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An Analysis Of United States International Relations Before And During Limited War

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An Analysis Of United States International Relations Before And During Limited War

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Content ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BEFORE AND DURING LIMITED WAR by Wayne Richard Martin A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (International Relations) August 1970 71-12,HOI •:A?.TI)I, Uaync Richard, lOHT- AE AEALYSIG OF RETTED STATIC IETERYATIOEA 1 P.ELATIOIS BEFORE ARE DOT,TAG LJGITED AAR. University of Southern California, Ih.r'., 1070 Eol.itical Science, international lav; and relations University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan copyright by WAYNE RICHARD MARTIN 1971 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA T H E G R A D U A T E S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y P A RK LO S A N G E L E S , C A L IF O R N IA 8 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by Wayne Richard Martin under the direction of Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by alt its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Gradu ate School, in partial fulfillment of require- metfts of the deyree of D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y f n<u±o f Dean Date August - - 2 6 - , - - - - 1 - 9 - 7 0 ik^;rtation co mm it tee Ilf 'ikthJb. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There have been a number of people who have offered encouragement, advice, and direction throughout the progress of this study. Dr. Charles A. McClelland, who has provided guidance and instruction for so many years, has given all three. Dr. Robert A. Young has done the same. I would also like to thank the many others who offered aid along the way, and especially Miss Sherry A. Christensen. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................ LIST OF TABLES ................................ Chapter I. THE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR IN THE NUCLEAR A G E .................................... Limited War and the International System International Conflict and Change Within the International System II. LIMITED WAR PROPOSITIONS ............. Limited War and the International System Limited War and Regional Relations Limited War and Relations with Selected Nations Summary III. THE EVENT/INTERACTION APPROACH FOR DATA ANALYSIS ............................. The Selection of the Korean and Vietnam Study Years Interaction Data Data Collection Procedures Chapter Page IV. UNITED STATES SYSTEM RELATIONS 139 Examination of Propositions IA and IB Examination of Propositions IIA and IIB Examination of Propositions IIIA and IIIB General Discussion V. UNITED STATES REGIONAL RELATIONS . . . . 247 Examination of Propositions IVAf IVBf and V Examination of Propositions VIA, VIB, and VII Examination of Propositions VIIIA, VIIIB, and IX General Discussion VI. UNITED STATES NATIONAL RELATIONS . . . . 330 Examination of Propositions XA, XB, and XI Examination of Propositions XIIA, XIIB, and XIII Examination of Propositions XIVA, XIVE General Discussion VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 415 BIBLIOGRAPHY v 465 133 142 145 146 150 153 157 158 161 162 163 LIST OF TABLES WEIS Code .................................... Profile of United States International Behavior, 1949 and 1951 ................ The United States as an Actor, Rank Change from 1949 to 1951 ......................... The Allocation of United States Behavior Toward High, Medium, and Low Frequency Targets by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 and 1951 ............................. Profile of United States International Behavior, 1963 and 1966 ................ The United States as an Actor, Rank Change from 1963 to 1966.......................... Profile of International Relations toward the United States, 1949 and 1951 The United States as a Target, Rank Change from 1949 to 1951.......................... Profile of International Behavior toward the United States, 1963 and 1966 The Allocation of Behavior Received by the United States from High, Medium, and Low Frequency Actors by Percent of Total Acts, 1963 and 1966 ............................. The United States as a Target, Rank Change from 1963 to 1966 ....................... v Table 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward Inter national System Members by Percent of Total Acts,' 1949 .......................... The United States as an Actor, 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ................... United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward Inter national System Members by Percent of Total Acts, 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 The United States as an Actor, 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ................... United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward and from International System Members by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 ...................... The United States as a Target, 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ................... United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior Received from International System Members by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 and 1951 ............. The United States as a Target, 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ................... Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as an Actor— 1949 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as an Actor— 1951 vi Page 171 174 177 178 181 182 184 187 198 205 Table Page 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. The United States as an Actor by Combevent Correlation Matrix, 1949 and 1951 . . . 208 Coefficient of Congruence, The United States as an Actor, Orthogonally Rotated Factor Matrices Compared, 1949, 1951 ... . 212 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as an Actor— 1963 . 215 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as an Actor--1966 . 218 Coefficient of Congruence, The United States as an Actor, Orthogonally Rotated Factor Matrices Compared, 1963 and 1966 . . . 221 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as a Target— 1949 . 227 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as a Target— 1951 . 229 Coefficient of Congruence, The United States as a Target, Orthogonally Rotated Factor Matrices Compared, 1949, 1951 . . . . 231 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as a Target— 1963 . 233 Factor Analysis of 22 Combevent Categories for the United States as a Target— 1966 . 235 Coefficient of Congruence, The United States as a Target, Orthogonally Rotated Factor Matrices Compared, 1963, 1966 . . . . 237 United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward International System Members and toward Eastern European Nations by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 . 252 vii Table Page 34. The United States as an Actor toward Eastern Europe in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory Behavior.............................253 35. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward Eastern European Nations by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 and 1963 255 36. The United States as an Actor toward Eastern Europe in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . 257 37. Eastern European Adversary Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward and from the United States by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 ............. 260 38. The United States as a Target of Eastern Europe in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . 262 39. The United States as a Target of Eastern Europe in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . 264 40. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and Eastern European Adversaries, 1949 and 1951 268 41. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and Eastern European Adversaries, 1963 and 1966 269 42. Comparison between United States Coopera tive, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward NATO and Eastern European Nations, by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 . 274 viii Table 43. The United States as an Actor toward NATO in 1949 and 19 51, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . 44. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward NATO Allied by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 and 1963 ................................. 45. The United States as an Actor toward NATO in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . 46. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward and from NATO Nations by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 ............................. 47. The United States as a Target of NATO in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . 48. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward NATO Nations by Percent of Total Acts, 1949 and 1963 .......................... 49. The United States as a Target of NATO in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. 50. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and NATO Members, 1949 and 1951 ................................ 51. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and NATO Members, 1963 and 1966 ................................ Page 275 276 278 281 282 284 285 288 288 ix Table 52. The United States as an Actor toward U.S. Aid Recipients in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory Behavior .......................... 53. The United States as an Actor toward U.S. Aid Recipients in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory Behavior .......................... 54. The United States as a Target of U.S. Aid Recipients in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . 55. The United States as a Target of U.S. Aid Recipients in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . 56. The United States as an Actor toward SEATO in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior 57. The United States as a Target of SEATO in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. 58. The Relative Frequency of United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory Relations toward Selected Regional Groupings and the International System, 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 ............. 59. The Relative Frequency of Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Relations toward the United States from Selected Regional Groupings and the International System, 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 . . 60. The United States as an Actor toward Far East Asia in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior . Page 292 293 295 297 298 300 302 304 309 x Table Page 61. The United States as an Actor toward South East Asia in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 310 62. The United States as a Target of Far East Asia in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 312 63. The United States as a Target of South East Asia in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 314 64. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and Far East Asia, 1949 and 1951.......................... 316 65. Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and South East Asia, 1963 and 1966 .......................... 316 66. Correlation Matrix for United States Regional Relations during Nonwar and Limited War Periods, 1949-1951, 1963-1966 ............................. 320 67. United States Cooperative, Conflictual and Participatory Relations toward Selected Regional Groups of Nations, 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 324 68. Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Relations toward the United States from Selected Regional Groups of Nations, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 .................. 326 69. The Conflictual Balance in United States Regional Relations, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 .................................... 328 Table Page 70. The United States as an Actor toward the Soviet Union in 1949 and 1961, Coopera tive, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior...........................333 71. The United States as an Actor toward Communist China in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory B e h a v i o r ................. 335 72. The United States as an Actor toward the Soviet Union in 1963 and 1966, Coopera tive, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior........................... 338 73. The United States as an Actor toward Communist China in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Partici patory B e h a v i o r ................. 340 74. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward the Soviet Union and Communist China, by Percent of Total Acts, 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 ............................ 342 75. The United States as a Target of the Soviet Union in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 346 76. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward and from the Soviet Union by Percent of Total Action, 1949 347 77. The United States as a Target of Communist China in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 348 xii Table 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. Page The United States as a Target of the Soviet Union in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 349 The United States as a Target of Communist China in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior 351 United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior Received from the Soviet Union and Communist China by Percent of Total Acts, 1949, 1951, 1963 and 1966 353 The Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and Communist China, 1949 and 1951 . ... 356 The Conflictual Balance in Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and Communist China, 1963 and 1966 . ... 357 The United States as an Actor toward the United Kingdom in 1949 and 1951, Coopera tive, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior.................................... 361 The United States as an Actor toward France in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. 362 The United States as an Actor toward Canada in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. 364 The United States as an Actor toward the United Kingdom in 1963 and 1966, Coopera tive, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior.................................... 365 xiii Page 367 369 370 372 375 376 378 379 380 382 The United States as an Actor toward France in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . The United States as an Actor toward Canada in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . The United States as an Actor toward Japan in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflic tual, and Participatory Behavior . United States Cooperative, Conflictual, Participatory Behavior toward Selected Ally Nations by Percent of Total Acts 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 ................ The United States as a Target of the United Kingdom in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior The United States as a Target of France in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, Participatory Behavior ................ The United States as a Target of Canada in 1949 and 1951, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. The United States as a Target of the United Kingdom in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior The United States as a Target of France in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. The United States as a Target of Canada in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. xiv Table Page 97. The United States as a Target of Japan in 1963 and 1966, Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior ............. 384 98. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior Received from Selected Ally Nations by Percent of Total Acts, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 . . . . 385 99. The Conflictual Balance in United States Relations with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 ..................................... 388 100. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Behavior toward and from South Korea, 1951........................ 393 101. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Interactions with South Korea and Other Selected Nations, 1951 . 395 102. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Interactions with South Vietnam and Other Selected Nations, 1966 .................................... 400 103. United States Cooperative, Conflictual and Participatory Interactions with North Korea and Other Selected Nations, 1951 . 404 104. United States Cooperative, Conflictual, and Participatory Interactions with North Vietnam and Other Selected Nations, 1966 408 xv CHAPTER I I I THE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE ! The phenomenon of limited war is not unique to the nuclear age, but since the introduction of nuclear weapons into military forces, international conflicts where the ; belligerents fight with less than a total commitment of i | military capabilities for limited but well defined objec- | tives have become very important foreign policy considera tions for modern nations.1 Limited war in the nuclear age has manifested itself in the vastly changed post-World War II international environment in such a way that contem porary limited war should probably be conceived of and examined as a special type of international conflict. The atomic age, the East-West cold war, and the ! | rapid increase in the number of independent often socially, economically, and politically underdeveloped ex-colonial Charles E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 1-4. Osgood identifies, for example, the Seven Years War (1756-63), as a good example of limited war in 18th Century Europe. 1 I nations have combined to create conditions and kinds of i events not present before 194 5. John Herz has noted that concepts in international relations, though pos sibly applicable to broad periods of time and large parts of the globe, still reflect changing conditions. They cease to be applicable where structures change fundamentally. . . .^ Herz suggests that since 1945 the structure of the inter national system has changed mainly as a result of the I introduction of nuclear weapons and technological change I | in general. The permeability of nations, including the I most technically advanced and militarily powerful, has placed restrictions on the behavior of nations during periods of both peace and war. As Herz has stated, "per meability presages the end of the traditional protective 3 function of state power ..." In addition to the introduction of atomic weapons, the factors of communist world revolution and the wide spread expansion of nationalism have challenged traditional 2 John H. Herz, International Politics m the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 9. 3 Ibid., p. 22. j interstate relations.^ The contemporary international i ( system, concluded Herz, "shows that policy, military and foreign, can no longer be mono-emphatic in the nuclear age, that is concerned with one chief aim and one chief strategy 5 only, as policy could be in the preatomic age." The impact of this condition is that any major international crisis or conflict will have a multitude of reactions both I within nations and in the international system, in general, which will very likely be different from the impact of international crises and conflicts in the pre-World War II periods. Modern limited war since 1945 has been a direct consequence of a new international system. Nuclear weapons have restricted the use of force by the major powers, the instability of a large number of the newly independent and highly nationalistic states has provided the conditions for i confrontation and conflict among nations and the underlying ^For a discussion of the impact of a new inter national condition on international law and organization, see Inis Claude, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1968); and Oliver Lissitzyn, "International Law in a Divided World," International Conciliation, 542 (March 1963), 37-62. 5 Herz, op. cit., p. 33. ! 1 ! 4 | cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States j i has prevented simple unilateral or cooperative multilateral i 1 I i control of foreign area conflict. While nuclear weapons I i ' | have tended to deter the major powers from direct conflict, | war has been common in the less developed areas of the j i world. John Burton has suggested that "the typical form of international conflict in the second half of the twen tieth century consists of rivalry over the underdeveloped areas,"*’ and the results of several studies of post-World War II international conflict indicate that the less developed areas of the world are indeed the most prone to 7 conflict. Disruptions in the less-developed world have given rise to the type of limited war common to the contemporary international system. Although it is fully conceivable **John W. Burton, Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 16. ^See, for example, Aerospace Systems Analysis Study Team "Key Variables Relevant to Military Conflict," Vol. I, Summary Report: Handbook of Regional Conflict/Commitment Systems, 1972-1985 (Huntington Beach, Calif.: McDonnell Douglas Corp., MDAC-Western Division, July 1969); Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building and Using Military Power in a World at War (Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969); United Nations Associa tion of the United States of America, "Controlling Con- flicts in the lgTO's" (1969), p. 13._________________________ ! 5 j j that a limited war could be fought in Western Europe even i with the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, it has I been the expansion of local turmoil and small wars in less-developed areas that have brought the attention and | occasionally the participation of major nations into local conflicts and created what we call limited wars. These local conflicts have drawn the attention of major powers, I according to the conflict analysts Barringe and Ramers, I largely because of conditions in the international system itself. They note that the Vietnam war provides an excel lent example of the limited war phenomenon which, because of changed conditions, is "as different from the great interstate conflict of this century as were these from Q their own pre-Napoleonic forebears ..." The separation of the limited war phenomenon from more traditional concepts of war and from general nuclear i war is clear, although it has taken the experience of j several limited conflicts and a number of theoretical Richard E. Barringe with Robert K. Ramers, The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study, prepared in part for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1967), pp. 3-4. I writings to reach an acceptable definition of limited 9 war. Several theorists have written on the topic, but i i the following discussion by Bernard Brodie is useful as J a brief reference for a general understanding of limited j war in the post-World War II international system. What distinguishes limited war from total war? The answer is that limited war involves an impor tant kind and degree of restraint-deliberate re straint. As a rule, we do not apply the term "limited war" to conflicts which are limited naturally by the fact that one or both sides lack the capability to make them total (for example, the colonial war in Algeria). We generally use it to refer to wars in which the United States on the one side and the Soviet Union or Communist China on the other may be involved, perhaps directly but usually through proxies on one or both sides. In such wars, the possibility of total or unrestricted conflict is always present as an obvious and immediately available alterna tive to limited operations. That is why we must emphasize the factor of deliberate restraint. The restraint must also be massive. One basic restraint always has to be present if the term "limited war" is to have any meaning at all: strategic bombing of cities with nuclear weapons must be avoided. . . .10 9 . . . For an excellent bibliography of early limited war writings, see Morton H. Halperin, Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and an Annotated Bibliography (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962). ^Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 309-310. 7 I ! Brodie has noted that limited war, although not a completely new concept of international conflict, had by j 1959 developed certain implicit meanings applicable to j modern international conditions. While strategic bombing j on a selected scale might be included in the conduct of | limited war, such a use of nuclear weapons is "not gen erally included in the concept of the term limited war." I I Furthermore, Brodie has noted that the deliberate restraint from using the massive forces available to a major nation makes modern limited war different from anything that has ; happened in the recent past. While nations in the twen- i tieth century have refrained from using all of their poten- i tial strength in war "usually from a lack of incentive," these nations, until after 1945, have not normally ! j restrained their use of available military power. As Brodie suggested in his study, massive retalia tion and other strategic doctrines of the atomic age may not have lessened the probability of nations going to war. i Korea, Vietnam, and numerous less "spectacular" limited j wars have been common since 1945. Morton Halperin and ! others have suggested that while conflict has been common i I - t : 11Ibid., pp. 310-311. even in the nuclear age, the concept of limited war has I been slow to evolve and it has been only recently that both the public and decision-makers have understood that limited 12 war is very different from past international conflict. Limited objectives, restricted battlefield operations in i ! a local area, the use of specified types of weapons, and circumscribed military and foreign policies and actions have come to be accepted limited war parameters. Seymour Deitchman explains: . . . In the evolution of the limited war idea, such warfare was at first conceived as direct, small scale, and localized— the term "brush-fire | war" gained currency. It was imagined that a | "limited war" could be fought with "fire brigades," as a sort of minor protective action. And yet this view was contradicted by the Korean war it self. It was a "limited war," but it was not a small war. It had profound effect on our use of j natural resources and our international position. I . . . Other wars, long and hard fought, also gave | the lie to the "brush-fire" i d e a . After the Korean experience it became clear that while it might be difficult to conceptually accept limited I war as a viable national policy it was even more difficult 1 12 ■ Halperin, op. cit., p. 1. 13 j Deitchman, op. cit. , p. 2. i i I ______________________________________________ 9 ! to actually conduct such a war. Almost all theorists and practitioners viewed limited war as a type of policy instrument which would not find easy public acceptance in | the United States. Furthermore, limited war came to be ! seen as a generally difficult strategy to conduct both on i l the battlefield and in overall United States foreign rela tions. Like a strategy of nuclear deterrence, it was conceded, however, that nations would implicitly work to keep limited any foreign area conflict with major nation ; involvement. Bernard Brodie makes this point below. Unfortunately, however, even in peripheral areas limited war is not going to be . . . easy to ! arrange. . . . We shall have to work very hard to keep it limited. We should be willing to limit objectives because we want to keep the war limited, and not the other way round. And we want to keep the war limited simply because fatal war as it would be fought today and in the j future against a well-armed army is simply too unthinkable, too irrational to be borne. Limited war has not, in fact, been a popular I undertaking in the United States. According to Halperin, | "the need for a capability and doctrine for fighting limited local wars was accepted slowly and reluctantly by Brodie, op. cit., p.313. 10 Americans in the postwar period."^"* It took a long time for the public and political analysts to recognize "a danger from local wars and a consequent need to develop a capability and doctrine to deal with that military prob- 16 lem." Charles Osgood recognized that not only did it i take time to accept the concept of limited war but that "in practice, the limitation of war is morally and emo- 17 tionally repugnant to the American people." Even more to the point, Admiral John Haynes noted in 1957 that an acceptance of limited warfare as an instrument in international relations will require some radical changes in American thinking. Limited wars are usually agonizing, drawn-out affairs and Americans are impatient about war. Limited wars never seem to get settled or settle anything.18 i Involvement in limited war has not been popularly received in the United States as experience in the wars in 15 Halperin, op. cit., p. 1. 16Ibid. ! 17osgood, op. cit., p. 13. i 18 John D. Haynes, Peripheral Strategy . . . Lit toral Tactics . . . Military Policy; Strategic Aspects i of World Political Geography (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 409. 11 ig Korea and Vietnam appear to testify. J And, while interest j in the consequences of limited war involvement on domestic international affairs have been great, there is growing :interest in the question of what impact limited war involvement has had on United States international rela- i i tions. Limited war is a highly political confrontation in the international system and there are signs that United i States' limited war involvement may have affected changes in its relations with other nations. Limited War and the International System The limited war concept that the objectives of a i (major nation involved in such a conflict are limited in ! jorder to reduce the threat of escalation into a general | nuclear war is especially important for contemporary inter national politics. This understanding has been one of the In a recent Harris Survey, Louis Harris com mented: 11. . . this dominant mood of pessimism also explains the ambivalence which has characterized the Ameri can people's feelings about the war over the past two or three years. At times, frustration about a war without end has led to support of bombings of North Vietnam. At other times, it has produced as many as 37 percent who want total jwithdrawal of U.S. troops 'as quickly as possible,'" in The Courier-Journal, October 6, 1969 (Harris reprint). 12 i main factors to shape United States' limited war policies and is the principal reason for the highly political nature of limited war. There are, however, other reasons why a nation attempts to limit war. These reasons as outlined below by Morton Halperin, have been ascribed to | specific national objectives. 1. The United States . . . whatever hopes its leaders may have for an ultimate transformation of Communist Society, is committed to seeking to stop the growth of the area under the control of Commu nist China. 2. When the major powers participate in a local war it is because of the expected political effects of doing so and not because of the direct payoff from battlefield success. . . . It is rather the political consequences of losing or gaining territory that are the major concern of the two sides in committing their forces, their j materiel, or their prestige in a local war. | j 3. Another major political-effects objective in a local war is to demonstrate, to other coun- I tries in the area, which way the tide is running. The manner in which the United States responds to Communist aggression in Indochina, for example, effects the orientation of Thailand, the Philip- j pines, other Asian nations. i 4. Though the ramifications of the outcome | of a local war are likely to be felt most keenly i in the immediate geographic area of the battle, i the implications may also be world-wide, i To some extent the policy makers themselves i of the major powers will be conscious of the political effects of local war, but in addition ! both their allies and the neutral nations will | continually bombard them with advice, suggestions, and other forms of pressure. 13 ! j The ability of allied countries to influence American policy in a local-war situation will in part depend on their general relationship with the United States. The British have exercised a major influence on American local-war policy during the entire postwar period. . . . On the other hand, the extent of influence of any par ticular allied country will be affected by whether or not it is engaged in the combat.20 j The suggestion of these points is that limited war is a complex phenomenon in the contemporary international i system and that to understand the impact and meaning of a limited war requires much more than a simple statement , that limited wars are a product of the atomic age and are | limited to avoid the possible outbreak of a general nuclear war. It is, of course, not a new idea that par- ] ticipation in war affects a nation's international and j ; domestic affairs. Clausewitz noted long ago that "the i j nature of war is diverse" and "the greater and more power- i ; j ful the motives for war, the more they affect the whole ! 21 existence of the nations involved ..." Samuel Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), pp. 4, 5, 8. Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics, and Power, trans. and ed. by Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Henry | Reginery Company, 1962), p. 84. t 14 Huntington has noted more recently that military policy, let alone war, has a complex function in international and 22 domestic affairs. ] The relationship between conflict and the affairs i of state are very important for the stability of the state t j and its international relations. That has been stated above in several ways, but in order to fully comprehend these relationships it must be shown empirically that there are links between international conflict and the international affairs of involved nations. There are i I I studies which have researched the effects of conflict on I i selected domestic and international affairs, and several ! i of these are referenced in various sections throughout this paper and presented to explain particular contentions about the association between limited war and disruptions and reallocations in the international system. In order to integrate these works into the analysis that follows, i | it will be helpful to consider several theoretical aspects of the impact of conflict on the international affairs of a major nation. i q q ! Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Stra- | tegic Progress in National Politics (New York: Columbia 1 University Press. 1961).____________________________________ 15 I j International Conflict and Change Within the International System j William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox have provided some important basic information on the relation ship between international relations as a system of inter actions among countries and conflict within this system. In the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, they have said the following: The substance of international politics is conflict and its adjustment among groups of people who acknowledge no common supreme authority. . . . The study of international relations has been developed by scholars who believe that the future is at most semi-determined and that scholarship can help men move toward a future of their own choice.23 < The important points here are that conflict is basic to i the international system, that there are identifiable ' patterns of international relations, and finally that knowledge of these patterns will be useful for understand ing and perhaps controlling future interstate conflict. The authors continue and discuss the extremely important ! 23 ! William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, "Inter national Politics," in International Encyclopedia of the i Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills, Vol. 8 (New York: | Macmillan Co., 1968), 51. 16 factors of change in the international system. j Both the Western state system as a whole and the j behavior of its constituent units are constantly changing. Identifying the major transformations j in the system is a central task for the scholar I who wishes to chart the limits of choice open to j the makers of public policy with specific value i preferences.24 j ! ! i The proposition that conflict affects social change can be found throughout the literature of the social sciences. As one sociologist suggests, conflict and potential conflict are considered important "since they i provide the dynamics of change.Lewis Coser has noted ; that: Elements that evade and resist the patterned structure of norms and the habitual balance of I power and interests may be considered harbingers I of the emergence of new and alternative patterns | emerging from an existing structure. Conflict j prevents the ossification of social systems by | exerting pressures for innovation and creativity. | . . . The clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups or I individuals feel ought to be, the conflict be tween vested interest groups and new strata 24Ibid., p. 51. 25 Lewis Coser, "Conflict: Social Aspects," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by ! David L. Sills, Vol. 3 (New York: The Macmillan Co., j 1968), 232-236. 17 demanding their share of wealth, power, and status are all productive of social vitality.26 Coser continues to say that social change can be analyzed only in relation to specified structures. This is why it is necessary to distinguish between the changes that take place within particular structures and changes that lead i to the decay of old structures and the emergence ! of new ones.^ Coser's statement when related to international politics suggests that a clear distinction can be made between international system change and periodic fluctuations within the international system. The advent of the atomic i ! age, the ending of colonialism and the rise of nationalism, i I and the East-West cold war have combined to effect the ! "decay of old structures and the emergence of new ones." The expectation is that the impact of a limited war in the | | contemporary international system affects more of a change within the system than a major restructuring of the inter- : national system. Limited war appears to be a consequence of a new international structure, and the manner in which nations cope with limited war will help to define the 26 Ibid., p. 235. 27Ibid., p. 234. contemporary international system. Following a similar conceptualization of social change, the political scientist Evan Luard has stated that ; "different systems bring different types of conflict arising from different causes."2® The implication is, as t i was noted earlier, that conflict in the contemporary international system is different from conflict in other former (or possibly future) international systems. Limited war today, for example, will produce affects unlike the affects of international conflict in previous international systems. Richard Rosecrance has suggested that one feature of the contemporary (post-World War II) international j system has been that "in the face of the thermonuclear j j threat, national actors themselves directly regulated their j OQ ; own disruptive conduct." Hence, strategic deterrence regulated by implicit controls pervades contemporary international politics. Limited war, too, fits well into | | the concept of national self-control over conflict, I or Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern I International System (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, I 1968) , p. 13. 29 | Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in | World Politics: International Systems in Perspective | (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 264.______ 19 especially by the major powers, for the reasons given earlier. The linkages between a nation's international affairs, its involvement in a limited war, and changes within the contemporary international system probably are highly integrated. John Burton has suggested that while conflict affects change it does so indirectly and through some type of filter mechanism. According to Burton, the reaction of nations to change is not a reaction to the change itself, "it is the perception by other nations of the nature of 30 change which determines their responses." The same change may be perceived differently by different nations, and differently by the same i nation at different times, and there may be a i variety of responses. . . . Although it is per- ! ception that is the stimulus to response, and not I the change, there are nevertheless categories of i change likely to be perceived as being delib erately injurious, and others not likely to be so perceived. While mindful of the role of percep tion, it is important from the point of view of policy to be able to differentiate between those actions which tend to provoke and those which i generally do not provoke retaliatory responses. 3^John W. Burton, Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 55. 31Ibid., pp. 55-56. 20 Conflict in the international system produces t changes in the relations of involved nations with other nations simply because involvement is perceived differently by various nations. Both positive and negative feedback can be expected from allies, enemies, and interested l I neutrals. It could be expected generally, for example, that during the period of United States involvement in I Vietnam, staunch allies of the United States came to its aid while enemies increased their verbal attacks. This is an empirical question which can be tested. I This discussion of limited war as a conflict I phenomena should not in any way be interpreted as placing i I particular value on conflict in the international system. Conflict and limited war need not be interpreted dialec- tically "as a necessary instrument of change and progress" I nor sociologically "as an instrument of social integra- ■ 3 2 . i tion." Rather the intent of this discussion is to raise j I I the question: Is conflict and, in particular, limited local war associated with changes within the international ! 32 Kenneth Boulding makes this point when discussing : the conflict theories of Hegel, Marx, Coser, and George ! Simmel in Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New j York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963) , p. 307. I 21 system? What happens to the international affairs of a major nation when it is involved in a limited local war is an important theoretical as well as practical question ! which deserves much more attention than that accorded it to date. j If it is true as J. David Singer has said that "the international system is essentially a conflictual ; rather than a harmonious one,1 1 ^ then it is especially important to study various aspects of international con flict. Since limited war is an essential part of the con- i temporary conflict environment and since it is generally I I accepted that limited wars will be a main feature of inter- i national conflict for at least the next decade,^4 the j relationship between limited war and changes within the I | international system should be well understood for both | | theoretical and policy needs. | 3 3 | J' >J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control, and j Disarmament; Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy j (Columbus, 0.: Ohio State University, 1962). j ^Bruce Russett notes, for example, that outside of J Latin America and Europe, "the prospects are for more con flict and new wars among the member states. The invita tion, and sometimes the necessity, for outside intervention is almost sure to remain for a long time to come," in International Regions and the International System: A Study of Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., j 1967), p. 205. CHAPTER II j LIMITED WAR PROPOSITIONS i : j To investigate properly the general hypothesis ! i that limited war is associated with changes in the inter national relations of an involved major nation, a system atic and rigorous analytic procedure must be followed. In this analysis an examination and comparison is made of two limited wars in which the United States was a direct participant. The Korean and Vietnam wars are studied with i event/interaction analysis, a method which is sensitive to i j changes in the direction, relative intensity, type, and I I balance of a nation's foreign relations. To conduct this j j i analysis guidelines were needed to focus the study proced- ! ure on a manageable set of research questions. On the following pages several propositions on limited war are ; discussed and listed. The propositions have been extracted i I j from the literature on limited war and will be examined j with the event/interaction analysis of Vietnam and Korean | war data. 22 23 The theoretical literature on limited war has provided enough information about limited war to permit a rigorous, although basically a descriptive, analysis to be accomplished. This study has been designed to take advan tage of the complementarity of exploratory, largely verbal exposition with quantitative data analysis.^ The proposi tions about limited war involvement presented in this chapter are useful guides for directing the empirical analysis of United States international relations during involvement in the Korean and Vietnam limited wars. In Chapter III, the procedure for linking quantitative inter- i national political analysis with the theoretical proposi- i tions on limited war is discussed. The study of the hypothesis that limited war is ' related to changes in the international relations of an involved major nation is an extension of the general interest in war-related change shared by a number of social I i | science scholars. The widespread disruptions in the For a discussion of different approaches to the ! study of international relations and the complementarity of these different approaches , see James N. Rosenau and Klaus Knorr (eds.), Contending Approaches to International I Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). I t I ___________________________________________ - __ _________________ CHAPTER II LIMITED WAR PROPOSITIONS To investigate properly the general hypothesis tnat limited war is associated with changes in the inter national relations of an involved major nation, a system atic and rigorous analytic procedure must be followed. In this analysis an examination and comparison is made of two limited wars in which the United States was a direct participant. The Korean and Vietnam wars are studied with event/interaction analysis, a method which is sensitive to changes in the direction, relative intensity, type, and balance of a nation's foreign relations. To conduct this analysis guidelines were needed to focus the study proced ure on a manageable set of research questions. On the following pages several propositions on limited war are discussed and listed. The propositions have been extracted from the literature on limited war and will be examined with the event/interaction analysis of Vietnam and Korean war data. 22 23 The theoretical literature on limited war has provided enough information about limited war to permit a rigorous, although basically a descriptive, analysis to be j accomplished. This study has been designed to take advan- I tage of the complementarity of exploratory, largely verbal [ exposition with quantitative data analysis.^- The proposi- | tions about limited war involvement presented in this chapter are useful guides for directing the empirical analysis of United States international relations during ! j involvement in the Korean and Vietnam limited wars. In i | Chapter III, the procedure for linking quantitative inter- i I I national political analysis with the theoretical proposi tions on limited war is discussed. The study of the hypothesis that limited war is related to changes in the international relations of an ! involved major nation is an extension of the general : interest in war-related change shared by a number of social j science scholars. The widespread disruptions in the For a discussion of different approaches to the ! study of international relations and the complementarity ! of these different approaches , see James N. Rosenau and ; Klaus Knorr (eds.), Contending Approaches to International j Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) . j affairs of nations which were associated with World Wars i 1 and II increased scholarly interest in modern war, and the uncertainties of the atomic age continue to raise | | questions and concern. The research that has been conducted on war-related i change as a consequence of World Wars I and II provides I I insight into how to approach the question of change asso- j ciated with contemporary limited war. Quincy Wright, who ! began research in 1926 on his classic work, A Study of I War, has noted that World War I shook the "general confi- | dence in the standards of world civilization as they had j ! been understood in the mid-nineteenth century," and sug gested that wars in general can be expected to be asso- 2 ciated with changes and "unanticipated results." Wright emphasized that the changes of war may be either positive | i or negative depending on a great number of factors, and i war, therefore "should be evaluated in a particular his- | | 2 i torical milieu." I 2 I Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Vol. I (Chicago: ! University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 271. I j 3Ibid., p. 270. i I I _______________________________________________________________________ 25 As Wright has noted, the environment in which a | war occurs is particularly important for determining what | changes can be expected to be associated with the con flict. Cultural anthropologists have suggested for some j time that war is a cultural phenomenon and, therefore, ! 4 ! derived from a particular set of conditions. Economists, | j too, have indicated that the degree and type of change I associated with a war will depend on the amount of mecha- j i nization and massiveness of the war potential and actual 5 i combat effort. ! 4 Bronislaw Malinowski. "War— Past, Present, and Future," in Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, War as a Social Institution: The Historian's Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941). | 5 I Economists more than any other group of social scientists have researched the impact of total war on national and international institutions. The massive re allocation of resources and costs of World War II and II created a whole new area of study for the field of econom- i ics. See, for example, Gaston Bouthaud, War, trans. from the French by Sylvia and George Lesson (New York: Walker j and Co., 1962); Simon Kuznets, National Product in Wartime ; (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., ; 1945); A. C. Pigou, The Political Economy of War (London: Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1940); Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of War (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968) (reprint of i 1938 article); and Emanuel Stein and Jules Blackman (eds.) , I War Economics (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1949). In the case of limited war, the relationship between war involvement and changes in the affairs of a ! major nation probably are not of the same degree as those changes associated with the total wars of the twentieth i ! century although, as Morton Halperin has noted, massive material resources may be absorbed in a limited war.6 The I { best indications of what changes might be associated with limited war come from theoretical books and essays, policy studies, and the few empirical analyses which are available i on the limited war phenomenon. i | A recent study by Bruce Russett offers a good ! indication that limited wars are indeed associated with changes in the affairs of nations but not of the same magnitude that total wars are. In an American Political i j Science Review article, Russett provided evidence to show i that the cost of defense during war periods (World War II and Korean) was associated with United States resource i ! allocations such that when expenditures by GNP categories, by function, and by governmental unit are compared for war Morton Halperin, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Introduction, pp. 1-10. L | 27 i and nonwar year periods for the United States, there is ; clear evidence that expensive war periods produce a reallocation of spending which "have severely hampered the nation in its attempt to build a healthier and better educated citizenry." Russett noted that "in general, the American experience has been that the consumer pays the most. Guns do come at the expense of butter."^ In the Vietnam case with the limited data avail- ; able, Russett did not find great resource deviations asso ciated with war and suggested that i | it is too soon to know how damaging the Vietnam ! war will be, but in view of past regularities one ] would anticipate significant costs. . . . We can ! already see the effect of the war on fixed capi tal formation . . .8 The conclusions of Russett*s study, while only giving cursory review to the Vietnam conflict and in the narrow view of money allocations, suggest that as in the case of ; total war (World War II) the limited wars in Korea and | Vietnam are also associated— but to a lesser degree— with I observable changes in the affairs of the involved major Bruce Russett, "Who Pays for Defense," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (June 1969), 412-427. 8Ibid., p. 421. j nations. I While the findings of this study do not come as a j , particular surprise, since various changing conditions i j within the United States including inflation and civil ! unrest have been said to be associated with limited war I q I involvement,* the study itself is a good example of how war-related change can be examined empirically. Russett Morton Halperin notes that "evidence from the Korean War and the war in Vietnam makes it clear that the conduct of a limited war would become an important domestic | political issue and would be influenced by domestic politi- : cal considerations. This is true, if for no other reason | than that local wars require the use of scarce resources— i resources that might otherwise be allocated . . ." in his Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown and j Co., 1967), p. 94. A recent CED report states, "The ori- j gins of the present (U.S.) inflation can be directly traced i to the sudden and excessive expansion in aggregate demand | that accompanied the buildup of the military conflict in j Vietnam after mid-1965 . . .," in "A Stabilizing Fiscal and I Monetary Policy for 1970," a Statement by the Program Com mittee of the Committee for Economic Development, New York, December, 1969, p. 5. Raymond Tanter suggests "the initial | escalation of the Vietnam war may be a primary cause of I breakdown in social order. Rates of increase in several ! important indicators of domestic turmoil are related to the escalation of the war. Based on past patterns, a policy of I further escalation abroad, by the new administration in Washington may result in an increase in the turmoil at home . . . ," in Tanter, "International War and Domestic Turmoil: Some Contemporary Evidence," in Hugh Davis ! Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Violence in America; Histori- | cal Comparative Perspectives, a Report to the National ! Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (June, | 1969) (New York: The American Library, 1969) , pp. 522-539. j 29 j demonstrated that data on United States defense expendi- i ture, GNP, investment, personal and government consumption, i and several other types of data describing resource alloca tion could be collected for war and nonwar periods, rigorously analyzed, and used to infer certain conclusions about the impact of war on the United States. I In another recent empirical study, further evi- ! dence was reported that raises some question about the I relationship between limited war involvement and major i j changes in the pattern of a nation's foreign affairs. | | Martin Miller and Harold Meinheit, two graduates students I j at the University of Southern California, investigated I with data for 1965 and 1966 the general hypotheses that the Vietnam war has affected certain changes in the inter national relations among nations within the Communist alliance system, within the Western alliance system, and between the two alliances.^® The conclusions of the study, while being tenta tive and as the authors note "basically a descriptive 10 Martin J. Miller and Harold Meinheit, "Behavioral Interaction in the Vietnam War: 1965 and 1966," School of Politics and International Relations, University of South ern California, June 1968. (Mimeographed) ! 30 j evaluation," are interesting. The analysis did not find, i for example, an expected shift in United States relations j away from Europe and toward the Pacific conflict area. i j Instead, "European allies received the great bulk of com- ! 11 mumcation from the United States"— fifteen times as j j much if bilateral United States-South Vietnamese inter- ! actions are expcepted— and even if those interactions are I included, over three times as much United States inter- ! action was directed toward Western Europe during the war t period. | This particular finding is important in that while I ! it surprised the researchers it is supportive of the j limited war theoretical proposition that during a limited j war the battlefield location is important, but of secondary i j importance to other geo-political considerations. Western i , European allies and Eastern European adversaries of the United States remain, even during local limited wars, the I | subject of paramount United States interest and one should not expect to find necessarily a preponderance of United States attention going to the Pacific area during the Vietnam war period. The data analyzed were, however, for 11Ibid., p. 28. I 31 i f j two early years when the United States was involved in the I ! Vietnam war, and the study did not examine changes in ! United States international relations from nonwar to limited war involvement periods. The results of this { study are then far from complete and the question still remains whether or not there was a change in United States political international relations with other members of the international system from before to during its involve- I ment in the Vietnam war. In order to examine United States international i relations during a limited war, propositions such as the belief that during limited war the United States becomes more involved with the nations local to the conflict are useful guides for an analysis. On the following pages, several propositions are listed which describe possible changes in United States political relations during limited | war involvement. These propositions represent major con cepts about limited war which have been extracted from statements by policy-makers, international relations theorists, and others concerned with international con flict. Our intention in the study is to rigorously examine these propositions with event/interaction data and then discuss how accurately these concepts about limited war 32 reflect the experience of the United States in the Korean and Vietnam wars. The propositions on limited war involvement have been separated into three distinct sections in this chap- | ter, each of which represents a very important feature of i j both limited war and the international relations of the I United States. The sections divide the general concept of j foreign relations into three categories or levels of ! analysis. The first level is the international system I level, the second is a geo-political region level, and the l | third is a nation level. These levels were chosen pri- i ! j marily because (1) the propositions on limited war are divided easily by these levels, (2) research methods are available which can operate readily within these three levels, and (3) a comprehensive analysis of limited war involvement can be offered with this three-level approach. J. David Singer noted several years ago that there are distinct benefits in observing system as well as individual nation behaviors. The system view, suggests Singer, "permits us to examine international relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity lost when our focus is shifted to a lower, more partial, level." A nation view, on the other hand, 33 permits significant differentiation among our actors in the international system. Because it does not require the attribution of great similarity to national actors, it encourages the observer to examine them in great detail.12 The effort to describe and study international relations j at several levels, especially if the questions and analyt- i ical procedures permit, allows for increased power over the research problem. ! As is noted below, the concept of system perspec- I tive has been modified slightly for this research. Special i ; operational definitions have been given to the concepts of ! system, region, and nation, and each of these is discussed j at length under the appropriate heading in this chapter. Limited War and the International System The study of international relations according to Charles A. McClelland "is bounded by the interest in con tact, exchange, and interaction," that occurs among inter- 12 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in James N. Rosenau, Inter national Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 20-29. 1 I 34 1 ? national entities. These exchanges among nations when ! conceived of as a whole are a complex system of interaction among a large number of social entities. The complete set of international relations among these entities make up the | international system. McClelland explains that "the con ception of the international system is an expanded version 14 ! of the notion of two-actors-in-interaction." The WHO i I did WHAT to WHOM relations of international relations when ; expanded from a two-actor model to all international actors i I describes the international system. McClelland explains i | the international system as a "view of the whole phenome- ! ! non." i The outermost boundaries of international relations are suggested if we imagine all of the exchanges, transactions, contacts, flows of information, and actions of every kind going on at this moment of time between and among the separately constituted societies of the world. To this picture in the mind we should add the effects created within 13 Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the Interna tional System (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966); see also, Charles A. McClelland, "General Systems and the Social Sciences," ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Vol. XVIII (February 1962), 449-468; and Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957). i | ‘ '■^McClelland, Theory and the International System, ! p. 20. t 35 j societies from all such interflowing events in I earlier times, both of the immediate and the more | remote past.15 | McClelland explains that neither time nor act limits the full conception of the international system i | when viewed in its most comprehensive form. Yet, to study t I a specific interest area within this system, perspective | boundaries must be defined and topical questions outlined. In this study the concept of international system structure and process have explicit reference. These conceptions i ; are given below to aid the reader in understanding the j meaning of system in this study. i ! International System Structure: All the units normally called nations, international govern mental organizations (UN, OAS, etc.), and quasi official organizations (Viet Cong, Biafra, etc.) which interact with other similar units are included in the International System. International System Processes: In this study ; the concept of system process will include only , (1) actions which are OUTPUT from the United States to any other international unit or to the international system in general, and (2) actions which are TARGETED directly to the United States from specified international units. A simple illustration of the concept of system as I used here explains that acts directed from or toward the 15Ibid. I United States make up the international relations under i investigation in this study. Only actions where the United i i States is the ACTOR or the TARGET are included. (See ! | Figure 1.) UNO UNK VCG USA ! Abbreviations United Kingdom UNK United Nations UNO VCG = Viet Cong USA = United States N = All other International Units Figure 1. ! 37 In the sections of this paper which concern United 1 States system relations, the term system only will refer to dyadic relations between the United States and other 1 international members unless otherwise noted. The speci- i j ficity of this usage of the term system is operationally j useful for the comparisons which will be made of United I States relations prior to and during involvement in limited war. It will also prove helpful in keeping clear the distinction between system, region, and nation anal yses. It has been emphasized that the use of system in I this paper has a special meaning to warn the reader not I I to confuse the results of this analysis with the work of | others using much different concepts of international j system where normally actions to and from all international | units are considered. This distinction is especially i important because in this study we will be examining United I States system relations as a special subset of all the j relations which occur among nations. Our interest here is J not to investigate, at least for the time being, the rela tionship between total system change and United States | participation in limited war, but instead the association between war involvement and possible changes in United i States international relations. ! 38 i I There is good reason for this distinction. In a few important recent studies, evidence has been presented I i which indicates that certain international system processes when examined for patterns among several nations over a few years time are relatively stable. These studies indi cate that at least some international system processes do ! not change radically from year to year. One of the main i questions in this study is to determine if this phenomenon ■ also seems to hold true for United States system relations i jwhen the United States is engaged in a large-scale foreign area limited war. There is considerable belief, as the statements recorded in this chapter will indicate, that United States system relations have been associated with various types of changes during limited war periods. Before the propositions for expected changes in the United States international relations are presented, we will i i ; briefly review the international system research of Charles j (McClelland, Rudolph Rummel, Raymond Tanter, and Bruce Russett in which they have indicated relative stability in overall system relations. Since some of the data examined and analytic procedures followed in this study are comparable to the data and technique of analysis used in their research, we should be able to cautiously infer | from our results whether overall system relations among i I ; nations are more or less stable than United States rela- j I tions with members of the international system. j j In 1963 Rudolph Rummel conducted an analysis of the conflict behavior among seventy-seven nations using 16 data collected for the years 1955-1957. Thirteen types i 1 of conflictual foreign behavior were measured. These | included such behaviors as number of negative actions, I number of protests, number of foreign ambassadors expelled, i | number of troop mobilizations, etc. A factor analysis of i ! these data resulted in the identification of three strong | dimensions of foreign conflict behavior in the inter national system. Rummel labeled them WAR, DIPLOMATIC, and BELLIGERENCY. The WAR dimension included activities "which index the preparation for war, war itself, and its conse quences." The DIPLOMATIC dimension represented a "non- ! j violent type of foreign conflict behavior" which was "short i of the use of force" and "intended to influence other nations." The BELLIGERENCY dimension was defined by the 16 Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations," General Systems Yearbook, Vol. 8 (1963), 1-50. ! 40 I I severence of diplomatic relations, anti-foreign demonstra tions, military actions of a limited nature, and negative i sanctions. The promising results of this analysis led to further research by Rummel and his associates. One of the j I most interesting products of their studies was reported j | by Raymond Tanter.17 i i 1 In 1966 Raymond Tanter explained the results of a i replication study of Rummel's work. Analyzing data for 1958-1960 for eighty-three nations with the same methods I i used by Rummel, Tanter found that "three dimensions of ; foreign conflict behavior describe both the 1955-1957 and I ! the 1958-1960 data: WAR, DIPLOMATIC, and BELLIGERENCY I 18 dimensions." From these results Tanter concluded that the dimensions of 1958-1960 foreign conflict behav ior appear to reflect a strong similarity of struc ture with the 1955-1957 dimensions with respect to j the type of variables which define the clusters as well as to the magnitude and pattern of the load ings themselves.19 t Tanter did find, however, that foreign conflict appeared to be somewhat less correlated and intense during the 17 Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior, 1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolutions, Vol. X (March 1966), 41-64. 18 Ibid., p. 48. 19 Ibid., p. 57. ! 41 | 1958-1960 period than the 1955-1957 period, suggesting i that while the system was basically stable, it was dynamic i , and subject to change. I | | These findings alone give some support to the i notion of a relatively stable international system when I | compared over short time periods. In another recent study i I by Charles McClelland and Robert Young, there is more ! indication of this phenomenon.2® While McClelland and Young had no intention of comparing their study with the i ! work of Rummel and Tanter, and, in fact, were looking at i | much more comprehensive aspects of the international i I system since their data included information on coopera- j tive actions as well as conflictual actions, they too found three major dimensions of behavior which were similar to those reported by Rummel and Tanter. In their examina tion of cooperative and conflictual behavior in the inter- i ; national system for the period 1966-1969, the dimensions i j DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE, which consisted of the international actions Yield, Comment, Consult, Approve, Promise, Reject, Charles A. McClelland and Robert A. Young, "The Flow of International Events: July-December 1969," In terim Technical Report, World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), School of International Relations, USC, January 1970. Deny, Warn, and Reduce Relationship; NON-MILITARY CONFLICT, which included Accuse, Protest, Reward, Warn, Threaten, i t I Demonstrate, Expel, and Seize; and MILITARY CONFLICT, which included the action Force, were identified. There appears to be a similarity between the results of this study and those from the Rummel and Tanter studies which again suggests a relative stability in the structure of j international system relations. | Finally, Bruce Russett, in a study of international i i regional relations, found that international trade as well ! | as membership in international organizations and voting | | behavior in these organizations were highly stable between | the 1950's and 1960's. Russett found that even with a ten-year spread between his data points, the agreement between the data exceeded .90 for these three types of 21 relations. These results suggest again, a strong con- ; tinuity in important aspects of international system processes. While these studies indicate that there may be a high degree of stability in international system processes 21 Bruce Russett, International Regions and the In ternational System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago; Rand McNally and Co., 1967). _______________________________ j among all nations, the literature on limited war suggests i generally that when a major nation is involved in a limited 1 j war, its relations with other system members will not be stable from the nonwar to war involvement period. Morton | Halperin has noted, for example, that i j though the ramifications of the outcome of a local [limited] war are likely to be felt more keenly in the immediate geographic area of the battle, | the implications [for the involved major nation] may also be world w i d e . 22 Halperin, as well as other limited war theorists such as I Charles Osgood, has contended that a major nation such as the United States has a large number of international interests which may be affected by limited war involvement. United States relations with Western European allies, strategic adversaries, and nations local to a limited war are expected to be especially influenced by limited war I involvement. Halperin has stated the following: In contrast to a period of central war when atten tion will be focused almost exclusively on polit ical and military implications of the "battlefield" encounter and its effects, during a local limited war the attention of policy makers on both sides will be divided between the particular local en counter and other aspects of the international 22 Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963) , p. 5. 44 political struggle. There will continue to be other local wars or situations of potential local war, in which the political-effects objec tives will be those tending toward expansion, but at other points of contact one or both sides may be trying to come to accommodations. Each side will be conscious of the possible impact of a local war on its efforts to reach accommoda tion in other geographic areas or on other prob lems .23 Oran Young has suggested that international crises, in which he includes the Korean conflict as one of the most intense post-World War II international crises, are closely related to various problems of sys temic stability. There is a distinct relationship between crises and systemic stability when stabil ity is defined as the tendency of a system's essential variables to remain within defined limits.24 Young suggests that international crises (including cases of limited war) are related to changes in international system processes. The most acute and extensive of international crises would result in the immediate disruption or breakdown of the total international system. Less acute crises would leave the essential ele ments of the system intact, but they might tax its regulatory and control capacities seriously. 23Ibid., p. 6. ^^Oran r . Young, The Intermediaries; Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1967), p. 12. j 45 | cause considerable damage and destruction within I the system, and set in motion changes which would in time significantly affect the operations of i the system.25 ! In order to develop a comprehensive set of propo- ! : sitions on the associations between United States involve- | ment in limited war and changes in its international i system relations, the research of previous studies, and i | the suggestions of noted observers of limited war were used to design the propositions. The first limited war propo sitions for system relations were based, in part, on the ; work of Miller and Meinheit which was discussed earlier. I ! In their study of nation behavior during the Vietnam war, 1 Miller and Meinheit attempted to determine whether or not j "the United States lessened its ties with NATO and con- ! 26 | centrated on its informal Vietnam alliance partners." i I Whether or not there has been a change in the allocation 1 of high level United States international relations toward 1 i nations in the local conflict area during a limited war j and away from other geo-political areas has been a special j concern during both the Korean and Vietnam limited wars. | 25Ibid., pp. 10-11. ^Miller and Meinheit, op. cit., p. 28. ! 46 | In the Korean war, Charles Osgood has suggested that among the three most important considerations of the American i Administration's conduct of the war was "the fear of over- i l | commitment toward the conflict area." Osgood has noted i [ j that the Administration's first consideration was "the fear I | of provoking Russian intervention and bringing about a ! Third World War."^ A second decisive consideration was the fear of overcommitment, of allowing the war in Korea to expand to such an extent as to render the i United States incapable of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen other potential trouble-spots. The administration was not only keenly conscious of the danger of depleting the defense of Western ! Europe and thereby encouraging major aggression in that vital area; it was also apprehensive of a Russian attack on Japan and of pressure of a I more limited nature on Berlin, Yugoslavia, Iran j and Indochina. President Truman assumed from ! the first that, whether or not the Korean War was I w j the immediate prelude to a general assault, the Kremlin aimed to destroy America's capacity to meet her principal adversary by drawing her into military conflicts with a satellite in A s i a . 28 The final consideration noted by Osgood, was that i t j "the administration was also restrained by its relations 27 Charles Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 169-170. 28 Ibid. ! 47 | with other nations."29 The United States wanted "to main- s tain unity" with its allies and friends. Thus, we expect that these considerations during the Korean war, which clearly influenced the decision of the United States to limit its actions on the battlefield, also probably influ enced its international relations by demanding increased j United States attention toward the local war area, and away from other geo-political areas. Similar concerns have also been raised over the j involvement of the United States in the Vietnam limited war. Senatorial comment on United States behavior in Vietnam has been especially critical of the "overcommit ment" of the United States toward the Vietnam conflict area. Senator Vance Hartke, along with a number of other Senatorial critics, has been particularly concerned with l failing United States relations with nations outside of the I Vietnam conflict area. i . . . the tally of American losses in the conti nuing war in Vietnam must reckon the intangible cost to our world leadership through erosion of confidence and fading respect of other nations. Many have parted company with us over Vietnam, but for the most part our focus on Vietnam 29Ibid., p. 170. 48 j itself has been so intense that we have not noticed our international loss of position. We are no longer cutting off the rest of the world, but now the rest of the world is cut ting us off.30 ! ! In order to investigate the question of whether i ! or not the United States has "overcommitted" itself to the local conflict area of a limited war we have posed the following two propositions. The first proposition is i designed to help better understand if United States inter national relations during a war year are allocated differ- j ently than during a nonwar year. Does the United States, | for example, reduce the relative frequency of its relations I away from Soviet bloc nations, Western European nations, j and nations in the peripheral areas of Latin America and i | Africa, and increase the relative frequency of its actions i | toward nations in the local area of a limited war while it Senator Vance Hartke, The American Crisis in | Vietnam (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968), p. 111. For a similar Senatorial view of United States Vietnam policy, see Vietnam Folly, by U.S. Senator Ernest Greening and Herbert W. Bensen (Washington, D.C.: The National Press, 1968) ; J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966) , and The Vietnaa Hearings (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). For a discussion and review of Congressional concern over United States foreign area commitments, see the Congressional Quarterly publications, Global Defense: U.S. Military Commitment Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969) . 47 j with other nations."29 The United States wanted "to main tain unity" with its allies and friends. Thus, we expect that these considerations during the Korean war, which j | clearly influenced the decision of the United States to i limit its actions on the battlefield, also probably influ- i I enced its international relations by demanding increased United States attention toward the local war area, and away from other geo-political areas. Similar concerns have also been raised over the t j involvement of the United States in the Vietnam limited i ! war. Senatorial comment on United States behavior in I I Vietnam has been especially critical of the "overcommit- i ment" of the United States toward the Vietnam conflict area. Senator Vance Hartke, along with a number of other Senatorial critics, has been particularly concerned with failing United States relations with nations outside of the | Vietnam conflict area. j . . . the tally of American losses in the conti nuing war in Vietnam must reckon the intangible cost to our world leadership through erosion of confidence and fading respect of other nations. Many have parted company with us over Vietnam, but for the most part our focus on Vietnam 29Ibid., p. 170. i 48 | itself has been so intense that we have not noticed our international loss of position. We are no longer cutting off the rest of the world, but now the rest of the world is cut ting us off.30 j In order to investigate the question of whether ' or not the United States has "overcommitted" itself to the I local conflict area of a limited war we have posed the following two propositions. The first proposition is i designed to help better understand if United States inter national relations during a war year are allocated differ ently than during a nonwar year. Does the United States, | for example, reduce the relative frequency of its relations I i away from Soviet bloc nations, Western European nations, j ! and nations in the peripheral areas of Latin America and Africa, and increase the relative frequency of its actions toward nations in the local area of a limited war while it 30 ! Senator Vance Hartke, The American Crisis in j Vietnam (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968), p. 111. For a similar Senatorial view of United States Vietnam policy, see Vietnam Folly, by U.S. Senator Ernest Greening and Herbert W. Bensen (Washington, D.C.: The National Press, 1968); J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York; Random House, 1966) , and The Vietnam Hearings (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). For a discussion and review of Congressional concern over United States foreign area commitments, see the Congressional Quarterly publications, Global Defense: U.S. Military Commitment Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969) . | participates in the conflict? In the proposition below, I this question is stated formally. In Chapter III, the data which are used to examine the proposition are dis- | cussed, and in Chapter IV the analysis and results are I presented. I I Proposition lA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the allocation of its external rela tions toward members of the international system j are not maintained as in a nonwar period. We expect, therefore, that the nations toward which the United States acts the most in a nonwar period will i tend to receive fewer United States actions, relative to I i j other system members, in a period when the United States i I is involved in a limited war. The nations in the local area of a limited war which receive few United States actions in a nonwar period, will very likely gain special attention from the United States during a war period. The j result is expected to be a redirection of United States actions away from other geo-political areas toward the nations in the war area. We also expect that there will be a major change in the allocation of system relations directed toward the United States. Nations in the local area of the conflict will increase the relative frequency of their actions toward the United States in a war period, 50 relative to the actions of other nations not in the local area of the limited war. Nations outside of the conflict area may find the United States "preoccupied" with its participation and conduct of an international war and tend to reduce their relations with the United States during I the period of the war. In order to investigate this pos sibility, we have posed the following proposition: Proposition IB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the allocation of other system member's external relations toward it are not maintained as in a nonwar period. A second question raised about limited war involve- | ment is whether or not the disposition of a major nation's system relations changes from a nonwar to a limited war j period. William Fulbright has suggested, for example, that j i he believes that United States involvement in the Vietnam I | : war has been associated with a worsening of United States- Western European relations, has generated mistrust and | antagonism between the United States and Eastern European I | nations, and has "frozen” United States-Soviet relations 1 31 | "in the direction of active hostility. George Kahin and John Lewis have suggested that from their study of 31 Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, pp. 120-129. 51 American involvement in the Vietnam war, United States admonishments to its allies that it must stay and win in Vietnam to maintain their confidence have been I j rejected generally. Kahin and Lewis note that "many [American allies] disapprove of U.S. actions in Vietnam, j ! fearing that these will lead to an extension of the war 32 ! and, despite their opposition to it, may engulf them." I Wesley Fishel has stated simply that American leadership of the "Free World has been sharply challenged, especially by some of our erst-while European friends" during involve- 33 ment in the Vietnam war. Equally important, according ! | to Douglas Mendel, is the suspicion that "U.S. policy in ! Vietnam [has] cooled relations between the United States i 34 I and all communist nations. . . ." i I | The implication of these observations is that j United States international relations during its involve- 32 George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: The Dial Press, 1967), p. 299. •^Wesley R. Fishel (ed.), Vietnam; Anatomy of Con flict (Itasca, 111.: J. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 621. 34 Douglas Mendel, American Foreign Policy in a Polycentric World (Belmont Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1968). j ment in the Vietnam war and, perhaps during the Korean i i war, may have become generally more conflictual and less i : cooperative. In order to investigate this possibility j ! the following propositions are posed. Proposition IIA: When a major nation is involved in I a limited war, the disposition of its external rela- j tions toward other members of the international system are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. i Proposition IIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the disposition of the external rela tions directed toward it from other members of the international system are less cooperative and more | conflictual than in a nonwar period. | The final question to be asked is somewhat more ! I j complex than the first two and relates back directly to | the research of McClelland and Young, Rummel, Tanter, and Russett mentioned earlier. It was noted in the dis cussion of the research of these scholars that patterns or characteristics of nation behavior can be identified, and I ; for the system as a whole have been shown to be relatively i I i stable for the periods which have been examined and com pared. The implications of the statements presented in this chapter on United States involvement in a limited war suggest, however, that United States relations with other members of the international system have not been main tained stably between periods of nonwar and limited war ! 53 j involvement. We might expect, therefore, that the "mix" of United States foreign policy output and intake will be different during limited war involvement, and that United States relations may be quite different from international 1 system relations. j I It is particularly important to examine the types of behavioral actions from and toward the United States in a limited war period since a specific way of acting may be as important as the frequency or apparent cooperativeness ! of nation interaction. We might find, for example, that ■ in a nonwar period the United States "mixes" its inter- f i national behavior in such a manner that when it acts with I threats and demands toward other nations it at the same time offers praise and grants such things as aid. In other j j words it acts "diplomatically" by offering positive with i ' negative reinforcement. If during a limited-war period, I however, the United States accuses and protests when it i | j threatens and demands, then a new and more conflictual behavior pattern is apparent in the manner of its actions. Likewise, if praise and grants are offered with approval and promises, another new and more cooperative behavioral dimension has been formed. With the data collected for this study and the technique of analysis employed, the 54 I "mix" of United States behavior as well as behavior directed toward the United States can be described and compared for nonwar and war years. In the McClelland-Young study mentioned earlier, this is exactly how the general system trait called DIPLO- ! MATIC EXCHANGE was derived. In this study, we will attempt to identify similar characteristics for international system behavior directed toward and from the United States. There is clearly, however, one important limitation to such an analysis for this study. It is impossible to state what ; kind of a change to search for in the system relations of I I ! the United States since we do not have available at this j time an empirical definition of what United States system | relations are in a nonwar period. We cannot, for example, | search for a breakdown in a DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE character- ! istic because we do not know if such a characteristic I exists in United States international relations. The I solution to this lack of information is to search the data for United States system relations for a nonwar and for a limited war period, separately describe the behavior patterns found in each of these periods, and then compare I | these patterns to determine if any change has occurred. 55 j The following propositions are intended, therefore, to guide the description and comparison of United States international relations between periods of nonwar and j j limited war involvement. Proposition IIIA: When a major nation is involved j in a limited war, the mix of its external relations i toward other members of the international system is not maintained with the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. Proposition IIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the mix of external relations from other system members toward it does not have the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. i The argument presented to this point has been j i | fairly clear; the system relations of a major nation | involved in a limited war are expected to change signifi cantly between nonwar and war periods. Three different ways of examining this research hypothesis have been listed and in Chapter IV they are examined with an analysis of i i empirical data for United States system relations before j and during the Korean and Vietnam wars. On the remaining pages of this chapter, the propositions concerning United States international relations with selected regional groupings of nations and with individual nations are pre sented. The statements of policy-makers, limited war theorists, and others interested in international conflict 56 from which the propositions were derived are also dis cussed. Limited War and Regional Relations One of the main reasons which has been given for i United States involvement in limited war is that its par ticipation demonstrates to certain allies and enemies the resoluteness of United States commitments. In large part, the United States has sought to accomplish certain inter national political objectives by involvement in limited I ! j war. Morton Halperin has noted that: j Because of the relative lack of importance of the j actual territories being fought over in limited war situations, the most important objectives at stake have been the perceived political effects of various possible outcomes. In general, the | super powers have justified their intervention I in local conflicts by citing the need to con vince other countries that they need to be de fended if they come under attack.^5 1 35 Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strat- ! egy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 90. David Rees, writing on the Korean war notes, "Limited war is thus political war par excellence, in that purely military considerations are excluded," Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1964), p. xvi. 57 I In a recent article in World Affairs, General Maxwell Taylor suggested that indeed the United States has , been concerned with such transfers of information to I ' selected countries during the Vietnam war. In Taylor's words, the United States has been faced "for a long time 1 j with a problem of communication— communication of our i i objectives and purposes to our own people, to our allies I 36 and to the international community." United States involvement in limited war is par- i i ticularly critical to its relations with some countries I because as an influential nation it has widespread con- l | i cerns and commitments beyond any single international I conflict area and it must allocate its interest, attention, j and resources among these. George Liska suggests that j United States foreign relations during a limited war period I 1 ! must reach beyond the difficulties of the immediate battle- ; field area to questions about the control and stability of | other relations in the international system. The destruction in South and North Vietnam becomes more bearable when one regards the war 36Maxwell D. Taylor, "Why Vietnam?" World Affairs, Vol. 128 (January-March, 1966), 218-223. I not as a defense of South Vietnam or of the United States, but as an increasingly symbolic contest, with both global and long-range signifi cance for the cause of order and therefore the degree and kind of peace on the world at l a r g e . The interactions between the United States and other countries probably will vary depending on whether i or not the relations are with enemy or ally. In the case of an enemy, we may find that as Frederick Schuman has suggested, these enemies may come together in a coalition "to put down" the United States as an aspirant to world : rule. Schuman believes, for example, that in the American | case, "mankind in the mass will no more accept American I i mastery than it has been willing to accept Russian or i | Chinese or Japanese or German or French or British con- ! 38 | trol." In turn, one of the principal objectives of an | involved major nation during a limited war is to communi- i I cate to enemies, including both those on the battlefield i and the major power adversaries, the intent of the involved 37 George Liska, War and Order: Reflections on Vietnam and History (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 69. 38 Frederick L. Schuman, The Cold War; Retrospect and Prospect (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 128. 59 i major nation. Halperin explains: Perhaps the most important political-effects objective with which each side has been and will be concerned in a local war is the message which its conduct will give to its main enemies.^ Charles Osgood has suggested also that communica- j tion between the major power and its adversaries is impor- I tant and, in fact, is necessary to achieve limitations in j an international war. A feasible strategy of limited war must be based upon a conception of limitation that is accept able to Americans and to Communist leaders: for unless the major adversaries of the cold war observe the conditions for limiting war, an j American strategy of limited war will not be I feasible regardless of what the objective inter- | ests of the adversaries may require.40 i In the Korean war, Osgood has noted that the "overriding considerations" of United States policy were to prevent Russian intervention and the starting of a third world war, and to avoid becoming overcommitted in South Korea ! "to such an extent as to render the United States incapable i j of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen other poten- 39 Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, p. 4. 40 Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p. 10. ! 60 , tial trouble spots."4^ This suggests that during a limited i This suggests that during a limited war, adversary rela tions will be influenced by a concern to communicate inten- i tions which are not important in a nonwar year. George Liska has suggested that United States | relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China are highly related to United States involvement in limited war and that the cold war relations between these adversaries : may be reinforced, weakened, or nullified by involvement I in the Vietnam war. The adversary relationship between the United | States and the Soviet Union has been increas ingly qualified by latent elements of consensus, i The adversary relationship between the United States and Communist China has been at once more strident and less specific. Against this background, the war in Vietnam tests the will | and capacity of these powers with results, ! which will either confirm the presently sus- j pected outcome of the cold war (as essentially | favorable to the United States) or reopen the issue of the outcome.42 | Others believe that the test of Vietnam was made as early as 1966 and the immediate results were evident 41Ibid., pp. 170-171. 42 Liska, op. cit., p. 42. I then. Douglas Mendel, writing on American foreign policy, has noted: U.S. policy in Vietnam cooled relations between the United States and all communist nations, despite protestations by Washington officials of their desire to "build more bridges" to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. U.S. attacks on , North Vietnam, however justified from an American I viewpoint, forced all nations that recognize Hanoi to echo Moscow's charges of American aggression.43 Senator Fulbright, in close agreement with Mendel, has stated: . . . the Vietnamese war thus far has had three major 'fallout' effects on East-West relations: first, it has generated a degree of mistrust and antagonism toward the United States on the | part of the Eastern European nations which other wise and most anxious to expand economic, cul tural and even political relations with the | West; second, it has weakened the drive of the I Eastern European countries toward greater in dependence of the Soviet Union; third, it has put a severe strain on the Soviet-American detente. . . . Relations, if not overtly hostile, ] have indeed, as the Russians say, become 'frozen' — frozen in the direction of active hostility.44 ! From these and other statements one must be | j impressed by the widespread belief that limited war involvement is related to changes in adversary relations. Mendel, op. cit. 44 Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, pp. 125-126. 62 : These changes appear to be primarily negative and should indicate for United States involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars a worsening of relations with Soviet bloc i nations. We have proposed, therefore, the following prop ositions. In Chapter V the nations for which data were j i analyzed and the techniques for analysis are explained. Proposition IVA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition IVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from adversary nations are less coopera- ! tive and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. • In addition to the question of the disposition of adversary relations there is also the very important ques tion of balance. While relations may have become more i i j conflictual, one might wonder if adversary relations toward < J i or from the United States have been relatively more con- ; flictual during war involvement. It is quite possible, t I for example, that while the involved major nation tried to communicate to its adversary what its policies were, the adversary either for reasons of true fear of a major nation's aspirations to global rule or for propaganda reasons, may have made particularly conflictual actions— especially of an offensive verbal nature such as accusa- 63 i tions, rejections, demands, warnings, etc.— toward the involved nation. Thus, the balance of relations from i adversaries may have become more conflictual toward rather i | than from the United States during the Korean and Vietnam ' wars. In propositional form we may ask the following: ! j Proposition V: When a major nation is involved in a limited war the balance of its external relations with its adversaries will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. In addition to expected changes in adversary rela- : tions there is also a general suspicion that ally relations I ; may change somewhat. Senator William Fulbright has t i i explained his feelings about United States involvement in i | Vietnam. The havoc brought by American involvement [in j Vietnam] is by no means confined to Vietnam, j Its effects are being felt all over the world j and I venture to guess that in the long run the Vietnamese war will have as significant an impact upon our relations with Europe as it will on our future position in Southeast Asia. . . . | , Fulbright has stated specifically that he suspects that "the American involvement in Vietnam has something to do with the current crisis in NATO. President de Gaulle has said as much, for example, in his press conference of 45Ibid., p. 120. I 64 46 j February 21, 1966 . . Thomas Finletter has suggested that the American Vietnam policy has been damaging to Western Alliance l | relations primarily because the United States "took on I this responsibility in Vietnam on a 'go it alone' basis j in relations to its NATO allies. This has produced a rift within the alliance.Wesley R. Fishel has noted that | throughout Western Europe there is a fear that large-scale ! United States involvement in Southeast Asia has turned i American interest away from Western Europe exposing the 48 | area "to pressures or even attack from the East." This, i i of course, was a very major concern during the Korean war i 49 period. Furthermore, not only has the United States possibly turned away from Europe, but as we noted earlier, 46 Ibid., p. 129. I j ^Thomas K. Finletter, Interim Report on the U.S. Search for a Substitute for Isolation (New York: W. W. Norton Co., Inc., 1968). 48 . Fishel, op. cit. 49 William Vatcher, Jr. has noted, for example, that "the United States could not convince its allies in Europe of the primary importance of a 'calculated risk' in the Far East of embroiling them in an all-out war," in his Panmun- jon: The Story of the Korean Armistice Negotiations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), p. 16. 65 | Wesley Fishel has suggested, "American leadership of what we like to call the Free World has been sharply challenged, 50 especially by some of our erst-while European friends." ! Kahin and Lewis have noted, however, that at least during | the period of the Johnson administration the United States i j attempted to conform, unsuccessfully, its alliance system, including NATO, to involvement in Vietnam, and that Secretary Rusk "admonished America's allies that they would lose confidence in this country if it did not win there.Kahin and Lewis suggest that few of these allies agree with Mr. Rusk's assess ment of their own conclusions, and many disapprove of U.S. actions in Vietnam, fearing that these will lead to an extension of the war and, despite their opposition to it, may engulf them. 2 j From these impressions of ally relations during 1 i limited war involvement— we may ask again— what changes i i l are associated with war involvement? The most identifiable | changes are likely to come from NATO members and we shall | concentrate on analyzing these relations. The first ^Fishel, op. cit., p. 621. ^Kahin and Lewis, op. cit. , p. 299. 52Ibid. question we can ask is whether or not United States rela- i tions with other members of NATO have become less coopera tive and more conflictual. We might expect that United | States relations toward NATO countries have not become particularly more conflictual since, as Charles Osgood has i l noted at least for the Korean war, "the administration was restrained by its relations with other nations. It was particularly anxious to maintain unity with America's European allies. ..." We suspect that the United States probably tended to make concessions to these allies. On ! the other hand, NATO relations toward the United States i may indeed have worsened with more negative advice than positive reinforcement from allies concerned with problems other than a war in Southeast Asia. We shall investigate, i j nevertheless, the possibility of less cooperation in United I i I | States relations as both an Actor and Target and, as in ! the previous case, we shall examine the balance of United i States-NATO member relations between nonwar and limited war periods. Proposition VIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward strategic allies geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. 65 Wesley Fishel has suggested, "American leadership of what we like to call the Free World has been sharply challenged, 50 especially by some of our erst-while European friends." Kahin and Lewis have noted, however, that at least during the period of the Johnson administration the United States attempted to conform, unsuccessfully, its alliance system, including NATO, to involvement in Vietnam, and that Secretary Rusk "admonished America's allies that they would lose confidence in this country if it did not win there."51 Kahin and Lewis suggest that few of these allies agree with Mr. Rusk's assess ment of their own conclusions, and many disapprove of U.S. actions in Vietnam, fearing that these will lead to an extension of the war and, despite their opposition to it, may engulf them.^2 From these impressions of ally relations during limited war involvement— we may ask again— what changes are associated with war involvement? The most identifiable changes are likely to come from NATO members and we shall concentrate on analyzing these relations. The first 5®Fishel, op. cit., p. 621. ^^Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., p. 299. 52Ibid. j question we can ask is whether or not United States rela- ! ‘ tions with other members of NATO have become less coopera- i tive and more conflictual. We might expect that United States relations toward NATO countries have not become j particularly more conflictual since, as Charles Osgood has | noted at least for the Korean war, "the administration was i j ! restrained by its relations with other nations. It was j particularly anxious to maintain unity with America's I i European allies. ..." We suspect that the United States i : probably tended to make concessions to these allies. On ! I the other hand, NATO relations toward the United States j i ! may indeed have worsened with more negative advice than positive reinforcement from allies concerned with problems other than a war in Southeast Asia. We shall investigate, nevertheless, the possibility of less cooperation in United States relations as both an Actor and Target and, as in I the previous case, we shall examine the balance of United States-NATO member relations between nonwar and limited war periods. Proposition VIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward strategic allies geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. j Proposition VIB: When a major nation is involved I in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from strategic allies who are geograph ically distant from the limited war area are less , cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar i period. I Proposition VII: When a major nation is involved in a limited war the balance of its external rela- | tions with its strategic allies will shift toward j the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. I It has been suggested that some changes, but not radical changes, are expected to be evident in the rela- ! tions of a major nation with its major adversaries and allies when it is involved in a limited war. The greatest I i | change in a major nation's relations are expected to j occur, however, in its relations with nations in the local i i I area of the conflict. Hans J. Morgenthau has noted that ! | American policies in Vietnam may affect adversely United i 53 ! States interests in Asia, and Morton Halperin has implied ; that indeed a shift in United States foreign attention can j be expected during involvement in a limited war since a major objective of limited war involvement is to influence | other nations in the local conflict area. As attention I becomes focused on the local area of the conflict, United S^Hans J. Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965). j States relations with neighboring nations can be expected I to be more active than in the pre-conflict period. i I Another major political-effects objective in a j local [limited] war is to demonstrate, to other j countries in the area, which way the tide is running. The manner in which the United States responds to Communist aggression in Indochina, j for example, affects the orientation of Thai- | land, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. j To some extent the policy makers of the major ! powers will be conscious of the political effects of local war, but in addition both their allies and the neutral nations will continually bombard them with advice, suggestions, and other forms i of pressure.54 Fulbright has implied that the reaction to United | ! States involvement in Vietnam has not necessarily been j ; very positive since, as Frederick Schuman suggested also, many less developed nations see United States policy as | imperialistic and threatening. I j I believe that one of the reasons for this concern and apprehension [over Vietnam] is a feeling on the part of some people, at least, that I have read in the press, very reputable scholars and i others, that we have inadvertently, perhaps, for i irrelevant reasons, stepped into a colonial war in 1950 on the wrong side.55 5^Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, pp. 5, 8. I I 55 The Vietnam Hearings (Fulbright), 1966, p. 33. j The general reaction from nations in the conflict I area toward United States participation in foreign area i limited wars can be expected, based on past experience, to be critical and generally disapproving. George Kennan i | reasons "... that our motives are widely misinterpreted, and the spectacle . . . produces reactions among millions of people throughout the world profoundly detrimental to the image we would like them to hold of the country." j George Kahin and John Lewis have suggested that while the | Vietnam war has been of long interest to Asian nations, "the extent of United States involvement in Vietnam has 57 added immeasurably to their concern.1 1 One major reason I for this heightened anxiety is that large-scale United States involvement may bring the Soviets or Communist Chinese into the conflict. i In this Asian view, the war will not determine the outcome of political unrest in other Asian coun tries, but it may soon compel the Russians and | Chinese drastically to increase their involvement in the area.58 56 Ibid. (Kennan), p. 112. 57 Kahin and Lewis, op. ext., p. 305, 58tV , Ibid. A similar concern may be found among local nations i i dependent on United States aid. These nations question the relationship between United States involvement in the war and its attitude toward the nations which support, do not support, or are neutral on the question of United i States involvement in Vietnam. Kahin and Lewis remark: Like Pakistan, India and Indonesia are desperately | dependent upon American economic assistance. Al though the Johnson Administration has given the impression that it will be less likely to respond favorably to New Delhi's and Djakarta's requests for aid if their protests against American actions in Vietnam are audible, their leaders have been i remarkably forthright in public condemnation of ! American Vietnam policy.59 | ! Kahin and Lewis have noted, also, that some ! scholars, including Edwin 0. Reischauer, "considered Vietnam to be the central issue undermining American- Japanese relations,"®® and in Indonesia "opposition to 59Ibid., p. 307. 60 Ibid., p. 308. See New York Times, November 19, 1965. See also an article by Shigeharu Matsumoto, a Japanese commentator on foreign affairs, "American-Japanese Relations" in Survival, Vol. VII (April 1966), 119-124. Matsumoto is very critical of America's Vietnam policy and suggests that this attitude is held by many Japanese and is the reason for Japan's refraining from giving the United States more cooperation in its Vietnam policy. ! 71 t f j United States military involvement in Vietnam constituted aspects of foreign policy wherein there was a congruence | of viewpoint between the Indonesian army, the Indonesian | communists, and President Sukarno.”^ Prince Sihanouk, i i j recent chief of state of Cambodia, flatly stated, before ! he was deposed, that he feared United States policy in | Vietnam strengthened Cambodia's traditional enemies of 62 Vietnam and Thailand. It is important to examine, therefore, United | States relations with Asian nations to determine if rela- i i i : tions with these nations have changed and deteriorated during the periods of United States involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Primarily we are interested in whether or not, as Senator Wayne Morse has suggested, the | American Vietnam policy has been a failure and has aided | i in "the unifying of the large non-Communist nations of I Asia— India, Japan, Pakistan, Indonesia— against the United 61Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., p. 309. 62See "Letters to the Editor" of the New York I Times, by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, published in the Times, | June 4, 1965. ! 72 1 63 j States." As in the case of United States adversary and | I ally relations, this is an empirical question and should i i be investigated with regard to both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Again, several propositions can be stated for United | States relations with local conflict area Asian nations. I | In Chapter V the nations included in the analysis and the i ; analysis itself are presented. Proposition VIIIA; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward nations in the local area of the limited war are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VIIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed ! toward it from nations in the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a i nonwar period. I While we expect a general increase in conflict j j relations, the behavior directed toward the United States is expected to be relatively less cooperative than its i behavior toward nations local to the war, since the United i j States probably will be attempting to curtail the amount Wayne Morse, "American Policy in Viet-Nam," in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 281-289. 73 i i j of conflictual relations in the area and these nations are I expected to be communicating their reactions against i I American intervention. We might expect, therefore, that j the balance of United States relations with nations in the ! local war area will be toward the United States receiving J more types of conflictual actions than it directs toward I | nations in the local conflict area. i Proposition IX: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations j with nations in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflict behavior than during a nonwar period. | i I I I Limited War and Relations with Selected Nations i _ On the preceding pages, several propositions on | expected associations between limited war involvement by i j j a major nation and possible changes in its system and j ; regional international relations have been posed. There ! I is some indication that changes of even greater magnitude i than those believed to occur in system and regional rela tions may occur in the international relations of the major nation with a very few particularly important nations. The relations which are expected to be affected the greatest are those between the United States and its | principal adversaries, allies, and particularly important I nations in the local area of the conflict. i i j A nation involved in limited war probably will j j attempt to communicate its policy objectives to principal i | allies and enemies and they in turn will attempt to influ- i j j ence the involved nation's policies. Interactions not l j 1 normally made in nonwar periods are expected to emerge and j affect behavior patterns. General Taylor, as noted earlier, has suggested that indeed during the period of i the Vietnam war the United States has made numerous | extraordinary attempts to explain its policies to other j ! nations. Kahin and Lewis have also noted: In attempting to legitimize its policies in Vietnam (as much in the eyes of the American public as in those of the international commu nity) the Administration began in 1966 to stress not only that the United States is entitled to take unilateral action but that the South-East Asia Treaty of 1954 obliges it to act unilaterally in South Vietnam.64 In the 1966 Senate Hearings on Vietnam, Secretary Rusk stated: 64 Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., p. 300. I . . . there have literally been hundreds of dis cussions with other governments, including govern ments on the other side . . . trying to probe the possibilities of a peaceful [Vietnam] settlement. During 1965 alone I myself had more than a hundred | and twenty discussions with the highest officers j of other governments, including Communist govern ments, to bring this matter to a peaceful conclu- | sion. Those efforts have been harshly and per- j emptorily rejected by the other side.®^ | While a large part of communication between the ! involved nation and its principal allies, enemies, and the nations in the local conflict area will be from its behavior on the battlefield (i.e., no strategic bombing, I j no use of nuclear weapons, a restricted battlefield area), ! and by spectacular diplomatic events such as requests for I negotiation, negotiation itself, cease-fire agreements, and other similar moves, there also may be changes in the general pattern of the involved nation's relations with these special nations. The major nation during involvement i , in a limited war probably will attempt to search for pos- j sible solutions to the war through the aid of its allies. It may attempt to explain more vigorously than usual its policy and the implications of its actions, but at the same time we expect that it will very likely act with 65 The Vietnam Hearings (Rusk), p. 52. 1 76 j I reluctance and in a more negative manner than in nonwar ; periods to requests for aid and actions outside of the ; conflict area. Overall its relations may become more i | conflictual verbally, especially if its allies are hesitant ! to support its policies completely. Adversary relations | will very likely become more conflictual. Both enemies and allies probably will make attempts to influence the major nation's policies and actions in ways different than ; in a nonwar period. Nations in the conflict area probably i i will try harder than usual to attract the attention of the : major power to their interests and concerns. i ! There is some indication in the limited war literature of what some of these changes might be. General Gavin noted, for example, in the Senate Committee on i Foreign Relations Hearings on Vietnam that the Vietnam war I j appears to be drawing American attention away from other I more important international concerns. i ; My concern . . . for Vietnam first became aroused j when I found us cutting back in our global commit- | ments in the realm of economics, for I began to | suspect that the escalation in Southeast Asia would begin to hurt our strategy position. If this has significance now, it may have tremendous significance in the long run.66 I I — - j 66Ibid. (Gavin), p. 65. 77 In these same hearings, George Kennan stated directly what his fears were. Kennan suggested that I United States relations with the Soviet Union and Japan have worsened during the period of the Vietnam war. | This involvement [Vietnam] seems to me to repre sent a grievous misplacement of emphasis on our foreign policies as a whole. Not only are great | and potentially more important questions of world | affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our involvement in Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy and hopefully possibilities we should be developing, are being sacrificed to | this uncompromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater. Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously . . . and more ■ unfortunate still, in my opinion, is the damage ! being done to the feelings entertained for us by | the Japanese people. . . .67 George Kahin and John Lewis also have noted that "one of the major casualties of the present Vietnam policy has been America's relationship with the Soviet Union." iThey suggest that movements toward a United States-Soviet I detente have "deteriorated under the pressures of the Vietnam war and will be further deteriorated by continua- | tion of the conflict. ^ Ibid. (Kennan), pp. 110-111. 68 Kahin and Lewis, op. cit. n 78 i i j In the case of Korea, William Vatcher has sug- I gested that not only were United States-Soviet relations i I i conflictual during the war period, but that it was prob ably the intention of the Soviet leaders to "create the ! illusion" of the Soviet Union as a defender against | American imperialism. These actions could only worsen | United States-Soviet relations. i Russia would create in Korea the illusion that she was the great defender against "American imperial ism," that she was a "peace-loving state" untainted ■ by any "wars of aggression," that she was a "refuge of peace" in a world of "warmongers." If she could j convey such an attitude, even though no material ! gains were made, communism would gain by that much.69 i | In addition the probability of increased conflic- | tual relations with the Soviet Union during limited war involvement, we expect that United States relations with i Communist China also worsened. It hardly even seems to j be a research question for the Korean war, since the United States and Communist China were directly opposed ] on the battlefield in Korea. In the Vietnam war, while J United States-Communist China relations are never very | cooperative, interests are again in direct opposition and [ I 69 Vatcher, op. cit., p. 10. 79 j relations probably have gone from bad to worse. George i' Kennan, in a response to a question by Senator Gore during I ; the 1966 Senate Hearings on Vietnam, noted that he felt ! | that the Soviet Union and Communist China would vie "to i see who could look most critical" of American policies. . . . I tried to make the point that if we pressed our intervention in Vietnam the Soviet Government would see no choice but to come down strongly | against us and to enter into a sort of a competi tion with the Chinese to see who could look most critical of our policies, and most dedicated and violent in their defense of the Viet Cong. I said that they would do this even if it had to proceed at the expense of Soviet-American rela tions . ] | Now, this is exactly what has happened. . . i Again this is a research question which can be answered with empirical data analysis. In order to examine United States relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union, we can pose the following propositions: Proposition XA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. 70 The Vietnam Hearings (Kennan), p. 125. ! 80 i | As in the investigation of Regional adversary i relations, there is an interest in whether United States i i relations toward the Soviet Union and China have become i j more or less conflictual relative to their relations toward | the United States. In order to answer this question, we i ! can study the balance of United States relations with its i I ! principal adversaries. We expect that the United States ! acted less conflictually than its adversaries in their international relations during limited war involvement. ! ! The involved major nation has the burden in a limited war ; to seek actively to bring the war to an end while avoiding any action which might escalate the limited war into a general war. The major adversary nation not directly involved in the conflict, on the other hand, is less ; restricted, while it too will not want the conflict to | : escalate, probably it will send admonishments, warnings, and threats to the involved nation with relative impunity. | i We expect that it will act with relatively more conflictual j behavior than the involved major nation. Proposition XI: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with principal adversary nations will shift toward I the reception of relatively more conflict behavior j than during a nonwar period. I In addition to expected changes in United States- i adversary nation relations, we expect that some change may I occur in United States-ally relations during its involve ment in limited war. One especially important concern of both scholars and decision-makers is that, as Thomas K. Finletter has warned, the Vietnam policy of the United | States "has been unconvincing to world opinion . . . and I ! 71 ; gravely damaging to the Western Alliance. . . ." x George l Kennan in the Senate Hearings on Vietnam noted a similar i belief. | | It is clear that however justified our action may | be in our own eyes [in Vietnam], it has failed to I win either the enthusiasm or confidence even among ! peoples normally friendly to u s . ^2 i j We do not know exactly what impact America's | involvement in limited war has had on its relations with its principal allies, but involvement probably has not i improved United States international relations with allies 71 ! such as the United Kingdom, France, or Canada. In order 71Finletter, op. cit., p. 108. ^ The Vietnam Hearings (Kennan), p. 111. 73 There is evidence that the greatest impact of war involvement will be on United States relations with its closest allies. David Rees noted in his study of the | to help determine whether or not United States relations i with these countries became less cooperative and more i i conflictual during involvement in limited war, we may pose | | and examine the following propositions: I Proposition XIIA: When a major nation is involved l in a limited war, its external relations toward j principal ally nations geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. i i Proposition XIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from principal ally nations who are geo graphically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. I I ! Proposition XIII; When a major nation is involved | in a limited war, the balance of its external rela- | tions with principal ally nations who are not geo graphically in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflict behavior than during a nonwar period. I l Finally, we must consider the impact of limited : war on United States relations with nations in the local i : area of the conflict which in this case includes South Asia i ; and Southeast Asia. Korean war that "the ability of allied countries to influ ence American policy in a local-war situation will in part depend on their general relationship with the United States. The British have exercised a major influence on American local-war policy during the entire postwar period. . . ." Rees, op. cit., p. 81. 83 We expect that during limited war involvement the United States will have very special relations with both local conflict area allies and enemies. In this case we refer specifically to South and North Korea in 1951 and South and North Vietnam in 1966. It is very likely that United States relations with these nations will be atypical of United States relations with other nations. Therefore, in Chapter VI several comparisons are made between United States relations with the above-mentioned countries and such other nations as the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Communist China, Nationalist China, Canada, and Mexico. We expect that relations toward local conflict area adver saries will be more negative and conflictual than United States relations with most other nations, and that rela tions with local conflict area allies will be more coopera tive. Therefore, the following proposition is posed: Proposition XIVA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local conflict area allies are relatively more coopera tive than its relations with other members of the international system. Proposition XIVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local conflict area enemies are relatively more con flictual than its relations with other members of the international system. 84 Summary The research hypothesis which has been developed in this long chapter suggests that when a major nation becomes involved in a contemporary limited war such as the Korean or Vietnam conflict, its relations with other mem bers of the international system will change. This hypoth esis is based on the writings of a large number of policy makers and international relations theorists, many of which have been reviewed. The intent of the analysis which follows is to examine this general hypothesis using the several propositions listed above as guides. The analysis will be conducted for the system, regional, and individual nation propositions in three separate chapters. In the next chapter, the data to be analyzed in the examination of the propositions are discussed. The three level-of- analysis chapters follow and in each of these sections the analytical techniques for examining the data are presented. The final chapter is a review of the findings. CHAPTER III THE EVENT/INTERACTION APPROACH FOR DATA ANALYSIS In Chapter I, limited war in the atomic age was presented as a possibly disruptive condition in the inter national system. In Chapter II, several propositions on the relationships between involvement in a limited war by a major nation and suspected changes in its international relations were discussed and listed. In Chapter III, a procedure based on the quantitative analysis of nation event/interaction data is introduced as a means to examine the limited war propositions. The conceptual link between limited war theory, event data and data analysis is made in this chapter. Chapters IV, V, and VI are analytic chapters for the system, region, and individual nation analyses. One of the features of the limited war phenomenon, as discussed earlier, is that there appears to be an association between involvement of a major nation in a 85 86 limited war and changes in that nation's international relations. Limited war, for example, is thought to be related to changes in an involved nation's relations with its allies and enemies. While the theoretical writings on limited war have explored several of these relation ships, the explorations have been largely literary and lacking in rigorous empirical support. There are a few notable exceptions,1 but in general most studies on the impact of limited war on the international relations of nations have been explorative and nonquantitative. The intent of this study is to bring together exploratory limited war research with empirical data analysis. The propositions in Chapter II provide a set of questions which quantitative approaches can help answer. The suggestion of this study is that rigorous data analysis See, for example, Jeffrey S. Milstein and William Charles Mitchell, "Computer Simulation of International Processes: The Vietnam War and the Pre-World War I Race," a Paper prepared for the Sixth North American Peace Research Conference Peace Research Society, Cambridge, Mass., November 1968. John Voevodsky, "Quantitative Behavior of Warring Nations," Stanford University, March 1968 (mimeographed). Martin J. Miller and Harold Meinheit, "Behavioral Interaction in the Vietnam War: 1965 and 1966," School of Politics and International Relations, University of California, June 1968 (mimeographed). (See references for other works by these authors.) 87 can be used to help verify or make suspect propositions about limited war which to the present have been largely impressionistic. This research moves well into the linking of limited war theory with empirical research by investigating with two case studies the propositions listed in Chapter II. The Korean and Vietnam wars have been selected as two case studies where most of the features of a "classic" large scale contemporary limited war existed. The nature of both of these wars has been such that (1) a major nuclear power was directly involved, (2) the wars took place in a foreign but localized area, and (3) the battle field tactics, weapons and location as well as the overall strategic policies of the involved nations were limited. Furthermore, the propositions listed in the preceding chapter were almost always discussed by the limited war theoreticians and policy makers in the context of the Vietnam and Korean conflicts. The availability of these two case studies pro vides an opportunity to examine the limited war proposi tions in two settings where, although the conditions were somewhat different, we can expect that the same underlying 88 aspects of limited war relations existed.2 Care has been taken throughout the research to design inquiry, collect data, and conduct analyses for both conflict periods in a parallel manner. Throughout the remainder of the study two data sets, one for the Korean war period and one for the Vietnam war period, are referred to. These data sets, as will be explained, are comparable collections and the analyses made on these data may be compared directly. Data on the international relations of the United States with all other nations, the United Nations, impor tant regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States, as well as with a few particularly active sub national groups such as the Viet Cong have been collected for time periods before (1949 and 1963) and during (1951 and 1966) the Korean and Vietnam wars. These data are used 2 In the introduction to Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. xi, Richard Snyder notes the timeliness of Paige's Korean War study and says, "The Vietnam conflict suggests interesting parallels and historical linkages though there are obvious differences, too." This two-case study provides a "first look" into these parallels and differences. 89 to compare pre-war with war relations of the United States in examination of the limited war propositions. The analysis of the data is descriptive and while many tests for association are made, the intent of the analysis is not to make causal inferences. There are three principal reasons why the study is descriptive and not causal. The first reason is that most of the research on limited war and its association with the international politics of nations has been exploratory and impressionis tic. As explained above, there is little empirical evi dence available to describe accurately how the internation al relations of a nation change when it becomes involved in a limited war. There is a need to better understand the environment surrounding limited war before we can take the major step of testing for cause and effect relations in our data on limited war. Secondly, there are still many problems to be solved before any reliable causal modeling of international relations phenomenon can be O accomplished successfully. Scholars working in the field 3 Jack E. Vincent noted in the Fall 1969 American Political Science Association Meeting his caution on using causal modeling in international relations, expecially when based on techniques of analysis borrowed from other social 90 of international relations should experiment with causal modeling but the strength of these analyses over descrip tive studies may not be very great. Where causal modeling might be possible is in the areas of international rela tions study where sufficient descriptive empirical investi gation has already been accomplished and a good under standing of the research problem is available. As noted above, this is not the case for limited war studies. The third reason for employing a descriptive approach in this study is that descriptive analysis is sciences such as the factor analysis technique. Vincent suggests that at this time descriptive analysis in inter national relations studies promise useful rewards. Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in Inter national Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and an Application" (American Political Science Associa tion, Copyright, 1969). Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte in "A Note of Caution in Causal Modeling," American Political Science Review, LXII (December 1968), 1258-1264, note that although several of the prerequisites for causal analysis have been somewhat clarified in recent social science research, there are still problems of complex social relations, crudeness of measure of many variables, and the conditions of simultaneous cause and effect among variables which limit the reliability of causal modeling. For a discussion of methods which might be applicable to causal modeling in international relations, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Non- Experimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). 91 capable of providing the answers sought for in the inves tigation being made. With descriptive analyses, data on nation behavior can be characterized, tested for associa tion over variables— including time— and can even be used 4 for making predictions. It is useful approach for exam ining nation behavior and is fully capable of determining the degree of change in a nation's relations between selected time periods. The analysis will use the limited war propositions to guide the examination for changes in the international behavior of the United States when it becomes involved in a limited war. Care is taken to characterize and compare as closely as possible the pattern of United States rela tions in pre-war and war periods for both the Korean and the Vietnam wars by means of several statistical procedures which vary according to the level of analysis. Following 4 Claire Selltiz, Mane Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations (Revised One-volume edition; New Yorks Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 65-78. For a selection of de scriptive international relations studies, see J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 92 the advice of Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, "a clear formulation of what and who is to be measured, and tech niques for valid and reliable measurement"^ have been carefully laid out. In the remaining pages of Chapter III, the general framework of the study including discussions on the selection of study years, event/interaction data, and data collection procedures are presented. As a guide to this framework, the reader should keep in mind the following suggestion by Selltiz et al.: The procedure to be used in a descriptive study must be carefully planned. Because the aim is to obtain complete and accurate informa tion, the research design must make much more provision against bias than is required in exploratory studies. Because of the amount of work frequently involved in descriptive studies, concern with economy of research effort is ex tremely important. These considerations of economy and protection against bias enter at every stage: formulating the objectives of the study; design ing the methods of data collection; selecting the sample; collecting; processing; and analyz ing the data; and reporting the finding.® 5Selltiz et al., op. cit., p. 66. 6Ibid., p. 67. 93 The Selection of the Korean and Vietnam Study Years The most direct means for examining the limited war propositions appear to be with data from actual periods of limited war. The Korean and the Vietnam war periods offer especially good situations to examine the proposi tions since a major nation, the United States, was involved directly in both wars. Comparisons of data collected for United States international relations for these two cases can be made systematically to insure similarity in test conditions. While the results of the examination of the propositions in this analysis are not considered final, they do indicate which propositions appear to be asso ciated, based on the two-case study, with limited war and which do not. To insure that the findings from both the Korean and Vietnam analyses are comparable, care has been taken to parallel as closely as possible the design, data collection, and analyses of the two cases. The first step in the data collection procedure was to select the time periods from which data were to be collected. The principal criteria for selecting these time periods were that (1) a time period before and a time 94 during both of the limited war conflicts had to be selected for analysis, (2) the time periods selected for the pre war and war periods should be as similar as possible for both the Korean and the Vietnam conflicts, and (3) the pre-war and war periods should not be too distant in time from each other to insure that the same international actors which interact with the United States are as likely as possible to be present in both the pre-war and war periods. For the Korean war, 1949 and 1951 were selected for analysis. The year 1949 was clearly a pre-Korean war year. The war broke out suddenly on June 5, 1950 with an invasion of South Korea by 70,000 North Korean troops. In 1949 the United States withdrew the last of its remain- n ing combat troops from South Korea. During the same year, the United States was concerned with a large number of international problems, including implementing Truman's Point IV program of aid to less developed nations and European recovery. While there was concern over the newly formed Chinese Communist government (1949) and Soviet 7 The New York Times, June 29, 1949, p. 11. 95 behavior, there was little fear of an imminent invasion p of South Korea. It was true, however, that in 1949 the United States and South Korea perceived that there was a potential threat of invasion into South Korea from North Korea. In early May, for example, the President of South Korea asked the United States to consider an attack upon g South Korea as an attack on the United States, and on May 18, President Li sought a United States-South Korea Mutual Aid Pact against the Soviet Union.10 Furthermore, on June 14, 1949, the United States decided to double the size of its military advisory group in South Korea.11 The year 1949 was a good year for comparison with a Korean war year. The United States was concerned about conditions in South Korea in 1949, as indicated by rela tions between South Korea and the United States including the presence and increase in the number of United States ®Paige, op. cit. ^The New York Times, May 7, 1949, p. 4. 10The New York Times, May 18, 1949, p. 11. 11The New York Times, June 14, 1949, p. 96 military advisors in South Korea, but this concern was clearly not expected war involvement. Furthermore, since one criterion of the data collection procedure (which is explained later in this chapter) was that the data collect ing must begin on January 1 and end on December 31, a full year of data was needed and 1949, as the nearest complete year to the outbreak of the war, fulfilled this require ment. Two years, 1951 and 1952, were available for analysis as full war years. The Korean war ended in July, 1953 and the data collection criteria could be fulfilled best with 1951 and 1952 data. It is probable that data for either 1951 or 1952 would have been equally good for the examination of the limited war propositions. The year 1951 was selected, however, because there was some indica tion that in 1952, an election year in the United States, the Korean war was "approaching cessation of hostilities" 12 and therefore was not as active a war year as 1951. In the case of Vietnam, 1963 and 1966 were selected for analysis. The Vietnam war, unlike the Korean war, did not start with a major overt invasion of South Vietnam by 12 Voevodsky, op. cit., p. 6. 97 North Vietnamese troops, and the selection o£ the time periods for analysis was somewhat different from that for the Korean war. The year 1963 was selected for analysis as a pre-Vietnam war year even though by the end of that year the United States had 16,300 military advisors in South Vietnam.^ The years 1961 and 1962 were considered for pre-Vietnam war periods, but there was the problem that United States involvement in Cuba may have affected international events to such a degree that the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis may have biased somewhat the data for United States international relations for those years. This was speculative since there were no data readily available for testing to determine if this suspicion were empirically true, but to be on the safe side, 1963 was selected over these other years. In 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place and brought a great amount of international attention to the Vietnam problem. The year 1964, because of this incident, did not seem a good year to select even though United States 13 The number of United States military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 3,200 in 1961 and 11,300 in 1962 indicating that in these years too the United States was concerned and involved in South Vietnam. 98 military advisors at the end of this year still numbered only 23,300. In light of these considerations, 1963 appeared to be the best year to select as a pre-Vietnam limited war year. The break point normally considered as marking the limited war period of the Vietnam conflict is 1965. Prior to 1965 the United States considered itself "an indirect participant in the conflict and that U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam were there only in an 'advise and support' capacity. Data on United States strength and casualties also suggest that 1965 separates two stages of the Vietnam war.1^ While this distinction in the Vietnam conflict is clear, it is not as abrupt as that point in 1950 when the North Korean invasion was launched. Nevertheless, the Vietnam conflict years before and after 1965 are very different. If the data collected from the New York Times to profile United States interactions with North and South Vietnam are compared for 1963 and 1966, we 14 Congressional Quarterly Service, Global Defense; U.S. Military Commitments Abroad (Washington, D.C., September 1969), p. 58. 1^Voevodsky, op. cit.. Figure 1. 99 can see the difference. In 1963, for example, the United States acted toward North Vietnam 3^ times and North Vietnam toward the United States £ times. These data from the New York Times suggest that the United States in 1963 was concerned more with the stability of the South Vietnamese government, Viet Cong terrorism, and the struggle between Catholics and Buddhists than with the North Vietnamese. After 1965 there was clearly a limited war in progress in Vietnam with large scale United States combat participa tion. In 1966 the United States acted toward North Vietnam 58 times and North Vietnam acted toward the United States 77 times, an indication that 1966 was indeed a war year with a large amount of United States-North Vietnamese mutual concern. The year 1966 was selected for analysis because it was an active Vietnam war year. The years 1967 and 1968 were considered and could have been selected for analysis, but they did not appear to offer any better information than 1966 and were further away in time from 1963. The year 1966 was also a relatively low internation al conflict period for the United States. The Dominican Republic Crisis had subsided, and the India-Pakistan con flict of 1965 had quieted down. In 1967, however, there 100 was the Middle East war and in 1968 the Pueblo seizure. While these international problems may not have greatly affected the data for United States international rela tions, it seemed best to select 1966 since it was a year with less international turmoil outside of Southeast Asia. Interaction Data With the years for analysis selected, the next step was to collect the data for analysis. As noted earlier, the type of data which was selected for the investigation of the limited war propositions was informa tion on the international interactions between the United States and other international actors. Interaction data were needed because the propositions were expositions on the international behavior patterns of nations, and the most direct approach to understanding nation behavior is with data on the actual exchanges of activity among nations. There are several types of information which can be used as indicators of nation interaction. Data on voting and other behavior within the United Nations have 101 been used successfully, for example, in studies by Bruce Russett, Hayward Alker, and Chadwick Alger. Bruce Russett studied United Nations roll-call votes to measure and compare international attitudes in the General Assembly.^ Hayward Alker has studied United Nations Assembly votes to "uncover the principal dimensions of conflict" in the Assembly (Sixteenth) and locate nations on these dimen- 17 sions, and Chadwick Alger has experimented with a some what different version of United Nations interaction data by studying with "intensive observation" the patterns of private conversations of national representatives at United Nations General Assembly committee meetings.18 While analysis of interaction data in international organizations gives useful insight into aspects of nation Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System, A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), chaps, iv and v. 17 Hayward Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII (September 1964), 642-657, 18 Chadwick Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly," in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 51-84. 102 behavior, it does not provide enough focus for investigat ing the propositions on limited war. The scope of topics voted on in the United Nations is limited to the specific agenda items and informal contacts are probably associated more with the legislative process itself than with the general political concern of nations in the international system. Any data on a specific subject area of inter national event/interaction such as official visits by high level government representatives are also limited in scope and tend to restrict the interpretation of results.^-9 To investigate changes in a nation's overall political rela tions a wide variety of political events should be accounted for. In like manner data for international trade, mail, and other types of international transactions Steven J. Brains, for example, has studied the visits of high level government officials to other nations because he believes these data reflect information on the "exercise of influence." Brams states, "There seems good reason . . . to believe that most high-level government officials visit their counterparts in foreign nations to discuss matters on which they think they can be more influential than their representatives," Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence in the International System," Institute for Defence Analysis, September 1967. (Mimeo graphed) 103 while giving insight into routine relations among nations tend to limit the scope of an investigation and are basi cally nonpolitical. Rudolph Rummel has found that a.s far as foreign conflict behavior is concerned there is little if any relationship between such political-military behavior and the level of communications or transactions among nations (trade, international mail, economic aid, 20 and export and import data). Event/Interaction Data and Analysis The procedure selected for the examination of the limited war propositions is called event/interaction analysis. It is a quantitative research approach which has been developed over the past few years specifically for the analysis of inter-nation political behavior. It is an especially powerful tool for studying the complicated patterns of relations which occur among nations. As such, it is an excellent method to examine the limited war 20 Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," The Dimensionality of Nation's Project, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Reprint No. 6 (n.d.). 104 propositions. Before describing the operational procedures of event/interaction data collection and analysis, a brief review of some of the research associated with this approach is presented. Event/interaction analysis was introduced as a research method to the field of international relations 21 in an early study by Charles A. McClelland. McClelland's concern in this report was with the phenomenon of transi tional changes in the international behavior of modern advanced nations as they interact in the international system. McClelland suggested that the international behavior of modern nations is initiated within the frame work of a national decision-making organization capable of recognizing and handling "familiar and expected experi ences" from other international actors such that the international relations among nations are normally routine and nonspectacular. When novel, unexpected, or threaten ing events occur among nations, however, reactions take place within the national decision-making organization. 21 Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute Interaction Crisis," World Politics, Vol. XIV (October 1961), 182-204. 105 The result is an outflow of nonroutine inputs into the international system from these nations. McClelland suggests that when these inputs reach a certain volume or intensity, a transition occurs and a crisis or some other new state of affairs develops. In a recent paper McClel land explained in detail the definition of event/inter- 22 action. According to McClelland, political event/inter actions are special international events which rise out of the routine transactions among nations to receive high official government attention. Where transactions are "the ordinary exchange of noninformation producing events" such as international trade, tourist visits, mail flows, etc., event/interactions are "the flow of major disturbing events." On some occasions, the routines of transactional activity are broken and events occur that override the usual administrative resources for guidance and control. Such series of events leave the marked channels and bring major control machinery into operation. In effect, alarms are sounded to call attention to the "break out" of event/inter- 22 Charles A. McClelland, "International Interaction Analysis: Basic Research and Some Practical Applications," Technical Report #2, World Event/Interaction Survey, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, November 1968. 106 actions. Both the events and the major guidance and control efforts are reported in the public ! communication media and take the form of inter national news.23 In working with event/interaction data, McClelland has offered the criterion of importance as a means to identify political event/interactions. Borrowing from information theory, McClelland suggests that the concept of surprise can be used to gauge importance. "Surprises i in the flow of events" are those international actions which come into public attention as news items about offi cial governmental actions directed from one international actor toward another. These actions, by the fact that they are government actions reported by the news media, are at the same time both important and political events. They are political because they require certain decisions and actions by official national decision-makers. They are important because they have broken from the routine flow of events among nations by drawing the attention of the news media to the event. McClelland explains: Very turbulent events, generating much information come into the focus of public attention. They are "news." In becoming news they also become politi cal. They acquire a political character because ^Ibid., p. 18. 107 (1) the outcomes of such a series of events can not be established merely by applying established rules of procedure; (2) the situation created is uncertain causing differences in outlook on how it should be handled and necessitating the exer cise of special judgment and decision; and (3) the problem of controlling the turbulence becomes paramount. In international relations, upper offi cialdom undertakes to manage events that are beyond the control capacities of regular administrative systems.24 A comprehensive picture of the political relations among nations can be viewed if attention is drawn to the event/ interactions of nations. All the international political actions of nations including diplomatic visits, official statements and comments, the signing of agreements, the making of accusations, and military confrontations are nonroutine events which are reported daily by the news media. McClelland and a growing number of scholars adopt ing this new approach suggest that by collecting and analyzing these events it is possible to describe and explain changes in nation behavior. Event/interaction analysis is a useful means to pattern the behavior of nations in order to identify when relations are routine, moving toward crisis, or shifting from one phase to ^Ibid., p. 15. 108 another, whatever the cause. In the case of this study, event/interaction data are used to compare inter-nation behavior before and during a limited war. In 1962 McClelland explained in a study of the Quemoy crisis of 1958 how event/interaction analysis can be 2 5 used to explain nation behavior during crisis. The method used in approaching the answers is that of interaction analysis. Because acute crises are not unitary phenomena, it is feasible to follow them through their phases and stages. The proced ure is first to collect all of the data that can be found which report events related to the crisis. Each piece of information is regarded as reporting either an initiating action, a repeating action or a responding action. Then after the data are assembled in a chronological order, sequences of action response are traced, extracted, and cate gorized. . . ,26 In this early study McClelland was concerned with identi fying international event actions and tracing the action- reaction links of these events. Since the early Quemoy study, many advances have been made by McClelland and his associates including the collection of larger data banks Charles A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Crisis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VI (September 1962), 201-213. 26 Ibid., p. 208 109 and the use of quantitative techniques of analysis. The tracing of event/interactions has been replaced (although there are plans for further research in this area) with aggregate data analysis, but the early concepts of event data remain today much as they were developed in the early 1960's. During the past ten years McClelland and his associates as well as other scholars now interested in i event data analysis have made great strides in advancing this approach to studying international politics. The primary impetus to this advance has come from the work of McClelland and his associates on the World Event/Inter action Survey (WEIS), which is a project at the University of Southern California encompassing international rela tions theoretical development, event/interaction data collection, and foreign policy and event/interaction analysis. Some of the studies resulting from the WEIS project have provided evidence that event/interaction data can be used successfully to investigate the proposi tions on limited war. These studies show clearly that descriptive studies of event/interaction data can be used to measure for association among variables over a large 110 number of nations,^ type the behavior of nations by 2ft their international relations, ° and describe the behavior patterns of nations at both the international system 29 30 level and at the regional level. All of these cap abilities are needed for the analysis in this research. In addition to these studies a series of analyses have been completed by McClelland and his associates on transi tions in nation behavior during crisis conditions. McClelland's early interest in international crisis has 27 See the WEIS Interim Technical Reports, especial ly Charles A. McClelland and Robert A. Young, "The Flow of International Events: July-December, 1969," School of Politics and International Relations, University of South ern California, January 1970 (mimeographed). 28 Robert A. Young, "Prediction and Forecasting in International Relations: An Exploratory Analysis" (Un published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern Cali fornia, 1970). 29 James A. Moore and Robert A. Young, "Some Prelim inary Short-Term Predictions of International Interaction" (Working Paper, School of Politics and International Rela tions, University of Southern California, September 1969). (Mimeographed) 30Charles A. McClelland and Anne Ancoli, "An Inter action Survey of the Middle East," WEIS Technical Report #7, School of Politics and International Relations, Uni versity of Southern California, 1970 (mimeographed). Ill continued to receive special attention, and this study of limited war as a disruptive feature in the international system is an extension of this interest. The event/interaction approach is especially sensitive to changes in the international behavior pattern of nations. When event data are observed for a nation over time, regularities as well as irregularities in nation behavior are clearly discernible. In a study completed in 1967 on Communist Chinese behavior in the Taiwan Straits confrontation from 1950 to 1964, event/interaction analysis was able to identify clearly periods of pre-crisis, crises, 31 and post-crisis. In a later study comparing data for both the Berlin and Quemoy crisis, the event/interaction approach demonstrated that international crises tend to repeat themselves, may be habitual, and appear to be area 32 specific. While these findings may not be directly 31 Charles A. McClelland, Daniel P. Harrison, Wayne R. Martin, Warren R. Phillips, and Robert A. Young, The Chinese Performance in Crisis and Non-Crisis: Quantita tive Studies of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation: 1950- 1964 (China Lake, Calif.: U.S. Naval Ordinance Test Sta tion NOTS TP 4138, May 1967). 32 Charles A. McClelland, "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Arenas," forthcoming in Charles F. Hermann (ed.), International Crises. 112 applicable to limited war conditions, they demonstrate the utility of event data analyses for measuring changes in nation behavior. It should be noted that while McClelland and his associates have introduced and developed most of the concepts and procedures for event/interaction analysis in international relations, a growing number of scholars are adapting and modifying the approach to their own research interests. Walter Corson, for example, has attempted "a quantitative study of East-West interaction since World War II" using an event/interaction type of data analysis. Many of Corson's basic procedures were borrowed from 33 McClelland's World Event/Interaction Survey. Stephen Salmore and Charles Hermann have undertaken an ambitious project to classify the "foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union and the United States into a number of alternative categories or sets of categories" by coding post-World War II actions of these countries 33 Walter H. Corson, "Measuring Conflict and Co operation Intensity in East-West Relations: A Manual and Codebook," Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, November 1969 (Second Draft). 113 34 including both internal and external acts. This project, according to the authors, will attempt to adapt some of the procedures of the WEIS. A number of other scholars have recently experi- 35 mented with variations of event/interaction analysis. Moses, Brody, Holsti, Kadane, and Milstein at Stanford University have attempted to scale inter-nation event data.At San Diego State, a project under the direction of Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend has been collecting and analyzing cross-national political instability Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, "Foreign Policy as a Dependent Variable in the U.S. and the USSR," Douglass College and Princeton University (no date, mimeographed). 35 Two event/interaction meetings, the first of their type, were held recently to discuss developments in interaction analyses. At both of these meetings it was evident that event/interaction analysis is becoming accepted as a highly useful technique for international relations study. These meetings were held at the Univer sity of Michigan in Ann Arbor in November 1969, and at Michigan State University, East Lansing, in April 1970. 36 Lincoln E. Moses, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti, Joseph B. Kadane, and Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action," Science, Vol. 156 (May 26, 1967), 1054-1059. 114 37 events. Rudolph Rummel and his associates in the Dimensionality of Nations project have studied foreign 38 conflict behavior for several years, and Edward Azar at Michigan State University has recently begun study on the 39 use of event data to examine conflict reduction theory. Donald Puchala has used event data to study West European interaction,40 and William Caspary has compared inter national event data with American public opinion.41 Several event studies, including one by Alvin Richman, 37 Bernice M. Beagles, Francis W. Hoole, Norman G. Litell, and Betsy A. Nesvold, "Cross National Data Bank of Political Instability Events (Code Index)," Public Affairs Research Institute, San Diego State, January 1965 (mimeo graphed) . O Q Rudolph Rummel has a long list of publications on this topic. Several can be found in the bibliography. ^Edward E. Azar, "The Quantification of Events for the Analysis of Conflict Reduction," Cooperation-Conflict Research Group, Michigan State University, November 1969. 40Donald J. Puchala, "Recording West European Diplomatic Interaction," Columbia University, Prepared for the American Political Science Association Meeting, September 1969. 41William R. Caspary, "United States Public Opinion During the Onset of the Cold War: A Study of Public Reac tions to International Events,” Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., November 1967. See also, Erik V. Nordheim and Pamela B. Wilcox, "Major Events of the Nuclear Age: A Chronology to Assist 115 have attempted to rank events along a continuum of behavior from conflict to cooperation,4^ and one proposed study suggests that event data, based on procedures very similar to those developed in the WEIS project, can be used to develop "A Computer-Aided Conflict-Cooperation Informa tion System."4^ This list demonstrates the recent interest in event/interaction analysis. The use of event data in these studies has varied depending on the subject under investi gation. In order to examine changes in nation behavior before and during war involvement, a special type of event/ interaction analysis is required. The procedure followed in this study of limited war is explained below. in the Analysis of American Public Opinion,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL-TM-1830, August 1967. 42 Alvin Richman, "A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum,” University of Pennsylvania, July 1966 (mimeographed). 43 Robert R. Beattie, Walter Corson, and Raymond Tanter, "A Computer-Aided Conflict-Cooperation Informa tion System," The University of Michigan, February 7, 1970 (Draft). 116 Data Overview The data for the event/interactions between the United States and all other nations have come exclusively from the daily editions of the New York Times and from the New York Times Index. One year of data, 1966, was avail able from the World Event/Interaction Survey. The 1966 data, a complete record of events from the daily newspaper, served as the basic data collection for the study. The rules and procedures employed to collect and code the 1966 data were made the rules for collecting and coding the data for all the years analyzed. The published codebook of the World Event/Interaction Study was used as the guide for the collection and arrangement of data from both the New York Times newspaper and the Index.^ The rules for data collection as outlined in the codebook manual are explicit and easy to follow. A few complete verbatim sections from the codebook have been included in this section to describe to the reader explic- 44 Barbara Fitzsimmons, Gary Hoggard, Charles McClelland, Wayne Martin, and Robert Young, "World Event/ Interaction Survey Handbook and Codebook," Technical Report #1, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, January 1969. 117 itly and without interpretation the basic procedures for collecting the data. These instructions were followed in the collection of data from the New York Times Index, but as might be expected the Index presents information in a different format from the actual newspaper and a few special considerations were made for the Index data in order to insure data comparability. These special consid' erations are discussed following the presentation of the general collection rules of WEIS. The event data include, according to the rules given below, what the United States said and did toward other international actors and what these actors said and did toward the United States during the years 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966. Simply stated, information from the New York Times on WHO did WHAT to WHOM for the United States as an international Actor and Target have been collected. There are, of course, limitations when using a single source of information to collect data on inter national events, and clearly some events have been over looked or deleted because of secrecy and failure of the event to be reported by the news media. We also expect that some event news is distorted or simply reported in 118 error. Events are sometimes reported which never actually occur, and others may be reported as government additions made to deceive the reader of the news. Charles McClelland has written on these problems and suggests that it is almost impossible to estimate how bad these defects might 45 be. Commenting on the reliability of the news, McClelland notes that the reporting of international news over the past half century has improved in volume, detail, and accuracy. Professionalization of journalism and the multiple sources of information which the New York Times employs are aides to news accuracy, and governments, suggests McClelland, are wont not to fabricate news too often since the news media are useful as a "pipeline" between the government and the public and "it does not pay to lie too often." McClelland sums up this argument: Although the public record of international events is defective by any strict standard, it serves well enough for many kinds of analysis. It is to be argued that public reporting can be used more effectively for statistical evaluations 45 Charles McClelland, "International Interaction Analysis: Basic Research and Some Practical Applica tions," Technical Report #2 (November 1968), pp. 43-46. 119 than for the purpose of historical reconstruction— its most common use. It is unlikely that a few erroneous reports will make a big difference in an aggregate of several hundred items. . . The issue of whether or not the New York Times is sufficient as a source of information or if it is biased is an important consideration. One rule of the WEIS data collection procedure to reduce the effect of newspaper bias is the avoidance of collecting editorials, news summaries, or any other information which is "explanatory, interpretative, speculative, or predictive." Nevertheless, we can expect some national bias in a national newspaper especially in the reporting of more events associated with the country in which the newspaper is published. Any bias of the New York Times toward emphasizing the reporting of international news and especially news about United States international relations is a beneficial bias for this study since only international events in which the United States was either an actor or a target were collected. 46Ibid., p. 45. 47 See Young, "Prediction and Forecasting . . . ," Chapter III. Young on this point makes reference to McClelland's Technical Report #2, pp. 38-49; Loyal N. Gould, "The ENDC and the Press," SIPRI, Stockholm Papers, No. 3 (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1969); and John C. 120 Data Collection Procedures As noted, all the data on event/interactions in this study are from either the daily New York Times news paper or the Index. The data collection rules for the WEIS project are general, however, and the instructions are written in a format applicable to many data sources. The writer has abstracted directly from the codebook the most important rules for data collection in order to demon strate to the reader the explicit procedures followed in 48 this analysis. Our practice (which may be varied, of course) is first to read a short section in a source (a few pages of a Xerox copy of a chronology or index or a daily issue of a newspaper) to locate all items that fall within the WEIS definition of an inter national event/interaction. To be selected as an item for the collection, the reported event must be: Merrill, "U.S., Panel Names World's Ten Leading 'Quality Dailies,'" Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 41 (1964). 48 Fitzsimmons, Hoggard, McClelland, Martin and Young,"WEIS Handbook and Codebook," pp. 5-7. 121 1. single and discrete. The report shows a specific "deed" or utterance, initiated by an actor . . . North Korea accused, Italy extended a loan, Pakistan rejected, South Korea apologized, etc. 2. international. The reported act, in some sense, "crosses" a national boundary. Ordinarily, the report will include a recipient or "target" of the act. Thus . . . North Vietnam accused the United States, Italy extended a loan to Morocco, etc. It is also possible that an act committed by an initiator will be about some foreign recip ient but not directed to that "target." The item qualifies for the collection in this case although no target is specified. The code 999 is used to record "unspecified target." 3. high level, official, governmental (and specified exceptions). a) The initiator or originator of the act is an executive officer of high rank (i.e., President, Premier, Foreign Minister, Minister of Defense, perform ing in an official role) or an executive 122 agency (i.e., Department of State, Office of the President, Ministry of Defense, mili tary branch, etc., performing in an official role). The following are additions (or exceptions) to the specifications set forth in a: b) If not according to a above, the initiator or originator is a party related plainly to a nation-identification and engaged in a cross-national military action, guerrilla operation, or demonstration. Examples are: Syrian forces kill Israel border guard. Polish demonstrators stoned U.S. embassy in Warsaw. c) If not according to a or b above, the ini tiator or originator is a United Nations organization or affiliate or a constituted international committee, commission, or body that is WEIS-listed. Such international organizations are considered initiators when they commit "outward" acts to recipients as 123 in the case of nation-state initiators described in _ 3 above. Examples are: Secretary-General U Thant (UNO) held private talk with Cyprus representa tives on future of United Nations force in Cyprus. UN rejected Rhodesia's request to speak in UN debate. Inter national Control Commission sent an observer group to Thateng in Laos. d) If not according to a, b, c, above, the initiator or originator is an official government news service, publication, or broadcasting facility. Example: A1 Ahram today denounced the U.S. for imperialist plotting. e) If not according to a, b, c, d, above, the initiator or originator, not otherwise qualified, is a party which has drawn a responsive utterance or deed (i.e., has been targeted) from a high level, official, governmental actor specified in 3a above. 124 Example: Bertrand Russell addressed a plea for peace to the Soviet Union. When the data are collected from the daily news paper the event items are clipped from the newspaper and placed on 3x5 cards. Data from the Index are written on these cards. Each item of information is recorded on a separate card along with the source (New York Times for this study), date, and page number that the event occurred on in the original newspaper. The Index provides this I information. An example of an item of information col lected from the Korean war period is shown below. New York Times June 26, 1951 page 1 Truman says the United States is willing to join in "real settlement" and restore peace for Korea. New York Times Index Data It has been assumed in this study, based on the statements made in the foreword of the New York Times Index that all the information related to international 125 events concerning the United States found in the daily (late city) edition of the New York Times are recorded, in brief form, in the New York Times Index. According to the editor of the Index, the Index contains a complete record of the events reported in the daily newspapers of the New York Times. As will be explained, the major prob lems when using the Index come more from abstracting data from the briefed volume than from fearing that the volume is not a complete record of the New York Times. In each edition of the Index the editor makes a statement similar to the following by John Rothman in 1966. The Index is the book of record of The New York Times. Patiently and painstakingly, the news of each day is condensed and classified, and, day after day, these condensations are compiled, topic by topic and name by name. With December 31st, the book is closed; the develop ments of the year as The Times reported them can now be traced, in the order in which they occurred, through brief but information-packed summaries, each indicating on what date, on which page and in which column the original news paper article appeared. The record is complete.^ 49 John Rothman (ed.), The New York Times Index, 1966, Foreword. In earlier editions of the Index, the same words "... a complete index to THE TIMES" can be found in the Foreword. 126 While it has been assumed that all international events involving the United States are included in the Index that are to be found in the daily New York Times newspaper, it is quite a different matter to extract this information from the Index than it is from the newspaper itself. When collecting information from the Index several precautions must be followed to insure comparability between it and the daily newspaper. The author had been trained previously in collecting WEIS data from both news paper and Index sources, and had participated in developing many of the original concepts and practices used in the survey. This past experience in addition to consultation with members of the WEIS project resulted in the adapta tion of a set of collection procedures.50 The Index reports news items in brief; places information about official nations activity in sections throughout the book under a wide scope of headings such as COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, and OIL as well as under The data collection from the Index was conducted by myself and a single graduate student assistant in the employ and trained by the WEIS project. Throughout the data collection regular meetings were held to discuss collection problems, review the data collected, and adjust any problems arising in the collection procedure. 127 nation headings such as ARGENTINA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA; and very often cross references material, but not in a highly systematic manner.^ The somewhat irregular categorizing of data by topic heading required that most all sections of the Index be reviewed for international relations event data. Only the most obvious nonpolitical and noninter national relations subject headings could be skipped over to retain a high degree of data collection accuracy. Furthermore, the Index often does not identify government 51 As a note of caution, I would recommend to any one using the New York Times Index to be aware of the fact that only partial information on a nation's international event/interactions can be gathered under the subject head ing for that nation. As an example, there is some question as to the reliability of a recent study by Edward Azar et al. comparing several news sources. They suggest that the New York Times Index does not report as much information on Egyptian event/interactions as the chronology of the Middle East Journal nor do the events reported in these sources overlap in more than a small percent of the total cases (10.9%). The Azar comparison was based on a proced ure which examined "only the heading of 'Egypt' in the sources where this was possible." In the New York Times Index a complete collection of event data would require a more thorough search for information on Egyptian event/ interactions under such headings as 'COMMERCE,' 'OIL,' 'MIDDLE EAST,' 'FOOD,' etc. While Azar's findings may be correct, the data collection procedure as explained in his report is inadequate for a reliable comparison of data sources. See Edward E. Azar et al., "A Quantitative Com parison of Source Coverage for Event Data: Preliminary Findings," Department of Political Science, Michigan State University (no date; mimeographed). 128 officials making statements by the government they repre sent. This requires checking various names with other sources of information in order to correctly identify a decision maker with his represented nation. Consequently, data collection from the Index is time consuming and often frustrating. Every page of the Index must be scanned for worthy news items, cross referenced items inadvertently collected must be later cleared out to avoid "double coding," and special care must be taken to insure the correct matching of event/interaction with the target and actor nations. This tedious procedure proved to be somewhat faster than reading the microfilm of the New York Times newspapers for 1949, 1951, and 1963. Trial experiments clearly indicated that collecting data from the Indexes of the New York Times was more efficient than reading daily copies of the New York Times from microfilm. If the requirement for data collection had been to collect all event data for all nations rather than just United States interactions, a daily reading of the newspaper itself probably would have been the most efficient means of data collection. In the case of selecting only a subset of event/interaction data, the Index proved useful in that 129 the symbol (US) and familiar US decision makers (Acheson, McCloy, Truman, etc.) could be quickly identified and collected from the column of the Index. The data from the indexes were somewhat "over collected." Items which seemed to be marginally acceptable under the rules described above were collected to be later judged as useful or unuseful information. The guideline followed when collecting data was that suggested in the 52 WEIS codebook. "When in doubt, retain the item." Collected but questionable items as a rule were discussed among members of the WEIS project and accepted or rejected after close examination. The cards found to be already collected, cross referenced information, or information not acceptable according to the coding rules accounted for about 25 percent of the total Index data collected. In summary, only items about events in which the United States was a direct participant were collected. In any situation where the United States was acting as a representative of a larger body, such as during the Korean war when United States representatives often acted in 52 Fitzsimmons et al., "WEIS Handbook and Codebook," p. 8. 130 behalf of the United Nations, the event was not included in the data collected. Combat items during 1961 and 1966 between the United States and its adversaries were also excluded, according to WEIS data collection rules. The event data for 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 are a profile of United States international political inputs and outputs into the international system for these selected years. Event/Interaction Codes It was explained above that data for international event/interactions in which the United States was either an Actor or Target were collected from the New York Times newspaper for 1966 and from the New York Times Index for 1949, 1951, and 1963. Only events reported as actual "events of the day" have been collected, and all editorial izing news has been passed over. We suspect that these data which surely do not contain all United States inter national relations do profile correctly the relative allocation, intensity, and types of United States inter actions with other members of the international system. The reporting of news in the news media is in a literary form which must be transformed into discrete items of information. The actions of nations are manifold, of 131 course, and range from highly cooperative actions such as agreements to threatening and forceful acts. In order to operationalize the original information on nation behavior into a form acceptable for quantitative data analysis, a strict set of rules must be followed to organize this information into types or categories of actions. These categories must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive so that every single item of information collected can be discriminated and placed into one and only one of the categories of action. The procedure for coding event/interaction data used in this analysis was borrowed directly from the World Event/Interaction Survey. The WEIS project has developed over the past several years a rigorous scheme for event data categorization. These rules for coding are briefly discussed below to aid the unfamiliar reader with this process of data preparation. For a more thorough discus sion of these rules and procedures, see the WEIS code book.53 Fitzsimmons et al., "WEIS Handbook and Code book," 132 The first step in the coding procedure is to identify the Actor (WHO) and Target (WHOM). A set of codes has been employed which identifies targets and 54 actors. The United States, for example, is identified by the number 002; the Soviet Union, 365; the United Nations, 399; Japan, 740; etc. These number codes are especially useful for computer operations concerning data storage and retrieval. The major coding of the data con cerns, of course, the designation of actions by type. The WEIS classification scheme identified two sets of codes. One set includes 63 action types and the second set (actually a subset) includes 22 collapsed categories of the original 63. Table 1 displays these codes. The 22- category system is used in this study. The following explanation should help the reader to better understand these codes.^5 54 . . For an explanation of these nation identifica tions see Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (September 1968) , 932-951. 55Fitzsimmons et al., "WEIS Handbook and Codebook," pp. 9-10. 133 TABLE 1 WEIS CODE (Event/Interaction Survey) 1. YIELD 011 Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest, etc. 012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate 013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement 2. COMMENT 021 Explicit decline to comment 022 Comment on situation— pessimistic 023 Comment on situation— neutral 024 Comment on situation— optimistic 025 Explain policy or future position 3. CONSULT 031 Meet with; at neutral site; or send note; stay in same place 032 Visit; go to; leave country 033 Receive visit; host 4. APPROVE 041 Praise, hail, applaud, condolences, ceremonial greetings, thanks 042 Endorse others' policy or position, give verbal support 5. PROMISE 051 Promise own policy support 052 Promise material support 053 Promise other future support action 054 Assure; reassure 6. GRANT 061 Express regret; apologize 062 Give state invitation 063 Grant asylum 064 Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition; de facto relations, etc. 065 Suspend negative sanctions; truce 066 Release and/or return persons or property 134 TABLE 1 (Continued) 7. REWARD 071 Extend economic aid (gift and/or loan) 072 Extend military assistance; joint military exercise 073 Give other assistance 8. AGREE 081 Make substantive agreement 082 Agree to future action or procedure; agree to meet, to negotiate; accept state invitation 9. REQUEST 091 Ask for information 092 Ask for policy assistance; seek 093 Ask for material assistance 094 Request action; call for; ask for asylum 095 Entreat; plead for; appeal to; help 10. PROPOSE 101 Offer proposal 102 Urge or suggest action or policy 11. REJECT 111 Turn down proposal; reject protest demand, threat, etc. 112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow; exclude 12. ACCUSE 121 Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove 122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse; condemn 13. PROTEST 131 Make complaint (not formal) 132 Make formal complaint or protest 14. DENY 141 Deny an accusation 142 Deny an attributed policy, action, role, or position 15. DEMAND 150 Issue order or command, insist; demand compliance, etc. 135 TABLE 1 (Continued) 16. WARN 160 Give warning 17. THREATEN 171 Threat without specific negative sanctions 172 Threat with specific nonmilitary negative sanctions 173 Threat with force specified 174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time limit specified 18. DEMONSTRATE 181 Nonmilitary demonstration; walk out on; boycott 182 Armed force mobilization, exercise, and/or display 19. REDUCE RELATIONSHIP (as Neg. Sanction) 191 Cancel or postpone planned event 192 Reduce routine international activity; recall officials, etc. 193 Reduce or suspend aid or assistance 194 Halt negotiations 195 Break diplomatic relations 20. EXPEL 201 Order personnel out of country; deport 202 Expel organization or group 21. SEIZE 211 Seize position or possessions 212 Detain or arrest person(s) 22. FORCE 221 Noninjury destructive act, bomb with no one hurt 222 Nonmilitary injury-destruction 223 Military engagement 136 1. Twenty-two cue-words organize the 63 types. These cue-words are not to be taken to be exact common- language meanings. They are technical mnemonic devices only. They are listed below. 2. A rough ordering of the 22 cue-words is pro vided so that the first ten have to do with more peaceful, benign, cooperative, nonaggressive types of events while the second group consists of more belligerent, aggressive, conflict-related events. No theoretical significance underlies this arrangement and no scaling techniques are involved. The ordering is a convenience to assist coders in remembering the system. The 22 reminders or cue-words, in the two groupings, ares YIELD ACCUSE COMMENT PROTEST CONSULT DENY APPROVE DEMAND PROMISE WARN GRANT THREATEN REWARD DEMONSTRATE AGREE REDUCE RELATIONSHIP REQUEST EXPEL PROPOSE SEIZE REJECT FORCE Under each heading (i.e., YIELD) are additional cue-words which refer directly to the 63-category system. The three- digit number equivalents are given here. For example. 137 YIELD contains: 011 Surrender; yield to order; submit to arrest 012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate 013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement The total number of event/interactions coded for this study for the four time-periods were 10862. The data have been separated into eight data sets for the analysis of the limited-war propositions. These include: LIMITED WAR DATA SETS FREQUENCY KOREA 1. The United States as an Actor, 1949, 1896 2. The United States as a Target, 1949, 1183 3. The United States as an Actor, 1951, 1571 4. The United States as a Target, 1951, 1267 VIETNAM 5. The United States as an Actor, 1963, 1688 6. The United States as a Target, 1963, 1333 7. The United States as an Actor, 1966, 1017 8. The United States as a Target, 1966, 907 These eight data sets include all the quantitative event/interaction information to be examined in this research. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, the data are analyzed in examination of the propositions listed in Chapter II. In most cases only a subset of the original data is em ployed in an analysis. In the study of United States actions toward NATO members, for example, only the data for acts toward those countries that are members of NATO 138 are examined. Accordingly, before each analysis a brief description of the data to be analyzed is provided CHAPTER IV UNITED STATES SYSTEM RELATIONS In Chapter II it was hypothesized that when a major nuclear nation, such as the United States, is involved in a limited war the overall patterns of its relations with members of the international system are expected to be significantly different from its relations in a nonwar period. In this chapter, the six propositions selected in support of this general hypothesis are examined. The examination of these propositions is not especially complicated, but it is long and involves the presentation of a large number of data analyses. In order to maintain an orderly presentation, the following pro cedures have been adhered to. The propositions are examined in order of IA through IIIB, and each proposition is examined separately for first the Korean case and then the Vietnam case. In the examination of each case, the nonwar period is discussed and then compared with the war period. At the completion of an analysis for both cases 139 140 for each proposition there is a summary of findings. At the end of the chapter there is a discussion, and the results are listed. Examination of Propositions IA and IB The reader may recall that the first questions discussed in Chapter II were concerned with the allocation i of a major nation's international relations when it is involved in limited war. Two propositions were posed which read as follows: Proposition IA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the allocation of its external relations toward members of the international system are not maintained as in a nonwar period. Proposition IB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the allocation of other system member's external relations toward it are not main tained as in a nonwar period. The importance of these propositions, according to inter national relations theoreticians and policy-makers, was discussed in Chapter II. The results of earlier research on limited war suggest that the impact of limited war on the system relations of an involved major nation is prob ably related to changes in both relations toward and from the major nation. The analyses which follow search for 141 changes in the overall patterns of United States inter national relations with other members of the international system. We begin the investigation with an examination of Proposition IA for the Korean case. Proposition IA; The Korean Case In Table 2 the total frequencies for the United States as an Actor in 1949 and 1951 are listed. As one can see, the Soviet Union in 1949 received more United States international actions than any other system member with a total of 252 recorded acts. The United Kingdom (178) and the United Nations (110) received the next greatest amounts. Haiti and thirteen other nations received the least amount of recorded action with only one per target. The event/interaction data provide a good indication that there was a large differential range in the relative allocation of United States international actions in 1949. If we make an arbitrary decision to look at only 10 percent of the most frequented targets of the United States (the first eight nations on the list), we find that these nations received 54 percent of the recorded United States international actions in 1949. The next 20 percent of the nations on the list received 29 percent of United 142 TABLE 2 PROFILE OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, 1949 AND 1951 USA ACTOR 1949 USR 252 CHL 7 UNK 178 SAF 7 UNO 110 PAK 7 FRN 77 IRE 6 CHN 70 JOR 6 JAP 59 DOM 4 NAT 52 URU 4 CHT 50 SWD 4 ISR 48 PER 3 CAN 48 BOL 3 GRC 43 SNZ 3 GMW 41 POR 3 ITA 37 SYR 3 HUN 35 VTS 3 NTH 29 CUB 2 CZE 29 ECU 2 YUG 27 PAR 2 SPN 22 LUX 2 BUL 22 ALB 2 IND 22 FIN 2 ARG 21 LBR 2 KOS 18 ETH 2 PHI 18 HOK 2 1RN 17 BUR 2 AUS 16 HAI 1 MEX 15 GUA 1 RUM 15 ELS 1 GME 14 NIC 1 NOR 14 VEN 1 INS 13 OAS 1 IRQ 12 EEC 1 DEN 11 MOR 1 AUL 11 LBY 1 COL 9 SAU 1 POL 9 AFG 1 PAN 8 KON 1 BEL 8 TAI 1 UAR 8 MAL 1 BRA 7 USA ACTOR 1951 USR 210 LEB 5 UNK 115 JOR 5 CHN 97 VEN 4 FRN 81 ECU 4 UNO 81 PER 4 GMW 74 BOL 4 KON 68 SWZ 4 CZE 63 POR 4 KOS 62 SWD 3 JAP 37 NOR 3 ITA 34 SYR 3 IRN 33 PAK 3 CHT 31 BUR 3 IND 28 CEY 3 CAN 20 CAM 3 HUN 20 BTS 3 UAR 21 INS 3 SPN 17 DOM 2 DEN 16 PAN 2 NTH 15 OAS 2 ISR 15 IRE 2 BRA 13 FIN 2 BEL 12 ETH 2 GRC 12 MOR 2 MEX 10 KUW 2 AUS 10 HOK 2 NAT 10 HAI 1 AUL 10 GUA 1 NEW 10 NIC 1 ARG 9 URU 1 GME 9 LUX 1 TUR 9 BUL 1 PHI 9 LBR 1 YUG 8 SAF 1 CHL 7 AFG 1 POL 7 NEP 1 COL 6 TAI 1 CUB 5 LAO 1 RUM 5 MAL 1 ICE 5 SIN 1 LBY 5 143 States actions, and the remaining 52 targets, which com prise 70 percent of those listed, received only 17 percent of the indicated United States actions. These results suggest that in 1949 the United States directed its inter national activity unevenly among system members, and that there were a few system members toward which the United States was very active and a large number of system members which received very few United States actions. The data also suggest that in 1949 South Korea was a mildly active target of the United States with eighteen acts received. North Korea received only one United States action. The Communist Chinese regime, which came to power in 1949, was acted toward frequently by the United States as were France and Japan. Israel, Canada, Greece, West Germany, Italy, and Hungary also received a rather large number of United States actions, suggesting an important Atlantic-European focus of United States relations in 1949, as well as an orientation toward the troubled Asian areas of post-war Japan and China. Latin America and especially Sub-Saharan Africa (where, of course, most present day nations were colonies in 1949) received, in general, a rather low amount of direct diplomatic action from the United States. 144 If we look at Table 3, we can see both similarities and differences in the data for 1949 and 1951. In 1951 the Soviet Union and United Kingdom remained the most acted toward nations. West Germany advanced in ranking somewhat while Japan dropped slightly and NATO quite a long way. There was not, however, a major shift in the relative frequency of United States actions toward the top twenty targets between 1949 and 1951. Furthermore, as i Table 4 shows, there was almost no change in the percent age of actions which the United States directed toward the most and least active targets between 1949 and 1951. In 1951, as in 1949, the United States continued to act rela tively infrequently toward Latin American and Sub-Saharan African nations. The most startling difference in United States relations between 1949 and 1951 was, as Table 3 shows, the great increase in the volume of United States actions toward North Korea. North Korea jumped 70 places in its rank as a target of the United States. This is quite a large increase in the number of acts received from the United States, since this does not include any of either the fighting actions or the negotiation actions between the two countries when the United States was acting in the 145 TABLE 3 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR RANK CHANGE FROM 1949 TO 1951 1949 RANK RANK CHANGE 1951 RANK SOVIET UNION 0 SOVIET UNION UNITED KINGDOM 0 UNITED KINGDOM UNITED NATIONS ♦2 COMMUNIST CHINA FRANCE 0 FRANCE COMMUNIST CHINA -2 UNITED NATIONS JAPAN +6 WEST GERMANY NATO +70 NORTH KOREA NATIONALIST CHINA 8 CZECHOSLOVAKIA ISRAEL +13 SOUTH KOREA CANADA -4 JAPAN GREECE +2 ITALY WEST GERMANY +4 IRAN ITALY -5 NATIONALIST CHINA HUNGARY +6 INDIA NETHERLANDS -5 CANADA CZECHOSLOVAKIA +14 EGYPT YUGOSLAVIA -1 SPAIN SPAIN +6 DENMARK BULGARIA -4 NETHERLANDS INDIA -11 ISRAEL 146 TABLE 4 THE ALLOCATION OF UNITED STATES BEHAVIOR TOWARD HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW FREQUENCY TARGETS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 AND 1951 1949 1951 Top 10% of U.S. Targets 54% 56% Next 20% of U.S. Targets 29% 28% Lowest 70% of U.S. Targets 17% 16% capacity of a United Nations representative. North Korea clearly became a major diplomatic target of the United States in 1951 which was a major change from 1949. This result is not surprising, however, since 1951 was a war period and we should expect the battlefield adversary to become a very important foreign policy object. These data alone do not provide enough information to either support or reject the first proposition on limited war involvement which suggested that a significant change would not occur in the allocation of a major nation's international behavior when it became involved in a contemporary limited war. United States relations 147 with North Korea and South Korea increased in frequency, but other United States relations appeared to change very little as far as the relative frequency of interaction was concerned. In order to study further this proposition, another test of the data can be made. This test is a simple measure of association between the allocation of United States acts in 1949 and 1951. The Pearson Product Moment correlation is used to provide a measure of the "degree or strength of the relationship"1 between the allocation of United States actions toward a large number of members of the international system between 1949 and 1951. In order to reduce "noise" in the data from system members with only marginal relations with the United States, we decided to eliminate from this analysis nations which received very infrequent acts in both 1949 and 1951. Although these relations do reflect actual system proc esses, we know that if this data contained a large number of targets receiving very few acts from the United States 1See Herbert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 285- 299. 148 in both 1949 and 1951, the correlation results would tend to favor these stable, but probably not very significant, United States relations. A large number of such system members might bias the results since the correlation measure is highly affected by extreme values. This is true, of course, for high as well as low values, but because the Soviet Union and other high frequency targets appear to be especially important to the United States, their influence over the data seems more justifiable. The criterion followed was that for a system member to be included in the correlation analysis it had to be acted toward by the United States at least five times in either 1949 or 1951. Thus, a nation such as Ireland (IRE) toward which the United States acted six times in 1949 but only twice in 1951 was included for analysis. The Dominican Republic (DOM), which received four acts in 1949 and two in 1951 was not included in the analysis. Fifty-one sys tem members from the 1949 and 1951 data (Table 2) were included for analysis by this criteria. The Pearson Product Moment correlation between the two years produced a rather high correlation of .88. This suggests that when only the most active targets of the United States are examined, there was not a major shift in 149 the allocation of United States international behavior toward members of the international system from the pre- Korean war period to the war period. Proposition IA: The Vietnam Case In Table 5, which provides the data for the United States as an Actor in 1963 and 1966, we again find that the Soviet Union received the greatest amount of United States actions for these years. The United Nations and the United Kingdom were also very active targets of the United States. In 1963 South Vietnam was a high recipient of United States actions which suggests a deep concern in the United States for the domestic problems in South Viet nam. In 1963, the reader may recall, the political situa tion in South Vietnam was in great turmoil. President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu both were assassinated and the period following these assassinations was very unstable. The United States made considerable efforts to help build and support a stable government in South Vietnam in 1963, which probably accounts for the high amount of United States action. North Vietnam was not, 2 Congressional Quarterly Service, Global Defense: U.S. Military Commitments Abroad (Washington, D.C., Septem- ber 1969). p. 58.______________________________________________ 150 TABLE 5 PROFILE OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, 1963 AND 1966 USA ACTOR 1963 USR 285 ISR 9 PAN 3 VTS 89 LAP 8 JAM 2 UNO 79 BUL 8 GUA 2 UNK 76 BOL 7 BEL 2 GMW 71 IRE 7 SWZ 2 FRN 62 POL 7 AUS 2 IND 59 HUN 7 CYP 2 NAT 44 TUR 7 DEN 2 CAN 42 SYR 7 GUI 2 PAK 37 VEN 6 CON 2 EEC 36 MOR 6 KEN 2 JAP 29 TAI 6 NEP 2 CHN 25 PHI 5 AUL 2 INS 22 CHT 5 COL 1 UAR 22 YEM 5 PAR 1 LAO 21 ECU 5 CHL 1 ITA 19 RUM 5 CZE 1 ARG 18 HON 5 MLT 1 VUG 18 GUY 4 ALB 1 CUB 17 OAS 4 FIN 1 HAI 16 NTH 4 NOR 1 BRA 16 POR 4 WAR 1 KOS 14 NIG 4 NEW 1 DOM 14 AFG 4 ICE 1 SPN 14 VTN 3 HOK 1 PER 13 SEA 3 IVD 1 CAM 12 TAZ 3 KUN 1 GME 12 SOM 3 LBR 1 SAF 11 GTH 3 JOR 1 ALG 11 IRN 3 GHA 1 SAU 11 IRQ 3 SUD 1 GRC 10 TOG 3 RHO 1 KON 10 MAL 3 LBY 1 CEX 10 SWD 3 MAW 1 COP 9 LUX 3 TUN 1 MEX 9 ELS 3 MAR 1 USA ACTOR 1966 USR 104 CHT 7 RWA 2 UNO 65 SAU 6 ETH 2 VTN 58 OAS 5 ZAM 2 VTS 56 SPN 5 MOR 2 CHN 53 GME 5 BUR 2 FRN 41 YUG 5 CEY 2 IND 36 RHO 5 SIM 2 GMW 35 IRN 5 HAI 1 UNK 30 JOR 5 NIG 1 NAT 19 LAO 5 ECU 1 PAK 17 AUL 5 PER 1 CAM 17 RUM 4 URU 1 ISR 16 KON 4 NTH 1 TAI 15 MAL 4 SWZ 1 UAR 14 CHL 3 POR 1 JAP 14 ITA 3 HUN 1 PHI 13 FIN 8 ALB 1 KOS 12 SAF 3 BUL 1 CUB 11 TUN 3 NOR 1 DOM n TUR 3 ICE 1 VCG n SYR 3 NIG 1 CAN 10 COL 2 KEN 1 GUI 9 GUY 2 OAU 1 ALG 9 AUS 2 SUD 1 INS 9 GRC 2 YEM 1 MEX 8 SWD 2 PIO 1 ARG 8 EEC 2 MON 1 POL 8 SEN 2 HOK 1 GHA 7 COP 2 NEP 1 BRA 7 TAZ 2 NEW 1 CZE 7 BUI 2 151 however, a receiver of very much United States action (four acts), which suggests that in 1963 the United States was highly concerned with civil unrest in South Vietnam but not with a war with North Vietnam. In 1963 Latin- American nations received somewhat more United States actions relative to 1949 and 1951, but Sub-Saharan African nations continued to be infrequent recipients of United States acts. Canada and European and Asian nations received the bulk of United States international actions in 1963. Again, as in both 1949 and 1951, the United States was very active with a small number of nations (i.e., 56 percent of its action went toward 10 percent of the system members for which there were data), had a middle range of activity with a somewhat larger number of nations (25 percent of its acts went toward 20 percent of the system members), and a small amount of activity (18 percent) with a rather large number of system members (70 percent of the total). If we examine the data for 1966 for the ten most active nations (10 percent of all targets), we observe very little change between 1963 and 1966. The only major change, and not unexpectedly, was in the United States relations toward North Vietnam which became very frequent 152 in 1966. Below the top ten, as shown in Table 6, there were interesting changes, however. Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines increased dramatically in rank suggest ing that there was some directional shift in United States relations toward the Vietnam conflict area. Israel also increased its rank and the UAR is in the top twenty nations. Problems in both the Middle East and Southeast Asia appeared to be drawing special attention from the United States in 1966. In general, the direction of United States rela tions did not radically change, however, between 1963 and 1966. In both 1963 and 1966 over 50 percent of United States relations went toward only 10 percent of the inter national system, about 25 percent of its acts went toward the next 20 percent of the nations, and less than 20 per cent of United States acts went to the majority of inter national system members (70 percent). Furthermore, if a correlation measure is taken between the allocation of United States actions for 1963 and 1966, there is a .81 correlation between the two periods for the 65 nations for which five or more acts were recorded for either 1963 or 1966. This suggests that regardless of the few rather spectacular changes in the direction of United States 153 TABLE 6 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR RANK CHANGE FROM 1963 TO 1966 1963 RANK_______ RANK CHANGE_______ 1966 RANK SOVIET UNION 0 SOVIET UNION SOUTH VIETNAM +1 UNITED NATIONS UNITED NATIONS +64 NORTH VIETNAM UNITED KINGDOM -2 SOUTH VIETNAM WEST GERMANY +8 COMMUNIST CHINA FRANCE 0 FRANCE INDIA 0 INDIA NATO -3 WEST GERMANY CANADA -5 UNITED KINGDOM PAKISTAN -2 NATO EEC -1 PAKISTAN JAPAN -16 CAMBODIA COMMUNIST CHINA +22 ISRAEL INDONESIA +33 THAILAND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 0 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC LAOS -4 JAPAN ITALY +35 PHILIPPINES ARGENTINA +6 SOUTH KOREA YUGOSLAVIA +1 CUBA CUBA +4 DOMONICAN REPUBLIC 154 international relations, such as its relations toward North Vietnam, the United States maintained in both 1963 and 1966 a similar allocation of international action. Summary: Proposition IA From this examination of Proposition IA for the Korean and Vietnam limited war cases, we can conclude the following: 1. The United States in both nonwar and periods of limited war involvement maintained a relatively strong flow of event-actions toward the Soviet Union. The United Nations, United Kingdom, France, and Communist China also consistently received a large proportion of United States actions. These system members appear to have had special relations with the United States whether or not the United States was involved in a limited war. These system members receive further study in Chapters V and VI. 2. The United States maintained, in both nonwar and war years, a consistent allocation of actions toward members of the international system. The most acted toward 10 percent of all system members consistently received over 55 percent of all United States actions. The next 20 percent generally received less than 30 percent of the 155 acts, and the next 70 percent of all system members received less than 20 percent of all United States inter national event-actions. The United States acted rela tively fewer times toward the Latin American and Sub- Saharan African regions than toward Western and Eastern European, Asian, or Middle Eastern regions during both war and nonwar periods. 3. The correlation between nonwar and limited war years for those nations with which the United States had a minimal amount of interaction were high enough (r = .88 and .81) to conclude that the allocation of United States actions towards members of the international system was not very different for the limited war and nonwar periods examined. 4. While United States system relations were maintained in general, the data suggest that there were some changes in relations with particular countries and especially those in the geo-political area of the limited war. In Chapters V and VI some of these changes are investigated further. 5. We may conclude, therefore, that the widely held view that involvement in a limited war has a major impact on the system relations of a major nation may not 156 be true, judging by the data and analysis used here to examine the allocation of United States event/interactions. Proposition IB: The Korean Case The data for the United States as a Target of other members of the international system in 1949 and 1951 provided in Table 7, show some similarities with the data for the United States as an Actor during the same periods. Among system members, the Soviet Union was the most active nation toward the United States in 1949, and the United Kingdom, France, and Communist China again ranked high. Table 7 shows that South Korea ranked in the middle range with seventeen recorded acts. Again, Latin America and Sub-Saharan African nations were not as active in their relations with the United States as other major geo political areas. The ratios of actions among the top 10 percent, next 20 percent, and final 70 percent of the nations were very similar to previous findings. The small first group of nations accounted for 54 percent of all acts, the middle group for 27 percent of all acts, and the final large group of nations accounted for only 17 percent of the acts. It is evident in Tables 7 and 8 that behavior 157 TABLE 7 PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1949 AND 1951 USA TARGET 1949 USA TARGET 1951 USR 226 AUS 5 USR 239 CAM UNK 159 AFG 4 UNK 128 BOL FRN 66 JOR 4 FRN 111 SWZ CHN 58 PAN 4 CHN 95 POR CAN 56 CHL 4 cuj QnW 51 SAF CZE 35 IRE 4 IND 40 (.EB CHT 33 NAT 4 CZE 39 JOR ITA 31 VTS 4 KOS 30 O0M UNO 31 GUA 3 CAN 29 VEN ISR 28 URU 3 JAP 24 AUS IND 26 POR 3 ITA 20 BUL YUG 25 RUN 3 CHT 19 RUM POL 23 SYR 3 UND 18 SWD GMN 22 LEB 3 ISR 18 ICE HUN 20 COS 2 HUN 17 MOR PHI 20 ECU 2 KON 16 KUW ARG 19 SWZ 2 NTH 16 HOK NTH 17 FIN 2 GME 15 GUA KOS 17 ETH 2 GRC 15 N|C CRC 15 TAI 2 YUG 14 COL IRN 14 INS 2 IRN 14 PER DEN 14 NEW 2 BRA 13 ElN JAP 14 CUB 2 SPN 13 NOR BRA 12 DOM 1 UAR 13 NAT AUL 11 ELS 1 AUL 13 GHA SPN 9 PER 1 DEN 12 LBY NOR 9 LUX 1 PHI 11 CEY COL 8 MLT 1 MEX 11 NEP BUL 8 ICE 1 BEL 11 TAI SAF 8 RWA 1 NEW 9 LAO PAK 8 MOR 1 TUR 9 NTS SWD 7 LBY 1 ECU 8 JAM UAR 7 SUD 1 CHL 8 HON BEL 6 IRQ 1 INS 8 IRE TUR 6 MON 1 ARG 7 SYR KON 6 BUR 1 PAK 7 AFG MEX 5 CEY 1 CUB 5 VTN GME 5 BUR 5 SIN 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 158 TABLE 8 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET RANK CHANGE FROM 1949 TO 1951 RANK RANK CHANGE 1951 RANK SOVIET UNION 0 SOVIET UNION UNITED KINGDOM 0 UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE 0 FRANCE COMMUNIST CHINA 0 COMMUNIST CHINA CANADA +9 WEST GERMANY CZECHOSLOVAKIA +5 INDIA NATIONALIST CHINA -1 CZECHOSLOVAKIA ITALY ♦11 SOUTH KOREA UNITED NATIONS -4 CANADA ISRAEL ♦13 JAPAN INDIA -3 ITALY YUGOSLAVIA -5 NATIONALIST CHINA POLAND -4 UNITED NATIONS WEST GERMANY -4 ISRAEL HUNGARY 0 HUNGARY PHILIPPINES +19 NORTH KOREA ARGENTINA +1 NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS +20 EAST GERMANY SOUTH KOREA -7 YUGOSLAVIA GREECE + 1 IRAN 159 directed toward the United States in 1951 was similar to the behavior in 1949. The Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Communist China ranked in 1951 exactly as they did in 1949. The major differences shown in Table 8 were the increased ranks of South Korea, Japan, North Korea, and East Germany, and the decreased ranks of Poland and Argentina. The increased activity from the two Koreas and Japan suggest some redistribution of action from nations in the conflict area toward the United States. The increase in East German actions was related, in part, to United States concern over some border and access problems in 1951. The ratio of total actions directed toward the United States in 1951 breaks into the now familiar pattern, but this time with somewhat more activity accounted for by the top 10 percent of the nations (60 percent of all actions), and from the last large group of nations (18 per cent of all actions). The correlation between actions directed toward the United States in 1949 and 1951 was .95, which is the highest yet to be reported. This correlation indicates that the allocation of actions from members of the international system toward the United States was similar before and during the Korean war. 160 Proposition IB: The Vietnam Case In the data presented in Table 9 for 1963 for the United States as a Target, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom rank first and second, indicating that they acted more toward the United States than any other nations. West Germany ranks third, with Canada, France, and South Vietnam following. Cuba ranks fairly high in 1963, and Argentina, Haiti, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic group somewhat below Cuba. This suggests that in 1963 Latin American nations were acting more toward the United States than during the periods studied for the Korean case. Sub- Saharan African nations acted relatively little toward the United States. North Vietnam is quite far down the list (four actions) giving further evidence that in 1963 the United States and North Vietnam had little direct inter action. As might be expected by now, the data show a few nations acting very frequently toward the United States, and a large number of nations acting very little toward the United States. The data for 1966 for the United States as a Target show some interesting shifts from 1963 in the allocation of actions toward the United States. The Soviet Union remains the most active nation but now Communist China is 161 TABLE 9 PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1963 AND 1966 USA TARGET 1963 USA TARGET 1963 USR 279 GRC 8 TUR 3 USR 138 ALG 6 SEN 2 UNK 91 KOS 8 MAL 3 CHN 88 AUL 6 TAZ 2 GMW 77* PHI 8 AUL 3 VTN 77 COL 5 BUI 2 CAN 56 VEN 7 JAM 2 UAR 32 BUL 5 ETH 2 FRN 52 GUY 7 LUX 2 FRN 31 ITA 5 ZAM 2 VTS 51 SWZ 7 MLT 2 GMW 31* GHA 5 MOR 2 CHN 50 BOL 6 FIN 2 IND 28 TUR 5 TUN 2 IND 35 POR 6 DEN 2 UNK 27 SAU 5 IRQ 2 JAP 29 BUL 6 LBR 2 UNO 25 KON 5 PLO 2 PAK 29 TAZ 6 IRN 2 CAM 25 CHL 4 HAI 1 CUB 28 PAN 5 JOR 2 VTS 24 HUN 4 COS 1 UND 25 IRE 5 YEM 2 CUB 21 RUM 4 PAN 1 CAM 24 RUM 5 MON 2 POL 15 SWD 4 VEN 1 YUG 21 COP 5 TAI 2 CAN 14 SAF 4 BOL 1 EEC 21 SAF 5 LAO 2 VCG 14 IRN 4 URU 1 KON 21 CHT 5 ELS 1 PAK 14 JOR 4 BEL 1 ITA 16 CEY 5 COS 1 SYR 13 DOM 3 POR 1 ARG 15 LAP 5 COL 1 SPN 13 ECU 3 AUS 1 m GME 15 VTN 4 PAR 1 JAP 13 PER 3 NOR 1 13“ HON 4 OAS 1 PHI 13 DEN 3 EEC 1 HAI 13 NTH 4 AUS 1 INS 13 CHT 3 COP 1 BRA 13 BEL 4 CYP 1 CZE 9 LAO 3 KEN 1 ALG 13 CZE 4 WAR 1 ISR 9 SIN 3 RHD 1 INS 12 SWO 4 ICE 1 GUI 8 NEW 3 SUD 1 DON 11 SOM 4 EFT 1 KOS 8 GUY 2 KUW 1 ISR 11 SYR 4 ZAM 1 MEX 7 UND 2 ARL 1 POL 10 AFG 4 RHO 1 YUG 7 GRC 2 MON 1 UAR 10 ECU 3 MAR 1 TAI 7 FIN 2 BUR 1 PER 9 ALB 3 SUD 1 GME 7 ICE 2 CEY 1 MEX 9 NOR 3 NEP 1 BRA 6 NAT 2 MAL 1 NAT 9 GUI 3 VCG 1 ARC 6 ETH 9 NIG 3 NEW 1 SAU 9 KEN 3 SEA 1 HUN 8 MOR 3 ‘Includes WBE (1) “ Includes EBE (3) 162 in second place and North Vietnam is third with a rather large increase in rank. Tables 9 and 11 show that the Viet Cong and the Philippines, as might be expected during the war period, also acted relatively more toward the United States in 1966 than in 1963. The high rise of the United Arab Republic, Poland, and Spain suggest other international problems which were impacting on the United States in 1966. The ratio of acts directed toward the United States from high, medium, and low activity system members in 1966 was very similar to the activity in 1963 as shown in Table 10. TABLE 10 THE ALLOCATION OF BEHAVIOR RECEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES FROM HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW FREQUENCY ACTORS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1963 AND 1966 1963 1966 Top 10% of Actors 58% 56% Next 20% of Actors 23% 26% Lowest 70% of Actors 19% 18% 163 TABLE 11 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET RANK CHANGE FROM 1963 TO 1966 1963 RANK ___ RANK CHANGE___________ 1966 RANK SOVIET UNION 0 SOVIET UNION UNITED KINGDOM +5 COMMUNIST CHINA WEST GERMANY +54 NORTH VIETNAM CANADA +24 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FRANCE 0 FRANCE SOUTH VIETNAM -3 WEST GERMANY COMMUNIST CHINA +1 INDIA INDIA -6 UNITED KINGDOM JAPAN +3 UNITED NATIONS PAKISTAN +3 CAMBODIA CUBA -5 SOUTH VIETNAM UNITED NATIONS -1 CUBA CAMBODIA +14 POLAND YUGOSLAVIA -10 CANADA EEC +86 VIET CONG NORTH KOREA -6 PAKISTAN ITALY +39 SYRIA ARGENTINA +1 SPAIN SPAIN -10 JAPAN EAST GERMANY +15 PHILIPPINES 164 The correlation between actions, as the list of rankings suggests, is not as high as it was for the Korean war. In the Korean case it was .95 and it is only .79 for the Vietnam case. The correlation indicates, never theless, a fairly high agreement between the two periods for the Vietnam case. This score suggests, therefore, that there was not a major difference in the allocation of relations from the international system toward the United States between 1963 and 1966. Summary: Proposition IB From the above examination of international system members' relations toward the United States, we can con clude the following: 1. The Soviet Union, France, and the United King dom were consistently very frequent actors toward the United States during the periods investigated whether or not the United States was involved in a limited war. Communist China, while a major actor toward the United States in a nonwar period, clearly increased the relative frequency of its actions toward the United States during the Korean and Vietnam wars. 2. During both the Korean and Vietnam wars, a few 165 nations in the local geographic area of the conflict increased the relative frequency of their actions toward the United States. In 1951 South Korea, North Korea, and Japan became very active toward the United States. In 1966 North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the Philippines increased their actions rather dramatically toward the United States. In general, however, there were no large- scale shifts in the allocations of system relations toward the United States (see point 4 below). 3. As in the case of the United States as an Actor, our data suggest that in 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 relatively few nations acted toward the United States often and a large number of nations acted toward the United States only a few times. We can conclude, at least for the periods examined, that a small number of system members were in close contact with the United States while a rather large number of system members were not, whether or not the United States was involved in a limited war. In the Korean case, Latin American and Sub-Saharan nations acted relatively infrequently toward the United States. In 1963 a few Latin American nations acted rela tively somewhat more often than in 1966 which suggests that some nations not in the conflict area which normally 166 have low interaction with the United States acted even less when the United States was involved in a limited war. Sub-Saharan African nations acted relatively few times toward the United States in both 1963 and 1966. Nations in this area apparently had infrequent relations with the United States in both the war and nonwar years examined. 4. For the Korean case, it seems evident that there was very little change in the allocation of system i ! relations toward the United States. The correlation of the allocation of acts between 1949 and 1951 was .95. For the Vietnam case the correlation between 1963 and 1966 was .79 which was fairly high, but clearly not as strong as for the Korean case. The Vietnam results imply that a somewhat different allocation pattern existed in 1966 than was evident in 1963. While the Korean and Vietnam cases do differ, the results of the analyses suggest, neverthe less, that the difference in the allocation of United States system relations between 1949 and 1951, and 1963 and 1966 were not very strong. Judging from the type of data examined and the analyses employed, the proposition that the system relations of the United States change sig nificantly during involvement in a limited war does not seem to hold for the periods examined here. 167 Discussion: Propositions IA and IB From the results reported above, we can conclude that neither Proposition IA nor IB appear to hold true for the data and periods examined. The data analyzed indicated that the allocation of United States relations for both the Korean and Vietnam cases tended to be main tained similarly in periods of nonwar and periods of limited war involvement. This finding implies that in volvement in limited war has not been related, in general, to major changes in the allocation of actions either toward or from the United States with other members of the international system. Limited wars, even of the size of the Korean and Vietnam wars have not drawn United States interaction away from the strategic areas of the Soviet Union and Communist China, nor from the traditional polit ically and militarily important areas of Western Europe and Canada. There were indications in the results which suggest, however, that if a few specific geo-political regions and individual nations were studied independently of the whole system, there would be a few major changes evident in the allocation of United States relations with these regions and nations. The results also indicated 168 that the biggest changes could be expected from 1963 to 1966, rather than from 1949 to 1951. Examination of Propositions IIA and IIB In addition to the propositions concerning the allocation of a major nation's international relations from a nonwar to a limited war period, there also were two propositions in Chapter II concerned with the disposition of a major nation's system relations. They were: Proposition IIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war the disposition of its external relations toward other members of the international system are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition IIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the disposition of the external relations directed toward it from other members of the international system are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. The purpose of investigating these propositions is that there are several ways in which the system relations of a major nation may change, and it seems especially important to determine if these relations become more con flictual in a limited war period. In Chapter II it was explained that a common expectation among many students of large scale international limited war is that the relations 169 of the major participants with other system members will become strained and generally less cooperative. The Korean and Vietnam wars are good cases to examine this view. Proposition IIA: The Korean Case In order to examine this proposition, it was neces sary to study the frequency of interactions by category type rather than simple total frequencies as was the case for the preceding analyses. In Chapter III, it was explained that the data collected for event/interactions were coded into 63 types of actions. These categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Furthermore, each item of event data is a unit with a value equal to every other unit of interaction. An act either occurs or it does not. When it does occur, it is counted and the frequency of acts are totaled for each category. We can, therefore, arrange the data in these categories into a variety of groupings of information without violating any of the assumptions under which the data were collected providing, of course, that the arrangement is logical and relevant to the problem considered. One of the especially useful features of the WEIS data is that the information collected has been coded in 170 such a manner that it can be placed into a variety of meaningful categories. In Chapter III the original coding of event/interactions into 63 codes and into 22 combevents was explained. In order to examine Propositions IIA and IIB it will be helpful to reduce even further the number of categories. The questions posed in Propositions IIA and IIB are concerned with cooperative and conflictual behavior. If we look closely at the categories we can see that it is possible to collapse the 22 categories into three behavior types which describe cooperative, conflictual, 3 and participatory actions. The 22-event categories distribute into the three behaviors as follows: Cooperation: Yield, Approve, Promise, Grant, Reward, Agree, Request, Propose Conflict: Reject, Accuse, Protest, Deny, Demand, Warn, Threaten, Demon strate, Reduce Relationship, Expel, Seize, and Force Participation: Comment and Consult 3 Charles McClelland and Gary Hoggard have discussed the aggregating and collapsing of event categories. They suggest that the participatory category which includes com ments, explanations, and consultations can be regarded (at least tentatively) "as functioning as a kind of 'overhead' expenditure to help keep the system in motion," Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in______ 171 If all the data collected for the United States as an Actor in 1949 are described by these three behaviors, United States system relations for 1949 are shown to be much more cooperative than conflictual as suggested in Table 12. The participation category identifies that in 1949 a large portion of United States behavior was participatory behavior or "overhead." TABLE 12 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD INTER NATIONAL SYSTEM MEMBERS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 Cooperation; 37% Conflict: 20% Participation: 44% Interactions Among Nations," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 715. 172 In the paper already referred to by Charles McClelland and Gary Hoggard, it was suggested that another more descriptive means to study conflictual and cooperative event/interactions data is by whether events are "talk" or "acts." McClelland and Hoggard explain: Another way to approach the proportions of activities in the international system is to consider the amount of "talk" compared to the amount of "action." Verbal activity is an awk ward term to cover a more complex grouping of behaviors. Under action we would include rewards which are consequent to and different from the promises which are verbal only. Punishments are actions that complement threats, on some occa sions. Also to be included under an action heading would be thost type of "physical deeds" that governments are capable of undertaking: arrests, confiscations, withdrawals of assist ance, impositions of penalties, armed attacks, intrusions, etc.4 McClelland and Hoggard suggest the following category scheme: Verbal Cooperation: Approve, Promise, Agree, Request, and Propose Cooperative Action: Yield, Grant, and Reward Verbal Participation: Comment Participatory Action: Consult 4Ibid., p. 11. 173 Defensive/Reactive Verbal Conflict: Reject, Protest, Deny Offensive Verbal Conflict: Accuse, Demand, Warn, and Threaten Conflict Action: Demonstrate, Reduce Relationship, Expel, Seize, and Force These categories show clearly that as well as the discrimination between cooperation, conflict, and partici pation, it is possible to describe also the event cate gories by whether or not event/interactions are "talk" or "action." We intuitively separate physical from verbal acts and often suspect that a physical action "costs" more than a verbal action. This may not be the case always, especially when comparing singular and discrete events, but when event data are aggregated the effect of aggregation reduces the influence of any single act and the general assumption that action "costs" more than talk can be usefully applied for the interpretation of aggre gated data. If a large proportion of the conflict for the United States is, for example, conflictual action and not offensive verbal conflict then we can infer a certain severity to these events. The data for the United States as an Actor are provided in Table 13. From this table several facts are 174 TABLE 13 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR, 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR VERBAL COOPERATION COOPERATIVE ACTION VERBAL PARTICIPATION PARTICIPATORY ACTION DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT CONFLICT ACTION TOTAL CORRELATION: .99 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts Total 459 24% 403 239 13% 186 566 30% 436 259 14% 235 142 8% 132 182 10% 145 49 3% 34 1896 102%* 1571 % of Differences Total In % Totals 26% 4-2% 11% -2% 28% -2% 15% +1% 8% 0 9% -1% 2% -1% 99% *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 175 clear. The United States in 1949, as well as being rela tively cooperative, was more inclined to talk than to act. The United States talked cooperatively 24 percent of the time, but acted cooperatively only 13 percent of the time; 30 percent of its behavior was verbal participation and only 14 percent was participatory action; finally, while the United States talked harshly 18 percent of the time, only 3 percent of its behavior was conflictual action. If we compare the United States as an Actor in 1949 with data for 1951 we find that there is a great similarity in behavior. Cooperative United States behavior in 1951 accounted for 37 percent of all its acts, conflic tual behavior accounted for 19 percent of its action, and 43 percent of its behavior was participatory. When these data for United States relations are viewed in the more detailed seven categories we can see that there was very little difference in the data for the two years. The greatest change was in Verbal Participation which tells little about either conflictual or cooperative behavior. The 2 percent increase in conflictual behavior in 1951 does not suggest a strong tendency toward increased con flict. In order to measure the degree of similarity in the 176 data between 1949 and 1951, the data for these seven variables were correlated. As might be expected the cor relation showed an agreement of .99, which is very high indeed. From these results it must be concluded that the data for United States international relations was as cooperative in 1951, a limited war year, as it was in 1949, a nonwar year. The international behavior of the United States did not become more conflictual nor, for that matter, more cooperative during the Korean war year. The disposition of United States behavior between 1949 and 1951 was very stable. Proposition IIA: The Vietnam Case In Table 14 the results for the United States as an Actor for 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 are provided. It is clear that there was not a great amount of difference in the disposition of United States system behavior among these periods. United States relations were primarily participatory and much more cooperative than conflictual. Furthermore, there was no increase in conflictual behavior between nonwar and war periods. If we look at Table 15, we can compare in more detail United States behavior between 1963 and 1966. The 177 TABLE 14 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MEMBERS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949, 1951, 1963, AND 1966 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPERATION 37% 37% 31% 40% CONFLICT 20% 20% 19% 18% PARTICIPATION 44% 43% 50% 43% most interesting was the relative increase in cooperative behavior by the United States. There was an 8 percent increase in cooperative behavior from 1963 to 1966 and a 2 percent decrease in conflictual behavior.^ The high cor relation of .92 between the data for United States system behavior in 1963 and 1966 suggests that the changes in United States relations during its involvement in the Viet nam war were not major shifts. As in the results for the Korean case, the Vietnam data do not indicate a major 5 These data do not include any battlefield events during the Vietnam war. 178 TABLE 15 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR, 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 383 23X 259 26X +3X COOPERATIVE ACTION 143 9X 144 14X +5% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 478 28X 287 28X 0 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 359 21X 147 15X -6X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 113 7X 82 8X +1X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 140 8X 72 7X -IX CONFLICT ACTION 72 4X 26 2X -2X TOTAL 1688 100X 1017 100X CORRELATION: 92 179 aberration in United States system relations during the war period 1966 for the type of data and according to the analysis used here. Summary: Proposition IIA The conclusions which may be drawn from the results of the analysis of United States actions toward other system members are the following: 1. The Korean and Vietnam cases were very similar. United States cooperative behavior ranged for the four years analyzed between 31 and 40 percent cooperative, and between 18 and 20 percent conflictual. There was no change toward increased conflict in the general disposition of United States behavior from the 1949-1951 period to the 1963-1966 period. 2. In all the four years studied, the United States "talked" more than it "acted" when its action was clearly cooperative or conflictual. It appears that "verbal" behavior, which may be less costly than "active" behavior, is the principal form of United States behavior in both war and nonwar years. 3. The correlations between the distribution of United States cooperative and conflictual behavior showed 180 that between 1949 and 1951 there was very little change in the disposition of United States international behavior toward other system members. United States actions did not become more conflictual. The analysis of the 1963 and 1966 data produced very similar results. The only difference was that the United States became more coopera tive in 1966 than in 1951. Neither war was associated with an increase in conflictual behavior from the nonwar period. The correlation between the data for 1949 and 1951 was .99, and between 1963 and 1966 it was .92. Proposition IIA, based on the data and data analysis employed in this study should not be accepted. Proposition IIB: The Korean Case In 1949, as shown in Table 16, the data suggest that members of the international system acted toward the United States about as cooperatively as the United States acted toward them in 1949. The data also show, however, that more conflictual types of acts were received than emitted from the United States in 1949. It appears that United States relations toward members of the international system were less conflictual than system member relations toward the United States. 181 TABLE 16 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD AND FROM INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MEMBERS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 USA Actor USA Target Cooperation 37% 33% Conflict 20% 28% Participation 44% 39% In Table 17 the data for the United States as a Target are described in terms of the seven behavior types. The data show that nations acting toward the United States, tended to "talk" rather than "act" cooperatively and con- flictually. This finding of a relatively high reliance on verbal behavior when an action was clearly cooperative or conflictual appears to underlie United States international relations since findings similar to these were present in the United States as an Actor data for both the Korean and Vietnam cases.® In 1949 there was a rather large amount ^McClelland and Hoggard found similar results in 182 TABLE 17 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET, 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 335 28* 412 33X +5X COOPERATIVE ACTION 55 SX 52 4X -IX VERBAL PARTICIPATION 209 18% 172 14% -4X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 250 21% 233 18X -3X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 69 6% 82 7% +1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 203 17% 285 23% +6* CONFLICT ACTION 60 51 30 21 -31 TOTAL 1181 100% 1266 101%* CORRELATION: .95 *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 183 of Offensive Verbal Conflict directed toward the United States relative to United States Offensive Verbal Conflict behavior in 1949. A large part of this action came from the Soviet-Bloc nations and Communist China. More is said about these relations in following chapters. In 1951 there was not a major change from 1949 in the general disposition of behavior directed toward the United States. Thirty-seven percent of all acts were co operative, 32 percent were conflictual, and 31 percent were participatory. There was a decrease in participatory behavior from 1949 which was split evenly in 1951 into more cooperative and conflictual behavior, as Table 18 shows. If we refer back to Table 17 we can see in more detail what these shifts were. The major change between 1949 and 1951 was an increase in both Verbal Cooperation and Verbal Conflict. As suspected, opposition to United States policies increased in 1951 during the Korean war period. There was an increase in accusations, demands, their analysis of system behavior for all nations in 1966. They found 48 percent of cooperative and conflict behavior were of a "talk" type and only 16 percent of an "action" type. McClelland and Hoggard, op. cit., pp. 715-716. 184 TABLE 18 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR RECEIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MEMBERS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 AND 1951 1949 1951 33% 37% 28% 32% 39% 31% warnings, and threats. This may indicate that United States adversaries were somewhat more negative in their relations toward the United States in 1951 than in 1949. In the following chapter we shall investigate further this question. The increase in cooperative and conflictual talk came at the expense of Verbal Participation. It also came, more interestingly, from the Conflict Action cate gory which was reduced by more than half. This suggests a possible reduction in the direct involvement of the United States in conflict areas outside of the Korean Cooperative Conflict Participation 185 7 area.' If we look at the overall measure of association between the time periods, 1949 and 1951, we find again a rather high correlation of .95 which indicates that while there were some changes, there was not a major shift in conflictual and cooperative behavior toward the United States from members of the international system between 1949 and 1951. Proposition IIB: The Vietnam Case The results for the United States as a Target in 1963 were somewhat different from the results for 1949 and 1951. There was more conflict directed toward the United States in 1963 and 1966 than in the earlier periods. In 1963, 28 percent of the acts from the international system directed toward the United States were cooperative, 33 percent were conflictual, and 39 percent participatory. Furthermore, this behavior was more conflictual than United States behavior in 1963, since only 19 percent of 7 There was also a slight reduction in the already low United States initiated conflict actions between 1949 and 1951 from 3 to 2 percent of total United States system relations. 186 the recorded actions for the United States, for that year were conflictual. If we look at Table 19 for the United States as a Target, we can see how these relations were distributed among the seven categories. Again, physical actions were received by the United States in both 1963 and 1966 in fewer numbers than Verbal actions, although there was a small increase in cooperative actions in 1966. The most interesting single change between the two periods was the large (10 percent) increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict. Thirty-two percent of all behavior directed toward the United States in 1966 were accusations, demands, warnings, and threats. In 1966, the United States acted in a similar manner in only 8 percent of its actions. System behavior directed toward the United States clearly was more harsh than behavior from the United States. We expected that with the rather large increase in 1966 of Offensive Verbal Action that the correlation be tween 1963 and 1966 probably would not be too high. The correlation was, however, .80 which is still fairly high. As Table 19 shows, the only other category where there was a very large shift (10 percent) was Participatory Action. While the correlation is high, there was, 187 TABLE 19 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET, 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total in X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 329 25% 182 21X -41 COOPERATIVE ACTION 37 3* 47 5X +2X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 179 13% 128 14X +1X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 347 26X 142 16X -10X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 83 6X 67 7X +1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 295 22X 292 32X +10X CONFLICT ACTION 63 5X 49 5X 0 TOTAL 1333 100X 907 101X* CORRELATION: .20 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 188 nevertheless, a large increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States between the pre-Vietnam and Vietnam war period. The examination of Proposition IIB with only the Vietnam case does suggest sane tendency toward increased conflict. Summary: Proposition IIB From the results of the analysis of the disposition of system members' relations toward the United States, the following can be concluded: 1. The international behavior of nations acting toward the United States when clearly of a cooperative or conflictual nature for the periods examined was predomi nantly verbal. Conflictual and cooperative "actions" never accounted for more than 11 percent of total acts toward the United States in 1949, 1951, 1963, or 1966. This also was true when the United States was an Actor. 2. The periods 1949 and 1951 for the United States as a Target were somewhat different from 1963 and 1966. During both the Korean and Vietnam periods there was more conflict behavior directed toward the United States than from the United States, but in 1963 and 1966 the United States received more conflictual behavior than in 1949 or 189 1951. Furthermore, between 1949 and 1951 there was a 4 percent increase in conflictual relations, but in 1966 the increase was 11 percent. This suggests that during the Vietnam war there was more hostility directed toward the United States than during the Korean war. This is not unreasonable since in the Korean war the United States was fighting under a unified United Nations command and al though the United States supplied most of the arms and personnel, there was a larger number of "allies" also involved in the war. Nations which may have refrained from abusing the United States in the Korean war because of their own involvement would not be so restrained during the Vietnam war. The correlation of .95 between 1949 and 1951 is further evidence that the two Korean periods were very similar. On the other hand, while the .80 correlation between 1963 and 1966 was fairly high, the fact that there was an 11 percent increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States suggests that the Vietnam war period was less similar to the nonwar period than was true for the Korean war period. 190 Discussion of Propositions IIA and IIB Based on the data and method of analysis followed here, Proposition IIA is not accepted. In both the Korean and Vietnam cases, there was not a major change during war involvement toward increased United States conflictual behavior. The disposition of United States system rela tions tended to be maintained whether or not it was involved in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Relations toward the United States were also main tained, but during the Vietnam war period examined, we found some changes in the maintenance of system behavior toward the United States. This was accounted for by an 11 percent increase in conflictual relations directed toward the United States from 1963 to 1966. There was little change, however, in relations between 1949 and 1951. These results do not permit, therefore, a strong general ization to be made about both the Korean and Vietnam war periods. Although relations in both war periods remained relatively similar to the pre-war period, the increase in negative relations directed toward the United States in 1966 suggests that the Vietnam war period was somewhat different, as far as our data show, from the Korean war 191 period. For the general case we do not accept Proposition IXBf but our results demonstrate that more study is needed about changes in United States international relations during the Vietnam war. In Chapters V and VI the analysis of United States relations with selected groups and indi vidual nations will explain more about United States rela tions in 1966. Examination of Propositions IIIA and IIIB The findings presented so far tend not to support the widely held view that limited war involvement is asso ciated with changes in the international relations of a major nation directly involved in the conflict. We have shown that when the event/interactions of the United States, as reported daily in the New York Times, are compared for a pre-limited war and a limited war period there have not been drastic changes in either the general allocation or disposition of United States relations to or from other members of the international system. United States system relations have tended to be very stable between nonwar and war periods. The one moderate aberration reported was for an increase in conflictual system relations toward the 192 United States between 1963 and 1966. In the next analysis, we shall see if again no major change can be identified in United States system relations. Particular attention will be paid to United States relations in 1966. In order to complete this investigation of United States system relations, Propositions IIIA and IIIB will now be examined. These two propositions, as explained in Chapter II, are concerned with possible changes in the manner in which actions are exchanged between the United States and other members of the international system. The propositions propose that during the Korean and Vietnam war period a major change occurred in the patterns of United States system relations as measured by the "mix" of its behavioral actions. In other words the propositions propose that if United States behavior with other members of the international system is coded into the twenty-two general event categories presented earlier for 1949 and 1951, and 1963 and 1966, there will be considerable dif ference in how these event actions are exchanged between the nonwar and war periods. The results presented so far imply, however, that there was not a very great change in the general disposi tion or allocation of United States relations in nonwar 193 and limited war periods. We shall examine the proposi tions as stated in Chapter II in order to determine whether or not this stability can also be found in the behavioral traits of United States system relations. Proposition IIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the mix of its external relations toward other members of the international system is not maintained with the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. Proposition IIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the mix of external relations from other system members toward it does not have the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. The method selected to examine these propositions is factor analysis. The principal reason for selecting the factor analytic technique to pattern the data is that it is a good available technique for delineating behavior patterns in the event/interaction data, and the factor model has been used for such purposes in international O relations research with very satisfactory results. The technique was originally developed to help explain psycho logical theories of human behavioral characteristics, but Q See the Appendix, "Bibliography of Factor Analysis in Conflict and International Relations," in R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Reso lution, Vol. XI (December 1967), 478-480. 194 has been shown to have far wider applicability in social Q science research than its original intention. The research discussed earlier by Charles McClelland and Robert Young, Rudolph Rummel, and Raymond Tanter employed factor analytic techniques. The principal use of factor analysis in this research is as a tool to classify and reduce the data for United States system relations in order to better describe these relations. As Harry Harman has noted, conceptually "a principal objective of factor analysis is to attain a parsimonious description of observed data." The method, suggests Harman, "in all cases . . . does give a simple Rudolph Rummel has made especially ambitious claims for the use of factor analysis in international relations research. See, for example, R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis" (December 1967), p. 448. Rummel has noted: "Factor analysis can be applied in order to explore a content area, structure a domain, map unknown concepts, classify or reduce data, illuminate casual nexuses, screen or transform data, define relationships, test hypotheses, formulate theories, control variables, or make inferences." Less ambitious claims have been made, of course, by others. See Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and an Application," The American Political Science Association, Copyright, 1969. 195 interpretation of a given body of data and thus affords a fundamental description of a particular set of variables analyzed. In this research the factor analysis method is used to examine the behavior of the United States toward members of the international system, as well as their behavior toward the United States. Data for these rela tions for 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 have been coded into the 22 event/interaction categories and will be factor analyzed in order to obtain a concise description of United States international relations for these periods which can be compared easily for the examination of nonwar and war periods. Because the factor analysis method is more com plicated than the techniques of analysis employed above, somewhat more attention is given to its explanation in this chapter than was afforded the other analytic tech niques . Factor Analysis is used in this study to examine the data for United States relations in such a manner that the 22 event/interaction categories described in Chapter 10 Harry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 5. 196 III, can be reduced into a smaller number of factors which describe for each analysis complex patterns of United States relations. The method calculates for each analysis the intercorrelations among the 22 event categories, based on the data for a large number of cases (system members). Clusters of highly intercorrelated event types are searched for, and artifical dimensions are mathematically created and placed centrally through these clusters of event types. The dimensions (or factors) are defined by the kind and degree of association the clustered variables have with the dimensions. The dimension takes on the character of the clustered event types.^ In order to conduct the analysis, only system members which had been acted toward at least five times in any year were included in the analysis. This eliminated from the data all cases with a large number of zero cells in the data matrix since such cases would bias the results toward those areas in the matrix. The first data set to Frank Denton, "A Handbook of Factor Analysis for International Relations," School of Politics and Inter national Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, November 1965. 197 be studied is the United States as an Actor in 1949 and 1951. Proposition IIIA: The Korean Case In Table 20 the factor analysis results for the data on the United States as an Actor in the pre-Korean limited war period are given. A brief description of this table will help the reader to follow the interpretation of j the results. On the far left of Table 20 the 22 Event/ Interaction Categories are listed as Variables. These are, of course, the same event types discussed in Chapter III, and all the data to be analyzed are in one of these cate gories. Just to the right are the Variable Communalities which explain the portion of the variables' total varia tion in the factor patterns shown. The communalities given are derived by summing the squared factor loadings for each variable across the four factors included in the unrotated matrix. The next set of information is the Unrotated Factors. Each unrotated factor identified a separate set of relationships among the variables. The numbers next to each variable for each factor are called Factor Loadings and measure the degree of relationship of each variable to 198 TABLE 20 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR-1949 VARI- VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY ABLES COMMUN- ROTATED FACTORS ALITY I II III IV V I II III IV V 1-YIELD .95 .12 -.24 .91 -.08 .23 .00 -.07 (.97T-.03 .02 2-COMMENT .86 .92 .12 .03 -.02 .07 (.70) .40 .16 .21 .39 3-CONSULT .95 .40 .41 .01 .78 .04 .22 .13 -.06 (.94) .03 4-APPROVE .93 .50 .77 .17 -.02 -.25 .04 (.85) .05 .40 .22 5-PROMISE .92 .54 .68 .07 -.34 -.22 .09 (.89) .00 .09 .34 6-GRANT .90 .52 .40 -.23 -.28 .57 .20 .20 -.09 .07 (.90) 7-REWARD .79 .12 .59 .16 .61 .19 -.16 .13 .05 (.85) .17 8-AGREE .93 .19 .44 .09 .83 .01 .03 .08 -.02 (.96) -.08 9-REQUEST .88 .84 .02 -.02 -.02 -.41 (- 74)(.561 .02 .09 -.05 10-PR0P0SE .89 .67 .51 .02 -.27 -.34 .33 (.86)-.02 .07 .21 11-REJECT .93 .93 -.17 -.04 .11 -.15 (.90) .28 .09 .16 .08 12-ACCUSE .96 .86 -.45 -.08 .06 -.08 .97 .05 .12 -.01 .04 13-PROTEST .72 .49 -.45 .51 .23 .09 (.54 >-.16 (.64) .15 -.09 14-DENY .93 .89 -.32 -.20 .04 .03 (.94 .07 .00 .03 .21 15-DEMAND .85 .75 .17 -.13 -.22 .44 (.50) .21 .05 .06 (.74) 16-WARN .84 .33 .67 -.05 -.45 .27 -.11 (.56)-.04 -.01 (.72) 17-THREAT .83 .83 -.23 .15 .01 .26 (.75) .04 .36 .10 .35 18-DEMON- STRATE .80 .15 .11 .75 -.25 -.38 -.06 (.54)(.66)-.11 -.26 19-REDUCE RELATION .95 .23 -.14 .91 -.11 .19 .05 .07 (.97) .00 .06 SHIP 20-EXPEL .63 .64 -.39 -.23 .01 -.12 (.79) .02 -.07 -.09 .00 21-SEIZE .93 .88 -.31 -.25 .01 .03 (.93 .08 -.04 .00 .23 22-FORCE .70 .66 -.47 -.16 .09 -.09 (.83 -.05 .01 -.04 -.04 % OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 39.7 17.4 12.8 10.7 6.3 32.8 16.3 13.3 12.9 11.7 *The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than .50 are Indicated by parentheses. 199 each factor. The range of a factor loading is *1 and these loadings can be interpreted like correlations. Thus, a high reading such as the .92 for the Comment cate gory on Factor I indicates a very high relationship between that variable and Factor I. A -.92 would identify a high negative relationship. The .12 for Reward on Factor I suggests that the Reward category is basically uncorrelated to Factor I. The explanation of each unrotated and rotated factor is made from interpretations of the relationships among the variables loading high on the factor. This is explained in more detail below in the discussion of the rotated factors. At the bottom of the table, the percentage of the Total Variance of all the data in the original factor matrix that is explained by each factor is given. The percentage of total variance measures the strength and comprehensiveness of the factor. In the unrotated matrix, the purpose of the factor structure of the model employed is to identify in the first Factor the greatest amount of variation that can be explained by any single dimension. The second and succeeding factors are mathematically uncorrelated (geometrically at right angles from the orig inal factor) to the first factor. They explain, given the 200 position of Factor I in a multidimension space, the second, third, and fourth best explanation for the data. They account for successively smaller amounts of the total variance. Thus, the Unrotated Factor I accounts for a total of 39.7 percent of the Total Variance for the United States as an Actor in 1949. This dimension is then a comprehen sive accounting of all the data for the event data for United States actions in 1949. It is clear that a large number of variables are related to this dimension. The succeeding factors account for smaller amounts of the total variance. In most studies it is the Rotated Factors which receive the principal consideration. The Rotated Factors are set to identify clusters of data within the total data set, and unlike the unrotated factors will generally have higher high variable loadings and lower low variable loadings making interpretation of the factors more under standable in terms of identifying groups of related variables. Where the purpose of the unrotated factors is to explain relationships considering all the data, the rotated factors explain relationships for subsets of associated data. In the study an orthogonal rotation was 201 employed primarily in consideration of the comparison of factors between 1949 and 1951. This is explained later. What is important here is that the Rotated Factors are uncorrelated to each other and define independent dimen sions of behavior. Since the factors have been rotated the percent of total variance accounted for by each factor changes and these percentages of total variance for the 12 rotated factors are given. In the matrix for the rotated factors, all loadings .50 or greater are in parentheses. The factor loadings when squared and multiplied by 100 give the percentage of variation a variable has accounted for in the given factor. Thus, a variable having a factor loading of .50 has 25 percent of its variation accounted for by that factor. These loadings, as explained for the unrotated factor loadings, can be read as correlations to the factor ranging from +1 to -1. The higher the positive loading, the more closely related the variable is to the factor. Loadings near zero are uncorrelated to the factor, and 12 Unrotated and Rotated Factors accounting for 5 percent or more of the total variance are included in the factor analysis tables. 202 high negative loadings have high negative correlations to the factor. The rotated factor matrix for the United States as an Actor in 1949 provides interesting results. A look at the percentage of total variance accounted for by the factors shows that Factor I accounted for 32.8 percent of the total variance. This is a strong factor. It suggests that almost one-third of United States actions toward members of the international system during 1949 can be accounted for by a single dimension of behavior. Factor 11 accounts for about 16 percent of the variance, Factors III and IV for about 13 percent, and Factor V for about 12 percent. If we look closely at Factor I it appears to be basically a GENERAL CONFLICT dimension in United States behavior. The categories which load high on this factor are almost all of a conflict nature. Reject, Accuse, Protest, Deny, Reward, Threaten, Expel, Seize, and Force are all conflictual event/interactions. The moderately high loadings of Comment and Request may be more noise than information and need not be considered at this point. What Factor I indicates is that in 1949 there was a con flictual orientation in United States system behavior which basically was independent of cooperative behavior. 203 In order to fully understand United States relations in 1949, we must attempt to understand the remaining four factors. Factor II in the rotated matrix accounted for 16 percent of the total variance and suggests a basically friendly behavioral characteristic. Approvals, Promises, Requests, and Proposals all loaded high on the factor, but Warn and Demonstrate were also part of the behavior | pattern. We can interpret from Factor II a CAUTIOUS APPROVAL dimension in United States international behavior in 1949. This characteristic will make more sense as the other factors are explained. Factor III is interesting because while it is basically a negative relations dimension, Protest, Demon strate, and Reduce Relationship, as well as Yield load high on this factor while every other loading is near zero. The factor definitely suggests a turning away behavior and can be labeled REDUCE RELATIONSHIP as is one of its com ponent variables. The factor accounts for 13 percent of the total variance and is, therefore, a moderately strong behavioral characteristic. Factor IV also accounts for about 13 percent of the total variance and is clearly a COOPERATIVE dimension. 204 Consult, Reward, and Agree load high suggesting a very friendly and positive behavioral characteristic. Factor V is presented in the table since it accounts for over 5 percent of the total variance explained in the data. Its interpretation is not clear, however, and no attempt shall be made to label this factor. If we now turn to Table 21 for the results of the analysis of the United States as an Actor in 1951 we can I find both similarities and differences from the 1949 analysis. In 1951 as in 1949, there was clearly a GENERAL CONFLICT characteristic in United States behavior. Factor I in 1951 accounted for about the same amount of variance (33.8 percent) as did Factor I in 1949. In 1951 the General Conflict factor again dominated United States external relations toward other members of the inter national system. In 1951, Factor II described a strong COOPERATIVE dimension (16 percent of the total variance) in United States system behavior. It tended to be more general than the cooperative factor in 1949, and, in fact, appears to be somewhat related to both Factors II and IV in 1949. The categories Consult, Approve, Promise, Reward, and Agree all loaded highly on this factor in 1951. 205 TABLE 21 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR-1951 VARI- VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY ABLES COMMUN AL ITY k I II III IV V I ROTATED FACTORS II III IV V 1-YIELD .72 .14 .23 .53 .50 -.34 -.01 .13 -.25 (.79)**.12 2-COMMENT .69 .73 .06 .16 -.24 -.27 .49 .11 -.17 .05 (.63) 3-CONSULT .84 .46 .75 -.02 .01 .28 .16 (.87) .09 .03 .22 4-APPROVE .88 .29 .79 .04 -.33 -.27 -.18 (.58) .07 .04 (.71) 5-PROMISE .73 .30 .66 .04 .05 .44 .09 (.85) .01 -.02 .00 6-GRANT .79 .78 .04 -.02 .40 .13 (.77) .32 .08 .30 .04 7-REWARD .69 .00 .80 .08 .20 -.03 -.30 (.67) .14 .34 .16 8-AGREE .82 .52 .69 .07 .08 .25 .23 (.84) .02 .13 .22 9-REQUEST .81 .71 .27 -.08 -.21 -.43 .39 .18 .13 .10 (.77) 10-PR0P0SE .89 .75 .39 .02 -.40 -.12 .39 .44 -.05 -.14 (.72) 11-REJECT .97 .96 -.21 .08 .03 .02 (.92) .09 -.14 .07 .31 12-ACCUSE .98 .92 -.32 -.07 .06 .12 (.97) .03 -.04 -.04 .17 13-PROTEST .86 .87 -.22 -.15 .07 .17 .90 .12 .05 -.06 .14 14-DENY .83 .88 -.15 .11 -.06 .15 (.83) .19 -.21 -.05 .26 15-DEMAND .94 .87 -.35 .22 .13 .01 (.89)-.03 -.28 .18 .20 16-WARN .80 .79 -.08 -.07 -.23 -.33 (.61)-.04 .03 -.02 (.65) 17-THREAT .92 .12 -.29 .86 -.25 .10 .09 -.11(-.94) .03 .07 18-DEMON- STRATE .48 .52 -.34 -.22 .06 -.20 (.58)-.26 .18 .04 .21 19-REDUCE RELATION .53 .61 -.29 -.17 .22 .08 (.71)- .04 .12 .07 -.01 SHIP 20-EXPEL .85 .85 -.21 -.17 -.01 .20 (.88) .14 .04 -.14 .15 21-SEIZE .80 .14 .16 .17 .79 -.32 .13 .07 .15 (.87) -.09 22-FORCE .71 -.06 -.22 .78 -.17 .18 -.05 -.06(-.84) .02 -.09 * OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 40.7 17.1 8.7 7.6 5.5 33.8 15.9 8.9 7.8 13.2 *The communalIty of each variable Is equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than .50 are Indicated by parentheses. 206 Factor III in 1951 is a new behavioral character istic. It is clearly a MILITARY CONFLICT factor and quite different from the other behavior patterns. The high loadings of only Threat and Force on the factor and the moderate amount of variance (8.9 percent) accounted for suggest that this is a medium-strong independent charac teristic in 1951. This behavior characteristic was not an independent factor in 1949 but was part of the General Conflict dimension. It suggests that in 1951 there were two conflict patterns in United States relations. One generally negative and suggestive of a cold war type of relationship, and the other a more directed and highly antagonistic type of pattern which was clearly of a mili tary conflict type. Factor IV is not easily interpretable and has not been included in the findings. It is presented in Table 21 because it accounted for over 5 percent of the total variance. Factor V, which accounted for 13 percent of total variance, is similar to Factor II in 1949 and is also labeled CAUTIOUS APPROVAL. Comment, Approve, Request, Propose, and Warn load high on Factor V. With the Promise and Demonstrate categories dropping out, the approval characteristic of Factor V in 1951 is somewhat less 207 "cautious" than Factor II in 1949. Before commenting on the similarities and differ ences in United States behavioral characteristics between 1949 and 1951 one further technique is employed to quanti tatively help interpret the results. In order to compare the findings of the analysis for 1949 and 1951 we could do several things. For one example we could compare the cor relation matrices before the factor analysis between the two sets of data. Such a matrix for the United States as an Actor in 1949 and 1951 is provided in Table 22 for visual comparison. There are several ways in which such matrices could be described more simply. One means which seems especially direct and easy to understand is to com pare the factored results of the correlation matrices. Such a technique would summarize the behavioral character istics already discussed. The procedure chosen to compare the factor results between 1949 and 1951 is called a Coefficient of Congru ence, and is suggested by Harry Harman as an appropriate empirical method for comparing factors across different studies at this stage of development of the factor analysis TABLE 22 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR BY COMBEVENT CORRELATION MATRIX, 1949 AND 1951 1951 1949 --- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1-YIELD .14 .07 .10 .11 .22 .32 .29 .10 .06 .17 .00 .05 .01 .22 .12 .19-.08-.07-.03 .45 .13 2-COMMENT .13 .32 .33 .17 .47 .07 .31 .52 .68 .67 .57 .45 .73 .64 .66 .26 .43 .26 .46 .03-.07 3-CONSULT -.08 .40 .64 .64 .40 .60 .86 .40 .52 .28 .21 .28 .35 .13 .21-.14 .03 .10 .27 .14-.11 4-APPROVE -.03 .56 .47 .45 .09 .51 .62 .65 .68 .10-.03-.01 .13-.05 .27-.09-.08-.07 .02 .07-.09 5-PROMISE -.06 .58 .24 .86 .30 .49 .64 .17 .51 .14 .10 .13 .21 .06 .02-.09-.05 .11 .15 .09-.06 6-GRANT -.08 .54 .20 .36 .54 .08 .47 .41 .46 .74 .73 .70 .63 .70 .47-.08 .38 .42 .72 .38-.10 7-REWARD -.02 .19 .70 .50 .18 .16 .43 .16 .16-■-14-.23-.14-.11-.24-.03-.21-.34-.21-.14 .24 .14 8-AGREE -.04 .19 .94 .41 .15 .05 .71 .42 .60 .37 .27 .34 .38 .24 .22-.09 .02 .10 .33 .16-.11 9-REQUEST -.03 .68 .29 .56 .56 .22 .04 .16 .76 .61 .52 .52 .47 .45 .69-.05 .31 .41 .49 .15-.08 10-PR0P0SE -.07 .65 .27 .80 .86 .45 .12 .14 .70 .60 .52 .48 .48 .47 .67 .08 .27 .22 .51-.09-.09 11-REJECT .09 .84 .40 .34 .37 .33 .04 .19 .79 .57 .97 .89 .89 .94 .76 .23 .49 .61 .88 .11 .01 12-ACCUSE .12 .73 .21 .08 .13 .22-.13 .02 .75 .35 .92 .91 .88 .91 .71 .14 .52 .67 .91 .08-.05 13-PROTEST .58 .40 .18-.03--.09-.05 .03 .13 .44 .03 .44 .57 .71 .77 .72 .01 .44 .61 .93 .01-.05 14-DENY .02 .81 .27 .15 .22 .40-.07 .04 .67 .42 .94 .94 .41 .86 .59 .34 .42 .58 .70 .06-.06 15-DEMAND .03 .73 .20 .40 .48 .77 .10 .05 .51 .46 .55 .55 .27 .63 .63 .36 .54 .60 .76 .20 .15 16-WARN -.08 .37 .06 .62 .68 .68 .25-.03 .23 .57 .07-.05-.21 .04 .56 .04 .40 .39 .73-.04-.07 17-THREAT .33 .71 .23 .22 .22 .43 .09 .09 .59 .36 .74 .75 .56 .77 .62 .20 -.08 .01-.03-.07 .70 18-DEM0N- STRATE .56 .15-.09 .35 .34-.15 .03-.06 .22 .32 .14 .05 .25-.04-.06 .10 .13 .42 .43 .13-.06 19-REDUCE RELATION .95 .24-.01 .11 .10-.01 o . i CM O . .69 .08 .17 .17 .59 .08 .11 .03 .40 .59 .48 to o • 1 CM CM • SHIP 20-EXPEL 1 • o CO .50 .10 .01 .05 .13-.17-.04 .62 .21 .70 .81 .36 .71 .45 .03 .47-.06-.02 .05-.02 21-SEIZE -.04 .77 .24 .14 .24 .44-.10-.01 .66 .45 .90 .91 .39 .97 .59 .07 .79-.06 .04 .65 -.05 22-FORCE -.03 .49 .12-.01 .05 .13-.17-.03 .62 .21 .64 .73 .52 .71 .31-.11 .74-.06 .03 .48 .79 208 209 13 technique. The formula for the measure is presented below because it is not commonly used in international relations research. While it is similar to the product-moment cor relation coefficient, it is not a correlation because deviations from the mean are not measured and the summa tions are over the n variables and not the cases (nations). The formula is: Study I 1949 are identical to those for Study 2 1951, "the application of the formula is straightforward to the corresponding numbers in the two columns representing the j=l Since for this examination the n variables for 14 factors p and q. The interpretation of the congruence 13 Harman, op. cit., see pages 268-272 for a dis cussion of measuring relationships between factors. 14Ibid., p. 270. 210 measure, as with the factor analysis itself is somewhat complex. In the case of the factor analysis, however, the method has been applied often with event data and the interpretation of the results are made in light of previous research. The use of this congruence measure has not been common, however, and the following information from Harman is provided for the reader to better understand the results presented in the tables which display the degree of con gruence among the factors for United States international relations. Harman notes: In situations where factors from two studies can be matched visually, and the number of vari ables common to the studies is small, it can be expected the co-efficient will be very high. Tucker* analyzes two studies— one involving 18 variables . . . and the other involving 44 vari ables . . . in which 10 variables are common and the six factors of the smaller study are matched with six out of the twelve factors of the larger. He accepts coefficients ranging from .999984 down to .939811 as defining congruent factors, but rejects a value of .459717 as "definitely low so that this factor will not be considered as a congruent factor. *Ledyard D. Tucker, "A Method for Synthesis of Factor Studies," Personnel Research Section Report, No. 984 (1951). Washington, D.C., Dept, of the Army Harman, op. cit., p. 271 211 As Harman suggests, the interpretation of the results of the Correlation of Congruence is by practical experience. In Table 23, the results of the Congruence examination of the 1949 and 1951 factors for the United States as an Actor are given. We will interpret these results as being somewhat tentative. The strengths of relationships among the factors are inferred strictly from only the information within this matrix. The percentage of total variance accounted for by each factor is also included in the table for reference. As expected. Factor I in 1949 is related to Factor I in 1951, although the relationship is not particularly strong (.70). The General Conflict pattern was maintained, but has changed somewhat as the Military Conflict pattern in 1951 broke away from the 1949 General Conflict charac teristic. Table 23 suggests clearly that the Military Conflict pattern in 1951 was new, independent, and fairly strong accounting for almost 9 percent of total variance. The General Conflict pattern in 1951 was still very strong (almost 34 percent of total variance), but somewhat differ ent because of the split*with Military Conflict. Not unexpectedly, Factor II in 1951 is similar to Factors II and IV in 1949. The coefficient is .83. 212 TABLE 23 COEFFICIENT OF CONGRUENCE THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES COMPARED, 1949, 1951 1951 % Total1 Variance FACTORS I II III IV V (1949) I (.70)2 .21 .46 .18 .50 32.8 II .38 (.83) .04 .07 (.80) 16.3 III 1949 .38 -.03 -.02 .35 .45 13.3 IV .11 (.84) .05 .22 .45 12.9 V .11 .31 .23 .31 .44 11.7 % Total 33.8 15.9 8.9 7.8 13.2 Variance (1951) The Variance scores are Included 1n this Table for easy reference. The Variance Is not part of the Coefficient of Con gruence, but Is a complementary summary measure. ^Coefficients equal to or greater than .60 are Indicated by parentheses. 213 Factor II in 1951 was a very general cooperative dimension which accounts for its similarity to both Factor II (.83) and IV (.84) in 1949. Factor V in 1951 is similar to Factor II in 1949 as they both describe a Cautious Approval pattern of behavior. The coefficient between the two factors is moderately strong (.80). These findings suggest that the United States in 1949 and 1951 had two types of cooperative behavior; one an approval type, and the other a friendly-cooperative type. These behavior patterns were maintained from pre-war to limited war periods. The type of behavior called Reduce Relationship in 1949 (Factor III) was not evident in the 1951 data analysis. It was not very associated (no association above .45) with any behavior pattern in 1951. It is difficult to infer why this is so, but it is likely that United States withdrawal behavior toward Communist China influenced the Reduce Relationship factor in 1949. In 1951, of course, the United States had withdrawn completely from mainland China and was engaged directly against the Chinese Communists in Korea, but under the auspices of the United Nations. Based on this analysis we can conclude that there were not major differences in the characteristics of United 214 States international system behavior between 1949 and 1951. The strong and clearly defined conflictual and cooperative dimensions of United States behavior were maintained in both nonwar and war periods, explaining about 62 percent of the total variance for both years. The differences that are evident are interesting, however, even if they are not major. The absence of the Reduce Relationship factor in 1951 and its replacement with a Military Conflict factor suggests a new and more negative independent con flict dimension in United States relations. We must, however, turn to the Vietnam data to determine if this is common to limited war or was a special case for United States relations in 1951. Proposition IIIA: The Vietnam Case The behavior of the United States during 1963, as shown on Table 24, was somewhat similar to its behavior in 1949 and 1951. There was again a single strong character istic which tended to be conflictual, but much less so than in the earlier years examined. Because this factor has cooperative as well as conflictual behavior, it has been labeled a DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE factor rather than a General Conflict factor. It accounts for a very large 215 TABLE 24 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR-1963 VARIABLES VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY COMMUN AL ITY I II III IV ROTATED FACTORS I II III IV 1-YIELD .67 .54 .30 .26 -.47 .46 -.10 .06 (.67) 2-COMMENT .93 .96 -.05 -.02 .05 (.851 .22 .37 .12 3-CONSULT .76 .77 -.30 .27 .04 (.74) .43 .02 .11 4-APPROVE .78 .65 -.52 -.29 .08 .43 (.60) .45 .13 5-PROMISE .67 .21 -.78 -.04 -.08 .05 (.81) .06 .07 6-GRANT .65 .47 .34 -.47 -.30 .21 -.20 (.68) .33 7-REWARD .51 .02 -.56 .32 -.31 -.03 (.60) -.29 .25 8-AGREE .80 .81 -.18 .32 .08 (.83) .31 -.01 .13 9-REQUEST .77 .73 -.21 -.43 .04 .49 .32 (.65) -.05 10-PR0P0SE .86 .79 -.48 -.07 .02 (.62) (.60) .32 .02 11-REJECT .86 .92 -.01 .07 .10 (.86) .17 .27 .10 12-ACCUSE .93 .94 .12 .00 .15 (.89) .03 .35 .08 13-PROTEST .80 .86 .22 -.05 .01 (.77 -.05 .39 .20 14-DENY .87 .91 .00 .18 .09 (.89) .16 .16 .14 15-DEMAND .88 .91 .33 .04 .04 (.86) -.05 .32 .20 16-WARN .82 .88 .02 -.19 .08 (.74) .12 (.50) .06 17-THREAT .50 .61 .21 -.19 .23 (.57) -.13 .39 -.09 18-DEMON- STRATE .77 .59 .14 .17 -.61 .41 .09 .15 (.75) 19-REDUCE RELATIOM SHIP 1- .60 .53 .05 -.53 -.18 .24 .07 (.71) .15 20-EXPEL .95 .92 .20 .24 .04 l:S -.02 .14 .25 21-SEIZE .92 .89 .22 .26 .08 -.06 .11 .21 22-FORCE .33 -.05 .18 .21 .50 .19 -.28 -.27 -.38 % OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 54.0 9.6 6.6 5.5 43.3 10.9 13.3 7.51 *The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than .50 are Indicated by parentheses. 216 portion of the total variance (43 percent), and explains a considerable amount of the variation on that factor for 17 of the 22 behavior categories (i.e.f they load highly on the factor). This factor probably accounts for a great deal of United States East-West Cold War relations in 1963. Factor II is clearly a COOPERATIVE factor account ing for about 11 percent of the total variance in the data for the United States as an Actor in 1963. It includes behavior such as Approve, Promise, Reward, and Propose. The third rotated factor in Table 24 is very difficult to interpret, and at this stage of the analysis it is not labeled. The factor is considered again later in the analysis of the 1966 data primarily because it accounts for such a large proportion of the total variance (13.3 percent) in the data for 1963. The fourth rotated factor in Table 24 is presented because it accounts for over 5 percent of the total variance which is the arbitrary cut-off point selected for the factor presentation cri teria, but the information in the factor is insufficient to interpret reliably. On Table 25 are the results for the 1966 analysis of United States system behavior. The results suggest 217 that in 1966 United States behavior was somewhat different from that in 1963. In the first place, Factor I, which is similar to the DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE factor in 1963, does not encompass as many behavior types, and accounts for only about 26 percent of the total variance in the data. It is clearly a weaker factor than the diplomatic factor evident in 1963. The strong dimension in 1963 which appeared to represent United States East-West relations weakened in 1966, suggesting that these relations may not be receiving the degree of concern they did in 1963, a non limited war year. Factor II in 1966 is a COOPERATIVE factor similar to that found in 1963. It is a fairly strong behavioral dimension accounting for about 13 percent of total vari ance. Although it is somewhat different from the COOPERA TIVE factor in 1963, it does suggest a maintenance of a single cooperative characteristic in United States behavior. Factor III in 1966 is a "busier" example of Factor III in 1963, which was not interpreted. Again the cate gories Grant, Request, and Warn are included, but in 1966 so also are Comment, Propose, Deny, and Force. This factor suggests an active, but again a difficult factor to 218 TABLE 25 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR-1966 VARIABLES VARIABLE * UNROTATED FACTORS COMMUNALITY I II III IV V VI 1-YIELD .85 .34 .10 .23 -.28 .32 .70 2-COMMENT .80 .68 .06 .56 -.12 -.07 .09 3-CONSULT .86 .62 -.65 .05 .14 .14 .08 4-APPROVE .77 .48 -.68 -.02 .23 .10 -.06 5-PROMISE .81 .15 -.65 .57 .10 -.16 .06 6-GRANT .69 .70 .26 .22 -.26 .00 -.15 7-REWARD .51 .01 -.38 .19 -.12 .38 -.41 8-AGREE .90 .78 -.38 -.29 .10 .22 -.06 9-REQUEST .65 .52 -.19 .50 -.02 -.29 .07 1O-PROPOSE .86 .88 .11 .15 .13 -.08 -.17 11-REJECT .85 .83 -.08 -.29 -.17 .04 .21 12-ACCUSE .88 .90 .11 -.21 -.07 -.08 .08 13-PROTEST .58 .42 -.21 -.01 -.13 -.53 .25 14-DENY .87 .86 .35 -.06 -.02 .06 -.09 15-DEMAND .52 -.12 .03 -.22 -.01 -.66 .15 16-WARN .87 .71 .53 .16 .09 -.03 -.21 17-THREAT .84 .30 .51 .16 .68 .01 .10 18-DEMONSTRATE 19-REDUCE .95 .83 -.02 -.48 .08 .03 -.12 RELATIONSHIP .57 .25 .21 -.03 .42 .50 .19 20-EXPEL .85 .74 -.01 -.52 .06 -.13 .09 21-SEIZE .87 -.07 .07 .01 .83 .26 .33 22-FORCE .66 .29 .25 .68 .05 .02 -.22 % OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 35.3 11.7 10.6 7.6 6.9 5.2 *The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. TABLE 25 (continued) ORTHOGONALLY I II III .06 .12 .16 .19 .33 (.75) .48 (.76) .02 .44 (.73) -.07 -.21 (.85) .21 .43 -.02 (.65) -.03 .29 .02 (.83) .41 .01 .11 (.51) (.57) (.63) .20 (.64) (.80) .17 .13 (.82) .07 .35 .29 .34 .15 (.72) -.12 (.55) -.02 -.07 -.12 .48 -.22 (.75) .15 -.17 .42 (.97) .05 .10 .19 -.22 .08 (.90) .01 .05 -.05 .10 -.16 -.15 .09 (.77) 26.2 12.8 16.7 ROTATED FACTORS IV V VI .08 .06 (.89) -.03 .07 .30 .04 -.14 .12 .05 -.18 -.08 -.05 .02 -.04 -.18 -.04 .19 -.25 (-.59) -.11 .04 -.20 .08 -.06 .22 .08 .11 .01 .00 -.08 .13 .37 .00 .18 .22 -.17 (.57) .07 .08 -.02 .17 -.10 .67 -.22 .16 -.01 .02 (.78) .08 -.06 .03 .00 -.01 -.15 -.30 (.61) .00 .16 -.07 (.91) -.07 .02 .08 -.17 .00 7.6 6.7 7.3 M Loadings on the rotated factors equal to or greater than are Indicated by parentheses. 220 interpret. After considerable efforts and a complete failure to define clearly this factor, it was decided to eliminate this factor and Factor III in 1963 from further consideration. The factor analysis method is a somewhat complicated technique of analysis requiring careful interpretation, and since neither Factor III 1963 nor Factor III 1966 can be interpreted reasonably, it seemed prudent at this time to pass over these results and con centrate the analysis on other results from the factor analysis. Factor IV suggests a negative type of conflictual behavior somewhat like the Military Conflict factor evident in 1951. In this case, however, we will call it simply CONFLICT since Seize rather than Force is dominant in this pattern. For some reason, as was the case in 1951, this behavioral characteristic is unlike any factor found in either the nonwar or war involvement period. It accounts for just under 8 percent of total variance and suggests a highly negative behavioral trait. Rotated Factors V and VI have not been interpreted since they do not explain clearly any behavioral trait. If we examine the Congruency measure we find that results in Table 26 support the earlier contention that 221 TABLE 26 COEFFICIENT OF CONGRUENCE THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES COMPARED, 1963 AND 1966 1966 1 % Total Variance FACTORS I II III IV V VI (1963) 1963 I (.79)2 .40 .59 .32 .36 .39 43.3 II .36 (.72) N CM • -.10 -.27 .00 10.9 III .57 .25 (.60) .10 .28 .42 13.3 IV .46 .24 .13 .03 .00 .49 7.5 1 Total 26.2 12.8 16.7 7.6 6.7 7.3 Variance (1966) The Variance scores are Included 1n this Table for easy reference. The Variance Is not part of the Coefficient of Congruence, but 1s a complementary summary measure. ^Coefficients equal to or greater than .60 are Indicated by parentheses. 222 Factors I and II, in the nonwar year, were related respec tively to Factors I and II, in 1966, the war year. The scores of .79 and .72 suggest similarity but not of a very high degree. If we concern ourselves with the inter pretable Factors I and II for 1963, and I, II, and IV for 1966, only about 54 percent of the total variance in the data can be accounted for in 1949, and about 48 percent in 1966. If we note the changes between the years we can see major differences. In 1963 43.3 percent of the variance was explained by Factor I. Only 26.2 percent of the same Diplomatic Exchange dimension was explained in 1966. Furthermore, in 1966 there was a completely new dimension in United States behavior which we have called Conflict. While this factor accounted for only 7.6 percent of the total variance it was easily interpretable and dissimilar from any of the factors found in the 1963 data. From this analysis we can conclude that while the basic patterns of United States relations were maintained between 1963 and 1966 as identified by a dimension called Diplomatic Exchange and another called Cooperative, there were considerable changes in United States behavior toward members of the international system. 223 Summary; Proposition IIIA The conclusions which may be drawn from the analysis of the behavioral characteristics of United States relations toward other system members are the following: 1. In both the Korean and Vietnam cases there were strong dimensions of behavior which explained a major part of United States system relations in both nonwar and war periods. For the Korean case these were General Con flict, Cautious Approval, and Cooperation. They accounted for about 62 percent of the total variance in the data for each of the time periods. In the Vietnam case, Diplo matic Exchange and Cooperation dimensions were maintained. They accounted for 54 percent of the total variance in 1965, and 39 percent of the total variance in 1966. These results suggest that United States behavior during the Korean and Vietnam periods was somewhat different. 2. While there were similarities between nonwar and limited war periods there were also major differences. In the Korean case a dimension called Reduce Relationship clearly was evident in 1949, but not in 1951. Furthermore, in 1951 a Military Conflict dimension appeared. It was not an independent trait in 1949 but was part of the more 224 encompassing behavior pattern called General Conflict. These results suggested small but possibly important changes in United States behavior. The Military Conflict pattern is a very hard and independent type of United States conflict behavior which indicates a severe and forceful pattern of United States behavior toward certain enemies in 1951 which did not exist during 1949. What may have been rather subtle behavior in 1949 became clearly antagonistic in 1951. In the Vietnam case, the analysis permitted reliable interpretation of fewer behavioral dimensions. In fact in 1963, only the dimensions Diplomatic Exchange and Cooperation were identified clearly. In 1966, a new pattern called simply Conflict was identified as a new behavioral trait. This pattern was somewhat similar to the Military Conflict pattern found in 1951, and suggests that indeed when the United States was involved in limited war it tended to develop a very conflictual behavioral characteristic which was not evident in nonwar periods. In the Vietnam case, there was also a major change in Diplomatic Exchange dimension. In 1963 43 percent of United States behavior could be accounted for by this dimension. There was some type of breakdown in behavior 225 dimension called Conflict. 3. We may conclude, therefore, that while the most basic aspects of United States system behavior were maintained from nonwar to limited war involvement periods, there were definite changes in United States behavior. The regional and individual nation analyses should help explain these changes. 4. The results again seem to indicate that there were differences between the Korean and Vietnam periods. While the dimension General Conflict (1949 and 1951) was similar to Diplomatic Exchange (1963 and 1966), it was clearly more conflictual. Secondly, in the Vietnam period fewer dimensions of behavior could be explained, and overall a smaller amount of total variance could be explained. Finally, the changes between nonwar and war periods were more severe in the Vietnam case. In order to understand these changes better we can turn to the examination of Proposition IIIB which is an analysis and comparison of behavioral traits in system relations directed toward the United States during nonwar and limited war periods. In the Discussion section at the end of the following analysis, the findings for the analysis of both Propositions IIIA and IIIB are reviewed. 226 Proposition IIIB; The Korean Case In Table 27 are the factor analysis results for 1949 for the United States as a Target. The variables loading high on the first factor are of both a cooperative and conflictual nature. The dimension is labeled DIPLO MATIC EXCHANGE. It accounts for about 26 percent of the total variance in the data. Factor II is clearly a COOPERATION dimension, and a strong one at that. It accounts for almost 21 percent of the total variance, which suggests that the COOPERATION dimension is nearly as strong as the DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE dimension in 1949. The categories Comment, Consult, Approve, Reward, Agree, and Propose all load high on Factor II. Factor III is a CONFLICT dimension, about as strong as Factor II, and accounts for 20 percent of total vari ance. The categories Demand, Warn, Reduce Relationship, Expel, Seize, and Force all load highly on Factor III. This is clearly a strong and very negative conflict pattern. Factors IV and V have not been interpreted since the results are not very clear. They do account, however, for over 5 percent of the total variance and are included, therefore, in the table. 227 TABLE 27 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET-1949 VARI- VARIABLE ABLES COMMUN- UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTORS ALITY I II III IV V 1-YIELD .93 .01 .08 -.20 .52 .78 2-COMMENT .96 .90 .32 -.16 .09 -.14 3-CONSULT .96 .46 .83 .14 .07 -.18 4-APPROVE .87 .27 .75 -.04 .39 .28 5-PROMISE .85 .36 .51 .08 -.62 .26 6-GRANT .90 .90 -.30 .03 .06 .01 7-REWARD .89 .37 .82 .22 .01 -.17 8-AGREE .95 .31 .89 .22 .09 -.13 9-REQUEST .37 .38 .28 .35 -.08 .15 10-PR0P0SE .67 .73 .32 -.15 .00 -.08 11-REJECT .73 .83 .05 -.13 .15 -.03 12-ACCUSE .97 .91 -.22 -.30 -.03 -.04 13-PROTEST .89 .77 -.16 -.52 .10 .04 14-DENY .45 .36 -.15 -.41 .03 -.37 15-DEMAND .88 .78 -.43 .29 .04 .00 16-WARN .87 .75 .01 .36 -.37 .19 17-THREAT .81 .38 -.07 -.26 -.68 .35 18-DEMON- STRATE .95 .86 -.14 -.42 -.09 VO o • 1 19-REDUCE RELATION .67 .75 -.18 .07 .26 .07 SHIP 20-EXPEL .65 .43 -.46 .46 .18 -.04 21-SEIZE .91 .82 -.42 .25 .03 .00 22-FORCE .86 .46 -.46 .65 .08 .03 * OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 40.3 19.5 9.3 7.2 5.5 I II III IV V .02 -.03 -.04 -.04 (-.96 {.75)(.58 .23 .12 -.02 .18 .96 -.03 .05 .05 .11 (.75)-.15 -.05 (-.52 .02 .48 -.03 (.79) .05 (.69) .07 (.64) .14 -.04 .06 .93 -.03 .08 .08 .00 (.97)-.07 .03 .01 -.02 .45 .33 .25 -.07 (.61] (.50) .14 .18 -.02 .70' .32 .35 .08 -.11 (.89 .05 .37 .21 -.01 (.91)-.01 .13 .13 -.18 (.62)-.07 -.06 -.13 .23 .45 -.02 (.82) .11 .03 .25 .30 {.62)( .58) .05 .31 -.13 -.01 (.83) .01 (.91) .05 .21 .26 .01 (.54] .14 (.57)- .02 -.19 .11 -.10 (.78)-.12 .04 (.50)-.02 (.80 .13 .03 -.01 -.06 (.92)-.01 .06 25.9 20.8 20.0 9.0 6.1 •k The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. Loadings on the rotated factors equal to or greater than .50 are Indicated by parentheses. 228 In Table 28 the results for the United States as a Target in 1951 are given. Again the first factor suggests a DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE dimension. It is composed principally of negative event-action categories, but unlike 1949, accounts for over one-third (38 percent) of the total variance. It is, therefore, a stronger dimension. Furthermore, the high loading of the Force category on this dimension and the generally higher conflict loadings suggest a more conflictual tendency in the factor in 1951 than in 1949. The principal reason for this is that the CONFLICT dimension found in 1949 dissipated somewhat in 1951, and some aspects of the 1949 patterns are included in the Diplomatic Exchange factor in 1951. Factor III which is again a CONFLICT dimension accounts for only 8 percent of the total variance and has only the Threat and Seize categories loading highly on it. Factor III suggests an independent and limited conflict behavior pattern quite different from the CONFLICT pattern identi fied in 1949 for the United States as a Target. Factor II is again a strong COOPERATION dimension which is stronger in 1951 than in 1949. Twenty-seven per cent of the total variance is accounted for by the factor and a rather large percentage of the cooperative variables 229 TABLE 28 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET-1951 VARIABLES VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY COMMUN- ROTATED FACTORS _______ ALITY I II III IV I II III IV 1-YIELD .82 .77 .32 .01 -.37 (.84)**.11 .18 -.27 2-COMMENT .91 .81 -.48 .09 .15 .43 (.84) .01 .15 3-CONSULT .87 .62 -.70 .07 .02 .19 .91 -.07 -.02 4-APPROVE .84 .24 -.86 .18 .11 -.24 .88' -.04 .03 5-PROMISE .59 .56 -.51 .04 -.15 .25 [•71] -.04 -.16 6-GRANT .86 .86 .33 -.13 .01 (.91) .13 .03 .11 7-REWARD .66 .21 -.74 .24 .07 -.22 [.78] .05 .00 8-AGREE .81 .71 -.56 .02 -.03 .35 •83| -.07 -.05 9-REQUEST .76 .57 -.66 .03 -.05 .18 .85’ -.09 -.09 10-PR0P0SE .80 .88 -.14 -.13 -.03 l:S!' [.54! -.09 .01 11-REJECT .88 .90 .25 -.09 .06 .23 .05 .15 12-ACCUSE .90 .90 .27 -.14 .02 (.92) .20 .01 .11 13-PROTEST .76 .80 .21 -.12 .26 (.78) .22 -.02 .34 14-DENY .59 .59 .11 -.09 .31 (.63) .26 -.03 .37 15-DEMAND .53 .62 .37 -.08 .05 (.71 ■ -.01 .06 .14 16-WARN .50 .59 -.37 .10 .01 .32 (.63) .05 .01 17-THREAT .95 .05 .34 .88 -.24 .05 • -.10 (.95) -.16 18-DEMON- STRATE .97 .88 .28 -.25 -.24 (.96) .15 -.08 -.15 19-REDUCE RELATION SHIP .79 .73 .42 .12 -.26 (.82) .03 .31 -.15 20-EXPEL .72 .07 .27 .02 .80 .10 -.15 .03 (.83] 21-SEIZE .83 .34 .43 .66 .31 .33 -.05 (.75) .41 22-FORCE .89 .80 .47 .20 -.03 (.86) .05 .38 .10 % OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 44.9 20.7 6.9 5.9 37.9 26.9 8.1 6.3 *The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than 50 are Indicated by parentheses. 230 load high on it. The relatively high loading of Warn on this factor probably is more noise than information. Factor IV did not provide meaningful results. In Table 29 the Correlation of Congruence is pro vided. The results show that indeed Factor I in 1949 is similar to Factor I in 1951, and the same is true for Factor II for both years. Factor III is more confused, however. In fact, Factor III in 1951 is more similar to Factor I (.72) in 1949 than to Factor III (.49). Further more, where Factor III in 1949 accounted for 20 percent of total variance, it accounts for only about 8 percent of the variance in 1951. Factor III in 1951 is then a com paratively weak CONFLICT pattern. In 1951 conflictual behavior toward the United States tends either to become mixed within the general negatively oriented Diplomatic Exchange factor or stands out in a weak but conflictual pattern consisting mainly of threats and seizures. From these results it seems fair to conclude that in general the same basic characteristics of system behav ior directed toward the United States in 1949, a nonwar year, were evident in 1951, a limited war period. Three behavior patterns— DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE, COOPERATION, and CONFLICT— were maintained with only minor changes. In 1951 231 TABLE 29 COEFFICIENT OF CONGRUENCE THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES COMPARED, 1949, 1951 1951 % Total1 Variance FACTORS I II III IV (1949) I (.82)2 .43 .36 .56 25.9 II .41 (.83) .20 .22 20.8 III (.72) .35 .49 .66 20.0 1949 IV .43 .55 .58 .42 9.0 V .50 .35 .22 .41 6.1 % Total 37.9 26.9 8.1 6.3 Variance (1951) Whe Variance scores are Included In this Table for easy re* ference. The Variance Is not part of the Coefficient of Con gruence, but 1s a complementary summary measure. ^Coefficients equal to or greater than .60 are Indicated by parentheses. 232 the DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE dimension was somewhat stronger (38 percent of the total variance) and more conflictual than in 1949. The CONFLICT dimension became weaker. The changing mix of these conflict factors (I and III) between the years suggests that the strong conflict pattern of 1949 becomes integrated in the general dimension which we call Diplomatic Exchange. This factor dominates, by far, system relations toward the United States in 1951. The Cooperative dimension also becomes stronger in 1951, accounting for about 27 percent of total variance. This pattern is very similar in both 1949 and 1951 with a co efficient of congruence of .83. This suggests that a strong and stable flow of cooperative behavior was directed toward the United States both before and during the Korean war. Proposition IIIB: The Vietnam Case In Table 30 the results for the United States as a Target in 1963 are presented. If we look immediately at Factor I in this table, we again see a type of behavior which can be labeled DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE. Fifteen of the event types load highly on this factor and it accounts for 37.9 percent of the total variance. It is a strong 233 TABLE 30 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET-1963 VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY VARIABLES COMMUN- ROTATED FACTORS _______ ALITV I II III IV I II III IV 1-YIELD .39 .55 .12 .27 .03 (•58]>**.08 .02 .20 2-COMMENT .85 .88 -.23 -.01 -.15 (.61 (.66] .12 .18 3-CONSULT .90 .85 -.36 -.07 -.15 (.54! (.77 .07 .12 4-APPROVE .77 .72 -.49 .06 -.07 .44 (.76! -.07 .02 5-PROMISE .68 .39 -.54 -.39 -.28 -.04 (.81 .09 -.03 6-GRANT .71 .84 .08 -.01 .02 (.71] .37 .27 .11 7-REWARD .62 .75 -.13 .16 .07 i .68 .39 -.02 .09 8-AGREE .90 .86 -.37 -.03 -.09 (.59! (.74] .03 .09 9-REQUEST .48 .46 -.30 -.41 .10 .20 (.56 .19 -.30 10-PR0P0SE .87 .92 -.12 .05 -.05 (.73) (.54] .13 .16 11-REJECT .90 .73 .13 .14 -.57 .45 .41 .30 (.66) 12-ACCUSE .81 .85 .21 .12 .19 (.85] .17 .22 .06 13-PROTEST .79 .86 .14 .09 .18 (.83) .24 .21 .03 14-DENY .61 .69 .07 .08 .35 (.75 .15 .09 -.15 15-DEMAND .83 .87 .21 .09 .11 (.83 .21 .27 .12 16-WARN .75 .84 -.06 .05 .17 (.76! .39 .11 -.02 17-THREAT .80 .40 .52 -.55 -.23 .14 .11 (.88) .07 18-DEMON- STRATE .81 .87 .15 .15 .12 (.84) .24 .19 .11 19-REDUCE RELATION .71 .73 .35 -.25 .00 (.57) .21 (.58) .04 SHIP 20-EXPEL .75 .36 .59 -.52 -.10 .19 -.01 (.85) -.01 21-SEIZE .81 .84 .26 .14 .15 (.85) .13 .25 .11 22-FORCE .77 .11 .27 .51 -.65 .07 -.12 -.01 (.87) % OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 54 9.3 6.5 5.6 37.9 19.7 10.8 6.8 *The communal1ty of each variable 1s equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than 50 are Indicated by parentheses. 234 behavioral dimension. The second rotated factor identified in Table 30 for the 1963 data was a strong positive factor which has been labeled COOPERATION. It accounts for almost 20 per cent of the total variance. The categories Comment, Consult, Approve, Promise, Agree, Request, and Propose load highly on this factor. Factor III is a moderately strong conflict pattern. Threat, Reduce Relationship, and Expel load highly on Factor III. This factor has been labeled REDUCE RELATIONSHIP. Although it is somewhat different than the Reduce Relationship factor in the 1949 United States as an Actor analysis, it has a "turning away" characteristic also and is labeled, therefore, Reduce Relationship. Factor IV, which accounts for 6.8 percent of the total variance, is a MILITARY CONFLICT dimension. The FORCE and REJECT categories identify highly negative and conflictual behavior toward the United States. In Table 31 the factor analysis results for the United States as a Target in 1966 are given. Factor I appears to be a weakened version of the DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE factor found in 1963. It accounts for about 22 percent of the total variance, which is less than in 1963 (37.9 per- 235 TABLE 31 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 22 COMBEVENT CATEGORIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET-1966 VARI- VARIABLE UNROTATED FACTORS ORTHOGONALLY ABLES COMMUN- ROTATED FACTORS ALITY* I II III IV V I II III IV V 1-YIELD .49 .48 -.13 .24 -.42 -.04 .13 -.01 .34 (.53)’ **.02 2-COMMENT .82 .78 .00 .44 -.02 .11 (.83) .09 .19 .20 -.24 3-CONSULT .79 .47 -.72 -.16 -.01 -.17 .16 (.58) .29 .41 -.40 4-APPROVE .86 .05 -.86 .10 .07 .30 -.09 (.88)i .03 .24 .11 5-PROMISE .56 -.08 -.08 -.62 .17 -.31 .10 -.04 -.23 -.06 -.57 6-GRANT .64 .44 .35 .54 .11 -.01 .10 -.31 (.63) .00 .34 7-REWARD .75 -.11 -.67 .00 .25 -.42 -.08 (.84)-.07 -.16 .05 8-AGREE .89 .76 -.49 .16 .18 -.16 .27 .43 (.71) .29 -.18 9-REQUEST .77 .20 -.40 -.02 -.48 .26 .06 .11 -.10 (.84) .12 10-PR0P0SE .66 .67 -.28 .04 -.25 -.20 .27 .11 .46 (.54) -.25 11-REJECT .84 .86 .12 -.23 .15 .10 S - 8 1 ! .02 .42 .07 -.10 12-ACCUSE .95 .82 .30 -.36 .04 .24 (.94)-.09 .22 .07 -.03 13-PROTEST .65 .73 -.07 .32 .06 .03 .35 .09 (.67) .23 .13 14-DENY .55 .65 .13 .20 .08 .05 .44 .05 (.52)-.04 .10 15-DEMAND .88 .64 .30 -.49 .21 .29 (.91)-.08 .07 -.10 -.03 16-WARN .80 .81 .18 -.23 .13 .21 (.81)- .08 .26 .26 -.01 17-THREAT .69 .04 .20 .22 -.52 -.08 -.02 -.07 -.02 -.02 .00 18-DEMON- STRATE .89 .88 -.14 .19 .15 -.19 .42 .13 (.80) .21 -.13 19-REDUCE RELATION .81 .83 .00 .19 -.06 -.26 .39 .00 (.71) .19 -.19 SHIP 20-EXPEL .81 .44 .20 .47 .55 -.14 .06 -.16 (.79)-.20 .20 21-SEIZE .58 .60 .26 .05 -.38 .06 .47 -.26 .26 .35 .05 22-FORCE .68 -.13 .04 .47 .10 .63 -.10 .06 .00 .04 (.80) * OF TOTAL VARIANCE: 36.3 12.3 10.0 6.6 5.2 21.8 10.4 19.4 9.3 7.1 *The communal1ty of each variable Is equal to the sum of the squared factor loadings for that variable. **Load1ngs on the rotated factors equal to or greater than .50 are Indicated by parentheses. 236 cent of total variance), and fewer categories load highly on the factor. In 1966 the strong Diplomatic Exchange dimension, as the Coefficient of Congruence in Table 32 shows, appears to have dispersed somewhat between Factors I (.81), III (.73), and IV (.56) in 1966. Factor III in 1966 is again a REDUCE RELATIONSHIP type of behavior pattern, but in 1966 it is stronger (accounting) for 19.9 percent of the total variance and includes some cooperative as well as conflictual cate gories. It is, consequently, moderately related to Factor I (.73) and III (.62) in 1963. These and the above results suggest that the strong and clear behavioral traits of system action toward the United States in 1963 have dis persed somewhat in 1966. Factor II, although weaker in 1966 (10.4 percent of the total variance) remains a COOPERATION factor with Consult, Approve, and Reward loading highly. Factor V which is a MILITARY CONFLICT pattern is not as related to Factor IV in 1963 as might be expected. The coefficient of .44 does not suggest very much similarity. The coeffi cient is much higher, however, than any of the others for Factor V in 1966. The Cooperative factor has a moderate inverse relationship with the Military Conflict dimension, 237 TABLE 32 COEFFICIENT OF CONGRUENCE THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES COMPARED, 1963,1966 1966 % Total1 Variance FACTORS I II III IV V (1963) I (.81)2 .15 (.73) .56 .08 37.9 II .54 (.76) .48 (.62) -.41 19.7 III 1963 .47 -.14 (.62) .19 .00 10.8 IV .30 .11 .30 .11 .44 6.8 % Total 21.8 10.4 19.4 9.3 7.1 Variance (1966) ^The Variance scores are Included 1n this Table for easy re ference. The Variance 1s not part of the Coefficient of Con gruence, but 1s a complementary summary measure. 2 ‘’ Coefficients equal to or greater than .60 are Indicated by parentheses. 238 and there is no similarity— positive or negative— between Military Conflict in 1966 and Diplomatic Exchange or Reduce Relationship in 1963. In 1966 a new cooperative behavior pattern— Factor IV— can be identified. The categories Yield, Propose, Request, and Consult (.41) are clustered together and suggest a SEARCH type of behavior pattern. Factor IV in 1966 has some association with Factor II in 1963. It suggests that in 1966 special and primarily cooperative efforts were made to appeal and recommend policy action by the United States. From these results we may conclude that while there were some strong similarities in system behavior directed toward the United States between 1963 and 1966. There also were definite differences. The strong Diplo matic Exchange dimension in 1963 weakens in 1966. New and changing patterns of cooperation were evident, and the narrowly defined 1963 Reduce Relationship factor became more encompassing in 1966 with more of the total variance explained by the factor with some cooperative as well as conflictual influences. Finally, the Force dimension remained as an independent behavior pattern, but it was not the same pattern in the war period as it was in the 239 nonwar period. Summary; Proposition IIIB The conclusions which may be drawn from the anal ysis of the United States relations from other system members are the following: 1. In both the Korean and Vietnam cases there were strong dimensions of behavior which underjudged system relations toward the United States in both nonwar and war periods. For the Korea case, these were Diplomatic Exchange, Cooperation, and Conflict. For the Vietnam case, they were Diplomatic Exchange, Cooperation, Reduce Relationship, and Military Conflict. 2. In addition to this similarity there were also some differences. In the Korean case, the Diplomatic Exchange dimension as well as the Cooperation dimension became stronger and more encompassing behavior patterns during the war period. In the Vietnam case, however, just the opposite occurred. The strong Diplomatic Exchange and Cooperation factors in 1963 dispersed somewhat in 1966 accounting for much smaller portions of the total variance. Furthermore, in the Korean case the factor patterns were maintained between nonwar and war periods. The factors 240 which were carried over from 1963 to 1966 for the Vietnam case were weaker and a new cooperative dimension called Search surfaced. As in the previous analysis, relations toward the United States during the Vietnam period changed more than relations did during the Korean war. 3. We may conclude, therefore, that while there does appear to be strong characteristics in the relations toward the United States which were maintained in both the nonwar and war periods examined, there were also some differences. We expect that these differences probably are quite marked for individual nation relations with the United States. We shall examine these relations in the following two chapters. General Discussion In Chapter VII the results for all of the analyses in this research are summarized in full. In this discus sion some of the most important findings from the examina tion of United States system relations are reviewed. An especially important finding from the analyses in this chapter was that United States relations with other members of the international system were relatively stable 241 between the nonwar and limited war periods examined. This finding raises an important question about the widely held view that there is associated with a major nation's involvement in large scale foreign area limited war changes in the general pattern of its relations with other members of the international system. In accordance with this finding three points should be made. The first finding is that the analyses in this chapter, and the following chapters for that matter, have been based on a very special set of data for United States international relations. Event/interaction data are indi cator information of only one aspect of United States relations with other nations. We do suspect, however, that since the type of information collected is for highly volatile actions that the data collection should be especially sensitive to disturbing international situations of which limited war may be an example. It is true, nevertheless, that the effect of involvement in limited war on a nation's international relations may be long term rather than, or as well as, short term. We propose that longer periods as well as lag-time relationships should be investigated before we can conclusively suggest the reliableness of any general hypothesis on system 242 change. We submit, therefore, that international relations I data of more types of information than solely event/inter actions should be investigated over longer periods of time than a single year and that techniques of analysis com plementary to those followed here be employed in such studies to help determine the import of limited war involvement on the foreign affairs of a major nation. Secondly, the method of analysis used in this i research is only one approach for examining event data. The event data are very basic indicator information which can be manipulated in various manners. The data can be used in computer or noncomputer modeling, may be scaled, or treated in a variety of other ways. We felt that for the purposes of this early study of limited war, the best use of the event data would be to examine and describe United States international relations with relatively common procedures. The third point is that while no radical changes in United States system relations were found between the nonwar and limited war periods examined, there were some differences which were generally greater for the Vietnam case than for the Korean case. These differences are reviewed below, but the point to be made here is that 243 relational changes in the Korean and Vietnam wars may have been dissimilar enough not to permit strong generalizing about limited war involvement. The nonwar patterns of relations during 1949 were unlike relations in 1963, and the changes that occurred from nonwar to war involvement also were different or the Korean and Vietnam cases. This may indicate that the impact of a limited war on the inter national relations of an involved major nation may be arena specific. The nations involved in a limited war, the condition of the international environment at the time of the war, and possibly many other factors may make it very difficult to generalize about limited war involvement. In the following chapters a closer look at United States relations with allies and adversaries as well as with nations local to a limited war may help to determine if these differences in United States relations can be linked with specific nations or groups of nations. In addition to these findings, the results showed that the United States for all the years examined acted most frequently toward the Soviet Union. The United King dom, France, and Communist China also received many United States actions in all of the years studied. During limited war periods the principal allies and enemies involved in 244 the war became very active with the United States. Latin American and Sub-Saharan African nations received less United States actions in nOnwar and war periods than Western and Eastern European, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations. The United States in war and out of war when acting cooperatively or conflictually tended to "talk" more than "act." Furthermore, United States system behavior tended to be more cooperative than conflictual. United States behavior did not become more conflictual during periods of limited war involvement. There did appear, however, during limited war involvement an inde pendent and very negative conflict pattern in United States relations. The pattern was not strong, but it was not found in the nonwar periods and may be directly related to war involvement. System member relations toward the United States were also fairly stable for the Korean case but less so for the Vietnam case. In 1966, it appeared that there was a sizeable increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States, the allocation of behavior toward the United States, the allocation of behavior toward the United States was moderately similar to behavior in 1963, but 245 there appeared to be a fairly large change in the "mixes" of these relations. The Vietnam case results were quite different from the Korean results which suggests that there may have been a general system-wide reaction against the United States during its involvement in the Vietnam war. As in the case for the United States as an Actor, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Communist China acted very frequently toward the United States in both war and nonwar periods, and, as might be expected, nations in the local area of the conflict became very active toward the United States during limited war involve ment. Sub-Saharan African nations acted very little toward the United States in any year studied. In 1963 Latin American nations acted frequently toward the United States, but reduced actions in 1966, the war year. Again, we found in both 1963 and 1966 in relations toward the United States that nations "talked" more toward the United States than they "acted" when an action was either cooperative or con flictual. This phenomenon may underlie all international system behavior. From these results we can conclude that for the data and periods studied here, limited war has not been 246 associated with a major change in United States inter actions with members of the international system. United States system relations generally appear to be very stable. The results do suggest, however, two considerations. The first is that there may be major changes in United States international relations with certain regional groupings of nations and with certain individual nations which the aggregating of data tended to overshadow. This considera tion is examined further in the following two chapters. The second consideration, as noted above, is that further study of limited war over larger periods of time and with additional types of data and data analyses should be conducted before the propositions listed in this chapter are judged finally. CHAPTER V UNITED STATES REGIONAL RELATIONS In Chapter II, three sets of propositions concern ing United States international relations during periods of involvement in limited war were discussed. In Chapter IV, the propositions for United States system relations were examined, and the results showed that involvement in the Vietnam and especially the Korean wars were not asso ciated with major changes in United States system rela tions. In this chapter, United States relations with certain regional groupings of nations are examined. As explained in Chapter II, the changes which may occur in these relations are expected to be moderate and more con flictual than cooperative. The procedure for examining the regional proposi tions in this chapter is similar to that followed in Chapter IV. The propositions to be investigated are stated, and then examined for the Korean and the Vietnam wars. The findings from the analysis for each proposition are summarized, and at the end of this chapter a discussion 247 248 and interpretation of the results is provided. Examination of Propositions IVA, IVB, and V The first regional propositions listed in Chapter II were concerned with United States relations with adver saries. Three propositions were listed in Chapter II and include the following: Proposition IVA; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition IVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external behavior directed toward it from adversary nations are less coopera tive and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with its adversaries will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. The principal reason for posing these propositions was that changes in United States relations with its Eastern European adversaries are thought to be related closely to limited war involvement. During periods when the United States is fighting in foreign area conflicts, mutual suspicion and mistrust are expected to increase in United States-adversary relations. We expect, therefore, 249 that the relations between the United States and Eastern European countries will become more conflictual and less cooperative when the United States participates directly in limited war. Senator William Fulbright has explained, for example, that one of the "fallout effects" of the United States involvement in the Vietnam war has been a worsening in Eastern European nations' relations toward the United States just when there was a trend among these countries toward growing independence from the Soviet Union. Fur thermore, contends Fulbright, involvement in Vietnam "has put a severe strain on the Soviet-American detente. . . . Relations if not overly hostile, have indeed, as the Russians say, become 'frozen'— frozen in the direction of active hostility."1 In order to determine if United States-Eastern European relations have become less cooperative and more conflictual during the Korean and Vietnam wars, data for the relations between the United States and Warsaw Pact members and Yugoslavia are examined for the years 1949, ^William J. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 125-126. 250 2 1951, 1963, and 1966. As in the examination of Proposi tions IIA and IIB, the 22 event/interaction categories of behavior discussed in Chapter III have been modified into the following seven categories of cooperative, participa tory, and conflictual behavior. Approve, Promise, Agree, Request, and Propose Yield, Grant, and Reward Comment Consult Reject, Protest, and Deny Accuse, Demand, Warn, and Threaten Demonstrate, Reduce Relation ship, Expel, Seize, and Force 2 Yugoslavia has been included in this group of nations because it is an Eastern European nation, even if not clearly an "adversary" of the United States. The term adversary and enemy connote attitudes rather than explicit definitions and the inclusion of Yugoslavia for this examination is a somewhat "liberal" interpretation of the term adversary. See David S. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago, 111.: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), for a discussion of the terns enemy and adversary. Verbal Cooperation: Cooperative Action: Verbal Participation: Participatory Action: Defensive/Reactive Verbal Conflict: Offensive Verbal Conflict: Conflict Action: 251 These seven types of behavior are used to compare the relative cooperativeness and conflictualness of relations between the United States and its adversaries for each of the four time periods under investigation. The distribu tion of behavior among the categories and changes in the distribution between nonwar and limited war periods is discussed below in terms of relative frequencies of actions, and the correlation of actions between nonwar and limited war periods. Proposition IVA; The Korean Case The data for the United States as an Actor in 1949 indicate that United States behavior toward Eastern European nations was very conflictual when compared with United States system relations. In Chapter IV, it was explained that in 1949 United States behavior toward mem bers of the international system was about 37 percent cooperative and 20 percent conflictual. As Table 33 shows, the United States in 1949 acted cooperatively toward Eastern European nations in 17 percent of all its actions while it acted conflictually in 45 percent of its actions. These findings substantiate that, relative to the inter national system in general, Eastern European nations 252 received from the United States an inordinate amount of conflictual relations. TABLE 33 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MEMBERS AND TOWARD EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 Eastern System Europe Cooperation 37% 17% Conflict 20% 45% Participation 44% 37% In Table 34 the data for United States relations toward Eastern European nations in 1949 and 1951 are com pared by the seven types of behavior. These data show, as was found in Chapter IV, that the United States tends to "talk" more than "act" in nonwar as well as war involvement periods. About 56 percent of the behavior which was explicitly either cooperative or conflictual in 1949 was talk. In 1951 63 percent of these relations were talk. Six percent of United States Cooperative-Conflictual 253 TABLE 34 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 58 14% 47 15* +1% COOPERATIVE ACTION 10 3% 13 4% +1% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 121 30% 68 21 % -9% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 30 7% 22 7% 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 70 17% 64% 20% +3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 103 25% 89 28% +3% CONFLICT ACTION 13 3% 20 6% 4-3% TOTAL 405 99%* 323 101% CORRELATION: .93 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 254 relations toward Eastern European nations in 1949 and 10 percent in 1951 were physical acts. These data demon strate the relative infrequent use of such behavior. The most significant change in United States adversary relations between 1949 and 1951 was an increase in all types of conflictual behavior. The overall increase was 9 percent between the two periods. This suggests that relations became more conflictual when the United States was involved in the Korean war, but not radically so. If we measure by correlation the degree of association in United States relations toward Eastern Europe between the two periods, it is evident that these changes were not major. The correlation between United States behavior for 1949 and 1951 was a rather high .93. From these findings we may conclude that United States relations toward Eastern European nations were very conflictual in 1949, before the Korean war, and they became even more conflictual in 1951, during the Korean war. These results reflect the tense situation which existed between the United States and Eastern Europe during the early cold war era. United States involvement in the Korean war tended to worsen (relations became more conflictual) rather than improve this situation. 255 Proposition IVA: The Vietnam Case In 1963, as in 1949, United States relations toward Eastern Europe were predominantly conflictual, but not to the same degree as in 1949. As Table 35 shows, United States behavior toward Eastern Europe was much less conflictual in 1963 than in the rather tense early cold war period of 1949 and 1951. A large part of United States relations toward these adversary nations in 1963 was participatory. This reflects the relative calm in United States-Soviet Bloc relations after the period of the Cuban Missile Crisis. TABLE 35 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 AND 1963 1949 1963 Cooperative 17% 21% Conflict 45% 30% Participation 37% 50% 256 In Table 36 the data for United States relations toward Eastern Europe for 1963 and 1966 are displayed. As in the Korean case, there was an increase in United States conflictual behavior from the nonwar to limited war period. The increase was 6 percent. Even more interesting is the relative increase in United States cooperative behavior which increased from about 21 percent of United States relations in 1963 to 37 percent in 1966. This suggests possibly that during the Vietnam conflict the United States attempted to work cooperatively with Eastern Europe to limit the war and improve relations in general. Whatever the exact reason, United States behavior toward Soviet Bloc nations was more cooperative and less conflic tual in the middle 1960's than in 1949 or 1951. In Chapter VI United States relations with Communist China and with the Soviet Union, independently of its Eastern European allies, are examined in order to determine if this rela tionship also holds true for United States relations with these two major adversaries. The correlations between the data for United States relations between 1963 and 1966 is only .50. The increase in both cooperative and conflictual relations in 1966 accounts for this low correlation, and the shift away from 257 TABLE 36 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE* CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 62 18X 36 27X +9X COOPERATIVE ACTION 9 3X 13 10X +7X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 104 30X 22 1 6X -14X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 69 20X 16 12X -8X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 38 11X 22 16X +5X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 43 13X 20 15X +2X CONFLICT ACTION 20 6X 7 5X -IX TOTAL 345 101X* 136 101X CORRELATION: .50 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 258 participatory behavior indicates that United States rela tions tended to be less "overhead" and more "directed" in 1966 than in 1963. This probably reflects United States efforts in 1966 to explain United States policy to the Soviet Union and warn her away from activities which might escalate the Vietnam war to a general rather than limited war. The results do suggest that even though United States behavior became more cooperative in 1963, there was related to war involvement a relative increase in con flictual relations. Summary: Proposition IVA From the above examination of United States rela tions toward Eastern Europe, we may conclude the following: 1. United States relations with Eastern European nations did become more conflictual for both the Korean and Vietnam cases. 2. There was little difference in United States relations toward Eastern Europe between 1949 and 1951, but a major change between 1963 and 1966 did occur. The cor relation between 1949 and 1951 was .93, and between 1963 and 1966 it was .50. 3. The pre-Vietnam period was much different from 259 the war involvement period as the low correlation between 1963 and 1966 demonstrates. United States behavior became more cooperative, somewhat more conflictual, and less participatory between 1963 and 1966. Changes in relations toward Eastern European nations between 1949 and 1951, and 1963 and 1966 were not very similar. 4. From these results we accept the proposition that United States relations become more conflictual toward Eastern European nations when it becomes involved in a limited war with the following caveats. First, the changes which occur in United States-Eastern European relations were not consistent between the Korean and Viet nam cases inferring that different limited wars may be associated with different types of relations toward these adversaries. Secondly, in 1966 there was a greater increase in cooperative than conflictual behavior. This suggests that United States relations overall may have actually been somewhat more cooperative toward Eastern European nations in 1966 than in 1963. We can now turn to Eastern European relations toward the United States to see if similar conditions hold true when the United States is a Target rather than an Actor. 260 Proposition IVB: The Korean Case The data for the United States as a Target of Eastern European nations in 1949 indicate that behavior directed toward the United States was more conflictual and less cooperative than behavior directed from the United States. In Table 37 we can compare these differences. TABLE 37 EASTERN EUROPEAN ADVERSARY COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD AND FROM THE UNITED STATES BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 USA Actor USA Target Cooperative 17% 15% Conflictual 45% 60% Participatory 37% 26% In 1949 Eastern European nations acted very con- flictually toward the United States. System relations toward the United States in 1949, for example, were only about 28 percent conflictual as compared with 60 percent conflictual from the Soviet Bloc. This indicates clearly how atypical adversary relations are when compared with the 261 general pattern of relations directed toward the United States. When the 1949 data are compared with the 1951 data, as they are in Table 38, we find that there was a 3 percent increase in conflictual and a 5 percent increase in cooperative behavior directed toward the United States. The correlation between the data for the two periods is .95 which suggests that there was not a major change in relations between the pre-Korean and Korean war period. The largest changes were increases in Verbal Cooperation and Offensive Verbal Conflict. Conflict actions decreased somewhat. These results are very similar to those for the United States as an Actor in 1949 and 1951. This suggests that United States international relations with the Soviet Bloc were very conflictual in 1949, a nonwar year, and remained as such in 1951, a limited war year. Relations were so conflictual in 1949 (60 percent of Eastern European behavior) that it is not surprising that there was not a large increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States from these nations in 1951. Proposition IVB: The Vietnam Case Behavior directed toward the United States from 262 TABLE 38 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF EASTERN EUROPE IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Totel Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 31 9X 49 14X +5X COOPERATIVE ACTION 20 6X 19 6X 0 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 60 17X 32 9X -8X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 30 9X 26 8X -IX DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 40 12X 45 13X +15 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 139 40X 152 44X +4X CONFLICT ACTION 29 8X 20 6X -25 TOTAL 349 101%* 343 100X CORRELATION: .95 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 263 Eastern European nations in 1963 continued to be very con flictual, but relatively less so than in 1949 or 1951. In 1949, for example, about 60 percent of Eastern European behavior directed toward the United States was conflictual. In 1963 about 41 percent was conflictual. Eastern European behavior also was relatively more cooperative in 1963 (27 percent) than in 1949 (15 percent). In Table 39, the data for 1963 and 1966 are com pared for the Vietnam case. In 1966 there was a very noticeable relative increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States. In fact, 20 percent more conflict was directed toward the United States in 1966 (61 percent) than in 1963 (41 percent). There was also a 6 percent decrease in cooperative behavior. This shows clearly that there was associated with the Vietnam war in 1966 a very large increase in negative behavioral actions from European adversary nations toward the United States. There was little change in Conflict Actions, but a large increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict which indi cates a very large proportion of Soviet Bloc behavior was Accusations, Warnings, Demands, and Threats. Interestingly there was also a relative increase in Verbal Defensive/ Reactive behavior suggesting that these nations were also 264 TABLE 39 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF EASTERN EUROPE IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 79 23X 27 14X -9% COOPERATIVE ACTION 15 4X 14 7X +3% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 40 12X 19 10X -2X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 70 20X 15 8X -12* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 22 6% 23 12% +6% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 95 27% 77 40% +13% CONFLICT ACTION 28 8% 17 9% +1% TOTAL 349 100% 192 100% CORRELATION: .69 265 keen on Rejecting and Denying United States accusations and charges. The correlation of .69 suggests that there were considerable differences in Eastern European relations toward the United States between 1963 and 1966. A similar finding was uncovered earlier for United States behavior toward the Soviet Bloc. Summary: Proposition IVB From the results of this analysis of Eastern European adversary behavior directed toward the United States, the following may be concluded: 1. Eastern European behavior toward the United States in all periods examined was predominantly conflic tual, and much more conflictual than system behavior directed toward the United States. 2. Eastern European relations became much more conflictual from 1963 to 1966. The increase was about 20 percent. The change from 1949 to 1951 was only about 3 percent, but relations were already very conflictual in 1949 (60 percent of all behavior), and a much larger increase seems unlikely. By 1963 while relations were still quite negative they were less so than during the earlier period. With United States involvement in the 266 Vietnam war, relations again became very conflictual, however. These findings tend to support Proposition IVB as well as the observation by Senator William Fulbright and others that involvement in limited war by the United States apparently has "generated a degree of mistrust and antagonism toward the United States on the part of Eastern European nations . . ." Proposition V: The Korean and Vietnam Cases In addition to the propositions on the disposition of adversary relations, in Chapter II a proposition was posed about the balance of conflictual relations between the United States and its principal adversaries. We ques tioned whether relations toward or from the United States had been more conflictual during limited war involvement. We suspected that adversary relations were more conflic tual than United States relations during the war period. In order to measure the balance of the inter national relations between the United States and Eastern European adversary nations, the conflict data for the United States as an Actor is compared with the conflict 3 Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power. 267 data for the United States as a Target for each period. The measure of balance employed is the percentage of United States conflictual actions toward Eastern European nations less the percentage of Eastern European conflictual actions toward the United States for each year. The simple balance equation is B = C -C , where B stands for balance, C„_ ^ us ee us for the percentage of United States behavior which is conflictual, and Cee for the percentage of Eastern European behavior which is conflictual for the period examined. The measure was made for both nonwar and war periods, and it provides a general idea of whether the United States or Eastern European nations acted relatively more conflictuallj during each period examined. The measure ranges from +1.00 to -1.00 with a positive score indicating that United States behavior was relatively more conflictual, and a negative score indicating that Eastern European behavior was relatively more conflictual for any period examined. The balance scores for the data are reviewed below for adversary relations and in later sections for ally relations. In general, there has not been a major differ ence between relations toward or from the United States in nonwar or war periods, and shifts toward much greater imbalance from a nonwar to war period have not been common 268 in the investigation. The first balance scores examined are United States-Eastern European adversary relations in 1949 and 1951. Table 40 has these measurements which indicate that during both 1949 and 1951 Eastern European relations were more conflictual than United States relations. As the table indicates, there was a small relative change (5 per cent) in the balance of United States-Eastern European international relations between 1949 and 1951. The change was toward increased conflictual behavior from the United States rather than toward it. The United States in 1951 increased its relative output of conflictual behavior more than the Eastern European nations did toward the United TABLE 40 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ADVERSARIES, 1949 AND 1951 USA Actor (C ) USA Target (C„) Balance (B) us ______________________ _ _ ______ 1949 1951 .46 .54 .60 .63 -.14 -.09 269 States. Eastern European adversary behavior continued to be more conflictual, nevertheless, than United States behavior. In Table 41 the data for 1963 and 1966 are pre sented. These results show that Eastern European relations toward the United States were again more conflictual in both the nonwar and war periods than United States rela tions toward this adversary. In 1966 there was a strong increase in the conflictualness of both Eastern European and United States behavior. Eastern European relations became relatively more conflictual, however, than United States relations as proposed in Proposition V. TABLE 41 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ADVERSARIES, 1963 AND 1966 USA Actor (Cus) USA Target (Cee) Balance (B) 1963 1966 .29 .36 .42 .61 -.13 -.25 270 These findings suggest that the Korean and Vietnam cases were somewhat different. In the Korean case United States behavior became relatively more conflictual than Eastern European behavior; but in the Vietnam case, Eastern European behavior became relatively more conflictual. Proposition V is appropriate for the Vietnam war period, but not for the Korean war. Discussion: Propositions IVA, IVB, and V The results of this examination indicate that Unitec States international relations with Eastern European adver sary nations were very conflictual during nonwar periods, and even more conflictual when the United States was involved in limited war. This was especially true for the Vietnam war. During the Vietnam war we also found that Eastern European behavior became relatively more conflic tual than United States behavior. From the analysis of United States relations with its Eastern European adversaries, we may conclude that for the periods examined United States-adversary relations do appear to become more conflictual when the United States is involved in a limited war as proposed in Propositions IVA 271 and IVB. During war periods adversary behavior directed toward the United States does not necessarily become rela tively more conflictual than United States behavior toward the adversary. Examination of Propositions VIA, VIBy and VII In addition to expected changes in United States relations with adversary groups of nations, it is expected that during limited war involvement changes may occur in a major nation's relations with important alliances outside of the local area of the conflict. As Senator Fulbright has noted, he expects "that the American involvement in Vietnam has something to do with the current crisis in 4 NATO. ...” The following Propositions— VIA, VIB, and VII— were posed in Chapter II to examine this question. Proposition VIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward strategic allies geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. 4 Ibid., p. 129 272 Proposition VIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from strategic allies who are geograph ically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VII: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with its strategic allies will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflic tual behavior than during a nonwar period. In order to investigate these propositions, data for United States relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization members (excluding, of course, the United States) are examined for the periods 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966. As an addition to this analysis, in the summary at the end of the examination of NATO relations a brief description of United States relations with (1) all aid recipients that received over one billion dollars in United States loans and grants between 1948 and 1968, and (2) SEATO members is provided and compared with the results for NATO relations. This comprehensive view of United States-ally relations is included to better substantiate what United States-ally relations are like when it is involved in a limited war. For the analysis of NATO relations two different sets of nations were analyzed for the Korean and Vietnam 273 cases. The NATO pact was signed in 1949 by the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. These nations are examined for the Korean case. In 1953, Greece and Turkey became members of NATO, and in 1955 West Germany joined NATO. For the examination of the Vietnam case, the relations of these three additional nations with the United States have been included in the analysis. Proposition VIA: The Korean Case In Table 42 the data for United States relations toward NATO members are compared with United States rela tions toward Eastern European nations for 1949. The results show clearly that United States behavior toward its NATO allies was much more cooperative and less conflictual than its behavior toward Eastern European nations. This is not surprising since the United States was very con cerned with European reconstruction in 1949, and was par ticipating in a large number of economic aid programs as well as working with Western European nations to build a defense arrangement against the Soviet Union. 274 TABLE 42 COMPARISON BETWEEN UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD NATO AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS, BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 Eastern NATO Europe Cooperation 49% 17% Conflict 8% 45% Participation 43% 37% On Table 43 the data for United States relations toward the NATO area in 1949 and 1951 are presented. One of the most interesting items on this table is the large percentage of Cooperative Action by the United States. In 1949 and 1951 a very large proportion of United States behavior toward NATO allies was Grants and Rewards such as military and economic aid. The results presented in Table 43 suggest that the United States changed its behavior very little toward the NATO area between 1949 and 1951. The correlation between the two periods was a very high .99. These relations were 275 TABLE 43 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD NATO IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 128 31X 107 35X +4X COOPERATIVE ACTION 72 18X 46 15X -3X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 51 13X 41 13X 0 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 122 30X 95 31X +1* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 16 4X 11 4X 0 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 14 3X 2 IX -2X CONFLICT ACTION 4 IX 4 IX 0 TOTAL 407 100X 306 100X CORRELATION: .99 276 very cooperative, and included very little conflictual behavior. Both before and during the Korean war, United States behavior toward its European allies was very friendly. Proposition VIA; The Vietnam Case The data suggest that in 1963 United States rela tions toward NATO allies were less cooperative and somewhat more conflictual than its relations were in 1949. As Table 44 shows, United States behavior, in relative terms, was about half as cooperative in 1963 as in 1949. The decrease in cooperative behavior and the increase in par ticipatory behavior in 1963 reflects the ending of the massive United States aid effort to Western Europe and a TABLE 44 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD NATO ALLIED BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 AND 1963 1949 1963 Cooperation Conflict Participation 49% 8% 43% 25% 12% 62% 277 shift to maintenance or "overhead" behavior. In 1963 United States relations toward its European allies were basically cooperative, nevertheless. In Table 45 we can see that in 1966 there was a 15 percent relative increase in United States cooperative behavior over 1963. The increase in Cooperative Action can be accounted for (by reference to the original data) by several (seven) yields by the United States toward France after de Gaulle ordered foreign troops out of 5 France. The increase in Verbal Cooperation is probably accounted for by United States assurances to its allies that it would continue to support NATO. There was a small increase in United States conflictual behavior toward its Western European allies (4 percent), and the combined effect of these changes is reflected in the moderate cor relation of .84 between the data for 1963 and 1966. The results do not suggest an increase in conflictual behavior by the United States, but rather an increase in cooperative relations toward Western Europe from the pre-Vietnam to The reader may recall that the Cooperative Action category includes the behaviors of Yield, Grant, and Reward. Reference back to the original data shows that just over half of the 12 acts in this category in 1966 were Yields to France.______________________________________________ 278 TABLE 45 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD NATO IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 53 21X 25 27X +6X COOPERATIVE ACTION 11 4X 12 13X +9X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 55 22X 20 21X -IX PARTICIPATORY ACTION 99 40X 22 23X -17X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 12 5X 7 8X +3X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 8 3% 4 4X 4-1% CONFLICT ACTION 10 4X 4X 4X 0 TOTAL 248 99X* 94 100X CORRELATION: .84 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 279 Vietnam war involvement period. These changes are probably influenced directly by NATO concerns and perhaps indi rectly by United States involvement in the Vietnam war. Senator Fulbright as well as others has alluded to this relationship. Summary: Proposition VIA From the results of the analysis of United States relations toward its allies before and during the Korean and Vietnam wars the following may be concluded: 1. United States relations toward Western European allies were much less conflictual and more co operative than relations toward Eastern European adver saries in both nonwar and limited war periods examined. 2. United States relations toward NATO members were more cooperative and less conflictual during the Korean period, 1949 and 1951, than for the Vietnam period, 1963 and 1966. Furthermore, the correlation between 1949 and 1951 was .99, and between 1963 and 1966 it was .84. There was a small decrease in conflictual relations directed from the United States and toward NATO allies between 1949 and 1951 and a small increase between 1963 and 1966. United States relations toward its NATO allies 280 probably remained fairly stable in 1951 because these allies, in general, supported and participated to some extent on the side of the United States in the Korean war. This suggests, as in the analysis of Eastern European international relations, that while United States relations toward NATO members were very cooperative for all periods examined, relations were somewhat different during the Vietnam period than during the Korean period. 3. The results do not suggest a strong tendency toward increased United States conflictual behavior toward Western European allies during either the Korean or Vietnam wars. There was a small decrease in such activity in 1951, and in 1966 there was a 13 percent increase in Cooperative behavior and a 4 percent increase in conflictual behavior. It is true, however, that in 1966 France ordered foreign troops to leave French soil, and the United States yielding to this order registered cooperative reactions to a French order which was not a very "friendly" action. Regardless of this French move. United States relations toward Western European allies did not become more conflictual and Proposition VIA cannot be accepted on the basis of this analysis. 281 Proposition VIB: The Korean Case In Table 46 the data for NATO ally relations toward the United States for 1949 are displayed with the data for relations from the United States for the same year. The table shows clearly that the behavior of NATO nations toward the United States was as cooperative in 1949 as United States behavior toward these allies. Very little conflictual actions were exchanged. TABLE 46 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD AND FROM NATO NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 USA Actor USA Target Cooperation 49% 41% Conflict 8% 8% Participation 43% 52% In Table 47 the data for Western European ally relations toward the United States are compared for 1949 and 1951. The table shows a small increase in both co operative and conflictual relations. The 4 percent 282 TABLE 47 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF NATO IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 139 38X 137 41X +3X COOPERATIVE ACTION 11 3X 12 4X +1X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 68 19X 64 19X 0 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 120 33X 89 26X -7X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 13 4X 11 3X -IX OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 10 3X 22 7X +4X CONFLICT ACTION 3 IX 2 IX 0 TOTAL 364 101X* 337 101X CORRELATION: .98 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 283 increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict indicates an increase in Accusations, Demands, and Warnings toward the United States. There was little change, however, among any of the behavioral categories, and this is reflected in the high correlation of .98 between the two periods. As in the case of United States relations toward its allies for 1949 and 1951, relations toward the United States from its NATO allies in 1949 were cooperative and changed little in 1951 during the United States involvement in the Korean war. Proposition V1B; The Vietnam Case In 1963 NATO relations toward the United States were less cooperative than in 1949, but were very similar to United States behavior toward its Western European allies in 1963 as shown in Table 48. United States relations with its European allies clearly were not as cooperative in 1963 as in either 1949 or 1951. In Table 49 the data for the United States as a Target of NATO members in 1963 and 1966 are provided. The data show a small increase in cooperative behavior (3 per cent) , and a more sizeable increase in conflictual behav ior (10 percent) between the two periods. Especially interesting is the 12 percent increase in Offensive Verbal 284 TABLE 48 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD NATO NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949 AND 1963 USA Actor 1949 1963 USA Target 1949 1963 Cooperative Conflictual Participatory 49% 8% 43% 26% 12% 62% 41% 8% 52% 28% 13% 59% Conflict which suggests that NATO allies were Accusing, Demanding, and Warning the United States relatively more often in 1966 than in 1963. There was also an increase in such behavior between 1949 and 1951. Conflict Actions directed toward the United States also increased somewhat between 1963 and 1966. These increases, in addition to the decrease in Defensive/Reactive behavior, indicate that NATO allies were very critical of the United States in 1966 while acting less defensively about their own state of affairs. The correlation of .84 indicates that ally behav ior toward the United States was similar in 1963 and 1966, but not as similar as between 1949 and 1951 where the 285 TABLE 49 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF NATO IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 52 26X 27 292 +3* COOPERATIVE ACTION 3 22 2 22 0 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 36 182 18 192 +12 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 82 412 24 262 -152 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 9 52 1 12 -42 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 12 62 17 182 >122 CONFLICT ACTION 4 22 4 42 >22 TOTAL 198 1002 93 992* CORRELATION: .84 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 286 correlation was .98. These results, unlike the findings for the United States as an Actor in 1963 and 1966, indi cate that there was associated with United States involve ment in the Vietnam war an increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States. Summary: Proposition VIB From the analysis of Western European ally rela tions toward the United States the following may be con cluded: 1. As in the case of United States relations toward its NATO allies, NATO nations acted toward the United States more cooperatively and less conflictually than Eastern European nations did whether or not a limited war was in progress. 2. As in United States relations toward its Western European allies, the relations of NATO countries toward the United States did not change very much from before to during the Korean war. There was a small increase in both cooperative and conflictual relations in 1951 with an equivalent decrease in participatory relations. During the Vietnam war there were changes, however, with increased conflictual behavior (10 percent) directed toward 287 the United States. There was also a small increase in cooperative behavior (3 percent). This suggests again that United States relations during the Vietnam conflict were somewhat different than during the Korean conflict. We may conclude, therefore, that Proposition VIB does not appear to hold true for the Korean case, but in the Vietnam case there was clearly an increase in NATO conflictual relations toward the United States. This finding tends to support the earlier finding that aspects of limited war may be arena specific and that any generalizing between United States involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars must be made cautiously. Proposition VII: The Korean and Vietnam Wars In Table 50 the balance of United States relations with NATO members is compared for 1949 and 1951. The results indicate that in 1949 United States and NATO behavior were equally conflictual. In 1951 NATO behavior was somewhat more conflictual, however. The shift suggests a small increase in the balance of conflict toward the United States as posed in Proposition VII. In Table 51 we can see again that the balance shifted against the United States in 1966. NATO behavior 288 TABLE 50 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NATO MEMBERS, 1949 AND 1951 USA Actor USA Target Balance* (Cus> ‘Siato* 1949 .08 .08 -.00 1951 .06 .11 -.05 ♦Balance = C - C us nato TABLE 51 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NATO MEMBERS, 1963 AND 1966 USA Actor USA Target Balance* <Cus> (Cnato> 1963 .12 .13 -.01 1966 .16 .23 -.07 289 toward the United States in 1963 was slightly more conflic tual than United States behavior in 1963. In 1966 NATO relations were even more conflictual. These results sug gest that Proposition VII has been confirmed, since in both the Korean and Vietnam cases, NATO relations toward the United States became more conflictual during a period when the United States was involved in a limited war. A similar tendency was found for United States-Eastern European adversary relations between 1963 and 1966, but not between 1949 and 1951. Supplement: United States Aid Recipients and SEATO Allies Although the principal interest for examining Propositions VIA, VIB, and VII was to investigate United States-NATO relations, a further examination was made. Since data were available for a large number of United States-ally relations in addition to those of United States-Western European relations, it was decided to examine United States relations with two other groups of allies. These groups are (1) "leading U.S. aid recipients" that between 1948 and 1968 received at least one billion 290 dollars in United States grants and loans,® and (2) members of the South East Asian Treaty Organization. The investi gation of United States relations with these two groups of nations will provide a fuller understanding of United States ally relations than if only NATO relations were examined. The nations which received from the United States between 1948 and 1968 over one billion dollars in grants and loans include the following: United Kingdom Japan Belgian-Luxembourg France Greece Chile India Brazil Austria South Korea Pakistan Thailand Italy Yugoslavia Israel South Vietnam Netherlands Mexico Turkey Iran Colombia Nationalist China Spain United Arab West Germany Philippines Republic The source of this information is the Agency for International Development. See Global Defense: U.S. Mili tary Commitments Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969), p. 39. 291 The nations which are signatories to SEATO or nations included under the treaty's defense provisions are the following, all of which are included in the examina tion; Australia Pakistan United Kingdom France Philippines South Vietnam New Zealand Thailand Cambodia Laos In Table 52 the data for the United States as an"" Actor toward its Aid Recipients before and during the Korean war are provided. The data suggests that there was very little change in United States relations toward these nations from 1949 to 1951 (correlation .98), but the changes that did occur were toward slightly more coopera tive (2 percent) and less conflictual (3 percent) rela tions. United States relations toward these nations were cooperative in both the nonwar and war periods and were very similar to United States relations toward only its NATO allies for the same time period. In Table 53 the data for the United States as an Actor to its Aid Recipients before and during the Vietnam war are provided. The table shows more change in United States behavior between 1963 and 1966 (correlation .86) 292 TABLE 52 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD U.S. AID RECIPIENTS IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total in % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 229 26% 195 29% 4-3% COOPERATIVE ACTION 168 19% 118 18% -1% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 222 25% 152 23% +2% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 166 19% 149 22% 4-3% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 42 5% 27 4% -1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 43 5% 19 3% -2% CONFLICT ACTION 11 1% 7 1% 0 TOTAL 881 100% 667 1 00% CORRELATION: .98 293 TABLE S3 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD U.S. AID RECIPIENTS IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts * of Differences Total Total 1n * Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 147 25* 101 29* +4* COOPERATIVE ACTION 61 10* 70 20* +10* VERBAL PARTICIPATION 125 21* 78 22* +1* PARTICIPATORY ACTION 182 31* 74 21* -10* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 26 4* 12 3* +1* OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 34 6* 10 3* -3* CONaiCT ACTION 20 3* 7 2* -1* TOTAL 595 100* 352 100* CORRELATION: .86 294 than there was between 1949 and 1951. The changes were toward much more cooperative (14 percent increase), and less conflictual relations (4 percent increase). These results show clearly that United States relations toward nations to which it has provided large amounts of aid tend to become more cooperative and less conflictual when the United States is involved in a limited war. Furthermore, these relations in periods of both nonwar and war involve ment tend to be predominantly cooperative. The large percentage of Cooperative Action in 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 reflects United States gifts, grants, and loans to these nations. In Table 54 the data for Aid Recipients' relations toward the United States before and during the Korean war are provided. These data show relatively little change in United States behavior between 1949 and 1951 (correla tion .98). The changes which did occur were small increases in both cooperative (3 percent), and conflictual behavior (4 percent). Like United States relations toward these nations, there was not a major shift in behavior between 1949 and 1951. Relations were predominantly co operative in both nonwar and war periods. The single most important change between 1949 and 1951 was a 5 percent 295 TABLE 54 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF U.S. AID RECIPIENTS IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 219 39* 251 41* 42* COOPERATIVE ACTION 18 3* 26 4* +1* VERBAL PARTICIPATION 104 18* 98 16* -2* PARTICIPATORY ACTION 165 29* 147 24* -5* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 20 4* 26 4* 0 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 25 4* 54 9* 45* CONFLICT ACTION 13 2* 5 1* -IX TOTAL 564 99** 607 99* CORRELATION: .98 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 296 increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict which indicates an increase in accusations, warnings, and demands toward the United States. In Table 55 the data for Aid Recipients' relations toward the United States before and during the Vietnam war are presented. These data again show little change between 1963 and 1966 (.95 correlation), and as in the Korean case there was a small increase in Cooperative behavior (3 percent). In 1966 there was, however, a 6 percent increase in conflictual behavior directed toward the United States, and relations were not quite as "friendly" as in 1949 and 1951. This suggests that rela tions from Aid Recipients were somewhat more conflictual during the middle 1960's and became even more so when the United States was involved in the Vietnam war. Before the conclusions are listed for these results we will look at SEATO relations and then compare these findings with the NATO and Aid Recipient examina tions. The SEATO member relations have been observed only for the Vietnam case, since SEATO was created in 1954. In Table 56 United States relations toward SEATO nations in 1963 and 1966 are given. The results indicate that while relations were cooperative in 1963 (30 percent 297 TABLE 55 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF U.S. AID RECIPIENTS IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts 2 of Acts 2 of Differences Total Total 1n 2 Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 153 302 91 302 0 COOPERATIVE ACTION 10 22 15 52 +32 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 86 172 49 162 -12 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 176 352 74 252 -102 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 23 52 10 32 -22 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 54 112 47 162 +52 CONFLICT ACTION 8 22 14 52 +32 TOTAL 510 1022* 300 1002 CORRELATION: .95 "Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 298 TABLE 56 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD SEATO IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts X of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 46 21% 31 22% +1X COOPERATIVE ACTION 19 9X 35 25* *16% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 53 24% 28 20% -41 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 75 342 31 22% -12% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 14 6% 10 7% +1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 8 4% 3 2% -2% CONFLICT ACTION 8 4% 3 2% -2% TOTAL 223 102%* 141 100% CORRELATION: .71 *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 299 of total behavior), they became very cooperative in 1966 (47 percent). United States relations also became somewhat less conflictual from 1963 to 1966. The low correlation of .71 reflects these changes which, while similar to the changes in United States relations toward its Aid Recip ients, were of greater magnitude. In Table 57 SEATO member relations toward the United States for 1963 and 1966 are shown. In this case there is 9 percent increase in cooperative behavior and a 2 percent increase in overall conflictual behavior. While there was not a general increase in conflictual behavior between 1963 and 1966, there was a 6 percent increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict. The decrease in Defensive/ Reactive Verbal Conflict and Conflict Action and the increase in Offensive Verbal Conflict suggests that in relative terms many admonishments were being directed at the United States from its SEATO allies in 1966. The data also indicate that during periods of both nonwar and limited war involvement. United States relations toward its SEATO allies were more cooperative and less conflictual than their relations toward the United States. 300 TABLE 57 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF SEATO IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 43 20% 32 26% >6% COOPERATIVE ACTION 2 1% 5 4% +3% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 46 22% 24 19% +3% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 74 35% 32 26% -9% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 13 6% 4 3% -3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 28 13% 25 19% 4-6% CONFLICT ACTION 7 3% 2 2% -1% TOTAL 213 100% 124 99%* CORRELATION: .89 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors 301 Summary: Propositions VIA, VIB, VII and United States International Relations with NATO and SEATO Allies and with Major Aid Recipients From this expanded analysis of United States rela tions with groups of allies we may conclude several things, but before we review these, one fact must be stressed. The groupings referred to above were not mutually exclu sive, and the inclusion of certain nations in all three groups such as France and the United Kingdom will tend to make somewhat associated the findings for these groups. With this warning made, the following may be concluded from the above analyses. 1. United States relations toward NATO and SEATO members, and toward its Aid Recipients were more coopera tive and less conflictual than United States relations toward Eastern European adversaries for each of the periods analyzed (see Table 58). 2. United States cooperative relations toward NATO and SEATO members, Aid Recipients, Eastern European nations, and the international system in general either stayed the same or became more cooperative from the nonwar periods 1949 and 1963 to when the United States was involved in limited war in 1951 and 1966 (see Table 58). 302 TABLE 58 THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL AND PARTICIPATORY RELATIONS TOWARD SELECTED REGIONAL GROUPINGS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 1949, 1951, 1963, AND 1966 NATO SEATO AID RECIPIENTS 1949 1951 1963 1966 1963 1966 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPER ATIVE 49% 50% 25% 40% 30% 47% 45% 47% 35% 49% CONFLIC TUAL 8% 6% 12% 16% 14% 29% 11% 8% 13% 8% PARTICI PATORY 43% 44% 62% 44% 58% 11% 44% 45% 52% 43% EASTERN EUROPE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1949 1951 1963 1966 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPER ATIVE 17% 19% 21% 36% 37% 37% 31% 40% CONFLIC TUAL 45% 54% 30% 36% 20% 20% 19% 18% PARTICI PATORY 37% 28% 50% 28% 44% 43% 50% 43% 303 Conflictual behavior from the United States did not follow such a clear pattern. 3. Relations toward the United States during the Korean period— 1949 and 1951— were most conflictual from Eastern European nations. NATO members and Aid Recipient relations were especially cooperative. In 1963 and 1966 relations directed from Aid Recipients toward the United States were relatively more cooperative than relations from NATO allies, SEATO allies, Eastern European adver saries, or the international system in general (see Table 59) . 4. Between 1949 and 1951, conflictual behavior toward the United States from all of the regions examined, as well as internation system behavior became more con flictual. Between 1963 and 1966 the conflictual behavior of all the regions examined, as well as international system behavior, toward the United States again became more conflictual. Furthermore, these shifts were con sistently greater between 1963 and 1966 than between 1949 and 1951. We may conclude from these findings for the Korean and Vietnam cases that when the United States was involved in these limited wars ally as well as adversary relations toward the United States became more conflictual, 304 TABLE 59 THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY RELATIONS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES FROM SELECTED REGIONAL GROUPINGS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 NATO SEATO AID RECIPIENTS 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPER- 41% 45% 28% 31% ATIVE CONFLIC- 8% 11% 13% 23% TUAL PARTICI- 52% 45% 59% 45% PATORY 1963 1966 1949 1951 1963 1966 21% 30% 42% 45% 32% 35% 22% 24% 10% 14% 18% 24% 57% 45% 47% 40% 52% 41% EASTERN EUROPE 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPER- 15% 20% 27% 21% ATIVE CONFLIC- 60% 63% 41% 61% TUAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1949 1951 1963 1966 33% 37% 28% 26% 28% 32% 33% 44% PARTICI- 26% 17% 32% 18% PATORY 39% 32% 39% 30% 305 although there were wide variances in the range of increased conflict. 5. Cooperative relations were somewhat less con sistent but also show a pattern. NATO, SEATO, and Aid Recipient relations all became somewhat more cooperative from the nonwar to war periods examined. Eastern European and international system relations toward the United States became more cooperative during the Korean war and less cooperative during the Vietnam war. 6. From the above findings we may conclude for the periods examined that the United States increased its cooperative behavior toward ally, enemy, and the inter national system when involved in a limited war. At the same time, it increased its conflictual behavior toward its Eastern European adversaries. Ally, adversary, and system behavior toward the United States became relatively more conflictual when the United States was involved in a limited war. Allies also increased, however, their cooperative behavior toward the United States when the United States was involved in a limited war, and some of the increases in conflictual behavior were small and probably not very significant. During the Vietnam war. Eastern European relations became less cooperative toward 306 the United States. Examination of Propositions VIIIA, VIIIB, and IX In addition to the questions of whether or not United States ally and adversary relations change during periods of limited war involvement, we will also consider relations with nations in the local area of the conflict. In Chapter II, it was suggested that United States rela tions with nations in the area of the limited war are probably less cooperative while the United States is engaged in a local area war. We expect that this is prob ably especially true for the Vietnam case where foreign occupation and intervention has been a major concern for local area nations for many years prior to United States direct involvement. The propositions listed in Chapter II are the following: Proposition VIIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward nations in the local area of the limited war are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VIIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from nations in the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. 307 Proposition IX: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with nations in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. In order to investigate these propositions, different sets of data were needed for the Korean and Vietnam analyses. For the Korean war case, the inter national relations of three Far East Asian nations with the United States are examined. These include Nationalist China, Japan, and the Philippines. For the Vietnam case, United States international relations with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia are examined. The analysis of these two cases is interesting because the prevailing environment for the Korean case was much different from that for the Vietnam case. In 1949 and through most of 1951, Japan was still militarily occupied by the United States. Nationalist China in 1949 was in a state of civil war, and in 1951 was receiving United States aid and protection. The Philippines was a strong ally of the United States in both 1949 and 1951. Given these conditions, the expected changes toward more conflictual behavior between the United States and these 308 Far East Asian nations during the Korean war period may not be as strong as we would expect to occur in the Vietnam case, where many of the nations in the conflict area were not allied closely with the United States. Propositions VIIIA: The Korean and Vietnam Cases In Table 60 the data for the United States as an Actor in the Far East in 1949 and 1951 are provided. The - ,* information in the table shows clearly that between 1949 and 1951 United States behavior toward Far East Asian nations became more cooperative and less conflictual. There was a 13 percent increase in cooperative relations and a 10 percent decrease in conflictual relations. These were definitely strong tendencies toward increased coopera tive rather than conflictual behavior, and Proposition VIIIA does not appear to hold true for this case. These findings suggest that during the Korean war the United States directed more "friendly" behavior toward nations in the war area than during the nonwar period investigated. In Table 61 the results for the United States as an Actor toward nations in South East Asia are provided. These findings are similar to those for 1949 and 1951. That is, the United States increased its cooperative 309 TABLE 60 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD FAR EAST ASIA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts 2 of Acts 2 of Differences Total Total In 2 Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 16 132 19 252 +122 COOPERATIVE ACTION 22 172 14 182 +12 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 54 432 24 312 -122 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 18 142 17 222 +82 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 7 62 2 32 -32 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 8 62 1 12 -52 CONFLICT ACTION 2 22 0 02 -22 TOTAL 127 1012* 77 1002 CORRELATION: .82 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 310 TABLE 61 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD SOUTH EAST ASIA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts 2 of Acts 2 of Differences Total Total 1n 2 Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 13 192 1 5 232 +42 COOPERATIVE ACTION 10 152 19 292 +142 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 20 292 12 192 -102 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 12 172 11 172 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 6 92 7 112 +22 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 62 1 22 -42 CONFLICT ACTION 4 62 0 0 -62 TOTAL 69 1012* 65 1012 CORRELATION: .66 *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 311 relations (18 percent), and decreased its conflictual ! relations (8 percent) from the nonwar to limited war involvement period. ' In 1966 there was a large increase in Cooperative Action which suggests increased United States aid to the nations in South East Asia. The correlation between the two periods was a low .66. This can be accounted for by the increases in Verbal Cooperation (assurances) and Cooperative Action (aid), and the reduc tions in Conflict Actions and Offensive Verbal Conflict. Again we must conclude that United States relations in 1951 and 1966 during involvement in a limited war did not become more conflictual toward nations in the local area of the conflict. Rather, United States behavior became more cooperative and less conflictual. Since the results of the examination of Proposition VIIIA are so clear we shall move directly to the examination of Propositions VIIIB and IX and summarize all the findings at the conclu sion of these examinations. Proposition VIIIB: Korea and Vietnam In Table 62 the data for Far East Asian relations toward the United States are provided. Again the same pattern found for United States behavior is evident in the 312 TABLE 62 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF FAR EAST ASIA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 28 42% 25 46% +4* COOPERATIVE ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 13 19* 9 161 -3% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 17 25% 17 31% +6% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 3% 0 0 -3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 5 8% 3 6% -2% CONFLICT ACTION 2 3% 1 2 % -1% TOTAL 67 100% 55 101%* CORRELATION: .99 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 313 behavior of nations in the conflict area toward the United States. In 1949 relations toward the United States were relatively very cooperative and only moderately conflic tual. As might be expected, cooperative behavior was primarily verbal since aid and assistance was a "one-way street" in the post-World War II period of occupation and reconstruction. The shift in the relations of Japan, Nationalist China, and Philippines toward the United States which occurred between 1949 and 1951 was not very great with a small increase in cooperative behavior and a decrease in conflictual behavior. The correlation between the two periods was a very high .99. These data suggest that relations toward the United States from Far East Asian nations did not become more conflictual during the United States involvement in the Korean war, but they did become somewhat more cooperative. If we turn to Table 63 we find that we must con clude that Propositions VIIIA and VIIIB cannot be accepted for the periods studied in this research. In 1963, 50 percent of the behavior from South East Asian nations directed toward the United States was conflictual, and only about 16 percent cooperative. In 1966 this changed. 314 TABLE 63 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF SOUTH EAST ASIA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts t of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 8 16% 14 22% +6% COOPERATIVE ACTION 0 0 6 9% *9% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 8 16% 12 19% +3% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 10 20% 11 17% >3% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 8% 4 6% -2% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 14 28% 15 23% >5% CONFLICT ACTION 7 14% 3 5% -9% TOTAL 51 102%* 65 101% CORRELATION: .70 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 315 however. While relations were still predominantly con flictual in 1966, they had become relatively less so, and cooperative relations had increased. There was an overall relative decrease of 15 percent in conflictual behavior and an increase in cooperative behavior by 15 per cent. Relations toward the United States became more cooperative rather than more conflictual. The correlation of .70 between the two periods reflects this change. We may conclude, therefore, that Propositions VIIIA and VIIIB did not hold for either the Korean or Vietnam cases. United States-local area regional relations during the period of United States involvement in both limited wars became less rather than more conflictual. We will now examine the balance of these relations. Proposition IX: Korea and Vietnam As Table 64 indicates, United States-Far East Asian conflictual relations in 1949 were about 13 percent of total behavior in either direction. In 1951 the total percentage of conflict behavior decreased, but less so in relations toward the United States than from the United States. Far East Asian relations in 1951 were slightly more conflictual than United States relations. 316 TABLE 64 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FAR EAST ASIA, 1949 AND 1951 USA Actor USA Target Balance* <Cus> <cfea> 1949 .13 .13 0 1951 .04 .07 -.03 *Balance = Cus - Cr, where r is the region observed. TABLE 65 CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, 1963 AND 1966 USA Actor USA Target Balance (C ) (C ) us sea 1963 .20 .50 -.30 1966 .12 .34 -.22 317 In Table 65 above, the data for United States con flictual international relations with South East Asian nations are shown. The table indicates that in 1963 South East Asian relations toward the United States were much more conflictual than United States relations. In 1966 there was a general decrease in conflictual international relations. South East Asian behavior in 1966 became less conflictual, but still remained about 22 percent more con flictual than United States relations. Summary: Propositions VIIIA, VIIIB, and IX From the preceding analyses of United States international relations with nations in the local area of a limited war we may conclude the following: 1. For both the Korean and Vietnam cases, United States relations during involvement in a limited war toward nations in the local area of the conflict became less conflictual and more cooperative. Proposition VIIIA cannot be accepted, therefore, according to the results of this analysis. 2. The findings for relations toward the United States from nations in the local area of a limited war are similar to the findings for United States relations during 318 war involvement. Relations became more cooperative and less conflictual during both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Proposition VIIIB also cannot be accepted based on the above analysis. 3. The international relations of the United States with nations in the local area of the conflict were more conflictual during the Vietnam periods 1963 and 1966 than during the Korean periods 1949 and 1951. The balance between 1949 and 1951 shifted toward more conflictual behavior being directed toward the United States. In 1966 East Asian nations continued to act more conflictually toward the United States than the United States did toward them. These nations reduced, however, their conflictual behavior between 1963 and 1966 more than did the United States. Based on these results we cannot accept Proposi tion IX which was an expectation that the relations of nations local to a limited war toward the United States would become relatively more conflictual than relations from the United States during periods of limited war involvement. 319 General Discussion In Chapter VII the results for all of the analyses in this research are summarized. In this discussion some of the most important findings about United States rela tions with regional groups of adversaries, allies, and nations local to the Korean and Vietnam wars are reviewed. In the previous chapter for the system analysis, the interest was to describe and compare the international system relations of the United States during periods of nonwar and limited war involvement. In this chapter we have shown that a regional level of analysis of United States international relations provides additional infor mation about changes in international behavior associated with limited war involvement. In Table 66, the correlations for the United States as a regional Actor between nonwar and war involvement periods for both the Korean and Vietnam cases are shown. These coefficients along with the scores for United States international system relations and a mean average of the regional coefficients are provided to help summarize the findings. As a note of caution, these data must be care fully interpreted since while all of the data compared 320 TABLE 66 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR UNITED STATES REGIONAL RELATIONS DURING NONWAR AND LIMITED WAR PERIODS, 1949-1951, 1963-1966 USA ACTOR USA TARGET 1949 1951 EAST EUROPE .93 NATO .99 AID RECIPIENTS .98 SEATO FAR EAST ASIA .82 SOUTH EAST ASIA M AVERAGE (.93) INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (.99) 1963 1949 1963 1966 1951 1966 .50 .95 .69 .84 .98 .84 .86 .98 .95 .71 — .89 .99 .66 — .70 (.71) (.98) (.82) (.92) (.95) (.80) 321 within the coefficients are mutually exclusive, the data across the coefficients are not. Data for France and the United Kingdom, for example, have been included in NATO, SEATO, Aid Recipient, and international system calcula tions and we would, therefore, expect a degree of simi larity in the correlations for these cases. The worst offender is by far the M average of the correlations. These data clearly are not independent since they average together the correlation coefficients and summarize infor mation which is not mutually exclusive. This score is then a very gross summary of the degree of similarity between the nonwar and war periods. The correlation matrix in Table 66 shows several interesting relationships. It is clear that United States regional relations were much more stable between 1949 and 1951 than between 1963 and 1966. The correlations between 1949 and 1951 were consistently higher than between 1963 and 1966. The mean average for United States regional relations reflects this consistency as does the overall system measure of United States behavior. The degree of association for regional relations between 1963 and 1966 as the coefficients show, was sporadic. The relatively low mean average reflects the inconsistency. This shows 322 that during United States involvement in the Korean war, its relations changed little from the pre-war period. During the Vietnam war there were, however, major changes. It suggests that limited war involvement may tend to be time and arena specific and generalizations about limited war should be made cautiously. The most stable United States international rela tions between limited war and war periods were with Aid Recipients. United States behavior toward these nations as a group and their behavior toward the United States changed little during either the Korean or Vietnam wars. United States-NATO relations were also relatively stable. Eastern European relations during the Vietnam war changed noticeably. United States-SEATO and South East Asia rela tions also changed from before to during the United States large scale involvement in the Vietnam war. These findings suggest that United States regional relations with its traditional Western European allies and with those nations which during the last twenty years have been closely tied to the United States by aid relations tended to not change radically for the periods examined when the United States was involved in the Korean and Vietnam limited wars. 323 United States relations during the Vietnam war with adversaries and with nations in the local area of a limited war did change, however. During the Korean war period Eastern European relations changed more than ally or aid recipient relations, but the changes were not very major. United States relations toward nations in the region of the Korean war changed somewhat, but their relations toward the United States remained very stable between the nonwar and war periods. In Table 67 the results for United States coopera tive, conflictual, and participatory regional relations are summarized. These data indicate that United States behavior toward all of the regions identified became more cooperative, in varying degrees, during periods of limited war involvement. At the same time, the United States increased its conflictual relations toward Eastern European nations and SEATO members, but decreased its conflictual relations toward Aid Recipients and nations in the local area of a conflict— Far East Asian nations in 1951, and South East Asian nations in 1966. United States relations toward NATO members became somewhat less conflictual in 1951 and slightly more conflictual in 1966. In 1949 and 1951 the United States was less TABLE 67 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY RELATIONS TOWARD SELECTED REGIONAL GROUPS OF NATIONS, 1949, 1951, 1963, AND 1966 COOPERATION CONFLICT PARTICIPATION INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1949 1951 37% 37% 20% 20% 44% 43% KOREAN CASE EASTERN EUROPE 1949 1951 17% 19% 45% 54% 37% 28% NATO 1949 1951 49% 50% 8% 6% 43% 44% AID RECIPIENTS 1949 1951 45% 47% 11% 8% 44% 45% FAR EAST ASIA 1949 1951 30% 43% 14% 4% 57% 53% COOPERATION CONFLICT PARTICIPATION INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1963 1966 31% 40% 19% 18% 50% 43% EASTERN EUROPE 1963 1966 21% 37% 30% 36% 50% 28% VIETNAM CASE NATO 1963 1966 25% 40% 12% 16% 62% 44% AID RECIPIENTS 1963 1966 35% 49% 13% 8% 52% 43% SEATO SOUTH EAST ASIA 1963 1966 1963 1966 30% 47% 34% 52% 14% 24% 21% 13% 58% 11% 34% 52% 324 325 cooperative and more conflictual toward Eastern Europe than during 1963 and 1966. United States relations toward the Soviet Bloc appear to have improved in the middle 1960's. NATO relations, on the other hand, were less co operative and more conflictual in the 1960's. United States behavior toward Aid Recipients was cooperative and fairly stable between 1949-1951 and 1963-1966. These findings suggest that when viewing United States relations in the early cold war era and again in the middle 1960's it appears that the United States relations toward Aid Recipients have remained very cooperative. Eastern European nations have become more cooperative, and rela tions toward NATO members have become somewhat less co operative. In Table 68 the findings for cooperative, conflic tual, and participatory regional relations toward the United States are summarized. These data show that except for relations from nations local to the limited war, behavior directed toward the United States from both adversary and ally became more conflictual, in varying degrees, when the United States was involved in a limited war. Local area relations— Far East Asian in 1951 and South East Asian in 1966— became less conflictual. At the TABLE 68 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY RELATIONS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES FROM SELECTED REGIONAL GROUPS OF NATIONS, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 KOREAN CASE INTERNATIONAL EASTERN NATO AID FAR EAST SYSTEM EUROPE RECIPIENTS ASIA 1949 1951 1949 1951 1949 1951 1949 1951 1949 1951 COOPERATION 33% 37% 15% 20% 41% 45% 42% 45% 42% 46% CONFLICT 28% 32% 60% 63% 8% 11% 10% 14% 14% 8% PARTICIPATION 39% 32% 26% 17% 52% 45% 47% 40% 44% 47% COOPERATION CONFLICT PARTICIPATION INTERNATIONAL EASTERN SYSTEM EUROPE VIETNAM CASE NATO 1963 1966 28% 26% 33% 44% 39% 30% 1963 1966 27% 21% 41% 61% 32% 18% 1963 1966 28% 31% 13% 23% 59% 45% AID RECIPIENTS 1963 1966 32% 35% 18% 24% 52% 41% SEATO 1963 1966 21% 30% 22% 24% 57% 45% SOUTH EAST ASIA 1963 1966 16% 31% 50% 34% 36% 36% 326 327 same time, relations directed toward the United States during the Korean war from all the regions examined became more cooperative. During the Vietnam war only relations from Eastern European nations became less cooperative. One especially interesting finding was that between 1963 and 1966 the conflictual behavior of Eastern European adversaries and NATO allies became 20 and 10 percent more conflictual, respectively. This is important because in 1963 Eastern European behavior toward the United States had become much less conflictual than in 1949 or 1951. In 1966, a Vietnam war year, Eastern European behavior again became about 20 percent more conflictual than it was in 1963. NATO ally behavior was especially important in 1966 because it was 10 percent more conflictual than in 1963, and, in fact, the most conflictual for any period examined. Strategic ally and adversary relations tended to change and become more conflictual during the Vietnam war period examined. This suggests that a Soviet-United States detente was probably somewhat more distant in 1966 than in 1963, and United States-NATO relations more dis turbed . In Table 69 the data for the balance in United States relations toward the selected regions are given. 328 TABLE 69 THE CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN UNITED STATES REGIONAL RELATIONS, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 EASTERN EUROPE USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance <Cus> <Cee> 1949 .46 .60 -.14 1951 .54 .63 -.09 1963 .29 .42 -.13 1966 .36 .61 -.25 NATO USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance (Cus) (Cnato) 1949 .08 00 o • 0 1951 .06 .11 -.05 1963 .12 .13 -.01 1966 .16 .23 -.07 FAR EAST ASIA USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance <Cus> (Cfea) 1949 .13 .13 0 1951 .04 .07 -.03 SOUTH EAST ASIA USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance (CUS> « W 1963 .20 .50 -.30 196*6 .12 .34 -.22 ^Balance » Cu$ - Cr, where r Is the region observed. 329 The balance scores show clearly that United States behavior toward the regions examined was never more conflictual than United States relations. United States relations with Eastern Europe were very conflictual and behavior toward the United States was more conflictual than behavior from the United States. The difference between degree of conflict was reduced between 1949 and 1951 with a large increase in United States conflictual behavior. Between 1963 and 1966 Soviet Bloc behavior became more conflictual than United States behavior did. This again shows the difference between 1949-1951 and 1963-1966 and the strong reactions against the United States in 1966 by the Soviet Bloc members. United States relations with NATO members were very conflictual and in very close balance in nonwar periods. During limited war, NATO relations toward the United States were more conflictual than United States relations toward NATO countries. NATO relations toward the United States in 1966 were especially conflictual. Far East Asian relations with the United States in 1949 and 1951 were not very conflictual and were in close balance. CHAPTER VI UNITED STATES NATIONAL RELATIONS In Chapters IV and V United States international relations with members of the international system and with selected regional groups of nations were examined. In this chapter, United States international relations with a few particularly important nations are studied to determine if changes occurred in these relations when the United States was involved in limited war. As explained in Chapter II, eight propositions on expected changes in United States international relations with ally and adversary nations have been posed. The procedure for examining the national proposi tions below is similar to that followed in the preceding chapter. The propositions to be investigated are stated and examined for the Korean and Vietnam wars. The findings from the analysis for each proposition are summarized, and at the end of this chapter a discussion and interpretation of the results is provided. 330 331 Examination of Propositions XA, XBf and XI The first propositions to be examined for United States-national relations are concerned with adversaries. Three propositions were listed in Chapter II and include the following: Proposition XA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XI: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with principal adversary nations will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. These three propositions were posed to search for expected changes in United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China from periods of nonwar to limited war involvement. George Kahin and John Lewis have stated, for example, that they believe United States involvement in the Vietnam war has been related to a deterioration in the movement toward a United States- 332 Soviet detente.^- George Kennan has noted that he believes that United States relations with Communist China as well as with the Soviet Union have fared poorly during involve- ment in the Vietnam war. We know that during the Korean war the Communist Chinese fought directly against the United States, and we expect that Communist Chinese-United States international relations probably were very conflic tual in 1951 when compared with relations in 1949. Proposition XA: The Korean Case In Table 70 United States relations toward the Soviet Union in 1949 and 1951 are shown. As we might ex pect after the analysis of Eastern European regional rela tions, United States behavior toward the Soviet Union in 1949 was predominantly conflictual. Forty-five percent of United States relations in 1949 were conflictual, 41 per cent participatory, and only 14 percent cooperative. Relations toward Eastern European nations in 1949, as explained in the previous chapter, were 45 percent con- ^George M. Kahin and John L. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New Yorks The Dial Press, 1967). 2 The Vietnam Hearings (Kennan), p. 125. 333 TABLE 70 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD THE SOVIET IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 29 12% 36 17% +5* COOPERATIVE ACTION 5 2% 5 2% 0 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 84 33% 47 22% -11% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 19 8% 16 8% 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 48 19% 43 20% +1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 59 23% 57 27% +4% CONFLICT ACTION 8 3% 6 3% 0 TOTAL 252 100% 210 99%* CORRELATION: .89 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 06 334 flictual, 37 percent participatory and 17 percent coopera tive. If we compare 1949 with 1951, it is evident that there was not a major change between these two time peri ods. The correlation was .89 between the data for 1949 and 1951. United States relations did change somewhat, however. There was a 5 percent increase in Verbal Coopera tion, and a 5 percent increase in Verbal Conflict. There was no percentage change in either Cooperative or Conflic tual Action. United States relations toward the Soviet Union in 1951 were equally as cooperative and 4 percent less conflictual than relations toward Eastern European nations in 1951. In Table 71 the data for United States relations toward Communist China are shown. These data must be interpreted with special care. In 1949 China was torn by a civil war and it was not until October 1, 1949 that the Central People's Government of the People’s Republic of China was formally established. Nevertheless, actions made throughout the year 1949 by Communist Chinese repre sentatives toward the United States and acts by the United States toward these representatives were identified and collected, and they have been included in the data. 335 TABLE 71 THE UNITEO STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 4 6% 11 11% +5% COOPERATIVE ACTION 5 7% 2 2% -5% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 23 33% 45 46% +13% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 1 1 % 1 1 % 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 11 16% 18 19% +3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 11 16% 19 20% +4% CONFLICT ACTION 15 21% 1 1% -20% TOTAL 70 100% 97 100% CORRELATION: .76 336 In 1949 the United States was working for the defeat of the Communists, and, as we might expect, the data in Table 71 indicate that United States behavior toward Communist China was very conflictual. Fifty-three percent of United States behavior toward this adversary in 1949 was conflictual and only 13 percent cooperative. United States relations toward Communist China were 8 per cent more conflictual in 1949 than relations toward the Soviet Union. In Table 71 United States relations toward Commu nist China in 1951 are shown to be about 13 percent less conflictual than they were in 1949. These data are a correct but limited view of United States-Communist Chinese relations in 1951. According to our rules for data collec tion only acts directly attributable either to an inter national actor toward or a target of the United States have been included for analysis. All actions during 1951 which were official United Nations acts even though carried out by the United States have not been included in our data. Statements and actions made by United States negotiators or commanders under the authority or command of the United Nations have been considered here as official United Nations actions. Furthermore, all Korean battle 337 field actions during 1951 have also been excluded from the data. Such action tends to be routine during war and pro vides little added information to the data analysis. The low number of conflictual actions directed from the United States toward Communist China in 1951 reflects, therefore, the absence of the United States from mainland China and the nonaccounting of Korean battlefield actions. The data show that in 1951, as in 1949, there was little cooperative behavior directed from the United States toward Communist China, and there also was little Partici patory Action. This suggests that meetings, other than Korean war negotiations, were not common between the two countries. The increases in both Defensive and Offensive Verbal Conflict show that 30 percent of United States behavior toward Communist China in 1951 was Verbal Con flict. This was a 7 percent increase over 1949. We can conclude from these data which offer a "correct" but limited view of official United States relations toward Communist China, that relations became more conflictual verbally during 1951, the Korean war year. In Table 72 the data for United States relations toward the Soviet Union during 1963 and 1966 are provided. These data show that in 1963, 20 percent of United States 338 TABLE 72 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts X of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 54 19% 31 30X +11* COOPERATIVE ACTION 4 IX 7 7X +6X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 87 30X 19 18X -12X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 55 19X 12 11% -8% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 33 12X 16 15X +3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 40 14X 15 14X 0 CONFLICT ACTION 13 5X 4 4% -IX TOTAL 286 100X 104 99%* CORRELATION: .64 * Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors 339 behavior toward the Soviet Union was cooperative and 31 percent conflictual. This parallels almost exactly United States^ behavior toward all of Eastern Europe in 1963. The data for the Soviet Union are, of course, a subset of the data for Eastern Europe. Table 72 shows that United States relations toward the Soviet Union in 1966 were more cooperative than in 1963 by 17 percent and more conflictual by 2 percent. Relations toward Eastern Europe in 1966 were equally co operative but 3 percent more conflictual. These data suggest that in 1966 the United States acted much more cooperatively toward the Soviet Union than it did in 1963, and only slightly more conflictually. Relations also were slightly more conflictual in 1966 toward the Eastern European Bloc than toward the Soviet Union alone. In Table 73, the data for United States relations toward Communist China are provided. In 1963 4 percent of United States behavior was cooperative and 16 percent con flictual. The United States made many Comments without apparent cooperative or conflictual implications, however. This suggests that while the United States clearly "recog nized" Communist China, its relations toward it were not "aggressively" cooperative or conflictual. These relations 340 TABLE 73 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 1 4X 6 11X +7X COOPERATIVE ACTION 0 0 6 11X +1IX VERBAL PARTICIPATION 15 60X 32 60X 0 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 3 12X 1 2X -10X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 8X 5 9X +1X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 16X 3 6X -10X CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 25 100X 53 99X* CORRELATION: .93 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 341 were more conflictual, nevertheless, than cooperative. In 1966, United States relations toward Communist China became 18 percent more cooperative than its coopera tive relations were in 1963. Conflictual behavior accounted for only 15 percent of United States relations toward Communist China in 1966 and again 60 percent of United States relations were Verbal Participation. The increase in cooperative behavior reflects United States efforts to reduce somewhat the isolation aspect of its containment policy toward Communist China. In 1966, for example, the United States offered to permit Chinese Com munist scholars, newsmen, and scientists to visit the United States as well as permit United States tourists to travel to Communist China. This proposal was rejected, however, by the Chinese. China's own internal concerns with the "cultural revolution," and a struggle for govern mental control in 1966 may have influenced the relative decrease in Offensive Verbal Conflict from the United States. As the correlation of .93 suggests, relations were not very different between 1963 and 1966. Summary: Proposition XA In Table 74 the data for the United States as an 342 TABLE 74 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949, 1951, 1963, ANO 1966 SOVIET UNION 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPERATIVE 14% 19% 20% 37% CONFLICTUAL 45% 50% 31% 33% PARTICIPATORY 41% 30% 49% 29% CORRELATION: .89 .64 COMMUNIST CHINA 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPERATIVE 13% 13% 4% 22% CONFLICTUAL 53% 40% 24% 15% PARTICIPATORY 34% 47% 72% 62% CORRELATION: .76 .93 343 Actor toward the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966 are summarized. The data indicate that United States relations toward the Soviet Union were very conflictual in 1949 and became even more so in 1951. Relations while only about 14 percent cooperative in 1949 became slightly more cooperative in 1951. United States relations toward Communist China in 1949 were also very conflictual. The data show a decrease in conflictual behavior toward Communist China in 1951, but as explained earlier, these data do not include United States actions which were conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and, therefore, no battlefield encounters or nego tiation discourse were included in the data. Even without including United Nations data we can see that relations were not very cooperative, and very conflictual in 1949 and 1951. If we were to include United States relations toward Communist China when made under the auspices of the United Nations, we would probably conclude that United States relations toward these two major adversaries became very much more conflictual during the Korean war. If we look at United States relations toward the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1963 and 1966 we find some very interesting results. United States behavior 344 toward the Soviet Union in 1963 was considerably less con flictual and somewhat more cooperative than in 1949. Furthermore in 1966, during the United States involvement in the Vietnam war, relations became much more cooperative and only slightly more conflictual. In 1966 the United States apparently was making friendly overtures toward the Soviet Union. Relations did become somewhat more conflic tual, but not to any great extent. United States relations toward Communist China in 1963 were not very cooperative (3 percent), and compared to 1949, not very conflictual either (24 percent). The United States acted toward Communist China, but mostly only through comments which were not clearly cooperative or conflictual. In 1966, United States relations toward Communist China were more cooperative and less conflictual. This appears to reflect an attempt by the United States to improve relations with Communist China in 1966, and it also may reflect that Communist China's internal problems diverted American concern over a Communist China's threat to South East Asia in 1966. These data seem to suggest two conclusions. First, United States relations toward the Soviet Union are not very similar to its relations toward Communist China, and 345 secondly, United States relations toward major adversaries do not necessarily become more conflictual during involve ment in limited war. Proposition XB: The Korean Case In Table 76 the data for Soviet relations toward the United States are compared with United States relations toward the Soviet Union for 1949. Soviet relations toward the United States are clearly more conflictual, and about equally cooperative. The 13 percent difference in conflict indicates an imbalance in Soviet-American conflictual behavior. If we look at Table 75, which compares Soviet behavior toward the United States in 1949 and 1951, we can see that in 1951 there was a 4 percent increase from 1949 in cooperative Soviet relations toward the United States, and a 5 percent increase in conflictual behavior. The correlation of .96 between the two periods indicates that Soviet relations during the Korean war period, while being somewhat more conflictual than the pre-war period, were quite similar. In Table 77 Communist Chinese relations toward the United States are shown. They indicate very conflictual relations (66 percent) in 1949. In 1951, even without any 346 TABLE 75 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF THE SOVIET IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts 2 of Acts 2 of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 21 92 36 152 +62 COOPERATIVE ACTION 14 62 10 42 <22 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 42 182 25 102 -82 PARTICIPATORY ACTION 18 82 18 92 +12 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 19 82 26 112 +32 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 100 442 117 492 +52 CONFLICT ACTION 14 62 8 32 -32 TOTAL 228 992* 240 1012 CORRELATION: .96 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 06 347 TABLE 76 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTION, 1949 USA Actor USA Target Cooperative 14% 15% Conflictual 45% 58% Participatory 41% 26% Korean war data, relations were still 67 percent conflic tual. Communist Chinese relations were also less coopera tive in 1951. These data indicate clearly that Communist China's relations toward the United States were more con flictual than United States relations toward China were shown to be in 1949 and 1951. As in the case for Soviet relations in 1949 and 1951, there was an imbalance toward the United States receiving relatively more conflictual relations from this major adversary than it output during these periods. In Table 78 Soviet relations toward the United States in 1963 and 1966 are shown. These relations are more cooperative and less conflictual than in 1949 or 1951. 348 TABLE 77 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 5 91 12 13* +4* COOPERATIVE ACTION 7 12% 0 0 -12% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 7 12% 17 18% +6% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 1 2 % 2 2% 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2 % 5 5% +3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 22 38% 56 59% +21% CONFLICT ACTION 15 26% 3 3% -23% TOTAL 58 101%* 95 100% CORRELATION: .75 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 349 TABLE 78 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 56 20X 21 15X -5X COOPERATIVE ACTION 10 4X 4 3X -IX VERBAL PARTICIPATION 35 13X 17 12X -IX PARTICIPATORY ACTION 57 20X 11 8X -12X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 20 7X 19 14X +7X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 80 29X 59 42X +13X CONFLICT ACTION 21 8X 8 6X -2X TOTAL 279 101X* 139 100X CORRELATION: .78 * Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 350 In 1966, the Vietnam war year, there was a major shift in Soviet relations toward less cooperative and more conflic tual behavior. In 1966 relations were 18 percent coopera tive and 62 percent conflictual. The correlation of only .78 indicates that relations between the two periods changed noticeably. The biggest change was the 13 percent increase in Verbal Offensive Conflict. Almost half of the Soviet Union's behavior toward the United States in 1951 was accusations, warnings, demands, and threats. In Table 79 the rather astounding data for Commu nist China's relations toward the United States are shown. Eighty-two percent of China's relations in 1963 were con flictual and only 4 percent cooperative. This means that every eight out of ten times that Communist China acted toward the United States it was an unfriendly and conflic tual act. In 1963 the United States acted conflictually toward Communist China in "only” 24 percent of its actions. There is clearly an imbalance in conflictual relations which may indicate that the United States pays little attention to the conflictualness of Chinese behavior, feels there is no need to respond to such behavior, or prefers not to antagonize the Chinese with a large amount of American conflict. Whatever the reason, there was in 351 TABLE 79 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 1 2% 2 2X 0 COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 2 % 1 IX -IX VERBAL PARTICIPATION 3 6X 12 14X +8X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 4 8X 1 IX -7X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2X 6 7% +5% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 41 80X 64 72X -8X CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 2 2X +2% TOTAL 51 100X 88 99X* CORRELATION: .98 *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 352 1963 and 1966 a relative imbalance in behavior between these adversaries. The correlation between Communist China's behavior toward the United States in 1963 and 1966 was .98. There was a 1 percent decrease in both coopera tive and conflictual relations. A shift toward increased conflictual behavior did not occur between 1963 and 1966, but relations were already so conflictual that it is not surprising that there was no change. China's relations toward the United States were so conflictual in 1963 that we should not expect them to become more so in 1966. Summary; Proposition XB In Table 80 the results for Soviet and Communist Chinese relations toward the United States are summarized. These data show that Soviet and Communist Chinese relations toward the United States were predominantly conflictual. Soviet relations became more conflictual during both the Korean and Vietnam war periods examined. In 1951, Soviet relations also became somewhat more cooperative, but from 1963 to 1966 Soviet relations became less cooperative. These data suggest that Soviet behavior toward the United States does become more conflictual when the United States is involved in a limited war. TABLE 80 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS, 1949, 1951, 1963 AND 1966 SOVIET UNION 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPERATIVE 15% 19% 24% 18% CONFLICTUAL 58% 63% 44% 62% PARTICIPATORY 26% 19% 33% 20% COMMUNIST CHINA 1949 1951 1963 1966 COOPERATIVE 21% 13% 4% 3% CONFLICTUAL 66% 67% 82% 81% PARTICIPATORY 14% 20% 14% 15% 354 Communist China's behavior toward the United States in 1951 probably became much more conflictual than the data in the table show since Chinese behavior directed toward United States officials acting under the auspices of the United Nations were not included in the data. Relations in 1963 were already so conflictual that it is not sur prising that there was not in 1966 an increase in conflict toward the United States. There was between 1949 and 1951, and 1963 and 1966, a decrease in cooperative relations from Communist China to the United States. The change in 1966 was a decrease of only 1 percent, but it meant that only 3 percent of China's behavior toward the United States in 1966 was cooperative. We can interpret from these data that Communist China's relations are very con flictual toward the United States whether or not the United States is involved in a limited war. We believe that in 1951 Communist China's relations became even more conflictual than the data show. In 1963 and 1966 relations were simply conflictual. Proposition XI: The Korean and Vietnam Cases In addition to the propositions on the disposition of cooperative and conflictual relations toward and from 355 the United States in limited war periods, the proposition on the balance of conflictual relations with adversaries seems particularly important. In Table 81 the conflictual balances in United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1949 and 1951 are presented. In both 1949 and 1951, for United States relations with both the Soviet Union and Communist China, there was an imbalance in conflictual relations. Relations were more conflictual toward the United States. Between 1949 and 1951 there was a relatively equal increase in conflictual behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior did not become relatively more conflictual. United States relations toward Communist China were less conflictual in 1951 than in 1949, according to these data for 1951 which exclude United States relations under the auspices of the United Nations. Chinese relations remained very conflictual, nevertheless, in 1951 as in 1949. In Table 82 the data for United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China for 1963 and 1966 are shown. The balances for these years, as in 1949 and 1951, indicate that adversary relations toward the United States were more conflictual than relations from the United States. There was generally, however, a much 356 TABLE 81 THE CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949 AND 1951 USA-SOVIET UNION USA Actor USA Target Balance* (C > (cUSr) usa usr 1949 .45 .58 -.13 1951 .50 .63 -.13 USA-COMMUNIST CHINA USA Actor USA Target Balance ^Cusa^ ^Cchn^ 1949 .53 .66 -.13 1951 .40 .67 -.27 ♦Balance = Cus - Cn, where Cus is United States conflictual behavior for the year toward the adversary nation listed, and Cn is the conflictual behavior of the adversary toward the United States. 357 TABLE 82 THE CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, 1963 AND 1966 USA-SOVIET UNION USA Actor USA Target Balance* 1963 .31 .44 -.13 1966 .33 .62 -.29 USA-COMMUNIST CHINA USA Actor USA Target Balance 1963 .24 .82 -.58 1966 .15 .81 -.66 358 greater dispersion in conflictual behavior in 1963 and 1966 than in 1949 and 1951. There were also much larger changes in the dispersion between 1963 and 1966 than between 1949 and 1951. The balance between United States-Soviet rela tions in 1963 was -.13, and -.29 in 1966. The balance was an incredible -.58 between the United States and Communist China in 1963 and -.66 in 1966. We may conclude that United States behavior toward Communist China and the Soviet Union was much less conflic tual than their behavior toward the United States for all the years examined. Communist Chinese behavior is rela tively more conflictual and more out of balance than Soviet behavior. Adversary relations generally became more con flictual toward the United States than United States rela tions toward them during periods of limited war. And finally, the conflictual balance in adversary relations shifted toward the United States receiving more conflict between 1963 and 1966 than between 1949 and 1951. Examination of Propositions XIIA, XIIB, and XIII One of the often spoken concerns about a major nation's involvement in limited war is whether or not 359 during the period of the conflict there are changes in the international relations of the major nation with its prin cipal allies. The most commonly noted fear is that rela tions become less cooperative and more conflictual during the period of a major nation's involvement in a limited war. The following propositions regarding this concern were posed in Chapter II. Proposition XIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward principal ally nations geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from principal ally nations who are geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XIII: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with principal ally nations who are not geographically in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. The nations for which United States international relations are examined for these propositions are the United Kingdom, France, and Canada for both the Korean and Vietnam wars, and also Japan for the Vietnam war. Rela tions with these nations in particular are thought to have 360 changed during the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam and Korean wars. Proposition XIIA: The Korean and Vietnam Cases In Table 83 the data for United States relations toward the United Kingdom in 1949 and 1951 are presented. The data indicate that United States relations toward the United Kingdom were very cooperative and not very conflic tual in both the nonwar and Korean war period. In 1949, 47 percent of United States relations were cooperative and 8 percent conflictual. In 1951, 49 percent of United States behavior was cooperative and only 6 percent con flictual. These relations became more cooperative and less conflictual in 1951. As the correlation of .98 suggests, these were not major changes and there is little difference in United States behavior between the two periods. In Table 84 United States relations toward France in 1949 and 1951 are shown. In 1949 these relations were very cooperative (55 percent), and not very conflictual (8 percent). In 1951 they were still cooperative, but about 7 percent less so. They were also less conflictual. The correlation between the United States relations toward 361 TABLE 83 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 62 35% 48 41% +6% COOPERATIVE ACTION 22 12% 9 8% -4% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 27 15% 19 17% +2% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 53 29% 32 28% >1% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 9 5% 5 4% -1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 2% 1 1 % -1% CONFLICT ACTION 1 1 % 1 1 % 0 TOTAL 178 99%* 115 . 100% CORRELATION: .98 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 362 TABLE 84 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD FRANCE IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 22 29% 29 36% +7X COOPERATIVE ACTION 20 26% 10 12% -14% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 10 12% 11 14% +2% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 19 25% 27 33% +8% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 3% 4 5% +2* OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONaiCT 4 5% 0 0 -5% CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 77 100% 81 100% CORRELATION: .86 363 France in 1963 and 1966 is .86, and the table shows that in 1951 the United States reduced the number of Cooperative Actions it directed toward France but increased its Verbal Cooperation. The United States also reduced its Verbal Offense against France in 1966. In Table 85 United States relations toward Canada in 1949 and 1951 are shown. Again, relations were very cooperative in both 1949 (48 percent) and 1951 (45 per cent) . Only 2 percent of United States relations in 1949 and 5 percent in 1951 were conflictual. The correlation between the two periods was .99, and the high amount of cooperation and low amount of conflict suggest that there was no tendency toward increased conflict in United States behavior toward Canada during the Korean war. These data suggest that United States relations toward the United Kingdom, France, and Canada during 1949 and 1951 were very cooperative and did not become more conflictual during the Korean war. In Table 86 the data for United States relations toward the United Kingdom in 1963 and 1966 are provided. These data show that United States behavior in 1963 was not as cooperative as in 1949 or 1951. Relations in 1963 continued not to be very conflictual (6 percent), and a 364 TABLE 85 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD CANADA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 19 401 7 35% -5% COOPERATIVE ACTION 4 8% 2 10% +2% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 3 6% 1 5 % -1% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 21 44% 9 45% +1* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2 % 0 0 -2% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 0 0 0 0 0 CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 1 5 % +5% TOTAL 48 100% 20 100% CORRELATION: .99 365 TABLE 86 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 22 29% 14 47% +18% COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 1 % 1 3 % +2% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 9 12% 2 7% -5% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 40 52% 11 37% -15% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 3% 1 3 % 0 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 0 0 0 0 0 CONFLICT ACTION 2 3% 1 3 % 0 TOTAL 76 100% 30 100% CORRELATION: .87 366 large part of United States relations were participatory or "overhead.” In 1966 relations became more cooperative by 20 percent and there was no relative change in conflic tual behavior. The correlation of .87 reflects the shift toward more cooperation from the United States to the United Kingdom from 1963 to 1966. United States behavior toward this ally clearly became more cooperative during involvement in the Vietnam war. In Table 87 United States relations toward France in 1963 and 1966 are shown. In 1963 relations were not very cooperative and accounted for only 13 percent of United States relations toward France. Eighteen percent of United States behavior in 1963 was conflictual, and, as in the case for the United Kingdom, a very large pro portion of United States relations was participatory behavior. In 1966 there appeared to be a shift toward increased cooperation since there was a 20 percent increase in Cooperative Action by the United States. This increase can be accounted for, as was explained in the preceding chapter in the discussion of NATO relations, by the seven Yields by the United States toward France in 1966 when de Gaulle ordered foreign troops out of the country. These compliances were, of course, cooperative behavior, 367 TABLE 87 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD FRANCE IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 7 11X 3 7X -4X COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 2X 9 22X +20X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 26 41X 14 34X -7X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 18 29X 5 12X -17X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 5 8X 5 121 +4X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 5X 3 7X +2X CONFLICT ACTION 3 5X 2 5X 0 TOTAL 63 101** 41 99X CORRELATION: .65 *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 368 but they do not necessarily reflect "friendly" relations. The 6 percent increase in conflictual behavior toward France suggests that relations in 1966 were not too co operative. The correlation of .65 indicates that relations in 1966 were not very similar to relations in 1963. In Table 88 United States relations toward Canada in 1963 and 1966 are provided. In 1963 relations were moderately cooperative (32 percent) and not very conflic tual (9 percent). As in the case for United States rela tions toward the United Kingdom and France in 1963, a major portion of relations were participatory. In 1966, based on a much smaller number of event-actions than in 1963, United States relations were more cooperative. Only one conflict act was registered and because of the low number of acts it was 10 percent of the total. Relations clearly did not become more conflictual in 1966, and the correlation of .88 indicates similarity between the two periods. In Table 89 United States relations toward Japan in 1963 and 1966 are shown. In 1963 relations were more cooperative (34 percent) than conflictual (13 percent), but predominantly participatory (78 percent). In 1966, as the correlation of .35 suggests, relations were very 369 TABLE 88 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD CANADA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 13 30t 5 501 +20% COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 2 % 0 0% -2% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 8 19% 1 10% -9% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 15 34% 3 30% -4% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 7% 1 10% +3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 7% 0 0% -7% CONFLICT ACTION 0 0% 0 0% 0% TOTAL 43 99%* 10 100% CORRELATION: .88 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 370 TABLE 89 THE UNITED STATES AS AN ACTOR TOWARD JAPAN IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 6 21X 2 14% -7% COOPERATIVE ACTION 4 13% 1 7 % -6X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 1 7 % 7 50X +43X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 13 44X 4 28X -16% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 101 0 0 -10% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 0 0 0 0 0 CONFLICT ACTION 1 3% 0 0 -3% TOTAL 29 981* 14 99* CORRELATION: .35 ^Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 371 different from those in 1963. In 1966 only 21 percent of United States relations were cooperative. According to the data, relations toward Japan in 1966 were not conflic tual at all. The data suggest that in 1966 the United States relations toward Japan were not very aggressive, either cooperatively or conflictually, but were primarily maintenance types of behavior. Summary: Proposition XIIA In Table 90 the data for United States relations toward the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan are summarized for the pre-war and limited war periods. The correlations for the seven categories of behavior are pro vided. The correlations suggest that there was less difference between pre-war and war relations for the Korean than the Vietnam case. The data also suggest that United States relations toward the United Kingdom and Canada were very cooperative in 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966. Relations toward France in 1963 and 1966 were not too cooperative and more conflictual than for the other cases. There is a good indication in the data that between 1949 and 1951 United States relations toward the allies listed did not worsen. United States behavior 372 TABLE 90 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD SELECTED ALLY NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS 1949, 1951, 1963; 1966 UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE CANADA 1949 1951 1949 1951 1949 1951 COOPERATION 47% 49* 55* 48* 48* 45* CONFLICT 8% 6* 8* 5* 2* 5* PARTICI PATION 44% 45% 37% 47% 50% 50% CORRELATION: .98 .86 .99 UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE 1963 1966 1963 1966 COOPERATION CONFLICT PARTICI PATION 30% 50% 6% 6% 64% 44% 13% 29% 18% 24% 70% 46% CANADA 1963 1966 32% 50% 14% 10% 53% 40% JAPAN 1963 1966 34% 21% 13% 0 51% 78% CORRELATION: .87 .65 .88 .35 373 toward the United Kingdom in 1951 became somewhat more cooperative and less conflictual. Behavior toward France became less cooperative, but also less conflictual. Rela tions toward Canada became somewhat less cooperative and more conflictual. United States behavior toward Canada in 1951 was only 5 percent conflictual, however, and the correlation of .99 between 1949 and 1951 indicates that the change was not very significant. The data for the Vietnam case show a rather in teresting change in United States relations from 1949 and 1951 to 1963. Relations are clearly not as cooperative toward ally nations as they were in 1949 and 1951. Rela tions toward Atlantic-European allies did become more cooperative, however, in 1966. United States relations became 20 percent more cooperative toward the United Kingdom, 16 percent more cooperative toward France— although we know that part of this increase was related to NATO withdrawals— and 18 percent more cooperative toward Canada. In the case of the United Kingdom and Canada there was no change in conflictual behavior between 1963 and 1966. Behavior toward France became less cooperative and less conflictual. These data suggest, therefore, that United States relations toward the ally nations investi- 374 gated did not become more conflictual as proposed in Proposition XII during limited war involvement. Proposition XIIB; The Korean and Vietnam Cases In Table 91 the data for the United States as a Target of the United Kingdom for 1949 and 1951 are shown. These data indicate that relations from Great Britain were very similar to relations toward it. The correlation of .96 shows that British behavior toward the United States between 1949 and 1951 also was very similar. Between 1949 and 1951 there was a 2 percent increase in both cooperative and conflictual relations. In both 1949 and 1951 there was a great amount of Verbal Cooperation directed toward the United States. In Table 92 French relations toward the United States in 1949 and 1951 are shown. As in the case of United States behavior toward France, relations were pre dominantly cooperative and not very conflictual. The cor relation of .98 between French relations in 1949 and 1951 indicates little change between the nonwar and war periods. There was, however, a 7 percent increase in conflictual behavior in 1951. There was relatively more Offensive and Defensive Verbal Conflict in 1951 than in 1949. 375 TABLE 91 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total 1n % Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 64 40% 53 41% +1% COOPERATIVE ACTION 7 4% 6 5% +1% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 26 16% 27 21% +5% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 52 33% 31 24% >9% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 5 3% 2 2% -1% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 3% 9 7% +4% CONFLICT ACTION 1 1 % 0 0 -1% TOTAL 159 100% 128 100% CORRELATION: .96 376 TABLE 92 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF FRANCE IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 29 44X 49 44X 0 COOPERATIVE ACTION 2 3X 2 2X -IX VERBAL PARTICIPATION 13 20X 21 19% -IX PARTICIPATORY ACTION 20 30X 26 24X -6X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2X 6 5X +3X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2X 7 6X +4X CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 66 101X* 111 100X CORRELATION: .98 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 377 In Table 93 Canada's relations toward the United States in 1949 and 1951 are provided. Again, the data show behavior similar to United States relations toward Canada in 1949 and 1951. Relations were very cooperative and nonconflictual. The correlation between the two periods is .95 with some of the change occurring in a 9 percent decrease in cooperative behavior. The change was not toward increased conflictual relations, but toward increased verbal participation. If we now examine the Vietnam period beginning with Table 94, we find that British relations in 1963 were again predominantly cooperative (33 percent) and not very conflictual (7 percent). Relations were about 10 per cent less cooperative than in 1949, the change being accounted for by increased participatory relations which are maintenance types of behavior. The change between 1963 and 1966 was not very big as the correlation of .97 reflects. There was an 8 percent increase in cooperative behavior in 1966. In Table 95 French relations toward the United States for 1963 and 1966 are shown. Unlike French rela tions in 1949, only 11 percent of the relations directed toward the United States were cooperative in 1963, and 378 TABLE 93 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF CANADA IN 1949 AND 1951 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1949 1951 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 26 46X 12 41X -5X COOPERATIVE ACTION 2 4X 0 0 -4X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 7 13X 7 24X +11X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 20 36X 9 31X -5X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 0 0 0 0 0 OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2X 1 3X +1X CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 56 101X* 29 99X CORRELATION: .95 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 379 TABLE 94 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE. CONFLICTUAL. AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts X of Acts X of Differences Total Total 1n X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 29 32% 10 37X +5X COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 IX 1 4X +3X VERBAL PARTICIPATION 15 16X 3 11X -5X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 40 43X 11 41X -2X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 3X 0 0 -3X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 4 4X 2 7X +3X CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 92 99X* 27 100X CORRELATION: .97 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 380 TABLE 95 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF FRANCE IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts % of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 5 9% 5 16X +7% COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 2% 0 0 -2% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 18 34X 10 32X -2% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 18 34X 6 19X -15% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 6 11* 0 0 -11% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 5 9% 9 29X +20% CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 1 3 % +3% TOTAL 53 99%* 31 99% CORRELATION: .66 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 381 22 percent were conflictual. In 1966 there was a 5 percent relative increase in cooperative relations and a 12 percent increase in conflictual relations. As in the Korean war there was an increase in conflictual behavior toward the United States, but the shift from the pre-Vietnam to the Vietnam war was larger than for the Korean case. Conflic tual behavior from France to the United States in 1966 accounted for 32 percent of French relations. In 1951, 11 percent of French behavior toward the United States was conflictual. The correlation of .66 between 1963 and 1966 reflects the change in French relations toward the United States. Canadian relations toward the United States were about half as cooperative in 1963 as in 1949 and about 20 percent more conflictual. As Table 96 shows, 29 percent of Canadian relations toward the United States in 1963 were cooperative and 23 percent conflictual. In 1966, the Vietnam war year, relations became more cooperative and less conflictual. Relations from Canada toward the United States in 1966 were more amicable than in 1963 before United States heavy involvement in the Vietnam war. The correlation between the data for the two years was .87 which suggests that there was not a great amount of change 382 TABLE 96 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF CANADA IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts * of Acts * of Differences Total Total In % Totals VER8AL COOPERATION 15 27% 5 36* +9* COOPERATIVE ACTION 1 2 * 1 7 * +5* VERBAL PARTICIPATION 13 23* 2 14* -9* PARTICIPATORY ACTION 14 25* 4 29* +4* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 5 9* 1 7 * -2* OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 8 14* 1 7* -7* CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 56 100* 14 100* CORRELATION: .87 383 in relations between 1963 and 1966. In Table 97 Japanese relations toward the United States in 1963 and 1966 are shown. The data show that relations were about 24 percent cooperative and 13 percent conflictual in 1963. In 1966 there was a large relative increase in cooperative behavior (15 percent more), and a relative decrease in conflictual behavior (5 percent less). The correlation between 1963 and 1966 was .85. Summary; Proposition XIIB The data for selected ally relations toward the United States are summarized in Table 98. These data show that, just as relations from the United States, there was more change in conflictual behavior toward the United States from nonwar to war periods for the Vietnam case than for the Korean case. The correlations between 1949 and 1951 for United States-ally relations range from .95 to .98. Between 1949 and 1951 they range between .66 and .97. Relations also were generally more cooperative and less conflictual in 1949 and 1951 than in 1963 and 1966. Between 1949 and 1951 there was a small increase in conflict from the United Kingdom, France, and Canada toward the United States. These were increases, however, 384 TABLE 97 THE UNITED STATES AS A TARGET OF JAPAN IN 1963 AND 1966 COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR 1963 1966 Acts % of Acts X of Differences Total Total In X Totals VERBAL COOPERATION 7 24X 5 39X +15X COOPERATIVE ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 VERBAL PARTICIPATION 5 171 3 23X +6X PARTICIPATORY ACTION 13 45X 4 31X -14X DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 7X 1 8X +1X OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 3X 0 0 -3X CONFLICT ACTION 1 3X 0 0 -3X TOTAL 29 99X* 13 101X CORRELATION: .85 *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 385 TABLE 98 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR RECEIVED FROM SELECTED ALLY NATIONS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTS 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE CANADA 1949 1951 1949 1951 1949 1951 COOPERATION 44X 46X 47X 46X 50X 41X CONFLICT 7X 9X 4X nx 2X 3X PARTICIPATION 49X 45X 50X 43X 49X 55X CORRELATION: .96 .98 .95 UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE CANADA JAPAN 1963 1966 1963 1966 1963 1966 1963 1966 COOPERATION 33X 41X 11X 16X 29X 43X 24X 39X CONFLICT 7X 7X 20X 32X 23X 14X 13X 8X PARTICIPATION 59X 52X 68X 51X 48X 43X 62X 54X CORRELATION: .97 .66 .87 .85 386 of only 2, 7, and 1 percent respectively. British coopera tive relations were 2 percent more cooperative, French relations 1 percent less cooperative, and Canadian rela tions 9 percent less cooperative. The increase in conflic tual relations from France and the decrease in cooperative relations from Canada are not particularly significant, since relations from these nations toward the United States were still very cooperative and not very conflictual in 1951, and, as noted above, the correlations between rela tions in 1949 and 1951 were high. In 1966 relations toward the United States from the ally nations examined did not become more conflictual except for the case of France where there was a 12 percent increase in conflictual relations. The behavior of the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and France all became more cooperative toward the United States during its involvement in the Vietnam war. The results do not suggest, therefore, a tendency toward increased cooperation toward the United States from its principal allies in 1966 except for France. The very small increases in conflict toward the United States from 1949 to 1951 also do not support the proposi tion that when the United States becomes involved in a limited war, the international relations of important ally 387 nations geographically distant from the war zone become more conflictual. Proposition XIII: The Korean and Vietnam Cases In Table 99 the data for the balance in United States interactions with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan are shown. There is no clear pattern which holds true for all of these relations. United States relations are best explained individually for rela tions with each nation. United States relations with the United Kingdom in all periods examined were not very conflictual and balanced rather evenly. A small shift in balance occurred between 1949 and 1951 when United States relations became somewhat less conflictual and British relations somewhat more conflictual. Between 1963 and 1966 there was not a similar change. United States relations with France were not very conflictual in 1949 or 1951, but were conflictual in 1963 and 1966. There were increases in conflictual relations from both the pre-Korean and pre-Vietnam war periods to the war periods. French relations became relatively more conflictual than United States relations. 388 TABLE 99 THE CONFLICTUAL BALANCE IN UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, CANADA, AND JAPAN, 1949, 1951, 1963, 1966 UNITED KINGDOM USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance4 (cusa^ (cunk) 1949 8% 72 +12 1951 6% 92 -32 1963 62 72 -12 1966 62 72 -12 FRANCE USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance (cfm) 1949 82 42 +42 1951 52 112 -62 1963 182 202 -22 1966 242 322 -82 CANADA USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance (cusa^ (Ccan) 1949 22 22 0 1951 52 32 +22 1963 142 232 -92 1966 102 142 -42 JAPAN USA ACTOR USA TARGET Balance (cusa^ fcjap) 1963 132 132 0 1966 0 82 -82 Balance * Cusa - Cn, where Cusa Is United States con- fllctual relations, and Cn the examined nations conflictual relations. 389 United States relations with Canada, as relations with France, were not very conflictual in 1949 and 1951, but were more conflictual in 1963 and 1966. Between 1949 and 1951 United States relations toward Canada became slightly more conflictual than Canadian relations toward the United States. In 1963 Canadian relations toward the United States were quite conflictual. In 1966 these rela tions became less so, but United States behavior became more conflictual as in the Korean period. In opposition to the proposition stated, in neither the Korean nor the Vietnam war did Canadian relations become more conflictual than in the pre-war period. United States-Japanese conflictual relations were in balance in 1963. In 1966 the United States and Japan both acted less conflictually. The data indicate no United States conflictual relations in 1966 which suggests that the Japanese acted more conflictually than the United States did, but less so than in 1963. From these data we may conclude, therefore, that ally relations do not necessarily become more conflictual toward the United States when the United States is in volved in a limited war. French relations did become relatively more conflictual, however, during both the 390 Korean and Vietnam wars. We may also conclude that during both nonwar periods and periods when the United States is involved in limited war, the relations of the allies examined above toward the United States generally are more conflictual than United States relations toward these allies. Examination of Propositions XIVA and XIVB The final questions to be considered with empirical data in this research are concerned with United States relations with nations local to a limited war when the United States is a major participant in the conflict. In Chapter II it was explained that United States relations with local area adversaries are expected to be more con- flictual than United States relations with most other nations, and that relations with local area allies are expected to be more cooperative. The following proposi tions were posed in Chapter II: Proposition XIVA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local con flict area allies are relatively more cooperative than its relations with other members of the inter national system. 391 Proposition XIVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local area enemies are relatively more conflictual than its relations with other members of the international system. In order to examine these propositions, event/ interaction data are used in a manner somewhat different from their use in the previous examinations. In all of the analyses discussed above, the event data were studied for the United States as either an Actor toward or a Target of the international system, selected regional groups of nations, or individual nations. The event data examined in this manner provided a clear picture of how the United States acted and was acted upon by various members of the international system. The procedure followed in the examination of Propositions XIVA and XIVB has been to examine the inter action process between the United States and selected nations. Unlike the procedure of first studying how the United States acted toward selected nations and then how they acted toward the United States, the complete inter action process is investigated. Thus, the data for the United States as an Actor and as a Target are combined and analyzed together as a process rather than separately as single nation behavior. The reason for studying the 392 interaction process as opposed to individual nation behavior is that here we want a more general measure of United States relations with its battlefield enemy and ally to compare with other nation relations for the same time period. The event data when analyzed for interaction relations provide a comprehensive view of the "state of affairs" between the nations examined for the selected time period. This viewpoint permits the patterns of relations between nations to be briefly summarized, and, as will be shown, several sets of these interaction patterns can be presented and compared with each other clearly and easily. In Table 100 the data for United States inter* actions with South Korea are shown. The first set of data is for United States relations toward South Korea in 1951, the second set is for South Korean relations toward the United States, and the third set is the combined data for United States and South Korean interactions. This table shows clearly that United States-South Korean interactions are the sum of United States actions toward and from South Korea in 1951. All the interaction relations discussed in this section are based on the summing of actions toward and from the United States as described in Table 100. 393 TABLE 100 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARD AND FROM SOUTH KOREA, 1951 USA ACTOR USA TARGET USA INTERACTIONS Acts % of Acts % of Acts % of Total Total Total VERBAL COOPERATION 5 8% 12 40% 17 18% COOPERATIVE ACTION 5 8% 0 0 5 5% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 37 60% 7 23% 44 48% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 11 18% 10 33% 21 23% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 5% 0 0 3 3% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 1 2 % 1 3 % 2 2% CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 62 101%* 30 99% 92 99% *Tota1s above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 394 Proposition XIVA; The Korean and Vietnam Cases In order to examine Proposition XIVA United States interactions with both allies and adversaries were examined and compared with United States-South Korean and United States-South Vietnamese international relations. United States interactions with the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Communist China, Canada, and Japan were selected for com parison. United States interactions with the international system also were included as a measure of the "average" interaction pattern of the United States. United States relations with these nations have been discussed already in this chapter and the reader should find them good exam ples to compare with United States-South Korean relations. The data are examined for the war years 1951 and 1966 and include only official diplomatic United States inter national relations. Battlefield operations during 1951 and 1966, and actions between the United States and South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations in 1951 have not been included in the data. In Table 101 the data for United States inter actions with South Korea and the other nations in 1951 are shown. If we look at United States-South Korean inter- TABLE 101 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY INTERACTIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA AND OTHER SELECTED NATIONS, 1951 USA-SOUTH USA-INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM KOREA Acts * of Acts * of * of Dif Total Total ference VERBAL COOPERATION 17 is* 815 29* +11* COOPERATIVE ACTION 5 5* 238 8* +3* VERBAL PARTICIPATION 44 48* 608 22* -26* PARTICIPATORY ACTION 21 23* 468 17* -6* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 3% 214 8* +5* OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 2% 430 15* +13* CONFLICT ACTION 0 0 64 2* +2* TOTAL: 92 99** 2837 101* CORRELATION: (.65) USA-COMMUNIST CHINA USA-CANADA Acts * of * of Dif Acts * of * of Dlf ference Total ference VERBAL COOPERATION 23 12* -6* 19 3* +21* COOPERATIVE ACTION 2 1* -4* 2 4* -1* VERBAL PARTICIPATION 62 32* -16* 8 16* -32* PARTICIPATORY ACTION 3 2* -21* 18 37* +14* DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 23 12* +9* 1 2* -1* OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 75 39* +37* 0 0 -2* CONFLICT ACTION 4 2* +2* 1 2* +2* TOTAL: ?92 100* 49 100* CORRELATION: (.32) (.54) *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 396 TABLE 101 (continued) USA-SOVIET UNION USA-UNITED KINGDOM Acts X of * of Dif Acts * of * of Dif Total ference Total ference 72 16* -2* 101 42* +24* 15 3* -2* 15 6* +1* 72 16* -32* 46 19* -29* 34 8* -15* 63 26* +3* 69 15* +12* 7 3* 0 174 39* +37* 10 4* +2* 14 3* +3* 1 0 0 450 100* 243 100* (- .03) (.57) USA-JAPAN Acts X of X of Dif Total ference 21 34* +16* 6 10* +5* 13 21* -27* 20 33* +10* 1 2* -1* 0 0 -2* 0 0 0 61 100* (-.05) 397 actions we can see that only 23 percent of the interactions were cooperative while 71 percent were participatory. This suggests that in 1951, which was a period when the Korean war was fully underway, relations between the United States and South Korea were primarily maintenance types of relations. We suspect, although we do not have the data, that relations in late 1950 probably were more cooperative and less participatory since agreements on war strategies and policies were very likely formulated in the early war periods and carried out in the later periods. Relations were only 5 percent conflictual in 1951, which indicates that while United States-South Korean relations off the battlefield were not evidently "overly" cooperative, they also were not very conflictual. In comparing United States-South Korea interactions with the other interaction data, we will look first at the correlations between the sets of data. We can see that United States relations with South Korea were not very much like United States relations with any of the other nations in 1951. The highest correlation was with international system relations, of which United States-South Korean relations were a minor subset. These results tend to suggest that the interactions between the United States 398 and South Korea in 1951 were atypical of its relations with the other members of the international system that are listed. These interactions were very different from United States adversary relations, and United States rela tions with Japan. United States interactions with South Korea were somewhat similar to interactions with the United Kingdom and Canada. The percentage difference scores indicate the difference in the proportions of events occurring in each of the seven categories between United States-South Korean interactions and the interactions of the United States with the other nations indicated. The greatest differences were in the participatory categories. More interesting, how ever, are the differences between conflictual behaviors. The difference between United States-South Korean and United States-British conflictual relations was only 2 per cent. The differences when compared with United States- Canadian and United States-Japanese relations were only 1 percent. When compared with interactions with the Soviet Union the difference was, however, 52 percent, and for Communist China, 48 percent. United States-South Korean conflictual relations clearly were very similar to United States-ally relations and very different from adversary 399 relations. Official United States-South Korean inter actions do not appear, however, to have been as cooperative as United States interactions with the United Kingdom, Canada, or Japan. This suggests that United States inter national relations with South Korea in 1951 were only moderately similar too and not more cooperative than United States relations with its major Asian, North American, and European allies. United States battlefield relations which are not included in this data were, of course, very co operative in 1951. In Table 102 the data are shown for United States interactions during 1966 with South Vietnam. The data describe very cooperative (41 percent) and only minimal conflictual (6 percent) interactions between the United States and South Vietnam in 1966. A large percentage of the interactions were participatory, but relatively less so than in United States-South Korean relations. In this case, United States-South Vietnamese relations were most similar to United States-Japanese relations. The correla tion between these two sets of interactions was .89. United States-South Vietnamese relations were about 11 per cent more cooperative and 2 percent more conflictual than United States-Japanese relations in 1966. The next most 400 TABLE 102 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY INTERACTIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM AND OTHER SELECTED NATIONS, 1966 USA-SOUTH USA-INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM VIETNAM Acts % of Acts % of % of Dif ference VERBAL COOPERATION 21 27% 441 23% -4% COOPERATIVE ACTION 11 14% 191 10% -4% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 29 37% 415 22% -15% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 12 15% 289 15% 0 DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 2% 149 8% +6% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 2 2% 364 19% +17% CONFLICT ACTION 2 2% 75 4% +20% TOTAL: 79 99%* 1924 101% CORRELATION: (.71) VERBAL COOPERATION COOPERATIVE ACTION VERBAL PARTICIPATION PARTICIPATORY ACTION DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT CONFLICT ACTION TOTAL: CORRELATION: USA-COMMUNIST CHINA Acts % of % of Dif Total ference 8 6% -21% 7 5% -9% 44 31% -6% 2 1% -14% 11 8% +6% 67 48% +46% 2 1% -1% 141 100% (.07) USA-CANAOA Acts % of % of Dif Total ference 10 41% +14% 1 4% -10% 3 13% -24% 7 29% +14% 2 8% +6% 1 4% +2% 0 0 -2% 24 99% (.54) *Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 401 TABLE 102 (continued) USA-SOVIET UNION USA-UNITED KINGDOM Acts % of % of Dif Acts % of % of Dif Total ference Total ference 52 21% -6% 24 42% +15% 11 5% -9% 2 4% -10% 36 15% -22% 5 9% -28% 23 10% -5% 22 39%. +24% 35 15% ♦13% 1 2% 0 74 30% +28% 2 4% ♦2% 12 5% +3% 1 2% 0 243 101% 57 102% (. 02) (. 46) USA-JAPAN Acts % of * of D1f- Total ference 7 26% -1% 1 4% -10% 10 37% 0 8 30% +15% 1 4% +2% 0 0 -2% 0 0 -2% 27 101% ( .89) 402 similar set of relations was United States interactions with the international system. The correlation between these relations and United States-South Vietnamese rela tions was .71, and again we caution that United States- South Vietnamese relations were a subset of United States- system relations. As was true for United States relations in 1951 with its South Korean ally, relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were much more conflictual and less cooperative than relations with South Vietnam. United States interactions with the United Kingdom and Canada were only a little more cooperative and conflictual than United States relations with South Vietnam in 1966. Relations with Japan were, however, 11 percent less cooperative. The data for United States interactions with the selected nations indicate that during both the Korean and Vietnam war periods investigated, United States relations toward the ally it was supporting in a limited war, when cooperative battlefield operations are not included in the data, do not necessarily tend to be more cooperative than United States relations with its allies outside of the conflict area. Proposition XIVA cannot be accepted, there fore, on the basis of this examination. 403 Proposition XIVB: Korea and Vietnam In addition to the proposition on United States relations with its limited war ally, a proposition for United States limited war adversary relations was also listed in Chapter II. This proposition suggested United States interactions with its battlefield adversary would be more conflictual than United States interactions with other nations. The enemies in which we were especially interested were North Korea in 1951 and North Vietnam in 1966, and as in the above case, United States relations with these nations were compared with interactions with the Soviet Union, Communist China, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the international system. In Table 103, the data for United States inter actions in 1951 with North Korea are shown. Again, these data do not include United States battlefield encounters in Korea, nor interactions made under the auspices of the United Nations. The data in Table 103 indicate that 63 percent of the interactions between the United States and North Korea were participatory relations. Eighteen per cent were cooperative interactions, and 19 percent were conflictual interactions. The data show that the United States commented very often toward North Korea in 1951. 404 TABLE 103 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY INTERACTIONS WITH NORTH KOREA AND OTHER SELECTED NATIONA, 1951 USA-NORTH USA-INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM KOREA Acts % of Acts % of % of Dif Total Total ference VERBAL COOPERATION 13 16% 815 29% +13% COOPERATIVE ACTION 2 2% 238 8% +6% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 49 58% 608 22% -36% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 4 5% 468 17% +12% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 3 4% 214 8% +4% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 12 14% 430 15% +1% CONFLICT ACTION 1 1% 64 2% +1% TOTAL: 84 100% 2837 * O CORRELATION: (.56) VERBAL COOPERATION COOPERATIVE ACTION VERBAL PARTICIPATION PARTICIPATORY ACTION DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT CONFLICT ACTION TOTAL: CORRELATION: USA-COMMUNIST CHINA Acts % of % of Dlf- Total ference 23 12% -4% 2 1% -1% 62 32% -26% 3 2% -3% 23 12% +8% 75 39% +25% 4 2% +1% 192 100% (.67) USA-CANADA Acts % Of % of Dlf- Total ference 19 39% +23% 2 4% +2% 8 16% -42% 18 37% +32% 1 2% -2% 0 0 -14% 1 2% +1% 49 100% (.16) * Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 405 TABLE 103 (continued) USA-SOVIET UNION USA-UNITEO KINGDOM Acts % of % of Dif Acts % of % of Dif Total ference Total ference 72 16% 0 101 42% +26% 15 3% ♦1% 15 6% +4% 72 16% -42% 46 19% -39% 34 8% +3% 63 26% +21% 69 15% ♦12% 7 3% -1% 124 39% +25% 10 4% -10% 14 3% +2% 1 0 -1% 450 100% (.28) 243 100% (.29) USA-JAPAN Acts % of % of Dlf- Total ference 21 34% +18% 6 10% ♦8% 13 21% +37% 20 33% +28% 1 2% -2% 0 0 -14% 0 0 -1% 61 100% (.29) 406 The large amount of participatory relations between the United States and North Korea probably reflects the fact that most of the cooperative and conflictual behavior between the United States and North Korea in 1951 were made \ | through the United Nations and were not directly official I I actions to or from the United States. The data in Table j 103 indicate that there was not a great amount of similar- | ity between United States-North Korean relations and the | other sets of interactions shown. Not surprising is the | fact that United States-Communist Chinese relations were j the most similar to United States-North Korean inter actions. The correlation of .67 indicates some similarity, but not of a great magnitude. The data suggest that United States-Communist Chinese relations were about as cooperative as United States-North Korean relations (18 | and 13 percent, respectively), but relations with Communist I ! China were much more conflictual. j United States interactions with the international system were somewhat similar to United States-North Korean relations (correlation: .56), but relations with the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan were not very similar. United States-North Korean relations were more conflictual than United States-ally relations, but 407 ! not more conflictual than relations with the Soviet Union, j Communist China, or the international system. If battle field interactions, and negative relations under the j auspices of the United Nations were included, relations j I would probably be much more conflictual than they appear J in Table 103. Nevertheless, the record of official j | governmental interactions between the United States and | North Korea does not appear to be more conflictual than j United States-Soviet relations, nor United States-Communist ; Chinese relations. In Table 104, United States interactions with North Vietnam in 1966 are shown. These data, as the data | for United States-North Korean relations, do not include battlefield encounters. United States-North Vietnamese interactions appear to have been relatively more conflic tual than United States diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1966. Fifty-five percent of these interactions were conflictual and only 21 percent participatory. Fourteen percent of the relations were cooperative. A very large proportion of the interactions between these adversaries was Verbal Conflict. The comparison of these data, unlike the previous analyses, show some very high correlations. Communist Chinese interactions with the TABLE 104 UNITED STATES COOPERATIVE, CONFLICTUAL, AND PARTICIPATORY INTERACTIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM ANO OTHER SELECTED NATIONS, 1966 USA-NORTH USA-INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM VIETNAM Acts % of Acts % of % of Dif Total Total ference VERBAL COOPERATION 12 9% 441 23% +14% COOPERATIVE ACTION 6 5% 191 10% +5% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 37 27% 415 22% -5% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 5 4% 289 15% +11% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 14 10% 149 8% -2% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 59 44% 364 19% -25% CONFLICT ACTION 2 1% 75 4% +3% TOTAL: 135 100% 1924 101%* CORRELATION: (.56) USA-COMMUNIST CHINA USA-CANADA Acts % of % of Dif Acts % of % of Dif Total ference Total ference VERBAL COOPERATION 8 6% -3% 10 41% +32% COOPERATIVE ACTION 7 5% 0 1 4% -1% VERBAL PARTICIPATION 44 31% +4% 3 13% -14% PARTICIPATORY ACTION 2 1% -3% 7 29% +25% DEFENSIVE/REACTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 11 8% -2% 2 8% -2% OFFENSIVE VERBAL CONFLICT 67 48% +4% 1 4% -40% CONFLICT ACTION 2 1% 0 0 0 -1% TOTAL: 141 100% 24 99% CORRELATION: (.99) <- .22) ^Totals above or below 100 percent are due to rounding errors. 409 TABLE 104 (continued) USA-SOVIET UNION USA-UNITED KINGDOM Acts % of * of Dif Acts * of * of Dif Total ference Total ference 52 21* +12* 24 42* +33* 11 5* 0 2 4% -1* 36 15* -12* 5 9* -18* 23 10% +6* 22 39* +35* 35 15* +5* 1 2* -8% 74 30* -14* 2 4* -40* 12 5* +4* 1 2% +1% 23T ToTT 57 102* (.81) (-.29) USA-JAPAN Acts % Of % Of Dlf- Total ference 7 26* +17* 1 4* -1* 10 37* +10* 8 30* +26* 1 4* -6* 0 0* -44* 0 0* -1* 27 101* (-.01) 410 United States were very similar to United States-North J Vietnamese interactions. The correlation was .99. Commu nist Chinese relations were slightly less cooperative and i slightly more conflictual. United States relations with the Soviet Union were also highly correlated. That cor relation was .81. Soviet interactions with the United j i States were more cooperative and less conflictual than i United States-North Vietnamese interactions. The correla tions between United States interactions with North Vietnam; j as compared to relations with the United Kingdom, Canada, { and Japan were low and slightly negative. They indicate a j j small inverse relationship. United States relations in j 1966 with its allies and also with the international system when compared to relations with North Vietnam were much more cooperative and much less conflictual. These data indicate that unlike relations in 1951 with North Korea, United States interactions with North Vietnam during the Vietnam war generally were more con flictual than other United States international relations. The only exception in the data examined here was in rela tions with Communist China which, as explained earlier, maintained extremely conflictual relations with the United States. These results suggest again that United States international relations during the Vietnam war were some- j what different from those during the Korean war. Proposi- | tion XIVB does not hold for both the Korean and Vietnam wars. j j General Discussion ! 1,1 1 ! i The findings from the above analyses provide some j interesting conclusions. In Chapter VII these findings are discussed with the results from the analyses of Chap- [ ters IV and V on United States international system and regional relations. The discussion which follows is con cerned only with the findings from this chapter. The analyses of United States relations with major power allies and adversaries before and during limited war has demonstrated that there are great differences between relations with adversaries and with allies. Relations with allies clearly are more cooperative and less conflic tual. In general, for the periods examined, United States relations with allies did not become more conflictual from nonwar to limited war periods. In 1949 United States relations toward and from the United Kingdom, France, and Canada were very coopera- 412 tive. From 1949 to 1951, there was no major change in I United States relations with these allies. In 1963 United | ] States relations toward these allies were not especially cooperative, but in 1966 relations toward the United King- [ dom and Canada again became quite cooperative. Japanese ! relations toward the United States also became more co- ! operative and less conflictual between 1963 and 1966. | i United States relations with France in 1963 were not very i cooperative, however, and the event/interactions between , the two nations did not become more cooperative from 1963 i to 1966. United States-ally relations were more coopera tive, nevertheless, than United States relations with the Soviet Union or with Communist China. United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were very conflictual in both nonwar and limited war periods. Soviet behavior toward the United States was 58 percent conflictual in 1949 and 44 percent conflictual in 1963. In 1951 and 1966 Soviet behavior toward the United States was over 60 percent conflictual. Soviet behavior became particularly conflictual between 1963 and 1966. United States behavior toward the Soviet Union in all periods examined was less conflictual than Soviet behavior toward the United States. 413 j I Communist China's behavior toward the United States| was extremely conflictual during the periods examined. United States behavior toward Communist China was rela- j tively much less conflictual than China's behavior. In 1949 and 1951 a little over 65 percent of Communist China's ] relations toward the United States were conflictual, and j i in 1963 and 1966 over 80 percent of her relations were conflictual. These relations did not become more conflic- ! tual during the Korean and Vietnam war periods, as meas- ! ured by the event data, but relations were already so j I conflictual in the nonwar periods that they probably could j i not become much more conflictual. This was especially true! between 1963 and 1966. United States interactions with its South Korean and North Vietnamese allies were found to be quite differ- ! ent from its relations with the United Kingdom, Canada, | s Soviet Union, Communist China, or the international system. These relations were more cooperative than United States international relations with adversaries, but not neces sarily more cooperative than relations with major European and Asian allies. Relations with North Korea and North Vietnam were found to be quite different and more conflic tual than relations with allies, but similar and not more 414 conflictual than relations with Communist China. We con- I eluded, therefore, that United States diplomatic inter- j national interactions during the periods examined with the nations it supported in the Korean and Vietnam limited j wars were not necessarily more cooperative than its rela- j tions with its major global allies, and United States s interactions with its limited war adversaries were not necessarily more conflictual than relations with major global adversaries. These findings tend to support the ! i re-occurring theme in our data analysis that the inter national relations of a major nation when involved in a j limited war are not radically modified to patterns un- j I familiar in nonwar periods. j CHAPTER VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS I The design of this study has been to examine with i j quantitative analyses several propositions on the relation- j r \ j ship between a major nation's involvement in contemporary I ! ! limited war and changes in its relations with other mem bers of the international system. Event/interaction data for the relations of the United States as an Actor and a i i : Target have been studied and compared for periods before and during its involvement in the Korean and Vietnam limited wars. Several conclusions have been drawn from j the examination of the propositions and these are reviewed below. In the early chapters of this paper it was explained that the Korean and Vietnam conflicts are exam- ! pies of a type of modern contemporary limited war which i I has involved large-scale and direct participation by the i United States. These conflicts have been a major policy i concern for the United States since they have involved 415 416 i direct and indirect confrontation with the Soviet Union and Communist China, raised the fear of escalation to a nuclear war, and have been credited with bringing about or ' at least being associated with increased United States domestic turmoil and decreased international cooperation | and understanding. * Whether or not limited war involvement has been associated with changes in American domestic and inter national affairs is an important policy consideration which should be examined with the best tools of analysis which are available to the social scientist. Unfortunately, there has not been a massive, concerted, and rigorous effort to explain the relationship between United States | involvement in limited war and changes in domestic and ! international affairs even though there is widespread | concern in the United States today that there is a rela tionship between limited war involvement and changes in American affairs. If the prognosticators of the future are correct in their predictions of continuing foreign area conflict and if American international commitments i | remain unchanged, then there is a high likelihood that the | United States will consider involvement in potential new limited war conflicts, possibly in Asia, the Middle East, j 417 I and even Latin America and Africa. In order to reduce somewhat the uncertainty of the implications of future i : limited war involvement, examination of the United States j experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars with modern social science research seems very appropriate. | An attempt has been made here to investigate | United States international relations during limited war involvement with empirical data analysis. The intent of the research has been to examine official United States international relations with members of the international system and not just relations associated directly with war involvement in order to determine if the general patterns | of United States international relations in a nonwar f period are very different from its relations during a limited war period. As explained in Chapter III, we have not looked for direct causal links between war involvement and changes in international relations. We do not believe i that sufficient understanding of international-domestic- i i i international processes or the tools for such analyses j are available at this time to ascribe causal effects to I the relations we have examined. Yet, we do believe that the results suggest tendencies in United States relations which were associated with limited war involvement. The j 418 i I general similarity in behavior patterns between nonwar and I war periods indicate that for the periods examined, limited war was not associated with major changes in United States international relations. The more pronounced differences in relations during the Vietnam war rather than the Korean | war suggest, however, that changes in relations may depend upon the specific time and place (situation/arena) of a j limited war in the contemporary international system. Furthermore, before conclusive statements may be made about changes in relations associated with war involvement, other indicator data of nation behavior in addition to event data \ should be examined for longer time periods and with more j sophisticated techniques of analysis including trend and i time patterning analyses. We have shown in this study that some of the propositions presented in Chapter II did appear to reflect recorded international relations during war periods while | I others did not. The conclusions drawn from this study i j should help in the design of new studies of limited war and give direction to areas in most need of further analysis. | 419 System Review The first set of propositions examined in this study were concerned with the overall patterns of United States relations with other members of the international system. Event/interaction data for United States system i relations were analyzed in order to determine whether or not there was a massive change in United States relations between the nonwar and limited war periods examined. We had hypothesized earlier in this paper that such a change probably would be evident in the event/interaction data. Six propositions based on the writings and statements of scholars, governmental officials, and others concerned : with limited war were posed which suggested the types of changes that we might expect to occur. On the following i pages these propositions and the findings based on their analyses are reviewed. The first two propositions exam ined, which are stated below, were concerned with the allocation of United States relations toward and from other j j members of the international system. i I Proposition 1A: When a major nation is involved | in a limited war, the allocation of its external relations toward members of the international | system are not maintained as in a nonwar period. 420 j Proposition IB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the allocations of other system members' external relations toward it are not maintained as in a nonwar period. From the analysis of these propositions the follow ing was concluded: 1. The United States had consistently active rela tions in both the Korean and Vietnam nonwar and war periods examined with the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Communist China. United States relations with these j i i major allies and adversaries were maintained, therefore, whether or not a limited war was in progress. 2. The allocation of the frequency of United States relations with other members of the international j system were biased in favor of a few nations. The data indicated that about half of all international acts toward and from the United States were with only about 10 percent of the members of the international system for which there were data, while about 70 percent of the members of the I international system accounted for only about 20 percent of the United States-system interactions. This biased allocation did not change from nonwar to war period for f either the Vietnam or Korean case. 3. In both nonwar and limited war periods the 421 I j i United States interacted most often with East and West i European, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations and least often I i toward Latin American and Sub-Saharan African nations. There was a slight increase in United States interactions t with some Latin American nations in 1963, but these rela- j tions became relatively less active in 1966. The data did ! j not suggest any major change in these regional relations j t r between nonwar and war periods. ! i 4. The correlation between the frequency of j United States actions toward members of the international | | system between 1949 and 1951 was a high .88. The correla tion for actions toward the United States was an even higher .95. This suggests that United States international relations between the pre-Korean conflict period and the conflict period were allocated very similarly. The cor relation between 1963 and 1966 for system acts from the United States was .81 and for system acts toward the United States was .79. These correlations for the Vietnam case are lower than for the Korean case, but high enough not to accept the propositions so stated. These differences between the Vietnam and Korean wars were the first indica tions that there were more changes in United States rela tions associated with involvement in the Vietnam war than 422 j the Korean war. J 5. These findings led to the conclusion that limited war involvement w.as not associated with a major change in the allocation of United States system relations, and that our data did not support either Proposition IA or j i ! ! IB. The premise of many observers of limited war that ! i involvement by a major nation in a large-scale foreign area war will draw its attention and interaction away from other geo-political regions during the war period was not substantiated by this analysis. As explained in Chapter II, there are many aspects to how a nation relates with other members of the inter national system and in addition to our interest in the allocation relations, we were also concerned with changes in the cooperativeness and conflictualness of United States system relations during war periods. We posed the proposition in Chapter II, based on the advice of limited war theorists, that there probably was associated with limited war involvement a major shift in United States international relations toward less cooperative and more conflictual system relations. There has been a general : suspicion that during limited war involvement American ; major power adversary relations have deteriorated, allies 423 I have challenged the United States for leadership of the "Free World," and relations with many other nations have j tended to become less cooperative. Accordingly, the j following propositions were stated in Chapter II and > i examined in Chapter IV. Proposition IIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the disposition of its external relations toward other members of the international ! system are less cooperative and more conflictual j than in a nonwar period. ! Proposition IIB; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the disposition of the external relations toward it from other members of the j international system are less cooperative and more ; conflictual than in a nonwar period. ! From the analysis of these propositions the follow-j i ing was concluded: 1. United States behavior toward members of the international system were much more cooperative than con flictual in both nonwar and war periods. For all four years examined, United States cooperative behavior ranged | from 31 to 40 percent cooperative and from 18 to 20 per cent conflictual. There was very little change in United States relations, as measured by the seven types of behav ioral categories— Verbal Cooperation, Cooperative Action, Verbal Participation, Participatory Action, Defense/Verbal i Conflict, Offensive Verbal Conflict, and Conflict Action, 424 between nonwar and war periods. The correlation for the data on United States behavior between 1949 and 1951 was j .99, and between 1963 and 1966 it was .92. ! 2. For behavior directed toward the United States j from the international system, again there was not much change from the pre-Korean to Korean war period. Between 1949 and 1951 there was a small but not very significant | i 3 percent increase in conflictual relations. The correla- j tion between 1949 and 1951 for behavior directed toward the United States was .95 which suggests a close similarity in relations between the two periods. Between 1963 and 1966 the correlation was a moderately high .80, which indicates that although there was a strong relationship between the two periods there was more change associated with the Vietnam war than the Korean war. There was a 12 percent increase in conflictual relations during the i Vietnam war which was not evident in the Korean case. Based on this finding a recommendation is made to examine data for United States international relations for 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1969 in order to determine if during the Vietnam war there has been a tendency in system rela tions to become less cooperative and more conflictual toward the United States. The analysis of 1966 suggests 425 that relations toward the United States from the inter national system may have become critical and unfavorable during the period of large scale American involvement in the war. A more complete analysis of the war period would determine if this tendency in 1966 became more exaggerated in the later war years. The findings for the regional and individual nation analyses given below suggest where some of the increases in conflictual relations came from in 1966. 3. Another interesting finding, although perhaps not surprising, was that cooperative and conflictual behavior toward or from the United States was predominantly "talk" and not "acts." Actions appear as if they were more "costly" than talk during both the nonwar and limited war periods examined. 4. From these findings we concluded that United States system relations generally did not become more con flictual from the nonwar to war periods examined. The one possible exception was in system relations toward the United States from 1963 to 1966 and we recommend further intensive study of the complete Vietnam war period to ; determine if this tendency was sustained over several years, increased during later war years, or was evident 426 | only during 1966. These results suggest again that there generally was not a major difference between United States system { i I relations from before to during limited war involvement, | but that in the Vietnam war period there was an apparent tendency toward noticeable changes in system relations | j toward the United States. The results from the final two I system propositions examined did not alter these findings. i In addition to the examination of the allocation i ! and disposition of United States system relations there i also was an examination of the types of interactions j j exchanged between the United States and other system mem bers. Two propositions in Chapter II were presented which suggested that the "mix" of behavioral actions (as meas ured by the 22 general event types) toward and from the United States might be very different between nonwar and limited war periods. As noted earlier, the empirical research of several international relations analysts has suggested that the international relations among nations when viewed from an international system perspective are so stable that similar behavioral traits can be identified for these relations over periods of several years. The limited war literature in general suggested, however, that 427 the system relations of a major nation involved in a limited war probably have not been so stable. We posed the following two propositions and examined these with the event data for both the Korean and Vietnam limited wars in order to determine if the patterns of high level United States system relations changed dramatically from nonwar to limited war involvement. Proposition IIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the mix of its external relations toward other members of the international system is not maintained with the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. Proposition IIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the mix of external relations from other system members toward it does not have the same characteristics as in a nonwar period. The results from the examination of these two propositions were the following: 1. In periods of both nonwar and limited war involvement there were strong, independent, and easily explainable dimensions of United States behavior toward other members of the international system. These dimen sions, especially for 1949 and 1951 were moderately similar between nonwar and war periods which suggests that the same patterns were basic to United States behavior during the periods examined. For the Korean case three behavioral 428 traits were uncovered which were similar during both 1949 ; and 1951. We labeled these General Conflict behavior, j Cooperative behavior, and Cautious Approval behavior. In | I I f both the Korean nonwar and war periods these three factors | accounted for about 62 percent of the total variance in | the data. j Between 1963 and 1966 there were two United States j international behavioral patterns which were similar. These were the Diplomatic Exchange and the Cooperation ! I factors. In 1963 they accounted for about 54 percent of j i the total variance in the data, but in 1966 they accounted J i for only about 39 percent of the total variance. This suggests clearly that there was much greater change in United States system relations between 1963 and 1966 than between 1949 and 1951. j 2. While the results suggested a continuity in United States international behavior between nonwar and war periods, there were also some important changes. As noted above, the biggest differences occurred between 1963 and 1966 rather than between 1949 and 1951. During both the Korean and Vietnam wars there appeared, however, an independent and very negative conflictual pattern. These | conflictual patterns accounted for about 8 percent of the 429 total variance in both the 1951 and 1966 data. Further more , in 1966 there was a major change in the Diplomatic Exchange dimension. In 1963 the dimensions accounted for 43 percent of the total variance, but in 1966 it only accounted for 26 percent of the total variance. We con cluded, therefore, that while there was not a major break down in United States behavior between nonwar and war periods, there were some changes in relations during the war period. This suggests a need for further study of the Vietnam limited war over longer periods of time in order to determine if trend patterns of change can be identified. 3. The patterns of relations directed toward the United States from the other members of the international system were maintained generally between nonwar and war periods. Between 1949 and 1951 two strong and similar behavioral dimensions were found, and the amount of total variance explained increased from 1949 to 1951. Between 1963 and 1966 there were four similar factors, but they tended to be weak in 1966. Less rather than more of the total variance was explained by these factors from 1963 to 1966. Again, these changes were somewhat different from the changes in patterns evident in the 1949 and 1951 data. Based on the results reviewed above, we have 430 concluded that United States international relations when i examined from a system viewpoint did not appear to be | greatly disturbed by United States involvement in limited war. Patterns of international system behavior from and toward the United States were maintained generally from pre-Korean (1949) and pre-Vietnam (1963) war periods to j the Korean (1951) and Vietnam (1966) limited war periods. These findings indicate clearly that limited wars are not associated with the types of international system aberra tions which normally have accompanied the total wars of the twentieth century even though the amount of material resources expended in limited war may be equivalent to that expended in World Wars I and II. In fact, the results suggest that if only the flow of event/interactions between the United States and members of the international system were examined, it might be very difficult to dis criminate between periods when the United States was or was not involved in limited war. The results of this analysis also tend to support the research of Charles McClelland, Rudolph Rummel, Raymond Tanter, and their associates who have suggested that the interaction processes among nations in the contemporary international system when viewed from a general system 431 j perspective are moderately stable. The results did indi cate, however, that while United States system relations i were maintained between nonwar and war periods there were j some important differences between the results for the j Korean and Vietnam cases. Relations appeared to be more stable between 1949 and 1951 than between 1963 and 1966. | The greatest amount of change recorded in the analyses i was for international system behavior toward the United States from 1963 to 1966. This finding is interesting ! since an often repeated criticism against American involve-j ment in the Vietnam war has been that involvement is | affecting adversely international attitudes toward the | United States. The finding also suggests that the Vietnam limited war may be affecting system relations differently from those of the Korean war which implies that limited war, much like international crises, may be arena specific. Verification of the suspicion would be possible by an analysis of longer periods of data for both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Study of United States international rela tions from 1949 through 1953 and compared with relations from 1963 to 1970 or beyond, according to the analytic procedures introduced in this paper, would describe more completely the similarities and differences between these 432 limited wars. At the conclusion of the review of United States regional and national relations, several differ ences found in this examination between the Korean and Vietnam limited war cases are discussed. Region Review In addition to the propositions for United States system relations, in Chapter II a lengthy discussion and several propositions were presented on United States regional relations during periods of limited war involve ment. It was explained that considerable interest has arisen among both scholars and policy-makers on whether or not United States relations with certain groups of allies, adversaries, and nations local to a limited war have changed when the United States has been involved in ! limited war. An outstanding question is whether or not United States relations with the Soviet bloc have deteriorated. One fear, as stated by Frederick Schuman, is that foreign area limited war involvement by the United States may trigger a reaction among United States adversaries to come down strongly against the United States during periods of foreign area war involvement. An equally important ques- 433 tion, as George Liska has noted, is whether or not United i States-East European relations during limited war turn j I toward negative-cold war types of behavior patterns or toward less conflictual relations "essentially favorable to the United States." A suspected condition, as expressed by Senator William Fulbright and the political analyst, Douglas Mendel, is that United States relations with Soviet Bloc nations have worsened. Three propositions were listed in Chapter II and examined in Chapter V on some probable relationships between limited war involvement and United i States-adversary relations. These propositions were: Proposition IVA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition IVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from adversary nations are less coopera tive than in a nonwar period. Proposition V : When a major nation is involved in a limited war the balance of its external rela tions with its adversaries will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. From the analysis of United States regional rela tions with Eastern European nations in Chapter V, the following was concluded: 1. The data showed that in 1949 United States 434 relations toward Eastern European nations were much more conflictual than cooperative, and these relations became j even more conflictual during the Korean war. The data also indicated an increase in United States conflictual relations toward Eastern Europe from 1963 to 1966. United States relations clearly became more conflictual toward these adversaries during involvement in limited war. 2. The data showed that Eastern European behavior toward the United States was much more conflictual than j cooperative during both nonwar and limited war periods, and that these relations became more conflictual from the nonwar to limited war periods. In 1949 Eastern European behavior was very conflictual and accounted for 60 percent of all event-actions toward the United States. The increase in conflictual relations in 1951 was only 3 per cent, but probably we should not expect that Soviet Bloc relations could become much more conflictual. In 1963 Eastern European relations toward the United States had become much less conflictual than in either 1949 or 1951. In 1966, the Vietnam war period. Eastern European rela tions again became very conflictual. The increase from 1963 to 1966 was a 20 percent increase in conflictual behavior. Eastern European relations toward the United 435 States clearly became extraordinarily more conflictual during the Vietnam war period examined. 3. The analysis of United States international ! relations with Eastern European nations identified the : Vietnam period as being quite different from the Korean | period. United States relations were less conflictual in 1963 and 1966 than in 1949 or 1951. Furthermore the correlation between United States behavior in 1949 and 1951 was a very high .93. Between 1963 and 1966 it was only .50. Eastern European nations' relations toward the United States also were more conflictual in 1949 than in 1963. These relations changed little between 1949 and 1951 as indicated by the correlation of .95, but between j 1963 and 1966 there was a large increase in Eastern European conflictual behavior toward the United States and j the correlation between the periods was only .69. Eastern European relations toward the United States did appear to have worsened during the Vietnam war period. United States ; relations became, at the same time, somewhat more coopera tive and more conflictual. As suggested in Propositions IVA and IVB, United States-Eastern European relations | became much more conflictual during the Vietnam war j period. The results suggest that United States-Eastern European international relations in 1963 had improved from j the early cold war period, but that with United States j I involvement in the Vietnam war, relations again became more conflictual and somewhat similar to relations in 1949 and 1951. I One of the most important questions relating to ! United States involvement in limited war is whether or not j relations with important allies not in the local area of ! | the conflict become stressed. Our particular interest was ; | in United States-NATO relations since Western European I nations have been traditional and strategic allies of the United States and Europe itself has been a highly tense geo-political area since World War II requiring massive United States attention and commitment. The Vietnam con flict especially has been suggested by students of the war such as Thomas Finletter and Wesley Fishel as being associated with worsening United States-NATO relations. Charles de Gaulle has also noted, as in his February 21, 1966 speech, that a principal reason for troubled United States-NATO relations has stemmed in part from United States policies in Vietnam. Although the purpose of Propositions VIA, VIB, and VII, given below, was to examine United States-NATO 437 relations as explained in Chapters II and V, two additional sets of United States regional ally relations also were examined. These were United States relations with SEATO members for 1963 and 1966, and United States relations with its major Aid Recipients for 1949, 1951, 1963, and 1966. Data for these relations were examined in order to compare similarities and differences among the sets of ally relations for a more complete view of United States ally relations during limited war. Propositions VIA, VIB, and VII were listed in Chapter II as follows: Proposition VIA; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward strategic allies geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from strategic allies who are geograph ically distant from the limited war are less co operative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VII: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its relations with its strategic allies will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. The analysis of Propositions VIA, VIB, and VII were conducted in Chapter V. The following was concluded: 1. United States relations toward and from NATO I 438 and SEATO members and Aid Recipients were more cooperative and much less conflictual than relations with Eastern Europe in both nonwar and war periods. United States relations in 1949 were relatively over 30 percent more conflictual toward Eastern European nations than toward NATO allies and Aid Recipients. These disparities were even greater in 1951. In 1963, United States relations toward Eastern European nations were 18, 17, and 16 percent more conflictual than relations toward NATO, SEATO, and Aid Recipient nations. In 1966 these disparities increased for NATO and Aid Recipient nations but decreased slightly toward SEATO nations. Eastern European behavior toward the United States was even more conflictual when compared with ally relations toward the United States than was United States behavior for the Korean and Vietnam cases. 2. Between 1949 and 1951, United States relations with its NATO allies and Aid Recipients did not change very much. The correlations for behavior toward and from the United States with these two regional groups of friends between 1949 and 1951 ranged from .98 to .99. We suggest, since many of these nations were allied with the United States during the Korean war and in 1949 and 1951 were working closely with the United States in postwar 439 reconstruction, that the similarity in relations between | these years is not surprising. During the Vietnam period j while relations were maintained similarly between the non- i war and war period, there were more changes than there were for the Korea case. The correlations, when SEATO j I relations are included, ranged from .71 to .95. The least i similarity was in United States-SEATO relations, and the | | most similarity in United States-Aid Recipient relations. From 1963 to 1966 United States relations toward NATO and SEATO members became more cooperative and conflictual, while relations toward Aid Recipients became more coopera- I tive and less conflictual. Relations toward the United J States in 1966 from NATO members was 10 percent more con flictual than in 1963, from Aid Recipients relations were 6 percent more conflictual, and relations from SEATO mem bers were 2 percent more conflictual. NATO relations, as explained in Chapter V, did not become more cooperative, Aid REcipients* behavior became slightly more cooperative, and SEATO behavior was about 9 percent more cooperative in 1966 than in 1963. We concluded, therefore, that United States ally relations during the Korean period improved, but during the Vietnam war NATO relations were ! 440 i l more troubled than in 1963, Aid Recipient relations were about the same, and SEATO relations improved somewhat. 2. In 1963 and 1966, United States interactions ,with NATO allies were less cooperative than during 1949 and 1951. By 1963 the United States was no longer giving !large amounts of aid to its NATO allies and relations, while cooperative, had become somewhat more routine and participatory from the early postwar period. In 1966, the United States increased both its cooperative and con flictual behavior toward NATO members, although as explained in Chapter V, the cooperative types of actions included a large number of Yields to France which were cordial but not necessarily "friendly" responses to demands to withdraw foreign military forces from France. NATO behavior toward the United States became slightly more cooperative, but also 10 percent more conflictual. It appears that United States relations with NATO countries when compared with other ally relations examined during both the Korean and Vietnam war periods especially were disturbed. 4. We have concluded, therefore, that when the United States was involved in limited war, relations from Eastern European adversaries, NATO and SEATO members, and 441 even Aid Recipients became somewhat more conflictual. During the Vietnam war, relations from Eastern European j nations became especially conflictual, since they appeared | ! I to be more cooperative in 1963 than in either of the early cold war periods or 1966. NATO relations toward the i : i United States also "worsened" in 1966. Unlike the Korean i I war period, NATO itself has not supported United States actions in Vietnam even though the aid of NATO was sought, and it may be that involvement in the Vietnam war has j helped, as General Gavin, Senator Fulbright, ex-French i i President de Gaulle, and others have noted, to worsen NATO j ; I members' relations toward the United States. We must | caution, however, that the apparent lag in relations was one of degree, and no major reversal of United States-NATO or other ally relations were indicated in our examination [ of the data for either war period. In addition to the concern in this paper with United States relations with its principal allies and adversaries during periods of involvement in limited war, there has also been an interest in United States relations : with nations in the local area of a limited war. In this j paper, we were interested primarily in United States j relations with Southeast Asian nations during the Vietnam 442 war. There has been considerable recent debate among students of the war on whether or not these relations have "improved" or "worsened" during the period of American involvement in the war. United States relations with Far East Asian nations during the Korean war were also inves tigated for a comparison with the Vietnam war even though United States relations with Japan and Taiwan in 1949 and 1951 were rather atypical of relations with Southeast Asian nations in 1963 and 1966. The propositions which were presented in Chapter II and examined in Chapter V are given below. The propositions reflected the suspicion of many writers on the Vietnam war that United States rela tions with nations in the local area of a limited war are more conflictual during the war period. Proposition VIIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward nations not in the local area of the limited war are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition VIIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from nations in the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition IX: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with nations in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of 443 relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. For the investigations of these propositions, I ; United States relations with three Far East Asian nations— j Nationalist China, Japan, and the Philippines— were grouped I i I together for the Korean study. For the Vietnam study, I j I i United States relations with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, ! t ; j Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia were j examined. The results for the analyses of these relations | were the following: i i - ‘ 1. United States behavior toward Far East Asian I i nations from 1949 to 1951 and Southeast Asian nations from I ! I | 1963 to 1966 became more cooperative and less conflictual. j The expectation that relations would become more conflic- I ! tual was not verified for the periods examined. i j 2. Far East Asian nations1 relations toward the United States were very cooperative in 1949 and became ' somewhat more so in 1951. These relations also became less conflictual. Southeast Asian relations in 1966 also I became more cooperative and less conflictual than in the pre-war period. Clearly, behavior toward the United j i States from nations in the local region of a limited war i | did not become more conflictual during the war period. | 444 i r I 3. United States relations with Southeast Asian nations in 1963 and 1966 were more conflictual than United States relations with Far East Asian nations in 1949 and i 1951. Relations toward the United States in 1963 and 1966 i were much more conflictual than relations from the United States, although much of this conflict was reduced in 1966. 4. We concluded, therefore, that while United States relations toward local conflict area nations during the Korean periods 1949 and 1951 were different from rela tions in 1963 and 1966 there was not an increase in con flictual relations in either the 1951 or 1966 war period. United States relations with nations local to a limited war for the periods examined appeared to have improved i during the period of United States war involvement. These i i i results tend to support the contention that, in general, ^ the national representatives of the nations local to a limited war react favorably toward the United States while it is involved in the local war. : Nation Review | In Chapter VI the third level of analysis was con- j ! ducted for United States limited war international rela- I tions. This was an investigation of United States rela- 445 i | tions with several selected ally and adversary nations including the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Japan, Soviet i Union, and Communist China, and a comparison of these rela- I | tions with United States interactions with North and South j Korea in 1951, and with North and South Vietnam in 1966. j The purpose of these examinations was to obtain a | closer look at a few particularly important United States i international relations. There has been considerable debate, for example, over the condition of United States | relations with the Soviet Union during periods of limited I war. Donald Zagoria has noted this problem in his book on Soviet and Communist Chinese interests in the Vietnam war. ! Zagoria has stated: i | Some analysts of Soviet affairs consider the j Vietnamese conflict the decisive factor shaping j Soviet foreign policy— perhaps even domestic j policy— in the post-Khrushchev era. Opponents of the war say that American policy in Vietnam has forced the Russians to adopt a harder line and that the war has strengthened Soviet society's most reactionary forces. The defenders of the ; Administration contend, on the contrary, that Washington's policy has intensified the Sino- Soviet disputes.1 j Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle (New York: Pegasus, 1967), p. 31. ! 446 l | We were also interested in, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has stated, whether or not United States participation in the Vietnam war has been associated with , "the rise of a new form of anti-Americanism, emotional rather than ideological, leading toward a serious estrange | ment between Europe and America.We were particularly ; interested in whether or not United States relations with the United Kingdom and France had changed significantly between 1963 and 1966. There was a similar concern for United States relations with Canada and Japan, two very i important allies during the period of the Vietnam war. The first propositions examined were for United I States relations with its adversaries the Soviet Union i and Communist China. The propositions were presented in Chapter II as follows: Proposition XA; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. 2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy: 1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 56. 447 Proposition XB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed toward it from principal adversary nations are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XI: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with principal adversary nations will shift toward the reception of relatively more j conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. The conclusions from the analysis of United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were the followings 1. As in the case of United States-Eastern European relations in 1949, the United States acted much ! more conflictually (45 percent of relations) than coopera- ' tively (14 percent) toward the Soviet Union. There was not, however, a major change in United States behavior toward the Soviet Union in 1951. The correlation between relations in 1949 and 1951 was a high .89. There was a . small increase in both Verbal Cooperation and Verbal Con- j j flict. Soviet behavior toward the United States in 1949 ! was more conflictual than United States behavior. Fifty- ! j j eight percent of these relations were conflictual and 15 percent cooperative. As in American relations, the Soviet Union's behavior became somewhat more cooperative and more conflictual in 1951. The correlation between 1949 448 | I and 1951 was a very high .96. We concluded that United States-Soviet relations were very conflictual in this i early war period, and between 1949 and 1951 relations j became somewhat more conflictual, but the changes were not | I s very significant. j 2. The results for the Vietnam analysis were quite different from that for Korea. In 1963 United States-Soviet relations were more cooperative and less conflictual than in 1949 and 1951. United States behavior was 20 percent cooperative and 31 percent conflictual in j 1963, and Soviet behavior was 24 percent cooperative and 44 percent conflictual. In 1966 United States relations j ! became 17 percent more cooperative and 3 percent more con flictual. In 1966 Soviet behavior became 6 percent less cooperative and 18 percent more conflictual. Accordingly, the correlation for these two sets of relations were only moderately strong (.64 and .78, respectively). There was clearly a change in United States-Soviet relations between these periods. United States behavior from 1963 to 1966 became more cooperative, and Soviet behavior became more conflictual. 3. United States relations toward Communist China in 1949, when the United States was in the process of leaving mainland China after the defeat of the American supported Nationalist Chinese, were very conflictual (53 percent) and not very cooperative (13 percent). The data showed that in 1951 relations toward Communist China were 13 percent less conflictual. These data do not include, however, actions which the United States made toward Communist China under the auspices of the United Nations and does not reflect completely, therefore, the intensity of United States conflictual behavior toward this major Korean war enemy. The decrease in Conflict Actions in 1951 toward Communist China does reflect, never theless, the absence of the United States from mainland China, where in 1949 contact was direct and often hostile. Communist China's relations toward the United States in 1949, not surprisingly, were very conflictual. In 1951, even without actions directed toward the United States/ United Nations, Communist Chinese behavior was 67 percent conflictual. 4. The data for United States relations with ! Communist China in 1963 were especially interesting. Only 4 percent of United States behavior toward Communist China in 1963 was cooperative and only 16 percent conflictual. I Sixty percent of United States behavior was verbal ! 450 information directed toward Communist China without clear I cooperative or conflictual overtones. In 1966 United j r States behavior became 18 percent more cooperative and j I 9 percent less conflictual. We have concluded that while j the United States acted frequently toward Communist China i i i i in both 1963 and 1966, the actions were not actively cooperative or conflictual and appeared not to signal any attitude other than noninterference. Communist Chinese behavior toward the United States, on the other hand, was extremely conflictual. Over 80 percent of China's behavior was conflictual in 1963 and 1966. Less than 5 percent of i its relations in both years was cooperative. All that can j be said of this is that Communist Chinese behavior toward the United States before and during the Vietnam war was simply conflictual. 5. From these findings we have concluded that adversary behavior toward the United States has been con flictual whether or not the United States was involved in a limited war. During the Vietnam war, we found that United States relations toward the Soviet Union and Com munist China actually became more cooperative suggesting that the United States was probably attempting to keep relations with these nations as cordial as possible. 451 Relations toward the United States were quite different. Communist China's relations were very conflictual whether j or not there was a limited war, and Soviet behavior clearly became more conflictual in 1966. The foreign relations i of the Soviet Union toward the United States during the I ! Vietnam war, as many observers have stated, apparently j I tended to be more similar to early cold war relations than detente relations. The concern of many students of the Vietnam war that United States relations with major Communist adversary nations have been especially disturbed during the Vietnam war seems to have been supported by this analysis. Another equally important suspicion has been that United States relations with principal allies have also worsened during the Vietnam war. Again, propositions for this concern were presented in Chapter II and examined in Chapter VI for both the Korean and Vietnam wars. The following proposi tions were examined: Proposition XIIA: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its external relations toward principal ally nations geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XIIB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the external relations directed 452 toward it from principal ally nations who are geographically distant from the limited war area are less cooperative and more conflictual than in a nonwar period. Proposition XIII: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, the balance of its external relations with principal ally nations who are not geographically in the local area of the limited war will shift toward the reception of relatively more conflictual behavior than during a nonwar period. The analysis of United States relations with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan suggested the following results: 1. United States international relations with the United Kingdom in both 1949 and 1951 were similar and very cooperative. Forty-eight percent of United States behavior toward its British ally in 1949 was cooperative and 8 per cent conflictual. There was little change in United States behavior in 1951. In 1949 British behavior was 44 percent cooperative and 7 percent conflictual. Again, there was little change in 1951. The correlations for United States-United Kingdom relations between 1949 and 1951 were over .95, and we concluded that there was basically no change in relations from the pre-Korean to Korean war periods and clearly no increase in conflictual relations. I 453 j i 2. United States relations with France were f somewhat, but not very, different from United States rela- i tions toward the United Kingdom during the Korean war. In 1949 United States behavior was 55 percent cooperative and i only 8 percent conflictual. In 1949 French behavior was j I ! also very cooperative (47 percent) and not very conflictual j (4 percent). In 1951 relations in both directions were ! i still cooperative, but United States behavior was 7 percent’ less cooperative and French behavior was 7 percent more 1 I i conflictual. The correlations between the two periods werei very high, nevertheless, and relations remained overwhelm ingly cooperative during the war year. There was little evidence to suggest any significant change in relations during the Korean war period. 3. United States relations with Canada in 1949 and 1951 also were very cooperative, nonconflictual, and stable between the nonwar and war periods. As in the other United States-ally relations examined, there was no strong indication of an increase in conflictual relations from 1949 to 1951. We concluded, therefore, that United States international relations with the United Kingdom, France, and Canada did not become significantly more conflictual I | from the nonwar period to the Korean war period. 454 j 4. In 1963 United States relations with the United! Kingdom were still much more cooperative than conflictual, but they were less cooperative than in 1949 and 1951. In 1963, 30 percent of United States behavior was cooperative I and 6 percent conflictual. British behavior was 33 percentj | i cooperative and 7 percent conflictual. These relations j improved in 1966. United States behavior became 20 percentj i more cooperative, and British behavior became 8 percent | more cooperative. In neither case was there increased conflict. 5. United States relations with France during the Vietnam war were somewhat different than United States- British relations. In 1963 only 13 percent of United States behavior toward France was cooperative, while 18 percent was conflictual. French relations toward the United States were 11 percent cooperative and 20 percent conflictual. In 1966 United States relations became 16 percent more cooperative and 6 percent more conflictual. This increase in cooperative behavior is not, however, a correct reflection of actual relations since 17 percent of all United States behavior toward France in 1966 was accounted for by Yields to France in response to a demand to withdraw all foreign military forces from French soil. These Yields which, in fact, were cooperative compliances were not especially "friendly" responses. If we considered these Yields to be neutral acts at best, there would have been a decrease in cooperative United States behavior toward France in 1966. Thus, we have concluded that United States relations toward France in 1966 did become more conflictual. French behavior toward the United States in 1966 also became more conflictual. The data showed that France vigorously lashed out at the United States in 1966 without being defensive about its own actions. United States relations with France in 1966, during the Vietnam war, were very hostile and much more conflictual than in 1963, the nonwar period. 6. United States relations with Canada in 1963 and 1966 were more similar to United States-British rela tions than United States-French relations. United States behavior toward Canada in 1963 was 32 percent cooperative and 9 percent conflictual. Canadian behavior was 29 per cent cooperative and 23 percent conflictual. In 1966 United States behavior became 50 percent cooperative and 10 percent more conflictual. Canadian behavior also became more cooperative and less conflictual. United States-Canadian relations improved noticeably during the 456 j war periods examined and there was no increase in conflic- I tual relations. 7. For the Vietnam case, United States relations with Japan were also examined. United States behavior i toward Japan in 1963 was more cooperative (34 percent) thanj conflictual. United States behavior changed noticeably j in 1966 with a relative decrease in cooperative as well as j conflictual relations toward Japan. In 1966 the United | i I States commented frequently toward Japan, but refrained | from either aggressive cooperative or conflictual behavior.j In 1966 the United States appeared to have stepped aside somewhat from particularly pointed types of behavior toward this Asian ally. Japanese behavior toward the United States in 1966 was 15 percent more cooperative and 5 percent less conflictual than in 1963. United States- Japanese relations clearly did not become more conflictual between the pre-Vietnam and Vietnam war period. The final set of propositions examined in this analysis were for United States relations with local limited war area allies and adversaries during the war periods. These relations were for United States inter actions with South and North Korea in 1951 and with South and North Vietnam in 1966. The propositions stated quite simply that United States relations (excluding all battlefield events and all events in 1951 which were made toward or in behalf of the United Nations) with local area allies would be much more cooperative than relations with other members of the international system, and that relations with adversaries would be much more conflictual. The propositions as posed in Chapter II were the following: Proposition XIVA; When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local con flict area allies are relatively more cooperative than its relations with other members of the international system. Proposition XIVB: When a major nation is involved in a limited war, its interactions with local area enemies are relatively more conflictual than its relations with other members of the international system. For the examinations of the previous propositions, relations from and toward the United States were analyzed separately. For the examination of Propositions XIVA and XIVB, the relations toward and from the United States were combined and studied as event/interactions. The following results were described in Chapter VI. 1. The data showed that United States relations toward South Korea in 1951 were 23 percent cooperative, 5 percent conflictual, and 71 percent participatory. We suspected that the principal reason for these results was 458 | that most of the activity between the United States and South Korea concerning aid, strategy, and other conditions i of war were exchanged in 1950, and that in 1951 the United j I Nations had taken over most interactions relating to the I i war and war negotiations. Direct United States relations j i with both South and North Korea in 1951 were primarily J "overhead" or maintenance types of relations. Not sur- J | prisingly, United States interactions with South Korea in i 1951 proved to be quite different from United States rela- f tions with the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, the Soviet ^ j Union, or Communist China. The most similar set of rela- j j i tions was United States behavior with the "international j system" which still was only correlated at .65. We con cluded that United States-South Korean interactions in 1951 were generally atypical of United States-other nation j relations. 2. The data for United States relations with North Korea, as with South Korea, for 1951 had to be inter preted rather carefully. Only interactions which involved directly the United States were included in the data, excluding, therefore, indirect relations toward or from the United States when made under the auspices of the United Nations. The data showed that 18 percent of these 459 interactions were cooperative, 19 percent conflictual, j I and 63 percent participatory. Most conflictual behavior between the United States and North Korea was either on the battlefield or made under the auspices of the United i Nations and not included in this data. The United States in 1951 clearly acted toward North Korea primarily through the United Nations. Even so these relations were more similar to United States-Communist China relations than any other of the relations examined. When only official United States interactions were considered, relations with both Communist China and the Soviet Union were more conflictual than United States-North Korean relations in 1951. 3. The data for United States-South Vietnam interactions in 1966 describe very cooperative relations. Forty-one percent of the interactions were cooperative and only 6 percent conflictual. The pattern of these relations was somewhat similar to United States relations with Japan in 1966, although they were more cooperative. United States relations with the United Kingdom and Canada in 1966 were slightly more cooperative than United States- South Vietnam relations, and relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were much more conflictual. From the results of the analysis of the event/ interaction data alone, we concluded that there was not a tendency in the periods examined for United States-South Korea or United States-South Vietnam relations to be more cooperative than relations with other important allies. I The United Kingdom and Canada, for example, during both the j Korean and Vietnam wars had very cooperative relations with| the United States. 4. United States-North Vietnam interactions in | I 1966 were 55 percent conflictual and 14 percent cooperativej I I These conflictual relations were very similar to United j i States relations with Communist China (correlation .99) and the Soviet Union (correlation .81) in 1966. United I ! States-Communist Chinese relations were somewhat more con flictual than United States-North Korean relations, but United States relations with North Vietnam were very con flictual, nevertheless. If battlefield encounters had been included in the data for both the Korean and the Vietnam cases, relations would have been extremely conflictual between the United States and North Korea in 1951 and North Vietnam in 1966. In terms of international event/interaction data alone. United States relations with these local area adversaries were not extraordinarily conflictual when compared with 461 United States relations with its major strategic adver saries , the Soviet Union and Communist China. We con cluded, therefore, that while the battlefield actions between a major nation and its limited war adversaries may be extremely hostile, their international political behav ior toward each other off the battlefield was not extraor dinarily conflictual for the periods examined. Conclusion From this summary of United States international relations during periods of both nonwar and limited war involvement, the results have shown a rather high degree of similarity in most United States international relations between nonwar and war periods. All the correlations for the data between nonwar and war years were positive and at least moderately high. The greatest change in relations were associated with the Vietnam war, and were centered primarily in behavior directed toward the United States. In 1966, for example, relations from both France and the Soviet Union became noticeably more conflictual. United States relations with its major Aid Recipients and the United Kingdom were especially cooperative for all the periods examined. Relations with Communist China were very 462 conflictual. The United States tended to increase its cooperative international behavior toward major adversaries during periods of limited war, and relations with nations in the local area of a limited war also tended to improve somewhat in both 1951 and 1966. From these and the other results summarized in this chapter we have concluded that this event data analysis does not confirm the contention of many public observers and spokesmen about limited war who suggest that major changes in United States relations can be expected to be associated with involvement in limited war. The results reported in this study suggest that at least at the level of this investigation, the relations among nations are very stable. We did find, however, that some changes in rela tions did occur primarily during the Vietnam war period and especially in relations directed toward the United States. These results may suggest that limited war is arena specific and that further study should be conducted of United States relations during the Vietnam war. We recommend further study of more Vietnam war years, perhaps even all the years from 1963 through 1970. We also suggest that the results reported here are tentative since 463 they only describe a single aspect of United States inter national relations during involvement in two limited wars. This analysis was descriptive and based only on event data. We proposed early in the study that the analysis should be considered as a preliminary investigation of war rela tions, and that the results of this study should enhance further empirical analyses of other aspects of limited war. The event data analysis describes a high level con trol aspect of international behavior, and while major changes were not found at this level of activity, there is still a possibility of a major international impact asso ciated with limited war at some other level. We propose, therefore, that the event analysis conducted here is one channel of investigation in a multidimensional research area, and that in addition to further study of more Vietnam war years, other complementary analyses are required before we can reliably accept or reject any hypothesis regarding the impact of limited war on the affairs of involved major nations. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is a need to possibly revise some aspects of contemporary limited war theory. 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Creator Martin, Wayne Richard (author)

Core Title An Analysis Of United States International Relations Before And During Limited War

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor McClelland, Charles A. (committee chair), Christol, Carl Q. (committee member), Swearingen, Rodger (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-458289

Unique identifier UC11362835

Identifier 7112401.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-458289 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7112401

Dmrecord 458289

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Martin, Wayne Richard

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA