of life of the i average city dweller does not differ greatly from that of ! i |the resident of a rural area. Perhaps this factor is as important as any in explaining the fuzziness of the rural- I urban split in California. CHAPTER VII i NORTH-SOUTH VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY j ! Up to this point, the two most frequently mentioned ; dichotomies effecting California legislative voting behav- I i jior have been exasiined: the Repub 1 lean -Democrat ic division land the rural-urban split. These two divisions are also invariably cited by writers examining voting patterns in jother state legislatures as well. This allows analysis of i i | the impact of these two items on the California legislature with comparisons of other state legislative bodies. North-South Background i A third schism long reputed to play a significant j.role in the California legislature is the north-south ! ; cleavage. While references to a north-south split are more uniquely a California phenomenon than the other two dichot omies, several other state legislatures also appear to have 148 a similar north-south sectional division. Derge, In his jroll call study of the Illinois legislature, organised the framework of his study around two legislative subgroups: : the Chicago metropolitan delegation and the other state i legislators, mainly down-state solous.* Havard and Beth I I in their analysis of Florida politics concluded that the j | north-south division was of prime importance in the penin- i o sula state. Indeed, there are several interesting paral- lels that can be drawn between the states of Florida and i California. Both, for example, have witnessed recent rapid population growth (much higher than the national averages) and, In many cases for the same general reasons: new jobs, j investment possibilities, retirement opportunities, and the i sunny warm weather. As In northern California, northern Florida is dominated by rural, status quo interests which have fought to retain their political power against the ; expanding populous power of the southern regions by ^David Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Align ments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review. LII (1958), 219. | ^William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics j of Mis-Representation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni- I varsity Press, 1962), p. 21. i i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 150 opposing reapportionment. An indication of the similar problems and patterns in the two states' political back- 'grounds can be notied from the following quotation: What emerges from this analysis of regional ism in Florida politics is a significant but com plex combination of rural versus urban political interests with an older and possibly diminishing conflict of North Florida--representing the old ante helium slave-owning South— and South Florida, which is "New" Florida, Yankee -dominated and tourist centered. These two patterns of conflict cut across each other in a complicated fashion, but some of the effects are clear. More and more, the major state-wide elections reflect the voting ! dominance of urban South Florida, and the result is that the governor in recent times— and this is particularly the case of Dan McCarty and LeRoy Collins— tends to represent the interests of the urban voters.3 | On the other hand, there are many important differ- j ences between the political patterns of the two states, not i the least of which is the recalcitrant opposition of northern Florida to integration efforts, but some of the ! | analogies are striking. To summarize, it would be fair to I [ state that there are indications of north-south splits in [ several other states, but these are the exceptions rather , than the rule. Almost all California government text book writers 3Ibid.. p. 20. 151 have referred to this third division as being of consider able Importance In Influencing California legislative i behavior. For example, Walker and Cave stated: i The manner in which legislative district lines are drawn always has a vital effect on the balance of power among rural and urban Interests, sections of the State, political parties, and even major interest groups In the State. In California the principle divisions, since 1910, have been between urban and rural Interests, and between northern I and southern California.4 i The same general theme was repeated by two other i keen observers of California politics when they stated: Existing evidence Indicates that the manner in which the senatorial districts are constituted has a definite bearing on the legislation enacted and, consequently, upon the fruition of the polit ical and economic aspirations of geographic regions of the state, or rural and urban Interest groups, and even of the political parties.5 The north-south division is thus probably as pro nounced In California as in any other state, primarily because California stretches father In a north-south | direction than other states, and secondly because the two i |regions of the state are quite dissimilar. California is ^Robert A. Walker and Floyd A. Cave, How California Is Governed (Hew York: Dryden Press, 1953), p. 131. 5Henry A. Turner and John A. Velg, The Government and Politics of California (Hew York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 92-93. --------------- — ------: K 2 over 800 miles long and its coastline extends almost 1200 miles. This is a mileage distance of the same proportion | |that on the east coast would be the distance from Boston, I Massachusetts, to Charleston, South Carolina. Almost un- ; . ' ! avoidably, this great distance encourages a disparateness. During the nineteenth century the major flow of i jpopulation into the state was into the San Francisco Bay {area and the gold fields inland. However, in the twentieth I century the major influx of population into the state has j ibeen directed to the southern part of the state, most notably to the Los Angeles County metropolitan complex, and extending into Orange and San Diego Counties. It is the ; southern part of the state which is today the most popu- i 'lous region. To evidence the spectacular growth rate of some of the southern counties, Table 35 has been compiled. In it i !the proportion of the population in California of four of ! * i i the fastest growing southern California counties has been i compiled in chronological categories. Attempts at reapportioning the state to give the urban population in the south more representation have frequently foundered upon the shoals of the north-south dichotomy. Many northern political leaders, fearing the 153 TABLE 35 PROPORTION OF THE STATE'S POPULATION IN FOUR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COUNTIES* Year F e r C e n t o f . State Population* 1930 47 1940 48 1950 49 1960 54 aThe four counties are: Los Angeles San Diego San Bernardino Orange ^Data compiled from California Abstract (Sacra mento: Economic Development Agency, Printing Division, Documents Section, 1962), p. 51. political weight of Southern California's exploding popula- tion and insistent on retaining their earlier voting supremacy in the legislature, have opposed all reapportion ment efforts. Assembly North-South History From the very beginning of California's statehood history, there has been friction between the northern and 154 southern regions of the state. California became a United States territory as one of the treaty conditions of the war between the United States and Mexico. The southern i j regional leaders wanted California to remain a territorial government, maintaining close ties with Mexico and having only a loose association with the United States, but the i I northern political leaders fought for and demanded state- hood. The north at that time was more populous and was | able, therefore, to send a majority of the delegates to the | convention called by Military Governor General Bennet Riley to determine California's future. At that convention, the delegates voted to approve a state constitution which was modeled to a considerable extent on the Hew York and Iowa ( constitutions. The new California constitution was ap proved by the voters in 1849, and the "Golden State" was admitted to the Union the next year. Throughout this century there has been a competi- | tlve rivalry which has marked the relations of the two sec- j tions of the state. This keen rivalry has been enhanced by the feud between cosmopolitan urban San Francisco (north) and middle-class suburbia, Los Angeles (south). While Los Angeles was developing into a notoriously anti- i [ union city, San Francisco, on the other hand, witnessed T55 during the middle 1930's the country's only city-wide work stoppage. Adjectives that San Franciscans might use to describe (and have used to describe) Los Angeles would i j include: anti-intellectual, crass, snoggy, ugly, and banal. j On the other hand, a loyal Angeleno might use the following |epithets against San Francisco: smug, ostentatious, foggy, j ; |and pretentious. I l i j Although trivial normally, the competition between i I the two areas of the state can be noted in one of the ] i ;unwritten rules of California politics, i.e., there should I be some kind of parity between northern and southern California in terms of political positions. For example, I if one of California's United States Senators comes from I | | southern California, the other Senator should come from the north. This sentiment can be noted, too, in the two par ties' elections for governor and attorney general or in the !selection of the parties' national committeeman and coamit- j J teewoman. The principle which is usually recognised in j | these position selections is that there should be a balance I of power between the two sections. Athletic rivalries between the Los Angeles and San Francisco professional sports teams, or school competitions j between the University of California (Berkeley) and the | 156“ University of California (Los Angeles), also help to i |heighten the identification of the citizens of this state , s with their regions. Newspaper reporters and college profes- i sors, pundits and average citizens, all could testify to i * the different attitudes found in each of the cities• ; Whether there really is such a great difference between the I two sections and the two cities is actually a moot point; i 1 the fact is that many people believe there is an important jdifference--and this is significant. | Defining North-South Just as there was a problem in defining the terms, rural and urban, coming to grips with the equally vague |north-south identification proved formidable. Several : definitions might have been used. One possibility was the Kayo-Breed line, which is used by the State Division of Highways. Under the quota established by this office 65 | per cent of the operating funds for state highways comes j from south of the line and 35 per cent from north of it. iYet it disburses money to countlds for road construction i . and maintenance in terms of a 55-45 southern-northern i ratio. The Mayo-Breed line formulation divides the state I in half, using as its basis a synthesis midpoint of the ------------- . !57 state's population distribution as well as its geography. | If we were to consider population concentration as the sole determinant in dividing the state into comparable inorthern and southern regions, it can be seen from the \ i 'map (Figure 3) that the seven most southern counties have ! |approximately one-half of the state's total population, ! ! !while geographically the midpoint would run somewhere along i I |the northern boundary lines of Inyo, Fresno, San Benito, I and Monterey Counties. i The boundary line dividing the north from the south which is used in this study is a compromise line ! drawn between the extremes of the other possible boundary |lines. Of necessity, it is arbitrary, but there is justi- i I fication for its use. Certainly, it would be reasonable to consider San Francisco County and all the counties to the north of it as being northern* while Los Angeles County and all the counties to the south of it as southern. The problem, however , is where the boundary line I should be between Los Angeles and San Francisco. Any num- | ber of observers have argued with this writer that the i cities of Santa Maria and Plsmo Beach in southern San Luis Obispo County are still part of "southern California"; but that the cities of San Luis Obispo and Morro Bay in North North-South Definitions 4 n« Mu Min Mayo-Breed Line _ _ — — Population--midpoint ....... Geographical— midpoint VAVkftvw\ Tehachapai Mountains xxxxxxxx This study Map 3.— North-South Definitions _____--------------------------- ] 3 9 San Luis Obispo County mark the beginning of "northern | ' |California." The criteria for this kind of classification are, at most, hazy. What should be Included as part of I each section Is probably as much a problem of psychology as geography or population. After much consideration, the boundary lines to be used In this study to divide north j | from south California appears eminently reasonable. This I line runs along the northern border of San Luis Obispo, Kern, and San Bernardino Counties and has the effect of putting 45 of the Assemblymen In Sacramento into the south ern delegation and 35 Assemblymen Into the northern group. This dividing line closely follows the north-south division of the state along the Tehatchapl Mountain range line, which is another one of the commonly used definitions of the north-south divisions. An example is the way in which Professor Anderson analyzed the north-south divisions of the state: I The Tehachapi Mountains constitute the south ern boundary of the Great Valley, creating a nat ural geographic, economic, and political barrier, dividing the state in two. The fourty-four coun ties in the north surround the vital trade area of metropolitan San Francisco, while the fourteen counties in the south are oriented toward the j giant, sprawling metropolis of Los Angeles, ✓ ~~~ 160 constituting the second primary trading area of the state.® i i Assembly Worth-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes ■There were not a great number of north-south disagreement votes In the California Assembly during the three sessions i ; of 1957, 1959, and 1961, but there were certainly more |than there were in the rural-urban vote totals. Since !there were not too many of these votes, Table 36 has been compiled to show the significance of the north-south division at several different levels of cohesion. It can be seen from the table that north-south differences were at their peak in 1959. When party division votes were examined, there was a steady trend in the direction of more of these votes. This does not hold true for north-south votes. It seems likely that the reason that the 1959 legislative session showed such jrelatively high north-south differences was because of the i Importance of water legislation during that session. Plans for piping water from northern California to southern i t °Totton J. Anderson, "California Enigma of Na tional Politics," in Western Politics, ed. by Frank H. Jonas (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah, 1961), p. 72. 161 TABLE 36 ASSEMBLY NORTH-SOUTH DISAGREEMENT VOTES LISTED AT SEVERAL COHESION LEVELS Cohesion Level 1957 1959 1961 Total Total number of conflict roll calls 265 430 273 968 Jewell— 90 per cent Number 0 0 0 0 Per cent 0 0 0 Basic disagreement— 75 per cent Number 3 9 6 18 Per cent 1 2 2 Moderate disagreement— 60 per cent Number 16 68 17 101 Per cent 6 16 6 | California were before the lower house. Now that the overall significance of north-south I division votes has been examined, Issues that tended to provoke north-south antagonisms will be analyzed. Table 37 has been constructed with the various Issues ranked on north-south disagreement votes. : TABUS 37 ASSEMBLY NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AND MODERATE DISAGREEMENT VOTES 162 Rank Issue Number 1 Appropriations 15 2 Taxation 15 3 Transportation 14 4 Water 13 5 Local administration 11 6 Law - 9 7 Education 7 8 State administration 5 9 Fish and game 5 10 Business 5 11 Welfare 5 12 labor 5 13 Elections * 5 14 Liquor 4 15 Agriculture 3 16 Natural resources 1 17 Legislative procedure 0 Total ’ 119 ‘ _ _ _ _ _ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------; — North-south division votes occurred frequently on | fiscal Issues— questions on the allotment of money for various projects or on questions concerning taxing policy. ! Two other categories which were cited frequently by author- j ! ities on California legislative politics as being sources i ; of important north-south differences were transportation ' and water legislation. One of the problems facing Cali- i > fornia to which reference has already been made is the : allotment of road fund money listed under the transporta tion classification. Southern Assemblymen are critical of the dividends received by northern Assemblymen for road money in areas of meagre population. Senator Vernon Sturgeon, of San Luis Obispo County, however, argued in i ' the following way: The conflict over the allotment of road funds has been over-emphasised and is not as clear-cut as you might believe. Go to any resort spot in out-of-the-way places in northern California. What car licenses do you see there? Why, mainly Southern Californians. These people are just as anxious for good roads in these resort and hunt ing and fishing areas as are the native citisens of that area.' Other issue categories ranged down the list, with only a few votes separating the various issue categories ^Interview with Senator Vernon Sturgeon, July 26, 1964._______________________________________________ T & r in the rankings. With the exception of one vote, the first four issues categories monopolized all of the votes at the 75 per cent cohesion level. In order to get a slightly idifferent perspective on the kinds of issues causing north- j !south conflict, the percentage of times votes causing I I splits in the various issue categories were divided into ! j : the total number of votes in each category, and the tabula- i i i itions from this computation can be seen in Table 38. It can be seen that on almost one-third of the votes dealing with water matters, a north-south split was in evidence. In California the northern part of the state has a water surplus and the arid southern section has a water deficiency. Fighting over the allocation of this i water surplus has provoked some of the most serious north- south disputes in the Assembly. It is interesting to note that fish and game legis- |latlon, although not a large category in terms of the total | number of votes dealing with it, ranked second on the list. This type of legislation would, obviously, most directly I affect the rural northern counties. Items such as the length of the hunting season for bears in Humboldt County or the price of a fishing license for out-of-state resi dents may appear to be trivial, but these were concerns TABLE 38 ASSEMBLY HORTH-SOOTH BASIC AMD MODERATE DISAGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER {Rank Issue Per Cent 1 Water 31 2 Fish and game 27 3 Appropriations 25 4 Transportation 23 5 Taxation 20 6 Agriculture 20 7 Education 19 8 Local administration 19 9 Liquor 19 10 Business 12 11 Election 11 12 Law 9 13 Welfare 7 14 Labor 7 15 State administration 7 which showed different voting patterns in the two regions I i j iof California. i Assembly North-South Basic Agreement Votes As has been stated previously, on the great major ity of votes taken during the three Assembly sessions, northern Assemblymen and southern Assemblymen voted along i . similar lines. This may be seen clearly in Table 39, in which the various issue categories are ranked by the per centage of votes each had in the basic agreement classifi cation. A high percentage and ranking on the list indicate :fewer north-south division vote* for a particular issue. i It is interesting that votes dealing with transportation matters ranked as low as they did. There, does seem to be an indication, then, that transportation legislation is an : i even more divisive issue than water measures, since this i i was the only category in which less than half of the votes r were in the basic agreement classification. As can be |seen, transportation, water, fish and game, and agricul- r tural legislation provoked the most consistent conflict between the northern and southern delegates. 157 TABLE 39 ASSEMBLY NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Per Cent 1 Welfare 87 2 Labor 87 3 Elections 85 4 Law 84 5 State Administration 84 6 Business 80 7 Liquor 80 ! 8 Appropriations 73 9 Taxation 72 10 Local administration 66 11 Education 65 12 Agriculture 60 13 Water 59 14 Fish and game 57 15 Transportation 40 Assembly North-South Moderate Agreamsat Vott« with Northern Mlnarl^y There were not many votes during the three sessions | Where a northern minority opposed majorities in the north ern and southern delegations. Again, this shows the lack iof disagreement o£ both delegations on most issues. Those few votes that were included in Table 40 were predictable— a few votes on water, transportation, and law. Assembly North-South Moderate Agreement Votes with Southern Minority There were 16 more votes in this classification | than the previous one, and this is one indication that the northern bloc of assemblyment had somewhat higher unity than did the southern faction. The greatest number of votes in this classification were in the transportation category dealing with the allocation of money for road ! construction and maintenance. Fights between the northern 1 and southern delegations were frequent on this issue but [ also differences within the southern delegation itself were also prominent. 169 TABLE 40 ASSEMBLY MODERATE NORTH-SOUTH AGREEMENT VOTES WITH A SMALL MINORITY OF THE NORTHERNERS VOTING AGAINST THE NORTHERN MAJORITY Rank Issue Number of Votes 1 Water 6 2 Law 5 3 Transportation 5 4 Local administration 3 5 Fish and game 2 6 Appropriations 2 7 Agriculture 2 8 Labor 1 9 Welfare 1 10 Business 1 11 Taxation 1 12 Education 1 13 Natural resources __1_ Total 31 i TABLE 41 ASSEMBLY MODERATE NORTH-SOUTH AGREEMENT VOTES HITS A SMALL MINORITY OF THE SOUTHERNERS VOTING AGAINST THE SOUTHERN MAJORITY 170 Rank i Issue Number of Votes 1 Transportation 11 i 2 Education 6 3 i Labor 4 4 Law 3 5 Business 3 6 Water 3 1 i 7 Local administration 3 j | 8 Elections 2 9 Welfare 2 10 Fish and game 2 11 Taxation 2 i 12 Agriculture 2 13 Natural resources 2 14 State administration 1 15 Legislative procedure Total 1 47 1 7 r Conclusions 1. North-south division votes in the Assembly were few and infrequent. There were four times more Republican-Democratic disagreement votes. 2. Of several thousand roll calls in the Assembly only 18 showed north-south splits with the two sides atthe 75 per cent level of cohesion. 3. North-south conflict occurred most frequently on transportation, water, and fish and game legislation along with a fair number dealing with fiscal matters. 4. There were no clear indications as to whether north-south voting splits were becoming more frequent over the sessions studied. 5. On most legislation there was considerable agreement or, perhaps more aptly, little dis agreement among the northern and southern blocs. CHAPTER VIII i NORTH-SOUTH VOTING IN THE CALIFORNIA SENATE | i North-South Background Experts on California politics have long maintained that north-south voting patterns and rural-urban splits are most pronounced in the upper house of the California legislature. For the reason, they contend that it is due | to the grossly malapportioned, unrepresentative California Senate. It vas noted previously, in Chapter VII, that the boundary line used to divide the state into northern and southern halves as constructed in this paper resulted in i the following divisions in the state legislature: in the i j Assembly there were 35 northerners and 45 southerners; in i the Senate there were 30 northerners and 10 southerners. | To put this another way, the southern ratio over the north j in the Assembly was 4 to 3, but in the Senate the advantage accrued to the north by a 3 to 1 margin. I ________________ 172 ____________ 173 Senate North-South Hlitorv The contrast in population make-up of the two houses has not always been as severe as this. Until 1927 the California Senate, like the Assembly, was based upon population for its representation and, therefore, the two legislative bodies were comparable in composition. As Southern California's population began to mushroom, north- i i era political leaders began to cast about for plans which would shore up their threatened political power. The so- ;called "Federal Plan" was eventually devised and introduced as a constitutional amendment. Under this plan, the lower house was to continue to be based on population for its I representation, but the Senate was to be changed dras- i i tically. In the upper house, each county would send one senator to Sacramento, with only the sparsely settled counties combined into senatorial districts. The maximum | number of counties composing a senatorial district was ! limited to three. This gave the north a great advantage: !first, because northern counties generally are much smaller i : geographically than the southern counties, and, second, for the most part they are less densely populated than the southern metropolitan counties. _ _ _ . — m Since the adoption of the Federal Plan there have I |been many attempts made to change the elective system devised for the upper house. ^ Most of these efforts have been led by Los Angeles Interests— the county which has been most adversely affected by the adoption of the Federal Plan. In 1928 a state-vide referendum was proposed and defeated, and In 1948 an Initiative campaign was organised, I again without success. A number of factors could be offered in explanation for the failure of these plans: 1. The power of northern rural counties would have diminished In any kind of plan to Increase representation of the urban areas, especially southern areas, and they have generally opposed any kind of elective reforms In the Senate. 2. Los Angeles political leaders have not been united in their efforts to change the power structure of the Senate. ^Ona excellent description of the various plans to I change the power structure of the Senate can be found in Gordon E. Baker, "The California Senate: Sectional Con flict and Vox Popull," in The Politics of Reapnortirument. edited by Malcolm Jewell (Mew York: Atherton Press, 1962), I pp. 51-63. 3. Many political leaders from urban counties are jealous and suspicious of the ambitions of Los Angeles leaders and have been reluctant to see this county obtain such a powerful voice in both houses of the legislature. 4. There is a superficial reasonableness to the Federal Plan. However, the analogy of a coun ty's relationship to the state government being comparable to the state governments' relationship to the national government is quite Inaccurate; counties have always been merely administrative districts of the state and never sovereign. 5. Business groups and farm interests, and at times even labor unions, have been reluctant to incur the wrath of the incumbent senators by proposing plans for their political demise. In fact, Democratic party leaders and union leaders, normally supporters of reapportion - ment, were confronted with an upper house in 1961 that was three-to-one Democratic. Any kind of rearrangement of the power structure would have been purchased at the prohibitive i _J 7 B cost of angering many important senators. Yet the impact of this malapportionment mas still a contentious Issue for many southern urban leaders. As one writer pointed out: Despite similarity between urban and rural partisan political sentiment, certain urban groups and related farm groups feel that they have very difficult sledding in the rurally dominated upper house. During the decade from 1935 to 1946, for example, Assembly bills regulating wages and hours and working conditions, particularly of women, children and farm labor, were killed In the Senate. In the last dacade many Assembly bills providing Improved or expanded health and welfare benefits were defeated in a Senate committee or on the floor. Until 1958 this was also true of bills creating a fair employment practices commission. In rebuttal, excepting only the farm labor Issue, it would also be fairly stated that the Senate has approved such welfare measures, but frequently— say critics— too little and too late.2 Since 1948 almost biennially efforts have been made to change the Senate's power structure. In 1960 a system of redistributing Senate seats (usually described as the | Bone 111 Plan) was Introduced in an initiative petition. Under this plan there would have been 20 northern senators I and 20 southern senators. Los Angeles would have been allotted seven senators, three other southland urban I ^Composition on Legislative Raapportionwant: 1 California (New York: National Municipal League, 1960). 177 counties would have received additional representation. I This plan was defeated by a 2-1 margin of voters of the state and, as the next move, Governor Pat Brown requested the formation of a nine-member reapportionment study com mission In 1961 to propose recommendations for some kind of Senate election r e f o r m .^ In 1962, another Initiative amendment was put on the ballot by the same Los Angeles Interests which had supported the earlier reapportionment efforts and again the measure was defeated in the state-wide vote. Defeat this time hinged, in part, on the opposition of a number of influential California firms who contributed generously to the campaign to defeat the reapportionment measure. Two keen observers of the California political scene pointed out: A supposition regarding these contributions is that the addition of several urban senators would upset the delicately coordinated channels to political power in the state legislature currently enjoyed by the economic interests.^ 3 Baker, loc. clt. ^Totton J. Anderson and Eugene Lee, "The 1962 Election in California,” Western Political Quarterly. XVI, Pt. 1 (1963), 398-420. T?y At the time this chapter is written, no elective ! solution has yet emerged. Several recent Supreme Court decisions, most notably the Baker vs. Carr decision, may very well alter this situation. In this case and in sever- 1al other recent decisions, the Court has argued that if a i state legislature failed to reapportion itself fairly on a | population basis, the federal courts would have to step in I 'and ensure a fair election. Although not clear at first, the series of subse- t i quent decisions by the Court on reapportionment now also indicates that both the lower and the upper houses of the various state legislatures must be reapportioned. These ;Court decisions are now being challenged in Congress and a number of state legislatures where constitutional amend ments have been proposed to limit the jurisdiction of the Court in this area. The final outcome of the Court's | Incursion in this area, of course, is still very much in i question, but it seems likely that in the not too distant future most state legislatures will have to be reappor tioned, if not voluntarily, then under Court order. i According to the definitions established in this paper for north-south, there are 10 southern and 48 northern counties. In terms of population the counties classified as southern In this work had 9,733,351 residents i |or 59 per cent of the state total, while the northern coun ties had 5,987,509 people, or 41 per cent of the California population.^ Of course, underlying this population dispar ity was the fact that the northern counties were mainly ; j rural, and the southern counties were primarily urban. Extent of the Onreoresentativeness I In a recent article, Professors Schubert and Press, i using some highly imaginative statistical techniques, have measured the extent of the unrepresentativeness of all the state legislatures.^ In Table 42 we see a ranking of the ten most malapportioned upper houses, using three differ ent quantitative measurements. To explain in any great detail the computations necessary to derive these formulations would be inappro priate in this study. Briefly, however, a low inverse coefficient of variation (I.C.V.) indicates malapportlon- j i i — ii m u ■ " . - — — I . 1 . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 %. S., Bureau of the Census, United States Census | of Population: 1960 California (Washington: Government Printing Office, I960). ^Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," American Political Science Review. LVIII (1964), 302-327. I8G TABLE 42 RANKING OF THE TEN MOST MALAPPORTIONED STATE SENATES USING VARIED MATHEMATICAL TESTS* Rank State Inverse Coefficient of Variation 1 California .2950822 2 Nevada .3397351 3 Arizona .3535464 4 New Mexico .3950909 5 Florida .4267358 6. Montana .4349539 7 Oklahoma .4521801 8 Idaho .4582692 9 Georgia .4592377 10 Kansas .4853394 Rank State Skewness 1 California 5.4394092 2 Minnesota 4.9967158 3 Kentucky 4.1624178 4 New Mexico 4.1341645 5 Alabama 3.9555078 6 Oklahoma 3.6939135 7 Kansas 3.5405495 8 South Dakota 3.0599798 9 Montana 2.8133181 10 Florida 2.7307594 Banlf State Kurtosls 1 California 29.7892981 2 Minnesota 29.7465438 3 Indiana 22.3989337 4 Kentucky 19.3547055 5 New Mexico 18.3434493 181 TABLE 42--Continued Rank State Kurtosis 6 Alabama 16.8197286 7 Kansas 13.6147078 8 South Dakota 9.9592983 9 Tennessee 9.5570304 10 Florida 8.7673628 a Compiled from computations for all 50 states in Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malappor- tlonment,1 1 American Political Science Review. LVIII (1964); computations. ment, the closer one approaches the figure of 1.00 the closer the score is to perfect apportionment. For example, the Massachusetts Senate had an inverse coefficient of variation of .8656090, which was the highest score of any state senate. Professors Schubert and Press explain the |other statistical rankings in the following words: The index of skewness indicates whether the variance for units on one side of the mean is less than that for units on the other side; and if imbalance exists, the index identifies which has the greater variance. . . . The index of kurtosis tells us whether the distribution is relatively flat or peaked, in comparison to the — - ^ normal curve, for which has a value of aero.7 The significant factor is that on each of these measures, the California Senate ranked as the most malap- |portioned upper house in the United States. This is espec- I ially noteworthy since sixteen states made at least one of jthe rankings, and there was great diversity as to an indi vidual state's place in each of the rankings. The over- j representation of the northern rural forces in the Cali fornia Senate certainly clearly resulted in gross total misrepresentation. Senate Worth-South Basic and Moderate Disagreement Votes In order to appraise the significance of north- south division votes in the California Senate, Table 43 has been constructed. By comparing the percentages found in this table with the number and percentage of party {division votes, it seems clear that north-south split votes occurred as frequently and were as important in the California Senate as party division votes. It might also i be mentioned that while there were higher percentages of 7Ibid., p. 320 1*3 TABLE 43 SENATE NORTH-SOUTH DISAGREEMENT VOTES LISTED AT SEVERAL COHESION LEVELS ! Cohesion Level i 1 ' 1957 1959 1961 Total Number of Conflict roll calls 137 189 100 426 i | Jewell— 90 per cent Number 0 0 0 0 Per cent 0 0 0 Basic disagreement— 75 per cent Number 4 13 7 23 Per cent 3 7 7 ! Moderage disagreement— 60 per cent Number 8 29 14 52 Per cent 6 15 14 i north-south disagreement votes than party disagreement j | votes, they were not much higher in the upper house. Generally, the same issue categories eliciting north-south division votes in the Assembly also provoked north-south splits in the Senate. In Table 44 the various I i j issue categories are ranked in terms of the number of____ TABLE 44 SENATE NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AND MODERATE DISAGREEMENT VOTES Rink Issue Humber of Votes 1 Water 14 2 Welfare 12 3 Taxation 10 4 Law 9 5 Transportation 8 6 Business 6 7 Education 5 8 Labor 3 9 State administration 3 10 Local administration 3 11 Agriculture 1 12 Liquor 1 Total 75 I i i ! | i_ 185 north-south division votes in each one of them. Again, the same general issues causing north-south splits in the i Assembly sessions ranked high in the Senate listings: i j j water, taxes, and welfare were the leading categories. In | Table 45 the percentage of disagreement votes in the i ; various issue categories is tabulated. Senate Worth-South Basic and Moderate 1 Agreement Votes On most issues there was no regional northern- southern division on votes with the exception of the few issue topics noted in the previous list. Agreement was high between the two scales on the other issues. Two vote classifications included In prior chap- 1 i ters have been omitted from this chapter. These two deal : with the minority faction opposed to a majority of its ; own delegation, when the majority of the delegation has j | voted in agreement with the other bloc of legislators. i | There were only a handful of votes where a sizeable fee- i i j tlon of northern Senators opposed a majority of northern i i Senators and southern Senators. TABLE 45 SENATE NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AND MODERATE DISAGREEMENT VOTES RANKED BT PERCENTAGE ORDER Rank Issue Per Cent 1 Appropriations 100 2 Fish and game 100 3 Liquor 97 4 State administration 94 5 Local administration 93 6 Agriculture 89 7 Labor 83 8 Welfare 75 9 Law 75 10 Business 70 11 Education 66 12 Transportation 65 13 Water 63 14 Taxation 50 --------------------------- Conclusions' 1. North-south differences are equally as crucial as party splits In the California Senate, » roughly about one-fifth of the disputed votes. 2. Issues such as water, transportation, and taxation caused north-south splits in the Assembly as well as In the Senate. 3. North-south differences are more important in the Senate than in the Assembly. CHAPTER IX SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS There will be three major sections in this conclud- i ing chapter: (1) a comparative analysis of the three afore mentioned dichotomies will be undertaken; (2) an investiga tion will be made of the Assembly and Senate bills of the 1961 legislative session which provoked sharp legislative conflict on one of these three vote divisions; and (3) an evaluation of present voting patterns and possible future voting trends in the state legislature will be attempted. Comparison of the Three Dichotomies In the preceding chapters the Republican-Democrat ic, rural-urban, and north-south voting splits were examined individually. The first task of this chapter, |therefore, will be to compare the relative importance of each one of these divisions with each other. Table 46 has been designed especially for this purpose with comparisons 188 IBS TABLE 46 COMPARISON OF THE THREE DICHOTOMIES IN THE ASSEMBLY AT THO DIFFERENT COHESION LEVELS Year Republican- Democratic Rural- Urban North- South Percentage of Disputed Votes at 75 Per Cent Cohesion Level— (Basic Disagreement) 1957 6 0 1 1959 13 0 2 1961 15 0 2 Percentage of Conflict Votes at the Moderate Disagreement Level 1957 22 2 6 1959 30 1 16 1961 33 1 6 Percentage of Conflict Votes at the Combined Basic-Moderate Disagreement Level 1957 28 2 7 1959 43 1 18 1961 49 1 8 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- j g g - at the basic disagreement and moderate disagreement levels ! ! of cohesion. ' i The following hypotheses can be suggested after perusing the tabulations In Table 46: 1. Party differences between Republicans and i Democrats accounted for the overwhelming pro- ; j portion of the conflict votes In the Assembly. By 1961 there were party differences at the 75 per cent level of cohesion on 15 per cent of the roll call conflict votes In the Assembly, and at least minimal party differences on almost half the disputed votes. 2. There appears to be no Important rural-urban division voting pattern operating in the Assem bly. Even at the moderate disagreement level of cohesion, there was only a handful of votes In which rural and urban legislators voted as blocs opposed to each other. i 3. North-south voting splits, although more impor tant than rural-urban divisions in the Assembly, occur infrequently on isolated votes. Only a few votes In this category were recorded with cohesion above the 75 per cent mark. The Z91 relatlvely high percentage of north-south split | votes cast during the 1959 session can be explained, in part, because of the controver- i sial legislation that was debated extensively during this session concerning water bills. | | 4. North-south and rural-urban voting divisions remained relatively stable during the three I sessions studied, but there was a steady in crease in party division votes over the same period. A somewhat different voting pattern prevails in the upper house of the California legislature when we make the same kinds of comparisons of the three dichotomies, as presented in Table 47. Several rather obvious conclusions about the voting patterns in the California Senate can ! be suggested after examining the figures in this table. First, it can be noted that partisan votes of Republicans versus Democrats occurred less frequently than did north- i 1 south division votes in the upper house. This is quite unlike the Assembly where party conflict votes were easily | the most important category. Second, north-south divisions were more prevalent and were of greater critical importance in the Senate than in the Assembly, although the difference I9Z TABLE 47 COMPARISON OF THE THREE DICHOTOMIES IN THE SENATE AT TWO DIFFERENT COHESION LEVELS Tear Republican- Democratic Rural- Urban North- South Percentage of Conflict Votes at 75 Per Cent Cohesion Level— (Basic Disagreement) 1957 2 0 3 1959 6 0 7 1961 4 0 7 Percentage of Conflict Votes at the Moderate Disagreement Level 1957 2 0 6 1959 9 2 15 1961 7 3 i 14 Percentage of Conflict Votes at the Combined Basic-Moderate Disagreement Level 1957 4 0 9 1959 15 2 22 1961 11 3 21 I between the two houses was not as great as might have been i expected. Third, rural-urban voting clashes proved to be ; f as insignificant in the upper house as they were in the \ lower house, which again is somewhat surprising since many 'authorities would probably have ranked this division as | being of prime importance in the upper house. Fourth, as in the Assembly, the impact of the rural-urban and north- i south conflicts in terms of the percentage of disputed votes remained relatively stable during the three terms ! examined. Fifth, party conflict did not increase from session to session in the Senate as it did in the lower house, and it never approached the much higher percentages of conflict found in the Assembly. j In order, more effectively to appraise the overall significance of these dichotomies in the two houses, Table 48 has been compiled. In this table the percentage of ’ moderate and basic disagreement votes cast out of all I those with at least 10 per cent opposition during the I 1957-1961 period, has been averaged for both the Assembly jand the Senate in the three dichotomies. The same general conclusions that have been discussed above could be repeated after examination of this table. " 155 TABLE 48 SENATE AND ASSEMBLY COMPARED IN TERMS OF THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE FOR THREE SESSIONS THAT EACH DICHOTOMY RECEIVED Republican- Rural- North- Democratic Urban South Assembly 40 2 11 Senate 10 2 17 Analysis of Legislation Now that the significance of the three divisions in the California legislature have been evaluated, both individually and comparatively, a further step must be I undertaken. This is to describe and analyze the Assembly j and Senate bills that tended to provoke sharp conflict in one of the three dichotomy categories. Bills analyzed in this next section were taken solely from the 1961 legisla- ! tive session, the one this author personally examined.^ William Buchanan, in his monograph, Legislative p»rtlgM>«hl|>; The Deviant Case of California ('University of California Publications in Political Science," Vol. XIII; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), has already examined these bills in the 1957 session. . _ __ ~T95 i Party conflict bills In Chapters III and IV it was found that party ‘ division votes in the Senate and Assembly usually occurred ] over the following issue topics: elections and reapportion- ment, labor, law, and social welfare bills. Two leading i iauthorities on the California legislature, Cresap and i Buchanan, in earlier studies discovered the same kind of I I !issues operating in the legislative sessions they analysed. As far back as 1949, Cresap had made an analysis of the kinds of bills that tended to promote party con flict. Cresap reported that on the following votes 95 per cent or more of the Republicans voted against a majority j of Democrats: 1. urgency clause— child care centers 2. withdraw from committee— unemployment compensation bill 3. withdraw from committee— prepaid health insurance 4. change in state incase tax laws 5. reconsider change In state income tax law 6. disciplining of state employees 7. proposal for punch card method of voting in state elections 8. resolution in regard to prayer 9. election procedures for election to county central cosadttee 10. assembly constitutional amendment dividing legis lative sessions into two time periods^ 2Dean Cresap. Golden State Politics (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954), p. 58. At the same tine, 95 per cent or more of the Democrats voted against a majority of the Republicans on the follow ing votes: 1. child care centers 2. disability insurance 3. amendment to disability insurance 4. public housing bill 5. aid to needy children 6. workmen'8 compensation 7. change in state income tax laws 8. initiative and referendum 9. aid to needy persons 10. hardship and destitution aid 11. election to county central committee 12. reapportionment vote 13. grants of federal aid^ Many of the same kinds of bills that Cresap dls- covered ' tending to cause Republican-Democratic voting dlvi- sions in 1949 were prominent in Buchanan's study of the 1957 legislative session. Bill topics such as welfare measures or election procedures were mentioned most frequently. In his recent study of the California legis lature, Professor Buchanan established three general clas sifications of Assembly and Senate bills shich served to foment party conflict. First, there were a number of votes dealing with elections, reapportionment, and party organi zation. Although these bills have no substantive policy concerns, they could, if enacted, affect the balance of 3Ibid.. p. 59. J9T voting power in the legislature. However, Professor ! Buchanan noted that at tines it was difficult to determine why the legislators would consider a vote on a particular election modification or party organisation bill as giving one party a certain added advantage— yet they frequently did. | The same type of legislation causing Republican- Democratic divisions in the 1949 and 1957 legislative sessions continued to generate party disharmony in 1961. For example, out of the handful of bills causing party conflict at the 75 per cent level of cohesion during the 1961 session were the following bills which the Republicans favored and the Desiocrats opposed: 1. Challenging a voter at the voting precinct on the grounds that he cannot read as required by the Constitution. 2. Restrictions on the political activities of public employees. 3. Absentee ballots to be returned five days before the election. On the other hand, Democrats gave solid support to the following measures on which the Republicans were in oppo- j sition: | ‘ - I9T 1. Deputised persons can act as voting registrars. 2. Reconsider vote on No. 1. i 3. Reapportionment bill. 4. Board of supervisors may submit to the electors the election of designated county officers. 5. Selection of delegations to national party conventions and the selection of unpledged delegations at the presidential primary elec tions . Under Buchanan's classification, the second group of votes provoking party conflict mere those which involved the traditional "ins" versus "outs" controversies. On these votes, Buchanan noted, one or the other party at tempted to take advantage of a voting situation to embar rass the opposition. In the 1961 Assembly session there was a series of votes dealing with Democratic Governor Pat Brown's appro- j Ipriation requests for certain state projects. Democrats ! in the lower house gave these appropriation measures hearty ! support, while the Republicans vigorously opposed them. Whether Republican opposition to this series of appropria tions roll calls was brought to bear because this was an | attempt to embarrass Governor Brown and the Democratic ; .~ — — - o t leadership in the state legislature, or merely because Republicans are traditionally more opposed to spending imeasures, is not easy to determine. Perhaps this was a combination of both factors. Aside from this series of 'votes, however, there were few roll calls in 1961 which could be grouped into this category. Why was there a 1 drop-off of these politically inspired votes from 1957 to i 11961? Perhaps this can best be explained by noting that in 1957 Democrats in the legislature (especially the Assembly) were very conscious of making a party record. Although they were still a minority in 1957, a number of new Demo cratic legislators had been elected to the state legisla ture during the past two elections and were beginning to "flex their muscles." On the other hand, in 1961 the Republicans in the Assembly and the Senate, now acting as a minority, were perhaps not used to thinking in political terms because of their long domination of the legislature iunder their ostensibly nonpartisan administration. Thus, there were only a handful of votes in which the "ins" | versus the "outs" conflict showed up in the later session. The third classification of bills used by Buchanan in classifying party conflict votes were those in which j there was a substantive issue at stake. The bills con- sidered In this category, all taken from the Assembly of 1961, mere as follows: 1. Separate Itemization of all welfare payments. 2. Cost of county hospitalization shall not constitute a lien against real property. 3. Increase provisions for old age assistance. 4. Workmen's compensation to provide rehabilita tion benefits. Not too surprisingly, the Democrats in the Califor nia legislature, as a whole, supported the extension of the benefits or an increase in the compensation of, social wel-j fare legislation, while the Republicans, generally, were iless enthusiastic about enlarging these programs. The | staunch support given these measures by the Democrats and the coolness of the Republican attitude toward them is, at least since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal program of 1932, consistent with the two parties' | national positions. Another classification of bills would be useful in considering party conflict legislation. This category, in addition to Buchanan's three, might be labeled as the legal or due process legislation category. During the 1961 ses- |slon there were several votes taken dealing with abolishing _ 2 x n r the death penalty; In addition, there were several amend ments to this bill such as on one vote which would have provided for a four-year moratorium on capitol punishment. Another due process bill dealt with the legal rights of the j plaintiff, and still another with certain technical provi- i sion8 as to where court proceedings should be held for i certain types of cases. For the most part, on these legal party conflict votes, Democratic legislators were more concerned with the legal rights of the individual, while the Republicans appeared to be more interested in protect- . ing the safety of the citizens of the state through strong i laws. |Rural-urban conflict bills As it was pointed out in Chapter V, no rural-urban vote divisions ever reached the 75 per cent level of cohe sion, and there were only a few votes in which a slight | majority of rural legislators opposed a small urban major- | ity. The eight rural-urban votes listed below were those i ! in which these two blocs, voting against each other, j registered their highest cohesion: 1. Claims against public officers and employees. Eliminate requirement that claim be filed as ~“ Z0Z prerequisite to commencement against public i i officers. 2. Obligations under bonding law. 3. Fish and game code exemptions for Indians to apply only on reservation of which he is a member. 4. Uses of imitation milk products. 5. Prohibits loans under Davis -Grunsky Act for irrigation or municipal distribution system projects except those involving public health. 6. Codeine compounds with not more than two grains of opium per ounce within a compound exempted from triplicate blank requirement. 7. Prohibits use of school material for election purposes. 8. Supervision of charitable trusts. Authorises the attorney general to levy charges on char* i ltable trusts which he administers under the j law to defray administrative expenses. It appears clear that there is no easily discern ible pattern in the measures which provoked rural-urban controversy— at least during the 1961 session. It is true, on the one hand, that several of these votes appear to fall logically Into this rural-urban conflict category. For | example, number 4 in the above list deals with the use of I j imitation milk products; not unexpectedly, the rural bloc opposed this type of product and sought through various restrictions to limit their sale. Quite obviously, most urban legislators did not view these products with the same jaundiced eye as their rural counterparts. Too, the |prohibition of loans for irrigation purposes under the jDavis-Grunsky Act in number 7 also clearly affects rural interests, and the majority of farm solons opposed this measure. The other bill which directly affects rural interests in number 3. On this, the rural bloc voted to oppose restrictions on Indians1 fish and game code privi leges. Perhaps rural legislators voted in support of Indians1 rights because they form part of some of the rural legislators' constituencies, or perhaps farm legislators are instinctively more zealous in protecting Indian hunting and fishing privileges. The other measures listed do not appear, at least i Son the surface, to involve traditionally rural-urban con cerns. It is likely that chance played some part in the grouping of these other votes. Perhaps party affiliations I (the majority of rural legislators were Republican and most . _ 2»r urban so Ions ware Democrats) may offer a partial explana tion for these other votes as veil. I North-south conflict bills North-south votes occurred more frequently and with higher cohesion in the Senate than in the Assesibly. The ; overwhelming proportion of these high cohesion north-south {division votes came on water legislation. Of the eleven i . . votes with the highest north-south cohesion, six were on ! Assembly or Senate bills dealing with water questions. I The water votes were as follows: 1. Adds "watershed protection" and "county of origin" provision to California Water Resources Act. 2. Appropriations of water. Establishes provi sions for application to appropriate water. 3. Financial assistance for local water projects. I Authorises grants under the Davis-Grunsky Act. 4. Prohibits Department of Water Resources from i contracting for delivery of water from Delta i in excess of 4 million acre feet. 5. Requires Department of Water Resources Devel opment System to apply surplus system power revenues to reduce only big users' rates. | 6. Prescribes pricing policy for delivery of sup plemental water for agricultural use. The other high cohesion north-south division votes dealt with a hodgepodge of substantive Issue matters: 1. Reapportionment. 2. Public Utilities Commission Impositions of ! $5,000 fines on highway carriers. 3. Property taxes. 4. Supervision of charitable trusts. 5. Minimal requirements on farm labor buses. Aside from the legislation dealing with water, which was also an important factor in the Assembly as well, there I was little of substantive content which could be said frequently to divide cohesive blocs of northern and southern legislators. Reapportionment, of course, would affect the northern delegation because of its overrepresentation in !the Senate and was a contentious issue. It is also true I | that northern senators frequently represented rural dis tricts and, therefore, several votes dealing with agricul tural questions were also Important issues. i i 2 o < r Evaluation of Vo ting Tranda i I Republican-Democratic Host of the recent commentary written about the |California legislature emphasized one point: the California Assembly, and to a lesser extent the Senate, since 1957 have become highly partisan.^ This can be noted by consid ering several factors. First, since 1957 there has been a steady Increase in party voting in the legislature. Second, cohesion of the two blocs, while not very high in comparison with other urban states, was much higher than the other two vote dichotomies and also was Increasing throughout the three sessions studied. Third, several ;personal conflicts, which have taken place in the legisla ture since the 1961 session, also attest to this growing party conflict. In a special session of the 1963 legislature called ;by Governor Brown, this growing partisan conflict was I especially highlighted in the vote on the budget bill. In I | order to pass a budget bill in the Assembly, 54 votes are needed out of a total of 80 (an absolute two-thirds ^Buchanan, on. cit.. pp. 123-134. I I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 207 requirement). Republican Assemblymen, for several reasons, were opposed to Brown's budget bill and refused to vote, ;tfau8 preventing passage of the bill. Jesse M. Unruh, | Democratic Speaker of the Assembly and a living symbol of | this new partisan atmosphere, through a clever par Hasten- i itary procedural tactic, had the legislature locked in the chamber until at least soote of the recalcitrant Republicans were willing to vote. ^ The Republicans countered by stat ing that these were the pressure tactics of a "political boss. After 27 hours the Republicans agreed, reluctant ly, to vote. The budget bill was finally passed and the lock-in was called off. In 1964 Speaker Unruh promoted two new rule changes later approved by the Assembly. The Republicans daisied that these rules were imposed as a punishment for their actions on the budget bill. Speaker Unruh discounted this i Republican contention, explaining that the isajorlty party j was seeking protection against what he called the "extreme i ! __________________ 5A good discussion of the rise of Jesse Unruh and the partisan overtones can be found in Buchanan, on. cit.. p. 132. ^Lawrence E. Bavies, Los Anarlrir -Innr. August 2, 1964, p. 1. ~20fr partisanship" practiced by the minority Republican Assem blymen.7 | The first rule change had to do with the election of the Speaker of the Assembly. Prior to 1964, Speakers j had been elected by a vote of all the assembled members of | the lower house. A great deal of jockeying went on among J I the various contenders, with promises of chairmanships, | vice-chairmenships, or key couaittee assignments being i |part of the bargaining quid pro quo used by the Speaker O candidates. Because the Speaker was elected in this fashion, the Assemblymen's party membership was not usually the crucial factor determining the legislators' votes, but other, more personal reasons accounted for the vote. i Indeed, on several occasions, a member of the minority party was elected Speaker of the lower house. The change, as proposed and approved by the Assembly, was to have the two parties caucus separately, select their Speaker candi- |date, and then in a joint meeting of the two parties in the Assembly go through the formality of electing a Speaker-- i i 7Jerry Gillan, Los Angeles Times. August 5, 1963, p. 9. a Buchanan, on. cit.. pp. 84-91. —— 209 although obviously the majority party's candidate mould be the victor. The second rule change had to do with the Speaker's selection of committee chairmen and vice-chairmen. Tradi- i i 1 tionally, members manning these positions were part of the | Speaker's election coalition. There were both Republican t i and Democratic chairmen, no matter which party had the {majority in the Assembly. The new rule change stipulated i j that only members of the majority party could be chairmen or vice-chairmen. Four Republican chairmen lost their chairmanships under this new rule provision. Although these were indications of increased par- |tisanship in the California legislature, several important I i mitigating factors can be noted. Even by the end of the i i1961 legislative session, California was far less partisan than any of the eight states studied by Jewell. The in- I crease in partisanship from 1959 to 1961 was minimal and I may very well indicate a leveling off of party voting in |the legislature. Jesse Unruh, leader of the staunchly i j partisan Democratic faction, has been far more circumspect in his dealings with the Republicans recently. The Los Anaeles Times Sacramento Bureau chief, Robert Blanchard, wrote the following about the 1964 legislative session and 2IU Hr. Unruh: It [the legislative session] also projected a nee image for Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh who, up to now had been characterised as the iron-fisted ruler of the lower house who locked Repub liesns up for 27 hours to gain his way. This time Unruh got along far better with the Republican leadership than he did with some members of his own party— Governor Brown, State Finance Director Hale Cham pion and State Controller Alan Cranston.9 Wien he announced that he was appointing Milton Marks, Republican Assemblyman from San Francisco, as a chairman of the newly reactivated Cosmittee on Government i Reorganization In 1964, Unruh said: I have selected Assemblyman Marks for this Important assignment because of his outstanding work at the helm of this committee during the 1963 session and his previous record as chairman of the Assembly Committee on Constitutional Amendments. ^ Whether this marks a diminution of partisanship in the legislature or the beginning of an attempt by Speaker Unruh for building bipartisan support in seeking higher |political office is not altogether clear. California's legislature is still far less partisan ■ than any other urban state legislature. Certainly the ^Robert Blanchard, Los Angelas Times. May 24, 1964, Sec. A, p. 5. 10Ibld.. July 7, 1964, p. 8. — ; _ m nonpartisan Progressive Party legacy Is still being per- jpetuated. In concluding, It might be said that there Is little doubt that the legislature Is more partisan than It mas just a few years ago, but It appears rather unlikely, after examining the voting trends and the personal factors, that in the near future California's legislature will soon : I approach other urban states In terms of the bitterness of the Republican-Democrat conflict. I 1 Rural-urban Certainly the conclusion of this study that the i rural-urban dichotomy's importance has been greatly over rated in this state agrees with the findings of other polit- I !leal scientists in their recent roll call studies of other state legislatures. It Is true that on a few specialized votes dealing, for example, with agriculture or state . highway taxes, most of the rural legislators will vote i | together but seldom against a united city bloc. In fact, j | there were only a few agricultural bills in which conflict i i | occurred. This may indicate the preeminence of the nation- ! al government on this subject area. It might be suggested that if legislation is | defeated in the California legislature on bills which would | 212“ {benefit urban metropolitan areas such as legislation for a i mass transit system or a slum clearance bill, the measures J are defeated primarily by a division within the urban ranks rather than by rural solons. It is quite likely that rural-urban votes will be even less crucial in the future than they are today. Agricultural trends in the country as well as in this state i indicate that fewer farm workers will be needed because of new mechanical labor-saving devices; also, the size of the average farm has grown larger for this same reason. This means a dwindling farm population and a mushrooming urban i population in the country. In addition, it appears that j the recent Supreme Court decision on reapportionment will affect the size of the rural delegation in the California Senate and will probably mean that the number of farm solons will be pared down even further. New highways and i r ! modern communications have the effect of minimizing the ! i differences between the attitudes and outlooks of the aver age "hayseed" and the "city slicker," and, one would pre- sume, their representatives. Certainly the belief that i . there are two highly cohesive rural and urban blocs that wage frequent internecine warfare on a wide range of i issues in the California legislature has little substance m !in fact. I ! North-south North-south voting had more significance in the jCalifornia Assembly than rural-urban voting, and much less importance than party voting. Enmity between northern and southern California is still a factor in the state and in |the current legislature. Seldom are cohesive voting blocs evidenced, however, except on water legislation where irather clear-cut differences do exist. In the 1965 legislative session there has been a great deal of debate and discussion in the California Senate over dividing California into two separate states— one northern and one southern. A number of northern Sena tors have gone on record as supporting this program. In a recent news story, a southern Senator, Senator Alvin C. Weingand of Santa Barbara, also endorsed this division: i | When residents of this coastal city speak of "going to the city" they mean San Francisco (380 driving miles to the north) rather than Los Angeles (94 miles to the southeast). Thus State Sen. Alvin C. Weingand, Santa Barbara, explained yesterday at a news conference to spell out his support of a bill to divide California into two states. "The culture of Santa Barbara County is much more compatible with the north than with the south," Weingand said. 2 ^ "Traditionally, when anyone In Santa Barbara : says 'lie are going to the city,1 he means San Francisco, not Los Angeles," he said. "I don't want Los Angeles to dominate the government of California and that Is why I became a co-author (of the bill," Weingand said. "Everyone knows Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego counties will control the state if reappor tionment becomes a fact." The bill sponsored by State Sen. Richard E. Dolwig, R-Redwood City, which Weingand admitted has little chance of passing the Assembly, would include Santa Barbara County in North California | although it is often, if not generally, thought of as a part of Southern California.11 Other differences between the northern and southern j I blocs in the state Senate, although operating at lower levels of cohesion, included several bills in the fish and !game, transportation, taxation, and agriculture categories; | And in the Assembly in the appropriations category. It seems likely that north-south voting divisions will become less prominent if Southern California's water deficiency problem is overcome. Certainly great progres has been made on this problem in two general areas: first, i the Feather River Water Project, costing some 1.75 billion dollars, will bring water from the north to Southern i 1 2 I California, helping to alleviate the letter's plight; 11 Los Angeles Her*i « * January 16, 1965, p. 5. 12 Leroy C. Hardy, California Cover"— "«• (New York: ; Harper and Row. 1964). p. 105. ___________ 213“ second, progress has been made in the use of converting i n jocean water to fresh water through a desalination process. At the moment the expenses for this conversion makes water I costs prohibitively high, but progress through research is I making desalination more economical. The disparity in the populations of northern and | i southern California; the "bonus*' received by the north in | 1 gas tax revenue allotments; the rural, isolated, more 1 I tradition-oriented north versus the bustling new metropoli- | t' tan south are all factors which mitigate against the devel^ opment of a truly homogeneous state. Thus, differences in voting behavior between the two blocs of legislators will l ! probably continue to manifest themselves, although seldom i in clear-cut voting splits and on only a few selected 1 issue topics. Of course, the critical factor influencing future | voting patterns in the state legislature will be reappor- j tlonment. Party line-ups will be altered, undoubtedly, and i there will be significant changes in the composition of rural-urban and north-south political forces In Sacrasiento. ^^Ray Herbert, Los Angeles Times. January 18, 1965, Pt. 2, p. 1. J ! I BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Books i ; i |Babcock, Robert. State and Local Government and Politics. New York: Random House, 1957. i | Baker, Benjamin. Urban government. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1957. i Baker, Gordon E. "The California Senate: Sectional Con flict and Vox Populi," In The Politics of Reaopor- tloimnnt. Edited by Malcolm Jewell. New York: Atherton Press, 1962. _______ . Rural Versus Urban Political Power. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1955. I Beek, Joseph A. The Legislature of California. Sacra mento: State Printer, 1942 ed. Buchanan, William. Legislative Parfcia*f*f hip; The Deviant Case of California. (University of California Publications in Political Science, Vol. XIII.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. | Burke, Robert E. New Deal for California. Berke ley: University of California Press, 1953. | i Carney, Francis M. The Rise of Democratic Clubs in Cali fornia. New York: Holt, 1958. ! Caughey, John V. California. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1958. - - • 218 ! ComposItion on Lettislatlve Reapportionment: California. j New York: National Municipal League, 1960. ! Cresap, Dean R. Golden State Politics. Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954. i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • Party Politics in the Golden State. Los Ange les: Haynes Foundation, 1950. | Crouch, Winston W. The Initiative and Referendum in California. Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1950. I McHenry, Dean E., Bollen, John C., and Scott, | Stanley. California Government and Politics. New York: Prentice Hall, 1960. ;Eulau, Heinz, Wahlke, John, Buchanan, William, and Fergu son, LeRoy. The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior. New York: Wiley, 1962. Farrelly, David, and Hinderacker, Ivan. The Politics of Government in California. New York: Ronald, 1951. !Gosnell, Cullen, and Holland, Lynwood. State and Local Government in the United States. New York: Mac millan Co., 1948. Graves, W. Brooke. American State Govern™** " * - Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1953. ; Guttman, Louis. "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Measurement and Prediction. Edited by Samuel A. Stouffer, et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 1 ; Hardy, Leroy C. California Government. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. ! Harris, Joseph P., and Rowe, Leonard. California Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. Havard, William C., and Beth, Loren P. The Politics of Mis-Representation. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. 219 Hofatader, Richard. The Aaa of Reform. New York: Vintage | Books, 1960. Hylnk, Bernard L., Brown, Seyom, and Thacker, Ernest V. Politics and Government in California. 3rd ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963. Jewell, Malcolm (ed.). The Politics of nmmmi- New York: Atherton Press, 1962. !______ . The State Legislature: Politics and Practices. New York: Atherton Press, 1962. Jonas, Frank (ed.). Western State Politics. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1961. Kendall, Wilmoore. Democracy and the American Party System. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1956. Key, V. 0. American State Politics: An Introduction. New York: Knopf, 1956. _______ . Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups. 4th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958. 1 _______. Southern Politics. New York: Knopf, 1949. Kneier, Charles. Cltv Government in the United States. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Lockhard, Duane, Bpgfend State Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. |_______. The Politics of State and Local Government. New York: Macmillan, 1963. I ! MacDonald, Austin F. a— State Government and Administration. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1960. McCrae, Duncan, m — *n*i«as of Congressional Voting. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. HeKean, Dayton David. Party and Pressure Group Politics. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1949. McWilliams, Cary. California: The Great Exception. New York: ▲. A. Wyn, 1949. ! i Ohmlnus, Arthur A. The Legislature of California. Sacra- I mento: State Printer, 1959. i Phillips, Jewell Cass. Strata and Lw»al Government in the United States. New York: American Book Co., 1954. ! | Price, H. Douglas. "Are Southern Democrats Different?" \ in Politics and Social Life. Edited by Nelson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964. i Polsby, Nelson, Dentler, Robert A., and Smith, Paul A. Politics and Social Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964. Rice, Stuart A. Quantitative Methods In the Study of Politics. New York: Knopf, 1928. i I Riker, William. "A Method for Determining the Signifi cance of Roll Calls on Voting Bodies," in Legis lative Behavior. Edited by Heins Eulau and John C. Wahlke. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959. Stouffer, Samuel A., et al. Measurer*^» • Prediction. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. | Truman, David B. The Con<fp-«aa-Ln>nal Par tv. New York: Wiley, 1959. j !_______ • The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. Turner, Henry A., and Velg, John A. The Government and Politics of California. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 221 Turner, Julius. Parj:v and Rnn«Mtumcv: Pressures on C o n g r a a a . (" T h e J o h n s H o n k ln i D n l w r i t t v S ta id la a In Historical and Political Science," Series 69, No. 1.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. iVahan, Richard. The Truth about tha Jyhn Birch Society. New York: Macfadden-Bastell, 1962. !Vines, Kenneth, and Jacob, Herbert (eds.). Comparative State Politics. New York: Little, Brown, 1965. i 1 Walker, Robert A., and Cave, Floyd A. How California Is Governed. New York: Dryden Press, 1953. ! Wilson, James Q. The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Young, C. C. The Lealslatnre of California: Its Member ship. Procedure and Work. San Francisco: Common- wealth Club, 1943. Zeller, Belle. *p^^an State Legislatures. New York: Crowell, 1952. | Zink, Harold. Government of Cities in the United States. New York: Macmillan Company, 1948. Articles and Periodicals Anderson, Totton J. "California Enigma of National Politics," in Western Politics. Edited by Frank H. Jonas. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1961. _______ , and Lee, Eugene. "The 1962 Election in Califor nia," Whs tern Political Ouart:ag>lv. XVI, Pt. 1 (1963), 413. Bliven, Bruce. "How Did Southern California Get That Way?" Reporter. XXVI (January 18, 1962), 39-40. I t "California," Esquire. February, 1963, p. 121. I Crane, Wilder. "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting," Midwest Journal of Political Science. IV (1960), 1-26. DeGrazla, Alfred. "General Theory of Apportionment," Law and Con^—wpo^rv Problems. XVII (1952), 123-131. i Derge, David. "Metropolitan and Outs babe Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review. LII (1958), 1065. ! 'Friedman, Robert. "The Urban Rural Conflict Revisited," Western Political Quarterly. XIV, No. 2 (June, 1961), 495. Frost, Richard. "On Derge's Metropolitan and Outstate Legislative Delegations," Communications Section, American Political Science Review. LIII (June, 1961), 792-795. Harris, T. George. "The Rampant Right Invades the GOP," Look. XXVII (July 16, 1963), 19-25. Jacobs, Herbert. "The Consequences of Malapportionment," Social Forces. XLIII (1964), 256-261. Jewell, Malcolm. "Party Voting in American State Legis latures," American Political Science Review. XLIX (1955), 773-791. Keefe, William J. "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature," American Political Science Review. XLVIII (1954), 450-464. "Party, Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly," Northwestern University Law Review. XLVII (1952), 55-71. Leroy, Mary Ellen. "The Party System Comes to California," Reporter. XVI (February 7, 1957), 33-36. 225 Lockhard, Duane. "Legislative Polities in Connecticut," American Political Science Review. XLVIII (1954), ! 166-173. Lowell, A. Lawrence. "The Influence of Party upon Legis lation in England and America," Annual Benort of the Aner*g«« Historical Association. I (1901), 321-542. iLuce, R. Duncan, and Rogow, Arnold A. "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-Party System," B*R»wloral Science. I (1956), 85-95. McConaughy, John B. "Some Personality Factors of State Legislators In South Carolina," American Political Science Review. XLIV (1950), 897-903. Pltchell, Robert J. "The Electoral System and Voting Behavior: The Case of California's Cross Filing," Western Political Quarterly. XII (1959), 455-484. _______ . "The Influence of the Professional Management Firms in Partisan Elections in California," Western Political Quarterly. XI (1958), 278-300. i "Report of the Political Behavior Comslttee of the Ameri can Political Science Association," American Political Science Review. XLVIII (1954), 716. Rice, Stuart A. "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," Political Science Quarterly. XL (1925), 60-72. Schlesinger, Joseph A. "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," American Political Science Review. XLIX (1955). i tr Schubert, Glendon, and Press, Charles. "Measuring Mal apportionment," American Political Science Review. LVIII (1964), 302-327. 224 Gdjfermwif Publications California. The California Bine Book. 1957, 1959, and 1961. Sacramento: State Printer. _______ . The Final Calendar of Legislative Business. Sessions 1957, 1959, and 1961. Sacramento: State Printer. I _______. The Journal of the Assembly. Sessions 1957, 1959, 1961. Sacramento: State Printer. i I The Journal of the Senate. Sessions, 1957, | 1959, 1961. Sacramento: State Printer. U.S., Bureau of the Census. P. S. Census of Population: 1960 California. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960. _______ , Dept, of Conmerce, Bureau of the Census. Countv and Cltv Data Book. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962. Newspapers Bevies, Lawrence E. Los Angeles Times. August 2, 1964, p. 1. Blanchard, Robert. Los Angeles Times. May 24, 1964 and July 7, 1964. jGillam, Jerry. Los Angeles Times. August 5, 1963. \ Herbert, Ray. Lo« Ang«ir1r~ "’ • ‘ hitt January 18, 1965. 1 An«;«Uf Herald Examiner. January 16, 1965. Unpublished Material Baer, Markell C. "The Story of the California RepublieWn Assembly." Unpublished rajmrt released by The Republican Assembly of Los Angeles County, 1955. (Mimeographed.) 225 Bell, Charles 6. "A Study of Four Selected Factors Which Have Contributed to the Inability of the Desttcratlc Party to Successfully Mobilise Its Latent Majority in California." Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1949. Best, Wallace H. "Initiative and Referendum Politics in California, 1912-1952." Unpublished Ph.D. disser tation, University of Southern California, Depart ment of Political Science, 1955. Ogle, Marbury. "Rural-Urban Splits in Indiana," Unpub lished report to the Mid-West Political Science Association, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Spring, 1958, p. 1. (Mimeographed.) |Price, H. Douglas. "Comparative State Governments." Unpublished paper presented at the American Polit ical Science National Meeting, 1962. Salisbury, Robert H. "Rural-Urban Factionalism in Missouri Parties." Unpublished report to the Mid-West Political Science Association, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Spring, 1958. (Mimeographed.) i

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

The 1961 Mayoralty Election In Los Angeles: The Political Party In A Nonpartisan Election

PDF

Political Aspects Of State Coordination Of Higher Education: The Processof Influence

PDF

Representation Theory And Apportionment Models: A Study Of California Constituencies

PDF

Civil Rights And The Public Employee. An Analysis Of Legal Protections Available To Public Employees Dismissed Or Facing Dismissal

PDF

Voting alignments in the California Legislature: A roll call analysis of the 1957-1959-1961 sessions

PDF

The Formal Organization Of The Democratic Party At The State Level In California

PDF

Alienation And Integration In The Political Attitudes Of Suburban Adolescents

PDF

The Relationship Between Community Political Systems And Defense Contracting

PDF

An Examination Of Economic Expectations As A Determinant Of Political Behavior

PDF

The Influence Of Anti-Poverty Policy-Making Upon Poverty Decision-Making: 1964-1974

PDF

The Company Town As A Feature Of Western American Development

PDF

The Cultural Institute In Mexico City As An Example Of United States Policy In Cultural Relations

PDF

Liberalism And Conservatism: A Study Of Mass-Media Foreign Policy Attitudes

PDF

The Role Of The California Community Colleges In The Education Of The Aged

PDF

Political Development And Political Parties In Turkey

PDF

The Socialist Labor Party, 1890-1903

PDF

The Interaction Between The Private, Public And Third Sector In The Defense Contract Award Process: Lobbying For Defense Contracts For Los Angeles County, 1952-1972

PDF

A Comparison Of Contemporary Conservatism In Great Britain And The Unitedstates

PDF

The new guerrillas: public administration in the new industrial state

PDF

Hegel And Dewey And The Problem Of Freedom

Asset Metadata

Creator Price, Charles Marshall (author)

Core Title Voting Alignments In The California Legislature: A Roll Call Analysis Of The 1957-1959-1961 Sessions

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Anderson, Totton J. (committee chair), Boskin, Joseph (committee member), Kuroda, Yasumasa (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-183460

Unique identifier UC11359720

Identifier 6600577.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-183460 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6600577.pdf

Dmrecord 183460

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Price, Charles Marshall

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA