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The meaning of judicium and its relation to illumination in the philosophical dialogues of augustine

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The meaning of judicium and its relation to illumination in the philosophical dialogues of augustine

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Content ThU dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 67-8005 BUCKENMEYER, Robert Eugene, 1931- THE MEANING OF JUDICIUM AND ITS RELATION TO ILLUMINATION IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES OF AUGUSTINE. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1967 Philosophy University Microiilms. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Robert Eugene Buckenmeyer All Rights Reserved 1967 THE MEANING OF JUDICIUM AND ITS RELATION TO ILLUMINATION IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES OF AUGUSTINE by Robert Eugene Buckenmeyer A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Philosophy) January 1967 UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 0 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by .R O B E O T _ ^ ............ under the direction of hX.9....Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y Dean DISSERTATIO MITTEE Chair m i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE............................................ iv INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1 Chapter I. THE TWO TRADITIONAL APPROACHES............ 38 II. THE SENSE JUDGMENT IN ANIMALS.............. 66 III. THE SENSE JUDGMENT OF RATIONAL SOULS .... Ill IV. RATIONAL JUDGMENT IN M A N ................... 158 V. THE MEANING OF JUDGMENT AND ITS RELATION TO ILLUMINATION ............................ 191 BIBLIOGRAPHY................ 231 APPENDICES.......................................... 243 Quid putatis, inquam? Ciceronem cuius haec verba sunt, inopem fuisse latinae linguae, ut minus apt? rebus imponeret, quas sentiebat, nomina? Come now, gentlemen 1 Do you consider Cicero to be inept in the Latin language? Do you really think the names he gave to things are unable to convey his thoughts about them? Augustine, Against the Academicians II. 11. 27 PREFACE i i i As one reads Gilson's Introduction a 1*etude de Saint Augustin together with Augustine's Philosophical j Dialogues of 386 to 396 A.D. , two problems arise concerning Augustine's concept of judgment. The first occurs when Augustine considers animal's internal sense judgments in relation to man's sense judgments. Augustine notes, for instance, that both, animals and men, desire self-preserva tion. Animals judge the things contributing to their self- preservation as good and those which threaten it as evil; they seek the former and avoid the latter. Gilson's treat ment of Augustine's concept of judgment, however, does not mention these animal judgments at all. Yet, Gilson con tends that in Augustine the very power to judge is possible only because of the Divine Presence to the soul of man through illumination. But, since Augustine states that animals make both internal and external sense judgments,' Gilson's conclusion would require the Divine Presence illuminating the souls of animals so that they might have the power to make such judgments. My first concern, therefore, will be to determine the meaning of Augustine's concept of judgment when used with respect to the senses of animals and of men. The first questions will be: (a) what is the nature of animal's sense judgments and man's sense judgments? (b) do man's sense judgments differ from those of animals? (c) If any illumination is present according to Augustine, what kind is it, and what is its proximate and remote source? The second problem arises because Augustine states that man differs from animals because he is rational. In fact, Augustine underscores man's superior difference by stating that the act of judging is proper to reason. One is puzzled here for two reasons: (1) Gilson holds that man's comparative judgments manifest an absoluteness or stability which is possible only because of the Divine Presence to the soul of man through illumination, yet, Augustine also states that animals make comparative judg ments. This admission would mean, according to Gilson's interpretation, that the comparative judgments of animals also possess an absoluteness or stability because of the Divine Presence. A second concern, therefore, will be to determine: (a) what kinds of judgments, according to Augustine, are unchangeable and absolute? (b) What is the cause of their stability? (c) If illumination, according i I to Augustine, is present, what kind is it and what is its proximate and remote source? The difficulty of accomplishing the above solutions is compounded by two things: (1) no articles dealing with ' ijudgment in the writings of Augustine seem to be available; I j I(2) there is a plethora of articles and conflicting posi- i tions on Augustine's concept of illumination.^ Because of the variety of theories about illumination, the emphasis has been to seek out the meaning of illumination itself in the texts of Augustine. This emphasis has resulted in more :attention being given to Augustine's later works like the j De Trinitate and the Gospel commentaries because they deal !with Christ and grace, the two sources of Christian illumin- 1ation according to Augustine. Two problems are involved in determining the meaning of illumination: what Augustine |means by illumination, and how he thinks it occurs? Some i |commentators hold that he means a supernatural i1lumination; some maintain Augustine means a purely natural illumination. Gilson holds that both, a supernatural and a natural illumination, are involved in Augustine's concept of i i ^Cf. , T. van Bavel, Repertoire Bibliographique de saint Augustin, 1950-1960 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963). « • VI1 comparative judgment.2 Although the ideas of what illumination means in Augustine are tangled enough, the interpretations of how it occurs are tied in knots. Some commentators interpret Augustine as saying that man is illumined directly and immediately by God Himself. This is called the ontologis- tic interpretation.3 Malebranche, Gioberti and J. Hessen 2This is a curious denomination because Augustine does not use the term supernaturalis in his total corpus of almost three hundred separate works: F. J. Thonnard, "La notion de nature chez Saint Augustin," Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, XI, 3-4 (1965), p. 239. Although the non-usage of a particular word does not argue to the non-usage of a particular meaning (since dif ferent words can be used in different languages to signify the same meaning, as even Augustine notes in On the Teacher), nevertheless, this word usage by Gilson does indicate his tendency to read-into Augustine terms which are Thomistic and which words have no meaning for Augustine. Other exam ples are evident in Part III and Chapter II of The Christian iPhilosophy of Saint Augustine wherein Gilson speaks of "Mat-' ter and Forms" relative to Augustine's theory of the struc ture of the world. In Augustine, however, there is no .trace of the Aristotelian idea of form informing matter and matter limiting form. To speak thusly of Augustine's theory of the structure of the world is to speak misleadingly; it is to try and place Augustine's thought within "scholastic" categories which were only later used by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Gilson speaks this way throughout his exposition of Augustine's views and theories. Indeed, one wonders if Gilson is presenting Augustine himself or Bonaventure's view of Augustine. 3 C. E. Schuetzinger, The German Controversy on Saint; Augustine's Illumination Theory (New York: Pageant Press, Inc., 1960). ■ . . . . * • ■ “ Vlll I j have interpreted Augustine in this manner. Others say that Augustine means that man is illumined indirectly and medi- j ately, through a faculty of some kind, e.g., an agent intellect. This is called the concordant interpretation. Aquinas, Lepidi, De Wulf, and Boyer are of this mind. Gilson holds that direct and immediate illumination by God ; acts as a regulator of all man's stable and absolute com parative judgments. Gilson is convinced that the compara tive judgments Augustine speaks of imply a standard accord ing to which the judgment is regulated: e.g., "This is a false statement" implies the standard "Truth" according to which the judgment is asserted and because of which the judgment is meaningful. Gilson concludes that in Augustine the "intellect has no power of its own to read in itself the truth,"4 and the very "power to judge" relative to true and false statements results from God's illuminative 1 Presence, not from the human mind.5 It seems, however, that the confusion surrounding the meaning of illumination and the problem of whether or 4E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint : Augustine (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 86. (For the convenience of accessibility, the English translation by L. E. M. Lynch will be used henceforward during this ;thesis.) j 5Ibid., p. 91. not man makes his own truthful judgments, according to j jAugustine, might root in a lack of investigating Augustine's I meaning of the "concept" of judgment For, if reason is the j ;feature distinguishing man from animals (and Augustine con- j i sistently maintains that it is), and its proper activity is ! that of judging, then it would seem that the way to deter mine what illumination means and how it occurs would be to discover what the concept of judgment means. Besides, Augustine himself claims that there are j two paths which man travels in attaining unchangeable and i istable truth: reason and authority. Reason, he contends, |is natural to man and its proper act is that of judging; 1 authority can be both human and Divine, and, in the latter sense, includes the gift of Faith. Thus, it would seem thai: despite Augustine's later preference for Faith, he would !have to conclude logically that both by the judgments of i I reason and the Beliefs of Faith man can attain truth. But, i - — ' does Augustine commit himself to this thesis? The majority icontention, especially since and because of Gilson's book, i |recently translated as The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, is that truth is achieved only by man through I the Divine Presence directly and continuously illuminating the soul of man. Although Augustine does not present a X ; systematic view philosophically speaking, he does reject as solutions both the Platonic theory of innate forms and the Plotinian theory of noetic pantheism. Furthermore, Augustine does not have a "faculty theory" of the soul; he emphatically rejects anything intervening between the soul of man and God, e.g., like a Plotinian Nous or a Platonic i ; Demiurge. According to Gilson, this would also preclude an accidental faculty of the soul, e.g., like a natural active intellect of Aquinas. Augustine merely characterizes man's soul operations by "reasoning," "understanding," and "sens ing"; he calls these operations "reason," "intellect," and "sense" respectively. It would seem, therefore, that what ever Augustine's "concept" of illumination, it would not | include an active intellect as a mediate cause of truth i 1 within the soul. The third problem, therefore, will be to determine the relation of Augustine's concept of rational j udgment to ;his concept of illumination: (a) what are the various kinds of judgment? and (b) how does illumination effect or affect truths which reason attains in judgment? The Introduction will consider Gilson's treatment of Augustine's concept of judgment in The Christian !Philosophy of Saint Augustine. Chapter I will consider the xi i iproblem of judgment within the two traditional approaches of Plato and Aristotle. Chapter IX will develop Augustine's concept of judgment as he applies it to the judgments of animals throughout the early Philosophical Dialogues. Chap ter III will expose Augustine's concept of judgment as he uses it of man's external and internal senses in the l Dialogues. Chapter IV will treat of Augustine's concept of judgment as he attributes it to man's reason in the Dialogues. Chapter V will formulate the meaning of the i concept of judgment as found in its various uses throughout these Dialogues and attempt to determine how illumination relates to judgment in Augustine's Philosophical Dialogues. By this approach, we hope to discover a meaning for the I concept illumination through the meaning of the concept of I judgment as found in the early Philosophic Dialogues. Through this approach, also, the meaning of illumination i ] will arise out of the meaning of judgment. In contrast, r JGilson's interpretation maintains that the meaning of judgment arises out of the meaning of illumination. The weakness of Gilson's method lies in the fact that he elaborates Augustine's concept of judgment from a considera tion of rational judgment only; and even this consideration ! is prejudiced by the fact that Gilson analyzes rational xii ! |judgments in and through Augustine's later, theological works. The strength of our method lies in the fact that we approach rational judgment from a consideration of ■ judgment in general, i.e., animal as well as human judgments). This consideration is enhanced by the fact that the analysis |makes use of Augustine's earlier, philosophical works. In < stating his conclusion about rational judgment according to Augustine, Gilson has in effect begged the question; i.e., instead of asking "what is the meaning of j udgment accord ing to Augustine," Gilson has asked "what is the meaning of rational judgment according to Augustine," and then he has jconcluded to the nature of judgment in Augustine. No matter how unsystematic Augustine is in his approach to i ' • jpurely philosophical problems, no analysis can neglect the j 1 general problem of the meaning of judgment before conclud ing to the nature of a specific kind of judgment, namely that of rational j udgment. The approach here taken will ! avoid that fallacy and consider the nature of j udgment in iits most general nature, i.e., animal sense judgment, jbefore considering the nature of judgment in its proper | sense for Augustine, i.e., rational judgment. This i !approach will reveal the distinctive quality proper to I rational judgment and thereby provide I in understanding what illumination is according to Augustine. k • « Xlll us with a key and how it occurs, INTRODUCTION Augustine's Insight and Gilson's Interpretation : In the course of the history of philosophy, Augustine contributed a new insight to the understanding of human judgment; he offered a new solution to the ques tion: what is the origin of the certainty and universality of human judgments? The insight was misunderstood by Descartes; and, as this thesis will show, the solution has been misinterpreted by Gilson also. Augustine's solution is different from those of both Plato and Aristotle; after all, his problem was different. Augustine's problem is not Plato's problem of how to obtain stable truth and live a consistent moral life, nor Aristotle's problem of how to attain scientific truth and live a consistent prudential life. His problem is how to obtain Christian truth and live as a Christian.^ • ‘ • Augustinus Magister I (Congres international augustinien, Paris: fftudes Augustiniennes, 1954), “Image de dieu et illumination divine," Herman Somers, S.J., pp. 451-54. This collection henceforth is cited as: AM. 1 2 The Christian World of Augustine Unlike the world of Plato and Plotinus, Augustine's world is not just a shadow world of misleading representa tions; it is a created world of informed matter and of human souls who reflect, as in a mirror, the image of the i •Trinity. The Augustinian world obtains its immutability and stability not from the Platonic world of forms, not I from Aristotelian forms educed from matter, nor from Plotinian forms emanated from Nous. It has its forms in . the mind of Christ; they are "impressed" in the world as a result of a free act of Creation. Created beings are not a Platonic copy of an idea, nor a Plotinian sensible exciting ithe soul to ascend to the One beyond mere noetic being; rather, created beings are freely redeemed realities, thanks to the Incarnation of Christ. The human soul is not ;an accidental and fallen habitant in a material body, nor j an emanated noetic image of Divine Nous; it is a created i image of the Triune God and redeemable through the Incarna tion of Christ. Now, all of Augustine's works sought to teach these Christian Truths. This teaching, however, was not conducted | in the Platonic manner (i.e., to make the soul mindful of i 3 J innate ideas already possessed because of its having dwelt !in a world of forms prior to its being in the body), nor was it conducted in the Plotinian manner (i.e., to enable the noetic portion of the soul to achieve contemplative union with an impersonal One). Augustine's writings sought j to teach men of a personal God present to every created i |being in His act of conservation, and to bring them to union with Christ, the Son of God, through charity. The Theological Goal and the Philosophical Method of Augustine I Twice in the Soliloquies Augustine expresses the ! desire to know the soul and God: "I desire to know God and ithe soul . . . nothing more."2 "God, always the same, may ! 2sol. I. 1.6 and 2.7 (BAC I. pp. 504, 06) The j abbreviations used to indicate Augustine's works are found iin Folia, Supplement II, November, 1954, pp. 9-11. Though the Migne edition has been consulted for all references, the new bilingual edition of the Bibliotheca De Autores I Christianos (Madrid: Spain, 1951-66) has been preferred. ! The new Spanish-Latin has this drawback: it is Obras de iSan Agust^n, but not complete; up to the present date the : following works are not included in the BAC edition and, | thus, the references made in this thesis will be to the j Migne edition: De musicS, De quantitate animae, De diversiis quaestionibus, De duabus animabus, C. Fortunaturn Manichaeum, De fide et symbolo, Psalmus contra partem Donati, Contra Adimantum Manichaeum. 4 t , 'I know me and you. This is the prayer."-5 Augustine agrees i with Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle that knowledge is the result of like knowing like. He praises the Platonists as the one school among many (e.g., Epicurean, Stoic, Skeptic, et cetera) which recognized the immateriality of the soul iin this material world.4 He observes that the Platonists jand Aristotle held in common a true philosophy which • emphasized knowledge of the soul and which guided men to a virtuous life. Yet, Augustine's knowledge is not just of Aristotelian or Plotinian immaterial similitude; his knowl- C edge begins with created immaterial similitude. Since his : soul is created in the "image and likeness of God," knowl- ; edge of the soul will lead to knowledge of the Creator; ! therefore, God will be the true guide for man's virtuous ! : living. He is the stable principle on which man can build his life. Knowledge pursued along this road of immateriality I j contains the solutions to the two problems which Augustine faced during his conversion— problems to which he sought 3Ibid., II. 1.1 (BAC p. 544). 4Ac. III. 17.37 (BAC III. pp. 171 ff.). j Srel. 3.3; cf., q. 35.1; vit. 4.34 (BAC I. p. 664); ! tri. offers an interesting later emphasis: 12.15; 15.21; ! XV. 23-4, 44, 20, 29 and XIV. 1 . 2 . _______________________ 5 I janswers during his early writings— (1) the Manichean claim that there were two gods, Hridzai or Light (the good prin ciple represented by the Sun) and Archai or Darkness (the evil genius, author of matter and darkness) (2) the Academic claim that no knowledge is possible and even the |wisdom of wise men consists in withholding assent (epoche). j |Augustine sought true knowledge about God (e.g., true reli gion, not the degenerating religions of pagan society or the Christian heresy of Manicheanism) P and true knowledge of the soul (e.g., true philosophy, not the false philosophies Q of the Epicureans, Skeptics or Stoics). Augustine sought unchanging knowledge about God and the human soul according ;to which he could guide his thought and actions. Although ;this knowledge is different in kind from that of Aristotle !and Neo-Platonists (i.e., knowledge of a created immaterial isoul and of its Creator), the method of discussion and | Q introspection whereby he seeks it is the same.9 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 6Patrology, Johannes Quasten (Maryland: Newman ; Press, 1960), Vol. Ill, pp. 356-57. Authoritative presents*- itions of the Manichaean doctrine are listed. 7A Monument to Saint Augustine (London: Sheed and jWard, 1930), "St. Augustine and His Age," Christopher iDawson, pp. 15-39) . ! ®Ac. II. 19.42 (BAC III. pp. 176-77). I 9Cf., sol. II. 7.14 (BAC I. pp. 564-65). i __ _____ __________________ _________________________ i i I Judgment, Against the Academicians and True Philosophy In Against the Academicians, Augustine discusses the important practical question: does man's happiness consist in obtaining truth or in merely searching for I it?10 This is the important question for Augustine ! because, if the Academicians are right in contending that i |truth either lies hidden or appears only in an obscure man ner, 11 then the wise man can only withhold assent and ;regulate his life by what is probable. Such a life, how ever, offers no stability for one's actions. Then "the wise man would do nothing if he did not assent to any thing."12 Augustine assails this position as one which t |leads men to do only probable actions, undermines moral ! I action in general and misleads young men in particular.13 10Ac., op. cit.,1.1. | 11Ibid. and II.5. 11-12 (BAC pp. 104-5). | 12Ibid. III.18.40 (BAC pp. 174-75). Augustine main- I tains the happy man is he who lives according to reason. !Since wisdom itself is the right way of living, the wise I man will be the happy man who lives rationally. (Cf., 1.2.5; 3.9; 4.12; 5.13). Augustine's philosophy, therefore, is a moral philosophy; his speculations are all practical ;in their orientation even in this first and most philosophi cal of his early works. As exclusively moral his philoso- |phical investigations lack a detached analytic approach :which a less committed and more critical attitude would j possess. 13Ibid., 13.29; 15.33; 16, 35; 17.38; 18.40; 9.42. j The Academicians contend that not even the wise man can i iknow wisdom; thus, they deny that the most capable men can discern the true from the false. Wise men cannot make a j 1 knowledgeable judgment, nor can they be happy. They can neither attain truths nor seek Truth. Truth itself is ' unknown and unknowable. Because the Academicians deny to i | man the possibility of attaining Truth, Augustine's first !concern is to establish the acquisition of some truths as a :factual reality for at least the wise man.-*-4 These truths i l will become the stable foundation of the wise man's thought ,and the unchanging guides for his actions. Only then can ! Augustine consider other truthful knowledge about the soul, |God and true religion. | Augustine draws upon Alypius' own argument in dis- | proving the Academician's contention. Zeno, the founder of Academic philosophy, stated: "That, indeed, seems to be i > able to be grasped and apprehended which is of such a i | nature that it has no notes in common with what is i ! false."15 Alypius, a New Academician, maintains that no i knowledge is attainable because no apprehension contains i i pure truth; all apprehensions contain only apparent truths l4Ibid., 14.30. 15Ibid., 9.18. !(verisimilitudes) In other words, every apprehension can be called "true1 ' in one sense and "false" in another; but no apprehension can be judged completely "true." There can be, therefore, no stable and unchanging knowledge according to which a man could guide his thought and ;actions. Alypius concludes that even the wise man cannot attain knowledge and thus must suspend all assent. Augustine dialectically reasons that Zeno's definition is either true or false. If the definition is false, the i Academicians would have to affirm that there is knowledge of false things. If the definition is true, then here at least is a knowledge of a truth.17 Augustine also notes the contradiction involved in the Academician's claim that even the wise man cannot know anything. The wise man at least must know what wisdom is; otherwise, he would neither ;be wise (yet Academicians claim he is) nor know what he is !seeking (yet the Academicians claim he does). I ; Now, all of the disputants agree that the most basic desire of men is the desire for happiness. 16Ibid., II.5.11-2; III.17.37; 18.40. 17Ibid., III. 9.21. | 18Ibid., 1.2.5. | ' j 9 iAugustine obtains the further agreement that happiness con- .sists in the possession of what one seeks rather than in the mere seeking as such.19 Joining both these agreements, he states that the wise man not only assents to the truth of wisdom, but he possesses this truth as a knowledge and ■therefore is happy.20 The wise man does have a stable and i I ’unchanging knowledge as a guide for his actions. The i |acknowledged existence of the Academic wise man turns out to be a proof against the Academicians themselves; the I wise man can and does attain stable knowledge and unchang ing truth. Augustine adds that many other truths are attainable s through this dialectical method; he calls it "the science oi: |truth."21 This dialectic operated as the "judge and organizer" of the non-Socratic elements which Plato incor porated into his "perfect philosophy."22 This science is, i - . - __________ ! 19Ibid., III. 12.27. 20Ibid., 14.30-1. 21Ibid., 13.29. 22Ibid., 17.37. Augustine treats this dialectical discipline (a discipline of the liberal arts and an {acquired habit of the man skilled in the liberal arts) in | The Soliloquies. Augustine description of this discipline {as the judge and organizer will figure significantly in the jrefutation of Gilson's contention that "the very power to |judge" is dependent upon the "application" of illumination. An indication of its importance is the contention of I Augustine that "dialectic . . . taught me . . . these______ |therefore, either wisdom itself or that without which wis dom is impossible. In either case, it is the one discipline of true philosophy and a habit in the wise man's soul. The wise man's soul is the seat and proximate source of this !stable knowledge and unchanging truth. This discipline |itself is the philosophy of this world which Plato and | jAristotle held in common.22 These philosophers "attained ;to a learned doctrine, and a code of morals which have ;truths . . . which are true in themselves." (Ac. III. 3.5; 13.29). This dialectic, by Augustine's own admission, is an acquired habit natural to and radicated in the wise man's soul. There are real questions with Augustine's position however, due to his attitude toward philosophy: (1) Augus tine has a Neo-Platonic view of philosophy. His philosophy !is a dialectical method, a process, meant to lead one to a position in which the truth can be revealed. Philosophy, j as such, is not an autonomous science having its own prin ciples and containing its own body of truths. (2) Augustine: 1 has a Christian view of Neo-Platonic dialectic, i.e., ;philosophy is an apologetic means of bringing men to Christ. Therefore, philosophy as such does not exist as |an autonomous discipline, independent of Christian Theology, jThe first, Neo-Platonic view, is questionable; the second, iChristian view of Augustine, is an assumption he never iquestioned. The fact remains, however, that there were ;philosophers before there were Christians; furthermore, one I does not have to be a Christian in order to be a philoso pher. As a matter of fact, when one begins to be Christian^ one ceases to be a philosopher. At one time Augustine even ;suggested that one must persue "secular" studies in order I to prepare for Christian truth and so be saved. i | 23ibid., 3.5; 14.31, 19.42. i iregard for the interests of the s o u l . ,,24 This, then, is j i the true philosophy of this world because true philosophy is "most vigilant about the soul {of m a n ) " ;25 this true :philosophy is also the source of many stable and unchanging 1 knowledges. i I i True Philosophy's Need for True Religion However, not even reason, as acute as it is, nor , men, as wise as these philosophers were, could have recallec. i souls, in error and defiled, to the knowledge of wisdom or to the attainment of a happy life. Besides the stable and unchanging truth of wisdom, more was needed in guiding men .to a virtuous life and happiness. Man could attain happi- jness only: i If the highest God in His Kindness toward people did . . . stoop down and submit the authority of His | Intellect by assuming a human body in order that souls, excited not only by His precepts but by His deeds, might be able to return into themselves with- I out being upset by disputations and again see the land of their birth (patria).26 24Ibid., 19.42. ! " 25Ibid., 17.38; 19.42. 26lbid., 19.42. Translation mine. i 12 !Augustine thereby announces a twofold path for obtaining certitude: authority and reason. Both authority (Faith) and reason (wisdom) offer stable knowledge and unchanging :truth by which man can* possess certitude and guide his actions. Man uses authority by adhering to the dictates |of the Christian religion; man uses reason in seeking truths in the "philosophy of this world."27 Augustine's I ! intent is pragmatic in both: i.e., how can man attain happiness? His answer is: by guiding one's life by the knowledge of wisdom, philosophically speaking, and guiding one's life by knowledge of Christ, Christianly speaking. ! The true philosopher is truly moral and religious; the ! true Christian is the true philosopher. i The Relation Between Reason and Revelation Man's judgments of religion will be stabilized by | the authoritative precepts of the Christian religion; his ; judgments of this world will be stabilized by reason. Reason will be formed by the "judge and organizer" of | philosophical truths, the science of dialectic. However, i i the Christian religion also contains all the elements of j 27Cf., sol. 11.14.26 (BAC I. p. 582). 13 1the true philosophy: (1) Christianity offers the life of Christ, the Christian wise man, as a moral discipline and guide for living; thus, Christian morality contains nothing alien to moral philosophy. (2) Christianity also has a view of the world which parallels the view of natural ; philosophy.28 (3) Christianity provides a set of teach ings and a way of reasoning which incorporate the rules of : rational philosophy.29 Now, true philosophy is more exactly "love of wisdom" than "knowledge of truth." Man's happiness, i ; claims Augustine, is thus most precisely a "rejoicing in the truth" rather than a mere knowing of the truth. True religion and true philosophy, therefore, according to 1 Augustine, are contained in the Christian religion which | ! endeavors to lead men to happiness by bringing them to know and to love Christ, "The Way, the Truth and the Life." Christianity, therefore, offers both the stable and unchang ing truths contained in wisdom, and the stable and unchang- j ' ing truths revealed in Christ. The wisest man is the Christian, and the Christian is the wisest man. The wise i Christian, guided by Faith, possesses the most stable, 28Thus, Augustine develops a philosophical theory of evolution while maintaining the revelational fact of | Creation. i i 29rel. 16.30 - 17.33 (BAC IV. pp. 102-6) . __________ I4 i !unchanging and certain knowledge by which man can guide his :life. Rational Judgment, Knowledge, and Divine Illumination Vernon Bourke recently wrote: 1 Augustine's position on the relation of faith and reason influences all the rest of his thinking; it could be argued that Augustinianism is essentially a certain way of looking at these key notions.30 In On Free Will Augustine examines the cognitive activities of the soul with a view to showing the Christian Faith to be reasonable. That part capable of controlling and, in a good man, of dominating the appetitive activities is "reason" (ratio) or "mind" (mens, spiritus). The term '"reason" is philosophical in origin, whereas "spirit" and "mind" are Biblical.31 "Reason" makes man superior to animals, and the "order of reason" enables him to live iwisely and well; "reason" is found in the soul and is as lit.were (quasi) "the head and eye of the soul."32 Man's reason is subject only to the law of the Highest Reason, 30The Essential Augustine, V. J. Bourke, Ed. (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 19. 31lib. 1.8.18 (BAC III, pp. 221-22) I 32Ibid., 9.19 (p. 224); II. 6.13. | the Highest Teacher, Eternal and Immutable, that all men must obey.33 But, it is precisely because of such state ments by Augustine that there are so many interpretations about Augustine's concept of illumination. The question is: how is man's reason subject to the "law of the High- : est Reason . . . Eternal and Immutable?" Is it in such a t way that reason does not make truthful judgments, but reason's activity is only an occasion for a direct and immediate illumination by God? If so, then reason's judgment is made truthful, e.g., stable, unchanging and certain by the Divine illumination. Gilson says that it is; but such an answer conflicts with Augustine's conten tion that animals make stable and unchanging judgments also, According to Augustine, reason's function (minis- j ;terium) is to receive whatever the senses offer and to announce the offerings to the soul so they may not be comprehended solely by sensing but also by knowing; reason, |however, is comprehended or known by itself.34 Reason (like the senses, particularly the interior sense) fulfills its function by judging. Since reason judges even the I 33Ibid., 6.15 (p. 217); II. 2.4 (p. 250); cf. , i sol. 11.12.22-13.23 (BAC I pp. 576-80). 34Ibid., II.4.10 (p. 261) 16 presentations o£ the interior sense, it is superior to this highest sense (of which the brute animals are also i possessed). ^ Truth (veritas), however, "according to which" reason judges, but "which does not judge it," is 1 superior to and more powerful than man's "rational mind."38 Yet, even granting this dependence, Augustine clearly states that "by reason we know (cognoscimus) all things that we know (omnia quae ad scientiam cognoscimus) .1,37 ! | However, a problem arises because Augustine also uses the term "intelligence" (intelligentia) and defines | I an activity of "understanding" (intelligere). "Intelli- jgence" is that which is most eminent in man, according to Evodius, and "understanding" means "to live in a way which is more perfect and more enlightened by the light of the mind itself."38 Furthermore, man knows that he possesses 35ibid., 6.13 (pp. 266-67). Two principles funda mental to Augustine's thinking are presupposed here: (1) "the agent is in every way superior to the being acted upon." (thus, spirit is superior to body: Gn. im. 12.16 32-33 (P.L. vol. 34 col. 466-67); and (2) the "one judging is superior to what is judged": the interior senses to the exterior, reason to the interior senses, and God (e.g., as Veritas) to reason itself. 36Ibid., 12.34 (p. 293); 6.13 (p. 266); 14.38 (pp. 298-99). 37Ibid., 19.51 (pp. 314-15). 38Ibid., 8.21 (pp. 226-27); 11.22 (p. 228). 17 j I j three kinds of activities; existing, living and understand- i ing. Of these three, understanding, Augustine agrees, is the most excellent.39 But, what does Augustine mean? INeo-Platonically man's activities are divided into: exist ing (6n), living (zSn) and understanding (nous); but the .difficulty is that understanding contains a "calculative" 1 I or "discursive" part (dianoia). The problem is: are the I jtruthful judgments (energeia) involved in the discursive operation the effect of reason (dianoia) itself, the effect of understanding (nous), or of both. Since "calculation" is a means (process) to the end (possession), Neo-Platonic :truth would consist in the mystical intuition and come through understanding (nous). 1 In Augustine the difficulties increase because j |what understanding (nous) is in the Neo-Platonic world, Christ is in Augustine's Christian world. Faith and grace enter in; but philosophy and reason are operative also. i jThe question is: Is philosophical understanding achieved through Christian Belief in Augustine? Does human under- istanding possess a meaning and a product different from and i {independent of Christian Belief? Even if philosophy can I and does exist as meaningful and independent for Augustine i _______ 39Ibid., II.3.7-8 (pp. 254-55) ._____________________ 18 i j j(and in the Philosophical Dialogues they do seem to), what jof truthful human judgments? In the Philosophical Dialogues Augustine insists that man is superior to animals because t of his rationality; he defines the human soul as a "rational substance designed to rule the body."4® Augustine even says ("since to make judgments is the proper activity of rational life, no nature is more noble (than man's) According to Gilson, Augustine means that stable and unchanging rational judgments are the direct and immedi- j ate result of a natural but Divine illumination. Does this mean that, for Augustine, man's reason is incapable of judging of the truth of anything by itself? Does this mean jthat man's reason is incapable of making anything true by !itself? What is the relation of the power of reason to that i ■of understanding in Augustine? What is the meaning of the activities of judging and enlightening elicited by each? Although both of these questions must be thoroughly I |investigated, to answer either completely, only one of them will be considered in this dissertation: what does Augustine mean when he says.that man or animal judges? Augustine states that animals judge, and he describes their I I 4®qua. 13.32. [_______ 41rel. 30.54 (BAC IV pp. 134-36).____________________ 19 j jjudgments. He contends that men make judgments and that t I wise men make truthful judgments. How? Will reason and its judgments be the source of rational human truths which ;are contained in true philosophy? Will these true judgments be true of themselves thanks to the activity of human rea son, or will they be in need of some kind of revelation in order to achieve truth? If, according to Augustine, some kind of revelation is necessary, will it be a partial aid to the operation of reason or is it absolutely necessary so that reason can operate at all? Gilson's Interpretation of Augustine's Concept of Illumination and Judgment In what has been accepted as an authoritative study of Augustine's whole philosophy, Gilson says: I am prepared to admit that there is much to be said against my interpretation of Augustinian illumination. Now in brief, what are the facts? Most evident of all is the fact that, regard less of our interpretation of his doctrine, Augustine did not distinguish clearly between the problem of the judgement in general and that of the true judgement in particular.42 ^Gilson, op. cit., p. 88. 20 5 j The assertion that "Augustine did not distinguish clearly between the problem of judgement in general and that of true judgement in particular" may be challenged on at least ;four counts: (1) Augustine's distinction between true philosophy and false philosophy, in Against the Academi- Icians; (2) the distinction between the seekers of learning i land those proficient in learning, in The Soliloquies; (3) the distinction between the flute players who lack the knowledge but possess the "touch" and those who have the i I knowledge but not the ability to play, in On Music; (4) the distinction between sense judgments of animals or men which ] are always right (bene judicant), and other sense judgments jwhich are sometimes wrong, in On Music and On Free Will. i ! I Against the Academicians and Gilson's Contention Augustine1s distinction between the true philosophy i (e.g., of Aristotle and Plato) and false philosophy (e.g., j of the Skeptics and the material philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans) certainly illustrates his distinction ibetween the "problem of judgement in general and that of ! the true judgement in particular." He clearly states that 21 I the "true philosophy"4^ is "the science of truth,"44 the habit43 natural to, acquired by, and "dwelling in," the wise man's soul,48 enabling him to discern the true from the false.47 It is the "judge and organizer" of his philosophy.48 The problem of the Academics was their |inability to concede that the "true" (yerum) could be dis- i Icerned in "what was similar to the true" (verisimilitu- i dines).48 In other words, they did not admit a distinction between "appearance" or phantasiS, and the phantasmata— i.e., the sensible images of sensible objects and the images similar to sense images excogitated by the mind. To Isay that something exists as it is perceived (e.g., a spoon "bent" in water), is different from denying that it exists 'as it is perceived because the person can think of it in I !different ways (e.g., think of the spoon as not-bent). If the spoon exists as it is perceived (e.g., "bent"), then jthe perception is shown to be true; if the spoon does not 1 |exist as it is perceived, then the person is not hindered 43Ac . III.19.42. 44Ibid., 13.29. 45Ibid., 3.5. 46Ibid., 14.31. 47Ibid., 10.23; 13.29; 14.32. j 48Ibid., 17.37 (pp. 171-2). Cf., also: 1.2.5 on !the function of judge. | ________4 8 Ibid. , II. 6.13 (pp. 106-7)._______________________ jfrom perceiving that it is not true. Perceiving that some thing is true (phantasia) is different from thinking of things as true or false (phantasms). Augustine clearly distinguishes the difference between the conceiving and the concept, and the imagining and the images. This dis tinction shows that the existence of something and my per ception of it are different from and independent of, my ;reaction to them.50 But this distinction is not enough for Augustine's purpose; he must show also that "thinking that i one knows" or "believing" is different from "knowing." This distinction has brought the admission that the wise j man exists and that he possesses wisdom; the problem which iremains is, "how can one know that he knows?" i w i Augustine makes another distinction which he does not elaborate until The Soliloquies. He distinguishes between knowledge as a possession of the mind and the excogitated images of the mind which he calls "phantasm."5^ 'The dialectical discipline is a natural habit dwelling in Ithe wise man's soul enabling him to discern the true from jthe false.5^ Man can not only assent to the existence and 5°Ibid., III.9.19 (pp. 147-48). j 51lbid., 13.29; 14.32 (pp. 160-65). j 52Ibid., 10.23 (pp. 152-54); 13.29 (pp. 160-61); l14-._22___(pp."~I1>T-65) ; cf.. lib. II.9.26-27 (pp. 281-83). 23 i i ! truth of certain things (e.g., If there is only one sun, then there cannot be two, and the same soul cannot both die and be immortal, et cetera), but the wise man can make truthful comparative judgments (e.g., he can judge the dif ference between opinion and wisdom and prefer the latter,53 , and he can discern the difference between the intelligible world and the sensible world, and prefer the former).5' * The wise man can do this because he possesses the real (i.e., knowledge, e.g., wisdom) and the image (verisimile, r i.e., opinion); because he can compare, the wise man has certitude as to the difference between knowledge and i opinion. The difference is that knowledge is possession of the real, whereas opinion lacks the possession and only i ■participates in it through an image.55 Certain judgments 'are elicited from knowledge; probabilities are forthcoming from opinion. i In Against the Academicians, therefore, Augustine |distinguishes between the judgments of the wise man and the perceptual judgments of men of common sense.55 Augustine 53Ibid., III. 14.34 (p. 164). 5^Ibid., 17.37 (pp. 171-72); cf. lib. 11.10.28. | 55Ibid., 15.34 (pp. 166-67). ! 56Ibid., 9.19 (pp. 147-48). 24 I |forces the New Academicians to acknowledge the difference •between true judgments and false judgments.57 He estab lishes some of the many true judgments at which true philosophers arrive.58 Augustine then exposes the agree ments among true judgments of true philosophers like Democritus and the early Natural philosophers and Epicurus and the "pleasure" philosophers.59 Augustine finally shows "how" and "why" there are true and certain judgments. The acquired habit of "discipline," the "true science of truth,' ;enables the wise man to discern the "true" and the "false" and therefore ensures him of true judgments; whereas the man who lacks this "discipline" can make false judgments.88 .In Against the Academicians, Augustine has shown clearly !the difference between judgment and perception as well as !the difference between judgment in general and true judg ment in particular. 57Ibid., II.5.11-12; III.17.37; 18.40). 58Ibid., III.13.29. 59Ibid., 10.23 (pp. 152-53). 60Ibid., III.13.29 (pp. 160-61); 3.5 (pp. 130-31); 14.31 (pp. 163-64); 10.23 (pp. 152-53); 13.29 (pp. 160-61); 14.32 (pp. 164-65). 25 | The Soliloquies and Gilson's Contention Again, in The Soliloquies, Augustine takes up the problem of discerning the difference between a "true figure which is contained by intelligence and one formed by cogitation which in Greek is called phantasia or phantasm. H i s discussion places in relief the charac teristic differences between a true judgment and a false judgment. As a man studies, he reads and looks upon the works of art. These liberal arts are reflected onto his mind as upon a mirror;**2 they are reflected from his I phantasia, i.e., the product of the act of perception which is a cooperative interaction of soul and body sensing. The phantasia is compared to a face, ever changing, reflected onto the mirror of the mind. Now, these phantasiS are images of the arts studied; the problem, however, is that jthe student, anxious to find truth but not yet possessed of .the artistic discipline he is studying, takes these examples of the art for the art itself. In so doing, he identifies ^ sol. 11.20.34 (p. 596). The identification of phantasiS with phantasm is Soliloquies with the distinction between them in On Music will be discussed in Chapter II on animal judgment according to Augustine. 62 | According to Augustine, the Liberal Arts comprised music, language, mathematics, et cetera. i ________ : ____________________________________________________ 26 !the image with the reality, the example for the truth !itself. The error in his judgment lies in his joining the real (art) with the image (example). His judgment is false, but it is still a judgment. The reason for the !false judgment is his lack of intelligent comparison. The i :student did not possess the second element necessary for such an intelligent comparison, i.e., the teacher (master) who, being possessed of the real (art via the habitual knowledge), could guide the student's judgment, or the real itself (art via habitual knowledge contained within his intelligent soul).4 *3 In The Soliloquies, therefore, Augustine distinguishes between false and true judgments in particular, shows how true judgments may be assured and :false judgments avoided and shows what constitutes a judgment in general. To assure true judgments, a man must I ; have both the image (or example) and the real (the art or I I knowledge) . Only then can he make a tirue judgment because :only then can he make a comparative judgment based on the objective evidence, not subjective opinion. Furthermore, according to Augustine, a judgment in general is a joining I the image with, or a separating of the image from, the real i I ----- . | _________63Ibid. , 35 (pp. 598-99). 27 i [Specifically, therefore, a judgment is the ability to dis cern the difference between what-appears from what-is. On Music and Gilson’s Contention Augustine distinguishes between sense judgments and rational judgments; within human sense judgments, he !distinguishes between those of the unskilled crowd and the unskilled musician, and those of the formally educated musicians. According to Augustine, some animals (e.g., elephants, bears, et cetera) are moved by harmonious sing ling, and some birds (e.g., nightingales, et cetera) are delighted by their own v o i c e s .®4 These animals are able !to discern harmonious from discordant musical sounds by a i ;natural sense of timing and rhythm. They cannot artisti- i cally make musical harmonies, but they can and do naturally respond to them and imitate these harmonies. These ani- I jmals even can commit the pleasurable harmonies to memory anc, ] i ithereby develop a certain power of imitation and reproduce the ordered movements and pleasant sounds at a later date.6* ' 64mus. 1.4.5 (col. 1085-86). j 65Ibid. and 6 (col 1086; cf., VI. 7.19 (1173). j | 66Ibid., IV. 16.34 (1145). 28 'Further on, Augustine specifies the difference between these sense judgments and rational judgments: sense judg ments recognize that some piece of music is harmonious or discordant; rational judgments determine why they are such.67 Within human sense judgments, Augustine dis- i ;tinguishes those of the unskilled crowds and musicians i 'from the skilled or formally educated m u s i c i a n p . 6 8 Augustine observes that the unskilled crowd (without any formal musical training) can recognize bad from good flute playing. Furthermore, they can appreciate good singing. As a matter of fact, the better the musician sings and :plays, the more they applaud his effort. Even the unskilled flute player sometimes can play well without any formal 'training; at times, he can out-perform the educated musici an. Both the musical judgments of the unskilled crowd and those of the unskilled musician are due to the sense of | hearing which nature gives to man by which such sounds are judged.69 Augustine comments that when a man's memory follows his sense of hearing and his physical members obey 67ibid., 1.4.8 (col. 1088). 68Ibid., 1.4.9; 6.11 (col. 1088-90). 69 jbi d., 5.10 (col. 1089). 29 1 | his memory, then he will play and perform more beautifully I the more he excels in the very things he has in common with animals, e.g., the desire to imitate, sense and memory. In other words, a man's ability to play a musical instrument (or sing) is not directly affected by his formal training; jit is effected by developing his animal sense-powers of i i i hearing and remembering. The more the man guides his prac tice by his sense judgment, the more his musical perform ances will excel. Augustine insists, however, that some :knowledge is present even though no formal training is. It is because of this knowledge (though Augustine does not ;expressly say so) that the untrained musician can be a musician, while the animal can appreciate only the differ- |ences between harmonious and discordant sounds. Some I |unskilled musicians make music; animals can only imitate and appreciate.70 The difference between the unskilled musicians' i j |judgments and the educated musicians' is important in I Augustine's theory of judgment. The unskilled musician can misuse his musical ability whereas the educated musician cannot. The Soliloquies discussion between the "inquirer" 70Ibid., 13.27-28 (1098-1100). 1 30 j jinto learning and the "master" offers a similar example. The educated musician realizes that the cause of music is the numerical progression which makes the harmonies; this numerical progression is a law, true and independent of the : musician. The musician discovers it, investigates it and imakes it a part of him by developing the habit of music within his soul; when the musician has the discipline of Imusic as a habit, he then legislates musically.7* He can also re-apply the law and thereby make musical harmonies. i The musician knows that the laws of rhythm are not his. Therefore, although the science of music is a habit of his i i soul, the science as such transcends him.72 The unskilled i musician, on the contrary, can misuse his ability to make i Imusic because he mistakenly can think the music he makes |originates in and by him. Because he does not know, he can not know the total cause of music. He thinks he is the jsource of music and is indispensable to music.7^ Therefore, I the science of music stabilizes the judgments of the edu cated musician so that, although he might not be able to 71Ibid., 13.27-28 (col. 1098-1100); II.1.2, 2.3 (1115-1116); IV.16.30 (1143-44); V.1.1 (1147); 5.10 (1152); VI.1.1, 2.3 (1161-64). j 72Ibid., 6.12 (1090); 13. 27-28 (1098-1100). j 73Ibid., 6.11 (1089-90). 31 apply his musical judgments and make music, he never could misuse his musical judgments.74 In On Music, Augustine has shown that some human sense judgments can be true although no reason other than the fact that they give a pleasurable sensible response can be given. Though Augustine does not do so, these judgments could be called right-opinion judgments. However, because Augustine sees these judgments can be misused, he specifies the exact difference between such true sense judgments and rational true judgments. The rational true judgments have the stability of knowledge; they cannot be misused because the why of their truthfulness is known. Science enables a man to know why his true judgments are true; in other words, he recognizes the source of their truthfulness. Augustine, therefore, has now shown the nature of true judgments, distinguishing judgments that things are true from judgments of why things are true. On Free Will and Gilson's Contention Augustine's discussion of sense judgments in general, and his observations about the interior sense 74Ibid., 6.12 (1090). 32 1 i judgment in particular# clarify the nature of rational i 1 judgment itself. In so doing# contrary to Gilson's just quoted contention# Augustine clearly distinguishes among various kinds of true judgments and penetrates into the nature of true judgment. The exterior sense-powers of animals and of men ! I elicit true judgments about what is pleasurable and what j f is painful; thanks to these stable and unchanging judgments, animals and men seek what is judged pleasurable (i.e.# cons-j i : tructive and perfective of nature) and avoid what is judged painful (i.e.# destructive and disruptive of 'nature).74 However, Augustine observes that animals and I men have an interior sense-power which judges "the bodily i i isenses, approving their healthy condition (integritatas) I and urging them to do their duty (debitum flagitat)."76 This interior sense is superior to the other sense-powers i because it is "a ruler and judge among the other s e n s e s . " 77 |But how do these different powers differ among themselves? The judgments elicited by the bodily senses deal with corporeal objects. In general, when the body is 7Slib. II.5.12. i | 76jbjd., II.5.12 (BAC III. p. 265). { 77jbid., p. 264. 33 i I S affected gently or harshly by the object sensed, the bodily !senses judge the object to be pleasurable or painful, respectively. In particular, any given bodily sense (e.g., the eye) judges its corresponding object (i.e., ■ object-as-colored) to be lacking in color or sufficiently jcolored (e.g., light red, dark red, et cetera). The I i interior sense, on the contrary, judges the activity or non-activity of the bodily senses themselves. The interior sense, therefore, judges whether or not the eye is sensing color (e.g., whether it is open or closed), and how it is sensing the colored-object (e.g., in a healthy and thus accurate way, or in a defective and thus inadequate way). , If, for instance, the sense of sight is not seeing, the I ; interior sense admonishes the eyes to open; if the seeing |of the eye is either excessive or defective, the interior sense councils it to correct its seeing by some appropriate m e a n s .78 por an the acuity of the interior sense judgments* of animals and men, however, reason's judgments are superi- ;or because reason judges that there are different sense powers and how they are different.79 in this sense, reason is the "head or eye of the soul" and its judgments are both ; directive and interpretive of all powers and activities in 78ibid., p. 265. 79Ibjd< 1 34 I i j jman. Reason is the chief "judge and organizer" in man. ! 1 In On Free Will, therefore, Augustine has explained the differences between sense judgments proper to animals and men, and the differences between man's sense judgments and his rational judgments. He has distinguished them, first, in terms of their respective objects and, secondly, i jin terms of the purpose of their operations. Augustine has j explained what the different objects of the exterior sense, .interior sense, and rational judgments are and how they each judge of their respective objects. Contrary to Gilson's contention, Augustine certainly has treated true ijudgments in particular, and the various kinds of true judgments, in terms of their proper objects and their |proper operations. i Gilson and the Relation of Judgment i and Illumination in Augustine j One of the major conclusions of Gilson's analysis of "rational knowledge" in Augustine is this: f Thus it seems true to say— salvo meliore judicio-- that illumination as Augustine saw it has as its exact point of application not so much the power to conceive as the power to judge, because in his view | the intelligibility of the concept resides rather in j the normative character which its own necessity j 35 j I bestows on the concept than in the general charac- ! ter of its extension. Gilson's contention is that the character of "necessity" or "absoluteness" in man's knowledge (or what Augustine also terms "stability and unchangeableness") are the direct, immediate, and sole result of the Divine Presence to the I soul of man through illumination. If the power to make stable and unchangeable judgments involves Divine illumina tion in any way, then the animal power to judge also depends upon and involves Divine illumination. As has been i noted, many animal and human sense-judgments, according to Augustine, have as characteristics stability and unchangeableness. Furthermore, the dependence upon, and involvement in, natural sense judgments in the practice of Ian art like music would necessitate an "illumination" [ i separate from any that might be involved on the rational ilevel alone. As a matter of fact, Augustine places more importance upon sense ability and habits in the practice l of music than he does upon the knowledge of numerical progression and musical theory. Granting that Gilson's contention would not only involve problems in reference to what Augustine specifically j -■"■■■■ “ ' — - - - . i ! 80Gilson, op. cit., p. 91. ------- 36 says about the animal and human judgment, but it would render nugatory one of Augustine's basic theories e.g., his i j idea of "impressed notion." In Against the Academicians and in On Free Will, Augustine speaks of the "impressed notion" of wisdom in the souls of all men. When a man 1 i develops this "notion" into habitual wisdom, he becomes a law unto himself. Augustine expands this to include "impressed notions" of knowledges. In other words, the | wise man according to Against the Academicians, the musical | man according to On Music, and liberal arts man according I to The Soliloquies, are all alike in that they are "mas- |ters" of laws relative to their respectively developed r \ abilities. The wise man decides what is wise and what is not; the man of music lays down rules for music; the liberally educated man says what is a "true form" and what |is a "false form." The reason why any of these men can speak so authoritatively is that they are possessed of the knowledge whereof they speak. Because they have developed the various "impressed notions," they have the "lights of i J the virtues" within their souls and they are "judges and organizers." If Gilson were correct, Augustine would never predicate wisdom of man (to say nothing of any stable and unchangeable knowledge), but he would attribute all such 37 j istable and unchangeable principles directly to God. 'Augustine does not do this. Furthermore, Augustine specifically says that "laws" are intrinsic to the world in general, and "mea sured movements" are evident in the world. If all ;stability and unchangeableness were the direct and iimmediate result of the Divine Presence through illumina tion, the "laws" inherent to, and guiding, movements in the world would be a direct and immediate result of Divine Illumination. Augustine never says that they are. We have started this Introduction with a brief outline of the specific situation of Christianity which Augustine uses as the basis for his distinctive insight into the problem of how human judgment can attain truth and certitude. Gilson's interpretation of judgment in Augustine has raised certain questions about the meaning of judgment in Augustine and the relation of judgment and I |illumination. Chapter I will locate Augustine's problem :of how human judgment attains truth and certitude within the traditional approaches of Plato and Aristotle. i i i CHAPTER I THE TWO TRADITIONAL APPROACHES The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the meaning of Augustine's concept of judgment in his early Philosophical Dialogues and to explore the problem of its relation to illumination. Before outlining the traditional views of Plato and Aristotle on the meaning of judgment, it would be well to clarify their Classical Greek and Latin meanings as Augustine inherited them. The Classical Latin meaning for judgment is pri- jmarily legalistic. Ius and dicere are its components. i ;Ius means a "binding together," particularly through a contract of some kind. Dicere indicates a "showing" by words or through an artist's works; rooted in the Greek word for justice, it implies the showing of the proper way of acting through customs, laws and legal judgments. We * might say, therefore, that judgment meant the act of "joining" two or more things through some contract, or a "showing" of how people are bound and should be bound ! i i _______________ 38____ |through customs, laws and so forth. i Judgment also meant the faculty whose activity is "to discern," and implied a cunning power to choose. Though Augustine's understanding of this aspect of judgment is our principal concern, this meaning is related to the jprimary one. "Discern" is the synonym for judgment and the 1 Classical Greek equivalent is krinein, meaning "to decide or to judge." The root of the Latin discerno and the Greek krisis is the Sanskrit word for sieve. Both "discern' and krisis, therefore, mean "to separate, set apart, or put asunder" the grain from the chaff. Now, what might be the relation of j udgment and discernment? The derivations of (1) "judge," "decree," ;"criterion," and (2) "adjudicate," "discern," "discrimin ate" seem to imply two different groups. The first group indicates an ordering, arranging, and unifying; the second i i i group indicates a separating, distinguishing and sifting. i j iThe key here is the act of sifting: it is at once separa- i tion and ordering, distinguishing and establishing rank. An example drawn from Augustine's Soliloquies clarifies :how the liberally educated man is able to judge similar but !false mathematical forms arising within the phantasm. He | j discerns the false from the true ones because he possesses 40 !the habit of mathematics which contains true mathematical j jforms. Having both the false and the true present before him, he separates the true from the false and then joins the mathematical forms with the true and the phantastic forms with the false. His judgment "separates" the one ;from the other and "unites" the true ones with the true and \ !the false with the false. I A judgment, therefore, would put order into diverse elements (i.e., a decree) and at the same time would separate a deciding element as a future guide (i.e., a i criterion). Any judgment would involve a choice of one ;thing over and/or from another as well as a new fusion of hitherto separate elements. In both cases, j udgment would have the effect of "binding oneself and/or others. The !"binding" of others would involve the issuing of some law guided by which they would decide. The "binding" implies and establishes a criterion for oneself and others. It i would seem, then, that even judgment means a "speaking" which both "joins" and "binds" through separating and uniting. i The Classical Latin meaning of illumination is the act "to light up," to "make light," from the Greek root | ,laukos, meaning "light, bright, brilliant." The Sanskrit 41 ; root means either the act, "seeing" or the power, "eye." Because the meaning of this concept of illumination is so complex and confused let us say only that Gilson contends Augustine means that God is present as a light to the soul ! and Augustine uses this concept metaphorically.1 Two Traditional Solutions to the.Problem of Truth and the Function of Judgment To understand Augustine’s epistemological problem : of judgment and to determine the importance of Augustine's meaning of judgment in his epistemological solution, the high points of the traditional answers will be summarized. | The two approaches to how man obtains truth and how he can ! | obtain certitude are the Platonic and the Aristotelian. Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 77; hence forth cited as CPSA. How such a concept could be purely metaphorical and constitute a metaphysics, I am not certain ; However, I shall consider this contention of Gilson in Chapter V. Some work has been done noting the use of the ; light metaphor in Classical Greek literature: Dorthy ; Tarrant, "Greek Metaphores of Light," Classical Quarterly, j Vol. 9-10 (1959-60), pp. 181-87. ; 42 Plato and His Predecessors The Pre-Socratic philosophers (e.g. Empedocles) confronted Plato with an epistemological problem. Empedocles thought the likenesses of things men knew were present to the knower through their natural being, i.e., man knew watery-being through water itself, airy-being through air itself, et cetera.2 Though Heraclitus attempted a middle position, emphasizing that immutable logos pro vided stability and guidance through its immanent presence in mutable nature, two extreme epistemological positions ; appeared: nature is solely becoming, and nature is solely ; being. The former position held only sense knowledge is j i : possible, e.g., Democritus; the latter that only rational t ! knowledge is real, e.g., Parmenides.J With Democritus the only stability possible in humaji i knowing was that afforded by the basic sameness of atoms | and the way they were combined at any given moment. 2Milton C. Nahm, Selections from Early Greek Phil osophy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964, 4th edi tion), p. 127, No. 333. Cf., also: p. 116, No. 2 and "d," "Theory of Perception," pp. 132-33. 3Plato, The Collected Works of, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1941), Bollingen Series, LXXI, Sophist 242D-249E, pp. 986-94, particularly 246C, p. 990 and 249D, p. 994; Theaetetus, 179D..ff., p. 884. This collection henceforth cited as Boi.S. jRelativity and probability were the characteristics of l rational truths. With Parmenides, on the contrary, the stability of human knowing was assured by the sameness of Being Itself; knowledge and intelligibility were Being, and vice versa. Rational truths were characterized as absolute jand certain. Socrates, disillusioned with Anaxagoras' i jinadequate use of Nous in providing a teleological inter- t Ipretation of nature, rejected physical philosophy as specu- latively inconclusive and humanly misleading. Rational truth and stability was not to be found in speculative theories about the structure of the world. The Socratic mar !was to know himself, not to expound theories about nature. Socrates concentrated upon man's reason attaining true and |stable knowledge, and thus moral and stable action. He I iturned man's consideration from external nature in general ;to consideration upon the nature of the human soul in par- i ticular. Moral living was more important than speculative i f I ! thinking. Plato proceeded to develop an ontological phil osophy from Socrates' moral insight and epistemological conviction. 44 i Plato's Position i Truth (al^tfreia), for Plato, does not come through sense perception (aig-thesis); truth is not found in this mutable world. Perhaps two reasons led Plato to this con viction: (1) man is aware of such truths as the mathemati- cal and these have no perceptible counterparts in the i mutable world; (2) some moral values such as justice and goodness have characteristics of immutability and necessity, not apparent in the mutable world.4 Such immutable things, i therefore, must be separate from this mutable, sensible iworld and subsistent in an intelligible world.® Like Empedocles, Plato held knowledge to be the result of some |likeness; unlike Empedocles, Plato thought this likeness j j had to have the same qualities as the intellectual operation ! :itself. Since, however, the form of whatever is known is i jin man's intellectual operation in an immaterial, intelli- |gible way, these forms must subsist in an immaterial, immutable and intelligible world. Man's intellectual i • stability is insured by an ontologically stable world. 4Bol.S., ibid., Theaetetus, 185C ff., p. 890. 5Bol.S., ibid., Phaedo, 78B, p. 61. Here is a !practical application of Plato's conviction in his reason- jing to the non-mutability of man's soul. 45 I i Plato, therefore, maintains the existence of two i worlds. There is a world of representations, or copies, a shadow world of sensible being, and there is a world of forms, or paradigms, the real world of intelligible being.® Plato names the former "idols" or "images"; the latter are I"species" or "ideas." Since "idea" means: (1) the look of , a thing as the immediate object of "seeing" (idein) and (2) a nature or kind, the words "species" and "idea" are complementary. These "ideas" are the essential natures of the various kinds of beings and are directly visible by the "eye of the soul." The "images" are representations and are visible to the "eye of the body." The Platonic Problem of Truth and Judgment Ontologically, the shadow world of mutable sensible;; ;exists through participating (methexis) in the intelligible :world of forms by imitation (mimesis).^ Now, the images of i — the shadow world do not have being properly speaking; the ideas in the world of forms have being, for they are ®Bol.S., ibid., Republic, 514 ff., p. 747; Theaetetus, 186B, ff., p. 892; Sophist, 267A ff., p. 1014; jPhaedo, 100B ff., p. 81, Timaeus, 49A ff., pp. 1176. j 7Bol.S., ibid., Timaeus, 27C-29D, p. 1161; 51A-52C, ip. 1 1 7 8 . ___________________________________________ ! 46 j jimmaterial, immutable and necessary. The question, of course, is how does the Platonic man achieve any kind of "joining" of these two worlds? What kind of epistemologi cal judgments are possible in such an existential situation? Plato contends that his perceptions (a&sth&sis) of :these images attain at best true opinion (al£thfeia doxa), but never knowledge (episteme). The images of this world are shadows fashioned in the likeness of the Good, just as ;the shadows within the cave world are made in the likeness 'of the real shadow world. According to Plato, therefore, the epistemological situation corresponds to the ontologica? situation, i.e., (1) opinion-sensible, subdivided into (a) imagining-images (false opinion) and (b) belief-visible ;things (true opinion), (2) thinking-mathematical, knowing- i ;forms, and intellecting— The Good. Now, stable knowledge, truth and certitude seem to l exist only within "intellecting," or understanding for 'Plato. Further, the man who judges seems to be identical Iwith the man who knows. Therefore, "judgment" (krisis) for jPlato seems to occur only within understanding, and thus, is not a conclusion consequent upon reasoning but one resulting from a revelation.® "Judgment" is not a "join ing" but a "seeing." The following example attempts to interpret Plato's concept of perception (aesthesis) and the consequent "true opinion" or "false opinion" (or, as the ! Bolligen translators render them: "true judgment" and "false judgment"). i An artist makes an artifact. The Platonic man per- i ceives the artifact; but since it is a copy, he has at best true opinion of it. The copy is merely an image, a ’ shadow of the idea, the form. As such, it hides the idea which the artist has in his mind. Unless and until the Platonic man could see the idea in the artist's mind, he would never be able to judge likeness to be inaccurate or j accurate, more accurate or less. Thus, the Platonic man | could attain neither truth nor certitude because he does not have knowledge. He would not be in the world of being : and could not compare the world of image with it. However, the intellectual perception (no&sis) of this form (eidos) ®The Bolligen translators render the word doxa by "Judgment," using "true judgment" al^theia doxa and "false judgment" for pheude doxa. I have not found any use of krisis in Plato for the act of judgment but only for j "judges" themselves. Perhaps the concept of j udgment has i been as overlooked in Plato as it seems to have been in Augustine. A plethora of articles exist discussing Plato's theory of forms. 48 I j is the un-covering of the essence of the artifact. When, | therefore, the form is known, truth (aletKeia) is possessed. But truth is not just knowledge of the un-hidden- ness (aletheia) of that-which-is for Plato; it is also a recalling of what is forgotten (lethe, lanthanfr) .® Even I the essence of teaching to Plato is persuading the learner I to turn within himself to "the eye of the soul" and recover i | what the soul has forgotten because it inhabits this bodily tomb (sftna). Sense perceiving, therefore, also i ! falls within the cave world analogy: all sensations involve mere images and can only be matter for opinions. If a man thinks perceiving (adsthesis) is sensing, then he is in the same situation as the men chained in the cave; he can but imagine (eikasia) and his opinions always will be false. 1 Such a man has no source of comparison immutable to and independent of the sensation whereby he can see these sense images for what they are, and thus even attain "true {opinion." Mind (nous), therefore, is the essential element ®Cf., Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. by W. I Barrett and H. D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962), Vol. 3, pp. 251-70. The criticism of Heidegger's position jby Paul Friedlander is interesting in this regard and is found in his: Plato— An Introduction, trans. H. Meyerhoff (New York: Harper and Row-Bollingen Library, 1964), pp. 221-29. ^°Bol.S., ibid., Theaetetus, 151E ff. , p. 856. 49 in perception. Because of it, "true opinion" is possible i in the sensations of man's bodily tomb. The Platonic man neither can make "true judgments" about images unless they are compared with the forms, nor I can he even learn. Recollection of the world of forms is I essential to the possession of knowledge and the attainment I iof truth. Even an awareness of the ideas in the artist's ;mind (as the awareness of the artificial copies and fire light in the cave) was not sufficient for knowledge and truth. Only the possession of the ideas in the world of .forms constitutes knowledge and makes possible judgment j |proper, i.e., intellectual judgment, understanding. i ! Two things seem, therefore, to characterize "judg- i Jment" in Plato: (1) the judgments are completely compara- i i i jtive. A "judgment" is not possible unless both the image land the idea are present to the mind: the image through i |perception (aisthesis) and the idea through intellect i !(nous). Two observations are important here: (a) This inous is independent of man's soul and the soul shares in it |through the illuminating rays of the sun?11 (b) the ideas | 11Bol.S., ibid., Republic, 508A ff, p. 743; Theaetetus, 185E, p. 890. Cf., also: Themistius, Comm. Tertii De Anima, c. 32, itoo are independent of man*s soul and only because of the i i sunlight are present to the soul. The two essential prin ciples of the soul's knowledge and truth are both separate from the shadow world and independent of man's soul. !(2) The "judgment" is not bi-lateral, i.e., from the image to the mind and back again within the act of perception. i ;Knowledge is not dependent upon the images because images ias imitations are mutable. "Judgment" is unilateral, i.e., from the idea as seen by the "eye of the soul" to the image, Mutable sensibles merely excite the soul to sense and the senses excite the intellectual soul to recollect.12 Yet, ;the intellectual soul is dichotomized completely from sense jand sense perceptions. Intellectual knowledge is dependent only upon the ideas and because of viewing them can be J j !independent of images, i.e., free to judge, possess knowl edge and attain truth. Images hide truth; forms reveal it. Platonic judgment is possible because of an intellectual ! {revelation not a sensible perception, and judgment is an act of seeing by the understanding, not a conclusion of reasoning. Six consequences of this Platonic theory are 12Bol1S., ibid., Meno, 81D, p. 364. 51 i |revelant to the problem of Augustine's concept of j udgment; (1) Ontologically, all forms (e.g., man, animal, plant) are subsistent; (2) Plato's epistemological attention is cen tered in man and not concerned with animal sensations; (3) sensation and intellection are actions of an incorporeaj. |principle, the soul, since the lower can not act upon the i higher;13 (4) truth (aletheia, literally "unconcealment," i and radically "remembering") is the result of a revelation !from another world and is neither present in nor obtainable l from the mutable world in any way; (5) knowing and learning, though occasioned by sensible stimulation, are the remember** .ing of archetypal forms in no way possessed by the soul but lonly seen by it; (6) Plato's philosophy is basically ISocratic, i.e., true knowing is true living; consequently, !there is no such thing as abstract truths, nor are there distinctions between intellectual and moral virtues. ' Aristotle and Plato — - ! ■ ■ I ............. ■ ■ From his eighteenth to his thirty-sixth year, |approximately nineteen years, Aristotle heard and questioner i _ _ ___ _____ . _ ...____ i j 13Bol,S., ibid., Theaetetus, 185D-186A, p. 890; {Timaeus, 43C-44A, p. 1171. : 52 j } ! j Plato's philosophical views. Plato emphasized the intellec tual , the importance of dialectical ascent to the intelligi- i ble world as a prerequisite for the revelation of truth; he minimized the sensible, the importance of investigating the ! physical world. Form was the reality in the Platonic world j and truth was the result of a revelation of intelligible I forms. Aristotle emphasized the rational investigation of the physical world. Substance was the reality in the Aristotelian world and truth was the complementary result of sensible and intellectual perceptions. To judge and to i know, for Plato, means to see intellectually (idein) sub- :sistent truths (ideia) which are the independently subsis- ;tent principles (archai) of all copies. To know, for 'Aristotle, means to investigate rationally (empeiria)the reasons (logoi) men say what they say (e.g., Nic. Ethics), or the reasons things do what they do (e.g., Physics) and the reasons substances exist at all (First Philosophy). To 'judge, for Aristotle, means to state rationally what jontologically is. Plato seems to have an ontology of light, whereas Aristotle has an ontology of reason. J Now, Aristotle criticized Plato's ontology on three i : important points: (1) Plato nowhere explains the relation I i jof intelligible form to the concrete particular but uses I "mere empty phrases and poetic metaphors" like "participa tion" and "imitation."14 (2) The Platonic hypothesis of ■ the world of forms does not explain the multiplicity of concrete particulars nor the ways in which they change. (3) The disjunction of intelligible forms from the sensible iworld presumes that essential characteristics of things are separated from the sensible things themselves; therefore, perceptual judgments of them, and thus knowledge and truth are impossible. To Aristotle Plato's epistemological pre- I supposition, that the form of whatever is understood is an l immaterial and immutable "subsistent," is not true. This i intelligible world of forms does not explain (a) ontologi- cally, individual substances, multiple substances, changing 'substances, or (b) epistemologically, how man knows individ ual substances, how man obtains truth and attains certitude. ,In short, Aristotle contends that Plato does not explain how man does make truthful and stable judgments and how he I t attains truth and certitude. •^Aristotle, The Basic Works of, ed. Richard McKeon (New York; Random House, 1941), Metaphysics, 990B-992B, p. 706. Henceforth cited as BWA. Aristotle 54 For Aristotle, substance is the reality, and he seeks to understand it by investigating what men say about it. He notes that substance is first of all the hypokeimenon, the logical subject, about which one can ! make any ten kinds of judgments. If, however, one asks |what the subject that man talks about essentially is, one discovers substance in the secondary sense, or essence. To Aristotle, substance in the sense of essence, of what a thing most specifically is, falls naturally into the predi- : cate of a sentence; it thus can be defined, employed as the middle term of a syllogism and treated by Logic. But ; in the primary sense, as the natural subject of predica- i tion (e.g., a "this" of which man, horses, rose are predi- I cated) it can not be treated by Logic, nor predicated of I anything further, but must be directly grasped as a fact i of sense perception.15 por Aristotle, there are physical i : beings about which we speak and conceptual beings which we 1 i use to speak about them. Form (eidos) is, therefore, not a : thing apart from physical beings, it is inherent in their matter (hyle). Thus, to Aristotle, for example, soul ^ ----- - J - - - - - - - - - j ! 15BWA, ibid., Categories, 2a 11, p. 8. (psych£), a form, is a "life principle" within a living substance, a cause and co-principle (aitia kai archS) with the matter, whereas to Plato, it was a "soul" mixed I with matter, as an imitation (methexis) of Soul, The Prin- ciple (Arche) in the world of forms. j Man, for Aristotle, was a part of nature (ph^sis). i iHis learning and knowing have, therefore, natural "this- i ' i jworld" explanations. When, however, a person made a ' knowledgeable judgment (e.g., Man is a political animal), i ;he did not state the complete actual character (entelecheia) I ~ ~ of man, but merely the general formal character (eidos). Logically, this formal character indicates the species lunder which the predicate immediately belongs (e.g., politi-j cal), and as a logical species, it exists as a second inten- i ^ j.tion in the human mind. Physically (physis) , it indicates the goal (telos) toward which all members of this kind tend ; i ■ i ;to move (e.g., organized society in a proximate sense, i i ("Thought thinking on thought" in an ultimate sense), and as ! a physical goal, it is intrinsic to the particular being ! :and is the reason it operates, or acts, at all. Form, j i ; therefore, is also a telic co-principle with matter; or, ■ * i — ------------------------------------------------------------1 !6bwa, ibid., On the Soul, 415b 9, p. 561. I ' ' ' ' ........... 56 i t jconversely, the matter of anything is its potentiality f !(dynamis) of receiving or becoming a certain form. Any composed substance is matter to the extent that it is potentially but not yet actually of this or that character, form to the extent that its potential character has already I been specifically realized. Matter and form are thus I co-relatives of every composed substance. This is Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, essential to understanding his ontology and his epistemology. | Truth and Judgment in Aristotle According to Aristotle, any natural substance can |be understood through its own operations and each operation of any substance is specified by its end.1? Through sense i perception (a<jsthesis) a man undergoes a change in his ;sense powers)This change is the sense power becoming jactually what the sensible object already is.18 This change ; i occurs when the sense power received the form of the sensible. The reception of form is not a physical one (as | ■“ " ........ ■ ■■ ' l | | ■ IB .1 . ■ ^ Ibid., 402a ff, pp. 535 and 407b 26, p. 546. i 18Ibid., 416b 33-34? 417b 20-21. ! ----- j 19Ibid., 418a 4-6; 423b 30-424a 2. jEmpedocles held)nor an intellectual and innate one (as iPlato held); it is an intentional one, i.e., the form of the sensible was the principle of its own operation (effi cient cause) and therefore, is present in its operations as a final cause, a messenger bespeaking the composite.21 jWhen the man sensing states "this tree is in blossom," he jhas a perception (aisth^sis) which is also a judgment j(krisis).22 if the statement (phasis) is composed and/or divided, the statement is true; if not, it is f a l s e . 23 i However, animals also possess this power of sense- discrimination.24 The question is then why do not animals make statement judgments as the above? For Aristotle, man's 20lbid., 404b 9-15; 409b 23-26. 23-lbid. , 425b 18-24. i 22ibid., 418a 4, 442a 21, 424a 5. Cf., also An. Post., 99b 35 ff,^ p. 184 and Nic. Eth. 1113a 1 ff. p. 970. |I am aware of L'Evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote of iFrancois Nuyens (Louvain, 1948) and the three stages he j notes in Aristotle's thinking relative to the relation of jbody and soul (p. 57 ff). However, my interest here is to 1 |present Aristotle's overall view of perception (aesthSsis) land its relation to judgment (krisis) over against Plato's. ^ BWA, op. cit., On . . ., 429a 26 ff., p. 592. 24ibid., Post. Anal., 99b 35 ff, p. 184; and On !the Soul, 434a 5, p. 599. 58 [perceptions, and those of certain more developed animals, : are preserved by the power of memory.2^ When these percep tions are long preserved and (as happens in the case of man alone) multiplied and compounded to a great degree, a rational order of thought appears, which, noting each new iexperience (empeiria) in relation to previous ones present |in the memory, discerns the universal characteristics i shared by them (e.g., this is a substance; this substance is white, et cetera). This is the inductive process (epagfrg^) basic to all human knowing and learning because it is the actualization of the first principles of human knowledge through rational judgment [e.g., Substance (being) is and cannot be not-substance (non-being) at the same time ! land in the same way, et cetera). These first principles ■ are the result of a twofold causality, one sensible (empeiria), the other intellectual (nous),28 and are ;re-applied through the imagination (phantasma) to every 1 i isubsequent judgment.2? (E.g., If anything is a substance, j 1 ■■ ■ ! > ■ ■ — ■ " ' 25Ibid., and Met., 980a 28, p. 689. 28Ibid., Post. Anal., 99b 35 ff, p. 184. Cf., C. J. De Vogel, Greek Philosophy (Leiden, Holland: E. J. ;Brill, 1953) , Vol. II, Section 5 passim, and pp. 63-64 (footnote No. 6. 27Ibid., On . . ., 431a 7 ff, p. 593. 59 i jthen it cannot not be a substance, et cetera). The general 1 formal character (eidos) of any sensible substance which is sensed becomes intentionally present in the imagination and is rendered actually intelligible by the active-mind- faculty (poigtikos) so the passive-mind-faculty can abstractly think (noein).28 All sense perceptions, how- 1 "" ever, of proper sensibles (e.g., color, sound, et cetera) ■ and all intellectual perceptions of proper intelligibles (i.e., essences) are neither true nor false properly speak ing because there is no judging (e.g., "joining"); there is only sensing or understanding of appropriate "simples," e.g., color or essence.20 ^11 other perceptions involving "complexes" will necessitate synthesis of concepts and, I therefore, be true or false judgments.80 Thus, for Aristotle, animals with memory also can perceive and make sense judgments. They can judge that a I certain sensible object threatens their self-preservation j 'and avoid it or that it aids their self-preservation and seek it (e.g., a cat can join a separate substance like a 28Ibid., 430a 10 ff., p. 591. 29Ibid., 429b 26 ff., p. 592. i 30Ibid., 432a 9 ff., p. 595. j 60 imouse with a memory of food and make the sense judgment "this mouse is good for me to eat").^ However, only man can effect an abstract (i.e., non-sensible) union in his judgments and this is due to the presence of reason (e.g., cats and mice are animal substances). Man's judgments are, ;therefore, properly rational because they discern (krinein) I j between concepts, separating and uniting the various sense data; this sense data is acquired through sensation, avail able through memory and present in the phantasm.32 Thus, only man can attain truth in his judgments; animals cannot. Such judgments are knowledge (epistem§), and this knowledge ! is knowledge of the sensible substance through its causes (e.g., material, formal, efficient and final) thanks to its intentional presence in the phantasm and the abstractive i power of the mind. According to Aristotle, a rational expression of what ontologically is, is true and is knowl- I edge, not "opinion" or even "true opinion," as it would be i i ! for Plato. Aristotle calls this rational statement a i judgment (krisis). Aristotle concludes that man's "thinking faculty" can be all things, but must think (noein) ideas (eidos) in i 31jbid., 434a ff., p. 599; 425b 21; 426b 10 ff., | 427a 20; 428a 3; 431a 8, 20; 432a 15. Cf., also Met., 1010 L b - - 1 8 , 32xbid. .434a_5r 10_..pp^_Ji9_£=.6.00_______ 61 !terms of images (phantasmal because form is only found as an intrinsic principle of composed substance and cannot be understood differently.^ Because the soul can be all things, Aristotle says the Platonists are justified in calling the soul the place of forms.34 However, he comments, \ they should have applied this description only to its Intel— ilective faculty in the sense that they potentially reside :there. Because this intellective faculty must think its ideas in terms of images (phantasiA), there can be no 'revelation of truth to the soul independent of sensation. Therefore, the Aristotelian man obtains truth through i !abstracting the intentional presence of the sensible sub- j stance and through a rational judgment which corresponds to the ontological reality as perceived. Thus, there is a I difference between truth abstractly speaking, i.e., scientific truth, and truth morally speaking, i.e., pruden- ; tial truth. There are also intellectual and moral virtues. I i Corresponding to the six consequences of the Pla- I tonic position adduced above, Aristotle's position would be: (1) Ontologically, forms are immanent in substances; though 33lbid., 432a 5 ff., p. 595. 34Ibid., 431b 20 ff., p. 595. ■ 62 !a few substances (e.g., man) transcend sensible substance ! I in operation (e.g., in understanding), all need phantasms as a source of concepts and as a reference for understand ing. (2) Epistemologically, Aristotle centers his atten tion upon the sensitive and intellective operations of • animals and men. (3) Sensation and intellection are opera- j tions of the composite; the lower (e.g., sensation) is a cooperating instrumental cause when raised to the higher level (i.e., when the making-active-facuity illumines the phantasm intelligibly); the passive-faculty knows the uni versal in relation to the particular.35 (4) Truth is ;attained through judgments (e.g., perceptual, rational and intellectual) and certitude is obtained through perceptual verification (i.e., reflection upon the phantasm and through it the sensible substance itself). (5) Knowing and learning begin with investigation of empirical data; i ; !though they are sometimes achieved via deduction, they i : i always presume induction (epag£g&) based in the "power of s ;sense-discrimination" (alsth§sis). (6) There is abstraction and abstract truths, as well as both intellectual and moral i virtues. 35Ibid., 432 5-10, p. 595. 63 Augustine and the Traditional Views Scholars substantiate the fact that Augustine's main contact with his sources was through reading some of Plotinus' Enneads and a few of Cicero's works.38 They all agreed that Augustine read some of Plato's work, namely the Timaeus, but until recently, there was no disagreement that i Augustine had read nothing of Aristotle's works except the Categories. However, Paul Henry has noted that Augustine's theory of relation can be attributed only to Aristotle, not to Plotinus.37 Other scholars are claiming direct influ ence of the Stoics on Augustine's theory of sensation.38 Whatever the final catalogue of Augustine's readings, the ’fact is that Plotinus' works are an attempt to reassess the jthoughts of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Consequently, I : Augustine, at least indirectly, was influenced by all three iways of thinking, albeit explained Plotinianly. Further- i more, his Classical training through an appreciation of | i I Cicero provided him with these same traditional philosophic !______________________________________________________________________________ 38Confer: E. L. Fortin, Christianisme et culture i philosophique an Ve si^cle: la querelle de l'^hne en !1'Occident (Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, France, 1959). ■ * 7Paul Henry, Saint Augustine on Personality (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 38J. Rohmer, "L'intentionnalite des sensations chez s. Augustin," Augustinus Magister I, pp. 491-98. 64 i j |views in an expository way. j Whatever the scholarly verdict on who or what i i influenced Augustine, this brief and high-lighted presen tation of Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of judgment serves to indicate certain similarities and differences between Augustine's epistemological view and theirs. |Augustine, for instance, shares Plato's conviction that i stable rational truth is the result of an interior search; but Augustine disagrees that stable truth is found already I • constituted in the memory as "remembered forms." Augustine claims that such concepts as "unity" and "goodness" are not i innately existing in the soul, but they are present as 1"impressed notions" which the learned man develops through I study (discipling) into actual habits. j Augustine also agrees with Plato that the world we live in is an image world. He contends, however, that ! i these images reflect truly and, therefore, can lead a i . sknower to Truth. Augustine praises the "true philosophy of; this world" rather than begrudge it as "true opinion" the way Plato does. As far as knowledge itself is concerned, ,Augustine denies that man has innate knowledge as Plato contended. Augustine definitely thinks that sensed-objects (and others) are present intentionally, i.e., as reflected |on the mirror of the phantasm. Whether this view is Aristotelian and/or Stoic is debatable. Yet, Augustine certainly does not hold that ideas like "truth," "unity," "beauty" and others are abstracted from the phantasm by an Aristotelian "factive-intellect." It is clear, however, j that judgment for Augustine involves a "union" and a "separation" just as it does for Plato and Aristotle. I 1 The particular nature of this "union" and "separation" is the determined work of this thesis. Chapter II will i develop Augustine's concept of judgment as he applies it to the judgments of animals throughout the early Philosophical Dialogues. CHAPTER II THE SENSE JUDGMENTS OF ANIMALS Augustine treats of the judgments of animals I because he is interested in showing how and why rational judgments are superior. The problem is that some animal judgments apparently are stable and certain or, in Kantian !terminology, a priori. All animals, for instance, judge that some things are conducive to their self-preservation and, therefore seek these things; other things are judged to be detrimental and, therefore, are shunned. The ques- ;tion is: What accounts for the stability and certainty of 'these animal judgments? Are such animal judgments differ ent from stable and certain human judgments? Augustine i was aware that circumstances change; he emphasized that i ieven nature changes. How, then, do animals consistently judge the pleasurable and seek it, and discern the painful and avoid it? Furthermore, how are these consistent animal ijudgments concerning pleasure and pain different from, or ;similar to, rational judgments about something being good i ! i 66 I 67 ! |or about three and two always equalling five? While considering this epistemological problem facing Augustine under the aspect of a priori universals, ‘Bertrand Russell trenchantly observes that in the case of !arithmetic: The thing to be accounted for is our certainty that I the fact must always conform to logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for this. Our nature, is as much a fact of the existing world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will remain con stant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that tomorrow our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This possibility seems never to have occurred to him, yet it is one which utterly des troys the certainty and universality which he is anxious to vindicate for arithmetical propositions.1 Augustine, like Kant and Russell, is seeking the source of I those stable, certain and universal judgments which all men i j recognize; some of which animals even seem to share. The present chapter develops the concept of j udgment ■ that Augustine applies to the sense judgments of animals. ! Augustine says the difference between animals and men is i ; that animals "sense" whereas man "knows."2 Man and animals are similar, however, both in their ability "to sense" and : in the sense activity of "discerning" and "judging." i j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — 1Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 87. 2gu. 28.54-29.57 (BAC III pp. 492-94). 68 (Augustine illustrates this by comparing the animals' abil- lity "to discern things that bring pleasure to souls such as theirs" with the baby's ability to "discern more easily the touch and presence of his nurse through sense." This baby is similar to the animal because it is so dependent !upon the sense that it is far removed from reason. Both |the animal and the baby are "discerning" the sensible good ! for their souls, and these "discernments?1 are due to the ■"great power" Augustine calls "familiarity" (consuetudo). ’The senses of both, baby and animal, are guided by what they are accustomed to; thus, "familiarity" is termed a power, i.e., natural to sensing beings but developed by ;them into a habitual way of acting.^ 3 This "familiarity" or "customary way" can be a |stumbling block as well as an aid. If the "familiarity" is old (inveterata) and born of false opinion (si falsS opinione geneta est), there is nothing more hostile to the :truth. I shall treat this aspect of consuetudo in Chapter III. j : ^Op. cit., qu. 28.54; compare mus. VI.7.19 (PL 32 !col. 1173). Augustine maintains as principles that: ; (1) sensation is an activity of the soul and (2) the soul has no faculties, or powers, distinct from it or in it. ' Yet, the above comparison of baby to animal seems to pose i grave problems for these principles. If the soul senses i and these sense judgments of the baby and the animal are of the same kind then: (a) the soul of the baby could not be rational but irrational as that of the animal; or (b) this sense judgment of the baby would have to be a rational one and different in kind from the animal's or (c) Augustine 69 i i j The "Certain Sense" Power of Judging The meaning of this "power" appears more clearly ‘ in the treatise On Music. Augustine comments upon the fact that certain animals imitate the words and actions of men. Some respond approvingly to harmonious or ordered musical 'sounds and register dissatisfaction with discordant or dis ordered ones. The reason they can respond in such ways i (and men have this in common with them) is that they possess a "certain sense."® Nature has given them this sense and by it such sounds "are judged."® It is not clear, however, whether or not this "certain sense" is identical i with what Augustine terms the power of "familiarity" or j would have to hold the baby has an irrational soul as well !as a rational one and that this sense judgment and all !others are acts of that irrational soul. I know of no place in the early works where Augustine shows an awareness of this problem; nor have I found any statements or prin- ]ciples in Augustine, whereby I could resolve it. There are i several problems relative to animal sensation which !Augustine dismisses before he attempts to solve them. One : iin particular (lib. II.4.10 (BAC III, pp. 261-62) emphasizes |the problem I have noted here. When Augustine asks whether !or not the "interior sense" can discern itself, i.e., judge ;that it lives, he "answers" it by saying that only reason i can know such things; no sense could. This is hardly an answer to such a problem. 5mus. 1.4.5 (PL 32 col. 1085-86). 6Ibid., 5.10 (col. 1089); cf., 13.27 (col. 1098-99); III.8.19 (col. 1126); VI.14.47 (col. 1187-88). 70 jwhat he calls the "judiciary power." ! The "Certain Sense" and Augustine's Concept of Sensation To understand this "sense" and the auditory judg ement that animals make because of it, some knowledge of i Augustine's concept of sensation and its attendant pleasure or pain is necessary. When the soul is perceiving the body I Augustine says, it does not suffer anything from the body; but it animates the body so that sensation can occur. Thus when the body is suffering (patitur), the soul becomes intent and active (in eius passionibus attentus agere); its :actions (has actiones) are either easy on account of har mony (convenientia) or difficult on account of disharmony ~ (inconvenientia). The soul is conscious of them (non earn Ilat§re)7 and the total occurrence (e.g., the body's I passion and the soul's action) is perception.® The soul itself, therefore, is said to see, hear, smell, taste and 7gu. 29.56 (PL 32 col. 1067). O . The relation of this non latere involved in Augustine's concept of sensation to Plotinus' me lathein has been commented upon by both J. M. Colleran [St. j Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul and The Teacher j(Maryland: Newman Press, 1950), footnote No. 73, pp. 208- llQ lJ -.a n d G i l s o n , _op. cit..,_p.^84... ....... 71 jfeel by touching and assimilating the pleasurable (and thus lits action is easy), and resisting the painful (and thus its action is difficult).0 Animal souls can discern the harmonious or the 'ordered and measured, which are the pleasurable, from the discordant, (the disordered and lacking measure). Through I I that "sense" they judge that certain music is harmonious i and, therefore, pleasurable, and that other music is dis cordant and painful."10 However, sense judgment can never attain why the music is harmonious.11 Such an achievement demands reflective knowledge of the ordered or measured i sound, i.e., a knowledge of the numerical relations which iare making the sound to have the order or measure it i possesses. This knowledge is attainable by reason alone (and is peculiar to man.12 Augustine's theory of sensation labors under two !fundamental convictions about the structure of the world. < -Ontologically speaking, Augustine holds that all rhythm, ^Op. cit., mus. VI.5.10 (col. 1069); cf; im. XVI.25. 10Ibid., III.8.19 (col. 1126); cf., 3.5 (col. 1118); V.l.l (col. 1147); 1.13. 27 (col. 1099). 11Ibid., V.5.10 (col. 1152). 12Ibid., IV.2.3 (col. 1130); 16.32 (col. 1144). 72 | e.g., measured or ordered movement of any kind (of which music is a specific type), is the result of numbers inher- ; 1 ent in the world. These numbers were implanted by God ‘through the creative act; the various beings of the world 'evolve, develop and harmonize their movements with these i i numerical ratios.The order and proportion within move ments and beings is attributable to these numbers as a proximate cause and to God as the ultimate cause. The har- j monious movements and sounds of animals lacking reason are i ja proof, to Augustine, of the existence of Divine Reason | according to whose "implanted numbers" the animals natural ly act and react.14 There is a strange mixture of Pytha- < gorian monads and Stoic seminal reasons in Augustine's view, He finds verification for it in certain Scriptural texts. Epistemologically speaking, Augustine holds that j every existing thing and every word expressing any existing ! j thing is an image behind which there is a reality. To express the theory more accurately, Augustine, like Plato, t is convinced that words are images of reality, i.e., the !word "tree," or "l'arbre," et cetera is an image whose j - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j 13rel. 77; lib. 11.11.30-32 (pp. 288-99). 14ord. 1.25; 2.12. 73 j | meaning is the real, perceptible tree. For example though ; an American and a Frenchman might not understand each other's words, they could understand the same meaning; each will realize this if both point to the perceptible tree. Now Augustine formulates his theory of sensation .according to these two convictions. The movement of all !beings is rhythmic; sentient beings perceive these rhythms. A nightingale, for instance, sings rhythmically and the sensible delight it experiences stimulates the bird to continue s i n g i n g .15 Animals seem to "know" what is pleasur able because they judge accurately and consistently about l the pleasurable and the painful. As a matter of fact, ani mal sense judgments are sometimes more acute and accurate than man's judgments. Nevertheless, says Augustine, all "knowledge" of harmonies man admires in animals is only an "image of knowledge, due to the power of sensing." i ; i . : t i i Sensible Harmonies and the Judicial Rhythm J Augustine now asks where these harmonies or rhythms exist: in the sound itself (sonates numeri), in the ear's l5Contra. Epist. Manichaei 20. i sensation of hearing (progressores numeri), in the act of pronouncing the verse (occursores numeri), in the recalling i of musical sounds (recordabiles numeri), or in all four?16 Might there be other rhythms also, asks Augustine? The initial conclusion is that there are five kinds of rhythm, iThe "judicial" is the most important since all the other i 1 1 rhythms are guided by it.*7 Animals obviously have the sonant, progressive, occursive and memorial rhythms present ito them. Of these, the sonant alone is in the body; the others are in the sensing itself and thus are of the soul.^-8 However, a problem arises where the judicial rhythm is concerned. Augustine says that animals are possessed of the 1 memorial rhythm both because memory is in the body (not in 1 the soul) and because some animals make judgments based upon memory (e.g., the Odysian dog judges his master and |some animals sing and dance to music). But what Augustine ! I 16The translation of numeri given by R. C. Talia- jferro in Saint Augustine (New York: Cima Pub. Co. Inc., 1947), Vol. 2 is "number"; however, I have chosen to render it by "rhythm." These numeri implanted by God give rise to "measured movements," i.e., rhythms within the world of :moved beings. These rhythms are arranged hierarchically |and are involved in a continuum. I l7Ibid., VI.6.16 (col. 1171); cf., 13.42 (col. 1185). j j 18Ibid., 10.25 (col. 1177). 75 i i j calls the "judicial power" distinguishes between pleasur- i I able and painful musical sounds, and prefers the pleasur able to the painful. However, it cannot do this without memory because of the time lapses involved in the progres- i sion of music and the consequent need for memory to retain ,these notes so a musical judgment can be made.19 Thus, |since some animals possess memory and do make such judg ments, Augustine would have to conclude that both "judicial rhythm" and the "judicial power" belong to animals as well !as men. Perceptual Harmony and the Power of Familiarity : Even the "Disciple," involved in the discussion, |is confused. After the "Master" points out that the judicial rhythm cannot be immortal, the "Disciple" admits I that, though he is not sure whether or not the judicial jrhythm is in the soul (in animo), he is certain that this 19Ibid., 8.22 (col. 1175). 76 rhythm is in the nature of m a n .20 The confusion is I i resolved when the "Master" points out that what they have been referring to as the "judicial power" is really the per- i ceptual rhythm (sensuales numeri) which delights in the har- !monious and takes offense at discords (in delectatione jconvenientiae, et offensione absurditatis talium motionum sine affectionum).2^ This perceptual rhythm operates in j — I |and through the power called "familiarity" (consuetudo), "a second and fabricated nature."22 Thanks to this power 20lbid., 10.28 (col. 1179). Though Gilson says: "Augustine's terminology is rather flexible," he claims j that: Properly speaking, anima designates the animat ing principle of bodies considered in the vital func- ! tions it exercises in them. Man has an anima, ani- ! mals also have one. Animus ... is used by Augustine j to designate man's soul, i.e., a vital principle that ; is at the same time a rational substance. ..." (op. ! cit., p. 269, Chap. Ill, footnote Mo. 1). ■ Gilson refers to the City of God to prove his contention. iThis work was written between 411-26. It is one of the jlate works of Augustine, written fourteen years after On , ‘Christian Doctrine, the last work considered in this jthesis, and twenty-two years after On Music. A cursory (reading of the Latin text [i.e., VI.6.16-13,42 (col. 1171- | 1185)] will show how inadequate and inaccurate such a state- jment concerning Augustine's use and meaning of anima and i animus is. The "judicial power" is in reason, but Augustine jsays it is in anima here. [(VI.9.24-10.25 (col. 1177)]; cf., |9.23 (col. 1176). Other similar statements by Augustine could be adduced from many places in On Music alone. None !of them would corroborate Gilson's above cited statement. i j 23-lbid. , 10.28 (col. 1179). ________22Ibid., 7.19 (col. 1173).__________ jthe auditory judgments of animals "discern” harmonious from idiscordant music and "judge" harmonies to be preferable to discords. It appears, therefore, that the power of "familiarity" is the "certain sense" nature has given to animals; it is the "certain sense" as habituated to respond ■to pleasurable stimuli. Gilson's treatment of the numeri- jcal rhythms does not determine the relation between the "power of familiarity" and the "certain sense." Gilson's Analysis of the Numerical Rhythms As a matter of fact,Gilson's analysis of Augustine's ! i numerical rhythms is faulty. Gilson says that there are jonly five groupings: i ! This fifth and last class of numbers is part and | parcel of the judgements [sic] whereby we rule that a verse was spoken too slowly or too fast, and that we like or dislike the reciter's delivery. In ! order to make the discussion easier, let us give the various numbers names, thus we have: sounding num- | bers, heard numbers, voiced numbers, remembered num- ; bers and discriminating numbers. The task before us is to discover the order of their influence upon one ; another.^3 'This is incorrect. Augustine initially distinguishes five | |kinds of numerical rhythms, but these, he finds, are all ^Gilson, op. cit., p. 59. { I [limited to sensitive life.24 There is a sixth which is proper to rational life, a point which Gilson omits;2^ as a result of this omission, Gilson's conclusion that "with out mind, there is no sensation,"26 is incorrect. What Gilson has understood as discriminating numbers and termed j"the most perfect class of numbers,"2^ are really in the [animal nature of man and are, therefore, the highest kind of I number in sentient beings. Thus, when Gilson reasons from this inadequate analysis to the conclusion that "without i mind there is no sensation," he does so incorrectly. These "perceptual numbers" are responsible for what I Augustine terms "that natural judgment which approves [rhythms and condemns discjrds" (naturale illud judicium i |. . . judicaturi de oblatis, quanquam a certa brevitate iusque ad certam longitudinem varientur, approbando in his numerosa, et perturbata damn an do. ) . 28 However, the "numbers i [which are more vivacious" judge of man's natural sense i i ! judgments (quibusdam numeris vivacioribus, de numeris quos i' - ” 24mus. VI.6.16 (col. 1172). j 25Ibid., 9.24 (col. 1177) 26Ibid., p. 64. 27ibid., p. 59. t 28mus. 7.18 (col. 1172). ; ".. 79 i j jinfra se habet posse judicare).29 The difference between these two kinds of numbers is the difference between animal I sense appreciation that a given rhythm is pleasurable or painful and rational awareness as to why the rhythm is pleasurable or painful.3° Augustine himself renames these respective "numbers," calling that which makes "natural judgment" possible "perceptible rhythm" and that which enables reason to judge man's sensitive "natural judge ments" "judicial rhythm."31 Gilson has missed this dis- i tinction entirely; therefore, his conclusion that "without mind there is no sensation is wrong if he is speaking I of animal sensation. The animal soul operates according ito the "perceptual numbers" and animals have a "natural sense judgment" that certain sounds and movements are 1 rhythmical. Man, furthermore, shares these "natural sense judgments" with animals. I i Passion and Action in Augustine's View of Sensation Although Augustine denies that the soul undergoes 29i b i d ., 9.24 (col. 1177). 30I b i d ., 9.23 (col. 1176). 33-lbid. i 80 anything from the body when it senses in the body, he does !try to explain the relation between the "natural sense i judgment" (and the perceptual numbers) and the "judicial judgment" (judicaria) and "judicial numbers". The problem is that the natural sense judgment, aided by the perceptual jnumbers, has such strength and ability (vis atque potentia) {because it judges what is harmonious and what is discord- j ant32 and because its judgments can always judge these {harmonies no matter what time intervals occur.22 Yet, despite its power to judge and its ability to judge so always, the natural sense judgment is mortal and therefore present in his animal nature.34 What then is the relation {between the natural sense judgment and its perceptual num- ibers and the rational judgment and its judicial numbers? To answer this question Augustine digresses into an explanation of sensation.25 There are two irreducible elements in sensation, |according to Augustine; a passion in the body affected by | ! 32Ibid., 2.3 (col. 1164). ! 33Ibid., 7.18 (col. 1172). 34Ibid., 8.20 (col. 1174). f | 3^Ibid., 5.9 (col. 1168). 81 sensible stimulus, and an action in the body effected by ithe soul. The result of both these elements is sensation. But the matter is more complicated than this. Augustine claims that the soul makes the difference between non living and living matter. Because of the soul's presence, I the body is tempered (temperatio) to the extent that it has ! -------- |the power (vis) to sense.3® He was certain that "solid I " I i state" things like rocks did not sense because he thought sensation could occur only where there was space within a body. This space was not empty but was occupied with a medium like air in the ears. This air was activated by ; the soul so that when a sound hit the ear, the air could jresonate with the sound's rhythm and thereby communicate i ! the sound to the brain.37 Living things sensed, therefore, t I in proportion to their possession of the instruments needed. These instruments were two: (1) the sense power l !and (2) air, moisture, et cetera, whose interpenetration {made possible the passion of one body moving against I ■ another. Of course, the soul is the principal agent in ,two senses: (1) the soul activates (agit) the light in the j ieyes, the moisture in the tongue, the air in the ears, i | 36Cf., mus. VI.2.3 (col. 1163-64). f j 37Ibid., 5.15 (col. 1171). ___ et cetera, and the sense power which is the eye, ear, et cetera. This is the meaning of the soul tempering the body so it is able to undergo the impression of an object. The eye, for instance, is toned up so that the object- form can impress itself upon the light in the eyes. This is what Augustine means by saying that the soul makes the body "more prepared" to feel an object than, say, an ordinary rock. Matter without a soul is not equipped to feel an object against it.3® (2) The second effect of the soul is to cause the actual operation of sensation (sentire). Although the living body is equipped with its instruments (e.g., the senses with their activated media of light, et cetera), the body only can feel (patitur) the object impressed upon it. The soul, through its attentive presence, effects the act of sensation.39 According to Augustine, sensation is either pleasurable or painful. When the passion impressed in the body elicits a discordant reaction, the sensation is painful. The soul, in other words, becomes more atten tive because of the difficulty encountered with the 38Ibid., 5.10 (col. 1169). 39Ibid., 5.9 (col. 1168). |disagreeable impression. This sensation has the name of !pain or labor. When the impression is congruent to the sense power, the soul easily brings all of it (or whatever it needs) into the journeying of its working (facile totum vel ex eo quantum opus est, in sui operis itinera traducit) |The passion elicits a harmonious response and the sensation is pleasurable.40 Whatever the influences upon this theory of sensa tion, Augustine's view is unique. Sensation is not an objective result of sensible objects acting upon sense powers informed by a formal principle, as it is for Aristotle; nor is it a subjective result of a bodily pro- 'jection meeting another bodily projection in mid-air and ! resulting in a detached sensation,as it is in Plato. Augustine's theory is subjective in two senses: (1) the spiritual soul prepares the body so it has the senses and ' their activated media. (2) Then the soul causes the sensa- I I Ition of the feeling sense power. The soul in effect dis- i iposes matter to be sentient; the human soul in effect !creates the animal body to be human. Augustine, therefore, ,conceives the unity of man to be an operational unity with 40Ibid. 84 the human soul having a directive and creative purpose. When a man, for example, responds to musical harmonies, he is, like an animal, approving of the pleasurable rhythm he feels. This is a natural sense response, according to Augustine, but for man this is not enough. A man's soul has the duty of tempering his bodily response and of transforming it into a measured response, obedient to reason. The human soul, therefore, has the obligation of creating a human body in man; it must attune the body to the rational use of pleasure and pain. For this reason, it is not sufficient for man to react and respond by his natural sense judgment according to "perceptible numbers"; these responses and numbers must be judged by reason according to the "judicial numbers."41 Man's soul, there fore, must take care not to activate merely the natural sense judgment according to "perceptible numbers," but must measure the sensation by reason according to "judicial numbers." But animals, thanks to the "perceptible numbers" impressed in the bodily senses by God's reason, react con sistently to the rhythms in sound and movement according to 41Ibid., 10.25-28 (col. 1177-79). 85 I I A o Stheir natural sense judgments. Sometimes, says Augustine, i this sense judgment is immediate (naturS) , but, at other times, it is mediate (fabricatS naturS, i.e., consuetudine).43 In any case, it consistently judges pleasurable things to be pursued and painful things to be avoided. The animal soul jmerely tones the animal body according to the "perceptible |numbers"; for animals to live, therefore, natural sense judgment is a sufficient, and consistent guide. It is unfortunate that neither Gilson in The Chris- jtian Philosophy of St. Augustine nor Gannon in her "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine" have dealt with [ jthe relation between "perceptible numbers" and "judicial numbers" in Augustine's theory of sensation. This relation : is essential to the understanding of both Augustine's view \ of sensation and of judgment. This understanding, as we shall see in Chapter V, is necessary to understand his view i j 1 ;of illumination. 42ord. 1.25; 11.12. 43rel. 79; an. II.3; mus. I The "Certain Sense" of Judging and the "Judicial Power” ■— ------ Augustine is still not certain whether the judicial I rhythms are mortal or not; he is sure that the other five measured rhythms are mortal. Since the judicial rhythm ! guides the other rhythms and is the rhythm because of which they can be rhythmic it has a non-mortal quality about it, i.e., inflexibility, unchangeableness. This quality leaves ! its mortality in doubt. Augustine comments that the pro gressive rhythm seeks "measured movements" in the body and ! in so doing its rhythm is modified by the judicial rhythm. I Some of the "measured movements" he describes are: walking I : with even steps, eating and drinking with even movements of ! j the jaw, scratching with even movements of the fingers. i Others, which might be added, are: any and all operations I of the autonomic nervous system, such as the hypothalmutic i i temperature in each animal body, the activities of diges- , tion, heart beat, et cetera. Though Augustine predicates j these activities of man only they certainly would be : applicable to animals also. Furthermore, Augustine did j ; state that the ability to judge of, and be delighted by, 87 equality is in the "natural judgment of sensation itself."44 j iIn the treatise On Free Will, Augustine observes that the sense of sight judges both what is lacking (quid desit) and what is sufficient (vel satis sit) in its sensation of 'colors.4® Thus, even the exterior sense of sight is seek ing an equality in its sensations of color, just as the !exterior sense of hearing is seeking an equality in its j I 'sensations of sound. Such seeking of equality must be the 'natural tendency of all five exterior senses. Therefore, i I |when he says that this demand for, and desire of, equality (parilitatas) (or aequalitas) is "something judicial"4® and i the progressive rhythm seeks this equality due to a "hidden |nod (i.e., inclination or will)" of the judicial rhythm, a I !question arises. Does this not mean that animals, too, I j ihave the "judicial power" as well as the judicial rhythm? I ' ; The "Judicial Power" and the Power of Familiarity ! I Augustine pointed out that "the natural power" t !which he describes as vis quasi judicaria, or "as it were ! j ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- j 44Ibid., VI.4.5 (col. 1165); 8.20 (col. 1173-74). 45lib. II.5.12 (BAC Vol. Ill, p. 265). J 46mus. VI.4.5 (col. 1165), and 1.5.10 (col 1089), |III.8.19 (col. 1126 ) . _________ judiciary," is present to the ears even when there is no sound (e.g., sonant rhythm); otherwise, when sound rhythm did occur there would be no judgment discerning harmonious music from discordant and thus, no acceptance or rejec tion.4^ In other words, the sense of hearing must possess the judiciary power because it does judge any sound that it experiences even when there are time lapses. This would mean that this "natural power, as it were, judiciary" would be present to the ears of all animals, not just man. But Augustine's distinction between the "actual sense judgment using perceptible numbers" and "rational judgment according to judicial numbers" clarifies the issue. Animals respond through "natural sense judgment," which is guided by the "perceptible numbers" impressed in their bodily members. But, who or what is the source of these "impressed numbers"? Augustine vacillates on the matter. He is certain their ultimate source is the Reason of God, but he says that each living body within the universe possesses a "sense of time and place" because its movements are measured according to the part of the universe it occupies and the time at which 47Ibid., VI.2.3 (col. 1164). 89 {it lives.48 This would seem to require the presence of I some kind of rational soul within all living bodies, not I just men. Augustine comments also that the "hidden nod (i.e., inclination or will)" of the judicial rhythm causes one to reach (insinuat) God, the Builder of animal. ; (conditor animalis).49 Augustine, however, thought that jthere was a soul of the world in his early works. There fore, though Augustine held God as the source of order within the universe of living bodies, he did entertain the probability of a world soul as a proximate source. What- l ever the final scholarly decision, Augustine held that the j ;"judicial numbers" were behind the desire of perceptual i rhythm for equality and constrains perceptual rhythm to i I I seek the pleasurable (convenientia) and avoid the painful j ! (inconvenientia). It would seem, therefore, that Augustine is not ifar from the Stoic idea of pneuma and the presence of logos J i i in all living things.88 The difference, of course, is that j 48Ibid., 7.19 (col. 1173). 49Ibid., 8.20 (col. 1174). 50Nutum comes from neuroa, meaning "nod, will, incli nation"; pneuma includes the reality of Logos, according to the Stoic doctrine, as the guiding force in all living things, jTo this extent the Stoic doctrine of logos and the Platonic idea of the whole world soul in the Timaeus could coincide. 90 i i j j Augustine maintains the strict spirituality of sensation. The "natural sense judgment" and the "perceptible numbers" are a mortal spirit; in man they must be directed by reason according to "judicial numbers." Only in this way can the consistency and stability of perceptual sense judgments jsatisfy man's need for unchangeable and immutable rational I judgments.51 Augustine's distinction between "perceptible :numbers" and "judicial numbers" is true to the Platonic principle, e.g., consistency, inflexibility, immutability |{which the "judicial power" supposes) cannot be found in mutable reality (and the animal nature of man is mortal f land mutable according to Augustine). Augustine's distinc tion also is an attempt to be true to the consistency of animal judgments concerning pleasure and pain, harmony and discord. His observation that animal perceptual rhythm ;works through the "power of familiarity" (consuetudo) shows | ; his awareness that animals learn some of their patterns of |sense response. Because of Augustine's view of consuetudo relative to sense response, we would disagree with Pope's comment that "Augustine realizes that their (animal) actions i _____________________ . . ______ _________ _________ . ____________________ 51Ibid., 10.26 (col. 1178). ! r jare'due to instinct rather than to r e a s o n ."52 Augustine t distinguishes between "nature" (natura) and "second or fabricated nature" (consuetudo). "Second or fabricated nature" is learned and becomes habit; it is not instinctual. Because of some things that animals do and because ;of some of their sense capabilities, Augustine observes that j I animals sometimes surpass man's abilities to respond. He !attributes this to animal's "power of sensing," which he calls an "image of knowledge."53 True to the Platonic view i Ithat the world of sense is an "image" of the real world, Augustine holds that animal sense awareness is an "image :of knowledge." Yet, unlike Plato, Augustine contends that the more man develops his powers of sense judgment and jmemory (which he has in common with animals) the more musi- i jcal he will be. Since music is a "discipline partaking of sense and intellect, and because animal sense judgment 'recognizes and responds consistently and correctly to rhythm, man can learn and practice by observing and follow ing his natural sense judgments. Thus, "the certain sense" j 7 2 3*Hugh Pope, St. Augustine of Hippo (New York: 'image Book , 1961), p. 214. I 53c[U. 18.56 (col. 1067). S 54mus. 11.14.41 (col. 780). | 92 |of which Augustine spoke guided by the "perceptual numbers" i ihas the ability to judge of, and be delighted by, equal- CC ity. Augustine reserves to reason, however, the "judicial power" which judges whether harmonious sounds please rightly or not (utrum recte an secus ista delectent).56 i Phantasia or Phantasmata and Comparative Sense Judgments I j Augustine's discussion of "phantasia" and "phan tasm" raises another problem— the problem, namely, of whether or not animals make comparative judgments, j "Phantasia" are the results of the movements of the i mind (animi) acting against the passions of the body (qui j adversus passiones corporis acti sunt).57 These "phantasia" are in the memory; if, however, they are held to be both what is thought and what is perceived, a man lives a life I ■ - • 55ibid., VI.4.5 (col. 1165). | 56Ibjd., 9.24 (col. 1177). ! ■ 57ibid., 11.32 (col. 1180). This application is but a further extension of Augustine's conviction that jthe soul (in this case man's) causes sensation; thus I "phantasia" exist because of the soul's attentive activity I on the body's passions, i.e., reception of objects. jof opinion only. Such a life, as far as man is concerned, constitutes the entrance into error, but is not of itself t error.58 When the movements of the mind and those of the body react with each other (cum sibi isti motus occursant), other things called "phantasms" are born (alios ex aliis motus pariunt). "Phantasia" give us sensible images of J ( sensible objects, but "phantasm" provide images similar to the sense images. "Phantasms" are thus images of images. The example Augustine offers is instructive; but, I jwhen looked at from the point of view of animal judgments, it raises a problem. Augustine's father, whom he has seen ioften, he knows in one way; he has a "phantasia" of this {father. His grandfather, whom,he has never seen, he knows | in another way; he has a "phantasm" of his grandfather. |The "phantasiA" of his father is the result of a sense per ception (i.e., the body's passion and the soul's action); i the "phantasm" of his grandfather is the result of the action of his mind on something which was in his memory.59 58The problem of "opinion" and "error" will be treated in both Chapter 111 (when it relates to man's {sensations) and Chapter IV (when it relates to man's ;reasonings). j 59Ibid., 11.32 (col. 1181). i 94 i I jllere arises the confusion. In the treatise On Free Will, Augustine discusses the fact that Odysseus' dog remembered his master after twenty years. Now, Odysseus' father was present to the dog during that time, but the dpg discerned he was not Odysseus (though he sensed him to be familiar). Odysseus' dog, therefore, would have had at least a "phantasia" of his master. The dog also would have compared the master with the "phantasia" at least once, i.e., when Odysseus returned ,and the dog recognized him. Thus, the dog would be making a comparative judgment involving the "phantasia" in his i ! memory and the sense object re-presented. This comparative judgment is a correct one, and one which the baby, the dog I and other animals make through the "power of familiarity." i ;This is the natural sense judgment developed and habituated which Augustine says judges the "agreeable" (convenientia) i i ;and the disagreeable (inconvenientia)--animals have it in I icommon with men. t I Again, the problem is that such judgments would seem to be inflexible, i.e., always correct. Augustine j does not speak of the possibility of the baby or the dog | being in error; nor does he mention the possibility of | animals being in error when judging what is "agreeable" to them; therefore, according to Augustine's distinction between “phantasia" and “phantasms," animals would not seem to possess "phantasms." Yet, even so, Augustine's observations concerning such matters seem to force the conclusion that animals, too, have the ability to dis tinguish between true images (phantasia) and images of images (phantasmata). In other words, Odysseus' dog not only judged the “stranger" to be different from Odysseus' father, but the dog "saw through" the disguise and judged the "stranger" to be Odysseus. The dog, therefore, is judging the sense judgment of his eyes. But, how can an animal judge its sense judgments? Would not such an observation of Augustine mean that animals have the "judi cial power" which is judging of the "perceptible" sense power? The Interior Sense in Animals and Men Augustine discusses what he terms the "interior sense" by which animals and men judge their exterior senses and the sensations themselves. Though the discussion clarifies Augustine's concept of animal judgment, it does not relate the "measured rhythms" or the "judicial power" of On Music to the "interior sense" of man and animals in On Free Will. Gilson offers no help here because he does i not even mention the "interior sense" as Augustine treats i j j it. 1 I . The usual date given for the writing of On Music is , ~ ~ I after 387, whereas the date for On Free Will is 388-395. In saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, Marrou uses letter 101, written by Augustine to Memorius between 408-9, to substantiate the claim that the amended Book VI |of On Music was completed just prior to the letter.®0 This j jcorrected copy of Book VI would overlap the time during which On Free Will was written and thereby offer Augustine the opportunity to clarify his thought. The fact is |Augustine does not seem to relate the "interior sense" |of On Free Will with the treatment of rhythms in On Music. ^ ■ I We shall attempt this task. | I In On Free Will, Augustine and Evodius are talking I about the hierarchy of beings, within reality in order to 1 i determine whether or not there is a being superior to all i others, i.e., God. They agree that living is superior to ®°H. I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Bibl: des Ecoles Fran^aises, Paris), pp. 380-83. 97 being, and understanding is superior to both. While analyzing the activity of living, they discuss sensation < I itself and discover the presence of an "interior sense" by which both, man and animal, discern what is received from the five exterior senses, and by which they discern the sensations themselves.61 Such discernment is necessary, says Augustine, for otherwise no animal would move to seek what is beneficial to it or avoid the harmful. Unless the ; "interior sense" judges of the sensations, it can not judge to accept or reject what is perceived by the exterior i I |senses. Furthermore, the animal must also judge that it i ; lives, and that living is beneficial; otherwise, no animal j would shun death. It is, therefore, through this "interiorj sense" that the soul of the animal is warned (admonetur) j I both to open its eyes (when asleep) so it can "see" and j i j to look accurately at whatever it " s e e s ."62 j | Augustine goes on to clarify the function of this i "interior sense." Since it judges the sensations of the S exterior senses, it also judges in a way all corporeal ; 610p. cit., lib. III.3.8-9 (BAC III, pp. 257-60). 62Ibid. , 5.12 (p. 265). 1 |things.63 The passions of pleasure and pain are proper to it. It judges the difference between a gentle touch i (leniter) and a harsh touch (aspere). It also judges ! I what any exterior sense lacks and when each exterior sense j is sensinq properly (satis). This "interior sense," I therefore, judges what is lacking to sensations and when !the sensations themselves are integral to the respective sense power; it warns of deficiencies in sensations and examines sensations to make sure they are appropriate to, , i I and healthy for, each external sense power (cum eorum integritatem probat, et debitum flagitat). The Superiority of the Interior Sense and the Nature of Its Comparative Judgments i Two things are clear concerning the judgments of ithe "interior sense" common to animals and man: (1) they i ! iare not just judgments that a proper sense object is j I agreeable or disagreeable (e.g., pleasurable or painful), i.e., color to the eye; they are comparative judgments about I(a) whether or not a given sensation is deficient or !excessive; and (b) when and when not a given sensation is ! I 63Ibid. 99 i : i appropriate and healthful to the sense power and when not. They are, therefore, judgments about how sensations are occurring and about degrees of pleasure and pain. Further more, they are concerned with the content of the sensationsi :(2) The comparative sense judgments involve no illumination; ; i natural or otherwise, and presume none. They are elicited ! from a power inherent in animal nature; and this power has as its object the sensations of the exterior sense powers. Augustine himself comments that since this "interior sense" judges other sense judgments, animals which possess this power are superior to all corporeal beings and all living ,beings which do not possess this power. The principle on which he bases this statement is a Platonic one: whatever judges of something is superior to that about which it judges. The "interior sense" literally guides and directs the other senses.^ i The Interior Sense, the Animal Soul and the Judicial Power i ! A problem seems to arise when one seeks the relation i of this "interior sense" to the animal soul. Augustine is j 64Ibid., pp. 264-65. | i - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J ! 100 t I j adamant on his principle that the body undergoes the I reception o£ the sense object whereas the soul is the cause of sensing the object received. However, Augustine agrees | with Evodius' unequivocal statement in On Free Will that the i soul is warned by the "interior sense power" both to open [ the eyes (which are shut, i.e., activate the eyes so they | I can sense) and to complete what is lacking in the act of I seeing (i.e., cause the eye to sense what it is not sens ing). This statement provokes two questions: (1) If the sense of sight is not sensing, what object stimulates this interior sense? The eyes are not capable of receiving their object (color) when they are closed; they cannot then be ‘affected by a sense object and the activity of seeing can- not occur, even though the soul causes the sensation. i !Perception, according to Augustine, is an activity involv- i ing both the passion of the body and the action of the | soul. Thus, if any one or all of the external senses were i |not receptive of their respective objects, what would i ;stimulate the interior sense to make its judgment of their deficiency? Augustine does not say. ! ; i A second question arises as a result of Augustine'sj iview that the soul "is warned or alerted" by the interior j !sense (sed ille interior, qua admonetur et anima). How can i '.. ~ I 101 the sense power which judges to a certain extent (quodammodo) about corporeal things, influence a soul which is non-corporeal? This view of Augustine's would seem to mean that the passions of desire (voluptas) and pain (dolor) cause the soul to be aware of the non-activity jof any of the exterior senses. Augustine has said that the i soul is conscious (non earn latSre) of what passions the body undergoes; but he said nothing in either the On Music or On the Magnitude of the Soul about the soul being aware i (or being made aware) of what the body does not undergo. ' If one goes further and relates the "interior | sense" to the "judicial power" referred to in On Music, the conclusion seems to be that they are one and the same thing. | Their activities are the same; (1) The judicial rhythm i guides the other "measured rhythms," and the "judicial : power" directs the hearing, touching, et cetera. Similarly, the "interior sense" directs and guides the exterior sense i powers in their sensations of seeing, et cetera. (2) Both ! accept the pleasant (convenientia) and reject the painful j(inconvenientia). The only difference seems to be that i : Augustine says that reason, through the judicial power, ijudges if the agreeable sound is sensed rightly or wrongly. i ■Whereas in On Free Will he says that the "interior sense" 102 judges whether the sensing is done well (e.g., integritatem probat . . . satis) or badly (e.g., debitum flagitat vel desit). It would seem, therefore, that the judicial power's judgment is a moral value judgment concerning how man should react to pleasant sounds; the interior sense power's judgment is a value judgment concerning how the sensation is taking place. But, both are value judgments and both judgments are measuring the acts performed. The judicial power measures the sensitive response according to "judicial numbers"; the "interior sense" measures the sensi tive response according to what? Surely not "perceptible numbers" because then "perceptible numbers" would be judg- i ing themselves. According to what criteria, then, does the "interior sense" judge the external sense responses? Augustine does not seem to say. j The possible reason why Augustine did not identify i the two is that the "judicial power" involves an awareness of the numerical quality inherent in the rhythms, the "interior sense" does not. The awareness of numbers is possible only to reason because it involves the recognition of number as number. Yet, when Augustine explains why the "judicial power" must operate through reason, he says the "power" judges whether or not these sounds pleased rightly 103 (utrum recte an secus ista delectent). The "power of familiarity" merely judges that the sounds are pleasant |or not. The "interior sense" judges that the sensation is |done well or badly. These three powers are different. I The "power of familiarity" is obviously the sense power i habituated to respond according to the "perceptible num bers;" it is the sense power with a "fabricated or second nature." The "interior sense" is a higher sensitive power which judges the operations of the exterior sense powers themselves. But, according to what does the "interior sense power" make these judgments? Augustine does not say and, since the "interior sense" is common to main and j animal, Augustine could not say it judged according to "judicial numbers" because this would mean animals had reason also. This matter seems to be unresolved by i t i |Augustine and impossible of resolution according to his i views of the relation between body and soul. J I 104 Sister M. A. Ida Gannon's Interpretation of Augustine*s Theory of Sensation65 Sister Gannon purports to: . . . consider the development of Augustine's thought from his early to his later works, list the various uses of the term sensus and suggest I some points of comparison and contrast between Plotinus and Augustine.66 She notes that Augustine distinguishes between the sense activity of brutes and man. The brute sensation and aware- ! ness is directed to activity alone; man's can be directed to knowledge (scientia).67 ghe even states that animals have the lowest type of memory which links the animal to the sensible objects.68 Later, she identifies this "lowest memory" with the "phantasia" and comments that animal judg ments of the pleasant or unpleasant "may, however, be 'affected by custom."69 However, Sister Gannon makes no mention of Augustine's distinction between "judicial * rhythm" and "judicial power"; nor does she relate the i 65sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, B.V.M., "The Active |Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine," The New Scholasti cism, Vol. XXX (1956), pp. 154-80. 66ibid., p. 154. 6?Ibid., pp. 155-56. 68Ibid., p. 156. 69ibid., pp. 156-58 105 | "judicial power" to the "power of familiarity." She does discuss the problems that occur when Augustine affirms the j presence of "judicial rhythm" to all the "measured move ments" of living beings, but denies the presence of "judi cial power" to any but man's reasoning movements. ! As a matter of fact, she inaccurately states, following Gilson's faulty analysis: j The highest motion of the soul, proper to reason, j is called judicial and is the means by which all j other actions are appraised in the light of eternal I truths.70 i J Besides this misleading and unexplained inclusion of "the i light of eternal truths" into the analysis, she says in a footnote: For a detailed analysis of the pertinent passages in Book VI see Gilson.71 The fact is that Gilson's analysis is incomplete? further- jmore, in this matter of "light" it is inaccurate. As has I been pointed out above, no mention of "illumination" or |"light" has been included in the passages where Augustine discusses the soul of animals and animal sense judgment. I Sister Gannon also includes the discussion of the "interior sense" found in the On Free W i l l .72 However, she 7°ibid., p. 158. 71jbid., footnote No. 15. 72ibid., pp. 158-59. 106 | does not mention the kinds of judgments the "interior j isense" elicits; nor does she bring up the passage in which i i r the "interior sense" is said to "warn" the soul. The need j for the sense power to undergo (patitur) a sense object J i 'before the soul becomes aware of it (and then causes the j !sensation) is not related to the fact that this "warning" comes about with no apparent passion of the "interior sense" (since its object, the sensation of the exterior i |powers, is lacking). Nor does she discuss how the "interior sense" could effectively "warn" the soul (since it is cor- iporeal and the soul, though mortal, is not). This "warn ing" action of the "interior sense" seems to challenge two |of the conclusions she claims Augustine consistently main- |tains: (1) The soul is superior to the body and therefore cannot be affected by it; (2) an external object is neces- isary to cause a passion in the organ. Gilson's Interpretation of Augustine's Theory of Sensation I l ! The fact is that Gilson makes no mention of animal sense judgment in Chapter IV, "The Fourth Step— Sense Knowledge." Can this omission be explained by the title, Ibid., p. 177 .... ' 107 i.e., that he is considering Augustine's concept of sense I knowledge? It does not seem so because of the omission of I ' i : several essential elements in Augustine's concept of animal! ! ' j j sense judgment. During the course of his interpretation, j I j ! Gilson says: Scattered indications regarding the classic doc trine of the five senses contain nothing original.^ References cited to support this contention include one |from the third book of On Free Will, but none from either | 1the first or the second book, in which Augustine treats 'sense judgment at some length.None of the references j j includes the puzzling "sense of time and place" which I Augustine says all animals have, or the "natural power of sensation" frequently spoken of as being within the sense power, cited in On Music. Many references, however, appear to On Genesis VII and XII, The City of God and The Trinity. Yet, these three are all later works. Nowhere in the chap ter does Gilson discuss the "interior sense" common to animals and man. I ^ G i l s o n , pp, cit., pp. 277-78, footnote No. 6. ^The text Gilson cites does not even use the words "judge" or "discern"; in it appears "light" (lux). But the usage refers to the sense of sight and does not relate to sense judgment as such nor to rational judgments. In this instance and in others, Gilson seems to cite texts in which Augustine uses "light" and its derivatives; but textual anaJy sis sometimes raises questions concerning their pertinence. [ When he analyzes the texts from On Music dealing j with the various kinds of rhythm, he does not mention the i i I further distinction which Augustine draws between percep- J tual rhythm (sensuales numeri) and judicial rhythm ! (judiciales numeri).7* » Gilson, therefore, is in no posi tion to question the distinction which Augustine makes between the "judicial power" which operates through man's reason, and judicial rhythm which inheres in all of cor- I jporeal nature.77 Neither can Gilson relate the "power of ] {familiarity" to the "judicial power." i j The inadequacy of Gilson’s treatment appears again when he discusses Augustine's distinction between "phan tasia" and "phantasm. "78 since Gilson does not treat ani mal judgments, he does not discuss the problem which Evodius faces because Odysseus' dog remembers his master. Nor does Gilson consider the problems which the facts of animal memory raise relative to Augustine's meaning of "phantasia," or the possibility of animals making compara- i tive sense judgments. Gilson, therefore, does not mention 76Ibid., p. 64. 77No where in this discussion does he refer to the distinction, though some of the cited texts include it in one way or another. 7 8 Ibid., p. 56 and p. 277, footnote No. 3. * 109 the fact that many of the so-called sense judgments are value judgments because they are comparative judgments. 'Neither does Gilson consider the problems which animal j I memory and the "interior sense" raise regarding Augustine'sj I contention that the soul senses when the bodily senses undergo or receive a sense object. Because of the inter- j relation of animal memory and "phantasia" and the activity i jof "warning" proper with the "interior sense," Augustine j |must hold that a sense power affects the soul. But if i Gilson had considered these factors of animal judgment at i Jail, he surely would not say: i ! Thus we see that memory is involved even in the ! briefest of our sensations. Now since memory is clearly associated with pure thought than with the elementary sensation of sound produced by the soul, the full contribution of the soul to sense knowledge bursts upon our view: it not only passes judgment on sense knowledge, it creates it.?9 l » I |How could he state that "without mind, there is no sensa- |tion"?80Animals both sense and remember; they make various judgments. Mind is not involved, nor is it needed. These and similar statements show how profoundly Gilson's inter- ! pretation of Augustine's concept of sensation has been affected by omitting a consideration of Augustine's concept 79lbid., p. 64. 80lbid. " “ ' 110' j of animal judgment. Throughout the present chapter Augustine's concept ; of animal sense judgment has been considered. The inade- j | i ;guacies of Gilson's interpretation have been pointed out. I I !In Chapter III we shall examine Augustine's concept of ' i sensation in man, and the nature of human sense judgments. i CHAPTER III I THE SENSE JUDGMENTS OF RATIONAL SOULS i This chapter develops the concept of judgment that Augustine applies to the sense judgments of rational souls, i.e., men. It is a complex chapter because of two funda mental concepts of Augustine: (1) his concept of the soul as the principal agent involved in sensation having no powers distinct in it or from it;1 (2) his contention that though man is an animal (animal), his soul (anima) is rational. A problem of balancing his theoretical tenets with his practical applications confronts us. Augustine acknowledges that man and animal have a i soul in common (anima). But because man is a rational animal (rational anima), he has more than animal.2 Though this statement seems to imply the possibility of man's having two souls, in On the Immortality of the Soul, ! _____________ ] -- 1mus. VI.9.24 (1176-77). 2sol. 1.2.7 (BAC I. p. 506). Ill 112 Augustine says that the irrational soul (i.e., the life principle) cannot be turned into (convertitur) a rational soul. Since, however, Augustine does hold that the body and soul of man are "mixed" together in a proper measure (temperatio), man could have two souls, one irrational (mortal) and the other rational (spiritual). Yet, it would seem that his comment that man's rational soul is differ ent from and higher than the animal's irrational soul would ' 3 -preclude this two-fold soul in man. In any case, Augustin^ jcalls man's body and soul combination an "unconfused union" (unio inconfusa).^ The "Function" of Man's Rational Soul When speaking of rational souls in reference to angels, Augustine says that by nature (natura) rational j souls are equal to angels, but in their function (officio) they are inferior to the angelic soul.5 He explains that their different functions are due to the difference of thei bodies and the consequent ease or difficulty with which 3im. XVI.25 (PL 32 col. 1034). 4e£. 137. 5lib. 11.11.32-33 (BAC III. pp. 359-60). 113 their respective souls can beautify and rule these bodies.^ This explanation of Augustine, ascribing the differences of < l i the soul's functions to the differences of the bodies they | i {are in, would seem to contradict Augustine's explanation I of sensation, given in On Music VI. In our previous chap- i ter, we noted that Augustine says the soul prepares (temperatio) both the body so it can feel the sense impression (patitur) and the medium of the passion, e.g., the air, moisture, et cetera in each of the senses. According to this view, Augustine would have to hold that the soul itself effects the differences in the body accord ing to its nature and functions. But, he seems to say the opposite. In On Music he is adamant in disallowing the soul to be affected directly by the body; "the soul does not suffer (patitur) from the body in any way." In our view, however, Augustine is not consistent on this matter. Therefore, we cannot accept Gilson's unqualified statement that: in none of the passages in which he dealt with the i problem either expressly or incidentally, did he stray from the rigid yet tortuous line which he had chosen.? 6Cf., <jua. 13.22 (BAC III. pp. 447-48) and mor. 1.27.52. n Gxlson, op. cit., p. 56. ........ ' ' 114' According to Augustine, the angelic soul resides within a celestial body; and, adhering to God as it does, ! manages the terrestrial body. It beautifies and rules the ! i earth according to the Divine will (nutum) which it | intuit* without mistake (infallibiliter) . The rational I " l soul, however, can hardly manage interiorly its own body because it is burdened and weighted down by a mortal one; (nevertheless, the rational soul beautifies its body in so j far as it can. Furthermore, when it comes to acting upon bodies near by, extrinsic to itself, the rational soul does p what it can by means of a greatly weakened operation. ! i Problems of Interpretation Due to Some Examples Used by Augustine A few difficult questions arise when some of i [Augustine's applications and illustrations are related to his theory of the soul. In On the Magnitude of the Soul he comments that the baby's perception of its nurse was similar to the animals'; it accepted her as pleasurable through the "power of familiarity" (which was shown to be ] the sense powers habituated to pleasurable responses in 8lib. III.11.34 (pp. 360-61). 1x5 Chapter II). This "interior sense," Augustine says, man and animals have in common. Even granting the correctness of Sister Gannon's observation that brute sensation is I i directed to activity alone and man's can be directed to knowledge,9 Augustine does not say these sensations were different in kind or function, nor did he place the differ ence in different kinds of souls. Besides, although Gilson and Gannon treat of Augustine's analysis of signs developed in On the Teacher, both fail to challenge Augustine limit ing its application to man alone. In the previous chapter, i we noted Augustine's view that animals always judge cor rectly what is pleasant (and then seek it) and what is painful (and thus avoid it). Now in On the Teacher, Augustine contends that reason achieves "meanings" (sig- nificationes) whereas sense attains only "signs" (signa); I Augustine states that the ability of reason to achieve "meaning" signifies it is a superior power and under the influence of Divine illumination.-*-® Yet, surely, any i j |animal fleeing an area at the first scent of smoke and a } dog identifying his master from his odor prove that both are going beyond the "signs" of smoke and disguise to the 90p. cit., pp. 155-56. _______ 10qua. 24.45-46? 32.65-66.___________________________ "meanings" of "fire-harmful-to-it" and "scent-beneficial- to-it." The fact that an animal retains these "harmfuls- 1to-it" and "beneficials-to-it" through memory, compounds ! the difficulties in Augustine's view because, Augustine also uses the retentive powers of memory as evidence for the spirituality of the rational soul,H and as evidence that the rational soul is not extended into the material body it vivifies.I2 Yet, this chapter seeks to determine i / t what, if any, differences Augustine attributes to the activities of man's external and internal senses. i 1 i The "Look of Sight" and the Act of Judgment I I In On the Academicians, Augustine notes that man has true knowledge as a result of true messages from the external senses, i.e., a man knows that something seems white (sight), something else is cold (touch), another thing pleases the ear, something else has a pleasant odor (smell), and another thing tastes sweetly. A man knows these things to be true because the senses report truly 11an., IV.5.6 (PL 44 col. 527-28). 12fu. XVI.20 (PL 42 col. 185). 117 (verum renuntient). ^3 If, says, Augustine, any man asks whether olive leaves which goats seek so assiduously are ; 1 bitter, this man has less common sense (modestior) than a I goat. Whatever the goat’s sensation of the leaves, they seem bitter to a man. If a man confines his judgment to the sense messages, he has true knowledge; but if he ques tions it, he has less sense than the goat. Augustine here contends that the various sense perceptions of animals are more accurate than some men's judgments about their own I J sense perceptions; but this does not mean that animals have jreason.^4 it does mean, however, that if men allow their |judgments to be guided by their sense perceptions, they i will not fall into errors like those of the Skeptics. At the same time, in another context, Augustine seems to deprecate man's sense perceptions. ! In On the Teacher, Augustine says that man does not learn through sensible signs but through knowledge of their 1 R meanings.x' Knowledge of the meanings precedes awareness of i * — - — _ . _ _ 13Ac. III.11.26 (BAC III. p. 156) Aristotle's com ments in this regard are interesting when compared to Augustine's: met. IV.6 (lOlla-lOllb 25, pp. 748-49 McKeon edition). ^mus. 1.4.6 (1086). 15mag. 11.36-38; 13.41-44 (BAC III. pp. 587-95). 118 j the signs by which the meaning is signified to and recog nized by the mind. Meaning, therefore, is an interior ; i j achievement of cognition and it is held by memory, whereas I isigns merely strike the ear, the eye, or some other sense ! j so that the passion, one of the two necessary elements which result in sensation, can occur.16 Here we encounter an interesting emphasis and an enlightening comparison by Augustine, which this chapter will pursue and clarify in exposing his concept of man's sense judgments: Augustine emphasizes the sense of sight (oculi corporis) and the look of sight (aspectus oculi) and he compares mental seeing and looking (oculus animae . . . aspectus mentis) with the physical. Through a look at the subject (per ejus aspectus), and not through spoken words, man learns some thing unknown, for it is by this look that man might know and remember what power the word has and what meaning it conveys (per quern factum est ut etiam nomen illud quid valeret, nossem ac teneram) .17 Although Augustine holds that the senses do not attain meaning in the sense of know ing the signification of the sign, an investigation of these: 16Ibid., 5.12 (p. 556); 10.34 (pp. 585-86). 17Ibid., 1035 (p. 587). 119 human sense judgments adds to rather than detracts from his concept of sensation and its relation to rational judgments. Ocular Judgments and the "Forest” "True" and 1 1 False'* Bodies j { Augustine compares the function of man's senses in | the attaining of knowledge to the function of a ship i carrying a man to his destination. When the man arrives i I jat his journey's end, he leaves the ship. A man, trying t |to learn the discipline of geometry uses sensible signs; i |the learner is thereby helped by the signs a little I i (aliquatulum). However, man could more easily navigate a t ship on dry land than perceive geometry by means of the s e n s e s .18 Disciplines (e.g., geometry, philosophy, et |cetera) are habits of the soul; the knowledges that they 1 jinvolve and imply are in the soul. The sense of sight can see a sphere, i.e., a round body,l® but not as sphere. The eyes can also judge one body to be more spherical than another;20 an(j they can judge a true spherical body from a , . . . . i . __ 18sol. 1.4.9. (BAC I. pp. 510-11). 19Ibid., 11.18.32 (p. 592) and 20.35 (p. 598). 20Ibid., 5.8 (p. 558). false one. But, senses cannot attain knowledge, i.e., of a true sphere as sphere. The question, then, is what do 1 the senses attain? What do sense judgments achieve? | Confronting man as a "knower" and a "senser" is what Augustine calls a 1 1 forest" of things (silva rerum) . This forest presents the mind and the senses with objects (i.e., phantasia) which have likenesses (similarities) and yet are dissimilar.21 Augustine analyzes this forest in i order to determine the origin of falsity. Since he, in the guise of "Reason," has said that "what the eyes see is not called false unless it has some similitude to the true,"22 21Ibid., 6.11 (p. 560). 22Ibid., 6.10. However, the translator falsifies the meaning by rendering it in English as: "that the shadows of bodies belong to the domain of the eyes" (The Soliloquies of Saint Augustine, trans. by Thos. Gilligan (Father's of the Church edition, New York, 1943), p. 95. In falsifying it, he actually prevents one from attaining the meaning and profundity of Augustine's thought here. As a matter of fact, in this regard he is neither accurate nor consistent in his translations; "judgment" translates incerto arbitrio, 11.14.26, p. 412; and sententiam, 11.15- 29, p. 415; "true and false judgment" are translations of veras sententias falsa sententia, ibid.; "to judge" trans lates arbitrer, 11.17.31, p. 417; "I judge," translates the word opinor, ibid., p. 418; then "I think" translates arbitror, ibid. To attain Augustine's thought through these translations is absolutely impossible. he called "the similitude of things which pertain to the jeyes the mother of falsity."23 In testing this conclusion,; Augustine divides the forest of things which involve j < j similarity into two genera: (I) the similar which are I I equal (aequalia), which we speak of when one thinq is similar to a second and the latter is also similar to the former. The examples adduced are: twins or the impression:: of a signet ring. (II) The similar which are unequal (deterioribus), which we speak of when one thing is similar but inferior to a second. The example is: the image of a man in a mirror. This group is subdivided as (A) being in some things experienced (patitur) by the soul, and (B) in some things which are being seen (videntur). Each of these species are subdivided as follows: (Ai) those experienced by the soul in the sense experiencing it (ipsum quod anima patitur, aut in sensu patitur), as the apparent movement of a tower, or (A2) within itself as a result of its having accepted something from the senses (aut apud seipsum, ex eo quod accept a sensibus); and, (Bj_) some which are expressed or fashioned by nature; or B2) by living things. Nature produces inferior but similar 23Ibid., 6.10 122 j things by generation, e.g., when parents bring forth chil- j idren who resemble them; and by reflection, e.g., as in ! i i I various kinds of mirrors. The inferior but similar things ! which nature produces by reflection are of two kinds: those reflected in mirrors, and the shadows cast by natural things, which are not removed from the being and are spoken of as similar to the corporeal bodies and even are called "false bodies."24 Augustine concludes that shadows are jsimilar, though inferior, to the natural bodies, of which |they are reflections, and that the shadows themselves are undeniably the objects of which the eyes judge.25 Although these and other similarities were called "the mother of falsity" in the course of the dialogue, Augustine now states that "similitude is the mother of truth and lack of similar-- ity (dissimilitas) the mother of falsity." i i i j A Schema of the "Forest" I To expose this "forest" of similarities more Jclearly, the following schematic outline is offered. The 24shadows are produced by a body exposed to light; thus, the shadow is a mirror-image and reflects the true body. 25Ibid., 6.11-12 (pp. 560-62). -~23~ structure of this "forest" and the concept of "mirror- image" is essential to the understanding of Augustine's | * theory of sense judgment and his epistemology itself. i I. The similars which are equal: e.g., twins by birth or the impressions of a signet ring. II. The similars which are inferior: e.g., the image of a man in a mirror. These involve a j duality, i.e., the mirror-image itself and that which is reflected. A. In things as experienced by the soul, e.g., relative to the subject seeing. i 1. In the sense experiencing it: e.g., • the apparent movement of a tower (phantasi5); 2. Within the soul itself as a result i of its having accepted something j from the sense: e.g., the things seen by sleeping or insane people (phantasmata). I B. In things which are being seen: e.g., j relative to the object seen. 1 1. Some as expressed or fashioned by nature: a. Through generation: e.g., chil dren born of parents and thus the | children resemble the parents. | b. Through reflection: e.g., in various kinds of mirrors. (1) Those reflected by mirrors themselves; (2) The shadows cast by natural ____________________________things and called "false bodies j * 124 I 2. The rest as expressed or fashioned by | living things. t i The Sense Judgments of Man1s Eyes i i As a result of the above distinctions Augustine t t notes that "false bodies are objects which pertain to the | judgment of the eyes" and this "must not be denied."2* * |He concludes that the eyes— and the other external senses, specifically small, taste and touch— judge shadows of i j bodies as similar to them and they judge the sensible i bodies themselves as well.2? The only difference is that j the eyes can see both the "shadows" and the "bodies" and j 2*>Reason states: "that the shadows" in group II, |B, l.b,2 "are objects which pertain to the judgment of the ! |eyes must not be denied." A comment upon the translation !in the Fathers of the Church edition has already been made ' !in footnote 22. 2^Ibid., 6.12 (p. 562). The BAC text reads as !follows here: Ergo, ne moremur: videturne tibi, aut lilium a lilio posse odore, aut mel thyminum a melle thymino de diversis alveariis sapore, aut mollitudo plumarum cycni ab anseris tactu facile iudicari? j For judicari, op. cit., The Soliloquies of Saint ! Augustine, trans. by Thos. Gilligan, p. 96~following the jMigne, Vol. 32, p. col. 890b— has diudicari. However, the |difference, though significant, does not indicate a mis- |take in the translation I have offered. The "di" merely |adds "among from many things." Both mean judge. 125 thereby distinguish between them. The other senses cannot of themselves make such a distinction (i.e., the sense of | smell could not distinguish between a "first lily and a j second" nor can the sense of hearing sometimes distinguish ! ibetween a "real voice" and a falsetto voice.28 Since I | "similitude is the mother of truth," therefore, both kinds of judgments, if not true themselves, would be prerequisite!; to attaining the truth. The sense judgments of the "shadows" would be of similitudes and these "similitudes would be true" because they would appear similar to the j true (Ergo si eo veri essent, quo veri simillimi |appararent). The sense judgments of the "bodies" would be of true bodies. Between the sense judgments of the similitudes and those of the true bodies there would be no difference.29 Relating the discussion of "shadow" of true body to "similitude," Augustine notes that the shadows relate to bodies like a mirror-image to the thing reflected. In this way, the shadow itself is spoken of as a mirror of the 28Ibid., 612. Cf., lib. II.7.17 (pp. 270-71) for a discussion of the further limitations on the senses of smell, taste and touch. 29Ibid., 7.13 (p. 564). 126 true body just as all of man’s phantasia are mirror-images of the sensible realities. These mirrors, as well as the j i I true bodies, fall within the ken of the eyes' judgments because without their judging of the shadows, the eyes coulc not judge that the "false bodies" were shadows mirroring the true bodies. The eyes, therefore, discern "shadows" from jtrue bodies, separate them, and relate them; because of thin jability to discern and to relate, the eyes can judge truly I of its objects, i.e., bodies and their shadows. Therefore, because the eyes can make comparative judgments, they can form true sense judgments. Do True Judgments by Sense Mean Truth in Sense? In speaking of true bodies and the eyes' ability to judge of them, Augustine raises a significant question: does this mean that "truth" resides in bodies, and does it further mean that the senses attain truth in their true judgments?30 ^ characteristic of truth is that it does not 30ibid., 15.27 (p. 584). The distinction Augustine makes between the form in a natural body attainable by sense and a true form attainable by intelligence is discussed in Chapter IV. The sense judgment of the true body and the rational judgment that a true is a tree or a sphere is a sphere will also be presented. These judgments (e.g., of sphere as sphere) are judgments independent of material bodies which are spherically shaped; they are judgments not possible to the sense powers. 127 [ i 1 die, says Augustine; but many objects of sense knowledge do die. "Truth," therefore, is eternal and unchanging, whereas |sense knowledge is temporal and changing. Augustine com ments that although one might not believe the senses judg ing "this is a tree," nevertheless, one would not deny that "if it is a tree . . . it is a true tree," because the latter statement is judged by intelligence, not by the sense.31 The senses, therefore, judge trees, et cetera to be— and this is why it cannot be denied that shadows mirroring existent trees pertain to the judgment of the jeyes also. However, the judgment that this is or is not a true tree (like the judgment that this is or is not a true sphere) is elicited by intelligence; therefore, although particular trees die, and thus eyes no longer see these; tree, in general does not, and intelligence knows it. Yet, the eyes' sense judgment that there are trees is necessary for the learner and required in order that intelligence make its judgment (e.g., phantasicT which result from sensation are required before the soul can cogitate phantasmata).32 In other words, an image is necessary 3lIbid., 28 (pp. 538-40). 32Ibid., 1.15.27 (p. 538) 11) mag. 12.40 (BAC III. pp. 591-92). 32Ibid., 1.15.27 (p. 538). Compare; 1.4.9 (pp. 510 before one can recall the reality. This is the reason (memory plays such a prominent role in Augustine's view of I | sense "knowledge" and rational knowledge. The sense 1 ‘ 1 memory is the storehouse of both phantasia (sense impres- j sions) and phantasmata (excogitated images). | j But Augustine's discussion of the animal's ability to judge that pleasurable things are to be sought because they promote and perfect the animal's life raises a prob lem at this point. These animals judge that they are living t j and that life is desirable through that interior sense I I which they have in common with man. Such judgments are certainly comparative as well as consistent. Furthermore, i |these judgments are saying, in effect, that to live is better than not-to-live, and life as life is preferable to non-life. This kind of judgment certainly is analogous |to the judgment that "if it is a tree, it is a true tree," jand "tree as tree is true tree." Do such animal judgments elicited by the interior sense mean that animals are able jto know life as such and discern it to be preferred to i j death as such? If so, according to Augustine's reasoning, such animals are possessed of rational souls.33 Augustine side-steps a solution; he says merely that in some things 33lib., II.3.7-4.10 (BAC III, pp. 254-63). animal senses are more acute than man's and invites Evodius ito move on their discussion to their goal by evidence "that! 1 14 I is certain and manifest.Augustine does not treat this i ' matter again. Wherever he encounters a problem of animal i sense judgment being more acute than man's, he dismisses itj by reasserting that, however animal actions excel man's, man is superior to animals because he possesses the power of reason whereas animals have only sense powers. Augustine is convinced that unless the eyes see |both the shadows and the bodies, a "true" judgment cannot i be insured; but he is equally convinced that these sense judgments are not truthful. These "true" sense judgments, however, do perform a useful function. As a matter of fact, in On the Immortality of the Soul, Augustine comments that though the power of sensing and thinking is still present t i to the soul when man is asleep, the sensible images the mind cogitates (i.e., phantasms) cannot be judged or dis cerned from those things of which they are the images. This lack and possible source of an erroneous judgment is precisely because the senses are dormant and not perceiving the objects themselves of which the mind has formed the 34Ibid., 4.10 (pp. 261-63). " ■ 13JT images. He even says that the "things seen by sleeping or insane people" are one of the group of "the similars which are inferior . . . as experienced by the soul . . . within itself as a result of its having accepted something from the sense." Here Augustine is speaking of the soul excogitating or "making" without the external sense per ceptions and presentations, i.e., phantasia. True judg ments about them can not be made without our "awakening" either from sleep or from insanity. According to Augustine, therefore, the senses and the mind work cooperatively in the formation of comparative judgments which thereby insure the attainment of truthful judgments.35 Yet, in apparent t contradiction to this statement, Augustine does hold that man can and does have "imageless thought." The only way these views of Augustine possibly can be reconciled would be to say he is speaking of mystical experiences when he i talks of "imageless thought." But, since this dissertation limits itself to the early Philosophical works, our conten- ition can only be stated as probable. 35im. XIV. 23 (PL 32 col. 1032-33). Cf., mus. VI.11.32 (col. 1180). Signs and Signified Compared to Mirror-images 131 Augustine's very discussion of "mirror-images" and what they reflect (written about two years prior to On the I Teacher), however, seems to clash with the contention that sensible signs are merely reminders of what man has a prior !knowledge of.3® Augustine maintains that words as signs I I 'are not natural (natura) but conventional; they are agreed ! :to (placito).37 Therefore, the meanings they convey would certainly precede the word and learning would result from ;seeing (sed aspectu didicerem) not from the signification I(non significatu). The word "horse," for instance, is a j ; I convention which was preceded by the reality "horse" and ; the seeing of a "horse." When, therefore, someone says j j"horse" to another, the learning that takes place is a I j j result of "seeing" a "horse"; the sign, "horse," would be | jlearned after the reality is known, rather than the reality; i 1 jbeing learned after the sign is known.38 words are nothingj i ■■ — . ■ . ! 36mag. 8.22 (BAC III. p. 572) and 10.34 (pp. 585-56). 37mus. VI.9.24 (1176 el alii). I 3®mac[. 10.34 (pp. 585-86). The relation between words and meanings is an old problem. However, there is a striking parallel in Augustine's approach to the problem and Wittgenstein's. The young Wittgenstein holds that the relation is neither purely conventional nor purely but "beaters" of the ears whose function is to remind man of what he knows by calling his soul's attention to what is 1 said (so that sensation can occur) and a comparative judg ment may result. Their purpose is not to convey meaning, but to make man recognize meaning, to know names.39 Mirror-images, on the other hand, actually contain what they reflect. The relation between these mirror- images and the things reflected is natural not conventional jit is significant that the schema of the "forest" of things I presented in The Soliloquies contains no place for words as ! ~ ~ ( |conventional signs. Augustine, like Plato, takes to heart |the idea that words are conventional signs; however, unlike natural; the relation of names and facts is a pictorial one. [(A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. by D. J. O'Connor (New Yorks The Free Press, 1965), "Con temporary British Philosophy," A. M. Quinton, p. 537 col. A)]. The later Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations [(trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958)], p. 2 with a quote from and com ments on Augustine's theory (conf. 1.8). 39Ibid., 5.12 (p. 556). Due to the findings of this chapter and the awareness of the Neo-Platonic influ ence upon Augustine, I find that the non earn latere which Augustine uses to speak of the soul's relation to sense- received data might.have a more profound meaning than hitherto granted to it: e.g., as the cause of the sensa tion activity the soul "lights up" the sense received data; thus, no sense data can escape, i.e., hide from, the enlightening activity of the soul. I shall treat this interpretation in Chapter IV. ' 133 Plato, his mirror-images are natural beings, not artificial and temporary composites into which forms have fallen.40 |According to Augustine, therefore, the conventional is {dependent upon and a function of the natural; terminology is a pure instrumentality. Carrying the conclusion further, the senses, external and internal, are discipuli whom the magister interrogates, from whom he obtains the natural response and through whom he attains the natural beings of jwhich he excogitates images. In other words, the phantasms are dependent upon the phantasia in order that human com- j parative judgments may result in rational truthful judg- j jments.43. i I The fact that Augustine.does not include words in the schema of the "forest" of images has led, therefore, to the mutual relationship and importance of Cl) image and jbody, (2) seeing and light, (3) ocular looking and mental looking. The "illumination" involved here is a natural one between the sun and the illumined object so the physi cal eyes may see, and between the soul and the phantasms so the mental eyes may see.42 True judgments are possible 40Cf., sol. 11.18.32 (pp. 592-94). 41im.. XIV.23 (PL 32 col. 1032-33). 42sol. II.18.32 (p. 594). Thus, Augustine comments that no one is so mentally blind_________________ 104 because the eyes seek both the shadows of the bodies and the bodies themselves; truthful judgments are possible because the eye of the soul, reason, sees both the real forms available to it through the possession of the discipline or habit (phantasiS) and the fictitious forms cogitated by the mind (phantasmata). Light to illumine the respective objects is necessary in both cases: e.g., the light of the sun to illumine the true bodies and the light of the soul in order to cause the sensation itself (thus forming the phantasia) and in order to illumine the true 1 I . iforms so they might be discerned from the fictitious ones.4 i ] According to Plato, man had to go outside the cave to see the light; the cave, furthermore, contained merely artificial light. According to Augustine, man's body (the cave)44 has a source of natural light both outside man (and available to his external senses) and within man (his soul)— and available through the soul's vivifying activ ity. 43 Man is an operational unity: his external senses, (mente tarn caecus est qui non videat) as not to see that the forms taught in geometry abide in the "Truth" and the "Truth" abides in them. This interpretation of Augustine's concept of illumination will be developed in Chapter V. 43lib.. II.8.21 (p. 275). 44sol.. 11.19.33 (p. 596). 45sol.. 11.20.34-35 (pp. 596-600) and 1.15.27 (p.53k 135 particularly the eyes, see the illumined objects and make true judgments about them; then reason, the eye of the soul, sees both the phantasiS (the sensed-objects) and the Iphantasmata (the cogitated-objects) and therefore, can make truthful judgments.46 The truthful judgments of i i j reason, therefore, are dependent upon the true sense judg- jments; although both ax^e activities of the soul, sensation I is a cooperative result of the bodily sense powers impressed ! by the sense objects (patitur) and the soul looking at the impression and the object impressing itself. Using Augustine's example of the ship voyage, we would say that i jwhile man learns (which includes the activity of remember- ! ing), he is engaged in a voyage. The destination of the voyage is Truth, and once man arrives, e.g., when he knows geometrical truths, he no longer needs the ship. He ceases to be a "learner" and becomes a "master." But, he still needs the ship in two ways: (1) to communicate these geometrical truths to a "learner"; (2) to recall them to jhis own mind either to exemplify them or to use them to 46sol. 11.19.33 (p. 594). This aspect of the judgments of reason will be treated of in more detail in Chapter IV; the cursory explanation provided here is merely to highlight the meaning of human sense judgments, the topic of this chapter. 136 bring them to an awareness of Truth Itself. In this latter case, he sees geometrical truths to be true because ;of Truth Itself.4^ i I t | Deceptive Judgments and the Exterior Senses Augustine sets down three requirements for the proper working of the eyes (and these are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all the other senses and to reason as well): one must have eyes (oculi); the eyes must look (adspicere); the eyes must be able to see (videre). Accord* • irig to Augustine, therefore, one must have the power, the operation of the power and the necessary circumstances in which the power can operate (e.g., in this case, light and illumined objects).48 One way, however, in which the eyes might fail would be the excessive brightness of the light. In this case, the eyes would turn from the object (e.g., the sun, or the reflected light of the sun in a mirror) and even close, thus taking refuge in their own darkness.49 4?This aspect of rational judgment will be treated in Chapter IV. 48sol. 1.6.12 (p. 516). 49Ibid., 10.17 (p. 522). 137 The light, however, is not at fault (vitio); it shows objects to us in so far as we have the power to judge them (ut . . . cernere . . . valemus).50 Either the power j j iitself, or the way of using it is the source of error. j i | Though the senses can not be deceived relative to j i their respective objects (e.g., color, sound, sweetness, et cetera), man can be deceived when a sense other than sight is confronted with equal-similar colors and asked to i discern one from another (e.g., the nose confronted by two lilies and asked to discern the first from the second), or confronted with unequal-similars and asked to judge which is real (e.g., the ears asked to discern between a real voice and its imitation) .^ Only if man suspends consent or if he diagnoses the difference can he judge truly. Yet, the senses are powerless to deceive (nihil quidem valent ad fallendum); nevertheless, says Augustine, they can lead one astray (non taroen nihil ad non ambigendumj. Because of the senses and their multiple sense-offerings man can busy himself with two things at one time, e.g., be j distracted, disturbed, et cetera.5^ Augustine seems to 50mag. 11.38 (BAC III. p. 589) Cf., Plato's Philebus. 51sol. , II.6.12 (BAC I. p. 562). 52Cf., 11.20.34 (p. 598). 138 have decried the multiplicity of ways the "forest" of similitudes could be interpreted. He ascribes the "varied ! i beliefs and errors" that men have to "a mind crowded with I the deceiving impressions of sensible objects, impressions i I which arise from the sensible world, (and) are transmitted by the b o d y ."53 yet, he also holds that if a man could compare the phantasia and the phantasms, the false forms with the true forms, et cetera, he would not be fooled. I I Of course this comparison could be made only by the liberally educated man.54 i i True Sense Judgments Not Enough for Truth Yet, at the same time Augustine emphasizes the common sense of people and praises their valid and natural common judgments.55 In On Music, for example, Augustine notes that some men can play the flute as a result of ears naturally attuned to harmonies (natura) and a memory which reimposes these harmonies upon their bodily members.55 He 53rel., 3.3. 54sol. 11.20.35 (pp. 598-600) cf., also 18.32 (pp. 592-94). 55mus., 1.5.10 (PL 32 col. 1089). 55Ibid., 4.9 (1088). 139 observes that some singers are also untrained, but naturally gifted in their ability to re-create harmonies. Having I characterized "music" as a "discipline partaking of sense and intellect," it would seem that only men could be musi cal; animals, he says, imitate only within limits. Ani mals sway with beautiful music, played or sung, but men applaud him who sings well and applaud even more, the more pleasingly he plays or sings.58 The crowd, though unskilled, is obviously making comparative judgments not I I ionly that the music is harmonious rather than discordant I ---- i I jbut also how harmonious it is. "It happens by nature," I says Augustine, "which gives to all the sense of hearing by |which such things are judged."^9 This unskilled ability, however, though primarily sense-produced, includes some knowledge. t | This unskilled, though musical flute player, notes when the flute is well-touched (euphes) and commits it to memory; by repeating this he accustoms his fingers to be 57ord. - 11.14.41 (BAC I. p. 780). j 58mus. I.1.1; 3.4 (col. 1083-85). 59Ibid., 5.10 (1089). Cf., 9.16 (1009); 5.10 (1084); 11.10.17 (1109); 13.24 (1113); 16.30 (1144). ... 140 guided by it (eo ferri) without the least fear or error whether he acquires what he plays from someone else or he ! ;himself creates it. His playing is led by and what he I plays is approved by the "nature” spoken of above. There- j !forer when the memory follows the sense and the joints of the player follow the memory, already domesticated (edomiti) and prepared by practice (usu), he plays as he wants. He plays better and more pleasantly the more he |excels in the things he has in common with beasts, i.e., |the appetite to imitate, sense and memory. Though the ;flute player is making comparative musical judgments, his I I |judgments can be misused (e.g., playing for the praise or money rather than for the pleasure of the music); this misuse results because his true musical judgments are not j grounded in and guided by the knowledge possessed as a |result of the habit of the discipline of music. Although Augustine does not characterize this "certain knowledge" of the unskilled musician as "right opinion," it does seem jaccurate to so label it. Thus, it would seem that men can I i jout-perform animals here precisely because men have reason. j jTherefore, though some musicians are unskilled, i.e., not possessed of the discipline of music, they can educate themselves to the extent they follow their natural and sensible perception of harmony. These unskilled musicians, however, are subject to misusing their natural true judg ments through erroneous opinion, e.g., preferring applause jto the harmonies of music.66 In this sense, natural sense i (judgments are more true than opinion.61 Even "one learning |to sing, judges praise to be better than the song"; in so doing, the learner "judges wrongly" and thus shows that he lacks knowledge (nullo dubitante scientiA ejus caret).62 The discipline of music, i.e., knowledge, is the stabilizing jelement which enables true sense judgments to become truth- i ful ones. j 60Ibid., 1.6.12 (1089-90). ! ---- | 61lib., III.8.22-23 (BAC III. pp. 246-48). It yould seem that Augustine has again improved upon Plato. •jPhe senses, according to Augustine, make true judgments ^nd thus are capable of and do contribute "right opinion," i.e., that a thing is true. But the dimension of reason is necessary to achieve knowledge, i.e., why a thing is j:rue. The improvement lies precisely in Augustine repeated ly seeking the "right opinion" of the senses (e.g., in The Soliloquies, i.e., of sight, and in On Music; i.e., <j>f hearing) in order to aid reason in coming to knowledge. ^n Augustine, therefore, there is a natural, necessary and cooperative effort between the senses and reason in attain ing truth; thus he says the senses and reason are companions [socios). mus., IV.16.33 (1145). Cf., 34 also. 62Ibid., mus. 1.6.12 (p. 1090). Cf., 6.11 (1089-90) 142 Sensible Custom and Rational | Knowledge as Guides 1 j Augustine sees man as engaged on a voyage through |li£e. The generic goal is the port of happiness; the spe- I i 1cific goal is "rejoicing in the truth." As we mentioned, he compares man's senses to the ship by which his reason travels toward truth; sense knowledge is a necessary instruf ment for the learner, i.e., the one inquiring after truth. Man, in this sense, is a philosopher, i.e., a lover of jwisdom, and Augustine comments on three kinds of these ! I j sea-faring philosophers. All of them can relate themselves I j back to their native land, which Augustine analogically calls "happiness," but only two of them return. The first group are philosophic sophists, i.e., they go a short dis tance with little effort and then present a personal posi tion by which they desire to attract people to themselves. The second and third group are genuine "inquirers" after truth. The second group travels far from their homeland and frequently forgets it because of the distance and the entia^ t | ments of the journey. They literally loose themselves in ! j the study of learned books and are recalled home only 143 through some tragedy or other.®3 The third group comprise both the young and those who have been tossed about in t ;travel. This group is kept mindful of its native land I through certain beacons and signs which it sees. Now, the first two groups are misled by opinion, t the first group by their own opinion the second by other's opinions. The third group keeps recalling the goal while seeking it. In On Free Will, Augustine notes that what one is accustomed to or habituated to can prevent one from discovering the truth if his custom or habit is old (inveterata). A person's customary ways are a kind of "fabricated," or second nature. Furthermore, they result from sense responses to what pleases or delights. They can be "right opinions" but they also could be "false" ones. A child, for instance, loves his pet sparrow; he would prefer the sparrow's life to the life of a man who was harmful to him. Augustine observes that his judgment is based on utility and utility is guided by the natural i sense response of convenience or appropriateness (consuetudine commodatis plerumque inclinatur).®4 por this 63Ibid., 2 (pp. 622-24). 64lib. III.5.17 (BAC III. pp. 340-41). 144 reason also, a carnal man would prefer (mallet) all the I trees or cows to be in his field rather than all the stars 1 to be in the sky. Utility requires sense priority and jsense responses guide man's judgments concerning the instruments he uses. When man attains the use of reason (compos rationis) however, he attains a new dimension whereby he can judge his sense responses and his customary or habitual ways of acting. What is sensible for a dog- |animal to do, may not be sensible for a man-animal, j Relative to man the sensible thing to do includes the i 'dimension of rationality; man must do the reasonable I thing. Augustine is aware that sense response and the consequent habitual or customary way of acting that results can be good and stable guides for action even on the human level. But, they are limited. Even though the ability to play the flute well results more from man's acute sensitiv ity and ability to imitate and to remember (which he has in common with animals), yet, this same man may become so lost in the pleasant applause that he would prefer the applause to the harmonies of music. Augustine contends that the science of music stabilizes the man's sense judgments of music. If a man knows music, in the sense of having the 145 discipline as a habit of his soul, the flute player would i not err and prefer applause of people to the harmonies of ! i music. Although natural sense response offers man a | i criterion for making true judgments, reason offers a criterion which judges the sense judgments. The very con- j sistency of sense judgments need the stability of reason's judgments to insure their truth for man. Natural Sense Judgments Preferred to Both Signs and Rules | On Music stresses three important ideas of jAugustine: (1) animals' natural sense judgment of what is pleasant and/or offensive never errs; man's natural sense judgments have this in common with animals. Men, however, can misuse these true judgments through subjec tive opinion. (2) Augustine, in the guise of the "Master," rejects the revelance of both poetic tradition (consuetudo) and grammatic authority (auctoritas) in seeking the metrically harmonious and the pleasant. The names ascribed by the Poets to certain metres and the authori tative rules formulated by the Grammarians are arbitrary in the sense that they are conventional signs arrived at 146 by agreement (placito).65 (3) The "Disciple," in On Music, uses his natural sense of hearing to arrive at what is j metrical et cetera, as he responds to the "Master's" ques tions and reacts to the "Master's" metres. The results of l Jthis approach to the metrically pleasant are telling: the | ! "Disciple's" reactions and natural sense judgments are in agreement with both the Poet's and the Grammarians" deci sions, with a few exceptions where, due to complications jof verses, the "Disciple's" ears are not able to follow.66 i I However, though Augustine comments that the Poets approved t metres by making them, and common nature approved these same metres by hearing them, he points out that they had to be commended to the "Disciple's" ears by learned men (docti) and by practice. Yet, even if the sense of hearing is no duller and slower than humanity demands (humanitas postulat), l and thus makes true judgments, it cannot make truthful judgments.67 Therefore, though man's senses (possessed of a natural power of sensation are capable of true judgments i 65Cf., I.1.1 (col. 1083); II.11-2.2 (1099-1101); ! III.2.4 (1117); IV.1.1 (1127). 66Ibid., 11.10.17 (1110); 10.19 (1111). 67Ibid., IV.17.37 (1146-48). i relative to the metrically pleasant), these same senses can be the source of mis-judgments if reason does not I supplement them. Sense judgments, in other words, offer ! a multiplicity of true judgments which man can misuse, if reason does not add its cooperative contribution. True Sense Judgments and Reason's Guidance Man's sense judgments need the guidance of reason in order that true judgments might become truthful judg- jments. This is precisely why the "power of familiarity" (consuetudo) of the child is different from that of the animal. This is also the sense in which the "power of familiarity" can be such a stumbling block to the dis covery of the truth by man. The child's use of these judgments can be in error; the child can prefer the death of a man to the death of his pet bird.**® That the life of the man is more important than the life of the pet bird is something that only reason can "see," independent of sensi tive inclination. Man's sense judgments must be more than just sense judgments in response to "familiarity" and/or 68lib. III.5.17 (BAC III. p. 340). H8" pleasure; they must be reasonable "familiarity" and pleasure, The "Disciple's" sense of hearing in On Music (and ithis is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to each of the other ! of man's sense powers) is clearly in accord with the law of rhythm (lex ejus numeri) and has attained the rational i . . — and legitimate principles of metrics themselves (ipius metri jure atque ratione). His sense of hearing, as naturally responsive to the principle that "equality and similitude are judged to excel inequality and lack of similitude"69 can passively be "offended" and actively "accuse" without the Poet and without the Grammarian, i.e., without the ability to write poetry (usus) and without the knowledge to criticize the grammar (scienticQ . But, in order to conserve his true sense judgments and use them consistently reason must guide them.*?1 In this way they become rational judgments, i.e., true sense judgments grounded in knowledge and knowledge based upon sense judgments; they can be, therefore, truthful judgments. 69mus. II.7.14 (1107); 9.16 (1109); 10.17 (1109); IV.8.19 (1126). Cf., VI.5.10 (1189). 70lbid., IV.2.3 (1129-30). Cf., 1.4.9 (1088). 71Cf., mus. 1.12.21 (1095-96); IV.3.4 (1130); 2.3 (1129-30); 10.11 (1134); 11.12 (1135) et alii. 149 They are not just judgments that something is so (i.e., i true judgments); they are also judgments as to why it is i true (i.e., truthful judgments). I i i i ! Interior Sense Judgments of Man | Although some of the foregoing examples were supplied by interior sense judgments (e.g., the child's i I judging of the life of the bird as preferable to that of | a man's life), a more detailed study of these interior |sense judgments further support the conclusions already |reached. In On Free Will the "interior sense" judges life !to be worth living and things that conserve and promote |life as worth seeking. This "interior sense" is common to both men and animals. This same "sense" also seeks the i |conservation of the animal's life, i.e., things that con tribute to its unity and it avoids those things that tends to divide the animal's life (e.g., pain and death).72 The Soliloquies, however, say that man desires not to live but to be wise; man lives, therefore, in order to be wise, not 72lib. III.23.69-70 (BAC III. pp. 388-400). “ ' 150 vice versa. Furthermore, it speaks of pain as to be feared not because it is unpleasant but because it hinders |a man from seeking wisdom.73 do these different desires I i indicate a contradiction or a change in Augustine's view of the "interior sense"? i These differences resolve themselves with the awareness that the lives involved are different. The animal's life is limited to sensible pleasure and the promotion of sensible activities. The animal's "interior sense" judgments, therefore, will be in accord with sensitive living. Man's life, however, is rational and his "interior sense" judgments, therefore, will be in t accord with rational living. Thus, Augustine speaks of the baby's judging his nurse according to the "power of familiarity"; this baby is living on the sensitive level, not yet having attained the use of readon-- thus, it cannot abuse its "true judgment." Likewise, the child who prefers the death of men to the death jof his pet bird is exercising a sense judgment not yet having attained the use of reason— thus, this judgment cannot be termed in abuse, but it can be 73Sol. 1.12.20-21 (BAC I. pp. 528-32) called a "wrong" one from the plateau of reason. In both cases, the judgments are limited to and performed within the sensible realm; neither manifests any rationality or I rational perspective.74 I i J On the other hand, in The Soliloquies Augustine is exercising his rationality. Therefore, his "interior sense" judgment adds to its desire merely to live, the rational desire to live in a rational way, i.e., to seek jto live wisely.75 In this context, the rational man's i j "interior sense" will judge anything which hinders him ! from living wisely as painful and whatever distracts him from living wisely as harmful. Thus, any and all "cupid ity," i.e., sensitive desire as sensitive, is not conceived i positively as contributing to the health of the soul, but only negatively as to be tolerated (toleranda).76 Any i I physical beauty is, to apply the "forest" distinctions, a mirror-image of God; therefore, any exclusive concern for the mirror-image without the awareness of that which it t i .---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 74iphe guiding role of "authority" will be dis cussed in Chapter IV. 75sol., 1.1.1 (BAC I. p. 546). Cf., qua. 13.22 and mor., 1.27.52. 76lbid., 1.10.17-11.19 (pp. 524-26). 152 reflects (i.e., God) is strictly animal, lacking the dimension of the rational (e.g., a higher level of human i activity and a new step up the ladder of comparative t {judgment). When Augustine is counseled to forsake sense j delights entirely because such delights will enmesh him in j i the darkness of his body, the meaning is that his body is 77 not sensual animal, but a participation in rational animal. In other words, his bodily desire as animal is no more i I |realistic than his eyes' desire for seeing body; both | jdesires must be inclusive of man, i.e., the bodily desire of a rational pleasure and the eyes' desire of a rational knowledge. In both cases the desire must be of complete man, not of partial man.78 Man will achieve his unity when he knows. Thus, the fulfillment and perfection of all his sense judgments will occur in the act of knowing itself.78 The purpose of sense judgments, natural and "true" as they are, is to bring man to rational judgments. Thus Augustine disproves the Skeptics from the nature of true sense judgments and the nature of true rational judgment (i.e., the wise man 77sol.. 11.18.32 (p. 594). 78Ibid., 1.14.24 (p. 534). 79Ibid., II.1.1 (p. 544); mus. VI.1.1 (1161-63). either knows or does not know). Furthermore, the purpose of sensible harmony is to bring man to a rational awareness j ! jof numerical harmony and thus to the source of all har mony. 80 The highest act of knowing will be the knowing of ispiritual things, i.e., the soul and God. Those who have I attained this ability need not waste their time with the ascent; they are already on the summit.81 This spiritual knowing, however, is not an exclusive knowing, but the I jhighest. It does not preclude the true judgments of the senses and the recognition of mirror-images; it includes them. The difference is one of use; the problem is one of abuse. The "inquirer" or "learner" needs words, i.e., I conventional signs to lead him to "see"; the "inquirer" needs the true judgments that things are so. The "edu cated" man possesses the natural discipline (i.e., habit) j and thus can judge the difference between the mirror-images j and that which they reflect; he can also go behind the 88Ibid., mus. In The Soliloquies also, the purpose of sensible true judgments is to bring man to a rational awareness that the true is true because of "Truth" and therefore lead man to "Truth Itself," the source of every true judgment (11.13.32 (pp. 592-94). In the On Free Will the awareness of number as number is credited to "this light of the mind" whereby the truth of an addition or sub traction answer is known: II.8.21 (p. 275). 81Ibid ., mus. words and determine the meaning— he even understands the !words by understanding the meaning. Furthermore, he can I attain the why a that is true, i.e., he attains a truthful t judgment.®^ Gilson's Interpretation of Augustine's Theory of Human Sense Judgment I Gilson admits that "there is much to be said I jagainst my interpretation of Augustinian illumination."®3 I I He goes on to say: i j However, I propose it only to the extent that the j facts warrant its acceptance. Now, in brief, what i are the facts? Most evident of all is the fact that, regardless of our interpretation of the doctrine, Augustine did not distinguish clearly between the problem of the concept and that of the judgement, nor between the problem of the judgement in general and that of the true judgement in particular.®4 i Whatever Gilson's definition of "concept" and I I "judgment" and whatever the significance of the adverb ! ®2Cf., sol. 11.13.32 (pp. 592-94); lib. II.8.21 i (p. 275). ®3Gilson, op. cit., p. 88. ! 84Ibid. "...155 "clearly,” it seems that his statement cannot lay claim to the noun "fact" as a result of the analysis of Augustine's i l iview of sense judgment. Although Augustine says he did not I define the truth "which only the pure can perceive" and I |that he did not define the nature of knowing in his treat- ! ment of human knowing in The Soliloquies,88 it is clear from the analysis of this dialogue and some of his others that Augustine would not have said he: i ... did not distinguish clearly between the prob- | lem of the concept and that of the judgment, or between the problem of judgment in general and that | of the true judgement in particular.86 i | (1) As far as the theory of judgment in general is concerned, Augustine contends that two elements are required for and present in any judgment on the sense level: mirror-images and that which is reflected by them (e.g., shadows and the true bodies). He develops this contention i I (through his presentation of the "forest" of images; he further clarifies it by showing the relation which exists |between language (and its conventionality) and things meant (and their naturality). 85re. 1.4.2 (PL 32 col. 589). 88Gilson, op. cit., p. 88. 156 (2) As far as the theory of judgment in particular is concerned, Augustine explores the relations between these two elements in order to determine what a true judgment is i and when true judgments are misused, i.e., mislead us. He shows that some of these true judgments are comparative: I the eyes (in The Soliloquies) and the ears (in On Music) can and do make comparative judgments. The eyes judge that something is a spherical body, and, within limits, how spherical it is; the ears judge that something is harmoni ous and how harmonious it is. The "interior sense," i ! furthermore, judges that the exterior senses are judging J and how they are judging. It also takes corrective action j by alerting the soul to the eyes not being open or the eyes not seeking as they can and should. All these judg ments are true, and some of them are comparative, or what i | might be termed value judgments. None of them are made ! I I as a result of or include the presence of "illumination." (3) The distinction between the problem of the concept and that of the judgment: Augustine notes that these true sense judgments can be misused. This misuse occurs when all the elements that make up a judgment are either not present or not alluded to. This brings him to his distinction between the phantasiS (i.e., the concept ....... Is 7 as sensed) and phantasm (i.e., the concept as cogitated), iThe phantasia results from the sense power's reception of I I the sense object and the soul's action upon the sense i power; this is the act of sensing, or the sensation itself. ! The phantasm results from the soul's action upon something the senses have already presented; it is an image of the image which the mind makes or excogitates. The misuse can occur when the man does not have or allude to both the shadow of the body and the true body (in the case of the phantasi5) or when the man does not have or allude to both the fictitious forms and the true forms (in the case of the phantasms). Augustine's whole analysis of the misuse I t of true sense judgments shows that he has made the dis tinction "between the problem of the concept and that of the judgment." As a matter of fact. Chapter IV considers how clearly Augustine makes this distinction in treating the concept of judgment which Augustine attributes to man's reason. The findings of the present chapter indicate there |is much to be said against Gilson's interpretation of i Augustine's theory of judgment. Chapter IV will prove there is much more to be said against Gilson's interpretation of Augustinian illumination. CHAPTER IV ! ! | ! THE RATIONAL JUDGMENT OF MAN j Augustine characterizes his desire to know as the seeking of the true which does not contend with itself as partly true and partly false (sed illud verum guaerere, quod non quasi bifronte ratione sibique adversanti).x He does not seek a true which is true in one sense and false i |in another, i.e., a true mirror-image of a man which is a I jfalse man; he seeks a true which is true itself. Augustine i is not satisfied to know images precisely because they are images. Neither is he satisfied to know the true bodies which these images reflect because these bodies (e.g., existing trees) do die and therefore, can become perceptual" ly extinct.2 Augustine desires to know the ontological ground of truth because of which true bodies (e.g., trees) |are true and that true because of which true forms i----------------------------------------------- : --------------------------- Xsol.■ 11.10.18 (BAC I. p. 572). 2Ibid., 1.15.27-29 (pp. 538-40). 158 (e.g., geometric figures) are true. He seeks to know the true itself, i.e., Truth (Veritas) "great and divine things, ■ > jby which whatever is called true gets its name. J I i i I I The Ground of Certitude; The Mutable or the Immutable We have seen Augustine's evidence that the average man knows some things as certain. Sense knowledge attains sensible objects as they appear. The oar, for instance, appears bent in the water; if a man did not see it as bent, his eyes should be examined not the oar. Besides sense certitudes, each man is certain that he exists, that he is alive, and that he understands. On top of this, wise men know what wisdom is and when they are possessed of it; ! as a matter of fact, educated men in general are certain of what they know. The mathematician, for instance, is cer tain that seven and three are ten. There are, therefore, certitudes on both the sense level and the rational level. The sense certitudes are limited, however, because they are confined to space and time; they are mutable. Although a 3Ibid., 11.10.18 (p. 572). man is certain he sees an elm tree in the park, that elm J tree could die or be destroyed tomorrow. Indeed, the elm i i •tree could become extinct. The rational knowledge of tree i as tree (not in its conventional verbal form, but in its conceptual natural meaning) is unlimited because it is [ understood by the mind regardless of its spatial location or its temporal existence. In other words, the judgments that "there is an elm tree in the park," or "two apples and two pears are four fruit" are contingent, mutable truths, whereas "tree as tree is true" or "two plus two is four" are necessary, immutable truths. Augustine's ques tion is: what is the source of the necessity and immutabil ity of the latter rational judgments? This question was a platonic problem, and it is a contemporary one. As we noted in Chapter I, the question i was asked by both Plato and Aristotle, to mention only the radical, traditional views. As we showed in the Introduc tion, the question was asked by Kant and elaborated by j Russell, to mention only two. In fact, Russell has an excellent observation about the nature and content of necessary and immutable judgments— or, as he also classi fies them, a priori propositions. When we judge that two and two are four, we are not making a judgment about our thoughts, but about all____ 161 ] actual or possible couples. The fact that our minds are so constituted as to believe that two and two is four, though it is true, is emphatically not what we assert when we assert that two and two are four. And | no fact about the constitution of our minds could make j it true that two and two are four. Thus our a priori I knowledge, if it is not erroneous, is not merely j knowledge about the constitution of our minds, but ! is applicable to whatever the world may contain, both , what is mental and what is non-mental. J The fact seems to be that all our a priori knowl edge is concerned with entities which do not, properly speaking, exist, either in the mental nor in the physi cal world. These entities are such as can be named by parts of speech which are not substantives; they are such entities as qualities and relations.4 ]Russell denies both the Platonic "World of Forms" as the i !cause of a priori propositions and universals and the i i Kantian claim that they are the independent result of our mental categories.5 Russell says that universals subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. The world of uni versals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact.® The world of existence, on the contrary, is "fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement." Up to now, this description seems to agree with that of both Plato and Augustine relative to the "two 4Russell, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 5Ibid., p. 92 and p. 98. 6Ibid., p. 1 0 0. 162 I world" view. However, when Russell seeks the relation between the "universal" and the "particular," a deep dif- ! i ;ference appears between himself and Plato but a strange I : i jsimilarity occurs between Russell and Augustine. | Russell contends that all a priori statements j (whether pure a priori dealing exclusively with universals, like "two and two are four," or complex a priori statements ' dealing with universals related to particulars, like "two apples and two pears are four fruit") may be known only by those who understand the terms and perceive the relation I between them which the statement asserts.^ But, although, the general proposition is a priori, all its applications to actual particulars involve experience and therefore contain an empirical element. He adds that "It must be taken as a fact, discovered by reflecting upon our knowl- i i edge, that we have the power of sometimes perceiving such relations between universals. " 8 Russell differs from Plato in contending that all our a priori knowledge involves our i jown mind's understanding the terms and perceiving the i relations between them and/or the empirical objects; these ?Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 105. 163 universals are not in another world, they are in our minds. Russell also differs from Kant in saying that our a priori |judgments result not from the way our mind is constituted but from the mind's perception of the relations between the terms making up the judgment. This perception of*the mind I is called "intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called self evident."® These intuitive knowledges or truths are in reality "some general principle, or some » instance of a general principle, which seems luminously jevident, and is not capable of being deduced from anything imore evident."10 I | It appears that Russell's position bears close parallels to Augustine's. The a priori judgments are truth-* ful judgments not made true by the constitution of the human mind (as Kant would have it); neither are they seen i true in another world or because of any other world (as Plato would have it). These a priori judgments are dis covered to be self-evidently true when the mind understands the terms and the relation between them and/or the physical objects they refer to and contain. Among such truths 9Ibid., p. 109. l°Ibid., pp. 111-12. 164 Russell enumerates "those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmeti cal principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethi cal propositions. The major difference between Russell's position and Augustine's is that Augustine seeks the source i of the "fact, discovered by reflecting upon our knowledge, that we have the power of sometimes perceiving such rela tions between universals."11 Augustine asks why some t (truths are self-evident to man's mind; he wants to know how i |certain general principles are luminously evident. The fact that the human mind perceives these universal relations and discovers these a priori judgments is the reason Augustine presses the investigation further. Because the human mind perceives universal relations to.be and dis covers a priori judgments to be self-evident are the ! premises of Augustine's search not the conclusion of his analysis. Of course, Augustine, unlike Russell, reaches the conclusion that the remote cause of the necessary judgmental relations reason discovers is the Divine Reason i itself, as we shall show. 11Ibid., p. 105. 165 Reason, Intelligence and Rational Man ! Augustine emphatically states that man is superior i I to bodies because he has reason.^-2 Man is superior to animals because his reason judges of the "interior sense" judgments on the exterior senses. Reason, therefore, is a "sort of head or eye of the soul."-1-3 Since reason judges jof material bodies and of sense activities, man's superior- J I ity consists in his rational judgments.-1 - ' * At the same time, i jhowever, Augustine asserts that judgments such as "a tree |as a tree is true" are made by "intelligence."3-3 In this i |context, he states that the most eminent thing in man is j"intelligence"; and its activity (understanding) means to "live in a way which is more perfect and more enlightened by the light of the mind itself."-1-3 The problem is, of course, what is the relation of the "eye of the soul" and its operation (reasoning) to that of "intelligence" and its operation (understanding)? As Rudolph Allers has put it: 12mus. VI.5.12 (col. 1170); <j. 54 (PL 40, col. 38). 1 3lib. II.6.13 (BAC III. p. 267); 3 . 30 (col. 20); 51.3 (col. 33). | 1 4lib. II.6.13 (pp. 266-67). 1 5sol. 1.15.28 (p. 540). l^lib. 1.8.21 (pp. 226-67); 11.22 (p. 228); II.3.7- 1-8—(pp.- 254-55)-f—3 . — 46— (col-.—30=31) . ------- ' ------------------ ; 166 J St. Augustine knows that reason and reasoning are two ! different things; the former * serves vision,' the lat- i ter search. Reasoning, ratiocinatio, is the name ' given to what is usually called discursive reasoning, the progress from premises to conclusion. Reason, ratio, designates, as it seems, some intuitive power. Here precisely lies the difficulty. Perhaps, the problem would vanish if one were to 1 think consistently in the terms peculiar to St. Augustine and free oneself of all connotations the names have acquired in later times. As long as one i conceives of ratio as performing chiefly the opera- i tions of abstracting, judging, a judgment, or that j denoted by it, can be the object of intuition or ! vision. We are accustomed to envisage a judgment as resulting from combination or division, as the techni- | cal terms read, hence, as an elaboration of data the intellect has at its disposal. But it may be that the j idea of St. Augustine was different.17 Through the analysis of the "judgments" of reason and 'intelligence, the relation between the judgments of both ! k. ( i ; jwill clarify itself; and an interpretation of "light" and j its relation to "judgment" will appear.!® ' l7Franciscan Studies, Vol. 12 (St. Bonaventure, New; York: Franciscan Institute, 1952), "St. Augustine's Doc- jtrine on Illumination," Rudolph Allers, p. 33. V. J. Bourke 'calls for the same analysis of Augustine's own words and j meanings as a solution to many problems of interpretation in Augustine; he comments that if we think of Augustine's words in a Scholastic way, we are reading into his terms a jlater and more complicated meaning than Augustine had avail- :able. ! Ip j This statement of the problem is foreign to jGilson. Gilson's analysis (and all analyses which are root led in his) presupposes and proves Gilson's pre-judgment of Augustine's theory of illumination. The problem, as posed here, is unique because it has not been found in any works treating of Augustine's epistemology or ontology. 1671 Reason, Mind and Rational Soul j J i The fundamental point in solving the problem is to j ; ;realize that Augustine works out his epistemology according to a physiological analogy. Just as the body has eyes I {whereby it can sensibly see, so the soul has eyes whereby it can mentally see.**** Mind (mens) is called the "eye of the soul" (oculus animae); and reason (ratio) is termed |"the look of the soul."20 Reason is "proper" to mind and I 21 |has two names for its activity: "reasoning" (ratio- cinatio, or motio mentis)22 and "looking"2* * (adspicere). Reason has the power (potens) to distinguish among the things that are learned and to connect them; it can separ ate and join (ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connect- endi) . 24 "Whatever uses reason or possesses the power of |reasoning is called rational; whatever has been done or spoken according to reason is termed reasonable."2^ 1 9sol. 1.6.12 (p. 516) 2 0Ibid. 21£. 7 (col. 13). I 2 2c[u. 27.53 (BAC III. pp. 488-89). ! 2 3sol. (p. 516). | 2 4ord. 11.11.30 (BAC I. pp. 766-68). 25ord. 11.13.31 (BAC I. p. 768). 168 Reason, therefore, judges and the judgments of reason i should be reasonable. But, only a rare kind of man is j j able to use reason and its judgments as a guide to the j understanding of God or of the soul. | i Such a man is rare because reason deals in sensible i facts and this trafficing makes the return to the soul difficult. As "the look of the soul," reason is looking at particular and mutable sensible objects (i.e., the phantasia) and can become accustomed to judge according to sensible light (i.e., light as sensible objects reflect it |from the sun) . 26 The phantasia, after all, means the J"appearance of a thing," and comes from phaos, meaning "daylight"; thus, the phantasia which reason "looks at" is the sensibly luminous particular, mutable object as it is sensed by the soul in the body. As Augustine terms it, the phantasia is a reflection of the sensible body, and "is similar to but different from" that true body.27 The object of reason is, therefore, the phantasia; reason i "looks at" these sensible, luminous, mutable images reflected there "as in a mirror." They are not the sensible 26mus. VI.9.24 (col. 1176-77); 11.32 (col. 1180-81). 2 7sol. II.6 .10-11 (pp. 560-61). 169 object itself, but a reflected image of it, similar to it but different from it. The fundamental operation of reason is that of discerning, i.e., judging the similarities and differences between the true images and the false images of the true bodies. When, therefore, some body is seen to be formed with congruent parts, it appears reasonable (rationabiliter 28 apparere). When we hear some music and it is "well com- jposed" (bene concinere), reason says it sounds reason- (able.29 With the other sensations (e.g., those of taste, I I smell and touch) reason explains them through a "because," i.e., gives the cause for its views, the "why," i.e., the impressed order or rhythm (humerositas).3° Reason, there fore, finds rationality present in the world of sense; it finds "traces" of proportion and order there.31 if, how- ! 1 ever, reason "looks at" a disproportionate building (through the eyes of the body and thus present to reason in the phantasia) , its "look" is offended, injured.**2 2 8ord. 11.11.32 (p. 768). 2 9Ibid. 3°mus. III.8.19 (col. 1126); IV.10.11 (col. 1134- 35); V.5.10 (col. 1152); VI.11.32 (col. 1180-81). 31ord. 11.11.33 (p. 770). 32Ibid., 34 (p. 770). A problem arises here for reason itself. Since the pleasure of pleasurable sensations is a pleasure of the senses themselves, reason might be distracted from return ing to itself in order to judge the rational aspect inher- 3 3 ent in the sensation; reason, therefore, might forget to | return to itself and not judge the images as an image of the reality to be sought.34 Reason then would judge the image as the r e a l i t y .35 This tendency also explains why an average person would be confused by the fact that real, or true, trees die; he would think that the "true" dies also.3* ' This explains too how the "learner's" reason tends to judge the images the teacher presents him with or his study 3 3Ibid., 11.11.31 (p. 768). Another problem might arise because the world appears reasonable, i.e., ordered and measured. Evodius broached it in On Free Will when he commented that some animals are so clever they seem to possess reason. Augustine countered by saying reason is proper to man and animals, no matter how clever, only appear rational because their sense powers are so acute. Whereas the Stoics thought Divine Reason was impregnated in the world, Augustine claims the Divine Reason (rationes seminales) are in the world as a result of creation. 34mus. IV.11.32 (col. 1180-81). ! 3 5Cf., sol. II.9.16 (p. 568) and ord. 11.14.39 (p. 778); 15.43 (p. 782). 36Ibid., 1.15.27-8 (pp. 538-40); II.2.2 (p. 548). conveys to him as the reality he seeks.37 if, however, what, we think is the reality, or, if the true dies with the tree, jthen the Academician could claim that nothing man knows i could be ascertained as true with no admixture of falsity. To the Academician, therefore, man can have no knowledgeable! certainty; and thus must withhold all judgment. Augustine's investigation leads him to the conclusion that there is one certainty because of which all certain things are certain, or One Truth because of which all true things are true. | | Another problem could arise with even the educated ! jman of reason. This is the man who has found the traces (vestigia) or rationality within the sensible world of i music, poetry, et cetera. The apparent immutability of these realities (e.g., as beautiful, true, et cetera) might lead him to seek his security in these apparent immutables,3® This man could become so enamored of the world of the arts and sciences that he would equate the 39 true disciplines he possesses with the truth itself. His error would lead to the vices of curiosity and pride. He might equate the joy of possessing true knowledge with 3'7sol. 11.20.35 (p. 598) and XI.3.3 (pp. 550-51). 3®mus. IV.14.44 (col. 1186). 39Ibid., 13.39-41 (col. 1184-85). ""..... 172 the joy of finding the Truth.40 He would be an educated and learned man, but not a wise man. This type of edu cated man would not recognize that he has a wisdom which is common to every wise man; he might conclude that his wisdom is private and unique. Of course, Augustine would maintain that such a man was not wise, but opinionated and proud. He would not see that the true knowledge of which he is possessed is but a reflection of the Truth Itself. His true knowledge, as splendid and illuminating as it is, is but a participation in the Truth because of which this possessed-knowledge is true. According to Augustine, therefore, there are three steps to the awareness of and appreciation for the Truth: (1) Man's reason "looks at" the world of sense, finds and formulates the rational proportion and order inherent in it. We might term this the "intuitive" or "perceptive" stage. Reason distinguishes, combines and discerns the truths present; it judges of the sense presentations and perceptions. This stage could be called the "discrimina tive" one. (2) Reason then elaborates laws and precepts, 40Ibid., 1.1 (col. 1161-63); 14.46 (col. 1187). 173 forming disciplines and arts. We might say this is the "constructive" stage. Reason becomes disciplined, habituated, and possessed of the true forms of knowledge. We might call this stage "dispositive." (3) Reason becomes aware that the truths it is possessed of are par- i ticipated truths because it itself changes and is changed when applying these truths while, they, as true, possess an immutable quality. Furthermore, reason can be in error formulating its findings and in applying them; a thing is true, however (e.g., a geometric truth, a grammatical truth, et cetera) whether or not a given man judges it so. In other words, they have an existential order which reason can mistake and misinterpret, but cannot change. Reason, therefore, turns its look inward, to the "eye of the soul," mind; there, intelligence judges the "true as the true." i I This could be named the "reflective" stage. Reason views the proximate source of the light which the truths it found participate in. Reason concludes to the existence of Truth Itself, the Source and Origin of the reflected light its soul participates in through possessing the true forms of knowledge. This might be called the "dialectical" stage the concluding to the ontological ground of truth. There is also an "intuitive" or "perceptive" stage here which 174 corresponds on the intelligible level to that which occurred on the sensible level. Here, in the awareness of God's presence, does "true joy" dwell, not in the awareness of possessed knowledge, nor in the awareness of the soul. "True Joy" is found in knowledge of God, not in knowledge itself nor in knowledge of the soul. Here is complete "joy in the truth." Error does occur at the first step because the stabilizing effect of the disciplines are lacking. Error can occur at the second step because of the possibility of the educated man being inordinately attached to and involved in the truths he knows. Error, however, is impossible on the third step because reason's look is aware that the "splendor of truth" within its soul is an image, reflecting in thought, as in a mirror, the Light of Truth Itself. Reason's gaze is now right and certain; it can no longer mistake images for the reality, or truths for the Truth. Man "sees" the one reality of truth and thereafter judges the multiple images accordingly. Reason and the Formation of the Liberal Arts 175 { Augustine notes that originally reason saw the need j I for communicating these rationalities it finds to other men. To do this it was necessary to impose words upon things, i.e., certain significant sounds (e.g., horse, chair, et cetera). This necessity occurs because men cannot sense each other's souls, so they use the senses as their interpreter in order to bring themselves together as social beings who have reason in common.4^ But, men-could not hear people speaking who were absent; thereupon, reason i | invented letters and fixed numerical limits to their use. Grammar was born; from it literature arises, and the necessity for history results.42 After perfecting and systematizing grammar (perfects dispositaque grammatics), reason was admonished to seek out and attend to the very power whereby it had produced the art. Reason could not pass on to make other things (ad alia fabricanda) unless it first distinguished, noted, arranged and brought forth the discipline of disciplines, "dialectic," the science which would both teach how to teach and how to learn.43 it is 4 1ord. 11.12.35 (pp. 772-74). 4 2Ibid., 37 (pp. 774-76). 4 3Ibid., 38 (p. 776).________ 176 in dialectic that reason shows itself and reveals what it is, what it wants and what it is capable of.44 This disci-; pline knows what knowledge is and by itself not only wants * * I ! to but is able to make men knowledgeable. ; I Reason and Dialectic, The Science of Truth Dialectic is the discipline which is a habit in ■the wise man's soul,46 a habit without which wisdom is impossible because it enables a man to discern the true from the false. It is the science of anything at all (which man seeks to know) . 46 The soul cannot reason cor rectly without this scientific discipline because right reasoning is cogitation or thinking (i.e., reasoning which includes the present sensible phantasia and the past sensi ble phantasia which the memory retains and recalls) dependent upon and moving from things certain to the investigation of things uncertain (Est enim recta ratio- Icinatio a certis ad incertorum indagationem nitens I — |cogitatio) .47 This discipline brings men out of the state ____________________________________________________________________________ 4 4Cf., mus. VI.10.25 (col. 1177). 45Ac . III.3.5 (BAC III. pp. 130-31)/ 14.31 (pp. 162-- 6 3 - AtT“ 4 6im. 1.1 (PL 32, col. 1021). 47Ibid. 177 of ignorance of things certain, to a state of awareness of things certain. This discipline, therefore, brings ignor- :ant men to knowledge (by revealing their thoughts to them i |through teaching) ,48 and carries learned men to wisdom (by |guiding their thoughts to a progressively deeper awareness i of the presence of the Truth in which their souls partici pate) .49 As a teaching discipline, it allows ignorant men to form a habit of knowledge in their soul, thereby leading them from the darkness of ignorance to a possession of the i i I {luminous splendor of knowledge; it empowers them with the {ability to discern between sensible images and intelligible realities. As a guide for the learned man, it leads him to a recognition that the luminous splendor of knowledge is a reflected participation; it can bring him to an intellec tual awareness of the Truth because of which the truths possessed by him are true. Augustine gives some statements which dialectic t has elaborated to him: one and the same soul cannot die and still be immortal; man cannot be at the same time I 4 8ord. II.7.24 (p. 758); 9.26 (pp. 760-62); sol. II.7.14 (pp. 564-66). 49mus. 1.4.5 (col. 1085-86); VI.1.1 (col. 1161-63). 178 happy and unhappy; we are now either awake or asleep; either there is a body which I seem to see or there is not ; a body. Dialectic has taught Augustine that if the ante- | ! I cedent of any of these statements were assumed, it would | I be necessary to deduce that which was connected with it.50 In other words if one would assume that there is a body I seem to see, it would follow that bodies exist; or if one would assume the soul to be immortal, it would follow that the soul could not die, et cetera. Through this dialecti cal process, man can arrive at definite truths and truths which are certain; therefore, dialectic is the science of truth.51 As such, it is the true philosophy which Plato and Aristotle held in common; it was the organizer and judge of all the elements which they included in their philosophy. Dialectic brings men to truths about the world, but it is most concerned with the truth about the soul of man.52 In dialectic, therefore, reason shows itself (as a power which discerns the true from the false in both phantasia and forms) reveals what it is (the "look" of the 50ac. 11.13.29 (pp. 160-61). 5 1Ibid. 5 2Ibid., 17.37-8 (pp. 171-73). 179 "eye of the soul"), what it wants (to discover the truth) and what it is capable of (to find truths about the world, but most important about itself as the "look" of the i I soul). ! I I Dialectic at Work in Reason Looking for Harmonies Through the possession of this discipline, reason "looks at" and recognizes harmonies (i.e., "seeds" or "traces" of order)53 in the world; it formulates these into laws (which become principles according to which it judges, or, as Augustine terms them, "rules"54).. These then become |the laws of the discipline.55 Reason thereby judges what is delivered to man through his sense perceptions,55 and, since reason's decisions are based on principles it has found and formulated into laws and rules, these decisions t i -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53mus. 1.12.25 (col. 1097-98); 13-28 (col. 1099- 1100). 5 4Ibid., 9.16 (col. 1092-93); 11.18, 19 (col. 1094-95); 12.25 (col. 1097-98); 13.28 (col. 1099-1100); V.4.8 (col. 1151). i j 55!bjd., III.5.12 (col. 1122). | 56Ibid., VI.14.47 (col. 1187-88). 180 are incontestable.57 On the whole, what is agreeable to reason, and thereby judged to be correct, will be agreeable to the senses (for the senses respond according to their j natural sensible power of judgment).58 Sometimes, however, the rules which learned people have rationally elaborated (e.g., about poetic verse, musical rhythms, et cetera), and which are the authoritative standards, conflict with the sense judgment;59 at other times, sense judgment is over ruled by reason itself.60 In both cases, the problem is that sense judgment perceives only that something seems agreeable (i.e., in terms of the sensibly perceived image, or phantasia). Reason, however, attaining the why, is capable of judging well (bene) (i.e., according to the numerical reality formulated in the soul and compared to the "traces" inherent in the sensible verse or rhythm).6^ 5 7Ibid., VI.16.32 (col. 1144-45); V.1.1 (col. 1147) 5 8Ibid., 1.5.10 (col. 1089); VI.2.3 (col. 1147-48); 4.5 (col. 1149). I 59ibid., IV.16.30-31 (col. 1143-44). 6QIbid., II.7.14 (col. 1107-08); IV.16.33-34 (col. 1145); V.3.4 (col. 1149); 4.7 (col. 1150-51). 6 1Ibid., III.8.19 (col. 1126); IV.10.11 (col. 1134- 35); V.5.10 (col. 1152); 10.20 (col. 1157); 13.27 (col. 1161); VI.11.32 (col. 1180-81). 181 In other words, sense judgments cannot be made about these things; only the mind, through "the look" of reason, is I capable of passing judgment here.6 2 Or, to put it another way, men's sense responses and judgments are not capable of responding in a measured way, i.e., according to the rhythmic limits inherent in the sound et cetera; only reason, which can read these measures, can guide the sense judgment to respond within the limits of reasonable sense action. Augustine, therefore, holds that only reason is able to judge whether or not what pleases us pleases us rightly (for reason alone can compare the image and the reality) . ® 3 Relative to musical sounds, therefore (and i this applied mutatis mutandis to every other kind of judgment) the man possessed of the discipline of music (i.e., the disciplined science) is the only one able to judge such sounds well.64 The possession of the science of music offers a stable and consistent standard according to which reason can judge the musical harmony and the sense pleasure. 6 2Ibid., V.5.10 (col. 1152). 6 3Ibid., VI.9.24 (col. 1176-77). 6 4Ibid., 1.3.4 (col. 1085). 182 Dialectic, The Liberal Arts and Truth The purpose of reasoning is to trace the harmonies back from the sensations (phantasia), in which reason first finds them and from which it formulates them, to their secret hiding place, i.e., the little room which is the soul (cubilia) where they reside.65 Because reason is disciplined and possessed of knowledge, Augustine speaks of it as using its own particular power of judicial esti mate. 8 6 Reason, thanks to its disciplined "look," habituated by the Liberal Arts, judges by its own judicial power. Together with memory,87 reason does find truths, but, reason recognized that they are both multiple and one. Reason also notes that it is changing and changeable but truths are not. Reason recognizes the soul, therefore, as a "little room" or a "little house" of truths. Reason's discoveries lead the learned man to look into himself and note "intelligence" which judges "the true as true." In this "intelligence" reason finds the "true which does not contend with itself like a two-faced reason."6® Here reason 6 5Ibid., V.13.28 (col. 1162). ®6Ibid., VI.10.25 (col. 1177). 6 7Ibid., 4.6 (col. 1165-66); 8.21 (col. 1174-75). 6 8Sol. 11.10.18 (p. 572). 183 discovers the "true forms" of which cogitation (cogitatio, i.e., thinking) has made images of (phantasms) from sensed 'impressions (phantasia) .69 These splendorous forms are \ I the proximate source of the reflected and luminous images in the phantasms. Yet, these truths are true because of i Truth Itself; and this Truth is conspicuous only to "intelligence," because "intelligence," as possessing the true forms is the power of the soul which is aware of the source of the splendorous truths present in the soul,79 Truth Itself, and seeks to view the "total face of truth" jin the "mansion where it dwells."7! Reason is the highest power in man because it judges of the world according to its disciplined and knowledgeable possession of truths; but "intelligence" judges of these truths as truths. "Intelligence" judges all images and forms in virtue of the One Truth, God. In so doing, "intelligence" understands God to be the Truth according to which true judgments are possible and sees God to be the Light because of which the true forms possessed by the soul splendorously shine forth.72 The 6 9Ibid., 20.35 (p. 598). 7 0Ibid. 7 1Ibid. and gu. 33.76 (col. 1076-77). 7 2sol. 11.20.35 (p. 598); mus. VI.1.1 (col. 1161- 63) . 184 rational man, therefore, using his senses, his reason and his intelligence arrives at and clings to "Him who rules and governs his intelligence, with no mediating nature between" (i.e., not the Nous of Plotinus, nor the Demiurge of Plato, nor the agent intellect of Aristotle). God alone is the ultimate and continuous source of the truths the rational man finds reflected in his soul and the knowledges which enlighten him. Rational man can now "live in a way which is more perfect and more enlightened by the light of the mind itself." Gilson and Augustine's Statements About the Judgments of Reason Headed by the title "The Inner Master," Gilson's chapter on "Rational Knowledge" begins with a long section in which he discusses Augustine's view of words and mean ings in conversation and teaching. He concludes by dis tinguishing Augustine's view from "Innatism" in a two-fold way: (1) It is legitimate to attribute to him (Augustine) a certain Innatism in the sense that the term indicates an opposition to Aristotelian empiricism. ... As we have seen, Augustine requires sensation only to account for the con tent of our knowledge of the corporeal; incorporeal 185 realities such as the soul and God, we know through the soul. (2) We can say that in Augustinism any knowledge, whether its object be corporeal or incorporeal, implies an innate element to the extent that it ! is the truth.73 ( !The presupposition of Gilson's conclusion appears in his i introductory statement to the second section of the chapter, "The Light of the Soul": Illumination is rightly considered such a distinc- | tive feature of his philosophy that we commonly ! call his theory of knowledge 'the Augustinian doc- j trine of divine illumination.'74 jLater on, he concludes: I I I Thus it seems true to say— salvo meliore judicio— I that illumination as Augustine saw it has as its i exact point of application not so much the power to conceive as the power to judge.75 That illumination is a "distinctive feature" of Augustine's philosophy is obvious; but that its point of application involves the very power to judge is an overstatement in the face of Chapters II and III. Can it even be true if it refers exclusively to the rational judgments of man? No, i I jfor two reasons. First, Augustine noted, in The Soliloquies; that the first kind of rememberer makes negative judgments. 73Qilson, op. cit., p. 76. 74Ibid., p. 77. 75Ibid., p. 91. 186 We are all aware, for instance, that we see something which seems familiar or hear some sound which strikes a sympathe-: tic cord. If we ask a qualified person (e.g., a musician) j ;what the familiar object or sound is, and he shows us many |pictures or makes many sounds, we can tell him that what i we heard or saw is not any of the examples, but we cannot tell him what the object or sound was. In other words, Augustine realizes men make judgments about what a thing is not, without judging what it is. Such negative judgments involve no illumination independent of the ordinary sensible luminosity of the phantasia. These negative judgments do not even involve the memory. In The Soliloquies Augustine commented that "remembered things" flood back into the memory "like a light." But, because negative judgments do not recall anything, they do not involve this luminous i return to conscious knowledge. In the second place, it does not apply to the developed habits of the liberally educated man. Augustine |calls these habits "lights"; they are the lights in virtue of which the educated man judges the various images excogitated by the mind to be images of the true knowledge j jcontained in the habit. Now, whatever the ultimate source of these knowledges are, they are certainly the proximate sources of intelligible light by which the "eye of the soul" sees the phantasms and judges them. Gilson's view i i of Divine illumination as the reason even man has the power j jto judge is, therefore, not true. i i Furthermore, Augustine distinguishes between (1) the musical judgments of the unskilled, (2) the musical judg ments of the skilled,7® (3) the true judgments of the edu cated, and (4) the false judgments of the inquirer.77 Though Gilson's interpretation of illumination and judg ment in Augustine might apply to the latter three kinds ■of judgment, it could not apply to the first. Augustine j !speaks of the man who can play the lyre although he does ^ not know music. This man senses musical harmonies to be different from discords, as do some higher animals. He can play the lyre because he has remembered these harmonious [sounds, and through practice has accustomed his body to resonate with these harmonies.78 His fingers are habituat ed to translate them on the instrument and his ears help jguide the fingers. However, an animal also has sense t memory. Then why could not an animal play an instrument? 76mus. 1.4.7 cf. 5.8. 77sol. 11.20.35. 78mus. 1.4.9 ff. 1881 Augustine maintains the man does not lack all knowledge, but only knowledge of music as a discipline (habit) of his : : I soul. According to Gilson, then, the explanation would lie I i I ;in Augustine's concept of illumination. But, even Augus- 1 ! ! I tine's analysis states unequivocally that the educated musician's judgments are attributable directly to his knowl edge, as a discipline possessed by his soul, not to Divine illumination. As Gilson proceeds to develop his theory of |Augustine's illumination, he offers a twofold advantage i which his interpretation has* over others. The second is of interest here: i Secondly, the interpretation suggested has the advantage of giving equal attention to the texts which imply a real activity on the part of the human intellect, and the texts which imply a real passiv ity on its part. Both activity and passivity must | be maintained, though not in the same respects. The i Augustinian mind is active, first of all, in regard to the body; it animates it and produces sensations on notice from it. Secondly, it is active in regard to the particular images engendered by sensation; it gathers, separates, compares them and reads the intelligible in them. But then something appears in the mind which cannot be explained either by the , objects which the mind ponders or by the mind itself which ponders them, and this is true judgment and the note of necessity which it implies. The judgment | of the truth is the component the mind must receive because it lacks the power to product it itself.79 ^Gilson, op. cit. , pp. 86-7. 189 That "the judgment of the truth is the component the mind must receive because it lacks the power to product it iitself" cannot explain: (1) the "discipline of true i jphilosophy," as a habit of the wise man's soul described |by Augustine in Against the Academicians in virtue of which i I the wise man judges and because of which he makes true judgments like "man's soul cannot both die and be immor tal." (2) The "discipline" of the Liberal Arts, as dis tinct from the phantasm treated by Augustine in The i I ]Soliloquies— Augustine tells Alypius, the New Academician, ! i that it is in terms of this habitual discipline, the "judge and organizer" of the parts of philosophy, that the wise J jman can judge true from false assertions. Augustine makes no mention of illumination as a condition for such judgments.8® Furthermore, time judgments are attributed to man on the sensible level. The eyes of the body, says Augustine in The Soliloquies, are able to discern shadows from real bodies and to judge true bodies from their shadow-copies because both the bodies and the shadows fall within the ken of sight. Therefore, the eyes can make a ®®mus. I.4.7-5.8. 190 j ) comparison and a true judgment. If a person sees the | i i shadow but not the true body also, a mistake is possible. :This, says Augustine, is why an inquirer into the Liberal j Arts will mistake false images of the Liberal Arts for the !Liberal Arts themselves, but an educated man will not. i I The educated man possesses the actual Liberal Arts habits. When various images (phantasia) arise in his mind, the educated man can tell which are true and which false because he has the real Liberal Arts present to his soul 1 through the habits. Since he can compare one with the other, he will not mistake one for the other. Thus, in The Soliloquies also, Augustine maintains that it is the man who is able to judge because of his power of sight and its possession of the objects or because of his pos session of the disciplines and the splendorous forms they t i contain within them. Both the eyes and reason can compare its respective objects and judge which is the true one (e.g., the eyes, the body or the shadow and reason, the image or form of the Liberal Art) and which is the false one. Again there is no mention of illumination as a con dition for such judgments.8 81sol. 11.20.35 CHAPTER V THE MEANING OF JUDGMENT AND ITS ! RELATION TO ILLUMINATION Judgment in the Early Dialogues of Augustine The findings of this thesis show that there are four kinds of judgments in the early dialogues of Augustine; judgments of the exterior senses, judgments of the interior | sense (common to both man and animals), judgments of reason, and judgments of intelligence. The present chap ter will re-examine these judgments through an analysis of Augustine's discussion of remembering in The Soliloquies, and re-evaluate Gilson's position on the meanings of judg ments and illumination. This analysis will show the rela tions among the various judgments, the continuity among them, the dependence each has upon light, and, as a result, suggest an interpretation of Augustine's theory of "illumination." 191 192 Remembering in the Soliloquies Augustine describes three situations.* (1) A man ;desires to make us recall something. He presents many j |examples (images), diverse from but similar to the thing I to be remembered (the reality). We listen, but do not see what he desires us to recall. Yet, we do see that none of the examples are the reality (what is signified by the images). We do not see the true, i.e., the signified; how ever, we are not able to be deceived or fooled by the images presented. That which we seek (the reality) is known sufficiently to us (satis norunt) so that our dis crete answers will not permit us erroneously to identify the image with what is signified (ipsa discretio qu3 non admittitur quod falso admoneris). We are, in a sense, remembering; we have not forgotten completely. But we are not remembering sufficiently to know what we have for gotten . (2) In the second situation, someone tells us that we laughed a few days after we were born. We do not dare to say that what the person tells us is wrong. If the person is credible, we have faith in him. To have faith 1sol. 11.20.34 (BAC I. pp. 596-98). 193 in this person, however, is in no sense an act of remember- ing; it is an act of believing. Augustine's distinction ! between remembering and believing is critical to the understanding of rational judgments. Belief does not entail a comparative judgment? knowledge does. Faith involves ascent to invisible realities; knowledge entails looking at visible realities. A person believes in absent things; a person knows things that are present— this view of i Augustine is Pauline in influence. Because knowledge is so different, memory is essen- i I tial in Augustine's epistemology; memory deals with what has happened. This is also why images are necessary to i judgment; memory preserves what we have known and, by recalling these forgotten images (phantasia), a man makes comparative judgments and knows again. Memory enables man to recall past evidences and compare them with the present evidence; in this way, man can make a rational judgment not just a sensitive response. Memory allows reflection upon one's past and present experience. But, this insight jcaused Augustine some problems in his early dialogues. Men I have this ability in common with animals. Because animals t judge what is pleasant to be preferable to what is painful, it seemed to Evodius that they reflectively judge life to X94 be better than death. I£ animals do make such a value judgment, it would seem they guide their actions by rationaL awareness and therefore have reason. Augustine attributes i i 1 j this uncanny ability of animals to their more acute sense perceptions and especially to their interior sense power which applies past memories to this present sensation. As we noted in Chapter II, Augustine does not seem to face the implications of such animal responses. The very consistency, for instance, of such animal judgment would occasion the thought that they are guiding their responses by an immutable and necessary standard. It is true that Augustine speaks in On Music of the sense judg- ment responding to the law of equality which God has impressed in animal nature, but Augustine never does relate the two statements and elaborate more fully upon this type of animal judgments. Since Gilson does not even mention the interior sense power in animals, he can not relate these consistent sense judgments to rational judgments. As a matter of fact, Gilson erroneously makes the follow ing statement and refers the reader to On the Trinity; Now there are in us, so to speak, two men: the exterior and the interior. To the exterior man belongs everything we have in common with the animals: material bodies, vegetative life, sense knowledge, images and recollections of images. To 195 the inner man belongs everything we possess in our own right and do not share with the animals: we j pass judgement on our sensations and make compari- ; sons between them, we apply ratios and numbers to bodies and forms and thereby take measurements of ; them. In every operation of this kind, as we have seen already, the eternal and divine 'reasons' come | into play, and these can be perceived only by the ! mind itself: mens. Man, then, is essentially his mind, or in other words, the mens is the inner man.2 Whatever the shortcomings of Augustine's presentation, he states unequivocally that the judgments we pass on our sensations and the comparisons we make between them are elicited by the interior sense power which man has in com mon with animals. The interior sense judgment of man does |not belong to the interior man, according to Augustine, as |we have shown. Furthermore, Gilson is in error when he i says "in every operation of this kind" (e.g., judging of our sensations and making comparisons between them) "the divine 'reasons' come into play." Although Augustine does not explain adequately such interior sense judgments of animals, he does not say animals have or involve the "divine 'reasons'" when making such judgments. | Because of Augustine's distinction between believ ing and remembering, it is easy to see that any human judgment demands some knowledge, some awareness of knowledge, ^Gilson, op. cit., pp. 116-17. 196 and some image stimulation to occasion the rememberance. I | By that same token, any illumination of these judgments ! |will be necessarily different from illumination involved in belief; in other words, illumination on the epistemologi cal level of human knowledge could not be supernatural. I (3) The third situation involves ourselves. We see an object, e.g., someone. We recognize for certain that we saw this person at some other time; we affirm that we know the person. However, where, when, how, or in whose company he had come to our attention (in notitiam venerit), i jwe do not remember. We struggle to recover and remember |the person (stagimus repetere atque recollere). If we ask this person where we made his acquaintance, and he reminds us, the whole affair floods into our memory like a light. We no longer struggle to remember. The person is known in relation to the source of our knowledge. We know the per son as the cause of our knowledge and we know the way the knowledge happened. Augustine provides an example of the last situa tion; through it, he compares and contrasts the "learned" and the "learner."3 We who remember are exemplified by j — ^sol. op. cit., 35 (pp. 598-600). those educated in the liberal disciplines (arts). By studying (discendo), the learned turns up things which, without doubt, are buried in themselves through forgetful- ; ness; in other words, the learned dig these things up again, i.e., become conscious of what they once learned. i [However, this process of "digging" and "remembering" does not satisfy the learned; nor does it stop them (nec tamen contenti sunt, nec se tenent). The arts, in which they i have become learned, manifest the splendor of the total I j face of truth; and it is this total face of truth, as the i source of this splendor, which the learned desire to view (intueantur). The "eye of the soul," the "interior mind,"4 wants to see the true (quae vult verum videre); and it turns itself rather to that according to which it judges, i.e., science, the splendorous possession of the soul. According to this splendorous presence, its "intelligence" judges that "drawn" quadratics which are produced by cogitation are quadratic.5 i i ! 4Ibid. (p. 598). i i 5Ibid. The learner might judge that the physical ]quadratic is a real quadratic because he is only "facing lout," i.e., looking at the physical image and judging according to it. 198 The "learner," however, is often deceived by and mistaken about the false colors and forms which arise from ; these same arts. His deception and mistake is due to his thinking that what he knows or inquires about is all there is (to know and seek). He thinks the images are the source i t of his knowledge. However, these false forms and colors are only imaginings which pour themselves out, as it were, onto the mirror of thought (velut in speculum cogitationis se fundunt). These cogitated images are only reflections. As such, they are multiple and varied images reflected in the mirror of thought. The "learner," however, mistakes these images for what is signified, i.e., the reality. The Four Elements Involved in Judgment | These three situations present the four elements Augustine finds to be involved in and necessary to "judg ment"! (1) image, (2) reality, (3) the true, and (4) the Truth. In the second situation we find a man being told jthat he laughed a few days after he was born. Obviously, the man has no "notion" of this happening; therefore, he can not remember it. The man can only believe that it happened. The believer, therefore, lacks the first element 199 necessary to judgment, i.e., an image. Because he has no j image, he cannot discover the reality, cannot judge it to j be true, and, therefore, no rational judgment is possible. ! ; I {He can only believe. I I The first situation Augustine presented tells of a ' I man who can discern that the examples adduced are not what he desires to remember; but he cannot see the true (what is signified), and, therefore, he cannot know why these images are not what he seeks. This man has the images, but he jdoes not have the reality of which the image is a reflec- i tion. This situation shows Augustine's awareness of nega tive judgments; such negative judgments are also compara tive. Not only does Gilson not mention them, but neither does Copleston, who is so critical of Gilson's view that God infuses necessary and universal notions into man's nund.° These negative judgments involve no illumination whatever, according to Augustine. Yet, these judgments are both comparative and certain. We are certain, says {Augustine, that the examples people adduce to enable us to see the truth (or object) are not the truth (or object) in ^Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., 1959), Vol. II, p. 65. question, but we cannot state what the truth (or object) is. Although Augustine does not say so, it would seem the |reason these certain negative judgments are possible is that man has impressed-notions of these things, e.g., wisdom, knowledge, et cetera; however, because these I t notions are not developed into habitual states of knowledge, we cannot recall exactly, distinguish precisely, or identify positively. Like the unskilled musician we possess the image afforded through the example, and we naturally empathize with it due to the impressed-notion to which it bears a similarity; but, because the impressed-notion is not yet a reality, or developed knowledge, we cannot make a positive comparative judgment. This same type of "in-between forgetfulness" (media est oblivio) would also seem to allow some kind of I jpositive judgment on the part of the unskilled musician, ! the "Disciple" in On Music, the audience who naturally {responds to and applauds beautiful musical sounds, in a f i {word, those lacking discipline, i.e., habitual knowledge. Judging according to their natural sense responses, the unskilled "know1 1 what is not harmonious musical sound and they can judge the harmonious from the discordant; they can even judge what is more harmonious within harmony itself. ____ But, they still cannot know; they cannot apprehend the numerical measure of the rhythm. j The unskilled cannot tell why these sounds are |musical and why others are not; they judge only that these i I sounds are harmonious whereas others are not. Though their 1 i judgments are perceiving something of the reality (by responding according to their natural sense of hearing to the "impressed" law of numbers within nature), they do not have the reality known, i.e., they are not possessed of the |science of music itself. Thus, their judgments can be true; but, without the science to guide them, these true judgments can be misused and abused. To cite the example of Augustine, the "learner" thinks the little he has learned is the whole of what is to be learned.7 In other words, he takes the image placed before him (by the teacher) for the reality it signifies; he takes the true for that because of which it is true, i.e., Truth. The "Look of the Soul" and the Splendor of Knowledge Thanks to reason, the "look of the mind," the learned man can make not only true judgments, but he will 7sol. op. cit. (p. 598) . 202 not misuse these true judgments because of the presence of knowledge as a habit of the soul. This knowledge will !lead him to an awareness of Truth. Augustine commented i that the "eye of the body" "is not able to see" that a "true sphere of any size is touched by a true plane at only one |point."8 The reason Augustine holds this seems to be analogous to the reason he gives for disallowing animals to have rational souls, i.e., the close union of body and ; |soul. Too much attention to the passions of the body | jlimits the soul's ability to reflect? the degree of reflec- j |tion indicates whether or not the soul is spiritual, i.e., rational. Consequently, the more attention the rational soul pays to the sense, accustomed to react to pleasurable feelings, the less the rational soul is able to discern the geometrical figure from the pleasurable figure.8 At the same time, however, Augustine has defined sensation as a cooperative activity resulting from the passion in the j body and the action of the soul; he has observed that 1 |sensation occurs because the passion of the body does not escape the attention of the soul. In spite of the fact 8Ibid. (p. 600). 8quan. 28.54 (PL 32, col. 1060) that Augustine's theory of the relation between body and soul is unique (i.e., neither an Aristotelian one nor a Platonic one),1° he never seems to resolve an apparently contradictory situation; sensation cannot occur unless the soul is aware of the passions of the body, but the soul cannot be perfect unless it is not involved in the passions of the body. Augustine has held, as a principle, that knowledge jis not present in sensation.11 Frequently, he has noted Jthat the "image" is equated with the reality of the "learner."I2 "True judgments," he asserts, can be mis used by those who do not have k n o w l e d g e .12 The conclusion this thesis draws is that the "cannot" of the learner is due precisely to his lack of knowledge; the "cannot" of the educated man is due to his lack of (or undeveloped) wisdom. The ability of the learned man lies in his knowl edge, i.e., being possessed of the habit(s) of the Liberal Arts. Now, it is true that some commentators on Augustine 10William O'Neill, "Augustine's Influence upon Descartes and the Mind/Body Problem," Revue des fetudes Augustiniennes, XII, 3-4, 1966, pp. 255-60. ilcf., ma£. 512 (p. 556); 10.34 (pp. 585-86); sol. 11.15. 28 (pp. 538-400); lib. II.3.9 (pp. 259-60). 1 2sol. 11.20.35 (p. 598); mus. 1.6.11-12 (col. 1089- 90) . 12Ibid. and lib. III.5.17 (p. 340). .. claim that these Liberal arts are innate knowledges like those Plato describes in the Meno.14 whatever the problems of interpreting Augustine's incomplete theory of sensation, I i we dispute this view on two counts: (1) though Colleran appeals to The Soliloquies (11.20.35), he fails to mention I Augustine's view of negative judgments,...e.g. , that a man can judge that a suggested example is not the reality he is thinking of. This is a type of remembering, according to Augustine; if Colleran were correct, Augustine would not distinguish this kind of remembering from the remembering i |he attributes to the educated man. Colleran fails to observe that Plato makes no such distinction between these two types of remembering. (2) Secondly, Augustine clearly distinguishes between "impressed notions" (e.g., wisdom) and the development of these notions into habits. Whatever l the problems interpreting Augustine's theory of teaching in relation to his views of "discipline" and learning, he cer tainly does not say, as Plato does, that all learning is remembering the formal knowledge which is innate, but for gotten, in his soul. ^ St. Augustine; The Greatness of the Soul; The Teacher, trans. J. M. Colleran, Ancient Christian Writers series (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1950), footnote 48, pp. 203-04. 205 The habits of the Liberal Arts are naturally splendorous; they are true. But, since they are true as j true because of Truth, the Truth glimmers forth from these I habits in the learned man's soul.15 Thanks to the light I from these habits as operating their knowledge (i.e., not I as forgotten, but as remembered), the learned man is able to discern the true forms and colors from the false ones jarising within his phantasms. This light, however, is i derived; it is a participation. What Augustine is claiming here can be illustrated by using the analogy of a solar battery. The radical source of the solar battery's energy i i jis the sun, but the battery is energized and operates the energy. Thus, the intelligence (which is the soul) is energized or illumined the same way the air is. The sensi ble sun is the radical source of the "lightened air" and j the intelligible sun is the radical source of the "intel- ligized soul." Then, just as the "lightened air" is the proximate principle of man's physical sight of the eye, so the "intelligized soul" is the proximate principle of the intellectual sight of the mind. When the wise man acquires the habit of wisdom, he develops the "impressed notion" of 15sol. 11.20.35 (p. 598), 206 | i wisdom in his soul, and it becomes what Augustine calls a "light" whereby he guides his wise judgments. In the same i jway, the educated man has developed the "impressed notions" I in his soul and they become "lights" because of whose light he discerns the shadow forms of the arts present in i his remembered and imagined phantasm from the true forms of art possessed by his soul. The learned man knows, however, that there can be no images without a reality of which they are the images; he knows, also, that there can be no true without a Truth because of which the true is true. He finds this One (Truth) in these many (truths), and he seeks his One (Veritas, God) as the source of these many (vera) possessed by his soul.^*> The Continuous and Ascendent Judgments i of the Learned Man i The learned man, therefore, possesses the four elements of judgment: images (i.e., as sensed in his phantasia and as excogitated in his phantasms) ; 17 the 1 6Ibid., 18.32-19.33 (pp. 594-96). 17mus. VI.11.32 (col. 1180); sol. 11.20.35 (p. 598). 207 reality (i.e., the forms of the Liberal Arts present in his soul as acquired and scientific habits)the true j j (i.e., the rational ability to make comparative judgments j | because of possessing both the images and the reality, ii.e., form);!® the Truth (i.e., these comparative judg- i ments are grounded back into the habit as operative through "intelligence").20 The learned man sensibly judges between true bodies and shadows; he rationally judges between true bodies (i.e., possessed of proportion and specificity)21 and true forms. He intelligently judges \ jthe true as true. Or, as Augustine phrases it, he "under- Jstands and sees" true judgments to be true as true, i.e., i jparticipating in Truth, not made true by the soul's "look," i.e., reason. In other words, Augustine contends, a man sees that the relation between true as true requires and i presupposes a relation to Truth Itself. The learned man, therefore, can be the wise man, the man who turns away from the images, the reality (forms) and the true in order to j------------------------------------------------------------ I -^Ibid., sol, as well as: 15.27 (p. 584); 18.32 (pp. 592-94). 1 9sol. 11.20.35 (pp. 598-600). ! 20Cf., sol. 1.15.28 (p. 540) with 11.20.34 (p. 596), 21sol. 11.18.32 (p. 594). 208 contemplate the splendor of the Truth present in his soul jthrough participation. The fact that he has the true within !his soul means that the Truth is relating him to Itself; inj I _ _ _ other words, the Truth is offering Itself to him.2 2 The j Truth, therefore, becomes "conspicuous" to him,22 i.e., ! i that there is a Truth is clear from the fact that the true is present in his soul; when the soul's reason "looks" upon the true, it knows that there is a Truth which is the source of the splendor of this true. The "look" of the learned man's soul is, therefore, rectified; his judgments are certain.24 He sees the source of his true judgments 1 jand knows where, when, how and why they are possible; the I "whole affair floods back into . . . memory like a light."21’ Order and Impressed Numbers; Illumination and Impressed Notions Two factors make this suggested interpretation of Augustine's theory of "illumination" preferable to Gilson's j 2 2lib. 11.12.33 (p. 292) et alii. I 23ibid., 34 (p. 293) et alii. 2 4Ibid., 13.36 (pp. 295-96). 25sol. 11.20.34 (p. 598). 209 interpretation: (1) our interpretation is derived from Augustine's Philosophical Dialogues as a result of the i investigation of a philosophical question: what does I ■ t jAugustine mean by judgment? (2) Our interpretation shows I the continuity among the various conclusions and statements of the different Philosophical Dialogues and allows a natur al resolution of them. Furthermore, it renders nugatory j any suspicion that Augustine1s theory leads to innatism or 1 j Ontologism because our presentation points out the un- I jPlatonic features.2® The first two reasons are clear from the progress of the dissertation; the third statement has need of a brief treatment here. The Light of Virtues and the Splendor of Knowledge i On Music and On Free Will emphasized that the orderly arrangement within the world is due to numbers having been "impressed" in each being. These "impressed numbers" guide all activities of the beings within the world.27 The "law of numbers" is perceptible to higher i . i ■■ ■ .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:__________________________________________________________________ 2®Innatism means pre-existent knowledge which the knower discovers to be already in the soul. Augustine's idea of notio impressa is definitely not innatism because the knower through studying (discendo) makes it into the known, i.e., it becomes a formal habit, or formal knowledge. 2 7lib. 11.11.31 (pp. 289-90). 210 animals and to people unskilled in the science o£ music {through their natural sense responses. According to these i ! ;natural sense responses, they prefer equality to inequal- I Iity and harmonious music to discordant music. The sense i i !response naturally reacts to the basic law: that equality is to be preferred to inequality.28 In other words, when the sense feeling (passion) is in proportion to the sense in question (e.g., eye, ear, et cetera), the feeling is I |pleasurable and, therefore, the soul's sense operation i |proceeds with ease; when the sense feeling is either defi- I cient or excessive to the sense in question, the feeling is painful and, therefore, the soul's sense operation pro- jceeds with difficulty. i Reason, however, is able to discover and formulate i this natural law (i.e., that it is a law); the "intelli- i gence" is able to understand the law (i.e., why it is a law) . 28 Such laws are immutable, and, when formulated by reason, become immutable rules. These rules, knowledgeably within the rational soul (as formulated by the "look" of I reason), actually becomes the "lights of virtues."30 In j 28mus. II.7.14 (vol. 1107); 9.16 (col. 1109); 10.17 ,(col. 1109); IV.8.19 (col. 1186). 2 9lib. II.8.22-23 (pp. 276-78). 30Ibid., 10.29 (pp. 286-88). 211 other words, these rules, as immutably true and present within the soul, shine forth; through the light they afford, the "eye of the soul" (i.e., the mind, or intelli- jgence), can guide the soul in virtuous action. This is I precisely why the wise man is a rule unto himself; and an authority for those who do not know.JX Yet, he recpgnizes that he did not make this law; he found it in the world about him and discovered that his intelligence possesses and operates this law because it is related to the Law Itself. i j These rules, these "lights," or this law are found in their most developed form in the wise man, the true philosopher. Augustine spoke of the existence of the wise man in On the Academicians; he noted that his wisdom was an acquired habit, a second, fabricated, nature.32 Augus tine concluded that the wise man was the true philosopher, and characterized true philosophy as the one which organ izes and judges of true things.33 In On Free Will, Augustine discusses the natural origin of this habit of wisdom; he notes that all men have some "notion" (notio) 31qua. 33.72 {pp. 510-11). 32Ac. III. 13.29 (pp. 160-61); 14.30-31 (pp. 162-64) 3 3Ibid., 17.38 (pp. 172-73); 19.42 (pp. 176-77). that they desire happiness. This "notion" is "impressed" in each man's soul.3^ The wise man develops this '"impressed notion" into the habit of wisdom itself. i i Although each man's habit of wisdom was his private and individual possession, wisdom itself was a common and public reality.33 The wise man becomes a "little sun" which shows the "true" to exist in the world; in other words, he has the active capacity to illuminate the common in the private. Thanks to this habit of wisdom, the wise |man is able to make truthful comparative judgments; these i judgments are immutable and participate in Wisdom Itself 34 lib. II.8 .121 (p. 275); 9.26 (p. 281). 35The problem of "private" and "public," "proper" (to the possessor) and "common" to all arises here. "Wis dom" does not belong to the wise man as man; he partici pates in it. In other words, he did not originate virtue as virtue, i.e., as transcending his personal possession and even conventional customary production of one culture or tribe; that one thing is virtuous to one man or one group of men and another thing is virtuous to another man or another group is not the point. The point rather is that whatever a man says is virtuous or vicious presumes that he has a standard "virtue" according to which he is judging but which he nor his society invented. Like the true as true, which exists because of "Truth," so the wise man as wise is a participation. His "wisdom" and anyone else's is a "splendorous reflection," a "light" according to which he judges of other things (and orders them) , but it is not the "Light Itself," i.e., the sole or adequate source having Immutability as its Nature. Cf., lib. 11.16, 41-46 (pp. 302-08 et alii). 213 because the wise man's human nature (even stabilized through the possession of the habit of wisdom in his soul) |is still mutable.3®These judgments are essentially immut- 1 able standards; the wise man's nature is essentially mutable. The wise man's judgments consist in deciding: (1) what lower things must be subordinated to what higher things; (2) what equal things must be joined to each other; (3) how to distribute to each man what is properly his own.37 The wise man is able, through the presence of this I jhabit of wisdom in his soul, to judge not only "what is true" and to organize these truths hierarchically, but also to judge "what should be done." This habit provides the splendor whereby the wise man discerns the relations of images to the reality and the true to the Truth. The j wise man, therefore, is able to point out that such judg ments as "seven and three are ten" is a necessary and immutable judgment. The wise man becomes a real teacher I I |who is able to show the man who denies that God exists j that they are both possessed of common, necessary and 36lib. 11.10.29 (pp. 286-88) and 31 (pp. 289-90). 37Ibid., 10.28 (pp. 284-86). 214 immutable truths which they did not originate but only discovered. Once the man who denies that God exists sees i |this fact of common truths, he can see that these judgments tentail.a necessary relation to a Necessary and Immutable I !Nature, called God.**® If one asks the content of this splendorous of wisdom, the answer, Augustine says, is that this "impressed notion" is the "seat and little dwelling of numbers."39 Whether wisdom makes the numbers or make one wise, however, Augustine does not k n o w .40 istill calls this habit "the little dwelling place" (habitaculum) because it is the "seat" God located in man's rational soul "from which He disposes all those lowest things to which He gave numbers."4 1 The point is that, 38It is easy to see how our interpretation offers a new dimension of interpretation of Anselm's Ontological argument. Our contention is that Anselm's argument cannot be interpreted correctly outside of the context of On Free Will, Book II to which it owes an obvious indebtedness. Although The Ontological Argument, edited by Alvin Plantiga (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965) is an admirable book, it fails to work from Augustine's argument to Anselm's and, therefore, it lacks the interpretation we think is valid in Augustine's argument to show the reasonableness anc insight of Anselm's argument. 3 9lib. 11.11.30 (pp. 288-89). 4 0Ibid., 32 (pp. 290-91). habit place numbers But he 41Ibid., 31 (pp. 289-90). 215 contrary to what Gilson contends, Augustine asserts that these "impressed notions" (which become the source of jnecessary and immutable judgments) are created in man's nature but are developed by man's effort. Furthermore, as developed habits, they become the luminous source where- i by the wise man (and in a lesser degree the educated man) judges the image from the reality and discerns the relation between the true and the Truth. The wise man realizes that his reason, whereby he judges of lower things, is a parti cipation in the Eternal Reason of God, which, as Augustine says in the Retractions, is "present to them, in so far as they can possess it . . . the light of Eternal Reason in i which immutable truths are conspicuous."4 2 In other words, these immutable truths are not placed in man by God's illumination, as Gilson contends, but they become conspicu ous to man as a result of his seeing their relation to an immutable source which is by nature immutable as they are by participation. — k * 4 2re. 1.4.4 (PL 32, col. 590). It is true that Augustine is speaking about "learners" in this context. But, because the wise man already has "learned" correctly, I have seen fit to apply this text to the wise man to illustrate the point made in the text. This appropriation does not in any way vitiate the meaning of Augustine's statement which we are applying here. 216 The wise man, is, therefore, in the truest sense i "the organizer and judge of all true things." He does not I make them true; Truth does that. The wise man organizes and judges of them because of his participation in the Truth due to his possession of the splendorus forms in his i soul. In the wise man, "the law of numbers," perceptible by all men as the judicial rhythm, "causes one to reach God, the Builder of the animal.1,43 The wise man becomes the religious man, led to the awareness of God as the ultimate source of the light present in his rational soul. i |His reason participates in the Reason of God to the extent that it looks at the "rules" ("impressed" on all things) as knowledgeably present in his soul and recognized as being in all other things he senses and knows; because the "rules as known" are formal realities (fabricated habits of I • his soul) and the "rules as impressed" are only imaged in his phantasia, he prefers the reality to the image and contemplates the rules rather than the phantasia. 1 His soul participates in the Light of God to the [extent his knowledge is splendorous and provides the light Jin which the "eye of the soul," (i.e., mind or intelligence) 43mus. VI.8.20 (col. 1174). ...............— — . . ...... — 2 1 T judges the true to be true. Only the rational man can per ceive this light through discovering laws. Only the edu- < cated man can possess and develop it through becoming | habitually learned. Only the wise man can live according to this light by submitting himself to God, Its ultimate source. The rational man discovers the true as true;44 the learned man perceives the relation it has to the Truth. The true wise man, however is religious and "rejoices in the Truth";45 j _ n this sense, the wise man "sees God" (i.e., understands Him) as present in the "light" his soul I :possesses and participates in and worships Him.4® i Human Judgment and the Rational Ascent to God; Natural Illumination t The analysis of "judgment" and the suggested inter pretation of "illumination" presented above is in agreement with the "seven levels of the soul" which Augustine explains in On the Greatness of the Soul.47 The first t 44rel. 39.73. | 45mag. 15.39 (BAC III. p. 596); lib. 1.13.29 (p. |237). 46sol. 1.7.14 (p. 518). 47qua. 33.70-76. 218 level of the soul is found in its power to give life (vis) to the organism. No judgment is present on this level. j The second level is seen in its power to cause sensation. The soul judges among (diiudicat) the innumerable differ ences of color, taste, sound and forms by tasting, smelling, jhearing and seeing. In all these things, the soul seeks anc. selects (adsciscit atque appetit) whatever is agreeable to {the nature of its body; and rejects and flees from what is i jdetrimental (reiicit fugitque contraria). The power whereby ! < I these latter judgments are made was called the "interior : sense" in On Free Will. The power in which these judgments | |were stored and conserved is "memory." Recalling these i stored judgments illuminates the present phantasia; this is why the memory is called a "light."48 The memory is of the {present; thus, it receives and stores the impressions of j I the present, which then becomes past. Whenever a person !(or higher animal) comes across something familiar, but Jdoes not remember a re-commemoration of the incident, the memory makes the whole affair flood back like a light, i.e., becomes sensibly luminous again thanks to the memory. 48mus. VI.8.21 (P. 32, col. 1174-75); cf., conf. 10.14-21. 219 The power of memory allows the Odyssian dog, the nursing child and the forgetful man to make a comparative judgment i ■ joining a present with a past sensation. I The soul, however, can produce all the above effects even in brute animals; in this sense, brute animals and men have these kinds of judgments in common. The "illumination" necessary for these judgments is the natural light which illumines the physical bodies (and produces the shadows, similar to but different from real bodies) and has its ultimate source in the sun, and its proximate source in the soul as operated in the eyes and through the memory. However, in so far as the bodies are illumined and the eyes ! are illuminated, the light is present to but identified with neither.49 Due to the presence of the sensible sun light, as participated in by each according to its nature, the eye can discern the true body from the shadow, i.e., the reality from the image. The threefold requirement, or ground, so to speak, necessary for the judgment to occur is that there be a power (eye), that it can look (adspicere), and that the object be visible (and this sometimes requires the memory). The only way, however, that the "looking" can 49sol. 1.6.12 (p. 516); lib. 11.12.33 (pp. 292-93). 220 occur and the object can be visible, is if there is a third thing present to both (according to each one's nature) but ! 'identified with the nature of neither, i.e., a sun (or the soul). This sun is the ultimate source of the light; it is present to the body according to the bodyIs nature, i.e., I in so far as the body reflects the light (or in so far as j the remembered body-phantasi5 is recalled and thus becomes luminous to the interior sense). This sun is present to the eye according to the eye's nature, i.e., in so far as j j the soul activates the body so that the eye can receive the reflected light from the illumined body and thus "sees."50 | The third "level" of the soul is that of the 50sol. 1.8.15 (p. 520). Two passages in The Soliloquies support this interpretation relative to both the physical eyes and the mental eyes: 11.13.24 (pp. 580- 82) and 11.18.32 (pp. 592-94). The soul is spoken of as a "light" and the discipline (formal habit) as "splendor," a luminous and illuminating thing; since the discipline is knowledge and knowledge is true, the statement identifying the true as an "image of the Truth" would mean that the discipline within the soul is a splendorous participation in the Truth, and thus, a true light, light from Light |Itself. Since the rational soul is the "seat" of these j trues, the soul too would be a "light." In this case, the j reason would be the "eye of the soul" but the intelligence would be the "look" because the soul is the proximate source of the light; i.e., reason discovers rules, laws and "immut able relations" whereas intelligence understands the rela- j tion to exist between these immutable judgments reason has discovered and the Divine Reason whose nature is Immutabil ity. Stoic as it sounds, the difference is that in Augus tine the soul is a spiritual light, not a material one. 221 rational. It is the level which memory can reveal to us, not memory in the sense of recalling learned habits, but ; memory in the sense of remembering all things that men notice every day, i.e., the arts of craftsmen, the shapes of buildings, symbols, languages, books, duties, the power t of reason and thought, poetry, music, arithmetic, et cetera. These are things that both the learned and the {unlearned, the good and the bad, have in common. There i I is, therefore, the fourth "level," i.e., that of the |learned man, the interior man. He is the one who discerns !that the >soul takes precedence over the body and the uni- 1 verse of bodies. He compares these bodies to the power and the beauty of the soul and judges the soul to be greater. This interior man follows the authority and precepts of the wise man. Yet, this man is troubled by the fear of death; and the more he progresses (in virtue), the more aware he is that he is far from true purity (mundatio). The judgments and lights of the wise man, though good and purifying to a degree, are not enough. The splendor of knowledge (even wisdom) is not a sufficient and stabilizing guide; the interior man demands more: a I new power whereby he might see, a new source of light, a 222 new hope and a new love.5^ i i j Faith, Hope and Charity and the Christian Vision j of God; Non-Natural Illumination Faith in God is the fifth "level" of the soul. Here the man places his confidence in God (thereby laying aside the fear of death every rational man has), and seeks His aid in the difficult task of self-purification (thereby turning the task of purifying his soul over to God). On this "level," a man finally realizes in every way how great f i the soul is in every respect. Then he advances with trust I to God through the contemplation of Truth; thus, the 1 interior man receives that secret and transcendent reward for which he has labored so hard.^2 The man has placed his faith in God, so God gifts him with Himself through Faith. Thanks to the Faith, this man has a new source of sight, a new power, another "eye" through which his soul can see t " " 51sol. 1.7.14 (p. 518). Cf., lib. 1.12.25 (p. 231) |for the good will as the "drive" for happiness in the wise |man. This good will is to the wise man what Hope and |Charity are for the man of Faith. j I 52mus. VI.1.1 (PL 32, col. 1163). 223 Truth Itself; this man now has the "eyes" of God, i.e., God's point of view about life, happenings, et cetera. JThis "look" makes the interior man of Faith blessed.53 I j An ardent desire to understand this Truth takes lover the soul; this is the sixth "level" of the soul. i i It is the highest "look" of the soul; it is a "right" and "serene" look, i—e., neither fear of error nor death occurs here and no misuse of judgments is possible on this "level." The "looking" of the new eye is rectified by the |habit of Hope; this infused habit makes this new eye healthy and its activity of "looking" healthy [just as the habit(s) of the Liberal Arts made the "eye" of the learned t man healthy and its activity of "looking" and judging of human truths healthy].54 If, however, someone endeavors to "see God" in the way those who have Faith "see" Him, and this person is far from being purified or prepared, he would judge that this God is a long way from being called "Truth."55 In effect, this someone would err in his 53sol. 1.7.14 (p. 518). 54Ibid. 55The "unpurified" would judge that Christ, in the New Testament, was not the "Truth." This type of person on this "level" of the soul is analogous to the "inquirer, or learner" in the matter of the Liberal Arts. Just as the "learner" would mistake the image for the whole (the real ity) , so the "unpurified" would deny the Image was the Whole, i.e., Christ was God. In Augustine's mind is, no 224 judgment about God because he lacked the habit of Faith | which he needs in order to make a good comparative judgment,, | The seventh, and last, "level" of the soul is that i i of Charity. This is the mansion to which these various levels lead, the first four, or rational levels, included. Here is joy in and enjoyment of the possession of Truth Itself. There is no further seeking, no more labor toward the end; there is only love of the end as achieved.^6 This achievement can be compared to that of the wise man, the perfection of the fourth "level." Just as each rational man strives to find and possess the truth, so does the man of Faith. Each has a "notio" of that which he doubt, the various heresies of his time. This is another instance of how important philosophy and human knowing were for Augustine's Theology and Christian knowing. 56The questions treated in Against the Academicians as to whether or not the wise man is the one who weeks knowledge or who possesses it are illuminating in this regard. He both possesses it (as an impressed notion) and seeks it as completed knowledge (as a fabricated nature) possessed in his soul. The additional problem posed by this comparison is: in Augustine's mind does man have a "notion" of the Revealed Christian God "impressed" within his soul, i.e., the problem of a natural desire for the Christian God. If our analysis is correct, it would seem right from this first dialogue that, according to Augustin^ man's appetite for God is natural, i.e., a fundamental orientation of man's nature to its Creator and Redeemer, not a superadditive via a created accident called grace, as it is for Aquinas. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, editio Leonina Manualis (Casa Editrice Marietti: Torino, 1948), Vol. II, IIa, IIae 171.2 ad 3; Vol. I, Ia 8.3 arg. 4. 225 seeks. ^ Just as wisdom is called the "seat" of God, the "little house" wherein the splendor of Truth is conspicuous to the learned man through the presence of the true in his I i i soul, so Charity is called the "abode" of God, the "mansion1 1 wherein Truth Itself now lives. I i i Judgment and Illumination: Augustine and Gilson Though much more could be said and many more texts could be cited, this thesis closes with the contention that all the evidence of Augustine1s Philosophical Dialogues points to the conclusion that Gilson's interpretation of Augustine's theory of "judgment" and his consequent theory of "illumination" is defective, inadequate and invalid. As we saw, Gilson's interpretation is defective in three ways: (1) Gilson claims that Augustine states that there are only five kinds of "numerical rhythms." We showed Augustine distinguishes six. (2) Gilson states that the very power to make immutable and necessary judgments is possible, according to Augustine, only because of the Divine Presence to the soul of man through illumination. We noted that Gilson's failure to notice i 5?Cf., footnote 56. 226 Augustine's distinction between perceptible rhythm and |judicial rhythm prevented Gilson from seeing that animals j also make a kind of necessary and immutable sense judgment since their natural sense judgment is guided by the "law of equality" impressed by God, "the builder of animal nature." However, these animal judgments involve no Divine illumination whatever but only (at times) the illuminative presence of a past phantasia as a result of recalling it through memory. (3) Gilson says that only the inner man "passes judgments on sensations and makes comparisons j between them." We showed that Augustine concerns himself j with such comparative sense judgments in some animals and elaborates a theory of an interior sense power. We also noted the difficulties Augustine faces because he sees that animals and men have this power in common, e.g., the apparent fact that such animals seem to value life over non-life, thereby suggesting the possibility that these animals are self-reflective. Augustine, we saw, leaves the question unresolved. Gilson's interpretation is inadequate because he fails to relate the "impressed notion" concept of Augustine to Augustine's development of "discipline" and "habits." Because of this oversight, Gilson does not see the importance of Augustine's discussion of "image" and |"reality" in reference to the problem of remembering and forgetting. Consequently, Gilson does not develop Augus- j tine's idea of the relation between comparative judgment and the "lights" of the virtues or habits. This oversight i prevents Gilson from realizing that it is not the content of its necessary and immutable judgments that result from i Divine illumination, but the light in which the mind sees that the necessary and immutable judgments it makes are necessarily related to an Immutable and Necessary Nature, i.e., God as Truth Itself. Gilson's interpretation is also invalid in two senses: (1) His interpretation is preoccupied with the theory of illumination and he proceeds from an incomplete view of rational judgment to a conclusion about necessary and immutable judgments in general. In other words, Gilson presumes he understands Augustine's theory of immutable judgments before he investigates them in all their forms. (2) He maintains that Augustine's theory of illumination is a mere metaphor. But, as we have seen, it is an ontological reality approached through an epistemological preoccupation. In other words, Augustine's preoccupation with the true judgments leads him to an affirmation of 228 necessary and immutable Being Who is Truth; Augustine jworks through Truth to Being. i Gilson has elaborated neither the what nor the how of Augustinian illumination. As a matter of fact, there is a question of whether or not Gilson's scholarly t |attitude was centered on understanding Augustine's theory or on defending Aquinas from Augustinian detractors. This question arises naturally when we read Gilson's con cluding statement: But with a creature it is an entirely different matter. The intelligible light which the soul sees in itself was created in it, and the soul can affirm that God exists only after a process of inductions from effect to cause, i.e., by means of a genuine proof. In Plotinus, the soul turns toward its own light and principle; in Augustine, the soul is raised gradually to the transcendent source of its truth. Between these two conceptions there is an essential difference, not merely one of degree. Unfortunately, this is something which Augustine's enthusiasm for Neoplatonism did not allow him to see. To have truth, which is divine by essence, dwell in a soul which is also divine involved no problem for Plotinus, but to explain how truth, which is divine, can become the truth of a creature was a difficulty Augustine could not escape. He did not see that he was responsible for introducing the problem into Plotinus, and for this reason was neither aware of it nor in a position to work out a solution for it .... In fact, it was impossible to escape the difficulty except by forsaking Plotinus in favour of J Aristotle. To St. Thomas Aquinas goes the credit for j this stroke of g e n i u s .58 L 58Gilson, op. cit., p. 110. "... " ' " 229“ Whatever the Plotinian influence/ there is no doubt that Augustine's view is unique. Augustine's emphasis upon the |"impressed notions" and his awareness that man's true as true judgments involve a necessary relation to an Immutable and Necessary Nature show he did see the difference between the Plotinian turning within towards the soul (in Augustine to the "lights" of virtue or splendorous forms within the human soul) and the soul being raised gradually to the transcendent source of its truth (in Augustine, the intel ligence's awareness that the immutable and necessary qual ity of some rational judgments implies a necessary relation to an Immutable and Necessary Nature). Gilson is right in asserting that Augustine could not escape the problem of how Divine Truth and some human truths are related, but wrong in formulating the problem. As we have seen, Augustine does not fret over how Divine Truth "can become the truth of a creature" because his question was: how does man make some necessary and immutable judgments when his nature is mutable? Augustine's answer is that man idiscovers some of his judgments are true as true (i.e., truthful) and realizes that they are because they have a relation to Truth Itself; the discovery is made by reason, "the eye of the soul," and the judgment is made by 230 intelligence, "the look of the soul." Gilson does not seem to accept the possibility that Augustine could elaborate a theory which is just as much a stroke of i i genius using a Plotinian starting point, as Aquinas did using an Aristotelian starting point. This lack of acceptance could preclude an unprejudiced effort to determine Augustine's own view of judgment and illumina tion and could include a prejudice for Aquinas' view of judgment and illumination. Though the suggested interpretation of Augustine's l i theory of "illumination" which this thesis presents is not meant to be conclusive, it is thought to be valid accord- a ing to the analysis of Augustine's theory of judgment in the Early Philosophical Dialogues. I I I I BIBLIOGRAPHY Section A: Works of Augustine The Philosophic Dialogues used from the early period: Academics, Against the, III (Contra Academicos) A. D. 386; PL 32, 905-958; CSEL 63, 3-81; BAC III, 63-179; OSA II, 24-163; trans. POC 1 (1948); ACW 12 (1950); Sr. M. Patricia Garvey, Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1948. Happy Life, The (De beats vita) A. D. 386; PL 32, 959-976; CSEL 63, 89-116; crit. ed. M. Schmaus, Bonn: Florilegium Patristicum, 37; BAC I, 622-667; OSA IV, 222-285; trans. F. E. Tourscher, Philadelphia: P. Reilly, 1933; L. Schopp, St. Louis: Herder, 1939; Ruth Brown, Washington: Catholic Univ. Press, 1944; FOC 1 (1948). Order, On, II (De ordine) A. D. 386; PL 32, 977-1020; CSEL 63, 121-185; BAC I, 680-797; OSA IV, 302-459; trans. FOC 1 (1948). Soliloquies, II (Soliloquia) A. D. 387; PL 32, 869-904; BAC I, 498-601; OSA V, 7-163; trans. Nicene, Vol. VII (1888); Dods, reprinted in Oates, I, 259-297; FOC 1 (1948); LCC 6 (1953). Soul, Immortality of the (De immortalitate animae) A. D. 387; PL 32, 1021-1034; OSA V, 170-219; trans. G. C. Leckie, New York: Appleton-Century, 1938; reprinted in Oates, I, 301-316; FOC 2 (1947). Music, On, VI (De musica) A. D. 387-391; PL 32, 1081-1194; OSA VII; trans. FOC 2 (1947); Bk. VI only, T. P. Maher, S. J., St. Louis Univ. Thesis, 1939. 232 233 Soul, Magnitude of the (De quantitate animae) A. D. 387- 388; PL 32, 1035-1080; BAC III, 418-522; OSA V, 226, 397; trans. FOC 2 (1947); ACW 9 (1950). Will, On Free, III (De libero arbitrio) A. D. 388-395; PL 32, 1221-1310; CSEL 74, 1-164; BAC III, 200-409; OSA VI, 136-471; trans. R. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, New Yorks Scribner's, 1929 (Book II only); F. E. Tourscher, Philadelphia: P. Reilly Co., 1937; LCC 6 (1953); C. M. Sparrow, Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1947. Teacher, The (De Magistro) A. D. 389; PL 32, 1193-1220; BAC III, 538-598; OSA VI, 14-121; trans. G. C. Leckie, New York: Appleton-Century, 1938; reprinted in Oates, I, 361-395; ACW 9 (1950); LCC 6 (1953) . Religion, On the True (De vera religione) A. D. 389-391; PL 34, 121-172; CC 32 (1962); BAC IV, 3-223; trans. LCC 6 (1953); J. H. S. Burleigh, Chicago: Regnery, 1959. Section B: Other early works consulted but not as opera tive in the dissertation because no significant insights into the meaning of judgment were found in them. Complete reference sources are not provided for this group of Augustine's works; only the PL references are given. Believing, On the Value of (De utilitate credendi) A. D. 391-392; PL 42, 63-92. Continence, On (De continentia) A. D. 394-395; PL 40, 348- 372. Donatists, Psalm Against the (Psalmus contra partem Donnati) A. D. 393-396; PL 43, 23-32. Faith and the Creed, On (De fide et symbolo) A. D. 393; PL 40, 181-196. Fortunatus, Disputation Against (Disputatio contra Fortunatum) A. 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"L'intentionnalite des sensations chez s. Augustin," Augustinus Magister I, pp. 491-498. Sestili, J. "Thomae Aguinatis cum Augustino de illuminatione concordia," Divus Thomas, No. 31, 1928, pp. 50-82. Solignac, A. "La condition de l'homme p^cheur d'apres s. Augustin," Nouvelle Revue Th^ologique, No. 78, 1956, pp. 359-387. Somers, H., S. J. "Image de Dieu et illumination divine," Augustinus Magister I, 1954, pp. 451-54. Tarrant, D. "Greek Metaphores of Light," Classical Quarterly, Vols. 9-10, 1959-60, pp. 181-187. Taylor, J. H. "The Meaning of Spiritus in St. Augustine's De Genesi, XII," The Modern Schoolman, March, 1949, Vol. 26, pp. 211-218. Thery, G. "L'augustinisme medieval et le probleme de l'unit£ de la forme substantielle," Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae, 1931, pp. 140-200. 241 Thonnard, P. J. "Ontologie augustinienne," Annee Th^ologique Augustinienne, No. 14, 1954, pp. 41-53. ________. "La notion de nature chez Saint augustin," Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, XI, 3-4, 1965, ; p. 239. Van der Linden, L. J. "Ratio et intellectus dans les premiers ecrits de s. Augustin," Augustiniana, ' No. 7, 1957, pp. 6-32. Verbeke, G. "Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez s. Augustin," Augustiniana, No. 4, 1954, pp. 495-515. Warfield, B. "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority," Princeton Theological Review, No. 5, 1907, pp. 357-397; 529-578. jxiberta, B. "De abstractione apud s. augustinum," Acta j Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae, 1931, I pp. 317-336. Unpublished Material Clarke, T. E. "The Eschatological Transformations of the Material World According to St. Augustine." Woodstock College, 1956. Geiger, J. A. "The Origin of the Soul: An Augustinian Dilemma." Rome, Angelicum, 1957. Maertens, G. "Le probleme de la connaissance de soi dans les oeuvres de s. Augustin jusqu'en 400." Louvain, 1956. Moriarty, P. J. "Illumination in Saint Augustine's Early Philosophical Writings." Unpublished Master's thesis, St. Louis University Graduate School, 1944. 242 O'Connor, W. "The Concept of the Soul According to St. Augustine." Unpublished Doctor's thesis, Catholic University, 1921. Solignac, A. "La condition humaine dans la philosophie de s. Augustin." Unpublished Doctor's thesis, Gregorianum, Roma, 1956. i iWade, W. L. "A Comparison of the De Magistro of Saint I Augustine with the De Magistro of Saint Thomas." Unpublished Doctor's thesis, St. Louis University Graduate School, 1935. i i i I i APPENDICES APPENDIX A TEXTUAL ABBREVIATIONS OF AUGUSTINE'S WORKS i Contra Academicos— Ac De beatS vita— vit De ordine— ord Soliloquia— sol De inunortalitate animae— im De musicS— mus De moribus ecclesiae— mor De quantitate animae— qua De Genesi contra Manichaeos— Gn Ma De libero arbitrio— lib De diversis quaestionibus— q De magistro— mag De vera religione— rel De utilitate credendi— cred De duabus animabus— 2 an C. Fortunatum Manichaeum— Fo De fide et symbolo— sy Psalmus contra partem Donati— ps-Do De Genesi ad litteram imp. 1.— Gn im De sermone Domini in monte— monte 244____________________ 245 Contra Adimantum Manich— Ad Epistulae ad Galatas expos.— Gal Ep. ad Romanos inchoata— Rm in Expos . . . ex ep. ad Romanos--Rm !De continentia— cont i I De mendacio— men Ad Simplicianum— q Si De agone christiano— ag De doctrinS Christiana 1-3, 24— do Enarrationes in Psalmos— Ps Contra ep quam vocant fundamenti— fu i !Confessiones— cf APPENDIX B SYMBOLS USED IN WRITINGS CITED PL— Patrologia Latina, Paris: J. P. Migne, 1844-1864. (Works of St. Augustine reprinted from the seventeenth-century Maurist edition, in PL volumes 32-47.) CSEL— Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum, Vienna: Tempsky, 1866-. (Works of Augustine are scattered through out the numbered volumes.) CC— Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, under direction of the Monks of the Abbey of St. Pierre de Steenbrugge Turnholti: Beepols; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1853-. The Augustine volumes are: 32, 1962; 33, 1958; - - 36, 1954; 41, 1961; 38-40, 1956; 47-48, 1955. ACW— Ancient Christian Writers, a series of English translations ed. by J. Quasten et al., Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1946-. The Augustine volumes are: 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 29, 30. FOC— Fathers of the Church, a series of English transla tions ed. by R. Deferrari et al., New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1948ff; since 1960, Washington: Catholic Univer. Press. Dods--The Works of Aurelius Augustinus, ed. by Marcus Dods, 15 vols., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark "Co., 1871-1876. Nicene— A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. by Philip Schaff, New York: The Christian Literature Co. and Scribner's Sons, 1892. LCC— Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia: Westminster Press; vol. 6— Augustine, Earlier Writ ings, ed. J. H. S. Burleigh, 1953; vol. 7— Augustine, Confessions and Enchiridion, ed. A. C. Outler, 1955; vol. 8— Augustine, Later Works, ed.^ -------- J. Burnaby, 1955. 2AB-------- " -------------------- 2TT BAC— Obras de san Augustin, ed. P. Felix Garcia, O.S.A., 22 vols., Madrid, Spain: Bibliotheca De Autores Christianos, 1951-66. jOSA— Oeuvres de Saint Augustin. Dialogues Philosophigues, ! IV, V, VI, VII, Bruges, Belgique: Descl£e, De Brouwer et Cie, 1947-52. CPSA— The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, E. Gilson, trans. L. E. M. Lynch, New York: Random House, 1960. AM— Augustinus Magister, III, Congres International Augustinien, Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954 & 1958. Bol.S.— The Collected Works of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairms, New York: Pantheon Books, 1941. BWA— The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, New York: Random House, 1941.

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Creator Buckenmeyer, Robert Eugene (author)

Core Title The meaning of judicium and its relation to illumination in the philosophical dialogues of augustine

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Werkmeister, William H. (committee chair), MacGregor, Geddes (committee member), Robb, J. Wesley (committee member), Robb, Kevin (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-125136

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Rights Buckenmeyer, Robert Eugene

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