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The Church Missionary Society, The Imperial Factor, And Yoruba Politics, 1842-1873

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The Church Missionary Society, The Imperial Factor, And Yoruba Politics, 1842-1873

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Content This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 67-2117 PHILLIPS, E arl Harold, 1926- THE CHURCH MISSIONARY SOCIETY, THE IMPERIAL FACTOR, AND YORUBA POLITICS, 1842-1873. U n iversity of Southern C alifornia, Ph.D., 1966 H istory, modern University Microfilms, Inc.. Ann Arbor, Michigan THE CHURCH MISSIONARY SOCIETY, THE IMPERIAL FACTOR, AND YORUBA POLITICS, 1842-1873 by Earl Harold Phillips A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (History) August 1966 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CA LIFO RN IA T H E G R A D U A TE S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y PARK L O S A N G E L E S . C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by .m]U..HARO^-.P.HILLIES................. under the direction of h%9....Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y <?• ....... Dean D ate ....September 3* 1966 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION . . ....................... 1 Historiography Concerned with non-Economlc Interpretations of Imperialism . • • • . 7 Purpose of this Study................. 9 Contemporary Nigerian Historiography . . . 11 Scope of the Dissertation............ 14 British Attitudes Toward Vest Africa . . . 15 Evangelical Antecedents of the Church Missionary Society .............. 23 Early Years of the Society.......... 26 The Society and the Establishment.... 29 Growth and Reorganization............ 31 Henry V e n n .......... 33 The Evolution of Missionary Policy Toward Vest Africa, 1808-41 ............ 36 Missionaries and Polltlos ................ 43 The C.M.3. and Politics................ . 45 iii lv Chapter Page XI. YOHOBALAMD TO THE ADVENT OF THE MISSIONARIES. 52 The Oyo Empire............... 55 Egba Wanderings and the Establishment of a New Homeland.................. 59 Government at Abeokuta.............. 62 Sodeke Directs Egba Ambitions toward the S e a ................. 66 The Growth of Ibadan................ 70 The Land and People of Ijebu............ 74 Alafln Atlba and the Collapsing Oyo Empire. 77 The Return of Liberated Slaves to Yorubaland; the Quickening of Missionary Interest .................... 8 0 The Establishment of the C.M.S. Connection In Yorubaland .............. 85 Summary................................. 90 III. FIRST CONTACTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISSIONARY POLICY.................... 92 Badagry and Its People ............ 95 Contemporary Coastal Unrest ............. 99 Lagos Island and Its Rulers............. 102 The Formation and Development of Missionary Policy...................... 105 The Mission Established at Abeokuta and the Intensification of Propaganda .... 115 ▼ Chapter Page Townsend, Gollmer, and C.M.S. Political Activity In England, 1846 .............. 122 Missionary Activity In England Increases, 1849-1830 132 Porelgn Office Acceptance of Missionary Policy, 1850 138 Parliamentary Victory for the Missionary Party ...................... 141 Missionary Activity In Yorubaland, 1849-1850 ............................. 144 Consular and Maval Support for the Missionaries...................... 147 Egba Frustrations........................ 150 Summary................................. 154 IV. FIRST FRUITS: THE TRIUMPH OF MISSIOHAHY POLICY........................ 157 The Defeat of Dahomey.................... 161 Results of the Egba Victory.............. 163 Townsend and Gollmer Press for British Action, 1 8 5 1 .................. 166 Oollmer and Badagry Politics, 1851 .... 170 Egba Military Campaign of 1 8 5 1 ........... 1 7 6 Crowther In England-'..................... 179 The Arming of the E g b a ............... . 186 "deduction” of Lagos: the Culmination of C.M.S. Polity...................... 190 Vi Chapter Page Treaty-making in 1 8 5 2................... 197 The Badagry Treaty: aollmer and the Merchants......................... 201 Oollmer at Lagos ...•••••••••• 204 Consular Government..................... 208 Fraser at Lagos; the Background to his Arrival....................... 210 Missionary and Consular Conflict ........ 212 Missionary Triumph..................... 215 The Missionary Position at the End of 1 8 5 2. 220 Summary . . . . . ....................... 226 V. MISSIONARIES AND THE IMPERIAL FACTOR .... 228 Rev. Oollmer and Civil War at Lagos .... 231 Gollmer Presses for Further Action .... 234 Opening of the Breach between Missionaries and Consul ............... 240 C.M.S. Pro-Consul in Yorubaland.......... 243 Dr. Irving and his Co-workers........... 248 Increasing Missionary-Consular Disagreement 252 The Mewu Affair............. 258 Consular Success....................... 266 Worsening of Relations................. 270 Changes at Abeokuta..................... 276 Chapter Page Campbell and Kosokoj the Crux of Missionary-Consular Disagreement . . . . 279 Missionary Advances on other Fronts .... 284 Egba Wars and the Dlstruptlon of Trade, 1855 290 Diplomatlo Attempts to Extend Ibadan Hegemony....................... 298 Missionary-Consular Relations, 1855 .... 301 Ascendancy of the Imperial Factor........ 313 Summary................................. 313 VI. MISSIONARY AND CONSULAR RAPPORT, 1856-59 . . 318 Campbell and the Merchants . .......... 318 Missionary-Consular Detente.............. 323 Trade and Politics, 1 8 5 6 - 5 7.............. 332 Egba Campaigns In Egbado............... 337 "Free Emigration" and Yoruba Unrest .... 341 Missionary Enterprise, 1857, and New Prospects................. 345 Commercial and Consular Enterprise .... 350 The Condition of Yoruba Politics, 1 8 5 8 -5 9 . 357 Domestic Slavery....................... 366 The Death of Atlba and the Consequences . . 372 Consul Brand........................... 376 viii Chapter Page Summary.............................. 378 VII. THE IJAYB WAS AND THE ADVENT OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION .......... 382 Causes of the War.................... 382 The Commencement of Hostilities....... 387 Official Reaction to the War . ........ 394 An Egba Reaction to the War.......... 398 Help for the Egba: Ijebu-Ode and Great Britain..........„ ......... 400 The Forward Policy of Consul Foote .... 404 MoCoskry and the New Direction of Imperial Policy........, ......... 416 The Cession of Lagos................ 421 Falacy of the Economic Interpretation • . . 428 The C.M.S. Position on the Cession .... 434 McCoBkry and the Egba........... 440 McCoskry and Kosoko.................. 446 Governor Freeman; the Inauguration of Colonial Office Administration ........ 449 Summary.............................. 453 VIII. MISSIONARY AND IMPERIAL CONFLICT, 1362 .... 459 The Fall of Ijaye ..................... 462 Extension of the War to IJebu-Remo • • • • 464 lx Chapter Page Further Deterioration of Lagos-Abeokuta Relations, the Rejection of Vice-Consul Taylor ................... 466 Results of the Taylor Affair............ 473 The Realities of Imperialism at Lagos • • • 480 Beginnings of Expansion................. 484 A Further Proposal; Official Reaction . . . 488 Lagos Protection extended to Ucorodu . . • 492 Palma brought Into the Lagos Orbit . • • • 497 Degeneration of Lagos-Abeokuta Relations . 302 Missionary Politics In London ............ 310 Whitehall Opinion ....................... 315 Summary................................. 321 IX. THE EXPANSION OF LAGOS................... 324 Blockade of Abeokuta ................... 324 The French on the Coast................. 331 Occupation of Palma................... . 338 Freeman's Conception of Lagos Territory . . 341 Map: Lagos and Its Dependencies .... 342 C.M.S. Response to Freeman's Policies . . • 348 Diplomacy at Abeokuta ................... 334 John Hawley Glover, R.N.................. 360 X Chapter P«« Clover's Opening Maneuver* .............. 565 Consul Daumaa at Porto Novo . .......... 569 Clover Protects his Revenues ....... 571 Imperial Parsimony and Unauthorized Expansion ................. 574 The Remainder of Clover's First Administration; Mounting Frictions............... 576 Freeman's Return; the Impasse Continued . • 584 First Fruits of Acculturation........ 589 Critical Times at Lagos; the Alternatives • 591 Charges and Counter Charges In London . • • 596 Clover's Reappointment.............. 603 Summary.............................. 607 X. THE CLOVER ADMINISTRATION, 1864-66 611 End of the War in Ijebu-Remo; Clover's New Diplomacy...................... 612 Clover's Proposals ..................... 616 The Noose Tightened •••••••..••• 621 Colonel Ord at Lagos................ 625 Clover's Plans Near Fruition ............ 630 Springing the T r a p ......... 635 The Egba Fall to Capitulate.......... 639 xl Chapter Page End of the Ijaye W a r ................... 645 Moves Against Porto N o v o ............... 646 New Taetlos toward the Egba ..•*•••• 650 Egba Reactions: the Board of Management . 652 The Adderley Committee; the C.M.S. Strikes Back................... 656 Results of the Adderley Investigation . • . 663 Decline of Missionary Influence........... 665 The Battle Continued................... 667 Blackall at Lagos....................... 670 Blackall and the Egba: Missionary Victory. 674 Further Marks of Acculturation at Abeokuta. 682 Glover's Departure ..................... 684 Summary................................. 686 XI. THE GLOVER ADMINISTRATION, 1866-72 689 The Imperial Factor and Crucial Changes at Abeokuta ............ 690 Glover Reappointed ..................... 694 The Resumption of Forward Policies .... 697 Political Difficulties at Abeokuta .... 702 Glover again turns to Porto Novo ........ 706 The Egba If v i e ......................... 712 xll Chapter Page Pressure Maintained at Porto Ko t o ......... 719 Peace and Tranquility................... 723 Events at Abeokuta..................... 729 Mainland Politics, Revenue, and Forward Policy, 1869-72 ....................... 736 John Pope Hennessy..................... 745 Pope Hennessy at Lagos................. 751 The Crisis of 1872-73 ................... 760 Imperial Power: the Ultimate Factor . . . 764 Summary................................ 766 XII. CONCLUSIONS................................. 771 The Decline of C.M.S. Influence and Activity......................... 773 Summary................................. 779 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................... 787 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION It Is unfortunate that tha commonly aooaptad explanation for tha expansion of European influence and power into the leaser developed areas of the world in the nineteenth century Is based on eoononlo theories. Pew knowledgeable people believe that economic motives alone were responsible for colonial Imperialism, but while the existence of several other motives Is often recognised, the largest role Is still assigned to economics. The economic argument that colonies were desirable Is of hallowed origin, harking back to the seventeenth century, and the loose body of doctrines which associated the well-being of the nation-state with foreign trade and colonial exploitation. But mercantilist theory had been almost completely demolished by the late nineteenth century, the period of spectacular colonial acquisition, by the theoretical analysis of the classical economists. 1 Nevertheless, s few strands of mercantilist Influence still lingered. There Is evidence that the commercial policies followed by several European countries In the last century were guided to an extent by principles of mereantlllstic origin, such as the argument that colonies were useful as sources of raw material. The economic Interpretation has therefore enjoyed a long vogue. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, much more sophisticated economic arguments appeared In explanation of the period of colonial expansion that had Just concluded. And these arguments still enjoy an almost universal popularity, among Marxists and non-Marxists alike, accounting as they do for expansionist activity with simple, logical, yet all-embraolve syntheses. J. A. Hobson was the first to propound this modern analysis, arguing that Imperial expansion was the result of a con spiracy of high finance and politics to dispose of capital that became surplus as a result of domestic undercon sumption. Hobson's Influential work on the functioning of capital was then seised upon by the Marxist-Leninist school. Reasoning from different premises, Lenin and other Marxist writers oame to the conclusion that colonies were secured beoause capital needed new outlets after having exhausted the possibilities of exploiting domestic labor. Capital exports to the colonies thus represented the means of delaying the ultimate fall of the profit rate that was to herald the demise of the capitalistic system. And of course both Hobson and the Marxlst-Lenlnlst writers depleted private capitalists as being anxious to win ac cess to colonial opportunities. But the objections to these Interpretations are as strong as the arguments offered In their favor are plausible. From the standpoint of contemporary under developed ex-colonlal countries, for Instance, one might wish that there were at least a modicum of truth In the contention that exploitive capital flowed to them on the heels of European governors. But despite numerous Induce ments, the Investment of private funds In these terri tories never amounted to more than a trickle; the Inter national movement of private capital remained In large part a movement from one developed country to another. Ultimately, colonial governments themselves had to take steps to fill the capital shortages in their 4 dependencies. This began only after 19*15* for prior to this, hazardous private speculation In colonial areas held but little attraction. This was especially true In the nineteenth century, as far as tropical Africa was con cerned, when trade figures show that Europe as a whole was Its own best customer. In the case of Great Britain, the English-speaking areas of the world provided not only the best markets but also the most Important souroes of supply and opportunities for investment. Even during the great scramble for African colonies at the end of the century, only southern Africa attracted British commercial or financial enterprise to any significant extent.1 There are other arguments which tend to refute the unitary economic explanation for overseas expansion, one of the most cogent pointing out that Europe In the late nineteenth century was by no means bursting at the seams with abundant capital. As far as Portugal or Italy Is concerned, this was an Incontestable fact. Yet Portugal, after almost half a millenlum of colonial existence In ^S. H. Frankel, Capital Investment In Africa, Its Course and Effects (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), Chapter V~passla. 5 Africa, carved out a not Inconsiderable empire. The Italians, of course, were not as successful, although not for lack of trying. And In addition, French Investment abroad Is recognized to have been the most conservative of the great powers, yet by 1900 Trance had won a colonial empire second only to that of Great Britain. In the Russian case, eastward and westward expansion stretches back to the seventeenth century and was quite obviously not dictated by any eoononlc law of mature capitalism. In fact, recent Russian Imperialism has been equally potent under an economic system which eschews private capital accumulation altogether. As for the position of Africa In the modern analysis of Imperialism, there has always been the naive assumption that the continent was the epitome of the tropical treasure-house, with untold millions of potential consumers and profitable opportunities for Investment Just waiting for exploitation. Marxists and non-Marxists alike have accepted this as an article of faith, but by so doing they have paid but scant attention to the nature of the nineteenth century African economy. Despite glittering accounts of fabulous mines and exotic agriculture, Africa was basically a poor continent— although with Isolated pockets of potential wealth— that provided neither the markets nor the raw materials that were of any moment to the European economy. What Is most remarkable Is that the proponents of the eeonomlo explanation have failed to oonslder the evaluations made of the continents potential by nineteenth century Europeans. As late as 1890, for example, a journal as respected and Influential as the Economist was saying that, apart from South Africa and possibly the lower Niger, trade with the continent south of the Sahara was Infinites imal. While admitting the possibility of future mineral discoveries, the article went on to say that It did not anticipate "any rapid development of either trade or financial success from these territories . . . ."2 But In spite of these flaws, the over-simplified economic explanation has met with wide acceptance and has consequently overshadowed the plethora of causes which underlay this complex historical movement. There Is, In fact, no single explanation for the appearance and ^August 30, 1890, 1109. 7 subsequent development of this phenomenon. Instead, there Is a variety of factors, sometimes working In conjunction with eaeh other to effect an enlargement of oolonlal Jurisdiction, sometimes functioning singly, or In varying combinations for different areas, circumstances, or time- periods. Among the multiplicity of causes msy be mention ed national ambitions and prestige, the desire for power, glory, International Jealousies, racial theories, strategic requirements, nationalism, religious fervor, and humanltarlanlsm. Frequently, there were Indigenous political factors which dictated the advancement of oolonlal administration, to say nothing of the crucial "men on the spot," the frontier men, frequently minor officials of one kind or another, who, finding themselves far removed from supervision and hemmed In by the realities of local conditions, pursued "forwardH policies which they knew to be contrary to offieial dictum. Historiography Concerned with non-Bconomlc Interpretations of Imperialism Most of these factors receive passing mention In the historiography concerned with Imperialism. Indeed, some of them have been subject to serious individual study as part of the growing current of opinion that maintains that economic analysis fails to provide the answers for the processes of expansion. For instance, Professor Langer has brought keen insight to the factors of nationalism and international political rivalry to Illustrate the eruption of European pressures into oolonlal expansion.3 A parallel work of outstanding value which depicts French expansion in terms of national Interest is Henri Brunsohwlg's ifythos et Realltes de 1 1 Imperialisms Colonial Frangsis, 1871-1914.* One of the instances of imperialism being the result of strategic considerations has recently been ex amined by Ronald Robinson and John Gallafcher in Africa and the Victorians.5 The authors reach the conclusion that British expansion in East Africa was dlotated by constant concern over the Suez Canal. Having been committed to Egypt, Great Britain then found it neoessary to Intervene 3w. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (2nd. edition; Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). Also,his European Alliances and Alignments. 1871-90 (2nd. edition; New York:Alfred A. Knopf7 1950). *(Paris: A. Colin, i9 6 0). 5(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961). 9 in East Africa to prevent Oenan possession of the lllle headwaters and the consequent dependence of Egypt on demean whims. In 1952 the well-known Africanist Roland Oliver published a work dealing with another of the non-economlc facets of Imperialism. He directed his researoh to the hitherto neglected area of missionary activity and colonial expansion, dealing especially with the critical part played by missionaries In Uganda.6 This theme has recently been taken up by an Amerloan historian, Robert Rotberg of Harvard University, who, In a concise work, demonstrates the clear connection between humanitarian endeavor and political expansion In Northern Rhodesia after 1880.7 Purpose of this Study It Is apparent then, that a start has been made In building a corpus of historiography concerned with the ^The Missionary Factor In East Africa (London: Longmans, Oreen & Co., Inc., 1952). 7chrlstlan Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-192^ (Princeton: University Press, !9<fe5^ 10 less material aspects of Imperialism. But mueh more awaits to be done before the myths have been fully exploded. The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute in small measure to this task by examining the processes by which British influence advanoed in a small area of Africa in the middle decades of the last century. The factors motivating this extension of British responsibility into the Yoruba heartland will be shown to be non-economio in nature, emanating from a variety of sources. One was humanltarlanlsm; another was the outgrowth of a strong evangelical movement within the Church of England; a third was the encroachment of French influence whloh led British colonial officers to react hastily by extending their own Jurisdiction; and after Lagos had been annexed, in 1861, the parsimony of the Imperial exchequer caused successive governors to participate increasingly in mainland politics, hoping in this way to Insure peaceful conditions and thus realize a customs revenue sufficient to carry on their administrations. 11 Contemporary Nigerian Historiography Such thames as these have all been overlooked In recent years by the small but growing group of historians who have written about nineteenth century Nigeria. Sir Alan Burns, for example, the author of a standard work, devotes the bulk of his book to a straightforward narration of events that have transpired since 1851* that Is, since the "reduction” of Lagos by the Royal Navy. He offers no Interpretation as such, although as a colonial governor, his view Is that Nigeria had precious little history before the arrival of the English and that British Intervention was for the best.® Dr. K. 0. Dike, a distinguished Nigerian historian, published an outstanding volume In 1956 concerned with the Niger delta. His work was pioneering In that he focused attention for the first time on African policies and politics rather than Imperial, showing the crucial role played by African middlemen In the palm oil trade and demonstrating that the volume of trade depended more on the ^History of Nigeria (4th edition; London: George Allen * Unwin Ltd., 1948). 12 condition of dolta politics than It did on tha demands of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.9 Professor Dike's opinion of European Intervention In the delta Is quite apparent: The British came with the sole Intent of exploiting the region and Its Inhabitants to the best of their ability. Another Nigerian historian, Dr. B. 0. Blobaku, published a valuable book the following year entitled The Egba and Their Neighbours.10 He dealt with the Egba, a Yoruba people, and their efforts to reach a successful understanding with the British, treating his topic essen tially as an Indigenous one and making no attempt to Judge the merits or motives of British Intervention. Three years later, however, the English historian J. E. Flint published a work on Sir George Goldie that portrayed British expan sion on the middle Niger not merely as an exercise In economic exploitation but as a vital struggle between England and France.11 9Trade and Politics In the Niger Delta, 1 8 3 0 -1 8 8 5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 10(0xford: University Press, 1957). llglr George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, i960)7 13 The next significant addition to Nigerian historio graphy was Colin Newbury's The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers.I2 Newbury's area of Interest extended westward from Nigeria, to Togo, but he considers the whole complex Issue of Prenoh, British, and German maneuvering on the Slave Coast In the nineteenth century to have been complete ly governed by economic factors. As for the British Inter vention at Lagos, he views It solely as an effort to bring under direct control the best outlet for the western palm belt. Newbury's book has been the last Interpretive study to appear, although Professor J. F. A. AJayi of Ibadan University recently published a book devoted to the development of missionary activity in Nigeria and the training of a new African elite,*3 The same author, In conjunction with Robert smith, has also written a brilliant monograph on Yoruba warfare which, for the first time, shows the Intermldable conflicts of the nineteenth century 12(oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). ^Christian Missions In Nigeria, 1841-1891 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 9 6 5). 14 to have been the result of Indigenous political factors rather than the slave trade.^ Scope of the Dissertation It Is apparent, then, that there is need for an analysis of British advance in Nigeria that examines the processes of expansion from a viewpoint other than the siaterialistic. But side by side with the themes of non economic expansion that will be illustrated in this dis sertation, connecting and ancillary topics will be explor ed also. For instance, it will be necessary to show the conflicting Interests which developed between several of the Yoruba peoples and between British officials and merchants as each sought ways of accomplishing their own objectives. In addition, the Church Missionary Society will be studied, the organization that was the progenitor of British expansion in Yorubalaad. It will likewise be necessary to discuss various aspects of Yoruba political organisation, as the internal and external pressures which contributed to their economic and political evolutions are l**Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge": University Press, 19^4). 15 analyzed. But to set the general frame of reference, that Is, the non-eeonomlo motives behind British Interest In Yorubaland, the first thing that should be discussed Is the tenor of nineteenth century British attitudes toward West Africa. British Attitudes Toward West Africa At the beginning of the century, Britain was bequeathed but a slim Inheritance of knowledge concerning the country and Its people. What Information there was has been garnered over a long period of time from people engaged In the slave trade and was thus limited In extent to the coast. But the era of exploration was underway and the end of the slave traffic began to Involve Great Britain In coastal affairs to a much greater degree than the trade itself had ever done. Although the Act of 1807 prohibited the trade to British nationals, slaving Increased steadily under different flags. The Royal Navy thus began Its long vigil in West African waters In 1819* * * - &s time passed its officers became closely Involved In mainland 16 politics.!5 At the same time, humanitarian pressures wire strong enough In Britain to rally successive governments to the anti-slave banner and In time a network of colonial footholds was built along the coast: Sierra Leone In 1 8 0 8, the Gambia eight years afterwards, the Gold Coast in 1821, and Lagos thirty years later. These small enclaves were envisioned as bases from which civilization and legitimate commerce would radiate; thus It was hoped that the obnoxious traffic would be engulfed. Looking at the stream of books and pamphlets deal ing with West Africa published In the first three quarters of the century, the Parliamentary debates, the Blue Books and the several Reports of the Parliamentary Committees which sat between 1842 and 1863 to Investigate the West African settlements or the slave trade, one cannot but be Impressed by the objective of British policy over this long period. It was not the amount of palm oil that was or could be imported; it was not the opportunities arising for the l^The best statement of the Royal Navy's role in West Afrloa Is by Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade. The Suppression of the African Slave Trade In the Nineteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green * Co., 1949). 17 export of manufactures; It was not the race to outstrip Prance In territorial possession and political influence, although these issues were mentioned frequently by the humanitarians themselves as camouflage for their real objectives and so designed to gain support from various groups; the primary and unchanging objective of British policy was the total extirpation of the slave trade. But after bowing to pressure and extending Its jurisdiction to the coastal forts and settlements, the Imperial government realised that these committments represented a heavy drain on life and an even greater drain on the Bxohequer. Traders and officials were con sequently warned with monotonous regularity to confine their activities to either commerce or administration; thus, it was hoped, entanglements In native politics would be avoided, along with the seemingly Inevitable aftermath of enlarged Jurisdiction. In fact several attempts were made to reduce the area of British responsibility on the coast. The third Earl Grey, Colonial Secretary between 1846 and 1852, tried to carry out the same processes of disengagement In West Africa that he had accomplished In 18 other colonies by extending large measures of self-govern* ment. But self-flnanclng self-government was not possible because of lack of revenue.^ Similarly, the Adderley Committee of 1865 asked the Government to withdraw from West Africa as far as practicable, but disengagement was again Impossible. Not only was there a continuing lack of revenue, but colonial administrators were by this time Inexorably enmeshed In African politics. This fervent desire not to expand colonial holdings can be shown to have still been operative In the decades following the Adderley Report, when Sir Carnet Wolseley was sent to the Gold Coast to administer a typical "imperialis tic" rebuke for the 1873 Invasion of Fantl territory by the Ashanti. But even In this Instance, the perfect opportun ity to extend territory, the General was admonished by the Colonial Secretary not to break the Asantehene1s power or government.*7 l^Henry George Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration (London: Richard Bentley, 1S53), II, P. 2 8 6. ^Kimberley to Wolseley, Nov. 24, 1873# Pari. Papers, XLVI (1874), 239-41. 19 While British officialdom was thus seeking to limit or even ourtall responsibility In West Africa It Is Impor tant to observe what that bete noire of economically- oriented scholars was doing: where was British capital flowing? One thing Is evident; It was not flowing to West Africa. In 1840 a Colonial Office official penned a short Minute on the back of a dispatch received from the Governor of Sierra Leone. The opinions and sentiments which he expressed are well worth repeating In extenso, not only for the official viewpoint concerning Investment In Africa but also for the prophetic qualities of the state ment, which were to hold true throughout the remainder of the century. He wrote: I cannot but think that even If our national resources were far more potent than they at present are, It would be very bad policy to employ In Africa that part of them which Is available for colonization. In North America and Australia we have vacant continents to ocoupy, and every shilling well expended there may be made to yield a large and secure return. But In Africa we cannot colonize at all without coming Into contact with numerous warlike tribes, and Involving our selves In their disputes, wars and relations with each other. If we eould acquire the Dominion of the whole of the continent It would be but a worthless posses sion.!® l®Dated Dec. 21, 1840, on Governor of Sierra Leone to Russell, July 29, 1840, C. 0. 267/159. 20 This low opinion of Afrioa in general and Weat Africa in particular did not change radically as the cen tury advanced. There were four small and impoverished settlements on the west coast in the l8 6 0's, after the slave trade had been effectively suppressed, and what commerce there was seemed none too hopeful. There were a few useful but difficult fields of private enterprise* notably on the lower Niger, but war was endemic among the tribal kingdoms and commercial conditions were therefore most difficult. As a recent work has stated most succinctly: With its lethal climate, barbaric tribes, disorders and difficult communications, its single small staple, its lack of skilled labor and purchasing power, West Afrioa certainly seemed an unpromising avenue for ex pansion, even if such expansion was to be desired.^9 This opinion did not change In business and financial circles even with the advent of the Great Depression in the 1 8 7 0* 8. The Parliamentary committee investigating the lethargy of the economy found that bus inessmen were looking for relief to the established markets of America, Australasia, India and China; that is, first to 19Roblnson k Gallagher, Africa and the Vlotorlans, p. 14. 21 the great regions of British and European settlements, then to the Far East, where railways still regained to be built.2 0 it seeais clear, therefore, that apart from the slave trade Issue, the predominant governmental and com mercial attitude towards West Africa throughout the last century was one of Indifference. 21 Official policy opposed resolutely any territorial enlargement, while the economic facts of life predicated against West Africa becoming either a great market, a bountiful source of raw materials, or a profitable field for Investment. Yet against long-held prejudices and the trends of previous expansion, despite the fact that the SOparl. Papers XXI, (1886), 7i>-117, bl4-62. 21A most Illuminating example of the Importance attached to the slave trade and the comparative lack of Interest shown towards the continent as a whole Is furnish ed by a Foreign Office administrative procedure which Il lustrates perfectly that department's hierarchy of values. Correspondence dealing with Egyptian affairs was filed by the clerks under "Turkey," signifying of course the ever present concern with the European balance. Correspondence dealing with the east coast of Afrioa found Its niche under "Bombay," Zanzibar presamably being considered an extension of India. The Cape and Natal had their own headings, but the rest of the correspondence to, from, or concerned with Africa, was lumped together under the gen eral title of "Slave Trade," a series of volumes which ultimately reached gargantuan proportions. 22 mainstream of trade, Investment and migration left West Afrioa practically untouched, Great Britain carved out a considerable empire there In the last fifteen years of the century. The fact that It did reveals a glaring discrepancy between economic theory and the realities of late nineteen th century national alms: Great Britain concentrated Its Imperial effort In that part of the African continent least important to Its prosperity.22 A general survey of British expansion In West Africa can thus argue persuasively that the causative factor underlying the acquisition of empire was not one of material gain, while demonstrating that official and com mercial opinion regarded the area with some disdain. It folxows, therefore, that a more detailed analysis of British expansion can investigate with good cause an explanation other than the economic, and that an attitude toward West Africa other than the official or commercial must be sought. There was Indeed such an attitude In nineteenth century Britain, based on conditions far 22The first chapter of Robinson and Gallagher's Africa and the Victorians discusses this paradox at length. 23 removed from the merely commercial, whose genesis lay rooted In the previous century, when the moribund Church of England was awakened from Its torpor to a sense of vocation. Evangelical Antecedents of the Church Missionary Society The Protestant revival of the eighteenth century, like many other great historical movements, Itself had Its antecedents In the violence and turmoil of the seventeenth century. Europe had been torn with religious wars while England experienced a civil war, the overthrow of the monarchy and Its re-establishment. In reaction, the following generations concerned themselves with expanding trade, with a degree of philanthropy, viewed religious enthusiasm with suspicion, and held "reason" and "ration alism" as the guide of manners and thought; Deism was in the ascendency. Them came a spiritual revival, shared alike by European and North American churches. The English awakening developed at first Into three distinct channels. Under John Wesley, the Methodists proper lived In a loose connection within the Church; 24 Whltefield assumed the leadership of the Calvlnlstlo Methodists and dissented with the Church; the third branch of the movement remained steadfast to the Churoh and beeame known as Evangelicals. They represented but a small minority in the Church of England and were looked upon with some odium by most churchmen, but It was the second generation of these Evangelicals which was to sire the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.). In the last decades of the eighteenth century two groups of Evangelicals were holding meetings In the London area. One of them consisted of churchmen who met In the vestry of St. John's In Bedford Row, Charles Simeon of Cambridge, the foremost theologian of the Evangelical movement, being their recognized leader; the group called Itself the Eclectic Society. The other group Is known to history as the Clapham Sect, the name of the London suburb where their meetings were often held. These were Influential laymen, for the most part, with humanitarian leanings, who met In the home of the Rector of 1he Parish, John Venn, and numbering among their company such Illustrious names as Henry Thornton, Zachary Macaulay, Oranvllle Sharp, James Stephen, and the very "sun of the 25 Claphamlc system," William Wilberforco.23 The Sect la beat remembered for lta anti-slavery work and the eatabllahment of a settlement for liberated Africans at Sierra Leone; thla formed only part of lta activity, however, which ranged from the aupport of Evangelical pulpita to con ducting parliamentary campaigns. Finding themselves unable to support the existing Church societies concerned with missionary endeavor (the long-established Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel In Foreign Parts), and unwilling to be left behind by the rash of Nonconformist societies springing up, the two 23sir James Stephen, "The Clapham Sect," In Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography II, 289-384, 1 8 5 3. There Is a considerable bibliography devoted to the Claphamites; the following is a sample. Charles Booth, Zachaney Macaulay. His Part in the Movement for the Abolition of the Slave Trade and Slavery (London; Longmans, Green k Co., Inc., 1934). Reginald Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1933). Reginald Coupland, Wllberforce: A Narrative (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1 9 2 3}. Ernest M. Howse. Saints In Politics; The Clapham Sect and the Growth of Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952). Edward Charles P. Lascelles, Granville Sharp and the Freedom of Slaves In England (Lon don! Humphrey Milford, 1928). John A. Patten, These Re markable Men. The Beginnings of a World Enterprise (London & Redhlll: Lutterworth Press, 1945). 26 Evangelical groups Joined forces. In 1799 they formed the "Society for Missions to Africa and the East,n the name of the embroyonlc organization marking Its Intended sphere of activity from that of the S.P.O., at that time active in North America and the West Indies. In time the name "Church Missionary Society" came Into familiar use as the Society's official title was changed to "Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East."2* * Early Years of the Society The Society therefore came into being as the child of an evangelical-humanitarian union. The Clapham Sect brought a modicum of knowledge of Africa to the marriage, while the theological basis of the Society had engrained 2^There are several works from which this synopsis of the birth and development of the C.M.S. have been drawn: Church Missionary Society, The Church Missionary Society. A Manual Outlining Its History, Organization and Commit ments (London: C.M.S.. 1961). C. P. Proves, The Planting of Christianity In Africa (London: Lutterworth Press, T9W-T95S7/ Vol. I. William Knight, The Missionary Secre tariat of Henry Venn, B. D. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., Inc., 1880). George W. E. Russell, A Short History of the Evangelical Movement (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., Ltd., 1 9 1 5). Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Missionary Society, Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work (London: C.M.S., 1899-1916), Yols. I, II. 27 within It conceptions of Africa derived from the moral and theological foundations of the Evangelical Movement. The depravity of human nature, the need of conversion, Justi fication by faith, the free offer of the gospel and the authority of the Bible were Evangelical tenants contain ing overtones applicable to missionary work among primi tive peoples. These, combined with the anti-slavery campaign In which many of the founders of the Soolety were engaged, threw Into sharp relief the existing conditions of the slave trade. Horror-stricken by reports of the Middle Passage, Imbued with Romantic ideas of the noble but degraded savage waiting patiently in the primeval forest for redemption and the clarion call of the Gospel, the Soolety determined that the chains be struck from the African's neck and that he be converted. This zeal, plus the faintly Jacobin theory of Interference with property rights., as well as the Society's grounding on Evangelical principles (illustrated by John Venn's statement that the Society would hold "the Church principle but not the High Church principle,"25),ied 25Knlght, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, p. 80. 28 the newly formed organization to encounter the thinly- veiled hostility of the Church. Wilberforce, Grant and Venn were entrusted with the task of securing the Prlma* * s approval of the venture, but a year passed before Wllberforce could report even slight success. During this time, however, the Soolety began Its official connection with West Africa, deciding to establish a mission In Sierra Leone as quickly as possible and Interesting Itself In the education of twenty-five children brought to England from there by Zacheray Macaulay. This early Inter est In Sierra Leone was natural, Claphamltes being the founders of that settlement. The tardiness of the Archbishop of Canterbury In extending his blessing to the new missionary body and the grudging manner In which he allowed it tc survive was symptomatic of the Church's attitude toward the Evangelical movement. The Archbishop specifically declined to express his full approbation, In fact, but hoped that the Society would go forward, assuring Wllberforce that he would view its proceedings dispassionately.2^ And this lack of 2%night, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, dd. 154-57. 29 episcopal support was a disadvantage under which the Society was forced to labor for the next forty years* Not until 1813 could a Bishop be found who would ordain the Society's candidates; not until the following year would a dignitary of the Church preach at one of the Society's anniversary celebrations, and when the C.M.S. was twenty- five years old It numbered only two English bishops amongst Its members* Only In l84l did the two Archbishops join the Society, followed shortly by a steady Increment of bishops; but not until the l8 6 0's did the entire English Episcopal Bench (except one) become Vice-Presi dents of the S o c i e t y .^7 The Society and the Establishment Fortunately for the C.M.S* this lack of clerical support was more than offset by the backing It received from laymen, especially those connected with other strata of the Establishment. In fact, the Society's historian admits that many early missionary enterprises would have been Impossible except for the help afforded by ministers 27stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., I, pp. 90-1, 242- 258, 389-95, II, p7 38. 30 of the Crown and mentions that missionaries frequently had passages given them In government ships; similarly, those making their way to the several colonies carried with them letters of commendation from the Colonial Offloe.2$ Support emanating from such Influential circles was perhaps equally as important as episcopal favor; If so, the Society was Indeed well endowed. Almost from Its Inception, the C.M.S. listed among Its active supporters dukes, earls, viscounts, lords and baronets; members of Parliament; the heads of Oxford and Cambridge colleges; civil servants; high-ranking naval and army officers; Anglo-Indian administrators; bankers, businessmen and generals; lawyers; manufacturers; railway magnates; mer chants, and a good many country gentlemen otherwise not remarkable. The Queen, Prince Albert,and the King of Prussia became financial supporters of the Society in the 1840's, while Russells, Greys and Pelhams sat at its councils, for although the Church Is normally considered a Tory preserve In the nineteenth century, Its Evangelical branch had a much closer Identity with the Whigs. Equally 28stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., I, p. 109. 31 Important with the roster of the wealthy, influential and high-born who donated their money and time to the service of the Society was the fact that of the many Church and non-Church societies which appeared in the early century devoted to missionary work of one kind or another, Evangelicals as a body conferred their affection and enthusiasm on the C.M.S. and the British and Foreign Bible Society.29 Growth and Reorganization As it was growing in stature and expanded its activity, the Society carried out several organizational changes in its first quarter-century. These were concerned not only with the administration of the Society but also with its ability to raise funds. In 1812, for instance, having thirteen missionaries in the field and another ten under training, aware that an income of 2,500- 3*000 annually was insufficient to meet the Society's burgeoning needs, provincial associations were established throughout the country; their specific function was to raise money. 29Russell, Short Hist, of the Evangelical Movement, p. 110. 32 This they did with such marked suocess that by 1825 the Soolety not only ran Its own seminary for training missionaries but It could claim proudly of having sent overseas more than one hundred missionaries while having over three hundred native teachers and assistants In Its service.30 The various committees which guided the Society's fortunes were also reorganized In 1812 and the office of President was added, Admiral Lord aambler accepting the position. On his death he was succeeded In 1834 by Henry Pelham, Earl of Chichester, a relative of Lord Ashley— the future Earl of Shaftesbury— who was himself a Vice-Presi dent of the Society at this time. Lord Chichester remain ed in this position for more than fifty years. This period witnessed the steady growth of the Society In income, in fluence and missionary activities, a growth which oolnolded with Its long-delayed acceptance by the Primate and episcopal bench and the accession to Its ranks of the Queen and Prince Consort. The period of Chichester's presidency also coincided with the period of triumph and 30stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., I, pp. 129, 242-44. Church Missionary Society, The C.M.S., pp. 16-17* 33 Increasing success experienced by the Evangelical sohool following Newman's secession to Rome In 1845 and the oollapse of the Tractarlan movement. Chichester himself played not an Inconsequential part In this development. But the most Important man by far during these years, particularly In regard to the Society's African missions, was Henry Venn, C.M.S. Secretary from 1841 to 1872, Its chief Intermediary with government departments, the main spring of Its political activity, and the chief architect of the Society's policies. Henry Venn Venn was the grandson of the Vicar of Huddersfield of the same name who was perhaps the chief promoter of the eighteenth century Evangelical revival. He was the son of the Rector of Clapham who had been one of the Society's founders, Its first chairman and the author of Its original constitution. He was born at the Clapham rectory and In early life Venn was on Intimate terms with Wllber- foroe and the other Claphamltes. Because of his background and environment It was only natural that, after his ordination In 1819 and when serving as curate of a Fleet 34 Street ohurch, he fell into the habit of attending C.M.S. meetings in the Society's headquarters adjacent to that street. His attendance became more regular in the 1830's and in 1841 he accepted a temporary appointment as Clerical Secretary to the Soolety*s governing board, the General Committee. He retained this pro tempore position for the next thirty-one years, becoming the real driving force of the Society, in its political as well as missionary activ ities, and asserting his considerable influence on colonial affairs as a leading spokesman for the Evangelical party.31 His long term in office was also the period in which China and Japan came within the C.M.S. fold; when the Society's work in Afrioa, India and North-west America was greatly expanded; when the number of ordained clergy employed by the Society reached 330; when the oommunicants in the missions increased from 6,000 to 2 3, 0 0 0, and when the Society's annual Income rose from^B6,000 to>^1 5 6,0 0 0.32 3*Knight, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, passim; Stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., II, p. 3*>. H. C. G. Moule, The Evangelical School in the Church of England: Its Men and Its Work In the Nineteenth Century (London: James Nlsbet & Co., Limited, 1901), p. 70. 32Knlght, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, p. 408. 35 Of all his activities, however, and of all the Society's far-flung enterprises, the missions In Africa remained Venn's favorite. This Interest had been acquired logically by his youthful exposure to the Clapham Sect and because of the mission established In Sierra Leone by the Society's founders. As Secretary, Venn thus Inherited a West African mission which had been established since 1 8 0 3, but one which had experienced many trials and vlolssltudes, owing mainly to the lack of knowledge of Africa and of the best methods by which missionary opera tions should be conducted there. Portuguese missionary enterprise In West Afrioa Indeed stretches back to the fifteenth century and the great voyages of discovery, but none of these early efforts had met with any permanent success. The same held true of the small-scale religious activity undertaken by Protestants on the west coast In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Dutch and English were vying for commercial supremacy.33 The 33The best account of missionary activity in Afrioa before the nineteenth century Is Groves' The Plant- lng of Christianity In Africa. Vol. I. 36 first Afrloan mission of the C.M.S. therefore had little but seal to go on and its early years in and around of Freetown had been most difficult. The Evolution of Missionary Policy Toward West Africa, 1808-41 Partly due to the Society1s political pressure, the British government assumed the administration of the small settlement in 1808, arranging for the colony to become the refuge for Africans released from slave ships by the Royal Navy. The population of the colony there after increased rapidly, making the task of the overworked missionaries even more difficult. Then in 1816 the Society arranged with the Colonial Secretary, Lord Bathurst, to divide the peninsula into parishes, the Society providing additional ministers and teachers while the Government furnished the financial support. More than twenty missionaries went out in the next few years, but by the mid-twenties the work nad all but collapsed due to a tragic succession of deaths. Fortthls and other difficulties the C.M.S. became the target of a torrent of criticism in Great Britain. 37 Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister, was sympathetic hut the Duke of Wellington, then at the height of his political power, refused categorically to patronize the Society, considering its efforts to be fruitless, if not outright mischievous, a view held by many of the High Church p art y .3^ But despite this adverse criticism the Society plodded on, founding the training school at Fourah Bay in 1827 and reinforcing its small band of men when it could; but death by disease continued to be the missionaries1 most constant visitor into the following decade. The C.M.S. was therefore casting about for other methods of converting the heathen and arresting the slave trade when Thomas Fowell Buxton, a friend of the Society, printed a pamphlet in 1837 which was later expanded into his important book The Afrloan Slave Trade and its Remedy.35 The work illustrated the immensity and horror of the slave trade, urged the strengthening of the Preventive Squadron and suggested anti-slaving treaties with native rulers. It then enlarged upon the 3^Stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., I, p. 240. 35(London: John Murray, 1840). 38 capabilities and resources of Africa and the possibility of commerce developing the continent. The Government and pri vate enterprise were to do their parts while missionary sooletlea were to spread the Gospel; ultimately, Africa would be regenerated by the Bible and the plow. Specifi cally, Buxton said that the Niger should be the highway in to the interior and called for a settlement at the Confluence; this enclave would be in the slave-providing area, and Africans would be trained in agriculture and commercial pursuits. He felt that the superior profits from legitimate commerce would provide an object lesson which would be quickly learned. At the same time, Christianity would provide the moral suasion necessary to \ convince the people to abandon slave-trading. Buxton disclaimed any intent of building an African empire,38 but vne proposal to acquire any territory at all ran contrary to British policy and seemed doomed.37 At 36rhe Afrloan Slave Trade and its Remedy, p. 453. 37Buxton's proposals and existing colonial policy are discussed by J. Gallagher in "Powell Buxton and the New Afrloan Policy, 1838-1842," in The Cambridge Historical Journal, X, No. 1 (1950), pp. 36-5 8. 39 this point the C.M.S. stepped in. The Colonial Secretary in 1838 was Lord Glenelg, a firm supporter of the Society, while his Permanent Under-Secretary was Sir James Stephen, son of one of the Society's founders, himself a member, and Henry Venn's brother-in-law.38 With this baoklng the Cabinet approved the venture; but before plans could be made, Glenelg retired and the project bogged down. Then in 1839 a new "Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and for the Civilization of Africa" was Inaugurated, supported heavily by the C.M.S. A great meeting was held at Exeter Hall with Prince Albert in the chair, supported by some twenty-five bishops and peers, a host of M.P.'s, Peel, Gladstone and other political figures, many of whom were C.M.S. members. After this, Lord John Russell, the new Colonial Secretary, and Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary, gave their support to the project; three iron steamers were built and sailed for the Niger in the Spring of 1841. The expedition ascended the river with two C.M.S. representa tives aboard, the Reverend J. F. Schon, who had spent ten 3®Stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., I, p. 453. 40 years at Sierra Leone and who had a special knowledge of West Afrloan languages, and Samuel Crowther, a liberated slave from Fourah Bay College. Thus from first to last the C.M.S. played an Important part In the Niger venture. The duties of the two men Included talking to the local chiefs about the Queen and explaining that the ships had been sent to make treaties to give up the slave trade and promote legitimate commerce. Treaties were Indeed signed and a model farm carved out at Lokoja; but the mosquito struck and waged a deadly oampalgn. Only one of the steamers reached as far as 350 miles Inland, the others turning back to return the dead and dying to the coast; the great enterprise had ended In disaster. But disaster or not, the C.M.S. learned great lessons and adjusted Its policy accordingly. The Journals of the two exploring missionaries were published In London almost Immediately, the volume appending copies of letters from Sohon to the Society In which he made various recommendations. The crux of his observations was that the West Afrloan climate and the lack of regular communications made a European mission virtually Impossible; on the other hand, none of the Africans 41 accompanying the expedition had died. Further, he found that educated Africans were greatly respected by their fellow countrymen and it was evident that they would be welcomed as teachers to their own race. It was apparent, therefore, that the regeneration of Africa should be under taken by Africans themselves; Africans should become their own saviors.39 These recommendations reached the C.M.S. as Henry Venn was taking up his position of Secretary and as the mortality of European missionaries at Sierra Leone was assuming alarming proportions. The Society promptly re evaluated its African policy. It accepted wholeheartedly Buxton's plan for the Bible and plow as the means of African renaissance, that is, a combination of Christianity and industry. Venn, especially, was to become a leading advocate of legitimate commerce as the means by which the 39j. f. Schon, Journals of the Rev. James Frederick Schon and Mr. Samuel Crowther, who, with the Sanction of Her Majesty's Government, Accompanied the Expedition up the Niger in 1&41, in Behalf of the Church Missionary Society (London: Hatchard and Son, 1842)7 pp. 351-70. Also, see K. 0. Dike, Origins of the Niger Mission, 1841- 1891 (Ibadan: Published for the C.M.S. Niger Mission by the Ibadan University Press, ±957), P* 8> and Stock, Hist, of the C.M.S*, X. 42 slave trade would be destroyed, but the complete program of Christianity and civilization was to be undertaken by educated Africans. The espousal of African salvation by "native agency," as It was called, was to lead the Society Into conflict with the Government twenty years later, when the annexation of Lagos and the replacement of Indig enous government by Europeans seemingly presaged Its downfall. However, this was many years In the future. At the moment, and contrary to the lesson seemingly taught by the losses of the Niger expedition, the Society determined to expand rather than restrict Its West African activities.^0 Because of the tragic cost of the recent expedition this decision conflicted with official opinion and meant, In effect, that the initiative for advance Into the continent passed from Government to missionary hands. The forward movement had In fact started In late 1842 with the beginnings of a new mission In Yoruba country, west of Lagos. As this study Is Involved closely with the ^Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the EastT 1842 (London: Church Missionary Society, 1843), pp. 40-51. *3 activities of the men connected with the Yoruba Mission, and because such a forward movement entailed political activity, an explanation of the Society's role in this sphere would be in order. Missionaries and Politics From its very Inception, members of the Yoruba Mission were closely associated with Afrloan politics. The connection was not sought; it was unavoidable. Indeed, the missionaries most active in political affairs frequently complained that they found the added burden most Irksome as it interfered with their primary function, but at the same time they realized that the progress of the Gospel depended in great degree on the political state of the country. In the early days of the Mission, in fact, their vary lives depended on it. To be engaged in tribal politics meant that the missionaries had to enjoy a close and constant relationship with the chiefs and headmen. This they did, and as this study will show, the missionaries as a body wielded great power and Influence; indeed, several of the most political ly active missionaries Identified themselves completely 44 with the objectives and aspirations of the communities In which they lived and worked. Over the years, the participation of missionaries In politics came to be resented, by Colonial and Foreign Office officials In Whitehall, by governors and consuls along the coast and frequently by commercial Interests. Finally, the Society In i860 was obliged to circulate Instructions to its servants governing their political activity. The document Is Interesting Inasmuch as It left the door open for political activity while admonishing the missionaries to be more circumspect. It reminded them of the Society's rule, with which they were all familiar, that missionaries were not to Interfere In the political affairs of the country or place In which they were stationed. But this was a broad and Indefinite rule, the message continued, for "political affairs” covered a wide spectrum of activity. The great principles of justice, humanity and Christian duty were very proper spheres of activity, no matter how they Impinged on politics, and If a missionary felt that these principles were being violated, the governing authority should be made to listen. If no attention was paid, the missionary was at perfect 45 liberty to appeal to public opinion ao that the government would yield to that which Christian principles, Justice and humanity demanded. The missionaries were reminded that an example of this was the Society's activity In the abolition of the slave trade. Toward the end of the circular the missionaries were told that the injunction not to Interfere In politics was not applicable when a native society was enmeshed In superstitions and social Institutions "which violate all Justice and humanity, and when the magistrate's sword Is in the hands of every petty chief . . . . As for the missionaries in West Africa, this Just about exempted them from the whole admonition, and although their political activity did decrease In the l860's the circular issued by the Society cannot be credited with the decline. The C.M.S. and Politics Missionary political activity therefore took place, was recognized and resented, but was at least partly 4lHenry Venn "Instructions to Missionaries on Politics and Missions" (i860), in Knight, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, pp. 468-83. 46 condoned by the Society. But what of the Society1* activ ity at the seat of power In London? Here, at the C.M.S. headquarters In Salisbury Square, a steady stream of correspondence arrived from the men In the field. These letters, journals, and reports did not confine themselves to accounts of the spiritual progress of the Mission, but ranged over a variety of secular matters: the course of rivers and roads, the topography and vegetation of the country, the laws and customs of the people, and the con dition of agriculture and commerce. Such matters as these were all reported at length, to say nothing of the state of the slave trade; the condition of the soil; water supply; population; barometer, hydrometer and thermometer readings; wind velocities and direction; complaints against colonial officials, or the state of local polltios. Qulded by this influx of Information, which was augmented by regular visits of missionaries home on leave and discussion with naval officers, traders, or offlolals newly-returned from Africa, the C.M.S. was able to plan Its campaigns and formulate its policy toward Yorubaland. Three methods were employed in persuading the government to Implement the Society's policies. One was 47 to send deputations of influential persons to government departments— peers, M.P.'s or distinguished army and naval officers— to present the Society's case to the Secretary or Under-Secretary. An interesting paragraph written by Lord Chichester soon after the death of Henry Venn illus trates clearly not only the position which Venn had held within the Society, but also this particular method of political pressure. Lord Chichester stated that the late secretary had been the most Important and respected member of the many deputations made by the Society to Government departments in connection with the various missions. He continued: During more than thirty years I was in the constant habit of going with such deputations to the heads of different public departments, and have always come away impressed with the fact that whatever weight was due to the deputation and what impression made upon the Queen's ministers was mainly owing to the clear, intel ligent and business-like statements of our honoured Secretary. I know that this was the opinion of several of the ministers with whom I conversed upon the subject afterwards.42 Another method utilized by the Society In forward ing its aims was to mobilize its friends and supporters in 42chichester to Mr. |j“ 3 Venn, Feb. 4, 1874, C.M.S C36/12. Parliament itself. This technique was used to insure their votes and influence being directed to measures calculated to further C.M.S. policy, or perhaps to pressure the gov ernment into a course of action, or force it to modify an existing policy, or, on occasions, to defend the government from attack. In addition, the Society's parliamentary friends secured places for themselves on the several com mittees which were organized in the mid-decades of the last century to investigate various aspeots of British re lations toward West Africa. In some Instances their pres ence in these committees was crucial, and Venn paid public tribute to the effectiveness of his parliamentarians when addressing the Society in 1862. Their Influence in the House, he said, as well as their presence in deputations to Government, had "often proved, under God, a defence and security to our cause."^3 Propaganda, aimed at nation-wide opinion-forming, was the third method by which the Society sought accep tance for its views. The most obvious way of accomplish ing this was from the pulpit itself; then there were ^3Quoted by Knight, Missionary Secretariat of H. Venn, p. 188. 49 various Journals, magazines, and reports published on a regular basis, containing excerpts from missionaries' letters and Journals; pamphlets and articles also poured from the presses when the Society or Its missionaries faced a particular crisis. And when home on leave the missionaries enlarged upon their widely circulated arti cles by relating their experiences to enthralled audiences the length and breadth of the country. In these ways popular attitudes were built and public opinion formed, while sympathy was aroused for the C.M.S. position. Charles Dickens was well aware of the effectiveness of these techniques, and In Bleak House he poked fun at the Interest being shown by so many of his countrymen In African missions* Mrs. Jellyby's philanthropic schemes for bringing light to the darkness of Barrlboola Gha becoming a butt for his humor. This Introduction to the secular activities of the C.M.S. might well close with a remark made by the Superintendent of the Foreign Office Slave Trade Depart ment to the Parliamentary body investigating the West African colonies In 1 8 6 5. Mr. Wilde possessed first-hand knowledge of the Society's political activity, both in 90 England and In Africa, and his opinions ware based on a long, intimate, but not always amicable relationship. His remarks, although understated, go a long way toward sum marizing the Society's activities. Speaking of both the missionaries and the parent body, he said, with regret, that "I think the missionaries like to be thoroughly Independent and to be the advisers of the native powers. They do not like any Interference with their policy. In 1865 Mr. Wilde could well afford to understate his feelings and exhibit gentlemanly magnanimity, for the Society's political Influence had greatly lessened. A British administration was firmly entrenched at Lagos, Henry Venn was growing old and becoming less active in the affairs of the Society, the founding generation of poli tically conscious missionaries in Yorubaland had been almost completely displaced by men with fewer secular proclivities, and many of the ambitious schemes of the C.M.S. had broken against the harsh realities of African life; as a consequence, the Society's political activities were undergoing major strictures. 44Parl. Papers, V (1 8 6 5), 119 51 That portion of this study belongs to future pages. Meanwhile, what Is now at hand Is a survey of the scene In Yorubaland prior to the arrival of the missionaries. CHAPTER II YORUBALAND TO THE ADVENT OF THE MISSIONARIES The territory occupied today by Yoruba-speaklng people la extensive. It was equally so In the aid- nineteenth century, being bounded on the east and north by the Niger, on the south by the Bight of Benin, and stretching westward Into modern Dahomey and Togo. The Yoruba living In this area numbered perhaps three millions at the beginning of the nineteenth century but this was by no means all of them. The Yoruba heartland, In the south west of modem Nigeria, was the center of the Slave Coast, so Its people had been scattered far afield for two hundred years or more, to Brazil, Cuba, and the United States. This heartland, Yorubaland, is divided into three distinct physical zones running roughly parallel to the coast. The coastal zone Is about a dozen miles wide and consists of Islands, peninsulas, sandbanks and swamps, the 52 53 most striking feature being the network of lagoons which spans the entire coastline and links the deltas of the Niger and Volta. Southward-flowing rivers empty Into the lagoons and the entire area Is covered with aquatic plants, mangrove and forest vegetation. Behind the coastal zone lies a swath of land about forty miles In depth, rising gently to an altitude of about six-hundred feet. This belt Is densely covered with rubber, mahogany and other products of the tropical rain forest including the oil-bearing palm tree. North of this Is the Interior plateau which, after reaching a height of some twelve-hundred feet, falls to the banks of the Niger. The zone Is marked by dissected granite hills and out croppings covered by deciduous trees and forests in the southerly portion; as the plateau descends to the river, this type of vegetation thins considerably and Is replaced by savanna and tall grass. 1 ^Several descriptions of the Yoruba land and people are available. The material In this chapter will draw upon the following works most heavily: Daryll Forde, The Yoruba Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria (London: International African Institute, 1951); Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubaa, From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (Lagos: C.M.S., 1937). 54 The name "Yoruba” la commonly applied to the people united by language more than by culture* for the tongue forma a dlatlnct unit within the cluater of Kwa languages while It la poaalble that the people fall Into two dlatlnct cultural groupa. However* the many Yoruba tribes* clana* or sub-cultural divisions themselves speak: differing dialects. 2 Thus the Egba* Oyo* IJebu, Ijesa* Ekltl and other sub-dlvlalons speak: their own dialect but are understood by others speaking the same Yoruba tongue. Despite these differences* all Yorubas regard the town of Ile-Ife (Ife) as the birthplace of their people. It was from here that the progeny of the mythical ancestor Oduduwa founded the various ruling Yoruba dynasties* the Important traditional rulers who wear bead ed crowns still tracing their origin to this town. This suggests that there Is some truth In the tradition that Nomenclature continues to be a vexatious problem among Africanists. Talking of the Yoruba* for Instance* some scholars refer to them as a "people" and subdivide them Into "tribes" or "clans;" others write of "tribes*” with "sub-tribal" divisions. On the other hand there are scholars who prefer to categorize the people Into cultural compartments. To some extent the differing academic disciplines of the writers explain the variations. 55 the Onl of Ife once held suzerainty over all the Yoruba. While there is no evidence that such a single political authority ever controlled effectively all the Yoruba groups, one of then, the Oyo, cane close to doing so. In fact the nllleu In which the C.M.S. nlsslonarles found thenselves when they arrived In Yorubaland in the l840*s was one of chaos and struggle caused by the collapse of Oyo hegenony. The Oyo Enplre Prior to the sixteenth century, Oyo had been mere- ly one of the several Yoruba klngdons, struggling for Its existence against Its northern neighbors Borgu and Mupe. The kingdon then adopted horses as anlnals of warfare, mastered Its antagonists and during the following century expanded to the south and west. Oyo warriors reached down the Ogun river toward the coast, but finding cavalry to be of little use In the forest they turned westwards and sub jugated the Dahomi In the eighteenth century.3 3j, p. A. AJayI and Robert Ssath, Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19^4),pp. 3, 4. 56 The empire wee probably beginning Its long decline early In the eighteenth century, at which time It extended from Benin In the east to Togo In the west and embraced many non-Yoruba people.^ Wars were constant during this century, especially with the Dahonl, and at the beginning of the next century Internal disintegration began to take plaoe. On the surface the empire still presented a fair appearance but the subjugated peoples were tired of the oppression exercised by the Alafln from Oyo. Laws were not administered, communications were Inadequate, the sub jugated peoples were heterogeneen?, and as was the case with earlier ephemeral empires of West Africa, Oyo hegemony was founded on nothing more substantial than force of arms. When this began to weaken, a period of Internecine strife was ushered In which lasted until the British colonial administration at last decided to Impose Its own peace In 1 8 9 2. Contrary to contemporary Interpretations, ^E. 0. Parrlnder, The Story of Ketu, An Ancient Yoruba Kingdom (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1 9 5 6), p. 6. J. P. A, AJayi, "Christian Missions and the Making of Nigeria, 1841-1891" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1958), p. 48. 5* however, held particularly firmly by the missionaries, these Yoruba wars were not the result of the slave trade and its demands; nor were they commercial wars In which the several Yoruba states sought routes to the coast, an Interpretation much favored by nineteenth century traders and officials. These explanations have been muoh exag gerated. Rather, the wars were the consequence of the collapse of the Oyo empire and the resulting struggles of successor Yoruba states to fill the vaeuum of power. How ever, as slaves formed a valuable and marketable commodity and were available as a result of the polltloal wars, chiefs were not slow to seize the opportunities which presented themselves. In this way such slave ports as Lagos achieved their notoriety in the nineteenth century.5 The Internal disruption of the Oyo empire began In earnest In about 1810 with the death of Alafln Ablodun. He was succeeded by Aole, whose Kakanfo (the holder of the 5Ajayi, Yoruba Warfare In the Nineteenth Century, p. 124; P. Amaury Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of Their History, gthnology and Language, with an Abstract of the 1921 Census (London: Oxford University Press, 192^), III, p. £9 8. 58 highest military post In the empire) was Afonja, the governor of Ilorln. Afonja seized the opportunity of the death of the Alafln and staged a successful revolt, sack ing the city of Oyo before returning to Ilorln. Sure that retribution would follow, he Invited a Fulanl mallam, Allmi, and his Hausa slaves to join him In defending the town. A strong Yoruba force then attacked but Afonja and his allies defended the place successfully. Following this, the Mohammedans took matters Into their own hands, deposed Afonja, and Allml set up his own near-Independent emirate. Fulanl and Hausa co-religionlsts flocked to him and the new Emir soon yielded only nominal allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto.6 This signal lesson In the politics of Independence was quickly learned by the restless Yoruba states under the Oyo yoke. They soon severed the knots which bound them as the empire faded Into anarchy; Qheso, the new ruler of Dahomey, did the same. In turn, the Fulanl at ^Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, I# pp. 2 8 9-9 0; Sir Alan Burns, History of Hlgerla, (4th edition; London: George Allen k Unwin, Ltd., 1948), pp. 26-7. 59 Ilorln began to attack southwarda, from about 1825, and until they were defeated by Ibadan In 1840 their armies successfully Invaded northern Yorubaland, forcing the surrender of the city of Oyo and pushing large masses of people to the south.7 The collapse of the empire and southward migration of many Yoruba before the advancing Moslems Introduces the Egba and IJebu subdivisions of the Yoruba. They and the town of Ibadan are to play large parts In this study. Egba Wanderings and the Establishment of a New Homeland The Egba had been one of the first Yoruba people to win Independence from Oyo. This was accomplished by about 1 7 8 0, after which they lapsed Into a long period of Intra-tribal struggles. The advent of the Moslem Invasions and the general disruption of the country thus found the Egba 1 1 1-prepared to resist their fellow Yoruba pressing upon them from the north, to say nothing of the ambitions of their neighbors to assume the Yoruba hegemony ^Ajayl, Yoruba Warfare, p. 64; 2, W. A. Ajayl, "Christian Missions,” p. 43. 60 now lo»t by Oyo. For the Egba were not a numerous people, occupying an area bounded on the west by the Ogun river, on the east by IJebu, reaching as far north as IJaye and in the south stopping short of the coast. Many hamlets and villages were scattered throughout the forests, each existing rather Independently, but loosely held together by a federation of the three Egba provinces, or "families" of Agbeyln (or Ake), Oke-Ona and Agura.® The destruction of Egba towns began In earnest in the 1820fs, accomplished by marauding Ife and IJebu adventurers and by Oyo refugees who had first success fully attacked the town of Owu on the northern Egba border. The victorious allies then pursued the Owu into Egba territory, destroying many settlements and forcing the Egba to retire. The Egba town of Ibadan was occupied in about 1825 by a mixed force of Oyo, Ife and IJebu under the command of Moye, an Ife balogun (war chief). Some Egba remained in the town but they quarreled with their conquerors and were forced in 1830 to retire south- 8 3. 0. Blobaku, The Egba and their neighbours, 1842-1872 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), chapter I; Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas, pp. 17* 18. 61 westwards to the hamlet of Abeokuta, to which other I|ba refugees had made their way a few years previously.9 The leader of the 1830 exodus and true founder of * the new Egba city-state was the warrior Sodeke. Until his death In 1844 he was the accepted and undisputed leader of the town, guarding and guiding It through the first diffi cult years of existence. He was an able and far-sighted ruler, wore soldier than politician; and fortunately so, for Abeokuta's prime concern was that of defense, the neighboring IJebu attacking the fledgling town almost Immediately. This threat was beaten off, with the help of the exiled Qba of Lagos, Adele I, giving Sodeke a breathing spell In which to turn his attention to Abeokuta and his fellow Egba. In a manner reminiscent of his Basuto con temporary Noshesh, he welcomed the Egba refugees who were pouring Into the town from all parts of the country. Also made welcome were the Owu, homeless since the destruction 9Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Mlgerla, I, pp. 44, 129, 201-2; J. F. A. Ajayl, ^Christian Missions," p. 43; Burns, Hist, of Nigeria, pp. 27-8 . 62 of their towns and villages, who settled with the Egba although ethnically closer to the Oyo. 10 Abeokuta is about seventy miles from the coast, and at that time was two miles or a little less from the east bank of the Ogun, the river which was to play such a large part in future Egba affairs. Its population in the 1830*0 is difficult to estimate, but in the 1840's and later, missionaries and travelers variously estimated the town to hold anywhere from 30,000 to 100,000 people. Perhaps it would be safe to hazard that in the 1830's the population stood at the low end of this range while by mid-century it had reached 6 0-7 0,0 0 0. Government at Abeokuta The Egba and the Owu adopted in Abeokuta the mode of government with which they were familiar. Within the city's newly-built walls (which measured some twenty miles 1°A. K. AJlsafe, History of Abeokuta (2nd ed. Bungay, Suffolk: Published by the author and printed by Richard Daly * Sons, Ltd., 1924), pp. 48-9; Yoruba Warfare, pp. 6 9, 70; Groves, The Planting of Christianity in Africa, II (London: Lutterworth Press), 1 9 4 8-5 8. k Vols. 63 In circumference within a few year* ) , 11 the different groups and towns continued to maintain their traditional rulers and chiefs as though they were still separated In the forest. With the arrival of the Owu the three original Egba "families" now numbered four, and each kept to Its own quarter In the city. In Its appropriate quarter the survivors and representatives of the abandoned settlements grouped together and built their new homes, Abeokuta thus becoming a city composed of many townships, different estimates placing the number between 130 and 153* with the lower figure again being perhaps closer to the mark. 12 Bach maintained Its Independent Identity and tradi tions. The township of Igbeln, for instance, which had custody of the roads to the coast prior to the Egba times of trouble, retained the function In Abeokuta and collected tolls at the town's several gates. In great measure each township governed itself with Its own chiefs and elders, administered Its own justice and guarded Its HRev. Isaac Smith, Journal. Aug. 19, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/082. 12Rev. C. A. Oollmer, a long-time resident of Yorubaland, giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee; Pari. Papers V (1 8 6 5), p. 241. 64 own interests, which were often at variance with the Interests of other townships. Amongst other things, this resulted In many people being Involved In the government of the town. A naval officer who visited Abeokuta In 1$52 calculated that some four-thousand persons were thus Involved.*3 of external relations, very little existed, each of the four "families1 1 managing Its own affairs. In short, the Egba failed to modify their traditional mode of government to meet the requirements of their new and more urban environment. The lack of a central executive was to plague the town's fortunes for the remainder of the nineteenth century. A Yoruba proverb says that "Egba ko l'Olu gbogbo won nl nse bl Oba," that Is, that the Egba have no king but all act like one. At least the first part Is true, although in the eighteenth century the chief of Ake, the Alakc, had been recognized as senior Egba chief. None was needed while Sodeke lived, for he assumed a considerable degree of executive authority because of the exigencies of the Egba situation. But even Sodeke was obliged to seek 13church Missionary Intelligencer (1853), p. 237. 65 ways of bringing together the disparate townships In order to have his wishes made known and Implemented. This he did by organizing a central council which brought together the leading figures of each township. This council continued to function after his death, but not being hallowed by custom, It possessed but little executive or judicial power. On the other hand, the council enjoyed a limited authority to legislate for all the Egba, but Its only like ness to a parliament was Its proclivity for endless debate. Possibly the most Influential people In Abeokuta were the Ogbonl. the traditional civil government of each Egba township. The word "possibly" Is used advisedly, for during the century and because of existing conditions a new military caste appeared, the Qlogun. The problems which beset the Egba during the period covered by this study, In fact, are a reflection of the struggle which took place between these two groups, each having Interests which appeared to diverge most sharply when the Egba were beset tqpajerplexlng situation. But at least In times of peace, the Ogbonl continued to be the real government of Abeokuta. Government by the Ogbonl was the feature of the Egba state which distinguished it most from the other 66 Yoruba states.1^ The institution la said to have derived from Ile-Ife and was a society of wealthy men and an occasional elderly woman whose traditional function was to stand between the head of each town and Its people. Ideally, this would prevent the chief from becoming too despotic while ensuring that the governed did as they were told. In fact, the Ogbonl constituted a court, and a town council, It selected and controlled the chief, and In addition It was the conservator of custom and tradition; It was the executive, legislative and Judicial bodies of each township In a single entity.^ Sodeke Directs Egba Ambitions toward the Sea Despite the undoubted limitations whloh the Ogbonl Inflicted on Sodeke and the inherent conservatissi of such an Institution, he was able to accomplish a considerable i^Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, p. 23. ^-^Blobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours, p. 6; Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas, p. 78; E. 0. Parrlnder, Religion In an African City (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 177-78; R. E. Dennett, "The Ogbonl and other Secret Sooletles In Nigeria," Journal of the African Society, XVI (Oct. 1 9 1 6), pp. 1 6-2 9. revolution in Egba aspirations and policy. He persuaded his people that their future lay not in the recapture of their old homeland but was to the south, to the coast and the sea; for here was wealth to be won by trade, by assuming the role of middlemen and purveyors between the coastal traders and the interior Yoruba, roles held by the Ijebu on the east of the Egba and by the Pope (Oun) on their west. The policy did not reach full fruition for twenty years, until the Church Missionary Society had persuaded the British government that the Egba were the best prospects for bringing civilization and Christianity to Yorubaland. Part of the Society's argument was that the best way of promoting legitimate commeroe and abolishing the slave trade would be by removing the ruler of Lagos and replacing him with someone sympathetic to the Egba; the best port on the Guinea coast was then delivered to the Egba in 1852. But in the meantime and during his lifetime, Sodeke had to be content with the lesser prize of Badagry, west of Lagos, and with Porto Novo, west of Badagry. To these he turned his attention after repulsing the IJebu attack of 1 8 3 2. 68 The following decade la therefore a history of the Egba drive to the coast. The Egbado (lower Egba) and Awarl people were subjugated and the Egba becosie supreme on the west bank of the Ogun. Badagry, dividing Its loyalty between Lagos and Porto Novo, came under Egba Influence. The Inland market-town of Okeodan, key to the Abeokuta-Porto Novo route, was forced to act as the Egba slave market and Otta, equally Important as a possible route to Lagos, was taken In 1842. The Egba had now broken the old trade monopoly held by the IJebu and had won their own supply routes for arms and powder; In addition, they now possessed their own outlets for the prisoners taken In the many wars, who were sold as slaves. Egba policy hereafter was to hold the trade routes to the coast by maintaining supremacy In Egbado country, a task accomplished by Sodeke not with formal administrative machinery but by making sure that local rulers were friendly. During this period of almost continual fighting the Egba position was further strengthened by a continuing ^Ajayi, Yoruba Warfare, p. 70; Ajlsafe, Hist, of Abeokuta, pp. 6 5-8, 8 1-3. 69 Influx of people Into Abeokuta and by the military defeat of Ibadan In 1835. Ibadan remained the moat constant threat to Abeokuta, and this victory over the strongest Yoruba military power resulted in the Egba assuming that position.1? And the Egba had other victories and campaigns to their credit. On their eastern flank remained the Ijebu, now not only commercial rivals but also the people partly responsible for the loss of the old Egba lands. Egba rmdfcrlbutlon fell during the 1830's. It continued to do so to such an extent that travelers passing through IJebu country In the 1 8 5 0*s could not fall being Impressed by the many ruined towns and villages.16 On their western flank werd the Dahoml, the Egba drive to the coast constituting a challenge to their own hegemony over the Egbado interior. Dahomey therefore went to the aid of Egbado and Awari towns attacked by the Egba, especially when Ado received Egbm attention, a town tributary to Porto Novo, whose king was related to Ghezo, 1?Biobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours, pp. 22-4. i^Rev. David Hlnderer, Journal. Ibadan, Dec. 18, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/049. 70 the Dahomey ruler. Fighting between the Egba and Dahoml broke out In 1844 when an Egba contingent surprised a Dahoml force on Its way to attack Ilar©.19 Qhezo's umbrella and royal chair were captured, his symbols of authority, an outrage which Qhezo swore would be avenged. Although the antagonism between the Egba and Dahoml was grounded primarily on conflicting ambitions In Egbade country, this Incident was the genesis of an Implacable hostility between the two peoples. The result was to be a long history of almost annual threats of Dahomey incursions Into Egba territory, threats which occasionally materialized. The Growth of Ibadan Implacable hostility toward the Egba was a feeling shared by Ibadan, and one which the Egba cordially returned. It will be remembered that Ibadan had been an !9lt is possible that the first Dahoml Invasion of Egba territory occurred In 1841, followed by another In 1843. See Edouard Dunglas, "La Premiere Attaque dea Dahomeens contre Abeokuta (3 Mars 1851),” In Etudes Dahomeennes (Porto Novo: Instltut Francals D'Afrlque Noire, Centre du Dahomey, 1948), I, pp. 8, 9. 71 Egba settlement until occupied by the balogun Moye and an Ife, Oyo and IJebu army in about 1 8 2 5. After that, its physical growth and increase in power had been as spectacular as that of Abeokuta. After the departure of Sodeke and the Egba, Noye and his Ife warriors were in effective control of the town up to about 1 8 3 6, when the Oyo revolted. Led by Oluyole, the uprising was successful despite an alliance of Ife towns against the Insurgents, Oluyole receiving much-needed support from the neighboring city-state of IJaye.2l Thus Ibadan became primarily an Oyo town, but not completely so; as Abeokuta had grown rapidly by an Influx of refugees, so likewise did Ibadan. But immigrants of a different stamp flocked to Ibadan: armed, bands and adventurers were attracted to it by its reputation for war and kidnaping; the disaffected were similarly drawn, as were warriors looking for opportunities to ply their trade. Settled as a military camp, Ibadan remained one, the 20Supra, p. 60. Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas, pp. 238-44; Parrinder, Religion in an African City, p. 64. 72 warlike character of ite people quickly becoming recognized throughout the whole of Yoruba. Warriors were the townfs only respected class and Its effective rulers. Like Sodeke, Oluyele achieved a degree of personal autocracy, but he too found his power limited. While there was no Ogbonl system at Ibadan, Oluyole's opposition came Instead from the town's abundance of influential personages. Having no hereditary chief, the form of government which emerged after an Initial period of anarchy was a compromise between the rulers of the military caste and the civil chiefs, the former having pressed for a military autocracy and the latter desiring a form of gov ernment more In keeping with Yoruba tradition. There were two parallel lines of chiefs, civil and military; when the senior chief of the town was a civilian he took the title of Bale (the closest English equivalent being "mayor”), and a balogun, he beoame Basorun (field marshal). Having no hereditary lineages, either civil or military, careers were open to talent, but contrary to theory, the war chiefs exercised the greater political Influence. 22 This perhaps 22AJayi, Yoruba Warfare, p. 6 8; Rev. D. Hlnderer, Journal. Oct. 4, 1851, C.M.3.CA2/049. 73 accounts for the friendship cultivated by Ibadan with the coastal states of IJebu to the south and Benin to the south-east, the town thereby ensuring a regular supply of muskets and powder. These articles were always In demand to equip the Ibadan war machine. The town's military strength was well- recognised even by the mld-1 8 3 0's, but suffered a set-back at that time at the hands of the Egba. Following this, Ibadan turned to the north and the east, In 1840 achieving a great victory over the Fulanl at Oshogbo. The victory was exploited and gradually the old Oyo provinces east of the Ogun were won back from Ilorln. Then the Ibadan turned eastwards and expanded In the Yoruba provinces of the Ijes^ Ekltl and Akoko, and on occasions their marauding bands reached as far as the Niger. But differing from the Egba, they Installed an AJele (governor) at each place they conquered.23 23j. p, a. AJayl, "Christian Missions,” p. 50 74 The Land and People of IJebu Judging by the ambitions and expansionist policies of Abeokuta and Ibadran It seamed possible that these two successor states to the Oyo empire would at some time come Into serious conflict. East and south-east of the Egba and south of Ibadan were other Yoruba people, the IJebu (Jebu), with whom conflicts also seemed likely; Indeed, the Egba and IJebu were at each others1 throats from the 18201s until mid-century. But the IJebu were themselves a divided pepple and alliances shifted as the course of Yoruba politics became more apparent. Richard Burton, consul at Fernando po, passed through IJebu country In 1861 and estimated that It covered 5,000 square miles and contained 200,000 people.24 For want of corroborating evidence his estimates might be accepted, for of all the Yoruba people the IJebu were the most exclusive and resisted to their uttermost the pene tration of Europeans, either missionaries, traders or officials. This was but natural, occupying as they did 24Richard Burton, Abeokuta and the Cameroons Mountains: An Explanation (London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, 1863), I, PP. 225-6. 75 the strategic area north of Lagoa, thus being placed In the perfect position to act as commercial middlemen with the Interior. They were thus a trading people, not overly concerned with the outcome of the struggle for Yoruba hegemony as long as their own position remained undis turbed . This helps explain the Egba-IJebu conflicts which took place as the Egba drove to the coast after 1830; the IJebu position also helps to explain the friendship which they maintained with Ibadan as that city seemingly showed no interest In the south, remaining content as long as the IJebu furnished sufficient supplies of arms or the other European goods required. The strategic location of the IJebu Is also the explanation for their resistance to European penetration; this, they thought, would deatrpy completely and forever the trade advantages which the Egba were already Infringing, And it Is a partial explanation for the change of heart ejqperlenced by the IJebu after mid- century, when It became apparent that Ibadan had changed Its focus and now desired Its own route to the sea. The shortest and best route from Ibadan passing through their territory, the IJebu at that Juncture began to regard the 76 Egba with more friendliness. This Is but a partial explanation, however, as the IJebu themselves divided their loyalties. While all the IJebu claim to have oome originally from Ife, as do the other Yoruba, the people who Inhabit the western provlnoe of IJebu, that Is, the country Immediately south of Ibadan which abuts the Egba to the west, claim to have come from the Reno quarter of Ife. Thus the people Inhabiting this western portion are known as IJebu-Remo, as Is their province. The other portion of IJebu Is the Ode provlnoe, with Its people similarly named. The paramount chief of all the IJebu was (and remains) the Awujale, who resided In the town of Ode and whose real authority lay In the IJebu-Ode province only. The ruler of IJebu-Remo was the Akarlgbo, living In the town of Ofln, who owed ritual allegiance to the Awujale and who was attempting In the mid-nineteenth century to weaken even this tie. Thus the Remo people tended to remain cordial with Ibadan, for their towns, adjacent to Egba territory, were frequently visited by Egba reprisals In the 1830's and l840's, and through them passed a lucrative commerce to Ibadan and the far Interior. On the other hand, the Awujale viewed the Egba with increasing friendliness after aid-century, representing as they did the best means for curbing Ibadan ambitions; at the save tine they were in a convenient position to chastise his western countrymen who were evincing signs of over-independence*25 Alafin Atiba and the Collapsing Oyo Espire Yet regaining to be noted are the fortunes which befell the Oyo empire and kingdom, assailed from within and without by Yoruba and Moslems. Under the press of circumstances, a new Alafin, Atiba, took the title in 1 835 after the city of Oyo had been surrendered to the advancing army of Ilorln. He built a new city further south, about thirty miles north of Ibadan, populating it with people from surrounding villages while making his new palace as closely similar 25Very little has been written about the IJebu owing to the lack of written records which persisted until the beginning of the twentieth century. Mention of them Is made in Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubaa; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Minerla. I; Porde, The Yoruba-Speaklng Peoples, and AJayl, Yoruba Warfare. 78 to the royal residence at Old Oyo as he could.2* > Even more important, he attempted to resurrect the shell of his In heritance and to reorganize the empire to withstand further assaults. Rather than break with tradition completely, the Yoruba states continued to recognize him as king of all Yoruba, while In some cases, noticeably that of Ibadan, It became politically expedient for rival factions to gain his approval; thus nominal allegiance was given as the means of securing his support. Central to Atiba's reorganization was the partici pation of Ibadan and IJaye, a large Oyo town with preten sions of Its own. First, Oluyole of Ibadan was appointed head of civil affairs for all Yoruba. The fact that he continued to reside In Ibadan was against all precedent, but as he had few imperial duties, If any, the departure was not serious. But In addition to this hollow title, Oluyole and the town of Ibadan were given the more sub stantial duty of protecting the north, and northeast Yoruba towns from further Invasion; Ibadan was also to have a free hand over the eastern Yoruba provinces and return 26J. F. A. Ajayl, "Christian Missions," p. 46. 79 them to their old allegiance to the Alafin. Ibadan Indeed defeated the Fulanl In 1840, and the method by which the Ijesa and Ekltl were returned to the Oyo fold has been mentioned previously.27 As for IJaye, the title of Are-Ona-Kakanfo was bestowed upon Its ruler, who thus became the highest-rank ing military figure In Yoruba. With the distinction was given the task of defending the Yoruba towns of the western provinces from any possible attack from Dahomey. These methods, It was hoped, would arrest the further disinte gration of the empire and regain as much as possible of the territories lost to the Fulanl.2® As has been seen, Ibadan carved out for Itself a new empire at the expense of the Akoko, Ijesa, Ekltl and the Fulanl. The mandate given to the Are of IJaye resulted In similar acquisitions: by 1 8 5 1 the IJaye were 27Supra, p. 73. 2®Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas, pp. 2 8 1 *>2. 80 claiming that their land stretched to Sake,29 a town almost a hundred miles away, to the northwest. The only result of Atiba*s efforts to shore-up his tottering empire, therefore, was to continue the pretense that It existed while enriching two of Its successors under the guise of legitimacy. The Return of Liberated Slaves to Yorubaland; the Quickening of Missionary Interest There remains to Introduce the final group of people who are to play a part In the unfolding of this story. Not only were they to become an exceedingly Impor tant factor In Yoruba politics but they were the Instru ments through which the missionaries made their appearance. During the 1830*b groups of liberated alaves at Sierra Leone organized a small coastal trade which was suc cessful enough to finance a larger venture. A few of the Yoruba at Freetown purchased from the Colony a condemned 29t. J. Bowen, Central Africa; Adventures and Missionary Labors In Several Countries In the Interior of Africa, from 1^49 to 185^ (New York; Sheldon, Blakeman and Company, 1857), P. l6l. 81 slave-ship, renamed It Wllberforde, loaded It with European and African produce and set sail for Badagry, the gateway to Yoruba country and a thousand mile* away. The venture was a commercial success and two other vessels were purchased. More Important, the traders brought back news of a great new Egbu city and that Sodeke, Its leader, was welcoming all Egba to their new home. Two parties then left Sierra Leone for Abeokuta In 1 8 3 8, one going via Lagos and the other by way of Badagry. The latter reached Its destination safely; the unfortunates who passed through Lagos were robbed of their property and some of them probably ended their journey In barracoons. Following this experience, Badagry became the accepted port-of-entry for the considerable number of ex-slaves who found their way from Freetown to Abeokuta.30 There are various estimates concerning the size of this migration, one placing It as high as 3 ,0 0 0 people by 30w. 0. Ajayl, "A History of the Yoruba Missions, 1843-1880," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Bristol, 1959), pp. 36-7. 82 1 8 4 4 ,3 1 But whatever the number, the influence wielded in Abeokuta by thla freah Influx far outweighed ita numerical atrength. The greater part of them were farmera and tradera, with a mlacellaneoua collection of akilla acquired in Sierra Leone. In aone caaea a modicum of literacy in English had been picked up during their trav- ela or taught in Sierra Leone miaalon achoola. All had experienced contact with a new culture and acme had embraced the Gospel. It waa in response to an appeal from one of the converts that missionary activity began in Yorubaland. One of the immigrants wrote back to Freetown in March, l84l, asking his Wesleyan pastor to cose to Badagry and minister to the needs of the returned Christiana. The letter, and others in a similar vein, were forwarded to the Wealeyan Methodist Missionary Society in London where the General Secretary requested a missionary working on the Gold Coast to proceed to Badagry. 31C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja-Speaklng Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo. (Oxford: Clarendon PressT 19bli p. 4^. 83 The man selected was Thomas Birch Freeman, son of an African father and English mother, who was Instructed to ¥ station an assistant at Badagry and make a reconnoiterlng visit to the new city of Abeokuta. He reached Badagry in September, 1842, and Abeokuta three months later.32 Thus the Methodists began the task of Implanting Christianity In Yorubaland. This early advantage was not exploited, however. Freeman stayed at Abeokuta only a few weeks, where he was received cordially by Sodeke, then returned to Badagry and thence to the Cold Coast. A permanent station was indeed erected at Badagry, but the Wesleyan entry Into Abeokuta was deferred until 1847 and even then the operation was on a small scale. But Freeman did Inaugurate the long history of missionary and governmental liaison In Yorubaland. On his return to Cape Coast Freeman asked his society to send him eight missionaries, but realized that political action had to accompany missionary enterprise If the slave traffic was to be overthrown. He therefore consulted Captain 32p. Deavllle Walker, A Hundred Years In Nigeria. The Story of the Methodist Mission In the Western Mlgerla District^ 1842-1942 (London: The Cargate Press, [1942] ), pp. 1 6-2 8. 84 George Maclean, the political agent of the Company to whoa the British government had delegated the government of the Gold Coast In 1 8 2 8. Maclean responded by dispatching a small detachment of soldiers to Badagry In 1843* where the Union Jack was hoisted and an Informal protectorate declared pending approval from London. The arrangement lasted only briefly, however, being withdraw the following year after administration of the Gold Coast had passed to official hands.33 Freeman also Instituted a practice which C.M.S. missionaries emulated later, asking the commander of the naval foroes in the Blight of Benin to do his best to pro tect the Badagry mission and its Christians. Captain Foote complied, Informing the slave dealers at Lagos that the Mission and its converts were not to be molested and instructing his cruisers to make occasional visits at Badagry. When they did so the officers made a point of visiting the mission as a token of their support and approval.34 33ifewbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 50; J. F. A. Ajayl, "Christian Missions,p. 97. 34walker, A Hundred Years, p. 3 8. 85 The Establishment of the C.M.S. Connection In Yorubaland Although the Methodist beginning In Yoruba country had anticipated the C.M.S., the advantage was short-lived. The Anglican missionaries In Sierra Leone had likewise been petitioned to send ministers to the Immigrants, and not to be outdone, It was decided In 1842 to send an exploratory mission to Abeokuta. The person selected was Henry Townsend, a young man born In Exeter In 1815 who had been teaching In Sierra Leone since 1 8 3 6. Of frail appearance, Townsend had nevertheless survived In West Africa, was Intelligent, determined, and smbltlous. He was to loom large In Yoruba politics for the next two decades, and of the many men subsequently sent to the Yoruba mission, he was the man most after Henry Venn's heart. An Intimation of this feeling was recorded In Venn's Journal on December 24, 1849, when he wrote: Townsend called; he exhibited a fine determined spirit for penetrating Into the Interior of Africa .... I felt I could lay no restrictions upon him, but assured him that If he felt he was called of God to the Interior he must go ... . I have seldom parted with a missionary with the some feeling. It was as if I had parted with Paul after he had said 86 'I an ready not only to be bound, but to die also at Jeruaalen'.35 This, then, was the man who took ship from Freetown In late 1842. He landed at Badagry In December and on Christmas Day conducted a Joint service with Freeman, who had Just returned from Abeokuta. Accompanied by two assistants he then continued to the Egba city, arriving on January 4, 1843. Being the first white man to visit Abeokuta his welcome was tumultuous, and with Sodeke*s per mission Townsend installed a C.M.S. representative, Andrew Wilhelm, to minister to the immigrants until a mission could be organized and to prepare the way for a permanent establishment.3 6 It should not be Imagined that the favorable reception given to Freeman In Abeokuta and the even warmer greeting accorded Townsend were marks of Egba altruism or of their deep-seated desire to embrace the true faith. Sodeke was a capable leader and very shrewd; he regarded it as imperative that his people have a seaport and contact 35c.M.S. F/21. 36tf. 0. AJayl, "Hist. of the Yoruba Mission," pp. 42-43. 87 with Europeans. And he viewed with delight, undoubtedly, any possible alliance with Europeans as calculated to strengthen the Egba against their surrounding enemies. Ready acceptance of missionaries for such reasons was not confined to the Egba but occurred throughout Yoruba country, with the exception of IJebu. This opportunism was Illustrated clearly at Ibadan some years later on the arrival of a second missionary In that town. Passing a marriage celebration the Rev. J. T. Kefer noted that he Immediately became the subject of their song: "White man become two, the walls of our town are now strong."37 According to an historian of missionary enterprise, Sodeke not only welcomed Townsend most cordially but asked him to carry to the Governor of Sierra Leone his thanks for everything Great Britain had done for his people. In addition, he assured Townsend of his determination to sup press the slave trade and of his Intention to weloome white merchants and missionaries to his country.38 Be that as It may, Townsend left the city Impressed with Its potential as 37journal, Oct. 25, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/059. 38oroves, The Planting of Christianity In Africa, II, P. 49. a missionary outpost, returned to Badagry and sailed to Freetown. He made a written report to the Committee In London and at the end of 1843 returned home for ordination. The report and his subsequent personal evaluation of the situation reached the C.M.S. at an opportune moment. Following the disastrous outcome of the 1841 Niger Expedition and the apparent blocking of any route to the Interior through the great river, the C.M.S. had two alter natives open to their determination to press inland. Sierra Leone could Itself be used as the base for a move ment to the regions of the Upper Niger; on the other hand, a penetration of the coast at a suitable point could be made from the sea and the Interior breached from there. It appeared In late l84l that the former plan was feasible when a member of the Sierra Leone mission, W. C. Thompson, made a successful journey Inland. But that door to the "hitherto Inaccessible Interior of Africa" was shut to the Society when Thompson died In 1843.39 Townsend's report then arrived at Salisbury Square, followed shortly by its author. 39Proceedlngs of the C.M.S., (1843), p 42. Venn and the Parent Committee now became convinced that a Mlseion In Yorubaland, with Abeokuta as Its first station and the stepping stone to the heart of Africa, was not only practicable but was a necessity. The organisa tion of the new mission was therefore taken In hand, to be similar In structure to the establishment at Sierra Leone. The mission would thus be guided by a local committee of missionaries, with a good deal of autonomy, acting under the general supervision of the Parent Committee In London. In spiritual matters the mission would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of London, In whose extended Overseas Diocese West Africa was merely a part. Townsend was appointed Secretary of the Local Committee, later called the Finance Committee, Its other members being Samuel Crowther, late of the Niger Expedi tion and since ordained, and the Reverend C. A. Oollmer, already stationed In Sierra Leone.^ The Local Committee held Its first meeting at Fourah Bay College on December 40*f# a . Ajayl, "Hist, of the Yoruba Mission," pp 49-50. 90 17, 1844, when the missionaries offered thanks to God for the work they were about to undertake.**1 Suflmary Thus, at the end of 1844 the stage was set for the advent of British Influence In Yoruba. Backing the move ment In London was the polltlcally-oonsclous Church Missionary Society, under the guidance of Henry Venn. Supporting him and the Society was an Influential cross- section of the Establishment--Church leaders, political figures and members of the peerage. Equally as important, the Evangelical Movement was on the threshold of Its mid- century surge of public approval, was dedicated to the utter extinction of the slave-trade by means of Christian ity and legitimate commerce, and was convinced of the role It had to play In redeeming Africa and its people. In Yoruba Itself a state of flux existed due to the breakdown of the Oyo empire. Ambitious successor states were either attempting to fill the vacuum themselves or seeking ways to thwart rivals from becoming overly ^Minutes of the Yoruba Mission Local Committee, C.M.S. CA2/01. 91 powerful. Pro* their new home the Egba were looking for opportunities on the coast and were proving eager to grasp European connections. The warrlor-dosd.nated city of Ibadan was flexing Its muscles, looking for Inland fields of congest while convincing itself that an Ibadan hegem ony over Torubaland was within reach. The IJebu continued their trading ways, their monopoly over Interior commerce already broken by the Egba and fearful of further Inroads being made. To the north and west of Yoruba lay ever present enemies, the Pulanl watching for any opportunity to carry the Jehad to the south, while the Dahoml lurked on the far side of the Ogun and sought to revenge almost a century of tutelage. At the same time the slave trade prospered, the coastal barracoons swollen by the human spoils of the continuing Yoruba wars. This was the setting, then, when the small band of missionary pioneers left the confines of Freetown harbor for the thousand-mile voyage to the Yoruba shores. CHAPTER III FIRST CONTACTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISSIONARY POLICY Landing at Badagry on January 17, 1845, there was nothing about the founding party to suggest that within a short time the Yoruba Mission would take the foremost place In the Interest and sympathy of the C.M.S. and of the Society's friends.1 It was composed of nineteen adults and several children, the Reverends Townsend and Oollmer and their wives being the only Europeans. The remainder of the party Included the Reverend and Mrs. Crowther, an Interpre ter, a teacher, a catechlst, carpenters, laborers and servants.2 Inasmuch as Townsend's two colleagues were also destined to play significant roles In future Yoruba 3-Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Missionary Society, Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work (London: C.M.S., 1 8 9 9-1 9 1 6) I, p.458. 2jesse Page, The Black Bishop; Samuel Adjal Crowther (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), p . 86. 92 93 politics, a word of Introduction should be given. Samuel Adjal Crowther was himself a Yoruba, about thirty-eight years old, whose career was quite unique. In 1821 he had been sold Into slavery but was rescued at sea by the Royal Navy the following year; he then became a student at C.M.S. schools In Sierra Leone, was baptised In 1825 and became a teacher for the Society. He took part In the 1841 Niger Expedition and so Impressed the Society with his work and conduct that he was ordained In 1843, fitting perfectly into the Society's "native agency" plan of Africans providing their own means of salvation. Later In 1 8 5 7* Crowther was to found a new mission on the banks of the Niger and In 1864 he was consecrated the first Negro bishop In the Church of England. He died at a great age In 1892.3 Born In 1812, Charles Andrew Gollmer was six years younger than his African colleague and three years older than Townsend. He was but one of the considerable band of Germans who Joined the Society In the nineteenth century, being a native of Wurttemberg. After studying at the 3page, The Black Bishop, pp. 68-72. 94 Basel Missionary College, he was ordained and sent to Freetown In 1841, where his wife died* The second Mrs. Oollmer also succumbed, to dysentery, shortly after arriv ing at Badagry. Soon becoming well-known as the Alapako ("owner of boards"), a title acquired on becoming the first person to erect a wooden house In Yoruba country,4 Oollmer was also to achieve considerable notoriety for his political activity. This and a marked similarity of character between himself and Townsend led to years of bickering between the two. When the Mission was a decade old an ex-naval officer, familiar with both meiv had cause to comment on their personalities and foibles. Of the two, he considered Townsend to be the more tolerant— but at the same time more remorseless; both were unforgiving and Impatient of opposition, "the love of power existing to an extreme In both." He continued: "I believe, however, [that} if anyone will saorlfIce his Independence and will consent to acknowledge the prominence of either . * . and 4charles H. V. Oollmer, Charles Andrew Oollmer: His Life and Missionary Labour In Africa (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1889), p. 1 8 7. 95 not offer any opposition to their words and opinions, they will be firm enough friends; not otherwise.”5 Badagry and Its People The writer failed to mention that both men also possessed courage and great strength of oharacter, quali ties much In demand at Badagry In 1845. About thirty miles west of Lagos, the town was not on the coast Itself but on the northern shore of the lagoon, thus being separated from the ocean by the lagoon and the coastal sandbar, about a mile In width at that point. Its nearest outlets to the ocean were at Lagos and at Cotonou, about an equal distance to the west, where a narrow channel through the sand gave access to the Gulf of Guinea. This lack of direct contaot with the sea did not prove an Insuperable barrier to ocean communications, however, as traders frequently anchored off-shore, braved the surf In boats then walked to the shore of the lagoon. In this way, but in the opposite direction, many thousands of slaves had been driven from Badagry to the waiting ships. 5Dr. S. Q. Irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 11, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/M3. 96 The town was of fair sire, numbering between five and ten thousand people. It had originally been of Egun ("dun" or "Popo") foundation In the eighteenth century but since that time there had been a considerable Influx of Hueda, Wemenu and Yoruba. The mixed origins of the people part|$ explain the disturbed history of the town, but there were other factors. One was Its geographical position, on the lagoon between Lagos and Porto Novo, and the fact that It offered a poor defensive site; another was that the lineage chiefs of Badagry*s eight townships were divided In allegiance between Porto Novo and Lagos, and an additional source of weakness was the limited authority of the senior chief. 6 Badagry had been an Important slave market In the eighteenth century and Its people had derived large profits. Its Importance was declining In the following century, however, not only on account of the repeated Egba and Dahoml Invasions to which the town was subjected, but 6C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja-Speaklng Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, Shuth e m Dahomey and Togo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961$, pp. 30, 32. 97 also because of the Increasing Importance of Lagos to the slave trade. Slave trading was still carried on actively when the missionaries arrived, Rev. Crowther laying the blame on the rum supplied by slave-ships; a partiality for the beverage led the people to excesses deeper than those of surrounding towns and villages, he explained.7 Besides this, the missionaries were exposed to their first real experience with domestic slavery, an Institution which was to cause considerable conflict between Yoruba and European authorities. These were some of the local difficulties facing the missionaries. On the brighter side was the fact that a minute trade In palm-oil was under way; an English factor had been living at Badagry for several years, the agent for the Cape Coast and London firm of Thomas Hutton. But this welcome glimpse of an embroyonlc legitimate commerce was besmirched, In the missionaries' view, as the merchant, Captain Parsons, lived with local women and thus set a bad example. 7Journal, Badagry, June 17, 18, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/ 031b; W. Q. AJayi, "A History of the the Yoruba Missions, 1843-1880," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Bristol, 1959), P. 57. 98 Even more serious were the external difficulties which the missionaries had to face upon arrival. The b*' news came thick and fast. Vorst of all were the tidings that Sodeke was dead, the rumored victim of poison.& His death removed any semblance of organized leadership at Abeokuta and left the Egba the victim of their own divided counsels. The clash between the Ogbonl and the Ologun now reached major proportions and precluded the reception of the missionaries at Abeokuta. Okukeno, a leading Ogbonl chief, assumed a position similar to a regency over the Egba with the title of Sagbua. He and the Ogbonl expressed anti-slavery senti ments, favored European contacts and so were inclined to adopt Sodeke's views concerning the missionaries. On the other hand, the Ologun policy was to supply slaves for export and the warriors favored stronger ties with Lagos; as for the missionaries, they were not wanted, either at Abeokuta or Badagry. The Ologun was apparently the stronger, for the tenor of the message conveyed to the ®W. 0. AJayi, ”Hlst. of the Yoruba Mission," p. 5 3. 99 missionaries was that Sodeke was dead and It was not yet convenient for them to be received at Abeokuta. Contemporary Coastal Unrest Even If the message had been more favorable, news equally as bad was that a general war was In progress around Badagry and that the road to Abeokuta was too dangerous to travel. This war was part of the continuous jockeying for advantage going on In Yoruba country, involving especially the Egba drive to the coast, an ambition to which the Ogbonl and Ologun both subscribed. In 1842 the Awarl people of Otta had acknowledge a tribu tary relationship with Abeokuta and had opened their strategic town for an Egba route to Ebute Netta, a village on the lagoon adjacent to Lagos Island. But the Egba had no Intention of giving up the road to Badagry and since then had encamped outside Ado, a town situated between Abeokuta and Badagry, preventing the Aworl there from Interfering with the route.9 9townsend Journal, Badagry, Feb. 1, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/085; Crowther Journal, Badagry, Feb. 1, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031. 100 This brought the Dahoml to the sucedr of Ado at the beginning of 1845 for two or possibly three reasons. The Egba move to the ooast interfered with their own aspiration of hegemony over the ooastal people; at the sane time, Ado was tributary to Porto Novo, Itself a fief of Dahomey. Ghezo, king of the Dahoml, was thus further ing his own anbitlons by attacking the Egba at Ado while supporting a friendly people. The missionaries, who did not view these wars as political struggles but as the result of efforts by pro-slavery powers to Impose their will on people dedicated to anti-slavery, suggested a different motive for the Dahoml attack. This was that Ghezo wished to open a road from Whydah to Lagos to facilitate the slave trade, while at the same time seeking slaves for export and to furnish victims for his annual human sacrifices. 10 Regardless of the motives, the Dahomey attack was beaten off by the Egba late In February, who thereupon returned to the selge of Ado. 11 lttTownsend to C.M.S., Badagry, March 4, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/M1; Oollmer Journal, Badagry, May 7, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/M1. ^Crowther Journal, Badagry, Feb. 25-28, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031. 101 The missionaries took a similar view of the con current campaign being waged by Porto Novo against Badagry. Trade along the lagoon between the two places had been stopped since early 1844 and there were occasional Porto Novo skirmishes against Badagry. A long-time and notorious resident of the Dahomey port of Whydah was a Brasilian slave-dealer, Francisco Felix Da Sousa. Da Sousa was the Dahomey customs official at Whydah, Oheso's personal slave-broker and for many years an Intimate friend of the King.1^ The missionaries presumed, there fore, that the Porto Novo attacks on Badagry were Insti gated by Da Sousa and were aimed at destroying them personally, as representatives of the leading anti-slave power, while opening a slave route to Lagos.*3 In fact, the Porto Novo campaign was very much part of the Egba- Aworl struggle, Ado being allied to Porto Novo and Badagry being under Egba Influence. The Porto Novo-Badagry war provides the first Instance of naval support being furnished to protect the 12Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 37* 13crowther Journal, Badagry, Feb. 22, May 6, 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031. 102 beleagured Missionaries. Commander Layton of H.M.S. Cygnet had landed at Badagry only a week after the arrival ; of the Missionaries, to Inquire about their fortunes and to deliver a Message to Crowther from a friend In Eng land. 1 2 ,1 He was briefed on the precarious position In which they found themselves, and fortuitously returned In March In the nick of tine to turn baok a water-borne In vasion of the town.15 The attackers promptly withdrew. Lagos Island and Its Rulers All this was but the missionaries* first brush with Yoruba politics. Within a few months they were to become much more Intimately Involved, the event trigger ing the deeper involvement being a coup at Lagos In whloh the ruling monarch was deposed by his nephew. Regarding the coup as yet another contest between pro- and anti slavery forces, the missionaries took up sides and began a ^Crowther Journal. Badagry, Jan. 24, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031. 15"British Residents at Badagry to the Governor of Cape Coast or any of Her Majesty's Maval Officers on the West Coast of Africa," Badagry, Aug. 20, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/05. 103 a campaign which was to culminate some six years later In the forcible removal of the "usurper" by the Royal Navy. The Importance of Lagos harbor had been recognized i as early as the fifteenth century by the Portuguese voy agers. For some hundred of miles on either side It was the only opening of any size In the sand reef which stretches along the coast from the Benin to the Volta. The waters around the island, although protected by a dan gerous bar, provided excellent anchorage and gave access* to a prodigious Inland waterway system of creeks, lagoons and rivers. The Portuguese also found the flat and sandy Island of Lagos to be occupied by the remnsnts of an any from Benin, then an extensive kingdom, signifying a sub servient relationship that continued to be recognized In the mid-nineteenth century. Portugal maintained commer cial or missionary relations until about 1 6 0 0, but with the decline of Portuguese power and Its unhealthy climate, Lagos subsequently received fewer and fewer visits from Europeans.16 l6p. Amry Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Mlgerlas A Sketch of Their History, Ethnology and Language, with an Abstract of the 1921 Census (London; OxfordUniversity Press, 1 9 2 6), I, pp. 79-84. 104 Not until the commencement of the nineteenth century did the Island and Its protective anchorage rise to any commercial significance. This came as a consequence of the collapse of Oyo, the resulting Yoruba wars providing slaves as Its main export commodity. At the same time, the Island’s growing Importance was augmented by the appearance of a new type of slave factor from Brazil, many of whom were Creoles, who became permanent settlers.17 By the 1820's, Lagos was rivaling Badagry In exports and In the Importation of arms, powder, rum, and other European goods. While this was taking place the succession to the Lagos throne entered a period of dispute. This ultimately resulted In the claim of the rightful heir, Kosoko, being thrice disregarded and his Uncle, Akltoye, winning the title In 1 8 4 1.^ Against advice, Akltoye Insisted on Inviting the exiled Kosoko back to Lagos, a mistake, as Kosoko retained a loyal following. Kosoke's opposition to his uncle grew more and more open as time went on until 17Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, pp. 36-7. l®John B. Losl, History of Lagos (Lagos: Tlka-Tore Printing Works, 1914), p. 39; Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria (4th ed. London: Oeorge Allen % Unwin, Ltd., 194577pp. 36-7. 105 open fighting broke out between the two factions In July, 1845. The civil war lasted Into the following month when Akltoye was at last forced to flee for his life, taking temporary refuge at Abeokuta as his mother had been an Owu.3-9 The Immediate cause of the fighting was probably Akltoye's last-dltoh attempt to save himself; through an exiled Lagos chief living in Badagry, the Eletu, he promised the missionaries to give up the slave trade at Lagos and admit the English In return for assistance against his nephew.20 Fearing outside Intervention, Kosoko then attacked. The Formulation and Development of Missionary Policy Akltoye1s offer placed the question of Lagos In clear perspective to Townsend, Oollmer and Crowther: Kosoko had usurped the throne and must be removed. Hard on 19a . K. AJlsafe, History of Abeokuta (2nd ed. Bungay, Suffolk: Published by the author and printed by Richard Daly & Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 89; Losl, Hist, of Lagos, p. 41. 20"British Residents at Badagry to the Oovernor of Cape Coast or any of Her Majesty's Naval Officers on the West Coast of Africa," Badagry, Aug.20, 1845, C.M.S.CA2/05. 106 the heels of the revolt they Bade their first plea for British assistance. A long communication was dispatched on the first passing ship, asking help for Akltoye against Kosoko, who was described as a vile slave-trader who aimed at "nothing less than the entire extirpation of the English.” Referring to the Sierra Leone Immigrants at Abeokuta as "the hundreds of British subjects In the Interior,” the letter went on to depict how their develop- ment and security was now threatened by Kosoko. If he had been beaten In the revolt "we doubt not that the English might have established themselves at Lagos In security and thereby have commanded one of the most Important Inlets of the country.” The letter closed by stating that "We need _21 your help and we need It Immediately. Townsend wrote to the Parent Committee at the same time, reiterating the fact that Akltoye was willing to enter Into an anti-slaving agreement and suggesting that the navy could effectively help the anti-slavery cause "by rendering timely assistance to those chiefs who wish for 21"British Residents at Badagry to the Governor of Cape Coast or any of Her Majesty's Naval Officers on the West Coast of Africa," Badagry, Aug. 20, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/ 05. 107 Its suppression. ... A little assistance, perhaps with out resorting to anas, might have gained the English a footing at Lagos to the exclusion of the slave trade »22 • • * • The assistance requested so earnestly and Immed iately arrived a fortnight later In the shape of H.M.S. Albatross, flagship of the Senior Officer In the Bight of Benin, Captain Yorke. He came at an opportune moment. Kosoko had made overtures to the Badagry chiefs, supported by four demijohns of rum, asking their assistance In removing the missionaries and establishing a prosperous slave trade.23 Badagryfs two most Influential men, the senior lineage chief (the Okran), and the war chief (the Possu), accepted these blandishments while two others did not; thus when the Albatross arrived, civil war In the town appeared Imminent.2^ In company with the missionaries, 22Townsend to Lay Secretary, Badagry, Aug. 20, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/1H1. 23oollmer, Journal. Badagry, Aug. 25, 1845, C.M.S. Ck2/Hl; Crowther, Journal, Badagry, Sept. 7, 8, 1845, C.M. S. CA2/031. 24crowther, Journal, Badagry, Sept., 7, 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031. 108 Captain York* and several officers spoke to the assembled chiefs on September 8, warning that their town would be destroyed If any harm befell the missionaries.25 What the officers1 reactions were to the missionaries1 suggestions concerning Lagos Is not recorded, but no action was taken against Kosoko. During the following few months the views of the missionaries concerning the course of action that should be pursued by the British government In Yorubaland were refined and extended. By November they had become crysta- llsed Into policies which held good until the British government finally accepted and Implemented them In late 1851. The only modification which took place between 1845 and 1851 occurred after the Mission had removed to Abeokuta, when It was urged that the Egba were the people most likely to extend Christianity and legitimate commerce throughout Yorubaland. The development of these policies Is Illustrated In the various written communications of the men and may be 25crowther, Journal, Badagry, Sept. 7$ 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031; Townsend, Journal, Badagry, Sept. 7s 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/M1; Oollmer, Journal, Badagry, Sept 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/M1. 109 summarized In a few points. Kosoko was not the legitimate ruler of Lagos and should be removed; Akltoye was dedicated to the anti-slavery principle and the Introduction of legi timate commerce; he had expressed himself willing to enter Into an arrangement with Britain and should therefore be returned to his rightful throne and the Mission established at Lagos; Lagos was the most flourishing slave-port on the coast, and with Its extensive water communications was the key to Abeokuta and the Interior; the Sierra Leone Immi grants at Abeokuta should be assisted and so furnish a link that would open Yoruba country to the Niger; the extension of British Influence was a matter of the greatest Impor tance to the welfare of West Africa; treaties should be made with chiefs and the Squadron Instructed to support those opposed to the slave trade. From the beginning,the Parent Committee was asked to do what It oould to "direct the attention of the British Government" toward these sug gestions. 26 This It did, successfully, but it took time to 26Crowther, Journal. Badagry, Sept. 8, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031; Townsend to Lay Secretary, Badagry, Nov. 3, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/M1; Minutes of a SpecdAl Meeting of the Local Committee of the Yoruba Mission, Badagry, Nov. 3» 1845, Nigerian National Archives, C.M.S.Y. 3/1 Vol. 1. The Nigerian National Archives will hereafter be cited as N.N. A. 110 organize public opinion and political pressure and then manipulate It through Whitehall's ponderous corridors of power. In the meantime, events progressed at Abeokuta, Badagry and Lagos. Akltoye, on taking refuge In the Egba capital In August, quickly found himself In an uncomfortable position; In fact his arrival precipitated a political crisis. Led by the Sagbua, the Ogbonl were generally In favor of pro viding asylum for the refuges but this was firmly opposed by the Egba Basorun and the warrior caste. Kosoko asked for his uncle's head to be sent to Lagos, and this course of action was endorsed by the Ologun. Illustrating the rad ical weakness which beset the Egba. This dichotomy between the civil and military chiefs precipitated disorder In the town bordering on civil war, and In December Akltoye was forced to leave.27 He found temporary refuge at the Badagry village of / Mo, about ten miles from Badagry Itself, whose chief, Mewu, 2?W. 0. Ajayi, "Hist, of the Yoruba Mission," pp. 55-6; Saburl 0. Biobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours, 1842-1872 (Oxford: University Press, 1957), ppi 32-4. Ill was himself an exile, having been driven from his home at Porto Novo many years previously by King Meyl. Prom No, Akltoye sent a message to the missionaries asking them to visit him. This was their first personal meeting with the deposed monarch, and on returning to Badagry they requested the town's chiefs to afford him refuge. They agreed, and Akltoye entered the town on Christmas Day, 1845, taking up his abode with chief Mesl, the Wawu of Badagry*s Ahovlko township.28 in this way commenced a long and Intimate association between Akltoye and the missionaries. Akltoye was not slow In pressing his case nor were the missionaries less slow In accepting It.29 While he gave no proof of his alleged adherence to the anti-slaving cause, besides his protestations, he assumed— and correctly — that this was the best method of securing their patronage and consequently set out to convince them of his dedication. At the same time, the missionaries saw In Akltoye the best opportunity of securing for themselves the use of Lagos 2®Crowther, Journal, Badagry, Dec. 22, 1845, C.M.S. CA2/031; Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 4 7. 29Crowther, Journal, Badagry, Jan. 12, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/031. 112 with its natural advantages. The Parent Committee In London was therefore made familiar with Kosoko's savage i and mercenary provllvities, the hindrance he represented to the extension of legitimate commerce and his desire to rid the coast of all English Influence. Akitoye was promised that everything would be done to restore him to his old position,30 a promise that the missionaries attempted to fulfill as early as February 1846. On the tenth of that month a long Interview took place In the missionary compound between the missionaries, Akltoye, and Commander Young of H.M.S. Hydra. Akltoye placed himself entirely under the direction of the British government, promising that If assistance was given In ex pelling Kosoko he would abolish the slave trade at Lagos and receive English merchants there, without authorization, this was obviously more than that officer was prepared to do, but the missionaries consoled themselves with the fact that Young at least had been given "correct Information" upon which to base his report to the Senior Officer.31 30Crowther, Journal. Badagry, Jan. 12, 1846, C.H.S. CA2/031. 31Crowther, Journal. Badagry, Feb. 10, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/031. 113 Akltoye was undoubtedly disappointed to find that British naval support oould not be enlisted immediately; instead, he turned to his own resources, both political and military. His oanoemen blockaded Lagos from the west while he attempted to Interest Porto Novo and the Awarl at Ado with an Egba-Badagry alliance against his n e p h e w . 32 This was successful only to the point that Porto Novo agreed to resume trade with Badagry, further success being perhaps thwarted by the presents Kosoko was reported to be distributing with great liberality.33 This falling, Akltoye turned to another quarter for assistance. He enlisted the financial support of one Domingo Martinez, a Brazilian slave-dealer at Porto Novo who was a great rival to the Lagos traders who supported Kosoko.34 Martinez was undoubtedly promised commercial advantage at Lagos if the counter-revolution proved suc cessful, for he invested a considerable amount of money in 32crowther, Journal, Badagry, March 13, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/031. 33crowther, Journal, Badagry, March 31, 1846, June 1846, C.M.S. CA2/031, 34j. f. A. AJayi, "Christian Missions," pp. 104-3. 114 the venture. Some#^200 worth of gifts went to the Egba alone, sufficient to secure their services for an attaok on Lagos; but, In the event, the enterprise proved unsuccessful.35 AkltoyeTs alliance with a slave-dealer36 shows clearly that the Lagos dispute was not the clear-cut dif ferentiation between pro- and anti-slaving factions that the missionaries represented. But their disillusionment with Akltoye Is not recorded, for they seised the oppor tunity of the Egba army's mercenary removal from Ado to make their long-delayed move to Abeokuta. 35crowther, Journal, Badagry, March 12, 1846, C.M. S. CA2/031; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, I, p. 90, gives a different Interpretation to these events, as does tf.O. AJayl, "Hist, of the Yoruba Mission," pp. 6l-6t, and C. R. Niven In A Short History of Nigeria (London: Longmans, Greenland Co., Ltd., 1955)7 PP* 114-5. 36)fartlnez, or "Domingo," as he was called, later turned to the less profitable pursuits of legitimate commerce. 115 The Mission Established at Abeokuta and the Intensification of Propaganda To his disappointment, Oollmer was left behind at Badagry to secure the rear and ensure the future dispatch of goods and mall to Townsend, Crowther, their wives, children and retainers. The party's reception at Abeokuta was very warm, especially that accorded Mrs. Townsend, who made a sensational entrance riding side-saddle on a horse, thus providing the Egba with a spectacle unrivaled In their experience. Most of the chiefs were friendly, and In fact there was a good deal of rivalry concerning the township whloh should be honored by their residence. It was at last agreed that Ake would be the plaoe, being the old royal town and the home of the Sagbua, and an area of about three acres was given as the site of the first missionary premises. The welcome was by no means universal, however. Paying formal visits to the town's many chiefs, a task which consumed several days, those not well-disposed toward the missionaries were conspicuously absent from 116 home when the visitors called.37 The cool welcome was most noticeable in the townships of Kemta, Igbore and Igbein, where the chiefs were most committed to the slave-trade. But on the other hand, the missionaries were told at a great council meeting that the Egba considered the English to be their only friends, assuring them that they would be allowed to preach and teach and that the people would obey their commands.38 Indeed, there was a considerable reservoir of good will at Abeokuta toward Oreat Britain, generated by the flow of liberated slaves from Sierra Leone. And the mis sionaries enjoyed still other assets: the prestige brought to the town by the residence of white men; a climate of opinion generally favorable to religious liberty; access to neighboring towns of considerable size, and the fact that the Egba were basically peaceful, agricultural and commer cial people. Conversely, the missionaries faced inherent difficulties. 37crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 10-12, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/031. 38crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 13, 1846, C.M. S. CA2/031. 117 Not only were there the obvious discomforts and hazards to health, but the town was surrounded by actual and potential enemies; domestic slavery was an aoeepted and accustomed institution and an active slave-trade was car ried on; besides Islam, which was a growing force in the town, traditional Egba polytheism boasted a pantheon of over four-hundred gods and opposition could be expected from the traditional priesthood, to say nothing of the dif ficulties which would be created within the extended family system as converts were made. To make life even more dif ficult, the Sierra Leone immigrants proved to be a great disappointment. Expecting a dedicated nucleus of Chris tians around whom congregations could be built, the mission aries found Instead that the Immigrants, by and large, had lapsed into their old ways; compounded with the smattering of learning and veneer of European culture brought back with them from Freetown, they were most difficult people of all to handle. Nevertheless, Townsend and Crowther with their small band set about the task of building new quarters. As the building progressed, so did their ideas and plans con cerning Abeokuta, Lagos and the Egba. They saw that 118 Abeokuta was a strategic commercial center, with malekets being held every nine days to which people flocked by the thousand from towns as distant as Ilorln and Ketu.39 But the free and unhindered use of Lagos was denied the Egba, despite the fact that the Ogun was at their door and the Journey downstream took only one day during the rainy season. Instead, they had to content themselves with their mastery over Badagry and Its Inferior facilities, which was a three-day overland journey through difficult country.**0 In addition, Qollmer at Badagry was respons ible for landing cargoes through the fierce surf, unpack ing them and reshlpplng the goods to Abeokuta. He saw Immediately that the possession of Lagos would make commun lcations with the Interior missionaries Immeasurably more simple and soon began to press for Its occupation.**1 39crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 13, 1846, C.M. S. CA2/031. ^°Townsend, Journal, Abeokuta, July 28, 1846, C.M. S. CA2/M1. ^Qollmer to Venn, Badagry, Sept. 4, 1846, C.M.S. CA2/043. 119 Kosoko was the one Impediment, for while he remained firmly In control at Lagos the missionaries could not enjoy that port's superior advantages, nor would the Egba realize their aim of becootfng the leading middlemen on the coast, an ambition supported whole-heartedly by the missionaries. Soon after establishing themselves at Abeokuta, therefore, they began a concerted campaign to educate the Parent Comsri.ttee. This was done by a constant stream of letters, reports, and Journals emphasizing a few basic points: the Egba were extremely receptive to Christian teaching and were undoubtedly the best means of transmit ting the benefits of Christianity and legitimate cosmierce Into the Interior; Abeokuta was a haven of light In a dark continent, and a great commercial center; It was capable of producing many tropical goods In demand In Europe— all that was needed was Lagos as an outlet; the usurper Kosoko was the determined enemy of everything English, and If he were removed slave-trading throughout Yorub&land would disappear; Lagos was a necessary link to maintain adequate communications with the Interior mission. 120 These themes remained constant as time passed and the mission expanded Its activities In the Egba citadel. New suggestions were added occasionally, such as Gollmer's plea that forts be erected along the coast to maintain British authority, Crowther's prayer for the destruction of Lagos on moral grounds and Townsend's suggestion that Lagos be made a free port and European Influence extended Immed iately throughout Yorubaland; all the missionaries asked for the strengthening of the Preventive Squadron.**2 At the same time the message was sent to British commercial Inter ests that If the country was won for Christ, "then will at once the door be opened to the Interior of this vast continent.This shrewd plea for the expansion of com mercial activity had already been acted upon at Abeokuta. In January, 1847, Gollmer accompanied to Abeokuta the merchant from Cape Coast, Thomas Hutton, and In concert *l2(tollmor, Journal, Badagry, Oct. 21, 1847, C.M.S. CA2/M1; Crowther to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 4, 1848, C.M.S. CA2/H2; Townsend to Rev. F. Sohon, Abeokuta, April 24, 1847, C.M.S. CA2/fel; Townsend, Journal, Abeokuta, Deo. 23, 1847, C.M.S. CA2/H1. ^3Rev. John C. Muller to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 18, 1848, C.M.S. CA2/H2. 121 with Crowther and Townsend expounded to the asseabled chiefs the advantages of legitimate trade. No great commercial expansion resulted, however, partly owing to the continuing unsettled conditions of the country. Even while Hutton was at Abeokuta the Egba were engaged in a siege of the neighboring tojn of Abaka and did not conclude the campaign until March.^ That accomplished, the rest of the year remained comparatively quiet, but the beginning of 1848 brought rumors of an impending Dahoml attack.^5 An attack Indeed took place, but it fell Instead on the town of Okeodan, which was razed. Following this, Ibadan and IJaye took part in large-scale campaigning on the banks of the Niger, ^6 and toward the end of 1848 sporadic fighting was breaking out between the Egba and Ijebu. ^Crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, March 25, 31, 1847, C.M.S. CA2/031. ^30ollmer to Major H. Stralth, Badagry, Feb. 3, 1848, C.M.S. CA2/043. ^Crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, June 21, 1848, C.M.S. CA2/031. 122 These ever-present wars continued to fulfill the demands of the coastal slave-traders, while Akltoye, on a ■ore limited soale, did likewise at Badagry. Working In conjunction with Domingo Martinez, Akltoye and his suppor ters carried out numerous slave-raiding expeditions In 1848, augmenting the local forays with at least two campaigns against Kosoko. **7 While opportunities to acquire European goods continued to exist It seemed unlike ly that legitimate cossnerce would take root. Townsend, Oollmer, and C.M.S. Political Activity In England, 1848 This was one of the chief concerns on Townsend's mind as he prepared to go to England on leave In early 1848, he and Oollmer having been relieved by the Rev. Miller and Isaac Smith. Townsend therefore took with him a letter addressed to Queen Victoria, purportedly from the Sagbua and chiefs of Abeokuta; In the face of the evidence against such a letter being composed by the Egba **7Rev. Isaac Stalth, Journal. Badagry, March 29, June 29, Aug. 26, 1848, C.M.S. CA2/082. 123 leaders, the more obvious explanation Is that Townsend him self was the author. The letter expressed friendship for England, confidence In the missionaries and satisfaction with their work. More teachers were requested, to train the children in the "mechanical arts" and agrloulture, and the document also touched on free trade and anti-slavery— sentiments guaranteed to arouse English sympathy. As for Lagos: .... We do not understand the doings of the people of Lagos and other people on the coast. They are not pleased that you should deliver our oountry-people from slavery. They wish that the road may be closed, that we may never have any intercourse with you . . . • We wish Tthe slave trade3 to be abolished. The Lagos people will not permit; they are supporting the slave- traders. We wish for lawful traders to trade with us 48 * # ♦ # The letter was presented to the Queen by Lord Chichester, and In 1849 a promising message from Her Majesty was returned to Abeokuta, expressing the hope that arrangements would be made for affording "the Yoruba nation" free and uninterrupted commercial Intercourse; two blbles and a small steel corn-mlll accompanied the ^&The Sagbua and chiefs of Abeokuta to Queen Victoria, Abeokuta, C.M.S. CA2/09. *24 message. ^9 That was In the future, however, and later reference will be made to the royal gifts. In the meantime, Townsend and Oollmer had arrived home at an opportune moment. One of the great polltloal topics of the late 1840*8 was the expense Involved In main taining the Preventive Squadron, an expenditure greatly opposed by such economically-minded M.P.*s as Joseph Hume. The parliamentary Quaker party, In Its anti-coerclonlst capacity, was similarly opposed to the Squadron. A debate on the future of the Squadron In fact took place In the Commons on March 24, 1848, but the motion to disband It was defeated easily under the leadership of Palmerston, Russell, and Sir Thomas Dyke Aoland, a staunch C.M.S. supporter and intimate friend of Henry Venn.50 Even before this, however, a Select Committee had been appointed to Investigate the best means of extinguishing the slave-trader presided over by Mr. Hutt, a member dedicated to the with drawal of the naval force. ^crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, May 23, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/031. 50parl. Debates, 3rd series,XCVII (1848), 971-1006. 125 The Hutt Committee hearings provide an excellent example of the working of the missionary party In Parlia ment. The Committee continued through the 1848-49 Session and Its personnel changed, but Sir Robert Harry Inglls, M.P. for Oxford University, remained throughout as the foremost C.H.S. advocate and spokesman for the Society's policies. He was ably assisted by another C.M.S. member, Sir Edward Buxton, the two men usually being supported by Colonel Thompson, Admiral Bowles and Mr. Monckton Mllnes.51 Every effort was made to produce witnesses favor able to the Society's goals. Venn rallied all available missionaries, colonial officials, naval officers or other advocates likely to support the Society, not only to testi fy, but to publish pamphlets and articles in favor of the Squadron.32 Then, when a friendly witness appeared, the 5lQladstone was on the Committee and a C.M.S. mem ber at this time, although he did not support the Society's views In Committee. He withdrew from the Society In 1850, however, taking objection to a map In a C.M.S. publication which depicted the world divided Into major religious re gions, being offended at the Greek and Roman Churches being shown together. From that time the future Prime Minister ceased to subscribe to the Society, despite Venn's remon strances; Stock, Hist, of the C.M.S., II, p. 52. 52chrlstopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade. The Suppression of the African Slave Trade In the nineteen th Century (London: Longmans, Green Is Co., 1949)>PP.112-3. questioning became Tory pointed. Such a witness was John Carr, Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, who appeared before the Committee on April 4, 1846. Inglls Introduced the subject of Abeokuta, at which Carr dwelt on the good being done there by the Society and told the story of Samuel Crowther. He was then asked how the missionaries and their work would be effected if the Squadron was removed, to which he responded by saying that the Navy was essential, as it was to the development of legitimate trade also. What was the influence of the Society on the West Coast? What had been the progress of liberated Africans? Their social and Intellectual advancement, their com mercial knowledge and industrial skills? To these questions Nr. Carr answered dutifully, concluding his evidence with a five-point program which, in his opinion, would eradicate the slave trade forever: the Navy should be strengthened, more treaties signed with native rulers, trading ports should be established, laws governing slaving made more stxlfcgent, 127 and missionaries should be protected and their activities extended.5| Several missionaries who were on leave appeared before the Committee, all In favor of Increasing the effec tiveness of the Squadron, augmenting missionary enterprise and promoting legitimate trade. While Oollmer and Town send were still making the tedious voyage to England, Venn had arranged for them to give evidence so that "the Abeokuta Mission will be brought under public attention and that such assistance will be given as It Is In the 54 power of persons In authority to bestow." Within days of reaching port the two men made their appearance and were questioned by Inglls and Buxton. Question by question elicited from than the history of Abeokuta; Its size and form of government; the relation ship between the slave trade and the Yoruba wars; the Sagjriia's benevolent Interest In the extension of civiliza tion and Christianity; the benefits derived from the Preventive Squadron and the vital role it had to play In 53parl. Papers, XVI (1848), 272, pp. 124-28. 54venn to Rev. Isaac Smith, London, June 30* 1848, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 128 the protection of legitimate commerce; the pleasant climate prevailing at Abeokuta and the good state of health enjoyed by Europeans there, a prevarication that the witnesses did not challenge. Further leading questions Illustrated the Egba's desire for peace, education, and religious Instruction, and the firm opinion that the slave trade could only be eradicated by methods such as were being used at Abeokuta, plus force of arms. Townsend was of the opinion that anti-slave-trade treaties should be made that would empower Great Britain to enter native territories to seize or destroy slave depots. As for Lagos, the only way to successfully remove that open sore would be by removing Kosoko and replacing him with the dedicated anti-slaver Akltoye.55 in addition to introducing this testimony favorable to C.M.S. policies, excerpts from Townsend's and Gollmer's Journals were then Incorporated into the Appendix of the Committee's Third Report. Despite these efforts, however, the Parliamentary missionary party was in the minority on the Committee. Attempts were made to have favorable recommendations 55parl. Papers. XXII (1848), 536, pp. 152-72 129 Introduced Into the final Report but they were rejected by Butt's anti-coerclonlst and economy-winded majority. Suffering this fate were recommendations that slave-ships be considered pirates, that a minimum of twelve ships be stationed on the west coast, that the Squadron be fully converted to steam and provided with coaling stations, that duties be levied against slave-grown sugar, that the Squadron be Increased In size and that forts or armed factories be set up.56 But all was not lost. While the Committee's final Report did not recommend the continuance of a naval force to suppress the slave trade, It did contain a resolution highly acceptable to the C.M.S. The Committee was sure that: . . . the Internal Improvement and civilization of Africa will be one of the most effective means of sup pressing the slave-trade; and for this purpose, that the Instruction of the natives by missionary labour, by educatlmn, and by all other practical efforts, and the extension of legitimate commerce, ought to be en couraged wherever the Influence of England can be dir ected, and especially where It has already been bene ficially exerted.57 56parl. Papers. XIX (1849), ^10, pp. xii-xiv. 57Ibid., p. Iv. 130 This was by no means the only success for the humanitarians. When It became apparent that the majority of the Hutt Committee was opposed to the continuance of the naval effort, Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford— son of the more famous Wllllan and himself of the missionary persuasion— moved for a House of Lords Investigation of the same topic. The Wilberforce Committee Interviewed many of the witnesses who had testified before the Commons Commit tee, Including Townsend, who predictably advocated In no uncertain manner the absolute necessity of maintaining the Squadron, repeating also his conviction that the slave trade could never be destroyed without the prior destruc tion of Lagos as a slave port.5® The Wilberforce Committee ultimately released a voluminous Report that reached conclusions precisely opposite to those of the Hutt Committee. Besides finding the Navy to have been most effective In reducing the slave trade and urging Its retention, the Report recommend ed the extension of British forts; the encouragement of settlements for freed slaves, as In Abeokuta; the 5&Parl. Papers, IX (1850), 53, pp. 59-75 131 establishment of coastal consular stations and the promo tion of tropical agriculture suitable for trade with England.59 The Wilberforce Report was a significant counter measure to the Hutt Report, but It was still not enough. Slave trade activity was Increasing In the late l840's and although the Royal Navy had guarded the West African coast for forty years, capturing hundreds of ships and releasing thousands of captives, the revived activity brought the navy under Increasing criticism on the ground of Ineffec tiveness. The controversy then became more acute In 1848 as a result of the publicity from the Parliamentary Investigation. The C.M.S. therefore began a campaign of maximum political effort designed to retain the Navy on the coast and secure an even more vigorous suppression of the trade; at the same time the campaign was directed at winning acceptance for the Society's views concerning Yorubaland. 59parl. Papers, IX (1850), 53, P. 6. 132 Missionary Activity In England Increases, 1849-1850 Henry Venn organised the operation. Various schemes were undoubtedly being considered during the summer of 1849* for during the latter part of that season he requested Townsend to draw up a memorandum suitable for presentation to the Porelgn Secretary, Lord Palmerston. Still on leave at Exeter, Townsend composed a forceful synopsis of the entire missionary viewpoint concerning the slave trade, legitimate commerce, Lagos, and the Egba. 6° Armed with this, as well as letters from Oollmer and other missionaries, an Interview with Palmerston was then requested "with a view of soliciting British counten ance and protection for Her Majesty's subjects, both European and African, who reside In the countries of the n6l Bight of Benin. Such a request was one that Palmerston could not resist and a C.M.S. deputation repaired to the Foreign Office at 5:00 P.M. on December 4. Lord 6°Townsend to Venn, Exeter, Octo. 17# 1849, C.M.S. CA2/085. 63-Major Hector Stralth (C.M.S. Lay Secretary), to Lord Palmerston, London, Nov. 21, 1849, P.O. 84/777. 133 Chlohester was unable to attend but commended the delega tion and Its objectives to the Foreign Secretary by letter. The primary object of the Interview, he wrote, was "to secure for the people of Abeokuta the free use of the river Ogun for the purposes of legitimate commerce." With this accomplished, "there Is no calculating what Influence such an example might exercise upon other tribes of the Inter ior, " and His Lordship was confident that the Government would "not be backward In lending a helping hand to so good and great a work." 62 Venn assembled an Impressive delegation; In addi tion to himself, Townsend, Oollmer, Major Stralth, and Lord Waldegrave, four M.P.*s were present: Sir R. H. Inglls, Sir E. N. Buxton, Sir Thomas Dyke Acland and Thomas Hutton, the merchant.63 The deputation was well prepared; besides various letters Illustrating the cruelty of Kosoko and the constant threat posed to the Egba by the Dahoml, there was also a sixteen-page "confidential" Minute. This printed document began by tracing the history of C.M.S. enterprise 62Chlohester to Palmerston, Stanmore, Dec. 3, 1849, P.O. 84/777. 63Venn, Journal. Dec. 4, 1849, C.M.S. F/21. at Badagry and Abeokuta, then noted the strategic position of the latter city for the penetration of the interior, spoke of the cosmerclal and agricultural background of the Egba, the tropical goods available for export and the Egba desire for the abolition of the slave trade. It recalled the "spontaneous act on the part of the chiefs of Abeokuta" in sending a letter to the Queen In 1848 and drew attention to the geographical situation of Lagos at the mouth of the Ogun, Its potential harbor facilities, and Its importance as the key to an immense natural system of Inland waterways. The slaving activity carried on there was emphasised, as was the fact that a chief "friendly to English connexion" had been expelled, this observation sub- subsequently being underlined at the Foreign Office.64 Townsend's memorandum to Venn was embodied in the document. In it, he stressed particularly the neoesslty of throttling the slave trade as the necessary prelude to any great improvements and of ending the threat of the slave- raiding Dahoml on the peaceful Egba. Gunboats at Badagry would deter any attack on that place, he wrote, but how was 64The Minute is to be found in P.O. 84/777. 135 Abeokuta to be protected, that Important post In England's benevolent plans for the welfare of Africa? "Can England now stand by and look on and see Christians who have become so through England's love of the Gospel, filling the bar- raooons of the slave-merchants . . . and suffering and dy ing under the cruel usage of the task-master?" If Abeokuta fell to King Ohezo and his Dahoml hordes "our hopes of ben efiting Africa will be blighted, without a hope of a more successful Issue at another place." Only the complete destruction of the slave trade could Insure its protection, and Ghezo should be made to leave unmolested all towns in habited by English subjects. If the British Government refused to help, the missionaries would stay at their posts regardless of the consequences, committing themselves in stead to the care and protection of the Heavenly Father. The Minute then closed ty summarizing the main points of the Society's recommendations: legitimate com merce would effectively stop the slave trade; the best route to the interior was via the Ogun river and Egba ter ritory; the Egba were friendly to England, protected British citizens, wished to abolish the slave trade, and therefore should be encouraged by an alliance with Great 136 Britain; Dahomey should be dissuaded from making any hostile movements Into Yoruba country; the Bight of Benin should be under strict naval blockade; forts should be established at Badagry and other places; a gunboat should be stationed on the lagoon and a "remonstrance, at least," should be made to the chiefs of Lagos. The delegates discussed the entire situation with the Foreign Secretary for about an hour, Venn Illustrating his points on a map while urging the exploitation of com mercial possibilities by appointing a consular official to Abeokuta. Palmerston asked many questions and broached the possibility of sending an envoy to Abeokuta "before further steps are taken."65 This Indeed sounded promising, but rather than allow the apparent advantage to slip past, the C.M.S. dispatched a similar deputation to the Colonial Of fice at the end of the following week. Lord Grey appeared to accept the possibility of setting up forts along the coast and expressed the hope that such establishments would be able to effectively suppress the slave trade north of the equator. 66 65venn, Journal. Dec. 4, 1849, C.M.S. F/21. 66venn, Journal, Deo. 15, 1849, C.M.S. F/21. 137 Venn did not allow the advent of the Christmas aeaaon to Interfere with hla urgent African activities. On December 19/ for Instance/ he was discussing with Captain Trotter— late commander of the 1841 Niger expedi tion and a faithful supporter of the Society— the suit ability of various naval officers for the diplomatic mission to Abeokuta.67 Then Just after Christmas he dined with Sir Edward North Buxton# discussing Lagos and the clear-cut casus belli Kosoko had already provided by recently firing on naval vessels, to say nothing of the exlstenoe of the notorious Lagos barracoons.6 8 By early January the situation was apparently im proving as support for the C.M.S. position began to make Itself known In high places. Thus the departing Oollmer was cheered by the encouragement he was given by Admiral Beaufort of the Admiraltyeven better news awaited Venn on January 30. Palmerston had appointed a comsul to the Bights of Benin and Biafra, and at a conference held at Buxton1s home to discuss the parliamentary tactics to be ^7venn^ Journal. Dec. 15/ 1849, C.M.S. P/21. 68venn, Journal. Dec. 27/ 1849/ C.M.S. P/21. 69venn/ Journal. Jan. 5/ 1850, C.M.S. F/21. 138 employed by the missionary party during the remainder of the Session, Venn was delighted to find the consul- designate, Captain John Beecroft. On this occasion the conversations lasted some two hours, ending In the geneaal agreement that the Preventive Squadron had to be maintained.7 0 Foreign Office Acceptance of Missionary Policy, 1850 Venn would have been even more pleased If he had known the content of the Instructions Beecroft was to receive, even then being drafted at the Foreign Office. That Palmerston had accepted completely the missionary view Is apparent from the dispatches addressed to the new consul prior to his departure for the African coast. He was first to go to Ghezo's principal city, Abomey, to persuade that monarch to give up slave trading and Introduce legitimate coianerce; for this, Great Britain was willing to subsidize him In the amount of 000 over a three-year period. Ghezo was to be warned of Britain's Interest In the Egba 70venn,», Journal, Jan. 30, 1850, C.M.S. F/21. 139 and In Badagry and of the "displeasure" that would be felt If any violence befell Abeokuta, or If ham was done to liberated Africans or Brltlsh-bom subjects, either black or white. After this, the consul was to present his credentials to the several potentates within his Jurisdic tion and endeavor to make then renounce the slave trade. Then he was to visit Abeokuta. Following recent conversations with representatives of the Church Missionary Society, the dispatch read, It was understood that the free navigation of the Ogun river would fulfill the objectives of the 1841 Expedition, namely, trade and coomunlcatlons with the upper Niger that would "materially contribute to the suppression of the slave trade." But the Egba were denied the free use of the Ogun by the people of Lagos, despite the fact that Lagos was the "natural port" of Abeokuta; thus they were forced to use the Inferior port of Badagry. The Egba were very friendly to England, Palmerston noted, were receptive to religious Instruction, and were anxious for the slave trade to be put down. Beecroft was therefore Instructed to ascertain "the actual wants and wishes and disposition” of the Egba.71 In a separate dispatch, Beecroft's especial atten tion was called to one of the C.K.S. papers enclosed In his Instructions. The paper explained that the pro-English and anti-slave trade chief, Akitoye, had been expelled from Lagos by his slave-trading nephew and was living In exile at Badagry. Beecroft was to Investigate the circum stances and report his findings back to the Foreign Office or to the officer commanding the Squadron, Commodore Fanshawe.72 Inasmuch as Beecroft was already in contact with the missionary party and was sympathetic to Its cause, Palmerston's Instructions could hardly have been more help ful, as far as Venn was concerned. So the African portion of the Society's campaign was proceeding well. But a great threat still existed In Parliament Itself, where Mr. Hutt was preparing to debate the Ineffectiveness of the navy In bringing the slave trade to a conclusion. ^Palmerston to Beecroft, Foreign Office, Feb. 25, 1850, N.N.A. Calprof 2/1, Vol. I. 72palmerston to Beecroft, Foreign Office, Feb. 25, 1 8 5 0, F.O. 84/816. Parliamentary Victory for the Missionary Party 141 Early in 1 8 5 0, therefore, the C.M.S. quickened the tempo of its political campaign. The pamphlet war was intensified; the Christian Observer, the organ of Evangelicalism, came out strongly against the Hutt pro posals pulpits rang with the message, and a week before the scheduled debate Venn, in company with some of his political and naval friends, called on Lord Palmerston at his London home. Venn recorded that the Foreign Secre tary's answers were "frank and very satisfactory;" and well they might be, for Palmerston Informed his callers that the retention of the Squadron was to be a Government issue.7^ The Prime Minister, Lord Russell, made this quite clear to his Parliamentary supporters prior to the debate, telling them in blunt terms that he would resign If Hutt's 73wiiHam Law Mathleson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1 9 2 9), p. 1 1 1. ^Venn, Journal, March 12, 1850, C.M.S. F/21. 142 motion w&b carried.75 All this appeared to be Insurance enough, but to make sure that nothing was left undone that could possibly affect the outcome of the debate, a formal petition from the Society was sent to the Commons on March 18. The document re-told the story of Abeokuta, stressing that the town was the key to the Interior. The Society relied upon the protection of the Squadron, It went on, and In the event of Its withdrawal the slave traders would expel the missionaries, Internal wars would Increase, and the "regeneration of Africa would be placed In imminent Jeopardy." It then appealed for "the encouragement of the efforts of Christian Missionaries” in extending the Oospel "to our benighted brethren."^ Mr. Hutt opened the debate, dwelling at length on the folly that had led the country to expend ^ 2 5 million In thirty years on maintaining the Squadron. Such fiscal Irresponsibility, he argued, not democratic Inroads Into the constitution, would be the reason why the country would fall from Its pinnacle of civilization. But despite 75Mathleson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade, p. 106. 76in Miscellaneous Papers on Africa. C.M.S. Vol. I, p. 266. 143 the financial pleading, and despite the eloquence of Gladstone's argument that the presence of the Navy was re sponsible for the horrors of the Middle Passage, the Hutt motion went down to defeat. The Prime Minister himself wound up the long debate In the early hours of the morning, the motion being beaten by 232 votes to 1 5 4 .7 7 The Church Missionary Society had done Its work well. Nor did the Society fall to exploit consul Beecroft's mission. What unofficial connections there were between the Foreign Office and Salisbury Square Is not known, but It Is a remarkable fact that within three days of the consul's Instructions being sent from Downing Street, the C.M.S. knew the content of the documents and prepared the missionaries in Yorubaland. The acting secre tary of the Mission, In Townsend's absence, was instructed to give the consul all the information concerning the Egba he thought It advisable to Impart, and he was to use the consular channel to make such representations to the British government nas may promote further encouragement to the political Independence of the Tribe." And of course, 77Pari. Debates. 3rd series, CIX (1850), 1094-1186. i44 the missionaries were to furnish the consul every personal assistance to make his stay at Badagry and Abeokuta more comfortable. Missionary Activity In Yorubaland, 1849-1850 The directives were unnecessary, the missionaries being well aware of their position and alive to the possi bilities of political action. The Rev. Smith, for Instance^ who was holding down Gollmer's station at Badagry, was maintaining his predecessor's close liaison with the Squadron. Anticipating an attack by the Dahoml In early 1849 he requested the Senior Officer of the Bights Division to warn Ghezo that the British subjects at Badagry and Abeokuta were under the protection of the Navy and were not to be molested. That officer complied and stationed himself off Badagry until the danger appeared to have passed.79 Smith also kept the Squadron fully Informed on 78c.M.S. to Rev. Isaac Smith, London, Feb. 2 8, 1850, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 79smlth to Capt. George F. Hastings, Badagry, Feb. 10, 1849; Hastings to Smith, H.M.S. Cyclops, off Badagry, April 3, 1849, In C.M.S. CA2/05. 145 political conditions In the area,®^ and was no stranger to the Intricacies of Badagry politics. In August of that year he became Involved In a threatened civil war In the town between factions at odds over the continued presence of Akltoye, personally preventing the outbreak from taking place,®1 The reverend gentlemen at Abeokuta were similarly engaged. Crowther and Muller assembled the Egba chiefs In March, 1849, apprising them of news to the effect that an attack from Dahomey could be expected. The chiefs were grateful for the Information, as they were for the donation made to the Egba war-chest for the defense of the town.®2 Then In April, when the new missionary David Hlnderer arrived, bearing the corn mill and blbles from Victoria and Albert, the missionaries were not backward In using the occasion to advantage. The chiefs and elders of the town were called to Ake to hear the Queen's hope that they ®°Smith to C.M.S., Badagry, March 20, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/082. ®1Smlth, Journal, Badagry, Aug. 11, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/082. ®2Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, March 13-20, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/031. 146 they would soon enjoy free commercial Intercourse with Lagos and to hear Crowther, Muller, Smith, and Hinderer extoll the magnanimity of the British nation.®3 in like manner, Townsend assembled the town's rulers upon his return and told them what he had accomplished on their behalf during his time in England.84 As for the Society's injunction to Inform consul Beecroft only of such matters as he could "properly receive," this, too, was an unnecessary stricture. It was unlikely that the missionaries would prejudice their case by reporting the persecution of converts which broke out in Abeokuta towards the end of 1849, nor of the violence and bloodshed that prevailed between Abeokuta and its neighboring towns.85 That is, not unless this state of affairs could be blamed on the slave trade and so dramatize the necessity of British Interference. 83smlth, Journal, Abeokuta, May 23, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/082; Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, May 23, 1849, C.M.S. CA2/031. ®**Muller, Journal, Abeokuta, April 17, 1850, C.M.S. CA2/072. ®5crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 2 7, 1849, C.M. S. CA2/031. 147 Consular and Naval Support for the Missionaries As matters turned out, Beecroft's mission to the Egba was delayed until January, 1851. But the year 1850 was of significance, nevertheless, as the Foreign Office hewed closer to C.M.S. policies and situations developed In Yorubaland which were to lead to the fruition of the Society's alms. Consul Beecroft, accompanied by Commander Forbes, R.N., visited Abomey In May-July, 1 8 5 0, but had no success In persuading Qhezo to relinquish the slave trade. And despite Beecroft's warning, Ohezo Intimated his Intention of attacking the Egba. On returning to the coast, Beecroft reported these unfavorable results to Palmerston, along with Ohezo's argument that he should not be made to give up the profitable trade while Kosoko was allowed to continue. Beecroft therefore recommended to the Foreign Secretary that Kosoko be removed from Lagos and replaced by Akltoye, who would agree to abolish the trade.The Consul then ®%eecroft to Palmerston, H.M.S. Bonetta, West Bay, Prince's Island, July 22, 1 8 5 0, F.O. 84/816. 148 met Commodore Fanshawe and It was agreed that Fanshawe should send a strong letter to Ghezo warning him against attacking Abeokuta because of the lively Interest taken by the British Government In that city and Its many British- born subjects.®? At the same time, Beecroft warned the missionaries at Abeokuta and Badagry of Ghezo's Intention, while Fanshawe Instructed the Senior Officer of the Bights Divis ion to comply with any request made by the missionaries for powder and ball.®® On September 28, Townsend read the Consul's warning to the assembled leaders and Crowther urged them to look to the town's defenses. The chiefs were most thankful for the warning, acknowledging the English to be their only friends.89 On leaving Beecroft at the conclusion of the mis sion to Abomey, Commander Forbes had repaired to Freetown, ®7Beecroft to Palmerston, Clarence, Fernando Po, Aug. 13, 1850, P.O. 84/816. ®®Fanshawe to Secretary of the Admiralty, H.M.S. Centaur, Cobenda, Aug. 8. 1 8 5 0, in Pari. Papers, LIV Tl552T7 1455, P. 78. 89Smith, Journal, Abeokuta, Sept. 2 8, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/082; Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Sept. 2 8, 1 8 5 0, C.M. S. CA2/031. 149 where he Informed the Principal of the C.M.S. Fourah Bay Institution of Ghezo's determination to attack Abeokuta. The Reverend Jones wrote immediately to Venn, who notified Lord Palmerston on September 23 of the anticipated attack. The Foreign Secretary thereupon dlspatnhed an admonition to Ghezo not to attack the Egba as Great Britain took "great interest in Abeokuta and its people."90 At the same time, he penned a memorandum to the effect that Akltoye should be restored to the Lagos throne if Kosoko declined to enter an anti-slavery agreement.91 This senti ment was then expressed officially to the Admiralty.92 As for the precautionary measures taken by Beecroft and Fanshawe, Palmerston approved.93 Commodore Fanshawe, meanwhile, besides frequently communicating with Townsend regarding the safety of the missionaries at Abeokuta, went to Badagry to find out what 9°Palmerston to King of Dahomey, Foreign Office, Oct. 11, 1850, N.N.A. Calprof 2/1, Vol. II. 9lDated Sept. 26, 1850, F.O. 84/819. 92AddIngton to Admiralty, Foreign Office, Oct. 11, 1850, F.O. 84/823. 93Palmerston to Beecroft, Foreign Office, Oct. 24, 1850, N.N.A. Calprof 2/1, Vol. 2. 150 arms were needed for defense against the Dahoml. Gollmer temporarily declined his offer of guns and ammunition but asked If It would be possible for naval officers to land as frequently as possible and for the ships to fire their guns occasionally. This show of force, he felt* would be sufficient deterrent not only against Ghezo but also for the Badagry chiefs who were showing signs of dissatisfac tion at the continued lack of trade with Lagos caused by the presence of Akltoye In their town.94 Fmmshawe obliged, so Instructing the Senior Officer of the Bights Division, who was still complying with the directive five months later.95 Egba Frustrations It was Impossible to offer substantive aid to Abeokuta, however, where the missionaries and the Egba were finding themselves In a difficult position throughout 1 8 5 0. True, Townsend had returned and heartened everyone 94 Gollmer to Venn, Badagry, Oct. 25, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 95captain Adams to Fanshawe, H.M.S. Gladiator, March 24, 1 8 5 1, in Pari. Papers. LTV (1 8 5 2), i%5, p. 101. 151 with hia presence; the Wesleyans had also established a mission station In the town and even an American Baptist missionary had arrived; this augured the continued Interest of the outside world In the Egba and their capital. But despite the missionaries' assurances that Great Britain had the interest of the place at heart, nothing positive In the way of assistance seemed to be forthcoming In the event of an attack by Ghezo. To make matters even worse, Ibadan was now clearly exercising supremacy over the Ekltl, Ifon, Ijesa and Akoko territories; In addition, It was becoming more and more difficult for the Egba to sell slaves at Lagos because of the naval blockade that was constantly being tightened. Compounding the difficulties was the pressure Kosoko was bringing to bear In Abeokuta to rid the town of English Influence.96 Seemingly thwarted whichever way they turned, the Egba struck back twice In the latter part of 1850. After a short campaign they took the town of Igbejl on November 3, to the south-west of Abeokuta, on the suspicion that the chief had aided the Dahoml In their 1848 attack on 96crowther to Captain Trotter, Abeokuta, July 4, 1850, C.M.S./VI2. 152 Okeodan and would perhaps play a similar part In a campaign against Abeokuta.97 Following this, a further persecution of Christians broke out, centered especially In Igbore township, where Crowther maintained his mission. The most likely explanation for the occurrence was that It stemmed from the Egba slave dealers, annoyed at the stagnation of the Lagos slave mart and perhaps encouraged by Kosoko. Their aim was to discourage the Society to such a point that the missionaries would be withdrawn and slave-trading once more resumed on the old scale.98 Crowther1s services were stopped, on pain of death to the worshippers, who were likewise barred from the markets.99 Such occurrences, compounded by the difficulty of the work and the generally apathetic attitude of the Egba toward Christianity, led Townsend to voice his private misgivings. In a letter to Venn he painted a picture that 97Crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, Nov. 5, 1850, C.M.S. CA2/031. 98crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, May 21, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/031; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Dec. 31, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/M2; Oollmer to Venn, Badagry, Jan. 3, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA 2/M2. 99w. 0. Ajayl, "Hist. of the Yoruba Mission," p. 82. 153 disproved completely the glowing Impression of Abeokuta that prevailed in England. The Egba rulers, he wrote, had no desire to see the Gospel spread as they realized that It would ultimately overthrow the traditional social and political organization. But they wanted the missionaries, nevertheless, as "they see that through us they are likely to keep open the road to the sea and obtain trade and be well supplied with guns and powder, for sale or war . . nlOO « # Despite the shattered Illusions, Townsend and the others persisted with the Egba policy already expounded, especially the necessity of providing the Egba and the Society with the port of Lagos and replacing Kosoko with the more pliant Akitoye. 101 And by the end of the year the prospect of the Society's plans bearing fruit was tak ing on a noticeably brighter hue. Not only was Venn Informing his Yoruba missionaries that a treaty was to be made with Lagos, that Ghezo had been cautioned not to 100Abeokuta, Nov. 14, 1850, C.M.S. CA2/O8 5. lOlCrowther to Trotter, Abeokuta, July 4, 1850, C.M.S. M/2; Townsend to Acland, Abeokuta, Aug. 22, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/&2. 154 molest the Egba or Badagry on pain of a blockade of his coast and that the Society's M.P.'s were agreed that ua great advance of our causeu had been made; but the broad hint was also dropped that "new prospects" were at hand and that "great things" could be expected, Including the possibility that "new stations may be opened to us. . . This sounded promising Indeed. Even more promising was the fact that Beecrort's long-awaited visit to Abeokuta was to take place, a visit that was to quicken the events which were to culminate In the forcible removal of Kosoko from Lagos and the triumph of C.M.S. policy. Summary While It had taken almost six years for the mis sionaries to popularize their Ideas to the point that the British Government was about to Implement them, the policies had been conceived soon after the missionary party landed at Badagry In 1845. 102venn to Gollmer, London, Nov. 29, 1850, C.M.S CA2/L1. 155 Finding themselves marooned In the town, they made the original mistake of presuming that the wars being fought around them were the direct result of the demands of the slave trade. This conclusion had no sooner been formed when their attention was directed to Akbtoye, who, in return for assistance In regaining his throne, promised to outlaw the trade at Lagos. From that point on, the removal of Kosoko became an article of faith and Immediate steps were taken to recruit the Royal Navy to the purpose. But naval officers proved unwilling to cooperate without official directives, so the missionaries embarked on a campaign to educate the authorities In England as to the course that should be followed. Their campaign empha sized that Akatoye was a dedicated antl-slaver, that Kosoko had usurped the throne, that Lagos was a flourishing slave port and that the Christian Immigrants at Abeokuta needed assistance. Most Important was the plea for the extension of British influence In Yoruba country on the ground of Its vital consequence to the welfare of West Africa. After reaching Abeokuta In 1846 these points were further elaborated as the missionaries came to Identify themselves with Egba aspirations to control Lagos, 156 conveniently situated at the mouth of the Ogun. Thus, the Egba were portrayed as being receptive to the Gospel and a hopeful means by which the Word of God could be carried to the Interior. Abeokuta was described as a commercial center but sorely lacking a coastal outlet; If this were obtained, however, the town would become a potent factor In extending the benefits of civilizing commerce through out Yorubaland. The Society In London accepted these views and turned Its hand to the practical aspects of carrying them out. After helping defeat an attempt to remove the Preventive Squadron, a concerted effort was then made to win over the Government to the missionary point of view. Citing the humanitarian, Christian, and commercial neces sities for deposing Kosoko and thereby aiding the promising Egba, the Society's political stratagems were so successful that Palmerston accepted the arguments and instructed the consul to Investigate. As Beecroft was already committed to the missionary cause, there could be no doubt as to his recommendations. CHAPTER IV FIRST FRUITS: THE TRIUMPH OF MISSIONARY POLICY Amid great excitement, consul Beecroft stepped ashore at Badagry on January 2, 1651- He was greeted by Oollmer and his pupils; Dr. Van Cooten, the Society's doc tor; Mr. Hutton and his new factor, William McCoskry, and the people of the town, who exhibited their enthusiasm by firing repeated volleys with their muskets. After making himself comfortable as Ckillmer's guest, the consul held a private Interview with Akltoye, Oollmer and Van Cooten, when the Lagos situation was discussed at length. Oollmer had previously rehearsed Akltoye on the presentation he should make, In which he was to stress his rightful claim to Lagos and his willingness to abolish the slave trade and establish legitimate commerce If Oreat Britain would restore him to his throne. 1 10ollmer, Journal, Badagry, Dec. 9, 1850, C.M.S. CA2/043• !57 Akltoye duly repeated the request, Beecroft responding by promising to do what he could and asking < that a formal petition be drawn up. 2 After other inter views with Akltoye and the Badagry chiefs, Beecroft began the overland trip to Abeokuta on January 7* accompanied by i Van Cooten and preceded by Oollmer»s messengers advising Townsend of the consul's approach. Oollmer was left with the feeling that Beecroft had been Impressed with Akltoye and hoped that Palmerston would heed the petition and plant the British flag at Lagos.3 He at least gave the Badagry chiefs a broad hint that Akltoye was to be rein stated. * * ■ Townsend had thoroughly prepared the way for Beecroft's reception at the Egba capital, emphasizing the honor that was being conferred by a visit from Queen Victoria's representative.3 Townsend himself had great 2 0ollmer to Straith, Badagry, Feb. 9, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/043. 3oollmer to Trotter, Badagry, Jan. 13, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/M2. ^Oollmer to Venn, Badagry, Jan. 6, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 3townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Dec. 10, 1 8 5 0, C.M.S. CA2/H2. 159 hopes that the contact would establish na good understand- „6 lng between Abeokuta and the British Government, and on January 10 Beecroft was accorded a rousing welcome, with great cheering and firing of guns, lodging with the Townsends at Alee. Then began a round of discussions with the mission aries and the principal Egba chiefs, the high-polnt being a great public meeting at which Beecroft, resplendent In his uniform and with the Union Jack flying at his side, presen ted four boxes of ammunition to the chiefs.7 it was at the more intimate meetings, however, attended by Beecroft, three or four missionaries and the most Influential chiefs, that the real work was done. The entire C.M.S. case for the support of the Egba was presented, emphasis being placed on the removal of Kosoko from Lagos and the defense of Badagry and Abeokuta from attack by Dahomey. 8 ^Townsend to Fanshawe, Abeokuta, Nov. 7» 1350, F.O. 84/6^5. 7crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Jan. 14, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/031. 8crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Jan. 10-22, 1 8 5 1, C. M.S. CA2/031; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 2 2, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/M2; Townsend to Straith, Abeokuta, Jan. 28, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/085. 160 After twelve days of almost constant discussion consul Beecroft departed for Badagry on January 22. Here he picked up Akltoye*s petition, written by Oollmer, which detailed the quarrels between uncle and nephew and closed by praying for Lagos to be taken under the British flag and Akltoye restored under its protection. In return, Akltoye promised "to enter into a treaty with England to abolish the slave-trade at Lagos. Beecroft stayed with Oollmer a few more days, during which he had another long Interview with his host and the town*s chiefs concerning Badagry's relations with Porto Novo and Lagos. On the eve of his departure he then decided that Badagry was too dangerous a place for Akltoye, so on January 28 he took Akltoye with him to Fernando Po in H.M.S. Jackal. 10 The consul was obviously swayed with the arguments pressed on him by the missionaries, his report to the Foreign Office revealing his sympathies quite clearly: ^Petition from King Akltoye to Consul John Beecroft, Badagry, no date, enc. In Beecroft to Palmerston, Clarence, Fernando Po,Feb. 21, 1 8 5 1, F.O. 84/ 8 5 8. 1 00ollmer to Straith, Badagry, Feb. 9, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/043• Lagos should be seized and the "right person" placed on the throne; he even suggested that the attack take place during the dry months of October to March* thus lessening the difficulties entailed In crossing the dangerous Lagos bar. 11 In fact shortly after making these recommendations* Beecroft tried to persuade the Commodore to take Independ ent action and place the "rightful and Just person" on the Lagos throne. But Fanshawe demurred* undoubtedly consider-* ing such a venture to warrant specific sanction from the Foreign Office and Admiralty. 12 The Defeat of Dahomey While attention was thus being focused on the Society's ambition to provide ltB chosen people with an outlet to the sea* the Egba suddenly became exposed to an Immediate threat from the other target of the Society's Ire* Dahomey. Palmerston had acquiesced to repeated requests to provide the Egba with military assistance* but ^Beecroft to Palmerston* Clarence* Fernando Po* Feb. 21* 1851* F.O. 84/858. 12Beecroft to Palmerston* Clarence* Fernando Po* April 19* 1851* F.O. 84/858. his authorization to supply muskets and powder to a value otjfeoo came too late.13 Despite this, the Egba achieved a major victory over the attackers on March 3, a . triumph aided significantly by the advance warning being received i from Beecroft, which had given the town an opportunity to strengthen Its defenses. In addition, ammunition had been sent to Abeokuta by the consul and the Governor of Sierra Leone, then distributed by Townsend, and word of the InvadersT Imminent approach had been received from the neighboring town of Isaga. The Egba were thus prepared for the assault, although the presence and ferocity of Ghezo's Amazons came as a surprise. A French historian describes this elite corps as "combattantes redoutables, Jalouses de surpasser JLes hommes en vaillance et fleres d 1 avoir ete designees comme troupes d'assaut contre Abeokuta."1^ The presence of women appeared to strengthen the defenders' resolve, 13Mlnute, dated March 15, 1851, in F.O. 84/816; Palmerston to Beecroft, Foreign Office, March 28, 1 8 5 1, N.N.A. Calprof 2/1, vol. 3. l^Dunglas, "La Premiere Attaque des Dahomeens contre Abeokuta," p. 15. Despite Inaccuracies, this article Is the best single account of the attack. 163 however, for the Dahomey arnywas soon In full retreat, streaming back over the Ogun with the Egba In hot pursuit as far as Isaga, some twenty miles to the west, where another battle took place. Results of the Egba Victory The Egba success was significant In several respects. To begin with,the Society capitalized on the event as a triumph of Christ's Kingdom, pursuing this tactic In England to such an extent that the name of the Egba capital became almost commonplace.16 in so doing, care was taken to publicize the missionary Interpretation of the attack as being part of a larger plot masterminded by Kosoko that was aimed at the expulsion from Yorubaland of English Influence. The entire situation was portrayed as a direct outcome of the continuing slave trade, the 15crowther, Journal. March 3, 4, 1851, C. M. S. CA2/031. Du Plessls, The Evangelisation of Pagan Africa. A History of Christian Missions to the Pagan Tribes of Central Africa (Cape Town and Johannesburg: J. C. Juta & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 137. lesson being that such wars would cease If only the trade was effectively stopped. This was a fallacious Interpretation; more accurately, the war was part of the continuing Egba-Dahoml rivalry arising from Egba ambitions to reach the sea and their efforts to wrest from Dahomey the domination of Egbado and Awerl country. Despite sympathy In England for the beleaguered Egba, apparently attacked without provoca tion, a British consul at Lagos later realized that this had not been the case. The attack had not been unwarran ted, he reported to the Foreign Secretary, as he knew of almost thirty towns and villages on the Dahomey border that had been destroyed by the Egba before 1 8 5 1 .1 8 Other significant developments resulting from the Egba victory were confined In Importance to Abeokuta and Yorubaland. For Instance, the defeat of Dahomey gave the Egba undisputed control of the west bank of the Ogun, a ^Oollmer to C.M.S., Badagry, March 20, 1 8 5 1, C.M. S. CA2/M2; Crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, March 5, 1 8 5 1, C. M.S. CA2/031; Townsend to Stralth, Abeokuta, March 4, 1851 C.M.S. CA2/M2, enc. In Venn to Palmerston, June 13, 1 8 5 1, in P.O. 84/860. ^^Benjamln Campbell to Lord Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 15, 1855, P.O. 84/976. 165 control challenged only once more by the Dahomi, in 1864; the victory can therefore be considered with Justiflcattiond as a great advance In the Egba drive to the sea. In Abeokuta, It was attributed In large measure to British help In general and to the Church Missionary Society in particular, resulting In Townsend's Influence reaching unprecedented proportions. For the next decade, in fact, he has to be acknowledged as the real architect of Egba policy.19 An additional aftermath of the victory was the enhanced prestige attained by the town's military caste, the Ologun, to the detriment of the civil rulers. This became apparent within days of the battle when the war chiefs called a meeting at Ake to protest the enormous fees levied by the Ogboni; so onerous were they, it was charged, that many warriors had been unable to provide themselves with arms during the recent engagement. 20 ^Saburi 0. Blobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours, 1842-1872 (Oxford: University Press, 1957), p. 45. 2 0Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, March 8, 1 8 5 1, C.M. S. CA2/031• Further evidence of this significant shift In the structure of political power occurred almost Immediately, with the Ologun successfully Insisting that all trade with Lagos be stopped. The reason put forward was that Kosoko had aided the Dahomi, but toward the end of the year, when trade was still stopped, It was claimed that another Dahomey attack could be expected.21 But the more obvious reason behind the continuing commercial disruption was that the war chiefs were seizing this opportunity to press the Egba claim to the coast; at this juncture they cer tainly did not want the army disbanded to follow more peaceful pursuits. Townsend and Oollmer Press for British Action, 1851 In his new role of Egba leader, Townsend wasted no time in furthering his plans. Informing the Commodore of all that had recently transpired at Abeokuta, he made a transparent attempt to have the Dahomey threat removed ^Townsend to Fanshawe, Abeokuta, March 19, 1 8 5 1, F.O. 84/865; Smith, Journal, Abeokuta, March 18. 1851. P.O. 84/865. 167 once and for all by emphasizing Qhezo's blatant disregard of British wishes. "That the King of Dahomey should so lightly regard the repeated requests not to molest this place may be regarded as an Insult to the British Government," he wrote. 22 Fanshawe perhaps concurred but refused to be goaded. In consultation with Beecroft he resolved not to blockade the Dahomey coast lest the lives of the missionaries be evemmore endangered. Instead; they decided to submit the case to England for official decision.23 This producing no Immediate result; Townsend charted a new course. He notified the Senior Officer of the Bights Division that the Egba wished "to submit to the English;" his letter Implying at least the status of protection.2^ In modified form he then repeated the request to Lord Palmerston; writing in the name of the 22Townsend to Fanshawe, Abeokuta, March 18, 1851* F.O. 84/865. 23Fanshawe To Admiralty, H.M.S. Centaur, off River Benin, March 30, 1 8 5 1, P.O. 84/865. 2i*Townsend to Capt. Jones, Abeokuta, July 18, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/05* He made the same statement In another let ter addressed to the British Residents at Badagry, Abeokuta, July 1 5, 1851, P.O. 84/8 5 8. 168; Egba chiefs. Because of their friendship with England, he wrote, Lagos, Dahomey and Porto Novo were conspiring to j close Abeokuta1s communications with the sea and wished the town destroyed. Akltoye should be restored at Lagos, he continued, or military aid provided to force Kosoko to open the Ogun and so allow the Egba to sell to the English their quantities of palm-oil, cotton, Indigo, pepper* ginger, and Ivory; In return, they would willingly sign a treaty of friendship and commerce.25 By the time his Lordship's reply had been received, however, the treaty had been signed. It Is apparent that Townsend was deeply Involved In Egba politics. Even more Involved In political affairs was the Rev. Oollme?, at Badagry, who maintained during 1851 a constant bombardment of communications to the Society, to the Society's friends, and to naval officers on the coast. Those addressed to his London headquarters frequently found their way to Lord Palmerston's desk^while those addressed to the officers went routinely to the Admiralty and then were again passed to the Foreign Office. 2^The Sagbua and chiefs of Abeokuta to Palmerston, Abeokuta, Aug. 15, 1 8 5 1, P.O. 84/658. 169 | i That department consequently became very familiar with Hr. Gollmer and the Intricacies of coastal politics from Lagos to Whydah. It was conversant with the pressing necessity of removing the usurper Kosoko, for Instance, of the Importance of seizing for Great Britain the command of Lagos, which was the key to the continent, of the friend liness of the Egba to England^ to say nothing of the commer cial possibilities of Yorubaland and the fact that the slave trade would be finished as soon as Lagos was taken. Gollmer18 enthusiasm for Lagos reached such bounds, In fact, that In one letter he vouchsafed that God was giving It to the British Government; under such circumstances, how could Divine Intervention be ignored?26 Gollmer thus served as a channel for political Information to England. Salisbury Square was Indeed recognized by this time as the source of the best and latest African news in London, a state of affairs attested In early 1851 by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Francis Baring, who suggested to the new Commodore of the West Africa Squadron, H. W. Bruce, that he visit the ^ G o l l m e r to Venn, Badagry, March 4, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 170 Society's headquarters before taking up his appointment to learn the latest Intelligence from the coast.27 Perhaps this was not a peculiar suggestion: the First Lord was one of the more influential members of the Parliamentary missionary party while Bruce himself was no stranger to Venn, who held him to be a true friend of the missionary cause.2® xt is worthy of note that the new Commodore's Instructions included the admonition to protect the missionaries.29 Gollmer and Badagry Politics, 1851 Gollmer's correspondence was but part of his total activity, which even Included the collection for the Admiralty of pertinent navigational information concerning Lagos waters.30 But his greatest concern was with local 27venn to Palmerston, London, March 26, 1851, F.O. 84/660. 2®Venn to Gollmer, London, March 11, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 2^Bruce to Admiralty, H.M.S. Penelope, Prince's Island, July 3 1, 1 8 5 1, in Pari. Papers (LTV)1852, 1455, p. 1 2 1. 30Qolimer to Venn, Badagry, March 20, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 171 politics at Badagry, a field of ample enough proportions to cater to his interests. It will be remembered that Badagry, because of its development, was divided in loyalty between Porto Novo and Lagos.31 Akltoye's five-year sojourn had consequently been disruptive, with scone of the town's eight chiefs favoring his cause but several of them being more sympa thetic to Kosoko. Compounding the difficulty was chief Mewu, who was not from Badagry at all but had lived there many years as an exile from Porto Novo. Mewu's residence in the outlying village of No was itself a disturbing factor in Badagry-Porto Novo relations and resulted in frequent interruption of trade and communications between the two places. The fact that Mewu became Akltoye's staunchest supporter complicated matters even further, as in this way he became a favorite of Mr. Gollmer. The departure of Akltoye with consul Beecroft at the end of January, 1 8 5 1, served immediately to heighten tensions. The Kosoko-oriented chiefs at last saw the opportunity to resume the trade relations with Lagos that 31Supra, p. 96. 172 Akltoye had forbidden for so long. But the Mewu-Akltoye faction, strenuously supported by Gollmer, refused to allow any such change. A civil war seemed Imminent In March and was only averted by the timely arrival of a naval cruiser, which served as a sufficient deterrent to Akltoye's enemies. Gollmer, of course, represented the crisis as a plot by Kosoko to destroy the Bngllsh-and missionary-oriented anti-slave element In Badagry.32 The arrival of the vessel provided but temporary respite for on June 12 the conflict broke out anew and the town suffered great destruction. By nlght-fall the Issue had been decided; Mewu and Akltoye's retainers were In control while the majority of the chiefs and their suppor ters had fled to neighboring villages. Two of the evac uees were the town's most Influential chiefs, the Wawu and Possu.33 32Gollmer to Fanshawe, Badagry, March 26, 1 8 5 1, F.O. 84/865. 33C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja-Speaklng Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 1), PP. 47-8; Smith, Journal. Abeokuta, June 14, 1 8 5 1, CA2/ 082. In response to an appeal organised by Oollmer, 3^ who feared a counter-attack supported In strength by Kosoko, H.M.S. Niger quickly appeared off-shore and began landing ammunition.35 Significantly, arms were also supplied to the beleagured town by the slave dealer Domingo Martinez,36 hopeful no doubt that his help would be suitably rewarded If and when Akltoye resumed his posi tion at Lagos. Kosoko's counter-offensive Indeed materialized, his war canoes sweeping past the town on June 21 and on several succeeding occasions for the next two months; but apart from sporadic firing, no serious attempt to retake the town was made. Kosoko would have been foolish to do so. The Niger had quickly been reinforced with other ships of the Bights Division and Commander Foote, of Prometheus. warned Kosoko In July not to Interfere with the British residents 3*1 "British Residents of Badagry to Captain Foote, H.M.S. Prometheus, or any other Captain of Her Majesty's Ships of War,H Badagry, June 16, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/05. 35commander Heath to Gollmer, off Badagry, June 17, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/05. 36ck>llmer to Venn, Badagry, Sept. 19, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/043. 17^ | at Badagry. The Senior Officer of the Division then Instructed his vessels to Intercept any of Kosoko*s canoes which attempted to attack the town.37 Nor was the naval help the only assistance forthcoming. Finding the stra tegic town to have been fortuitously delivered into friend ly hands the Egba quickly organised an expedition under their military commander In person* the Basorun Somoye* designed to protect the new regime by guarding the land approaches to Badagry. Never one to miss an opportunity* Gollmer utilized the presence of the Basorun* who was preceded In Importance at Abeokuta only by the Sagbua, to write a petition In his name to the Senior Officer begging for even more acfelve assistance. Kosoko was attempting to form a grand alliance of all the coastal peoples against Badagry and AbeSMuta* the letter read* and asked for the destruction of Lagos and Kosoko*s replacement by Akltoye. It concluded by humbly requesting the annexation of Badagry and for the Queen to "place some person of authority here* which would greatly contribute to our safety and the welfare of the 37Heath to British Residents at Badagry. H.M.S. Niger* off Badagry* Aug. 5, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/05. 175 ! i country at large . . . ."38 Captain Jones, while declin ing to assume such responsibility, continued to leave his ships at the service of the missionary party. An Interested eye-witness to these happenings was a Scot who had arrived at Badagry In May to represent the London firm of Forster and Smltfc. This gentleman, Mr. J. G, Sandeman, later became an outspoken critic of the Society's political activity In Yorubaland. As will be seen, the small group of European traders to appear on the coast In the next few years frequently had Interests Inimical with those of the missionaries; on this account, Sandeman's testimony should be weighed carefully. He admits to being completely persuaded at first by Gollmer's explanation of local affairs, especially regarding Akltoye and Kosoko, and consequently subscribed his name to the numerous letters written by Gollmer during 1851 to naval officers describing political conditions. But his doubts mounted as he saw how Gollmer was guiding events. He became especially critical of Mewu being made chief of the town, at Gollmer's Insistence, and of missionary 38Basorun Somoye to Captain L. T. Jones, Badagry, July 3, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/05• 1 7 6 ; I requisitions for arms and ammunition made to passing war ships. More often than not the arms wound up In Egba hands for use In their aggressive Incursions Into Dahome&J4 charged. Further, the sole cause of the disturbances at Badagry was the Interference of the missionaries. "Akltoye was made a tool to carry out the ambitious views of the two men, Messrs. Gollmer and Townsend,” he wrote several years later, and It was Townsend who had persuaded Beecroft to take Akltoye to Fernando Po. He quoted Townsend as saying that if Akltoye could be placed on the throne at Lagos, "we can twirl him around our little finger."39 Egba Military Campaign of 1851 Sandeman was also suspicious of the motives which had led the Egba to send relief to Badagry In mid-1 8 5 1, preferring to believe that the real Intent had been to attack Ado and Porto Novo. Gollmer himself had told him, he maintained, that by breaking Porto Novo the right hand 39sandeman to consul Campbell, Lagos, Aug. 28, 1 8 5 5, P.O. 403/5. of Dahomey would be crippled.40 Be that as It may, the fact remains that Somoye and his warriors did Indeed range through the coastal towns and villages during the summer with fire and sword, from AJldo In the east to Ipokla In the west. But the reasons behind the campaign were more complex than Sandeman Imagined. For Instance, the prestige of the Egba Ologun had been greatly enhanced by the victory over the Dahoml, and as has been observed, the Influence of the warriors In Egba councils had been enlarged correspondingly. Then there was the question of revenge, for the Egba believed that several of the Popo (dun) coastal towns had actively assisted Ohezo's March attack on AbeokutaAlso of significance Is the fact that trade between Porto Novo and Badagry had been halted for a long time because of the presence of Mewu at the latter place. According to the Egba, Porto Novo was therefore enjoying too great a propor tion of trade, so the attacks were made In an attempt to ^°Sandeman to consul Campbell, Lagos, Aug. 2 8, 1855, P.O. 403/5. ^Oollmer to Venn, Badagry, Aug. 16, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/043. 178 I redress the situation. The Egba summer campaign, however, can best be viewed as the culmination of the long-held ambition to reach the sea, the removal of the Dahomey threat and the coup at Badagry providing the occasion. Being thus safe on the west, having a temporarily enlarged army at their disposal— which the war chiefs made sure would not be reduced**2— and with Badagry held by the friendly Mewu and backed by the Royal Navy, the opportunity was taken to extend Egba hegemony once and for all over the coastal region from Lagos to Porto Novo. Although subscribing to this general aim, Qollmer was both puzzled and annoyed by the Egba campaign. An attempt to clear the coast of Popo was Itself a "wild scheme," to say nothing of It being quite unnecessary; when Abeokuta had possession of Lagos as Its trading port there would be no need for the Inferior beach-towns.**3 Further evidence to support the view that the Egba campaign was directed toward the fulfillment of their * * 2Supra, p. 165. **3aollmer to Venn, Badagry, Sept. 18, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 179 ; i i coastal ambition Is found In the simultaneous attacks being made on the Ijebu* who contained the Egba to the east. Despite an attempt made In July by Ibadan to mediate between the two and despite Ijeba envoys being sent to Abeokuta* the Egba rejected the overtures* appar- : ently preferring to settle the Issues by force of arms.^ Crowther In England One of the missionaries took no direct part In the mounting events In Yorubaland. Samuel Crowther left Abeokuta shortly after the Dahomey attack for a visit to Freetown* but soon after reaching there he was called to London by Venn. The news of the Egba victory had aroused great popular Interest In England and Venn had been using the occasion to persuade the Government to Issue the direct order for the annexation of Lagos. The decision to bring Crowther to England was a tactic In this same campaign* calculated to be as effective as possible by utilizing a westernized African to preach the necessity of British Intervention. ^Hlnderer to Venn* Ibadan* July 16* 1 8 5 1, Hlnder- er, Journal* Ibadan* July 22* 1 8 5 1* C.M.S. CA2/049. 180 The Society's Lay-Secretary apprised Lord Palmer- ston of Crowther's arrival and asked for an Interview. Major Stralth explained that Crowther would demonstrate ! that the recent attack on Abeokuta was part of a larger plot underwritten by the slave dealers to remove British influence on the coast. Secondly, in proving the Egba to be attached to British Interests, he would show why they deserved assistance and why Abeokuta»s rising civilization should be protected. In an appeal to the Foreign Secretary's more commercial Instincts, he then said that Crowther could show how an Immense area of cotton-produc ing country would be thrown open to British commerce If Akltoye was restored to Lagos and allied to Gtreat Britain. Thanking his Lordship for the ammunition already received at Abeokuta, Major Stralth made the additional request for two or three light cannon for the defense of the city and for arrangements to be made to train the Egba In gunnery.^5 Palmerston agreed to see Crowther Immediately, and accompanied by Venn he repaired to his London residence on ^5stralth to Palmerston, London, Aug. 20, 1851, P.O. 84/860. August 22, The conversation lasted more than an hour and Crowther acquitted himself well, setting forth persuasive ly the importance of supporting the Egba and of securing for them the unhindered use of the Ogun.^6 Following this the two men had a similar interview with the First Lord of the Admiralty, who proved equally sympathetic, both Ministers giving the assurance that any tribe willing to negotiate an anti-slave trade treaty was worthy of support.^7 On the heels of these interviews Crowther was dispatched on a speaking tour, visiting Exeter, Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Cambridge and York; at Bristol and Manchester particularly, his talks dwelt on the commercial possibilities of the Yoruba country. All his appearances were marked by the attendance of large numbers of the most influential p e r s o n s .^8 But no matter how distinguished the gallery, the slave trade always 46venn to Qollmer, London, Sept. 9, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/L1. ^7lbld. 48Rev. F. H. Kingdom to Earl Qrey, Pyworthy Rectory, Devon, Dec. 15, 1 8 5 1, in Pari. Papers, XXXII (1852), 355, PP. 8, 9 . 182 dominated the discussion. Crowther portrayed the Egba as Industrious, anxious for trade and commerce, but bowed down with the agony of the trade; but on Its removal, he Insisted,all hindrance to the rapid extension of Christianity would disappear.^9 The climax of Crowther's visit was his reception at Windsor on November 18, an audience made possible by Venn's political connections. The Rev. Lord Wrlothesley Russell, brother to Lord John and an enthusiastic C.M.S. supporter, acted as his chaperon when Crowther spoke with the Queen and Prince Albert on the state of affairs in West Africa. All the ramifications of the slave trade were discussed, with particular attention being paid to Lagos and its future as a commercial port. Victoria was anxious to know how Palmerston and Baring had reacted to Crowther1s Information, and the Prince Consort expressed his opinion that Lagos "ought to be knocked down, by all ^9jesse Page, The Black Bishop: Samuel Adjal Crowther (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), p. 109. 5°Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Mission ary Society, Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work. • : • ' (London: C.M.S., 1 8 9 9-1916)^1,pp. 111-13* 183 What effect Crowther1s campaign In England had on the subsequent expulsion of Kosoko Is difficult to evalu ate. Venn was convinced that the Interview with Palmerston had been crucial, writing after the event that the Information presented by Crowther had enabled the Foreign Secretary "to issue the decisive orders which have over thrown the stronghold of slave trading."51 Venn was perhaps correct. A week after the Interview Palmerston notified the Admiralty that the Commodore should confer with the Governor of Sierra Leone concerning the best and most practicable way the Egba could be defended.52 Even more explicit Instructions were Issued the following month. Again writing to the Admiralty, Palmer ston referred to the two remaining black spots of slaving on the West Coast, Dahomey and Lagos. Two missions to Ghezo had proved unavailing, he wrote, as had Fanshawe's admonition not to attack Abeokuta, the scene of successful exertions of British missionaries. He went on: 51c.M.S. to Abeokuta Mission, London, Feb. 24, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 52F.O. to Admiralty, Downing Street, Aug. 29, 1 8 5 1, F.O. 84/863. 184 Her Majesty's Government necessarily takes an Interest In the welfare of a town which seems destined to be a centre from which the lights of Christianity and Civi lization may be spread over the adjoining countries. This "Interesting community," Palmerston continued, would have fallen to Ghezo "had It not been assisted by European skill In planning [its] defense and by arms and ammunition to repel the attack." If Abeokuta had fallen, the mission aries and the converts would have been killed or reduced to slavery; It was therefore the Queen's Command that the coast of Dahomey be blockaded until Ghezo signed an anti- slave treaty. As for Lagos, Palmerston Informed his Lordships that Kosoko had encouraged the Dahomey attack on Abeokuta, believing that the British antl-Blave campaign would be Impeded If the missionaries were destroyed. Further, he had been Informed by Mr. Crowther and others that It would not be difficult for a small naval force to expel Kosoko; Commodore Bruce should therefore be Instructed to under take this operation and reinstate Akltoye If It could be accomplished without much difficulty. This done, Lagos, "In connection with the navigable River Ogun . . . [would] become an Important outlet for the commerce of a large 185 range of country in the interior . . . ."53 The tenor of these communications does not prove Venn's contention that Crowther*s interview with the Foreign Secretary had been decisive in the Government decision to overthrow Kosoko. They do show, however, that Palmerston had been completely won over by the Church Missionary Society's long campaign on behalf of the Egba and they show a complete commitment to the Society's policies. Always with an eye to possible political advantage, either at home or in Yorubaland, Venn suggested on the eve of Crowther*s departure that a letter from Palmerston showing Crowther to have represented Egba Interests and the manifestations of friendship shown in Britain would be useful political ammunition to take back with him. It was simple for Lord Chichester to broach the subject to the Foreign Secretary, who proved Immediately receptive. Crowther thus left armed with a letter assuring the Egba of the Government's lively interest in the welfare of their town, "which seems destined to be a centre from 53Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Sept. 27, 1 8 5 1, F.O. 84/863. 186 ; which the lights of Christianity and Civilization may be opened over the neighbouring countries." Although this ! i passage was not too original, the concluding paragraph held out the hope that the measuras which the Commodore had | been Instructed to take "... will have the effect of pro tecting the serenity and well-being of the Egba nation. The Aiming of the Egba Not reaching Abeokuta until July, 1852, Crowther did not witness the measures being put Into effect. But at Badagry his colleague Gollmer not only witnessed but actually took part In them. As early as September, 1 8 5 1, Gollmer was reporting that his naval friends were dropping "broad hints"[Gollmer*s emphasis^, that Kosoko was soon to be removed from Lagos and Beecroft himself told him that he would be at Badagry In November to settle the Lagos affair.55 5^Venn to Chichester, London, Dec. 10, I8 5I; Chichester to Palmerston, London, Dec. 11, I8 5I5 Palmerston to Crowther, Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1851, in F.O. 84/ 860. 55oollmer to Venn, Badagry, Sept. 18, 1 9, 1051, C.M.S. CA2/043. 187 He was preceded by Commander F. E. Forbes, en route to Abeokuta to organize that town's defenses against future attack from Dahomey. Forbes had accompanied Beecroft to Abomey In 1850 and was a man dedicated to the missionary cause* In a book describing his experiences In Dahomey, Forbes clearly showed this predilection, as well as the fact that he had succumbed to the Society's propaganda. Before laying eyes on Abeokuta he described It a "nearly Christian city" that would become the coranerclal entrepot for the Upper Niger If Lagos was opened to legitimate trade. The Importance of stopping the slave-trade at Lagos, he wrote, "cannot be exaggerat ed.^ it was not surprising, therefore, that Forbes was chosen to go to Abeokuta, nor was It surprising that he should consult with Venn before leaving England. Venn reflected with "much satisfaction" on this Interview,57 and Gollmer was Instructed to show the Commander every 56prederick E. Forbes, Dahomey and the Dahomans: Being the Journals of Two Missions to the King of Dahomey* and Residence at his CapitalJ in the Years 1849 and 1850. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, I8 5 1), I, pp. 8-1 0. 57C.M.S. to Abeokuta Mission, London, Feb, 24, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 188 attention as his mission could have significant resuits.58 After a week with Qollmer, Forbes made his way to Abeokuta accompanied by the Society's mechanic, Nr, Huber, who was to assist in mounting the cannons which were on the way. He stayed with Townsend while carrying out his task of supervising the repair of the city's walls and training Sierra Leone Immigrants to man the guns.59 He and Townsend took time to visit many of the chiefs and Forbes again warning Qhezo not to attack the town, it being the Intention of the Quean of England nto extend and protect the missionary labours in Abeokuta and in surround ing countries.”60 Forbes was obviously Impressed by what he saw of the town but he modified considerably the published estimate he had made concerning the size of the Christian population; Abeokuta now sheltered only "several hundred" Christians behind its walls.6l 58c.M.S. To Gollmer, London, Sept. 9, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA 2/Ll. 59porbes to Bruce, Abeokuta, Nov. 1 3, 16, Dec. 9, 1 8 5 1, Pari. Papers, LIV (1 8 5 2), 1455, pp. 177-82. 6°Forbes to the King of Dahomey, Abeokuta, no date, in Pari. Papers. LIV (1 8 5 2), 1455, p. 179. 6lporbes Bruce, Abeokuta, Nov. 1 6, 1 8 5 1, in Pari. Papers, LIV (1 8 5 2), 1455, p. 179. 189 Qollmer received more Important guests shortly after Forbes had left for Abeokuta, this time consul Beecroft, with Akltoye In tow. A long discussion was held on November 15 concerning Akltoyefs return to Lagos, but Beecroft was disappointed to find that no help for a land attack on Kosoko's stronghold could be offered, an assault on Badagry by the exiled chiefs being anticipa ted .62 Beecroft brought with him cn H.M.S. Bloodhound a large quantity of arms and ammunition for Abeokuta, Qollmer sending the welcome supplies to Townsend for storage and distribution. This arming of the Egba continued, another great quantity of muskets and two fleld-pleces being sent from Freetown in January aboard one of Bruce's cruisers.^3 But Qollmer's part In unloading and dispatching the weapons to Abeokuta brought him Into disrepute with Badagry's European traders. Sandeman was annoyed at everything that was going on— with the C.M.S., with Forbes, with the 62Gollmer, Journal, Badagry, Nov. 14, 15, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/043. 63crowther to Venn, Freetown, Jan. 12, 1852, C.M. S. CA2/M2. 190 British government for what was being done for the Egba— while Qollmer himself was castigated as a "political agent” and "head of the war department."^ As Qollmer explained It, all he had done was obey the Society's Injunction to assist Commander Forbes by forwarding Government ammunition for the defense of Abeokuta.65 As for his Intercourse with naval off lexers, he had been engaged in this only for the protection of Badagry, while his dealings In native politics were Involuntary; how could he forbid people coming to him for help and how could he refuse to act as mediator in native quarrels?66 "Reduction" of Lagos: the Culmination of C.M.S. Polity Qollmer was less upset at the charge than he was with the threat that his political machinations would be exposed In the London preBS. But even his concern over 6^Gollmer to Venn, Badagry, Jan. 2, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/1 M2. 65Qollmer to Bruce, Badagry, Jan. 6, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/05. ^Qollmer to Sandeman, Badagry, Dec. 26, 1 8 5 1, C.M.S. CA2/0^3. 191; this was outweighed by the Joyous events which were talcing place: Commodore Bruce had attacked Lagos, Kosoko had fled and Akltoye was back on his throne. With sweet success at last crowning the Society's long campaign, with a docile ruler on the throne, with Lagos delivered to the Egba as their satrapy and with Britain at last actively Involved In defending them, Qollmer1s response to the news reflected the reaction of all the Society's mission aries, Its executive, and Its many friends and supporters. What had been done was "god's Interposition," Gollmer philosophized to the Commodore, and would further "the Holy Cause we are engaged In." It was, In fact, "an effectual door opened by a gracious God, not only for Lagos, but Central Africa also."^7 Qollmer hastened to add In a more practical vein that he would shortly visit Akltoye to secure a spot for a new mission, the removal of the Badagry establishment to Lagos having received Venn's prior authorization. The story of the actual "reduction” of Lagos, as It was called, which took place at the end of 1 8 5 1, Is 67Qollmer to Bruce, Badagry, Jan. 6, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/05. well told and does not warrant repetition, 68 Lees famil iar are some of the events related to the action, the simultaneous blockade of the Benin coast, being an example, Bruce Instituted the blockade for four reasons, his i explanation lending credence to the thesis that mlssl&nary influence lay behind the entire course of events.69 First was the fact that Dahomey, Lagos and Porto Novo refused to stop the slave trade; second, that Qhezo refused to abandon the practice of human sacrifice; next, that the three places were In league against Abeokuta and Badagry, where British missionaries were located and In which Her Majesty's Government took an Interest, being destined (shades of Palmerston), "to be points from whence the lights of Christianity and Civilization may be spread over the adjoining countries," Lastly, Commodore Bruce main tained that the three offending places declined to respect 6&rhe most complete account Is the official one, "Papers Relative to the Reduction of Lagos," Pari. Papers, LIV (1852), 1455- 69standard works on Nigeria cite the attack on Lagos as an "Imperialist” adventure dictated by economic considerations. As a random example see Michael Crowder's The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), P. 134. 193 the live# of British subjects living at Abeokuta.70 it should not be omitted that Badagry was the only port in | the Bight not closed, being the sole avenue for supplying j the missionaries and arming the Egba. Another interesting circumstance connected with the attack on Lagos is that it was carried out on the specific instructions of Sir Francis Baring, First Lord of the Admiralty, long-time friend of Venn and one of the most important C.M.S. parliamentarians. Palmerston had issued the general directive on September 27*71 but it was Baring who Implemented his instructions.72 The preponderance of evidence clearly suggests, therefore, that the reduction of Lagos was an operation inspired by the C.M.S. as part of its anti-slavery cam paign which also matched the requirements of the Society's Egba policy. In addition, the Society keenly appreciated 79Bruce to Louis Fraser (H.M. vice-consul in Daho mey), H.M.S. Penelope* Sierra Leone, Dec. 6, 1S5I* F.O. 84 /886. 71supra* pp. 183-84. 72”F. T. Baring and R. D. Dundas, the Lords Commis sioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to Commo dore Bruce, Commander-In-Chief of Her Majesty'sdiips and vessels on the West Coast of Africa,” London, Oct. 14, 1 8 5 1, in Pari. Papers* LIV (1 8 5 2), p. 1 3 8. 194 the necessity of obtaining for Its own use a port linked by water to Its missionaries in the interior. By making use of a convenient rival to the throne, about whom the missionaries had no illusions, the Society then mounted Its political campaign and ultimately engineered the coup. The first consul appointed to Lagos came close to bearing out this contention several years later, when In the course of a routine letter he stated that Kosoko had been expelled in order to provide "the Egba in particular” with a safe port to trade in peace and security.73 As it was the Church Missionary Society that had popularized the unknown Egba, the consul's statement lends further Indir ect proof of the Society's participation. The arguments put forward by modern African scholars that this British Interference In native affairs was dictated by economic considerations falls far short of the mark. True, there is sometimes an oblique reference In African historiography to humanitarian Influences, but an obsessive psychological barrier precludes any causative factor being considered other than the harshly 73b . Campbell to the Alake of Abeokuta, Lagos, May 6, 1 8 5 6, N.N.A. CSO 8/1 Vol. 2. materialistic and exploitive. An eminent Nigerian, for Instance, writes that the British Interest at stake In the •vents of 1851 "was the suppression of the slave-trade for the purpose of promoting legitimate commerce," and that Akltoye was placed on the throne "to promote this vital British Interest."74 This placing of the cart before the horse Ignores several salient factors. There was no "vital" British commercial Interest at Lagos to begin with, In fact there was no commercial Interest at all. There were only two or three British firms represented In the vicinity, at Badagry, and even here trade was so notoriously poor that the expense of maintaining factories was hardly met. The coastal trade In palm oil was but a trickle, amounting to less than 4,000 tons In 1 8 5 6 ,7 5 five years after the event, despite the fact that by this time a comparatively ordered administration was creating an environment much more con ducive to commercial Intercourse. In addition, except 7^Lloyd C. Qwam (Director of the Nigerian National Archives), An Inventory of the Administrative Records Assembled from the Colony Province (Ibadan: Nigerian National Archives, 1 9 6 1), p. 7. 75parl. Papers. V (1865), 412, p. 467. 196 from the C.M.S. viewpoint, Lagos had little or no strategic significance and Its trade remained miserably low for decades, a place devoid of Importance In the over-all pat tern of Britain's International trade. The economic argument becomes even more Improbable when It Is remembered that the entire Issue of the economic potential of Lagos and Yorubaland had been raised by the C.M.S. as a device to heighten Interest In the area and so gamer political support for the Society's policies from commercial Interests. Venn, in fact, with the technical assistance of Sir William Hooker of Kew Cardens, conducted a long campaign In the 1850's to Introduce Yoruba products Into England. At the same time, he and the missionaries In the field became heavily Involved in the cultivation and marketing of Yoruba cotton, hopeful that It would displace the American slave-grown product in the English market while furthering the program of bible and plow. Both campaigns were disappointing. The first met an apathetic response In England while the second aroused the opposition of the missionaries, heartily opposed to a disdainful participation In commercial undertakings. Treaty-making in 1852 197 Meanwhile, to the ohagrln of the traders and chiefs around Lagos who sympathized and supported his cause,76 Kosoko and his retainers fled to the IJebu town of Epe, east of Lagos on the lagoon, and Akltoye dutifully signed an anti-slave compact on January 1, 1 8 5 2. It was later asserted that even at this Juncture Akltoye asked for a two years moratorium on the prohibition,77 but meet ing no response he appended his mark to the document. The treaty prohibited slave dealers from residing at Lagos and the export of slaves; It gave to Great Britain the right to seise Lagos boats suspected of being engaged In the trade and stipulated that no hindrance be placed on commerce; the trade of one nation was not to be privileged more than another. Human sacrifices were prohibited and Article VIII called for the protection of missionaries "following their vocation of spreading the knowledge and doctrines of Christianity and extending the benefits of 7^Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Oct. 24, 1 8 5 3, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 77sandeman to Campbell, Lagos, Aug. 28, 1835, P.O. 84/976. 198 civilization within the territory of the Kings and Chiefs of Lagos.M Encouragement to build schools and churches was to be given and no obstacle raised to the teaching of ; Christianity. Converts were not to be molested nor j i Christian graves disturbed.78 Commodore Bruce, informing the missionaries of the treaty, stated his conviction that the measures he had taken would "... under Cod's blessing [contribute] In some degree to the success of the most Important undertaking which devolves upon you."79 Bruce then sent a similar treaty to Commander Forbes at Abeokuta for the acceptance of the Egba. Townsend and Stolth took an active part In the negotiations, assuring the Sagbua and chiefs that no Interdict was being placed on domestic slavery and securing approval of a supplementary clause by which the Egba agreed not to hinder the advance Into the Interior of missionaries, mer chants or Immigrants,80 The treaty was signed on January 78parl. Papers, LXI (1 8 6 2), Cmd. 2 9 8 2, pp. 1, 2. 79Lagos, Jan. 2, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/05. 80rownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 3, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/085; Smith, Journal, Abeokuta, Jan. 3, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/082. 199 5 ,® 1 followed during the next few months by fourteen similar agreements with chiefs throughout the Bight of Benin, including treaties with Dahomey, Porto Novo and Badagry, Host of them were worthless, of course, and although Lagos ceased to be a slave port, the trade con tinued from Porto Novo, Whydah, Little Popo and Innumer able creeks and Inlets along the entire coast. And despite Portuguese and Brazilian slave dealers being expelled from Lagos, they began slipping back again almost Immediately In an attempt to revive the trade,* several became engaged In seeking the restoration of Kosoko.&2 Neither did the Sgba cease dealing In slaves for export, merely changing their outlet to Okeodan, which became their great slave market In the 1 8 5 0's, slaves being sold there and then passed on to the coast for shipment. The flurry of treaty-making in the first months of 1 8 5 2, aided considerably by the simultaneous naval block ade of the coast, brought an Interesting reaction from the Foreign Office. Lord Malmesbury was holding sway under 8lA copy Is In the C.M.S. archives, CA2/M2. 82Qoilmer to Captain C. 0 . Phillips, R. N., Lagos, June 14, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/H2. 200 Lord Derby's short-lived administration, and the prevailing attitude against acquiring West African territory Is I Illustrated by his admonition that naval officers negotia ting the treaties were not to accept cessions of land offered by Icings and chief s. ^3 The naval blockade of the Benin coast had Itself caused difficulties. A deputation of Bristol merchants called at the Foreign Office on March 14 to protest the losses being Incurred and the promise was made that legitim mate traders would be Inconvenienced as little as possible.S2 * The most significant protest came from France, however. French factors at Whydah complained about the blockade Immediately, the exclusion of Badagry rousing their suspicion that the blockade was but a pretext for Insuring commercial advantage to the British traders there. French suspicions were not lessened, despite assurances from the Foreign Office that the chiefs of Badagry were not employed In selling slaves and were allied with 83f.o. to Admiralty, April 1 7, 1 8 5 2, F.O. 84/891. ^^The Times. March 20, 1 8 5 2. 201 : "another antl-slavlng tribe" at Abeokuta.^5 Pressure per sisted, ultimately resulting In Bruoe being Instructed to life the blockade of W h y d a h . 8 6 The Badagry Treaty; Qollmer and the Merchants The treaty-making of 1852 also Involved Qollmer In a growing acrimony with the merchants at Badagry only days after he had written to Bruce to vindicate himself of the charge of being "head of the war department" and a "political agent." Commander Wllmot of H.M.S. Harlequin stopped by to see Qollmer on January 10, when the mission ary told his story of Mewu being Akltoye*s friend and dedicated to antl-slavlng principles while the exiled 85Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 55* who quotes French Foreign Office sources for this Interchange. 8 6porelgn Office to Admiralty, May 12, 1 8 5 2, N.N. A., Calprof 2/1 Vol. 4. The lifting of the blockade at Whydah was one of several actions by the 1 8 5 2 Tory govern ment that annoyed Venn. Referring to Derby's administra tion after Its demise, Venn wrote that there had been many Instances of Its determination "to offend and thwart us" and that It had been the only Government to act In this way; C.M.S. to Qollmer, London, April 23* 1853* C.M.S. CA 2/Ll. The Tory Evangelicals were apparently much happier under a Whig or Whlg-Peellte administration. chiefs of the town were supporters of Kosoko and therefore slavers. On his return from Porto Novo a few days later, Wllmot went ashore at the Possu1s camp, some three miles east of Badagry, and cautioned him In no uncertain terms against attacking the town or Interfering with the lagoon traffic between Badagry and Lagos.®7 Qollmer was full of praise for this exemplary action. The following week, Commander T. 0. Forbes of H. M. S. Philomel arrived at Badagry to negotiate the anti- slave treaty. Qollmer was fully prepared for Mewu to sign the agreement but the merchants protested vehemently on the ground that Mewu was not the legitimate chief. Their prime objection to Qollmer's candidate was that Porto Novo refused to trade with Badagry while Mewu remained and that Qollmer made sure that Mewu allowed none of the ex-chlefs to return. Baffled, Forbes left without concluding the treaty, saying that he would refer the matter to the Commodore.38 ®7ck>llmer, Journal, Badagry, Jan. 10-15, 1852, C. M.S. CA2/043. 8®0ollmer, Journal, Badagry, Jan. 22, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/043. 203 Mewu then wrote directly to Bruce* or to be more precise* Qollmer wrote in his stead* asking to be recognized as King or Badagry* and Bruce himself came to i the town in early February. Then on March 17 the Senior | Officer of the Division arrived* Commander Strange of H.M.S. Archer. Strange stayed with Gollmer* who took the opportunity of acquainting him with "the real state of things here*"upon which the officer assured his host that there would be no official Interference with his policy concerning Mewu* nor was It the intention of Commodore Bruce to restore the exiled chiefs. The treaty was there upon signed* Mewu making his mark as the ruler of the town.®9 Bruce had determined to recognize Mewu when he visited Badagry in February* when he reported his decision to the Admiralty. The dispatch was forwarded to the Foreign Office* which concurred in Bruce's claim that Mewu was the de facto chief' and should be so recognized .9 0 The 89Gollmer, Journal. Badagry* March 19* 1852* C.M. S. CA2/043. 90porelgn Office to Admiralty* April 24* 1 8 5 2* P.O. 84/891. 204 whole train of events filled the traders with disgust and they determined to shake the dust of Badagry from their feet and seek new fields at Lagos. Gollmer at Lagos But here again conflicts arose with the C.M.S. With the opening of Lagos the Society had great plans for expansion In Yorubaland and were determined to spare neither treasure nor men In seizing the opportunities.91 However, as reports of Gollmer's political activities became Increasingly frequent In London, Venn was not sure that Gollmer should be placed In charge of the new station. It was possible that he had been too mixed up In political affairs, the Home Committee confided to Crowther, and It might be the better course for Mr. Gollmer to move to Abeokuta "and work In simple Missionary w o r k . "92 The gentleman In question defended himself admirably, Imploring Venn not to let second-hand reports Influence his Judgment, especially those from merchants, 91venn to Captain Coote, R.N., London, April 14, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. fiLondon, March 15, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/L1. ninety per cent of whom were llare. He wrote that hie Intention was to keep as far away from politics as he could, "but to keep entirely clear Is next to Impossi ble. "93 But by this time he had moved to Lagos, so Venn allowed him to remain. With Akltoye* s consent, Qollmer picked out five parcels of land In various parts of the town, which were deeded to the Society. Work on a large waterfront com pound was started, leading Immediately to another long dispute with Mr. Sandeman, who coveted the same piece of ground. Making no Impression on either Qollmer or Akltoye and finding his second choice similarly pre-empted, Sandeman Informed his employers that the Society had acquired three-quarters of the lagoon frontage. At this, Messrs. Forster and Smith lodged a written complaint at the Foreign Offlee.9^ The dispute reached the Commons, where, In Venn's words, "one of our parliamentary friends" was asked 93oollmer to Venn, Lagos, July 30, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 9^London, Nov. 29, 1852, F.O. 84/887. 206 whether the Society possessed all the Lagos wharfage.95 Admiral Bruce was Instructed to Investigate, resulting In exoneration for Oollmer when Lieutenant White found the Society's 280 yards of property to present no Injury to mercantile Interests.96 The Foreign Office subsequently Informed Forster and Smith of the decision,97 but by the time the case had been settled, Oollmer was embroiled in yet another affair, this one Involving both Sandeman and the newly-appointed vice-consul at Lagos, Mr, Louis Fraser. The argument had a long history. The altercation at Badagry In 1851 Involving Mewu and the exiled chiefs had shown a clear conflict of Interest between the C.M.S. and the traders. While both desired an extension of trade, although for different reasons, each had different priorities. The missionaries backed Mewu, being a friend of Akltoye and the Egba and an opponent of the chiefs friendly to Kosoko; the traders, 95venn to Oollmer, London, Dec. 2, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 9&White to Bruce, Lagos, Feb. 28, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 97p0reign Office, April 25, 1853, P.O. 84/921. 207 on the other hand, saw that Porto Novo refused to deal with Badagry while Mewu remained and consequently favored the town's exiled ohlefs. This was but one Instance of the differences between missionaries and traders which were to plague Yoruba politics for decades. The prime example of this divergence of Interest was the championing of the Egba by the missionaries, a people held by the traders to be war like, overbearing, ambitious, and the greatest obstacle In Yorubaland to the extension of trade, their opinion being based on the geographical advantage enjoyed by the Egba which placed them In the perfect middleman position, and the consequent ease with which they were able to halt commercial Intercourse. This lay In the future, however. In the meantime, the advent of consular officials, follow ed by colonial administrators, Introduced to the scene men who likewise considered the promotion of trade to be more Important than missionary activity. But their motives were different from those of the traders. Consular Government 208 Both consuls and governors were concerned with administration, the prime requisite of which Is money. It can be pointed out that consuls have no concern with government, but to argue this In the case of Lagos In the mid-nineteenth century Is to Ignore the realities of the situation. Akltoye and his successor were weak, corrupt, and Inept, and It was recognized from the first, by missionaries, traders and naval officers alike, that a European official of some kind was necessary If the mini mum essentials of government were to be performed. And there can be no doubt that with the arrival of the very first consular official at Lagos a type of protectorate was exercised, a situation that bore neither authority from the British Government nor direct sanction from the rulers of the Island, but one that was recognized never theless. Within the decade, consuls were carrying out a variety of executive and Judicial functions which had passed gradually to their domain. Being concerned with fulfilling their tasks, the consuls were therefore concerned with customs revenue; such Income being dependent on trade, they were as anxious 209 as the merchants to Increase the level of commercial activity and like the traders they came In confliot with the missionaries. Specific policies were disputed, such as the Inclination of several consuls to seek rapproshfc#- ments with slave trading elements In the Interests of trade and revenue. Also In dispute was the position of adviser to the king, a position held Jealously by Qollmer and resented by the consuls. Admiral Bruce was the first to put forward a plan for consular appointments, suggesting consulates at Lagos and Whydah, with nine additional agents scattered along the coast as a means of controlling the slave trade.98 The plan was not accepted. Qollmer was soon pressing Venn to do what he could to have an official sent to Lagos, there being endless customs difficulties and Akltoye being greatly In need of assistance In governing.99 Nobody being forthcoming from England, Beecroft took the oppor tunity of Mr. Louis Fraser being found persona non grata 98Bruce to Admiralty, Jan. 17, 1 8 5 2, In Pari. Papers, 1 8 5 2, LIV (1 8 5 2), 221, p. 213. 990ollmer to Venn, Lagos, April 24, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/043. 210 at Ghezo's court to appoint him vlce-coneul at Lagoa. Oollmer, who knew Fraser, was greatly disappointed, conal- j ! i t dering him unfit In every way for the post and likely to | do more mischief than good as "Akltoye Is easily led. ”1 0 0 j But Nr. Fraser commenced his duties on December 10, 1852, realizing Gollmer1 s worst fears almost Immediately. Fraser at Lagos; the Background to his Arrival Fraser arrived at a bad time. The Egba had Just resumed their Interminable siege of Ado, which, besides being tied to Porto Novo and thence opposed to Mewu, had also temporarily harbored Mewu's rival, the deposed Possu of Badagry; favoring him, Ado was likewise sympathetic to Kosoko and opposed to Akltoye. In addition, the attack was part of the long-range Egba plan to subjugate their routes to the sea, and there was a determination to replace the chiefs with men friendly to Akltoye. 101 Perhaps the attack lOOQollmer to C.M.S., Lagos, Nov. 16, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/043. 101Gollmer to Venn, Lagos, Nov. 16, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/043. 211 had even been encouraged by Moslem and heathen priests, as Crowther ohamged, who had promised the Egba a speedy victory within nine days, 102 Besides this, and a resultant lack of trade be tween Porto Novo and Lagos, the C.M.S.-Sandeman land dis pute was raging and missionary and commercial tempers were being Inflamed by another Incident, Allegedly on Qollmer*s representation, Commander Heseltlne of H,M,S, Brltomart had organized a small naval expedition against Porto Novo to assist the Egba at Ado, but before reaching Its desti nation the expedition met Sandeman on the lagoon. In sur prise, Sandeman asked Heseltlne why he should attadk the place, which had never harmed British subjects, and why should the Boyal Navy assist the Egba to plunder and en slave? Sandeman reminded the officer that the King of Porto Novo had recently received Commander Wllmot and with little hesitation had signed an anti-slave trade treaty,103 102Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, July 25, 1853, C. M.S. CA2/031. 1 03p. Amaury Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Niger ia. A Sketch of Their History, Ethnology and Languages, with an Abstract of the 1921 Census (London; Oxford Uni versity Press, 1926), I, p. 9 7, quoting an unspecified dis patch from a later consul, Campbell, to the Foreign Office. 212 Qollmer admits that ha had previously spoken "very frankly" to Heseltlne on the political situation existing In Lagos, Badagry, Porto Novo and Abeokuta.10^ But the chance meeting on the lagoon, according to Sandeman, apparently opened the Commander's eyes to a differing Interpretation of coastal affairs and to the fact that the missionaries were the "secretaries of war to savage chiefs. He abandoned the expedition and returned to Lagos, much to the chagrin of Qollmer and his colleagues at Abeokuta.106 Missionary and Consular Conflict This was the state of affairs on Frajfter's arrival, when, according to the missionaries, the new vice-consul Immediately succumbed to the Influence of Sandeman and the other few European traders.107 Specifically, he became 104oollmer to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 24, 1853* C.M.S. CA2/043. 105sandeman to Forster and Smith, Lagos, Jan. 16, 1853, P.O. 84/921. I06n>id. l°70ollmer to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 15* 1833* C.M.S. CA2/043; Townsend to C.M.S., Abeokuta, Jan. 21, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 213 convinced that Mewu was the sole cause of trouble, wished for his removal from Badagry and desired the Egba to with draw from the siege of Ado. To make matters worse, he and Gtollmer were at loggerheads almost Immediately, a series of angry verbal and written communications between the two being concerned with the land dispute, Oollmer(s habit of flying a Union Jack on his boat (an Illegal practice, according to Fraser), and the consul's Insistence that the barrage of letters addressed to Commodore Bruce by Oollmer, usually marked "Immediate, 1 1 first be submitted unsealed to himself.10® Fraser now embarked on an active policy which, In his eyes, was aimed solely at removing the obstacles to a smooth flow of trade; In the opinion of the missionaries, his actions were directed against Mewu, were hostile to the Egba, and were thus In favor of the pro-slavery faction which Included Kosoko and the exiled Badagry chiefs. Accompanied by Heseltine, he first visited Porto Novo where he agreed with the King that Mewu had to be removed and the Egba siege of Ado lifted; In return, a 108rhe correspondence is contained In C.M.S.CA2/M2. promise was given that Porto Novo trade with Lagos would be resumed. Following this the two men visited the Egba encampment at Ado and made their proposals, only to be rebuffed out of hand. Mewu himself was visited, who declined to surrender his position unless the Egba first gave their assent.109 On returning to Lagos the demands were repeated by letter to the Egba chiefs at Abeokuta: Mewu must be removed as his presence at Badagry was the sole obstacle to peaceful relations; for good measure he was accused of murdering the wife of the Possu, one of the exiled chief s. According to the missionaries, the threat was also made that unless the Egba complied, the white people and their guns would be withdrawn from Abeokuta and England would become their enemy.Hi 109praser to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 3, 1 8 5 3, P.O. 84/920. llOHeseltlne to the Head Chief of Abeokuta, Lagos, Jan. 7# l853> Fraser to the Chiefs of Abeokuta, Lagos, Jan. 8, 1853, in P.O. 84/920. HlQollmer to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 15, 1853* C.M.S. CA2/043j Townsend to Bruce, Abeokuta, Jan. 17, 1853, C.M. S. CA2/05. Missionary Triumph As might be expected, the missionaries raised a storm of protest, letters by the dozen being sent to Londcn and to the Commodore. On hearing that Heseltlne was pre paring to remove Mewu by force, Oollmer Implored him not to undertake such a rash act, assuring him that he had given him the correct political Information and that the conflict was between a slave trade faction which included Dahomey, Porto Novo, Ado, Kosoko and the Possu, as opposed to the pro-English anti-slave party headed by the Egba, Mewu and Akltoye. The removal of Mewu would be a gross Injustice, would ally Great Britain with the pro-slavers and would re sult In selling many people Into slavery for a few gallons of palm-oil.112 Heseltlne was unimpressed, returning a curt note that declined any further correspondence.H3 Townsend, on receipt of the letters from Fraser and Heseltlne addressed to the Egba chiefs, called together the town's civil leaders to discuss their content. Anger 112Oollmer to Heseltlne, Lagos, Jan. 17, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/043. 1 13Heseltine to Oollmer, Lagos, Jan. 18, 1 8 5 3, C.M.S. CA2/043. 216 was intenre, but Townsend advocated a courteous reply that would explain the Egba position.114 The chiefs assented and Townsend replied accordingly.H5 But In a letter to the Commodore, Townsend was less contained. He accused Heseltlne of dictating wholly unacceptable terms to the Egba, under the Influence of Sandeman, which Ignored the facts that Porto Novo had broken Its treaty by stopping trade, that the anti-slave treaty with Badagry had already recognized Mewu as chief, and that to pursue Heseltlne1s dangerous policy would be to alienate the very people most friendly to England. Bruce received the letter alongside Commander Heseltlne's report: his reaction was all that the mission aries desired. He disapproved the course followed by Fraser, and as for Heseltlne, that officer had obviously allowed his "better judgement to be controlled by other parties.*1 Newu would not be removed from Badagry; his lli*Townsend to C.M.S., Abeokuta, Jan. 13, 1 8 5 3, C.M.S. CA2/H2. USTownsend to Fraser, Abeokuta, Jan. 11, 1 8 5 3, P.O. 84/920. Il6* p 0wnsend to Bruce, Abeokuta, Jan. 17, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/05• 217 enemies would not be aselated by Great Britain nor would the Egba be required to withdraw from Ado. 117 Fraser was Informed that naval officers would no longer be allowed to Interfere In affairs at Badagry.H® What Heseltlne was told In person when the Commodore returned to Lagos can only be Imagined; sufficient to say that within weeks of this event Heseltlne was sent to a new station* first expressing to Oollmer his regrets for the difference of opinion that had arisen between them.H9 Fraser did not surrender quite as gracefully* complaining of the "machinations of the missionaries“ In his report to London.120 There* Foreign Office officials had no lack of reports on the situation as Venn had been keeping them well informed. In addition* there were many requests from the missionaries that Fraser be removed; 13-7Bruce to Townsend* H.H.S. Penelope. Sierra Leone* Feb. 16* 1853, C.M.S. CA2/05. llSBruce to Fraser* H.M.S. Penelope. Lagos* Feb. 25* 1853, P.O. 84/920. ^^Heseltlne to Oollmer* Lagos* I March!* 1853* C.M.S. CA2/043. 120praser to Malmesbury* Lagos* March 3, 1053, F.O. 84/920. 218 Bruce received similar requests, from them and from Akltoye and other chiefs, but originating from the same source. 121 All ultimately found their way to the Foreign Office. So In March, when 3andeman*s employers wrote to the new Foreign Secretary complaining of Oollmer's "dangerous Intrigues" and the'Indiscreet and improper Interference of the missionaries In native wars and dis putes, " and In April, when Mr. Forster called at the Foreign Office to complain about Admiral Bruce's non- assistance In the removal of Mewu, the official mind had been made up. Lord Clarendon fully concurred In Bruce's decision not to disturb Mewu and the Egba; the Commodore had acted correctly In every way, he believed.1 2 2 in the words of Henry Venn, "it is all that we could wish."123 Indeed, at this point, the Society had good reason to feel pleased. It had shown Itself to be the arbiter of Yoruba policies, had successfully achieved Its ambition at 121In P.O. 84/920. Also, see Rev. Paley to C.M.S., Lagos, Jan. 15* 1853, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 122Lox*d Wod©house to Mr. Mathew Forster, Foreign Office, April 27, 3.853, F.O. 84/921. 123c.M.S. to Oollmer, London, April 23, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 219 Lagos, where Oollmer had become the right hand of the king, and new fields of expansion were presenting themselves. , Seven missionary stations and ten schools were In operation and the Mission boasted ten ordained missionaries and over twenty laymen.12^ And that was not all. Ibadan was being opened as a new station by Rev. and Mrs. David Hlnderer and Rev. J. T. Kefer, while Rev. Mann had taken up resi dence at IJaye and the missionaries were making extensive tours of new territories. As for the Society's Egba policy, this too had been amazingly successful. Townsend was In a position of prominence In Egba counsels and the favored people had been furnished with their own seaport; except for the troublesome IJebu, the Egba In fact could be considered masters of the Ogun. Matters were even improving with the Ijebu, as from late I8 5 2 they had been making definite peaoe overtures to the Egba.^25 Further, a highly success ful visit to Abeokuta had been made at the end of 1852 by 12i *C.M. Proceedings, 1852-53. p. vill. 125Townsend to Fraser, Abeokuta, Dec. 31# 1 8 5 2, F.O. 84/920; Oollmer to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 15, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/043; Crowther, Journal. Abeokuta, March 23* 1853, C.M. S. CA3/ 0 3 1. 220 two naval officers. Captain Poote and Doctor Irving, to ascertain Egba defense requirements. The gentlemen departed impressed with what they had seen and gave the Commodore a very favorable report.12* * The Missionary Position at the End of 1832 As for the general Yoruba situation, peace reigned— albeit uneasy. Ibadan was becoming more power ful, being challenged only by the Egba, around whom the other Yoruba states were beginning to cluster, watching with apprehension the growth of Ibadan military power. Only Qyo continued to side openly with that city-state, the Alafln mistakenly viewing the Ibadan drive to attain a Yoruba hegemony as an attempt to restore his own position.127 126t. b. Macaulay to C.M.S., Abeokuta, Dec. 8, I8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/M2; Crowther, Journal, Abeokuta, Dec. 4- 7, 1852, C.M.S. CA2/031. 127j. F. Ade AJayI and Robert Smith, Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: University Press, 19&0, p. 7 3. 221 On the whole, the missionaries could congratulate themselves that their situation was not unfavorable; hut there were a few dark clouds. The handful of European traders at Lagos were proving bothersome, especially as their principals In England were becoming critical of a cane aspects of missionary enterprise. The activity of Kosoko continued to be a thorn In the Society's flesh, as did the lax enforcement of the treaty with Lagos. Domestic slavery had not been covered by treaty and slaves continued to be bought and sold, making It difficult to know for whom or where slaves were destined. Apparently, an Illi cit route existed from Lagos to Porto Novo and Whydah, from where cargoes of slaves continued to be shipped, 1 2 6 mostly to Cuba. Also of concern was the latent support of Kosoko which was apparent In Abeokuta and the opposition to the missionaries which was centered In two or three Egba townships most connected with the slave trade. Then there were Internal problems In the Mission, the most outstanding of which was the friction between Townsend and Gollmer, a friction which caused Townsend to 12&Gol0mer to Capt. C. G. Phillips, R.N., Lagos, June 14, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 222 offer his resignation as Mission Secretary In 1 8 5 2 In the belief that the Society placed more confidence In Oollmer i than It did In himself.129 There were other disagreements, too, such as Townsend*s opposition to Venn's recurring l theme concerning the Introduction of “legitimate commerce." In the opinion of the man on the spot there existed already too great a proclivity to trade; rather, Townsend felt that trading should be discouraged before It completely stifled Interest In more productive pursuits.*30 And all the missionaries resented their participation In the Abeokuta cotton enterprises organized by Venn, whlcn Involved them In buying and shipping the staple as well as encouraging Its cultivation. They disapproved of them selves representing Manchester Interests and becoming little more than commercial agents.131 While some of these problems were serious, or potentially so, the missionaries1 morale and prestige were 129Townsend to C.M.S., Abeokuta, July 22, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 130Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, May 1, 1 8 5 2, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 131Ibid. 223 given a large boost in July, 1 8 5 3. The Egba had been at the gates of Ado since the previous November and in fact had been besieging this Egbado town, a tributary to Porto Novo, for ten years or more in intermittent fashion. The place was strategically located on the overland route from Abeokuta to Badagry and several attempts had been made by British officers, to no avail, to Induce the Egba to with draw. Despite the hopes for quick victory, the siege had dragged on, lengthened by the material assistance given the defenders by Porto Novo. Crowther and Townsend then decided to take the initiative, aware of Egba dlsgruntlement at the lack of success meeting their warriors. They arrived at the Egba camp in late July and began talks with the Basorun. Following this there were meetings with the Porto Novo representatives and with Ikoko, the head of the Ado elders. TherS was half-hearted request from Porto Novo that Mewu be removed from Badagry and the Possu and the Wawu permitted to return; but this was dismissed by the missionaries on the ground that the exiles were enemies of England and the matter rested with Commodore Bruce. 224 This being disposed with, the Egba terms were sub mitted for consideration. They would withdraw If Ado guaranteed neither to Interfere with the road nor molest any of the neighboring settlements friendly to Abeokuta. The Ado elders agreed at once, the siege was lifted and the Egba camp destroyed, as was the custom.132 Townsend relayed the good news to Bruce, who sent his warm congratulations and stated his Intention of Informing the Government of this signal service performed by the two men.133 But the Commodore need not have troubled himself. Alive as always to the possibilities presented by the occasion, Venn saw the chance of present ing the work of his men "In an Important light . . . before the government of this country.“134 a pamphlet was published describing the peace-making activities of the Society's servants, one reaching the Foreign Office as a 132(jrowther, Journal. Abeokuta, July 25-27, 31, 1853; Crowther to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 23, 1 8 5 3, C.M.S. CA 2/031; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 23, 1 8 5 3, C.M.S.CA 2/085. 133Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 23, 1 8 5 3, C.M. S. CA2/ 0 8 5j Dr. Irving to consul Campbell, Ibadan, Oct. 9, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/04. 134venn to Townsend, London, Oct. 24, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 225 matter of course. Also In the pamphlet, which was circu lated widely, were copies of the letters from Lieutenant White to Bruce, and Bruce to the Admiralty, which refuted the charges brought against the Society over Its land acquisitions at Lagos.135 An article on the Ado affair was also Included In the next Issue of the popular Church Missionary Intelligencer. Every effort was thus made to Illustrate the Influence and prestige enjoyed by the missionaries In Yorubaland and the beneficial effects flowing from this happy circumstance. The case was overstated, however, as the route to Badagry had by now faded Into comparative unimportance. Lagos was now open to the Egba, the Ogun was firmly In their hands, so the Ado affair had been more of an embarrassment than anything else, the Intervention of the missionaries being accepted as a graceful way of withdrawing from an uncomfortable and unnecessary position. The missionaries1 morale was even further raised In the same month of July with the long-awaited arrival In Lagos of Benjamin Campbell, the man replacing Fraser as !35Enclosed In Venn to Clarendon, London, Nov. 18, 1853, P.O. 84/921. 226 the first full consul. As Campbell, rather than Fraser, ushered into Yoruba history the period of consular Juris diction, his arrival and the events which followed warrant examination in a new chapter. Summary When British power had been enlisted, the mission ary campaign to oust Kosoko at last bore fruit. In missionary eyes, the coup had several objectives: it was designed to end the slave trade at Lagos, deliver to the Egba their own coastal outlet, and at the same time advance the evangelization of Africa by securing for missionary use a port linked by water to the interior. But despite the apparent realization of the Society's objectives by the end of 18^1, all was not well. Missionary intervention in African politics had been aggravating the European trading community even before Kosoko had been removed. At Badagry, their support of Mewu resulted in an interdict of trade with Porto Novo; at Abeokuta, missionary success in persuading Ctreat Britain to support the Egba had resulted in a flow of armaments that enabled the Egba to pursue their ambitions in Egbado 227 and Awari country with fresh vigor, to the detriment of commercial intercourse• And on top of this, the naval blockade of the Benin coast, while not Intended to inter fere with legitimate commerce, had the unavoidable conse quence of depressing trade even more. This conflict of Interest was unfortunate, leading to controversies between the two factions which ultimately harmed African Interests more than any other. But more serious was the disagreement that developed between the missionaries and the representative of the British Government. Finding himself concerned with civil adminis tration, and hence commercial conditions, Fraser's political ends were the same as those of the traders, and of course he clashed with the missionaries. This was the genesis of a struggle between missionaries and officials, each seeking to win acceptance for their conflicting views, that was to continue with varying degrees of inten sity until the missionaries conceded victory to the imperial factor. The fact that the Society's strength in England proved sufficient to win the first skirmishes meant only that the ultimate decision was to be delayed. CHAPTER V MISSIONARIES AMD THE IMPERIAL FACTOR Casqpbell was about to mark his fifty-third birthday when he landed at Lagos. He had been trading on the coast for many years and was assuming this new position after serving as Polloe Magistrate at Sierra Leone. His appointment had been one of the first official acts of the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, who decided that Beecroft*s extended consulate should be split and named Campbell as consul to the Bight of Benin; Beeeroft's Jurisdiction was thus confined to the Bight of Blafra. Oollmer was delighted with the appointment. Campbell was Just the type he had hoped for: able, exper ienced, a gentleman who commanded respeot, a Christian greatly Interested In missionary work and a man, hopefully, who would prove to be na blessed Instrument In the hand of God for the good of the country." Oollmer anticipated a 228 229 fruitful partnership, so to begin the new relationship on a proper footing he pressed the consul to stay with him until suitable accommodation could be found. As Campbell had no wish to associate with traders, those "uncouth Europeans," as Oollmer termed them, he accepted the offer gratefully .3" One of his first tasks was to Investigate complaints leveled at the missionaries: Forster and Smith had charged that they encouraged the Egba to make war and Fraser had complained of their Interference at Badagry. 2 Campbell had no difficulty In exonerating the gentlemen w ^ from both complaints, and Indeed paid glowing tribute to Oollmer. The Idea that the missionaries were Inciting the Egba was sheer nonsense, Campbell reported, and he was aware of only one Incident of missionary Interference In politics— Crowther and Townsend stopping the war at Ado. 3 lOollmer, Journal, Lagos, July 21, 1853; Oollmer to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 3* 1853, C.M.S. CA2/043. 2ciarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, March 30, April 23, 1853, F.O. 84/920. 3Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, July 28, Sept. 20, 1 8 5 3, F.O. 84/920. 230 Campbell really did not have time to Investigate the complaints thoroughly and his reports seem to be based strlotly on Oollmer's Interpretation of events. For, like Fraser, Campbell landed at Lagos at a bad Juncture In the town's affairs. Trade had been at a standstill for months, due to the continued presence of Kosoko's warriors on the lagoon, who were effectively stopping trade on the Qgun and hindering commercial communications between Lagos and the Ijebu markets. Likewise, no oil was forthcoming from Porto Novo because of the continued presence of Mewu at Badagry. Lagos trade was so notoriously poor, In fact, that only three merchant vessels dropped anchor during the first six months of 1 8 5 3.^ This resulted In considerable local unrest, not only on the part of the European traders, who blamed the missionaries for Kosoko1s activities, but also on the part of the town's chiefs who derived their Incomes from trade. Two chiefs In particular were most unhappy, Ajlnla and the Lagos Possu, Pellu. Oollmer had been negotiating with them since April to persuade them against an open revolt 4praa«r to Clarendon, Lagoa, June 27, 1853, P.O. 2/9. 231 against Akitoye, but because of their dissatisfaction with the state of things and the agitation they were stirring up he considered them, ipso facto, slave traders who were friends and allies of Kosoko and actively working for Akitoyefs downfall. This was not necessarily the case. That the two chiefs were Indeed plotting with Kosoko seems apparent, as Townsend had received Independent Ijebu reports confirming this as early as May.5 But their dis satisfaction probably steamed more from the general sparsity of trade brought by the new regime than It did to aay desire to restore the slave trade. Rev. Oollmer and Civil War at Lagos Open revolt was but narrowly averted in May, thanks In part to Oollmer and the timely arrival of an Egba force; but by the end of July, when Campbell arrived, things were again coming to a head. The following account of the rebellion which broke out In the early hours of August 5 la the one given by Campbell two years later, when he was embroiled In bitter controversy with Oollmer ^Townsend to Oollmer, Abeokuta, May 20, 1833, C.M. S. CA2/043. ^32 and the Society. However, It is corroborated by a naval officer who took part in the proceedings, so as missionary sources have nothing to say on Oollmer's role in precipita ting the outbreak, Campbell's account will be used. 6 The consul stated that although matters were very tense in late July he was confident that he oould work out a pacific settlement between Akitoye and the rebellious chiefs. But as the town was on the verge of civil war H.M.S. Waterwltch was standing off the bar, permanent naval instructions stipulating that Akitoye was to be maintained on the throne.7 It had been arranged for a rocket to be fired if naval assistance was required, but both sides had promised not to begin hostilities and up to midnight on August 4 the promises had been kept. Soon after this hour, Commander Alan H. Gardner of Waterwitoh observed the rocket signal and thinking it to be the pre-arranged sign, launched his boats and soon ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, July 30, 1635* 7.0. 64/976; Commander Gardner to Admiralty, Nov. 5» 1 6 5 3, eno. in Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Jan. 3« 1 8 3 6, F.O. 84/ 1002. 7Lord Stanley to Admiralty, Foreign Office, July 14, 1852, F.O. 84/891. 233 landed at the C.N.S. compound. Campbell and Oollmer were awakened, knowing nothing about the rockets being fired, but the latter gentleman, according to Campbell, became ;very excited and sent for his assistant, Samuel Pearce, He Instructed Pearce In the Yoruba language to take a flag to Akitoye, the flag being a pre-arranged Instruction for Akitoye to begin his attack. This done, he explained that the arrival of the armed naval boats presented a good opportunity for the king to put down the rebellious chiefs, Gardner protested that his men were being provided for defensive purposes only and went Immediately to Akitoye to make this quite clear. But upon arrival, Akitoye told him that orders had already been sent to his captains and that It was too late for them to be countexmanded. Firing then commenced shortly after daybreak. Gardner and Campbell thus state plainly that Gollmer was responsible for precipitating the rebellion, although It should be re-emphasized that the charge was made much later, when tempers were Inflamed, and that the contemporary reports of the two men make no reference to the Incident. But the fighting which resulted saw great damage Inflicted on the town, several thousand people taking refuge In the missionary compound, which was defended by the sailors and with the help of powder and shot supplied by the consul. During the ensuing days several unfruitful at tempts were made to reconcile the king and chiefs and on August 10 It was learned that Kosoko was on his way to aid the rebels. Caaqpbell negotiated with him for two days but It was not this which averted catastrophe for Akitoye; rather. It was the timely arrival of Commodore Bruce In his flagship, in company with H.M.S. Polyphemus. Narines were landed Immediately and Kosoko, Ajlnla, Pellu, and their supporters fled from the Island to Kosoko1s retreat at Epe, east of Lagos on the north shore of the lagoon. 8 Oollmer Presses for Further Action The victory was not completely satisfactory In Nr. Oollmer*s opinion. He realized, correctly, that Kosoko had ample support and was well placed at Epe to disrupt Lagos trade and communications with the mainland, with Abeokuta particularly. He therefore advocated a policy ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 1. 1853, P.O. 84/920. 235 j more aggressive than the mere support of Akitoye as author ized by the Government. The Commodore and the consul were ; | the chief recipients of his advice, being the men on the ■ spot, but he did not fall to advocate his forward policy to Society headquarters In London. In the short run, his campaign was very successful. Oollmer first fired a broadside against Commander Oardner and the alleged lack of support he had provided during the rebellion. His erltlolsms were published by the Society, forcing Oardner to defend himself to the Society and to Commodore Bruce. His defense Is worthy of note, Illuminating as It does the relationship with Akitoye enjoyed by Nr. Oollmer and Oollmer*s part In the rebellion. The king was "entirely Influenced" and "much governed" by the missionary, Oardner wrote, and during the uprising Oollmer had resisted all attempts to effect a reconciliation between the warring factions. He had not counseled the king strongly enough against fighting, and as for the charge that he had not supported Akitoye vigorously enough, Oardner countered that he had actually 236 exceeded his orders Nto meet Nr. Oollmer's views."9 Oollmer*s forward policy was clearly spelled out t In a letter to the Society written just a few weeks after the flight of the troublesome chiefs, Venn sending It on to Lord Clarendon. Lagos was safe only for the moment, he wrote, and danger would persist as long as Kosoko, Pellu, and Ajlnla had It In their power to hinder the water and land routes. To him It was plain that Lagos "and all British Interest and enterprise" would be lost [his emphasis], If England did not actively participate In re moving this threat. This done, Lagos would soon become one of the greatest ports on the coast and much benefit would accrue to suffering Africa. 10 How much Oollmer was able to win Commodore Bruce to his way of thinking Is not known; perhaps Bruce, being an admirer of both the Society and Oollmer, did not need ^Oardner to Bruce, Sierra Leone, Jan. 10, 1854, Oardner to C.M.S., Sierra Leone, Jan. 12, 1854, In C.M.S. CA2/K2. 10Gollmer to C.M.S., Lagos, Sept. 2, 1853# F.O. 84/920 237 to be persuaded. 11 Regardless, an expedition of about ninety men from the Polyphemus and a thousand warriors were dispatched to destroy Epe on September 8 . But the men returned two days later, having burned four villages without reaohlng their objective.12 That Campbell became fully committed to Oollmer*s viewpoint there can be no doubt. In September, for instance, he was referring to Kosoko as "that wretch who seeks to destroy the most Important position we have In Abeokuta.nl3 a few days later he was expressing his re gret that the expedition against Epe had been a failure and telling the Foreign Office tha-c something had to be done to ensure the safety of Lagos.So when Admiral Bruce suggested bringing Egba soldiers to Lagos, Campbell 11Bruce to Oollmer, Lagos, Aug. 15* 1853# quoted by Charles H. V. Oollmer, Charles Andrew Oollmer. p. 8 3. 12Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 11, 1853* F.O. 84/920. 13campbell to Oollmer, Lagos, Sept. 3, 1853* C.M.S. CA2/H2. I4campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 11, 1 8 5 3* F.O. 84/920. 238 agreed wholeheartedly and made the request to Abeokuta.15 About two thousand arrived on October 7* Campbell provid ing for their maintenance, and another attack against Xpe was arranged; again, there was to be naval support and this time Campbell hoped that jteace would be restored to the country once and for all.l6 Despite the high hopes this attack also failed, leading the missionaries not only to criticize the way In which the operation had been carried out but also to renew the demand that Kosoko be broken completely.17 The demand had become more urgent even before the second attack as Akltoye had died In September. His death had come suddenly, some claiming that he had died by his own hand In the manner traditional to Yoruba rulers who l^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 1 0, 1834, P.O. 84/930; Alake of Abeokuta to Campbell, Abeokuta, [Sept.], 1854, P.O. 84/976. I6campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 7, 1833, P.O. 84/920. ^Townsend to Campbell, Lagos, Oct. 17, 1 8 3 3, P.O. 84/920; Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Oot. 24, 1 8 3 3, C.N.S. CA2/085. 239 ceased to give satisfaction to their subjects.1® There were later reports that he had been poisoned by the i dissident chiefs In any event. It was Oollmer who was | first Informed of Akltoye's demise and who was asked to carry the news to the consul. Doceao, the eldest son, was quickly elected to his father's position, A man of about thirty years, Dooemo at first was highly regarded by Gollmer and Campbell and It was hoped that his rule would be firm and efficient. Nevertheless, the occasion raised the question of Kosoko's claim to the throne, and as his war canoes Increased their activity on the lagoon and at the mouth of the Ogun while his warriors ranged further afield on the mainland opposite Lagos, the missionaries stepped up their demands for his removal. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 3, 1854, P.O. 84/920. *9Dr. Irving to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 240 Opening of the Breaoh between Missionaries and Consul There Is evidence that the consul began to recon- slder the whole state of coastal politics following the unsuccessful attaoks on Epe and ICosoko1s Increasing bold ness. For one thing, Campbell had moved out of his temporary quarters at the missionary compound and was no longer In such Intimate contact with Oollmer. At the same time, he was on terms of growing familiarity with the European merchants, especially Sandeman and MoCoskry. There was no Immediate reversal of policy, however, shown by the fact that naval escorts were being provided for Egba canoes crossing to Lagos and that Campbell suggested In December that an Egba consul and a force of warriors be permanently stationed on the Island to guard Egba Inter ests and to Insure their uninterrupted supply of munitions "and even heavy artillery.n2° Protection of the Egba thus remained of prime ooncern. 20cempbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Nov. 30, 1 8 3 3, Campbell to the Sagbua and chiefs of Abeokuta, Lagos, Dec. 13, 1853, in F.O. 84/920. 2 4 1 At the game time, Kosoko's harassment of trade on the lagoon was depriving Lagos of the large voluae of goods normally received from Ijebu country and was conse quently decreasing the Island*s necessary revenue. Campbell therefore cast around for alternate sources of Income and picked the most obvious, the trade that should normally flow to Lagos from Porto Novo via Badagry. He had received a letter from the King of Porto Novo In late September asking for the removal of Mewu from Badagry and informing him that no goods would move eastwards from his towns until this had been accomplished.21 By this time Campbell had also learned from the traders that Oollmer*s Interpretation of Badagry politics was not the only one. Consequently, In October, the consul made his first move against Mewu, a move not designed to antagonize the missionaries but merely to augment the Island's revenue. Mewu was warned by the consul that he knew that he was engaged In slave trading and was therefore violating his treaty. Simultaneously, the Foreign Office was Informed of the friction that existed between Mewu and 21Porto Novo, Sept. 26, 1853, P.O. 84/920. Porto Novo and Campbell requested that the treaty be annulled.22 The request was denied by Clarendon, but pending Instructions the consul complained of Mewu1 a alleged slave trading to the Commodore, who warned him to cease the practice on pain of being deposed.23 In this way began an estrangement between the consul and the missionaries which was to lead to several years of bitter hostility. On one side the missionaries claimed that Campbell had become the mere tool of the traders, was actively supporting the pro-slave elements and was thus overturning decades of British policy for a few gallons of palm oil. On the other ranged the consul and the traders, all concerned primarily with an Increase In trade, but with different motives. The Mewu dispute came to a head the following year, but before examining this conflict of Interest another C.M.3. servant must be Introduced, one who played an active role In the events of 1 8 5 4 as the Society's "lay agent." 22campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 26, 1853# P.O. 84/920. 23Bruce to Mewu, Nov. 7, 1853, P.O. 84/950. C.M.S. Pro-Consul In Yorubaland 243 The Man who arrived In Lagoa In January of that year to take up this position was Doctor Edward Irving, i ! R.N., one of the two naval offloors who had visited Abeokuta In Deeember, 1 8 5 2, to ascertain Egba defense requirements.2^ His appointment by the Society can well be regarded as marking the second phase of Venn's plans for Yorubaland, a phase aimed at the broadening of British Interest and Intercourse with the Egba as the Society's chosen vehicle for the enlargement of Christianity and commerce. The first part of the program had Included the Introduction of the Egba to the attention of Great Britain, the campaign to assure them a supply of arms and ammuni tion and the reduction of Lagos to provide then with a port. This phase had then closed with the Installation— and acceptance by the British Government— of Egba parti sans at Badagry and Lagos. Venn had been pressing for the appointment of a consular offlolal at Abeokuta for several years. His requests had never been successful, however, as there was 24sUpra. pp.229*20. 244 not a sufficient commercial connection between Great Britain and tne Egba to warrant the expense.2^ The need i for a representative at Abeokuta who could officially I represent the Egba had become more acute, In the eyes of j the Society, when It learned of the fracas with Fraser and Heseltlne which had taken place in early 1853* It then became very desirable to "obtain the appointment of a vice- consul at Abeokuta favorable to the views of the Society" who would relieve the missionaries of political and com mercial work and the frequently embarrassing and unpleasant communications with merchants and naval officers.2^ But the Foreign Office still declined to appoint a representa tive because of the sparsity of trade. This falling, Venn approached Dr. Irving, who had visited Salisbury Square to report on his visit to — Abeokuta. The doctor had been deeply Impressed by the work being carried out by the missionaries, so when Venn broached the subject of his returning to Yorubaland as the 25venn to Crowther, London, Feb. 28, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 2^Venn to Townsend, London, March 23, 1&53, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 245 Society's lay representative Irving readily accepted. Although he was to be in the paid employment of the i Society, Venn visualized "some recognition from the Oovera- ment" for the position he was to fill.27 i Accordingly, a deputation from the Society called on the Foreign Secretary in May to discuss the appointment. Lord Clarendon showed Interest and asked Chichester to submit a written draft of the proposed instructions under which the doctor was to carry out his duties. This was done, the covering letter emphasizing that the Society would amend the orders in any way Clarendon desired as it was anxious that Irving should go "with the full approval of Her Majesty's Qovenment,"2® This was not found to be necessary. The instructions were straightforward enough, although some surprise can be evinced at the extent of Irving's military duties and the fact that, if he were to succeed In his multifarious activities he would achieve 27Venn to Townsend, London, March 23, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 28c.M.S. to Clarendon, London, May 31* 1853* F.O. 84/921. 246 a veritable revolution In Yorubaland. He was to work with the Missionaries In ameliorating the "social, political and commercial conditions" of the natives; he was to communicate with the Squadron and the oonsul on behalf of the mission; he was Instructed to encourage the growth of cotton In all possible ways, for If Abeokuta proved to be a significant source of supply "Its political Importance to England will at once be established•" He was to advise the chiefs on their olvil Institutions and connsel then on defenses; If possible, he was to organize a defensive alliance between Abeokuta, Ibadan, IJaye and Ketu.29 Upon examining the Instructions Lord Clarendon wrote a memorandum outlining the gist of his reply to the Society. He also wrote, privately, that he wished to afford Dr. Irving "all possible assistance" and that he desired to be Informed at any time If the doctor needed help that the Government could offer*30 in the reply which went to Salisbury Square a few days later, Clarendon expressed his entire approval of the mission and at the 29c.M.S. to Clarendon, London, May 31, 1853, P.O. 84/921. 3Poated June 4, 1853, F.O. 84/921. 247 same tine enclosed a copy of a dispatch that was being sent to Campbell at Lagos. In It, the consul was Instructed to i help Irving In any way he could, Her Majesty*s Government j taking a "lively Interest" In the suocess of the mission. 3jj Sir James Graham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, also obliged with a letter to the Commodore coon ending the mission and Instructing that all possible naval assistance be furnished. Finally, the missionaries themselves were required to aid and assist their new colleague, 3 2 and with this admonition preceding him Irving arrived at Lagos on January 18, 1854. He was able to send home almost at once optimistic reports of the situation. He found cotton being grown extensively around Abeokuta, the Egba to have entire com mand of the Ogun, and between three and four hundred puncheons of palm oil arriving at Lagos every month for export to Europe. It would be a good Idea for the Egba to colonize Lagos, he thought, and thus consolidate their ^Clarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, June 11, 1853* enc. In Clarendon to Chichester, Foreign Office, June 11, 1853, F.O. 84/921. 32stralth to Gollmer, London, Nov. 23* 1853* C.M. S. CA2/L1. position In their "natural" seaport.33 it is worthy of note, nowever, that despite the Instructions to the mis sionaries to oooperate with Irving and hand over their secular duties, he experienced more difficulties with his colleagues than he did with the consul or with naval officers. Dr. Irving and his Co-workers Differences with Campbell certainly arose before Irving's death, some sixteen months later, but they did not equal the point of personal Invective reached between Irving and Oollmer, for example. On the other hand, Irving was treated most kindly by Admiral Bruce on his arrival at Lagos, Bruce, In fact, Inviting him to stay on his flagship. Campbell, too, was an old friend, and 33lrvlng to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2 /0 5 2. A pjncheon was a cask with a varying capacity of up to a hundred and twenty Imperial gallons. This report de plots the small amount of trade carried on at Lagos. The Insignificance of the port to British commerce Is further Illustrated when It Is realized that not even this small amount of oil was destined for British markets, perhaps half of It being consigned to France or Hamburg. 249 was delighted to see the new arrival .34 But with the missionaries, his relations were not so cordial. It must be admitted that his task was difficult, for the stations were widely separated and months elapsed between his visits to any particular station. And It was literally Impossible for him to relieve all the mission aries of their temporal duties. Then, as Irving himself realized, political affairs had been their responsibility for such a long time that they found It difficult to entrust them to other hands.35 There was also a good deal of Jealousy, with the missionaries tending to regard the doctor as an Interloper, and his presence did nothing toward mending the discord which existed between the English- and German-speaking missionaries. 36 jn addition, the missionaries had enjoyed long and Intimate relation ships with the ohlefs, who naturally Inclined toward the men with whom they were familiar rather than the newcomer. 34irving to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 35irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 4, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 3^irving to Venn, Ibadan, Sept. 22, 1854, Irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 11, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA^052. 250 Irving, therefore, was never wholly accepted either by the Missionaries or their charges, a situation he felt keenly up to his death. He realized full well the practical impossibility of assuming Townsend's position at Abeokuta, even if Townsend had wished it. Townsend, Irving thought, thoroughly understood the feelings and habits of the Egba and was loved in return; he never permitted a oase to pass the Sagbua that was not Judged fairly and impartially, and Irving could not "sufficiently admire the power Hr. Townsend has acquired over these men . . . ."37 But Townsend was unwilling to share his position, although Irving anticipated that Townsend would be willing to hand over his secular duties, up to a point, when he went heme on leave.38 The only other man in the entire Mission who wielded as much power and Influence was Oollmer. But whereas Townsend's position was built upon respect, Irving 37irving to Venn, Abeokuta, June 1, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 3&Irvlng to Venn, Ibadan, Sept. 22, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. found that Oollmer's was based on fear and was supported nby a sort of superstitious dread of the natives for him, whoa they regard as their Fetish. There Is no love In lt,M39 Nor was there any love lost between Irving and Oollmer, although the doctor stayed at his house for several weeks after arriving at Lagos, finally being brusquely requested to leave and find new quarters.2 *0 Consequently, Irving's opinion of Rev. Oollmer was very low. Irving found him to be proud of his position of "war chief" at Lagos, flattered by being looked up to as "the great dictator of the political war movement,"2 *1 and full of dislike and jealousy. He was cordially hated by the European merchants, the doctor claimed, while' Oollmer1s fellow missionaries had no time for him. In addition, he was so embroiled In Lagos politics that Irving despaired of peace being achieved on the Island 39irYlng to Venn, Abeokuta, June 1, 1854, C.M.S. CA3/052. ^Ojownaend to Venn, Abeokuta, May 2, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA3/O8 5. ^Irving to C.M.S., Lagos, March 8, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/fe2. 252 while he remained .42 These opinions were returned in kind by Oollmer, of course, their mutual animosity making it impossible for Irving to be in Lagos when Oollmer was there. Increasing Missionary- Consular Disagreement These frictions and Jealousies contributed greatly to the difficulties facing Irving as soon as he set foot on the sandy ground of Lagos. Caaqpbell had begun to reconsider the condition of local politics in late 1 8 5 3, after the unsuccessful attack on Kosoko at Epe in October. He had then started a campaign to remove Mewu; but perhaps because of Bruce's reluctance to take any action in that direction or because he had not yet received Clarendon's reply to his proposal, Campbell began a different tack in January, 1854. It involved a rapprmo^hement with Kosoko, the goal being to increase the island's trade and revenue. 42Irvlng to C.M.S., Lagos, March 8, 1854, C.M.S. Ck2/K2} Irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 4, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/M3. The new departure wae completely unexpected; Egba warriors were still In Lagos and preparations were afoot for another expedition against Epe.^3 But following a meeting with Tapa, one of Kosoko*s chiefs, It was arranged that Campbell and Commander Bedlngfeld, R.N., visit Epe to discuss the entire Lagos situation. This was done but little progress was made, Kosoko refusing to renounce his claims to the Lagos throne. A later meeting was arranged, to be held at Langbassa, an uninhabited Island midway between Lagos and Epe Mot knowing Campbell's Intention but fearing that an attempt was afoot to restore peace by bringing Kosoko back to Lagos, the missionaries were up In anas Immediate ly. Townsend wrote to Campbell and Bruce on behalf of the Egba chiefs pointing out the folly of such a move, which, he warned, would end In another period of treachery, treason and civil war.^5 Oollmer wrote to Bruce on behalf ^3oollmer to Venn, Lagos, March 10, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA 2/043. 44campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Jan. 29, 1854, P.O. 84/950. ^Abeokuta, Jan. 16, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/08. 254 of Doeemo asking for an explanation, and Irving, newly arrived, personally impressed Campbell with the slavery and anti-slavery Issue Involved between Kosoko and D o e e m o .46 Everyone was assured, however, that there was no Intention of allowing Kosoko to return to Lagos; peace and the resumptlonoof trade were the objectives. Campbell asked Doeemo to send representatives to the Langbassa meeting, but at Oollmer's prompting he refused. The consul Insisted, however, at which he reluctantly sent seven of his youngest and most Inferior chiefs, a sure mark of his displeasure. Also attending were Egba representatives, Dr. Irving, Campbell, Bedlngfeld, Sandeman, McCoskry, and Pellu, A J Ini a and Tapa for Kosoko. But again there was little result; Campbell made It quite plain that Kosoko would not be allowed to return to the Island, so besides mutual expres sions of good will and desire for peace, no practical results were obtained.47 46irving to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 47irvlng to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. The affair served to Increase the frictions between the consul and the missionaries. Campbell brought back ! with him the proposal that trade be resumed between Epe and Lagos, but at Oollmer's behest Doeemo flatly rejected it. 48 According to Oollmer, Campbell countered the rebuff by Informing Doeemo that as long as he remained oonsul there would never be any naval help forthcoming In the event of Kosoko attacking the town.^9 Relations deterio rated even more. There were dark hints of a financial reward the oonsul was to receive from the merchants If trade was resumed, and Oollmer's suspicion grew that Campbell's ultimate Intention was to remove Doeemo. Con versely, Campbell's opinion of the missionaries, previously very high, dropped sharply. He accused Oollmer of exerting his "paramount Influence" over Doeemo to oppose all his efforts to work out a peaoable solution to the problems. While admitting that he possessed a degree of Influence, exercised only "for good and not for evil," Oollmer denied the charge ^fltoilmgrtto Venn, Lagos, Martffh 10, 1834, C.M.S. CA^/043. *9ibid. 256 categorically.50 Despite the denial, Campbell reported to the Foreign Office that he had made no progress toward the | pacification of Lagos and Its environs because of Oollmer'J i opposition and the Improper Influence he exerted over the I king and his chiefs.51 And amidst other acrimonious correspondence with Oollmer he reminded that gentleman that he was a missionary, employed by "an Influential, wealthy and benevolent Society," and Instructed him to confine himself to his clerical duties and "not to assume the part of a political agent" enmeshed In native disputes.52 Oollmer had Isolated himself even from his mission* ary brethren by this time. His colleagues were generally In favor of a peace being negotiated between Kosoko and Doeemo, their criticism stemming mainly from the clumsy way Campbell had gone about It, without first Informing 50campbell to Oollmer, Lagos, March 13* 1854, Oollmer to Campbell, Lagos, March 14, 1654, In F.O. 84/950. 51-Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, May 4, 1854, F.O. 84/950. 52campbell to Oollmer and Rev. Oerst, Lagos, May 8, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/04. Oerst was Oollmer's assistant at Lagos. Doeemo of his Intentions. But Oollmer*s reactions had been so vociferous and Indiscreet that he alienated the other Europeans, who felt that his presence had become a liability to the Mission. As Irving had done previously, Townsend now suggested that Oollmer be recalled to Europe, the sentiment being echoed by Hlnderer, who thought that Oollmer1s meddling In politics had brought matters to such a pitch "that one must feel he had better leave the mission for some time . • • ."53 Being fully aware of Oollmer's activities, as well as the resulting commotion at the Foreign Office, Venn at once concurred. Oollmer was reminded of the Society's regulation which directed missionaries not to Interfere In the political affairs of the country In which they were stationed and Venn Invited him to return home as soon as possible, leaving Dr. Irving "to arrange all political and commercial matters • . . ."34 Oollmer managed to delay his departure until 1855* however, despite Irving's 33Townsend to Stralth, Abeokuta, March 6, 1834, C.M.S. CA3/0 8 3; Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, May 2 3, 1 8 3 4, C.M.S. CA2/049. 34yenn to Oollmer, London, June 30, 1834, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 258 warning that by doing so he was endangering the health of his child. At the same tine he defended hla activities by explaining that political conditions made It "necessary at times to Interfere."55 The Mewu Affair Oollmer had good reason for wishing to remain. The passions Inflamed by the Kosoko matter had not yet subsided when another crisis arose, of equal Import to Oollmer and the missionary party. Oollmer having thwarted his attempts to reach an agreement with Kosoko and so release the significant IJebu-Lagos trade, Campbell again turned his attention to the western lagoon and the trade from Porto Novo, similar ly bottled up by the presence of Mewu at Badagry. The campaign which he now commenced to remove that chief Illus trates a classic example of a forward policy undertaken by a local official In direct contravention of the known desires of the Government. For Campbell was well aware that the Foreign Office was unwilling to Interfere In 55ooiimer to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 11, 1854, CA2/M3. 259 local quarrels and had disapproved Fraser*s earlier attempt to remove Mewu. He was also In receipt of Clarendon's Instruction not to annul the treaty with Mewu.56 Despite this, the consul began his campaign In April, 1854, perhaps taking advantage of the absence of Admiral Bruce, on his way back to England, who had always shown himself sympathetic and amenable to missionary arguments. The new Commodore had not yet arrived and In the meantime the Senior Officer, Commander Miller, readily agreed to provide naval support If It became necessary to remove Mewu by force. Accompanied by the traders Sandeman and McCoskry, Campbell visited Badagry and Porto Novo In April. At the latter place King Sodjl repeated his dictum that no trade would pass to Lagos while Mewu remained, whereupon Campbell Informed the Badagry people that Mewu was not their rightful chief and would be removed.57 According to the C.M.S. agents at Badagry, the oonsul was abusive of Mr. 56ciarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1853, P.O. 84/920. 57campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, June 1, 1854, P.O. 84/950. Qolitter, referring to him as the "King of Lagos;" after being made aware that the people did not wish for the return of the exiled chiefs, he blamed Gollner for their refusal,58 On his return to Lagos Caapbell net Townsend and Crowther, who happened to be visiting, and told then of his Intentions, Townsend offered to present the consul's case to the Egba chiefs, feeling that mediation would be preferable to the use of force, and his offer was accepted Immediately. It Is apparent that Campbell's arguments, although couched In terms of Newu's continuing participa tion In the slave trade and his questionable position as ruler of Badagry, were nevertheless governed by the necesilty of Increasing the Lagos revenue. The consul committed to paper his complaints against him, Including the charges that he was a usurper, had consistently violated his treaty and had murdered a wife of one of the exiled chiefs; he also cited the refusal of Porto Novo to send oil to Lagos while Mewu remained at Badagry. He had no personal Ill-will toward the chief, he wrote, but "If 56John Coker and T. Wright to Oollmer, Badagry, April 12, 1854, C.M.S. CA3/M3. the icing of Porto Novo makes [his removal] a sine qua non for opening the trade of Badagry, I must proceed . . . ." He offered Mewu a pension If he would retire peaceably to Lagos, but If he refused nothing would stop MHer Majesty's forces the painful alternative of enforcing his removal•“59 Armed with the ultimatum, Townsend returned to Abeokuta and met the Egba chiefs on April 25. The result could have been anticipated: there was an adamant refusal to desert their man at Badagry.6° Campbell was equally stubborn, advising the Egba to remember the many favors they had received from Great Britain and urging them to advise Mewu to leave, thus avoiding the necessity of using force. It must be admitted that the arguments on both 1 sides contained considerable merit. Mewu was Indeed a usurper and even Townsend privately acknowledged the 59campbell to Townsend, Lagos, April 19, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/04. 6°Townsend to Campbell, Abeokuta, April 2 6, 1854, P.O. 84/950. ^Campbell to Townsend, Lagos, April 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA3/04. 262 accusation of slave trading to be true.^2 His expulsion would undoubtedly provide a signal lesson to the coastal chiefs that Great Britain Intended to enforce Its anti slave trade treaties firmly, as Campbell maintained, but It was naive to presume that trade would flow smoothly to Lagos when Mewu had been removed; such had not been the case prior to 1851* There were further arguments against Campbell's proposals which the missionaries did not fall to point out, either to Campbell himself, to naval officers or to the Society at home and Its Influential friends. For Instance, the king of Porto Novo was himself the most active slave trader on the coast, so why make an example of a compara tively unimportant chief? And would not the return of the exiled chiefs to Badagry deliver the town to Porto Novo, which owed allegiance to the notorious Ghezo of Dahomey? And had not Mewu always shown his friendship to England and been recognized by treaty as the chief of the town? It was also pointed out that the Egba would be weakened If Campbell's plan succeeded and that British Influence and 6^ownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, May 2, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/085. 263 prestige built on Justice and fair-dealing, would suffer a sharp reversal. And to make matters worse, Kosoko would be strengthened by having the Wawu and Possu returned to Badagry while Deeemo would be correspondingly weakened. These and other arguments poured from the mission aries' pens In a veritable storm of protest. Meanwhile, Townsend and Irving went down to Badagry to discuss things with Mewu, from where they Informed Campbell that his pro jected course of action was quite wrong and that It would be most undesirable to use any aggressive measures.^3 The consul remained unmoved, and In fact made a formal demand for Mewu to deliver up his copy of the treaty; otherwise, strong measures would be taken.64 Profoundly Impressed at the Injustice of the entire proceedings and Incensed that the consul was prepared to sacrifice Mewu at the whim of Sodj£, Townsend then warned Campbell that he would appeal to higher authority.65 63Townsend to Campbell, Badagry, May 9, 1854, P.O. 84/950. ^Campbell to Townsend, Lagos, May 12, 1 8 5 4, P.O. 84/950. ^^Townaend to Campbell, Badagry, May 15, 1854, P.O. 84/950. 264 A long letter was composed to the Foreign Secretary which presented Mewu's entire history In a favorable light. Townsend went to great lengths to deny Mewu's participation In the slave trade (which he had previously admitted to Venn), earnestly beseeching Lord Clarendon to stay the con sul's hand.66 In a similar correspondence to Venn he pointed out the necessity "of having the case properly represented to the British Government at home, and, If pos sible, a stop put to the consul's Interference with native palavers . . . . " 6 7 Campbell was doing the same, of course, complaining bitterly to Clarendon of missionary Interference, their opposition to all plans for bringing peace to the coast and the short-sightedness of the C.M.S.-British policy that maintained the Egba to be the only people worthy of support.68 Downing Street and Salisbury Square were a long way away while the Squadron was at hand; so It was to the Navy that Irving turned for Immediate help. It was he 66Abeokuta, May 23, 1854, C.M.S. CA^/0 8 5. 67Abeokuta, May 25, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/085. 68Lag0s, May 1, 4, June 1, 1854, F.O. 84/950. 265 who could claim credit for the first Improvement being made In the missionary position. He began his letter to the Senior Officer by point* Ing out that his presence In Yorubaland had been approved by the Foreign Secretary and the Admiralty, that the First Lord had requested the Squadron to assist him and that he was authorized to communicate directly with naval officers. He went on to explain Campbell's proposal to expel Mewu, by force If necessary, and refuted the consul's arguments point by point. The letter gave almost a complete history of missionary enterprise on the coast and the favored position enjoyed by the Egba. But It explained the posi tion only; no requests were made.^9 it was effective, nonetheless. Within days that officer was "already pre pared to tell you" that naval forces would not be used to Implement Mr. Campbell's schemes at Badagry.70 The consul complained strenuously and about Irving's apparent authori zation to Interfere between himself and officers of the 69Abeokuta, May 30, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/05. 70commander Miller to Irving, H.M.S., Crane, off Lagos, June 8, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/05. 266 Squadron, but to no avail.71 Naval assistance was Indeed denied, forcing Campbell to employ a different mode to realise his objective. Townsend had already proposed the alternate solu tion of allowing the former chiefs to return to Badagry while permitting Mewu to remain. This the consul had rejected out of hand as being totally unacceptable to SodJ1.72 on second thoughts, or perhaps knowing by this time that naval assistance would not be forthcoming, Campbell accepted this on condition that all the chiefs resume their former rank.73 This was agreeable to the missionaries, both sides undoubtedly hoping for present compromise to develop Into future advantage. Consular Success Campbell, the Wawu, the Possu and many of their armed followers then arrived off Badagry on July 1, but 71campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 14, 1 8 5 4, F.O. 84/950. 72rownsend to Campbell, Abeokuta, April 26, 1 8 5 4, Campbell to Townsend, Lagos, April 30, 1854, In F.O. 84/950. 73campbell to Mewu, Lagos, June 1, 1854, Mewu to Campbell, June 10, 1854, In F.O. 84/950. 267 Mewu at this point refused them permission to land without Egba representatives being present.74 Campbell later charged that Gollmer was responsible for this reversal, having learned from a "reliable source" that Gollmer had sent Mewu strict Instructions not to allow Campbell or the chiefs to set foot In the town.75 Be that as It may, Campbell sent to Abeokuta for the missing representatives but after waiting for many days returned to Lagos when none appeared. He subsequently reported that upon his return he heard that the Wawu and Possu had attacked Badagry, been repulsed, and that the chiefs later returned with reinforce ments from Porto Novo and Ado and took the town.76 At all events, Mewu arrived In Lagos on August 10 to live under Docemo's protection, dying there the following year. 7^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 11, 1854, P.O. 84/950. 75campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Dec. 22, 1854, F.O. 84/950. Campbell's contention Is probably close to the mark. Mewu wrote to Townsend at this time thanking him for what he and Irving were doing on his behalf; he was doing everything according to their advice, he wrote. Badagry, July,19, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/fc3. 84/950 76Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 11, 1854, P.O. 268 Campbell's official report of the affair thua exonerates himself from any part In the actual expulsion of the chief, suggesting rather that he went there only with the pacific Intent of reconciling all the chiefs; but on Mewu's refusal to honor his pledge, the exiled chiefs then took matters Into their own hands. This report Is at complete variance with the missionaries1 account of the events, which maintained that Campbell appeared at Badagry with the specific Intent of forcing a conflict between Mewu and the exiled chiefs. Every attempt was made to goad Mewu and his people Into opening fire, but to no avail. In fact Mewu specifically asked the consul to with draw, not wishing any hanu to befall him if a fight ensued. At last growing tired of waiting, Campbell left, and short ly afterwards the attack took place, the war-cry being "The consul's war is come." This was repulsed but a second attack several weeks later was successful, rein forcements from Porto Novo and Ado having been arranged by the consul. Known agents of Campbell were present at the second attack and at Its conclusion Immediately departed for Lagos to make their reports.77 If it was any consolation to the missionaries, the Foreign Secretary completely disapproved Campbell's entire campaign against Mewu; but such disapproval went for nought against the accomplished fact. Lord Chichester, on behalf of the C.M.S., began a voluminous correspondence with Lord Clarendon on the subject In August, stating the complete missionary case against Campbell's maneuvers along with many supporting documents.78 it Is of Interest to note that despite Campbell's report of the affair, which exonerated himself from taking part In the actual ejqpulslon, and despite the fact that he was later able to prove that Mewu had engaged In slave trading, the Foreign Office preferred to accept the C.M.S. interpretation. The Society would have been even more consoled If It had seen a Foreign Office memorandum drawn up for Clarendon's attention which summarized events. The memorandum could Indeed have been prepared by the Society Itself so closely 77irvlng to Commander Miller, Abeokuta, July 1$, 1834, C.M.S. Ck2/H3; Townsend to Stralth, Abeokuta, Sept. 14, 1 8 3 4, C.M.S. CA2/083; Townsend to Chichester, Exeter, June 21, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/L1. 78London, Aug. 14, 1854, F.O. 84/951. 270 did It hew to the missionaries1 arguments, Including the one that maintained that the Egba were "the principal friends of the British Government In that part of Africa." Only one point was raised critical of the Society— that Gollmer "meddles with matters at Lagos which do not belong to his position as a missionary."79 Worsening of Relations But disapproved or not, Campbell had achieved his coup. The Immediate consequences were varied, but all resulted In the worsening of relations between the consul, the missionaries and their proteges. The Egba had received a bad blow, for it appeared that the English, for the first time, were actively helping their enemies; even worse, the consul seemed to be bent on Insulting and Injuring them. By late August an Egba attack on Badagry was expected hourly, engineered by Townsend, Campbell claimed, who was constantly advising them to retake the place and reinstall Mewu.8° But the attack, If any such 79Aug. 22, 1854, P.O. 84/951. BOcampbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 17> 1855» P.O. 84/976. 271 was planned, did not materialize; It was possibly discour aged by a letter to the Egba chiefs conceived by Campbell and signed by some twenty Sierra Leone Immigrants. It begged than not to act rashly as the Wawu and the Possu were the lawful chiefs of Badagry and Nr. Campbell and the English wished them to remain.01 Campbell then made an effort to reconcile the Egba with the new leaders at Badagry, but the Egba declined to negotiate on the subject.**2 This was hardly surprising, as Irving was continuing to press for the restoration of Mewu03 while Townsend, In reply to Campbell's accusation that he was Inciting the Egba to thwart his plans, pledged that he would maintain his opposition as long as Campbell exercised his Influence "to oppress and wrong the native chiefs and peopleAs the two men were counseling the 01Lagos, Aug. 2b, 1854, F.O. 84/976. 02Lagos, Nov. 8, 1854, Abeokuta, Nov. 25, 1854, In C.M.S. CA2/07. 83lrvlng to Venn, Ibadan, Sept. 22, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA#B3. ^Townsend to C.M.S., Abeokuta, Oot. 28, 1854, C.M.S. CA3/M3. 272 Egba during the entire affair®5 it Is small wonder that the Egba spumed consular attempt at mediation. There was a more basic factor as well. Egba sensibilities and prestige had most certainly been hurt by the loss of the I town, but on the other hand Badagry was no longer of Importance. The Egba continued to enjoy the far greater convenience and facilities available at Lagos, so Badagry was therefore disregarded, fading more and more Into Insignificance• Personal relations between the consul and the missionaries continued to deteriorate. Charges and countercharges were flung by both sides, each accusing the other of lying, deceit, hypocrisy, encouraging the slave trade, fomenting civil war, unwarranted Interference and shortsightedness, among other things.86 Campbell was held to be the avowed enemy of the Egba and the missionaries, matters not being Improved when It was suspected that the consul's Methodist conviction had a bearing on the course &5irvlng to Campbell, Ibadan, Oct. 9> 1854, C.M.S. CA2/04. 86campbell to Irving, Lagos, Aug. 22, 1854, Irving to Campbell, Ibadan, Oct. 9> 1854, In C.M.S. CA2/0*. 273 of events. His abortive attempt to have the Egba chiefs communicate with him through the embryonic Methodist estab lishment at Abeokuta rather than through the Church missionaries^ was seized upon to support this contention. Campbell, likewise, did not fall to forward to London a report by the Wesleyan assistant missionary at Abeokuta to the effect that Townsend did not Interpret fairly the consul's letter to the chiefs, always managing to place Campbell In an unfavorable light.88 Of particular annoyance to the missionaries was the fact that Ado had joined the attack on Mewu, allegedly at Campbell's Invitation. Townsend and Crowther had played the prominent part In negotiating the truce between Ado and Abeokuta only the year before, when Ado had promised not to molest any friends of the Egba. The truce was now broken; only with the greatest difficulty, according to the missionaries, did they dissuade the Egba from once more attacking Ado and Instead persuade them to let the Society 8?Davld Williams to Campbell, Abeokuta, Sept. 21, 1 8 5 4, Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Dec. 19, 1854, In C.M.S. CA2/M3. ®®Edward Blckersteth to Campbell, Abeokuta, Deo. 28, 1854, P.O. 84/976. 274 handle the protest to the British Government.89 What respect would the natives have for treaties, Townsend Inquired, when they saw the consul deliberately break a compact made by white men merely to serve his own private ends?90 This was but one of the many complaints made by the missionaries In pleading for Campbell's removal, or for the Society "to take any steps that may be thought desirable."91 The Egba sent a letter to Clarendon asking that he be sent away, while the Society at home actively pursued the same objective through a series of personal letters between Lords Chichester and Clarendon on a "My dear Clarendon" and "My Dear Chichester" basis.92 The Foreign Office balked at taking such a step, however, although there was consternation at the course Campbell had pursued; It was privately acknowledged that the consul 89Irving to Commander Skene, R.M., Abeokuta, March 24, 1855, P.O. 403/5. 9<^ownsend to Stralth, Abeokuta, Sept. 14, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/085. 9*Ibid. 92p#o. 84/951. 275 possessed an unfortunate disposition for involving himself in quarrels.93 Oollmer had been especially active throughout the affair, maintaining a barrage of letters and deputations to the consul and to the officers of the Squadron. Although acknowledging the purity of his colleague's motives, Irving had doubts about the propriety or effec tiveness of this campaign as Oollmer *s appearance in any political arena usually served to damage the cause it advocated. Even worse, he feared that the entire question of Mewu and Badagry would appear to naval officers as nothing more than partisan squabbles.94 Irving was 93|iemorandum, Nov. 22, 1854, P.O. 84/950. It should be remarked that although the Society found the Aberdeen Government more compatible than the Tory adminis tration it replaced, it still did not compare with Russell's government. Venn complained in early 1854 that it was be coming more difficult "to Influence the Government in matters oonneoted with the Squadron and coast of Afrloa. When Lord Palmerston left the Foreign Office we lost one who thoroughly understood the subject as well as being heartily with us. I fear we lost still more ground at the Admiralty." Venn to Gollmer, Feb. 23, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/L1. Sir James Graham, a Peellte, was the First Lord In Aberdeen's Government. 94jrvlng to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 4, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. 276 probably correct, for Oollmer was simultaneously lamenting that naval officers no longer called at the missionary i compound. On the other hand, Oollmer attributed this to Campbell's baneful Influence or to the fact that "the friends of Africa, the God-loving and fearing men,n had all left the coast.95 Changes at Abeokuta While the Badagry dispute still raged there occurred at Abeokuta a development which Townsend had been advocating for years. He had always been disturbed by the lack of a central executive, the existing structure result ing in weakness, prolonged debate and the chronic Inabil ity of the plethora of civil and military leaders to work together. What Townsend wanted was a strong authority that would be more efficient than the prevailing chaotic decentralized system, an executive that at the same time would be easier for him to guide. The Egba finally yielded to his persuasion and revived the defunct title of 95aollmer to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 11, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/M3. 277 Alake, leader of Ake and traditionally recognized as fore most of all Egba chiefs. i The pressing question was the choice of the person i to fill the office. Here Townsend was disappointed. There were three candidates: the Saguba, the Egba Basorun Somoye, and Ogubonna, the Balogun of Iklja. Of these, Ogubonna was Townsend's first choice, then Somoye; he did not want the "timed, dilatory" Sagbua, who was already acting as a kind of regent.96 But great friction develop ed between the civil and military leaders, the Ogboni backing the Sagbua as being one of themselves and the Ologun desiring one of the other candidates for a similar reason, yet being jealous of one of their own number assuming a position of paramountcy. There Is evidence that the Ogboni finally broke the deadlock by taking matters Into its own hands, for the mild Sagbua was ulti mately chosen; but the election creating a degree of 9%ownsend, Journal, for the Quarter ending June, 1851, C.M.S. CA2/0 8 5. bitterness within the ranks of the 01ogun.97 The great occasion was solemnized at Ake on August 11 amidst great pomp and splendor, one of the attending missionaries describing It as the most impressive scene he had ever witnessed In Africa.9® The big English cannon fired a twenty-one gun salute and Townsend was honored by being called from the gathered multitude to shake hands and converse with the Alake, significant proof of the high esteem In which he was held.99 Unfortunately, and to the disappointment of the missionaries, the new Alake proved to be only primus Inter pares and his effective authority continued to be largely confined to Ake. So the Inherent weakness of the Egba government remained, leading to Immediate difficulties. In his extremity, Mewu had appealed to the Egba for aid In July and an army was readied to move south to 97smlth, Journal, Abeokuta, July 29, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/082; Irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 4, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052; Oollmer to Venn, Lagos, Feb. 2, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA2/043. 98&aith, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 11, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/082. 99Rev. John Andrew Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, Aug. 11, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/068; Smith, Journal; Abeokuta, Aug. 11, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/082. 279 his assistance.But because of the Ogboni-Ologun conflict, the dissatisfaction of the war chiefs at the selection of the Sagbua and his Inability to enforce obedience to his wishes that military assistance be given to Mewu, the army did not go.101 If It had, there can be little doubt that the outcome at Badagry would have been different. Campbell and Kosoko; the Crux of Missionary-Consular Disagreement As It was, the consul had achieved a considerable victory and he confidently expected that Mewu's removal would result In palm oil from the Porto Novo district reaching Lagos to the tune ofjf250,000 a year,102 This estimate proved widly optimistic, as the missionaries had maintained, the volume of goods from this source remaining a perpetual disappointment. This had still to be learned, lOOjrving to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 4, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/052. lOlTownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 14, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/085. 102Campbell to Townsend, Lagos, April 30, 1854, P.O. 84/950. 260 however, and in the meantime Mr, Campbell turned hie attention to the one obstacle which obstructed the j complete and normal flow of trade to and from Lagos. The difficulty was Kosoko, who oontinued to hinder Ijebu-Lagos trade with his warriors and canoes. Even worse, he was succeeding in diverting part of the trade to his own port of Palma, a poor place affording few facilities but nevertheless having access to the sea through a narrow channel. Campbell had attempted to resolve the problem earlier in the year, only to be thwarted by Gtollmer, so hard on the heels of his success ful Badagry settlement he made the effort once more. The Kosoko question revolved on a fundamental difference between the missionaries on one hand and the consul and traders on the other. Both favored the extension of trade; but in the opinion of the missionaries, the consul and merchants inclined to disregard the personal, moral, and political attributes of their commercial contacts. The missionaries, while supporting legitimate commerce as the handmaiden of Christianity and a necessary tool in the regeneration and redemption of Africa, insisted that commercial Intercourse should not be 281 maintained with such notorious slave dealers as Kosoko. Dr. Irving well represented this sentiment when he Inform ed Venn that there could be no peace at Lagos until Kosoko was "either dead or his party broken up."l°3 This was so much nonsense to Campbell, pressed for money to prop up Docemo's shaky administration and main tain the bare essentials of necessary services In a commercial entrepot. Even so, the agreement made In September came as a surprise. Another attack by Kosoko was being expected at Lagos during the first half of the month, the consul himself arranging for naval protection and storing gunpowder In the C.M.S. compound.1^ But the attack not materializing, the consul and Commander Miller went to Epe and negotiated a treaty with Kosoko that was signed on September 2 8. In return for an annual pension from Great Britain of 2,000 heads of cowries or $1,000, Kosoko and his chiefs renounced all claim to Lagos, promised to abandon the slave trade, agreed to protect 103lbadan, Sept. 22, 1854, C^M.S. CA2/&3. lO^campbell to Gollmer, Lagos, Sept. 2, 1854, C.M. S. CA2/M3; Gollmer to Venn, Lagos, Sept. 13, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/043. merchants and to assist the consul In opening the IJebu markets. Palma was recognized as his port, where he was to levy an export duty of one head of cowries per puncheon of palm oil.105 This last provision was made at Campbell's Insistence. The duty at Lagos was twice that amount but It was hoped that the difference of two shillings or so per puncheon would not be great enough to Induce European merchants to move to Palma. Conversely, if Palma had no duty at all, the merchants would certainly consider It worthwhile to relocate, despite the added discomforts and Inconvenience. The Foreign Office approved the treaty, although complaining at the size of the pension.1Q6 105in F.O. 84/950. Cowries, (Cypria Moneta), were the common currency on the coast. Their value fluctuated, but the table compiled by Burton In the l860's Illustrates their contemporary worth. 40 cowries ■ 1 string ■ id. to Id. 5 strings « 1 bunch - 3d. to 6d. 10 bunches = 1 head ■ l/9£d. to 2/-. 10 heads a 1 bag (20,000 cowries), ■ 18/- or American and Spanish dollars were also In wide circulation. Richard F. Burton, Wanderings In West Africa, from Liver pool to Fernando Po (London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, 1 8 6 3),I,pp.40-45• 106ciarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, Feb. 23, 1855, P.O. 84/976. 283 The agreement being made known, the missionaries set up a howl of protest. Campbell later complained of being assailed by Townsend with "lengthy letters and remonstrances written by him In the name of the Chiefs of Abeokuta. m1°7 one of these accused him of making the treaty at the behest of the merchant Sandeman, to whom Kosoko was supposedly in debt,alleging this to be the reason why Epe had not been destroyed by the Navy.108 Irving had a similar opinion, hinting that Campbell was Involved "In some mysterious way with our merchants at Lagos, all of whom are favourers of Kosoko’s party and haters of the Egbas." This "mysterious" connection was so strong that the consul had "no will of his own."109 Sandeman and Campbell made emphatic denials, both at the time and later, H O but suspicions were aroused even further when It became known that HcCoskry, on Campbell's 107campbell to Clarendon, LagoB, Oct. 17* 1855* F.O. 84/976. 108Abeokuta, n.d., F.O. 84/976. 109irving to Venn, Ibadan, Sept. 22, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/M3. HOcampbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 3, 1855* F. 0. 84/976. 284 recommendation, was to be appointed vice-consul at Badagry. As far as the missionaries were concerned, even worse humiliation followed In the wake of the treaty. Campbell renewed his pressure on Docemo to allow the Epe people to trade at Lagos, assuring him that Kosoko had renounced his designs on the throne. Against Gollmer1s vehement protests the king finally agreed, setting aside a plot of land for use as their market.111 But Campbell must have had an exhausting battle; Docemo would not take his advice, he complained, but "has always followed the counsels of Mr. Gollmer, which are notoriously antlpaclflc, and which have given so much trouHe In my efforts to promote peace."112 Missionary Advances on Other Fronts Having suffered two defeats during the year, first over Mewu and now over Kosoko, with the realization becoming clear that they no longer held undisputed sway In 111Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Nov. 24, 1854, F. 0. 84/950. 112campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Dec. 20, 1854, F. 0. 84/950. 285 political affairs, thanks to an aggressive official who seemed to make his own policy, 1854 appeared to be drawing to a dismal close for the missionaries. Yet two bright rays pierced the year-end gloom, one from the banks of the Niger and the other from closer to home. Rev. Crowther had been the C.M.S. member of the successful 1854 Niger expedition and It was not long after the Pleiad returned to the mouth of the river that the Yoruba missionaries heard the good news. Dr. Balkle, a a naval surgeon, had ascended the Benue for nearly four hundred miles without loss of life, a signal success due to the proper use of quinine.^^3 Equally sub Important was Crowther's suggestion that the time had now come for Christianity to be plsmted on the shores of the great river, an Idea grasped by the Society at home suad by the missionaries In Yorubaland. The prospects thus revealed took on additional luster when viewed with the extension of the Yoruba Mission; both Townsend and Venn had 113crowther wrote an Interesting account of the voyage, Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tahadda Rivers, undertaken by Maogregor Laird. Esq.. In Connection with the British government in l5s4 (London; C.M.S.. 1855). 286 Immediate plans for an expansion that would eventually link the Mission to stations on the upper Niger. i Closer to home, Hlnderer and Irving made an exploratory trip through IJebu-Remo In December which promised to facilitate this projected extension. Their main purpose was to find a shorter route from Lagos to Ibadan, the existing road passing through Abeokuta.H5 As will be shown later, this Independent route for Ibadan was to cause a great deal of trouble, threatening to deprive the Egba of their middleman profits. Even more Important, the road would give Ibadan easy access to arms and powder at Lagos and by so doing would wreck the political status quo in Yorubaland. It Is significant that Hlnderer, the Society's agent at Ibadan, should embark'on the venture at this time, Ibadan having Just completed the subjugation of Eklta country.11^ It seems possible that Ibadan ambitions ll4fp0wnsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 28, 1 8 5 4, C.M. S. CA2/M3; Venn to Crowther, London, Feb. 23, 1855# C.M.S. CA2/Ll. 115Hlnderer, Journal, Dec. 13# 14, 1 8 5 4, C.M.S. CA2/049. 11^Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (Lagos: C.M.S., 1937)# PP. 317-31. 287 In the Interior were satiated, at least temporarily, and Interest at last was being shown In the one remaining avenue of advance— the road to the sea. That a missionary should direct this major new Initiative Is noteworthy. Hlnderer and Irving arrived at the Remo capital of Ofln on December 17 and were received graciously by the Akarlgbo. He readily promised a free road through Remo country from Ibadan to Ikorodu, a good-sized town on the mainland opposite Lagos. While his messengers were on their way to the town of Ode to ask the Awujale of IJebu to receive the white men, Hlnderer and Irving used the enforced delay to discuss a friendly compact between the Remo and the Egba.13-7 The desirability of establishing amicable relations between the two peoples was discussed and a truce of sorts made. Although it proved Ineffective against petty robberies and kidnaping, the services of the two men were held by the Akarlgbo as the reason why no major conflict took place during the ensuing few years .3-3-8 3-17Hlnderer to members of the Yoruba Mission, Ibadan, March 1855, C.M.S. CA2/049. 13.8(jrowther to Venn, Lagos, June 3, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/031. 288 The AwuJale proved less friendly. He refused permission to enter his country, nor did he want to see them. It was presumed that the refusal was based on the close proximity of Ode (town) to Epe, the AwuJale being intimidated by Kosoko; also, the AwuJale and several of his chiefs had taken Kosoko's daughters as wives•119 These are valid explanations, undoubtedly, but the principal reasons for his refusal were not so apparent. On one hand they stemmed from an IJebu tradition concerning the origin of white men. According to legend, male and female albinos had been born in different parts of IJebu many years ago, but as they grew up nobody could be found to marry them. At last they were brought together, placed in a canoe and sent away across the lagoon; the white men who later returned to the coast were thought to be the offspring of these outcasts and were consequently held In low regard. 1 2 0 The fable was held more strongly in the Ode province than in Remo, but it 11^Hinderer, Journal, Ofin, Deo. 26, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/049. a. AJayl, "A History of the Yoruba Mission, 184-3-1880, n unpublished Master *s thesis, University of Bristol (1959), pp. 147-8. 289 served to Inhibit European penetration of IJebu, whether missionary, mercantile or official, until a colonial punitive expedition broke the exclusion In 1 8 9 2. On the other hand, the AwuJale1s refusal to receive the missionaries sprang from more mundane consi derations. By this time he was growing Increasingly concerned with the menace of Ibadan, the foremost Yoruba military state. Up to now, Ibadan had appeared content to confine Its expansionist tendencies to the interior, but If It won a road to the sea there would certainly be major political consequences In Yorubaland. In addition, there was a crucial issue of domestic politics. The AwuJale*s Remo subjects were restive under his continuing juris diction, and his endorsement of a road to Ibadan through their territory would enhance the Remo position and consequently their pretensions. Thus, the refusal of the AwuJale to receive Hinderer and Irving, intent on opening a road from Ibadan to the sea at Ikorodu, was dictated by a combination of circumstances. Although the attempt to open an Ibadan road soon proved Illusory, It served to cheer the missionaries as 1854 ended. Had they known that the following year was 290 to be as disappointing and frustrating as the one Just ending, they would perhaps have taken even more comfort from their year-end successes than they did. Egba Wars and the Disruption of Trade, 1 8 5 5 The year started with the rumor of an Impending Dahomey attack on Abeokuta, a rumor which Campbell had heard even before Dr. Irving asked for ammunition for the town's defenses. Campbell had received a report that Brazilian slave Interests at Bahia had given Ghezo large bribes to conduct a slave drive; he was highly suspicious, also, of the cheap tobacco and rum that had suddenly appeared In Lagos, suspecting the same source to be responsible.12* He called together the leading Sierra Leone merchants In the town, Impressed upon than the urgency of helping the Egba with ammunition and asked for donations. Eight hundred pounds of powder was thus sent up on January 3 1, along with Campbell's contribution of 121Campbell to the Alake, Lagos, Jan. 23, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/07. grapeshot and ball for the slx-pounders. 122 He could do nothing about the Egba request for officers to teach gunnery but he did promise to see If more cannon could be obtained. In addition, he and Commodore Adams wrote to Qhezo warning him against attacking the town.123 At Abeokuta, Dr. Irving took charge of organizing the town's defense, spending a busy month In consultation and preparation. By the beginning of March the work was well In hand, the guns mounted and protected by breast work; he had plenty of grapeshot, designed to give "a good raking effect" when the time came.12^ But the time did not come. Instead, the Egba themselves went out to the Dahomey border and spent most of the year raiding and kidnaping. What annoyed the consul most about this unexpected turn of events was that trade from Abeokuta was stopped In April, resumed briefly I22campbell to Irving, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA2/04; Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 15, 1855, P.O. 84/976. 1 23campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 1 5, 1 8 5 5, F.O. 84/976. 12^Irving to Stralth, Abeokuta, March 1, 1855* C.M.S. CA2/052. 292 In September, but was Interrupted again by January 1 8 3 6, when Campbell complained bitterly that Egba merchants had visited Lagos only twloe during the last ten months.125 The Alake gave the excuse that trade had been stopped because the Egba were being cheated by the Sierra Leone middlemen at Lagos and asked that something be done about It. 1 2 6 The consul admitted this to be true. The Egba complaint was that they were being paid artificially low prices for the palm-oil and thatlhe middlemen cheated when measuring It, using containers holding close to twelve gallons but calling It only ten.3-27 There was a further difficulty, Involving a word of explanation about the commercial structure of the oil trade. The Egba who took oil to Lagos were not themselves producers or collectors but merchants who bought or bartered It at Abeokuta from many Individuals. These 125campbell to the Alake. Lagos, Jan. 31, 1856, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. I. 126>phe Alake to Campbell, Abeokuta, June 2, 1 8 5 5, P.O. 84/976. 12*^Maser, Journal. Abeokuta, Aug. 9, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/068. 293 merchants belonged to a guild, the Parakoyi, which con trolled most of Abeokuta*s commercial activity. Attending the markets held every seventeen days at Lagos, they sold the oil to other middlemen, usually Sierra Leone immigrants who had monopolized this function.*28 These "Saros," as they were called, in turn sold to the European merchants• The whole complicated operation functioned on a lavish credit basis, the Europeans advancing goods to the Saros, who did the same to their suppliers without much regard being paid by anyone to ordinary business precau tions. The European trader would advance merchandise to a Lagos middleman for a specific amount of oil, say five thousand gallons. The middleman was then expected to trade exclusively with that merchant until the debt had been paid, but as this frequently took a long time, further credit would be extended before the original debt had been liquidated. Similar arrangements would exist between the middleman and his Egba suppliers. 12®Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 30, 1^55# P.O. 84/976. 294 The system constantly embroiled the consul In disputes when efforts were made to recover debts; It Is possible that It had a bearing on the frequent stoppages of trade which plagued relations between Abeokuta and Lagos for generations. African traders, at Abeokuta and Lagos, heavily In debt, perhaps encouraged the stoppages In the hope that their debts would be avoided, or at least postponed. While there Is no evidence to suggest such to have been the case In 1 8 5 5# a later colonial official was sure that this explained the long Interruption of trade which occurred in 1872-73- He thought that a "powerful Influence, backed by pecuniary Inducements, was brought to bear from Lagos on the native authorities . . . with the express purpose of keeping up the blockade•"129 Another reason which contributed to the 1 8 5 5 stoppage was the general dissatisfaction of the Egba Parakoyi with the oil trade, especially with conditions in L a g o s .1 30 only did they have to deal with other 1 29Administrator Borkely to Adminlstrator-ln-Chlef, Lagos, July 23, 1873, N.N.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. 4. 130campbell to Lord Malmesbury, Lagos, March 5, 3.859, P.O. 84/1088. 295 middlemen, a transaction obviously affecting their profits, but they were also tied by bonds of debt to a particular buyer, creating a situation later known as monopsony. Such theories of Imperfect competition were then unknown but Campbell did recognise and acknowledge the fact that the Egba were being cheated.^-31 On his advice the Lagos middleman began to pay twenty per cent more for the oil and he started work on a uniform system of weights and measures. In return, the Egba lifted the Interdict In September, but only briefly. This was enough to convince the consul that the real reason for the stoppage was not the sharp practices of the Lagos middlemen at all but the Egba desire to make war, the custom being to stop trade at such times in order to augment the army. Campbell was correct. The pressure of the Egba on his borders during the summer worried Gthezo to such an extent that by the end of the year he was contemplating sending his army to defend Porto Novo and B a d a g r y . 1 3 2 131campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 30, 1855t P.O. 84/976. 132campbell to Qhezo, Lagos, Nov. 5* 1855, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1 296 This did not prove necessary, however, as the Egba suddenly reversed direction and sent an expedition to the I far north.133 Campbell was finally forced to remonstrate ! with the Alake on the constant Egba wars on their neighbors and the resultant closure of the trade routes to Lagos.134 The Alake1s reply was revealing. He much regretted the wars and was aware of the evils of the course being pursued by his people. But the expeditions were organized and undertaken by the Basorun, he wrote, and he had no power to stop than. He admitted his lack of authority In the town and even asked the consul to use his Influence on the Ologun when he heard of any new expedi tions being prepared.135 In addition, Campbell's remonstrance was read to Somoye and It waB thought that It might persuade him to stop the forays.136 133Maser, Journal. Abeokuta, Dec. 20, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/068. ^Lagos, Jan. 31# 1 8 5 6, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. I. ^Abeokuta, n.d., N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. I. 136campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 26, 1856, P.O. 84/1002. 297 The consul mistakenly referred to these campaigns as "predatory kidnapping expeditions" or "slave hunts,m137 not realizing them to be Intrinsic to the unfolding of | Yoruba politics and part of the continuous maneuvering ! taking place to maintain or Improve the Egba position vls-a vis Ibadafa especially. Ibadan, meanwhile, was doing exactly the same, and with a good deal of success. Having established their supremacy over the Eklti the Ibadan army returned home In September after a successful campaign In the north, in Efon territory on the Niger.*38 Several towns had been destroyed and many prisoners brought back, some of whom became slaves on Ibadan farms while the rest were sent to Abeokuta for re-sale at Okeodan and shipment from Porto Novo and Whydah.139 137Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 30, Oct. 1, 1855, P.O. 84/976. 138campbell to Commodore Adams, Lagos, Dec. 4, 1855, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. I. 139Hinderer to Straith, Lagos, Oct. 1, 1 8 5 5, C.M. S. CA2/049; Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 1, 1 8 5 5, P.O. 84/976. 298 Diplomatic Attempts to extend Ibadan Hegemony Soon after the army reached home a general Yoruba meeting was held at Ibadan with envoys attending from the most Important city-states except Abeokuta and IJebu. Called at the behest of Ibadan, the meeting had the Immediate objective of reconciling Atlba, the Alafln of Oyo, with Kurunml, the Are of IJaye. Their quarrel was of longstanding, but had been rekindled In 1854 with the Are's refusal to Join an Oyo-Ibadan campaign against the Ilorin Fulanl encamped against the Ibadan-controlled town of Otton.3-^0 Kuruml apparently suspected mischief to be afoot, knowing full well that Atlba wanted his life; more over, he had serious reservations about Joining a campaign designed to further the Ibadan cause. This fracas led to an unusual development Inspired by the Ibadan war chiefs. They desired that retribution not be meted out to the Are for the refusal to obey his suzerain's commands; further, and contrary to custom, the l^°Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, April 22, 1854, C.M. S. CA2/049. 299 Oyo-Ibadan army would not forage In Yoruba towns In future and there should be no more Internecine fighting in Yorubaland. As all Yoruba were of the same family, wars should be directed against outside people only.^3- The palaver called at Ibadan In October, 1 8 5 5, was In pursuit of this objective, termed by Rev. Hlnderer as "Yoruba Nationality." ! ^ 2 In particular, Ibadan sought to reconcile Atlba with his Are and secure a general Yoruba agreement to maintain friendly relations.1^3 it was also decided that there should be peace with the Egba and IJebu "because of their roads to the sea" and that Ilorln be brought Into a Yoruba union as soon as the Fulani and Housa had been driven out.!^ Hlnderer*s description of a budding "Yoruba Nationality" was somewhat premature; rather, the meeting ■^^Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, Oct. 26, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA2/049. l4 2Ibld. James Barber (catechlst at Ibadan) to Hlnderer, Ibadan, Nov. 25, 1855* Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, Feb. 2 7, 185b, In C.M.S. CA2/049. 1 ^Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, Oct. 26, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/049. was more obviously Intended to extend Ibadan hegemony In Yorubaland. The fact that Ibadan was mediating between Oyo and IJaye Itself speaks volumes for the position and prestige enjoyed by Ibadan; but even more* It seems that there was an ulterior motive behind the conference. IJaye was a strong city-state, about a day's march from Ibadan, and Hlnderer was aware of a "secret plan," devised by Ibadan, for IJaye to give up to Oyo the towns and villages to the north which It held In tribute.^5 As Oyo by now was almost an Ibadan fief, but with the fiction maintained that the Alafln was suzerain of all Yoruba, the real Intent of the Ibadan conference was to Improve the Ibadan position at the expense of IJaye. The subterfuge was not successful but the meeting nevertheless paid lip service to the pious hopes expressed by Ibadan for greater Yoruba fraternity. The affair was regarded by the Egba In Its true light— as an effort by Ibadan to consolidate and extend Its position. They reacted accordingly. Crowther, traveling In IJebu-Remo the following month, met Egba messengers returning from 1 ^Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, Oct. 26, 1855# C.M.S. CA2/049. 301 visits to the AwuJale and Akarlgbo of IJebu. Their mission had been to make peace, Crowther reported, but It Is more probable that a defensive alliance was discussed. In either event, he was told that matters augured w e l l . 1 ^ j The Egba wars during the year, the long disruption of trade and the Improving position of Ibadan all contrib uted to make 1855 most depressing for the missionaries. The most unfortunate event by far, however, was a year long dispute with the consul which reached new heights of Invective. Missionary-Consular Relations, 1855 The year started badly right from the beginning. Being charitable to Mr. Campbell It must be admitted that he had much to contend with. Docemo was easily led by Oollmer— always in the wrong direction according to the consul; relations between himself and the missionary were poor, and they were opposing him to their fullest extent; trade with Abeokuta was stopped and trade from Porto Novo was proving disappointing; an underground traffic continued l^crowther, Journal, Of in, Iperu, Dec. 18-20, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/031. 302 In slaves for export and seemed Impossible to curtail; Lagos politics were always in an uproar and there were intrigues, plots and counter-plots backed by slave inter ests to remove Docemo and restore Kosoko. In early January Campbell was especially concerned about large quantities of tobacco appearing in the city from Brazil, imagining that bribery was afoot designed to expel him and restore the slave trade. To make matters worse, the Foreign Office was pressing him for explanations of a charge from Paris that he had not accounted for the sal vage money realized from the sale of three French vessels when he had acted as French consular agent in Freetown in 1852.1*7 A victim of these tensions, Campbell wrote a vitriolic letter to Dr. Irving accusing the missionaries of poisoning the Egba against him by "dirty means and false insinuations." Most startling was the claim that a plot was being hatched to murder him, that Oollmer was privy to it and that people known to be involved had been "going into and leaving the Church Missionary premises l47This matter is contained in P.O. 2/16. 303 dally, even nightly. "1**® In reply, the doctor admitted that Oollmer had Interfered In politics, out of necessity, but to accuse him of plotting an assassination was "a flight of Imagi nation to which even his worst enemies would have . • . hesitated to soar." Dr. Irving denied the rest of Campbell's charges and closed by saying that unrest would continue until Lagos was permanently occupied by Britain.1^9 This Is the first known expression of such a sentiment. The consul continued to assert that his charge against Gollmer was true, but did not produce the witness es he claimed to have as he feared that Gollmer would murder them a l s o . 1 5 0 He obviously considered himself to be In danger, however, for later In January he called for naval protection and sailors guarded him for three days l^Campbell to Irving, Lagos, Jan. 10, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA2/04. l Z , , 9irving to Campbell, Abeokuta, Jan. 15* 1855, C.M.S. CA2/04. •^Ocampbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 20, 1855* P.O. 403/5; Irving to Clarendon, Abeokuta, March 26, 1855, P.O. 84/977. 304 during the height of an alleged conspiracy aimed at deposing Docemo.151 At the Commodore's Insistence, Docemo finally took a stand against the plotters and ordered the expulsion of the supposed ring-leader, gadam Tinubu, a woman trader notorious as a bad credit risk.152 However, on the earnest entreaty of the Alake, she was allowed to remain. This uproar continued for several weeks, Dr. Irving keeping the Society at home fully informed. The consul's mind was unsound, he thought, and he was senile; he had an implacable hatred of Docemo and the doctor suspected that he was trying to build up a case for his removal, the alleged conspiracy of January being part of it.153 Equally as bad, Irving accused Campbell of taking a paternal Interest in Kosoko and suspected that the ex-king was bribing him; he was the sworn enemy of the Egba and was actively engaged in poisoning the minds of 151campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 12, 1 8 5 5, F.O. 84/976. 152campbell to Signor G. B. Scala, Lagos, Oct. 2 5, 1855, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. I. 153irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 17, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/052. 305 naval officers against the Society; he was probably receiving presents from Porto Novo for getting rid of Mewu and the merchants were rumored to be paying him a percent age for the oil coming Into Lagos. In addition, according to the good doctor, Campbell had bullied Docemo into giving up almost every vestige of his authority. "Surely, surely, this Is not the wish of England In sending out a consul to Lagos," he asked, and prayed that the Society would use every means In Its power to Inquire Into the matter; even better, the consul should be recalled.1^ Under such circumstances, Townsend and Gollmer returned to England on leave in March, Crowther taking over the duties at Lagos. Five days after their departure, Campbell appeared at the C.M.S. compound and laid claim to an adjoining parcel of land. Despite Crowther1s protest that the land belonged to the Society, Campbell Informed him that he was going to build a consulate on the plot, and after erecting a temporary shed he hoisted his consular flag for good measure. Thus began an argument which raged for the remainder of the year, Involving the Squadron, the ^^^ipving to Straith, Abeokuta, March 1, 1855* C.M.S. CA2/052. 306 Admiralty, the Foreign Secretary, the Society in London, the Egba, as well as European and African merchants in Lagos.!55 During the course of the quarrel all the old issues between the consul and the missionaries were re-aired. The Society tried to depict Campbell as being allied to slave trading interests, ruthless, an Injurious Influence on British prestige, against the advancement of civilization and an opponent of established British policy toward the Egba. This Campbell admitted, maintaining that to carry out the policy advocated by the missionaries, namely, "to make the Egbas masters of Lagos and of the seaboard for many miles east and west . . . would lead to endless wars and disputes, to the entire interruption of legal trade." Further, "it encouraged the slave trade. r,156 He also made charges of his own. Gollmer and Townsend were responsible for the Egba wars against the coastal tribes; Gollmer was responsible for the civil wars 155some of the voluminous correspondence relating to the dispute was printed as a Blue Book, F.O. 403/3. The rest is in F.O. 84/976-7. 156eampbeii to Clarendon, Lagos, May 28, 1853, F.O. 84/976. 307 at Badagry and Lagos; the missionaries were too Involved In native politics and constantly thwarted his plans; Townsend censored his letters to the Egba chiefs and wrote replies In their name without even consulting them; the missionar ies proclaimed that the extermination of Kosoko and his followers were justified by Holy Writ. There was much more In the same vein. One of the more Interesting Items of correspondence which passed between Lagos and London at the height of the controversy was a petition to the Foreign Office praying that Gollmer and Townsend not be allowed to return to Yorubaland. The missive was signed by all nine European merchants In Lagos, the Methodist missionary E. A. Gardiner; and about two dozen African merchants and Immigrants from Sierra Leone and Brazil. The document charged the two with acquiring undue Influence over the chiefs and with stirring up trouble. Peace reigned when they were away and their return would be ruinous to commerce.157 Campbell told his superior that he knew nothing of the petition until the merchants presented It to him and 157]Snc. in Campbell to Clarendon, May 2b, 1855, F.O. 84/9?6. 306 asked that It be forwarded.158 He was stretching the truth, perhaps, for ohly days after Gollmer and Townsend had left for home Crowther had reported that a petition against their return was being made up at the consulate.*59 Later, when he knew more about the document, Crowther explained that the trader Sandeman was the organizer .3-6° But as Campbell lived with Sandeman and Sandeman1s house was the temporary consulate, It seems clear that Campbell knew more about the petition than he chose to admit. Crowther also pointed out that some of the lmlgrants who appended their signatures or marks had only recently arrived In Lagos and knew Townsend and Gollmer only by hearsay. He Interviewed some of them, who admitted being unable to read and being Ignorant of what they had signed.1^1 *56campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 9, 1855, P.O. 84/976. *59crowther to Venn, Lagos, April 3* 1655* C.M.S. CA2/M3. 160crowther to Venn, Lagos, May 10, 1 8 5 5, C.M.S. CA2/M3. l6lcrowther to Venn, Lagos, May 10, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/M8. 309 Not to be outdone, the Egba organized a counter petition. It cited the ten years service given by the two men, their excellent work and the fact that they were still needed; they had brought peace to the country. The petition also stated that when the men had first arrived there was nobody "definitely commissioned to attend to the political state of the country," and they had been obliged to fulfill this function for their own safety. Over five hundred signatures or marks were appended.162 An Abeokuta missionary disclaimed any knowledge of the document, asserting It to be a spontaneous expression of Egba senti ment, ^3 but the internal and external evidence makes this difficult to believe. Needless to say, the Society mounted a full-scale offensive of letters and private interviews at Downing Street pleading for Campbell's removal. Campbell knew all about it and realized, correctly, that the chief reason for the attack was his failure to accept the Society's Egba l62The King, Chiefs, Emigrants, and Native Converts of Sierra Leone to Rev. Henry Venn, Abeokuta, May 29, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/&3. ■^^Maser, Journal. Abeokuta, April 12, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/068. 310 policy.164 He therefore began a major counterattack of his own, not so much In defense of his actions as designed to blacken the character and policy of the missionaries In general and Gollmer in particular. His campaign was especially remarkable In September and October, when his dispatches to London were full of Innuendo, hearsay and rumor; he enclosed many letters from merchants or others willing to vilify the missionaries for their political undertakings. Campbell himself was somewhat apologetic about this form of defense and acknowledged that he was using It with reluctance. But he would not allow himself to be "crushed and overwhelmed by the powerful Influence of the Church Missionary Society's Committee . . . ."165 That Committee was Itself having a tough fight. Venn regarded the situation as a contest between rival candidates for the chief position of Influence on the coast, Irving versus Campbell. If Campbell were removed "your Influence for good among the Natives will be l6^campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Dec. 7* 1855, F.O. 84/976. I65campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 3, 1855, F.O. 403/5. 311 established," the doctor was told, but If not, "your position will be more difficult than ever."1®® But Lord Clarendon was proving reluctant to disavow his consul. Venn feared that Campbell had successfully prejudiced the Foreign Office against the missionary cause; at best, Clarendon had become convinced that the principals were so angry at each other that he could not settle their differences.1^7 In either event, Clarendon gracefully disengaged himself by turning over the affair to the Admiralty with the request that Commodore Adams conduct an Inquiry on the spot. Adams was unable to reach Lagos Immediately so instructed the Senior Officer of the Bights Division to act In his stead. Commander Skene had conducted an investiga tion of the disputed land as early as April, when he had found In Campbell's favor and made some scathing comments about the missionaries.1®® This time, with five other l66yenn to Irving, London, June 23, 1855, C.M.S. CA 2/Ll. l67venn to Irving, June 4, 1855, C.M.S. CA^/Ll. 1®®Skene to Campbell, Lagos, April 10, 1 8 5 5, F.O. 84/976. 312 officers, and with Campbell, Sandeman, and McCoskry In tow, he began re-measuring the ground on December 3- Crowther and Hlnderer represented the missionaries but the five- hour Inquiry was antlclimatlc. After the land question had been argued the missionaries were asked the nature of the Society's charges against the consul. Their reply was that their Instructions precluded them from making accusations; they were merely to give Information when questioned. Campbell proved Just as reticent but stated that he would leave Lagos If Gollmer and Townsend returned. McCoskry, now vice-consul at Badagry, echoed the s e n t i m e n t . 1 ^ Regard ing the disputed land, Skene found the Society's claim to be Invalid.170 Allowing passions to cool, the Foreign Office did not notify Salisbury Square of the results for several months. The blow was further softened by saying that Campbell and the missionaries had both been wrong regarding ^-^crowther to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 3, 1855, C.M.S. CA2/fo3. ^OAdams to Admiralty, Lagos, Dec. 5, 1855, P.O. 84/1002. 313 the exact site and area of the land In question but that Campbell was correct In his contention that it did not belong to the Society. Without comment, the letter closed by remarking that European residents at Lagos had told the Board of Inquiry that peace had come to Lagos with Gollmer's departure and that disorders would accompany his return.171 Ascendancy of the Imperial Factor The land was of small consequence. What boded ill for the future of the Society in Yorubaland was that Campbell, with a known antipathy for the missionaries and the Egba, had achieved a clear victory and had been supported and apparently vindicated by the Foreign Office. Equally as ominous, from the missionary point of view, was the fact that in this case the Society had failed to carry its objective; not only was Campbell to remain at Lagos but it was clear that the Foreign Office did not relish Gollmer's return. Further complicating the missionary position was the untimely death of Dr. Irving, the ^ldarendon to Chichester, Foreign Office, May 26, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/M3. 314 Society's proconsul and the man best suited by temperament and training to stand up to Campbell. These auguries of future difficulties for the Society were aggravated by the poor relations existing between the three most Influential missionaries, Townsend, Qollmer and Hinderer. Townsend had evinced an active dis like for Hinderer, the result of Hinderer establishing an Independent "monarch” for himself at Ibadan and championing Its cause against the Egba.1^2 Hinderer cordially returned the feeling, and as for Gollmer, he felt that his presence at Lagos did inestimable harm to the missionary cause.^73 Townsend held similar views and admitted a strong personal dislike at being closely associated with Gollmer. He did not want him back at Lagos, nor did he want him at Abeokuta or Ibadan; the best way to keep him out of mischief In future, he thought, would be to station him in IJebu country.174 172irving to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 11, 1855# C.M.S. CA2/052. 173ninderer to Venn, Ibadan, May 23# 1854, C.M.S. CA2/049. 174r0wnsend to Venn, Exeter, (March) 28, 1855, C.M. S. CA2/085. 315 On these unhappy notes 1855 drew to a close. Despite the forebodings., however, and despite the position of supremacy now achieved by the consul, the missionaries were about to enter a three-year period of comparative tranquility and advancement, helped no doubt by the entente reached with the consul In 1 8 5 6 which brought his powerful patronage to their side. Summary With the arrival in 1 8 5 3 of a confident and assertive consul, the disparate and conflicting objectives of the humanitarian and Imperial factors was brought Into sharp focus. A struggle soon commenced to decide the goals which were to be pursued and who was to play the principal role in guiding events. At first, Campbell subscribed to the policies being advocated by Gtollmer, entering enthusiastically Into the scheme to crush Kosoko and advance Egba Interests. But finding Kosoko's harassment of trade to be seriously affecting Lagos revenue, he had to turn to other sources; In his resulting efforts to remove the controversial Egba candidate at Badagry, Campbell then clashed with the 316 missionaries. And to further complicate matters, he reversed his attitude toward Kosoko and sought an under standing that would allow unhindered commercial Intercourse and so relieve the pressure on the Lagos treasury. From the missionary point of view these developments seemed to presage a complete reversal of the policies they had always enunciated and which had been accepted by the British government, namely, support of the Egba and a dedicated effort to extirpate all aspects of the slave trade. As they pointed out, Kosoko had been deposed in pursuit of 9 these ends; now they were to be overturned for a few gal lons of palm oil. And to make matters worse, the attain ment of Campbell's objectives would lend Important support to Ghezo, the most notorious slave dealer on the coast, would weaken the possition of Docemo at Lagos and would harm British Influence and prestige. But despite the strenuous activities of the mis sionaries and their political pro-consul, Campbell was able to exert his will. Having done so, personal relations between himself and the missionaries worsened dramatically, each accusing the other of all manner of things. And no matter how the missionaries tried, or how the Society 317 In London railed against the usurpation of established policy by a forward consul, all efforts to remove the offending official proved unavailing, due perhaps to the complexion of the Aberdeen Government, which was weighted in favor of the High Church Peelites. To Campbell's Intense annoyance, however, the removal of Mewu from Badagry and a treaty with Kosoko did not Improve the island's shaky financial structure, for no sooner had these things been accomplished than the Egba went to war. The Important Abeokuta-Lagos trade conse quently dried to a trickle in 1855; but Campbell, like his successors, failed to grasp the fundamental political objects of the Egba campaigns. They were not predatory kidnaping forays, but part of the continuous maneuvering taking place as the Egba, amongst others, sought to improve their position in Yorubaland. CHAPTER VI MISSIONARY AND CONSULAR RAPPORT, 1856-59 Campbell and the Merchants The era of good feeling between the consul and the missionaries which became apparent during 1 8 5 6 was brought about originally by the estrangement which developed between Campbell and the European traders. This began to show Itself In February, after which the rift widened during the remainder of the year. The argument which broke out In February Involved the collection of export duties. With Campbell's permis sion, Docemo had farmed the duties to the consul's Saro Interpreter, S. B. Williams, who had been less than rigorous In enforcing collection from European merchants. As their trade contributed by far the larger proportion of exports, the result was Docemo being chronically short of 318 319 funds; In anger, he stopped all exports In February. This led to an acrimonious dispute between Campbell, the merchants and the king, ending with an offer by Signor Scala to collect the customs for the next three years• With Campbell's approval, Docemo accepted, glad to be assured of an annual Income of between thirteen and sixteen hundred pounds sterling.2 Giovanni Baptlsta Scala was an reformed slave trader turned merchant, agent for the African Steamship Company and consul at the court of Docemo for the King of Sardinia. His experience on the coast, his familiarity with the techniques employed by his colleagues for evading customs and his marked lack of reticence in demanding payment earned for him the Immediate odium of the European trading community. At first they refused to pay, but when Scale seized two ships attempting to evade his levy and Docemo prohibited defaulters from engaging In any commercial Icampbell to Clarendon, Lagos, May 14, 1 8 5 6, P.O. 84/1002. ^C. W. Mdwbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers; European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and AdJa-Speaklna Peoples of South-Western Mixerla. Southern Dahomey and Togo (Oxford; Clarendon Press. 19&1), p. 6 1. 320 pursuit they were brought to heel. The consul had no sym pathy with their protests and a serious altercation arose when Campbell questioned McCoskry about the rumor he was spreading that Scale gave him a percentage of the money being collected.3 Finding the consul to be of no help, several of the merchants complained to the Squadron. Again finding no recourse they then presented their alleg ed injuries to the Foreign Office, complaining of the seizure of property, the lack of protection offered by Campbell and his tyrannical government No doubt finding it a relief to escape the un pleasantness at Lagos, the consul visited the Benin river in March. During his absence a near-insurrection took place when Madam Tlnubu organized a scheme to drive from Lagos the European traders and the immigrants from Sierra Leone and Brazil. The consul mistakenly charged the con spirators with wishing to re-establish the slave trade,5 ^Crowther to Venn, Lagos, March 25, May 3, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/031. ^McCoskry, Sandeman et al., to Clarendon, Lagos, May 2, 1 8 5 6, F.O. 84/1004. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagoa, March 26, 1856. 84/1002. 321 but a more reasonable explanation would be found In the commercial rivalries Involved. The Immigrants at Lagos by now held a near-nonopoly of the profitable mlddlenan function and Tlnubu was heavily In debt to the European factors. The simultaneous removal of both would Inprove her position enormously. However, the enthusiasm of the Insurgents was first dampened by the arrival of H.M.S. Childers, after which It was effectively squashed by Campbell's return.^ The consul now determined to rid the town of Tlnubu1s troublesome presence but straightaway encountered the opposition of several European merchants to whom she was In debt.7 Campbell was eventually forced to call on the Navy to assist In her expulsion, which was resisted to the last by McCoskry, who allegedly attempted to bribe Docemo to let her remain.8 Despite the protests of the Alake, she was ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, March 2 6, 1 8 5 6, P.O. 84/1002. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, June 23, 1856. F.O. 2/17. 8copb.ll to MeCoskry, Lagos. Jun. 12. 1 8 5 6. N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Tol. 2} Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, June 23, I8 5 6, P.O. 2/1 7. sent to Abeokuta,9 Relations between the consul and the merchants were again worsened and Campbell relieved McCoskry of his vlce-consulshlp in June. 10 By this time Campbell was fulminating about the English merchants considering them selves entitled to special privileges and exemptions. 11 A series of strong letters passed between them In July and August, and Campbell had no compunction In turning the screw a little tighter on his chief antagonists, Sandeman and McCoskry. Campbell had McCoskry's trading stopped, ("a mild but effective process,1 * he called It), for his refusal to pay the salary owing to a dismissed clerk. He then ntook action * * against him for flogging his Kroomen, after which he Instructed Docemo to release a middleman Imprisoned at McCoiilsyjjs behest for trading with another merchant while owing McCoskry five hundred gallons of ^Campbell to the Alake. Lagos, April 17, 1 8 5 6, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 10Campbell to McCoskry, Lagos, June 12, 1 8 5 6, N.H. A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2; Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, June 23, 1 8 5 6, P.O. 2/1 7. 11Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, May 14, 1856, P.O. 84/1002. 323 oil.12 as for Sandeman, Campbell willingly agreed to act on behalf of Forster and Staith In their attempt to collect from him a debt ofwf8,000.13 Missionary-Consular Detente With the traders united against him It was small wonder that the consul turned to the missionaries. By mid summer he was once again attending church regularly and showing himself "very friendly ... In the best manner possible."1^ He had even suffered a change of heart con cerning Badagry, where the restored chiefs had been turning a blind eye to the activities of a Brazilian slave-trader and had proved themselves Incapable of preventing European merchants from being robbed. Tired of excuses and their Inability to keep order, the consul finally told them that they were unworthy of his protection and that he bitterly 12Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Nov. 29, 1 8 5 6, P.O. 84/1031; Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 23, 1 8 3 6, P.O. 84/1002. 13campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Sept. 23, 1 8 3 6, P.O. 84/1002. ^Crowther to Venn, Lagos, July 28, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/031. 324 regretted not letting then perish In exile. Menu had been a better ruler than "such drunken and worthless chiefs as Wawu and the others . • . .Bl5 The consul likewise softened his feelings toward the Egba during the summer, a move hardly designed to placate the merchants, who resented the Egba ability to stop trade with the Interior and their disposition to do so at the slightest provocation. This had happened again In 1 8 3 6, when the Egba were campaigning In Egbado country, but Instead of remonstrances, Campbell gave them warning that Ohezo was looking for Yoruba allies and was preparing an attack. As the Egba had welcomed and protected the mis sionaries, he told them, there was a deep feeling of concern In all Christian countries for their welfare. In addition, they could rely on "the good will and sympathy of the Government and people of England. "3-6 To prove his good Intentions he promised to ask the Commodore that more cannons and ammunition be sent to ^ C a m p b e l l to Badagry chiefs, Lagos, March 1, April 16, June 14, 1 8 5 6, N.N.A, CSO 8/1, Vole. 1, 2. ^Campbell to the Alake, Lagos, June 9, 1856, N.N. A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 325 Abeokuta, together with an officer to direct their emplace ment,^ This he did, and more. No ahlpa of the Squadron being at Lagos, he wrote to the Commodore requesting assistance for Abeokuta, describing It as a city of rising Importance and the principal Interior station of the Church Missionary Society. "The welfare and safety of Abeokuta Is watched with deep Interest and anxiety by Her Majesty's Government," he continued, "and by a numerous and Influ ential body of persons who promote and encourage missionary operations. After this he wrote to Ghezo and to the principal towns and chiefs of the lagoon warning them not to molest the Egba.19 The fact that the Egba were well aware of Ghezo*s designs to fomm an alliance with one of the Yoruba states or with Ilorln2 0 does not lessen Campbell's concern. The Egba, In fact, used this occasion to press their case with 17campbell to the Alake, Lagos, June 23, 1 8 5 6, N.N. A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. l8Lagos, June 27, 1 8 5 6, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 19In N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 20Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, June 18, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/068. 326 Queen Victoria, congratulating her on the successful termination of the Crimean War and praying for her assist ance against Dahomey and the powerful Yoruba towns which sought to destroy them. The consul forwarded the request to the Foreign Office. 21 Campbell's new-found regard for the Egba persuaded Crowther that the consul had become convinced that the missionaries had been right all along and that his earlier leanings to Porto Novo, Kosoko and the Wawu and Possu of Badagry had been wrong. Crowther was even more persuaded when the consul began to turn to him for political advice. Being well aware of the difficulties which had been caused in the past by missionary Involvement In political affairs, Crowther at first determined to stear clear. However: . . . the Consul's frequent coming or sending over to the Mission House to ask advice and to give Information^ sending me his letters to the Chiefs ... to see If they were to the point; and considering my total silence may be to the disadvantage of the Mission and country at this crucial state of things, I was obliged to yield my determination and to advise him to the best of my knowledge. 22 21The Alake and Basorun of Abeokuta to Queen Victoria, Abeokuta, July k, 1856, F.O. 84/1002. 22Crowther to Venn, Lagos, Sept. 30, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/031. 327 It would seem that a considerable rapport had been reached between the consul and the missionary party by this time. One further wedge was then driven between Campbell and the merchants, pushing him further into the arms of the missionaries. This was occasioned by Kosoko and the reports which became more insistent in August that he contemplated an attack on Lagos. By September, Campbell had positive information that the attack would be launched in October. Kosoko, with help from Benin and Ijebu, was to attack Lagos, while Dahomey and Porto Novo were to attack the Egba. Falling to take Lagos, Kosoko was to establish himself at Otta and Ado, thus severing land communlcations between Abeokuta, Lagos and Badagry and placing himself in a good position to disrupt traffic on the 0gun.23 In a burst of feverish activity during the last week of September, Campbell sent letters and messengers to friend and foe alike, either warning to prepare themselves or warning not to make any foolhardy moves. One rather 23campbell to Commander Uaswell, R.N., Lagos, Sept. 26, 1 8 5 6, Campbell to Kosoko, Lagos, Oct. 6, 1 8 5 6, in N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 328 remarkable message to the Egba stressed that under no circumstances was Kosoko to establish himself at Otta, "for the communications between Abeokuta and Lagos must be kept open at any price." While Great Britain would not condone any aggressive wars, he went on, matters were now crucial and he advised them strongly, though Indirectly, to take the place under their control; to do so would not constitute an aggressive act.2* * In the event, however, Otta heeded a warning sent by Campbell and in early October assured him that Kosoko would not be allowed to use the town. But to be on the safe side, the Egba decided to send a garrison anyway.25 The arrival of the Commodore and two other naval vessels effectively deterred any attack, especially when the steamer Minx crossed the bar and anchored Just off the town.26 But relations between Campbell and the merchants came to a head. During the past several months the ^Campbell to the Alake and chiefs, Lagos, Sept. 27, I8 5 6, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2. 25Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/53T 26campbell to Clarendon, Oct. 1, 1 8 5 6, F.O. 84/1002. 329 merchants had repeated to the Foreign Office their charges against Campbell, qpkifctofcKngiMkt right he legislated and enforced laws In a place that did not belong to Britain, and petitioning for his removal .27 They now took advantage of the Commodore's arrival to present a bill of particulars complaining of his arbitrary and tyrannical measures. Specifloally, they charged that Campbell had acted precipitously during the present scare, had not checked the veracity of his reports and had used force when conciliation would have been preferable. Adams ordered an Inquiry, but before It convened McCoskry and a Hamburg merchant named Delderlchsen visited Kosoko at Epe. This Immediately confirmed Campbell's suspicions that the merchants were secretly backing Kosoko to drive out Docemo and himself In one fell swoop.29 He was able to convince the Commodore that this was the case and 27Sept. 4, 1856, F.O. 84/1004; [oct.1 1 8 5 6, F.O. 84/1002. J ^Sandeman, McCoskry, et al„ to Commodore Adams, Lagos, Oct. 2, 1 8 5 6, F.O. 84/1002. 29campbell to the Alake. Lagos, Oct. 7, 1 8 5 6, N.N. A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 2; Crowther to Stralth, Lagos, Nov. 3, I8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/031. 330 that officer warned McCoskry that he eould expect no pro tection from either the consul or the Squadron In future If his "strange conduct” warranted the displeasure of D o c e m o.30 Needless to say, Docemo considered the actions of both men to be highly objectionable and hostile toward him; at Campbell's request he gare McCoskry three months notice to quit Lagos.31 This was later remitted to a fine of 2 0 0 bags of cowries, levied on both men. The naval Inquiry was duly conducted by Commander Hope of H.M.S. Prometheus. Campbell was exonerated com pletely, thanks partly to the testimony of Crowther, who assured the officers that an attack on Lagos was Indeed being prepared according to the Information gathered by C.M.S. agents In the Interior.32 The Merchants were reprimanded. Regarding the charge that he legislated and MMffttfOMd laws and had, In fact, usurped Docemo, Hope's comments are well worth noticing. Not only do they reflect 3£>Lagos, Oct. 15, 1 8 5 6, P.O. 84/1002. 31crowther to Stralth, Lagos, Nov. 3, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/031. 32Crowther to Campbell, Lagos, Oct. 15, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/04. 331 the realities of life on the eoaat but they also shed light on the actions of "forward" officials so much criticized by their superiors at home. Such men were not "forward" on their own account, but pushed by the necessi ties of the situation. Hope wrote: No doubt Mr. Campbell exercised powers totally dlf ferent from those of Consuls at civilized places where a regular government exists . . but the peculiar position Nr. Campbell occupies In a perfectly unclvlll zed country . . . renders it absolutely necessary that he should take upon himself power and authority which Consuls in civilized countries cannot assume.33 The inquiry served to complete the disruption between the consul and the merchants; conversely, it con tributed to healing the breach between Campbell and the missionaries. Townsend was not slow in recognizing the changed atmosphere when he returned to Lagos from England in November. The consul was now most friendly, he wrote, had given considerable aid to his party in getting their belongings ashore and insisted that the visiting Bishop of Sierra Leone use his personal boat for the Journey to Abeokuta.3^ 33Hope to Adams, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1 8 3 6, F.O.84/1002. 3i *Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 1, 1 8 5 6. C.N.S. CA2/B3. 332 Trade and Politic®, 1 8 5 6 -5 7 It la possible that trade with Abeokuta furnished another basis for the Increasing friendliness between the two parties, Crowther suggested this in mid-year when he observed Campbell to be at last realising the importance of Abeokuta as a trade center, a point that the missionar ies had been propounding for years. What struck the consul particularly was the fact that on a recent market day in Lagos the Egba had brought down in their canoes some four hundred tons of oil, worth about sixteen thousand pounds sterling in England.33 in view of the consul's disappoint ment at the size of the trade from the western lagoon, and Kosoko's tapping of the IJebu trade in the eastern lagoon through his port at Palma, the Egba trade must have appeared even more impressive. And besides the oil trade, Abeokuta was now ship ping cotton to England in amounts that promised to become significant. Unlike the European merchants at Lagos, who gave neither Interest nor encouragement to its cultivation, 33crowther to Venn, Lagos, June 27, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/031. 333 Campbell and the missionaries haul great hopes that the staple would become an Important export commodity. The consul was therefore much Interested In the Society's program at Abeokuta, where people were encouraged to cultivate cotton and shown how to clean and prepare It for export. He likewise took an active Interest In the Society's warehouse at Lagos where the cotton was pressed and packed. On one occasion In 1 8 3 6, on being told that operations would soon cease because of a shortage of canvas wrapping, he personally scoured the town to find a substitute.36 on another occasion, when the Society's cotton press broke down, he enlisted a naval engineer to repair It and donated4f5 toward a new and better machine.37 36crowther to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 28, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/031. 37crowther to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 4, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/031. Campbell estimated that 34,491 pounds of cotton was exported from Lagos In 1 8 5 6, all of which was from Abeokuta. However, the Insignificance of trade at Lagos can be realized by the rest of the export figures for that year, when only !&,884 tons of palm oil and 16,037 lbs. of Ivory were exported besides the cotton. The gross total of less than 4,000 long tons was worth an estimated #178 ,000 at English prices, but not all of It was consign ed to England. Campbell to Clarendon, Jan. 3, 1 8 3 7, F.O. 84/1031. 334 In the following year It seemed as though the hopes for cotton were on the way to realization, exports Increasing threefold to 114,000 pounds weight.36 Besides this, the Government was beginning to show an Interest In the future of African cotton and was even willing to provide a moderate outlay for the purchase of seed, gins, and agricultural equipment to encourage Africans "to substitute productive labour for the destestable traffic In slaves."39 one Manchester cotton manufacturer, Thomas Clegg, "under the guidance and with the advice of Rev. H. Venn," had consigned 119 cotton gins to Abeokuta by mid- 1 8 5 7 and planned on sending more, so widespread was their use by that time.40 And presses arrived at Abeokuta dur ing the same year, enabling the more manageable bales to be sent to Lagos rather than numerous bags of loose cotton. 38campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 2, 1 8 5 8, F.O. 84/1061. 39ciarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, March 9, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. i * °Bxamlner and Times (Manchester), Aug. 13# 1857# In F.O. 2/221 335 To facilitate the movement of the bales from the town to the river, roads were Improved and bridges built. 1 *1 The overall picture was thus promising. But the expectations of the consul and the C.M.S. were not fully realized. The export of cotton Indeed reached 2 3 6,OCX) lbs. In 1 8 5 8 but fluctuated wildly after that, dropping to 1*735 lbs. In i860. Oil exports showed a decline also, from 4,942 tons in 1857 to 2,752 tons in i8 6 0.^2 As Campbell realized, the perpetual hostile movements of Gthezo and Kosoko presented great obstacles to the enlarge- ment of cotton cultivation and trade In general.**3 He did not realize that the continued Interplay of Yoruba power- politics presented an even greater barrier. Trade was affected by both these obstacles In 1857* In January, Townsend was speaking of the possibility of a renewed attack on Abeokuta by a combined army of Dahomey and Oyo. Atlba, the Alafin, had been pressing the Egba to ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 2 5, 1 8 5 7, C.M.S. CA2/M3• ^2jiewbury, The Western Slave Coast, pp. 57-8* quoting consular returns. 43campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Jan. 5, 1 8 5 7, F.O. 84/1031. 336 allow the old Oyo frontier toll-town of IJana to be re established south-west of Abeokuta, toward Porto Novo. The Egba had replied by telling Atlba that If he wished to return to conditions of yesteryear he should begin by restoring the Egba to their ancestral lands.^ The refusal had angered him and he began considering an alliance with Qhezo. By February an attack on Abeokuta seemed Imminent and Gollmer, newly-landed with missionary reinforcements, was consequently delayed at Lagos for three weeks. The Egba asked Campbell for help, for grape-shot and ball for the slx-pounders that were In the missionary compound at Ake, and for officers to direct the artillery fire.^5 with the onset of the rains In April the threat of attack diminished and the Dahoml went home. They had come close to the Yoruba frontiers, and the threat of Invasion served Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 28, 1857, C.M. S. CA2/085. ^^The Alake to Campbell, Abeokuta, Feb. 25, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. 337 to choke off trade from Abeokuta to Lagoa from January to April. 2 *6 Sgba Campaigns In Egbado Following this there waa the expectation of another attack on Lagoa by Kosoko, who waa buay fitting out hla war canoea In June, still threatening In Auguat and at the aame time Intriguing at Otta to aet up a puppet chief friendly to hla cause.^7 By far the most Important event of 1857# however, waa the Egba campaign against Albo, a principal Egbado town west of Abeokuta toward Ketu (Iketu). There had been complaints of Egba being kidnaped there and given to Ghezo as presents, and of others being killed for sacrifice and their heads nailed to the town)s walls. 2 * 6 Regardless of the veracity of the complaints, It seems more likely that the Egba campaign was 2 *6Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, April 14, 1857# F.O. 84/1031. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, June 29, Aug. 6, 1857# F.O. 84/1031. 2 * 6Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Hay 26, 1857, C.M.S. CA2/ 0 8 5; the Alake to Campbell, Abeokuta, June 4, 1 8 5 7, N.N.A. CSO 8/i, Vol. 2. 338 part of their long-range design to win Egbado supremacy from Dahomey, Even more, Atlba was now developing his own ambitions toward the south and was laying claim to Albo. His hope, perhaps, was to withdraw the claim If Qhezo would enter an antl-Egba alliance that would materially assist his effort to re-establish an Oyo town at IJana.^9 The war can properly be considered, therefore, as part of the developing Yoruba power struggle. Evidence to support this lies In the measures approved by an Egba war-councll held In early June. It was then agreed that trade with Ijaye, Ibadan, Ikorodu, IIorIn, Lagos and all adjacent towns be stopped; that no canoes be allowed on the Ogun except those of the missionaries and that anyone breaking the edicts would be executed.50 These were certainly more elaborate measures than would have been warranted by a mere retaliatory e^qpedltion against Albo, which would probably have consisted of nothing more than ^^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 25, 1857* C.M. S. CA2/0 8 5• 5°Charles Macaulay to Scala, Abeokuta, June 15* 1857* quoted by P. Amaury Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria. A Sketch of Their History, Ethnology and Languages, with an Abstract of the 1921 Census (London; Oxford University Press), I, pp. 138-9. 339 minor kidnaping. The very fact that the Alake wrote to Campbell warning him that a campaign was being prepared, that trade would be stopped and asking for his approval^1 also tends to support the contention that the campaign was more than one of vengeance. The Alake would not have sought approval in such a case. Campbell advised against the campaign, suggesting that Ibadan might use the opportunity to fall on Abeo kuta. The Egba reply to this was that all preparation had been made and that all roads were to be closed "In order to prevent our soldiers stealing away to trade."53 The consult response was both surprising and Indicative of his changed feeling for the Egba. He naturally regretted the campaign, as trade would suffer, but as It was not an aggressive war but one of self-defense he wished Cod's good providence to crown their arms.54 The consul took care not ^Abeokuta, May 20, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. ^^Campbell to the Alake, Lagos, May 26, 1 8 5 7, Camp bell to the Basorun, Lagos, June 1, 1 8 5 7, In F.O. 84/1031. ^^The Alake to Campbell, Abeokuta, June 4, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. ^Campbell to the Alake, Lagos, June 10, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. 340 to mention this Message to Downing Street, Instead report ing the advice he had given against the campaign. This had been quite correct, approved Lord Clarendon.55 Despite the divine Intercession called for by the consul, the siege of Albo fared badly. After dragging on for several Months the war chiefs asked Townsend for the cannon, which were kept In his compound at Ake. Townsend refused their use for offensive purposes, at which the Alake approached Campbell for his permission. To Townsend's surprise, the consul gave his consent. Campbell then changed his mind, but one gun had already left.56 Whether the weapon was used Is not known, but Albo finally surrendered at the beginning of November after a five month siege, the victorious Egba bringing home about four thousand captives, mostly women and children.57 The Egba resumed their Egbado campaign In January, 1 8 3 8, had some quick successes In the towns and villages 55porelgn Office, Aug. 20, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. 36rownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 25, 1857, C.M. S. CA2/085. 57aollmer, Journal, Abeokuta, Nov. 11, 1857, C.M.S. CA2/043. 341 around Albo, then returned home. Yet another foray Into the same area was planned but canceled at the last minute when word was reoelved that the Dahomey army was moving east, presumably to attack Abeokuta In revenge for the Albo affair. Instead, Ghezo Invaded Ketu, thus driving this Yoruba kingdom Into the arms of an alliance with Abeokuta.58 "Free Emigration" and Yoruba Unrest The Immediate result of the 1837 wars was that the oil taken by the Egba to Lagos during that year was barely half the amount they had sold In 1 8 5 6 .5 9 This was mis takenly attributed by all concerned to an Increase In trans-Atlantic slave trading activity. In fact, oil ejqports should be studied In light of the political rela tionships between Lagos and the Interior and between the Yoruba states rather than a result of the fluctuations of the slave trade. The extent of the slave trade, therefore, 58campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 6, March 3, 1858, F.O. 84/1061. 59campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 6, 1838, F.O. 84/1061. 342 was a reflection of political conditions In the Interior, not vice-versa. On the other hadd it would be foolish Indeed not to recognize that expeditions must have been undertaken for the sole purpose of taking prisoners and selling them to the waiting ships. This was how it appeared to the men pn the spot, and In 1857 they had good cause to argue this case. The French Government had Just launched a scheme to recruit "free labor," principally for their West Indian possessions.^ 0 One of the firms participating was Victor Regis of Marseilles, a concern long associated with slaving activity but more recently dealing In oil and other local commodities. Regis factors had established them selves in 1 8 5 6 with Kosoko at Palma, In fact, but had been active at Whydah and other ports on the Dahomey coast for many years. As few, If any, Africans were desirous of emigrating, the scheme could only succeed If slaving was disguised as free emigration; so In August a large French vessel, the Stella, appeared at Whydah to take twelve 6°Saburi 0 . Blobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours. 1842-1872 (Oxford: University Press, 1957)* p. 61. 3*3 hundred of these "emigrants." Campbell and the mission aries were Immediately up In arms, the consul attributing the Egba attack on Albo to the Whydah Influence and expecting a general Yoruba war to result; Townsend specu lated that It would lead to an attack by Dahomey on Abeokuta.6l Venn put the matter Into the hands of "our parliamentary friends"^2 and the Foreign Office waB Inundated with petitions and memorials from philanthropic, religious and commercial bodies.63 But there was little need to press the Palmerston government on this Issue. The strength of the Squadron was raised, diplomatic pressure began to be exerted in Paris and Palmerston sug gested that Whydah be taken as a signal lesson to those chiefs breaking their treaty obligation; slave dealers should be expelled and Whydah made Independent of ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Aug. 6, 10, 1 8 5 7, F.O. 84/1031; Townsend to Venn, Aug. 24, 25, 1857, C.M.S. CA2/O8 5. 62C.M.S. to Townsend, London, Oct. 23, 1857, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 63in F.O. 84/1034. 344 Gthezo, he noted .64 The Admiralty was instructed to study the practi cability of occupying Whydah and the Senior Officer of the Bights Division landed there to make a personal survey. Campbell, too, was asked for his comments and suggestions. He concurred fully In the project of making Whydah a British settlement and gave a great deal of practical Information regarding the proposed landing, Including the numbers of troops required, the drinking water available, the type of bombardment that should precede the assault and the best time of year for It to take place.65 Although the "free emigration” scheme was not officially abandoned until 1 8 6 2 It was not a success on the West Coast due to the fact that by the terms of the contract, Regis could offer little more than half the cur rent price for a male slave In good condition. 6 6 neverthe less, missionaries and consul alike continued to attribute ^Memorandum, dated June 7* 1857* in P.O. 84/1031. ^Clarendon to Campbell, Foreign Office, Nov. 13, 1857, Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 6, 1 8 5 8, In F.O. 84/1061. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Oct. 2, 1837# F.O. 84/1031. 345 the growing unrest In Yorubal&nd to this outside Influence. Nor were they slow In backing up their arguments with references to the growing practice of slave ships to fly U.S. colors. As British cruisers had positive Instructions not to Interfere with any such vessel, enforcement became most difficult.67 This and the French scheme were then blamed for conditions In the Interior. Missionary Enterprise, 1857• and New Prospects The missionaries therefore had worries enough, despite the rapport which had been established with the consul. On the other hand, the Mission Itself was flourishing, boasting seven stations, fifty-nine clergy and laymen and fifteen schools In operation. 6 8 Even Oollmer and Campbell were on friendly terms, a situation helped by Oollmer being stationed at Bclja township In Abeokuta and therefore not In Immediate contact with the ^Vice-Admiral Sir F. W. Orey, giving evidence before the Adderley Committee, Pari. Papers, V (1 8 6 5), 412, pp. 150-51. 68church Missionary Proceedings, 1856-57, p. vill. 346 consul, an arrangement considered prudent by the Society.^9 Oollaer and Townsend were naturally thrown together more In this new circumstance, but In this case also the men were on much better terms. Judging by the content of Oollmer's letters, as well as their frequency— which decreased markedly after his return to Yorubaland In 1 8 5 7— a partial explanation for the Improved relations lies In the fact that Oollmer largely disassociated himself from politics at Abeokuta, concerning himself Instead with his spiritual duties. On leaving England both men had been Instructed to expand missionary activity from Abeokuta, Oollmer to the west and Townsend to the northeast. This they did, and 1837 was very much a year of penetration and expansion. One Important journey undertaken by Townsend was to Qyo, where he Impressed the Alafln with the need for the Oospel and the advantages to be gained by a legitimate commerce In oil and cotton. He advised Atlba to send messengers to Lagos to open correspondence with the consul, who was very ^Chichester to Clarendon, London, June 20, 1856, P.O. 84/1004. 3^7 Interested In promoting trade. This the Alafln agreed to doJO What the Society had In mind was an expansion of the Yoruba Mission to the Niger, where It would Join the stations to be established as a result of the 1857 Niger expedition,71 it had been hoped that the successful Balkle expedition of 1854 would have been followed up quickly, but the Crimean war had Intervened and the project was delayed. Barely had the peace been concluded, however, when Venn and a "powerful deputation of the Houses of Lords and Commons" called on the Prime Minister to press for a new ascent of the river. Palmerston assured them that their recommendation would receive Immediate attention.72 He was as good as his word. Within months a contract was made with McGregor Laird for a vessel to ascend the river annually for five years, the government to 7^Townsend to Venn, Oyo, June 24, 1857* C.M.S. CA2/ 0 8 5. T^Townsend to Venn, IJaye, Jan. 24, 1 8 5 8, C.M.S. CA2/085. T^Venn to Hlnderer, London, July 23, 1856, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 348 subsidize the venture to a sum of 35,000. The main objects were similar to those of 1841: to survey and chart the river, make anti-slave treaties, encourage trade and missionary enterprise, extend geographical knowledge and spread civilizing Influences* Dr. Balkle was to command the first ship, the Dayspring, assisted by Lieutenant J. H. Glover, R.N., as cartographer, and they were to ascend the river to Fulanl territory.73 Laird asked the Society If they wished to send a representative, an offer that was Immediately accepted. Crowther was the obvious choice, who was Informed that the Society wished him to accompany the expedition and found the long-dreamed Niger Mission. He was to be assisted by the Rev. J. C. Taylor, an Ibo from the Sierra Leone Mission, and several African teachers; they were to stay on the river a year or two, considering themselves "itinerating evangelists,n and set up stations at conven ient places; If possible Crowther was to return to Lagos overland from Rabba by way of Abeokuta. Within this 73a. C. G. Hastings, The Voyage of the Dayspring (London: The Bodley Head Limited, 1926), pp. 1&-2 0. 349 general framework: he was to conduct the venture as he saw fit.7* The Rev. Gottlieb Buhler was sent down from Ibadan to replace Crowther at Lagos and by July, 1 8 5 7, the Daysprlng was steaming up the river. Stations were estab lished at Abo, Just north of the delta, Onitsha, Idda and Gbebe, at the confluence of the two rivers. The voyage continued to Rabba, where the travellers were welcomed by the Bnlr, but on resuming the up-river Journey the Daysprlng struck rocks and sank on October 7 . The relief * ship Sunbeam did not reach them for a year, but the time was not wasted; Glover continued his charting, Crowther began building a mission and overland communications with Lagos were established.75 On hearing that this long-sought link had been made, it was clear to the Church Missionary Society that the country between Lagos and the Niger should receive the blessings of civilization "through missionary operations 7Venn to Crowther, London, Dec. 23, 1 8 5 6, Jan. 23, March 30, 1857, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 75Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Miasionaiy Society, Its Environment^ Its Men and Its Work (London: C.M.S., 1699-1916), II, pp. 7S-7. 350 and lawful c o m m e r c e ."76 Though less ambitious* consul Campbell had similar Ideas* and to further them he Journeyed to Abeokuta In May* 10f>8. Commercial and Consular Enterprise The background of his visit to the Egba capital stretched back to the time In late 1856 when Signor Scala had visited the town. He had arrived with a letter of Introduction to the Alake from Crowther* with the purpose of establishing a factory. Permission had been given after missionary advice had been sought and the trading station began operations at Ake.77 Opposition to the venture was apparent from the beginning. In London* Venn objected strongly to the settlement of a Roman Catholic at Abeokuta; Scala himself may be harmless* he wrote* "but a Romanist layman Is never safe from being made a Priest's tool."78 More surprisingly* 7^Venn to Samuel Crowther Junior* London* April 20* 1858, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 77jjaser* Journal. Sept. 22-27* 1856* C.M.S. CA2/068. 78yenn to Townsend* London* Sept. 23, 1858, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 351 In view of the Society's encouragement of legitimate commerce, Townsend was Instructed not to encourage European settlement at Abeokuta In future.79 At first, Townsend himself had doubts about the wisdom of doing so, but later came to recognize Scala's personal merits and considered the step to be an advancement toward the liberalization of trade.®0 The establishment of a European factor met additional opposition at Lagos and Abeokuta. European traders and African middlemen at Lagos both objected, the former on the ground that Scala was gaining an advantage and the Saros because the operation by-passed their func tion as middlemen; In fact an extension of the practice would eliminate their services altogether. But the most perlstant opposition came from Abeokuta, where the Parakoyl registered Its objections by closing the river for a week soon after Scala began his operation.®1 79c.M.S. to Townsend, London, Dec. 23, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/L2. ®°Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, July 2 8, Sept. 2 8, I8 5 8, C.M.S. CA2/085. ®1Maser to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 27, 1 8 5 6, C.M.S. CA2/068. 352 The complaints of this trading fraternity were quite logical. Scalars factory would buy oil, cotton and Ivory direct from the producers and the happy position enjoyed by the Egba traders In buying and reselling would thus be broken. The Parakoyl had Its greatest strength In the townships of Igbeln and Igbore and It was from here that the lamentations were loudest. They had traded with the coast since olden times, they said, It waB the custom, and they were the "proprietors" of the Ogun.®2 Despite the opposition, which took the form of an Intermittent closing of the river, robbing his loads and Intimidating people who wished to trade with him, Scala persisted In his efforts until the beginning of 1 8 5 8, when mounting losses and the Inability of the Alake to protect his goods resulted In the decision to abandon the proJect.®3 Campbell was upset. He had watched the experi ment with great interest, Imagining that It would result in an extension of trade and had hoped that It would point ®^Maser to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 27$ 1856, C.M.S. CA2/068. ®3Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, Feb. 6, March 3, 1858, F.O. 84/1061. 353 the way to a method of conducting business that was not based on the troublesome credit system. He determined to go to Abeokuta and see what could be done. With Townsend at his side he had several Interviews with the Alakej the principal chiefs and the Parakoyl leaders. He explained how Injurious to trade was the exclusive right claimed by the guild of trading with the seaboard and navigating the Ogun. The Parakoyl chiefs at last agreed to abandon their claims and signed an agreement which* If It had been observed; would have revolutionized the entire commercial structure. Henceforth; any merchant could settle In Abeokuta If armed with a recommendation from the consul; he could pick his own site and the chiefs of that township were to protect him. Merchants were not to be compelled to give credit and trade was not to be stopped except for urgent political reasons; In which case a month*s notice would be given to the consul. Merchants were to trade with whom they pleased and the Egba agreed to Improve the roads from the town to the river. The Alake and six chiefs signed the agreement on May 22.®^ d^Enc. In Campbell to Lord Malmesbury; Manchester; July 30, 1858, P.O. 84/1061. 354 Brilliant success appeared to crown the mission. Scala decided to continue his venture and two more European traders Joined him. Despite all the good fellow ship now apparent between Campbell and the missionaries, however, Townsend declined to accept his proposition that one of the newly-arrived merchants, Nr. Hughes, be appointed vice-consul at Abeokuta; a vice-consul would be worse than useless, he thought.^ This was not too great a rebuff, so with high hopes that he was leaving things in good order, Campbell departed Lagos on a working vacation, combining his furlough with an embassy to the Manchester Cotton Supply Association to promote the Yoruba product. He carried presents to the Queen from his Egba friends and visited Salisbury Square several times. Venn was most Impressed by the consul's friendliness and civility; and by the time his leave was over, Venn was quite confident that 85Buhler to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 5, 1858, C.M.S. CA2/M4; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, April 30, 1858, C.M.S. CA2/O85. ®8rownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, June 24, 1858, C.M.S. CA2/O85. 355 Campbell at last appreciated who were the "time" friends of Africa. In his absence, Campbell had left the charge of consular affairs to the captain of the steam gunboat Brune. stationed permanently at Lagos since December 1857* But Lieutenant Lodder had barely grown accustomed to his duties when he realized that the new trade agreement with the Egba was not working as It should; neither dll nor cotton was arriving at Lagos In Increased quantities— In fact the volume appeared to be decreasing. In a way, Campbell had been at fault In expecting the Egba to honor a written agreement, a scrap of paper having neither Immediate nor long-term Implications as far as they were concerned. And the Egba mode of government being what It was, the Alake had no means of enforcing the treaty even had he wished; trading matters were by tradi tion the concern of the Parakoyl. and If they chose to Ignore the agreement that was very much their own affair. Other pressures were being brought to bear on the treaty. A Saro middleman from Lagos named Turner had &7Venn Vo Townsend, July 22, 1858, Venn to Haser, Dec. 23, 1858, in C.M.S. CA2/L2. appeared In Abeokuta as early as April and was distribut ing largess in an effort to halt direct trading with the Europeans. Then there were a number of Sierra Leone Immigrants in Abeokuta who wished to break down the old trading guild and assume the role of middlemen themselves. They fiercely resented white merchants being In their midst and, perhaps backed by European factors at Lagos, they began making every effort to drive the new merchants away. By July, a great struggle was taking place In Abeokuta for the control of trade, 8 8 one consequence being the frequent closing of the river. Actlng-consul Lodder at length went to Abeokuta to see what could be done. He found the main difficulty to be a recent prohibition against women taking part In trade, apparently enforced by the Parakoyl after the agreement had been signed. This had almost brought trade to a complete halit, Lodder explained, ”... the women being the working class In this country." However, he and Townsend had an eight-hour discussion with the chiefs which ended with ®®Townsend to Venn, July 28, Sept. 28, 1853, C.M.S. CA2/085. 357 their agreement to respect the treaty and permit anyone to trade The Condition of Yoruba Politics, 1858-59 Even if it had been effective, this new agreement came too late to improve the Lagos oil receipts for 1 8 5 8. Interruptions of trade became more frequent throughout Yorubaland that year as alignments and alliances were crystallizing between Oyo's successor states; tensions mounted. In the north, Qyo and IJaye were at each other's throats over supremacy in the Shakl country, the Alafln still holding his own but being pressed constantly by the Are. Ghezo began to play a part early in the year, seek ing Yoruba allies for a renewed attack on Abeokuta and being especially Interested in Oyo. He was determined not to relinquish to the Egba the domination of Egbado country they coveted, and he wanted revenge for the Egba attack on Albo. Oyo seemed a likely friend as the Alafln was known to have ambitions to &9i«ieut. Edward Francis Lodder to Malmesbury, Lagos, Dec. 25, 1 8 5 8, F.O. 84/1061 358 the south, through Egba territory, and had recently been rebuffed by them In an attempt to re-establish IJana as an Oyo town. Ghezo was therefore tempting the Alafln with a promise to resume the tribute formerly paid by Dahomey In return for support against the Egba. Even more, the Dahomey army would also help Atlba bring back to the Oyo fold the Yoruba states which had broken away and assist In restoring the old Oyo hegemony. Campbell returned to his post, got wind of Qhezo1s overtures and employed the services of Lieutenant Glover, returning overland to the wrecked Daysprlng. to warn the Alafln of the Impollty of allowing Dahomey to obtain Influence In Yorubaland.90 Unrest was also evident at Ibadan. Hlnderer, on Intimate terms with the chiefs, had said as early as 1 8 5 6 that Ibadan would have to fight a war with IJebu before It could consider Itself safe.91 What he meant by "safe” was that Ibadan would have to take possession of IJebu country to the south to obtain Its own road to the sea, Independent 90campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, April 7> 1838, F.O. 84/1061. 9lHinderer to Venn, Ibadan, May 25 > 1856, C.M.S. CA2/049. 359 of both the IJebu and Egba. Throughout 1 8 5 8 Hinderer was atill complaining that Ibadan traders were only allowed to go as far as Ip&ra or Iperu, the northermost towns of IJebu-Remo on the road from Ibadan to Lagos.92 This situation warrants explanation. The IJebu, and by now the Egba, were In the for tunate position of occupying territory adjacent to the coast. In common with other West African people, they valued this strategic position as It meant that goods going and coming to the coast from the Interior had to pass through their territory. Not only was there money to be made, but they were also In the position to regulate the flow of European arms and powder to their actual or potential enemies. In practice, the system worked In the following manner. Traders coming from the Interior would be allowed only to the northern market towns, Iperu or Ipara In the case of IJebu, or Abeokuta In Egba territory; here they had to sell their goods. Egba and IJebu traders then resold to Lagos middlemen, who In turn did business with 92Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, Feb. 25, Sept. 24, I858, C.M.S. CA2/049. 360 the Europeans. The Egba normally sold their produce In Lagos but the IJebu practice was to transact business at markets on the north shore of the lagoon, Ikorodu or EJerin being the largest of their markets. Goods flowing north were regulated In like fashion. Lagos traders were allowed Into Egbaland only to the lagoon-side towns of Ebute Netta and Isherl, and Into IJebu at Ikorodu or EJerin. Ibadan was therefore very much at the whim of Its coastal neighbors, although It should be noted that It had a more remote access to the sea at Benin, an alternative unsatisfactory to the merchants and consul at Lagos, when It was used, depriving them as It did of trade and revenue. Because of the extra distance, the Benin road was similarly unsatisfactory to Ibadan. Ibadan's dependency on IJebu was brought Into sharp focus In the second half of 1858 when the Awujale decided to stop the passage of oil from Ibadan through his territory. Despite the entreaties of the consul and the costly presents presented by a delegation of Lagos merchants In March, 1839# the Awujale refused to rescind the orders, giving as his reason his quarrel with Ibadan.93 If he had been more specific, the Awujale could have told the merchants that his dispute with Ibadan was of several years standing, stretching baok to the time when It became clear that Ibadan had ambitions to the south. He could also have reminded them that the first overt action was made In 1857 when IJebu traders had been seized at Ibadan and communications out for a time.9^ If the Awujale had been even more explicit he would have explain ed that his prohibition against trade also had certain domestic political overtones that complicated his relations with Ibadan. The Remo province of IJebu was now attempting to sever its tenuous ties with the Awujale; Ibadan, with Its best route to the coast lying In Remo territory, was encouraging the secessionist movement.95 His decision to exert pressure on Ibadan and on his restless Remo subjects 93campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 22, 1 8 5 9* and enclosed "Report of Mr. McCoskry and others of their Mission to Jaboo Ode,” In F.O. 84/1088. ^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, July 1, 1857, F.O. 84/1031. p. a . Ajayi and Robert Smith, Yoruba Warfare In the nineteenth Century (Cambridge: University Press, p. 71. 362 by stopping trade would therefore stay In effect, despite the blandishments of the Europeans at Lagos. Besides this quarrel with the Awujale. further unrest was apparent at Ibadan during 1 8 5 8 and was marked by bands of warriors roaming the country on plundering expeditions. Hlnderer attributed the lawlessness to Kosoko bribing the baloguns to catch slaves for export; at the same time he defended the large standing army at Ibadan as the traditional Yoruba force necessarily kept under arms to protect all Yorubaland from the Mohammedan hordes at Ilorin.96 Thus, despite the hopes of missionaries, merchants and consul for an extension of legitimate trade, this desirable condition was not obtained In 1 8 5 8. Palm oil exports from Lagos were down over the preceding year by some 3 0 0 tons; and although the cotton figures showed an improvement, the Increase was less a reflection of expand ing production than a result of the prolonged stoppage of trade from Abeokuta In 1 8 5 7; thus a large amount of stored ^^ainderer to Venn, Ibadan, Sept. 24, 1858, C.M.S. CA2/049. 363 cotton reached Lagos in 1 8 5 8#97 Instead of considering political conditions in the interior, Campbell unhesitatingly blamed the adverse trade figures on the revived slave trade.98 yet at the same time he was reporting the complete failure of the French scheme to buy slaves, even from Kosoko, who by now was regarded by Campbell as the most obnoxious slave dealer on the coast.99 Exports fell still further In 1 8 5 9, and although Campbell was not alive at the end of that year to recognize the fact, it had become quite clear by then that Yoruba Internal conditions and not the slave trade was the cause of the continuing decline. The year started out badly with a destructive fire at Lagos. With reports reaching him that Kosoko was preparing to reassert his claim to Lagos, the consul 970ii exports were 4,612 tons compared to 4,942 tons in 1 8 5 7* Cotton exports doubled, from 51 tons to 1 0 5; ivory was down from 1 0 tons to little more than 2; all figures are in long tons. Campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, Feb. 7, 1859, F.O. 84/1061. 98(jampbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 5, 1859, F.O. 84/1088. 99campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 4, 1859, F.O. 84/1088♦ 364 suspected him to be responsible and asked for naval support In the event of an attack.100 This done., he met the chief Tapa and other representatives of Kosoko and warned them not to undertake a course that would most certainly end disastrously for them. 101 This contretemps had no soener subsided when word came from Abeokuta that another attack from Dahomey was expected, whose new king, Glele, had started his long reign by swearing to destroy Abeokuta In honor of his deceased father. Ammunition was required urgently.102 Campbell had different Intelligence but assured the Egba of his help If the situation became urgent, Impressing on them the "deep Interest taken by the British Government and people" In their continued welfare.103 100Campbell to Captain Sanderson, Senior Officer in the Bights, Lagos, Feb. 4, 1859, P.O. 84/1088. 101Campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 4, 1 8 5 9, F.O. 84/1088. 10^Phe Alake and chiefs to Campbell, Abeokuta, Feb. 21, 1859, P.O. dk/ioQQ. 103campbell to the Alake, Lagos, Marsh 5, 1859, P.O. 84/1088. 365 Finding his appeal to the Awujale to resume trade to be fruitless, Campbell then turned his attention to Porto Novo, whloh likewise had sent no oil for several months. Taking advantage of the presence In Lagos of Lieutenant 01over and the Niger relief ship Rainbow, the consul took the Brune and Rainbow to Porto Novo to remonstrate with Sodjl, thinking perhaps that a minor show of force would do no harm. Here again he met disappoint ment. Sodjl was dissatisfied with the prices being offer ed for oil at Lagos and was sending his canoes westward to Cotonou, where a narrow channel through the sand bar gave access to the sea and better prices were being offered.10^ Sodjl might also have mentioned that there were no duties levied at Cotonou, but he did give the vague promise to reconsider the situation. The journey to Porto Novo was one of the consul's last official acts; he came down with dysentery and after a short Illness died on April 1 7. But before his death he became embroiled In a dispute the effect of which lingered for many years. 10^Campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, April 5* 1859, F.O. 84/1066- 366 Domestic Slavery Dr. Balkle and Lieutenant Olover, of the Niger expedition, were preparing In March to leave Lagos for the overland journey back to Rabba. Campbell, In fact, was planning to employ their services to Impress upon the Interior chiefs his dissatisfaction with the small amounts of oil arriving at Lagos and to warn them that arms, rum and tobacco would be cut off If this "hostility" to Eng land continued.Balkie was to leave first, but a few days prior to his departure the word went around Lagos that he would take with him any slaves who wished to return to their homes In the northern territories. Some Joined his retinue and the consul himself placed several men In the caravan, slaves who had absconded from dealers at Whydah. The result was that the caravan was ambushed by Irate Lagos slave owners when only a few miles along the Abeokuta road. One man was killed and another wounded. 105campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 5, 1859, F.O. 84/1088. 10^Campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 31, 1859, F.O. 84/1088. 367 Glover then prepared to leave, first dispatching an advance party of porters. When he was preparing to go there was considerable excitement, in the belief that he too would take absconding slaves. He had difficulty keeping people away and was finally forced to Invite Docemo to Inspect the caravan, to make sure that none of the royal slaves were using this opportunity to escape. Arriving at Abeokuta he found that the Egba had confiscated sixteen loads from his advance party. Only twelve were returned, representing a loss of <^6 5. He was told that the goods had been taken because several of Docemo* s slaves had run away and he was asked to give them up. This he refused, calling It a ’ great Insult to the Queen of England and of no concern to Abeokuta. In making his report he included a strong indictment of slavery at Lagos, charging consular employees with holding slaves and saying that Campbell, driven by the objective of Increasing palm oil trade, returned runaway slaves to their masters In the Interior If the tribe concerned was sending oil to Lagos. If not, he allowed the slaves to remain in LagosJ0? 107oiover to Malmesbury, Ibadan, May 31, 1859, P.O. 84/1095. 368 Townsend, who saw the letter, believed the statements to be true,10® Baikle had the same opinion and supported Glover*a contention that the most notorious slave holders at Lagos were the Immigrants from Sierra Leone, The English merchants had kept quiet about the unsavory situation "from a dread of Incurring the dis pleasure of the late Consul."10^ Glover, as was his wont, did not give the complete story of the robberies; nor did he have sufficient eaqper- ience to render an objective report on the slave situation at Lagos. He knew full well that slaves had Joined his advance party and he knew that some of them belonged to Docemo. Just after his porters had left Lagos he asked Townsend to detain Docemo*s men at Abeokuta, If they were still there, but he hoped they were gone. If any were detained he asked Townsend to make sure that "none but the King*s slaves are given up. I hope all have gone off."110 108Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, June 2, 1 8 5 9, C.M.S. CA2/0 85. 10^Balkle to Malmesbury, Rabba, July 1 9, 1 8 5 9, P.O. 84/3.095. 110Glover to Townsend, Lagos, April 21, 1859, F.O. 84/1095. 369 A later consul, defending the consular employees charged with slave holding, concluded that the robbery of the Niger loads was caused "by an uncalled for and Injudicious Interference with slave property at Lagos.” Great evil would result from this spasmodic agitation by passing travelers, he said; what was needed was a long-term plan.111 The Foreign Office agreed that Baikle and Glover had Indeed encouraged slaves to desert their masters.112 Neither Glover nor Baikle understood the Institu tion of domestic slavery. It was not a harsh Institution— on the contrary. Lagos had a population of about 25,000 at this time, of which approximately ninety per cent were slaves•113 And although Campbell had Indeed given refuge 111George Brand to Russell, Lagos, May 3* i860, F. 0. 84/1095. 112Russell to Brand, Foreign Office, June 22, i860, F.O. 84/1114. 1 13The population of the Island at this time Is difficult to estimate. Robert CamfMl, a Jamaica-born chemist passed through Lagos In July, 1859* &nd guessed the population to be about 30,000; see his A Pilgrimage to My Motherland (London: W. J. Johson, 1861), p. 20. But a rude census In 1866 placed the figure at 25*000; Lagos Blue Book. 1866, In C.O. 151. Consul Campbell made the estimate of the percentage of domestic slaves, In Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, March 28, 1 8 5 8, F.O. 84/1061. 370 to runaway slaves, he was never Inundated with them. This would have been different had domestic slavery been an oppressive Institution. Many owned property, were treated as family mem bers, and for male slaves there was little difficulty In arranging terms of manumission. Terms were Invariably higher for women, however, and Campbell was frequently called upon to arbitrate when agreement could not be reached over price. On the occasions when runaway slaves sought his protection, Campbell handled the probldm In one of two ways. If the person wanted to stay In Lagos, Campbell would let It be known that he now enjoyed British protection.11* * If he wished to return home, he was attached to a caravan and given the consul's passport, which was recognized Inland a great distance, Campbell's policy, In fact, was one of non-interference with domestic slavery unless his influence was sought.11^ Domestic slavery was precluded from the anti-slave 11^Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos, March 28, 1858, F.O. M/1061. ^^Campbell to Malmesbury, Lagos, March 31, 1859, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 371 trade treaties concluded by Great Britain with Lagos and neighboring people. In several instances this had been discussed and explained at length when the treaties were signed. Campbell was well aware of this, and although he did not like the institution he learned to live with it, as did the missionaries, recognizing it as an ancient institution and a necessary adjunct to the existing economic organization; hopefully, it would change in time. Ironically, the introduction and growth of legitimate commerce, which was held to be the only sure way of abolishing the slave trade, brought an increasing demand for domestic slaves for agricultural work or for porterage, the demand reaching its peak in the l880's. Meanwhile, the robbery of goods bound for the encampment at Rabba, a direct result of Glover's ill- advised activities, became a bone of contention which marred British relations with the Egba for years. In addition, there is good reason to believe that Glover's altercation with the Egba led to the personal dislike he later evinced on many occasions. Compounded with the closer identification he felt for Ibadan, partly developed when the Hlnderers once nursed him back to health in that 372 city, the result was a major British policy reversal towards the Egba several years later when Lieutenant Glover was serving as Governor of Lagos Colony, Of more Immediate concern, the unrest at Lagos over domestic slavery and the Egba robberies— almost Immediately followed by their refusal to allow another caravan bound for Rabba to pass through— added to the earlier events of 1 8 5 9 to make It a year of worsening trade. Still other happenings were to contribute, the most significant being the death of the Alafln Atlba, this event leading directly to the Yoruba wars which broke out In earnest In i860. The Death of Atlba and the Consequences By earliest Oyo tradition, the eldest son succeeded to the title. During his youth, the heir-apparent (Aremo), would be given more and more power until the custom was established that the Alafln and Aremo reigned practically conjointly. But In some Instances It became suspect that the Aremo hastened the demise of his parent; this resulted In the later practice of the Aremo being put to death with his father. This would effectively discourage overly- 373 ambitious heirs, It was felt.11^ The kingship then rotated to different segments of & ruling lineage, the specific decision being reached In consultation with the Ifa divining oracle.^^7 However, because of the circum stances under which the old capital had been abandoned and the pressures of the time, Atlba had not observed these formalities In 1835 During his long reign Atlba*s eldest son, Adelu, became Increasingly olose to his father, shared many of the same dangers and privations and together attempted to rebuild the dignity and potter of the Alaflns of old. But custom demanded that he die with his father. Atlba did not want this, so true to his revolutionary tradition he decided that Adelu should succeed to the throne on his death. But the decision was easier to reach than Imple ment; the chief stumbling-block was Kurunml, the Are of IJaye. Rev. Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Edited by Dr. 0. Johnson. (Lagos: C.N.S. Bookshop, 1937)> PP. 41-2. H7j. p. A. AJayi, Yoruba Warfare, p. 7 6. 374 Enmity between Kurunml and Atlba had existed for many years and had grown even more bitter as IJaye sought to Improve Its position at the expanse of Oyo, particularly In the upper Ogun territory. The missionary stationed at IJaye, In fact, reported In 1854 that It was a capital crime In that city even to mention Atlba's name In the presence of the AreJ- 1^ He later noted the great rejoicing that took place at IJaye when Atlba's death became known. 1 2 0 Being cognizant of this opposition and surmising that It would be-transferred to his son when he became Alafln, Atlba took the prior precaution of securing the sanction of Ibadan to the non-tradltlonal succession. Ibadan agreed to support Adelu when the time came. 121 The time came In April, 1 8 5 9, but the Initial opposition to the new way of doing things came from the city of Qyo Itself. In the days following Atlba1s death a civil war In the town between the traditionalists and 13-9Mann to Rev. J. Ridgeway, IJaye, Peb. 8, 1854, C.M.S. CA2/066. 120Mann, Journal, IJaye, April 21, 1 8 5 9, C.M.S. CA2/066. 1 2 1Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas, pp. 327-28, 331. 375 Adelu*» supporters seemed Imminent, but faithful to Its word, Ibadan Intervened and Adelu was crowned at a private ceremony on May 7.^^ As Atlba had expected, Kurunml then refused to accept Adelu as the new sovereign. Tensions bordering on overt hostility between Oyo and IJaye Increased during the rest of the year. At Shakl, which for several years had been a testing ground for the ambitions of both sides, a skirmish took place at the close of the year when an IJaye contingent attempted to enforce the Are's will. Oyo loyalists overwhelmed them, taking many prisoners that were sent home only at the Insistence of Ibadan.123 The Immediate causes of the war which finally broke out In the following year will be examined In the following chapter. Sufficient to say that the approaching crisis served to affect appreciably the Interior oil trade; exports from Lagos fell to less than 4,000 tons In 1859 A further Instance of the Insignificance to which trade had 122<jcorge Meakin, Journal, Oyo, April 19-21, May 7, 1 8 5 9, C.M.S. CA2/069. 123j. p. a. AJayl, Yoruba Warfare, p. 79* l^Brand to Russell, Lagos, Dec. 31, 1859, P.0.2/28. 376 fallen Ilea In the fact that In the laat three months of the year only two British merchant ships called at Lagos, with a combined capacity of 710 tons.125 Consul Brand Such were the depressing conditions when the new consul arrived In November to take over the duties which had been performed since Campbell's death by Lieutenant Lodder of the Brune. Townsend and Baikle had urged Venn to press for the appointment of Clover, but Lord Russell, Foreign Secretary In Palmerston's new Administration, chose instead Mr. Ceorge Brand, a former naval officer who had most recently served as vice-consul at Loanda. Venn was not greatly disappointed. Brand had made It a point to call at Salisbury Square before leaving for Lagos and Venn was delighted to find that he took great Interest In the Society's alms. Even more, he expressed the desire to further Itm objects by every means In his power and ls^Brand to Marine Dept., Board of Trade, Lagos, Dec. 31, 1859, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 377 hoped that he oould be of use in the Society*s plans.l2^ But Brand found conditions on the coast to be as ill-conducive to missionary enterprise as they were to commercial pursuits. Lieutenant Lodder had recently been to Epe to warn Kosoko once again not to attack Lagos and had found the ex-king preparing to force his way baejg; Docemo, in fact, was only being maintained on the throne by British authority. Even that was weak, consisting of two officers and nine Kroomen on the Brune, augmented by semi-monthly visits by one of the ships of the Squadron.127 Even worse, the French naval vessel Rennudin had just left after an unpleasant visit. Captain Barbotln had come to complain about the expulsion of a French merchant, who had left Lagos rather than pay a fine for trading with Kosoko at a time when commercial Intercourse was prohibited. Barbotln threatened to "blow down and destroy the town" unless French citizens received better protection and also let it be known that his government was 126C.M.S. to Maser, London, Oct. 24, 1859, C.M.S. CA2/L2. l27Lodder to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 2, 1859, P.O. 84/1088. 378 considering placing a gunboat on the lagoon.12® The affair caused great excitement at Lagos and was the first Instance of a clash with the French, whose Interests on the Dahomey coast had become predominant during the 1 8 5 0*s. So with troubles at Lagos, disturbances In the In terior and with trade grinding to a halt, with France show ing Interest and British authority resting on slim resources, It was painfully obvious to the new consul that his Job was no sinecure. But of all the problems he'faced, the most pressing was the situation in the Interior where It was becoming more and more apparent that the uneasy Yoruba truce of the last decade was about to break up. ■ * t: Summary Beginning with the consul's Insistence that European merchants pay their Just share of customs duties, a resulting series of arguments between Campbell and the small European trading community at Lagos developed Into bitter hostility. It was but natural for CampbSll to then turn to the missionaries for support, but his change of 12®Lodder to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 3, 1859, F.O. 84/1088. 379 heart was reinforced by more practical considerations. At Badagry, the legitimate ohlefs were proving to be even less conducive to trade than had Mewu, causing the consul to regret his previous actions there, while from 1 8 5 6 onward Campbell came more and more to realize the dependency of Lagos on Abeokuta commerce. His attitude to the Egba then became most friendly and he began showing practical marks of support; In turn, his re-klndled warmth to the mis sionaries became quite apparent. By late 1 8 5 6 the breach between consul and missionaries had been completely healed and Campbell was again subscribing to their objectives. With this happy state of affairs and with Yoruba- land supposedly at peace, It was confidently anticipated that both missionary and commercial activity would flourish. Such was the Intent. For Instance, the C.M.S. held out optimistic hopes for a speedy link-up between the Yoruba stations and the newly-founded Niger Mission, while Camp bell did his best to encourage cotton cultivation while at tempting to reform the inhibiting mode of economic organiz ation at Abeokuta. Yet despite the promising conditions, both missionary and commercial expansion was stopped; far from improving, the volume of trade began to decline stead ily after 1 8 3 6. 380 Missionaries, traders, and consul alike, attribut ed the deteriorating conditions and unrest in Yorubaland to the revived activity of the slave trade• They looked with special concern at the French attempt to recruit labor for the West Indies. But although French shipping was standing-by to embark those unfortunate enough to be Impressed, and slave hunts must certainly have taken place under this stimulant, the decline in trade was Instead the mark of an approaching Yoruba political crisis. Armed with Brltlsh-supplled powder and shot and encouraged by Campbell's blessing, the Egba resumed their campaigns In 1 8 5 7, hopefully to decide once and for all their supremacy In Egbado country. This served to stop almost all trade through Abeokuta for the year. Commercial interruptions became more frequent In 1858 as alliances and alignments then took form. Oyo and Ijaye began to flex their muscles around Shakl, Dahomey looked to Oyo for possible support against the Egba, while Oyo dreamed of passed glory and began talking of re-establishing tradi tional rights In Egbaland. As for the great Imponderable in Yoruba politics, on whom the question of war or peace ultimately depended, Ibadan started looking with more 381 Interest to the south and to the possibility of a direct and Independent road to the sea. At this, the AwuJale of IJebu promptly closed his roads and neither bribes nor blandishments from Lagos traders could Induce him to change his mind. In 1839 came the death of the Alafln Atlba. The question of the Oyo succession then became the triggering mechanism for the outbreak of general hostilities In i860. It appeared as though the still undecided question of supreme political authority In Yorubaland was to be decided. CHAPTER VII THE IJAYE WAR AND THE ADVENT OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION Causes of the War The ultimate cause of the five-year Yoruba war whloh broke out In i8 6 0 lies in the eighteenth century. In the disintegration of the Oyo empire. The IJaye war, as It Is called, was one of a number of Yoruba wars, before and after i8 6 0, fought between the empire's successor states to decide which was to pre-empt the Oyo position. As none of the states succeeded In assuming a Yoruba hegemony comparable to that exercised by Oyo, the several wars were faught on a balance of power principle; that Is, shifting alliances were made to thwart attempts by parti cular states to become overly powerful. Thus the IJaye war was primarily an effort by the Egba and their allies to curb Ibadan. 382 383 In the event, the war was inconclusive and ushered In another decade of uneasy peace. IJaye itself was eliminated from all future consideration In the Yoruba power struggle, but Ibadan, Oyo, and the Egba all emerged strengthened. The contest was then resumed in the late 1870's, but again inconclusively. Only in the following two decades was the outcome decided, almost a century after it had commenced, and then in favor of the imperial factor thrusting Inland from the coastal enclave at Lagos. Peculiarly enough, the IJaye war was not recog nized as a political war by contemporary witnesses, nor Indeed have subsequent writers regarded it as such except the modern Nigerian historian, J. F. A. AJayi. 1 The practice has been to regard it as a struggle for economic advantage; specifically, as an attempt by the Egba and IJebu to maintain their monopoly over the routes to the interior threatened by Ibadan. This was the interpretation put forward by officials, traders and missionaries, and accounts for the fact that the attempts made by them to arrange a peaceful settlement were all unsuccessful; not 1In Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: University Press, 19&). 384 understanding the Issues, they were unable to present any basis for negotiation. Only Henry Townsend recognized the war for what It was, Impressing upon the consul before the outbreak of hostilities that "the present balance of power should not be changed . . . "2 The unidentified nlsslonary who wrote the following lines was probably Townsend, but regardless of the author, the quotation expresses succinctly the nature of the IJaye war: It Is not a mere slave-catching war; It Is for domination. In the opinion of the natives, their greatest Interests are at stake. The Egbas have been afraid of the growing power of Ibadan; they think a free road to the sea would add to that power and make their position insecure. It Is not a case of trade rivalry, for the Ibadan do not excel In this, but the power of conquest and the disposition to put all the country under tribute to themselves.3 On the other hand, as Professor AJayi points out, economic consideration should not be ruled out completely as a contributing factor. An Ingredient of power In Yorubaland was land and peasants, and the contestants ^Townsend to Brand, Abeokuta, March 12, i860, F.O, 84/H15. ^Quoted by A. K. Ajlsafe, History of Abeokuta (2nd ed. Bungay, Suffolk: Published by the author and printed by Richard Daly & Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 103* 385 sought to extend dominion over both. Also* slaves were valuable by-products of the war; the participants actively sought them for work on farms, for porterage, and for military service.^ And there was always a slave ship skulking somewhere along the coast. But to view the IJaye war as a struggle for trade routes, or as an excuse for slave-raiding, overestimates commerce in the Yoruba economic structure and misses completely the political motivation. The events precipitating the outbreak began to appear after the death of Atlba In 1859 and the subsequent refusal of Kurunml to recognize Adelu as the new Alafln. There Is reason to believe that Kurunml sought to provoke the conflict, believing It to be Inevitable, and at the same time conscious of his own position of Are of all Yoruba. He was an old man, conservative, and aware that Yoruba custom attached special duties to his title that should not be neglected or abused; one was that he should ^J. P. A. Ajayl, Yoruba Warfare, p. 125 386 die In battle.5 He therefore determined to provoke the war and perhaps fulfill hla duty.** Following the elash between hla soldiers and those of Oyo at Shakl In 1859> a later and similar Incident took place at Okeho. Oyo warriors were captured this time but despite the mediation of Ibadan the Are refused to return them, holding out for ransom and Insulting the Ibadan emis saries . This provoked a crisis at Ibadan. There were close blood relationships between Individuals and lineages In IJaye and Ibadan and the extended families still came together on Important occasions. At a meeting held to dis cuss the growing crisis, one of the leading war chiefs (the Osl or Osin Balogun) revealed that he had no less than a hundred and twenty relatives at IJaye; was he to go and fight them? The Balogun Iblkunle was likewise opposed to a war but his second-in-command, the Oton Balogun Ogunmola was the most Influential figure and was determined upon war. ^AJayl K. AJlsafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 24. ^Meakln, Journal, Oyo, Jan. 17, i860, C.M.S. CA2/ 069; Mann to Venn, IJaye, June 18, i860, C.M.S. CA2/066; Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, March 19* April 25, i860, C.M.S. CA2/049. 387 Opinion In the town was behind him, so to avert civil strife In Ibadan Itself It was decided to fight.7 The first Inkling of the casting hostilities occurred In January when Ibadan kidnapers became active In the IJaye farms; by the following month the roads between the two towns were blocked. 8 The Commencement of Hostilities While these opening gambits were being played the rest of Yorubaland except Oyo looked on with some hesita tion. Therefwas no doubt where Oyo sympathies lay and a passing traveler noted In February that the Alafln was levying a tax In preparation for the war against IJaye.9 While there was no doubt that the Egba would go to the ?Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, March Ip, i860, C.M.S. CA2/049. ®Mann, Journal. IJaye, Jan. 12, i860, C.M.S. CAS/066; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 28, i860, C.M.S. CA2/0 8 5. ^Robert Campbell, A Pilgrimage to My Motherland; Or, Reminiscences of a Sojourn Among the Bgbaa and Yorubas of Central Africa, In 1859-18^0 (London; William John Johnson, for the African Aid Society, 1861), p. 7 6. 3 88 assistance of IJaye1 0 they nevertheless postponed any overt action, Instead preparing to resist yet another Dahomey Incursion and being urged by Ketu (Iketu) to send soldiers to face Glele's Invaders.H Townsend and the other British residents at Abeolcuta appealed to consul Brand for powder and ammunition to meet the emergency .3-2 The consul responded Immediately by dispatching more than a ton of armaments, a practical answer which made a "good Impression" on Townsend. 13 Brand also tried to persuade Lieutenant Lodder to go to Abeolcuta to direct the artillery arrangements but this was more than Lodder was prepared to do without authorization from the Senior Officer.!** The Foreign Office approved the precau tionary moves of the consul "as It has always been the 10Townsend to Brand, Abeolcuta, Feb. 27, i860, F.O. 8 4 /1 H 5 . llRev. Joseph Smith, Journal, IsagA, March 8, i860, C.M.S. CA2/083. l^Abeolcuta, Feb. 1 9, i8 6 0, F.O. 84/1115. ^■^Townsend to Venn, March 3» i860, C.M.S. CA2/M4. l4Brand to Russell, Lagos, March 9, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 389 policy of this country to support the Abeokutans."15 In addition, Russell suggested to the Admiralty that the time had now come for more positive action to be taken against the Dahomey and their yearly threats against the friends of England. Olele should be warned by the Commodore not to attack on pain of his ports being destroyed. 1 8 The Admiralty agreed and undertook to Investigate the best means of attacking Dahomey.1? This consular and Foreign Office reaction to the Egba predicament makes It quite clear that British policy toward the Egba had not changed. However, the advent of the rains In March forced the Dahoml to give up their plans for the season, and after campaigning In Ketu they returned home. This allowed the Egba to turn their atten tion to the pressing problem of Ijaye and the over-mighty Ibadan. ^Memorandum, dated April 16, i860, In F.O. 8VU15. l6poreign Office to Admiralty, May 2, i860, F.O. 84/1122, May 23, i860, F.O. 84/1123. ^Admiralty to Foreign Office, May 29, i860, F.O. 84/1123. 390 Relations between Abeolcuta and Ibadan were not Improved by the destruction of two Egba villages west of the Ogun In early March by an Ibadan force Intent on cutting the IJaye supply road from Badagry and Porto Novo. Despite this, viewed at Abeokuta with the suspicion that Ibadan was attempting to link up with Dahomey, the Egba still did not move except for stopping trade with Lagos and thus beginning their mobilisation. In Townsend's opinion, the views of the peace party were prevailing. Messengers went to and fro between the two towns, perhaps In an attempt by the Egba to postpone any action before the Dahomey threat had been resolved. Hoping that the crisis could still be averted, Townsend suggested to the consul that an effort on his part and In conjunction with the Lagos mercantile commun ity might be fruitful.1^ Brand concurred and dispatched Lieutenant Lodder and two Saro merchants to Abeokuta, Ibadan and IJaye on April 13, armed with letters to the ^-^Townsend to Brand, Abeokuta, March 13, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 19rownsend to Brand, Abeokuta, March 12, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 391 chiefs. His Intention was to persuade Ibadan to forgo Its warlike designs while urging Abeokuta to keep out of any war; but the mission was not successful. It was received* coolly at Abeokuta, civilly at Ibadan, and could not reach IJaye at all; no assurances were given at either place. 2 0 By this time It was probably too late to mediate. A protective Ibadan army had arrived at Oyo at the end of March; IJaye was almost completely cut off; the Egba had stopped all trade; roving bands of kidnapers from both sides were molesting their opponents and Ilorln had declared for IJaye. There was little left to do, and on May 6 the Egba carried out their war flags while the Ologun met to plan the campaign. The main Egba army left almost Immediately and arrived at IJaye not a moment too soon. Their allies, short of ammunition, had already suffered three reverses and were retiring to the shelter of their own walls. The reinforcements were therefore very welcome but were not Immediately effective. In the first large-scale confronta tion with the Ibadan army the Egba suffered a sharp defeat 29Brand to Russell, May 8, i860, P.O. 84/11*5• 392 on June 4, the bad news casting a great gloom over Abeokuta. 21 After this the war degenerated into typical Yoruba style, that is, a war of siege, small-scale ambuscades and kidnaping. Mrs. Hinderer, who observed at first-hand many such campaigns, refers to them with few exceptions as wars without battles. Rather, she epitomizes them as "a state of hostility, treachery, secrecy, lying in wait for stragglers, and capturing them for slaves." 22 The encampments of both sides became villages, with farms and markets and peopled by women and children; operations were confined to "picking each other up singly, if one goes too far from the camp."23 Commercial Intercourse between towns practically ceased, stopped not only by edict but by armed bands that lurked on river banks and beside Jungle tracks waiting for 21<k>llmer, Journal, Abeokuta, June 1, i8 6 0, C.M.S. CA2/043. 22Anna Hinderer, Seventeen Years in the Yoruba Country (London: Seeley, Jackson, and Holliday, 1872), p. 2 1 6. 23Maser to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 13, i860, C.M.S. CA2/068. 3 9 3 easy prey. On the other hand, large heavily-guarded caravans would be made up at intervals by the combatants and sent on their way. In this way some commercial activ ity continued between the main centers, such as Abeokuta to IJaye, Ibadan to Ikorodu, Abeokuta to Lagos, or Ibadan to Benin. Missionary activity was likewise inhibited. Not only were all the stations except Lagos Involved, but the war produced a deadening effect in that communication became difficult and people became more concerned about the day-to-day difficulties of living. Equally as serious, the war split the ranks of the missionaries themselves. The Hinderers at Ibadan suffered increased privation as the supply route to Ikorodu was cut and they championed the Ibadan viewpoint vociferously. That the Egba had entered the war unnecessarily, were prolonging it, and wished only to deny Ibadan its rightful road to the sea were themes they reiterated constantly. Completely oblivious to the primary reason for the war, Hinderer maintained that if the Egba had not interfered, the worst that would have happened would have been that IJaye fell to Ibadan and a friendly chief Installed.2^ Needless to say, the missionaries with the Egba did not share this view. While Hinderer maintained that "As long as Ilorln stands a Mohammedan power In this country, It Is by no means to be wished that Ibadan's war -25 power should diminish," Townsend had a quite different Idea. To him, the Egba were "the power that represents progress and advancing civilization, and It Is to be feared If they should be conquered, our cause, or that of God, would suffer."2^ Official Reaction to the War While consul Brand was not greatly concerned with the missionaries' quarrel nor with the curtailment of their activities, he was acutely aware of the disruption of trade, the resultant decrease In revenue, and the fact that the war was Increasing the number of slaves available for ^Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, Jan. 7, l8 6l, C.M.S. CA2/M4. 25Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, Aug. 26, i860, C.M.S. CA2/049. 2%ownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 4, i860, C.M.S. CA2/085. 395 export. Slaves were being shipped from Badagry, In fact.27 He could see only one solution to the whole problem: the occupation of Lagos and Whydah by Great Britain. This would do away with the slave trade at one blow, Increase legitimate commerce and Introduce an administrative and legaV system that would protect property and enforce the payment of debts. Also, It would relieve the consul at Lagos of the anomalous position of having a "feeble, Irregular and Irresponsible Jurisdiction over a variety of judicial, police and even administrative matters" that had been forced upon Campbell and himself as a matter of necessity.28 Thus wrote consul Brand to the Foreign Office In one of his last dispatches before falling victim to a fatal bout with dysentery. The suggestion that Lagos be annexed was not novel. Palmerston himself had put forward the Idea after reading Glover's Indictment of domestic slavery at Lagos.29 it 27samuel Pearce to Lieut. Commander Henry Hand, Badagry, Aug. 27, i860, C.M.S. CA2/M2. 2®Brand to Russell, Lagos, April 9, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 29supra, p. 3$*. 396 should be observed, however, that the tenor of the Prime Minister's memorandum on the subject suggests some con fusion on his part and a failure to differentiate between the trans-Atlantic slave trade and domestlo slavery. Thus, he wrote that Lagos should be taken and the "slave trade" forcibly put do*n. It had been attacked In 1 8 5 1 to finish the trade, he said, and those efforts would be nullified If the people at Lagos were allowed to persist In their habits.3 0 Thus the first official suggestion for annexing Lagos was made under a misapprehension. An earlier scheme had been discussed to build a fort at Lagos as protection against Kosoko,31 and even as Brand's recommendations were on their way to England the Foreign Office was debating the future of the Island. A Minute drawn up by the head of the Slave Trade Department, Mr. Wylde, summarised the various opinions, Including those of Lord Palmerston, and came to the conclusion that Lagos should not be a n n e x e d .32 30piemoranda, dated Oct. 7, 16, 1 8 5 9, In F.O. 84/1095. 31in F.O. 84/1122. 32pated April 20, i860, F.O. 84/1122. 397 However, the Under-Secregary, Lord Wodehouse (later the Earl of Kimberley), was not ao sure and asked that the Colonial Office give an opinion.33 Wylde changed his mind on receipt of Brand1s recommendation and a subsequent dispatch from Brand's acting replacement, Lleutenant-Commander Hand. The actlng- consul reported that a Dahomey attack could be expected on Abeokuta during the coming dry season,3^ to which Wylde observed that the destruction of the town would end legitimate trade throughout the Bight and completely negate the progress made against the slave trade during the past decade. The only method of counterbalancing Dahomey's aggression, he wrote, "would be the taking possession of Lagos."35 A few days after this had been written, the Government assured anxious gentlemen In the Commons that Britain would render assistance to Its friends at Abeokuta In the event of a Dahomey attack.36 33his comments are appended to the Wylde Minute, dated April 27, i860. ^Lagos, July 8, i860, F.O. 84/1115. ^Memorandum, dated Aug. 14, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 36Parl. Debates, CLX (i860), 1476-78. 398 An Egba Reaction to the War While this debate over the future of Lagos and Abeolcuta was taking place In London, actlng-consul Hand was facing present realities. The most pressing was the absence of business, so under considerable persuasion from the merchants, Hand sent the seoond master of the Brune to Abeokuta to see If the Egba could be Induced to resume trade. Mr. Richards found his Journey to have been In vain, for upon arrival he found the roads to be open. This was of significance, for It bespeaks a con siderable departure In Egba tradition. The roads had been closed In March as a war measure, but after the battle for IJaye had settled down to siege conditions and the rains had commenced, thus effectively hampering action by both sides, considerable opinion had been voiced In Abeokuta that trade with Lagos be resumed, at least temporarily. But Igbeln, the home of the Parakoyl and the township accorded by custom the privilege of trading with Lagos, refused to open the river as a protest against the Sontln- ued presence of European factors In Abeokuta. At the same time, Igbeln refused to collect a tax demanded by 399 the Ologun to support the war.37 The Sierra Leone Immigrants in Abeokuta, who had long chafed at the limitations Imposed on their trading proclivities by the traditional Parakoyl; and who wished to control trade themselves, now saw theVr chance to further their smbltlons. Gaining the support of the war chiefs by agreeing to pay fifty bags of cowries quarterly, to be derived from a regularly Imposed one per cent tax on the town's ejqports, they then Induced the Alake to negotiate with Docemo at Lagos to seize Igbeln canoes which had not paid the tax. In this way the Parakoyl was broken, the oontrol of trade from Abeokuta fell Into the hands of the "Commercial Association," and trade with Lagos was resumed In July.38 Naturally enough, Hand was pleased at this development. Perhaps to mark the esteem In which he now held the Egba he prohibited the sale of ammunition at Ikorodu, Ibadan's chief market on the lagoon. In fact the 37Townsend to Hand, Abeokuta, July 9, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 38Rj,Chards to Hand, Lagos, July 25, i860, F.O. 84/1115; Abeokuta Commercial Association to Hand, Abeokuta, Aug. 2, i860, F.O. 84/1115. 400 Abeokuta Commercial Association asked him to make It clear to Ibadan that If they did not stop the war the British Government would side with the Egba.39 Hand's Interdict did not last long; at the Insistence of the European merchants, who favored neutrality— or at least non- partlallty toward the Egba— the ban was lifted almost as soon as it was imposed.**0 Help for the Egba: IJebu-Ode and Great Britain At this point the war was extended by the entrance of IJebu. The cooperation of IJebu-Ode was of the utmost Importance to the Egba, the province being ideally located to disrupt supplies reaching Ibadan from Ikorodu and Benin. But while the Awujale expressed sympathy with the Egba, he had refrained from any overt action during the war's opening months. At the same time many Remo towns, Includ ing Ikorodu, were actively siding with Ibadan on the ground 39ja c. Dewring, Secretary, to Hand, Abeokuta, Aug. 2, i860, P.O. 84/1115. **°Maser to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 13, i860, C.M.S. CA2/068. 401 that they were a commercial people and Ibadan was their best customer. But in August the AwuJale'a neutrality came to an end and Ode warriors started raiding Ibadan farms.**2 Within weeks, this was followed by the destruction of the Ikorodu market, where Ibadan transacted Its business.**3 After this, Ode warriors began to move In force, capturing Apomu and establishing a base at Oru from which they harassed every caravan taking supplies to Ibadan from the coast.**** According to the actlng-consul, the Awujale had entered the war fearing that If the Egba were beaten he would be the next target for Ibadan aggression.**5 ^Rev. Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas. Prom the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Edited by Dr. 0. Johnson? (Lagos: C.M.S. Bookshop, 1937), p. 338 **2Hlnderer to Venn, Ibadan, Aug. 26, i860, C.M.S. CA2/049. **^Maser to Venn, Lagos, Oct. 9, i860, C.M.S. CA2/068. * * * * Johnson, Hist, of the Yorubas. pp. 342-44; J. P. A. Ajayl, Yoruba Warfare, pp. 92-3; Maser to Venn, Lagos, Nov. 10, i8 6 0, C.M.S. CA2/068; Hinderer to Venn, Ibadan, Jan. 4, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/049. **5Hand to Russell, Oct. 9, i860, Lagos, P.O. 84/1115. 402 There can be no doubt that Lleutenant-Comaander Hand concurred in thla evaluation of Ibadan intentions. His reports to London make it clear that he considered Ibadan responsible for the troubled state of the interior; conversely, his sympathy for the Egba is Illustrated by the short-lived embargo he placed on arms destined for Ibadan. He was therefore receptive to an appeal from the missionaries at Abeolcuta for arms and artillery ammunition to fend off yet another anticipated attack by Dahomey, this one in alliance with Ibadan and Oyo, it was feared.46 He left immediately for Abeokuta, where he was able to point out various improvements that could be made to the town's defenses. But even more important, he held long discussions with the missionaries, who undoubtedly reminded him of Britain's long friendship with Abeokuta and that the Egba were the greatest hope for the extension of civilization and Christianity. On his return to Lagos he then suggested to Lord Russell that Abeokuta be garrisoned by negro troops of the West India Regiment. In conjunction with an Egba army, which the chiefs had agreed to provide, ^60ct. 15, i860, Abeokuta, F.O. 84/1115. 403 an attack could be launched against Abomey Itself that would reduce the Dahomey threat once and for all.^7 Russell was disturbed to hear the Dahomey news2 *® and was as Intrigued as the Egba with the prospect of stationing troops at Abeokuta. The Government would certainly be willing to employ troops for the "defense" of Abeokuta, he wrote privately,^ and the consul should ascertain whether a body of black troops would be accept able In that city. In the meantime, the Egba were to be given the munitions they requlred.50 This became one of the first tasks of the newly- appointed consul, Henry Grant Foote, who, like his predecessor, paid his respects to Rev. Venn before leaving for Lagos. To Venn's delight he expressed the Intention of cooperating with the Society, at which Venn responded by assuring him that the Yoruba missionaries would offer every 47H»nd to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 3, i860, F.O. 84/1115. ^Foreign Office to Admiralty, Dec. 29, i860, F.O. 84/1122. Memorandum, dated Jan. 22, 1861, F.O. 84/1122. 5°Rus8ell to consul Foote, Foreign Office, Jan. 23, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 404 assistance In their power.51 The consul fully lived up to expectations. He became the great champion of the Egba, maintaining that they should become a powerful military power and he worked actively to provide them with substantial aid. Unfortunately for the Egba, consul Foote did not live very long. The Forward Policy of Consul Foote On arrival at Lagos he quickly formed the opinion that there was no prospect of a Dahomey attack, causing Lord Russell to place In abeyance the elaborate plans being formulated for a large-scale Egba-Brltlsh Invasion of Dahomey, to be launched from Abeokuta and tentatively scheduled for January, 1862.52 Foote was much more con cerned over the visit to Lagos of the French Commodore, that officer's earnest conversations with the Regis agent and his trip to Epe to see Kosoko, Foote suspected a plot ^Venn to Townsend, London, Nov. 23, i860, C.M.S. CA2/L2. 52Foreign Office to War Office, [Febl 13 , 1 8 6 1, F.O. 84/1158. 405 to use the deposed king to further French ambitions at Lagos.53 Even though the consul later explained that the visit had been quite harmless and that the Commodore had even assured him that his country recognized the British "protectorate," Lord Palmerston became very anxious on learning of this apparent quickening of French Interest. No time should be lost "In assuming the formal protector ate over Lagos," he wrote, for while the Commodore acknowledged the British presence, the French Minister of Marine and Colonies might not be as moderate "and we might find ourselves In difficulties If we don't take Time by the Forelock."54 This latest proposal for the annexation of Lagos went to the Colonial Office for consent, as had prior suggestions. Here, however, the Duke of Newcastle and his staff seemed unalterably opposed to seizing Time by the Forelock. Letters from the Foreign Office on the subject seemed to become loBt when they reached the neighboring 53p0ote to Russell, Lagos, Jan. 9, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 5^Memorandum, March 25, l86l, F.O. 84/1141. 406 department and several memoranda circulating at the Foreign Office remarked on the slowness. "At all events they might send us an answer to our letters," complained the Under-Secretary.55 The noble Duke's views on the subject were not In fact made known until June, but In the meantime consul Foote was Indeed using time in the manner advocated by the Prime Minister. Receiving word from Abeokuta that a con certed Dahomey-Ibadan attack could be expected Imminently, he asked the Commodore for Immediate assistance In the form of two or three hundred troops. He reminded the Commodore of the determination of the British Government to prevent an attack on the Egba "by either the people of the Interior or by the troops of the King of Dahomey." This enlargement of British policy came perhaps as a sur prise to the Commodore, but the consul continued: The occupation of Abeokuta by Dahomeyian troops would cause a profound sensation In England. Our emi grants would be Immediately sent to the coast as slaves, the missionary establishment would be destroy ed, and the Interior of Africa thrown back a century In civilization.56 55Lord wodehouse, April 11, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 5^Foote to Edmonstone, Lagos, Feb. 9, 1861, F.O. 84/114. 407 In the face of this powerful pleading Captain Edmonstone could only acquiesce, steaming off to Bathurst and Freetown In his flagship to pick up 250 troops of the West Indian Regiment.57 Foote's explanation to the Foreign Office was couched In similar terms. As the Egba were defending IJaye, he wrote, the destruction of Abeokuta was certain If It were subjected to a combined Dahomey-Ibadan attack. All hope of civilizing the Interior would be lost, trade would be Interrupted and the missionaries placed In great danger. As a further precau tion, he concluded, he was sending a messenger to Ibadan cautioning against any advance toward Abeokuta.58 This done, but with the troops for Abeokuta1s defense not expected for many weeks, the consul cast around for more Immediate ways to help the Egba. He hit upon a plan that had been suggested to consul Brand by Townsend the year before under similar circumstances, when a Dahomey attack was being expected and when the Egba were 5?Edmonstone to Admiralty, H.M.S. Arrogant. Bathurst, March 5, 1861, F.O. 84/1148. 5®Foote to Russell, Lagos, Feb. 9» 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 408 about to go to war against Ibadan. Thus being threatened on two fronts, Townsend had suggested that a naval attack on the Dahomey coast would divert aiele*s attention from Abeokuta and allow the Egba to concentrate on I b a d a n .59 Townsend had proposed Whydah as a suitable target, being heavily engaged In the slave trade; but with only the Brune available, Foote decided that Forto Novo would be Just as good. It was known that slaves were being shipped from there, In violation of the 1 8 5 2 treaty, and British merchants attempting to start factories had long experienced difficulties at Porto Novo, Including the seizure of their goods, This was likewise a treaty violation, the stipulation being that no hindrance be placed on commerce and that the trade of all nations receive similar privileges. With sufflolent "legal" Justification, therefore, Foote took the gunboat and bom barded Porto Novo In late February. The attack was less than a success, the Brune encountering such strong small-arms fire that It was forced to retire. Nevertheless, as Sodjl was perhaps the 59Abeokuta, April 30, i860, F.O. 84/1115 409 strongest of Olele's vassals, capable of putting 20,000 warriors In the field, Foote thought the attaok would hope fully distract Dahomey frost the Egba capital. As addition al Insurance, the consul dispatched an envoy to Porto Novo after the bombardment with the object of persuading Sodjl to break his alleglanae to Dahomey. If he would do this and encourage legitimate trade, the messenger was authorized to tell him that Qreat Britain would protect him from Oleic1s retribution and would provide an annual Income until Increasing revenue from customs duties would mateh his Income from the slave trade.6° This pro-Egba "forward" policy was matched by further recommendation. Foote envisaged a line of outposts along the coast, from Badagry to Benin, each manned by a detachment of troops and a vice-consul. This would effectively suppress the shipment of slaves from Isolated creeks and lagoons; and with "so many political objects . . . in view" he himself should be made Consul-General or 60poote to Russell, Lagos, March 8, l8 6l, Foote to Wylde, Lagos, March 10, l8 6l, in F.O. 84/1141. 410 "Resident Political Agent. n^ 1 He augmented this plan In March, appointing Mr. Thomas Tlckel, a trader from the Gold Coast, as vice-consul at Badagry and Porto Novo, to whom he entrusted the negotiations with Sodjl. At the same time he made McCoskry his vice-consul at Lagos, find ing the work too much for one man and having a high regard for McCoskry1 s qualities. In addition, as the Egba had frequently asked for British officers, he could see no objections to black troops being stationed at Abeokuta. He suggested that a thousand would be sufficient, with engineer and artillery officers, mountain artillery and rockets. A portion of them should be sent Immediately, to be employed during the rainy season In training the Egba and strengthening the town's defences. The remainder should then be sent about November, after the rains, at which time a grand army of 10,000 Egba and 1,000 British would launch the attack on Abomey.^2 ^Foote to Russell, Lagos, Feb. 9, 1861, Foote to Wylde, Lagos, March 10, l8 6l, In F.O. 84/1141. ^2Foote to Russell, "Confidential,” Lagos, March 9, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 411 In the meantime, 250 troops were on the way and Foote had still not talked to the Egba about receiving them. Consequently, he set out for Abeokuta on April 2, accompanied by Crowther, explaining hlsdtolce of companion as being dictated by the missionary's knowledge of the people, language and history of the country "and the various Influences which Impede or advance the Improvement of the people."^3 xt can be Imagined that the consul was given a good grounding In these several Influences before the two-day Journey was accomplished. But significantly, on reaching Abeokuta, he declined the Invitation to lodge with the missionaries, Instead staying In an empty house, no doubt to still the criticism being voiced at Lagos that he was too greatly under missionary Influence.6^ Like all Europeans first visiting Abeokuta he was disappointed, the town falling far short of the glowing descriptions common In England. He was likewise upset to find so many slaves, but the warmth of his reception ^Foote to Russell, Lagos, May 8, 1861. F.O. 84/1141. 64Rev. J. L. B. Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, April 5, l8 6l, C.M.S. CA2/096; Oollmer to Venn, Abeokuta, April 5, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/M4. 412 overwhelmed him. He was thanked repeatedly for the attack on Porto Novo, the Alake being quite positive that It had saved them from the Dahoml. He was "almost worshiped" In fact, and Egba enthusiasm for Great Britain rose to "fever heat" when It became known that British troops were on the way. He attributed It all to the missionaries.^ With so many soldiers coming to the town there was some concern on the part of the chiefs over the safety of the women; but this qualification was overcome by their enthusiasm for a combined land attack on Glele, to be assisted by a naval blockade and bombardment of his coast. The Egba readily agreed to provide a large force for the enterprise, which was to be undertaken after Ibadan was beaten. Foote assured them that their soldiers would receive adequate training, including artillery instruction.^ In addition, he wrote to the Awujale of IJebu while In Abeokuta, proposing to prohibit arms going from Lagos to Ikorodu, and thence Ibadan, In return for ^Foote to wylde, Abeokuta, April 6, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 66 C3owther to Venn, Lagos, May 6, l86l, C.M.S. CA2/04. 413 which the Awujale was to lift his long embargo on the oil trade.67 But the main work of the visit was accomplished at a secret council of the Make, chiefs, Foote, and Crowther, Townsend having returned home on leave the month before. The Egba agreed to accept the troops, participate In a joint campaign, and resume commercial relations with Lagos stopped since the beginning of the year. They also agreed to two points which virtually brought them under British protection: they would neither sign a treaty nor make an agreement of any kind with a foreign power without the consent of Great Britain; upon the conclusion of the war with Ibadan they would act upon the advice of the British Government, as far as their custom would allow, and would always consult with the consul before taking any steps In cases Involving foreign Interests. The agreement was informal. ^8 67April 15, l86l, P.O. 84/1125. Foote to Russell, Lagos, Hay 8, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 414 The consul's whole-hearted support of the Egba can best be judged by his own words. Concluding the report of his visit to Abeokuta he wrote: If the Egbas had a sufficient force for the purpose and could make themselves masters of the country, the whole of the petty chiefs on the coast would rejoice at their occupation, and certainly the great object we have In view, namely, the abolition of slavery, would be finally secured If our friends the Egbas did extend their possessions to the coast, Including Whydah and the other Dahomlan slave-trading ports.69 But on his return to Lagos the consul was given the unexpected and unwelcome news that the troops were not coming. The Commodore, about to embark the men at Freetown, met Townsend on his way home on leave. The missionary told him that the possibility of an attack on Abeokuta at this late date In the dry season was now very remote; at this, Edmonstone canceled the troop movement and Instead arranged for an officer and ten men to be sent to Abeokuta to teach g u n n e r y .70 Foote was disconcerted, but not nonplused. ^poote to Russell, Lagos, May 8, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. "^Townsend to Edmonstone, Freetown, March 21, l8 6l, Edmonstone to Admiralty, H.M.S. Arrogant, Freetown, March 21, 1861, in F.O. 84/1148. 415 Finding that Tickel's negotiations with Sodji were not progressing, he recruited the services of the Commodore for another attack on Porto Novo. Three ships bombarded the town on April 26, Inflicting considerable damage and leaving It burning. The consul had every hope that this would serve as a clear warning to Glele and noted that the attack was widely cheered at Abeokuta. In addition, the chiefs he considered to be non-frlendly, Including Kosoko, Immediately sent letters and messengers to Lagos offering friendship and alliance.71 Only days after making his report of the bombard ment consul Foote died, another victim of dysentery. His short consulship marked the apogee of Britain's pro-Sgba policy and his death signaled the end of consular and missionary accord upon the essentials of Yoruba politics. His temporary successor was William McCoskry, recently appointed vice-consul and the bete noire of the mission aries for ten years past. ^Foote to Russell, Lagos, Nay 9, l86l, F.O 84/1141. McCoskry and the New Direction of Imperial Policy Their disagreement was basic. McCoskry was a trader, pure and simple, who viewed Yoruba politics In terms of trade only. Not only was there his own business to be considered, but since 1859 be had been farming the Lagos customs; he therefore favored an extension of trade, but without favor to any particular Yoruba people. His natural sympathies were against the Egba, however, holding as they did the power to shut off a considerable proportion of Lagos trade at pleasure, a power used far too frequently, according to his lights. Further, his free-trade princi ples were offended by their "monopolistic" role as middlemen between the coast and the Interior, and falling completely to understand the political essence of the IJaye war he considered It nothing more than an Egba-Ijebu attempt to retain their favored position. His sympathies therefore lay with Ibadan. His first official letter showed that a wind of change was blowing. It was a matter of regret, he wrote, that It had never been pointed out to the Egba that Great Britain did not Intend to support them "In every war In 417 which they may choose to engage."^2 A short time later he noted that Egba policy was designed specifically to draw Britain to their assistance, when the only course which Britain could pursue was one of strict neutrality. At the same time he made a specific policy recommendation which showed his conception of neutrality to be quite subjective. A small force of soldiers should Indeed be sent to Abeokuta, which, while deterring an attack from Dahomey, would hold rein on Egba ambition, exert a "beneficial influence" over the commerce and civilization of the inter ior and "give us a voice In maintaining peace between the 73 Abeokutans and their neighbours." Britain was to be more neutral with Borne than with others, it seemed, an attitude made clear In short order when he made the thlnly-velled threat of stopping ammunition shipments to Abeokuta If the Egba did not honor the undertaking given to Foote and open ?2McCoskry to Edmonstone, Lagos, Nay 20, 1861, P.O. 84/1149. 73McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, May 31, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 418 the roads.7^ This despite the fact that the Alake had previously notified him of his temporary Inability to do so, on the advice of the war chiefs, but that he would comply with the agreement as quickly as possible.75 Not long after this exchange McCoskry had the first opportunity to Inaugurate his new policy. The officer and men of the 2nd West India Regiment, arranged for by Edmonstone to teach gunnery to the Egba, arrived at Lagos In April. However, Edmonstone now decided that a better arrangement would be to send only the officer to Abeokuta to begin with, on a reconnaissance mission of sorts, to obtain military Information on Egba resources and their ability to undertake an offensive.76 Consequently, only Captain Arthur Jones went to Abeokuta, In early May, the ten men remaining at Lagos as a consulate guard.77 74 ' McCoskry to the Alake and Chiefs, Lagos, June 5, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/k4. 75McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, May 31> l86l, P.O. 84/1141. 7^Bdmonstone to Captain Jones, Lagos, April 29, l86l, P.O. 84/1134. 77poote to Russell, Lagos, May 9, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 419 Captain Jones was critical of practically every thing he saw at Abeokuta and at the Egba war camp outside IJaye. He liked neither their courage, discipline, tactics, nor the way In which the guns had been maintained.78 Nevertheless, he chose twenty to twenty- five Egba to rdoelve artillery Instruction, arranged accommodation for his ten men, and with apparent good-will on both sides left Abeokuta on June 18, promising to be back In a week.79 That was the last they saw of him, or of the premised soldiers. On returning to Lagos they were sent back to Freetown while Jones readied himself for a mission to Ibadan and Oye. He sent a strong letter to Abeokuta complaining of trade still being stopped and of Egba unwillingness to cease their unnecessary wars; he told them that they should accept peace terms, threatening that he and McCoskry would take "strong measures" to restore peace and trade if the 7®Jones to Commanding Officer, 2nd W. I. Regt., Abeokuta, June 6, 1861, F.O. 84/1134. 79wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 7, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/09$; Dr. A. A. Harrison to Rev. W. Knight, Abeokuta, Aug. 2, 1 861, C.M.S. CA2/045. 420 mission he was about to make to Ibadan proved unsuccess ful.^0 The hand of McCoskry seems apparent, as It does In the dispatch which Jones wrote to the Foreign Secretary. Besides putting himself forward as a candlate for the vacant consulship, he complained that the Egba refused all peace negotiations while there was the possibility of military aid being forthcoming from Britain. They seemed to think that they were entitled to It, he wrote, so for this "and other reasons" he was disregarding his orders and craved Lord Russell's indulgence.®1 However, within hours of leaving Lagos for the Interior, Jones was dead, another victim of the deadly clime. The Jones mission accomplished nothing, besides antagonizing the Egba, who within two months had seen the promise of a thousand soldiers whittled down to one officer who apparently preferred their enemies. Trade remained stopped, to say nothing of friendly Intercourse with the chiefs, so McCoskry, like consuls before him and governors after, turned his attention to Porto Novo. He ®°Jones to the Alake and Elders, Lagos, July 3> 1861, C.O. 147/11. 81Lagos, July 3, l86l, P.O. 84/1157. 421 enthusiastically took up the negotiations with Sodjl that Foote had started, but unlike his predecessor he was not Interested In diverting Glele's attention from Abeokuta; trade was his sole objective. Sodjl's last experience with British warships having been unpleasant, he proved receptive to McCoskry and the Brune and agreed on June 17 to open his town to traders. The Cession of Lagos As he was accomplishing this, things were happen ing In London of which McCoskry had no knowledge. On July 10 a lengthy Minute had been penned at the Colonial Office dealing with the question of Lagos becoming a British possession. The tenor of the Minute was against the move on the ground that trouble with neighboring tribes would be Inevitable as the Island would become a haven for absconding domestic slaves.82 On the other hand, His Orace the Duke of Newcastle was well aware that Russell and Palmerston wanted Lagos as a counterpoise to Dahomey and to forestall French ambitions. He therefore Informed 82In C.O. 147/1. 422 Russell that although he was opposed to any extension of British territory on the West Coast he would concur with the proposal because of the Importance the Porelgn Office attached to the place as a means of suppressing the slave trade and promoting In Its stead a more legitimate commerce.&3 Armed with this, the Foreign Office moved rapidly. But before the consul's Instructions were drafted, a memorandum from the Under-Seorttary said that the dispatch was to be so worded that the discretion Involved In taking Lagos was to be left to the consul.81* This raises an Interesting speculation. The Foreign Office at this time did not know that Foote was dead; If they had, there Is considerable doubt that McCoskry would have been entrusted with the affair. Hearing several weeks later that McCoskry had assumed the position, Russell privately wondered If his trading Interests would conflict with his duties and wanted to 83June 19, 1861, C.O. 147/1. 84 June 20, l86l, F.O. 84/1114 423 know more about the acting-conaulThe consul being granted latitude In the affair, It can be further specula ted whether or not Foote would have made the annexation, or If he had, could he have accomplished It In a less bellicose manner than did McCoskry, a manner which resulted In difficulties for years to come. Returning to realities, the final draft of Foote's Instruction Informed him that Great Britain was extending Its dependencies only with the greatest reluctance. But the decision had been reached as the Government was con vinced that the permanent occupation of the Island was "Indispensable to the complete suppression of the Slave Trade In the Bight." Further, possession of Lagos would assist In the development of lawful commerce and would serve to check the "aggressive spirit of the King of Dahomey, whose barbarous wars and encouragement to slave trading are the chief causes of disorder In that part of Africa," If Foote thought It advisable to take "temporary possession" pending final arrangements he was to do so; If not, he would receive further Instructions after he had 85Memorandum, July 11, 1861, F.O. 84/1114 424 written back stating his Ideas fully. In either case he was to make no move until he had conferred with either the Commodore or Senior Officer. Docemo's Interests were to be secured, either by a pension or by a stipendiary position and the dispatch concluded by reminding him that the Government would not tolerate any aggression upon the surrounding chiefs.86 A postscript, sent two days later, told him not to take the Island If he thought that force would be required. In this event he was to write back and await later Instruction. Inasmuch as a report from McCoskry crossed these dispatches somewhere at sea, stating his opinion that there would never be progress In Yorubaland "until we have sufficient force to keep the peace among the tribes, McCoskry1s reactions to the Instructions were obvious. The Commodore was not available but the Senior Officer, 86Porelgn Office, June 22, l86l, P.O. 84/1141. 87Russell to Foote, Foreign Office, June 24, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. Lagos, July 9, 1861, F.O. 84/1141 425 Commander Norman Bedlngfeld, was available and willing.®9 The Prometheus crossed the bar, causing great excitement In town, and Doceme was called on board on July 30. He was told that he was to cede his possessions to Great Britain and that he had two days In which to make up his mind. The European residents ware then told what was happening, and on August 1 McCoskry And Bedlngfeld went to Dooemo for his answer. He refused to sign the Instrument, saying that he and his chiefs did not think that the Queen had authorized It. Bedlngfeld thereupon "advised Docemo to reconsider the matter" and he was given until August 6 to do so, with the Incentive added that he would receive a pension for life equal to his customs revenue If he agreed; If not, he would receive nothing. 9 0 ^Bedlngfeld had been attached to Livingstone's ex pedition to the Zambesi In 1 8 5 8 but had resigned aftdr an alteroatlon with the doctor almost as soon as the river was reached. According to Bedlngfeld, the circumstances did not do Livingstone any great honor (Maser to Venn, Lagos, Sept. 10, 1861, C.H.S. CA2/068). The dispute Is mentioned by Reginald Coupland In Kirk on the Zambesi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 114-17. "Bedlgfield” has crept Into most references to this of ficer. ^°McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Aug. 7, 1861, F.O. 84 /1141; Bedlngfeld to Edmonstone, Lagos,[Aug. 8, 186^| , F.O. 84/1150; MaBer to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 9, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/068. 426 Then followed a period of high excitement, with the rumor running riot In Lagoa that all white people were going to be killed. The Europeans learned that Bedlngfeld had orders to take the place even If Docemo would not cede It, a palpable untruth, and In the words of one of the missionaries, the precaution of bringing In the Prometheus "was not unnecessary."^1 But Docemo bowed to the Inevit able and the cession was executed on August 6 at the consulate. The Union Jack was hoisted, and aUdat a booming 21-gun salute from Prometheus the pupils In the Society's schools quavered through "Qod Save the Queen."^2 The treaty Itself was a simple document consisting of only three articles. Docemo was ceding his possessions so that the Queen could better defend Lagos, stop the slave trade and "prevent the destructive wars so frequent ly undertaken by Dahomey and others for the capture of slaves." Decemo was to continue as King and was to be allowed to decide disputes between his subjects, with their consent and subject to appeal to British laws. For this, ^1Maser to Venn, Lagos, Aug. 9, l86l, C.M.S. CA2/068. 92Ibid. 427 he was to receive a pension equal to his erstwhile net revenue.93 one source of future trouble was that there was no definition of the territory ceded, but with the document In hand the Foreign Office nevertheless approved McCoskry1s actions.9^ Not so the Colonial Office, where responsibility for the new acquisition would now lie. After reading the dispatches dealing with the affair one memorandum observed that Docemo had not been allowed much choice and glumly anticipated a great deal of trouble, "especially as we have entered upon It with our eyes open." A further notation, undoubtedly the result of years of bitter exper ience with forward consuls, complained that "The F.O. are always great friends to our making territorial acquisi tions. The moving spirit Is generally the Consul, and I often wonder whether the Department at home sufficiently represses over-zeal In that class of functionaries.” The 93In F.O. 84/1141. 9**Russell to McCoskry, Foreign Office, Sept. 23# 1861, F.O. 84/1141. 428 Duke of Newcastle read the comments and appended his initials without comment.95 Falacy of the Economic Interpretation There remains the question: what In fact prompted the annexation? A careful examination of the relevant sources discloses no ulterior economic motivation. Lagos was an Inconsequential port dealing with an Insignificant amount of goods. At Its peak, four years before the cession, the annual value of Its exports, based on English prices, reachedwp255,000 and thereafter declined. The products entering and leaving the place could be carried by a single ship of modest tonnage visiting every few months; not until 1866 did exports even reach 10,000 tons a year. If Britain was significantly Interested In palm oil it would far better have taken possession of Porto Novo or Whydah, where oil exports were about twice as great as those of Lagos. It can be suggested that Lagos was the only good port along the coast and was taken (with a remarkable 95sept. 20, Oct. 18, 1861, C.O. 147/2 429 degree of prescience), to provide a future outlet for the entire western side of the palm belt. But this supposi tion falls to hold up when It Is realized that any plans for making Lagos a major entrepot necessitated extending political Jurisdiction over a huge area. This the British Government fought against strenuously for twenty-five years after the cession and no attempt was made to make Lagos a good port until the twentieth century. The truth of the matter Is that Lagos was an impoverished place, perpetually on the brink of bankruptcy, a constant headache to successive British governments as a prime example of a colony which failed to meet the fundamental requisite of financial self-sufficiency. It was governed by a handful of Europeans, usually about half- a-dozen, the establishment relying heavily on literate Africans to fill the score or so of such minor colonial positions as Inspector, clerk, bailiff, storeman and the like. The position of the colony and Its tenuous administration can be visualized by the plea of an official, made when the colony was more than ten years old, for the presence of a naval vessel on the lagoon. It would be most effective In asserting British authority, he wrote, 430 "which to a great extent la maintained by prestige and the occasional visit of the colonial steamer."96 True, various early governors tried to exert authority and extend their Jurisdiction but such activities were unau thorized, frowned upon in London, eventually overturned and were followed by policies of appeasement and quiescence. The colony remained a failure, another skeleton In the West African closet. Only determined Intervention In hinterland politics could have turned It into a success, but no British (Government was willing to undertake such a step. Even as late as 1881 Lord Kimberley was telling the (Governor that he would not approve any measure "involving direct Interference with the inland tribes." This would Involve the colony In dangerous complications and result In "an extension of responsibilities which H. M. Government are not prepared to undertake. ^Administrator strahan to Commodore Hewett, Lagos, Feb. 4, 1874, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 3. ^Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 19^1), p . 40. 431 It seems clear, therefore, that Great Britain's prime purpose In taking Lagos was exactly what It said It was, namely, the suppression of the slave trade, Its replacement by legitimate commerce— a fundamental of British anti-slavery policy since 1840— and the establish ment of a counterpoise to Dahomey. In fact, even after the orders to take Lagos were on their way, Palmerston and Russell were still pressing for more stringent measures to be taken against Dahomey, Including the destruction of Porto Novo and Whydah.98 The reason why this step was not taken was the extreme reluctance of the Admiralty to become further Involved on the west coast, an attitude which vexed Palmerston considerably.99 In addition, there was the overtone voiced by Palmerston concerning the possibility of French Intervention. What the British government in 1861 and its successors did not grasp, however, was that the possession of Lagos for anti-slavery purposes or to promote legitimate trade In Its stead made the expansion of British power a Minute, dated July 7, l86l, F.O. 84/1141. "Memorandum, April 30, 1861, F.O. 84/1141. necessity- Suppression at Lagos would be Ineffectual unless similar measures were exercised along the whole coast; similarly, efforts to promote trade made It manda tory that the Lagos administration Interfer In Yoruba politics to Insure the unhampered flow of goods. In this context It was assumed that an orderly European government at Lagos would automatically result In Increasing trade. But the result was quite different. The Introduction of a new element of power, tenuous as It was, served to further confuse the outcome of the contemporary Yoruba power struggle. In addition, It probably protracted the IJaye war as both sides refused to give up the fight while there was a chance of British Intervention on their side. Acting-Govemor McCoskry, for one, realized Implicitly that the extension of commerce hinged upon a parallel extension of British power. Thus, before the cession, he was recommending armed force to maintain peace In Yorubaland and his first dispatch after the event asked for two hundred troops. He also wanted shallow-draft gunboats to penetrate the navigable rivers and "to protect and stimulate a legitimate commerce In places before 433 unvisited by the lawful traders." 1 0 0 McCoskry, of course, was expecting that the cession would Introduce a large- scale administration and a peace-keeping force. In this he was disappointed, but herein lies the answer to the remarkable alacrity with which he seized the opportunity to place Lagos under British administration. Palm oil prices in England had risen from about if4o per ton in the early 1 8 5 0's to a peak of Jf48 later in the decade. After that there was a slow decline, falling to if38 at the beginning of the l860's101 As the margin of profit narrowed, despite falling freight rates, traders viewed with anxiety any interruption in the flow of oil from the interior. Greater volume was desired, not only from the natural impulse to maximize profits, but to avoid the pinch of decreasing margins. Besides this, there was the old complaint from the European merchants about their frequent inability to 100McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, July 9* Aug. 5* 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 1 0 1C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja-Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo (Oxford: C1arendon Press, 1 9 6 1), p. 6 0. 434 collect the debts owed by African middlemen at Lagos. With Its long and uncertain periods of accumulated debts, the credit system and the Inability to obtain financial satisfaction under the consular-Docemo administration had been the core of European dissatisfaction. So at one blow McCoskry had hopes of Improving his lot and that of his fellow merchants, who not surprisingly expressed their "unqualified satisfaction" at the cession as soon as It had been accomplished.102 The C.M.S. Position on the Cession This suggests that the Lagos middlemen were some what less pleased at the new regime. This Indeed was the case. Their opposition was apparent even during the negotiations In August103 and It mounted steadily during the remainder of the year. Their objections were founded basically on the correct suppoiltlon that British law would deal more stringently with debt and that methods 102Bedingfeld to Admiralty, Lagos, Aug. 8, 1861, P.O. 84/1149. 103McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Aug, 7, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 435 would be Introduced to enforce payment. Such Indeed was the case and In the months following the cession their unrest became more acute; all kinds of criticism was leveled at McCoskry, Including the charge that he was con fiscating property without compensation for Improving Lagos streets.1Q4 By the end of the year an uprising of sorts appeared possible, but the presence of Prometheus and the arrival of Arrogant In October discouraged the disaffection.105 It was these worried Saro businessmen who first Involved Henry Venn and the C.M.S. In the question of the Lagos cession. The acquisition had come as a complete surprise to the Society; Indeed, on hearing of It Venn Imagined the cession to have been Palmerston's reaction to the presumed ambitions of France.1°^ But the Society and the missionaries In the field were optimistic about the 1Q4j# p# jJa Davies to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 10, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/033. 10^Maser to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 10, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/068; McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 8, l86l, F.O. 84/1141. 106y-enn to Maser, London, Sept. 23* 1861, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 436 step, Venn hoping that the missionaries would become more Important than ever "to guide the natives In their behav iour under the new relations in which they are placed."10? However, It was not long before the Society changed Its attitude. The disagreement was basic, being founded on the Society's philosophy of "native agency" being the path to the spiritual and temporal regeneration of Africa. The classic statement of the principle had been formulated by Venn in 1851 and was contained in a document entitled "Minute upon the Employment and Ordination of Native Teachers." In its last paragraph the Minute stated that the ultimate object of a mission was the establishment of a self-supporting native Church under its own pastors. This would be accomplished when the European missionary, surrounded by well-trained native congregations, would gradually resign all pastoral work to native clergy and llttle-by-little relax his superintend ence until it ceased completely. In this way the former 10^Venn to Harrison, Jan. 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3 437 Mission would become a settled Christian community and the missionary would move on to new fields. This policy of preparing congregations for Independence by training them to act for themselves held Implications for matters other than ecclesiastic. In part, It was the cause of the missionary opposition which developed to the annexation, for the Introduction of a colonial administration took the task of government away from Africans. This was not the way to prepare them for their own salvation, It was felt. The Society's disenchantment with the cession began almost as soon as news of the event reached London, the first mall from Lagos carrying to Salisbury Square three petitions addressed to the Queen. They came from Docemo, the Chiefs of Lagos, and the Common People of Lagos, but were rather the handiwork of James Pinson Labulo Davies, originally a C.M.S. protege from Freetown but since 1855 a successful businessman In Lagos. They were In similar vein, complaining of the forced cession lo0Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Mission ary Society, Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work (London: C.M.S., 1&99-1916), II, p. 415. 438 and Bedingfeld's threat to destroy the city unless Docemo signed the document; all asked for redress. Without com ment , Venn forwarded the documents to the Foreign Office.10^ A month later Venn passed on four more petitions asking for the cession to be rescinded. At the same time he asked for an Interview, to lay before the Foreign Office "some particulars which appear to several friends of Africa as well as myself worthy of the attention of H.N. Government. Despite the "decline Interview" and "Mo" written on the back of his letter the Interview took place, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Layard, receiving Venn and Townsend on November 8 . At a later date Townsend was heartily opposed to the cession, regarding It as a mixture of force and fraud. 111 Whether this opinion was so well formed in l8 6l 109yenn to Russell with enclosures, London, Sept. 20, 1861, P.O. 84/1160. McCoskry Informed Russell that Docemo was not the originator of the scheme, Lagos, Sept. 3> 1861, P.O. 84/1141. ■^^Venn to Russell with enclosures, London, Oct. 2 8, 1861, P.O. 84/1160. lllTownaend to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan, 5, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/085. 439 Is not known, but the Interview progressed peacably enough. Little was accomplished, however. The missionaries explained that the deed had aroused great resentment and would give rise to suspicion among the neighboring people over British ambitions; In addition, they pointed out that the Egbs dislike of McCoskry was so Intense that they would not recognize him as the representative of Great Britain. It was suggested that a public meeting be held at Lagos, with representatives of all the neighboring people present, whtn the disinterested reasons for the cession would be explained and Docemo's residual position and privileges made clear. Layard asked Venn to commit to paper the things that had been discussed and the meeting closed. Venn complied. 1 1 2 At this point Venn was still not radically opposed to the cession. But shortly after the Interview he received a letter from Abeokuta which complained bitterly about McCoskry*s attitude to the Egba and lamenting that consul Foote was still not In charge.la-3 This, perhaps, 112Venn To Layard, London, Nov. 13, 1861, P.O. 84/1160. 113Henry Robbins to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 7, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/080. 440 was the turning point In Venn18 attitude toward the colonial administration at Lages, for It Indeed appeared that the Egba were being victimized. McCoskry and the Egba The very fact that McCoskry was In command at Lagos was anathema to the Egba, their dislike stretching back a decade to McCoskry >s opposition to Mewu; more recently had been the Incident of the Influence he had exerted on Captain Jones. Adding to Egba mistrust was the news they heard soon after the cession concerning a visit by Bedlngfeld to Epe. He had Interviewed Kosoko— about what they did not know— but the suspicion was abroad that McCoskry wished the deposed king to return to Lagos. The Egba were not In a receptive mood, therefore, when McCoskry asked If he and Bedlngfeld could come to Abeokuta to dis cuss the continuing Ijaye war. From there they were to go to Ibadan, and after hearing both sides would endeavor to negotiate a peace,The proposal stemmed from the recent death of the Are of IJaye and the subsequent hope that 11^McCoskry to the Alake and Chiefs, Lagos, Sept. 24, 1861, P.O. 84/1150. 441 matters could be more easily arranged with his abrasive personality removed from the scene. On such grounds the proposal reveals McCoskry1 a failure to grasp the causes of the war, a fact which the Egba brought out In their curt reply. He was asked "not to exert himself at all" In the matter, as with his limited views they Imagined that whatever he did would probably result In the war's continuance. He was request ed not to Interfere as he was "totally Ignorant" of the Egba position, and "to keep aloof from having any more • i ^ /f words to say respecting the war." McCoskry determined not to answer, fearful of his personal business relations with Abeokuta.^^7 Inst ead, he asked Bedlngfeld to make the reply, who dispatched an antagonistic message express ing astonishment at the tone of their letter. He request ed an early explanation before he took "more active measures" to bring them to their senses; did they Imagine ^^^Maser to Venn, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/068. H^Alake chiefs to McCoskry, Abeokuta, Sept. 30, 1861, P.O. 84/1150. ^^Maser to Venn, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/068. 442 themselves powerful enough "to pull the whiskers of a sleeping Lion?" he wanted to know.H® The Egba bowed In the faoe of this. They might well have spared themselves, though, If they had known that McCoskry1s new and hard line toward them had already been accepted by the Foreign Office. According to recent Instructions from Lord Russell, McCoskry was to Inform the Egba that British protection was to cease If they continued to wage war and refuse the peaceful advice of British offleers.119 But not being aware of this they agreed to receive an embassy. Lagos was honored at this time In having as a visitor Richard Burton, distinguished soldier, scholar, explorer, and newly-appointed consul for the Bight of Blafra at Fernando Po. Having heard about Abeokuta for many years he wished to satisfy his curiosity and required little urging from McCoskry to accept the Invitation to accompany Bedlngfeld to Abeokuta. The third European member of the mission was Mr. Eales, surgeon of the nft Prometheus, Lagos, Oct. 3, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/08. ^Foreign Office, Aug. 20, 1861, P.O. 84/1150. 443 Prometheus, who had the fixed Idea that unicorns abounded In northern Yorubaland and likewise wished to satisfy his curiosity.1^0 Bedlngfeld1s main objectives were to ejqplore the possibility of an Egba peace settlement with Ibadan, to renew the 1 8 5 2 treaty and If possible smooth the ruffled Egba feelings. 121 Meetings with the Alake and chiefs were held on November 2 and 4. Significantly, although several of the Society's native agents took part In the discus sions, the European missionaries did not. Townsend was In England, but despite this Burton observed that the absent missionary held "the destinies of Abeokuta” In his hand. 1 2 2 The Alake waxed hot about McCoskry's past sins toward his people and made It clear that the war against Ibadan would continue. Further, Egba war alms had now expanded: there would be no peace until they had occupied l20Richard F. Burton, Abeokuta and the Cameroons Mountains: An Explanation, (London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, I8 6 3J, I, pp. l-l4. *21Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. Js 1861, C.M.S. CA2/0 9 6; Maser to Venn, Lagos, Nov. 9> l8 6l, C.M.S. CA2/068. 122Abeokuta and the Cameroons, I, p. 246. 444 their ancestral lands held by Ibadan, and Ibadan was to be destroyed once and for all. Bedlngfeld made It equally plain that although Great Britain might assist the town to defend Itself It would never participate In an offensive actlon^23 such as had been contemplated against Dahomey. Although the offer to mediate was unsuccessful, all was not lost. The treaty was renewed and the additional stipulation made that trade would not be stopped In future except after consultation with Lagos.12^ But how well the treaty was observed, and the Alake1s Inability to enforce Its provisions, Is Illustrated by the human sacrifice that was made within days of the agreement being concluded. The mission to Abeokuta was a failure, In fact; relations with Lagos were not Improved and the Alake was unable to enforce the treaty. What was of Importance was the report made by Burton to the Foreign Office and subse quently forwarded to the Duke of Newcastle's department, a 1 23Burton, Abeokuta and the Cameroons, I, pp. 258- 6 3; Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 7, 18(>1, C.M.S. CA2/096. 12^McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 10, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 445 report which precisely echoed McCoskry*s views. It had been bad policy to champion the Egba, he wrote, as now they expected British help In their aggressive wars. Puffed up with these attentions "and by dealings with missionaries, merchants and others who pay court," they had resolved to make themselves the "sole medium and channel of trade between the Interior and the maritime countries." Naturally enough, Ibadan would not tolerate this hindrance to free trade.125 The report was given much weight at the Colonial Office, the staff concurring with the criticism that prior help to Abeokuta had been a fruitful source of mischief, 1 2 6 The mistaken notion was also ImblUed that the disruptive IJaye war was being fought solely on economic grounds, both concepts having been repeatedly put forward by McCoskry, who also harped on the alleged Egba recalci trance to consider any proposals for peace.^27 1 25Burton to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 20, 1861, C.O. 147/2. ^2^Memoranda, Jan. 16, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 127McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Oct. 4, l86l, P.O. 84/1141.is a good example. McCoskry and Kosoko 446 Thus* within six months of the grandiose scheme for a combined Brltlsh-Egba attack on Dahomey and the recommendation that the Egba be made masters of the coast* McCoskry had engineered a complete reversal of official thinking. He had also brought to a successful commercial conclusion the coercive measures started by Foote against Porto Novo* and oil from there was arriving at Lagos in satisfactory volume. However* in the eastern lagoon* Kasoko continued to tap the flow of oil from Ijebu country through his port at Palma* and to this problem McCoskry directed his attention. Here* too* he was able to accomplish a reversal of established policy. McCoskry sent Bedlngfeld to see the ex-king only a month after the cession* explaining to the Foreign Office that Kosoke was well disposed toward Great Britain. In any event* he thought* Kosoke could not do any harm with Lagos in British hands* and old difficulties would not be healed by keeping him out. Bedlngfeld found Kosoko and his chiefs anxious to return* and for$hJs privilege he was willing to renounce all claims to the throne. McCoskry recommended that the move be made.12® Awaiting approval from London, a further step was taken In December. The event has two versions. According to McCoskry, he Invited one of Kosoko*s chiefs, Tapa, to pay a friendly visit to Lagos, which proved successful. Tapa would not remain, though, without Kosoko also being allowed back.129 Commodore Edmonstone tells a different story. Led by the Saro middlemen at Lagos, considerable unrest over the cession was still brewing In December. The crew of the Prometheus being unwell, McCoskry, In some concern, Invited Tapa to come to Lagos with his warriors; he stayed twelve days until the trouble had subsided.^30 But both men agreed that the visit had a salutary effect; the Saros Sere shown that the administration had friends at hand. The one most upset about the whole things was Docemo. He complained bitterly that he had not been 1 2 8Lagos, Oct. 4, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 12^McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Jan. 7, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. ^OEdmonstone to Admiralty, Jan. 20, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 448 consulted about Tapa'a visit, although he accepted the fact that Tapa was to be allowed to return to Lagos. However, when he learned that Kosoko was also to be brought back he addressed a petition to Queen Victoria begging that the rebel and traitor be kept out of his kingdom.131 His request was disregarded, however, the Foreign and Colonial Offices agreeing with McCoskry. It Is possible that In this matter McCoskry was motivated by considerations other than commercial, for In 1 8 5 6 Docemo had ordered him to leave Lagos for communica ting with Kosoko when an Invasion of the Island by the deposed king seemed Imminent. The sentence was later remitted to a fine.1^ However, revenge alone does not explain McCoskry's great activity In attempting to Increase the volume of oil coming to Lagos In the months following the cession. True, he had his own commercial Interests to consider, and could be expected to capture his fair share of new business If the Egba and Ibadan stopped fighting, If Porto Novo sent Its oil to Lagos, and If Kosokofs port was ^Lagos, December, l8 6l, C.O. 147/2. 132 Supra, p. 330. 449 closed. Nevertheless, even this does not satisfactorily explain his actions. Perhaps the real motivation was the financial Interests he had In the Lagos customs receipts. Docomo had farmed his revenue since 1 8 5 6, and In 1859 McCoskry had been the high bidder for a two-year period. Finding It reasonably lucrative, he was again the successful bidder for a three-year contract to begin In January, 1 8 6 1, with an offer of 2 ,0 0 0 bags of cowries (Jfl, 8 0 0) per year.133 McCoskry therefore had a considerable financial stake In the Lagos revenue during 1861, and perhaps was doing all he could to maximize his profits before the arrival of a governor and the Inauguration of an adminis tration that would certainly discontinue the farming of customs. Governor Freeman; the Inauguration of Colonial Office Administration The man chosen as first Governor of the colony was Henry Stanhope Freeman, who had originally been named as 133aovernor H. S. Freeman to Russell, Lagos, March 8, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. 450 consul to succeed Foote. The cession then took place, and at the suggestion of the Foreign Office, the Duke of Newcastle agreed to Freeman being appointed to the com bined position of Governor and consul for the Bight of Benin. Designed to save money, this arrangement continued for several years although It was not a happy combination of offlees.134 After an Interview with Venn, followed by a letter Invoking Divine Blessing on his administration, Freeman left England with strict Injunctions from the Colonial Office against enlarging the new colony and plentiful advice concerning self-sufficiency and frugality. An example of the latter greeted him at Bathurst, where his ship embarked the troops which were to garrison the colony. Instead of the two hundred men suggested by the Foreign Office, the Duke had halved the number; this was an Inaugural example of the Colonial Office parBlmony that was to plague all succeeding administrations. Nothing daunted, Freeman landed at Lagos on January 22, 1 8 6 2, a missionary fellow-passenger having the 1 ^Memorandum, Oct. 27, 1862, C.O. 147/2. opportunity to evaluate him aa being suitable for the Job but not a person from whom much help would be forthcoming in the missionary s p h e r e .135 He assumed his duties three days later under promising circumstances. True, the Egba were sullen and proving reluctant to take advice, but the war before IJaye was languishing to such an extent that it appeared possible that it might die of its own accord if no new fuel was added. In addition, King Sadji was paying attention to his 1861 treaty and trade from Porto Novo was uninterrupted and satisfactory .3-36 And things were becoming more settled in Lagos Itself, where negotiations with Kosoko were progressing to the point where It seemed that his valuable trade would begin flowing to Lagos in the near future. Under these hopeful circumstances the Governor took stock of his new surroundings and with the assistance of McCoskry began his administration. The first matter to be settled was with Decemo and concerned the treaty of 135Rev. jr a. Lamb to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 31# 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M4. 136McCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Jan. 6, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 452 cession, for as Freeman discovered, there remained con siderable opposition on the part of the IdeJo (lineage) chiefs. He was told by Docemo and his advisors that they had been forced into signing the document without under standing its content. Brushing this aside as the mischievous plotting of Saro malcontents, as he did the complaint that Decemo had no traditional right to alienate communal land, Freeman explained to the king and chiefs that far from them taking their land, the treaty had in fact rendered it more secure.*37 According to the Governor, this explanation answered all the questions arising from the cession to everyone's satisfaction and Docemo agreed to add to the treaty an article concerning his Income. By this, he agreed to give up his revenue for an annual pension of 1200 bags of cowries up ,0 3 0), the pension to begin on July 1, 1862, when the arrangement with McCoskry would t e r m i n a t e .^38 The agreement was obviously unfair to 137preeman to Russell, Lagos, March 8, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. •^^Freeman to Russell, Lagos, March 8, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 453 Decemo, for not only had McCoskry been paying 2000 bags of cowries for the privilege of collecting the duties but the value of cowries fluctuated; also, It was confidentially expected that the revenue would Increase substantially. This accomplished, Freeman turned his attention to a Judicial system, establishing a Police Court for petty cases, a Criminal Court, a Slave Court to settle matters relating to absconding slaves, and a Commercial Tribunal to deal with business matters and debt.^39 McCoskry was appointed to the Criminal and Slave Courts, a legal appren ticeship which apparently qualified him to become acting Chief Magistrate of the colony In 1 8 6 3. Temporarily laying aside his Colonial Office posi tion, Freeman took up his consular hat In February. During the month the forces at his disposal had been augmented by the arrival of the gunboat Handy, commanded by John Glover, late of the Daysprlng and now promoted Lleutenant-Commander after a spell In the more bracing service of the Channel Squadron. With McCoskry and Glover as advisors, there was no doubt which direction his policy toward the Interior Yoruba would take. I39preeman to Newcastle, Lagos, March 8, 1862, C.O. 147/1. *54 Pressing Glover into service, he dispatched him to Ibadan on February 22 to discuss peace; after that he was to secure a route to Dr. Balkle at Lokoja on the Niger. At the same time he carried a friendly letter to the Awujale of IJebu suggesting that the Lagos government act as mediator in the war.1^0 Glover unfortunately became 1 1 1 soon after leaving and was forced to return, so the Governor's first attempt to force a road to Ibadan proved unsuccessful. That Freeman had determined by this time that the war was being fought over trade routes and that the Egba were at fault was made quite clear after Glover came back to Lagos. Freeman then addressed a blistering letter to Abeokuta threatening to close the Egba reads to Lagos and open alternate routes to the Interior unless they gave up the war in which they were so clearly in the wrong. 1 * * 1 This was a blow to the Egba, who had been hoping for an ^^Freeman to the Awujale and Chiefs, Lagos, Feb. 22, 1862, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. I. ^^Freeman to the Alake, Lagos, March 1, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M4. 455 improvement in relatione with Lagoe now that McCoskry had been superseded. But this was not the only blow inflicted on the Egba during March. They had more immediate concerns which relegated Freeman's message almost to a place of minor Importance. The stalemate at IJaye was being broken and the war was taking a new and violent turn; to complicate matters, a visitation from their old enemy, the Fon of Dahomey was expected. The simultaneous threats endangered the very existence of Abeokuta and its people. Summary For a variety of political reasons, the Yoruba people went to war with each other in i860. As far as the Egba were concerned, the reason was painfully obvious: Ibadan had to be stopped from engrossing any more Yoruba people or land. At this Juncture, however, the Egba were fortunate in having at Lagos a succession of British representatives who fully supported their cause and who illustrated their empathy in such practical ways as supplying arms, bombarding Porto Novo, or stopping the flow of powder and shot to Ibadan. With such support, it 456 was obvious that the Egba had the upper hand in the Yoruba military struggle. When consul Foote then promised soldiers and guns and spoke of a combined attack on Abomey, Egba enthusiasm for Great Britain reached unprecedented proportions. But the war had disrupted trade and decreased Lagos revenue, andUhad unavoidably produced an enlarged supply of slaves for ejqport. According to consul Brand, annexation was the only way to stop the slave trade, cure the several ills of Lagos, and relieve the Foreign Office of the Irresponsible jurisdiction thrust upon its consuls. When Whitehall also heard that Abeokuta faced the possi bility of Fon attack and that the French Commodore seemed interested in Lagos, decisions began to mature that resulted in the consul being given the opportunity to annex the Island. Consul Foote had died, however, and his acting replacement was William McCoskry, who entertained entirely different feelings for the Egba. And with busi ness Interests at stake he chose to annex the place, no doubt htoplng that British influence, either direct or indirect, would soon halt the war and restore trade. Not 457 only that, but mlsunderstanding the cause of the war, he Instituted a policy that was markedly less friendly toward the Egba. Indeed, to the Egba, his policies appeared to be specifically directed against them. That was also how the C.M.S. Interpreted events. The Society had watched an original undertaking of significant military aid to Abeokuta dwindle Into nothing; It was suspected that McCoskry had exerted his baneful Influence on Captain Jones; there was the annexation Itself, which seemed to threaten the Society's plans for "native agency;" and above all, McCoskry had apparently been successful In preaching an antl-Egba doctrine to the Foreign Office, which was about to give up Its long- established policy of supporting Abeokuta as an enclave of civilization and Christianity. Perhaps equally as bad from the missionary viewpoint was the fact that McCoskry started to treat with the hated Kosoko, whose name fairly reaked with slaving, and Intended to return him to Lagos. Thus the action of 1 8 5 1, that had been undertaken to rid the coast of slaving, was to be reversed and ten years work go for naught. 458 No wonder that the missionaries and their proteges at Abeokuta looked forward fervently to the arrival of the Governor. But alas! Freeman Immediately took McCoskry as his Intimate advisor, and to compound his apostasy, admitted Commander Glover to the Inner circle of Lagos government, a man who had on prior occasions evinced his dislike for the Egba. Thus, at the beginning of 1862, when the military situation In Yorubaland was becoming critical for the Egba, their fortunes seemed to be in a period of decline. CHAPTER VIII MISSIONARY AND IMPERIAL CONFLICT, 1862 Pressed on two possible fronts, the Egba military position had been deteriorating slnoe the beginning of 1862. By early February the Ibadan army was Increasing Its pressure on Ijaye, had crossed the Ose river and had established Its main camp within sight of the town.^ Even worse, rumors of a great expedition about to be launched by Olele had been mounting for months. In an agony of Indecision the Egba at last decided that the Dahomey threat was more Immediate and concentrated their forces closer to hone. It is significant to observe that In the long history of actual or threatened Fon attacks on the Egba, this was the first Instance of an appeal for assistance not being made to British authorities. The significance F. A. AJayi and Robert Smith, Yoruba Warfare In the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: University Press, IgS^TTpTlo^ 459 460 was not lost on Freeman. He took pains to Inquire about the omission and found the Egba to have been persuaded that if they placed too much trust in the English and allowed them too much Influence at Abeokuta the result would be an occupation of their country similar to the fate which had overtaken Lagos. 2 The rumors of Glele's Intentions turned out to be true, although his army did not enter Egba territory proper. Instead, the blow fell on Isaga, an Egbade town of between four and five thousand people some fifteen miles west of Abeokuta. The town was under Egba Influence, however, and the attack can rightfully be considered to be part of the continuing Fon-Egba struggle for mastery of the country which separated them. Glele also had an old score to settle against Isaga for the crucial help it had given Abeokuta during the 1851 attack on the Egba capital made by Ghezo, his father. The attack on Isaga came on March 15, at a time when Ibadan was preparing a full-scale effort against Ijaye. The possibility is thus raised that the blow was 2Freeman to Russell, Lagos, April 8, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. 461 made In conjunction with Ibadan, a coalition which had worried the Egba for years. An historian of the Fon has examined the possibility but reaches no conclusion; M. Edouard Dunglas states merely that "II est possible que le Basorun d'Ibadan, Ogunmola, connalsaant blen 1'hostlllte^ Implacable neurrle par lea Dahomeens contre les Egba, alt secretement avertl le rol Glele de eette situation favorable. But In the event, the town was razed and many prisoners taken. The C.M.S. mission house and church were destroyed and William Doherty, a native agent, was taken prisoner together with seventeen members of his congrega tion. Oollmer, who was In charge of the territory west of Abeokuta, made Immediate application to Freeman for help in obtaining the release of the captives, especially Doherty, who was a British subject born In Sierra Leone. Freeman did what he could but to no Immediate avail.^ 3nDeuxleme Attaque des Dahomeens contre Abeokuta (15 mars 1864)," In Etudes Dahom^enes (Forto Movo: Instltut Fran§als D'Afrlque Noire, Oeuvernement du Dahomey, Centre Ifan, 1949)» II* p. 38. ^Oollmer to Freeman, Abeokuta, March 20, 1862, Freeman to Glele, Lagos, April 8, 1 8 6 2, in F.O. 84/1173. 462 The Fall of IJaye Although the Egba took no part In the battle the destruction of Isaga was nevertheless a blow at their prestige. But a more serious blow was being prepared simultaneously at IJaye, where Rev. Adolphus Mann had been attempting to settle the differences between that town and Ibadan. In response to letters to the Governor on the subject, Freeman dispatched Lieutenant Delben of the Pronetheus to IJaye for the double purpose of discussing peace and escorting Mann and his wife to Lagos, Mrs. Mann expecting a batty and not wishing to have It delivered at IJaye. En route to IJaye, Dolben reached Abeokuta on March 12, where It was decided that Rev. Edward Roper should accompany him to his destination. Reaching IJaye three days later It was found that the chiefs had made up their minds not to avail themselves of Dolben1 s services. The party thereupon prepared to leave, first arranging for Roper to stay behind In charge of the mission during Mann's absence. But on Sunday, March 16, Ibadan soldiers Inflicted a sharp defeat on the town's defenders and the chiefs changed their minds, asking Dolben for help. On 463 the point of departure, it was decided to delay no longer; but the undertaking was given that the Governor would step In and exert his Influence as quickly as possible.5 Hr. and Mrs. Mann, Dolben, and a large entourage left the town on Monday morning, but the departure of the white men was considered a bad omen and the defenders1 morale broke at the sight of the exodus. Within hours they began to flee and the long siege was at an end; by early evening the Jubilant Ibadan army was taking possession of the town. Roper was taken prisoner and removed to Ibadan, where all Hlnderer's pleading failed to secure his release. The ransom of ten slaves, ten guns, ten kegs of powder, ten pieces of cloth and ten bags of cowries was considered excessive, 6 so Roper was paroled to Hlnderer's custody and remained a prisoner until 1 8 6 5, despite the repeated requests of the Governor. ^Mann to Venn, n.p., May 15, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/ 066; Roper to Venn, Ibadan, March 24, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/ 081. 6Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, April 4, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M4. *164 Extension of the War to IJebu-Remo The fall of IJaye eliminated one contender from the Yoruba power struggle and Ibadan strengthened Itself by taking over the upper Ogun territory which IJaye had been disputing with Oyo. But IJaye had been but a minor contender, and even taking Into account the reputed 2 0 ,0 0 0 captives taken by Ibadan, this phase of the war was not conclusive. On the contrary, the loss of IJaye served to renew Egba determination against allowing Ibadan to extend its power beyond the new acquisitions. The feeling was shared by the Awujale of IJebu. Both had Interests In IJebu-Remo; the Awujale wished to reassert his authority over the province and the Egba were anxious to deny Ibadan Its most direct route to the sea, through the Remo towns of Ipara, Iperu, Makun and Ikorodu, which were all friendly to Ibadan. Consequently, only a month after the fall of IJaye, Egba and Ode forces turned their attention to the Remo province and began a siege of Makun, which fell after two months. At this, the Balogun of Ipara, Kehere, warned Ibadan that the allies would undoubtedly attempt to take all the towns on the road to Ikorodu. He asked for help, 465 reminding the Ibadan chiefs of past favors shown by the Hemo people In allowing caravans to pass to and from the coast against the wishes of the Egba. Ibadan agreed, but by the time Its soldiers began moving Into Ijebu-Remo, Iperu also had been lost to the allies.7 Ibadan then entered this new campaign In force, first attacking Iperu then joining forces with the main Remo resistance at Ipara. A camp was left outside Iperu, which proved far enough removed to allow Its Egba defenders to sally forth occasionally, but the main Ibadan- Remo effort was concentrated on the defense of Ipara, the most Important of the towns on the road to the coast.® With these new positions taken up and with the rainy season fully advanced, the opposing forces settled down to their respective sieges. This was quite satisfac tory to the Egba and Ode allies, situated as they were with their farms Immediately to their rear. On the other hand, the Ibadan were In a less favorable position. They were now fighting much further from their homes and farms than ?Wood to Venn, Lagos, May 9, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/096; Roper to Venn, Ibadan, March 1, 1 8 6 5, C.M.S. CA2/081. 8j. p. a. Ajayl, Yoruba Warfare, pp. 112-13. 466 they had been at IJaye, and even more Important, their supply lines, both north and south, were dangerously exposed to attack. In view of the Importance attached to the Ikerodu- Ibadan road by Freeman, MoCoskry and Glover as an alternate route to the Interior, the resultant blockade hardly added to their estimation of the Egba. Their Interpretation of the war as an obstinate effort by the Egba and IJebu to maintain their hold over the trade routes was apparently confirmed. Even before Makun had fallen, Freeman was con vinced that the Egba were the sole cause of disturbance In the country and was threatening to meet them with force If they blockaded the road between Ikorodu and Ibadan.9 Further Deterioration of Lagos-Abeokuta Relations; the Rejection of Vice-Consul Taylor Relations between Lagos and the Egba deteriorated even more In June over the question of consular representa tion at Abeokuta. Russell had announced In early 1861 that Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, June 5, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/09*. 467 a consul was to be appointed and the fact was known at Abeokuta almost lamedlately.10 Later that year the Egba were anxiously awaiting his arrival In the hope that the misunderstandings with Lagos which had arisen since the cession would be rectified and that relations with Great Britain, slowly worsening, would return to the old friendly footing.H However, when Bedlngfeld and Burton returned to Lagos from Abeokuta at the end of 1861 they mentioned to McCoskry that the Alake and chiefs had repeatedly asked for assurances that Townsend would return to them when his leave was over. This caused McCoskry to warn Russell that the placing of a consul at Abeokuta was not going to be easy. With a remarkable degree of accuracy he made the following prophecy: Iwe Irohln, (Abeokuta), May 6, 1861. The Iwe Irohln was a small Yoruba-English news-sheet printed semi monthly at Abeokuta since 1859* Townsend had originated the paper as a means of acculturation and to maintain the missionary party as the dominant factor In "leading the public mind." (Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta* Feb. 6, i860, C.M.S. CA2/O8 5). The paper enjoyed a greater circulation In Lagos than It did In Abeokuta. 11Gollmer to Dawes, Abeokuta, Nov. 4, 1861, C.M.S. CA2/043. 468 Nr. Townsend Is a person who possesses great influ ence over the Alake and people of Abeokuta and has been so long in the habit of directing the affairs of Abeo kuta that he would not brook any Interference Cby] any consular officer .... I should anticipate the re currence of a similar struggle for the direction of affairs as that between the late Mr. Consul Campbell and the Rev. Mr. Oollmer, which was only ended by the latter being sent to Abeokuta.3-2 Such a struggle Indeed arose, but it is only fair to Townsend to point out that by the beginning of 1862 the Egba were no longer in favor of receiving an official representative, fearful that the step would lead to British occupation, as it had at Lagos.13 And Townsend was still in England at this time, only returning to Abeokuta in May, a month before the new vice-consul reached his station. Thomas C. Taylor Was Russell's choice for the position, and like officials before and after, he had sev eral interviews at Salisbury Square before leaving England.1^ Arriving at Lagos on May 21 he found Rev. Wood 1 2Lagos, Dec. 2, 1861, P.O. 84/1141. 13Rev. Thomas King to C.M.S., Abeokuta, Feb. 1, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M4. ^Venn to Wood, London, Dec. 23, l86l, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 469 about to return to the Egba capital so the two men traveled up together, arriving on May 30. He was lodged with Townsend at Ake, but to his chagrin he found that It was extremely doubtful whether he would be allowed to stay. Meetings were being held dally, but Taylor was not pre sented to the chiefs; however, he considered Townsend to be doing "all he can to bring the matter to a favourable Issue .... Then on June 4 a great public meeting was held before the Alake's house, in Taylor's opinion called for the purpose of conveying In the most public manner the consensus that the Egba did not want a British official In their town. All their complaints were aired, Including Captain Jones' failure to make good his promise to return with soldiers; the new one was added that Britain had passively stood by while Dahomey had destroyed Isaga. Despite the complaints, Taylor was convinced that the real concern was that a consul would be superseded by a governor, as at Lagos. After the meeting, Townsend gave the opinion that It would be useless to press the matter !5Taylor to Russell, Abeokuta, June 3* 1862, P.O 84/1175. 470 any further and advised Taylor to leave. But even though Taylor considered Townsend to be "fully aware of . . . the inmost thoughts and feelings of the people," and "even a sort of King here," he was undecided what course to pursue. He resolved the problem by feigning sickness, hop ing that the high feelings would soon subside. But they did not, and on June 11 he was told that his house would be burned over his head unless he left the town that day. Townsend declining to Intercede, Taylor had no choice but comply, returning to Lagos and within a short time embarking for England.1? In Taylor's opinion, Townsend was responsible for his dismissal.18 This Townsend denied, maintaining that he used every means he "judged right" to persuade the ^■^Taylor to Freeman, Abeokuta, June 5> 1862, F.O. 84/1175. ^Taylor to Freeman, Lagos, June 25, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. ^■^Taylor to Freeman, Lagos, June 25, 1862, F.O. 84/1175; Taylor to Townsend, Lagos, June 27, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M5. 471 chiefs to receive him "and was sorry they did not. He also defended himself to the Society at home. It had been known that a consul was arriving, he explained, and It was also apparent that there were objections to It. It was therefore a delicate situation which had to be handled In a proper, respectful, and tactful way. But Instead, Taylor arrived at Abeokuta with no warning and with no letter of Introduction, a violation of the custom that Important travelers be preceded by messengers, to give the chiefs time to consider the matter. With this Initial blunder, Townsend went on, and with the matter thrust Into his hands, he did everything he could to smooth the way. He met privately with the chiefs to persuade them to accept a consul and thought that he would have been successful except for the excessive suspicions which had arisen with the seizure of Lagos, the unyielding attitudes of McCoskry and Freeman and the conduct of Captain Jones. Consequently, when the meeting was held on June 4 It had all been decided and nothing he 19rownsend to Taylor, Abeokuta, July 2, 1862, F.O, 84/1193. 472 could have done would have made any difference.2® In a subsequent explanation Townsend described the unofficial position he held at Abeokuta: I have to fill an office, not of choice but of necessity, an office made by the laws of the country; It was told me so at the first. There Is no sain, but much responsibility attaches to It. There Is no name nor title that I know of belonging to It; but there Is a reality In It that I am often made to feel.21 In the same letter, Townsend wrote that he had welcomed Taylor as a means of relieving himself of this burden. But despite his disclaimers, It would appear that Townsend was In fact responsible for the incident. If not directly, then because of his failure to wield the Influence he enjoyed. A colleague suggests that he did not want Taylor because of his dislike of the Lagos government and because he Imagined that a vice-consul would be Its tool. 2 2 Two articles printed in the Iwe Irohln at this time certainly 20Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, June 6, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/085. 21Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, July 4, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/085. 22Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, June 5* 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. 473 contributed nothing to Taylor's reception or suggested that Townsend, their author, was sorry to see him go. The first appeared on June 4, the very day of Taylor's appearance before the town's assembled elders. Townsend wrote that the English had lost much Influence at Abeokuta by pursuing a course,, considered by the Egba as designed to win control of them. At the same time, Lagos was too prone to threaten the Egba Into giving up the war, yet none of the other combatants was so treated. No good would be accomplished and It was bad policy for Lagos to quarrel with Abeokuta, where Englishmen had always been protected. The article closed by hoping that Lagos would now become more conciliatory and adopt a policy more acceptable to Abeokuta. The second of Townsend's editorials was In the Issue of July 4, when he again mentioned the Ineptitude of Taylor arriving without formal notification. This had served to Increase Egba suspicion that the affair was part of a plan to rob them of their lands. It complained of the dictatorial attitude maintained by McCoskry and Freeman and especially of the fact that Lagos had become a haven for runaway slaves. It was therefore not surprlftlng that 474 Taylor had been refused.23 As Freeman observed, articles such as these Tanned the flames of hostility.2^ This was true, but the spark of hostility had not been kindled by Townsend; this had happened before his return from England. The people most likely to have started the agitation against an official representative were the Sierra Leone Immigrants. Those at Abeokuta were familiar with English law and feared Its introduction among the Egba on two counts: Its possible effect on slave-holding and Its known attitude toward the payment of debt. The concern they aroused was augmented by the Saros at Lagos, already upset for these reasons, who likewise warned the Egba chiefs not to allow Great Britain to obtain any foothold at Abeokuta.25 These sources are undoubtedly responsible for raising the fear that a consul was the thin end of the colonial wedge. 23Both editions in F.O. 84/1175. ^Freeman to Russell, Lagos, July 7, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 25Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, June 5, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/086. 475 Results of the Taylor Affair In England, the affair had repercussions which lasted for months. The Initial Foreign Office reaction was mild: In view of the Insult; a consular officer would not be sent until ample apology had been made.26 But this attitude hardened as more Information was received; despite the fact that Taylor himself suggested Freeman's responsibility for the fiasco to be as great as Townsend's.27 The opinion then held at the Foreign Office was that the missionary had engineered the refusal because of his antipathy to sharing Influence; as Russell noted; "The Jealousy of Mr. Townsend and the C.M.S. has defeated Mr. Taylor."2® Further charges and counter-charges were made; but by the end of the year Russell had made up his mind: If Townsend "will not allow any British consul or 2®Russell to Freeman; Foreign Office; Aug. 23, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. ^Taylor to Wylde, London; Aug. 27, 1862; F.O. 84/1193. 2®Menorandum, Aug. 30, 1862, F.O. 84/1193. 476 agent to stay at Abeokuta, Lagos must be defended but not Abeokuta. Venn worked strenuously with parliamentary friends to overturn the unfavorable attitude. He himself was deeply disturbed at the turn of events, being In favor of a consul at Abeokuta and upset at the tone of the Iwe Irohln attacks on Freeman. But all his Influential friends condemned the conduct of the Egba, the Foreign Office staff continued to be annoyed, Lord Russell was unmoved by his protestations and Palmerston said that he could no longer regard Abeokuta as deserving England's friendship. Wylde, at the Foreign Office, told him that In future Abeokuta would be regarded only as coequal with Ibadan, Porto Novo, Epe and other t o w n s .30 what caused Venn the greatest concern was that Abeokuta had been cut off from connection with the Foreign Office, which had been the department most favorable to Africa and to Indirect measures for the suppression of the slave trade. All future questions would go to the Colonial Office, ^Memorandum, Dec. 4, 1862, F.O. 84/1193. 3°Venn to Townsend, London, Aug. 23, Dec. 23,1862, Venn to Lamb, London, Aug. 23, 1862, In C.M.S. CA2/L3. 477 "which naturally looks to the revenue of Lagos as a British colony rather than to the elevation of the African race."31 The repercussions In Yorubaland were no less adverse to the Egba cause. Freeman had already made up his mind about the Egba and even before the affair had reached its conclusion he was threatening to blockade Abeokuta unless they gave up their petty wars. At the same time he rejected the request of the Abeokuta Commercial Association to collect at Lagos the customs duty on Egba exports If It had not been paid at Abeokuta. Freeman refused categorically, warning that If traders who refused to pay were molested In any way, all friendly relations between Lagos and Abeokuta would be at an end. He suggested Instead that the traders who refused to pay be brought before British courts at Lagos.32 Such a suggestion, of course, was not acceptable to the Abeokuta Saros, despite the desire to enforce their customs system. S^enn to Lamb, London, Aug. 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 32Harrlson to Venn, Abeokuta, May 29, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/045. 473 To the Egba and the missionaries who represented them, these attitudes bespoke a direct hostility. The threat to blockade Abeokuta unless the war was given up was not directed to the belligerents In general, It was felt, but to the Egba specifically. The suggestion that Lagos courts be used was obviously designed to extend Lagos authority over them; If they did not have the right to Impose duties and enforce payment according to their own laws, then they did not have sovereignty In their own country. Nor would they accept Lagos adjudication over their own concerns. After this, and when he was anticipating Taylor's rejection at Abeokuta, Freeman made a slashing attack on the Egba to the Colonial Office. While all the Yoruba people were unfriendly to Great Britain because of the annexation of Lagos and the fear that their towns would follow, the Egba, "who have been preached up as the nation through whom civilization and Christianity are to be spread throughout Africa," were the most hostile and would have to be coerced Into accepting Lagos policy. Compound ing the difficulties were the missionaries and the unfortunate aid and support previously given by Great 479 Britain; as a result, the Egba had Insolently refused all offers of mediation and Insisted on denying Ibadan Its own road to the Interior; In fact, he concluded, the only chiefs who were really friendly to the British were Kosoko and the King of Porto Novo.33 This was followed by a bitter lettsr to the Alake when Taylor returned to Lagos. The Governor rejected as a "mere formality" the excuse that they had not been given advance notice of his arrival and launched Into a recita tion of their bad behavior: the war, the robbery of the Niger expedition goods, the Insulting letters to McCoskry were all enumerated, as well as their failure to observe the l8 6l treaty by continuing to participate In the slave trade.34 Receiving no response to his offer to send Taylor back if they apologized, Freeman then proposed to drop the entire matter and suggested that he make a per sonal visit to Abeokuta.35 But this overture was declined 33Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, June 4, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. S^Lagos, June 14, 1 8 6 2, F.O. 84/1175. 35preeman to the Alake, Lagos, June 27, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/015. 480 also, albeit politely, on the grounds that the town was In a confused state and the people very suspicious. 3 6 At this, Freeman allowed the affair to simmer; but In August he reported to Lord Russell that he was firmly convinced that nothing but coercion would bring the Egba to their senses and asked permission to blockade the roads and stop their supplies. But two days later came an apparent volte face. He had heard that a large-scale attack on Abeokuta was being prepared by Glele and urged that additional troops be sent to Lagos, "for In spite of the present opposition of the Egbas to the views of H.H. Government, It would be a severe blow to British policy In these parts If Abeokuta should be destroyed by Dahomey."37 The Realities of Imperialism at Lagos The request for troops to defend Abeokuta seems strange In light of Freeman's dislike for the Egba. It Is even possible that this excuse for strengthening the Lagos garrison was a subterfuge to add weight to a similar 3^Alake to Freeman, Abeokuta, July 2, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M5. 37Lagos, Aug. 8, 10, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 481 recommendation made In July, Freeman perhaps hoping that the plight of the Egba would swing the decision In his favor. But whatever the motive, the request sheds light on the basic difficulty which confronted successive governors, leading them to Interfere more and more In hinterland politics and embark on expansionist policies which were unauthorized and strictly forbidden by the h~*ne Government. The difficulty aas money; specifically, the inability of the colony to raise revenue sufficient to support its administration— the prime requisite of a British colony. Combined with the parsimony of the Colonial Office, or more precisely, of an Exchequer watched over by a frugally-minded Parliament Imbued with notions of small government, low taxes and balanced budgets, the shortage of money forced Lagos administra tions to face the realities of Yoruba politics and coastal geography. On one hand, the Yoruba wars seriously Interrupted the flow of trade, the revanue of Lagos suffering directly as a consequence; therefore, efforts had to be made to halt the Internecine strife. Influence, threats and 482 coercion were all applied, but not grasping the political orientation of the wars, colonial officials proved unable to suggest satisfactory bases for negotiation. Paradox ically, they were prohibited by successive British governments from taking the single step that could have effectively stopped the wars and raised revenue; namely, military Intervention on the mainland. On the other hand was the geographical factor. The Island of Lagos commanded the best entrance to an extensive coastal lagoon Into which flowed a considerable number of rivers and creeks. The Ogun, for Instance, debouched close to Lagoa Itself, but to the west, the navigable Addo, Yewa and Weme rivers lay Just as close to a narrow channel through the coastal sandbar at Cotoneu. East of Lagos, Kosoko's psrt of Palma was situated on a similar channel. And In addition. It was not strictly necessary that Lagos or the lagoon be used at all; as at Badagry, goods could be loaded and unloaded offshore. So Lagos, although by far the best, was by no means the only outlet to the sea. All efforts to bring peace to Yorubaland falling, the colony was thus deprived of adequate revenue and 483 administrators were forced to turn to the other alter native. That was, to bring into the Lagos custems orbit the neighboring lagoon ports, both east and west, which diverted considerable commerce from Lagos because of lower duties. This was accomplished quickly in the places close to Lagos; it will later be shown how colonial officials unfailingly turned to the further ports every time trade with the Interior was stopped, and pleading one excuse or another, sought to Integrate them into the Lagos customs system. This was the measure of British imperialism in Yorubaland in the l860fs and 70's; nothing more than the attempts of desperate administrators to find sufficient revenue to carry on their Job. Freeman Initiated this expansionist-revenue policy in June, 1862, after the Egba and Ode had captured Makun and moved In force to block the Iksrodu-Ibadan road. This would result in an immediate loss of revenue to Lagos Just at the time McCoskry's arrangement to farm the customs was to cease and Docomo's pension payments were to begin.3® Freeman's position was indeed precarious. McCoskry had 38supra, pp. 452-53. 484 been paying 1 ,8 0 0 a year for hla concession, so the actual revenue was undoubtedly higher, perhapsJf2,5 0 0. Then there was to be a grant from the Imperial Exchequer of # 4,0 0 0 ,3 9 making a total of <jf 6,5 0 0, but that sum was being correspondingly reduced because of the closure of the Iksrodu-Ibadan road. Out of this Freeman had to pay Docemo's pension of 4^1,0 0 0, his own salary of # 500, the salaries of two or three more colonial officials, to say nothing of the salaries of African clerks, policemen, bailiffs, minor officials and laborers. On top of this there were living quarters for the Europeans to be built and maintained, as well as barracks, offices, and a hospital; there were streets to be widened and swamps drained, while numerous other Improvements demanded Immed iate attention. Clearly a formidable task on such an amount of money. Beginnings of Expansion But Freeman was familiar with the trade figures for the preceding year. Lagos had exported 3*865 tons of 39Reduoed toJf3,000 In the next financial year. 485 oil, Palma 1,200 and Badagry 1,600.^° McCoskry had already started negotiations with Kosoko about closing off Palma, so the obvious place to begin augmenting his revenue was at Badagry. Freeman convened a provisional Council In June, con* slating of McCoskry, another merchant, the Colonial Secre tary and the officer In charge of the troops, Captain Williams. Its first act was to pass an Ordinance for the collection of Import and export duties of two per cent ad valorem at all points "within the territory of Lagos." According to local "opinion," Lagos territory Included Badagry, Palma and Lekkl, another small port on the eastern lagoon. Armed with this, Freeman went to Badagry on June 27 In the gunboat Handy and Informed the eight lineage chiefs that Docemo's treaty of cession also Included Badagry, as the King of Lagos had always exercised sovereignty over their town.**1 According to Freeman, the chiefs "already con sidered themselves under British law and protection" and 4QMcCoskry to Russell, Lagos, Jan. 7, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. These figures were not accurate, merely educated guesses. ^Freeman to Newcastle, July 9, 1862, C.O. 147/1- 486 willingly agreed to become stipendiary chiefs of the Lagos government; their Individual pensions were fixed at thirty- six bags of cowries and a white hat per year. Hr. Tlckel, the erstwhile vice-consul at Badagry, was relieved of that title and became Collector of Customs, the levy to be the same as at Lagos. 4 2 The financial advantage of Importing or exporting goods at Badagry was thus removed. By no stretch of the Imagination could Badagry be considered to have been part of Docemo's realm. It was an Egun town, Inclined more toward Porto Novo than Lagos, although several of the chiefs had affiliations with the latter place. 4 3 This was perfectly well known. McCoskry had made a report of possible changes that should be made In the Lagos eustoms system almost a year before, soon after the cession, In which he clearly Implied that Badagry was not part of Lagos. Freeman had been Instructed to look Into McCoskry's recommendations and he too had reported Badagry to be an Independent town. 4 4 later ^Spreeman to Newcastle, LagoB, July 9* 1862, C.O. 147/1; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. 4 3Supra, pp. 9 5-9 6. 44 Newcastle to Freeman, London, Dec. 16, 1861, Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, March 8, 1862, In C*0. 147/1. 487 statement was therefore an obvious misstatement. No map had been attached to the treaty of cession, and the acquisition of mainland territory was exactly what the Colonial Office did not want.^5 Freeman's report of his acquisition of Badagry was consequently received at Downing Street with consternation, one of the civil servants appending the opinion that a message be sent designed to check the Governor's alarming extension of British responsibility. This was done. Badagry and Palma were not Included In Lagos territory and were not within his jurisdiction, it read; If he enforced the Ordinance he would expose himself to serious difficulties from which "you cannot expect Her Majesty's Government to extricate you, as you have acted not only without authority but In a spirit quite alien from that in which Her Majesty's Government desire the government of Lagos to be carried on." But the deed was done. ^Memorandum by Newcastle and Mr. Chichester Fortescue, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Nov. 27, 29, 1861, in C.O. 147/2. ^%ewcastle to Freeman, London, Aug. 27, 1862, C.O. 147/1. 488 A Further Proposal; Official Reaction The Governor's next proposal was not so successful, but it illustrates clearly the position he was in, caught in the pincers of decreasing revenue and increasing expenses. It was an elaborate scheme, designed to solve the revenue quandary in a stroke by setting up a customs system for the entire coast. His suggestion was camou flaged as a plan to eliminate the last vestiges of the overseas slave trade, but there can be no doubt that its real purpose was to bring under Lagos control all possible sources of revenue. He proposed to occupy a two-hundred mile stretch of coast, from Palma in the east to Cape St. Paul in the west (a promentery situated in present-day Ghana). This should be garrisoned by a thousand men, to be stationed— naturally enough— at the ports of Palma, Lagos, Badagry, Porto Novo, Whydah, Great and Little Popo, Keta, and other strategic places. Of this total, he proposed raising two hundred Housa locally, to be led by English offleers.^ A ^Freeman to Russell and Newcastle, Lagos, July 1, 1862, P.O. 84/1175 and C.O. 147/1. 489 few days later he asked for a quick reply to the proposi tion. In the event of Its rejection he requested that the existing garrison be doubled, the hundred men of the West India Regiment being Insufficient If the Egba "come down and destroy towns within but a few miles of Lagos, which have put themselves under our protection." The extra hundred men which he wished to have available "for service out of the Island," would quickly be able to stop the war between Abeokuta and I b a d a n . ^8 The Colonial Office was Incensed, first deciding to Ignore completely the outlandish suggestion that the entire Slave Coast be seized. Freeman was not a "prudent person," "did not clearly understand the position which the C.O. expect him to maintain," and the Duke noted that he was proceeding at a pace which would soon Involve the Government In native wars. "How far this Is the necessary consequence of the acquisition of Lagos remains to be seen," he wrote privately, but Freeman was acting "in a spirit the very opposite of what I enjoined upon M3 Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, July 4, 1862, C.O, 147/1. 490 hlm"^9 A strong letter of censure was sent, refusing to Increase the garrison, positively prohibiting him from extending British Jurisdiction beyond Lagos, enjoining him from any armed Interference in native wars and asking for a complete explanation of the towns near Lagos which had placed themselves under British protection.5° The dis patch was as strong as the language of diplomacy would allow. Regarding the proposition of occupying the coast, it was later decided that it would be dangerous "to put away in silence such a proposal from this enterprising young man who gives many signs of having very Inflated ideas of the Importance both of himself and of his Settlement,"51 Lord Russell agreeing that the scheme was out of the question.5s Freeman was warned against entertaining such extensive projects: "Her Majesty's ^Memoranda, Aug. 16, 1862, C.O. 147/1. 5°Newcastle to Freeman, London, Aug. 22, 1862, C.O. 147/1. ^Memorandum, Sept. 19, 1862, C.O. 147/1. 52Russell to Newcastle, Foreign Office, Oct. 6, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 491 Government would strongly disapprove the adoption of any measures of aggression and conquest."53 Except for the suggestion of enlisting Housa troops at Lagos, a plan that blossomed Into a force called the Armed Housa Police, the project came to nought. But It Illustrates several truths. For example, It shows quite clearly the prevailing "imperialist" attitude toward West Africa: expansion was strictly prohibited and the territory Great Britain was unfortunate enough to possess was to be kept within the strictest confines. It also Illustrates the realization of the loan on the spot that If Lagos was to succeed In Its avowed purpose of putting down the slave trade, the expansion of the colony was manatory, a reality not grasped by official thinking. Likewise, It shows the Governor's awareness that the Imperial factor, weak as It was, had already become the decisive Influence In Interior politics, while portraying the Government's refusal to utilize Imperial power. And lastly, It Illus trates vividly the desperate measures that Lagos was forced ^Newcastle to Freeman, London, Oct. 16, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 4 9 1 to consider In order to raise revenue* the true cause of colonial expansion in Yorubaland in this irt&. Lagos Protection extended to Ikorodu Newcastle's demand for an explanation of the remark concerning towns which had placed themselves under British protection draws attention to the other method used by colonial officials to Insure a steady revenue* namely* the Interference In mainland politics. The "towns" referred to by Freeman were not "towns" at all* but a single town* Ikorodu* the Remo terminus of the Ibanan route to the coast. Freeman's Interest In the Ibadan road had first been raised by McCoskry's explanation that It was the cause of the war and a possible route to the Interior that should carry a great volume of trade. His Interest had then been quickened by the extension of the IJaye war Into Remo territory* with the Egba siege of Makun and the resultant stoppage of a trade already severely limited because of the war. In May he therefore dispatched Glover on a mission to Ibadan to find out If the road was completely blocked* *93 to see If the Egba at Makun would talk peace,5^ and Incidentally to take supplies to the Ibadan missionaries, who were suffering considerable privation. But Ikorodu, misunderstanding the purpose of Glover's mission and thinking that he was going to Makun to help the Egba, refused permission for him to pass through. The chiefs were adamant, although Freeman himself went to see them. Returning to Lagos, Freeman warned that unless adequate apology was rendered he would blockade the water ap- promhes to the town and confiscate goods destined for their markets.55 Glover was sent to find an alternate eastern road to Ibadan, through IJebu Ode,56 a mission obviously doomed to failure. Not waiting for the apology, Freeman carried out his threat and blockaded the town at the beginning of June. His tactic quickly proved successful. The chiefs apologized and the Governor Imposed a small fine of forty ^Freeman to Capt. Williams, Lagos, Nay 23, 1862, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 55Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, June 4, 1862, F.O. 84/H75. ^^Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, June 5> 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. 494 bags of cowries for their Insolent behavior, on condition that the section of the road to Ibadan under Ikorodu con trol be opened. They readily agreed to do so, even promising to furnish Glover with a guide when he was ready to try again. But on June 25 they sent word that he should not go as the Egba had taken Makun and together with their Ode allies had established three war camps on the road.57 Temporarily baffled, Freeman's next move was tailor-made for him by Ikorodu. On July 8 a deputation of nine principal men of the town called on him and asked for protection as they expected an attaek from their Ode compatriots. Freeman complied willingly, Instruction Glover to take the Handy and protect the town.58 Later in the month he sent a message to the Egba Basorun cautioning him against attacking Ikorodu as It was now under British protection. On the other hand, speaking to Ibadan messen gers on July 22, he told them that the Lagos government 57x*mb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 8, 186t, C.M.S. CA2/03. 5®Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. 495 would give every support if they pressed their attacks through Remo country and took possession of the road all the way to Ikerodu. On reaching there, however, they were to go no further and cease aggressive action.39 This done, he sent Glover and a shipload of laborers to Ikorodu at the beginning of August to build a direct road from the shore of the lagoon to the town It self, a distance of about a mile. Reporting this mainland activity to the Colonial Office, Freeman wrote that the road would help him reinforce the town quickly In the event of an Egba attack and would bring under his control the starting point of the direct road to Ibadan. He went on to say that the prompt help he had given had Improved relations to such an extent that Ikorodu was "completely subservient to the wishes of the Government .... According to the missionary In charge of the C.M.S. establishment at Lagos, Ikorodu by early September had 59Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. f ir , Sept. 10, 1862, C.O. 147/1. 496 become "a sort of British dependency• Delightful though the arrangement may have been for Ikorodu, It was something less for the Awujale of IJebu, for It seemed to license the revolt of the town against his authority. The situation would have been difficult even If the Ikorodu people had been passive, but they were not. By the end of the year they were actively engaged In attacking Ode villages and making raids on the Egba at Makun. This worsened things, their attacks apparently being made under the blanket of Lagos Immunity. The situation was brought Into sharp relief on December 16 when an urgent message to the Governor brought news of an Imminent Egba attack on Ikorodu. Responding at once, Freeman embarked sixty men of the West India Regiment on the Handy and reached the town the following d a y . ^ 2 But the Egba had retired before he arrived, thus avoiding an armed clash.63 Freeman asked ^1Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Sept. 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. ^2Freeman to Glover, Lagos, Dec. 16, 1862, N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 63preeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Jan. 5, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 497 for Colonial Office approval of his actions, but this the Duke of Newcastle refused, merely acknowledging receipt of the report.64 But the very possibility of such an encounter Illustrates the dramatic change which had taken place in Egba-Lagos relations In the eighteen months since the death of consul Foote. Palma brought Into the Lagos Orbit While Freeman was thus Inaugurating a policy of intervention In Yoruba politics he was also bringing to fruition the movement begun by McCoskry In 1861 to close the Palma loophole by bringing Kosoko back to Lagos. The Foreign Office, finding no obvious and apparent reason for the move, asked Freeman In Maroh to Investigate the proposal but to take no action until he had received Instructions.^5 The Governor's reply was that Kosoko and his people should be broughfcsbaek to Lagos aa the trade they enjoyed at Palma would be brought with them. Further, "an 64London, Feb. 26, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 63March 7, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 496 arrangement might be made to levy our customs dues at Palma also.Having made the plea calculated to sway Colonial Office opinion In his favor. Freeman then con vened his Counoll and passed the Ordinance levying duties at all points within the territory of Lagos, Including Palma, That done, he and Glover left Lagos on June 17 to pay Kosoko a personal visit. The visit lasted several days, and according to Rev. Lamb, who was on friendly terms with the Governor, Freeman was very impressed by Kosoko*s sumptuous hospitality. But disregarding the ex-king1s Imposing supply of Imported wines, Freeman gave his consent for Kosoko and his followers to return to Lagos.^7 Having committed himself this far, contrary to Instructions, Freeman then had to convince his superiors that the step was essential. This he did In two dispatches dated July 68 m m 1, the second of which he marked Confidential. ^Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, June 7, 1 8 6 2, P.O. 84/1175. 67Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. ^In P.O. 84/1175. 499 The first was written as though the only human and charitable thing to do would be to accede to "the earnest and oft-repeated entreaty” of the exile to return to his native country. Thus, Kosoke was portrayed as an old man who wished to die at home; if the Egba and IJebu won the war he would be driven out of Epe; conversely, if Ibadan won, they too would sack his town. But the "Confidential" dispatch contained the meat of his argument. According to Freeman, the French had a treaty with Kosoko which gave the Regis company the privilege of trading at Palma and Epe; In addition, the French Commodore had assumed the title of "Protector of Epe." Freeman argued that If Kosoko were brought back to Lagos there would be little trade left for the French at the two places and they would probably withdraw their "protection." Also, as Palma was within the territory of Lagos, but had been given to Kosoko at the time he was expelled, his removal from therewwould return It to Lagos jurisdiction. In this way any French ambitions in the eastern lagoon would be thwarted while a significant loophole in the Lagos customs system would be removed. 500 The suggestion that there existed a French protectorate at Epe can only be described as a figment of Freeman's Imagination, designed to convince Downing Street of the necessity of agreeing with his plans for Kosoko. Kosoko certainly had a commercial treaty with France, as did many coastal ohlefs, but far from exercising any protection, the French Commodore had given assurances In early l8 6l that his government fully recognized a British "protectorate" In the Lagos district.69 Equally erroneous was Freeman's statement that Palma was within Lagos territory and had been given to Kosoko when he was removed from the Lagos throne. Kosoko had fled to Epe at the time of the "reduction" of Lagos and had assumed control of the port of Palma after that. This situation had been recognized In Campbell's treaty with Kosoko, made In 1854.7° Freeman's prevarications which, It should be remembered, were made at a time when his young administra tion was under considerable financial strain, proved ^Foote to Russell, Lagos, Feb. 9, 1861, F.O. 84/11 501 unnecessary. Convinced by the revenue argument he had put forward, Newcastle authorized Kosoko*s return on July 71 23. That In hand, Freeman moved swiftly. Kosoko and a large retinue arrived on the Island on September 16, took up residence In a house provided by the Governor, and Freeman settled back to reap the benefits of the substantial lncremont of trade Lagos was bound to enjoy. In gratitude, he urged upon the Duke of Newcastle the obligation of providing for Kosoko*s maintenance now that he no longer enjoyed his customs receipts at Palma. A modest sum of j£400 annually would be sufficient to prevent him from spending his declining years In poverty, he thought.73 The move was accomplished without any overt manifestation of dissatisfaction In Lagos, much to Freeman's relief, who had arranged that the Handy stand by 71In C.O. 420/2. 72Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Oct. 8, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/03. 73LagOB, Oct. 6, 1862, C.O. 147/1. 502 until everything was q u i e t .74 Docemo positively refused to meet his cousin* however* and their mutual dislike was not lessened even when Freeman brought the two together and made them shake hands .75 Nor was the dislike of the Colon ial Office lessened regarding Freeman's acquisition of Palma* despite the arguments he presented to show the legitimacy of Lagos claims. It was unhappy with all the Governor's forward actions and reminded him that British policy was designed to limit Jurisdiction within the narrowest limits compatible with the object of the colony* viz.* "the suppression of the Slave Trade."76 Degeneration of Lagos-Abeokuta Relations If the Governor's policies were disliked In London they were execrated In Abeokuta* seeming as they did to be directed specifically against the Bgba. Hoping that the Governor would overturn McCoskry's policies and re-introduce an era of good feeling In their relations 7^Freeman to Glover* Lagos* Sept. 13* 1862* N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 75Lanb to C.M.S.* Lagos* Jan.9* 1863* C.M.S.CA2/03. 7%ewcastle to Freeman* London* Dec. 1* 1 8 6 2, C.O. 147/1. 503 with Lagoa, the Egba had instead been confronted by an active implementation of the hated policies, by an extension of Lagos jurisdiction, by an apparent determina tion to assist their enemies by forcing a road to Ibadan and by giving military assistance to their Remo antagon ists at Ikorodu. Far from Lagos being their own port, it was now in the hands of an alien and unfriendly power which was extending its control further and further along the very coast it had been Egba policy for thirty years to dominate. To make matters worse, there had been a small but aggravating number of domestic slaves absconding from Abeokuta and seeking santuary in the British possession. As McCoskry himself sat on the Slave Court and was giving free papers to the runaways, this situation was not alleviated one whit. Nor was It helped by the practice adopted by the Egba in 1862 of kidnaping Lagos people in retaliation for the slaves redeeming themselves before the Court.77 ^Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, June Aug. 8, 1862, F.O. 84/H75. 504 Yet another factor should be considered In the deteriorating relations between the Egba and Freeman's administration, a factor connected with the changes in the structure of political power which were taking place at Abeokuta. Naturally enough, the war had given the military Ologun more voice in Egba councils, but this process had been accelerated in l8 6l by the deaths of the chiefs Ogubonna and Sokenu, old men to be sure, but greatly valued for their wisdom and sage advice. By mid- 1862 the Egba government was being described as rotten to the core, controlled by the war party, and in danger of imminent colapse.78 But even this condition worsened in September when the Alake died. True, he had been weak and largely ineffectual, yet nevertheless he had represented the voice of the civil Ogbonl. His successor was the aging Baaorun Somoye, not as Alake. but merely as senior chief, a nominal position he was to retain until death claimed him in 1868. This resulted in the further attrition of civil power as Somoye was totally unfit even for his 78wood to Venn, Abeokuta, July 4, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/096. 505 empty position. All In all, the missionaries summed up the ensuing situation by saying that Abeokuta was now bereft of olvll government; the war-hawks were In complete command.79 The changing climate at Abeokuta was reflected In a variety of ways. One was a marked lessening of respect for the missionaries, manifested by Increasingly frequent Insults and taunts; another was that distrust of white men was openly expressed along with the opinion that Abeokuta had made a mistake In ever accepting missionaries as they were the forerunners of foreign domination. 8° While Townsend Insisted that the mission was not losing Influence and that the Alake's death had not affected his position,81 his colleague Wood explained matters differ ently. The older chiefs had been replaced by a new 79tfood to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 4, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/096; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 2, 1 8 6 2, C.M.S. CA2/0 8 5. 8oBuhler, Journal. Abeokuta, Jem.-July, 1862, p. 4, C.M.S. CA2/024; Harrison to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 21, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/065; H. Robbln to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 7, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/080• 8lTownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 6, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/085. 506 generation of young and ambitious men, he said, and because the war was generally popular and attainment of Influential position depended upon their standing In the community, these younger leaders never sought the advice of the missionaries. It seems apparent, then, that one of the results of the new conditions at Abeokuta was a growing distrust of Europeans and a loss of missionary Influence. But In Its relations with Lagos, a more dangerous manifestation appeared following the death of the Alake. This was a wave of robberies carried out against traders traveling between Abeokuta and Lagos by river, partly the work of warriors In the camp at Makun— only a few hours distance overland from the Ogun. McCoskry was one of the sufferers, losing In this way several boat loads of goods,®3 But undisciplined warrloms were not the only source of trouble. The displaced Parakoyl saw In this period of lawlessness an opportunity to reassert their old rights on the river and ®2tfood to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 6, 1863, C.M.S. CA^/096. ®?Harrlson to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 30, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/045. 507 If possible break the Saro traders who had taken over the management of Abeokuta commercial affairs. Consequently, those who suffered most from the robberies were the Saros who had Joined together as the Abeokuta Commercial Association.8^ in the face of this double danger it became unsafe to use the river and trade with Lagos suffered as a consequence. On Freeman's demand, the Basorun apologized for the robberies and promised to punish the culprits and make restitution. But far from doing so a fresh wave of Incidents took place and«^2 ,0 0 0 worth of goods were stolen In one week.^3 At this, Freeman sent a Proclamation to Abeokuta on November 14 Instructing all persons claiming British protection to leave the town forthwith; anyone falling to do so would forfeit their right to such protection. The reason for this step, the Proclamation read, was that British life and property were being disregarded by the Egba and they had made no redress. To ^^Freeman to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 20, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. ®3preeman to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 20, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. 508 avoid future recurrence, British subjects and their property were to leave In a covering letter to the Abeokuta Commercial Association the Qovemor complained of receiving only opposition from the British residents of the town. There can be no doubt that the Proclamation was aimed specifically at the missionaries, although theoretically It applied to the numerous Immigrants from Sierra Leone. As Freeman explained to the Foreign Office, the with drawal of Europeans from Abeokuta would result In the Immediate collapse of Egba resistance to his policies. 8 8 It Is Indeed possible that the Governor had further considerations In mind In Issuing the Proclamation, for In the same letter he told Lord Russell of his worries concerning the presence of the Egba at Makun, the town comnanding the road to Ibadan and also conveniently located to stop traffic on the Ogun. "Sooner or later we shall be forced Into hostilities with them," 86In C.M.S. CA2/011. 87Lagos, Nov. 14, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/09. Aft Lagos, Nov. 20, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 509 he wrote, and Makun ought not to be left In their hands. So perhaps Freeman was toying with the Idea of a campaign to dislodge the Egba grip on communications with the Interior, but thought It wise to first remove the Europeans from Abeokuta. Townsend suspected such a plan.90 In either event his plan miscarried. The two or three European merchants left promptly but the missionaries refused to obey a "mere proclamation"91 With some Justification the Governor fulminated against this strengthening of Egba opposition by such an open defiance of Instructions. Had all the white men left Abeokuta the Egba would have given In Immediately, he wrote, "but when they see that all my words and actions are utterly disre garded by the polltlce-mlsslonary agents, they are also apt to pay little attention to them."92 8 9Lagos, Nov. 2 0, 1862, P.O. 84/H75. 9C^ownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, March 5. 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/O8 5. SH-Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Dec. 2, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/0 8 5. 92Freeman to Russell, Lagos, Nov. 20, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. 510 While the Foreign Office fully supported Freeman's Proclamation and hoped that it would obtain redress for the robberies,93 the Church Missionary Society took a completely different view. After weighing the circumstances the Society agreed that the mission aries had acted correctly in refusing to leave, and Venn asked for more information so that ''measures may be adopted to prevent such attempted Interference with the Mission In times to come. He obviously had in mind some form of political action designed to preclude British offlcals from attempting to Impose their will in non-Britlsh areas. Missionary Politics In London In truth, 1862 was turning out to be an exception ally active year for the Society In the Whitehall corridors of power. There had been the debacle of vice- consul Taylor which had kept Venn and hlB political 93RuBsell to Freeman, Foreign Office, Feb. 6, 1863, C.O. 147/5. ^**Venn to Townsend, London, Jan. 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 511 friends In frequent but unavailing contact with Lords Palmerston, Russell and Newcastle. And even before the news of Taylor's rejection had reached England the Society was preparing for a parliamentary denouement of the entire Lagos situation. This had taken place In June when the Supply Bill was being debated., Sir Francis Baring being the spokesman for the missionary party, which by now was thoroughly disgruntled at the unfavorable outcome of the cession. Rising to propose that the entire estimate for the Lagos establishment be eliminated, Baring gave a brief history of the events leading to the removal of Kosoko, Akltoye's treaty and Docemo's succession. The cession was unwar ranted, Immoral and Illegal, he charged, and It was sheer nonsense that the vile deed be referred to as a "cession," the real truth being that Lagos was confiscated by force of arms. Nr. Layard, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, supporting the appropriation, gave an entirely different story, of course, and gently reminded the House that It was Baring, as First Lord of the Admiralty, who had given the Instructions for the original British 512 Intervention at Lagos In 1 8 5 1 .9 5 Baring's motion failed, as It was known It would, but he spoke longer than all the other speakers combined and had served the useful pur pose, according to Venn, of airing the matter before Parliament and the public. Venn hoped that the Lagos administration would be reformed as a result.96 A short time later Baring sought to embarrass the Colonial Office by raising In the House the question of slavery at Lagos, but the next major political campaign mounted by the Society concerned the Christian prisoners taken by Glele at Xsaga and the threat of another attack on Abeokuta. A number of gentlemen had waited upon the Prime Minister soon after news of the destruction of Isaga had reached London, but Venn had not joined them In case It would appear, In his words, that the Society was asking for "the Blfle to help the Bible•" Palmerston promised to try to obtain the release of the prisoners 95Parl. Debates. CLXVII (1862), 502-08. 96Venn to Lamb, London, June 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 513 "and to make the future more assured as regards Dahomey. However, fresh news of the Christian captives reached Salisbury Square In early October, A naval officer had learned that the prisoners had been executed, that the C.M.S. agent, Doherty, had been crucified and that Glele was preparing for a November attack on Abeokuta. On receiving this Information Commander Perry wrote to Freeman Immediately, and when at Freetown shortly after wards gave a copy of the letter to one of the missionaries, who forwarded it to V e n n . 98 A deputation from the Soolety called at the Foreign Office, but on receiving little comfort decided upon a different tactic, the well-tried appeal to public opinion. Informing the Yoruba missionaries of the step being taken, the Society said that this was by far the best way to prod the Government as It was not "the part of a Missionary Society to urge upon the Authorities an armed 97venn to Townsend, London, July 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 98perry to Freeman, H.M.S. Griffin, Little Popo, Aug. 6, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/M5. 514 Intervention for the protection of missionaries."" But to belle these words a letter was sent simultaneously to the new Commodore of the Squadron, a close friend of Venn, Captain Eardley Wllmot. Venn wrote that he would not be asking for armed Intervention If It was Just to protect the missionaries; but the threatened attack on Abeokuta was an out-and-out slave-hunting expedition, was In defiance of Great Britain and an outrage to humanity. So would Wllmot please send a man-of-war to Whydah and see If Glele could be turned back by a show of strength?1^0 By this time Commander Perry's letter had been released to the press and a pamphlet published on the threatening situation which pointed out the number of missionaries at Abeokuta and Its Christian population. It closed by calling for united prayer to restrain Dahomey and the preservation of the missionaries and their flocks so that "the chiefs of Abeokuta . . . may glorify this Land of Christians•" Of course, the pamphlet concluded; "London, Oot. 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA3/L3. lOOLondon, Oct. 22, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 515 "The petitions to be urged are obvious." 1 0 1 The response was Immediate and overwhelming. Letters and petitions from Individuals, churches and other Interested groups reached the Foreign and Colonial Offices in a torrent, Including one from Townsend's brother In Exeter, but the official response was something less than the Society had hoped. Whitehall Opinion True, the Prime Minister expressed his anxiety about Abeokuta to one of the Society's Vice-Presidents on November 21 and gave his opinion that the best way of defending It would be to bring Glele to terms at Whydah. But he also maintained that the Egba should submit to Lagos arbitration In the Ijaye war. 1 0 2 This proved to be the decisive factor In the formulation of official policy, a fact Illustrated by an exchange of notes between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in October. 101 In P.O. 84/H93. 102yenn to Townsend, London, Nov. 23, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 516 In response to the letters concerning the danger to which the missionaries and Christians were exposed at Abeokuta, the Colonial Office Inquired from the Slave Trade Department what means were being employed to defend the town, if any, and admitted that the Colonial Office had done nothing in the matter.Replying, Nr, Vylde said that the Foreign Office had done nothing, either, as there was no means of giving effectual aid "even if we wished to do so.” He had told the Church Missionary Society that the best thing to do would be to Instruct the missionaries to retire to Lagos in the event of Imminent danger. The Society did not like the advice, he continued, but it would show the Egba that after declining a vice- consul and refusing to accept LagoB arbitration in the IJaye war, they could not ask for British help and expect it to be forthcoming Immediately. On the other hand, Wylde informed his confrere, if it really appeared that Dahomey was going to take the town, we would do what we could to prevent so disastrous a result, because as our object is to civilize Africa, it would be a great blow to have all that we have hitherto done utterly destroyed .... But I think 1030ct. 28, 1862, P.O. 84/1193. 517 It would not be bad policy to make use of the Dahomlan threats as a lever to assist our own policy.10^ A Colonial Office memorandum then admitted that the problem was perplexing as "the missionary party will probably cry out If we do not undertake to fight for them at Abeokuta,"105 But Colonial Office was not greatly Interested In civilizing Africa, and as the Duke of Newcastle privately observed, "The missionaries and their friends In England are too ready to Involve us In any of their wretched African weirs if they can."^0^ Consequently, Townsend1s brother was Informed that no steps were being taken to defend Abeokuta, "which is a place lying beyond the British dominions.wl°7 with Sir Francis Baring and others raising embarrassing questions about slavery at Lagos; with the Island*s treasury constantly on the verge of bankruptcy; with an aggressive governor seemingly bent on Increasing his Jurisdiction while avoiding Instructions 10i*Wylde to Sir George Barrow, Foreign Office, Oct, 31, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 105No v . 3, 1862, C.O. 147/2. lO^Memorandum, Nov- 1862, C.O. 147/2. 10?London, Nov. 6, 1862, C.O. 147/2. 518 to submit a map with the boundaries of the colony precisely delineated;10® and now with pressure being exerted to Involve Great Britain In the defense of an Interior town, small wonder that the Duke of Newcastle glumly observed that the Foreign Office should have looked Into the possible results of the Lagos cession much more thoroughly before It "rendered Inevitable that hasty measure."109 The Foreign Office followed a like policy of leaving Abeokuta to Its own devices. Freeman had asked permission to Impose a blockade on the town but In the face of the Dahomey threat Hussell declined to authorize a step which would deprive the Egba of armaments, at any rate "for the present.” On the other hand, Freeman was Instructed to tell the Egba that If they did not make reparations for the robberies the British Government would extract them "sooner or later." Freeman was also to con sult with Commodore Wllmot regarding measures short of actual hostilities which would bring the Egba to reason. 108 J - w Preeman to Commodore Edmonstone, Lagos, Aug. 1 1862, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 109Memorandum, [Nov. 18], 1862, C.O, 147/1. 519 But he was not to carry out any such measures without obtaining prior approval, 1 1 0 On this unhappy note the year drew to a close. But not quite. In December there was an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate peace between the Egba and Ibadan, made principally by J, P. L. Davies, the Saro businessman from Lagos, but with the assistance of Revs. Lamb and Buhler, who were anxious to get supplies to the mission aries at Ibadan. The emissaries visited Abeokuta, Oyo, Ibadan, and met the Egba war chiefs from the camp at Makun; they made no progress, however. Both sides appear ed to want peace but neither would make the first definite proposals, being unwilling to exhibit such a mark of weakness. In any case, there was no foundation for negotiation. The Egba would not consider giving up Makun and their control over Ibadan access to the coast, for to do so would tip the scales Irretrievably In favor of Ibadan's bid to win the Yoruba hegemony. The Ibadan, on the other hand, strengthened by Lagos support of their 110Russell to Freeman, Foreign Office, Oct. 23, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 520 cause, would not negotiate on any other basis,111 In either event, a promise by the three men to resume the effort in early 1863 was not kept, partly owing to the difficulty of traversing the war-torn country and partly due to Freeman's indifference to a project in which he did not play the vital part.112 So the year closed on a note of frustration. The war was ending its third year, trade continued to deteriorate and relations between Abeokuta and Lagos con tinued to grow worse. The attempts by the colonial authority to remedy these conditions and secure an adequate income for administration— an object fast becoming the colony's raison d'etre— constitute the principal themes of the following year. But 1 8 6 3 began with an even sharper deterioration of relations between the Imperial factor and the Egba. 111Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Dec. 2, 1862, C.M.S. CA2/085; Roper to Venn, Ibadan, March 1 7, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/081. 11?Buhler to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 5# 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/024; Davies to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 8, March 9, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA3/0 3 3J Lamb to Venn, Lagos, Jan. 9> March 9, 1363, C.M.S. CA2/03. Summary 521 Hhlle the C.M.S. had quarreled with official representatives on previous occasions, most noticeably with consul Campbell In 1854-55, the Society had always been remarkably successful In Its dealings with the Imperial factor. Its views had been accepted and Its policies adopted, but when the missionaries found them selves facing a much stronger representative, In the person of a Governor, trouble developed at once. It had been hoped that Freeman would repair the damage done by McCoskry to relations with the Egba, but far from so doing, he accepted McCoskry' s opinions whole heartedly. In particular, he agreed with him that the continuing war, moved to Remo country after the fall of IJaye, was Indeed being waged by the Egba and Ijebu In defence of their commercial positions. From this mistaken premise, relations between Lagos and Abeokuta went from bad to worse. From the Egba-mlssionary point of view, the enhanced power of the Imperial factor was proving catas trophic. Initially, it had meant the loss of Lagos, but no sooner had the Governor taken up his duties when the 522 colony started on an Inexorable process of expansion. Neither understanding nor sympathizing with the reasons that forced the colonial settlement to exert Its paramountcy over the coastal regions that for thirty years they had sought to master, the Egba and their missionary allies watched with apprehension the engulfment of Palma, Lekkl, Badagry, and Ikorodu. It was small wonder that the proposal to station a British consul In their midst met with opposition. And after that, the threat to blockade Abeokuta and the Proclamation designed to remove European Influence did nothing to Induce a more harmonious relation ship. The point to which conditions had deteriorated was Illustrated at the end of 1 8 6 2 when an armed clash with British troops at Ikorodu was only averted by the with drawal of the Egba. Compounding the difficulties were the changes taking place at Abeokuta. Worsening relations with Lagos produced the Inevitable aftermath of an anti-European feeling, and there was a corresponding loss of missionary Influence. Even more serious, the warrior caste was In the ascendency while the Parakoyl was attempting to re assert Its traditional commercial prerogatives. These 523 conditions were ultimately manifested in a series of robberies that annoyed the Governor even further and caused him to move toward a coercive policy. But although Freeman did not realize It, his efforts were resulting in the war being prolonged. Because of his anti-Egba attitude, Ibadan was becoming convinced that the much-desired object of an Independent coastal route could be obtained with Lagos support. On the other hand, the Egba could never agree to such an acquisition, one that would threaten their very existence. While the missionaries were still behind them there was always the chance that British Influence would again be exerted on their behalf. Thus, the Intrusion of the imperial factor in mainland affairs, merely to promote peace, served Instead to prolong the Yoruba political struggle as both sides recognized it as decisive. CHAPTER IX THB EXPANSION OF LAGOS Blockade of Abeokuta In the eyes of the Governor, the Egba nust certainly have appeared to be a great nuisance. Under their control was the best water route to the Interior while the best overland routes also lay through Egba and Ijebu territory. This near-nonopoly was bad enough, but at the sane tine they appeared bent on controlling the alternate route to the Interior and Its untapped markets, or at least they were detemlned to deny Its unhindered use to Ibadan. To retain their privileges the Egba had enbarked on aggressive war which served only to disrupt oonnerolal Intercourse throughout the country and deny the colony Its sorely-needed Income. Seenlngly responsible for all the Ills which beset Yorubal&nd, Egba control of the channels of trade would alone have been sufficient to condenn then In the eyes of 524 525 the Han responsible for governing a colony and charged with doing so at little or no cost to British taxpayers* But there were other aggravations. They refused to accept a consul and continued to be guided by "evil" European councilors who themselves blatantly refused to obey Instructions; they spumed his advice about stopping their unnecessary wars and rejected his attempts to mediate; they had robbed goods bound for the Niger expedition and had failed to make compensation; similarly, they had not made good the river robbert.es of late 1862; to make matters worse, they were now threatening Ikorodu, a town under his protection* By the beginning of 1 8 6 3 their three war camps on the Ogun had effectively stopped com merce on the river while the camps on the Ibadan road blocked that route* In addition, the war camp at Makun was perilously close to Lagos Itself, and with the Egba there was no telling what wild scheme might be attempted* Indeed, If the Governor had but known, the principal architect of Egba policy was beginning the new year by explaining to his superior the grounds that existed to 526 Justify an Kgba attack on Lagos*1 The Governor1s opinions were all subjective, dictated as they were by the necessities of his position. They were certainly open to argument, but that made them no less flxm nor his responsibilities less real. Conse quently, It Is not difficult to understand why he disregarded his Instructions and Imposed a strict blockade on Abeokuta, to be enforced along the coast from Porto Novo to Palma and to go Into effect on January 14, He had Indeed consulted the Cmamodore, but Wllmot had advised against the step because of the anticipated Dahomey attack.2 But Wllmot was known to be a great friend of the missionaries, and having departed on & mission to Glele his advice was disregarded. So was Russell's Injunction against Inaugurating hostile measures against the Kgba without prior approval from London.3 ^Townsend to Yenn, Abeokuta, Jan. 5, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/085. ^Freeman to Russell, Lagos, Dec. 6, 1862, P.O. 84/1175. - 3Russell to Freeman, Foreign Office, Oct. 23, 1862, F.O. 84/1175. 527 Part of Freeman's Intention waa to exact repara tion for all the robberies; but even more Important, he hoped to force the Kgba evacuation of Makun and thus open a road to the Interior.4 In face of the danger from the Fon, he anticipated that the Kgba would quickly bow to his demands In order to safeguard their ammunition supplies. Indeed, an Abeokuta missionary visiting Lagos In January detected amongst colonial offlolals a hope that the Kgba would be severely beaten by the Fon.5 Be that as It may, Freeman took no notice of messages sent down to Lagos promising to make restitution for the robberies.^ It was the read and Its revenue that he wanted, not the payment of old debts. Taking advantage of a visit to Lagos by Samuel Crowther, Freeman pressed him Into service as an emissary te Abeokuta at the beginning of February. His demands i *Freeman to Russell, Lagos, Jan. 3, 1863, C.O. 147/5. ^Harrison te Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 5* 1863, C.M.S. CA 2/045. ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 4, I863, C.M.S. CA2/O85; Lamb to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 6, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/03. 528 rcsud.nod the iut^ howertr, and Towns and at first refused to accompany Crowther to the Basorun. fooling "the utter uaoloaanoaa of It as I hays no oonfldonoo In the Oovernor, believing It to bo bis ain to hunblo tbls place political ly ." But realising that his refusal could brand hln as being pro-war, Townsend changed his mind and the three non discussed the Governor's denands. Although there would hare been little difficulty In reaching an aocon- ■odatlon about the robberies, the Basorun regarded the denand to quit Makun as protff positive of Preenan's enaltyj why were the Ibadan not required to do the sane?? Crowther/s Intercession proved fruitless, and with the blockade now being enforced as severely by the Xgba as against then, Preenan realised that he was bargaining fron a position of weakness rather than strength. He thereupon wrote to Abeokuta late In Pebruary apologising for the enbargo, and offering to renove It if they would nake restltqtltlon for the robberies. Nothing was nentloned about Makun. Townsend "persuaded the Basorun to return a civil answer," In fact he wrote It hlnself, saying that the ?Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Peb. 4, 1863, C.M.S. CA 3/O85. 529 Dahomey natter waa ao pressing that consideration of the propoaal had to be postponed until the danger had passed That danger paaaed on March 23, when the Dahoney arny deoanped fron the weat bank of the Ogun after being within alght of Abeokuta for alxteen days. Christians throughout the world rejoiced at the deliverance, consid ering It the mlraole they had been praying for since the Society published Its pamphlet the previous October.9 On the other hand, the Xgba non-Chrlstlana attributed the victory to their own gods while the war chiefs claimed that the Pon were afraid of their military prowess. An equally cogent explanation for the abrupt departure of the enemy was that Olele had supposedly received a visitation from the spirit of a long-departed ancestor, who advised him not to attack but to wait for one more year when victory would be assured. Overjoyed, he struck camp and ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, March 5, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/085. ^Church Missionary Society, Church Missionary Intelligencer (1863), p. 6 7; Proceedings ef the C.M.S. (1863), P. 32; (1864), pp. 5 5 ^ 530 returned to Abomey to prepare for the long-awaited 10 vengeance. The approach of the Dahomey army to Abeokuta doea not account for the remarkably conciliatory approach made by Freeman to the Egba, completely reversing hla prior insistence that Makun be evacuated and lamely offering to lift the blockade if the robberies were made good. He even retreated from this position. After the Fon had left, Townsend asked Freeman how much he estimated the Egba to owe for their robberies, to which Freeman replied that as he believed they would discharge the obligation he was lifting the blockage as an earnest of his good faith. This he did on April 6.11 Inasmuch as this was done without even a token payment being made, while his previous Insistence that Makun be given up was dropped completely, this was an extraordinary reversal from the position he had been main taining in January and February. The explanation lies 10Edeuard Dunglas, "Deuxkeme Attaque des Dahom£ens contre Abeokuta," Etudes Dahomeennes (Porto Movo, 1948), pp. 48-9• 11Townaend to Freeman, Abeokuta, March 28, 1863; Freeman to Townsend, Lagos, April L44, 1862, C.O. 147/5. 531 partly In the Governor's financial predicament. Pal* kernels are harvested in the Spring of the year and if the blockade continued they would undoubtedly have been left to rot on the trees and Lagos condemned to another year of poor trade and an empty exchequer. For although the customs duties at Lagos had been reorganised in January, taxing imports only, 1 2 the laok of palm oil for export would have resulted In a corresponding dearth of Imports and a loss of revenue. As usual, the Governor's policy was framed by his financial position and the almost stagnant condition of Lagos commerce. The French on the Coast In this case, however, revenue was not the only consideration. France now entered the picture as a possi ble colonial rival, and in fact was partly responsible for the vast increase of colonial activity on the mainland which took place in 1 8 6 3. The actions of the French at 12Hlgh duties were placed on spirits, tobaoco and guns, and a 3£ tax levied on all other imports, except a few duty-free goods. Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Jan. 8, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 532 Porto Eovo In January and February should now be consider ed In light of Freeman*s new friendliness for the Egba. There had not been much official Frenoh Interest In that part of the ooast In reoent years. A survey had been carried out by Lieutenant Bouet In the l840*s, forts built and a refueling depot for the Frenoh anti-slave squadron established at Gabon. A treaty of friendship was then signed with Gheso In I851 dealing with the customs to be paid by Regis at Whydah,this serving as a pattern for similar agreements with other coastal rulers. Then there had been the unsuccessful "free emigration" episode of the late 1850*a; but what official Interest there was remained centered In the groundnuts areas north of the Qold Coast1* * and In the plans of the doughty Governor Faldeherbe to extend Frenoh Influence In the western Sudan. However, the Roman Catholic Church had established a Seminary of African Missions at Lyons In 1856, which 1^Etudes Dahoneenees. IX (1953)* PP. 11-12. ^C. W. Mewbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and AdJa-Speaklng Peoples of South-Western Mlgerla. Southern Dahomey and Togo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 68 533 four years later organised the vicariate apostolic of Dthcmoy, extending from the Volta to the Niger. Father Borghere, an Italian, was the first Superior of the Mission and with a companion arrived at Whydah in April, l86l. Unlike his C.M.S. counterparts, Borghere claimed to be a missionary pure and simple: ”0n salt, au Dahomey, quo nous ne somnes nl des agents oomnerolaux venus pour falre fortunes, nl des emlssalres polltlques enveyes pour explorer le pays afln d'en preparer la conquete, comma on accuse d'aglr les protestants anglais."1- * Regardless of his disclaimer, French Interest had been qulokening and quickened even moreiln July, 1862, when Sodjl formally offered Forte Novo te Napoleon III, promis ing to end the slave trade and allow French colonists to settle on his lands What prompted the offer Is net known. It Is possible that Rlgls agents could have had a hand In persuading him, fearing that the British enclave at Lagos would extend Itself to Include Porto Novo. The naval 1^Annales. XXXIV (1862), p. 209, In C. F. droves, The Planting of Christianity In Africa (London: Lutter- worth Press, 19^-5^), II, p. 232. ^■^Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 68. 534 bombardment he suffered at the hands of consul Foote In 1861 eould also have turned Sodjl's thoughts to the possi bility of Xuropean protection, while Freeman's suggestion of occupying two hundred miles of coast was an open secret and undoubtedly pressed upon him heavily. But whatever the cause, the request resulted In the Hlgls agent at Lagos, Marius Daumas, being appointed French consul at Forto Move In late 1862. Daumas had an uncomfortable apprehension of what the extension of Lagos jurisdiction would entail, for he occupied himself while waiting to remove from Lagos to Porto Novo by complaining to Freeman and the Colonial Office of the 1863 tariff structure which seemed designed to keep out Frenoh imports,1? namely, the specific taxes on brandy, wine, cordials, rum, tobacco and cigars. Once Installed at Porto Novo he took steps to Insure that his company would not again be placed In such an unfavorable position by agreeing te pay Sodjl an annual grant of^320 In lieu of oustoms. On behalf of France he then concluded a treaty of friendship *4th Sodjl and on February 23 ■ * ■ 7 Jan. 10, 12, Feb. 7, !863, C.O. 420/1 535 witnessed a formal request for Frenoh protection signed by eight of the principal Brasilian traders of Porto Novo, Including the slaver Joachim de Carvalhe.1® It was not by chance that the request was made at this time. Visiting Porto Novo was Baron Dldelot, Rear- Admiral In command of the West African naval division, who notified Freeman officially that following Sodjl*s appli cation to Louis Napolen and a further appeal made to himself directly, "j'al formellement acoeptl le 26 fevrler / *tlQ dernier, le Protectorat de ces terrltotres .... Dldelot was not greatly enthusiastic about Daumas* forward policy, while the French Minister of Marine considered the affair a commercial legerdemain engineered by the consul. Nevertheless, he advised the Qual D'Orsay that the protectorate should not be rejected as It might prove a useful pawn In negotiations with England, nafln d'arrlver a etab Hr une sorte de drolte International ^■^Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 68 ^Lagos, March 1, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 536 qui garantlsse tous lea lnterets engages dans le Oolfe de Benin.1,20 The Yovuba missionaries and Commodore Wllmot regarded the coup as an indletment of British policy that had foroed Sodjl to seek proteotlon from the aggressions of colonial officials.21 Of course, Freeman did not sub scribe to this, merely reporting that he enjoyed a cordial relationship with Dldelot and It had been decided between them not to Interfere "with the march of affairs at the **22 points occupied by the other .... This generosity had a fine sound on paper, but as the practical men at the Colonial Office pointed out, what would happen to the Lagos revenue If the French decided to make Porto Novo a free port or Imposed only trifling duties? 20Chasseloup-Laubat to Dreuyn de Lhuys, Paris, April 20, 1863, Ministers des Affaires Estrangeres, Afrique/51, in Newbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 69. 21Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, March 5* 1863* C.M.S. CA2/085j Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, March 9, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/ 03; Wllmot to Wylde, H.M.8. Rattlesnake. Lagos, May 5* 1863, F.O. 84/1213* 22Freaman to Newcastle, Lagos, March 8, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 23colonlal office to Foreign Office, April 24, 1863, C.O. 420/1. 537 There can be no doubt that the Governor was driven by the sane anxiety, especially as Porto Novo had proved to be the colony's most dependable supplier and source of revenue since McCoskry's 1861 treaty with Sodjl, But what was to happen If the Frenoh decided to by-pass Lagos completely and use the Cotenou entrance to the lagoon? And what of the legitimate Porto Novo claims at Badagry? Would France now Insist that Sodjl's territory Include that port also? In view of these possibilities, particularly that Porto Novo customs would radically undercut the Lagos level, Freeman by late February could no longer Indulge himself by antagonizing the Egba with his blockade. It was painfully clear that there must come a point when the Egba, In disgust, would decide that the longer overland trek to Porto Novo, with lower-taxed goods available at journey's end, was preferable to the easier water route to Lagos, Its high tariffs and constant trouble with the Governor. This, as muhh as the revenue he was already losing, was the consideration which prodded Freeman to a conciliatory policy toward the Egba and his decision to lift the blockade• 538 Occupation of Palma Revenue and the presence of Admiral Didelot were also the factors which In February and March pushed Freeman Into a further extension of Lagos Jurisdiction. This came as a result of Kosoko's recent return to Lagos, when to Freeman's chagrin, Kosoko's war chief, Pellu, refused to accompany his master. Instead, he opted to remain at Epe and assume Kosoko's old position. This was Immaterial to the Governor, at least until Pellu decided to assume Kosoko's old prerogative of using Palma as his trading port. He refused to return to Lagos, encouraged by the French merchants at Palma, whom' he exempted from duties, levying his taxes only on the African traders who dealt with them.2* * By early January Freeman was complaining of the customs gap at Palma and Informing the Colonial Office that he could no longer delay placing a customs house there. At the same time he asked for his garrison to be doubled, which would allow him to station troops at Palma, Ikerodu and Badagry and Z^Russell to Baron Gros (French Ambassador), London, June 29, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 539 thereby establish the eastern, northern and western frontiers of the colony.25 He made his move at the beginning of February when Major Leveson, the Colonial Secretary and second-in- command of the colony, was sent with a detachment of House polloe to take Palma and establish a customs station. The protests of the Rlgls factor at this high-handed action came to nought with the presence of H.M.S. Ranger and the coup was accomplished with little difficulty. To throw a cloak of legitimacy over his proceedings the Governor then bade Kosoko make his mark on a document which stated that when he had been King of Lagos his territory had extended eastward as far as Palma and Lekkl. On being expelled, "l claimed these ports as my ports of trade by right of my former ownership. • . • Having now left Kpe and returned to Lagos ... I lay no further claim to the ports of Palma and Lekkl, which consequently revert to the Lagos Government. 25Lagos, Jan. 6, 1863, C.O. 1*7/3. 26Lagos, Feb. 7, 1863, in C.O. 1*7/3. 540 Armed with this and ths fait accompli at Palma, Freeman and the Investigator then went to Epe on February 16 to treat with Pellu, But the ehlef proved obdurate; he refused even to board the gunboat and fighting broke out following fruitless negotiation. The town was bombarded and left burning, the market at Ejerln being dealt a similar blow beoause of Its importance to Epe.27 Having accomplished his primary purpose of plugging the customs gap at Palma, Freeman might have been contdnt at this point to let matters rest, although he was aware that the French merchants at Epe and Palma were still urging Pellu to resist his authority. But at this moment he heard that Admiral Dldelot was expected, whose presence would be sure to complicate mattems.2^ Taking advantage of the arrival of troops of the 3rd West India Regiment, to relieve the garrison, Freeman returned to Epe In strength on March 12 and completed the work of destruction. This time Pellu asked for peace and formally bound himself 27Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Feb. 26, 1863, C.O, 147/3; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, March 9, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/03. 28preeman to M.wca.tle, Lagoi, Fob. 26, 1863, C.O. 1*7/3. 5*1 to reoognlxe the Lagoa government while acknowledging hlmaelf to hare no claim to either Kpa or Palma.29 Freeman* a Conception of Lagoa Territory Freeman*a occupation of Palaa brought within tho roalsa of poaalblllty tho annual aatlnatas ho had already submitted to tho Colonial Offloe. He anticipated a revenue o f 16,000 for the year, but to reaoh thla amount, he pointed out, it waa vital that Faina and Badagry be retained.3° Varloua memoranda at the Colonial Offloe noted that diapoaltlon of the two plaoea waa atlll not aettled, but it waa deolded to aubnlt the eatinatea to the Treaaury anyway and hope that the Parliamentary grant of ,000 would not be dropped in the faoe of auoh a large and unexpeoted income. Freeman aoon followed thla opening gambit with a map entitled "Lagoa and lta Dependencies," the firat ^Enclosure in Freeman to Hewoaatle, Lagoa, Maroh 30, 1863, C.O. 1*7/3. ^Freeman to Hewoaatle, Lagoa, Jan. 8, 1863, C.O. 1*7/3. 0 1 in n to ttttta i tu c o t toon 543 pictorial representation of the colony's boundaries that had been seen In London and whleh had been anxiously awaited for soeie eighteen Months. At the sane tlae he enolosed the document signed by Kosoko which claimed that Palma had always been In Lagos territory; It was therefore not surprising that this was depleted on the map. What was surprising, even startling to the Colonial Office, was Freeman's generous Interpretation of what constituted the "dependencies" of Lagos: Instead of a small Island, the Colonial Office now found on Its hands a oolony of almost a thousand square miles, the great bulk of which lay on the mainland .31 But the Colonial Office reaction was Interesting. In view of the official abhorrence of West African possessions It could be reasonably predicted that the Governor's ooncept of the oolony weild have raised a storm of protest. But not so. The only explanation seems to lie In the fact that Freeman's revenue estimate had just been received; In the light of such an unexpectedly high Inoome, conceivably sufficient to remove Lagos from the ^Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Feb. 7, 1863, C.O. 147/3# with enclosures. 544 worrisome and overlong list of pauper colonies, his nap was received with a much less jaundiced eye than could have heen expeoted. For instance, while old Sir Oeorge Barrow termed the boundary a "startling line," he also noted that the ports of Falma and Badagry appeared indispensable and that it would be "impracticable to confine ourselves to the mere island." Sir Frederic Rogers wrote that he was sorry to see Britain take on new African colonies, "but when it judges proper to do so I think it would be very unwise to cramp ourselves." He therefore favored Freemans project. Even the Duke of Hewoaatle*s reaction was mild. He was of the opinion that the Foreign Office, being responsible for the "unsatisfactory acquisition" in the first place, should also be responsible for defining its borders; besides that, "I have nothing to say against the proposed line which would not apply to all others." ^ 2 It should be pointed out that this proposed boundary, while never officially accepted, was likewise never rejected. Later in 1863 it was extended even ^Memoranda, dated March 12, 14, 19, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 545 further, but for many years— In faot until West African frontiers began to be more precisely narked as British and French anbltlons collided late In the century— the Colonial Office had only the vaguest Idea of what consti tuted the Lagos settlement. As Freeman's line had been drawn as a result of his revenue difficulties, compounded by the fear that the French would economically throttle his colony, succeeding governors behaved similarly. Their primary Interest was not In markets or sources of raw material, except In the sense that the colony's revenue depended upon an adequate commercial foundation. But besides that, colonial administrators had no pecuniary Interest In the expansion of trade nor In the success of the mercantile community. Rather, their Idea of success was to govern the colony with the financial resources available and so remain In good graces with their superiors In Downing Street. In the case of Freeman, a remarkable example of how the realities of revenue and the presence of the French governed his expansionist tendencies Is contained 32Mamoranda, dated March 12, 14, 1863, C.O. 147/3. in a memorandum sent to the Duke of Newcastle shortly after his map had been dispatched. In it were his reooMMendations for the policy to be pursued in future, which he broke down into specific suggestions for eaoh crucial a r e a.33 Thus, concerning the affair at Epe., in which he was currently engrossed, he wrote of the "necessity of having perfect command of the lagoons towards the Niger.” (treat Britain "must crush opposition at once or it will increase as we advance. Must not allow French to get a footing on the coast between Lagos and the Niger • • • •” Concerning Palma, we " . • • might pur chase the French factory.” Ijebu: "The King and people must be forced into . . . allowing whitemen in their country . . . His suggestions for Ibadan illustrate perfedtly the Lagos desire to open a second road. "If the Ibad&ns can fight their way to the coast, or we can get Inland to them, we may make good use of them to counterpoise the Influence of the other traders. But we must gain their confidence first." Later in the year he added: 33| *confidential," Lagos, March 10, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 547 The Ibadans are now working their way down, hut we must not allow then to be successful. If we can make peace between then and the Egbas before they have gain ed all they desire, the peace nay last* But If they get all they desire by their own arms we nay find then as difficult to deal with as the Egbas.34 Returning to his earlier suggestions, he wrote that Abeokuta had to be "brought to reason and ought to be annexed 1 [colonial Office emphasis and exclamation addedj • It Is one of the most Important keys of the Interior. If we don't have It, the French will and then Lagos Ishhalf ruined . . . ." Badagry had to be garrisoned "on account of the French.” As far as Porto Novo was concerned: Before recognizing Porto Novo as French we should Insist on their levying the same duties as Lagos. . • . Why not obtain from the King of Dahomey a ces sion of the beach from Whydah to the East. We should then effectively block the passage to Porto Novo O-.e., at Cotonou] and could dictate our own terms. France at Porto Novo will block our passage Into the lagoons towards Dahomey. As for Lagos, It "must become the most Important point on the West Coast of Africa If we join with It the exploration of the Niger and . . . the lagoons .... If we once exert the powers we possess at places near Lagos, those further Inland will concede all we ask.” He then ^Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Dec. 10, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 548 asked for a steamer and five hundred men to be plaoed at his disposal. With these, "and permission to Impose our guarantee that Lagos In a very few years would require no aid from the Home Government, whereas . . . if left to It self . . . It will entail a heavy expense on H.M. Treasury for many years to come." [Colonial Offloe The contents of this dispatch were unknown outside official circles, of course. But without being cognizant of Freeman's recommendations for the future, the existing embargo against Abeokuta and Freeman's attacks on Epe had raised the Ire of the missionaries. A stream of com plaints started to flow to Salisbury Square In January, broadening In volume and condemnation as events unfolded. Townsend accused the Governor, with some truth, of attempting to become "the Dictator of the country" and asked for the Immediate recall of this Godless and views on the tribes around [Freeman's emphasis], I would emphasis added] • C.N.S. Response to Freeman's Policies dishonorable nan.35 The Society swung Into action. To begin with, letters of complaint from the missionaries were forwarded to the Colonial Office, but Venn realized that a major campaign would be necessary to put a stop to Freeman's Draconian measures. Consequently, a meeting of the Society's political, naval and other Influential friends was called, at which It was decided that a written Indict ment of Freeman's policy should be drafted and presented personally to the Colonial Secretary.36 in addition, Sir Francis Baring was to prepare a Parliamentary attack on the Lagos government In the event that the visit to Newcastle proved unsuccessful.37 Everything made ready, Venn and a "strong deputation" waited upon His Grace on March 20 and were received In a most friendly and cordial manner.3& The ^^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, March 5, 1863, C.M.S CA2/0 8 5. 3^Venn to Commodore Wllmet, London, March 23, 1863 C.M.S., CA2/L3. ^Venn to J. P. L. Davies, London, March 23, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S., CA2/L3* 3**Venn to Abeokuta missionaries, London, March 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 550 Society'» printed complaint was presented, which took the fora of a lengthy missive detailing the history of British relations with the Sgba sinoe the missionaries arrival in Abeokuta in 1846. The kindness with which they had been received, their acceptance of the Gospel and the fact that the New Testament had now been translated into Yoruba were all brought out. In addition, the document dwelled on the material encouragement afforded by a long succession of officials and naval officers and the lively Interest expressed in the welfare of Abeokuta by Lord Palmerston and successive British governments, which had ultimately resulted in the civilization and prosperity of the town being greatly advanced. But all this had changed since the arrival of Governor Freeman, the Memorial continued. He had meddled in Egba affairs with marked hostility and had accused them of being responsible for the IJaye war, when, im'fact, they were doing nothing more than protecting themselves and their allies from Ibadan. He had restored the notorious Kosoko to Lagos, the man responsible for the death of a hundred British sailors in 1851, who had had a price put on his head by Admiral Bruoe. All this had made the Sgba 551 suspicious of tho Governor's Motives and had resulted In vice-consul Taylor being rejected. His latests acts of aggression had been the recall of British subjects fro® Abeokuta and the blockade of the town. Both had encouraged Dahomey, the first by making It appear that the town was doomed and the second by depriving the Sgba of the means to defend themselves. Free®in was Interested only In trade and Increasing the revenue of the colony,and the Menorlal admitted that by his measures "the customs of the port may be sustained and the colony pay the expense of Its establishment. But It Is submitted that It was not for this purpose that Lagos was assumed by the British Crown. It was that native Industry might be cherished and the slave trade eradi cated." Thus, Freeman had reversed established policy, weakened the faith of Africans In Gtreat Britain, enoour- aged Dahomey, Imperiled Abeokuta and endangered the lives of missionaries. The Duke of Newcastle was therefore urged to check Freeman's policies and reassure the C.M.S. that Abeokuta would again enjoy the support of Orest Britain.39 ^Salisbury Square, March 17, 1863, in C.O. 147/5. 552 The discussion which took place between the deputation and Newcastle followed the themes of the Memorial. Newoastle defended his Governor as much as he could and assured the gentlemen that the Government was still much Interested In Abeokuta and the role it was playing In spreading Christianity and civilization. The Government was upset about the rejection of the vice- consul, he told them, but he was sorry about the embargo. He would write to Preeman about it. 1 * 0 Venn was pleased with the Interview, which made it evident that "the C.M.S. has great weight with the Colonial Office at present," and Instructed the Secretary of the Yoruba Mission to keep him fully Informed on political matters as "Our old friends are new fully alive to the critical state of things and will be ready to stand by us at any future time, or to move in Parliament If the necessity occurs. A flurry did Indeed occur in Parliament shortly afterwards, when the ^2,000 grant to Lagos under the 1864 ^^Venn to Abeokuta missionaries, London, March 23, l8t>3, C.M.S. CA2/L3. ^Venn to Lamb, London, March 23* April 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 553 Supply Bill came up for discussion. Baring objected to the grant and objected to the duties being levied, which was driving away trdde, he said, and had resulted In the Ooverner laying claim to Palma. The object of Great Britain, he went on, was not territorial aggrandisement but the spread of civilisation and the termination of the slave trade. "Our policy ought to be to encourage the self-government of the Africans, to support those who are willing to make treaties with us . • . but not ... to exhibit an Inclination to take possession of all the land we can lay our hands on." Another C.M.S. member, Mr. C. Buxton, spoke about the bad relations between Lagos and Abeokuta, and attributed It to "the Injudicious conduct of Gtovernor Freeman who, I hope, will be recalled forth- JlO with." However, the appropriation was carried. True to his word, the Colonial Secretary wrote to Freeman after his Interview with the C.M.S. He pointed out that official policy toward Abeokuta had not been changed and presented the missionary argument that the blockade Impeded legitimate trade and thus promoted ^2Parl. Debates. CLXXI (1863), 1484-88. 554 kidnaping and slaving expeditions. In addition, as an attack by Dahomey was expected, “it would be Impolitic on every account to debar the Abeokutans from obtaining arms and ammunition for their defence . • • ." He therefore hoped to hear by the next mall that the embargo had been removed.^3 Diplomacy at Abeokuta However, Freeman removed the embargo on his own velltlon on April 7* one of the last acts he performed before going home on leave; his health was not of the best and he had been advised to leave Lagos during the rainy season.^ But he went home disappointed. His attempt to placate the Egba had proved unavailing, for as soon as the blockade was lifted the Egba redoubled their own embargo of Lagos, the purpose being to dissuade their people fram resuming commercial activity while the war still remained to be fought. The stoppage was complete, even from Ijebu, ^Newcastle to Freeman, London, March 20, 1863, C.O. 420/2. Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, March 9, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/086. 555 and was perhaps enforced even more rigorously than usual as & mark of Egba and Ijebu displeasure at the bombardment of Epe and Ejerln, both XJebu towns, and as a sign of derision against the weakness of the Lagos administra tion.^ in any event, Immense quantities of oil were seized on the Ogun and poured away, bringing trade at a complete standstill.^ Freeman entrusted the temporary governance of the colony to Captain William Rice Mulllner of the 3rd West India Regiment, who, In the opinion of Rev. Lamb, was a very suitable man for the post. Lamb described him as unbiased, and though a soldier, Mhls designs are all of a conciliatory and peaceful nature and he seems to have the real good of the country at heart. Such attributes were obviously of advantage, although they did not pre clude him from lodging an Immediate complaint with the ^5Harrlson to Rev. R. Long, Abeokuta, April 28, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/045. ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, April 2 9, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/085; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, May 8, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/03. to C.M.S., Lagos, May 8, 1963, C.M.S. CA2/03. 556 Egba about the sparelty of trade.48 As Nulliner realized, his apprenticeship with civil administration was not likely to be easy. But the outlook took on a brighter oast when Commodore Wilmot arrived at the end of April, full of confidence that he could settle the outstanding differences between Lagos and the Egba. Venn and Townsend had been urging Wilmot to visit Abeokuta for some time, but Freeman had discouraged the Idea. Now, with the Governor absent, the Commodore pressed Mulllner to write to Townsend to find out If a visit would be convenient and advisable.49 Awaiting the answer, Wilmot busied himself with a long letter to Venn castigating that "obnoxious man" Freeman, who had no sympathy or understanding for the native character, who had destroyed the good feeling which had existed between Abeokuta and Great Britain and who was totally unfitted for his job. He enclosed a letter to Venn from Dooemo enumera ting that potentate's grievances against Freeman, and Venn ^Nulliner to Newcastle, Lagos, Nay 7, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 49mu1liner to Townsend, Lagos, Nay 1, 1863, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 557 was to contact the "higher powers" concerning them. Wilmot's opinion could be quoted, but Venn was cautioned to mention his name only discreetly: "Remember, all I am telling you is private: that is to say, you may make use of what I tell you amongst these friends whose confidence m 50 you possess, and who will not bring my name forward.” He wrote a similar denunciatory letter to Wylde, at the Slave Trade Department, complaining of the mess Freeman had made of relations with the natives, the "loss" of Porto Novo and the bombardment of Epe.51 This done, and Townsend assuring a warm welcome, Wilmot and Nulliner set off for the Egba capital. After a few days rest the men attended a great public meeting, in the words of Townsend, "at which the differences that had occurred between the Lagos and Abeokuta governments were freely and properly stated." Rather, the meeting seemed to consist of a recitation of Egba grievances. The matters discussed were the slaves who had absconded to Lagos; the destructlonuof Epe and 5°Lagos, May 2, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/016. 51Lagos, May 5, 1863, F.O. 84/1213. 558 EJerln; the fact that Ikorodu was under British protection and was actively engaged against the Egba and IJebu, and the Lagos partiality for Ibadan, despite the fact that Roper was still held prisoner while white men had always been protected at Abeokuta.52 Next day, a long and private meeting was held between the visitors, Townsend, and the chiefs, during which Nulliner was much annoyed on hearing the disrespect ful manner in which Freeman was referred to. He was also perturbed at Egba insinuations that "influential people" in Lagos were inviting the Fon to attack Abeokuta. Much past ill-will might have been avoided, he thought, if the missionaries had scotched these wild stories at the onset. But the rumors, as well as other assertions concerning the Governor's policies, had remained uncontradicted "by those whose duty it was to make peace rather than create discord."53 5^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nay 27, 1863, C.H.S. CA2/085. 53)(ulliner to Newcastle, Lagos, Nay 22, 1863, C.O. 1*17/3. 559 Besides these vague charges, the matter which received most attention during the discussion was the runaway slave problem. Acoording to the Egba, they had lost over a thousand people this way and in future they would want restitution amounting to full market value. However, they were willing to waive the amount already owing as payment for their own transgressions on the river and for the robbery of the Niger expedition goods. Nulliner explained the English position on slavery and Wilmot promised to present their case to the British Government, but the chiefs were obviously very unhappy. For their part, they explained that the recent stoppage of trdde had been Imposed to maintain the army, and refused to consider reopening the roads until the war with Ibadan had been concluded.54 The meeting thereupon broke up, with little accomplished. But before the emissaries returned to Lagos it was decided that Mulllner and Townsend begin serious peace negotiations between Abeokuta and Ibadan. They 5**Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nay 27, 1863, C.H.S. CA2/085; Nulliner to Newcastle, Lagos, Nay 22, 1863, C.O. 1^7/3. 560 would first west at Ikorodu and try to reconcile the town to tho Awujale* then go to the Egba ware amp at Makun and frosi there visit Ibadan. Both non had high hopes of success* so with a measure of optimism Nulliner and Wilmot returned to Lagos. Townsend found Nulliner to be a trifle too eager to defend Freeman and inclined toward relmposlng the blockade* but he and Wilmot were able to dissuade him; oh* how he wished that the Commodore was Governor of Lagosi55 John H&wley Glover* R.H. But a surprise was In store for everyone. Three days after Nulliner and Wilmot reached Lagos* Commander Glover appeared* fresh from England and bearing the Queen's Commlslon to act as Colonial Secretary and authorized to administer the colony In Freeman's absence. His appointment had been made hurriedly when It became known In London that Freeman was sick* for Najor Leveson* the second In authority* was himself on the disabled list* Incapacitated by a facial wound received at Epe. Glover ^^Townsend to Venn* Abeokuta* Nay 27* 1863* C.H.S. CA2/085. *61 being In England, he was asked to return to Lagos on a Tew days' notice to fill what was thought to be the temporary position of Aotlng Colonial Secretary. He was more than happy to do so. If the Colonial Office had been less pressed to find an available man, Clover would not have been offered the appointment. Hearing In 1861 that a consul was to be appointed to Abeokuta, Clover had offerdd himself for the position. On receipt of his application, Mr. Wylde wrote: Prom what I have seen of Lieut. Clover's corres pondence when he was on the African Coast, I hardly think he Is a man of sufficient judgement for the appointment . • • and this opinion was confirmed when I . . . mentioned his name to Captain Washington, the Hydrographer at the Admiralty. Lord Wodehouse added, "I don't think he would be a fit Yet through a quirk of fate, the man thus assessed as possessing Insufficient judgment to qualify him for the posftv A0*.ceHsul at a remote town was two years later given the much more responsible position of Actlng-Oovernor. And not only that, he was to remain In charge at Lagos, with only brief breaks, for the next nine years, later Memorandum, March 4, 1861, P.O. 84/1158. §62 being knighted i«d appointed Governor of Newfoundland. Commander John Hawley Glover, or "Obba Golobar” aa he became known to countlesa Africans, was a nan of thirty four, a bachelor who had suffered an unrequited love- affair In Cologne. Claiming descent on one side fron a West Saxon nonarch and on the other fron Charlenagne1 a wife, Hildegarde of Swabia, he was hlnself cast In heroic mold. He was a large nan with a massive head, his portrait In later life showing him to sport an inperial and thick drooping mustaches while his face combined the expressions of friendliness and self-confidence. His entire appearance exuded a sense of power. Of spartan habits, his name later becane a by-word along the coast for horsemanship, hair-breadth escapes and skill at palavering. And his hospitality earned him equal renown. During his tenure, Government House becane the scene of gay dances, croquet parties and dinners; at Christmastlde he reputedly mixed the plum pudding hlnself.57 Janes Pope-Hennesay, Verandahs Some Episodes in the Crown Colonies, 1867-1889 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 19^4), pp. 13^-37; Lady Elizabeth Glover, Life of Sir John Hawley Glover, R.N., G.C.N.G. (London: Smith, Elder, f t Co., lS'97). ------------------ *63 The Reverend Lamb hoped that his arrival augured the oommenoemant of a new deal for the dlstraoted country,58 which was exactly the sentiment the Society In London had expressed when It learned of his appointment. His arrival at Lagos would usher In a new era of peace for Africa and an enlightened approach to mlsslonary-govern- ment relations, Venn enthused. At the same time he warned Lamb, In charge of the Society's operations In Lagos and consequently In close contact with Government House, that Glover had a "seamanlike" character and the utmost prudence would still be required to avoid complications; If he were treated as though still on the quarter deok, all would be well.59 In giving these reminders Venn had perhaps over looked the corollary Inherent In the relations between the man who walks the quarterdeck and the rest of the crew: unquestioned, prompt obedience to the voice of command. But Venn had good cause for his exuberance. Glover had fi&Lamb to C.N.S., Lagos, June 9, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/03. 59London, April 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3; also; Venn to J. P. L. Davies, London, April 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. *64 called at Salisbury Square the very day he was Informed of the appointment, and although he had only three days before Bailing and many preparations to complete, had called again on April 20. From these meetings a mission ary -government concordat had emerged, approved by both parties, with Glover receiving copy of the agreement In the form of a letter from the Society to all Its Yoruba missionaries. There were contractual obligations on both sides. For his part, Glover agreed to observe the Independence of Abeokuta and promote the rising civilization and Christianity of the Egba In the spirit of Lord Palmer ston's policy. Further, he was to respect the positions of the missionaries "as the trusted and confidential advisors" of native Africans, "and In some cases as their representatives with the British Authorities." Converse ly, the missionaries would not abuse these privileges, the more so since they had recourse "not open to other parties, of stating their complaints to the Committee at home, who have been allowed at all times an access to Her Majesty's Secretaries of State, and have ever found a candid and friendly attention to their statements." 5 65 For their part, the missionaries were to forget old animosities and consider the appointment as the beginning of a new period of benevolent and fruitful relations. Glover was assured by the Society, on behalf of the missionaries, that it was regarded "a sacred duty to show all honour and respect to constitutional authori ties, especially those who bear Her Majesty's Commission, and to defer to such authority in all matters which do not appear to them to invoice the higher considerations of conscience, Justice, and humanity." Further, both parties were to work toward the termination of the war, and the missionaries were to use their Influence in Yorubaland to open two routes to the Interior as well as a road from IJaye to the Niger. Glover's Opening Maneuvers Hopeful that the arrangement would prove workable, a few days after his arrival Glover sent a letter to the Baserun with the request that Townsend read and translate it. The letter was Innocent enough, promising Glover's 60 London, April 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 566 help In resolving difficulties and asking for the Basorun1s assurance that he would cooperate In measures which would lead to greater peace, happiness and prosperity. Townsend was asked If Glover would be able to visit the Egba war camp at Makun.^l However, Townsend misinterpreted the Society's concordat letter of April 23* newly received, and announc ed his complete abdication from political affairs "to save 62 myself from complications that may arise . . . . He declined to have any part of Glover's letter, Instead entrusting the Basorun's correspondence to Henry Robbins, a Saro merchant at Abeokuta and a former employee of the Society. The Basorun's reply was civil, merely hoping that Glover would agree with the Egba on "measures tending to the general welfare of the country."^3 Robbins then went to Makun to sound out the war-ohiefs about a visit by Glover. 6lLagos, May 26, 1863, C.O. 147/3; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, June 9, 1863# C.M.S. CA2/03. ^^ownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, May 27* 1 8 6 3, Town send to Lamb, Abeokuta, May 27, 1 8 6 3, In C.M.S. CA2/O8 5. ^Abeokuta, June 1, 1863, C.O. 147/3. 567 They expressed satisfaction over his appointment but consternation over the question of Ikorodu, the town being under Lagos protection and actively engaged In fighting them and their Ode allies. As soon as the Ikorodu question was settled they would be pleased to welcome him at the camp.6* With that, Glover visited Ikorodu on June 6, where he was told that the town would never submit to the Awujale, fearing his revenge. He asked the chiefs to give him their full confidence and promise to abstain from further hostilities until he had conferred with the other tribes.^5 He then reported to Newcastle the line he was going to pursue. First he had to persuade the Awujale not to seek vengeance on Ikorodu; then he would make a general peace, the Egba giving up Makun and Ibadan giving up Ipara. This done, he would arrange for Ibadan to have a road to Lagos through Remo territory. The road was the sole object of the war, he wrote, the Egba wanting all 64Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, June 9, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/03. ^Glover to Newcastle, Lagos, June 9, 1863. C.O. 1*7/3. 568 trade to the Interior to pass through Abeokuta. If the other road was opened, Lagos, Ibadan and IJebu-Remo would all reap the benefits, "... the Egba alone being the ones to lose anything."^* But he realized that the Egba would not meekly aooept his proposals, so he took the precaution of asking that the military establishment be augmented and the Housa police Increased from thirty to a hundred men. Uppermostihn (Hover's mind was the possi bility of an Egba attack on Ikorodu, his correspondence showing clearly that he considered the Egba to be the greatest threat.67 One of the reasons he cited to back up the request for more soldiers was that Badagry was In a state of open defiance to Lagos authority. Gtlover determined to show the flag, but when departing Lagos on June 14 in the gun boat Handy he little knew the consequences his trip would entail; nor did he realize that the Egba problem, seemingly ^Olover to Newcastle, Lagos, June 9, 1863, C.O. 147/3. ^Olover to Newcastle, Lagos, June 10, 1863, Qlover to Senior Officer, Lagos, June 10, 1363, In C.O. 147/3. 569 so pressing, would sink to secondary consideration for a time. Consul Daumas at Porto Novo On arrival at Badagry ha found the town olosa to civil war, a rasult of divldad loyalties to Porto Novo and Lagos and the objections of the Porto Novo-oriented chiefs to the Lagos administration of their town. This was not too serious, and the troops he had brought could easily cope with the situation. What was most disturbing was the news he heard that consul Daumas had raised the French flag at Appa, a town a few miles west of Badagry, on the spit separating the lagoon from the ocean, and was laying claim to all Porto Novo possessions, including Badagry. Glover strongly objected to Daumas breaking the Informal agreement reached between Freeman and Didelot in early March to the effeot that neither side would make terri torial changes while their respective governments were deciding where their appropriate spheres lay.63 63qlover to Daumas, Badagry, June 18, 1863* N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 570 Great Britain w&a not the only nation plagued by overactive consular representation, It seemed. While Prance had pursued a policy of cautious Inactivity over Dldelot's Protectorate, neither accepting nor rejecting the responsibility, Daumas had been securing agreements from lagoon-slde villages assuring unsestrloted passage for trading canoes. Further, he had organized labor to open a track from Appa to the beach and had cleared a oreek, suitable for canoes, from Appa to the lagoon. He then extended the French Protectorate to the town and went to Abomey to obtain from Ctlele a verbal cession of Cotonou to France for an annual payment of $4,0 0 0 .6 9 Glover's fear was that this new French possession, conveniently located near the mouth of the Ado river, would siphon off commerce from the water and land routes through Okeodan and Ado to Abeokuta and the Interior, the route normally terminating at Badagry. If this happened, Lagos would suffer great loss of revenue. This point was made crystal clear by the Lagos Collector of Customs, who reported on July 1 that the colony had lost JfS,541 In ^Hewbury, The Western Slave Coast, p. 69. 571 revenue during the few months Porto Movo had been taken over by the French, no duty being levied there and the looal Merchants taking advantage of the fact.7° To make matters worse, a large caravan from Oyo, Isejln and Ibadan had just reached Porto Novo;71 the route must have been circuitous, but It beded 111 for Lagos customs receipts. Olover Protects his Revenue Clover therefore wasted little time arguing with his French antagonist. Knowing Daumas to have plans to extend his Jurisdiction up the Ado river,72 Qiover rapidly concluded protectorate agreements with Ado, Ipokla, and Okeodan In late June and early July, thus bringing both banks of the river under his control. Thomas Tlckel, hitherto Civil Commandant at Badagry, was named "Resident Agent for the British Protectorates of Okeedan, Ipokla and Ado." To block further French expansion toward the east, ?°J. Maxwell to Clover, Lagos, July 1, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 71Lamb to Venn, Lagos, July 9, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/03. ^2Clover to Daumas, Badagry, June 30, 1863, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1 572 Glover then persuaded the eight whlte-cap chiefs of Badagry to formally oede the town to Great Britain, a task not too difficult when he offered an annual stipend almost double the one they had been receiving. Lieutenant Dolben, in the Handy, was placed In charge of the town.73 To consolidate his customs sons and cripple Porto Novo, Appa and Cotonou trade, the chiefs of the Protectorates were soon Informed that European goods entering tholr areas by way of Porto Movo would pay Import duties, collected at the mouth of the Ado. But goods coming from Lagos and Badagry would not be liable for additional duties.74 And to counter the loss of revenue due to the free entry of goods at Porto Novo, Glover halved the Lagos duties on spirits and tobacco, hoping to lure back the business that had been lost. The affair raised tempers on both sides and many sharp Interchanges took place.75 At one point Glover 73oiOT*r to Newcastle, Lagos, July 9, 10, C.O. 147/ 3; Lamb to Venn, Lagos, July 9* 1863, C.M.S. CA2/03. 74 Glover to Russell, Lagos, Sept. 8, 1863, 7.0. 84/1221. 75In C.O. 147/4. 573 Issued an ultimatum and wrota darkly of the two sides drifting toward an outright confrontation. But Glover had clearly won and nothing remained for the French but to reach agreement with him over their respective areas. The Ado river was to be the dividing line, with Ipokla con sidered neutral territory; in the south, the line ran from the mouth of the Ado to the beach, and left Appa on the French side. The entire dispute was then submitted to the two governments.^6 in the event, the French accepted the Porto Novo Protectorate but preferred to have the boundaries settled on the spot and so Instructed their Admiral. This was accomplished In early 1864, along the lines of the Glover-Daumas agreement, and both Britain and France agreed to accept the arrangement without further Investigation.77 ^Glover-Didelot agreement, Lagos, Aug. 1, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 77Lanb to C.M.S., Lagos, March 9, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/03; Cardwell to Glover, London, Aug. 23* 1864, C.O. 420/2. Imperial Parsimony and Unauthorized Expansion 574 The Colonial Office, Inundated by dispatches from Glover, was frankly at a loss In reaching a decision over this unauthorized extension of British responsibility. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frederic Rogers, finally wrote a lengthy Minute on the developments, which was accepted by Newcastle and his advisors as the correct Interpretation of events. The document Is revealing In that It placed the blame for this Imperialistic outburst squarely where It belonged, on the Imperial Exchequer. Rogers started by saying that Lagos had been acquired on the Insistence of the Foreign Office to put down the slave trade "and partly, I suppose, also for the encouragement of legitimate commerce with the same end In view." After that, the colony "was put on the worst possible financial footing" and the Governor Instructed to make It self-supporting on the Insistence of the Treasury, "being notoriously Indisposed to Incur Colonial Estimates." Freeman, at his wlts-end with this parsimony, finally had to Impose duties on Imports, but the Immediate result was that goods were landed on either side of Lagos to avoid 575 the tax; Palma and Badagry were then annexed to seal the gap. Taxes on French goods being exceptionally heavy, the French consul countered by taking control of Porto Movo, made It a free port and attempted to attract trade which had hitherto gone to Lagos. Glover, seeing his Income about to evaporate, had then been forced Into desperate action and the protectorates were the result.7® Newcastle's official response Informed Glover that It had not yet been decided whether to accept the treaties, but In the meantime he expressed his decided disapproval.79 The Duke was particularly annoyed at Glover, as he had Interviewed him before his departure from London and enjoined him In the strongest manner to avoid . . .all annexations, under whatever form or pretext. I told him that the course pursued by Mr. Freeman was viewed by me with great distrust . . . but that I entrusted temporarily the government to him In confidence that Increase In territory would be avoided.®0 Glover's reply to the censure Is equally revealing. French expansion around Porto Novo would have destroyed 78Sept. (15J, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 79London, Sept. 23, 1863, C.O. 420/2. 8oMemorandum, Sept. 12, 1863, C.O. 147/5 576 the colony's trade and revenue and reduced Lagos to an Insignificant Island, he wrote, which would be "a constant 8l Burden upon the Mother country." Rogers was Impressed by this argument; he was against extending British possessions, but when It was done "It seems to me necessary to take sufficient territory to make It self- supporting by admitting to the successful collection of a customs revenue . . . ." Even the Duke of Newcastle was Impressed, admitting that Glover had faced great difficul ties, "mainly caused by the French and the missionaries," but he still thought him to be overly anxious to "enlarge his territory and draw the sword. The Remainder of Glover's First Administration; Mounting Frictions The Immediate threat posed by France having been successfully countered, Glover was again forced to turn his attention to the Egba and the vexing problems of the 8l Glover to Newcastle, Lagos, Nov. 6, 1 8 6 3, C.O. 147/4. ^Memoranda, Dec. 12, 14, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 577 war. His forward policy had not improved matters, as the protectorates at Ado and Okeodan had effectively blocked Egba access to the sea. In addition, his expansionist policy seemingly Justified the course they had followed with respect to vice-consul Taylor, for since the cession of Lagos the colony had extended itself spectacularly. Townsend, for one, was pleased at the Intervention of the French at Porto Novo as furnishing a check to the colony's westward expansion. He also thanked God thfct Lagos was not prospering, its administration being built on infidelity, opposed to the Qospel and dedicated to increasing its power at the expense of the natives. Nevertheless it was Townsend, his retirement from politics being brief, who suggested to the chiefs that Glover be invited to Abeokuta, to discuss especially the question of Ikorodu. This was an unpleasant situation for the Egba, Ikorodu stepping up its activities against their' war camp at Makun while they remained powerless to retaliate while Ikorodu enjoyed British protection. But Qlover denied that Ikorodu was attacking the camp, ®3rownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, July 27 > 1863* C.M.S. CA2/085. 578 leveling the countercharge that the culprits were refugees from Makun whom the Egba had driven from their homes. He did not want to discuss the Ikorodu situation anyway, he wrote, but would be pleased to meet the Egba chiefs, including the war chiefs, to talk over the possibilities of a "general peace. The Egba falling to respond, Glover tried a new tack in reply to a protest by the Awujale about the pro tection being afforded his rebellious subjects at Ikorodu. Glover's reply was a transparent attempt to drive a wedge between the Awujale and his Egba allies. He would not give up Ikorodu until the Egba had left Kakun, he wrote, but in the meantime the Awujale should open his Ode territory for a road to Ibadan. From the tolls he would collect he would soon become a rich man, besides receiv ing some of the money being collected solely by the Egba because of their control of the lucrative interior trade. The Awujale should never trust the Egba, Glover warned, or allow them to remain on his territory; Lagos and IJebu ®^Glover to the Basorun, July 30, 1863. C.M.S. CA2/080. 579 should Join together and peaoe and prosperity would ensue.^5 Like his overture to the Egba, this proposal met a similar silence. Being predicated upon the one Issue upon which the war now revolved, a road for Ibadan, neither the Egba nor IJebu were prepared to sanction an extension of Ibadan power which would decide forever the question of Yoruba supremacy. At the same tine, Glover was equally Insistent that the road should be opened in the Interests of trade and revenue and that the existing Egba-IJebu control of the trade routes be broken. For this reason he actively resisted the efforts made In the latter half of 1 8 6 3 by a group of African merchants In Lagos to negotiate a peace. Suspecting the basis of the negotiation to be a return to the pre-war status quo, he sent messages to Ibadan telling Ogumolla to disregard all peace proposals from anyone but himself, as only he wanted the same thing as Ibadan, namely, a second route to the Interior. He forbade the Lagos emissaries to visit Ibadan, and when they attempted to go despite his 85 Lagos, August 12, 1863, M.H.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 580 injunction he informed the Ikorodu ohlefe that they were not to be allowed passage through the town.86 Instead, he had his own solution to the problem. In September he asked the Colonial Office to send five hundred troops, which would be used to take Makun from the Egba. This done, the war would end Immediately, he thought, trade with the Interior would resume and the road to Ibadan would be firmly In his hands.®7 The troops would also be useful In Lagos Itself, where opposition to his administration was running so high that he had to swear In "All true and loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen" as special constables. This local unrest stemmed from the program of municipal Improvements Inaugurated by Freeman and continued by Clover to Improve the health and safety of the town. Ordinances had been passed for the widening of streets, the compulsory purchase of property, the drainage of swamps, to C.M.S., Lagos, Aug.-Dec., passim, C.M.S. CA2/03; c. W. Faulkner to H. Robbins, Lagos, Sept. 25, 1 8 6 3; C.M.S. CA2/080; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 6, 1 8 6 3, C.M.S. CA2/0 8 5; African Commercial Association to Newcastle, Lagos, Jan. 8, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 87Lagos, Sept. 10, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 581 the exelusion of native doctors, and prohibiting the use of thatch for roofs. Resistance had been mounting for months, culminating when Docemo publicly announced that he had never given up his kingdom to the English Queen. At this, Glover made arrangements to deport the king and his leading chiefs but changed his mind at the last minute and fined him ^ 5 0, threatening to stop his pension unless he behaved.®® At first, Glover referred mysteriously to "certain evil-disposed persons” leading the opposition to his measures, later charging the missionaries and Saros specifically with fanning the flames of discontent.®9 In truth, Rev. Lamb, at Lagos, had been opposed to many of the measures, believing the program to be going too far and too fast— especially when It Involved C.M.S. property.90 But It was Townsend, In Abeokuta, who made the most vociferous complaint. Q Q Glover to Newcastle, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1 8 6 3, C.O. 147/4. ®^Glover to Newcastle, Lagos, Nov. 6, 1 8 6 3, C.O. 147/4. ^°Glover to Lamb, Lagos, Oct. 13* 1863, C.M.S. CA2/04. 582 Besides the physioal expansion of the colony, the question of runaway slaves, the protection of Ikorodu, dlover's friendliness with Ibadan and the natter of Dooemo being fined, whleh had all caused great unrest at Abeokuta, the civic improvements in Lagos had similarly excited the Egba. Several Lagos ordinances made changes In long established customs, such as the prohibition against burying the dead In private houses. Although not directly affected, such radical departures from tradition In neighboring Lagos disturbed the Egba deeply. Townsend then decided that the time had come to make a public protest, and In consultation with his colleagues came to the conclusion that It should be in the form of a memorial. He wrote the document, which was subsequently signed by all twelve Europeans In the town and by five dozen others.91 The memorial stated that since the cession of Lagos the native population had become discontented with Oreat Britain, and the changes Introduced by the Lagos government together with the forced compliance to English law were magnifying the discontent. A hatred of the white ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 4, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/085. 583 man, of his civilization and his Christianity, was conse quently becoming more common. With the rapid absorption by Lagos of adjacent native powers, the result had been a growing mistrust of British intentions, exemplified in the Egba case by the rejection of a vice-consul, the stoppage of trade and the refusal to accept Lagos mediation. The memorial then asked for a change of policy, saying that although law, order and civilized society were great objects, forced compliance and too rapid change would end only in hatred for the white man.^ Glover was annoyed at the document but dutifully forwarded it to the Colonial Office, Far from adopting a more conciliatory policy, however, he redoubled his current effort to raise an additional six hundred Housa armed police on a stand-by basis, a levy that would raise his effective strength to nine hundred men. Newcastle was annoyed at the request, declining to sanction it or the complementary requisition for armaments and clothing. But as Freeman had been pronounced fit to resume his post, Newcastle asked for his opinion on the matter when he 92Abeokuta, Oct. 30, 1863, C.O. 147/4. 584 reached Lagos, together with his views on the protectorates assumed by Glover during his absence. Freeman's Return; the Impasse Continued The news that Freeman was to return came as an unexpected shock to the C.M.S. After the high hopes with which Glover's appointment had been hailed, his subsequent administration had Indeed been disappointing, but Venn regarded It philosophically, "In the light of a calamity sent by G o d ."93 But his feelings about Freeman bordered on abhorrence and he was less than pleased when the Governor paid an unexpected visit to Salisbury Square in mid-October. The visit was evidently made for the purpose of conciliation, for after voicing complaints about Townsend and articles In the Iwe Irohin, Freeman expressed the hope that past bitterness might be forgotten and a good understanding exist in the future.9^ 93venn to Harrison, London, Nov. 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 9**Venn to Wilmot, London, Oct. 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 585 Venn told him frankly that the Society regarded hla policies as unwise and unfair to the natives, warning him that he would be watched closely and complaints lodged with the Secretary of State If necessary,95 He repeated the warning In a letter Just a few days later, reminding the Governor that the Society had always enjoyed confidential access to the Government and that the missionaries had a recognized relationship with the Yoruba as their confidential advisors; Indeed, In some cases they had become their "protectors and representatives with the British Authorities. Nothing daunted, Freeman returned to Lagos In November. After hearing Glover's report of his caretaklng activities and a synopsis of the current situation he had no hesitation In recommending the additional Housa police, as "this Government may be forced to make a step In advance to protect Its honour and Interests," {c.O. emphasis added.} • Further, he gave his unqualified endorsement to 95venn to Lamb, London, Oct. 23, 1863* C.M.S. CA2/L3. 96Venn to Freeman, London, Oct. 23, 1863, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 586 the protectorates and urged that the censure Imposed on Glover for arranging them be withdrawn.9? Finding the colony1 s finances to be In their usual precarious state, he reminded the Egba of the good faith he had shown before his departure when he had removed the blockade and he gently chided them for their lack of response. He suggested that they send reprejfes mtatives to discuss peace and the resumption of trade, but the Egba reply was not promising. Talks had taken place with tfllmot and Mulllner during his absence, the unsigned note read, but as nothing had resulted there was no point In continuing then.98 At an Impasse, heightened at the beginning of 1864 when the Egba tightened even further their Interdict on trade, Freeman relieved his pent-up antagonisms toward Abeokuta in a perceptive report to the Colonial Office. The Egba had flourished and grown strong because of British help, he wrote, but now feared that they would fall under the domination of Lagos. Their opposition took its 97Lagos, Dec. 10, 1863, C.O. 147/4. Q8 Abeokuta, Dec. 8, 1863* C.O. 147/6. 587 origin In this fear and had been nourished by bad advice. They realized that one of two things must happen: "Either the British Government will give up Lagos, or Lagos must gradually absorb the adjacent countries." There was no doubt which would take place, he continued, so the Egba should be made aware that their opposition "does but tend to accelerate the consumation."^9 The Governor's analysis was perfectly correct. But In 1864 the Colonial Office was aghast at this threatening tone, Newcastle fuming that the "original sin" of taking Lagos would lead to the same consequences that had followed the acquisition of territory In other parts of the coast, namely, "Intermeddling by force of arms between the neighbouring tribes." In a tone of utter resignation and Inevitability he concluded his comment by saying that he had little hope of "permanently arresting this mischief, but I quite approve of making every effort to do so."10^ As a result, Freeman was specifically prohibited from engaging in "any hostility, except in 99preeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Jan. 7, 1864. F.O 147/6. 100Memorandum, Feb. 19, 1864, C.O. 147/6. 588 self-defence, without permission previously obtained from the Secretary of State. The words "self-defence" provided the escape clause from this Injunction which Glover later seized upon to force his will on the Egba. But In the meantime, Freeman used a comparatively friendly message from Townsend and the personal appeal of another Abeokuta missionary, Buckley Wood, to request the Basorun and chiefs that per mission be granted for him to visit their town. At the same time he was anxious to explain to the Egba that he, too, was annoyed at Ikorodu for staging in late January yet another attack on their camp at Makun.102 After prolonged negotiation the visit did not materialize, due to Freeman's 111-health, the expectation of a Dahomey attack on Abeokuta and the Egba plea that their chiefs were absent at the war. The three excuses had solid bases In fact; but the most cogent reason for the loi Newcastle to Freeman, London, Feb. 22, 1864, C, 0. 420/2. 102Harrison to Venn, Lagos, Feb. 3, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/045; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Feb. 9, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/ 03; Wood to Rev. R. Long, Abeokuta, March 5* 1864, C.M.S. CA2/096. 589 collapse of the proposal was the opposition aroused In Aoeokuta by a man named Turner. ■ v First Fruits of Acculturation Turner himself Is not greatly Important, although he will be mentioned again; what Is Important about him was that he manifested an embryonic anti-European movement emanating from a comparatively literate elite whose maxim, even at this early date, was "Africa for the Africans."1^ In this case he used his Influence with the chiefs to bar the Governor's visit, slmulataneously raising the popular outcry In Abeokuta that Freeman would bring the Fon and destroy the city.10* * - J. M. Turner was a Yoruba, perhaps an Egba or IJebu, who had been captured and sold Into slavery then released In Sierra Leone. After the rudiments of an education In a mission school he had made his way back to Lagos In the l850's and secured a minor job from Docemo In ^°^Freeman to Newcastle, Lagos, April 9, 1864, C.O. 147/6. 104«rownsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Feb. 25, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/085; Buhler to Venn, Abeokuta, March 5> 1864, C.M.S. CA2/024. 590 the EJerin market, his function being to smooth over disputes between Lagos and IJebu traders. Trading himself, he remained at EJerln after 1861 but his premises and business were destroyed In 1 8 6 3 by Freeman's bombardment. Turner then lodged a claim of 1^4,000 against the British Government, but this was rejected on Freeman's advice. Charges for debt pending against him, Turner could not go to Lagos so Instead went to Abeokuta In 1 8 6 3 where he Immediately became close to the Basorun. With some cause, he was violently anti-European and even more violently anti-Freeman. The Governor reciprocated the feeling and referred to Turner as one of a class of Sierra Leone Immigrants who, . . . after owing their education and every farthing they possess to British philanthropy, return to their native country and then systematically endeavour to undermine British Influence and to turn the natives against the white man. With the smattering of educa tion and the shadow of civilization they have Imblded at Sierra Leone, they would easily obtain the upper hand over the natives were the white man out of the country .... This class has done Its best to In crease our difficulties with Abeokuta, where the chiefs have been greatly guided by their advice.105 105preeman to Newcastle, Lagos, April 9, 1864, C.O. 147/6. The chiefs were certainly guided by Turner In the case of Freeman's visit. But one of the other excuses put forward to reject the proposal was the probability of a Dahomey attack. After years of such speculation the attack finally materialized on March 13 when Glele battered on the walls of Abeokuta with an army of about ten thousand. Some of them Indeed penetrated the town's defenses but the victory Glele had been promised by the spirit of his ancestor instead became a stunning defeat, the victorious Egba pursuing Fon warriors and amazons as far as Isaga. Subsequent expeditions would approach within five or six miles of Abeokuta but never again was the city to be visited by an outright Dahoml a t t a c k . Critical Times at Lagos; the Alternatives Fearing the victory would Increase Egba intransi gence, Freeman gave up hope of persuading them to resume 51-7; Rev. Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Edited by Dr. 0. Johnson. (Lagos: C.M.S. Bookshop, 1937), p. 362. r t Deuxieme Attaque des Dahomeens," pp 592 trade and Instead turned to other means of supplementing the colony's revenue. At this time he was negotiating with the French Admiral on the settlement of the British-French protectorate boundaries and made It quite clear that the only navigable entrance to the Ado river belonged to Lagos and was subject to the colony's customs levy.10? At the same time he restored the cuts Glover had made on French imports, brandy, wine and cordials, and raised the ad valorem duty on all other imports from three to four per cent. But to avoid driving French merchants— and even English— to Porto Novo, he instituted a drawback system by which goods entering Lagos but destined for Porto Novo paid only half the Lagos tariff. This comparatively low schedule would Induce traders to use the superior facili ties of Lagos rather than Cotonou or Appa, he thought. As for the Egba, Freeman turned to Glover's solution and asked for the regular military force to be increased to four hundred men, sufficient to occupy Xkorodu and Makun.10® Then, with the Ibadan route in 10?Freeman to Admiral Laffon Ce Ladebat, Lagos, March 8, 1864, C.O. 147/5. 10®Freeman to Newcastle, May 6, 1864, C.O. 147/6. 593 operation and held securely by the troops, the Egba would be forced to open their roads to avoid losing business. The ailing Duke of Newcastle had now been replaced at the Colonial Office by Edward Cardwell, but far from Intro ducing any new policy, Cardwell inaugurated^his adminis tration by suggesting that Badagry and Palma be given up and mere protectorates placed over them.109 Regarding Freeman's latest suggestion, Cardwell would have no part of It, cautioning his Governor once more against becoming involved In mainland politics.110 Adding to this bad news, which completely tied Freeman's hands, was the further blow that the parliamen tary grant for the year was a meager «|^3,125. This was supposed to cover the cost of building Government House, a store-house, wells, and the myriad other Improvements so desperately needed In Lagos Itself, to say nothing of the parallel civic and administrative requirements at Palma and Badagry. The Colonial Office warning to make every practicable reduction In expenditures, "notwithstanding 109C.O. to F.O., London, Hay 23, 1864, C.O. 420/1 110London, July 22, 1864, C.O. 420/2. 594 this liberal allowance," and not to expect a grant of more than jpl, 5 0 0 the following year, must have fallen on Incredulous ears. 111 By June the colony was quite Insolvent, revenue not being sufficient to cover the operating costs of administration, 1 1 2 let alone the pressing civic Improvements. Disgusted at the niggardliness of the Treasury, prohibited from using force to Impose peace and restore trade, baffled by the Intractable Egba and the nuances of Yoruba politics, faced with a bankrupt colony and In poor personal health, Freeman told the Colonial Office exactly what needed to be done. The war was dragging on, trade was stagnant, revenue was insufficient and traders were leaving. But Lagos was the most promising of all the African settlements, he wrote, and warranted support because of its future potential. Therefore, the Imperial government had to face up to one of two unpleasant alternatives: either provide sufficient assistance to 111C.O. to Freeman, March 24, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 112ppeeman Herbert T. Ussher, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, Lagos, July 4, 1864, N.N.A. CSO 8/ 5, Vol. 1. 595 weather the financial consequences of the war or allow force to be used to stop it. But even as he wrote he knew that neither alternative would be given official sanction. Consequent ly, he called his Council together, told them exactly how precarious were the colony's finances and asked the gentlemen to authorize his Immediate return to England to negotiate a<3^20,000 loan. The money was to finance public works and the purchase of a steamer, both being Impossible through revenue or parliamentary grants.11^ In addition, as Freeman suffered from recurring fevers and the unhealthy summer rains were in mid-season, it was hoped that the change would benefit his health. Neither of the objectives was realized. The money proved Impossible to obtain and the Governor never returned to his post, dying in Tunis the following Spring while In quest of his broken health. But the eventuality of Freeman leaving Lagos for medical reasons had been foreseen by the Colonial Office and Glover was authorized 113Lagos, July 8, 1864, C.O. 147/7. H4preeman Cardwell, London, Aug. 9« 1864, C.O. 147/7. 596 to assume command. The two had been In perfect accord over the policies which should be pursued. Indeed, Freeman had sent Olover home at the beginning of 1864 to press for either monetary or military assistance, urging the Colonial Office to heed his emissary's message as the policy to be followed during that year would be decisive to the colony's future.^*5 Charges and Countercharges In London Glover pressed his campaign at both the Colonial and Foreign Offices. During the first conversation at the Colonial Office, which ranged the entire gamut of Lagos affairs and relations with the mainland, Glover expressed his strong opinion that the only way to make peace and thus "save the trade and revenue of Lagos" would be by attacking the Egba at Makun and he anticipated the necessity of occupying Abeokuta Itself.other Interviews were in a similar vein. ^-^ppeeman to Newcastle, Lagos, Jan. 10, 1864, C.O. 147/7. ^^Fortescue memorandum, Feb. 16, 1864, C.O. 147/6. 597 He then sent a long and detailed letter to Lord Russell covering the same ground, the missive containing a melange of Innuendo and half-truth at which aiover was adept, "Little or nothing of the real object of the war seems to be known In this country," he wrote, "It seeming to be the policy of the missionaries . . . to keep matters quiet and not let It be known that the Egbas . . • are In reality no better than their neighbours . . . ." He accused the Egba of sundry "crimes,” told how their hostility toward Britain was Increasing and how they opposed Ibadan's reasonable desire to have Its own road to the sea. This was the fundamental cause of the war, he maintained, but was closely followed by Egba determination to maintain the slave trade and hide their frightful atrocities. As for the closing of their roads, this had not been directed against their enemies but against Great Britain and the Lagos government specifically. Under these circumstances he Inquired whether the object for which Lagos had been annexed, namely, to suppress the slave trade, was to be prevented by the oppo sition of the Egba fostered by "the advice of the Church Missionary Society's agents In Abeokuta." He concluded 598 by stating that the time had now oome to assume a firmer attitude toward the Egba, otherwise Lagos would be ruined. The Foreign Offloe was In faot subjected to a concurrent barrage, MoCoskry being In London to negotiate with the West Africa Company regarding his appointment as chief agent at Lagos. One more overture should be made to the Egba, he suggested, but If this proved unavailing he urged the occupation of Ikorodu and the joint Lagos- Ibadan slezure of the road; but In any communication with the Egba a trustworthy envoy should be used as "no confidence should be placed on the Interpretation by the Rev. Mr. Townsend . . . . In the face of this advocacy a marked anti-Egba outlook became apparent In both departments, particularly noticeable at the Foreign Office, for the Colonial Offloe had Inherited such an attitude In 1861. But even here a change of opinion took place In May, when a dispatch to Freeman was drafted, but not sent, authorizing him to ^^London, March 9, 1864, F.O. 84/1233. 11®London, March 30, 1864, F.O. 84/1233. 599 occupy Ikorodu and open the road to Ibadan. But In the Foreign Office the Egba came to be considered the principal slave dealers on the coast and responsible for the war and Its continuation. On these grounds the suggestion that Ikorodu be taken and the Ibadan road forcibly opened came close to winning Russell's approval. 1 2 0 Venn was keenly aware of what was taking place and moved on two fronts. He began by sending a long letter to Cardwell detailing Egba and Lagos complaints against the colonial administration, the letter commencing with a denial of the general accusation that missionaries were mixed up In polltlos. On the contrary, he said, his men had the strictest Instructions not to Interfere, "as far as possible." The main body of the letter went on to point out that trade at Lagos had decreased since It had become a British possession, thus subverting the original Intent that legitimate commerce be promoted as a means of breaking the slave trade. Egba mistrust began with the 119In C.O. 147/6. l20F.O. to C.O., Hay 6, 1864, C.O. 147/7 600 forcible annexation of Lagos, he maintained, and had slnee been nurtured by the further acquisition of territory, by the increase in the garrison, by the attacks on Pains, Epe, and Porto Utoro, and by the protection given to Ikorodu in defiance of the protests of its ruler. The courting of Ibadan, with the express purpose of opening a new road, was certainly desirable for Lagos Interests, Venn admitted, but resulted in the unhappy position of Great Britain actively supporting Egba enemies. As for Lagos, there were complaints that private property was being confiscated for public improvements without adequate compensation and that educated Africans were being denied a just share in the ooanolls and administra tion of the town. Combined, these fears and complaints had caused British prestige to decline and resulted in the Governor enjoying less influence than the consuls who had preceded him. Venn therefore suggested that educated Africans be given a voice in government and that a Proclamation be published at Lagos, in the Queen's name, setting forth the principles by which the oolonial administration was to be guided. Besides a clear statement of the colony's polloy 601 regarding fugitive slaves, the document should specify that Great Britain had no desire to acquire territory, would take no part In Internal conflicts and would not open roads by force of arms. 121 Both the Colonial and Foreign Offices liked the suggestion, the fomer even drafting a tentative Proclamation with the notation that Venn should exaalne it to see If It was satisfactory. 122 But it was never published, nor would Venn have cared for It, for while It disclaimed the intention of participating In Internal oonfliots It left room to maneuver by excluding situations when the roads to Lagos would be blockdd. Nor did It mention African participation In government, and only renounced expansion beyond the territories already possessed. 123 in truth, Venn did not expect his sugges tion to be acted upon. Rather, he wanted some kind of documentary proof that could be produced In Parliament should conditions in Yorubaland worsen, showing the 121London, May 17, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 122May 21, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 123In C.O. 147/7. 602 Society to have warned the Government that It was pursuing the wrong course.12^ The Missionary party also took the offensive In the House of Commons. Hr. Arthur Mills, son-in-law of an earlier C.M.S. parliamentarian, Sir T. D. Aeland, attacked the governor's policies and asked for his reoall on June 9, Inquiring of Mr. Cardwell at the sane tine whether the Government had considered the expediency of relinquishing all territory on the west coast.125 The main offensive In the Commons took place the following montfc, however, when discussion of the Supply Bill reached the provision of Jfl4,355 fox' the four African settlements. A bitter attack was then launched on the expansion of Lagos and Preeman's policy toward Abeokuta. Mr. C. B. Adderley, Tory Member for Staffordshire North, gave warning that on the first day of the next Session he would ask for a Select Committee to Inquire Into the whole subject of the African l2^Venn to Lamb, London, May 23* 1864, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 125Parl. Debates, CLXXV (1864), 1456-7. 603 settlements in the hope that some, if not all, would be abandoned.12* * This missionary campaign achieved a degree of suooess. The Colonial Offloe, which had been undecided whether or not to allow Freeman to take Ikorodu, now decided against It.12? And Lord Russell also changed his mind "In view of • . . the debates that have taken place In Parliament." His Lordship was now of opinion that the Governor should not be allowed to occupy Ikorodu and like wise changed his mind about the strong letter he had proposed sending to the Egba.12® Glover's Reappointment Glover had been In England only a month when the Colonial Office learned that Major Leveson would not be returning to his post at Lagos because of his Injuries. Suspecting that Freeman's health would not permit him to lg6pari. Debates. CLXXVI (1864), 1 6 5 8-7 7. 1 2?C. 0. to F.O., London, June 24, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 128F. 0. to C.O., London, Sept. 5, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 6 0 4 remain there muoh longer, it therefore became necessary to appoint a Colonial Secretary at Lagoa who would assume control In the event of Freeman leaving. Glover was the obvious choice. He had experience on the coast and had demonstrated his faculty for staying alive, thus fulfilling the primary requirement of the position. His name was suggested even before Glover made formal application for the Job, but with his unwholesome record of extending British responsibility In 1 8 6 3 the Colonial Office was very dubious. Sir Frederic Rogers noted that the Commander had faults "akin to those which we notice In Governor Freeman— rather too much self- confidence and Impatience of opposition, and a somewhat overbearing tone." Hr. Fortesoue, the Parliamentary Under secretary, while admitting Glover to be energetic and experienced, thought that he was not likely to "act as a drag upon the Governor's wheels. He will require a tight hand." The noble Duke observed that Glover's "embarrassing government of Lagos” made him unsuitable for the appoint ment and decided to see "if I have any fitting person on 605 my list." 129 There the matter would have ended, with Glover presumably returning to aotlve nav&l service, but for one of the vagaries of history whloh dictated the immediate retirement of Newcastle for reasons of health. Cardwell took the seals of office In April, but with the Duke not having made a choice and the matter pressing, Glover was appointed Colonial Secretary and Instructed to sail by the next mall. Venn, for one, had no Illusions about what would happen If Glover assumed control of the colony. That officer called at Salisbury Square a week before sailing and had a long talk with the missionary leader concerning Lagos relation with Abeokuta. Glover singled out Townsend as the only obstacle to the pacification of Yorubaland and the consequent prosperity of Lagos, Venn gloomily report ing that the conversation "left a very painful Impression upon my mind as to the future policy of Lagos” If the worst happened and Glover became G o v e r n o r .^30 129Memoranda, March 14, 15, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 1^°Venn to Wilmot, London, May 23* 1864, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 606 As noted, the worst came to pass In July, when Freeman departed the Island In search or health and financial support for his bankrupt administration. One of his last official acts, apparently undertaken during the month-long voyage home, was to pen a thirty-age rebuttal to Vernas most recent indictment of his policies. The Colonial Office had sent Freeman a copy of Vennfs letter and asked for his comments. The Governor's reply was a countercharge against this "political society" which ended by requesting a similar public Proclamation, but this one specifying official approval of the policies of the Lagos administration. Further, the Egba should be sent a strong remonstrance for their past conduct and be told that "however much the missionaries at Abeokuta, to serve their private Interests and gain political influence, may support the Institutions of polygamy and slavery," such practices would not be condoned by the British Government. He would forget the attacks made on him by other Individ uals and societies, he concluded, "but when a body of the power and Influence of the Church Missionary Society, whose members, numbering tens of thousands of Englishmen, naturally believe the reports of their agents and above 607 all of their Committee, make a deliberate and persistent attack on me," he Insisted that public approval of himself and his policies be given so that he could retain the Influence and respect demanded by his official position.1^ With this last hurrah the first Governor of Lagos bowed out of the picture. Freeman had accomplished much In two years and a half, and against tremendous diffi culties. But he had failed In his most Important task, that of restoring peace among the Yoruba. In fairness, the failure was caused In great measure by factors beyond his control, but the mark of his failure was the Inherit ance by his successor of an empty colonial treasury. How Lieutenant-Governor Glover dealt with the bequest will be shown In the following pages. Summary It was during 1 8 6 3 that the pattern of Imperial expansion at Lagos beome clearly defined. Paradoxically, while there was a dislike of West African possessions— and Indeed a profound aversion to their enlargement— the ^^Enclosed in Freeman to Cardwell, London, Aug. 15, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 608 necessity of expansion was Imposed by the official ration ale that colonies be financially self-supporting. The Lagos administration was then forced Into expanlonlst activity by the realities of Yoruba politics and the proximity of the French, both of which conspired to deprive the colony of revenue. Thus, expansion was merely the reaction of local officials to the exigencies of the moment; In no Instance did the colony enlarge Its borders for economic exploitation• The first significant Illustration of this took place In early 1 8 6 3, when the outlying post of Palma was brought under direct control. It had been hoped that Kosoko's return to Lagos would dam this revenue drain, but Pellu's subsequent ambitions made the move essential. Soon after, Badagry was ceded to the Cyown and protector ates declared over Okeodan, Ipokia, and Ado, to make sure that revenue was not siphoned off by the French at Porto Novo. Even the Colonial Office realised this outburst to have been caused by the imperial Exchequer, but while sympathising with the Lagos predicament, It was placed In the ambivalent position of frowning on the measures taken. 609 While expansion was thus the result of Immediate condition*, the policies followed by the Lagos government were likewise dictated by mainland events and were direct ed to the sole object of realizing Income. This being the case, It was almost unavoidable that Freeman and Glover adopt policies designed to stop the war, or, that falling, to open a new road to the Interior Independent of the troublesome Egba and IJebu. But neither pressure nor cajolery produced results. Even a blockade of Abeokuta collapsed when It was realized that Lagos was more dependent on Abeokuta than vice versa. And to complete the prescription of possible courses of action open to them, the Colonial Office refused to sanction the use of troops on the mainland and Issued repeated Injunctions against Interference In Yoruba politics. With pressure on the Egba mounting, the C.M.S. took up the cudgels In their defense. Relations between Lagos and Abeokuta had been worsening since 1861, but the westward expansion of the colony In 1 8 6 3 aggravated matters even more by threatening to cut off Abeokuta from the coast completely. In fact, as the Society viewed It, Lagos policy was specifically directed against the Egba. 610 But It was In vain that Vann pleaded for a change of policy, pointing out that the ultimate object ahould bd the civilization of Yorubaland rather than the financial self-sufficiency of Lagos. The Government was beconing Increasingly persuaded that the Egba were the chief source of trouble, he found out. However, due to the concerted efforts of the Missionary party It was decided not to allow Freenan to ooeupy Ikorodu. This was some consolation to the Society, but there was precious little else— except perhaps that the godless policies being followed at Lagos had led the colony to the very brink of Insolvency. CHAPTER X THE GLOVER ADMINISTRATION, 1864-66 Faced with a critical financial situation on Freenan*a departure, Glover had to resort to radical methods. The Abeokuta and Ibadan roads being closed, one way of revitalizing trade would be by pioneering another road to the Interior, and this he attempted. A possible route lay to the west, through Ado and Okeodan, then northward to Ketu, a route which had also Interested Freeman several months previously. Freeman had Instructed the Resident Agent In the protectorates, Thomas Tlckel, to obtain all the Information he could regarding rivers and roads leading northward. 1 As part of this route lay through Dahomey, Glover Implemented Freeman's beginning by seeking Glele*s permission to traverse his country and by sending another Tlckel, Jabez, to Ado and Okeodan to ^Lagos, Dec. 14, 1863, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 611 612 pursue the matter. But the scheme was never successful. Glover*s next gambit was more radical, for It involved placating the Egba. This new departure began in July, when he sent friendly messages to Abeokuta and to the warcamp at Nakun; within a few months it resulted in an apparent reversal of his violently anti-Egba attitudes. It would seem that the pursuit of revenue could result In strange partnerships, but this union never received Divine sanction. Glover*s change of heart was more apparent than real, In fact, and his devious policy ultimately resulted In a Lagos-Abeokuta military con frontation. It Is possible that this had been G&vver's aim from the beginning. End of the War In IJebu-Remo; Glover1s New Diplomacy Various reports had reached Lagos In July to the effect that the Ibadan alliance was breaking up, that Oyo was refusing to continue Its meager effort against the Egba and had made a treaty with Ilorln. It was even 613 rumored that Ibadan was preparing to attack Oyo. 2 Whether or not the reports had any basis In Tact Is not known, but they were sufficiently widespread to persuade Ikorodu that It should take steps to protect Itself. Not only were Egba attacks becoming more frequent, with the rumor gaining credence that they Intended to make the town their own coastal outlet,3 tut a break-up of the Oyo-Ibadan-Remo alliance would probably lay the town open to che terrible vengeance of the AwuJale. In either event, Ikorodu decided to sever completely Its remaining ties with the AwuJale. Glover, seeking a chance to mollify the Egba, thereupon withdrew Lagos protection— one of the chief Egba complaints— on the ground that Ikorodu had given Itself to the Alafin of Oyo contrary to his advice. He announced the removal of the protection on August 3, by Proclamation,^ but two days earlier he had sent a message to the Egba at Makun 2Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, July 9, 1864, C.N.S. CA2/03. 3Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 3, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/086. 4In N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 614 telling them that within a few days his representative would arrive with Important news concerning Ikorodu. Thomas Tlckel was the representative* leaving Lagos on August 4 with Instructions to smooth the way for a meeting between Glover and the war chiefs,5 The removal of protection from Ikorodu led to unexpected consequences. Unknown to Qlover* the Alafln of Oyo had been attempting to negotiate a truce between Ibadan and Abeokuta* but had not met with success as Ibadan believed that It would eventually win the war with Lagos help. But the news that Lagos had given up the southern terminus of the road at Ikorodu had the decisive effect of convincing the Ibadan that their cause was now hopeless. Both sides being tired of the two-year war In Remo country* an armistlc was soon arranged under which both armies were to return home; Ijebu-Bemo towns which had sided with Ibadan were not to be claimed by Ibadan and roads were to be opened; a more comprehensive peace settle ment was to follow. 6 ^Glover to Tlckel* Lagos* Aug. 3* 1864* N.N.A. CSO 8/5* Vol. 1. 6Hlnderer to Venn* Ibadan* Sept. 6* 1864* C.N.S. CA2/049. 615 However, the evacuation of the camps was marred by a serious Incident at Ipara. The Ibadan had been given five days to decamp and had almost completed the operation when their wounded, Imagining that they were being left behind, set fire to the town.7 with that, the Egba cried "treacherjr" and fell on the Ibadan columns retiring to the north, taking great numbers of prisoners. Ibadan viewed the circumstance In a different light, con sidering the treachery to have been on the Egba side for attacking their soldiers who were returning peacefully to Ibadan.^ The occurrence delayed the conclusion of peace, but this Remo phase of the war was nevertheless concluded. Ctlover was greatly cheered by the armistice and even more so at Tlckel*s news that his proposed visit to the war camp was acceptable to the Egba chiefs. Preparing to go, he was Immediately aware that there was opposition within Lagos to the venture, an opposition which was centered In the Immigrant traders, who were ^T. Tlckel to Glover, Iperu, Aug. 29, 1664, C.O. 147/6. ®Roper to Venn, Ibadan, March 1, 1665, C.M.S. CA3/049. 616 warning the Egba that Glover was coming to destroy them. Their concern, no doubt, was that the advent of peace would no longer allow them to plead the dearth of trade as an excuse for not paying their debts.9 Glover settled the Issue by threatening to Impose martial law on the colony, and after the Ikorodu chiefs had told him of their decision to surrender to the Egba and asked that he procure for them what terms he could, he left for the Egba camp on September 7 . Glover's Proposals His meetings with the war chiefs lasted three days and were quite amicable after the chiefs had overcame their original suspicions. They voiced their complaints against Lagos, which boiled down to their concern over slaves finding refuge on the Island and their chagrin over' the prohibition of powder being exported from the colony, an embargo which Glover had Imposed the previous September. On his part, Glover refrained from reciting his complaints ^Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1864, C.O. 147/6; Lamb to C.H.S., Lagos, Sept. 9, 1864, C.N.S. CA2/ 03; Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 2, 1864, C.N.S. CA2/085. 617 against the Egba, and after agreeing to remove the powder restriction he made four proposals. First, Abeokuta and Lagos should exchange consuls; second, trade on the river should be more strictly controlled and supervised; third, an Egba-Lagos boundary be established and unauthorized passage between the two places stopped, and lastly, that an agreement be reached on the extradition of criminals. In return, Glover gave permission for them to take Ikorodu, which he Insisted had to be accomplished within ten days on pain of Lagos taking a hand In the dispute. Ikorodu having been captured, the chiefs agreed to sign a treaty alone the lines of Glover's proposals. 1 0 That Glover should have thought the Egba capable of enforcing such sophisticated provisions as the treaty suggested Is surprising In Itself. Even more surprising Is his Ignorance of the fact that the war chiefs did not possess the authority to make an agreement such as this, an agreement that would affect the entire Egba nation. Egba law and tradition demanded that matters of such portent be discussed before the entire assemblage of elders 10Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Oct. 10, 1864, C.O. 147/6. 618 and civil chiefs. However, most difficult to understand Is Glover giving the Egba permission to take Ikorodu, If It could be accomplished within ten days. This was such a drastic reversal of policy that It warrants closer examination. On one hand It can be argued that Glover, desperate for the resuaqptlon of trade, was willing to overcome his antipathies toward the Egba and allow them to take the town. But this supposition Is open to so many arguments that It Is difficult to entertain. First Is the matter of his active dislike for the Egba, originally conceived when they robbed goods belonging to his Niger expedition, nurtured by many succeeding circumstances and so prosilnently displayed during his recent visit to England. 11 Then there Is the Inclination of his laisses faire beliefs, which had always been aggravated by Egba control over trade routes; to give them Ikorodu would Improve their favored position while rendering Lagos even more vulnerable to Abeokuta caprices. And Qlover had always been convinced that the ultimate 11Supra,pp. 596*r98 619 cause of the war was the struggle for control of trade; to strengthen the Egba position would surely be Inviting yet another war and Its consequential difficulties for the colony. Perhaps the most cogent of all objections to the supposition that Qlover was willing to let Ikorodu fall Into Egba hands la the argument that the Egba at Ikorodu would represent a real threat to the safety of Lagos. The tentative treaty proposed by Glover had Inherent In It the notion that Lagos territory extended on the mainland to some undefined boundary with the Egba. To allow them to extend their possessions as far as Ikorodu would be at once to push the Lagos frontiers back to the lagoon, and with a powerful people between the Island and the Interior, the colony would become quite dependent. Further, the Egba at Ikorodu would represent a military threat to the Island. Flushed with victory over Dahomey and Ibadan, they might not be content with limiting their frontiers on the lagoon but might even attempt to assault Lagos Itself. And lastly, Lagos was not self-sufficient, but relied on foodstuffs from the mainland. Ikorodu In Egba hands would thus gravely 620 Imperil the island's very existence. It Is possible to assume that Glover, naively, thought that the only Egba objeotlve In attacking Ikorodu was to return the town to the allegiance of the Awujale, and this done, return peacably to their homes. But Glover knew perfectly well that the Egba could not even begin the Invasion of Ikorodu within ten days, let alone complete it. And If once begun, the siege would linger Indefinitely, as was the hallt of Yoruba warfare, to the continued detriment of trade, which was Glover's Intent to resume as quickly as possible. Above all, Glover certainly did not want an Egba army, sustained only by plunder, remaining In the environs of Lagos for months on end. Ruling out these possibilities, there remains one other: that Glover's Invitation to take Ikorodu was a ruse de guerre designed to entice the Egba to the water's edge. There, Lagos military and naval strength could be most effectively brought to bear, and pleading self- defense he could administer the lesson which he had long been urging to demonstrate the fact that Lagos was master of the situation. Such a plan possessed additional benefit In that Ibadan would probably not countenance Egba possession of Ikorodu and would participate In a campaign to dislodge them. There was also the possibility that the Awujale of IJebu would consider the presence of Egba In his town with a distaste equal to that with which he regarded the Lagos protectorate and could be persuaded to Join Ibadan In driving out the Invaders. If this happened, Glover could consign the Egba to their fate while having the best of both worlds: Egba gratitude for allowing them to "take" Ikorodu, peace, Ibadan with a road to the Interior and the colony's revenue at last freed from Its dependence on trade with Abeokuta. The Noose Tightened In pursuit of these devious objectives the Lieutenant-Governor Imposed a naval "blockade” on Ikorodu on the tenth day after his agreement with the Egba war- chief s and In accordance with the stipulation that he would Interfere If the town had not fallen by that time. 1 2 The blockade served the dual purpose of showing the Egba l2Glover to Lieut.-Commander Montroy, H.M.S, Handy. Lagos, Sept. 27, 1864, N.N.A. C30 8/5, Vol. 1. 622 that he was on their side, while Insuring against Egba adventures which might be directed at Lagos. But as Glover well knew, the Egba siege and the naval blockade did not deprive the town of supplies, for Its defenders had their backs to the lagoon and had no difficulty In meeting their requirements from IJebu country or Lagos itself.*3 In fact It was a blockade In name only. As far as Glover was concerned, a further benefit accrued from the show of naval strength In that It con vinced Ikorodu that Lagos was against It. The town thus accepted the Awujale1a peace terms of forty-two slaves and jfl20 of cowries. Ikorodu thereupon returned to Its former allegiance, but with the Egba siege continuing the Awujale began to be annoyed at his allies.1^ Then, continuing his policy of playing one against the other, Glover removed the prohibition against the export of powder to the mainland, a particular source of Egba annoyance. ^Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Dec. 9, 1864, C.O. 147/6. l2*Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Dec. 9, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/03. 623 With some Justification, the Colonial Office was extremely puzzled over Glover's apparent volte face. Sir Frederic Rogers confessed that the transactions were very obscure: "After a prolonged state of differences with the Egbas, we have now suddenly made ourselves their active ally against the people whom previously we had been encouraging to resist them," he wrote, and he experienced "uncomfortable misgivings" at this "remarkable and Instantaneous change of conduct." Sir George Barrow wanted to know what had become of the Independent Ibadan road to the coast, which they had always been told was of so much moment.*5 Nr. Secretary Cardwell was likewise concerned about Glover's decided Intervention In favor of the Egba and requested a full explanation for the encouragement Glover had given for the attack on Ikorodu, a town which had enjoyed British protection and been encouraged to resist the Egba.1^ A full explanation would have been based on the necessity of securing an adequate revenue for the colony ^Memoranda, Nov. 14, 1864, C.O. 147/6. ^Cardwell to Glover, London, Nov. 23, 1864. C.O. 420/2. 624 and would have hinged upon official reluctance to permit the colonial government to Interfere militarily on the mainland. Glover did not furnish such a basic explanation; Instead, he wrote a report which although not explicit, made It clear that his prime objectives remained unchanged, that Is, the defeat of the Egba and an Independent road for Ibadan. His dispatch reported the continuing Egba siege of Ikorodu but assured the Secretary that the town was able to secure food and powder. Disagreement between the Egba and the Awujale over the siege was growing, he wrote, as was the unrest among the coastal people over the presence of an Egba army. Ibadan, meanwhile, had threatened to enlist the entire Yoruba country unless they returned to Abeokuta and Ibadan warriors were reported harrying the Egba rear. Glover also noted with satisfaction that private Information he had received made It quite clear that the Egba would not be able to take the town. All this led to the conclusion that his policy was bearing fruit, that peace would be restored and that the Ibadan 625 road through Ikorodu would be opened.^7 He Might have added that If his plan to surreptitiously form a Yoruba alliance against the Egba did not materialize, he had already approached the Senior Officer of the Bights Division about providing naval support for a military con frontation with the Egba.1^ One way or another, the Egba had been drawn Into his trap. Colonel Ord at Lagos No important changes took place In the general situation around Lagos during December but the Christmas season was enlivened by the arrival of Colonel H. St. George Ord on a Colonial Office assignment. Cardwell, taking note of Hr. Adderley's statement that he Intended asking for a Select Committee to Investigate the whole question of West African colonies, decided to send a commissioner to the four settlements and so have an up-to- date report on hand when the Committee was organized. Ord was chosen for the task, an engineer officer who was 17Dec. 9, 1864, C.O. 147/6. ^Glover to Lieut.-Commander Knowles, Lagos, Nov. 9, 1864, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 626 Governor of Bermuda and who happened to be home on leave when Cardwell was casting about for a suitable man. Ord1s broad Instructions were to visit the colonies and report on their success or failure with respect to the suppression of the slave trade and Its replacement by legitimate commerce; he was to suggest how Improvements might be made to attain this objective more completely. Venn had been trying desperately to secure such an Inquiry concerning Lagos, with Wllmot as commis sioner, but he was pleased, nevertheless, at Ord1s appointment.^9 He met the officer before his departure, then sent him a lengthy Minute concerning relations between the settlements and the native races, at the same time enclosing the names of the missionaries who would have most to contribute to the Inquiries concerning Lagos. Significantly, Venn named Townsend, Wood, Lamb, Buhler and Maser, the men most outspoken In their opposition to the colonial government and the most pro-Egba In outlook, not ^Venn to Wllmot, London, Sept. 22, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 627 mentioning Mann, Roper or Hlnderer, who fully supported the Qovernor and were vociferously pro-Ibadan. 2 0 The Colonel arrived In Lagos on December 18 and spent a busy four weeks traveling around the colony. Townsend came down from Abeokuta for a long and private discussion, during which he urged a more conciliatory policy toward his people. But he studiously avoided making outright complaints against Glover, especially as his current policy seemed bent on assuaging the Egba; In fact Townsend commended Glover's apparent change of heart. On his part, Ord let It be known that he thought It most Important for the two men to work In harmony, and Townsend readily agreed to subscribe to "any policy of concili ation, " He was optimistic about the outcome of the Inquiry and the Colonel promised to report fully to Hr. Venn. 21 Ord was also presented with two petitions, one from Docemo and the other from the Sierra Leone 20Venn to Ord, with enclosure, London, Oct. 25, 1864, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 21 Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, June 9> 1365, C.M.S. CA2/03; Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Dec. 29, 1864, Abeokuta, March 8, 1865, In C.M.S. CA^/085. 628 Immigrants; both were critical of the colonial adminis tration. Docemo complained that his pension was not paid regularly, often being withheld at the whim of the Gover nor, and protested the displays of military strength which were alarming the neighboring tribes. The Saro complaints were more detailed. They had hailed the cession of Lagos with joy, they wrote, even though It had been forced on the king, but experience since then had not fulfilled their expectations. The annexations of Palma, Badagry, Okeodan and Ado, the proliferation of armed power, the attacks on Epe, Porto Novo, and Ejerln had all led to a great mistrust of the Lagos administration. 2 2 Things had been much better under a consul, they claimed, and they asked specifically for jury trials, a sore point for the Saros, who frequently found themselves hauled before the commercial court on debt charges only to find the officiating European to be the person filing the action or one of his business colleagues. 22ln C.M.S. CA3/09. 629 Colonel Ord*s findings were quickly published,23 but the section dealing with Lagos proved a great dis appointment to the C.N.S. He reiterated all the arguments of Freeman and Glover concerning the legitimacy of British claims to Badagry and Palma, stated that Okeodan and Ado had become protectorates of their own volition, laid the blame for the deterioration of condi tions between Lagos and Abeokuta on the Egba and referred to the IJaye war as an attempt by Ibadan to overthrow the objectionable trade monopoly of the Egba and IJebu. As for the Lagos administration, he considered It to be perfectly Impartial; Its sole purpose was to secure peace and reopen trade. The cession of Lagos had been quite necessary, he reported, and recommended that the four settlements be governed by a central authority at Sierra Leone,a recommendation subsequently seconded by the Adderley Committee and Implemented In 1866. 23NReport of Colonel Ord, the Commissioner appointed to Inquire Into the Condition of the British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa," Pari. Papers. XXXVII (1865), 170. 240rd Report, pp. 24-27, 33. Glover'b Plans Near Fruition 630 While Ord'8 contention that the sole purpose of the Lagos government was to secure peace and reopen trade cannot be denied, the colonel's opinion of Glover's impartiality is not so defensible. This was shown early in the new year, when the direction and objectives of his plans became more apparent. This growing illumination was no doubt aided by the greater freedom of action Glover enjoyed when the French Admiral decided in December to withdraw his country's protection over Porto Novo. This decision had been taken as the result of the Porto Novo chiefs' refusal to heed his injunction against taking Yoruba hostages in exchange for slaves who fled to Lagos, and Rear-Admiral de LadAbat's realization that he had insufficient means to enforce his order.25 As far as Glover was concerned, this opened new visions of a western route to the interior in the event that the Egba proved 2^De Ladebat to Glover, Lagos, Dec. 21, 1664, C.O. 147/9; de Ladebat to Chasseloup-Laubat, Dec. 22, 1864, Miniature des Affaires Istrageres, Afrique/52, in C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers; European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and AdJa-Speak- ing Peoples of South-Western Nigeria. Southern Dahomey and Togo (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 1), p. 71. 631 recalcitrant, and he lost no time In paying his personal respects to Mlkpon, the new king of Forto Novo. Following a friendly visit In mid-January, when Mlkpon agreed to levy the sane tariffs as Lagos, Glover suspended the fifty per cent drawback and appointed the ubiquitous Thomas Tlckel as Resident Agent at Mlkpon1s court, "to exercise Influence over the councils of the King" and to counteract the opposition against the new duties that Glover expected from the Forto Novo merchants.2^ This stroke of fortune allowed Glover to turn his attention to the execution of his plans to construct an anti-Egba Ibadan-IJebu alliance. During January he began an active correspondence with the IJebu-Ode war-chiefs In an attempt to detach them from their Egba ties. The campaign was successful to the point that by early February they were considering an attack against the Egba encampment at Ikorodu.27 The IJebu-Remo chiefs needed little persuasion, their commercial sympathies to Ibadan 26oiover to Cardwell, Lagos, Jan. 31, 1865, C.O. 147/8. ^"Report of messengers from the Baloguns of IJebu-Ode," In Farl. Papers. XXXVII (1 8 6 5), pT 24. 632 already being firmly established, to say nothing of the fact that Ikorodu was a Remo town.2& Simultaneously, Qlover was urging Ikorodu to greater exertions and nocturnally supplying powder for Its defense.However, although the Ibadan expressed "united Joy” at the prospect of their own road and a Lagos-IJebu partnership against the E g b a ,30 they appeared little Inclined to take the step Glover required of them— a large-scale expedition to forcibly eject the Egba from Ikorodu. Instead, they commenced skirmishing operations against outlying Abeokuta farms.31 With his plan now developing reasonably well, Glover dropped his pretence of friendship for the Egba and began an overt csmpalgn. First blockading the mouth of the Ogun to forestall a water-borne attack against the 20 The correspondence with the IJebu chiefs Is enclosed In Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Feb. 7, 1 8 6 3, C.O. 147/8. 2^Maser to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 3, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/ 0 6 8. •?o The Oton Balogun to Glover, Ibadan, Feb. 12, 1 8 6 5, C.O. 147/^ 31Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Feb. 6, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/03. 633 Ikorodu rear, he then wrote to Townsend and the senior Ogboni chief at Abeokuta complaining about the lack of accord between the Egba civil and military chiefs and the continuing stoppage of trade, protesting also about the threat posad to Lagos by the Egba and giving them until the end of February to lift the siege. If this was not done, he threatened to take "all necessary measures" to protect Lagos and open the Remo road to Ibadan. Townsend protested their apparent change of policy and of the termination of the brief period of conciliation. But Glover now bared his knuckles. He had finished placating the Egba, he replied, and was imposing a com plete blockade on Abeokuta. He had no ill-will against the Egba but was resolved to have trade resumed and open an unhindered route to the interior. Consequently, he was in communication with Ibadan and the IJebu, he concluded, and unless the Egba withdrew from Ikorodu, "their destruction is sure.”33 But the Egba were as Intractable 32Giover to Townsend, Lagos, Jan. 30, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/04; Glover to Asalu, Lagos, Feb. 14, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 33Lagos, March 6, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/04. 634 under duress as they were under blandishment; they would move from Ijebu territory just as soon as Ibadan moved from the Egba ancestral homeland, Glover now made one last effort to ooalesce the Ibadan-Remo-Ode alliance and prod it into a concerted military attack. An officer of the 5th West India Regiment was sent to Ofln to meet the Akarlgbo of Remo and representatives of Ibadan and Ode, to impress upon them "the necessity of relieving Ikorodu with as little delay as possible ..." Further, he was to explain that Glover was prohibited from commencing hostilities "until some act of aggression had been committed . • • within the juris diction of this government.” This done, he was to make arrangements for the opening of the Ibadan road.34 In the event, the officer was unable to reach Ofln and Glover sent a second emissary, this time to Ibadan. Nr. Naxwell of H.M.3. Investigator was received very warmly by the Oton, newly returned from successful forays against Egba villages close to Abeokuta. He agreed to do everything Glover desired regarding the road, protested ^Glover to Ensign Barrow, Lagos, March 1, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 635 his earnest desire for peace and trade, but refused Glover's request to release Rev. Roper from his long con finement. Moreover, he demurred against mounting an Immediate offensive at Ikorodu, doubtless hoping to under take more raids on Egba villages while the Egba warriors were away; In fact Maxwell was Instead requested to ask Glover to relieve the city.35 Springing the Trap The futility of the embassy was relieved only by Maxwell taking Mrs. Hlnderer back to the coast, a victim of long war-time privations. But this was of little comfort to Glover, faced with the collapse of his plan to form an effective antl-Egba alliance. With the Ibadan not yet willing to move and with the rains about to start— thus precluding a large-scale land operation for six months or so— Glover was faced with a dilemma. Anticipating a favorable response to Maxwell's mission he had already put Into effect his coordinating plans. A complete blockade of Abeokuta had been ^Maxwell to Glover, Lagos, March 25, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 636 proclaimed on March 15, extending aa far west as Cotonou. Besides the Interdict on all goods, the blockade also stopped mall between Lagos and Abeokuta and prohibited personal travel to that city; any Egba In Lagos were instructed to return home within five days. This was followed on March 18 by martial law being proclaimed over a large district between the Ogun and Igbessa rivers, and from the lagoon to as far north as Otta. In addition, pressure was exerted on Okeodan and Otta to stop all trade with Abeokuta under pain of military occupation. Then on March 23 Qlover went to Ikorodu for a two-day visit,36 presumably to alert the town of his Immediate plans. On his return he called together his Council and told them that If Ikorodu was taken by the Egba they would become the "sole arbiters of the prosperity or ruin of the whole country." They should be dislodged at once.37 The Council agreed, of course, as did the senior military 3^aiover to Lieut. Sealy, 4th W.I. Regt., Lagos, March 18, 1 8 6 3, Glover to Lieut. Sandys, R.N., Lagos, April 27, 1865, in N.N.A. CSO 8/ 5, Vol. 1; Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, April 8, 1 8 6 5, C.M.S. CA2/03. ^Minutes of Lagos Executive Council, March 27, I865, in C.O. 147/9. 637 officer, a Lieutenant, and the senior naval officer, a Lieutenant-Commander. The approval was of importance to Glover, not only to justify the action he was about to take but to vindicate himself in case of offlolal disapproval. This done, he moved swiftly. The following day he embarked some 270 men of the West India Regiment, the Housa armed police and the available sailors and marines, and landed them at Ikorodu. The Egba were given a twenty- four hour ultimatum to lift the siege and return home, which was rejected, whereupon an immediate attack was launched on the two main Egba camps. In the face of cannon and rocket fire the Egba broke and ran, leaving many dead and wounded. In Glover*s words, it was a "brilliant achievement" which placed "the arbitration of all pending disputes entirely within the hands of this government."^ Two days later it was followed by an equally effective Ibad&n-Remo attack on the Egba at Makun. The Egba streamed back to Abeokuta from both places. 3®Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, April 3, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 638 Glover’s official report sought skillfully and successfully to exculpate himself for violating long standing and oft-repeated orders, at the same time throwing an aura of heroism over a brutal attack. Ikorodu had been on the verge of exhaustion, he wrote— which In Itself was a clear refutation of his previous reports. He therefore considered It time to render effectual aid, "In compliance with the ejqpressed request of the surrounding tribes," not explaining that the "surrounding tribes" were at war with the Egba and that he himself had solicited the request. He was also Influenced by a "threatened Invasion" of Lagos, he went on, a "possible” scarcity of food In the colony and the entire suppression of trade.39 aiover did not explain that the attack was launched as soon as the Egba had rejected the ultimatum, despite the fact that the ultimatum was for twenty-four hours.Nor did he mention that the Europeans In Lagos 39aiover to Cardwell, Lagos, April 5, 1865, C.O. 147/8. ^Lieut. Sealy to Olover, Lagos, April 5, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 639 dismissed as fantastic the notion of an Egba Invasion of the Island; and neither did he tell Mr. Cardwell that one of the naval officers who participated in the affair maintained that It was entirely unnecessary. But Glover emphasized that the attack was made In concurrence with the views of the Council and the military and naval authorities, and under these circumstances asked for official approval. While requesting to be Informed of the evidence upon which Glover had based his apprehension that Lagos would be Invaded, Cardwell approved the Governor's actions and defended them In the House. It was a clear case of self-defense, he said.^3. The Egba fall to Capitulate With the blockade of Abeokuta still vigorously enforced, Glover was surprised that there was not an Immediate Egba offer to submit to his terms. But In accordance with English tradition he blamed "evil council" rather than the Egba themselves, and Rev. Lamb, in Lagos, was forced to listen to torrents of abuse directed against 4lParl. Debates. CLXXIX (1865), 389-90. 640 his colleagues at Abeokuta. Lamb himself was upbraided for not conducting a thanksgiving service for the great victory and deliverance at Ikorodu, and was told to warn those "pestilent fellows" at Abeokuta what the conse quences of their policy would be; the threatened consequences were so ridiculous that Lamb would not repeat them to the Society. * * 2 Under these circumstances, Glover attached much significance to a letter received from Townsend In mid- April which asked about the terms he had proposed to the war-chiefs In September; If Glover would let him know, Townsend would begin negotiations.**3 Delighted at what he Imagined to be the Egba capitulation, the Lieutenant- Governor replied immediately; but his terms reflected the heavy hand of the conqueror rather than the lighter touch of the conciliator. The object of any negotiation was the permanent settlement of peace for the entire country, he wrote. And regardless of a treaty, the blockade would continue until all produce stored at Abeokuta had been * * 2Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, May 6, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/ 03. ^Abeokuta, April 13, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 641 sent to Lagos. This done, the terms of the treaty would Include the delineation of common boundaries, the exchange of consuls, regulation of canoes on the river, extradition of criminals, and an Egba apology for the rejection of vice-consul Taylor. The primary condition for exploratory talks was that the Egba nominate someone of authority with whom he could treat.^ Glover's devious ways continued, however, Writing to his "good friend" the Oton of Ibadan on the same day to Inform him of this Egba overture, he said that the blockade would continue until Abeokuta submitted to the peace terms which he and the Oton would decide upon con jointly. One of the conditions, he wrote, would be Egba acceptance of the Ibadan road^5— a point he had not mentioned to Townsend. But at this moment Glover was supremely confident that he was master of the situation and could Impose what terms he chose. Traders were flocking to the markets of Ikorodu and EJerln, an Ibadan- IJebu agreement was about to be made concerning the tolls 44 Lagos, April 17, 1865, C.O. 147/8. ^5Lagos, April 17, 1865, C.O. 147/8. 642 to be charged on the Ibadan road, and with some Justifi cation he could boast that his policies were resulting In the colony's prospects assuming a brighter hue than they had since Lagos had been added to the Crown.^6 For self- preservation, the Egba would obviously have to accede to any demand that Lagos cared to make. Or so Qlover thought. But the Egba proved to be a tougher nut to crack than the Lleutenant-Oovernor had Imagined. For one thing, the defeat at Ikorodu was never forgotten, and added to the fear which had persisted since 1861 that Britain wished to envelop the whole country, resulted In even greater bitterness and distrust.^7 it wa& this suspicion, rather than any clearly defined Egba policy, that made It Impossible for Qlover or his successors In the next decade to devise an agreement that would be accepted. In addition, and to Qlover's chagrin, the blockade of Abeokuta was not completely effective. The naval commander at Lagos, despite Qlover's pleas, withdrew i i & Qlover to Cardwell, April 9, 1865, C.O. 147/8. ^Maser to Venn, Abeokuta, June 2, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/068. 643 his blockade in the western lagoon as being contrary to Commodore Wllmot's Instructions, which forbade the use of naval vessels for any duty other than the protection of British life and property.^8 This gave the Egba access to the Porto Novo market, via Okeodan, a route Qlover tried to shut In May when he sent an officer to Okeodan threatening to occupy the town unless the Egba traders were expelled. But far from ejqpelllng them, Okeodan refused admittance to Qlover1s messenger.^9 ^®Lleut.-Commander J. Q. McHardy to Qlover, Lagos, April 2 8, 1863, Qlover to Wllmot, Lagos, May 1, 1 8 6 5, In N.N.A. CSO 8/ 3, Vol. 1. An active antipathy existed be tween Wllmot and Qlover, arising on one hand from Wllmot's dislike of the other's pushing ways and his readiness to resort to force. On the other, Qlover could not bear the Commodore's Interference In political affairs, carried on at two levels: there were his close ties and active com munication with Abeokuta, and there was the Commodore's veto over the use of ships, a situation that resulted In the navy, rather than the Governor, being the final arbi ter of policy. Their quarrel waxed hot during 1 8 6 3, reach ing all the way to the Admiralty, the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The Colonial Office Imagined there to be a well- defined prejudice In the Royal Navy against Qlover and a readiness on the part of naval officers to unduly slight his administration at Lagos. In C.O. 147/6, 147/9. ^Qlover to Commander Rellands, Senior Officer of the Bights Division, Lagos, May 19, 1 8 6 3, N.N.A. CSO 8/3, Vol. 1; Rev. Lancelot Nicholson to C.M.S., Lagos, June 9, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/03* 644 Nevertheless, negotiations between Lagos and Abeokuta were carried on for many months during 1865, with Townsend acting as the Egba intermediary. At one point, in July, it appeared to Qlover as though his terms were to be accepted and he lifted the blockade to the extent that goods from Abeokuta were allowed into Lagos. But this hopeful development collapsed when Qlover refused to accept two of the three representatives designated by the Egba to conduct further negotiations. All three were British subjects, in fact one was an Englishman, a trader residing at Abeokuta, but they were not Qlover1 s idea of Egba representatives empowered to reach a settlement of outstanding issues.50 In this he was perfectly correct. Townsend had pointed out to Qlover that Egba custom required such weighty Issues to be debated by all the elders of the town, in council, and Qlover had been invited to Abeokuta for the purpose. He had refused to go, however, and preferred to regard the subsequent choice of the three commissioners •^Glover to Cardwell, with enclosures, Lagos, July 7, 8, Sept. 7, 1865, C.O. 147/9. 645 as a trick designed to throw on Lagos the onus of breaking off the negotiations.51 End of the Ijaye War In truth, during July and August, both sides were engrossed In affairs other than their mutual antagonisms and suspicions. Peace messeages were exchanged between Ibadan and Abeokuta In July, notable prisoners were returned and mutual opportunities granted for ransoming relations and friends captured during the past five years. Both sldeB called In their roving kidnapers and by the following month the roads between the two cities were open. The Ijaye war was In fact over. No decision had been reached as to the ultimate outcome of the Yoruba power struggle, signifying that It would resume some time In the future. But the war had brought many changes. Ijaye, as a city and as a possible successor-state to Oyo, had been removed completely from further consideration; Oyo, thoroughly dominated by Ibadan, had become just as much a cipher. Lagos had entered the struggle, to the ^Qlover to Cardwell, Sept. 7> 1865, C.O. 147/9. 646 relative detriment of Abeokuta and advantage of Ibadan, and had to be counted as a future Imponderable. But In the meantime a peace of sorts was arranged, a mark of Its uneasiness being that Ibadan was again preparing for war against the Egba within weeks of hostilities being concluded.52 As for the coveted prize of the war, the road to Ibadan, IJebu messengers at Ibadan made It clear In early September that no right of transit through their country was to be granted. Things were to be Just as they were before the war, with trade safely In IJebu hands.53 Moves against Porto Novo While the Egba were thus settling affairs with their Yoruba neighbors, Qlover was attempting to settle affairs with his Gun neighbors at Porto Novo. Like Freeman before and other governors after, the unfailing reaction when trade and revenue were disrupted at Lagos was to turn to Porto Novo, and under one pretext or another ^^lover to the Oton Balogun of Ibadan, Lagos, Sept. 25, 1865, C.O. 147/9. 53Rev. Joseph Smith, Journal. Ibadan, Sept. 4, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/O83. 647 seek approval for Its annexation In order to close that costly customs gap. Although business revived after the attack on Ikorodu and oil began flowing Into Lagos In volume so great that It piled up because of Insufficient shipping, the boom had no Immediate effect on the colony's revenue, which was based on Import duties. Traders were caught unawares by the volume of business, their small stocks of goods were quickly depleted and because trade had been at a standstill for so long, no regular or sizeable shipments from Europe were expected. Consequently, the colonial exchequer benefited not one whit from the rejuvenation of trade. In fact Qlover was forced to send Maxwell to Freetown In May to borrow Jf3,000 from whatever source he could. Anxiously awaiting his return, he was obliged to ask the military commander for a loan of Jfl,000 to meet the colony's current obligations. This chronic condition existed for the rest of the year. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore looked anxiously for some pretext which he could claim as pro vocation for taking drastic measures against Porto Novo, and In August appeared to find one In the report that two 648 Lagos women had been so Ill-treated there that they had died. With this, he dispatched a gunboat to lodge strong protests, quickly-following this Initial reaction with a personal visit. Finding the naval officer to have been "Insulted," Qlover Imposed a fine of seventy puncheons of oil on the king, stationed a gunboat off-shore In the hope of cowing the town Into submission, allowed seven days for the fine to be paid and Informed King Mlkpon that a British official would henceforth reside there.5^ In filing his report, Qlover complained of con sistent violations of the 1832 and 1861 treaties with Porto Novo, but thought It "unnecessary ... to specify what particular articles . . . have been violated." As an afterthought, he did mention that six hundred people had become human sacrifices at Porto Novo and that two women had recently lost their lives. But as Mlkpon had refused to accept a British agent and the fine had not been paid, Qlover suggested one of three alternatives. He could remove Mlkpon and replace him with the pliant son of ^Qlover to Lieut.-Comm. McHardy, Lagos, Aug. 18, I865, Porto Novo, Aug. 29, 1863, In N.N.A. CSO 8/1, Vol. 1. 649 Sodjl, the late king; he could station a ship there permanently to force the acceptance of a British agent, or he could take the place Immediately, the annexation to be confined to "the narrowest limits." The latter was the best plan by far, he thought, and would meet with the approval of the European merchants at Porto Novo as well as the majority of the Inhabitants of that town. This plan would cost nothing, he hastened to emphasize, the additional revenue more than offsetting the cost of administration.55 Awaiting a reply, Glover's style was somewhat cramped by the Commodore1s strict Injunction to the captain of Investigator that he was not to fire a single shot at Porto Novo, despite Glover's demands, without the express sanction of the Imperial government or unless the safety of Lagos was at stake.56 But still hopeful, Glover kept the ship there for months, even though Cardwell told 55oiover to Cardwell, Lagos, Sept. 7, 1865, C.O. 147/9. 56tfiimot to McHardy, H.M.S. Rattlesnake, Ascension, Oct. 5, 1 8 6 5, C.O. 147/10. 650 him that the step was not likely to be sanctioned by the Government.57 New Tactics Toward the Egba Having done what was Immediately possible at Porto Novo and hopeful that the continued threatening presence of the gunboat would Induce Mlkpon to "voluntarily" cede his possessions, Commander Glover returned to his main problem, the Egba. His embargo was working no great hardship on them, for besides the accessible markets of Porto Novo, the road through XJebu was open and they could procure anything they needed at Ibadan. There was really no point In continuing the Interdict any longer. Glover therefore decided on a new approach. He was loath to back down completely from the position he had felt so recently to be one of supreme authority, so he seized upon the comparatively minor Issue of compensation for past Egba robberies. He lifted the embargo, but on September 13 he Imposed an ad valorem duty of two-and-a-half per cent on all goods leaving Lagos ^London, Oct^ 23, 1865, C.O. 420/2. 651 for Abeokuta until restitution had been made. Simultan eously, he prohibited the export of arms and powder and a week later Imposed a comprehensive prohibition against European traders, British citizens and other subjects of the Queen trading or traveling to Abeokuta.There were no restrictions whatsoever on Egba traders or travelers, and Qlover exempted missionary goods from the export tax, but the missionaries, like the Saros, were stopped from traveling. Qlover was not greatly Interested In collecting compensation for the robberies; rather, his aim was to divert the Interior trade from Abeokuta to the Ibadan road. The tax, he thought, would go a long way toward this, while the removal of European merchants from Abeokuta, with whom Interior merchants and oll-producers could deal direct, would complete It. At the same time there would be a good chance that the Saros at Abeokuta, most affected by his decrees, would counsel the Egba to come to terms with the colonial administration.59 -^Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Oct. 6, 1 8 6 5, C.O. 147/9. 59o3,0ver to Cardwell, Lagos, Sept. 7, 1865, C.O. 147/9. Egba ReActlons: the Board of Management Qlover was disappointed on all counts. As shall be seen, the Colonial Office did not like the tax, did not like his prohibition against the movement of persons and did not like the sums embargo, which was directed at the Egba particularly. By far the most Interesting reaction to Glover's decrees came from Abeokuta, however, where Instead of the Saros advising compliance to the wishes of the Governor, a new political entity was formed, the Egba United Board of Management. The origins of the Board are obscure. It was first mentioned a few days after the new tax had been Imposed, when the Basorun Informed Glover that In future all correspondence should be addressed to the Board.6° A fortnight later Townsend first remarked on the new organi zation, referring to the members of the Board as Sierra Leone men who had been deprived of their commercial activity by Glover's decrees, and having to be busy about something had become the letter-wrlters for the 6°Abeokuta, Sept. 18, 1865, C.O. 147/9. 653 Basorunf1 But as Townsend well knew, letter-writers were more than scribes: they were close personal advisers to the chiefs. The Board of Management was the direct result of the processes of acculturation, and It manifested Its cultural obligation with a marked anti-European bias. The Treasurer was J. M. Turner, mentioned previously,^ 2 the President-General of the Board was the Egba Basorun, but the man who wielded the real power was the Secretary, George William Johnson. "Reversible” Johnson was a tailor by trade, who had gained his nickname by devising a kerchief with the design on both sides; he was from Sierra Leone, had been to England and had resided In Abeokuta only a few months.^3 The Board comprised a few literate Saros, traders and clerksj at the most, It was an attempt to form a compromise government between the traditional rulers and ^•^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Oct. 2, 1 8 6 5, C.M.S. CA2/O8 5. ^2Supra, pp. 589-90. ^^Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, Oct. 24, 1865, C.M.S. C A 3/068. 654 the new literate element; at the least* It was an attempt by a minority of the Saros to make their voices heard In Egba councils. The Nigerian historian* S. 0. Blebaku* has referred to the Board as an "empty bureaucracy* parading sovereign pretensions,"^4 while a contemporary American considers It an early manifestation of Nigerian "nationalism."^-* Jiobaku comes much closer to the mark* for the organization evinced a provincial Egba exclusive ness* with an anti-European flavor* rather than an embryonic nationalism. But It did assume the responsi bility of conducting relations with Lagos* and although Townsend tried to Influence this new elite he was unsuccessful.^ ^ *The Egba and their Neighbours. 1842-1872 ( Oxford: Unlverslty™3ress7~3557T7TpTH5oI ^-*Jean H. Kopy toff* "Two Types of Early Nigerian Nationalism: Sierra Leonlana In Lagos and Abeokuta*" a paper presented at the sixth annual meeting of the African Studies Association* October* 1 9 6 3• s*1** reported In African Studies Bulletin (New York: African Studies Association* 1 9 6 3), Vol. VI, No. 4* p. 44. 66 Townsend to Venn* Abeokuta* March 8* 1866* C.M.S. CA2/085. 655 The first major act of the Board was to stop all produce going to Lagos, on pain of death.^7 Then, amid rumors that Townsend was to be expelled, all Europeans were summoned to a great council at the Basorun1s compound on October 30. The meeting was held to voice Egba displeasure at Townsend, who was charged with being Glover's ally and privy to his scheme of attacking the Egba at Ikorodu while masquerading as their friend. The meeting debated the Ikorodu fiasco at length, and after the Basorun had expressed the fervent wish that Glover would be carried away by small-pox, Townsend was asked to return to England and personally present the Egba case to the authorities.^® He declined, believing the request to represent the wishes of a small minority only. ^7uaserj journal. Abeokuta, Oct. 20, 1 8 6 5, C.M.S. CA2/0 6 8. Minutes of a Special Meeting held on Monday, the 30th day of October, 1 8 6 5, In the Council Hall of Shomoya Bashorun, President-General of the Egba United Board of Management," signed by G. W. Johnson, Secretary and Director, Abeokuta, Oct. 30, 1865* In C.M.S. CA^07. 656 The Adderley Committee; the C.M.S. strikes Back This did not mean that the Egba case was unrepre sented In England In 1 8 6 5. Far from It, for Salisbury Square had been kept well Informed of Glover's activities since the attack at Ikorodu and the Society had not failed to make ample representations to the Government throughout the year. However, Its main political activity during 1 8 6 5 was concentrated on the Parliamentary Select Committee appointed to Investigate the West African colonies. The Society's aim was to use the hearings as a forum for Its views and as a means of Indicting the Lagos administration. Guided by the canons of free-trade, non-coercion, retrenchment and non-involvement, the formation of the Committee had been precipitated by Ashanti campaigns In the Gold Coast and resulting British military Intervention In 1863-64. The scope of Inquiry was much broader than the Gold Coast, however, for Mr. Adderley, the Chairman, was a leading anti-expansionist who questioned the basic premise of coastal settlements. 657 A good deal of the Committee's time was taken up with the affairs of Lagos and Yoruba country, both before and after the cession, and the C.M.S. paraded before It all available missionaries and others willing to support Its views. Most Important In presenting the Egba oase and In airing the Society's grievances were the three members of the parliamentary missionary party who sat on the Com mittee, Baring, Buxton, and Mills. Their leading questions admirably Illustrated C.M.S. contentions that the annexation had been unnecessary, had resulted In dis turbances and unrest, caused trade to decline and had been responsible for the continuing deterioration of relations with Abeokuta. The antl-Egba opinions held by McCoskry, Freeman and Qlover came under attack, as did the Ikorodu affair. Contrary opinions were Introduced, to the effect that Abeokuta had been forced Into the Ijaye war to protect Its freedom and that the best way of bringing civilization to Africa was by allowing the people to be Independent and govern themselves. Witnesses such as McCoskry, Wylde and Burton spoke critically of the Egba and the missionary influence which had led them to pursue policies Inimical to those of Lagos, 658 but Burton supported the missionary argument that coastal conditions had been better before 1861 and that the colony should be given back to Docemo. Naturally enough, the political Influence of the C.M.S. In Yorubaland and England was remarked upon and drew strictures from several witnesses, but by-and-large Venn was satisfied that the Committee was sympathetic to the missionary cause and that the Society had gained In public repute. The Committee's report was a triumph for the anti- expanslonlsts. It censured the annexation of 1861, main taining that without this original mistake the Lagos government would not have become embroiled In the Yoruba wars. While recognizing that It was not possible to withdraw wholly or Immediately from Lagos or the other settlements, all further extensions of territory should be prohibited. However, this definite recommendation was weakened by a clause attached to the draft report by the Colonial Secretary, himself a Committee member. The Cardwell rider admitted no exception to the recommendation as far as new acquisitions were concerned, but maintained ^^Venn to Lamb, London, April 24, 1865, N.N.A. CMSY, file 2. 659 that It should not be an absolute prohibition against measures which might become necessary In existing settle ments to further a more efficient or economical administra tion. The clause In the final report which most pleased the C.M.S. was the one which endorsed "native agency" as the best means of promoting civilization. British policy, It read, should encourage In Africans "the exercise of these qualities which may render It possible for us more and more to transfer to them the administration of all the Governments, with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, probably, Sierra Leone."70 Here at last was 7 ° "Report from the Select Committee appointed to consider the State of the British Establishments on the Western Coast of Africa," Pari. Papers, V (1 8 6 5), 412, p. 111. It should be pointed out that Venn was not adverse to West African colonies as such; the contrary Is true. The C.M.S. and Venn's objection was to the specific way Lagos policy had developed under Freeman and Glover. Par ticularly obnoxious to the missionaries was the element of coercion, not Just against the Egba, but force in general. Also, It was felt that the extension of territory was un necessary, bringing as It did more people under British government, a principle which ran counter to the "native agency" thesis. Venn supported a concept of limited West African possessions, and In fact published a monograph during the Adderley hearings urging their retention: West African Colonies: Notices of the British Colonies on the West Coast of Africa (London: Dalton and Lucy, 1 6 6 5). 660 the official answer to Qlover»s forward policy. Dr. Dike has suggested that the recommendations of the Adderley Committee did not represent contemporary official attitude toward West Africa In the i8601s. To support his contention he says that the British Government "and her traders" launched a vigorous policy of expansion In the Niger territories during that decade.71 The suggestion Is completely erroneous, for not only was there official aversion to West African colonies, but the Adderley report faithfully reflected the prevailing "little England" opinion of Parliament and the British public. On the basis of nineteenth century assumptions, the anti- expansionist findings of the Committee were perfectly sound, for the Committee did not advocate a total physical withdrawal from the coast; what It recommended was the dismantling of costly and troublesome colonial adminis trations. In fact one of the Committee's main objectives had been to prove that trade conditions had been better under consular Jurisdiction, with lower tariffs, fewer embargoes and more peaceful conditions. ^Trade and Politics In the Niger Delta. 1830-1885 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. I&S-6 7. 661 Another objection to Dr. Dike's point of view Is the Inherent suggestion. common to all economic Inter pretations of expansion, that there existed a conspiracy between government and trade circles which dictated the advancement of the flag. Inasmuch as mld-Vlctorian British governments were of a Whlgglsh complexion, with aristocratic prejudices against commerce, this thesis Is open to fundamental questions. In the case of Lagos, however, there Is substantial evidence against the alleged association of trade and Imperial expansion, an association which Imagines merchants to advocate the extension of official Jurisdiction so that commerce would be conducted In a more orderly fashion and markets protected. One of the witnesses giving evidence before the Adderley Committee was Mr. David Chinery, Managing Director of the London and African Trading Company, one of the four London mercantile houses which dominated Lagos trade In the i860's. Mr. Chinery was of the opinion that the British assumption of control at Lagos had led to disturbances and had resulted In a dlmunutlon of trade. He advocated the removal of colonial status and the 662 return of consular Jurisdiction. This was not an Isolated Instance. The company conducting the largest volume of business at Lagos was another London firm. Banner Brothers. According to the economic myth, the firm should have applauded the original annexation and after that continually urged the enlarge ment of British Jurisdiction, the "pacification" of Yorubaland, and so on. But this was not the case. Colonial Office records for this decade are replete with complaints from Banner Brothers about all aspects of colonial administration. In 1864, for Instance, the firm criticized the forceful annexation of Lagos, objected to the way Badagry and Palma had been made dependencies and said that It would have been far better If Lagos had remained a protectorate.? 2 The following year the firm was again complaining about the depressed state of trade; this had existed ever since Lagos had become a colony, It was charged, and was due to the continuous Interference of the Governor In native affairs. Other complaints were that It had been a mistake to acquire Lagos In the first ?2Banner Brothers to Cardwell, London, Nov. 8, 1864, C.O. 147/7. 663 place; that colonial officials knew nothing of native habits, customs and prejudices; that taxes had risen eight-fold In four years; that the administration had pursued arbitrary and vacillating policies, the worst of which was the restrictions placed on trade with Abeokuta.73 Results of the Adderley Investigation Before leaving this critique of Dr. Dike's opin ion of the Adderley Committee and the connecting fallacy of commercial enthusiasm for territorial aggrandizement, a few more words should be added concerning the results of this Parliamentary Investigation. The most Immediate consequence was the adoption of the recommendation that the four colonies be Joined admin istratively, with a central government at Sierra Leone and officials entitled "Administrators" placed In charge at the Bambla, the Gold Coast and Lagos. Communication between the settlements was to be Improved by the Intro duction of fast colonial steamers, but each was to enjoy a ^^Banner Brothers to Cardwell, London, Dec. 18, 1865, C.O. 147/10. 664 degree of local autonomy* subject to the Governor-in- Chlef at Freetown. Less concrete but more significant was the after- math which lingered for many years. The recommendation that the settlements be ultimately abandoned* except Sierra Leone* was of course not carried out. But the strong recommendation against further extensions of territory was enforced by the Colonial Office for years* and whenever a governor proposed any local annexation it effectively barred the way. And to show the seriousness with which this anti-expansionist policy was to be pursued* Adderley was appointed Parliamentary Under secretary at the Colonial Office in the Derby-Disraeli government of 1 8 6 6-6 6* charged with the Implementation of his own convictions. On the other hand* events at Lagos did not progress In the way intended by the Committee's recom mendation that Africans be prepared for self-rule. Far from withering away* the administration continuously strengthened its powers* particularly In judicial and fiscal fields* as officials governed the colony with a minimum of direction. Despite the steamers* It was still two thousand miles to Freetown and back, and with slow communications and only the general principles of "frugality" and "non-expansIon" to guide them, adminis trators substituted pragmatism and local necessity for specific guidelines and close supervision. Decline of Missionary Influence Before returning to the Church Missionary Society's representation of the Egba cause In London, It should be noted that developments were now taking place which presaged the future diminution of missionary Influ ence. In Yorubaland, a new elite of literate Africans, the product of local or Sierra Leone mission schools, was replacing Townsend and his colleagues as the advisers and confidants of the chiefs. In Lagos, a forceful Governor was evincing little sympathy for the missionary party or Its objectives and even less for the Egba. In England, the mid-century Evangelical revival had already passed Its peak and the Church was returning to Its accustomed quietude. There was a corresponding lessening of missionary Influence, both In Africa and Britain, com pounded by the fact that Henry Venn, the missionary 666 statesman par excellance, was growing old and tired. The year 1 8 6 5, In fact, represents a clearly defined watershed as far as his official activities were concerned, for after that his name appeared with much less frequency In the conduct of the Society's business. The Society's fortunes were also adversely affected In 1865 by the death of Palmerston. On occasion, Venn had Inveighed against Palmerston's habit of backing up colonial officials on Issues In which the Society took an opposing stand; but Palmerston had been a good friend of the missionary party over many years. On his death, Venn sadly observed that the Society would now be at the mercy of "under-officials" who viewed African matters "under strong prejudice for the Government and against the Mission."^* And this situation worsened with the advent of the Derby-Disraeli Ministry In 1866. Engaged during that year In yet another campaign to oust Glover, Venn found the Tories to override all the Society's opposition. "With the late Ministry we could have prevailed," he wrote, 7Venn to Townsend, London, Oct. 23, 1865, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 667 referring to Russell's government, "but with the [Torlesjj we are powerless."^ The Battle Continued T Aware of some of these limiting factors, Venn nevertheless went to the defense of the Egba In 1865 when news reached him of the export tax against Abeokuta Imposed by 0 1over, his prohibition against travel to that city and the embargo on arms. After consultation with his parliamentary friends he visited Secretary Cardwell In November and lodged a vigorous protest against this policy, which, he felt, could only have as Its objective the weakening of the Egba and the extirpation of British Influence at their capital. The Interview was followed by a letter which reiterated the complaints and alleged Glover's bad faith during the protracted negotiations with the Egba earlier in the year. x ’ Me even - suggested that the arms embargo was being Imposed to encourage a T^venn to Townsend, London, Dec. 22, 1866, C.H.S. CA2/L3. 668 Dahomey-Ibadan offensive against Abeokuta.76 Venn's remonstrances were remarkably successful, Invoking an Immediate dispatch from Downing Street Instructing Olover not to Implement the arms embargo In any way likely to weaken the Egba. Further, the Colonial Secretary could not agree that the failure of the Egba to reach an understanding with Lagos was sufficient grounds for Imposing a duty on goods destined for Abeokuta. Nor could he see how this measure would promote peace In Yoruba country. He was not satisfied with the entire situation, In fact, and instructed the Lieutenant- Governor to furnish him with a complete report on Lagos- Egba relations since the attack at Ikorodu in March, together with his precise reason for levying the export tax.77 An interesting sidelight to this dispatch Is that Venn was perfectly conversant with its content, even pre dicting that Glover would change his policy forthwith. 7 6London, Nov. 22, 1865, C.O. 147/9. 77London, Nov. 23, 1 8 6 5, C.O. 420/2. 7®Venn to Nicholson, London, Dec. 23, 1 8 6 3, N.N.A. CMSY 1/1, file 2. 669 In this he was at least partly correct, for Qlover removed the offending arms embargo; but he subjected weapons and ammunition bound for Abeokuta to the export tax. At the same time he prohibited all Europeans, except mission aries, from going to Abeokuta.79 But by return mall Qlover was instructed to lift this ban also.®0 The C.M.S. pipeline Into the Colonial Office was still In full-scale operation at this time, for in early December Venn received the Information that It was now the Intent of the Government to reorganize the West African settlements along the lines suggested by the Adderley Committee. He also learned that Major S. W. Blackall, Governor of the Gold Coast but currently on leave In England, was to be the first Governor-ln-Chlef of the four territories. Further, Cardwell himself told Venn that he was at liberty to discuss Yoruba affairs with Blackall before he left; he was equally free to request the new Govemor-ln-Chlef to Investigate matters at Lagos, as Blackall was going there directly. 79proclamation. dated Lagos, Jan. 5, 1866, enclos ed In Glover to Cardwell, Jan. 6, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 8o Cardwell to Glover, London, Feb. 15, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 670 Needless to say, Venn took advantage of the Invitation and had two Interviews with the gentleman In December; this done, he confidently anticipated the forth- coming visit to Lagos would result In "much benefit." But to make doubly sure that Blackall was perfectly familiar with the Sooiety's complaints and opinions, Venn repeated them by letter on the eve of his departure, assuring him that the Yoruba missionaries would cooperate fully In the investigations.®^ Blackall at Lagos With this to comfort him, Blackall set out for Lagos, his primary task being to examine the whole Issue of Lagos relations with Abeokuta, particularly Glover's tax on goods consigned there. He was also to report on Glover's persistent demand that Porto Novo be annexed as a means of plugging the customs gap and furnishing the terminus for a new western road to the Interior, through Q i Venn To Nicholson, London, Dec. 23, 1865, N.N. A., CMSY, 1/1, file 2. 82London, Jan. 23, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 671 Ketu, that would by-pass the Egba.**3 a supplementary Instruction was sent after his departure Instructing him to report on the Incidence of domestic slavery at Lagos and the physical extent of the colony* which was still not precisely known in London. This dispatch Is worthy of mention* Illustrating as It does the embarrassment of Great Britain at the presence of slavery In one of its colonies and the prevailing anti-expansionist mood of the Government. Cardwell was of the opinion that the easiest way to escape the uncomfortable situation of slavery was to confine British territory to the smallest possible limit. If Blackall found that slavery could not be abolished on Lagos Island and In the satellte towns* British territory should then be constr&cted to land occupied by Government buildings only* while the remainder of the territory acquired from Docemo would be considered a protectorate. In this way "our Influence could be used to soften and gradually destroy slavery* without our authority being called on to abolish it*" wrote Mr. Cardwell. If ®3oiover to Cardwell* Lagos* Feb. 1* 1866, C.O. 147/11. 672 Blackall found this to be unnecessary, Cardwell wished him to define the settlements boundaries as to embrace the island of Lagos and the towns of Badagry, Palma and Lekkl at the most. If possible, he wanted the outlying towns given up.®^ Not being aware of these radical Instructions, Blackall dealt first with the Porto Novo problem, which he had been Instructed to settle without extending British territory. Qlover did not present his real arguments for annexation, Instead basing his case on reasons calculated to win the approval of a British officer and gentleman. Thus, he complained of Mlkpon's non-observance of his 1852 and 1861 treaties, particular ly of his failure to enforce the provisions dealing with slavery and the protection of British citizens. In addition, he dwelled on the king's refusal to allow a Resident Agent to reside In his town and on his mistreat ment of the two women In 1865, which had resulted in the stlll-unpald fine of seventy puncheons of oil. ^London, Feb. 23, 1866, C.O. 420/2. 673 But Qlover miscalculated his man. Blackall had been hand-picked to hold a tight rein on "forward" men and to Implement the letter and spirit of the Adderley report. He brushed aside Glover's protestations and made the settlement guaranteed to please the Colonial Office. A Resident Agent should not be forced on Mlkpon; the fine should be reduced by half., and annexation was simply out of the question. However, the Commodore should pay a visit to Porto Novo to Impress upon the king that he would not be allowed to remain on his throne unless he ful filled his treaty obligations. Both Cardwell and the Foreign Office breathed a heartfelt "amen" to this simple and pacific settlement, Cardwell adding the anxious foot note that he hoped the occasion would not arise to use this threatened c o e r c i o n . But unfortunately, and as Qlover well knew, this "settlement” was no solution at all. The basic problem of the escape of revenue at Porto Novo still remained; Indeed, It was perhaps worsened by Blackall*s insistence that the fifty per cent drawback be ®5cardwell to Blackall, London, April 21, 1866, C.O. 147/H. 674 discontinued. With such a large differential between the two places, Lagos would be sure to lose trade. " Blackall and the Egba: Missionary Victory But the matter was now closed, albeit temporarily, and Blackall focused his attention on the next Item on his agenda, the Egba. The news that Blackall was to arrive with authority to settle their grievances had been known in Abeokuta for some time, and in fact had triggered a power-struggle between Townsend and the United Board of Management as to who should present the Egba case. The majority of the chiefs preferred Townsend, but the Basorun gave his prestige and influence to the Board. Both Townsend and Johnson then drafted letters to the Govemor-ln-Chlef which set forth the Egba complaints, and both were read to a council of the assembled chiefs. ^^The Basorun was the Board*s most influential supporter, one explanation being that he was a notoriously covetous man who had been persuaded by the arguments of Johnson and Turner that in return for his support he would become wealthy from the customs they would collect at the gates of the town. Maser, Journal. Abeokuta, Feb. 26, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/068. 675 Townsend's letter was accepted and Johnson was told to copy It, out contrary to instructions he changed the tenor of the document. What the differences were Is not known, but when It came time for Townsend and a small deputation to leave for Lagos, the missionary refused to go If he had to bear the altered letter. His colleagues then began to exert pressure on the prominent chiefs to urge the Basorun to have the letter restored to Its original form. Their argument was that Blackall's visit was the result of their complaints to England concerning the Injuries the Egba had received at Glover's hands, and if Townsend did not represent their case personally the complaints would be considered untrue. The Basorun was thus forced to call another meeting of the chiefs, when Townsend's letter was again approved. This time the Basorun signed It Immediately as President-General of the Board, while to placate Johnson, he was permitted to add his signature as "Secretary.**®^ ^Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, Feb. 21-28, 1866, C.M. S. CA2/068; Townsend to Venn, Lagos, March 8, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085. 676 As delivered, the letter reviewed the deteriora tion of Lagos-Abeokuta relations since 1861, enumerated old grievances and plainly stated that Glover had continuously deceived the Egba; they wanted no more dealings with him. More interesting was the composition of the deputation, which contained no Egba, but represen ted the three Protestant missionary bodies operating in Abeokuta, Anglican, MethodlBt and Baptist. Even more interesting, but not surprising, was that Glover had attempted to scotch any protests being made by making it clear to Nicholson, the C.M.S. agent in charge at Lagos, that Blackall»s only business in the colony was to confer with himself and not to receive missionary delegations.®® Glover's ruse had no effect, and to his annoyance, Townsend and Blackall had several interviews. The crux of Townsend's argument was that the Egba were a primitive people, that their government was anarchic and that the Saros were now beginning to assume an unhealthy Influence in Abeokuta. The only way by which these conditions could be Improved was by free and unhindered contacts with 88 Maser, Journal, Abeokuta, Feb. 24, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/068. 677 Europeans, not by punishing them or by prohibitions against personal and commercial intercourse.®9 Blackall was Impressed by the argument and by Townsend's protest ations of Egba good faith and willingness to cooperate with Lagos If an equitable modus vivendl could be reached. On the other hand he was conscious that the arguments and professions were essentially European; did they, In truth, represent the Egba viewpoint? To find out, he sent a letter to the chiefs asking whether they were prepared to honor their obliga tions, and if so, requesting that they formally express their Intent to protect British lives and property as stipulated by treaty.9° The answer which came back was quite unexpected. It had been composed despite the efforts of the Abeokuta missionaries to soften the blow; but with Townsend not there, Johnson's voice was supreme.91 The Egba would protect British lives and ^Townsend to Venn, Lagos, March 8, 1866, C.M.S. CA 2/ 0 8 5. 90Lagos, March 3, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 91 Maser, Journal. Abeokuta, March 5, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/068. 678 property, the message ran, but the treaties with Britain had been made by their fathers and were henceforth repudiated. In addition, Qlover's removal was demanded and unless the duty on goods going to Abeokuta was rescinded, all trade with Lagos would be stopped. The content and tone of the letter were such that Blaclcall refused to accept It, and at this moment It must have appeared to Qlover that the providential letter would swing Blackall to his way of thinking. Townsend must certainly have been nonplussed, but he seized upon the document as the perfect Illustration of his argument: continued European contacts were essential If such attitudes were to be changed and If the baneful ambitions of Johnson and his clique were to be thwarted.93 On the basis of this final burst of eloquence and on Townsend's promise that the chiefs would compose a more acceptable letter as soon as he returned to Abeokuta, Blackall decided to overrule Qlover and remove all 92Abeokuta, March 6, 1866, C.O. 147/11. ^^Townsend to Venn, Lagos, March 8, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085; Blackall to Cardwell, Freetown, March 21, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 679 restrictions on trade and travel between the two places.9^ In a note to Townsend, written on the day Qlover was forced to announce the new dispensations, Blackall half admitted that It was Townsend and Townsend alone who had brought about this change of policy. He had been persuaded, he wrote, "by your own representations of the good feeling of the Bashorun and chiefs and the probable result of a generous policy toward them, to exceed the ordinary bounds of proof and confidence and to advise concessions which might be Interpreted JasJ a confession of weakness. In this he was most certainly correct. Because of the missionaries, and not forgetting the part played In London by Venn, the Egba had emerged victorious from their long struggle with Glover. After Ikorodu, Qlover had Imagined himself to be the supreme arbiter of Yoruba affairs, but his position had now been completely demolished. Trade and communications between Lagos and Abeokuta were to be freed, without any general peace settlement, without a treaty of any kind, and without any ^Slaser, Journal. Abeokuta, March 15, 186S, C.M.S. CA2/068. 95Lagos, March 9, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 680 reparations for past robberies. Even the Colonial Office was surprised at the liberality of Blackall1 s conces sions.^ And no matter how Glover railed at the over throw of a successful policy^? which* in his own words, was aimed at confining the Egba within strict territorial boundaries,^ the favored people again enjoyed unlimited and unhampered access to the coast. What had been achiev ed, in fact, was a return to the pre-war status quo, which was precisely what Glover had wished to avoid. As the Imperial factor had sided with Ibadan during most of the war, and markedly so in Its latter stages— culminating with the resounding Egba defeat at Ikorodu— the achievement was Indeed remarkable. The Governor-in-Chief made one more Important disposition during his few weeks In Lagos. Like the others, it ran counter to Glover's opinions and concerned the Lagos garrison. Glover had been informed previously ^Memoranda, April 12, 14, 1866, C.O. 147/11. ^Glover to Colonial Office, London, Aug. 28, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 98 Glover to T. Tickel, Lagos, Nov. 13, 1865, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 681 that the troops were to be withdrawn In pursuance of Colonel Ord's recommendations and the subsequent opinion of the Adderley Committee. Twelve conqpanles of the West India Regiment were to garrison the four African settle ments , but as the Housa armed police were considered tc be reasonably efficient, Lagos was to have none of the regular soldiers.99 Glover had been upset at this, and when the ship had arrived to embark the men he did not allow them all to go, keeping back two under-strength companies totaling 159 men. The reason he proffered for this refusal to obey Instructions was that there was a widely-held notion in Lagos that Britain was withdrawing from the colony, a belief that had arisen from mistaken accounts of the Adderley recommendations. Then, when the ship arrived to pick up the troops, the rumor quickly spread that the British were indeed going; to quash the gossip and fore stall any possible lawlessness, he retained part of the garrison. 100 Q Q _ Cardwell to Glover, London, Feb. 23, Sept. 1, 1865, C.O. 147/11. 100 Glover to Cardwell, Lagos, Feb. 3, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 682 The Colonial Office was disturbed about this gross interference; and even more so at his statement that permanent barracks were being built at an Initial cost of ,0 0 0, but with an anticipated future outlay o f 0 0 0. Blackall would stop this nonsense, it was hoped.10- * - Blackall did: although he recommended that the troops remain, he reduced the complement of House police by more than half, to 200 men, leaving Glover with a combined net i loss of effective strength. Further Marks of Acculturation at Abeokuta This final blow being struck in the name of retrenchment, but with the added objective of curbing Glover's adventurous spirit, the Governor-in-Chief departed for his seat of authority at Freetown. But hard ly had he gone when a new development took place in Abeokuta, one with no lasting effect, but a novel departure wortty of note. 101Memorandum, March 15, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 683 On March 23 there was published In the Egba capital, "By command of the President-General" of the Egba United Board of Management, a Proclamation which stated that In response to the removal of the Lagos duty, Abeokuta was lifting Its blockade against Lagos. However, all goods leaving Abeokuta In future would pay an export tax at a Customs House according to a published schedule. Permits were to be Issued for exports and would be avail able from the Collector or Deputy Collector; anyone found violating the Ordinance would appear before a Justice of the Peace of the Board of Management. The document closed with the sentence, "Passed and confirmed by the Egba United Board of Management, this 23rd day of March, the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty six," and was signed by "G. W. Johnson, Secretary." 1^2 The Proclamation was replete with pseudo-legal jargon and was of impressive appearance; Johnson had composed It. Townsend printed in on the Iwe Irohin press, with a few corrections, and his comments are worth noting for the processes of acculturation which he describes. 102In C.M.S. CA2/07 684 He drew Venn*s attention to the use of the English language, "the attempt to follow the example given In Lagos, and the use of printed forms to give publicity to their acts. The Sierra Leone men are thus forcing on civilization and English customs, teaching the people the use of writing and printing, and bringing about the adoption of written law." He went on to say that he could not bring the emerging leaders under his control, but was trying to influence them and thus "give a better turn to their doings than they would alone do. n-^3 Townsend did not think that the duties would be paid, and he was perfectly correct. In addition, the Egba did not open the roads for a month after their published date, which came and went unnoticed. When goods did begin to move down river the tax met great opposition. Olover's Departure As far as Qlover was concerned, the whole affair was academic. In late March he learned that Rear-Admiral Charles Patey was to be appointed Administrator of Lagos 10*3 Abeokuta, April 3* 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085* 685 and on April 22 the new official arrived. Qlover let it be known that he was only leaving for six months, but when Fatey was publicly sworn in on the Lagos racecourse and his Commission read, it distinctly revoked Glover's appointment.10^ Commander Glover was apparently unem ployed, so after showing the new man around the colony he left for England on Hay 10. Few regretted his going. His bequests were meager. Besides the ill will, he left a Treasury teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, illustrated by his request to the Civil Commandant at Badagry, Just a few days before his departure, to forward all the money on hand to meet "urgent payments" at Lagos.10^ as there was only*^230 available at Badagry, the plight of the colony was obviously acute. With no credit due to himself, Glover also left a period of com parative peace on the mainland; uneasy, to be sure, for as yet no decision had been reached in the Yoruba power- struggle, yet sufficient to Insure his successor few 10Slicholson to C.M.S., Lagos, May 7, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/03. 10*5 Walter Lewis to A. H. Duthle, R.N., Lagos, May 7, 1866, N.N.A. Badadiv, 5/1, Vol. 1. 686 Immediate worries on the score of trade stoppages. And a period of peace was Just what was needed to give the' young colony a chance to establish Itself more firmly and attend to the pressing taBks of local Improvement. Summary As might have been expected from a man of his stamp, Glover's administration to 1866 was marked by a great deal of activity and aggressiveness; yet It Is remarkable how unsuccessful he was In achieving his goals. Defeated by a combination of 3gba-stubborness, missionary Influence, and the refusal of the Colonial Office to be drawn Into territorial acquisition, all his plans went crashing despite his appearance of having won the day after the Ikorodu affair. After successfully luring the Egba Into his trap and Inflicting a lesson calculated to make It clear that Lagos was the supreme arbiter of affairs, the Egba proved Impervious to his suasion. Ultimately governed by the emptiness of his coffers, Glover began making concessions within months of his victory. And when Governor Blackall, with missionary prompting, Imposed his will In 1 8 6 6, what 687 emerged was a return to the pre-war conditions it had been Glover's intention to change; the Egba and IJebu were to stay in command of the trade routes and Lagos was to remain dependent on their caprices. Perfectly reflecting Britain's anti-expansionist philosophy, Blackall also vetoed the scheme to Incorporate Porto Novo into the Lagos customs system. In all, the settlement concluded by Blackall was a threefold victory: for anti-expansionism, for the mission aries, and for the Egba in their conflict with the imperial factor. But the settlement was more armistice than peace. In the Yoruba political struggle, changes had Indeed taken place In the relative positions of the several combatants, but an impasse had been reached which served only to clarify the fact that Abeokuta and Ibadan were the chief contenders. But Lagos had been added as a possible third force, and although the imperial factor had chosen not to exert its decisive influence on this occasion, it was apparent that this would not always be the case. Other circumstances suggested that only a tempo rary settlement had been achieved. For several reasons, the C.M.S. had passed the zenith of its position. It 688 played a crucial role In the agreement of l8 6 6 . but in future lta direct Influence in Great Britain and Yoruba- land was to be curtailed. This was the case in Abeokuta especially, where partly because of the cultural changes induced by the missionaries and partly due to Egba efforts to fashion a mode of political organization more in keeping with their changed conditions, the forces of modernization were searching for means of expression. How these changes would manifest themselves vis-a-vis Lagos and the rest of Yoruba country was an imponderable that also suggested the agreement of 1866 to be but a temporary arrangement. CHAPTER XI THE GLOVER ADMINISTRATION, 1866-72 Admiral Patey was a man eminently suitable for the changed conditions. His short tenure at Lagos was remarkable only for its lack of vigor, especially notice able after Glover's turbulent rule; it can aptly be described as one of cautious inactivity. Personally, Patey was reported to be a pious, God-fearing and dedicated Christian, and Rev. Nicholson was not alone in his opinion that Lagos was a different and better place with Glover gone and the Admiral in command With all roads open and trade flourishing, only one small cloud marred the otherwise clear horizon. The surrounding Yoruba people had all sent friendly messages of greeting to the new official, except the Egba, from ^Nicholson to C.M.S., Lagos, May 7, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/03; Nicholson to Venn, Lagos, June 8, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/073. 689 690 whom nothing was heard for months. This inclined Patey toward the anti-Egba opinions expounded by Glover, and this frame of mind was not altered by the first official communication which arrived from Abeokuta at the beginning of August, signed by Secretary Johnson, which complained about more of the Basorun's slaves running away to Lagos. Patey*s reply was to the effect that no attention would be paid to communications from Abeokuta until an understanding with Lagos had been reached, and under no circumstances would Johnson be recognized as the Egba spokesman; nor would his letters be acknowledged.^ So matters remained, with trade flowing normally between the two places but with no official communications. The Imperial Factor and Crucial Changes at Abeokuta Johnson's truculent letter was symptomatic of the changes taking place at Abeokuta; changes set afoot twenty years before when Townsend and the first emigrants had introduced the elements of a new culture; changes 2Nicholson to C.M.S., Lagos, June 7» Aug. 8, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/03. conditioned by several years of poor relations with the Imperial factor and a growing apprehension of Its Intentions; changes now accelerated by the Egba United Board of Management and the antl-Kuropean bias of Its guiding spirits. The most marked manifestation of the changes became a tendency to withdraw, to Isolate Abeokuta from contacts with Lagos and with Europeans, In the hope, perhaps, that the danger would somehow pass. The movement toward Isolation from the Imperial factor came to fruition In 1867* when Europeans were expelled from the Egba capital, but a change In the climate of opinion toward white people was readily apparent In 1 8 6 6. The single factor most responsible was the policy pursued by Freeman and Glover of making the colony's revenue Independent of the Egba by opening a route to the sea for Ibadan. The policy had been unsuccessful ^.Inasmuch as Ibadan, though amply supplied, was still dependent on IJebu or Egba middlemen, Just as It had been before the IJaye war. But the fact remained that although Glover had gone, the British were still at Lagos and could again at any time throw their power on the side of Ibadan. The IJebu, In the same position as the Egba and similarly 692 fearful of the Ibadan cause being championed by Lagos, withdrew Into Isolation after 1666* They had never encouraged European contacts, either missionary, commer cial or official, due In part to the IJebu tradition con cerning the origin of white people.3 But the post-war IJebu Isolation was so rigid that It was only broken In 1 8 9 2 by the use of Lagos arms. Portents of a like nature began to appear In Abeokuta In 1866. The first occurred In June when Rev. Lleb was assaulted In the street and beaten severely. Such an occurrence was unknown at Abeokuta and was compounded by the fact that nothing was done to punish the offender. As Rev. Maser observed, missionaries were no longer protected in the city, only tolerated.^ Soon afterward, Townsend was told privately by an old chief that plans were afoot to drive out all the white men.5 Although a few days later he found that the plan did not ^Supra, p p. 2 8 8-8 9• ^Journal. Abeokuta, June 24, July 3* 1866, C.M.C. CA2/0 6 8. ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 1, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085. 693 Involve the missionaries., the existence of such a scheme Illustrates the changes that were taking place. Then at the end of the year came the destruction by fire of the church In Heija township, the fire deliberately set as a mark of growing hostility to all white men, their culture, their Institutions, and their power. Another sure sign of the changes taking place was that by November, the month which marked the thirtieth anniversary of his arrival In Africa, Townsend was report ing that he no longer had any connection with political affairs; Johnson and the Saros had completely pre-empted his position with the chiefs.^ But because of his long experience, Townsend was able to explain accurately the changes which were taking place around him. Having just learned of the plan to expel Europeans, he wrote that everyone In Abeokuta dreaded the threat of Lagos and disliked the changes being Introduced there; the Egba were being taught by Johnson, Turner, and similar people that their town was In danger while white men were allowed to remain. They were reporting all sorts of false news, he ^Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 1, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085. 694 went on, . • • the object being to get power, and then they will upset the native government and make It more English than white men could If they tried* This Is supposi tion, of course* But these men are Introducing a fixed duty on exports In Imitation of European ways; they have a customs house, and give permits. . . . In doing this the greatest opposition has been met but nevertheless It stands. This stir about white men arises out of It, I believe* • • • The great fact Is that Immense changes are taking place and the old chiefs, while providing as they think for the safety of the town and Its Institutions, are lending their power to those who, for selfish purposes, are Introducing the greatest changes. . . . A great revolution Is being effected in the country.7 Qlover Reappointed A revolution of sorts, affecting the future of Commander Clover, had been taking place in England during the summer. There can be little doubt that the Colonial Office did not want Glover back at Lagos, and Glover did not expect to go back, for shortly after arriving home he submitted a formal application for the post of Administra tor at the Gambia, a position that was about to fall Q vacant. 0 An attached Colonial Office memorandum observed 7Townsend to Venn, Abeokuta, Nov. 1, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/085. ^Glover to Cardwell, London, June 20, 1866, C.O. 147/11. 695 that Glover would be suitable for the Gambia, but as Earl Russell's Government had just resigned, It was suggested that the final disposition be left In the hands of Cardwell's successor, who might have his own roster of men eligible for patronage.9 Lord Carnarvon had nobody In mind,but suggested Instead that as Glover was experienced at Lagos, he should return there and Patey sent to Bathurst. Despite the strong protests of Mr. Venn, who felt that the Society's objections would have been heeded If Russell was still In power,the arrangements were made accordingly. All was not lost, however. One of the leading London firms conducting business at Lagos— probably Banner Brothers— also entered a strong remonstrance over the appointment and a representative of the firm had a long Interview with Glover at the Colonial Office. Reporting this to one of the missionaries Venn went on to say that a person "on whom I can rely" was present at the Interview and had Informed him that Glover's attitude had apparently 9 June 21, 22, 1865, C.O. 147/11. 10Venn to Townsend, Dec. 22, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 696 •hanged and that the fear* ef the merchant concerning Glover*s Intentions were quite allayed. 11 Venn was further reassured when the Under-Secretary told him that Glover had been enjoined to take no measures adverse to Abeokuta; rather, he was to Ignore the Sgba and submit all matters of any Importance to the Governor-in-Chief. 1 2 More cheering news soon reached Salisbury Square when Rev. Wood, who had sailed with Glover In October, told Venn that Glover had assured him that he had no wish to meddle In mainland politics; the Yoruba could carry on as they wished, he reported Glover as saying, while all GlovOr wanted was to be left alone to govern Lagos In his own way.1^ This statement Is open to more than one Interpretation, but giving Commander Glover the benefit of the doubt, It should be observed that he was markedly agreeable to everyone on his arrival at Lagos, Including ^Venn to Lamb, London, Nov. 23, 1866, N.N.A. CMSY, 1/1, file 2. 12Venn to Townsend, London, Dec. 22, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/L3. 13Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 1, 1867, C.M.S. CA2/096. 697 the C.M.S. agents.^ He even sent a friendly message to the Egba, receiving in return a lukewarm expression of hope that relations would be better in future than they had been in the past.1^ At this faint thaw Clover sent two more letters, but both were returned unopened; the Egba chiefs, "as a body," declined to enter into any negotiation with him.1* * The Resumption of Forward Policies As Glover Interpreted the situation, the improved conditions of trade could not be expected to last with the Egba sulking as they were. At some point they would be bound to stop their roads, for ane cause or another, and the colony's dependence on this major source of revenue would be made crystal clear once again. He therefore resumed his campaign to win an Independent road 14 Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Dec. 4, 1866, C.M.S. CA2/03. 15 G. tf. Johnson to Glover, Abeokuta, Dec. 1, 1866, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 1. ^Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, Jan. 4, 1867, C.M.S. CA2/03i Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Jan. 1, 1867, C.M.S. CA2/096. 693 to Ibadan, thereby inaugurating a period of mounting pressure on the Egba, grounded on their fear of an active Lagos-Ibadan alliance. Faoed with this hostile liaison, seemingly thwarted whichever way they turned and at the same time suffering Internal political tensions, the Egba were ultimately to react by following their nascent anti- European sentiments to their conclusion and expelling white people from their midst. Glover commenced his campaign at the beginning of 1867 by sending an officer of the West India Regiment to Ibadan. Lieutenant Gerard's mission had several purposes, but the most important was to find out whether uninterrup ted transit was possible on the road from Ikorodu. He was Instructed to inform the chiefs that it was the Governor's Intention to have the road, even if it meant using force; in Glover's words, "there is only one thing the Lagos Government will fight for, as they have fought before, viz., a road from Ibadan to Ikorodu. But even if Ibadan was heartened by this renewal of Glover's ^Glover to Gerard, Lagos, Jan. 3> 1 8 6 7, quoted by Aoting-Adminlstrator Fowler to Governor-in-0hief Pope Hennesay, Lagos, Dec. 20, 1 8 7 2, N.N.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. 4. 699 friendship, the Ijebu were not. No changes were made and they continued to engross the trade between Ibadan and the sea. Qlover at least succeeded In establishing a bi-monthly mall service to Ibadan, and with this done allowed the question to simmer for a few months while maintaining a warm correspondence with that city. He turned his attention to a report made by his predecessor that during a six-month period In 1 8 6 6 four ships had dis charged cargoes at Cotonou destined for Porto Novo; Patey had estimated that this represented a loss to the Lagos revenue of almost three thousand pounds sterling.1® As much as Olover disliked the drawback arrangement with Porto Novo, reduced tariffs gave Lagos at least a chance to attract this predominantly French commerce. So he reintroduced the fifty per cent reduction of Import duties on goods destined for Porto Novo, hoping that merchants and shippers would not object to paying a two per cent levy for the use of the superior amenities at Lagos. 18 Patey to Blackall, Lagos, Oct. 5$ 1366, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 1. 700 The Egba continuing their aloofness, Glover then decided to reverse one of Admiral Patey*s "little Lagos" precepts. On the heels of the fight with the Egba at Ikorodu, Glover had stationed his Housa police on the mainland In a northwesterly arc around Lagos, extending from Isherl to Igbessa, that Is, from the lower reaches of the Ogun to the lagoon on the west of Lagos. However, to Glover's displeasure, Patey had constricted this boundary considerably. Glover therefore reestablished the abandoned outposts, Indeed pushing the boundary further north to Idemo, a town south of Otta. According to Glover, this extension of Jurisdiction was made at the request of the chief of Idemo.^ This had been accomplished by June, at which time Glover renewed his pressure for the road to Ibadan. In a letter to the Ibadan chiefs which clearly Invited them to action, he asked If they had yet reached a decision concerning their Intentions toward "our road” to Ikorodu; he would lose confidence In them, he wrote, If they continued to allow the Awujale's representatives to ^Glover to Blackall, Lagos, Jan. 17, 1868, C.O. 147/14. 701 collect tolls at "the gate of your town leading to our 20 road," The answer, which suggests that Interest In the road lay more with Qlover than with Ibadan, made no mention of their Intensions.^ 1 In fact the Awujale. growing Increasingly suspicious of Qlover's activities, now decided to close the road altogether. Gloverrs reply took on a bellicose note. He was not prepared to see "our road" closed by the Awujale; he proposed that Ibadan offer a thousand dollars a year to that potentate for the unrestricted use of the road, which Lagos would pay, In addition to the usual tolls. But If this offer was rejected, the Awujale should be told that Ibadan and Lagos were determined to have the road and that they would "reserve free action as to the time and the means we may consider fit to adopt to obtain for us that which we mean to have" (Glover's emphasis) . 22 Whether or not the message was conveyed Is not known, but Glover himself offered the bribe to the Awujale later in 2 0Lagos, June 5, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 2 1Ibadan, June 26, 1 8 6 7, N.N.A. CSO 8/ 5, Vol. 1. 22Lagos, July 4, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 702 July. It was not only rejected, the road remaining closed, but the Awujale called a great Yoruba meeting at Ode during the same month to discuss ways of halting the alarming Lagos encroachment.2^ Political Difficulties at Abeokuta Like the Ijebu, the Egba were observing Glover's actions with concern, for his scheming with Ibadan was an open secret. But because of their divided councils, the Egba could not react as quickly as had the Awujale. by closing his road. The problem of government at Abeokuta had been growing progressively worse during the year, and had not been helped by an achievement accomplished by the Board of Management. In April, the Board had made arrangements with Glover for a thrice-weekly mail service to Lagos; official proclamations had been posted around the city and the Board had achieved added stature in the eyes of many. By this time It had become the principal authority In the town, but paradoxically, it could not command much public respect; there was a feeling that It 23aiover to Blackall, Lagos, Jan. 17, 1868, C.O. 147/14. 703 had too much power,as Indeed It had If the very narrow basis of Its support be taken Into consideration. An Instance of the afflictions disturbing the town's government occurred In July, when a campaign against the Egbado town of Imeko was under discussion. Imeko maintained friendly relations with both Dahomey and Ibadan, which In Itself was sufficient cause for Egba hostility, and the town had also kidnaped considerable numbers of Egba during the Ijaye war. More recently, when a disturbance had broken out In the town of Ketu between the pro-Ibadan king and the pro-Egba war chief, the king had taken refuge at Imeko. The Egba were therefore anxious to kill two birds with one stone, but the Ibadan warned that they would defend Imeko In the event of an Egba attack.25 The missionaries had gone In a body to the Basorun to urge peace, but their advice was no longer of conse quence, more so as Townsend was not there, having recently pit Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, May 2, 1867, C.M.S. CA2/086. ^Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, July 15, 1867, C.M.S. CA2/086. returned home on leave• But the debate over the projected campaign disclosed fundamental difficulties and differ ences of a more serious character. The Basorun, the senior chief of the town, was also President-General of the Board of Management and was In favor of the war. At the same time, he only supported the Board as It provided him with a reasonably steady Income derived from export duties. On the other hand, the Board's only source of Income was the collection of duties; In the event of a war, both trade and the Basorun1s Income was sure to suffer— to say nothing of the personal Income of the Saro traders who provided the Board with the bulk of Its following. And If the Basorun's Income suffered, he would withdraw his support from the Board, which without the prestige and Influence attached to his name would collapse overnight. Almost all the Board was thus In favor of peace, but with the Basorun wanting war It could not act as a body. Some Board members spoke up for giving the Basorun his wish and cutting their commercial lasses; to make the situation even more difficult, there were the usual 705 differences between the civil and military leaders.2^ By early August the decision had been made not to fight, but the Intra-Board struggle by this time had reached such a pitch that one missionary observer expected the body to destroy Itself.2? A further instance of the divided councils at Abeokuta occurred immediately afterward when Egba war symbols were sent to Ado. The rumor spread rapidly in Abeokuta that an attack was to take place, but the Egba Balogun and the chiefs of Igbein knew nothing about the matter and were forced into the embarrassing position of writing to Qlover to ask if he knew who had sent the symbols.2® Qlover did not, but he replied with the warn ing that Ado was under British protection, repeating the caution in a separate letter to the Board of Management.29 At the same time he told Rev. Lamb that If the Egba made 26Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug. 1, 1 8 6 7, C.M.S. CA2/096. ^Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Sept. 14, 1 8 6 7, C.M.S. CA2/096. 28 Abeokuta, Aug. 12, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 29Lagos, Aug. 14, I867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 706 such an attack they would be met by Lagos t r o o p s , 30 a n d he sent an urgent request to the Aeting Governor-ln-Chlef for permission to Inorease the strength of his Housa police from two to three hundred men.31 Qlover Again turns to Porto Novo Awaiting the reply, which proved to be unfavorable, Qlover mustered the entire garrison of about four hundred men and marched them to Badagry. His purpose was twofold* He certainly wanted to nshow the flag* 1 and have men available In the Western District In the event of an Egba attack on Ado; but at the same time events were transpir ing at Porto Novo which Qlover hoped could be turned to advantage by the close proximity of his soldiers* The situation hinged on Qlover1s determination to render more adequate the basis of the colony's revenue*32 The only alternative to territorial expansion, which 3°Wood to Venn, Abeokuta, Aug* 30, 1 8 6 7, C.M.S* CA2/ 0 9 6. 3 1Lagos, Aug. 19, 1867, C.O. 147/13. ^The imperial grant for 1 8 6 7 -8 was 3,300. Out of this, 4Tl,500 went Immediately for Qlover*s salary and Docemo's pension* 707 Qlover now realized was firmly prohibited, was to open a new trade route to the Interior which would by-pass the Egba and Ijebu. There were two possible routes, one In the east through Ondo territory, or through Ketu In the northwest. The first, which would pass through Ijebu, was Impracticable due to the opposition of the Awujale who was firmly refusing passage even on the Remo road to Ibadan. But the second route had several advantages. If Porto Novo could be brought Into the Lagos sphere, a route through the Ado and Okeodan protectorates could perhaps be opened through Egbado country to Ketu. This accomplished, not only would the chronic revenue drain at Porto Novo be sealed but the Egba would be truly tamed by bringing the entire coast under Lagos Jurisdiction. Further, It was possible that under such circumstances, and for certain concessions, the Egba might be Inclined to use their Influence with the Ijebu to secure the unhampered use of the Ibadan road, one of the negotiable concessions being the possibility of not opening the competing route through Ketu. But even If this failed to materialize, Qlover knew that If only one route was firmly In his hands, the Egba and Ijebu would be forced to keep their roads open In order to survive commercially. The annexation of Porto Novo would never be sanctioned, Qlover k n e w , 33 a new intriguing possi bility was presenting itself. A eivil war was in progress at Porto Novo, with dissident elements of King Mlkpon's subjects, under Prince Dassl, actively seeking their sovereign's removal. It is even possible that Thomas Tlckel, the Commandant at Badagry, was leading and supporting the rebels, Judging from a letter he wrote to Qlover on the subject.3^ But in any case, Qlover thought there was a good chance of Klkpon being deposed and his own client placed on the throne. Dassl was the likely choice, for as Tlckel Informed his superior, the coup could be achieved if the rebels were assured of help, and Dassl was anxious to cooperate.35 While Qlover waited at Lagos for Dassl's messengers he ordered the Investigator to Porto Novo to protect the -'-'Carnarvon to Blackall, London, Oct. 23, 1866, C.O. 420/2. 34 Badagry, Oct. 1, 1 8 6 7, N.N.A., Badadiv 5/1, Vol. 1. 35Badagry, Oct. 3, 1867, N.N.A., Badadiv 5/1, Vol. 1. 709 rebels, who were camped across from the town on the south shore of the lagoon. The captain's Instructions were to prevent Mlkpon from crossing the lagoon and attacking D a s s l ,36 t>ut he was also to carry a passenger In the person of the Chief Magistrate at Lagos, Mr. Benjamin Way. Way had his own Instructions. He was Informed that Clover had been In negotiation with dele for the cession of the beach from Badagry to Cotonou Creek, and that the land In question was Indeed being ceded to Britain "pending Her Majesty's approval." With regard to Porto Novo Itself, Qlover continued, "we exercise no pressure upon the princes, chiefs, and people as to their choice of King," but Way was to enter Into discussion with Dassl and keep Qlover Informed dally of the course of events.37 Way Immediately contacted Dassl, whom he found to be encouragingly pliant; he was quite willing to see Cotonou ceded to Lagos and was equally willing to rule his kingdom under Lagos advice If he won the throne. At this, Qlover offered the following terms as his price for ^Qlover to Lieut. A. £. Kay, Lagos, Oct. 2, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 37Lagos, Oct. 3, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 710 support: existing treaties to be recognized, Porto Novo to be governed under Lagos guidance, a monthly "court of equity” to be established under the Lagos Chief Magistrate, and no restriction whatsoever on trade.38 It Is debatable whether Glover intended using force to support the coup, perhaps hoping that Investigator and the presence of troops In the Western District would overawe Mlkpon Into "voluntarily” surren dering his throne. On one hand, he appended to the above conditions the rider that "other methods” would be used to secure compliance unless the terms were met, which seems to suggest that he was at least considering the use of force. He also asked the Senior Officer of the Bights Division to come to Lagos as quickly as possible,39 which connotes a similar Intention. On the other hand, It does not seem possible that even Glover would choose to Ignore the repeated Instruc tions against becoming Involved In mainland politics, against the use of force and against the seizure of Porto ^Glover to Way, Lagos, Oct. 8, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/ 5, Vol. 1. 39Lagos, Oct. 3, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 711 Novo. There Is also hie own explanation, which, if taken at face value, denies the Intent of using force. "I anticipated a revolution,n he later explained to Blackall, Mand that I was prepared to profit by it In obtaining the recognition of our treaty and better terms for the pro tection of our merchants and trade, X admit. But I was not prepared to obtain this by force or to give any active assistance to either party. But thlB manly-sounding explanation fails to mention the terms he stipulated to Dassl, terms which were designed to reduce Porto Novo to the status of a Lagos satrapy. Glover himself went to Porto Novo on October 12, perhaps to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. While there, he received an irate note from the French vice-consul protesting the threatening presence of Investigator and the colonial steamer Byo Honesty, as well as the transparent attempt to excite and support the 40Lagos, Feb. 4, 1868, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 3 712 rebels.^ But Qlover aleo received tidings of a more serious character, news that sent him hurrying back to Lagos, leaving the Porto Novo question to simmer with Investigator still standing off-shore. The Egba Ifole The news which precipitated his hasty withdrawal was that serious rioting had broken out at Abeokuta on Sunday, October 13, that the mission stations and churches had been destroyed and that the missionaries were In grave danger. As more news came In, the matter became clearer. What had happened was that the Basorun had decreed that churches and schools were to be closed, so that the missionaries would go to see him. He Intended to complain to them about Qlover and ask that they write to the Queen to request his removal; when that had been accomplished, the schools and churches would have been allowed to re-open their doors. ^Bounaud to Qlover, Porto Novo, Oct. 14, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 28. ^2Rev. J. B. Wood, "Report on the Outbreak at Abeokuta,” In C.M.S. CA2/M6. 713 However, when It became known In Abeokuta that the missionary establishments were to be closed, there was a general misinterpretation of the motives; crowds began to fora and rioting broke out. Mission premises throughout the town were broken into and property was destroyed, including the Iwe Irohin press; but while the missionaries were robbed, no physical harm befell them. The destruction and rioting had not been planned, but was more in the nature of a spontaneous demonstration. Nevertheless, the missionaries were in a serious situation. On the following Wednesday they asked the Basorun what they were to do, either go or stay, to which he replied that the matter had not yet been decided and that they would be informed. A few days later a general Egba meeting was called, at which the complaints against Lagos were recited and it was decided that the missionar ies should go. Consequently, most of them left on October 30, followed by the remainder and the solitary European merchant a week later.^3 Thus, after twenty-one “SRev. J. A. Maser, "The Second Persecution of the Abeokuta Mission," in C.M.3. CA2/068. 714 years of continuous and hopeful tutelage, European contact with Abeokuta was broken. The outbreak, or Ifole In Yoruba parlance, had long-range causes which stretched back more than two decades to the arrival In the new Egba homeland of the first Immigrants from Sierra Leone, bearing traces of a new culture which had subsequently been extended by the missionaries on a systematic basis. The causes became less tenuous after 1861, when a series of conflicts began between Egba and Lagos Interests, culminating at Ikorodu In 1865. Since then, and especially since Glover*s return, there had been an Increasing dread of Lagos Intentions. Also of significance was the emergence of the new men In Egba politics, the literate Africans of the Board of Management, with a selfish and parochial anti-European bias. Further, Egba Institutional factors contributed to the outbreak. The continuing absence of a strong traditional leader, the lack of an effective executive and the struggle between civil and war chiefs for the predominant voice In Egba affairs were all contributing factors. The failure of the Board of Management to provide 715 the effective and popularly accepted authority which It sought to assume was also partly to blame. And the lfole had no lack of Immediate causes. Qlover's policy throughout 18^7, by a mixture of chance and design, seemed to be aimed specifically at bringing Abeokuta under the Lagos yoke. The Intrigues with Ibadan, the replacing of troops on the Egba "frontier” and then Qlover's actions at Porto Novo had all been highly suspect at Abeokuta. In addition, an acrimonious dispute between Secretary Johnson and Qlover had been raging since June, when the Board of Management had announced Its Intention of placing customs houses below Abeokuta on the Ogun. Qlover's reply suggested that boundaries between Egba and Lagos territories be defined, but Johnson rejected this. In turn this led Qlover to extend even further his armed police posts, castigating Johnson as a treasonable British subject liable to execution If caught. While deny ing any Intention of extending his frontiers, Qlover then proposed that Lagos territory Include the town of Otta and that the area north of there be considered neutral.^ ^*The Correspondence Is In N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 1. 716 This particular argument ended at the beginning of October when Glover, half-persuaded that the Egba were planning to Invade Lagos territory, or, at least, Invade his conception of what constituted the Colony's territory, moved regular troops to the mainland at Ebute Metta and distributed arms to the people "on the frontier."^ But even If this disturbing extension of Jurisdiction had not taken place, which convinced the Egba that Glover Intended to Invade their territory, some other Incident would have provided an equally suitable occasion for triggering the Ifole. The time was ripe, the stage was fully prepared, and neither Glover nor Johnson possessed patience or diplomatic talent sufficient to maintain any longer the uneasy relations between the two places. As an event has Its distant and Immediate precursors, so It has Its Immediate and long-range conse quences . Xn the case of the Egba lfole, the Immediate result was a migration of Christians from Abeokuta to Lagos. Glover dealt with the refugees by granting them 45 Glover to Major E. Kolesworth (officer commanding the garrison), Lagos, Oct. 2, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 8/5* Vol. 1; Glover to Acting Governor-In-Chief, Lagos, Oct. 5, 1867, C.O. 147/13. 717 farm land at Ebute Metta and Onigborlgbo, on the road to Otta, thua fulfilling the dual purpose of augmenting the Island's food supply while providing himself with future scouts to watch the road for Egba marauders.^6 By what authority he felt himself empowered to grant land that did not belong to Lagos is not known; as with forward officials before and after, he probably did not concern himself overly with the legal niceties Involved. As for the converts who remained In Abeokuta, they were not persecuted or deprived of their religion even though they were not permitted to use the churches. A few African teachers soon went back, followed by ordained Africans, but the European missionaries, despite early hopes that they would soon be invited to return, were doomed to disappointment. Townsend was allowed back for a few days in 1871, and in 1875 he and his wife resided there for the greater part of the year; but not until 1880 was a European missionary permanently located in the city. Qlover, either in Ignorance or deceit, blamed the entire affair on the machinations of the Awujale of XJebu, ^Maser to Venn, Lagos, June 29, 1872, C.M.S. CA2/068. 718 who, he said, had been designing to drive out all Europeans from Yorubaland, then throw over the trade In palm oil and reintroduce the slave trade.^7 But Qlover's superiors would have none of this, especially after hearing In person Townsend's Interpretation of events, which was undoubtedly more accurate than Qlover's. Accompanied by Lord Chichester, Townsend visited the Colonial Office on November 22; the result was a strong censure of Qlover sent to the Govemor-in-Chlef the following day. The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, castigated Qlover for stationing police at Otta, which was beyond any boundary ever con templated for the colony. .Further, his design to extend jurisdiction was readily apparent from his suggestion that Otta and the country north of It be considered neutral. The Duke went on to say that he disapproved strongly of this unauthorized attempt to extend jurisdiction, which was quite contrary to established policy. The outbreak at Abeokuta was therefore Glover's sole responsibility ^Glover to the Acting Govemor-in-Chief, Lagos, Oct. 19, 1867, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 3. 719 and he viewed "with great dissatisfaction" his handling of the whole affair.2 *® Pressure Maintained at Porto Novo The Duke soon had occasion to add to his disap probation. Glover had not relaxed his pressure on Porto Novo, and despite the strict Injunction he received in mid-November to avoid all aggressive measures and arrange a pacific settlement, ^*9 he kept the Investigator where it was. The captain was Instructed to keep Dassls's Insurgents Intact pending the arrival of the Governor-ln- Chlef and the establishment of "some definite policy" toward Porto Novo.50 For hi3 part, Blackall considered Glover's Intrigues against Porto Novo to be so serious that he sent his deputy to Lagos to Impress Glover person ally with his absolute prohibition against interfering.51 hO. London, Nov. 23, 1867, C.O. 420/2. 4q ■^Acting Governor-ln-Chief Yonge to Glover, Freetown, Nov. 9, 1 8 6 7, C.O. 147/13. 5°Glover to Kay, Lagos, Nov. 2 5, 1 8 6 7, N.N.A. CSO 8/ 5, Vol. 1. -^Blackall to Buckingham and Chandos, Freetown, Dec. 15, 1867, C.O. 147/13. 720 But Commander Glover, unable to accept any policy other than his own as "definite," refused to accept even this prohibition as final. After sending Tickel to Porto Novo in late December to gather first-hand information on the exact state of affairs, Glover then sailed to the Gold Coast to plead his case in person to Blackall, then making his annual visit of inspection. Blackall took the opportunity to show him the most recent dispatch from the Colonial Office expressing strong censure of his proceed ings at Porto Novo and of his blatant attempt to disavow the established policies of non-interference in native disputes and non-extension of territory. Blackall was so sure that Glover now understood "non-interference" and "non-extension" to mean exactly what the words implied that he confidently reported back to London that the Commander would now retire from the position he had assumed at Porto Novo. To further insure the troublesome Administrator from getting into trouble, Blackall also prohibited him from entering into ^Buckingham and Chandos to Blackall, Nov. 23, 1867, C.0^ 147/13. 721 communication with the Egba except upon terms which had received his own advance approval,53 But Governor Blackall underestimated Glover's resilience and his proclivity to disobey clear and repeat ed Instructions If they conflicted with his own Ideas. On returning to Lagos In early January he kept the ship at Porto Novo In the hope that the man who was soon to replace Blackall would view the matter In a more favorable light. Tlckel had reported Porto Novo to be still on the verge of civil war and Dassl to be still anxious for h e l p ,54 so Qlover left matters Just as they were until the new Governor's arrival. As soon as the new Governor-ln-Chief arrived at Freetown Glover reopened his campaign. Tlckel had drawn up a pseudo Memorial from the princes and people of Porto Novo begging for the removal of king Mlkpon and the annexation of their town to Lagos, Glover forwarded the document to his new chief, Sir Arthur Kennedy, with his own endorsement of the project and the assurance that the 53Accra, Jan. 6, 1868, C.O. 147/14. 54riokel to Glover, Badagry, Dec. 23, 1867, N.N.A. Badadiv 5/1, Vol. 1 722 French navy would not object to the change of government at Porto Novo.^5 But Kennedy returned an Immediate and scathing reply warning against any such adventure,56 the reply effectively damping Glover*b ardor for the coup which Dassl declined to attempt without substantial help. The affair came close to costing Qlover his Job. Occurring concurrently with the Egba ifole, the Permanent Under-Secretary noted that Qlover had thrown "the whole of the country around Lagos Into a ferment," and unless the mischief was arrested promptly and a satisfactory explanation furnished, the proceedings could only "raise doubts whether he can long be allowed to retain his office•" Mr. Adderley and the Duke affixed their Initials without comment.57 The matter was not carried further, although the Colonial Office was never satisfied with Qlover's explanations and realized full well that he was deliberately withholding information in ^Qlover to Kennedy, Lagos, March 20, 1868, with enclosure, C.O. 147/14, 56preetown, March 30, 1868, C.O. 147/14. ^Memorandum, Jan. 4, 1868, C.O. 147/13. 723 order to carry out plans of his own which were contrary to official policy.But apart from further messages of official disapproval and reminders that extensions of territory would not be permitted,59 nothing was done. Peace and Tranquility With the collapse of the Porto Novo scheme there followed a comparatively long period of peace, lasting until the end of 1871* True, there were such minor dis turbances as a Dahomey attack on Porto Novo In the summer of 1868, Egba raids In Egbado country and Ibadan expeditions toward the north. But they were Isolated and minor Instances, passing almost unnoticed as tranquil months stretched Into years. It was not a real peace, of course. Rather, It was a period of watchful waiting, an Interval of continuing political flux as the struggle for predominance In Yorubaland remained to be settled. -^Memorandum, April 16, 1868, C.O. 147/14. ^Buckingham and Chandos to Kennedy, London, April 23, 1868, C.O. 420/2, April 25, 1868, C.O. 147/14. 724 The period was well reflected in Glover's corres pondence; It became far less volatile, showed a decreasing involvement in mainland political affairs and much more concern with the routine of administration. Perhaps at last he had been forced to accept the realization that there were to be no colonial adventures. Indeed, with all the roads open and trade in full swing, adventures became unnecessary. And as official connections with Abeokuta were almost non-existent, despite the flourishing commerce between the two places, the tranquility was that much more enhanced. Glover used the period to establish his adminis tration on the mainland close to the island and along the northern shore of the western lagoon, the territory being more-or-less recognized as belonging to Lagos and euphemistically styled the Lagos "Protectorate" by the Colonial Office. Whitehall still preferred to believe that the colony was comprised solely of the island of Lagos and the towns of Badagry, Palma and Lekki. Glover's system in these outlying districts was to appoint stipendiary chiefs and village headmen, their primary 725 responsibility being to keep open the roads near their villages.6° Another factor contributing to the era of peace was the withdrawal of the missionaries from political affairs. European missionary activity during this period was confined to the colony itself or to the "Protectorate," where Qlover's dominance was too entrenched to countenance political opposition, even if it had been deemed desirable. Mr. and Mrs. Hlnderer indeed remained outside the colonial frontier, at Ibadan, but when they returned home in 1869 they handed over the station to an African, who, like the ordained African missionaries at Abeokuta, was of little consequence in political matters. And Townsend was home on leave from 1867 to 1 8 7 0. His absence certainly contributed to the missionary withdrawal from politics and it is even possible that it helped the cause of peace. It is certain that Qlover would have thought so, and several of Townsend's colleagues shared the opinion. The Society had suggested Lloyd C. Qwam, An Inventory of the Administra tive Records Assembled from the Colony Province (ibadan; Nigerian National Archives, 1961)* p. 19. 726 In early 1868 that Townsend be sent back to restore the Mission at Abeokuta and to mediate between Olover and the Egba. But the Mission Secretary, Rev. Lamb, considered the suggestion to be quite worthless. Not only had Townsend's Influence at Abeokuta disappeared, he wrote, but: His old political antecedents, his bitter hatred towards Lagos Government, his known tribal partisan ship, and his determination always to have his own way, render him, In my opinion, an utterly unfit man to undertake any work of mediation. I can confidently say, we never enjoyed such peace or ejqperlenced such harmony of action In the Mission since I have been In it, as we do now.^1 The extent of the missionary retirement from the Yoruba political scene can best be Judged by another quotation from Rev. Lamb. Lamb had been a lawyer and was* highly esteemed by the Society; he had been hand-picked by Venn soon after the 1861 cession to fill the critical position at Lagos and since then had been In the thick of political affairs. But from 1867 onward his letters were less and less concerned with politics, and In early 1868 he wrote to the Joint Secretaries in London as follows: ^Lamb to C.M.S., Lagos, March 5, 1868, C.M.S. CA2/03• 727 I have told Mr. Venn . . . why I do not enter Into political matters at all In my communications with you. As far as I can see, the less we have to do with them the better. The mixing of missionary and political affairs has been, I am persuaded, a fruitful source of mischief to our Mission to this country and of course renders It less easy for the natives to distinguish between Government Agents and those of the C.M.S.62 Later, he expounded further on the topic, writing of "The unnecessary Interference of the Society and Its agents In political matters," and "the baneful effects of missionaries having mixed themselves up with politics."^3 Coming as they did from the recognized leader of the Yoruba Mission, In Townsend's absence, these opinions Illustrate perfectly the new outlook concerning politics. It should also be added that relations between Glover and the missionaries Improved as the tensions between Lagos and Abeokuta relaxed after l867.» the rapprochement helped also by a change of attitude on the part of the C.M.S. toward the Lagos administration. A primary missionary argument against the colony had been that European administration took government from native hands, thereby subverting the principle of African 62Lagos, Feb. 1, 1868, C.M.S. CA2/03. 63x,agos, April 6, July 14, 1868, C.M.S. CA2/03 renaissance and rejuvenation by "native agency." But as time passed, the Society discovered that this was not the case. Due no doubt to the parsimony of the Imperial Exchequer; Europeans filled only about a quarter of the colony's official positions; the rest going to literate Africans. True; Englishmen filled the more Important post8; while Africans for the most part were consigned to menial or clerical functions. But on the other hand; Africans were also being appointed commissioners In the several courts; an African was chief of police; an African was the colony's Registrar; while prominent Saros such as J. P. L. Davies were Increasingly consulted In local affairs; In fact Davies was later given a seat on the Council. So "native agency” was by no means dis carded by the colonial government. The Society's discovery of this promising arrangement went a long way toward reconciling it with the fait accompli. Thus, with a Yoruba truce in effect, with Glover evincing a rare quiescence, with the missionaries devoting themselves to spiritual matters and with the Egba maintaining a chilly aloofness, the new era of peace was ushered In and Lagos became something of a quiet 729 Imperial backwater. Nothing Illustrates better the changed conditions than the trade figures for the late 60's and early JO* a. Exports rose from <^262, 000 in 1866 to 2C444,000 in 1872; imports showed a similar improvement, increasing fromJf220,000 to J£366,000.^ The figures were insignifi cant, to be sure, but as Lagos had not been acquired for commercial purposes, any improvement which helped place the settlement on a self-supporting basis was to be welcomed. The colony, in fact, ceased to be a burden on imperial mun- ficence by 1 8 7 0, after Mr. Gladstone's eagle-eyed account ants had noted that customs receipts had Increased from Jf 19,000 in 1866 tojf33>000 in 1 8 6 9.^ Citing the colony's affluence, the annual grant of a few thousands pounds was then discontinued, to the pleasure of economy-minded parli- amentarlns but to the discomfort of Commander Glover, taxed with the burden of equating expenditures with income. Events At Abeokuta These quiet years were not destitute of events of significance, however. The most interesting was the 5 4 “ " ' William N. M, Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1927), p. 4 9. 65Parl. Papers. XLIII (1 8 7 2), 1 9 1, p. 1. 730 struggle for political control at Abeokuta, a struggle that was underway In 1868 when Somoye, the Basorun. was attempting to break with the Board of Management In order to assume a more personal g o v e r n m e n t.^6 This was cut short by hlB death In August of that year, an ev*nt which triggered a resurgence of political activity as the Egba again grappled with the problem of evolving an effective form of government In keeping with their changed circumstances. Secretary Johnson of the Board of Management made the first move. Only weeks after Somoye1s death, and on hearing reports that Townsend was on his way back, he Issued a proclamation prohibiting white persons from entering Abeokuta until "such time as the Board of Management be able to maintain organized Government lor the protection of all lives and property."^7 This done, Johnson appointed an Influential Ogboni elder, the Asalu. as "head chief of the Government of Abeokuta" and started to consolidate his position. He evidently Intended to 66 Rev. William Moore to C.M.S., Oslele (an Abeokuta out-statlon), May 28, 1868, C.M.S. CA2/070. ^Abeokuta, Sept. 11, 1868, C.M.S. CA2/07. 731 broaden the Board's representation, for in 1 8 6 9 he invited the Rev. Moore, at the Osiele mission, to name an Anglican teacher and convert to represent that denomina tion on the Board. In Johnson's words, this was to further "the progress of an organized Government which is being established for the advancement of Christian Civilization and Improvement of this Country."^® In the event, Moore declined to participate on the ground of the clear C.M.S. policy of non-intervention in political m a t t e r s . But this attempt to win public support for a radically different mode of government was doomed to failure, not only on the ground of its sophistication but because the Egba had decided to revive once more the Alake title and persevere with a system of government that was known and respected. There were about a dozen candidates vying for the position, but at the end of 1 8 6 9 a senior chief was picked, Ademola, who was very much a compromise choice, but who acted as Alake until 1877. ^Johnson to Moore, Abeokuta, July 16, 1869, C.M. S. CA2/07. ^Moore to Johnson, Osiele, July 28, 1869, C.M.S. CA2/07. 732 He was confronted with great factional opposition throughout his tenure, particularly for the first two or three years. Supporting him was the great majority of the Ogbonl, the backing of the influential chief Ogudlpe of Iklja being of the greatest importance. But the opposi tion was considerable. On one hand was Johnson and the Board of Management, in alliance with the war chiefs, who were all financially dependent on the export duties collected by the Board. On the other was the township of Xgbeln, led by Solanke, the Egba Balogun, which was attempting to reassert the Old Igbein prerogative of controlling trade and collecting customs. The combined opposition was sufficient to limit Ademola's authority to that of the traditional Alake, no more and no less, with Johnson maintaining the fiction of executive power by using a "Government House" letterhead on his correspond ence. Significantly, however, by 1871* he was referring to the Board of Management as representing the war chiefs only. Thus the Egba remained primarily attached to their traditional form of government based on the township. And as far as it was aimed at providing an executive 733 authority, the attempt to revive the position of Alake proved unsuccessful. An interesting footnote to this constitutional struggle was that all the competing factions courted Qlover*s support— mute testimony to their recognition of the imperial factor as the principal power in mainland affairs. Ademola inaugurated a friendly correspondence soon after his elevation, asking for the Administrator's help and support and hoping for better relations in future. Qlover indeed recognized him as the prime Egba authority and was especially delighted when the Alake wrote in 1 8 7 1 that he desired most of all "to obtain your Excellency * s advice always."70 But at the same time Qlover well knew that Solanke and Igbeln had effective control of the roads to Lagos, so he could not afford to antagonize Solanke by rejecting completely his request for recognition as chief Egba spokesman.71 Qlover was thus constrained to walk a diplomatic tightrope, which he did quite successfully, antagonizing neither Ademola, Solanke, 7°Abeokuta, April 14, 1871, C.O. 147/21. 71Solanke to Qlover, Igbeln, July 1, 1871, C.O. 147/21. 734 nor the Board of Management. Throughout, he acted under, the Governor-in-Chief*s oft-repeated instruction to let the Egba settle their own internal p r o b l e m s .72 A consequence of the difficulties at Abeokuta was that Townsend was not allowed to visit his old home for a full year after his return to the coast at the beginning of 1 8 7 0. Although the Alake and the Ogboni favored the return of "Sodeke's Whiteman," the Saros connected with the Board of Management were able to block the proposed visit. Their purpose was to avoid the potential threat of political opposition represented by the missionary, and at the same time thwart any rapprochement with Lagos that might result in the reestablishment of European commercial rivals In their town. When Townsend finally succeeded in arranging a visit, in early 1 8 7 1* it was only brief; he was accorded a warm welcome but it was made abundantly clear that European missionaries were not to be allowed back. He discovered the prevailing fear that a European lodgment in the city would be the prelude to annexation, 72Kennedy to the Earl of Granville, Freetown, May 26, 1870, C.O. 147/18. 735 an attitude probably engendered by the Saros playing on Egba fears.73 Nevertheless, Townsend construed his visit as extremely successful. He felt that the majority of Egba leaders, as well as the general population, wanted him to resume residence In Abeokuta, and with some confidence he predicted an early return to his old scene of labor.7^ It came as an unpleasant surprise, therefore, that when he tried to do this a few months later he was stopped en route and made to retrace his path to Lagos.75 As the Alake himself admitted, who wished to have Townsend back, his authority was not sufficient to enforce his commands and he was powerless to overrule the opposition.76 in early 1872 Townsend was still waiting In Lagos for the call to return; but It never came. By this time he was ^John P. King, Journal, Abeokuta, Jan. 14, Feb. 6, 1 8 7 1, C.M.S. CA2/060; Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Feb. 11, 1871, C.M.S. CA2/085. 7^Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Feb. 11, 1 8 7 1, C.M.S. CA2/085. 75Townsend to Venn, Lagos, May 26, 1 8 7 1, C.M.S. CA2/085. 76alake to Qlover, Abeokuta, June 3* 1871* C.O. 147/31. 736 despairing of the political state of Abeokuta and con sidered It evident that the town was controlled by the "worst class of Sierra Leone young m e n .”77 Mainland Politics, Revenue, and Forward Policy, 1869-72 Also of Interest during these years of compara tive peace was the sporadic Interest shown by Qlover In opening another route to the Interior, an Interest which recurred as a faithful barometer of Yoruba political condition. For Instance, In 1869 the Ibadan had Invaded Ijesa country and by midsummer were hammering at the gates of the principal town. Anticipating their success and a subsequent renewal of Interest In a road to Lagos through Remo country, Qlover expected fresh hostilities between Ibadan and an Egba-Ijebu alliance. Fearing for the colony's revenue, he therefore began the active investigation of an eastward road to the interior via the lagoon to Agbabu, then Inland to Ondo and from thence either westward to Ife and Ibadan or north through Ekltl 77Townsend to Venn, Lagos, Feb. 13> 1872, C.M.S. CA2/O85. 737 to Ilorln and the Niger.78 He made a preliminary over ture to the IJo chiefs, east of Lagos, but when the Ibadan showed no inclination to press a claim to the Remo road, Glover let the matter drop. He felt sufficiently confident in 1 8 7 0 that war was not imminent that he entrusted the colony's fortunes to a newcomer, William Henry Simpson, while he went home on leave. But no sooner had he left, in August, than Yoruba tensions again began to erupt and the IJebu road was closed. Revenue was affected immediately. The colony's finances were already in a precarious state, with high-Interest loans from local merchants remaining unpaid and the Crown Agents in London constantly appealing to the Colonial Office for payment of the colony's embarrassing overdraft. Things quickly became even worse. By the end of the year Simpson was reporting that the pay of colonial officials— Including his own— was months in arrears and that the few workmen still retained had twice stopped work because of non-payment of wages; likewise, ?®Glover to Admin.-in-Chief, Lagos, Aug. 14, 1869, N.N.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. 2. 738 the Housa police were on the verge of mutiny for the same reason.7 9 Such were conditions when Glover returned to his post in early 1871, with revenue falling and war between Ibadan and Abeokuta apparently ready to break out at any moment. As far as Glover was concerned, the anticipated war was solely on account of the Bgba-IJebu determination not to allow Ibadan to have its own road to Lagos, an oversimplification, but a goal that met with Glover's complete a p p r o v a l .80 The war did not materialize, despite the active preparations and the closing of the roads. Glover seized the respite to hold a large-scale conference at Lagos in July, called to preserve peace, to secure IJebu and Egba consent to an Ibadan road, or falling these, to impress on the delegates his determination to open another road in the event of war. It was an Impressive gathering of Yoruba people, with delegates from Abeokuta, Ibadan, IJo, IJebu, Ketu, Oyo, and as far away as Benin, but it was 79 ‘^Simpson to Kennedy, Lagos, Dec. 1, 1870, C.O. 147/18. 8 0 Glover to Kennedy, March 25, 1871, C.O. 147/20. 739 utterly unsuccessful. As Glover discovered, the Egba and IJebu were completely adamant about allowing any further extension of Ibadan power, especially after the recent Ibadan victory at IJesa. They knew full well that an Independent road for Ibadan would virtually settle the Yoruba power-struggle, and neither threats nor blandish ments could change their minds.Glover continued to Interpret their refusal as a mercenary attempt to retain their favored economic position. Trade and political conditions in Yorubaland in fact worsened after the conference. The Egba stopped arms and ammunition from going beyond Abeokuta and the IJebu did the same; Lagos traders were prohibited from preceed- ing further than the Egba capital and were not allowed in IJebu at all; similarly, interior traders were barred from going further south than Abeokuta, while none were allowed through IJebu.^2 Q - i ■ ‘ ■Glover to Capt. Sheppard, Acting Admin.-in- Chief, Lagos, July 31, 1871, C.O. 147/21; Glover to Kennedy, Lagos, Oct. 18, 1871, C.O. 147/21. ®2Glover to Kennedy, Lagos, Oct. 18, 1871, C.O. 147/21. 740 Glover's reaction to this situation, which threatened to plunge his administration Into bankruptcy, was the only one left to his limited resources: after Imposing an embargo on the export of arms from Lagos he turned once more to Porto Novo. The possession of the town would augseat his falling revenue, secure the terminus of a western route to the Interior and allow him to Impose a reasonably effective blockade on Abeokuta If such a step became necessary. He Inundated his superior with petitions and memorials expressing the earnest desire of practically everyone (except King Mlkpon), that Porto Novo be placed under British rule and stressing the necessity of quick action to Insure the prosperity of the colony.®3 Awaiting a reply, Glover ordered his steamer to Porto Novo to Impress Mlkpon with his Intentions and to reopen communications with the still-rebellious Prince Q o JLagos, Oct. 18, Nov. 1, 1871, with enclosures, C.O. 147/21. 741 Dassl, whom Glover began to supply with arms and powder. ^ Kennedy Immediately forbade the annexation but forwarded to the Colonial Office Glovers letters and petitions on the subject. There, the septuagenarian chief of the African Department, Sir George Barrow, half-way supported the Idea because of the estimated yearly loss to Lagos revenue o f 10,000 by having a free port on Its doorstep. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Knatchbull-Hugessen, also gave partial support but was concerned about the reaction such an extension of Jurisdiction would have on opinion In Great Britain. But the Earl of Kimberley, Gladstone's Secretary of State and no stranger to Lagos affairs because of his previous experience at the Foreign Office, was firmly opposed. If Glover's advice was followed, he observed, there would be no limit to annexa tions; Porto Novo would be followed by pleas to take over Dahomey, Abeokuta, Ashanti, and any other places consider ed by British officials to be loopholes In their revenue ^Charles B. Macaulay, First Clerk of Customs at Badagry, to Charles Foresyth, Chief Clerk and Treasurer at Lagos, Badagry, March 18, 1872, N.N.A. Badadlv 5/1# Vol. 2. 742 aystems.®^ Kennedy was thereupon Instructed to Inform Commander Clover that his proposal would create distrust among the neighboring tribes and that Her Majesty's Government would not entertain the Idea In any shape or form.86 Despite these Instructions, which were quite precise and left no room for Interpretation, Clover kept the steamer anchored off Porto Novo. He paid equally scant attention to the complaints of the French consular agent that the presence of the ship was keeping the area In a state of agitation and was paralyzing trade.87 But with one excuse or another Clover kept up his pressure, hoping against hope that the man who would soon be replacing Kennedy as Admlnlstrator-ln-Chief would be more sympathetic and use his Influence at the Colonial Office to urge the annexation. At the same time he rushed to complete negotiations for an eastern route to Ibadan, via Oboto, 85Memoranda, Dec. 5, 9, 11, 1871, C.O. 147/21. 86London, Deo. 16, 1871, C.O. 420/4. ®^Jobelot to Clover, Porto Novo, Jan. 8, 1872, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 2. 7^3 Ondo territory and Ife, before the threatening Yoruba war broke out and the £gba and IJebu roads were closed. In March it appeared for a moment that his efforts would be successful! for he Jubilantly reported that the road was to be opened and that Lagos would henceforth be Independent of the Egba and IJebu.Work was started on an administrative building at Ode, a village on the beach about fifteen miles east of Lekki, which was to be the starting point for the new road. Forty Housa police were sent in case of IJebu wrath* and Glover even thought it possible that they might seek vengeance by attacking Palma and Lekkl; hensensequently reinforced those towns at the expense of the Badagry garrison. No sooner had this been done and one of Glover's half-dozen European officials* Lieutenant Goldsworth* dis patched on a trail-blazing expedition to Ibadan* than the Egba and IJebu closed their roads. It was not an angry reaction against this attempt to break their monopolistic 88 Glover to Administrator-ln-Chlef* Lagos* March 21* 1872, C.O. 147/23. ^ M a c a u l a y to Foresyth* Badagry* May 6* 1872* N.N. A. Badadiv 5/1, Vol. 2. 744 position, as Glover Imagined It to be, not was It retaliation against the arms embargo, which was still In foroe; armaments were readily available at Porto Novo and Okeod&n. These were Indeed Egba and IJebu grievances, and they did not exhaust the list. There was the continuing problem of domestic slaves absconding to Lagos, and as far as the Egba were concerned, Glover's recent establishment of police posts beyond Ebute Netta, at Agege, Onigbomgo, Idlmo, and other places clearly In Egba territory.90 <phe reason for the Egba road being closed was that a Dahomey army was marauding In Egbado country and was believed heading for Abeokuta. More Important, it seemed to the Egba and IJebu that the Yoruba war was finally about to reopen, as Ibadan raiding parties were kidnaping and attacking farms north and east of the Egba capital. This threat, which did not escalate Into anything more than nuisance raiding In 1872, was nevertheless sufficient to keep the Egba and IJebu In a state of nervous apprehension ^ Crowther to Kimberley, Abeokuta, Feb. 6, 1872, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 12; message delivered by Sada to Goverwnent House, Lagos, on behalf of Solanke and other Egba war chiefs, Feb. 13* 1872, C.O. 147/23. 7^5 about Ibadan Intentions and resulted in their roads remaining closed for more than a year. John Pope Hennessy At this point a remarkable man was introduced into coastal affairs in the person of the new Acting Adminls- trator-in-Chlef. John Pope Hennessy had been Governor of Labuan for four years, had then been appointed to the Governorship of the Bahamas and in late 1871 found himself in England on his way to this new position. At the Colon ial Office he discovered considerable consternation over the West African Settlements. The Administrator-in-Chlef, Kennedy, was expected home on leave and it was known that he did not wish to return to the most notoriously unhealthy of the British possessions. At the same time, negotiations were concluding with the Dutch government con cerning the transfer of its nine Gold Coast forts to the British flag, and Kimberley was looking for a capable man to supervise the transfer. Pope Hennessy was known to have been on good terms with the Dutch authorities in Borneo, so he was asked to defer his voyage to the Bahamas for six months while the forts were transferred and a new 746 Adminlstrator-ln-Chlef found. He readily agreed and set out for Freetown early in 1872.^ A close friand of Charles Adderley and a protege of Disraeli, Pope Hennessy was an Irish Roman Catholic aged thirty-seven, who, though related to the Franco- Irish family of the same name famous for its cognac, came from the poorer branch of the family. According to his biographer, he grew up convinced that he was descended from indigenous Irish landed gentry who had been evicted from their estates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to make room for English Protestant landlords. The conviction left a profound effect on the young man, who grew up feeling that he had been deprived his birth right and keenly aware that his country was under the heel of an alien power.92 This did not deter him from removing to the seat of that power, for Pope Hennessy was an ambitious youth who realized that only in London could his prospects be ^James Pope-Hennessy, Verandah; Some Episodes in the Crown Colonies, 1867-1889 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964), pp. 113-15• Unlike his grand father, the author hyphenates his name. 92 y Ibid., pp. 23-4 747 fully realized. After throwing over the study of medicine for a clerkship in Whitehall, he began reading law in the evenings but in 1859 set this aside to run for Parliament as an "Irish Nationalist Conservative," It was a successful bid, despite the uniqueness of an Irishman standing as a Tory. For the following six years he cut a wide swath in the Commons and in English society, but was beaten at the polls by seven votes in 1865. Disraeli was upset at his defeat, but when the Tories were returned to office in 1866 he secured for his impecunious young friend the modest position at L a b u a n . 9 3 Here, the young Governor experimented with the highly personal system of government for which he later became notorious. It was based on the replacement of existing officials with men sympathetic to his own views, involving a process commonly known in the colonial service as "clearing the decks." But Pope Hennessy possessed a great deal of native charm, which he used successfully on even the most exasperated Secretary of State, so his drastic measures were accepted. With ^^Pope-Hennessy, Verandah, pp. 35-53. 748 Disraeli taking an interest In his welfare and with Gladstone perhaps retaining him as a symbol of his Irish policy, he survived in the colonial service; and this despite his penchant for disobeying explicit but unwelcome Instructions and the violent reactions he seemed to engender In those with whom he came Into contact.^ After arriving at Freetown In February he soon began to urge Downing Street to appoint distinguished Africans to Important administrative positions, a policy that had been recommended by the Adderley Committee but one that the Colonial Office had been remarkably slow In Implementing. He also suggested that a West African University be founded, not only for the benefit of the sons of rich Africans, but open to all youths with talent. But this scheme was also too novel for the Colonial Office, although his programs of sanitary Improvements and public health were warmly applauded by his superiors. He quickly executed a minor "clearing of the decks" at Freetown and then settled down to read the 94 Pope-Hennessy, Verandah, pp. 22, 23, 84. 9^Ibld., pp. 115-20. 749 correspondence which had been passing between his predeces sor and Commander Glover concerning the letter's activities at Porto Novo. He perceived immediately that Glover was not obeying the Instructions given by Kennedy and Kimberley, so he thereupon Instructed him to withdraw the steamer from Porto Novo at once.96 Glover refused, explaining that civil war had broken out and that the ship "remains In Porto Novo waters."97 And he followed this insubordination by declining to send to the Gold Coast the detachment of a hundred Housa police that had been arranged as the tempo rary garrison for the forts acquired from the Dutch. His explanation was to the effect that it would be undesirable to weaken the force at his disposal at this critical Juncture in Lagos affairs, especially as he was just establishing a new trading station at Ode that necessi tated a further drain on his available manpower.9* * ^Freetown, March 4, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 97Lagos, March 21, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 98Lagos, March 27, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 750 Pope Hennessy fulminated to the Colonial Secretary about this gross refusal to obey orders, writing with masterly understatement that as soon as he met Clover In person he hoped "by a few words of friendly advice to be able to Induce him to pay more attention to his instructions. The Colonial Office was equally annoyed, Kimberley noting that If the Adminlstrator-in-Chlef was not successful In making Clover see the error of his ways, some "decided step" would have to be taken to deal with the Commander.100 So Pope Hennessy crossed swords with Clover even before meeting him, and there seems little doubt that he formed an unfavorable Impression. Clover, In fact, was the perfect example of the adventurous colonial official Pope Hennessy disliked most, perhaps unconsciously comparing him to the landlords In his own sad country. 99St. George dl Elmina, April 10, 17, 1872, C.O.147 /23. 100Memorandum, May 15, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 751 Pope Hennessy at Lagos In any event, Pope Hennessy at last came face to face with Glover on April 25 when he landed at Lagos. His arrival came at an unfortunate time. Trade was quite dead and had been for some weeks. All the roads were closed, the Treasury was empty and a dozen vessels swung at anchor outside the bar waiting for cargoes which never appeared. He immediately came to the conclusion that Glover's policies were the root of the trouble,101 an assessment with which the Colonial Office agreed. Glover had done well in his administration of the colony, an unknown official at Downing Street wrote on Pope Hennessy's report, but he had pursued a "too spirited and interfer ing policy" in native affairs. It was suggested that West African Administrators be shifted around at more frequent intervals.102 The Administrator-in-Chief Immediately set about rectifying the offending policies. To his astonishment he 101Pope Hennessy to Kimberley, Lagos, April 27, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 102Memorandum, June 6, 1872, C.O. 147/23. 752 found that the colonial steamer was still threatening Porto Novo. Not only was the offending vessel brought back forthwith, but It was then loaded with some seventy Housa police, and In company with the other colonial steamer, the Eko. sent to the Gold Coast over Glover*s protests. This done, Glover was stopped from instituting a planned blockade against the Egba, and Pope Hennessy wrote to the Alake asking that he spaalt fully and freely concerning his complaints against the colony.103 He then interviewed the European merchants, who held conflicting opinions about the dearth of trade and responsibility for it; they all wanted Pope Hennessy to use his authority to revive trade, but there were varying views about Glover. One group asked for his removal while the other was more interested In the resumption of trade. Both sides asked for the support of the missionaries, but this was refused and the matter ended with Pope Hennessy interviewing the groups separately.10^ But before anything had been decided an urgent message arrived from 103Lagos, April 30, lb72, C.O. 147/23. 104 Rev. Wood to Secretary Hutchinson, Lagos, June 4, 1872, C.M.S. CA2/086. 753 Elmina saying that trouble was brewing over the transfer of the forts, that a Dutch officer had been killed and that the Administrator-In-Chief should return Immediately. So after only a week at Lagos Pope Hennessy departed, leaving his reforms unfinished but promising to return. Clover wasted no time In sending a letter after the departing official reporting the further deterioration of affairs. The IJebu had stopped all provisions from being sent to Lsgos, he wrote, and were threatening to attack Palma, Lekkl, and the new station at Ode. In addition,because of the removal of the steamers and police to the Cold Coast, rumors were flying that Britain Intended to give up the colony.in some annoyance, Pope Hennessy1s reply blamed the stoppage of trade on Clover's arms embargo and accused him of meddling In Porto Novo affairs.10^ But nothing could be settled at long distance, so Clover consoled himself by sending an almost hysterical letter to the senior naval officer at Fernando Po asking for immediate assistance. There was a plan 10*5 Lagos, May 6, 1872, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 12. 1060old Coast, May 18, I872, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 12. 754 afoot to starve out the island, he wrote, and he expected hostilities to break out at any moment; affairs were critical, and the garrison had been greatly weakened by Pope Hennessy sending seventy of his men to put down 1 1 some disturbance" at Elmina.107 H.M.S. Pioneer arrived in ten days to deal with the nonexistent plot, followed In early June by Pope Hennessy himself. His first act was to order the recall of Lieutenant Goldsworthy from Ibadan and the Ondo road, followed by the repeal of the arms embargo. As far as Glover was concerned, this was enough, for together with Pope Hennessy's prior decision against interfering at Porto Novo and the injunction against an Egba blockade, the measures meant the complete negation of his Egba policies. There were also two letters from the Alake awaiting the Administrator-ln-Chief, making it painfully clear that matters of trade would not be discussed while Glover remained in Lagos. At this, and in the face of Pope Hennessy*s obvious attitude that there was no longer any room for him at Lagos, Glover submitted a written 107Lagos, May 11, 1872, N.N.A. CSO 8/5, Vol. 2 755 request for six months leave "for the benefit of my health.”108 Pope Hennessy was more than pleased to comply and Commander Glover left Immediately, never to return. "Another Administrator going home I" Pope Hennessy reported to Robert Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, adding with more than a touch of sarcasm, that "We gave him three cheers as he stepped Into the boat.nl°9 g0 after more than a decade of ser vice, Glover left In some disgrace. The Lagos decks had been cleared. He and Captain Ussher, late of the Gold Coast and another Administrator who had fallen foul of the young Irishman, spent some months In London virulently criticizing Pope Hennessy*s government of the Settlements. Letters appeared in The Times predicting a massacre at Lagos and questions were threatened in the Commons, but Glover was quickly appointed special commissioner to the Gold Coast, where his energies found outlet In the current Ashanti campaign. A few years later 108Lagos, June 14, I872, N.N.A. CSO 1/8, Vol. 12. 109 ^Quoted by Pope-Hennessy in Verandah, p. 135. 756 he became Governor or Newfoundland and was subsequently knighted for his long and meritorious service. y A rough form of justice was at work In Glover's more-or-less forced departure from Lagos. Like Pope Hennessy, he could not abide any form of Independence or anthlng less than complete support from his subordinates. Thus, over the years, a stream of his victims had departed Lagos on trumped-up or Inconsequential charges after being hounded Into resigning or transferring to other posts. And judging from his correspondence, he was personally unpleasant, brusque and short-tempered. Domineering, impatient of opposition and overbearing with Inferiors, to his superiors he was sly and sanctimonious, prone to making insinuations against opponents while protesting his own high motives, conduct and sacrifice. It was common for him to bend the truth to suit his own purposes, suppress information and otherwise mislead his superiors. In all, Commander Glover Is represented through his correspondence as an unsavory character. But Pope Hennessy, not understanding the essentially political nature of the trade stoppage, was completely wrong In his conclusion that Glover was solely 757 responsible for the economic stagnation and that business would be revitalized within days of his departure. Such did not occur. Ignoring the officials at Lagos, whom he regarded as a backward Gloverlte clique, Pope Hennessy embarked on serious negotiations with the Egba as soon as Glover had gone. He was aided by the group of European merchants who were convinced that Glover had been responsible for the depression and who had been most vociferous in calling for his dismissal. He also inclined toward several African merchants for adaice, particularly J. P. L. Davies, who was suspected by many Lagosians of weing earnestly anti-British. Promises were given, and hopes held out little short of promises, that large concessions were to be made all around. As for the Egba, Pope Hennessy decided that the colony consisted only of Lagos and the towns of Badagry, Palma and Lekkl; mainland territory beyond Ebute Metta was to be given up. This had b*en a major Egba irritant. The promise was given that runaway domestic slaves were either to be returned or their owners compensatedIn return for these major concessions the Egba undertook to reopen their roads, a commitment they were unable to fulfill due to the continuing lack of clear-cut authority in Abeokuta. Then, in ai public speech, Pope Hennessy announced that Docemo was to have a measure of his former authority restored and that the King's staff, his symbol of authority, would henceforth have precedence over the government staff on all official occasions.111 Having shored up the bankrupt Treasury with a loan from the local trading community, Pope Hennessy prepared for his departure in early July confident that all the problems had been solved and that Lagos would be on its financial feet in short order. Before leaving, however, he had to find a man capable of running things until a new Administrator could be sent from England. He picked Mr. Henry Fowler, a young Irish Roman Catholic newly arrived at Lagos after quitting the Gambia in some haste, where he 10Maser to Venn, Lagos, June 29, 1872, C.M.S. CA2/068; Roper to Hutchinson, LagoB, June 17, 1873, C.M.S. CA2/081. 11: L Pope-Hennessy, Verandah. p. 138. 759 had left a lady In a compromising condition and broken hla engagement to the distressed victim's cousin. There had also been some Irregularities In the dispensation of drugs at Bathurst, the total circumstance necessitating Hr. Fowler's request that his talents be transferred, citing as his reason a "difference of opinion" between himself and his colleagues.112 Warmed by his Irish smile, Pope Hennessy Informed Whitehall of the high regard in which he held Fowler and placed the governance of Lagos In his charge. The Colonial Office did not share this opinion, especially when the new appointee suggested that his brother, a London bank clerk, would make an excellent Treasury offi cial at Freetown. One Fowler was quite sufficient, thought the Earl of Kimberley.113 But contrary to expectations, Fowler's brief administration, which lasted until the end of the year, was very much In keeping with official policy of noninvolvement In mainland affairs and financial retrenchment. 112 Pope-Hennessy, Verandah, p. 13ti. 113Ibld., p. 141. The Crisis of 1872-73 Almost Immediately he reduced the complement of Housa police, curtailed building programs and even instructed that repairs on existing buildings not be made without his specific authorization. He also discontinued Glover's practice of paying stipends to mainland chiefs, thus saving several hundreds of pounds a year. But even these measures made no appreciable improvement in the financial situation, for the Egba and Ijebu roads remained closed and commercial activity was almost non existent. In addition, rumors to the effect that Britain intended to withdraw from the colony were gaining credence; together with the trade depression and Docemo's increasingly overt pretensions of power, the combined result was a considerable amount of unrest and agitation at Lagos throughout the latter half of 1872. Indeed, a condition akin to outright rebellion obtained at Badagry during the summer and in November Fowler was forced to ask for a gunboat. Meanwhile, Glover's Ondo road to Ibadan and the Interior had been a complete failure, due to the unwill ingness of merchants to set up factories at Ode and the 761 circuited sness of the route, Its debouchment on the lagoon being closer to the Benin markets than Lagos. Faced with complete Insolvency, to say nothing of the discontent among the civil and Housa police because of lack of pay, Fowler had to borrow money from the more affluent Cold Coast and an Imperial loan ofJ£20,000 was also arranged. But these were stop-gap measures, reliev ing the immediate need but adding to the colony's fixed obligations. What was required was the opening of the roads and the resumption of trade. But despite promises, neither the Egba nor Ijebu showed any sign of allowing trade to resume. As Fowler Informed Pope Hennessy as tactfully as possible, the policy of concession and conciliation which had followed Clover's downfall had been completely devoid of results. "Every reasonable demand of the natives Qhas] been dealt with, without any reciprocations on their part," he com plained, and suggested that a blockade of the Interior be Imposed. llifLagos, Nov. 8, 1872, N.N.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. #. 762 Realizing that the colony could not continue to borrow Indefinitely, Pope Hennessy bowed to the Inevitable return to Glover's coercive methods and gave Fowler's successor permission to Institute the blockade. George Berkely was not convinced of the propriety of such a course, however, at least until the rains started and the Ogun became navigable, when it would be known if the Egba Intended to continue their Interdict. All-in-all, he preferred to adopt a “quiescent attitude"11^ and not let It become too apparent to the interior people that the Lagos position was desperate. He was also aware that the Egba and Ijebu were conjointly discussing the opening of the roads and did not wish to upset any delicate negotiations with precipitate action. Moreover, he had come from England with instructions that three of Pope Hennessy's commitments were to be denied, namely, that Docemo's powers were to be restored, that runaway slaves would be returned or their owners compensated, and that land beyond Ebute Metta would ^^Berkely to Pope Hennessy, Lagos, Feb, 4, 1873, N.N.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. #. 763 be given up.H6 what the Colonial Office had in mind for the mainland territories adjacent to Lagos was not direct British administration, however, but a form of protectorate11? similar to that exercised by Glover with his system of stipendiary chiefs. Recognizing that this news would have to be broken to the Egba as soon as any meaningful discussions were underway and that It would probably upset them considerably, Berkely decided that the best course would be to do or say nothing until it became quite clear that they wanted trade to resume. Yet another consideration persuaded him that a policy of watmhful inactivity would be best. Political conditions in Abeokuta remained much the same, with Johnson and the Board of Management, backed by the Ologun. vying for power with the Alake and the Qgboni. And as traditional control of trade with Lagos belonged to Igbein, any negotiations concerning the opening of the roads would undoubtedly have to include Solanke, the Egba 116 Roper to Hutchinson, Lagos, June 17, 1873, C.M. S. CA2/081. Roper had sailed from England with Berkely and during the voyage had been apprised of these instructions. 1 1 7 'Hutchinson to Maser, London, Aug. 12, 1872, N.N.A. CMSY 1/1, file 3. 764 Balogun and the principal chief of that township. Thus, any advance made by Lagos to the Alake entailed offending one or other of the political groupings, all of consider able Influence, and might pgesAbly result in negotiations being set back. Imperial Power: the Ultimate Pactor ^ ■ * Berkely's quiescence proved fruitful. On March 10, Egba and IJebu messengers arrived in Lagos and asked to be received. They made their complaints about Lagos, the most Important being the escape of slaves; the IJebu also complained about their ports of Palma and Lekkl being held by the English, while the Egba made a similar protest concerning Ebute Metta. But they were ready to discuss the opening of the roads. Berkely then broke the news concerning the non-fulfillment of Pope Hennessy's promises, but assured them that the colony would never encourage slaves to abscond and that no fresh territory would be acquired. At this, the meeting adjourned for three days. When it resumed, Berkely learned some very Interesting things. The complaints which had been lodged 765 at the first meeting had only been put forward as pretexts for keeping the roads closed, he was informed. The real grievance was that Lagos, instead of studying the interests of the people immediately bordering the colony, had formed an alliance with Ibadan which was inimical to the IJebu and Egba, and had given advice and assistance to Ibadan with the purpose of injuring them. Compared to this fear of a Lagos-Ibadan alliance, which would prove decisive in the Yoruba power-struggle, the other grievances were of minor consequence; the reason for the roads being kept closed for such a long time was the fear that Clover would return and once more court Ibadan. After Berkely assured the representatives that Lagos in future would observe strict impartiality, the messengers returned home. The following month Berkely was Informed by the Awujale that he was well pleased with what had been discussed and that the roads would be opened shortly. True to his word, the Ijebu roads were reopened in May, followed in June by the resumption of trade with 110Berkely to Adminlstrator-in-Chief, Lagos, May 16, 1873, N.A.A. CSO 1/1, Vol. 4. 766 Abeokuta, the Egba delay being caused by their usual political difficulties compounded by the proximity of a Dahomey army. As soon as the roads were opened, however, a great flood of goods reached Lagos and the long financial crisis was over, Berkely, satisfied that his policy of Inaction had been successful, sailed off to Freetown to take up his new appointment as Adminlstrator- in-Chief. Summary To a great degree, John Glover was a victim of circumstances. It had been his misfortune to serve at Lagos when the Yoruba political question was being decid ed, and his whole experience had taught him that the colony's revenue could disappear In a twinkling. So when he returned to Lagos In 1866 and found things to be peaceful, his experience led him to believe that such conditions could only be temporary. Typically, he took advantage of the situation and resumed the policies designed to guarantee the colony's income when the roads again would be closed. Thus, he renewed his attempts to open a route to the interior that would force the Egba and 767 Ijebu to keep open their roads; he seized the opportunity presented by an Insurrection at Porto Novo to bring to fruition his efforts to absorb that town within his customs system; and for good measure, he mounted pressure on the Egba, his chief stumbling block, by re-occupying mainland positions abandoned by Admiral Patey. The result of his activities was the Egba Ifole. The revolt against the white man had been long in matur ing, and the slow processes of acculturation cannot be overlooked. But the event had been quickening since 1861, when the Imperial factor at LagoB had been strengthened. Since then, and because of the Yoruba wars, the colony had pursued policies seemingly inimical with Egba Interests; of most concern was the possibility that Lagos join forces with Ibadan, and by so doing, decide the question of Yoruba hegemony. When Glover returned and Immediately embarked on a course that realized their worst fears, and doubtless encouraged by the selfish motives of Saro traders in the town, the ifole took place. Thus, while directed against Europeans, the fundamental cause of the outbreak was fear of Lagos. Subsequently, the fear was manifested In precisely the same way as the earlier 76a Ijebu reaction, although to a lesser degree: withdrawal from contact with Europeans. As far as the colony was concerned, the lfole was a blessing. Occurring at the same time as a temporary lull in the Yoruba political struggle, it ushered in a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity. Helping prolong this happy state of affairs were other circumstances: the missionaries were In the process of retiring from the political arena, and there was a grow ing detente between the missionaries and Glover, brought about by the discovery that colonial government did not necessarily preclude "native agency.” Also of help in the cause of peace was the fact that the Egba were them selves in the throes of political and constitutional changes; their attentions were thus occupied as long as Lagos remained unthreatenlng. And It is noteworthy to observe that Glover's "forward” activities ceased during this sustained peace except on those few occasions when it seemed as though Yoruba country was again about to erupt: the colony's revenue being assured, there was no need of forward policies. 769 But by the end of 1870 the Yoruba truce was drawing to a end. Returning from leave, Glover found Abeokuta and Ibadan to be again on the verge of war and the roads closing. Pressed by the dangerous condition of Lagos finances, Glover then returned to the courses most open to him: possession of Porto Novo, a new road to the Interior, and renewed pressure on Abeokuta. At this point, Glover met his nemesis In the person of the temporary Adminlstrator-in-Chlef. Bringing to bear his innate and acquired prejudices, Pope Hennessy completely overruled Glover on every point and forced his removal. But In presuming the sparsity of trade to be the result of Glover's abrasive policies, Pope Hennessy was as Incorrect as Glover himself, who to the last blamed Egba and Ijebu selfish ambitions to monopolize trade. In fact, as a subsequent Administrator discovered, roads were closed by the Egba and Ijebu because of their dread of Ibadan being supported by Lagos, an alliance that would prove decisive in Yoruba politics. Thus the Imperial factor, that had worked for a general peace Just as diligently as the missionaries or 770 traders, by its very presence had served to prolong the wars CHAPTER XII CONCLUSION The respite was welcome, but only temporary, reflecting a deceptive lull In Yoruba Internal affairs before the struggle for hegemony broke out anew. When that happened, In 1877, the Ibadan were at the height of their power, exerting control as far away as Nupeland. But when they turned their attention to the coast In that year and successfully convoyed a caravan of arms and ammunition from Porto Novo to Ibadan, the other Yoruba people ljuaedlately sprang to arms to prevent the ultimate acquisition that would settle the long struggle for supreme control. Ibadan found Itself surrounded by hostile armies of Egba, Ijebu and Ilorln, and to the east, the camblned forces of the IJesa and Ekltl. Despite this formidable array, later augmented by the Effon, Yagba, and Akoto, Ibadan survived. Not until 1886 did the war stop, when 771 772 at the Insistence of the Governor a peaoe treaty was signed at Lagos for all Yorubaland except Ilorin, which still refused to negotiate. The treaty settled nothing, however, and the roads to Lagos continued to be blocked periodically with the ebb and flow of mainland politics. Finally, in 1892, after Ignoring Lagos ultimatums to allow trade to resume, IJebu-Ode was occupied by a military expedition. The Egba came off much easier. Governor Carter visited Abeokuta early In 1893 and concluded a treaty which guaranteed Egba Independence on condition that their roads would not be stopped without the oonsent of Lagos and that disputes between Egba and British subjects be referred to Lagos. The terms were almost Identical with those suggested by Glover in 1864. By this time, with British Influence and adminis tration advancing rapidly throughout southern Nigeria, It was clear that It would only be a matter of time before the Egba, too, came under direct British control. The event was hastened in 1898 when a railway from Lagos to Abeokuta was opened, extended within a few years to Ibadan, by which time practically all Yoruba country was Incorporated Into 773 the Lagos protectorate. Then, In 1899, a Commissioner was stationed at the Egba capital, followed In 1903 and 1904 by the advent of British Judges. The remarkable thing was that formal annexation still did not take place, especially when Judicial power was further extended In 1909, and was followed In 1912 and 1913 with troops being sent to quell rioting. Hot until 1914, when riots again broke out In Abeokuta, was the formal annexation accomplished and Egbaland placed In the same position as the other Southern Nigerian provinces. The Decline of C.M.S. Influence and Activity The suggestion that Great Britain exert Its benign and civilizing Influence among the Egba and thence throughout Yorubaland, made seventy years previously by the Church Missionary Society, thus came to pass In full measure. But of course, none of the original principals were alive to see the outoome of their efforts to stimulate British interest In Yorubaland, nor the ultimate result of their coup In engineering the removal of Eosoko from the Lagos throne In 1851. 774 Henry Venn died In 1873, his list eoneern being Pope Hennessy1s drastic reversal of Glover's policies, which he felt to be an outright victory for the trouble some Johnson and his supporters at Abeokuta. He was Just as concerned, as were all the Yoruba missionaries, over Pope Hennessy himself and his appointee at Lagos, Hr. Powler, whose religion they considered obnoxious. Venn worried a great deal about this "introduction of the Romanist policy Into high quarters," and urged the missionaries to combat Its Insidious Influence by all possible means.1 Had he lived only a short time longer, the mis sionary leader would have been even more disturbed. With in months of his death, the C.N.S. reached the conclusion that the long-cherished plan for making the Sgba the vehicle for Christian expansion was Impraetlcable under existing circumstances.2 The decision was realistic. The Yoruba Mission by this time was more-or-less synonomous Venn to Xaser, London, Aug. 5, 1872, C.M.S. CA2/L4. 2Hutchinson to Maser, London, May 29, 1873, C.M.S. CA3/14. 775 with the Society's operations In the Immediate vicinity of Lagos; also, European Missionaries were still excluded fro* Abeokuta, a condition that prevailed until 1880. The decision also reflected the fact that the Yoruba Mission, which for many years bad been the Society's chief Interest and the main topic of Innumerable Mission ary meetings and publications In England, was by the mld- 1870*s no More than a Memory to the older friends of the Society. The IJaye war and the Egba Ifole of 1867 had effectively put a stop to many grandiose plans. And with the resultant curtailment of activity, a spirit of apathy filled missionaries and supporters alike, especially In the crucial area of expansion. Missionary recruits became fewer, and were not eager to serve In Yoruba country.3 The domestic apathy was In turn reflective of the demise of humanltarlanlsm as a recognizable social and Intellectual movement In Britain as the State began to tackle many of the problems hitherto left to philanthropy. Further, It marked the end of the evangelical movement as 3w. G. AJayi, "A History of the Yoruba Mission, 1843-1880," (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Bristol, 1959), P. 309. 776 the chief dynamic within the Church, which by now was returning to its accustomed lethargy and allowing Nonconformity, with its well-known "conscience," to dominate the field of social action. The loss of prestige and lessening of public support then resulted in a parallel decline of the Society's political activity and influence• And a closing word should also be spared for Venn's chief lieutenant in the Yoruba Mission, Henry Townsend. Townsend spent almost the whole of 1875 the scene of his long and devoted labors, engrossed in his final task of re organizing the Abeokuta churches and schools on a self- supporting basis.^ But although the Egba accorded him a warm welcome, many people in the city seemed afraid that k It can be noted that one of Venn's goals had been reached by the late 1870's, that is, the missionary task (as he saw it), of establishing self-supporting churches, with their own ministers, then closing down missionary operations, moving on to new areas and leaving the ministry of the established congregations to ordained natives. The accomplishment of this task is shown by the number of ordained clergymen, both black and white, serving in the Mission in 1861 and 1877. In the former year there were fourteen European missionaries compared with five African; by 1877 there were four Europeans but fourteen Africans. However, the figures were not as impressive as Venn had hoped. 777 his coning would mark the return of other Europeans. Probably with a good deal of accuracy, he attributed his chief opposition to the Saro Merchants who feared the re-lntroductlon of European competitors• Sosie of these Saros were also heavily In debt to European factors at Lagos, according to Townsend, and were less than anxious that their creditors be located In their midst. Conse quently, they were doing their best to Inflsme a fear of Europeans and the possible political consequences of allowing t-.em back.5 They directed their most persuasive efforts on the chiefs, and as Abeokuta continued to be plagued by the lack of a central executive, the plmy was successful. This was Townsend's final year with the Mission, however, and In 1876 he made the return voyage to England for the last time. He lived In retirement for another ten years, still maintaining an active Interest In the Mission, and his death In 1886 marked the passing of a true pioneer and a significant figure In Egba and Yoruba history. His long service In Yoruba country spanned a ^Townsend to Rev. H. Wright, Abeokuta, Jan. 8, 29, 1875, C.M.S. CA2/085. 77 8 thirty-year period of missionary endeavor that achieved success In some fields but disappointment In others. Evangelical ferver and Its political strength In Britain, In conjunction with business enterprise and the Royal Navy, and not forgetting diplomatic activity, had Indeed won the battle of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. But despite the early hopes for the regeneration of Africa through the Gospel, hopes resting on the Egba especially, conversions had been difficult to make and even harder to maintain. There had been other successes, however, not the least being Townsend's long leadership of the Egba, which, combined with the political activity of the Society at heme, had thwarted for many years the unauthorized expansionist tendencies of British officials. The pity was that conflicts between the missionary party and officials had arisen In the first place, grounded as they were on lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of each others' positions. Summary 779 The missionaries did not recognize the difficul ties faced by British administrators at Lagos, or by their predecessors, the consuls, themselves de facto administrators because of the peculiar nature of the post. The best roads to the Interior, controlled by the Ijebu and Egba and on which Lagos depended for revenue, were constantly being closed. It was mistakenly assumed that the frequent Interdicts were the result of the monopolis tic position enjoyed by these two Yoruba people and the dread that their favored position would be broken. The real explanation, however, was less economically oriented. Instead, the stoppages were the prime result of Internal Yoruba Jealousies and were grounded on the struggle for domination which had been going on since the oollapse of the Oyo empire. There were other causes, such as the recurring threats of Fon Invasion In the Egba case and their Inability to evolve a form of government In keeping with changed circumstances. Certain Ijebu conditions further aggravated the situation, the most Important of which was the Remo desire to break their ties with the Awujale; and there was also the reaction throughout Ijebu against whlte-sklnned people. The trade stoppages resulted In overnight losses of revenue for the colony, and administrators, plagued by the sparsity of Imperial funds, were driven to extreme measures. Inoreaslng duties had the Immediate effect of diverting taxable cargoes to places beyond British jurisdiction and thus resulted In revenue decreasing even more; consequently, as much ooastal territory as possible had to be amalgamated within the Lagos customs system. The only loopholes east of Lagos were Palma and Lekkl, so they were taken almost as soon as Lagos was annexed. To the west lay Porto Movo, Cotonou, and many places beymnd, and successive governors, even the otherwise passive ones of the post-Glover era, turned their attention In this direction as soon as the Toruba roads would close. But here again they met with frustration. From Governor Freeman's original suggestion that two hundred miles of coast be placed under British jurisdiction, to the more modest proposal made In 1874 and 1875 that the Porto Novo customs be "assimilated" Into the Lagos system, successive British governments answered with a vehement "No." Not until International rivalries grew to fever 781 pitch toward the end of the century did auch schemes receive official sanction, when Britain was beaten to the post by prior French claims In Dahomey and the unexpected appearance of Germany on the Togo coast. Frustrated by official anti-expansionist policy, British officials from Campbell to Glover resorted to the only remaining avenue of relief and began interfering In mainland politics,hoping to Insure peaceful conditions, uninterrupted trade and a dependable revenue. But here again they were thwarted, this time by the agents of the Church Missionary Society and the Influence wielded by the Society In British domestic politics. Glover carried this policy of Interference to extremes, and after coming close to losing his Job several times, finally met his downfall at the hands of Pope Hennessy. Like his superiors In Downing Street, Pope Hennessy clung to the conviction that a coastal enclave could be maintained without extending British Influence and responsibility. According to this view, administrators were not sent to pacify the Interior, create trade, or open roads; they were there merely to maintain order and good government In the colony Itself. 782 In this area, at least, even Pope Hennessy had to admit that Glover had been successful, for on his depar ture he left behind a comparatively neat and up-to-date port boasting an attractive esplanade, wharves, ware houses, stores, a courthouse, hospital, racecourse, sosie well-built houses— to say nothing of the churches. But mistakenly, Pope Hennessy believed that the depression of trade and bankruptcy of the colony were due to Glover's policies, specifically, his handling of runaway slaves, his attempts to extend Jurisdiction, and the opening of the Ondo road to the Interior. He thus overturned the offending policies, forced Glover out, and expected conditions to lnprove at once. In this he was mistaken, for he had not grasped the real causes of disagreement between Lagos and the Interior people. Absconding slaves and boundary disputes certainly aggravated conditions, but they were but facets of the main difficulty, which was the presence of the Imperial factor, with Interests and policies Inimical to those of the Egba and Ijebu. Perhaps an accommodation could have been reached which would have at least post poned the Inevitable; but this never proved possible as 783 neither Glover nor his predecessors understood the nature of the Yoruba conflict which caused trade and revenue to dry up; and not understanding, they were unable to offer solutions. Colonial officials without exception regarded the disruptions of trade as attempts by the Egba and Ijebu to preserve their favorable positions by denying Ibadan a road to the coast. This was not the case. As Xgba and Ijebu messengers Informed Berkely In 1873, their main concern was not the tangential ,«*8ues of slaves or bound aries: It was the possibility of Lagos farming an alliance with Ibadan, and by procuring for It free access to the sea, thus deciding the outcome of the Yoruba political struggle. But the political reason for the frequent stoppages of trade were not realized, nor was It ever grasped that attempts to open new roads were regarded by the Xgba and Ijebu as threats to their very existence rather than Infringements on their economic well-being. Glover's failure to understand the political overtones Inherent In his efforts was also the crux of his disagree ment with the missionaries, who, with the exception of 784 these stationed at Ibadan, viewed with alam the lnslplent threats against their chosen people. On the ground of this apparent "antl-KgbaR attitude, the missionaries then campaigned against his policies until the late l860's; both in Yorubaland and England. At that time, when a lull In Yoruba politics resulted In trade and revenue going undisturbed for several years and with plans for a new road being dropped as a consequence, relations between Clover and the missionaries Improved remarkably. To such an extent, In fact, that In 1872, when he tried once more to force a new route in the face of an Egba-Ijebu blockade and was dismissed for his efforts, the sympathy of the missionaries went out to him for this uncalled-for rebuke. By that time, of course, their plans for the Egba had been dashed. Thus closed the missionary connection with Commander Olover, Sn terms muoh better than those which had marked most of the relationship. And thus this paper also closes, after examining one area of British expansion In the nineteenth century. In this Instance, as has been shown, expansion was not based on economic motives, but on - the humanitarian Impulse to civilize, extend the blessings of the Gospel and extinguish the slave trade. After the first missionary foothold had been made, the next task was to persuade a reluctant nation to take an Interest In Lagos. This done and the Imperial factor Introduced, albeit In the tenuous form of a consulate, "Imperialism" raised Its head as a long succession of officials sought to extend the bounds of British Jurisdiction. But as the paper has shown, these efforts to extend Influence or administration were not designed to win markets for Manchester shoddy, nor were they aimed at feeding the hungry maw of British Industry. Still less were they part of a nefarious soheme to furnish British capital an opportunity to reap profits. In fact the expansionist tendencies of colonial officials were most loudly criticised by those commercial elements which should have been urging greater and greater acquisitions If the materialistic thesis is to be accepted. Instead, British officials were driven by Internal Yoruba political conditions Into attempts to expand the colony, for lacking financial support from England, their administrations were wholly dependent on revenue derived from customs duties. Only In one Instance was an effort made to Incorporate additional territory other than for this reason, when In a short-lived flurry of Anglo-French rivalry In 1863* Glover moved swiftly In the Western District to thwart what he Imagined to be French ambitions. But even In this Instance It should be noted that such schemes for enlarging the colony were rejected outright by successive British governments of whatever political stripe. Again there was an exception, when possession of the outlying ports of Badagry, Palma, and Lekkl was reluctantly acknowledged after It had been shown that their Incorporation Into the Lagos customs system was mandatory If the colony was to come close to achieving financial self-sufficiency. It can thus be maintained that considerations of a grossly materialistic nature played no part In the case of British Interest and expansion In Yorubaland In the middle years of the nineteenth century. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL A. Official Papers Colonial Office Records; at the Public Record Office, London. goraiffin Office Recordsi at the Public Record Office, London. Nigerian National Archives; at the Federation of Nigeria Archival Headquarters, University of Ibadan. B. Private Papers Church Missionary Society Papers; at Church Missionary Society Headquarters, Salisbury Square, London; by permission of the Secretary. C. Manuscripts Ajayl, J. F. Ade. "Christian Missions and the Making of Nigeria, 1841-1891." Unpublished Ph.D disserta tion, University of London, 1938. 638 pp. + Appen. Although dealli^E with several missionary bodies, the work is mainly concerned with the C.M. S. Dr. Ajayl emphasizes the unwitting role of the missionaries as progenitors of nationalism through the education of an elite. 788 789 Ajayl, W. a. "A History of the Yoruba Mission, 1843- 1880." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Bristol, 1959• 336 pp. ♦ Appen. A straightforward aooount of the purely missionary activities of the C.M.S. In Yoruba aountry. II. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates (3rd series). ________ . Parliamentary Papers. Gwam, Lloyd C. An Inventory of the Administrative Reoords Assembled from the Colony Province. Ibadan: Nigerian National Archives, 1961. 123 PP. The author Is Principal Archivist at Ibadan. As a preface to the catalog, he Includes a short statement of British activity at Lagos In the nineteenth century. III. ARTICLES, JOURNALS, NEWSPAPERS, PAMPHLETS Church Missionary Society. Church Missionary Intelligencer (1853). First published In 1849, the Intelligencer was a popular monthly journal of Information pertain ing to the Society's activities. ________ . "Deliverance of Abeolcuta from the Attack of the Dahomlans.” London: Church Missionary Society, 1863. 4 pp Typical of a host of suoh pamphlets printed to popularize the Yoruba Mission, this particular one considered as miraculous Glele's gratuitous depar ture from the environs of Abeokuta In March, 1863. 790 Church Missionary Soolsty. "Petition of the Committee of the C.M.S. Deprecating the Diminishing of Removal of the Squadron.” London: Church Missionary Society, 1850. 11 pp. Another of the Society's missives, this one aimed at the Hutt Committee. ________. Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Afrloa and the Bast. The Proceedings were the Society's annual reports. Dennett, R. S. "The Ogboni and Other Secret Societies In Mlgerla,” Journal of the African Society. XVI (Oct., 1916), 16-29. An early explanation of the Ogboni by a C.O. official; only partially accurate. Dike, Kenneth Onwuka. Origins of the Niger Mission. Ibadan: Published for the C.M.S. Mlger Mission by the Ibadan University Press, 1957* 20 pp. A short account of the founding of the Niger Mission by Samuel Crowther, published to observe the centenary of the event. Dunglas, Edouard. "Deuxl&me Attaque des Dahomeens contre Ablokuta," Etudes Dahomeennes. II (Porto Novo, 1949), 37-57. The author was a French administrator In Dahomey In the 1940's. He takes his story mostly from Egba and English sources, except some Important French missionary accounts, Including those of Father Burghero. ________ • "La Premiere Attaque des Dahomeens contre Abeokuta," Etudes Dahomeennes. I (Porto Novo, 1948), 7-19. 791 Relying mostly on Yoruba history and Commander Forbes, M. Dunglas brings little new to this event. Economist (London). Aug. 30, 1890. A significant article of the mid-"Imperialist" period. Reflecting well-informed contemporary opinion, the article oasts doubt on the economic Interpretation of expansion In Africa. Elgee, C. H. The Bvolutlon of Ibadan. Lagos: Printed by the Government Printer, 1914• 41 pp. Captain Elgee was Resident at Ibadan from 1903 to 1913* His slim work, understandably, Is concerned with the growth of British adminis tration In the town rather than its history In the nineteenth century. Gallagher, John. "Fowell Buxton and the Mew Africa Policy, 1839-1842," The Cambridge Historical Journal. X, Mo. I (1950), 3^-58. An Important article depicting the growth of a more positive approach to Africa than the mere suppression of the slave trade, a policy first enunciated by Buxton. Gwam, Lloyd C. "The Honourable Captain James Pinson Labulo Davies, 1828-1906." Ibadan: Nigerian National Archives, 1964. 10 pp. This article Is part of a series on prominent nineteenth century Nigerians written for the Lagos Sunday Times In 1964 and 1965. It fulfills a function of contemporary Nigerian hagiography by portraying Mr. Davies as an early nationalist, with no apparent shortcomings; in fact Davies becomes the "Father of the Modern Nigerian nation." Iwe Irohin Fun Awon Ara Bgba Ati Yoruba [‘(Abeokuta). ("A paper of Information for the Egba people and the Yoruba country").] 792 The famous (of Infamous) paper was produced by Townsend from 1859 until 1867, when the presses were destroyed during the Egba Ifole. Printed semi-monthly, the original Yoruba edition quickly appeared In English also, allowing the Abeokuta missionaries a forum for airing their polltloal ▼lews. Until Its demise, the paper enjoyed a larger circulation In Lagos than It did In Abeokuta. Kopytoff, Jean H. "Two Types of Early Nigerian Nationalism: Sierra Leonlans In Lagos and Abeokuta," a paper delivered at the sixth annual meeting of the African Studies Association, San Francisco, October, 1963, and summarized In African Studies Bulletin, VI, No. 4 (Dec. 1963), W. Drawing from her dissertation research, Mrs. Kopytoff (daughter of the late Melville Herskovlts), Identifies as "Nigerian nationalism" the provincial and grasping actions of Abeokuta and Lagos Saros. Her Identification Is premature. Stephen, Sir James. "The Clapham Sect," Essays In Bcclestlastlcal Biography. II (London, 1853), 289-385. A brilliant essay by the son of one of the Sect's founders. The Anglo-Afrloan (Lagos). A weekly tabloid published for a few years In the l860's. It was the first Lagos newspaper, and as can be Imagined, It was violently anti-Egba. The Times (London)• Venn, Henry. West African Colonies. Notices of the British Colonies on the West Coast of Africa. London: Daltonand Lucy, I865. 39 pp. 793 This booklet was published by Venn as an antidote to the Adderley Report of 1865* Venn was not against colonies as such— In fact he favored then strongly as means of "civilization. * He makes this quite clear In this short statement. IV. BOOKS Adderley, Charles B. Review of "The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell^ Administration." by Earl Qrey. 1853; and of Subsequent Colonial History. London: Edward Stanford, I069. 423 PP• The chapter on West Africa reiterates the position taken by the author In his Committee of 1865; namely, that British Interests were best served when there were no colonies, merely consul ships. It should be noted, however, that Sir Charles advocates the withdrawal of official administration, not the withdrawal of Oreat Britain. AJayi* J* V* Ade. Christian Missions In Nigeria. 1841- 1891: The Making of a Mew Elite. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. 317 pp. A shortened version of Professor Ajayl*s doctoral dissertation. Ajayl, J. P. Ade, and Robert Sbalth. Yoruba Warfare In the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: University Press, 1964. 128 pp. ♦ Appen. ♦ maps. An outstanding volume written by colleagues at the joint universities of Ibadan and Ife. The book Is noteworthy In that It shows It possible to write purely African historiography from European sources. 794 AJlsafe, Ajayl K. History of Abeokuta, 2nd ed. Bungay, Suffolk: Pub11shad by the author and prlntad by Richard Daly & Sons, Ltd., 1924. 205 PP* * Appen. An Interesting work, but not greatly accurate. ________ . The Laws and Custosie of the Yoruba People. London: George Rout ledge Se Sons, Ltd., 1924. 97 PP. Poor. The content does not natch the title. Barber, Mary A. S. Oahlel.le: Or Village Life In the Yoruba Country. London: Janes Nlsbet and Co., 1657. 222 pp. Oshlelle was a snail village a few miles from Abeokuta. Written by a lady who had never visited the place, this book Is typical of the ronantlc and misleading literature published about the Yoruba Mission In the mid-century. Blobaku, Saburl 0. The Egba and their neighbours. 1842- 1872. Oxford: University Press, 1957* 99 PP. * Appen. A brief but excellent monograph by one of Nigeria's most eminent contemporary historians, concerned primarily with the Egba attempts to reach a modus vlvendl with Lagos. Booth, Charles. Zachary Macaulay. His Part In the Movement for the Abolition of the Slave Trade and Slavery" London: Longman & Co., 1934. A good biography by a descendant of Macaulay, who had access to his private papers and diaries. Bowen, T. J. Central Africa: Adventures and Missionary Labors In Several Countries In the Interior of Africa, from 1849 to 1856. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman And Company, 1857. 359 pp. 795 Bowen was a pioneer Baptist Missionary representing the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board. He founded stations at Ogbomoso and IJaye, but the Southern Baptist effort In Yorubaland suffered a crippling financial setbaok with the ClTll War. Brunschwlg, Henri• My thes et Realltea de 11Iwperlallame Colonial Francals. 1871-1914. Paris: A. Colin. I9S0: 205" ^ Excellent. The leading revisionist of French expansion exposes the venerable myth of economic Imperialism. Burns, Sir Alan. History of Nigeria. 4th ed. London: George Allen k Unwin Ltd., 1948. 283 pp. ♦ Appen. Written by a distinguished colonial officer, this standard work portrays Nigerian history as but an extension of British history. Thus, the body of the book deals with the enlargement of British Interest In Nigeria from the early nine teenth century onward. The author's professional viewpoint Is well represented. Burton, Richard F. A Mission to Qelele^ King of Dahome. London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, 1§64~ 2 vols. In this and the following two works, the celebrated Orientalist, soldier, explorer, and author, gets as much commercial advantage as possible from his consulship at Fernando Po. The three works are uniformly well written, however, and If Burton's prejudices are borne In mind, they are worth reading. ________. Abeokuta and the Cameroona Mountains: An Explanation. London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, I863. 2 vols. ________. Wanderings In West Africa, from Liverpool to Fernando Po. London: Tinsley Brothers, Strand, I863. 2~vols. 796 Buxton, Thomas Powell. The Afrloan Slave Trade and -Its Remedy. London: John Murray, l84o. 531 pp. ■ » Appen. This influential work reviews the extent, mortality, and cruelty of the trade, and the failure of the Squadron to stop It. The only remedy, therefore, was to Increase the strength of the Squadron and Introduce legitimate commerce, agriculture, and Christianity. Campbell, Robert. A Pilgrimage to My Motherland: Or. Reminiscences of a Sojourn Among the Bgbas and Yorubas of Central Africa, in 1859-1660. London: William John Johnson, for the African Aid Society, 1861. 110 pp. ♦ African Aid Society brochure. Campbell, a Jamaica-born chemist, was a member of a small and disorganized American expedition to explore the Niger Valley with the object of re settling American Negroes. Partly due tc the opposition of the Abeokuta missionaries *ud partly because of the Civil War, the venture was not successful. Campbell was a keen observer of con temporary affairs In Yoruba country. Church Missionary Society. Register of Missionaries (Clerical. Lay & Female). and Native ClergyT Prom 1804 to 1904. London: C.M.S.. Printed for Private Circulation, n.d. 493 PP* A helpful research tool, with brief biographi cal sketches of the Society's servants. ________ . The Church Missionary Society. A Manual Outlining Its History. Organization and Commitments. London: C.M.S., 19^1. 53 pp. A brief statement, concerned mainly with the modern period. Cook, Arthur Norton. British Enterprise in Nigeria. Phila delphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1943. 290 pp. 797 The book grew from a pioneering U. S. dissertation, and was the first study of British activities in Nigeria to be written by a foreigner. As such, it has a greater objectivity than works written in England up to 1945, but the author has been overly-Influenced by Professor Noon. Of minimal use in this study. Coupland, Reginald. The British Anti-Slavery Movement. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1933* 255 PP* Although dated, this and the following volumes on Kirk and Wllberforce have not been superseded• ________. Kirk on the Zambesi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925"! 276 pp. - r map. ________. Wllberforce: A Narrative. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923. 52^ pp. Crowder, Michael. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber, 1932. 258 PP. An otherwise good narrative is seriously marred by the author's uncompromising economic interpre tation of British expansion. The acquisition of Lagos, for example, is described in terms of pro viding a stable base from which the interior trade could be regulated. Crowther, Rev. Samuel. Journal of an Eaqpedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers, undertaken by Hacgregor Laird, Esq. in Connection with the British Govern ment in 1854. London: c7m .S., 1855. 193 pp. ♦ Appen. The main expense of this famous expedition, led by Dr. Balkle, was met by Laird, who asked the C.M.S. for Crowther's assistance. As far as mortality was concerned, the exploration was an unqualified success. The Society immediately popu larized it and determined to follow it up with a 798 Niger Mission. Crowther headed the new establish ment In 1 8 5 7. Crowther, Samuel A. and Rev. John Christopher Taylor. The Qospel on the Banks of the Niger. Journals and Notices of the Native Missionaries Accompanying the Niger Expedition of 1857-1§59. London: cTm .S. 1 8 5 9. 451 pp. + Appen. t map. Crowther*s account of the Ill-fated Dayspring expedition but the more fruitful beginnings of a new missionary enterprise. Dike, Kenneth Onwuka. Trade and Politics In the Niger Delta, 1830-1885. An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. 218 pp. A brilliant work by the undisputed leader of the contemporary school of Nigerian historians. But objectivity suffers from Dr. Dike's rigidly applied thesis of economic determinism, which views humanitarian! sm, for example, as only a reflection of the changes taking place In the economic system. Similarly, the abolition of the slave trade was but a manifestation of the major shift In economic organization that ushered-ln a full-blown capita list system. ________ . 100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria, 1851-1951. 2nd ed. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, I960. 51 PP. A reasonably factual account of a century of British administration, originally published to mark the anniversary. Du Plessis, J. A History of Christian Missions In South Africa. London: Longnans, Green and Co., 1911. 408 pp. r Appen. ♦ map. 799 Du Plessls, J. The Evangelisation of Pagan Africa. A Hletory of Christian Missions to the Pagan Tribes of Central Africa. Cape Town and Johannesburg: J. C. Juta ft Co., Ltd., 1930. 355 PP* ♦ Appen. The author was Professor of the New Testament and of Christian Missions at the D.R.C. seminary, Stellenbosch. This work is the complementary volume to the book cited above, the set only recently being supplanted by the more thorough work by C. P. Groves. Flint, John E. Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, i9 6 0. 319 PP* ♦ Appen. This narrative of the man as significant in West Africa as was Rhodes In the south-central portion of the continent, is in fact more than a biography. Mr. Flint shows clearly that competi tion with France, rather than economic exploita tion, was responsible for Britain's acquisition of Niger territory. Forbes, Frederick E. Dahomey and the Dahomans: Being the Journals of Two Missions to the King of Dahomey, and Residence at his Capital, in the Years 1849 and 1 6 5 0. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1861. 2 vols. Commander Forbes, R.N., a supporter of the C.M.S., was actively Involved with consul Beecroft in coastal dlplomaoy at mid-century. Forde, Daryll.t The Yoruba-Speaklng Peoples of South- Western Nigeria. Ethnographic Survey of Africa. Part IV, edited by Daryll Forde. London: International African Institute, 1951* 83 pp. ♦ map. The West African section of a comprehensive undertaking in descriptive anthropology, but super seded In the last few years by more definitive 800 local studies• This volume has a good anthropological bibliography. Frankel, S. Herbert. Capital Investment In Africa^ Its Course and Effects. London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 8. 429 pp* ♦ Appen. ♦ maps and charts. Professor Prankel's excellent study, still the best single statement In the field, was originally undertaken to supplement Lord Hailey's African Survey. As the latter work has been revised, there Is likewise need to bring Frenkel1s volume up to date. Freeman, Thomas Birch. Journal of Various Visits to the Kingdoms of Ashanti, Aku, and Dahoml In Western Africa. 2nd ed. London: J. Mason, 18441 2 9 8 PP. Freeman was the pioneer Methodist missionary on the Gold Coast, and narrowly preceded Townsend at Abeokuta. Geary, William Nevill M. Nigeria Under British Rule. London: Metheen & Co. Ltd., 1927. 273 PP. ♦ Appen. t map. The author practiced law at Lagoslln the early years of the twentieth century. As the title Implies, only the first few chapters of the book are germane to this study. The remainder Is a somewhat biased account of subsequent colonial administration. Glover, Lady Elizabeth. Life of Sir John Hawley Glover. R.N., Q.C.M.Q. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1897. 325 PP. As might be expected from his widow, the brief coverage of Commander Glover's African career is a vigorous defence of his policies and actions• 801 Gollmer, Charles H, Vidal. Charles Andrew Go 1 liner: His Life and Missionary Labour In Africa. London: Hodderand Stoughton, 18S9 . 196 pp. ♦ Appen. Written by the subject's son, the book Is only remarkable for what It does not say. Grey, Henry, George. The flolonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration. London: Richard Bentley, 1853. 2 vols. The work was of no great Importance to this study, but coming from the pen of an outstanding Colonial Secretary It sheds light on the progres sive colonial policies of Russell's Whlgglsh government. Qroves, C. P. The Planting of Christianity In London: Lutterworth Press, 1946-58. 5 In Africa, vols. A scholarly work of great magnitude. By far the best account of missionary enterprise In Africa. Volume XV takes the topic up to 1954. Hastings, A. C. G. The Voyage of the Dayspring, Being the Journal of the late Sir John Hawley Glover. R.N.. Q.C.M.Q., Together with Some Account of the Expedition up the Niger River In 1857. Introduced by Lady Glover, London: John Lane The Bodley Head Limited, 1926. 226 pp. Glover was the official cartographer of the expedition, but according to his own account It was he, rather than Balkle, that was actually In command. Herskovlts, Melville Jean. Dahomey. An Ancient West African Kingdom. New York: J. J. Augustlan, 193o. 2 vols. By the late Dean of American Africanists, thlB work has yet to be surpassed. 802 Hlnderer, Anna. Seventeen Yeats in the Yoruba Country. London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halllday, 1 6 7 2. 3^2 PP. Mrs. Hlnderer remains completely silent on her husband's political activities. Howse, Ernest Marshall. Saints in Politics; The Clapham Sect and the Growth of Freedom. Toronto: University of Toranto Press, 1952. pp. 215. The bock presents the noteworthy tale of that dedicated group of men gathered around Wllberforce in the closing years of the eighteenth century. Humanitarians all, the men were closely connected with the O.M.S., and as Tories, supported the programs of social and political repression carried out during and after the Napoleonic wars. Hutchinson, Thomas J. Impressions of Western Africa. With Remarks on the Diseases of the Climate and A Report on the Peculiarities of Trade up the Rivers In the Bight of Blafra. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1 8 5 8. 267 pp. ♦ Appen. Hutchinson replaced Beecroft as consul at Fernando Po. As this and the following work Illustrate, he wasabkeen admirer of the C.M.S. ________. Ten Years Wanderings Among the Ethiopians; With Sketches of the Manners and Customs of the Civilized and Uncivilized Tribes, from Senegal to Gaboon. London: Hurst and Blackett, Publishers, 18&L. 329 pp. Johnson, Rev. Samuel. The History of the Yorubas. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Edited by Dr. 0. Johnson. Lagos: C.M.S. Bookshop, 1937* 6 5 0 pp. ♦ Appen. The author was an African C.M.S. clergyman who served at Ibadan and Oyo during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. The work was 803 completed by 1897 but was not published until 1921, when It was extensively re-written by the editor. It Is a signal work In African historiography and a fundamental source for Yoruba history. Knight, Rev* William. The Missionary Secretariat of Henry Venn. B.P. London: Longmans. Oreen, and Co.. i535o!" 556 pp. Venn deserves a better biography than this, written by one of his colleagues. His prodigious political life Is largely Ignored, perhaps for good reason, but perhaps because of the disappear ance after his death of the political letter- books he Is presumed to have kept. Langer, William L. European Alliances and Alignments. 1871-1890. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. 510 pp. ________. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951* 797 PP* This and the previous citation remain unmatch ed In detail and scholarly approach. Langer was the first to revise In depth the economic Inter pretation of Imperialism, Instead examlng the phenomenon from the viewpoint of European politics. Lascelles, Edward Charles Ponsonby. Granville Sharp and the Freedom of Slaves in England. London: Humphrey Milford, 1 9 2 8. 1 5 1 pp. Part of the considerable body of historiograp hy concerned with the Clapham Sect, the book portrays an almost forgotten aspect of the anti slavery movement. Lloyd, Christopher. The Navy and the Slave Trade. The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 19^9* 314 pp. 804 A unique and admirable book that Illustrates, Indirectly, a profitable field of research remain ing untapped. Nineteenth century diplomatic history has still to be Investigated to give credit to a succession of Foreign Secretaries who struggled long and hard to achieve the goal of abolition. Losl, John B. History of Abeokuta. Lagos: Bosere Press, 1924. History of Lagos. Lagos: Tlka-Tore Printing -------- Works/ 191* .--- Both works by this author, who was a Lagos teacher, are marked by Inaccuracies and are not dependable• Oliver, Roland. The Missionary Factor In East Africa. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952. 302 pp. + map. An excellent study that Illuminates the European motivation behind expansion In tens other than economic. Hathleson, William Law. Great Britain and The Slave Trade, 1839-1865. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929. 199 PP. Part of a series by the same author covering all of the nineteenth century. Maxwell, J. Lowry. Nigeria: The Land, The People and Christian Progress. London: World Dominion Press, 1 9 2 7. 143 pp. + Appen. ♦ maps. A very superficial and synthetic survey. Moon, Parker T. Imperialism and World Politics. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. 5 8 3 pp. ♦ maps. 805 In Its time, a most slgnlfleant work. But Professor Noon's economic Interpretation Is now out of date. Moule, H. C. G. The Evangelical School In the Church of England. Its Wen and Its Works In the Nineteenth Century. London: James Nlsbet * Co., Limited, 1901. 119 PP. Henry Venn Is accorded mention In this brief survey as one of the most prominent Evangelicals. Newbury, C. W. The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers; European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja-Speakinm Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 204 pp. ♦ Appen. Using British, French, and German sources, Mr. Newbury reaches the conclusion that Imperialism was very much governed by economic factors. An excellent work, Including a first-rate biblio graphy. Niven, C. R. A Short History of Nigeria. 6th ed. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955. 2?8 pp. A popular standard text, quite unremarkable. Page, Jesse. The Black Bishop: Samuel Adjal Crowther. London": Hodder and Stoughton, 1908. 440 pp. Published a few years after Crowther's death, this Is an uncritical study that warrants replacement• Parrlnder, E. Geoffrey. Religion In an African City. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 1 9 8 pp. * Appen. An excellent work, although only Professor Parrlnder's brief discussion of the Ogboni was of import to this study. 806 Parrlnder, E. Geoffrey. The Story of Ketu. An Ancient Yoruba Kingdom. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1956. 84 pp. ♦ maps. This Is the only published account of Ketu, by a senior lecturer In Religious Studies at Ibadan. Being unique, It Is valuable. ________. West African Religion. Illustrated from the Beliefs and Practices of the Yoruba. Ewe, Alcan, and Kindred Peoples^ London: The Epworth Press, 19^9* 215 PP. The outgrowth of a London University dissertation, the content is only of tangential Interest to this study. Pascoe, C. F. Two Hundred Years of the S.P. Q.: An Historical Account of the Society for the Propa gation of the Gospel In Foreign Parts. 1701-1900. London: Published at the Society's Office, 1901. 942 pp. The official history of the S.P.G. Patten, John Alexander. These Remarkable Men. The Beginnings of a World Enterprise. London and Lutterworth Press, 1945. 159 PP. The volume Is concerned with the formation of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Pope-Henneasy, James. Verandah: Some Episodes In the Crown Colonies. l367-l6&9. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964. 304 pp. An Interesting sketch of the authoi * s grand father. Unfortunately, the subject's widow des troyed all her husband's personal papers, so these glimpses Into his life are deprived of their best source. 807 Robinson, Ronald, and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny. Africa and the Victorians. The Official Wind of Turnerlallam. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 19ol* 478 pp. * maps. This outstanding work argues persuasively that Britain acquired East Africa In an attempt to make safe the Suez Canal; later, the object of British policy became the protection of the Cape-to-Cairo communications route. Rotberg, Robert K. Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia. 1880-1924. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 6 5* 147 PP* ♦ Appen. Professor Rotberg shows that missionaries of several denominations actively abetted the advance of the secular partltloners of trans-Zambezia, and Individually contributed to Its Inclusion within the British sphere. Russell, George W. E. A Short History of the Evangelical Movement. London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1 9 1 5. 144 pp. ♦ Appen. An unimportant and uncritical work. Schoen, Jacob Friedrich. Journals of the Rev. James Frederick Schon and Mr. Samuel Crowther. Who. With the Sanction of Her Majesty's Government. Accompanied the Expedition Up the Niger in l84l, In Behalf of the Church Missionary Society. London: Hatchard and Son; Nisbet and Co.; Seeleys, 1842. 344 pp. * Appen. A fascinating account of the disasterous 1841 expedition. Crowther's portion of the authorship was very small. One of the appendices Is a copy of a letter from SchoSn to the Society recommend ing the employment of Africans for missionary work In view of the high mortality rate for Europeans. The C.M.S. paid attention. 808 Stock, Eugene. t h^ > hi «tory of the Church Missionary Society, Its Environment, Its Men and Its Work. London: C.M.S., 1899-191^. 4 vols. The official history of the Society, which, although dated, is nevertheless valuable for its factual content. Of course, nothing of importance is mentioned concerning the Society's political affairs. Talbot, P. Amaury. The Peoples of Southern Nigeria. A Sketch of Their History, Ethnology and Languages, with an Abstract of the 1921 Census. London: Oxford University Press, 1926. 4 vols. The author was a C.O. Resident in Nigeria. His broad historical and cultural apprc~ ch was an . Important step forward but the work has lost much of its original value in light of more detailed studies. Townsend, Qeorge. Memoir of the Rev. Henry Townsend. London: Marshall Brothers, 1887. 1&£> pp. An innocuous work, written by the missionary's brother. Townsend, one of the towering figures in nineteenth century Yoruba history, would be a worthy subject for a major biography. Walker, P. Deaville. A Hundred Years in Nigeria. The Story of the Methodist Mission in the Western Nigeria District, 1542-1942» London: The Cargate Press 1942 . 130 pp. ________. The Romance of the Black River. The Story of the C.M.S. Nigeria Mission. Revised edition. London: C.M.S., 1938* 238 pp. These two books by the same author are superficial accounts of the work of the two missionary bodies, and are evidently aimed at the popular market.

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Creator Phillips, Earl Harold (author)

Core Title The Church Missionary Society, The Imperial Factor, And Yoruba Politics, 1842-1873

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag History, modern,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Lovell, Colin R. (committee chair), Hearn, Joseph E. (committee member), Phillips, E. Bryant (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-110349

Unique identifier UC11360619

Identifier 6702117.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-110349 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6702117.pdf

Dmrecord 110349

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Phillips, Earl Harold

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA