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The Philosophies Of Ralph Tyler Flewelling And Edgar Sheffield Brightman: A Comparison And A Critique

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The Philosophies Of Ralph Tyler Flewelling And Edgar Sheffield Brightman: A Comparison And A Critique

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Content This dissertation has boen microfilmed exactly as received 6 7 - 2 1 1 8 PRICE, R oss Eugene, 1907- THE PHILOSOPHIES OF RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING AND EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN: A COMPARISON AND A CRITIQUE. U n iversity of Southern C alifornia, Ph.D ., 1966 Philosophy University M icrofilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, M ichigan © Ross Cugene Price All Rights Reserved 1967 THE PHILOSOPHIES OF RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING AND EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN A COMPARISON AND A CRITIQUE by Ross Eugene Price A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Philosophy) June 1966 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C ALIFO R NIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by nnder the direction of //A®.-Dissertation C om mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y CT - - * » — - - v • Dean Date. June 1966 DISSERT AT IChatrman "The fullness of personality is not realized until the individual has nade it captive to the highest good." --Flewelling, Creative Personality, 285, "Without our co-operation, even God the Eternal cannot save us," --Brightnan, The Spiritual Life, 193, TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE PART I. INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY I. INTRODUCTION........................... 1 Reasons for the choice of this topic . . . 1 The need for such an investigation .... 4 Some related investigations........... 5 The scope and extent of this investi gation ................................. 8 The major sources of data............. 9 Proposed nethod of procedure ............ 10 The organization and structure of presentation ........................... 10 Definitions of iaportant terns .......... 12 II. AREAS OP SIMILARITY AND DIFPBRBNCB..... 14 Vitae............................... 15 Ralph Tyler Flewelling ................... 15 Edgar Sheffield Brightnan............. 20 Some Areas of Agreenent and Similarity . . 25 Areas of disagreement and difference . . . 29 Flewelling1s methodology .............. 31 Brightman^ methodology. ............ 48 iv CHAPTER PAGE PART II. THE CATEGORIES OP COMPARISON III. THEIR DOCTRINE OF GOD.................... 63 Flewelling's view of God.......... 63 Brightaan's view of God................ 76 Flewelling*s criticisms of Brightaan's position.......... 96 IV. MAN, AND HUMAN NATURE.................... 104 Brightaan's view of human nature .... 104 What is human nature?................. 105 What are its characteristics?........ 107 How does it function?................ 113 What is its destiny? ........ 122 The cultured nan. . ................ 124 Flewelling's views on man.............. 125 V. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.................. 145 Flewelling'« philosophy of evil........ 146 Some data of the noral situation. . . . 146 Toward a definition of sin............ 152 The problem of suffering. .......... 154 The solution of these problems is personal............................ 160 Brightaan's philosophy of evil.......... 163 The surplus of evils.................. 164 V CHAPTER PAGE Inadequacies of traditional Theism* • . 169 Evil and human freedom ........ 172 Current solutions examined. .......... 173 The rationale of the Given............ 176 Various types of evil................ 177 Omnipotence vs. experience............ 179 VI. THEORIES OP PHYSICAL NATURE.............. 183 Brightaan's theory of physical nature . . 183 Physical things ...*• ............ 184 Matter ............................. 186 Nature................................. 190 The objective referent of sense exper ience......................... 190 Nature and God...................... 191 Nature and supernature. ....... 195 Two realms of experience............ 196 A monistic view of nature.......... 197 Natural evils ...................... 200 The universe...................... 201 Flewelling*s philosophy of physical nature............................... 204 Physical objects....................... 206 Matter................................. 211 Nature...................... 214 vi CHAPTER PAGE The Universe .................. 210 Creation.......................... 220 Evolution........................ 224 VII. THE CATEGORY OF TIME...................... 230 Brightman's Metaphysical Teoporalism . . 231 Tinelessness ........................ 241 Time and mind........... 243 Time and reality.................... 244 Time and God........................ 245 Time and eternity.................... 247 Time and the person.................. 249 Flewelling1s philosophy of the nature of time.......... 250 Time as form........................ 269 Time^ objectivity.................. 272 Time and measurement................ 274 The relativity of time.............. 276 The flow of time.................... 277 Personality is both teeporal and timeless.......................... 279 Bright man1 s criticism of Flewellingfs doctrine of time.................... 283 VIII. THEIR PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY............ 285 Flewelling^ philosophy of history . . . 286 vii CHAPTER PAGE History and the individual............ 294 History as dynamic process ............ 298 History and the human element.......... 302 The personalistic focus of history . . . 30ft The theistic foundation of history . . . 311 The optimistic outlook for history . . . 316 History's challenge for the future . . . 323 Brightman's philosophy of history........ 330 IX. THEIR VALUE THEORIES....................... 348 Brightman's discussion of the realm of values................................. 350 Some evaluations of Brightaan's value theory................................. 370 Flewelling*s conception of the things that matter most....................... 375 The cosmic reality of values.......... 391 The higher values are immaterial and spiritual............................. 393 Values and freedom.................... 395 Values and faith....................... 396 Values and religion.................... 397 The supreme value is the person........ 400 Truth as value......................... 403 viii PAGE RELIGION............................. 407 Flewelling*8 philosophy of religion. . . 409 Religion has a legitimate place in human experience............... 410 True religion is universal..... 413 True religion is self-validating . . . 419 True religion is pragmatic..... 424 True religion is ethical * ..... 425 True religion is spiritual ...... 427 True religion is social......... 430 True religion is intellectually respectable ................ 432 Prayer and the world order...... 434 The reasonableness of the Incarnation. 439 Flewelling’s view of theism...... 449 Immortality a reasonable postulate . . 452 Brightman's philosophy of religion . . . 460 Reason in religion.............. 466 Metaphysical realities in religion . . 472 True religion is ethical........ 474 True religion begets social involve ment .............................. 476 Personalism is mystical.......... 479 ix CHAPTER PAGE Personalism believes in immortality for the individual............... 483 The increase and conservation of values. 488 Personal religion and the spiritual life............................. 489 Religion needs its critics ............ 495 The Bible........................... 498 The Church......................... 500 XI. THEIR THOUGHTS ABOUT EDUCATION......... 504 Flewelling's philosophy of education . . . 505 Brigbtman's philosophy of education. . . . 528 XII. FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM............... 541 Brigbtman's philosophy of freedomism . . . 542 Flewelling's idea of personality as free activity....................... 550 PART III. A CRITIQUE AND SOME CONCLUSIONS XIII. SOME CRITICAL EVALUATIONS............... 566 The idea of a finite God............. 567 Rosy optimism about man............... 582 The problem of evil. • ................ 585 The status of nature................. 590 Metaphysical temporalism ................ 602 Does process guarantee progress? ........ 608 Some axiological considerations. ..... 612 X CHAPTER PAGE Theological synergism ................... 617 Rational eepiriclsm and theological anthropomorphism .................... 619 Which way from Bergson?.............. 624 The nature of the self................ 626 Some personalistic attitudes toward education........ ................. . 633 Flewelling*s insights and oversights. . 633 Brightman's Ideal: Educate the whole man for life as a whole ....... 639 Freedom and contingency . • » ....... 643 XIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . .............. 646 Summary.............. 646 Conclusions' .................. 666 Suggestions for further research..... 678 BIBLIOGRAPHIES BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN .... 681 Introduction.............................. 682 Books written by Bright man............... 686 Thesis and Dissertation.................... 667 Monographs, Periodical Articles, and chapters in Syeposia ....................... 687 Articles for Ferm*s Encyclopedia of Religion . 709 Articles for Collier1s Encyclopedia (1957) . • 710 xi CHAPTER PAGE Articles for Rune's Dictionary of Philosophy • 711 Articles for The Twentieth Century Encyclopedia ....... ................ 711 Books Reviewed by Brightman in Various Journals.................................. 711 Articles by Brightman on Philately .......... 732 Poems written by Brightman.................. 735 Articles about Brightman by his contempor aries. ................................ 736 Reviews of Brightman's books by his contemporaries ............................ 739 Doctoral dissertations about Brightman .... 745 BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING.......... 747 Introduction .••••... ................ 749 Books written by Flewelling.................. 756 Editorial articles for The Personalist .... 757 Articles for the feature section, "Notes and Discussions".......................... 767 Articles for the feature section, "Current Thought".................................. 774 Articles for the feature page, "The Lantern of Diogenes".............................. 778 Articles for the feature section, "Our Foreign Letter"............................ 786 xii CHAPTER PAGE Articles written for other publications than The Personalist ...... ................ 787 Articles for the magazine Science of Mind . . . 788 Articles republished in La Science du Mental. . 790 Articles for Rune's Dictionary of Philosophy................ 792 Articles about Flewelling by his colleagues and con temporaries.........................793 Reviews of Flewelling*s books by his contemporaries.............................794 Books reviewed by Flewelling in The Personal!st and other journals............ 797 Flewelling*s Doctoral dissertation. ...... 884 Bon Voyage2 R.T.F. .........................885 A GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED AND CITED WRITINGS..................................... 886 Books....................................... 887 Articles..................................... 896 Unpublished items ........................... • 897 APPENDICES APPENDIX A: OUR PHILOSOPHERS AS POETS.......... 899 Some examples of Brigbtman's poetry........ 900 Some examples of Flewelling*s poetry........ 904 xiii CHAPTER PAGE APPENDIX Bs BRIGHTMAN AND HIS CRITICS............ 909 A, C. Knudson's criticism of Brightaan's theory................... 910 Andrew Banning's appraisal of Brightaan's position.................................... 91B Edwin Lewis charges Brightaan with Manicheisa . 924 Nels Ferrd's criticism of Brightaan.......... 925 E. W. Lyman's criticisa of Brightaan's finitisa.................................. 928 H. N. Wieman's attack on the doctrine of the Given .................... .•••••••• 932 D. C. Macintosh thinks Brightman distorts Personalism .......................... 934 Baker's criticisa of the Liaited-God concept. . 940 Douglas Horton's remonstrance and Brightaan's reply...................................... 947 A scholastic states his objections............ 951 DeWolf's religious revolt against rationalism . 956 Carnell's case against theistic finitisa. . . . 961 Notations from still others who object to Brightaan's theory. . 976 Helsel's criticisa............................ 976 Robinson's criticism.......................... 977 Werkasister's criticisa .. .................. 978 xiv CHAPTER PAGE Whits's criticism ........................... 979 Beiswanger's criticism....................... 980 Garvie's criticism........................... 980 Woodburnc's criticism .................... . 961 Ames's criticism............................. 982 Thomas's criticism........................... 982 Williams's criticism......................... 982 Holland's criticism ......................... 983 Brightman*s continued satisfaction with MThe Given" ......................... 986 APPENDIX Ct Brightman's correspondence with Long ............................ 988 PART I INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This treatise seeks to set forth an analysis, comparison, and evaluation, of the philosophies of Ralph Tyler Flewelling and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. The former served as administrator and professor of the school of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. The latter was the Borden Parker Bowne Professor of philosophy at Boston University. Since both men were classified by themselves and others as Personal- ists, and since each disagreed with the other at several vital points, a study of this topic seemed both worthy and inviting. Reasons for the choice of this topic This researcher has, throughout his intellectual pilgrimage, been vitally interested in the philosophy of Personalism. His first introduction to this way of thought was by a course in Introduction to Philosophy taught for college freshmen by a graduate of Boston Uni versity. The teacher had majored in philosophy under Brightman and the text he used was Brightman*s 3 Introduction to Philosophy.^ It was in the same class that we were introduced to the writings of R.T. Flewelling. Thus came an admiration of these two men and their writings as outstanding among the exponents of personalistic thought in this century. Later, upon coming to California, it was our privilege to meet Flewelling personally and to converse with him, though by that time he had retired from teaching at the University of Southern California and was devoting his time to the editorship of the journal known as The Personalist. He had founded this periodical in 1920 and served as its editor until 1957. It was a privilege to take courses with Flewelling1s colleagues: Paul R. Helsel, Herbert L. Searles, and Wilbur Long. Since college days it was our practice to pur chase and read, as they came from the press, the books of E.S. Brightman. A special study in philosophy for the master's program included an intensive look, at the writings of such men as Bowne, Knudson, Brightman, Buckham, Flewelling, and MacMurray. Thus when facing the practical need for a topic that would afford both inspiration and motivation for one especially interested in metaphysics and values from the ^-Published at New York by Henry Holt & Co., 1925. 4 standpoint of modern personalism, this seemed to be an unique opportunity to deal vd th the philosophy of person alism here at the home of the now well known journal, The Personalist. Finally, there seemed to be a need for such a study now that death had removed each man from the con temporary scene. The Need for such an Investigation To our knowledge, although short articles and evalu ations had been written concerning the thought of each of these men, no study of the nature of this treatise had yet been done. Then, too, there was the need for a full and complete bibliography of the writings of Flewelling. 2 Even his Autobiography, The Forest of Yggdrasill, was published without such a bibliography due to other pres- sing and time consuming duties involving its editors. Before his death Brightman had completed a year by year bibliography of his own writings, but it also seemed that included in a complete Brightman bibliography should be writings about Brightman by his critics and contemporaries. Likewise, a codification of the facets of thought found in the writings of each of these two men, and of ^Ralph Tyler Flewelling, The Forest of Yggdrasill (Los Angeles: University of Southern Cali7ornia Press, 1962). 5 each in relation to the other, seemed especially desirable. This would result in a re-emphasis of some of the salient, and perhaps unique, features of personalistic thought. Frankly, this writer looks upon personalism as worthy of promotion in the field of philosophy. Perhaps, then, a study such as this would not prove amiss. It is important to note that the highest intrinsic value in this present world order is still the person. The totalitarian challenge of this concept would seem to validate its continued study and evaluation. Some related Investigations The best full length study of the philosophy of Flewelling now in print is Wilbur Long's introduction to Flewelling's own Autobiography, The Forest of Yggdrasill.^ This thirty-six page analysis of Flewelling's thought is a splendid synopsis, but it is admittedly limited by lack of space. Nor does it attempt to compare or contrast Flewelling with any of his contemporaries. Next to this as a study of Flewelling's philosophy is a portion of a chapter in his History of Philosophical Ideas in America,4 by W.H. Werkmeister. Here again the ^"Flewelling and American Personalism," pp. xiii- xlviii. .H. Werkmeister, History of Philosophical Ideas in America (New York: Ronald Press, 1949). cf. Chapter T5. study mist be necessarily brief because of the limitations of space, Werkmeister's book also appeared prior to the publication of three of Flewelling's most important books. Rannie Belle Baker has written a work entitled The Concept of a Limited God, A Study in the Philosophy of 5 Personalism. She devotes about forty pages to a discus sion of Brightman's conception of the Given in the Nature of God, The remainder of Brightman's thought is not treated, and no space is given to Flewelling's position at all. Brightman's own colleague at Boston, A.C. Knudson, has criticized Brightman's thought about God and commended his thought in other areas of personalism but has made no attempt to present the whole of his philosophy. Partial evaluation and criticism has been made of our philosophers by the various book reviewers in the learned journals, but these again are very limited in scope. There have been various periodical articles of the briefer type which have sought to commend or evaluate the philosophies of these men. Yet by the very nature of their limitations they present only a cursory viewpoint. 5Rannie Belle Baker, The Concept of a Limited God, A Study in the Philosophy of PersonallsnfTwashinqtori. D.C. ShenandoaK PuElTsTTTngHouseT- 193*).----- 7 The research paper by this writer on the topic Is Personalism the Answer?6 is rather a treatment of the philosophy of personalism in general and thus can mention Brightman and Flewelling only as among others who sub scribe to a similar position. A recent dissertation at Boston University deals with "The Religious Epistemology and Theodicy of Edward John Carnell and Edgar Sheffield Brightman: A Study in 7 Contrasts.1 1 Its treatment is limited to but two important facets of Brightman1s thought. Of course it purports to say nothing by way of comparison about Flewelling. A dissertation by James John McLarney at the Catholic University of America is entitled: "The Theism 0 of Edgar Sheffield Brightman." As its title suggests it is concerned chiefly with Brightman1s theism, though Brightman^ epistemology and his view of mind are also considered and criticized. Since it was published in 1936 it preceded two of Brightman's most important books and many of his more recent articles. ^Pasadena College Library, 1944. Joe Edward Barnhart, Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1964. 357 pp. O Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1936. 8 Rev. Timothy J. Holland wrote a master's thesis of twenty-nine pages on "The Personality of God according to Professor Brightman," at the Catholic University of 9 America. Again the treatment of Brightman's thought is limited. It, too, was written at a date prior to Brightman's more important later works. Shorter articles about one or the other of our philosophers have appeared from time to time in the journals of the learned societies. These will receive attention as our treatment of their thought progresses. The Scope and Extent of this Investigation The aim of this investigation was to present the salient facets of thought in the personalistic^ philoso phy of these two men. It was the endeavor of this writer to develop an exposition and a comparison of at least ten of their major areas of emphasis. This involved a careful reading of all the books written by each and of most of their important periodical articles and essays. Along with this came the necessity of studying the writings of their critics. Careful attention was paid to the reviews of their books by others than either of them. Many of ^Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1933. IQa definition of "personalism," is given on page 9 these incisive criticisms appear in the evaluation of their respective positions. The building of a master bibliography on each man involved a careful search through fifty years of publi cation for each of thirty-six of the learned journals, both in philosophy and religion. Flewelling's earliest publication appeared in 1903. The earliest for Brightman came about fourteen years later. Brightman died in 1953 and Flewelling in 1960. Flewelling*s autobiography was published two years later posthumously. The Major Sources of Data The major sources for our data thus became the the actual writings of these two men--their books, their periodical articles, and chapters written in various symposia. Other sources are those articles and discus sions about them by their various reviewers and critics. So it happens that the Libraries at Boston University and the University of Southern California (Hoose Philosophical Library), became the chief depositories of our data. Mention should also be made of the Religion and Philosophy Library at Pasadena College and the Los Angeles Public Library. Periodicals of special importance are The Personal- ist, The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, 10 The Philosophical Forum, The Crozier Quarterly, The Hibbert Journal, The Methodist Review, The Journal of Religion, Religion in Life, and The Journal of Bible and Religion. Encyclopedias for which our authors have written are: The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, A Dictionary of Philosophy (D.D. Runes, editor), Collier 's Encyclopedia, and Living Schools of Philosophy (also known as Twentieth Century Philosophy; D.D, Runes, editor). Proposed Method of Procedure After selecting ten major categories for comparison, we proceed to a separate statement of each man's philoso phy as related to the position of the other. Then is noted any criticisms either may offer of the other man's position. Following this comes criticisms written by their contemporaries. This is followed by occasional evaluations by the present writer. The Organization and Structure of our Presentation Part One of the dissertation consists of two chapters: this present chapter as an introduction, and a second which surveys areas of agreement and difference in the thinking of our philosophers. Included in this second chapter is a biographical sketch of each man. The 11 chapter concludes with a brief statement of each of the main categories of comparison and a statement of each man's position as related thereto in but a sentence or two. This sets the stage for the main body of discussion which follows in Part Two of the dissertation. The present chapter concludes with some definitions of the inr- -»rtant terms. Part Two is comprised of ten separate chapters, each dealing with a single category of comparison--a salient facet of thought upon which each man has expressed himself. Sometimes the chapter begins with the position of one, at other times with the position of the other, depending upon the extent to which one has written on the subject in comparison with the other. Then follows the thought of the other philosopher. This is followed, as stated above, by any criticisms either may offer con cerning the position of the other* After this we have tabulated pertinent criticisms by their contemporaries. The chapter usually concludes with some observations and conclusions by this writer. These categories of comparison are: The Concept of God, of Human Nature, their solutions of the problem of evil, their idea of physical nature, the category of time, their philosophy of history, their theories of values, their philosophies of religion, of education, and of free will and determinism. 12 Part Three is composed of two chapters, the first of which is the critique. This is followed by a chapter devoted to summary and conclusions and some suggestions for further research. The bibliographies and appendices follow in their order. It mas convenient to separate the bibliographical material related to each philosopher and to follow this with a general bibliography. Included in the appendices are samples of the poetry of each man. Definition of Important Terms By the term personalism we understand "any philosophy which considers personality the supreme value and the key to the meaning of reality."11 It is the "theory that only persons are real; and that all true being is p e r s o n a l . " 1 ^ Hence "as a metaphysical theory it is the conception of reality as a world of persons with a 1 Q supreme person at the head."* By the term category we shall understand "a principle essential to the very being of some universe of 11R.T. FTewelling, "Personalism," Dictionary of Philosophy (D.D. Runes, ed., Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1956), p. 229. 12B.S. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1925), p. 3'59’ . 13R.T. Plewelling, Creative Personality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 12. 13 14 discourse." The term is used "to name any universal, fundamental assertion about being. . . . The word "category" actually means "down in the market place" and ✓ j ✓ it comes from the two Greek terms, mxa "down," and a70pa "market place." It was in the market place that discus sions, bargaining, accusations and counter-accusations were made. Hence the term indicates, basically, an accusation. We use it here in the looser sense as a funda mental predicate. Hence, applied to the philosophies of the men we are comparing, it would indicate one of the classes into which their objects of thought may be divided. The term "critique" is used in the looser sense of a critical review of a literary production or evaluation of a philosophical position. There are lesser terms which need defining on location. This is done at the proper time and place in the discussion. It seemed proper to acquaint the reader with the two thinkers in a more generalized manner before taking up carefully and more fully each item of their respective philosophies as selected for the purpose of comparison. This we have done in the chapter which follows and to it we now turn our attention. Brightman, Person and Reality (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1958), p. 158. 15Ibid. CHAPTER II AREAS OP SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE For th« sake of comparison and contrast it became necessary at the very outset of this study of our philoso phers to give attention to a life sketch of each of them. Biographical data are given for each nan in their respec tive listings in the various Who1s Who volumes.* Each man has given us information concerning his own biography, intellectual and biological, which aids us in our quest for an understanding of each. Mention has already been made of Flewelling's own autobiography, The Forest of 2 Yqgdrasill. Here the philosopher and his colleague have given us most helpful insights and summaries. As for Brightman, his own autobiography, if it could be called that, is much shorter. It appears in a symposium edited by V. Ferm entitled Contemporary American Theology.3 Therein each man summarizes his thinking and the processes through which he arrived at his various positions. Jennette E. Newhall has written an excellent biographical sketch of *On Flewelling, see Who*s Who in the West; and for Brightman consult Who Was who in America. 2Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1962. 3V. Ferm, Contemparary American Theology (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), cf. pp. J>3-6l. 15 4 Brightman for the Philosophical Forum. The memorial numbers of the Philosophical Forum and The Personalist in honor of Brightman contain valuable information about him as does the memorial number of The Personalist in honor of Flewelling serve a similar function. Since Flewelling was the older of these men we take up his vita first. VITAE Ralph Tyler Flewelling Flewelling was born at DeWitt, Michigan, on November 23, 1871, the son of Francis Tyler Flewelling and his wife, Mary Cornelia (Whitney). His birth place was a log house on a farm. He includes in his biography only a few memories of his parents. His father worked first as a photographer, then as a farmer clearing the timber land of Michigan. He served at least one year as a pastor of a small church there. His mother died during his youth. She was an admirer of Emerson and had named her son for him. His ancestors were of rugged Welsh descent. On August 16, 1893, he was united in marriage to Jennie Carlin. He had attended the University of Michigan from 1890 to 1892. In September of 1893 he entered Alma ^f. Vol. XII (1954), pp. 9-21. 16 College at which school he received the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1895. Following his graduation from college he spent a half year at Garrett Biblical Institute in Evanston, Illinois. He was appointed to the pastorate of the Methodist Episcopal church in Bellaire, Michigan, and qualified for ordination to the Methodist ministry which occurred in 1896. He next was pastor in Augusta, Michigan. Following a year in this parish he sought appointment to a church in the New England District for the sake of being near Boston University with the privilege of continuing his studies. His first New England appointment was in the village of Osterville, below Cape Cod. From there he was appointed to the parish at South Walpole, Massachusetts. An interim appointment took him to the Park Street church in Lewiston, Maine, at the conclusion of which came a call to Newton Center, a suburb of Boston. (This same place later became the home town of B,S, Brightman during his professorship at Boston.) At Newton Center Flewelling served from 1903 to 1906. From there he went to Athol, Massachusetts where he was pastor for another three year period. In 1909 he was invited to the Harvard Street Church in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Here he served until 1913. His next pastorate was in the suburb of Boston at Leominster, where 17 he remained until his invitation to the pastorate of Boston First Church in 1916, After a year there, he was invited to the University of Southern California, in Los Angeles, to become the head of the department of philosophy there* Meanwhile he had received the S.T.B. degree from Boston University in 1902, and the Ph.D. in 1909. His dissertation for the latter degree was entitled, "Tran sition from Prophecy to Apocalypse*" His work at the University of Southern California was interrupted for the year 1918 when he served as head of the department of philosophy for the American Expe ditionary Forces University at Beaune, France. This afforded him the opportunity to do research studies at The Sorbonne during the same year. At this same time his studies were guided by a committee of which Henri Bergson served as chairman. His book on the philosophy of Bergson had its beginning at this time. Flewelling served as head of the department of philosophy at the University of Southern California and as professor of philosophy until 1929 when the reorgani zation of the University into Schools occurred. He then became the director of the School of Philosophy. In this position he served until his retirement in 1945, at which time he was made Director Emeritus. 18 Early in his career as a philosopher Flewelling founded the journal known as The Personalist. He served as its editor from its founding in 1920 until 1959, In 1960 he was succeeded by the present editor, W.H. Werkmeister• In the school year of 1934-35 he visited China and served as visiting professor at the California in China College of Chinese Studies at Peiping. During this same year he was engaged as special lecturer at Yenching Uni versity in the same city. He also lectured at various national and Christian Universities in other parts of China. From 1946 to 1947 he was the director of Inter national Studies for the Olive Hill Foundation. Flewelling was a member of the Western States Congress of Faiths, an honorary member of the United Nations Fellowship, and a member of the permanent Com mittee for the International Congress of Philosophy. He was active as a member of the American Philosophical Association and was President of its Pacific Coast Section for the year 1938-39. He was also a member of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies, the American Scienti fic Association, and a delegate to the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion. He belonged to such Greek letter societies as 19 Phi Eta Sigma, Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Kappa Phi, and was the founder in 1931 of the national honor society for philosophy, Pi Epsilon Theta. He was also active in such clubs at the University as the X Club, and the Twenty Club. Flewelling's activity as an author was indeed prolific. This is evidenced by the bibliography of his writings included herewith. As editor of The Personalist he wrote many editorials and feature articles, and during his life time reviewed for its columns nearly 1500 books. He was instrumental in securing funds for, and saw the construction of, the Seely Wintersmith Mudd memorial building for the School of Philosophy during his director ship. He also succeeded in gathering a very sizable library which is now housed in its second floor and known as the Hoose Library of Philosophy. It numbers more than 40,000 volumes, and includes the famous Heinrich Gomperz Library, and there are special collections of medieval, eighteenth century, Port Royal, Kantian, and personalistic philosophy, with numerous incunabula and early manuscripts. Flewelling died on March 31, 1960, and his Auto biography was published in 1962— edited by W.H. Werkmeister with an introduction by Wilbur Long. Of his philosophy a colleague, Herbert L. Searles, lias written: Philosophically, Flewelling represented a trend in philosophy in opposition to much of the current 20 analytic and positivistic thinking. He was broadly humanistic, theistic, and personalistic as against all absolutisms, mechanism, and re- ductionism. The key concept in his metaphysics is that of the essential irreducible uniqueness of the person. The Person is the center of reality, and it is on the basis of this model that the Cosmos can be understood. The recognition of the supreme value of personality is a mandate to democracy and the source of ultimate world under standing. He was able to achieve in his personal philosophy a remarkable reconciliation between a realistic appraisal of human finitude and a profound enthusi asm for human potentialities. In this work he strove to transcend the former in himself and liberate the latter in others.^ Edgar Sheffield Brightman Edgar Sheffield Brightman was born in a Methodist parsonage at Holbrook, Massachusetts, on September 20, 1884, the son of George Edgar and Mary Charlotte (Sheffield) Brightman. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Brown University in 1906, and his Master of Arts from there in 1908. He was awarded an honorary Doctor of Letters from this same institution in 1936. At Boston University he received the Bachelor of Sacred Theology degree in 1910, and the Doctor of Philosophy in 1912. An honorary Doctor of Laws was conferred upon him at Nebraska Wesleyan University in ^Herbert L. Searles, "Ralph Tyler Flewelling," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1961-1^62. (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press), XXXV, p. 107. 21 1929, and the same degree was conferred upon him by Ohio Wesleyan University in 1942. He attended the Universities of Berlin (two semes ters) and Marburg (one semester) in 1910 and 1911. On July 1, 1912 he was married to Charlotte Hiilsen. She died on May 24, 1915. On June 8, 1918 he married Irma Baker Fall. During the years 1906 to 1908 he served as an assistant in philosophy and Greek at Brown University. He was professor of philosophy and psychology at Nebraska Wesleyan University from 1912 to 1915. He was associate professor of Ethics and Religion at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, from 1915 to 1917, and full professor there from 1917 to 1919. He then accepted a position as professor of philosophy at Boston University Graduate School in September of 1919. In 1924 he was made the Borden Parker Bowne professor of philosophy at that same institution. He served as chairman of the Board of Graduate Studies at this University from 1933 to 1951. Brightman was frequently engaged as a lecturer in philosophy and religion. Among his lectureships were: the Ingersoll Lectures at Harvard University in 1925, the Lowell Institute Lectures at Boston University in 1925 and again in 1934. He gave the John McTyeire Flowers 22 Lectures at Duke University in 1927, and the Loud Lectures at the University of Michigan in 1937. At the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical and Reformed Church he gave the Swander Lectures in 1942. That same year he gave the Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt University. At Ohio Wesleyan University he delivered the Merrick Lectures in 1943. His Fondern Lectures at Southern Methodist University in 1945 became the material for his book, Nature and Values. He gave lectures at Boston University in 1950 and again in 1951. He was ordained by the Nebraska Conference of Methodism in 1912, and transferred to the New England Conference in 1914, where he had held student pastorates (Wiekford, 1906-8; Cochset, 1908-10). He was a member of the American Association of University Professors, and of the American Theological Society. The second of these he served as its president for the year 1933-34, He was a member of the National Association of Biblical Instructors (now the American Academy of Religion), and served as its president from 1941 to 1943. He was a Phi Beta Kappa scholar, a member of Kappa Sigma, and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was awarded honorary membership in the Kant-Gesellschaft. At the time of his death he was a member of Institut Inter na tiona1 de Philosophie with its headquarters in Paris. 23 During his professorship at Boston he was active in various University Clubs, including Philosophies Anonymous• He has written fourteen books and edited others, including the Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of philosophy. His Introduction to Philosophy has been translated into both Chinese and Portuguese* His Philosophy of Ideals was translated into Spanish. He contributed frequent articles to such journals as the Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, the Journal of Religion, Religion in Life, and The Personalist. He also supplied various chapters for symposia and articles for some encyclopedic works. He died February 25, 1953. His home was in Newton Center, Massachusetts. Of his philosophy Harold DeWolfe has written: Brightman's thought, while clearly in the Bowne tradition, was nevertheless highly creative and independent. His method he properly called 'rational empiricism.' He rejected the religious apriorism proposed by Bowne and developed by Knudson, as seriously lacking in safeguards against wishful thinking. No interest or experience, he held, can establish the truth of its presuppositions in isolation from relevant evidence from other types of experience. Brightman took his stand within the Platonic-Hegelian tradition of synoptic thought, using empirical coherence as criterion of truth. Verification is to be accomplished by the bringing to bear on any given hypothesis of all the relevant evidence discoverable, not, like positivism, assuming the superiority of sensory data, but considering all kinds of data of our experience and determining By the relations of consistency and 24 positive relevance whether the hypothesis should be denied, revised, or adopted, pending further evidence* In ethics, Brightman endeavored by this method of empirical coherence to formulate and prove a system of moral laws, which can be violated only at the cost of self-contradiction. That we ought not willingly to accept self-contradiction, he pointed out, is a necessary presupposition of cur whole intellectual life and of all demands for proof. But if this postulate is accepted then there follow, in view of the common experience of mankind, a system of formal, axiological and personalistic laws. Empirically he defended also the belief in a system of objective ideal norms of value and, having established the validity of his system, he found it to be of crucial importance as evidence for the existence of God. The principal innovation of Brightman's meta physics and philosophy of religion was his finitistic theism. According to this view, the perfectly good will of God must act within the limitations of His own nature, described as 'the Given.' The Given, in turn, is analyzed in terms of two components. The rational Given is the sheer rational necessity which restricts the divine will to the logically possible. The no.n-rational Given is the qualitative content of God's consciousness analogous to the sensory qualia of human experience. This content is the only material with which His will can work and the pain and imperfection within it inevitably infect the divine activity and the experience of His creatures. However, He always has 'control of the Given' so that His purposes are never finally defeated, but gradually overcome evil at progressively higher levels, using even the worst of tragedies, however costly and regretted in themselves, as instruments of progress. God and the world are alike seen as growing and hence, of course, as temporal, though the intent of the divine will is unchangingly perfect. This interpretation of the form and content of human experience as grounded in God's own unchosen being was Brightman's answer to the problem of natural evil. The pain and sorrow in the world he thought to be both quantitatively and qualitatively beyond adequate explanation by those theists who believe God's power unlimited.® ^"Personalism in the History of Western Philoso phy," The Philosophical Forum, XXI (1954), pp. 49-51. 25 SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND SIMILARITY There are many items in which the lives and thought of our two philosophers are similar* These we do well to note • Both men were personalists, and both were disciples and admirers of Borden Parker Bowne and his teaching. Neither man followed in detail the Bowne-Lotze system of thought, but both were students of Bowne during his pro fessorship at Boston University. Both were Methodist ministers. Brightman was born in a Methodist parsonage and Flewelling lived in one for at least a year in which his father served as pastor of a parish in Michigan, the exact location of which he does not state. While Flewelling served as pastor for a number of Methodist churches both in Michigan and New England, Brightman served only two student pastorates, though he did take orders in the church. Flewelling has g been referred to as an "Emersonian Methodist," and 7Cf. R.T. Flewelling, The Forest of Yggdrasill (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1962, edited by W.H. Werkmeister, with an introduction by Wilbur Long), p. 9. ®By Wilbur Long, in The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxi. 26 9 Brightman may be thought of as a Ritschlian Methodist* Both men rejected Calvinism^ as being inconsistent with a true view of either God or man* Each man held a strategic chair of instruction at an important university as has been noted in their life sketches above. Brightman spent at least one summer as visiting professor at the University of Southern California, Whether Flewelling did the same for Boston University is uncertain. With their prolific pens and frequent lectures, each of the two men was like an evangelist for the pro motion of personalism. Flewelling was the more prolific writer of the two, whereas Brightman was more frequently on the lectureship platform. Each of them produced in his lifetime about the same number of books.^ ^See Brightman's own intimation of this in E.S. Brightman, "Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theology (V. Ferm, ed., New York: Round Table Press, 1932), Vol. I, pp. 54 and 62. Cf. also his "Christian View of Nature," The Christian Bases of World Order (R.E, Diffendorfer, ed., Nashville: AbTngdon Press, 1943), p. 68. That he was also influenced by Schleiermacher is evident from his definition of religion on page 321 of the first edition of his Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925). lOpor Flewelling, see The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxi. For Brightman, see his fthilosophyof Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1940), pp. 25, 180, 221. ^Flewelling wrote fifteen and Brightman sixteen apart from his editorships of symposia. 27 Both men tried their hand at verse and poetry, samples of which will be found in the appendix. These verses came as a by-product of their rich acquaintance with the best in literature and expressed the romantic 12 strain in each personality. With but few exceptions, personalists are theistic in their metaphysics.^ This is the case with both Brightman and Flewelling, who also give strong emphasis to values, both human, and what they believe to be more- 1 a 15 than-human.Both men believe in immortality, and both reject the idea of eternal damnation.^ Neither man 17 accepts the concept of a personal satan. They agree in l^cf. The Pe r s ona1i s 1, and Ferm's Con temporary American Theology"! pi 5£>. ^■^McTaggert and perhaps W. H. Werkmeister. ^See Flewelling, The Things That Matter Most (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1946), p. T\ and Brightman, Religious Values (New York: Abingdon Press, 1925), Chap. V. ■^Cf. Flewelling, The Person (Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press, 1952), p. 2061 and Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 340-349, or his Philosophy of Religion, p. 13. ^See Flewelling's Forest of Yggdrasi11, p. xxi, or his Creative Personality, p. 25T7 and Brightman's Philoso phy of Religion, pp. 406-407. ^Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 248-249, or his Finding of God (New York: Abingdon Press, 1931), p. 186; and Flewelling, The Reason in Faith (New York: Abingdon Press, 1924), p. 20W, orThe Forest of Yggdrasill p. xxxviii, note. 28 holding that human nature is in a process of evolution which is under divine management.18 Because of this both are optimistic about human nature, though each of them recognizes some evil in man, and neither would accept the belief in human depravity and the doctrine of original sin.1^ Flewelling thinks of the Virgin Birth for Jesus of Nazareth as being irrelevant to the belief in His 20 divinity, and Brightman would rule it out for empirical and rational reasons. By means of their works which have been translated into Spanish and Portuguese, as well as through their publications in English, both of these philosophers have exerted a strong itvfluence in the area of Latin American philosophy.^1 18See Brightman, "A Personalistic View of Human Nature," Religion in Lif e, XIV, 221-222, 227; and consult Flewelling, The Survival of Western Culture (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1Q43J7 p^ 273, or The ~Person, p. 132. Cf. also all of chapter XVII in The Person, and note his definition of "evil," p. 330 in The same volume. l«Cf. Flewelling, The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 169, but see his Survival of Western Culture, p. 126. Cf. Brightman, The Finding of God, pi ll4, Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon Press, T933), p. 69, and The Future of Christianity (New York: Abingdon Press, 1937*7^ p. 52. 2<^The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 168. 21This is evident as one reviews their bibliographies. But cf. Corea's note on Brightman's tatin American influ ence in The Philosophical Forum, XII, p. 80. Flewelling exerted his influence chiefly through The Personalist, but he wrote also at least one editorial for La Aurora under the caption, "El Sentido Cristiano de la Vida." ("Buenos Aires, 1944). 29 Incidentally, we may note that each of our philoso phers favored the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,22 no doubt for humane reasons particularly. Across the years of their experience as educators, both men have said some incisive things with reference to O ^ education. Both of them may be classified as liberal 24 protestants. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE Both Flewelling and Brightman studied the Greek and Hebrew languages. Both qualified for the doctorate in French and German. Flewelling was more at home with the French language and read it easily, which was an asset to him in his study of French Personalism. He also spent spent time doing research in Paris and pursued studies 22cf. Brightman’s statement in Ferm's Contemporary American Theology, p. 79, and his Future of Christianity, p^ 147; and Flewelling, Surviva 1 of Western Culture^ p. 120, and Winds of Hiroshima (New York: Bookman A'^soci- ates, 1956), p. 75, 2^See Flewelling, Survival of Western Culture, Chaps. V, XIII; The Person, Chap. XlTj and Creative Personality, Chap. XXXIII. Cf. Brightman, "Ethics and Education," Alert, II (1938), 7-13, 24; The Finding of God, p. 64; Future of Christianity, p. 1^8; and Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon Press, 1945), p. 11. 24But see Brightman*s definition of "Liberalism" in Crozer Quarterly, XXIII (1946), p. 141. 30 25 at the Sarbonne. Brightman, on the other hand, had more occasion to use German. He spent two semesters at the University of Berlin and one at the University of Marburg.26 His ability to make his own translations from the German was evidenced as early as 1925 in his Ingersoll lecture at Harvard in that year.27 Later in life Brightman*s interest in Latin American philosophy moti- 28 vated him to master the Spanish language. There are many influences in a man's intellectual pilgrimage, but the French influence, and especially that of Bergson, is evident in Flewelling*s thought, whereas the German influence is the stronger with Brightman who owes a special debt to Hegel.2® It may be evident as we proceed that Flewelling shows, though perhaps uncon sciously, the influence also of this great German 25Forest of Yggdrasill, Chap. 7; cf. pp. 65-66. 26Cf. Jannette E. Newhall's biographical sketch of Brightman, Philosophical Forum, XII (1954), pp. 12-13. 27E.S. Brightman, Immortality and Post-Kantian Idealism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press^ 1925), p • 6l. 28Cf. Paul E. Johnson, "Brightman*s Contribution to Personalism," The Personalist, XXXV (1954), 61 f. 29Cf. Roland Stahl, Jr., "Hegel and Dr. Brightman's Idea of Truth," Philosophical Forum, VIII (1950), pp. 15 ff. Flewelling notes Brightman's "repeated de fense of Hegelianism" in Religion and Life, XII, 302. In the case of Flewelling and Bergson, cf. The Forest of Yggdrasill, pp. xx, 66, and Flewelling*s own admiss Ton of to Bergson in his Survival of Western Culture, p. ix. 31 systematizer• Likewise we shall discover the influence of Bergson in Brightman. One of the basic differences between Flewelling and Brightman was in the area of methodology. Flewelling was the more "pragmatic” and Brightman the more "dia lectical.” Let us first consider Flewelling. Flewelling 's Methodology Flewelling's methodology is in keeping with his 30 "Personal Realism," which was the name he chose for his type of personalism. Broadly speaking it is an appli cation of the logic of life itself in the formulation of his philosophical views. As such it is metaphysical, realistic, intuitional, dynamic, normative, and pragmatic. Flewelling defines "personal realism" as follows: PERSONAL REALISM--Emphasizes the metaphysical nature of personality, its continuous activity in natural phenomena, and its unanalyzable or realistic character as experienced fact, the ultimate real. Term used by James Bissett Pratt and Ralph Tyler Flewelling.3l Flewelling thinks of the person as "the only substance in a world of shadows.Thus it is his contention that 30 R.T. Flewelling, "Personalism," Dictionary of Philosophy, D.D. Runes, ed., p. 230* See also FleweTTing, Bergson and Personal Realism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1920), wherein FlewelTing evaluates Bergon's philosophy. 31r.T. Flewelling, The Person (Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press, 1952), p. 333. 32Ibid., p. 1. "the person is • . . the constant co-creator of the world of reality," and although he is "unconscious of the mental processes involved in constructing that reality," yet "the world he knows is a world of meaning which he erects out of his sensuous experience and which is his world of 33 reality." This being the case the person is the one 34 common factor in all reality. "Any knowledge must 35 include man's own nature and responses." Thought, too, is man's activity, for it is the person who commands and directs the activity of his brain. He says "thought is a mental act directed by the personality in response to certain sensations chosen for attention out of a great 37 multiplicity. ..." It is this active nature of mind 38 that proves the presence of a controlling person. Flewelling agrees with Bowne that "the essence of QQ reality is simply causal activity.His own definition 40 of reality is "that which can act or be acted upon." 33Ibid., p. 31. 34Ibid., p. 12. 35Loc. cit. 36Ibid., p. 28. 37Ibid.. p. 27. 38Ibid., pp. 28-29. 3^R.T. Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy (New York: The Methodxs t Book Concern, 19l5)T~* p. 75. 33 This may be divided into two parts, "the world 'out there'," and "the world 'in here',"41 neither of which can be ignored. Thus he contends that: . . . the really great world of nature and reality will not break upon our understanding until we have com to see that the world 'out there,' while important, gets its significant meaning and value within the person himself.42 He insists "what is within is quite as important for establishing the world of reality as that which is with out."43 Concerning the relationship which maintains between these two parts of reality, Flewelling contends that it is the relator rather than the relationship that is the final reality. He says: Personal realism, . . . contends for the indi visibility of personality rather than for that of relation. It holds that the relator rather than the relation is the finality. This claim for indivisible and unanalysable consciousness in per ception, which is personality, constitutes the realistic element.44 He believes that "in the fact of personality perception and reality coincide," and he adds "this is what we Man by personal realism."45 Here he is in agreement with 41lbid., p. 37. 42Loc. cit. 43Loc. cit. ^Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 201. 45Ibid., p. 208. 34 Pratt who holds that Mthe knowing process presupposes the 46 reality of an active self.” Flewelling therefore sug gests that reality exists "in the fusion of external with internal known as the person."4^ Here again he would agree with Pratt who says: Both epistemologica1 and psychological consider ations, therefore, point to the necessity of acknowledging an existent subject or self if we are to have any real explanation for the unity which must be, and which is, in the life of m i n d , 48 Flewelling says: It is this unanalyzable self that is the reality, and we must be satisfied to accept this element of personal realism and accept the ‘self1 at its face value,49 It has been a truism in philosophy that the reality of personality is fundamental to intelligence; that if we cannot believe in our own reality, we cannot be sure of any knowledge whatever. What is not so generally recognized is the fact that per sonality is a metaphysical as well as an episte- mological necessity. ^ He notes that there are two distinct tendencies manifest among personalists, depending upon whether their interests are primarily epistemological, or metaphysical. He says: 4^J.3. °ratt, Persona 1 Realism (New York: Macmillan Company, 19^7), p, 263. 47 Flewelling, The Person, p. 32. 48pratt, 0£. cit., p. 289. 4^Flewelling, Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 180. 35 The latter group may be said to be the more thorough-going personalists because a theory of thought implies and cannot avoid certain meta physical assumptions, such as the intelligible nature of the world,*1 He then observes that such personalism bases its theory of knowledge upon the idea that the world springs from an intelligent Source and thus it "must of necessity be in telligible to all normal minds and human perceptions are CO true," He therefore looks up "the person as the center of reality, and bearing within himself the meaning of the Cosmos, But beyond the metaphysical character of his personal realism arises the contention that intuitive knowledge is closer to life than is the merely theoretical, discursive, or even dialectical, Flewelling believes that the truth and reality may be perceived by intuition or known by insight. In The Person he speaks of "spiritual rzA insight," And in his work on Bergson and Personal Realism he makes frequent mention of intuition, as the following examples bear witness: ... intuition ... is knowledge in the moment of action. Intelligence is knowledge ^"Personalism," Twentieth-Century Philosophy, D.D. Runes, ed., p. 282. 52l o c. cit. 53The Person, p. xi, ^4Ibid., p. 32. 36 55 in the moment of reflection. Intelligence without some measure of intuition is impossible.56 . . . intuition is the personality in action, while intelligence is the personality in the act of reflection, . . .57 Apparently, if intelligence cannot give us a true report of reality, and intuition can, truth must be intuitional rather than conceptual or rational.58 In as much as analysis cannot give us anything that at all resembles the self, it would seem that the ultimate mystery, behind which we cannot go, is personality itself. The consciousness of person ality seems to be gained by simple intuition and not by analysis. This interior reality is something enduring through time and surviving the multiplied states of consciousness.59 If there is one thing above another that dis tinguishes personality, that makes it what it is, it is the indivisible presence of intelligence in intuition.60 In keeping with these thoughts, Flewelling defines in tuition as "knowledge acquired by other than conscious inquiry or learning, the result of unconscious mental 55Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 96, 56Ibid., p. 102. 57Ibid., p. 104. 58Ibid., pp. 96-97. 5^Ibid., p. 181. 60Ibid., pp. 184-185. 37 processes, or inspiration."^ It should not be surprising to find Flewelling's methodology making room for valid insights based upon the nature of life itself if this emphasis upon intuition be remembered. Along with the metaphysical and intuitive in his methodology we find the pragmatic. This emphasis implies the supremacy of living interests and values above those of formal logic. Life is held to be the best commentary on reality. Thus he writes of the "pragmatic authority 62 of life," and contrasts the "practical versus theoreti- A ^ cal knowledge," insisting that "knowledge is ... a practical possession, the worth of which is to be measured by its practicality, or by the insight it gives into the 64 nature of the general order of reality." He says: "We are quite incapable of dealing with things apart from their use, their relations, and their meanings. Writing of Personalism, he observes: "Logically it is pragmatic and holds that life is more important and more ^^The Person, p. 332. 62Survival of western Culture, pp. 279-281* ^The Person, p. 34. 64Ibid., p. 35. 65Loc. cit. 38 convincing than any verbal form of expression, that reality is forever bursting the bonds of fixed meanings or verbal pronouncements."^^ But Flewelling's pragmatism is of the subjective, rather than the objective, type. The former is humanistic and moralistic. The latter is ready to make sensation the beginning and end of knowledge. The former is personal and voluntary, the latter is sensory and activistic. In the case of objective pragmatism, verifiability is publicly perceivable. This is the scientific viewpoint. The emphasis rests upon the perceptual or behavioral fact, which stands outside the self. The certainty of proof is essentially in the recurrence of the expected and experi enced phenomena. Subjective pragnatism, on the other hand, depends upon a verifiability that is more private. Its concern is with the interior more than the exterior, the personal rather than the natural. It finds room for the volun- taristic and contingent. It is concerned with freedom and human values. Its verifiability stands in the realm of personal satisfactions. As Flewelling himself states: We can never consent for long to abide by an inquiry which begins, continues, and ends with the physical world, denying this profounder and, ^^"Personalism," Twentieth Century Philosophy, p. 282. 39 for man, more important world. . . .While the proof may not be quite of the identical order which we observe in the scientific field, still, like proof anywhere else, it is of a practical ^ nature and is determined by the presence of values. He also points out that in either case knowledge is at best only tentative whether scientific or philosophical, and "proof has to be of a practical nature as judged by a normal mind" for "proof is finally determined by normality H68 to experience." Both objective and subjective pragmatism are thus unified by purpose, satisfaction, fruitfulness, and coherence. The difference lies in the epistemologica1 principle involved. But it is important to note that the subjective type of pragmatism is an anti-rationalistic methodology•^9 70 We are now ready to note, as does Wilbur Long, that Flewelling1s pragmatism is a "normative pragmatism." It would hold that being is never unrelated nor uncon ditioned. It is concerned with ideals, values, creative conduct, and standards for judging value or evaluation. ^ Creative Personality, pp. 128-129. 68Ibid., p. 129. ^Our discussion of subjective versus objective pragmatism here and above is based on a class lecture by Wilbur Long on December 13, 1960. 70 Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxxix. Thus Flewelling contends that "the activity of the mind is bound up with the whole meaning and outcome of life, 71 with creative effort and purpose," He would put man's life, his insights, values, purposes, and destiny at the center of things. An approach such as this is practical rather than theoretical. Value now becomes the criterion of ontological truth. The dominant principle in his personalism is a concern with moral and spiritual values. Its basic axiom is the cosmic worth of persons. Philoso phy, he thinks, should be interested in the whole of life. In such case "knowledge becomes ... a practical possession whose worth is measured largely by its practi cality or by the insight it gives into the nature of the 72 general order." Such an approach is what we find in the first two chapters of his book, The Reason in Faith, where he dis cusses "The Nature of Proof in Science and Life,"7^ anci "The Self-justification of the Truth, In the first chapter he criticises science for its "tendency to forget 75 that its field is not the whole of life," He complains 7^ - The Person, p, 24. ^^Creative Personality, p. 122. ^^The Reason in Faith, pp. 17 ff. 74Ibid., pp. 32 ff. 75Ibid., p. 18. 41 . . . the field of demonstration or proof in physical phenomena is not identical with the field of demonstration in the realm of freedom, that is, where the power of human choices enters into the results.76 But he insists that it is this "realm of first causes" that is the "field of chief importance to the living 77 man." He calls attention to the fact that "scientific 78 demonstration is confined to succession in phenomena," hence "we can learn nothing more from science than the 79 order of and control of phenomena." On the other hand "demonstration in the field of self-conscious life is a on matter of values." Here we are concerned with "the needs of life,"®* and "the facts most important to man's Q O life and happiness." Since these have to do with human choices, such manifestations of freedom cannot be gotten into statistics of any kind, yet they "are exactly the QO ones of most importance." As such they "must forever lack the mechanical exactness of demonstration possible 76Ibid., P* 19. 77Ibid., P* 20. 78Loc. cit. 79Ibid., P. 21. 80Ibid., P- 22. 8*Ibid., P- to u> • 82Ibid., P* 22. 83Ibid., P» 26. 42 to science."84 Their problem is vaster and more important depending as it does upon "values that bulk on human freedom."^ With such considerations in mind, he contends that "demonstration in the realm of life must be individual and particular. ... In any event it is a demonstration of value."88 It is Flewelling's belief that "the pro- foundest truths are realized not by demonstration but by faith."87 Moreover, "the proof of ethical or spiritual values lies not in actual results but ... in ideals Aft pursued." This means that "the profoundest ethical and spiritual interests are capable of demonstration to the 89 individual alone." Therefore, "the best demonstration of life cannot be had by mathematical precision nor by observation of scientific phenomena, but in living itself."90 Advancing now to a consideration of his second chapter, "The Self-Justification of Truth," we are assured that truth can never be proved untrue. He says: 84Ibid., p. 27. 8^Loc. cit. 88Ibid., p. 28. 87Ibid., p. 29. 88Loc. cit. 89Ibid», p. 30. 90ibid., p. 31. 43 It is true because it meets human needs or the eventual demand of the human spirit, because it fits in with life, because it is in keeping with the highest human ideals, 'because it works,' to use a phrase of pragmatism. In the last analysis it is true because it is the truth. It will in the long run prove its own justification.9* Of course human truth is always fragmentary, hence "there is no truth which does not have to meet momentarily the judgment of life."9^ That is why "truth gets no real hold upon us, possesses no real meaning for us, except 03 as we work it out in life." Yet the multiplication table needs no defense; and "the reason is that its practical need is too obvious" for question.94 Flewelling further contends that the validity of truth is internal. This is seen by reason of: The necessity that truth shall be judged continu ously by its reference to the needs of men, being re-proved or rediscovered by each generation, [which fact] shows that the validity of truth rests upon internal rather than upon objective foundations.^ The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a consideration of Revelation, Inspiration, and the Authority of Scripture, 91Ibid., pp. 32-33. ^ Ibid., p. 35. hoc. e x t . 94Ibid., p. 36. 95Ibid., p. 39. 44 none of which need concern us here. We have noted prior to this that Flewelling came to philosophy by way of his Emersonian Methodism.®^ There is a real sense in which he was more pragmatic than his teacher, Bowne• Trained, as he was, in the German tra dition, Bowne was a thoroughgoing rationalist. Yet he tried to get both the rationalistic and the pragmatic standpoints into his philosophy. But Eucken thinks the influence of Lotze, the logician and dialectician, left him in the tradition of a hard and speculative meta physician. He employed extensively speculative arguments to support his metaphysics. But he always felt that life was larger than logic. Eucken thinks that Lotte's religion remained more "on the fringe of life, and it is a question whether it ever affects the central thought. For this reason it does not exert any strong influence 96plevelling confesses the influence of Emerson upon him* In an article for The Personalist (XX, 343-352) entitled, "Emerson and Adolescent America," he refers to Emerson as "the first great American philosopher" (p. 344). He notes that Emerson's thought was characterized by "an abounding realism" (p. 349). He compares him to Bowne who like Emerson was "a transcendental empiricist" (p. 349). But he notes that Emerson's "transcendentalism was primarily human and factual" though he states that Emerson was "reluctant to be known as a transcendentslist" (p. 349). He also calls attention to the fact that Emerson and the Lyceum were important factors in the growth of intellectualism in the middle West (p. 352). 45 97 upon his philosophy•" But as to Bowne, Eucken observes: Bowne, on the contrary, puts religion at the very center, and regards it as the crown of being, main taining that metaphysics and logic are enlightened by the fundamental question of religion, and are to be understood only in connection with it. . . . Religion cannot be proved or explained in ordinary words; neither anything that lies deep in our nature* Aristotle asserts that the knowledge of anything must be derived from something higher than itself* Religion, therefore, would have to be proved through something of a still higher nature, and as we have access to nothing higher, it must remain unproved* Consequently we must not try to prove it but to illustrate it; and this we may do by showing that every phenomenon depends closely upon it, and also, that an intelligent being is the established basis of every reality. Hence religion lies at the basis of our life if it is real; and if this be denied, there is nothing to fall back upon. Bowne maintains that any other attempt to explain life is due to bad thinking* The practical appli cation of any tenet is so important in Bowne's philosophy that he takes this truth almost for granted, for by it our very life becomes exalted and valuable* The proof of religion, then, so far as it can be proved, is the creation of a new life and a new world in m a n*9® This quotation from Eucken will help us see how Flewelling took the normative pragmatic methodology of Bowne, whereas we shall find Brightman is more strongly ^7Rudolf Eucken’s essay, "The Work of Borden Parker Bowne," is Chapter One, in Flewelling's book, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy: An Appreciation of the Work of Borden Parker Bowne. The above citation from Eucken appears on pages T9-20 therein. It should be noted here, however, that Eucken*s evaluation of the place of Religion in Lotze's thought may be challenged. Likewise Eucken has overlooked Lotze's "practical ought" orientation, Q Q °Eucken, "The Work of Borden Parker Bowne," in Flewelling's Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 19-21. ~ 46 influenced by the rationalistic, dialectical, and logical methodology which also characterized Bowne, and more particularly Brightman's professor of logic, Alexander MeikleJohn. Flewelling's basic methodology can be seen in one 99 of his earlier essays: "Three Windows into Reality." Therein he suggests that Science, Philosophy, and Religion, are such, with philosophy as the unifying principle between the other two* Thus he held, as Long notes: "that philosophy in some measure straddles the line between science and religion, but that, essentially it is on the religious side."^0 And although he did not reject Bowne's metaphysics he put less faith in formal theoretical reasoning than did his teacher*1°1 As Long further observes: From the outset Flewelling indicated that he was not in sympathy with either a purely rational istic point of view nor the principle of spiritual compartmentalism, and he looked to pragmatism as the key to the resolution of the bifurcation problem.102 "His own 'personalistic pragmatism'," Long continues, ^The Philosophical Review, XLVIII (1939), pp. 109- 117. lOOcf. Long's "Introduction," to Flewelling's Forest of Yggdrasi11, p. xxxvi. 101Loc. cit. 102porest of Yggdrasill, p. xxxvii. 47 "was an ontological position identified with normative 103 standards," Long explains further: It was the identification of value, as the primary and all-inclusive abstract category in both epistemology and ontology, with the normative that made it available to solve the problem of spiritual dualism. ^ 4 Long's summary reads as follows: Flewelling's normative pragmatism, as a theory of cognition, distinguishes between science as knowledge of order and philosophy as the concern for 'Truth,' The one is abstract and impersonal, the other con crete, existential, and an interest in 'meaning,1 or ideal quality and ends. Philosophy, in other words, moves toward the religious pole and in some degree merges with religion. Truth in the philosophical sense, Flewelling said, 'can never be separated from living existential experience.'*05 por Pragmatic personalism, truth is 'value.' 'Truth as value,' was his way of proposing that on the ontological level what is cannot be found by a formal specu lative process which takes sense and formal rational categories as its data; truth, possessed by man, is grounded upon the spontaneous ontological judgments that are associated with value-experience, or, more precisely, are an integral component of them. In sum, the humane sphere of personal existence is more revelatory than the fields of empirical science and formal reason. Pre-eminent among the revelatory data of values are the ethical, social, communal, and aesthetic.107 Long therefore looks upon Flewelling's Christian IQ^lqc. cit., cf. also Bergson and personal Realism, p. 258. * ^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxxvii. Creative Personality, pp. 223-224. 1Q6Ibid., p. 226. lQ7Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxxix. 48 Personalism as "a general valuations1-ontological orien- 1 Q Q tation based on the New Testament." Thus he believes that "Flewelling gave a new and important interpretation of personalism."^^ As Flewelling himself states: "Values are thus given a standing in the nature of things as certain and as direct as that of natural or physical phenomena." Such, then, is the methodology of Flewelling. As we turn our attention to Brightman we discover a very different methodology, though it, too, is greatly con cerned with values. Brightman* s Methodology Of the basic principle of his own methodology, Brightman says: "Respect for Logic seems to me the corner stone of all sound thinking and even of intellectual honesty.Yet he says: "highly as logic is to be 112 valued, it is no substitute for experience." In more than one of his books he has declared in favor of "logical ^•Q^Ibid. 9 p. xli. 109Ibid., p. xlv. llOnpersonalism," Twentieth Century Philosophy, p. 283. ^^Brightman, "Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theology, p. 59. ll2Ibid., p. 61. 49 113 coherence as the Sole Criterion of Truth." In his revised edition of his Introduction to Philosophy,114 he offers his answer to the question, "what wethod or methods shall philosophy use?" as follows: It is obvious that all rational thought must use logical method. Logic— the science of implication and inference— is a basic method of philosophy. Facts must be observed and related to laws; this is method. The confused stream of experience must be broken down into its parts; analytic method must be applied. But the parts must be seen in relation to the wholes to which they belong; a grasp of such relations of the properties of wholes requires syttoptic method. The need of understanding develop ment and of supplementing every partial view by a more comprehensive one requires dialectical method.115 Thus Brightman*s methodology is characterized by logical rigor, which in turn is characterized by such activities as analysis, synthesis, synopsis, and dialectic. An example of this is his dialectical development of what he calls "the Ideal of Reason," as presented in his book, Nature and Values:116 We suggest that reason is an ideal of completely coherent thinking and living, never fully realized, never merely static, yet always imperative in its claims. It is the supreme court of the mind. 113I£i£-» P* Religious Values, p. 21, Introduction -Co Philosophy (1925K p. 6l. ^**Published at New York by Holt, Rinehart and Winston in 1951. ^ ^Introduction to Philosophy, p. 8. 116h«w York: AbdLngdon Press, 1945. 50 It consists of the following norms: Be consistent Be systematic Be inclusive Be analytic Be synoptic Be active Be open t o alternatives Be critical Be decisive (eliminate all contradictions), (discover all relevant relations), (weigh all available experiences), (consider all the elements of which every complex consists), (relate all the elements of any whole to its properties as a whole). (use the experimental method). (consider any possible hypothesis), (test and verify or falsify hypotheses). (be committed to the best avail able hypothesis). This analysis of reason speaks for itself. The inevitable conclusion is that if one appeals to reason he appeals to systematic thought; if he does not appeal to reason he cannot be reasoned with. ^ In another context he says: Concretely, Reason is equivalent to reasoning--the process of applying logical principles to our actual consciousness. More exactly, concrete reason is the movement from a problematic, confused, or inconsistent conscious situation toward a better-ordered, clearer, and more consistent conscious situation. He lists the elements of reason in the following formula: Reason includes the discovery of the simplest parts of every complex (analysis), of the relation of the parts (synthesis), and of the properties of the whole which do not belong to the parts (synopsis) . 117Ibid., pp. 106-107. lift E.S. Brightman, ’ ’ Freedom, Purpose, and Value,” in Ruth N. Anshen, ed., Freedom: Its Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1940), p. 4^6. 119Ibid., p. 497. 51 Brightman approves of coherence as a rational criterion. This he explains to be "inclusive systematic 120 consistency." He then adds: "The coherence criterion looks beyond the mere self-consistency of propositions to 121 a comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience." Brightman therefore adopts it as the central principle of his methodology, since "it is the very nature of coherence to take all aspects of life, all experiences, all points of view, into account before coming to its synoptic con- 122 elusion." More precisely, then, the coherence cri terion is employed in the synoptic method which he defines as: A method which (a) presupposes the exhaustive use of all other available methods, especially the analytic and (b) emphasizes the importance of the properties of wholes as distinguished from but related to properties of parts.123 But this is what he characterizes as the "personalistic method," in his latest book: Personalistic method stands in a sort of middle ground between a purely deductive method (which must cast aside most experience as being extra- logical), and a method of pure intuition or pure faith (which ignores the just demands of deductive reason and of coherent wholeness). Personalistic ^Introduction to Philosophy, p. 68. 121Ibid., p. 69. 122Ibid., p. 73. 123Ibid.. p. 338. 52 method is an empiricism which recognizes the demands of reason and of experiential fact; of descriptive fact and of value; of part and of whole. It is both deductive and inductive, both rational and empirical. It starts with personal experience raw and moves to personal experience reinterpreted and growing toward rational whole ness .124 In his intellectual autobiography Brightman presents nine fundamental principles that are vital to all of his thought. They are as follows: 1. Logical coherence is the sole criterion of truth. 2* Religious experience furnishes data for truth about religion. 3. The study of history is both necessary and dangerous in the search for religious truth. 4. All truth, including religious truth, is hypothetical • 5. Religion is essentially metaphysical. 6. The real is personal. 7. The real is valuable. 8. The church is worthy of support. 9. The social order is in need of radical reform.^2^ His enumeration of these nine principles is not only a statement of his basic convictions, but as stated they are an example of his methodology. The dialectical tabulation of the movement of his thoughts is characteristic of Brightman. In his Philosophy of Religion Brightman discusses what he believes to be the true philosophical method of 1 2 4 p e r son and Reality, p. 33. 125,,Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theology, p. 58. 53 investigation. It is not "arriving at a system of philosophical conclusions without regard to the empirical facts. . . . One should start with the empirical subject matter," discover its meaning, "and then relate it to the 1 9 f t other areas of experience and thought." He delineates the true process of interpretation by internal criticism in the following five steps: (1) Preliminary synopsis. This consists of a tentative intuition ox the general field of facts to be studied. (2) Scientific analysis and synthesis. First of all the various portions of the field are isolated and broken up into their constituent parts. Ideally, this analysis proceeds until simple elements have been found that can be analyzed no further. Then these elements are seen synthetically in their relations to each other. . . . (3) Synoptic hypothesis. The third stage is the most distinctly philosophical one. It is an experi ment of thought . . . the synoptic hypothesis . . . it aims to relate the subject matter under investi gation to a view of experience as a whole. A living whole is always more than the sum of its parts. . . . An hypothesis relates the particular to the uni versal . . . the part to the whole. . . • The part necessarily implies the whole to which it belongs. . . . Reason is such that it is impossible to avoid using universals which apply to the whole. . . . The individual needs synoptic hypotheses for his mental health. Yet . . . their value for health is tested by their truth. (4) Verification. . . . Given a synoptic hypothesTs • I I some means of testing it must be devised, or else there is no way of knowing whether it points to fact or fancy. There is a difference of opinion about what constitutes verification. . . . A . . . belief can be verified only by its relation to the system of ^^A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 116-117. 54 our beliefs as a whole which have the marks of consistency with one another and with experience. No verification can hope for more than this prin ciple, (5) Reinterpretation. No verification is completely inclusive^ There is no test that does not need retesting. . . . Every stage of insight may lead to a deeper insight. Every interpretation requires reinterpretation. . . . We cannot reach the end; but as long as we live and use sound method, we may grow endlessly. Reinterpretation does not imply that when it goes on, every belief we now hold will be found to be false. It does not require groundless rejection of any faith. It requires, rather, the recognition of incomplete proof, incomplete understanding, and incomplete information, together with insight into the method of philosophical interpretation which constantly corrects and supplements, but never absolutely completes man's fragmentary but growing grasp of reality.127 Here, again, we have a stated method of procedure that is characteristic of Brightman's rigorously logical employ ment of his methodology. H.N. Wieman has characterized the Brightman metho dology in his review of Brightman's Philosophy of Religion for the Journal of Religion in the following statement: Brightman is a past master at Dialectic. He has spent all his life striving to formulate his views in such a way that when he presents them he will be in the most strategic position for self- defense and attack in dialectical combat with any critic who may raise his head. The present work represents the highest degree of finesse in such formulation. I can see how everyone of his l27Loc. cit. Italics are his. Amplifications and discussions have been deleted for brevity’s sake. 55 affirmations can be defended by dialectical maneuvers* It is as though he had planned a game of chess in such a way that he would either win or else keep himself out of checkmate for so long a time that the opponent would weary and give it up.128 A more friendly summary of Brightman's methodology is given by a former assistant of Brightman, Arthur W. Munk, who says that his greatness as a thinker is evi denced by his "empirical-rational approach to all prob lems; . . . the emphasis on wholeness and the synoptic 1 oQ method; (and) an attempt at clarity and preciseness." His colleague, Paul Johnson, has written of him: "To him reason works always within experience and its function is to extend and organize experience into mean- 130 ingful patterns of intelligible relationships." The foregoing quotations will be sufficient to enable us to compare the more scholastic, rational, and dialectical method of Brightman with the more intuitive, pragmatic, and realistic method of Flewelling, and to understand why Brightman became more the research scholar whereas Flewelling was the man of life's affairs with a concern not so much for logical system as for answers to l^8See the Journal of Religion, XXI (1941), pp. 197-200, for wTeraan^s revTew. 129Cf. his review of Person and Reality in Ethics, LXVIII, p. 300. 130 Paul Et Johnson, "Brightman's Contribution to Personalism," The Personalist, XXXV (1954), p. 68. 56 the question, "So what?" His interest was in "the things that matter most," Brightman, as we shall see, also had a great concern /or values and answers to life's problems on the more rationalistic approach. In sum, Brightman was the mare systematic of the two men in the organization and presentation of his thoughts, Flewelling, on the other hand, was more poetic and literary, as the titles of his books and many articles bear testimony. Here, then, are two different temperaments, with different interests and orientations, Brightman was the more systematic and speculatively acute, whereas Flewelling was more concerned with the practical appli cation and the historico-social dimension. Flewelling, the elder, outlived Brightman, the 131 younger. Both men were ordained Methodist ministers, Flewelling spent fourteen years as a Methodist pastor, Brightman carried the responsibilities of a pastorate where his father was minister during the letter's illness. He also served as a student pastor and did considerable preaching during his early professorships. Both men show ^3^-The date of Flewelling's ordination was 1896, The date for Brightman*s ordination was 1912, Brightman's biographer in the Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (p,~ lU>d)~wls-»staies that he was ordalne3~ by the Mew England Conference of the Methodist Church, whereas his listing in Who's Who in Methodism says he was ordained in Nebraska by that con?erence in l9l2, and was transferred to the New England Conference in 1914, 57 a grasp of Biblical teachings,132 but, perhaps due to his years as an active pastor, Flewelling seems to have excelled in this quality. Since the major portion of this study will be con cerned with the categories of comparison, we shall defer detailed and intensive contrasts to their proper chapters. In anticipation of what follows in part two, the following are the chief points to be elaborated: 1. Brightman*s God is finite and limited by both the rational and the irrational Given within His own nature; whereas Flewelling*s God is Infinite and Self limited only by the rational given in His own creativity. 2. Evil for Flewelling is mainly the result of the misuse of freedom by human agents; whereas evil for Brightman arises from God’s inner limitations, a ’ ’surd evil" within the divine nature. Brightman’s doctrine of the Given is persistently criticized and rejected by Flewelling, Brightman lays more stress on man’s moral failure than does Flewelling. Likewise Brightman seems more perplexed by the natural evils than does Flewelling. 3. Recalling what was said about their respective methodologies, one may expect a difference in their 132Brightman published his Sources of the Hexateuch in 1918. cf. E.S. Brightman, Sources of1 the Hexateuch (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1918). 58 epistemological positions. Reason and experience are paramount with Brightman; whereas insight and human needs come to the foreground with Flewelling. 4. Our philosophers are at variance in their understanding of physical nature. Brightman is Hegelian, whereas Flewelling follows Berkeley and Bowne. For Brightman "nature is a part of God,"^^^ that is, it Mis one of the many realms within the divine, rather than 134 being a system external to God.” It would therefore 135 be "the spatial aspect of God." Thus nature is the very experience of God for Brightman, whereas for Flewelling it is the creative activity of God. Objects within the realm of nature are dependent upon a Creative Mind for their existence and evolution.Thus Flewelling holds to the belief in continuous creation. But nature remains, for him, distinct from God as activity is distinguishable from an agent. Flewelling accepts only theistic evolution. Brightman accepts naturalistic evolution and seems to place even God within an evolu tionary process. ^-^Philosophy of Religion, p. 216. ^ 4Ibid., pp. 216-217. 135Ibid., p. 218. 136piewening, The Person, p. 149. 137Ibid., pp. 151 ff. 59 5* Again, the two are in sharp disagreement as to their conception of time. Brightman makes time the cate gory of all being. He is sure that we cannot "escape time 138 without escaping being." Time, then, is "a universal 139 subjective-objective category." There can be no existence, for Brightman, without duration, even in the life of deity* Flewelling, on the other hand, holds to the idea of a timeless existence for both God and for man's future immortality. He is sure that "time has no 140 meaning apart from a self-referring intelligence." Man, he thinks, "must be in some measure timeless in order 141 to know time, changeless to be aware of change." 142 6. We have noted, as has Weber, that both men have something important to say about a philosophy of education. Perhaps because of his administrative duties, 143 Flewelling has written more fully on this subject. ^®Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 117. ]~ 39Lo c . cit. l^Flewelling, The Person, p. 195. 141Ibid., p. 197. ^ - 4^Christian O. Weber, Basic Philosophies of Education (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, T560), pp. 125 f. cf. also pp. 208-208. 14. “ 3 I.N. Thut, The Story of Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 4, 7, clTtes Flewelling's Things That Matter Most as a reference. 60 His philosophy of education is more definitive and complete than that of Brightman. 7. While both men contend strongly for the fact of human freedom. Flewelling has written more at length than his contemporary upon this subject. We shall deal with this in the chapters on time and history and on "free-will” and determinism. 8. Flewelling wrote much more extensively on the philosophy of history. This was a major concern with him. Brightman presents his philosophy of history in a single article. 9. Brightman1s stronghold was the philosophy of religion* Yet Flewelling was concerned vitally with religion, though he is excelled by Brightman in the number of volumes written and the number of problems considered. 10. Brightman's system of values is worked out in greater detail than is that of Flewelling. Both men changed and developed their points of view as across the years their research and study brought refinement and consolidation to their positions. Flewelling, for example, began his philosophical career as a full-fledged Bownian, but as time passed he moved toward pragmaticism; although there are pragmatic under tones in his thought from the beginning. Brightman admitted that he was fond of Royce's AbsolutiSnz, then of 61 James' Pragmatism, and then of Bowne's Personalism* Later he was increasingly influenced by Darwin, James, and Hegel. He admitted that for some years he was a rigid determinist, rejecting freedom of the will, until the influence of Bowne and Spaulding led him to the conclusion that belief in freedom is necessary if reason is to function. He also confesses that in his later years he moved from eternalism to an evolutionary temporalism under the influence of such men as James, Bergson, and 144 Leighton. Critics of Brightman's temporalistic and finitistic notion of deity have served only to confirm his thinking, and his latest book speaks out most defi nitively for this position. We now proceed to a detailed consideration of the above mentioned categories of comparison which is part two of this study and the basis for the critique which follows in part three. 144Cf. his article in Ferm's Contemporary American Theology, pp. 57-58. ^4^Cf. his "The Given and its Critics," Religion in Life, XI (1941), pp. 19-20, with his last book where his conviction is stronger. PART II THE CATEGORIES OF COMPARISON CHAPTER III THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Although Flewelling and Brightman were personal- istic theists they disagreed sharply in their theology. As an innovator Brightman dealt more extensively and specifically with the topic of God; in fact he wrote more at length on the theological problem than on any other theme. Flewelling, on the other hand, did not make God the subject of a full-length study. His position was more conventional and he discussed it more commonly in connection with other matters. Yet Flewelling persistent ly rejected Brightman's doctrine of a Finite God.* Our procedure in this chapter will be to consider Flewelling's position first. Then we shall turn our attention to Brightman's views. Thereafter we shall consider Flewelling's criticism of that position. FLEWELLING'S VIEW OF GOD Flewelling wrote a number of articles emphasizing the importance of belief in God and the validity of a theistic philosophy. In 1925 he wrote such an article for *Cf. his reviews of Brightman's books, also Winds of Hiroshima {New York: Bookman Associates, 1956), pp.“59^100. 64 2 The Personalist under the caption, "My Idea of God." Later there appeared from his pen the following articles 3 for the same periodical: "Science and the Concept of God," "Highbrowing God,"4 "The Living God and Reality,"5 "If 6 7 there be a God," "One View of Theism," "The Supreme g g Continuum," "The Mills of God," "In God: No East and West,"*^ "The Unknown God,-1 ** "Theological Panic: 'God is Dead!',"*2 "The Signature of the Unknown God,"*2 and "Is God a Christian?"*4 Theological interest was manifest in all of Flewelling's full-length studies. His first Volume, published in 1913, was entitled Christ and the Dramas of ^The Personalist, VI, 271-276. ^ol. IX, 185-191. ^Vol • X, 5-11. 5Vol. XII, 5-11. 6Vol. XVII, 140-148. 7Vol. XXI, 5-15. ®Vol. XXVII, 252-268. 9Vol. XXVIII, 117-128 10Vol. XXIX, 341-349. “ Vol. XXXII, 117-124. 12Vol. XXXV, 5-13. 13Vol. XXXV, 238-250. 14Vol. XXXIX, 341-348. 65 Doubt.*5 In his book, The Reason in Faith,16 he devotes a chapter to "The Reasonableness of the Incarnation," and another to "The Meaning and Function of the Holy Spirit." His concluding chapter dealing with "Creative Personality," is a further elucidation of his doctrine of God. His 17 book, Creative Personality. entitles chapter thirty-one "The God of the Living." The final chapter of his book, 18 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, is under the caption, "The Unknown God." Part four of his later work, The Person. h a s five chapters dealing with "The Person 20 of Persons." In his Winds of Hiroshima chapters two, three, six, and ten are devoted to his thinking about God. Finally, chapter thirteen of his autobiography, The Forest 21 of Yggdrasill, is devoted mainly to his theological ideas under the title, "The Power not Ourselves." Flewelling definitely rejected the deistic idea of *5R.T. Flewelling, Christ and the Dramas of Doubt (New York: Eaton and Maines, 1513). *®R.T. Flewelling, The Reason in Faith (New York: Abingdon Press, 1924). *7r.T. Flewelling, Creative Personality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926)• *®R.T. Flewelling, Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, (Stockton: College of the Pacific Press, 1551). l^Los Angeles: Ward Ritchie Press, 1952. 2®New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. ^*Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1962. 66 22 God as a static, absolute, or absentee God* He says: "We could never experience an absolute which is uncon- 23 ditioned or unrelated." Thus his God is not "so abso- 24 lute as to be separated from the world He creates." Moreover, "an absolute God is a contradiction of the 25 Christian message of God-in-the flesh." Therefore He is not an absolute, static, absentee God, in a universe sharply divided into the natural as against the super- 26 natural. He cannot be totally unlimited nor uncon- 27 ditioned, for creation involves limitation. 2 f l God is the "supreme Creative Intelligence," the Supreme Reality,29 the "Supreme Creative Fact, source of the highest manifestations of life. . . . "God is 31 Cosmic or nothing." He is verily "the Causal efficiency 22Cf. The Person, p. 285; The Personalist, XXV, 80; Winds of Hiroshima, pp. 33, 69"J l05; The Persona list, XXI, 6; Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 83; Creative Personality, p. 270; and TKe Forest of Yggdrasill, pp. li“ 77 164, 165. 23The Person, p. 144. 24Winds of Hiroshima, p. 104. 2^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 82; cf. also pp. 164,166. 26The Personalist, XXI, 6. 27Ibid., XXXIX, 344. 28winds of Hiroshima, pp. 105, 113, 116. 29The Personalist, XXV, 79; XVII, 147. 30Ibid., XVII, 148. 3^Ibid., p. 144. 32 of spiritual forces in the Cosmic order." He is "a supreme Cosmic Intelligence . . . the ultimate reality of things' 1 giving meaning and "eternal significance" to all."33 God is "the Supreme Creative Intellect behind the moving and changing universe."^ Flewelling believes most opponents of the concept of God are attacking only a local or a straw deity; for the concept of God, properly 35 understood, is "a necessity of metaphysical thought." It is understandable, then, that Flewelling makes much of the Hebrew expression, "the living God," and its restatement by Jesus that He is "the God of the Living;"37 since these express "closeness of contact and relation 38 with all living beings." "On examination," he says, "it will clearly appear that the only God adequate for a 3g changing, living world is a living God." God lives and expresses "Himself to living men through the medium of 3^The Personalist, XXI, 6. 33Ibid., XII, 8. • ^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 65, also Conflict and Conciliation"~of^Cultures^ p. 101. 35The Personalist, X, 11. 36 Creative Personality, p. 266. 37Loc. cit. 68 life. . . ."4^ He thg qq^ Df an men ancj 0f whole earth.4^ God must "be conceived as a living person."4^ Only a living God can be responsible for an order of change. He observes: Life means continuous activity in relations. Change in those relations implies continuous readaptation. In a world of growing moral ideals the concept of a living God would be that he is continually adapting himself to the needs and under standings of men, working and cooperating with tfiem toward a moral goal for the world.44 In one of his earliest articles he says: "ray God must . . . be possessed of two characteristics: he must 45 be moral and he must be personal." It is as a person 46 that God is both transcendent and immanent. But God Ls 47 Spirit, intelligence, and personality. He is active in nature, and yet at the same time he is the creator and the 40 upholder of the world. 0 "He maintains and upholds the ^The Personalist, XXXV, 13* 41Ibid., XXIX, 344. 4^Winds of Hiroshima, pp. 116, 118; Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, pp. 37, 84; and The Person, pp. 70, 1W, 551, 262, 285. 43The Personalist, XII, 10-11. ^Creative Personality, p. 266. 45"My Idea of God," The Personalist, VI, 271. 46Ibid., p. 272. 4^The Personalist, IX, 188. 48Loc. cit. 69 40 whole order of relations which constitutes the Cosmos." ’ Flewelling notes that some see an ''apparent conflict between immanence and transcendence."50 But he is sure that "a great part of the difficulty springs out of an assumed contradiction" between the two concepts which, in 51 fact, are complementary to each other. It is the rare gift of personality to be at the same time both immanent and transcendent. It is measurably so in human experience. We are immanent in every work we do, in that our work is the expres sion of our desires, skills, and motives. We trans cend our work in that we could express ourselves in countless other ways. If to be immanent is to be confined to the work accomplished, to be immanent is to be the very prey of time and change and to be inadequate for a living world. Man with his possi bility of transcending all his work would be superior to such an immanent but non-transcending deity. God must be held to be both immanent and transcendent.52 But at this point we need to remind outselves of the limi tations of any human concept of God. Thus he warns: We ought to remember that in all our affirmations of the relation of God to the world, in all talk of immanence and transcendence, we describe God under the special and temporal order because it is the only order we know. When, however, we thus conceive him we must remember that we are conceiving him through the medium of our own limitations, because we cannot say what such limitations as we impose by the necessity of human thought might mean ^Creative Personality, p. 270. 50Ibid., p. 268. 51. Loc. cit. 52Ibid., pp. 268-269. 70 to One who lives and acts not completely under the temporal and the conditioned. 54 The true God is not to be weighed in earthly scales; nor is he to be comprehended by the methods of human reason- 55 ing. God is "a being not holden of the temporal or 56 spatial order." So Just as the conscious self is time and space transcending, so God as Supreme Person is trans cendent as well as immanent. As he says: "In personality the contradictory notions of immanence and transcendence, of essence and reality, find common ground. Whenever they 57 coincide in man or God, we have personality." We must conceive . . . of God as both immanent and transcendent. The order of nature and of life are expressions of his immanence. But we could not by summing up all his works get him, his willing free personality. In that he possesses self-consciousness and self-direction, he is never lost in his works; he transcends them. This unique power of immanence and transcendence occurs in but one situation--in creative will, in what, for want of a better term, we describe as personality.58 Now since God is both a living and a personal being, then it also follows that he is a ceaselessly 53Ibid.. p. 269. 34The Personalist, IX, 190. ^Ibid., p. 191. 3^The Reason in Faith, p. 233. 57 The Survival of Western Culture, p. 180. 38The Reason in Faith, pp. 200-201* 71 59 active and a "continuously creative" being. This ceaseless creativity is a basic concept with Flewelling. Creativity is essential to personality. God is ultimate activity,^ manifesting Himself in a free creative self- direction.*’* We get back to the fundamental reality only when we reach the uncaused cause.. . . When we have ascribed it to a person we need and indeed can go no further. We have arrived at a first or efficient cause. We have an illustration of how to personality alone is given the power of creating ex n i h i l o . 6 2 This creation ex nihilo is not confined to God alone, for "we do each of us experience it in every truly A ^ creative act." Creativity is the way in which person ality finds true self-expression. The universe "is vocal with the marvels of infinite purpose . . . and an intel ligible world calls for an intelligent First and Con+inu- 6 4 ing Cause. ..." Flewelling's belief in the ancient idea of contin uous creation is well expressed in the following ~^The Personalist, XII, 9. Cf. also XXI, 10-11, and VI, 273. See further, The Person, p. 285, and Creative Personality, p. 270. 6QThe Personalist, X, 10. ^*Reason in Faith, p. 233. ^2Ibid., p. 234. 63Ibid., p. 233. ^The Person, p. 287. 59 active and a "continuously creative” being. This ceaseless creativity is a basic concept with Flewelling. Creativity is essential to personality. God is ultimate activity,60 manifesting Himself in a free creative self- direction,61 We get back to the fundamental reality only when we reach the uncaused cause. . . . When we have ascribed it to a person we need and indeed can go no further. We have arrived at a first or efficient cause. We have an illustration of how to personality alone is given the power of creating ex nihilo.62 This creation ex nihilo is not confined to God alone, for "we do each of us experience it in every truly ft creative act.” Creativity is the way in which person ality finds true self-expression. The universe ”is vocal with the marvels of infinite purpose . . . and an intel ligible world calls for an intelligent First and Continu- ing Cause. ...” Flewelling's belief in the ancient idea of contin uous creation is well expressed in the following 59The Personalist, XII, 9. Cf. also XXI, 10-11, and VI, 273. See further, The Person, p. 285, and Creative Personality, p. 270. 60The Personalist, X, 10. 6lReason in Faith, p. 233. 62Ibid., p. 234. 63Ibid., p. 233. 72 paragraph: Such a God cannot be conceived in the terms of the ancient and modern deists, as static, absolute, and absentee* He must be seen as maintaining and upholding, continuously creating, the order of relations which constitutes the cosmos* Matter is not independent of Him, natural law is but the uniformity of His free activity, life is a mani festation of his purposive presence, upon him all is momentarily dependent for its existence. The fact is that he did not more create the world in past time than that he is now creating it under the temporal and spatial form. Space is the established relation between things made necessary for the development of personality, and time is the condition of moral development. He lives and his life is manifested in ceaseless creative activity, and this immanent and transcendent God survives the welter of time and change through the possession of an enduring self- consciousness and self direction. We shall see later that such a conception of God has tremendous implications for Flewelling's philosophy of history. A further doctrine in Flewelling's concept of God, and one that grows out of his idea of the divine per fection, is that the only limitation for God is self- limitation.^ He insists that a continuously acting God is perfect though not completed, just as a living flower Ibid*, p. 285. cf. also his Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 207, where he says: "The Source of things and intelligences is a Common One; . . . both systems exist by virtue of a supreme personality which unceasingly wills both into being." 66cf* The Personalist, XII, 11; Creative Personality p. 267; The Person, pp. 66, 154, 277, 263; Winds of Hiroshima, pp. 66, 69, 97, 100, 116; Conflict and~7Toncili- ation of Cultures, pp. 25, 84; and Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 236. 73 may be perfect but not completed; for incompleteness is not a mark of imperfection.**7 Perfection is not completion, and a living God may be perfect while His experience is still in process. Nor need His power be impugned, for the limitation which follows any creation in space and time may be a self-limitation for the purpose of the supreme act of all creation, the creation of free spirits like himself worthy of his love and care.6 Flewelling insists on "the plain teaching of Scripture 69 that God is a Spirit," who as such is "an ever present 70 and pervasive one," and "the most dependable thing in M71 the universe." Thus he cannot accept either Brightman's con tention that God is both temporal, finite, and limited by an irrational Given (of which we must speak at length 72 presently), nor Bergson's idea of "a becoming God." A God who is part of and subject to the general movement of his own creative processes could not furnish an identity 67The Personalist, XXI, 10-11. From his review of Patterson's book on Channing, The Personalist, XXXV, p. 80. This is in definite dis ag reemervt*^JTtE~Brightman who "maintained that perfection means completion." See Stahl, "Professor Brightman's Theory of the Given," Religion in Life, XXIII (1953-54), p. 546. Note how Flewelling objects here to any umpugnLng of divine power. 6®Winds of Hiroshima, p. 99. 70The Personalist, XXIX, 345, 7*The Personalist, X, 8. 7^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 157 ff. Also Bergson and PersonaT Realism, pp. 161 ff. 74 of impulsion thereto, but would become a prey of his own -7 O creation, and thus be no God at all. Thus he objects: It is not enough to affirm that God always existed* We must go still further and ask what he was at first. In the case of a becoming God he may not have been God in the beginning. He may have grown to that estate. Mental and moral perfection and timelessness, in other words, are necessary to our thought of God. A lesser Being may be a blind demiurge, but possessing no per sonality, becomes inevitably the victim of his own world.74 That God is a Spirit would rule out much of our present anthropomorphic, "Paul Bunyanism" thinking about deity. He observes: The world is, for the most part, held in the grip of a childish concept of God. This idea has been aided and abetted by the art of painters, such as Gustave Dore with his Bible Gallery, or even the magnificent Paul Bunyanism oif Michelangelo, perpetu ated in the Sistine Chapel.7^ 7 6 Finally, Flewelling was a trinitarian, and 7 7 openly opposed Unitarianism. He gave basic and constant 78 emphasis to the Deity of Jesus Christ, noting that if 7 Q 'Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 157-15*n 74ibid., pp. 162-163. 7~ * Winds of Hiroshima, p. 99. ^The Reason in Faith, pp. 126-127. 77Ibid., p. 104. 7®The Person, p. 277; Winds of Hiroshima, p. 116; Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 9i 75 some of the attributes of God are to be found in Jesus, nonetheless "Deity in Jesus does not imply limitation in 79 God;" it bespeaks rather the essential dignity of man. In his book, The Reason in Faith, he says, "Christ's Moral 80 perfection implies Deity,” and in his autobiography he refers to it as "the unassailable proof of Jesus' 81 Deity." He agrees with Rufus Jones that here we have 82 the one "complete expression of Divinity and Humanity." This being the case, we may assure ourselves also that God is Christlike. Flewelling also accepted the personality of the Holy Spirit, and contended that the notion is reasonable, observing that "the foremost reason for assuming the reality of the Holy Spirit as a necessary part of the God head would seem to lie in the personalizing of the Divinity."84 In his Reason in Faith he devotes all of chapter five to a discussion of the person and work of the Holy Spirit, and in his Conflict and Conciliation of 7®The Reason in Faith, pp. 100-101. 80Ibid., p. 101. 8*The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 168. 82Loc. cit. cf. also The Personalist, VI, 275, "Christ is both human and divine." 8^The Personalist, VI, 274. 84The Reason in Faith, p. 117. 76 Cultures he refers to the Spirit as "the third member of the Trinity."85 Flewelling's main objection to "the Unitarian position" is that "it fixes a great gulf between God and humanity which makes it impossible for the one to go to the other, or to find any basis of communication or fellowship8^ In his article entitled "My Idea of God," Flewelling affirms: "My idea of God grows out of my sense of need," and testifies that he finds in God "the Great 87 Companion." In a later article, in a similar strain, he sets forth the practical and pragmatic basis for belief in 88 God. That he was theistic, pragmatic, and realistic in 89 his personalism, we have already had occasion to note. BRIGHTMAN'S VIEW OF GOD The part of Brightman's philosophy for which he was most criticized and upon which he seems to have spent the greater proportion of his thought and effort was his ®^See page 94. 8<*The Reason in Faith, p. 104. 87The Personalist, VI, 276. ®®The Personalist, XVII, 140 ff. QO Cf. Supra, pp. 31 ff. 77 doctrine of a finite God. The main works of Brightman wherein this doctrine is set forth sure: The Problem of God, and its sequel, The Finding of God, his Philosophy of Religion, his metaphysics, entitled Person and Reality, and his Lowel Lectures, Personality and Religion. Many of his articles have been written in its exposition and defense, most important of which are "The Given and its Critics,"90 and "A Temporalist View of God."9^ Among the forty articles which he wrote for Ferm's Encyclopedia of 92 Religion those related to his belief about God appear under such titles as "Evil," "Finite God," "The Given," and "Personalism." One article in The Personalist is also 93 important: "Bowne: Eternalist or Temporalist?" Others of his articles will be noted as the occasion arises. Brightman defines Theistic Finitism as follows: A theistic finitist is one who holds that the eternal will of God faces given conditions which that will did not create, whether those conditions are ultimately within the personality of God or external to it. If those conditions are external to the divine personality, the position is a kind of dualism (or dualistic personalism); if they are all within the divine personality, then the position is a variety of idealistic personalism. All theistic later XI, I, 134-145; and ten years 9^Journal of Religion, XII, 545-555. 92 New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. 93See Vol. XXVIII (1947), 257-265. 78 finitists agree that there is something in the universe not created by God and not a result of voluntary divine self-limitation, which God finds as either obstacle or instrument to his will.9^ One could wish that Brightman had striven to define just as carefully exactly what he understands by Theistic Absolutism. He does suggest that such a God may be iden tified with Aristotle's "Pure Form," and is "the ideal of the best and greatest that man can think, and includes perfection of power and knowledge as well as perfection of 95 goodness." This ideal he sees to be an outgrowth of man's logical as well as his religious nature. In con trasting theistic absolutism and theistic finitism, he says: The two forms of theism agree in the proposition that God is an eternal, conscious spirit, whose will is unfailingly good. The difference between the two may best be brought out by saying that theistic absolutism is the view that the will of God faces no conditions within the divine experience which that will did not create (or at least approve), whereas theistic finitism is the opposing view, namely that the will of God does face conditions within divine experience which that will neither created nor approves.96 This characterization of absolutistic theism is far from satisfactory as a conception of God for those who would contend that God is both Transcendent and Immanent, 9*See his Philosophy of Religion, pp. 313-314. 95Ibid., p. 306. 9^Ibid., pp. 281-282. 79 97 Omnipotent, and full of perfect wisdom and goodness. But we must hear Brightman's full position before we attempt an evaluation of it. In his introduction to his book, The Problem of God, Brightman says: The view which I have come to hold is that of a God who is creative, supreme, and personal, yet is genuinely limited within his own nature by 'Given' experiences eternally present, which his will does not create, but which his will can control, no matter how refractory they may be. This view, . . . seems closer to the empirical facts of evolution and daily life, more in harmony with th£ combination of love and pain which experience reveals, and hence more satisfactory as a solution of the problem of evil than traditional theism. ® It has been noted above that Brightman's intel lectual pilgrimage moved through several different 97 The outstanding Arminian theologian of this century, H. Orton Wiley, defines his God as follows: "Absolute Reality, Infinite Efficiency, and Perfect Per sonality." Christian Theology, I, Chapters XI, XII, XIII. We do well to note that the divine absolutism is in the realm of reality. A.E. Taylor observes: "To 'be what it means and mean what it is' is an ideal never fully real ized in the structure of any finite piece of reality, precisely because the finite, as its name implies, is never a completely systematic whole." Elements of Meta physics, p. 33, note 1. Flewelling rejects both abs>- lutisiic theism and the finitistic theism for a type of being midway between these concepts; infinite in wisdom and power and goodness, transcendent to his universe but immanently and dynamically operative within its processes. The point we seek to make here is that Brightman may not have considered all the possibilities when he set up the "either-or" proposition between an absolutistic theism and a finitistic theism. ^®E.S. Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: Abingdon Press, 1930), p. 16. 80 99 stages* He began with conservatism, then turned to absolutism, then departed to pragmatism, and later to personalism. Then after a renewed study of Darwin and biological evolution, followed by a further study of James and Hegel, Brightman read E. Noble's Purposive Evolution* This book contributed much to his more recent theory of the finiteness of God.*^ Thus he confesses: Following the tendency of modern thought and the logic of the then Dean Alexander Meiklejohn, I long rejected the freedom of the will and was for some years a rigid determinist, until reflection on the type of argument which Bowne and, more recently, E.G. Spaulding presented led me to see the need of a freedomist theory if reason itself is to function. Similarly, I have moved from the eternalism of most traditional philosophy to an evolutionary temporalism, being influenced by such men as James (again), Bergson, and Leighton. I started with a theism substantially identical with Bowne's. Then, first of all, I was stimulated by Frank H. Foster's article on 'Some Theistic Impli cations of Bergson's Philosophy,' in The American Journal of Theology, 22 (1918, pp. 27#-9§", and by J.A. Leighton's two articles on 'Temporalism and the Christian Doctrine of God' in The Chronicle, 18 (1918), pp. 283-88, 339-44. I owe further suggestions to the whole literature on the finite God, especially Bishop Francis J. McConnel's book, Is God Limited? But the immediate occasion for the first formulation of my present view was an intensive study of evolution, and in particular of Edmund Noble's book Purposive Evolution* Strange as it may seem, my view also QQ Cf. Supra, p. so. 1°°"Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theology (V. Ferm, ed.), pp. 56-57. 101Ibid., pp. 57-58. 81 owes much to recent studies of Hegel, With none of these writers do I agree entirely (although I am very close to Foster and Leighton); but to all of them I owe much.* - 02 "Frankly,” he says, I believe in a God who has more to do than he has yet done, and so is capable of growth; and in a God who is not the voluntary cause of all human misery, although he is supreme in the sense of being able to bring meaning and value out of all misery.103 After another one hundred pages of carefully reasoned discussion and proofs, Brightman formulates his definition of God: God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's very nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into everyone of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and consti tutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given. The evils of life and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it.1^4 102The problem of God, p. 10. 103Ibid., p. II. 1Q4Ibid., p. 113. More succinctly defined: "God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature."^ After discussing his belief that God is both "supremely conscious" and "supremely valuable," he con siders the third of the above items, "God is supremely creative,"*06 He says: "Pure Creation is indeed super - 107 human and mysterious," "For God to create means for 108 him to bring into being by an act of will," "It means that the entire universe is dependent on his will for its existence,"'*'0^ "The constant conservatism of the universe he continues,"points to a will that is eternally creating Hence, creation implies the immanence of God in all things. In particular, it means that the law of evolu tion is God's method of creation,"H*-* As a finitist Brightman maintains that God is limited both by the choices of free individuals, his created persons, and by the Given within his own nature, 105lqC. cit. 106Ibid., p, 122. l07Ibid., p. 123, 83 Most theists are ready to allow that God is limited by the free choices of other persons, since willingness to grant free choice to his created persons is no threat to divine omnipotence. As Flewelling commented, self- limitation on the part of God is no mark of finitude. But they are not prepared to accept a genuine finitist theology of the divine Given or of restrictions within God's nature. Brightman readily granted that his novel doctrine seems, to conventional minds, something of a scandal: The idea seems at first abhorrent. But, as we have said before, the evidence for God lies in experience, and we must think of God, if we are to think truly, in such a manner as to make experience intelligible. At this point we have to consider the mass of evidence which pointed toward what we have called the contradiction of God. On the one side is God, the glorious and expanded one, supreme in good ness and power; on the other, the facts of evil in the world. It may be that we can ascribe all sin to human wills; but we certainly cannot impute to man the blame for the slow and painful processes of life, or for the presence of earthquakes, cyclones, and disease germs in the world. It is difficult for the mind to refrain from two judgments on nature: that it is the work of a power which aims at ends and achieves them, and also that this power is working under great difficulties. Indeed, so great are the difficulties that some observers can see nothing but them. H.M. Kallen says that 'a surd lurks under every law of nature, a flaw in every design of God,1 and General Smuts speaks of 'the dark opaque character' of the universe— ethically and rationally. But our view frankly sees these dark factors as elements within the life of a good G o d . HI li:LIbid.t pp. 125-126. 84 In looking at nature he sees that "there is evi dence of design in nature; there is also evidence of frustration of design and of delay in its achievement•"3,12 There are three possible explanations of this situation. First, that of traditional theism which holds that this element of opposition is chosen of God as the best means of attaining his ends. The second is the dualistic view that this contrary element is something external to God himself. This Brightman ascribes to such positions as 113 Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. The third possibility is that there are factors withim God himself which are eternal aspects of his nature but not due to his will or choice that account for it. This is Brightman1s view, which, he says: . . . holds that God is eternal reason and eternal will, dealing with what I have called the Given in his eternal experience. God's will is the creative aspect of the universe, but that will is limited by the eternal laws of reason and by the facts of the Eternally Given. . . . That there is an eternal Given element in divine experience which is not a product of divine will is evident from the diffi culties under which the divine will evidently labors in expressing perfection in the world. This last 112Ibid., p. 126. 113Ibid., pp. 126-127. But a careful reading of the article on Manichaeism in Ferm's Encyclopedia of Religion seems to substantiate the contention of Edwin Lewis that Brightman's position is a modern form of Manichaeism. See Lewis' God and Ourselves (New York: Abingdon Press, 1931), p. 55. Note also that the most recent authorities hold that Manichaeism teaches a "self-perpetuating commingling of good and evil." Cf. Martin Sprengling's article in the Encyclopedia just named, pp. 465-467. 85 conception, although the most obscure and difficult of the three, is, in my opinion, the most important to recognize, U - 4 In sum Brightman1s God is "a spirit in difficulty,1 1 and is essentially therefore "finite Brightman marshalled four main types of evidence in support of his finitistic concept of God, The first is that of evolution, which "plainly means that time and change are of fundamental importance in the universe, . • • Doubtless the universe must be guided by certain un changing laws; but our whole experience is that of a world changing and evolving in time."^^ Moreover, a non temporal God would have no vital significance for man; for: . . . any view of God which elevates him entirely above time and process and renders him an eternal nunc stans— a standing present— pays tribute to his excellence without relating his being to the actual facts. The only God worth believing in, however, in the light of the evidence, is a God in living re lation to the facts of cosmic and human history. He is a God into whose very being time enters; we need a temporalistic rather than a purely eternalistic view of God. God is one who works; one to whom the passage of time means something; to whom the events of a progressive creative evolution are significant; for whom change is profoundly important. . , , 114The Problem of God, p, 127, ^ ^Loc. cit. 116Ibid., p. 129. H^Loc. cit. 86 To assert that God is temporal, however, "is not to deny lift that he is eternal; it is only to deny he is timeless,"* ° Brightman insists that God is intimately related to and concerned with events in time. Acknowledging that we are naturally offended by the idea of a God who is developing, he objects that we should rather be offended by the idea of a God who has nothing further to do. His God must be one who guides the processes of an essentially creative and progressive universe. "Thus," he continues: . . . our finite God is not one of a finished perfection; his perfection and the perfection of his world consist in their perfectibility. This does not mean that God is ever ignorant or evil in his will; he always knows all that can be known and his will is always guided by perfect devotion to the ideal of love. Yet it does mean that he confronts within his own experience genuine difficulties, out of which arise the apparent defects of the physical world. On this view, God does not deliberately choose the cruelties of evolution and the sufferings of creation; they represent, rather, the necessary outcome of his own eternal Given nature, out of which he is always bringing higher good. H - 9 Some twenty-five years later, in his Person and Reality (a posthumously essay on metaphysics), he makes time to be the category of all being, whether "situations experi enced" or "situations believed in." He says: "All being, then, is temporal. Whatever is, endures." Therefore, 118Ibid., p. 130. 119Ibid., pp. 130-131. 120person and Reality, p. 119. 87 "God is not a timless being; he is an ever enduring creator. His existence is an eternally changing 121 present,1 1 "The Cosmic Experient is omnitemporal rather 122 than nontemporal." The second type of evidence for theological fini- tism comes from the nature of consciousness. Here Brightman singles out in particular the problems of human freedom in its relation to the divine foreknowledge. If man is truly free, then God must be finite as regards his knowledge. Man’s freedom "is an actual limitation on the 123 foreknowledge of God." Here, then, is one area where God is limited. Next he looks at the relation of will and nature in any conscious being. "Every being . . . must have a nature; . . . a definite structure, definite properties 124 and qualities." As such, a conscious being is able to make choices. This fact we refer to as its will. This is not a separate faculty or power, however, Yet even in the case of God his will is not unlimited. He cannot choose 121person ancj Reality, p. 323. Yet in his earlier book, Is God a Person (New York; Association Press, 1932), he had-declared: "God is eternal, and is not limited in time. . . ." cf. p. 30. 122Ibid., p. 331. 123 The Problem of God, p. 132. 124Loc. cit. 88 to make a round triangle. ’ ’Rather his eternal nature includes reason, never-ending activity in time, and the rich realm of the Given with which his will has to cope."^5 And since ”his nature as a conscious being sets limits to his will; God must be finite.” Finally, Brightman calls attention to the fact that every state of consciousness has its combination of both its active and its passive factors. ”We both do and suffer; we choose and are determined in the same act. . . • There are an element of will and an element of sensation 127 in every moment of our life." ’ ’Now,” he says, "our hypothesis is that the divine life is constituted in the way in which all known experience is constituted, namely, 128 as a union of active and passive elements." Thus he affirms: We must acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of things, in which the active is indeed in control, but maintains its control with struggle and pain. This view is at once nearer to the facts observed by science and to the Christian faith in a God who can save only through the shedding of blood. 129 125Ibid., p. 133. 2.26 Loc. cit. ~^^Loc. cit. 128Ibid., p. 134. 129Ibid., pp. 134-135. 89 Brightman's third argument for the finiteness of God is based upon the Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis which in their synthesis give us the higher truth. So it is that "the nature of God is to contain tension. . . . Thus . . . the divine life consists essen tially of struggle and victory over opposition, a victory for which a price has always to be paid even by God him self. itour view," he continues, "sees him as the greatest sufferer in the universe and through this the greatest victor; his nature is not only goodness but also 131 dialectic struggle. . . ." His fourth argument for the finite God is based upon, or derived from religious experience. He thinks that the testimony of most religious experience points to this divine finiteness. "It seems," he says, "to be the voice of religion that there is something beyond reason in the reasonable God. . . . This dark aspect of religion 132 points to a tragic reality in God." He concludes that if on this basis we are compelled to modify our faith in God (and he for one must), then it were better to deny the divine omnipotence rather than the eternal goodness. "On our view," he concludes, "God is perfect in will, but not 13QIbid., pp. 135-136. 131Ibid., p. 136. 132Ibid., p. 137. 90 in achievement; perfect in power to derive good from all situations, but not in power to determine in detail what * 1 M those situations will be," So the question is not what kind of a God we want, but what kind do we actually have* Perhaps no real theist would challenge Brightman's declaration that: "The Creator must be a redeemer if he is to be a God*"134 Still, surveying experience from the religious point of view, he would emphasize the following traits: All experience is in the form of opposition and struggle. There is, therefore, something dualistic about all religion. Light and darkness, God and Satan, Yang and Yin, sin and redemption, being and nonbeing, thesis and antithesis, stimulus and response; religion, philosophy, and science alike testify to the dualistic structure of experience. Moreover, biological evolution and human history are processes in which, to a greater or less extent, rational ends are attained and values achieved, but always in a costly and slow manner, as if it were under great difficulties. When we consider the facts of emergent evolution, the long sweep of development from the fire-mist to the dawn of life and from the dawn of life down to the present time, and in particular the growth of the religious consciousness, we find experience testifying to slow but real changes and novelties• ^5 Brightman holds that there is "universal agreement 136 about the difficulty in attaining religious values*" 133Loc. cit, 134Ibid., p. 177* 135Itid., pp. 177-178. 136Ibid., p. 179. 91 "Let us grant," he says, "that the religious idea of God will define certain limitations within the divine nature,"137 He is sure that to be "is to be limited,"138 "Indeed, a God might well be called the most limited of 1 beings," Moreover, "any being must be something and so must have a nature,"140 And, "we may begin by assuming 141 that the nature of God is prior to his will," "But it is very difficult for a theist to find in such a will an adequate explanation of the cosmic drag which retards and distorts the expression of value in the evolutionary process and in man's nature."^ It is at this point that Brightman finds his hypothesis helpful. He says: "If God is to serve as a rational explanation of cosmic order and interaction, he must be reason and will, knowing all that can be known and willing the best that can be willed."^4^ But he thinks that if with traditional theism we hold "that all of the content with which God has to deal is a 137t Loc • cit. 138, cit. Loc . 139_ Loc . cit. 140Jk 2£- cit. 141Loc. cit. l42Ibid., p. 182 143Loc, cit. 92 product of his creative, benevolent will," then we have no 144 "morally adequate explanation of human suffering." What this content would be within the divine consciousness Brightman seeks to set forth in his idea of the Given. First of all, "the Given is to be regarded as of the nature of consciousness,"^^ consequently it "must be within the divine consciousness and not external to it,"146 if it is to explain why God has so much difficulty in expressing and achieving his ideal purposes. Moreover, it cannot be created by God. This Given, then is a limitation within the divine nature, a problem for the divine will and reason additional to that which is constituted by the existence of finite selves who are other than God.'** Furthermore, its status is non-rational: It is irrational, not in the sense of containing logical contradictions or immoral purposes, but in the sense of being given to reason as a datum and not derived from rational premises or purposes.148 Finally, it implies permanent existence in God and endless acts of divine perfecting: Our hypothesis is that God can make an increasingly better conquest of it throughout 144Loc. cit. 14- ’Loc . cit. 146Loc. cit. 147Ibid., p. 183. 148Loc. cit. 93 eternity without ever wholly eliminating it. The divine perfection, then, is an infinite series of perfeetings. Such a Given within the nature of God would provide, he thinks, a rational explanation of the slow and painful methods of evolution as well as of the miseries and accidents of human life: "The Given would take over many of the functions of matter, potentially, the devil, and 150 what the Germans call 'the irrational.,M Brightman's theory is a dualism of process, not of ontology. "God," he says, "would remain personal, ethical, and rational, but the temporal process would be more 151 significant for him than it was under the older view." "It must be granted," he continues, "that the Given introduces a factor of hazard and uncertainty about details" into the processes of the universe, but he thinks this "would in no way imperil the divine ideals and 152 purposes." Whatever one’s view of God, "human suffer ing must be genuinely shared and explained by the divine life," and this he feels is done by his theory of the 149 Loc. cit. cf. _Is God a Person?, p. 65. 150Ibid., p. 185. 151probiem of God, p. 185. 152Ibid., p. 186. 94 153 Given, The conception of a God limited by the Given within his own nature, yet wresting meaning from it by the achievements of his rational will, seems to account more adequately than other ideas of God for the paradoxical assertion of religious experience that its object is both a Mighty God and a Suffering Servant. It places the Cross in the eternal nature of God.1^4 Thus also "this finite God who achieves meaning in con flict . . . shares as a comrade in the struggles and suf- 155 ferings of humanity." This Given . . . is akin to sensation in man. Just as sensation limits the will and reason of man, yet presents problems which can be solved in rational terms, so the Given limits the will and probably the foreknowledge of God, without limiting his goodness or his rationality or his power so to mold the Given as to derive value from it. God would no longer be omnipotent or omniscient or impassible; but he would remain the perfectly benevolent Creator and the perfectly wise Knower of all actual exis tence, He would also be the controlling power of the universe, guiding it through all struggles and delays toward an ever-enlarging value. . . . The Given would account for natural evils and the 'mistakes' of evolution, would give God an eternal reason for activity, would render him a worthy object of numinous worship. *^6 In his volume, The Finding of God, which came as the sequel to his Problem of God, Brightman reasons as follows: J - 5^Ibid., p. 189. 154Loc. cit. cf. also Is God a Person? "The Given is God's eternal cross," p. 80. 155Ibid., p. 191. 156Ibid., pp. 192-193. 95 If God were both infinitely omnipotent and infinitely good, the very situation from which man is redeemed by religious experience would never have existed in a world in which such a God controlled all the conditions. The fact that the situation does exist proves God to be finite. . . .*-57 Brightman contends further: Surely if God were omnipotent beyond our poor power to conceive, he could have created a race of free beings who would always choose righteously (as he himself, being also free, always chooses righteously), even though in theory they were free to sin (as he also is), There must be something in ’the nature of things' to render impossible the creation of a race of free beings who would never sin, even though they were free to. . . . The impossibility must lie in the very nature of God, for . . . surely he would always do the best pos sible. This ’something in him’ is again, an aspect of the Given. In his Philosophy of Religion, he asserts: • . . (1) The hypothesis of a finite God does not need to derive any of its basic evidence from our ignorance. STl that it asserts is based on an interpretation of actual experience. (2) The Surd evils are not ascribed to the will of God, although idealistic personalists assert that the surds are to be found within God’s experience of himself as an eternal person. (3) Finitism maintains the eternal distinction between what is good and what is evil. (4) Finitism is an inspiring challenge to eternal co-operative moraT endeavor --a cooperation between God and man. (5) Finally, finitism is empirical. It is based on the truly empirical motive of giving a complete and rational account of all of the experiences of man. It resists attempts to explain the known by the unknown; starting from the known, •^^The Finding of God, pp. 121-122. 158Ibid., p. 173. 96 159 it explores the unknown. With this we must conclude our rather lengthy study of Brightman's Finite God* We shall have occasion to analyze more at length what he understands to constitute the Given when we come to our study of his theory of evil* Having followed Brightman faithfully through his strongest presentations of this finitism, we may now turn to hear from his contemporary and critic (and his friend), Ralph Tyler Flewelling. FLEWELLING'S CRITICISMS OF BRIGHTMAN'S POSITION In volume eleven of The Personalist (1930), under the feature caption, "Notes and Discussions," Flewelling reviews at some length Brightman's book, The Problem of God. Brightman himself acknowledges that Flewelling has raised a fundamental objection to his theory in holding that it is no solution of the problem.We therefore deem it justifiable to include at this juncture, somewhat at length, the major objections expressed by Flewelling to the position set forth by Brightman in his book. Flewelling writes as follows: Greatly as it would please us to agree with our personalistic colleague, we feel that his •^^Philosophy of Religion, pp. 314-315. Italics are Brightman*s. 160«»The Given and its Critics," Religion in Life, I (1932), 136. 2----------- satisfaction with his explanation arises out of too short-sighted a view of the necessary impli cations of his doctrine of the Given, too inade quate an analysis of the problem of evil, and too narrow a conception of the meaning of divine perfection.*61 . . . It does not remove from God moral respon sibility for the control of the Given. But as one might suspect there is a hidden inconsistency lurking here. We are in time of difficulty, when it is necessary to explain the presence of evil, led to assume that the 'Given' is not under the divine control, but is able to frustrate and determine the Divine activity to accept not what is best but what is the best it can get. That is, The Given both enables us to eat our cake and to keep i t . 1 6 2 . . . The main question is not the limitation of God, which might be readily granted by many, but whether the limitation is self-limitation imposed from within, or other-limitation imposed from without. Are these 'restrictions within his own nature* according to his will and are they deter mining? If a self-limited God he must be held morally responsible for the defeat and obstruction of his own will. If they are not, there is a power beyond his control which yet controls him. The Given is either his servant, and an undesirable one, or his Frankenstein to destroy him. We cannot get around this dilemma by any subterfuge of language.I63 Flewelling asks just what are God's difficulties, and seeks to learn from Brightman if these are of "moral will, or moral ignorance, or incapacity? It is positively fatal to thought not to be clear at this point," he 164 says. And he continues: 16LThe Personalistt XI (1930), 275 162Ibid., p. 276. 98 The limitations suggested are inherent in the eternal nature of God--in the very warp and woof of his consciousness and are not a product of his will or choice. With this conception it is diffi cult to see how there is moral freedom either for God or man but only a terrible necessity, Anangke, which rides the universe, a sort of Chronos or super-God.^65 We may be pardoned the impression that these most surprising manipulations of the idea of the Given in the Divine Nature arise from an inadequate con ception of the problem of Evil and an insufficient concept of the meaning of divine perfection. . . . We can make no gain by the confusion of all suffering, pain, desire, with moral evil and moral consequences in one category. Here the author seems controlled by the time-spirit. The advance of our civilization has made us super sensitive to suffering. In so far as this leads to altruism it is all gain, but wherein it becomes inversion and self-pity it is a fault. We ought to remember that the supposed suffering of the brute world 'ravin in tooth and claw* exists but slightly, if at all, outside the mental suffering of human on lookers. Even our own sufferings seldom become unbearable except to our pitying and helpless friends, and the acutest pain is always mental. In the meantime the fact should not be overlooked that pain has been our schoolmaster by which we have been led to social virtue and the chances are good that out of this tutelage will come eventually the mastery of pain by man. Mental suffering is even more amenable to human correction, which leaves only death to be accounted for. Here again the suffering is rather in the dread or fear of it. Death is a blessing so far as the growth and development of the new generation is concerned and necessary to racial progress. If indeed there be a purposeful and supreme creative power behind the universe conserving all values but most of all the supreme values, then death must in the higher sense be but the birth into a broader and freer and more noble existence. 165Ibid., p. 277 *^Loc. cit. 99 The inadequate conception of the divine per fection seems to us the commonest error of Theism from the inside, and the commonest souree of Atheism from without. We have thought of divine perfection as meaning absoluteness of power, knowledge and the rest, until we posited a God incapable of creation of, or participation in, the world created. We have overlooked the pathway to perfection too often for ourselves and for God as well. The road to perfection, if it is to have moral quality, is not the way of self-aggrandizement, nor freedom from limitation, but it is the way of a rigorous self-limitation with a worthy purpose in view* This is the necessary price that human personalities pay for moral character and achievement, and there is no reason to believe that the Father of all souls would excuse himself from or evade the same grim requirement. Such seems to be the light which moral character throws upon the meaning of the Incarnation and is the fundamental source for the belief that we do discover the God in Christ.^67 The self-limitation of God to a space-time world and the aim of creating a world of kindred moral personalities would thus appear not in the strictest sense a limitation of the divine perfection, but an enhancing of it, a giving of it of those fine moral elements which alone could make it perfect in the highest sense. The author finds self-limitation not a solution of 'the retarding factor which is the source of so much delay and suffering' and proposes to introduce instead the concept of 'the Given' which opposes itself to the divine will and provides the eternal conflict. This is but another form of the demiurge or personal devil on which or whom to lay everything that goes wrong. It can be a solution only for an easily satisfied mind. The tragedy is that it gives no hope of ultimate moral triumph of the good, no assurance of the superior strength of righteousness. . . . The answer to the remark that self-limitation does not explain 'the retarding factor' might be partly, that God's own perfection, assuming him to be a person and therefore a social being, must include the creation and development of other beings. If these personalities are to be finite and moral, it is impossible to see how they could appear other than under the form of time, and 167Ibid., pp. 277-278. loo if they are not to be utterly lost in the supreme creative spirit, at space. This creation would moreover be a part of the divine perfection. So long as man has not in every instance achieved moral perfection, and so long as God has not yet achieved perfection in experience, there is bound to be irrationality in the universe such as Brightman finds a stumbling-block. We do not however assume a Given which is a part of God’s nature and yet not of his moral character, which paradox who can explain?*6® What Brightman thus ascribes to the divine character may more properly be held to arise out of the very requirements of otherness in the creation of free moral personalities. As explanation we need perhaps no other justification than the creation of filial spirits conquering sin and evil as the supreme goal worthy of all cost.!69 Thus, for Flewelling, the main question is not the limitation of God, but just when it comes. The sequel to Brightman’s Problem of God is his book published a year later under the title, The Finding of God. This, too, is reviewed by Flewelling in The Personalist. and once again Flewelling objects to his solving of the problem of 171 evil by referring it to the imperfection of God. But Flewelling notes now that Brightman has God controlling the Given which seems not to him to have been the case in Brightman’s earlier book. Flewelling notes further that Brightman makes the time-space order act as a limitation 168Ibid., p. 278. 169Ibid., p. 279. 170 The Personalist, XIII, 60-61. 171Ibid., p. 60. 101 on God.^7^ Once again, Flewelling conceives of this as a self-imposed limitation "in order to produce other volun tarily moral personalities who can become creative like 173 himself." Flewelling sees the present world as a 174 "training ground for^free spirits." He likewise insists that to conceive God as morally imperfect is to 175 do away with the God concept altogether. In a later volume of The Personalist Flewelling 1 reviews Brightman*s Nature and Values, and again this doctrine of the Given is attacked. Flewelling asks whether this Given has reality apart from the divine necessity not to over-ride the moral will of man in the 177 interests of moral character. Finally, when the work on metaphysics appeared under the title, Person and Reality, Flewelling once again was the reviewer of it for 178 The Personalist. He now noted that in Brightman’s thinking, "the shining present" of first person conscious 172t„ • + L>00 * C1T * 173Ibid., p. 61. 174 Loc. cxt. 175Loc. cit. 176The Personalist, XXVIII (1947), 90-91. 177Ibid., p. 91. 178The Personalist, XL (1959), 63-65. 102 experience may be analyzed into two basic types: What can be controlled becomes the "owned," and what cannot be 179 changed is "the Given." Flewelling then states: Our dissent from the doctrine of the Given has been made so frequently that it will be expected here, but will not be treated at length. To establish a Given beyond the control of God has seemed to this reviewer a giving of the final victory to the powers of evil— a limitation on God without reason. There is a Given which God chooses for the present not to transgress, but it must be viewed strictly as a self-limitation in the pursuit of a wider creative process. Assuming that the goal of creation is the production of souls, of moral and spiritual beings, such can be brought about only by providing a choice between good and evil. Otherwise, and without freedom, there is no possibility of moral character, neither for God nor man. Goodness can be purchased only by the love of goodness, not by inheritance, gift, threat, or compulsion. So in the creation of a Kingdom of God, there can be no compulsion except the inner and self- compulsion of love. God will never violate the freedom of any living soul. Neither He, nor prince, potentate, dictator, social tradition, birth, nor any other influence can make a man choose righteously, and we believe that Brightman, in this section, was put into contradiction with his own higher insights, falling here into an unfortunate dialectic of over- analysis. Thus does Flewelling'persistently reject the doctrine of the Given, and other limitations upon God than that of self-limitation. In our discussion of the views of our philosophers in reference to the nature of God, we have been unable to 1 JQ Cf. Ibid., pp. 63-64; and see Brightman, Person and Reality, pi 56. 180Ibid., p. 64. 103 avoid the problem of evil which we expect to take up more at length in a later chapter. Brightman's finitistic and temporalistic God was attacked and his theory of the Given criticized by many of his contemporaries. Most valid among these, for Brightman, was that of his own colleague at Boston 181 University, A.C. Knudson. Space does not permit further reference to Brightman's critics and his answers to them here. Knudson's criticisms, along with those of twenty-two others, and Brightman's replies to many of them, will be found in the appendix under the caption, "Brightman and His Critics." ^^■Knudson's criticisms of Brightman's theory appear in his two books, The Doctrine of God (New York: Abingdon Press, 1930), and The PoctrTne of Redemption (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933yi See" BrTghtman's acknowledgement of their cogency in his Philosophy of Religion, p, 324, note 33; and Person and Reality, p. 338; also note 40 on that page. For Knudson's criticisms, along with those of other critics of Brightman's position, consult the Appendix of this dissertation. CHAPTER IV MAN, AND HUMAN NATURE At the outset it might be queried why we should now, immediately after our consideration of the nature of God, turn to a consideration of human nature. For, that study was continually pointing to the problem of evil. Our answer is that to deal adequately with the problem of evil, we first need to see what our philosophers think about man. Only then can we understand what must be catalogued as evil for human persons, both in relation to each other and the divine person. We propose, in this chapter, therefore, to spell out as faithfully as possible the positions taken by Flewelling and Brightman in their respective conceptions of man. Let us begin with Brightman. BRIGHTMAN*S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE Brightman*s most important pronouncement concerning human nature is an article written in his later years for Religion in Life.1 An earlier article for The Person- o alist, and another for the Tenth International Congress *"A Personalistic View of Human Nature," Religion in Life, XIV (1945), pp. 216-227, 2|lWhat is Personality?" The Personalist, XX (1939), 129-138. 105 3 of Philosophy, when considered along with the first article mentioned, pretty well summarize his basic phil osophy of man. There are many references to the subject scattered through his books which enrich and complete the basic picture drawn in the three articles. We may present his position as the answer to four basic questions: What is Human nature? What are its characteristics? How does it function? What may be its destiny? Thereafter a final thought on the cultured man will complete the study. What is Human Nature? First, there is the need for definition of the term "nature." Brightman thinks of nature as "the essen tial or intrinsic being of anything."^ But, more fully, the nature of anything is "its potentialities--what it can develop into, what it can do. Human nature is what man can do within its limits. It is no scholastic entity."^ We may also think of the nature of anything as "what it is 3 "Man and Religion," Library of the Tenth Inter national Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam, August 11-18, 1948). (Amsterdam: North-Hoiland Publishing Co., 1948), pp. 14-16. A "A Personalistic View of Human Nature," Religion in Life, XIV, p. 217. 5Ibid., pp. 218-219. 106 innately."^ Brightman therefore holds that "personality is simply what we experience it to be." Which means that Q it is "the whole of conscious experience as given." If one should raise the question about what he considers to be the self, his answer would be: the Self is "the 9 10 empirical situation." He says: "1 am my experience," or, stated otherwise, "my personality is my experience."^ Thus "the person is present consciousness, not its 12 objects, nor its causes." He would distinguish: . . . the datum self (or present situation) from the whole self or personality. The datum self is the present field of attention or time span, which at any given moment is actually given as my consciousness. But my whole self is all the past and future consciousness that is connected with the present by chains of self-identifying memory or anticipation linkages.*3 Which is to say: "the whole self consists of all the empirical situations connected with any given empirical 6Ibid., p. 218. 7Ibid., p. 219. 8”What is Personality?", p. 132. 9Ibid., p. 134. IOma Personalistic View of Human Nature," p. 219. 11Ibid., p. 220. 12 Loc. cit. 13Ibid., p. 221. 107 14 situation by valid linkages of memory and anticipation.” In the present consciousness we find: "sensations, reasonings, inferences, beliefs, emotions, hopes, antici- 15 pations, memories, and imaginations." Yet**the empirical situation is always an indivisible self-experience."^ This related to human nature enables him to say that "human nature is the field of the potentialities of human experience, and the limits of that field. What man can experience is within human nature. What man cannot 17 experience is foreign to human nature." Thus defined, "human nature is no definite substantial entity; it is a process, undergoing evolutionary development in a tempor- 18 alistic universe." "Man's nature, then, is his potentialities and his limits. . . . Human nature is a 19 voyage of discovery." What are its Characteristics 1. Human nature is limited. These limits are the 14The Personalist. XX (1939), 135. ^Loc. cit. ^ Loc. cit. 17Religion in Life. XIV (1945), 221. 18Ibid.. pp. 221-222. 19Ibid., p. 222. 108 laws of logic, mathematics, ideal values of truth, beauty, goodness, and holiness.20 ’ ’Potentialities are realizable only within the limits of the truths of reason and of fact. Ideals and brute facts limit every possible nature, 21 human or divine— especially the human." "Brute facts are limits," yet these may be investigated. In the moral realm "sin is a limit," yet it may be forgiven and sinful 22 habits may be overcome. 2. Human nature is potential. The possibilities for human nature are infinite. "There is," he says, "in the depths of human nature an ideal of infinity. . . . 23 It is an infinite, an inexhaustible ideal." This is evident, he thinks, to any one who has encountered very seriously the ontological argument. But man’s "ideal of perfection, more or less dimly apprehended, [also involves] the ideal of perfect coherence" which is also one of its aspects.2^ "The personalistic view of human nature is an affirmation of the possibility of infinite progress; it is a denial that any limit can be set, as long as man is conscious, which would render progress 20Loc. cit. 21Ibid., p. 223. 22Loc. cit. 23Loc. cit. 24Loc. cit. 109 25 impossible." 3# Human nature is free, Brightman explains: In addition to the finite limits and the infinite potentialities of human nature, the fact of freedom should be made explicit--partaking both of the limit and the unlimited potential. Freedom within limits is man's contribution to the creativity of an end lessly creative universe.26 There are three aspects of man's freedom: (1) Man experiences choice. He selects. Herein lies the root of morality and sin. Main is capable of obedience to a freely chosen ideal. Sin is disobedience to that ideal. There fore sin is universal, for all have at sometime disobeyed the heavenly vision. But Brightman thinks it is "a moral calamity that the same word has been used for the unchosen misfortune of 'missing the mark1 and for the chosen act of 27 repudiating the mark." He would thus define sin as oo "knowledge of an ideal and a choice to reject it." This enables him to deny that pain, failure, and defeat are to be thus defined. (2) Man has capability of achievement. He can plan and execute plans. Achievement is possible, and "free activity yields results.(3) Man exhibits 25Ibid., p. 224. 26Loc. cit. 27Loc. cit. 28Ibid., p. 225. 2^Loc. cit. autonomous responsibility. He is capable of responsible relationships toward both man and God. "The free man lays an autonomous responsibility on himself; . . . no free man can choose without involving himself in relations 31 to his human comrades and his God." 4. Human nature exists in a moral situation. Whereas man is a potential child of God, his human nature experiences a situation that is "partly tragic, partly 32 comic, partly drab and neutral." Moreover, "it is human nature to sin; but it is also human nature to find peace 33 and love." Man as a creature is "blind, willful, suf fering; but in it all, his kinship to God is the most 34 revealing and vital aspect of his nature." Man is a citizen of two worlds: one of tragedy and one of aspir- 35 ation toward the divine. Brightman believes: . . . it is necessary but not sufficient to condemn human nature as sinful. . . • Man is more funda mentally a potential child of God--a realizer of spiritual values— than he is a sinner--a repudiator 30, Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 32Ibid., p. 226. 33Lo c . cit. 34Loc. cit. Ill of those values. Basically, then, if we have a formula, man is a child of God even when he fain would fill his belly with the husks that the swine eat.36 Brightman would define a person as "a self capable 37 of moral experience." In this connection he says: "whatever one may think about the technical theology in volved, the Christian doctrine of original sin expressed the truth that there is something fundamentally unreason able about man."^8 "Man’s conduct offers plenty of 39 material for the pessimist." We must not suppose, there fore, that his basic idealism closed his eyes to the realization that man is a sinner. In his book, The Finding of God, he expressed himself as follows: Man’s condition is one that cries aloud for reform; and any experience of God makes the need for reform more vividly evident in the light of the Eternal. Whatever our place in the scale of culture or economic success, we are inevitably implicated in the social sins of the race. We profit from a sinful society, but we also share its sin and its suffering. Any roseate picture of an innocently divine human nature that men may have entertained in the past is hope lessly out of touch with the real world in which we live. No theology is needed to teach us that men are national, international, economic, alcoholic, sexual, sinners both retail and wholesale; and that 36Ibid., pp. 225-226. 37 Moral Laws, p. 79. 3®Ibid., p. 69. 39puture of Christianity, p. 143. 112 they are sinners by aggressive free choice and by their own fault as well as by yielding to social and biological pressure. This is simply the verdict of experience. But the misery and weakness of men's lives is due to no personal fault of the individual; the whole race suffers from defects which it inherits and passes on to future generations. That theology calls those defects by the name of original sin does not alter the fact that man is not responsible for them and, so far as he knows, cannot remove them. Religious experience shows us that this whole situation is out of harmony with God's will.*® Yet in another context he warns: . . . it is just as erroneous to overemphasize the tendencies to irrational lawlessness in human nature as to overemphasize the tendencies to be guided by rational laws. Sometimes, if not always, rational processes control the irrational. Here, then, it is sufficient to note that he does not accept "any roseate picture of an innocently divine human nature" even though he is certain that man is not "responsible . . . for his biological heredity,and that he is "a potential child of God."^ 4^Xhe Finding of God, p. 114. The above paragraph would lend itself to an interesting theological analysis of its contents and their implications for such things as the solidarity of the race, whether or not guilt attaches to original sin, and just what is the extent of man's depravity. The theologian who does so will at once con clude that Brightman is neither a Calvinist nor a Pelagian. But he did not classify himself as a theologian and we must not attempt to make him such. 4^Moral Laws, p. 69. 4^The Finding of God, p. 114. 43»»a Personalis tic View of Human Nature," p. 225. But if hunan nature is sinful and needing reform, Brightman is also sure that it is redeemable. He declares "to be a man is to be capable of salvation; that is, capable of a better life, a life that the believer des- 44 cribes as redeemed, or holy, or saintly, or blessed." In a paper read at a conference in Springfield, he said: The Christian experience of salvation, when it is authentic, is one that transforms life with a sense of the power of divine goodness. Yet the very fact that salvation is necessary is an acknowledge ment of the power of evil*4^ So much, then, for the moral situation in which human nature finds its experiences. So much, likewise, for its characteristics. Let us now ask of Brightman: How does it Function? One answer he would surely give is suggested in his observation that "man is an end-realizing organism,"4* * manifesting a definite "urge toward wholeness" or a "nisus 47 toward totality." He notes that "there are relatively permanent tendencies in every life, whether we call them instincts, sentiments, dispositions, habits, purposes, or 44Per son and Reality, p. 11. "Dialectical Tensions in The Christian Idea and Experience of God," The Seminar Quarterly, VI (May, 1937), p. 16. ^ Moral Laws, p. 186. 47Person and Reality, p. 277. 114 48 conditioned reflexes." Hence, "roan is not only a being in time, moving through the vanishing present into a 49 veiled future, but he is also a being with a purpose." 50 "Man is always building the City of Is-to-Be." The rational tendencies within human nature "can inhibit the undesirable, select the desirable, and guide the movement of consciousness toward a chosen goal. . . This function of human nature is an important consideration for Brightman, inasmuch as "ethics is based on this fact 52 of purposive control by rational principles." He is persuaded that "the consent which one gives or refuses to give to a situation determines both the moral quality of one’s act and the direction of one’s further develop- 53 ment Brightman would also contend for what he calls "the normative dimension"^4 of human nature. It is man's 4®Loc cit. 4^Future of Christianity, p. 10. He also says: "Persons are essentially purposers, and purposers of rationality and values." Philosophy of Religion, p. 371. 5Qloc. cit» 5- *- Moral Laws, pp. 69-70. 52Ibid., p. 70. 53Ibid., pp. 75-76. ^E.S. Brightman, Persons and Values (Boston: Boston University Press, 1952), p. 2~SZ 115 nature to seek, "discover, and acknowledge norms of beauty, of moral right and wrong, and of reverence for the holy, as well as of logical coherence.1 ’55 Such norms are not freely given in man’s ordinary everyday experience, "they must be sought out," and even then man's "knowledge of them is never absolute."5^ Nevertheless, "search for norms, acknowledgement of norms, and creation of values in accordance with norms, is of the very essence of human nature."57 A second answer to our question is to be found in Brightman’s contention that it is human nature to interact with God, other selves, Nature, and one's own body. 1. Human nature interacts with God. In his per- sonalistic view of human nature Brightman declares that: Man 'apart from God' . . . as a purely natural being . . . is . . . a fantastic abstraction. . . . Man is constantly surrounded by, constantly sus tained by, constantly affected by God. Without God's continual activity, both Nature and human nature would vanish.58 At this point at least two distinctions seem necessary: [1] Existentially, . . . the divine is totaliter aliter. God is no part of man; man is no part of 55Lo c . cit. 56Loc♦ cit. 57Loc. cit. 5^Religion in Life, p. 227. 116 e g God. Persons are existentially private. Man is not part of God. If he is( why does he need to overcome evil, ignorance, and sensual feelings? Why does he need spiritual exercises? How can a perfect God experience man's iraper- Q fections just as imperfect man experiences them? [2] Telically, man and God are interactive and may interact for common purposes. 'I and my Father are one.' Man's response, if total and affirmative, is both rational and receptive. Reason must receive; and it must interpret critically what it receives, whether from other men or from God. Such response involves discrimination, commitment, co-operation, and warship. Man without all of these experiences is rot fully human or fully religious.^1 Brightman reminds us that all religions presuppose that man is somehow akin to the divine. To establish this he thinks: No anthropomorphism is necessary; the organon of man need not resemble the divine organon. But anthropopathism is essential. Some truth, some beauty, some love, some reason must be in man, akin to the divine; otherwise the divine is groundless, and meaningless for man. Man is somehow an imago dei. Men have 'authority to become sons of God." . . . The fact of this kinship is the inevitable idealistic element in all religion. He is convinced also that this divine-human relationship is based upon valid empirical evidences: Man cannot rationally interpret his experience on the supposition that human experience is all ^E.S. Brightman, "Man and Religion," Tenth Inter national Congress of Philosophy, p. 16. His italics. 6QLoc. cit. 6^Loc. cit. His italics. 62Ibid., p. 15. His italics. 117 there is. Human experience must belong to a larger universe, and can be understood only when seen in relation to that universe.® He therefore states: My conviction remains that in religious experience man has his most immediate contact with the divine purposes. In the consciousness of the presence of God, God himself is actually there, giving himself to man,^ In sum, he thinks that man is a citizen of both the human and the divine world, with the task of being a good citizen in both.^ 2. Human minds interact with other minds. Brightman looks upon the realm of persons as an interacting 66 system. For although selves are no part of each other, yet their mental interaction and their inner experience constitute the structure of the universe. Characteristic of human nature is its "social consciousness" forming the f S 7 basis for an "intimate intercommunication." Even though "the problem of interaction between minds is itself no simple one to solve, . . . to deny that minds can somehow interact is to render our whole experience 63gws. Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), p. 60. ^"Religion as Truth," pp. 62-63. 65Religion in Life, p. 227. ^ Person and Reality, p. 279. 67Ibid., p. 276. 118 unintelligble."68 "Persons communicate with each other."69 We need not go into Brightman's fuller discussion as to how this interaction between minds is possible and real. Suffice it here to note that this is one of his views about human nature. He is convinced that "persons act upon persons through events in nature and (perhaps) 70 through telepathy," 3. Human nature interacts with its own subcon scious. An interesting facet of Brightman's thought is the theory that man is also interactive with that part of his environment which is commonly referred to as the sub conscious. He states it in his Philosophy of Religion as follows: The subconscious consists of those conscious processes which are connected with our organism and from time to time affect the normal datum self without being actually present in that self. We call them conscious because the evidence indicates that they are in themselves processes of conscious sensation, desire, or even reasoning; we also call them subconscious because they are not experienced as an integral part of the conscious datum self and so they are environment of the total person, rather than part of it.?l The subconscious is in one sense nearer to being part of the person than any other environmental 6®E.S. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy (Revise^ New York: Holt, Rinehart-ancT wTnston,~l951), p. 215. 69 Person and Reality, p. 276. 7QIbid., p. 274. cf. Philosophy of Religion, p. 359. 7*Philosophy of Religion, p. 359. 119 factor, because it is a series of conscious processes which almost always (perhaps always) accompany the person as satellites accompany a planet, yet act on the person more intimately than the tidal action of any moon; but in another sense the subconscious is more definitely excluded from the person than is biological and physical nature, for our knowledge of it is more clearly inferential. Yet even the so-called direct observation of physical nature is no more than a personal experience which leads to the belief that an environment is present. For any experient, his subconscious consists of Situations Believed-in, which are no part of Situ ations Experienced by him.7^ His position as thus stated would indicate that he looks upon the personal self as a high grade of conscious activity which interacts with subconscious processes and 7 3 with the body but is in no way identical with them. J 4. Human nature interacts with its own body. Let us follow Brightman as he explains man's interaction with his own body: . . . the human personality is a constituent of an interacting system which includes the body. . . . [Yet] no part of the body has ever been an actual element in the empirical situation. That situation includes effects of the body . . . but neither the body nor any part of it (least of all the brain) is any part of conscious experience. . • . Personality is restricted to actual consciousness. . . . the empirical situation in interaction with a body. 72 Ibid., pp. 359-360, note 17. 7^As his editor, Bertocci, opines in Person and Reality, p. 274. ^"What is Personality," p. 138. 120 Hence he says: 1 1 My body is not within my experience," He thinks rather that only "the person is present in 7dS consciousness, not its objects, nor its causes," ° Thus he further seeks to clarify the point by saying: Man's body, of course, is a part of physical nature. But man is a person— a self-unity of consciousness, able to reason, to discover norms, and to achieve ideal values. This human person is not a body, but rather has a body. The body Ts not the tomb of spirit (no soma-sema); but rather it is a tool and instrument of "spirit (soma-skeuos or organon)• Sometimes it is very defective, but always it is a relation of inter action with spirit. That man is essentially spirit is evidenced by the reflection that the fate of the body is of no importance whatever save as it affects conscious spirit. An unconscious body could suffer any tortures, bombs, or destruction and no one would be the wiser or the sadder.77 Now because of his unique philosophy of nature (which must be considered more fully in a later chapter) Brightman can also hold that "man's interaction with his organon is 78 part of his interaction with God." It is his belief that a mind's body is activity of Cosmic Mind. In which case: Mind then interacts with and is dependent on body, which, for the personalist, means that human personality interacts with and is dependent on 75"A Personalistic View of Human Nature," p. 219. 76Ibid., p. 220. 77"Man and Religion," p. 16. 78L o c . cit. 121 Divine Personality; for body is in nature and nature is God in a c t i o n . We shall note later that nature, for Brightman, is one realm of God's being. Therefore, "if body is itself an expression of the supreme Mind, a human body is simply a point of interaction between the supreme Mind and the 80 human mind." 5. Human nature interacts with physical Nature. Such being the case, it logically follows that Brightman also holds the view that human nature interacts, by means of its body, with what most people refer to as NATURE. 81 "Nature is divine experience." Which is to say: "the personalistic faith is that all the energies of nature are activities of a cosmic mind--the mind that our value experiences reveal to be the eternal God. Every law of nature is a law of God, every energy of nature a deed of 82 God." For this reason also nature "is responsive within the limits of that order, at least, to the volitions of finite persons"88 and therefore "natural processes are 7Q Person and Reality, p. 271. 8^Loc. cit. Also Philosophy of Religion, p. 354. 81Nature and Values, p. 114. 82Ibid., p. 120. 88Person and Reality, p. 275. 122 84 instrumental to divine-human value realization," for as man interacts with nature he interacts with God. Human nature thus becomes, for Brightman, not merely an act or a syndrome of conscious experience; 85 ’ ’the finite person,” is both ”act-or and inter-act-or." There remains one more question to ask concerning human nature. What is its Destiny? This question becomes important in view of the fact that Brightman rejects "the scholastic theory of a substantial soul which is other than the phenomena of consciousness.”86 He does affirm belief in "an eternal order,” for in concluding his presentation of his personalistic view of human nature he says: The personalistic view of human nature, there fore, suggests a faith in personal-social immortality, with a career of inexhaustible per fectibility in a universe in which the Lamb is slain from the foundation of the world, and yet 84Ibid., p. 295. 85Ibid., p. 274. 86E.S. Brightman, "The Finite Self," Contemporary Idealism in America (Clifford Barrett, ed. New York: “ the MacmiTTan Co., 1932), p. 174. At times, however, he teaches "creationism.” Cf. his The Finding of God, pp. 158-159, where he contrasts human and divine creations. 87Religion in Life, p. 227. 123 eternally rises again from every slaying. In his Philosophy of Religion he states the opinion that the one crucial argument for immortality is the goodness of God: . . . there is only one vigorous argument for immortality. . . . If there is a God--a supreme, creative, cosmic person--then there is an infinitely good being committed to the eternal conservation of values. That being is the controlling and directing power in all natural processes and is engaged in a process of immanent cooperation with all other persons. Since all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, the existence of values depends on the existence of per sons. Value is personality at its best. God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of persons. In an earlier quotation he affirmed that "man is essen tially spirit" able therefore to survive the fate of the Body.^ In his Ingersoll lecture, Brightman affirms: It comes to this: if reason, as idealism under stands it, is trustworthy, then immortality is a fact. If value is to be found in experience, even when experience is taken as cynically as it is by Schopenhauer, and if personality is a spiritual whole that finds value through its own membership in the universal order which includes but transcends all human persons, there is substantial ground for reasonable hope of immortal life. Be that as it may, the case for immortality must rest on its coherence with the world view to which reason leads us. The seeker for truth about immor tality in an age of philosophic confusion may take 88Loc. cit. ^^Philosophy of Religion, p. 401. 90 Cf. Supra ^ p# 120, note 77. 124 comfort from the optimistic words of the great pessimist, Schopenhauer: 'The power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance.'91 The Cultured Man This brings us to a consideration of what Brightman understands to be the truly cultured man. In his essay, 92 "Three Conceptions of Culture," he says that the cultured man is one who possesses "a comprehensive taste resulting from a broad education," for "culture is broad 93 and inclusive." He suggests that there are three possible views of culture: (1) There is the contemplation of the eternal. This was the position which looked upon culture as characteristic of aristocracy. It savored of an other-worldliness, and maintained, he thinks, from Hellas to the eighteenth century. It is the view especially adapted to social criticism rather than to Q A social reconstruction. (2) There is the second view of culture which came as a new movement with Hegel as its herald. It majored on contemplation of the past, and 91 Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism, p. 60. The quotation is from-Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea (English Translation), I, 157. 92Philosophia, II (1937), pp. 146-158. 93Ibid., p. 146. 94Ibid., pp. 147, 151. 125 engaged in an objective historical study of human insti- 95 tutions. It was of the nature of scientific culture. But there is (3) that view of culture as a remaking of the future. It looks to the future. "Man is an active being and a culture of the will must supplement the QA culture of the intellect." The "culture of the soul which is action" must include the eternal and the histori cal of course, but like Christianity it must also be a call to action. Therefore, his conclusion is: Man is an active and purposive being and any view of culture which omits this fact omits the essence of human personality and of society, namely, activity towards goals. . . . Culture means intelligent participation in the remaking of society, and the cultivation of a better world order.97 This concludes our study of Brightman's views of man and human nature. FLEWELLING'S VIEWS ON MAN The humanistic element in the philosophy of Flewelling is a major emphasis. As a champion of the cause of humanity, he ranks among the leaders. Flewelling reacted strongly against anything that tended in any way to downgrade the essential dignity of man. Readers of his 95Ibid., pp. 147, 154. 96Ibid., p. 154. 97Ibid., pp. 156-157. 126 works are familiar with his dictum: "To the wise man in 98 search of reality nothing human can be alien," Thus any contempt for man was frowned upon in his thinking and 99 writing. In his very first volume he declared: "No true religion or service can be built upon scorn of 100 men." Flewelling's basic conception of man is expressed in his own phrase, "Creative Personality."^^ In his survey of human values under the title, The Things That Matter Most, he has expressed in a single paragraph a view that has received elaboration at many other places in his writings. It reads as follows: The most significant fact about man is his power to create. By powers within himself he can determine destinies, change the direction of nature, command the activity of the body and mind, and make the physical world around him his servant. This he is able to do because of a peculiar capacity for self- consciousness and reflection, of which, in the world order, he alone is possessor. By reflection he can bring to bear upon the present and the future the wisdom of past experiences in creative action. He is thus able to visualize future possibilities and make them real. This capacity lies within the realm of the creative imagination. The first step toward any future activity or achievement is the objecti fying of that possibility as an accomplished fact. on Person, p. 12, and Survival of Western Culture, p. 1 7 ( 5 " . ^Cf. his Conflict and Conciliation of Culture, Chapter II. lOQchrist and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 228. 10lThe title for his first book on metaphysics published in 1926. 127 What one thus visualizes to himself, if strongly willed and followed up with the appropriate action, is already on the way to accomplishment. Such pictured activities gain a power over our unconscious activity, so that the drive of life takes the direction of what we have strongly wished and willed. It springs up between intervals of attention like a hand guiding us to some distant goal. It rules the thinking which does go on in moments of slumber, bringing its contribution to our waking efforts. How important are imaginative concepts that are followed up with action! Such dreams are the particular accomplishment which may present them selves to you, and how essential they should be noble, worthy, and daring! Let us not be afraid to dream of doing what men declare impossible, for the great contributors to civilization have in that way reached their goal. Achievement once pictured in the mind and set by activity makes a man an inventor, a poet, a philosopher, a painter, a musician, an administrator, a creator of human values. As one by one he turns his dreams into action, the power to dream and the power to accomplish, grow, until the whole drive of life is set toward the desired accomplishment, which seems so easy to the world around that they call it good luck. But make no mistake at this point! Such accomplishments do not arise except at the cost of laborious preparation and practice of technique, for which the individual has to pay all there is to pay. Intense action, painful acquirement of technique, rigid self- control, limitation to definite objectives, these form the inner price that one must pay, and beside all these there must be emotion and emotional control, if one is to become truly creative. At long last, the man who follows such a program comes to high self-realization.102 In his Bergson and Personal Realism he had written, "man's greatest glory is his power to originate action, to be himself a creator." Thus he believes that we 102The Things That Matter Most, pp. 493-494 lO^Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 130. 128 may "assume that personality is the one source of unique 104 action in the universe." Basic to man's power to create is his "creative imagination" of which Flewelling has much to say in many places of his writings.105 He thinks of it as "the unique gift of personality."10^ It can be controlled by the human will and directed toward achievement of worthy tasks and the realization of projected worthwhile goals. It is closely allied to the subconscious. Hence it is important that it be directed into avenues of activity and not allowed to deteriorate into mere day-dreaming, or even to become master of the will. He is sure that "without a strongly stimulated creative imagination, 107 original work is impossible." That there is a close connection between the creative imagination and religion, mysticism, and art, he is also convinced. Thus man's ability to visualize goals and achievement opens to him 1 Ott great potentialities for self-realization. Flewelling thinks there are "godlike potentialities ^ L o c . cit. lOScreative Personality, Chap. 32; Winds of Hiroshima, pp. &~4-85; The Pe~rson, Chap. 12; et cetera. 106xhe Person, p. 90. 107 L o c . c i t . 1Q8Ibid., pp. 95-96. 120 inherent in every soul . • . investing him with unique 109 values.1 ' Man is of far more worth than the mere ninety-eight cents worth of chemicals which make up his physique.*10 He is really the clue to the universe and its meaning.111 He is the climax of evolution.11^ Or, 113 again, he is the chief ingredient of reality. Flewelling often declares his agreement with Protagoras 114 that "man is the measure of all things." He has capacities for creative causation.115 Therefore man is not only a carrier, but a creator of values.11^ In fact, 117 "his highest power [is] the capacity to create values." Man as a living organism is able to struggle toward lift values. He declares: "... the highest distinction 109»i^rt and The Man," The Personalist, XXX, 118. IIOt^q person, p. 249. ■^^Ibid., pp. 182, 209. 1I2Ibid., p. 189. 113Ibid., p. 267. ll4Cf. The Personalist, XXV, 7; Personalism and the Problems oi? Philosophy, pp. 51, 113; et cetera. 115The Person, pp. 170, 181. ll6Ibid., pp. 168, 233. H7,tThe Measure of a Man," The Personalist, XXV, 8. 1 1 O Creative Personality, pp. 82, 248* in man is not intelligence--though many would have it that way— but morality * . . moral achievement is the 119 highest point of life in man. • . ." Unlike the animals, man is able to engage in reflection upon his 120 mental states. Likewise man's ability to relate suc cessive events in such a way as to anticipate the future from events already present, is one of the hallmarks of IP 1 personality. So he holds that personality is the only 122 real field of potentiality. Furthermore: "man differs from the sinless animals by the possession of self-consciousness, self-identifying conceptuality, and self-directive purpose which involve freedom of choice and form the basis of moral charac- 123 ter." On the same thought in another context he says: "Out of this proficiency springs the sense of the cosmic which betokens the presence of self-criticism that comes with the human consciousness and separates it from the animal consciousness."^^ Man is the only "animal capable 119 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 155. 120rhe Person, pp. 128, 191. cf. Creative Personality, pp. 70, 82, 247. l^lcreative Personality, p. 247. 122Ibid., pp. 31-32. 123"Is God a Christian?" The Personalist, XXXIX, 345. 131 125 of laughter." Thus "we cannot overlook the new world that came into being with the first creature that could think, reflect upon his desires, build new aspirations out of his experience, and laugh at his own idio- 126 syncrasies." In this fact of self-censorship "we have 127 the foundation for a psychology of the person." More over, he contends that "the power of self-criticism and laughter is the handmaid of perfecting personality, or 128 progress, and of creativeness." Along with his reflective consciousness comes man's freedom and responsibility~-features which again distinguish him from the animal. We read in his book, Reason in Faith, the following: . . . granting the highest possible content to that type of personal consciousness which we find in the animals, it is obviously far removed from that which we discover in man because of this very great and often-neglected distinction--the presence in man of reflective consciousness. This dis tinguishing feature of human personality has in philosophy been called consciousness of conscious ness. The animal self-consciousness reacts to whatever impulses move him. Man, though following impulses with the greatest rapidity, carries on a moral censorship upon his own reaction. He has power to discuss his own moods, to question the -^^Ibid. f chap. II. 126Ibid., p. 15. *2^Ibid., p. 18. 126Ibid., p. 23. 132 rightn«ss of his own mental attitude, and to improve it* In other words, his responses to external impulses are consciously free, and this fact endows him with moral responsibility. It is the investiture of the soul and lifts all his activities out of the plane of the animal world. Whatever animality he may fall to, he does under protest from the moral censor*1^9 He continues: This chief distinction between man and animals is, then, the principal value in man and is his prime characteristic. With the power of reflective thought has been born freedom, for freedom is possible only to a being who can relate the past and the future to its present consciousness, and who has also power to reflect upon it* This freedom is man's unique gift in the world of nature, and it enables him to become, within his limited field, creative. His creativity is in the nature of the case limited to the intelligent combination of natural forces about him and such choices within himself as are creative of moral values and character.130 Flewelling holds that with the animal there could be no real element of choice or willing. In contrast to man at best it is only a faithfulness to instinct and habitual response due to training. However near it may approach an act of human choice, there is a difference* In the animal there is probably no reflection upon the motives of choice. In man reflection is the chief charac teristic of his willing. For with man it is not a blind following of impulses, unless he wills it to be so, nor even a weighing of impulses to determine the direction of greatest desire or value. It is a choice made in the full light of conscious motives, 129t^c Reason in Faith, pp. 231-232, 130Ibid., p. 232. 133 of ends to be gainedy and it may be made on direct opposition to the most urgent of natural impulses. Its exercise under these reflective conditions gives to willing on the part of man the nature of moral decision and endows him with a sense of moral responsibility. The absence of moral sense, or real social understanding, and of language seems a potent reason for denying the existence in animals of the capacity for reflection upon conscious states. The possibility of reflective selection becomes the basis of language, and all social and political institutions and the academic denial of it is nothing less than moral and social nihilism.^31 Since man is free and does reflect upon his own motives and act as his own censor, the next thing worthy of note is that religion, which involves faith, Mis 132 common to all humanity." Faith "is the very nature and function of man."*33 It is "unique to personality This he expresses more fully in the following paragraph: The fact that faith is the unique possession of human personality is of the utmost import, for it is possible only to a being capable of self- reflection and self-criticism. Therefore it cannot be disconnected from intellect and conviction. It is never blind adherence to other people's opinions, nor can it conflict with assured knowledge. Through reflection and criticism we become conscious of the deeper relations between ourselves and other men, between ourselves and the universal order, between ourselves and the righteousness which is God. Our conviction of the reality and workability of this order as a source of action is the indication of *3*Creative Personality, p. 203. 132 Personalism and the Problem of Philosophy, p. 25. 133 The Reason xn Faith, p. 14. 134The Person, p. 229. 134 our faith. Through it we attain insight into an ideal relationship between ourselves, our world, and God. Here in the region of ideals, the commitments, the subconscious, lies the laboratory of living, the workshop of the creative imagination. Here dreams of action are first formulated and impulses encouraged which become strong enough to sweep away all lesser obstructions. So great is this influence, fostered by faith in our dreams, that we become what we ponder, and work and pray to become, often by such uncon scious gradations that arrival is a surprise* For Flewelling, real faith "is action," it is "an 13A adjustment to facts." Hence, "the highest type of 137 saint is also the highest type of man." Consequently the normal natural man is the spiritual man. For "sin is abnormality, bringing decay of powers, and righteousness 138 alone can bring the normal fulfillment of man." He says: "The spiritual functioning of man in accordance with 139 his powers is necessary to his full existence as a man." Moreover, "man can choose or even create his environment, and the possession of capacities for spiritual living is proof that by nature he is divine."He insists: "The spiritual capacity of man is the norm of his activity, 135Ibid., pp. 229-230. 136Ibid., p. 230. ^^Bergson and personal Realism, p. 104* 138The Person, p. 310. ^ ^Loc. cit. 140r _ L oc • C X X t 135 and Christ is set before the Christian as the normal nan, 141 a fact often forgotten.” He thinks of Christ as the ideal nan,^ and, as such, a clue to the fact that there is divinity in nan.^ He mourns the fact that among ancient societies "there was little thought of the God like potentialities inherent in every human soul. . . ."144 "The normal man," he says, "is never the wicked and evil man. Such a man falls short of the normal standards of 145 manhood." He holds that "no one can at the same moment cherish a contempt for man and be a lover of the 146 Christian God." Or again, "to hold man to be normally the son of earth rather than the son of God is to deny Christian teaching."^47 Thus Flewelling speaks of "God in man,"^ and says: "Every man is by his birthright a potential partaker of Deity. Apart from this his true 141Ibid., p. 312. 142Ibid.. p. 249. 143 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, pp. 33, 55, 76. *44Ibid., p. 55; The Personalist, XXX, 118. ^ • 4- *Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 24. *4^Loc. cit. 147Ibid., p. 25. *4®Winds of Hiroshima, p. 114. 136 149 nature, he cannot be properly evaluated." He thinks "it is as essential to ground the spiritual nature of man in God as it is to account for his physical nature by l so reference to his physical ancestry." In his Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, which evaluates contrasting concepts of man both East and West,^^^ Flewelling objects to "the apotheosis of man,"^^ 1 5 3 and emphasizes Jesus' conception of human worth. He is sure that the totalitarian view of man can never be 154 valid. Man's value as a person is evident when we ICC recognize that he is a part of the divine plan, and a part of the eternal purpose.Man has a place in the 157 Supreme Continuum, in fact, "man himself becomes the raison d'etre of being to the exact degree in which he realizes himself in the Supreme Continuum,"^® So it is 149Ibid., pp. 115-116. 150 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 99. l5lIbid., p. 43. ^52Ibid., p. 28. •^"^Ibid., p. 24. 154Ibid., p. 21. l55The Person, pp. 283, 307. l56Ibid., p. 306. 157Ibid., p. 285. 158Ibid., p. 286. 137 that "man . . . [is] the supreme pilgrim of time and •* „159 eternity,*’ Two facets of Flewelling's thinking concerning man remain to be explored, namely, his account of human nature, and his notion of the nature of the soul. To these let us now turn. In 1924 Flewelling wrote an article entitled, 1 ah "Nature and Human Nature," in which he distinguishes between Nature as physical and material, and Human nature as "spiritual."'*'^ He very definitely rejects three common fallacies: (1) the doctrine of total depra vity of human nature; (2) the pronouncement of all of the human as good; and (3) the identification of human nature X62 with Nature. His later positions that human nature possesses power of moral reflection, conscious reflection, possibilities for self-realization, and an inner tendency to realize its highest possibilities, are here stated. So also is his contention that human nature most fully realizes its true nature the nearer it approaches the 159The Personalist, XXXV, 343. 160The Personalist, V (1924), 81-87. *6*~Ibid. t p# 86, 162j^jd< t pp# 82-84. Cf. also his article, "Is God a Christian'?" The Personalist, XXXIX, 342-343. 163The Personalist, V, 86, 87. 138 divine.^ 4 Sin as unnatural to human nature is also pictured as "an offence toward God, neighbor, or self."*6^ He asserts that "the character of the new-born babe is not inherited from his parents, for there is no sinfulness but by sinning.His antagonism to a particular type of theology is evident in the following statement: The idea that all motherhood is an act of sin is a pernicious heresy. The condemnation of infants 'a span long' to everlasting punishment, cannot be consistently attributed to One who said of the little Jewish children who thronged about him, 'Of such is the kingdom of heaven.' Flewelling does acknowledge that there is a certain animality in man: Should the question arise as to what keeps us back from the normal functioning of spiritual men and women, it must be answered that character demands freedom and is to be had at a price. It is only by voluntary choices that we can work our way out of animality, or what we call animality. It is something worse than animality, however, for animality is innocent, being unaware of moral obligation. Man is never free from such awareness. The possession of moral sensitivity, which is natural to man, lifts him above the innocent plane of the animal. If he resorts to what is called animality, he is not an animal, but worse, a fallen angel. We have fondly thought that by dropping to the lower level of action we were merely being natural, and therefore excusable, but we were in l^Loc. ci t. ^ ^Reason in Faith, p. 150. ^-^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 169. 167lqc. cit. 139 reality being unnatural in sinning against the higher nature potential within us. The divine capacity demands the divine life, and man's true nature is his highest nature. If we are betrayed, it is not nature around us or within us that betrays us. Our 'fifth column' is within us by reason of our invi tation, our evil choice, our coddled and cultivated 'affections and lusts.' The teaching that it is natural to be evil has had unhappy repercussions within the field of theology, and has also widened the gap between religion and science, making them appear hostile and contradictory when they shouldn't be. No truth in any realm and part of the universe can rightly be held to negate or contradict any other truth.1^8 Noticeable here is his basic distinction between man and the mere animal. There seems to be no suggestion of depravity about such animality, but when it is offered by men as an excuse for wrong doing, such action takes on the characteristic of perversity. Writing on the general theme of anthropology, Flewelling sees no validity in the idea that a theory of evolutionary process guarantees automatic progress. If there is anything in modern man's dream of automatic progress or automatic evolution for society, it should hold as a principle for all races and classes. But this the facts will not substantiate, for "a study of history shows that the movement of culture is not necessarily in one direction--upward. Civilizations fall as well as rise." Yet where examples of this decline of culture 168^he Person, p. 313. Ifr^Survival of Western Culture, p. 5. 140 are present, he insists: "That they were the possessors of inferior mentality cannot be sufficiently established by a few scraps of skull indicating a low brow and their 170 presence in the stratum of stone implements." Rather, Flewelling contends: ". . .a real civili zation apparently must be one in which is possible the 171 highest disciplinary self-expression of the person." So "we can safely say that the degree of any civilization is to be measured by its success in the cultivation of the achieving person, among all its members." This calls for a recognition of Flewelling's con tention that while the human person influences others,^7^ likewise the presence of and interaction with other T ‘ * 7 Ji persons is necessary for one’s own self-realization. He says: "There must be harmonious response to other souls and to the living world outside. . . . for to be is 175 to cooperate. ..." The last item in our consideration of Flewelling's 170Ibid., p. 6. l7lIbid., p. lO. *72Loc. cit. l73The Person, p. 233. 174Loc. cit. *7~*Ibid., p. 108. thought about man involves his belief about the nature of the human soul* As early as 1923 he had written: "The soul is metaphysical and cannot be scientifically demon strated." Yet he is sure that belief in the soul is reasonable, though its existence is demonstrable only in living experience. We must not think of the soul as being 177 in any way scientifically commensurable. In his thinking the soul is the subject of moral decisions and moral self-realization. Thus in soul with its moral action one reaches the highest meaning of personality. Soul and personality are so closely related that the difference between them is only one of degree or emphasis. These thoughts are presented in the following important paragraph: . . . much misunderstanding has arisen from taking the soul as something apart from concrete moral activity. It is assumed as an abstraction which exists apart from its activity. The imagination is then called into play and souls are discussed as something quite independent of their manifestations, and just as in the case of thoughts considered as independent of thinking, we begin to demand a place to hold them, and all sorts of troubles arise from our wrong conception. Just as personality must be grasped by a sort of realism, assumed as a self- conscious entity, so the soul carries its unity and its persistence within itself. That which is the subject of moral decisions and moral self- realizations is the soul. It is useless then to ■^^R.T. Flewelling, "Is the Soul Scientifically Commensurable?" The Personalist, IV (1923), 129. 142 discuss whether or not we have souls, as useless as to discuss whether or not we exist, for if there is moral activity, the choosing of right or wrong, or the power of choice, that unit which thus morally realizes itself is a living soul. We do not have to prove nor to substantiate it. Like the personality it is substantiated in living experience. Its substantiation is that of life. It will have been noted that in this definition there is no essential difference between the soul and personality. It is only a difference of degree or emphasis. It is in the soul alone, that is to say, in more strictly moral action that one reaches the highest meaning of personality. Because the exercise of freedom takes on moral or spiritual qualities, we prefer to call this phase of the experience of personality, the soul.1'8 In an article written in 1936 he addressed himself to the question: "Have we Souls?"!79 Therein he likewise 180 insists that the soul is known by its activity, as it 181 "functions in moral choices." But he reminds us that: "With Personalism, to be is to act; it is also to act toward an end, and with a certain consciousness of itself 182 as actor." He continues: "Reality is then primarily activity and activity infilled with purpose and intelli gence and for that reason bearing meaning for intelli- 183 gences." So, for Flewelling, "being a soul is the 178 Creative Personality, p. 208. 179The Personalist, XVII (1936), 229-237. 180Ibid., p. 230. *8*Loc. cit. 182Ibid., p. 234. ^ ■ 8^Loc. cit. 143 184 crowning act of the Person." He follows his discussion about the soul in his Creative Personality with the suggestion that "if the soul cannot truly be said to exist apart from moral action . . . as soul it would then begin with the dawning of moral self-consciousness," but he hastens to add: "moral self-consciousness begins with the first sense of oughtness, and this may very probably be much earlier 185 than we realize." He notes that many difficulties arise at this point. The old question must again be asked: "Is the soul transmitted or created?" He says that heredity furnishes the physical field, but he believes that: "the personal elements which make up the soul cannot be said to be inherited, because it is of the very nature of goodness that it must be free and concrete moral choice 186 of an individual." Thus, he thinks, "the answer would 187 seem to be that the soul is created." "But can it be 188 said to be self-created?" The answer is both "no and yes." "No in the sense that it could not exist except 184_, „ The Person, p. 107. 185creative Personality, pp. 208-209. 186Ibid., p. 209. ^®^Loc. cit. *88Loc. cit. 144 through the creative act of a Cosmic Intelligence, which provides a world of relations and a physical body and mind which are capable of being the field of its mani festations. Yes, in the sense that the moral choices through which it realizes its life and existence are its 1 8 9 own." After some discussion he again asks and answers thus: "When does the soul begin? Potentially it begins with or before birth; efficiently with the beginning of 190 moral self-consciousness." Such are the thoughts of our philosopher as he views this thing people refer to as human nature. Human nature in several of its relationships will be further noted as we follow our philosophers in con sideration of the remaining categories of comparison. ^ ^Loc. cit. 190 Ibid., p. 210. It is noteworthy that when Flewelling recast this discussion in his later book, The Person, his chapter title then became, "Are we Souls?" (Chap. XIV), thus indicating that the soul in his later thinking still was an act rather than a possession. Cf. pp. 102 ff. CHAPTER V THE PROBLEM OF EVIL Only spirit reals have any problem of evil, for there can be no moral failure apart from the action of a free and responsible moral agency. Modern man usually is cognizant of three types of disvalue, namely, suffering, As Boyer has expressed it: The two great historic religions of salvation are Buddhism and Christianity, Budhism professes to offer man salvation from suffering, while Christianity attempts to save men from sin. The first is concerned largely with cosmic evil. It seeks to eliminate those disvalues in the natural world which are due to a world in which sickness and pain, hurricane and famine, birth and rebirth are always in operation. Christianity is concerned with moral evil. It seeks to eliminate the hold that disvalue has upon personality. Going even deeper than this it seeks, somehow, to reconcile man's ingrained selection of and tendency toward disvalue with a God who is the source and ful fillment of all values.^ Personalism in its dominant form holds that there is a Personal God who is holy and powerful and just and actively at work in the creation and superintendence of the universe. Its crucial point, therefore, as for all sin, and (for lack of a better term) negative goodness. 1 1 » Muhlenberg Press, 19 2Ibid., pp. 314-315. 146 idealistic philosophies, is the problem of evil. We shall find our philosophers differing in their respective solutions of this very troublesome problem. Basically, they take opposite poles in their answers to the question, whence cometh evil. We shall find that Flewelling places the responsibility for evil in man's misuse of his freedom and God's refusal to over-ride man's freedom; whereas Brightman places the source of evil within the very nature of God Himself. This helps us to understand why Brightman has written so much concerning the nature of God, whereas Flewelling's greatest concern has been with human society and culture. Both men feel that Personalism has the best solution or answer to this troublesome problem of evil, yet they find that solution in opposite directions. It is important to note that they agree in rejecting the ideas of human depravity or "original sin," and a personal satan. Both seek to relieve God of a willful and ultimate responsibility for the presence of evil in the universe and in man. Both are sure that God sympathizes with human suffering. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL Some Data of the Moral Situation First we must note that Flewelling distinguishes between evil and the "possibility of evil," and he 147 insists that "evil must be defined as a moral act of the will,"3 His position is stated clearly in the following passage: The average person fails after many explanations to see any distinction between the possibility of evil and its existence. Show him that moral character is dependent on moral choice and that moral choice is impossible without contrasting alternatives and he will assent. In the very next breath he will be assuming that evil as an act is identical with evil as a possibility. However difficult it may be, nevertheless there is a dis tinction, and a distinction which is the turning of the ways for theism. Distinguish evil as a moral act and one can reasonably save the moral character of God. Fail to make that distinction and one can keep moral character in God only by a resort to an eternal dualism which denies his power. If evil is to be defined as a moral act of the will, it can be distinguished from temptation, it exists only where there are evil-willing personalities.4 After calling attention to a "sense of oughtness" in man which distinguishes him from the animal, and having noted that moral character can issue only from moral free dom, he continues: Surely, no man could be called actively good who was good simply because he could not be bad. The possibility of evil for each one of us gives the value to our right moral choices which come by struggles and self mastery. Just as the possibility of error has helped produce man's mental development, and as the possibility of pain has taught the care of the body and social amelioration, so the possibility of evil has led the way to the development of moral character, the building of the human soul. ^he Reason in Faith, p. 209. ^Loc. cit. 148 Let no one say that we have thus declared evil a necessity for goodness. We need not 'sin that grace may abound.' It is quite sufficient evidence of grace and of character that sin is not entered into. One is quite as much saved from sins never committed as from those actually entered into. The best evidence of moral character is not reformation but steadfast and life-long refusal to enter into sin. 5 All that is needed, then, for the moral situation is the possibility of evil, not its actuality, and he who chooses the right instead of the wrong is thereby to be reckoned good. This is an important distinction with Flewelling and runs throughout his entire thought about this problem of evil. In an earlier writing,^ he had insisted that evil is not the expression of reality nor of the divine will, but is merely the attendant possibility of freedom. According to Personalism: . . . evil is no longer the necessary expression of the fundamental reality, nor is it loaded upon the Divine will. It is, rather, an attendant upon the granting of freedom to responsible human personali ties, it being more dear to the Divine to secure moral character than to create an otherwise perfect but morally irresponsible world.7 In his study of Bergson,® he has also stated: It is not necessary to load the presence of evil upon the Divine Being or to make him responsible 5Ibid.. pp. 210-211. ^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 76. 7Ibid.. pp. 76-77. ^Bergson and Personal Realism. 149 for its existence. The assumption that evil came into the world as some independent absolute entity is quite unnecessary. The possibility of evil lies in the nature of free will in process of develop ment. The future of evil is determined not by the Divine Being but by the moral agents he has created for this task. It has no external permanence apart from the willing individuals and will disappear from the universal scheme as soon as all moral beings come to an intuitional or rational obedience to the divine will. It is our task as moral beings to banish evil from our own hearts, and also, insofar as we can, from our world.^ In The Reason in Faith he writes: The practical removal of God from the natural order sets up a contrasting kingdom of evil as powerful and as tenacious as the kingdom of good. This arises from a failure to distinguish between the existence of evil as an act and evil as a possibility. This distinction many minds refuse to make, and yet it is fundamental in its consequences for theology. Temptation to evil, though not entered into, is frequently treated as if it were evil. Evil is removed from wrong moral choices and given an inde pendent existence of its own as if it could exist apart from action.10 In his very first book Flewelling contended that man's freedom is "the efficient reason for the possibility of evil."1* Its possibility in the area of human decision is basic to character formation. He declares: It is only through moral choice and the conquest of evil that we can become partakers with God in a moral universe."It is 9Ibid., p. 107. l°The Reason in Faith, p. 178. 11Chr ist and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 268, 12Loc. cit. 150 therefore his conviction that: By positing all causal efficiency as arising from personality, place is left for the existence of error and evil without offending the human sense of moral obligation or erecting error into the plane of truth, or of burdening the Deity with responsibility for evil.13 That is, a moral universe involves the possibility of evil, but not its necessary actuality. In the Survival of Western Culture Flewelling pointed out that the doctrine positing evil as a necessary aspect of the world 14 order is Stoic rather than Christian. In sum, evil is a moral act,^ its possibility gives value to moral T JL X 7 choice, and it is essentially a wrong moral choice. Flewelling devotes chapter twenty-seven of his Creative Personality to a consideration of the problem of evil. There he again argues that r i evil may be possible but not chosen, and so long as it is not chosen it does X8 not exist." Such a distinction "frees us from the assumption that evil is as eternal as goodness and cannot 1 Q Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 83. ^Survival of Western Culture, pp. 42-43. ^Reason in Faith, p. 209. 16Ibid., p. 210. 17Ibid., p. 179. TO Creative Personality, p. 237. 151 eventually be overcome. . . . It presents likewise the 19 only known rational ground for ethical achievement." In his later volume, The Person, he argues in a similar strain: The possibility of moral evil is an evidence of the supreme importance the Creator has placed upon freedom, for the measure of the possibility of moral evil is the measure of freedom as well. Without freedom there can be no morality. Sin lessness without temptation is not moral character. The spiritual development of man depends upon the voluntariness of his choice of goodness. . . . To be free to do evil and yet to forsake it, to love and follow the good is to be godlike, and the moral problem, the problem of sin and righteousness is forever within man’s own power of solution. We may now summarize Flewelling’s thoughts about evil as they have been thus far presented: (1) the actual existence of evil is not necessary for goodness to have existence or for man to have freedom; (2) the possibility of evil is sufficient for a moral situation, just as the possibility of error spurs us on to a quest for truth; (3) evil is not eternal; (4) man is responsible for moral evil, in which case it is within the control of man; (5) since evil arises through the misuse of human freedom, its possibility may be thought of as the price God was willing to pay for the development of free moral character; and (6) finally, since moral evil is "an 19Loc. cit. ^The Person, p. 223 152 individual problem, it can be solved for society and the world of lesser forms only when the last individual has 21 won the solution." Toward a Definition of Sin The foregoing discussion has certain implications for Flewelling's conception of sin. He rejects the doctrine of original sin or human depravity. He is of the opinion that sin is "a wrong choice between two courses of moral action," hence it is "not biological, but always personal" and "without personal self-consciousness there can be no sin."22 He continues: "This seems the irre futable standpoint of any true personalism, for choice is impossible except to a self-conscious, self-identifying 23 subject of experience with the power of memory." Flewelling cannot believe that all men sinned in the sin of Adam; that "we can sin by proxy without choice, and indeed, before we have come into existence" is incredible 24 in the light of both reason and conscience. This sinning by inheritance or imputation . . . throws the weight of responsibility on God for 2*"If There be a God," The Personalist, XVII, 142- 143. 22 "Is God a Christian?" The Personalist, XXXIX (1958), pp. 341-342. 23Ibid., p. 342. 24Loc. cit. 153 maintaining and even expanding to infinite proportions through the countless ages the stream of evil from Adam’s half-enlightened misstep. * 26 Sin is "a personal act and never inherited.” Freedom "on which the soul of man is dependent, is incompatible 27 with compulsion, whether by heredity or imputation.” Flewelling cannot think of God as "an absolute Autocrat imputing sin to those who have had no choice, even to the unborn, and then expanding that burden of iniquity to 28 untold generations. . . .” Such a picture is not what we find in the teachings of Jesus in the Gospels. The Incarnation is a demonstration of "the reasonableness of the Divine call upon human hearts," and "the potential 29 unity between man and God." He does, however, look upon sin as "an eternal injury" to the soul,"^0 with irretrievable consequences.3* For "though through divine grace we rise above the fault to better living, there will ever be something missing 3 2 from the soul's eternal satisfactions." Too often 25Loc. cit. 26Ibid., p. 343. 27Ibid., p. 345. 28Ibid., p. 346. ^Loc. cit. 3QChrist and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 163. 3lIbid., p. 158. 32ibid., pp. 163-164. 154 men's eyes have been closed "to the abiding and blasting 33 qualities of sin," and the seriousness of the moral order has been admitted only half-heartedly. How fatal is any trifling of the human soul with wrong, any receiving of the rewards of injustice or of fraud] Our close-shut universe will let no soul escape from its sin, however secret, but will, if it be not disavowed, write it with indelible lines into character. How foolish for men who have no desire for character to think they can cheat or defraud the heart of the universe and the great God, hugging to themselves pet sins and follies, rejoicing in the deception of their fellows--proud in the super ficial standing of society] With what glee do they hail the proposition that there is no hell, and take comfort in sin at the thought that the crude, medi eval conception is gone. No hell? God needs only to turn upon them the white light of unescapable conscience, and themselves are hell--a hell that cannot be escaped without a change in all that they have thought or known or loved. If hell be an in ternal thing, then, indeed, a Savior that saves from the love and the following of sin is the only Savior adequate.34 Thus, for Flewelling, sin culminates in "that everlasting Q C obloquy and self-contempt which is hell indeed," He warns us that we are not saved in our sins, "we are saved by ending our sin; we are saved from our sins," The Problem of Suffering It is a basic conviction with Flewelling that: 33Ibid., p. 163. 34Ibid., p. 168. 35|'Is God a Christian?" The Personalist, XXXIX, 348. 36Christ and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 169. 155 . . . Responsibility for the greatest suffering of these times, and sufferings that make those of other days seem insignificant, is not to be placed upon God, but upon evil men. Just as the real evil of the world is seen to be the result of an unholy, lustful and greedy individualism, we are beginning to see likewise that it can be done away and an age of peace brought in only as men are willing to give up everything material for the greatness of the spiritual ideal. There is in this fact too a suggestion for the solution of the problem of evil so far as it touches the individual. The individual can make the pains and sufferings of life yield him a rich treasure of personal and spiritual attainment according to th/e spirit in which he meets them. Death itself may become the glory which consummates his earthly career.37 Flewelling acknowledges that the speculative intellect may not be satisfied fully with this as a com plete explanation: it may be tempted to throw "heavy responsibilities" upon God, and demand to know why an evil world is possible which involves the innocent in suffering. But he reminds us that: There are two considerations that arrest the attention and constrain us at least to withhold judgment. The first is whether there would be any value or reality to moral freedom if evil were impossible. The second regards the part of God. Suppose it shall be discovered that this life of moral possibility is the superior goal of creation, and that in order to create men in his own spiritual likeness he has himself been willing to partake in their sufferings. If the concrete solution of the problem of evil is to be found in the individual attitude toward the woes of life through a spiritual self-mastery that glorifies all, then the endurance of the cross by the Master and Creator of Life ^ Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 289. 156 himself must furnish the philosophical and theo logical justification of an uncompleted world.38 Here we find one of the rather unique contributions of Flewelling to understanding of the problem of suffering. He speaks as a philosopher and not as a church theologian, yet he boldly asserts the idea of cosmic vicariousness. He says that the problem of evil and suffering, for its solution on the divine side, demands the incarnation and 39 the cross. An incarnation was necessary to justify the existence of pain and evil in the world and to show that, in spite of appearances, the heart of the Eternal is love. If God being able to order a universe in which there should be neither sin nor pain, orders one where the contrary is true, he must show, first, that the suffering is disci plinary, and, second, that he is willing to share it in the task of working out man’s redemption. There is a deadlock, and deadlock only, in philoso phy and in theology unless the appearance of God in the person of Christ be allowed. There is logically and practically no solution for the deeper problems of human existence apart from the deity and suffering of Jesus. The whole problem of reconciliation centers here. How this can be is a great mystery. The important fact is that it is. How it should be explained is another matter. This desire to explain the participation of God in the world through Christ has been the source of much unprofitable theorizing which has often confused the practical issues.40 38Ibid., pp. 289-290. 39 The Reason in Faith, pp. 108 ff. 40Ibid., pp. 108-109. 157 After a mention of the various explanations men have offered to the mystery, he suggests that the New Testament solution is the most valid, and then states: The fact of forgiveness, the sympathy of the Eternal with man's lowly struggle away from baseness, the possibility of overcoming every sin, the part which the Christ takes in every moral victory, the willingness of God to tent with us along the common plains of life and to abide with us through storm and sunshine until the conquest over self and the world is won, and then to receive us to himself-- these are the things that have been brought to us by the incarnation.41 It was essential that the Being who in the creation of moral beings must resort to freedom with its con sequences of error, the possibility of evil, should justify Himself by the full participation in their sufferings. . . . A God of love proves his love by identifying himself with his creatures. . . . God's greatness is to be measured by his self-abasement. There are eternal implications in the statement that Jesus 'was slain from the foundation of the world.' Such an event was implicit in the determi nation to create spiritual beings, human souls. The principle of spiritual conquest through suffering, is the law of the universe. Being such, the Creator applies it to himself as well as to the created. . . . A just and loving God could not allow the infliction of so much suffering and retain his character of love, were it not that He is the chief sufferer. This is the eternal truth of the Cross and gives whatever confirmation is needed of the presence of God in Christ.4^ Thus Flewelling is of the opinion that: "The suffering of the Cross became the beacon of the ages, the supreme remonstrance against the power of evil, the ever-powerful 41Ibid., p. 112. 4^Winds of Hiroshima, pp. 116-117. 158 43 reminder of the iniquity of sin*" Ultimately the problem of suffering is a personal one. Hence it calls for a personal solution. The individual suffers on his cross alone. Here lies the bitter heart of the problem, but here is the kernel of its solution. The person may by Divine inspiration transmute the suffering into the gold of character. The depth of suffering may become the measure of the soul. Pain seems often the only weapon that can stab our souls awake and teach us the great realities of life. . . . Out of hardship come strength and fortitude, and through courage, victory.44 He is of the opinion that in the case of most physical evils, man can either discover a remedy for them or learn to transform them into spiritual values. "Pain is a blessing in disguise, for it is the great danger signal which the body sends up to warn us against physical A . Cl disaster." Likewise "death clears the way for the progress of the race. . . . At any rate it may become the lesser of many ills."4* * He looks upon error, pain, and the possibility of evil, as the educative principles of life.4^ "They are 4^The Person, p. 224. 44Ibid., p. 244. 4^Ibid., p. 222. 4^Loc. cit. 4?Cf. The Reason in Faith, Chap. IX, also his article, "Schoolmaster PaTn," The Persona list, IV (1923), 90-95. 159 the schoolmaster triad of life, but this is not in their 48 actuality so much as in their possibility." Flewelling is not unaware of the sharpest focus of the problem of human suffering, for he explains: This is no attempt to escape the terrific problem imposed by the suffering of the innocent with the guilty, or the greater one of the suf fering of the innocent for the guilty. But such events must arm with sacrificial courage every true man to end the iniquity. It will be ended only by the voluntary giving of many lives before we come generally to understand the contemptibility of selfishness and wrong, and the necessity of exalting righteousness, justice, and truth in every department of human relations. . . . Humanity learns only the hard way, but none of us is called to a life of ease, irresponsibility, carelessness, and self- indulgence so long as one human being is, by reason of untoward conditions, defrauded of the right to be in the fullest sense a person. That we have too often felt our brother's problem to be no concern of ours, so long as we were comfortable, has been the deep damnation of this age which has brought us so near to the twilight of civilization. Until this indifference passes there cannot be 4-0 peace The basic insight he would emphasize for us in relation to suffering is the redemptive character of that suffering which is vicarious, be it Cosmic or individual. "To die in honor is great victory. To die for others is 50 the supreme moral achievement." Hence, "for the suf ferer there is the possibility of turning even suffering 4®The Reason in Faith, p. 203, A Q The Person, pp. 224-225. 50Ibid., p. 222. 160 into the pure gold of patience and blessing to one's self and to others*” Thus pain and suffering have not only an educative value but when vicarious in a loving concern for others they may also be redemptive for both the indi vidual and his society. "Pain has provoked the scientific research which has made possible the marvels of modern surgery."52 He suggests that if the world "out of tragedy and vicissitude has learned to love the will of God" then "such a world alone could be adequate justification for 53 pain and evil that have been world-wide and age-long." He is therefore of the opinion that "the problem of pain 54 is easy as compared with that of moral evil," The Solution of These Problems isPersonal Flewelling is convinced that the problem of evil will find its real solution only in the arena of personal living, as the following paragraphs suggest; We can make no headway with the problems of error, pain, and evil so long as we remain on the 5lIbid., p. 224. 52Ibid*, p. 222. 5^The Reason in Faith, p. 185. ^^The Person, p. 223. ^^The Reason in Faith, p. 211; Bergson and Personal Realism, pp. 257-258; Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 192, fi and The Person, pp. 223-225. 161 impersonal plane. We can never account in a general and wholesale way for the wandering of the entire races of men through the dark mazes of superstition and error* We cannot justify the destruction which follows in the wake of wholesale disaster* We cannot even account for the suffering and death of one other human being* Hardest of all is it to gather from the field sown with evil deeds any harvest of hope* Why the world has so long been allowed to exist as the field of exploitation for evil is beyond the power of any man to explain* We are able to read but a single chapter from the book of life, and we catch but occasional glimpses of that Creative Mind behind all. There is one sort of solution, however, of which each is capable* It is possible for each of us to see that pain, error, and possibility of moral evil work in us a growing mastery of nature, of our physical powers, and the self-discipline of our souls. Out of the struggle with the chance of error we can build a mental life that can see straight and solve problems which reach into the field of the hitherto unknown. . . . Out of our struggle with pain and disease can come for us individually both sweetness and light. We can bear patiently and not be embittered, and we can learn lovingly to care for the less fortunate and so build the structure of the family, society, and civilization. Out of temptation we can gather to ourselves the moral power of continuously right decisions, and when all men have truly learned that lesson, we shall have a heavenly society not because from us has been taken away the possibility but because we have conquered the will to sin. The general problem is in a wiser and all understanding Mind. The particular problem is specifically our own* Just why error, pain, and evil should have been permitted, we do not know and cannot say* But it may be that to God, the final mental, social and moral outcome was worth the venture, and to his eye there may be a goal far off of such supreme worth for every son of man as to far outweigh every distress. It is the part of religion to live as if this were true,^6 He also admits that "much of our difficulty with the ^ The Reason in Faith, pp. 211-213* 162 problem of evil arises out of our demand for speedy and 57 universal results," Whereupon he adds: There can be no ultimate solution short of the dream and the fact of immortality. . . . This world is only a place of beginnings. Nothing is finished here. That is what makes life so interesting. Not only do we spend our years as a tale that is toldf but it is a tale of suffering, wrong, frustrations, struggle toward the unattainable. If this life were all, we should be of all men most miserable. Our world is, to all appearances, a school in which for a few short lessons it is our privilege to learn of possibilities now too great for us. To most men it is unthinkable that these lessons should have no outcome but darkness. As the primary and simple cell worked toward a fulfillment which it could not en vision but in its darkness could only feel as an inner urge, and out of that feeling brought the world of sentient life into being, so the urge of the human soul is eloquent of brighter and fairer worlds to come. Unless we can attach this meaning to the dreams that throng our souls, there is no solution to the problem of evil, nor indeed any rational explanation of existence.58 Thus he is sure that "the problem of evil is above all a personal problem which each must solve for himself."59 Flewelling's first published volume was concerned with the problem of evil. After considering the various solutions to the problem which have been set forth in the world’s greatest literature, his concluding chapter deals with the example and the personal solution of evil and suffering given by Jesus of Nazareth. He says: 57The Person, p . 223. 58Ibid., p. 225. 59Ibid., p. 224. 163 When the evils of our present life are turned one by one into a new sympathy for men, into a larger striving after the perfect day, the mists that have darkened vision fall from us. When our lives fall into step with a Divine Will that worketh hitherto and still works in us; when our lives are looked upon from the eternal standpoint, all shadows fall behind us, because our faces are toward the Light and the Ultimate Revelation. We can face the worst that life can bring with the triumphant joy with which Jesus went to his cross.60 He concludes: To face disaster with triumphant soul for the sake of the world around you, to sink your lesser ills in the universal need, to live heroically and to die with one's face to the light--this is the on ly solution granted to mortals, and it is enough until, speaking in the words of a teacher whom many loved, 'we pass beyond the night and know as we are known.'6 ^ BRIGHTMAN’S PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL Flewelling's chief concern, as we have noted above, is with moral evil and man's responsibility for it with the challenge to overcome it. Brightman, on the contrary, is troubled chiefly by the presence of natural evils in the world. His most important thoughts on the problem of ftP evil will be found in his Philosophy of Reliaionr although they are expressed more succinctly and syste matically in his article on "Evil," in Ferm's ^Christ and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 271* 6lIbid.. p. 272. The quotation is from Bowne, Essence of Religion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910), p. 6$. 6^Published at New York by Prentice-Hall, 1940. 164 € \ o Encyclopedia of Religion. The Surplus of Evils Before we consider the above mentioned sources more carefully we may make some preliminary notations from others of Brightman’s writings. He notes that there is a 64 ' ’surplus1 1 of evils in our world. There are evils which are not man’s fault,65 nor are they all due to or the result of human sin.66 While he is sure that evil is not the fundamental meaning of the universe, yet much of the cosmic process is evil.6® There is evil in nature,6^ and this manifests itself as a sort of cosmic drag of 70 dysteleological facts. While he is willing to admit that "there are facts that seem to point to purpose, there are many more facts that seem to point to an indifferent 6^See pages 263-265. ^Finding Qf God, p. 62. ^Future of Christianity, p. 104. 6^Finding of God, p. 117. f \ 0 7 Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 162. ft Personality and Religion, pp. 116-117. ^^Nature and Values, p. 96* 70 "Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theology, p. 76. 165 71 or malevolent universe." Furthermore, while he is certain that the problem of the good is more fundamental 72 than the problem of evil, yet in his own situation: Life has not allowed me to escape these experiences. At an early age, I had occasion to observe the terrible deeds that could be performed by one of the best of men when insanity rendered him irresponsible. A few years afterward, I perceived how another could, through the merest accident while swimming, suffer a shock from which his nervous system never recovered. The ravages of an awful disease swiftly took a loved one away. My affection for Germany made the world war seem peculiarly tragic. These and other experiences have rendered me stonily indifferent to all Pollyanna optimism and to most so-called solutions of the problem of evil. I cannot separate life from thought. ^ 74 For Brightman, evil, as the contrary of value looms so large, there is so much of suffering and evil in 7 ^ nature, that "the view which holds that there is not only a human, but also a cosmic struggle between good and 7 f\ evil" ° seems the most reasonable. Otherwise the presence of both good and evil in the same universe becomes a "fundamental tragedy . . . that no optimism should conceal ^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 255. 7^"Religion as Truth," p. 76. 73Ibid., p. 75. 74Religious Values, p. 81. 75 Philosophy of Ideals, p. 92. 7^Future of Christianity, p. 105. 166 from our eyes."7^ He says: The coexistence of beauty and offensive ugliness, or pleasure and pain, of supreme happiness and despair, or saintly nobility and debased immorality in the same world creates a problem that has concerned writers of the greatest prose and poetry, painters and reformers, as well as philosophers.78 Again, he states: If one surveys life with the thought of its value in mind, one is struck first of all by the ills from which life suffers, which seem to frustrate and even to destroy higher aims and purposes. . . .7^ Also, if one is "interested in the cosmic fortune of values, every item of experience that hinders or renders impossible the fullest attainment of value becomes a 80 problem." While it is "reasonable to regard the existence of evil as an unsolved problem in a universe in which the deepest reality is good,"8- * - yet the problem Q O of evil must be frankly faced. 6 As he does so, Brightman cannot believe that "labor and suffering, disease and death, came into the world as a result of 7introduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 162. 78Ibid., (1951), p. 175. 79 Religious Values, p. 89. 8QIbid., pp. 89-90. 8ibid., p. 134. 8 2Finding of God, p. 118. 167 83 human sin." So he asks: Are they not rather essential parts of the whole order of life, which belonged to the realm of animate nature long before man appeared on the earth? It is vain to ascribe all of the darkness of creation to human will. The obstacles which matter and time, suffering and finiteness, offer to the onward move ment of spirit cannot be wholly due, as traditional theology has taught, to the sin of man and the curse of Eden. Some of them serve a real disciplinary purpose, of course; but man is too insignificant, and the obstacles too vast and cosmic, for them to be explained as wholly due to a deliberate divine purpose to discipline humanity.84 He continues: The unexplained obstacles cannot be wholly due either to our ignorance or our sin or to the divine desire to discipline us. Yet religious experience points to the faith that there is a God who can be found in many different ways. Shall we close our eyes to the evil while we accept him, or shall we face the problem of evil? The number of religious persons who are content to believe without facing the problem is amazing. They doubtless have reasons of their own for not reasoning; and many are literally too busy or too untrained to think seriously. But when any of the trained religious specialists of the community, members of the clergy, take pride in not facing the problem of evil, and in not offering any interpretation of it, they are inviting skepticism and encouraging irreligion.8^ Brightman is convinced that: those who face the problem, at the present stage of our thought, refusing to accept the lazy man's comfort of resting where we are because the matter is too high for us, will see that the universe contains obstacles to the will of God besides the 83Ibid., p. 117. 84Ibid.. pp. 117-118. 85Ibid., p. 118. 168 obstacles due to human sin. These obstacles, since they delay the fulfillment of goodness and beauty, cannot be due to God's will. Ultimately, they must either exist independently of God or else they must be due to something within the nature of God. The dualistic view that they are independent of God, and so eternal and uncreated, is alluring. On this view, God is struggling to bring order and purpose into a world of matter which he did not create but which he can subdue and use. While this view has its attractions if we consider the problem of evil alone, it raises difficulties as great as those it solves. What is the nature of this eternal matter? How is it related to the divine will? What in God restrains him from destroying it?8^ Since, therefore, Brightman rejects the possibility that such a surplus of evils in the world can be due to either God’s desire to discipline, or to an evil system independent of the divine creation, he offers what to him seems the only logical alternative, concerning which he writes as follows: If, then, we turn to the other possibility, it is that the obstacles are due to something within the nature of God--what I call 'The Given.' On this view, the divine consciousness contains, in everyone of its experiences, both freely chosen activity and unchosen passivity, both form and content. The eternal God, thus, is always a perfectly good will and a perfectly wise reason, in the sense of being always loyal to the highest purposes and of knowing always everything that can be known. But his eternal nature is not a peaceful, happy, effortless willing that attains its ends as soon as they are conceived. All experience testifies to the contrary. The eternal nature of God contains a principle of delay and suffering within itself. Every choice of God is limited not merely by the eternal necessities of reason (which prohibit contradiction), but also by 8 6 Ibid., pp. 118-119 169 the eternal and uncreated nature of divine experi ence, which it is equally necessary for us to posit and absurd for us to undertake to chart in detail. Yet we may say that the content of this experience is such that it both renders necessary eternal pain in God and also renders possible the kind of triumph over pain that the inexhaustible good will of God achieves.87 Inadequacies of Traditional Theism Quite obviously Brightman is dissatisfied with the traditional theism which "exalts the omnipotence of God but obscures his moral perfection by leaving it in an 88 untelligible relation to the evils of existence.1 1 While he is quite sure that "experience shows a power at work which brings cosmos out of chaos, and good out of Q Q evil, in countless cases and marvelous ways,"0* he is also sure that "there are . . . many cases in which chaos on and evil have not yet led to any visible good." So he says: A contemplation of the whole of human life, and of the sufferings of creation apart from man and before he appeared on the earth, convince me that 87Ibid., p. 119. We discussed Brightman's theology of "the Given" under his doctrine of God, but a complete picture of his philosophy of evil warrants its re- introduction here. 88Ibid., p. 91. 89Ibid., p. 90. ^®Loc. cit. 170 God himself is suffering and contending against real difficulties and pain. One who can confront reality without a tragic sense of the cosmic struggle is moving in a sphere of thought which ^ simply does not conform to experience as I see it. Thus he believes that: A faith that admits the presence of something given within God which he did not create but which he can endure and control seems to be more in harmony with the evidence than a faith which declares that all apparent evil is real good.^ He is of the opinion that "the existence of values and of evils leads to a belief in a God who is good and whose 03 power is sufficient to control evil." In fact, he is willing to venture so far as to say that "while God did not create any of these evils, he can sure all of them," but "his cure is slow and evolutionary rather than sudden 94 and absolute." Brightman therefore sees in his theory of the Given a better and more rational explanation of the presence of evil in man and the cosmos, than in the tra ditional theological postulates of a Satan and Original 95 Sin. Though he is willing to admit that Satan’s 91i_s God a Person? p. 65, 92puture of Christianity, p. 105. 9^Loc. cit. 9^Finding of God, p. 92. 95ibid., p. 186. 171 96 negation heightens the problem of evil, yet he says: Of the two views, surely that of an eternal Satan threatens the unity of the ultimate rule of goodness far more than does an antithesis within the divine nature which divine power can always lead to a higher and higher synthesis. Divine self-control is more credible than divine creation or tolerance or conquest of Satan. Likewise he is certain that Mthe presence of moral evil in the universe does not prove the objectivity of evil. The argument for a devil does not stand on the same 98 plane intellectually with the argument for a God.*' Moreover, since "moral evil is essentially incoherent, both within itself, and with fundamental aspects of truth;" since "it is contradictory and negative, not positive and 99 coherent," it should not be given an objective status. Evil is inherently non-rational. "Evil is a principle of fragmentariness, of incoherence, of mockery."^^ The very fact that "you cannot define what you mean by evil without reference to the good," is evidence that "evil is always in-consistency, disharmony, absence or repudiation or of inattention to the good."3,0^ 96philosophy of Religion, p. 249. Q 7 Finding of God, p. 186. ^ Introduction to Philosophy, (1925 and 1951), p . 162. 99jLoc. cit. lOOphilosophy of Religion, p. 259. ^•^Religious Values, p. 133. 172 Evil and Human Freedom Although Brightman rejects the idea of a personal Satan and the idea of inherited guilt,102 he is sure that 103 human nature is not innocently divine. Men do choose evil, "murder, wage war, and otherwise voluntarily 104 destroy values." He also admits that "some human individuals . . . may become so vicious that even God may despair of arousing them to any higher aspirations."105 "Man’s condition is one that cries aloud for reform."^ Granting, however, that moral evils may be ex plained as a result of human freedom--for he says: "moral evil is always of this voluntary sort; it is impossible to do moral wrong unintentionally; and all voluntary evil 107 is moral evil" --yet this does not explain many aspects ^ 108 of moral evil. He asks: "Why are there in the nature of things, independent of human choice, so many temptations and lQ2The Finding of God, p. 114. 108Loc. cit. 104Nature and Values, p. 84. 3.05phjlogpphy of Religion, p. 408. 106pinding of God, p. 114. 10^Nature and Values, p. 84. 108Philosophy of Religion, p. 260. 173 allurements to evil choices?" and, again: "Why are the consequences of some evil choices so utterly debasing and 109 disastrous." Brightman expresses disagreement with St. Paul and St. James when he declares: "Freedom, we repeat, explains much of moral evil, but it does not explain either the force of temptation or the debasing conse quences of moral evil." Current Solutions Examined Brightman takes up successively the other suggested explanations of evil. He cannot accept the idea that non- moral evils are a punishment for moral evils inflicted by a God of perfect love as expressions of his resentment. He does not think that regarding non-moral evils as dis ciplinary is philosophically adequate, since such a belief entails incoherencies so far reaching as to dis- 11? credit it. The idea that evil is incomplete good, as the Absolute Idealists would have it, is inadequate since "from incompleteness alone, the goodness of the complete 113 cannot be derived." The idea that evil is needed as a ^■Q^Loc, dt . 11QIbid., p. 261. H ^Loc. cit. 112Ibid., p. 262. J , 13Ibid., p. 264. 174 contrast to the good is likewise unsound since 1 1 it is not necessary to visit a hospital in order to enjoy life" or to taste "a rotten apple in order to eat a good one with 114 satisfaction." He cannot accept the idea that non- moral evils, as well as moral ones, are a result of free dom. For, as he says, "the misuse of freedom does not relieve God of responsibility for having placed in his creation the possibility of so many direly cruel and unjust consequences of the misuse of freedom." The idea that evils are needed in the universe as instruments to beings other than men he finds undemons- trable on the basis of experience. He is not interested in multiplying possibilities when the actualities cry so loud for solution.As to the idea that all evils, intrinsic or instrumental, serve an unknown good he sees as simply an appeal to ignorance. Our ignorance cannot be 117 used to support any particular belief. He is certain that the Hindus and Christian Scientists are mistaken in their contention that evil is unreal. For if all nature is illusory, then nothing can be objective. That good 114Ibid., pp. 265-266. 1] - 5Ibid., p. 267. 116Ibid., pp. 267-268, 117Ibid., pp. 269-170, 118Ibid., pp. 270-271. 175 and evil are the outcome of processes or entities which are axiologically neutral, since there can be no value or disvalue apart from consciousness, does not, he thinks, render the problem artificial and unreal. In fact it offers "no explanation at all for the most characteristic 119 facts of human history and culture." He sees no co herency in such a position. Thus it turns out that we face a dilemma, yea more, a trilemma. We may choose any of three philosophies, namely: "agnostic humanism, theistic absolutism, and 1 pd theistic finitism." Brightman accepts the last as the most coherent and least problematic. He never did enter tain the possibility of agnostic humanism. As for theistic absolutism, it "entails the admission that we cannot explain the surd evils--the waste, the cruelty, 121 the injustice of nature--." Moreover, "since theistic absolutism includes the belief that the divine will is omnipotent and faces no conditions which it did not create, an upholder of that view must find the ultimate source of all surd evils in 122 the will of God." A more coherent account of surd 119Ibid., pp. 271-272. 120Ibid., p. 274. 12^Ibid., p. 309. 1 2 2 Ibid., p. 310. 176 evils is found in theistic finitism. He says: "If we suppose the power of God to be finite, but his will for good infinite, we have a reasonable explanation of the 123 place of surd evils in the scheme of things." The Rationale of The Given As we have noted above, and in Chapter III, Brightman holds that it is "The Given" in the nature of God that accounts for surd evil in the universe. We therefore ask the reader's indulgence of the following quotation from his Per son and Reality, which is in turn quoted by the editor of that volume from his Philosophy of Religion. He states: God is personal consciousness of eternal duration; his consciousness is an eternally active will, which eternally finds and controls the Given within every moment of his eternal experience. The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason--including logic, mathematical relations, and Platonic Ideas— and also of equally external and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (cjualia), dis orderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space ana time, and whatever in God is the source of 'surd' evil. The common characteristic of all that is 'given' is first, that it is eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being; and, secondly, that it is not a product of will or created activity. For the Given to be in consciousness at all means that it must be process; 123 Ibid., p. 319. cf. also his Person and Reality, p. 336. 177 but unwilled, nonvoluntary consciousness is distinguishable from voluntary consciousness, both in God and in man, God's finiteness thus does not mean that he began or will end; nor does it mean he is limited by anything external to himself (except finite wills). Strictly we should speak of a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God; for even the finite God is absolute in the sense of being the ultimate source of all creation. .... God’s control of the Given means that he never allows the Given to run wild, that he always subjects it to law and uses it, as far as possible, as an instrument for realizing the ideal good. Yet the divine control does not mean complete determi nation; for in some situations the Given with its purposeless processes constitutes so great an obstacle to divine willing that the utmost endeavors of God lead to a blind alley and temporary defeat. At this point, God's control means that no defeat or frustration is final, that the will of God, partially thwarted by obstacles in the chaotic Given, finds new avenues of advance and forever moves on in the cosmic creation of new values.124 Various Types of Evil We may now turn to a summary of Brightman's article in Ferm's Encyclopedia of Religion, entitled simply 1 O K "Evil." Therein he defines evil as the "antithesis of Person and Reality, pp. 341-342; and Philosophy of Religion, pp. 336-338. We have noted that Brightman retracted his assertion made in his Philosophy of Religion to the effect that "surd evil is not m any sense an in strumental good," p. 246. In his review of DeWolf's book, The Religious Revolt Against Reason (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949^ he wrote as follows: "Here I went alto gether too far. No matter how evil evil is, it may be instrumental to courage, to patience, and even to love. I should have said that 'surd evil is not in any sense an intrinsic good,' and am instructing my publisher to revise accordingly." Zion's Herald, CXXVII, 923. ^ ’ ’ See pages 263-265. good or value; disvalue; whatever is harmful, painful or undesirable, or disapproved; what is contrary to any purpose (dysteleological) or ideal, especially to the moral or to the religious. Moral evil is called wrong 1 26 and religious evil, sin." He mentions many types of evil as he amplifies this already broad definition of evil. There are at least seven, which he lists as follows: 1) evil will (wrong, sin); 2) intellectual evil (ignorance, error); 3) aesthetic evil (ugliness); 4) religious evil (irreverence, blasphemy); 5) maladjustment (psychological, biological, social); 6) incompetence; 7) surd evil (evil of any sort in which there is no principle of improvement; its only function is to be endured, rejected, conquered, or passed by).^27 Brightman thinks the usual classification of evils as moral (voluntary), and natural (independent of human 128 volition) to be an oversimplification. He also insists that "there are states of pain and misery which are evil in and of themselves, whether they hinder or promote the 129 good." But with such a statement one wonders if he has not reverted again to his belief that surd evils may be considered intrinsic evils. 126E.S. Brightman, "Evil," Encyclopedia of Religion (V. Ferm, ed.), p. 263. 127 Ibid., p. 264. 179 The problem of evil arises from the presence in experience of incoherencies and contradictions. "The problem is: how can we think the real in such a way as to account for its seemingly contradictory manifestations 1 an of good and evil?" He notes that "the need for a coherent explanation of good and evil exists for every 131 thinker, whether he be theistic or not." As to theodicy, he acknowledges that "the problem of evil is obviously more acute for theism than for any 1 3 ? other type of philosophy or theology." As to the apparent insolubility of the problem of evil, he notes that "most thinkers are challenged by difficulties, 1 3 3 rather than being led to abandon search for truth." He then goes on to enumerate ten proposed solutions. In doing so he seems to be following step by step what we 134 have listed above from his Philosophy of Religion. Omnipotence versus Experience Before leaving our consideration of Brightman’s philosophy of evil, one passage from his book, The ^ ^Loc . cit. ^31Loc. cit. ^ 2Loc . cit. 133Loc. cit. 1 3 4 Cf. Supra, pp. 1 7 3 f. 180 Finding of God, should be noted. There Brightman argues as follows: It has always been recognized by believers in freedom that God has to deal with problems created by human will* But the full implications of this and its extension to other fields have rarely been realized* Why can God attain his purposes only at so great a risk and with so much frustration? Surely, if God were omnipotent beyond our poor power to conceive, he could have created a race of free beings who would always choose righteously (as he himself, being also free, always chooses righteously), even though in theory they were free to sin (as he also is). There must be something in •the nature of things* to render impossible the creation of a race of free beings who would never sin, even though they were free to. If it were possible, God would have created them. The impos sibility must lie in the very nature of God, for if it lay merely in the created world, we should have to ask why God created such a world. There would have to be something in him which rendered such a creation the best possible--and surely he would always do the best possible. This 'something in him' is, again, an aspect of The Given. . . . Those who say, as some of my critics do by implication, that any possible expression of divinely omnipotent and benevolent power in an ordered world must necessarily contain alcohol and syphilis, insanity and arterio-sclerosis, or their equivalents, know a great deal more about what must necessarily be than is vouchsafed to me. However, necessary the truths of formal logic and mathematics may be, I know nothing about what must necessarily be in the concrete world; yet I dare claim to know a little about what experience is. Now whether we look at the subjective experience of man's inner life or at the objective experience that we call nature, we see purpose and reason struggling with refractory material, bringing order out of disorder, beauty out of ugliness, life out of death, mind out of life. We see every ideal realized in a medium that delays and distorts it somewhat, yet reveals the ideal. We see good achieved through effort and suffering.135 135The Finding of God, pp. 173-174. 181 But when Brightman has said all this it seems to this writer, as it would have seemed, no doubt, to Flewelling, that he in his own candor makes the admission which refutes much of his argument when he says: "We see even the evils which are most hostile to human values as embodiments of laws which may be understood and, to an ever-increasing extent, made to serve ends which ennoble 1 % human existence." If this be the case, then much of what Brightman has classified as evil turns out to be our schoolmaster toward nobler human life and achievement. Flewelling would contend that in his own view alcohol and syphilis are not necessities, only their possibilities are. Whether God be omnipotent or not His omniscience seems to have been more concerned with man's character than with man's comfort. If, now, we would compare our two philosophers in what they have thought and written about the problem of evil, it may be said that they are different in their basic concerns. Brightman*s definition of evil is much broader, and like the Buddhist, he is much more troubled with the problem of suffering. Flewelling's definition of evil is much narrower, and like the Christian, his chief concern is with moral evil and sin. Earlier in our com parison of their ideas of God we had occasion to note that 1 3 6 Ibid., p. 174. 182 Flewelling criticises Brightman's position as being "too 137 inadequate an analysis of the problem of evil." Yet when all has been said, one i* impressed that Brightman is seriously seeking to face the problem and not to evade any of its implications. Later in this essay we may ask whether there can be any real good or evil apart from the good or evil will. Perhaps it is sufficient here to have stated the two positions in as clear and full a delineation as space permits* Thus one sees that the two thinkers disagree basically in their definitions and in the scope which they find for the problem. 1 3 7 Cf. Supra, p. 9 6 , and The Personalist, XI, 275 CHAPTER VI THEORIES OF PHYSICAL NATURE Since our philosophers are not in agreement as to the nature of either God or man; and since they differ so widely in their thought about the problem of evil; we should not expect to find them thinking precisely alike when they seek to explain the nature of the physical uni verse. Yet both agree that nature is not static but is ultimately dynamic. Both believe that it is a created universe by way of an evolutionary process. Generally speaking, however, Brightman thinks of physical nature as wholly within the experience of God, whereas Flewelling makes it to be more specifically the activity of God. It must be said that if one rejects Brightman's doctrine of God he will no doubt be dissatisfied with his theory of physical nature. Brightman has sought to build a con sistent system, and his theory of nature is determined to a great extent by his doctrine of God. Likewise, for Flewelling, the idea of a living God calls for a theory of nature in keeping with that concept. The greater task will involve the consideration of Brightman1s thought, so to this we first give attention. BRIGHTMAN'S THEORY OF PHYSICAL NATURE The chief sources for an understanding of 184 Brightman*s philosophy of physical nature are five: his book, Nature and Values; his Philosophy of Religion, Chapter VII; his Person and Reality, chapter 13; his Philosophy of Ideals, chapter II; and, fifth, and perhaps most important, is his essay in the 1943 Merrick lectures at Ohio Wesleyan University entitled, "A Christian View of Nature."1 Although there is some overlapping in his use and understanding of the terms, we find Brightman expressing his thoughts on physical nature in four different cate gories. These are: "physical things,** "Matter," "Nature," and "the Universe." For the sake of convenience we may consider them in this order. Physical Things From the epistemological standpoint Brightman observes that "all reasoned accounts of the world of physical things agree that things are not just what they appear to be." For "all scientists and philosophers would agree that an observed physical thing is nothing 3 ultimate." "By physical things,’ * he says, "are meant those objects in the system of space and time by means of 1R.E. Diffendorfer, ed., Christian Bases of WorId Order(A Symposium. New York and Nashville: AbingHon- Cokesbury Press, 1943), pp. 67-84. ^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 118. ^Loc. cit. 185 4 which we communicate with each other." Physical things should not be regarded as "tiny solid bodies, indivisible, and impenetrable."^ Nor are they "neutral entities,"^ as distinguished from mind and matter. He notes that modern science has shown that physical things are "more or less 7 stable clusters of energy systems." These in turn belong to a larger universal system. Moreover, he believes that "the system of things is active like a mind; changes, like a mind; is coherent and rational like a mind; and Q within limits mind can use it." Brightman declares him self in favor of that physical view known as idealism which holds "that the world of visible things is the expression to our mind of the activity of a Supreme Q Mind." This view he finds validated both by modern physical theory and philosophical analysis which "alike point to the conception that the world is a system of activity in accordance with law."^® 4Ibid., p. 103. ^Ibid., p. 108* 6Ibid., p. 112. 7Ibid., p. 118. 8Ibid., p. 120. ^Loc. cit. 1 0 Ibid., p. 119. Matter Brightman rejects dualistic personalism and accepts idealistic personalism which holds that "matter is a form of spirit."3 '* "Idealism," he says, "holds that matter and spirit are both aspects of a single unitary type of pro- 12 cess, namely, the process of a personal will." He has defined matter in the lexicon of his Introduction to Philosophy as: "the physical entity that is supposed to be the bearer of energy and to occupy sgace,"^ He agrees with John Dewey that "the view of matter as activity must 14. supplant the view of it as substance." He also notes that in this century "both science and religion hr.ve transformed our conceptions of what we mean by matter. The trend of science to view matter as energy, the source 15 of which is inaccessible to scientific observation." He is sure that "matter cannot be ultimate, because it is an hypothesis incoherent with experienced facts." Matter 17 is subservient to personality. "Matter is itself a ^Is God a Person? p. 14. IP Loc. cit. "^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 331, and (1925), p. 388. 14 Problem of God, p. 32. ^Ibid. f p# 78. ^ Philosophy Qf Religion, p. 403. ^Problem of God, p. 142. 187 18 manifestation of cosmic personality." So, along with other idealists, he would "regard matter as being an order of organization of the experience of God."^ Matter cannot account for mind, but if evolution is the striving of God, then every material thing has a place in the 20 divine purpose. In that instance matter is no error, it is rather "the very presence of God with us in his 21 actual wxll and energy." The oriental belief that matter is inherently evil must be recognized as only a partial view. Likewise the occidental opposite of this which takes matter to be a direct revelation of the immanent God is only partial. He says: Matter is an instrument for good and a partial, though blurred and incomplete, revelation of Deity; but it is also a source of weariness and delay and suffering not only to man, but to God himself. It is at once a revelation of God and a barrier to his revelation.22 Furthermore, . . . What appears to us as physical force or matter is, when truly understood, a form of spiritual life, 18Ibid., p. 156. 1 Q Philosophy of Religion, p. 226. 20ls God a Person? p. 15. 21 E.S. Brightman, The Spiritual Life (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1942), p. 92*. Finding of God, p. 116. 188 . . . when we view physical force as nothing but compulsion we do not grasp its spiritual meaning. On such a view all force is purpose. He states this view that matter is a form of soiritual life, and then hastens to note that in the realm of nature we see physical force as purpose, but as ’ ’ purpose 24 dealing with recalcitrant material." Here, then, he sees the presence of the Given. But in explaining his idea of this Given he notes several uses of the term ’ ’ matter,’ ’ and says: The Given is not any unconscious stuff, material substance, or mysterious entity of any sort; it is conscious experience of God. When I have referred to it as 'matter,' I have not meant physical substance, but conscious content. At least one of my critics has been confused because of his failure to distinguish logical, physical, and metaphysical uses of the term 'matter.' There is no unconscious matter in God. If he is a person, he is through and through conscious; and every part of his being is conscious. As his love is conscious, so also are the eternal conditions under which it labors. Thus Brightman thinks that the real meaning of matter is intelligible "only if matter be regarded as itself a form piL of mind, a divine activity." If it be so regarded there is a Given, an uncreated limitation, within the divine 23Ibid., p. 152. 24Ibid.t p. 153. Ibid., pp. 174-175. 26Ibid., p. 177. 189 nature."^7 Yet Brightman does not hold that a ’ ’contempt for matter is . . . essential to a religious philosophy of 28 life,” He admits that there have been ascetics who have gone to absurd extremes in their attitude toward matter, but he feels that the truly religious view of matter is achieved when one learns to use it as a means of com munion with God, Moral and social uses of matter are possible for "one who sees in the material world an in carnation of the divine and regards physical life as a 29 sacrament." Moreover, he declares: "Our faith in an immaterial God is expanded with all the knowledge accumu lated by modern science. We do not scorn matter. We 30 scorn only an unspiritual view of matter." In keeping with this he thinks that "God is eternally both matter and , M 31 form." We must not conclude from this that Brightman identifies nature with God in that sense which makes them identical, hence we need now to follow Brightman*s thinking about nature, 27 Loc. cit. 23The Problem of God, p. 117. 2^Loc. cit. 3QIbid., p. 118. 3 1 Ibid., p. 190. 190 Nature The Objective Referent of Sense Experience. Brightman believes in the objective reference of human 32 sense experience, contending that sense impressions give 33 us clues to the objective order of nature. He defines 34 Nature as "what is implied in sense experience"; "the area that can be approached through the senses";^ and, the object of the investigations of science, namely: "what is sensuously observable." We may think of nature 37 as the visible, or the realm of things which we see. It must not, therefore, be viewed as the whole of all possible OO reality, but only as "the totality of physical reality, 39 exclusive of minds and the mental." If the Kantian definition of Nature as "the object of all experience,"^ be limited to sense experience, Religious Values, pQ. Ill ff. 33Ibid., p. 109. 34Nature and Values, p. 39. 35Ibid., p. 40. 36Ibid., p. 37. 37Ibid., p. 38. 38Ibid.. p. 37. 3^Loc. cit. Brightman approves definition six in Webster1s New International Dictionary as given here for Nature. Ar\ ^Nature and Values, p. 36. 191 Brightman would accept it as valid since with Kant he would hold that man's experience of the moral law is non-sensory. Yet he warns against a too radical dichotomy between the physical and the mental, even though we should exclude from 41 Nature the non-sensory. 42 Nature, like human bodies, is in space and time. 43 Studied by the scientific method its laws point to an objective natural order,44 a comprehensive system of uni- 4.= 46 47 form sequences, the realm of matter, and phenomena. Nature and God. Brightman admits that the above definition of Nature only tells us the where of nature, not its what.48 For while Nature does not tell us all we need to know about human experience,4^ it seems to indicate that human experience is not all.*^ If nature is like what 41Ibid., p. 44. ^ Personality and Religion, d . 43. 43 Person and Realityt p. 243. 44 Religious Values, p. 168, 4^Person and Reality, p. 243. 46Ibid., p. 244. 47Ibid., p. 247. 48Nature and Values, p. 45. 4^Philosophy of Ideals, p. 61. 5 QIbid., p. 60. 192 51 52 we experience, it is also unlike us in many ways, so 53 much so that there is a mystery in nature. Recognizing the fact that "not all experience is sensory," he dis- 55 tinguishes physical nature from psychical nature. He also believes that everything that is is a conscious mind or some aspect thereof. ^ Nature is not impersonal, ^ and the energy at work in the system of physical nature may 58 best be understood as the will of a Supreme Person. So it happens that nature is best accounted for as the per- 59 sonal experience of a "Cosmic Experient." He thinks of nature as "itself a (superhuman) shining present which illuminates all other (human, subhuman) shining present s. Nature, therefore, is one of the many realms ^ Personality and Religion, p. 44. 52Loc. cit. 5^Ibid., p. 48. ^Nature and Values, p. 44. 5^Philosophy of_ Ideals, p. 41. ^^Nature and Values, p. 114. 57 "Religion as Truth," in Ferm's Contemporary American Theology, p. 73. ^Introduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 336. ^Person and Realityt p. 360. 6 0 Ibid., pp. 127-128. 193 within the divine, and cannot be external to God.^ It has no life of its own apart from God, for it is the conscious will of God in action. All the energies of A 5 nature are the activities of a Cosmic Mind. Energy is 64 God's will in action. Nature thus becomes divine experience,^ the experience of a creative Mind.^ It is the spatial aspect of God, and exists as a vast area of f\*7 the divine being. Thus Brightman speaks of the imman ence of nature in God, rather than the immanence of God R in nature. Nature is one realm of being in a Being 69 greater than nature. Brightman refers to the foregoing concepts as a "Personalistic Conception of Nature," to be summarized as follows: ^ Philosophy of Religion, p. 217. ^2Nature and Values, p. 114; Problem of God, p. 124. 63ibid., pp. 120-121. 64Ibid., p. 114. 65lqc. cit., also "A Christian View of Nature," Christian Bases of World Order (R.E. Diffendorfer, ed.), p. 77. ^ Personality and Reality, p. 248. ^Philosophy of Religion, p. 218. aL Q Person and Reality, p. 249. 6 9 Ibid., p. 254 194 A metaphysical conception of Nature is needed which is based on empirical evidence in the shining present and eventuates in a coherent interpretation of the illuminating absent. Such is the personal istic view of Nature. In accordance with what has been said . . . we may approach this view as follows: (1) The sensory processes in the shining present, specifically the experiences of space and motion (and, of course, of time, but only as involved in motion), are the only evidence we have for the whole system of Nature and all the natural laws developed by scientific thinking. (2) Nature is not all that there is because experience con tains more than sensory experience. (3) Nature is found revealed in the realm of phenomena. (4) Nature's laws are discovered by scientific methods of observation and experiment. (5) It is the realm of what is called matter, but has been found to be energy, or force, or activity. (6) This force or activity is most empirically viewed as the ener gizing of a will other than human. (7) Nature elicits mystical satisfactions, but it also manifests cruelty and suffering. (8) Nature is in some sense a created order, but the words are empty until 'what sense?' is clearly specified. Such considerations lead to the personalistic conclusion that the Nature, the illuminating absent indicated by the shining present, is the experience of an ordering, creative Mind other than any numan mind. Yet it is only one realm of experience within that Mind. Nature even thus conceived, fails to account for the whole evidence that appears in the human experient; it affords no theory of value or of the goal of evolution, specifically of human life. Nature, however, is given a metaphysical context. It is wholly within God’s experience and is a combi nation of the active (volitional) and passive (Given) aspects of his being.70 Now since Nature is within the being and the experience of God Brightman does not regard it as a 71 created order external to God. In this connection he 70Ibid., pp. 247-248. 7*Philosophy of Religion, p. 218. 195 notes two possible views for the theist, "nature . . . is either continually caused and conserved by God or is actually an integral part of the divine Person so that all 72 natural events are divine acts." He favors the latter view. Nature is therefore a revelation of the Divine 73 Personality. Nature and Supernature. Brightman does not con- 74 sider nature and God identical. There is a world of 75 nature, and we must make "a clear distinction between 76 nature and what we may call supernature." He states his distinctions at this point as follows: The concept of Nature, as we have seen, becomes practically meaningless if Nature be taken to be all there is. But if Nature is not all, it is obvious that there is something which is not Nature* The name which has historically been used for non- Nature is supernatural. This word is, to be sure, more or less mis-leading. It suggests that Nature is something more or less low or debased and that there is a break or gulf between Nature and the Supernatural. Indeed, the break is conceived by many to be so complete that there is supposed to be a flat contradiction between the two. The supernatural is thought to be an intervention in, 72Person and Reality, p. 246. 7^Nature and Values, p. 160. 74Ibid., p. 46. 7 S Personality and Religion, p. 21. 7^Nature and Values, p. 46. 196 or even a direct violation of, the laws of Nature, and it is often associated primarily with miracles, which derive their supernatural character from their antinatural character. Both the empirical basis of personalism and the personalistic postulate of the immanence of Nature in God require a reconsideration of the meaning of the supernatural from these two points of view.77 Brightman then notes that "our knowledge of Nature is confined to observations of sense data and reasonings about them."78 But it is his contention that "all other experiences--of memory, self-identity, inclusive reasoning purpose, emotion, obligation, value, choice, and 79 worship--are supernatural."'1 ' That is to say, they are super-sensory and thus cannot be identified with Nature. A second use for the term supernatural is to designate "the Cosmic Mind as a person . . . whose purposes and norms are indicated by supersensory experi- „80 ences." Two Realms of Experience. Brightman predicates two realms of experience--the realm of nature with which we have sensory experience, and the realm of values with Q1 which we have supersensory experience. He says: 77Person and Reality, pp. 248-249. 78Ibid., p. 249. 7^Lo c . cit. 80Ibid., pp. 249-250. 8^Nature and Values, pp. 47-48. 197 Idealists hold that moral experience points to an objective moral order in reality, as truly as sense experience points to an objective physical order, and most idealists believe that the objective existence of both orders can be understood ration ally only if both are the activity or thought or experience of a supreme mind that generates the whole cosmic process and controls its ongoing. His book on Nature and Values is his amplification of his thinking about these two realms— two worlds, as he calls them--the world of nature and the world of values. And yet they are not two separate existences but only two realms of experience for the one personality, comprising one world 83 composed of nature and values. Monistic View of Nature. Brightman is a quali tative metaphysical monist, and an epistemological dualist. He distinguishes between thought and thing, thought and its objects; but he likewise looks upon ultimate reality as one--namely mind or consciousness. This includes not only human nature, but also Nature--the object of human objective experiential reference. He thinks "it is quite unfair for realists like R.B. Perry to make much of the 'ego-centric predicament.' That we are conscious is more than a pre dicament; consciousness is the very stuff of all given 84 reality." He insists that "nature and personality are Q O Moral Laws, p. 286. 83 Nature and Values, pp. 138, 166. ®^Tbid., p. 124, note 11. 198 constituted of one and the same kind of stuff, the stuff 85 of personality.” "Nature consists of personal con- 86 sciousness and of nothing else." ’ ’ Physical nature is divine consciousness and physical energy is divine will in action under the conditions which the divine experience fixes.”87 Such a philosophy of nature not only satisfies the intellectual demand for an ultimate monism, recog nizing as it does the phenomenality of matter, but it also elevates nature to the level of spirit; in which case we should not expect to have a "wertfreie Wissenschaft-- 88 science free from value.” Even nature is instrumental to spiritual values, since sensory experience and value 89 experience are related, with nature ’ ’subordinate to 90 values,” w He looks upon nature as "the best instrument thus far forged to help persons grow,”^ a sort of per- 92 manent setting for human history, responding to human 8^”Christian View of Nature,” p. 75. 86Ibid., p. 69. 87Ibid., p. 70. 88Person and Reality, p. 280* 89 Ibid., p. 283. 90Ibid., p. 295. 91Ibid., p. 297. 92”Christian View of Nature,” p. 67. 199 efforts." He would thus look upon nature as "an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace in two senses. It both reveals the grace of God and also is a medium for expressing the graces of the spiritual life in 94 man," As already noted, nature is "immanent within God,"" and "wholly within God,"" so that "the laws of 97 science are the ways of working of the God of nature," Such a "personalistic immanentism is a monistic view of 98 nature" to be sure, thus making it "a divine language" 99 so that "every event in Nature is a revelation of God." Viewing nature as "one realm in a divine mind of many realms," Brightman can insist that "every event in Nature involves God's will, as well as whatever there is in God that is not will— what Schelling called 1der gottliche Unwille’."^^ ln i*1® light of such immanentism, which he looks upon as a "sacramental view of the Universe,"^'*' "ibid., p. 83. 9%a ture and Values, p. 161. ""Christian View of Nature," p. 74. 96Ibid., p. 73. " Loc. cit. 98Ibid., p. 74. "ibid., p. 78. 100Ibid., pp. 77-78. 1Q1 Ibid., p. 83. 2 0 0 Brightman cannot see how the idea that nature is sinful or under a curse can be valid. "If nature is God in action, it cannot be under a curse. Nature is not sinful either originally or derivatively. . . . Man alone creates the curse and the sin when he misuses God's 102 nature." Natural Evils. Brightman does admit that there is "evil in nature, but even though nature seems at 104 times to "be at war with ideal values," we should not think of tempests, for example, as being due to the 105 activity of satan. In his way of thinking there is "a duality of nature at the very heart of things."It is difficult," he says, "for the mind to refrain from two judgments on nature: that it is the work of a power which aims at ends and achieves them, and also that this power 107 is working under great difficulties." For although "there is evidence of design in nature; there is also 102Ibid., p. 82. Nature and Values, p. 96. 104Ibid., p. 138. 105,,^ Christian View of Nature," p. 74. lQ6The Problem of God, p. 134. 1 0 7 Ibid., p. 138. 2 0 1 evidence of frustration of design and delay in its 108 achievement," Of course it is the "irrational Given" in the very nature of God which is the ultimate source of the natural evils which, he thinks, remain unexplainable on any other basis or rationale. His first book in philosophy dec lares: The belief in the divine immanence has sweeping implications. If it be true, every motion of every ’particle of matter' is nothing more nor less than God himself willing that he and finite persons shall have experiences of a certain type. Every event in nature is God's own conscious deed. Religious thought readily enough recognizes the divine presence in rainbow and cherry blossom, in the crystal and the song of birds. But nature is not all beauty and sunshine; in nature there is harsh ness and horror, agony and death. There are earthquakes; and even the prophet could not find the Lord in the earthquake. Yet, if there be truth in the personalistic view of nature, it must be interpreted completely and consistently. Storm and calm, disease and health, are alike the literal will of God. Such are his thoughts about physical events and the essence of nature. This view of nature also carries over into his estimation of the Universe to which we may now turn our attention. The Universe The creation of the universe did not occur at some 108Ibid., p. 126. 109introduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 336. Italics are mine. 2 0 2 point in time long ago.^^ God’s will "is eternally creating, and the ’ ’law of evolution is God’s method of 112 creation." Ours is a world that is "changing and 113 evolving in time," for "evolution plainly means that time and change are of fundamental importance in the universe."*-14 Moreover, "the history of the cosmos and the history of God may be different aspects of one and the same striving. . . . Since modern physics has destroyed the solidarity of the atom, 11^) and Heisenberg’s principle of indetermi- 117 nism has introduced the possibility of chance, we may expect to find "a striving of rational form to shape and control a content which is not in itself rational but is lift capable of producing rational results." A While Brightman looks upon the physical universe 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 Loc. cit. Loc. cit. 'Ibid., p. 129. : Loc. cit. 'ibid., p. 184. 'Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 184. Loc. cit. 203 1 IQ as "one order of being— a personal order," he regards it also as a "society of b e i n g s or nan interacting 121 system" consisting of "experients, selves, or persons,"^*22 comprising the totality of that universe 123 without residue. Thus the universe is rational, "a 124 system of activity in accordance with law," whose 125 "activity is of the nature of mind," As such "the entire universe is dependent on his (God's) will for its • * „126 existence." In one of the latest expressions of his thought on this theme he states: The divine, cosmic person is incomparably greater than any of the lesser selves, so great (on my view) that he includes within himself the whole order of nature, both organic and inorganic, as a subordinate segment of his personal being, whose comprehensive reason and love, truth, beauty, creativity, and social purpose far transcend the whole order of nature as we know it. On this view, every body, whether of human or subhuman selves or of super human ones (if there be supermen or angels), is to ^ %ature and Values, p. 126, l2QIbid., p. 114 121,'The Best Possible World," Journal of Bible and Religion, XI, p, 14, *22Person and Reality, p, 129, ^2^Problem of God, p, 148, ^ • ^Introduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 121, ^ 5Loc. cit, l26problem of God, p. 123, 204 be understood literally as God in action. A body, then, whether of man or mouse, elephant or amoeba, is the activity of the conscious will of God, in control of the Given, and in cooperation with the self whose body it is.*2? Earlier, and in a more general fashion he had written: . . . that explanation is truest which gives the completest and most adequate account of all the data from which it starts. Metaphysical idealism, in its personalistic form, seems to me, for reasons which I have given elsewhere, to be such an explanation. It asserts that to be real means to be a person or an experience of a person. There is, then, no reality that is absolutely impersonal and unexperienced by any one.128 Such a view of the Universe and God causes one to ponder just how far from full agreement with Spinoza Brightman's position really is. Perhaps the influence of Spinoza at this point is more unconscious than intended. One can also discern the presence of a strong Hegelianism which Brightman is frank to acknowledge. His position amounts to a full strength pan-entheism to say the least. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL NATURE Since Flewelling's personalism is that of personal realism, neither the problem of evil nor the problem of 127 '"A Review of Reviews," Philosophical Forum, IX (1951), p. 5. 128,'Religion as Truth," p. 73. 205 physical nature loomed so large in his thinking as it did for Brightman. He was influenced in his thinking by such scientists as Berman, Blum, Du Nouy, Fiedler, Guye, Heisenberg, Lillie, Millikan, Planck, Punnett, E.S. Russell, Sherrington, Weizs&cker, and Eddington. He also spoke highly of Werkmeister's Philosophy of Science. It was to the viewpoints of such men that he limited himself in his thinking about physics, and, to a great extent, 129 also metaphysics. As one will note from a survey of his many book reviews, Flewelling read as many volumes on the relationships between science and religion as he did in his own specific area of philosophy. Our chief sources for his thought under this category are certain chapters of his most important book, and certain articles written for The Personalist. We shall find it necessary to search out his thinking in reference to objects and objectivity, matter, nature (physical), evolution, and the universe. He wrote 130 an article for The Personalist, and also included a 131 chapter xn his book, The Person, entitled, "Nature 129"The Metaphysical Predicament of Science," The Personalist, XXXIX (1953), 117, footnote 1. ISOnNature Comes to Herself," The Personalist, XXVI (1945), 5-16. 131The Person, Chapter XIX, pp. 146-154. 206 Comes to Herself*" He has devoted a page and a half to his idea of Nature in his book, The Things that Hatter Most. There are also many incidental references to the above mentioned topics scattered throughout his writings. Physical Objects Flewelling raises the question: "What are physical objects?"^33 He answers: "The sense definition includes such properties as extension, mass, impenetrability, 1 Q A specific gravity, or chemical affinity." From this point he proceeds to show that all these qualities are assumptions related to mental experience, and concludes with the observation that "objectivity must needs be 135 described in terms of effects upon intelligent beings." To the question, "How do objects make themselves 136 known?" the usual answer is that they are known through the different physical senses. But the reality of an object, Flewelling points out, must be stated in 132See pp. 483-484. 133The Person, p. 147j The Personalist, XXVI, p. 7. ^ • 3^Loc. cit. 135 Ibid., pp. 148, and 8 , respectively. 136loc. cit. both external and Internal terms: "A definition of objectivity in order to be adequate must include the element of intelligibility, mind, and it must be carried to a metaphysical ground if we are to assume a knowledge 137 of reality*’ * To the question whether objects are independent of though^ Flewelling replies, "objectivity must mean that there is to objects some meaning that out- 138 strips our human and finite interpretations•" If the intelligibility of the evolutionary process extending through millenia of time is to be maintained, objects must exist independently of our individual perception of them. This, he thinks, "could be only by positing the dependence of objects upon a Supreme Creative Mind for 139 their existence and their evolution," which implies reality "that human intelligence does not create." Next he seeks to show that a thoroughgoing plural ism destroys any coherence in the universe, and reduces it to a dissolving panorama of experiences. There must be an "abiding core of experience or understanding," if 141 reality is to be intelligible. He says: "Duration in 137Ibid., pp. 149 and 8, respectively. 138 Ibid., pp. 149 and 9, respectively. 139. Loc. cit. 208 experience • . • is a necessary part of world rela- 142 tions." Changing relations must be noted by something fairly static. "But,” he says, "the only existence of which we have direct knowledge that maintains permanence of identity in the midst of change is that of the 143 person*" This role of the person in 'Nature' does not, however, lead Flewelling to the position of subjective idealism* He agrees that finite persons are not the source of objectivity* So, while we demand that objects shall not be dependent upon our observation of them, this re quirement may be sufficiently met by the comment that our intelligence does not make them altogether, since behind our temporary consciousness is an Eternally Creative Intelligence* Thus alone may we solve the paradox of dependence and independence, of changelessness and change* Since objectivity has a range beyond us and our knowledge, as well as a reality within our grasp, we must look outside ourselves for an intelligent cause of objects which measurably corresponds to the intelligence within us*1^5 This argues for the proposition that "objects and persons both proceed from a common intelligent source,"^ and is 142Loc* cit. 143 The Person, p. 149, and The Personalist, XXVI, p. 10* 144 Ibid., pp. 150 and 10, respectively. 145Loc. cit. 146loc* cit. 209 the personalistic answer to the age old question whether "intelligence makes the objectivity, or objectivity makes 147 the intelligence." Flewelling notes that the answer usually follows one of two ancient alternatives. If we believe that intelligence makes the objectivity, then our position is idealistic; if, on the other hand, we believe that objectivity makes the intelligence, then we become materialists. He suggests a compromise between the two which would be the personalistic answer, which posits both the real object and the necessity of its perception. "Intelligence must be held to be as true a part and source of objects as the material and external elements we have considered to be the essential nature of objects." Turning now to the characteristics of this back ground of reality, he says: If the World Ground as the base of the cosmic order is to produce objectivity under the temporal form, and to constitute reality and permanence of meaning out of change, it must be both creative and continuous . There is a very real sense, he thinks, in which we per - 151 ceivers "must create the world that is," for "there is 147Loc. cit. 148Ibid., pp. 151 and 11, respectively. ^4^Loc. cit. 15Qibid. t pp# i5i an(j H - 12, respectively, l^llbid., pp. 151 and 12, respectively. no world of color and no world of sound without the in- 152 terpreting mind." Again, "there must be a continuing Intelligence" who constantly maintains the objects of our sensations for a purpose which is "superior to the cosmic ebb and flow," and at the same time "is not caught up and 153 consumed by its own activity." For "strive how we may," he says, "it is impossible to separate the concept of creativity from the implications of purpose or teleol- 154 ogy." Moreover, "there must be unique creations for 155 progress in evolution." If this involves an advance in function, adaptation, or refinement of structure, or better power for survival, "it must be assumed as an example of creative intelligence working in and through the physical structure."This presupposes a "cosmic Ground . . . active in all existence, organic and in- 157 organic," and implies that the activity of the atom ISA takes place "at the behest of a Supreme Creative Will." The Supreme Intelligence, then, is "continuously active I52Lo c . cit. 153 Ibid., pp. 152 and 13, respectively. 154Lo c . cit. *^Loc. cit. *~*^Ibid., pp. 152-153 and 14, respectively. 211 and creative."159 In that case, creation is not something which happened in the year 4,004 B.C., but is "a process dependent momentarily upon the Divine creative activity."1^0 Objectivity thus "existing under the form of time, would, in the very nature of the case, exist as continuous creation,"1^1 and "objectivity to be real and to be intelligible, could proceed only from intelligence which is cosmic, efficient, and free."1^3 Such an intel ligence, he then proceeds to show, could be no less than the Cosmic Person. Matter Flewelling variously defines matter as "a continuum 163 of acts from a transcendent Source," "a succession of events in a space-time continuum,"^4 t » a continuum of events proceeding from a Supreme Mind,"1^5 "the smallest ^ ^Loc. cit. ^^Ibid., pp. 153 and 14, respectively. 1^1Ibid., pp. 153 and 15, respectively. 1^> ^Loc. cit. 163"IS God a Christian," The Personalist, XXXIX, 344. I64rhe Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 165. 165Ibid., p. 174. 212 organic unit of being,"166 or simply as "an activity."167 However, he does not believe in anything like "inert matter,"168 for the idea of mere lumpishness is not a valid concept of matter, nor can the atom be any "longer considered to be a lump of matter chiefly distinguished by mass, extension, inertia."16^ "The atom is primarily active. Instead of being a center of inertia, the old 1 7A view, it is now seen as the center of force." Still further: "the new physics poses a fertile concept in the notion that what we call matter is the result of the balancing of immaterial forces whose nature is energy 171 rather than extension." Flewelling reminds us that "our idea of substance as something solid can be held only as such to our human 172 perceptions." Thus he speaks of the "myth of ^-^See his Glossary in The Person, p. 329. 167Loc. cit. 168"Victorianism in Science," The Personalist, XXX, 343. 169The Person, p. 152. 170Ibid., p. 141. 17lIbid.. p. 247. l72"The Metaphysical Dilemma of Science," The Personalist, XXXIII, 345. 213 173 materialism,1 1 and disparages man's "devotion to the 174 false gods of materialism." In the light of what happened at Hiroshima he notes that "matter which once seemed so substantial, so inert, appears above the possi bility of our comprehension, the play of invisible forces „175 and purposes." He notes with some satisfaction that science has 176 abandoned "the materialistic concept of reality." Granted that materialism has heretofore "dominated 177 culture," yet it "has led from illusion to illusion." Thus he is confident that there will come a time when "the present mania of materialism shall have passed away."178 As early as 1915 he had stated that: The assumed law of indestructibility of matter would seem likewise insufficient as a basis for a doctrine of phenomena. It may be sufficiently accurate as a working basis in the physical realm, but it cannot be accurately demonstrated even there.*7^ ^ • 7^Survival of Western Culture, p. 196# l74Ibid., p. 149. ^7^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 60* 176 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 15, 177Ibid., p. 2. 178 Survival of Western Culture, p. 298. 170 x'^Personalism and the Problems jaf Philosophy, p. 6 6 . 214 In his later years he was sure that there is no validity 180 to "the assumption of the eternity of matter," since 181 matter "is in process of dissolution#" With this the materialistic and mechanistic and so-called "classical doctrine of evolution falls to the ground, since a genuine evolution depends upon increasing complexity, 182 higher and higher stages of creative power#" He offers the opinion that "the alliance of evolutionary theory with materialism has always been a bastard one that arose from 183 absence of reflection." Nature There is a classic passage on Nature in Flewelling's book, The Things That Matter Most, which gives us in summary form his philosophy of Nature: It has been quite popular to look on man and mind as some fantastic contradiction in a universe which was nothing but matter, force, and motion# But Nature has produced mind, and the ground of personal choices, just as surely as she has produced mountains and seas. Mind, reflection, thinking, wishing, and willing, then, must be accorded at 180 The Person, p. 180; also The Personalist, XXX, 342# 18^Winds of Hiroshima, p# 55; also The Personalist, XXXIV, 119# 182 The Personalist XXXIV, 119; also The Person, pp. 176; 16$; and Winds of Hiroshima, p* 55. 183Survival of Western Culture, p. 272. 215 least an equal, and by all human measurements a superior, place in the reality of things. The fact that we can cooperate with Nature, discover her laws and bend them to our wills, as we have done in the invention of telephone, telegraph, television, radio, electric lighting, airplanes, and a million other creations which Nature could not by herself achieve, shows how closely the world of nature is related to persons and personal accomplishment. It also dis closes the superiority of these internal and personal possessions over the world of matter. This is because it holds within its power to make the material world the servant of its desires. To say, then, that the imaginings, good purposes, religious and moral convictions, dreams of the human soul, are mere fog and vapor, illusions lacking reality and powerless for results, is to deny the supreme facts of existence. For these personal achievements are also of the nature of things. Nature is only waiting for our cooperation to carry our whisperings over land and sea, to perform our heavy labor, or to convey us on the wings of the wind. Who shall say that she was not made for human voices, and human minds? Nature has made us for herself and we are her offspring, but in a deeper sense, since we must not reverse values, she is made for us and is our servant. Not only does Nature prove herself part and parcel of our human fabric by responding to the inventive genius of mind, but she shows moral sympathies for those who do well, who love righteousness, justice, and peace. The profligate she deprives of health and strength; the violent she makes the victim of violence; for the good man she makes goodness the normal atmosphere of life and sets a premium on love; but she causes the deceiver to deceive himself; she betrays the betrayer; she delivers over the dishonest and wicked to the torment of his own self- recriminations; she destroys the creative imagination of the evil-minded, both by giving him over to a sense of inferiority, and by making him the prey of his own misjudgments, thus putting a limit on his power for evil. For the children of her love she provides that her harsher decrees of suffering, pain and death, shall not have compulsion over the inner spirit. For Nature, the normal life is the good life, and abnormalities of every kind are ultimately self-destructive. Thus the system of human needs rests on the great moral facts of the universe. All sins are sins against Nature. Whenever a man steals, 216 lies, does unjustly, is unsympathetic against his neighbor, he really takes arms against Nature herself and, not only so, he betrays also his own deepest significance. Human abnormalities, digressions from the path of virtue, become the natural means of destroying not only man's satisfactions, but his creative genius, his powers, his personality itself.184 We are confident that, had Flewelling been asked for a summary of his thought about Nature, he would have referred the enquirer to this passage, which reads like Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, or like the Sermon on the Mount. That it is both idealistic and Christian no one could deny; it is classic from the pen of one whose philosophy of nature seeks to be both human and Christian. Believing that Nature is not passive but cease lessly active, he says: "However passive Nature may seem outwardly in her moods, she is the center of never- 185 ceasing activity." This is, of course, the theistic position. For as he takes his stand with Planck that the energies of Nature move in quanta, he declares: A nature whose energies move in quanta, and not as 'something always there,' existing quxte inde pendent of meaning is a nature whose rational explanation requires an indwelling intelligence of a supervising Personality. Such indeed is the latest conclusion of Planck himself. Changing from a former extremely materialistic, mechanistic, and atheistic standpoint, he has of late, in his work 184The Things That Matter Most, pp. 483-484. IS^Thc Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 132. 217 The Philosophy of Physics, arrived at the affir mation of the theistic position.^88 Just prior to this statement he had called atten tion to Planck's view that "in nature we have not a 187 continuous but an intermittent energy," The impli cations of this he explains as follows: These discontinuous impulses he calls quanta. If this is true it could be that quanta 'are issued as needed,* Their activity may spring out of or in accordance with a rational requirement. They may issue in response to a demand made by the general system of relations which calls them into being. But to get such a result we must endow nature with intelligence and personality in either a pantheistic or theistic way. The pantheistic notion would call for an equal intelligence and self-direction in every cell. It is less difficult to assume that the presence of intelligence is the result of a higher personality capable of reviewing the whole process. In other words, the universal order may be dependent upon a supervising Mind more than upon a continuously uniform energy.I®8 He believes that "the growth of the scientific spirit," has brought "with it the new appreciation of lflQ nature," Our attempts to get at the meaning of nature engage us in the "endeavor to interpret certain cosmic effects upon us,"^ In the light of the fact ^ • 88Survival of Western Culture, p. 203. 187Ibid., p. 202. 188Loc. cit. 189 The Person, p. 314. 1 9 0 Ibid., p. 49. 218 that nature is not hostile to man or to goodness,3 ’ ®*' the call is for men of character who may function wisely as 102 "the controllers of nature.1 ' "Nature provides the basis, the field and the opportunity for immortal 103 194 spirits," . . . for although it is not autonomous, 195 it does cooperate with man. Flewelling believes that "the order of nature and the order of spirit find their synthesis in the Person ality which maintains both as manifestations of his own 196 creative will." Thus there is, and is possible, a 1 Q 7 real unity between mind and the objective world. 198 Nature as God's activity cannot be left out of the great program of world redemption. In his book, Reason in Faith, he insists: A world redemption to be complete must go even further than this and include nature herself. Only thus can be resolved the dark antinomies of pain and evil. If it be true that the natural world has been •*®*Creative Personality, p. 301. 192xhe Person, p. 201. *®^"Scientific Data and Spiritual Fact," The Personalist, XXIV, 344. 194The Person, p. 6. 195Ibid., p. 311. ^^Reason in Faith, p. 202. ^^Creative Personality, pp. 178-179. 19^The Person, p. 70. 219 groaning and travailing in pain waiting for the appearance of the sons of God, a redeemed order must show a result worth all the suffering and a disciplinary purpose worth all the cost. And this discipline when attained by *the sons of God' must be adequate for ending the age-long agony of nature. In keeping with this line of thought, Flewelling . 200 . . sees not only contingency in nature, and change m 201 202 nature, but also freedom. He says: "There are events in nature that are unpredictable; they spring 203 from a cause that is not mechanical. ..." Which cause is "that active force behind the universe upon which all objectivity, all life, all thought is momen- 204 tarily dependent for its existence." Here is his "assumption of a Creative Intelligence as the ground of all being and reality• "^05 The Universe Flewelling*s teaching about the universe falls ^^Re&son in Faith, pp. 187-188. 200The Person, pp. 42, 124. 2Q1Ibid., p. 31. ^^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 90. 203»»xhe Scientific Revolution and the New Day," The Personalist, XIII, 291. 204Ibid., p. 292. 2 0 5 Loc. cit. 220 under the two categories of creation, and evolution. Creation. The Universe did not spring "out of 20A chaos through a fortuitous concourse of atoms." The natural order implies the existence of a Cosmic Intelli- gence as its adequate Cause: The thoughtful man will be conscious of a feeling of inadequacy in the assumption that this growing order of complexity and adaptation raised itself up out of chaos into order, adaptability, and intelligence, without the aid of intelligence, either inside or outside the process. There has been too much scientific begging of the question. If we have an effect, the cause must have been adequate to produce it. Intelligence in the cause is demanded by intelligence in the effect. Non- intelligence can never be logically held to be the cause of intelligence.^? In The Reason in Faith, Flewelling has this observation on Creation ex nihilo: The older philosophers used a phrase which is at present relatively neglected and indeed positively rejected by the scientism of our time. This phrase is a hard one because it seems to take us outside the realm of fact, yet it is a necessary one if there is to be any causal explanation. This term the mediaevalists ascribed to the First Cause as the power to create ex nihilo. Far be it from us to attempt to revive a term musty with memories of a perished latinism and scholasticism, but may we not be permitted to point to two facts: First, that there is no causal explanation without it or its equivalent; and, second, we do each of us experience it in every truly creative act. The object of the ancients in asserting the creation out of nothing doctrine was to end the infinite regress from cause to cause in order ^^Survival of Western Culture, p. 79. ^Q^creative Personality, p. 61. 221 to arrive at explanation. The reason which is as cogent now as it was then, is that we get back to the fundamental reality only when we reach the uncaused cause. We do not deny the reality of a picture by Rembrandt, but there is a deeper reality than the picture, namely, Rembrandt himself. And the real Rembrandt is deeper than the Rembrandt impulses, the Rembrandt environment, the Rembrandt heredity or education. All these external things slight be repro duced without producing a Rembrandt. We have in the last analysis a soul giving unique expression to itself in reaction to character in that it contains elements of expression which had never before been given to the world and will never be again achieved by any other individual. Creativity means this uniqueness which constitutes Rembrandt's message to the world and which is inexplicable on any naturalis tic basis. We can only say Rembrandt did it. When we have ascribed it to a person, we need and indeed can go no farther* We have arrived at a first or efficient cause. We have an illustration of how to personality alone is given the power of creating ex nihilo. We have noted already Flewelling1s belief in continuous creation. This is in keeping with his idea of matter and nature. He speaks of it in many places throughout his writings as Mthe new scientific concept of a universe 209 in continuous process of creation. • . ." This is also in keeping with his definition of the term "Universe1 1 : "The aggregate of being, acquiring unity from its source 2 lO in a Supreme Creative Intelligence." With such a theistic approach to the understanding ^®Reason in Faith, pp, 233-234. 2Q9The Personalist, XXXIX, 347. 21°The Person, Glossary, p. 334. 222 of the Source of our universe, "creation becomes . . . a 211 living process of reality." Creation must be viewed as 212 going on now. "Objects and persons both proceed from a 213 common intelligent Source,” with objects being con- 214 tinuously created. Flewelling, while noting that matter "is in process of dissolution, with its complexities reducing more and more to the vanishing point," insists that "the classical doctrine of evolution falls to the ground, since a genuine evolution depends upon increasing complexity, higher and 215 higher stages of creative power." In a paragraph in his book, The Survival of Western Culture, he makes the following statement: If evolutionary theory is to be logically maintained, it must be through the assumption that within nature or above nature, or supreme through nature, is a creative mind and purpose that forsees the outcome of the growing complexities of the cosmic order and is working toward ends that are desirable and that represent progress. Far from being hostile to religion, a consistent evolutionism demands a belief in the existence of God though not necessarily of the theologian's God. At most the theory of 2**The Personalist, XXI, 8-9. 212Ibid., p. 9. 2l3»tj^ature Comes to Her Own," The Personalist, XXVI, 10. 214Ibid., pp. 10 ff. ^l^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 55. 223 evolution can be seen as a striking hypothesis that is, in spite of itself, rooted and grounded in the belief in a Creative Power not ourselves that works for progress.216 Thus his contention is that if evolution is to be con sistently understood and logically held it must be super intended by a Cosmic Intelligence. In his Creative Personality, he states: The very purpose of evolutionary thought is to set up an order of uniformity, of causal sequence, and of intelligible progress for the old notion of chaotic, accidental, or miraculous creation. Its very existence urges the necessity for the presence of reasonableness, but it can reach the full measure of order and reason only when it assumes in its causal explanation the existence of an intelligence, which is the source of a reasonable world and a rational species, as the final member of the evolu tionary process. The theistic hypothesis is required to make it complete.217 With this as his basic contention, one can readily understand why and how it is that Flewelling defines the World Ground as he does. He conceives it as "some sort of self-transcending consciousness,"2* - 8 which is "capable of memory of the past, and of prevision for the future which 219 it creates," self-limiting as to the time, circumstance, 2*6suxvival of Western Culture, p. 273. 017 “ 'Creative Personality, p. 82. Cf. his essay, "Evolution an Act of Intelligence," The Personalist, V (1924), 245. 2l8Winds of Hiroshima, p. 6 8 . 219.__ LOCf CXT 9 224 and the means or medium in which it works,22° capable of 5oi 222 self-revelation, and continuously creative. His formal definition of the World Ground reads thus: ' ’ The Supreme Creative Intelligence conceived as the 223 continuously active source and ground of reality.” Elsewhere he says: "In other words, the universal order may be dependent upon a supervising Mind more than upon 224 a continuously uniform energy.” Thus the way is already pointed to that theory which he will think most tenable in reference to evolution. Evolution. A Bergsonian influence is manifest when Flewelling says that "all evolution is in some manner 225 purposive,” and insists that any evolutionary progress implies the introduction into the effect of something not already in the cause.22^ An order of evolution is pos sible "only to a unitary self-referring subject which 220loc. cit. 221Ibid., p. 69. 222Loc. cit. cf. The Personalist, V, 241. 22^The Person, Glossary, p. 334. 2 2 4 Survival of Western Culture, p. 202. 2 2 5 Bergson and Persona 1 Realism, pp. 147, 234. 226ibid,, p. 241. 225 itself does not rise and pass away with the events which 227 it contemplates and brings to pass*" In short, "evolution" cannot be logically maintained without assuming a Creative Intelligence above and within the process.1*228 Evolution proceeds, that is, by intelligent 220 purpose rather than by natural selection* For "if there is to be evolution in ever ascending order, there must be forethought somewhere. We can scarcely lay to natural selection adaptations which are made before 030 selection is possible." Flewelling sees, therefore, "little or no confir- 231 mation of the mechanistic view of evolution." "Evolu tion can be no mechanical thing as is often supposed, but 232 a process of transcendence"; for "evolution is impos- 233 - sible without the appearance of the unique," Any "appearance of the new and unique cannot be explained by ^^Survival of Western Culture, p. 204. 228Ibid., pp. 272-273. 229creative Personality, p. 78. 23QReason in Faith, p. 75. 231winds of Hiroshima, p. 18. 282Ibid., p. 48. 2 3 3 Ibid., p. 79. 226 pointing to the past which did not contain it."234 In any true evolution we oust recognize "the fact of contingency based on purpose."235 it is therefore "an act of intel— 14 ..236 ligence." His philosophy of evolution is succinctly expressed also in his definition of Naturalism: A belief in the competence of matter and motion to account for all reality, denying evidence for the existence of a creative or upholding spiritual principle behind the world. While ordinarily it may be assumed the opposite of personalism, the latter may be considered naturalistic in assuming the laws of nature to be the uniform activities of the Creative Spirit.237 238 He insists that matter cannot be the source of mind, 530 nor can matter and motion explain life. Naturalism 240 only seeks to dodge the issue of metaphysics. Along with Bowne, he criticises "evolutionists for commonly 241 confusing the ideas of cause and effect." Even the 234The Personalist, V, 245. 233Ibid., p. 241. 2 3 6 Ibid., pp. 238-249. Creative Personality, p. 86. 237The Person, Glossary, p. 332. 238Survival of Western Culture, p. 273. O *aQ Creative Personality, p. 75. Reason in Faith, pp. 67 f. 2 4 0 Survival of Western Culture, pp. 154, 155. 24^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p * 25 . 227 more recent British notion of "emergent evolution" is only "an effort to let ourselves down easily from a position which even the materialistic evolutionists were beginning 2 4 2 to discover to be no longer tenable." On the theistic basis of this belief he holds that "the order of nature and the order of spirit find their synthesis in the Personality which maintains both as the 2 4 3 manifestation of his own creative will." "The world 244 is either personal or non-existent." Finally, Flewelling looks upon the Universe as "an organic continuum," which "cannot be cut up into unre- 245 lated parts or discontinuities"; "the universe itself is an organism closely related part to part, and disease in any part is certain to infect the whole."246 However, he offers the opinion that: . . . whoever finds the complete harmony of inner integrity discovers the whole universe fighting on his side. The forces with which he learns to cooperate, cooperate with him. . . . The universe answers his prayers as he cooperates with it,247 2 4 2 Survival of Western Culture, p. 288. 243Reason in Faith, p. 202. 244"Victorianism in Science," The Personalist, XXX, 345. 245The Person, p. 279. 246Ibid., p. 109. 24^Loc. cit. 228 Both man and Nature are very important parts of reality. It is therefore impossible to consider "the world of objects as independent of persons, with the expectation of learning more than partial facts concerning reality. [For] without man, nature is but a meaningless and broken • i . . 2 4 8 circle." The basic differences between our philosophers, it will be noted, arise from their different personalistic positions. Brightman seeks to keep his philosophy of nature in line with his personal idealism, whereas flewelling's theism and his personal realism color his concepts. Our men have different thoughts about evolu tion and its processes. Brightman seems to place even God within that process, whereas for Flewelling, God is the efficient cause of evolution and though dynamically active therein, stands transcendent to it. Both reject any kind of mechanistic naturalism and materialism. In their concern for the organic unity and coherence of the universe, mind and matter become manifestations of reality. Flewelling looks upon nature as more of an ally to persons and morals, than does Brightman. Nor is he troubled by the so-called natural evils to the same extent that Brightman is. 24®"Nature Comes to Herself," The Personalist, XXVI, 6. 229 We are now prepared to advance to the consider ation of their differing philosophies of time. Does the Supreme Person stand within time or can He transcend it? CHAPTER VII THE CATEGORY OF TIME Our philosophers do not agree concerning the nature of time. Because of his metaphysical teoporalism, Brightman cannot accept the postulate of timelessness. He therefore breaks with his teacher, Bowne, and also criti cises Flewelling's theory of time which he thinks is un satisfactory. Because of his belief in a finite and tenporalistic God Brightman has written more definitively and fully on the subject of time. He seems also to have changed or modified his earlier views regarding time. In his first edition of his Introduction to Philosophy» published in 1925, he seems to accept the Kantian view of time.1 But in the revised 1951 edition his earlier dis cussion of time has been removed and also his former 2 discussion of space. This would seem to indicate that he was unwilling to burden the beginning student in philoso phy with his more developed and refined thinking in reference to this category. In his latest book, Person and Reality, time is the first of the categories of being ^■Cf. pp. 272-279. 2See pp. 245 ff for the omission of sections (4) and (7) of the earlier edition. 231 to receive full treatment. To its consideration he de votes the twenty-three pages of the seventh chapter of this work. A chronological check of Brightman'$ books reveals the increasing richness of his thought on this theme. BRIGHTMAN'S METAPHYSICAL TEMPORALISM As late as 1910 Bowne had written as follows: . . . the notion of time as a separate ontological existence shows itself on every hand as a congeries of contradictions, and must be given up. The impossibility of more than one independent principle forbids us to admit the independent existence of time. Whatever it may be it depends on being as a consequence or creation. . . . Conceived as resting or flowing, time is absurd. Conceived as ontologi cal, it cannot be brought into any relations to things without positing an inter-action between them; and then we need a new time as the condition of this interaction, and this would lead to an endless regress. Time, then, cannot be viewed as a substantive fact created or uncreated. As a whole, time does not exist, and substantive reality is not in time any more than it is in space.3 Brightman’s colleague at Boston, A.C. Knudson, affirms: "Bowne was unequivocal in his advocacy of the ideality of both space and time, and this is manifestly the con- 4 elusion to whxch a thoroughgoing personalism points." With this position we find Brightman in disagreement. O Borden Parker Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 174-175. 4 A.C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1^27), p. ^54. 232 He distinguishes "timeless subsistence," which he will allow, from "timeless existence," which he will not allow since it is unthinkable.^ Even God cannot choose whether or not His nature shall be in time or not; for his 7 nature includes "never-ending activity in time." There- 8 fore, God "cannot be timeless." Since chapter seven of his writing on metaphysics (Person and Reality) deals with time, we find there Brightman's latest and most refined thinking about this category. We follow now his thoughts on this topic. Time is "the most pervasive category of both the given and the ungiven.It is "indissolubly involved in present experience."1^ Thus "time is empirically uni- 11 versal. Experience is always a time-span." Although "time, as experienced, occurs as private, . . . it is 12 believed to be public." How then shall we "escape time ^Brightman, The Finding of God, p. 132. ^Brightman, The Problem of God, p. 133. ?Loc. cit. O Brightman, The Finding of God, p. 127. ^Person and Reality, p. 116. ^ loc. cit. 11Loc_. cit. 12Ibid., p. 117. without escaping being?”^ since it is "a universal 14 subjective-objective category.” Not even the mystics have achieved this. Brightraan argues that time is a category not only of situations experienced, but also of situations believed in, or what he specifies respectively as ”shining presents” and "illuminating absents." He says: "Contrary to those who identify time with change, our point of view identifies it with real duration. "Time is ineradicable.”^ It is "experienced duration.”^ "All being, then, is temporal. Whatever is, endures.”' * -8 IQ "Time is a category of all that there is." Thus 20 "wherever there is experience . . . there is time.” He looks upon time as an order of succession. "Time, essen- 21 tially, is a past-present-future order.” Its order is therefore unique. With Kant he agrees that "time is in ^Loc. ci t. ^4Loc. cit. 15Ibid., p. 118. ^Loc. cit. l7Ibid., p. 119. ^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 21Ibid., p. 121. 234 itself a series— and is the formal condition of all 22 series." Its order is therefore chronological rather than logical. Moreover, "time's order is irreversible. What is past can never be present again, . . . The future is not until it occurs. Relative to any actual present, the past is determinate and the future is potential."2^ This being the case they cannot be laid out in a series and regarded as being contemporary with any one point in the series. Thus it is that even God's "consciousness is an eternal movement,1 ' 24 and time is not one absolute now even for God.25 In the ethical orientation of his Moral Laws, Brightman has written as follows: All experience without exception takes place in time, and no event can be literally repeated. Similar events can, of course, occur at a time later than that of the original event; but, however similar these later events may be in other respects, they necessarily differ as to the time at which they occur. Furthermore, at no two moments in time is the total situation in which a moral choice occurs the same. . . . In the case of a physical experiment, these differences are relatively far less important than in a moral situation . . . ; but in the moral 22Loc. cit. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A411, B4357 23 Person and Reality, pp. 121-122. ^Finding of God, p. 132. 25Ibid., p. 133. 235 life the essential subject matter is the personal will, and it is in process of growth and develop ment in its whole nature. Hence the uniqueness of every moment of experience, the so-called 'irrever sibility of time'--the fact that time can move only into the future, but not into the past— imparts a specific and individual character to every moment of our experience. Each present is, to some extent, unique and irreplaceable; hence it merits attention.26 He calls our attention to the fact that "the experi- 27 ence of time is a union of change and permanence." Thus the impropriety of identifying time with change only. Change could not be known apart from "some permanent O Q meaning in the change." Hence, "knowledge of the law of 29 change" presupposes "the permanence of the self." So "experience requires us to acknowledge both permanence and 30 change as inherent in all knowledge and all being." Brightman sees an unique relationship between time and purpose. The concept of timeless purpose he regards as meaningless. True enough, some purposes may not be exhausted in time but that does not render them inde pendent of time: . . . all purposes are temporal--applying either to finite stretches of time, like the architect's blue 26Moral Laws, pp. 173-174. 27 Person and Reality, p. 122. 28T 4 * Loc. cit. 29Loc. cit. 30Ibid., p. 123. 236 print for a house, or else to all time, like the ideal of rationality. In every shining present, a purposive or telic process . . . can be detected, either transient or permanent. Purpose and time seem inextricably involved in each other. Certainly no time, no purpose. Quite possibly (although this remains to be seen): no purpose, no time.31 32 "Time's order is both immanent and transcendent." It is immanent as a category of situations experienced, even though "time-spans vary greatly in their actual 3 3 duration." But any given time-span is strictly immanent. There say be discontinuities in experience but these are bridged by memory and the experience of self- identity. But even though memory and self-identity transcend any particular experience they too exist in moments of experience. Brightman warns against the error of thinking that memory makes the past present, and the error of denying the unity of the self in memory. He further notes that our temporal experience involves an "illuminating absent" (situation believed in) in the case of communication with other selves, and our relationships with nature. Thus it turns out that "the immanent order is 'my' shining present. The transcendent order is partly 31Ibid., pp. 124-125. 32Ibid., p. 128. 33Ibid.. p. 125. 237 'my* past and future shing presents, but it is also ob- 34 jectively in 'nature,1 whatever nature may be." To be a person "is to be a tire movement, as well as to trans- 35 cend time. . . Nevertheless, "the spacious present and memory (however dim) elevate every self above time to 36 some extent; ..." As to the relativity of time, Brightman is sure that 37 "all measurement of time is a system of relativities." Moreover, "all theories of time, then, are reasonings of persons about the nature and implications of personal experience."®® He thinks that: Relativity, instead of undermining personal experience, reenforces the basic importance of the shining present, reveals its complex structure and powers, emphasizes the observer and his frame of reference, and points out the inescapable relatedness of the human experient to the whole objective universe revealed by scientific obser vation, experiment, and theory. He continues: "Time is the daughter of experience. . . . There is no impersonal experience of time. . . . Rela tivity always presupposes the observing, reasoning, 34Ibid., p. 128. 33The Finding of God, p. 133. 36 Philosophy of Religion, p. 351. ^ Person and Reality, p. 128. 38Ibid., p. 129. 39Loc. cit. 40 time-binding, time-transcending person.” At this juncture Brightman makes his comparison of 41 Meternalism and temporalism." He says, "The view of time that has guided us thus far is a metaphysical temporalism and implies that time-experience affords a category for all illuminating absents, as well as for the structure of the self."^ Yet he recognizes there is an opposing view which he terms eternalism. Here we face such questions as: "Is time ultimate? . . • Or is there literally a timeless reality— an eternal on which time depends? . . . Or can the eternal endure without duration . . . Will there be a time when ’time shall be no more' ?"4^ After stating various positions concerning time by the important thinkers down through history, Brightman next notes the various senses in which the word "eternal" may be used. He thinks it probable "that time and eternity are more closely and empirically interrelated than has been supposed."44 In fact, he suggests that "the eternal must be a function of time, rather than ^°Ibid.. p. 130. 41Loc. cit. 42 Loc. ext. ^Loc. cit. ^Ibid.. p. 132. 45 time an incomprehensible function of eternity.” He insists that: . . . time as we experience it is not merely the measure of motion or the fact of change; it is the total real duration of personal experience in the shining present. Hence the absent being which this present faces, on which it depends, and with which it interacts, must be also a real duration. For how can the nontemporal, the nonenduring, produce the temporal without itself being or becoming temporal at the very moment time began? Does the supposedly unchanging not change the moment it produces time?4^ Brightman appeals to the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit, to show that "thought cannot conceive of an 47 absolute beginning out of nothing.” He does not agree with Kant's contention that the idea of a beginning of time and of an unbegun time are necessary ideas even though antinomies. He insists that "an unbegun, non- temporal eternity initiating a temporal series and still remaining nontemporal" is definitely unthinkable.48 He is sure that if we start with experience we must "infer that time is unbegun and unending, since a real beginning would mean an effect without a cause, and a real end would mean a cause without an effect."4^ So he returns to 45Loc. cit. 46Ibid., pp. 132-133. 4 7 Ibid., p. 133. a favorite suggestion that ’ ’the eternal is not the non temporal but the omnitemporal.”50 He summarizes by saying that the facts of experience point to belief in that which 51 ”is unbegun and unending duration," He thinks that "this unimaginable but empirically coherent concept of eternity may well be adequate: the eternal is the unbegun 52 and the unending," Time, in sum, is a category of eternity, Brightman concludes this chapter on time with a discussion of temporalism and personalism. He thinks the true metaphysics "must be both a temporalism and a 53 personalism," He is sure that an iapersonalistic tem poral process is not possible.**^ He states his position as follows: Personalism • , , is the hypothesis that all being , . . is either a personal experient (a complex unity of consciousness) or some phase or aspect of one or more such experients, Ihe postulate now being presented is this: All being is temporal and therefore all being is personal. A Personalist holds that the truth in naturalism and the truth in eternalism can best be reconciled 50Lqc. cit. 51Loc. cit. 52Ibid., p. 134. 241 and interpreted by the truth in personalism, 'Nature' cannot account for consciousness or for experienced time, while impersonal eternity cannot account for real process and evolution. The postulate of ever- enduring personality as the objective real accounts for both.^5 We now proceed to consider certain facets in Brightman*s thought about time. Timelessness It is in relation to the problem of infinitude that Brightman comes to grips with this concept. He suggests that only being could be timeless, although some maintain that mathematical principles and like subsistences may be so considered. He notes that much religious and philo sophical thought has been spoken of "God as an utterly timeless being, for whom all time is a single, changeless 56 present, a nunc stans." "But," he insists, "an utterly timeless eternity is much easier to adore unthinkingly or to discuss verbally than to comprehend intelligently." "To be timeless means to lack all of the attributes of time, to have no before or after, no change, no activity, 58 no past, no present, and no future." Timelessness 55Ibid., p. 135. ^The Finding of God, p. 126. 57Loc. cit. 58Loc„ cit. 242 "means utter freedom from change, activity and causal- 59 ity." There may be timeless subsistences, but "to exist means to be in time or in space or both."60 Exis tence therefore cannot be timeless. Brightman wonders if anyone has ever formed a definite idea of timelessness. He says: It is doubtful whether anyone has ever formed a definite idea of what is utterly timeless and so completely transcendent to time as to stand wholly outside and beyond the time process. There is something of sublime humbug in the idea. He is sure that "an absolutely timeless eternity" is "inconceivable," even "if it could be conceived it would fail to explain the time order and the part that is played by time in every experience and every fact of the real world."62 Appealing to experience, as is his custom, Brightman notes that: "Experience reveals no timeless moment. What does not endure is not. Everything that exists is in some significant present-past-future con- 63 text." 59Ibid., p. 127. 6°Loc. cit. 61Ibid.. pp. 127-128. 6 2 Ibid., p. 128. 63 Persons and Values, p. 21. 243 Time and Mind Brightman says: The ideality of time does not imply its unreality; it implies only that time is self-contradictory if taken to be independent of mind. Time has meaning only for mind; it is mind-dependent. But it has meaning for all mind; and if, as personalists hold, the universe is all mind, then the universe is also all time. Brightman contents that ’ ’there is no time or space external to all mind. To put it otherwise: Minds or experients are not in time or in space, but all times and spaces are in experients, cosmic or otherwiseHis dictum: ’ ’ Time is mind," is based on the fact that "we experience time as duration of mind. . . . Thus "mind, f\*7 not formula, is the stuff of which time is made." Mind, of course, is both temporal and super- temporal. In the first edition of his Introduction to Philosophy Brightman stated that the mind "is temporal in that it experiences sequence and duration, but it is supertemporal in that it is able to grasp in a single € \ F K conscious act a series of events that takes time." This ^'Vinding of God, p. 134. 6^Person and Reality, p. 144. 66Ibid., p. 143. 67Ibid., p. 129, note 20. 6QIntroduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 275. 244 "time-transcending act of mind1 1 enables it to Mgrasp the passage of time without itself passing as fast as the time f t o does." It is also well known that "it is only because 70 of this time-transcendence that I can think at all." On the other hand it is through the time principle that "one part of mind sinks into the past, and a new part grows 71 into the future." (Echoes of William James appear here in Brightman.) The mind "is a growing whole, living in an environment revealed by mind’s self-transcending knowl- 72 edge," and, we may add, time transcending experiences. Time and Reality This relationship between time and mind has impli cations for the reality of time and the temporal nature of reality. Brightman declares that every view of objective reality as non-temporal and non-experiential "fails to account for the time that the person finds in his experi- 73 ence." He also reminds us that: "Scientific observation shows us a world developing in time; and if evolution is ^Philosophy of Ideals, pp. 21-22. 7QIbid., p. 21. 7lIbid., p. 19. 7^Ibid., p. 22. 7^Person and Reality, p. 120* 245 in any sense an expression of the nature of the real, time 74 must be fundamental in reality." "For evolution, then, time is ultimately real. If time is not real, evolution is not real. The same is true in an even more emphatic 7 5 sense of history. . . ." He believes that "human history, as well as the eternal history which religion 76 envisages, is an enduring time process." Consequently, "when the trumpet of the Lord sounds, it is really impos sible that time should be no more; this time, this age, may end, and a new age begin, but there will still be time."77 Time and God Brightman*s teraporalistic view of God is one that he frequently sets forth and accepts as consistent and 74"Dialectical Tensions in the Christian Idea and Experience of God," The Seminar Quarterly, VI, 3 (May, 1937), p. 12. 75 Future of Christianity, p. 86. 7^Philosophy of Religion, p. 384. 77"Dialectical Tensions in the Christian Idea and Experience of God,*' p. 13. A gospel song with which Brightman was surely familiar opens with these words: "When the trumpet of the Lord shall sound, and time shall be no more.'* Cf. Rev. 10:6; KJV. But Brightman prefers the alternate translation: "Delay no longer." Cf. Person and Reality, p. 136, note 29. 246 and coherent with his understanding of time as the cate gory of all being. We have noted his belief that God cannot be timeless. That God is a temporal being he argues again as follows: Nothing real is a Nunc Stans. Activity, change, duration, are the essence of the real. The real endures, the real changes, the real grows, God is the real, or at least the most significant part of the real. Nothing real is timeless . . . eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity.70 Therefore "the temporal character of the self points to the temporal character of God. . . . The world is a world 79 of events." We must never confuse subsistence and existence. The divine immanence in history "is real for QA God." "Things happen in God's experience; time is real 81 for him. ..." Nor does this "view of time as a real and essential aspect of God . . . deny his concrete eternity. . . . The divine eternity means God's endless 82 duration (duree reelle). . . ." Yet "God transcends 83 time by his memory." Moreover, "we have to think of God as being eternal ongoing activity, in addition to 78 "A Temporalist View of God," Journal of Religion XII, 544. 79Ibid., p. 546. 80Ibid., p. 547. 0*Finding of God, p. 130. 82Ibid., p. 131. 8 3 Ibid., p. 132. 247 having eternal self-identity in character and reason. . . • For him, time experience is ultimately real."84 In view of this Brightman can content that "time 85 . • • is a limit on God." His activity and creativity require time* "One or infinitely many acts of creation are performed in time and in both the time process has to be continually conserved and sustained." If God is thought of "as above and beyond all time and change . . . His relations with the world of our actual time experi ence are not only contracted, but are rendered remote and 87 unintelligible." He thus insists that time is a part of the Given in God,88 Since God is a temporal being, eternity cannot be thought of as non-temporal. Time and Eternity In his Philosophy of Religion, Brightman speaks of 89 the eternal as "what is true at all times." The eternal 84Ibid., p. 133. 85Ibid., p. 131. 86Ibid., p. 128. 87Problem of God, p. 99. 88Person and Reality, p. 144. go Philosophy of Religion, p. 385. 248 must not be thought of as utterly timeless or wholly 90 other than the temporal process. The eternal is really one of the terms of time. Likewise in his book, The Problem of God, he has written: If we reduce time to its lowest terms, there are two points of certainty. The first is that we have actual experience of time, the consciousness of change and succession in our experiences. The second is that there must be something eternal in the uni verse. If we try to think of a beginning before which there was absolutely nothing, we are thinking either of an effect without a cause or of a cause without an effect, and either idea is irrational. But to say that the temporal and the eternal must both be recognized is not to solve the problem of their relations.91- In his Boston lecture he defines eternity as "unbegun and 92 unending inexhaustible time." Thus "time is a universal 93 category." What, then, should be the position of a true personalist with respect to time? Brightman replies: "Personalists . „ . should hold that there is no timeless or nontemporal eternity. Rather, there is unbegun and unending real duration, eternally active, creative, and 94 purposive." 90Ibid., p. 386. 91 Problem of God, p. 99. 92 Persons and Values, p. 22. 93 Person and Reality, p. 158. 94"Bownei Eternalist or TemporalistThe Personal ist, XXVIII, 265. 249 Time and the Person Brightman holds that "consciousness is always a 95 process in time." Selves in process experience time. They move ahead as if reaching for purposes yet unattained. 96 Again: "there is no impersonal experience of time," for "the minimum possible self is an experience of real 97 duration (duree reelle) There is no simple indivisible instant of self experience. Every self endures in time; in its lowest terms every self is at once a unitary experience and a succession of experiences. In one conscious grasp, many details are comprehended as the unitary structure of one self.9® Brightman continues: Indeed, the first and most basic characteristic of the self is its temporarily indissolubly con nected with time-transcendence. In order to grasp any sentence or any sensory whole or any series of events, the mind must be aware, in one actual present, both of parts and of whole. It must grasp the temporal succession of the parts and their total meaning in one act of gestaIt-experience. Thus every time-span is also time-transcendence. Likewise every present experience transcends present time by an ex plicit or implicit reference to past time or future time. Memory, on the one hand, and anticipation and purpose, on the other, are always present in consciousness and always are temporal experiences with transtemporal reference." 95„The Finite Self," Contemporary Idealism in America (Barrett, ed.), p. l93. 96Person and Reality, p. 130. 97Ibid., pp. 261-262. 98Ibid., p. 262. "ibid.. pp. 262-263. 250 We must not, therefore, think that "when it is said that time is transcended," that any "experient can mean that time is abolished."*®0 Personal consciousness, however, 101 "is temporal in a special senseAV/J- It is at least abstractly possible that self experience might continue were all experience in the space form to be extinguished. . . . But time is far more structural to spirit than space is. Let space vanish, spirit might remain; but let time vanish, and spirit would vanish too. With no succession of consciousness and no temporal order the whole basis of conscious experience would fall away and sheer nothing would remain.102 It is Brightman’s temporalism that gives him confidence in the hope of immortality for the finite personality, for "the goal of evolution is the eternal development of 1 AO spirit." Of course, he has much stronger arguments for immortality than this, but they stem from other con siderations. With this we conclude our survey of Brightman's doctrine of time. Let us now hear from Flewelling. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE NATURE OF TIME Chief sources for a study of Flewelling*s lQOper sons and Values, p. 22. ^^"Dialectical Tensions in the Christian Idea and Experience of God," p. 13. *02Lqc. cit. 1Q3Introduction to Philosophy (1925), p. 347. philosophy of time are his Bergson and Personal Realism, chapter IV, Creative Personality, chapter XV, The Person, chapters VII, IX, XXIV, and XXXVI. Articles on time published in The Personalist have been very similar in content to some of these chapters. In the glossary of his book, The Person, Flewelling defines time as follows: "The form of thought by which the person relates events to each other and to himself. Tran scending individual time is the relation which the Supreme 104 Person bears to succession in events.1 ' Since The Person is the expression of his more mature thought we shall first summarize its account of time. He acknowl edges at the outset that "the relative character of time 105 has become a matter of common knowledge." Perhaps "for the first time in human history the relativity of time has broken upon the consciousness of the common man,"^ But now amid all of man’s multiplicity of affairs and events time seems "much shorter, at the very 107 moment in which it has been greatly lengthened." This •*~°^The Person, p. 334. 105Ibid., p. 54. 252 fact leaves man with "new attitudes toward the time 108 experience." When attention is absorbed time fleets past as of little duration, in hours of agony and tragic 109 hoping a short time seems to be an eternxty. There is surely some sense in which time is the shadow of man's own thought, the framework of his own experience, the measure of his limitations, and yet it is not an illusion, he does not create it, he must bow to it as inexorable fact.^*-® Yet there cannot be an experience of flowing events unless there is something which does not flow with them,*^ Any time in history we seek to grasp is always related to our own present which stands as "the abiding center of the 112 time relationship." "All time is seen as bearing upon the present instant of experience which is itself passing 113 away." Moreover: It is because we discriminate a before and after in events relating our experiences in a form of suc cession to distinguish them from each other that we get the impression of time. We do not mean by this to assert that time is an illusion. It is part and parcel of the world order and does not depend on us for its validity. It is a portion of the general relations which we call the universe, but it calls for a conception of the universe as an activity, an *^Loc. cit. 110Loc. cit. li:LIbid., p. 54. H^JLoc. cit. 113Loc. cit. 114 order of events rather than a fixed solidity. He points out that ’ ’there is that in us which is both a part of the process of change and yet above 115 change,” So it is one's "experience of change and at the sane time transcending change [which] gives him the notion of time."*^6 Really man's sense of time is made 117 by "his reflection on his mental states.” Thus he thinks "the time experience lies essentially in the power of reflection and self-reference both as to change and the 118 survival of change." Again, we must think of time as "relation of suc- 119 cession in events." He says: "The process is seen as a whole, because we are able to grasp the relations under the form of time. Time can never be thought of apart from 120 relations between events." Time, then, becomes also "a significant symbol of 121 our incompleteness.” It is the "reminder of our human ^ 4Loc. cit. 115Ibid., pp. 54-55. ll6Ibid.. p. 55. 117 Loc. cit. 118Ibid., pp. 55-56. *^Ibid., p. 56. 122 limitations.” Flewelling doubts that temporal form would be necessary except to minds greatly circumscribed and limited. Yet he thinks that "it is essential to any experience of causation, and for that reason the necessary concomitant of moralityOur minds are incapable of seeing universally. Our mental and moral progress comes through our power of discreteness. As we concentrate on a single event we see it as one in relations. With our sense of self-continuity we apply a similar discreteness to our mental states. Thus we discern relation between our will and our deed, and discover moral value in the expression or inhibition of our desires. That we cannot see all the results of our decisions is due, he thinks, to our limitations. However, if we could see them all we should probably be unable to act at all, or at least in freedom. So our limitation becomes the ground on which we may erect moral character with its measure of freedom. Now Flewelling suggests that time might indeed take on other characteristics under more universal conditions. If as a child sitting on the curb of a crowded street viewing a passing parade between many bystanders, we see but one event at a time, then everything occurs in suc cession. But if that same viewer could be in an airplane 255 watching the same parade, he could then grasp it almost in its entirety and "succession would become a simul taneity." The change of frame of reference has changed the experience of time. Thus succession and simultaneity 124 become mere variations in the form of relations. Flewelling believes that in such a conceptual time "the only limit would be the limit of the human mind in 125 handling the concepts of relation." "At any rate," he says, "we do erect time into a fourth dimension when we symbolize it in the clock and the calendar." He next calls our attention to the "variability of the time-sense in human experience." He asks: "What would we make of the passage of time were it not for the arbi trary divisions made by the succession of day and night, seasons and years?"^27 We have all felt the interminable length of relatively short periods of time and also the sense of brevity of longer periods. So he declares: "It is impossible to disentangle time from this variable mental element, or to make it something extraneous and 128 independent from the active processes of thought." ^^Summarizing to here from The Person, pp. 56-57. 125Ibid.. p. 57. ^^Loc. cit. 127, + L O C a C i t • 1 2 8 Ibid., p. 58. 256 In order to have that which flows we must have both a change and changelessness— that which abides a time order and that which is above it* Yet, "this paradoxical fact we find only in one place in the universe, in the person. . . . The normal person has no difficulty in identifying himself as the continuing subject through all the experi- 129 ences of change in physical, mental, and moral selfhood.” He continues: The essence of the experience of selfhood seems to lie in the ability to gather all experience into enduring relation to itself in spite of the momentous changes that take place within its own nature. This grounding of time would not be complete, however, by reference to finite intelligence or persons alone. . . . Time is meaningless to us apart from our interpretations of relation, but it is not made by us* It is a part of a larger system of relations which provides the field of human activities and more. . . . We must see time as a part of a general system of relations which includes all existence as well as our own.130 Here follows his objection to the Kantian view of time. Of Kant, he says: "He did not make time a part of 131 the general order of existence." He regards the unknowable Ding an Sich to be powerless for metaphysical explanation. There is no basis for metaphysics short of the reference of the whole cosmic order to a supreme, 129. Loc. cit. ^ L o c . cit. 131ibid., p. 59* 257 purposive, and personal Intelligence both in all and over all. The difficulty in this concept arises, of course, from the use of the term 'person' which has customarily been used in too limited a fashion. The real significance of personality lies in its capacity for both immanence and transcendence which many hold to be mutually exclusive terms. These terms come together, however, and find their compatibility in the person. This is not to think of the Supreme Intelligence as an overgrown body but as the spirit which inspires all life and all cre ative thought, and which is very nigh us even in every one. It must be assumed that from this creative spirit proceeds the activity known as the atom, which momentarily creates into existence, maintains and upholds all things. . . .132 Thus he thinks that: . . . working under a time order becomes then a possible cooperation between finite and infinite intelligences. . . . Time becomes thus the instru ment by which the finite and the limited may reach toward the infinite. . . .133 Though limited now "it is prophetic of a vaster world of 134 experience when 'time shall be no more1." Thus his lack of agreement with Brightman is quite obvious. In chapter IX of The Person, Flewelling deals with infinity. Herein he notes that "the soul . . . seeks its 135 natural home beyond the boundaries of time and space." Denying belief in a static Absolute, he affirms his faith in a God who "reveals himself in historic time, and [therefore] human understanding of the Divine Character ^ 2Loc. cit. 133lo£. cit. 134loq. cit. l^5 Ibid., p. 6 8 . 258 and Will must grow with the Divine process in history."^3* * God is not unapproachable in his perfection but is "a living God acting in and through the world-process, 137 capable of human association. . * ." Admitting that infinity is incomprehensible, he would insist that it is a valuable concept and is useful in theology, mathematics, and physics. It is actually 1 38 the symbol used to "account for the unaccountable," Hence the practical value of the concept, "Questions," he says, "have to be left open, and the symbol of infinity is a symbol of faith and hope that secrets may eventually be unraveled."-*-^ Admittedly the concept is inexplicable but it is not necessarily thereby nonexistent. He says: We cannot argue its nonexistence, but must rather find in the notion a confession of the limitations of human knowledge and at the same time the evidence of a supreme faith as a working basis for the higher life. Flewelling thinks that "the difficulty of the relation of the finite to the infinite in religious thought is also largely verbal. In practical living the infinite is to be ^^Ibid. f p# <j9# *37Ibid., p. 70. 138Ibid., p. 71. 139Loc. cit. 140Ibid., p. 72. 259 experienced rather than explained* . . . Men are to live 141 as if the infinite were possible." So he concludes: There is a sense in which the struggle toward infinity is to be identified with infinity, the Infinite realizing his infinitude under the aspects of time and change, which is for some a nobler con cept than that of mere immutability, as having relation to a Living God. Even so the dream of a world of perfectible human relationships, becomes at once a challenge and a command to the human spirit.142 The important point to note here seems to be his intimation that the infinite cannot be pushed outside the temporal to a status of utter transcendence, nor can the idea of the infinite be dispensed with as mere illusion. In chapter XXIV of the same book, Flewelling writes about "the Second Dimension of Time." This, of course, turns out to be eternity in which the finite person achieves immortality. But his references to time are again significant as part of his thought on this category. He opens the chapter by stating: By referring to the atom as an event in a space time continuum modern physics has set a new emphasis on the place and meaning of time in the world order. Not only is time cited as a fourth dimension of space, since our notion of space depends on the time of passage from point to point, but a world whose only permanence is change calls for a new inventory of time. Upon time depends the diversity in phenomena which makes science possible, for science holds sway 1 4 1 Ibid., p. 74. ^ ■ 4 ^Loc. cit. 260 by reason of its prediction of coming events in a world where things physical are represented through motion and change. . . . If now we are to admit change as a portion of reality, we must locate per manence somewhere* If we cannot assume it lies in a monism of substance, it will hardly answer to assert simply that change itself is the only permanence. There must be some permanence to bind the fleeting into relationship and meaning, and it must be some thing more than an abstraction like 'duration' or change* Whatever this permanence, it must in some measure transcend time, must be conscious of some thing more than the fleeting event, must be able to remember happenings that are past and from them to reap a synthesis with what now is and with what will be* It becomes immediately apparent that time has no meaning apart from self-referring intelli gence. The separation we are able to make between events under the form of time makes experience possible, for change is experience and experience is experience of change. Flewelling sees the need for a "new study of the perceiving subject and his relation to and place in 144. reality." He states: If time is the essence of reality, and is also the form under which the person discerns between experiences, it may be that the person has a much greater place in reality than has been commonly supposed* He might turn out to be the most real of all realities. If time be taken as a relating of events to each other through an abiding medium of some sort, and this act of relating calls for memory and self-reference, the cat is out of the philosophical bag. Whenever in experience we have a reality that has to do with a temporal order we must have a person who is a part of that reality. . . . So far as actual knowledge can go there is but one example of perdurance through change and that is the person.*4^ *^The Person, p. 195, 1 4 4 Ibid., p. 196. 1 4 5 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 261 Taking up now the relationship of change and the unchanging, Flewelling continues: If any definition of change is impossible without reference to time; if, as Bergson so brilliantly said, ’duration' is the string on which the concept of change must be strung, we must include in our description of it that without which it could not be known, namely the unchanging. . . . Change is a reality only for some point of relative fixity, and change as experience is possible only to an abiding self-consciousness able to work under the time- transcending form. If we turn to Lotze's definition of reality we may there discover a dictum startlingly appropriate to our discussion: 'The real is that which changes and yet survives change.' Even slight reflection will show us the one spot in our experience where this paradoxical reality of unchanging change can hold true, and that is in our selfhood, the person. No adequate definition of change then can leave out the personal element. Change has no meaning for that which itself altogether rises and passes away, but only for that which experiences change as a part of its own abiding meaning. We must be in some measure timeless in order to know time, changeless to be aware of change.1^6 Here Flewelling notes that: The knowledge of change is not given us offhand or ^ priori, or even empirically, without an attendant constructive activity on the part of the thinking subject. The concept of change does not arise from unassisted perception. There must be a relating activity. . . . Into a perception of what is now existent, the mind recalls its former perceptions and concludes through comparison that this is some sort of continuation of or relation to the past, or a possible future. Wherever change is apprehended it will be seen as nothing more nor less than a relation, conceived to exist between past, present, and future events, which the mind sets up in furtherance of its intel lectual interests,147 1 4 6 Ibid., p. 197. 1 4 7 Ibid., p. 198. So he insists: "Nowhere save in personality do we find a nexus of change and identity*”*4® Thus it is that ”while change may be affirmed as a universal fact, the experience of change can be had only by some such self-conscious unit as the person, who can gather past, present, and future 149 into a synthesis of meaningful relations.” But we cannot stop here with human experience* He says: ”We must assume the existence of a Supreme Person in order to ground the universal system of change and reality.”*^® Flewelling finds this especially important for the theory of cosmic evolution. He notes: "As change, viewed from the individual standpoint, demands a person who transcends change, so change in the cosmic order calls for an abiding subject above the process.”*-** He thinks "the assumption is necessary if we are to relate the 152 beginnings of evolution with its outcome.” He further insists that: The short experience of man is too meager to grasp so great a generalization, and unless we are to assume the presence of purpose, it is futile to presume an ordered progress of evolution. Change 148Ibid., p. 199 is a recognized relation between the different members or events in a movement process, but the relations are set up by intelligence, somewhere, from which they derive coherence and meaning. In the end, no doctrine of universal change can be rationally grounded, except through the affirmation of an abiding Cosmic Intelligence, or a Supreme Creative Person.153 This discussion is pertinent to Flewelling's con tention that time may be transcended. We may pass over his arguments in this chapter for immortality as a reason able postulate, though the ladder of steps he presents is very important to us in another reference. He does climax it with the notation that life climbs "the ladder of existence to its highest expression, the ability to trans- 1 ei cend both time and change." * * With this he comes to what he calls a suggestion of "the second dimension of time."^^ It is closely con nected with his concept of "creative personality." He says: "No creative soul has ever been able to complete its self-expression here. It lays down its earthly tasks at the point when, by reason of experience and mastery, it should begin a career of new creativeness. . . . To this end it commonly and naturally craves eternity." Hence: 153lqc. cit. l54Ibid., p. 205. 264 In a world which is nothing but beginnings, a second dimension of time is essential to the thought and planning of men who are to make the most of the first dimension* A world which humanly speaking is a place of beginnings, calls for a larger world and a time, for all such pilgrims of the spirit as are prepared to profit, by its extension into a second dimension, . . . The life of man is heavy with the promise of immortality* 157 Therefore, "the challenge of the hour is that we 1 CO shall begin to live in the second dimension of time," ° This is to be accomplished by means of a new quality in our living and not by some cataclysmic turn of events that thrusts men willy-nilly into the kingdom of God, This, he says: "is altogether voluntary, for no force, nor fright, nor fear has power to transform character. The children of light are such because they love light rather than i 50 darkness. . . . The chapter concludes as follows: Time is continuous, and its existence, as in the case of the atom, is so bound up with the reality of the soul that it is altogether impossible to divorce its first from its second dimension. Here and now we are living in and partaking of eternal life, and if there is to be assurance of a life to come, it can only be by seizing upon it and living after its mandates here and now. The eternal life has its beginning in time. In fact the very essence of per sonality lies in its conquest of time, that trans cending power by which it may become immortal.160 * ^ Ibid., p. 206. 158Loc. cit. 150 XJ*Ibid.t p. 207, 160loc. cit. 265 For Flewelling, then, this life is but the prelude to one that transcends today's little temporalities. The criti cal point is his contention that the eternal as well as the infinite is ultimately time transcending. Chapter XXXVI of this same book is entitled, "Beyond Time." Again the theme is immortality. He thinks of immortality as "the survival of the living over time,"^^ It is "as a conscious participant in evolution" that "man occupies a unique position and opportunity to create a moral and spiritual world" which is "his special X 6 2 privilege and responsibility." 1 6 3 He looks upon life as "the token of perpetuity." Which is to say: "One most important reality is the con- 1 6 4 tinued triumph of life over the static world," So he thinks: If the whole world of matter is to be considered a congeries of events, from which our senses draw the interpretation of form and substance, then outside of perceiving minds or Mind, there could be no continuity at all. What there is of perpetuity here is not in matter, where we persistently look for it, but in these imponderable meanings and qualities that survive the passage of events. As made up of constantly active forces, the whole of reality at one moment gives way to another whole of reality the next moment. . . . Conscious being, in distinction from 161Ibid., p. 302. l62Ibid., pp. 302-303. 163Ibid., p. 303. 164Loc. cit. 266 unconscious, while continually changing is able to preserve its self-identity as the subject of swiftly passing experiences which it weaves into the cloth of meaning. The perpetuity which is discoverable in the simplest forms of life is raised to the nth power in self-conscious life. This leads him to the thought that man is "the New Step in evolution."He thinks that it is man who is now exercising "the power of evolving new species, . . • and will be more and more,”^^ Henceforth it is apparent, if evolutionary progress is to be made, it is to come through moral and intellectual, and spiritual cooperation of man. With him is the power and with him is the responsibility. . . . Morality cannot be achieved by external circumstance, but only with the cooper ation of righteous wills. . . . It would be impos sible for God to create a moral world outside himself without voluntary cooperation of moral beings. A change in the heart of man would instantly usher in a new world. . . . Each of us is the 'missing link* in this new order of evolution.168 Contending that "eternal life is eternal living,"169 he insists that "without immortality, creation is a mess."^® Thus he urges man to realize the "capacity he has, to create, to fulfill a lot and destiny so superb as ^ 5The Person, pp. 303-304. 166Ibid., p. 304. 167Loc. cit. 168 Ibid., pp. 304-305. l69Ibid., p. 305. 1 7QIbid., p. 306. 267 to be beyond computation, by reason of the forces-- 171 physical, mental, and spiritual--that are his," He also notes that "one reason most of us are so 'absent from the Lord' is because we are so ’present in the body,' so 172 engrossed in matters of little account," Though we have souls capable of embracing a universe of time and existence, "we are content to spend our days 'as a tale of 173 little meaning'," Each of us needs to realize his "place in the Divine plan" and recognize that his life is a "part of an intricate pattern of universal life, that 174 ages have been working toward." Although "our part may seem to us small and of little account to the Supreme Continuum [yet] . . . in his hands the smallest loyalty, fully surrendered, can be made to grow into greatness and power If we are apprehensive about what lies "beyond time" he reminds us that "there is little use of inquiring about the prospects of immortality. The more appropriate question might be whether we have anything about our hopes, 171Ibid., p. 307. 172Loc. cit., cf. II Cor. 5:6, 9. 173Loc. cit. l74Ibid., pp. 307-308. l75Ibid., p. 308. aspirations, plan of life, which hooks up with the whole order and savors of immortality." He is willing to admit that "to have our present life and labors perpetu ated to all eternity would, for most of us, be the acme 177 of boredom." But he hastens to add that "the creative 178 life can never be boresome." Each of us needs to "read the long roll of the world's geniuses" and then 17Q "hear the bugle call to a larger world" for himself. Such, then, is the general survey of Flewelling's thinking relative to time as set forth in his latest and most systematized writing thereon. The chapter in Creative Personality, referred to above, is largely repeated in the key chapter in The Person. His thinking about time in the study based on Bergson, while primarily a criticism of Bergson's position, does nevertheless state the basic elements of his later thought about time. Much as we would like to take our leave of Flewelling's doctrine of time, it is necessary to analyze the basic categories of his thought about it and to present in sum mary under these categories what is to be found by a care ful gleaning throughout all his books and articles. In 269 doing so we shall discover the answers to some specific questions which he may not have considered so carefully in The Person, Let us once again raise the question, Mwhat is Time?1 1 Then we shall have occasion to note our use of time as an arbitrary measurement. Flewelling's insis tence that there is no absolute time is to be noted. His escape from the idea of solipsistic time to its objecti vity in the world order must be seen. Again we may con sider his teaching that divine and human persons are both timeless and time transcending. Finally, we have his teaching that the temporal order is the momentary crea tion of a Cosmic Intelligence. Time as Form Flewelling thinks of time as the form under which 180 one relates events to himself. Time is really "our method of uniting in a single meaning, events of experi ence, some of which no longer exist, some of which we are not conscious, and some which do not yet exist but which 181 we anticipate." Or we may think of time and space as "the canvas on which [personality] relates its 180 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 114. Cf. Survival of Western Culture, p. £03; things That Matter Most, p. 357. ■^^Thlngs That Matter Most, p. 487. 270 1 QO experiences." Human experience does have its temporal form* Time is a relating of events to each other 1 AA through an abiding medium* Flewelling seems willing to consider Bergson's statement that "time is but a bastard space, a device for dividing, classifying, and relating 185 events," yet he criticises this designation as follows: Bergson calls time, bastard space, and speaks of the discretion made in counting from one to fifty as requiring space in which the first forty-nine units may await the arrival of the fiftieth* Is he not speaking of the power of discretion rather than of space as it is ordinarily meant?186 Thus he observes: It will never do to make space or time the possession of the individual alone* Some basis must be laid for a common order of time* Space is not sufficiently removed from the realm of abstract ideas by affirming that it exists only in the con crete act of perception. Flewelling is certain that his sense of time is, for all practical purposes, like that of his neighbor, and may therefore have validity for all men. But he reminds 1 A9 Bergson and Personal Realism, p* 250* 183 Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p* 160. 184creative Personality, p. 36* 185 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 113. Person alism and the Problems of Philosophy, p* 150. 186creative Personality, p. 147, 187 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. Ill, 271 us that: In order to reach this common validity and to escape the realm of subjectivism, we must assume that space as well as time has some meaning for the creative power behind all* And, because they are a portion of the mental equipment of man they are as much a part of reality as any other of his possessions• He continues: Such an assumption in regard to the nature of space would make unnecessary the definition of time as 'bastard space,' and would save considerable confusion, as we do not in our thought ordinarily identify the relating of the two systems to our selves, the one of things which may be simultaneous, the other of events which are successive* He points out that homogenous space is not identical with homogenous time* Especially is this so when we consider time under the form of duration* "Time flown may be homogenous with space, but not time 190 flowing." Therefore, "in spite of any attempt to evade the issue, time is the form under which one relates events to himself. He is ready to agree with Kant that "the mind has 1 OP a task in experience." He will also grant that "time p. 87. *88Bergson and Personal Realism, p* 112. *89Loc. cit* 190Ibid., p. 113. 1 9 1 Ibid., p. 114. 1 02 Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, 272 is . . . a law of intelligence rather than an entity in itself.1 1 He says: As space is the form under which we relate a world of diversity to ourselves and each other, so time is the form under which we relate the world of experiences to the abiding self. Without this con tribution of the self which survives the changes there could be no sense of time. In other words, it is because there is an element of timelessness in the thinker that he gets the idea of the passage of time. Time being the form under which intelli gence acts, the mind by its own constitutive activity is able to grasp and assign a meaning to historic periods of which experience could tell it nothing.194 But Flewelling sees a weakness in Kant’s position, which brings us to another important category of Flewelling1s thought about time. Time 1s Objectivity Flewelling is convinced that there is objective validity for the world of time and space relations. He affirms: The weakness in Kant’s position lay in the fact that he took account only of the subjective side of this activity of mind. It is well enough for me to say that time and space are only forms under which I think, but are they peculiar to me? Do they not exist apart from my thinking? How may I be sure that the time and space which I think will correspond to that which others think? Kant’s failure to answer these questions vitiated his system. It becomes at once apparent that both time and space must •^^Ibid., p. 8 8 . 1 9 4 Ibid., pp. 88-89 273 possess some objective validity to free them from the disjunctive caprice of the individual and make possible a world united in space and time relations. This Kant did not give us,195 Flewelling agrees with a statement from Bowne to the effect that "we cannot impose mental forms upon the world of experience unless that world itself be adapted to 196 those forms• " Thus the forms of time and space must be true for the object of thought as well as for the indi vidual thinker. It is Flewelling's contention, again in agreement with Bowne, that "space and time gain a validity which makes them universal for all intelligent beings through a Supreme Personal Intelligence who creates and upholds all. . . . All are comprehended in a Supreme Intel ligence from which they acquire their meaning and 1Q7 reality." So the reason Flewelling can contend that there is "a common element of validity in our idea of time, which is not accounted for by explaining it as contracted experience," is due to the fact that "time . . • 198 has been written into the nature of mundane things." Time is "part of a temporal . . . order maintained by a 195Ibid., p. 89. * " 9^Ibid., p. 90; and Bowne, Kant and Spencer, p. 150. 197Ibid., p. 90. ^ %ergson and Personal Realism, p. 119. 274 Supreme Personal Intelligence."199 Thus also he does not think of time as being solipsistic. ^ 0 It is more than the artificial product of human intelligence. It is part 201 and parcel of the world order. Before taking up consideration of the relativity of time, we should note that we both measure time and use time as a measurement. Time and Measurement It is common knowledge that we both measure time by itself and that we use time as a measurement of space- distance. Flewelling admits that there is a sense in which "the measure of time is arbitrary and artificial."202 He is aware of the fact that time is "conceived in its 203 relation to space as another dimension of space." As such it is referred to as a fourth dimension. He says: "Time introduced as a special element does then give us a species of fourth-dimensionality."204 He continues: "Our igo Ibid.. p. 247. Compare his essay on "Person alism," in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 773. 200Loc. cit. 20*Creative Personality, pp. 137, 142. 202Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 118. 203creative Personality, p. 140. 204Ibid., p. 149. 275 spatial idea is varied or modified by the time element involved. We use time as the measure of space.” More over, "we state the distance of the stars in terms of the speed of light, and the years are but the time of revolu tion of the earth in its orbit, as the days are created 20# * by its axial revolution.” As to the use of time in its own measurement, he asks: "What would we make of the passage of time were it not for the arbitrary divisions of it made by the suc- 207 cesxon of day and night, or seasons and years?” "In the end we have to adapt ourselves to the clock, and only by thus adapting ourselves can we manage to get along in a 208 world of men.” No matter how filled the hours may be, they "write their inevitable trail across both bodies and , . 209 minds.” He says: The hours of life may be so intense that our three score years and ten seem as a day to that conscious ness of time through which some unfortunate, invalided, or suffering brother creeps from the cradle to the grave. But that fact does not extend the hours of human life. His days and ours are eventually measured by the clock.210 205Ibid., p. 146. 206Ibid., p. 147. 2°7Ibid., p. 141. 208 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 118. 209Ibid., p. 119. 210Loc. cit. 276 But though time is objective and may be measured arbitrarily by various standards, Flewelling does not think of it as absolute. In his article on "Personalism," for Twentieth Century Philosophy, he states: With regard to the exploded idea of an absolute space and time, Personalism has long held the theory of relativity, namely that these are the forms under which we conveniently relate objects and events to each other and to ourselves.211 The Relativity of Time As we have already noted, in Flewelling*s thought, "time is the relation of succession in events. The time- transcending mind seeks out relations of similarity which exist between the successive moments and establishes identity under .the form of temporal relations.*'^12 That is to say, "the identity is essentially one of meaning for a mind which is able to grasp the multitudinous relations . . . [so that] the process is seen as a whole. It is expressed under the form of temporal relations, and time can never be thought apart from the relations between 213 events." Moreover, we have noted Flewelling's sug gestion that comprehensiveness of perspective changes the 211 R.T. Flewelling, Living Schools of Philosophy (Twentieth Century Philosophy, P.P. Runes, ecT. Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1956), p. 293. ^^Creative Personality, p. 139. 213. • + . Loc • cit* 277 limitations of temporality, hence the relative character 214 of the temporal order is evident. Flewelling continues by saying: "The relative nature of time is still more strongly emphasized when we consider the extreme variability of the time sense in 215 human experience.” Since time is not something apart from, and extraneous and independent of the experiencing mind, its flow varies with the greater or lesser multi- 2 ^6 plicity of events grasped by the mind. The Flow of Time Our philosopher also refers to time as ”a flowing stream of events (whose) flow has meaning only for some- 217 thing which does not flow.”' * ' "Succession is reality 71ft only for intelligence.” He says: ”If time is duration, 219 we must ask, 'For Whom?1." Nor does time flow as 220 something real independently of things and events. Time is the experience of change by that which transcends 2l4Ibid., p. 141. Cf. Supra, p. 212. 2^5Loc. cit. 2l6Ibid., p. 141. 217Ibid., p. 136. 2^ - 8Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 124, 2^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 152. 220Ibid.. p. 160. 278 221 change* As noted above, if roan could not reflect on 222 his own states he would have no sense of time* ' For without the self that survives change there could be no 223 grasp of time. Duration calls for something more than objective time,22^ there must be a self-conscious subject 225 of time. He says: ’ ’ Time is not a stream that flows irrespective of events, meanings, and of observing minds.”226 It is evident therefore that behind the cease- 227 less flow of events there is a constant. To have time 228 demands both change and changelessness. We must admit the birth of a new set of relations with every moment of time.22^ Yet only personality synthesizes both change o on and changelessness. He insists that "it is just the timeless and spaceless element in the human mind which 221Crea tive Personality, p. 138. 222 Loc. cit. Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 89. 224Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 63* 225Ibid., p. 64. 226Basic Ideas of East and West, p. 42. Cf. Also Things That Matter Most, pi 108. 227Winds of Hiroshima, p. 50. 22®Creative Personality, p. 141. 229^jnds of Hiroshima, p. 80. 2 3 Q c r e a t i v e personality, p. 142. 279 231 makes possible the conception of time and space." Thus we have seen his frequent emphasis upon the fact that personality involves both temporality and timelessness. Personality is Both Temporal and Timeless Flewelling is constantly insisting that man is both "a time being" and a "time transcending being,"232 and since "there is a real sense in which the human 233 personality is timeless," we may be sure that "the essence of personality is neither time nor space, but creativity."234 He likewise reasons that if man, the human finite personality, is in a real sense timeless, then much more 235 so would this be true of God the Supreme Personality. The World Ground is not, therefore, "the slave of time 2 3 6 and space." More fully he states: It is also true of any God acting in the temporal order, that any series having a before and after, requires a self-referring subject which 231Reason in Faith, p. 79. 232Ibid., p. 218; and Survival of Western Culture, p. 204. 233Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 248. 234Ibid., p. 215. 233"Nature Comes to Herself," The Personalist, XXVI, 15. 23ft Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 214. 280 distinguishes itself from that which it creates* If we are forbidden to believe that God by self limitation acts under the order of time, we cannot affirm of Him any relation to the world in any degree** By assuming God as static or absolute, we sever all conceivable connection between him and the temporal order* We have intimations within our own experience of how this may be, for we also in a lesser degree are time transcendent. . . . If the Cosmic Intelligence is conscious of a developing world order, then it must be conscious of itself in relation to that development, and in that measure its experience must fall under the temporal form* It can be held truly to transcend the time series while it works under it, by a self-limitation for a purpose which is held in view* The existence of purpose in the world order as truly calls for trans cendence in the temporal series, as for immanence in it. This peculiar demand is met only when we consider the Cosmic Intelligence to be a Person. We must then in the truest sense consider ourselves as living in a personal world and the whole realm of nature comes to herself in and through the Person.237 Here he has insisted that God both transcends the temporal order and yet works within it. The "Cosmic Intelli gence is conscious of a developing world-order,”239 thus 240 there is"the temporal in the Cosmic Intelligence." Yet he thinks also that if we conceive "the whole temporal order to be the momentary creation of a living Cosmic 241 Intelligence," then Perfect Personality "might involve 237,t r ( jature Comes to Herself," pp. 15-16* 238 See also his Creative Personality, p. 55. 239Loc. cit. 240Ibid., p. 54. 241Ibid., pp. 142-143. 281 242 a complete transcendence of space and time." Surely 243 God is not a temporal being with a past and a future, as we know man to be. If we are to posit non-temporality 244 anywhere it can be so only of the Infinite. Moreover, there is a real sense in which timelessness "is necessary 245 to our thought of God." Flewelling, then, can speak of a "timeless supreme Personality,"24^ for whom time is not a necessity but is the form of His purpose toward an uncompleted or unfinished world.247 Although time "has 248 some meaning for the Creative Power behind all," the "Creative Being who [is] timeless and spaceless; . . . [is] not a being dependent upon temporal and spatial order 240 for either self-identity or moral perfection." Thus it is that "the Continuum, though it may appear to reside in the series of events, does really reside in the Creator Himself. In creating events in succession, and creatures 24^Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 215. 248Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 160. 244Ibid., p. 161. 245Ibid., p. 163. 246 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 249. 247Ibid., p. 267. 248Ibid., pp. 112, 127. 249Ibid.. pp. 167-168. 282 that also transcend events, He is also the creator of time*"250 In that very case the time order becomes the arena of cooperation for the infinite and finite intel ligences «23^ Time may then be thought of as the ladder 052 by which the finite climbs toward infinity, while it 253 is also the shadow of human incompleteness. "We make all our progress, mental and moral, by a power of dis- 254 creteness,1 1 Out of the temporal consciousness also arises what Flewelling calls "consciousness of immor tality,"2^*5 since "personal experience erects time into eternity." Time and freedom "derive their meaning from 257 the unfinished character of the world," --a world of time and sense but dependent upon timeless personalities 258 for its very reality. Thus, for Flewelling, God is not 2 5 0 the slave of time but the Source of time. 250"The signature of the Unknown God," The Personalist, XXX, 249. 2^*Creative Personality, p. 143. 232Loc. cit. 253Ibid., p. 139. 254lqc. cit. 233Reason in Faith, pp. 216 ff. 256conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 77. 257Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 128. 258Ibid., p. 248. 25^Forest of Yggdrasill, pp. 165, 174. 283 Flewelling, in sum, rejects the temporalism of Brightman, and Brightman finds Flewelling*s position im possible, although he says so without giving himself to a systematic attack upon it. No doubt each felt that the careful positive statement of his own position would be sufficient refutation of another position. One could wish that these fellow personalists has come to more definitive grips with each other's thought in their various writings. BRIGHTMAN'S CRITICISM OF FLEWELLING*S DOCTRINE OF TIME Brightman wrote a review of Flewelling*s book, The n r A Person,for both The Philosophical Review and for Zion's A/Ll Herald, In it he devotes but one paragraph to Flewelling*s doctrine of time. It reads as follows: The author defends immortality for those who are worthy of it. The reader wishes for more grounds to support this interestingly selective view. Flewelling goes on to assign immortality to a realm wholly 'beyond time* (p, 308). Yet he gives no empirically personalistic account of this abstraction. The concept of time is too difficult and too essential to persons to be banished so cavalierly. Kant's struggles with the timeless in Das Ende aller Dincie are not especially encouraging. A " more empirical personalist should find timeless 26QPhilosophical Review, LXII (1953), pp. 282-287. 2 6 lZion's Herald (1952), p. 592. 284 immortality not merely difficult. He should find it impossible.262 This is what we should expect from one whose doctrine is temporalistic• We shall have occasion later to point out more carefully the contrasts between our two philosophers at this point. Here we note that though both men are influenced by Bergson in reference to a doctrine of time, each is influenced differently--one accepting from that 263 philosopher that which the other rejects. We now proceed to consider the philosophy of history. Since our two thinkers differ in their views of time we need not expect them to agree in their philoso phies of history. By far the more voluminous writer in this area is Flewelling, although Brightman has a care fully worked out interpretation of history. Philosophical Review, LXII, pp. 286-287. o r o Compare Flewelling's rejection of a temporalis tic God, such as Bergson suggests, as against Brightman's acceptance of the same concept. CHAPTER VIII PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY This chapter is concerned with a summary of what Flewelling and Brightman have written about the meaning and significance of history, to which they give a personalistic interpretation. Hence, both men see pur pose in history, and both are optimistic about the out come. But whereas Flewelling is more pragmatic, culture oriented, and prophetic; Brightman is more systematic, metaphysical, and cataclysmic. As to be expected, both men are more favorable to personal theism than are most of their contemporaries. Neither of them is much impressed with an apocalyptic view of history. Whereas the doctrine of God and the problem of evil seems to have been a major concern with Brightman, it is in this chapter that we approach a study of what was Flewelling's forte as a philosopher. His socio-cultural philosophy of man makes much of the evolution of the human species and its variant societal manifestations. Brightman acutely notes that Flewelling Mhas developed a personalism largely on the basis of history";^ this is ^Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 206. 286 the central emphasis of all his thinking. Just as the idea of the person has great significance for history, so also does history have tremendous importance for one's philosophy of the person. Because of this concern on the part of Flewelling, the major portion of this chapter must be devoted to his thought. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY The major sources for the study of Flewelling's philosophy of history are threefold: (1) the various articles which he has written for the journal of which he himself was the founder and which he edited for so many 2 years, The Personalist; (2) his books, especially Philosophy and the War, 1918; The Survival of Western Culture, 1943; Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, 1951; and Winds of Hiroshima, 1956; (3) his "Foreword" to his book, The Person, 1952, pp. ix-xii. Flewelling rejects both the linear idea of history which has been so basic to the progress of western culture, and the cyclic view of history that has long been basic to eastern culture. He adopts what he calls a "Quantum View" of history which is dynamic and personal- istic. This point of view involves such salient features ^See the Bibliography on Flewelling for the publication data. 287 as individualism, humanism, personalism, theism, and over all a basic optimism about human destiny and society's future. Flewelling thinks of history as a process which involves divine cooperation, and takes on the nature of a phenomenology of spirit. Unconsciously he seems to be influenced by Hegel in his setting up of this dialectic. The thesis of the eastern cyclic idea of history stands over against the antithesis of the western linear development, and a synthesis is achieved by means of his "Quantum View." His foundation for a universal synthesis of these conflicting concepts of culture is the basic principle of personalism--"the supreme worth of the Person." Here is the true basis for a rapprochement.^ Commenting on Flewelling*s book, The Survival of Western Culture, his friend and colleague, Wilbur Long, has stated: . . . A study of Spengler's pessimistic philosophy of history, led him to the conclusion that the idea of person, which is implicitly the seed thought of both Socrates and Christ, is the central theme of Western history and the key to the understanding of occidental institutions and values, whether ethical, social, political, legal, economic, or religious. This was the thesis of his volume, The Survival of JThis emphasis is especially prominent in his Reflections on the Basic Ideas of East and West (Peiping, China: College of Chinese Studies; California College in China, 1935), and his Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, 1951. 288 4 Western Culture published in 1943. Flewelling's book was written, then, in answer to Spengler's widely read and challenging work, Per Untergang des Abendlandes, with its less pungent English title, The Decline of the West.5 It is interesting to note the optimism of Flewelling as over against the pessimism expressed by Spengler. But Flewelling's book is more than an answer to Spengler, it is the positive setting forth of our philosopher's thought regarding human history. Hence it must be regarded the most important of our sources for a study of this facet of Flewelling's thought. Elsewhere, however, Flewelling has written: "The history of Western Culture is the story of the successive attempts of the Western world to find individual self- expression in various realms of human experience and activity6 . . . the primal impulse of modern civilization is . . . the search for moral self-realization."7 Wilbur ^See his "Introduction" to Flewelling's autobiogra phy, The Forest of Yggdrasill (edited by W.H. Werkmeister. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1962), p. xxvi. ^Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (2 Vols. in One. C.F. Atkinson, translator. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1934). ^"Creative Ideas in the Field of Western History," The Personalist, XIII, 83. 7 Loc. cit. 289 Long further comments on this insight. He says: Professor Flewelling's philosophy is in principle not new; it is indeed that venerable doctrine which is the collective insight of civilization both East and West. Moral law and spiritual principles, he teaches, not only operate as dynamic forces in human life, but represent the essential character of Reality itself. This subscribing to the 'Wisdom of the ages,' however, is merely the foundation for the building of his own philosophy of history. . . . Western ideals in general, then, embodied in such words as individualism, liberalism, theistic per sonalism, and democracy, are not a passing episode, a closing chapter in world history. They are rather an authentic embodiment of the moral principle behind the world and the goal of human history every where.® Flewelling served as a professor with the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. His specific assign ment was with the A.E.F. University at Beaune as head of its department of philosophy. He also undertook further studies at the Sorbonne with Henri Bergson serving as the 9 chairman of his studies committee. Here he completed Bergson and Personal Realism. His little book, Philosophy and the War, given first as a lecture to the Graduate Council at the University of Southern California, was published in 1918 and used in some of the training camps, which fact became a barrier later to Flewelling's entry into Germany,It shows the power of a ®Wilbur Long, "Death or Survival of Western Culture?" The Personalist, XXIV, 300-301. Q See his Forest of Yggdrasill, pp. 65-66. 10Ibid., pp. 62-63. 290 philosophical idea upon history as one of the major under lying causes of that war* In his Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, a series of lectures which he delivered at the University of the Pacific in honor of the late Tully Cleon Knoles, he declares: "Spiritual ideas are the determinants of world events," and contends that "a change of spiritual objectives would alter the face of society overnight In his later book, Winds of Hiroshima, he shows how an "increase of physical power brings increase of 12 moral responsibility." He states it thus: The long-neglected voices of the spirit speak a language which must no longer be misunderstood or neglected. The preservation of our historic culture depends not so much upon scientific knowledge as upon the moral and spiritual integrity of the possessors of the H-bomb, In his "Foreword" to his larger book, The Person, Flewelling states in summary his matured philosophy of history. The entire passage merits quotation at this juncture, but for the sake of brevity we shall summarize it. Even "from before the days of Heraclitus . . . the Western World has sought to break the matrix of Oriental ^onflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 2. l^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 5. 13Loc. cit. 291 14 Absolutism from which it was born." Moreover, "Heraclitus was also the first of the Greeks to describe the person as having central place in the world of phenomena. " ' * ' 5 Likewise the prophetic movement in Judea reaching "its climax in the Founder of Christianity, gave new meaning to this emphasis by stressing the intrinsic worth of the person,"^ Yet even then the West did not succeed in sloughing off the older totalitarianism of the East: due to Plato’s influence upon early Christian theologies which were "formulated by men trained in the Platonic tradition," the earlier Medieval mind "became 17 dominated by totalitarian and absolutistic concepts." The first step toward a recovery from this situ ation came with the revival of Aristotle in the Christian * | Q world, who was "the great exponent of individualism," and for whom the real was not the class but the individu als which constituted the class. This augured the advent of democracy, in which "institutions would depend upon persons, and not persons upon institutions";^ it was ^ • ^The Person, p. ix. 15Loc. cit. ^Loc, cit. 17Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. also a return to Christianity. "The great light that reinstated personalism and democracy was Thomas Aquinas ."2® Flewelling thinks that now in his time the forces of totalitarianism and democracy "may be in their last great struggle, and the outcome involves the survival of Christian personalistic culture, or its supplanting by 21 Oriental absolutism." He suggests that the recent line up of combatants was significantly totalitarian on one side and democratic on the other. Yet into this condition of affairs the new scien tific discoveries have come as an additional ferment of change. Science, long subject to the concept of monism of matter, has now reverted to the principle of Heraclitus, and come to recognize "the changing and personal nature of reality. It thus finds itself in a new and surprising rapport with the principles of Hebrew prophetism and early 22 Christianity." The full implications of the new physics and the implications of relativity may not yet be grasped. But from various sources there is coming in now "a full tide, with the center of interest in the person, whose inner world is now seen to be the world of important 20t, . , Ibid., p. x 293 23 realities and the field of future inquiries," So he concludes: The person as the center of reality, and bearing within himself the meaning of the Cosmos, is the distinctive discovery of Western Culture. Because it is so elemental to the interpretation of the world, it can find response also in the heart of a wearied and buffeted Orientalism, and can become the basis of new understanding between East and West. Because of its common human appeal, recognition of the intrinsic worth of every person is the foundation of democracy and the source of any ultimate world under- standing.24 It is his further suggestion that personalism with its emphasis upon the sanctity of the individual could rise like a ground swell, become the synthesizing and rallying point "in a world made small by modern discovery,” and bring in that universal understanding that could avert 25 universal destruction. He thinks that "Personalism as the philosophy of such a universalism has always existed, but could act as a catalyst only in the fulness of time."2* * Salient characteristics of Flewelling's philosophy of history must include its individualism, its dynamism, 23Ibid., p. xi. 24Loc, cit. ^Ibid., pp. xi-xii. 26Ibid., p. xii. 294 the strong humanistic note, its personalism which ascends into a real theism, its basic optimism, and a wholesome prophetic view* We propose to let each of them become the focal point for one of the succeeding sections* Others of Flewelling’s writings will be found corroborative of thoughts gathered from the above mentioned sources* To this analysis let us now turn our attention. History and the Individual We have noted above Flewelling's emphasis upon the importance of the worth of the individual, in the prog ress of western culture the individual has been signifi cant* He says: An examination of history shows with a remarkable unanimity of cases that the advances of society are almost wholly through the personalities of great leaders. These are the creators of the social mind who lift the general level of thought. Significantly enough the world's great leaders have been those endowed with a marked self-consciousness* When we note the cases of men who have profoundly affected not only their own age but the ages that have come after them, we discover a curious similarity in one respect. Self discovery has come to each with the power of a great conviction. Each has been imbued with a new sense of the worth and meaning not only of his own personality, but of all personality. All other things for which men strive and in which they rest have seemingly become as naught to them under the supreme consciousness of the value, the worth, and reality of the individual.27 One does not read far in the writings of Flewelling 27Creative Personality, p. 292• 295 until he is convinced that he, like Boethius, "believed with all his soul in the intrinsic worth of the individual as possessing a value within himself which should not be surrendered to prince, power, potentate, or organised society."28 But individualism can be overdone. So he contends that individualism in morals must be balanced always by responsibility. He cites both Socrates and John the Baptizer as exemplary exponents of this warning. Indi vidualism in society must be balanced by law. "We forget," he says, "in our individualism that law is the necessary OQ concomitant of a crowded world," ^ Individualism in the state must be balanced by Democracy. Individualism in the mental life must be balanced by universal education with learning open to all. This is the very idea of the term, University. Individualism in religion must be constantly refined by such processes as Reformation and Counter- Reformation. Likewise individualism in science must be counterbalanced by a true understanding of dynamic evo lution, not identified with materialistic determinism, but with contingency and freedom. The raicrocosraic mirror 28The Things That Matter Most, p. 306. 20 "The Present Dilemma of Civilization," The Personalist, XIII, 169. 296 of the universe is the person--the self. And lest our individualism get off balance, as is often the case in our present dilemma of modern civilization, it needs these checks and balances to make it a responsible individu- n . 30 alxsm. Flewelling offers the observation that "Western culture is a spirit of freedom based on the right of every person to the completest self-expression and fulfillment possible without the invasion of similar rights in 31 others ." In his little book, Philosophy and the War, mentioned above, he shows the influence of philosophy upon the course of human history in the case of the German nation. It is his contention that the philosophy popular in Germany prior to World War I created a type of egoistic individualism that resulted in somewhat of an overbearing impersonalism. First, there was Goethe's ethical philoso phy in his Faust which made a claim for the rights of individualism, but here was individualism at the expense of personality. Thus it took on the nature of an embattled impersonalism which exalted the individual at the expense of human values. He observes that Goethe's "doctrine that 30Ibid., pp. 165-177. 3^"The Person and World Crisis," The Personalist, XXII, 345. 297 the individual is right in seeking his own development at any moral cost and without regard for the rights of notes that "the popular worship accorded Goethe in the German world prepared the way for the political ethics of a Bismark and the essential prophet was provided in World War I there were three books included in every German soldier's knapsack: Nietzsche, Faust, and the Bible. He is of the opinion that Nietzsche's achievement of power concept had much to do in conditioning the German mind for the War of aggression. He adds a further obser vation that "the surest cure for radicalism is to make it responsible."34 Thus history shows the demand for the personalistic interpretation of life based on "the intrinsic value of 35 one person." Wherever we overlook human values and drift into impersonalisra it becomes a veritable Frankenstein to mock us. So he urges that we move from individualism with its "self-seeking, to personalism with others has had most baneful consequences." 32 He further 33 Nietzsche." He had occasion to know that during the 3^R.T. Flewelling, York: Abingdon Press, 1918,, 33Loc. cit. 34Ibid., p. 64. 35Ibid., p. 47. 298 its self -giving ,"3^ He holds that "society . . . should be so organized as to present every person the best possible opportunity for self-development, physically, mentally, and spiritual ly, since the person is the supreme essence of democracy Q7 and hostile to totalitarianisms of every sort," History shows the supreme worth of the individual. It also shows the falsity of that egoistic individualism which would advance through a disregard of the rights of others and an ignoring of basic human values. History as Dynamic Process Flewelling looks upon the person as a "Field of 38 Energy." He says: "Out of the immaterial sources of the spirit spring all creative acts and they rest upon 39 freedom." This concept tallies with his "Quantum View of History,"^® a view wherein he seeks to apply Max Survival of Western Culture, p. 281. 37 "Personalism," Living Schools of Philosophy (Twentieth Century Philosophy. D.D. Runes, ed.), p. 283. 38"The Person as a Field of Energy'," The Personalist, XXXIII, 5-14. Cf. also The Person, chapter XXXVIII, pp. 321-328. 3 0 The Person, p. 323. 4 ®Cf. Survival of Western Culture, Chapter XXVII, pp. 287-298. 299 Planck's "Quantum Theory" of physics to history. Planck sought to show that the elemental amount or unit of radiant energy varies according to the frequency of the radiator, the emission or absorption of which is not con tinuous but takes place in small, finite amounts which he called quanta. This would oppose the theory of continuity of force in physics by asserting that forces are not continuous but discontinuous. They move in waves like the beat of the surf upon the shore, and "the action of 41 individual atoms is unpredictable." This concept he applied to history. It is not linear or cyclic but intermittent in waves and surges like Planck's quanta. He quotes Heraclitus to the effect that "out of strife comes existence."^ There are surges or turning points in the road of history.^ The world is a 44 process. So he rejects any static absolutism, declaring that "society is a living organism" rather than a static ^Ibid.. p. 287. It would seem that Flewelling introduces here also Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, though he does not mention him or his theory. Elsewhere he says: this principle "is linked up with the Quantum Theory." Survival of Western Culture, p. 201. AO "A Turn in the Road of History," The Personalist, XXXIII, 229. Cf. Ibid., also his Survival of Western Culture, Chap. XXVII. 44 Survival of Western Culture, pp. 22-23, and 21. 300 achievement,45 It is not, therefore, a mechanism46 which operates on laws that are mechanistic and predictable. There is the possibility of human choice with its effects 47 upon large portions of society. This makes room for novelty, change, and freedom,4® "Being is a universal 49 Becoming," Thus the dynamic principle in the course of history is the "directive will of man,'1^ Over and above all this in the process of human evolution there is the "dynamism of the spirit, a Divine Presence in history."5^ "Out of the immaterial sources of the spirit spring all 52 creative acts and they rest upon freedom," When one takes cognizance of these facts then he knows that history CO cannot be an unchanging status quo. Western civiliza tion can never be satisfied with itself. "Harmony reaches its highest fulfillment, not in static unity, but by the 45Ibid., p. 295. 46Ibid., p. 18, 47Loc. cit, 48Ibid., p. 20. 49 Winds of Hiroshima, p. 49. 5QThe Person, p, 323. ^^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 101. 52The Person, p. 323. ■*^Cf. Survival of Western Culture, Chapter XX. 301 more marvelous concatenations of diverse influences 54 working toward a common end*1 ' Flewelling thinks that Heisenberg's principle of 55 uncertainty concerns the very nature of reality, and reality is to be looked upon as an event in a space-time continuum.^6 Hence there is seen a very close connection between metaphysics and history in Flewelling's philosophy of history. This also leads him to the rejection of any evolutionary necessitarianism. True evolution is dynamic. Man may reject his higher values and turn back to chaos, or he may cooperate with their dynamic evolutionary prin ciples and advance to a new day.^ We shall have occasion again to note how Flewelling rejects both the linear and the cyclic views of history in favor of his so-called Quantum view which is basically dynamic. If the question be raised as to how he 54 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 61* - * ■ ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 200. 56 Ibid., p. 203, Flewelling follows this with the explanation: "A continuum requires not only a before and after but a continuing self-referring subject of the persisting experience, for experiences persist only in meaning. That is, a continuum of any kind calls for an observer who can grasp a unity of meaning past, present and future." 57„Thc Future of Civilization," The Personalist, XII, 166-174. 302 avoids sheer pessimism in the light of the fact that man can reject a higher destiny and turn back to chaos, the answer lies in his strong faith in the dynamic divine- human cooperation that manifests itself in vital resur gences of human values in the divinely superintended evolutionary process. With this we approach another facet of his philosophy of history. Moral law and spiritual principles operate as dynamic forces in human life, but they also partake of the very nature of reality itself. There is but one arena where these are realized, and that is the one trans-temporal reality, human life itself, the Person. History and the Human Element It is Flewelling’s contention that man is the most 58 significant of all things. Hence his frequently stated dictum: "To the wise man in search of reality, nothing 59 human can be alien." Modern man seeks nobler self- realization.^ Thus, in his essay on "Personalism," in the symposium on Twentieth Century Philosophy, he says; The resurgence of personalistic ideas in the history of western thought has been rather 58 Survival of Western Culture, p. 280. 59Ibid., p. 170. 6 0 Ibid., p. 254. 303 significantly connected with certain historical crises. These crises have borne recurring simi larities. It is as if man is forever bending himself upon the building of well-defined govern mental, social, institutional, intellectual or religious systems in his efforts after stability and progress. As these outer structures have proved illusory or have failed to achieve expected results he has each time been driven back upon his own personal resources. He has from time to time been called upon to take account of human nature itself and of those values which are perennial because they are a common function of personality.^ Thus man in crisis must take account of human nature itself. In fact, the human race is on the thres hold of a higher destiny. The new frontier is within the soul of man himself. It is man alone who stands in the presence of opportunities related to all that is past and all that is to come.^ Therefore the new challenge of history is not the conquest of nature but of human 64 nature. There may be something valuable that man can learn from his crises, such aj the recent wars, for out of the wreckage of war comes "the unity of common inter- 65 66 est," and men discover their common noble qualities. ^^"Personalism," Living Schools of Philosophy, p. 285. ^ Winds of Hiroshima, p. 17. 63Ibid., p. 87. 64Cf. Ibid., p. 101. ^Philosophy and the War, p. 49. 6 6 Ibid., p. 51. 304 Though science has given to man such powers over nature for human destruction, it has also opened doors to the amelioration of the human lot, but upon the rugged con- 6 7 dition of spiritual self-mastery, ’ ’ Only man can con- 6 A sciously forfend the future and bend it to his will," but let him never forget that "the person finds himself and his highest good only in the well-being of all," Now since man is an emotional creature, the emotional element must be recognized, and this emotional element must involve universal solicitude for the rights of man. Philosophy and science must lead the way. The future idealism must be humanistic and intensely person- 7 0 alistic. In history man has seen and tried authoritarianism, individualism, scientism, socialism, materialism; but ever there remains the divine unrest and soul-sickness in the heart of man. Traditionalism and authoritarianism in religion similarly have failed; the religion of the future must include the dynamic needs of the entire person, must 6 7 Winds of Hiroshima, p, 128, 68Ibid.. p. 84. 6^Survival of Western Culture, pp. 29-30. 7 n "Future of Civilization," p, 169, be emotionally satisfying, and must be intellectually 71 honest and respectable. Flewelling disparages the mischief that has been wrought in our present century by the dream of a "chosen people," called to impose themselves upon the rest of the 72 world. Because of this he is more favorable to Zeno's Republic than he is to Plato's. The former would embrace the whole world and make every citizen become a "philosopher-king."/J He objects to the drawing of class lines in relation to humanity. Herein he discerns the genius of personalism as a socio-cultural movement; it has within it that germ of true humanism which surmounts the differences in culture, religion, and politics, and, if rightly understood and applied, can serve as a rallying point for men of good will everywhere.74 "In the last analysis," he says, "we can be be- 75 trayed by ourselves alone." . . . the greatness and the glory of human life is this, that it is possible for man to tie up his life to matters of such moment to human progress that he 7^ ~Loc. cit. 72"A Turn in the Road of History," The Personalist, XXXIII, 231. 7^Loc. cit. 74Cf. Wilbur Long's "Introduction," to The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxix. 306 leaves the race under obligation to continue and to realize his ideal, It may be a dream of social righteousness, or international association, or perfect color in art, or perfect line in sculpture, or abiding principles of truth, but if it have about it that which goes deeply into the nature of man, world, or God, it can never die.7^ It is because of the "unfinished, unperfected quality of the human spirit," that man "cannot be satis fied with a world which is less than perfect and as yet 77 is far from the moral goal which is home." Thus our philosopher is convinced that "the future idealism must be 7 8 humanistic and intensely personalistic." The Personalistic Focus of History The truth of Brightman's observation, noted above, that Flewelling "has developed a personalism largely on 79 the basis of history" becomes impressively evident as one works through the philosophy of history held by Flewelling. We have already noted his contention that "the person as the center of reality, and bearing within himself the meaning of the Cosmos, is the distinctive 80 discovery of Western Culture." Here, therefore, we are Creative Personality, p. 244. 77 Christ and the Dramas of Doubt, p. 4. 78„The Future of Civilization," p. 169, 7 ^Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 206. ®®The Person, p. xi. 307 involved with the metaphysical aspect of his philosophy of history. Flewelling is quite certain that our world calls for a common principle supreme over all nationalisms, races, and languages, that is, some basis of thought and foundational philosophy upon which people of the whole world may come together on a common ground. This, since all men are human, and seek to realize their basic potential, is the very principle of personalism, the standpoint offering "such a principle in its doctrine of the intrinsic sanctity of every personality which alone 81 can ground a true democracy." As early as 1918 Flewelling had declared that history shows the demand for a personalistic interpre tation of life based on "the intrinsic value of one 82 person." Since then the advent of modern totalitar ianisms has served to validate this principle and opinion, in view of the fact that the subordination of the indi vidual to the ruthless will of a dictator in charge of a totalitarian state, is only to reverse the evolution of the human person. The center for world understanding is, he is sure, the person. ®*Loc. cit. QO Philosophy and the War, p. 47* 308 Speaking of "Creative Ideas in the Field of Western 83 History," he again contends that the recognition of the full significance of the person affords us "a common basis of appeal as wide as humanity itself, providing the way out to a broader basis of world wide culture than has ever 84 been known." An impersonalistic concept of world history will not suffice, the answer to the world’s prob lems can never come from thence. Neither will any abso lutism furnish the answer. He declares: "A world of events in continuous change must work toward betterment or Q C toward decay." Herein lies the challenge of today's world. Western man has come by a linear route westward in his conquest of new worlds, but now that this has been achieved, there must be an upsurge of new spiritual life that shall engage him in a conquest of the very nature of man himself. This must take on the challenge of new value commitments and moral achievements. Here, again, personalism as a socio-cultural movement offers the most pragmatic philosophy to be had. This is true by reason of the fact that Personalism is individualism tempered with 83 Cf. his article by this title, The Personalist, XIII, 81-93. 84 , . Ibxd., p. 81. 8^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 121. 309 8 6 self-restraint and the attitude of Noblesse Oblige. Moreover, "the degree of any civilization is to be measured by its success in the cultivation of the 87 achieving person, among its members." For "only that organization of society has a right to the title ’civilized' which holds persons to be the supreme 88 value." Hence, "the free person must be the aim and O Q achievement of the social order," since "the supreme 90 end of civilization is the person." Looking upon natural reality as events in a space- 91 time continuum (which he notes xs in keeping with the modern definition of the atom by recent physics), person ality must then be recognized as the one living constant of reality. In it he recognizes the underlying continuum 92 of the world. Therefore every person possesses an 93 inalienable worth because of what he may become. 86nxhe Future of Civilization," p. 172. Q7 Survival of Western Culture, p. 10. ®8Loc. cit. 89Ibid., p. 229. 9QIbid., p. 265. 91Ibid., p. 203. 9^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 43. "Personality alone gathers past, present, arid future into a continuum." Winds of Hiroshima, p. 46. 98Things That Matter Most, p. 235. 309 8 6 self-restraint and the attitude of Noblesse Oblige. Moreover, "the degree of any civilization is to be measured by its success in the cultivation of the 87 achieving person, among its menriiers," For "only that organization of society has a right to the title 'civilized' which holds persons to be the supreme 88 value," Hence, "the free person must be the aim and go achievement of the social order," since "the supreme 90 end of civilization is the person," Looking upon natural reality as events in a space- 91 time continuum (which he notes is m keeping with the modern definition of the atom by recent physics), person ality must then be recognized as the one living constant of reality. In it he recognizes the underlying continuum 92 of the world. Therefore every person possesses an 93 inalienable worth because of what he may become, ®^"The Future of Civilization," p. 172, f t 7 Survival of Western Culture, p, 10, ®®Loc, cit, 89Ibid., p. 229. 9QIbid., p. 265, 91Ibid., p. 203. 9^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 43. "Personality alone gathers past, present, and future into a continuum." Winds of Hiroshima, p. 46. 93 Things That Matter Most, p. 235. 310 In his Things That Matter Most, a work on ethics and morals which emphasizes values throughout, he says: If every person is of value intrinsically, the good life, happiness, peace, ataraxia, can be achieved only as each is given opportunity and permitted and encouraged to realize his highest possibilities. The good society is menaced if within its bounds any one is denied by any means the right to his highest self-expression. The right of each to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' becomes then a supreme right and the basis of democracy. In The Survival of Western Culture, he declares: "Any organization of Society which smacks of regimentation that is not self-regimentation is an offence against the 95 person." Only a society that makes room for and recognition of the rise of the ordinary person to leader ship within that society is based on the true principle of the worth of the individual. As one looks to history, Flewelling believes, It is possible to trace the development of civilization by a consideration of its great leaders, and these men have apparently come to their place of leadership because of an assurance arising within self-consciousness. Social progress then may be seen as coming perhaps not primarily through change of environment nor of social circumstance, but first of all through the impact of personality.®^ Our philosopher therefore looks upon history as the 94Ibid., p. 236. 95 Survival of Western Culture, p. 90. ®^Creative Personality, p. 297. 311 progression of the human person marked by its evolution toward higher and greater unfolding, and characterized both by set backs and upsurges of human energy and in sight. But ever the questing, restless spirit of man can be relied upon, with its sense of destiny, to seek that 97 cosmic reality which pertains to human values. We must now give attention to the basic theism which pervades all of Flewelling's philosophy of history. The Theistic Poundation of History Flewelling is convinced that causal intelligence is 98 in the very constitution of reality. This makes person ality the clue and the key to a proper understanding of reality and the dynamics of the spirit, a Divine Presence 99 working in history. Philosophy "cannot stop with humanism alone."^ It must not be anti-theistic. There must come assurance of the cooperation of a Supreme Intelligence with man's sacrifice and suffering for achievement. The new basis of authority must be human values, but for their highest realization there must be 97Cf. Creative Personality, Chapter XXV. ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 85. 9^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 101. 10O»»The Future of Civilization," p. 173* 312 a sense of God. It is just here that the philosophy of _ . 101 personalism offers hope. Man's sense of destiny must become cosmic in its 102 sweep or it becomes nationalistic and divisive. v What is lacking in our day is a consciousness of a living God at work in human affairs. History, when rightly under stood, reveals the hand of God in the affairs of men. 103 "The Invisible constant is the Creative Spirit." As he has often insisted, there could be no true evolution without a guiding intelligence--a creative power that ^ ^ 104 works for progress. Evolution is an act of intelligence. The evolu tionary theory must find its completion in the theistic hypothesis which is necessary to make it reasonable. "An evolution which provides for growing moral achievement can be explained only by referring to a Creative Intelligence of which moral purpose is the chief and abiding charac- 105 teristic." Yet belief in the existence of God acting in evolution and history must, of course, ever remain in 101Ibid., p. 174. lQ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 29. ^ ^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 49. l^Survival of Western Culture, p. 273. IQ^creative Personality, p. 79. 313 the status of only a "warranted belief" or faith.But it is not an unreasonable belief to hold that "the order of nature and the order of spirit find their synthesis in the Personality which maintains both as the manifestations 107 of His own creative will." "The Supreme Creative Power," says Flewelling, "is spirit and consciousness, living and manifesting itself in all life as plan and purpose, working toward events, and it cannot be under- 108 stood from the standpoint of materialism." He con tinues: "It can only be that the personhood of man is the creation, the echo, the similitude, of the power within 10Q and behind all being." The phenomena of our universe may be classified either as persons or things. And since both are necessary to the system, it follows that personality is a part of the world order, or, more generally speaking, of the universal order. Since the world order includes minds or mind, it is only by the closest cooperation--by unity of effort— that the fullest expression of either can be achieved. If the world order is personal it must also be 106Cf. Ibid., Chapter VII. 10?The Reason in Faith, p. 202. IQ^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 31. 1 0 9 Ibid., p. 115. 314 moral. We may then ask, what is the secret of the Cosmos? On what basis can we bring together man's objective world? Flewelling suggests that it is upon the basis that matter itself is continuously and purposely willed into being by a Supreme power which creates both the relations and the persons who grasp these relations. This is God's world. God awaits man's cooperation in moral achievement. God, the Supreme Person, is the secret of the world-order "All true laws of the universe are God's laws."^* The only reality is God and his progressively unfolding plan 112 and purpose and work, and the world of finite spirits." He affirms: "This is God’s world," but of a God who wishes 113 "to make man a party to moral achievement." The Divine and human actors in this drama of 114 history must move toward an increasingly perfect goal: ^Summarizing his Creative Personality, pp. 299- 304. lllThe Reason in Faith, p. 202. 1 1 O x ^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 109. H ^Creative Personality, p. 304. ^^Flewelling has shown that if one changes the reading of St. John's opening sentence from "in the begin ning was the Word," to "in the beginning was the act," as does Goethe in his Faust, then history becomes a mere "ebb and flow of becoming": the only adequate solution of Goethe's problem is "the recognition of a directing Per sonality." For "man himself is a lonely, inexplicable tragedy, except as behind nature there is a directing Personality, a Mind that can fellowship with his." See his Christ and the Dramas of Doubt, pp. 151-153* 315 The demands of an all-wise and perfect Creator can be nothing less than the redemption of the whole social order, and that through the cooperating will of his creatures. . . . That surely would be a sorry outcome of cosmic effort which resulted only in the redemption of some broken fragments of its creation. Having created the world of free individuals, God has purposed that this world cannot be redeemed without the cooperation of the free wills of the individuals thus created.This is part of the self-limitation a Creator of free individuals imposes upon Himself. Nothing less, then, than the recovery of the whole social order,"a world which out of tragedy and vicissitude has learned to love the will of God--such a world alone could be adequate justification for pain and evil that have been world-wide ,,117 and age-long." Flewelling came to grips with the problem of evil in his earliest literary and philosophical achievement, his book, Christ and the Dramas of Doubt. And, as »e have noted in the introduction, his Survival of Western Culture was written specifically as an answer to Spengler's pes simism. He is not to be accused, as some personalists may rightly be, of dodging the problem of evil in a world presided over by a good God. With it all he is a radiant 115 The Reason in Faith, p. 185* ll6Ibid., p. 183. 1 1 7 Ibid., p. 185. 316 optimist: he is convinced of the limitless perfectibility of human nature, and he has faith that a Superintending Providence will not be worsted in the long reaches of history and human evolution. To this emphasis let us now advance. The Optimistic Outlook for History Flewelling has great faith in humanity and the future outcome of history. This basic optimism colors his entire book, The Survival of Western Culture, written, as we have noted, in answer to Spengler's pessimism. Wilbur Long's observation that Flewelling is not "a bland optimist" but recognizes both the perils and the possi- lift bilities for human society, is worthy of note. Yet the entire outlook of Flewelling rings with a radiant optimism that fills the reader with encouragement. In 1918, even before the Armistice had been signed, Flewelling wrote: "Our day is no day for pessimism."H® At another place in the same work he says: "The old order passes away with noise and great heat that a new and better order may come."^20 He peiieved and could hope ■^^Wilbur Long, "Death or Survival of Western Culture?" The Personalist, XXIV, 301. 119 Philosophy and the War, p. 67. *^°Loc. cit. 317 that out of the wreckage of war would come ,!the unity of l o i common interest," that leads men to discover "their 122 common noble qualities." His faith in the outcome of history is grounded in his basic faith in man; for though man may reject God's spirit and turn back to temporary chaos, he may also 123 cooperate and advance to a new day. For this new day he looks with confident expectation, since it is right here that the philosophy of personalism offers hope--it begets a sense of the dignity of man and of the reality of 124 God. Even the new physics becomes for him the har binger of a better day: New theories of science can portend a new and better day in human history. If belief in the inert atom brought on the mechanical age of the world, why should not belief in an atom of inherent activity bring on a new age of the spirit?125 It is his opinion that man in his love for the common weal will find his own self-realization.^2^ Thus he believes that the human race is on the threshold of a 121Ibid., p. 49. 122Ibid., p. 51. l23"The Future of Civilization," pp. 166-174. *2*1 Loc. cit. I hC Survival of Western Culture, p. 205. 1 2 6 Ibid., p. 255. 318 1 2 7 * 1 2 8 higher destiny, a frontier of world citizenship. The historic drama speaks of a living power, operative within man himself, with capacity to build a society 129 greater than ever he has done in the past. We have noted how Flewelling rejects the Oriental cyclic view of history, which he declares "ends in stati- 1 3 0 cism." It is, in his way of thinking, too "centra- petal" [sic] in nature and in its sense of human destiny, involving as it does a returning to the all of the infinite, on the part of each individual historical . , 131 uni t. No view of history built upon the cyclic theory of endless repetition, however voluminously sustained, can stand before the simple facts disclosed by recent discoveries which followed in the wake of the doctrines of relativity and nuclear reaction. . . . A world of events in continuous change must work toward betterment or toward decay.13* This, too, would rule out the idea of a mere status 133 quo; hence he must also object to and reject the 127 *Ibid., p. 21. Winds of Hiroshima, Chapter I. 128, 129t, • , Ar. Ibid., p. 40. ^^Survival of Western Culture, p. 20. 131Ibid., p. 25. 132 Winds of Hiroshima, p. 121. 1 33 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 61. 319 western linear view of history which is imper sonalistic^-3^ 135 and too centrifugal in its sense of destiny.History may move in waves, or even in quanta surges of dynamic energy, but not in constantly recurring cycles nor on a straight line of a single direction. There must be some way to account for its uniqueness at every stage. So he offers the following observation: Every event in history is new, in that it is made up of new factors, new situations, and presents new problems. While there are historical analogies in the march of events, there are no repetitions. The linear concept of history which at least since the advent of Christianity has dominated its thinking, has led the Western world to look forward to the achievement of some sort of social perfection, and this expectation is the inspiring genius of Western thought. As one by one, its goals have been achieved, as, for instance, in the abolition of slavery, or peonage, feudalism, and despotism, society has rested comfortably for a time in these achievements until it has become conscious of greater objectives. Thus it is that Toynbee in A Study of History could cite the proud accomplishments of civilization, such as national expansion, idolization of tradition, standardization, and totalitarianism, as evidences of decay. In a truer and more hopeful sense it may be averred that the perfecting of contemporary instruments in any age, and man’s satisfaction with them, provides the prophecy of new accomplishment. There was a world of insight in the admonition of Jesus to his disciples not to be troubled by wars and rumors of war because, according to the Greek text, these were indications of the birth pangs of new worlds. The human race may be considered to have just topped a new hill in scientific achievement, the disclosure of hitherto unknown powers, which can in ^^Survival of Western Culture, pp. 181-182. 1 3 5 Ibid., p. 25. 320 no sense be called a recurrence of history, however inevitable the strife for their control. From the contemporary hilltop we can view in the atom for the first time in history the alternative of world salvation or world ruin.13^ In the same writing he said: . . . The present is big with the discovery of new dimensions. Human progress is never in a straight line, but like a river, gathers force behind obstructions, working silently until strong enough to overcome them, then spilling over or pushing them aside with a great r u s h . ^7 This climbing of history over the top of a new hill, this rising of the water-level behind some impounding obstruction, this standing at the parting of the ways facing "the alternative of salvation or world ruin''^3® may bring less unconditional assurance about history, but at the same time it gives to Flewelling the privilege of saying in his optimism that even though the event may be entirely unique and fraught with perils, human nature is dynamic and can be depended upon to react creatively in each crisis. Hence, "to the very extent that present world situations are disillusioning according to the measure of their failure to satisfy, to that extent is the 139 demand for a better order destined to be realized." ^ 6Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 75. 137Ibid., p. 74. 138Ibid., p. 75. ^ • 3^Survival of Western Culture, p. ix. 321 Here it is that a "'sense of destiny' may become a world- gripping factor of the future, and the dominating idea of 140 Western Culture need not entail decline." Flewelling has faith in "the eternal nature of 141 truth and righteousness founded in freedom"; he also believes in "the moral capacity of all men irrespective of 142 birth or education"; he is sure that the average man 143 can be trusted with the truth; and he has faith in the 144 moral nature of the universe itself. So it turns out that "the quantum view of history gives hope that we may 145 be near the turning point toward better things." For Flewelling, man is a pilgrim of the eterni- 146 ties, whose destiny should not be read in the times 147 but in the eternities. Only "to human persons is given the privilege of taking hold upon the eternities, or becoming co-partners in the Kingdom of God."*4® "We 140Ibid., P. 19. 141Ibid.f P* 34. 142Ibid., p. 52. 143Ibid., P« loo 144Ibid.t P* 167 145Ibid., P* 294 146winds of Hiroshima, p. 41. ^ ^Ibid . , p. 50. 148Ibid., p. 87. 322 shall always have truth enough to live by, and it will grow as we cooperate. To live in HIM (God) is to be 149 free, and to have the backing of the Universe," He also thinks that man's conquest of space, the shrinking of his world, the coming to know his fellowmen of other races and lands, his dying together with them for common causes, his questing together with them for nobler forms of self-realization; these will bring him increasingly to the realization that "the supreme end of civilization is the person, . . . and love is the universal solvent,"^^ Too optimistic, does someone say? But this is the view of history that makes for creative and vicarious living on the part of men who have caught its vision, and only creative and redemptive living will increasingly perfect both man and his world. This writer finds such a view more realistic and satisfying than the pessimism of either Spengler or Sartre. But the perfection and improvement that man seeks is not one xnat is unconditionally guaranteed, as we have noted, and as history and present circumstances show. 149Ibid., p. 97. ^ “ ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 265. ^■^Ibid., p. 262. cf. also, Winds of Hiroshima, p. 117. 323 Therefore we need our modern prophets to warn and exhort us to realize in each situation man's highest potential* This, too, is Flewelling's role, as we shall now see. History * s Challenge for the Future Herbert L. Searles, in his memorial article for 152 Flewelling, lists the various characteristics of our philosopher. Among them is the role of a prophet. We have already seen that Wilbur Long referred to him as T 55 154 such, and F.C.S. Schiller has so regarded him. The fact noted by Schiller that there are two types of prophets: the oracular and the rational, is pertinent. The former sees as in a vision and lays claims to absolute authority and prediction on the basis of his oracle. The latter makes much of intelligent reflection upon the probable consequences of external conditions. He is not fatalistic or dogmatic, but exhorts to an intelligent avoidance of the dangers he foresees. It is in this 152Herbert L. Searles, "Ralph Tyler Flewelling," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1^61-196^. ^Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press), XXV, 106-107. 153„Death or Survival of Western Culture," p. 301. l54Cf. Schiller's "Introduction," to Flewelling's book, The Survival of Western Culture, p. v. Searles, Schiller, and Long were all Flewelling's colleagues and served on the Philosophy faculty. 324 latter category that he classes Flewelling. Flewelling has thought and spoken of himself as a modern Amos, speaking warnings to the culture of our day.^56 So, although our previous section spoke of him as an optimist, we must bear in mind that he is not one who believes in the automatic progress of civilization. He has reminded us that "civilizations fall as well as 1 S7 rise." But he also views the sufferings of this age as the "birth-pangs" of a new era. At a number of times in the preceding pages we have noted how he envisages Western Civilization as standing now at the turning point 1 58 in history. He is quite sure that moral and spiritual 1 50 integrity is the price we must pay for its survival. 7 In fact, the kind of revolution needed now is a spiritual 1 AO and personalistic one. He affirms: "We need not a new world but a new soul,"^^ Thus, as a true prophet, Flewelling sits in judgment upon our present stage of 155Loc. cit. ^^Cf. Long's article cited in note 153 above. ^^Survival of Western Culture, p. 5. -^^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 128. ^ • 5^Loc. cit. 16QIbid., p. 130. 1 6 1 Ibid., p. 131. 325 Western Civilization, but he also points the way to man's next new frontier. "Men of today," he says, "are faced by a call for a pioneering of the spirit." Diagnosing our modern societal sickness he opines: "What is lacking is the con- l i d sciousness of a living God in human affairs." He quotes Caponigi of Notre Dame who, commenting on Vico, says: "It is in God's presence as providence that man 164 achieves his total presence in history." Just here, for Flewelling, is the highest expression of man's uniqueness, ^ 5 "To him, alone, of all the world of being, is given the privilege of conscious cooperation in the creative work of Deity. The possibility of intelligent partnership with God is the high-water mark of existence. • . ."^66 Hence, "greater worlds are open to faith 167 alone." For "the unseen Power that determines the universe resides also in the heart of man and is the | J t Q eventual key which must unlock for him its secrets." 162Ibid., p. 101. 163loc. cit. 164Ibid., p. 118. 165Ibid., p. 85. 166lqc. cit. 167Ibid., p. 79. 1 6 8 Ibid., p. 30. 326 Today "we walk with wary step among forces of deadly power," he says, as he contemplates man's scientific dis coveries which may mean either the uplift or the total annihilation of the race,^ He adds further: Continuation of the race depends upon human decisions and the mastery which awaits the rising generation depends upon something more than dietary regulation, free education, or social organization* It means conformation of human lives to the spiritual forces that rule existence. Unless the same spirit of life which daily creates the living world find [sic] living expression in us, there can be no future progress, no fulfilling of the higher purposes of creation. ^7C> He is aware that "new paradises lure us, but [they] can be had only by the exercise of moral and spiritual ,,171 powers•" For Flewelling, the new frontier is one of world citizenship. If man works out the practical implications of his new science a new worldwide civilization may be born. A world democracy must arise out of the death of our old isolations. This is the new challenge of history. "Universal love, and that alone, can save us from threatened calamity. Through human personality the creative Spirit of life is acting and will act, providing 169Loc. cit. 170Ibid., pp. 30-31. 171Ibid., p. 12. 327 172 creative capacity for those who seek*” We must never forget that "self determination can be overdone if it 173 does not find its way to a larger brotherhood.” Such emphases show Flewelling's attachment to the basic position of Zeno's Republic and his dissatisfaction with the Platonic classification for men in the ideal 174 state. If each citizen may become a "philosopher-king," then no racial, social, or religious classism will find room; man's sense of destiny can become cosmic and 17ft compelling; individualism will come to its best in 177 "self-giving"; and democracy will find a sure guarantee 178 in the moral good will of each individual citizen. Then, in the fulness of time, personalism may well act as the catalyst,offering the new and universal religion for the conciliation of cultures East and West. Thus he speculates, and that rather wistfully: "Perhaps the making 172Ibid., p. 51. ^ • 78Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 136. 174„A Turn in the Road of History," p. 236. ^7®Survival ^>f Western Culture, p. 29. 176Loc. cit. 177Ibid., p. 281. 178Ibid., p. 99. 179The Person, p. xii. 328 of a new world may come with a shifting of the frame of reference from material things, to a higher center of spiritual reality. Man's real evolution awaits in the 180 offing." He is quite certain that "there must be a revival of spiritual values if Western culture is to ,,181 survive," To usher in that new and upward advance so vital to our survival, Flewelling would reject such programs as Zionism, or, in contrast therewith, any cataclysmic coming of the kingdom of God by means of the sword of St. 182 Michael. This may be due to his basic faith in pur posive evolution, but it is also his belief that "eternal 183 life has its beginning in time." He would rather sug gest that "suffering may be the only catalyst that can 184- usher in the age of the Spirit." However it may come, "concerted action at the behest of the Spirit must lead 18 5 the way." Yet he seems to allow also that "for this great end nothing would seem to suffice short of a 18QIbid., p. 44. 1 f t 1 Survival of Western Culture, p. 110. 182The Person, p. 207. Cf. his review of Pieper's book, The End of Time, in The Personalist, XXXVI, 443-4437" 1®3l o c. cit. 184Winds of Hiroshima, p. 113. Cf. also The Personalisf^ XXJiVl, p. 444. --- cit. 329 theophany." For the Spiritual Renaissance and a new world, he, like John the Baptizer, would call the world once again to 187 repentance for its sins. Thus he concludes his work on The Survival of Western Culture by saying: "Should Western culture succeed in rising to the new opportunity that faces her, should she take a step forward, it must now be toward a more spiritual interpretation of life and society."*®® Such, then, is our philosopher’s thinking about history--its nature, meaning, and implications. To this theme he devoted many articles and it occupied a major por tion of his thought and time. In history, oast and still future, he saw the validation of his philosophy of personalism. What will a thinker a hundred years hence be able to say of it? Of this we are sure, he cannot disagree with Flewelling's assured belief: "A culture which is built up at the expense of toil and hardship of the forgotten multitudes is a false culture which carries with it its own curse and its own undoing."*®^ *®6Survival of Western Culture, p. 292. 187Ibid., p. 294. 188Ibid., p. 298. 180 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 284* 330 BRIGHTMAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY Brightman has not written nearly as extensively about history as has his contemporary. Yet in an article for The Journal of Bible and Religion he has worked out very systematically what he has entitled "A Personalistic 190 Philosophy of History.” There are other references scattered through his writings that also give suggestions concerning what he thought about the meaning of history. We shall seek first of all to summarize what he has said in the above article; thereafter we may seek out other important statements from him. Brightman thinks that "there is no branch of philosophy that is intrinsically more complicated than philosophy of historyThis is due mainly to the fact that it deals with unrepeatable events which can only be verified by inference from their effects upon the present. Many philosophers have sought to unravel its meaning in various ways. Brightman passes over a con sideration of these and comes to seek an understanding in the light of possible contributions from a personalistic 190 Journal of Bible and Religion, XVIII (1950), pp. 3-10, ST.---------------------- 2--- 191Ibid., p. 3. 331 philosophy, "with special reference to twentieth century 192 history, its chaos and its despair." Considering what he calls "the constituents of History," he first notes that personalistic philosophy here is roughly a type of "theistic idealism," combining features from Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze; and, later somewhat systematized by Bowne. He lists twenty-three persons who have carried personalism as applied to history forward in various directions--among them Ralph Tyler Flewelling. Brightman offers the following definition of Personalism: Personalism may be defined as a system of philosophy that regards the universe as an inter acting system of persons (or selves). According to it, everything that exists is either a person, or some experience, process, or aspect of a person, or persons, in relation to each other. Reality is social or inter-personal. A person is taken to be a complex unity of consciousness that is able to develop rational thought and ideal v a l u e s .193 Thus "the personalist is able to say with especial force that the sole constituents of history are per- 194 sons." History is not concerned with material environ ment, or fate, or an impersonal deity or force. He says: i^2Loc. cit. ^^Loc. cit. 194Ibid., p. 4. 332 History is the ongoing process of the conscious lives of inter-related persons. One person, God, is a participant in every historical occasion. History, then, consists of the inter-relations of man and God. At no time is God absent or inactive; but at no time can the presence of God be construed pantheistically.195 Brightman would maintain both the distinctivenes of persons and the fact of their interaction in history. He next considers some possible views of history. First among them would be the impersonal theories such as would hold that "personal forces are products rather than primary causes," with history's ultimate cause being 196 "some sort of impersonal and unconscious force." This is ultimately degrading to human dignity, he thinks, and therefore deserves to be rejected. Next we may think of the fate theory— the idea that some mysterious nemesis "controls the outcome of all human 197 endeavor." A more popular theory today is what he calls the "matter theory," which he summarizes as the theory that "all historical process is an effect or epi- igo phenomenon of physical events." Said events may be viewed as either geographical, biographical, economic, or 195Loc, cit. ^96Loc. cit. 197t Loc. cit. 1 9 8 Ibid., p. 4. 333 something physical* But the materialist plays into the hands of the persona list by believing that progress comes through purposes freely chosen for the sake of change. Another type of theory is pluralistic. On this view there is no one predominant force but many forces and no unity or unifying principle in control of them. Of such a view the practical outcome is confusion. Brightman turns next to four possible personalis tic theories. In them personality plays the central and determining role. The first of these he calls "the great-man theory." Carlyle was its ardent exponent, though Hegel had hinted at it. Modern history could not be the same were it not for the great personalities of the nineteenth and ^rentieth centuries. Yet great men are not the sole cause of the conditions which they have confronted nor of the movements in which they have each l go participated. A second personalistic and a broader view is what he calls "the all-men theory." According to it, history is what all men do, since men are the warp and woof of history. It is the humanistic position, or at best the atheistic existential theory. But it is Brightman's contention that man as a merely natural being is man in a ^■""A Personalistic Philosophy of History," Journal of Bible and Religion, XVIII, 5. vacuum. He says: To try to give an account of history in purely human terms, leaving God out, is to fail to account for the great good men and even for the great sinners; it offers no view of man's aspirations and spiritual yearnings evidenced throughout history.^0° A third view he calls "the God-alone theory." Man racially or individually is a mere creature, a product, or an episode. God is the all including all determining one and history is His puppet show. Whatever happens is be cause of Him; He alone endures, matters, or triumphs* Man is but a worm of the dust; human personality is sacrificed 201 to the divine and is almost depersonalized. The fourth theory Brightman calls "the inter personal or the co-operation theory." Since this is his own view we may consider it more at length. Of it he says: According to it, all of history, and especially religious history, is viewed as a system of inter personal relations on widely varying levels among all kinds of persons--both human persons and the Divine Person— with the goal of increasing co operation in the achievement of the highest values. This assumes inexhaustible possibilities in the quality and quantity of personal life. ... This is the theory of history as progress--although . . . an interpersonal philosophy of history cannot assert that there is constant, uninterrupted, or guaranteed progress among men. No one who believes in freedom could hold such a view without self-contradiction. It excludes the idea that the millennium is just around the corner. ... It excludes materialistic 335 norms of progress in terms of wealth, territory, or power* But it rests on a rational faith in God and immortality, and therefore takes as its basic principle that wherever there are men and God in a universe there are always inexhaustible possibilities of progress* Possibilities of sin, obviously; but God is the guarantee that the possibilities of progress are greater than the possibilities of sin* . . . This view has much in common with Toynbee. It might also be called cosmic democracy* The test of progress, then, is to be found in three factors: the types of personal value realized in history; the number of persons who prize and attain ideal values; and the degree of possible improvement that is available in any situation. . . . The aspiration for progress comes from God and is at bottom a longing for an increasingly co-operative and loving union between the human will and the divine will. To quench faith in such progress is to quench faith in God. To surrender it is to reduce action to co-operative acquiescence in the status quo (Latin for sin). It turns faith into futility.202 After noting the constituents of history, and some possible views thereof, Brightman next recognizes that the nature of reality is historical. This is reasoning consistently with his temporalism. But he says: "According to a personalistic philosophy of history, all reality is historical for the simple reason that all 2Ao reality is personal." He continues: "Persons are histories; they are active, developing, enduring, beings* Personalism is a kind of temporalism, because purpose and freedom and achievement of reason and value all require 202 T. . , t , Ibid.f pp. 5-6. 203T, . , Ibid., p. 6 . 204 time.” He observes: "The creative resources of free dom are illimitable. Personality is inexhaustible history."205 But the personalist can also assert that "there is nothing external to history, metaphysically conceived. 206 The concept of the non-historical is illegitimate." Even if we think of the will of God as non-historical we have misnamed what is a constant in all history. Just as that which is impersonal is valid for all persons and should be renamed "omnipersona 1" so should the eternal be renamed "omnitemporal," since it is valid for all time. Brightman thinks this view of reality as historical provides for the various epochs of history, yea, even the epochs of the universe. There may have been a pre-cosmic epoch, we now live in the cosmic epoch, and he thinks there will be a post-cosmic epoch. Thus he assures us: The sublime perspective of living in a history which is one of innumerable histories, all flowing from the inspiration of the one divine creative source is a point of view at once humbling and ennobling to man whether in misery or sin or in rectitude and happiness.^0? By arenas of history, Brightman intends the more immediate and environmental situations of the historical processes. He thinks there are also arenas of the natural and the supernatural. Both are in the realm of interpersonal history. Moreover, "all epochs and arenas are in, of, and for persons. They have one purpose--rational love, logos and agape. History is essentially one, at all times, in all arenas,"2^8 Brightman insists that "there is no super-history. There are simply different stages, phases; aspects of history."^^ His next major notation about history is that it is purposive. From the viewpoint of both personalism and religion "the most important problem is whether history has a meaning, that is, whether there is a single, unified purpose or value or a set of values toward which history is tending, by which it is guided as well as ?io judged." The presence of many purposes he thinks almost anyone would recognize. But whether these many purposes are dominated by one universal purpose is the issue. "In short," he says, "the basic problem of philosophy of history is whether there is (to quote 2 0 8 Ibid., p. 7. 338 211 Pratt) a ’Determiner of Destiny’.” Today this is a most vital problem, since widespread atheism and material ism challenge such an idea. We have the anomaly of devotion to purpose by those who deny any universal purpose. As a personalist, Brightman would accept the Jamesian concept of the self as "a fighter for ends"; for 212 to ”be a person is to be a purposer.” History has revealed certain ideal goals toward which humanity when at its best is always striving. "Chief among them are 213 truth, beauty, goodness, and holiness. . . Civili zations have constantly sought means for their attainment. From the standpoint of the personalist, ideal norms can only be actualized by cooperative effort. Hence the necessity of social institutions and their accompani ments. To one who doubts an over all purpose for history, though he acknowledges the necessity of interpersonal endeavor, the personalist must ask: "Whence all this good, 214 if not from a common source, with a common aim?" Brightman is sure that The universality and coherence of values, despite conflict, sin, and suffering, require a 211L o c . cit. 2^2Loc. cit. 213loc. cit. 2 1 4 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 339 doctrine of over ruling Providence, such as personalists assert: an over ruling, but not an all-predestinating Providence. That is the future is free and open on the one hand, yet directed and guided on the other. For personalism then, there is no history without God; the notion of a godless history as redeemer is not merely absurd--it is impossible. God is participant in all history; no history is godless. . . . Likewise since human history is God's business, a personalistic philosophy of history can never be restricted to the here and now of this world. History here is only a segment of history there. "To sum up," he says, "a long-range view is necessary both for faith and for reason. . . . In fact, the end is end- Now this matter of purpose is very complex, and as we humans are acquainted with it it is a personal experi ence. Purpose therefore presupposes an experient. But within all personal experiences there are, according to Brightman, two basic factors--The rational Given, and the irrational Given. It therefore consists of a potential to be achieved by all lesser persons. Discussion heretofore in consideration of Brightman's doctrine of God tells us just what he would include under this category of The Given. As to the irrational Given, he says: "The non- rational Given, on the other hand, consists of potentials 2 ^5 Ibid., p. 8 2 ^6 Loc. cit. to be suffered and controlled . . . all of the immediate 217 qualities of experience other than reason and will." Brightman does not view them as creations of God. "They are contingent, sometimes dystelic, sometimes atelic. 218 They are nonrational brute fact." They may be viewed as part of the total uncreated experience of the divine personality. It is Brightman*s belief that "neither personality 219 nor history is exhausted by the Given.1 * There is the presence of such items as "will, selection, control, responsibility, creativity. These words describe the very 220 stuff of history and of its realization of purpose.1 * Man’s freedom to do good or ill is amply witnessed to by history. Purpose is an act of a unitary person, interacting with other persons. So Brightman thinks that "from the very nature of purpose and personality, it follows that there can never be a final eschaton in time: no last event, no end of all of God’s world when time (and purpose) shall be no more. . . ,"221 He says: "The 2*^Loc. cit. 218Loc. cit. 2 1 9 Ibid., p. 9. 341 eternal purpose which history is actualizing is that in exhaustible creativity, including endless variety in control of the Given, endless growth in individual powers, 222 community, and lcve," His fifth and final major thought about history is that it is "Interpersonal, Rational Continuity." He recognizes that the implications of the term "interper sonal" run counter to the thought of Dewey, yet he cannot believe that history is irrational. Granted, history is largely sinful and sin is irrational in its essence, but to believe that basically history is irrational is to 223 surrender faith in God and His control. Thus he says: "Reason, for personalism, . . . is an all-inclusive view 224 of experience." He therefore agrees with Hegel that the "true is the whole, and the real is the rational.*'225 So he states: The two most essential elements in reason are, accordingly, inclusiveness and systematic unity. Reason includes all the ideal potentials of logic and norms as well as all the empirical potentials of brute fact and suffering. It is not reasonable to omit any factor; nor is it reasonable to judge history from the standpoint of any one factor--unless 222lqc. cit. 223Loc. cit. 224Ibid., p. 10. 223Loc . cit. 342 that factor can include all the others. Not only is reason an inclusive view; it is also a unified view. The mere summation of all facts is not sufficient; the facts must be seen consistently, systematically, in one synopsis. In this sense, if history is to be rational, somehow a unified principle must be found in it; unless 'one increasing purpose runs,' history is irrational.226 After discussing how these thoughts may be applied to our present melange of historical circumstances, he says: The sense in which history is rational is beginning to emerge. It is rational not because it is perfect or is entirely deducible from rational principles. History is rational because in all its sufferings and defeats and in spite of its errors and sins it always evidences the power of a controlling purpose that opens possibilities for co-operative love, no matter how dark and hateful the situation may be. History, then, with its wars and bombs and barbaric warfare, is the price that God pays in order to have men who are free. It is rational because its purpose is rational.227 But now what about the assertion that history is a continuity? Brightman acknowledges the presence of many discontinuities. "Yet," he says, "life goes on; the stream of life is unbroken. Peoples are more continuous than are governments; aspirations survive failures; . • ." and in spite of exploitation, revolt, injustice, "man's unquenchable desire for something better" persists.22® He then concludes with the following paragraph: 2 2 6 . Loc. ext. 2 2 7 r Loc. ext. 2 2 8 Ibid., p. 8 8 . 343 The personalist must rest his case for inter personal rational continuity in history not on any single event or phase of history, but on its direction as a whole. Rational faith in God sees in history a lex continui amoris— a law of the continuity of love. Continuity and coherence out weigh discontinuity and paradox. Potential good is greater than potential evil. God is more funda mental than sin and evil. This faith is not absolutely demonstrable, but it is a reasonable faith in view of all the facts. The article mentioned and summarized above (and to this point) leave little for us to note further concerning Brightman's philosophy of history. It is the product of his mature thought, written just three years prior to his death. Prior to this he had expressed belief in "a teleological philosophy of history, which seeks religious authority in the increasing purpose which runs through 230 all history." He had also acknowledged the charge that idealism holds the past in high esteem, when he wrote: "If the universe is the activity of mind, then all history O Q I must reveal traces of the reason and truth of mind."^JA In the light of the above article just summarized, one can appreciate his troubled reactions to Reinhold Niebuhr's Faith and History as he reviewed that book for 229. Loc. cit. 230"Religion as Truth," p. 67. 231 A Philosophy of Ideals, pp. 194-195. 344 the Crozer Quarterly,232 for it is Brightman's contention that "a Christian philosophy of history is essentially 2 3 3 temporalis tic• " He also thinks that one good way "to test the truth of faith in the future as God's future is to compare views of the future which leave God out with those that find God in all history."23^ He spends several pages of his book, The Future of Christianity, doing just that with the philosophies of Nietzsche, Spengler, and Pareto#233 As for himself, therefore, he finds that "the Christian faith in an eternal God who is also the Lord of history and consequently the Lord of the future,"23^ is satisfying, though, like other views of the future, it cannot be verified as one would a scientific hypothesis. The reason being that "its verification consists in its power to interpret what we do not know."237 Since "no human being can live or make sense out of his present experience unless he has some sort of faith in the 232Cf. Crozer Quarterly, XXVI (1949), pp. 249-252. 233ua Temporalist View of God," JournaI of Religion, XII, 547, 234The Future of Christianity, p. 112# 235Ibid., pp. 113-118. 236Ibid., p. 112. 2 3 7 Loc. cit. 345 unverified future," he must insist that "faith in the p O Q future is a precondition of reason" itself. Brightman would add that "faith in man's future is not dependent on 239 confidence in steady unbroken progress." At the beginning of this chapter it was observed that neither Flewelling nor Brightman were much impressed with the apocalyptic or catastrophic view of the coming kingdom of God. Brightman notes that there are "two radically different views among Christians about the prospects for the future of man. These views may be 240 called the catastrophic and the developmental." He then notes that the catastrophic view is the one held by the so-called premillennialists, which sees the world and society becoming worse and worse until this age culminates in a sudden coming of the Lord to destroy the kingdom of evil and set up his own kingdom. On the other hand, the development view (which, incidentally agrees with Brightman's temporalistic and evolutionary position) believes that the kingdom of God is within man and growing like a grain of mustard seed. "Those who hold this view," he says, "believe in the immanence of God in human 238, Loc. cit. 239Ibid., p. 135. 2 4 QIbid., pp. 140-141 346 241 history. . . He continues: "the developmental view is confident that God has not abandoned and never will abandon His human children. . . . They have faith that the earth will not be utterly spoiled and that it can be en- 242 lightened." He then offers the following observation: Both the catastrophic view and the developmental one have hope for the future, although in very dif ferent ways. To have no hope far the future at all is to have abandoned all religious faith and to be 'of all men most miserable.' The minimum Christian faith about the future of man is that God, in his own way, will control that future.243 Cognizance must be taken of one more notation con cerning our philosopher's thought about history. This relates to the significance of history's time processes for the experience of God Himself. He says: Any theistic philosophy of history, moreover, must recognize to the full the significance of the time process for God. History is not merely a screen on which the timeless Platonic Ideas are shown; even in Plato's myth of the cave, the real objects have to be moved. History is marked by real changes, real advances and decay, real activity of real persons. The God of history--the patient God of whom we are thinking— is, then, a God for whom these historical changes are real, and who somehow brings his will to expression in human life through them. This means that God rejoices in the forward movements of human history and grieves at its delays, and reverses, yet is able to make both contribute to his purposes.244 241Ibid., p. 141. 242Loc. cit. 242Loc. cit. 244The Finding of God, p. 129. 347 Summarizing, we have seen in this chapter that both of our philosophers are optimistic about the outcome of history. Both see history as a process of interpersonal relations. Both see purpose in history. But, whereas Flewelling is more pragmatically concerned with society and culture, Brightman is more temporalistic, systematic, and, in a sense, more metaphysical. Both men are theistic and Christian in their philosophy of history, and neither of them is much impressed with catastrophic apocalypticism. Their strong faith in the future of man is evident throughout. A partial reason for their optimism is found in their belief in the conservation and increase of values. To their thought about values we now turn our attention. CHAPTER IX VALUE THEORY Boyer is perhaps right in saying that "man is a value-obsessed creature,"* for man is constantly showing preferences. Brightman thinks that "of all the problems of philosophy none is closer to the heart of life than this; indeed it is the very problem of the heart of 2 life.1 ' He also says: "The value-problem has been studied from every angle in the past twenty-five or thirty years-- its psychological, ethical, religious, metaphysical, and applied aspects." He then adds: "But it is not far from the truth to say that the net yield has been disap- 3 pointing." He states the need for more careful thought in this field as follows: % If philosophy is to justify itself as an interpretation of life, the theory of value ought to furnish results of the most illuminating and practical significance for the understanding and the guidance of human civilization. If progress is possible in philosophy at all, it ought to be possible in the theory of values. . . . If the questions of value theory could be answered, it *M.W. Boyer, Highways of Philosophy, p. 239. 2Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, p. 210. ~ ^ Loc. cit. Since the publication of his book in 1928 we may note that the same problem has been "tossed out" by some. Others have carefully studied it for another thirty years. 349 would make a real difference in life. Some of these questions are: What are the supreme values of life? On what basis ought we to decide that one value is more valuable than another? Are there different types of criteria for different kinds of value? Is there an essential unity in the whole life of value? Is value objective or subj'ective? Is it essentially an experi ence of personality or not? Here ethical, logical, esthetic, metaphysical, epistemological, and practical considerations meet. If idealists can do something more toward interpreting and clarifying the data of value experience* they will perform a real intel lectual service. Both of our philosophers have placed great stress on values. Flewelling has referred to them as "the things that matter most,"^ and Brightman has spent much effort to show the relationship between values, ideals, and norms, and their further relation to existence. He would rate value experience as of equal importance with sensory experience. He says: "The basic facts that confront us here are that there is sensory experience, that there is value experience, and that somehow they are related."^ If Flewelling's writings on history and society were more extensive than those of Brightman, here the situation is reversed with Brightman exceeding his con temporary in the time and space devoted to values. 4Ibid., pp. 210-212. -*Cf• Flewelling's anthology on the problems of human values by the above title which translates the Greek phrase TO T L liL OTCXTOV . ^Person and Reality, p. 283, 350 Preponderance of space in this chapter must be given to the consideration of Brightman*s thinking. BRIGHTMAN*S DISCUSSION OF THE REALM OF VALUES The chief sources for a study of Brightman*s philosophy of values are: (1) Sections of his books devoted to value theory: such as Religious Values, chap ters III, IV, and V; Nature and Values, in its entirety, but especially chapter IV; Persons and Values, especially pages 17-26; Introduction to Philosophy (1951), chapter VII; A Philosophy of Religion, chapter III; and the sum mary of his mature thinking on the subject found in * chapter 15 of his last book, Person and Reality. (2) Vari ous shorter discussions to be found in others of his books: A Philosophy of Ideals, pages 210-212; The Spiritual Life, pages 64-68; 114-125; 167-173; The Problem of God, pages 27, 35-36, 111-112, 121-122, 148, 157-160; The Finding of God, pages 23, 87, 189-191. (3) His arti cles for the journals and symposia, written especially on the subject, such as: "Value," in Ferm's Encyclopedia of Religion, pages 808-809; "Axiology," in Runes Pictionary of Philosophy, pages 32-33; "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments," Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, pages 1-6, 8-11; "Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence," Philosophy and Phenomenological 351 Research, IV (1943), pages 219-224; MNeo-Realistic Theories of Value," Studies in Philosophy and Theology (E.C. Wilm, ed.), pages 22-64; and "Freedom, Purpose, and Values," Freedom, its Meaning (Ruth N. Anshen, ed.), pages 485-506. An evaluation of his value theory as set forth in Person and Reality appears in The Philosophical Forum, XVI, page 11, as it was given at Boston University by W.H. Werkmeister. In seeking to grasp the fundamentals of Brightman*s thought about values, one does well to begin with his Introduction to Philosophy, chapter VII, and his Philosophy of Religion, chapter III. In the glossary of the first of these two books Brightman defines Value as: "Whatever is desired or pre ferred is an empirical value. A 'true' value is what is preferred in the light of rational (coherent) thought." The index of his Philosophy of Religion defines value to be: Whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by anyone at any time. Prereligious value: Any experience of an empirical value (whether or not it be a true value) which is not yet 'taken' as related to a cosmic source of value.8 Brightman queries whether or not one should begin 7 Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 339. His italics • 8Philosophy of Religion, p. 538. 352 or conclude with definitions. Yet the reader has a right to know the results of the finished investigation at the outset, he thinks, so he begins with definitions. A more general definition of value would be his notation that "the word value," is used "to designate the realm of what is esteemed to be intrinsically worthy as an end of human g action or enjoyment." He further notes that "the compre hensive investigation of value experience is called axiology."^® This terra is the all inclusive one applied to the field of worthwhile human experience and endeavor, and the theories relating thereto. Brightman begins by distinguishing intrinsic and instrumental values. The former would include "whatever is liked, desired, prized, enjoyed, preferred, or acknowledged as interesting, important, or worthy of approva1."^ The latter is "whatever is a cause, means, or ’instrument' for producing or developing intrinsic 1? value." He defines "valuation" as "the experience of ascribing intrinsic value to an experience, or the mere ^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 140. lQIbid., p. 141. *^Loc. cit. 12Ibid., pp. 141-142. 353 1 ^ feeling of value." A substitute term for this could be value-claim. Now since value "is the actual experience of enjoying a desired object or activity," it becomes there- 14 fore, "an existing realization of desire." He looks upon "a desired object not yet experienced" as "a potential value," whereas an actual value "is the presence in experience" of such a desired object or experience• "The opposite of value is disvalue or evil or worthless- ness,"^ Intrinsic values are "immediate, consummatory, 17 ends." Instrumental values are "contributory, mediate, causal, means."*8 An intrinsic value is thus "whatever is desired or enjoyed for its own sake, as an end in itself."^ An instrumental value is "any fact whatever, whether in my experience or out of it, which tends to or> produce the experience of intrinsic value." "As a matter of experienced fact, all intrinsic values are also 13Ibid.. p. 142. ^ Philosophy of Religion, p. 88. ^Loc. cit. His italics. ^ Ibid. t p# 89. His italics. ■^Loc. cit. His italics. 1 A Loc. cit. His italics. ^ Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 354 instrumental, for the simple reason that every experienced 21 value must be the cause of some effects. . . Brightman gives us a fourfold classification of values. There are (1) those that are intrinsic and instrumental; (2) permanent and transient; (3) Catholic and exclusive; and (4) higher and lower. Then he offers his twofold classification of intrinsic values as follows: Lower intrinsic values: Recreational (play). Bodily (health). Social (association). Labor (economic and other). Higher intrinsic values: Intellectual (knowledge, truth). Esthetic (beauty). Character (goodness). Religious (holiness).22 Commenting on the latter group he says: "It is question able whether there is any intrinsic value whatever in social relations from which truth, beauty, goodness, and 23 religion are lacking»M 2^Loc. cit. 22Introduction to Philosophy (1951), pp. 147-148. It should be noted that this arrangement differs from his earlier listing in his Philosophy of Religion (1940). There social values were included among the higher intrin sic values. Hence the importance of his statement following the present classification listing. 2 3 Ibid., p. 149. 355 Brightman also makes distinctions between values, ideals, and norms. A value we have already seen defined. As to ideals, he says: "Ideals constitute a special class of instrumental values. An ideal is a general concept of a type of experience which we value. To have such a concept is a very different fact from the actual experience 24 to which the concept refers." Thus he says, further: "An ideal is a definition of value; the value is the 2 5 reality defined." In another of his writings he states it thus: "The ideal or Idea, as a definition of value, is a concept, an essence, a quiddity, a subsistent if you will."2* * Now the logical function of ideals is "in 27 judging actual or potential experiences of value," and "an ideal regarded from the point of view of this logical 28 function is called a norm." Now the first step of a value theory, Brightman believes, is to determine values. The second step is to 29 formulate ideals. The third is to prescribe norms. OA Philosophy of Religion, p. 90. 25Ibid., p. 91. 2l > "Value, Ideals, Norms and Existence," Philosophy and Phenomenologica1 Research, IV (1943), p. 22TT 2 7 Philosophy of Religion, p. 91. 28Loc. cit. 2 ^"Value, Ideals, Norms and Existence," p. 221. In keeping with this he states: "An ideal is a definition of any type of value claim, whether the claim be warranted 30 • or not." "A norm, however, is a special kind of ideal. It is an ideal that ought to be realized--an imperative 31 ideal." Again he says: "A norm is an ideal that is characterized by . . . requiredness." ^ He continues: "All norms are subsistents which command existence. Every 33 norm is an ought-to-be." Brightman also calls our attention to the "inter- 34 penetration of values," since "there is no intrinsic 35 value that stands alone." To elucidate this point he says: Attempt, if you will, to define any one value as utterly alone and apart from all others. What value can stand without truth? What value is completely defined if its esthetic aspects are omitted? What is the value of religion when the good, the true, and the beautiful have been removed from it?36 The values, then, interpenetrate. No values can be fully appreciated without taking all other values-- 30, Loc. cit. 31Ibid., pp. 221-222. 32Ibid., p. 222. 33Loc. cit. ^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 149. 3 5 Loc. cit. 357 indeed, the whole personal consciousness, into account. Since every person is a member of society, we must go further and take the entire society into account. But since society itself is dependent on the world in which it lives . . . we must take all reality into account. In other words, our values can only be understood and must always be interpreted and criticised in the light of our world-view. . . . Thus the study of value drives us on to metaphysics. If we wish to think truly about value, we must seek to think truly about reality as a whole. Our human values not only interpenetrate each other, but value and all reality also mutually interpenetrate. We must not think that "value is . . . a single experience of any sort; it is an organization of the total person ality on a level where the person can 'like* himself, when he judges impartially and rationally."®® Consequently, as he has stated it in his Moral Laws, he thinks that the highest intrinsic value is "the experience of a person whose values are harmonious,’ 1 and therefore "the whole of value experience is that which gives value to the parts."®9 Brightman's next concern is the relation of values to existence. He has already anticipated his conclusions, but speaking of ideals he says: Ideals, mere schemes or programs of possible value, are of no intrinsic worth; only the actual 37Ibid.. pp. 149-150. 38Ibid., p. 150. 39 Moral Laws, p. 135. Cf. also his Philosophy of Religion, p. loTii He says: "There is only one value, namely, the systematic whole of our value experience. No value has sovereignty in its national territory; only the league of values is sovereign." 358 realization of value in character or knowledge or beauty is of value. . . . What ought to be, but isn't is valueless, except as a guide-post. Whenever, then, we talk about values, we talk about the real world* No realm of ideal fancy or abstract validity is meant . . . we mean (values) ought to exist, they have a rightful and obligatory place in the realm of being. Thus, again, the study of values drives us to metaphysics. We must ask the question: What is the status of values in reality?4^ He is now ready to consider the subjectivity and objectivity of values. We recognize it as one of the persistent problems of philosophy. He states the question thus: "Are values simply and solely relative to human desires and pleasures, customs and institutions, or are they in some way permanent, objective aspects of the universe?"4' * - By objectivism we mean to assert more than the subjectivist will allow. "The 'more'," he says, "consists of at least two assertions," (a) that an objective value, or better, norm, is one that all minds that think reasonably ought to acknowledge (logical objectivity), and (b) that it is valid not only for human individuals and groups, but for the universe, the reality on which man depends and in harmony with which he lives (metaphysical objectivity) He continues: Now, the objectivist quarrels with every shade of subjectivism. He admits, of course, that the value experience is subjective, both individually and socially; but he will not admit that the meaning 4^Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 151. 41Ibid., p. 152. 42lbld.. p. 153. 359 of value is exhausted by the subjective experience. He says that the sunset is really beautiful, and that if I do not enjoy it, I ought to learn to enjoy it. He holds that if I a* true to coherence and harmony as the root principle of mind, I shall find myself under obligation to acknowledge true beauty; I fail to acknowledge it only when I do not see it clearly or do not understand my own mind clearly. He may add that since coherence is the criterion of truth, it follows that what coherence commands us to regard as beautiful really is beautiful for the universe as well as for the human mind. . . . All who believe that there are eternal values . . . hold to the metaphysical objectivity of value; although it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of the meta physical objectivity of norms, and the subjective existence of values in the persons who experience them.43 Turning then to the subjectivist criticisms of objectivism, he admits that actual valuations differ at different times and places. But he contends that even though standards evolve, this does not prove there is no objective norm. Furthermore, he believes that "at least one value is objective, namely, the value of truth."44 He also admits that desire may be a subjective experience, but contends that far from making objectivity impossible it is a necessary condition of truth finding. Granted some values have only a subjective basis, this does not discredit the objectivity of any and all values.4^ He 4 3 Ibid., pp. 153-154. ^Ibid., pp. 154-155. 4 5 Ibid., p. 156. 360 notes that others would hold that belief in the objec tivity of values implies that the universe is already perfect and in that case no room is left for progress. In answer to this he suggests that the objection may be valid against a static universe, but he affirms: Perhaps the very objectivity of value may consist (in part) in the fact that the universe is indefinitely perfectible; perhaps it is true that there are valid norms that ought to be attained by finite beings, yet are unattainable in finite time. If this be the case, and the perfectibility of the universe is something inex haustible, then the objectivity of value is the greatest possible stimulus to progress. ® He also mentions those who think man's place in the universe is too insignificant for human values to have an objective ground. But he hastens to remind such that in that case we have the assumption that the reason of man can correctly describe the truth about his universe, none the less.47 Turning to the positive side of the argument, he contends, first, that "value judgments claim objectivity 48 as truly as do our sense perceptions." For though errors may arise in either field, yet "the presence of erroneous value judgments in experience no more destroys 46Ibid., p. 157. 47Loc. cit. 4 8 Ibid., p. 158. 361 the objectivity of value than the presence of illusions 49 destroys the objectivity of the world of nature." If the subjectivists want to insist further that in the case of truth as the model of objective value, only truth that is known is valuable; then Brightman counters that all truth is known by the Supreme Mind "and in this knowledge of truth by God would reside the objectivity of the value of truth."50 Finally, Brightman would defend the objectivity of values on the basis of the nature of the criterion of truth--coherence. Hence he states: . . . Our ground for asserting the objectivity of the realm of value in reality is the fact that our value judgments can be organized into a system that is most coherent when we interpret value-norms as objective claims that reality makes, rather than as our merely subjective demand for pleasure or satis- faction.51 One needs only to take note of the very systematic way in which he has stated his system of moral laws to recognize how this may well be done.^ Continuing his application of the coherence prin ciple, Brightman states: 49Loc. cit. 5QIbid., p. 159. 5 lIbid., pp. 159-160. 52 Cf. for example, Moral Laws. pp. 89-90. 362 This position grants to the subjectivist that our reasons for asserting a real world have their roots in our own being but insists that neither our perceptions of physical nature nor our perceptions of value are merely subjective. Both point to a reality beyond us; both reveal objective truth.53 If the subjectivist parlies with the objection that mathematical coherence can be achieved in the realm of sense experience so far as to enable the physicists and astronomers to make precise predictions; but that such coherence can never be hoped for in the realm of values, he would remind us that "philosophy is an interpretation of experience as a whole, not merely of the neatly mathe matical aspects of it."5^ So he continues: "Our knowledge of values is not, and probably never will be, mathematical. Our experience of values is none the less real and none the less important."^ The real point he would have us see, and one which gives truth to the contention of both the subjectivist and the objectivist, is that "values are subjective, but norms are objective," This he explains as follows: In short, which is more coherent: to assert that there are objective norms or standards, although our 53 Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 160. ^*Loc. cit. 55Ibid.. p. 161. 5 6 Loc. cit. 363 knowledge of them is only approximate; or to assert that really there are no objective standards, that all value is relative to desire, and that nothing is truly better than anything else? Does not reason collapse if objective norms be not acknowledged? The thinker is called on to answer no more important question. Brightman also thinks that "the existence of values in human life is hard to explain if the universe itself be 58 entirely indifferent to value.” If, now the subjecti vist resorts to the age old problem of evil, Brightman would insist that "evil cannot be the fundamental meaning 59 of the universe.” Thus, for Brightman, ”... the doctrine of the subjectivity of value is matched by the doctrine of the objectivity of norms. Norms are not confined to the person who acknowledges them or who applies them. They are rational, universal, true for all."^° Following Brightman a step farther at this point, we note his teaching that "value experience is temporally prior to norms.For "it is value experiences which furnish the data on which rational hypotheses about norms 57Loc. cit. -*®Loc. cit. 59Ibid.. pp. 162-163. ^"Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence,” p. 224. ^Person and Reality, p. 291. 364 P are based." Values have their being only in the present "lived through" experiences of the self, for in every case the liking and enjoyment of any experience is that of the experient. Hence he would hold that "all values, then, are inherently private, subjective, personal experiences-- which does not mean that they are entirely dependent for their occurrence on the experient, any more than experi- 63 ences of color and sound are." On the other hand, norms are public. "When a person proposes a norm as true . . . he is asserting that it is rationally defensible as well as empirically 64 grounded." In Socratic fashion he is appealing to the public to accept such a norm for reasons or else show some reasons for its rejection. In whatever form these norms are finally stated "they constitute the true standards by which all values ought to be judged."**5 The way to conceive of the objectivity of norms metaphysically is stated in the following paragraph: Values, as human experiences, are not objective; norms, developed by coherent criticism of human experience of value, are objective and are valid for 62Loc. cit. 65Loc. cit. 64Loc. cit. ^5 Loc. cit. 365 all persons. But their objectivity, we suggest, consists in the fact that the cosmic Mind knows them to be norms, or, better, purposes that human beings should achieve coherent value-realization through living in accordance with them. Since the norms are rational truth, it follows that ultimately they cannot be changed either by human mind or the cosmic Mind. Human knowledge and application of them may be creatively and infinitely varied. But norms remain the solid logical structure and validation of any possible world at any possible time. They define its possibilities and its goals. They are, to quote Whitehead, 'eternal objects.* Brightman thus looks upon valid norms as "definitions of the objective teleological structure of the universe. . . . As purposes of the Divine Mind, . . . norms are imperatives of reason, and their home is wherever reason 67 dwells, and their work is wherever persons exist." In one of his more important articles, Brightman writes: All personalists except Sartre, who is peripheral, find in value experience a clue to the metaphysical structure of reality, supplementing the clues in sensory experience. Hence personalists assert 'the objectivity of value,' although Brightman has pointed out that values may be viewed as subjective, while their norms, as standards in the divine mind, are objective.6® 66Person and Reality, p. 292. Cf. "Values, Ideals, Norms and Existence," xn Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, pp. 219-224. 67Ibid., p. 294. 6®"Personalism, Including Personal Idealism," A History of Philosophical Systems, V. Fern, ed., pp. S?9- 355'. This is a direct quotatxon in which Brightman refers thus to himself. 366 Thirty years prior to this writing, Brightman had 69 contended for both human and "more-than-human values.” Though he had also affirmed that "the more-than-human . . . is not less than personal,"7® It is in his book, The Spiritual Life, that he states the significance of a person as "an intrinsic value, the bearer and realizer of 71 spiritual values*" He observes: Just as a world with two persons is twice as good as a world with only one person, so also a person with two great ideals is twice as good as a person with only one great ideal, provided the ideals in question are both worthy ones* Cosmic development of spiritual life, then, requires an increase in the number of persons in the universe and also an increase in the number of values they experience. Value requires both repetition and variety. * Brightman accepts HtSffding's axiom of the conser vation of values, but he contends that values must not only be preserved in a spiritual universe, they must also be increased* A good life that is standing still isn't even standing still. If the reader will forgive two coined words not in the dictionary, we may speak of 'axiosoteria' (value salvation) as meaning the conservation of values, and 'axiogenesis' (value development) as meaning increase of values* Then **^Religious Values, Chapter V. 70Ibid., p. 126. 7*The Spiritual Life, p. 167. 72Ibid., pp. 167-168. 367 we have the concise formula, no axiosoteria without axiogenesis.73 The simple point being that value can be preserved only by being increased. The next question is just what kind of value is it that can be increased indefinitely. The answer is: spiritual values, for those that cannot be so increased are unspiritual. He does not hold that the unspiritual values need be disvalues or physically harmful or evil, but he thinks of them as on a lower level of existence than the spiritual. He illustrates his point as follows: Food is good for us; but enough is enough, and too much food easily leads to satiety. The practice of certain physical vices leads not only to satiety, but also in the end to the utmost boredom and ennui. No one is more weary of lif e than the typical rake who has exhausted himself in pursuit of the so-called pleasures of the flesh. On the other hand, spiritual values are such that it is impossible to have too much of them. Of wise and true love, of sound faith and well-grounded hope, we cannot weary. There is no such thing as surfeit of them.74 Brightman agrees with St. Paul that "there can be no law against the increase of the fruits of the Spirit, because the laws of spirit are the laws of the increase of 75 life," Moreover, the truly spiritual man, when he sees "that some areas show no promise of increase of value," 7 3 Ibid., p. 168. 7 4 Ibid., p. 171. 7 3 Loc. cit. 368 will “indeed abstain from spiritual commitments in those areas" which he thus judges “to be unpromising."76 Brightman looks upon “spirit in man and the Divine Spirit" 77 as "co-workers in the eternal development of value." In 70 such case life is indeed a "glorious adventure." It is his belief, therefore, that "ultimate truth about religious values" would be: . . . our experience of religion makes a genuine contribution to the total experience of value, which, however, can be adequately appreciated and understood only in a living interrelation of all the values to each other, coalescing in a living whole.7^ Furthermore: Religious ideals are not merely definitions of possible value experience; as religious, they are also assertions about the future continuation of value experience, and about ideal attitudes toward the source of cosmic value, thought of as God.®® In the light of these many considerations about values, one can recognize how it is that Brightman looks upon values as "the war aims of the universe."®^- With two fixed values leading the way to our realization of all 76Ibid., p. 173. 77Ibid., p. 174. 78Loc. cit. 7^Philosophy of Religion, p. 195* 8QIbid., pp. 195-196. ®^Nature and Values, p. 6 8 . 369 82 others--respect for truth and respect for personality, combined in their expression, they amount to no less than Mreason-love" or, to use the Pauline expression, 83 "speaking the truth in love." What we have, then, is logos plus agape in their expression of such norms as "truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness."®4 "Without respect for personality, all other values are cor- oe rupted." Therefore the "world of values can be built" only by persuasion, and not by suicidal violence, ox OSL totalitarian tyranny. In one of his most eloquent paragraphs, Brightman warns against the perils which attend a world of norms: The world of norms is beautiful in its promise to man; but it is also perilous. There is the peril of abstraction; man may contemplate the norms and never apply them. There is the peril of smugness; man may be sure that his knowledge of the norms is adequate, and that the standards of his group need no correction. It is against this peril that the naturalists inveigh when they deny the fixity of ends of nature. There is also the peril of radicalism; man may insist that norms be applied perfectly and immediately. And there is the peril of cynicism; men disguise their despair beneath a sneering exterior. 82Ibid., p. 72. ®^Ephesians 4:15. ®4Nature and Values, p. 87. ®^Persons and Values, p. 18. ^ Nature and Values, p. 86. 370 All of these perils are signs that the building of a world of values is an eternal task,**? With this we conclude our survey of Brightman's theory of values. SOME EVALUATIONS OF BRIGHTMAN'S VALUE THEORY Following the publication of Brightman's posthumous book, Person and Reality, D.C. Williams, W.H. Werkmeister, and John Wild participated in a symposium at Boston Uni versity in which each man offered his evaluation of the book or a criticism of some of its positions. Werkmeister offered an evaluation of Brightman's basic value theory as 38 given therein. Werkmeister agrees with the statement by Brightman to the effect that "every moment of the present includes (along with much else) a striving, a conation, a choice, a preference, or a purpose in some stage of development."®* He then says: "... this activity of the person is in separably intertwined with the problem of values and the problem of moral obligation; and it is these two sets of 87Ibid., p. 87». Italics mine. 88W •H. Werkmeister, "Some Aspects of Brightman's Thesis in Person and Reality Re-examined," The Philo- sophical Forum, ' XVT~( lSSft'-'St). 8 - 1 2 . --------- 8^Person and Reality, p. 207. 371 QO problems that 1 wish to discuss briefly." Taking up first the problem of value, Werkmeister agrees with Brightman's contention that "there is sensory experience, . . . there is value experience, and . . . Q1 somehow they are related." He then raises the question, on the basis of Brightman's definition of value, whether desire is logically prior to value experience. It is his belief that value experience is not thus related to desire, since Brightman's context does not use the term 92 "desire" with its usual connotation. Werkmeister then questions and comments: Is an experience valuable because we desire it? Or do we desire it because it is (or we think it is) valuable? That in any given value experience analysis reveals also an 'implicit pro-attitude' is true; but this means only that in any positive felt-value experience there is an indissoluble unity of 'hedonic tone' and 'implicit pro-attitude'; it does not mean that 'desire' is the indispensable precondition of having the experience at all.^3 Werkmeister then considers a second difficulty involving Brightman*s theory of "intrinsic" and "instrumental" values as it appears on pages 284-287 of the above named book. He states: ^Philosophical Forum, XVI, 10. ^Person and Reality, p. 283. 09 Philosophical Forum, XVI, 11. ^3Lo c. cit. 372 Specifically his thesis that all 'intrinsic values' are 'instrumental values' either to 'further intrinsic values' or to 'disvalues' (p. 284) is strange and misleading terminology especially in view of the meticulous distinctions drawn by C.I. Lewis. But also it entails confusion in Brightman's own thinking; for he asserts (a) that an Ideal, as such is not a 'value'; (b) that, 'to be exact, an ideal is an instrumental value . . . but not an intrinsic one"; and (c) that 'it is potential, not actual value' (p. 287). I find these three assertions . . . to be irrecon- cilible. To make this clear, however, we must take into consideration the fact that, aside from the immediately-felt value experiences (Lewis's intrinsic values), all other values are ascribed to objects, situations, ideals; that such value ascriptions pertain to objects and situations which directly elicit a felt-value experience (Lewis's inherent values) and to things, conditions, and activities which are 'instruments' in the actualizing of the objects and situations that elicit the value experi ence. This whole problem of the ascription of values Brightman neglects, although it seems crucxal to value theory. It is my impression that, despite his empirical approach to matters of cognition, Brightman is at this point strongly influenced by the Platonism implicit in Nicolai Hartmann's value theory, and that he has not seen his way clear to a consistent inter polation of his own epistemological presuppositions. My suspicions at this point are re-enforced by Brightman's interpretation of value norms— an inter pretation which culminates in the statement: 'All norms are subsistences which command existence.1 Every norm is an 'ought to be' (p. 293). And this brings me to my last point. If every norm is an 'ought-to-be,' what answer are we to give to the question, what ought I to do? What I am driving at is this. In identifying all norms with an 'ought- to-be,' Brightman seems to have overlooked the basic distinction between value-norms and moral norms, between the prudential 'ought' and the moral 'ought,' and has unwittingly reduced the latter to the former. Let me put it this way: Although, in the book here under review, Brightman has not developed his ethics, it is inevitable that, on the basis of his theory of norms, he would have to make 'good' and 'bad,' rather than 'right' and 'wrong,' the fundamental categories of morality. And if so, then he cannot escape making the prudential ought 373 the key-term of all behavioral norms, thereby misconstruing the very crux of man's moral existence.94 With such a criticism in mind let us hear from Brightman himself. In his Philosophy of Ideals, he says, concerning an idealistic theory of values: "Here ethical, logical, esthetic, metaphysical, epistemological, and practical considerations meet."9^ The added italics will suggest that he might indeed reckon the prudential and moral ought in the case of norms to be identical. In his 06 "System of Moral Laws," it should be noted that six out of the eleven (group two) deal with axiology, and, as imperatives, call upon the ethical person to seek "con sistent values," to "consider and approve foreseeable consequences," to seek always "the best possible," to "develop values relevant to the situation," to strive always for "the most inclusive end," and to "control 07 empirical values by ideal values." Here, too, it would seem that the prudential ought and the moral ought run parallel if not into identity. In such a case Werkmeister's criticism still 94Ibid.. pp. 11-12. 95A Philosophy of Ideals, pp. 211-212. 9 oral Laws, pp. 89-90. ®^Loc. cit. 374 stands, but we venture to think that Brightman may well have accepted it as true, yet with the insistence that he was not thereby "misconstruing the very crux of man's moral existence," since Brightman seems to make his norms to be both moral and prudential. A quite eulogistic evaluation of Brightman's theory of values appears in Religion in Life, written by QD Cornelius Kruse. Therein he observes: In both Americas Professor Brightman became recognized as a leading scholar in the field of value theory." Brightman was among those who greatly stimulated discussion and furthered the study of values in general theory and in their application in morals and religious fields. He showed how to overcome cultural relativism.. . . Brightman showed that though values are very intimately personal, they are, when true and valid, oriented toward ideals or standards or 'norms,' as he preferred to call them, that transcend the limitations of finite human persons. Again with William James, Brightman held that all experience is double-barreled. It is possessed by the person, but also goes beyond him. It is what Rufus Jones, in speaking about the Divine, used to call 'the beyond within.' Students of value theory should be grateful to Professor Brightman for having shown how these two polar aspects of man's evaluations could be conjoined, how values could be intimately intertwined with human persons and their deeper interests, and at the same time lead to a glad obedience to the true, the good, the beautiful, and the holy as norms valid for all persons, including the Supreme Divine Person. Far Brightman squarely stood with Socrates and Plato in believing that the holy ""Edgar S. Brightman's Contribution to American Philosophy," Religion in Life, XXII (1953), pp. 594-603. "ibid., p. 598 375 is beloved by the gods only because it is holy eternally, and has not adventitiously become holy only because it chanced to be loved.100 . . . he recognized that nan's full stature is won only in society and in cooperative attempts with God and fellow man to make ideal values prevail in the affairs of men.101 We now turn our attention to a survey of Flewelling's theory of values* Brightman and Flewelling validate the observation made by H. Wildon Carr to the effect that Personalism's "main concern is with values and it concentrates attention on the ethical and religious values rather than on the metaphysical problem."10^ Though it does not skirt even the metaphysical problem, one should surely add. FLEWELLING'S CONCEPTION OF THE THINGS THAT MATTER MOST Our chief sources for the study of Flewelling's theory of values are: (1) various chapters in his books suck as The Things That Matter Mostt chapters 1, 2, 14, 15; Creative Personality* chapters XXV-XXX; (2) various scattered paragraphs in his books, The Person* and The Survival of Western Culture; and (3) articles in The 100Ibid.* pp. 598-599. 101Ibid.* p. 602. 102Cf. his "Introduction" to Flewelling's book, Creative Personality* p. 13* 376 Personalist under the following titles: ’ ’ The Cosmic Reality of Values," VII, pp. 5-14; "Profit Motive," XXVII, p. 116; "The Palace on the Sand," XXXI, p. 116. Inciden tal references expressing his theory of values appear in other contexts scattered through his writings. Two definitions of value are to be found in his writings, as follows: "Value is whatever we want, or whatever we can trade for what we want. It is that which is diligently sought as possessing worth or interest Again: "Values--Elements in the supreme reality of life due to the response of the Divine or finite person to stimuli which originate in and for a self and others. God as a part of the finite consciousness and experience is the supreme human value." Since his book, The Things That Matter Most, had its beginning as a university course under the title, "Problems of Human Values," and grew to full size as an anthology on that theme with key chapters and forewords written by Flewelling himself, it would seem to be the logical starting place for our study. We seek first to summarize what he has written there* He begins by noting that many a person has come to 103rhe Things That Matter Most, p. 25. *04The Person, p. 334. 377 frustration and disillusionment because of his ''failure to know the sources of the permanent values of life."^®^ He further notes that what a man most desires is prophetic of what that person will become* In seeking an answer to the question, "is there such a thing as Value?" he sug gests that there are those who deny its reality while at the same time they are pursuing it* But for the most part, that there is such is usually admitted* "Pew," he says, "have had the courage openly to doubt the existence of what all men seek after, and so the 107 reality of values has seldom been directly attacked*" Men give various answers to the question as to what matters most* "Everywhere men (are) bartering away long range X08 benefits for the obvious and the quick returns." Thus Flewelling reminds us that: * * * beneath the external appearance of values there is a deeper one calling for consideration. The wise man not only will look at the surface of things, but will endeavor to find the hidden values underlying appearance• His further question is: "Is there any difference between 10^Things That Matter Most, p. 12* ^ L o c , cit. 1Q7Ibid*, p. 12. 108Ibid.. p. 16. ^-O^Loc. cit* 3 7 8 possible choices of what we want, or are all desires to be taken at face value, such as coraon opinion, or the fad of the hour?"110 Noting that there are some who assure that the great universal and all but inclusive value is money and possessions, he still thinks that most of us will recognize that we must gain immediate wants and yet need not miss those things of mare account. In our study of the nature and problem of values we soon become aware that though values are constituted by our needs and desires, there is a variety of human wants possessing worth* Some are more important and satisfying than others. Many presumed benefits are mutually exclusive* Hence the individual must forego some for the sake of realizing others. "In fact," he says, "life is made up of con stantly recurring choices between desirable things."111 He thinks that when one really analyzes the world's strug gle we must eventually come to realize that "only those values which are devoid of personal vanity seem to yield the more permanent and abiding fame."112 Thus "the wisdom of life consists in knowing how to surrender the lesser to 113 arrive at the greater" values. Hence, "we must keep in 110Loc. cit. 111Ibid., p. 18* 112Loc. cit. 113Ibid.» p. 19* 379 mind the deeper values that underlie all surface con siderations In a series of paragraphs he not* offers the fol lowing suggestions: Some values are only transitory. Some values are what might be called incidental. Some values are destructive of those that are greater. Some satis factions are more lasting than others. "Values to be permanent must be such as to command indefinitely our intellectual, moral, and spiritual self-respect."^** Some goods are cumulative. The more we possess of them the greater is their satisfaction and the greater is our capacity to enjoy them. Others in their very acquisition destroy themselves. But "the most satisfying goods are inner, mental, moral, and spiritual, those which may be definitely called human."1^ Man's capacity for this type of values distinguishes him from the beast, as does his capacity for greater enjoyment and satisfaction. Thus, "man can never be enduringly happy except through the 1 1 7 realization of his highest capacities." The benefits that follow the doing of one's best are moral and 114Loc. cit. 1-15Ibid., p. 20. **6Loc. cit. 117Ibid.. p. 21. 380 spiritual. The demand for them arises out of human nature itself* They are involved in the normal functioning of our personalities, and penalties and benefits for their disregard or observation are written into our human 118 nature. Concerning values, he declares: All values are ultimately human. That is, they are created, evaluated, and enjoyed by individuals. They have no existence apart from the service, welfare, and gratification of human beings. The degree of their worth consists in the service they can render in the development of the highest type of experience, and by this fact they must eventually be judged. If this is true, and how can it be successfully refuted, the intensest values have a most intimate character. He next considers the role of human values in history. It is his belief that "human values have made and are making history."^20 H^s observation here is: Just as the sense of value determines the outcome of the human lives that entertain it, so the general estimates of worth held by large portions of society determine the future of races and nations. Civili zations, historical cultures, even languages are modified or created by prevalent ideas of value. Change the objectives of the peoplefs desires and you change the course of history. Every great move ment in education, in art, in architecture, in science, or in religion has depended for its inception upon some concept of worth, whether of freedom, power, commercial supremacy, or domination of other peoples. 118 Summarizing Flewelling, oj>. cit., pp. 19-21* 11 o Things That Matter Most, p. 21. l20Ibid., p. 22. 121Loc. cit. 381 He thereupon points out how this was true in Greek, Rowan, and Medieval times. Such has been the "transforming power of ideas of value let loose upon the world" it is demonstrative of "the power of an idea to make over a 122 world within a few short generations." Such, then, is "the power of value-concepts to determine civilization and 123 to change the face of the world." This being the case "we must have clear concepts of value and we must be ready 124 to fight for them." It is important, he thinks, that each one of us shall find out for himself the meaning of life and decide what really matters most, for "we spend our lives working at the riddle of existence--ourselves are the answer. Such is the problem of human values." It is "a para- mount issue." Chapter two is devoted to a consideration of "Value-Concepts and achievement." He begins with the observation that "all human efforts are based on some concept of value. . . . Human interest demands some 122Ibid., p. 23. 123Ibid., p. 24. 124Ibid., p. 25. 125Ibid., p. 26. 126Ibid., p. 27. 382 objectives as incentives to action. Whichever one or more we may choose indicates what we consider to be worth while."127 Thus no one escapes the habit of assessing values, and since one's sense of values dictates his future, it is important that each one shall enter into a 128 serious examination of his ideals, Flewelling takes the position that "successful achievement must conform to Nature. . . . Only (so) is it possible to achieve the important values of life."^-29 At this point his estimate of the metaphysical status of values becomes evident, for he says: Values are an ingredient of nature herself. She possesses a character which is in keeping with man's highest interests and is not indifferent to the creation of value. This fact is in the strictest accord with the evolutionary processes of the uni verse, All living things are committed to progress or improvement. They must cooperate toward some end, a true and normal fulfillment for which they exist, or failing this, they sicken and die by the wastage or neglect of powers which they do not properly use. These facts of nature can never be rightly inter preted as meaning that nature is indifferent to achievements,130 With such a status for values "the law of evolution 131 is progress or perishNature, even in her unconscious 127Ibid., p. 30. 128Loc. cit. 129Ibid., p. 31. *2<^Loc. cit. 131 Loc. cit. 383 processes may be said to be moral and to promote morality. Therefore she is not indifferent to man's use of his gift of conscious choice. Nature arranges life against the man mho refuses to live in accordance with her principles. He tells us: "We live in a moral world, where only the highest and best possibilities are in keeping with the natural order. Where the effort after perfection is the 132 law of life, • . Thus in order to secure values it is necessary to cooperate with nature. Flewelling is aware, however, of the fact that neither science nor philosophy, alone, or in cooperation, seem able to provide one with all the facts that are of moment to our human lives. Man's most important hunger for values lies in his subjective nature. Therefore if he is to arrive at supreme satisfaction he must discover religious values. He next notes that man's ruling desire becomes the organizing center of his life. Therefore one's sense of values determines his achievement. From this center of interest all of life's activity is organized. The fullest life can be realized only as one reaches the highest function of his nature. He who organizes life about the 132Ibid., p. 32, 133Ibid., pp. 32-34. 384 things that natter nost finds that nature cooperates with hin in varying degrees.134 The foregoing brings him to his most important 135 consideration--"the creative nature of Value,'1 Perhaps the most important of all in these reflections lies in the effect of known and noble pur suits on the creative imagination. We cannot feel any great enthusiasm toward a course of activity that is degrading, or contemptible, or that is unworthy of our best. Such courses of action induce feelings of inferiority and fear which the psycholo gist tells us are deadening to constructive and creative activities. We need for the plan of life to pick out those courses of action for which we can feel a respect, of which we will not be ashamed. The emotional side of our life is strongest and most productive under the spur and inspiration of great and noble objectives. They create ends to which we can enthusiastically give ourselves. . . . Of a worthy aim the mind never tires, never turns away in disgust, but enthusiasm rises with achievement. • » . The things worth-while, or what ever we conceive to be worth-while, consciously or unconsciously become the organizing centers of life.136 Part Two of his book is devoted to a consideration of "Five World-Concepts of Human Values."1^7 included here are the answers from Confucianism, Buddhism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Judaeo-Christianity, to the question, how to discover and achieve that which really matters most. 134Ibid., pp. 34-35. 135Ibid., p. 35. 136Ibid., pp. 35-36. 137Ibid., pp. 63-263. 385 Introducing this section, Flewelling observes that "with unanimous voice they all exclaim: 'The value that includes 138 all others is peace'." "We must begin the search for values with the question: What do I most desire?" So doing I shall discover that "only peace can be the ultimate answer to man's search, the one that includes all others."1,3^ A chapter is devoted to each of the typical answers: "the 'Gentleman' of Confucius"; "the Buddhist retreat from the world"; "the Stoic 'Life of Reason'"; "the Epicurean 'Limitation of Desires'"; and "Judaeo- 140 Christian 'Unity with the Divine1." For part three of his book , Flewelling selects six proponents of value, rather arbitrarily, he admits; acknowledging as he does so that another sextet as good could be chosen. But he thinks these men of literature are typical of leading proponents of value down through the sweep of history. Socrates is chosen for his emphasis upon "dependence on self-knowledge"; Dante is chosen as "the voice of Freedom"; Rousseau represents "the Demo cratic Way of Life"; Nietzsche, "the Will to Power"; and l38Ibid., p. 67. 139 Ibid., p. 65. 140Ibid,, pp. 70-112; 113-147; 149-187; 189-221; 223-263; respectively. 386 Pasteur is typical of 1 1 the Scientific Quest for Value Part four of his book is devoted to "Self- Realization as a Value."142 Chapters 14 and 15 are devoted to "Self-Realization as World-Value"; and "Self- Realization as Intrinsic Value"; respectively. Since they continue Flewelling*s own personal thinking about values we seek a summary of each here. They really constitute his own resume of the ground covered in the book. After a quick survey of the ground covered in the book to this point, Flewelling says: If in the beginning we had any doubts about either the reality or place of human values, we can now scarcely deny their existence in personal ideals, activities, and achievements. In other words, any thing to be of worth must offer some satisfaction to the individual. Values are to be judged by the satisfaction they provide the person, and their cogency in creating in him an aptitude and love for still higher accomplishment. The highest satisfaction of all is to be the kind of man or woman which in his heart one knows he ought to be. Self-realization is the supreme value. I43 He notes that reflection upon the nature of values "ought to convince us of their dominantly subjective character. . . • It is apparent that values are created by personal wants, needs, and desires•"144 This being true, we also 141Ibid.. pp. 269-300; 301-331; 333-369; 371-406; 407-438; 439-476; respectively. 142Ibid., pp. 476-523. 143Ibid., pp. 481-482. 144Ibid., p. 482. 387 need to recognize that the greatest values to society cone because of 1 1 the existence of truth, honor, goodness, justice, and freedom, . . . These are the things worth while. . . . They are the essence of human satisfac tions.1,145 But the very existence of values implies a corresponding world, he thinks. Nature herself is a realm of values subject to improvement by the mind of man and responding to his inventive genius. Yet nature is arrayed against disvalues. He states: For Nature, the normal life is the good life, and abnormalities of every kind are ultimately self- destructive. Thus the system of human needs rests on the great moral facts of the universe. All sins are sins against Nature. . . . Digressions from the path of virtue become the natural means of destroying not only man's satisfactions, but his creative genius, his powers, his personality itself.1*6 Moreover, he believes that a world of values implies unity. Man must achieve unity between Nature and himself. Success lies only in his cooperation with Nature. But "for man, the life of nature is the life of his 4 highest nature,"^ But there is another unity that must be realized if man's highest values are to be forthcoming. "The far most positive and difficult thing is to achieve an inner unity which will make us acceptable to 145Loc. cit. 146Ibid., p. 484. 147Loc. cit. 388 1 4 8 ourselves." Cross purposes, indefiniteness of aim, unclearness of thinking, conflicting ideals, lack of persistence, tend to beget lack of self-control and defeat self-realization. The achievement of this integration is what makes one a person rather than an individual only. Flewelling thinks that could men generally live in con formity with their highest capacities and in unity with their world, the possibilities in value realization would exceed the farthest flights of human fancy. Thus he, like Brightman, looks upon values as a systematic and inter- 149 penetrating whole system. In fact, on the basis of evolutionary process he thinks "there must be residing within (the universe} or behind it some order or purpose which is striving for self expression. . . . A Mind within or behind all these activities, expressing Itself through them. . . . For 4»e says: "Matter unattended by consciousness has no power to bind together momentary facts 1 Cl into meaningful connection." Hence the unfolding evolutionary process bears evidence of a moving vital energy which bears some relation to our own creative 148Ibid., p. 485. 149Ibid., pp. 485-486. 150Ibid., p. 486. 151Ibid., p. 487. 389 energies and "is itself time-transcending, creative, 152 mental, and personal." If so, then "the values we have been considering . . . are of supreme importance in a 153 world of evolution and of changing meaning." But self-realization is not only the chief world- value, it is also an intrinsic value. Flewelling's con cern now for the socio-cultural values of true democracy becomes evident. He insists that "belief in the intrinsic worth of the individual is basic to the democracy pro- 1 54 cess." "Likewise," he says, "if each citizen QLs} important to the whole, then each must bear within himself some intrinsic worth, the possibility of some essential contribution to the common weal."155 Thus "democratic society has come to recognize the intrinsic value of each 1 citizen." This being the case, he further points out that: "No state, democratic or otherwise, can rest on firm foundations if one person remains deprived of his just rights to best self-fulfilment."157 "This freedom for self-fulfilment" means primarily "personal liberty to do right," and that "man can be free 152Loc. cit. 153Lo c . cit. 154Ibid., p. 490. 15**Loc. cit. 156Ibid., p. 491. 1^7Loc. cit. 390 only as he exercises self-restraint,” so that ”the measure 158 of his freedom is also the measure of his self-control.” He stresses the point by saying: "The democratic way of life is thus a give-and-take proposition, and personal liberty means liberty to behave one's self in a decent society."1^9 He now comes to his favorite concept--that of creative personality. Since all values are human values we may think of the person as the creator of values. He affirms: "The most significant thing about man is his power to create. By powers within himself he can deter mine destinies, change the direction of nature, command the activity of body and mind, and make the physical world around him his servant Man's ability to reflect on his past brings its wisdom to bear upon his present and future; it evidences a creative imagination that may objectify further possibilities; and it turns his dreams into action and achievement. Yet "a true creator must be ruled by something higher than his selfish interests, . . Hence each needs to have a concern for making ^®Loc. cit. l5^Ibid.. p. 492. 16°Ibid., p. 493. 161lbid.. p. 494. 391 a life as well as a living. He should also beware of that "lack of vision," which bespeaks an "incapacity to under stand what is worth while.Thus how one conceives of values and how one sticks with them will determine his 1 6 3 success or failure* Such is the teaching of our philosopher with refer ence to values, as he has presented it in his book, The Things That Matter Most. A study of certain facets of emphasis to be found in Flewelling1s writings in relation to values seems justified at this juncture. It will underline Long's observation that Flewelling1s "personal realism" is primarily an ontological orientation based on value. . . . The Cosmic Reality of Values Flewelling holds that values have "a standing in the nature of things as certain and direct as that of natural or physical phenomena."^5 He devoted a chapter in his Creative Personality to a consideration of "the 162Ibid., p. 495. p. 283. l63Ibid., p. 496. ^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxxiv. 165Mpersonalism," Living Schools of Philosophy, 392 cosmic reality of human values,"^ In it he says: If science can get nowhere in the ascertainment of facts, except upon the hypothesis of the solidarity of the universe, and must in the end justify its hypothesis by the pragmatic test of values, how much deeper is the demand that in philo sophical and religious thinking we should start with the hypothesis of moral and spiritual solidarity in the cosmos, the universal reality of mental, moral, and spiritual values in the experience of man. If we are to consider life as it is there is no other way. As there can be no scientific thought without the scientific assumption of universal law, so there can be no true explanation, religion, or philosophy of life, without the assumption of the universal reality of human values He is ready to admit that there can be no scientific demonstration of the reality of human values, but he thinks that "however undemonstrable human values may be from the scientific standpoint, yet they are the values 1 f t A that give worth and meaning to life," Even "scientific 'facts' are meaningful and real to us largely from the 169 standpoint of value," It is worthy of notice that the ideal of human betterment has furnished lofty motives for devoted scientific research. Likewise, "without the presence of moral insight the advance of science becomes the menace of humanity. Morally untempered, it promises 166Creative Personality, chapter XXV. 167Ibid., p. 217. 168Ibid., p. 219. l69Ibid., p. 220. 393 only universal destruction to that fragile plant which we 170 call human life and civilization." It is his further contention that "values must be 171 recognized as part of the Cosmic Order," and that 172 "moral and spiritual values . . . are reals." That view is a "new paganism" which "discredits all values of 173 the transcendent order or of the inner spirit." Thus Wilbur Long notes that Flewelling "accepts in a straight forward manner the ontological import of value judg- 174 ments." Flewelling himself agrees with "Berkeley's 175 recognition of the reality of spiritual Values." The Higher Values are Immaterial and Spiritual Admitting that scientific facts are "values of a lesser order,piewexiing is sure that values are not to be identified with physical facts: If we come to grips with the significance rather than with the activity of nature we shall see that 170Ibid., p. 221. *7^Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 12. 172 Survival of Western Culture, p. 167. 173Ibid., p. 241. *74The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xlv. 175Ibid., p. 122. l76craative Personality, p. 220. 394 for man the better part of the world must consist of values* These values are largely out of relation to physical facts, and are therefore beyond the reach of positiviatic explanation* These values can be identified with physical facts only by denying their character c£ value* . . . We cannot hope to explain moral and spiritual values by reducing all to the dead level of mechanism. i77 There are also "certain great values that are not measur- 178 able by sense arithmetic*" Therefore: To show the scientifically undemonstrable character of the human values is not to show them unreal or illusory, but simply to designate them as in another field of demonstration* Though not demonstrable scientifically, they gather and prove their value out of life and experience* However undemonstrable human values may be from a scientific standpoint, yet they are the values that give worth and meaning to life. They are the supreme interests in spite of every effort to ignore them. The finer loyalties in the world in which we live are forever superior to the most startling scientific facts.179 Elsewhere he has written: 'Certain values, and these the most important to human life and happiness are immeasurable and in computable like love, heroism, honesty, good will* Such realities possess no commensurable degrees of any kind*180 He holds that "the great human values are demonstrable 181 through faith and experience,M declaring: l77Ibid* * pp. 106-107. 178The Person, p* 9* 17^Creative Personality, p. 219. 180survival of Western Culture, p. 160. The Person, p. 286. 395 Yet with their supreme importance to life, these realities are scientifically undemonstrable. They are known and comprehended in living experience, through faith. To those who experience them, scientific demonstration is unnecessary. If such is the case with the lesser values of life, it is not surprising if the supreme value of all, God, as a part of the Human consciousness and experience, should fall within the same category. The existence of God is forever undemonstrable scientifically, because he abides within the field of faith and of values, and by reason thereof partakes of supreme reality. We should not demand that science demon strate His existence, nor should science dream that He does not exist because not susceptible to spatial or temporal measurement• It is also Flewelling's belief that values are established 183 in freedom and grounded in faith. Values and Freedom Concerning the relationship between values and freedom, he writes: Values are established only in freedom. Even social science, which Comte declared to be the highest of the sciences, is deprived of value if grounded in a world of mechanism. It has taken a long time and bitter disillusionment, which is not yet ended for some, to relieve ourselves of the folly of thinking that we can by a simple change of environment change the moral state of man. The social state must ultimately depend upon good will, the freedom of moral choices, without which social values vanish. Yet the effort to avoid frank recognition of spiritual reality in the advancement of humanity is the daily and hourly task of many of the brightest minds of our age, a task as futile as 182Ibid., p. 287. 1 8 3 Cf. Creative Personality, p. 107; and The Person pp. 162, 193. 396 that of Sisyphus rolling the stone. As qualities are the higher realities which the mind of nan weaves out of the web of sensations, so the highest of all qualities are those produced by spiritual and noral choices. Without these there is neither value, explanation, nor the reality that natters most.184 Values and Faith Flewelling also discourses about the relation of faith to the higher values, for he sees faith as creative and constitutive of values: It would not be appropriate to stop at this point without the barest hint at the deeper facts: the relation of faith to the higher values. In these, faith in a profounder asset than knowledge, paradoxi cal as that nay seem. It is faith that creates values, makes then an actuality in human life. With out faith they perish. Love, for instance, cannot last long in an atnosphere of unbelief. If I cannot believe in the reality and sincerity of ay friend's love, I cannot enjoy it as an active asset of life. Were I to insist upon scientific denonstration of its existence before accepting it, I would certainly lose it. The other values grow likewise on the tree of faith. . . . ’And why,' sone may ask, 'is faith so inextricably bound up with values?' The answer is simple* Faith, we have said, is more important than knowledge, for knowledge with all its pricelessness is of things that are seen. Faith takes hold upon things that as yet are not seen and creates them into reality. Faith is creative. Knowledge is often created with the values faith achieves, but knowledge without faith is stag nant and helpless. Faith brings insight where knowledge with sight alone has failed, and insight is necessary to progress. So while knowledge in smug self-complacency accepts what it calls the in evitable, faith demands the 'impossible' and cries: 'It shall be donel' The advance of society depends upon faith, and through faith alone may we link 184The Person, p. 288. ourselves up with the deepest processes of life, visible in the evolutionary order, and expressed in1A and through cooperation with the Supreme Continuum.*-®5 This brings us to his thinking about values in relation to religion. Values and Religion Our philosopher would define religion as a love of values, for he says: "There is no religion where there is not love of values for themselves •”*'®® Yet "wherever a man loves these values however protesting his irreligion, 187 there is religion." This is true since "the aim of religion everywhere is the same, the cultivation of the 188 good life as the supremely worth-while reality." Religion, then, is "an utter devotion of one's powers to the life of values."*‘ ®^ It now becomes understandable that Flewelling can speak of "the values that attend goodness, and the 185rhe Parson, p. 288. p. 166. *-®®Ibid., p. 9. Also Survival of Western Culture, 187 *Loc. cit. Loc. cit., in both instances. 188, 180 Survival of Western Culture, p. 166. 398 1Q1 religionist's "insight into spiritual values*" For the test of religion--"its real measurement--is its capacity to produce ethical values* If it does not produce ethical values it remains a physical or mental experience but not i go a religious one." At this point his pragmatism becomes evident, as he declares that the test of any religion is, not i 03 after all "a pragmatic one*" Religion must/ only in volve us in a devotion to life's higher concepts and values, but it bust lead to a better life and "to a 1 Q4 larger achievement of those values*" Religious values, themselves must be "subjected to the pragmatic and ethical tests* Thus religion must be measured not by claims of creed and opinion but by its works. On such a basis all religions would be called upon to demonstrate their value in life."19^ "The great human values are demonstrable only through experience."*9* * Of course we must not forget "that which runs into the realm of moral values can be judged only by him who is himself loyal to these values, 1QI Survival of Western Culture, p. 169* 192Ibid*, p. 167. *93Loc. cit, 194Loc. cit. 195Ibid., p. 199. 1^ Creative Personality, p. 263* 399 just as the untrained man cannot properly be the judge of astronomical phenomena or of chemical reaction."^^ For Flewelling, religious values "are the great values of life; by them men live and die. They are the 198 forces that make human history." He says: "We have come to see that we cannot deny the important facts of value, which are the bases of law, government, social 199 institutions, and decent living." Now because religion concerns itself "with those moral and spiritual values that are necessary to the preservation of civilization,"200 he thinks "there must be a revival of spiritual values if Western culture is to survive."201 "To meet the present dilemma calls for faith in spiritual values,"202 for "the world is growing tired of all sorts of paganism," and "it may very well be that modern religion has come upon the present era that it may purge itself of paganism and demonstrate its spiritual and living character."202 At 197The Reason in Faith, p. 31. 198Creative Personality, p. 264. i^The Person, p. 41. Cf. also, Creative Person ality, p. 226; and 'fhe Things That Matter Most, pp. 2i, 24. 2°QThe Person, p. 298. 201Survival of Western Culture, p. 110. 202Ibid., p. 290. 2 0 3 Ibid., p. 243. 400 least he is sure that "the times are ripe for a mani- 204 festation of the true God." Thus he says: "There is hope for a religion sufficiently living to dare to stand forth and stress the spiritual values as the only enduring ones."205 As to the relation of spiritual values to the future of mankind, Flewelling says concerning evolution itself: Evolution ceases to be automatic (if it ever was automatic) with the appearance within the organism of reflective consciousness. Future progress in evolu tion is now dependent upon the exercise of brains and moral qualities, the choice to live by spiritual values.206 As to what is the case for the future of the individual, he says: Eternity is not of tomorrow more than it is of today. What we achieve of spiritual values here and now is the essence of our spiritual existence forever, the foundation upon which alone can be erected the realities of the future life.20? The Supreme Value is the Person Flewelling calls attention to the fact that Jesus, following the emphasis of the Hebrew prophets, taught "the 2°^Loc. cit. 205Loc. cit. 206Ibid., p. 278. 207The Person, p. 286. 401 208 intrinsic worth of individuals*M Following Him, Christianity likewise gave "a divine sanction to democracy and emphasised the intrinsic value and sanctity of human 209 beings.” Personalism follows this example and places the person uppermost in any hierarchy of values* This is the case with both Flewelling and Brightman, and Flewelling observes: The last value to be evaluated in civilization is the supreme end of civilization, the person* The chief bane of our civilization so far, with all the advances which individualism could bring, has been its impersonalism.210 He therefore deplores the wrong sense of values to be found in any totalitarian system, and says: MThe only effective opposition to such systems can come through recognition of the intrinsic worth and value of the free person."2^ He would also remonstrate against materialism: The world of matter, wonderful as it is, is not the most wonderful fact of existence. More and more clearly it appears that we cannot afford to ignore the factuality, the importance, and the explanatory function of human values in a compre hension of the universe. . . . Human values include the factualities of greatest moment to us, without which all explanations are worthless.212 208Things That Matter Most, p. 233. 209Ibid., p. 234. ^^Survival of Western Culture, p. 265. 211Ibid., p. 228. 212lhe Person, p. 168. He insists that "the supreme value is always one that inheres in the person himself, . . ,"213 for "here we are at the very center of the domain of value, the fount and 214 citadel of all." Furthermore, since the supreme value is the person, then "values created by relations are the supreme reali- 215 ties." The individual must not overlook the high value of interpersonal relationships, society must remember that "man is the most significant of all things, nor "can religion forget its duty to persons. There is a vivid sense in which no one of us can save his own soul unless 217 he saves the souls of other men with his own." There fore we must "advance from individualism with its self- 9 1 0 seeking to personalism with its self-giving." It follows from this evaluation of the person that the Supreme Person would be the Supreme Worth of the uni verse of values. Flewelling thus speaks of "the supreme value of all, God."21^ "For man," he says, "is indeed 213Ibid., p. 116. 214 Things That Matter Most, p. 492. 2^Survival of Western Culture, p. 282. 216Ibid., p. 280. 2 1 7 Ibid., p. 281. 403 great in the universe and lord of all only as behind his little and short-sighted purpose lies a deeper Purpose which is also Person."220 Yet "every man is by his birth- no 1 right a potential partaker of Deity." He believes, therefore, that "philosophy must make room in its system not only for the intrinsic reality, worth and sanctity of the human personality, but for a Supreme Mind from which all realities derive."222 Hence belief in God is also a human value.22^ Truth as Value In his Creative Personality Flewelling devoted a chapter to the question, "What is Truth?"**24 He answers as follows: No one has yet been able to seize it, to state or embody it except in terms of life. Living truth or lived truth is really the only kind of truth that has a chance for survival. . . . Truth can never be separated from living experience; in fact it is apprehended only in living experience.225 220 Personalism and The Problems of Philosophy, p. 161. 22^Winds of Hiroshima, pp. 115-116. 222 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, pp. 12-13. 223The Person, p. 193. 224 Creative Personality, Chapter XXVI. 2 2 5 Ibid., pp. 223-224. 404 Compared with knowledge, “truth is the more inclusive term. Knowledge is of things we observe; truth includes the larger world of relations ,»»226 He therefore thinks that “truth is part and parcel of life, and if there is to be continued life in the mind and soul of man there must 227 be continually growing apprehension of truth." Continu ing, he says: “The realm of truth as value, becomes then the most important field of living interests, for it is the realm in which is given us to try out our capabilities, to realize ourselves as personalities, and to reap the rewards of life,”228 Nevertheless, “truth becomes a value to us only as it becomes to us a matter of faith, of spiritual insight, and of apprehension wrought out in living terms.“2^9 it is his opinion that: All those fine values which are the crown of civilization--art, sculpture, architecture, music, and literature--are not, as our too prosaic and material age has so often assumed, to be relegated to the kingdom of misty unreality. They are the deepest evidences of reality, the profcrundest tokens of life and truth. There is then an indis soluble connection between faith, truth, and the exaltation of the human spirit,23° 226ibid#, p. 224. 227Ibid., p. 226. 228Loc. cit. 229Ibid., p. 227. 230Ibid., pp. 227-228. 405 Flewelling allows that this sort of realism is akin to the Bergsonian doctrine of intuition. It is a sort of 231 mysticism for "it implies fundamental cosmic sympathy," a being en rapport with facts, beauty, and God. "Thus it is," he says, "that truth becomes a thing wider than knowledge, a matter of the whole scope of relations, an illuminator of the field of knowledge."2^2 In case he thinks "reflection makes increasingly clear that in our world of relations there can be no real conflict between science and religion, or between knowledge and human values."2^ Science is therefore mistaken if it "relegates values to the field of unreality" and "a religion that fears any truth which science can dis cover ... is essentially irreligious."2^ Therefore, "only between knowledge and belief can there be conflict, and belief is always the sufferer if it places itself in the position of being hostile to facts."2^ Knowledge and truth must go together, and as for science and religion, 231Ibid., P. 228. 232Loc. cit. 233Ibid., P- 229. 234Ibid., pp. 229 235Ibid., P. 230. 406 236 they "are necessary to each other." Concerning our philosopher, Wilbur Long notes that Mthe criterion of ontological truth, in his thinking, was value; . . • ,»*237 Since Flewelling places such impor~ tance upon the realization of value in the human situation, he is also sure that there are some values superior to life itself. On this note let us conclude our survey of Flewelling1s theory of values. 236lqC. cit. 237Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxiii. 238Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 288. CHAPTER X RELIGION Both Brightman and Flevelling were serious and active churchmen. Both subscribed to a view that might be termed liberal protestantism, and both were Methodists. Naturally, then, each of them should be expected to ex press himself on matters religious. That such is the case we have been convinced before now, as even a glance through the titles of their books will show. It is not the purpose of this chapter to recount or even summarize here what has already been noted from each man in reference to a doctrine of God, the problem of evil values, and human sinfulness. Rather do we seek here to grasp a synoptic view of each man's philosophy of religion Neither man questioned the significance of religion for the person, or of the person for religion. Both men would agree with Flewelling's statement to the effect that personalism "believes religion to be a legitimate demand of the human spirit which can be neglected only at a very immense loss to the person whose religious longings are not met."^- Or, again, both would agree with Flewelling's suggestion that "the services which Personalism might ^.T. Flewelling, "Personalism," Living Schools of Philosophy, p. 297. 408 2 render to religion are » . . great," Flewelling may be permitted to speak for both Brightman and himself when he writes: Religiously, Personalism is theistic, holding that the person can reach highest self-expression only in finding fullest harmony with the nature of things. This completest self-realisation can come only by the subjugation of abnormal, selfish, and individualistic interests, or in the sublimation of all interests to the highest and supreme values of life. On the other hand, Brightman may well speak both for himself and for Flewelling in the following passage: The chief function of religion is to bring man to realize, in feeling, in thought, and in action, a due sense of the worth of personality, individual and social, human and divine. Religion has eminent social utility.^ Or as Brightman further states: Religion, then, is, first of all, the belief that to be a man is to be capable of salvation; that is, capable of a better life, a life that the believer describes as redeemed, or holy, or saintly, or blessed. Any questions about religion or about God necessarily derive from the question about man and man's possibilities.3 Furthermore, Flewelling would surely agree with Brightman's reaction against any attempts to downgrade man's potenti alities, when he says: ^Loc. cit. 3Ibid., p. 283. 4Brightman, Personality and Religion, pp. 10-11. 5Ibid., p. 11. 409 As soon as we suppose nan to be nade wholly in the image of the worm and not at all in the image of God, so we have either denied religion entirely or asserted that the only religion we recognise is one that involves bizarre contradictions.6 Instances of their agreement as personalists and believers could be multiplied, but these must suffice* We now seek to summarize what each of our philosophers had to say concerning a theory of religion, and we begin our study with Flewelling. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Unlike Brightman, Flewelling did not write a volume devoted specifically to a philosophy of religion. The nearest to this type of writing is his book, The Reason in Faith. One must therefore glean his thoughts on religion by searching through many areas of his writing, and all of his writings have many references to religion. His two books, The Person, and its predecessor, Creative Personality, have much to say about religion. Long calls attention to the account of "the religious dimension of personalism . . . found in Flewelling's Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures." Much is said about religion in his Survival of Western Culture, and his Winds of 6Ibid., p. 30. 7 Wilbur Long, "Flewelling and American Personalism (An Introduction)," The Forest of Yggdrasill. p. xxxix, note 24. 410 Hiroshima. There are important considerations also in his other works. Flewelling also wrote some articles on religion for The Personalist. Organisation of his thought must, to some extent, be arbitrary, but by way of induction consistency with what he has written on the subject is sought. Religion Has a Legitimate Place in Human Experience Flewelling states that religion "is a legitimate demand of the human spirit."** for he looks upon it as one g of the three windows which open onto reality. This estimation is reiterated in his latest writings.^- ® He also contends that "religion . . . touches the higher needs of man's nature and meets the wider demand of learned and ignorant alike.Again he says: . . . the spiritual needs of man are more clamorous in a civilized society than the physical because they involve the very values that give man his distinctive place in nature. They are necessary not from the religious standpoint alone, but equally from the standpoint of humanity.^2 8Cf . Living Schools of Philosophy, p. 297. ^"Three Windows onto Reality," Philosophical Review, pp. 109-117. 1QThe Person, pp. 8-12. 11Ibid., p. 33. 1 2 Ibid.. pp. 33-34. 411 Flewelling asks the question: "Whence arises the ■oral consciousness?" and his answer is: . . . nan is ’incurably religious.' If we are to find the ultimate and effective unity, if we mist be in the higher reaches of the human spirit, the very essence of personality. From thence spring the moral mandates in man’s reverence for the Holy. But what do we mean by religion? . . . Morality as a matter of habit or practice, or social confor mity, would seem to fall short of the devotion which characterizes religion. When we say that man is incurably religious we refer to the creative urge which lifts man above the animal world. The presence of creativity is normal to full manhood, but is fully realized only in the advance to spirituality.13 Agreeing with Bowne he puts religion at the very center of life, regarding it as "the crown of being. He also agrees with Bowne , in maintaining that "meta physics and logic are enlightened by the fundamental question of religion, and are to be understood only in connection with it."^5 Also along with Bowne he would insist that "religion lies at the basis of our life if it is real; and if this be denied, there is nothing to fall back upon."^ "Religion is common to all humanity;" it is "the spiritual experience of humanity . . . manifested in the individual."^ ^^Winds of_ Hiroshima, p. 22. ^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 20. ^Loc. cit. 16Ibid.. p. 21. 17Ibid., p. 25. 4 1 2 "The charge of anthropomorphism carries no serious weight," he thinks, since "the relation between man and 18 God is necessarily expressed in terms of human values*" Furthermore, "no religion can claim independence of the individual person" for "his own nature is • • . (that) IQ through which he interprets all experience,"-1^ In the feature section of The Personalist called "Notes and Discussions" Flewelling responds to a reader’s request that he clarify distinctions between his concept of philosophy as compared with his idea of religion* His reply is as follows: Philosophy is a mental construct by which a person achieves what to him seems a rational explanation of the world of appearance and reality* Its test is coherence— coherence within itself, and coherence within the common world of experience, which is known as rationality and reasonableness* Religion is quite another order* An inadequate but cogent definition might be that religion is a consciousness of God. It is an immediate psychical experience that is tested by its achievement of moral and spiritual values* It is based on faith, not on reason, faith in the existence of God, and its acceptance as the working principle of life. It is not something to be rationally demonstrated, but something to be experienced, and which the religious man finds again and again to be dependable. That it does not arise from the empiricism of physical science, nor from the rationalizing of philosophy is nothing against it, because it is in another realm of demonstration than these* All our profound values partake of the same character* They become real only *®The Person, p. 282. 1 9 Ibid., p. 13* 413 as they are believed and acted upon. Without faith they die. The commonest illustration is human love which cannot exist apart from faith. One cannot know in advance whether the person he loves will be true to him, but he must believe it so as a condition of loving and being loved. The venture of faith is a part of the character of love and determines its essence and reality. Likewise with religion, to remove it from the realm of faith is to destroy it. Yet the individual does prove it for himself by finding it the source of inner strength and inspir ation as he gives himself to its highest dictates in spite of appearances. This gives quality to religion. I might be able to argue another man into my philoso phy by showing him its reasonableness, but his re ligion is an incommunicable experience arising in him as the result of his faith in and response to God. This experience is ae individually his own as falling in love, and neither can be rationally described or defined. Personalism as a philosophy can go no farther than to show that since all phenomena of reality must yield to the sifting of personal meaning and interpre tation, it is reasonable to assume there is something intelligent and personal as the basis of cosmic reality. All religions base themselves philosophi cally upon some assumption. For this reason it should be possible for men of all religions to come to some thing like common philosophical agreement, but each man will build his religion out of his own personal experience of God in the way he best can. Some personalists are, I believe, inconsistently atheistic, in not believing that personal reality implies a personal world order. Yours sincerely, Editor20 True Religion is Universal Near the conclusion of the above article our philosopher suggests that on such a basis men of all on ’ •Philosophy or Religion?” The Personalist, XXIII, 418-419. 414 religions ought to be able to come to something like common philosophical agreement, yet each will build his religion out of his own personal experience as best he can. This is a frequent emphasis with Flewelling, for he be lieves that true religion is universal. In The Person he expresses the following belief: We may be once more on the verge of some such widespread impulse toward religion if we can lift our periscopes high enough to see the universal elements present in all religions, and from these as a basis come to the true universal religion. Let us not begin by claiming ours to be the universal religion; let time and the fulfilment of human need proclaim that. Though we may believe that Christianity is the only truly universal religion, it may be that we have localized what should be a universal religion into something less by the narrowness of our interpre tations and our failure to practice its universal concepts. If we go to the world with claims of exclusiveness, we do by that much localize and pro vincialize our faith. We must realize that God is not alone the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, but of the whole earth, who has been trying since the advent of man to get his message through to stupid and stubborn hearts. Shall we lightly assume then, that but in our instance, He has altogether failed? In religion we have a common basis of approach to all men of good will: the search for righteousness through unity with the God of all souls. No one of any faith will object to the practice of the Golden Rule, or declare it unorthodox. We know of no religion that denounces love toward our fellowman. The exceptions to this are all on the part of pro vincial idolaters, who would restrict the love of God to men of their philosophical or theological opinion, or communion, or race. . . . Love is a universal language, and once our God is released from the limitations of our parochialism, and worshiped as the Loving Father of all men, their struggles to know Him, to discover His will, take on an importance which can never be truly estimated by the religious provincial. Because religion concerns itself with those moral and spiritual values that are necessary to the preservation of civilization, or 415 better, perhaps, to the making of civilization, there is necessity for emphasizing Its universal elements. These are the ones that men everywhere are able to understand, . . . The world has really grown too close together in an association of many peoples, to be able to gather the universe of religious reality into the frame of reference of a particular theology or philosophy of a restricted place, time, or race. 1 love my own point of view because by it I have found the way to peace, but 1 can realize a sympathy with all others who seek the same goal, thought it be by a different road.21 Flewelling suggests that among those universal aspects which we seem to be losing from the religion of the Western World are "the sense of sin," the "validity of prayer," the "need for meditation," and "the practice of the 'consciousness of God'."22 Though we Westerners charge the religions of the East with neglect of the worth of the individual, we, on our part, have neglected the importance of these universal concepts in our keenness for 2 3 individualism. He disparages the fact that "in the field of religion our parochialisms have set us quarreling over statements of opinion rather than over facts; over forms of worship, rather than questions of righteous- 24 ness." To the followers of Christianity he says: 23-The Person, pp. 298-299. 22Ibid., p. 299. 23Loc. cit. 24Ibid., p. 280. 416 The more complete the faith in the universality of the Christian religion, the more genuine the belief in Christ as the center of human history, the more ready will Christians become, to meet and cooperate with other faiths on the solid ground of comparative ethical accomplishment. Here is the acid test of religion. The refusal to acknowledge good in others, the over-haste to defend theological dogma, is a sign not of faith but of wavering belief. It is an expression of fear that we may not be in possession of the truth, or that the truth is not strong enough to prevail.25 Insisting that if Christianity is ever to claim univer sality it must, as a religion, measure up to universality, he says: . . . The coming of the Ideal Man, the Christ, may be looked upon as the central fact of human history. Such a claim is a bold one and carries tremendous consequences to thought. In the first place it demands of Christianity a universality, which so far, her organized institutions have not achieved. There can be about the universal religion nothing which is merely local, provincial, national or racial. Institutionalized Christianity must measure up to universality, or failing this must be looked upon as one among other religions. In other words, it cannot claim the exclusiveness until it has become all-inclusive.26 This is not a plea on his part for religious syncretism, but the urge for "a capacity to embrace all men in its love, and to accord full value to their best efforts after the understanding of God."27 He is sure 25Ibid., pp. 265-266 26Ibid.. p. 309. 27Loc. cit. 417 that religious isolationism is not a mark of the true 28 religion* MA provincial world," he says, "suddenly turned universal through universal communication, demands OQ a universal religion." In short: Christianity, the universal religion, has been too often reduced by its devotees to cultism, myth, tradition, form, sectarianism, theological lunacy, the parochialism of abounding sects or even nation alism. Wide as the sea of humanity, it has been fenced about with limitations and restrictions calculated to confine its benefits to the practices, forms, superstitions, or opinions of a favored few.30 With an emphasis upon Christianity's central doctrine, he calls for it to advance toward true univer sality: Recognition of the deity of Jesus is the recog nition of the possible divinity of man and constitutes Christianity as the universal religion, toward which all religious faiths, in spite of errors and per versions have striven. Christianity must now advance to the full claim of its Pounder in this wider and universal sense.31 Likewise, he declares that "God must be conceived as a living person, . . and he then states: "because Christianity poses this concept of God, and to the degree that it demonstrates it in practice, it can be considered 28Ibid., p. 265. ^conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 87. 30lbid., p. 8 8 . 8 *Ibid., p. 92. 418 32 truly Christian and universal." Elsewhere he has declared: Christianity, if it is to construct a new world, must not fear to become cosmopolitan; it must become in a new sense a world religion. In order to do this it must prepare to delete everything which is not essential to its true char acter. ... Upon the Christian capacity to offer itself and its Leader as the surest fulfillment of universal religious aspirations will depend the success of the Christian evangel, the realization of Jesus' prayer that ’all may be o n e . ' 3 3 One reason for his insistence that Christianity become vital and universal is his belief that "religion is the great melting pot in which men of diverse interests, tribes, races, blend their differences into political and 3 4 institutional amalgam." In fact religion takes on the nature of an universal language. He expresses it this way: Religion, then, in offering a common vehicle for the higher emotions, provides for wide understandings and general communication of ideals to be had nowhere else. Its emotional power unites high and low, learned and ignorant. Its intuitional character is the source of its power. It speaks with compelling mandate directly to the souls of men. It is the universal language which all can understand.33 He therefore regards "religious devotion" as "a universal 3^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 118, ^"Christianity and Worlds to Come," The Personalist, XVIII, 342. 34Survival of Western Culture, p. 27. 3 5 Ibid., p. 246. 419 36 Instrument of mutual understanding." In an interesting article dealing with the concept of the so-called "holy Catholic Church," Flewelling asks four pertinent questions: 1. Would a truly catholic church fear to acknowledge the worth and standing of true holy aspirations after the Divine which are in other religions? 2. Can a truly catholic religion fear the free expression of its highest aspirations by any other religion? 3. Can a truly catholic church fear rapprochement with other faiths on the basis of friendly sincerity? 4. Can a truly catholic church fear the loss of its institutionalism, formularies, customs and habits that spring from racial or national history or limited social outlook as over against a universal vision of God?^? He leaves the obvious answers for the reader to give for himself. They are again indicative of his contention that a true religion must be univeral in its scope, appeal, and application. True Religion is Self-validating One of the evidences of the validity of religious experience is the fact that it aids the creative person ality in achieving harmony within himself. Flewelling observes: 36Ibid.. p. 24 5. ^“ 7"The Holy Catnolic Church," The Personalist, XVIII, 236-237. 420 Here lies the psychological reason for religion. Religion is the surest means of bringing harmony in emotion, imagination, sub-conscious willing, self- direction, and effort, while lack of harmony here will discolor and confine the springs of creative action. Here also is the reason for worship in religion* The object of worship as well as of prayer is the achievement of harmony within one's self, harmony with one's neighbors, harmony with God, with the universe, with one's own highest aspirations*38 Moreover, it is in a life of religious commitment that one comes to a true discovery of the meaning of being a person. For, "to be a person is to turn life in the highest direction with effectiveness and in full consciousness of 39 the loftiest motives." He continues: The fulness of personality is not come by until the person has made himself captive to the supreme good. When the individual has reached the point of self-control where neither selfish comfort nor private interest are allowed to hold him back from spending life where it can accomplish the most for human benefit, then he has in a true sense of the word become a person. The full personality is realized only through the complete consecration of powers to society, to righteousness, and to G o d , 4 0 In the realm of action, Flewelling thinks "righteousness, mercy, brotherly love, are easily recog nizable by every stripe of belief," and he says, "here we may act together, however diverse our explanation of the 41 Divine Mystery." He therefore contends that "the 38The Person, pp. 95-96* 39Ibid., p. 98. 4QIbid*, p. 99. 41Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p* 93. 421 authority of the Christian ideal of living cannot be denied nor remain unrecognized*” He is further convinced that ”the order of living disclosed in the life of the Man of Nazareth" is such that "no religion on earth can find fault” therewith*43 "The Founder of "Christianity represented the normal religious life, not as a retreat from, but as a participation in, the life of the world."44 Thus Flewelling holds that the "highest type of saint is also the highest type of man*”43 Or, as he has stated it further, "the Christ must be viewed today as the Universal Man.”46 He declares: We dare to believe with all our heart that, whatever one's religious or ethnic background, the ethic of Jesus is essential to our religion, and necessary to a creative age, when dedication to scientific truth and to righteousness are equally important to a new civilization now breaking upon the horizon. . . .47 Our philosopher thinks of religion as "the feeling of divine sanction, an appropriateness to the character of God, or of nature, or of the universe . . . the highest 42Loc. cit. 43Ibid., p. lOl. 44Winds of Hiroshima, p. 126* 45Berqaon and Personal Realism, p. 104* ^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 176. 4 7 Loc. cit* 422 48 spiritual achievements and needs of the human soul." True religion, therefore, ' ’offers the open door to cosmic 49 fulfillment of the spiritual aspirations of all men*” "Man's highest self-expression, the true deliverance, can be only a spiritual and mental one, and for this only 50 religion is adequate." Flewelling commented frequently concerning the relationship between religion and science. He insists that one needs a philosophy "that rings true to the facts, and that brings science and religion into working agreement."51 We must have "the glow of imagination and insight, which are the distinct gift of religion, but we also need a philosophy that comprehends the relatedness of the person CO to his whole environment.Hence, "for science to deny religious facts because they cannot be measured and weighed, or for religion to anathematize science" is futile.'*3 He goes so far as to suggest that if there be a contest between science and religion it only amounts to a contest between two theologies, "one of atheism and the ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 246. 49Ibid., p. 248. 5QIbid., p. 244. 51The Person, p. 269. 52Loc. cit. 5 3 Ibid., p. 1 2 . 422 48 spiritual achievements and needs of the human soul*” True religion, therefore, "offers the open door to cosmic 49 fulfillment of the spiritual aspirations of all men." "Man's highest self-expression, the true deliverance, can be only a spiritual and mental one, and for this only religion is adequate.""*^ Flewelling commented frequently concerning the relationship between religion and science* He insists that one needs a philosophy "that rings true to the facts, and that brings science and religion into working agreement We must have "the glow of imagination and insight, which are the distinct gift of religion, but we also need a philosophy that comprehends the relatedness of the person ■CO to his whole environment." Hence, "for science to deny religious facts because they cannot be measured and weighed, or for religion to anathematize science" is CO futile. He goes so far as to suggest that if there be a contest between science and religion it only amounts to a contest between two theologies, "one of atheism and the ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 246* 49Ibid., p. 248* 50Ibid,, p. 244. 51The Person, p. 269, 52Loc. cit. 5 3 Ibid., p. 1 2 . 423 54 other of fundament*lisa." But he thinks there is no basic reason for any "acrimonious controversy between religion and science."55 If science can increase knowledge, that knowledge is but a phase or portion of eternal truth and cannot be hostile to a true religion. If religion is true, it has nothing to fear from any discovery in any realm. Science in the last analysis is judged by its conformity to observable phenomena, and religion in its last analysis is judged neither by authority nor purity of descent, but by its practical value for human needs. Some scientists make the mistake of assuming the unpractical nature of religion. In such a contest as that, religion is sure to win out because it touches a higher range of practical needs. The spiritual needs of men are even more clamorous than the physical because they involve the very values that give man his distinctive place in nature. They are necessary not from the religious standpoint alone; they are necessary also from the standpoint of humanity.56 Flewelling speaks in a similar fashion in a number of other places in his writings. He is sure that both science and religion must stand the test of human values, for both must be forever on trial and must justify themselves by their contributions to human welfare.57 Religion is not less real than science since the reality of both must be CO measured by their importance for life. He also is ^Ibid., p. 174. 55Creative Personality, p. 119. 56Ibid., pp. 119-120. Cf. also pp. 229-230. 57Ibid., p. 221. 58Ibid., p. 227. 424 convinced that when both evolution and theism are cor- CQ rectly understood then both will be on friendly terms. True religion is therefore self-validating, for the more it seeks of truth and of life's highest values the more satisfying and relevant it becomes. True Religion is Pragmatic As many of Flewelling's reviewers have noted, he manifests a strong strain of pragmatism. This is true in his philosophy of religion. He proposes to "judge religion by its fruits of righteousness, love, peace, and longsuffering" rather than by its philosophy or its formu lae.^0 For him, "religion is a matter of living decisions, in a living world under a living God."^ It should there fore be "subjected to the pragmatic and ethical test."62 This being so "religion must be measured, not by claims of creed and opinion but by its works. On such a basis all religions would be called upon to demonstrate their value in life."63 Religion must never be allowed to "forget its duty CQ Survival of Western Culture, p. 274. 60Winds of Hiroshima, p. 108. 61Ibid., p. 124. 62Survival of Western Culture, p. 199* ^Loc. cit. 425 to persons," part of which is to realize the fact that "no one of us can save his own soul unless he saves the souls of other men with his own."64 A definite part of the pragmatic test of true religion pertains to the manner of results it achieves in human society. True Religion is Ethical Closely related to the practical concern is the ethical emphasis in Flewelling1s thoughts about religion. He declares that "religion is less than nothing if it does not build up the ethical personalities of its devotes. . . . Plain ethical righteousness and brotherly love must be recognized as the heart of all true religion."66 "Devotion to righteousness is the principle that cannot be divorced from religion [for] it finds its place in all true religions. . . So he warns: "We cannot afford to dally with the pleasantest sin, for it is taking some thing out of us that is demanded by our better person ality."67 Flewelling pleads for a "larger realization of the 64Ibid., p. 281. 65rhe Person, p. 292. 66Ibid.. p. 261. 67Ibid., p. 317. 426 moral self-restraint in which all freedom rests,”^® for lack of this applied to religion . . . brings descent from ethical achievement in practice, by substituting an un ethical emotionalism as far from righteousness of conduct as the spinning of whirling dirvishes."69 Moreover, "anything short of complete good will, or perfect holiness, or the effort after it, is something less than religious freedom. Perfect freedom attends alone upon perfect 70 goodness." True religion, therefore, is not unre strained but is self-restraint. Since "souls are not saved by intellectual 'isms' or beliefs that fail to get into action, or are not embodied in actual living or choosing," he insists that "the final judgment on any man's philosophy or on his theology must rest on its capacity to produce righteous- 71 ness." x In his book, The Reason in Faith, he objects to that type of mysticism which has wrought "a hostility toward reason and a plain neglect of the most obvious sources of ethical knowledge in the interests of a blind 68Ibid., p. 122. ^Loc. cit. 7^Loc. cit. 71Ibid., p. 105. 427 unreasoning 'feeling' which [has] no issue in ethical living,"72 He insists that "it is necessary to distin guish sharply true religion, which is fundamentally ethical self-control, from a sometimes erotic, sometimes hypnotic and merely suggestive 'experience' of religion."73 Since law and order spring from "within the hearts of good citizens and not from external mandate or decree" he sees the importance of the development of "moral persons,"7* for "where morals and religion prevail, law breakers are reduced to a minimum. Where they are neglected no law can be drastic enough to compel obedi ence."73 Hence he affirms: "In any situation involving the depths of human interests to the extent of reordering a civilization, the backbone of success must be sought in , . ..76 religion." True Religion is Spiritual Flewelling has much to say about the ministry of the Holy Spirit in vital religion, for "the Holy Ghost is ^Reason in Faith, p. 116. 73Loc. cit. 7*Survival of Western Culture, p. 282. 75Ibid., pp. 282-283. 76Ibid., p. 248. 428 77 the authority which Jesus named for religion." We may therefore be sure that "wherever the fruits of the Divine Spirit appear . . . we have evidence of the presence of 70 the God who was in Christ." Moreover, "we can cooperate with that Divine Spirit which acts through the processes of nature" and is "the source of every creative inspir ation, and was named by Christ as the ground of religious authority, whose function should be to lead us into all 79 truth." A recognition of the fact that "to this Divine and living Spirit, every human soul has direct access," should become the universalizing factor in all religions and beget understanding between all religions East and 80 West. Hence "the supreme need of our age is to listen 81 to the voice of the Spirit." It is the Divine Spirit which "participates in human life" bringing to it its highest fulfillment--"a voluntary unity with the Divine 82 creative purpose." Religion also must take account of this inner secret of progress and of life. Such internal forces 77 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 91. 78Loc. cit. 7®Ibid., p. 96• 80Ibid.. p. 78. 81Forest of Yqgdrasill. p. 172. 82Ibid.. p. 174. 429 are the very heart and soul of religious faith, the one consideration without which it cannot exist. And yet, religion has too often fallen frost its high estate of reverence for the inner light to the mechanical beating of ecclesiastical tom-toms, the frigidity of theological or liturgical conformity. It is in sore need of a revelation of the enshrined and potential God within the human spirit itself, which is the meaning and the message of the Incar nation. Writing in The Parsonalist, he said: "The best per- suadant to Christianity lies in the indwelling spirit, the 84 living experience of God." In the same periodical he wrote: Christianity must be seen not as an achievement but as a living process, the manifestation of Cosmic life as sure as any of the processes of nature. The reason for this is not far to seek. The future of Christianity always rests on its power to be realized in the experience of living persons.85 He therefore thinks of true religion not as a "system of beliefs but as personal relatedness, a harmony with the cosmic order made up of God and other men and [man] q r himself." It is "essentially a personal commitment to 87 the highest human capacities. . . ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 283. ^"Christianity and Worlds to Come," The Personal ist, XVIII, 347. 85"Can Christianity Save Itself?" The Personalist, XVIII, 123. ®6The Person, p. 269. ®7Loc. cit. / 430 Speaking of an adequate frame of reference for the human life of our day, he says: It can be nothing less than a complete and unquestioning surrender to the will of God as we are able to understand it, and there are ways of growing illumination open to every seeking soul. This means that we will not impose, in the way of the good life, selfish and petty aims, personal comforts, vanities, or weaknesses that would dull in us the highest and truest expression of the Divine Spirit.88 Admitting that the word "salvation" is a "hackneyed term" he contends that it really means "being in a state of health."89 He therefore says of it: • . . Salvation is taking place in persons when they are functioning spiritually, when they are achieving lives of love, mercy, justice, honesty, integrity, self-sacrifice, altruism, and truth. Such a life is possible only in the atmosphere of spiritual ideals. It is the result of inspired personal effort and surrender to the Highest, and the struggle against opposing forces, as surely as the life of the tree is successful overcoming of the disintegrating elements of water, soil, and sun. The forces of decay are transformed into the growth of the living organism. The human spirit likewise, through the life that is within it, rises superior to the spiritually disintegrating forces that surround it, and finds its salvation in being just, and good, and loving. Salvation then is a process of becoming, and its essence is life. ® True Religion is Social In his lectures in honor of the late Tully Cleon 88Ibid., p. 300 89Ibid., p. 105 9°Loc. cit. Knoles, (1951), Flewelling emphasizes "the social note" in true religion, with an appeal to Jesus' words to the Rich Young RulerHe thinks that the fact that the "person finds himself and his highest good only in the well-being of all," must be recognized not only as "the heart of personalism and the soul of Christianity," but that its practice must become part and parcel of Western culture if it is to escape a sure decline.92 He would also contend that any true religion must show a concern QQ for "the weaker members of society," for "the great fact in evolution is not struggle for survival but rather for the survival of others."®^ He is sure that "the world of tomorrow cannot subsist on rights filched from the multi tudes, multitudes unable to speak for themselves."®5 Therefore, "the future of democracy, in the light of these reflections, is dependent upon the assistance of genuine religion."®^ "Why religion?" he asks. The answer is because "social partnership, to be permanent, must be based on the highest motives, [and] these motives cannot be had 91Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 32; Cf. Mark 16:21. ®^Survival of Western Culture, pp. 29-30. ®3Ibid.. p. 56. 9 4 Ibid., p. 274. 95The Person, p. 297. 96Ibid.. p. 260. 432 97 outside religion.” He is of the opinion that the church faces social obligation such as "never appeared before, and the question is whether she has living power to rise QO up and meet it.” The fact that each person "bears an intrinsic worth” is one that "has been lifted into religious significance and made the heart of religion by 99 Christian teaching.” Yet if in a single instance his human rights are denied to the individual "the whole structure of society is weakenedHere, then, we "touch the heart and core of the present problem of democracy.•♦101 He pleads as follows: At no time has there been such opportunity for a true religion which will commit itself to its own authentic methods and character. The age needs to be shown that religion means deliverance to captives, and sight to the blind and peace to the inner spirit. It is this interpretation which, more than any others, has given wings to the speech of the modern missionary. It is the best evidence of a living religion, for the time has come for religion to demonstrate its living character.1°2 True Religion is Intellectually Respectable In an article written for The Personalist, 97Loc. cit. 98Survival of Western Culture, p. 134. 99 The Person, p. 261. 10^Loc. cit. 101Loc. cit. 102 Sttivly-ftl of western Culture, p. 244. 433 Flewelling sets forth the intellectual respectability of Christianity and religion: At least two sources of Christian theology must be recognized* The first source must be taken as religious experience, the individual soul in com munion with God; the second is an attempt to rationalize that experience, to make it more than individual, to place it in Cosmic settings, and that rationalization is Philosophy. . . . Religion finds sustenance for its faith as it discovers it filling a cosmic role•103 Later in the same article he says: Though religion is of the spirit, it partakes also of the intellect since it has to do with the whole man. The satisfaction of the intellect may be a prior step to the satisfaction of the spirit. In this light alone can the existence of philogophy finally be judged. If Christianity is properly to meet the sweeping tides of change it is not enough that it should present only the mystical side to men. It must also capture the intellects. To this end it must call in again the services of philosophy as it has in the great periods of the past. . . . There is no more sense in approaching the intellectual world of today with the philosophical weapons of the first century. . . • New mental outlooks must be approached on their own ground. Last of all should the Christian faith distrust truth from any quarter. The power of early Christianity was in its capacity to clear itself from the limiting concepts of Judaism and meet the Greek world on its own terms. . . . To bring effectiveness to the Christian evangel today something similar must take place in Christian apologetics • - 1 - 04 Thus he suggests the important role of philosophy: At this point philosophy may be of exceptional service, just as it has been in the past ages of istianity and Worlds to Come," p. 343. 104Ibid., pp. 347-348. 434 religious history* * . • Men may come togehter to discuss the basic philosophy of all religion because religion springs from recognized common needs every where present, Prayer and the World Order In the third volume of The Personalist, and as chapter six of his Reason in Faith, Flewelling writes on the topic, "Prayer and the World Order," He begins by noting that the dominance of the scientific spirit has had a tendency to shake the confidence of men in the validity of prayer, even among the devout. The resultant skepti cism about prayer has caused, he thinks, the neglect of one of the most vital of spiritual experiences. If a man holds to the idea of a universe with no contingency in it, then indifference to prayer is what might have been expected. Perhaps the older world before the advent of science had too much magic in it,^°® Yet he is convinced that the attempts at recon ciliation between rationality and prayer have been too few. The pious think such a venture not in keeping with piety, and the unbelieving look upon prayer as a carry over from \(Y7 an ancient superstition. 1Q5Ibid.. p. 350. l^Reason in Faith, pp. 128-129, 107Ibid., p. 130. As for himself, Flewelling looks upon prayer as a means for changing the world order* Here God cannot save Himself or His world without the prayers of men. Yet he would rather look upon prayer as man putting himself in tune with the divine order rather than as a means for changing that order only. Noting objections, he still thinks that the real value of prayer is to clear man's purposes from the unessential and the unreal and give him insight into God's will and to put man in harmony there with. A study of the greatest prayers of history will reveal the primal object of prayer to be a means of putting man en rapport with God. He cites prayers both from the Bible and from the Stoics to this effect. More over, he thinks this savors of the essential element of 1 Oft all worship, this "adaptation to the divine order." Too often religious people have tended to overlook the sanctity of harmony and uniformity in the universe. He next notes that the scientist cannot tell us the essence of matter and of life, he can only tell us of its activity. Such is also the case with the living cell and the phenome na of electricity. He thinks the guess of the theist that there is a supreme mind responsible for this activity is 1Q8Ibid., p. 139. 436 more conservative of values than the materialistic hypothe- . 109 sxs • If one is to accept both science and theism, he must assume then that this back-lying force or activity is nothing less than the divine will and all natural laws are the uniformities of that will in action.HO This, he feels, would do away with the distinctions between the sacred and the secular. It would make the order of nature God's order. He then wonders if it is reasonable to think that God will upset the uniformity of His action where merely trivial matters are involved. Anyone who prays should make the uniformity and dependa bility of nature's laws his first consideration. There fore, the better part of wisdom is to seek conformity to the divine activity. Nature punishes the lawbreaker. We may well feel pity and sympathy for those who suffer because natural law has been violated, but should we expect God to revise His universe in keeping with each *.• o111 human whxm? Flewelling next observes the threefold nature of prayer. Its effect upon man should be our first concern* Thereafter what it might be in relation to the divine 10^Summarizing to here pp. 131-137. ^ ^Ratson in Faith, p. 137. ^■^Summarizing Ibid., pp. 137-138. character. (1) The first purpose of prayer is to bring man into adjustment with the divine Order. Prayer should conform us to God rather than vice versa. Thus by prayer the individual seeks to know the divine will. One may thereby call in the Divine Spirit to review one's motives and ambitions. Prayer then becomes the sine qua non of human adjustment and religious living. (2) Prayer may, even further, put the individual into cooperation with God. If one beseeches God to do what He already wishes without being willing for Him to use the pray-er, he is asking for a divine infraction of the human will. This God does not approve. Cooperation with God must open the avenues of power. (3) Prayer must be engaged in there fore to accomplish the end sought. Sometimes the best answer to prayer is a denial. Such is the case always with selfish prayers. But real prayers are like ships launched to circle the earth and return laden with reali zation. He who desires what God desires will find it so. (4) Prayer then becomes a source of power.112 One must somehow anchor himself in the nature of things which is God. He must give himself to causes that are eternal, to satisfactions that cannot die, to expressions that are as true for one age as another, or at the very least to the heroisms that stand forth in undying splendor.113 113Summarizing to this point, Ibid., pp. 139-145. 11^Reason in Faith, p. 145. 438 One nay not achieve this until time and sense hav removed the trivial from his desires and motivations. Putting one’s self thus in tune with the divine order makes for an inner sense of power in the face of obstacles-—even death itself.114 Flewelling now turns attention to the relationship of prayer to the Divine Character. He thinks prayer a particular need of our problem filled age. But what one thinks of prayer is decided by what one thinks of the divine character. Is prayer the cajoling of a Divine Despot? Is it a mere cry for favoritism? ’ 'Unless our prayers are social and include the general good, they cannot in the strict sense be considered prayers at all; they are the expressions of selfish wishes."11^ One may have come to such a truth even through the blinding tears of self denial, but if thereby one arrives on the highways of God, he will now see Him as One Who treats all His children with unchanging love. So "the highest pathway for man lies along the steep ascent of reconciliation with 114Summarizing Ibid., to p. 146. 115Ibid., p. 147. Note the above mentioned point that true religion must be social in its concern, Supra, pp. 430 n . 11^Ibid., p. 148. This paragraph summarizes pp. 146-14&. 439 The Reasonableness of the Incarnation A constant emphasis in the writings of Flewelling is the logical validity of the incarnation of Christ. Of this emphasis Long has written in his "Introduction" to 117 Flewelling*s autobiography. Such an emphasis may be regarded as the Christian focal point of both Flewelling*s humanism and his personalism. It is even more, for, as Long observes: The Christology of the Divine Incarnation, then, is the focus and final evidence not only of cosmic humaneness, but also of every man's capacity to become an embodiment and expression of absolute value. Flewelling insists that God was in Christ, and that Jesus of Nazareth, having attained such a goal, becomes the ethical ideal for every man. On this discovery and on this fact is based the true claim for the deity of Jesus. This is not a limiting and sectarian affirmation, but an assertion of divinity in every man who yields obedience to the highest demands of the human spirit. It is Jesus who establishes the moral and spiritual respectability of man; who assures the inviolable sanctity of every human soul because of its spiritual possibilities, its final term. Recognition of the deity of Jesus is the recognition of the possible divinity of man and constitutes Christianity as the universal religion, toward which all religious faiths in spite of errors and perversions have 117The Forest of Yggdrasill, pp. xlii-xliv. H ^Ibjd., p. xliii. 440 striven. Christianity must now advance to the full claim of its Founder in this wider and universal sense. Flewelling devotes chapter four of his Reason in 1 2 0 Faith to "The Reasonableness of the Incarnation.He approaches the question from the standpoint of admitted facts. He would submit it to the tests of logic, science, and life, even though scientific demonstration of the incarnation is not to be had. This need not trouble us since the field of scientific proofs is extremely limited, and practical and living values must be taken upon faith.121 He asks: "Is the incarnation a reasonable suppo- sition? Is it in keeping with what we know of the higher human values?" In answer to this he declares: "We believe the assumption of the incarnation of God in Christ is of the most stupendous moment to human progress and attain ment and that it is in the completest sence reasonable and 122 necessary." He first calls our attention to the fact that Jesusf thought of the incarnation grew out of His con sciousness of the Divine Fatherhood. Jesus freed the 11 Q Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, pp. 91-92. l20The Reason in Faith, chapter IV, pp. 82-114. 12lIbid., pp. 82-83. 122Ibid., p. 83. 441 Jewish conception of the Fatherhood of God from its limitations. It was made to include more than the nation. Jesus' doctrine was unique and the summit of His teachings about God was the Divine Fatherhood, Flewelling presents the essence of Jesus' teaching under three emphases: (1) The direct words of Jesus on the Divine Fatherhood, Jesus thought of the Fatherhood as being one of love--the foundation of ethics and religious action for all who desire to be children of God, Here the "Sermon on the Mount" is the keynote. But the reason enjoined for the practice of such principles is that men might be the children of the heavenly father. Fatherhood implies brotherhood, not escape from personal penalty, but in volvement in love's responsibilities. Noting the various facets of Christ's emphasis in that sermon, its climax which is the divine Fatherhood is the immutable foundation which alone stands life's tests. For Flewelling this is the most wonderful emphasis of all religious history. It cannot be surpassed or outmoded. Man is asked to behave after the pattern of the Divine Father, He can do so by reason of the Father's example. We have scarcely begun to realize the profound implications of this, he .. . . 124 l^hxtilcs # 123Summarizing pages 84-85. 124 Summarizing pages 86-89. 442 Again, Jesus definitely set forth this teaching in His parable of the Prodigal son, Wilbur Long notes Flewelling's high regard for this pericope: The key to Flewelling's Christian humanism, both as religion and as a philosophy--between which he made no serious distinction--is the Gospel parable of the prodigal son; if this is kept in mind all the details of his thought and life fall logically into place,*25 Flewelling himself speaks of it as "the consummate teaching \Of% of Jesus on the divine Fatherhood," The parable is radical but true to father and mother love. It is Jesus' picture of the character of God, His humane and forgiving 1 2 7 attitude is because man is potentially divine. (2) The Divine Fatherhood is taught by Jesus' conception of Messiahship, The fact that He behaved like His Father was Jesus' own validation of His messiahship. His spiritual kinship with God obviated the necessity of any proof of linial descend from David. Jesus remolded the prevailing idea of messiahship in his day from that of a political-warrior-deliverer type, to that of one who should conquer men's hearts by the might of love and truth, meeting also the deepest inner needs of mankind. 125Wilbur Long, "Introduction," The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxii. l26geason in Faith, p, 90. l27Cf. Ibid,, pp. 90-91, 443 He taught the idea of a "huiane, universal, spiritual Messiah answering to a divine kingdom of kindred 128 character." Since it would mean the fulfillment of humanity's deepest longings it would not be superseded. This conception of messiahship takes on further significance in the claim of Jesus that those who had 129 seen him had seen the Father also. Jesus' idea of the divine Fatherhood was thus exemplified by his own example of brotherliness. This conception of messiahship was rooted in his assertion of the Divine Fatherhood. v (3) What Jesus thought of the office and work of the Holy Spirit also vindicates His claims to incarnation. He was willing to trust all that He taught and claimed to the validation of truth in the hearts of men by the ministry of the Divine Spirit. Who else ever trusted the hearts of men to speak his word? He assumed his truth was the deepest truth which was in them. He believed what he said, that he was the Eternal Son of the Eternal Father, and that he gave unto men the words of eternal life.131 Jesus knew that the Divine Paraclete would be able to 128Ibid., p. 93. 129John 14:7-11. ^"^Summarizing to p. 95. 131Reason in Faith, p. 96. teach Ben valid truth and point their way to a valid 132 righteousness. Flewelling also thinks that because of this Spirit in the world the revelation is bound to grow and increase. He pleads for a recognition of the sane Holy Spirit today, and thinks that if we do so then the Father's way and will will be even nore fully spelled out 133 to us. He next contends that the incarnation does not lower God, but that it really does exalt nan. Why should anyone think it degrading to deity to be nanifest in hunan personality? The how of it all is a mystery, he admits, but no more of a mystery than our daily experiences of 134 spirit acting upon matter. Flewelling thinks that a denial of the incarnation is far more destructive than one at first recognizes. Especially is it destructive of the dignity of man. Thus he insists: "If we persist in denying the possible deity of Jesus and are to remain logical, we must deny that the goodness which comes to birth in human hearts if of God."^33 in that case how should we affirm God as the 132John 14:26; 15:26; 16:7 ff. 133 Summarizing Reason in Faith to p. 99. l34Ibid., p. 99. 135 Ibid., p. 100. Here he seems to agree with Brightman that the problem of the good is still more significant than that of evil. 445 world-ground. If wc are to affirm God has relation to the world then His most significant self-manifestations must take on the nature of justice, righteousness, and love. These are exactly what we find revealed in the person of Jesus, and these are the divine qualities which could be manifested in time and space. Thus the assumption of the incarnation also is declarative of the thought that moral goodness in human lives comes via the Divine Spirit. This is also the manifestation of our sonship to God and our brotherhood to Christ. So we can see man as the crown of the whole evolutionary process and as the one creature capable of voluntary oneness with God. If we admit the deity of Jesus we also make way for the potentialities of man his younger brother. A third major appeal for the validity of the in carnation is that admission of Christ's moral perfection implies his deity. He is sure that "the supreme reve- 137 lation of God to man must be the moral one. ..." If we seek the one life that meets man's ideal of morality we find it in Jesus. The proof of Jesus' deity is his love, sacrifice, and devotion. Flewelling says: "Jesus presents the one blameless character that fulfills the highest •^^Summarizing his Reason in Faith to page 101. 137Ibid., p. 102. 446 moral and spiritual ideals of man,1 ' and if we admit that all goodness is of God, then we must also recognize "that God was perfectly in Christ revealing himself unto the world,"138 Flewelling cannot accept the Unitarian position which would make Jesus only human: The Unitarian position fixes a great gulf between God and humanity which makes it impossible for one to go to the other, or to find any basis of communi cation or fellowship. If God could not reveal Himself in the man Jesus, he cannot reveal himself in any man. Christ brings God nearer, establishes the divine Fatherhood, and makes clear the divine sonship; not only so, but the philosophical trend of intelligent thinking is toward this position.1^9 Hence it is for the sake of the dignity and majesty of man that Flewelling contends so strongly for the validity of the Incarnation and Deity of Jesus. This is why acceptance of the Deity of the Man of Nazareth is essential to the universal religion. It recognizes potential incarnation in every man under the sun. Christianity is a new interpretation of religion: He who was in the complete sense human, was also by reason thereof, in the complete sense God.140 From a universal God we must proceed to a universal manhood exemplified in God-in-the-flesh, providing a pattern to follow, and to alleviate the problem of evil by participation in the sorrows by which man 138Ibid., p. 103. 139Ibid., p. 104. **°Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 32. 447 141 comes to self-realization and freedom. Flewelling believes that a recognition of the Incarnation will have future implications for the well being of man. Jesus is certain to speak with increasing authority, since, as he says: "Jesus of Nazareth is the one ultimate goal of 142 humanity." Likewise a recognition of Jesus' claims and profound teaching here will hasten the bonds of universal 143 brotherhood among all nations and cultures. Finally, the Incarnation is demanded by the problem of evil. "An incarnation was necessary to justify the existence of pain and evil in the world and to show that, in spite of appearances, the heart of the Eternal is 144 Love." If God being able to order a universe in which there should be neither sin nor pain, orders one where the contrary is true, he must show, first, that the suffering is disciplinary, and, second, that he is willing to share in the task of working out man's redemption. There is deadlock, and deadlock only, in philosophy and theology unless the appearance of God in the person of Christ be allowed. There is logically and practically no solution for the deeper problems of human existence apart from the deity and suffering of Jesus. The whole problem of reconciliation centers here.145 1 4 1 Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 166. Cf. also p. 168. ^ Reason in Faith, p. 106. 143Ibid., pp. 106-108. 144Ibid., p. 108. 145lbid., pp. 108-109. 448 The desire of God to participate in the world through Christ may be a mystery but it is indeed the teaching of the New Testament and must await its validation in the experience of each individual person. This, he thinks, comes in the wake of a repentance which includes the forsaking of sin and acceptance of God's forgiveness. The resultant new forces set in motion in one's life be speak the willingness of God to share our struggles and make us new creatures in Christ Jesus.146 Flewelling concludes the chapter by deploring the fact that even "Christian people have too often for gotten that the supreme revelation is the living Christ himself."147 Thus the greatest convincing factor is the witness of Christ's presence as living authority in modern lives. Theories may be gainsaid by sophistry, but the witness of life is the most convincing. "To reject the moral goodness of the Man of Nazareth is to make the supreme decision for evil; to accept and to follow is to live," he concludes.14® This is his view of the centrality and reasonable ness of the Incarnation, around which his whole philosophy 146Ibid., pp. 109-112. 147Ibid., p. 113. 148lbid., p. 114. of Christian humanism is built. 4 4 9 Flewelling1s View of Theism Our philosopher would readily admit that his personal realism is also a type of theism, yet his theism is not an acceptance of all that passes as such. He expressed his views in an article entitled, ' ’ One View of Theism."**^ Therein he looks upon reality as active--God is a living God; the God of the living--in keeping with suggestions by Heraclitus, Bergson, and modern person- alists. He also notes that the idea of reality as active is receiving renewed attention especially in the views of modern physics. Even the atom can best be thought of as a substanceless center of activity.*'*® But he rejoices to note that this new physics finds already on the scene a philosophy ready to deal with its latest concepts, which philosophy is personalism. So "in the basic con cept of theism that reality is an activity it is possible for science, philosophy, and religion to find the basis of common understanding, a condition which has not obtained for generations."*5* 149tione View of Theism," The Personalist, XXI, 5-15. *5QIbid.. p. 7. - *5*Ibid., p. 8. 450 From this basic definition of reality as active the theist draws certain metaphysical conclusions. If all reality is continuously active toward the realization of ends, there is a causal agency producing this activity. And if this continuously active somewhat is intelligible, then the world ground must be a supreme creative intel ligence. Creation thus becomes a living process of reality, continuously being renewed. Then looking to history the theist sees both intelligence and progress to have been on the side of the optimist. Man may also 1 5 2 participate in this living process called reality. Flewelling now takes up the standard objections to this type of theism, from the standpoint of the absolutist, the dualist, the agnostic, the fundamentalist and the naturalist.^3 positively, he notes that the theist thinks of God "as possessing primarily qualities of self- consciousness and self-direction without the possession of a physical body . . . conceived as intelligent and purposive . . . best described by the term personal."’ * - 34 The article concludes with a consideration of the advantages of this type of theism. They are four: 152lbid., pp. 8-9. 153Ibid., pp. 9-14. 134Ibid., p. 14. (1) It solves the conflict between Religion, Science, and Philosophy. Each is a valid way to reality and they are mutually complimentary. As science verifies its hypothe ses facts come. Philosophy discovers the reasonable relations of reality. Religion explores the realm of values, (2) This type of theism emphasizes the conduct of life. MThe proof of religion becomes pragmatic.'’155 It finds its validation in the social order. (3) "This type of theism provides for the recognition of values in all religion."156 All goodness, love, etc., is recognized as a manifestation of the indwelling God. Religion thus be comes universal rather than provincial. Thus, "when Christianity begins to think of itself not as an exclusive but as a universal religion, the day of its greatest power 157 will arrive." And, (4) this type of theism makes room for the intuitive mystical in religion. "If all reality is due to a continuous divine activity it must be held possible for receptive souls acting in unison with the Divine Will to be recipients of divine understanding and 158 power." This type of theism, he thinks, is due to 155Ibid., p. 15 452 159 exert an increasing influence in human affairs. Immortality a Reasonable Postulate There are several sources from which we glean Flewelling’s thinking about Immortality. An early article bears the title, "The Consciousness of Immortality,"^^ and it later became a chapter in his Reason in Faith. Chapter XXIX in Creative Personality talks of "Deathless Personality," and two chapters in The Person treat this theme under the captions, "The Second Dimension of Time" (Chapter XXIV), and "Beyond Time" ( Chapter XXXVI). Other incidental references appear in various parts of his other writings• As to the consciousness of Immortality, Flewelling grants that it has been assailed and doubted many times but since it holds such comfort for man it has never been successfully set aside. Flewelling thinks, first, that our consciousness of immortality arises from the time-transcending nature of ^■^Summarizing ibid., pp. 14-15. 160In The Methodist Review, CVI, pp. 230-236. See Reason in Faiih, Chapter X. 16lThe strongest modern polemic against the idea of immortality known to this writer is a book by Corliss Lamont, The Illusion of Immortality (New York: Philosophi cal Library, , 315” pp. 453 experience. For this reason no other animal than man has ever been troubled with the notion. Only man is given this unique consciousness of his conscious states, or the power of reflection upon his moods. Out of this power of reflection comes man's moral world and sense of responsi bility. Flewelling disagrees with many who would ground man's consciousness of immortality upon visions from his dream states. The ground for the "feeling of immortality" lies in man's ability for reflection. Animals dream but do not reflect upon their conscious states. Neither does Flewelling believe that the idea of immortality arises from man's fear of the dead. Here again such a fear is common in the animals--the horse, for example--but there 162 is no evidence that they reflect upon this fear. Another source of man's consciousness of immor tality is his temporal consciousness. Man does not interpret his experience long until he is conscious of a time order. He says: Man is conscious of the past with relation to the present and very soon learns to project the present experience into the future, to reflect upon it and to act with it in mind. He thus becomes the master of time, and, being limited by it, yet transcends it.*63 In answer to the objection that the animals provide for 162Cf. Reason in Faith, pp. 214-216. 16^Reason in Faith, p. 217. 454 their future, Flewelling notes that this is due to instinct, not to reflection* But man is a time being and also a time-transcending being* He also naturally expects to continue the survival of time, for the chief item of personal experience is continuity. Because of this funda mental consciousness, all theories of his non-survival of time have had hard going. The more he reflects the deeper becomes his consciousness of the need for immortality. Now the conviction of immortality does not grow insistent save in the presence of an eternal order of living. Mere continuance of mere living is not sufficient. Only as life takes hold upon profounder issues and is bent on interests that transcend time does the demand for immortality arise. There are programs of service, love, loyalty, and aspiration that surpass the fleeting years and create belief in the persistence of values* If animal instincts correspond to reality, he suspects that human consciousness of continuity does also. Only an eternal order of living can satisfy the human spirit. If life be lived after ideals that enlarge as they are realized, death becomes but the introduction into an order unlimited by temporal and spatial conditions in which whatever is willed is done*1^5 ■'■^Summarizing Reason in Faith, pp. 217-219. l65Ibid*, p. 221. 455 He further thinks that man's consciousness of immortality i9 in accord with the logic of life and growth. Most men have only begun to learn how to live when death calls them. There are unnumbered evidences that the present life is only an apprenticeship in self-mastery and self-control, the anteroom to some vaster life.1^6 If these are but man's own thoughts we may ask why he alone of all animals has such thoughts. Left without immortality his span of usefulness is truncated and there is little excuse for his existence in the first place. Of course he recognizes that much faulty religious teaching has been but an unfortunate dualism. On the other hand if one is now living his life after the eternal order he may be assured that this is the nature of the life to come. He says: "His task is not to get to heaven, but to get heaven in his heart and life."*^7 He who has acclimated himself to God's order of life finds death but the doorway into a less limited life but one in keeping with that with which he is now familiar. Flewelling insists that "immortality is individual or nothing."*8^ Since the present life centers about 166Ibid., p. 222. 167Ibid., pp. 222-223. 168Ibid.. p. 223. 169Loc. cit. 456 individual experience, then any immortality to be genuine must do likewise. It cannot be merely the successive generations in which man's continuity is to be reckoned. If immortality is to be meaningful it must involve personal continuity through time and change. If this is severed there is no immortality. Nirvana, transmigration, or even Panpsychism would not suffice. He insists that: "Immor tality to be such has the same center as living experience^ 170 a continued and relating personality." He is willing to grant that this is outside of the field of scientific demonstration. Fundamentally psychism, spiritualism, and kindred attempts to demonstrate life after death are but forms of materialism based on the assumption that nothing non-material is real. Attempts to photograph spirits are futile, for the proof of another order of life must be in terms of that order. The affairs of the soul are not materially demonstrable. Love is of another order and cannot be reduced to the material.*71 172 In his chapter on "Deathless Personality," Flewelling raises the question as to how far philosophy sustains theology in its postulate of immortality. He ^7QReason in Faith, p. 224. 171Cf. Ibid.. pp. 224-227. 172Creative Personality, pp. 245-253. 457 recognizes that immortality has been brought to light not by reason but by revelation— "an intuitional insight 173 which may be truer than all our faulty reasonings*" He believes that philosophy may argue from the standpoint that personality embodies certain deathless qualities. So he turns to the question of what we are to understand life to mean. The one distinguishing feature of life is its power of adaptation and conquest of environment. But it is given to human personality alone to "follow the line of higher adaptations indicated by reflective self- consciousness" and "apparently the highest type of person ality is realized in an active and living adaptation to a 174 moral and spiritual universe." With this he turns to consider what may be the essential qualities of deathless personality. First among them is the continuance of functioning power on the part of the same self-conscious organism. Second is the fact that the essence of life is activity. This is the nature of the life of the spirit— a growing continuous adaptation to a moral and spiritual environment. Here the spiritual life turns out to be a conscious harmonizing of the personal will with the divine order. Thus so long as the 173Ibid., p. 246. 174Ibid., p. 248. 458 divine order shall endure the life in harmony therewith may be presumed to continue* Hence the very fact of eternal life here becomes evidence for eternal life here- 175 after. He says: "The capacity to function according to a spiritual order, to set [one's] own activities to a 176 nobler note, is eloquent of continuance." Personality as the highest achievement of the present order requires a permanence greater than that of matter and the lower orders of life. To remove from our interpretation of human life the element of immortality is to deprive it of signifi cance and to miss the profounder fact of the world 1 77 order.177 He follows a similar strain of argument in his later book, The Person, relating it more carefully to the 17ft process of evolution itself. "By such a process," he says, "does life climb the ladder of existence to its highest expression, the ability to transcend both time and change.n^7^ He states the following conclusion: No creative soul has ever been able to complete its self-expression here. It lays down its earthly tasks at the point when, by reason of experience and mastery, it should begin a career of new creativeness. To this end it commonly and naturally craves eternity. 252. ^7^Ibid., p. 252. Summarizing to here also pp. 248- l76Ibid., p. 252. ^77Loc. cit. 178Chapter XXIV. l79The Person, p. 205. 459 This is the natural state of the person who has lived for something more than the satisfaction of selfish desires. Ennui of life falls only upon those who think primarily of their selfish interests, which interests grow morbidly with every satisfaction to an increasing dissatisfaction. The person who finds his life in some eternal emprise craves the privilege of 'going on and ever to be.' . . . In a world which is nothing but beginnings, a second dimension of time is essential to the thought and planning of men who are to make the most of the first dimension. A world which, humanly speaking, is a place of beginnings, calls for a larger world and a time, for all such pilgrims of the spirit as are prepared to profit, by its extension into a second dimension. Such as expectation is only in keeping with the tale which all existence tells from the humblest atom to the veriest saint. The first atom speaks of a world yet to be, sentient life discloses the probable approach of a higher consciousness, and the life of man is heavy with the promise of immortality.*8® Thus he thinks "the challenge of the hour is that we shall begin to live in the second dimension of time."^8^ This is to recognize the fact that "eternal life has its beginning in time. In fact the very essence of person ality lies in its conquest of time, that transcending 182 power by which it may become immortal." Such consider ations as these are they by which he would employ philoso phy to establish presumptive evidences in favor of the reasonableness of the postulate of immortality. We conclude our study of Flewelling's philosophy of religion with his own personal affirmation of faith: 180Ibid.. pD. 205-206 181Ibid.. p. 206. 182Ibid., p. 207. 460 We believe in a living God and a continuous revelation; in a God who is trying to manifest himself to all men in all ways; we believe in a growing revelation of his will to men who will to do His will. We believe in a Christ who is so cos mic, so fitted to the needs of all men, races and times that He will be discovered as the ultimate solution of all problems, religious, social, and political. We believe He needs only to be shown to command all hearts, all allegiances; that he is all and in all. So long as we have Him we fear no adaptations which may be made of Western theology or practice by the Eastern world. The only danger is that we shall smother Him in some absolutism of our own conceit, some bibliolatry of our own inter pretation, some credal or institutional idolatry which conceals Him and accepts the letter as a substitute for the fact. An area of thought closely related to Fie welling's philosophy of religion is that of free-will and determi nism. This is reserved for a later chapter. We now turn our attention to Brightman. BRIGHTMAN1S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION For Brightman, religion is definitely a philo sophical problem, for since man's greatest problems are religious they must find a philosophical answer and expla nation. Brightman, therefore, exhibits a strong concern for a rationale of our knowledge of God, of good and evil, of human and divine purpose, of the nature of God, the question of immortality, and the validity of religious l®®Flewelling, "Totalitarian Religion," The Personalist, XX, 45. 461 experience and values* He spent much of his time seeking out and reducing to writing his solutions of such problems* A glance through the various titles of his books and his many articles helps one grasp the strong interest he mani fested in religion. He is sure that religion needs its critics, for there is a logical as well as the moral basis for religion. He also thinks that both reason and reve lation are important factors in the enrichment of religious experience. Brightman's chief work on religion is his Philosophy of Religion. Others among his writings with a special con cern for religion are: l£ God a Person?, The Problem of God, The Finding of God, Religious Values, Personality and Religion, The Future of Christianity, Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism, Moral Laws, Sources of the Hexateuch, and The Spiritual Life. Since our philosopher always placed emphasis upon the need for definitions, we may now give attention to some that concern religion. "Philosophy of Religion" he defines as follows: "An attempt to discover, by rational interpre tation of religion and its relations to other types of experience, the truth of religious beliefs and the value of religious attitudes and practices."*84 Or, again: "The experience of interpreting those experiences which we call * 84Philosophy of Religion, pp. 22, 535. 462 religious and of relating them to other experiences, as IOC well as to our conception of experience as a whole," He thinks of religion itself as being: Concern about experiences which are regarded as of supreme value; devotion toward a power or powers believed to originate, increase and conserve those values; and some suitable expression of this concern and devotion, whether through symbolic rites or through other individual or social conduct,186 He says, "religion may be defined either descriptively or 1 0 7 normatively•" The first would state what have been the common elements of religion historically and manifested by various bodies that have called themselves religious. The second would undertake to tell us what religion ought to be. He offers for consideration the following "descrip tive definition" of religion: "Religion is the total attitude of man toward what he considers to be superhuman and worthy of worship, or devotion, or propitiation, or at least of reverence,"^88 As a possible normative definition of religion, he suggests the following: "Religion ought to be characterized by the feeling of dependence on a personal God and dominated by the will to co-operate in ion the conservation and increase of values," Here he 185Ibid,, pp. 1, 535. 186Ibid., pp. 17, 536. 187Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 168. 188Ibid., p. 169. ^8 ^l-oc. cit. 463 enters the area of philosophy of religion and betrays the presence of his own idealism. Therefore he grants that such a definition must be tested by one's total philosophy* Brightman surveys some of the fundamental problems of religion after having noted that religion is concerned with matters which cannot be observed by the senses. Hence religion is supersensuous, nevertheless if we are to have a true and coherent philosophy, then "the super- sensuous cannot be excluded . . . it must rather be ad- 190 mitted as a fact and rationally interpreted." Another problem is the matter of faith and reason relationships. Brightman argues that they are not mutually exclusive. He states the case as follows: Faith is confidence; and the contrary of confidence is not reason, but distrust or lack of confidence. Reason is coherence; and the contrary of coherence is incoherence or irrationality, not faith. Both reason and faith are approaches to the deepest reality of the universe. There is no a priori ground for regarding them as mutually exclusTve^ The object of faith gains nothing by being unreasonable; the object of reason is not necessarily untrustworthy.19^ He thinks it folly to suppose that man's reason could ever fully comprehend that which is the course of man's being. Moreover he thinks that "faith presupposes reason and 192 reason faith." We can have no faith in that which is 1 9 0 Ibid., p. 160. 1 9 1 Ibid., p. 170. ^ ■ 9 ^Loc. cit. 464 self-contradictory or incoherent. Likewise if reason is to interpret the real world it must have confidence in the rationality of the entire cosmos. On the other hand "if faith ventures to assert its independence of all reason, 103 it is already on the road to self-destruction." Faith must not fear analysis or investigation. What we should seek is a reasonable faith. Thus he says: "if we either demand absolute proof or reject reason entirely, then nothing is left but emptiness or fanaticism and anarchy in the realm of values,"^ True religion must concern itself with the conservation and increase of values. Another problem for our philosophy is to find a reasonable answer to the question whether the ground of all values be a personal God. Here the concern is not whether the postulate is easy or hard but whether or not it is reasonable. At any rate our Supreme Being must be more than Creator, he must also be worthy of worship. Philosophy of Religion may inquire about the reality of God, and one's answer here will decide the permanency of the place of religion in his life. Since, however, "religion depends on faith in God; and the kind of religion one has depends on the kind of God one believes in, no investigation should be omitted that would shed 1 9 3 Ibid., p. 171. ^ ■ 9 ^Loc. cit. 465 light on the grounds of belief in God."19^ The question is not so much whether the philosophical thinker can believe in God as whether he can escape belief in God, Brightman at this point appeals to his former discussion and validation of universals and particulars as the ex perience of a cosmic mind which he characterizes as "a 1Q6 universalizing particular." Again, he notes that value- perceptions have indicated the existence of a realm of ends. Bach of these argues for a Supreme Person the expression of whose purposes they must be. He thinks that religious experience will confirm the foregoing philosophical reflections. A life in which devotion to God, prayer, and worship have their normal place finds harmony of thought, feeling, and action. Thus one's philosophical considerations bring him to a "rational faith in God."197 As was the case for Flewelling, so with Brightman; in earlier chapters we have considered his doctrine of God, his thoughts on the problem of evil, and his value theory. Here we are concerned with the special positions he has taken relative to religion itself. Brightman notes that his own interest in religion, which has been "deep 1 9 5 Ibid., p. 172. 1 9 6 Ibid., p. 173. 197Loc. cit. 466 and life long, is not," as he says, "an interest in religion a9 dogma, but . . . an interest in religion as 198 truth." This point will serve as the beginning for our study of his philosophy of religion. Reason in Religion In his article on "Religion as Truth" Brightman writes: Religion is not merely intellectual truth, but it is practical truth. Without religious experience, the best theory is hollow and futile. Thus my philosophy of religion is equally critical of abstract rationalism, which ignores experience, and of abstract pragmatism [a very common kind], which neglects reason. The interest in religion as truth implies that reason is the final court of appeal, whether we are dealing with theory or with practice. The practical reason is reason; and no amount of respect for conscience or mystical experience or experimental method or strong personalities can justify the thinker in being satis fied with what he knows to be irrational--that is, contradictory or incoherent. My interest in religion as truth is also an interest in religion as life. Yet life is not worthy merely because it is life or because it can be lived successfully. Religious life, like all life, must be lived intelligently and responsibly if it is to be worth living. This, then, is the mainspring of my philosophy of religion: to inquire critically into the truth of religion as a view of the universe and as a way of living, and to seek for reasonable embodiments of that truth. I can see what those mean who say that a rational religion is no religion; yet I deliberately reject their standpoint and assert that I must have a rational religion or no religion. Without an honest mind I can have no religious peace.199 l98,t^eligion as Truth," p. 54. 199Ibid.. pp. 54-55. 467 In an article entitled "Reason in Religion," he once aore defends its importance: In support of the place of reason in religion are the following considerations: 1) God is truth, and reason is unbiased search for truth; 2) truth cannot be self-contradictory or incoherent; 3) there is no way to test rival revelation-claims, within or without the Bible, other than appeal to reason; 4) blind, unreasoning faith is a violation of the integrity of personality; 5) reason and faith need each other ('there is no knowledge without faith nor faith without knowledge,' Clem. Alex. Strom. II, 373); 6) reason is a humble search for truth, not proud self-assertion; 7) reason always deals with experienced revelations of reality which reason alone could not create; 8) the inexhaustibility of the task of reason is in harmony with faith in immortality and with the kinship of the soul with God; 9) it is not reasonable for God or man to expect any individual to penetrate further into philosophy than he is able-- but reason should be followed to the extent of one's ability; 10) without some true ideas, there can be neither ethics nor religion.2^ Brightman's criterion of religious truth, as for all truth, is coherence, "namely, that the consistency of our beliefs with each other and with experience is the 201 test of the truth of religious beliefs." Elsewhere he says: "Any belief, then, is true if or insofar as it organizes, interprets, and explains experience more consistently, systematically, and economically than any 202 competing belief." Concerning reason itself he has 200 E.S, Brightman, "Reason in Religion," Encyclo pedia of Religion V. Ferm, ed., New York: The Philosophi caT Library, 1945), p. 637. 20^Philosophy of Religion, p. 122. 2Q2Religious Values, p. 23. 4 6 8 written: "reason is a coherent explanation based on a 203 synoptic view of experience*" Introducing his book, The Finding of God, Brightman states his concern for reason in religion: Thus two currents run through the present book: religious rationalism and religious realism* The former is a faith in the reasonableness of God; the latter is a faith in His reality* The rationalism warns us not to purchase the realism too cheaply; the realism warns us not to treat the present results of rationalism dogmatically; each spurs the other on toward the divine truth and the divine reality.2^* Brightman thinks of reason as a road to God: It would seem to follow that, if there is a reasonable God, reason must be a road to him. Of course God must be thought of as far above man. But that is true in every respect and not as regards reason alone. Some seek to discredit reason, yet save some other approach to the divine, such as intuition or emotion. But if reason be rejected because human reason is inferior to divine reason, then there is equally good ground for rejecting every human approach to God on the ground that every human experience is inferior to divine experience* It is difficult to escape the suspicion that the way of reason is avoided because it involves hard thinking rather than because God's reason is so superior to man1s. History shows that many who have sought God by reason have found him.2®5 He continues: If it could be proved that reason is thoroughly untrustworthy (although any such proof would have to trust reason!), the result would not be, as some 2Q3personality and Religion, p. 27. 204The Finding of God, p. 12* 205Ibid., p. 55. 469 think, to make room for faith, but rather to destroy all basis for belief in God and all con fidence in the existence of any power in the universe worthy of worship. Habit and emotion would keep religion going, but its bottom would have dropped out. In a word, we may say that the cause of reason and the cause of religion stand or fall together. Religion avows belief in the reasonableness of the universe. If you undermine religion, you undermine confidence in rationality as a cosmic fact. God should be accessible to all men of every level of ability and intellect. But i f he is accessible only to those who cannot or will not think and who fall back on 'common sense,' it will not be long before he ceases to be accessible even to them. 'Common sense* is the gradual spread through the masses of humanity of the experience and wisdom of the best minds of the past. Common sense now believes in God. But i f common sense were to lose confidence in reason, i t would destroy its own f o u n d a t i o n . 2 ® 4* Brightman is also convinced that if there was to be a revelation (the fact of which he does not doubt) it would have to be rational and appeal to reason. Revel ation, he allows, may be above reason in the sense of not being produced by it, but so, in a sense, is every thought we thi.ik about our sense world also. Revelation in experience brings us to know sound, color, love and hate. Reason works constantly on materials which it cannot OCY7 create. "But, while it cannot create, it can judge." Thus he insists upon a rational synthesis of our thought about revelation. 2 Q6 Ibid.. pp. 56-57. 2 0 7 Ibid., p. 75. 470 There is a combined emphasis in Brightman's thinking upon what the New Testament indicates by its two Greek terms, logos and agape» reason and love. The one he regards as respect for truth, the other as respect for personality.^08 They are basic to any valid religion, and combined they constitute what he calls "reasonable love." He says: It needs to be asserted that God is a God of truth; that personality is able to reach its highest only when it is devoted to truth; and that all the claims made by the conflicting interests of human life need to be adjudicated before the Supreme Court of reason. To appeal to reason is to appeal to God. The God of the New Testament is essentially logos and agape, reason and love, or, better still, reasonable love. A personalism built on this foundation can make a universal appeal to all races and creeds of men. Any religion or society based on irrationalism can only create partisan feuds and bitter divisions. Person alism respects and dignifies personality--not merely as an individual and social ideal, but as the clue to a reasonable and inspiring philosophy of nature and values. Personalism is not science, but it is a sane philosophy of science. Personalism is not religion; but it is an introduction to the under standing of religious experience and religious revelation. The personalist cannot assert that his is the only thinkable philosophy; but he can view it as offering light on many of the dark places of the world's thought and life.209 These are also dynamic and practical principles in religion, thus "when a man feels reasonable love for God he expresses it in at least three ways--by understanding, 20* *Nature and Values, p. 72. 2 Q9 Ibid., p. 137. 471 O IQ by worship, and by service.'1 Moreover, it is on the level of a divine-human cooperation that, as he states it: Manfs will is freed from bondage to selfishness and is able to gain the joy and strength that come from shared work--as man works with and for his fellowman and with and for his God. . . . On this level, too, logos and agape, reason and love, can find the best soil for their growth. Here is the kingdom of God in which all races and creeds can meet, learn, and respect each other in religious liberty. Thus it is obvious that Brightman insists upon a large and valid place for rational processes in religion. Religion must not be held in defiance of reason and truth. To allow that would be to assail the very integrity of the 212 mind and break down the unity of personality. In his essay on "Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," he states: Personalism, then, is opposed to every 'irrational* philosophy of religion. . . . It should be noted that a rational philosophy of religion leaves room for 'revelation,' just as it leaves room for conversation with other selves; but it holds that the meaning of any conversation or revelation can only be determined by reason.213 In the same article he affirms that a personalistic philosophy of religion is also metaphysical, ethical, 210Ibid., p. 153. 211Ibid., p. 165. 212Ibid., p. 136. 213ifperSonalism as a Philosophy of Religion," Crozer Quarterly, V (1928), p. 391. social, and mystical, and it accepts the idea of a develo- 214 ping immortality. Metaphysical Realities in Religion Even more important than reason is realism in religion, and Brightman declares it so: But even more important than the reasonableness of all true religion is its realism, by which is meant no anti-idealism and no theory of nonexistent neutral entities, but simply the fact that for religious life the actual reality of God is the object of all worship, and that this reality is far more essential to religion.than any present stage of our theories about it. Brightman notes that the metaphysical aspect of the per sonalis tic philosophy of religion is opposed to positivism which seeks to confine knowledge to immediate objects of human experience. But he insists that one will never dis cover God if he looks no farther than the objects of science. The highest being for positivism must therefore be humanity. Positivism talks about humanity, but Brightman contends that "humanity" is a metaphysical object rather than a mere abstraction. Yet no one ever immediately ex perienced any such object as humanity. Man does have self experience and he does go beyond that to postulate the existence of other selves. Brightman therefore reasons as 2 1 4 Ibid., pp. 388-392. 473 follows: The personalist argues that if we can go beyond our immediate experience to the existence and experience of other selves, the same logic which grants us that right grants us the right to define any other objects which are necessary to the explanation of the facts of experience. The very existence of consciousness and of value experience, especially of moral and religious experience, points to some traits of the rest of the universe which make their existence possible, A real, personal, creative, and active God is, the personalist believes, the only adequate being which possesses traits ade quate to explain those experiences. Positivism and humanism are religiously hollow and intellectually unfinished. They simply do not think the problems through. Perhaps no one can think them through in the sense of reaching a point where one is through thinking, and who wants to. But that fact affords no shadow of excuse for getting through before one has fairly begun,216 In keeping with this Brightman notes that "the center of gravity of the metaphysical account of religion lies always beyond the self," thus giving an objective refer- 217 ence to religion. He would argue not only for the objective reference of religious experience,2^® but for the objective reference of all experience, since objective reference "is the essence of all knowledge; science, philosophy, and religion all point beyond themselves to a reality which they describe."2*^ 2l6»»personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," p. 389* Cf. also pp. 388-390. 217Religious Values, p. 114. 218Ibid., pp. 108 ff. 2 1 9 Ibid., pp. 113-114. 474 True Religion is Ethical As in the case of Flewelling’s philosophy of religion, so it is with Brightman: ’ ’ personalism is an 220 ethical philosophy of religion." It would emphasize value experience of which the ethical is the most funda mental aspect. "Morality," Brightman says, "is the con dition of the realization of all other values in any total and harmonious way."221 Therefore any general philosophy must take account of moral facts: If a man renounces moral obligation, he may have streaks of genius in art, in intellect, or even in religion; but he has abandoned the power which would unify and perpetuate his values. For the personalist, then, the moral will is at the center of personality and hence of religion. Any violation of or disrespect for the moral will is wrong, even if committed in the name of religion. The authoritarian principle is therefore rejected by personalism. No tradition or revelation can be accepted as true because some authority vouches for it. All true religion must commend itself directly to the moral will and reason of m a n . 222 In another context he declares: "Sound moral principles are logical; unsound ones are in some way illogical."22^ Brightman also allows that though the good life 220"Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," p. 389. 221Loc. cit. 222Loc. cit. 223Moral Laws, p. 53. 4 7 5 involves respect and reverence for every personality, it does not mean that we are obliged to respect one's sin* If we are to live a good life, we should reverence personality* This does not mean that we are to approve of every person as he is* No intelligent person would want a baby always to remain a baby, no matter how lovable the little one may be* Much less would a good person want a sinner to remain a sinner* To respect a sinner's personality does not mean to respect his sin* It means to love him, not for what he is, but for what he may be, or even to love him as he is in order that he may become better. The greater the love for the person, the greater the hatred of his sin.224 Here the ethical nature of an intelligent love for person ality is quite evident. Brighton would insist that "any religious attitude which undermines the goodness of good ness or the evil of evil is blasting at the very founda- n o e tions of religion." Again, he declares: "The only sinner who finds Cod is he who wills no longer to be a 004 sinner*" He thinks of virtue as "steady obedience to 227 a rational conscience." Furthermore, "true religion teaches us that freedom is found only in complete obedi ence to the will of God, which defines for us the con- 22 8 ditions of the highest opportunity." Brightman would 224Nature and Values, p. 149. 225Finding of God, p. 79* 226Ibid*, p. 85. 227Moral Laws, p. 115. 228The Spiritual Life, p. 204. 476 therefore urge the individual not to engage in "loose living, loose drinking, and loose thinking," for this 220 means "life without any principles." In his view religion is "cooperation between man and God, expressed port both in worship and in the conduct of life." Here he approaches the social concern which characterizes the religion of personalism. True Religion Begets Social Involvement "Personalism," says Brightman: . . . is a social philosophy of religion of a definite type, which may be called the co-operative. Personalism believes in the genuine separateness of individual minds, such that no mind is a part of or can become a part of any other mind; it is there opposed to belief in a 'social mind' as any real fact which either includes or transcends the individual; much more is it opposed to any absolutism or pantheism which includes all individuals with One Absolute Self. On the other hand, personalism believes in the genuine interaction of the many individuals, and in the presence within all indi viduals of common laws and common meanings; hence despite its individualistic emphasis, personalism is opposed to absolute or anarchistic individualism. Its social theory, then, is that of the free co operation of different and distinct individual persons in the attainment of common purposes. The aim of the universe, then, is not absorption in the Infinite, nor is it the mere assertion of personal liberty; it is rather, free and moral co-operation. The essence of religion and religious salvation is 22^Nature and Values, p. 141 230 Moral Laws, p. 264. A m co-operation with God. Brightman devotes chapter five of his book, Personality and Religion, to a consideration of "social religion." Therein he insists that both personality and religion, "however privately and individually they may be experienced, always imply social relations, just as 232 society implies personal beings and experiences." He thinks that the social interest of the religious man comes from "the discovery of a supreme divine value which society can neither give nor take away, but which imparts an eternal meaning to every human life and hence trans forms the struggles of society into stages of a cosmic drama."233 Yet, and "just because the divine power is superhuman and supersocial, a relation to God is neces- n 04 sarily a relation to all of human society." Thus the fact "that religion is social is a truth that does not depend on the assertions of philosophers."235 Recognizing that "not every religious leader has been an Amos or a Confucius or a Buddha or a Savonarola 231 "Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," p. 390. 232 Personality and Religion, p. 129. 233 Ibid., p. 135. 234Ibid., p. 137. 2 3 5 Ibid., p. 138. 478 or a Gandhi,” yet he is sure that the "burden of prophecy in all ages has been the rebuke of social injustice.”226 It is therefore an error to identify religion with its corrupted and debased forms which have become the instru ments of social oppression for ”true religion is social."23^ Brightman takes his stand with men like John Woolman and others who would insist that ”mystical knowledge of God" must lead "straight to a remaking of social and economic institutions."23® As examples where this ideal has been demonstrated he cites the lives of such men as Kagawa, Gandhi, E. Stanley Jones, and others. He thinks, there fore, that "where religion has fallen short in social interest, it has failed to be full-orbed religion." To have faith in God is to assert a social universe. It is to declare allegiance to the faith that one purpose, one reason, and one love interfuse all things. When thought out, it implies some form of democracy as the ideal of society; an order in which there is free cooperation, with no exploiters and no exploited. On the other hand, to deny faith in God is to assert that there is no universal purpose, no divine spirit of love in the cosmos apart from man.240 236Ibid., p. 139. 23?Loc. cit. 238Ibid., p. 141. 239Ibid., p. 142. 479 Personalism is Mystical There is a strong plea for a genuinely mystical element in Brightman*s thoughts about religion* This is his fifth point about the personalistic philosophy of religion as set forth in the above mentioned article. Therein he says of personalism: Its conception of reason as the coherent inter pretation of experience makes it empirical in its emphasis. Experience reveals the fact that the relations and persons are mediated by experiences having a peculiarly immediate emotional quality. The consciousness of the presence of a beloved human being elicits our moral nature and our highest rational powers; but it also produces a uniquely satisfactory feeling-tone which suffuces conscious ness with a glow which nothing else can equal. Such experiences when ascribed to divine influences are called mystical. They constitute the secret of the joy and rapture of religion; and when they occur in a life which is reasonable and moral, they are sources of great strength and inspiration. Lack of that relation to God which makes mystical experience possible, is, in my opinion, one of the chief sources of weakness in contemporary American religion. The personalistic conception of mysticism, it need hardly be said, differs from that of the pantheistic mystics. For the personalist, the mystical experience is one of communion, not of union. Or, if one in sists on calling it union, it is a union of purpose by feelings which subserve that purpose rather than a union of actual being. Personalism, then, is a philosophy of prayer, laying special stress on the prayer of communion with God, but also finding room for prayer of intercession; for a reasonable God will have to respond differently to a situation in which prayer is present than he would to a situation from which it is absent.241 O A. 1 ’ ’ Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion,” Dp. 391-392. 480 So although he contends for the social dimension of true religion, he is certain that "an exclusively social point 242 of view impoverishes the content of religion*" Further more: "Unless social religion is balanced and supplemented by personal religion . . . there is grave peril of inhuman and irreligious regimentation."243 In that case the whole battle for freedom of thought and of conscience would have been in vain. An exclusively social standpoint must not therefore triumph. Religion must insist upon its rights to act as judge and critic of the social order or religion 244 itself will die. He sees value in the medieval empha sis upon the worth of a soul, for he thinks that along with it there existed "a more social and organic view of the church and of society" than we have today.243 What we need is "a society in which the individual is treated as of intrinsic worth and dignity while he is a member of 24^ an organic whole." Therefore: If Religion is to offer man more than a momentary consolation while he perishes, it must furnish a goal and a meaning to human existence which is not to be found in an exclusively social point of view.^47 242Personality and Religion, p. 144. 243boc. cit. 244Ibid., p. 145. 245Ibid., pp. 145-146. 246Ibid., p. 146. 2 4 7Loc. cit. 481 This is why a purely social type of religion is self-defeating. Religion can be the means of re deeming society only by reaching beyond society to truth and to God,248 Religion . . . is equally opposed to abstract individualism and to abstract socialism. The indi vidual must be redeemed in social relations; and society must be redeemed through individuals who are related to God as well as to society.249 If one should now ask Brightman what is the nature of this mystical element in religion, his reply would be as follows: The religious experience ranges from an almost commonplace atmosphere of everyday to the ineffable heights of mystic ecstacy. Although there is an unhappy prejudice against the word 'mystical1 among many religious people--based partly on the excesses of abnormal mystics such as annoyed John Wesley, and partly on a congenital incapacity for the delicacy of mystical feeling--we may properly say that this consciousness of divine presence is the mystical element in religion. One is strongly tempted to say that it is an essential, perhaps the central, trait of religion.25^ Brightman is convinced that "the saint and the scientist alike must start with given spiritual experi ence,"2^1 Notwithstanding his love for reason and logic, he is yet convinced of the futility of an emphasis upon merely a priori aspects of thought. For "highly as logic 248Ibid., p. 148. 249Loc. cit. 2^The Finding of God, p. 95. 251personality and Religion, p. 24. 482 is to be valued, it is no substitute for experience. . . . Apart from experience, there is no basis for belief in the goodness, the purposiveness, or the intelligence of the world ground; and apart from specifically religious exper ience there is no basis for belief in a specifically religious reality• « * 252 He testifies: "My Methodist heritage of class meetings, camp meetings, and revivals made religious experience a very real thing to me from my 253 earliest days." He adds: "My conviction remains that in religious experience man has his most immediate contact with the divine purposes. In the consciousness of the presence of God, God himself actually is there, giving himself to man."25^ Nor is this consciousness of the 255 divine presence limited to any one religious faith. Brightman expresses the belief that "the idea of God as a person . . . is peculiarly adapted to develop a 2 high type of religious experience." He states: "If God is a person, then communion and prayer, worship and love, are genuinely mutual conscious relations between man and 252"Religion as Truth," p. 61. LOC t Clt« 254Ibid., pp. 62-63. 255Ibid., p. 63. 256Personality and Religion, p. 112. 483 God, which they cannot be if God is an impersonal system or power,"257 He ajso believes that ’ ’ religious experience is a faith that real communion is taking place; it is a cooperation with God,”258 For "religious experience is not merely a theory or a philosophy. It is a practical adjustment of the soul to reality."25^ Hence we have his notation that: "One of the most characteristic experiences of religion is communion with the Divine. The sense of intimate personal relationship between the soul and God. . . ,”260 Many similar emphases of the mystical can be found throughout his writings. Personalism Believes in the Immortality orf the Human IndivT3uaT Returning again to the frequently cited article on "Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," we note one more emphasis: . . . From its general conception of religious values and from its belief in a good God, personalism infers that the human person is immortal. A good God could not destroy an intrinsic value, and persons are the 257Loc. cit. 258Ibid., p. 114. 259Ibid., p. 124. 2^QReligious Values, p. 116. 484 only intrinsic values. Personalism does not attempt to speculate, in the lack of evidence, about the details of the future life, and it finds little co herence in the pretended evidence of spiritism. But I venture one suggestion. If the future life is to be good, it must be moral and rational? and if so, it must be developing, if there is any continuity between the life in this world and in the world to come. Too often, orthodoxy has adopted a perfection- istic or rigoristic ethics for this world, and a hedonistic ethics of eternal selfish enjoyment for the other world. If there be immortality, it cannot be one of mere pleasure; it must be work and service, if the values which cause us to believe in immor tality are truly valuable.261 In his Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality2* * 2 Brightman was able to show that "post-Kantian idealism as a whole is much more favorable to belief in personal immortality than is commonly supposed."2* * 3 Therein also he acknowl edged that "one's attitude toward immortality is funda mentally determined by one's world view and not by this or that particular fact."2^ He affirms that "the organic logic of idealism shows that human personality is an organism within the universal organism, a whole within a whole, essential to the meaning and content of the whole."2^3 26J~Crozer Quarterly, V, p. 392. 262Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism, 192 5. 263Ibid., p. 56. 264Ibid., p. 57. 265Ibid., p. 59. 485 It comes to this I If reason, as idealism under stands it, is trustworthy, then immortality is a fact. If value is to be found in experience, and if personality is a spiritual whole that finds value through its own membership in the universal order which includes but transcends all human persons, there is substantial ground for reasonable hope of immortal life.^^ In his Philosophy of Religion, Brightman has argued as follows for immortality: When civilized man accepts faith in immortal life, he does so because of his experiences of purpose. Purposes are strivings for value experience. The seat of purpose and value is personality. A chief trait of the values which we actually realize is their incompleteness, their imperfection and their evanes- C6HCG • * * • Our life, then, is essentially a life of purpose, but of uncompleted purpose. Out potentialities are to a great extent unrealized when death comes. . . . In general, faith in immortality is an extension of the experience of purpose beyond this life. Man observes that purpose is the most constant and characteristic feature of his existence; he observes that his ideal purposes are capable of indefinite variety and growth in their realization; and he observes the fact of death, which seems bring purposing to an end. The belief in immortality is the belief that purpose is a better clue to man's real nature and destiny than is death. Both purpose and death are facts. Which gives truer insight into man's future? If death is final, that fact must be faced realisti cally, and the values of life enjoyed while we possess them. But if purpose is the clue to cosmic reality, there is reason to suppose that the cosmic purpose may cause personal consciousness to continue after the death of the body. No careful thinker would say that the solution of the problem of immortality can be regarded as self-evident.267 After noting many weaker arguments for immortality, 266Ibid., p. 60. *7 Philosophy of Religion, pp. 388-389. 486 he turns to consider the one crucial argument against immortality which is physiological psychology. Thereafter he takes up the consideration of the one crucial argument 2^ , Q for immortality which is the goodness of God. Just as there is only one vigorous argument against immortality (which reduces to the argument for a materialistic philosophy), so there is only one vigorous argument for immortality (which reduces to the argument for a theistic philosophy). If there is a God--a supreme, creative, cosmic person--then there is an infinitely good being committed to the eternal conservation of values. That being is the controlling and directing power in all natural processes and is engaged in a process of immanent cooperation with all other persons. Since all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, the existence of values depends on the existence of persons. Value is personality at its best. God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of persons.269 If belief in immortality rises or falls with our belief in the existence of a good God, Brightman is now ready to contend that "rationally . . . faith in immortality is better grounded than is materialistic denial of that faith."27® Granted, of course, that neither argument is absolutely decisive. Brightman is willing to entertain the possibility that there is only conditional immortality for such Cf. Ibid., pp. 395-404. 269Ibid., pp. 400-401. 270Ibid., p. 403. 487 persons as "God judges to be capable of developing worthily at any time in their future existence,"27* Conversely "it is conceivable that some human individuals, once responsive to the divine impulse, may become so vicious that even God may despair of arousing them to any higher aspirations.272 He concludes his chapter on immortality with a sum mary of the religious values of immortality: The good life is a life of goal-seeking; it is a life of forward-looking purpose. Immortality symbol izes the faith that good purpose never fails to all eternity. The tap-root of all human endeavor is in the hope that purpose can achieve values. Those who deny immortality continue to strive largely because they believe that they are laying foundations for the next generation. If courage and meaning are imparted to life by a short look into the future, how much more dignity, hope, and perspective arise from the faith that every life capable of purposive development is eternal. Immortality symbolizes the intrinsic value of shared, cooperative living, and the goodness of God.273 In sum, his thoughts on religion are, in his own words: "strong, vigorous, rational faith affirms the eternal God, eternal goodness, and eternal life."274 Nonetheless, another theme needs notation. 27^Ibid., p. 408. 272Loc. cit. 273Ibid., pp. 409-410. 274Puture of Christianity, p. 109. 488 The Increase and Conservation of Values Throughout Brightman's writings there are frequent, almost constant, references to Httffding's phrase "the conservation of values."27^ This Danish writer's idea that the conservation of values is dependent upon their increase was accepted by Brightman and frequently mentioned. Brightman also looks upon "the longing for spiritual values [as] the essence of religion."27^ Development of the spiritual life involves "an increase of 277 the sheer quantity of values," therefore (in agreement with Hoffding) religion presupposes "the axiom of the 278 conservation of values." "The name that religion gives 279 to the availability of values is the grace of God." Religious experience is "essentially an experience of value" with "God as its final cause and cosmic 2 go Continuer." Religion seeks "the increase of the value 275 Instances are, his Problem of God, pp. 41, 4S, 58, 121; Religious Values, p. 74; Introduction to Philoso phy (1951), p. 172; Spiritual Life, pp. 48, 168, 169; Philosophy of Religion, pp. 27 "J| 35, 86, 106 note 12, 240 note 1; Person and Reality, p. 306; Finding of God, p. 92. ^ ^ Personality and Religion, p. 25. 277Spiritual Life, p. 167. 278Ibid., p. 168. 279Ibid., p. 194. 280Person and Reality, p. 302. 489 of human existence,1 ’281 and its faith is that God "can be 282 depended on to increase the values of life forever." Furthermore,"religion, when conscious of its own destiny, is best defined as cooperation with God and man for the realization of individual and of shared values,'*283 Personal Religion and the Spiritual Life In his two highly devotional books, The Finding of God, and The Spiritual Life, Brightman has discussed the nature of the human quest for God and the nature of the spiritual life. In an earlier work, Religious Values, he has given one of the finest analyses of "Creative Worship" to be found in philosophical thought. But it is in his Personality and Religion that we find his answer to the 284 question, "What is Personal Religion?" . . . The universality of religion consists in the fact that the divine presence can be found by anyone who moves toward God on the basis of his own beliefs, not those of another, and in the further fact that the movement toward God gives rise to religious experiences remarkably similar among believers in faiths that are widely divergent in their ideas about God.285 28lFuture of Christianity, p. 29* ^^^Religious Values, p. 158* o oq Philosophy of Religion, p. 435. Brightman's italics* 284Cf. pp. 117-125* ^ ^Personality and Religion, p. 117. 490 Brightman notes six aspects of such a universal religion: They are: a feeling of membership in the Whole, a sense of the presence of God, unmercenary trust, obedience to the divine will, freedom from convention, and loyal testing of a specific belief.286 Concerning the third point he observes: "Faith that has confidence in God . . . demands no pay for serving him."287 He affirms that "personal religion is the discovery and the possession of something worth living for and worth dying for, if need me. It is not a mere theory or a mere 288 289 mood." Looking upon "religion as spiritual life," he insists that there is an inseparable connection between 290 religious experience and religious belief." Concerning faith, he says: Trust in God need not and should not be taken to mean trust in any particular definition of theology. It means, rather, a hopeful confidence that there is a divine power in the universe, combined with the attitudes of search for that power and of inner loyalty to it.291 Blsewhere he says: In addition to trust the spiritual life is characterized by joy. . . . The characteristic mood 288Loc. cit. 287Ibid., P. 120. 208Ibid., P« 125. 289Ibid., pp. 20 ff 290Ibid.. P- 104. 291Ibid.. P* 107. 491 of one who finds God or has been found by Him is that of 'Rejoice with me.' Religions have their songs and their dances, their music and their art; the joy of the Lord is one of the most character istic experiences of the Biblical religion.292 However, this joy is not something apart from a basic morality as some have thought, holding that duty is dis agreeable. He would remind us that "religion and mor ality were so intertwined in their origins that it is impossible for us to determine which was which in primi- 203 tive times." He therefore suggests that keeping the moral will directed toward the right and toward God in a basic loyalty to moral law will produce this joy as a by product. It is "one of the fruits of finding God" rather than "a root of religion."29^ The sudden blissful exaltation of the convert whose previous life has been shameful is no ex ception to this rule, for the essence of the con version, so far as the man's will is concerned, is his decision to begin a life of loyalty in which he feels assured of divine approval and aid. The joy is not determined by the quantity so much as by the quality of the moral will of the convert.295 That there are such "soul-transforming experiences called by the historic names of conversion and sanctifi cation" Brightman has no doubt.29* * He further thinks that 292Finding of God, pp. 83-84. 293Moral Laws, p. 265. 2 9 4 Finding of God, p. 84. 295Ibid., p. 85. 2 9 6 Nature and Values, p. 158. 491 of one who finds God or has been found by Him is that of 'Rejoice with me.' Religions have their songs and their dances, their music and their art; the joy of the Lord is one of the most character istic experiences of the Biblical religion.292 However, this joy is not something apart from a basic morality as some have thought, holding that duty is dis agreeable. He would remind us that "religion and mor ality were so intertwined in their origins that it is impossible for us to determine which was which in primi- 293 tive times." He therefore suggests that keeping the moral will directed toward the right and toward God in a basic loyalty to moral law will produce this joy as a by product. It is "one of the fruits of finding God" rather than "a root of religion."29^ The sudden blissful exaltation of the convert whose previous life has been shameful is no ex ception to this rule, for the essence of the con version, so far as the man's will is concerned, is his decision to begin a life of loyalty in which he feels assured of divine approval and aid. The joy is not determined by the quantity so much as by the quality of the moral will of the convert.293 That there are such "soul-transforming experiences called by the historic names of conversion and sanctifi cation" Brightman has no doubt.2^ He further thinks that 292Finding of God, pp. 83-84. 293Moral Laws, p. 265. 9 0 4 Finding of God, p. 84. 295Ibid., p. 85. 2 9 6Nature and Values, p. 158. 492 "there is in all worship an illustration of what St. Paul 297 called ’the witness of the Spirit'." Commenting on this he writes: Religion is an experience of the otherness of Divine Spirit, an experience which, at its higher levels, is as convincing and satisfying in its objectivity as is the experience in human conver sation that we are really talking to another mind. . . . The witness of the Spirit is not to be taken as a substitute for rational thought. It is, however, a fact which rational thought has to reckon with; it is a clue, a hint, an invitation.2^8 Space will not permit the tracing out in any detail of his splendid analysis of the nature and results of worship. Suffice it to note that he discerns "four 2QQ stages of worship." ^ These are "reverent contemplatxon, revelation, communion, and fruition."3^* They may take place in this order or they may occur almost simultaneously yet each higher stage includes and presupposes that which logically precedes it in this list. Worship characterized by these stages becomes what he regards as "creative worship."301 If now one asks what worship creates, he would answer: 2^?The Spiritual Life, p. 135. 298. . + wOC t C1 v# 2^Religious Values, pp. 179 ff. 300Ibid., p. 179. ^^JCbid., Chapter IX. 493 A complete account of the fruition of worship would be impossible within the limits of a single chapter* From the many fruits of the Spirit four will be selected for special consideration, namely, perspective, a spiritual ideal, power, and a com munity of love. These are a few of the many 'very lofty and lovely things touching a perfect life,' which are the peculiar property of w o r s h i p . Having discussed these four items, he addresses himself to the question which must invariably arise in the mind of anyone who seeks reality in worship: "How can the miracle be wrought in me?"3* - * 3 An enumeration of the five points given in answer must suffice. They are: the preparation of the soul, growth through conflict, silent self- possession, the vision of God, and the will of our total 304 personality to cooperate with God. Worship may then be defined as "the complete personality of man directed 305 toward and responding to the presence of God." It is in the area of decision and commitment that the man of religion faces a dilemma. One ought not to act until his knowledge and information of all the involve ments is complete, yet to wait for such perfect knowledge would render one guilty of procrastination and indecision. 302Ibid., pp. 212-213. 303Ibid., p. 223. 3^Ibid., pp. 223-235. The word "commitment" would better summarize the last clause. 3 0 5 Ibid., p. 235. 494 He comments: We cannot avoid the necessity of decision; and we cannot avoid the possibility of being wrong. (This dilemma is inherent in the situation and there is no escape). . . . There is, therefore, a sense in which all decisions made by man must be tentative, subject to further light. Science and religion agree in principle on this point. The scientist holds all his hypotheses lightly, being perfectly willing to abandon any hypothesis which is refuted by new experi mental evidence. The religious believer knows that his beliefs are something seen 'through a glass darkly.1306 Bright insists, however, that one can take the tentative nature of truth too seriously and push it to extremes, thus, in the name of the scientific attitude ruling out any real commitment to the truth. He says: "But when they infer that, because the scientific method requires open- mindedness, it therefore prohibits any commitments they become confused,"^^ One cannot avoid commitments in such areas as ethics, religion, and metaphysics. "Ethical decisions are necessary, even in the absence of perfect knowledge. So, too, it is necessary to decide what atti- tude one is to assume toward religion. . . He thinks that one who refuses to do so commits himself to an atti tude of irreligion--a position just as precarious as that of the one who embraces religion. Here is the fallacy of q a a Nature and Values, p. 104 307 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 3 Q8 Ibid., p. 105. 495 the naturalistic refusal to come to any metaphysical judgments. Tentativeness should mean an open-minded search for truth and a commitment to truth now apprehended. It should never involve an unwillingness to learn new 309 truths and to criticize old beliefs. Thus he is sure that "every attempt to escape philosophy drives man back to it. Life forces us to think. . . . Man is always and 310 everywhere a valuer." In such case one must seek the most coherent and consistent philosophy of religion and commit himself to it. Religion Needs its Critics Brightman concludes his Philosophy of Religion with two chapters on the criticism of religion. Religion has both its internal and its external critics. Most valuable of these are the former. He says: The very nature of religion is such that self- criticism is inherent in it. If the religious man is one who is devoted to the objective source of the highest values, which he calls God, such a man will be moved by a consciousness that the best that he and all humanity have ever done falls far short of the purposes of God. Nothing could be more irreligious than a sanctification of the status q u o .311 3Q9loc. cit. 3 1 0 Ibid., pp. 145-146. Q1 1 Philosophy of Religion, p. 442. 496 He is willing to recognize a valid function of conser vatism and so-called authoritarianism. They criticize the new and novel and have "the useful function of warning that human history does not begin afresh every morning, but is rooted in the past."312 Yet if religious values are to be conserved by being increased then "no truly religious mind could be content to endorse as fully ade quate any present embodiment of the religious spirit. . . . The essence of religion is a continual remaking of qi q the temporal in the light of the eternal." Hence the church and religion stand in need of those liberal minded souls who can furnish valid criticism of the conventional and traditional aspects of religion. He thinks that often the philosopher with religious convictions has made the mistake of separating himself from the church and thus seeking to maintain his individualistic independence. But he declares: I feel that it is a greater social service to remain within the church and assert one's inde pendence there than it is to be a religious indi vidualist. If every liberal were to leave the church, that institution would ultimately become socially antiquated and a useless hulk. As long as the church subordinates itself to the kingdom of God and does not close the mouth of those who think for themselves, so long the church will have 3 1 2 Ibid., p. 444. 3 1 3 Ibid., p. 450. 497 a claim on the loyalty of everyone who believes in the value of religion*3^ Brightman is optimistic about the future of religion on the basis of Mthe law that religion tends to 315 correct its own tendency to extremes." There may be the dialectical opposites of extreme fanaticism and extreme formalism which develop out of religion itself, yet "at the same time, the spirit of religion tends to correct and criticize the extremes which it has 316 developed." Religion is not, therefore, a static tradition. "Rather, religion is a developing process of self-criticism, what Hegel calls a dialectical uove- « . M317 raent." As to the external critic of religion, Brightman notes that to be sure that one is not attacking religion for defects which most religious thinkers have already discussed and discarded, one will need first to have been an internal critic of religion. He says: "The external critic must first be an internal critic unless he is to be ^^"Religion as Truth," p. 78* 3^5Philosophy of Religion, p. 456. 316Ibid., p. 456. 317Ibid., p. 458. 498 Ol Q a mere partisan propagandist for an opposing view."-3- 1 - 0 He therefore suggests: The great tasks of external criticism are, first, to point out areas of experience which have not been included in the realm under investigation (in our case, religion) and, secondly, to suggest alternative hypotheses for the explanation of the facts.319 He then takes under consideration some of the most impor tant external criticisms which have been made against religion. But he concludes with this pertinent observation: MThe truth of religion is not to be judged by the present moment of man's achievement, but by the direction of his best aspirations."32® The Bible Brightman's attitude toward the Bible is that of a Christian liberal. He subscribes to the so-called "docu mentary hypothesis" for the first six books of the Old 321 Testament. He holds that "the Bible is based on the presence of God in experience and history." He would regard the Bible "as a laboratory manual of spiritual 318Ibid., p. 460. 319Loc. cit. 320Ibid., p. 488. OO I * Cf. hxs Sources of the Hexateuch, pp. 9 ff. 322The Finding of God, p. 49. 499 323 experience and experiment." He mourns the fact that it 324 is the "least read best seller" of all books. He looks upon the Bible as essential to Christianity and believes that they will stand or fall together in their futures. If we look from the confused present toward the future of Christianity, we can make two af firmations about that future in the if-then form, of which we may be reasonably certain. The first is: If no Bible, then no Christianity. The second is: TT Christianity, then the Bible. In other words, the future of Christianity and the future of the Bible stand or fall together. If one lives, the other lives; if one dies or is neglected, the other will not be long in dying• The problem of the Bible is of the utmost importance to the future of Christianity.325 He therefore suggests that: "A sincere and open-minded study of the Bible in our times might mean the birth of an undreamed-of Reformation."32^ In answer to the question, "what, then, is the future of the Bible?" he says: The Bible will be of permanent value as long as there is any religious faith on earth. If we cannot find God in the experiences of the prophets and the apostles, and supremely in the life of Jesus, we can not find God at all. This does not mean that God is to be found only in the Bible. The God of the Bible is the God of all men and all history, and the clear implication of the newer view of revelation is that God may be found anywhere, within or without the Christian tradition, by anyone who seeks him. But experience shows that there are widely varying levels 323Nature and Values, p. 95; and Future of Christianity, p. 6l. 324Future of Christianity, p. 45. 325Ibid., p. 49. 3 2 ^Loc. cit. 500 of religious experience, and that the highest levels have been accessible to more people through the Bible than through any other literature. So true is this that we may venture to predict that if humanity readies a stage in which it cannot find spiritual sustenance in the Bible, it will have moved so far away from spiritual receptivity that it will no longer find God, turn where it may. But our fundamental faith in the goodness and power of God will not allow any such assumptions. We therefore face the future confident that through the Bible man will continue to perceive his vital relation to the living past, and will continue to discover the eternal values in the temporal, A book that has brought eternal values to every age of history since it was written and to every age of men has a future as glorious as its past has been,327 As to the nature of the Bible, he says: "Whatever view we take of the Bible, it is a complete and relatively unified whole, with all its variety,"328 The Church Brightman also has a philosophy about the church. He affirms: "The church is worthy of support."32^ This arises from his belief, as he states it, that: The embodiment of religion in persons and institutions is essential, even from the rigorously intellectual standpoint. If religion is a true value, it is worthy of practical devotion. There fore I believe that the church is worthy of support. This does not mean that I regard the church as in possession of the full or final truth. But she is, I 327Ibid., pp. 59-60. 328Ibid., p. 62. 329 "Religion as Truth," p. 77, 501 think, striving toward the truths about God, about love and justice, more effectively than any other institution. Her defects are many, yet I love her in spite of them.33® He does not regard the church as essential to the survival of Christianity as he does the Bible, however. For he thinks: If the church is abandoned, Christianity might very well survive notwithstanding. . . . If the church perished, the Bible would soon produce a new church; and if parts of the Church today sometimes actually die spiritually, the Bible raises up new members with a new vision of vital Christianity,331 Since religion is inherently social it is bound to have, or find for itself, some form of social expres sion. Brightman *s enumeration of the grounds for en couragement and discouragement about the church would involve us in a discussion beyond the main purpose of this study. He believes that the church must become more international in its outlook and program. Likewise he would insist that it must recognize ''other roads to God” in other great world religions.^32 COIBinon cause for all religions, he suggests: The common cause of all religion is not merely that of friendliness among the religions, but it is also that of hostility to practical and theoretical materialism, secularism, and sin, A church that lacks 33°Loc, cit. 331 Future of Christianity, pp. 63-64. 332Ibid., p. 80. 502 the aggressive missionary spirit is doomed to death. A church that is apologetic and seeks to prove that there is no essential difference between its faith and the point of view of the world is a church that has confessed that it has no message and no mission. The living church of the future must, therefore, be a Congregation for the Propaganda of the Faith.333 He is sure that the church must be more concerned about the realization of the Kingdom of Cod than the preser vation of itself as an organization. For only a church that is willing to die for the sake of the Kingdom of God is worthy to live and survive. "And such," he optimisti cally affirms, "I dare predict, the Church of the future will be."334 We conclude our survey of Brightman's philosophy of religion with the notation that he looks upon his view 335 "as personalis tic theism." "Religion," he says, "is essentially an evaluation of personality."33^ In the broadest sense, personalism is the belief that conscious personality is both the supreme value and the supreme reality in the universe. In this sense, practically all theists are personalists.337 It is his personal opinion that personalism presupposes "a reasonable faith, a working hypothesis that meets the 333Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., p. 82. 3 3 3 Personality and Religion, p. 71. 336Ibid., p. 92. 337 Nature and Values, p. 113. 503 test of experience, 338 and he affirms: "We have found principles of rational faith which enable us to face the future with a disciplined hope."339 Our philosophers manifest an essential agreement in their thought about religion along the following lines: In reference to the importance of religion; as to the significance of religion for the person, and of the person for religion; as to the social responsibility and value of religion; as to the place of reason in religion; as to the importance of ethical concern in religion; and as to the validity of religious experience. They differ widely in the following respects: their beliefs about the nature of God; their attempted solutions of the problem of evil; Flewelling is more concerned with the practical aspects of religion; Brightman with the ideal and valuational aspects. Both men have a basic optimism about the future of Christianity— at least in the form of a Christian Person- alism--and both contend for the reasonableness of the hope of immortality. 338Ibid., p. 115. 33^Future of Christianity, p. 154. CHAPTER XI THOUGHTS ABOUT EDUCATION The curriculum of a modern college or university includes a course on the ''Philosophy of Education." In consideration of this many books are coming from the presses which offer either a particular philosophy of education, or a survey of the various philosophical systems pointing out the implication of each for educa tional theory.^- Personalism also has basic implications for a philosophy of education. Therefore our philosophers have on several occasions spoken and written concerning education that places emphasis upon the supreme worth of the person in the light of his cosmic and cultural signifi cance. Flewelling is certain that educational procedures must discover the person to himself and encourage his own creativity as a member of a society of selves in process of evolution and self-realization. As an educator - philosopher he succeeded in building an outstanding school ^To mention but a few we list: I.N. Thut, The Story of Education: Philosophica1 and Historical Foundations "(TTew York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957); Robert Ulich, Philosophy of Education (New York: American Book Co., 1961); C. 0. Weber, Basic Philosophies of Education (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, i960); and Philip H. “ ' ’ ' Education (New York: John Wiley & 505 of philosophy at the university which he served; its unique building, with its now famous library, its out standing journal with its wide circulation, and its selected faculty, all testify to his ability as a thinker, and administrator. Brightman also became an able teacher and admini strator, who sought an educational theory in keeping with his idealistic personalism and based upon a faith in the union of nature and spirit, But first let us hear from Flewelling. FLEWELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION Our main sources for the study of Flewelling's thought under this caption are his book, The Survival of Western Culture; his article on "Personalism" in the symposium, Living Schools of Philosophy; several articles for The Personalist, and incidental paragraphs and remarks appearing in his other books: Winds of Hiroshima, The Person, and The Things That Matter Most. His article in the above mentioned symposium was written in his mature years and warrants careful con sideration: Personalism is equally prepared to meet the exigencies of a changing world of thought. This it does by placing the demands of life and change before the demands of formal logic, or accepted ideologies, or totalitarian ideas in church, state, or society. 506 It holds the person himself, his welfare physical, mental and spiritual, the opportunity for free development, consonant with the rights and freedom of others as the supreme end of all statecraft, or social organization. These in themselves are only the means to the end. If then institutions fail of the best interests of persons by that they are to be judged. Personalism is then not to be looked upon as an ideological system already cosipleted or to which it is necessary to be conformed. Its vitality is the vitality of life itself which is best evi denced by the power of self-adaptation. Nor is the personal reference to be judged a weak and impermanent thing. The most continuously permanent thing in creation is the demand of the human soul for freedom, the thirst after fullness of life and opportunity. These demands are written into nature itself. How ever much the individual may misunderstand his own needs and abuse his best opportunity there is satis faction for him at long last and the solution of his problems only in the realization of his best and highest self. The search for these ends will vary with the passing centuries; the only unvarying factor will be the need itself and its solution in the search for the highest. Since the highest can be found and understood only by search and self- discovery, Personalism realizes that the problems of the next generation cannot be solved by fastening upon it the shackles of opinions, ideologies and views of the past. In the freedom of the struggle lies the only hope of success. Its personalistic character guards it even from its own dogmatisms and the danger of trusting in fixed systems already complete. Personalism is a living philosophy because it is a philosophy of life. Its true value has been shown in hours of the greatest historic transition.2 Having stated the basic philosophy of personalism, he now proceeds to draw out its implications for a philosophy of education: The personalistic attitude toward education is marked by the same characteristic of freedom. In the ^"Personalism," Living Schools of Philosophy, pp. 294-295. 507 field of education the struggle has gone on between those who would make of education a fixed and mandatory system of studies characterized by a high degree of discipline from above, and an opposing group who would leave the child free to make his own choices and discoveries. If the first type of education may be said to have failed by destroying initiative in the individual and forcing upon him studies not in keeping with his character and needs, the second system has too often left him without either discipline or education. Here personalism would recognize the common danger in both systems of too close an attempt to follow a like ideology in every case without regards to the need of the individual. Personalism would hold the chief aim of education to be the production of personal value. Value is such a system would include the full cultivation of the person in such studies as would yield the largest understanding of the meaning of life, of history, of cultural heritage, of self-discipline, of morality and of religion. Over against the value of initiative in the individual it would balance the value of self-control, over against the training for financial and social success it would balance the training for social sympathy and self-giving. All education would take on an ethical significance since its end would be the production of the highest personality, the completest self- realization which can ultimately be reached only by spiritual achievement. It may be objected with much force that such an effort could never succeed since it must fall into the teaching province of people with no ethical qualms of Conscience, or into the hands of religious people who would seek to impose special religious views and shackle youth with their own narrow opinions. Such a result does not necessarily follow as the long history of American education goes to prove. The ethical achievement in our schools has been high when insistence was made on religious and ethical-mindedness on the part of our teachers without regard of religious affiliations. Our present situation may be due to many causes but there are at least two prominent ones. One is indifference to the ethical and moral standards of the teachers employed, the other the widely prevailing belief fostered by a certain type of psychology which holds that man is without free choice and can only yield to the immedi ate impulse. Thus we have at the present moment trained a generation of youngsters to believe that there are no such things as moral values and that 508 they are free to do whatever they can 'get by' with. Personalism without entering into all the theological realm would endeavor to demonstrate the fact that moral values are the most certain and the most real of all values with which the person has to deal. It would show the law of honesty for instance to be as undeviating as the law of gravitation. It would indicate how if the cheater 'gets by' with others he in a much deeper sense cheats himself, a penalty he can in no wise evade. Prom the standpoint of the person, his highest development, his capacity for success and happiness, the betrayer inflicts upon himself and his future a betrayal far deeper than that of the person wronged. The constitutional liar builds about his life an atmosphere of falsehood that eventuates at last in deceiving himself more than anyone else. Personalism would call attention to the loss of unity within the personality which inevitably follows on any wrong doing, thus lowering the powers of the creative imagination introducing inferiority complexes and detracting from the highest success. Such are the brief illustrations of what might follow in the wake of a theory of education which had due consideration for human moral values. The times are rotten ripe for new practices in education.3 Those who know of his practices as a professor at the University of Southern California are aware of the fact that he sought to put such a philosophy into practice by means of his general education course for which his anthology on values, The Things That Matter Most, served as a test. Therein he admonishes the college student as follows: The main objective of a college career, as I see it at least, is to provide something of a cultural background on which later to specialize to good advantage. But beware of specialization before the background is achieved.4 3Ibid., pp. 295-297. ^The Things That Matter Most, p. 494, 509 In an address delivered at Occidental College on its Founder’s Day, April 7, 1938, Flewelling took for his theme: ’ ’ Educational Skulduggery.” The contents of the address appear in The Personalist for that same year.^ Therein he contrasted education for dollars to be earned with education for happiness. He said: "No education can be called practical unless it serves the whole man, 6 society at large, and the whole life.” His plea is for wide classical backgrounds and training in the modern languages and mathematics. He insists that the most 7 cultural education is the most practical. This is true because of its wider outlook, its larger vision of Society, and its greater capacity far thought. Thus such an edu cation leads to more satisfying choices and a greater degree of intellectual independence. He therefore warns against feeding youth so much of the "mental pabulum of Q our day.” True education should provide assistance to 9 the creative imagination. Mere professionalism must not be allowed to take the place of learning. It is his ^"Educational Skulduggery," The Personalist, XIX, 229-240. 6Ibid., p. 230. 7Ibid., p. 232. 8Ibid., p. 234. 9Ibid., p. 235. 510 contention that the broader the learning the more creative will be the imagination.10 We should beware of turning out ignorant specialists from our colleges and univer- 11 sities. What he would classify under the term "skulduggery' 1 is that trickery, befogging of the issues, or hidden wickedness, which betrays genuine education* Here he observes that "one does not scuttle the ship on the main 1 o deck. That is done far below."x He objects to the situ ation which permits a future teacher to have four units or less of his subject matter and requires, in proportion to that, twelve or fifteen units on how to teach it. This, 11 he thinks, constitutes an "educational racket," In his general education course referred to above, Flewelling warned his students to beware of the six weeks course that promises to fit one for any calling,In valid educational theory there can be no short cut to real education,^ One must not dream of learning quite without lOjLoc. cit. 1] - Ibid,, p. 236. 12Ibid., p. 237, ^Ibid . , p. 240, 14 Things That Matter Most, p. 20. 15The Person, p. 92. 511 effort or sacrifice,Thus his plea is for a broad cultural education with solid disciplines. In an article for The Personalist he said: Education, boasting of continuous improvement, has quite generally achieved the result of leaving the young in blissful ignorance of the foundations of our historic culture and they are advised to build their structures on the sands of amused irre sponsibility , I? In one chapter of his book, The Survival of Western Culture, Flewelling has summarized for us some of his sharpest and most incisive criticisms of modern education. 18 The chapter is entitled "Educating Education." He begins by noting that "the Western World has for a long time been under the dominance of the educational philoso phy of Rousseau,”^ This is especially true in America, Rousseau’s nature theory of education" began as a protest to those older methods of education that left no initi ative to the child either as to what he should learn or how he would learn it. Intrigued by the tales of the idyllic life of the American Indian, Rousseau took up the thesis that "nature was a kindly mother who would do her l^winds of Hiroshixaa, p. 48. ^"Can Christianity Save Itself?” The Personalist, XVIII, 118. ^ h e Survival of Western Culture, Chapter XIII, pp. 121-1257 ^Ibid.. p. 121. 512 20 own work perfectly if left alone.” The mental life of the child, that is, should take its own course and direction assimilating that which it naturally requires. There was present in Rousseau's system a strong confidence in democracy, and in many ways it was a wholesome break from the older educational theory that had bound the centuries. However, the big mistake, as Flewelling sees it, was the confusion of natural processes in education with those that were easy, almost presuming that the child could acquire an education unconsciously and without much effort. Flewelling is ready to allow that "the driving interest in education” should be "impulsion rather than 21 compulsion." But this must not involve the descent to a "mere dillydallying, a mere playing with knowledge, an intellectual and moral flabbiness."22 He therefore in sists that "any education which overlooks the value of mental discipline is sure to fail." Hence, "the per version of education must stand its share of the blame for for the decline of Western Culture,"^ 2®Loc. cit. 2^Ibid., p. 122. 22. Loc. cit. 23Ibid., p. 122. 24Loc. cit. 513 Flewelling thinks there is a palpable falsehood in the attempt to make education painless. We cannot do so without omitting physical and bodily training. Moreover, the student who is left to his own judgment in the selection of an education from mostly elective courses lacks the experience necessary to understand his own needs. Especially is it true that "the intellectual discipline that the student needs is something about which he knows nothing, which presents no particular appeal to him, and 2 5 whose benefits he is not prepared to understand.The net result of this is to ask the student to choose a special interest and make a commitment thereto at an age when he is quite unprepared to judge what this special interest should be. Decisions are made on the basis of whims rather than experienced judgment in such a case. This means that in later life disillusionment is often experienced.^ Flewelling thus laments "this trashy and speedy type of education, which turns out the ill-prepared with a diploma, and a "swelled head," as "being certain they are completely educated. . . . "27 He continues: "There being 25Ibid., p. 123. 2^Loc. cit. 27Ibid.. p. 124. 514 no discipline in such education, we acquire a growing body of citizens who are taught to resent discipline in society even as they were able successfully to avoid it in school."28 So it happens that they "believe in success without work, governmental protection and support without obligation, and individual desires without social res traint."^9 While Flewelling would not approve the old outmoded system of putting all students through the same curricula, yet he notes that under that system everyone got a taste of fundamental culture. He says: "Much outcry was raised against history, philosophy, Greek, Latin, but most of the students at least learned what an education might mean."3^ But under the present system they do not get even that. He objects to a curriculum that will allow a high school student to apply courses in manicuring toward a diploma. He would insist that a college course be more than a continuation of high school "snap" electives. Nor does he approve the modem insistence upon a so-called "practical" education.3' * ’ 28, Loc. ext. 29Loc. cit. 3®Loc. cit. 31Ibid., p. 125. 515 A more serious defect in Western education is its lack of moral education. Coming from lands where educa tion has been sponsored chiefly by the church, Americans have "well nigh driven out the teaching of morals in the fear that their children may absorb some religious views not quite in keeping with the views of the hereditary sect.""^ The net result is to make religion and morals seem hostile to learning, or at least to impress the child of the unimportance of ethical training. Hence, whereas, "the public school used to be the great moral bulwark of the democracy, [it] can scarcely be called so any longer."33 Moreover, religious training out of school hours turns out to be only a makeshift since the mind is not a compartment affair. . . . To separate religion and morals from the common processes of education is to make them seem something less important and less authoritative than the school curriculum. Nothing can bridge this gap in a child's education but the combining of the moral with the mental discipline.34 It is his further opinion that: All the churches and all right-minded people have enough in common without infringing on special faiths and creeds to give this fundamental training in the public schools and leave the children still enthusi astic for the hereditary faith. But the policy of 3^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 34Ibid., p. 126. mutual jealousy between faiths is driving the youth from all religious, and even moral, loyalties.35 Flewelling would seriously question any educational theory which holds that the child should never be thwarted in any way. Any child taught to consider his own designs as supreme "is not learning that he has an obligation to society quite as profound as any obligation for self- expression." He insists that the weakness of the "whole Rousseauan theory lies in the assumption that 'whatever 3 7 is in him' ought to find expression regardless." "There are," he declares, "many things 'in us' that are not worth expression, and some few that are worse than that. The citizen of a civilized community is constantly called 38 upon to practice self-restraint." He is therefore certain that the way to the production of a race of geniuses, artists, and inventors, is not that of allowing « -i Q them simply to express their whims and idiosyncrasies. "Education which expects the unassisted infant to arrive at all wisdom by consultation with his own personal 35Loc. cit. 3^Loc. cit . 37Loc. cit. 38loc. cit. 517 40 desires” he thinks is an anomaly. He also thinks that our dream that every man is worth educating has ended in the tendency to exalt the contribution of every man to our fund of education, with the net result amounting to pooled ignorance. "And," he observes, "we study the lisping of babes in order that we may discover therein 41 matters that are hidden from the wise and prudent.” Likewise, he laments the situation in our system of universal education which, "because of the mechani zation of our school procedure, reduces many to the dead 4 2 level of mediocrity." "The student," he says: Instead of being encouraged to provide himself with a body of sound learning which would be a secure basis from which to build any special field of activity . . . is incited to specialize. Thus he comes through the schools with many courses to his credit but with little fundamental education.43 The net result is something like the child at a feast who goes in for the desserts with frosting, for he elects only the "snap" and popular courses. Consequently: . . . An increasing number of Doctors of Philosophy cannot spell nor write with cultured consistency, others are totally innocent of the history of the race, still others will never be able to read a book 40Ibid., p. 69. 43-Lqc. cit. 42Ibid., p. 127. 43Loc. cit. 518 in any other language than their own; that there are mental concepts which lie at the base of the present state of scientific achievement would be news to many of them.44 His observation is that under the present system we have teachers who are "actually going into the schools unpre pared for the subjects to which they are assigned" simply because the major portion of their training has been con cerned with the principles of pedagogy and little with the subject they were expected to teach,45 This "sacred cow" of our modern education, "while requiring so much in the pursuit of educational fads, . . . eventually leaves the student without the fundamentals of a truly cultured life."^ So he asks: "Who will essay to educate edu cation?"47 Flewelling believes that here is a new frontier for modern man. It may be stated thus: "The first great frontier to meet and overcome is connected with the popular education in science and morals,"4® since "no education can be considered balanced without moral content, . . . mental 44Loc. cit. 45Loc. cit. ^Ibid., p. 128. 47Loc. cit, ^^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 20. 519 enlightenment must attend moral action, and, above all, 49 a vital education must include a spiritual aspect." Thus he expresses the opinion that "the main requisites for future evolution are mental, moral, and spiritual, and 50 to be secured only by the co-operation of free men." One thing is certain and that is that American universal education has proved its value for democracy.^ Neverthe less an adequate foundation for national culture must include more than training of the mind, it must also in- CO elude a general philosophic outlook,' * * ’ and some food for the soul.5^ Any attempt to ground a culture upon training or education alone must fail, since an enduring culture must satisfy the whole need of man, emotional as well as rational. There must be food for his soul as well as for his mind. Yet many have dreamed and are dreaming that a permanent ordering of society can be built merely upon the basis of economic needs.54 His Christian humanism is evident in the following passage from his book, Creative Personality; Some day we shall realize that the greatest value of the teacher to a community lies not in his mastery 49Loc. cit. 5QIbid., p. 19. 51Ibid., pp. 19-20. ^ Survival of Western Culture, p. 263. 53Ibid., p. 259. - > 4Loc. cit. 520 of method nor in the marks which the schools have placed upon him, but in the possession of moral and spiritual character and humanness which give him sympathetic contacts with his pupils. His supreme value to the community lies not so much in the method or content of his teaching as in his ability to dis cover students to themselves. By the power of sug gestion he sends individuals out to the careers for which they are fitted. The possession of highest spiritual and religious qualities are involved if individuals are to be directed into channels of greatest value to the community. The teacher who has not these will merely send his students in the direction of a low and dead vocationalism. The state has plenty of skilled artisans. What it needs is moral and spiritual leaders.55 On the other hand: "Commercialize a man's heart by making the monetary the chief interest and you transform his out- society, education, political life, and reli- course the chief function of education is to mind to think,5^ and this cannot be done suc- where the chief emphasis is on manual and pro- 58 training. "In the final analysis, each mind 59 must conceive in order to know." He violently disagrees with the Freudian suggestion that "the victim of an edu cation be read to while in a hypnotic state and so ^ Creative Personality, p. 279. 56 Survival of Western Culture, p. 231. 5^The Person, p. 30. CO Survival of Western Culture, p. 99. 5^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 84. look upon „56 gion." Of train the cessfully fessiona1 521 provided with a streamlined and painless education. Our own experience with sleeping pupils, he remarks, has not been encouraging but perhaps they did not get 'fully under'."60 There is no valid "shortcut education."61 This fact is evident when it comes to the creative use of imagination, about the use of which he observes: Here lies the real difference between the truly educated and the uneducated man. The truly educated man has learned to command his imagination, both mentally, and morally, and to drive it in the direction of accomplishment. The uneducated man may or may not be a college graduate, but his dis tinguishing characteristic is that he is controlled by his imagination, and thus becomes the victim of his emotions, his half-learning, his prejudices, or his monetary d e s i r e s . 6 2 Here, also, he sees the weakness of some modern educational theories: This giving way to one's inner desires on all occasions is the weakness of some modern educational theory which ends by unfitting the child for normal human association and cooperation. One such kinder- gartner is reported to have told the teacher, when advised or urged to some cooperative action: 'But Flo, you know I have to do just what I want to do.' Thus we poison the springs to well-ordered living.63 Flewelling objects to our modern practice of depending upon a merely quantitative regimentation of 60The Person, p. 19. 6 1 Ibid., p. 92. 6 2 Ibid., p. 93. 6 3 Ibid., p. 80. 522 genius and stupidity, while all the while forgetting that education must be personal and inspirational. So far our educational system has depended on a quantitative regimentation of genius and stupidity in the same classes and grades, exposed to the same tedious curriculum and dedicated to the theory that the consumption of courses, books, or 'units,* was the equivalent of education. At its very roots, however, education is personal and inspirational or it is nothing. One teacher with a sympathetic interest sufficient to discover and inspire the indi vidual genius of his different pupils is worth more than all the books ever written on scientific pedagogy. Modern educational pedantry can be quite as deadening as that of the past. Education can take place only where there is a love of study and such love can frequently be induced by the right appeal. The problem of education is not predominantly one of organization, technique or apparatus but of an inner spirit.64 After speaking of the invasion of, and thwarting of free education by both the religious and scientific dog matists, he declares: The most serious invasion of education lies possibly in the manipulation of courses, the waste of time on matters extraneous to education, the endeavor to demoralize and despiritualize the machine like production of mass education, the com pulsions which silence individual expression and repress genius into the given molds of tests, which seem desirable only to the overcredulous educational doctrinaire. Free education will sometime be judged less by those who survive in spite of it and more by its cast-off products— those upon whom it has failed to take e f f e c t . ^ 5 Disparaging impersonalism in philosophy, Flewelling ^Survival of Western Culture, p. 283 6 5 Ibid., p. 119. 523 therefore believes that in the field of education it would also breed contempt for man. He notes that "wherever this impersonal mood has gone, it has worked havoc with the highest interests of society, and it is everywhere rampant, in philosophy, in education, in politics, in business, in society,He continues: "Everywhere we witness the worship of the colossal, which triumphs universally over the rights and welfare of individuals like some holy juggernaut. Everywhere we observe the depreciation of „67 man." If we attempt to define culture in terms of edu cation, then we must ask, "what do we mean by education?" His answer is that education is two-fold, or of two varie ties. There is the training of the head, and there is the training of the hand. When we ask of what the train ing of the mind consists, he remarks that to an earlier generation it meant at least a knowledge of Greek and Latin and of the ancient classics. It meant knowledge of mathematics and of music as a branch of mathematics. It included also logic and rhetoric and a certain facility in the use of language. But in Western education the emphasis has been upon more training in science, and the tendency 6 6 ibid., p. 150. ^Loc. cit. 524 Aft has been to omit subjects of a merely cultural nature.0 In the strictly professional sense, education has become the study of pedagogy, but pedagogy based on an already obsolete psychology. Thus the trend has been away from mental discipline, toward the use of mechanical 69 devices. Turning to the training of the hands, he thinks that soon the complicated inventions of modern science will render the fine old arts based on tactical skills "high and dry, since there are apparently no operations of the hand which may not be more accurately executed by the machine Education, he thinks, "is falling short in that it does not sufficiently provide a discipline of the mind but drops more and more into the vacuity of mere profession- 71 alism which is deadening personal development." He would disparage the priority of the know how over the know what. Likewise, "The destruction of art seems threatened by the invasion of mechanics into the field of education, turning the emphasis away from the creative genius and 68Ibid., pp. 7-8. 69Ibid., p. 8. ^Loc. cit. 7 ^Ibid., pp. 9-10. 525 72 expression of the individual.1 1 While Flewelling is ready to recognize the great contribution of the universities to democracy,73 and while he is hopeful that through education there may come a breaking down of national seclusions, hatreds, and sus picions, making way for the greater feeling of world com munity;7* yet he is aware of the fact that "education of itself can never insure the progress of society."7^ ^his is because "the road to reformation lies not through rationalization, however perfect, but through capture of the emotions." This is true for the simple reason that "the springs of emotion control the creative imagination, 77 where reason can only assist and direct.” It is religion which captures the emotions, and "no civilization 78 can long survive without religion." He offers the fol lowing suggestion about what may be considered to be the most practical type of education: 72Ibid., P» 10. 73Ibid., D. 67. 74tK., Ibid *, P. 258 75lbid., P. 43. 7^Loc. cit. 77Ibid., P. 43. 78Ibid., P. 44. 526 . . . The education which most builds up a man's capacities for life, professional, mental and spiri tual, is the most practicalj it must equip him to meet the sudden crises which may lead on to fortune or the reverses which have power to overthrow him: it must go deep enough to life him above the power of circumstance and make happiness possible in spite of the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. A practical education will provide against all such contingencies instead of basing all success upon a single chance throw of the d i c e . 7 ^ In an article written for The Personalist entitled, 80 "Demoralizing American Education," he discusses the modern trends in education which seek to remove morality from its processes. Among them he enumerates and dis cusses such things as the "break up of old religious f t 1 assurances," "the transference of dogmatism . . . from 82 religion to science," "the transitional stage of modern f t f t home life," "hostility of rival religious sects who refuse to be ruled by their common religious interests for 84 fear of losing theological and institutional ground," thus permitting Behaviorism to take the triumph and attenpt the presentation of an un-moral or at least a-moral ^"Educational Skulduggery," p. 239. 8QThe Personalist, IX (1928), pp. 5-13. 81Ibid*, p. 6. 82Ibid., p. 7. 8 3 Ibid., p. 8 . 84. Loc. cit. 527 education. He insists that "to separate mental from moral 85 education is impossible." Here, again, he contends that the moral character of the teacher is of vital importance 36 to education. He further pleads for science to disown 87 unscientific Behaviorism. Another observation is that "the reality of morally choosing persons, responsible for 88 their acts is a necessary assumption to moral society." This also means that true religion is of the practical 39 kind. Hence he sees no controversy between true 90 religion and true science. Home life in the future must, he thinks, spring from a sense of the importance of its 91 place in the social order. Here he sees a good omen in the emancipation of woman, and declares: "Out of the hands of emancipated and trained womanhood with her sense of justice to the child and recognition at last as an equal partner in the home must come the solution of the home 92 problem." He is certain that "harking back to the past will not much help us. Neither shall we gain by an 85Loc. cit. 86Ibid., p. 9. ^"Demoralizing American Education," p. 10. 88Loc. cit. 89lbid.t P. 11. 9°Loc. cit. 9*Ibid., p. 12. 9^Loc. cit. 528 idiotic dependence upon social evolution. There must be a new conviction of the importance to society of ethical 93 values.” Such is the thinking of our philosopher with refer ence to the problems of education in practice and theory. Weber classifies him as a contemporary realist among the 94 modern philosophers of education. But Weber fails to recognize many of the practical and realistic suggestions offered by Flewelling for a philosophy of modern education. BRIGHTMAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION On the educational scene Weber classifies Brightman among the idealists--particularly as a personal idealist.95 His discussion of Brightman's position, however, is brief and disappointing: Hegel had identified knowledge with the objects known. Brightman takes a step toward conmon-sense realism by holding that knowledge refers to its objects but is not identical with them. All physical objects represent God's will in action. These statements imply that you can have no relation with other persons which are not personal because all persons are spiritual selves. You cannot have purely impersonal relations with physical objects because they are manifestations of the will of God. Brightman makes the personal self distinct from the outer world in 93Ibid., p. 13. 94 C.O. Weber, Basic Philosophies of Education, pp. 207-208. 9 5 Ibid., pp. 125-126. 529 that the self exercises volition in the form of choice and effort.^6 That there is more to Brightman's philosophy of education it is important to note, though Weber fails to do so, Brightman approves Dewey's insistence on the im mediate and the practical, but he complains of Dewey's lack of respect for that which is "beyond" the immediate: The reasoner . . . starts with the facts of experience as they are present to him whenever he begins a thinking enterprise. Taking the clues furnished in his datum, he is able to recover much of his previous experience, and to learn from obser vation and from records about the experience of others. He is then ready to work on the problem that confronts him. That problem, no matter how abstract it may be, always has its roots--its begin ning and its end--in the actually experienced situation. American thought owes much to the constant insistence of William James and John Dewey on this truth. But professor Dewey, at least, has not been clear about the extent to which the present situation drives us beyond itself for its explanation. More respect for that 'beyond' and for the methods of reaching it (that is, more use of the truth in James's 'will to believe') would mean immense cultural and spiritual gains in those wide areas of American education and religion that have learned from Professor Dewey about the importance of the immediate and practical.’ * 7 Brightman continues by asking: "What, then, is the method by which reason goes beyond the present as it first 98 appears, toward a deeper truth?" Noting the contemporary emphasis upon analysis which holds that beyond the present 9 6 Ibid., p. 126. 97The Finding of God, p. 64. 98Loc. cit. 530 experience lies only its constituent elements and rela tions, he counters by saying: But this is an incomplete picture of reason. If we do nothing but analyze the contents of our present experience, all we can get is the contents of our present experience ground fine. Analysis is fruitful only because it is supplemented by hypotheses about the relation of 'fine ground' experience both to the coarse experience from which it was ground and to past and future experience, and also about the relations of all human experience to its objective and cosmic setting. Experience thus drives us beyond itself to a larger whole for its explanation. We speak then of the analytic and the synoptic methods of thought. The analytic seeks to investigate the invisible parts of which every visible whole is composed. The synoptic seeks to understand the properties and meaning of every whole, and its relations to other wholes. The analyst describes the chemical constitution of the body; the synoptist studies the functions and the uses of the body in life. Synopsis, to be intelligent, presupposes analysis; but it is a fatal blunder to suppose that reason is confined to the purely analytic methods of the natural sciences." Thus he would argue that "reason must do more than analyze, if it is to understand truth. It must synthesize." Reason "does her full work only when she goes beyond the collecting of atoms to the apprehension of the spirit and meaning of the whole, that is, when she is synoptic as well as analytic and synthetic. " As to the insuf ficiency of the merely synthetic method he observes: "ibid., p. 65. 1 0°Ibid., pp. 65-66 ^Q^-Ibid., p. 6 6 . 531 A synthetic personality would not be immortal; a synthetic value would disintegrate; a synthetic God would melt away with the elements. But when reason seeks wholeness and unified meaning, she moves nearer and nearer to God, the spirit who gives meaning and value to every part of the universe.102 In order to reach an apprehension of the wholes which permeate and explain experience, reason employs methods of deduction and of hypothesis, as well as of induction. In fact, the three aspects of thought are in such constant interplay that no one ever functions alone in real thinking. When reason seeks for God, it observes facts of purpose, of value, and of worship which point toward God.^03 In view of his synoptic emphasis, expressed in the foregoing quotations, we are not surprised to find Brightman troubled by the specialization, subdivision, and competition between departments in our colleges and uni versities, which, he thinks, makes for a definite disunity in our culture.He believes that Mthe results of education are not unified, partly because education [itself] is not u n i f i e d . "*^5 With Ma large part of our education . . . devoted to understanding what we call nature, another part to man's ideal strivings in art, literature, music, morality, religion, and philosophy," the net result "in society and in the individual is a 1 0 2 L o c . cit. ^ ^Loc . ci t. ^°^Nature and Values, p. 11. Ibid., p . 1 0 . 532 divided soul. Man is arrayed against himself.”106 Brightman is aware of the fact that man in his con centration on the mastery of nature, has forgotten to master himself: Ever since the scientific period of the Renaissance man has been concentrating on the mastery of nature. Unless he adds to his mastery of nature the mastery of his will by ideal values-- justice, brotherhood, reverence, truth— he will find that his mastery of nature is self-defeating. A single act of true love is worth more than all knowledge of all the energies of nature without love,10' Furthermore, he thinks: One of the commonest facts of our modern, especially of our capitalistic and militaristic society, is the co-existence within the same soul of a highly refined technological intelligence and a beastly morality. Expert knowledge of nature and even of psychology is often accompanied by a conscienceless disregard of the rights of others and such savage aggressiveness as is manifested in Dr. Goebbels, a Ph.D. in psychology from Heidelberg. Such, them, is the world of personality. It is fundamental to all knowledge and existence; it is a richer world than that of physical nature; it inter acts constantly with nature; it is an invisible world; a world of purpose; a world of self- identifying, private individuals; a social world; and a world of conflict. In it is the key to our highest purposes and ideals; in it are the depths of degradation. Personality is the soul to which religion offers salvation; and 'modern man in search of a soul' surely needs to be saved from himself as he is, in the interests of himself as he may be.l°8 1 0 6 Ibid., pp. 1 1 -1 2 . 1Q7 Ibid., p. 48. 1 0 8 Ibid., p. 6 6 . 533 Looking toward a possible solution of our educational problems he says: What man needs is not science alone, and not fulfillment of his desires alone, but rather science used in the service of desires which have been purified and criticized by the tests of ideal norms. The sciences set forth that is, and what is possible. But physics and chemistry, geology and astronomy, and even psychology and sociology, taken together, do not of themselves and by their own methods dis close a single ideal by which man ought to live or for which he ought to die. Soldiers die by means of physics and chemistry, not for them. Psychology may be used equally by a Jane Addams and a Josef Goebbels. The same sociology may be used by a ward politician and a Salvation Army lassie. But the norms by which Miss Addams and Dr. Goebbels, politicians and religious workers live and die are not to be found in psychology and sociology. All norms are, of course, psychological and sociological facts, but scientific method, which is constructed for the purpose of establishing facts and causes, is impotent to determine which ideals are true and which are false. Light can come only by an appeal to coherent and inclusive reason, which means an appeal to philosophy and its investigation of the norms of truth, goodness, beauty, and worship.109 Brightman pleads for coherent thinking and living which form the ideal of reason. The following statement of their principles he would surely want applied to educational processes: We suggest that reason is an ideal of completely coherent thinking and living, never fully realized, never merely static, yet always imperative in its claims. It is the supreme court of the mind. It consists of the following norms: Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions). Be systematic (discover all relevant relations). Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences). 1 0 9 Ibid., pp. 80-81 534 Be analytic (consider all the elements of which every complex consists). Be synoptic (relate all the elements of any whole to its properties as a whole). Be active (use the experimental method). Be open to alternatives (consider many possible hypotheses). Be critical (test and verify or falsify hypotheses). Be decisive (be committed to the best available hypothesis). This analysis of reason speaks for itself. The inevitable conclusion is that if one appeals to reason he appeals to systematic thought; if he does not appeal to reason he cannot be reasoned with. Appealing to logical coherence as his criterion of truth,he states: "Respect for logic seems to me the cornerstone of all sound thinking and even of intellectual honesty. . . Brightman is ready to agree with Dewey that we can not attain absolute certainty and finality. But he rejects the further inference that "because the scientific method requires open-mindedness, it therefore prohibits 113 any commitments. . . . He thinks that in spite of Dewey's remarkable amount of learning, he "has often been restricted in his thinking by the dictates of his bio logical approach."On the other hand, "personalism is 11QIbid., pp. 106-107. ^''Religion as Truth," p. 58. 112 Ibid., p. 59. ^ %ature and Values, pp. 105-106. ^^Philosophy of^ Ideals, p. 203. 535 based on faith in the union of nature and spirit.” Therefore, "a personalist is able to draw the conclusion that nature is subordinate to values•1 1 He insists that: . . . Until there is a widespread and adequate moral and religious education, intelligence will be directed, as at present, to selfish and unworthy ends. It is evident that the great need of the hour is for an educational philosophy based on a sound theory of values.1U In another context he writes: If catastrophe is to be forestalled by education, then education must not only include physical and natural science, with its knowledge of human environ ment and of the means which man must use in order to attain his ends, not only sociological and psycho logical science, with its descriptions of the facts of human nature, but also philosophy and religion, with their insight into the ends for which men ought to live.118 He warns that education, and especially Religious Edu cation, must not be anti-philosophical: No theory of religious education is worth while unless it is based on a genuinely philosophical interpretation of religious values and therefore of the aims of religious education. Religious life is molded by religious thought.H9 Brightman admits that ''ignorance may always be TIC Nature and Values, p. 122. ^ ^ Ibid., p. 126. 1^ Philosophy of Ideals, p. 216. * ^Future of Christianity, p. 138. ^*-9Religious Values, p. 240. 536 120 necessary, but it is never holy;" and because "life 1 p I forces us to think," "neither a sound government nor a 122 sound religion can prosper where thought is choked." Brightman complains that often wealth has too much authority over education and its institutions. He admits that the authority of wealth is too vast a subject for his thorough discussion, but he does attempt to state the situation for education: . . . I cannot forbear touching on one point of vital interest to the scholar, namely, the authority of wealth in educational institutions. Wealth is necessary to a modern college. The individual Professor Vergil cannot expect a Maecenas for him self; but the college as an institution requires wealthy patrons. Phi Beta Kappa itself seeks an endowment. Moreover, endowment funds, if they are to attain their end, must be invested in profit- yielding enterprises. Now, it is possible to picture a college endowed by wealthy friends whose methods of acquiring their wealth commend themselves neither to the department of Bible nor to that of ethics nor to that of economics or sociology. If the liberal giver be also liberal-minded, and leaves the college free to use its best judgment in the expenditure of the gift, it is well. But what if a giver should expect a return in the form of perpetual support of his opinions by the college? The necessary dependence of the college on wealth is partly heartening, partly ominous. It is heartening because many generous givers have rallied around worthy colleges, sharing the ideals of the college and glad to support it freely in the free devotion to truth. But it is ominous because of the possibilities 120Nature and Values, p. 137. 1 2 1 Ibid., p. 145. 1 2 2 Ibid., p. 147. 537 of ill which lurk in the situation. Would it not be tragic if a twentieth-century Emerson should have to write of any American college or of anyone connected with American Education as the nineteenth- century Emerson wrote of the great statesman? Why did all manly gifts in Webster fail? He wrote on Nature's grandest brow, For Sale. This awful peril can be averted, I believe, if the college plays its part. Men of wealth are not monsters. They are human beings, amenable to reason and ideals. The function of the college is not to become the breeding place of fear or hatred of men of wealth, but rather to become a center which will enlighten rich and poor alike regarding the true values and ideals of life, and which will attract wealth to the service of ideals rather than debase ideals to the service of wealth. That our colleges have elicited the generosity and unselfish devotion of many men of means is one of the most encouraging features of American civilization; but it would idle optimism to suppose that there is no danger from this source. The college is the brain, and, with the church, the conscience of society. The college, then, should admonish wealth to use its authority in the interests of a higher authority than wealth alone can confer.•l^3 Brightman states the need for training in philoso phy on the part of all educators, be they secular or religious; this in order that the educator shall know the meaning and realize the implications for society of that which he is teaching and striving to accomplish. He says: "Society has the right to demand that her teachers, if not her kings, shall be in some sense philosophers--shall have thought through the meaning and value of what they are 123a Philosophy of Ideals, pp. 109-110. 538 doing.The final chapter of his Religious Values- * -25 is concerned with the importance of philosophy to the Religious Educator. He likewise feels that if education is to be the potent factor it might be for the moral consciousness of society, it must not overlook the "tap-root of morality" which is "the sense of obligation" which is to be "found TO A only in the inner life of consciousness." He says: Any conception of morality or of education (secular or religious) that lays exclusive stress on conduct, on external expression, is untrue to the psychological facts of moral and religious experience. Out of the heart are the issues of life; and in the heart, that is, in the conscious awareness, is the seat of obligation.127 In view of this, "moral education . . . needs to lay more stress on personality and moral reason, and perhaps less I OQ on the externals of conduct."In short, he would contend for a metaphysical basis for moral philosophy. Thus he offers the suggestion that "the soul of religious educators may well be sick of men who know their field, but do not know what their field means for life."^-29 No 124Religious Values, p. 252. *25Ibid., Chapter X. 126Ibid., p. 44. *27Loc. cit. 128Ibid., p. 53. 1 2 9 Ibid., p. 262. 539 doubt he would say the same for secular education if there be such. Brightman spoke more truly as a prophet than he had any reason to know, when in his article for the Journal of Bible and Religion entitled "The Best Possible World,"he complained of the fact that American youth had received only an "education for death." Remarking that when peace comes and the eighteen-year-olds return from fighting who have been cheated of an education and a start of moral living, "they will be old before their time, and they will be the most illiterate generation spiritually and culturally that America has known."^^^ Moreover: They will be ripe for any propaganda that hits their fancy. Special interests will play on them. Unless those whose interest is in the common welfare and the good life are super-humanly effective in the re-education and moral rehabili tation of these millions of men and women, America and the world will then be facing a future sorrier than war itself.132 Yet being an optimist and a personalist, he seemed to expect just such super-human effectiveness on the part of those concerned with his nation's educational procedures. ^^E.S. Brightman, "The Best Possible World," Journal of Bible and Religion, XI (1943),pp. 7-15. 131lbid.. p. 10. I^ loc* cit. 540 Our philosophers are agreed about the need for an increased and sustained emphasis in education upon values, ideals, and ethics. To this end religion and morals should find a place in the classrooms of America and any other nation that would educate for creative living. The importance of philosophy in the curriculum would be urged by both of these men. The philosophy most suited to the task, as they see it, would, of course, be Christian Personalism. Since neither of our philosophers were fatalists or determinists, each of them has something to say about human freedom. To this we now turn our attention. CHAPTER XII FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM The tenth and final category under which we wish to wake comparison of our philosophers is that of free will and determinism. Neither of them would accept determinism, nor allow that the universe is an impersonal mechanism. Neither would accept a philosophy of "tychism"1 and neither man uses the term indeterminism with approval. Brightman prefers his own term, "free- domism," whereas Flewelling prefers the term "contin- 3 gency ^Tychism, is defined in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy, by J.J. Rolbiecki as follows: "A term”"3erived from the Greek, tyche, fortune, chance, and employed by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) to express any theory which regards chance as an objective reality, operating in the cosmos. Also the hypothesis that evolution occurs owing to fortuitous variations." p. 324. Whereas indeterminism is defined in the same work by Ledger Wood as: "The theory that volitional decisions are in certain cases independent of antecedent physiologi cal and psychological causation." p. 143. 2He admits that "freedomism" is "an awkward word, but," he says, "it is less misleading than 'indeterminism,' and more consistent technologically than 'libertarianism'." Moral Laws, p. 277, note 26. ^The terms included in his Glossary for his book, The Person, are: "freedom" and "contingency" defining the latter as "the concept opposed to determinism, which holds that free activity may enter causally into natural proces ses," the former he calls "the power of choice by persons between possible courses of action." pp. 329, 330, respectively. 5 4 2 Since Brightman gives careful attention to defi nitions, first attention should be given to him and his thought under this category. A consideration of his position also serves as a fitting introduction to what follows as we consider Plewelling's conception of con tingency. BRIGHTMAN'S PHILOSOPHY OP PREEDOMISM Brightman defines freedom as "the experience of 4 choice as self-determined." He thinks of it as an emergent trait of the personality,^ and the basis of moral and non-moral evils,^ thus constituting a problem for 7 philosophy. Concerning his own preferred term, "free- domism," he writes as follows: By determinism is meant the theory that any given act of choice is an unequivocally necessary consequence of the situation immediately preceding it. The situation includes all relevant factors, both psychological and environmental. Given that situation, the choice is inevitable. Given any number of precisely similar situations, a precisely similar choice is inevitable. By the theory of free will or freedomism is meant the view that a given act of choice is not unequivocally determined by the immediately preceding situation, but that the person ^Philosophy of Religion, p. 529* 5Ibid., p. 353. 6Ibid., pp. 266-267. 7Ibid., pp. 381-382. 543 himself determines his choice by a spontaneous, selective act* Freedom!sm grants that every free act has necessary consequences and that the situation in which the act of choice occurs determines the possibilities from which selection can be made; but it denies that the choice itself is externally determined. Its causation is internal to the act and purely personal, not impersonal and external to it.3 In discussing the importance of the will he offers an enlightening comment on the concept, freedom of the will: Will is the rudder of personality, or rather the pilot who directs the rudder. Whether the pilot steers toward the rocks or toward the harbor, he is still the pilot. One further clarification is necessary. Freedom of will does not mean complete self-determination, without regard to past experience or the rest of the universe; it means, rather, the power to choose from among the given possibilities. The possibilities are determined by past history and the present environ ment of the individual, but only the free choice of the individual can make a particular possibility actual in the sphere of the moral life. The person is therefore free to shape the direction of his life, although he is not the creator of his own being and its powers.^ Brightman recognizes the unique nature of our experience of voluntary choice.*® Ultimately it is a form of creative activity, and amounts to an efficient cause. Each efficient cause produces something new, and exhibits a self-determining, self-directing power.** Thus "no ®Moral Laws, p. 277, and note 26. ^Person and Reality, p. 264. *°Ibid., p. 168. **Ibid., pp. 168-169. 544 thinker . . . can neglect the empirical fact of voluntary causal efficacy without flying in the face of experience-- 12 least of all if he would be an open-minded empiricist.” He is sure that a logical and coherent thinker will r , acknowledge the fact of free choice as an ultimate exper ience of causal efficacy,"*3 since "efficient cause is a category of the realm of freedom” which if denied would negate all free acts.*4 "Agency involves choice and purpose. Choice and purpose require conscious reference to an end chosen or purposed, and this is precisely what is meant by final cause."*3 Brightman also believes that "the free person acts in every choice; but he acts on the material given by previous experience . . . and by the environment. . . He is also of the opinion that if a "free choice occurs, it is an event which is caused by nothing else in the 17 universe but itself.” Likewise, "whatever the theory of cause that is adopted • • .it must include the 12Ibid., p. 169. *3Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. *5Loc. cit. ^ Philosophy of Religion, pp. 381-382. *7Person and Reality, p. 161. 545 necessary and contingent, the novel as well as the fand.liar.”18 He sees no way of ruling out the unexpected IQ in “this surprising universe.” Brightman calls attention to the fact that freedom is essential both to the formation and the realization of ideals: To carry out an ideal it is necessary to guide a long series of acts so that it will conform to the approved type. This implies a purpose, freely chosen and freely sustained; the free choice of means to its attainment; and the free will to criticize every stage of achievement in the light of the chosen ideal. The realization of ideals, then, rests on freedom.20 In the chapter above dealing with Brightman's idea of the nature of man it was noted that Brightman regards him a free being. His statement is: Within limits set by the laws of nature and the range of the individual's own experience, man can choose this or that. He has the power to say ’Yes' or 'No.' . . . Science itself could not be built up unless man were free to think and to Judge his thoughts by free appeal to the ideal of reason. Every scientific experiment is a free act. The very theory of determinism which denies freedom is itself an achievement of free thought, although an incon sistent one, because it denies its own foundation. In so far as man is free it is not yet determined which one of his possible futures he will choose to realize. To a large extent, then, the future of man is indeterminate, not merely in the sense that we 1 8 Ibid., p. 162. l^Loc. cit. 20Philosophy of Ideals, pp. 84-85. 546 ar« ignorant of what it will be, but also in the sense that 'the shape of things to cone' depends partly on how our will chooses to shape them.2* - Of this he is certain: "all the rest of the universe can not compel a free act."22 In an article written for one of the symposia he 23 has a chapter entitled "Freedom, Purpose, and Value." Therein he states the following meanings: Freedom he defines as "the experience of choosing among possible 24 courses of action." "Normal freedom," he says, "involves a reference to value--a standard of estimation; the possi- 25 bility must be regarded as worth choosing." Freedom further implies "interaction between the chooser and his world; it means control of mechanisms by the act of choice."2^ Moreover, "we are directly conscious of free dom, purpose, and value in nearly every moment of experi ence."27 He recognizes that "no actual free act is 'wholly free1. It is a choice within limits rigorously 2^Future of Christianity, pp. 122-123. 22Person and Reality, p. 185. 23mFreedom, Purpose, and Value," Freedom, Its Meaning, Ruth N. Anshen, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., T940, 686 pp.), pp. 485-506. 2*Ibid., p. 487. 25 Loc. cit. 2^Loc. cit. 2 7 Ibid., p. 503. 547 28 determined by past experiences and present environment." Therefore, "freedom and reason are allies. Freedom requires reason for its self-protection and its guid ance. Finally, "what man is free to gain, man is also free to lose,"^ Brightman is sure that the world is no mere 31 machine. He is also of the opinion that the last word 32 has not been said on the problem of freedom. The con temporary thirst for freedom manifests itself in many ways--in poetry, art, and society--as a hunger for new powers and new values," His observation is: Almost everyone who was educated before the World War was taught that mechanism and determinism were the only acceptable bases for philosophy. Now the Old Guard of mechanists is fighting what seems to be a losing battle. . . . In short, the main tendency of modern physics and philosophy is away from the old mechanistic materialism both with regard to the constitution of matter and with regard to its laws; moreover, it is in the direction of a greater recognition of the place of mind, even in physical knowledge.34 . . • Contemporary thought, in many of its currents, is recognizing the principle of creativity and freedom as a real factor both in man's 28Ibid., p. 494. 29Ibid.. p. 497. 3QIbid., p. 498. 31Introduction to Philosophy (1951), pp. 225; 235 ff, 32 Philosophy of Ideals, p. 199. 33Religious Values, pp. 211-212. 34Problem of God., pp. 31-32. 548 psychological experiences and in the objective world. This tendency of thought is a revolt against mechanism. . . .35 . . . The most ardent deterainist would not assert that he knows enough about any human being to predict exactly what he will do in a life situation. Certain forms of reaction, of course, can be predicted in the light of previous knowledge of the individual. We aay know in advance a subject's knee-jerk, or the responses of a color-blind person to color stiau- lation. But iaportant coaplex reactions are not pre dictable. As long as freedom and creativity are ultiaate facts of experience it hardly seems probable that the future of a human personality, or of a society of such personalities, can ever be mapped out in advance by psychological s c i e n c e . 3 6 Brightman is also of the opinion that "if the uni verse is morally constructed, freedom in some sense must be a genuine and precious fact, . . ."37 To deny freedom and the objectivity of values is to involve one's self in a more serious problem than "the existence of sin in a universe of free persons, namely, the problem of how a universe without mind or value could produce mind and 38 value." So he notes with some satisfaction "the renewal of confidence in human freedom" among contemporary philoso- 39 phers other than personalists. ^^Religious Values, p. 236. ^Future of Christianity, pp. 23-24. 37Religious Values, p. 130. 38Ibid., p. 135. 39Ibid., pp. 207-208. 549 In chapter six of his book, The Spiritual Life, Brightman discusses both the negative and positive aspects of freedom. "Negative freedom," he says, "may mean free dom of consciousness from external control or freedom from 40 internal control." On the other hand, he thinks that "positive personal freedom is far more important than any 41 form of negative freedom, physical or personal." He states their differences as follows: By positive personal freedom is meant the power to achieve chosen objectives. In this sense, freedom is a fusion of two powers, the power to choose and the power to achieve. . . . Freedom of choice is a ghostly shadow unless accompanied by some degree of freedom of achievement. The spiritual value of freedom hinges on the extent to which the free man can, in some sense, not only choose a better world, but actually remake this one. Freedom in the spiritual sense is creative in that it aims at co operative action which shall bring into being a new social state of affairs.42 In discussing the nature of spiritual freedom,43 Brightman sees it as freedom within limits.44 It is not irrational*5 nor irresponsible,*6 but in its highest and *®The Spiritual Life, p. 180. *^Loc. cit. 42Ibid.. pp. 185-186. *3Cf. The Spiritual Life, pp. 188 ff. **Ibid., p. 190. *5Ibid.. p. 199. 46Ibid., p. 201. 550 truest form exists as "obedience to the laws of the spirit.”47 "One thing is certain," he says, "when the love of freedom stands alone without support from the 48 whole spiritual life, freedom becomes an empty shell." Brightman therefore looks upon man as being free within sufficiently wide limits for the achievement of purposes and the development of character. Attention may now be given to his contemporary who also champions human freedom. FLEWELLING1S IDEA OF PERSONALITY AS FREE ACTIVITY On frequent occasions in the preceding pages we have noted Flewelling*s favorite term for man--"Creative Personality." We should expect an emphasis upon freedom throughout his thinking which must be posited for any valid creativity. Flewelling looks upon freedom as one of the greatest of human values. In the glossary of his book, The Person, he defines freedom to mean: "the power of choice by persons between 49 possible courses of action." In the same work he defines contingency as: "the concept opposed to determinism which holds that free activity may enter causally into 47Ibid., p. 205. 48Ibid.. p. 178. 4^rhe Person, p. 330. 551 natural processes."^"* "Will," he defines as: "the act of a self-reflective person toward a desired goal,"51 Flewelling is quite sure that "... apart from person ality, freedom can possess no meaning, . . . Freedom must have both a forward and a backward look, and be the result of intelligent choice."5^ He would thus insist that "the CO one essential of freedom is contingency," Man's greatest glory is his power to originate action, to be himself a creator, and if we are to escape the pitiless and relentless tyrannies of mechanism, we cannot do it by pursuing a dance of atoms far beyond powers of human investigation and experience in an Unknowable, We can at least have the comfort of analogy which in any other scheme is entirely wanting. We can assume that personality is the one source of unique action in the universe, the uncaused cause, and we cannot be controverted by any known facts,54 "In plain words, he says, "... personality contains the only grounds we know of unique efficient cause or of uncaused reality."33 Again he writes: "Freedom is, how ever, so basic a reality in human experience that upon the assumption of its reality all the institutions of society 5°Ibid., p. 329. 51Ibid., p. 334. 52Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 175. 53Ibid., p. 275. 54Ibid.. p. 130. 55Ibid., p. 129. are built."56 He is ready to admit that there is "theoretical denial of freedom" but he notes that at the same instant there is "tacit acceptance of the reality of freedom . . • with every human relationship that is," for "to deny free- dom is to preach a theory and to practice its opposite." Here, then, is the chief distinction between man and animals; man has ability to reflect upon his conscious states and act in the light thereof. This is "the prin ciple value in man" as it is also "his prime character istic."'*® He continues: With the power of reflective thought has been born freedom, for freedom is possible only to a being who can relate the past and the future to its present consciousness, and who has also power to reflect upon it. This freedom is man's unique gift in the world of nature, and it enables him to become, within his limited field, creative. His creativity is in the nature of the case limited to the intel ligent combination of natural forces about him and such choices within himself as are creative of moral values and character.59 Thus he holds that "willing is the particular and unique act of personality."6® He affirms will as "the act of a 56The Reason in Faith, p. 14. 57Ibid., p. 19. 5QIbid., p. 232. 553 self-reflecting person that has no existence apart from its activity . . . will, like thought consist only in its exercise.*’ 61 In man's case "it is a choice made in the light of conscious motives, ends to be gained, and it is often made in direct opposition to the most urgent of 2 natural impulses." In chapter nine of his earlier work entitled Creative Personality, Flewelling discusses the question, "Is the World Contingent?"^ There he notes that con tingency is the spectre of mechanistic thought, and that in spite of the discovered uniformities in nature and the so-called "laws of nature" yet the belief in contingency persists due primarily to practical reasons and to "the consciousness of every human being" of "an experience of freedom."^4 Thus man not only talks of exercising a mind of his own, but also of going against natural impulses in the pursuit of honor and obligation. He also doubts the universality of mechanistic law to every department of reality. Man finds himself unable to rid himself of the lingering belief in contingency. Reasons for this are: 61Loc. cit. 62Ibid., p. 87. 6^Creative Personality, pp. 97-103. 64Ibid., p. 97. 554 first, that every man is sure he has experience of con tingency; second, the assurance of it is the basis of social organization; third, the belief in contingency per sists because it seems necessary to rational explanation.6- * Hence he writes: "Any non-contingent scheme of the uni verse keeps us groping from cause to elusive cause until we are lost in the infinite regress of eventual skepti- „66 cism." The main objection to contingency comes in the field of science which seeks laws of uniformity applicable to the natural world. But we do well to remember that law is but a uniformity of response and activity and nothing more. It contains no self-enacting provisions or compel ling necessity. What it amounts to is an experience of uniformity. But this might well be in keeping with "the contingency of an individual acting with consistent uni- formity." It need be "grounded in no necessity but in the uniform volition of a freely choosing personality."6® He would suggest that it is quite as possible that the laws of nature derive their necessity not from within "but 65Cf. Ibid., pp. 98-100. 66Ibid.. p. 101. 6^Loc. cit. 68Ibid., p. 102. 555 from the uniform activities of a rational and purposive 69 cosmic Intelligence," This is in keeping with the fact that in "human experience contingency is the privileged 70 possession of personality alone." Furthermore: With the power of foresight, of reflection, comes the ability to act in a creative way upon the temporal series. We choose only as we see the before and the after, and conceive the possible relations of events. We are thus enabled to direct events in a creative way. We are no longer quite mastered by a world of law and necessity; we ourselves become creators. These facts prepare us for the assumption of personality in the cosmic Intelligence or world- ground. It is only a self-conscious and self directive being that can exercise freedom. A state of freedom is the sole condition of development, progress, or evolution. We shall have to advance this supreme assumption or give over the doctrine of contingency altogether. Scientific demonstration at this point there is none, but the great values of life, of human institutions, of society, and of the individual heart demand it. No theory which reck lessly puts itself in conflict with these known needs can hope to survive the passage of time. Do things happen? In the sense that things can be taken apart from their relations? No! But in the sense of freedom, Yes! They may be the voluntary acts of freely choosing persons.7- 1 - It is Flewelling's contention that the assumption of the fact of freedom is the necessary attendant of all 73 creativity.Freedom is basic to creative art, to ^Loc. cit. 70Loc. cit. 71Loc. cit. 72Survival of Western Culture, p. 277. 73Creative Personality, p. 255. Cf. also Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, pp. 56-57; and The Person, 556 intellectual achievement,7* to the establishment of values,7" * especially moral values,^ and to moral respon- 77 sibility; and contingency is essential to any evolu tionary theory.78 There could be no valid inhibitions unless there were freedom,7® no valid government and AD society without it, and no hope of victory over tragedy without it.®*- Naturalism does not provide for freedom,8^ for the 8 3 only free causation is personal, therefore there can be Q X no freedom apart from a personal world-ground.0’ Continu- 85 ous creation does provide for freedom, and the only 74Creative Personality, p. 256. 78Ibid., p. 107} also Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 174. 76lqc. cit. 77Reason in Faith, p. 236. 78Creative Personality, p. 258; also Winds of Hiroshima, p. 90. 7^Creative Personality, p. 286. 80Ibid.. p. 254. 8^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 83. 8^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy. p* 186. 88Bergs on and Personal Realism, pp. 147, 149. 8^Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 125, 153. 85 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 208. 557 example of perfect freedom is to be "found not in the least rationalizing, and least conscious living being, but in the most conscious and most rationalizing being," the supremely creative One. He is therefore convinced that there is contingency present in life however it may be disguised.8^ Let us now think with Flewelling about the nature of freedom, for he speaks of it as "the commonest of human experiences and beliefs."88 It is not license, illegality, disorder, or looseness, or the basis for irresponsible tyrannies.89 It is "not a physical possession but one of moral activity."90 This being so, the highest freedom is consonant only with the highest ethical achievement. Anything short of complete good will, of perfect holiness, and of God, is something less than perfect freedom. Which is to say there cannot be perfect freedom unless there is perfect goodness*91. Freedom is definitely related to self-restraint, in fact they are inseparable.92 For self-restraint is basic to 86Ibid., p. 141. ^ C r e a t i v e Personality, p. 90. 88Ibid,, p. 56. 89Ibid., p. 254. 90Ibid., p. 257. 9^Loc. cit. 92Ibid., p. 255. 558 true freedom,93 and therefore freedom is never synonymous 94 with lawlessness. Flewelling reminds us that "unless there is strict moral self-restraint, new-found freedoms may result in the destruction of society."93 He points out the importance of the relationship between personalism and democracy, saying: The development of the person can be achieved only under the highest possible conditions of freedom. But freedom is discovered as possessing limits in an ordered society. The person can be free only to the extent of not impinging on the reasonable rights and opportunities of others. It is obvious then that freedom must be practiced with self-restraint. Democracy cannot exist without a rigid self-control on the part of each citizen. Democracy is impossible in a group of criminals or thugs. Personalism becomes a chief aid to Democracy then by showing that self-control is itself one of the rare and necessary elements of self-development. The person can realize his highest gifts and happi ness only in the service of all. Personalism is opposed to every totalitarianism because only in freedom can each person achieve the best that is in him. It is the proponent of Democracy because only in self-restraint can be raised any permanent or enduring structure of society.96 Flewelling realizes that danger to the structures of democracy arises "when we forget the spirit of freedom in the interest of maintaining the means to freedom."9^ 93Ibid., p. 256. 94 Survival of Western Culture, p. 200. 95 Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, p. 12. 9<> "Personalism," Living Schools of Philosophy, pp. 298-299. 97Survival of Western Culture, pp. 228-229. 559 He is sure that the principles of free speech and free press do not include their abuse for the suppression or oppression of persons. Only the common welfare of all would ever justify the invasion of the rights of other persons. He insists that "the free person is the supreme aim and achievement of the social order."98 Therefore the scope of human freedom is not absolute.99 Moreover, "the inherent purpose in law is to make freedom possible, by setting bounds to irresponsible action. . . . Law is the friend of the well-doer. Chaos and disorder are the 100 destruction of freedom. . . ." Nature sets her rewards upon rational purposive freedom, and man must exercise his freedom in the pursuit of rational normal ends or he loses it. For the highest degrees of natural functioning come only as man, bird, and beast are true to their highest possibilities.*®* The "supreme slavery" is "treason to one's better self."*02 The situation with freedom is as with "time's arrow, it 98Ibid., p. 229. 00 The Person, p. 83. l°°Winds of Hiroshima, p. 96. *®*Survival of Western Culture, p. 201. 102Wjnds of Hiroshima, p. 103. 560 flies in a single direction. Freedom in the highest sense must be considered to be freedom to do the right.”103 In the arena of self-direction me find that "right choices in the direction of the normal functioning of life lead to a continuously expanding capacity for freedom."104 Since the person is basically a creator of value, "moral willing is the supreme act of life. . . • 105 Moral choices are the self-realizing acts of the souL" Hence "the achievement of freedom depends upon . . . growth into the full stature of moral and spiritual man hood."10* * Flewelling is in full agreement with Bowne that 1 07 evil is not a necessity for free persons. With these thoughts in mind our philosopher becomes metaphysical, noting that "the question of freedom of will 108 is always connected with the basic question of being," and "for human beings, freedom is existence; its absence, non-existence."10^ Moreover, "freedom in the individual 10^The Person, pp. 87-88. 104Ibid., p. 88. 105Ibid., p. 89. 1q6Loc. cit. 107 Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, pp. 76, 8^ f. 108jhe Person, p. 89. 10^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 90. 561 argues for freedom in the world order and in God, for it is unthinkable that any power should exist in the creature man which does not exist in the forces of creation." On the other hand, "if we deny cosmic freedom we cannot logically refuse to go the full limit of materialism and deny its reality in ourselves."^^ Flewelling seems profoundly impressed with the estimation that God puts upon human freedom, for he says: . . . In days when hearts still ache with loss and the world looks with horror into the abyss of wickedness, calamity and evil in which all the bestiality of the inhuman depravities seem to have been concentrated in our time. There comes the feeling that God should have stopped it if he had the power and if he was powerless, to deny his existence altogether. If there is a God no doubt he would have stopped it if it had been possible without the destruction of human freedom. Reflection upon the character of Go3~and the present state of the world should give us a new understanding of the estimate that God places upon freedom. It is in the fact of human freedom that Flewelling sees validity in part of Brightman's "Given" which God will 113 not override. Yet there could be no reality to moral freedom if evil were impossible, hence there can be no H^The Person, p. 125* Cf. Creative Personality, p. 259. ^^Loc. cit. 112 Ibid., p. 293. Italics added by this writer. H^"Lantern of Diogenes" ("The Cost of Freedom"), The Personalist, XXXIV, p. 116. H^Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 289. 562 coercion in moral freedom*Moreover, redemption must be "a redemption of the moral will or it is nothing for God "having created a world of free individuals, that world cannot be redeemed without the cooperation of the free wills created."**7 He thus finds himself in agree ment with "the Book of Common Prayer which declares the 1X8 service of God to be the perfect freedom*" Signifi cantly, then, "man's freedom is born of his loving cooper ation with the will of God* In the love of law and order and the Supreme Will, lie man's freedom and his peace." Flewelling would therefore remonstrate with Brightman as follows: The divine humiliation is voluntarily under taken as a means to the eventual creation of beings with whom He can associate, and who will love Him for what He is. This is no base necessity arising from an irresponsible 'Given,' it is God paying the price of His own and our freedom, enriching and completing His own experience, through the things that He suffers. . . . Thus, He completes His experience by the completion of free souls, and the sufferings of this present time are not to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed. And ^ ^Reason in Faith, pp. 175, 183. 116Ibid., p. 175. 117Ibid., p. 183. 118 Winds of Hiroshima, p. 98. **9Ibid., pp. 97-98. 563 120 Freedom is the dynamic of new worlds. Thus for both God and man "perfect freedom" is achieved 121 "only through perfect holiness, complete personality." * Moreover, "anything short of complete good will, of perfect holiness, or the effort after it, is something less than religious freedom. Perfect freedom attends alone upon perfect goodness."122 We now conclude our survey of Flewelling's thought on this theme with his exhortation; let science be "now free to move away from the old absolute of impersonal 123 realities" and to speak as a true "voice of freedom," "in a contingent universe," where freedom must "be con sidered the characteristic possession of the creative ^ ^Ibid., pp. 99-100. In his book, Christ and the Dramas of Doubt, pp. 246-247, at note 2, Flewelling quotes the following paragraph from James Ward: The actual existence of moral evil in our world is only incompatible with a theocracy, if God is the author of this evil; if, in other words, God is the sole free agent and his so-called creatures only so many impotent vessels of honor or dishonor. Then, indeed, God and the world would be bad together, but God only would be morally evil. And that, surely, is a supposition as absurd as it is monstrous. Before the presence of evil in the world can be cited as evidence that God is not present in it, it must be shown that the evil is such as not merely to retard but absolutely to prevent the onward progress of a moral order and render the attainment of the upper limit of moral evolution forever impossible. Ward, Realm of Ends, p. 375. 121The Person, p. 125. 122Ibid., p. 122. 123survival of Western Culture. p. 204. 564 124 Power which is the source of all." Thus have our two philosophers spoken and written on behalf of free-will and human freedom as opposed to determinism. Both are firmly opposed to that kind of "supernaturalistic deism" which makes God "so wholly other than man that we learn about God not by interpreting our 125 experience, but by turning away from it to God." Both Flewelling and Brightman found Calvinistic predestination- TOft ism repugnant. As Wilbur Long has observed: "Person- 127 alism is primarily an ontology of Man," and included in his very existence is his prerogative of choice. Or again as Werkmeister has declared: The personalist's faith in man's creative efforts needs ever-renewed emphasis at a time when the determinism inherent in the basic orientation of our sciences is an implicit denial of freedom and creativity. If it be argued that the inexorable logic of science precludes human freedom and genuine crea tivity, one can but answer that the facts of experi ence are otherwise and that these facts entail a limitation in principle of all scientific endeavor. ^2^Winds of Hiroshima, p. 96. I O C Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 221. 126Cf. Ibid., for Brightman's attitude, and The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xxi, for the same attitude Tn FlewellTng. ^ ■ 2^Long, "Introduction," Flewelling's Forest of Yggdrasill, p. xl. ■ * - 2®Werkmeister, "Some Aspects of Contemporary Personalism," The Personalist, XXXII (1951), p. 352. PART THREE A CRITIQUE AND SOME CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER XIII SOME CRITICAL EVALUATIONS In this chapter the reviewer faces his most crucial task* To criticize and evaluate men of so great devotion to truth--men with whom one agrees so extensively— is dif ficult. Yet neither of them felt that he had reached the pinnacle of the philosophical quest, and each of them would and did welcome criticism. The motive of any reviewer must not be the mere seeking of faults. Like these, he too, must seek the advancement of truth. To follow through their writings and thought in reference to the categories under which comparison has been sought proved both an arduous and delightful task. In many in stances our philosophers have criticised each other's position and thought. Thus their agreements and differ ences have become manifest. There are areas, as we shall seek to show, in which one or both of them may be justly criticised. Perhaps the best methodology would be to return to our categories in order of succession and note further criticisms to be offered. Thereafter we may take up various considerations of a more unclassified nature. In some facets of thought one will be found clearer and more forceful than the other. In some areas both may be accused of lack of insight. But let us proceed. 567 The Idea of a Finite God Here criticism is directed chiefly toward the position taken by Brightman* In the appendix of this dis sertation an attempt has been made to include all that is available in print as of criticisms of Brightman's position along with his replies thereto. What is here offered is by way of further consideration. The first difficulty is the troublesome pair of contradictory terms, "finite" and "infinite," concerning which Flewelling and Brightman disagree both in definition and theological application. According to Brightman: "To say that God is infinite is to call him boundless, unbegun and unending, subject to no limits save those of his own being. The Infinite is the eternally Self-Existent. But, he argues, . . . A real Infinite must be definite; although the word means 'boundless,' a real infinite must have bounds. To say that the real God is infinite, then, means that he is the self-existent source of all being; but it also means that he contains and recognizes limitations. If he didn't, he would be formless, meaningless, lawless chaos--a Greek infinite instead of a religious infinite.^ Brightman offers as a support for his theology the de batable claim that belief in God "has always been more ^•Personality and Religion, p. 72. 2Ibid., pp. 75-76. 568 concerned with God's goodness than with his infinity. The concept of infinity is relatively late, a product of 3 philosophical and theological reflection." What is religiously important is that God be infinite in goodness and perfectibility, not in power. If God were both infinitely omnipotent and infinitely good, the very situation from which man is redeemed by religious experience would never have existed in the world in which such a God controlled the conditions. The fact that the situation does exist proves God to be finite, just as religious experience proves the finite God to be a comforter and a burden bearer.4 One might reply that the existence of such a situation proves only that God respects human freedom even when it is exercised to resist His will. What is at issue is whether or not the existence of evil proves the finitude of God. In adopting the position that it does, Brightman acknowledges that he must accept a strange paradox, "the paradoxical truth that, though God is infinite, his will is finite, being limited by that in him which is not will."5 Flewelling charts a clearer course in defining what is to be understood by "infinity." He thinks of it as "more or less a symbol for that which is really beyond 3Ibid.. p. 76. *The Finding of God, pp. 121-122. ^Personality and Religion, p. 84. 569 computation. . . ." Too frequently we postulate the infinitude as an active and important agent and set up a contrast, an irreconcilable conflict, between finite and infinite. Having thus made the two irreconcilable by definition we turn about and endeavor to bring to pass the reconciliation, not realizing that the problem we attempt is purely a verbal one. When we question the nature of infinity we find as its leading characteristic that it is always 'beyond human comprehension.' This characteristic view holds of the_concept of infinity in whatever field it is taken.7 This, he points out, is just the case whether in mathe matics, or physics, or psychology, or even theology. This concept persists in the various fields of thought because it continues to have practical value. But with the religionist, at least, it is not a fiction but "the pro- Q foundest of cosmic realities." Such a faith, he thinks, should not be discounted by the materialistic critic who himself finds the concept of infinity practical. The notion of infinity should never therefore be used in a merely negative sense and for the purpose of denial. The failure to grasp infinity is not a proof of its non-existence. . . . We should be through with the fallacy that nothing exists which we cannot comprehend and explain. Just as in the scientific use of the term we cannot safely enter a denial of its reality so must we likewise grant it place in theology. We cannot argue its non-existence, but must rather and more surely find in the notion ^Creative Personality, p. 154. 7Ibid., pp. 154-155. 8Ibid., p. 156. 570 the strict and oft embarrassing limitations of finite knowledge.^ In cosmology difficulties with the assumption of infinitude have been acknowledged since the time of the Eleatics and Zeno's paradoxes. But "all such verbal dif ficulties are compelled to fall before the practice of life,"10 in which conditions are never ideal, and wherein we must be content with approximations* Flewelling insists that "the difficulty of the relation of the finite to the Infinite in religious thought is likewise a verbal difficultyYet he thinks that "as a practical thing it has been desirable 12 that man should live as if there were an Infinite." As for himself, if the mathematician finds the concept useful in his equations, why may it not be useful in reference to 13 "God, freedom, and immortality?" He would therefore suggest that infinity be defined as "whatever surpasses describable meaning or comprehension."1^ We should thus 9Ibid.. p. 157. 10Ibid,, p. 158. 11Ibid.t p. 159. ^Loc. cit. ^Ibid., p. 160. 14The Person, p. 331. 571 beware of pretending to comprehend that which is beyond comprehension. Reference to Bowne will help clarify the situation. Bowne insists that not the finite, but the infinite is more real: "In the fullest sense of the word, only the infinite exists; all else is relatively phenomenal and non-existent."^ He warns us against those difficulties which "arise from transferring to the infinite the limi tations of the finite.One suspects Bowne of being influenced by his own teacher, Lotze; this is suggested by the following: And now looking away from this bad logic and psychology, and recalling the essential meaning of personality as self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control, it is clear that the traditional dogma of superficial criticism on this point must be reversed. Instead of saying that personality is impossible to the infinite, we must rather say that it is possible in its fullest sense only to the infinite. The finite because of its necessary dependence and subordination, must always have an imperfect and incomplete personality. Complete self- knowledge and self-control are possible only to the absolute and infinite being; and of this finite personality can never be more than a faint and feeble image. Ferry's objection to Brightman's idea of a develop ing God seems valid when he says: "Eternal Isness as the 15 Bowne, Metaphysics (Revised), p. 101. l6Ibid., p. 117. l7Ibid., p. 118. 572 Ground of change must be its own adequate cause and Self- 18 being, and has nothing else whereby to be changed." Likewise Gilson's observation seems pertinent: Plato, for instance, had clearly seen that the ultimate philosophical explanation for all that which is should ultimately rest, not within those elements of reality that are always being generated and there fore never really are, but with something which, because it has no generation, truly is, or exists.19 Ross reminds us that the term finite, used by Brightman, is ambiguous. A finite God "may be as big or as little, as powerful or as feeble, as good or as bad, as one pleases. It (the term, 'finite') can be expanded or con tracted at the will of the writer and may be simply the 20 infinite in disguise." We further agree with Ross when he points out that: Only through a certain looseness in his statements can Brightman defend the unity and the goodness of God, at the same time that he insists on putting the retarding Given within God. The explicit admission, even affirmation, of an eternal duality at the heart of things, coupled with the difficulties involved in trying to place that duality in God, indicates that Brightman's idealistic personalism may be closer to falling into a dualism than he himself admits. 1 ^®N.S.F. Ferre, Christianity and Society (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950J, p. 12• 19 E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941'), p. 42. on F.H. R o s s , Personalism and the Problem of Evil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1^40), p. 22. 21Ibid., p. 43. 573 Ross has also scored a point in emphasizing that "the whole tenor of Brightman's view is that the Given is not an integrated part of the divine personality; it opposes God's will and thwarts it; God has to struggle with it to bring meaning out of it."^2 On this view God is uninte grated, not to say disintegrated, or perhaps mildly schizophrenic. One wonders also whether or not this Given is not therefore more infinite than the God which it limits. In such case one might ask, "is such a being really God?" It is true that the traditional theological view, adopted by some philosophers also, which regards God as infinite and considers evil as finite, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Brightman's position appears as a reversal of this. Furthermore, one wonders how Brightman can be so sure that a created being using his freedom (God-given freedom) could not have revolted against the divine will and thereby have become a Satan. Brightman seems to believe that for satan to exist at all he must of necessity be eternal rather than 23 a creature gone berserk in his abuse of freedom. 22Ibid., p. 48. 23Cf. The Finding of God, p. 186,< a 'note 31_, 574 Kingdon, in his review of Brightman’s book, The Problem of God,2^ suggests that the Given looks very much like the Devil: Lucifer, thrown out of heaven, has taken refuge in the nature of God* . . . Dualism has just shifted its battleground. Instead of being out there in the area of activity, it is within the very nature of God himself.25 "What," he asks, ’ ’has become of our whole concept of personality when so sharp a distinction is drawn between the Divine will and the Divine nature?”2^ In some respects this suggests Plato’s doctrine that the Divine Reason, facing blind necessity and the 27 errant Cause, finds always some chaos within the cosmos. In fact, Cornford thinks the presence of this surd in the Platonic system "can only be attributed to an irrational element in the World-Soul,”2® Yet, even Brightman himself, in an interesting passage, has stated the case succinctly against himself: It is true that the intellectual difficulty of arriving at a coherent view of God if it must be assured that he creates or tolerates a Satan, is so 24The Methodist Review, CXIV (1931), 131-132. 25Ibid. 26Loc. cit. 27Timaeus, 48 A. 28F.M. Cornford, Plato1s Cosmology (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 19571 ), p. I76T Cf. also Plato’s idea of the Receptacle of all Becoming with its chaotic contents. 575 great that monotheists generally have come to abandon belief in any Devil or Satan. But the negation of an incoherent, evil, Satanic person ality TH the cosmos leaves the problem of good-and- evil even more acute than ii mas; and the more coherent God of today finds many who cannot believe in him at all.29 It may be open to challenge whether or not monotheists generally have abandoned belief in a Satan. Some who have not rejected the notion contend that God did not create a Satan, but that he is an angelic being who "fell from heaven,"3° and is tolerated as other sinners are, such as Hitler or a Nero, until such time as he accomplishes his own destruction.^ It may surely be questioned whether Brightman's God, limited by the "irrational Given," is really "the most coherent God of today." At least Trueblood is correct in noting that "it is highly signifi cant that the great weight of opinion in philosophical theology is critical of the doctrine of the divine 32 finitude." Among outstanding opposers of Brightman's 29Philosophy of Religion, pp. 248-249. Italics are mine. Elsewhere Brightman allows the possibility of superhuman persons (Person and Reality, p. 208); then why not the possibility of a Satan? 30Cf. St. Luke 10:18; 2 Peter 2:4; Rev. 20:1-3; et cetera. 31one may recall the frequency with which it was heard said, during the hectic days of World War II, "If there be a God, why doesn't He kill Hitler?" ^2D. Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 242. 576 view is F. R. Tennant, who believes that the inequities of the created world can be understood without recourse to so drastic an hypothesis; for unless we assume some pur pose for the world which is not really God's purpose, this world with its physical ills does not prove God's finiteness. He is of the opinion that "physical ills follow with the same necessity as physical goods from the determinate 'world plan' which secures that the world be a suitable stage for intelligent and ethical life."33 The passage is worth quoting at length: And if this be so, the disadvantages which accrue from the determinateness and regularity of the physical world cannot be regarded either as absolute or as superfluous evils. They are not absolute evils because they are parts of an order which subserves the highest good in providing opportunity for moral development. And they are not superfluous ills because they are the necessary outcome of that order. They are collateral effects of what, in itself or as a whole, is good because instrumental to the highest good. They are not good, when good is hedonically defined; but they are good for good, when good is otherwise defined, rather than good for nothing. As in the case of moral evil, so also in the case of physical evil, appeal has sometimes been made from necessary linkages and conditionings to a supposed possibility of their being over-ridden by divine omnipotence. And as it was found absurd to suppose that God could make developing beings at the same time morally free and temptationless, so it involves absurdity to suppose that the world could be a moral order without being a physical cosmos. To save mankind from the painful consequences which flow from a determinte world-order, such as the earthquake and 33F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology (2 Vols. Cambridge: The University Press, 1935, 1937), Vol. 2, p. 201. 577 the pestilence, would involve renunciation of a world- order, and therefore of a moral order, and the sub stitution of a chaos of incalculable miracle. Doubt less some directive agency, or the introduction of new streams of causation into the course of Nature, is conceivable without subversion of such regularity as is requisite for human prudence and without the stulti fication of our science. But the general suspension of painful events, requisite on the vast scale pre supposed in the elimination of physical ills, would abolish order and convert cosmos into an untelligible chaos in which anything might succeed upon anything. We should have to 'renounce reason' if we would thus be 'saved from tears,' as Martineau says.34 Again, the question might be raised as to the validity of making the structure of human experience the criterion for the structure of divine experience, and consequently the possibility of an excessively anthro pomorphic theology. As McLarney well observes: "If there is an analogy between the nature of God and the nature of 35 man, it is an analogy of proportionality." He rightly points out that Brightman's application of the notions of nature, reason, purpose, and struggle, to both man and God turns out to be univocal. "To argue," he says, "that God has an active-passive nature because such a nature is experienced in mankind is to imply that we have had as much experience of divinity as we have had of humanity; a claim which has no foundation in fact." ° 34Ibid., pp. 201-202. 35J.J. McLarney, The Theism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1936), p. 136. 36Ibid., p. 142. 578 Brightman maintains that man, like God, is also finite-infinite. He observes that: Not only can we grasp the meaning of the mathe matical infinite, but we can think of the eternal and self-sufficient being. Our own spirit with its active-passive nature is also finite-infinite. Now, the faith with which religious idealism confronts experience suggests that the small segment of the universe which we call ourselves is truly a sample of what the whole universe is.3? But McLarney’s rejoinder is pertinent: To conclude • • • that God is finite-infinite, that He struggles because we struggle, that He has problems because we have problems, is a brand of anthropomorphism which has little of sound reason to commend it. To invoke conscious experience as proof that God is limited by human characteristics is to imply that God's intellect is subject to the physical instru ments which are utilized in the processes of human knowledge. It is startling to find an insinuation that God has for an eternity of divine life groped through the darkness of existence with an under standing no different from our own. . . .38 Perhaps it is wiser to admit with intellectual modesty that the mystery of God is baffling to human reason. Brightman grants that God is infinite in every attribute except power, and, as we have seen, argues for this exception on the basis of human experience, which: . . . implies a powerful, an unconquerable, but not an omnipotent God. God, as we have already seen, is infinite in many respects; yet his power is finite in the sense of being limited by conditions in the 3?Personality and Religion, p. 83, 38McLarney, og. cit., p. 142. 579 divine experience which the divine will did not originate.39 Quite frankly we are faced with two alternatives: Either man's reason is infinite, in the sense that he can explain God, or it is finite, and cannot explain God, and must admit that evil too is a mystery. Brightman chooses the former alternative, thus practically deifying man as omniscient, and in consequence he must denigrate God as finite. The other choice is more commonly accepted and seems better since it looks upon man as finite in intel ligence and allows God to remain infinite. It is worthy of note that Brightman at this point is Greek, not Christian. The Greeks maintained that meta physics or I . kloxTipLT) is infallible science. The Jewish tradition accepts the same principle of infallible ration alism. Christianity, on the contrary, accepts, with Job, the principle of mystery. This is symbolized by the Cross, which marks the irrational fact that innocence suffers for the guilty--in lieu of the guilty--a common human fact. In Pauline thought there are a number of mysteries mentioned, but the Christian must live by faith and not by yvwols- Brightman's choice and solution is therefore Greek, not Christian. 39Personality and Religion, p. 85. 580 We have noted above Brightman's contention that if God were omnipotent he could have (and no doubt would have) "created a race of free beings who would always choose righteously (as he himself, being also free, always chooses righteously), even though in theory they were free 41 to sin as (he also is)." But since that has not proven to be the case Brightman argues that God is finite in power rather than omnipotent. We objected at that time of our notation, that Brightman was asking for gods not men. It may also be said that God is seeking to produce just such beings as Brightman wishes for, but their pro duction requires just such temptations and provings as demand the exercise of free-choice between alternatives. God's method in obtaining free beings who will not choose evil is their evolvement through testings rather than a sudden short-cut via the creative act. Moreover, character may be forged only on the anvil of constant choices. Let us suppose that God had made all men perfectly virtuous--beings that never committed any wickedness, never thought any impure thoughts, never chose to sin. Is not this conception of "virtue" a spurious one? Innocence may be present without choices, but never can it be so for virtue. Men of that sort would be mere automata, ^^Cf• Supra, p. 95, and note 13^. ^ The Finding of God, p. 173. 581 marionettes, with God as the Great Puppeteer, They would leek responsibility for their acts. Lacking such respon sibility, they would not be deserving of either praise or blame. Such "virtue" as they may have exhibited would be divinely imposed; it would not be their own, nor oould they be looked upon as true moral agents. In such case the only goodness in the world would be primary goodness, enjoyed, but unchosen by these "puppets." This would be but a relatively insignificant kind of goodness. Man would not have, or attain, a real secondary goodness, which must come from within; nor would God then realize in His world any tertiary goodness. Such a world would obviously not be the best possible, when, instead of these human "puppets" God, the omnipotent Being, Himself a moral agent, could have had a world with other moral agents peopling it. The latter type of world is what God has actually chosen, endowing men with free-will and running all the risks involved. Freedom, which is the greater good, as well as the presupposition of real secondary goodness, necessitates the possibility of secondary evil. Yet, as Flewelling has pointed out, "evil may be possible but not chosen, and so long as it is not chosen it does 42 not exist." Yet the moral situation is valid so long as 4 2 Creative Personality, p. 237. 582 the possibility of evil is there. What Brightman seems to be asking for is a world with no possibility of evil, and therefore no genuine freedom, since a real choice is one the outcome of which is not predetermined by any factor outside the agent. The choice must be determined by the agent, it cannot thus be either capricious or externally predetermined. Moral goodness, which in man's case is secondary goodness, is qualitatively superior to natural goodness (mere enjoyment of that which could not have been otherwise). Hence a world containing moral goodness is superior to one without it, which world is what comes logically from a God infinite in goodness, as Brightman allows He is. The true springs of moral action are internal. Other criticisms of Brightman's doctrine of the Finite God are presented in the appendix where the objec tions of Knudson and more than twenty others have been tabulated. Agreement with most of these is herewith admit ted. Rosy Optimism about Man It seems reasonable to ask if our philosophers are not too optimistic about human nature, not so much as to its possibilities as to its probabilities. One wonders if either of them has really seen the depths of diabolical corruption to which men can plunge themselves, for 583 instance the former threshing crews of the American wheat belt, the railroad work gang, the men of either the army or the navy (or other branches of the military service) in times of war especially but also in times of peace, or, more particularly, the Nazi concentration camp or the Japanese military prison and torture cells of World War II, and more anciently the inhumanity and brutality of the Assyrians and of a Tamerlane. Neither of our philosophers puts much credence in the theological idea of the fall of man or the doctrine of human depravityThey stand, therefore, in the traditional line of thought set forth by Pelagius, Erasmus, and Harnack; they take more kindly to the idea that man has within himself adequate resources for his own salvation, and are not disposed to think that apart from divine grace he has no ability to choose righteously or achieve the higher goal and good. Both see man in a process of evolution which be cause of his free choice is not unconditionally guaranteed. Yet both are optimistic about the future of the race under the guidance and challenge of the Divine Spirit, and 4 3 In his review of Flewelling's book, The Person, T.M. Greene says: He "underestimates . . . the ultimate stubborn inescapability of sin. . . . He never, it seems to me, comes to grips with that in human sin which man's greatest efforts will never be able to eradicate." Theology Today, IX, p. 543. 584 maintain that in cooperation therewith man will transcend his old self and society and achieve a better world. This optimism about man arises, no doubt, from their liberal protestant orientation. But since their time liberal protestantism has taken a more serious atti tude toward the problem of sin. One hesitates to cite specific individuals as examples of this contention that more recent protestantism has moved beyond the thinking of our two men,^ yet the writings of a number of the leading men of the National Council of Churches, for example, evidence a more serious appraisal of man's passionate love for destruction and chaos--a characteristic that hardly validates a rosy optimism about man. There are even times when our philosophers have misgivings about their optimism. In these instances their reactions are not identical. Brightman, seeing the theological implications of his speculation, retreats into philosophy, whereas Flewelling faces the same implications and boldly turns theologian. There are times when Brightman seems more reserved in his ^Examples may be found in the following works: Georgia Harkness (a former student of Brightman) Our Christian Hope (New York: Abingdon Press, 1964), Chaps. I and II; Geo. W. Forell, The Protestant Faith (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), (jhap. 5; James A.Pike, Doing The Truth (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1^55), Chap. VI; and E. Lab Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., l9f>5) , entire. 585 optimism about man; an instance of this is his objection to Flewelling*s idea that man possesses the divine charac- 45 teristic of "creativity.” The Problem of Evil Brightman's "theory of multiple meanings" is a far better explanation of surd evil than is his doctrine of the Given. The advantage which it offers is that it permits the retention of the idea of an omnipotent deity as opposed to his finitistic theism. His best statement of it is as follows: . . . The fundamental point to note is this: physical events are not good or bad in themselves; they are good or bad only as they express and influence personality. When we call a thing a physical event we are thinking of it in abstraction from its rise in the mind of God and its influence on human person ality. An event thus thought of has no value or disvalue. A kiss as a physical event has no meaning or value; as personal experience it conveys the most intense and various meanings to Romeo and to Juliet, to Judas and to Christ. The same physical event may easily have contradictory meanings to different minds. To God, the source of all being, every physical event means law and love; to man, many such events may mean lawlessness and hate. This may be called the theory of multiple meanings. According to this theory every physical event as caused by God conveys a meaning or value, but the same event may also convey any number of conflicting human meanings. This implies that man may express his purposes through events of which not he, but God, is the metaphysical cause. The theory of multiple meanings may be illustrated by a murder. An evil man slays an innocent person. 45Moral Laws, pp. 75-76 586 The evil man means by this murder hatred, revenge, or robbery or whatever else it may be. His evil meaning is real; he is responsible for it and its consequences, for he knew what they would be and he intended them. Yet, by this same physical event, God (so our theory would hold) meant his purpose of law and patient love. Let us not blink the fact that if God be immanent in all nature, every motion of the murderer's hand, and of his weapon, and all its deadly effect, down to the subtlest tremor of the most minute electron, was all the deed of God's will, whose purpose is supreme value. By one and the same event, man means evil, God means good; just as by a handshake between two human beings, one may mean friendship and the other treachery. The doctrine of multiple meanings receives its most complex and overwhelming illustration in war, the physical events of which express the wiles of the diplomat, the patriotism of the poet, the fear or hope or helpless ness of the common man— and the long-suffering purpose of the infinitely good God.46 That this is a comparatively late development in his thinking is evident from the fact that it does not appear in the 1925 edition of his Introduction to Philosophy. One wonders why this should not have satis fied Brightman's mystifications in reference to natural evils. Yet against the "multiple meanings" principle questions may be raised. What about the divine immanence as Brightman conceives it? Is God as minutely involved in every physical event as Brightman seems to make Him? Again, should not Brightman allow a distinction between God's orderly universe and His permissive will as ex pressed in established laws of nature, on the one hand, ^Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy (1951), pp. 177-178. Cf. also his Person and Reality, p. 296. 587 and, on the other hand, God's particular-active-positive- specific choice? It would seem that he should and that some of his difficulties with the problem of evil stem from his failure to do so. He might have found profit by considering the classic illustration in Genesis 50:20, in which Joseph was sold by his brethren into Egypt; according to which a single event was evil on man's part and good from the divine standpoint. It is regrettable that Brightman and Flewelling failed to take greater cognizance than they did of the fact that man, through many years of his misuse of freedom, may be more directly responsible for some of the so-called evil events of nature than we have been willing to admit. Witness the deforestation of the land with the ensuing erosion that is so often accompanied with floods and dust storms; not only Palestine but America has its rocky ter- rane all because the fertile top soils were exposed un necessarily to the elements. "Dust bowls" too are of human origin. Wars likewise have their share of responsi bility for the plundering of the natural resources and much consequent so-called "surd evil." Brightman is right in saying that "the same physical event may easily have contradictory meanings to different 47 minds," and in that case the attitude and reaction of 47Introduction to Philosophy (1951), p. 177. 588 the person influenced or affected thereby is the chief factor in determining its moral (or value) significance* If used to increase value by a proper attitude and ad justment on the part of the person involved, a natural fact can be considered good; if connected with a different attitude it can be used to detract from or deter the in crease and conservation of values, and then it must be considered bad* To make the deity responsible for man's use or abuse of freedom in his choice of attitudes and motives is hardly fair. It pushes the doctrine of the divine immanence to extremes* One suspects that Brightman might admit this while objecting to its seeming smugness. What troubled him was such evils as cancer with its intense suffering, insanity, which is hard to explain in any case, and the apparently unnecessary violent suffering and wretchedness in the case of famine, pestilence, disease, death in extreme agony* Brightman is not willing to leave the matter in the realm of mystery which pleads for faith in a good God in spite of all that happens to us to contradict that faith. At the risk of being accused of further smugness the question may be raised concerning that which constitutes the highest good for nan— character or comfort? Pain may become the means of moral victory (especially vicarious pain), like wise faith in the midst of mystery, struggle, and pain, 589 has become the stepping stone to progress. Furthermore, it may be queried whether Brightman has not attempted to solve the problem of evil on a hedonistic, pain and pleasure basis. Such is the opinion of Brightman*s colleague and best critic, A. C. Knudson: People as a rule, for instance, estimate the natural evils of life from a hedonistic standpoint. They look upon the passive pleasures of life as its chief good, and hence condemn the universe for causing or allowing so much pain and suffering. But this is a mistaken standard by which to judge the world. The true goal of life is ethical; it lies in achievement, in the formation of character, and from this point of view much of human suffering is seen in a new light. It ceases to be pure evil and becomes a means to a higher end. The importance of this consideration can hardly be exaggerated. The complaints against the universe have come chiefly from those who have consciously or unconsciously adopted the hedonistic viewpoint.48 That pain serves an important function in the preservation of life none would dispute. The leper whose sense of pain is largely lost is looked upon as extremely unfortunate, for his physical extremities are destroyed through injuries incurred and unattended to because of his lack of physical sensitivity. A fact to which more than one medical missionary to these unfortunates has borne witness. Krumbine’s observation is pertinent: MThat which makes man 4®A.C. Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, pp. 215-216. Most of his criticisms of Brightman's position are included in the appendix of this writing, but Knudson*s entire chapter on "Suffering" in this book is worthy of note as the best available answer to Brightman's doctrine of the Given. 590 man is his power to suffer. The Status of Nature Personalistic discussions of physical nature tend to become obscure. Yet personalists generally agree upon the dynamic essence of material nature and reject the Newtonian notion of absolute space and inertial matter. In the chapter on Nature it was pointed out that Flewelling as a "personal realist" holds that physical nature is God’s activity and continuous creation, whereas Brightman, as a "personal idealist," insists that physical nature is wholly within the being of God. For Flewelling it is objective to the deity as is the deed to the doer, yet it is dynamic in its essence as a space-time event. It is therefore God's creature, God’s production, God’s work. Yet he does not look upon it as something achieved in the past but as something that God is continuously doing and sustaining. Brightman, on the other hand, sees nature as a very part of God’s being, wholly within the divine experience, not to be thought of merely as a divine activity but as "actually an integral part of the divine 50 person." Flewelling can speak of the divine immanence Miles H. Krumbine, Ways of Believing, p. 142. 50Brightman was not satisfied with Bowne’s cosmology as related to the problem of evil. Bowne concludes Part II of his Metaphysics with the admission that 591 of God in all things natural, whereas Brightman must con tend for the immanence of all things within the nature of God. In Brightman's thought the divine transcendence is minimized if not denied. In Flewelling's thought there is the divine transcendence as complimentary to the divine immanence. Flewelling thinks of God as the Source of all things, whereas Brightman thinks of God as the sphere of all things. In Flewelling's thought nature can thus be objective to the deity, in Brightman's thought it cannot be. This is not to charge Brightman with pantheism but to recognize what he really intends by the term he himself preferred, namely, panentheism. For Flewelling God is the "the problem of evil . . . admits of no speculative solu tion at present (p. 347). On the other hand Flewelling*s view of Nature is essentially that of Bowne (which in turn is essentially that of Berkeley) who held that "the physical elements are simply forms of the activity of the infinite . . . no fixed and changeless beings, . . . but . . . flowing formulas [sic] of the divine activity" (p. 342). "The atoms themselves . . . are acts of the infinite" (p. 343). "God does not first make a lot of raw material, with rigid laws, and then combine it as best he can, but matter and all its laws are but his purpose in cessantly realizing itself. The conception of matter as something given and fixed we repudiate entirely. . . . Matter is simply a form of manifestation of which the reality is the Immanent God" (p. 343). But for Brightman much of the divine activity is inscrutable. Moreover, he is not willing to abandon some sort of speculative solution of the problem of evil. Hence his postulate of the "irrational Given" within the nature of God and his placing of Nature within the being of God" as an integral part of the divine person" (Person and Reality, p. 246). Of Nature Brightman declares: "It is nothing external in which he [God] dwells or on which he acts. It ijs part and parcel of his very being" (Person and ReaTTty, pi 276. Italics are mine). 592 superintendent of the evolutionary processes, for Brightman God himself is in process of evolution. Flewelling would distinguish causal and phenomenal reality,51 and he therefore can speak of "matter,” "mind," 52 and "God," of "material universe and individual mind CO . . • both [of which] proceed from the same Source," a common World-Ground which is personal.^ For him "the world of things depends upon the causal activity of the 55 Divine Personality" yet this "fundamental causal activity is not a Prime Mover, but an immanent Mover continually 55 manifesting himself in the on-going of the world." Flewelling, like Bowne, allows both a phenomenal and an efficient causality,57 ancj this efficient causality is God "the uncaused cause of phenomena."5® For "the world of things is not a succession of phenomena, but depends Slpersonalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 94. 52Ibid., P« 106. 53Ibid., P- 107. 54Ibid., P- 108. 55ibid., P* 75. 56Ibid., P« 79. 3^Loc. cit. 58Ibid., P* 81. 593 59 upon the causal activity of a divine personality,” ' All that exists is the result or manifestation of a supreme, active, purposive intelligence which creates and sustains the world of lesser intelligences and things* It has no meaning apart from this purpose which is its ground* Mind can understand the move ment of matter because both proceed from the same source* The mind grasps the meaning of the world because it owns kinship with the intelligence which creates the world* It is itself purposive, self- directive, and causal within the world order* By this definition personalism escapes the pantheistic conclusions of absolutism and the mechanical determi nism of empiricism.60 Furthermore, ”the purposive causal intelligence is not taken as pure abstraction existing independently of the world. . . . The divine being exists in, and not apart from His activity.”6^ Yet "both time and space must be given objective validity to free them from the disjunctive caprice of the individual and make possible a world united in space and time relations.”62 Flewelling thus follows the line of succession from Berkeley and Bowne. Brightman, on the other hand, rejects Bowne•s doctrine of the immanence of God63 and contends for 5^”Personalism,” Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 772. 60loc. cit. 62Ibid*. p. 773. 63B.P. Bowne, The Immanence of God (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., T55sy7 594 the immanence of all things in God* Nature is more than the form and product of God's ceaseless activity, it is one of the realms of being within that God in whom all things live and move and have their being. In the chapter on nature we saw that for Brightman matter "is a form of spirit."**4 This is different than Flewelling's idea that it is a "continuum of acts from a transcendent Source,1 '^® or "a succession of events in a space-time continuum, Brightman's type of personalism is a thoroughgoing panentheisro. It argues that the world is included in God's being something as cells are included in a larger organism, although the world of nature does not exhaust God's being or creativity. Just as a person is both the sum of all his parts and experiences and yet is more than they, so God has all of finite being as part of his being and experience but includes within his divine nature other realms of being. Thus Brightman rejects the idea of God's independence from the world, and rejects also the divine impassibility, omniscience, and eternity, as well as the divine omnipotence. Because nature is a realm within the being of God, the content of God's experience literally Is God a Person?, p. 14. 65The Personalist. XXXIX, p. 344. ^Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 165, 595 changes, though he always experiences whatever there is to experience. In the light of human freedom, and spontaneity within nature, it is impossible for God to know all the future, even though he knows all that can be known. Therefore God is himself temporal, if not also spatial. ^ In this Brightman is especially sympathetic with the thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne. His doctrine that matter is a "form of spirit,"**8 also makes him approve the position of panpsychism, the view that all reality is composed of beings that possess consciousness, ranging from the lowest degree of unity, awareness, and purpose, to the highest. He would even allow that "quite possibly some so-called lower animals can think, and can test first impressions by further inquiry into experience. If so, such animals are persons, however elementary."**^ One wishes to ask, "if that be so has not the term 'personality* become purely relative?" Another question is whether Brightman would deify the € \ * 7 Brightman says: "we may say that the spatial aspect of God is a vast, yet subordinate, area of the divine being." (Philosophy of Religion, p. 218). See further Section T~t oi? chapter SEVEN of the work here cited. 68Is God a Person?, p. 14. 69e .s. Brightman, "A Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self," Radhakrishnan (Inge, et al., eds. London: George Allen & Unwin, T551), p. 297. Cf. also Brightman's article "Panpsychism," Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, T555), p. §38. world, or naturalize God with this theory. Since, however, his identification of nature and God is not an equating of God with nature (for nature is within God as only one of the realms of His being) he claims to escape pantheism. He must, of course, surrender God's perfection in power. Flewelling, on the other hand, holds to the substantial transcendence while contending for the effective immanence of God’s relationship with physical nature, thus retaining belief in the divine omnipotence. One wonders whether in Brightman*s case God does not emanate the physical order rather than create it. Brightman allows there are two types of theism: one which holds that "nature . . . is continually caused and con served by God," (which is Flewelling's position) and another which holds that "nature . . . is actually an integral part of the divine Person so that all natural TO events are divine acts," (which is his own position). Both types of theism may be personalistic. The former allows for the substantial transcendence and effective immanence of God in relation to His created world, the latter minimizes the divine transcendence and objects that Bowne's expression, "the immanence of God in Nature" is "incompatible with personalism," because Brightman 597 71 thinks it is suggestive of a metaphysical dualism. Brightman believes also that there is a ’ ’social pluralism, in which many persons interact with God and 72 through him with each other” which belief is required by his own personalistic theory. For "persons other than the cosmic Person cannot be literally parts of the eternal 7 3 Person without contradiction,” and ”the word 'create1 celebrates this fact” of distinction between the divine and human persons. It is to be asked of Brightman, however, in such case, why cannot the word "create” cele brate a like distinction and difference between God and physical Nature? Cannot God be creator here also and nature be the creature, just as surely as God and man stand in a creator and creature relationship? But this he rejects, for he says: Whatever creation may mean, it sheds little light on the concept of Nature to say that it is created or is in process of creation, . . . the statement is empty without definition of its content and cannot be taken as an additional definition of Nature.7* It still seems logical to ask: if one makes Nature to be "an integral part of the Divine Person” so much so "that all natural events are divine acts,” how much ahead of 7ilbid., p. 249, note 14. 72Loc. cit. 7^loc. cit. 74Ibid., p. 248. 7 5 Ibid., p. 247. 598 Spinozistic pantheism are we? Here too we encounter the problem of man's physical nature--must it likewise be considered "an integral part of the Divine Person?" Brightman would answer affirmatively, perhaps insisting as he did so that this fact serves only to enhance the dignity and sanctity of the human body* But in that case how can any "son of man" say: "a body hast Thou prepared for me," (Hebrews 10:5)? To the average person, much of the foregoing dis cussion may seem like theological hairsplitting, yet there are advantages in preferring Flewelling's position and in positing physical nature outside the divine substance, as God's creative activity rather than His essential being* These are as follows: (1) It makes God substantially trans cendent yet effectively immanent with relation to physical nature* (2) It takes God from within the process of evo lution and makes Him its superintendent, and it becomes rather His method* (3) It makes room for a genuine creation rather than a Platonic or Neo-Platonic emanation. (4) It places "surd evils" within the functioning of Nature and not within the very Divine nature itself* (5) It allows for the Biblical idea that Nature has been placed under a curse by reason of man's sin, and for man's sake--heightening man's struggle for existence and enhan cing his sense of need--while holding forth the Biblical 599 hope that both man and Nature may partake of an ultimate redemption.7^ (6) It provides a truly material means of communication between finite persons (in keeping with personal realism), in a world that is objective to the human experient, even though he can know it only through his own sensations. Moreover these sensations report an essentially true and unterrupted, if limited, account, which gives faithful and direct knowledge of the actual world. (7) Finally, the door is closed against possible descent into hylozoism or animism and the oriental phil osophy which would make all life as an individuation a departure from the World Soul in the direction of evil. Hence, it seems to this writer one thing to say that the natural world is wholly within God's experience as a result of His creative activity, and yet another thing to say that physical Nature is totally within God's being. We can agree with John Wright Buckham's declaration that "however strongly one may revolt from Naturalistic Realism, it cannot be met by going to the opposite extreme of Pure Idealism."77 In this connection the objection may be raised that 76Cf. Flewelling's chapter on "The Character of World Redemption," The Reason in Faith, pp. 171-202. 77j.W. Buckham, The Inner World (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), p. 277. 600 too often Brightman writes as if his version of person alism were exclusively standard. Thus he speaks of "the personalistic postulate of the immanence of Nature in God,1 ’78 as "actually an integral part of the divine Person so that all natural events are divine acts."7^ He objects to the Biblical declaration that God placed a 30 curse upon nature for man's sake, contending that this makes God a devil, and prefers to place the curse within the nature of God himself in the form of the "irrational Given." That other personalists have disagreed with Brightman's type of personalism has already been noted, and notations of the disagreement of others may be found in the appendix. In the case of Buckham, who was him self a disciple of Bowne and Howison, the suggestion is made that we "find gloom or cruelty or treachery . . . in D 1 Nature" by reading "human traits into the non-human." He notes that it was Calvin who "held that every drop of rain falls by divine fiat,"82 contention is that we 7®Pcrson and Reality, p. 248. 79 Ibid., p. 246. Italics are mine. Genesis 3:17; Romans 8:20-22. 81 J•W. Buckham, The Humanity of God (New York: Harper & Bros., 1928), p. 12?. 8 2 Ibid., d. 129. His italics. 601 cannot properly hold, as does Brightman, that Mall natural events are divine acts,”83 for he says: "Events in 04 the natural world are not the immediate acts of God." It is only since the rise of modern science that men have come— and not all of them yet--to realize that natural laws do not represent God's intention toward them individually. Whatever the dark side of Nature means, it clearly does not mean the dis pleasure of God towards those who suffer from the operation of natural l a w s . ® 5 Furthermore: Nature seems to have been waiting, as Paul said, for the coming of the sons of God, not only that she may be released from her own 'bondage and corruption' but to help man on his way. God, Nature, and Man together are making all things new. The future is full of promise for human progress and happiness. Yet all depends— ay, there's the rub— but the incentive, too— on men being true to their high calling and living as sons of G o d . ® 6 It is also Buckham's opinion that: The most reasonable solution of the problem of Nature seems to be to regard the natural world as the progressive creation of a purposive, benevolent Intelligence who has infilled it with an inex haustible developing potency, intelligence, and germinal freedom which enable all the various life- forms to work out, each for itself, its unique self- expression, yet who holds all within the bounds of an all comprehending unity and progressive purpose.87 83Person and Reality, p. 246. ^Humanity of God, p. 128. 85Ibid., p. 130. 88Ibid., p. 133. 87ibid., p. 138. 602 Brightman's position relative to the natural world is not subscribed to by most personalists. It may be granted that although novel it is personalistic* Yet a basic objection to it is that he makes material existence to be too much like that of mind* If human analogies may be permitted, as Brightman allows they may, the distinc tion remains valid between the Creator and His creation, as in the human realm between the workman and his work* Metaphysical Temporalism Following a survey of the thinking of our philoso phers about the world of physical nature came the investi gation of their respective philosophies of time* There we took note of Brightman's contention that "all being 88 . . • is temporal. Whatever is, endures"; consequently time "is a category of all that there is,"®9 and "we need a clear conception of time as a universal subjective- objective category."9® It was also noted that Brightman departs the position of his teacher, Bowne, which position 91 we now review briefly. "Time itself," Bowne held, "may be viewed as a correlate of change; but if there were no 88Person and Reality, p. 119. ®^Loc. cit. 90Ibid., p* 117. 9 1 Bowne, Metaphysics (Revised), Chapter II, Part II, pp. 164 ff. 603 change the changeless would still endure. . . . Time, then, depends on change. In a changeless world time would have no meaning.Change is therefore the basal fact: It is not in time and it does not require time; but it founds time; and time is but the form of change. In the common thought time exists as a precondition of change; in our view change is first, and time is but its form. It has no other reality. 93 Time, then, is not an ontological fact but is essentially a function of self-conscious intelli gence • 94 Time is phenomenal and limited to phenomena: Phenomenal realities are not to be mistaken for ontological ones; and the categories of phenomena must not be applied to their ontological ground. . . . Finally, our judgments of phenomenal time have in them so much of relativity, owing to the limited range of our consciousness and our general dependence and finitude, that we cannot be too circumspect in transferring them to the infinite.95 Brightman frankly disagreed with this Kantian position of Bowne. Had he followed Bowne, instead of holding that time is the most important category of all being, he would have said rather that being is the reality back of all time. 92ibid., pp. 178-179. 93lbid., p. 183. 94Ibid., p. 186. 95ibid., pp. 192-193. Bowne's ten-point summary of his position at the conclusion of his chapter on time is worthy of note. pp. 193-194. In our comparison of Flewelling with Brightman we noted that Flewelling sees God as the Creator of time, whereas Brightman makes God subject to time.^8 His is a temporalist view of God, based on the fact that experience manifests inescapable duration, and time is sin aspect of all experience. Paul Tillich's observation is valid that "the categories of experience are categories of finitude," and "the main category of finitude is time. Being finite means being temporal.Contrary to Brightman he acknowledges the futility of man's attempt to "grasp the infinite with the categories of finitude."^8 Kant, he admits, is often interpreted only as an epistemological idealist and as an ethical formalist--and consequently rejected. But: "Kant is more than this. His doctrine of ^8In order that the reader may not think the writer unfair to Brightman's position, the following statements by Brightman are herewith noted: "The thesis to be defended is that the God of religion, from everlasting to everlasting, is a temporal being. Indeed, it may be said that all reality, all experience, whether human or divine, is a temporally moving present. Nothing real is a nunc stans. . . . God is not a timeless being; he is an ever enduring creator. His existence is an eternally changing present." Person and Reality, pT 523. Italics are mine. Cf. alro his "A Temporalist View of God," Journal of Religion. XII (1932), 544-555. Q7 y'Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, l£5l), Vol. I, p. 82. 98l o c . cit. 605 the categorical imperative is a doctrine of the uncon- 99 ditioned element in the depth of practical reason." He also notes that it is unKantian to denominate time and space "categories," which are for Kant forms of perception or "intuition."^®® In an important chapter dealing with space and time A. E. Taylor has sought to show that "conceptual time and space" are but abstractions based upon our "perceptual space and time" contending that "the space and time order is phenomenal and not ultimate," . . . because the whole character of our perceptual space and time depends upon the very imperfections and limitations which make our experience fragmentary and imperfect. Perceptual space and time are for me what they are, because I see them, so to say, in perspective from the special standpoint of my own particular here and now. If that standpoint were altered, so that actually for me there and then became my here and now, my whole outlook on the space and time order would suffer change. But the Absolute cannot look at the space and time order from the standpoint of my here and now. For it is the finitude of my interests and purposes which confine me in my outlook to this here and now. . . . Hence the absolute experience, being free from the limitations of interest which condition the finite experiences, cannot see the order of existence from the special standpoint of any of them, and therefore cannot apprehend it under the guise of the perceptual space and time system.*01 99 Loc. cit., note 7. 100Ibid., p. 166, note 1. 101A.E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1903. Reprint 1961), p. 254, 606 Taylor thus argues that since the perceptual time and space system of our concrete experience represents only an imperfect and finite point of view, then the conceptual abstraction based upon it cannot be that of an absolute and all-comprehensive experience: An absolute experience must be out of time and out of space, in the sense that its contents are not apprehended in the form of spatial and temporal series, but in some other way. Space and time, then, must be the phenomenal appearance of a higher reality which is spaceless and timeless,102 Quite properly, then, we may say that space and time are conceptualizations based upon our perceptions of relations within the phenomenal activity and manifestation of a higher reality--the Kantian Ding an Sich, or the non- finite (meaning "infinite1 *) Deity. One suspects that the very reason for Brightman's awareness of duration is that there is that about him which endures--i.e., transcends time. Kant, Bowne, and Flewelling are on the surer ground in regarding both time and space to be phenomenal. Brightman, of course, seeks to be consistent with his previously decided upon finitism which results in the application of finite percepts to his concept of the deity. Thus he shifts the forms of perception to the status of categorical concepts and commits the fallacy 1 0 2 Ibid., p. 255, against which Tillich warns of attempting to "grasp the 103 infinite with categories of finitude." It may also be suggested that Brightman may have been further influenced toward such temporalizing of the deity by reason of the fact that he has placed physical nature within God's being 104 as "actually an integral part of the divine Person." One is rather inclined to agree with Flewelling that "the essence of personality is neither time nor space, but creative activity"; and to say with Tillich: "Time belongs to the creative process of the divine life" and "time is the form of finitude . . . in creaturely existence."'*'^ Brightman himself has stated that "time is the daughter of experience" . . . "the offspring of personality," while at the same time insisting that "relativity always presupposes the observing, reasoning, 107 time-binding, time-transcending person." Hence the logical conclusion would be that time is the consequence of being and being is the reality back of all time. 103rinich, op. cit., p. 82. "We need to be on our guard against ascriBTng to God the feelings that grow out of our own finitude."--A. C. Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, p. 186. 104perSon and Reality, p. 246. ^ Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 215, lO^Tillich, ££. cit., p. 257. 608 Does Process Guarantee Progress? Both of our philosophers may be criticized, Flewelling especially, for giving too much credence to the idea that process guarantees progress. Perhaps because of their faith in the process of evolution they have failed at times to recognize the many facts of human existence which would negate such faith. Flewelling very optimistically concludes his Survival of Western Culture with the following paragraph: All these are considerations which may be justly taken into account in any consideration involving the survival of Western culture. To some they will seem feeble and utterly inadequate because all of them may be reckoned among the imponderables. But it is the imponderables that dictate the future. Should Western culture succeed in rising to the new opportunity that faces her, should she take a step forward, it must now be toward a more spiritual interpretation of life and society. Material progress has reached its bound and end until there is broader and deeper pioneering in the spirit. The genius of her past, the tenseness of her disillusionments and dissatisfactions with material things, point to a nobler and ultimate survival.108 Now while one wistfully approves of Flewelling's analysis and longs for the realization of his optimism, can we be certain that such things "point to a nobler and ultimate survival"? Other questions emerge and demand answer, including the following: Does life always tend toward higher forms? Are there not atavisms in society IQ^Survival Qf Western Culture, p. 298, 609 as well as in physical progeny? Can we overlook the presence of stunted runts in social situations which may be as real for society as for physical organisms? In all our rosy optimism about evolution, shall we not recognize the presence of involutions'? If our philosophers are willing to agree with Whitehead that "existence is activ- i no ity ever merging into the future," on what basis have they a right to believe that the future will be better than the past? Edgar P. Dickie has pointed out that there is much discontinuity underlying the process of evolution, which may be spoken of as non-continuity. He even allows that the process may be at tiroes disrupted by such discontinuities. George A. Buttrick points similarly to man's pre cariousness by noting that: . . . by whatever theory, 'evolution' cannot be posited of human nature. If evolution has in evitability is man free, or is he merely a dummy riding an escolator? If, on the other hand, man has a measure of genuine freedom, can he not wreck A. N. Whitehead, "Nature and Life," The Age of Analysis (Morton White, ed., New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1955), p. lOO. *-^®Edgar P. Dickie, God is Light (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), pp. 18,“53, 211. 111Ibid., pp. 52, 53. 1 1 2 Ibid., p. 18. 610 the escolator (or any other 'evolution'), as when the obscurantist denies to the scientist his proper liberty, or a white mob threatens Negro children enrolling in an integrated s c h o o l ? H 3 To posit an 'evolution in history' is to borrow again from the world of nature, or from a supposed 'technological advance'--which may yet be the instrument of our destruction. . . . Notice this: any pattern, if it could apply, would destroy free dom; for we would each then become a tiny curve or an inch-line in the pattern. . . . We are not per mitted to be spectator historians• Each of us as a whole man must play his part in the drama of life.H4 We must agree that man, as man, has no built-in guarantee of progress simply because he recognizes a problem and seeks a solution thereto. Is not that which gives promise of forwardness to human history something of the nature of a Divine EncounterIs man guaranteed progress apart from the restraining and constraining influences of grace? Does not his own freedom guarantee otherwise the possibility that if he over-rides re straining grace and his own sanity in some hour of human greed and madness, history on this planet may reach a fiery conclusion? We agree with Hugh Vernon White when he says: *^George A. Buttrick, Christ and History (New York: Abingdon Press, 1963), pp. 49-56. 114Ibid., p. 156. HSibid., p. 25. 611 History can bring progress but not redemption. Progress is what man does for himself; redemption is what God does for him. The modern doctrine of progress has various roots and elements. It isf in some cases, a simple and uncritical transference to history of the idea of evolution. It is also pro foundly conditioned by Hegelian rationalism which issues in the theory that history is the concrete unfolding in time of the Idea, and that it is a ’necessary* movement of dialectical advance. This, transferred from the ideal to the material order, is the structure of Karl Marx's doctrine for which history is an inevitable movement in terms of economics and through class conflict to the paradise of the classless society. A more engaging rationale of progress derives from the doctrine of Hegel conditioned by the empirical method, and the social idealism of democracy. Its great prophet is John Dewey, who sees man as his own savior, and the social process operating through the realization of ideals as both progress and redemption of man. Unfortunately the ideals that actually dominate man and so tend to get realized in history are not always the ideals of democracy and freedom. As we have seen in the past half century, they are too often ideologies of totalitarian and dictatorial and ruthless domination of man by self-chosen oligarchies.116 As Georgia Harkness has so aptly stated it: . . . the ’evolutionary optimism’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries died of its own weight of error, and can no longer be defended on either historical or theological grounds. Nevertheless, this does not automatically banish belief in progress, any more than earlier naturalistic assumptions automatically guaranteed it. What sur vives is the evidence that in many aspects of human existence progress has occurred, though never as an unmixed forward movement, and that its ultimate explanation is to be found in divine providence rather than in natural or human causation as the last word. It is in this providence and man's Hugh Vernon White, Truth and the Person in Christian Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1^63), pT 169. 612 obedient response that our hope is grounded.1*7 Some Axiological Considerations Brightman and Flewelling, as personalists and theists are "axiological objectivists," or, as Brightman himself classifies such, "metaphysical objectivists"; that is, they hold "values— or norms or ideals--are integral, objective, and active constituents of the meta physically real."11® Value, then, becomes for them a quality; but, since the supreme intrinsic value is the person as valuer, it also includes relation and attitude. Brightman allows a distinction between sensory and value experience and thinks that somehow they are related.11^ But both he and Flewelling could have strengthened their value theories had they sought to spell out more in detail the nature of this relationship. Brightman's empirico-dialectical methodology should have 120 driven him to it. Flewelling is perhaps too ll7Our Christian Hope, p. 89. Miss Harkness com pleted her Ph.D. work under Brightman*s guidance at Boston. Cf. Ibid., p. 10. 11®E.S. Brightman, "Axiology," Pictionary of Philosophy, D. D. Runes, ed., p. 33. ll9Per son and Reality, p. 283. 120Peter A. Bertocci has given an admirable presen tation of the processes involved in evaluation. Cf. his article, "The Person, Obligation, and Value," The Person- alist, XL (1959), pp. 141-151. 6X3 poetico-practical in his methodology to have achieved it. But in their analysis of first-person experience, which includes seeing, hearing, feeling, remembering, thinking, imagining, or denying something, they should have dis covered certain felt qualities.i21 Even though such felt qualities defy linguistic definition, they do become basic to value experiences. Among these felt qualities perhaps the most elemental are pleasantness and unpleasantness. It is doubtful whether there can be any such thing as a completely indifferent experience. Some sort of feeling tone must permeate it. This is certainly true of value experience, which, if positive, has also its hedonic tone; furthermore, in this case the person adopts an implicit pro-attitude which seeks to retain such an experience, or at least returns to it. The experient also finds himself involved in "ascriptive judgments" as to the quality of the experience, and advances to "preferential judgments." Naturally the felt quality of any experience will be conditioned by the experient whose background and present commitments will surely be reflected in the exper ience. No experience is without this context. Personal involvement and personal commitment become, therefore, 121 Here we follow an analysis by W. H. Werkmeister, Class Lecture, "Seminar in Value Theory," University of Southern California, Spring, 1958. 614 important determiners of value experience. But since man is always in some measure a self-directed becoming, he is engaged in each value experience as one in process. Hence the future must be considered. Moreover, the present experience gives rise to ascriptive judgments which in retrospect and prospect shade over into preferential judgments. Man as such a self-directed becoming is engaged in the constant formulation of these preferential judgments for the sake of self-fulfillment and self- realization. Here we have followed Werkmeister, whose 122 value theory could strengthen Brightman's empiricism. Man is a creature dominated by a varied quest for satisfaction. Thus he has feelings of appreciation which find expression in such terms as "pleasing" or "dis pleasing," "meaningful" or "insignificant," "precious" or "of little worth," "desirable" or "undesirable," "good" or "bad." Whether he is aware of it or not, man is, as Boyer notes: "a value obsessed creature," who is "constantly making choices on the basis of his likes and dislikes," and who is always showing preferences with his past experiences of value in mind.123 xhe range of values too Cf. Supra., pp. 350 If .Werkmeister seems to have been influenced by C.I. Lewis in formulating his own value theory. Cf. Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois: OpenCourt PublTshing Co., T$46), Chapter XIII. 123m.W. Boyer, Highways of Philosophy (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1949), p. 259. 615 which he appreciates is not only extensive but it is capable of indefinite expansion. Man is also capable of relationships and interactions that expand and maximize his range of appreciation. Flewelling*s concept of ' ‘creative personality" has greater implications for a theory of values than he has drawn from it. Similarly Brightman*s concern for the conservation of values might have been supplemented by that for the maximization of values. But neither of them analyzes in any detail man's experience in the valuational process. Flewelling saw something of the importance of international and intercultural contacts for the increase of values among men. Brightman has noted that there are variant levels of value and that values may be organized into a coherent system of norms to which the person may yield his allegiance and devotion, but he did not grasp either the importance of personal commitments as deter miners of the relative importance of values or the chief sources of loyalty thereto. No doubt both of our philoso phers would have agreed with Boyer when he speaks of: (1) man as a carrier of values; (2) the community as the conserver of values; (3) education as the transmitter of values; and (4) religion as the fulfillment of values.*24 1 2 4 Ibid., p. 248. 616 There is one area of philosophical thought where Brightman deserves far more attention and credit than has been given him. His volume on ethics entitled Moral 125 Laws is, in the opinion of this writer, one of the finest volumes ever written in this area of philosophy. Concerning this work L. Harold DeWolf has written as follows: In ethics, Brightman endeavored by this method of empirical coherence to formulate and prove a system of moral laws, which can be violated only at the cost of self-contradiction. That we ought not willingly to accept self-contradiction, he pointed out, is a necessary presupposition of our whole intellectual life and of all demands for proof. But if this postulate is accepted then there follow, in view of the common experience of mankind, a system of formal, axiological and per- sonalistic laws.126 Of Brightman’s achievement in the general study of values, DeWolf says: Empirically he defended also the belief in a system of objective ideal norms of value and, having established the validity of this system, he found it to be of crucial importance as evidence for the existence of G o d . 127 It seems too bad that so many readers of Brightman, who Published by Abingdon Press in 1933. It would be a service to future teachers of undergraduate ethics were his publisher to bring it out in a new edition. Harold DeWolf, "Personalism in the History of Western Philosophy," The Philosophical Forum, XII (1954), p. 50. 127Lo c . cit. 617 concentrate on his doctrine of a finite God, overlook his system of moral laws and the validity of his eleven prin ciples underlying human responsibility, which seem unim peachable* Theological Synergism True to their Methodist backgrounds, both of our philosophers subscribed to the theological idea of synergism, a theory best seen in contrast with the two possible types of monergism. In religious theology "monergism" commonly has reference to the dogma that the individual's salvation is totally an act of God wherein saving grace is applied to the elect. At the opposite extreme stands the belief that the individual's salvation is dependent upon only the human himself. The former view is represented by Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Hodge; the latter by Pelagius who represented the position of thoroughgoing humanism by affirming that man's will is completely competent to keep God's law. Midway between these extremes stands "synergism," which is aptly charac terized by P. E. Hughes: "The term synergism means liter ally 'working together' and is associated with the view that in the work of individual salvation both man and God cooperate."^® This position is represented by Arminius 128P.E. Hughes, "Synergism," Baker's Dictionary of Theology (E. Harrison, ed., Grand Ra£>idS: BaRST B6<5k HoiX5e, i^&0), p. 510. 618 and, on the whole, by Wesley, who taught that man is free either to accept or reject the regenerating grace of God in Christ, Both Flewelling and Brightman represented their Methodist tradition by accepting synergism. The latter affirms that f,it is the faith of Religion that all life is a cooperation between God and Man."^2^ The former 130 similarly teaches that nto be is to cooperate," and he speaks of "the moral consciousness of man" as "the field 131 of Divine co-operation with man," Commenting on the inscription carved in the exterior face of the Philosophy building at the University of Southern California, Flewelling said: Wishing to capture the memorial spirit, and yet the greatest words of philosophy and religion, the following words were inscribed on the outside of the building: He that loseth his life shall keep it unto life eternal. THese words were chosen as the pro- foundest expression of philosophy of nature, man, and God, for:'Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit.' This makes of religion not a self-abasement of man kowtowing to an Absolute Autocrat, but a loving participation of man and God in the divine process.132 Synergism in principle is an essential concept in traditional personalism. As Brightman observes: 1 9 0 Is God a Person?, p. 46, 130rhe Person, p. 108. 131^jnds of Hiroshima. p. 76. ^^The Forest of Yggdrasill, p. 116, 619 Personalism . . . with its fundamentally social philosophy, retains the separateness and dignity of all personalities, while finding profound meaning in oneness of purpose, worshipful communion, and loving cooperation between God and man.133 For Flewelling also, man's salvation is a divine-human cooperation in both crisis and process for his redemption. We find this personalistic position acceptable: synergism is the via media between the two extremes of monergism, and it provides the background, as our philosophers show, for the true picture of valid religious experience. Rational Empiricism and Theological Anthropomorphism Brightman's philosophy of religion involves a definite type of religious epistemology. We may analyze it as personalistic, empiricistic, rationalistic, and anthropomorphic. It is personalistic because, in his own words, it assumes "no source of information about the real, other than the experience of conscious persons•"1^ It is erapiricistic because it presupposes that "all human knowledge begins, continues, and ends in experience." It is rationalistic because it rejects basic ontological mystery, and contends that "no revelation, general or 133 Nature and Values, p. 132. 134Person and Reality, p. 23. ^^Loc. cit. 620 special, is a source of final or infallible knowledge."136 Finally, it is anthropomorphic because it infinitizes man’s nature and experience by assuming that these suffice for an adequate knowledge of God. In a very real sense it assumes that man can, by searching through the experiences of humans, find out God. It exalts the inductive method above the deductive, and contends that investigation can be substituted for revelation. It would oppose the theologian's contention that the way of eternal life is never a mere discovery, but is always a revelation to man 137 from God by His Spirit. Brightman freely acknowledges that his position is anthropomorphic, both with respect to science and philo sophical theology: ... It must be admitted that all theism and all idealism alike assert that the ultimate reality of the universe is to some extent akin to human con sciousness and human values. Having said this we must say more. Not only is religious idealism anthropomorphic, but so, too is science. Natural science rests on the foundation of human sensations and human logic; it makes no statements about objects which are not logical interpretations of our human sensory experiences. In fact, all thinking, whether ^^Philosophy of Religion, p. 178. 1 ^7 ^'"The Knowledge of a finite being can never be self-originating and unconditioned. It must first be awakened from without. It depends ultimately on the reve lation to the mind of an object beyond it."--Samuel Harris, The SeIf Revelation of God (New York: Charles Scribners Sons" 1893), p. 46. 621 good or bad, must be anthropomorphic. All of our experience is human.138 Nonetheless Brightman recognizes that if "anthropomorphism is unavoidable," that fact alone solves no problems. We still must face the question: . . . What kind of anthropomorphism, critical or uncritical? And the answer to this, it is said, depends on the relations between human experience and reality: What human experiences, if any, afford models of the real; what anthropomorphism is false, what true?139 But a more fundamental question still remains to be considered, and Brightman has not answered it. Since he allows that there are "subhuman [or possibly superhuman] persons,"^40 what justifies us in supposing that man and his experience provide the complete clue to the basic nature of the Real? What guarantees the truth of the assumption that finite man enjoys more than a limited per spective that is the mark of the creature? The ancient Greek rationalists infinitized man's intellect; is Brightman on more solid foundations when, as an empiricist, he infinitizes man's experience? Is not William James more sound when he adopts the principle of epistemological modesty, as acknowledged in the following passage? ^ • 38Philosophy of Religion, p. 339. 139E.S. Brightman, "Anthropomorphism," Collier's Encyclopedia (1957), Vol. 2, p. 38. 140pe rson and Reality, p. 208. 622 I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe. I believe rather that we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life. They inhabit our drawing-rooms and libraries. They take part in scenes of whose significance they have no inkling. They are merely tangent curves of history the beginnings and ends and forms of which pass wholly beyond their ken. So we are tangent to the wider life of things. But, just as many of the dog's and cat's ideals coincide with our ideals, and the dogs and cats have daily living proof of the fact, so we may believe, on the proofs that religious experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to save the world on ideal lines similar to our own,14l From another metaphysical position Norman Kemp Smith makes the same point: ’ 'By no idealization of the 142 creaturely can we transcend the creaturely." Since the writer is thoroughly in agreement with this statement, the context of this proposition is worth quoting: . . . The Divine is not known through analogy with the self, or with any other creaturely mode of existence. ... Divine attributes presuppose God's existence, and save in this reference even their bare possibility cannot be established. If without any antecedent or independent apprehension of the Divine, we have to start from the creaturely, as exhibited in Nature and in man, and by way of inference and of analogy--on the pattern of what is found in the creaturely--through enlargement or other processes of ideal completion, to construct for ourselves concepts of the Divine, then the sceptics have been right; the attempt is an impossible one, condemned l^lwilliam James, Pragmatism (New York: Meridian Books, Reprint 1955), pp. 192-193. ^^Norman Kemp Smith, Is Divine Existence Credible? (British Academy Lecture, 193TY, o. T3. 623 to failure from the start. We cannot reach the Divine merely by way of inference, not even if the inference be analogical in character. By no idealization of the creaturely can we transcend the creaturely. ^43 The writer not only accepts the position, with the ancient prophet, that human experience is not an adequate 144 measure of the divine nature and experience, but main tains that man imperatively needs some form of super natural (or superhuman) revelation. Such revelation, of course, must be received and interpreted in the light of life’s highest experiences and clearest reasoning, since these are man's best and most valid experiential clues to the nature of reality. Brightman’s cognition theory is objectionable because its anthropomorphism deifies the creature and, in the process, de-infinitizes the Creator, both of which are forms of idolatry. Brightman cannot believe that faith sees farther into reality than does reason and sense experience. Faith's attitude of trust and insight becomes for him but an appeal to ignorance. On the basis of what one does know about God and reality he allows no right to postulate that which cannot be proved about them. Yet it would seem 1 4 3 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 144Isaiah 55:8-9. that reason itself points in the direction of faith's attitude of belief in the supernatural, and therefore grasped only by an experience greater than the human. Which Way from Bergson? Flewelling and Brightman, we have previously shown, have been influenced by Bergson's doctrine of Time, which as Duration is the fundamental abstract principle in his system; but this influence has been more considerable in the case of Brightman than Flewelling. One of the basic differences between their two personalisms is the fact that Brightman accepts the ontological temporalism of Bergson, by making time and duration a category of all being, whereas Flewelling flatly rejects this notion. "Time," Brightman has written, "is a limit on God."^~’ On the whole, however, the evolutionary aspect of Bergson's thought has outweighed in Brightman's thinking the creative aspect. Flewelling on the contrary maintains that time as a limit on God would destroy the idea of God. He quotes with approval Eucken's observation that: Spiritual life must never be understood as an entire Becoming--as mere Process--for, if this were the case, Truth would become the mere slave 625 of its age; and such a state of things would mean an inner destruction of truth. To place on God the yoke of necessity, by making him subject to becoming and time, in mind, thought, and moral character, cancels the God idea: . . . The yoke of necessity which must ever hang about the neck of a Being whose mind, thought, and moral character are in process of becoming--that is, who is himself a creature of time. It is not enough to affirm that God always existed. We must go still further and ask what he was at first. In the case of a becoming God he may not have been God in the beginning. He may have grown to that estate. Mental and moral perfection and timelessness, in other words, are necessary to our thought of God.147 The Bergsonian principle of time provides for ’ ’ creative personality” and "creative evolution”; but it does so only if time itself is subject to eternity* In sum, Brightman makes time the category of all being, whereas Flewelling makes Being the category behind all time. Brightman's God will never be free from the limitations of time and evolutionary process, since God's consciousness ”is an eternal time movement,”- * - 4® and the ’ ’divine eternity means God's endless duration.”^49 ^4^Rudolph Eucken, Knowledge and Life (London: Williams and Norgate, n.d.y^ p*I 228. i47per sonalism and The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 162-16TT My italics. l48Th6 Finding of God, p. 132. 1 4 9 Ibid., p. 131. 626 Flewelling, on the contrary, sees God as the eternal and infinite superintendent as well as the author of cosmic process and creative evolution. The Nature of the Self Brightman holds that there are at least seven minimal qualities of the self: Self-experience, qualia, sense of time and perhaps also of space, a transcendence of time and space, process and conation, awareness of . . 150 . , meaning, and response to environment. His own view of the person is as follows: The word self is used for any and every conscious ness, however, simple or complex it may be. A self is any conscious situation experienced as a whole. Each 'empirical situation' is a self. All consciousness is self-experience; but self-experience is not properly called self-consciousness (reflective con sciousness) unless the self in question has the special attribute of being able to think about the fact that it is a self in addition to the fact that it experi ences sensations and desires. A person is a self that is potentially self-conscious, rational, and ideal. That is to say, when a self is able at times to reflect on itself as a self, to reason, and to acknowledge ideal goals by which it can judge its actual movements, then we call it a person. There is no reason on the basis of known evidence to draw the line sharply and say that only human beings are Dersons; pigs, dogs, apes, and horses seem to be at least elementary persons.151 To many thinkers, however, this account of the self or 150Cf. Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 351. *Philosophy of Religion, p. 350. 627 person is unsatisfactory because he rejects the notion of an ontological substantial person, and substitutes for it the "organic view" of the individual. This is at least a radical departure from the classical view of personalism as represented by Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Bowne. Brightman*s unorthodox notion of the person stems from his sensitiveness to the discoveries of recent psychology, and from the influence of such thinkers as William James and Hegel, who abandoned the Aristotelian and scholastic category of substance and the view that "every real object is a substance, either material or spiritual, and that substance is a necessary category, although not an object df sense perception nor discover able in consciousness."^^ Brightman rejects the notion that "substance" is something "which takes its stance in a subway below experience, " insisting that that which the word denotes is more expressly an "in-stance": "it does not stand below experience in some subway of being; it stands revealed in experience as active-passive per sonal unity of consciousness,1 1 If the word is still to be employed it should be identified with "experienced efficient cause."*-*4 152Ibid., p. 355. 1 S3 Person and Reality, pp. Ill, 177. 1 5 4 Ibid.. p. 186. 628 In sun, no transcendent soul substance can be dis tinguished from consciousness, nor is it essential to an understanding of personality. "To add to consciously experienced unity and identity the further unity of a substance is philosophically to create a needless 155 hypothesis." It is sufficient, then, to understand the personality to be "experienced reality and unity of con sciousness" in "interaction with the environment."1^6 On the other hand Brightman cannot accept epiphe- nomenalism, Hume’s analytical theory of the self, or James’s "stream of consciousness." His own position mediates between the two extremes of classical substantial - ism and a psychological theory of experiential flux. He finds the word "it" useful when talking of the experienced unity of consciousness. But Tennant is more logical when he distinguishes the "experient" from the "experience" it has of that which is "experienced."157 Tennant is correct when he insists that "no one ever has really dispensed with the subject of consciousness, whatever terms he may have used to hush up its existence." • ' • ^Philosophy of Religion, p. 356. •'^Loc. cit. 1 57 AJ'Tennant, Philosophical Theology» I, pp. 17 ff. 158Ibid., p. 18. 629 Attempting to escape from what he believes to be outmoded substantialism without falling into a flux theory of mere process, Brightman sums up his position as follows: The whole self, or person, then, consists of all the conscious experience that is or has been or will be present in all the empirical situations that constitute the history of the person. ... Personality includes consciousness only. . . .159 As he says elsewhere: "immediate experience" is "all we ever actually have and are."^60 But we ask, how can we both have it and be ijt at the same time? We insist, along with Baker, that "the real is an active spirit which must not be confounded with its products or with the principles expressed through its activities. " She is right also when she warns us against confusing the psychological and 162 the ontological in our analysis of the self, mind is not mere consciousness but is that which has consciousness. As far as Brightman is concerned we agree with Baker's warning that a great danger for personalism is its tendency at present to lapse into phenomenalism. McLarney also ^ ^Philosophy of Religion, p. 358. 160philosophy of Ideals, p. 62. l^lRannie Belle Baker, The Concept of a Limited God (Washington, D.C.: Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc., 1934), p. 33. 162Ibid., p. 128. 163Ibid., p. 91. 630 is on solid ground when he insists that: There is something prior to consciousness, » its subject, call it 'soul,' 'self,' 'spirit,' or what you will. This priority of subject invalidates Brightman's starting point: c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 1 6 4 Flewelling has made the same point that "the Person is more than consciousnessSo has Tennant, who reminds us that experience demands that we postulate the exis tence of an experient or subject, or what Kant termed the transcendental ego.^6 In his recent little book, The Self in Philosophy, Alburey Castell has drawn valid distinctions between activity and process, the first of which must describe the behavior of an agent whereas the latter may apply to the behavior of a mechanism. Whereupon he further notes that the agent cannot be identified with his activities but that the presence of activity implies the agent. 164McLarney, The Theism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, p. 53. intution of our mind (as object of consciousness) which is represented as being determined by the succession of different states in time, is not the self proper, as it exists in itself--that is,”Ts not the transcendental subject--but only an appearance that has been given to the sensibility of this, to us unknown, being. This inner appearance cannot be admitted to exist in any such manner by itself; for it is conditioned by time, and time cannot be a determination of a thing in itself."-- “ ’"' “ “ son (Norman Kemp Smith, Trans.), 165The Person, pp. 15 ff. ^■^Kant declares: "Even the inner and sensible 631 The non-substantial view of the self attempts to reduce the agent to its activity only, but this is as illogical as the attempt to reduce activity to mere process. As Castell states it: Where traditional materialism would 'reduce* activity to process, traditional empiricism would 'reduce' agent to activity. If I am right in this, the conclusion would be that materialism cannot be the whole truth about behavior, and empiricism cannot be the whole truth about agents,167 Contending that the self is more than its activity, he further notes that activity passes and is essentially transient, hence it is important to consider that: "an activity is not a continuant. Continuity pertains to agents, to selves, who perform the activityOn the basis of such consideration he argues that the self as an agent is a substance: This is to say that a self has qualities but is not those qualities, not any one of them and not all of them taken together. Further, a self stands in relations, but is not those relations; performs activities, but is not those activities; has experi ences, but it is not those experiences; lives through events that happen to it, but is not those events; undergoes changes, but is not those changes. The objection has been raised that this makes the self obscure, even mysterious. That is as may be. ^■67/\i][)urey castell, The Self in Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co,, 1965), p. 3"SZ l68Ibid., p. 62. ^^Loc. cj[t. 632 It is not impossible that the self is^ obscure, even nysterious. Emerson may not have been misled when he said, 'in mystery the soul abides.1 I have asked myself repeatedly whether I am the qualities that from time characterize me; whether I am the relations 1 stand in; whether I am the activities I perform; whether I am the experiences that occur to me; whether I am the events that happen to me; whether I am the changes I undergo. In each case I find no reason whatever to say that I am. I see no coercion in the question, "Well, if you are not those things, what are you?* If I am asked what qualities I have, there is, at any one time, an answer; for example, sad, slow-witted, jealous, puzzled, hungry, hopeful, ambitious, bored. But if I am asked whether I am those qualities, either the question is not clear, or the answer is 'No.'170 He points out that our use of the term "substance" ex presses one's reluctance to identify the self with any of its qualities or activities, since qualities cannot belong to each other, but belong to a substantial self: There is nothing mandatory about the word substance. Inspecting its etymology, we see that it is a handy spatial metaphor: ^to stand under, " But to say I am a substance does not mean that I "stand undert J my qualities in any spatial sense. We do not keep on removing my qualities, like the layers of an onion, until we arrive at me. My substantiality is not to be gotten at that way. We either perceive directly the point of saying *1 am sad but I am not sadness; I have the quality but I am not the quality,* or we arrive gradually at the insight that personal qualities, relations, activi ties, experiences, and changes do not exist inde pendently and are not qualities of each other. They presuppose persons, selves, agents. The point would be expressed by saying they presuppose substances• l7 0 Ibid., pp. 62-63 1 7 1 Ibid., p. 63. 633 This writer agrees with the validity of such a contention that to make the self identical with its activities is to miss the true ontological and substantial self. That which manifests free will, causality, and the ability to learn, is not mere choice, effected result, or truth grasped, but rather the agent whose behavior is manifested in such activity. Some Personalistic Attitudes Toward Education Flewelling's insights and oversights. Valid in sights from the philosophy of education expressed by Flewelling would include his basic contention that "the chief aim of education" is "the production of personal 172 value." Therefore he consistently rejects a behavior istic psychology and calls upon science to repudiate it from among its presuppositions, since a valid psychology is basic to any true pedagogy. That the student should be required to build broad foundations in the scope of his learning before proceeding to specialize for his chosen profession is an agreement with the present day attitudes of administrators in commerce and industry who prefer this type of college graduate promising that they will them selves take the responsibility for his technical training, 1^2**pers0naliSm," Living Schools of Philosophy, p. 295. 634 the contention being that the man with the broad general training matures into the best type of business executive, Flewelling recognized the needs for both discipline and freedom in education, pleading thus for a wholesome synthesis of two modern opposing views. His insistence that languages and the cultural classics must not be omitted from the college curriculum, and that the student be required to master the communicative disciplines is likewise valid. One can also agree with his objection to the cafeteria type of course selection and curriculum programming which permits the student to select snap courses merely for the sake of accumulating credits, college hours, and honor points. His contention that education cannot be made painless is opposed to the modern "fun fare" which overshadows learning today with its frill and snap courses designed to attract especially the lazy mind. He would hold that this must yield precedence to a real training of the mind and that it can only be accom plished in a planned and orderly fashion. Flewelling is also right when he insists that there must be the transmission and inculcation of values if education is to produce the highest type of personality. Education must therefore be both transmissive and creative. It must summon the resources of the past and deliver to the learner their full content as well as teach him how to pass this on to others according to the latest and most 635 proven methodology. New vertical frontiers must also be opened for the challenge of pioneers in education for moral responsi bility and adjustment to norms, resulting in a display of both competence and piety on the part of the educated. Hence advantage must be taken of religion to awaken the emotions and arouse the imagination of the potential genius. Teachers must therefore themselves be people of high moral character and spiritual idealism. They must exemplify that competence and piety which they seek to induce in the learner. But Flewelling is sure that the greatest service the teacher can render to the learner is to discover him to himself, guiding him into the development of the quali ties of personality and intellect which will give high purpose and coherence to his life. One can also agree with Flewelling*s several objections to such activities as: the dogmatic invasion of education by either religion or science; the needless multiplication of educational tests; the attitude that would make the schools responsible for tasks that rightly belong to the home, the church, and the community; the giving of academic credit for a host of fringe courses such as manicure and cosmeticulture• Less understandable are his objections to education 636 for increased earning power, standardized courses for large classes in general education, training in the manual arts, and pre-professional courses in the general curricu lum. He lashes out against the quantitative regimentation of stupidity and genius in the same courses without seeming to recognize that in a democracy which sponsors universal public education such must of necessity be the case. His lack of enthusiasm for a strong emphasis upon pedagogical methodology and eductive "know-how” in the teaching processes is puzzling, especially in the light of his emphasis upon the importance of a creative use of the imagination. His own personal interest in the fine arts should have caused him to place a greater emphasis thereon in his educational theory. He manifested a keen interest in the fine arts by the emphasis upon art and architecture that was incorporated into the School of Philosophy building at his university, and by the poetry and the * reviews of the finest works in literature which he included in The Personalist. So it happens that in some instances Flewelling's philosophy of education is altogether too negative. Like wise his merely incidental references to the importance of courses in philosophy for a well balanced education is a weakness in his position. It would seem that for the sake of college curriculum planning he should have exploited 637 more fully the implications of his essay concerning the three windows which open onto reality. His apparent unawareness of the implications of his plea for the non regimentation of stupidity and genius in the large general education courses of a college or university leads one to ask how then would he escape the unprofitable prolifer ation of courses and the increase of small classes for students of select calibre and specialized interests? Flewelling himself was a genius in securing the financial aid and assistance that was needed for a first class philosophy building and its library, but he never was obliged to grapple with the task of raising and appor tioning the funds for the ordinary and continually mounting expenses necessary to the current operation of an educa tional institution. His philosophy at this point is in opposition to such reports to the Trustees as that so recently given by Ruml and Morrison.The pinch of economic problems which confronts the business manager of any non-tax supported educational institution soon con vinces one that education is expensive. Some important questions which Flewelling's philosophy of education fails to answer would include the 1 7 3 Beardsley Ruml and Donald H. Morrison, Memo to a College Trustee (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1959. 94 pp.). 638 following: How shall the broad learning— comprehensive and expert knowledge--be given to the one who would teach with a wholistic and generalized grasp of his subject matter , if any type of specialization must be deferred beyond his college days? Education in depth is as impor tant as education in breadth. Moreover, if Flewelling is to achieve his goals for education how can he avoid an increasing centralization of the controls in education? He seems unaware of, or at least he has not given full consideration to, the great complexity of modern demo cratic education. Again, one wishes to ask whether we can neglect the training of the hand while at the same time we are seeking training for the heart and for the head. Is not Maritain correct in saying: . . . from the very start, and, as far as possible, all through the years of youth, hands and mind should be at work together. This point has been made particularly clear by modern pedagogy as regards childhood. It is also valid for youth. The importance of manual work accompanying the education of the mind during the high school and college training is more and more recognized. There is no place closer to man than a workshop, and the intel ligence of a man is not only in his head, but in his fingers too. Not only does manual work further psychological equilibrium, but it also furthers ingenuity and accuracy of the mind, and is the prime basis of artistic activity. . . .174 It would also seem that there is a legitimate place for 174jaCqUes Maritain, Education at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press, I943J, p. 45. 639 education for increased earning power, and that education must not overlook those skills that one needs for better everyday living. As Maritain also states: The utilitarian aspect of education--which enables youth to get a job and make a living--must surely not be disregarded, for the children of man are not made for aristocratic leisure. But this practical aim is best provided by the general human capacities developed. And the ulterior specialized training which may be required must never imperil the essential aim of education,1^5 Even though in many cases the machine can do it better than the hand, and even though the computer can store more data and furnish more answers in less time than can the head, yet because of these facts education must not make excuses for the neglect of training for both the hand and the head, Flewelling rightly contends for the moral and religious training of the heart, but freedom from want must also include training in skilled handiwork. Creative education must therefore include the whole man--head, heart, and hand--as well as his aesthetic taste, Brightman1s ideal: Educate the Whole Man for Life as a Whole. If the task of philosophy is to interpret life as a whole,then the task of education is training for life as a whole. In our presentation of Brightman’s l75Ibid,, p. 10. 176Relig ious Values, p. 139, 6 4 0 philosophy of education his objection to soecialization, subdivision, and competition between departments in our colleges and universities was noted. Whitehead voices agreement with this and says: The solution which I am urging, is to eradicate the fatal disconnection of subjects which kills the vitality of our modern curriculum. There is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations.*77 Brightman's reason for such an objection is that in such case man is arrayed against himself. He would therefore plead for unification of education, rather than endure the present situation that is so divisive of our culture. More specifically, he deplores a situation which permits a highly refined technological intelligence to co-exist in the same person with a beastly morality, and as an example of this bifurcation in education he cited the person of Dr. Goebbels, a Ph.D. in psychology, but a leader in the atrocities of the Hitler regime. He thus holds that man needs to concentrate more on self-mastery along with his quest for and achievement of the mastery of nature, for if he does not achieve the former the latter will become definitely self-defeating. Since personality interacts with nature the quality of the person is supremely signifi cant. Brightman therefore pleads for science in the 177 A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York: Macmillan CoT^ 1929)” p^ 18. 641 service of ideals and personal values* He prefers edu cation that fosters a situation in which men are willing to die for the advancement of science than one wherein they die because of the advancement of science (as in the case of modern scientific warfare). He sees a redemptive use of the sciences as a worthy purpose for education, and he objects to the employment of education for any unworthy end. Education should rather be creative of insight into values and worthy goals of life. It is Brightman's contention that education should foster a high regard for logical consistency both in thought and action. There should be a scientific open- mindedness coupled with basic value commitments. Modern bifurcations in education between nature and spirit are detrimental to the be$t enlightenment of the whole person. Moral and religious instruction should also be part of the educational program. Moreover, education must show a con cern for man's being as well as his doing. We must have education for life and living, rather than for death and destruction. Brightman insists further that without character education the common man becomes morally illiter ate and as such is an easy prey to modern forms of per nicious and subversive propaganda. The authority of wealth over education can be either a bane or a benefit to an institution of higher learning. Brightman therefore warns that education's 642 dependence on wealth is both heartening and ominous. If the brain and conscience of society--namely the school (and the church)--comes under the authority of wealth, then our only hope is to admonish wealth that it too must come under authority--that Higher Authority which is the Source of values and things spiritual. Undoubtedly Brightman would agree with Boyer, who believes that "the educator is in a position today where he must become a philosopher before he can fulfill his task as an educator."*78 This means that a new type of educator must arise who is creative in his methodology, world centered in his outlook, and value oriented in his attitudes. Personalism pleads therefore for the education of the whole man that man once again may be made whole. Brightman's philosophy of education is unfinished, but it is valid as far as it goes and manifests a basic consistency with his general philosophy of personal idealism;*7^ furthermore, he did frequently emphasize in his writings for Bostonia the importance of philosophy in *78Boyer, ojd. cit., p. 291. 179 It is regrettable that his article, "Ethics and Education," written in 1938 for the Alert magazine is no longer available since that publication was then only a mimeographed production. Efforts to recover it in both the Boston and Los Angeles areas have proven futile. 180 a liberal arts education. 643 Freedom and Contingency Our tenth and final category of comparison has to do with the experience of choosing between possible courses of action. Here our thinkers are basically in agreement. Brightman is surely correct in his contention that freedom cannot be denied without at the same time exercising the free act of denial. He also is right when he insists that the power of choice implies also the power to achieve. As for Flewelling, the contention is valid that personality is the one example of uncaused cause, "the one source of 1 AT unique action." * The basic reality of contingency in the realm of personal agency is necessary to his rational explanation of the act of choice. However, one could wish that either or both of our philosophers had clarified the relationship between free dom and character, conation and choice. Some distinction such as that made by Kant between Wille and Willkilr would 182 have been helpful. Likewise some clarification of the 18Qcf. his "Philosophy in a Liberal College," Bostonia, 11 (March, 1938), p. 10. 181 Bergson and Personal Realism, p. 130. ^■®^Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (Trans, with Introduction and Notes by T7 M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, with a new essay "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," by John R. Silber. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), cf. pp. xcv ff. 6 4 4 relation between habit and impulse is needed for an under standing of the psychology of personal decision and the positive exercise of selfhood. Flewelling should have explained the psychological aspects both of creativeness in the external environment and that inner creativeness by which one makes himself other than he is or was. If anything can claim to be an experience, choice certainly can, but it would seem that choice builds habit and habit makes character which in turn enters very largely into one's exercise of choice. Thus man makes the motive and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man is no motive at all to another. The whole psychology of the relationship between agency and becoming needs to be more fully explored and explained by our philosophers for the sake of a better understanding of self-evaluation, self-determination, self-development, self-expression, self-giving, and self- restraint. For without freedom we have only process, not activity, since an act or deed has as its author a free cause• One must agree with their basic philosophy of freedom, while at the same time he wishes for a better psychology of the act of choosing between motives and alternative courses of action. We now conclude this critique of our two men, who 645 are in many instances each other*s best critic* A sum mary and some conclusions will direct our attention in a final chapter* CHAPTER XIV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The main body of this dissertation, or part two, composes ten chapters which consider basic categories in the personalistic thinking of Flewelling and Brightman. In chapter three, devoted to their accounts of the nature of God, sharp disagreement was noted. Flewelling (who rejects Bergson's and Brightman's idea of a God who is in process of becoming) looks upon the deity as personal, infinite, omnipotent, living, and constantly creative. God is transcendent and creative of both time and space, as he is of the material universe, and He is perfect although not necessarily complete. Brightman, on the other hand, thinks God as personal is finite, limited, and not omnipotent, restricted within his own nature by the "Given." This "Given" has both rational and irrational aspects. As irrational it assumes the nature of a "surd" evil, and against which God has to struggle even to the point of suffering, for it hinders him in the achievement of his purposes. This element within the nature of God also accounts for the non-moral evils of the universe, and inspires what might be called a cosmic struggle. To this position we found Flewelling taking radical exceptions, and these were noted. Other 647 criticisms of Brightman1s position, including those of his colleague, A. C. Knudson, have been collected and placed in the appendix, where they appear along with Brightman's replies to many of them. The chapter con cluded with the notation that notwithstanding the objec tions of his critics, Brightman became more and more satisfied with his belief about God. Chapter four was concerned with man and human nature. Brightman regards the human self as a process rather than a substance. He nonetheless affirms Man's kinship to deity, his distinction from physical nature, and the reality of human freedom. The key term expres sive of Flewelling1s philosophy of man was seen to be "creative personality," which indicates that Man1s power to create is the most significant fact about him. Inte gral with this stands man's "creative imagination." Flewelling, we also noted, makes much of the fact that in Christ there was an incarnation of deity, which he regards as basic to the divinity of man. Incarnation, reflective consciousness, and human freedom alike enhance human dignity. Sin is unnaturalness. The highest good for man is self realization; and being a soul is the crowning act of the person. In chapter five consideration was given to the problem of evil. According to Flewelling (who makes a 648 real distinction between the possibility of evil and its existence), evil is a moral act of the will. By positing all causal efficiency as personal, he makes place for the existence of error and evil without ignoring the human sense of moral obligation, or the necessity of raising error to the plane of truth. This also frees Deity from the burden of the responsibility for evil. Error, pain, and the possibility of evil, Flewelling regards as the schoolmasters of life. Brightman's philosophy of evil is more concerned with "surd evil," "cosmic drag," and dysteleological facts which he finds in the universe. He is especially interested in the cosmic fortune of values. He is dis satisfied with both the traditional theism and the traditional idea of Satan. He cannot accept any of the so-called easy solutions offered by traditional thought here. He rejects the idea that "surplus evils" in the world can be due either to God's desire to discipline, or to an evil system independent of the divine causation and creation. Hence his only alternative, as he believes, is to posit a finite God who is not omnipotent and whose will must struggle with both rational and irrational limitations thereupon. In sum Flewelling is most concerned with moral evil, whereas Brightman is preoccupied with the problem of 649 dysteleology and human suffering. Chapter six brought us to grips with theories of physical nature. Basically Brightman looks upon physical nature as the experience of God, if not the very body of deity; whereas Flewelling thinks of it as the continuous activity and creation of God. Brightman takes his stance with idealism and looks upon matter as a form of mind or spirit, and consequently is able to place nature within the being of God. Flewelling, on the other hand, is more of a realist and speaks of matter as a continuum of the acts of a Supreme Agent: matter he characterizes as an event in a space-time continuum. Brightman thinks of the Given not as any unconscious stuff, or material substance, but as the conscious, and limiting experience of God. For both Brightman and Flewelling Nature is the objective reference of experience so far as sensory; from Nature is excluded the non-sensory. But Nature for Brightman is not a created order external to God; he seems to suggest that it is an emergence or an emanation from God. For Flewelling it is an external order, continually main tained by the creative activity of God. Brightman looks upon the universe without residue as persons in process of becoming, a society of conscious beings. Flewelling looks upon it as the aggregate of the continuous activity of a Supreme Creative Mind. For Flewelling, then, 650 evolution becomes God’s method, an act of intelligence; whereas, for Brightman, it is the mode of existence for God and the universe. When we studied their respective theories of time, in chapter seven, we found our philosophers at real variance. Brightman holds to a metaphysical temporalisro, as does Bergson; whereas Flewelling contends for the relativity of time. Brightman breaks with Bowne who denies the ontology of time, whereas Flewelling follows Bowne and Kant quite consistently in holding to its phenomenality. Brightman, rejecting eternalism in favor of temporalisra, is certain that there can be no experience without duration, and insists that time is unbegun and unending. Man's experience in "the shining present" is dependent upon and interacts with God and "the illumi nating absent" which is itself real duration. God cannot be timeless being; a timeless eternity is inconceivable. The eternal is merely what is true at all times. In embracing the eternal, in this sense, the person may transcend time, but he does not abolish it in so doing. Since Brightman thinks of the goal of evolution as the endless development of spirit, he thinks his temporalism gives him a stronger hope of immortality than that of the eternalist. Flewelling holds that man's sense of time arises 651 from his reflection upon his conscious states. Time must therefore be a relation of succession among events. Succession, like simultaneity is a variant form of the possible relations of occurrences. Time's duration is related to our frame of reference and our range of comprehension of events. Time is therefore the form under which a person relates events to himself, and, as such, it is a law of intelligence rather than an entity in itself. But yet we cannot inpose mere mental forms upon the world of experience unless that world has adap tation to such forms. Time is thus objectively valid for all experients. It is also a succession of events in human perception. The person who grasps it cognitively is both temporal and timeless. Flewelling's God both transcends and yet works within the temporal order: He is not the slave but is the Source of time. Chapter eight took us on a study of the respective philosophies of history set forward by our two thinkers. This, we noted, is Flewelling's forte. Flewelling, we saw, rej'ects both the linear idea of history so charac teristic of Western Judaeo-Christian thought, and the cyclic idea of history which has been characteristic of Eastern thinking. He holds what he calls the Quantum view of history, which regards it as a dynamic process which exhibits what in physics is known as Heisenberg's 652 principle of uncertainty. He sees no validity in the notion of a chosen people, whether Aryan or Semitic. He takes more kindly to Zeno's Republic than to the work of Plato by the same title. In and through history Flewelling thinks he discerns the personalistic focus. Personalism, he thinks, offers the universal principle for the unity and reconciliation of world cultures, with its emphasis upon the supreme worth of the person, its superior type of individualism tempered with self- restraint, and its attitude of Noblesse oblige. This leads him to the theistic foundation of history, on the practical ground that unless man's sense of destiny becomes cosmic in its sweep it becomes nationalistic and divisive. He insists that both the divine and human actors in the drama of history must move toward an in creasingly perfect goal. We also noted Flewelling's supremely optimistic outlook for both human culture and history, and his proposal that man's destiny should be read in the light of the eternities. The one thing lacking today, he notes, is the consciousness of a living God in human affairs. The new frontier must be one of f both world-wide and cosmic citizenship. Brightman has not written nearly so extensively on this theme as has his contemporary; but he has pre sented a carefully analyzed summary of the possible 653 philosophies of history, and has offered his own. He views all reality as personal and historical, and conse quently holds that history is purposive. To this view he relates his theory of both the rational and the non- rational Given. The former is incomplete in all persons except God; the latter must be struggled against by both man and God. History, which bears witness to man's freedom, takes on the nature of interpersonal, rational, continuity. But this concept of history cannot be valid unless we view it as a whole and by means of a rational faith see it as a law of the continuity of love. Brightman therefore contends that a Christian philosophy of history is essentially temporalistic and that it moves endlessly onward to no final solution, or eschaton. Theologically speaking, neither Brightman nor Flewelling takes pre-millennia.lism seriously, with its catastrophic view of history's culmination. Both are optimistic about the future. Chapter nine brought us to a consideration of value theories. Here Brightman has written quite exten sively. He makes a clear distinction between Intrinsic and instrumental values, although he maintains that all intrinsic values are also instrumental; and he distin guishes between the potential and the actual. He iden tifies valuation with value claim. Brightman has worked 654 out a classification of values with careful distinctions between values, ideals, and norms. He is likewise aware of the interpenetration of values. He holds to the meta physical objectivity of norms. His discussion of the relative claims of subjectivity and objectivity theories proves to be enlightening. Personalists assert the objectivity of values. Their great concern is the in crease and conservation of values. The supreme value is the person, without respect for which all other values are corrupted and apart from which are non-existent. Werkmeister1s criticism of Brightman*s value theory was noted, preeminently his charge is that Brightman has overlooked the distinction between value- norms and moral-norms. This criticism we thought Brightman would accept, since he himself tends to iden tify the prudential and the moral ought in the, case of norms. Flewelling*s conception of values as *'the things that matter most'* was next considered. By this expres sion he seeks to indicate man;s constant choice between desirable things. The wisdom of life, he holds, consists in knowing how to surrender the lesser for the achievement or possessing of the more permanent and abiding. Moral, spiritual, and human considerations make up the higher values. All values are ultimately personal. As far as 655 man is concerned they have their existence in the service, welfare, and gratification of human beings. Values have made and are making history, because as incentives to action they are determinants of achievement. Flewelling's reference to values as an ingredient of nature suggests his philosophy of the metaphysical status of values. In a moral world the highest and best possibilities are in keeping with the natural order. Values become creative in the realm of self-realization as man seeks harmony with his truest nature. Values find their ultimate reality in the divine person. True religion, therefore, involves the love of values. The person is the supreme end of civilization and likewise personality is the supreme value. The criterion of ontological truth in, Flewelling's thinking, is value since truth can never be separated from living experience, for we create truth by living it, not merely by believing it. Chapter ten involved us in the consideration of one of the most important facets of our philosophers' thinking. Both men have much to say about religion. Both are convinced that religion has a legitimate place in human experience. We found that for Flewelling, true religion is universal, self-validating, pragmatic, and ethical; it is also spiritual, social and rational. Prayer, if correctly understood and engaged in, has a 656 valid place in the world order. A strong and constant emphasis in Flewelling’s thought is the reasonableness of the Incarnation of Jesus, a doctrine that is basic in his Christian humanism. He contends that the recognition of the incarnation will have triplications for the future well being of man. He also favors that view of theism which looks upon God as the living God, and reality as an activity. He holds that reality is continuously active in pursuit of the realization of ends. God is the causal intelligence producing such activity. Immortality finally is a reasonable postulate. Religion is definitely a major philosophical con cern for Brightman, who asserts it is a supersensuous fact that must be admitted and rationally interpreted. He argues that faith and reason are not mutually exclusive. The ground of all values is a personal God. Investi gations which shed light on one's belief in God are of supreme importance, and they may lead to a rational faith in God. Reason, then, must feature largely in religion. In fact the two New Testament emphases upon logos and agape become key motifs in Brightman's concept of reason able love. He insists that a personalistic philosophy of religion must take cognizance of metaphysical realities; like Flewelling, he maintains that true religion must be both ethical and social. it is also identified with the 657 conservation and increase of values. Brightman places a strong enphasis upon the mystical element in religion. He also insists that personalism believes in the immor tality of the human individual. In his treatment of personal religion and the spiritual life, Brightman develops a carefully thought out philosophy of Christian worship. He also esteems the church worthy of support, but not of unquestioning obedience. Religion needs its critics, best among whom are the keen and liberal minded members of her own canp. His own attitude toward the Bible is that of a Protestant liberal. Basically, except for their disagreements on their doctrines of God, and of evil, our philosophers are in agreement as to their philosophy of religion. Chapter eleven was devoted to the philosophy of education. It was noted that personalism, with its supreme emphasis upon the worth of the person, has definite implications for this subject. Flewelling suggests that Personalism is more than a completed ideological system to which it is necessary for thinkers to conform. it is, rather, a categorial or basic point of view that has the vitality of adaptability to the changing and the permanent. It does not seek to fasten upon the coming generation the shackles of past ideologies; consequently its attitude towaxd education is one of permissiveness and freedom. It holds that the 658 chief aim of education is the production of personal value, and sanctions the full cultivation of the person in such studies as will yield the largest understanding of the meaning of life, history, culture, self-discipline, morality, and religion. Over against individual initia tion it would balance a sense of stewardship, social sympathy, and self-giving. True education must include not only the sciences but a spiritual aspect and a basic philosophical outlook in keeping with the true worth of the person. A personalistic philosophy of education makes a large place for ethical-mindedness and moral values. It teaches that education should provide a broad cultured background upon which one might specialize later to good advantage, and it stresses assistance to the development of the creative imagination of the individual. Professionalism, it warns, cannot be substituted for sound learning. Flewelling disagrees with the philosophy of education advanced by Rousseau when he insists that any education that overlooks the value of mental discipline is certain to fail. He is Rousseauan, however, in objecting to any regimentation of students to a single curriculum, although he gives a large place to the classics and dis courages the so-called "snap" electives. He also rules out educational "fads," including systems of mechanization which would reduce capable students to the level of 659 mediocrity. The chief function of a good teacher is the ability to discover students to themselves. The chief function of education is to train the mind to think creatively. True education should promote the breaking down of provincialisms, hatreds, and suspicions, and advance the world community. Brightman expresses approval of Dewey's emphasis upon the immediate and practical, but he feels that Dewey has overlooked considerations which lie beyond the immediate. In contenporary education Brightman sees an over-emphasis upon analysis and not a sufficient concern for synthesis and the wholistic approach. Whenever reason seeks wholeness and unity of meaning, he says, she moves nearer to a grasp and understanding of her universe. Brightman, like Flewelling, is troubled by the speciali zation and division of education by a multiplication of departments in our colleges and universities, as they compete one with another and create disunities in modern culture. He believes that a highly refined technological intelligence combined with a beastly morality portends nothing but savage aggression and inhumanity. Science in the service of purified desires guided by ideal norms is the end to be sought. Brightman rejects the thought that because the scientific method requires openmindedness it therefore prohibits any basic commitments. There is a 660 significant role to be played by religion in education, but even religious education roust not be anti- philosophical. The authority of wealth over educational institutions is ominous because of the tragic possi bilities involved in such a situation, although wealth in the service of education and ideals can become a great boon. Moral education needs to place more stress upon personality and moral reason, Spiritual illiteracy, above all, is to be avoided. Chapter twelve was concerned with the question of human freedom. Neither of our philosophers subscribe to determinism. Brightman prefers to call his position "freedoroism." There is what may be called voluntary choice. This is unique. If one is to be an open-minded empiricist he must accept the fact of voluntary causal efficacy. The free person acts in every choice but the material upon which he acts is already given. Of course freedom is essential to the formation and realization of ideals. Yet what man is free to gain he is also free to lose. Brightman, however, does not think freedom of will means complete self-determination. Many of the possi bilities for an individual life are determined by the past and by one's environment. It is Flewelling's contention that the one essential of freedom is contingency. Man's greatest glory is his power to originate action. Personality 661 contains the only grounds we know of unique efficient cause or uncaused reality. All the institutions of society are based upon the assunption of the reality of human freedom. Denials thereof are only theoretical. Freedom is born with the power of reflective thought: an act of choice is possible only to a self-reflecting person. Any non-contingent scheme of the universe involves us in an infinite regress. Even the laws of nature derive their uniformity from the consistent volition of a rational and purposive Cosmic Intelligence. The assumption of freedom is basic and necessary to all creativity. Freedom is thus the commonest of human experiences and beliefs. In a democratic and moral society freedom must toe practiced with self-restraint. Yet the free person is the supreme aim and achievement of the social order. Flewelling agrees with Bowne that evil is not a necessity for free persons. He also holds it is unthinkable that man should possess free dom and at the same be lacking in the world order or in God. But even God cannot coerce the free will which He has created. Man's highest realization of freedom comes, of course, in loving cooperation with the will of God. As opposed to Brightman, he holds that the divine humiliation of the Cross was voluntarily undertaken; thus freedom is the dynamic of redemption and of new worlds. In chapter thirteen the writer offered some critical evaluations of positions taken by our two 662 philosophers. Brightman*s tendency to identify the terms "infinity" and "absolute" was noted. Appeal was made to Flewelling*s definition of "infinity" and his insistence upon the verbal nature of the difficulty arising out of the assumption of infinitude. Notations from Bowne, Ferre, Gilson, Ross, Cornford, Tennant, McLarney, and Brightman himself were given in opposition to Brightman*s idea of a finite and limited God. Attention was next focused upon the easy optimism about roan which characterizes our thinkers, both of whom are great humanitarians. Although they alike acknowledge the stubborn and inescapable fact that sin remains, they take for granted the inevitability of human moral- spiritual progress. This brought us to the problem of evil once again. Here it was suggested that Brightman*s own proposal of "the theory of multiple meanings" as an explanation for surd evil seems to be a better solution than his doctrine of the Given. Man's responsibility for much natural evil as well as moral evil was noted, and again objection was raised against making the deity responsible for man*s abuse of his freedom. A. C. Knudson’s suggestion that Brightman*s theory was an attempt to solve the problem of natural evils from a purely hedonistic standpoint seemed pertinent. Moreover, the ability to suffer seemed characteristic of the normal man. 663 A query was next raised as to the validity of Brightman's (and to some extent Flewelling's) theory of the status of physical nature. Here their disagreement marks them as representing different types of theistic personalism. Flewelling holds that nature is continually caused and conserved by God, whereas Brightman puts nature within the being of God himself. Brightman conse quently denies that nature needs redemption. We sought to show that Brightman's philosophy at this point cannot be taken as normative for personalism. Observations from Bowne and Buckham showed their essential agreement with Flewelling rather than with Brightman. Usually personal ism would hold that events in the natural world are to be thought of as the immediate acts of God. Brightman’s Metaphysical Temporalism was compared with the position of Bowne and Flewelling. Paul Tillich's objection to applying the categories of fini- tude to the Infinite was considered. The contention of Taylor that "conceptual time and space" are but abstrac tions based upon our "perceptual time and space" seemed pertinent. Our conclusion was that time is the conse quence of being, not its prerequisite. Because of their appreciation of the theory of evolution both of our philosophers seem at times to identify process with progress. Here one discerns the influence of Bergson. That there is such discontinuity 664 in the process of evolution seems evident. Buttrick has warned that we cannot hold a rigid theory of evolution and at the same time retain belief in human freedom. The question was raised whether man has a built in guarantee of progress. It was also suggested that our philosophers should not conclude that because history can bring progress that it likewise brings redemption. Georgia Harkness seemed correct in her notation that the processes of history are not always an unmixed forward movement. Following through our categories of comparison, our next concern was with theories of value. That neither of our philosophers goes very definitely into the detailed explanation of what takes place in valuation seemed evident. Suggestions from Werkmeister were offered as supplying this lack. Neither of our philosophers seems to grasp the importance of personal commitment as a determinant of ascriptive judgments in the valuation process. As personalists both make the person the supreme intrinsic value, and both are concerned with the conser vation and maximization of values. The present neglect of Brightman*s volume on ethics was noted with regret. In their philosophy of religion the point was noted that our thinkers accept the theological doctrine of synergism, and agree that man's salvation is of the nature of a divine-human cooperation. 665 The influence of Bergson upon our thinkers has been diverse in kind. Flewelling rejected so much of what Brightman accepted from Bergson that his criticisms of Bergson seem also valid as criticisms of Brightman. Flewelling reacted from Bergson’s "Creative Evolution" to what he explains as "Creative Personality" whereas Brightman's debt to Bergson is manifestly at the point of his metaphysical temporalism. Brightman's rejection of the notion of an ontologi cal substantial self was considered as a radical depar ture from the older type of personalism found in Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Bowne. His attenpt to mediate between classical substantialism and that theory which reduces the self to a mere stream of experiential flux seemed untenable in the light of more valid insights from Tennant, Criticisms from Baker and Castell's more valid suggestion that the self is a substantial agent were approved. Under our ninth category of comparison, which is education, some insights and oversights by Flewelling were evaluated. His lack of appreciation for the manual arts and educational methodology seemed to be such an oversight and a weakness in his position. His apparent unawareness of the conomic inplications of some of his attitudes was also noted. That there is a legitimate utilitarian aspect of education was pointed out by 666 quotations from Maritain. Brightman's ideal that the whole man must be educated for life as a whole, while not fully explicated, seemed to be the more consistent and inclusive position. No basic disagreement with the thought of our philosophers in respect to human freedom seemed possible. The wish for more explanation of the psychology of de cision was expressed, and a plea was made for clarifi cation of the relationship between character and choice. With this we concluded our critique of the two personalists. It must be admitted that there are still many minor items concerning which criticisms might be offered. Turning now to final conclusions, we once again call attention to the zeal with which both men have sought to promote and explicate their philosophy of per sonalism. Both seek to enrich their philosophy with a faithful consideration of all the wealth of personal experience, whether that experience be aesthetic, cultural, social, moral, or religious. They, along with some of their contenporaries, represent the end of an era in philosophy. Already the pendulum has begun to swing away from their Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. The age of analysis is rapidly approaching in philosophy. Existen tialism in religion is also filling the horizon. Perhaps their personalism belongs to this past age, and if so, 667 what will, or has, become of their personalism? Both men are survived by their successors and students in various parts of the land. Their voices are still lifted in defense of the system to which their teachers devoted their keenest efforts. But in spite of this, personalism seems now to be waning as a system of philosophical thought. The need now seems to be for a careful re thinking of the basic tenets of personalism in the light of recent developments. Can it be made independent of its sources and given a new and challenging vitality? If so, one wishes to ask just where and how this personalis- tic renaissance shall begin. Two trends arising within personalism seem now to be manifest. The one is the tendency toward theism and a theological enphasis, the other is a trend toward human ism. The tendency toward theism is discernible in the writings of such men as Buckham, Tennant, and White. Some impetus in this direction was given by A. C. Knudson. The trend towaxd a humanistic personalism is discernible in the writings of Schiller and Werkmeister• For the latter especially there is an advantage in making man the highest consideration in philosophy thus avoiding the many problems with which theists like Brightman must 668 1 grapple. Regardless of what may befall it as a system, personalism's basic tenet is valid. The Person is the supreme value in the realm of reality, the key to our understanding of being, and the supreme speculative principle for philosophy. It is to be hoped that when modern philosophical trivia have been left behind the light of this basic truth of personalism will point the way to a saner and more inclusive philosophy. Of this we may be well assured: any science, any political system, any philosophy, and even any religion, will stand approved or condemned in the light of its treatment of the human person. The best criticism of Brightman's doctrine of the finite God still remains that of his own colleague at Boston, A. C. Knudson, and Brightman's students with whom this writer has conversed have stated that Brightman so *While not unfriendly to belief in a deity this type of personalism does not consider it vitally essential to philosophy, though not necessarily denying practical value to such a belief. Man is looked upon as a self- directed becoming with potentialities unlimited for his own advancement. This view of reality makes humanity the primary object of its interest, and its fundamental for mula is found in the dictum of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things." Man is capable of self-direction and his character may grow in clarity and strength of purpose. As a free agent man is accountable for his errors, hence self-complacency is the deadliest foe of human excellence. 669 regarded it. Most of Brightman's critics have commended his attitude of willingness to face the problem of evil in its most difficult aspects, and all would admit that if one faces a choice of alternatives, as Brightman felt he did, between the concept of an omnipotent God as against a good and holy God, he does well to contend for the latter. Brightman's rigorous and logical methodology is likewise commendable. In fact, his statement of the philosopher's (and meta-physicians's) attitude deserves to be quoted here: Perhaps the most profitable ATTITUDE toward the problem of realms of being may be summarized as follows: Avoid preliminary decisions and rigid classifications. Observe the facts of experience in all their variety and unity. Rely on rational, inclusive, empirical coherence as the test of all hypotheses. Seek for the hypothetical metaphysical perspective that is most adequate to, and most explanatory of, the whole shining present. Reject any hypothesis that fails to take full account of both the variety and the unity of the shining present. But do not demand 'absolute proof,' whatever that may mean; for such proof would be accessible only to a being informed about all facts in all possible presents and about all possible alternative hypotheses regarding the illuminating absents; and this being would not only need perfect information and perfect imagination but also perfect reasoning. Only the Absolute is absolute. The human being must always labor under conditions of being human. Metaphysics is not for one who resents being human and who imagines that there is some hocus pocus by which he can cast off the fetters of humanity. Metaphysics is simply the attempt to make human sense out of human experience. It is an exploration of the human realm. But this sets no a priori limits to the variety of 670 realms that may be inplied or involved, or suggested in the experience of being human. Each metaphysician must embark on his own voyage of exploration. One cannot read Brightman without believing that he is sincerely striving to do just as he has suggested in these two paragraphs. Flewelling seeks to make philosophy speak to the whole of life. Hence his viewpoint is more value oriented than speculative. His chief concern seems always to answer the question, "what does this mean for life? Life at its human best?" He has great concern for the relation of religion to science. Literature and poetry are another of his special interests. His three windows opening onto reality--his "Strip of blue," as he calls it--are Science, Philosophy, and Religion. His one serious venture into the speculative area was his study of Bergson. If Bowne, as some think, sharply separated philosophy and religion (though this may be challenged), it is not so with Flewelling. He seeks to import into philosophy all the wealth of human experience. For, as he says, "to the wise man in search of reality nothing human can be alien."3 F. C. S. Schiller, who wrote of him in a 2 Brightman, Person and Reality, pp. 87-88. In the first paragraph we Ihave set the key term in full capitals. 3 Survival of western Culture. p. 170. 671 review of his Creative Personality says, "he has the root of the matter in him, and views the relations of science and religion in the right spirit and with the right atti tude . "4 An evaluation of Brightman’s contribution to 5 personalism has been admirably done by Paul E. Johnson, and it will suffice here to tabulate his points. Johnson holds that the first contribution of Brightman to person alism was his own personality, "for the man himself was a living and concrete demonstration of every cardinal 6 principle he taught and expounded in his many writings." A second contribution made by Brightman was the character of his scholarship. Johnson observes: . . . Brightman was no isolationist and he plunged joyously into every swimming hole of thought, from religion to the natural sciences and from ancient history to the largest ripple in the contemporary scene to sound its depths and test the direction of its currents. Having read most of the philosophy that could be found in the English language he delved into the source materials in other languages such as Hebrew, Greek, Latin, German, French, Spanish, and Italian. As editor of the Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy he was able to edit the manuscripts submitted in the original languages as he kept abreast of philosophical writings in so many countries.7 ^he Hibbert Journal, XXV (1926-27), p. 573. c Paul E. Johnson, "Brightman's Contribution to Personalism," The Personalist, XXV (1954), 59-72. 6Ibid., p. -60. t 7Ibid., pp. 61-62. 672 A third contribution was his logical method of empirical coherence. MTo him," Johnson states, "experience is the beginning and the end of knowledge, the starting point of Q every quest and the final test of the real." "Experi ence" here means "the situation-experienced" or "my present consciousness in contrast to situations-believed- in such as nature, society, or God to be inferred from 9 experience." Referring to Brightman's Persons and Values, Johnson shows that Brightman developed a somewhat new view of the person as a process in many dimensions. Hence a fourth contribution is to the enrichment of the personalistic view of the self. A fifth contribution is the development of a more systematic theory of ethics. Convinced that ethics is a science of ideal principles, Brightman found eleven moral laws which he contends have universal application. Their universal character, he holds, arises from the fact that "reason works always within experience and its function is to extend and organize experience into meaningful patterns of intel ligible relationships."^ Although he does not regard his moral principles as his own invention but sees them as 8 Ibid., p. 63. 9 Ibid., p. 64. 1QIbid., p. 6 8 . 673 valid summaries of the universal experience of the race, he would disavow any finality for them. The sixth contri bution noted by Johnson is in the field of the philosophy of religion. Here Brightman is well known for his theistic finitism and his doctrine of the Given. What shall be said of Flewelling's contribution to personalism? Included here would be his published books. But more important than these, no doubt, is his influence in philosophical circles through the medium of The Per- sonalist and the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. Sterling M. McMurrin, while traveling through Europe and the Middle Bast on a mission for the United States Department of State, found knowledge and acquaintance with the writings and philosophy of Flewelling in such widely separated places as the philosophy faculty at the University of Moscow, and the home of professor Martin Buber in Jerusalem.** In an article written for The Persona list while on this tour, McMurrin observes: Among personalistic philosophers Professor Flewelling especially has produced a continuous polemic against whatever in social organization and practice encroaches upon the full freedom and dignity of the individual. **Cf. The Personalist, XL, pp. 114, and 117. *^Sterling M. McMurrin, "Existentialism, Personal ism, and Professor Flewelling," The Personalist, XL (1959), pp. 118-128. 674 He continues: It is the strength of personalism . • • that, while it has attempted to come to terms with the social circumstances of recent decades as well as with the rich findings of both the psychological and social sciences, that it has refused to capitu late to the existential temper by abandoning its essentially liberal conception of man defined in terms of the reliability of reason and the human capacity for moral goodness* It is just here, of course, that the leadership of Professor Flewelling among personalistic thinkers and writers has been so much in evidence* No one has written with a more refined, even poetic, sensitivity to the tragedy and desolation of the recent past, or with a greater awareness of the gross dangers that threaten the present, and of all that this means in the measure of human suffering and failure* But Flewelling*s recent work, which has achieved a new maturity under the impact of this suffering and failure, exhibits, nevertheless, a persistent faith in man and in his future. Just as earlier in his philosophy of history he had taken a stand against the prospects of cultural doom pro claimed by Spengler and his followers, he has refused to embrace apocalypticism that has brought much existentialist and other non-liberal thought to an impasse of confusion, meaninglessness, and resig nation. McMurrin*s final paragraph reads as follows: Personalism, on its part, because it describes reality in terms basically religious, must continue to encounter the onslaught of secularism and naturalism* Because it is a theory of reality, it must contend with positivism; and because it takes a stand on a fundamental value structure, it must face the continual opposition of extreme relativism and nihilism. The crucial question will continue to be asked, whether such a philosophy can survive in a world enlightened by the natural sciences, sophisti cated in the ways of knowing, made cynical by the spectacle of unspeakable human suffering, and become anguished for its own survival. Whatever may lie 1 3 Ibid., p. 1 2 0 . 675 ahead for personalis tic philosophy, it is to the lasting credit of Professor Flewelling that, having long ago committed himself to the centrality of human personality for philosophical discussion, he has defended his position aggressively and, while attempting to come to terms with empiricism and science, has steadfastly stood his ground under the attacks of every opposition. Now, with the mature wisdom of advanced years, he continues to speak with the same vigor, the same persistence, and with the same poetic eloquence, affirming his faith in man and his future, and demanding from him a new commit ment to reasonableness and to the things that matter mos t • 4 Finally, with the modern emphasis upon the impor tance of inter-personal relations and communications, Flewelling's emphasis upon the central significance of the Incarnation takes on even greater meaning for future personalism. Here man partakes of deity and deity becomes human. Since both God and man are persons, their inter personal relationship is not only possible but most probable. In the Incarnation of Jesus, Flewelling sees not only the highest for man in the Ideal Man, but also the truest God in a Christlike deity. Personalism, to remain true to its central tenet, must insist upon this divine-human encounter as valid and the essential aspect of man's highest experience of reality, and God's greatest revelation thereof. To quote our chairman for this study: "Life's finest experiences are its best clues to the true 1 4 Ibid.. pp. 127-128. 676 nature of reality."15 The highest revelation of the pos sibilities of grace for man comes to us in the union of the human with the divine in Jesus. To such a philosophy Flewelling was definitely committed. The impression that Flewelling was a mere propa gandist for personalism must not be allowed. In an article for The Personalist William H. Alamshah has summarized the basic philosophical contributions of Flewelling.^ These are: (1) his metaphysical definition of the person as "a continuum in a space-time world,” characterized by "moral creativity,” "self-direction,” and a "possessor of in trinsic values and creative powers.” (2) His recognition and emphasis of the demands of life upon the person for "growth,” "cooperation,” and "creativity." (3) His acknowledgement of "a new order of relationships, on a world wide scale," "a new order of values," for the con ciliation of world cultures, and the necessity for "a new approach" to world problems. (4) His plea for: (a) "uni versal Education" on the ground that "genius may issue from any neighborhood," (b) "world citizenship," "granting to others the same liberties we claim for ourselves"; and 15Wilbur Long, Classroom Lecture, University of Southern California, Seminar in Pragmatism, January 17, 1961. 16William H. Alamshah, "The Value of Personality: The Philosophy of Ralph Tyler Flewelling," The Personalist, XL (1959), pp. 229-238. 677 (c) ''world religion" which in a spirit of unselfish love "embraces all men as brothers" and "refuses to shut the 17 door in the face of" any "prodigal." Such a summary not only points out the chief facets of professor Flewelling's philosophy but it also recog nizes the basic passion of Flewelling's Christian Person alism. Recent studies in the field of personalism would indicate that this philosophy is not dead. Works are coming from the presses occasionally written by the British and French personalists, and some by our American thinkers. Doctoral research programs, too, have been devoted to such men as James Ward, F. R. Tennant, and others of like thought. Someone should make a study of another West Coast personalist, John Wright Buckham, and another might be done on his friend and informer, George Holmes Howison. It would also seem profitable if someone were to do a restudy and reevaluation of Hegel's writings, especially his Phenomenology of Spirit, for the sake of searching out his intimations of personalism. Likewise a revival of interest in the works of Hermann Lotze seems imperative. He has done much groundwork that ought to be 17 Summarizing the above mentioned article. Mr. Alamshah was a classmate of this writer at U.S.C., a former student of Flewelling, and later at the Claremont Men’s College he was a teaching colleague, with Flewelling. 678 restudied and acknowledged by working out more of the implications of his writings. He has been acknowledged by Henry Churchill King, one of the leading modern liberal 18 theologians. One may query as to the extent of Brightman's acquaintance with Lotze. Perhaps his doctrine of God would have been influenced differently had Brightman given stronger considerations to the man who influenced Bowne so strongly. With this note we may conclude this lengthy but, to the writer, rewarding study of our two personalists. There are still areas which remain uninvestigated in this treatise, the consideration of which we offer as sug gestions for further research. Flewelling and Brightman might profitably be compared in the following facets of their thought: Their doctrine of Grace and Salvation. Their philosophy of art and aesthetics. Their philosophy of science. Their philosophy of Society. Their eschatology. Their analysis of the relation of faith to reason. Their philosophy of Ideals. 1 ft Cf. his Reconstruction in Theology, Rational Living, The Moral~"and Religious CKa 1 lenge of our Times, all published at New York Dy Macmillan in T5ol, 1$08, and 1911, respectively. 679 Their metaphysics of Selfhood might be compared and criticised. Flewelling*s idea of conditional immortality might be explored. Whatever one's evaluation of the respective philoso phies of our two personalists, from henceforth he who seeks a distinctively Christian rationale of life stands indebted to them. b i b l i o g r a p h i e s A BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN A BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING A GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED MASTER BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS BY OR ABOUT EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN INTRODUCTION TO BRIGHTMAN»S BIBLIOGRAPHY For the compilation of Brightman’s Bibliography we are indebted to the assistance of Jannette E. Newhall, professor of Research Methods at Boston University, who made available Brightman's own self-kept bibliography of his writings. It seemed necessary in addition to this to include here the many articles about Brightman and the reviews that have been made of his books by his contem poraries. Brightman served as an advisory editor for The Personalist, and on the editorial board of Religion in Life. He wrote articles for Ferm’s Encyclopedia of Religion and for Collier's Encyclopedia. His Introduction to Philosophy (1925) was published also in London by Jonathan Cape, Ltd., and was translated into Chinese and published in 1930. It was also trans lated into Spanish and published in 1932. A second Spanish edition was published at Buenos Aires in 1946. The 1951 edition of the same work in English was trans lated into Portuguese and published in 1951. He began writing for publication as early as 1900, but his earliest articles were philatelic in their con tent, dealing with his hobby as a stamp collector. After 1917 his concern is chiefly philosophical as his biblio graphy indicates. Thereafter a number of important 683 articles came from his pen each year until the time of his death, with the exception of 1923. Brightman was a frequent contributor to Zion1s Herald, a periodical which styles itself Mthe Free Voice of American Protestantism.” Being capable in several languages he also translated many important articles into English from the French and German, and occasionally from the Spanish. He reviewed about three hundred twenty books for the various philosophic and religious journals. His platform for personal idealism appears in his article "A Definition of Idealism,” in the Journal of Philosophy (XXX, 429-435), and it is especially worthy of note. Of course his greatest contribution to philosophy still is to be found in his books, most of which have been reviewed by many different writers in an impressive number of important journals. Brightman's written verse is a minor part of his literary activity, but it testifies to his aesthetic interests. It is very largely ’ ’occasional”; he usually wrote a poem in response to announcements of the birth of babies in his students' families. His one long poem, "Phra Amon,” was written while in college on the theme of reincarnation. It was first published in the Brunonian in 1904 and then was later reprinted in 1914 in College Hill Verse, edited by I. Boone. He also wrote 684 nunerous philosophical rhymes in answer to similar ones from his students and chiefly for fun, not publication. A number of his Christmas poems were published in ZionVs Herald, and The Philosophical Forum. One of his other poems became the words for a hymn published in the American Student Hymnal (H.A. Smith, editor. New York: Century, 1928), and appears there as number 32. His published poems are listed separately in the bibliography which follows, and some have been included in the appendix of this treatise. From his exceptional collection of stamps to his contributions to personalism, his own unique and creative personality is evident. He was highly respected and admired by his students, one of whom has written of him as follows: We find it very difficult even to distinguish Brightman, the man, from Brightman the teacher. For in most ways the teacher was the man and the man was the teacher--his teaching objectified so much of his mind and heart and spirit. He was indeed the Socratic midwife. He so wanted us to come alive to the problems of existence not as neat little intellectual problems, part of an intellectual chess game but as choices between modes of living. Philosophy for him was a verb in the imperative mood: Philosophize I--but this meant the kind of thinking that xs one way of acting, and the kind of acting that exemplifies thinking. To be a moral human being--whatever else it meant--was to think. Thinking, in turn was determined seeking for the best theoretical and practical solution of any problem. Wisdom for him was a matter of morals; morality was the spirit of wisdom; and the faith that both ultimately were our inner ties with the 685 cosmic Person was the religion that burned in the very marrow of his bones. One of his fundamentalist students once said of him: 'I can ^ tell by the way he teaches that he is regenerated.' As his bibliography makes evident, he did not review as many books as did Flewelling, but he wrote articles for a wider number of journals, and occasional articles even for the newspapers. Selected bibliographies of Brightman's works, compiled by Jannette E. Newhall, have been published in Brightman's posthumous book, Person and Reality, pp. 367-370, and in The Philosophical Forum, XII, pp. 22-28. They are based on the same complete bibliography of more than 700 items, prepared by Brightman himself. It includes his many early phila telic writings, his many "Letters to the Editor," and numerous popular and brief articles for the religious press, as well as his specifically philosophical writings. From this same bibliography now before us we have sought to arrange our own bibliography on Brightman both cate gorically and chronologically. We trust that any future researcher will find this data an accurate and valuable aid to his study of Brightman. Peter A. Bertocci and M. Alicia Corea, "Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Through his Student's Eyes," Philosophical Forum, XII (1954), p. 62. 686 A. BOOKS written by Edgar Sheffield Brightman The Sources of the Hexateuch. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 395 pp. An Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, l$2f>. Immortality in Post Kantian Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard UniversTty Press^ 1925. 60 pp. Religious Values. New York: Abingdon Press, 1925. 285 pp, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of PhllosopKy. E.S. Brightman, editor. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1927. 716 pp. A Philosophy of Ideals. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928. 243 pp. The Problem of God. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 209 pp. The Finding of God. New York: Abingdon Press, 1931. 200 pp. Is God a Person? New York: The Association Press, 1932. Mora 1 Laws. New York: Abingdon Press, 1933. 323 pp. Personality and Religion. New York: Abingdon Press, 1934. 160 pp. Essentials of a Vital Religious Faith. (Mimeographed) Haddam, Conn.: The Hazen Foundation, 1934. The Future of Christianity. New York: Abingdon Press, 1937. “158 pp. A Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentree Hall, Inc., 1940. 539 pp. The Spiritual Life. New York and Nashville: Abingdon- Cokesbury Press, 1942. 218 pp. Personalism in Theology. E.S. Brightman, editor. Boston: Boston University Press, 1943. 257 pp. 687 Nature and Values. New York: Abingdon press, 1945. 171 pp. An Introduction to Philosophy. Revised Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951. 349 pp. Persons and Values. Boston: Boston University Press, T$S2. 27 pp. Person and Reality. Edited by P.A. Bertocci. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1958. 379 pp. Manua1 for Students of Philosophy. (Fourth Ed.) Boston: Boston University Press, 1948. Philosophy in the United States 1939-1947. Tokyo: Nankodo Publishing CoTj T^ITI Edited with notes by David N. lino. Our Faith in God, n.p. The Advance for Christ and His Church, 1949. Copyright by Bishops William C. Martin and G. Bromley Oxnam. Published anonymously; revised anonymously. Manua (Fifth Ed.) Boston: Historical Outline of the Bible. Co-author with W.C. Muelder. Berea: Berea College Press, 1936. "The Originality of Jesus' Teaching on Love as Reported in the Synoptic Gospels." A Thesis for the S.T.B. degree, Boston University School of Theology. Boston: Typescript, 1910, "The Criterion of Truth in Albrecht Ritschl‘s Theology." Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University. Boston; Typescript, 1912. B. THESIS AND DISSERTATION C. MONOGRAPHS, PERIODICAL ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS IN SYMPOSIA "The Chief Academic Need of Methodist Colleges." Christian Student, 15 (1914), 123. 688 "Ritschl's Criterion of Religious Truth." American Journal of Theology, XXI (1917), 212-224. "Some Remarks on 'Two Common Fallicies in the Logic of Religion'," Journal of Philosophy, XV (1918), 71-76. "Confessions of a Reformed Pacifist," Christian Advocate, 93 (1918), 733-734. "Studies in Human Action,” (A Discussion) Psychology Bulletin, 16 (1919), 24-26. "The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Valuation," American Journal of Theology, 23 (1919), 500-518. "Philosophy in American Education," The Personalist, I, 2 (July, 1920), 15-28. "The Personalistic Method in Philosophy," Methodist Review, CIII (1920), 368-380. "Modern Idealism (1910-1920)," Journal of Philosophy, XVII (1920), 533-550. 1921 "The Unpopularity of Personalism," Methodist Review, CIV (1921), 9-28. "The Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Philosophy," The Personalist, II (1921), Part I, 162-171; Part II, 254-266. "The Personal Relation Between God and Children," Religious Education, 16 (1921), 23-28. "Fourteen Points on Premillennialism," Zion's Herald, 99 (1921), 499. "The More Than Human Values of Religion," Journal of Religion, I (1921), 362-377. "Religious Values and Recent Philosophy," Boston University Bulletin, 10 (August 1, 1921)• "Why is Personalism Unpopular?" Methodist Review, CIV (1921), 524-535. 689 "The Religious Situation in Russia," Zion's Herald, 99 (1921), 1406. 1922 "Truth and Value in Religion," Methodist Review, CV (1922), 42-47. "The Use of the Word Personalism," The Personalist, III (1922), 254-259. "A Repointed Point on Premillennialism," Zion's Herald, lOO (1922), 141-142. "Two Kinds of Inspiration Again," (A Letter) Zion1s Herald, 100 (1922), 389. "Neo-realistic Theories of Value," in B.C. Wilm, Studies in Philosophy and Theology. New York: Abingdon Press, 1922. Chap. Ill, pp. 22-64. "Some Appreciations of Borden Parker Bowne: Sources of Bowne's Power," Methodist Review, CV (1922), 370-371. "Why do We* Believe Jesus?" (A Letter) Christian Century, 39 (1922), 1333. 1924* "Why Train Preachers?" Zion * s Herald, 102 (1924), 134. "The Contribution of Philosophy to the Theory of Religious Education,” Boston University Bulletin, 13 (July 15, 1924). "Conventional Prayer," Zion1s Herald, 102 (1924), 881. "Psychological Faddism," Zion's Herald, 102 (1924), 934. "The Church and Society," Zion* s Herald, 102 (1924), 998. ♦Brightman wrote only an article on Philately in 1923 which is listed elsewhere in this Bibliography under that category. 690 "The March of Freedom," Zion’s Herald, 102 (1924), 1062, "A Salute to the Professor," Zion’s Herald, 102 (1924), 1094. "The Educational Field," Zion1s Herald, 102 (1924), 1314. "The Educational Field," Zion’s Herald, 102 (1924), 1442, 1457. "The Meaning of Obligation," Rochester Theological Semi nary Bulletin, LXXV (1924), 46-70. 1925 "The Educational Field," Zion's Herald, 103 (1925), 270-271. "The Educational Field," Zion's Herald, 103 (1925), 593. "What is Personalism?" Zion♦s Herald, 103 (1925), 1222- 1223. "In Behalf of Personalism," (A Letter) Christian Century, 42 (1925), 512. "Dr. Brightman Replies," (A Letter) Christian Century, 42 (1925), 1382. 1926 "From Professor Brightman," (A Letter) Christian Register, 105 (1926), 10. "What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion?" Journal of Religion, VI (1926), 250-258. "Good Hunting," (A Letter) Christian Advocate, 101 (1926), 1705. "More on O.K.," Boston Herald, March 17, 1926. 1927 "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," The Personalist, VIII (1927), 25-32. See the same artTcTe-For 691 Brightman’s chapter in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. New York: Longman's Greene & Co,T927. "The Art of Book Reviewing," Zion's Herald, 105 (1927), 746-747* "Is It a Greater Service to Make People Good or Happy?" Boston Traveler, Sept, 24, 1927, "The Definition of Religion," (One in a Symposium) Journal of Religion, VII (1927), 113-116. 1928 "Can the Soul Come Back?" Christian Century, 45 (1928), 108-110, "Professor Gay on Emerson," Boston University Alumni Magazine, 2 (No. 4, 1928), 15-16. "Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion," Crozier Quarterly, 5 (1928), 381-395. "Voltaire," Zion's Herald, 106 (1928), 666. "The Blasphemy Case," (A Letter) Boston Herald, August 30, 1928. 1929 "What is Education For?" Boston University Beacon, 53 (May, 1929), 3-9. "Must Religion Seek a New God?" Christian Herald, 52 (1929), 56-57. "A Case of Overstatement," Zion's Herald, 107 (1929), 579-580. "Pre-Scientific Conceptions of the Universe," Chapter II, and "The Advent of Man— His Contributions," Chapter XXII, in F.A. Cleveland, Editor, Modern Scientific Knowledge of Nature, Man, and Society. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1^29, pp. 15-30, and 381-401. 692 "The Importance of Being Conscious," Journal of Philosophi cal Studies, 4 (1929), 497-503. "A Misunderstanding of Idealism," Journal of Philosophy, XXVI (1929), 605-607. (A Response to <5tto's review of E.S.B.'s Philosophy of Ideals.) "Did Mr. Holmes Leave Something Out?" Christian Century, 46 (1929), 1344-1345. "The Dialectic of Religious Experience," Philosophica1 Review, XXXVIII (1929), 557-573. "Has God Anything To Do?" Methodist Review, CXII (1929), 920-922. "Professor Coe's Dilemma," Religious Education, 24 (1929), 973-974. "America's Newest Religion: What is it Worth?" Christian Herald, 52 (1929), 4-5, 24. "A German Schoolbook," (A Letter) Boston Herald, June 10, 1929. "The Philosophical Approach of the Sunday School to Bible Study," The Church School Herald Journal, 1 (1929), 4. "Differences in Propaganda," (A Letter) Boston Herald, Sept. 14, 1929. "Lo and Beholdi" Zion's Herald, 107 (1929), 1186. "Personalism and Borden P. Bowne," in D.S. Robinson, Editor, An Anthology of Recent Philosophy. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1929), ppT 138-142. Reprint of Brightman's chapter in Proceedings ^f Sixth Inter national Congress of Philosophy. 1927. 1930 "Logic and the Macintosh Case," (A Letter) Christian Century, 47 (1930), 213. "Oberammergau 1930," Boston University Beacon, 55 (December, 1930), 5-8. 693 "Amerikanische Jugendbewegung," Mitteilungen des deutschen Institute fur Auslitnder an der UniversitKt Berlin, 5 (1930), 143^143“ ’ ’ Mary Whiton Calkins: Her Place in Philosophy," Wellesley Alumnae Magazine, 14 (1930), 307. "Behaviorism and Experience," Chap. XIV, in W.P. King, Ed., Behaviorism a Battle Line. Nashville: Cokesbury Pre s s " J j 1930. "Space, Ether, and Field Physics," Brightman's Translation from the German of Albert Einstein, Forum Philo- sophicum, 1 (No. 2, 1930), 12. "Character and Religion in Tyrol," Zion's Herald, 108 (1930), 1578-1580. 1931 "The Educational Field," Zion's Herald, 109 (1931), 258, 287. "Religion and Politics," The United Churchman, 6 (1931), 6-7. "Where Physics Fails," (A Letter) Christian Century, 48 (1931), 1427. "The Dialectical Unity of Consciousness and the Meta physics of Religion," in G. Ryle, Editor, Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of PhilosophyT London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1931, 70-77. "The Call of Help From Germany," Zion's Herald, 109 (1931), 1033. "Professor Brightman Replies," Zion's Herald, 109 (1931), 1193. "Antinomies of the Problem of Sex," Brightman's Trans lation of Walter Del-Negro's German, Forum Philosophicum, 1 (No. 3, 1931), 361. "The Problem of Relativism," Brightman's Translation of Karl Groos German, Forum Philosophicum, 1 (No. 3, 1931), 461. 694 "Identity and Comprehension," Brightman's Translation of Emile Meyerson's French, Du Cheminement de la Pensee, Forum Phi losophicum, 1 (No, IT, 1931), 474, 1932 "Philosophy," in C, Skinner, "Ethics, Philosophy, Religion," Boston Community Church, (Jan. 17, 1932), 8-13. "The Given and Its Critics," Religion in Life, 1 (1932), 134-145. "Professor Macintosh on Personalism," Religion in Life, 1 (1932), 461-463. "A Temporalist View of God," Journal of Religion, XII (1932), 544-555. "The Finite Self," Chap. VIII in C.I. Barrett, Contemporary Idealism in America. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932, 169-195. "Religion as Truth," in Vergilius Ferm's Contemporary American Theology I, (Theological Autobiographies). New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1932, 53-81. "The Personality of God," Colgate-Rochester Divinity School Bulletin, 5 (1932), 46-62. "R.O.T.C." Boston University News, Feb. 16, 1932. A Letter. "Solely For Truth," (A Letter) Boston University News, Feb. 23, 1932. "Dr. Brightman Also Asks Questions," (A Letter) Christian Advocate, 107 (1932), 491. "Can An Athiest Be Noble?" (A Letter) Christian Century, 49 (1932), 887. "Is It Time for God's Intervention?" Register, 111 (1932), 483-484. "Dr. Brightman's God," (A Letter) Christian Century, 49 (1932), 1307. "On Throwing One's Vote Away," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 110 (1932), 1346. 695 1933 "Personalism and Economic Security," American Scholar, 2 (1933), 215-223. "Hitler's Own Testimony," Zion * s Herald, 111 (1933), 341, 357. "The Definition of Idealism," Journal of Philosophy, XXX (1933), 429-435. "Dogma, Dogma, Who's Got the Dogma?" Religion in Life, II (1933), 553-562. "Professor Brightman Protests," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, III (1933), 448. "What Does the New Testament Say?" Brightman's trans lation of Wilhelm Bornemann's German in Die Christliche Welt, Zion's Herald, 111 (1933), 842. "Dr. Harop's 'Paradox of Ethical Naturalism'," Christian Leader, 47 (1933), 1202. 1934 "The Self, Given and Implied— A Discussion," Journal of Philosophy, XXXI (1934), 263-269. "The Need for Courage," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 112 (1934), 314. "Psalm 50 for Today," Zion's Herald, 112 (1934), 853. "Humpty-Dumpty," (A Letter) Christian Century, 51 (1934), 1063. "Another Professor Says a Word," Zion's Herald, 112 (1934), 1005. "Immediacy?" Idealismus, 1 (1934), 87-101. "Immediacy," Jahrbuch fUr die Idealistische Philosophic Bd. I, ppT 87-i01. 696 1935 "Advent of Facism," Symposium, Boston University News, March 26, 1935. "Hegel’s Influence in the Contemporary Social Situation," Crozer Quarterly, 21 (1935), 47-56. "The Dream," Bulletin of Theta Phi, 1 (1935), 6. "News Nerves Jittery!" Boston University News, November 12, 1935. (A Letter) "Foreiqn Control," (A Letter) Boston Herald, December 13, 1935. "About G.C. Cell," (A Letter) Zion’s Herald, 113 (1935), 866. "A Modern Hero (Peter Brunner)," Zion’s Herald, 113 (1935), 805. "ViIfredo Pareto," Religion in Life, 5 (1935-36), 295- 303. "Prayer for Massachusetts," (A Letter) Boston Herald, September 18, 1935. 1936 "The God Who Controls the Given," Christian Recorder, 88 (1936), 1, 12. "Question and Answer," Zion * s Herald, 114 (1936), 709. "Der Americanische Idealismus seit 1910," Die Tatwelt, 12 (1936), 69-78. "The Present Outlook in Philosophy of Religion: From the Standpoint of an Idealist," Chapter in Wieman and Meland, Eds., American Philosophies of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1936*77 318-325. "An Empirical Approach to God," Proceedings and Addresses of the American philosophical Association, X (1936), 147-169. His Presidential address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, session at Cambridge, December 29, 1936. 697 1937 "The Problem of Compromise," Congregational Quarterly, 15 (1937), 38-49. "An Empirical Approach to God," Philosophical Review, XLVI (1937), 147-169. Same as last item under 1936. "An Empirical Approach to God," Zion1s Herald, 115 (1937), 147, 152. "Dialectical Tensions in the Christian Idea and Experience of God," Seminar Quarterly, 6 (May, 1937), 7-18, 18-21. "Idle Words," Zion's Herald, 115 (1937), 1129. "The Practice of a Limited God," Zion1s Herald, 115 (1937), 1202. "Conservatives in the Church," (A Letter) Christian Century, 54 (1937), 1111. "The World of Ideas," in H.F. Rail, Ed., Religion and Public Affairs. (New York: Macmillan Co., 193"/), T3T-T567----- "A Serious Proposal," Zion1s Herald, 115 (1937), 1213- 1214. (A Letter). "Not His Finite God," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 115 (1937), 1372. "Three Conceptions of Culture," Philosophia, II (1937), 146-158. "God and the Existence of Evil," Chapter in MacRossie, Ed., God (Place and Publisher not known, 1937), 58-61. 1938 "Man's Battle Against Insecurity," Mimeographed abstract of lecture given at Temple Israel Meeting House, "Ethics and Education," Alert, 2 (1938), 7-13, 24. "Dr. Brightman at Social Union," Zion's Herald, 116 (1938), 128, 130. 698 "Philosophy in a Liberal College," Bostonia, 11 (March, 1938), 10. "New Light on the Soul and God," Religion in Life, VII (Spring, 1938), 191-202. "The Presuppositions of Experiment," The Personalist, XIX (1938), 136-143. "The Gospel as Co-operation,1 1 Chapter in Nall, Ed., Vital Religion (New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1938), 45-50. "Four Comments on One Issue," Christian Century, 55 (1938), 1100-1101. "Notes and Discussions: Professor Brightman's Reply to Professor Werkmeister," The Personalist, XIX (1938), 407. "Is Democracy Right?" World Affairs Interpreter, 9 (1938), 265-274. "Note on de Hostos (Spanish)," Boletin No. de la Comision del Centenario de Hostos (San Juan: Comission He Puerto Rico, 1938)~ 12-15• "Liberalism and Conservatism," Alert, 2 (1938), 141-143. (A Letter) in America1s Future, 1 (November, 1938), 22. "Eugenio Maria de Hostos: Fil&sofo de la personalidad," (Translated into Spanish by Mr. Jos4 Franquiz) La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, December 15, 1938. 1939 "The Church and an Economic Conference," (A Letter among others under this caption) Christian Century, 56 (1939), 60. "The Ethics of Symbolism," The Standard, 25 (1939), 139. "Defends Professor Wieman," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 117 (1939), 139. "From Rationalism to Empiricism," Christian Century, 56 (1939), 276-279. 699 "El Fichte de la America Espanola," Nueva Democracia, 20 (March, 1939), 8-9. "What is Personality?" The Personalist, XX (1939), 129-138. "What Easter Means to Me," The Rocky Mountain Churchman, 5 (April 2, 1939), 1. "Algunas Ventajas del Personismo," Luminar, 3 (1939), 41-49. "Eugenio Maria de Hostos: Fil6sofo de la Personalidad," Universidad de la Habana, 4 (1939), 57-61. "Borden Parker Bowne," Bostonia, 12 (1939), 19. "Another Question for Dr. Brightman," (A Letter) Christian Century, 56 (1939), 612-613. (Article with no title), Boletin de la Comision del Centenario de Hostos~j Tl ("1939), 194-196. (On Hostos^ "Professor Brightman's Reply to Professor Fuller," The Personalist. XX (1939), 300-303. "Eugenio Maria de Hostos, Filisofo de la Personalidad," Luminar, 3 (1939), 204-208. "A Ballad of Hell," Zion's Herald, 117 (1939), 944. "Christian Means," (A Letter) Christian Century, 56 (1939), 1309. "A Statement about the War of 1939," Zion's Herald, 117 (1939), 1067. "Call to Repentance," (A Letter) Zion1s Herald, 117 (1939), n.p. "A Statement About the War," Christian Century, 56 (1939), 1412. 1940 "Autarky," (A Letter) Saturday Review of Literature, 21 (January 6, 1940), 9. "Chaos and Cosmos: A Meditation for Our Times," Religion in Life, IX (Winter, 1940), 16-30. 700 "German Spelling," (A Letter on the Editorial Page) Boston Globe, January 13, 1940. "The Church, the Truth, and Society," in Schlipp, Ed., Theology and Modern Life, 246-270. "Eugenio Maria de Hostos," American y Hostos, in Philosophical Abstracts, 2 (1940), 19. "Freedom, Purpose, and Value," in Ruth Anshen, Ed., Freedom: Its Meaning (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940)7 24-357 "The Hidden God," Bostonia, 14 (1940), 24-30. "Why I am Going to Vote for Norman Thomas," Zion*s Herald, 118 (1940), 1048. "Los Principios del Personismo," Luminar, 4 (1940), 140-153. 1941 "Duty to God--Duty to Country," Zion's Herald, 119 (1941), 29. "Let's Be Fair," Zion * s Herald, 119 (1941), 74. "History and Biological Evolution," (Discussion— Correspon dence with Edgar Zilsel) Philosophy of Science, 8 (1941), 100-101. "The Faith of the Church," in W. K. Anderson, The Church Today and Tomorrow, 31-36. Communication on Lotteries, Bay State Church Life, 4 (1941), 2. "Is Christianity Reasonable?" Religion in the Making, 1 (1941), 393-414. "Philosophy and Psychology," Contribution to Chapter IX in G. Vaughan, Temples and Towers (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1941), 292* "God Who Is," Christendom, 6 (1941), 583-585. "Are Christian Non-Drinkers Too Meek?" Christian Century, 58 (1941), 1204-1206 "Letter to the Editor," Word Study, 17 (1941), 7. 701 "First Prize," Letter to the Editor, Saturday Review of Literature, (October 18, 1941), 15. "The Given and Its Critics," Religion in Life, XI (1941), 19-20. "The Essence of Christianity," Crozer Quarterly, 18 (1941), 111-125. 1942 "Axiology," in D. D. Runes, Pic tionary of Philosophy, 32-33. "Notes on M. C. Otto's Discussion of 'Christian Essentials’," Crozer Quarterly, 19 (1942), 20-21. "Critica Externa de la Religion," Luminar, 5 (1942), 137-167. A translation into Spanish of Chapter XVI of Brightman’s Philosophy of Religion. "Mr. Eden and Nazism," Letter to the Editor, Christian Century, 59 (1942), 156. "Christianity, Philosophy, and the Teaching of Religion," Journal of Bible and Religion, X (1942), 14-21. "Teaching Religion in War Time," Journal of Bible and Religion, X (1942), 43. Statement about D. D. Runes, signed by E. S. Brightman et al., Journa1 of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 139. "Co-operation," Co-op Review, 9 (1942), 29. "War and the Moral Code," (A Letter) Christian Century, 59 (1942), 232. Reply to letter from S. F. Fredericks, Manager, Philosophical Library, Inc., Signed by E.S. Brightman, et al., Journa1 of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 195-196. Foreword to Frederick deWolfe Bolman, Jr., Translation of Schelling's The Ages of the WorId. "Pacifist and Victorian," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 120 (1942), 934. "Planning for a University's Post-War Problems," Correspondence, School and Society, 56 (1942), 356. 702 ’ ’Freedom to Think,” Boston University News, 28 (No. 8, 1952), 2. "The Versatile James,” Religion in Life, XII (1942-43), 9-19. 1943 "Filosofia ContemporAnea en Norteamirica," Filosofia Letras, 4 (1943), 199-217. "The Best Possible World,” Journal of Bible and Religion, 11 (1943), 7-15, 72. "A Philosopher Sends Greetings,” College Item, 1 (1943), No. 16. "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments," Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 1-6. Also 8-9 and lO-ll, where Brightman answers comments on his article. Comment on Pratt, "The Nature of Value," Third Symposium on Science, philosophy, and Religion" 98-99. Comment on Kroner, "Reason, Reality, Imagination," Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 49-51. Comment on Franck, "The Relativity of Truth and the Objectivity of Values," Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion" 32. Comment on Ferri, "The Meaning of Human Destiny from a Theological Perspective," Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 292-29^T "A Christian View of Nature," in Diffendorfer, Ed., Christian Bases of WorId Order, 67-84. "Personalism in Latin America,” The Personalist, 24 (1943), 147-162. "Personality as a Metaphysical Principle," in Brightman, Ed., Personalism in Theology, 40-63. "Universals and Particulars,” Philosophical Forum, 1 (1943), 3-10. 703 "Democratic Unity," (A Letter) The Humanist, 3 (1943), 90-91. "The Spiritual Life," The British Weekly, 115 (October 14, 1943), 21, 23. "El Existencialismo no es Concepto," Luminar, 6 (1943), 212. "El Mejor de los Mundos Posibles," La Nueva Democracia, 24 (1943), 3-7, 29-32. "Prayers of Dedication," Service Flag Dedication, The Methodist Church of Newton Center, Sunday, September 12, 1943. "Some of the Best Books of 1943: On the Philosophy of Religion," Journal of Bible and Religion, XI (1943), 230. "On 'Good Intentions '," Pacifica Views, 1 (December 17, 1943), 3-4. "Structure and Transcendence in the Thought of Francisco Romero," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1943), 'I34-T41.---------------- --------------- / 1944 "Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, V (1943-44), 219-224. "Personality and Authority," Journal of Bible and Religion, XII (1944), 3-11. "Russia," The Beacon, 68 (1943-44), 4-8. "Birds in Lime Twigs," Religion in Life, XIII (1943-44), 167-176. "Russell's Philosophy of Religion," in Schlipp, Ed., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, (1944), 537-556. "Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace," in Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maclver, Eds., Approaches to World Peace, (N. Y.: Harpers, 1944), 542-556. Comments on Shridharani (170-171), Beck (538-539), Garnett (594-595), Morris (632-634), Northrop (659-661), Weiss 704 (715), and Aubrey (736-737); in Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maclver, Eds., Approaches to WorId Peace, (1944), "Our Thanks to You, Too, Professor Brightman," (A Letter) University Club News, September, 1944, p. 8. Letter, Newport County Sentinel, 21 (November 30, 1944), 1. "Happy School Days," (A Letter) Newport County Sentinel, 21 (December 7, 1944), 5. "Do We Have Knowledge by Acquaintance of the Self?" Journal of Philosophy, XLI (1944), 694-696. "Encuesta de Minerva? Que Puede Hacerse por el Adelanto de la Filosofia en Latinoamerica? Repuesta de Edgar Sheffield Brightman," Minerva, 1 (1944), 284-286. "From Professor Brightman," (A Letter) Jewish Advocate, March 9, 1944. 1945 "In Defense of Colleges," (A Letter) Pacifica Views, 2 (February 16, 1945), No, 37, p. 4. Contribution to "An East-West Symposium," The Biosophical Review, 8 (1945), 34. "Intimations of Immortality," Christian Advocate, 120 (1945), 340-341, 351. "A Personalis tic View of Human Nature," Religion in Life, 14 (1944-45, 216-227. "Conditions of Free Growth,” Pacifica Views, 3 (1945), No. 3, June 22, p. 3. "About Conscientious Objectors," Zion’s Herald, 123 (1945), 499-500. Comments on Garnett (533), Horton (689-690), Finkelstein (817-818), and Wilder (926-927); in Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maclver, Eds., Approaches to National Unity, (1945). Fifth Symposium (1944). "The Philosophy of World Community," in F. E. Johnson, Ed., World Order (1945), 14-30. "Limits to Freedom," (A Letter) Pacifica Views, 3 705 (November 23, 1945), 1* 1946 "Editor's Yes and No," (A Letter) Zion * s Herald, 124 (January 30, 1946), 98, "Brightman's Stand,” (A Letter) Pacifica Views, 3 (February 22, 1946), 2, "South of the Rio Grande," Religion in Life, XV (2, Spring, 1946), 191-201. "Coming Evengs in Religious Thought," Crozer Quarterly, 23 (1946), 137-146. "Anarchism as Egoism," (A Letter) Pacifica Views, 3 (April 5, 1946), 2. "The ^roto-Personal," (A Letter) Walden Round Robin, No, 36 (August, 1946), 3, "Into All the World," in W. K. Anderson (ed.), Christian WorId Missions, (1946), 155-164. "Foreword" to Swami Akhilananda, Hindu Psychology (1946), xi-xiii. "The New Orthodoxy," (An Editorial) Journal of Bible and Religion, 14 (1946), 129-130. "Some Definitions for Personalists," The Personalist, XXVII (1946), 365-373. "Brightman's Reply to Gerstner," Asbury Seminarian, 1 (1946), 115-116. "Query," Walden Round Robin, No. 38, p. 2. "Pension Fund," (A Letter) Zion1s Herald, 124 (1946), 1154. "Conscientious Objectors," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 124 (1946), 2026. "Don Jos£ Vasconcelos," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, VII (1946-47), 453-460. 706 1947 "Toys of Life and Death,1 1 in Motive, 7 (January, 1947), 5* "For C.O.'s," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 125 (1947), 26. "El Mejor de los Mundos Posibles," in Rembao, Ed., Flor de Traslaciones, 99-118. "The Dilemma of Communication," in Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maclver, Eds., Approaches to Group Understanding, 574- 582. Also in same, comments on articles by various writers: 30, 77, 187, 205, 387-388, 455-456, 528-529, 534, 535, 542-543, 544, 551, 572, 586-587, 601, 627, 638-639, 652, 667, 680, 693, 694, 697, 821. "Bowne: Eternalist or Temporalist," The Personalist, XXVIII (1947), 257-265. "Philosophy in the United States 1939-1945," Philosophical Review, 56 (1947), 390-405. "Conscious Objectdfcs," Zion * s Herald, 125 (1947), 867. "Personal Religion," Zion's Herald, 125 (1947), 950. "Culture and Truth," in Bryson, et al., Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture, 509-517. ATso in same, comments on various writers: 436n, 494n, 546-547. "Brother Singh Chided," Zion * s Herald, 125 (1947), 962. "Letter to the Editor," Journal of Bible and Religion, 15 (1947), 261. "Sri Ramakrishna," Prabuddha Barata (or Awakened India), 52 (1947), 452-455. "School of Theology: 1910. Class Report," Bostonia, 21 (No. 3, December, 1947), 29. "Antonio Caso visto desde la Universidad de Boston," Centro de Estudios Filosoficos, Homenaje a Antonio Caso (1947), 185-199. ” 1948 "Brightman Proof-Reads," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 126 (1948), 98. A Letter, Modern Review, 2 (1948), 159-160. "Correspondence on 'Purpose'," 707 "Inter-American Amity," Philosophical Forum, VI (1948), 47. "School of Theology, 1910 Class Report," Bostonia, 21 (May, 1948), 34. "German Re-Education," (A Letter) Commentary, 5 (1948), 572. "Man and Religion," Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam, HollancT™ 1948), 14—16• "How Much Truth is There in Nietzsche?" Christian Century, 65 (June 16, 1948), 593-595. "Personal Religion," in Howard, e_t al., Eds., Proceedings of the Seventh E. M. C*, 178-185. "Comments," Bryson, e_t al., Eds., Learning and WorId Peace, 295, 508, 509. "Little Similarity," (A Letter) Zion's Herald, 126 (1948), 1202. Annotated Bibliography: "Our Faith in God," in C. T. Craig, et al., Eds., The Advance for Christ and His Church, 48-50. "Freedom Threatened," (A Letter) Zion's Herald 126 (April 28, 1948), 386. 1949 "Scholarship in Argentina," (A Letter) New York Times, (March 4, 1949), 20. "Man and Religion," Philosophical Forum, 7 (1949), 3-5. "Respuesta y Lecciin," lil Socialista, 1 (March 22, 1949), 1. (A translation of letter in New York Times, March 4, 1949). "Homenaje al Professor Doctor Manuel Nunez Regueiro," El Ljbro del Homenaje, (1949), 92, 708 1950 "Battle of the Century," (A Letter) Boston Daily Globe, 157 (January 5, 1950), 16. "Dr. Brightman Replies," Zion * s Herald, 128 (1950, 266. "Social Action: Fringe or Foundation?" Zion*s Herald, 128 (1950), 291, 310-311. "The Teaching of Philosophy in Boston University," Philosophical Forum, 8 (1950), 2-8. "Belated Comment," Crozer Quarterly, 28 (1950), 154. "To the Bishops," Zion * s Herald, 127 (1950), 55d. "Contribution to Peace," Zion * s Herald, 127 (1950), 587. letter on MFSA, Christian Advocate, 125 (1950), 1131. "Personalism (including Personal Idealism)," V. Ferm, Ed., A History of Philosophical Systems, (N. Y.: Philosophica1 Library, t950)t 340-352. "Unity in Difference," Bryson, et al_., Eds., Perspectives on a Troubled Decade, 435-452. "The Teaching of Philosophy in Boston University," Harris, Ed., The Teaching of Philosophy, 12-15. "Neo-Orthodoxy — Comments," Religion in Life, 20 (1950), 15-16. "El presente patente," Sociedad Cubana de Filosofia (Pub.), El Tercer Congresso Interamericana de Filosofia, 35. 1951 "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self: Its Distinctive Features," Inge, et aJL., Eds., Radhakrishnan (1951), 287-304. "A Review of Reviews," Philosophical Forum, IX (1951), 2-7. "Captain Matrix," (Letter and Cut) Vineyard Gazette, 106 (No. 1, 1951. Invitation Edition), Sec. F, 8. "Generally Commendable," (A Letter) Zion’s Herald, 129 (1951), 794. 709 "In Memory of Simeon E. Cozad," All Souls Church, Lowell, Mass., In Memoriam: Reverend Simeon Earl Cozad, 23-25. "A Meeting of Extremes: Operationalism and Personalism," Journal of Religion, 31 (1951), 233-243. Comments on Edith Hunter's article, "Neo-Orthodoxy Goes to Kindergarten," Religion in Life, (1 Winter, 1950-51), 15-16. (See under ±950). 1952 "Foreword," to Munk, History and God (1952), iii-iv. "Goals of Philosophy and Religion, East and West," Philosophy East and West, 9 (1952), 6-17. "Batting .250," (A Letter) Christian Century, 69 (1952), 675. "Radhakrishnan and Mysticism," in P. A. Schlipp, Ed., The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1952), 391-415. "Autonomy and Theonomy," Journal of Religious Thought, 9 (1951-52), 6-12. Editorial: "What is Research?" Boston University Graduate Journal, 1 (1952), 45-46. "The Bible Says . . .," (A Letter) Christian Century, 69 (1952), 1162. "Foreword," to Patrick Romanell's, Making of the Mexican Mind (1952), 1-5. D. ARTICLES WRITTEN FOR V. FERM'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION "Absolute," P. 2. "Casuistry," P. 124 "Antinomy," P. 29. "Category," P* 129 "Atheism," P. 44. "Comte, Auguste," P* 191 "Axiology," P. 50. "Dogmatism," P. 232 "Bowne, Borden Parker," P- 86. "Equivocation," P. 254 710 "Evil," pp. 263-265. "Neo-Hegelianism," P« 528 "Finalism," pp. 278-279. "Optimism," P« 549 "Finite God," pp. 279-280. "Personalism," P. 576 "The Given," p. 299. "Pessimism," P* 577 "Hegel," pp. 327-328. "Plato," pp. 592-593 "Hegelianism,"pp. 328-329. "Platonism," pp. 593-595 "Heraclitus," p. 322. "Positivism," P* 600 "Ideal," p. 356. "Reality," P. 636 "Idealism, Epistemological," p. 356. "Reason in Religion," pp. 636-637 "Idealism, Metaphysical " n » P • 356. "Ritschl, Albrecht," P- 664 "Idealism, Practical," P. 356. "Ritschlianism," pp. 664-665 "Matter," P. 476. "Skepticism," P- 713 "Meliorism," P- 479. "Spiritual Life," P« 732 "Metaphysics,"pp. 486-487. "Value," pp. 808-809 E. BRIGHTMAiN*S ARTICLES IN COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA (1957). "Anthropomorphism,” Vol. 2, p. 38. "Bonne, Borden Parker," Vol. 3, p. 634. "Deism," Vol. 6, p. 349. "Howison, George Holmes," Vol. 10, p. 231. "Personalism," Vol. 15, p. 575. "Self," Vol. 17, p. 458. "Theism," Vol. 18, p. 532. 711 F. BRIGHTMAN'S ARTICLES FOR RUNES' DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY. "Axiology," pp. 32-33. "Latin-American Philosophy," p. 165. (With Jos4 A# Franquiz). G. BRIGHTMAN’S ARTICLES FOR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. "Personalism," pp. 867-868. "Panpsychism," p. 838. "Idealism," p. 546. H. BOOKS REVIEWED BY BRIGHTMAN IN VARIOUS JOURNALS. A Adams, G. P., et al., Problem of the Individual, in The Personalist, XIX (1938), 423-428.. Adams, G. P., Man and Metaphysics, in The U. S. Quarterly Book List, 4 7T94877-i28TI Adams, G. P., Man and Metaphysics, in Crozer Quarterly , 26 (1949), 68-70. Adler, A., The Science of Living, in Social Science, 5 (1930), 549-550. Akhilananda, Swami, Hindu View of Christ, in Philosophy East and West, II (1952-53J7 172-173. Allport, Gordon, Personality, in The Personalist, XIX (1938), 433-3551 Alonso, F., Investigacion filosofico-natural: Los Libros del Alma"! Libros I y II; Notas y Reflexiones, Philosophy ani Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944), $54-558. Athern, C., Interchurch Government, under title, "A Study of Present Day Church Conditions," in Zion's Herald, 103 (1925), 1255. 712 Avelino. A., Metafisica Categorial, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2 (1942) , 418-420, Avey, A, E,, Re-Thinking Religion, in the Journal of Religion, i7 (l.$37). 239. Ayer, A, J., Language, Truth, and Logic, in Journal of Bible and Religion^ 5 ^1937), 14^-145, B Bacca, Carcia, El Poema de Parmenidea, in Philosophical Abstracts, 15-16 fl945), 6-7. Baker,H.C,The Dignity of Man, in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, 45 (April 6, 1948), 86-87. Baillie, John, The Interpretation of Religion, in Philosophical Review^ 39 (19307, 418-423. Barrett, Clifford, Contemporary Idealism in America, in Idealismus, 1 (1$34), 267. Beck, L. W., (Translator and editor) The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in MoraT Philosophy, Immanuel Kant, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 10 (1949), 271-274. Bennett,J.C.Christian Realism, in Journal of Bible and Religion^ 9 (194iy^ 176. Bently and Dewey, Knowing and the Known, in United States Quarterly Book List, 6 {1950), 29. Berdyaev, Nicolas, Slavery and Freedom, under title: "Personalist Doctrine Imperiling Personal Unity," in Christendom, 9 (1944), 520-522. Bevan, Symbolism and Belief, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 7 "(1939), 36-37. Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza, in Journal of Bible" "and Religion, 20 (1940), 408-409. Black,M.M.The Pendulum Swings Back, under title: "The Trend Away from Mechanism,* * ' in Social Science, 13 (1938), 337. Blanchard, et al., Philosophy in American Education; Its 713 Tasks and Opportunities, in Christendom, 11 (1946), 63-8?.------ --------------- Boodin, J. E., God, under title: "A Revival of Idealism," in Zion's Herald, 113 (1935), 562-563. Booth, E. P., The Greater Church, in Zion's Herald, 130 (1952), 158^15§T Bosley, 1 1 .AThe Quest for Religious Certainty, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 7 (1^39), 201-202. Bornhausen, Karl, Pascal, in Journal of Philosophy, XVIII (1921), 444-445. Bowman,J.W.^\ Sacramental Universe, in Religion in Life, 8 (1938-39), 631-6327 Brandt, R. B., The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 9 (1941)~ 110. Bridgman, P. , The Intelligent Individual and Society, in Journal oi Social Philosophy, 5 ("1939-40), 71-74. Brightman, E. S., Abstract: "Structure and Transcendence in the Thought of Francisco Romero," in Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 684. Bratton, 1. G .The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit, in Journal of Bible andReligion, 12 (1944), T18-119. Erochard, Victor, Abstract of his, Estudios sobre Socrates y Platon, in Philosophical Abstracts, 4 (Winter, 1940-41), 27. Brownell, Baker, Earth is Enough, in Kansas City Christian Advocate, 82 (193277 12-13. Brunner, Emile, The Divine-Human Encounter, in Journal of Bible and Religi on, 12 (194477 121-122. Bryan, W. J., _In His Image, under title: "Foolish to the Mind," in Zionrs herald, 100 (1922), 389. Bryson, et al., Sources of National Unity, in The Journal of Religious Thought, 3 (19467, 100-102. Bryson, et al., Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture, in U. S. Quarterly Book List, 4 (1948), 279-280. 714 Buchanan, S., Poetry and Mathematics, in Social Science, 6 (1931), 65-86. Buchenau, A,, Kant's Opus Posturaum, in Tatwelt, 13 (1937), 212-213. Buchenau, A., (Ld.), Kant's Opus Postumum in Tatwelt, 14 (1938), 224-225. Buckham, John Wright, The Inner World, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 10“ (T942), 47-48. Buchler, J., Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment, in U. S. Quarterly Book List, 8 Xl952), 34-40. Burch, G. B., Early Medieval Philosophy, in U. S. Quarterly Book Lis t” 7 ( 1951) , 148. Burns.C, 1L,Civilization, in Journal of Social Philosophy, 5 (1939-40), 71-74. Buswell, J, O., Jr., The Philosophies of F. R. Tennant and John Dewey, in Crozer Quarterly, XXVIII (1951), 249-251. C Campbell, I-. , The Forgotten Hume: jLe bon David, in Philosophical Abstracts, 3 (No. 12, 1943), 14. Carr, H. Wildon, The Unique Status of Man, in Journal of Religion, VIII (1928), 643-645. Carr, H. Wildon, Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, in Philosophical Review, 37 (1928), 516-519. Casserley, J. V. L., The Christian in Philosophy, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 19 (1951), 207-208. Casserley, J. V. L., The Christian in Philosophy, in Religion in Life, 20 (1951), 620-622. Carritt, E. F., The Theory of Morals, in Social Science, 5 (1930), 405-406. Caso,A., El Acto Ideatorio, in Philosophy and Phenomeno logical Research, 4 (1943)~ 113-114. Cheney, S., Men Who Have Walked with God, in U. S. Quarterly Book List, 1 (1945), No. 4., 16-T7T 715 Childs. J. L. , Education and Morals, U. S. Quarterly Book List, 6 (1950), 324. Clarke, E. L., The Art of Straight Thinking, in Social Science, 6TT93T7, 70. Coffin, J. H., The Soul Coioes Back, in Christian Century, 46 (1929), 583. Cohen, M.R.The Meaning of Human History, in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, 36 (Apri 1 2i>, 1949), 164-106. College of the Pacific Publications, Publications in Philosophy, I, in Social Science"^ 8 (1933), 200. Comision, La, pro celebration del centenario del natalicio de Eugenio Maria de Hostos, America ^ Hostos, in Philosophic Abstracts, 2 (1940), 19. Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, Perspectives on a Troubled Decade, in U. S. Quarterly Book List" 7T951T7T48.------------- “ -------- Conklin,E.O. ,Man: Real and Ideal, in Journal of Bible and Religion7~T2 (1944)T~Tl9-126. Cooma * 1 A " “ ' Keeper7 in The World Cornford, Francis M., The Republic of Plato, in Philoso phical Abstracts, 2 (No. ii, 1943*57 47 Coviello,A., El Proceso Filosofico de Bergson su BibliograYTa, Una Paaina de His torla, and El Filosofo Hans Driesch, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1943), 115-117. Cunningham, G. Watts, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, in IdealTsmus, 1 (19^4), 267: Curry, Bruce, Speaking of Religion, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 5 (1955^ 127. D*Arcy, M. C., Mirage and Truth, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 3 (19^7*77” D 716 Davidson,P.F . Rudolf Otto’s Philosophy of Religion, in Crozer Quaf-Eer l y 7 T(T^jy,-“74-757 ------- Davidson ,P. J?. 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T., The Things That Matter Most, in Philosophical Abstracts, 7 (T947), lo. Flewelling, R. T., The Person, in Zion's Herald, 130 (1952), 592. Flewelling, R. T., Creative Personality, in The Personalist, VIII (1927), 5^-53. Flewelling, R. T., The Person, in Philosophical Review, LXII (1953), 282-287. Fontanilles, J. C., Humanologia: Cultive de la razon del sentimento y del caracter, in Philosphxcal Abstracts, 1 (1940), 21. Francovich, G., Filosofos Brasilenos: Mendez Samara, Iniciacion en la Filosofia^ Tn Philosophy ancf PhenomenologTcaT Research, 4 (1^44), 544-558. Frank, e. , Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, (1945)\ 113. Freeman, h.\ f (Editor), Peace is the Victory, in Crozer Quarterly, 21 (1944), 369. Frondizi, R., El Punto de Partida del Filosofar, in Philosophy and PhenomenoTogicai Research, 8 (1947), 294-296. Fuller, B. A. G., A History of Philosophy, 2 Vols., in The Personalist, XIX (1958), 4^3-428. Flllttp-Miller, The Saints that Moved the World, in U. S. Quarterly Book List,~~2 (^1946), 18-19. G Garnett, A.C. Reality and Value, under the title: "Metaphysics and Epistemology," in The Personalist, XIX (1938), 428-433. Garnett, A.C.A Realistic Philosophy of Religion, in Journal of Bible and~Religion7 TT (1943), 47-49. 719 Geddes.n.r, .Meaior ies of a College Professor (ed. S. M. Waxman), in Sostonia, 19 (April', 1946), 46. Gomperz, Henrich, Theodor Gomperz: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen ausgewSlt, erlKutert und zu einer Darstellung seines Lebens verkntipf t, I.,Tn The Personalist, XVIII (1937), 429-430. Gonzalez, M., The Call of the Heights, in Bostonia, 12 (1939), 23. Gotshalk, D.tf.Structure and Reality, in The Personalist, XIX (1938), 428-433. Greenberg, M.,The Infinite in Giordano Bruno, in U. S* Quarterly Book~~List, 6 TI950), 29§. H Haering, T.,Hegel: Sein Wollen und sein Werk, Bd. 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A., Enthusiasm, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 19 (1950), 146-147. Krikorian,Y.II.(Editor), Naturalism and the Human Spirit, in Philosophical Review, 54 ^1945), 423-425. Krikorian,Y.H.. Naturalism and the Human Spirit, in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, (19457,ill-113. Kroner, Richard, How Do We Know God? in Crozer Quarterly, XX (1943), 335-336. Kroner,Richard, Culture and Faith, in The Pastor, 15 (February,* 1952), 40. Kuhn, H., Freedom Forgotten and Remembered, in Philosophical Abstracts, 13-14 (1944), 13. Kuhn, H., Encounter with Nothingness, in Occidental, 7 (194977^ 8: Kuhn, H., Encounter with Nothingness, in Journal of Bible and Religion, 17 (1949), 250-251. L Laird,John Theism and Cosmology, in Philosophical Abstracts, 9 (1942),13. Lamont, Corliss, The Independent Mind, in U. S. Quarterly Book Lis t, « * 7 * ( 1951) , 348 . , Lamont, W. D., The Principles of Mora1 Judgment, in Christian Century, 64 J^.9A7)~t 831. Laraprecht,5 . P . Our Religious Traditions, in U. S. 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R., Types of Modern Theology, in Christendom, 3 (1938), 137-139. 723 Lewis, Edwin, A Philosophy of the Christian Revelation, Lewis, Edwin, The Creator and The Adversary, under title: "A Growing Mind,'* Tn The Drew Gateway, 1 (1950), 3-4. Lewis, H. D., Morals and the New Theology, in The Pas

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Creator Price, Ross Eugene (author)

Core Title The Philosophies Of Ralph Tyler Flewelling And Edgar Sheffield Brightman: A Comparison And A Critique

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Advisor Long, Wilbur H. (committee chair), Robb, J. Wesley (committee member), Werkmeister, William H. (committee member)

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