University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Accion Nacional: Mexico'S Opposition Party

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Accion Nacional: Mexico'S Opposition Party

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Content This dissertation has been microiilm ed exactly as received 67-13,752 LUX, W illiam Robert, 1938- ACCION NACIONAL: MEXICO'S OPPOSITION PARTY. U niversity of Southern California, Ph.D., 1967 P olitical Science, general University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by WILLIAK ROBERT 1967 ACGION NACIONAL: MEXICO»S OPPOSITION PARTY by William Robert Lux A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Latin American Studies) June 1967 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A L IF O R N IA T H E G R ADUATE S C H O O L UNIVERSITY PARK LOS A NGELES, C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by .......WILLIAM.. RCBERX.LUX......... under the direction of hi^S...Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y ...... Dean Date. .April . 1 . 8 . , . . . 1 9 . 6 . 7 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairman PREFACE In my opinion, an insufficient amount of scholarly attention has been devoted to the history, organization, doctrines and contemporary role of Mexico^ opposition party— the Partido de Acci6n Nacional. In this doctoral thesis, I have presented a new interpretation of the social revolution in Mexico and a reevaluation of the opposition party. In my research for information on this unstudied facet of the Mexican Revolution, I consulted materials and docu ments at the Doheny Memorial Library of the University of Southern California, the Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley, the Zimmerman Library at the University of New Mexico, the Library of the University of California at Los Angeles, the Library of the University of Texas at Austin, the Library at the University of Illinois at Urbana, the Library of the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, and the Mexican libraries in Chihuahua, Cuerna vaca, Toluca, Pachuca and Guadalajara. I also used many Mexican newspapers and magazines— largely articles which I had microfilmed or collected over the last five years. Extremely valuable too as sources of information were my many Mexican (Panista and others too numerous to list here) friends all over Mexico who spent innumerable hours answer ing— what were to them no doubt— elementary questions, who ii patiently responded to no doubt tedious questionnaires, and who faithfully answered letters. And, finally, I wish to thank my wife, Geri, who faithfully assisted me as I developed this topic from a nebulous idea into a thesis, and my children, Bobby, Tony, and Laurie, who patiently {and sometimes not so patiently) tolerated ray apparent neglect of them. Con muchfsimo carino os dedico esta obra- William Robert Lux Las Cruces, New Mexico June, 1967 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ii CHAPTER Part I I. THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1910-28 ........... 1 II. THE GOVERNMENT PARTY...................... 34 III. THE REGIMENTATION OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE .... 48 Part II IV. THE MIDDLE CLASS REVOLUTION.................... 76 V. MEXICO'S POLITICAL EDUCATION ................ 114 VI. THE OPPOSITION PARTY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY......................................136 Part III VII. THE EDIFICE: NOT PERSONALISM BUT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION..............................176 VIII. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY . 225 IX. THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY...............268 Part IV X. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE........................ 287 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 299 iv PART CHAPTER ONE THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1910-26 With fifty years of hindsight, it is now apparent that the 1910 Revolution erupted primarily because of economic reasons. Most of the arable land was in the hands of about 1 640 individuals of a feudal-type mentality. The Church possessed many large idle haciendas or estates which were free from taxation and which continued to increase in number each year. Many foreigners were given large parcels of land especially along the northern border by the pro- 2 foreigner Porfirio Dfaz regime. This small landed class was influential enough to be exempted (or very nearly exempted) from taxation, thereby leaving the already oppressed classes to bear the burden alone . These estates were never cultivated by their often absentee owners to obtain maximum production. Consequently, agricultural 1 Jesus Silva Herzog, Breve historia de la Revolucidn Mexicana (Mexico, D. F.t Fondo de Cultura Econ<5mica, I960), I, 7. 2 "Entre las referidas entregas de inmensos terrenos, senalamos los casos siguientes: a la Companla Richardson, 22,000 Has., en la regidn meridional del rfo Yaqui, y otra parte en el norte hasta completar 300,000; a la Colorado River Land Co., 325, 364 Has. en el Distrito Norte de la Baja California; a The Paloraas Land Co., en Chihuahua, 776 938 Has.; a L. Bocker, 35 000; a E. P. Fuller, 230 000; a H. G. Barret, 105 702; a The Chihuahua Timber Land Co., 125 000." Silva Herzog, Breve historia, p. 26. 1 2 products—increased in price annually to the point where it was exceedingly difficult for the campesino to provide even a minimal livelihood for his family. Consider, for example, these prices: 1792 IS92 1908 7 .6 0 12.67 13.32 1 .7 5 2.50 4.89 1 .8 0 5.09 10.17 1.63 6 .6 1 10.84 rice, 100 kilos maiz, hectolitro wheat, 100 kilos beans, 100 kiD.os This, briefly, was the socioeconomic situation in Mexico on the eve of the revolution. Officially, the revolution began on October 15, 1910, with the pronouncement of Francisco Maderofs Plan of San Luis Potosf. Madero, who had studied in France and in the United States and had returned imbued with democratic ideas undiluted by the realities of Mexico, was a vegetarian, 4 spiritualist and an idealist but certainly not a social 5 reformer. In his Plan of San Luis Potosl he revealed his interest in the political principles of "effective suffrage 5-------------- These are Mexican pesos. Silva Herzog, Breve historia, p. 34* 4 Before the Battle of Ciudad Jufirez, it was rumored that he conferred with the spirits of Napoleon, Socrates, Benito Juarez, and Cagliostro without arriving at an adequate battle plan. See Timothy G. Turner, Bullets. Bottles, and Gardenias (Dallas, Texas: South-West Press, 1935), P.~5J. "El caudillo de Revolucidn /Kadero7, segun nuestro paracer y otras opiniones, tuvo siempre grandes simpatfas por Limantour y crefa que era indispensable su permanencia 3 and no re-election.” Conspicuously lacking was a program to improve the conditions of the workers, to protect the Indians, to stimulate agricultural development (with all 6 its ramifications), and to combat monopolies. en la Secretarla "de Hacienda. Adem£s, cuando comenzaron las conversaciones de paz, no pensaba que fuera necesaria la renuncia del General Diaz." Jesds Silva Herzog, "La etapa maderista de la Revolucidn," Cuadernos Americanos CIV (mayo-junio, 1959), 193, 198-199. 6 This conspicuous lack is broughc out by the following interview conducted by newspaperman Mr. Timothy G. Turner in Chihuahua just before the Battle of Ciudad Juarez: "Madero was about to go to bed in the ranch house when I walked in....He said he was very sleepy but would give me the interview. I did not fail to tell him how the whole world was waiting on tiptoe for his words, nor fail to hint how important it would be to get out an interview appealing for American sympathy at that time. Holloweyed as he was he stood, and raised his hand in an oratorical gesture while as he held in it a sock he had just removed. So he talked as he undressed....As he talked all seemed so easy. 'All is favorable for us because we have the aid of the people, all the people.' It all seemed so noble, 'Our soldiers volunteer, they are fighting for ideals, for liberty and for their rights. The impressed soldiers of the dictatorship we shall free from their servitud.' It all seemed so progressive. 'We are fighting for the Consti tution for the rights of suffrage and for general and free education.' It all seemed so fair and reasonable. 'I am friendly to the American people but against the trusts of any nation.* It all seemed so just...A few years later it was all to seem so foolish....Madero was now as eager as I that I should get back safely over the border. He had been pleased with what he had told me• My questions had brought out points that had not occurred to him before. His eyes lost their sleepy look. They sparkled." Turner, Bullets. Bottles. and Gardenias, pp. 33-35* 4 Article 3, Paragraph 3 was the only economic portion of the Plan of San Luis Potosf: Taking advantage of the law of uncultivated public lands, many small-property owners— mostly of Indian ancestry— have been deprived of their land by decree of the Secretaria de Fomento or by judgements of the tribunals of the Republic. It is only just that property which has been so arbitrarily taken away, be restored to its«former owners or their heirs, with indemnization. Nevertheless, this brief paragraph caused thousands of campesinos to take up arms emphasizing the need for social revolution. They interpreted Madero*s plan as an expression of their socioeconomic aspirations. Subsequently, Madero*s Plan of San Luis Potosf became the goal of agrarian revolutionaries, such as Emiliano Zapata and his brother who felt that their struggle was over & when Madero became president. However, when Madero denied 7 Francisco Naranjo, Diccionario biogr&fico revolucion- ario (Mexico, D.F.: Imprenta Editorial Cosmos, 1935), PP« 245^24$. B "Luis Cabrera, among others, insisted that Madero had pledged a general and complete restoration of the ejidos, and Madero*s failure to carry out such a program was con sidered by that group to be a negation of one of the funda mental reasons for having fought the revolution. This mis understanding regarding Madero*s promises and ideas about land reform had an adverse effect on his position, it tended to alienate both the conservatives and the radicals— the conservatives because they feared reform which would entail the destruction of the haciendas, and the radicals because they considered Madero to be a traitor to the revolution since he did not comply with his promises." Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero {Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), pp. 220-221. 5 in a statement to the press on June 27, 1912, any intention to expropriate the latifundios and distribute them, they 9 felt betrayed. And when Zapata rebelled, Madero sent a powerful army against him, confirming this belief. MaderoTs apparent lack of interest stemed from a lack of comprehension of the economic situation of the oppressed 10 Mexican. To Madero (whose family was one of the largest landholders in Coahuila), agrarian reform was an evolution ary process. At the Constitutional Progressive Partyfs convention on September 1, 1911, he only briefly mentioned the problem. Later, speaking to a group in Veracruz shortly before the election, he said: I well realize that the situation of the Mexican worker from the economic and social standpoint has not materially changed with the revolution.... The triumph of the revolution has returned political rights and liberties to every citizen; from that point of view the change has been 9 Blanche Blue DeVore, "The Influence of Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama on the Agrarian Movement in Mexico" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, June 1963), P. 35. 10 "El senor Madero no se daba todavfa cabal cuenta de la magnitud de ese problems y de cuan urgente era comenzar a resolverlo sin pdrdida de tiempo. Continuaba embragado de optimismo, soffando en las palabras mdgicas del sufragio efectivo y la no reeleccidn; continuaba sin preocuparse seriamente de las cuestiones sociales y econdmicas, causas substantivas que provacaban la inconformidad y la agitacidn." Jesds Silva Herzog, "El gobierno de Madero y la decena trdgica," Cuaderno Americanos. XVI (septierabre— diciembre, 1957), 155-1551 6 radical and rapid. But from the economic and social point of view the change cannot be so rapid; it cannot be brought about by..a revo lution, nor by laws, nor by decrees. 1 Madero was preoccupied with political problems and reforms; yet were it not for the support of the masses, Madero would have no doubt passed into oblivion like other idealists 12 before him. His only attempt to solve Mexico’s socio economic ills was to commission a study to be made and to promise to work toward the creation of a small, individually 13 propertied class. This was inadequate, yet one must re- 14 member that Madero was in office less than two years. On February 22, 1913, General Victoriano Huerta, com- mander-in-chief of the army, arrested and subsequently 11 Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 211. 12 Silva Herzog, Breve historia I, 131* 13 Lucio Mendieta y Ndfiez, El problems agrario de Mexico (Mexico; Editorial Porrda, S.A., 1959?, P* lCff; see also Blanche Blue DeVore, "The Influence of Antonio Dfaz Soto y Gama on the Agrarian Movement in Mexico,” passim. 14 "The attitude of Madero and his government toward labor was somewhat the same as it was toward the landless peon. Although he ./as an interested spectator of the labor troubles after 1900, labor reform was not one of the items which he stressed in his campaign for the presidency. The Plan of San Luis Potosf contained no reference to labor, nor did any other public ^pronouncement until he issued the manifesto of June 24, 1911; and then he promised no more than an opportunity....” Cumberland, Mexican Revolution. p. 221. 7 15 murdered the President and Vice-president. For ten days his artillery cannonaded the Palacio Nacional terrorizing the population of Mexico City. Once HuertaTs cuartelazo had succeeded, he arbitrarily replaced the duly elected state governors with military officers of proven loyalty. Some Maderista governors were even imprisoned. In Morelos and Quer^taro, even the state legislatures were arrested 16 by Huertista generals. This was accomplished within four or five months. At the same time, in the capital a reign of terror was initiated. On September 23, 1913, Senator Belisario Dominguez, in a speech before his colleagues, directed a distribe, which was labeled his suicide speech, against the 17 Huerta government. Two weeks later, nobody was surprised 15 Diego Arenas Guzman, La consumacidn del crimen (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 19J5), pp« ll-l5- 16 On November 15, 1913, American consular officer at Guadalajara, Will B. Davis voiced his indignation in a re port to Mr. Nelson OfShaugnessy the Charg£ d* Affairs of the American Embassy when Governor Rojas threatened the Maderista state legislature of Jalisco with imprisonment if it did not return the names of the two men selected by the Huerta government as senators to the federal congress from the state of Jalisco. Will B. Davis, Experiences and Observations of An American Consular Officer During the Recent Mexican Revolutions (Los Angeles. California: Wayside £ress, 1920), pp. 9-10. 17 See Belisario Dominguez, Memorable discurso del Dr. Belisario Dominguez (Mexico, D,F.: Bloque Nacional ftevo- lucionario de la Camara de Diputados al Congreso de la Union, 1929), PP. 1-4. g when Dr. Dominguez was murdered. This intolerable act IS aroused and united the members of the Camara de Diputados. It named a commission to demand an investigation of the crime and punishment of the guilty by the Ministro de Gobernacidn. A resolution was passed by which protection was to be requested of the army; otherwise the legislative body determined to move to a more secure location. On October 10, 1913, the Camara was filled with police agents in an attempt to intimidate the Congressmen, who had to force their way into the building. To constitute a quorum, some Congressmen had to be brought involuntarily in order that the session might open. Congress requested Secretario de Gobernacidn Manuel Garza Aldape to withdraw the police. Instead, federal troops surrounded the building to prevent the Congressmen from leaving. Garza Aldape then addressed the legislative body, stating that either the assembly re voke its resolution of the previous evening or the army would take "necessary measures.” When the resolution was not retracted, the inspector general of police entered and arrested 110 Deputies and placed them in the penetentiary• When the Senate learned of the fate of the Deputies, as an act of solidarity, it passed the same resolution and was IE See Jorge Vera Estaffol, La Revolucidn Mexicans . origenes y resultados (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, S. A., 1957). passim. 9 19 likewise arrested. Later in October, General Huerta appointed another Congress which met in session with him in cantinas or bars throughout the city— wherever Huerta 20 happened to be that day. Meanwhile the rest of the country was literally "up in arms” against Huerta*s military governors. When Generals Pascual Orozco and Jerdnimo Trevino decided to support Huerta, the young officers who had followed Madero grouped around Carranza, who refused to join Huerta more for personal ambition than anything else. On March 2 6, 1913, he issued his Plan of Guadalupe. Its theme was the defeat of Huerta and the re-establishment of constitutional 21 order. "Not a word in it referred to the agrarian situ ation which was by that time a principal, if not the main, source of the prevalent unrest and nation-wide state of 22 revolution. Huerta tried to "buy" Zapata who had Silva Herzog, Breve historia. pp. 15-16. 20 Anita Brenner and G. R. Leighton, The Wind That Swept Mexico: The History of the Mexican RevolutTon (toew York and London: Harper and brothers, 1343)» P» 35* 21 Planes politico^ £ otros documentos (Mexico, D. F.: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1954), pp. 137-152. Lena Gordon Lichty, "Mexican Agrarian Reform, 1910- 192&" (Unpublished thesis, University of Southern Cali fornia, 1936) . In addressing his followers at the formulation of the Plan de Guadalupe. Carranza said: "La guerra serA mas breve 10 rebelled against Madero, but he refused to deviate from his 23 revolutionary principles. Doroteo Aranda, known as "Pancho Villa," rose up in Chihuahua against Huerta and won his first victory against the Federales on May 29, 1913, at 24 Saucillo. In Sonora, General Alvaro Obregdn and his group controlled the state. Pablo Gonzalez, Francisco Murgfa, and Antonio I. Villarreal fought in Nuevo Le6n. In Coahuila and Zacatecas, Eulalio and Luis Gutierrez and mientras menos resistencia haya que veneer. Los terra- tenientes, el clero y los industriales son mas fuertes y vigorosos que el Gobierno usurpador; hay que acabar primero con £ste y atacar despu^s los problemas que con justicia entusiasman a todos ustedes, pero a cuya juventud no le es permitido escogitar los medios de elirninar fuerzas que se opondrfan tenazmente al triunfo de la causa. Silva Herzog, Breve historia. pp. 2k, 25- 23 On May 30, 1913, Zapata revised his Plan of Ayala. He said that "la Revolucion continuaria hasta obtener el derrocamiento del pseudo mandatario, por exigirlo la con- veniencia publica nacional, de entero acuerdo con los principios consagrados en este Plan: principios que la misma Revolucion esta dispuesta a sostener con la misma entereza y magnanimidad con que lo ha hecho hasta la fecha, basada en la confianza que le inspira la voluntad suprema nacional." Silva Herzog, Breve historia. pp. 17, 1&» 24 "One of the earliest successes of the Constitu tionalists was at Durango under the leadership of a brute called Urbina, where the soldiers were given twenty-four hours1 license to do as they pleased! The story of the looting and the raping of that poor town will always remain a disgrace to the Constitutionalists general staff and soldiery. They pillaged the bank, they robbed the stores, they chased every comely face that dared venture onto the streets, and they stabled their horses in the parlours of the private houses." Caspar Whitney, Whatfs the Matter with Mexico? (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1916), p. 3?• 11 P£nfilo Natera fought Huertistas. In Michoac£n, Gertrudis Sanchez, Joaquin Amaro, Juan Espinosa y Cordoba, Martin Castregjon, Hector F. Ldpez and others fought HuertaTs Federales as did Alberto Carrera Torres and the Cedillo 25 brothers in San Luis FotosI. General C4ndido Aguilar took much of Veracruz. By April, 1914, Nuevo Le6n, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and San Luis PotosI had been taken by the Division of the Northeast. Generals P£nfilo Natera, Pancho Villa, and Felipe Angeles (with his artillery being the decisive factor) took Zacatecas on June 23, 1914* In the West, General Obregdn took Orendain on July 6-7, 1914, and then occupied Guadalajara. By June 29 General Alberto Carrera Torres had taken Guanajuato, while General Francisco Murgla took Quer^taro— only 2f$0 kilometers by railroad from the 26 capital. In August Obregdn entered Mexico City tri umphantly . 25 Silva Herzog, Breve historia. p. 31. 26 Administrative immorality, corruption, confusion, graft, a conscripted army and disorganization were instru mental in Huerta rs defeat. The few civil liberties that had existed, prior to the Huerta regime, were all removed; in return, the populace did not even enjoy the stability of the Diaz era. Gradually, conservative and vested interests (because of acts such as the forced loans on the established banks in the country) left Huerta to his fate. 12 This was, once again, the social revolution which had surged forth in support of Madero in 1911• It was the oppressed classes struggling for ideals (which it was not to realize for decades to come), led by middle class intel lectuals and liberals, such as those who grouped around Carranza and the other revolutionary leaders, anticipating 27 true social justice. In October the military chieftains and the intel lectuals met at Aguascaliente in an attempt to avoid further civil war. (A serious rift between Villa and Carranza had developed after March of 1914 when Carranza prevented Villa from "executing" General Manuel Chao, the 28 governor of Chihuahua.) The convention, finding itself 27 "Ya no solo les anima el cumplimiento del Plan de San Luis /Fotosf7 y del Plan de Guadalupe, sino ademis aspiran a realizar cambios radicales y profundos en provecho del campesino, del artesano y del obrero que yacian en ia miseria desde hacia mas de cuatro siglos, vfctimas de la explotacidn de una minoria egoista." Planes politicos y otros documentos. pp. 188-190. 28 Previously, Villa had confined himself to merely being rude, disputing Carranza*s orders, and being general ly insubordinate. But by June, 1914, strong animosity had developed between the two "revolutionary" caudillos and their unquestioning followers. This division became more pronounced as Villa and Carranza competed for the glory of taking Zacatecas. Realizing the necessity to continue to cooperate to defeat the federales, after five days of arduous discussions, on July 8, 1914 the representatives of the two generals signed the Pact of Torredn, whereby Villa agreed to submit to the authority of Carranza. The Plan de Guadalupe. which included the provision that Carranza was to become interim president once Huerta was defeated, con tinued to be their guideline. Planes politicos y otros 13 at an impasse, finally nominated General Eulalio Gutierrez as provisional President. The attempt, however, was a failure. The inevitable period of instability and struggle for control between Villa and Carranza continued until about October of 1915* According to Caspar Whitney, who was living in Mexico at the time, Carranza assumed control of the government as First Chief of the Constitucionalista and decreed a pre constitutional period. ...It became a government by manifesto. A decree of the First Chief in charge of the Executive Power had all the effect of law. There was no other law. Having set aside that historic and dearly prized document for which so much blood had been spilled, he allowed his officers to take what they pleased. And the officers did. No property was safe. The street tramways, English- owned and managed, were confiscated and run by the First Chief and his officers. The railroads, the express companies, were seized and operated for war revenue. Houses, automobiles, horses, pianos, furniture, ornaments, clothing, were taken over, used, sold, or destroyed as suited the fancy of the moment and the individual. The submerged SO per cent., as represented by the Carranzista soldiery, slept on the concrete floors of the patios of the luxurious houses occupied by their * self-denying* officers, and waited on them;...*9 documentos. pp. 152-157• 29 Whitney, What*s the Matter With Mexico?, pp. 128, 129. 14 Meanwhile the Villistas and the Carranzistas (the self-made generals and their idle troops) fell to quarrel ing; they seemed to vie with one another in their looting, plundering, destroying the various unfortunate towns that fell under their control. To fully grasp the chaotic con dition of Mexico at this time, one need only read some of the eyewitness accounts which portrayed the suffering of the Mexican people during this period which should have been its liberation. The United States consular officer at Guadalajara, Dr. Will B. Davis, reported a disgusting list of atrocities committed by the Constitucionalista and 30 Villista forces against the Mexican people. Clergymen were driven into hiding, forced to make their living at other professions. "Each time one faction abandoned the city and another occupied it, there was a period of looting of both private residences and business houses." Davis reported that the factions were equally sanguinary. He continues on to enumerate numerous instances where entirely innocent citizens were murdered, women violated, property destroyed all by so-called revolutionaries (who were to be 30 ~ Davis cites the brutal murders of at least five priests in act of administering extreme unction to fatally wounded soldiers (of both sides) cn January 3* 1915* Will B. Davis, Experiences and Observations of an American. pp. 13, 45* idolized by subsequent generations): Nearly all the horses and mules of the various haciendas have been commandeered for military purposes; and even the ox, that was wont to pull the Mexican plow, has been sacrificed; if not to regale the inner man of the soldiery, then for their hides alone, either to be used in the purchase of yet more death-dealing missiles, or to swell the bank accounts of revolutionary leaders, in banking institutions somewhere beyond the confines of their own country. The spirit of wanton destruction that has characterized the conduct of the various armed gentry camping on the haciendas of this State, has been most abominable. Not satisfied with the commandeering of necessary supplies and animals, their practice has been to throw upon the ground at each feeding? corn or other grain in super abundance, and in such extravagance, that there was trampled in the earth as much again as their consumed; and on leaving, destroying whatever they might not be able to carry away with them. The irrigated lands of many haciendas, where the last winter*s crop of wheat, rye and barley were growing, have so much been made the pasturage and stamping grounds of the animals of the hordes of soldiers encamped upon them, that when the season for reaping came, the fields were as bare as unto so much waste land. Along nearly all of the frequented thorough fares of the State, the small farmers— "rancheros" — have abandoned their homes, and taken refuge in some neighboring village, town or city. About the houses of these neglected farms can frequently be seen domestic animals— especially dogs— already reduced to walking skeletons. Mr. A. W. Earnest, manager of the American Club here, told me that a friend of his recently travelled all the way from Mascota to Ameca on horseback, and that he told him that everywhere he travelled, he had found such as is related above to have been the case without exception whatever— that whereas, in ordinary times, these small farms showed signs of cultivation, and growing crops were in evidence on every hand, 16 now there cannot be seen a growing thing that promises food for man or beast. Many of the larger farms— "haciendas"— plantations— have been abandoned in like manner — in some cases because of the want of horses, mules and oxen to work them, and in others because their owners have become too much dis heartened to make further attempts to produce crops only to see them abused in the growing, and afterwards, the little that might be garnered after maturity, confiscated by the soldiers of one or the other of the revolutionary factions, or by some of the many roving bands of predatory nondescripts.31 Another realistic account of these violent years is that of Caspar Whitney, who spent two years traveling around Mexico taking notes on occurrences. He enumerates incident after incident where soldiers and officers alike 32 deserted a defeated general or colonel to join forces with a more generous or victorious general, {which meant 31 Davis, Experiences and Observations of an American, pp. 149, 150. 32 Regarding the patriotic fervor of the Mexican sol dier, Whitney states that they were more concerned with their salary than the ideas (if any) for which they fought; unfortunately, the Mexican officers were just as unpro fessional. In an attempt to explain this unprofessional ism, Mr. Caspar offers this observation: "The revolution has raised to unaccustomed importance and authority all kinds of low born, ignorant men who naturally do not know how to use their new power and make it the medium of domi neering over their men and of vain-glorious display in their little world." Whitney, What*s the Matter With Mexico?, pp. 60-62. 33 more looting. One gunboat officer who switched fealty from Madero to F£lix Dfaz and back again stated: "How can 34 one be a patriot if he is on the losing side?" Not only did the average Mexican officer and soldier demonstrate an avaricious attitude, but he usually lacked even the faintest concept of what the revolution was all about. Witness, for example this conversation cited by Whitney: An Englishman who had a ranch nearby and chanced to be in the town, asked the looting jefe what it was all about, why he fought and robbed these people who had taken no part in the battle or the controversy and done him no harm. "A just cause," replied the jefe. "Yes, I know," per sisted the Englishman, "but what is it about? You destroy and carry off the crops of your fellow countrymen, you loot their stores, you misuse their wives and daughters, what’s the reason, why do you do this?" "A just cause, and that’s all I'll say, a just cause," replied the jefe; and that was all the Englishman could get out of him. And it is about all I was ever able to get out of any Mexican high or low who endorsed the riot of anarchy. A riot of anarchy, a riot unrestrained and atrocious indeed— fittingly describes the activi ties of the revolutionists of this last "passion for peace" explosion, whether under Madero, Huerta, Villa, or Carranza.35 33 Whitney, What’s the Matter With Mexico?, pp. 25, 29. 34 Ibid .. p. 30. 35 Ibid.. p. 3 4. 18 Greed, selfish motives, personal ambitions obscured by lofty, patriotic statements were the usual motivations: Such are the workings of the Mexican mind and habit; such the rule of revolution as we have more often seen it. Constitutional govern ment as the excuse for leaders to exercise the profession of politics— politics, the open sesame to the grab bag. Apart from the few high minded, loyal Mexicans, for whom jail has been the usual reward of constancy, patriotism has served as a mere phrase and a cloak to hide the opportunist. ..•The usual procedure of a revolutionist party upon successfully carrying a town, is to first search out the women; second, to loot, third, to destroy. Such is the fight for "consti tutional" government: destruction and brutality visited upon their own harmless people; and some of their exploits have been fiendish even in this day when "flaming fire" and gas and burning tar are the usual weapons of attack. Of the atroci ties committed in Northwestern Mexico alone, I have eleven sheets of legal cap fully covered with brief statements— the longest being five lines— of murders, kidnapping, seizure of property, rgbbery, and ruthless destruction of livestock!^ In summary, Whitney*s account, like that of others, is a series of atrocities against the Mexican people. These two accounts are typical of what happened wherever the "patriots" roamed. By the Fall of 1915 Villa and his supporters were forced to submit to the Carranzistas. (At least Villa saw that his Presidential aspirations were unobtainable as long as Carranza had the tacit support of the United States1 35------------------ Whitney, What1s the Matter With Mexico?, pp. 32, 33- 37 government after October 19, 1915*) Carranza had become generally accepted as the provisional leader of Mexico by the spring of 1916, but soon demonstrated that he was as incapable of establishing order as President as he had been 33 as a victorious general. The situation became so bad that Carranza, evidently to conceal from the outside world the true condition of Mexico, ordered the expulsion of the Red Cross. In a report from a Red Cross worker on file in the State Department at Washington appears the following: In conclusion, I only regret that some of our higher-up government officials could not have been with me to see the brand of individuals that are now in control of the situation in Mexico. They do not represent any of the good element in Mexico....Not a single one of the several rebel chiefs, who have been in power, can be said to represent the wishes of the Mexican people. They 37 His reaction, in his animal-like way, was to retali ate: in January, 1916 he stopped a train at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua, and murdered sixteen United States engineers and two months later he raided Columbus, New Mexico murdering sixteen men, women, and children. This was Pancho Villa. 33 Because of the impending break with Villa, Carranza had attempted to come to an agreement with Zapata. On August 23, 1914, the negotiations were begun at Cuernavaca but little was accomplished because of Zapata*s intransi gence. He insisted that the socioeconomic ideals embodied in his Plan de Ayala be foremost. Carranza, a great land holder himself, did not intend to carry out such a compre hensive land reform program, although occasionally there was talk about the need to resolve the agrarian problem. Conse quently, hostilities began between the Carranza and the Zapata factions. 20 do represent a small faction and all of the laws made and enforced in that time have been for the benefit of the officials and their friends and not for the people....They are lawless and have no more idea of patriotism than a yellow dog. They are mentally incapable of handling the situation. General Elisondo, in command at Monclova and also in command of a district larger than Massachusetts, is a boy of twenty-four years, uneducated and absolutely irresponsible. General Zuazua, formerly classed as a saloon bum around Eagle Pass, a Lieutenant-Colonel in command of a territory as big as Rhode Island, was sent to the Mexican army some fifteen years ago, having been arrested for stealing horses and cattle. These are not the exceptions but the rule of the character of the men who now dominate one of the largest states in northern Mexico. This fact is largely due to Carranza who has allowed them to do as they please and they have no respect whatever for hini, each man ruling his district as he sees fit.39 And then there was the social situation which Carranza did little to ameliorate. In an article in the New York Sun on January, 1913, an investigator gave this report on con ditions in Mexico: Mexico City is full of starving Indians, insuf ficiently clad and with no shelter to protect themselves at night to escape the icy winds that sweep down from the encircled snow-clad mountains when the sun goes down. They huddle together for warmth on recessed doorsteps, passing the bitter night in a physical state that must somewhat approach that of the hibernating bear, and in the morning they crawl into a sunny place and slowly thaw into life again, when they get up and resume their pathetic quest for food.1* 0 39 Thomas Edward Gibbon, Mexico Under Carranza (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1919), PP* 7-10. 40 Ibid.. pp. 11-12. 21 In 1919 the Red Cross report stated that the conditions continued to exist: ...I am sure that on that walk I saw at least three thousand miserable persons crouching in recessed doorways and other places that offered some slight protection from the wind. They were lying as close together as they could get, often with a dog in the center of the pile to contribute the warmth of its body. They were men, women, and children. Most of the latter were naked, though a few had a raggec remnant of a coat or While these conditions continued, Carranza himself was ex porting some thirty-seven thousand tons of food stuffs from Veracruz and pocketing the proceeds. (Statement made in Senate by Senator Albert Fall June 2, 1916.) The best thing that can be offered in Carranzafs favor is that he called the constitutional assembly in the autumn of 1916 which met at Quer^taro. Even this act, according to some, was "in order that his name, like that of Juarez, might go down in history in association with a code of laws, 42 and partly to legalize his dictatorial ambitions." Questioning Carranzafs revolutionary convictions, one Mexi can historian asked: "What measures did Carranza take after the true revolutionaries defeated him in the Constituent Henry Bamford Parks, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1^60), P• 3^0. pair of trousers. 41 Gibbon, Mexico Under Carranza. p. 12. 42 22 Congress with articles 3, 27, and 123? None whatsoever.” He let the promise of land for the peasants remain a promise. He betrayed the working classes once he had triumphed over Villa and no longer needed their support by prohibiting strikes and threatening to shoot any violators. Luis Morones was sentenced to death. Even had Carranza been a true revolutionary, he could have not carried out a program without difficulties. For while he had annual income 46,000,000 pesos greater than that of the Dfaz administration, nearly two-thirds of it (for the year 191$) was devoted to maintaining the military which was his 43 salvation and at the same time his greatest danger. By 1920 the country had had enough of this so-called "revolutionary.” In May Carranza was murdered as he fled the country leaving Obregdn the logical successor to political power. In 1917 Obregdn, disillusioned with the deplorable situation of graft and corruption in the Carranza govern ment, had retired to his estate in Sonora. Disgruntled labor leaders ran to him. Politicians of many shades sought his aid or opinion. But astutely he kept himself free from any connection with the disintegrating admini stration of his former chief. He parried questions and demands with the statement that he was a private citizen, and such matters should 43 Gibbon, Mexico Under Carranza, p. 33* 23 be discussed, not with him, but the proper authorities. When political foes lashed out at him increasingly in papers and pamphlets, he simply urged his partisans not to reply, not to defend him.44 His technique, if such it can be called, consisted simply of permitting the Carranza clique to commit suicide, and that they proceeded to do with greater efficiency and dis patch than they revealed in anything else.**5 By 1920, as we have seen, 0breg6n*s strategy succeeded: he 46 was elected without opposition. Obregdn was a revolutionary, but in a different way. "Unlike some of the other leaders, Obregon was not a 44 He was tremendously popular with the military which was a key factor in those turbulent years, "...embraced... tendencies, radical and reactionary. He consciously built himself power on the Mexican confusion,...Obregon1s presence on the scene, his entire political actuation blurred all issues. He played peasant against laborite, pitted both against the militarist;...and out of disorder used his strength to attract foreign adhesion." Carleton Beals, "Mexico Rises out of Chaos," The Nation (April 3, 1929) , p. 393. 45 Donald D. Johnson, "Alvaro Obregdn and the Mexican Revolution" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1946), p. 126. 46 "His campaign partisans included the old-line mili tarists, Manzo, Escobar, the communists, and the extreme radical peasants. At the same time he had become one of the largest landowners in the country, and he had big personal dealings with California capitalists and the Standard Oil of California. He was capitalizing for his own purposes indigenous aspirations, and local loyalties. He still controlled part of the Yaquis, though he had also stirred up a war against them to dispossess them of their traditional valley-lands. He was even playing possum with the Catholics." Beals, "Mexico Rises out of Chaos," The Nation (April 3, 1929), p. 393* 24 prohibitionist, not an ascetic; he was for the abundant life, and nobody ever called him a utopian. He knew where the enemy was, but had no illusions about bringing the 47 millennium overnight." His idea of land reform, for example, was a cautious, yet a continued program of educa tion and advance, rather than a simple, mere, mass distri bution of land. Obregdn probably never fully relinquished his idea that the individual farmer would be induced to work harder to improve his lot if he had the obli gation (and the opportunity) to pay for his own land, rather than looking to the State to support him. But he could see beyond the monetary incen tive. Most of all he traced the backwardness of the Mexican agricultural worker and small farmer to the lack of education in rural areas. It was not simply cultural information that the President had in mind, but knowledge of the simple, basic facts of personal hygiene, sanitation and the ef ficient utilization of the soil and resources which the peasant-farmer had before him.^B From this statement it is clear that he did not favor the collective agrarian approach through the e.iido, as would be later forced upon the desperate, land-hungry pe6n. Obregdn "believed that the Revolutionary creed left room for pri vate initiative and enterprise such as had raised him from the status of wage worker to that of landowner. Thus it was possible for him to regard his own economic status and 47 Jaime H. Plenn, Mexico Marches (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 193$), P» 113 • 43 Johnson, "Alvaro Obregon," p. 167* 49 his political radicalism as compatible.” 25 Being more anticlerical than Carranza (yet less so than Calles would be) , one of 0breg6nfs big political problems 50 was the Church. Fortunately, by the time Obregdn assumed the Presidency, his antireligious fervor had abated somewhat. Permission was given in 1922 for the opening and recon struction of thirteen Catholic and ten Protestant churches; in 1923, the figures were twenty-four and eleven respective ly. In his public addresses the Executive showed all respect for the Catholic Church, but he did not hesitate to denounce certain types of libelous attacks generally attributed to Catholics.... On January 11, 1923, a quite unusual cere mony was held on the mountain el Cubilete, close to Silao, Guanajuato. The Apostolic Delegate, Monsenor Philipi, laid the cornerstone of a monument dedicated to ”Cristo Rey {Christ, the King)f" eleven prelates and numerous priests took part in the ceremony. It was estimated that 4^ In Sonora, he had assigned himself the monopoly on handling chickpeas, an important Mexican crop. He organized the growers, most of whom liked the idea because they had been bilked before by more exacting monopolists. Obregdn was noted for a prodigious memory and for his endless reper tory of anecdotes and wise cracks. One of his favorites was: "I am better for Mexico, for the simple reason that I canft steal as much as the others. I have only one arm.” Johnson, "Alvaro Obregdn," p. 119. 50 Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution 1914-15. The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana Universi ty Press, 195b) , PP* 186, 1&9, 191, 192. 26 fifty thousand people witnessed the most imposing of ceremonies in this place, practically the geo graphical center of the country. Many considered this simply a part of a definite program of se curing the allegiance of the people by an elaborate and solemn religious spectacle which would involve the outstanding leaders of the Church in an act that publicly violated the Constitution.*! Two days later, on January 13, Obregdn ordered Monsefior Philipi expelled (being an alien) from the country for violating Article 33 of the Constitution which banned such public religious worship. A United States' citizen questioned Obregdn soon thereafter: Why, if you consider every minute technical violation of law by the clergy so reprehensible, do you tolerate it in many instances as in the schools? ...Is there any reason why the clergy should be more respectful of the laws than the authorities sworn to enforce them? "Yes, it is illegal," President Obregdn admitted, "and we are not unaware of the menace of these Catholic schools whose aim is to inculcate anti-government and anti-revolutionary propaganda. But at present there is not money enough nor facilities for the Government to teach all Mexican children. It is preferable that they receive any kind of instruc tion than grow up illiterate."52 While Obregdn had many shortcomings as a great social revolutionary leader, he did, however, make token overtures 5! Wilfred Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico. 1857- 1929 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1931) , PP. 294-295. 52 Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York and London: The Century Co., 192^T, p. 220. 53 to the landless, allow freedom of the press, tolerate criticism in Congress, have the support of labor, and permit Jos£ Vasconcelos to initiate educational reforms. 54 Like Carranza, he, too, had to contend with militarism. Only his tolerance of its corruption and his diplomacy avoided a similar fate. In 1926 General Plutarco Calles succeeded Obregon. His election marked the beginning of a new era. In his 53 For the four years, 1921-1924, of the Obregdn administration there were distributed a total of 4,602,420 hectares. 367,994 of which were in provisional grants and 1,234,42b hectares in definitive grants. Just after the close of 0breg6nfs administration it was announced that about one-third of the land distribution had been completed. DeVore, "The Influence of Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama on the Agrarian Movement in Mexico," p. 257 as quoted from Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico* 1857-1929. PP* 303-304. 54 "...it was not a national army. It was a col lection of chieftains, if one wishes to speak in terms of their Indian lineage, or of robber barons, if one prefers the Spanish analogy....A little less unruly than in the heyday of civil war...^but7 still corrupt, dissolute, dis orderly ... Obregdn created fifty-four new generals and promoted thirty-three for 'meritorious conduct in the field.' In addition he bestowed gratifications of from twenty-five to fifty thousand pesos (while school-teachers were going un paid) , automobiles, and other bounties. Most of the loyalty he— and the nation— got, he paid for." Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. pp. 319, 320, 321, 322. 2$ Plan of Agua Prieta he had complained of violation of States1 rights, and proclaimed for restoration of democracy. ...Unlike many other ' Plans’ that have appeared during the last thirty years, the Plan of Agua Prieta did not offer any advanced social program or any class appeal. It was strictly an anti- Carranza document...."55 Calles understood the aspirations of the Mexican people and upon taking office he too made the usual heretofore unful- 56 filled revolutionary promises to the masses. According to some, he was sincere. Be that as it may, his admini stration is remembered primarily for its attempts to "/But7...Calles, in power violated States* rights, nullified individual rights, and kept democracy hidden in the Pandora's box of the Revolution." Plenn, Mexico Marches, p. 115* Italics are mine. 56 In an article published in The Nation, for con sumption in the United States, Calles revealed this aware ness of Mexico's social ills and avowed progress toward their removal. In Mexico,...we are confronted with the problem of making heard and felt, and of answering, the long inaudible cry of a submerged people, a people which throughout centuries was enslaved mentally and physically, politically and economi cally . In part the shackles of our people have been broken, but the devastating effect of their long serfdom is still visible on every hand. It is to the task of completely emancipating them, of making them happy, healthy, hopeful men, women, and children, citizens of the republic in the fullest sense of the word, conscious of both their rights and their duties, that the present govern ment is dedicating its every effort. The premises of our revolution, a revolution which in varying forms has gone on for a century, of which the 29 enforce the anticlerical clauses of the constitution. The Church-State conflict began when Archbishop Jose Mora y del Rfo criticized three times the anticlerical provisions of the constitution. The government "met what it considered a challenge by the clergy by enforcing the constitutional articles in controversy which had hitherto remained unen forced. It deported foreign priests. It closed Catholic 57 primary schools and nunneries. "The Government required all priests to register. The Episcopate thereupon ordered them not to comply and to withdraw from the churches on the day that the new legislation was to become effective July 53 31, 1926." Almost immediately, the antagonism between the Church 59 and the State erupted into open warfare; some overzealous last decade and a half has witnesses merely a fuller manifestation, have been generally ac cepted . The carrying out of a definite program of material betterment remains before us. Plutarco E. Calles, "Mexico Today," The Nation, 121 (July 1, 1925) 13, 19- 57 Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage, p. 275* 53 Ibid.. p. 277- 59 "One other grievous error of the Calles administra tion, which must be recorded is the ruthlessness incidental to the suppression of the revolts, Catholic and political, in the years 1926-27... .was the summary execution /which/ was wholly unjustifiable when applied to civilians, __who were/ taken from their homes on suspicion, no matter how welT founded, tried secretly by court-martial and shot." Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. p. 664- 30 believers armed themselves and endeavored to defend the 60 Church. By July, 1927, the uprising was more or less suppressed, but was not resolved until June, 1929, when 61 President Emilio Portes Gil announced a settlement. It would have no doubt terminated much sooner had it not been 62 for the military. 5S------------------ Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico. 1857-1929. P* 370. 61 "It was agreed that priests in charge of property should be registered but others were not required to go through the formality; religious instruction in public and private schools was prohibited, but such instruction in "chair confines" was to be allowed; also church members were guaranteed the right to exercise the right of petition for amendment, repeal, or passage of any law. Since the first provision permitted the bishops to designate those priests who were to register, this was equivalent to recog nition of the ’corporate rights of the Church and the au thority of the Bishop of the diocese.’ On June 27, 1929, mas was celebrated in eleven Catholic churches in the Federal District for the first time since July 31, 1926. By that date ninety priests had been certified for regis tration." Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929. p. 278. 62 "It was the Mexican military who would not let it die. They profiteered and patrioteered on its continuance. They accepted the opportunity with a whoop. Under it any one could be denounced and robbed. In conservative Jalisco, where greater sympathy with the rebels did not necessarily imply overt aid, merchants, hacendados, and rancheros of known Catholic affiliations were systematically arrested and their property confiscated* But the lower middle class— and the poor--who had through heart-breaking toil acquired a cow, a pig, and a few chickens, suffered most* They were swept into the flood of human jetsam, wearied in body, anguished in soul, staggering under their household goods, their pathetic children dragged along--exiles and fugitives in their own country, a prey to misery, disease, and death* Recruits 31 In the name of social reform Calles steadily "concen- 63 trated power in the hands of a ruling clique." He, like other once-liberal leaders, found "it inexpedient to push 64 the 'socialization1 program further." By the time he left office, Calles was an ally of antirevolutionary 65 interests. What was the Revolution's record of achievement to 1934? Was it a successful revolution? If so, how? Before one can answer these questions, one must first recognize what goals or objectives of the Revolution were. And this for banditry or the next revolt! All this in the name of putting down the enemies of the Revolution! True, the Catholics who started the rebellion were to blame. But what would one think of a doctor who kept open and deliber ately infected an easily healable wound so that he might profit?" Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. p. 329; see also the informative article Carleton Beals, "Civil War in Mexico," The New Republic, 27 (July 6, 1927) , 166-169. Henry Bamford Parks, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 19^0), p. 381. 64 Mary Margaret Harker, "Organization of Labor in Mexico Since 1910" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1937), p. 256. 65 According to Professor Simpson: "...In the four years from January 1, 1925, to December 13, 192&, over 3.2 million hectares of land were distributed to 1,576 villages and 307,607 ejidatarios....;" Lesley B. Simpson, Many Mexicos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 96-97. 32 is difficult to ascertain; for they did not evolve in a systematic universal manner. There was no definite pro gram, doctrine, or logical development of ideals which resulted in what can best be classified as the ideology of the Revolution. Ideological formation was very nebulous and anonymous in character with no principle affecting all states at the same time and with the revolutionary clauses of the constitution being only sporadically enforced, but never completely. If one can measure progress by the number of Mexicans who benefited, the revolutionary struggle and government action were only a qualified suc cess, the peon^ the campesino» and the Indian benefited only slightly while their revolutionary leaders profited much. Obviously the Mexican Social Revolution was in a 67 crisis. It had been betrayed by personalistic, false revolutionary leaders who had often used the conditions which had spawned the Mexican Social Revolution to further 55------------- "Up to date 13 *6 per cent of the Mexican rural population has received thirteen and a half million acres in accordance with the agrarian laws of destitution1 and fdotation. Carleton Beals, "Mexican Military Adventurers in Revolt," Current History 31 (May, 1929), 223* 67 Silva Herzog, "La Revolucidn Mexicana en crisis,” Cuadernos Americanos II (February, 1943) » 32-33* 33 their personal objectives. They had used revolutionary rhetoric to promise much but had actually given the people 63 little, all the while wisely continuing to use the mystique of the Revolution to hold its imagination. There had been much violence, much rhetoric, and little positive social action. The era, however, had made it evident to the world that there was a need for a social revolution, and had produced another anomaly which Mexico was to know for decades to come— the authoritarian government party. 63 Plenn, Mexico Marches« p. 36. CHAPTER TWO THE GOVERNMENT PARTY The summer of 1928 marked the beginning of a seven-year period (1928-1935) in Mexican history when Calles "made and unmade presidents, shifted their cabinets at will, and as- 1 sumed direct control over the political apparatus." When one considers the dissident elements and the many opposing political factions in Mexico at this time, this feat was remarkable if not laudable. How and why did Calles do it? When Obregon was assassinated in the summer of 1928, a political vacuum was created. Calles1 first move was to assemble the military chiefs and state governors to avoid the inevitable coup and to demand "that they renounce all Presidential ambitions and unite behind a single candi- 2 date." Several weeks later, Congress elected Emilio Portes Gil provisional President, while Calles retired to private 3 life to manipulate the first of a succession of puppets. 1 Nathaniel and Silvia Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico. The Years of L^zaro Cardenas (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 94. 2 Ibid.. p. 87. 3 "...The first of the puppet presidents, Emilio Portes Gil, was a radical agrarian who represented the revolution ary current of the small middle class. His successor, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, had the narrow social perspectives of the provincial rich. With Calles1 aid, Ortiz Rubio 34 35 Later in the year, Calles announced a nascent democracy, a new system which was to confederate all the political forces into a National Revolutionary Party giving all freedom of expression. Of the political forces, the military was foremost 4 5 which is not surprising. It was a corrupt but powerful strangled the agrarian movement, reduced land distribution to a minimum, and savagely persecuted radical peasant and labor groups. The last of the satellite presidents, General Abelardo Rodriguez, was a member of the inner circle of revolutionary millionaires who had won wealth and power through subservience to Calles. This former miner had acquired canneries, hotels, health resorts, and gambling casinos to become one of the twelve richest men in Mexico. A representative of large capital, Rodriguez pursued a policy of energetic construction of public works, revived land distribution, reorganized the Governments agrarian banks, and sought to impose compulsory arbitration on the trade unions." Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico. p. 95; Miguel Alessio Robles / fcist<3ria polTtica de la Revolucidn (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1938), p. 413. 4 "There are also too many generals in active service— as there have always been. Mexico has one general to every 335 men, compared with ItalyS 1157, Frances 1662, and 1755 in the army of the United States. A nation that is cutting down expenses, discharging five-peso-a-day clerks in the interest of economy and has by law reduced the priests to a handful on the ground that an excess beyond that number con stituted a needless charge on the community, can ill afford to continue this useless burden. Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. p. 330. 5 y- -r "Generals [_had/ established themselves as virtual war lords of states, or regions, ...they had been allowed to re main in control of the territories on the condition that they cooperate with the Federal government. Sometimes these Revolutionists* became protectors of vested interests in their areas for the Raul.1 When order was fairly well reestablished, it remained 36 reactionary force that restrained any true revolutionary activity that Obregdn or Calles may have wanted to carry out. To control the military, Calles set to building an equally powerful counterforce centered about labor in general, and the Confederacidn Regional de Obreros Mexicanos 6 (CROM) in particular. This was CROM's first opportunity to prove itself; and with government protection, it was to grow while other labor groups such as the Confederacidn General for Calles to place the generals in big business. He showed them that, by playing together and not fighting each other, they could reap huge fortunes. Not a few of them made millions— in dollars, not pesos; most acquired one, or several, large landed estates. It would be difficult to name a general in Mexico today who has not one or more choice properties. One of Calles* generals is credited with taking 530,000,000 out of Mexico, although 510,000,000 probably would be closer to the truth. Calles maintained his power for many years by serving, to a large extent, as a clearing house for the division generals in matters of business as well as politics. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the generals, as an outcome of the Revolution, became the new ruling class of Mexico." Frank L. Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 193£), pV 203. 6 Calles had entered office with the complete support of CROM, and had appointed Luis Morones Minister of Indus try, Commerce, and Labor. "In moments of national crisis the C.R.O.M. mustered its strength for the administration. The Labor parade in the capital at the time of the incipient Catholic rebellion in August, 1926, was such a show of support." Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. p. 359. 37 7 de Trabajadores diminished in strength. (This made the difference between successful and unsuccessful labor at tempts to secure benefits.) Labor unionism which might have represented the needs of the laborer, but which refused to 8 ally itself with the PNR, was destroyed. Labor in turn was held in check by other groups such as the fascist-oriented Gold Shirts which "encouraged under the period of Calles domination, in order to combat militant trade unionism, had 9 become a strike-breaking organization." 7 "Rival labor organizations...in a contest with the C.R.O.M. were invariably worsted. The C.G.T. was given a virtual death blow in the carmen's strike of 1923— although its violence at that time more than justified such a govern mental course. An independent union among the street-car workers subsequently formed met a similar fate in 1925. Beneath the railroad workers1 strike in 1926-27, which was defeated, lay the rivalry of the two great organizations, the railroad workers desiring to maintain their autonomy, the C.R.O.M. aspiring to control them." Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage, p. 359. 8 Writing in 1928, Ernest Gruening summarized the Mexican labor situation as follows: "...the masses who ostensibly ’rule* are merely manipulated, sometimes for their benefit, but invariably for the leaders1 ....Beneath the insistent assertion that principles and not persons guide the C.R.O.M. the Hispanic tradition of 'personalism* has only in a measure been shaken off. At present what is called laborismo by a large section of Mexican workers has in it far more Moronismo than many of them perhaps realize. This liderismo (leaderism) previals in the other labor organizationsbut in none of them have the leaders achieved the dominance either in their own organization or in the community comparable to that of the C.R.O.M. directors." Johnson, "Alvaro Obregdn," pp. 15-16. 9 Plenn, Mexico Marches. p. 79. 32 Another important pressure group which was incorporated 10 was the local caciques in each patria chica. One writer observed: Under the kingfish system, the head man's word was law. Like the gods, he controlled the fate of human beings. They might plead with him, they might beg for his mercy, but none dared to question his right to pass judgement. There were big king- fish and little kingfish, and this system of ruling — developed to a fine point under Porfirio Diaz and his "cientificos”— was the antithesis of popu- lar government, even when it took republican forms. For a more detailed description of the cacique system in operation with all of its crudities, one need only consult Ernest Gruening's account based on the confidential files of 12 the Secretarfa de Gobernacidn. By carefully counterbalancing these special interest groups, Calles was able to consolidate his political machine nr-------------— ,T.. .bossdom, known in Mexico as the cacique (chief tain) system, has persisted right on through the twenty- eight years of the Mexican Revolution. It has been the most effective dike for holding Mexican social evolution within the old bounds. Against the cacique system, discharge after discharge of reform legislation spattered ineffectively, like birdshot against a stone wall. Labor laws, agrarian laws, had to have the blessing of the local kingfish before they could be put into effect. That was part of the price the big kingfish paid for support of the little kingfish. Enforcement of this law or that depended on the convenience of the local boss.” Plenn, Mexico Marches. p. 23. 11 Plenn, Mexico Marches. p. 23. 12 Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. pp. 401-403. 39 by March, 1929, at Quer^taro. Officially named the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, the coalition with General Calles at its head, claimed the prerogative to carry out the nebu lous ideals of the Mexican Revolution. Actually the PNR's primary objective was to monopolize and retain political power, which it succeeded in doing in the absence of broadly based civilian, political parties. Unlike its successors, the PNR was not highly centralized: "instead it was an amalgam of local political machines and...interest associ ations, backed by the silent but ever-present force of the 13 military." Since Calles and the new political machine had a mo nopoly on force, violence was kept to a minimum and those who opposed the combined strength of the PNR soon disap peared politically. Gradually local power centers were subordinated as the increasingly centralized PNR increased its authority by using government prestige and expenditures; 14 it also developed independent income and a bureaucracy. 13 Robert E. Scott, "Budget Making in Mexico," Inter- American Economic Affairs VIII (January, 1955), 122. 14 The PNR under the Portes Gil administration began to deduct seven days salary each year from each government employee's income. Francisco Torrado S., "La anti- constitutionalidad del Partido Nacional Revolucionario," (Unpublished thesis, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1936), pp. 69-91. 40 During the early years of its existence, ex-President Calles was successful in manipu lating the apparatus of the PNR and in domi nating the men who held the office of president. Consider what happened in 1930. Calles con cluded that the allotment of farm land to un prepared peasants should be speedily brought to a halt. He therefore made the kind of offhand decision in momentous matters that is so characteristic of the charismatic-type leader. Small groups of state governors were called to Mexico City, where Calles gave them their orders. Eleven States promptly adopted legislation to end the land program, and by 1932 total land distribution fell to one-third that of 1929. Three governors who refused to comply with Calles1 commands were quickly and effectively disciplined. Their particular candidates to succeed them as governor were rejected by the official party in all three states. All of this occurred after Calles had left the presidency. Little wonder that Mexicans call this the period of callismo.^5 (This is but one example of how the PNR continued to pro claim revolutionary slogans e.g. Tierra y Libertad to keep the imagination of the masses while it actually halted the 16 Revolution instead of furthering it.) 15 Scott, "Budget Making in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs VIII (January, 1955), 123- lb By requiring government employees to belong to the government party, the PNR violated Article 5 of the 1917 Constitution; it violated Article 40 by impeding the exis tence of a multi-party system; it violated Article 51 by not allowing all Mexicans to be represented in the Camara de Diputados; Articles U& and 50 prohibited government em ployees from supervising the polls at election time thereby making it unconstitutional for PNR members to officiate. Torrado, "La anticonstitutionalidad del Partido Nacional Revolucionario," pp. 44, 45, 4#. 41 Until 1933 the PNR was occupied with party discipline and discouraging the opposition. "Elected officials were kept in line with a strict caucus system and the threat of expulsion from the one political machine that possessed 17 effective electoral power." In 1932 a structural change was made: the regional confederation arrangement was re placed by a hierarchy of conventions "which were to decide IS policy and select candidates." By 1934, under L£zaro Cardenas, the PNR was no longer 19 a loosely-united party of interest groups; it had under gone changes and become centralized around the Cardenista faction. In government posts and in Congress Cardenistas replaced Callistas as party president Emilio Portes Gil purged the machine. (Later the Cardenistas forced Portes Gil from power.) Once thi3 internal "reorganization" had 17 Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, pp. 343-344. IB Scott, "Budget Making in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs. VIII (January, 1955), 124. 19 One Mexican writer stated that the mere existence of the government party was a denial of electoral liberty and democracy; Ing. Alberto J. Pani, Una encuestre sobre la cuestidn democritica de Mexico (Mexico, D. F.: Editorial Cultura, S.A., 1948), pp. ll8, 13B; "as long as the PNR or any state party exists there will not be authentic repre sentation." Torrado, "La anticonstitucionalidad del Partido Nacional Revolucionario," p. 13. 42 been accomplished, the government party made plans to ex tend its control, Cardenas, always popular with the military, had re lied upon its support in his contest with Calles and con tinued to do so as he restructured the PNR. The force of the military was his key support in preventing a coup d! 20 21 etat and in implementing the Six-Year Plan. (The plan stated that "the National Revolutionary Party declares that the National Army, being the armed organ of the Mexican Revolution, is the firmest support of the national insti- 22 tutions.") The military continued to be a primary pillar of support in the reorganized PNR. 20 The most important if not obvious, source of execu tive power has always been the military. The president is head of the army and "it is he who decides where and at what post this or that general is to be placed." Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," Foreign Affairs. 27 (October, 194&), 46. 21 "...should the revolutionary regime ever be threatened, the people would rise in arms, to be sure. But the task of guarding the institutions which the Revolution has created is assigned mainly to the Army.... Mexicofs army,...is designed chiefly to support a government created by the people*s Revolution." Alberto Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and The Six-Year Plan (Mexico, D. F., 1937TT p. 130. 22 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party. p. 201. 43 The culminating step, in the collectivization of the Mexican peasant was the formation of the Confederaci6n Nacional Campesina which formed a second pillar in the re structured Cardenas amalgam. Cardenas, through the govern ment party and the bureaucracy (which was the same), or ganized peasant leagues in each agricultural community. These leagues, with the assistance of leaders such as Graciano Sanchez and Celestino Gasca, were then organized into a superorgan called the Confederaci6n Nacional Campe- 23 sina, which became the largest mass organization in Mexico. The significant point here is that the CNC placed the Mexican peasant under the direct control of the government 24 which controlled both land and agricultural credit. The first steps to discipline labor had been taken by President Abelardo Rodriguez when he sent a special message to the 1933 PNR Convention to obtain the inclusion of the following paragraph in the Plan: The State shall likewise see that trade unions perform as efficiently as possible the social functions entrusted to them, without trespassing beyond their proper limits and becoming instruments It represented about 2 1/2 million organized peasants in the late 1950*3. 24 "The vast majority of the ejiditarios are poor, isolated, and easily manipulated by their leaders in the CNC. /Twenty years laterA/ in 195$, the CNC attacked the concept of small farm property as 1antirevolutionary1...." Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, University of Illinois, 1959)» PP. 6<5"T 70. 44 of oppression within the social classes they represent.25 This act in due time led to compulsory government arbitra tion of labor disputes with business and state control of heretofore free unions. Subsequently the Confederacidn de Trabajadores de Mexico, the largest confederation of labor unions, was taken over by the government with the tacit support of labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano. In 1936 the PNR took its first step toward making the CTM and the CNC an integral part of the government party. The executive committee issued a statement which promised the CTM and the CNC increased influence within the govern- 26 ment party itself; .^.All /organized/Mexican workers and peasants ^/purportedly organized to carry out social development and reform/ automatically became members of the PNR with the right to vote in its primaries, ...The Party pledged itself to treat all labor and peasant groups impartially and announced that it 'would favor a policy on the part of the proletarian groups of entering into agreements among themselves, rather than creating political rifts during elections.27 Finally in March, 1933, the last phase in the metamorphosis of the Calles machine into the Cardenas machine occurred. 25 Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, p. 117. Italics mine. 26 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party, pp. 215- 227. 27 Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, p. 345. 45 The PNR was transformed into the Partido de La Revolucidn 28 Mexicans (PRM) with four autonomous sectors— Labor, 29 Peasant, Popular, and Army, and Cardenas at its head as undisputed leader. This was merely the formalization of relationships already established. By 1940 the PRM had placated the army, labor, and the 30 peasants and was a smoothly running political machine. This did not make the party more democratic, for policy decisions without an opportunity for debate, were still made at the top by a National Executive Committee (with the 28 In 1945 the PRM "re-organized" itself and became the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or simply the PRI. Three of the former sectors were unchanged; the fourth, the military was dissolved. Since then, in general, "the only direct concession that the PRI has made to the growing pressures upon it for greater popular participation in the selection of candidates has been at the state, local, or municipio level. In an experiment first tried in the elections of ayuntamientos for the state of Baja California (Norte) held in April, 1959> a new procedure for choosing the partyfs nominees was adopted. Any group of two hundred or more dues-paying members of the party could submit an election slate to the local PRI Municipal Committee, to gether with substantiating discussions of each candidate. The Municipal Committee would then send copies of these slates, together with its comments, to the state-level party committee and the Central Executive Committee in Mexico City. This last, after considering the comments of both local and state-level committees would narrow the number of slates to two, one of which would be selected by the local PRI nomi nating convention. The nominating convention, however, would be composed of the usual sixty delegates, with twenty coming from each of the three party sectors." Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, p. 143. 29 Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, p. 346. •^Around these most important vested interested groups 46 President ultimately approving all decisions). "The presi dent of the party’s National Executive Committee met with the president’s cabinet as a matter of course, and quite 31 frequently the party actually initiated official actions." "What little political independence had been left to the states by the PNR now was divided between the state 32 government and the sector organizations." Offices were allotted to each sector (except the military) in local and state elections in proportion to its numerical strength. The officials of the sector then nominated the candidates for the posts. Nomination, of course, meant appointment with the formality of an election, for all sectors of the PRM then combined forces to support the candidate. As a final precautionary measure the party supervised the elections and counted the ballots. The process was not democratic. Access to the President, who controlled politi cal decision-making for the nation, was through sector leaders rather than through the elected officials of the state administration. As a result of the development of the government party, 1) the possibility of a two-party system revolved campaign issues, elections, and platforms. 31 Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, p. 136. 32 Ibid., p. 135. 47 was eliminated; 2) politicians continued to be unconcerned about serving the people they were supposed to be repre senting since all favors came from the party; 3) the control 33 of the entire nation remained in the hands of a few; and 4) rule by an elite was continued, preserving the despotism that had existed since the rule of the caudillos and caciques. In summary, in Mexico in 1940, an autocracy existed, yet it was an imperfect one. 33 Newspaperman for the New York Times Frank Kluckhohn, who was later expelled from Mexico, commented: "A relatively small clique of generals and politicians has centralized power over a growing part of the preponderantly agrarian population, men, women, and children, and over an important sector of industrial workers. Under these circumstances it would be relatively simple for either an ultraradical or violently conservative group to establish its chosen form of government, provided that it could gain control of the nerve centers of the present system, either peaceably or otherwise." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 5. CHAPTER THREE THE REGIMENTATION OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE The government party, described in the previous chapter, soon dominated the Mexican political arena. Through its extralegal monopoly of the government structure, it acquired the power of the executive branch of government over the Mexican people. As we shall see, the government party increased this control even further by extending it 1 into other areas of society. Nominally at least, Mexico adhered to the concepts of separation of powers and federalism. Actually, however, the situation was quite different. As in many Hispanic American republics, the executive branch of government dominated the legislative and judiciary. This was accomplished in part through its ability to control elections, thereby tending "to make for a Congress that was dependent upon the Chief 2 Executive." Although several times the Congress attempted 1 It was not by chance that the declarations of the Six- Year Plan "were sufficiently ambiguous to mask the real in tention behind them." With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that Calles, Padilla, and Rodriguez advocated a corporate state. Donald D. Johnson, "A Study of the Back ground and Certain Provisions of the Mexican Six-Year Plan" (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1941), pp. 137-138. 2 Frank L. Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1939), p. 250* 48 49 to assert its independence, the Chief Executive either 3 through his extralegal powers of removal, or his power of 4 appointment, or as head of the only real political party, 5 was able to subordinate Congress to his demands. Further more the Secretarfa de Gobernacidn, the head post in the Chief ExecutiveTs cabinet, had almost complete control over 6 all internal political affairs. The Mexican Executive further dominated the state and local governments by usurping Congressional powers of Article 76 of the 1917 Constitution, which allowed the Senate to declare that the 3 For example, Cardenas openly removed senators who had supported Calles; in 193&, he expelled several party members who insisted on passing a measure granting civil service employees the right to strike. 4 His power of appointment made the politician's re lationship with the .jefe supremo and the government party the most important fact in his political life. He sought "...merit in the eyes of those who have power and who will select the officeholders for the next constitutional term. He does not try, therefore, to appeal directly to the electorate....When the president and his advisers have made their selection, it is customary for the government party... to ratify the choice unanimously without debate, discussion, or disagreement." William S. Stokes, Latin American Poli tics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1959), p. 337* 5 Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 252. 6 Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York and London: The Century Co., 1923), p. 394* 7 legal powers in a state had disappeared. This was used to 8 remove uncooperative state officials. In cases of con flicting claims for a state office, a permanent Senate com mittee was supposed to decide who was really elected. But the permanent committee was the arm of the president, and the president, therefore, really made the final decision. Once the issue had been settled, the local military chieftain was in structed to see to it that the properly certified governor was permitted to take office, and to enter the state capitol building....The governors, in spite of the federal system established by the Constitution, were the instruments of the presi dent. .. .9 But this is not the limit of the Executive's authority. Article 29 of the Constitution of 1917 stated that the Con gress might grant facultades extraordinarias to the Chief Executive in "cases of invasion, grave disturbances of the public peace, or any other emergency which may place society 7 Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism, 1917-1948" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1949), Chapter II. 8 "More recently, however, the presidents position in relation both to the party and to the organs of government has become so well established that he no longer needs to resort to this form of discipline. Instead, he reserves Article 76 for the infrequent occasions when he must throw a political supporter to the wolves in order to placate public outrage." Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federal ism," pp. 137-138. 9 Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," Foreign Affairs, 27 (October, 1948), pp. 4^-49. 51 in grave danger or conflict.” During this state of emergen cy, the Executive ruled by decree. He constitutionally controlled Mexico singlehanded; it was "simply a suspension 10 of all constitutional guarantees in Mexico." Consequently most of the important legislation from 1917 to World War II was decreed by the Executive— without exception the Congress granted facultades extraordinarias when requested, in time 11 of a national emergency or otherwise. The judiciary like the legislative branch of the Mexican government was dominated by the Executive. Yet, this was not considered unusual, for most "Mexicans did not even think of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government as separate and equal. The 10 Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 393. 11 Since the 1930Ts the same effect has been accom plished by forcing measures through Congress, which has not dared to oppose the President. "Such delegations of legis lative authority to the president are not necessary in the Mexican one-party state. The Congress is the servant of the Executive, eager to do his bidding without serious check. This is shown in the case study of budget making. The President delegates the function of preparing the budget laws to the Minister of the Treasury. Once Treasury has completed its task and the laws have been presented to Congress, no major change is ever made by the legislature. As a matter of fact, the Mexican Congress is not likely to change the Executivefs laws at all. The laws are usually presented to the Legislature on December 15, and the legis lative session is over on December 31. There is, therefore, little time to consider changes, even if the Legislature were of a mind to do so. The Mexican President has an item veto, but he has never had occasion to use it with respect to fiscal legislation." Stokes, Latin American Politics, 52 Congress and the courts, in the public mind were subordi- 12 nated one hundred per cent to the Executive." So anxious was the Supreme Court of Mexico to serve the Chief Executive, it did not hesitate to reverse its 13 previous decisions to cooperate. 'while Article 105 of the 1917 Constitution stated that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in all controversies between state officials or branches of government, the Court did not use this juris diction to strengthen its position— to the contrary. "This permitted the Supreme Court to decide in favor of those state officers whom the president supported. The record of state appeals to the Supreme Court for protection Tagainst the depredations of the national government1 was a list of 12 Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 253. 13 "It was generally recognized in Mexico that the Mexican Supreme Court, on all important issues, ruled in accordance with the Executive’s desires. Cardenas had somewhat more direct control than his predecessors because, just before he took office, the terms of elected Supreme Court justices were changed to coincide with the presi dential term of six years. Cardenas’ Attorney General visited the justices in their chambers before important cases and came out, to announce publicly that the Supreme Court would act in accordance with ’Revolutionary1 princi ples. It is a matter of record that the Supreme Court upheld the President in all matters. It would vote against a law only if it had become expedient for the Chief Execu tive thus to have an unfortunate action annulled." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 252; Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in-Mexico," Foreign Affairs, 27 (October, 1946), 4 6. 53 14 unsuccessful attempts." When one considers that this preponderence of Executive authority (which also included the military) was effectively controlled by the PNR, it becomes apparent why opposition to it was almost nonexistent. With this immense power the government party suppressed the freedom of the press, the freedom to educate in one*s own beliefs, and the freedom to worship as one desired. After the revolution erupted and until the PNR was formed, the free press tradition existed. But with the 15 coming of the PNR press censorship spread. And it was in creased greatly under Cardenas and the PRM as he began to experience difficulties at home and abroad with the Six-Year Plan, and with the nationalization of aliens1 property. On January 1, 1937* he found it necessary to create a special 16 department for publicity, named the Department of Press 14 Stokes, Latin American Politics. p. 495. 15 Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage. p. 6 6 4. 16 In 1934, CArdenas had considered expropriating all the sugar refineries in Mexico. In June 1937 he expropri ated the National Railways. And finally on the evening of March 13, 1935, CArdenas announced the nationalization of the petroleum industry after the unsuccessful settlement of a more or less minor labor-manageraent dispute. These ex propriations, coupled with the earlier land expropriations, or confiscations as they were labeled, created a very Soviet Union-like image in the foreign press. By 1935, it was apparent that CArdenas was having difficulty in maintaining a good image abroad. 54 and Propaganda or simply the DAPP. Publicity was wisely substituted for Propaganda in 1936. Luis Cabrera, a member of the opposition, referred to it as the Department of Public Praise. This was the beginning of the government party's organized control of the press. The DAPP's task was twofold: first, to improve, if not maintain, a good image abroad and, secondly, to sell Mexico on the plan or at least control information. The first real test for the DAPP came in 193# after the oil expro priation. "The Department proved itself: booklets, leaf lets, posters, newspaper articles, radio speeches, agitation in the schools, meetings, demonstrations, motion pictures dramatic programs, shot from the DAPP offices in a steady 17 barrage." The DAPP presented the government's position and established controls on information leaving Mexico. 17 Jaime H. Plenn, Mexico Marches (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1939), P* 26. 16 Until "...the first half of 1937, affairs seemed to be going well for Mexico. Land was being divided among peasants, local business was booming, and the government was carrying out constructive public works. Correspondents had little difficulty during this period, for their reports reflected that condition. Later, when extreme difficulties and controversies developed, the government's viewpoint was given on all matters upon which it was possible to get statements or explanations; so was that of the other side* It was then that coercion became more direct." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 262. 55 The DAPP’s second function was to "sell Mexico" on government programs. First, all opposition was suppressed on the grounds that it was opposing the government party (which meant the Mexican Revolution) while the government’s programs were praised. Veteran newspaperman Frank L. Kluckhohn, who was in Mexico at this time, observed: ...not only through the schools, but in a variety of ways, the righteousness of government actions and programs are being dinned into the ears of the masses. In Mexico the largest single news paper has a circulation daily of only 140,000 copies; the radio, which is capable of reaching a far larger number of people, is in the hands of the government. Propagandistic programs are constantly on the air. The State and its policies are exalted. So-called "exploiting" classes, and those not in sympathy with government policies, are attacked and are not permitted to reply.... In its manner of controlling the press, the Mexican Government’s indirect, but effective, manner of putting its own shine on the various facets of Mexican life is perhaps best demon strated. The velvet glove with the steel hand behind it may here be clearly recognized.19 The task of DAPP became that of "furnishing official news" 20 which the press was obliged to print. This allowed the 19 Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge, p. 257. 20 "...DAPP’s hundreds of employees turn out reams of printed propaganda for the press every day, only a small proportion of which is newsworthy, even in the eyes of government sympathizers. The DAPP also prints propaganda magazines and pamphlets? but all these activities are merely side lines to the principal function of information control. No Mexican official can be quoted except through the DAPP. Interviews, except with the President, are arranged 56 government to present its position in a most favorable light, prohibiting criticism or failures, and suppressing all 21 opposition. But how was the government able to force the press to accept this censorship? It was accomplished because 1) all newsprint was supplied by a government monopoly which could raise its price, 2) the labor for the presses was controlled by government which could be called on a strike, and 3) there was always the threat of a heavy fine or official "tax." This censorship, one must remember, was not just through the DAPP only with the greatest difficulty, the tendency being to choke off information from reporters, particularly that of an unfavorable sort. Mexican editors know just how far they can go and how far they cannot. One managing editor with fifty years of newspaper work behind him remarks frequently, "My task is not getting news; it is to know what not to print." In times of relative peace this forcing of a sort of auto- censorship is deemed sufficient. In moments of stress the DAPP telephones the newspapers and tells them what cannot be published, what can be published, and how much space and what position should be given to the printable matter. At such times the DAPP sometimes sees fit to send editorials to the newspapers, their publication obligatory. Anyone who is able to sit in the office of a Mexican newspaper in diffi cult moments can see this system in operation." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. pp. 259-260. 21 "...There is no question in Mexico of the govern ment’s being unable to get its ideas across if it did not thus control the press. El Nacional, organ of the official party, and El Popular. published by CTM unions, both carry fully the government’s day-to-day viewpoint and will con tinue to do so. For two reasons Mexican newspapers are incapable, under any circumstances, of rousing the rabble; their circulation is extremely limited and they reach largely the better-educated people. By hamstringing a free 57 22 control by the Mexican government, but control by the PNR. The one remaining area not completely dominated by the government party, through its monopolization of the Mexican executive branch of government, was the economy. The inter vention of the State into the realm of economic affairs began, however, on a large scale during the period when Cardenas intensified land distribution, expropriated the national railroads and the big British and American oil companies. The government, in effect, began a persistent movement to regiment industry, to control business, and in many instances to actually take over industries outright— all in the name of the Mexican social revolution and sup- 23 posedly for the betterment of the Mexican people. There press and banning free discussion, the Mexican officials put another hurdle in the way of any movement toward democracy." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge, pp. 256-256. 22 "Today," Prof. Marvin Alisky of Arizona State University states, "the press in Mexico can speak for its own communities;" Edward Alvarez, grandson of the publisher of the daily El Informador of Guadalajara, however, reported to the California Press Association in December, 1957 that suppression still poses a threat to the Mexican Press; Marvin Alisky, "MexicoTs Newspapers of the Provinces," a paper read at the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies, meeting at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, April 11 and 12, 195#, p•5; the first edition of Antonio Estrada M. La grieta en el yugo on February 4, 1963 was de stroyed by the government of San Luis Potosi; the editor*s home was ransacked in search of all notes and documentation, as well; the prologue says that this second edition "had to be printed on several presses throughout the Republic." 23 Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge. p. 254. 53 was t f almost no aspect of the national life, especially no economic activity, which the Government did not control in 24 whole or in part, either directly or indirectly." How did this phenomenon occur? By 1932, the Calles group was rapidly loosing any re maining true revolutionary support it may have ever had. Yet the PRM continued to "loudly proclaim its love and solicitude for the masses and produce carefully doctored 25 statistics to illustrate the great progress being made." But the people were tired of being deceived by revolutionary rhetoric, and the Calles clique found it increasingly dif ficult to justify the disparity between the poverty of the people and the revolutionaries* lavish mansions and sumptu ous entertainment obtained from government patronage and 26 power. Labor and agrarian groups were no longer convinced of the revolutionary sincerity of the government, in view of 24 A Mexican Intellectual, "Mexico: On Road to Social ism— Affected by the U.S.?" U.S. News and World Report. 52 (February 12, 1962), p. 93. 25 Donald D. Johnson, "A Study of The Background and Certain Provisions of The Mexican Six-Year Plan" (Unpub lished M. A. thesis, University of Southern California, June, 1941), p. 33* 26 Plenn, Mexico Marches, pp. 107-10S. 59 the opulence of its officials. ’ ’Once more the familiar cycle of Mexican politicos had been performed on a grand scale from poor sincere (or insincere) reformers to wealthy 27 reactionaries...." To retain the imagination of the masses, it was imperative that some "gimmick" be found. This was to be the Six-Year Plan. There was another reason behind the formation of the Six-Year Plan. On May 30, 1933, Calles in an interview stated that "labor organizations lack^ed^ a feeling of solidarity with the rest of the nation and especially with 28 similar fraternal organizations." "The human material" was deficient for true socialism. In the words of Senator Ezequiel Padilla at the same interview: ...Individually man has not improved his nature in the course of the centuries. He is always the zoological being at the time of hunger. Only organization improves him. Decisions...must not depend upon a factional assembly, but upon to talitarian organization where all the sectors of labor and if possible, all theQfactors of pro duction shall be represented.2^ 27 Johnson, "The Mexican Six-Year Plan," p. 34. 28 Plutarco E. Calles, "El General Calles Senalando rumbos," Del Mexico Actual. No. 9, p. 25 as cited in Johnson, "The Mexican Six-Year Plan," p. 123. 29 Abelardo Rodriguez, "A que debe tender el Plan de los Seis Anos," Del Mlxico Actual, No. 11, p. 9 et seq.. 60 "The statements of both Calles and Padilla clearly suggest 30 that a totalitarian or corporate type of state was the 31 solution which appeared to them most practicable," as a means of solving Mexico's problems. Professor J. Lloyd Mecham suggests, as a third pos sible reason for the Six-Year Plan, that the PNR, having become the official party, determined, "in emulation of European dictatorships, to employ this unified and highly personalistic party control for the social and economic unification of the country. Thus the PNR under the in fluence of the highly publicized Russian Five-Year Plan, 32 announced its own Six-Year Plan." At the PNR convention in 1933, Calles and his sup porters saw to it that the Six-Year Plan was adopted as the party platform. 30 But these ulterior motives were not immediately apparent, especially to the uneducated peon. It was not by chance that "these declarations were sufficiently ambiguous to mask the real intention behind them." Calles, "El General Calles," p. 27 as cited in Johnson, "The Six-Year Plan," p. 123. 31 Johnson, "The Six-Year Plan," p. 123. "Mexican Federalism— Fact or Fiction?" Annals, 20$, (March, 1940), 36. 61 ...The Plan was /purportedly/ designed to advance the proletarian cause, to solve the agrarian problem, to reorganize the national economy, to construct a vast system of public works, to install socialist education in the schools, and, in the words of one of its more frenetic propa gandists, who became Minister of Education in the Cardenas Cabinet, to prepare for the final abolition of the capitalist system and the dic tatorship of the proletariat! General Cdrdenas was selected to sell this fantastic piece of demagogy to the Mexican people.33 Cardenas had not been consulted by the strategists in the formation and adoption of the Six-Year Plan at the 34 government party convention in 1933. Yet, once Calles 33 L. 0. Prendergast, "Behind the Overthrow of Calles," The Nation. 141(July 17, 1935), 67. 34 In his first months in office, Cardenas did little but continue his campaign for popular support. He was well aware of the government party's role in his election and he determined to "create a personality for himself independent of General Calles." He promised land to the landless; he promised government support for workers; he reorganized the army to assure loyalty to himself all of which perplexed Calles. Soon the rumors of a division between Cardenas and Calles became an open fact by May 1935. At a press con ference in Mexico City on June 11, Calles denounced the leftist "...workersT organizations and their leaders and the series of recent strikes /encouraged by Cardenas/ as unjus tified, the product of 'illegitimate' interests, and pre judicial to the prosperity and stability of the government and to the period of reconstruction which the revolution had now entered." Prendergast, "Behind the Overthrow of Calles," pp. 63, 69; Cardenas was now openly confronted by Calles; but labor was not to abandon its newly found champion. It united in a show of force behind Cardenas, issued a state ment denouncing Calles as a fascist, and threatened to call a general strike. When the military likewise supported Cdrdenas, Calles realized he had lost and publicly announced his retirement from politics. Actually, he probably should have announced his public retirement from politics, for he continued his cabals which eventually forced Cardenas to exile him from Mexico. 62 was out of the way, he proved that he had "not only studied the Plan, but mastered it. He discovered it to be a flex ible instrument that could be turned at will either toward collectivist or corporative purposes.../He determined and promised to implement/ a socialistic interpretation of the 35 new national P.N.R. program," much to the Callista faction’s consternation, the laborists' and agrarianists1 gratification, and the lower classes1 general satisfaction. While it is not in our interest to consider in detail the entire Six-Year Plan, I should at least consider some of the portions pertaining to the collectivization (and regimen tation) of the Mexican people. Also we will see how this increased State control was actually increased government party control--all in the name of the Mexican Revolution. The authors of the plan were well aware of the prece- 36 dents they were establishing. Regarding state control of the economy in general and private property in particular, 35 Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, The Years of Ldzaro Cdrdenas (London, New 'York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939)> pp. 117-118. 36 They stated that "...with the application of the Six- Year Plan the country would enter into the first state of a regimen of controlled economy,...marking the end of an era and the beginning of another." Alberto Bosques, The Nation al Revolutionary Party of Mexico and The Six-Year Plan /Mexico, D. F.: Government Press, 1937), P^ 134. 63 a new concept was introduced. Previously, the concepts of free enterprise and the right to private property were theo retically respected; but now, even while contradicting 37 itself by maintaining these sanctities, these concepts 38 were challenged. According to the Six-Year Plan, property was not a private or individual right but a social function and the "duty of government was...to regulate that function so as to favor the interests of at least the majority." This was what the plan termed Mexico*s doctrine as "first 39 voiced by President Carranza." Not only did the govern ment party--the Plan was its platform— avow to determine the use of property, but it furthermore maintained that "it was the State that permitted individuals to hold property.... And it maintained that the Statefs right to take away what 40 it alone had power to give, was logical." 37 The government party stated it "emphatically declares that respect for private property is fundamental." Johnson, "The Mexican Six-Year Plan," p. l£l. 38 The Plan stated that "shallow thinkers who conceive of democracy only in terms of electoral campaigns conducted along the lines of North American orderliness...would have the government limited to the functions of keeping order and safeguarding the holiness of private property." Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico, p. 15. 39 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico, p. 17. Italics mine. 40 Ibid., p. 16. Italics mine. 64 The growth of capitalism— obviously an enigma in a would-be State controlled economy— the plan concluded, was a result of technological progress unaccompanied by "corre sponding changes in the system of ownership of the instru ments of production in the distribution of wealth." This 41 resulted in the wealth of a few and poverty of the masses. The primary factors, according to the plan, responsible for this disparity were "the freedom of initiative of entre preneurs, the freedom of competition among merchants." These factors the plan promised in so many words to elimi- 42 nate. As a substitute, the plan, intended to impose a new, socialistic economic system in which State control was foremost: ...it is the thesis that the Mexican State assume and maintain a policy regulatory of the economic activities of the Nation. That is to say, it is openly and definitely declared that in the Mexican revolutionary concept the State is an active agent moving and controlling the vital processes of the country. not a mere custodian of the national 41 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico. p. 16. 42 "Until such a time as the regimen of property is transformed becoming properly adjusted to the new systems of production, the National Revolutionary Party deems it neces- sary that the State act effectively, in the interest of that indispensable order and coordination that should prevail among manufacturers, dealers and consumers...." Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico, p. 169. Italics mine. 65 integrity and keeper of the public peace and order..../This/ doctrine of State intervention, .../was/ logical,...because the Constitution of 1917...divested the State of the nature of a purely political institution....^ All business enterprises "inadequate to meet, in a thorough ly satisfactory way, the needs of.../their/workers and their 44 dependents" were to be eliminated. Commodity prices were to be regulated and channels "established for the distri bution of merchandise, adding a minimum change to the cost of production and eliminating the greatest possible number 45 of middlemen." Finally, the State was to "regulate domestic commerce compelling it to comply with its proper £5 function...." The agrarian collectivization aspect of the Six-Year Plan has received considerable attention largely because of Cardenasf large scale land confiscations and distributions which he used to attract much-needed, wide-spread support 43 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico, pp. 131» 132. Italics mine. 44 Ibid.. p. 170. 45 Ibid.. Italics mine. 46 Ibid.. Italics mine. 66 47 among the oppressed in his struggle for supremacy. The fact that Cardenas used his office to seize and distribute land without making provision for payment as the agrarian codes dictated apparently was of little concern to most Mexicans. The important thing to the peon was that someone at last was distributing land. And it was usually taken for granted that all landholders had come by their properties illegally, at the expense of the masses, which was no doubt true in many if not most instances. One of the stated objectives of the program was to give the farmer a decent return for his labor and to guarantee 43 sufficient food production for his family's needs. But did collectivization really benefit the farmer and guarantee 47 This land, confiscated by the Cardenas' regime, according to Kluckhohn was taken without due compensation (as of 1933) to any domestic landowners. "Landowners are told to file claims, upon which they may, or may not, get some payment in the far-distant future." Plenn, Mexico Marches, p. 215. 43 A point illustrating the failure of the program to guarantee the peon a living for his family was pointed out by Ballesteros Porta in his study of the ejidos of Tlahualilo of the once-productive La Laguna basin: 64 per cent of the ejiditarios emigrated from 1942 to 1964 as braceros to the United States in search of work. The La Laguna basin was at the time of its confiscation by Cdrdenas in the 1930's, the best agricultural region in Mexico. While it is not our purpose to go into all the many reasons for the failure of the collective agricultural program, the indisputable fact remains that it failed. ;.Explotaci6n individual o colectiva? (Mexico, D. F.: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Econdmicas, 1964). 67 him a decent return? What about the credit facilities and the improved farming techniques that collectivization was 49 supposed to provide? To get land for use only, each farmer had to be part of an e.jido and to submit to the con trols of the government party through the Confederacidn Nacional de Campesinos (CNC). Agricultural credit was ex tended only to those farmers who were organized under the control of the government or in an e.jido— while the needs, interests, and desires of the small-propertied private farmer were ignored. Ultimately the Banco Ejidal became the nerve center of the collective agricultural system and the once privately financed e.jido gradually was forced to like wise become a part of the system. Luis Cabrera, a former member of the Carranza cabinet, commented on this in 193$ in Veinte anos despu^s: The Ejido Bank is the one that selects the land which seems suitable for ejidos; the bank seeks the peasants who will apply for the land; it transfers the land, it organizes the credit societies, decides which crops are to be grown, when the land is to be watered, when to harvest, advances the money for seed, buys the plows and oxen, names the foremen, pays wages and calls them Advances1 on profits, it directs who can work and who cannot. S3----------------- Cardenas believed that this could "be best achieved through the development of cooperatives, necessarily govern ment-subsidized, that the peasants* hope lay in a system of control of the land by the man who works it." Plenn, Mexico Marches, p. 241. 68 And if you ask almost any peasant— there are exceptions— about all this, his answer will usually be, "So what?" He’ll tell you that he has more say-so about things than he did under the hacen- dado.5° This was certainly not the "perfect system of agricultural credit in the Plan's own words through the operation of the Banco de Cr^dito Agrfcola...for the use of credit to all concerns of rural production, mobilizing mortgage liens and providing savings facilities for agriculturists throughout 51 the country." The Six-Year Plan also made provisions for increasing 52 the State's control in education as in other areas. It stated: ...that the primary school is a social institution. By that token the subjects it should teach, and 50 Plenn, Mexico Marches. p. 249. 51 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico. p. 209. 52 But, like the agrarian contest, this struggle was not new either. It had first erupted into open warfare in the years 1926-29 and had remained in an uneasy state since then. This issue was crucial; for education was according to many, the last stronghold of the Church's influence. "For the church, the government educational program was more than an academic matter. It was not just a battle for the privilege of molding the plastic mind of young Mexico. For simultaneously with application of 'lay' education provided in the 1917 Constitution, the Calles government in 1925 nationalized some twenty-one million pesos of Church proper ty, which it planned to convert into schools and libraries that the limited federal budget could not provide." Plenn, Mexico Marches. p. 176. (Again, it was not a matter of nationalization but outright confiscation.) 69 the conditions required of its teachers in proof of their ability to comply with the social mis sion entrusted to them, shall be determined by the State as the genuine and direct representa tive of the community. No recognition shall be given to private individuals, as would be done under a false and farfetched notion of individual freedom, of any right to conduct educational institutions not controlled by the State.53 This was contrary to the Constitution which was amended by the PNR in Congress. Whereas Article 3 of the 1917 Consti tution had previously merely prohibited clerical control of 54 education and private religious schools, education now be- 55 56 came centralized and socialistic, and under the direct 53 Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico. p. 209. 54 On December 13, 1934, two weeks after Cardenas took office, Article three of the 1917 Constitution was amended to state: "The State shall impart Socialist education and besides excluding all religious teaching, education shall combat fanaticism and prejudice.... The State— through the Federal, State, and Municipal governments— is exclusively entitled to impart primary, secondary, and normal education...." Bosques, The National Revolutionarv Party of Mexico, p. 233. Italics mine. 55 The government was to assume "...complete regulatory control over all schools of any type whatsoever within the nation to see that this ’socialist1 character was observed." Johnson, "The Mexican Six-Year Plan," p. 15$. 56 "The Mexican proletariat should protest against the so-called ’Mexican socialistic education' which is not socialist but fascist." Vicente Lombardo Toledano, La doctrina socialista y su interpretacidn en el ArticuXo 3° (Mexico, D. F.: Editorial Futuro, 1935T, p. 27. 70 57 control of the federal government. This was necessary because, in the words of Ram6n Beteta, a high government party official, "to leave education in the hands of its enemies ^meaning, of course, the Church7 meant to condemn the Revolution to a sure death." On the other hand, monopolistic control of education meant control over the minds of coming generations of Mexicans and the means with 59 which to instill revolutionary fervor, i.e., support for the government party and collectivism as the way to fulfill 60 revolutionary ideals. Control of education became the 57 Victores Prieto, El socialismo en M£xico {Mexico, D.F.: Imprenta mundial, 1935), pp. 101-107. 53 Johnson, "The Mexican Six-Year Plan," p. 157. 59 This was accomplished through paintings and murals, handicrafts, and the eulogization of military figures of the earlier period of violence, such as "Pancho" Villa. Fernando Salmeron, Guestiones educatfvas p^ginas sobre Mlxico (Mexico, D. F.: Biblioteca de la facultad de filosofia, letras, y ciencias, Universidad veracruzana, 1962), pp. 156- 223. 60 After the educational program, as outlined in the Six-Year Plan, had been in effect about seven years another writer, Professor Waldo Frank, commented: "In villages north and south I have seen the poor teachers impose doc trines on the Indian children that meant even less to them than the Catholic catechisms which the priests once made them parrot. There is a lack of adequate teachers in Mexico. I suspect that the nature of the curriculum is one of the causes. The spirit of L£zaro Cardenas is so alien to this in temperate rigidity that it appears, at times, to go to the other dangerous extreme. Waldo Frank, "Mexico Today, The Deepest Danger," The Nation, 149 (September 16, 1939), 288. 71 medium through which nationalism was injected into the life of the nation, and the way to develop the popular support which had been obviously lacking for twenty-five years. These conditions attracted extreme leftist, if not marxist teachers. But their numbers, the extent of their influence, or even their allegiance to the international movement is not known. What conclusion can we honestly draw from this evi dence? Just how "red” was the Mexican little red school- house? This point could be debated ad infinitum, but the fact that education became centralized, State-controlled and monopolized cannot. One hears many charges of Church inter ference in secular affairs; yet how little emphasis has been given to the political interference of the government in Mexico in religious affairs. Here is an excellent example. The Six-Year Flan contained special provisions for regimenting labor, which like agriculture was comprised of 6l vast mass membership. And Cardenas attempted to implement them as he urged labor unions to consolidate into one large 62 organization, under, of course, governments guidance. 51----------------- In the early 1930's, the Confederacidn de Trabaja- dores de Mexico, led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, was the largest organization of many claiming to represent the workers. 62 It was partly because of labor’s recalcitrance that Calles and Padilla first devised the Plan. 72 He, in effect, revamped (with Vicente Lombardo Toledano's assistance) the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) granting it a favored position like that which the Confederacidn Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) had once enjoyed under Calles. With government support, the CTM flourished to the extent that it became the only union of importance. (At the same time, the CTM was carefully counterbalanced by the newly-formed CNC with Cardenas ex- 63 ercising control over both.) This new superlabor organi zation, like its agricultural counterpart was gradually to 64 become part of the government. In this chapter it has been seen how the government party by monopolizing the Executive Branch of government dominated a system which gave it extensive control over the lives of the Mexican people. It increased this control even more by devising a popular appeal plan to exploit the 65 social aspirations of the oppressed. While most Mexicans 63 Eventually, Lombardo Toledano was forced out of both the CTM and the PRM. 64 How could labor spurn the government party*s offer when all strikes were government-regulated through the power to declare a strike legal or illegal? 65 Alberto Bremauntz, Panorama social de las Revo- luciones de Mexico (Mlxico, D. F.: Ediciones Jurfdico Sociales, I960), pp. 355-35#. 73 considered the plan to be just a masterpiece in demagoguery — another series of promises which of course were not meant 66 to be fulfilled — once Cardenas took office it took on new importance as he proceeded to organize the country. In the process of organizing the nation for planned uniform de velopment through the Six-Year Plan, additional controls were established over the Mexican people. In a word, the Six-Year Plan was another step toward authoritarian con- 67 trol. In view of the situation, the conclusion that one must arrive at is that the government party was not developing a socialistic or even communistic system, but an authoritarian one with the government party effectively controlling every 66 And when almost no action was taken to implement the Plan (from September 1932 until December 1933) the people felt that its lack of belief was justified. 67 There were those who were aware of the impending danger in allowing the government to take such a course and they criticized "the rapidly extending government control of the farm workers, who comprise the majority of the Mexican population, and of the industrial workers. It is barely possible that this control is temporary, but its present existence is certain, and the future is far from clear. A loosening of certain restrictions is counter balanced by increasing regimentation of the masses, and that fact cannot be ignored." Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge, p. 254. Italics mine. aspect of society to benefit a favored few. To quote one Mexican: "The revolution had climbed down from its horse," to which another promptly added "and into a Cadillac!" Yet while most Mexicans resigned themselves to the situation, there was a select minority of Mexicans that would not. This group began to consider solutions to the Mexican problem: how to really develop a Mexican Social Revolution, and how to effectively oppose the authoritarian government party. m ----------------- "Mexico is a land of millionaire Socialists. It is a land of Knight errant Marxian capitalists. It is a land where the owners of luxurious gambling dens make throbbing speeches in behalf of the proletariat. It is a land where suburban Coresuses living in fairy-like palaces damn mon strous clericalism and the harsh exploitation of human beings....This group of collectivist idealists, which,... controls the destinies of our neighbor country, has created for itself one of the luxurious paradises of this continent In benign Cuernavaca, a place of eternal spring set proudly on the southern slopes of the Sierra Madre and overlooking a great valley, the successful chiefs of the Mexican revo lution have laid out lovely gardens and winding boulevards, along which they have constructed their palatial homes. Nearby are the fashionable De la Selva gambling hall and dance cabaret and a new country club hangs an oil painting of Calles, first chief of the revolution, decked out in golf togs and wielding a putter. Out on the greens, so softly glowing under the Southern light, the creators of Mexico’s new liberty trudge from hole to hole attended by soldiers as caddies; soldiers care for their private gardens; soldiers guard their possessions and their lives; soldiers scour the mountain road that leads to the capital as a precaution against bandits." Carleton Beals. "Social ism on a Platter," The Nation, 140 (April 10, 1935), 414. PART CHAPTER FOUR THE MIDDLE CLASS REVOLUTION By the late 1930Ts, as Mexico began to think of the forthcoming 1940 Presidential election and another govern ment party imposicidn, certain middle class intellectuals, largely outside the government party, began to organize. Their common goal was to oppose the government party and its 1 regimentation of Mexico. We are interested in the part of this group which came to call itself the Partido de Accidn Nacional (PAN), led by Manuel G6mez Morfn former rector of 2 the Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico. It was logical that Gdmez Morfn should head an opposition group, 1 In 1939, one observer of the Mexican scene accurately foresaw the approaching conflict of two political forces in the forthcoming election: "Some political prophets in Mexico see in the next elections a showdown between leftist col lectivism and rightist collectivism, both of which have been gaining ground under Cardenas' policy of giving the class struggle full play. Either side may try to jell the Mexican Revolution into its particular mold." Jaime H. Plenn, Mexico Marches (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1939), p. 103. 2 Since Accidn Nacional was founded by Manuel Gdmez Morfn, his background and political thinking are of interest to us. He was born in Batopilas, Chihuahua, in 1&97. Me graduated (bachelor of law, later honorary doctorate) from the Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico in 191&, became the secretary to the dean of the law school, and a professor of public law. A year later, he was appointed Undersecre tary of Finance (and was the financial agent for Mexico), a post which he held until 1921. From 1925 to 1929 he was president of the Banco de Mdxico. He returned to teach at 76 77 for earlier he had written a book in which he analyzed the political course of moral disintegration during the so- called revolution. He described this process as the un avoidable consequence of an undirected military situation, a turbulent display of uncontrolled appetites, murder, violations, robberies, and vengeance. This was fundamental ly the spiritual night for Mexico, stated Gdmez Morin, which resulted in skepticism and corruption. Many of those who advocated a course of logic and reason as the best to follow 3 were called reactionaries. With all of this past, Gdmez Morin continued, it was time to raise a spiritual banner, and this was the responsibility of the group of intellectu als who had been educated during the revolutionary period when the revolution had neither political leadership nor the Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico (political economics, money and banking) from time to time and was a collaborator in drafting, banking, and monetary laws for Mexico until 1933. He was also a member of the fiscal com mittee of the League of Nations after 1931. From 1933 to 1934 he was president of the Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico. Gdmez Morin belonged to numerous organizations such as the Academia de Legislacidn y Jurisprudencia, the Sociedad Mexicana de Derecho Internacional, the Sociedad Cientlfica de Estudios e Investigaciones and was decorated by the Ecuadorian government. Finally, he was the author of numerous articles and books on finance, monetary and banking laws, agricultural credit, and Mexican-Spanish re lations . 3 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Manuel Gdmez Morin, 1915 (Mexico, D. F.: Editorial Cultural, 1927), pp. 13, 19, 20f 21, 23. 73 4 intellectual guidance. This was the only course which, according to Gdmez Morin, could elevate Mexico once more 5 from a prostrate position. Accidn Nacional itself was formed late in 1933 when a 6 7 group of university students and civil servants, after having taken the national situation into account, approached 3 Manuel Gdmez Morin because of his revolutionary desire to reform Mexico and requested his assistance in founding an 4 A grave responsibility, he said, rested on the shoulders of this generation, which included Josd Vascon- celos, Alfonso Reyes, and el maestro [_Antonio?/ Caso. It had to supply the intellectual, leadership and form a revo lutionary ideology which would integrate the vague desires of the Revolution. It had to be an ideology without oratory which would result in action and not in merely becoming literature. It had to be clearly defined action which would serve human ends, to aleviate human suffering, place man foremost, and affirm the concept of liberty. 5 Gdmez Morfn, 1915. pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 41, 43. 6 Interview with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera on July 31, 1965, in Mexico City. 7 Many of them held government offices in Tampico, Ciudad Victoria, Linares, Monterrey, Saltillo, and San Luis Potosf. Luis Calderdn Vega, ’ ’Biografla del FAN,” La Nacidn, 23 (April 5, 1953), 17, hereinafter cited as ’ ’Biograf^a,” La Nacidn. Almost a decade earlier, Gdmez Morfn and his colleague Manuel R. Samperio had urged Jose Vasconcelos to cooperate with them in forming a permanent political party, one that would not be polarized about some caudillo and destined to fail with his political defeat. Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, gerente of La Nacidn, in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign, p. 10. 79 authentic political party which would represent the Mexican 9 10 people. These young men wanted to elect a government which would benefit society in general, that would respect human personal dignity, and assure an environment for 11 material and spiritual fulfillment. They advocated that the government serve Mexico and not Mexico the government. In effect, they stated that they were opposing the official government party and requesting the formation of a political party that would really carry out the long-delayed Mexican 12 Social Revolution. Gdmez Morin later stated that the founding group was also composed of a group of middle-aged intellectuals preoccupied with the problems of Mexico, among whom were Ezequiel A. Chdvez, Frofessor Valentin Gama, and 9 "Conmemoracidn," La Nacidn, 26 (September 19* 1954)» S. 10 Among them were Efrain Gonzalez Luna, who headed the organizational committee, Manuel Samperio, Manuel Herrera y Lasso, Luis Islas Garcia, Porfirio M. Ramos, Daniel Kuri Brena, Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Carlos Ramirez Zetina. "Biografia," La Nacidn, 23 (March B, 1953)> 15. 11 Manuel Gdmez Morin, "Informe a la Asamblea Consti- tuyente de Accidn Nacional, rendido el 14 de Septiembre de 1939," Diez Anos de Mdxico: Informes del Jefe de Accidn Nacional (Mdxico, D. F. : Editorial Jus, 1950), 5. 12 Bernardino Mena Brito, El PRUN Almazdn y el desastre final (Mexico, D. F. : Ediciones Botas, 1941), P. 1B<5"! 80 Ingeniero Agustln Aragdn, who became intellectual guides for the party. By the end of January of 1939 organizational plans for the party had reached a definite form, and in February a 13 Comitd Organizador was formed to organize the party. Its members traveled over Mexico meeting with the people, dis cussing issues, and forming party-nuclei or "grass roots" 14 organizations. On March 4, 1939, the first nuclei was organized in Guadalajara, Jalisco; in the following weeks others were formed in Kichoacdn, Yucatan, Durango, and 15 Guanajuato. The committee studied Mexico's needs, synthesizing a program of action or party doctrines that was to serve as 16 the basis for the party; it made it apparent that the program was not a foreign importation but the expression of 17 ideas, sentiments, and desires of the Mexican people. 13 Gdmez Morin, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 8. "Conmemoracidn," La Nacidn. 26 (September 19, 1954), 8. 15 Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Mufioz, gerente of La Nacidn. in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign, p. 10. 16 "Biografia," La Nacidn. 23 (March 1, 1953), 11. Gdmez Morin, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 8. Bl "From the beginning workers, farmers, employees, profes sionals, businessmen, industrialists and artists joined Accion Nacional. It was not an organization of conserva- l£ tive interests," states one of its prominent leaders. These members came from two groups: those attracted by Accidn Nacional's principles which gave a new interpretation of Mexican society and those who merely wanted to break the 19 government partyTs political monopoly. In April the Organizing Committee appointed a commis- 20 sion, which was to organize an Asamblea Constitutiva or Constituent Assembly, a national meeting where the delegates from the newly formed nuclei could define more precisely the party's ideological position and chart a future course of 21 action. When sufficient interest had been aroused, the 22 Organizing Committee convoked the Constituent Assembly to 1# Correspondence from Diputado Federico Estrada Valera on July 31, 1965, from Mdxico, D.F., p. 1. 19 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 8. 20 Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, gerente of La Nacidn, in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign, p. 11. 21 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 8. 22 Before the assembly the Comite Organizador submitted to the regional delegations an agenda to be considered. 32 meet on September 14, 15, 1939, in Mexico City in the 23 Frontdn Mexico to officially organize Accidn Nacional into a political party. Delegates came from all over Mexico. There were "teachers, university students, indus trialists, businessmen, workers, farmers, and artists em- 24 phasizing the universal appeal of Accidn Nacional. Ad dressing the assembly, Manuel Gdmez Morfn stated: In the last years public life has been monopolized by the regime. The citizenry has not been allowed to participate in elections; it has suffered vio lence, all in the name of the State. This process is an attempt to make the nation an indifferent, defenseless mass subject to the absolute will of the State, which means the group of men that con trol it.25 Because of the grave political crisis in Mexico, it is necessary to form an authentic political party to make Mexico aware of political realities and her problems, to form public opinion and civic conscience and; to give the politically aware an adequate instrument or vehicle through which to act for to merely promote ideas and awaken the public conscience is not enough— they must be put into effect; and to open a way for all men and women concerned over their common future, especially young people,...to work in the service of the general w e l f a r e !26 23 Luis Tercero Gallardo, "PAN: XVI aniversario," La Nacidn. 23 (September 13, 1955), 2. 24 Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Mufioz, gerente of La Nacidn, in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign, p. 11. 25 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Affos de Mdxico. pp. 6-7. 26 "Conmemoracidn," La Nacidn, 26 (September 19* 1954), 3. 83 It is an authentic desire to renovate that inspires this young group, /Gdmez Morfn continued/; one objective is to guide us: to work toward a better Mexico. The responsibility of deciding the future of the nation belongs to the population; and it is its first duty to accept it, to partici pate in public life, to put its convictions into practice. But the problem is not to be resolved by a group of young men, but by all Mexicans de fending their rights and personal integrity. Immediate action by all is demanded throughout the nation, all the time because the regime con trols all aspects of life.27 With this introduction, the Constituent Assembly pro ceeded to consider the official formation of PAN, its most 28 important business matter: the twenty-one delegations studied and approved the Principios de Doctrina, the 29 Estatutos which made Accidn Nacional a "civil association 30 and a political party" and the Frograma Mfnimo de Accidn 31 Folitica. 27 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico, pp. 6-7. 28 "XV Aniversario: Importancia y significancia de las Asambleas del PAN," La Nacidn, 26 (October 10, 1954), 10. 29 Supra, p. 177, 30 Luis Tercero Gallardo, "PAN: XVI aniversario," La Nacidn. 28 (September 18, 1955), 2. Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Kufioz, gerente of La Nacidn, in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign, p. 12. 34 Proposals on all three documents had been submitted to the nuclei prior to the Constituent Assembly by the all- important Organizing Committee which emphasized the impor tance of organization, hierarchy, discipline— the only capable way of achieving structure, action, group activity. Discipline and hierarchy, it stated, furthermore differenti ated Accidn Nacional from mass activity. Yet while the Organizing Committee recognized hierarchy and discipline as necessary for the success of the party, it also recognized that it must represent the general will of the Accion Nacional membership. Once the party had officially organized itself, the Constituent Assembly adjourned and the first Convencidn Nacional or National Convention was called to order. For the next two days it debated an extremely important ques- 32 tion: whether or not PAN should participate actively with 33 a Presidential candidate in the forecoming 1940 election. 32 Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, gerente of La Naci6n. in a speech presented in the 196^ presidential campaign, p. 12. 33 This is not a mere political episode but a problem of depth. "A mere government act or proceeding is not at stake, not a question of persons or one of state organi zation. But something more, gentlemen: that which consti tutes the essence of this anguishing crisis that is strangling us: it deals with the concept of the individual, of society, of the nation, and even of life itself# Gdmez Morin, ”Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente,” Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 15. PAN could either enter the political fray actively with a Presidential candidate or it could merely expound ideas, 34 doctrines, etc., and support some other candidate. The nonparticipating faction of the convention advocated con tinued organization around the new program and party which 35 would reform Mexico over a period of years. To partici pate in an election, this group stated, presupposed an honest election, which was not possible under existing cir cumstances which made normal political activity impossible. Furthermore, there existed in Mexico an unrepresentative regime and a political climate which excluded the possibili ty of an honest election because society lacked the organi zation to oppose this regime. This organization could be achieved through Accion Nacional by forming a national conscience and political awareness. Accidn Nacional must 36 attack the source of Mexico’s evils; anything less than 34 An editorial printed in the Boletin de Accidn Nacional, (December 15, 1940), reprinted in Accidn Nacional, * ' La s j o rn ad a s histdricas, " (Mexico, D. F. : PAN publication, 1943)> passim. 35 Among these members were: Licenciado Efrain Gonzdlez Luna, Licenciado Carlos Ramirez Aetina, and Licenciado Miguel Ramirez Mungula (PAN’s first deputy to Congress, 1946-49). 36 Gdmez Morin, ”Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 12. 36 37 complete renovation would be less than success however the election must turn out. A leader of the nonpartici pating group, Efrafn Gonzalez Luna stated to the convention: We Lo* the nonparticipation position/ are not suggesting that for years, decades, or centuries that we abstain from elections.... We only insist on necessary preparation and indispensable maturity before action;... In summary, this faction held that Accidn Nacional could not risk its inestimable value as the future salvation of Mexico by becoming a casualty in an electoral episode. And it was also felt that to participate would merely lend an 33 air of respectability and legitimacy to the election. 39 The other faction, in view of the urgency of the political situation, wanted to select a candidate and enter 37 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico, p. 13. 3 8 Josd Vasconcelos stated in a letter to the Assembly: "I believe that Accidn Nacional represents the intellectual elite of the nation. Accidn Nacional can become a political force for the future if it follows an intelligent course of action. In doctrine Accidn Nacional in my opinion repre sents a just balance of the past, present, and the future. Accidn Nacional will survive this election because it has principles. But it should not participate in it because it is not an election of the Mexican people. To participate would make Accidn Nacional an accomplice in a farce." Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," p. 6. 39 Among those who favored this position were: Licenci ado Gustavo Molino Font, Licenciado Carlos Gisniega, Licenciado Manuel Herrera y Lasso, Licenciado Aquiles Elorduy (deputy from 1946-1949), Licenciado Tedfilo^Garcfa, Licenciado Bernardo Ponce, and Licenciado Cdrdoba Ztiniga. 57 the election struggle in an effort to end continuismo and 40 to bring about much-needed changes. Licenciado Carlos Sisniega of Chihuahua stated that PAN should enter the political struggle, otherwise the party would be considered a mere civil association with social objectives. Licenciado Aquiles Elorduy stated that he felt that Accidn Nacional had large enough a following and should participate. Licenciado Manuel Herrera y Lasso felt that the party should continue to proclaim its doctrines but should also compete in the election which in itself would improve party organi- 41 zation. Luis Islas Garcfa stated: "We are not speaking of neutrality. While many Mexicans merely want to see the defeat of Cdrdenas, we want to see essential change." Others stated that since PAN evolved at an election time, the citizenry was more alert, which also meant that the young organization was expected to participate with candi- 42 dates and programs. 40 Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," pp. 2-3. 41 Ibid. 42 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico. p. 10. 88 1 O At this point, in view of the impending impassd, Manuel Gdmez Morfn addressed the convention once again. Accidn Nacional, he stated, was not formed to win the 1940 election; it was not prepared to win it yet or to assume the necessary responsibilities in the event it should win. Accidn Nacional was a group of nonprofessional politicians working out of a sense of duty, and as such, was not pre pared to compete with professional politicians and their 44 methods. Nevertheless, he agreed that Accidn Nacional should make itself a national symbol for the future. Gdmez Morin continued: "I do not believe that men alone can save the country, but men with ideas. Let us offer as a candi date a man who believes in our ideasHe proposed as a 43 The September 16, 1939 issue of the magazine Hoy carried these words which were a very good summary of the controversy: "The doctrinaire group that calls itself Accidn Nacional is passing through a moment of truth because some members have begun to demand an organization of the personalist type; or to speak more clearly, to openly sup port the candidacy of General Juan Andreu Almaz^n. These impatient individuals fail to understand that Gdmez Morin’s efforts are to support ideas and doctrine over individuals." Accidn Nacional was formed precisely to combat this un questioning subservience of the masses to personalistic leaders. When one considers that this approach was so radically new for Mexico, it is understandable that these Accidn Nacional delegates like other Mexicans should be con cerned with the politics of individuals, personalities. 44 Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Diez Anos de Mdxico, p. 15; Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas, p. 15. 45 Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," p. 17. B9 final resolution of the First National Convention of PAN that the group work toward the diffusion of the principles that comprise its doctrines, that all work toward fulfilling the Programs Mfnimo de Accidn Politics approved by all, and that all participate in the presidential election without offering a candidate, yet allowing each indivi dual to vote as he so desired, but and in no case to support a candidate of the imposicionista regime.46 This statement was applauded enthusiastically. Several pro posed that Accidn Nacional support Juan Almazdn if he would accept the party's principles and program. This decision was approved unanimously by the convention. with this, a commission was designated to contact Almazdn, and the con vention adjourned. Once the National Convention had been recessed, accord ing to the party Estatutos, the Consejo Nacional was to direct party affairs. However, since this body had not yet met to assume its functions, the Organizing Committee con tinued to guide the party. On December 22, 1939, the National Council met for the first time under the leadership of Manuel Gdmez Morfn, who had been elected party president 46 Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," p. 1&. 47 Ibid. 90 43 at the National Convention. At this first meeting he was also elected president of ^he National Council. Gdmez 49 Morfn, addressing the members of the National Council, called for faith, complete renovation, in minds, hearts, conduct, institutions, and preparedness for a long and dif ficult struggle because the party must work within the 50 structure of reality. The Consejo Nacional ^Gomez Morfn continued/ is (after the Assembly and the Convention) the supreme organ in the direction of the party. To carry out the party’s policy there is the hier archy, which makes the party an organization and not an amorphous mass. The Consejo, comprised of men from all over Mexico and from all social backgrounds, is the party senate; it serves to maintain a permanent political structure and to establish discipline.?! After this introduction the Organizing Committee ful filled its one remaining task before dissolving itself as it 43 "XV Aniversario: Importancia y significancia de las Asambleas del PAN," La Nacidn. 26 (October 10, 1954), 10. 49 Manuel Gdmez Morfn, "Informe a la Nacidn Respuesta al Discurso pronunciado en Chilpancingo por el Presidente de la Republics, Gral. L5zaro Cdrdenas, el dfa 20 de Febrero de 1940," Diez Anos de Mlxico. pp. 27-34. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., p. 30 91 52 presented a hierarchical plan to the National Council. It emphasized that the highest positions in the hierarchy were not to be rewards but to be offered to members of out standing intellect and most experience, those capable of leading, stimulating, and being a good example— all traits which merited them a place in the National Council. With this the National Council assumed the direction of the newly founded party and the Organizing Committee ceased to exist. After having officially organized the party, the mem bers proceeded to diffuse its doctrines throughout the Republic and prepare for the coming election. Here is a representative list of Accidn Nacional meetings for just the month of January: January 7 - 6 First Inter-Regional Convention in Tampico.53 January 9 Meetings in Ciudad Victoria and Linares.54 52 Gdmez Morin, "Informe a la Asamblea Constituyente," Pie2 Anos de Mdxico, p. 9. 53 All types attended these meetings: distinguished intellectuals, artisans, workers, merchants, miners, factory workers. "Conmemoracidn," La Nacidn, 26 (September 19, 1954), 6. 54 At these various meetings new leaders, like Eustaquio Escanddn and Josd Ferndndez de Cevallos of Jalisco, and Jaime Robles and Molina Font of Yucatan, demonstrated them selves to be individuals of ability. "Biografia," La Nacidn, 24 (April 12, 1953), 12. 92 January 11 Assembly in Saltillo. January 12 Installation of Accidn Nacional's Regional Council of Nuevo Ledn. January 14 Meeting in the Plaza de Toros in San Luis Potosf. January 17 Assembly in Teatro Princesa of Torredn. January 20-22 Meetings in Chihuahua, Ciudad Delicias, and Santa Eulalia. January 25 Public lecture by Licenciado Preciado Herndndez in Mexico City. January 26 Supper to celebrate the delivery of flag to the National Committee.55 During these weeks of activity, the Accidn Nacional member ship worked subordinating personal ideas and ambitions. The Mexican people were offered the new concepts of disci pline, the respect for public opinion and the will of the people, and free submission to that will— ideals so diffi cult to achieve with an individualistic people. Concerning this first campaign, Gdmez Morfn later said: We had to begin at the most elementary level: campaign, print and distribute propaganda, hold meetings, etc. It was necessary to find indi viduals, common everyday persons, who were wil ling to face continuous opposition of caciques and all the risks involved, to be the local Accidn Nacional representatives and organizers. It was necessary to find persons of honor and "Biograffa," La Nacidn, 24 (April 12, 1953), 12. 93 prestige in the community, men who could with stand the calumny and assaults of the government party, men capable of forming local programs that would fit within the Accidn Nacional schematic in general. These people were hard to find, but we found them.56 Perhaps the most significant meeting in January was the First Inter-Regional Convention at Tampico on January 7 and S at which Efrafn Gonzalez Luna (and many other Acci6n Nacional officials) spoke. He first refuted charges that Accidn Nacional was an academic party and its members 57 manipulators of ideas and then proceeded to describe the conditions which had caused the Accidn Nacional leadership to form the party: the artificial conflict which had de veloped between Man and the State. The State had come to consider Man the human being and Man the social being as irreconcilable. But Man and the State, stated Gonzalez Luna, were interdependent. The State had abandoned its mission, had become incapable of fulfilling its duty and destiny. Mian was bowing without dignity before a totali tarian state which hypocritically called itself 56 "Conmemoraci<5n," La Nacidn. 26 (September 19, 195L)» Efrafn Gonzalez Luna, "Versidn taquigr£fica del dis- curso pronunciado en la Primera Convencidn Inter-Regional de 'Accidn Nacional,1 el 7 de enero de 19^0* en Tampico, Tamps.," El Hombre x Bstado. (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publi cation, 1940T1 9.” 94 revolutionary. In this moment of tragedy the philosophy of Accidn Nacional was born. Accidn Nacional's doctrine was simple, clear, and elevated: Accidn Nacional felt that it is its duty to point out the roles of man and the State in 53 society. The party has spoken out on the right to private property, the rights of the family, the freedom of instruc tion, the economic well being of workers in both the country and city; Accidn Nacional has spoken out on all that which is of concern to Mexicans. And it has proposed concrete 59 solutions. An interesting note is the following "Corrido de Tampico," representative of the enthusiasm of the Con vention's participants giving some insight into the Con vention itself which inspired its author, the poet Jos£ "The family is his first social circle. It is re placed by others such as the city, municipio, etc., as man attempts to fulfill his destiny. And there are also special circles for special ends: religious, scientific, cultural, professional (work), all of which are orbits in life for the realization of the common or personal welfare; this is the country, the nation, the country is an extension of the home. The nation is like a large house; and we are the walls, foundation, columns that sustain it." Efrain Gonzalez Luna, "Version taquigr^fica del discurso pronunciado en la Primera Convencidn Inter-Regional de 'Accidn Nacional,' el 7 de enero de 1940, en Tampico, Tamps.," El Hombre £ el Estado, (Mexico, D. F.: PAN publication, 1940), 9. 59 Ibid.. p. 16 95 Marfa Gurria Urgell. En Tampico y en tan poco tiempo como estuve alii grandes y maravillosas fueron las cosas que vi... Accidn Nacional reunlo en una fiesta civil delegaciones del Puerto, Torredn, Saltillo, y San Luis. Y fue una fiesta del pueblo; los hombres fueron dos mil y las mujeres...enero convertieron en abril. Y les habld Melo y Ostos, con entusiasmo viril; Su noble frente lucfa bajo su cabello gris. Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna, Pericles en el decir, grabd conceptos eternos en palabras de marfil. Y cantd Porfirio Ramos un poeta paladfn: sus vocabalos perfumaban con aromas de benjul. Miguel Estrada Iturbide habld como hablara el Cid; Islas Garcia clavaba las notas de su clarln. Y vertid Pianuel Samperio su alma honrada y varonil en palabras trabajadas por la magia del buril. Palabras de Kuri Brena con poder de proyectil; las de Ramfrez Zetina fulguraban en rub!. 96 Y Manuel Herrera y Lasso dej6 su verbo fluir, estrellas que itan cayendo para ternar a subir; visidn de la zorza ardiente y cumbres de Sinai... Y dijo G6mez Morin, el sembrador del ideal: A Mexico salvaremos; pero es preciso luchar y llegar a nuestros hijos la lucha por heredad; porque no es brega de un dia, es brega de eternidad. Mirad el £guila prdcer en campo de claridad, triturando la serpiente sin que la quiera soltar, entre el verde y el carmin del pabelldn nacional. No es la Patria solo tierra donde sufrir y medrar; ni es el fantasma de un sueno sin belleza ni verdad. Es en el tiempo infinito Una vida realidad. Hombre y Patria constituyen una suprema unidad, realizada por la vida en la fragua del hogar, donde se forja lo eterno a base de lo mortal. La vida del hombre es lampo, y, como lampo, fugaz; pero, divina, propaga el fuego y es luminar que quema para vivir y vive para quemar. La vida human;- un soplo y, como soplo, i ^az; pero es h£lito divino, se reproduce al azar; si primero es una brisa, es despu^s el hurac^n. 97 La vida del hombre es gota y, como gota, fugaz; pero, divina, en si lleva la virtud del manantial: primero produce el rfo y luego produce el mar. La Patria es el hombre mismo es devenir sin final; y si es lampo, soplo, y gota, es hoguera, viento, y mar. El hombre es Patria que pasa; y Patria, el hombre inmortal. El hombre digno a su Patria le dar£ su dignidad; si es noble y libre, su Patria noble y libre vivir£. El hilo presta a la tela la fuerza y la calidad. Gonquistemos libertades y Mexico las tendr£: libertad en las acciones, libertad para pensar, encauzada en las riberas, del Derecho y la Moral. No dejemos que el Estado nos pretenda esclavizar; el est£ para servimos y nos debe respetar. No permitamos al criado que al amo quiera mandar. No dejemos al Estado la familia destrozad; por ella reconquistemos el fuero y la propietad; propiedad para vivir, y fuero para educar. Salvemos en la familia el protoplasma integral donde la vida realiza su destino universal. Las familias forman Patrias, Las Patrias, Humanidad. 93 Y la Humanidad el mundo en que Cristo reinar£, por los Siglos de los Siglos, y para Siempre Jam£s, Asf habld Gdmez Morin, el sembrador del ideal... Y yo que fui de comparsa, no me pude arrepentir, porque me traje un corrido sobre las cosas que vi; el mismo que estais oyendo y al que pongo punto y fin. Manuel R. Samperio, Miguel Estrada Iturbide, and Manuel Herrera y Lasso organized the Second Inter-Regional Convention held at Guadalajara, Jalisco on March 31, 1940.^" One of the many speakers once again was Efrain Gonzalez Luna who spoke on "the tremendous dignity of the human 62 being." The State views man as a necessary servant, a unit in its political flock, an impersonalized unit of production, a social unit, a component in the community. Accidn Nacional doctrine is based on the concept of the complete man, the 60 "Biografia," La Nacion, 23 (April 5, 1953), 17. 61 These meetings are of importance because they dem onstrate party progress, explain doctrine, and show policy development. 62 Gonzalez Luna, "Version taquigr£fica del discurso pronunciado en la II Convencidn Inter-Regional de 'Acci6n Nacional,' el 31 de marzo de 1940 en Guadalajara, JaL," El Hombre y el Estado, p. 47. 99 person with life and a spirit which allow him to realize his own destiny, a being which pertains in only one aspect to civil society, a being with problems, a destiny, future, etc. Fortunately there yet exist individuals with bodies and souls, destinies, duties, and aspi rations who have not bowed to the State.63 These individuals need liberty for their spirits like air for their bodies. In order that social life not be a denial of all that is human; in order that the State not enchain or degrade the indi vidual, and in order that this Mexican grave yard of human values hear the trumpet of the resur rection, Acci6n Nacional offers itself. It is politics that has enslaved us and it will be politics that will free us.64 Meanwhile, organization on a national scale had pro gressed very well. As Acci6n Nacional campaigned, it con tinued to increase in number. On February 12, 1940, it was officially recognized as a political party by the Secre- tarfa de Gobernacidn (which makes Accion Nacional the 63 "Does the Mexican political situation respect the individual? Are we, according to the laws, complete beings? Are thought, culture, religious activity, edu cation able to progress freely in our country? Is the family recognized as an inviolable institution? Can one truly be free in Mexico?" "Freedom is simply the possi bility to be ourselves." If Mexicans are oppressed by the State, political transformation should not be expected through programs which ignore the individual. Gonzalez Luna, "Version taquigr^fica del discurso pronunciado en la II Convencidn Inter-Regional de fAcci6n Nacional,’ el 31 de marzo de 1940 en Guadalajara, Jal.," El Hombre y el Estado. pp. 4#, 49, 52. 64 Ibid.. pp. 4#, 49, 54. 100 oldest party in Mexico). And on March 15, 1940, the party publication La voz nacional, which was to be later called 65 La Nacidn, began its existence. And finally, on April 20 and 21, barely seven months after the delegates had met to form Accidn Nacional officially, the party had its Second 66 National Convention— this time in Mexico City. This convention was especially significant because this was the last major Accidn Nacional meeting before the Presidential election, which was but six weeks away and because the delegates discussed and subsequently approved a revised version of the Programa Minimo de Accion Politica del PAN, presented by Preciado Hernandez. The most impor tant speaker to address the Assembly was party president Manuel Gdmez Morin who discussed Mexico’s international situation and domestic and economic problems. For many years, he stated, Mexico’s international position was dictated by foreign influences which at times amounted to 67 modest intervention. Regarding Mexico's position in the _ "Biografia," La Nacidn. 23 (April 12, 1953), 13. 66 This time Eustaquio Escanddn, Carlos Sisniega, Estrada Iturbide, and Aquiles Elorduy organized the Con vention. 67 Cdmez Morin, "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Conven- ci<5n Nacional de Accidn Nacional, el 20 de abril de 1940," Diez Anos de M|xico, p. 45. 101 Western Hemisphere he said: We have forgotten evidently, of the mountains and deserts that one hundred years ago were traveled over by missionaries and conquistadores and colo nizers, and which are no longer ours. We yet re tain our own personality which is racial, physical, and spiritual, and which is also Hispanic. This we can still lose! We must retain our identity which is distinct from that of the United States. At the same time we should all work for the com mon welfare. Instead of recognizing and fulfill ing this high vocation, the Mexican government has turned its back on rational and traditional orien tation which would win respect....This artificial policy has been imposed at the expense of realistic Mexican and Hispanic American interests, a policy which would have brought better understanding with the U.S. G6mez Morin felt that a realistic policy was lacking in domestic economic and political affairs: Nothing has been done to formulate a firm policy for Mexico’s natural resources. Little has been done, as in the mining situation, or nothing as in other instances while all wait for an official policy which never comes or which results in twisted ends and corruption.69 ...The railroads are notorious example of mismanagement. What is needed is a complete rehabilitation of the existing system to guarantee better conditions and more opportunities for the nation. Instead of assuming this responsibility, /now that it has nationalized the railroads/ the . G6mez Morin, "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Convencidn Nacional de Accidn Nacional, el 20 de abril de 1940," Diez Anos de Mexico. p. 47; One should remember that pan- hispanicism was widespread about this time. 69 Ibid., p. 4& 102 government has preferred to void it by de livering the operation of the lines to what it has called 'workers* administration.' Actually, the workers do not administer at all; it should be renamed, (thereby exonerating the workers) 'political leaders' administration.* Results? Daily errors increase and sections are abandoned. Neither the problems of the railroad nor those of the workers have been solved. In all, the nation has lost. Mexico has yet to industrialize herself. Because of rude ignorance and political conven ience, the history of intervention by Public Power in the industrial organization of Mexico has been nothing more than a series of interferences to increase and disorient the social struggle. Inept to construct, incapable to understand the duties of justice, ignorant of the ends and possibilities of authority, the government has refused its responsibility to labor organizations; it has pre ferred to capitalize politically by delivering the labor unions into the hands of irresponsible inter mediates (who cannot resolve the worker's needs) so the government can benefit by emphasizing the so-called class struggle. At the same time, G6mez Morfn continued, the government has smothered true organizational movements. This artificial movement has retarded the labor movement, cost many lives, and retarded the economy. What is needed for the betterment of the laborer is increased production for the nation, order, stability and justice for Mexican society. But this pseudolabor government has kept a real labor movement from evolving by creating a sterile climate. In summary, the regime has substituted the traditional concept of the use of men as a means of production for a new concept which exploits man as a mere in strument of political capital.70 70 G6mez Morfn, "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Convenei6n Nacional," Diez Anos de Mexico, pp. 48, 49, 50, 51. 103 G6mez Morin continued with a description of the inadequate agrarian situation: Mexico has waited in vain for the fulfillment of the movement to give the rural population land but which became a political tool. Now after 30 years the problem is still with us. Meanwhile the State compromises credit and the national monetary system through ignorance to organize agriculture credit; the few productive means left for the nation are stopped and foreign systems initiated while the regime pushes for ward a so-called farmers' organization, which is only part of the regime. The peasantry, is herded together like sheep in a flock. j _The Result?/ the nation must import cereals, while virgin lands are unused. At the present we must rely on foreigners for our smallest food needs. Previously the worst of Mexican reactionary regimes did not disdain the individual human. It was authoritarian, committed flagrant injus tices, denied rights and liberties, violated the law, and used public force to suppress popular protest— but it treated its enemies like human beings. The present regime treats them like instruments; instead of public prisons, it has hired assassins....When this regime can likewise control our children /through the educational system/ what can we expect from the future?71 For this reasonf although there may be considerable opposition, Accidn Nacional has decided to assume the responsibility of these matters which affect all Mexicans. Accidn Nacional presents to the Nation, a new interpre tation of man, society, the State, of authority, and of the country. It has a program which is based upon concrete and immediate solutions— its principles of doctrine— to reorganize the essential aspects of Mexico's life.72 71 Cf. Chapter VIII on doctrines, 72 G6mez MorjCn, "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Convencion Nacional," Diez Anos de Mexico. p. 56. 104 At this Second National Convention, Acci6n Nacional posed the question, "What should we expect from this elec tion of the first Sunday of this July?" This was not a theoretical question but a very practical one. Accidn Nacional continued: "Under the existing circumstances (which have existed since the Porfirista period) elections are devices of the government. The people are aware that the outcome is decided beforehand and for that reason usually does not participate." Acci6n Nacional had never stated that the solution of Mexico’s national problems de pended on the outcome of the 1940 or any other election. The fulfillment of national goals, it held, was not accom plished by just voting. Accidn Nacional had stated, how ever, that civic organization and a large voter turnout was important in itself. The nation was without organization and consequently remained inert because of its incapacity to put forth the necessary effort required to fight the regime which dominated it. Party leader G6mez Morfn stated: In 1910, because of a lack of knowledge of reality, anxiety for power, opposition by the regime, and disorganization, the social movement was not successful. Action became an explosion and the results are well-known. Will the opposi tion forces, the uncontrolled army, appetite for power, childish vanity once again frustrate the movement_ Or will the people have the maturity and necessary organization to meet the challenge? If it finds difficulties in exercising its right and duty— can it remain true to its principles and not explode into violence as previously? Is not this what the regime would like to see? That would make the government 105 organizations appear to truly represent the workers and farmers of Mexico; that would con fuse the loyalty of the army; that would give the regime an opportunity to cultivate lies and create confusion through the official propaganda machines.73 Now, as in 1910, the Nation and the Govern ment are separated, and antagonistic; the regime is decadent and corrupt— beneficial for only a minority. Now, as then, the near-sighted regime ignores what is happening within the country.... And now as then, the country is exhausted, tor mented with ruin, lacerated with disorganization and misery, tired of pistolerismo and corruption and lies in public life. And now, more than then, exists the desire for complete change. While a mere change of men in office would siaf=. fice, complete, total renovation is necessary.'^- With less than two months remaining before election time, G6mez Morin stated that the necessary electoral organization and the selection of election officials, the determination of the locations of ballot boxes, and all the other prepar ations necessary for a true, honest count— had not yet be- 75 gun. Only the head of government, G6mez Morin continued, can fulfill the moral, political, and constitutional obli gations necessary for an honest election and compliance with its results. At the September convention he said: 73------------------ Gdmez Morin, "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Convencion Nacional de Acci6n Nacional el 20 de abril de 1940," Diez Aftos de Mexico. p. 63. 74 Ibid.. p. 61. 75 Ibid.. p. 63. 106 The electoral struggle demands a minimal con dition of government impartiality charged with making possible an election and counting the votes. Now, as then, we affirm that this con dition does not exist in Mexico— controlled by a political machine. We must repeat that under these circumstances all political activity de signed to renovate through suffrage is condemned beforehand to be laughed at. However, at least one can denounce beforehand the curse of con spiracy if one cannot remove it. For those who do not have illusions, there is no disillusion ment. This is but one more battle in the same old struggle between Mexico and the opposing forces which dominate her.76 Licenciado Manuel Herrera y Lasso, the last speaker of the convention, closed with words of admonition to the delegates, and the historic assembly was dismissed by Efrafn 77 Gonzalez Luna. Before considering the 1940 campaign issues and elec tion, one should first point out that the whole electoral demonstration was ridiculous for Mexico had never known an honest election. Elections were controlled by the party in power: "in the entire history of the Mexican Republic, /.as of 194Q7 no government had ever suffered an electoral 76 G6mez Morln^ "Informe Rendido a la Segunda Convencion Nacional," Diez Anos de Mexico, p. 6 5. 77 "Biograffa," La Nacidn, 24 (April 12, 1953), 13. 107 73 defeat." Actually the government party1s campaign had begun some two years before the voting on July 7, 1940. With this, the writer referred to the internal struggle among 79 the several power centers. Once this question had been resolved and all dissident elements pacified or at least disciplined, the PRM was prepared to effect another impo- sicidn. The main argument or theme of the PRM campaign from the first centered about a personal attack on Almazdn and his revolutionary affiliations: he had co-operated with Huerta, Obregdn, Calles, and the latterfs puppet presidents He was accused of having opposed Zapata. The PRM also attacked Almazdn's attitude toward the Mexican Revolution. As it spoke in glowing terms of what the government party had done for the people, it asserted that Almaz^n and his supporters would destroy all of this: Strong contingents from all social classes grouped themselves about Juan Andrdu Almazdn because they were enemies of the Revolution, the Constitution, 73----------------- Henry B. Parkes, "Political Leadership in Mexico," American Academy for Political Arts and Sciences, 203 (March 1940),12. 79 Shirley E. Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election of 1940 as Seen Through the Press of the Capital" (Unpub lished M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1943), pp. 15, 16 108 and the Republic. fascist1 Juan Andr6u Almazdn has promised the Church its control over its education, full liberty to propagandize, the destruction of Article 3, and the right to re open its convents; to the hacendados he promised to restore their lands; to the capitalists, he promised to annul the oil expropriation. He promised to the Spanish Falangists to confine the Spanish exiles, being nearly all communists and terrorists. The Fascist-orientated Unidn Nacional Sinarquista which supports Almaz6n and calls him a candidate of the people, openly calls for abolition of the 1917 Constitution. The other reactionary group, Acci6n Nacional, composed of outstanding capitalists is possibly more of a potential menace than the chaotic UNS. They were not expected to incite armed action but to hurt national prestige and its representatives and the government p a r t y . When he was not attacking Almaz5n, Avila Camacho "spent ^is^ time reassuring the people of the party*s good intentions," and emphasizing national unity, especially in the last 82 weeks of his campaign. Since the PRM would control the m ----------------- Plre Foix, Cardenas {Mexico, D. F.: Editoro Latino Americana, S.A., 1947), pp. 289, 291. 81 Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election," p. 25. 82 He offered to form an administration "with repre sentatives of all factions." This was an attempt to win over the middle class and induce finance and business ele ments "to lift the economic siege...." Avila Camacho hoped to turn depression into prosperity by winning the confi dence of business. Harry Block, "From Cardenas to Camacho," The Nation. 152 (March 8, 1941), 2 6 6, 267. 109 outcome of the election, he did not find it necessary to have a well developed platform. (Some writers say that Avila Camacho "appropriated” Almaz^^s political plat- 63 form.) In view of the circumstances Almaz^n was obliged to answer the charges leveled against him such as in this ex cerpt where he explained his personal fortune: They repeat with dull insistence that I am a rich man, they attribute to me millions, as if they, converted into magicians and witches, had given me my money. They know perfectly well that in the cruel period of fighting, from 1910-1940, I lived in misery, while they robbed the Mexican people of millions. What really offends them is that in peacetime with honor, I earned a fortune which I have placed intact at the disposal of the Mexican people in this electoral fight. It is not my fault that the millions they stole in years past from this land have been dissipated and lost by their stupidity.®4 But Almaz^n also made policy declarations and promises of his own as "the following excerpts from his speech in Zitacuaro, Michoac£n on February 3," illustrate: For the campesinos, not only a bit of land, but a guarantee that their work will not be taken from them. For workers, a constant increase in salaries, healthy homes, social security, particu larly in the field of the public utilities, and a good future for the miners. 63 Block, "From Cardenas to Camacho," p. 2 6 6. 64 Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election," p. 22. 110 These advantages cannot be realized if the workers and all the citizens do not take the liberties which the Constitution guarantees and which the authorities constantly deny.®? Later, on February 7, he stated: When General Magana {governor of Morelia) and I, at the side of the southern caudillo Emiliano Zapata, initiated the agrarian revolution, never did we imagine that the results would be so disastrous....It is indispensable that we work... to rectify all the damages, all the disasters caused to the class most suffering in our country- the Mexican ranchero. Disgracefully, the war we launched in 1910 has retarded the development of our new Mexican race. The day that farmers become ten million rancheros, Mexico will be a country which has influence in the destiny of the Americas. In a speech on May 13 to foreign correspondents, Almaz£n promised to 1) welcome foreign capital, 2) maintain order, 3) keep the fundamental bases of the revolution, 4) provide religious liberty and parochial schools; 5) reaffirm Mexican nationality; 36 6) and finally, respect foreign investments. 37 Throughout the campaign, Almaz5n, like Avila Camacho, 33 Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election,T t p. 23. 36 Ibid.. pp. 25» 26. 37 And most important was Avila Camacho's declaration, "I am a believer." The significance here is farreaching: the government allowed him to make such a statement only because it recognized the importance of the religious issue and Almaz5n's use of it. Mena Brito, El PRUN Almaz£n y el desastre final. p. 142. Ill demonstrated an awareness of the importance of the re ligious issue. On February 11 Almaz£n stated in a speech that he believed it imperative that all have freedom to believe in and adore the God of his fathers, and to practice other religious beliefs different from those of the men in power, without being persecuted...,/AndZ on February 25, in Guadalajara, he attacked Article 3..--°° When election day, July 7, 1940, finally arrived, there were the usual election "irregularities’ 1 accompanied by violence. In the first casilla at Cabecere, Zitacuaro, the PRM received 72 votes when there were 502 officially registered voters in all the municipio. On the other hand, the less populated municipios of Contepec or Maravatio, where it was not possible to have PAN representa tives, 3,254 and 2,369 ballots were reported. The figures speak for themselves. Twenty-five years later Gdmez Morfn stated that violence was lessened because of the presence of the brave women who marched to the polls with their men. Unfortunately, vio lence was not completely prevented. Among those Accidn Nacional members who died attempting to fulfill their duty were Juan Vicente Sepulveda, Eusebio Vela, Coronel Vicente Obregdn, Gilberto Zamora Hernandez, and Vicente Gonzalez Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election," p. 44. 89 "Biograffa," La Naclon 24 (June 7, 1953), 14. 112 Gasca of Monterrey, J. Refugio Rodriguez of San Luis Potosi, Liborio Villanueva, Juan Castillo, Fdlix Salgado, Pedro 90 Kuri, Jesus Nava, and Diego Pineda— all of Iguala. In the Federal District, former General Melchor Gonzdlez Casas, Josd Horacio Munoz, Felix Rodriguez and more than five hundred others died and more than one thousand five hundred others were injured. One writer later explained the elec tion violence as a popular reaction against the communistic program and,...CdrdenasT candidate for the Presidency.... Businessmen, intellectuals, the Church, even large numbers of the common people understood the nature of the conflict, took a firm stand and set to work against Communism. Their organizations spoke out clearly and courageously. The leaders led, the people followed, and Cardenas was halted, if not completely routed and eliminated.^1 In view of this popular reaction, to accomplish his impo- 92 sicidn, Cardenas had to crush the popular will. 90 Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," p. 19. 91 A Mexican Intellectual, "Mexico: On Road to Social ism— Affected by the U.S.?" U.S. News and World Report. 52 (February 12, 1962), 97, W. 92 Accidn Nacional, "Las jornadas histdricas," p. 19; "Biograffa," La Nacidn 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 113 93 While the government party’s election results showed an overwhelming victory for Avila Camacho, many Mexicans strongly suspected that Almaz^n had won. Twenty-five years later when Almaz^n died a prominent Mexico City newspaper As it is well known, Juan Andr^u Almaz£n won the 1940 Presidential election; but the imposicidn that was all-powerful gave it to General Manuel Avila Camacho....It was a very sad conclusion and it left another scar on Mexico that was de frauded, left without a will to fight....94 Whether or not Almaz£n actually won the 1940 election is certainly debatable. The apathetic aftermath, the dis appointment and disillusionment of the Mexican people— who felt that Cardenas had broken his promise for an honest election— is a fact. stated: 93 Here are the election figures which the PRM pub lished : General Manuel Avila Camacho General Juan Andr^u Almaz^n General Rafael Sanchez Tapia 2,476,641 votes 151,101 votes 9,340 votes P£re Foix, Cardenas. p. 300. 94 El Universal. October 13, 1965. CHAPTER FIVE MEXICO*S POLITICAL EDUCATION The first ten years of its life, Accidn Nacional fol lowed a course of action which appears to us today to have been very extremely aloof from Mexican political reality. This was because the preponderantly powerful government 1 party would have not tolerated any other type of oppo sition and because Accidn Nacionalfs leaders and members felt that until Mexico was educated politically, informed of its political rights and obligations, until a Consciencia Cfvica existed in Mexico, it would be hopeless to compete earnestly (and expect to win) in an election— especially a Presidential election. Consequently, Accidn Nacional's actions in this first period were didactic, reflecting the intellectualism of its founder and first president, Licen- ciado Manuel Gdmez Morfn— and that of his fellow intel- 2 lectuals. The most important of this group, however was 1 Had Accidn Nacional been other than an organization of intellectuals at this time, the writer is convinced that the government party would have crushed it in its infancy. 2 We have already presented Licenciado Manuel Gdmez Morfn's illustrious career as a writer, professor, and the rector of the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mdxico. Other, of many, exemplary party leaders at this time are Licenciado Efraln Gonzdlez Luna, a well educated philosopher and lawyer; Licenciado Roberto Cossio y Cossio, catedrdtico in the UNAM faculty of jurisprudence; Licenciado Rafael Preciado Herndndez, catedrdtico of legal philosophy in the 114 115 Gdmez Morin whose political philosophy was very simple: 3 "Hay que mover las almas." Once the souls of the people were moved, according to Gdmez Morin, "it would be obvious that the eternal truth of ideas and values of the heart, which alone point the way to a solution to social problems, 4 would move men to act and even sacrifice." This approach, advocated by Accidn Nacional intel lectuals, presupposed an information campaign of close con tact with the Mexican people. And to reach the people, Accidn Nacional worked diligently "sowing ideas" throughout the republic. The titles of these publications by the party members are representative of Accidn Nacional's effort through the press: "i,A ddnde va Mdxico?", "Reflec- ciones sobre un nueve orden social," "Programa de Accidn UNAM faculty of jurisprudence; Licenciado Manuel Ulloa Ortiz, a distinguished jurist and catedrdtico in the facul ty of jurisprudence; and Luis de Garay who also held a catedra of law. These men were able to exert their influ ence by expressing their views in the party's Convenciones, Asambleas, and Consejos and through their writings as pro fessional people— university professors, writers, philoso phers, lawyers, and economists. Miguel Castro Ruiz, "Accion Nacional opina sobre el proyecto de Ley Electoral," La Nacidn, 9 (December 23, 1945), 6-7, 22. 3 Gilberto Moreno, "Cuatro jefes, cuatro etapas," La Nacidn, 36 (September 27, 1959), 6. 4 Manuel Gdmez Morfn was quoted in a speech by Salvador Morales Munoz in the 1964 presidential campaign. 116 Nacional en la lucha polftica por el gobierno de Aguas- calientes," "Aprovechamiento de recursos naturales," "Del regimen de faccidn al Estado nacional," "Cada hora de tra- 5 bajo legislativo de la Camara cost6 al pais, 535,460.92." In these articles, Acci6n Nacional criticized the ineffi ciency of the government regime and simultaneously presented 6 its own programs for a true Mexican social revolution. It demanded decentralized and representative government, and it 5 Other titles are: "Porque debe Accidn Nacional parti- cipar en las elecciones prdximas," "Las prdximas elecciones: una valorizacidn," "Mexico responde a Accidn Nacional," "El comercio exterior de Mdxico," "Cuales deben ser los puntos esenciales de un programa de gobierno para los prdximos seis anos," "Los problemas de la electrificacidn del pais: un andlisis de la politics que sigue en este aspecto..." "La elevacidn moral y material del hombre..." "La paz nos en- cuentra con 7 milliones de hectdreas sin cultivo y 3.5 millones de hombres que apenas comen," "El PRM es un instru- mento creado para impedir que se ejerzen los derechos es enciales de la democracia," "Braceros marcados como esclavos con las ideas del politico que los explota: la tirania del PRI," "La dnica razdn de la falta de pan: no hay trigo porque la nadrquica imprevisidn de la polftica agrdria ha frustrado la produccidn nacional," and "Hacia el municipio libre." 6 "We entered into World War II to defend democracy— something Mexico has never known....The president stated once that Mexico wanted social democracy more than demo cratic forms. But how can this be achieved when most Mexi cans suffer from a lack of food and misery? ...Although the revolution awakened the national conscience to social justice, the increasingly corrupt revolutionary regimes made it impossible...The solution is very simple: the ex istence of a legitimate government. The day that Mexico achieves this she will have unknown prosperity and pro gress." Miguel Castro Ruiz, "ik ddnde va Mdxico?" La Nacidn, 6 (May 3, 1944), 10. 117 reiterated that the local and national governments existed to serve the people of Mexico and not vice versa. In addition to writing and distributing many articles, hundreds of lectures were delivered by party members. A few representative titles are: "La anarquia economica," a lecture presented by Licenciado Luis de Garay on December 2, 1943, in the Front6n Mexico; and "La persona humana, el bien comun y la cultura," by Licenciado Efrafn Gonzalez Luna on May 15, 1947, before a youth group in Guadalajara. And finally, Accidn Nacionalfs third front in its cam paign to "sow ideas" (not to win elections), consisted of 7 intensive local, municipal, and federal campaigns through out the republic. It did not offer candidates for the Presidency, for the party held that until local democracy was achieved— through educating the Mexican people politi cally at the "grass-roots" level and through local govern mental reform— national democracy was inconceivable. Conse quently, the partyTs platforms frequently were centered 7 Well-informed, educated individuals were selected to serve as Accidn Nacional candidates. S These local campaigns were in effect on-the-job training programs in democratic participation--something which would have not been accomplished in a national presi dential campaign at this time. 113 about demands for municipal reform as the titles of these campaign pamphlets indicate: "El pequeno municipio mexi- cano," "Alcurnia del municipio," "El municipio, comunidad fundamental," "La ciudad: necesidad del municipio libre," "Ruina y esperanza del municipio mexicano," "Naturaleza y funciones del municipio," "Esquema de un programa munici- 9 pal." Of Accion Nacional's three methods of educating the public politically, the third-intensive campaigning— was the most important with the first two serving as supporting activities. Because of the importance of these campaigns, we will examine some of the more important ones of the ten- 10 year period. 11 With the 1940 election episode behind it, Accidn Nacional continued its tenacious march— organizing and 9 These local campaigns were also considered opportuni ties to reveal the governmentrs dishonest and violent tac tics, to denounce abuses and impositions, to present the party's analysis of local problems and their solutions, as well as opportunities to present progressive platforms. y Manuel G6mez Morin, "La vida de Accion Nacional," La Nacion, 36 (September 27, 1959), 6. 10 We will not attempt to evaluate the party's success at this point but rather will postpone this until a later chapter. Infra, p. 2&7• 11 Accidn Nacional had reiterated many times during the campaign and had reaffirmed at the Second National Conven tion in March 1940 that it had not hoped to see electoral success. "No illusions and disillusioned citizens. This will be but another episode in the great struggle between 119 12 reorganizing nuclei, combating the apathy of the post- 13 election period. To co-ordinate the 1940 municipal cam paigns, the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional organized a Comisidn Nacional de Accidn Nacional with Enrique M. Laoeza, Rafael Preciado Hernandez, Carlos Contreras, Carlos Toditi, Mexico and the forces dominating her.” Luis Calderdn Vega, "Biograffa del PAN," La Nacidn, 24 (May 10, 1953), 16. 12 In the Distrito Federal: the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional strengthened the Comissions on Organization, Propa ganda and the Treasury, presided over by Ernesto Ayala, Martfn Diosdado, and Licenciado Juan B. Amezcua respective ly. Jefe Esteban Pina presided over the local Comitd of Huichapan, Hidalgo. Miguel Estrada Iturbide presided over a reorganization meeting of the local Consejo in Michoacan. Antonio R. Sanchez y Salinas became the new Jefe for San Pedro Yucunama, Oaxaca. Juan D. Ortuzar became the new Jefe of San Luis Potosf Comity. In Morelia, there were new Consejeros. In Guerrero, the Comitd, presided by Filogonio Mora, reorganized completely almost all of the one hundred and two municipios. In Oaxaca, in September of 1940, there were Comitds Locales in Santiago, Huajolotitlan, Santa Catarina Sapoquilla, Yuxichi de Huajuapan, Cuyotepeji, Santa Maria, Chilixtlahuaca, Tezoatlan de Mixquistlahuaca, Tequistepec, Ayu San Segura y Luna and Santos Reyes Yacuna. Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn, 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 13 In Monterrey, yet in July, Accidn Nacional leaders Carlos Gonzalez, Luis Obregdn, Rodolfo Gutierrez, J. Guadalupe Trejo, Ignacio Diaz, Santos Torres, Vicente Gonzalez Guafardo, and Ovidio Elizondo gave lectures on the topics: "El orlgen de Accidn Nacional," "iQu6 es un partido de principios?," "La habitacidn obrera en Monterrey," "La dignidad humana," "Puntos de doctrina," "Salario familiar," and "El sentido de la Nacidn." In Saltillo and Torredn, similar lectures were given by Marfn G. Trevino, Licenciados Josd Marfa Gurria Urgel, Rafael Preciado Herndndez, and Juan Sdnchez Navarro. In Jalisco, Jaime Robles Ledn, Carlos Septidn Garcfa, and other leaders worked diligently to stir Mexicans from their apathetic position. Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn. 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 120 Mauricio M, Campos, Enrique de la Mora, Juan B. Amezcda, Alberto Salcedo, Ernesto Robles Le6n, Eustaquio Escanddn 14 and Luis Torres Landa serving as its first members. In its first manifesto, the Comisidn Nacional instructed the local comites that Accidn Nacional intended to consider public opinion and form practical programs about the party's doctrines designed to "lessen the people's misery, 15 local corruption, inefficient government administration." Also, in accordance with the party's Principios de Doctrina, it intended to support the concept of local government which had long been forgotten or ignored by the government party (although that party continued to pay lip service to it). Accidn Nacional proclaimed that the base of the national political structure should be the city and municipal governments. Historically.. ./local government/'has been the source of political liberty, efficient government, and honesty in public life. The municipal government must be autonomous, responsible, permanently subject to the will and vigilance of municipal citizens.... Only under these conditions can the municipal administration fulfill its responsibilities. Only in this way can the municipal citizens avoid 14 Calderdn Vega, "Biograffa," La Nacidn. 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 15 IMd. 121 ruinous government in the hands of irresponsible caciques, and be assured of necessary public services. The Comisidn met with the Comitds Regionales which represented the Municipios of Tampico, Monterrey, Guada lajara, and Chilpa; it was agreed to call for delegates to meet in four regional conventions to decide whether or not to participate and, if so, to select candidates. On Sep tember 25 a Convencidn met in Tampico. The delegates de cided to participate, selected their candidates, and 17 elected Licenciado Carlos Zorrilla to head their campaign. On October 11, the people of Monterrey held their Conven- cion, decided to participate, wrote a program, and elected IS Victorio Cepeda and Licenciado Victoriano Garza Ferndndez 16 Quoted on cover of Accidn Nacional, La Ciudad: Necesidad del Municipio Libre {Mdxico, D. F.: PAN publi cation, n.d.); also cited in Calderdn Vega, "Biograffa," La Nacidn, 24 (May 3, 1953), 14- 17 The delegates selected for Regidores Propietarios: Agustfn R. Luna, Leovigildo Castillo, Juan C. Dfaz, J. Concepcion Herndndez, Josd Marfa Bojorquez; J. Guadalupe Pdrez Lara. Regidores Suplentes: Ramdn D. Galvan, Pedro M. Larios, Francisco Pumarejo Jr., Francisco S. Pier, Adalberto Elizondo, Fortino Martfnez Espinosa. Sfndicos: Josd Manuel Lozano, Ezequiel H. Herndndez,- Ramdn Lacavez, Antonio Fusco. IS Monterrey was later to become a center of pro-Accidn Nacional sentiment. 122 19 to direct their campaign. The citizens of Chilpa, Guerrero, despite government persecution and local poverty finally decided to launch a municipal campaign. And, on 20 November 1 Guadalajara initiated its municipal campaign. "The inventory of our urban misery is written throughout the city," declared the Comity Municipal in Guadalajara. "Each inhabitant of Guadalajara is a witness and victim of 21 this misery and demands immediate correction." 19 Monterrey’s Programs de Accidn Municipal was: 1) re form of the legal system (from the state constitution to the Federal) which governs municipal life so that it may be in the control of its citizens; 2) the creation of a Depart ment of Public Works, which a city of Monterrey's importance and size should have, to attend to its problems; 3) to take necessary measures to avoid a repetition of flooding from the Rfo de Santa Catarina; 4) the construction of a bridge to annex the Colonia Independencia to the city; and 5) to study the city's master plan to develop it in modern methodical way. Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn, 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 20 It selected as its candidates: Regidores Propie- tarios: Ramdn J. Fregoso, Licenciado Jose Gutidrrez Hermosilla, Ingeniero Luis Ugarte, Julidn Limdn, Dr. Esteban Cuevas Brambila, Dr. Remberto Sdnchez Valdds, Julio Garcia, Vicente M. Contreras, Othon Ibdffez. Regidores Suplentes: Carlos Medina, Jeses M. Rivas, Salvador Ramirez Rincon, Joaquin L. Casillas, Ignacio L, Moreno, Guillermo Sierra Souza, Gilberto Huerto, Fernando Bolanos, Juan Soria Castillo. Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn. 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 21 Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn. 24 (May 3, 1953), 14. 123 In the ensuing campaign the party exposed problems which had been previously circumvented and camouflaged by 22 the government party. In short, Accidn Nacional presented a new interpretation of the individual, society, and the State. 23 The most important business before the delegates that met May 7 to 9, 1943, for the Third National Convention was 22 For a summarization and evaluation of the over-all Accidn Nacional successes and failures from 1939 to the present, see Chapter IX. No judgement will be presented at this time. 23 But this was not the only matter discussed at the convention. The first day the delegates heard reports from the regional delegations such as these: "In Costa Chica (Guerrero) there are only three cattle raisers left and not one head of cattle. "we have been assaulted for belonging to Accidn Nacional," said Filogonio Mora....Dr. Salvador de Lara presented the problems of La Laguna; Licenciado Miguel Nino de Rivera, those of Huajuapam de Ledn (Oaxaca); Mrs. Bernardo Elosua, the problems of Nuevo Ledn, Mrs. Ernesto Aceves, those of Jalisco, and Mrs. Josd T. Carpizo, those of San Luis Potosf. Maestro Manuel Herrera y Lasso summa rized the discussion of the session and brought it to a close. On the second day of the Convention Accidn Nacional considered the problems relevant to the farm situation: the full utilization of natural resources, agricultural credit, the small-land owner, social problems of the agricultural population, salaries and cost of living, and social securi ty. Two other memorable presentations were made that day: a poem by don Josd Marfa Gurrfa Urgel, entitled "Retorno al campo’ ’ and a speech by Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna entitled "Visidn del Mexico Futuro." Also, Srta. Ignacia Mejia of the Comite of Morelia spoke on the "Necesidad de la Beneficencia Pri- vada;" there was a debate on social security; and Licenciado Isaac Guzmdn Valdivia spoke on the topic "El Sistema Colec- tiva de la Propiedad Agrfcola y la Naturaleza Humana." Calderdn Vega. "Biograffa," La Nacidn, 24 (May 10, 1953), 16. 124 whether or not to submit Congressional candidates in the 24 1943 election— the second election to be considered (and the first national election in which Accidn Nacional party- 25 members participated as candidates). Party president Manuel Gdmez Morin submitted the question to the delegations 24 This does not mean that Accidn Nacional was dormant during the interim. Here is an arbitrary list of its ac tivities in the months of May in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943* May 5, 1940— The Comitd Regional convoked an assembly at San Luis Potosl. May 8, 1940— Licenciado Carlos Sanchez Navarro began a series of lectures on the ,THistoria moderna de Mdxico." May 5, 1941— The Comitl Regional of Morelia met in comemoration of the IV Centennial of the settling of Morelia. Licenciados Manuel Gdmez Morfn, head of the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, Efraln Gonzdlez Luna, head of the Comitd Regional of Jalisco, Ingeniero Luis Alvarez, head of the Comitd Regional of Queretaro, attended. May 24, 1941— The Comitd Regional of Guerrero met in Chilpancingo. May 25? 1941--The Comitd Regional of San Luis Potosl met. Licenciado Gonzalo Chapela, Adolfo Pimentel, and Luis Calderdn Vega attended. May 2 6, 1941— Licenciado Gonzalo Chapela presented a week of lectures on contemporary Mexico. May 2, 1942— There was a party reunion in Huajuapan de Ledn, Oaxaca. Manuel Cantu Mdndez, Clicerio Cardosa Equiluz of the Comitd Nacional attended. May 3, 1942— An Inter- Regional Convention was held in Torredn. Delegates of the Comitls of Durango, Saltillo, Parras, Monterrey, San Luis Potosl, and Torreon attended. Licenciado Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Carlos Septidn Garcia, and Luis Calderdn Vega represented the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional. May 10, 1942— A reunion of the members of the Comitl Regional of Jalisco and Acatldn de Juarez. May 15, 1942— There was a party reunion at Matamoros. Josd G. Martinez, Jefe of the Comitd Regional of Monterrey met with the newly established Comitd Local. May 7-9, 1943— National Convention of the Party met. 25 Calderdn Vega, "Biografia," La Nacidn, 24 (May 10, 1953), 16. 125 in these words: We must strive toward forming a truly national State. This means participation in elections, even though there may not be the most remote possibility of succeeding. Elections in them- 26 selves serve to unite opinion against the regime. The matter was debated by delegates with the same ardor as in 1939. On Sunday, May 9 by a vote of forty-nine to 27 thirty-one, it was decided to participate. The delegates also voted to assist the Comitds Regionales (through the 28 Comitl Ejecutivo Nacional) coordinate their activities should they decide to participate, submit candidates, and need assistance. One of last acts of the Third National 26 Calderdn Vega, "Biograffa,” La Nacidn, 21+ (May 10, 1953), 1 6. 27 According to the Boletin (as La Nacidn was then called) on that date, the party officials in favor of par ticipation in the 19A-3 campaign were: Rafael Preciado Herndndez, Luis de Garay, Aquiles Elorduy, Pdrez Rivero, Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Josd Loaeza, Ferndndez Cueto, Carlos Sisniega, Josd Aguilar y Salazar, Ferndndez de Cevallos. Those opposed to participation were: Samuel Melo y Ostos, Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna, Ernesto Aceves, Manuel Herrera y Lasso, Jaime Robles, Josd Ramfrez Zetina, Bernardo Elosua, Marfn G. Trevino, Jose Borja, and Rojas Morano. 28 Later in an interview with a reporter from El occi dental de Guadalajara. Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna, who had op posed participation in the campaign, stated: "The situation is of such gravity, the party deems it necessary to have party representatives in the Cdmara to present and support measures. It is an opportunity to fight for the principles of liberty, personal integrity, and genuine democratic representation...." The reporter continued, "Does Accidn Nacional think that this time the regime will respect the popular will as manifested in the election of its repre sentatives to the Congress?" Gonzdlez Luna replied "As long 126 29 Convention was to prepare a platform which was signed on June 1, 1943, by the forty-two Congressional candidates. In the ensuing weeks, Mexico witnessed a struggle in the forty-two districts where Accidn Nacional presented its as there is no electoral reform legislation, the fraud will continue. However, if once again the imposicionistas methods of falsification and violence inhibit the genuine popular representatives, the regime will lose more than Accidn Nacional. It will have demonstrated that it is definitely incapable of retaining control through legitimate means.0 This is a good example of Accidn Nacional’s disci pline. Calderdn Veba, "Biograffa,0 La Nacidn, 24 (May 17, 1953), 17. 29 Accidn Nacional advocated: °1) reform of persecutory texts such as Article 130 of the 1917 Constitution, which inhibit freedom of conscience and make social peace and national unity impossible, or Article 3 which impedes the creation and the development of a great educational system, a fundamental necessity for the nation; 2) reform of Article 115 of the Constitution to assure municipal autonomy; 3) agrarian reform not based on sectors or parties for the genuine improvement of the social and economic condition of the farmer a. through the creation of private property for the ejiditarios and guaranteeing the rights of small private property holders, b. through establishing easily obtained, inexpensive and sufficient agriculture credit, c. through taking better advantage of the immense resources of the countryside, d. and through national programs of irrigation, colonization, and communications development; 4) measures that keep the cost of living down;.... 5) negotiation for a just salary that covers the physical and spiritual neces sities of the worker and his family at a human level of ex istence..., and a universal system of social security; ...6) a general economic program...defining the position of the State as a rector, not as an owner, of the economy;... 7) formation of true tax system..., just fiscal policies..., appropriate utilization of public credit..., an audit of public accounts and government transactions;... S) a Civil Service law that defines the responsibilities of public em ployees;... 9) reform of the electoral system...to assure effective suffrage as an authentic expression of national will; 10) honesty and dignity in public life; 11) the inde pendence of Mexico." Calderdn Vega. "Biografia,0 La Nacidn, §4 (May 17, 1953), 17. 127 candidates: in Guerrero, there was Filogonio Mora and his rural supporters; in Monterrey, Bernardo Elosiia and his university students and workers worked diligently; and Accidn Nacional leader and university professor Trinidad Garcfa carried the party's political ideology to the plazas of each town and city. These men, like other Accidn Nacional members, exposed the politics of the PRM and were 30 threatened by local government party strongmen. What was the outcome of the election? Out of all the Accidn Nacional participants, only two candidates were elected and the Electoral College refused to recognize their victories. The party reacted as before: "This was simply another incident." Between the 1943 Congressional campaign and the 1946 Presidential campaign, the highlight was the July, 1944, 31 gubernatorial campaign in Aguascalientes. Aquiles 55 Carlos Septidn Garcfa and Josd Ferndndez de Cevalles, who were assaulted and attacked at the polls, recorded the fervor of election in these words: "llegaron los sarracenos y nos molieron a polos, que Dios protege de los malos cuando son mds que los buenos." Calderdn Vega, "Biograffa," La Nacidn. 24 (June 7, 1953), 14» 31 There were also extraordinary municipal campaigns in November of 1945 in Monterrey and Guanajuato as Accidn Nacional continued its battle against caciquismo. 126 Elorduy, the Accidn Nacional candidate, was threatened many times by the PRM's pistoleros during the campaign. Never theless, he conscientiously visited every Municipio in the state and was enthusiastically received by the people. His opponent hardly bothered to campaign. On election day, when the PRM officials distributed the ballot boxes at two in the morning, they were already filled with PRM votes. As a precautionary measure, the PRM brought in e.iiditarios from outlying areas to disrupt the voting process. They were told to fight or lose their plots 32 of land. No one appeared surprised when a large voter turnout occurred that the PRM's pistoleros destroyed uncast 33 ballots and dispersed the people. The people were angered, but Accidn Nacional leaders request for nonviolence pre vailed. The following day, the PRM announced another over- 34 whelming victory— 12,10$ votes to 6 2 1. 32 Salvador Sdnchez Septidn, T f La campana en Aguas- calientes," La Nacidn. 6 (July 22, 1944), 6. 33 Aquiles Elorduy, Cuarto a espadas (Mdxico, D. F.: Ediciones Botas, 1943). 34 Later Elorduy presented a petition, signed by 4,000 citizens, to the state government officials requesting that the election be voided. When it was refused, on July 17 a delegation went before the National Supreme Court and pre sented a petition, signed by 5,000 citizens requesting that the election be investigated. This request likewise was re fused. "Debate en la Corte," La Nacidn. 6 (July 29, 1944), 6. 129 In an interview later that day Manuel Gdmez Morin stated: What has happened here was not unexpected or un anticipated. It is a mere repetition of previous PRM behavior: not just electoral fraud, dishonest registration, etc., but also an atmosphere of violence....But the conduct in this election is of importance to the nation since it is one of the last before the 1946 presidential election and it will determine how the presidential elec tion will be conducted....This is the shameless regime that corrupts public life..., the reason that Accidn Nacional must continue its struggle for a government of the people— a true expression of national will.35 The next milestone in the party's history was the 1946 Presidential campaign— important not because of the Presi dential campaign itself; for as stated earlier Accidn Nacional did not present a Presidential candidate— but be- 36 cause of the Party's Congressional campaign. "La campana en Aguascalientes," La Nacidn. 6 (July 8, 1944), 11. 36 Some months before the 1946 campaign, party leader Manuel Gdmez Morfn, presented his view of the approaching election in an interview: "I do not think that the PRM should even have a candidate because it does not represent the people.... The government should be in civilian hands, but most important that it be in the hands of the genuine representatives of the people. If the present monstrous system is retained, there could be a violent struggle be tween several factions of the regime— a repetition of the farce as in the past." Gdmez Morfn, however, did admit that progress had been made in allowing freedom of expression. "Vida Nacional," La Nacidn. 6 (June 10, 1944), 4. 130 On February 2, 3, and 4, 1946, the party held its usual pre-election Convencidn Nacional. The Comisidn Politics proposed: "that Accidn Nacional participate in the presidential election and submit to the people candidates for the presidency and congress." The ensuing two-day de bate was one of the most heated in the party’s brief his tory. Of those who debated the question, Manuel Saraperio, Manuel Rojas Moreno, Jesus Herndndez Dfaz, and Luis Calderdn Vega opposed participation, while Eduardo Limdn L., Israel Gonzdlez, Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna favored participation. The main problem with Mexican internal affairs, /stated Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna/, is disunity. Accidn Nacional has organized for seven years, now it must show its unity through a victory. Accidn Nacional must propose a candidate to the citizenry to achieve such national unity; and Luis Cabrera is just such a man, although I personally disagree with some of his politics. Other delegates favored partial participation— submitting only Congressional candidates. Finally, by a vote of 115 to 13 the convention voted to participate, and by a vote of 162 to 6 it was decided to select a candidate "of national 37 stature"— namely Luis Cabrera. A commission was formed consisting of Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna, Aquiles Elorduy, Samuel Melo y Ostos, Pietado Herndndez, Filogonio Mora, J. Caballero, A. Coughland, I. Gonzdlez, and Jestis Herndndez Other Accidn Nacional leaders were suggested: Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Bernardo Elosua, Teofilo Olea y Leyva, Vejar Vdzquez, Ezequiel Padilla, Miguel Henrfquez Guzmdn. 131 Dfaz to offer the candidacy to Luis Cabrera. On February 5 Luis Cabrera addressed the convention which received him with an enthusiastic applause. (Later he was to confess that he had expected to find a few hun dred intellectuals, but was surprised and impressed by the thousands of country folk as well as representatives of other social classes that welcomed him.) He expressed his gratitude for having been selected, but stated that he could not nor should not, accept such a great responsi bility. He continued: I do not refuse because I am not a member...for Accidn Nacional*s beliefs do not differ con siderably from those which I have expressed in public; and I cannot deny that they are patriotic and honorable. ...I would like to accept..., but for one to be president, it is not enough to be honorable, patriotic, and wise..., one must be strong physically and politically to support the tremendous responsibility that the office imposes. It would be a great privilege to collaborate with such distinguished patriots. The partyfs programs do honor to the men that for years have worked organizing the party.3“ In conclusion, he thanked Accidn Nacional for having offered to him the highest honor of his life. His decision, of course, disappointed many who had looked forward to present ing a presidential candidate. (Later, members of the government party*s faction were to accuse Accidn Nacional 33 "Cabrera: la candidatura presidencial del PAN," La Nacidn, 26 (April 25, 1954), 16. 132 of being cowardly for once again not presenting a Presi dential candidate. This, they stated, was because Accidn Nacional would have had to put up ’ ’some candidate like the wealthy Juan Gutierrez Lascurain, which would have required 39 an explanation.”) The final decision of the delegates to the Convencidn Nacional was to participate only in the Congressional elec- 40 tions. In the next sixty days, the candidates (and others) held more than nine hundred meetings in twenty 41 states. However, no one, least of all Accidn Nacional, ”E1 PAN no se atreve siquiera a lanzar candidato. Ha tenido tiempo para pensarlo detenidamente, pero se escuda en razones de estatuto, conforme lo declara el Licenciado Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna....En la publicacidn de propaganda que el P.A.N. insertd en el didrio Novedades del 24 de septiem- bre, Gonzdlez Luna aparece diciendo que estd de acuerdo en que el P.A.N. lance candidato a la presidencia; pero que estatutariamente no se puede hacer esa recomendacidn a la convencidn pues esta debe tener absoluta libertad de decisidn. Evasidn curiosa. Curiosa porque senala como son estos sefiores, que no se atrevan a lo que es un derecho de todo grupo ciudadano, a lanzar una candidatura por lo que se quedardn sin candidato, para luego acusar al rdgimen de violar las garantfas comicales." Angel Compdn y S., Bidgenes. (Mexico, D. F.: n.p., 1951), p. 136. 40 Candidates subsequently selected to run for the National Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were: Alfonso Junco, Antonio L. Rodriguez, Licenciado Efrafn Gonzalez Luna, Licenciado Manuel Gdmez Morfn, Licenciado Rafael Preciado Herndndez, Manuel Ulloa, Esteban Manzanora del Campo, Vicente Villasana, Giblerto Valenzuela, Samuel Melo y Ostos, Juan Gutidrrez Lascurafn, Ignacio C. Enriquez, Ingeniero Emilio Madero, Mario Torroella, Licenciado Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Gustavo Molina Font, and many others. 41 In all of the 1946 elections about one hundred and twenty-six Accidn Nacional candidates participated. 133 was too surprised when the regime accomplished its usual 42 imposicidn. Of Accidn Nacional's eighty-seven candidates, 43 only three were seated in Congress. The 1946 election was important— not only because it placed Accidn NacionalTs first delegation in Congress to voice its doctrines through proposals and measures--but also because it marked the beginning of an internal movement 44 within Accidn Nacional itself. This movement first ap peared in Licenciado Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna's 19A6 Convencidn Nacional speech in which he suggested a more realistic political course: "Enough organization— now on to a politi cal victory!" Evidently, he, like many other party members, favored more active involvement in politics and less intel- 45 lectualism. Accidn Nacional had unknowingly completed 42 Vincente Lombardo Toledano aptly described the 1946 election when he told reporters on election day: "First the generals got together in conclaves to decide who would be president. Then the Governors did the same thing. A little later the labor organizations distributed the posts." Howard Cline, "Mexico, a Maturing Democracy," Current History. 24 (March, 1953), 133. 43 Ingeniero Juan Gutidrrez Lascurain, Ingeniero Miguel Ramfrez Mungufa, Licenciado Antonio L. Rodriguez. 44 Often, political parties, like other organizations, do not completely realize or understand the phases through •which they pass. 45 This is especially interesting since Licenciado Efrafn Gonzdlez Luna was one of the most outstanding intel lectuals in the party! 134 its political education program and was now ready for a new approach to Mexican politics. New party leadership and political tactics were needed. In September, 1949, Licenciado Manuel Gdmez Morfn re signed as party president and Ingeniero Juan Gutidrrez 46 Lascurain was elected the new leader of the party. With Gdmez Morfn's resignation, the characteristic intellec- 47 tualism of this first period began to subside. Gutidrrez Lascurain, whose political philosophy was to guide the party through seven years of party development, through the party's first presidential campaign, and through a "popu larization" of Accidn Nacional by forming political alli ances, directed a vigorous 1949 Congressional campaign--or rather another cycle of campaigns: new Comitds were formed; one hundred and thirty-six Accidn Nacional candidates participated; and finally, a second Accidn Nacional delega tion was seated in Congress. The new diputados, Juan Josd Hinojdsa, Jaime Robles, Gonzdlo Chapela, and Eduardo Facha 46 He was elected September IS, 1949 at the VIII Con vencidn Nacional and the IV Asamblea Ordinaria Nacional with more than three thousand delegates attending. 47 However this transition was gradual— extending to about 1950. 135 48 Gutierrez, able men like their predecessors in Congress, re-presented the proposals that the government party had refused to consider in 1946 and repeatedly demanded that the legislature study the proposals presented by Accidn Nacional. In a word, Accidn Nacional the political educa tor had evolved into Accidn Nacional the opposition party. 43 Luis Tercero Gallardo, f t Como ha servido el PAN a Mdxico," La Nacidn. 30 {October 15, 1956), 21. CHAPTER SIX THE OPPOSITION PARTY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY In the second part of its history, Accidn Nacional became the first political party to oppose the previously unopposed government party. This change in its overall 1 approach to politics occurred because of changes in party leadership--the result of an internal realignment within Accidn Nacional. A "new generation" of youthful political 2 realists, in effect, supplanted many of the "old guard" intellectuals, giving the party the additional enthusiasm, stimulus, and drive that it needed.________________ ___ 1 Note that the partyTs objectives or Principios de Doctrina did not change— but rather its means of achieving them. 2 As it was mentioned earlier, after 1946 the Sector Juvenil began to request that it be included in the decision-making bodies of the party. The Sector Femenil likewise developed about this time under the direction of Dona Conchita Morfn (Manuel Gdmez Morfn's mother), Dona Lidia T. de Gdmez Morfn (Manuel Gdmez Morfn's wife), and Sra. de Gutidrrez Lascurain (the wife of Juan Gutidrrez Lascurain). These small groups of dedicated individuals extended their organizations from the capital to the provinces. The women * s activities were especially commend able; for previously the role of Panista women in politics, like that of other Mexican women, was confined to organizing breakfasts, distributing food and clothing to the needy, and serving as secretaries at the party headquarters. Horacio Guajardo, "La tarea de la juventud," La Nacidn. 36 (September 27, 1959), 1#. 136 137 This period in Accidn Nacional's history is divided 3 into two parts: in the first, from about 1949 to 1959, the "new Feneration"— now influential in the inner party circles yet still restrained by the old guard— demanded more active politicking, that Accidn Nacional compete in the national Presidential elections as well as the Congressional elec tions . From November 17 to 20, 1951, four thousand delegates from thirty-one regions attended the partyTs Convencidn 4 Nacional in Mexico City. The delegates decided that the party should participate in the Presidential election and subsequently adopted a Presidential platform with political, economic, and social provisions which were basically the 5 party's Principios de Doctrina. The delegates then The second part— to be considered in the second half of this chapter— pertains to the period from 1959 to the present. 4 One-half of the delegates were farmers; 15 per cent were workers; 10 per cent were students; and the remaining 25 per* cent was comprised of businessmen, merchants, and soldiers. Each region's delegation had a proportional vote, based on its population. El Universal. November 25, 1951, p. 1. ^"Concerning the economy, PAN pledged to continue and expand economic development, to utilize natural resources more efficiently, and to raise the standard of living through adequate public programs. The platform promised to stop inflation and to curb monopolies. PAN condemned the government's "unilateral and unequal" economic policies, which, it claimed, paralyzed private initiative, stopped the normal dynamics of the market, and aided inflation. Instead, 133 selected Licenciado Efrafn Gonzalez Luna as the party's Presidential candidate— which was evidence that the old 6 guard was yet influential. PAN-urged that the State abandon its role as an owner in the economy and resume its "true" mission as merely an arbitor in economic affairs. Private initiative would thus be stimulated. Development of communications facilities, increased agricultural production, and expanded credit facilities were advocated. PAN promised denationalization of the e.lidos and full ownership of land to ejidatarios. New labor legislation, which would provide adequate systems for wage increases and for the worker to have a real voice in the determination of policies and the selection of leaders of his union, was sponsored. Expanded social security measures and decentralized administration of the social security program were also proposed. Salaries and wages for government employees equal to /those of/ other workers in private positions was stressed. PAN criticized the operation of Mexican federalism under the official party. The political monopoly of the PRI, the great centralization of power in the federal government, and the dominance of the executive branch over the other branches of the national government, were all attacked. PAN proposed an effective and independent Con gress and judiciary, real representation and respect for the suffrage as essential reforms to halt the degeneration of federalism. Another important reform urged by PAN was for greater freedom and democracy in the municipios and the delegation of responsibility for local problems to these local units of government. Prohibition of the existence of an official party and recognition of the right of women to vote were other political goals announced by the PAN, Accidn Nacional, Plataforma polftica— 1952 (Mexico, D. F.: PAN publication, 1952), as quoted in Ralph Eisenberg, "Presidential Election in Mexico— 1952" (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Illinois, 1953), pp. 73-74. 6 The other potential candidates were likewise members of the old guard: Rafael Preciado Herndndez, Roberto Cossio y Cossio, Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Juan Gutidrrez Lascurain, and Antonio L. Rodriguez. 139 In December of 1951 Gonzalez Luna began his campaign, 1 which was in itself an unprecedented tour, for he cam- & paigned in one hundred and sixty-one municipios or nearly all municipios and districts, speaking sometimes three 9 times a day. He campaigned in small villages and large towns; he spoke to groups of farmers and gatherings of workers. His approach--to appeal to the intellect as well as the emotion--reflected his generation’s. In his speeches to the crowds which flocked to hear him, he re iterated the party’s progressive platform in a clear and simple manner: It was the people’s duty to break its own chains and clear away the obstacles that blocked the door to freedom. The people must control once again its 7 Previously, the government party did not bother to campaign in rural areas. Ldzaro Cardenas was the first government party presidential candidate to campaign ex tensively at all. a Accidn Nacional, continuing its earlier role as the political educator of Mexico, carried its program to all of the people. As Accidn Nacional campaigned, it continued to establish Comitds Regionales in all of the states and in most districts and municipalities. However, Accidn Nacional’s most important source of political strength came from the Union Nacional Sinarquista (which had been out lawed politically in 1943) and state groups such as the Alianza de empleados of Chihuahua and similar labor groups in Monterrey. Eisenberg, ’ ’Presidential Election in Mexico,” p. 70. 9 "XVII Cena de Navidad del PAN," La Nacidn. 30 (December 23, 1956), 17. 140 house. It should organize and resolve political obstructions. Until they are resolved, Mexico's other problems cannot be solved. Political power should not be used for personal gain, but for national progress and human dignity. The people must demand thst the government respect its rights and freedom. In general, the 1952 campaign was relatively peaceful with the exception of local PRI attacks on Fanista meetings 11 in Merida, Yucatan. (As a precautionary measure, the secondary schools and the national university were closed two weeks before election.) "PAN was sometimes criticized as being merely a debating club, with no dynamism. Its appeal in the 1952 election generated principally a local 12 response which sent its deputies to the Congress." The government party, on the other hand— other than placing posters on public property and committing other similar abuses— did not bother to campaign too actively until the last few weeks just prior to the election. 1° Cited in a speech by Salvador Morales Munoz of La Nacidn in 1964. 11 "PAN, however, did not resort to violence but waged a peaceful although highly critical campaign. There was no evidence of any strong personalistic drive behind the PAN movement which might cause fear among government and official party leaders," Eisenberg, "Presidential Election in Mexico," p. 29. 12 Eisenberg, "Presidential Election in Mexico," p. 116. 141 On election day the FRI, "the party of two hundred new 13 millionaires by now," registered another victory. Accidn Nacional's Presidential candidate, according to government 14 statistics, received 235,555 votes. However, a new 15 Accidn Nacional delegation of five members was elected, but only four took office: Francisco Chdvez Gonzdlez, Ramdn Garcilita Partida, Felipe Gdmez Mont, and Eugenio 16 Ibarrola Santoyo. Two and a half years later, in October, 1954, Accidn 17 Nacional held its Convencidn Nacional. The outcome of the two sessions were three important studies on Mexican national problems. The first commission (headed by Manuel Gdmez Morfn) evaluated Accidn Nacional and contemporary 13 Merrill Hippy, "who’s Revolutionary in Mexico?," The Nation. 175 (July 10, 1952), 252. 14 Eisenberg, "Presidential Election in Mexico," p. 116. 15 Jaime Robles Martfn del Campo was elected as governor by the people of Jalisco but a PRI imposition did not allow him to take office. Gerardo Medina Valdds, "A1 rescate de la provincia," La Nacidn, 50 (September 27, 1966), 36. 16 "Cdmara," La Nacidn. 26 (September 19, 1954), 1. 17 "Un verdadero programa de gobierno," La Nacidn, 27 (October 17, 1954), 13. 142 18 Mexico in a study entitled "Frincipios y programs de 19 20 Accidn Nacional." The second commission made a study on improving the party’s local organization, the partici pation of women in politics, and the development of a 21 22 "civil conscience." The third commission made a nation-wide study, hearing suggestions and proposals from party members everywhere, on political problems such as electoral fraud and the corruption of would-be democratic 23 institutions. On the basis of these three studies the convention delegates decided that Accidn Nacional should actively participate in the 1955 local, state, and Con gressional elections. IB----------------- "El IAN y la situacidn actual de Kdxico," La Nacidn, 27 (October 17, 1954), 12. 19 The "old guard" was well represented on this commis sion. 20 In its report, it reported that "the acceptance and completion of tasks by the Sector Femenina had been a very important factor in the life of the party...." "Fartici- pacidn polftica de la mujer," La Nacidn. 27 (October 17, 1954), 13. 21 It was evenly representative of the old guard, the youth, and ianista women. 22 All three sectors were represented. 23 "Los ciudadanos ante la falisificacidn," La Nacidn, 27 (October 17, 1954), 15. 143 In the Congressional battle which followed in February 24 and March of 1955, new party comit^s were formed as Acci6n Nacional prepared for and waged an intensive cam paign for municipal, state, and Congressional offices. In all, Acci6n Nacional had candidates in eighty-nine dis tricts. On election day there were long lines at the polls as men and especially women exercised their voting rights. While Acci6n Nacional had reported only one hundred thousand registered members, it won some one and one-half million 25 votes or 3.6 per cent of all votes cast because of its 26 vigorous and general-appeal campaign. A large part of this percentage was— to be sure--the result of women voting for the first time. Enthusiasm was high: "iAdelante hasta 27 la victoria final!" was heard in Accidn Nacional centers. 24 "Informe: polftica en estos 15 anos," La Naci<Sn, 27 (November 7, 1934), 10-11. 25 "XVII cena de Navidad del PAN," La Nacidn» 31 (December 23, 1956), 17. 26 There was such a large vote the official party had to nullify most of it lest all Accidn Nacional candidates be elected! Only 250,000 votes were recognized for Acci6n Nacional. Luis Tercero Gallardo, "XV aniversario: como ha servido el PAN a Mexico," La Nacion, 31 (October 15* 1956), 19. "The mechanics used...are very simple: If in a dis trict in which the PP has won a victory, the PRI has a prominent or influential leader who cannot be sacrificed, 144 28 Later, in his annual report to the Consejo Nacional, party president Juan Gutierrez Lascurafn stated that the Federal Electoral College had recognized the election of 29 six Accidn Nacional candidates: Alfonso Ituarte Servfn, Licenciado Manuel Sierra Macedo, Patricio Aguirre Andrade, Ingeniero Federico Sdnchez Navarrete, Manuel Cantu Mendez, 3° Jesus Sanz Cerrada. Licenciado Guillermo Villalobos from Chihuahua and Licenciado Jose Gonzalez Torres in the the PP is compensated by the PR1 giving it a victory in another district where it lost and the PRI has won.... Conse quently PRI candidates seek not to win favor with the con stituents of their districts but with the party officials." Carlos Duplin, "La indiferencia de la ciudadania," Excelsior, (June 22, 1955). 28 Gutilrrez Lascurain alluded to a new PRI tactic: denying the citizenry of its vote by refusing to register the opposition. There were cases of this in Jalisco, Chiapas, Baja California, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla. Alejandro Aviles, "XIII Consejo de Accion Nacional," La Nacidn, 31 (October 21, 1956), 11. 29 Accidn Nacional lost two of its best possible repre sentatives: Lie. Miguel Estrada Iturbide from the 8th dis trict of Michoac^n and Licenciado Victor Gonzalez Luna of the 3rd district of Jalisco. Accidn Nacional candidates were required to each defend their election before the Congress. Jesus Sanz Cerrada of Chihuahua in Congress said: "Mexico is not a democracy but a dictatorship with one party, the PRI, in control. We Mexicans are not citizens but slaves!" Licenciado Manuel Cantu Mlndez, Patricio Aguirre Andrade, Licenciado Manuel Sierra Macedo, and Jesus Sanz Cerrada, the Accidn Nacional delegation, walked out of Congress rather than sanction its proceedings with their presence. Excelsior, (September 2$, 1955). 3° "Patrimonio familiar," La Nacidn, 31 (November 18, 1956), 8. Distrito Federal still, as of October, 1956, had not been 31 seated! Alfonso Ituarte Servln, who succeeded Gutierrez Las- curain as party president, waged a pre-election information 32 33 campaign, and organized new Cuadros with the enthusi astic support of the party’s youth and women in antici pation of the 195^ Presidential campaign. Later at the party’s XIII Convencidn Nacional in November, 1957, the delegates selected Luis H. Alvarez to be the party’s Presi- 34 dential candidate. Accidn Nacional’s campaign platform reiterated the party's unchanging political, social, and economic position as first enunciated in 1939. Alvarez began his eight-month campaign in December. He and a small group of young people--a decided contrast to 31 These two candidates— although their election was indisputable— were never seated; the constituents in their districts were not represented in Congress. 32 Miguel Estrada Iturbide lectured in Morelia on the constitution; Alejandro Ruiz Villaloz lectured on the party and Luisa Isabel Salas lectured on women in politics. "Actividades del PAN," La Nacidn, 32 (May 5, 1957), H. 33 Alfonso Ituarte Servin had reorganized the party in the D. F. earlier and been the most outstanding Acci<5n Nacional diputado elected in 1955. 34 More than four thousand delegates were present. Luis Tercero Gallardo, "Campana de Luis Alvarez," La Naci6n 36 (September 27, 1959), 25. 146 the government party’s caravan (in government vehicles) made it a point to visit the small villages usually over looked by the government party's candidate. They were re ceived by larrre gatherings in cities such as Le6n, Acambaro, 35 Fenjamo, Celaya, ';uer!taro, and San Juan del Rfo. In his speeches he stated that "the election was not a struggle between two men or two parties— but something more impor tant and profound: two totally diverse ways of systems of 36 life." 'while his speeches centered about unsolved prob lems and possible solutions to them, he also emphasized the lack of (and need for) representative government: as it was, the municipal mayors were appointed by the governors, and the governors by the President of the Republic who was also 35 The pistoleros of the caciques in these outlying areas broke up AccicSn Nacional meetings; in Jalpa, Zaca tecas, Alvarez was jailed which produced national protest. In Tonila, Jalisco Alvarez and his wife (who accompanied her husband throughout the campaign) were threatened by the local cacique and several of Alvarez’ entourage were jailed. In Tlalnepantla some pistoleros opened fire on a panista meeting obviously an attempt to assassinate candidate Alvarez. In Chihuahua, the government party pistoleros were more successful— they attacked and murdered Acci6n Nacional’s Jos! de Jesus Monrreal and escaped punishment. Luis Tercero Gallardo, ’ ’Campana de Luis Alvarez," La Nacion, 36 (September 27, 1959), 29; TtEn Ojinaga se cuida mas la cerveza que las vidas— cabildazo en Camargo," La Naci6n. 32 (May 5, 1957)., 11. 36 Luis Tercero Gallardo, "Campana de Luis Alvarez," La Naci6n. 36 (September 27, 1959), 28. 147 37 instrumental in appointing the members of Congress. Luis H. Alvarez proclaimed a "fight against misery" to allow every Mexican household to have a house, clothing, food, schools, freedom and individual rights. He also promised land to farmers (with a title to it), peace for all, schools, labor union reform, autonomy for municipios, poli tical separation of powers, and a government that would re- 33 spect human dignity. As AlvarezT campaign climaxed, he drew larger and larger crowds; in Guadalajara more than forty thousand 39 gathered to hear him speak. Crowds filled the town plazas in Kichoac^n to listen to him speak; in Yucatdn, Campeche, and Tabasco there were five or six daily meetings. On June 29 Alvarez ended his campaign. He had spoken at 511 public meetings and had traveled more than 150,000 kilometers all over the Republic. 37 Luis Tercero Gallardo, "Campana de Luis Alvarez," La Nacidn, 36 (September 27, 1959), 28. 33 Ibid.. 29. 39 By February 15, Alvarez had visited 130 towns and villages; by mid-campaign, Alvarez had visited more than 250 towns and traveled more than 30,000 kilometers; from May 13 to May 22, thirty-seven meetings were held in Hidalgo, the Distrito Federal, and Tlaxcala. 14$ Alvarez and the other 140 candidates for the House of Deputies and the 51 candidates for the Senate, which Accidn Nacional had submitted, had been enthusiastically received by the Mexican people. The government party, however did not accept these gains peacefully: Licenciado Salvador Rosas Magalldn of Baja California reported ’ ’suppression of freedom and speech,” Ingeniero Jorge A. Gonzalez of Yucatan 40 reported violence and repression against Acci6n Nacional. Licenciado David Alarcdn of Jalisco reported ’ ’brutal methods of repression by the government." Hugo Gutierrez Vega of the Sector Juvenil explained the repression as a logical reaction of a government, not representative of the people, which was not capable of responding in any other way. "Consequently ^stated party president Alfonso Ituarte Servfn in his report/, after much consideration, the Con sejo Nacional agreed that the party*s recently-elected Diputados should not take their seats because of the general 41 42 fraud in the recent election." 40----------------- "Voces de Mlxico informan: V asamblea ordinaria," La Naci6n, 36 (March 29, 1959), 6-7, 22. 41 As an example, Ituarte Servfn cited the 95 per cent voter turnout reported by the government party in the state of Hidalgo. 42 The four Diputados who refused to abide by the de cision of the partyTs Consejo Nacional, were automatically expelled from the party. The four which did not were decorated by the party. 149 The second phase in Accidn Nacional's role as Mexico's opposition party began at the III Asamblea General in March of 1959, when the Fanista youth demanded that the party's statutes be amended to make the Sector Juvenil and the Sector Femenil integral parts of all policy-making party 43 committees. Consequently, the "new generation" increased its control through the selection of new Acci<5n Nacional party officials at the XIV Convencidn Nacional which fol lowed almost immediately. Jos£ Gonzalez Torres, Luis H. Alvarez, Alfonso Ituarte Servfn, Manuel Sierra Macedo, Hugo Gutierrez Vega, Rafael Preciado Hernandez, Jos£ Hernandez Diaz, Felipe G6mez Mont, and Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa were nominated as candidates to succeed Ituarte Servin as the head of the party. (Clears ly both the "old guard" and the "new generation" were well represented.) Alvarez, Gutierrez Vega, Ituarte Servfn and Gomez Mont withdrew their names--G6mez Mont in favor of Gonzalez Torres. Of two of the remaining candidates, the 43 Also, the five-year interim between the Asambleas Generales was abolished, permitting the party to meet when ever necessary; the Consejo Nacional was increased from 250 Consejeros to 324. The 324 were to be selected on a basis of two Consejeros for each federal district to assure better national representation. For uniformity in termi nology, party Comit^s were to refer only to national, regional, district, and municipal areas. "Ill Asamblea extraordinaria: reforma de los Estatutos," La Naci6n, 36 (March 29, 1959), 8. 150 vote was overwhelmingly in favor of Licenciado Jos6 44 Gonzalez Torres. 45 Gonzalez Torres accepted the party banner from Jefe Alfonso Ituarte Servfn, and addressed the delegates of the convencion in a voice full of emotion, giving homage to Licenciado Manuel Gdmez Morfn, the party’s founder, and Ingeniero Juan Gutierrez Lascurain, the party’s second jefe, and finally to Alfonso Ituarte Servfn. He presented the goals and objectives before Accidn Nacional in organization, 44 "3esi6n del Consejo: nuevo Comit£ Ejecutivo,” La Nacidn, 35 (March 29, 1959), 10-11. 45 Licenciado Jos£ Gonzalez Torres was educated in Guadalajara, Jalisco. He studied law at the UNAM under Licenciados Rafael freciado Hernandez and Manuel Ulloa Ortiz. He belonged to Catholic youth organizations; Asoci- acion Catolica de la Juventud Mexicana, 1944-49; was a leader 1947-49 in Fax Romana and attended congresses at Anzio, Italy; Spa, Belgium; and Mexico. From 1949-52 he was president of Accidn Catdlica. In 1955 he was an Accidn Nacional candidate for congress and head of the Comit£ in the D. F. The government party in Congress could not deny his election yet it did not want him in Congress; conse quently it refused to consider his case and the 13th con gressional district did not have representation for three years. In 195$ Gonzalez Torres campaigned all over Mexico for other Accidn Nacional candidates and Luis H. Alvarez and again the PRI denied him a seat by fraud. In 1957 he became Secretary General of the party. He has been a cate- drdtico of Historia General de Derecho; lectured on His- toria de Mexico and Historia Universal at the Carlos Septi£n School of Journalism; published studies on history, sociology, and ethics: Breve historia de la conquista; Balance de la obra de Espana en Mexico, Misifln de la juven tud; an£lisis de la tesis de la Revolucit$n en~sus contactos con la doctrina de la Iglesia. ”E1 que recibe: Josl Gonzalez Torres,” La Nacidn.35 (March 29, 1959), 19. 151 basic politics, and electoral endeavors. The thirty state delegations (with more than two thousand members in atten- 46 dance) applauded enthusiastically. In a later session that day, Licenciados Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa and Manuel Sierra Macedo— representatives from the Comisidn sobre la polftica b£sica— presented to the convencidn a thirteen point proposal--basically the 47 principles for which the party stood. The reading of the conclusions to the proposal was hardly finished when what was to become a historic debate erupted between two groups within the party: the increasingly impatient new generation and the old guard. The first group argued that the intel lectuals had studied many problems in the past but neither solved any nor would they as long as the party was not in power. Impeccable proposals of this type had been sup ported for twenty years with no means of implementing them, 46 Other party leaders, as was the custom, also spoke: Licenciado Manuel G6mez Morfn, Luis H. Alvarez, Licenciado Efrafn Gonzalez Luna, and Miguel Medina Maldonado (Jefe Regional of CampecheJ. In general, they criticized pseudo revolutionaries and the lack of progress in solving urgent social, political, and economic national problems. Gerardo Medina, "Creo en Accidn Nacional," La Nacidn. 35 (March 2 9» 1959), 12. 47 Actually, this is neither new nor surprising for such study groups nearly always re-presented the party's doc trines in election platforms. stated Hugo Gutierrez Vega. Jesiis Hernandez Diaz stated that political parties were organized to educate but also to achieve power. "We must appeal to the workers not only to vote but also to act." The view held by the second group was that the party should daily exert even more effort to implement Acci6n Nacional's principles. To leave its present course of attempting to develop public con- science--though it may be through philosophy--would be to make the same errors that the regime had made. Guillermo Ruiz Vazquez of Jalisco, representing the old guard, re plied that politics was based on philosophy. To direct the party in any other way— to become obsessed with achieving power--would be to become puppets of the PRI which monopo lized all power. Ef'rafn Gonzalez Luna stated "It is well and good that the youth feel restless; but let them make concrete proposals for action and let us discuss them! It is not good that we proceed so slowly but neither is it 49 that we should proceed too rapidly! The mission of a 4§----------------- Those against the proposal: Manuel Rodriguez La- puente (Chihuahua), Carlos Chavira (Chihuahua), Enrique Silva (Baja California), David Alarcdn Zaragoza (Jalisco), Luis Buitron Pineda (D.F.), Hugo Gutierrez Vega (D. F.), Felipe G6mez Mont (D.F.). Gerardo Medina, "Creo en Accidn Nacional," La Naci6n, 35 (March 29, 1959), 14. 49 Miguel Medina Maldonado of Campeche stated that the Republic was like a caldron ready to explode; if Accidn Nacional proceeded too rapidly, it would sacrifice the lives of thousands and few would benefit. 153 party is to illuminate and organize the people, workers. What the party needs is more daily party campaigning. with 50 that we would already be in power." The proposal was eventually approved because of Gonzalez Lunasf intervention but with the provision that the delegates discuss concrete plans for action— which they did. It was also agreed that commissions be sent to all sections of the country to make detailed political action 51 studies. In a word, the March, 1959 XI Convencidn Nacional marked the beginning of a new era in Accidn Nacional’s party history. The youth, educated by Accidn 52 Nacional’s intellectuals, were now the party leaders while the old guard intellectuals acted at best as a 50 Those in favor of the proposal: Antonio de Ibarrola (D.F.), Catarino Canales (D.F.). Adolfo Christlieb (D.F.), Guillermo Ruiz Vazquez (Jalisco), Efraln Gonzalez Luna (Jalisco), Miguel Medina Maldonado (Campeche), Jesus Hernandez Dfaz (D.F.), Abel Vicencio (D.F.), Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa. Gerardo Medina, "Creo en Accion Nacional,” La Nacidn, 35 (March 29, 1959), 14. 51 At a later meeting these ideas were adopted: 1) public protest by the party against any act of violence committed by the regime, 2) to initiate immediately an information campaign to reveal the political situation to other countries, 3) to form immediately after the conven tion, a junta de Jefes Regionales to discuss more concrete details on forming an electoral program for the year. 52 Statement made by Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, gerente of La Nacidn, in a speech presented in the 1964 presidential campaign. 154 restraining force. Gonzalez Torres and the other young 53 men added new momentum to the movement all of which meant 54 the new approach was to be one of even more active 55 participation in Mexican politics. 56 In the succeeding months Gonzalez Torres launched a literature campaign through the local Comites, and Acci6n Nacional participated actively and enthusiastically in nearly every federal, state, and municipal political cam paign. At a youth meeting, statements were made which 53 The Sector Juvenil had an Instituto de Capacitacidn to train youth and its own paper— ACCION: Organo de las Juventudes Panistas. 54 The political philosophy of the new party president also was to influence the direction of Acci<5n Nacional, Jos! Gonzdlez Torres, a believer in "authentic social Christian Democracy," said: "I accepted the party leader ship because I believe in man and his capacity for redem- tion... Accidn Nacional wants to gain the presidency and will win it through constitutional means." The Acci6n Nacional movement is based on ideas of Social Justice derived from the values of Western Civilization. Gilberto Moreno, "Cuatro jefes, cuatro etapas," La Nacidn. 35 (September 27, 1959), 14. 55 Had Accidn Nacional attempted this approach in 1939, it would have been met with suppression and violence from the government party. 56 The Comit! Nacional planned to visit the areas of most difficulties. Comisiones de Estudios were to be sent to study problems all over the nation, to organize Circulos de Estudios, and to print pamphlets explaining Accidn Nacionalfs doctrines. 155 57 illustrated this very aggressive attitude: Esteban Zamora, Jefe Regional Juvenil of Sinaloa, stated that "Our obligation is not just to fight--but to win!"; Carlos Ortega of Baja California that Mwe must return the govern- 53 ment partyfs blows— blow for blow." Accidn Nacional sharply criticized the lack of free elections despite the 59 revolutionary facade which the government party continued to maintain. Accidn Nacional also criticized the lack of accomplishments at the first National Agrarian Congress 60 which met in Toluca on November 26, 1959: antirevolution aries were worse than pseudorevolutionaries, for the latter did not destroy the confidence of the citizenry in its 57 At the same meeting Jesus Herndndez Diaz, former organizer of the Sector Juvenil, spoke to the youth in an attempt to restrain it: "Our organization should be aggres sive and mobil; but with aggressiveness there should also be the indispensible, true, and mature theoretic prepara tion, Pure activism is not enough. Think of that which is meaningful: the doctrine of the task. The youth— the van guard of the party— must reflect its solid theoretical formation." "Reunidn Juvenil: organizacion agresiva y movil," La Nacidn, 35 (March 29, 1959), 20. 53 "Reunidn Juvenil: organizacidn agresiva y mdvil," La Nacidn. 35 (March 29, 1959), 20. 59 Miguel Estrada Samano, "Intocables principios demo- cr£ticos," La Nacidn, 37 (November 1, 1959), 10. 60 Gerardo Medina Valdds, "Congreso agrario: oportuni- dad desaprovechada," La Nacidn, 37 (November 1, 1959), 11. 156 public servants— or destroy the Consciencia Civica which 61 Accidn Nacional worked so diligently to develop. Simul taneously the party continued its scholarly analyses in search for solutions to Mexico’s problems such as at the Inter-Regional Convention at Puebla on September 16-16, I960. Licenciado Juan Landerreche 0breg6n presented a 62 paper advocating profit-sharing for corporation employees. And the party founder himself--Licenciado Manuel Gomez Morfn— presented a paper on Social Security for all Mexi cans . Beginning in June, 1959, it quickly became evident that the government party did not intend to passively ac cept Accidn Nacional's new aggressive approach. Panistas were attacked in Chihuahua; a political rally was broken up in Mexicali, injuring twenty-nine; Accidn Nacional members 63 throughout the Republic were jailed as political prisoners. Journalist Ledn Barradas was attacked and brutally beaten Gilberto Moreno, "Planteamiento y soluciones del PAN," La Nacidn. 37 (November 1, 1959), 16-16. 62 "Participacidn de los trabajadores en las utilidades de las empresas," La Nacidn. 3$ (September 25, I960), 16. 63 Gilberto Moreno, "Cuatro jefes, cuatro etapas," La Nacidn, 36 (September 27, 1959), 14. 157 6i+ in Yucatan by the pistoleros of the local cacique. In the early hours of the morning on October 22, 1959, Senores Jesds Rodriguez and Meliton Fierro were forcefully taken from Accidn Nacional offices in Mexicali by the police and jailed. Senores Juan Montoya Quiroz, Jose Herndndez Cepeda, Josd Guadalupe Mordn Garcfa, Dionisio Polanco, Angel Ldpez, Enrique Medina Garcfa, Manuel Carrillo Serrano, Ricardo Cdzares, and Isalas uuezada--also of Mexicali--were taken from their homes and placed in jail without due process of law. The Jefe of the Accidn Nacional Comitd Regional, also jailed, protested as soon as he was released to the national 65 Secretarfa de Gobernacidn. In a word, it was apparent that the new Accidn Nacional approach had surprised (and was a threat to) the government party. The forthcoming 1961 Congressional elec tion promised to be interesting indeed, 66 On February 5, 1961, at the XV Convencidn Nacional, Licenciado Jorge Garabito read a statement prepared by the "Brutal golpiza a Vallejo," La Nacidn, 37 (November 1, 1959), 7. 65 "Sigue la persecucidn de Panistas in Baja California'} La Nacidn. 37 (November 1, 1959), 9. 66 "Debate: apuestos para la lucha polftica," La Nacidn. 39 (February 12, 1961), 9-16. Comisi6n Politica which stated that Accidn Nacional was aware that the PRI would welcome Accidn Nacional's presence in the campaign to give it a democratic appearance. The campaign would not be equal, he stated, because the PRI u8 controlled public communication media and public funds. Nevertheless the Comisidn advocated that Accidn Nacional participate. Ten speakers (out of many who volunteered from the audience) debated the participation question for 69 three hours: and then, when all facts had been presented, 70 the convention’s delegates voted to participate. The platform committee was presided over by Licenciado Guillermo Ruiz Vdzquez, Manuel Rodriguez Lapuente, and 67 The Comisidn Politica was headed by Dr. Octavio Corral and Licenciado Jorge Garabito. "Debate: apuestos para la lucha oolitica," La Nacidn, 39 (F eb ru ary 12, 1961), 14. 68 "Debate: apuestos para la lucha politica," La Nacidn, 39 (February 12, 1961), 9-16. 69 Manuel Gonzdlez Hinojosa, speaking for the old guard, opposed participation in favor of continued civic conscience formation which he considered to be more effec tive. 7° "Repercusiones de la Convencidn," La Nacidn, 39 (February 19, 1961), 4-5. 159 71 Hugo Gutierrez Vega. There were heated discussions in which Licenciado Manuel G6mez Morin, Licenciado Juan Landerreche Obregdn, Licenciado Rafael Preciado Hernandez, Licenciado Miguel Estrada Iturbide, and others entered into. 72 Social justice, private property, liberty, democracy, a 73 Christian social order, freedom of instruction, authentic and free labor unions, responsible leaders, and Ibero- american integration were all important parts of the plat- 74 form. Strong statements were made against communism and 71 Efrain Gonzalez Morfin, one of the more active young men whose writings clearly advocated Christian Democracy, made a statement to the effect that the platform should include a clause stating that Mexico should maintain diplo matic relations with Spain. "Debate: apuestos para la lucha politica,” La Nacidn, 39 (February 12, 1961), 15* 72 It must be remembered that Pope John XXIII made his extremely influential Mater et Magistra— which had profound social significance--in 1961. 73 In this article, which promised active participation, a better Mexico, and an information campaign, there is a picture of a poster which showed Accidn Nacional's program in outline form written on a flag with a caption under neath: Social-Christian Principles. "Repercusiones de la Convencidn," La NacidnT 39 (February 19, 1961), 4-5. 74 Josd Gonzdlez Torres made a speech in which he de nounced communist penetration through pro-soviet groups. "Editorial: sentido de la campana." l»a Nacidn, 39 (February 12, 1961), 2. 160 75 the policies of the Iron Curtain countries. In the final analysis the platform which the Convencidn's delegates approved, once again was basically a restatement of the party’s original Principles de Doctrina. Consequently, much emphasis was given to social justice and Christian duty to eliminate misery, etc. In the 1961 Congressional campaign, Accidn Nacional fought and worked hard: its members continued to study 76 77 Mexico’s problems, vociferously denounced government 75 "Debate: apuestos para la lucha politica," La Nacion, 39 (February 12, 1961), 16. 76 Simultaneously, Licenciado Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola continued his fight, on behalf of Accidn Nacional, within the Comisidn Federal Electoral. Gerardo Medina Valdds gives a good account of Accidn Nacional’s legal fight within the Comisidn Federal Electoral, a struggle which eventually re sulted in modifications which got Accidn Nacional twenty seats in the Camara in 1964. "Los doctores de la ley son ignorantes hasta de la letra," La Nacidn. 39 (February 5, 1961), 10-11. Gerardo Medina VaTdls, "Comisidn Federal Electoral; 10:155— el reloj de Gobernacidn sigue marcando la hora porfiriana," La Nacidn. 39 (January 29, 1961), 14-15 tells of Accidn Nacional’s struggle with Licenciado Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz the head of the PRI faction— a great debate': 77 Examples of pointed attacks on government ineffi ciency: "Kaiz: porque se suspendid la investigacidn," La Nacidn, 39 (February 19, 1961), 16; and "Jaramillo: El fondo-la desesperacidn en el campo," La Nacidn. 39 (Febru ary 19, 1961), 17. (Jaramillo was later murdered by govern ment troops.) Very informative articles caciquismo in Baja California are: "Vuelven los atracos contra el pueblo," La Nacidn, 37 (January 24, I960), 10-11; and Gerardo Medina Valdes, "Continua el gangsterismo sindical," La Nacidn, 37 (January 24, I960), 12-13. 161 failures, and offered Accidn Nacional’s solutions to 73 them. Party president, Josd Gonzdlez Torres was, of course, in the forefront of the campaign. In an interview with a reporter from El Diario de Kdxico Gonzdlez Torres noted that national problems had become worse and that in- 79 creased tyranny was especially evident in Baja California. He continually organized and reorganized the party’s efforts for maximum efficiency such as the Convencidn Inter- 60 Regional which he called in the name of the Comitd 7§ A study by Accidn Nacional on housing: ’ ’Congreso de propiedad inmobiliaria," La Nacidn, 39 (February 5, 1961), 12-13; examples of critical Accidn Nacional articles on real issues are: Carlos Alvear Acevedo, "Fese a_su comprada ineptitud...el gobierno mantiene el monopolio /educativo/," La Nacidn, 39 (January 29, 1961), 12-16.; "Convencidn: Ta meta-librerar al campesino,” La_ Nacidn, 37 (March 27, I960), 12-17. Accidn Nacional studied and attempted to solve at an Inter-Regional Convention at Guadalajara the increasing restlessness caused by government apathy. An example of Accidn Nacional’s continuing struggle for better labor unions which represent the interests of laborers is: "Nuevas luchas por la autenticidad sindical,” La Nacidn, 37 (February 21, I960), 10-12. 79 The first edition of Antonio Estrada M. La grieta en el yugo. an exposd of local caciquismo. was smashed February 4, 1963 by the pistoleros of the local cacique. When Accidn Nacional campaigned San Luis Fotosf--don Roque Delgado and Licenciado Manuel Gonzdlez Hinojosa— two of its members were forced to flee the state from persecution. 60 A report on the Convencidn was written by Gonzdlez Torres himself in an article entitled T,Campo: no esclavitud colectivista, sino respecto al derecho del hombre,’ ’ La Nacidn, 37 (March 27, I960), 10-11. 162 Ejecutivo Nacional to meet on March 1&-21 in Guadalajara.^ While the Federal Electoral College only recognized 62 the election to Congress of five Accidn Nacional deputies, in the final analysis the new active campaign approach did prove to be successful because more public interest was aroused and the public participated more actively than in most previous Congressional elections. Furthermore, to the surprise of many, Accidn Nacional continued its enthusias tic campaigning, after the campaign had ended. This action showed the Mexican people that the new approach was not a single electoral episode but another Accidn Nacional inno- 63 vation for Mexican politics. Accidn Nacional continued to form new party cuadros, to criticize government party failures, and to make more studies in national problems, SI "Convocatoria," La Nacidn. 37 (January 31, I960), 2 6; "Campo: no esclavitud colectivista sino respecto al derecho del hombre," La Nacidn, 37 (March 27, I960), 10-11. 62 Javier Blanco Sdnchez, Carlos Chavira Becerra, Carlos Garibay, Alfonso Guerrero Briones, and Rafael Morales Valdds. Correspondence from Diputado Federico Estrada Valera dated July 31, 196$. 63 Like intensive campaigning in rural areas was in 1952. 163 such as the one that Licenciado Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola gave on October 31, 196l, before the Club 20-30, entitled 35 "Polftica y civicismo." His main point was that all Mexicans should be politically aware, and active in sup porting programs and political representatives: "Politics 86 need not be considered a dirty business." These topics suggest that Accidn Nacional was not only an extremely 8k The new president, Licenciado Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola was again part of the new generation. He stated that: "Political parties have two functions: to form and organize public opinion on national and international issues and problems and to participate in electoral activities. When parties limit themselves to the function of forming opinion, they become cold, and intellectual academies." Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Idearios politicos (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1964), p. 9. 35 Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Temas politicos (Mdxico, D. F. : Ediciones de Accidn Nacional"J 1963K 86 On February 28, 1962, he gave another entitled "Comentarios sobre el proyecto de reformas al articulo 123 de la constitucidn" at a meeting of the Club sembradores de Amistad at the Hotel del Prado in Mexico City. It was largely a restatement of Accidn Nacionalfs position on pro visions such as minimum wage, profit-sharing, severance pay, restrictions on minors working, etc. Christlieb Ibarrola also gave a lecture on July 27, 1962 at the monthly meeting of the Club de Banqueros in Mexico City entitled "Transformacidn de los empresarios." He suggested that Article 123 be updated through reforms in accordance with Pope John XXIII's Mater et Magistra. 164 87 active opposition party politically but also the party 33 most interested— according to its own statements --in 89 Christian Democratic-like Social Justice. 37 Licenciado Efrafn Gonzalez Luna published an article on MLa polftica internacional de Mexico: la normalidad politica interna es la base de una sana polftica inter- nacional," which shows Accidn NacionalTs increased interest in international affairs after Castro used Kexico as a training base and came to power. 33 At the XV Convencion Nacional in November 1962 Licenciado Juan Landerreche Obregdn presented a study on "El problems del trabajo en Mdxico," in which he suggested that Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution be modified and implemented. Licenciado Rafael Freciado Herndndez read a study he had prepared on "Sin autenticidad en la represen- tacidn polftica, no habrd democracia en Kdxico." Dr. Francisco Cuiroga F'erndndez presented a paper entitled: "El problems educativo de Mdxico y su posible solucidn." Christlieb Ibarrola earlier presented the party's 1939 po sition in this matter: the right to educate one's own chil dren as one so chooses is basic. To take it away is to suppress individual freedom. "La educacidn debe ser empresa nacional," La Nacidn. 33 (June 12, I960), was a study paper presented at the II Convencion Inter-regional at Rorelia Kay 26-30, i9 6 0. This study criticized the PRI's education program and presented PAN's estimate of the nation's edu cational needs. Accidn Nacional also pointed out the de ficiencies of the government's education system: insuffi cient number of teachers. Accidn NacionalTs conclusion: the State cannot afford to monopolize education. Private education must be encouraged; parochial schools must be legalized; in a word, Article 3 must be revised. 39 Christlieb Ibarrola later in Kay, 1963 in an inter view with a reporter from Excelsior made a statement on "Religidn y polftica: las crisis de Accidn Nacional," in which he reiterated the party's completely independent political position. It was in no way whatsoever associated with the Catholic Church. Excelsior, Kay 22-23, 1963. 165 While the 1961 Congressional election was the first opportunity for the new generation to try its political strength at the polls— and it did relatively well— its efforts and new approach became even more evident in the 90 1964 Presidential election. Through statements such as 91 the following one of September 12, 1963, by party presi dent Christlieb Ibarrola, Accidn Nacional made it clear that it expected certain performance in the coming cam paign : 90 Earlier in 1963 a notable success was the municipal election in San Pedro Garza Garcia (pop. 18,232), Nuevo Leon. In November, 1963 Accidn NacionalTs Humberto Junco defeated PRI’s Roberto Cantu Arreola— but what surprised Mexico most was that the victory was officially acknow ledged! On December 31, Junco took office as the new alcalde. He pledged to provide the city with good govern ment, lights, gas, water, sanitation, paved streets, a beautiful city plaza, and police protection. One year later, he reported an improved bookkeeping system, a reorganized treasury, reorganized government, traffic control by radar, clean streets, and a modern, efficient police force. Nine signal lights and 592 street signs had been erected; professional people had been hired to organize the police department, the public works de partment, and transit and treasury; public telephones had been installed, the streets had been cleaned up and pre pared for pavement; and the plaza had been beautified. Accidn Nacional, Municipio de Garza Garciat N.L.: primer ano de Trabaio (Monterrey, N.L.: Impresora del Norte, S.A., December, 1964), passim. 91 The occasion was the 24th anniversary of Accidn NacionalTs organization. 166 ...It will be necessary for political parties to present their ideologies and points of view on national questions in order that the people may regain confidence in politics, in voting, and in public opinion, in representative assemblies, and in the government. Only thus will it be possible to stop the political apathy of the citizenry and enlist the voluntary alignment of the citizenry in the ranks of political parties. Only in this way will the citizenry regain interest in partici pating in politics and in solving the political, social and economic problems of Mexico. For the government's part, it must absolutely respect the electoral p r o c e s s .92 Still combating political apathy, Accidn Nacional issued a general call to the Mexican people to participate in the election, and present the best of possible candidates. We of Accion Nacional know of the economic, social, and labor difficulties that many will be confronted with. We know also of the force that will be necessary to overcome the quarter of century's fatigue produced by sterile political struggle. Accidn Nacional is aware too that it will be opposed on many sides not only by the State which controls public propaganda but also by those who have been influenced unwittingly by the State and now serve as opposition to the opposition.93 Accidn Nacional, still committed to its original Frincipios de Doctrina, furthermore stated that it now planned to actively compete for public office— all of which was part 92 Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Partidos, grupos. £ accidn politica (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 19&3)> p. W . 93 Ibid. 167 of the new generation’s approach: Acci6n Nacional does not seek power for power’s sake. It has a message to convey to the Mexican people: material progress given priority over human needs may perhaps produce technological advancement but will never produce political and social progress. The State cannot in spite of its structured budget and administration assume the task of national integration which can only be accomplished by a free people with dignity. Above all Accidn Nacional believes in the establishment of a just and peaceful order. It searches for a way to form such an order based on justice and liberty in which the majority enjoy in reality the rights which are theoretically ?ranted to them: the right to existence--but existence with dignity, the right to liberty, the right to cultural benefits, and the right to an order in which all enjoy free access to material goods without sacrificing spiritual liberties. V/e of Accidn Nacional want to assume the responsibilities of power but to serve Mexico and not to provoke sterile and destructive agi tation as we are accused of wanting to do by those motivated by extremist ideologies who would install a totalitarian system. tve want to participate legitimately in the decision making process not only to discuss a long-range, social reform program; but to see that Mexicans of today live as free individuals with sufficient material goods for human existence.94 The same elements contained in the previous Consciencia Civica program were still present but with a new element of determination added: Accidn Nacional now stated its new objective of achieving political power— not power for 94 Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Partidos, grupos, y; accidn politica (Mdxico, D.F. : PAN publication^ 19^3), r. 6 9. 168 powerTs sake but to implement its by-then twenty-four year old Principio3 de Doctrina. Later in the fall of 1963, when Accidn Nacional held its usual pre-election Convencidn Nacional, the new genera tion, through its majority, selected Licenciado Jose Gonzalez Torres to be the party’s Presidential candidate. One hundred seventy-four candidates were selected for the 95 House of Deputies and fifty-four for the Senate. In all, four hundred fifty-seven candidates were presented for public offices. In his campaign Gonzalez Torres hit at the problem of bureaucratic waste and overassessment for public s e r v i c e s .96 He later called for admini strative decentralization, branded as unconsti tutional the concentration of power in the hands 95 "La eleccidn," La Nacion, 48 (June 1, 1965), 19. 96 According to Professor Kenneth F. Johnson, "The use of public money to finance the Gustavo Diaz Ordaz campaign was a source of discontent throughout Mexico." "Political Alienation in Mexico: a Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," The Rocky Mountain Social Science Reviewt 2 (Play, 1965), 169. Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, former business manager for La Nacidn, in an interview on September 27, 1966, in Mexico, D.F. stated that Accidn Nacionalfs total expenditures in the 1964 election for all public offices were $1,155,627.31 pesos. (Contrast these costs with the millions spent by the PRI for elaborate campaigning.) This, of course, did not include the time and effort of the individual members. Furthermore, Acci6n Nacional submits an annual public statement of party expenditures and will open its books to members at any time. 169 of the president, and decried the corruption and weakness of State and local governments.... PAN demanded an end to the ejido profram of State-supported collective farms and condemned the Banco Ejidal for dishonest lending and fore closure practices.... A major point of the PAN attack was the program of free and compulsory textbooks for the public schools, (initiated during the L6pez Mateos regime) and promised continued support by all PRI candidates.... 97 The party's overall activity in the 1964 election was notable: in six of the seven states that held local elec- 96 tions, it participated; it increased its efforts through 99 the Beccion Femenina and the Sector Juvenil; it prepared people to run as candidates and to act as party representa tives at the polls; it increased party propaganda through lectures, talks, study circles, debates, etc.; it increased written propaganda; it prepared for local campaigns with programs incorporating solutions to local problems (e.g., Seis estudios sobre Ba.ja California) . La Naci6n was now published weekly instead of bimonthly; and the party 97 Kenneth F. Johnson, "Political Alienation in Mexico: a Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," The Rocky Mountain Social Science Review, 2 (May, 1965), 155-171- 96 Conseio Nacional, "Tareas concretas e inmediatas," La Naci6n, 48 (June 1, 1965), 44. 99 Under the direction of Sra. Maria Elena Alvarez de Vicencio. 170 increased La Naci<5n's distribution through the local 100 comit£s. In all, Accidn Nacional mobilized more than 101 two hundred thousand persons in the campaign. On election day, July 5, 196A, the government party's Licenciado Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz, according to the govern ment ’s own figures, polled 89 per cent of the vote and 102 Licenciado Jos£ Gonzalez Torres 10 per cent. Ten out of the thirteen and one-half million registered voters actual ly voted. The official voting statistics recognized ToD Consejo Nacional, "Tareas concretas e inmediatas," La Nation, 1+8 (June 1, 1965), L4. 101 Accidn Nacional won victories in Zamora, Uruapan; Jiquilpan (birthplace of Gral. L^zaro Cardenas); Villa Aldama, Santa Barbara, and Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua; in Guanajuato, Le6n, Celaya, Salvatierra, Acambaro, and other places, the party claimed victories. (Earlier Accidn Nacional had participated and succeeded on different dates in the ayuntamientos of Quiroga, Mich., El Grullo, Jal., Ascencidn, Chih., Santa Clara, Dgo., Sahuayo, Mich., Salvatierra, Gto., Garza Garcia, N.L.) The party also participated in gubernatorial elections in Chihuahua, Baja California, Nuevo Le6n, and Michoacan. In none of them has Accidn Nacional triumphed "officially," but Accidn Nacional's progress is evident. Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico City dated July 31, 1965. 102 Martin C. Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico," Current History. 1+8 (January, 1965), 26. 171 11.54 per cent of the total vote for Deputies or 1,042,396 103 votes, which surpassed Accidn NacionalTs minimal 104 goal. Gonzalez Torres, who shocked all of Mexico when he established precedence by conceding defeat to the government party's Presidential candidate, said that the 105 1964 campaign was very fruitful. He later said in an interview: "we got two diputados for receiving the second 106 largest vote and eighteen by vote." He continued, "I am convinced that the 1964 campaign was much better than T03 This represents in Mexico a considerable electoral force when one takes into account that each vote was authentic. General Alvaro Obregdn once said "In Mexico, when the opposition gets 10 per cent of the vote, it is a sign that it won the election." Information obtained in correspondence with Piputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico City dated July 31, 1965. 104 In reality, when one considers the government's controls and official pressure exercised over workers, em ployees of the government, merchants, and other groups, the votes that Acci<5n Nacional received were proportionally more than those received by the government. Information obtained in correspondence with Licenciado Juan Landerreche 0breg6n from Mexico City dated June 23, 1966. 105 Gonzalez Torres did not recognize the vote count as being accurate or the election as being honest, however. Statement made to the author by Licenciado Jorge Quiroga in Mexico, D.F* on September 27, 1966. 106 Mauro Jimenez Lazcano, "Entrevista con Gonzalez Torres: a un ano de la campana presidencial," La Naci6n, 4# (July 1, 1965), 22-23. 172 the 195# and the 1952." Acci6n Nacional is gaining momen tum each day. Gonzalez Torres expressed his conviction that soon the local congresses would have Accidn Nacional representatives and others of the opposition, but the pro- 107 vincial laws should be reformed. Later, in his report to the Consejo Nacional on February 5, 1966, party president Adolfo Ghristlieb Ibarrola stated: Accidn Nacional members direct at the present in all the republic onlyl^® six municipios: Gan Pedro Garza Garcia in Nuevo Le6n; Santa Barbara and Aldama in Chihuahua; and Suchitepec, San Andres Tepetlapa, and Amatengo in Oaxaca. 107 liauro Jimenez Lazcano, "Ent re vista con Gonzalez Torres: a un ano de la campaha presidencial," La Naci6n, US (July 1, 1965), 22-23. 103 Adolfo Ghristlieb Ibarrola stated in 19t>6 that Acci6n Nacional’s presence both in the local congresses as well as in other ayuntamientos has not been possible because of electoral dishonesty which flourishes plentifully in the states and because of the constant scorn made of suffrage which have made many citizens politically apathetic who now abstain from participating in elections. Attempting to overcome these adverse situations, in 1965 Accidn Nacional participated in the following cam paigns: in Baja California it participated in the election for governor with Norberto Corella as candidate, in the election for the diputados locales, and the municipal elec tions; it participated in campaigns of one type or another in each of these states: in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoaccln, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas, in elections for diputados locales and ayunta mientos; and in the states of Guanajuato, Morelos and Zacatecas it participated in the elections for state legis latures. In MLchoacan the party refused to allow its mem bers to take seats in four ayuntamientos because the govern ment proposed to give Accidn Nacional these offices when actually the party had won seats in six municipios. Informe al Gonsejo (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1966), 5. 173 In summary, in 1964 the new Accidn Nacional approach was even more successful than in 1961. At the annual Acci6n Nacional Christmas banquet in 1964, Licenciado Adolfo Ghristlieb Ibarrola stated that Accidn Nacional would continue to oppose the govern ment party until Accidn Nacional won power. The task of Accidn Nacional in Mexican politics is not limited to diffusion of principles— but to face up to daily realities and act accordingly. It must expand its activities not only for a democratic political system but also for material gains for a better life. To influence the government— while not in power— is only possible when one understands the daily needs of the community and has a desire to alleviate them by removing political and social abuses and proposing concrete solutions.169 This is what Accidn Nacional is attempting to do at the present: to continue, as it has in the past, to reform Mexico politically, socially, and economically in order that all Mexicans may benefit from the Mexican Revolution and to let Mexicans live, develop themselves, progress, and ad- 110 vance. In conclusion, from 1939 to 1949 Accidn Nacional pre pared Mexico through its political education or Consciencia CIvica formation program. It was at a political disadvan tage in its competition with the government party; it 1 ( 5 9 Speech made by Licenciado Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola at the annual Acci6n Nacional Christmas banquet on December 14, 1965. 110 Diputado Miguel Estrada Iturbide, "Bandera invari able, firme, gallarda, intacta," La Nacidn, 46 (June 1, 1965), 32. 174 insisted on playing the game according to the rules and thus was attempting to instill electoral honesty, no re- election, and nonviolence. Also, Accidn Nacional was forced to pursue this academic approach to avoid repression. The government party, meanwhile, did not hesitate to use any method to secure its position. By 1949 Mexico— at least in part because of Accidn NacionalTs example, influ ence, and Consciencia Civica program— had recovered some what from its politically prostrate position of 1939-40. Simultaneously a new generation had grown up within Accidn NacionalTs ranks which beginning about that time assumed 111 the leadership of the party. Consequently, while Accidn Nacional did not change doctrinally, it underwent changes in its approach to politics after 1949 (and especially after 1959) which put its candidates in public offices and which made some of its twenty-five year old doctrines into laws. Ill One of the most important characteristics of a successful political party is the ability to adapt itself to new situations and conditions; this Acci6n Nacional had done. Any differences that may have existed between the old guard and the new generation were quickly bridged. PART III CHAPTER SEVEN THE EDIFICE: NOT PERSONALISM BUT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION Since the 1940 election, in the twenty-six year interim, Acci6n Nacional has participated in many campaigns. Its existence has been unique in Mexican history where parties typically with no forethought regarding doctrines, programs, and platforms, spring up with almost every major election, support some personality, and then wither away. This chapter on the organization and structurization of Acci6n Nacional partly explains its continuous existence. It also illustrates how Mexico's first political party not centered around a personality (which in itself sets prece dence), continues to campaign, organize, and to steadily grow without ever having won a presidential election. This, to say the least, is not typically Mexican, but per haps comparable to European or United States political 1 parties. From its origin, Accidn Nacional claimed to be a party founded on doctrine, a disciplined party, a party with a hierarchy--yet one responsible to its party membership. 1------------------- Comparable also perhaps to the Argentine Unidn Civica Radical party of 1690-1916, 176 177 These objectives were foremost in the Estatutos Generales, the first organizational document offered to, and approved by, the Constituent Assembly that met in Mexico City on September 14 to 17, 1939, to officially organize the 2 party. From the very start, careful planning and organi zation was typical of Accidn Nacional--the first party in Mexican history (with the exception to the government 3 party ) to organize itself to such a degree. with this introduction, let us analyze the structure 4 of Accidn Nacional. According to the Estatutos Generales, Accidn Nacional is a permanent, civil association organized to participate in public life and to implement the follow ing principles: 2 As you may recall, this document, hailed as the most important work of the Assembly, was largely the work of the Comit£ Organizador which had also organized the Constitu ent Assembly. The members of the Comit£ Organizador and other Accidn Nacional leaders had met with groups of in terested Mexicans all over the Republic, had learned of their aspirations and had incorporated them into the Principios de Doctrina, and the Estatutos Generales. The delegates to the Constituent Assembly then were informed, before coming to the Assembly, of the documents to be dis cussed and they came prepared to represent their consti tuents1 views. 3 The great difference between the two being that, power comes upward from Accidn Nacional's Asamblea Ordinaria; in the PRI it filters downward from the top party officials. 4 Registered as public document number 18669 before notary Licenciado Mario Garcia Lecuona on March 1, 1940. 178 1) the recognition of personal, human dignity and the assurance of social conditions to main tain that dignity; 2) the recognition of the pre-eminence of the general national welfare over special interests and the regulation and coordination of these interests in the interest of the nation; 3) the subordination of state activity, indivi dual activity, and social activity, in political affairs in favor of the national general welfare;... U) and the political education of its members through establishing, developing, and sustaining institutes, suborganizations, publications, news papers, and social services necessary for the * - fuifillment of the above-stated objectives.... This permanent, civil association has an active party mem bership which consists of individuals "who unconditionally accept the principles of Accidn Nacional, who are the honest, solid-citizen type, who agree to submit to party 6 discipline, and who agree to work consistently for the 7 realization of the objectives of Accidn Nacional." All 5 Accidn Nacional, Estatutos Generalest Articles 1-4, pp. 5,6. 6 The corresponding Comitls (Municipales, Distritales, Regionales, and Ejecutivo Nacional) have the authority to "admit, suspend, exclude, or expell" members or potential members under the following conditions: a) "admission with the recommendation of two active members; b) suspension or exclusion because of indiscipline, abandonment or liency in fulfilling civic obligations, verbal attack or attack through some action against Accidn Nacional principles and programs (outside of the party meetings, conventions, Comitds, Consejos, Asambleas); for committing immoral acts,..." Estatutos Generales , Article 7, p. 7. 7 Estatutos Generales. Article 5, p. 6. 179 active members have equal rights and obligations: to help the party achieve its goals, to participate on an equal basis in the party's government and in adopting party de cisions, and to contribute toward defraying the party's ex- penses. All other Mexicans who work for the realization of Accidn Nacional's social goals, who contribute financial ly or intellectually, who support Accidn Nacional through opinion, voting, or propaganda, are classified as miembros 9 adherentes. Two of the most important parts of Accidn Nacional's organization are the popular-wili, policy-making institu tions of the Asamblea and the Gonvencidn. The Asamblea is usually concerned with basic organizational and internal functions. All party members attend Asambleas Municipales. When the district has more than one Municipio, the repre sentatives of the Asambleas Municipales attend an Asamblea Distrital. The Asamblea Distrital elects the Consejos and Comitds Distritales. g Estatutos Generales. Article 9, pp. 7, 9 This makes Luis Cabrera, Josd Vasconcelos, and others members. Estatutos Generales, Article 6, p. 6. 180 10 There are also Asambleas Regionales made up of ac tive members selected by the Comitds Municipales on a pro- 11 portional, population basis. The Comity Ejecutivo 12 Nacional has the authority to convene Asambleas 10 An Asamblea Extraordinaria of Comitd Regional met May 11, 12, 1957 in Guerrero to revise the party structure. Representatives from Zumpango del Rio, Xochipala, Huitzil- tepec, Tixtla, Huiteco, Arnojileca, Xochihuehuetlan, and Retaquillas attended. On the 11th of May there was a meet ing of delegates from the oub-Gomites of Ahuacotzingo, El Ocotito, and Buenavista; they were instructed on the re organization to be implemented. The following day party chief Alfonso Ituarte Servin spoke. The meeting was basically to reorganize the Comitds Municipales in prepar ation for the forthcoming election. Also the Oonsejo Regional was reorganized to send a delegate to the Comitd Nacional. 11 Estatutos Generalest Article 29, p. 13. 12 The first Asamblea Ordinaria in 1939 approved the Estatutos Generales, the Acta Constitutiva, and the 14 Funtos de L'octrina. The second Asamblea held at the Frontdn Mexico approved these doctrinal points; 1) the necessity and primacy of Social Reform; 2) social-economic-judicial bases for the Campo; 3) the responsibilities of Society and the State of Social Reform; 4) the urgency and means for political reform. To show the complete party participation, there were 412 delegations present, 22 committees at work, 15 commissions at work, and 148 studies presented and discussed. The third Asamblea met with the VIII Convencidn Nacional in September, 1949. The fourth Asamblea met on October 10, 1954, with more than 2,750 delegates from 29 states and the Distrito Federal attending. It considered: 1) Accidn Nacional prin ciples and programs within the context of contemporary Mexico, 2) the overall organization of the party and the participation of women, and action of the citizenry before continuous election fraud. 131 Municipales, Distritales, and Regionales, and can veto their decisions when it deems them to be contrary to the 13 party’s program. The party meets as a whole and makes collective de cisions through the Asamblea Ordinaria which consists of delegations (each with a jefe and a subjefe) from the Comites Regionales and Comite Ejecutivo Nacional. This institution, the supreme decision-making organ of the 1A party, is obliged to meet at least every five years. It 15 is convoked usually in the first three weeks of September by the Comitl Nacional or the Consejo Nacional (with the agreement of twenty members) which also distributes the agenda or order of business through the Comites Municipales, Distritales or Regionales. The Jefe of the Comite Ejecu tivo Nacional is the president of the Asamblea Ordinaria. Likewise, the Secretary General of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional is the Secretary General of the Asamblea Ordinaria. The sessions as a rule are public but can be closed if the Asamblea Ordinaria so chooses. To constitute a quorum, the 13 Estatutos Generales. Articles 49, 50, pp. 22, 23. 14 Estatutos Generales. Article 11, p. 3. 15 "XV Aniversario: La importancia de la Asamblea," La Nacidn, 26 (October 10, 1954), 11. 182 Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional or its delegates and two-thirds of the delegates of the Comit£s Regionales must be present. The Comit£s Regionales can send other members or any active members can attend to observe, but only accredited dele- 16 gates can vote. The authority of the Asamblea Ordinaria consists of: a) naming and replacing the members of the Consejo Nacional; b) examining, approving, or censuring the general administrative account and report of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional; c) ratifying the decisions to admit new members; d) and considering and acting on all decisions that do not come under the jurisdiction of the other party organs.17 Five Comit^s Regionales or five per cent of the active IS members, can call an Asamblea. The Asambleas convoked 19 either of these ways are called Asambleas Extraordinarias. 15 Each delegation from each Federal Electoral District in the last election has five votes plus one. The Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional has as many votes as the largest Comiti Regional. The Jefe Nacional has an extra vote to break ties. Eighty per cent of delegates must agree for their votes to be cast as unaminity. Voting can be secret. Fifty per cent and one carries a decision usually. All Asambleas decisions are binding on all members. Estatutos Generales. Article 29, p. 13. 17 Estatutos Generales. Article 14, p. 9. 18 Estatutos Generales, Article 12, pp. 8-9. 19 Estatutos Generales. Article 13, p. 9. 163 20 The Asamblea Extraordinaria had the authority: a) to modify or reform the party ’Estatutos* or any decision made by the Comitd Ejecutivo or the Consejo Nacional, or anything trans cendental in the life of Accidn Nacional...; b) to transform or fuse Accion Nacional with another group; c) to dissolve Accidn Nacional...; d) and finally to deal with the other matters21 concerning the internal life of the party. This brings us to the Gonvencion, the second great representative party organ. Trior to the convocation of the Gonvencion Nacional before each I residential or Congres sional election, considerable preparation has to be made to truly reflect the opinions and demands of the average party member— the average Mexican hidden away in some remote 20 To 1954 there were four Asambleas: three Ordinarias (September 14-17, 1939; September 11-17, 1944; September 16-1$, 1949; March 20 and 21, 1959; September 15 and 16, 1964) and one Extraordinaria on February 3, 1946 when it was necessary to reform the Estatutos Generales, in accord ance with the Ley Electoral Federal of December 31, 1945. (To reform the Estatutos Generales, it is necessary to have a two-thirds vote of the Asamblea Extraordinaria.) Estatu tos Generales, Article 64, p. 29. To dissolve the party, it is necessary to have an $0 per cent vote of an Asamblea Extraordinaria; Estatutos Generales, Article 65, p. 29. "In the event of dissolution, the same Asamblea will desig nate three individuals to liquidate the party’s patrimonial and grant the proceeds to another association or Society with similar principles and objectives as Accidn Nacional or the UNAM or an Institution de Beneficiencia according to the will of the Asamblea, Estatutos Generales, Article 0 6, p. 30. 21 Estatutos Generales, Article 15, pp. 9-10. 18/, corner of the Republic. This preparation, approximately every three years when the Convencion system is activated, usually begins at a meeting of Jefes Regionales such as this one which met in Aguascelientes on Kty 1Z, and 15, 1957. It was called by the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional to 22 determine the political cause of Accidn Nacional. Party President Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servfn, representing the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional, Jose Antonio Lomelfn, president of the Comitd Regional, of Aguescalientes, the president of the Seccidn Femenina, and former Secretario General of Accidn Nacional--Dr. Raul Velasco Zimbron--presided over 23 the session. In accordance with the convocatoria, the twenty-six Jefes Regionales presented reports on the goliti- 24 cal situations in their areas. They showed a decisive 25 Accidn Nacional advance all over the Republic, especially 22 The Comite Ejecutivo Nacional specified that the meeting be held in a regional capital. 23 Presidente Nacional of the Seccidn Femenina, Srita. Profesora Luisa Isabel Salas and Jefe de Prensa of Accidn Nacional Sr. Alejandro Avilds attended as guests. "Acuerdoe de los Jefes Regionales," La Nacion, 32 (May 12, 1957), 14. 24 "Acuerdos de los Jefes Regionales," La Nacidn. 32 (Play 12, 1957), 14. 25 Ibid. 185 the report from Kichoacdn which showed outstanding social work by the Seccidn Femenina and the report from Jalisco 26 which showed outstanding work by the Sector Juvenil. President Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servfn lauded the im portance of the party publication, La Nacidn, in this 27 regional effort. After an enthusiastic debate, the details were com pleted for the Convenciones Regionales to decide Accion 28 NacionalTs role in the coming Presidential election and to make a study of the problems in each area to be incor porated into a platform at the Oonvencion Nacional, should 29 the party decide to participate. ----------------- Among the other speakers, Javier bianco Sdnchez of the Sector Juvenil spoke on the role of the youth in the future of the party, he mentioned a special publication, "Jornadas Nacionales de Capacitacidn" which was prepared for youth leaders. A similar speech was made by the repre sentative of Seccidn Femenil. 27 ,TAcuerdos de los Jefes Regionales," La Nacidn, 32 (May 12, 1957), U. 28 Ibid., p. 15. 29 At a meeting on February 1, 1959, not only Jefes Regionales, but also many Jefes Distritales and other out standing members met in Guadalajara for a Reunidn Lxtra- ordinaria. In general the pattern of events was the same: The roll was called. Jefe Nacional Alfonso Ituarte Servfn gave a report on the party's activities. (He praised es pecially the work of Licenciado Josd Gonzdlez Torres and Hugo Gutidrrez Vega who directed the Sector Juvenil. He spoke briefly on the most recent municipal campaigns: 186 After the Reunion de Jefes two alternatives were possible: organize Gonvenciones Municipales and Distritales and then send delegates to a Convencidn Regional or simply 30 organize a Convencidn Regional. In the fall of 1957, the Yucatan and Zacatecas.) The Jefes Regionales gave their re ports on party activities in their respective regions. The Jefes spoke of election conditions in their states. A large part of the session on the first day was devoted to discus sing economic problems presented by its Comisi6n de Finanzas. The Comisidn de Asamblea (designated the day be fore), presided over by Licenciado Manuel Sierra Macedo, reported that March 20, 21, and 22 was to be the date for the Asamblea Ordinaria and Convencidn Nacional. The Asam blea Ordinaria was to deal with reports, reform of the Estatutos Generales, nomination of a new Consejo Nacional which would in turn select a new Jefe. The Convenci6n was to deal with basic politics and the electoral question. The Reuni6n of Jefes designated these commissions to present reports to the Asamblea and the Convencidn Nacional: Comi- si6n de Folftica Bdsica (Licenciado Manuel Gonzdlez Hinojosa and the Comitds of Nuevo Le6n and the Distrito Federal), the Gomision de Folftica Electoral (Licenciado Rafael Freciado Hernandez and the Comitds of Jalisco and Chihuahua), Comi sidn de Reforma de Estatutos (Licenciado Manuel Ulloa Ortiz and the Comitds of Michoacan and Baja California). The major difference between these two Reuniones de Jefes is: the first was called to prepare Convenciones Regionales while the second was to organize a Convenci6n Nacional and an Asamblea Ordinaria. The second required more committee work, etc., whereas the first required local organization. "Hacia la Asamblea Nacional," La Nacidn. 25 (February 8, 1954), 11-12. 30 However, the other situation prevailed at the Conven- cidn Regional del D.F. (which met September 14, 15, and 16, 1957) where the Comisidn Folftica announced at the end of the Convencidn that the Comitds Distritales were to hold their respective Convenciones and select candidates prior to December 31, 1957; "Convencion del FAN en el D.F.," La Nacidn, 32 (September 22, 1957), 24. 187 former case prevailed in the state of Chihuahua: September 9 Convencidn Distrital at Ledn September 11 Convencidn Distrital at Torredn September 15 Convencidn Distrital at Parral September 29 Convencidn Municipal at Ciudad Judrez October 6 Convencidn Distrital at Ciudad Camargo November 3 Convencidn Regional Regardless of the course taken, it is customary for the local-level party members to be allowed to select their own candidates for the local election and to arrive at a consensus regarding a national Presidential candidate and 31 ^ platform. Here is an example of the Convencidn Distrital that was held in Ciudad Judrez on September 29, 1957, with 32 more than three thousand members attending. The Conven cidn, presided over by Jefe Distrital Fernando Villalobos, Diputado Jesus Sanz Cerrada, Luis h. Alvarez, Alfonso 33 Arronte, and others, was held at the Casa del Pueblo. 31 In urgent situations and on rare occasions, the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional, its Jefe, or the respective Comitds Regionales can resolve questions on participating in local, municipal, or federal election and select the candidates; Estatutos Generales, Article 34, P* 15. 32 On the day before the Convencidn began five members were arrested arbitrarily for campaigning with a loud speaker. The public in general protested. Licenciado Manuel Rodrfguez la Puente, Don Luis H. Alvarez, Fernando Villalobos, Oscar Noriega and Jesiis Sanz Cerrada went to the police headquarters and demanded their freedom which was ultimately granted. The Casa del Pueblo is a name given to the Accidn Nacional meeting hall in each local area. 188 All of the Municipios for the third electoral district of Chihuahua were represented: Tres Castillos Samalayuca, Montes de Oca, Galeana, Nuevo Casas Grandes, Villa Ahumada, Janos, San Buena Ventura, Ascensidn, Guadalupe, Praxedis G. Guerrero. Fernando Villalobos opened the convention with a brief speech and Licenciado Josd Rafael Terrazas gave the delegates a warm welcome. The Sector Juvenil put the national flag in its place. One by one the numerous dele gates delivered greetings, messages, and reports from the people represented. Then the order of business of the Convencidn was read and approved. The first heated debate of the Convencidn was between Diputado Jesus Sanz Cerrada, representing the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional, which supported the candidacy of Licenciado Rafael Preciado Herndndez for Presidential candidate (selected three days earlier in San Luis Potosf) and one of the delegates who rose to oppose Sanz Cerrada. Licenciado Manuel Rodriguez la Puente offered and defended the candidacy of Antonio L. Rodriguez vehemently. He stated that the party needed Preciado Herndndez in the Comisidn Federal Electoral where he was doing a brilliant job. When the issue was placed to a vote, it was resolved to support at the Convencidn Regional at Chihuahua and later at the Convencidn Nacional Antonio L. Rodriguez for Presidential candidate. The Convencidn Regional then proceeded to select candidates to represent 139 them at the Convencidn Nacional. Nine were selected: Luis H. Alvarez, Fernando Villalobos, Manuel Rodriguez la Puente, Jose Rafael Terrazas, Manuel Fazos Cano, Josd Fosada y Fompa, Alfonso Herndndez, Oscar Aguilar Urbina, Adalberto Martinez. They were farmers, workers, businessmen, employ ees, professional men, merchants— people from all social sectors. Two— Manuel Rodriguez la Fuente and Josd Rafael Terrazas— were finally selected. With the agenda completed, 34 the Convencidn Regional rendered its respect to the flag, applauded enthusiastically, and left determined to continue the struggle for democracy in Mexico. 34 At the same time the Convencidn bistrital was being held in Ciudad Judrez, there Convenciones Municipales in Monterrey and 3altillo--evidently because of the metropoli tan area with many party members. Generally, however, the Convencidn Distrital was the lowest level. Here is an ex ample of a Convencidn Municipal held in Saltillo on Septem ber 29, 1957: Before election the candidates for the Ayuntamiento /.city government/ the conventionists discussed three alternatives: abstention, collaboration with the Partido Accidn Clvica [a local party/ or a campaign with its own candidates. The first two alternatives were re jected. A debate followed which resulted in the proposal of fifteen individuals for office. The following day this number was narrowed down to the following party members: Presidente Municipal— Sr. Carlos Siller Gil, Primer Regidor — Sr. Guillermo Zepeda, Segundo Regidor— Sr. Oscar Rodriguez Gdmez, Tercer Regidor— Sr. Josd Rosales Sdnchez, Cuarto Regidor— Sr. Lorenzo Urciaga Jr., SIndicos— Sr. Gdnaro Ddvila Pena y Sr. Fernando Davila Davila. Immediate prepar ations were begun for the campaign which was to center about a well-structured program.for municipio government. After the business of the Convencidn Municipal had been attended to, the delegates adjourned and reconvened for a Convencidn Regional. 190 After the Convenciones Distritales and Municipales, the Jefes of the Comites Regionales begin preparation for the Convenciones Regionales which are usually simultaneously held in the last weeks of September and the first weeks of 35 October --just before the Convencidn Nacional. The Comisidn Politics of the Comitd Regional assists the Jefe Regional in this task. The Jefe Regional and a representative of the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional usually preside at these Convenciones Regionales. There are usually several days of sessions, 36 studies, and reports by committees on local problems and the means to solve them. But the most important function is the decision whether or not the area will participate in the local and the Congressional elections; if the decision is to participate, then the Convencidn Regional must select its candidates and write a platform. In a Presidential 35 For example: VII Convencidn Regional in the Distrito Federal held September 14, 15, and 16, 1957; Convencidn Regional of Jalisco held September 26, 1957. Convencidn Regional of Chihuahua held November 3, 1957. Traditionally, the Convencidn Nacional was first held in the first two weeks of February. 36 In addition to the usual cycle of reports and speakers at the Convencidn Regional, occasionally there are speeches on topics such as "La crisis de la educacidn" pre sented by Sra. Celia G. de Herndndez Diaz on September 14, 1957 at the VII Convencidn Regional in the Distrito Federal. 191 election year, the Convencidn Regional must also select its Presidential candidate and elect a delegation to the Con vencidn Nacional to support any special proposals or demands it may want incorporated into the national party platform. When the party has prepared itself, the Jefe Nacional in the name of the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional convokes the Convencidn Nacional and announces the business to be dis- 37 cussed. The primary function of the Convencidn Nacional is to decide whether or not Accidn Nacional will partici pate in the federal election and, if so, select the Accidn 38 Nacional Presidential candidate. An example is the announcement issued February 2, 1959, for the XIV Conven cidn Nacional by Jefe Alfonso Ituarte Servin. On this par ticular occasion the V Asamblea Ordinaria and the III Asamblea Extraordinaria were also scheduled. By viewing the overall program, one can see the relationship of the Convencidn Nacional to the other party meetings: March 20 Asamblea Ordinaria a) All delegates register b) Afternoon plenary session as follows: 37 This was in conformity with Articles 12, 13* 30, and 36 of the Estatutos Generales. 38 Eighty per cent of the delegates at the Convention had to agree on the candidate. 192 March 21 1) Greetings 2) Report of Jefe Nacional 3) Report of Treasurer 4) Nomination of members to Consejo Nacional. Asamblea Extraordinaria a) Morning plenary session b) Reform of party Estatutos March 21 (7 :00 p.m. ) March 22 Sesi6n of the Consejo Nacional 1) Designation of the Comisidn Permanente of the Consejo Nacional 2) Designation of the Junta General de Vigilancia 3) Designation of the Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional XIV Convencidn Nacional order of business: 1) Assumption of party leadership by the new Jefe 2) Dictamen of the Comisidn de Activi- dades Polfticas BAsicas 3) Dictamen of the Comisidn de Activi- dades Politicos— Electorales Here is a detailed account of the XIV Convencidn Nacional, the culmination of weeks of party organization and prepara tion. On March 22, 1959» retiring Jefe Alfonso Ituarte Servln presented the party banner to Licenciado Josd Gonzdlez Torres who respectfully saluted it and became the new Jefe of the party. With this act, the XIV Convencidn Nacional (with more than two thousand in attendance) 39 began. Gonzdlez Torres presented the goals and 39 Gerardo Medina, "Creo en Accidn Nacional," La Nacidn. 193 objectives of Acci<5n Nacional in organization, basic poli- 40 tics, and electoral endeavors. He spoke with a voice full of emotion, giving homage to Licenciado Manuel G6mez Morfn, the party1s founder, and Ingeniero Juan Gutierrez Lascurain, the party’s second Jefe, and finally of Ituarte Servfn. He criticized the four Accidn Nacional Diputados who refused to submit to party discipline and who were expelled for 41 taking their Congressional seats. When the thirty state delegations presented their reports, they were applauded enthusiastically. Then, other party leaders, as was the custom, spoke: Licenciado Manuel G6mez Morin, Licenciado Efrain Gonzalez Luna, and Miguel Medina Maldonado, Jefe Regional de Campeche. Licenciados Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa and Manuel Cierra Macedo of the Comisidn Sobre la Polftica Bdsica presented a proposal which criticized pseudo- revolutionaries, and exposed urgent national social, pol- 42 itical, and economic problems; it had thirteen concluding points, basically the party’s principles. The conclusions were individually debated but eventually approved. Then 35 (March 29, 1959), 12. 40 Gerardo Medina, ”Creo en Accidn Nacional,” La Nacidn. 35 (March 29, 1959), 12. 41 Ibid.. p. 13. 42 Ibid. 194 the delegates proceeded to discuss a concrete course of action: 1) public protest by the party against any act of violence committed by the regime.... 2) initiate immediately an information campaign to reveal the Mexican political situation to Accidn Nacional-like groups in other countries, 3) form immediately after the convention, a Junta de Jefes Regionales to discuss in detail an electoral program for the year. At each of the four levels (the district, the munici pal, the regional, and the national), there is a Consejo, a consultive body which makes policy within the guidelines established by the party at the Asambleas and Convenciones or representative. It is autonomous as long as it functions within the guidelines of the party statutes, principles, and regulations from the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. Sur prisingly enough, local organizations--more specifically the Consejo Municipal and the Consejo Distrital were not originally delineated in a detailed manner as the Consejos were at other levels. Perhaps the Comit£ Organizador con sidered it best to allow the people to organize themselves. Two years later, however, on February 3, 1943, the Comit6 Ejecutivo Nacional, in accordance with its authority under article 41 of the Estatutos and after having consulted the Comit^s Regionales, issued the "Reglamento de Consejos y Comit^s Regionales" and the "Reglamento de Socios Activos y Adherentes" in the name of the Consejo Nacional. These two documents were simply a clarification on certain points of 195 the partyTs local level organization, obviously indicative of certain problems which had arisen in the two-year period since the Estatutos had been accepted. (This demonstrates that the party organization was flexible enough to evolve in accordance with its realistic needs. The Estatutos had merely established general guidelines.) Perhaps most significant of these two new reglamentos is the second which pertains to the organization of the party at local or "grass roots" level. It states that Comit£s are to be established in population centers which are to be divided into sectors and groups of seven to fifty 43 individuals who can easily and effectively maintain constant contact because of residence, place of work, or previous friendship and acquaintance.^ Each of these units is to be under the direction of a Jefe, a sub-jefe, and a secretary, who are desig nated by the majority of the members of the sector or group and the Secretarla de Organizacidn of the Comit£ Regional.45 The Jefes de Manzana are to establish contact with the active and with the adherent members that live on the blocks under their direction and see that party information reaches all. The Jefes de Zonas will oversee the 43 Accidn Nacional, Reglamento de Socios Actiyos y Adherentes (Mexico: Editorial ^Jus,1* -1959)» Article lo, p. 24. 44 RSAA, Article 17, p. 24. 45 RSAA, Article 34, p. 27. 196 the work of the Jefes de Manzana and will assist their immediate Jefes and the Secretarla de ^5 Organizacidn of the Comit£ Regional of the party. The Jefes de Grupo are to maintain unity among the group and to integrate the group into the , „ sector to participate in the life of the party. ' The Jefes de Sector are to maintain constant contact with the groups of members under their direction and carry out necessary parley instruc tions for coordinated, efficient action. The Secretarfa de Organizacidn of the Comit£ Regional will be kept informed by the Jefes through fre quent communications.**-® The Jefes of the Corait^s Municipales are to be nominated by the Jefe of the Comit£ Regional and approved by the Comit£ 49 Regional. The Comit^s Regionales are to assist the Comit^s Municipales in their work within their territory or 50 jurisdiction. The Secretarfa de Organizacidn, with the assis tance of the Secretarfas de Estudios and de Propaganda of each Comit£ Municipal or Regional, will meet at least once a month with the Jefes de Sector and de Grupo to deal with questions of organisation and to develop party doctrine and program themes or to discuss the political situ ation to orient the party members.51 The Jefes 45----------------- RSAA, Article 36, p. 27. 47 RSAA, Article 21, p. 25. 43 RSAA, Article 20, p. 24. 49 Acci6n Nacional, Reglamento de Consejos y Comltes Regionales (Mexico: Editorial "Jus," 1959) / Article 24, p. 10. 50 RCCR, Article 33, p. 17- 51RSAA, Article 22, p. 25- 197 de Sector and de Grupo will attend the lectures or studies that the party organizes and should be well acquainted with the principios of Accidn Nacional and their a p p l i c a t i o n .52 The Consejos Regionales occupying approximately the area of a state, are comprised of no less than nine and no more than seventy party members who reside in the region. The Consejeros are nominated by the president of the party from among the most distinguished members of the region, taking into consideration the candidacy of those who serve on Comit^s Municipales, Distritales, and Regionales, and the Consejos Municipales and Distritales. They are to re main in office for two years and are re-electable. They are also removable for misbehavior at the request of their Consejo or the president of the party- The Consejo Regional meets in ordinary session at least once a year and in extraordinary session whenever convoked by the president of the party, by the Jefe of the Comity Regional, or at the 53 request of five or more Consejeros. The Consejo Regional can function and pass measures with the attendance of one half of its membership plus one. Consejeros that cannot attend a session may write in their opinions and votes. 52 RSAA, Article 23, P- 25. 53 Estatutos Generales. Article 55, P- 24- 193 The president of the Comit4 Ejecutivo Nacional may attend or send representatives to the sessions of the Consejo Regional. In general, the Consejo Regional has the authority to: 1) name from among its members its Jefe and secretary...; 2) designate a permanent commission from among its members...; 3) act as a consultive and restraining organ for the Comit£ Regional; 4) initiate before the Jefe of the Comit6 Regional programs and measures it considers important; 5) approve the budget of the Comit£ Regional and the Comit^s Municipales and Distritales and authorize in each case extraordinary expenses not included in the budget...; 6) revise at the request of the Comit6 Regional the agreements of the Comit£s Municipales and Distritales; 7) fulfill any other duties as outlined in the statutes and regulations.54 The second document of February 3, 1943, the "Reglamento de Consejos y Comit^s Regionales" clarifies certain matters— e.g. the jurisdictions of the Comit£s and Consejos Regionales are to be determined by the Comit€ Ejecutivo 55 Nacional. The Consejeros of the Consejo Regional are ex- 56 pected to attend the ordinary and extraordinary sessions, Estatutos Generales. Article 52, pp. 23, 24. 55 RCCR, Article 1, p. 5. 56 The failure to attend three consecutive sessions (without justified cause) is sufficient motive for a Con- sejero to lose his position. RCCR, Article 9, p. 7. 199 to express their opinions and vote on all of the ConsejoTs deliberations, and to work on and with commissions as 57 designated by the Consejo Regional. The Consejo Regional now is to have an ordinary session at least once each six months....5o An extraordinary session can be called at any time by the Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional as well as by the previous m e a n s .59 in the ordinary sessions the Consejos are to deal with usual matters of business at hand but in the extraordinary ses sions they are to deal exclusively with the , business for which the session was convoked. The sessions are to be presided over by the Jefe of the Consejo or in his absence the Secretario...,°l At the end of each session, the Secretario General of the Consejo is to read the minutes of the meeting for approval. These acts are to be registered in a special book and veri fied by the Jefe and Secretario. The latter officer is to send a copy of the same to the Jefe of the Comity Ejecutivo 62 Nacional. The Consejo Regional is to periodically inspect the records of the Comit£ Regional to approve its rulings. 57 RCCR, Article s, p. 7. 5 8 RCCR, Article 1 0, p. 9. 59 RCCR, Article 1 1, p. 7. 60 RCCR, Article 1 2, p. 7. 61 RCCR, Article IS, p. S. 62 RCCR, Article 20, p. 8 200 Also it is to submit the names of party members to the Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional for nomination to posi- 63 tions on the Comity Regional. Each Consejo Regional is to designate from among its members at least three permanent commissions: one to form programs, one to be in charge of organization, and one to handle the treasury. Each of these permanent commissions is to have no less than three consejeros and is to meet at 64 least once a month. The Jefe, the Secretario de Organi- zacidn, and the Tesorero of the Comit6 Regional are ex officio members of these commissions. The Comit£ Regional is to name from among its members (with the approval of the Jefe of the Comit6 Regional) the heads of the Secretarfas (and any necessary subsecretarlas or assistants) de Estu- 6$ dios, de Propaganda, de Organizacidn, and de Tesorerfa. The Secretarfa de Estudios is to: 1) procure and analyze facts and reports on matters of general interest; 2) prepare courses, lectures, publications and organize informal gatherings; 3) prepare programs and studies for party conventions:...6° *3------------------ RCCR, Article 21, p. 9. 64 RCCR, Article 7, p. 6. 65 RCCR, Article 24, p. 10. 66 RCCR, Article 29, pp. 13* 14. 201 The Secretarla de Propaganda is to be concerned with: 1) preparing programs and general methods of publicity; 2) with selecting and preparing in agreement with the Secretarla de Estudios, the propa ganda topics and the publication texts; 3) preparing, once again in agreement with the Secretarla de Estudios and the Secretarla de Organizacidn, the necessary persons to carry out the work of organization and propa ganda; 4) directing the work of the propagandists; 5) distributing the party propaganda; 6) giving the local press party news; 7) and sending to the Comity Ejecutivo Nacional information for publication in the national press and the party organs.®7 The Secretarla de Organizacidn is to: 1) organize party organs in new areas; 2) maintain discipline and direct party activity; 3) organize civic action; 4) select and train Accion Nacional members for greater responsibility; 5) establish Comit^s Municipales in those places where the Comit£ Regional cannot act efficiently and directly; 6) visit periodically and oversee the function of the Comit6s Municipales; 7) organize public meetings, lectures, group and sector reunions of Jefes and others; 8) organize, with the approval of the Comit< Ejecutivo Nacional, municipal and regional conventions. The Secretarla de la Tesorerla is concerned with: 1) forming the projected budget of the Comit4 Regional; 2) revising the budget of the Comit^s Munici pales presenting them to the Consejo Regional; 57----------------- RCCR, Article 30, p. 14. 68 RCCR, Article 31, pp. 14, 15. 202 3) soliciting the necessary income to cover the Comit£s’ budget and to assist the Comit£s Municipales; 4) requiring the punctual payment of the dues of active and adherent party members; 5) giving detailed account of income and ex penses of the Comit6 Regional; 6) adjusting payments to the budget especially authorized by the Consejo Regional; 7) preparing its own accounts to present them to the Consejo Regional. The highest Consejo in the party structure is the Con sejo Nacional. It is the partyTs senate, the top directive, and the policy-forming body. It is elected by the dele gates every five years at the Asamblea Ordinaria with the Consejeros representing at least two-thirds of the districts directed by Comit^s Regionales. The Consejo Nacional is 70 comprised of from 100 to 324 active members, and the Consejeros are subject to recall. The Consejo Nacional meets at the party headquarters in Mexico City in ordinary session at least once a year. Extraordinary sessions are 59 RCCR, Article 32, pp. 15, 16. 70 Articles 35, 36, 3&, 40 and 46 of the Estatutos Generales were reformed at an Asamblea Extraordinaria in Mexico City on November 20, 1962. The Consejo Nacional, with a membership of one to two hundred Consejeros, now in cludes the Jefes of the Comit^s Regionales. The Comit^s Regionales each submit names, with the approval of the Comit^s Municipales and Distritales, for Consejeros at the Asamblea Ordinaria. The Asamblea determines the number, based on population, of Consejeros each region is to have. The Jefes of the Comit^s Regionales are also part of the Comisidn Permanente of the Consejo Nacional. 203 called by the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional or by three Comit^s Regionales. To constitute a quorum, one-half of its mem bership plus one must be in attendance. Measures are adopted by a majority vote. Among the duties of the Consejo Nacional are these: 1) elect the Comit€ Ejecutivo Nacional and its Jefe; 2) resolve the problems submitted by the Comit6 Ejecutivo Nacional; 3) revise and approve the annual party budget and to present a report to the Junta General de Vigilancia; U) select from its membership two other permanent commissions or committees: the Comisidn Perman- ente del Consejo71 and the Junta General de Vigilancia. 5) designate any other commission that it con siders convenient or necessary; 6) settle all matters or disputes between the other party organs; 7) perform any other functions delegated to it by the Estatutos.72 This report of the XIII Consejo Nacional, which met October 12, 1956 to elect its new committees, will give the reader a better idea of the function and importance of the 71 After the 195# election fraud, Accidn NacionalTs presidential candidate called a special session of the Con sejo Nacional to prepare a party statement. The Consejo Nacional decided to boycott the election and forbade its members to take their seats in the C&mara. The decision was released by the Comit4 Ejecutivo Nacional. Some Acci6n Nacional candidates refused to adhere to the decision. Their cases were presented to the Comisi6n Permanente del Consejo and they were expelled. "XIV Convencidn," La Haci6n. 35 {April 5, 1959), 20. 72 RCCR, Article 36, p. 16. 204 Consejo Nacional. Ingeniero Juan Gutierrez Lascurain, the 73 retiring Jefe Nacional, presented a twenty-page report on the Party's campaign efforts in the First Public Plenary Session. He denounced a new tactic used by the regime— the tactic of not registering would-be voters who might vote against it. He pointed out cases where Accidn Nacional had not submitted a candidate and the people consequently 74 did not bother to vote. He stated in his report that the Electoral College had recognized the election of six 75 federal Accidn Nacional Deputies. Then Licenciado Juan Landerreche Obregdn, national treasurer of the party pre sented his report. Eva Morin of the Junta General de Vigilancia gave a report on the period from August 1, 1953, to September 30, 1956. It was signed by the members of the Junta: Licenciado Manuel R. Samperio, Julio Novoa, Licenci ado Manuel Ulloa Ortiz, Eva Morin, Ingeniero Luis Torres 76 Landa. 73 He had been leader for seven years; "XIII Consejo de Accidn Nacional," La Nacidn, 30 (October 21, 1956), 11. 74 "XIII Consejo de Acci6n Nacional," La Naci6nt 30 (October 21, 1956), 11. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 205 Six committees had been commissioned to consider six problems: party structural functioning, organization, propa ganda, means of action, finances, and the present political 77 situation. The report of the committee on the present political situation, presented by Licenciado Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa, suggested these improvements in party 73 activity: 1) more expansive and extensive party activity; 2) increased effort to get the people to vote and demand that its vote be respected; 3) increased effort to expose the regimeTs revo lutionary myth by denouncing its violations of the Constitution and by presenting pro posals in Congress for Constitutional reforms; 4) renewed struggle by the heads of families for their liberties; 5) increased effort to free labor unions and ejidos from political submission; 6) and organized resistance to government in vasion into the national economy in the areas which belong to private enterprise. The Comisi6n Permanente then presented its report and recommended that the following persons constitute the new 77 "XIII Consejo de Accidn Nacional," La Nacidn, 30 (October 21, 1956), 3. 73 Ibid.. p. 13. 79 Ibid. 206 comision: Ingeniero Carlos Ochoa Arroniz, Licenciado Roberto Cosslo y Cosslo, Licenciado Manuel G6mez Morin, Juan Jos£ Hinojosa, Elena Alicia Chavez, Ricardo Quiroz, Licenciado Manuel R. Samperio, Maria Luisa Garcinava, Luis M. Aranda, Zenon Ibarra G6mez, Licenciado Efraln Gonzfilez Luna, Jesiis Obregon Renoso, Licenciado Miguel Estrada Iturbide, Gabriel P4rez Gil, Ingeniero Bernardo Elosua, Antonio L. Rodriguez, Ingeniero Marcos Mastreta, Jos6 Fernandez de Ceballos, Jesus Hernandez Diaz, Simeon Zuniga, Luis H. Alvarez, Licenciado Manuel GonzAlez Hinojosa, Licenciado Guillermo G6mez Arana, Luisa Isabel Salas, Doctor Raul Velasco Zimbr6n, Ingeniero Juan Gutierrez Lascurain, Licenciado Rafael Preciado HernAndez and Celia de Hernandez Diaz. SO Likewise completely a new Junta General de Vigilancia was chosen: Licenciado Clicerio Cardoso Equiluz, Ezequiel Correa, Ingeniero Francisco Garcia Sainz, Carlos Martinez Cosslo, Ingeniero Jorge Nunez. It was also necessary to select a new Jefe Nacional to replace retiring Ingeniero Juan Gutierrez Lascurain. Licen ciado Miguel Nino de Rivera of Huajuap£n, Leon nominated Licenciado Roberto Cosslo y Cosslo who refused, explaining that he had been with the Secretarla General for years and someone new should be selected. Juan Gutilrrez Lascurain m ----------------- The Junta General de Vigilancia is a special commis sion designated by the Consejo Nacional from its own mem bership to act as a "watch-dog" over the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. It consists of five individuals, capable of making an audit of the party's funds and activities, which reports in detail to the Consejo Nacional at its regular meetings. Estatutos Generales, Articles 47 and 4&, p. 22. 207 was nominated for election again, but he requested that he not be considered. A period of debate ensued. The candi dates finally selected, with Alfonso Ituarte Servfn win- 81 ning, were: 82 Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servfn (61 votes) Licenciado Rafael Preciado Hernandez (23 votes) Licenciado Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa (10 votes) Licenciado Jos4 Gonzalez Torres (10 votes) Licenciado Eduardo Limdn Lascurain (1 vote) The next order of business was the selection of a new Comity Ejecutivo Nacional. Twenty-seven were nominated and from these a commission (Licenciados Alfonso Ituarte, Roberto Cossfo y Cossfo, Efrafn Gonzalez Luna, and Francisco 83 Chavez Gonzalez) selected the following individuals: Rafael Preciado Hernandez Alejandro Aviles Vicente Cordero Guillermo Gdraez Arana Jos4 Gonzalez Torres Manuel Gonzalez Hinojosa Luisa Isabel Salas Celia de Hernandez Diaz Francisco ChAvez Gonzalez Juan Guti4rrez Lascurain Raul Velasco Zimbrdn Jorge Garabito Martfnez Manuel Ulloa Ortiz Juan Manuel G6mez Morfn Francisco Garcfa Sainz With this business completed, all the Consejeros swore allegiance to the new president and the outgoing and g_ "XIII Consejo de Acci6n Nacional," La Naci6n. 30 (October-21, 1956), 14. 02 Ibid.. p. 15. 83 Ibid.. p. 16. 206 incoming Jefes embraced, signifying an exchange of responsi bilities. After two brief speeches, the party hymn was 84 sung and the Consejo Nacional adjourned. The Estatutos also provide for a bureaucracy to imple ment the policies and decisions made in the Asambleas, the Convenciones, and the Consejos. It is organized on the same basis as the Consejos: municipal, district, regional, and national. In each Municipio and district there is a Comit£. Sometimes there are even Subcomit^s if the Comit6 Regional 85 deems them necessary. They are organized by the Jefe of the Comite Regional of the region and the local citizens. This is done under the general supervision of the Comitl Regional which determines the jurisdiction of each Comit6 Municipal and Distrital. These two primary organs are sub ject to the further following regulations: a) they are auxiliary organs of the Comit£ Regional and subject to its instructions through its Jefe; b) their budgets must be presented by the Jefe of the Comit£ Regional to the Consejo Regional for approval; c) persons to serve on the Comit^s Municipales "XIII Consejo de Accidn Nacional," La Nacidn. 30 (October 21, 1956), 16. Estatutos Generales, Article 50, p. 23. 209 and Distritales must be approved by the Comit6 Regional which also has the authority to re move them; d) the Comites Municipales and Distritales can grant provisional admission to members, but for separation, suspension, or exclusion, the approval of its Comit£ Regional is required; e) the Jefes of the Comit£s Municipales and Distritales are required to report at least once each three months a statement of income and expenditures and a list of members ad mitted, separated, suspended or provisionally expelled. The main administrative organ for the local party government is the Comit£ Regional. It is comprised of from five to forty party members, who reside in the region, appointed for a two-year term by the Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. They too are removed for justified 37 cause. The Comit€ Regional can function with the attendance of a simple majority. It has the following functions: 1) to act as an organ of consultation for the Jefe of the Comit6 Regional; 2) to approve the admission, seperation, sus pension, or exclusion of party members who reside within its jurisdiction; 3) to co-ordinate its activities with other regional political organizations (with the approval of the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional); 4) to name from among its members a Secretary General and all necessary commissions; 5) to ratify the nomination of the Jefes of the Comit^s Municipales and Distritales; m ----------------- Estatutos Generales, Article 60, pp. 27-23. 37 Estatutos Generales, Article 56, p. 25- 210 6) and to fulfill all other duties as set forth in the^Estatutos and the regulations of the party.88 The Jefe of the Comity Regional is responsible to the Consejo Regional and the Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo 39 Nacional (who appoints him ) for the party activity of the Comit6 Regional. He has the following duties: 1) to maintain contact with the Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional to present pro posals, to receive instructions, and to assure adequate co-ordination of the party's effort in the region with the rest of the nation; 2) to consult with the Comit£ Regional on im portant measures; 3) to propose at the Convencidn Regional and to the Consejo Regional and the Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional measures which come under their respective jurisdictions; 4) to sustain communication with the other Comit^s Regionales, especially the bordering ones, and to participate in the inter regional meetings organized with the approval of the Jefe of the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional; 5) to urge the members under his jurisdiction, with the authorization of the Comity Ejecu tivo Nacional and in accordance with the party Estatutos to participate in elections, to attend Convenciones, to assist in the selection of a candidate and a platform for the region; 6) to assist the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional or ganize the region's delegations for Asambleas Ordinarias and Convenciones Nacionales; 7) to direct and oversee the work of the M ----------------- Estatutos Generales, Article 53, pp. 25, 2 6. 39 The Jefe Nacional usually meets with the Consejo Nacional and appoints the new Jefe Regional from a list presented by the Consejo Nacional. "MichoacAn: renovacion del Comit6 Regional," La Nacidn, 30 (September 23, 1956), 9. 211 secretaries and dependent organs of the Comit£ Regional...; 8) to approve the Jefes of the Comit^s Munici pales and Distritales and submit names to fill vacancies for approval of the Comit£ Regional; 9) to oversee the administrative details of the office of the Comit6 Regional with the assis tance of the Secretario General; 10) to present to the Consejo Regional and the Jefe of the Comity Ejecutivo Nacional a re port on the party's activities in the region and a general financial statement at least each six months.90 At the head of the party bureaucracy is the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. This body has between seven and forty members including the representatives from the Seccidn Femenina and the Organizacidn Juvenil. The members are selected by the Consejo Nacional from a list prepared by the Asamblea Ordinaria and they remain in office until re- 91 placed by the Consejo Nacional. The Comit6 Ejecutivo Nacional can function with a simple majority. The Comity Ejecutivo Nacional has authority: 1) to act as an advisory organ to the Jefe of the Comit6 Ejecutivo Nacional; 2) to carry out functions entrusted to it by the Asamblea Ordinaria or the Convencion Nacional; 3) to approve the party*s programs of action; 4) to co-ordinate Acci6n Nacional's political efforts with those of other national political organizations; 9° Estatutos Generales. Article 59, pp. 26, 27. 91 Estatutos Generales. Article 40, p. 18. 212 5) to designate any necessary commissions to assist the Jefe Nacional in his work; 6) to represent the party legally through the Jefe Nacional under the terms of the articles 2554, 2574, and 25&7 of the C6digo Civil for the Distrito and Territorios Federales, Article 9 of the Ley Fraccion II, and 27 of the Ley Electoral Federal; 7) to make up the budget and approve accounts which, with the general report of its activi ties, are to be presented to the Consejo Nacional; 3) to convoke the Consejo Nacional, the Asamblea Ordinaria, and the Convencion Nacional for ordinary and extraordinary meetings; 9) to approve the decisions of the Consejos or Comit^s Municipales, Distritales, and Regionales,... 10) and to fulfill all other duties as set forth in the Estatutos.92 The Comity Ejecutivo Nacional selects one of its mem bers to serve as Secretario General, who has the responsi bility of co-ordinating the efforts of the various sub committees and commissions of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. The Secretario General also serves as Secretario General at the Asambleas Ordinaries, the Convenciones Nacionales, and for the Consejo Nacional. The Jefe of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional, selected by the Consejo Nacional, is also the president of the party and the Consejo Nacional. His term 93 of office is for one year and he can be re-elected. His 92 Estatutos Generales. Article 41, pp. 13, 19. At an Asamblea Extraordinaria in Mexico City on November 20, 1962 this was extended to three years. 213 duties are: 1) to formulate Reglamentos for Accidn Nacional which are submitted to the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional for approval; 2) to propose to the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional programs of action; 3) to represent Accidn Nacional legally as stated in Article 41 of the Estatutos; 4) to be a member ex-officio of all Comit^s Municipales, Distritales, and Regionales, and commissions that the Consejo Nacional or the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional appoints; 5) to maintain a working relationship between these Comites and the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional, co-ordinating their efforts and seeing that they conform to the principles and programs of Accidn Nacional; 6) to establish the necessary departments to improve the partyfs organization to improve the diffusion of its principles for more effective participation in Mexican public life and to maintain and develop relation ships with other civic and social organiza tions which have similar activities; 7) to designate and remove Accidn Nacional em ployees, to determine their obligations, and to be responsible for the organization of the Accidn Nacional office; 3) to designate delegates or a commission to study or execute party measures; 9) to represent the party in general and to oversee its development toward the fundamental objec tives, which inspired its creation, of implant ing its principles in public life and attempt ing to execute the necessary judicial, political, and social reforms in accordance with the re spective regulations and statutes of the party.94 After the 1943 modifications, the party has remained relatively unchanged except for changes due to growth and 94 Estatutos Generales, Article 45, p. 21. 214 the development of two special associations: the Seccidn Femenina del Partido and the Sector Juvenil del Partido. The Seccidn Femenina, the womenf s organization, is designed to prepare young women, not yet of voting age, for civic services. Likewise, the young men's association, the Sector Juvenil, serves as a means through which young men can develop their talents which is important in a society where one political party monopolizes public life. Consider the individual growth of these two associations which have increased in importance, developed hierarchies, and are now included in the party councils. These women were the founding group of the Movimiento Femenino de Accidn Nacional, which gradually spread throughout the Republic: Sra. dona Amada Terrazas de Sisniega, Srita. Trinidad Mendoza, Sra. Felicitas Lujan de Prieto, Sra. Anita S. de Vdzquez, Sra. Josefina Carlisle de Fesler, Srita. Clarita Olivera, Sra. Micaela 0. de Portillo, Sra. Arabela 0. de Chavira, Srita. Reyea Hernandez, Sra. Margarita P. de Uranga, Srita. Elisa Horcasitas y Sra. Maria S. de Martinez and others. As an example of its activities in the state of Chihuahua, 95 in two years the Comisidn de Organizacidn established 95 Senoras Zapopan B. de Terrazas, Luz Madera de Villa lobos, Berta Godoy de Ochoa, Carmela Flores, Victoria Medina de Alvarez, Maria Trinidad y Luz Olivas, Sofia Legarreta de Carrasco, Felicitas Lujan de Prieto, Esperanza Gutierrez, Margarita Prado de Uranga and Carmen Zuluaga de Kraft. 215 nineteen Comit^s Municipales and eleven Subcomit^s and pre pared another nine towns through weekly activities for es tablishing Comit^s. Once the basic units were organized, the Seccidn Femenina in Chihuahua held its Asambleas and Convenciones like the Asambleas which met in the Distrito Federal on 96 March 15, 1957, and on March 22, 1957, to elect a new 97 Comit£ de la Seccidn Femenina and make preparations for 98 the coming May 6, 7, and 8 Jornadas or series of lectures. On June 24, 1955, Manuel Gdmez Morfn declared the Seccidn Femenina fully organized in Chihuahua; and on April 27 and 28, 1957, it held its first Convenci6n Regional 99 Femenina. "Special guests were: Jefe Nacional Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servfn, the founder of the party Licenciado Manuel G6raez Morfn, Srita. Luisa Isabel Salas, Presidente 55 "Se prepara la primera Convencidn Femenil," La Naci6n, 31 (March 3, 1957), 14. 97 This illustrates the development of the organization at this level. Presidente— Sra. Celia de Hernandez Dfaz, Secretaria General— Srita. Elena Huesca, Secretaria de Organizacidn— Sra. Martha de Limon Maurer, Secretaria de Propaganda— Srita. Elena Alicia Chavez, Secretaria de Esta- dfstica— Sra. Elena de Ruiz Villalpando, Tesorera— Sra. Eva Morfn. 93 "Nueva directive del Sector Femenila en el D.F.," La Naci6n. 31 (March 31, 1957), 20. "Se prepara la primera Convencidn Femenil," La Nacidn, 31 (March 3, 1957), 14. 216 Nacional of the Seccion Femenina, and Licenciados Efrafn 100 Gonzalez Luna and Miguel Estrada Iturbide.n The speakers 101 were: Srita. Florentina Villalobos of the Grupo de 102 Parral, Sra. Berta Godoy de Ochoa of the Grupo de Ochoa 103 and Sra. Celia G. de Hernandez Diaz. Jovita Granados presented a report of activities of Comision Femenina. The five hundred Convencion delegates then considered fundamen tal problems related to party doctrines, organization, pro grams, and techniques. As was customary, before adjourning the Convencidn they sang the national anthem and the party anthem. Later President of Accidn Nacional Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servln and Licenciado Jos4 Gonzalez Torres, Secre tary General of the Party released a report to the press. Like the regular national Accidn Nacional meetings, the Seccidn Femenina too has its national meetings such as the Reunidn Femenina Nacional held in Mexico City in Novem- 104 ber of 195&. Sixteen delegations from twenty-three 100 ,fSe prepara la primera Convencidn Femenil,” La Nacidn, 31 (March 3, 1957), 14. 101 Diputado, 1963-1966. 102 Consejera Nacional 103 Member of the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional. 104 ”XIV Convencidn Nacional: Informe del Jefe," La Nacidn, 35 (April 5, 1959), 22. 217 Comisiones Regionales Femeninas (the equivalent of a Comit4 Regional) attended, made plans of action, and improved the Secci<5nfs organization. Later on March 22, 1959, taking advantage of numerous women delegates in Mexico City for the Asamblea Ordinaria, the Asamblea Extraordinaria, and the Convencidn Nacional, the Seccidn Femenina called a special meeting under the direction of Srita. Carmen Lozada, President of the Comision Regional Femenina of the Distrito 105 Federal. The topics which the delegates considered reveal much about the activities of the Seccidn Femenina: 1) reports on activities of the Seccidn Femenina of a social nature such as the free medical service in Nuevo Le6n; 2) house visits and study centers for women; 3) a report on the results of the leadership training course for women in Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, and other places; 4) and the selection of candidates for President de la Comisidn Femenina Nacional. (Srita. Luisa Isabel Salas, Srita. Carmen Lozada and Sra. Celia G. de HemAndez Diaz were 106 chosen.) In conclusion, the progress that Mexican women in Accidn Nacional have made is notable. Previously their 105 "Terna para la nueva jefatura," La Nacidn, 35 (March 29, 1959), 22. 106 Ibid. 218 activities were limited to the home. But now they have been called upon to assist with social works in the realm of politics as well. They have organized study groups, lectures, written articles and commentaries, and founded a publication called Brecha. They have carried out an elabo rate program of social work, established free instructional centers, free medical assistance, and given courses in first aid. In a word, the Seccidn Femenina has assumed a social welfare role that is important for the overall Accidn Nacional program. Women have assumed an important role in politics itself both as members of the overall party and as members of the Seccidn Femenina. In the state campaign in Morelia in 1956, sixty-one women campaigned for the offices of Diputado Local Suplente, Presidentes Municipales Suplentes, and for Regidoras Propietarias and Suplentes. They also distributed propaganda, campaigned with loudspeakers, and worked at the polls among other things. According to the Jefe Nacional’s report to the XIV Convene!on Nacional, the Comisidn Nacional Femenina in the 1958 Presidential campaign, visited twenty- seven federal districts, and twenty-nine women ran for 107 Local offices. The Comisidn Femenina Nacional maintained IDT---------------- "Terna para la nueva jefatura," La Nacidn, 35 (March 29, 1959), 22. 219 constant contact with the Comisiones Femeninas Regionales 103 informing them of necessary developments. The second association, the Sector Juvenil, under the 109 direction of Alejandro Avilas and Jestis HernAndez Dfaz likewise experienced phenomenal growth. At the municipal and district levels there were local chapters of the youth organization. At the regional level there was a ComitA Regional Juvenil, which, like the party's ComitA Regional, had a Secretario de 0rganizaci6n, a Secretario de Relaciones, and a Secretario de Propaganda. At the national 110 level there were periodic Asamblea-like Reuniones de 111 Estudios with nationwide representation. In view of the Sector Juvenilfs active role in poli- 112 tics, in 1956 it decided to request statutory m s ---------------- "XIV Convencidn Nacional: Informe del Jefe," La Nacidn, 35 (April 5, 1959), 22. 109 He was later the director of La Nacidn. 110 "Abanderamiento del Sector Juvenil," La Nacidn, 30 (October 7, 1956), 17. 111 When the party Jefes meet alone, the meetings are also called Reuniones. 112 The first national Reunidn de Estudios for the Jefes Municipales, Distritales, and Regionales and their assis tants was held in Mexico City, November 17 to 20, 1956. (Previously there had only been two Reuniones Regionales: in Guadalajara and in Zacatecas.) There were four plenary sessions, various meetings of the Comisiones de Estudios, 220 incorporation into the party structure to allow it a voice in the party’s policy-forming Consejos and the directive 113 ComitOs. The Sector also requested that its name be changed from Sector Juvenil del PAN to OrganizaciOn Juvenil de AcciOn Nacional. A petition was sent to the ComitO Ejecutivo Nacional which it in turn presented to the 114 party. The requests were granted and the OrganizaciOn Juvenil reorganized itself, electing a Jefe Nacional to co-ordinate activities throughout the nation. By March 30- 31 of the following year, the OrganizaciOn Juvenil had a 115 hierarchy similar to that of the party. Since 1957, the and considerable debate, discussion, and proposals. Jefe Nacional Diputado Alfonso Ituarte Servln presided over the debates in which the Mexican youth analyzed the grave, com plex, numerous problems confronting it. It suggested bet ter forms of propagandizing: murales, pamphlets, lectures, and open meetings. The suggestion to create an Instituto de Ciencias Politicas received enthusiastic approval. Jefe Nacional Ituarte Servln applauded the Sector's enthusiasm and efforts. Before closing the session, he nominated a comisiOn {Luis CalderOn Vega, Jos£ Gonzfilez Torres, Javier Blanco, Manuel Rodriguez La Puente, and Jesus Sanz Cerrada) and a president to head it to study all the proposals made at the Asamblea. nLa organization juvenil del PAN,” La Nacidn, 31 {November 25, 1956), 17. 113 "La organizacion juvenil del PAN,” La NaciOn, 31 (November 25, 1956), 17. 114 The Sector’s requests were granted at the next Asamblea Extraordinaria. 115 In the 1956 election campaign in Morelos, the Sec tor Juvenil even had its own Secretaria de Prensa. The ComitO Regional Juvenil del Distrito Federal directed the 195# campaign for Congress in the state of Morelos. 221 association has not changed radically. Presently there are twenty-seven Comit4s Regionales Juveniles which are now attached to the Comit£s Regionales. The youth also work in various secretarlas at various functions. The Organizacidn Juvenil publishes fortnightly some six thousand numbers of its newspaper Accion. On December 13 and 14, 195#» the first Asamblea Nacional Juvenil, with delegates from twenty-seven areas attending was held. Their decisions and proposals were submitted to the Comit£ Ejecutivo Nacional for approval and presentation to the Asamblea Nacional. Also a national plan of youth work and plans for an Insti- 116 tuto de Capacitacidn Polftica was developed. The Organizacidn Juvenil, like the Seccidn Femenina, takes advantage of national party Asambleas and Convenci- 117 ones to call special meetings such as at the Asamblea 116 Ordinaria which met October 10 through 12 in 1954. At these meetings there are reports from the regional leaders TE6 The Instituto de Capacitacidn Polftica began operation in May of I960 to give instruction on the politi cal reality of Mexico through lectures, conferences, and seminars. 117 The Organizacidn Juvenil also periodically holds "Jornadas" of its own. na "La Asamblea Ordinaria," La Nacion, 26 (October 17, 1954), 9. 222 and a general report from the national leader. Then there is the usual committee work resulting in new proposals and plans of action. The last institution of importance in the Accidn 119 Nacional party structure is its voice— La Nacidn. From 120 the beginning, Carlos Septien Garcia and his colleagues 121 attempted to make it the best review in Mexico. They 122 hoped to present sophisticated articles on social justice, 119 The party is required by law to have a publication, a central meeting place, and an overall membership of at least 70,000. 120 Septidn Garcia was a journalist who had founded three other newspapers in his youth and collaborated on many others. In 1940 he joined Accidn Nacional and directed its Boletin until October IB, 1941 when he founded La Nacidn. Re also wrote for El Universal, Portal, and Manana. In 1949 he founded the Revista de la Semana. a Sunday edition to El Universal. and he directed ftROA. In 1943 and in 1946 he was elected to congress from QuerStaro but was not allowed by the government party to take his seat. He directed the school of journalism of Accidn Catdlica Mexi- cana. 121 Adolfo Pimentel Mejia, f , Como salid el primer ntiraero," La Nacidn, 30 (October 15, 1956), B. 122 It was founded and legally registered with the Secretaria de Educacidn Publica as required, on September B, 1941 by Carlos Septidn Garcia. Its principle objectives were to develop public opinion and to present the important issues to the citizenry. Quoted from a speech by Carlos Septien Garcia, December 1944, PP« 1-2, provided by Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz of La Nacidn. 223 political liberty, freedom of worship and education, free enterprise and other themes derived from our Western Christian tradition as well as current events. It was to be cultural and political, to have regular sections on the Congress, the world situation, the fine arts as well as domestic politics. Evidently it has been relatively suc cessful in achieving its objectives, for former government party president Emilio Portes Gil describes it in these 123 words: "...La Nacidn is in my opinion the best written of all newspapers in Mexico. It deals with more documented material on social, economic, and political problems than 124 any other." Accidn Nacional is a sophisticated, intricate organi- zation--largely by necessity although some parts of its _ By 1953 La Nacidn had a permanent staff of writers which included celebrated writers and thinkers such as: Efrain Gonzdlez Luna, Manuel Castillo, Juan Gutidrrez Lascurdin, Pablo Herrera Carrillo, Rafael Preciado Herndndez Manuel Ulloa Ortiz, Gustavo Molina Font, Adolfo Christlieb, J. Fernando Mendoza, Gonzalo Chapela y B., Alejandro Ruiz Villaloz, Jorge Gordoa, and Pedro Crespo. 124 Emilio Portes Gil, La crisis politics de la Revo- lucidn x la pro.lima eleccidn presidential (Mexico. D.F.: Ediciones Botas, 1957T, pp. 92-93• 224 125 organization and behavior are required by law, and are realistically financial burdens which cannot be eliminated. Accidn Nacional has based its organization on the Asamblea and Convencidn systems— the popular will organs of the party where basic organizational and functional decisions are made. The delegates to the Asambleas and Convenciones select representatives to serve on the consultive, policy making Consejos which in turn select competent, adminis trators to serve on the Comitds. The Comitds are adminis trative, executive units which, as committees of the Con sejos are responsible to the latter. But the real unifying core of Accidn Nacional is not just its elaborate structure. No, it is something greater than mere organization. It is the belief in certain principles, doctrines, and above all, a belief in Mexico. T25 Consider, for example, some of the requirements according to the 1964 Ley Electoral Federal: 1) All political parties have to have at least 75*000 members throughout two-thirds of the republic; 2) politi cal parties cannot have a religious nature or character; 3) they must have an internal election process to desig nate presidential candidates; 4) they must have means of politically educating their members; 5) they must function through an Asamblea Nacional, a Comitd Ejecutivo Nacional (with representation from all over the country), a Comitd Directivo in each federative where there are more than 2,500 members; 6) they must be registered with the Secre- taria de Gobernacidn; 7) they must present a list with the members' names and their places of domicile to the Secretaria de Gobernacidn. Comision Federal Electoral. Ley Electoral Federal (Mdxico, D.F.: Talleres Grdficos de la Nacidn, 1964), Articles 29-41, pp. 16-22. CHAPTER EIGHT THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY It was not only Acci6n Nacional's organization that made it a permanent party but also its doctrines. As each doctrine is analyzed one should keep in mind that this is the party which has been labeled a "reactionary and anti- 1 revolutionary party." Accidn Nacional's doctrines are divided into three categories: political doctrines, social doctrines, and economic doctrines. Accidn Nacional is continuing the political struggle which began with Francisco Madero— the fight for "sufragio 2 3 efectivo" and electoral reform. In the 1943 election, 1 Many writers in the United States have simply echoed these names and labels without ever determining their validity. 2 "...Sufragio Efectivo and Tierra y Libertad, the initial standards of the Mexican Revolution are the ideals of PAN." Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico City dated July 31, 1965; "The PAN believes in the ideals of the Mexican Revolution: Effective Suffrage, Social Justice, etc.— ideals that the 'Partido Revolucionario1 has be trayed." Information obtained in correspondence with Dipu- tada Florentina Villalobos Chaparro from Chihuahua dated September 3, 1965. 3 As in 1911, the party in 1943 and still in 1966 first faces the problem of restoring the faith of the people in effective suffrage and electoral reform to make these con cepts a reality. Accidn Nacional has struggled for twenty- six years attempting to inspire hope in the heart of Mexico 225 226 the first in which Acci<5n Nacional offered its own candi dates with its own political platform, one of the most im- 4 portant points was that which dealt with electoral reform. Twenty-one years later, according to the 1964 Presidential campaign platform, the most serious problem confronting Mexico was still the need to "reform the State through 5 electoral reform. The solution of all other problems /the platform statedA7 hinged on this one; and until this was solved, all socioeconomic reforms must go begging." This was reiterated through interviews and correspondence^with Accidn Nacional*s Diputados presently in the CAmara: the and belief in these concepts. This has not been an easy task with"the systematic imposicidn of governors, the al most uninterrupted succession of oligarchs and dictators, the patrimonial concept of public authority, the separation of the government from the people, the consequental absten tion of the electorate, the lack of preparation of the_ youth for public office, and the social consequences /of this situation/ like the problems of education, campo, the economy in general." Rafael Preciado HernAndez, Sin auten- ticidad en la representacidn politics, no habrA democracia en Mexico (Mlxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1962), p. 1. 4 Rafael Preciado HernAndez, "RAgimen electoral y demo cracia," La Nacidn. 6 (July 29, 1944), 2 6; Luis Calderdn Vega, "Biografla del PAN," La Nacidn. 24 (May 17, 1953), 17. Accidn Nacional, Plataforma politics social: 1964 1970 (MAxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 19631, p. 1. Approximately the equivalent of the United States1 House of Representatives. 227 consensus being that electoral reform was necessary before the other ideals of the Mexican Revolution could be accom plished. Diputado Ricardo Chaurand Concha stated: The electoral process remains entirely in the hands of the PRI, thereby allowing the government to elect whosoever it chooses.... It is unquestionable that the political situation in Mexico will change radically, allowing Mexico to have a truly repre sentative government, with modifications such as the establishment of a national register of voters, the participation of all political parties1 person nel at the polls, and the establishment of an inde pendent organ to tally the election results, in vestigate complaints, etc.‘ Diputado Luis M. Aranda Torres, less optimistically, stated that "electoral reform will not solve all of Accidn NacionalTs political problems... but it will place one more obstacle in the path of those who defraud the people of its 8 vot e." Specifically what are the electoral reforms that Accidn Nacional would like to implement? In an interview, J. 9 Antonio Alvarez ennumerated these: 1) Accidn Nacional believes Mexico should have a supervised election system with proportional representation whereby all minority 7 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Ricardo Chaurand Concha from Celaya, Guanajuato dated August 16, 1965. 8 Interview in Leon, Guanajuato, Mexico on August 18, 1965. 9 Interview in Mexico City on August 28, 1964* 228 political parties would be represented; 2) Accidn Nacional opposes the present election committees which supervise the elections and count the votes and which are selected ex clusively of and by the PRI; 3) Accidn Nacional believes that the commissions sent out to investigate election fraud complaints should be comprised of members from all politi cal parties; A) Accidn Nacional opposes the PRI's using government funds for campaigning; 5) and finally Accidn Nacional believes that there should be a current National 10 Register of Voters (at present registration is entirely 11 in the hands of the PRI ) to eliminate dishonesty at the polls. In summary, Accidn Nacional wants electoral reform to guarantee authentic representation and democratic process beginning at the state and municipal levels of government. A second important point in the political platform of 1943, and others since then including the platform in 1964, 12 was municipal reform. Accidn Nacional^ drive for 10 These lists as now maintained are not revised to remove the names of the deceased or individuals who have moved to a different district; still these names are on record as having voted. Newly registered opposition party members often do not receive their registration certificate in time to vote. 11 Interview with Licenciado J. Antonio Alvarez in Mexico City on August 28, 1964; "Paralelo entre el PRM y el partido nazi," La Nacidn, 6 (June 24, 1944), 25-26. 12 For a detailed account of a struggle for local autonomy in 1945 see Alfonso Trueba, La. batalla de Ledn por el municipio libre (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN, 1964), p. 2. 229 municipal reform was to build up "grass-roots" democracy; or in the words of the party, it was part of "an effort to 13 form a civic conscience." While many of Mexico's political ills are due to non enforcement of the existing laws, the need for municipal reform in part stems from a misuse of power by the execu tive of the federal government. The federal government (the PRM in 1940 and the PRI today) dominates local govern ments by its preponderent power and by depriving local governments of sources of revenue. The net result is that the citizenry loses; the people do not get the local pro grams that it wants and would carry out itself. This 14 "government control is a denial of democracy by those 15 specializing in retaining power." According to Accidn Nacional, the Municipio is the basic unit in national political organization and as such Accion Nacional, Metas de Accidn Nacional (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1964), p. 2. 14 According to Diputado Profesor Ricardo Chaurand Concha in correspondence dated August 16, 1965 from Celaya, Gto. the fact that Accidn Nacional members are not permitted to serve on government commissions or in the bureaucracy is proof that democracy does not exist in Mexico. 15 Miguel Estrada Samano, "Intocables principios demo- craticos," La Nacidn, 35 (November 1, 1959), 10. 230 16 should be autonomous. It should not be an instrument of 17 national political control. Accion Nacional wants "the Municipio to be respected as a basic unit in the constitu tional organization of the nation and to have sufficient IS income to fulfill its functions." Its function is to develop and offer basic services in the community that families cannot afford; its mission is to protect and de velop the values of local community living. In summary, Accidn Nacionalfs principle objective is to assist the establishment of true democracy in Mexico. Consequently, a program of municipal reform for local government, designed to end caciquismo. while simultaneously promoting community development in the fullest meaning of the term, is neces sary. 16 For a detailed study of an exemplary municipal pro gram, consult the one presented by Licenciados Daniel Kuri Brena and Manuel Ulloa presented at the Second Regional Convention at Jalisco and later published as: Accidn Nacional, Esquema de un programa municipal (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.T”and Programs eiemplar de municipio (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1954), p. 12. 17 Accidn Nacional, "Principios de Doctrina— su proyec- cidn en 1965," La Nacion. 4# (June 1, 1965), 24-31. This was reiterated In an exclusive interview with Accidn Nacional Jefe Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola by Manana. 31 (April 13, 1963), 2#-34, on the eve of the 1964 Presidential election campaign. Accidn Nacional, Plataforma politica y social: 1964 1970. p. 11. 231 The third point in Accidn Nacionalfs domestic political program deals with government reform and constitutional en- 19 forcement. Accidn Nacional believes that the government should represent the people, guarantee true liberty, respect public opinion to produce an atmosphere in which the indi- 20 vidual as well as politics and society may flourish. For national unity and social peace, there should be freedom of association for organizations like schools, labor unions, agrarian co-operatives, and the bureaucracy. Accidn Nacional also advocates freedom of assembly for political purposes to encourage a multiparty system: Diversity of convictions, tendencies, and political interests invites discussion. The exercise of these rights through political parties represents advancement toward democracy for political parties represent convictions, programs of diverse groups. Systems with one official party are antidemocratic because...they attempt to nullify this diversity of opinion. An official party seeks to continue a group in power under the pretext of maintaining political stability in a country where the people are underdeveloped politically.21 The State should function, according to Accidn Nacional, according to the guidelines established by the Constitution. In theory Mexico has a federal government “T9 Estrada Samano, "Intocables principios democrdticos,n p. 10. 20 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965i" 24- 31. 21lbid.. p. 24. 232 which adheres to the concept of separation of powers; in practice it is centralized politically and economically with the executive branch dominating the other two. These discrepencies mean that the federal executive has usurped the authority of and dominated the other two federal 22 branches of government and local governments. Consequent ly, the administration of justice is inadequate in Mexico; the Judiciary does not protect the individuals rights adequately; it does not protect the individual from abuse by the government. The Judiciary, states Accidn Nacional, should act independently and fulfill its constitutional role freely and efficiently dispensing justice with 23 dignity. We must have good judges and laws: Laws like the Law of Social Dissolution, which has been applied against Accidn Nacional's mem bers attempting to fulfill their political duties,2b should be abolished. Unwarranted arrest, prisoners held incomunicado, the use of unsatisfactory jails, the use of torture to extract confessions, police corruption, and bribery all must be e l i m i n a t e d . 2 ' 22 TtPrincipios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965,” p. 25; Accidn Nacional, Metas de Accidn Nacional (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.), p. 2. 23 Plataforma politics % social: 1964-1970. p. 2. 24 Ibid. . p. 6. 25 Ibid. 233 The Congress, too, must assume its full responsibilities and exercise its authority not only in legislating but in controlling the executive branch as the Constitution pre scribes. In the making of foreign policy, it should like wise, utilize the powers it has abdicated to the execu- 26 tive. To correct these maladies, Accidn Nacional proposes that a sufficiently adequate budget be alloted the Judiciary to make it independent; that a system be established which would demand honest, professional behavior of the members of the Judiciary; that the Law of Social Dissolution be rescended; and finally, a legal code which would allow humane, equitable, administration of justice respecting the 27 rights of individuals be established. Accidn Nacional further proposes that the Congress reform laws restricting human rights; that the Ley de Responsibilidades be applied to all civil servants; that it assume its constitutional functions; and that all be allowed free access to all 25------------- "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965»” p. 26. 27 Plataforma politica £ social: 1964-1970. p. 11. 26 Ibid.. p. 2.; Accidn Nacional maintains that public administration should not exist to maintain a bureaucracy as an end in itself, as a way to achieve personal promotion and public power— but should be a service for the general welfare to assist it realize its aspirations. Metas de Accidn Nacional. p. 2. 234 sources of public information without unnecessary restric tions other than those for national security and the re- 29 spect for the rights of others. This, states Accidn Nacional, would end the supremacy of the federal executive over the other branches and levels of government which presently upsets the necessary balance for democratic 30 organization. The federal and local legislative bodies could then resume their political and legislative functions 31 and cease to be dependencies of the federal executive. The last point in Accidn Nacionalfs domestic political program is woman suffrage. Accidn Nacional "believes that 32 women should participate in political life on an equal basis with men without neglecting their family obligations." Largely because of Accidn Nacionalfs stand, sufficient interest was created which resulted in 1952 in the enfran chisement of women. This was a major political victory in more ways than one. 29 Metas de Accidn Nacional, p. 2. 3° "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," P- 26. 31 Plataforma politica £ social: 1964-1970. p. 11. 32 Metas de Accidn Nacional. p. 2.; "Las mujeres en el PAN," La Nacidn ,—54"~Tt)c to be r 4, 1953), p. 6. 235 Mexico*s foreign policy, according to Accidn Nacional, should be based on the values of Western Civilization. It should be directed toward the cause of peace (which is not a precarious coexistence of hostile forces), toward strengthening international peace-making institutions, toward effective nuclear arms control, and in general toward 33 disarmament. Accidn Nacional considers that foreign re lations should be maintained with countries only when the domestic political situation is normal and that the use of 34 the concepts of sovereignty, nonintervention, and self- determination by dictatorial regimes to violate human rights 35 is intolerable — a government must represent its people. This foreign policy statement, in general, means that Accidn Nacional does not favor diplomatic relations with the 36 Communist bloc nations and definitely not with Cuba. To 33 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," pp. 24-31. 34 Sovereign isolationism is an erroneous, anarchron- istic concept based on the ideal of self-sufficiency, ignores the need for co-habitation. "Principios de doctrina — su proyeccidn en 1965," pp. 24-31. 35 Plataforma politica £ social: 1964-1970. p. 8.; "Principios de doctrina— su proyeccidn en 19o5," pp. 24-31. q 21 At the present, Mexico maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba and was the only member which did not agree to adhere to the Organization of American States* sanctions against Cuba. 236 quote one Panista, "Accidn Nacional considers Fidel Castro a Communist tyrant who has drowned the liberties of the Cuban people in blood. /As a resultA7 Accidn Nacional cen sures the attitude of the Mexican government, invoking the principle of self-determination of peoples toward Cuba 37 while not sustaining it toward Spain. Dos pesos y dos 38 medidas." The party has stated that the best weapon 39 against communism is social justice and true democracy. Accidn Nacional advocates maintaining diplomatic re lations with the Franco government in Spain (which is prob ably a carry-over from the earlier Pan-Hispanic movement). It also believes that the Mexican government of a people approximately 97 per cent Catholic should maintain relations 40 with the Vatican. 37 The PRI does not maintain diplomatic relations with Spain. "Considering that Franco won with the assistance of outside forces, Mexico never recognized the falangist regime that has usurped power in Spain...Once the war was over in Spain, the Mexican government opened the country to Spanish immigration and the legal government of the Repub lic. The PRI has repudiated the Franco regime." Pdre Foix, CArdenas (Mdxico, D.F.: Editorial Latinoamericano, 1947)* p. 273. 38 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Ricardo Chaurand Concha from Celaya, Gto. dated August 16, 1965. 39 Plataforma politics y social: 1964-1970. p. 8. 40 Interview with Licenciado J. Antonio Alvarez in Mexico City on August 28, 1964. 237 Regarding relationships with Europe and Hispanic America, Accidn Nacional believes that Mexico should inte grate politically and economically into the community of Ibero-American nations and the world in general, but should emphasize developing her people's potential through edu cation and sound economic policies. Prerequisites to inter national integration are the freedom of education, the ownership of property, the realization of just agrarian re form with appropriate technical assistance and credit, and the development of production. Without them, outside assis tance and development projects are destined to fail. While Accidn Nacional has never opposed maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, it was sus picious of the Good Neighbor Policy and of Pan-Americanism because of the United States' poor record in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. At the same time there were, especially in the late 1930's, many reasons for supporting the Pan-Hispanic movement which was primarily an expression 41 of admiration for mother Spain's culture, and a desire to 4l Shirley E. Stone, ''The Mexican Presidential Election of 1940 As Seen Through The Press of The Capital*' (Unpub-* lished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 194#), p. 37. 236 unite Latin America culturally, economically, and political- 42 ly. This opposition dissipated as Hispanicism waned and 43 as Pan-Americanism assumed a new character. (Accidn Nacional opposed the Mexican bracero treaty with the United States because it would not have been necessary nto export Mexican citizens in boxcars," if Mexico's agricultural prob- 44 lem had been solved.) Accidn Nacional believes that Mexico should have an immediate settlement, which was promised by President Kennedy, of the salinity problem in the Mexicali valley area. And Accidn Nacional applauded the 42 Pan-Hispanicism was an appeal to the intellectual, to the unlettered, to the religious, and to the nationalistic. In a word, Pan-Hispanicism challenged Pan-Americanism, which meant U.S. hegemony to many if not most Latin Americans, Here Efrain Gonzdlez Luna, a prominent Accidn Nacional offi cial gives an example of this line of thought: "Hispanicism and the Good Neighbor Policy are two systems in conflict. The United States fights against_Spanish influence in Amer ica and attempts to replace it ^with Pan-Americanist", or ganizing in the Western Hemisphere a world radically separ ated from Europe economically, politically, militarily, and culturally. The message of Monroe is applied to something more imponderable, abstract, spiritual and more vital than forms of government, territorial ambitions, and the more or less imaginary dangers of colonization and conquest." "Un panamericanismo en busca de nombre," La Nacidn. 1 (December 6, 1941), reprinted in Efrain Gonzalez Luna. Humaniamo politico (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1955;, p. 319. 43 Maurice Halperin, "Mexico Shifts her Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 19 (October 19, 1940), 207-221. "Vida nacional: Braceros," La Nacidn. 6 (May 15» 1944), 6-9. 239 settlement of the Chamizal problem when it finally came in 45 1964. Accidn Nacional has not made an official statement on the Alliance for Progress but the general consensus of opinion is that it would be beneficial: 1) if structural reforms of political regimes were to accompany it permitting the people in general to benefit 2) in solving some Mexican problems which private enterprise and the government have not been able to solve; 3) for countries with weak economies or socially needy groups if well directed;4© 4) for the hungry inhabitants of this continent who earnestly want the project to flourish.49 An integral part of Accidn Nacional's doctrines as enunciated at the September, 1939, Constituyent Assembly and reiterated at the Second National Convention in April, 1940, dealt with social problems. The party, then as now, held 45 "Chamizal,* La Nacidn. 6 (August 19, 1944), 5. 46 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Abel Carlos Vicencio Tovar dated July 29, 1965. 47 Information obtained ii} correspondence with Diputado Luis M. Aranda Torres from Leon, Gto. dated August 13, 1965. 48 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Ricardo Chaurand Concha from Celaya, Gto. dated August 16, 1965. 49 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera of Mexico City dated July 31, 1965. 240 that, for Mexico to progress socially, there must he a basis for understanding and solidarity between all Mexi- 50 cans. The doctrines which search for a solution to social problems in the 'class struggle1 /states Accidn Nacional/ are false, inhuman, and contrary to the most fundamental laws of social life. The concept of the State as an instrument to fight for one social class (whichever it may be) for the destruc tion or domination of the other is antisocial and monstruously injust. The nation needs social justice, not a 'class struggle1 and the State should face the motives and causes of all disorders of Society and all injustice.51 Accidn Nacional affirms that "man is free, has eminent dignity, a spiritual and material destiny. His liberty, dignity, and development is supported by the family, the municipio, the labor union, and other professional or cul- 52 tural organizations." Accidn Nacional demands respect by 53 the State (or from the capricious will of the State) for the individual as a human being, respect for his religious convictions, his liberties, personal rights, and property. 50 Plataforma politics y social: 1964-1970. p. 11. 51 "Entrevista con Christlieb Ibarrola," pp. 26-34. 52 Accidn Nacional, Hay pais. hay pueblo; lo que nos ha faltado siempre es gobierno (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.) , p. 1. 53 Accidn Nacional, Programa minimo de accidn politica (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1949)» p. 4. 241 (This means that the decision by the State to declare a State of Seige is a denial of the individual's rights for he should be allowed to share the responsibility of any national crisis.) There should not be any restraint of thought, conscience, opinion, or teaching. These essential, personal prerogatives the party emphasizes are not State- 54 granted concessions. In general, Accidn Nacional demands a system where public officials are required to be responsi ble. It is indispensible that the law acknowledge the family as the basic institution in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the nation. Accidn Nacional therefore opposes legislation and anything else (such as abortion, prostitution, and pornographic publications) that would weaken the family as an institution, that would reduce marriage to a mere contract. While "the care and education of children is primarily the responsibility of the family..., the State should assist the family in completing this mis sion without supplanting it." Labor reform legislation should be introduced to protect working, expectant women. And a solution should be found to solve the problem of Accidn Nacional, Programs mfnimo de accidn politics (Mdxico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1949), p. 4. 242 55 unmarried mothers and to protect fatherless children. Accidn Nacional believes that social justice is not limited to the solution of labor-management problems, nor to a mere better distribution of material wealth among areas of the nation. It has stated that social justice is not a class-struggle— quite to the contrary. To achieve social justice the co operation of all is necessary to overcome misery and ignorance which are a result of moral, economic, and political disorganization and can only be eliminated /according to Accidn Nacional/, through order based on the realization of spiritual values and the fulfillment of the general welfare. This means through the exercise and defense of rights and the reciprocal fulfillment of obligations especially in re lations between persons and social groups. Before the most pressing problem of agricultural reform 56 can bring social justice, there must be a solution of the 57 problem of "human elevation." To increase economic pro ductivity of the campesino. first he must be respected as an individual, given allowance for private initiative. This means the ownership of his land, social security, and essen tial services like water, transportation facilities, Programs mlnimo de accidn politics. p. 6, 56 R. P. Iglesias, "La parte gangrenada de la Revolu- cidn: sus ateos, sus enriquecidos, sus comunistas— no realizard nunca la Justicia Social," La Nacidn. 6 (July 29, 1944), 12-13. "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," p. 30. 243 53 technical and sanitary instruction, and sufficient credit. While "private property is not an end in itself, it is an instrument for encouraging freedom of the individual and security for the family." In summary, social justice ac cording to Accidn Nacional is a permanent human necessi- 59 ty; social justice is living in a just, equitable manner with sufficient material goods and spiritual well being, 60 enjoying personal liberty and human dignity. Because Accidn Nacional advocates freedom of religion, it has been accused of clericalism— the use of the Catholic Church, religion, and its moral authority for electoral 61 purposes. This accusation results in part because re ligion means Catholicism or the unrestrained Church of the 62 pre-revolutionary period to the average Mexican. The government party has been quick to capitalize on this historically based misconception. 5B----------------- "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," p. 30 • 59 Metas de Accidn Nacional. p. 2. 60 Christlieb Ibarrola, Temas politicos. p. 72. 61 Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Religidn £ politics, las crisis de Accidn Nacional (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, n. d.) , p. 1. 62 Christlieb Ibarrola, Temas politicos. p. 30. 244 While Accidn Nacional^ principles are derived from the values of Western (Christian) Civilization and, as party president Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola stated, "papal encyclicals certainly orient the social thinking of certain party members who in turn influence the position of the party,...the party has no relations with the Church or ec- 63 clesiastical authorities." The party merely holds that religious liberty to worship and to instruct children in religion is a right which should be fully guaranteed in Mexico; a fundamental right of all is violated when spirit- 64 ual liberty is suppressed. Furthermore, this means that all laws and governmental activity, directly or indirectly 65 persecutory, should cease. In general Accidn Nacional believes that the State should not intervene in religious affairs and matters of the conscience, nor the Church in State affairs. Accidn Nacional proposes the following on low-cost housing: 1) a national educational campaign be promoted among the campesinos to establish rural housing and minimal conditions required for healthy family living; 53 "Entrevista con Christlieb Ibarrola," p. 31. 64 Christlieb Ibarrola, Temas politicos, p. 33. 65 "Entrevista con Christlieb Ibarrola," p. 33. 245 2) the State or private institutions grant long term cheap credit for the individual acqui sition of houses, preferably o n e - f a m i l y ;66 3) each family occupying a unit in a multifamily, State-built project be assisted in purchasing it; 4) to develop low-cost housing, bank and corpor ation investment be stimulated; 5) low-income families be assisted in obtaining housing; 6) plans be made to assure the co-operation of the State and employers in guiding city development about employment centers.67 Accidn Nacionalfs position on Social Security developed as a result of nonenforcement of section XXIX of article 123 of the Constitution. It was one of the first doctrines distributed in pamphlet form by the party to inform workers and the public in general of Accidn Nacional*s position. Many hours were spent with union members explaining the benefits of Social Security and its evolution as an expres sion of the dignity of man. At a convention in I960, Gdmez Morin stated that labor union leaders in 1939 opposed the idea of Social Security even though it was a constitutional 6d fact. Yet Acci6n Nacional was attacked by the regime as 66 Metas de Accidn Nacional, p. 3. 67 Plataforma politics y social: 1964-1970* p. 6. 6d "Texto integro de la ponencia que presento su autor, el Licenciado Manuel Gdmez Morin, fundador de Acci6n Nacional, el domingo Id de septiembre en la ultima sesion plenaria de la Convencion Interregional que para estudiar 'El Problema del Trabajo que llevo a cabo el Partido en la ciudad de Puebla de los Angeles." La Nacidn. 3d (October 9. I960), 3. 246 counter-revolutionary and of wanting "to increase govern ment expenses while it alone propounded Social Security, a 69 revolutionary ideal.” The party presently believes, as in 1939, that the installation and maintenance of Social Security are clearly a community effort and an inexcusable duty of the State, because it is a community obligation to avert misery or any other thing that reduces its members1 capacity to work. At the same time, however, the State is not the owner of the Social Security system nor of the institutions that inte- 70 grate it. Social Security, states Acci6n Nacional, must have the complementary assistance of other institutions. Education occupies an integral position, for ignorance is one of the primary causes of misery, unhealthfulness, and other risks. The educational system should be enlarged and its content reformed, to make it accessible to all Mexicans. One must ------ 65----------------- When the regime promulgated its Law of Social Securi ty in 1943, Accidn Nacional applauded the act but pointed out its technical shortcomings and later denounced its use for political ends. In 194&, the Accion Nacional deputa tion in Congress presented a proposal for the formation of a committee to study Social Security to improve it. 70 nTexto integro de la ponencia para estudiar 1 El Problema del Trabajo," p. 5. 247 not forget that without an agil and robust economy, Social Security cannot be a success. An expanding economy can pro vide the necessities of a rapidly increasing population and thereby resolve the complex problems related to popula- 71 tion growth. Mexico, stated Acci6n Nacional, unfortunate ly continues sacrificing her economic potential to politi cal interests. Accidn Nacional feels that Social Security should be operated in a humanistic manner, extending benefits to all 72 individuals in need of assistance. It should not become an instrument of domination or political control which would leave in the hands of the State the subsistence and future 73 of families in need of assistance. The beneficiaries should be allowed to select their own physicians, who should be allowed to prescribe the necessary medicines. Social Security should include private as well as provide public 74 assistance. Finally, it should be recognized that Social Security is not a panacea for misery and suffering; but rationally structured, with ef ficient techniques, humanized in its administration, 71 "Texto integro de la ponencia para estudiar El Prob lems del Trabajo," p. 7. 72 Metas de Accidn Nacional. p. 3. 73 Christlieb Ibarrola, Temas politicos. p. 74. 74 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970» p. 5. 24$ complemented with the institutions that make its functioning possible, freed from political ex ploitation, under the vigilance of the State— genuinely representative of the people— it can avert misery, free men and the community of privations that fill life with bitterness and suffering.75 In 1934 General Plutarco E. Calles, a former teacher, began what culminated in a revision of Article 3 of the 1917 Constitution making education at all levels socialis tic and a government monopoly. This effort to monopolize 76 education was the beginning of a polemic which exists to the present. Many question the government's right to 77 monopolize education (a totalitarian tendency), to dic tate the only textbooks and materials which teachers should 7$ use. While the establishment and conservation of insti tutions for the formation and diffusion of culture is a 75 "Texto fntegro de la ponencia para estudiar El Problems del Trabajo," p. 8. 76 Carlos Alvear Acevedo, "El laicismo, ataque hipo- crita a la fe," La Naci6n. 37 (November 1, 1959), 2-3. 77 "Educacidn: el Estado, monopolista de la ensenanza," La Nacidn, 27 (November 14, 1954), 10. 78 Accion Nacional states: "It is contrary to these principals for the State to impose textbooks in any grade of school, to limit the right of parents to select, in accordance with their convictions the type of education that they want their children to receive...." "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," p. 29. 249 duty of the State, Accidn Nacional holds that this should 79 not be considered a monopoly. The Statefs function should be limited to assuring all citizens of receiving at least an elementary education and to determining the pre- 80 requisites and methods for teaching. The State should respect and encourage private institutions of culture. In a word, Article 3 of the Constitution and all other similar government measures should be rescinded in favor of full SI freedom of education. In its Principios de Doctrina, the party stated these views: Freedom for research, scientific or philosophic opinion like all freedom of thought should not be constrained by the State. Freedom of ex pression should have no other judicial limits other than those imposed for national interest by moral norms, and in the general w e l f a r e . 83 The 1964 campaign platform stated: Education should be made accessible for all Mexicans and maintained accessible as the popu lation increases; all national efforts should be concentrated on solving the problem of illiter acy. Article 26 of the Constitution establishes 79 Acci6n Nacional, Principios de Doctrina (Mexico, D.F. PAN publication, 1939), p. 2. 80 Programa minimo de accidn politica. p. 15. 61 Ibid.t p. 16. 82 Principios de Doctrina. p. 2. 83 Jose Gonzdlez Torres, De la ignorancia y su natural remedio— la educacidn (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.). 250 the right of every Mexican to free elementary education. Education develops the full indi vidual and strengthens the fundamental rights and liberties of man. To educate is to diffuse Mexican culture. It is to develop the greatest national resource— the population. The govern ment cannot maintain a monopoly in education, condemning sectors of society to illiteracy. The present apparatus does not satisfy the need to develop morally and technically the popula tion.®^ The universities, stated the party, should be autonomous, representing an expression and defense of liberty. Uni versity work should not be limited to preparing profession als or technicians but should be oriented toward scientific investigation in the fullest meaning of the word: It...can only fulfill its mission if it develops in an atmosphere of disciplined autonomy. Because of its importance to national life, it should be supported morally and economically by all but it should be economically independent of the State....®5 The educational budget that the State allots to education should be justly distributed to all sectors of the population. Technical education and university education, in province should be strengthened. Because the education issue has been one of the most controversial issues (since it concerns the preparation of future generations), the party has elaborated on its 55----------------- Plataforma politics y social: 196J4.-1970. p. 2. $5 Principios de Doctrina. p. 2. 251 86 position more frequently and in greater detail. Also the problem has obviously worsened considerably in the twenty- five year period since Accidn Nacional first presented its 87 original statement. Be that as it may, it is evident that the government party's statement that "Acci6n Nacional 55------------- Among the Accidn Nacional studies of the education problem and proposals to solve it is the one made at a special Inter-Regional Convention at Morelia on May 26-29, I960. The convention's study utilized United Nation's publications and statistics to determine what would be needed (and its costs) for a comprehensive primary educa tion program for a ten-year period for twelve million chil dren. This study pointed out the inadequacy of the exist ing government party program. The PRI's cost 17,512 million pesos, while PAN's cost 22,362 million pesos, the difference being that PAN not only allowed for expansion and students now not in school but also for improvement of classrooms, teachers, etc.. Acci6n Nacional, "Los terminos reales del Problems Educativo," the II Inter-Regional Con vention held May 26-29, I960 at Morelia to study the Mex ican education problem, La Naci6n. 38 (July 12, I960), 7* 67 At the XV Convenci6n Nacional in November 1962, Dr. Francisco Quiroga Fernandez presented a study in which he stated that "the education problem is most distressing be cause of its relationship to human dignity. It disrupts the home life because the State teaches the child to des pise the fanaticism of his parents. The State's monopoliz ing action cannot be justified on the grounds of efficiency for in 1961 33 per cent of the student population could not enter primary school; there are too many students and too few teachers. Accidn Nacional will present to the government a study on the existing system of schools and attempt solutions if the State will abandon its monopoly..." Francisco Quiroga Fernandez, El problema educativo actual de Mexico y su posible solucion (Mexico. D.F.: PAN publication, n.dTT, p. 3. 252 seeks privileges, that it wants to retrocede the nation to 33 'epocas oscuras,T that it seeks an educational monopoly for the Church, that it fights for the wealthy class that enriched itself at the expense of ignorant people, and that it wants to make education a dirty business” is not justi- 39 fiable. The reform of Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution is one of Accidn NacionalTs most important economic doctrines. Because it wants to change this article, it has been accused repeatedly of being antirevolutionary, reactionary, and of wanting to ”turn the clock back” so to speak. Acci6n Nacional's proposals, however, as the party's position was enunciated in 1939 demonstrates, do not seek to eliminate any of labor's socioeconomic gains tinder Article 123 but 90 attempt to improve them and make them obtainable. As this gg The most complete, single study on this topic is Licenciado Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, Monopoiio educativo o unidad nacional: un problema de Mgxico (Mexico. D.F.: Editorial Jus, 19627T 39 Quiroga Ferndpdez, El problema educativo actual de Mexico y; su posible &oluci5n. p. 8. 90 "Accidn Nacional advocates true democratic organi zation in labor unions so that laborers may present their interests through honest, responsible leaders. This defin itely excludes the present leaders who have for so many years made unions a means of personal enrichment, an instru ment to support the regime...." Metas de Accidn Nacional, p. 2. 253 most pressing problem became more acute because of popula tion growth and the resulting need for even more jobs, Acci6n Nacional continued to search for solutions as its 91 various platforms reflected. In November of I960 a Con- vencion Inter-Regional was held at Puebla which considered the problems of labor in general and specifically a pro- 92 posal on profit-sharing. Accidn Nacional felt that labor should be included in the decision-making bodies of busi ness, ideally an efficient social service for the community, 93 and have a share of the profits. The party stated that profit-sharing would encourage a collaborative spirit between labor and business.94 It should not be an excuse for continuing unjust salaries, but be a means toward improvement of relations between the two sectors which morally cannot be avoided.... Labor should be considered as coowner and developer of business.95 91 Juan Landerreche Obregdn, El problema del trabajo en Mexico (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.). 92 In 1961, forty-four years after the 1917 Constitution was written, the so-called revolutionary government began to consider Accidn NacionalTs proposal for implementing profit- sharing reforms as originally envisioned by the Constitution 93 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965," p. 29; nParticipaci6n de los Trabajadores en las utilidades de las empresas," La Nacidn. 3# (September 25, I960), 5« 94 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970. p. &. 95 Ibid. 254 At the XV Convenci6n Nacional, which met in November of 1962, Licenciado Juan Landerreche Obregdn presented a very complete study entitled, "El problema del trabajo en Mexico," a large part of which was devoted to these pro posals to improve Article 123: Section XXXI nationalized the petrochemical, metalurigical, the iron and steel industries and the foundry supposedly for the benefit of labor. Actually they were nationalized to increase the Federal Governments economic, social, and politi cal control over local governments and labor unions. This centralism is unconstitutional be cause it strangles regional authority which in turn strangles municipal authority. Since its founding, Accidn Nacional has opposed this type of centralism and has demanded that the State respect the principles of federalism. The federal government has overstepped its jurisdiction. Accidn Nacional proposes that section VI be reformed to permit minimum wages to be determined by regions instead of by municipios, a political division. The real problem, however, is obtain ing a minimum wage adequate for a head of a family to provide its material necessities. Also pro vision should be made to pay the professional worker a wage commensurate with his capability. 55----------------- The political platform for the 1964 presidential election stated the partys1 previous position and enlarged on these points: "...Accidn Nacional believes that salaries, the economic base for most Mexicans, should be just {taking to account the type of work, the cost of living, the em ployers limitations, and the worker*s productivity). Sala ries should not be determined by a simple game of social forces but by a mutual, free decision under the vigilance of the State. There should be additional compensations for family obligations. Many Mexicans do not have just salaries because of manipulation of unscrupulous employees who contract to do work at home which nullifys the rights of the workers. Un- numerable workers are maintained through complicity with the inspectors. Accidn Nacional urges the organization of an 255 Sections II and III prohibit minors of less than fourteen years of age from working. This is well and good but Accion Nacional states that this prohibition does not solve the problem of these minors, which originally forced them to work. For these sections to be effective, the conditions which forced their parents to allow them to work must be improved. Acci6n Nacional proposes that the heads of families be paid an adequate salary, be given family benefit allowances, and fiscal franquicias to solve the problem of minors working. Private enterprise must share this burden by pro viding adequate salaries for workers.97 The sections of Article 123 which provoked much commentary and the obstinate opposition of the business group are sections XXI and XXII. They state that, except in unusual cases, an em ployer may not dismiss an employee (without justi fied cause) without paying him indemnization. These sections are based on the principle that human labor is not a saleable commodity to be separated from the individual. Upon contracting a worker’s labor, the employer becomes obliged to keep him in his employ as long there is work. If he reneges the employee has the right to demand compensation (severance pay) or reinstatement. Accidn Nacional feels that the workers must not abuse these guarantees or become apathetic in their work for as partners in a business, it is to their advantage that it p r o s p e r .98 On May 15 and 16, 1965, a committee at the XVIII Con- vencidn Nacional made a study for unsalaried workers honorable group of inspectors to eliminate unjust salaries and to make hiring and working normal." Plataforma politi- ca y social: 196^-1970. p. 8. 97 Landerreche Obregdn, El problema del traba.io en Mexico, p. 2. 98 Ibid. 256 99 (woodcarvers, gardeners, ceramic and pottery workers) and prepared this proposal which was read by Licenciado David Alarcdn Zaragoza, former candidate for the governorship of Jalisco: The solution should be devised with the laborers themselves, with labor associations, with the State which should pass legislative measures to guarantee authentic, democratic functioning of these associations which should not be utilized for political parties. Unsalaried workers1 as sociations should technically prepare their members, establish norms of quality and produc tivity, establish sufficiently remunerative wages, organize co-operatives to grant credit, materials, tools, and access to markets. It is imperative that unsalaried workers be incorpor ated into the Social Security system. When un salaried workers like newspaper sellers perform a service for an industry, it should be required to collaborate for the improvement of the worker’s well b e i n g .100 The artisan activities that unsalaried workers perform through small businesses merit special protection and encouragement by the State from the economic, social, and physical point of view. It is the State’s responsibility to protect and stimulate these economic activities, these national artistic trades. The State should legislate means to avoid adulteration of artistry; and it should establish art sch o o l s .101 Luis Alberto Garcia 0., "El PAN enjuicia 50 anos de polltica ejidal, reclama seguridad para los asalariados, plantea urgentes reformas electorales y proyecta sus prin cipios de doctrina a esta hora de Mlxico y del Mundo," La Naci6n, 4# (June 1, 1965), 13. 101 Ibid.. p. 16. 257 A 1965 statement of doctrine shows that the party had enlarged on its original 1939 position to incorporate the studies made at Asambleas and Convenciones: The right to work is a common prerogative of all men because in the final analysis it is the basis for life and liberty. All individuals capable of working, should have an opportunity to regular work. Working women too have the rights and obligations of men in addition to their rights in conformity with their sex and duties as wives and mothers. These rights should not be subject to the ideological or political criteria of any labor union patrdn- . — not even the government.... Employment, has pre-eminence... over property. To consider labor as an article to be sold or a simple element of production abuses the dignity of laborers and violates the order of the com munity.... All socially useful labor should have just retribution that permits the laborer to live and maintain a family satisfactorily with the attainable possibility of improvement.1^2 it is a community obligation, to provide sources of employment.... The Statefs duty is to urge the various groups to provide or create or develop the necessary employment to guarantee the ful fillment of this right efficiently: it should also resolve, justly, labor conflicts.103 In general, Accidn Nacional fights for the establish- 104 ment of democracy and the freedom of city workers, 102 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1 9 6 5 p. 29. 103 Ibid. 104 Information obtained in correspondence with Accidn Nacional Deputy Luis Manuel Aranda Torres from Mexico City dated August IS, 1965. 258 farmers, professional people, and businessmen to organize 105 labor unions. This is in order that they may have their 106 interests represented by responsible leaders unlike the present ones who seek personal enrichment and who serve the 107 government party. Labor unions and other organizations formed by occupation have the right to participate in public life, to present their groups1 professional interests and to recommend election measures that they consider to be 108 in the interest of their groups, but they should abstain from political questions and respect the political beliefs of their members. While business and labor are responsible for solving labor problems, the State should act as an impartial arbitrator and take the initiative through legis lation. Business should not resist these social reforms 105 Accidn Nacional Deputy Florentine Villalobos Chaparro stated that "the Mexican worker, like the farmer, does not enjoy freedom. Labor unionism is political; a union member is automatically a member of PRI therefore obliged to support official party candidates." Union mem bers can be and have been expelled for political reasons. "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965»” p. 29. 106 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyecci6n en 1965," p. 29. 107 Plataforma politica y social: 196L-1970. p. 8. 108 "Principios de Doctrina— su proyeccidn en 1965,M p. 29. 259 but should co-operate, while labor should avoid unnecessary conflicts in interest of all. The principle obstacle to solving these problems is the lack of true workers1 repre- 109 sentation through the unions because the union leaders are politicians who seek personal gain. They are political instruments of the regime which exploits the "class struggle idea" to maintain their and its position. This spirit of the so-called "class struggle must end for labor-business 110 relations to improve." Labor and business are not dia metrically opposed groups, but two groups with an interest in a successful business. By 1939, agrarian reform, a socioeoonomic problem, un- 111 fortunately had become a political instrument of the so- called revolutionary government which produced much rhetoric but little progress. While Accidn Nacional did not want social reform to be delayed a moment longer, the 109---------------- Accidn Nacional opposes the inclusion of organized labor as an integral part of any political party. Accidn Nacional, Sindicatos. polftica. y clausula de exclusi6n (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, n.d.). 110 El problema del traba.lo en Mexico. p. 2. Ill The original plan was for the ejido to be merely a transitional phase to private ownership— but the Cardenas period changed all of this. Luis Alberto Garcia 0., "El PAN enjucia 50 anos de polltica ejidal," pp. 11-12. 260 "reactionary PRM strove to conserve at all cost the con- 112 ditions which existed in the countryside," yet, the PRI continually denounced the PAN as a party of antirevolution aries. Accidn Nacional in turn proposed to expose "the myth of the revolution, maintained by the government party, 113 which betrays and stabs the true revolution in the back." It proposed to change what one campesino described in this way: "La Revolucidn sigue y sigue y nosotros los encuerados 114 seguimos igual." To the present, Accidn NacionalTs position has not changed. It considers the problem to be one of "human ele- 115 vation" — affecting 16,620,000 people— and of insufficient 116 agricultural production. The e.iiditario must be freed H 2 ---------------- Luis de Garay. La anarquia econdmica (Mdxico, D.F. : PAN publication, 1943i, P- 2. 113 Manuel G6mez Morfn, "Informe a los delegados de la IV Convenci6n Nacional, febrero de 1946," reprinted in Gilberto Moreno, "Planteamiento y soluciones del PAN," La Nacidn, 37 (November 1, 1959), 16. 114 "La deficiencia de la produccidn agrfcola hard fracasar los proyectos de nuevo," La Nacidn. 6 (May 1, 1944), 20: Manuel Gdmez Morfn, "La situacidn agrfcola," La Nacidn. 2o (August 29, 1954), 6-7; "El crddito agrfcola en Mdxico," La Nacidn. 26 (May 6, 1955), 13- 115 Principios de Doctrina. p. 3. 116 Programa mfnimo de accidn polftica. p. 9* 261 from political subservience to the government machine and sound economic policies must be followed. In a speech on November Id, 1943 * Licenciado Gustavo Molina Font stated that "Accidn Nacional does not propose the re-establishment of latifundios nor the regimes that history has judged and 117 condemned." To resolve the overall problem, Accidn Nacional considers it necessary: 116 1) that the efforts of all private and public organizations that can contribute to the economic and cultural betterment of the campesino be co-ordinated; H9 2) that the campesino be freed from political subservience to the government machine through the ejido-government party relation ship; 3) that municipal authority and local indepen dent justice be strengthened to allow the campesinos to solve their own agrarian prob lems ; 4) that the personal rights of the e.iiditarios be respected; ^-20 5) that e.iiditarios own their land individually for the ejido system was only to be transition al; 117 Gustavo Molina Font, Necesidad y fracaso de la re forma agraria (Mdxico, D.F.: no press given, 1943T7 P* 2. IIS Programs minimo de accidn polftica. p. 10. 119 Plataforma polltica y social: 1964-1970. p. 4. 120 Metas de Accidn Nacional. p. 2. 121 The First National Agrarian Congress held in Toluca on October 26, 1959 reiterated that the e.iiditarios wanted to own the land. Gerardo Medina Valddz, "Congreso agrario: oportunidad desaprovechada," La Nacidn, 37 (November 1, 1959), 11. 262 6} that the regime respect private property and define the rights of small property holders; 7) that free co-operative agrarian organizations of agriculturists be encouraged;122 6) that technical assistance, water for irrigation, cheap and easily obtainable credit be made available to the campesino;123 9) that the State, without establishing any con trols or fixing prices, facilitate access of agricultural products to markets;124 10) that, since agricultural products are to satisfy primary human needs, prices be kept at a minimum to make the products accessible to all yet still be sufficient to allow the,2c agricultural sector to live satisfactorily; 5 11) that complementary economic activities to over come unemployment in the countryside be pro moted ; 12) that forest products be harvested properly and a reforestation program be organized to prevent erosion and conserve water;12° 13) that colonization be encouraged in fertile zones heretofore unused. In general, Accidn Nacional promotes a program of economic sufficiency in the countryside, security through ownership of property, the protection of agrarian workers, 122 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970. p* 4* 123 Luis Calderdn Vega, "Biograff a," La Nacidn, 24 (May 17, 1953), 17; "El crddito agrfcola en Mexico," La Nacidnt 28 (May 8, 1955), 13. 124 "La deficiencia de la produccidn agrfcola," La Nacidn, 6 (May 1, 1944), 9* 125 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970« p* 5* 126 Accidn Nacional, Aprovechamiento de recursas naturales (Mexico, D.F*: PAN publication,~T943)• 263 human elevation so that people can live with dignity on the 127 land. and conditions that will reduce the human exodus 128 for employment in a foreign country. To accomplish such a program, Accidn Nacional recog nizes that planning or government co-ordination which in- 129 eludes public and private efforts is indispensible. Once the economic possibilities of the nation are known, a 130 full and progressive industrialization program can be launched which will absorb the now idle labor surplus from the countryside and improve its standard of living. Simul taneously other facets of the economy such as the trans portation system and technical schools can be expanded. But before formulating a program, one should determine the national objectives of the economy. According to Accidn Nacional, the natural objective of the economy is to satisfy human necessities. "Private 127 Plataforma politica y social; 1964-1970. p. 5. 128 For a more detailed description of this see "Braceros a garrotazo limpio," La Nacidn. 28 (June 5, 1955)» 10-11. Manuel Gdmez Morfn, "Vida nacional," la Nacidn. 6 (June 10, 1944), 4. 130 "Public works should be completed in order of pri ority established after public debate." Programs mfnimo de accidn politica. p. 12. 264 enterprise is the best source of social betterment and as such should be respected and encouraged by the State which 131 should complement and assist it but never supplant it. Private property is the best way to assure national pro duction: it constitutes a fundamental guarantee of personal dignity and liberty. The State may regulate it, limit, to encourage social development...but it cannot deny the right 132 to private property.” State corporations (whose books should be open to the public) are justifiable only when private enterprise fails to provide a service or fulfill a 133 need. While the State has authority to direct, it should be emphasized that it does not own the national 134 economy: it should regulate economic life without becom ing a participant or competitor. "The State, /according to Acci6n Nacionalfs Principios de Doctrina/,... should protect the individual from becoming a mere instrument of the 131----------------- Gumersindo Galv&n, "Los industriales del pais atacan resueltamente el desastre ferrovario y senalan un plan mejor," La Nacidn. 6 (July 29, 1944), 10. 132 Juan Landerreche Obregdn, Hay pais. hay pueblo: lo que nos ha faltado siempre es gobierno (Mdxico. D.F.: PAN publication, 1961), 2. 133 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970. p. 3. 134 "Entrevista con Christlieb Ibarrola," p. 33; Princi pios de Doctrina. p. 4. 265 economy and guarantee that the economic activities of the 135 nation will always be subordinate to the individual.” For integral economic development of the nation, Accidn Nacional proposes: 136 1) the creation of a nonpolitical National Planning Commission with representatives of private corporations, city workers, farmers, consumers, and the State as members; 2) the creation of similarly comprised Regional Planning Commissions for regional development (which should include an inventory of human and material resources, technical studies of the regions, and information on possible national and foreign investment); 3) a revision of the division of income (which presupposes an end to raquitismo at the municipal level) between the municipios and the states in order that the former may properly and independently fulfill their function; 4) that the rural school systems receive their proportional share, based on population, of the budget; 5) the establishment of government policies which would prohibit the government from com- peting!37 with private enterprise in areas where the latter is efficiently fulfilling its function;138 135 Principios de Doctrina. p. 4. 136 "The Mexican economy cannot progress as long as the State continues to introduce political elements like col lectivization." Programs minimo de accidn politica. p. 12. 137 State control of activities which should be pri vately controlled, Accidn Nacional considers to be an in fringement upon the rights of the community. Metas de Accion Nacional. p. 3. "Iniciativa privada frente a hostilidad oficial," La Nacidn. 6 (April 15, 1944), 6. 266 6) the establishment of an effective system of control and vigilance by the Congress over government investment and State participation thr^gh State corporations,^39 in the econo- juy . These are not the doctrines of a reactionary and anti revolutionary party as so frequently echoed. Similarly, the charges that Accidn Nacional seeks to reestablish the prerevolutionary status quo of 1910. These are statements of doctrine by Mexicans attempting to solve Mexicofs prob lems. They are part of an enlightened program designed to correct the legal shortcomings of the Constitution to make its ideals more attainable to promote political, social, and economic national progress. In a word, Accidn Nacional fights to give the Mexican people a political alternative, 139 Plataforma politica y social: 1964-1970. p. 4. 140 The following are but a few of the many State-owned monopolies and corporations: ANDSA, government builder and operator of warehouses; C0NASUP0, the state agency which distributes basic commodities at State-fixed prices; PEMEX, the State monopoly of petroleum and petroleum products, in cluding petrochemicals; Industrial de Abastos, State-owned meat packer; the motion picture industry, (distribution and exhibition); electric power; the Mexican telephone system and the railroads. Frank B. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice^ffall, Inc., 196$), pp. SB, B9, 94, 117. 267 141 to implement its progressive doctrines --the ideals or the Mexican social revolution. When one views Acci6n Nacional in this light, it becomes the True Revolutionary Party. 141 This "democratic opposition" or struggle for freedom of religion, education, expression, press and the other fundamental rights of man is well presented in a chapter entitled "Por que lucharaos en Accidn Nacional," in Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, La oposicidn (Mdxico, D.F.: Ediciones de Accidn Nacional, 19o5)» pp• 65-75* CHAPTER NINE THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY While no one has previously studied Accidn Nacional's political doctrines, considerable has been said and written about the party which has created a false image: it has 1 been labeled as right of the Mexican ideological spectrum, 2 3 rightist, a traditionally conservative group, a right-wing 1 "The PAN...is identified with the Right of the Mexi can ideological spectrum..." L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexi can Political System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 67. 2 "The second major political group in Mexico that re flects a restoration!st ideology is the Partido de Acci6n Nacional. PAN was founded two years later than UNS, in 1939, as a part of the conservative reaction to CArdenas. Sinarquistas are quick to point out that they antedate PAN and that it was formed out of splinter elements from their own group. Although many panistas deny this, enough agree with it to make the contention plausible." Kenneth F. Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," a paper delivered at the Annual Con vention of the Western Political Science Association, March 19, 1965, at Victoria, B. C. Canada, p. 7. 3 "The political embodiment of Traditional Conservatism is the National Action Party, or as it is popularly known in Mexico, the PAN. Originally established as a pro-Axis political movement, the PAN even today espouses a pseudo- McCarthyism: it would have the public believe that Commu nism is synonymous with leftist political views, radicalism, state ownership, public education, land reform, progressive taxation, Protestantism, and Freemasonry." Frank R. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 6 4), PP. 127-129. 266 269 4 5 6 group, conservative; antirevolutionary, antiagrarian 7 reform, against minimum wage, against the nationalization of basic industries, not against child labor, against 6 9 profit-sharing, against job tenure; a Church-front, 4 "The Partido de Accidn Nacional. formed in 1939, is an outgrowth of the right-opposition movement that grew bolder and more active with the return of political stabili ty and the increase of pressure upon vested interests as President CArdenas perfected the organization of the revo lutionary party." Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 110. 5 "Accidn Nacional always had been known as a conserva tive party, representing the interests of the Church, big business, and upper-and middle-class professional people." Scott, Mexican Government in Transition. p. 110. 6 Accidn Nacional "...has always opposed the revolu tionary government." Scott, Mexican Government in Transi- tion, p. 110. 7 "Howard Cline has contended that opposition groups in Mexico find it impossible to woo the electorate away from the PRI and thus are forced to adopt demagoguery and other extreme postures which serve only to reduce their popular appeal." Johnson, "Ideological Correlates," p. 1. S "As for the amendments to Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution, calling for the amplification of the minimum wage laws, the end of child labor, profit-sharing, job tenure, and the eventual nationalization of certain basic industries— such prospects raised wails of TSocialism!* from the Right." David L. Graham, "The Rise of the Mexican Right," The Yale Review. LII (October, 1962), 106-107. 9 _ "But PAN, a rightist group close to the Church, /in July 19617 doubled its vote." Graham, T^he Rise of the Mexi can Right," p. 103; "The political background of the PAN, as described by Scott, has been of such a nature as to raise doubts among many Mexicans as to the sincerity of the 270 10 11 Church-oriented in its political views, proclerical, 12 13 the Catholic party, the Catholic Action Party; a party party in its ratherrecently assumed interest in social jus tice and democracy. Scott also shows that there is no unanimous voice of Church-oriented political opposition in Mexico." Frederick B. Pike, The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1964), p. 225. 10 "Essentially, it was a small group with an elitist focus representing church-oriented political views, the views of some of the older and more prosperous businessmen and drawing to it a number of upper and middle-class pro fessional people." Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. 9. "The main opposition party in Mexico is the Cnurch- oriented Party of National Action (Partido de Acci6n Nacional). or the PAN." Pike, The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America, p. 218. 11 "PAN is conservative, pro-clerical, and overtly or covertly opposed to much of the social message of the Revo lution." James L. Busey, Latin America: Political Institu tions and Processes (New York: Random House, 1964)» p. 24. 12 "PAN has also been identified as the Catholic party, because it has vocally held positions commonly associated with the Catholics of the nation and— less openly because of constitutional prohibitions— of the clergy." Ralph Eisenberg, "Presidential Election in Mexico— 1952" (Unpub lished M.A. thesis, University of Illinois), p. 52. 13 In 1952, Acci6n Nacional was mislabeled as the "Catholic Action Party." Merrill Rippy, "Whofs Revolution ary in Mexico?" The Nation. 175 (July 10, 1952), 52. 271 Ik 15 of bankers, a group of growing bourgeois, the hobby of 16 a few paternalistically-inclined millionaires; a politi- 17 IS cal gadfly, an instrument of the Revolutionary Coalition, 19 and the loyal opposition to the PRI. After having H "In short, the National Action party seems to have traveled a circular route from elite group to more popular ly based movement and back to intransigent and narrow oppo sition, once again meriting its popular designation as club bancario, 'the bankers' club'." Scott, Mexican Government in Transition. p. 111. 15 "The Party of National Action (PAN)represents in large part growing 'bourgeois' elements." Martin C. Needier, "The Political Development of Mexico," American Political Science Review. 55 (June, 1961), 311. 16 "Let it not be thought, however, that the Right operates through PAN, the hobby of a few pious, paternal istically-inclined millionaires." Graham, "The Rise of the Mexican Right," p. 110. 17 "Despite the efforts of the G6mez Morfn faction, therefore, of necessity in 195& Accidn Nacional reverted from its 1952 role as a true (if hopeless) electoral ma chine to that of a political gadfly." Scott, Mexican Govern ment in Transition, p. 111. lg "It is held that the PAN, the PPS, the PARM and any other parties that obtain legal registration are really mere instruments of the Revolutionary Coalition, paid and used by the leaders of the coalition to provide the ap pearance of a contest and thus make a gesture towards the required norms." Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. B. 19 "Another faction, personified in G6mez Morfn, saw that possible advantages could accrue to the PAN by partici pating in the existing political system as a 'loyal' oppo sition; they hoped thereby to win greater consideration for the interests they represented and a louder voice in policy making councils, even at the cost of making peace with the 272 carefully studied Accidn Nacional's doctrines, the writer cannot accept these altogether too facile judgements made by individuals who merely echoed original errors made by previous writers, and by individuals who possibly quite 20 innocently misinterpreted the Mexican political situation. The writer feels these individuals are responsible for propagating a serious error for a quarter of a century. Accidn Nacional is not a party of bankers. It is sup ported economically by monthly membership dues (varying from fifty centavos to one thousand pesos paid by its Revolution." Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, p. 110. 20 Misleading statements such as this one have done much damage to Acci6n NacionalTs image: "The PAN also at tacked one of the major pillars of the "Revolutionary re gime ," the agrarian program. PAN speakers maintained that one of the most grave problems was a land tenure arrange ment in which the government demands political submission of the peasant in exchange for the loan of some land." Padgett, The Mexican Political System, pp. 72-73* ”In an attack on still another pillar of the revolutionary system the PAN hinted at widespread corruption in the petrochemi cal industry, collaboration between a corrupt union and inept management, industry and jobs in much of Mexico." Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. 74* "Originally established as a pro-Axis political movement, the PAN even today espouses a pseudo-McCarthyism: It would have the pub lic believe that Communism is synonymous with leftist po litical views, radicalism, state ownership, public educa tion, land reform, progressive taxation, Protestantism, and Freemasonry." Brandenburg, The Making of Mexico, pp. 127- 219* 273 21 Congressional Diputados), the annual sale of credentials 22 (from two to two hundred pesos each), raffles, and contri butions from sympathizers (which vary from twenty to fifty 23 pesos to an exceptional ten thousand pesos). Except the two or three secretaries in the the national headquarters in Mexico City, it has no salaried staff: everyone else donates 24 his or her time. Accidn Nacional does not receive support 25 from the government, the Church, or any other organization. Acci6n Nacional technically speaking is not Church- oriented, a political front for the Church, or a party of clerical-minded individuals. It did not develop to defend 21 The sale of credentials has not been uniformly ac cepted by party members all over the nation. Miss Jovita Granados, Accidn Nacional candidate from Chihuahua for Con gress in 1964, informed the writer that the party had not been able to raise funds in Chihuahua through this method. 22 In November, 1966, the writer saw panista youth sel ling tickets at ten pesos each for a raffle to be held on a new Volkswagon. He was informed that, if all the tickets were sold, the party would bring over the cost of the car, about 10,000 pesos. 23 Interview with Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz in Mexico City on September 27, 1966. 24 Interview with Sr. Victor Guerrero in Toluca, on September 27, 1966. 25 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico, D.F. dated July 31, 1965. 274 26 the Church. It advocates freedom of religion as an in- 27 alienable, individual right of every Mexican. 23 Acci6n Nacional is not the PRITs loyal opposition. While the party has made an effort to maintain decorous re lations with the public authority, it has expressed its points of view and has succeeded in maintaining a situation 26 Information obtained in correspondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico, D.F. dated July 31, 1965. 27 "Frequently in official spheres we are attacked and accused of clerical activities--clericalism being the un warranted utilization of religion and the moral authority of clergy for political ends. In politics it is legitimate to work for constitutional reform and this we have done. It is our conviction that, because of historical reasons an attitude is being maintained which is contrary to the best interest of Mexico. For many in Mexico, Christianity signifies Catholicism. And for a political party to be considered Christian is to involve the Catholic Church once again in politics. Accidn Nacional opposes that the Catho lic Church be used for political ends by Acci6n Nacional or any other political party. Acci6n Nacional does support freedom to worship and Christianity as a philosophy for human co-existence. The State does not have the right to involve itself in matters of the conscience." Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, in an interview dated May 23 > 1963 with newspaperman Julio Manuel Ramfrez of Excelsior. 23 A comparison of the partyTs Principios de Doctrina printed in September of 1939 and its Principios de Doctrina published in 1964 shows that Accidn Nacional presently stands for the same principles it stood for in 19391 It shows the same dedication to its original program as in 1939* It still opposes the authoritarian government party as it did in 1939* Acci6n Nacional has not changed or compromised its objectives in any way. 275 that permits an unrestricted exchange of impressions and opinions. nExperience has shown us that this is possible without compromising our principles," stated Manuel Ulloa 29 Ortiz. It has participated in all of the Congressional debates to make its point of view known, has submitted many legislative proposals to improve Mexico, and has openly de- 30 nounced all shortcomings to the government party. (Yet while Acci6n Nacional?s criticism has at times been very harsh, it has never advocated any change that was not 31 legal.) 29 Manuel Ulloa Ortiz, "XV aniversario: t€sis centrales de la educaci6n," La Nacion, 50 (October 15, 1966), 20. 30 "Since the Mexican Senate and the House of Deputies do not fulfill their constitutional functions but limit themselves to merely approving proposals submitted by the Executive and eulogizing the Chief Executive himself... Acci6n Nacional has worked since 1939 to correct this error. Acci6n Nacional has experienced considerable difficulty in this role as the opposition party." Information obtained in correspondence with Licenciado Juan Landerreche 0breg<5n from Mexico, D. F. dated June 23, 1966. 31 This legality unfortunately has been misunderstood and misinterpreted as a tacit agreement with the PRI: "...an interesting insight into Mexican attitudes is pro vided by the insistence in some quarters that the PAN was clearly in a ’deal’ with the government throughout the cam paign. The only evidence which the writer can find to sup port this is the consistent position taken by the PAN can didate in urging a rejection of the use of force. After an outbreak of rioting during a public appearance of the PRI candidate in Chihuahua, Gonzalez Torres told his audience, ’By that road we reach chaos and National Action wants to achieve social order.’ Over and over again the theme of the importance of a legal and orderly political opposition was emphasized. Perhaps it is this concept of the loyal 276 Accidn Nacional is not a rightist party of conserva- 32 tives. It believes in the right to private property— but 33 also that it has a social function. In an interview with Sr. Luis H. Alvarez, Accidn Nacional1s presidential candi date in the 1958 election, the writer was told that Acci6n Nacional does not oppose national control of certain indus tries or services such as transportation, but opposes state regimentation of the corporations1 employees ^which must vote PRI to keep their jobs/; State monopolization of sec tors of the economy; and the maladministration of State corporations administered by political, official party 34 appointees. opposition so alien to the Mexican scene that has encouraged both domestic comment as well as statements by foreign ob servers to the effect that the campaign represented a sell out. Is it impossible that in Mexico someone might support in good faith the concept of the loyal opposition?" Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. 73. 32 Professor Martin C. Needier stated that in the 1964 election the "PAN spokesmen took some pains to deny that the party was reactionary, referring to its ideology as Christian Democratic,..." "Changing the Guard in Mexico," Current History. 4# {January, 19651, 28. 33 Only those who have not bothered to read Aecfon Nacional's programs can say that Accidn Nacional represents conservative interests. Information obtained in corres pondence with Diputado Federico Estrada Valera from Mexico, D.F. dated July 31, 1966. 34 Interview with Sr. Luis H. Alvarez in Chihuahua on November 27, 1966. 277 35 Acci<5n Nacional is not anti revolutionary, (against agrarian reform, minimum wage,). At no time whatsoever has Accidn Nacional ever made any statement opposing the Mexi can Revolution, It does, however, oppose the government 36 party which falsely claims to represent the Revolution. Accidn Nacional states that the government has not attempted to carry out the ideals of the Revolution but has produced 37 wealthy revolutionaries— official party revolutionaries. 35 Some writers cannot even agree on whether or not Accidn Nacional's founding leaders broke off from the so- called revolutionary party. Padgett, The Mexican Political System, p. 67; "The founders of the PAN, Manuel G6mez Morin and Efrafn Gonzalez Luna, never had any opposition in the Revolutionary Coalition." Compare this statement: "Another group, which included such men as Jos£ Vasconcelos and Manuel G6mez Morin, began in the revolutionary camp, work ing with such middle class leaders as Obregdn and Calles, but reacted in an increasingly conservative manner to later attempts at basic social and economic change." William P. Tucker, The Mexican Government Today (Minneapolis: Universi ty of Minnesota Press, 1958),p. 294. 36 Scott, Mexican Government in Transition. p. 112. 37 "It is easy to be cynical about the achievements of the Mexican Revolution. There is no doubt that suffrage is still far from effective, and the principle of no reeleccion is not applied to the continuing dynasty of the PRI. Cor ruption is still rampant, and numerous public officials con sider their offices to be designed primarily for their own enrichment. Except when el presidents comes to town, the Mexican citizenry displays a monumental though understand able apathy toward the whole political and electoral process. Mexican political controversy tends to extremism and vio lence in both word and deed, and there is no prospect that any foreseeable election will have a significant impact on the political patterns of the country. There is much truth to the theory that the Revolution modified some forms of Mexican government, but wrought no fundamental changes, and 278 (After 1959, Accidn Nacional began to actively compete for public offices to carry out the True Mexican Social Revo lution which erupted in 1910 but which was betrayed by the so-called party of the revolution which institutionalized itself and regimented the Mexican people.) On the less defensive and more positive side, the writer would say that "Accidn Nacional is a progressive 33 party of idealists; its members have faith in the supreme value of ideas--but simultaneously have their feet firmly 39 planted on reality." One need only to read the party’s Principios de Doctrina to see that it clearly believes in the social and political restoration of Mexico. Further more the party has earnestly attempted to implement its socio-political beliefs. To quote Sr. Victor Guerrero, Jefe Regional for the state of Mexico, "Accidn Nacional 40 works for the Mexican and Mexico of tomorrow." Only a that fWfirio Diaz could almost find himself at home in the politics of Mexico today." Busey, Latin America, p. 4 6. 38 Cf. chapter VIII on Accidn Nacionalfs doctrines. 39 This statement was made by Diputado Miguel Estrada Iturbide— one of the founding members who met in the Salon on Isabela la Catdlica street in 1939 to write Accidn NacionalTs Principios de Doctrina. "Bandera invariable, firme, gallarda, intacta," La Nacidn, 4 8 (June 1, 1965), 32. 40 Mr. Guerrero works as a salesman in a Toluca Furni ture store (which is not Accidn Nacional-owned). Interview he?d in Toluca on September 2 6, 1966. 279 progressive party could continue to work for twenty-five years outside of the government. Accidn Nacional is also a didactic party, as its first ten years of existence aptly demonstrated, and it continues to be so to the present. The writer witnessed a leadership training session at the partyTs headquarters in Mexico 41 City, and was informed that these meetings are held once a week in all states where campaigns were in progress. Also, each week (Monday through Friday nights), Accidn Nacional holds regular meetings at its headquarters in Mexico City at which one of its officials or one of its 42 congressmen usually speaks. These discussions are de signed to teach the Mexican people of its rights and that 41---------------- Sr. Adolfo Vicencio Tovar, the brother of Diputado Abel Vicencio Tovar, led a discussion on the problems facing the candidates for municipal offices (a campaign was in progress) in the State of Mexico. The unspoken theme was Consciencia Cfvica. The participating members were candidates rudely dressed as mechanics, hired hands, and other "non-banker” types— selected by the people of the various Municipios of the state. Plans for a voter regis tration drive were discussed; electoral law technicalities were explained by party lawyers; and reports were given and heard on the progress made at recent Convenciones Munici- pales. 42 Mrs. Luis H. Alvarez, wife of the 1956 Accidn Nacional presidential candidate, showed the writer flannel board figures that the Seccidn Femenina had prepared on all of the party's doctrines to use to teach people who had not been fortunate enough to get an education. The presenta tion, which the writer observed, was basic, elementary, and very enthusiastically received. 280 the government should represent its wishes and interests*^ This progressive and didactic party is also, in the writer’s opinion, part of the new democratic left which Professor Robert Alexander recently described as having drawn its inspiration from Europe* He said: "These parties profess an ideology based on the social encyclicals of the Pope’s Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, and Mater et Magis- 44 tra." Chilean President Eduardo Frei, certainly a well- qualified spokesman, described the Christian Democratic 45 Party in Chile as a nonconfessional party of a positive 46 character, founded on the principles of Western Christian philosophy, and "inspired by trust in man, in man's spiritu- 47 al and personal destiny, and in man as a subject." It ad vocates, he continued, a new social order in which man will be considered as the center of civilization rather than a bourgeois society which works only for monetary gain. It ------ 23----------------- On September 30, 1966 Diputado Miguel Estrada S. was scheduled to talk on "El gobierno del Distrito Federal." 44 Latin-American Politics and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 59* 45 Most members are Catholics because most Chileans are Catholics* 46 It is not just anti-Communistic. 47 "The Aims of Christian Democracy," The Commonweal, 71 (October 9, 1964), 6 5. 23l also advocates new social conditions based on Christian values and the concepts of Christianity to bridge the gap between the conditions of the poverty-stricken and the wealthy, which, because of Latin America's tremendous population problem are becoming increasingly critical. The Christian Democrats believe, stated Frei, that the educated, university elements and the middle class can, utilizing Latin America's Western Christian tradition, solve the social and economic disparities in houwing, health, income. To do this the Christian Democrats are prepared to break away from the prevailing socioeconomic structures but main tain that power is best "bestowed by free and secret vote.” This, in general terms, is a very close description of Accidn Nacional, which likewise is a secular, nonviolent party directed by a university-educated, middle class ele ment— a party with doctrines based, in part, on papal en- 49 cyclicals. It certainly has, since its founding, through 48 See also Pedro de Alba, "El socialismo cristiano," La nueva democracia. VIII (January, 1952), 26. 49 By their own statements many Accidn Nacional members are Christian Democratic in philosophy. Accidn Nacional party president Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola recently stated in a speech: "By principle we oppose totalitarianism and autocracies— even though they may for appearance's sake look democratic--because they represent imposed control. We believe that each people should be free....We believe in human capacity to realize general welfare as a norm of life and for this reason we believe in democracy. We, recognize and accept progress that improves human coexistence which 282 since its founding, through its political doctrines advo- 50 cated respect for the individual and his rights. Its economic doctrines are socially oriented to give the Mexi- 51 52 can people a new social order and social justice. Accidn Nacional, however, refuses to allow itself to 53 be officially classified as Christian Democratic and is John XXlII advocated in his encyclical Mater et Magistra." Partidos, grupos. y. accidn politics (Mexico, D.F.: PAN publication, 1963), p. 3. 50 Cf. chapter VIII on doctrines. 51 When Licenciado Josd Gonzdlez Torres accepted the leadership of the party in March of 1959, he stated that the Accidn Nacional movement was based on the ideas of Social Justice derived from the values of Western civiliza tion. His administration was labeled by La Nacidn as the "authentic Social Christian Democratic phase." Gilberto Moreno, "Cuatro jefes, cuatro etapas," La Nacidn. 36 (Sept ember 27, 1959), 14. 52 At the present, Accidn Nacional still, according to one group, works primarily for Social Justice. Interview with Sr. Victor Guerrero in Toluca on September 26, 1966 and with Sr. Jorge Quiroga in Tlantlepantla in September, 1966. 53 According to Accidn Nacional leader Luis H. Alvarez, about 1960-61 a number of what the writer has labeled as the "new generation" went to Germany to study the Christian Democratic movement. They returned to Mexico naively de termined to make Mexico another Germany, to establish labor unions to compete with the government party’s, and willing to accept outside financial assistance and guidance. Accion Nacional had since its beginning encouraged work within the existing labor unions, but was not willing to establish new ones to compete with the government party’s. Likewise Accidn Nacional officials refused to make Accidn Nacional liable for charges that it was a puppet to outside influ ences. Consequently about eight of the "new generation" in Chihuahua left the party and established an independent 283 making: a public effort to disassociate itself from the Catholic Church. Accidn Nacional, according to Diputado Federico Estrada ValeraTs letter of July 31, 1965, propounds that Mexico is a Christian nation. The Mexican people are the product of Western Christian development. While Accidn Nacional enthusiastically welcomes and encourages the Christian Democratic Movement, it cannot label itself Christian Democratic... because the party would be accused of being con fessionals. Furthermore Accidn Nacional cannot allow itself to be linked with any international movement... because of MexicoTs laws. However, many of Accidn Nacional!s members attended the Christian Democratic conferences held in Caracas, Santiago de Chile, Rio de Janeiro, etc. Accidn Nacional like the representatives at those con ferences works for the liberation of the indivi dual in order that he be allowed to be a man and not be forced to be a machine or beast. And Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz, then business manager of La Nacidn. stated in a letter to the writer that ...Accidn Nacional surely has various points 54 which coincide with Christian Democratic doctrines. Christian Democratic party. To date, very few have joined the newly-founded party which has not flourished. Inter view with Sr. Luis H. Alvarez in Chihuahua on November 27, 1966 with Dr. Octavio Corral, Accidn Nacional congressional candidate for Chihuahua in 1964 present. While articles on Social Justice, Social doctrines, Social reform, and Christian political duties were never uncommon in La Nacidn: after 1960-61, however, it began to carry articles which were more obviously Christian Demo cratic. "Democracia cristiana: mensaje de Rafael Caldera," La Nacidn. 40 (June 25, 1961), 19; "Declaraciones de Caldera,” La Nacidn, 40 (July 16, 1961), 22; "Conferencia democratica— cristiana: Reunion mundial en Santiago," La Nacidn, 40 (July 16, 1961), 22; "Frente al comunismo-solo el cristianismo," La Nacidn, 39 (April 2, 1961), 10. 264 Nevertheless, Acci6n Nacional does not have any official connection with American Christian Democracy, and does not pertain to any ^inter national/ organization of this type although its doctrines may be similar.... On the other hand, it is true that various of the partyTs members manifest a marked personal inclination toward Christian Democracy— but this is personal and not official.... 55 In conclusion, according to the writer, whether or not Accidn Nacional is Christian Democratic or not is a ques- 56 57 tion of semantics. A realistic appraisal certainly shows that the party's political philosophy is certainly 53------------------ Information obtained in correspondence with Sr. Salvador Morales Munoz from Mdxico, D.F. dated May 14, 1966. 56 It is difficult to say when a Social Justice party becomes a Christian Democratic party because the two are by definition already one and the same. At the XV Convencion Nacional, held on February 19, 1961 in Mexico, D.F., the report of the Comision Polftica contained notable state ments which showed that self evaluation was even then in process. "There is within the party two points of view on how it should work toward the same objective— but by two distince methods: one would have the party actively parti cipate in every election possible..., fighting the regime wherever possible. The other would have Accion Nacional boycott the election...." "XV Convencidn Nacional," La Nacidn. 39 (February 26, 1961), 11. 57 It admits being a party founded on what Professor Robert Scott also calls the traditions of Western Christian Civilization, a party for Social Justice, and a party which accepts the papal encyclicals as social guidelines. Its doctrines, as described in detail in Chapter V are almost identical to those described by President Eduardo Frei. What more must be presented as evidence to convince one that Accidn Nacional is Christian Democratic at least in philosophy? Christian Democratic. What is equally undeniable is that the party is not part of any organized, international move ment. While the writer feels that Accidn Nacional would have certainly gained internationally had it been connected to the movement, at the same time he feels that the party chose the best course in view of its need to disassociate itself from any Church-related movement. Accidn Nacional would have certainly lost ground nationally being other than as it now is: Mexican to its core, a Mexican political party working to solve Mexican problems. PART IV CHAPTER TEN PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE Before concluding this study and prognosticating on Accidn Nacional’s future, the writer feels that it is necessary to question, just how effective has this uniquely nonviolent party been in the last twenty-five years, in a situation which has historically required violence for po litical success? To evaluate effectiveness or success, one must con sider the objectives toward which the party was working and 1 works. In 1939 Accidn Nacional launched a political edu cation campaign to form what it called a Consciencia Cfvica to ultimately give Mexico representative government. This 2 was a stated objective of primary importance. In its fight for a Consciencia Cfvica and restored representative govern ment, Accidn Nacional offered the citizenry local reform 1 The writer maintains that political success cannot be measured by the number of elections won because this pre supposes electoral honesty which does not yet exist in Mexico. Accidn Nacional has openly stated that it "had no electoral illusions and therefore no disillusions." 2 Until the Mexican people could understand political issues, the party stated, how could it be expected to in telligently decide between candidates to represent its interests as it was supposed to in a democracy? 2&7 2 SB 3 4 programs, proposed electoral reform programs through its representatives in Congress, submitted proposals to improve 5 electoral laws, and worked through the Comisidn Federal 6 Electoral. 3 At election time the Mexican people now respond en thusiastically to the doctrines which the party has "sowed.n Accidn Nacionalfs own Convenciones are democratic models— such as the Convenci6n Municipal which the writer attended in Tlanepantla, Mexico in September of 1966. To ascertain the will of the people, the candidates went out into the streets and taped interviews and then at the Convencidn Municipal wrote these requests into the platform. San Pedro Garza Garcfa, N. L. has been administered exemplarily since the Fall of 1963, by representatives of Accidn Nacional. Many new services are now available to the people of the "now cleaned up" city; a monthly income- expense statement is published in the local newspaper which shows {for the first time in the cityfs history) a steady increase in city income. 4 Accidn Nacional has had within its ranks since its beginning, distinguished professors of jurisprudence and consequently has been in a most favorable position to make such proposals. 5 Miguel Castro Ruiz, "Accidn Nacional opina sobre el proyecto de Ley Electoral," La. Nacidn, 9 (December 23, 1945), 607, 22. 6 Accidn Nacional proposed— among other things— an im proved registration system and a National Register of Voters. The party’s proposals to the Comision, were re fused by the PRI majority led by Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz. Accidn Nacional has been forced to— because of the official party’s intransigence— to re-submit its proposals repeated ly. "Pero no basta el padrdn," La Nacidn, 39 (January 15, 1961) , 10. 289 As Mexico*s only true opposition party, Accidn Nacional 7 felt that it should expose the corruption of the official party— its betrayal of the Mexican Social Revolution, This important objective was accomplished through the party*s primary publication, La Nacidn. (which waged an unrelent- less attack for the public*s information); through books, pamphlets, and other material for distribution; and nation ally through the party*s mouthpiece— its Congressional 8 delegation. 7 On September 14, 1956 a committee of ninety deputies was designated to investigate the rumor concerning a month ly theft of 14-15,000 pesos. It was to meet with repre sentatives of the Executive branch. On not one of the three days could a quorum be made— consequently the incident was dropped. "No hay clorum (sic),** La Nacidn. 30 (September 23, 1956). 5; The Accidn Nacional criticized FFCC (National railroads) which was losing 528 million monthly. Luis Tercero Gallardo, **Es un resumidero de millones;** La Nacidn. 30 (September 23, 1956), 20; **Salen mal los calcuTos del agua-no hay maiz a pesar de las ferias,** La Nacidn, 32 (May 5, 1957), 9-10. **Cada hora de *trabajo* legislativo de la Cdmara costdal pafs *35.460.92" por Sdnchez Septidn, La Nacidn. 9 (February 2, 1946), 7. g On the Congressional level the party has not hesitated to oppose the official party. This in itself is notable for the Mexican legislature has been historically a weak institution; not even the majority party dared to question the Executive— not to mention an opposition party. This criticism extends even to an annual commentary on the presi dent rs State of the Union Address. A good example of this opposition occurred on October 26, 195o, when Accidn Nacional Deputy Manuel Cantd Mdndez in a debate with a PRI representative, condemned the absorbing economic centralism of the regime at the expense of the states and especially the Municipios. "Contra el centralismo econdmico," La Nacidn. 30 (November 4, 1956), 4. 290 Another of Acci6n Nacionalfs objectives was that of achieving social justice for the Mexican people. Once 9 elected to public office, the party's representatives pro- 10 posed progressive initiatives, attempting to implement 11 its progressive campaign promises. The fact that the 9 Before each electoral campaign, the party made po litical action studies (such as its "Programa mfnimo de accidn polftica, 1952” which always contained socioeconomic provisions. 10 Examples of these legislative proposals--which are hardly, in the writerfs opinion, representative of a con servative, antirevolutionary, etc., party— are: ”Iniciativa que reforma y adiciona la ley electoral federal;" "La funcidn esencial de aprobar los gastos ptiblicos;" "Necesi- dad de rehabilitar los ferrocarriles nacionales; organiza- cidn de la ciudadania;" "La reforma polftica una exigencia ciudadania que no puede ser burlada;" "La crisis econdmica de Mdxico;" "La moneda y el crddito: instrumentos basicos de la economia;" "La gran esperanza de la Seguridad Social;" and "Cr4dito para nuestra agricultura." What became of these bills? Consider the proposals presented in 194-3 when there was an increase in the cost of living, inflation and other economic problems. To remedy these problems the Accidn Nacional delegation in Congress presented twelve proposals. Most of the proposals were never considered. Horacio Guajardo, "1,330 dias para dic- taminar sobre una iniciativa," La Nacidn. 24 (November 1, 1953), 2. 11 Between elections the party continued to make studies to improve Mexico through Social Justice. Representative examples are: "El problema del trabajo en Mdxico;" "Partici- pacidn de los Trabajadores en las utilidades de las em- presas;" "Transformacion de los empresarios: transcendencia de los reformas al Artfculo 123 constitucional;" "El prob lema educativo actual de Mdxico y su posible solucidn;" "El problema politico de Mdxico: sin autenticidad en la repre- sentacidn polftica, no habra democracia en Mexico;" "Par- tidos, grupos, y accidn polftica." 291 government party co-opted Accidn Nacional's legislative proposals (such as woman suffrage and profit-sharing) and gradually accepted some electoral reforms, demonstrates that Accidn Nacional was successful even in the government 12 party-dominated Congress. Another important Accidn Nacional objective has been to be a party of civic duty. It has served as a vehicle through which the Mexican people could express its political demands, a vehicle through which young Mexicans could train for public service, and a vehicle through which Mexican women could participate in politics. In summary, given these Accidn Nacional objectives, the writer maintains that it has been an extremely success ful political party. In recent years, Mexico has progressed democratically. Some writers explain this as a result of less antirevolu- 13 tionary opposition. This writer maintains, however, that 12 It's mere permanent, unchanging existence for over twenty-five years is a success in itself. 13 "As the goals of the Revolution have broadened and become less radical so as to satisfy the needs of more and more of the Mexican people, a systematic adjustment between them and the most enduring of Mexico's older social and po litical values has occurred, producing new and more effec tive political institutions to replace those disrupted by the Revolution. Even those factions which once opposed the Revolution, now share this common goal....Opposition now is to PRI and its leaders— not to revolution itself....the struggle is over who shall administer the Revolution and how." Robert Scott, The Mexican Government in Transition. 292 the official party--partly because of the reforming influ ence of Accidn Nacional— has changed and not Accidn Nacional* The government party has relaxed its controls 14 considerably in the areas of freedom of the press, speech, 15 and religion. (Nevertheless, Accidn Nacional legalisti- cally, must continue to improve constitutional short comings in these areas.) In Congress the government party 16 recognizes the value of a "democratic opposition." Accidn Nacional legislation since 1962 has been given fair con sideration, recognized as of value for Mexico, and has been p. 107, 112* 14 Yet according to the Constitution, many liberties (such as the freedom to educate one^ children as one so desires) still do not exist* 15 On November 23, 1955, The Christian Century reported the Bishop of the Guanajuato diocese as stating tnat the administrations since the 1940 election have had an im proved relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. The Bishop went on to say that the laws remain unchanged but that government inspectors no longer hindered the Roman Catholic schools. Another notable example of this retreat was on May 28, 1950 when Miguel Aleman restored the Salesian schools to the fathers, in spite of the fact that Mexico*s constitution and bylaws made religious schools illegal. The Christian Century. 72 (November 23, 1955), 1374- lb This progress is a result, in part, of the realistic approach taken by the "new generation*" Also the "new generation" has shown a willingness to support government party legislation that will benefit Mexico. 17 13 approved. In September of 1965, a representative of Accidn Nacional was permitted to serve as president of the The most important legislative measures passed since 1964 are: modification of the penitentiary regime of the Federal power to accomplish in an effective form the re habilitation of delinquents, declaration of the Sea of Cortes as territorial waters, extension of credit of pri vate institutions to educational institutions, reforms of congressional regulations to make its work more effective, suppression of patents of "corzo" which as an outdated in stitution which persisted in the Constitution, the estab lishment of the possibility for women to exercise the pro fession of Notary Public, etc. Furthermore Accidn Nacional has greatly influenced public opinion. Other measures presented but not yet approved are: reforms to Article 73, section VI of the Constitution and to the Ley OrgAnica of the Distrito Federal and the Territories Federales to radically change its government system making it one of democratic partici pation and taking from it the unipersonal character of the Jefe del Departamento, addition to Article 115 of the Con stitution in order that it establish minimal organization bases of the Judicial powers in the states with the object of improving this service by establishing permanent regis tration, the identification of voters, and the effective participation of parties in the designation of electoral personnel, etc. The most recent Accidn Nacional proposal was in 1966 whereby it advocated improving the working con ditions of women, especially expectant mothers. Accion Nacional, Iniciativa de reformas a la Ley Federal del Trabajo (Mexico, D. F.: Government Publication, 1966), 3 pp. Information obtained in correspondence with Licenciado Abel Carlos Vicencio Tdvar from Mexico, D. F. dated March 30, 1966. 13 By way of contrast, compare what a writer wrote in 1947i "There is an almost general disillusionment in the Revolution, particularly in the view of the fact that, whereas Utopia has not come for the masses, the older Revo lutionary generals and the new Revolutionary politicians have become ostentatiously wealthy, with splendid houses in the capital, ranches and other properties in the country, automobiles and general evidences of having done well for themselves in the process of economic reform. Disillusionment and resentment, similar to that 294 House of Deputies and a group of the Accidn Nacional dele gation to Congress accompanied the president of the official party in his automobile to deliver his State of 19 the Union Address. When a Congressional committee was formed in September, 1966, to investigate the activities of the governor of the State of Mexico, members from the PPS, the PAN, the PARM, and the PRI were all appointed to serve on it. For Mexico's sake this Congressional co-operation must continue. Clearly, Mexican democracy, while yet im perfect, has progressed. Nevertheless, the need for the social revolution, which erupted in 1910, certainly still exists. In the future, as MexicoTs only true Social Revolutionary party, expressed for the'Revolutionary millionaires' is every where evident also as regards the leaders of organized labor, including Vicente Lombardo Toledano....In the field of religion, it is immediately clear that the Catholic Church enjoys a larger measure of freedom than at any pre vious time since the era of General Calles. Many churches which had been closed for years are again open....Two nationally organized civic groups continue to work for the revision of the anti-Catholic laws and endeavor to combat communist tendencies, namely, the National Sinarchist Union and the Accidn Nacional (National Action) Party....In the judgement of this writer, both of the above named groups have an important role to play in the formation of public opinion and will exercise a decisive part in the reconstruc tion of Mexico if they can resist the division tactics of their enemies.** James A. Magner, "Mexico on the Move," The Commonweal. 40 (October 31, 1947), 64. 3-9 El Universal. October 10, 1965. 295 Acci6n Nacional must continue to combat official party propaganda and expose the pseudorevolutionaries, as long as 20 the government party continues to use the mystique of the Mexican Revolution for its own selfish gains, as long as it 21 continues— through its propaganda machine--to deceive the Mexican people. Accidn Nacional must continue to scruti- 22 nize the activities of the official party, and must con tinue to politically educate Mexico in the concepts of the true Mexican Social Revolution. In conclusion, the writerrs opinion is that Accidn 23 Nacional represents the political ideals of Western 20 In the summer of 1966 the remains of Venustiano Carranza were moved to Mexico City--with much notoriety-- and intered at the Monumento a la Reforma. In September, 1966, the writer saw posters on display in the (public) offices of the Direccidn de Agricultura y Ganaderia in Toluca, Mexico, which showed Francisco Madero and Father Hidalgo marking their ballots for the PRI! On November 2 6, 1966 Francisco Villa was nationally honored in the Congress. 21 In an interview with owner of a bookstore in Chi huahua, Chih, on November 12, 1966 the writer was told that he--the owner— was not a Panista but that he supported Accidn Nacional because he was Catholic. Even many Mex icans do not understand Accidn Nacional. They have been deceived by the government partyfs propaganda. 22 Acci6n Nacional, La oposicidn comenta el II informe gresidencial de Diaz Ordaz (Mexico, D.t'. : PAN publication, 23 The references to "Western” and "Western-oriented" government are used as Robert Scott defines them in the first chapter of The Mexican Government in Transition: constitutionalism, parliamentary systems, and separation and division of powers are part of "Western" government, 296 Europe— ideals which the Mexican people has never known or understood. At times one is tempted to question whether or 24 not Accidn Nacional is too "Western" — just as Francisco 25 Madero was in 1910— for a nations of mestizo people which has never known political concepts such as democracy, and 26 representative government. The government party, on the other hand, is completely Mexican— a benevolent (lately), 27 paternalistic, autocratic political party. Should Mexico whereas the indigeneous Mexican political system would be "non-Western." 24 It is not uncommon to see references in Panista publications to the writings of figures such as Alexander Hamilton and Lord Chesterton. 25 Acci6n Nacional has a large life-size portrait of Madero in its party headquarters in Mexico City. 26 A second question, worthy of consideration is: "Would Accidn Nacional, should it gain control of the government, be any more effective under the same conditions and circumstances than the government party has been?" Opposition parties do not always function as efficiently once in power as they did while they were the opposition. 27 Both Accidn Nacional and the government party claim to be democratic: At its XVI Convencidn Nacional in 1962, Accidn Nacional resolved to develop its party's democratic base even further. Jefes de Manzana were to be organized into each neighborhood. In the last year or so, the PRI, too, claims to have made the process of selecting party officials (still within the party) more democratic. In November, 1966, the PRl held a convention for empresarios in Aguascalientes. Could it be that the PRI is incorporating another sector into the party to make it more democratic? 297 try to become "Western," or should it stay completely Mexi can and hope for good "revolutionary" leadership? The choice is between Accidn Nacional the government party, and hopefully Mexicans will be free enough to make the decision. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Theses Aguilar Aguilar, Jorge. "El municipio libre." Unpublished doctoral thesis. Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico, 1946. Aguilar Rojas, Mario A. "Libertad de conciencia y person- alidad juridica de la Iglesia en Mdxico." Unpublished doctoral thesis. Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mdxico, 1946. Alarcdn Garcia, Celia. "Estudio y critica del artlculo tercero constitucional." Unpublished doctoral thesis. 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Creator Lux, William Robert (author)

Core Title Accion Nacional: Mexico'S Opposition Party

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Latin American Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

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Advisor Servin, Manuel P. (committee chair), Hadley, Paul E. (committee member), McMahon, Dorothy Elizabeth (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-147488

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