The Modification Of Age-Specific Expectations Of Piaget'S Theory Of Development Of Intentionality In Moral Judgments Of Four-Year-Old To Seven-Year-Old Children In Relation To Use Of Puppets In A...

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Content 72-17,502 REEVES, John Marcus, 1929- THE MODIFICATION OF AGE-SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS OF PIAGET'S THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTENTIONALITY IN MORAL JUDGMENTS OF FOUR- TO SEVEN-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN IN RELATION TO USE OF PUPPETS IN A SOCIAL (IMITATIVE) LEARNING PARADIGM. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1972 Education, psychology University Microfilms, A X ERO X Com pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan © 1972 John Marcus Reeves ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE MODIFICATION OF AGE-SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS OF PIAGET'S THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTENTIONALITY IN MORAL JUDGMENTS OF FOUR- TO SEVEN-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN IN RELATION TO USE OF PUPPETS IN A SOCIAL (IMITATIVE) LEARNING PARADIGM by John Marcus Reeves A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Education) February 1972 UNIVERSITY OF SO UTHERN CALIFORNIA T H E GRAD U ATE S C H O O L U N IV ER SITY PARK LO S A N G EL ES , C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by John Marcus Reeves under the direction of h. . i . ? . . Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Gradu ate School, in partial fulfillment of require ments of the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y Dean Date..F . e b r_U a ry. _ 1.9 7 2 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ' ) PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This investigation represents the combined effort, thought, and cooperation of many friends of the writer, foremost of whom is his wife, Heather, who provided contin ual support and allowed innumerable inconveniences to her personal plans and domain. Our children are also to be commended for the enthusiasm with which they bore the major burden of the puppet production: Ann, assisting with sched ules and costume changes; David, making the puppets into believable characters from a few pieces of styrofoam and cloth; Steven, producing off stage voices and general handy man; Susan, acting as the model who provided vicarious re inforcement; and Michael who was too young to know much about it, but was always an appreciative audience at im promptu rehearsals. The writer wishes to express deep appreciation to Dr. William B. Michael, whose empathy, wisdom, and special philosophy of life and learning have been, and will continue to be, a personal paradigm for higher education. Gratitude is further owed to Dr. David Cotton, Dr. Frank Fox, and Dr. C. Edward Meyers, for valuable suggestions during the various stages of the research. Three colleagues, Dr. Maurice Hodgen and Dr. Shirou Kunihira made insightful criticisms and Dr. Paul Yahiku provided advice on computer programming, for which the author is indebted. Special thanks are due to Mr. Roland Sylwester, member of the "Puppeteers of America" and art teacher, for his tireless efforts during the ten hours required for filming the puppet show. The writer expresses his gratitude to Mr. Edward Hamilton of the Audio-visual Department, Loma Linda University, for his excellent technical advice and assistance in editing the film as well as in producing the sound and action of the motion picture. Appreciation is extended to Dr. Paul Crowley, of Our Lady of Providence Seminary, Warwick, Rhode Island, for his willingness to share his unique picture booklet tests of intentionality. The sixty-four members of the Nursing Class of 1972 and twenty-five graduate students of the School of Education, all students at Loma Linda University, were responsible for the testing involved in this study. As a result of their faithfulness in keeping appointments at odd hours and diverse schools, the job of testing became a real joy. ii This investigation received partial support from an intramural grant from Loma Linda University, which was af forded through the kind cor ?!deration of Dr. Robert Cleve land, Vice-President for Academic Affairs. Finally, the writer wishes to thank the administra tive personnel, teachers, and children, who gave so freely of their time and effort by cooperating in every possible way with the research requirements and especially Mr. R. Campbell, Assistant Superintendent of the Redlands Unified School District. Special commendation is due to the prin cipal and staff of each of the six schools involved: Mr. Turner, Victoria Elementary School; Mr. Smith, Loma Linda Elementary School; Mr. Allen, Mission Elementary School; Mrs. Webb, Rainbow Kindergarten; Mrs. Qurney, University Day Nursery; and Mrs. Broussard, Town and Country Nursery. iii CONTENTS Chapter Page I. THE PROBLEM.............. '.................. 1 Introduction Purpose of the Study- Conceptual Assumptions Delineation of the Research Problem Importance of the Study Definitions of Terms Used Delimitations of the Study Organization of Remainder of the Dissertation II. SELECTED REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.......... 16 Intentionality Imitation A Short History of Puppetry III. METHODOLOGY................................. 35 Organization of the Chapter Research Design and Statistical Analysis Research Sample Instrumentation Data Collection Procedures and Recording Methodological Assumptions Limitations of the Study Null Hypotheses IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS....... 50 Analysis of Results Discussion of Results V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . 67 Summary Conelusions Recommendations REFERENCES........................................ 75 iv Page APPENDICES............................................ 82 APPENDIX A. Reproduction of Crowley's (1 9 6 7) Stories Used as a Pretest......... 84 APPENDIX B. Reproduction of Crowley's (1 9 6 7) Stories Used as a Posttest....... 86 APPENDIX C. Reproduction of Stories Used in the Film for the Experimental Session Adapted from Crowley (1 9 6 7) . 91 APPENDIX D. Item Analyses for Pretest and Posttest Data.............. 95 APPENDIX E. Instructions to Assistant Examiners........................... 99 v LIST OP TABLES Table Page 1. Racial and Ethnic Distributions by Percentages for (A) Redlands Unified School District* 1969-1970 and (B) Sample Employed in This Investigation, 1969-1970 .............. 37 2. Descriptive Statistics for Subjects Eliminated Because of Inappropriate Pretest Scores Judged to be Indicative of Too High a Level of Maturity or of Misunder standing of T a s k ........................... 51 3. Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of the Retained Subjects Judged to be Immature and Thus Appropriate for Task Exposure........................... 52 4. Means, Standard Deviations and Adjusted Means for Immediate and Two-week Delayed Posttests ........................... 53 5. Results of Analysis of Covariance for Immediate Posttest ......................... 54 6. Results of Analysis of Covariance for Two-week Delayed Posttest ................... 54 7. Results of Analysis of Covariance for Immediate Posttest with Question able Items Omitted......................... 56 8. Results of Analysis of Covariance for Two- week Delayed Posttest with Question able Items Omitted......................... 56 9. Frequencies of Subjects Who Yielded Designated Categories of Pretest Results of Objective and Subjective Responses ....................... 58 vi : CHAPTER I i • THE PROBLEM Introduction Research in the development of moral judgment rep resents one of the most viable and newly expanding subareas jof psychology today. Previously, concern with the moral ;domain was almost exclusively limited to religion and phil osophy, as many psychologists considered the study of moral ity too subjective to provide empirically valid results. However, some early writers, such as McDougall (1908) the social psychologist, placed a large emphasis on the individ ual's moralization. 1 The recent surge of research in moral development i 'has undoubtedly been due, at least in part, to the insight- Iful study of Kohlberg (1 9 5 8) in his clarification of some ^important issues of Jean Piaget's seminal investigations Iset forth in his classic volume, The Moral Judgment of the Child, written in 1932. Piaget's theory described two major ^stages of a child's developing morality, namely, "the moral- iity of constraint" and "the morality of cooperation." i jKohlberg's further amplification of Piaget's work provided I six stages of moral development that apply beyond childhood 1 to adolescence and adulthood. | 2 | Kohlberg (1964) directed his research emphasis to ward the locus of moral judgments, rather than the other two ’ options: moral behavior (Hartshorne & May, 1930) and moral i affect (Freud, 1953-1964). Although the present study fol- j flows Piaget and Kohlberg in their emphasis on moral judg ment, it is limited to investigating intentional moral jchoices of four- to seven-year-old children and therefore !is more closely oriented toward Piaget's approach. ^ Background i Employing adult models, Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3) |were the first to use experimentally manipulated variables to aid facilitation of children's moral judgments. They iconcluded that their social learning paradigm was highly successful, and on the basis of this study they indicated |that moral judgment was less age-specific than had been im- ; plied by Piaget. ! After replicating Bandura and McDonald's study, Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich, and Nathanson (1 9 6 9) stated that I their results provided substantial support for Bandura and McDonald's contention that exposure to adult models could modify children's moral responses, but at the same time I denied that their findings negated Piaget's theory. Cowan, ]et al., concluded that the differences between the cognitive j and social learning theories had not been resolved. 3 Problem Situation— Area of Concern The present Investigation does not presume to be an experimenturn crueis for deciding the merits or demerits of i I the cognitive-developmental or social-learning theories. ! jHowever, it would seem appropriate to raise a number of ;questions concerning the possibility of modifying young ! |children's (four-to seven-year olds) moral choices. Bandura (1969a) suggested that the child is no :longer limited to human models, but is daily deluged by |symbolic models via the communications media. The very real possibility exists that parents and other adults (teachers) may be limited in any competition with symbolic models j I 'relative to the education and socialization of their chil- j dren. If this is true, would it be advantageous to enlist ithe use of peer-puppets in an endeavor to facilitate change 1 in children's moral judgments? Specifically, if puppets iacted out Piaget-type stories which exemplified everyday experiences, would this aid the observing child to modify his moral judgments toward a more mature orientation? ! Is it possible that we have not been able to get useful information on how children communicate below the ;age of six years, because we are asking them to do it on iadult terms rather than their own? Realizing that the |child below.the age of six is often unable to make his |thoughts and wishes clear in a verbal manner, would it be Jreasonable to allow the child to use pictures of problem 4 situations (Crowley> 196?, 1 9 6 8) to aid problem solving? ;Jean Piaget stated: "in psychology one must speak to chil- i jdren in their own language, otherwise the experiment re solves itself Into a trial of intelligence or of verbal i iunderstanding [l9 6 9, p. 120]." 1 ' Purpose of the Study | The present Investigation was undertaken to ascer tain whether the age-specific expectations of Piaget's theory regarding the development of moral judgment in chil- Idren from four to seven years of age— a theory which has ! been challenged by recent research studies (e.g., Bandura | i & McDonald, 1 9 6 3)— were modifiable through use of a certain ! : I ladaptation of Bandura and McDonald's imitative learning paradigm which had utilized adult models. In this study of 'pro-social learning of pre-school and first-grade children, ;an adaptation of the social-learning paradigm involved the ! introduction of a 20-ininute color and sound l6-millimeter film (a) using glove-type, hand-manipulated puppets as models to act out Piaget-type stories, which provided a natural plot or dramatization, and (b) affording vicarious :reinforcement (Bandura, 1965b) from a six-year-old peer ’throughout the treatment in an effort to maximize the re- I suitant acquisition of those moral judgments that involve ;the distinction between social acts of intentionality or I accident. 5 Questions to be Answered In terms of both immediate and delayed generaliza- bility of four- to seven-year-old children's moral judg ments, the objectives of the investigation were clarified in terms of the following questions: 1. Was there an age difference in the objectivity (focusing on immediate consequences of an ac cident irrespective of intent of the subject— an immature reaction) versus subjectivity (in- tentionality or purposefulness of an act re flecting a mature moral choice) continuum of intentionality choices between children aged four to five years and six to seven years? 2. How effective would the treatment (a color and sound 16-millimeter film-mediated performance of puppets which imitate the actions of the characters in Piaget-type stories of accidental- intentional themes and receive vicarious rein forcement from a six-year-old peer) be in pro ducing change from objective to subjective judgment? 3. Would there be an interaction between treatment effects and age level? 6 Conceptual Assumptions The following conceptual assumptions were made in this study: 1. The subjects of this experiment had not previously been exposed to Piaget-type stories of accidental- intentional themes. 2. Piaget's (1 9 6 5) description of the two extremes of intentionality (objectivity— immature choice and subjectivity— mature choice) and operationalized by Crowley (1 9 6 7* 1968) in the picture test- booklets constituted not only a valid framework of dimensions within which the ability of four- to seven-year-old children could be Judged with regard to making distinctions between social acts of intent or accident, but also a basis for not discriminating against the child without verbal facility. 3. Since Piaget-type intentional-accidental stories had been used successfully as a treatment with six-year-old children (Crowley, 1967* 1968), these stories (which were presented in the form of a puppet show) could be useful in implement ing a change in four- to seven-year-old "objec tive" children toward a "subjective" orientation in moral choices. One reason for the apparent validity of this assumption is that since the 7 competing cue (size of damage) has been equal ized in both stories of the intentional-accidental set (Crowley, 1967* 1968), therefore the child is allowed to attend to intention alone. However, once learning has been acquired, the child must then extrapolate to new situations given in the posttest which have the usual Piagetian "complex" combination of size of damage and intention mixed together. 4. More imitation would be expected in kindergarten children than in older ten-year-old subjects (Rosenblith, 1959). 5. Positive vicarious reinforcement dispensed by someone with status to a model, would produce a high incidence of matching behavior (Bandura, 1965bj Bandura, G-rusec, & Menlove, 1 9 6 7* Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1 9 6 3). However, if there was too much difference in status, the observer might feel that the "idiosyncrasy credits," which he did not have, would be used to his disadvantage (Hollander, 1958). 6. If the model adopted a consistent moral orienta tion, this orientation would be likely to be adopted and maintained by the subject (Bandura &'McDonald, 1 9 6 3). 7. Filmed models would be as effective as live models 8 with nursery school children (Bandura, Ross, & ' Ross, 1 9 6 3). 8. Having a model would be more effective in bring ing about a change in behavior than having ad- i | ditional trials (Rosenblith, 1959). | ! 9. Puppets acting out everyday life experiences of | children would intrigue the young child (Wall, l ! White, & Philpott, 1 9 6 5). 10. The young child would identify with the puppet peers as if they were his friends and relatives. This interaction would provide the opportunity to take the perspective of others and thus help i the child give more mature responses than his I present stage would suggest. 11. There would be a high correlation between age ] and ability to make intentional moral judgments (MacRae, 195^; Medennus, 1957; Johnson, 1962aj I Stuart, 1 9 6 7). I Delineation of the Research Problem The research problem was concerned with ascertaining ! the extent to which differences occurred in the acquisition ■of intentionality on the part of two groups of children: I 1. An experimental sample of four- to seven-year-old children who were exposed to a social-learning i ; experience involving the use of film-mediated puppet models and reinforcing experiences by one ! six-year-old peer. I 2. A comparison sample of children of comparable age and background, who were exposed to conventional I | classroom activities and only incidental experi- | ences pertaining to the development of moral j j judgment. i i ’ Research Hypotheses Relative to the research problem the following hy potheses were formulated: 1. In terms of an immediate posttest designed to represent the acquisition of generalizability of i ; intentionality, children in the experimental | group would show an average level of performance j different from that of children in the comparison | group. j | 2. In terms of a delayed posttest designed to repre- j ! sent the acquisition of generalizability of in tentionality, children in the experimental group l i would show an average level of performance differ- ! ent from that of children in the comparison group. i i 3. With respect to the immediate posttest, children ! of six to seven years of age would show a higher | average score than would children of four to five I i ! years of age. 10 4. With respect to the delayed posttest, children of i ' six to seven years of age would show a higher | average score than would children of four to I five years of age. ! j Importance of the Study As a review of the literature in the next chapter i jreveals, there is a paucity of research that has attempted, iby experimental means, to facilitate change in the moral judgment of children. Furthermore, there is little if any |research investigating the educational implications of this Jchange. Piaget (196 5) made no specific application in his book, but in the closing chapter he seems to leave the door iopen for further educational experimentation. As far as the writer has been able to discover, Ipuppets have not previously been used experimentally in I training children to acquire moral judgment. However, pup- 1 jpets have historically been connected with teaching of i 'values and morals. Successful use of puppets would suggest ;a teaching strategy that could be widely used. This study attempted to employ a previously unused ivariable— peer-puppets— in the form of a training film. I The simulated television production provided the treatment i [ . for the experimental group (but could also relate educa tional and socialization objectives to television program ing). As Bandura (1969a) indicated, today's children are 11 replacing parents and other adults with symbolic models. jThe prognosis is that the trend will increase in the future. i jTherefore, innovation along these lines would seem to be j appropriate. i j Definitions of Terms Used i | Imitation. Observational learning is generally labeled "imitation" in experimental psychology and "identification" in the ories of personality. Both concepts, however, encom pass the same behavioral phenomenon, namely, the tend ency for a person to reproduce the actions, attitudes, or emotional responses exhibited by real-life or sym- | bolized models [Bandura & Walters, 1963* p. 8 9]. Intentionality. Stated in simple terms, intention- ality means, "Did the person mean to do what he did?" Piaget used the term intentionality to describe a child's mature moral judgment which develops in normal children at jthe average age of nine years (Piaget, 1 9 6 5). Younger chil- jdren base their judgments about "badness" solely on conse quences, whereas the mature child attends to the motive. Objective-subjective responsibility. These are Piaget's terms used to describe immature, consequential, and accident-oriented moral judgments (objective responsi bility) and mature, intentional, motive-oriented (subjective j jresponsibility) moral judgments. These two terms are, how- lever, somewhat confusing because present usage of objective I !and subjective would be exactly the opposite relative to | |maturity. To keep Piaget's distinction clear, this study 12 prill use the terms accidental-intentional for the immatur- iity-maturity continuum. i j j Puppets. The puppets used in this investigation jwere of the glove-type., hand-manipulated variety. This is !in contrast to the marionette, controlled by strings. ;The nine puppets were approximately one foot tall and made j i jof styrofoam and plaster with cotton and wool clothing. I ; The decision to use puppets was made on the basis of their obvious interest to children from four to seven years of |age. Moreover, their actions and expressions could be standardized and they were maneuverable and efficient when j l needed in the dramatization of a scene. i ; j Symbolic peer. For the purpose of this study, boy land girl child puppets were used as models to act out jPiaget-type accidental-intentional stories. Bandura and IWalters (1 9 6 3) spoke about symbolic models that use oral, : aural, and visual means of communication. Thus it appeared ■ that puppets would qualify in those categories. I Vicarious reinforcement. j Defined as the operation of exposing 0 to the procedure i of presenting a reinforcing stimulus to M (i.e., a pre- ! sumed or confirmed reinforcing stimulus for 0) after j and contingent upon a certain response by M [Flanders, i 1 9 6 8, p. 3 2 0]. In this study a six-year-old female provided rein- 13 jforcement to the puppets depending upon their accidental- intentional responses. j Delimitations of the Study ! The present study was subject to the following de limitations that served to narrow its focus and generaliza- Ibility: i 1. A selected group of pre- and primary, public and ! private schools in the area of the Redlands Uni- | fied School District were chosen on the basis of j parental willingness to cooperate with the require ments of the Investigation. The children that j were allowed to participate were given a pretest j to screen out those who were already capable of j making intentional moral judgments and also those I who were confused by the whole process. The re maining children were "objective" and immature, but were capable of making rational decisions. These children who became the subjects of the study were randomly assigned to the various groups for further study— 20 to each group. 2. Only four- to seven-year-old children were used as subjects. They were limited in the amount of ed ucation to nursery, kindergarten, and first-grade levels. 3. The relative homogeneity of the subjects in terms of being members of the middle class, could be expected to limit the extent to which the results could be generalized. 4. Only nine puppets were used to play the parts of children in 20 different stories (10 accidental and 10 intentional). However, the hair and clothing styles and colors were changed in ran dom order so that there would be optimum identifi- ! cation among the observing children. The names of all characters in the 20 stories were eommon-ly--- used ones with everyone having a different name. j 5. Because of the factor of fatigue in the younger children, a limit of 20 minutes was placed upon- | the treatment (puppet show). Therefore, a total of 20 stories was all that could be handled ex peditiously. 6. The term "symbolic peer" was restricted to the extent that the hoped-for generalization from peers to puppets actually takes place. 7. No provision was made for follow-up study beyond the two-week delayed posttest. 8. The study, which was concerned solely with moral understanding, had no results necessarily perti nent to moral behavior. > ' * * * > 15 Organization of Remainder of the Dissertation | Chapter II presents a review of selected literature i land previous research primarily related to the substantive jand somewhat incidentally to the methodological aspects of jthe investigation. | Chapter III describes the methodology of the study 'including the research design and statistical analysis, the i 'research sample, the instrumentation, the data collection and recording procedures, the methodological assumptions, I and limitations. Chapter IV reveals the findings of the investigation and contains a discussion of the results. Chapter V consists of a summary of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. CHAPTER II j i I SELECTED REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE i i | Jean Piaget, the eminent Swiss genetic epistemolo- :gist, has contributed extensive empirical research related ito cognitive moral development. He reported his research !in his book. The Moral Judgment of the Child (1 9 3 2), which became the source of numerous recent studies which ampli- j I jfied critical parts of Piaget's thought. 1 Piaget's method has been both praised (Pittel & j : | iMendelsohn, 1 9 6 6) and criticized (Bloom, 1959). His clini- j cal interviews were carried out during the latter part of ! | the 1 9 2 0’s and the early 1930's as he observed and talked toi I children in Geneva. Piaget explained his approach by say- ing: ; We tell the children the stories, two at a time. | Before questioning the subject it is best to make him : tell the stories from memory so as to make sure that ; he has understood them and especially that he has grasped the intentions that come into play. This is done by asking the child after each story: "Why did : the boy say that?" [Piaget, 19^5^ p. 1^9J. Intentionality The emphasis of this investigation is centered on 1 ^intention as it relates to moral judgment. Piaget pointed jout that the child does not understand motive or intention i 1 7 [because he views responsibility as purely objective or tied !to the results of an act. Objective responsibility is an [important part of Piaget's theory of moral development as [indicated by his statement: "We can even use this [objec tive responsibility] as a criterion of realism, for such an [ attitude towards responsibility is easier to detect than the [two that precedes it [Piaget, 1965.» p. 111]." Piaget was not the first investigator to write about intention. Johnson (1962b) quoted from the studies 1 :of Barnes and Schallenberger who published their work in i 'I 8 9 4, some forty years before Piaget's research. Schallen berger (1894) pointed out that "young children judge actions! [by their results, older look at the motives that prompt j them [Johnson, 1962b, p. 9 6]." Although these writers i antedated Piaget in the conception of intention, it was [Piaget who made the extrapolations which are the rich jsource of current research in the area. ! Piaget saw the young child of three or four to i seven or eight years of age as under the influence of "moral irealism." In this condition, the child cannot appreciate the difference between objectivity (blame placed because of 1 ;the consequences of an act) or subjectivity (motive for an I [act as the prime factor in placing blame). Furthermore, I [the child is egocentric or unable to take another person's [point of view and sees adults and rules as always right. | I Following this period, the older child leaves the "morality I I . _____________________________________________ ______________ ______________________________ ________________ 18 of constraint/' and enters into the "morality of coopera tion," in which he literally cooperates with his peers in i ‘ learning the lessons of intentionality. Thus he begins to i understand how motives operate and increases his ability for mutual respect. j ! i i Using Piaget’s theoretical formulations concerning j ; i iintentionality, numerous writers have adopted either de scriptive or experimental methods in analyzing the results of their research. By far, the majority of studies have j : i been cross-sectional. Many have used correlational analy- j ses to investigate the extent to which variations in in- j : tentionality correspond with variations in one or more ! ■ i ,other factors. Since there have been a number of excellent i 'recent reviews of the literature concerning intentionality ! (Armsby, 1 9 6 8; Crowley, 1967* 1968; Dworkin, 1 9 6 8; King, 1 9 6 8; Stuart, 1 9 6 5) this part of the review will be limited I to a brief outline, especially as it pertains to some of 'the factors in the descriptive studies. I ;Correlational Studies ‘ Age has consistently had a high relationship with intentionality as older children comprehend the motives |more readily than younger children. Starting with Learner !(1937) and including many others (Boehm, 1962a, 1962b, |1963a, 1 9 6 3 6* Boehm & Nass, 1962; Caruso, 19^3; Cudrin, 1 9 6 5; Durkin, 1959; Johnson, 1 9 6 2; King, 1 9 6 8; Kohlberg, 1964; Lee* 1 9 6 8; McRae, 1954; Medinnus, 1957; Morris, 1958; Stuart, 1967; Whiteman 8c Kozier, 1964) who assert that age !±s an important factor in a child’s development of inten- I itionality. ! Intelligence, though not correlated so highly with i i intentionality as age, has been found to relate to inten sion (Boehm, 1962a, 1962b; Cudrin, 1965; Johnson, 1962a; ^Porteus & Johnson, 1965; Stuart, 1967; Whiteman & Kozier, 1964). Durkin (1959) indicated that the relationship be- | I tween intelligence and intention was not clear. j ; j Social class (Boehm, 1962a; Harrower, 1934), sex j I j (Morris, 1958; Porteus & Johnson, 1 9 6 5) and church school j education (Boehm, 1962b) show that middle-class girls who j attend parochial schools as compared with other girls have ! greater ability to discern intention from accident. How- j lever, other researchers have found that there are no clear- •cut differences on intentionality choices with regard to ^social class (Boehm & Nass, 1 9 6 2), sex (Whiteman & Kozier, 1964), and church attendance alone (Whiteman 8s Kozier, 1964). Stuart (1 9 6 5, 1967) investigated a most important aspect on the intentionality question. He reported a high irelationship between two of Piaget's own tests when he j |stated "that moral judgments as represented by the objective ‘responsibility items are the judgment tasks most closely 1 ’associated with decentration [1 9 6 5* p. 1 5 6]." 20 Some other variables that have shown little or no I irelationship to moral judgments are family size* sociometric jratings, behavior problems as rated by teachers, and member ship in scouting organizations (Armsby, 1 9 6 8). i I l Experimental Studies ; The emphasis of this review of the literature will ibe in the direction of the experimental studies concerned I with intentionality. Although few in number, they have be gun to appear with increasing frequency during the past j ifive years. Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3) appear to be the first j t ! to show that judgments of intention could be experimentally j ; i imanipulated. They were interested in investigating a j "higher order form of modeling" (Bandura, 1969b )j rather jthan mere mimicry. The second goal of the 1963 study "was I to test whether conceptual judgments that are assumed to reflect two successive stages of moral development in Piaget’s theory could be significantly altered by social ^learning variables [Bandura, 1969b, p. 275]." After pretesting a large number of five- to eleven- ! year-old children (78 boys and 87 girls) with Piaget-type : stories, the Ss_ were placed in either objective or subjec tive groups dependent on pretest results. The treatment of iinterest to this investigation involved exposing the Ss_ to j I adult models whose judgments ran counter to the child's 21 pretest orientation. The results indicated that observation ■of adult models who provided reinforcement was significantly {effective in changing the Ss1 minds regarding intentionality {choices. Kohlberg (1 9 6 9) might criticize the results of this istudy by pointing out that learning theory alone, whether {behavioristic or social learning, is not enough to account Ifor the complexity of moral judgment. Whether Kohlberg is correct or Incorrect, is the basis for a current debate (Cowan, Heavenrich, & Nathanson, 1969j Bandura, 1969b). J In an attempt to test Kohlberg' s adaptation of Pia- | get's schema of moral stages, Turiel (1 9 6 6) indicated that { i 1 ; children could be taught by means of role playing situations; {with an adult to comprehend modes of moral thought that were| i one stage above their normal level of cognitive understand ing . The operant level was decided by the results of six istory situations devised by Kohlberg. The treatment in volved role playing of another three Kohlberg stories. The posttest employed all nine stories previously used in the pretest and treatment conditions to assess the influence {of the treatment conditions. | Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3) were criticized by {Turiel for dealing with mere surface responses rather than with valid stages. Turiel quoted Kohlberg (1 9 6 3) to the {effect that Piaget's moral judgment stages were inadequate. I I 22 (Furthermore, he cited Bandura and McDonald for confusing 'the objective-subjective responsibility dimension with the much broader heteronomous-autonomous orientation. Turiel leveled two more criticisms at Bandura and McDonald: (a) the argument that any changes in moral judgment were due to the Ss_ conforming to the answer that they thought the E idesired rather than understanding of the concept of inten sion, and (b) the administration of an immediate posttest ! i rather than a delayed— a circumstance which did not allow enough time to provide evidence of the existence of cogni- j i I tive structure. j In a well-designed study, Crowley (1 9 6 7* 1968) ; j found very significant results from two of his four train- j ing conditions, that of moral stories with labeling desig nated as (M/L) and of moral stories with labeling and dis- Icussion denoted by (M/L + D). Two innovations used by \Crowley and adopted in the present investigation were the use of stick-figure pictures of the Piaget-type stories in the three phases of the experiment and the simplification of the treatment stories in order to make equal the conse quences of each story. The purpose of this study was con- 1cerned with training moral judgment (intention) in pre viously immature (objective) six-year-old children. The :experiment was eminently successful as shown by the fact (that no significance tests were judged to be needed. The I I mean of the M/L group was 11.0 as compared with that of 1.5 r 23 jfor the control group (the standard deviation being 1.5 and ‘2.4, respectively). Posttests were given two weeks after ! treatment. | Crowley (iSSj, 1968) was commended by Adelson (1969): The author's Interpretation Is pleasingly conser- j vatlve: he does not claim that a higher Piagetan stage | ■ Is achieved, but rather that "training was effective because it dealt with a relatively specific response" : [p. 2 2 4]. Because Piaget's stories of intentionality revealed a number of misleading complications, Armsby (1 9 6 8) made a j i reexamination of these stories and revised them. He fur- j i ther increased the answer possibilities to four different ! i levels. Quoted from his summary were the following conclu- j I sions: ; | 1. Children make moral judgments based on intention ality at an earlier age than Piaget and other moral judgment experimenters have postulated. 2. Although there is an age progression in the in ternalization of intentionality (as Piaget postu lated), there is no clear age level at which the morality of constraint ceases to operate and the child moves into the more mature stage of the morality of cooperation based on intentionality judgments. 3. When the distinction between purposive and acci dental behavior is made clear (i.e., using the revised stories), the percentage of Catholic school children who make intentionality judgments is no higher than the percentage of public school children who make intentionality judgments. 4. Young children judge in terms of motives if blame is to be assessed but have difficulty judging in terms of motives when praise is merited [p. 7 0]• 24 | In a study that has a number of points in common [with the present research., Dworkin (1 9 6 8) investigated the .effects of three types of imitation on intentionality ! through using 80 six- to nine-year-old children. Ten 1 jPiaget-type stories were employed in each of the three .phases of the experiment. During treatment, three groups i i j'of experimental children were given the following differen cial forms of training: (a) pure imitation, (b) imitation plus reinforcement (verbal approval), and (c) cognitive .information (evaluative response from the model). The posttest was administered one month after the treatment in order to test for cognitive structure rather than for a j [mere learned response. | I 1 Results of Dworkin’s study yielded some useful con clusions. Cognitive information was significantly more ef fective than were the other two types of imitation, although the two forms of imitation were effective for the younger and cognitively unsophisticated Ss. The point was further made that in order to promote meaningful moral learning .which will last over time, cognitive clues can be communi cated so that the child can comprehend the moral concept of : choice. i ! | In a replication of Bandura and McDonald’s study (1 9 6 3)* Cowan et al. (1 9 6 9) justifiably criticized the ]lack of a delayed posttest in the design of the older study. ! jIn their investigation, Cowan et al. (1 9 6 9) delayed their 25 posttest for two weeks and found that "the modeling effects iwere much more pronounced on subjects conditioned up than on jthose conditioned down [1969* p. 273]." They referred to :the findings of Turiel (1 9 6 6) to make the point that this joutcome might be an indication that Ss_ tend to choose one i j : level above their usual level of moral development. 1 i j Although Cowan et al. (1 9 6 9) found that their ex- j Iperimental results were quite consistent with those of Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3) they denied that these findings had relevance to Piaget’s stage theory. Evidently the problem Involved in this controversy concerns the meaning of the data as pointed out by Hartup and Yonas (l97l)s ! | : Cowan et al. argued that modeling studies provide j i data on limited aspects of moral reasoning, overlook- j ing several dimensions of moral judgment, as well as intention consequences, which would be assessed by j Piaget. Pleas that Piaget's theory of moral develop- I ment has been misunderstood or inappropriately assessed in these studies . . . however strike us as specious ; [p. 374]. Hartup and Yonas defended Bandura's social learning ; approach when they concluded: Modeling is implicated as a process in the develop ment of children's moral thinking even though the ex- i tent to which modeling is involved in the development of moral judgment and the nature of its interaction j with other aspects of the child's cognitive functioning i are less clear. The importance of these interactions i is recognized by many social learning theorists . . . and therefore one wonders about the point of this con- | troversy [1971* p. 374]. 1 Following Crowley's (1 9 6 8) approach and using his j 'test stories, Jensen and Larm (1970) found a very signifi- j i 26 cant difference between experimental and control groups ! after a short training session. They investigated Crowley's jconclusion that reinforcement was more effective than was ! Idiscussion in the training sessions and observed, contrary I jto Crowley's findings, that the group that had received j ^verbal explanations as compared with the one that had been j f exposed to reinforcement arrived at more nearly correct and j i mature choices. This result would seem to be consistent with the work of Dworkin (1 9 6 8), as it relates to giving ;the S_ cognitive information. A useful follow-up study by Glassco, Milgram, and j Youniss (1970) of Crowley's (1 9 6 8) subjects was conducted | 1 1 ;six months after Crowley had concluded his research. Test- ! i ! ling was done in small groups following Crowley's procedure, j |The results gave substantial support for Crowley's training i |program which changed objective children to a subjective ;orientation with impressive significance. Turiel's (1 9 6 6) requirement regarding the need for duration of responses over time would appear to have been fulfilled. Glassco et al. (1970) pointed out that there is a i I small coterie of researchers who are finding that Piagetian i I 'cognitive operations can be modified and that the results ] |of their investigation are quite consistent with them. Imitation ! The process by which a child is transformed into 27 what society calls a "moral adult" is an intriguing one which has not suffered for lack of theories. One of these jhas been the multi-faceted theory of learning which includes Social learning. Of particular concern for this review is the smaller 'area of interest within the large concerns of social learn- I |ing theory— that of imitation. Even more specifically, it !is interested in vicarious reinforcement as it relates to imitation. The number of studies on the subject of imitation has grown considerably over the past ten to fifteen years iand is continuing to burgeon at a rapid pace. A book l(Lindzey & Aronson, 1 9 6 8) and three excellent literature reviews (Flanders, 1968; G-ewirtz & Stingle, 1 9 6 8; Wodtke & Brown, 1 9 6 7) became available within a short time of each jother. The information they contain will not need to be 'repeated in this limited review. One quotation, however, iwill be taken from Flanders (1 9 6 8) as it relates to the :work of Bandura. "The shrewdest theoretical statements labout imitation thus far have come from Bandura and his co workers (Walters& Mischel) [p. 3 2 9]." i According to Bandura and Walters (1 9 6 3)* vicarious |reinforcement is the method of choice when novel responses iare required. The study by Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3) previously referred to gave substantial evidence concerning the strength of vicarious reinforcement compared to that of 28 operant conditioning. A number of recent studies concerned with various aspects of vicarious reinforcement (Bandura, jGrusec & Menlove, 1967; Bandura & Menlove, 1 9 6 8; Fernandez j |& Liebert, 1970; Liebert & Fernandez, 1969* 1970; Phillips, i ;Bentson & Blaney, 1969; Rosekrans, 1967; Thelen & Soltz, j 1 9 6 9) will not receive further consideration, as they do inot relate directly to moral development. ! By far the great majority of studies utilizing im itation have dealt with adult models. This is to be ex pected because adults can represent parents, teachers, and ; other significant persons who play a part in the child's j socialization. Also, research has shown that "adult models have a more powerful influence than peer models [Bandura & Kupers, 1964]." Although peer models place second to adult models, j !it does not mean that peer influence is ineffective. In reviewing Piaget's treatment of children's moral judgments, ; Flavel stated that Piaget sees morality and logic as "fired in the crucible of the spontaneous give and take, the inter play of thought and action, which takes place in peer-peer interaction [Flavell, 1 9 6 3* P* 2 9 6]." It is obvious to any casual observer that there is an increase in all forms of |peer social interaction with increasing chronological age :in the pre- and early-school years. Therefore it is sur prising that there has been such a paucity of research in- i jvolving peers as models. I 29 I { One of the few studies on peer imitation was an in- i Ivestigation by Hicks (1 9 6 5)* who studied the effects of {adult and peer film-mediated aggressive models on imitation j land retention of modeled responses. After viewing either jmale or female adult or peer aggressive models, children : from three to six years of age were tested twice for imita tive behavior. It was found that the peer male model group showed the greatest immediate modeling influence. After ; six months, however, the adult male model group showed the j ; ! ;most matching behavior, although none of the groups per- j formed even close to the amount of imitative behavior that j they had displayed immediately after exposure to the models.! i 1 I Although not concerned with peer imitation, a recent 'investigation by Phillips et al. (1 9 6 9) may be compared with Ithat of Hicks (1 9 6 5). As a result of manipulating the vari- j jables of sex of model and sex of subject, Phillips et al. jfound that the female model showed superior influence. :However, this outcome was true only in the vicarious rein forcement condition. : Although the literature relative to peer imitation is admittedly sparse, nothing has been written, as far as j jthe writer knows, on the subject of peer imitation of moral |judgments. Research in this area, which is long overdue, |was the original emphasis of the present study. However, 'the logistics required to "set the stage" for the produc tion, together with the unreliability of four- to seven- 30 year-old children acting as models, proved to be too inef ficient and cumbersome. A substitute, "symbolic peer," was subsequently chosen in order to standardize the treatment ;and to eliminate extraneous variables as far as possible. i Symbolic models will have an increasingly larger j irole to play as the American culture becomes more dependent ! lupon the mass media (Bandura, 1969a). It may be helpful to jpresent a further explication of how the models are used. Symbolic models may be presented . . . pictorially, or through a combination of verbal and pictorial de- j vices .... Pictorially presented models are provided in films, television, and other audiovisual displays, i often without the accompaniment of any direct instruc tions to the observer. In fact, audiovisual mass media j are, at the present time, extremely influential sources j of social behavior patterns .... Consequently, par- j ents are in danger of becoming relatively less influ- j ential as role models . . . [Bandura & Walters, 1963* P. ^9]. i The basic feature of this above-mentioned method is i jthe use of boy and girl hand-puppets, instead of children, acting as models. Among its advantages is the guarantee ; that there will be no inadvertent smiles, glances, or raised ;eyebrows. Such responses are quite likely to emerge from even a well-trained adult model and could provide uncontrol lable and unmeasurable variables. To the extent that this j ! presumption is sound, the social stimuli the puppet can i joffer could be profitably less complex and variable than a i jcorresponding interaction between the observing child and |a live peer. 31 The only study having any relationship to the pres ent research is one which used an animated talking puppet as i ja model for young children (Baer & Sherman., 1964). In this [experiment social reinforcement was used to strengthen a jset of behaviors directly. Three imitative responses, head inodding, mouthing, and saying nonsense syllable chains, were i [established in children by social reinforcement from the ipuppet. A fourth Imitative response, bar-pressing, which iwas never reinforced, was found to increase in strength ! i jwhen reinforcement followed the other three imitative re- | 'sponses. This increase in imitative bar-pressing was taken | j to indicate that a generalized similarity of responding j between puppet and child could be a reinforcing stimulus j [dimension in the child's behavior. The authors concluded: j Responses of the child which "produce similarity" are ! those responses which have a topography that the child ! can compare to the topography of the model's responses, : e.g., he can see both his response and the model's or j can hear both. Hence, the child will become generally ! "imitative," and, if similarity has great strength as a discriminative and therefore reinforcing stimulus, imitative behavior will be correspondingly more preva lent and apparently autonomous [Baer & Sherman, 1964, P. 47]. The generalization that takes place in the above !study moves along the dimension of similarity between the ! jchild's response and the model's response. This kind of |generalization is expected to function in the present study 'as the experimental children extrapolate intentionality in ja "complex" Piaget-type story (posttest) after having under r 32 gone treatment based on a "simple" Piaget-type story. The following quotation from the Review of Educa tional Research, points up the usefulness of imitation in the educational process and the need for innovative re search. Many teaching practices undoubtedly involve elements of imitative or observational learning. Video-tape recordings, films, slides, audio materials in the language laboratory, the demonstration experiment in the science laboratory, and even the lecture method itself are all predominantly observational or imita tive in nature. This form of instruction is primarily reproductive and may be contrasted with more active, productive forms of instruction which place greater emphasis on student problem solving and self-discovery. In view of the prevalence of imitative learning in the classroom, educational researchers would do well to study the phenomenon systematically. A number of im portant questions come to mind. How effective are teachers as models in modifying the behavior of their students? How effective are classmates as models in modifying the behavior of other students? . . . [Wodtke & Brown, 1967* pp. 529-530]. A Short History of Puppetry Some historians say that the first ancestor of the puppet was made in Egypt. Since the priests wanted to make their people more religious, they built human-sized doll- like figures operated by means of strings. These idols supposedly awed their followers during religious processions by life-like gestures. Others say that puppets were first used in ancient Greece. The Romans appropriated them with other forms of Greek art and made them popular all over Europe. 33 Actually, nobody seems to know just how puppets came into existence; however, puppetry has always had a close i jconnection with religious ceremony. An old fable in India I |stated that puppets are little divine beings sent down to jearth to amuse and educate man. "According to ancient 'mythology, the Adi Nat, or the first puppeteer, was born ! ! 'from the mouth of Brahma, the Creator. That is about as | i I i I !venerable a beginning as is accorded any puppet culture j ' I ! [Baird, 1965* p. 46]." ; i i The glove-puppet, as it is called in the United j J j iStates, came from a long line of European progenitors "known! ;as Punch in England, as G-uignol in Prance, as Casper in j I ■ j !Germany and Austria, as Casparek in Czechoslovakia, and as j i i Petrushka in Russia [Woltmann, 194-0, p. 4-4-7]." "The exis tence of glove puppets in the Middle Ages is confirmed by i I two extremely important miniatures in the well-known four- :teenth-century Romance of Alexander in the Bodleian Library, ! 'Oxford [Speaight, 1970, p. 30]." Of interest to this study is the use of puppets in the old morality plays of the Middle Ages. The morality plays were dramas in verse, which sub stituted personified abstractions of Gluttony, Vanity, Lechery, Perverse Doctrine, Covetousness, and Vice, or I Old Vice, as he came to be called, for the Biblical j characters of the miracle plays. These were fat parts, j and actors, monk and puppet made the most of them. ; Old Vice, in particular, was a comical rogue and sinner, i a roisterer, a quarrelsome braggart, and a coward. In | the end, he was usually carried away by the imps of i Satan, howling as he went. Audiences enjoyed him j hugely, and though later he slipped into Elizabethan 34 drama as a buffoon, his origins had been to teach a moral lesson [Baird, 1965* p. 68]. | Later William Shakespeare pointed out that morals and value judgments can be efficiently communicated by drama jwhen he wrote: I The play's the thing Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king. i CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Organization of the Chapter The main objectives of this chapter were to discuss (a) the research design and statistical analysis; (b) the research sample; (c) the instrumentation; (d) the data col lection procedures and recording; (e) the assumptions of the study, mainly methodological; and (f) the limitations in the methodology. Research Design and Statistical Analysis This investigation involved a pre- and posttest 2 X 2 factorial experimental design (treatment vs. control and four-to-five vs. six-to-seven-year age levels) involving random assignment of 10 subjects to each of four classifi cations for both immediate and delayed posttests (80 sub jects in all). As dependent variables, immediate posttests and delayed posttests were separately analyzed for statis tical significance by two-way analysis of covariance with age and treatment as the main variables and with pretest scores as covariates. Both planned and post hoc comparisons among individual pairs of means were made. The program 35 36 used was the BMDX64— General Linear Hypothesis— prepared by Dixon (1969)* i i I Research Sample | The research sample consisted of children of middle blass socioeconomic status who were enrolled in selected public and private schools (nursery, kindergarten and ele- 1 jnentary— grade one) in the area of the Redlands Unified j School District, Redlands, California, The schools involved were: Loma Linda Academy Elementary School, Mission Ele mentary School, Rainbow Kindergarten, Town and Country Nursery, University Day Nursery, and Victoria Elementary 'School. The results of a survey conducted by the school jdistrict during the 1969-1970 school year relative to racialj : | and ethnic distribution is compared to the racial and ethnic [distribution of this study in Table 1. 1 I Of an initial group of 189 children ranging in age ;from four to seven years old and for whom parental permis sion to participate in the experiment was given, 80 were selected as the sample on the basis of their scores on a <picture~story pretest booklet to be described. According jto the criterion chosen, only those subjects were retained !who earned an objective (immature) score of seventy-five jpercent or above (Crowley, 1967. * 1963). 37 TABLE 1 RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS BY PERCENTAGES FOR (A) REDLANDS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, I969-I97O AND (B) SAMPLE EMPLOYED IN THIS INVESTIGATION, I969-I97O Spanish Surname Other White Negro or Black Oriental Other Total A. Redlands Unified School District, 1969-1970 18.2 78.3 2.6 o.k 0.5 100.0 1 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 I B. Sample used in this investigation, 1969-1970 16.0 79.0 2.5 2.5 100.0 Instrumentation i I The instrument used in this study was an adaptation j : 1 of accidental-intentional moral stories previously employed | 1 iby Piaget (1 9 6 5)^ Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3)* and Crowley (1967j 1968). 1 A pretest booklet was composed of eight sets of ac~ 1 jcidental-intentional "complex" stories (the well-intended story character has larger negative consequences than the ill-intended story character) portrayed by stick-figure drawings (Crowley, 1 9 6 7* 1968). The posttest picture book let, which contained similar subject matter, had 12 differ ent sets of stories. The pretest and posttest questions jare reproduced in Appendix A and Appendix B. i Since the treatment phase of this experiment was Icomposed of a film-mediated puppet performance, it may be jconsidered appropriately within this section on Instrumenta- 38 jtion. It was a 20-minute l6-millimeter color and sound mo- ! 'tion picture portraying hand puppets acting out the charac ters in 10 sets of Piaget-type accidental-intentional "sim plified" stories (Crowley, 1967* 1968) in which both well- iintended and ill-intended story characters receive equal consequences for their acts; therefore, the intention is imore clearly seen by the observer. The stories used in the 1 i 'film are reproduced in Appendix C. A six-year-old peer I ; | (female) provided vicarious reinforcement at the conclusion I of each of the 20 stories. The first two minutes of the j film were used to introduce the six-year-old peer as she j : j visits Disneyland. She is shown meeting some of the cartoon! ; characters (e.g., Captain Hook and The Three Pigs and the .Wolf), and is seen enjoying some of the more popular rides. An additional feature of the treatment was that it was pre sented to the subjects in the experimental group as a color ;T.V. show. Projection was done through a plastic lens 'screen behind a television console. A rough "item analysis" of both the pretest and posttest was made. The 40 six- and seven-year-old experi mental group members provided the low pretest scores (objec tive) and an equal number of high pretest scores (subjec- i jtive) were obtained from the six- and seven-year-old chil- i ;dren who had been eliminated from the study because of their 'ability to discriminate intention. The posttest item analy- j Isis was completed from the results of scores provided by the 39 experimental (high) and control (low) groups of this study. The results of these item analyses are reported in Appendix P- I I Data Collection Procedures and Recording i Pretest i Eight sets of intentional-accidental complex sto- i i iries, using the procedure described by Bandura and McDonald ! (1 9 6 3) and Crowley (1 9 6 7* 1968) were used in small group ! 1 ;test sessions (G-lassco, Milgram, & Youniss, 1970). An ap- j Iproach to individual testing was made., however, with the j assistance of 64 members of the student nursing class of i ; i ;1972 and 25 education students from Loma Linda University, j l ; Test administration was limited to five Ss_ per ses- j sion, attended individually by five students of nursing or I education. The E (the writer) brought five equally aged Ss_ i to the room designated for the testing session by the school authorities (there were no restrictions relative to the use ;of whole classrooms; therefore, Ss_ from different classes iwere taken to the test session according to the randomiza tion procedure). The five university students (henceforth ; referred to as Asst. Es) were already seated in chairs ar- i |ranged in spaced dyads to allow conversation between the I !adult and child without disturbing the other members of the j group. Upon entering the room, the Ss_ were given a "warm" i Iwelcome and invited to sit next to one of the Asst. Es. 4o Introductions (first names only) were made, and Ss_ were I 'asked what their names were (the nursing students did not i jwear uniforms nor did they inform the Ss_ regarding their future profession). The S_s_ were next asked whether they iliked stories and they were told that they would he having ;some stories about some children Just like themselves. The !stick-figure test booklet was then presented to the S_ by jthe Asst. E, and the S_ was told that these were pictures of ; : the stories he was going to hear. He was requested to jwrite his name on the top right hand corner of the booklet '(help was given to the younger Ss_). further instructions ^provided for all Asst. Es are to be found in Appendix E. E began the test session by telling the Ss that they were going to hear some stories, but that they must choose who was naughtier. At this point, E asked the Ss_ whether j !they all understood what it meant to be naughty as well as |requested examples of naughty behavior. ! Testing began with the presentation of two randomly ordered Piaget-type accidental-intentional stories of a set. Time was allowed for the Ss_ to communicate their answers to the Asst. Es (see Appendix E for details). Reference was ;made during the E's story-telling to large identical repro- ! jductions of the stick-figure booklets which each S_ had in j 'his hands. These pictures were matched in color with the Ss booklet and were easily visible to all Ss_ at any given test session. 4l At the conclusion of testing E returned the Ss_ to 'their individual classrooms. At the same time E picked out [the necessary Ss_ for the next test session and accompanied j !them to the test room. I | On the basis of the results of pretesting, 80 Ss_ ivrere selected who gave objective (immature) judgments. The jremaining number of the original 189 children were elimi- inated from the study either because of their inability to comprehend the stories and the problems involved (mostly | four- and five-year-olds) or because of too much knowledge j 'regarding intentionality choices (mostly six- and seven-year ! j ; olds). A child was categorized as objective if he answered ; ; | : seventy-five to one hundred percent of the pretest items j I 1 which emphasized the accidental consequences of an act. j These 80 children who became the Ss_ of this experiment were .randomly divided into eight groups (four experimental and I four control). Two experimental and two control groups i 'were formed for each of two age categories: four to five iyears and six to seven years. Data cited in Table 9 were iobtained for Sjs at each of the four age levels in terms of the frequencies of those who, according to criterion speci- i ified, responded in an objective, subjective, transitional !(neither subjective nor objective) or apparently confused j I manner. Descriptive item analysis information was also I derived and recorded for purposes of subsequent test revi sion. (See Appendix D.) 42 Experimental Treatment The 40 subjects in the four experimental age groups ireceived the following treatment: j 1. Ten children selected at random from the experi- I | mental pool of Ss_ within a given school were ! ! directed by the E from their classrooms to the I j room where they were going to watch a special "color T.V. program." Actually, it was a 16- : millimeter Bell and Howell motion picture pro jector mounted behind a television console j I showing a 20-minute color and sound filmed puppet show on a plastic lens screen (Hicks, 1965). ' The televised form of presentation was utilized primarily because attending responses to televised stimuli are strongly conditioned in children and this procedure would therefore serve to enhance observation which is a necessary condition for the occurrence of imitative learning [Bandura, 1965a, p. 590]. 2. A "game" and "party" atmosphere (Rosenblith, 1959) was fostered by appropriate decorations on the seven foot green cardboard screen which obscured the projector from the Ss. Also in the E1s in troduction, reference was made to the enjoyable time the Ss_ would have watching the "color T.V. show." The five Asst. Es were already in the room and took two Ss, one on either side, to seats in front of the T.V. console. The E ________lowered the lights and started the film.____________ 43 3. The puppets shown on the film were handmade of styrofoam and plaster with acrylic paints form ing facial features. Each puppet wore cotton and wool clothing. Puppets were made hy David Reeves and were operated hy R. Sylwester, a member of the organization "Puppeteers of America." The nine hand puppets were used to play the parts of children in 20 randomly ordered sets of short dramatizations of Piaget-type "simple" accidental-intentional stories. Cloth ing, hair style, and color were different and randomly ordered so that the Ss_ would not get the personalities of the various stories con fused. The program, which lasted 20 minutes, was filmed on sound and color l6-millimeter film by E. Hamilton, Audio-visual Service, Loma Linda University. 4. The introduction of the puppets takes place in the first part of the film depicting a six-year- old girl (Susan Reeves) at Disneyland. She is presented as "the star of Storyland Adventure" in order to give her status (Bandura, 1 9 6 3). The girl is shown on some popular rides as well as in a few filmed sequences with some Disney characters such as the "Three Pigs and the Wolf" and "Captain Hook." Following a boat ride into a cave, the Ss_ are invited to come along and watch for the puppet show. The puppets proceed to act out the stories (See Appendix C.) At the end of each individual story, this same six-year-old comes into the scene with the puppet and either gives sympathy or condemns the puppet, depending upon whether the results have been accidental or intentional. When giving sympathy she says, "[Name], that's all right, you didn't mean to do that." She also holds, or in some manner, touches the puppet thus giving nuturance (Bandura & Houston, 1 9 6 1). However, she shakes her finger at the puppet who has done the wrong thing intentionally, saying, "[Name], you're a naughty boy (girl), you meant to do that I" This procedure was expected to optimize the knowledge of results (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1 9 6 5a). Following the viewing of the film, half of the Ss were returned to their classrooms according to random assignment. Each was admonished to keep the secret about what he saw on the T.V. The five remaining Ss_ were given an immediate posttest using the same procedure as in the pre test phase, but with different stories. 45 Control Treatment The 40 subjects In the four control groups attended {regular classes during the treatment sessions. Following i s the showing of the film to the experimental group and the |administration of the Immediate posttest, five control Ss_ were taken from class and given their "immediate posttest." iThese Ss_ had received no treatment, but testing was done at [that time to keep temporal consistency between groups. i Immediate Posttest Twelve sets of accidental-intentional complex sto ries (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Crowley, 1967* 1968) were used in small group sessions. The method was identical to I that used in the pretest. Only half of the experimental and one-half of the control group Ss, randomly assigned, iwere subjects of this test session. (The other two halves iwere saved for the delayed posttest.) i Delayed Posttest— Two Weeks To test the generalizability of the results of this I experiment, half of the experimental group (the Ss_ who had i : returned to class immediately following the viewing of the Ifilm) and half of the control group (the remaining Ss_ who j Ihad not been given the immediate posttest) were tested with the same 12 sets of accidental-intentional complex stories [used by the Ss_ in the immediate posttest group. The same 46 procedures were used as previously described in the pretest and immediate posttest phases. | Before administration of the tests, samples of the linstruments to be used were submitted for approval to each I 'participating school administration. Written parental per mission was obtained. t | The pretests were administered during the two weeks Iprior to Christmas vacation, 1 9 6 9. Treatment and posttests were given during the month of January 1970. Delayed post- jtests were administered exactly two weeks after the treat ment for all experimental Ss. i 1 Methodological Assumptions j 1 j | Relative to the methodology, the following assump tions were made: | 1. The stick-figure pictures (Crowley, 1967.1 1968), | which adapted Piaget-type stories concerning objectivity (immature choice) and subjectivity i (mature choice), constituted a sufficiently re liable and valid framework of dimensions within ; which the ability of four- to seven-year-old l children could be judged with regard to making I I distinctions between social acts of intent or I 1 | accident. Furthermore, these tests would not 1 discriminate against the child with less verbal ! I facility. Concerning this point, Longsteth sug- 47 gested that "the verbal Index of morality lags be hind the behavioral Index [19 6 8, p. 542]." | 2. The participating Ss_ could interpret the intended i I meaning of the stories and evaluate the term j "naughty., " because they already understood the meaning of the concepts "bad" and "good" (Rhine, | Hill, & Woodruff, 1 9 6 7). j I 3» The eight samples employed were adequate and suf- j ficiently representative of the middle-class cul ture to permit some degree of generalization of intentionality choices-of pre- and early-school children reared in this culture. 4. In the responses to each of the 20 sets of Piaget- type stories, there would not be appreciable in teraction between stories— in other words, a given ! | set of stories would maintain essentially its same i : meaning irrespective of the order or context in 1 ! which stories in the set were presented. 5. Response sets in both the eight pretest and 12 posttest sets of items were not sufficiently / ' great to invalidate the interpretability of the I results. i 1 1 I j Limitations of the Study To the extent that the conceptual assumptions enum- j •rex’ated in Chapter I and the methodological assumptions set 48 forth in this chapter were not met, limitations in the in vestigation were present. A few specific limitations should !be noted as follows: | | 1. No account was taken of possible sex differences j | in the sample of pre- and early-school-age chil dren. | 2. No specific directions were given to the Asst. Es regarding their making any allowance in their per ceived needs of the children who came from differ- I ent ethnic or cultural backgrounds. 3. There was no completely adequate control over the possibility that the children involved in this investigation might not have received some in formation concerning intentionality from par ents, siblings, peers, or the mass medial, sub sequent to the pretest administration. 4. Although all participants were requested not to tell others about the test stories or the "T.V. show," there was the possibility that they might have communicated some information. 5. The pretest was selective in that it chose from the screening session those four- and five-year- old children who were mature enough to comprehend the stories and discriminate between the two choices. Also it kept the six- and seven-year- 49 olds who were Immature. Therefore, the pretest tended to make both age groups homogeneous. Null Hypotheses The four substantive hypotheses In Chapter I were jrecast in appropriate null forms and subjected to statistl leal evaluation. The alpha level was set at .05. | i i CHAPTER IV i I ; ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OP FINDINGS i i I | Analysis of Results | In terms of the questions posed in Chapter I, the | ifollowing results were obtained: i : Age Differences Between Four- | to Five-year-old Children and | Six- to Seven-year-old Children Relative to their Responses to Objective-Subjective Questions Pretest screening results of 189 children are pre sented in Tables 2 and 3 (Table 2: subjects eliminated from I this study, and Table 3: subjects Included in this study— Your experimental and four control groups). ! The means, standard deviations, and adjusted means Ifor each of four experimental and four control groups for I Iboth immediate and delayed posttests are found in Table 4. The results of the analysis of covariance between age and itreatment group are given in Tables 5 and 6. No significant ^differences occurred relative to age of Ss_ in either imme- ! jdiate or delayed posttests. 50 51 TABLE 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SUBJECTS ELIMINATED BECAUSE OF INAPPROPRIATE PRETEST SCORES JUDGED TO BE INDICATIVE OF TOO HIGH A LEVEL OF MATURITY OR OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF TASK Sex Pretest Score (eight items) Age in Years N M F Mean S.D. Four years 19 9 10 .89 1.32 Five years 21 8 13 1.57 2.38 Six years 29 13 16 4.27 2.68 Seven years 4o 16 24 6.42 1 .8 2 52 TABLE 3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RETAINED SUBJECTS JUDGED TO BE IMMATURE AND THUS APPROPRIATE FOR TASK EXPOSURE (N = 80) Immediate Posttest Group Group Male Number Fern. Total Age im Months Mean S.D. Pretest Score (eight items) Mean S.D. 1. Experimental 5 5 10 59.83 6 .7 0 1 .3 0 • 25 2 . Experimental 5 5 10 82.24 7 .8 2 1 .2 0 .24 5 - Control 6 4 10 57-84 8 .2 5 1 .6 0 .16 4 . Control 6 4 10 8 2 .6 9 8 .0 7 1 .0 0 • 25 Delayed Posttest Group (two weeks) Group Male Number Fern. Total Age in Mean Months S.D. Pretest Score (eight items) Mean S.D. 1. Experimental 6 4 10 60.37 7.46 1 .1 0 .23 2 . Experimental 6 4 10 8 1 .0 5 6 .6 0 1.40 .2 1 3 - Control 6 4 10 58.75 6.84 1 .0 0 • 25 4 . Control 4 6 10 8 1 .4o 7.55 1 .1 0 •27 53 TABLE 4 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND ADJUSTED MEANS FOR IMMEDIATE AND TWO-WEEK DELAYED POSTTESTS (N = 80) t — — — — ! Immediate Posttest (twelve items) Group Age N Mean S.D. Adjusted Mean 1 1. Experimental 4-5 10 3 .8 0 2.31 3.78 I 2. Experimental i 6 -7 10 6.20 3.99 6.24 3. Control 4-5 10 2.40 1.85 2.19 ! 4. Control 6-7 10 2.10 2.16 2.27 l Delayed Posttest (twelve items) (two weeks) ! Group Age N Mean S.D. Adjusted Mean 1. Experimental 4-5 10 3.30 2.19 3.33 2. Experimental 6-7 10 5.30 4.60 5.14 3* Control 4-5 10 i . 4 o 1.42 1.49 4. Control 1 6-7 10 2 .6 0 2.05 2 .6 3 54 TABLE 5 | RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR IMMEDIATE POSTTEST Source df MS F Age 1 15.27 1.86 Group (Experimental vs. Control) 1 77.29 9.44** Interaction (Age X Group) 1 13.75 1.68 Covariate 1 8.15 0.99 Error 35 8 .1 8 **p<.01. TABLE 6 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF TWO-WEEK DELAYED COVARIANCE FOR POSTTEST Source df MS F Age 1 21.36 2.55 Group (Experimental vs. Control) 1 46.45 5.56* Interaction (Age X Group) 1 1.13 0.13 Covariate 1 8 .7 0 1.04 Error 35 8.35 *P < . 0 5. 55 Effectiveness of Film-mediated Puppet Performance as Treatment in Producing ‘ Change in Objective Children Toward a Subjective Orientation Tables 5 and 6 present the analysis of covariance results for both immediate and two-week delayed posttests. Significant differences occurred for the treatment groups Ion the immediate posttest as well as the delayed posttest. [The two significance levels were .01 and .05 respectively. ! Tables 7 and 8 give additional information on the results of the experimental treatment. An analysis of co- jvariance gave the significant level of .001 for the data on the immediate posttest that excluded all questionable | jitems. For the delayed posttest, significance was'achieved j ! | iat the .05 level. During the testing procedure, all Asst. j E's wrote down the S1s answers verbatim and also made a [judgment regarding the S1s genuine understanding of the [story requirements of intention or lack of it. All test |items that were in questionable categories were omitted from the statistical analysis. ' Interaction Between Treatment [ Effects and Age Level The results of an analysis of covariance between [age and treatment groups, using pretest scores as covariate [(Tables 5 and 6), indicate that there were no significant interaction effects. 56 TABLE 7 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR IMMEDIATE POSTTEST WITH QUESTIONABLE ITEMS OMITTED Source df MS F Age 1 2 8 .2 8 3.64 Group (Experimental vs. Control) 1 1 0 2 .7 8 13.23*** Interaction (Age X Group) 1 7.93 1 .0 2 Covariate 1 1 .1 2 0.14 Error 35 7.76 ***p <. 0 0 1. TABLE 8 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR TWO-WEEK POSTTEST WITH QUESTIONABLE ITEMS OMITTED DELAYED Source df MS F Age 1 1 8 .6 6 2 .6 1 Group (Experimental vs. Control) 1 35.48 4.97* Interaction (Age X Group) 1 3.70 0.51 Covariate 1 28.95 4.05 Error 35 7.13 *p <.05. 57 Additional Data I For reasons of interpretation of data thus far 'presented in relation to age of Ss, one additional table | [(Table 9) is included which cites frequencies of subjects I !at different age levels who according to previously de- ! iscribed criteria responded in each of four manners desig- i bated as objective, subjective, transitional, or confused. i Discussion of Results Relative to each of the questions posed in the jproblem statement, many of the findings were in need of in- i fterpretation, evaluation, and qualification. Outcomes Pertaining to Age Difference's' As revealed in Table 9, the results of the pretest igiven to 189 children ranging in age from four- to seven- 1 lyears old, indicates that there was a definite increase in |the number of subjective (mature) moral responses as a i function of age and gives indication of a trend toward [stages relating to the ages. i The pretest results of this part of the investiga tion were quite consistent with Piaget's point that age is |an important independent variable in the development of a jchild's moral or cognitive judgments. Cowan et al. (1 9 6 9)* iin defense of Piaget's stage theory, stated: "One of the most cogent arguments against social imitation as the prime r~ - .......- .......... " ■ i 58 TABLE 9 FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS WHO YIELDED DESIGNATED CATEGORIES OF PRETEST RESULTS OF OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES Age Level Categories of Response Four Five Six Seven (N = 189) 1. No. of S jb who gave Subjective responses 0 1 11 30 2. No. of Ss who gave Transitional responses between Objective and Subjective 7 9 15 10 3- No. of Ss who gave Objective responses 20 20 20 20 k. No. of Ss who gave confused responses 12 11 3 0 Totals 39 4i k-9 60 5. No. of answers designated by examiners as being question able according to age group and two classes (a) and (b) (a) Ss eliminated from study 75 57 31 13 (b) Ss used in this study 9 3 10 k Totals 8k 60 kl 17 jvariable in the learning of moral judgments is the fact that 'lower-level judgments predominate at earlier ages [p. 2 6 3]." 1 ! Although in his view of moral developments Piaget ;(1965) linked age and stage in a rather loose way, never- | jtheless he did give age seven as the average for objective j ■responsibility when a child sees an act as bad because of ■the material damage or consequences. The second stage, (subjective responsibility, provides evidence that the child is gaining maturity and ability to judge intentions or mo tives of an act. The average age for the subjective stage iis nine years. Piaget summarized his view by saying: "We | I j ;have therefore two processes partially overlapping, but of ! :which the second gradually succeeds in dominating the first [1 9 6 5* P. 133]." The results of this investigation furnish evidence I from the pretest results which give credence to the relation |between increasing age and ability to discern intention. 'However, the data in Table 9 also suggest that there was a certain amount of homogeneity in the Ss_ who gave objective iresponses. These objective Ss_ attained a pretest score of (either six, seven, or eight objective responses out of a (total possible of eight objective responses. This scoring ; procedure followed Crowley's (1967* 1968) method that al lowed seventy-five to one hundred percent in either an ob jective or subjective direction, to define an objective or subjective S_. 6o Pretest scores for the 80 objective Ss_ who took part in this investigation tended to result in the selection of subjects of a comparable level of moral naivete across ages. No significant differences were found for various age sub groups either on the pretests or posttests. An explanation of these findings could be that the tests matched mature four- and five-year-old with immature six- and seven-year- old children. It would seem reasonable to assume from this selection process that some four-year-old Ss_ were as capable of making intentional choices, after they had been provided with a treatment, as were some seven-year-old Ss. Accord ing to Turiel (1 9 6 6) the child tends to prefer the next highest level of moral judgment available to him. Thus some four- and five-year-old children were evidently on the borderline of maturity preparatory to gaining an understand ing of intentionality. Hence, in view of the selection process a definitive test of Piaget's hypothesis regarding age-specific expecta tions could not be made. It would appear, however, from the data presented in categories 1, 2, 4, and 5(a) (Table 9) that some degree of association was present between chro nological age and development of moral judgment in terms of Increasing sensitivity to intentionality at least as por trayed in the pretest stimuli. 61 Outcomes Pertaining to ( Treatment Variables I I Piaget (1 9 6 5) spoke about the change from moral irealism toward a more mature orientation by including in- jtentionality as a part of the process: i It is cooperation which leads to the primacy of ' intentionality, by forcing the individual to be con- I stantly occupied with the point of view of other peo- j pie so as to compare it with his own. Indeed, one is ! struck to see how unconscious of itself and how little i inclined to introspection is the egocentric thought of very young children [Piaget, 1965* PP. 189-190]. Further, Piaget (1 9 6 5) pointed out that the child ineeds to understand the reasons and the meanings of rules |or as he put it to "grasp the why and the wherefore [1 9 6 5* ;p. 191]." 1 In a thoughtful study relating psychology and phil- iosophy, Granrose (1 9 6 6) indicated that the child needs some !outside help if he is to develop toward a mature moral 'stage: | Parents (or others) must provide some stimulus, 1 help, and guidance in this process, and the means by which this is done is known as "reasoning." It appears, then, that reasoning (whether by parents, by his peers, or by characters on television) will play an essential role in the development of the child's moral judgment. And since making moral judgments is a central feature of the moral life, it may be said in general that rea soning is fundamental to moral development [Granrose, 1 9 6 6, p. 151]. ; The film-mediated treatment of this investigation I (attempted to incorporate intentionality and reason within |the confines of a 20-minute production. It attained a measure of success in that it dealt with children who were in Piaget's "intuitive thought stage" (ages four to seven). {Children of this period of development are noted for their jleaps to cognitive conclusions rather than for reasoning ithrough to an answer. It follows then that children of ithis age would tend to guess at questions requiring them to {analyze and to extrapolate to new situational conditions— a i {source of error variance in measurement— resulting in no i Isignifleant differences relative to final evaluation. This outcome was not the result of this study, which {provided evidence of significant differences on the two i {posttests, hut not on the pretest for the experimental and icontrol groups. Hence the results of the present study ! {could he interpreted as having heen primarily accomplished J ! I {through social-learning methodology; however, it may be j possible to explain some of the results from a cognitive- ! {developmental orientation. i Reconciliation of Cognitive- I development and Social- learning Orientations Piaget (1968) pointed to the child's egocentrism, iduring the "preoperational period," as an overbalance of the iassimilative process. This excess of assimilation needs to {be balanced and brought into equilibrium by the process of < ! accommodation, if the child is to mature in his cognitive operations. i i Based on Piaget's further suggestion (1965) that 63 there is a parallel relationship between cognitive and moral development, would it be reasonable to suggest that |the discrepancy between assimilation and accommodation can ! jbe rectified, in part at least, by providing imitation ex- iperiences for the child, which Piaget (1 9 6 2) says are a i I itype of accommodation? In other words, when the child is lied to question his own thinking by the examples set by 1 imodels, either adults (Bandura & McDonald, 1 9 6 3) or peers I (King, 1 9 6 8), would his schemata be more likely to change ; toward further maturity and the ability to take another ] Iperson’s point of view by allowing an optimal balance i(equilibration) between assimilation and accommodation? j ! Turiel (1 9 6 6) demonstrated that the child In a j I lower stage might tend to choose a solution to a given prob lem at the highest level available to him. This observation. i I Is quite consistent with Smedslund's, "cognitive conflict" ■and Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" theories, in the instance of which the point made by Granrose (1 9 6 6) concern ing stimulating the child to reason would appear to be I valid. Implications for use of puppets. This study has 1 |attempted to show that acceleration of cognitive contact |with the egocentric child can be accomplished by the use of • puppets. Piaget (1 9 6 8) spoke of doll play as being an im portant part of "symbolic play" which is a prominent compo- l l 64 nent of the child's egocentric thought pattern. It is therefore possible that puppets could be used as means of jestablishing communication with the "intuitive" child of |four to seven years of age to encourage equilibration. i | For puppets to be effective, imitation would have to !be involved in some phase of the interaction. However, I Piaget (1 9 6 2) used the term "pseudo-imitation" to describe the use of imitation by young children. On closer inspec- i |tion it will be noted that Piaget's references to pseudo- ! imitation are tied in with his description of the child in ithe "Sensory-Motor Period" when imitation is mimicry and copying. Bandura (1969b) has pointed out that the kind of ! imitation used in his study (Bandura & McDonald, 1 9 6 3) was |a higher cognitive type that allowed the child to general- l 1 iize. j 1 i I Implications for communication between adults and | jchildren. Piaget (1 9 6 5) indicated that the average age for objective responsibility is seven while the average age for ;subjective responsibility is nine. This investigation took |the age range from four to seven and found that a signifi- j jcant number of objective children could be helped to make subjective choices. One additional factor that aided the [results of this study was the use of Crowley's (1 9 6 8) in- [genious pictures replicating Piaget's story plots. They no i |doubt provided an additional means of communication with 65 the egocentric child. Brown (1 9 6 5) says that egocentrism 'has an effect on the child's language by | his inability to explain something clearly to another j person. He does not take proper account of the infor- ( mational requirements of his listener but appears to ! assume that the listener understands in advance every- ! thing that is to be explained [Brown* 1965j p. 220]. I i The problem of communication between adults and (children in the preoperational period* seems to be at least I (partially overcome by the use of pictures representing the ;Piaget-type stories. Thus* the "intuitive" child is al lowed to rely on his perceptual supports in searching for jthe correct answer to the problem presented to him. I A Defense of Moral Judgment 1 as a Cognitive Operation ! Piaget is reported to have said rather facetiously 'that the research he did during the 1920's was done during 1 his "Preoperational period" (Tanner & Inhelder* 1953)* iKohlberg (1 9 6 3) would tend to agree* especially as it re- Hates to some of Piaget's conclusions relating to the de velopment of moral Judgment. Kohlberg is a strong cogni- :tive-developmentalist* as is Piaget* therefore it is not !clear why such writers as Cowan et al. are so adamant in making the claim that the evidence they found (1 9 6 9)— similar to Bandura and McDonald's (1 9 6 3)— did not tend to 'discount Piaget's stage theory of moral development. j j A number of successful attempts have been made to (facilitate change in immature children with regard to their intentionality choices as described in detail in Chapter II. Kohlberg (19&9) explains this trend by indicating that Pia get's approach to the study of moral development was not the same as when he studied intelligence. As has been stated elsewhere in this report, Piaget (1 9 6 5) indicated that the jstudy of moral judgment and cognitive operations ran a parallel course. Even though Piaget's book, The Moral Judgment of the Child, was written in 1932, which was be fore he had worked out the four major stages of intellec tual development, it is relatively easy to see obvious re- 1 I jlationships between the two domains. An interesting study ion this point has been done by Stuart (1 9 6 7)^ in which he i | jcompared the cognitive task of decentration with the moral j ijudgment task of intention. His results are most relevant I in that he has used two of Piaget's variables and compared them providing prime evidence of the considerable relation- j ship that exists between intelligence and moral judgment at a significant age factor for both areas, that of the in- I jtuitive period within the preoperational stage. j CHAPTER V I I | SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS I | A review of the literature revealed that relatively I j llittle experimental research had heen done in the domain of jmoral Judgment, although a large number of studies dealt I ’ with the subject using a descriptive method. The expert- | Imental investigation employed a previously unused independ ent variable, peer puppets, within a social-learning para digm. j Summary I Purposes | The underlying objective of this study was to de- i |termine whether the age-specific expectations of Piaget’s |theory regarding the development of moral Judgment in chil- ,dren from four to seven years of age— a theory which has been challenged by recent research studies (e.g., Bandura & McDonald, 1963)— were modifiable through use of a certain ;adaptation of Bandura and McDonald's imitative learning 'paradigm which had utilized adult models. In this study of I |pro-social learning of pre-school and first-grade children, !an adaptation of the social-learning paradigm involved the |introduction of a 20-minute film (a) using glove-type, hand- 68 manipulated puppets as models to act out Piaget-type sto ries, which provided a natural plot or dramatization, and |(b) affording vicarious reinforcement (Bandura, 1965b) from |a six-year-old peer throughout the treatment. An effort was made to maximize the resultant acquisition of those i moral judgments that involve the distinction between social acts of intentionality or accident. i i Delineation of Problem In terms of both immediate and delayed generaliza- jbility of four- to seven-year-old children's moral judg- j :ments, the objectives of this investigation were clarified I iin terms of the following questions: j 1. Was there an age difference in the objectivity (focusing on immediate consequences of an accident j irrespective of intent of the subject— an immature | reaction) vs. subjectivity (intentionality or a j purposeful act reflecting a mature moral choice) continuum of intentionality choices between chil dren aged four-to-five and six-to-seven years? 2. How effective would the treatment (a color and ' sound 1 6-millimeter film-mediated performance of | a puppet which imitates the actions of the char- 1 | acters in Piaget-type stories of accidental- | intentional themes and subsequently receives i 1 . j vicarious reinforcement from a six-year-old peer) 69 be in producing change from objective to subjective judgments? J 3. Would there be an interaction between treatment ef- ! fects and age level? i Research Hypotheses | Relative to the research problem the following hy- i jpotheses were formulated: \ 1. In terms of an immediate posttest designed to ; represent the acquisition of generalizability of | I j intentionality, children in the experimental group j ; j would show an average level of performance differ- j ent from that of children in the comparison group, j 2. In terms of a delayed posttest designed to repre- j j sent the acquisition of generalizability of in- | tentionality, children in the experimental group i i would show an average level of performance differ- | | ent from that of children in the comparison group. j 3. With respect to the immediate posttest, children of six to seven years of age would show a higher average score than would children of four to five years of age. 4. With respect to the delayed posttest, children of six to seven years of age would show a higher average score than would children of four to five years of age. Methodology Subjects i | The sample used In this study was composed of 80 jchildren enrolled in six public and private schools (nur sery, kindergarten, and grade one classes) located in the i !area of the Redlands Unified School District, Redlands, jCalifornia. The subjects whose ages ranged from four to !seven years came from homes covering all levels of middle- class socioeconomic status. iInstruments I Piaget-type stories, adapted by Crowley (1 9 6 7* 1968 ) j ■into picture-story booklets, were used in the four phases j (pretesting, treatment with a film relating 10 sets of two I jstories reflecting intentional or accidental behavior, im- |mediate posttest, and two-week delayed posttest) of the experiment. The stories, which included some previously !used by Piaget (1 9 6 5) and Bandura and McDonald (1 9 6 3), were rephrased and simplified by Crowley in order to be more intelligible to first-grade children. Experimental Design and jStatistical Analysis A pre- and posttest 2 X 2 factorial experimental design (treatment vs. control and four-to-five vs. six-to- |seven-year age level) involving random assignment of 10 subjects to each of four classifications (4-5 vs. 6-7 age 71 levels and treatment vs. no treatment) for Immediate post test and to each of the same four classifications for the delayed posttest. As dependent variables, immediate post tests and delayed posttests were separately analyzed for statistical significance by two-way analysis of covariance with age and treatment as the main variables, and with pre test scores as covariates. A further analysis, using the same procedure, was conducted on the data after all ques tionable answers, as Judged by the Assistant Experimenters, were eliminated from the group totals. Findings The results may be summarized as follows: 1. Pretest results showed that there were no sig nificant differences between the subjects across all age categories from four to seven years. Therefore all subjects started this experiment on an approximately equal basis. 2. The variable of age, for both the immediate and two-week delayed posttest, yielded no significant differences in average performance. 3. The treatment variable exhibited differences in mean performance of the immediate posttest and the two-week delayed posttest which were signifi cant, respectively, at the .01 and .05 levels. 4. Following elimination of all previously cited questionable responses, the treatment variable showed differences in mean performance of the immediate posttest as significant at the .001 level and the two-week delayed posttest at the .05 level of signifies - 5. There were no signifi- r „iteraction effects associated with treatment ouid age in this ex periment . Conclusions On the basis of the data analysis the following conclusions were drawn: 1. A general age progression from objective respon sibility toward subjective responsibility could be seen between the ages of four to seven years; this progress appeared earlier than indicated by Piaget. 2. Children of four and five years could comprehend the concept of intention when it was presented in a form that allowed them to communicate their thinking. 3. Within the limited context of this investigation involving the distinction between social acts of intentionality or accident, it would appear that the use of the puppet film was a vehicle for pro- ________moting moral development._________________________ 73 4. Results of both Immediate and delayed posttests afforded a basis for questioning the age-specific I expectations of Piaget's theory. j Recommendations In light of the findings and conclusions presented, jthe following recommendations are made: ; 1. The use of peers as models, especially in the area of moral development, needs further experimental amplification. ! 2. Further study into the use of a variety of moral i i conflict situations to promote acceleration of moral education should be encouraged. 3. The use of puppets with a single sex identity should be investigated so that some generaliza- i tions may be made concerning the interactions of i like-sex or opposite-sex models and subjects. 4. The results of this investigation seem to pro- ! ■ vide an obvious extension to educational tele- ] vision. While the simulated television produc- j : tion provided the treatment for the experimental I group, it could also be an example for relating | educational and socialization objectives to | television programing. i ! REFERENCES t 74 REFERENCES Adelson, J. Personality. Annual Review of Psychology, | 1969, 2 0, 217-245. jArmsby, R. E. A re-examination of the moral judgments of ! children. 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APPENDIX A REPRODUCTION OF CROWLEY'S (1 9 6 7) STORIES USED AS A PRETEST 83 PRETEST STORIES (A = Accidental; I = Intentional) 1. I. One day when Henry's mother was out, Henry tried to get some cookies out of the cookie jar. He climbed up on a chair, but the cookie jar was still too high, and he couldn't reach it. But while he was trying to get the cookie jar, he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke. 1. A. John is in his room. John's mother says, "Come down to dinner, John." John goes down and opens the door to the dining room. But behind the door was a tray with 15 cups on it. John didn't know the cups were behind the door. He opens the door, the door hits the tray. Bang go the 15 cups; they all get broken. 2. A. Claudia and her sister are looking at pictures of the family. As Claudia starts to turn the page of the family picture book, her hand bumps into a glass of cherry soda. It spills on the album, and marks up about 20 pictures. 2. I. Norma is looking at the snapshots the family took while on their vacation last summer. As she looks thru the vacation snapshots, she notices that her brother got into most of the pictures; he's in almost all of them. So when she comes to another picture with her brother in it, she gets a crayon and makes a mark on the pictures. 5* A. One day Floyd's father is painting the fence. Floyd asks his father, "Can I help you?" His father says, "Sure." So Floyd gets a brush and starts painting the fence. After he paints for awhile, he steps back to see how it looks. But he forgot that the paint can was behind him, and his foot knocks over the paint can, and the paint spills all over the ground. 3. I. Paul comes out to watch his father paint the picnic table. He asks his father. "Can I help you?" His father says, "Paul, don't bother me now." Paul doesn't like that. So when his father goes to the garage, Paul takes the paint stick and drib bles a little paint on the ground. 4. I. One morning, Alice came in from the yard and found that her mother wasn't home yet. Alice thinks, "i'll get some ice cream before my mother comes home." She gets a little dish from the cupboard. As she is going to the refrigerator, the little dish slips out of her hand and breaks. 4. A. Kathie's mother was late coming home from shopping. Kathie thinks, "I'll help my mother by setting the table for her." As she is carrying the dishes to set the table, two large dishes slip out of her hand, fall and break. 84 85 5. I. Harvey and his class are playing kickball. All of a sudden, the school hell rings. The teacher says, "Recess is over; everybody back to the classroom!" Harvey didn't have a turn yet at kicking the ball, so when the teacher is lining up the children, Harvey kicks the ball to the far comer of the play ground, and someone has to go and get it. 5. A. Two first grade classes are playing a game to see which class can kick the kickball the farthest. Everybody has had a turn except Ross. So far the classes are even, but if Ross can kick the ball real far, his class will win. Ross takes care ful aim, and kicks the ball with all his might. The ball goes sailing across the playground, smashes into a window and breaks it. 6. A. The teacher asks, "Who would like to help clean up the paints?" Judy says, "I will, teacher." Judy wants to help so much that she tries to carry six paint jars to the sink. But they slip out of her hand, and spill all over the floor. 6. I. Ann doesn't care very much for finger painting. When the class was finger painting that afternoon, Ann didn't do much finger painting. She just played with the paint, and a little paint dribbled on her desk. 7. I. One day at school, Sam's friend made fun of him. Later that day, Sam saw his friend coming home from school. Sam hid be hind a fence, and as his friend passed by, Sam squirted him on the leg with a water pistol. 7. A. One afternoon, Jack was watering the lawn for his father. One of his friends was passing by, and started to make fun of Jack. So Jack turned his head to look at his friend. When Jack turned his head, the hose squirted water all over the man next door, who happened to be walking by just then, 3. A. Ed doesn't know the names of the streets very well, and he's not sure where Marlboro Pike is. One day, a man comes up to Ed and asks him, "Where's Marlboro Pike?" So Ed says, "Urn . . . I think it's that way." But it wasn't that way. The man really got lost, and couldn't find the place he was looking for. 3. I. Joe knows the names of the streets very well. One day a man came to Joe and asked him. "Where's Marlboro Pike?" But Joe wanted to play a trick on him, and he said, "it's that way," and he pointed the wrong way. But the man didn't really get lost, because he found his way again. APPENDIX B REPRODUCTION OF CROWLEY’S (1 9 6 7) STORIES USED AS A POSTTEST POSTTEST STORIES (A = Accidental; I = Intentional) 1. I. David came home from school. His mother was out, so David figured this would he a good time to get some ice cream. He opens the refrigerator, and sees that there is a lot of ice cream. So he helps himself to a small dish of ice cream. 1. A. One day Peter's mother made sandwiches for the party that night. Then she went out. Then Peter came home from school for lunch. He looks in the refrigerator and sees the sand wiches. He doesn't know that the sandwiches are for the party; he thinks they're for his lunch. So he ate some. That evening Peter's mother didn't have enough sandwiches for the company. 2. A. Joe and his father go to the shopping center. As they're get ting out of the car, his father says, "Joe, lock the car door." But Joe doesn't hear his father, so he just closes the door without locking it. While they're in the store, a man comes along and takes a camera out of the car. 2. I. Bill is playing baseball with his old baseball bat. Bill's father says, "Bill, come to supper, and bring your baseball bat inside with you." But Bill wants to play with his bat after supper, so he leaves the bat outside on the front lawn. While he's eating supper, a man comes along and takes the bat. 3- I. Doris is all alone at home. She knows that her parents won't be home til suppertime. She wants to see the things in the top of her parents' closet. So she climbs up on a chair. As she's reaching for the things in the closet, her mother's hat box falls down, and the hat gets bent a little bit. 3. A. Jane comes in from playing outside. She feels real tired, so her mother tells her to take a rest. She walks over to the sofa and plops down. Jane doesn't know that her mother left her hat on the sofa. When Jane plops down, she squashes her mother's hat all out of shape. A. One day it starts to rain. Vivian's father says, "Go shut the car windows so the seats won't get wet." Vivian goes out and shuts the windows, except the back one. She doesn't see that the back window is open. She goes back inside, and the rain rains all over the seat covers, through the window she didn't see was open. Her father has to get new seat covers. 87 88 4. I. Andrea goes riding with her father. She wants him to get her some ice cream. But her father says, "Not today. We've got to get home, because it's raining." Andrea feels sad that she can't have any ice cream. So when she gets out of the car, she doesn't close the window. But it stops raining pretty soon, so only a little rain gets on the seat, and it dries up right away. 5. A. Randy went to the school library to get a book for his teacher. When he was coming back, he opened the classroom door. Just then, a girl was passing by with jars of finger paint. Randy didn't know that she was behind the door. He opened the door, the door hit her arm, the jars fell out of her hands, §nd the finger paint spilled all over the floor. I. Clark was tickling the boy in front of him while the teacher wasn't looking. The boy turned around, to see who was tickling him. Clark jerked his hand back so the boy wouldn't see him. When he jerked his hand back, it hit a small jar of water. A little bit of water spilled on the desk. 6. I. Rachel's class is doing spelling. Rachel is tired of spelling. When the class is spelling, she just plays with the pencil sharpener. When she does, a few little scraps fall on the floor. 6. A. Sonia's teacher asks, "Who will help sharpen the pencils?" Sonia says, "I will, teacher." She wants to help so much that she turns the handle too hard. The pencil sharpener falls over, and all the scraps fall on the floor. Teacher has to get a broom and cleans all the scraps up. 7- I. It's wintertime. Gary is throwing snowballs. He sees a car coming by, so he throws a snowball at the car. The snowball hits the windshield. The driver has to stop, get out, and clean the windshield. 7. A. It's wintertime. Roger is in his yard, playing with another boy. He throws a snowball at his friend. But his hand slips. The snowball goes over the fence, and hits a car that's coming down the street, right on the windshield. The driver can't see where he's going, and he runs right into a telephone pole and smashes up the front of the car. 3. A. One day, Linda goes to school. Her mother says, "Bring your raincoat." But Linda is in such a hurry that she forgets to bring her raincoat. That afternoon, it rains very hard when she's coming home. Her dress gets all wet, and she gets a cold, and has to stay out of school three days. 89 8. I. One day, May goes to school. Her mother says, "Bring your raincoat." But May doesn't like to -wear her raincoat, so she leaves it at home. That afternoon, it rains a little -when she’s coming home. Her dress gets a little hit vet. But it stops very quickly, the sun comes out, and her dress dries right away. 9. A. Barbara decides she'll clean her room so that her mother won't have so much work to do. Barbara puts her big doll in the toy box, and then she puts the wooden blocks in too. Barbara didn't think that the blocks would hurt the doll, but when she puts the blocks in the toy box, they fell on the pretty doll and broke it all to pieces. 9. I. Amy wants to watch television, but her mother says, "Turn off the TV, Amy, because I want to talk with my friend here." Amy doesn't like that, because she can't watch her favorite pro gram. So when her mother leaves the room, Amy picks up a doll and drops it on the floor. The doll's finger breaks off. 10. I. Ted is walking through the park, eating a banana. When he finishes, he throws the banana peel behind him, because he figures it's too far to walk over to the trash can. A man comes walking behind Ted, and starts to slip on the banana peel. But he doesn't fall; he gets his balance again and stays standing up. 10. A. Reggie is running through the park to play marbles with his friend. As he's running, a marble falls out of his bag. He doesn't see it because it falls behind him. Along comes a man behind Reggie, and slips on the marble. He falls down, and gets a cut on his head. 11. I. John is at supper. He's eaten all his food except his pota toes. His mother says, "if you don't eat your potatoes, you can't have any dessert. So when his father and mother are busy talking and they're not looking, John pushes his plate, and it knocks over the salt shaker, and a little salt spills. 11. A. Peter and his parents are at supper. His mother needs some sugar, so Peter says, "I'll pass it to you, Mother." As Peter reaches quickly for the sugar bowl, he (sic, his) hand hits the bottle or milk, and the milk spills all over the table. 90 12. I. Kate is getting tired of sitting and waiting while her mother is shopping. So Kate runs up and down the aisles in the grocery store. The clerk tells her, "Slow down! Be more careful!" hut Kate doesn't pay much attention to him. She starts to run again when he isn’t looking. As she turns the comer, her hand hits a box of Kleenex, and it falls to the floor. 12. A. Pam goes grocery shopping with her mother. Her mother says, "Oh, I forgot the ketchup, and it's way at the back of the store!" Pam says, "i'll get it for you, mother." As she's taking the bottle off the shelf, she doesn't lift the bottle high enough, and two bottles of ketchup fall off the shelf and break. The ketchup spills all over the floor. APPENDIX C REPRODUCTION OP STORIES USED IN THE FILM FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL SESSION ADAPTED FROM CROWLEY (1 9 6 7) 91 TREATMENT STORIES (A = Accidental; I = Intentional) 1. A. Sharon is painting a picture. She says, "Oh, I just love to paint. I love to paint the blue sky and the green grass, the yellow road and the white house, the green trees and the yel low sun. Isn't it beautiful? I'm finished." (Sharon steps back to look at her painting and steps on her dogs tail.) "Bow-wow!" barks the dog. Peer - "Sharon, that1s alright, you didn't mean to do that." 1. I. Peggy's dog is sick. It's been whining all day. Peggy says, "Mother, why does Pido have to whine all day?" "He isn't feel ing well Peggy," answered mother. "Well, I'm getting tired of it. . . there! (she steps on the dog's tail). "Bow-wow!" cries the dog. Peer - "Peggy, you're a naughty girl, you meant to do that." 2. I. Ed and his father are cleaning the garage. Father says, "Come on Ed. Get to work. We'll never get this garage cleaned if you just stand there. Ed answers, "O.K. Dad." He starts sweeping until his father goes and then says, "Aw Phooey!" He knocks a can of oil off of the shelf when he hits his broom against the wall. Peer - "Ed, you're a naughty boy, you meant to do that." 2. A. Steve and his father are cleaning the garage. Father says, "Come on Steve. Let's get busy and clean up the garage." Steve answers, "O.K. Dad, I'll clean the floor." As Steve sweeps the floor, his broom hits the wall and knocks down a can of oil from the shelf. Peer - "Steve, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 3» I. Marcia's mother says, "Do you see my sun glasses In there?" Marcia is reading an adventure book. She doesn't look up. "No mother," she says. So her mother has to come in and look. She finds the glasses on the table. Peer - "Marcia, you're a naughty girl, you meant to do that." 3. A. Alice's mother says, "Do you see my sun glasses in there?" Alice gets up and looks around. The glasses are under a news paper, so Alice doesn't see them. "I can't find them," she says. So her mother has to come in and look. She finds the glasses under the newspaper. Peer - "Alice, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 92 93 k. A. David, asks his friend, "Can I help you build that tower?" "Sure, come on and help." As David puts a block on the top of the tower, his hand slips, and one block falls off the tower. Peer - "David, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." k. I. Hugh asks his friend, "Can I help you build that tower?" "No," says his friend, "I want to finish it myself." When his friend turns to pick up a block, Hugh knocks one block off of the tower. Peer - "Hugh, you're a naughty boy, you meant to do that." 5- A. Ken's father says, "it's time for bed now Ken; turn off the T.V. set." Ken turns the knob. As he does, the knob falls off. Peer - "Ken, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 5. I. Frank's father says, "Don't play with the T.V. set." Frank keeps changing stations, spinning the knobs. One of the knobs falls off. Peer - "Frank, you're a naughty boy, you meant to do that." 6. I. Diane's mother says, "Diane, don't play with the eggs on the table. Put them in the refrigerator." Diane answers, "O.K. mother." However, she keeps playing with them and they fall on the floor and break. Peer - "Diane, you're a naughty girl, you meant to do that." 6. A. Jean says, "Here comes mother with the groceries. Let me take the bag of groceries mother." Mother says, "Thank you Jean. There." Jean takes the groceries and the bag slips out of her hands. The eggs in the grocery bag fall out on the floor and break. Peer - "Jean, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 7. A. Bob is getting the newspaper so his father can read it. As he's going up the steps, the newspaper slips out of his hand and falls behind the steps. Nobody can reach it, so his father has no paper to read that evening. Peer - "Bob, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 7. I. Earl hides the newspaper for fun. He puts it behind the steps so nobody can reach it. So his father has no paper to read that evening. Peer - "Earl, you're a naughty boy you meant to do that." 8. A. While Debbie's father was away, Debbie noticed that her father's pen was empty. She thought she'd help by filling the pen so it would be ready when her father needed it. But while she was opening the bottle, the ink spilled and made a little spot on the tablecloth. Peer - "Debbie, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 94 8. I. While Janet's father was away, Janet thought it would be fun to play with her father's pen. First she played with it for awhile, then she made a little spot on the tablecloth. Peer - "Janet, you're a naughty girl, you meant to do that." 9- A. It's Ann's mother's birthday. Ann thinks, "I'll make a sur prise cake. It will be a chocolate cake." While she's making it, her elbow bumps against the flour box, and it falls on the floor and spills. Peer - "Ann, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." 9. I. Mary Jane asks her mother, "Can I bake a cake now?" Her mother says, "No, I'm using the kitchen now." Mary Jane doesn't like that. As she leaves the kitchen, she pushes over the flour box, and it falls on the floor and spills. Peer - "Mary Jane, you're a naughty girl, you meant to do that." 10. I. Bill's sister tells him, "Be quiet. Mother doesn't want us to wake the baby." Bill is tired of his sister telling him what to do all the time. As he goes out, he slams the door. The baby wakes, and starts to cry. Peer - "Bill, you're a naughty boy, you meant to do that." 10. A. Mike's sister tells him, "Be quiet. Mother doesn't want us to wake the baby." Mike says, "O.K., I'll be real quiet. I'll take my toys into the other room." As he picks up his toy box it slips out of his hand and slams onto the floor. The baby wakes, and starts to cry. Peer - "Mike, that's alright, you didn't mean to do that." APPENDIX D ITEM ANALYSES FOR PRETEST AND POSTTEST DATA 95 ITEM ANALYSIS OF PRETEST STORIES Subjective Objective (N = 4o) (N = 40) Number Number Questionable Number Number Answering Answering Items Answering Answering Item Item Item Item Item Subjectively Objectively Subj. Obj. Subjectively Objectively 1. 35 4 1 1 5 34 2 . 4o 0 1 5 34 3. bo 0 4 36 4. 38 2 3 6 31 5. 32 8 1 39 6 . 33 7 2 2 36 7r 37 2 1 1 2 37 8. 38 2 6 9 25 Note.— The children used in this item analysis are six and seven years old. They are the subjective children who were not used in the experi ment proper because of their mature score on the pretest (answered 75 percent or more of the items in a subjective manner). The objective children became half of the Ss_ for the experiment (answered 75 percent or more items in an objective manner). The subjects who had been categorized as either subjective or objective by their pretest score could have made confused verbal re sponses to one or two items out of the eight pretest questions (in view of 75 percent criterion). For example, test items 1 and 7 have one subject for each extreme (subjective and objective) responding in a confused manner which required the examiner to judge the examinees’ answers as inappropriate for either subjective or objective categories. These are the responses that were eliminated in the second analysis of covariance; however, they must be accounted for in order to be consis tent with the N = 40. 96 97 ITEM ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE POSTTEST Experimental Group (N = 20) Questionable Items Control Group (N = 20) Item » I Obj. Subj. Obj. Subj. Obj, 1. 7 13 2 18 2 . 11 9 6 lk 3- 8 10 2 3 2 15 4. 8 12 1 1 18 5- 13 7 1 1 18 6. 6 13 1 1 3 16 7- 8 11 1 3 3 lk 8 . k 15 1 0 20 9- 13 7 2 8 10 10. 10 10 2 18 11. 10 10 2 2 16 12. 6 ik 2 18 Note.— The greater heterogeneity in subjective and objective responses with experimental groups as compared with the control group would not be unanticipated as the treatment could be expected to effect a greater level of maturity for the experimental group as manifested by relating more frequent "subjective" responses. 98 ITEM ANALYSIS OF TWO-WEEK DELAYED POSTTEST Experimental Group Questionable Items Control Group (N = 20) (N = 20) Item Subj. Obj. Subj. Obj. Subj. Obj. 1. 5 ik 1 1 19 2 . 10 10 5 15 3- 9 n 3 17 k. 3 16 1 0 20 5 • 6 13 1 6 Ik 6 . k 16 1 3 16 7- 9 11 1 3 16 8 . 5 15 0 20 9- l l 8 1 1 7 12 10. 5 15 1 l 18 11. 8 11 1 1 k 15 12. 8 12 2 18 Note.— The greater heterogeneity in subjective and objective responses with experimental groups as compared with the control group would not be unanticipated as the treatment could be expected to effect a greater level of maturity for the experimental group as manifested by relating more frequent "subjective" responses. APPENDIX E INSTRUCTIONS TO ASSISTANT EXAMINERS 99 The following instructions were given to all Asst. Es concern ing test administration. 1. Bring two pencils and at least two sheets of notebook paper and a clipboard. You will transcribe a verbatim record of Ss responses. 2. You will be scheduled at one hour intervals— on the hour. Be early for your appointment, but do not enter the test room while testing is progressing. Please wait outside and out of sight until it is your turn. When you meet your S, be friendly, introduce yourself by your first name and ask for his. Help him write his name on the upper right hand corner of the test booklet if help is needed. Carry on a spirited conversation until E is ready to start the testing. 3. Five Ss will be tested at a time. One of you to one S. Plan to keep both of your chairs together and well away from the others (at least six feet)— as long as you can see the charts in front of the room without strain. Of course each child has his own matching picture booklet. k. During the test session, do not give any clues— verbal or non-verbal. If the S asks you the answer, reply, "What do you think it is?" 5- After E has presented the story set (one accidental and one intentional story), ask the S to point to the picture 100 101 he thinks is the answer after E says, "Just point in your book to the boy (girl) who was naughtier. Don't say the name out loud, otherwise someone else will get your secret." 6. Ask S (whisper) to tell you why he chose that picture. Remind him to whisper his answer to you. Write down his explanation. DO WOT CORRECT HIM IW ANY WAY. Be ready to write fast. If S speaks too fast, you may ask him to repeat what he said. Ss usually don't say more than a few sentences for each picture. 7. Ask S to repeat the story he chose. Make a judgment con cerning his accuracy. Was his answer germane? If the S is at a loss for words you may ask him, "Then what hap pened?" But never say, "Are you sure that is the right answer?" 8. Ask S to tell you the story he did not choose. 9. If you are satisfied that S is not guessing, but has understood the main parts of the stories of the set, let S make an "X" mark underneath the picture of his choice. 10. If you finish before the others, you may quietly talk to S, however, do not allow the S to talk loudly. Remind him that he is to talk only to you. For active Ss you may have to make a firm statement as to what you expect them to do, but always try to keep it friendly. 11. 1 2. 13- 102 At the end of the test session,, make sure that the S's name is on the test booklet cover; check each page in order to make sure that no pictures have been omitted; fold your report sheet in half and put inside the test booklet; turn booklet and report sheet in to E. Take leave of S. E will return them to their individual classrooms. Total time involved— approximately forty minutes.

Asset Metadata

Creator Reeves, John Marcus (author)

Core Title The Modification Of Age-Specific Expectations Of Piaget'S Theory Of Development Of Intentionality In Moral Judgments Of Four-Year-Old To Seven-Year-Old Children In Relation To Use Of Puppets In A...

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag education, educational psychology,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Advisor Michael, William B. (committee chair), Cotton, David A. (committee member), Fox, Frank H. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-477596

Unique identifier UC11362210

Identifier 7217502.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-477596 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7217502.pdf

Dmrecord 477596

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Reeves, John Marcus

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA