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Participative Management And Industrial Democracy: Toward A Participative Theory Of Organization

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Participative Management And Industrial Democracy: Toward A Participative Theory Of Organization

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Content PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY:
TOWARD A PARTICIPATIVE THEORY OF ORGANIZATION
by
Edwin Francis Connerley
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Public Administration)
January 1974
74-9062
CONNERLEY, Edwin Francis, 1941-
PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A PARTICIPATIVE THEORY
OF ORGANIZATION.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1974
Political Science, public administration
I
5 '
v
| University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
i ........... ...
© 1974
EDWIN FRANCIS CONNERLEY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED. EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ER N CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
^dwin..Eran.cia..C.Qmierley........
under the direction of hi,s . . . Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
Dean
D a t e . . Q . ( £ j h 6 r < A ^ J $ J . 9 7 3
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................1
An Overview of the Study
Assumptions and Definitions
The Variety of Contemporary National Models
A Brief Description of Self-management
in Yugoslavia
The Importance of the Topic
Conclusion
II. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE...................IS
Introduction
The Literature
Pateman
Cole
Blumberg
Rhenman
Emery and Thorsrud
Holter
Dunlop
Derber
Zupanov and Tannenbaum
Other Works of Interest
Conclusion
III. THEORIES, MODELS AND CRITERIA: THE
DISTILLATION OF EXPERIENCE ................. 56
Introduction
The Structures of Participation
Unions and Collective Bargaining Processes
Collective bargaining and industrial
democracy
Unions and collective bargaining in
the United States
Representative Systems Internal to
the Organization
The major variables
Systems of Direct Personal Participation
Motivation and expertise
ii
Chapter
The Objectives of Participation
Job Satisfaction and Productivity
Power Equalization
Self-Development of Workers
Social Self-Government
IV. OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND PARTICIPATION .... 97
Introduction
Power and Control in Organizations
Authority— an Organizational Phenomenon
Property and the Rights of Ownership
Ownership, Authority and Control in
Contemporary Organizations
Contemporary Ownership and Workers'
Participation
Ownership and Control in Yugoslavia
V. PARTICIPATION AS PROCESSES AND ISSUES ... 114
Introduction
Participation in Organizations: A
Structural-Functional Analysis
Unions and Collective Bargaining
The collective bargaining model as
industrial democracy
Representative Systems Internal to the
Organization
Introduction
Organizations as political systems
Workers' participation through
representatives
Industrial democracy through
representatives
Workers' Personal Participation
The Meta-Issues of Participation
Cooperation and Conflict
Psychological Versus Socio-political
Approaches to Organizations
Conclusion
VI. PARTICIPATION IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE
COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND: AN EMPIRICAL
CASE STUDY .............................. 139
Introduction
A Brief History of the California State
Compensation Insurance Fund
iii
Bureaucracy and Change
The Fund as a "Changing Organization"
Changes in Organization and Processes
Hierarchy reduced
District autonomy
Management council
Program advisory council
An Empirical Case Study
Introduction
The Semantic Differential
Theoretical Basis of This Study
The Research Procedure
Selection of concepts
Selection of scales
Selection of respondents
Data Analysis and Conclusions
Introduction
Perceived participation and influence
Results of the semantic differential
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................
APPENDIX
FACSIMILE OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT ..........
1S1
1S9
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Types of Workers’ Participation............ 26
2. Perceived Influence-Participation by
Organizational Group ..................... 169
3. Mean Score and Rank Order for Each Concept:
N=163 172
4. Mean Scores by Dimensions of Meaning and
Concept Groups: N=l63 ..... ............ 174
5. Mean Scores by Concept, Organizational Group
and Dimensions of Meaning................. 176
v
FIGURE
Figure Page
1. Actual and Ideal Control Curves ....... 47
vi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation concerns itself with the broad,
ill-defined subject of participation in organizations. It
is intended to be a first step towards a participatory
theory of organization, but we fear that it falls far short
of that rather lofty mark.
This study has been undertaken, and an abstract,
theoretical approach to the topic adopted, because of the
author’s conviction that participation in organizations has”
been seen by management theorists as an ’ 'overlay," to be
grafted on to the existing, rather rigid hierarchical
structure. The more openly cynical theorists have treated
participation as another public relations or employee rela
tions tool. More sincere, but perhaps less honest with
themselves/ theorists have tried to induce participation
in organizations through changes in personal and inter
personal variables among individual organizational members.
Participation is seen as an overlay in the first instance
because it is a tool, a means rather than an end. In the
second instance it is an overlay in that persons and inter
personal relationships are the targets of change rather
1
than organizational variables. A participatory theory of
organization- * - must be far more fundamental in its approach
It must deal with variables that are intrinsic to organiza
tion. It must deal with organizations rather than indi
viduals and groups.
We think it important to state that this study
relates primarily to organization theory— a subject which
is different in important aspects from "management theory"
and "administrative theory." Perhaps the best way to
describe these important aspects is to assert that organi
zation theory attempts to be, and to some degree is, more
substantially rational than management theory and adminis
trative theory; which, in terms of Merton’s well-known
paradigm, are functionally rational. Of course, the func
tion which is beyond question in terms of the rational
paradigm of management theory and administrative theory is
management and administration. A participatory theory of
organization must be capable of calling into question the
functional rationality of management and administration.
It must seek substantive knowledge rather than "improved"
• * - A "participatory theory of organization" should
not be confused with a "theory of participation in organi
zations." The former implies a radical departure from
contemporary organization theory in that participation is
as important as organizational efficiency. The latter
implies a less than radical departure from contemporary
organization theory in that participation is a tool or
technique in service of a higher goal— efficiency.
3
management technique. Much of the literature concerned
with participation in organizations has been written by
management/administration theorists and does not, there
fore, question the need for, or desirability of, management
as a specialized function in organizations.
As a somewhat tentative indicator of the logic and
evidence which this study seeks to present, we will label
it as a study in the political sociology of organization.
From our perspective one of the weaknesses of contemporary
organizational research is its too-extensive reliance on
the relatively well-developed micromethodologies of psycho
logical research. Recent emphasis on "behavioral science"
in organizations, particularly with regard to participa
tion, has led to a too-easy acceptance of the cooperative,
equilibrium-oriented assumptions of psychological theory.
While we recognize the worth of such work, we think it
important to present the sometimes contradictory and some
times complementary viewpoint of political sociology.
An Overview of the Study
This study is organized as six chapters. The first
of these is the "Introduction," of which this overview is
a part. The main functions of Chapter I are to make
explicit the assumptions and definitions which are the
basis of this study; and to give the reader a preview of
the study and its organization.
4
Chapter II, "A Review of the Literature," concerns
itself with a review of a selected sample of the literature
of participation. The books and articles reviewed focus
primarily on participation in work organizations, but some
mention is made of participation in political systems.
None of the more popular American writers on "participative
organizations," such as Warren Bennis, Douglas McGregor,
Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, etc., are included in the
review. It is felt that the ideas of these writers are
widely known and that a systematic review of their works
is not particularly important; even though critical refer
ences to their works may be made later in the study. Also
contributing to the decision not to review the works of
Bennis, et al.. is our intention to focus on organization
theory, rather than management theory. In our opinion the
prominent American writers are management theorists.
Chapter III, "Theories, Models and Criteria: The
Distillation of Experience,1 1 attempts to weave the frag
mentary ideas of the literature review into a more coherent
picture of the dominant structures and typologies of par
ticipative systems. It also seeks to call attention to the
variety of objectives which have been sought through par
ticipation.
Chapter IV, "Ownership, Control and Participation,"
is a discussion of the authority structure in organizations
and the role of the concept of ownership in that structure.
5
It is contended that the concepts of property and ownership
are important determinants of the organizational authority
structure. In support of this contention the evolving
notions of ownership which are embodied in the Yugoslavian
system of workers' self-management are briefly discussed.
Chapter V presents our conclusions and recommenda
tions with respect to a participatory theory of organiza
tion. It draws upon the evidence and arguments of Chapters
II, III, and IV to present a coherent representation of the
"state of the art."
Chapter VI, "Participation in the California State
Compensation Insurance Fund— A Case Study," is the results
of empirical research conducted by this author within the
California State Compensation Insurance Fund (the Fund).
It is illustrative of some of the concepts and variables
which we deem important to the subject of participation in
organizations.
Assumptions and Definitions
It seems important at this point to define some of
the terms which we will be using throughout this study and
to state some of the assumptions which are implicit in this
approach. The reader should be aware that these terms are-
subject to variations in meaning by other authors and that
we have selected these particular usages as a convenience
and for the sake of clarity in this study.
6
Our first definitional task is the term, "partici
pation." The word has been widely used, perhaps too
widely; and often misused. Pateman (1970:67) is especially
critical of the imprecise use of this term in the litera
ture. Fortunately, there does seem to be considerable
agreement among those who have bothered to define the term
precisely. Pateman (1970), Blumberg (1969), and Holter
(1965), after surveying the various definitions and usages
in the literature, have elected to use the definition of
French, Israel and Aas:
Participation refers to a process in which two
or more parties influence each other in making certain
plans, policies, and decisions. It is restricted to
decisions that have future effects on all those making
the decisions and on those represented by them.
(1960:3)
Pateman (1970:68) has commented that, "This definition
makes clear that participation must be participation in
something; in this case participation in decision making. •
. ." and that, "The whole point about industrial participa
tion is that it involves a modification, to a greater or
lesser degree, of the orthodox authority structure; namely
one where decision making is the ’prerogative’ of manage
ment, in which workers play no part."
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, partici
pation shall be taken to refer to an alteration of the
orthodox, hierarchical authority structure wherein two or
more parties influence each other in making decisions which
7
have future effects on the parties.
In an effort to further clarify the usage of the
term we should point out that the vast literature concerned
with participation uses a wide variety of phraseologiesj
among them are "participative management,” "workers1 partic
ipation in management," and "industrial democracy."
Although these terms are often used almost interchangeably,
we are convinced that there are important differences in
their intended meanings.
We will normally use participative (or partici
patory) management to refer to instances in which partici
pation is confined to managers. This is perhaps typical of
participation in most American private firms and is the
2
major emphasis of most American theorists. No real effort
is made to extend participation in decision making to all
members of the organization and, consequently, decision
making is still very much a function performed by managers.
Participative management emphasizes group decision making
and cooperation among managers.
The phrase workers’ participation in management
will be used to denote situations in which the emphasis is
on extending participation in decision making to other than
managers. However, this is not to say that workers partic
ipate in all decisions, or to the same degree as managers.
this conclpf Holder> 1972, for an excellent illustration of
s
In most instances of this kind workers1 participation is
job-related and, therefore, workers participate in day-to-
day, lower-level decision making only. This type of partic
ipation is typical of proponents of "job enlargement" and is
widely used to overcome resistance to change in industrial
organizations . . 3 When this type of participation is used
solely to overcome resistance from workers to changes
imposed by management, it cannot be regarded as true partic
ipation. However, it is possible for authentic workers’
participation to occur, even though it is confined to lower-
level decisions.
The term "industrial democracy" is widely used, but
very poorly understood. Widely varying descriptions of
industrial democracy have been advanced by Derber (1970),
Clegg (1963), Pateman (1970) and Cole (1957). For our
purposes, we find the views of Katz and Kahn most illumi
nating :
. . . every organization has an executive system for
carrying out policy or the implementation of adminis
trative decisions. In a democratic structure there is,
in addition, a separate legislative system with the
power vested in the membership to select top executives,
to set policy, to choose between alternative policies
of the leadership, or to veto policy proposals. In an
3lt can be argued that this type of participation
is extremely manipulative of workers; an argument which has
been made with respect to Harwood Manufacturing’s use of
this technique. See Coch and French (1946) and the debates
between William Gomberg and Warren G. Bennis in Transaction,
July/August and September/October, 1966.
9
authoritarian structure a single system may include
the executive and legislative functions, and the
top executives do the legislating for the organiza
tion. It is also possible for an authoritarian struc
ture to have separate legislative and. executive
systems, in which an appointed or self-perpetuating
board of directors sets policy and a manager and his
subordinates execute it. The essential_difference
between a democratic and an authoritarian system is
not whether executive officers order or consult with
those below them but whether the power to legislate
on policy is vested in the membership or in the top
echelons. (1966;45)
In this essay, then, industrial democracy will refer to a
situation in which the legislative power is vested in the
entire membership of the organization, in accordance with
the "one man, one vote" principle.
A second group of terms which it seems advisable to
define at this point deals with the various "schools" of
the literature of participation. We will, from time to
time, refer to the authors of participation literature as
participatory theorists. There is the danger in this usage
of categorizing as similar the views of theorists who are
actually quite dissimilar. The term is notably misleading
when we are in fact referring to both participatory manage
ment theorists and participatory political theorists. As
we will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, there are
substantial differences between the theoretical treatments
of participation in politics and participation in organiza
tions. We will attempt to be faithful to those differences
by using the terms "participatory (participative) theorists
of management (organization) and "participatory
10
(participative) theorists of politics” where appropriate.
We will also use the terms ’ 'human relations" and
"industrial humanist" to refer to sub-groups in the litera
ture. These terms are widely used and understood, and
perhaps do not require definition in this essay. However,
it is important to state that we feel that the differences
of these two schools, from the perspective of organization
theory, are largely differences of semantics and historical
epoch. Industrial humanism is essentially human relations
in a new vocabulary. At its core, industrial humanism is
still preoccupied with the manipulation of workers to
achieve increased organizational efficiency. It falls
victim to the same unacknowledged pro-management biases as
the human relations movement. Perhaps we could sum up our
argument by stating that both are theories of management,
rather than theories of organization; and, therefore, do
not differ substantially in their implications for organi
zation theory.
The most reliable criterion for differentiating
these two schools is chronological. The human relationists
were active from approximately 1930 to 1950. Their views
enjoyed a resurgence in industrial humanism starting in the
late 1950’s and continuing to the present time. Such
notables as Elton Mayo, Fritz Rothlesberger, W. L. Warner,
George Homans, and L. R. Sayles are human relationists.
The industrial humanists include Abraham Maslow, Douglas
McGregor, Rensis Likert, Warren Bennis and many more
11
The Variety of Contemporary National Models
Even though we have defined the terms "participative
management,” "industrial democracy," etc. as used in this
dissertation, we must be aware of the variety implied by
these terms in a comparative international context.
"Industrial democracy" in the United States is very dis
similar from its counterpart in Sweden or Yugoslavia. To
describe in detail the features of each of these examples
of industrial democracy is a task beyond the scope of the
present work, but we think it advisable to be aware of the
tremendous variety in national models.
Excellent descriptions of the more prominent nation
al models have been provided by other authors. The Swedish
system is ably discussed in articles by Wilfred List and
Lars Erik Karlsson in Hunnius, Garson and Case (1973)* The
examples of the kibbutzim and Histadrut in Israel are dis
cussed in depth by Keitha Sapsin Fine in Hunnius, Garson
and Case (1973). Perhaps the most widely written about
approach is that taken in Yugoslavia. Blumberg (1969),
Horvat (1971), Kolaja (1966), Broekmeyer (1970), Adizes
(1971) and Sturmthal (1964) are excellent sources. The
Norwegian experience is presented by Emery and Thorsrud
(1969). Codetermination, the West German approach, is dis
cussed by Blumenthal (1956) and by the executive board of
12
the West German Trade Union Federation and by Helmut Schauer
in articles in Hunnius, Garson and Case (1973)* The British
system is discussed in Coates and Topham (1966),
A Brief Description of Self
management in Yugoslavia
We shall refer frequently to "the self-management
system," which is the system of industrial democracy
practiced in Yugoslavia. The basic governing subdivisions
of a self-managed organization are the Economic Units
(Zbors), the Workers’ Council, and the Governing Board.
The Economic Units are the basic functional units of the
organization; which, in the self-management system, are
empowered to make, through an electoral process in which
all members of the Unit may vote, many of the basic
decisions pertaining to work assignments, production rates,
distribution of a part of production bonus income, etc.
The Workers’ Council, which is elected by the general
membership of the organization, is the legislative organ
of that organization. Its powers and functions are more
akin to those of a parliament than to an American-type
congress. This is particularly true in respect to the
relations between the Workers' Council and the Director of
the organization. Accounts vary with respect to the exact
nature of this relationship, but it is clear that the
Workers' Councils play significant roles in the nomination
and tenure in office of Directors of enterprises.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Director is an adminis
trator rather than a governor. Adizes comments:
An American executive is free to act as he sees
fit, within a 'zone of indifference' of the interested
parties and as long as he does not violate any laws
and fulfills the requests of the Board. In Yugoslavia,
the executive is not free to act unless the right for
that action is rendered to him by the company's govern
ing body, which is the general membership or its
elected body. (1971:33)
The Governing Board is elected by the Workers'
Council from among its own membership. The Governing Board
has the responsibility of translating the decisions of the
Workers' Council into operative tasks for implementation by
administrators. In general, it can be characterized as
"supervising" the administrative sectors of the organiza
tion, which frees the Workers' Council to concentrate on
policy decisions.
The development of a governing elite within an
organization is made very difficult by the principles of
"rotation" and "pluralism." Adizes states with regard to
pluralism:
According to this principle, the Director cannot
be President of the Council or of the Board. Thus the
three top positions— those of the Director, the
Presidents of the Council, and of the Board— are held
by three different people.(1971:4^-49)
The principle of rotation forbids the election to consec
utive terms for any individual. This principle is applied
in the "public" political sphere (except for Tito) as well
as in the election of Workers' Councils and Governing
14
Boards. As a corollary of this principle, an elected
person who completes his term of office is expected to
return to his previous job, back to the people who elected
him. This is thought to be an effective deterrent to
elitism while in office.
The Importance of the Topic
The participation of workers in the affairs of
their work organizations is of increasing theoretical and
practical importance. Most of us spend the majority of our
waking hours in an environment dominated by the formal rules
of organizations. A great deal of our behavior is deter
mined by these rules as they apply to members and clients.
These facts, coupled with the increased importance of
"nurture” in contemporary psychological theory leads us to
conclude that organizational participation (in the sense of
"membership") is a grossly under-.-studied area in relation
ship to its potential theoretical importance.
On the practical, empirical level, it is obvious
that we are experiencing both widespread alienation from
and resentment of the roles we occupy as workers, and a
widespread, but poorly understood, attempt to deal with
that alienation through increased participation (here
implying something more than mere "membership") for workers.
Empirical evidence for these statements is almost ubiqui
tous.
15
Industrial unions have shown an increased interest
in moving beyond the traditional limits of collective
barbaining to issues associated with workers’ participation.
(Hunnius, Garson and Case, 1973) In many instances this
increased "interest” on the part of union leaders is a
rather reluctant response to the increasing number of
"revolts" and wildcat strikes by union membership that have
characterized the American labor scene in the 1950’s and
’60’s. (Hunnius, Garson and Case, 1973: 45-46) Therefore,
the number of unions currently seeking to expand the scope
of collective bargaining to include issues related to
participation in all probability under-represents the
strength of this movement among rank-and-file union members.
As further evidence of the importance of this topic,
we cite the increasing instances of participative manage
ment and industrial democracy in this country and abroad.
Many of our largest and best managed corporations are
adopting "participatory styles of management." Examples
are the experience of Proctor and Gamble with the socio-
technical systems approach; the use of "decision making by
consensus" at Yellow Freight (See Holder, 1972); and the
Topeka, Kansas plant of the Gaines dog food company.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for this study
is the paucity of knowledge in this area among management
theorists. Most of our knowledge about participation in
organizations has been generated by researchers of a
16
psychological-human relations frame of reference. The
organization theory, conflict theory, and political theory
approaches to the problem have been largely ignored. If we
really want to understand the phenomenon, we must seek to
complement management theory with the insights of these
other theories. In the absence of such understanding, the
current boom in participation is rather alarming.
Conclusion
This study presents what we hope is a well-
reasoned examination of the phenomenon of participation in
organizations. It is not primarily intended to be a report
of the results of empirical research conducted by the
author; although the results of such a research effort are
the subject of Chapter VI. Since the scope of the study
vastly exceeds the parameters of the research reported in
Chapter VI, we have only the shaky framework of "reason"
and the cited results of other researchers to guard the
veracity of our conclusions.
It is hoped that a degree of objectivity will be
maintained in this study despite the fact that the author
holds strong personal convictions about the subject. It is
difficult to be objective when one cares deeply, but we will
make every effort to eliminate our biases from this work,
where possible; and to make our biases evident where it is
not possible to eliminate them. In the final analysis, no
product of man is objective; we do not, therefore, claim
ultimate objectivity for this study. We claim only that
the arguments presented have considerable merit.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
In this chapter we will attempt to point out the
main features of the considerable body of literature on
participation in organizations. The reader should be aware
at the outset that this review represents only a selected
sample of the literature; and that large bodies of related
literature are not covered. Examples of these related but
unreviewed literatures are the "citizen participation" and
"decentralization" literature arising largely from the
experiences of Office of Economic Opportunity and Model
Cities agencies in the 1960’s; and the "community power
structure" literature which was born out of the contradic
tory findings of political scientists and sociologists with
regard to power structures in United States’ cities and
counties.
Our primary interest is in assessing the place of
participation in theories of organization and in modern
organizations. Most of the literature will, therefore, be
directly focused on organizations. However, since an
adequate critique must involve a transcendence of the
assumptions on which organization theory is based, we have
IS
19
included some literature focused on political systems.
It should be noted that we have omitted from this
review the considerable literature of the Industrial Human
ists. Under the label "industrial humanist" we include
Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert, Chris Argyris, Abraham
Maslow and many others who have been prominent in the
American literature of participative management. We have
taken this potentially controversial step because we feel
that much of this literature will be familiar to the
reader due to its frequent usage in schools of adminis
tration and management and its popularity among practicing
managers. A second reason for excluding the industrial
humanist literature is that we see it as a part of the
literature of management theory— a subject which we see as
distinct from organization theory. Hopefully, this disser
tation focuses on the second theoretical area and will
bring out the distinctions between the two areas. In
capsule form, the differences could be characterized as
the differences between a "psychological" approach to
organizations and a "sociological" approach.
In the course of this writing, it has become evident
that a choice must be made between making a critique of the
liter attire and making a critique of the theories presented
in the literature. We have chosen to do the former; which
may cause this chapter to be logically disjointed. We have
chosen to focus on the books and articles as entities rather
20
than looking at the inter-relation of the ideas presented
in these books and articles. The weaving together of the
various ideas will be the task of the following chapters.
One of the most difficult problems associated with
the study of participation is the diversity and volume of
the literature. No social science discipline has been able
to claim the subject as its own. Contributions to the
literature have, therefore, come from a variety of disci
plines and have included a variety of sometimes conflicting
assumptions, criteria and value bases. One must abandon the
comfort and security of a particular disciplinary base while
avoiding the temptation to synthesize the theory of partic
ipation from the contributions of the several disciplines.
The Literature
Pateman
Participation and Democratic Theory by Carole
Pateman is almost indispensable to an understanding of the
place of participation in democratic theories of politics.
Among political theorists, especially in the United States,
the current, widely accepted theory of democracy attaches
very little importance to the participation of the citi
zenry. Indeed, it emphasizes the dangers inherent in
widespread popular participation in politics. (Dahl, 1966)
Pateman argues that the current theory is based on
an inadequate understanding of the writings of earlier
21
democratic theorists; that much relevant sociological
evidence has been ignored and that the notion of participa
tion should have an important place in a revised modern
theory of democracy. She examines the theories of
Schumpeter, Berelson, Dahl, Sartori and Eckstein, arguing
that they have misrepresented the earlier, so-called
classical, writers. She then discusses the theories of
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and G. D. H. Cole and points out
the importance which these theorists placed on participa
tion. Particularly important to these theorists is the
notion that participation has an educational, developmental
effect, which furthers the ability of the citizen to partic
ipate in meaningful political decision making. Pateman
concludes with an examination of the system of workers1
self management in Yugoslavia and its relevance to a
participatory theory of democracy.
She is particularly critical of the views of
management theorists with respect to participation. Among
those that she singles out for the ambiguousness of their
definitions of participation are Rensis Likert and Douglas
McGregor. She states:
• . • what is important is that these writers use the
term 'participation’ to refer not just to a method of
decision making, but also to cover techniques used
to persuade employees to accept decisions that have
already been made by the management. (Pateman, 1970:68)
Pateman follows Verba (1961) in calling this pseudo
participation.
22
A typical example would be a situation wherein the
supervisor, instead of merely telling the employees of a
decision, allows them to question him about it and discuss
it. The primary concern of the leader is to set up a feel
ing of participation through the adoption of a particular
style. (Verba, 1961:220)
Pateman goes on to define two categories of genuine
participation. Partial participation is a situation in
which workers can influence decisions, but the final
decisions rest with management. This situation is "partial”
because the worker does not have equal power with manage
ment. (1970:70) Full participation is "a process where each
individual member of a decision-making body has equal power
to determine the outcome of decisions." (Pateman, 1970:71)
Pateman emphasizes that in full-participation
situations there are no longer two "sides" (worker and
management), but a group of equal individuals who have to
make their own decisions. The basic paradigm of Pateman’s
approach to participation in the work place is completed
when we add her definitions of "lower level" and "higher
level" participation.
. . . lower level refers broadly to those management
decisions relating to control of day-to-day shop floor
activity, while the higher level refers to decisions
that relate to the running of the whole enterprise,
decisions on investment, marketing and so forth.
(1970:70)
23
Cole
No review of the literature of industrial democracy
would be complete without some mention of the work of
G. D. H. Cole. Cole was an early and prolific writer on
the subject. He published from 1913 to 1957» with the bulk
of his work taking place before 1920. He was a scholar
rather than a researcher; a social critic rather than a
scientist. We have chosen for purposes of illustration of
his work his most recent publication, The Case for
Industrial Partnership. It is rather difficult to define
in operational terms Cole’s position since he was both a
radical social critic and an abstract thinker of consider
able merit. Therefore, at this point we will simply
present illustrative quotations without extensive comment.
Cole defines partnership as,
... a status in the enterprise which protects the
worker from being dismissed, except on account of some
fault of his own sufficient to merit dismissal, without
being at the same time transferred to partnership in
some other enterprise in which his services can be
appropriately used or, in default of such immediate
transfer, being maintained on the strength of the
enterprise he is leaving until an appropriate transfer
can be arranged and, in the meantime, receiving any
training that may be needed to fit him for his new
employment. (1957:22)
He further states that industrial partnership involves a
redefinition of "the entire structure of working relation
ships inside the workplace, especially with regard to such
matters as discipline and the choice of persons for pro
motion to supervisory and managerial posts." (1957:37)
24
Also,
The equality implied in democracy is not of a
sort that excludes leadership; it only transforms it.
But it does mean that leadership can no longer be
imposed, and will not be acceptable unless it is chosen
freely. (1953:61)
In condemning profit sharing plans, Cole says, "The
worker, if he is to achieve recognition as a partner, needs
to get it in his own right, as a worker, and not as an
inferior sort of capitalist or participant in capitalist
profit." (1953:50)
Cole was a political theorist and a leading spokes
man for the Guild Socialists. His prescriptions do not
translate well into the language of organization theorists,
but he provides stimulation for thought.
Blumberg
The contemporary sociological counterpart of Carole
Pateman is Paul Blumberg. In his Industrial Democracy:
The Sociology of Participation. Blumberg systematically
examines the place of "the sociology of participation" in
industrial sociology. An important component of his argu
ment is a reinterpretation of the "Mayo" (Hawthorne) experi
ments. Blumberg contends that Mayo and cohorts unwittingly
introduced worker participation in the decision-making
process as an independent variable in their classic, though
methodically shoddy, experiments. (1969:14-46)
A second vital component of his argument is an
25
examination of the problem of alienation from work and a
proposal that increased participation of workers offers the
most plausible solution to this increasingly serious prob
lem. (1969:47-133) The third, and final, component of his
argument is a refutation of the writings of Hugh Clegg,
whom Blumberg regards as a revisionist theorist of indus
trial democracy; and a report on the successful (from
Blumberg*s point of view) experience of workers’ self-
management in Yugoslavia. (1969:139-234)
Another model, using the word loosely, of partici
pation in industry is presented by Blumberg in the follow
ing typology. See Table 1.
As we move downward through the chart, the power
of the workers increases. It should be noted that the
essential element of participation presented in this chart
is joint decision making between two opposed groups,
workers and management. Blumberg notes that only the
extremes of this typology are not instances of joint
decision making. In the first case the workers have no
real input in the decision-making process; decisions are
unilaterally made by management. (Blumberg, 1969:70-71)
One must qualify Blumberg*s assertion of the uni
lateral nature of decision making in the final case. In
most instances of worker control the definition of "worker”
has been expanded to include those who were formerly re
garded as management; managers are regarded as workers.
TABLE 1
TYPES OF WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION1
26
I.
II.
Cooperation (Workers influence decisions— except in
No. 1 below where this is nominal— but are not
responsible for these decisions.)
1.
2.
3.
4»
Workers have the right to
receive information
Workers have the right to
protest decisions
Workers have the right to make
suggestions
Workers have the right of prior
consultation but their decisions
are not binding on management
Workers’ Role
passive
negative
positive
positive
Codetermination (Workers control decisions and are
responsible for them.)
1. Workers have the right of veto
(a) Temporary, after which
management
(i) may implement its
decision
(ii) must negotiate with
workers
(b) Permanent
2. Workers have the right of co
decision
3. Workers have the right of
decision
Workers’ Role
negative
passive
positive
positive
positive
^Blumberg’s typology is an adaptation from
Abraham Shuchman, Codetermination: Labor’s Middle Wav in
Germany (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957),
p. 6.
27
The movement from management control to worker control is
most correctly conceptualized as a process of defining away
the distinctions between worker and manager rather than a
process of reversing the hegemony of the two groups.
Pateman's (1970:70-71) concept of full participation is
perhaps more useful than Blumberg's notion of worker control
(the final case in the above chart) in this respect; in
that Ms. Pateman specifically recognizes that full partici
pation involves a merging of the two groups.
It is possible, however, to conceive of situations
in which Blumberg's workers control may be more applicable.
Up to now it has been possible in situations of workers'
control, or full participation, to expand the definition
of "worker” to include management level employees largely
because most of the efforts to establish workers' control
have occurred in countries with a socialist tradition. To
establish workers' control in a capitalist system will
involve dealing with the resistance of owners to attempts
to define them as simply another kind of worker. While
salaried management has been able to accept their redefini
tion, it is doubtful that entrepreneurial elements of
management will do so as easily. In a social system
strongly devoted to capitalist values, but heavily
pressured by workers' demands for participation, it is
conceivable that separate, antagonistic groups (workers and
owners) might be maintained even though the workers were in
2a
full control.
Rhenman
Industrial Democracy and Industrial Management by
Eric Rhenman is a publication in the series, ’ 'Technology
and Democratic Society,” published by Tavistock Publica
tions, Limited. This is "an international series of
publications concerned with the relationship between the
requirements of technology in work organizations and the
needs, potentialities and aspirations of their members.”
(Rhenman, 196S: title page)
Rhenman has organized his book in terms of what he
sees to be the two central, recurring goals put forth in
the debates about industrial democracy. These goals are
increasing productivity and the balancing of various
interests in the company. Productivity, in Rhenman*s usage,
is broadly defined to include job satisfaction among the
company’s "products.” In looking for ways to increase
productivity Rhenman looks primarily at research on leader
ship. He approaches the balancing of various interests
through the framework of conflict resolution.
Rhenman makes a number of interesting points, but
the message that he presents seems somewhat confused and
ambivalent. It may be that this confusion arises from
Rhenman*s attempts to achieve the scrupulous objectivity of
the traditional social scientist. His objectivity can
29
sometimes be perceived as a lack of clarity.
Rhenman starts his explanation of organizations by
conceptualizing them as interdependent groups or indi
viduals. These interdependent groups or individuals are
called stakeholders. Stakeholders are dependent on the
organization for the realization of their personal goals;
the organization is dependent on securing the cooperation
of the stakeholders; and, therefore, the stakeholders are
interdependent. Stakeholders place demands on the organi
zation and the organization has claims on them. Stake
holders of primary importance are the customers, owners,
employees, management, suppliers, the State, and local
authorities. (Rhenman, 1963:24-25)2
The fact that this model is explicitly based in
management theory may be the source of its greatest
strength and its greatest weakness for our purposes. Its
great strength is in its direct relatedness to much of the
literature of the field. Its weakness is that it is based
on many of the same assumptions and value biases as manage
ment theory and cannot, therefore, offer us an adequate
critique of that literature. In particular it shares with
management theory an overly sympathetic treatment of
2We have used the word "organization" where Rhenman
normally uses "company." There doesn’t seem to be anything
about his definition or use of the word which would
preclude our substitution of the more general term.
30
management and managers. Although management is one of the
stakeholders, it soon becomes evident that management
. . . is in a unique position since it has also to act
as a mediator, resolving conflicts between the stake
holders and sometimes even deciding which claims will
be satisfied. Moreover, management is usually the group
most inclined to identify itself with the organization
and to fight for its survival, expansion and future
security. (Rhenman, 1966:26)
While Rhenman admits that managers are somewhat unique
among the stakeholders, the uniqueness of managers is cast
as a kind of "white man's burden" in that they must assume
the responsibilities of "resolving conflicts"; presumably
because of their stronger tendency to "identify" with the
organization. Although he specifically identifies manage
ment as a stakeholder, Rhenman tends to treat them as dis
interested problem solvers and conflict resolution special
ists rather than emphasizing the potential power of their
unique position vis-a-vis other stakeholders. Managers are
not disinterested and their role as problem solvers and
conflict resolutionists gives them considerable power— all
of which Rhenman basically ignores.
Rhenman is more innovative and perhaps more helpful
in his application of conflict theory to organizations. He
identifies three basic types of conflict in organizations:
1. Conflicts of interest which are the unavoidable
result of the competing claims of stakeholders.
2. Conflicts of fact which occur when decision
makers do not agree on matters of fact: they
31
disagree about the limitations of the problem
and its relation to other problems, or about
the action alternatives available, etc.
3. Formal conflicts which occur when decision
makers do not meet each other’s behavioral
norms and expectations.
Conflicts of interest are seen as unavoidable, but
conflicts of fact and formal conflicts are the result of
misunderstanding and, therefore, subject to measures for
prevention and treatment. (Rhenman, 1963:55)
The importance of this modest typology of conflict
lies in the notion that conflicts of fact and formal con
flicts are the result of misunderstanding and, therefore,
are settled "by an exchange of information which enables
the stakeholders to make a joint decision." (Rhenman, 1963:
40) The reader will recall that joint decision making is
the key element in both Pateman’s and Blumberg’s notion of
participation. Conflicts of interest may be dealt with
through other means— Rhenman discusses cooptation and
"market" mechanisms— but conflicts of fact and formal
conflicts must be dealt with through exchange of informa
tion and joint decision.
Emery and Thorsrud
A further contribution to the literature of partic
ipative management is Form and Content in Industrial
32
Democracy by F. E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud. It is another
publication in the series on "Technology and Democratic
Society" and thus offers the advantages of being well
conceptualized and explicitly related to other segments of
the literature. The authors are affiliated with the
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (London) and the
Institute for Industrial Social Research at the Technical
University of Norway (Trondheim), respectively. Both of
these Institutes have a long tradition of research related
to industrial democracy, and it is to these researches and
the publications arising from them that this study is most
directly related.
This particular book is the first publication
arising from a long-term "Participation Project" in which
the two research Institutes, the Norwegian Confederation of
Employers (NAF), the Trades Union Congress of Norway (LO),
and the Norwegian government have engaged. The Project is
a comprehensive social science research effort to examine
various kinds and patterns of industrial democracy in
Norwegian factories. Its results promise to be very sig
nificant for the literature on participation.^
%e should point out that participation in Norway
and, indeed, in Europe as a whole, takes place in a cultural
setting which is in many ways quite different from our own.
Particularly important is the difference in union-management
relations. The European countries discussed in this book
have been characterized by extensive cooperation between
unions and management for a number of years.
33
After the above "high praise" we should caution the
reader that Form and Content in Industrial Democracy is
merely the first, somewhat tentative publication with
respect to the project. It is specifically focused on the
subject of employee representation on company boards rather
than more generally focused on industrial democracy.
For our purposes the six appendices are at least as
valuable as the book itself. These appendices present the
conceptual basis of the total research program and, there
fore, an excellent conceptualization of the dilemmas of
industrial democracy as seen by these eminent researchers.
The research to be conducted during the
Participation Project has been divided into two phases:
Phase A— A study of existing Norwegian and other
European experiences with mechanisms that allow
formally for employee representation at top-management
level. • .
Phase B— A study of the roots of industrial
democracy in the conditions for personal participation
in the workplace. (Emery and Thorsrud, 1969:99)
Form and Content in Industrial Democracy is a first
summation of the findings of Phase A, but the appendices
present the theories and hypotheses of Phase B in some
detail.
In their assessment of employee representation on
boards of directors, the authors look at experiences in
Norway, in some depth, and compare these experiences with
the models and experiences of Yugoslavia, West Germany and
34
Great Britain. In general, it is found that employee repre
sentation on boards falls somewhat short of the ideal as
an expression of industrial democracy. There are the
obvious drawbacks such as the relative lack of knowledge
and experience of employee representatives, but the basic
limitation seems to arise from the nature of the boards'
primary function— the conservation and ensurance of the
growth of company capital. Given the above primary func
tion of boards it becomes clear that although employee
representatives
share legally in the power of the board they find it
very difficult to see how to use that power in ways
that are in accord with the usual board purposes and
at the same time make a direct impact on the working
life of their constituents. (1969:#3)
In essence, these authors hold that representation at the
board level is inappropriate to the problems of the workers
A more appropriate representative mechanism would seem to
be probable at the level of the manager rather than the
level of the board. The basic position of the authors with
respect to this matter is summed up in the following quota
tion:
... it would seem that a board has functions and
responsibilities that make it difficult for it to
accept as members people who represent outside
interests, even though these interests are related
to its own. This situation may not, however,
constitute any great obstacle to the pursuit of
industrial democracy, for two good reasons:
(a) The general arrangements for economic democracy,
and the strength of trade unions, can make it
mandatory for boards to relate their company
interests to the social interests and welfare of
35
their employees.
(b) The decisions that relate most closely to the
interests of the workers may be made at a lower
level than the board at the various levels of
management• (1969:$2)
The authors suggest that these systems of workers'
representation have failed to distinguish clearly the
power of boards and managers from the power of employees.
The power of boards and managers is derived from the
system of industrial organization, while the power of
workers is derived from their ability to withhold labor.
Too often the proponents of workers' representation on
company boards have assumed that the elevation of workers'
representatives to the board will produce an effective
counterbalance of board and management power and will thus
constitute industrial democracy.
The evidence suggests that these assumptions are
unwarranted— countervailing worker power does not lead to
industrial democracy. The true sharing of industrial power
is not the same as negotiation and reconciliation between
different but related sources of power.
With the above distinctions in mind, Emery and
Thorsrud recommend the following actions:
(a) Extending the area of negotiation within the
firm. They have in mind Works Councils and similar
representative mechanisms rather than employee repre
sentation on the board, for the reasons discussed
above.
(b) Insofar as industrial democracy means more
than extended negotiations and consultations, there is
a need for the transfer of some real managerial power
36
to the employees. It is difficult indeed to see how
this sharing can be started at the top— at board level.
If democratic participation is to become a reality,
it seems inevitable that it must be started at a level
where a large proportion of employees are both able
and willing to participate. (1969:65-66)
In terms of their own research, the authors seem to be
saying that Phase B— A study of the roots of industrial
democracy in the conditions for personal participation in
the workplace, offers more hope, because it is at the level
of "personal participation in the workplace" that a "large
proportion of the employees are both able and willing to
participate." They maintain that,
The bulk of scientific evidence suggests that the
more the individual is enabled to exercise control
over his task, and to relate his efforts to those of
his fellows, the more likely is he to accept a positive
commitment. This positive commitment shows in a number
of ways, not the least of which is the release of that
personal initiative and creativity which constitute
the basis of a democratic climate. (1969:100)
As we noted before, the work of Phase B is not
presented in this book, but the conceptual outline is
presented in the appendices. Particularly important in
this respect is Appendix V, "Some hypotheses about the ways
in which tasks may be more effectively put together to make
jobs.” Thirteen hypotheses are suggested dealing with the
variety of tasks, the length of the work cycle, the manner
in which standards of work are set, the criteria for set
ting up work groups, the communications channels provided
and the procedures for promotion to foreman. For the sake
of brevity, we will not present these thirteen hypotheses
37
in detail. Instead, we will present some of the "general
psychological requirements", which according to the authors
are the bases for their hypotheses about the construction
of jobs from tasks. These psychological requirements are:
(1) the need for the content of a job be
reasonably demanding of the worker in"terms other than
sheer endurance, and yet to provide a minimum of
variety (not necessarily novelty);
(2) the need for being able to learn on the job
and to go on learning; again it is a question of
neither too much nor too little;
(3) the need for some minimal area of decision
making that the individual can call his own;
(4) the need for some minimal degree of social
support and recognition in the workplace;
(5) the need for the individual to be able to
relate what he does and what he produces to his social
life;
(6) the need to feel that the job leads to some
sort of desirable future. (1969:105)
As will be seen later in this document, there is fairly
widespread agreement on the need for these kinds of con
ditions in the democratic workplace.
Holter
Also dealing with participation in Norwegian
organizations is the article by Harriet Holter (1965),
"Attitudes Towards Employee Participation in Company
Decision-making Processes." This article is an important
source of support for the conclusion that workers are,
indeed, interested in expanded participation in organiza
tional decision making. Holter*s conclusions are based on
a survey of 1,12& non-supervisory employees in eighteen
establishments in Oslo. The data were gathered in 1962.
33
The article is a detailed, quantified treatment of the data
and their many nuances. It is a valuable reference for the
serious student of industrial democracy.
Holter*s study focuses on many of the same aspects
as Emery and Thorsrud’s long-term research in the
Participation Project and may suggest some of the more
probable conclusions of their Phase B.
Holter concludes that there
exists among non-supervisory employees a widespread
but perhaps vague and diffuse desire for more joint
participation in decisions about the firm as a whole;
there exists an equally widespread desire for more
cooperation between employers and employees and for
more information about the plans and the management
of the establishment. (1965:293)
The following table summarizes Holter*s findings:
Workers should participate more in decisions
that concern the management of the establishment
as a whole. 70 percent
Would like to participate more in decisions
that directly concern my own work and working
conditions. 61 percent
Would like to participate more in decisions
that concern the management of the whole enter
prise. 14 percent
Have no special interest in more partici
pation. 22 percent
Although the desire for joint participation in the affairs
of the firm is widespread (approximately 70 percent of the
sample), the percentage of workers who themselves want to
participate in such joint decision making at the top-
management level is relatively low (approximately 14
39
percent). There are indications that those employees who
do desire to be personally involved in joint, top-
management level decision making are an especially well-
qualified and responsible group of personnel with consider
able unused potential. Even those who are not personally
interested in influence on top management appear to be
considerably under-utilized in their present work.
There also seems to be a widespread desire to
increase workers’ participation in matters concerning their
own job and immediate work surroundings (approximately 61
percent). It is important to note that a system of
employee representation in management decision making will
do little or nothing to satisfy this desire of workers.^
Dunlop
Industrial Relations Systems by John T. Dunlop is
of interest to us for two reasons. First, it contains an
excellent chapter, "The Yugoslav Industrial Relations
System,” which has much to say about workers’ self-
management. Second, it is an attempt to develop a general
theory of industrial relations systems and is, therefore,
useful in trying to come to an understanding of industrial
relations systems in general, including participatory
systems.
^The two preceding paragraphs closely paraphrase
Holter’s general conclusions. (Holter, 1965:296-299)
40
This is an excellent book, although a bit old— it
was published in 195#. The author uses a "comparative
description" method of developing and reinforcing his
general theory. He compares a number of national indus
trial relations systems and accounts for their differences
in terms of his general theory. The theory seems quite
plausible and potentially useful; although rather more
descriptive than analytic.
Briefly, Dunlop characterizes industrial relations
systems as structured of four classes of variables:
1. Actors— a hierarchy of managers and supervisors
— a hierarchy of workers and/or their
spokesman
— specialized government agencies con
cerned with workers, enterprises and
their relationships
2. Context— the technological characteristics of
the work place and community
— market or budgetary constraints
— the locus and distribution of power
in the larger society
3. Rules— procedures for making new rules
— rules governing compensation; duties
and performance expected from workers;
and the rights of worker, including new
or laid-off workers
4* Ideology— a set of ideas and beliefs commonly
held by the actors that helps to bind
or to integrate the system together.
(1953:7-13)
These are the basic elements for Dunlop’s general theory
and may be useful to us in comparing the various approaches
to participation in management.
In discussing the origins and functions of self-
management, Dunlop emphasizes the unsatisfactory experience
with centralized administrative planning during the period
1947-1951; the strong ideological commitment to socializa
tion of the means of production despite the shortcomings of
administrative planning; and the unique ability of the self-
management system to recruit and train the large numbers of
new workers needed by an emerging industrial system. Dunlop
maintains that the self-management system is especially
effective in this regard because existing workers are given
a great deal of the responsibility for receuiting, training
and inculcating standards of industrial discipline.
(Dunlop, 195$:2S0-2&4) This role of the existing workers
would seem to be particularly valuable in developing
economies because of the characteristic shortage of mana
gerial talent.
Dunlop raises a very interesting point in the
following quotation:
The workers council provides a means of direct
concern with a variety of community problems in the
discussion of the distribution of profits. These
profits have been invested to some extent in housing,
in technical educational facilities, in scholarships,
in clinics and medical institutions, and in other
social institutions. The conflicts between enterprise
and community have been softened by the institutions
of workers* management .... (195#:27#)
We cannot, therefore, evaluate self-management solely on
its impact within the factory. Nor can we, strictly speak
ing, compare it with the socio-technical systems experiments
in Norway and participative management in the United States.
The latter systems have yet to demonstrate their impact
42
outside the factory, and are not fully dedicated to such
impact•
Derber
Milton Derber takes a broad-scale, historical look
at the United States’ industrial relations systems in The
American Idea of Industrial Democracy 1665-1965* Berber’s
task is to trace the development of the American system of
industrial relations since the end of the Civil War, which
coincides roughly with the acceleration of industrialization
in this country. More than any other source, Derber empha
sizes the historical forces which have shaped industrial
relations in this country. He cites as especially impor
tant the patterns of industrialization, urbanization,
immigration and what he calls the socio-psychological
climate— which was dominated in the nineteenth century by
laissez faire capitalism and an emphasis on individual
liberty. The last-third of the nineteenth century was
characterized by widespread abuse of the work force and
concomitant industrial strife and violence. This gradually
brought about limited acceptance of employee representation
and collective bargaining, although not necessarily includ
ing the acceptance of trade unions. Trade unions have
always, therefore, been in the position of an outside
adversary on the American industrial scene. Unlike many
European countries, no widespread challenge to capitalist
43
ownership of industry was ever sustained. These two differ
ences, the position of unions and the dominant concepts of
property, are crucial in a comparison of American and
European systems of industrial democracy.
According to Derber, the American approach to
industrial democracy rests on the "collective bargaining
model," which is embodied in the following principles:
1. Representation. Both employers and employees
have the right, if they so desire, to form organiza
tions and to choose representatives who will act in
their behalf in the government of an enterprise or
industry. Employee representatives are chosen by
majority vote of an appropriate constituency on the
principle of one man, one vote. (In a system of private
ownership of industry, employer representation is
determined by financial rather than electoral con
siderations.)
2. Participation. Employees have a voice, directly
or through their representatives, in the determination
of the rules relating to their terms and conditions of
employment.
3« Equal rights and opportunities. All employees
have equal rights as citizens of the enterprise and
equal protection under the rules. Discrimination
because of race, religion, sex, nationality, or other
personal characteristics unrelated to the requirements
of a job is prohibited.
4« Right of dissent. The rights of freedom of
speech and orderly opposition to the formal leaders are
protected.
5. Due process. Individuals or groups may raise
complaints over the interpretation or application of
existing rules and have ready access to effective pro
cedures which assure them of a fair hearing and a just
decision.
6. Responsibility. The parties live up to their
contractual duties and responsibilities in an orderly
and lawful manner.
44
7* Minimum standards. Socially acceptable minimum
terms and standards of employment are provided.
S. Information. All needed information, including
an accounting of funds, consistent with the external
relationships of the enterprise, is provided to the
interested parties.
9. Personal dignity. The dignity of every indi
vidual in the enterprise is respected. (1970:19-20)
Even a casual perusal of these principles brings out signi
ficant differences between these principles and the state
ments of Pateman, Blumberg, and Emery and Thorsrud. These
differences will be featured in our later discussion.
Zupanov and Tannenbaum
A useful addition to the literature of workers’
self-management is "The Distribution of Control in Some
Yugoslav Industrial Organizations as Perceived by Members,"
by Josip Zupanov and Arnold S. Tannenbaum.^ Although this
is a relatively brief article, it is of importance for at
least two reasons:
1. The conceptualization of two distinct authority
structures within worker managed enterprises.
2. The application of the "control-graph" model of
-*In Arnold S. Tannenbaum, ed., Control
Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196B),
pp. 91-109.
45
control in organizations.6
Zupanov and Tannenbaum posit the existence of two
rather distinct authority structures.
The first includes workers as producers at one
end, followed by supervisors, heads of economic units
(which are roughly equivalent to department heads),
and the manager at the other. The second includes the
workers' council at one end, followed by the managing
board and the manager at the other. Theoretically,
the first is concerned with operative, and the second
with general policy decisions. (1963:94)
We should be aware that Yugoslav descriptions of workers'
self-management tend to emphasize the latter structure.
Zupanov and Tannenbaum posit two hierarchies on the basis
of the kinds of powers vested, and problems addressed in
each hierarchy. Obviously, this distinction is a matter of
degree rather than kind. We should also note that the
manager is included in both authority structures, acts as
a link between the two structures, and derives considerable
power from this role.
The control-graph is a method of describing control
structures in organizations. It characterizes the control
structure in terms of two axes.^ The horizontal axis is
^For details of the control-graph model see Clagett
G. Smith and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Organizational Control
Structure: A Comparative Analysis," Human Relations. XVI
(1963), 299-316.
*^A detailed discussion of the control-graph is
presented in Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn,
"Organizational Control Structure: A General Descriptive
Technique as Applied to Four Local Unions," Human Relations.
X (1957)» 127-140.
46
based on a universal characteristic of formal organizations
the system of hierarchically defined ranks. This axis is
designed to represent the various hierarchical levels, from
low to high, in the organization. The vertical axis of the
graph represents the amount of control over the organiza
tion's policies and actions that is exercised by each of
the hierarchical levels. Varying shapes of curves can be
generated from these axes, depending on how much control is
exercised by each of the hierarchical groups.
Zupanov and Tannenbaum present the control-graph
which they developed from data gathered from fifty-six
workers attending a two-year course at the Workers
University in Zagreb. They were asked to indicate the
control exercised by the various hierarchical groups in
their work organizations. In an interesting embellishment
of the basic control-graph method, they were asked to also
indicate the control which, in their opinion, each group
should have. From these data Zupanov and Tannenbaum
developed the "actual" and "ideal" control-graphs for each
of the two hierarchies of the worker self-managed enter
prise. These graphs are presented in Figure 1.
It is possible to draw several conclusions from
these graphs with regard to workers' perceptions of control
structures in workers' self-managed organizations:
A very-
great
deal
5.0
A great
deal
4.0
Some
3.0
little
2.0
Actual
Ideal
None
1.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
Actual
Ideal
1.0
Managers Heads of Supervisors Workers Managers Board of Workers
Economic Units Management Council
Hierarchy I Hierarchy II
Fig. 1.— Actual and Ideal Control Curves
Source: Zupanov and Tannenbaum {196S:9&)
1. Even under this very highly democratized admin
istrative structure, managers are perceived as
retaining a great deal of control and influence.
2. The workers’ council is seen as wielding con
siderable control, but this does not seem to
translate into a feeling of strong control for
the workers themselves. This conclusion is
based upon a comparison of the reported actual
levels of control for workers and workers’
councils (workers are much less influential
than workers’ councils); and a comparison of
the disparities between Actual and Ideal levels
of control for workers and for workers’ councils
(under ideal conditions the power of the workers
would be increased by an amount much larger than
the increase for workers’ councils).^
3* In ideal circumstances, the managers would be
the only group to experience an actual decrease
in control. The control of all other groups
would be increased.
The above conclusions are deserving of far more
discussion than we can give them in this work, and are dis
cussed at length in Zupanov and Tannenbaum. (196S)
d
°The reader will recall our earlier discussion of
the similar findings of Emery and Thorsrud with regard to
worker representation on boards of directors.
49
For our purposes we will content ourselves with
further discussion of the third conclusion only. The ideal
expressed in this conclusion would seem to be based on
reasoning which is rather contrary to traditional notions
of control in organizations. Traditionally, increased con
trol for one organizational group was thought to necessitate
decreased control for some other group or groups. However,
the respondents in this survey have indicated an ideal
situation in which almost all groups would experience an
increase in their control over the affairs of the organi
zation. What they are hypothesizing, then, is the possi
bility of increasing the total amount of control that the
organization is capable of exercising.
Although these findings are from Yugoslavian
organizations, they are similar to findings reported from
several other nations, especially the United States, and we
will return to them in our more general theoretical section.
Other Works of Interest
There are two books which were among the earlier
English language publications on workers' self-management
and, which until recently, were an important part of that
literature. These books are Workers Councils: The
Yugoslav Experience by Jiri Kolaja and Workers Councils by
Adolph Sturmthal. Their usefulness for our purposes is
limited by several factors. Among these factors are the
50
relatively advanced age of these studies coupled with swift
changes in the form of workers’ self-management; and the
participant observer/case study nature of these works as
compared with more recent, theoretically based publications.
Either or both of these books might be useful as historical
background, and are often cited for this purpose, but they
are not well grounded in organization theory. The Sturmthal
book does, however, make some useful observations which we
will utilize in later chapters.
Also worthy of mention, although slightly peripheral
to our interests, is Yugoslav Workers’ Selfmanagement.
edited by M. J. Broekmeyer, which is the proceedings of a
symposium held in Amsterdam, January 7-9, 1970. Unfortu
nately, for our purposes, most of the articles presented
focus on self-management as a sub-system of the social,
economic or political system rather than on the internal
processes of self-managed organizations. The strengths of
this book are in the relative recency of its publication,
and in the high quality of scholarship exhibited in the
articles. Also of benefit is the ''adversary" style of
presentation— articles are presented by Yugoslavian author
ities, and comments are made on these articles by non-
Yugoslavian, in most cases Dutch, authorities. From the
macro level, this is one of the better contributions to the
literature.
Another work of considerable merit is The
51
Participatory Economy by Jaraslav Vanek. Vanek, a
Czechoslovakian by birth, is an eminently well-qualified
economist who has taught at Harvard and is presently teach
ing at Cornell* Most of his research over the past ten
years has been directed toward the study of an economy based
on workers* participation in management. The Participatory
Economy is one result of that research.^ it should
probably be regarded as an interesting, somewhat specula
tive work in political economy, because it addresses not
only macro economic problems, but also their attendant
social problems. The basic task of the author is a compar
ison, in theoretical and empirical arguments, of the
western-capitalist, command and participatory economies.
He uses the United States as his primary example of a
western-capitalist economy and the Soviet Union as his
example of a command economy. He refers to the Yugoslav
economy as a "participatory economy1 ' and as a "labor-
managed market economy." He acknowledges that each type of
economy should be regarded somewhat as Weber regarded his
"ideal type," but when faced with the need to marshal
empirical data to support his arguments, he chooses each of
these economies as closely representative of its type.
^Vanek has also published The General Theory of
Labor-Managed Market Economies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1970), which contains the rigorous and
strictly economic results of his research.
52
The labor-managed market economy has five defining
characteristics:
1. Labor-managed— It is composed of firms con
trolled and managed by those working in them.
2. Income shared— The participants of the labor-
managed firm, after they have paid for all
material and other costs of operation, share in
the income of the enterprise.
3. Ownership— The working community which has the
exclusive right to control and manage the
activities of the firm does not have full
ownership— in the traditional sense of the
word— of the capital assets which it uses. The
working community cannot, for instance, destroy
the assets or sell them and distribute the
proceeds.
4. Market mechanisms— All decision-making units,
firms, households, etc., decide freely on
actions they take without direct interference
from the outside. Government economic planning
and policy may be implemented through the use
of indirect policy instruments, discussion,
improved information, or moral suasion, but not
through a direct order to a firm or group of
firms.
5. Freedom of employment— The individual is free
53
to take, not to take, or to leave a particular
job and the labor-managed firms are free to hire
or not to hire a particular person. (1971:^-12)
Obviously, Vanek would not have written the book had
he not believed in the viability and importance of the par
ticipatory economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that
his empirical evidence and theoretical arguments produce
several conclusions which make the Yugoslavian (partici
patory) economy appear very impressive indeed. He cites
the fact that for the period 1952-1964 per capita growth in
Yugoslavia was at an average annual rate of 8 percent.
(1971:46) He also states that for the period 1950-1964 the
share of national production allocated to investment was 26
percent. (1971:4#) Both of these figures are among the
highest in the world for nations at that period of time.
Based on these and other arguments Vanek^ states:
We can thus safely conclude that the economy of
Yugoslavia under the participatory system has performed
remarkably well, unsurpassed in a significant manner by
any economy in the world, and about equal to the
economy of the top (growth rate rather than size, E.
C.) two or three countries. (1971:49)
The interested reader should see Vanek’s Chapter 3,
"How Well Can the Participatory Economy be Expected to
Operate?," pp. 21-36. In brief, and over-simplified, he
argues that the participatory economy will tend to be
slightly less efficient than a western-capitalist economy
in responding to a changing market— the adjustment process
being slower in the participatory economy— and more
efficient in producing optimal market concentrations and
sizes of firms.
Vanek1s book is a very interesting and unique
addition to the literature. Because his interests lead him
to address questions of social functioning which lie out
side his area of expertise, economics; some of his con
clusions are subject to argument. However, none of these
more speculative conclusions are crucial to an understand
ing of the participatory economy, or crucial to a comparison
of it to other economies.
Another contribution by an economist is Branko
Horvat’s nYugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period:
Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments." It is a
brilliant, comprehensive statement, but directed to an
audience of professional economists. Its usefulness for
our purposes is somewhat limited. Because of the "techni
cal" nature of much of his discussion, we will forego a
detailed review at this time. However, in later sections
of this paper we will make reference to Horvat’s arguments.
Conclusion
We have concluded our review of the literature, but
we have by no means covered the literature. There are
numerous "bits and pieces" of literature which will be
important to our theoretical arguments of the following
chapter, but which have not been presented in this chapter.
The literature that we have presented might be said
to follow certain "themes." Pateman looks at the importance
55
of participation in political systems and briefly examines
the Yugoslavian system. Emery and Thorsrud, Holter and
Rhenman relate to the social scientific state-of-the-art in
organizational participation. Zupanov and Tannenbaum shed
light on both the social scientific state-of-the-art and
the Yugoslavian experience. Dunlop and Berber give us
their insights into the Yugoslav system and their expertise
in the economics of participatory systems.
Our review has covered a diverse, but inter-related
body of literature which might be said to revolve about the
following themes: participation in political systems,
participation in organizations and the supporting social
scientific evidence, the special case of Yugoslavia, and
participation as a facet of industrial relations systems.
These themes and their implications will form the basis of
Chapter III.
CHAPTER III
THEORIES, MODELS AND CRITERIA: THE DISTILLATION
OF EXPERIENCE
Introduction
Good theory is paradoxical in its nature. It repre
sents an optimization, at a particular point in time, of
the expression of the dilemma of "essence and existence."
It must be both general and particular. In the final anal
ysis it is either useful or not useful; not true or untrue.
This chapter reflects the above view of theory; and has,
therefore, a rather loose logical structure in order that
the poles of the various paradoxes may coexist.
The chapter will be divided into three identifiable
sections. The first will deal primarily with the structural
variables of systems of workers' participation in manage
ment. We will describe the rules, properties and effects
of some of the existing approaches, and bring out some of
the ways of classifying and evaluating participative
schemes. The second section examines the various motiva
tions and objectives advanced in participative schemes. As
we will see, participative approaches have been instituted
for a variety of purposes and with widely varying results.
56
The final section deals with some of the unresolved issues
of participative systems.
The Structures of Participation
In this context the term, "structure," must be seen
as including a wide variety of meanings. We are referring
to attitudes of participants, rules (both formal and
informal), characteristic behaviors, and other indicators
of consistency.
In the most macro-classifications, we can discern
three broad categories of participation structures. These
categories are:
1. Unions and collective bargaining processes.
2. Representative systems internal to the
organization.
3. Systems of direct, personal participation.
These categories are intended as primarily heuristic
devices. The purpose is to provide a useful classification
scheme that is broad enough to include all of the instances
of workers' participation described in the literature. In
fact, they may be too inclusive from some points of view,
in that many authors (Pateman, Emery and Thorsrud, and
Vanek— to name a few) would exclude category one. On the
other hand, it is clear that Derber and Clegg feel that the
"collective bargaining model" is the ultimate in participa
tion systems.
There are actually two criteria at work in these
categories. The first is based on an "internal-external"
distinction; while the second involves a "representative-
direct" difference. On the one hand, we are making a dis
tinction between participation systems that are internal
to the organization and those that are external to it.
This criterion is the primary reason that "unions and
collective bargaining processes" is a separate category.
In many senses, unions are "representative systems," but
they are largely external to the organization and are thus
distinct from category two.
Both categories two and three are composed of
processes largely internal to the organization. These
categories are differentiated, however, by the representa
tive-direct criterion. Category two envisions participa
tion by representatives of the workers, and category three
includes only those instances in which workers participate
personally.
Unions and Collective Bargaining Processes
Only in the United States and the United Kingdom
among writers of an industrial relations background is the
collective bargaining process given much credence as an
example of workers' participation in management. In fact,
it is surprising, and we think somewhat overly bold, that
Derber (1970) and Clegg (1963) see the collective bargaining
59
model as not simply workers' participation in management,
but use the more exalted phrase "industrial democracy."
Derber's notion of industrial democracy is embodied
in his nine principles which we presented in Chapter 11.^
Derber is an industrial relations expert; it would appear
that he is not a trained social scientist in that nowhere
does he elaborate on the operational meanings of the above
principles. He continually lauds these principles and the
American idea of industrial democracy, but nowhere does he
systematically gather empirical data to test his implied
proposition that these principles are operational in the
American industrial relations system. We must argue against
such an implication on two grounds:
1. Only a fraction of the American labor force is
unionized and those that are unionized are not
guaranteed that employers will bargain in good
faith. The legal recognition of and actual
adherence to the collective bargaining process
is not as widespread as Derber would have us
believe.
2. Derber's principles have the flavor of an
1These principles can be summarized as: represen
tation, participation, equal rights and opportunities, right
of dissent, due process, responsibility, minimum standards,
information and personal dignity. See pages 43-44 of this
study, or Derber (1970:19-20) for further information.
60
"ideal type” about them. The gap between
actual and ideal is particularly wide in this
instance. The average workplace is most
emphatically not characterized by well-
established rights of dissent, equal rights and
opportunities and so forth. These characteris
tics are also noticeably absent in the internal
affairs of unions.
In short, it would seem that Derber’s principles are more
fuzzy, wishful thinking than good scholarship.
Derber was cautious enough to confine his argument
to the American context. He does not argue that collective
bargaining ought to be the model for all nations. He
merely asserts its superiority in the American context.
Hugh Clegg (1963) does not confine himself to a national
context. His theory attempts to define the "proper" role
of trade unions in modern political democracies. There are
three main elements in his theory.
1. Trade unions must be independent both of the
state and of management.
2. Only unions can represent the industrial
interests of workers.
3. Ownership of industry is irrelevant to good
industrial relations.
61
We will not enter into an extensive critique of Clegg's
theory because that has already been done in truly devas
tating fashion by Blumberg (1969:Chapter 7). Clegg bases
his theory on the contention that the existence of an
opposition is the sine qua non of the democratic process—
industrial or political. In the industrial context, the
unions must be the opposition in order to guarantee democ
racy in the workplace. Therefore, they must maintain their
independence. Only unions can represent the industrial
interests of the worker because to allow other institutions
to also represent the industrial interests of workers would
undermine the power of unions. Ownership is irrelevant
because it is the existence of an opposition that guarantees
democracy, and an opposition is possible in both capitalist
and socialist circumstances. (Clegg, 1963:1-19)
That, briefly, is Clegg's argument. We would point
out two major weaknesses:
1. Clegg greatly overemphasizes the importance of
an opposition. The "modern theories of
political democracy," which he claims to
closely parallel, are increasingly doubted by
political scientists. (Walker, 1966; Lowi,
1969; Connolly, 1969)
2. Unions cannot constitute effective oppositions
in that, unlike an effective political
opposition, they cannot hope to actually
62
replace the government (management). The
management— government and union-opposition
analogies are not good analogies. (Blumberg,
1969)
We agree with Derber and Clegg in saying that unions and
collective bargaining are the dominant features of certain
industrial relations systems; noteably the industrial
relations systems which have arisen from an Anglo-Saxon
heritage, the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and
New Zealand. We disagree with their contention that such
systems constitute industrial democracy, although they may
be viewed as a form of workers’ participation in manage
ment. We further disagree with Clegg's contention that
this is the "proper” system of industrial democracy in
modern political democracies.
Collective bargaining .and
industrial democracy
Sturmthal sheds some light on the differences
between collective bargaining processes and industrial
democracy through representatives internal to the organiza
tion.
The differences are mainly two-fold: collective
bargaining is a pressure-group activity, while the
(representative, E. C.) council shares in the formal
processes of decision-making; the range of issues
covered specifically by collective agreement is usually
narrower than those in whose resolution the councils
are supposed to participate (although there is great
variety in the latter respect). Perhaps somewhat more
63
important than these formal distinctions— which, anyhow,
are often blurred in practice— is the fact that collec
tive bargaining is not intended to give the union
responsibility for the management of the firm, while
council participation in management does constitute
the open assumption of some measure of responsibility.
(1964:176)
Sturmthal's responsible-unresponsible dimension
seems parallel to our internal-external dimension. The
union is clearly an external, unresponsible pressure-group
which wields influence on behalf of the workers. In this
limited sense, the collective bargaining model can be seen
as workers’ participation, but democracy involves much
more.
We would also do well in this context to heed Emery
and Thorsrud’s observation,
When people talk about industrial democracy they
are usually referring to the sharing of managerial
power, but when they come to the practice of industrial
democracy they tend to assume that steps to increase
the effective application of their independent power
(and hence their ability to get what they define as a
fair deal) will automatically lead to a greater sharing
of managerial power (and presumably responsibility).
In the cases that we have examined there is no evidence
that this happens. (1969:65)
Further evidence that an important criterion of
industrial democracy is the internal, responsible sharing
of managerial power, which is extremely unlikely in a
system of workers’ participation based on unions and
collective bargaining, is provided by Blumenthal (1956) in
his discussion of the codetermination system of Germany.
The legal framework of codetermination would suggest that
6 4
it is a fair example of the internal, responsible sharing
of managerial power. However, the strength and length of
the tradition of labor unionism in Germany is such that
unions do in fact play a decisive role in the operation of
the codetermination system. In the supervisory boards
(similar in function to our boards of directors) of the
large steel-making firms on which Blumenthal reported, the
representatives of labor concentrated on their traditional
goals with regard to wages and working conditions, while
management representatives were able to maintain their
traditional control over all other matters. Each group was
able to achieve its major objectives in an arrangement
which resulted in a process of parceling out rather than
sharing decision-making powers. If Blumenthal’s analysis
is correct, codetermination is an example of the discrep
ancy between talk and practice cited above by Emery and
Thorsrud, as well as an indication that a strong system of
trade unionism may act as a hindrance to development of an
p
expanded system of industrial democracy.*
Unions and collective bargaining
in the United States
As we stated above, the collective bargaining model
^See Petit (1959:74) for a rather good explanation
of this point.
65
is most influential in countries of an Anglo-Saxon heritage.
The predominance of collective bargaining is particularly
notable in the United States. Derber traces the eventual
dominance of this model of industrial government to
the principles of laissez faire capitalist enterprise
and individual liberty (especially the liberty of the
employer to run his enterprise as he saw fit and the
liberty of the employee to either accept the terms
and conditions of employment offered by the employer
or to look elsewhere for a job). (1970:104)
Various socialist and syndicalist alternative approaches
had been tried in the last third of the nineteenth century
on a limited scale, but none could survive and prosper
because they challenged the principles of laissez faire
capitalism and individual liberty— it mattered little that
the liberty of the capitalist was considerably more than
the "liberty” of the worker as is evidenced by Derber's
parenthetical remarks above.
At another level of explanation, Das sees the
predominance of collective bargaining in the United States
as due to the following phenomena:
1. Collective bargaining covers a wider scope of
issues in the United States than in the
European countries.
2. American managers have been far more determined
to protect their prerogatives than their
counterparts in Europe.
3. American trade-unions have been pre-occupied
66
with wages and conditions of employment and
have sought very little voice in the management
of the firm. (1964:46)
Both Derber and Das make contributions to our understanding
of the predominance of collective bargaining in the United
States. Collective bargaining is the form of participation
which challenges traditional capitalist ownership and
traditional systems of industrial authority least. The
bargaining process is based upon a clear conception of two
opposing sides, management and labor. Workers’ participa
tion in management internal to the organization would blur
the carefully cultivated distinctions which are deemed
necessary to the bargaining process. Industrial democracy
presumes a merging of these distinct power bases.
Representative Systems Internal to
the Organization
Most of the currently prominent examples of
workers' participation in management are based on processes
whereby representatives of the workers participate in the
management of the organization. There are a large number,
and a great variety, of these participative systems, but
all of them have two characteristics in common:
1. Participation is accomplished through workers'
representatives rather than all workers partici
pating directly.
2. The workers' representatives are members of
legitimate organizational decision-making
bodies with specified powers and responsibili
ties.
Adolph Sturmthal has provided a superior descrip
tion of the variety in representative systems of participa
tion. According to Sturmthal, such systems may vary with
respect to:
1. The proportion of workers’ representatives on
the governing board of the enterprise. Three
major examples are:
a. Full workers’ control— virtually all board
members are workers’ representatives.
b. Workers share in management— the most
prominent illustration of this system is
the tripartite management of nationalized
industries of France. The governing boards
of these industries are equally representa
tive of the state, the public (consumers)
and the workers.
c. No official workers’ representatives— Work
ers' representatives, usually trade union
officials, are appointed to the governing
boards of companies by proper authorities
of the government, but they must end their
previous work or union affiliations before
accepting the appointment.
68
2. Subject matter and degree of influence— the
boards or councils on which workers’ repre
sentatives sit, may be limited as to the
subjects they may consider; or the workers'
representatives may have specially limited
authority in these boards. (1964:20-21)
We would also do well in this context to briefly
review the findings of Pateman and Blumberg. As we stated
in Chapter II, Pateman (1970:68-71) carefully defines and
makes distinctions among "pseudo," "partial," and "full"
participation. Pseudo participation is a technique used
to persuade employees to accept decisions that have already
been made by management. In situations of partial partici
pation workers can influence decisions, but the final
decision-making power lies with management. In full parti
cipation "each individual member of a decision-making body
has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions."
Pateman also distinguishes participation in decisions
relating to "control of day-to-day shop floor activity"
from participation in decisions that "relate to the running
of the whole enterprise, decisions on investment, marketing
and so forth." The former she refers to as "lower level"
and the latter as "higher level."
Blumberg's typology of participation (Blumberg,
69
1969:71P distinguishes between situations in which workers
have the right to:
1. receive information
2. protest decisions
3• make suggestions
4. consultation prior to management decisions
5. temporary veto of management decisions
6. permanent veto of management decisions
7. co-decision with management
S. make binding decisions
Another useful typology is presented by Terrence E.
Cook and Patrick M. Morgan in Participatory Democracy.
(Cook and Morgan, 1971) The reader should be aware that
their discussion is aimed at participatory democracy in a
variety of social institutions: including, but not limited
to, industrial organizations. They discuss student parti
cipation in universities, neighborhood control of public
schools, citizen participation in government and much more.
Their general "model" has utility for us.
Cook and Morgan state:
It seems that participatory democracy connotes two
broad features in patterns of decision-making: (1) de
centralization or dispersion of authoritative decision
making, whereby the authority to make certain decisions
is to be displaced downward from remote points near the
top of administrative hierarchies or outward from
central geographical locations, thus bringing authority
closer to the people affected by it; and (2) direct
-
Presented on page 26 of this text.
70
involvement of amateurs^ in the making of decisions.
(1971:4)
They further contribute to the dialogue by dis
tinguishing among forms of participatory democracy on the
basis of structure and function.
First, we can distinguish between two basic types
of participatory-democracy structures: the ’co-
determination' models and the ’self-determination’
models. Second, in terms of functions, we can dis
tinguish between those participatory democracy units
that have some measure of authority to make rules and
those that are limited to the implementation of rules
arising from another source. Who makes the decisions
depends on the type of participatory-democracy struc
ture; which decisions are made by means of partici
patory democracy depends on the functions assigned to
that structure.
The degree of autonomy that amateurs enjoy in
decision-making is determined by whether the
participatory-democracy structure is the co
determination or the self-determination form. The
co-determination form involves joint decision-making
by amateurs and nonamateurs (formally trained experts
or regularly elected officials), and it usually
provides for the election or appointment of amateur
representatives by or for some immediate and intimate
grass-roots constituency of other amateurs .... In
contrast, the self-determination structure is a
participatory-democracy unit with a sphere of power at
^■Cook and Morgan (1971:4) point out that they do
not intend amateur as a disparaging term. Amateurs are
defined as people who "need not carry credentials as
formally trained experts or professionals serving in career
capacities and are not regularly elected officials; they
are laymen, not professional participants.” We would point
out that although workers' representatives are sometimes
’ ’ regularly elected officials," in most cases being a work
ers' representative is not a career for the representative.
The most prominent exception to this is the union official
in collective-bargaining schemes; which is part of our
reasoning for considering collective-bargaining to be only
a very peripheral case of industrial democracy.
71
least formally reserved to amateurs alone, not to be
shared with elective or appointive officials of other
political structures ....
Once we have understood whether the participatory-
democracy structure is one of co-determination or self-
determination, we may distinguish the unit by the
nature of its functions. We are not concerned here
with the substance of its functions (economic policy,
etc.), but rather with the phases of authoritative
decision or action exercised by the unit. Does this
unit have the authority to initiate, deliberate on,
and ratify new rules or changes in old rules, or is
it confined to the implementation of rules, as in
administrative or judicial application? (1971:4-5)
The ma.ior variables
What Pateman, Blumberg, Sturmthal and Cook and
Morgan demonstrate is that there is a great deal of variety
in actual systems of participation and variety/confusion in
the classificatory schemes that have been applied to these
systems of participation. Three basic variables can be
detected, however:
1. the powers of the participatory decision
making body
2. the powers of the individual members of such
bodies
3. the proportional representation of various
groups in such bodies
Variations in the powers of the decision-making
bodies are referred to in Pateman* s discussion of ’ ’ lower
level” and "higher level" participation; by Sturmthal when
he talks of limitations on "subject matter" which can be
considered by different boards; and by Cook and Morgan in
72
their references to "the phases of authoritative decision
or action exercised.”
The powers of individual members of participatory
decision-making bodies is most clearly referred to as a
variable in Pateman's differentiation of "partial" and
"full" participation. Only if all members have formally
equal powers is the situation termed full participation.
Sturmthal speaks of this variable as the "degree of influ
ence" of workers' representatives. This variable is
important because workers’ representatives have often been
given "advisory" or ex-officio status in so-called partici
patory management structures.
The proportional representation of various groups
is an important variable because participatory decision
making bodies often operate by majority decisions. The
French have taken cognizance of this fact in their tripar
tite management of nationalized industries. Management,
workers’ and consumers' representatives are numerically
equal on the Plant Committees. Sturmthal speaks most
directly to this variable when he discusses his "full
control," "worker's share in management," and "no official
representatives of labor" variations. Cook and Morgan also
touch upon it in discussing the differences between "co-
determination" and "self-determination" structures.
73
Systems of Direct Personal
Participation
In this section we are primarily concerned with the
structural characteristics of direct participation.^
Normally direct participation is confined to decisions con
cerning day-to-day operations (Pateman1s lower level parti
cipation); however, this is often combined with participa
tion in broad policy decisions (Pateman*s higher level par
ticipation) through representatives. Empirical research
would appear to support these limitations on direct personal
participation at the present time. This is true largely
because real direct participation presumes motivation and
expertise on the part of the participants. (Mulder, 1971:
35) Holter’s research (1965) has demonstrated varying
levels of these two qualities among workers in organiza
tions .
Motivation and expertise
Holter (1965), in her study of Norwegian firms,
speaks most explicitly to the issue of the motivation to
5
"Tt is difficult to decide what constitutes an
empirical example of direct participation since to some
extent all workers personally participate in decisions at
their job. However, most such decision-making represents
a fault or incompletion in organizational design rather
than an objective. Only in cases where decisions are
systematically and explicitly left to the workers and where
the decisions are such as to produce ego-involvement of
the worker will we acknowledge that a system of direct
participation exists. For an explanation of ego-
involvement see Allport (1945)*
74
participate among workers. Her conclusions are of particu
lar interest because she has investigated workers1 atti
tudes with regard to increased participation in decision
making at the level of their own work (Pateman1s lower
level) and at the level of decisions that concern the
management of the organization as a whole (Pateman1s higher
level). Approximately 60 percent of her sample expressed a
desire for increased participation in decisions that
directly concern their own work and working conditions,
while just 13 percent were interested in increased parti
cipation in decisions that concern the management of the
whole enterprise. Approximately 22 percent of her respon
dents were not interested in increased participation at
either level.
These data show that a relatively widespread desire
for personal participation in decisions pertaining to the
work processes exists in these Norwegian firms— a clear
majority of those surveyed supported this position. We
cannot generalize these results to organizations in other
cultures, but it would seem reasonable to assume somewhat
similar results in other cultures until further research
£
demonstrates a contrary result.
^This assumption is reasonable because of the rather
consistently demonstrated positive correlation between par
ticipation and job-satisfaction in a variety of research
settings. See Blumberg, (1969:119-122)
75
On the question of expertise as a prerequisite of
participation Mulder offers the following interesting
hypothesis: "When there are relatively large differences
in the expert power of members of a system, an increase in
participation will increase the power differences between
members." (1971:34) Mulder's own laboratory research
fully supports the above hypothesis. One can argue that
Mulder's laboratory results may not generalize to the
organizational setting, in that the time duration of par
ticipation in on-going organizational decision making is
qualitatively different from the time duration of Mulder's
experiment. In making this argument one would argue that
in the longer time frame of the organization initial differ
ences in "expert power" would decrease due to the "educative
effect" of participation, and that in the long run differ
ences in power would decrease rather than increase.
However, to accept the above argument and ignore
Mulder's laboratory results would be to ignore a possible
explanation for the frustration and resentment on the part
of participating workers often reported in the participation
literature. Expertness and knowledge are not, realistically
speaking, evenly distributed throughout the organization
and, therefore, the sudden introduction of participation
(both higher-level and lower-level) is likely to have a
number of negative effects. Mulder's own conclusion in
this respect is:
76
Since expertise is a strong prerequisite for
participation, the most practical strategy for develop
ing real participation would be to base it on suffic
ient expertness. There is an extensive area in which
co-workers on lower organizational levels have great
experience and expertness: the workers in a factory
may not know too much, or virtually nothing about
problems of financing, macroeconomic factors influ
encing sales, or leadership training, but they do know
about problems related to their own work. Thus, for
all workers the preconditions of motivation and expert
ness necessary for real participation and decision
making problems ... do exist, namely in the work
site, where the work is actually carried out. (1971:35-
36)
Holter has given us evidence of the strong motiva
tion of workers to participate in decision-making relative
to their own work and working conditions, while Mulder has
shown that the expertness of workers is also closely
associated with their work and working conditions. These
two arguments would seem to make an imposing case for
systems of direct, personal participation in the decisions
concerning work and working conditions.
The Objectives of Participation
A surprising number and variety of objectives for
participative schemes have been put forth in the literature.
At one time or another participation has been suggested as
the answer to almost all organizational ills. Indeed, the
"umbrella" of participation has been spread so wide that it
has been referred to as "the participative panacea."
(Wilcox, 1969)
It is not the purpose of this essay, however, to
77
advance participation as a panacea. We believe that enough
is known about participation in organizations, and the
various approaches to it, that we may begin to make more
discriminating statements about it. It is our present
purpose to discriminate among the various objectives of
participative schemes which have been suggested by various
authors. The following objectives are suggested for parti
cipative schemes:
1. increased job satisfaction— higher productivity
2. power equalization
3. self-development of workers
4. social self-government
The above objectives are intended as rather broad cate
gories, which are suggestive of the main thrusts of the
literature to this point. As such they should not be con
sidered as mutually exclusive categories. Other terminol
ogies appear in the literature, but these terminologies can
be subsumed in our categories.
Job Satisfaction and Productivity
The largest part of the participation literature is
concerned with the general hypothesis:
increased participation—► increased job-
satisf action—^ increased productivity
which should be read as increased participation tends to
lead to increased job-satisfaction, which tends to lead to
76
increased productivity. This is an almost "common sense"
statement among management theorists and has been sub
stantiated in a large majority of the researches to date.
However, there have been enough ambiguous or contrary
results to suggest that the "general hypothesis," while not
necessarily wrong, is too gross a statement and needs to be
qualified and refined in a number of ways.
One qualification that needs to be made is that in
many instances, for example Lewin’s "Boys Club" experiments
and Morse and Reimer’s "Insurance Company" work,? not only
did the experimental treatment of "participation" lead to
increased productivity, but the experimental treatment of
"hierarchy and authority" also led to increased productiv
ity; relative to "laissez faire" control groups. Further
more, the production of the hierarchical groups was higher
than the production of participative groups.
It was largely in response to these anomolous
results that Rensis Likert (1961 and 1967) developed his
concept of human asset accounting. In the Lewin and Morse
and Reimer experiments the hypothesized relationship
between participation and job-satisfaction was strongly and
^Rather than giving specific literature citations
for the examples used we will refer the reader to Blumberg
(1969i70-136), where all of these examples are discussed in
considerable detail. Many of these examples are "classics"
in the organization theory literature and will be familiar
to the reader.
79
clearly supported; even though the results with respect to
the relationship between participation and productivity
were somewhat ambiguous. Using research of his own concern
ing turnover in the labor force, absenteeism, and other
indicators of morale; Likert has demonstrated that the
"higher productivity" of hierarchically-managed groups can
be explained as the using up of the organization’s human
assets, rather than any superior productive efficiency of
such groups. He maintains that proper accounting for the
organization's total assets, including its human assets,
would show that participative groups are more productive
than hierarchical groups.
Despite Likert’s conclusions, it remains clear that
the relationship between participation and job-satisfaction
is more apparent and better understood than the relation
ship between job-satisfaction and productivity and, by
implication, the relationship between participation and
productivity.
One could take the position that the consistently
demonstrated increased job satisfaction is enough to justify
increased participation, but this is not the case with most
researchers and authors. Their persistence in trying to
demonstrate a positive correlation between participation
and productivity is not surprising in view of the historic
management bias of organization theory; and the dependence
of theorists and researchers on managers to provide them
80
with access to organizations.
Indeed, much of the research on participation
carried out by management theorists is actually research on
pseudo-participation— to use Pateman*s term. This is
patently true of Lewin’s famous attempts to use * ' partici
pative" methods to change eating habits; and much of the
research at the Harwood Company (Bavelas; Coch and French)
on overcoming resistance to change. The whole point of
these efforts was to demonstrate for management more effec
tive ways of manipulating employees.
Management theorists have done extensive research
involving participation (often pseudo-participation) as the
independent variable and such things as morale, job satis
faction, and work alienation as the dependent variables.
Often this kind of attitudinal research is complemented by
measuring various indices of production; such as productive
output, labor turnover, training costs, absenteeism, and
scrap loss; which are also treated as dependent variables.
The addition of this second class of measurements completes
the paradigm of the basic hypothesis,
increased participation—►increased job-satisfaction
—►increased productivity
The reader might note that there is no necessary
logical or conceptual reason for including the job satisfac
tion variables in the paradigm. It appears that the "shape"
of the paradigm is based on the history and politics of
Bl
organization theory and organizational research. We have
already mentioned the dependence of researchers upon
managers for access to organizations. We might also note
that organization theory, unlike many social sciences, has
a specific consumer or user group, managers. Organization
theory is in many senses an applied science and it is
expectable that the consumers (managers) will have some
influence on the product (theory); which tends to explain
the participation— hproductivity aspects of the paradigm.
The introduction of the "intervening variables," and they
are often labeled as such, of job satisfaction and morale
can be explained by the fact that the members of this
school are the successors to the Human Relationists, and
are, therefore, accustomed to working with these kinds of
variables. A second, complementary explanation for their
inclusion might be based on the assertion that another,
although somewhat "second class," set of consumers of
organization theory, the workers and their unions, exists.
It can be argued that participation is "sold" to the
managers on the basis of productivity and the workers and
unions on the basis of job satisfaction.
Power Equalization
Power equalization is without a doubt one of the
main thrusts of the participation literature. However, it
is often an unacknowledged topic. In the vast literature
82
of participation we have found just two articles which
center on the subject of power equalization (Strauss, 1963;
Mulder, 1971); both of which concentrate on its limitations
as a means of furthering organizational effectiveness. If
it is true as both of these respected authors claim that
power equalization through participation has been a central
concern of the human relations/social science literature
(Strauss, 1963; Mulder, 1971:31)> why has the term not been
more widely used?
In part, the answer lies in a tendency of our
society, and thus our social sciences, to ignore power and
status differences through an emphasis on "equality of
opportunity" and "social mobility." To the extent that
equality of opportunity is thought to be a feature of the
society or the organization, inequality of power and status
can be thought of as "natural" or "earned." The fundamental
importance of this view is that it allows us to have extreme
differences in power and status while simultaneously empha
sizing the values of equality and democracy.
A second, though similar, perspective on the dispar
ity between the supposed importance of power equalization
and paucity of its use in the literature can be gained by
reexamining the well-publicized biases of the Human Rela
tions school; which as we have said is the chief source of
the dominant views of participation. The Human Relationists
studied organizations almost solely through the study of
S3
individuals and groups. Therefore, they tended to rely
heavily on psychological theory wherein conflict is treated
as a pathology. Conflict in organizations is viewed as
being the product of faulty interpersonal relations or
inadequate communications. Mouzelis states with regard to
this point:
. • . the theory fails to make the fundamental dis
tinction between interpersonal frictions and social
conflict which has its basis in the structure of the
organization and the society in which groups and indi
viduals are embedded.
Furthermore,
. . . when we move to the organizational level and
consider the power-structure as a whole, there are
conflicts which are not due to bad communications or
bad interpersonal relations, but to differences in
interests— differences in the sense that what one
?
roup may gain, the other will lose, and vice versa.
1969:115-116)
To emphasize the need for power equalization would
imply the legitimation of conflict in the organization, a
position inconsistent with the cooperative, communicative
assumptions of human relations theory. Power differences,
though rarely explicitly treated, are assumed to be based
on "merit" and consistent with differences in "expertise."
Strauss and Mulder indicate that power equalization
is, or ought to be, an important objective of participation
in organizations. However, they do not comment on the
rarity with which this objective is acknowledged in the
literature. We share with Mouzelis the belief that the
Human Relationists "want to revolutionize the organization
84
without revolution, without touching its societal founda
tions.” (1969:117) Or perhaps Scott expresses the thought
better when in speaking of the "industrial humanists" he
states,
Management supports democracy as long as it remains
in the never-never land of ’authentic confrontations,
meaningful dialogue, interpersonal competence, and
loving-kindness.’ But management is less supportive of
organizational forms which enfranchise employees and
reenfranchise ownership in the legislative process.
(1969:51)
Self-Development of Workers
There are two distinct segments of the participa
tion literature that speak of self-development. The indus
trial humanists, to use Scott's label, have been concerned
with self-development of the worker, and the participatory
theorists of democracy have been concerned with the
development of citizens. Their vocabularies may be some
what different and their objectives dissimilar, but both
of these groups recognize the importance of the modern work
organization in human development.
Chris Argyris and Abraham Maslow are prominent
spokesmen for the industrial humanist point of view. We
will use Argyris' paradigm which he presented in
Integrating the Individual and the Organization. Argyris'
views are both a critique of traditional authority struc
tures in organizations and an affirmation of the possibil
ities of modified organizational authority structures for
furthering human growth. The traditional (hierarchical)
authority structure is such as to encourage "dependence,"
"submissiveness" and "child-like" behavior from organiza
tional members, particularly that majority of members on
the lower levels of the hierarchy. These behaviors are in
marked contrast to the "independent," "creative," "adult"
behavior required for the growth and development of human
beings. In this way he illustrates the "dichotomy" of
individual and organizational needs. However, in many
senses this "dichotomy" is Argyris* "straw man" in that
bridging this gap can turn out to be a source of "chal
lenge" and successful bridging of the gap a source of
"competence" for the individual. Argyris* summary of his
notions of ''psychological success" are particularly
instructive in this respect.
The individuals must value themselves and aspire to
experience an increasing sense of competence. This,
in turn requires that they strive continuously to find
and to create opportunities in which they can increase
the awareness and acceptance of theirselves and others.
The second requirement is an organization that
provides opportunities for work in which the indi
vidual is able to define his immediate goals, define
his own paths to these goals, relate these to the
goals of the organization, evaluate his own effec
tiveness, and constantly increase the degree of chal
lenge at work. (1964:33-34)
In the above quotation we have come full circle from the
original postulation of a dichotomy between organizational
and individual needs, to the postulation that only in
meaningful work can the individual find "psychological
36
success."** This seems to us to place an inordinate empha
sis on man as homo faber. This is a point that we shall
return to later.
The participatory theorists of democracy have
approached the subject of the development of the individual
through the "educative effect" of participation. Pateman
sums up Rousseau's position in this respect as an
argument that there is an interrelationship between
the authority structure of institutions and the
psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals,
and . . . the related argument that the major function
of participation is an educative one. (1970:27)
The education of individuals through participation is
thought to have three primary dimensions:
1. the acquisition of skills and information— to
the extent that people are encouraged to parti
cipate in decisions, they will tend to seek to
acquire skills and information relevant to
those decisions.
2. changes in attitudes and values— widespread
participation tends to force people to transcend
their narrow self-interest and become aware of
their relatedness to others; also, to the
extent that participation is meaningful and
fruitful, feelings of cynicism, alienation and
3
Maslow's "self-actualized" individual is also
heavily dependent upon meaningful work as his primary
source of identity. See Maslow (1965).
S7
anomie may be overcome.
3. societal integration and stability are
promoted— the legitimacy of authority is
enhanced and collective decisions are easily
accepted as binding by individuals. (See
Pateman, 1970:22-44; Cook and Morgan, 1971:7-
11)
The argument of these theorists is a highly complex one,
whose implications transcend the boundaries of that which
has traditionally been considered to be "political." Their
vision is of a participatory society rather than just a
participatory political system. The transcendence of the
narrow definition of "political" is a necessary result of
their argument that there is an "interrelationship between
the authority structures of institutions and the psycho
logical qualities and attitudes of individuals."
We should also note that these theorists view par
ticipation as having both an instrumental and an intrinsic
function. The instrumental function, policy-making by
majorities, has been emphasized by contemporary pluralist
theories of politics; which has led to a downgrading of the
importance of participation. However, Rousseau, as inter
preted by Pateman, maintains that the intrinsic function of
participation, the education of participants, is the major
function; and, therefore, participation is seen as crucial
to a viable democracy.
gg
Obviously these arguments are fairly abstract and
Rousseau, J. S. Mill and G. D. H. Cole were not well known
as empirical researchers. How, then, do we relate these
arguments to the empirical facts of participation in
organizations?^ Fortunately, these ideas and variants of
them have been empirically investigated.
One line of research which tends to substantiate
the position of the participatory theorists is that
relating to "ego psychology," which is to say the bulk of
psychological research since the Freudians. Although they
disagree on the specifics of the cause-and-effect relation
ships involved, modern psychologists are almost unanimous
in their findings that motivations and attitudes are
learned phenomena. Those who succeed at tasks tend to be
motivated to undertake additional, more difficult tasks.
Those who fail at tasks are discouraged from undertaking
further tasks. The major thrust of all branches of psy
chology has been towards an emphasis of "nurture" over
"nature" as the primary shaper of human personality. The
position of Rousseau that there is an interrelationship
between the authority structure of institutions and the
psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals has
^Mill and Cole specifically relate these arguments
to organizations, but they do not support their arguments
with empirical research.
39
been fully supported by psychological research.
In some respects one might say that the position of
the participative theorists of democracy has even been
expanded in that the "educative effect" of non-participation
has also been demonstrated. The apathy and resistance of
the modern factory worker, and the relationship of this
apathy and resistance to the oppressive authority of
superiors and "superior" machines, is increasingly recog
nized.
A second source of empirical support for the par
ticipatory theorists of democracy is the line of inquiry
into political culture initiated by Almond and Verba in
their classic, The Civic Culture. Their conclusions are
based on a five-nation (United States, Britain, West
Germany, Italy and Mexico) survey of some five thousand
people. Their study, an outstanding example of the "psy-
chocultural" approach to politics deals with many of the
issues raised l?y the participatory theorists.
Their research revolves around the competence of
citizens to influence governments. They are interested in
measuring both the actual influence of citizens and the
perceived influence. Citizens who can actually influence
government decisions are said to be politically competent;
while citizens who perceive themselves as able to exert
influence are said to be subjectively competent. (1965:137)
These are said to be the competencies relating to inputs to
90
the political process. A third kind of competence,
relating to what Almond and Verba consider to be the out
puts of the political process is called administrative
competence. Those who possess administrative competence
perceive themselves as able to appeal to a set of regular
and orderly rules in their dealings with administrative
officials. (1965:171)
Almond and Verba find that a number of important
political system variables correlate significantly with one
or more of the three competencies. For instance, ’ ’ The more
subjectively competent an individual considers himself, the
more likely he is to be politically active." (1965:168)
And, "... the sense of ability to participate in politics
appears to increase the legitimacy of a system and to lead
to political stability." (1965:204)
Of special interest to us are their findings with
respect to opportunities to participate in the work organi
zation and political competence.
Essentially we are interested in the extent to which
a democratic political system depends upon democratic
substructures in the society .... Of crucial signi
ficance here are the opportunities to participate in
decisions at one's place of work. The structure of
authority at the work place is probably the most signi
ficant— and salient— structure of that kind with which
the average man finds himself in daily contact.
. • . .In each nation those who report that they
are consulted about decisions on their job are more
likely than the others to score high on the scale of
subjective political competence. And the same relation
ship exists between informal job participation (freedom
91
to protest) and a sense of political competence.
(1965:294-295)
In their conclusion to the chapter from which the
above quotations are taken, Almond and Verba state:
. • .this chapter has attempted to seek some of
the non-political sources of the belief that one has
a voice in governmental affairs. One such source is
experience with authority figures outside the
governmental sphere. From these experiences the indi
vidual generalizes to politics. If in all his social
relationships he is afforded no opportunity to parti
cipate meaningfully in decisions, he may derive from
this a general belief in his incapacity to control any
decisions, including political decisions. On the other
hand, if he finds authority figures in social situa
tions amenable to influence he may come to believe
that authority figures in politics will also be amena
ble to his influence.
The data presented in this chapter suggest that
there is indeed a generalization from the nonpolitical
sphere to the polity. (1965:299-301)
They also do extensive analysis of the effect of
the opportunity to participate in the family, the school
and the job. They conclude that participation on the job
is more strongly correlated with political competence; and
that participation on the job can, to some extent, substi
tute for participation in school or the family; but the
reverse is not true. (1965:302-303)
We have seen the importance placed on self-
development and education of the individual in the two
major concepts of participation that we have examined. We
have reviewed some empirical evidence for the validity of
these theories. Both the industrial humanist theories of
organizational participation and the participatory theories
92
of democracy place great emphasis on the authority struc
tures of work organization as primary determiners of the
psychological qualities of citizens/workers.
However, as these theories are alike; they are also
different. The difference which we think we discern is
difficult to describe and yet, perhaps, fundamentally
important. On the one hand, the industrial humanists have
a vision of man as homo faber: for them it would appear
that "self-development" is largely a matter of self
definition vis-a-vis one's work and increasing ego-
involvement of the worker in his work. In this respect it
can be said that worker's participation in organizations
may free him of the immediate authority of the superior as
this authority is replaced by the more ubiquitous, subli
minal authority of the internalized homo faberian self-
concept .
The "self-development" envisioned by participatory
theorists of democracy would, on the other hand, appear to
some extent to be a transcendence of the rather narrow self-
concept implied by homo faber. The ideal self of a partici
patory democracy would be defined by its relatedness to
"significant others" and to the community and its values.
Obviously these are highly speculative, interpre
tive conclusions and we do not insist on their ultimate
correctness. However, it does seem to us that the indus
trial humanists show their human relations intellectual
93
ancestry. Moreover, this is not just a case of intellectual
nitpicking. It has often been pointed out that the move
ment towards increased organizational participation implies
greater commitment and involvement on the part of the
worker. (See Blumberg, 1969: Chapter 4— "Proposed Solutions
to Work Alienation") The phenomenon of "partial inclusion,”
which heretofore has been a source of relief for the worker
from the boredom and tyranny of the job, is eroded by the
participatory movement. The price paid by the worker for
freedom from organizational authority is increased commit
ment to organizational goals. It seems crucial, therefore,
that participation also entail an expanded role for workers
in the processes that lead to the setting of organizational
goals.
Social Self-Government
Social self-government is the explicit objective of
the Yugoslavian political and social system. Worker’s self-
management is a crucial step in a multi-faceted change
process which it is hoped will lead to social self-
government. No other empirical example of worker’s parti
cipation in management has this kind of far-reaching goal.^^
■^Undoubtedly some of the changes instituted in
China since the communist takeover have goals akin to social
self-government. It would also appear that developments in
many of the nations of Africa and Asia may be leading in
this direction. However, the literature in these areas is
almost nonexistent.
94
The requirement of social self-government as it has
been worked out in Yugoslavia includes the following:
1. A marked attempt to decentralize the powers of
government and an emphasis on problem solution
by the local units of government, the communes.
2. Where possible direct, rather than representa
tive, democracy is encouraged.
3. The encouragement of free, self-managed
association of peoples to solve common prob
lems independent of formal government institu
tions .
4. A deemphasis of the Communist Party. This is
accomplished primarily by opening up the
nominating processes for political office.
5. A five-chambered federal legislature— three
chambers of which are composed of representa
tives of the various self-managing enterprises.
6. The widespread adoption of worker’s self-
management in economic enterprises. (Pasic,
1970J11
It is not our purpose to fully describe the
XJ-It is impossible in this limited space to convey
an image of the total social transformation envisioned by
social self-government and the many measures taken by the
Yugoslavs toward this end. The interested reader should
see Pasic (1970) and Horvat (1971)•
95
Yugoslav system. We are interested in social self-
government primarily as one conception of a fully partici
patory political democracy. In many ways Yugoslavia is
striving to actualize what Rousseau, J. S. Mill and,
particularly, G. D. H. Cole described as democracy. We say
"particularly G. D. H. Cole" because his theories were set
in a modern industrial economy unlike the theories of
Rousseau and Mill.
We include this brief discussion of social self-
government for the purpose of emphasizing the potential
exogenous effects of systems of workers’ participation in
management. We do not claim that something resembling the
Yugoslav system of social self-government is the inevitable
long-term result of systems of workers’ participation in
management. It is obvious that the large-scale social
transformation which is taking place in Yugoslavia encom
passes much more than an alteration of the authority struc
tures of organizations. Social self-government is clearly
dependent on concomitant changes in the political, legal,
and economic institutions of the society.
It is also obvious, however, that workers’ self-
management is the cornerstone of social self-government and
that the concomitant changes in the political, legal and
economic institutions are aimed at facilitating the partici
pation of non-experts in the decision processes of the
society. Indeed, the facilitation of participation is the
96
i
one theme that ties together the many changes which have
taken place since 1950.
CHAPTER IV
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND PARTICIPATION
Introduction
A recurring argument among Yugoslav theorists and
commentators concerns the compatability of various systems
of ownership with workers' self-management. (Horvat, 1971:
106-lOS) Virtually all of the participation literature
written in the United States ignores the questions relating
to ownership. Those infrequent books and articles that
mention ownership, do so only to make clear that the basic
rights of ownership as we know them are not, and ought not
to be, challenged by worker's participation. The rights of
owners are thought to be immutable and are, therefore,
virtually unexamined in our participation literature.
Unfortunately the rights of owners are at the
center of one of the great controversies of our time, the
ideological struggle between communism and capitalism.
This is unfortunate in that it has led to emotional, over
simplified, falsely dichotomized views with regard to
ownership. We have been blinded to the complexity of the
subject by the polarizing effect of competing ideologies.
In this emotionally-laden atmosphere one is either
"communist" or "capitalist" with respect to ownership.
97
98
The concepts of ownership and property are badly in
need of a thorough reanalysis. A recognition of the full
complexity of these concepts is essential to the intelli
gent, comprehensive treatment of the subject of workers'
participation in management.
Power and Control in Organizations
We have followed Pateman, and others, in defining
"participation" as participation in decision making and
have accepted her statement that,
The whole point of industrial participation is that
it involves a modification, to a greater or lesser
degree, of the orthodox authority structure; namely
one where decision making is the ’prerogative’ of
management, in which workers play no part. (1970:68)
For that reason it seems appropriate to consider the nature
of authority, power and control in organizations. Unfortu
nately, the participation literature, and here it betrays
its human relations basis and bias, is of very little use
]
in this respect. The human relations approach to organi
zations avoided explicit reference to social power or con
trol, partly because these terms carried connotations that
were inconsistent with the ideal of harmonious, conflict-
free organization. (Tannenbaum, 1968)
■^The reader might want to recall our earlier
comments on the scarcity of specific treatments of "power-
equalization" as an objective of participation.
99
Power and control in organizations have been
described and analyzed in terms of two paradigms, which
have been labeled the "zero-sum" and "resource mobilization"
approaches.2 The zero-sum paradigm involves the assumption
that a fixed quantity of power is available within an organ
ization, and that as a consequence an increase in the power
of one member or several members must always be accompanied
by a corresponding decrease in the power of others. In
contrast, the resource mobilization approach assumes that
the total amount of organizational power is variable.
Therefore, it is conceivable that gains in the power of an
individual or group are achieved without diminution of the
power of others. Power increases may be achieved through
the mobilization of previously under-utilized or unutilized
resources rather than the exploitation of others. Certain
courses of organizational action may lead to simultaneous
increases in the power of all groups.
It has been pointed out that the zero-sum paradigm
tends to lead to an emphasis on relative power differences
among organizational groups, i.'e., workers and management;
while the resource mobilization paradigm tends to focus
interest on the total amount of power or control in an
organization. (Tannenbaum, 1963)
^The interested reader should see Tannenbaum, 1963
and Dahrendorf, 1959: 165-173 for excellent discussions of
the implications of these two views.
100
While the basic assumptions of the two approaches
are certainly contradictory, it would appear that in terms
of their worth as analytic tools they are more complemen
tary than contradictory. When applied to the group level
of analysis the resource mobilization paradigm seems to
reflect reality rather well, but at the organizational
level we feel that the zero-sum paradigm is superior.
Tannenbaum (1966:19-23) has posited that the
resource mobilization approach offers a superior explana
tion of the relative effectiveness of participatory manage
ment. He points out that the superior motivation of
employees often achieved in participatory organizations can
be seen as the mobilization of previously untapped
resources. Participation has the advantage (from the
organizational point of view) of overcoming, to some
extent, the phenomenon of "partial inclusion." Workers
become more fully committed to the organization.
While accepting the descriptive accuracy and the
utility of the resource mobilization paradigm in certain
settings, we suspect that it is biased in favor of manage
ment and the organizational point of view. Implicit in the
paradigm is the view that increases in the total quantity
of organizational control which do not alter the relative
quantities of power and control among groups or individuals
within the organization, are equally beneficial to those
groups or individuals. That is, in the hypothetical
101
situation where the power of all groups within the organi
zation is increased, all groups benefit equally. This
seems to us to overlook a fundamental fact of hierarchy;
namely that rewards are distributed unequally in a hierar
chy. Those near the top of the hierarchy will undoubtedly
benefit more from the increased total control of the organ
ization than those near the bottom. Rather than demon
strating a community of interests among organizational
members, the resource mobilization paradigm assumes it.
Authority— an Organizational Phenomenon
Dahrendorf has made what may be a telling criticism
of the resource mobilization paradigm in observing that
power is essentially a personal phenomenon while authority
is intrinsic to organization. He cites Weber’s definitions
of power as the "probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which
this probability rests"'; and authority as the "probability
that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed
by a given group of persons.” He follows these definitions
with the statement that,
The important difference between power and authority
consists in the fact that whereas power is essentially
tied to the personality of individuals, authority is
always associated with social positions or roles . . .
while power is merely a factual relation, authority is
a legitimate relation of domination and subjection.
In this sense authority can be described as legitimate
power. (Dahrendorf, 1959:166)
102
It would seem, therefore, that if one seeks to treat organ
izational phenomena he would do well to be aware of the
distinction between power and authority.
Neither the resource-mobilization paradigm nor the
zero-sum paradigm is careful to make the distinction between
power and authority explicit.^ Both paradigms tend to use
the terms "power1 ' and "control," rather than "authority."
However, the zero-sum paradigm is clearly more amenable to
the concepts attendant to authority than is the resource-
mobilization paradigm.
The fundamental facts of organization are based on
authority. Arguments about the nature of organization as
a general phenomenon which are couched in terms of power
are misleading and confusing. The Human Relationists and
their intellectual descendants have largely based their
arguments in favor of participation on implicit concepts of
power. They have attempted to alter what Weber described
as "merely a factual relation" (power), while ignoring the
^Tannenbaum (1966:5)> in an article which is
basically an argument for the resource-mobilization
approach, spends three-quarters of a page carefully dis
cussing various definitions of "power" and the deals with
"authority” by saying, "For most authors the term authority
usually refers to the formal right to exercise control, and
we follow this general convention . . . ." Tannenbaum fails
to grasp the significance of the fact that power is a per
sonal attribute while authority is an organizational vari
able.
103
more fundamental relations of domination and subjection
(authority). Mouzelis has called this stance an attempt to
"revolutionize the organization without revolution." (1969:
117) In effect, the industrial humanists have tried to
change people and the relationships among people in organ
izations, while neglecting to change the organization
itself.
Property and the Rights of Ownership
As was stated in the introductory section of this
chapter, we feel that contemporary notions of ownership,
particularly as embodied in organizational literature, have
been grossly over-simplified and falsely dichotomized. In
order to explore some of the conceptual links among owner
ship, property and organization, we propose to take a brief,
though broad-scale, look at the notions of "property as a
social institution" and "property as a bundle of rights."
Property has been studied as a social institution
by anthropologists in a variety of cultures. Such studies
show that there are many aspects of property which are
beyond the scope of the economic and legal analyses which
are commonly applied to the subject. Examples of such
aspects are the relation of property to political organiza
tion as it functions in the power structure of a society and
in relation to the class structure and social attitudes.
Hallowell (1955:233-244) has argued that property
104
has a "structure" which includes the following variables:
1. the nature and the kinds of rights exercised
and their correlative duties and obligations;
2. the individuals or groups of individuals in
whom rights and privileges, powers, etc., are
invested and those who play the correlative
roles in the operation of the whole complex
schema of relations;
3. the things or objects, over which property
rights are extended;
4* the specific social sanctions which reinforce
the behavior that makes the institution a going
concern.
From the above framework it can be seen that a particular
configuration of the variables involved (a particular con
ception of "property") implies a particular set of relations
among individuals. Rights, privileges, duties, powers,
obligations, etc. are assigned to individuals and groups
through the many possible combinations of the complex insti
tution called property.
The above concept of property implies a triadic
relation (A owns B against C, where C may represent all
others or only certain others) rather than the more common
concept of a diadic relation (A owns B). This triadic
formulation of property highlights the social dimension.
Property is not simply a set of relations between owners
105
and things, but a set of relations between persons, things,
and other persons.
It is important to note, at this point, further
ambiguity in the commonly understood concept of property in
that the term is "commonly applied to both objects that are
said to be owned as well as the rights exercised over such
objects." (Halowell, 1955:239) In addition to being ambig
uous, in this respect, it could be said that common usage
of the term is in error in that it is most often understood
to imply objects, whereas the legal system and the dominant
trends in the development of the legal system stress the
importance of rights. (Hohfeld, 1913) We need only examine
the intricacies of property law, particularly as it relates
to corporate ownership, to see that property is an extremely
complex "bundle of rights" with enormous implications for
the structuring of the authority relations in work organi
zations .
Ownership, Authority and Control in
Contemporary Organizations
Capitalism is both an economic system and a politi
cal system. Not, we hasten to add, a political system in
the sense of implying certain governmental or political
party structures and processes; but political, in the widest
sense of that word, implying certain kinds of authoritative
relations within the society, and, most importantly within
the industrial organization. It is ultimately political
106
because as a set of widely held beliefs, backed by sanctions
in law, it has effect in the lives of men. This effect is
political in that it is both widely generalized and dis
criminatory or differential.
The hierarchy of authority within the capitalist
work organization is ultimately based upon the rights of
owners to have control over the use and enjoy the fruits of
production of capital assets. In large part the rights of
management to make authoritative decisions are derived and
delegated from these basic property rights. The resulting
authority structure coordinates organized aggregates of
roles through the domination of the incumbents of some
roles and the subjection of others.
Such hierarchies have been widely supported by the
prevailing norms, values and laws of our society, but it
may be that the most significant implications of the cur
rent widespread demand for participation by workers are a
renewed questioning of the legitimacy of such hierarchies.
In an historical perspective it can be seen that the
separation of ownership and management typical of the
modern corporation, has already altered the over-simplified
authority structure presented above. It is widely recog
nized that a part of the authority of managers derives, not
from the delegated property rights of owners, but from the
expertise of the managers themselves. Managers have a
107
"special competence"^ which contributes to their power vis-
a-vis owners and workers. Owners are increasingly buffered
from actual control of the enterprise. Dahrendorf has
referred to this process as "the decomposition of capi
tal."5 (1959:41-4#)
Dahrendorf has highlighted another aspect of the
consequences of the separation of ownership and control.
In describing the social structure of industrial enterprise
^Talcott Parsons has called attention to the
implications of this special competence in Structure and
Process in Modern Society. Glencoe: Free Press, I960:59-96.
The reader should be aware that in Parson’s usage of these
words the significance is not on the competence qua
competence, but competence as a source of power or indepen
dence. It also contributes to understanding of the phe
nomenon to note that although we have used the term
"power," the usage here does not, strictly speaking, con
form with the Weber-Dahrendorf distinction between power
and authority. "Special competence" undoubtedly resides in
individuals and is, therefore, properly conceptualized as
power; but it is tied to institutional positions and might,
therefore, be better conceptualized as authority.
5An interesting empirical fact yet to be ascertained
and extremely important to theories of participation, is
the extent to which this special competence is arrived at
through the superior capabilities of those who are managers.
An alternative, or complimentary, explanation might suggest
that the "special competence" of managers is the result of
the "special opportunities" of their work. Empirical
evidence in support of this explanation could be taken as
support for the "educative effect" hypothesized by partici
patory theorists of democracy. If, on the other hand, it
can be shown that only individuals of superior innate abil
ities acquire this increment of power called "special
competence," after experiencing the work of management, it
would tend to support a meritocratic view of the ideal
organization.
log
he first notes that the authority of managers is primarily
the delegated property rights of owners. Then he states:
. . . the manager, by virtue of his more immediate
contact with the participants of production, has to
seek a second, and often more important, basis of
legitimacy for his authority, namely, some kind of
consensus among those who are bound to obey his
commands. Typically, this consensus merely takes the
form of an absence of dissensus. However, the manager,
unlike the ’full capitalist,’ can ill afford to exer
cise his authority in direct and deliberate contra
vention to the wishes and interests of his subordi
nates. The mechanisms by which manual and clerical
workers who object to a member of top management can
make their interests felt are complex and largely
unregulated. But there are such mechanisms, and
managers have ways and means to forestall their being
brought to bear. In this sense, the ’human relations’
movement is nothing but a symptom of the changing basis
of legitimacy of entreprenurial authority once owner
ship and control are separated. (1959:45/
The authority of the manager and, by implication,
the authority structure of the enterprise is extremely
complex. There are at least three component parts of that
authority— the rights of owners, expertise or ’ ’special
competence," and the consensus among those bound to obey
the managers’ commands. If we search for analogies in
types of governmental authority, it would seem that the
rights of owners are similar to monarchical authority,
authority based on expertise is meritocracy, and the con
sensus among those bound to obey the managers’ commands
begins to resemble democracy.
Contemporary Ownership and Workers’
Participation
The foregoing arguments have demonstrated the
109
complexity of ownership and property. Ownership is not
adequately dealt with in the simple dichotomy between capi
talism and communism. Within our own society, in what from
an historical perspective is a relatively brief period, we
have seen the separation of ownership from control due to
the rise of the professional manager. One can easily
predict further, accelerated change and increased complexity
for the concept of ownership due to specialization and
interdependence in the society. A current illustration
might be the extensive modifications to the traditional
rights of owners that are visible in environmental legisla
tion.
If, as we have argued, property is a basic organi
zing concept of societies and, therefore, subject to changes
in meaning as dominant values change; does it not follow
that the current, widespread demand for participation has
far-reaching implications for owners? We feel very strongly
that this question must be answered in the affirmative, even
though contemporary American management theorists have,
without exception, ignored the question or answered in the
negative.^
Ownership and Control in Yugoslavia
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the
^or a particularly blunt negative answer see
Richard (I960).
110
Yugoslavs have given a great deal of attention to the place
of ownership in the system of workers1 self-management• As
a result, the Yugoslavs have evolved some unique concepts
of ownership which fit neither the capitalist nor the
communist stereotype.
The first thing one should note about the Yugoslav
system of ownership of capital assets is that no person or
group "owns" them in the sense that word is used in
America, or even in the Soviet Union. An over-simplified,
but perhaps useful, explanation would assert that the
rights of ownership; which in the United States are vested
in owners and in the Soviet Union are vested in the State;
are divided between the State and the workers in the
Yugoslav system. The right to use and enjoy the fruits of
production (usus fructus) is vested in the workers as a
collective; so also is the right of possession; but the
right of disposal is shared by the workers and the State.
Workers may dispose of capital assets, but only in accor
dance with restrictions imposed by the State. Workers may
not, for instance, sell the assets of a firm and pocket the
proceeds. It should be noted in passing that the State
exercises control over the self-managed enterprises pri
marily through the indirect, economic forces of tax
policies, export subsidies, etc.; in preference to the
direct legislative-administrative imposition of controls.
Self-managed enterprises are given much discretion in
making important policy decisions within the parameters of
their own self-interest and the incentives provided by the
State. It is thought that the emphasis on indirect, market-
type controls is a necessary condition for the "withering
away of the State" envisioned by Marx and emphasized by
Trotsky. (Blumberg, 1969:168-137)
The system of workers' self-management is unique in
the extent to which it has explicitly recognized the nexus
between participation and ownership. As a result, partici
pation has led to extensive changes in the law and in the
ideology of the society. The law, particularly with regard
to ownership and control of large-scale capital assets, has
been made to conform with the requisites and principles of
workers * s elf-management.
It is surprising, given the high ideological
content of workers' self-management, that the Yugoslavs
have exhibited a considerable degree of flexibility and
practicality in its implementation. It is, even today,
rapidly changing in its operational details. While the
sources of the self-management movement are undoubtedly
ideological and intellectual, its implementors have shown
a willingness to learn through experience, and have fre
quently adjusted the legal and ideological framework of
self-management in response to evidence of failure in some
aspect of its practice.
As one brief illustration of the dual emphasis on
112
ideology and practicality, we will examine the norms with
regard to employment of others by small-scale, private
entrepreneurs. As a matter of socialist ideology it can be
argued that anyone who earns non-labor income, who controls
the labor and product of others, is exploiting those others.
It may be, and has been, argued in reply, however, that a
worker, by choosing an individual employer instead of a
large, self-managed firm, indicates that he finds such
employment more profitable for himself. This must be
recognized as a very powerful counter argument in that
increased personal decision power is at the very heart of
workers’ self-management and its societal counterpart,
social self-government. On one side of the argument we
have a fundamental point of socialism and on the other side
we have the undeniable empirical fact that some workers
choose to work for small entrepreneurs. Horvat points out
the solution to this apparent impasse which has been
accepted after much debate.
To resolve the question whether workers may be
hired by individual employers, and if so how many of
them a sociological argument has been advanced as a
criterion. As long as an individual employer works
himself in the same way as his employees and has not
become an entrepreneur merely organizing the work of
others, employees may be considered as (often younger)
associates in the work process, direct personal rela
tions of a primary group are preserved and the aliena
tion phenomena of wage labor relations are not present.
(1971:103)
Although this compromise is not in any sense profound, it
113
is illustrative of the Yugoslav capacity to be at once
ideologically sound and cognizant of empirical reality.
The development of workers* self-management has, in numerous
ways, been characterized by this spirit of informed pragma
tism.
CHAPTER V
PARTICIPATION AS PROCESSES AND ISSUES
Introduction
This is the final chapter in the theoretical phase
of this work. In this chapter we wish to accomplish two
things. First, we will make an attempt to summarize the
significant aspects of previous chapters and to comment on
the implications of these findings. The central thrust of
this effort will be in the form of an attempt to relate the
structures of participation; "personal" or "direct,"
"internal representative," and "external representative;"
to the goals or functions as we discussed them in Chapter
III.
Second, it is our intention to correct, or compen
sate for, the deficiencies which are endemic to our first
aim. In essence, the first part of the chapter could be
characterized as attempting to indicate the "state of the
art” or present a current "picture" of participation. An
approach of this type tends to emphasize the static
elements, such as structures and goals, at the expense of
the dynamic aspects of the problem. The dynamics in this
case are the many unresolved issues relating to
114
115
participation. An attempt to define the problem in terms
of its issues, rather than in terms of currently accepted
answers, is particularly appropriate in rapidly changing
situations such as those attendant to participation in
organizations. (Tornquist, 1973)
Participation in Organizations: A Structural-
Functional Analysis
In Chapter III we discussed the structures of
participation and some of the goals which have been advanced
through participative schemes. We did not, however, relate
specific goals, or functions, to specific structures. As
a summary of the "state of the art" at the present time, it
would be helpful to do so.
Unions and Collective Bargaining
The collective bargaining model does not fit easily
into the definitions of types of participation ("participa
tive management," "workers’ participation in management"
and "industrial democracy") which we established in Chapter
I. As was noted in Chapter III, it can be viewed as an
instance of workers’ participation in management, but such
a categorization has to be qualified in many respects.
The "participation" which workers enjoy in a
collective bargaining situation is participation only in
the sense of having indirect influence in the decision
processes of the organization. This collective power is
116
exercised in the name of, and hopefully on behalf of, the
workers by a small group of professional representatives,
the union leaders. Numerous studies have documented the
tendency for American union leadership to resemble the self-
perpetuating oligarchies described by Robert Michels in his
famous "iron law of oligarchy."
The collective bargaining model
as industrial democracy
In an historical perspective, the organization of
unions and the implementation of collective bargaining
agreements have to be seen as steps toward democracy in the
work place. However, the resemblance of unionism and indus
trial democracy is more apparent in terms of goals and out
comes than it is in terms of processes. Unionism like
industrial democracy seeks distributive justice for the
workers, but the methods through which this is accomplished
are rather dissimilar.
In a sense, the notion that the collective bargain
ing model is an instance of industrial democracy has been
a casualty of events of the last twenty years. In the post
World War II era, if one were looking for phenomena which
could be described as industrial democracy, one would have
had to seize upon collective bargaining. There were very
few other phenomena that could justifiably be described as
industrial democracy. However, the tremendous social,
economic and political reorganization which occurred in the
wake of World War II produced a number of essentially new
systems of labor relations, which are more democratic in
method than the collective bargaining system. Among such
systems are the self-management system in Yugoslavia, the
co-determination system of West Germany, and both the
Kibbutz and Histadrut systems of Israel. In addition to
these national models of variations in industrial democracy,
a number of social science-based methods of supervision and
management have arisen which can legitimately claim to be
instances or aspects of industrial democracy. Among these
methods are the Likert-style participative management, job
enlargement, management by objectives, the socio-technical
systems approach of the Tavistock Institute and many others.
In the light of these developments collective bargaining
does not appear to be particularly democratic.
If events of the last twenty years have seriously
undermined the relative democracy of trade unions, does it
follow that unions and the more democratic workers’ repre
sentation systems are basically incompatible? This ques
tion has been addressed by a number of the more recent
authors (Blumberg, 1969:156-164; Tornquist, 1973:365-366;
Kolaja, 1965:29-35; Aronowitz, 1973:105-106). The consensus
of these authors is that, although the upsurge of other
forms of workers' participation undoubtedly will be associ
ated with changes in the traditional roles and functions of
unions, it will not bring about the demise of trade unions.
nd
Insofar as the contemporary workers’ participation
movement does relate to trade unionism, it is a revolt
against the union leadership as much as it is a revolt
against company management. The last several years have
been witness to a rising tide of "wildcat” strikes by rank-
and-file union membership, over the vehement opposition of
their leadership. In most cases these militant "wildcat”
actions are in support of workers’ demands to take direct
action beyond the scope of the collectively bargained con
tract. (Aronowitz, 1973:105)
European experience with the various national models
of workers' participation would seem to indicate that in
the long run there is a degree of complementarity in the
functions of trade unions and the functions of the various
representative structures within organizations. Blumberg
has argued that the function of the union is to protect the
worker as an employee, and that the interests of the worker
as an employee are separate and distinct from his interests
as a producer. It is the function of the internal repre
sentative structure to promote the interests of the worker
as producer. Blumberg analogizes this situation to the
dual representation of citizens through a school board and
a city council. He states,
. . . we do not think it at all odd for citizens to
elect two different sets of representatives for
different purposes, and for these representatives to
discuss, bargain, and occasionally even clash ....
119
There is no reason why this analogy cannot carry over
into an industrial setting and why it is any more
ludicrous to think of workers bargaining with them
selves than for citizens to do the same. (1969:163)
The logical extension of this principle of functional rep
resentation is a plurality of representational structures
which, in theory, would have many of the virtues of plural
ist political systems.
From the workers' point of view, internal repre
sentation offers the advantage of more comprehensive repre
sentation. This is true in two respects. First, as we
noted in Chapter III, the range of issues which are within
the purview of internal representative bodies is normally
broader than the range of issues that can be subjected to
collective bargaining. Secondly, where craft, as opposed
to industrial, unions are predominate; or where, as is the
case in many European countries, the union movement is
badly split by political and/or religious ideology; the
internal representative structure may be the only structure
which represents all of the workers of that organization.
(Blumberg, 1969:161)
As a final comment on unions and collective bargain
ing as an instance of industrial democracy we should note
that a logical impact of the participation movement might
be a change in the way that unions typically function. In
recent years union bureaucracies have had to become increas
ingly responsive to the desires of the membership.
120
(Aronowitz, 1973) Unions, which have had formally demo
cratic structures for many years, may come much closer to
realizing democratic ideals in the future as the member
ships become increasingly active.
Representative Systems Internal to
the Organization
Introduction
As was stated in Chapter I, we think it important
to present a socio-political view of organizations. Many
of the arguments of this dissertation are designed to
illustrate the relative advantages of just such a view. We
have used various terminological dichotomies to refer to
the comparison that we want to make. At some points we
have referred to "socio-political” versus "psychological”
approaches to organizations; at other points the argument
has been cast in terms of "conflict” versus "cooperative"
or "equilibrium" oriented approaches; we have also made use
of an "authority based" versus "power based" argument.
It should be evident to the reader at' this point
that two of our "structures" of participation, presented in
Chapter III, roughly coincide with the poles of the above
dichotomies. Specifically, representative systems internal
to the organization can be described as based on principles
which are relatively compatible with the socio-political,
conflict oriented, authority-based approaches to organiza
tions. And, in similar fashion it can be said that systems
121
of direct personal participation are based on principles
which are relatively compatible with psychological, cooper
ative or equilibrium oriented, power-based approaches.
Organizations as political
systems
Organizations are political systems in many differ
ent senses. They are political in that members jockey for
power, position and prestibe within them. That is, they
determine the answer to the famous allocation question of
who gets what, how, why, when, and where. They are also
political in the wider sense implied by the following
quotation from Denhardt:
The individual's life space is circumscribed by
such organizationally provided objects as the machine,
the desk, the workroom, or the office, while his view
of time is regulated by strict guidelines which
dictate sequence and duration. Even aspects of his
involvement which one might expect to be largely
subjective, his personal expressions of meaning through
social interaction, are objectified by organization.
In all cases, the individual is bound by set rules of
social interaction and more broadly by a particular
vision of organizational life. (1972:1)
We have noted in a previous section of this dissertation
that this "vision of organizational life" tends to general
ize to non-organizational life through a process called
"the educative effect."
^-As the point we are attempting to make is both
complex and subtle, we emphasize the word "relatively" in
the above paragraph. The tendency to falsely dichotomize
is a weakness of Aristotelian logic of which we must be
particularly careful.
122
In Chapter III, in our discussion of power equali
zation as an objective of participation, it was noted that
although power equalization is obviously inherent in the
notion of participation, that particular subject matter and
terminology are only obliquely and infrequently mentioned
in the literature. Scott has pointed out a similar dis
crepancy in the following comments:
"The fact that administrative organizations are
political systems has not been ignored by theorists. But
this commonplace insight is not exploited."
And,
. . . democratic management is currently treated as
a psychotherapeutic technique. But if democratic
management is anything, it is first a governmental
phenomenon. Yet, this obvious notion receives little
systematic attention in the literature. (1969:43)
We have cited as reasons for the lack of attention
to power equalization as an objective of participation the
inability of psychological theory to deal with conflict,
the tendency of our society to tolerate extreme differences
of power in the name of "equality of opportunity," and the
fact that the most influential clientele group of manage
ment theorists is the managers. (See Chapter III:&L-34)
Scott feels that the lack of attention to democratic
management as a governmental phenomenon is logical and
expectable if one correctly perceives the nature of manage
ment theory. The key to Scott’s provocative reinterpreta
tion of management theory is his statement that "Industrial
123
humanism is not an alternative to management science, or a
softener of its impact. Rather industrial humanism is the
behavioral science adjunct of management science.” (1969:
47) Scott’s statement stands out for its boldness in the
tentative and sometimes obscure world of management theory.
Both industrial humanists and management scientists are
likely to disagree vehemently with Scott. The argument
which supports Scott's statement is quite complex and
should be seen in the original (Scott, 1969:4^-49) by the
serious reader.
Scott contends that the programs of industrial
humanism— he cites managerial team building; the encourage
ment of ”openness, confrontation and authenticity” in
interpersonal relations; sensitivity training and organiza
tion development as typical— are highly functional because
they supply management with a human technology entirely
consistent with the values of what Ellul has called La
Technique. La Technique is defined as
a socio-technical paradigm which is solely dedicated to
the rational quest for the one best way of innovating,
producing and distributing material goods and service
... it has been mutated into an end quite apart from
human values and goals . . . it is a massive applica
tion of rational values to all planes of organizational
life and government. (1969:46)
The function of industrial humanism as technique is
to eliminate "irrational” behavior that might interfere
with the rational performance of organizational processes.
We see parallels here to our own argument that
124
industrial humanism changes people and interpersonal
relationships in order that organizations may remain
unchanged. (Chapter IV:102) The values of industrial
humanism are the relatively narrow values of technical
efficiency. The concept of man which it implies is the
narrow homo faberian concept. In the industrial humanist
paradigm the constraints of coercion are replaced by the
subliminal, more pervasive constraints of socialization.
Workers* participation through
representatives
Examples of this type of participation are
relatively common, but have not been of much interest to
researchers and writers in recent years. These partici
pative structures have not tended to be of vital importance
because the participative decision-making bodies were
dominated by management representatives or because only
inconsequential problems have come before the group.
Emery and Thorsrud (1969) alluded to management
domination of the participative body when they discussed
the problems of worker representatives on the Boards of
Directors. Non-worker representatives tend to dominate the
affairs of the Boards because:
1. They are more numerous.
2. The typical affairs of the Board fall far
outside the area of interest and expertise of
the workers’ representatives.
125
A classic example of assigning inconsequential problems to
the participative body was the Human Relationist ploy of
turning control of the company recreation program over to
the employees.
These examples serve to illustrate the incomplete
ness of representative structures alone. Before one can
come to any real understanding of the impact of a repre
sentative structure he must also know its jurisdiction and
the composition of its membership.
Industrial democracy through
representatives
A number of the national models of industrial
democracy which have evolved in Europe place great emphasis
on representation of the workers in organizational councils.
This is true in the French tripartite system, in the co
determination system of West Germany and the self-management
system of Yugoslavia. It is somewhat less true of the
movements towards industrial democracy in Britain and the
Scandinavian countries. In almost all of the European
models some kind of workers’ council exists, but the powers
and intended functions of these groups vary widely.
In our own definition of industrial democracy we
have utilized Katz and Kahn’s criterion of democracy in
organizations that the locus of the legislative function
be the membership of the organization as a whole rather
than being restricted to some part of management. It is
126
clear that in the self-management system this vital cri
terion is met. It has not been our purpose to study the
other systems in depth, but it is our impression, based on
the more capitalistic concepts of ownership which have
prevailed, that none of the other systems can be called
industrial democracy in the strictest sense.
Representative systems of industrial democracy have
the obvious advantage, relative to personal systems, of
consuming lower levels of resources. They are efficient in
the same sense that representative political democracies
are efficient. However, we must be wary of certain pseudo
efficiencies in the representative approach. Pateman (1970)
has argued (although not in this terminology) that by fail
ing to take into account the costs (in terms of the educa
tive effect) of a representative system of government, the
classical theorists have made the strictly representative
system of government appear more efficient than it really
is. Therefore, we can state that representative systems
are more efficient than personal systems, although to some
extent we are "comparing apples with oranges."
A second potential advantage of a representative
system of industrial democracy is that it i3 more easily
2
recognized as a system of organizational government.
^The reader should recognize that we are returning
here to our contention that a socio-political conception of
organizations has certain advantages over a psychological
conception.
127
Viewing organizational authority structures as analogous to
governments provides new insights into the relationships of
organization. In particular, it "desanctifies" the prop
erty rights of owners, and thus managers; and it opens the
way to an expanded notion of the rights of organizational
members.
In a society heavily imbued with democratic values
and familiar with the structures and processes of tradi
tional, representative political democracy the existence of
participative structures within organizations as mere
formalisms is not likely to be tolerated. Insofar as rep
resentative systems of participation do produce pressures
to move beyond mere formalism, they will tend to legitimate
workers’ participation. Participation will be seen as a
right; not a privilege.
Workers’ Personal Participation
In this kind of participative system the emphasis
is placed on enabling organizational members to participate
more fully in their day-to-day tasks. Members are encour
aged to offer their views with regard to possible solutions
for the problems which confront them in their work. Sys
tems of personal participation have in many cases led to
increased productivity and to increased satisfaction among
the workers.
Theoretically, widespread personal participation
123
will lead to more innovative solutions to problems. We
know of no research in real world organizations which would
confirm or deny this hypothesis. However, Leavitt (1964)
and others have demonstrated laboratory results in connec
tion with communications patterns which would tend to
support the above hypothesis.
The strength of systems of personal participation
is that they are in fact "personal"; they do involve all
members. They do not deal with just a few representatives
or leaders. Thus, systems of personal participation have
the ability to impact the work force deeply. Such systems
are often outstanding motivators of employees. The "edu
cative effect" is widespread.
Holter*s empirical data argue strongly for systems
of personal participation. Holter found that over 60 per
cent of her sample wanted to personally participate more
than they presently did in decisions that directly
concerned their own work. However, only 13*5 percent
wanted to personally participate more in decisions that
concerned the management of the whole enterprise. (Holter,
1965:301)
In practice, systems of personal participation
have been vulnerable to manipulative abuses by management.
Since systems of participation in the United States have
until recent times been designed and initiated by manage
ment or their consultants, without real "rank and file"
129
demand for such systems; it is not surprising that "parti
cipation" has been rather manipulative. Even pseudo
participation is a rather powerful motivator of employees
and is often used as such. The manipulative spirit of
pseudo-participation is visible in the following quotation:
Actual participation is one of the best ways of
involving employees in their work and the problems of
the organization and thus, from a behavioral position,
it is difficult for a participant to be unresponsive
to a plan which he has helped create. The employee
wants it to succeed because it involves him and his
own personal self-esteem. Through the principle of
active participation, today’s enterprise can better
align the needs and aspirations of its employees with
those of the company. (Rosenfeld and Smith, 1967:104)
From the point of view of the democrat, this manipulative
use of pseudo-participation is particularly distressing.
In pseudo-participation democratic forms and modalities are
made to serve the interests of dictators.
The Meta-Issues of Participation
If there is a consistent failure in the literature
relating to participation in organizations, it would seem
to us to be a tendency towards idiosyncratic, descriptive
empiricism. Although a concern for descriptive accuracy is
laudable in many contexts, it seems to us to neglect, or
even obscure, the essence (in the Aristotelian sense) of
the topic in this case. The essence of participation in
organizations can, in our opinion, be understood best by
130
analyzing the meta-issues^ of the topic. They are of a
sufficiently abstract nature as to be often overlooked.
The particular resolutions of these meta-issues which
prevail in a particular instance of participation are akin
to Thomas Kuhn's "scientific paradigm” in that they serve
to define the situation without themselves being subject to
inquiry.
One could argue that an examination of the meta
issues of participation will lead to the same kind of
unscientific chaos which "systems theory" sometimes pro
duces. Such reasoning degenerates to the simplistic notion
that everything relates to everything else. We do not deny
that such a result is possible given the present reasoning,
but we hope to prevent its happening. By the same token,
we realize that the meta-issues presented herein are a
partial listing of the possible issues which results from
our own pre-theories about participation.
Cooperation and Conflict
Theorists of participation in organization must
dilemma presents itself as to whether we ought
to use the term "meta-issues" or the term "pre-theories"
in this respect. Insofar as these phenomena are uncon
scious, unexamined determinants of our actions, they are
"pre-theories." They are assumptions about "reality" which
cause us to act in certain ways. On the other hand, since
it is precisely our intention to point out the episodical,
and episode shaping, character of such pre-theories; we
think it best to refer to them as "meta-issues."
131
seek to know more about, and be more self-consciously aware
of, the theory and practice of cooperation and conflict as
they apply to organizations. As has been stated previously,
we feel that cooperation has been over-emphasized in the
participation literature. An important, although somewhat
limited, first step in redressing this imbalance has been
taken by Rhenman (1963) in his attempt to apply conflict
theory to organizations. In particular, his classification
of interorganizational conflict in three categories; con
flicts of interest, formal conflicts and conflicts of fact;
is a necessary step in legitimating conflict within organi
zations. Participatory management theorists have tended to
treat conflict as an anathema. By admitting to the possi
bility of legitimate conflicts of interest, which are not
solvable through the exchange of information only, Rhenman
has in effect rejected the Human Relations paradigm which
treated conflict as a consequence of a failure in communi
cation.
Dahrendorf (1959) has also argued persuasively for
the importance of conflict theory in the theory of organi
zation. Dahrendorf goes much farther than Rhenman in
insisting on the legitimacy of conflict in organizations.
His argument is that the very existence of an industrial
authority structure is the basis for conflict within
organizations. As "imperatively coordinated associations"
organizations are composed of positions of "domination and
132!
subjection.” (1959:243-257)
It should be understood that Dahrendorf is attempt
ing to modify and reinterpret Marxian social theory in the
light of post-Marxian historical reality. The key point of
interest to us is his explanation for the relative lack of
violence, in contrast to the predictions of Marxists, in
industry in what he describes as "post-capitalist society."
In this regard he states: "My thesis is that in post-
capitalist society industrial conflict has become less
violent because its existence has been accepted and its
manifestations have been socially regulated." (1959:257)
The above quotation serves to introduce a discussion which
Dahrendorf has titled, "Industrial Democracy." (1959:257-
267) In this discussion he analyzes:
five elements of industrial democracy in advanced
countries which seem to me of particular importance:
(1) the organization of conflicting interest groups
itself; (2) the establishment of ’parliamentary*
negotiating bodies in which these groups meet: (3) the
institutions of mediation and arbitration; (4) formal
representations of labor within the individual enter
prise; and (5) tendencies towards an institutionali
zation of workers’ participation in industrial manage
ment. (1959:257)
The first three, and probably the first four, of
Dahrendorf’s "elements of industrial democracy" fall into
the framework of what we have described as the collective
bargaining model. His fourth element might reflect collec
tive bargaining or internal representation, dependent upon
whether Dahrendorf’s "formal representations of labor"
133
represent the union or the workers as workers, independent
of union membership. His fifth element can encompass both
of our categories which are internal to organizations.
Obviously, Dahrendorf!s conception of industrial
democracy differs in its emphasis from our own. He seems
to give more credence and emphasis to collective bargain
ing as an instance of industrial democracy than we have
given. A good part of this difference may be due to differ
ence in our perspectives. Our perspectives differ in two
separable aspects. First, Dahrendorf discusses industrial
democracy as a small part of a much larger argument, which
focuses primarily on the functioning of industrial soci
eties and examines this functioning from an historical
perspective. Our own arguments are more directly focused
on industrial organizations and their internal functioning.
Second, DahrendorfTs arguments were first published in a
German edition of his work published in 1957* Given the
rapid and diverse developments relating to participation
in organizations in the intervening years, it is not
surprising that our emphases differ. Contemporary systems
of participation internal to organizations were in their
infancies at the time that Dahrendorf wrote.
In his discussion of "industrial democracy" and its
five elements, Dahrendorf ably portrays the functions of
both cooperation and conflict in a system of industrial
democracy. He states: "Organized groups stand in open,
134
and therefore in controllable conflict.” (1959:259) At a
later point in a discussion of collective bargaining he in
part quotes T. H. Marshall in saying:
The rules of the game of political democracy can
only partly be applied to the industrial conflict of
interests. ’The whole of this collective system rests
upon the principle of mutual consent, and the value of
the agreements and the machinery for settling disputes
has depended upon the loyal acceptance by the constit
uent members on both sides of the decision reached.’
(1959:260)
Again, in discussing arbitration and mediation, he states:
. . . for arbitration to be effective, it is necessary
that it be based on the acceptance of the conflict
itself, i.e., that it follow a political rather than
a legal conception of its task .... (1959:261)
What emerges from Dahrendorf’s discussion is, among
other things, an atypical conception of conflict and coop
eration. They are not the polar opposites which we often
think them to be. Each is related to the other. Both
arise simultaneously out of the interdependence of the
parties, but there is a prepotency of, or predisposition
towards, conflict in the organizational setting. In this
respect, we are reminded of Mouzelis’ citation of Simmel
in stating that,
. . . interdependence does not only imply collaboration
but conflict as well— especially if the interdependent
parties for one reason or another, are not on an equal
footing but hierarchically situated. (l969:llS)
Psychological Versus Socio-political
Approaches to Organizations
In our opinion, the preceding arguments establish
135
a reasonable case for including conflict-theoretical
approaches in our studies of organizations. As we stated
in the "Introduction" of this work it is our belief that
the cooperative, equilibrium oriented approaches of psycho
logical theory have been relied on to a greater degree than
is justified. This is particularly true among participa
tory organization theorists.
We do not argue for a rejection of the findings of
psychologically-based researchers, but we insist that, at
least within the realm of participatory theorists, and
particularly in the United States, a serious imbalance
exists between cooperation-based and conflict-based the
ories of participation in organizations. Some examples of
possible socio-political approaches to participation in
organizations, which seem highly fruitful are Scott (1959),
"Organization Government: The Prospects for a Truly
Participative System" and Denhardt (1972), "Civic Experi
ences in an Organizational Polity." The Denhardt article,
in which the author attempts to apply citizenship theory to
organizational membership, is especially innovative and
useful. What is crucial about socio-political approaches
to organizations is that they are capable of critiquing
the "structures" of organizations, the organizational facts
themselves. In the terminology of an argument which we
advanced in Chapter IV, they are capable of critiquing, and
hopefully modifying authority (an organizational fact) as
136
opposed to power (a personal fact).
Psychologically-based theories, on the other hand,
are far more capable of critiquing, and thereby changing,
personal attributes of organizational members. While such
changes may create a more pleasant "work environment" they
do not deal with organization qua organization.
Conclusion
One of the central arguments of this work has been
the contention that we need to develop a participatory
theory of organization, which implies a radical restructur
ing of organizations. A restructuring of organizations in
order to facilitate the true and full participation of all
its members in organizational decision making would involve
both costs and benefits. It has traditionally been argued
that such a restructuring would entail a loss of organiza
tional efficiency or productivity. Later theorists have
argued that the reverse is true. The empirical evidence in
this respect is mixed, although it is possible to conclude
from the evidence that under certain conditions participa
tion tends to increase production.^
The potential benefits of participation, aside from
^■See Blumberg (1969:70-122) for an excellent
summary of the empirical evidence to date.
137
possible increases in productivity, are traditionally not
measured on a company balance sheet. Traditionally these
potential benefits of participation, which can also be
regarded as "costs” (opportunities foregone) of hierarchy,
have been regarded as externalities. These benefits, which
are the ultimate proof of the "educative effect" of partic
ipation, potentially include improvements in the mental
health and happiness of the entire citizenry.
After recognizing that the intended beneficiaries
are individuals, does it necessarily follow that the most
efficacious method of bringing about improvement is to
attempt to change the behavior of individuals as they find
themselves in organizations? In our opinion the prominent
proponents of participation in organizations in the United
States, the organization development specialists, the
industrial humanists, the T-group leaders, etc.; are doing
exactly this. It seems more efficacious to us to change
the organizations themselves— in essence, to change the
authority structures of organizations. We maintain that to
concentrate on changing interpersonal behavior in organiza
tions is to treat the symptom rather than the disease. The
"disease" is the oppressive, hierarchical authority struc
ture of most organizations.
The management consultant is often in a similar
position to the prison psychologist. He is asked to facil
itate the "adjustment" of those who, being basically
136
healthy individuals, resent the oppressive situation in
which they find themselves. Resentment, paranoia, even
aggression by the workers have to be seen as healthy
reactions to coercion, however subtle, from the managers.
Such responses are almost certainly disfunctional, but they
are not unhealthy. Before the industrial humanist can
legitimately ask for changes in the behavior of organiza
tion members, he must eliminate the oppressive conditions
which cause such behavior.
The oppression of organizations is not primarily
the personal oppression of a few ogres. It is the
impersonal oppression of seemingly arbitrary rules, all of
which are made, implemented and enforced by a relatively
few rather nice people. To deal with the oppression of
organizations, primarily through changing interpersonal
relationships is at least uneconomic, perhaps ineffective,
and usually manipulative.
To change organizations effectively, we need to be
able to observe and manipulate variables which are them
selves aspects of organization. This suggests changes in
the authority structure of the organization; and, in the
context of participation, suggests changes in the organiza
tion rules concerning who is entitled to participate in
decision making. The theories of sociology and political
science, with their explicit recognitions of conflict and
its value, are relatively under-utilized in this respect.
CHAPTER VI
PARTICIPATION IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE COMPENSATION
INSURANCE FUND: AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is the pre
sentation, in a case study format, of data which this
author gathered and analyzed with respect to participation
in the California State Compensation Insurance Fund. It
was originally intended that the data herein presented be
the primary focus of the dissertation, but for a variety
of reasons a decision was made to broaden the scope of the
dissertation and to treat the data as a case study. As a
consequence of this change in focus, the data in this
chapter appear to be rather pathetically ideographic when
compared with the broad-scale nomothetic approach of
previous chapters. It is freely acknowledged that these
data do not in any sense prove the assertions of previous
chapters.
139
140
A Brief History of the California.. State
Compensation Insurance Fundx
The California State Compensation Insurance Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is a public corporation
created in 1914 by an act of the California legislature.
It was intended that the Fund demonstrate the profitability
of selling workmen's compensation insurance; a practice in
which existing insurance carriers were reluctant to engage.
The Fund accomplished this objective in a most expeditious
manner by repaying to the state a $100,000 loan, which had
provided the original capital for the Fund, and by support
ing itself without further state aid. Today the Fund is a
unique,, semi-regulatory force in the compensation insurance
marketplace. It tends to set the standards for the indus
try and tries to assure appropriate benefits for both the
worker and the employer.
Although the Frond does not receive appropriated
financial support from the state government, it is subject
^The "brief history" contained herein is meant to
familiarize the reader with the California State Compensa
tion Insurance Fund. It is derived from this author's
conversations with members of the Executive Committee of
the Fund, primarily Mr. John Wiebers; and with Professor
Neely Gardner of the School of Public Administration of the
University of Southern California. Professor Gardner has
been an external consultant to the Fund for a number of
years.
141
to the rules and regulations of the state civil service
system and centralized general services. It resembles to
some extent the unusual blend of public purpose and private,
entrepreneurial means present in the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
Bureaucracy and Change
The word bureaucracy has undergone a rather exten
sive metamorphosis in meaning since its usage and defini
tion by Max Weber. Whereas Weber saw bureaucracy as a
highly efficient productive tool, modern theorists tend to
emphasize its rigidity and resistance to change. In the
contemporary theoretical paradigm the rigidities of bureau
cracy are exacerbated by the rapidly changing environments
in which today's organizations find themselves. Only
organizations which have developed considerable capacities
to change are thought to be capable of surviving and
prospering in contemporary environmental circumstances.
The planned change effort of the California State
Compensation Insurance Fund is very much the result of the
contemporary theoretical paradigm outlined above. A
continuing effort to create a capacity for change and
flexibility in the Fund has been engaged in since 1962.
At that time the Fund's share of the compensation insurance
market was declining. This decline was traceable to change
in the environment. Emerging conglomerate corporations had
142
engulfed a number of California corporate customers of the
Fund. The Fund was not in a position to insure these
nation-wide customers and was losing this business to
nation-wide private insurance carriers. A second cause of
the decline in the Fund’s share of the market was a growing
movement towards self-insurance on the part of public
jurisdictions. Many of the larger cities and counties were
moving in this direction. Because of these apparently sig
nificant and continuing changes in the environment, it was
decided that the Fund should be restructured and recon
ceptualized so as to maximize its ability to adapt and grow
with the environment.
The Fund as a ’ ’ Changing Organization”
An ambitious program was undertaken with the objec
tive of restructuring the organization so that its struc
ture and functioning might be more effective. This effort
continues to hold a high priority and a consequent command
of resources within the Fund at the present time. It is
doubtful that this effort will ever ’ ’end" in that the Fund
has committed itself to changefulness rather than the
implementation of a particular change strategy.
The means through which changefulness are sought
are varied. The executives of the Fund are unusually well-
read in the management theory literature and use the
terminologies and espouse the methodologies of a number of
143
the progressive management theorists— primarily those which
we have previously identified as the industrial humanists.
Fund executives speak of the Fund as a "changing organiza
tion" a la Warren Bennis; there is a preference for "Theory
Y” approaches to management as developed by Douglas
McGregor; and one hears of leaders acting as "linking pins"
in the manner described by Rensis Likert. There is also
widespread familiarity with the grid of Blake and Mouton,
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and Herzberg’s approach to
motivation in organizations. The Fund's general manager
and all of its vice-presidents have attended one or more of
the executive development workshops conducted by the
Graduate School of Management of the University of
California at Los Angeles. The Fund can be fairly charac
terized as a leading corporate proponent of pragmatic indus-
2
trial humanism.
Changes in Organization and Processes
The Fund has for many years taken pride in its
progressive management and has used various external con
sultants as a source of new ideas and constructive critic
ism of present policies. Among the consultants who have
contributed notably to contemporary practices at the Fund
O
*It is difficult to more precisely characterize
the management philosophy of the Fund. Whatever the
philosophy is, it is characterized by a tendency to
eclecticism.
144
are the Stanford Research Institute, Professor Charles K.
Ferguson of the University of California at Los Angeles
Graduate School of Management, and Professor Neely Gardner.
In the late 1950's after two years of research con
cerning the management practices of the Fund, the Stanford
Research Institute recommended that the district offices be
given more autonomy and that the importance of the district
offices be reemphasized* In effect this was a recommenda
tion for a limited decentralization of the Fund. The
Stanford Research Institute report also recommended that
the existing Executive Development Program of the Fund be
strengthened and that the services of the State Training
Division be utilized in executive development programs.
Both the Executive Development Program, and the State
Training Division used Theory Y approaches to management.
To a large degree these recommendations were received
favorably by the Fund, but there was considerable debate as
to how they could best be implemented.
In the early 1960’s Professor Ferguson was retained
by then General Manager, A1 Young. Professor Ferguson
acted as a counselor to the senior executives of the Fund.
He was a facilitator of authentic communication within the
executive group.
Professor Gardner was retained by the Fund in 1966
after he left his position with the State of California. He
had been familiar with the management of the Fund for a
number of years. He was thus uniquely qualified to carry
on and extend the work of Professor Ferguson and the
Stanford Research Institute. Both threads of the emerging
effort (the personally supportive, Theory Y style engendered
by Ferguson and the structural changes recommended by
Stanford Research Institute) continued with Professor
Gardner’s support.
Under Gardner’s tutelage the Fund made a series of
definitive structural changes which were calculated to lead
the Fund toward the status of a "changing organization."
The effect of these structural changes was to implement,
indeed to exceed, the spirit of the Stanford Research
Institute recommendations which had been made almost ten
years before.
Hierarchy reduced
A number of moves were made which in effect elimi
nated three levels of hierarchy in the organization. Under
the centralized planning and control structures which had
evolved in previous regimes, it was necessary to divide
Fund operations into six divisions. Furthermore, each of
the operating divisions was divided into two regions. In
order to free the general manager from some of the deluge
of paperwork which flooded his office in this highly
centralized, multi-layered system, the position of
assistant general manager was created. .
146
The current organization of the Fund eliminates the
positions of assistant general manager, division chief and
the regional manager. Currently, the general manager and
the former division chiefs act as an executive committee.
The former division chiefs are sometimes referred to as
vice-presidents and sometimes as executive committee
members. They do not retain the divisional jurisdiction of
their former jobs, although some members tend to specialize
in certain problem areas.3 The Executive Committee attempts
to operate using a consensual decision process.
3It is the assertion of Executive Committee members
and Professor Gardner that three levels of hierarchy have
been effectively eliminated. It is evident to this writer
that at least two levels have been eliminated; those of
regional managers and the assistant general manager. How
ever, the changes in roles of the former division chiefs
can be interpreted differently. To the extent that
Executive Committee members specialize in certain problem
areas and, through the knowledge gained from specialization,
are deferred to by other committee members in making
decisions about those problems the present organization
tends to resemble, in theory if not in name, the divisional
hierarchy previously described. Even if divisional respon
sibilities are not in effect retained by Executive
Committee members, the argument that three layers have been
eliminated assumes no hierarchy within the Executive
Committee; which is a highly dubious assumption since one
member is the general manager. Although the Executive
Committee members, including the general manager, do make
an effort to function as a plural executive; the statutory
responsibilities of the general manager remain unchanged
and serve as an abridgement of the claim that there is no
hierarchy within the Committee.
District autonomy
Following the Stanford Research Institute report
there was much debate concerning ways to give increased
autonomy to the twenty-three district offices. In the next
ten years a number of incremental changes were made which
tended to increase the autonomy of the districts. In
general this was accomplished by decentralizing head
quarters staff and service departments such as the Claims
Department and the Safety Services Department. Gradually
the whole range of services of the Fund came to be lodged
in the district offices.
Although the results of these changes were gratify
ing, an additional, more dramatic, move was made in 196S
and 1969 when, first on an experimental basis and later on
a system-wide institutionalized basis, district offices
were permitted to negotiate annual performance contracts
with the Executive Committee. Eabh district office now
''contracts" to perform at certain levels of output in
exchange for agreed upon resource commitments from the
Executive Committee. The day-to-day autonomy of the dis
trict office is greatly enhanced by this arrangement
because each office is free to use the resources at its
disposal to achieve the agreed upon outputs in whatever
manner it chooses. In the Executive Committee the emphasis
is placed on goal achievement by district offices rather
than the supervision of means. In a sense, both parties to
this "contract” become more autonomous. The district
office is free to choose the means it uses to achieve goals
and is able to participate in goal setting; while the
Executive Committee tends to be more autonomous (i.e.,
competent or knowledgeable) in setting policy for the
organization as a whole
It should be noted in passing that the contract
approach is also being applied to the various departments
of the Home Office (headquarters). In addition to con
tracting with the Executive Committee for resources and
levels of output, these departments, which are basically
service departments such as the Data Processing and Legal
Departments, have moved toward a "contractual" or "market"
relationship with the district offices. The service
departments have had to become more "competitive" because
the district offices may, in some circumstances, contract
with outside vendors for services previously provided by
the service departments.
Management council
The commitment to the concept of a changing organi
zation requires redoubled effort if a simultaneous commit
ment is maintained to programs and goals. In the words of
^It can be argued that this is an instance of the
"power as resource mobilization" phenomenon described in
Chapter IV. See also Tannenbaum, 1963 and Dahrendorf,
1959:165-173.
Neely Gardner a question arises as to: "How do you organize
to stay loose, to avoid habitualism, to respond quickly to
the environment, and at the same time keep the organization
output oriented?" (1969:1) The Fund has dealt with the
need for looseness, and quick responsiveness by reducing
the number of the layers of management hierarchy. It seeks
to insure a strong orientation to output primarily through
the mechanism of a Management Council. This council is
composed of all of the district managers and all of the
program managers from the Home Office.^ The Management
Council meets once each month with the general manager of
the Fund normally present. Its primary tasks are to compare
on a month-by-month base actual program results with planned
results and to communicate to and among the district and
program managers on a "real time" basis the current think
ing of the Executive Committee. Every effort is made to
insure timeliness, accuracy and non-punitiveness in this
very important communications mechanism. It is hoped that
through this mechanism the Fund can be not only "changing,"
but also "error correcting" in that it can operate with an
^At the time of the empirical study which will be
reported later in this chapter there were two distinct
councils; the District Managers Council and the Home Office
Managers’ Council. These have since been merged into the
Management Council.
150
awareness of the results of its own actions*
Program advisory council
Another important communications mechanism is the
Program Advisory Council. It is the only specifically
representative body in the Fund. Its members are elected
on a "one-man, one vote" basis; with one member coming from
each district office and each home office department.^
Gardner says of this body,
Advisory Council members bring the Home Office
up-to-date views of opportunities or problems occurring
in the field. The President communicates to the members
the latest significant information available to him.
Research and development task teams receive advice and
counsel from the members, and when their studies are
concluded, reports are made to the Council before
recommendations are implemented. (1971:5)
The deliberations of this body are only advisory;
only rarely are formal decisions even taken in its meetings.
However, it does represent a useful two-way communications
path between the rank-and-file and the Executive Committee.
An Empirical Case Study
Introduction
During the last quarter of 1971 this author, through
Professor Neely Gardner, became interested in using the
California State Compensation Insurance Fund as the subject
^This council was also two separate councils at a
prior time, but they had already been merged at the time of
the empirical study.
151
of an empirical study of participative organizations.
There followed a series of meetings and discussions with
Professor Gardner; Mr. John Wiebers, a Fund vice-president;
and the Fund's Executive Committee. As a result of these
meetings permission was secured for such a study and work
began in earnest by January of 1972.
It was originally intended that this research
effort be a thorough and definitive evaluation of the
effects of the newly adopted participative-communicative
management style at the Fund; but that intention has been
altered by subsequent events and changes in the author's
point of view.
It became apparent during the course of data
collection and analysis that the research design and
research instrument chosen were inadequate to the task at
hand. After the data had been analyzed the author was left
with the feeling that although the results tended to
support the original hypotheses there were other plausible
explanations for the observed phenomena; and, thus, any
conclusions would have to be very tentative and highly
qualified. In short, the study was not very useful.
Secondly, and perhaps this has been visible in the
previous sections of this chapter, after the additional
exposure to the Fund involved in the data collection, this
author found it difficult to accept the Fund as an example
of a participative organization. In terms of the concepts
152
Which we defined in Chapter I (participative management,
workers’ participation in management, and industrial
democracy), the Fund is best characterized as an example of
participative management.
In fairness to the Fund the following points need
to be made:
1. I now believe that the Fund is primarily model
ing itself after the "changing" or "self-
renewing" concept of organizations. Such
organizations utilize participative methods,
but they value survival and effectiveness.
These distinctions were not apparent to this
author at the beginning of this study. It is
doubtful that they were apparent to members of
the Fund•
2. The primary constraints upon a theoretical
study are the constraints of intellect,
imagination and expression. The constraints
which operate in attempting to change the real
organizational world are the constraints of
resources, statutory prescription, and deeply
ingrained expectations; in addition to those
which operate in theoretical activity. Seen
in this light it is inherently unfair to
compare the actual (the Fund) with the ideal
(industrial democracy). Relative to other
153
contemporary organizations the Fund must be
seen as participative, but relative to ideal
situations it is not. Even if participation
was highly valued for its own sake, Fund
management would be prevented from becoming an
"industrial democracy” by such pedestrian
realities as the civil service system.?
The Semantic Differential^
The semantic differential is a well-validated tech
nique for measuring the meaning of concepts. It has been
used in a number of studies, some of which are quite
similar to this study.9 in the semantic differential
respondents are asked to assess the meaning of concepts by
checking the appropriate "boxes” on seven point scales.
The end points of the scales represent bi-polar, opposite
adjective pairs. For instance, the meaning of GOD might
be assessed in terms of the following scales:
?For a fuller explanation of the inherent biases
of comparing ideal concepts with "real world" systems see
A. Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A
Critique and a Suggestion," Administrative Science
Quarterly. V (I960), 257-25$.
%or additional information on the semantic differ
ential see Osgood, Succi and Tannenbaum (1957). For an
analysis of its application in a variety of contexts and
an in-depth discussion of its validity see Osgood and
Snider (1969).
Q
See especially H. C. Triandis, "Some Determinants
of Interpersonal Communication," Human Relations. (1967).
154
Good
Strong
Active
Bad
Weak
Passive
Each scale is a ’ ’ dimension” of the meaning of the concept
involved.■L0 The researcher may use as many concepts and
as many scales per concept as suits his purpose.
Through the factor analysis of the results of a
number of previous studies utilizing a semantic differen
tial it has been shown that although meaning is multi
dimensional and highly complex, there are three primary
dimensions. That is, three dimensions which account for
most of the meaning in most concepts. These dimensions
have been called the ’ ’evaluative,” ’ ’ potency," and "oriented
activity” dimensions. The evaluative dimension has refer
ence to concepts in which judgments of goodness or badness
are important. The potency dimension refers to connota
tions of strength or weakness. And the oriented activity
dimension, hereinafter referred to as simply activity, is
concerned with connotations of activity or passivity. Most
concepts can, therefore, be fairly accurately described by
a set of scores on these three dimensions. The data
gathered from the Fund were "collapsed" into these three
10For a clearer understanding of the technique
involved see Appendix, which is a facsimile of the actual
instrument used in this study.
155
primary dimensions of meaning to simplify their presenta
tion and facilitate their understanding.11
Theoretical Basis of This Study
The theoretical basis for this study is drawn
rather loosely and distantly from what has been called
"Gestalt psychology." In particular, Fritz Heider's The
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (195#) is a direct,
though distant theoretical antecedent of this study.
Heider’s work stimulated two related, though different
from each other, lines of inquiry. All of these, including
Heider’s own, were
... based on the central idea that an organization
or structure of beliefs and attitudes or of inter
personal relations can be imbalanced, disharmonious,
dissonant, or incongruous, and that when imbalance
exists a tendency will arise to change one's beliefs
and attitudes until they are balanced. The change may
occur by alteration of the reality to which the beliefs
and attitudes refer or by direct modification of the
beliefs. (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965:22)
Heider (1953) elaborated what has been called his "theory
of balance." Balance, in accordance with the above quota
tion, was thought to be both a cognitive (intrapersonal)
and a social (interpersonal) phenomenon.
One line of inquiry, which sprang from Heider’s
11The factorial loadings used in this process were
those provided in Osgood, Succi and Tannenbaum (1957) and
Osgood and Snider (1969).
156
work, has been primarily aimed at making Heider’s theories
more formal and predictive. Cartwright and Harary (1956)
have applied the mathematical theory of linear graphs to
Heider’s theories, and have had some success in operation
alizing them in this manner. In this same tradition,
Abelson and Rosenberg (1956) have used matrix algebra to
improve Heider’s theories. These studies have tended to
concentrate on the intrapersonal aspects of the theory and
are only very distantly related to the present study.
A separate, though compatible, line of inquiry
emanated from Newcomb's (1953) attempt to formulate a theory
of communicative acts and his use of that theory to explain
the structure and cohesiveness of groups. Newcomb uses
Heider’s notion of balance to posit what he calls "strains
toward symmetry of orientation" in dyads and groups.
Following this line of reasoning, Osgood and Tannenbaum
(1955) demonstrate that changes in the attitude of a person
in response to new information are always in the direction
of increasing the internal consistency of the person's
frame of reference. The important variables of the frame
of reference are (a) the existing attitude toward the
source of information, (b) the existing attitude toward the
concept evaluated by the source, and (c) the nature of the
evaluating assertion which relates source and concept in
the message (1955:42). Osgood and Tannenbaum maintain that
if a source that is valued (+) tells us something
157
unfavorable (-) about someone or something that is also
valued (+), a tension or incongruity is set up which will
cause us to change our attitude to either the source or the
subject of the message.^
Festinger, in Chapter One of A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance acknowledges the similarities of his own and
Heider’s work. He was also aware of the Osgood and
Tannenbaum article. (Festinger, 1957:7-£)
The most recent work in this line of inquiry has
been that by Triandis (1967a and 1967b). Triandis, in dis
cussing the possibility of generalizing his conclusions
about dyadic communication to small groups, states the
following as hypotheses:
When people form groups they develop common norms.
This increases their attribute similarity, as well as
other kinds of cognitive similarity.13 The greater
degree of cognitive similarity results in greater
communication effectiveness within the group. Greater
communication facilitates the attainment of group
goals. The attainment of group goals reinforces the
members of the group. This reinforcement leads to
increased liking between the members of the group. The
interpersonal liking will increase the interaction rate,
over and above the rate that is required for the attain
ment of group goals. The higher interaction rates will
lead to a further increase in the cognitive similarity
of the group members. (l967a:l£l)
■^See Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) for illustra
tions of the other permutations possible in their paradigm.
■^Triandis defines ’ ’attribute similarity’ ’ as”con-
cerned with the similarity in the dimensions used by persons
A and B when examining events in their environment.” (1967:
176) The "dimensions” in the experiment were polar opposite
adjective pairs.
i5a
Triandis’ hypotheses form a rather too-long, loosely-woven
logical chain which would be difficult to support or reject
on the basis of a single study such as this one.
This study treated the communicative-participative
management style of the Fund as a "message" which was "sent"
by the Executive Committee and "received" in varying degrees
by the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. An
attempt was made to "measure" the effectiveness of "commu
nication" of this new management style by examining the
meaning of relevant concepts to various groups in the
organizational hierarchy. The analysis of this data con
sisted primarily of comparing mean scores between groups—
mean scores close to the mean scores of the Executive
Committee being taken to indicate effective communication.
The purpose of the study was to measure the differ
ing impact of the change in management styles which had
taken place in the Fund. In order to develop a coherent
theoretical framework it was necessary to make certain
assumptions.
It was assumed that there had in fact been a defin
itive change in style; since the research was of an ex post
facto nature. All of the data which were gathered in this
study were gathered after the supposed "experimental treat
ment," which consisted of a change in management philosophy
and practice.
It was further assumed that the change which had
159
taken place could best be characterized as a change from a
more traditional, bureaucratic style of management to a
communicative-participative. These assumptions are very
much in accordance with the perceptions of those who ini
tiated these changes. It was felt that the Fund had
gradually de-emphasized aspects of the organization, such
as hierarchy and authority, which are characteristic of
relatively bureaucratic organizations; and had tended to
rely more on participation and cooperation. It was known
that the change effort had been initiated at the "top" of
the organizational hierarchy and that, at the time of the
study, most of the change effort had been directed at the
"higher” levels of the organization
The relatively rigid, unresponsive structure of the
organization had been diagnosed as a problem by higher
management and its consultants. Although there was dis
content and alienation at the lower levels of the organiza
tion, there is no evidence of a "grass roots" demand for
more communication and participation. The consultants
worked primarily with managers, particularly the district
managers and those who presently make up the Executive
Committee.
What emerges from the preceding paragraphs is a
"portrait" of the change process in the California State
Compensation Insurance Fund. This process has two primary
dimensions. On the one hand the change is thought to
160
represent movement along a continuum from ' ’ bureaucratic” to
"participative-communicative” organization. On the other
hand it was noted that the change effort was "top down" in
character. Presumably the higher levels of the organiza
tion were more participative. In essence, we were seeking
to measure change along two dimensions— one of them a con
ceptual dimension (from "bureaucratic" to "communicative-
participative") and the other a hierarchical dimension of
the Fund ("top" to "bottom").
The research procedure which logically derives from
the above conception of the problem must have the following
characteristics:
1. It must seek to measure changes in the meaning
of concepts.1^ The meanings to be examined in
this instance must be related to the bureau
cratic-communicative-participative continuum.
2. The research sample should constitute a
"vertical slice" through the organizational
hierarchy.
l*It is recognized that B. F. Skinner and others of
considerable stature in the social sciences would find this
line of argument both trivial and unverifiable. Skinner
argues that the causal link between internal states (in our
case the meaning of concepts) and external actions (in our
case the behavior of individuals in the Fund) cannot be
demonstrated. See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), especially
Chapter 1, "A Technology of Behavior." Time, space and
intellect do not permit that we enter into that argument.
161
The Research Procedure
Selection of concepts
The prime criterion used in the selection of con
cepts whose meanings were to be measured was that these
concepts be representative of the two management styles.
All of the concepts selected are widely used in organiza
tions and in the organizational literature. The determina
tion of their "representativeness" was made by the author
with the advice and consultation of several experts.
Osgood, Succi, and Tannenbaum (1957) state that
concepts should be selected which will:
a. maximize the likelihood of individual differ
ences in meaning;
b. be unitary in meaning for the individual
respondent;
c. be familiar to all subjects.
An attempt was made to observe the above guidelines.
Using these criteria the following concepts were
selected for semantic differentiation:
Bureaucratic Concepts Communicative-Participative
Concepts
As a "benchmark" for the assessment of respondents'
feelings about the organization to which they belonged "The
Hierarchy
Authority
Management
Participation
Communication
Coordination
162
Fund" was included as a concept. It was clear to the
respondents that "The Fund" referred to the California
State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Finally, a concept group which was called "Personal"
was included. This group was as follows:
Personal Concepts
Ambiguity
Self-disclosure
Intimacy
These concepts were included for two reasons. First, they
were part of an attempt to assess some of the extra-
organizational or "personal" impacts of organizational
participation. That is, we were attempting to measure the
similarities or differences in the meanings of these
"personal" concepts to see whether organizational partici
pation did, indeed, have "spillover" effects on non-
organizational meanings. This was a crude attempt to
measure the "educative effect" hypothesized by participatory
political theorists.
A second reason for including these concepts was
that they served to mask the intentions of the researcher.
It was felt that some respondents might be able to sense
the "groupings" of the Bureaucratic and Comraunicative-
Participative concepts if they were presented by themselves.
Selection of scales
As was mentioned previously, it has been found
through prior research using semantic differential tech
niques that most of the meaning of concepts lies along three
primary dimensions— evaluative, potency and activity.
Assessing the meaning of concepts with respect to just these
three dimensions greatly reduces the computational load of
the researcher without decreasing the accuracy of the
results substantially. It was, therefore, decided to select
scales which were known from previous research to be maxi
mally loaded on one of these three primary dimensions and
minimally loaded on all other dimensions.
Lists of adjective pairs and their factorial
composition are contained in Osgood, Succi and Tannenbaum
(1957) and in Osgood and Snider (1969). After the elimina
tion of duplications, the two lists contained 110 adjective
pairs. In order to maximize the relevancy of the selected
pairs, a merged list of the 110 pairs was given to ten
experts (doctoral students and faculty in public adminis
tration) along with a list of the ten concepts which had
been selected for semantic differentiation. Each expert
was asked to select, for each concept, adjective pairs
which, in his or her opinion, were particularly descriptive
of a dimension of the meaning of that concept. This process
produced "consensus choices" for approximately seventy of
the needed pairs. "Consensus" was deemed to be the
164
nomination of a particular pair as appropriate for a partic
ular concept by four or more of the experts. The remaining
thirty pairs were selected by the researcher from among the
"also rans" submitted by the experts.
*
Osgood, Succi and Tannenbaum (1957) suggest that
three pairs are sufficient to represent each primary
dimension. Naturally, each of these pairs should be maxi
mally loaded on the dimension it represents and minimally
loaded on all other dimensions. Simple computation shows
that a minimum of nine pairs must be used to achieve this
end (three pairs for each dimension; three primary dimen
sions = nine)* In this study ten pairs were used for each
concept. In conjunction with each concept no more than
four and no less than two of the pairs represents each
primary dimension.
Selection of respondents
The respondents in this study approximate a
"vertical slice" through the organization. The constraints
of time and logistics have forced some compromises in the
selection of respondents, however. As a result of these
compromises, the lower end of the organizational hierarchy
is very greatly under represented among the respondents in
the opinion of the researcher.
The semantic differential, consisting of the con
cepts and scales discussed above (see Appendix), was given
165
to the following organizational groups:
Organizational Group
Executive Committee
Number of Respondents
7
20
16
District Managers
Home Office Managers
Legal Department
Data Processing Department
Program Advisory Council
Non-supervisory
31
33
31
2£
Total N = 163
In the Executive Committee, District Managers, Home Office
Managers and PAC groups virtually all members of the groups
were respondents. The Legal Department, Data Processing,
and Non-supervisory groups are representative samples. All
of the above groups, with the exception of the Non-
supervisory group, were operating, functional groups within
the Fund at the time of the study.
Department respondents represents two compromises because
of logistical constraints which we spoke of at the begin
ning of this section. The bulk of the employees of the
Fund work in its twenty-three district offices which are
widely disbursed throughout the state of California. In
the Executive Committee, District Managers, Home Office
Managers, and Program Advisory Council groups, geographic
dispersion was not a problem; either because they were
The selection of the Non-supervisory and the Legal
166
headquarters groups and thus not disbursed, or because they
met periodically and could respond to the instrument at
these meetings.
Personal administration of the semantic differential
at each of the district offices was prohibitively expensive.
Mailed semantic differentials and mailed return of those
differentials seemed likely to produce an excessively small
sample. The problem was dealt with in the Legal Department
by giving the instruments to selected senior counsels who
passed the instruments on to a representative sample of
their subordinates, all of whom are lawyers, and returned
the completed instruments to the researcher by mail. Having
the instruments handed out and collected by the Senior
Counsels insured a relatively high return rate from a group
of very busy professional people who might otherwise not
have responded. However, introducing the Senior Counsels
into the data collection process may have biased the
responses; either through their selection of a "representa
tive" sample or through intimidating the respondents. The
Legal Department data contains indications that some of
this may have taken place.
The Non-supervisory group was selected by giving
each member of the Program Advisory Council an extra copy
of the research instrument and asking that they administer
it to a "typical, non-supervisory person" in their home
office department or district office. The completed
167
instruments were mailed to the researcher; although approx
imately 20 percent of the instruments handed out in this
manner were not returned.
Unfortunately, very little is known concerning the
degree to which the meanings expressed by the Non-
supervisory sample are representative of the views of those
at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. Allowing
the Program Advisory Council members to "randomly" select
the respondents in this group was a serious error on the
part of the researcher. At the time of the data collection
it was thought that the Non-supervisory data was "extra" or
likely to be complimentary and reinforcing to the data of
the Program Advisory Council. The actual data did not
support this expectation, and immediately raised questions
as to whether the Program Advisory Council data or the Non-
supervisory data is more representative of those at the
bottom of the organizational hierarchy. This will be dis
cussed further in the "Data Analysis and Conclusions"
section of this paper.
All data were gathered in the period of February 16
to March 20, 1972. Conclusions derived from this data were
the subject of "feedback" sessions that the researcher
conducted for most of the organizational groups involved.
These meetings took place in June and July of 1972.
i6a
Data Analysis and Conclusions
Introduction
In keeping with the case study approach, the data
analysis presented herein will be minimal. The analysis
will consist primarily of arraying and rearraying various
organizational group and concept group means in order to
illustrate possible differences among them. Additional
statistical analyses were performed beyond those presented
herein. These consisted primarily of tests for significance
in the differences of various group means. None of these
tests produced statistically significant results. There
fore, our intention is to suggest possible interpretations
of the data, without being able to "prove” these interpre
tations on the basis of the data alone.
Perceived participation and
influence
On the second page of the research instrument,
respondents were asked the following question:
To what extent are you an active participant in
the California State Compensation Insurance Fund and,
therefore, able to influence those organizational
decisions which will influence your work-day life?
Responses were in the form of checkmarks on the following
scale:
I _______ I______ J_______ I _______J
not moderately very
influential influential influential
The responses were coded from 1 through 9, with ”1"
169
indicating "not influential" and "9" indicating "very
influential."
TABLE 2
PERCEIVED INFLUENCE-PARTICIPATION BY
ORGANIZATIONAL GROUP
Organizational Group Mean Response:
Influence-Participation
Executive Committee 7.71
District Managers 6.40
Home Office Managers 6.50
Legal Department
3.64
Data Processing 3.27
Program Advisory Council
4.29
Non-supervisory 3.60
This is the only question in the research instru
ment which directly asks the respondent about his perceived
level of influence. Although the scale is labeled in
"influence" terms, the question was designed to elicit
subjective perceptions of "participation." The "active
participant" and "work-day life" phraseologies were designed
to bring out this aspect of "influence."
It can be argued that participation is much more
than mere influence— an argument with which the researcher
is likely to agree— however, inasmuch as this was an attempt
170
to elicit information about the end result, a subjective
feeling, rather than the process, whether formalized or not,
of participation itself; it is felt that the question is
appropriate as stated.
These means are approximately as "common sense"
would have them. Perceived influence-participation declines
as one descends the organizational hierarchy. Managers
(Executive Committee, District and Home Office) definitely
perceive themselves as to influence to some degree
those decisions which influence their work-day lives.
Groups whose membership are basically other than managers
perceive their influence as somewhat less than "moderate."
The interpretation of data is always subject to
argument, but it would be difficult indeed to interpret
these means as indicating significant progress towards the
realization of a fully participative organization. The
hierarchy of organizational authority is clearly reflected
in the perceptions of organization members. These data
would seem to be more consistent with a "changing organiza
tion" concept of the Fund than with a "participative organ
ization." These data would indicate that the Fund may be
an example of participative management, but it looks very
little like a portrait of industrial democracy.
It should be pointed out, however, that there is
little, if any, evidence that non-managers find the present
situation particularly frustrating. There does not seem to
171
be any demand for industrial democracy. In response to a
question, ("How happy are you with your work and with the
Fund as a place to work?") group means ranged from a high
of 7«$6 for the Executive Committee to a low of just 5.SC
for the Non-supervisory group (see Appendix for the scale
used). Even the least happy members of the Fund character
ize themselves as "slightly happy."
Results of the semantic
differential
The analysis presented will be fairly straight
forward. It will consist primarily of organizing and
summarizing, and then reorganizing and resummarizing so
that we may view the data from several perspectives. The
several perspectives and the contrasts which they bring out
will lead us to possible interpretations of the meaning of
the data.
Let us start at the broader levels of analysis and
proceed to more narrow, and perhaps more definitive, levels.
In its larger aggregations, the data enable us to make
statements about the "average" meaning of the ten concepts
in the Fund as a whole. We must remember that these aver
ages will tend to obscure possibly important variations
within and between the seven organizational groups that
participated in the study.
The semantic differential gave the respondent a
choice from among seven spaces. Therefore, the possible
172
range of these mean scores is from 1.00 to 7.00. The
middle space (4.00) was a hypothetical mid-point that indi
cated irrelevancy or equal association with both ends of
the scale.
In general, it can be said that a relatively low
score indicates a favorable or positive connotation for the
concept in question. That is, participation, which received
the lowest mean score (2.99) is the most highly regarded of
the list of ten.
TABLE 3
MEAN SCORE AND RANK ORDER FOR EACH
CONCEPT: N=l63
Concept Mean Score Rank Order
Participation
2.99 1
Communication 3.21 2
Management 3.32
3
The Fund 3.40
4
Authority
3.41 5
Intimacy
3.47 6
Self-disclosure
3.49 7
Coordination 3.52 S
Hierarchy
3.67 9
Ambiguity 4.OS 10
173
The means range from 2.99 to 4>0# which is inter
preted as an indication of low level positive regard for
most of the concepts involved. There are no real "heroes"
or "villains," although the participative concept group
seems to fare relatively well. Its three concepts, parti
cipation, communication and coordination, are ranked num
bers 1, 2 and 8 respectively, with means of 2.99, 3*21 and
3.52. The hierarchical concept group was not at all
unfavorably evaluated, however, with rankings of 3, 5 and
9 and means of 3*32, 3*41 and 3>67> We should also note
that our "benchmark" concept, the Fund, received a moder
ately favorable ranking (4) and mean (3>40).
It is this researcher’s opinion that this combina
tion of results is best interpreted as indicating an aware
ness of and emphasis on the positive aspects of both hier
archy and participation. Apparently, the advantages of
each have been emphasized. It would seem that the poten
tially serious polarizations have been for the most part
avoided.
Perhaps a little more insight can be gained if we
reorganize the data at this point. Let us collapse the
concepts into their respective concept groups in order to
discriminate with respect to the dimensions of meaning.
One possible way of displaying the data for the entire
organization in this manner is presented in Table 4>
174
TABLE 4
MEAN SCORES BY DIMENSIONS OF MEANING AND
CONCEPT GROUPS; N=l63
DIMENSIONS
Participative
CONCEPT GROUPS
Hierarchical Personal The
Fund
Evaluation 3.20
3.45 3.97 3.35
Potency
3.64 3.55
4.00 3.48
Activity
3.09 3.23 3.43 3.43
Once again lower means are "better." That is, more
highly valued, more potent or more active. It has been
demonstrated by other researchers using the semantic
differential that there is a tendency for evaluation,
potency and activity to be positively correlated. That is,
a tendency for highly valued objects to be seen as potent
and active, and active objects to also be potent and
highly valued, etc. This tendency is partially, though not
unequivocally, born out by the data of Table 4. The parti
cipative group has the lowest mean activity and evaluation
scores (3.09 and 3*20), but its potency score (3*64) is
somewhat higher than the potency score of the hierarchical
group (3.55).
One puzzling aspect of the data of Table 4 is the
consistent relative weakness of the potency scores. In all
four concept groups, the potency score is the highest mean
175
for the group, which indicates a relative lack of potency.
No really defensible explanation presents itself. Perhaps
an explanation will emerge as we look at other aspects of
the data.
In Table 5 we see for the first time information
which will allow us to pinpoint the similarities and differ
ences in meaning held by the seven organizational groups.
One of the most obvious differences which is suggested by
the data is a "management-worker" difference. A small, but
very consistent, difference in mean scores is highlighted
if, leaving aside for the moment the Program Advisory
Council Group, we array the three management groups
together (Executive Committee, District and Home Office
Managers) and the three non-management groups together
(Legal, Data Processing and Non-supervisory). The manage
ment groups give consistently more favorable scores to all
of the concepts involved.
An interesting aspect of this management-worker
array is the place of the Program Advisory Council in this
regard. The Program Advisory Council is especially
interesting because it has a basically worker membership,
but its members have been given the opportunity to "parti
cipate" in the affairs of management, the Program Advisory
Council data would seem to indicate the persuasive power of
even partial participation. The data strongly suggest that
the Program Advisory Council is very similar to the
management groups in its conception of the meanings of
these terms. In fact, the Program Advisory Council would
appear to share more meaning with the Executive Committee
than the Home Office Managers share with the Executive
Committee.
TABLE 5
MEAN SCORES BX CONCEPT, ORGANIZATIONAL
GROUP AND DIMENSIONS OF MEANING
Concepts*
Exec
Comm
Dist
Mgrs
Home
Off
Mgrs
PAC Legal DP
Non-
Sup
Communication Ev 2.96
2.75
3.00 2.5JT 3.22
2.95 3.39
Pot 3.93 3.75
3.72 3.66
3.95 3.95
3.78
Act 2.71 2.90 3.06 3.23 3.37
3.76
3.24
Participation Ev 2.65 2.78 3.16
2.73 3.45 3.19
3.18
Pot 3.00
2.95 3.00 2.97 3.32 3.42 3.72
Act 2.36
2.35
2.36
2.39
3.00 3.18 2.90
Coordination Ev 3.37 3.18
3.95 3.19 3.97 3.46 3.64
Pot 4.14 3.95 4.06 3.85 3.84
3.62
3.64
Act 2.62 2.80 3.10 3.16 3.49 3.64 3.15
Hierarchy Ev 4.19 4.17 4.19 3.74 3.56 3.62 4.08
Pot 4.10 3.80
3.71 3.55
3.60
3.57 3.15
Act 4.36 3.60 3.36 3.46 3.47
3.62 3.40
Authority Ev 3.20
3.14 3.71 3.32 3.46 3.47
3.61
Pot 3.69 3.65 3.70
3.47 3.31 3.73
3.36
Act 2.29 2.30
3.44 2.71 3.03
3.30 2.96
Management Ev 2.71 2.90 3.21
2.77 3 *44 3.55 3.72
Pot 4.21 3.25 3.56
3.34
3.81
3.59
3.50
Act** -
— — — — —
The Fund Ev 2.83 2.82 3.28
2.97 3.90
3.39
3.68
Pot 3.71 3.12
3.37 3.33
3.88.
3.95 3.24
Act 2.86 3.18
2.94 3.19 3.79 3.74 3.54
* The three concepts of the Personal group have
been omitted from this table.
** Due to an error in construction of the semantic
differential, no activity data were collected
for the concept, "Management.*1
177
The apparent differences between the Program
Advisory Council and the Non-supervisory group are surpris
ing to this researcher in view of the manner of selection
of the Non-supervisory group. Each Program Advisory
Council member selected a "typical, non-supervisory" member
of his or her district or home office department to respond
to the semantic differential. This is an obviously biased
method of selection, and should tend to produce a non-
supervisory sample which reflects many of the biases of
the Program Advisory Council members who selected them.
Therefore, we would suspect that the typical non-
supervisory Fund member is more "negative" than the data
would indicate.
The tendency for potency scores to be relatively
low which we noticed in the data of Table 4 is also evident
in Table $. Table 5 does not, however, suggest an
explanation as we hoped it would. The tendency towards low
potency scores is evident in the data for each of the
organizational groups.
Once again in Table 5 we note the preference (lower
mean scores) for participative concepts over hierarchical
concepts which we noted in Tables 3 and 4* The relatively
strong showing of this group is due in part to the very low
mean scores attributed to the concept "participation" in
the data of the management groups (Executive Committee,
District Managers, Home Office Managers and Program
17S
Advisory Council). Of the twelve scores given to this con
cept- by the four management groups, eleven of them are 3*00
or lower. The average of the twelve scores given to this
concept by the management groups is approximately 2.72.
The corresponding average for the three worker groups is
approximately 3*26. This certainly does not indicate a
rejection of participation by the worker groups, but their
acceptance of the term is more cautious and restrained.
In fact, it can be said that the worker groups are
characterized by mid-range mean scores. They do not seem
to have many very low means nor many high means. Of the
thirty-three means of 3.00 or below in Table 5 only four
are worker data. Of the nine means of 4.00 or higher only
one is worker data. This mid-range tendency can be
attributed to several causes, but three possible causes
seem of special interest to this author. First, it seems
probable that the mid-range scores may accurately repre
sent a relative lack of involvement on the part of worker
groups. These concepts may not, in fact, have the depth of
emotional or affective meaning for workers that they have
for management. To the extent that conceptualizing is an
important function for managers, but not a function for
workers, the meaning of concepts will be more real, vivid
and important to managers.
Secondly, the mid-range tendency might be more
accurately explained if we conceptualize the two groups as
179
participant and non-participant rather than management and
worker. One of the primary assumptions of this research is
that the movement toward a participative style in the Fund
started at the top and that most of the participation has
taken place at the top. Seen in this light, the relative
strength of the management responses could be one of the
effects of participation. One of the selling points of
participation is that participants care more than non
participants .
Thirdly, the mid-range tendencies of the worker
groups may reveal a degree of fear or mistrust on the part
of the workers. It may be that the mildly "positive”
responses (3*00-4.00) are seen as "safe” by the workers.
By themselves the data do not necessarily lead us to this
conclusion, but the experience of gathering the data would
indicate that fear and mistrust may have biased the data,
particularly in the Legal Department. Legal Department
respondents were more likely to "forget” to include bio
graphical data such as age or number of years employed by
the Fund which could be used to identify them. They also
displayed high levels of frustration by checking the mid
point of the scale (4.00) on all of their answers much more
often than any other group. This group was also much more
likely to question the researcher’s "credentials" and the
uses that were to be made of the data.
On the whole, these data reveal a rather positive,
ISO
progressive climate in the Fund. The Fund has every right
to be proud of its accomplishments. However, there are
suggestions of potential problems. The data indicate that
some of the interfaces between groups might be difficult.
The fact that the data for the Program Advisory
Council closely resembles the data of the Executive
Committee is both a sign of success and a potential prob
lem. The concordance between these two groups may pose a
status problem for the District and Home Office Managers.
These data would indicate that this is especially true for
the Home Office Managers. The showing of the Program
Advisory Council is a potential problem of a different kind
when we contrast their scores with the scores of the Non-
supervisory group. This contrast demonstrates both the
significant progress of Program Advisory Council and the
unfinished, perhaps even unstarted, work with the "masses"
of the organization.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
131
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APPENDIX
FACSIMILE OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
Age
Sex Male Female.
Number of years employed by the Fund
circle one: 1. less than 3
2. 3 to 5
3.
5 to 10
4.
10 to 15
5. 15 to 20
6. 20 to 25
7. more than 25
Number of years of formal schooling
Highest degree or diploma attained
circle one: 1. high school
2. two year college
3. four year college
4. master’s degree
5. law degree (L.L.B. or J.D.)
6. doctoral degree
7. other ____________ _____
(please specify)
To what extent are you an active participant in the
California State Compensation Insurance Fund and, therefore,
able to influence those organizational decisions which will
influence your work-day life?
I ____________L ___________ ±------------------ I ------------------ L
not moderately very
influential influential influential
How happy are you with your work and with the Fund as a
place to work?
J____________ I ____________ L
very unhappy neutral happy very
unhappy happy
INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of this study is to measure the meanings of
certain things to various people by having them judge
them against a series of descriptive scales. In taking
this test, please make your judgments on the basis of what
these things mean to vou. On each page of this booklet
you will find a different concept to be judged and beneath
it a set of scales. You are to rate the concept on each
of these scales in order.
190
Here is how you are to use these scales:
If you feel that the concept at the top of the page is very
closely related to one end of the scale, you should place
your check-mark as follows:
fair__x :____:____:____:____:____:____ unfair
or
fair :____:___:____:____:____: x unfair
If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to
one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you
should place your check-mark as follows:
strong ____: x :____:____:____:____:___ weak
or
strong ___:____:____'____:____: x :___ weak
If the concept seems only slightly related to one side as
opposed to the other side (but is not really neutral), then
you should check as follows:
active ___ :____ : x :____:____:____:___ passive
or
active ___ :____:____:____: x :____:___ passive
The direction toward which you check, of course, depends
upon which of the two ends of the scale seem most charac
teristic of the thing you’re judging.
If you consider the concept to be neutral on the scale,
both sides of the scale equally associated with the concept,
or if the scale is completely irrelevant, unrelated to the
concept, then you should place your check-mark in the
middle space:
safe ___:____:____: x_:____:____:____ dangerous
Important: (1) Place your check-marks in the middle of
spaces, not on the boundaries:
THIS NOT THIS
« Y • • • • v
[ [ | * A • • _______ • • A
(2) Be sure you check every scale for every
concept— do not omit any.
(3) Never put more than one check-mark on a
single scale.
191
Do not look back and forth through the items. Do not try
to remember how you checked similar items earlier in the
test. Make each item a separate and independent judgment.
Work at fairly high speed through this test. Do not worry
or puzzle over individual items. It is your first
impressions, the immediate "feelings" about the items, that
we want. On the other hand, please do not be careless,
because we want your true impressions.
# a}: # s{c #
The concepts which are being looked at in this study have
been selected from literature about organizations. It is
possible that some of them may have more than one meaning.
Please remember that we are interested in those meanings
which are most appropriate in an organizational context.
192
HIERARCHY
constrained ___:____:____:____:____:____:___ free
active :____:____:____:____• ' ____• * ___ passive
changeable ____ :____:____:____:____:____ stable
high :____:____:____:____:____:___ low
intuitive ___ :____:____:____:____:____:___ rational
cooperative ___:____:____:____:____:____:____competitive
relaxed :____:____:____:____:____:___ tense
weak :____:____:____:____:____:___ strong
simple :____:____:____:____:____:___ complex
orthodox :____:____:____:____:____:___ heretical
193
COMMUNICATION
valuable ___:____ :____:____:----:---:---- worthless
boring :____ :____:____:____:___* • ____ interesting
meaningless ___ :____ :____:____:____:---:----meaningful
complex ___ •____ •____:____:----:---;---- simple
loud :____ :____:----:----:---:---- soft
clear :____ :____:____:____* • ___;____ confused
dishonest ___ :____:____•____•____:---:---- honest
unintentional___•____•____•____' • ____:___• . . .---intentional
complete : ; « • — •--- incomplete
feminine ___ " ■ ____•____•____■____•___:____masculine
194 -
AMBIGUITY
light :____;____:____:----:----:---- heavy
complex •____ ' •____:----•----:----:---- simple
clear » « • * — •--- *-------— hazy
meaningless ___ :____ :____:____:----:----:--- meaningful
unintentional____:____ •____ •____:----:----:---- intentional
formless ' * ■ •----•----•----formed
calm :____ :____:____:____:----:---- agitated
transparent ___ :____ :____:____:----:----:---- opaque
tangible ___ •____ :____:____•____•____•____ intangible
harmonious ___ :____:____:____ •____:----:---- dissonant
I
AUTHORITY
195
cruel
soft
valuable
weak
changeable .
competitive.
progressive.
passive
severe
heretical .
kind
hard
worthless
strong
stable
cooperative
regressive
active
lenient
orthodox
196
PARTICIPATION
passive » _: . . . — • :_— •----:--- active
worthless ___ ' • ____:____:____:____:----:--- valuable
honest :____:____:____:____:____:___ dishonest •
unsuccessful____:____:____:____•____:----:--- successful
competitive : : t ’ • • ----*--- cooperative
meaningful ___:____ :____:____:____* • ____:--- meaningless
constrained ___ :____ :____:____:___ ____:---- free
negative ___:____ :____:____•____:----:--- positive
intentional ___ :____:____:____:____:____* • _unintentional
strong : : ;____' • •____•___weak
197
SELF-DISCLOSURE
unpleasant ___ :____:____:____:____:____:___ pleasant
dishonest ___:____:____ :____:____:____ honest
active :____:____:____:____:____:___ passive
sick :____:____:____:____:____:___ healthy
relaxed :____:____:____:____:____:___ tense
happy :____ :____:____:____:____:___ sad
public :____:____:____:____:____:___ private
painful :____:____:____:____:____:____pleasurable
free :____:____:____:____:____:___ constrained
intentional ___ :____:____: :____: __ unintentional
19$
MANAGEMENT
reputable ___ :____ :____:____:____:____:__disreputable
severe :____ :____:____:____:____:__lenient
unsuccessful ___ :____ :____:____:____:____:__successful
cooperative ___ :____ :____: : :___:____competitive
dishonest : _ : ;____: :___;___ honest
regressive ___ :____:____:____:____:____:____ progressive
weak :____:____:____:____:____:___ strong
sensitive ___ :____:____:____:____:____:___ insensitive
divisive ___:____:____:____:____:____:___ cohesive
fair :____:____:____:____:____:___ unfair
COORDINATION
199
harmonious
intentional
incomplete
soft
awkward
complex
intuitive
constrained
active
cooperative
. dissonant
. unintentional
complete
hard
graceful
simple
rational
free
passive
competitive
200
INTIMACY
strong ___ :____ :____:____• * ____:____• * ___ weak
passive ___ :____ :____:____:____:____:___active
graceful ___:____ :____:____:____:____:___ awkward
stable ___:____:____:____:____:________ changeable
int ent ional____:___ :____:____:____:____ : unint enti onal
humorous ___ :____ :____:____:____:____:___ serious
complete ___ :____:____:____:____:____:___ incomplete
pleasant ___:____:____:____:____:____:___ unpleasant
dishonest ____: :____:____:____:____:___ honest
sensitive ___ :____:____:____:____:____:____ insensitive
201
THE FUND
heavy :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ light
bad :____:____:____:____ :___:___ good
active ___ :____:_______ :__:____:____ passive
feminine ___ :____:____:____:____ :___:___ masculine
complete ___ :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ incomplete
closed ___ :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ open
excitable ___ :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ calm
soft :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ hard
positive ___ :____:____:____:____ :___:____ negative
rigid :____:____:___ :____ :___:___ flexible

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Asset Metadata

Creator Connerley, Edwin Francis (author)

Core Title Participative Management And Industrial Democracy: Toward A Participative Theory Of Organization

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Gardner, Neely (committee chair), Berg, Larry R. (committee member), McEachern, Alexander W. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-819107

Unique identifier UC11363178

Identifier 7409062.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-819107 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7409062

Dmrecord 819107

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Connerley, Edwin Francis

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA