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The Themes And Technique Of Johnson'S 'Rambler'

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The Themes And Technique Of Johnson'S 'Rambler'

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Content I 71-21,509 WORDEN, Jr., John Louis, 1927- THE THEMES AND TECHNIQUES OF JOHNSON'S RAMBLER. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1971 Language and Literature, general University Microfilms, A X ER O X C om pany, Ann Arbor, M ichigan ©COPYRIGHT BY JOHN LOUIS WORDEN, JR. 1971 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE THEMES AND TECHNIQUES OF JOHNSON'S RAMBLER by John Louis Worden, Jr. A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (English) February 1 9 7 1 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES. CALI FORNIA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ..... JO LOU IS _ WORDEN _ JR . ............... under the direction of /(-is..... Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Gradu ate School, in partial fulfillment of require ments of the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y Dean DISSERTATIO {i ■ (/<' table of contents Page List of Tables ......................................... iii Short Titles ........................................... iv j CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1 II. A SURVEY OF THE RAMBLER’S CHARACTERISTICS ... 29 III. THE ECONOMY OF LIFE .......................... 104 IV. ENLISTING THE READER'S SYMPATHIES ........... 165 V. A RECAPITULATION AND SOME INFERENCES ........ 255 APPENDIX A. INTERRELATED ESSAYS ........................... 264 B. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE TECHNIQUE OF MORE AND LESS ...................... 274 BIBLIOGRAPHY 291 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Classification of the Literary Essays .......... 5^ 2. Primary and Secondary Features ............... 63 3. Allusions ....................................... &5 4. The Conditions on Which the Goods of Life are Granted ................................... 107 Short Titles Letters. Life. Lives. Miscellanies. Works. The Letters of Samuel Johnson With Mrs. Thrale's Genuine Letters to Him. Ed. R. W. Chapman. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1952. Boswell * s Life of Johnson. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill, rev. L. F. Powell. 6 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934-1964 Lives of the English Poets. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill. 3 vols. Oxford:. Oxford University Press, 1905. Johnsonian Miscellanies. Ed. George Birk beck Hill. 2 vols. 1$97; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson. Vols. III-V: The Rambler. Ed. Walter J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. Vols. VII and VIII: Johnson on Shakespeare Ed. Arthur Sherbo, with an introduction by Bertrand H. Bronson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Samuel Johnson's reputation, which the Victorians were certain had been fixed for all time, has been increasing steadily throughout this century. We are learning to respect his literary as well as his political reasoning, to appreciate his poetry and fiction, and even to enjoy his moral essays, long thought unreadable.^ This “Important recent studies include Paul Kent Alkon, Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967); SKeridan Baker, "Rasselas: Psychological Irony and Romance," PQ, 45 (1966), 249-61; Bertrand H. Bronson, "The Double Tradition of Dr. Johnson," ELH, IB (1951), 90-106; James L. Clifford, "A Survey of JoHnsonian Studies, 1BG7-1950" [with a "Postscript, 1965"], in Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Donald J. Greene (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 46-62; A. T. Elder, "Irony and Humour in the Rambler," UTQ, 30 (i960), 57-71; Donald J. Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, I960), and "'Pictures to the Mind': Johnson and Imagery," in Johnson, Boswell and Their Circle. Essays Presented to Lawrence Eitzroy Powell in Honour of His Eighty-Fourth Birthday (Oxfordl Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 137-58; William R. Keast, "Johnson's Criticism of the Metaphysical Poets," ELH, 17 (March, 1950), 59-70, and_"The Theoretical Foundations of Johnson's Criticism," in Critics and Criticism Ancient and Modern, ed. Ronald S. Crane (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 3&9-407; Frederick W. Hilles, "Johnson's Poetic Fire," in From Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Frederick A. Pottle, ed. Frederick W. Hilles and Harold BToom (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 67-77; David Nichol Smith, "Johnson's Poems," in New Light on Dr. Johnson; Essays on the Occasion of his 2 50th BirtKday (New Haven: 1 revival of interest may be attributed partly to the ; profound alteration in the Western world-view stimulated j by this century’s two great wars— by humanity's develop- | ment of unprecedented destructive capacities and by our realization, during the baffling frustrations of the ! peace settlements, that there is an incalculable disparity between conceiving a policy and making it work. Western Promethean man is learning the truth of Johnson's lines, How small of all that human hearts endure, 2 That part which laws or kings can cause or cure. It may be, too, that we have come full circle from the attitude toward the individual which set the psychological i tenor of the nineteenth century: "To move out of the i eighteenth century into the nineteenth," Bertrand Bronson observes, "is an experience like passing from the first book of Gulliver's Travels into the second, where every one is a giant. The Ego becomes the measure of all things."^ That is not our present mood; we have more in common with the skepticism of the early Augustans, with their distrust or pride and enthusiasm, than with the optimistic faith in progress of the Victorians. Yale Univ. Press, 1959), pp* 9-17; C. R. Tracy, "Democritus Arise! A Study of Dr. Johnson's Humor," Yale Review, 39 (1949), 294-310; and Alvin Whitley, "The Comedy of Ras selas," ELH, 23 (1956), 4^-70. ^Oliver Goldsmith, The Travel!er, Or A Prospect of Society, 11. 4^9-30 (contributed by Johnsonj. ^"The Double Tradition of Dr. Johnson," ELH, l£ (1951), 102. However, although we now accept the greatness of Johnson1s biographical and critical work and of The Vanity 1 of Human Wishes and Rasselas, we feel no such assurance respecting his moral essays. Editors all too frequently i manifest an undercurrent of apology in presenting them, j and critics tend to exempt them from the mainstream of ! Johnson's literary output. The problem consists, perhaps, j in the fact that critics have been unable to discover a theoretical basis for appreciating the literary artistry of the periodical essays. Curtis B. Bradford's 1937 Yale j I dissertation, the most thorough previous study of The ! Rambler, admirably presents the historical facts of its publication, estimates the probable sources and subsequent influences, and identifies characteristic syntactical features. But Bradford, apparently deeming it hopeless to attempt a literary appraisal, brushes the issue aside: Johnson cannot be said to rank with the great essayists. He lacks both the sublime egotism of Montaigne and Lamb and the intellectual brilliance of Bacon; he was not blessed with the savior vivre of Addison or the charming naivete of Steele. But a worthy place in the second rank of essayists may be successfully challenged for him. 4 The "second rank of essayists," indeed, and who, pray, may that include? Budgell? Hawkesworth? Arthur Murphy? The statement is preposterous. Johnson's work is still living literature, and that it should be so after two ^"Curtis Baker Bradford, "Samuel Johnson's 'Rambler,'" Diss. Yale University, 1937, p* 140. centuries is prima-facie evidence of its membership in the i j first rank, even though critics cannot fully explain why. That The Rambler forms, in Boswell’s phrase, "a series of grave and moral discourses,"-^ has all too frequently been observed. Yet the modern reader, approaching the work burdened with twentieth-century i portents of biological extinction, scarcely notices such j a passage as this: "The depravity of mankind is so easily J I i discoverable, that nothing but the desert or the cell can j exclude it from notice."^1 Or this: "We are by our occupations, education and habits of life divided almost into different species, which regard one another for the most part with scorn and malignity" (R. 160; V, 88). In our present historical circumstances, such statements simply affirm Johnson’s competence as an unsentimental observer and thereby recommend his commentaries. Skeptical Johnson surely is, but it greatly oversimplifies the character of his work to call him "sombre" or "melancholy" merely because his attitude conflicts with the "brave new world" mood of nineteenth-century expan siveness. Johnson did indeed reject the utopian trend ^Boswell’s Life of Johnson, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, rev. L. F. Powell, I (Oxford: EJxford Univ. Press, 1934)j 202. Hereafter cited as Life. £ Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, ed. Walter J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, V (New Raven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), T50 {RanTbl'er 175)« Hereafter cited as Works. that was gaining momentum in his age, but in doing so he was not other than consistent with the tradition of Christian skepticism that had prevailed from the Middle Ages to the neoclassical rejection of enthusiasm.^ Variously today, as in the ecology movement, we manifest our yearning for the Augustans1 acceptance of human limitation. A more serious obstacle to the proper literary acceptance of Johnson's periodical essays is one that developed from an otherwise fruitful technique of appreciation. That is, critics early in this century began to treat Johnson as if he had been two individuals: Johnson the conversationalist and Johnson the author. The distinction is grounded in a fact concerning Johnson's conversation: Care, however, must be taken to distinguish between Johnson when he 'talked for victory,' and Johnson when he had no desire but to inform and illustrate.— 'One of Johnson's principal talents (says an eminent friend of his) was shewn in maintaining the wrong side of an argument, and in a splendid perversion of the truth.— If you could contrive to have his fair opinion on a subject, and without any bias from personal prejudice, or from a wish to be victorious in argument, it was wisdom^itself, not only convinc ing, but overpowering.'8 ^James L. Clifford points this out in Greene, Samuel Johnson, p. 53- d Life, IV, 111; other contemporary observers made the same point: see, for example, Sir John Hawkins, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed. Bertram H. Davis (¥ew York: The Macmillan Ho., 1^61), p. 110. Distinguishing "Johnson the author" from the personality j i featured in Boswell's Life gave the critics of the present j century a rationale for disregarding nineteenth century dogma and for re-examining The Vanity of Human Wishes, Rasselas, and The Lives of the Poets. However, since the periodical essays, especially The Rambler, have always ; i been associated with Johnson's conversational character, j the "double tradition" logic resulted in their exclusion. Few scholars today, of course, employ such reasoning.! The extraordinary complexity of Johnson's mind and character has received general recognition; and yet, like a low-grade infection, attitudes engendered by the notion of Johnson's dichotomous personality linger on, apparently too trivial to warrant formal critical attack yet insidiously sapping his reputation. Just two years ago, Geoffrey Bullough, writing in the journal of England's Johnson Society, characterized The Rambler in this manner: The basic religious and moral themes were not very varied. Johnson's constitutional melancholy, aggravated by ill-health, and his religious insistence on man's fallen nature and need of Divine Grace, made him reflect often on the Vanity of Human Wishes and apply the Juvenalian theme of the great poem he had recently published, to many different aspects of life. Related to this theme was the dominance of the passions in all their manifold symptoms and effects, including the delusions arising from self-love, the "diseases of the imagination" "to which (Mrs. Thrale said) he had given particular attention" in himself.9 9"Johnson the Essayist," The New Rambler, V, series C (June, 1963), 13. 71 i That such a one-sided statement could still be published : by such a journal should be evidence enough that the old stereotyped notions concerning Johnson have not yet been eradicated. i A second great impediment to critical appreciation ! The Rambler arises from the legend of Johnson the no-nonsense realist, the literal-minded logician of whom i F. R. Leavis writes that Johnson cannot understand that works of art ! enact their moral valuations. It is not enough that Shakespeare, on the evidence of his works, ’thinks’ (and feels), morally; for Johnson a moral judgment that isn’t stated isn't there. Further, he demands that the whole play shall be conceived and composed as statement. The dramatist must start with a conscious and abstractly formulated moral and proceed to manipulate his puppets so as to demonstrate and enforce it.10 Such a mind affords the literary scholar nothing to grasp with the tools of his discipline, nothing to criticize, in short. Once having identified The Rambler's method as 11 one of "stepwise, logical progression," as Jean Hagstrum : does, there is no more to say concerning its literary nature: Virtually everything that Samuel Johnson said about the mind indicates firm adherence to the principle that most human knowledge arises from "Johnson and Augustanism," in The Common Pursuit (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962T, pp. 110-11. Jean H. Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism (Chicago: Univ. ot Chicago !Press, 195^)> p. 124. the closest possible contact with objective, inescapable, coercive experience. His realism may seem naive, his reliance upon experience unsophisticated, to an age that is becoming increasingly aware that rational and imaginative hypothesis is present in all perception and has an important directive function to perform even in scientific research. But the fact that Johnson had learned well the lessons of Locke gave firmness and sanity to his determinations. One feels that Johnson's feet are always firmly planted on the ground. But this is not a commentary on literature, for literature, properly speaking, whether of the neoclassical period or any other, is valued for its power of suggestion, not of statement. Absalom and Achitophel, The Dunciad, The Rape of the Lock, Gulliver's Travels— each exemplifies neoclassical perspicacious statement, yet each acquires its literary value by making implicit satiric commentary on subjects scarcely mentioned directly at all. And it is because The Rambler is presumed to lack techniques of indirect appeal that the bulk of it has been excluded categorically from critical examination. Thus, the danger of the biographical fallacy, insofar as The Rambler is concerned, consists not so much in confusing the man with the writer as in assuming that the two are distinct and irreconcilable. Such a rigid dichotomy between Johnson "the man" (stereotyped as dictatorial and utterly intolerant of opposition) and Johnson "the writer" (a tactful artist, capable of i p Hagstrum, p. 19. 9 ! i moderating his tone) paralyzes effective criticism. For j j so long as that notion persists, critics will believe it necessary to watch diligently for intrusions of the ! "man"; yet, being aware that no writer excludes himself absolutely from his work, they can never be sure that ! i they have determined the probable influence of "mere i personality." And so they tend to neglect Johnson's | achievement in literature— and in The Rambler. | The fact is that even as a conversationalist Johnson was much more than just a kicker of stones and wielder of rhetorical pistol-butts. Evidence has always been available, for anyone who cared to notice it, that counteracts the portrait of Johnson as a dialectical bully. People generally sought his company to enjoy his personality and not merely to see him "toss and gore" the unlucky. That he was occasionally remarkable for violence of temper may be granted: but let us ascertain the degree, and not let it be supposed that he was in a perpetual rage, and never without a club in his hand, to knock down every one who approached him. On the contrary, the truth is, that by much the greatest part of his time he was civil, obliging, nay, polite in the true sense of the word; so much so, that many gentlemen, who were long acquainted with him, never received, or even heard a strong expression from him.13 "No man loved laughing better," writes Mrs. Thrale, "and 13Life, III, 61. 10! his vein of humour was rich, and apparently inexhaust- He used to say [she writes], 'that the size of a man's understanding might always be justly measured by his mirth;' and his own was never contemptible. He would laugh at a stroke of j genuine humour, or sudden sally of odd absurdity, as heartily and freely as I ever yet saw any man; ' and though the jest was often such as few felt besides himself, yet his laugh was irresistible. . . .15 ! 1 Fanny Burney recorded a similar impression: "Dr. Johnson j has more fun, and comical humour, and love of nonsense ■ " 1 & about him than almost anybody I ever saw." Boswell praises Johnson's "superlative power of wit," and recounts hearing David Garrick say that "'Rabelais and all other wits are nothing compared with him. You may be diverted by them; but Johnson gives you a forcible hug, and shakes laughter out of you, whether you will or no.Sir John Hawkins presents like testimony drawn from his experience with Johnson in the tavern milieu: Let it not, however, be imagined, that the members of this our club met together, with the ■^Hesther Lynch Piozzi, Anecdotes of the Late Samuel T „ „ — - • - *--- ------ George Birkbeck Hill (.1897; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966), I, 269. and Le ible. ,,14 kx>n ea. Lionaon. i'/«o 1, in Johnsonian Miscellanies, ed Piozzi, 344-45* 'Piozzi, 287, n. 3 (Hill's note. Quoting: the Diary 17Life, II, 231. 11 temper of gladiators, or that there was wanting among us a disposition to yield to each other in all diversities of opinion; and indeed, disputation was not, as in many associations of this kind, the purpose of our meeting. . . . On the contrary, it may be said, that with our gravest discourses was intermingled Mirth, that after no repenting draws, Milton. for not only in Johnsonfs melancholy there were lucid intervals, but he was a great contributor to the mirth of conversation, by the many witty sayings he uttered, and the many excellent stories which his memory had treasured up, and he would on occasion relate; so that those are greatly mistaken who infer, either from the general tendency of his writings, or that appear ance of hebetude which marked his countenance when living, and is discernible in the pictures and prints of him, that he could only reason and discuss, dictate, and control.18 "With these powers of instructing and delighting those with whom he conversed," Hawkins observes, "it is no wonder that the acquaintance of Johnson was sought by 19 many. . . ." But Johnson's attractiveness as a personality did not arise solely from his occasional sallies of humor. His opinions, like his behavior, were not at all those of the monolithic "Defender of the Faith" so dear to the purveyors of legend. He was continually surprising his contemporary audiences by taking unorthodox positions respecting social and political issues. To be sure, he "^Hawkins, pp. 110-11. ^Hawkins, p. 166. consistently avoided the stance of an atheist or an anarchist, but on the majority of issues Johnson charac teristically argued along the line that seemed most likely to advance the immediate social gathering's empirical exploration of the subject. He appeared to have a pleasure in contradiction [writes Boswell], especially when any opinion whatever was delivered with an air of confidencej so that there was hardly any topick, if not one of the great truths of Religion and Morality, that he might not have been incited to argue, either for or against it.20 Because of this Socratic quality, Johnson's immediate friends found their thoughts stimulated rather than subdued by his personality. Some of Johnson's listeners apparently heard more than others did. Boswell, we now realize, delighted particularly in the competitive aspect of Johnson's conversation and emphasised it somewhat unduly in his portrayal (though in strict fairness to Boswell, it should 20 Life, III, 24. See, for example, Boswell's account of Johnson defending the Inquisition before his fellow- passengers in a stagecoach: Life, I, 465* The most extensive and most illuminating analysis of Johnson's intellectual independence, and his concurrent desire to promote that quality in others, is provided by Donald J. Greene's The Politics of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, I96OJ. Greene demonstrates, by an empirical examination of Johnson's writings, the utter falsity of the "hidebound Tory" stereotype. The fact is that Johnson was democratic in the highest sense, and a great part of his journalistic work was devoted to educating the British electorate in their privileges and responsibilities. He was a natural rebel, who, had he lived during the twentieth century, would very likely have gravitated toward the left rather than the right in his politics and social thinking. be noted that assertive speech lends itself readily to recording, the more so when transcription must occur several hours after the event). Other reporters, however, hint at subtle undercurrents in Johnson's conversation. "It is much to be wish'd," writes Frances Reynolds, "in justice to Dr. Johnson's character, that the many jocular and ironical speeches which have been recorded of him had been mark'd as such, for the information of those who were 21 unacquainted with him." Similarly, Mrs. Thrale observes that "It was not very easy however for people not quite intimate with Dr. Johnson, to get exactly his opinion of a writer's merit, as he would now and then divert himself by confounding those who thought themselves obliged to say 22 to-morrow what he had said yesterday. . . One contemporary quotes Johnson as saying that "I look upon myself to be a man very much misunderstood. I am not an uncandid, nor am I a severe man. I sometimes say more than I mean, in jest; and people are apt to believe me serious: however, I am more candid than I was when I was younger."^3 And Hannah More reports, apparently, just such an incident in this anecdote: He reproved me with pretended sharpness for reading 'Les Pensees de Pascal' . . . alleging O I Frances Reynolds, "Recollections of Dr. Johnson by Miss Reynolds," in Miscellanies, II, 271* 22Piozzi, 185. 2^Life, IV, 239; Powell attributes the statement to William Bowles: Life, IV, 235> n. i+. 14”! that as a good Protestant, I ought to abstain i from books written by Catholics. I was begin- J ning to stand upon my defence, when he took me j with both hands, and with a tear running down ! his cheeks, ’Child,' said he, with the most ! affecting earnestness, 'I am heartily glad that you read pious books, by whomsoever they may be written.'24 That such irony, a kind of deadpan playfulness, commonly | i infused Johnson's conversation suggests that the intrusion i of his personality into his art should not be entirely j dreaded; furthermore, consideration of this biographical ! fact suggests that his literary expression was not so ■ uniformly denotative as critics have assumed. Before presenting evidence of Johnson’s indirect literary appeal, I should like to establish a reasonable ' degree of probability that he possessed both the inclina tion and the ability to attempt it. Certainly he had available to him a rich tradition from which to learn techniques of presenting arguments in an oblique manner. The literary temper of the age was one in which virtually every writer longed to distinguish himself as a satirist, and it was a period of profound classical influence; Johnson was thus conforming closely to current literary preoccupations in London and The Vanity of Human Wishes, 25 both being formal satires based on classical models. ^"Anecdotes by Hannah More," in Miscellanies, II, 194. 25 See, for example, Mary Claire Randolph, "The Structural Design of the Formal Verse Satire," PQ, 21 (1942), 363-34. Classical authors supplied both form and theory to j i the writers of Augustan England, for Greek and Roman j writers practised the ironical modes of satire and allegory: with superb facility and, furthermore, wrote about them j with subtle analytical perception. Although the eighteenth century developed a "new rhetoric" of its own, j emphasizing pragmatic appeals to the audience's sympathetic; faculties, the rationale of the trend was derived from the textbooks of Aristotle, Quintilian, Cicero, and Longinus. In substance, the eighteenth century rhetorical rebellion amounted to a rejection of the modern interpreters of the classics, and the rebellion took the direction not of abandoning theory altogether but of going back to the ancient texts that had derived precepts directly from 27 practice. 26 See, for example, The Institutio Qratoria of Quintilian, trans. H. E. Butler (.London: William Heine- mann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1920), III, 375- 4-41 (Bk. IX, ii). 27 See, for example, these studies: Vincent M. Bevilacqua, "Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 32 (March, 1965), 1-12; Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Introduction," George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric ([1776] London: William Tegg & Co'., 1850; facsimile rpt., Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1963), pp* ix-xxix; Douglas Ehninger, "Dominant Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750-lSOO," Southern Speech Journal, 1& (1952), 3-12; Lillian Feder^ "John Dryden's Use of Classical Rhetoric," PMLA, 69 (1954)» 125B-78; Edward Niles Hooker, "The Discussion of Taste from 1750 to 1770, and the New Trends in Literary Criticism," PMLA, 49 (1934), 577-92; Wilbur Samuel Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 319-33; and Johnson's classical knowledge was, of course, extensive; he was recognized in his time, indeed, as one ! 23 of the foremost Latin scholars in England. And Johnson's acquaintance with the classics included the rhetorical writers: when he terminated his undergraduate career j at Oxford he left in the care of Gilbert Repington a box ; 29 i of books containing volumes of Quintilian and Longinus, ' ! and Quintilian's Institutes was in Johnson's library at 30 his deatir (both Quintilian and Longinus are quoted in ; The Rambler).^ Johnson recommended Quintilian and Vossiusi Douglas McDermott, "George Campbell and the Classical Tradition," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (1963), 403-09. Hugh Blair, perhaps the most influential of the new rhetoricians, wrote that "It is to the original ancient writers that we must chiefly have recourse; and it is a reproach to any one, whose profession calls him to speak in public, to be unacquainted with them." Blair specifi cally recommended Aristotle, Cicero, and, above all, Quintilian. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1753; rpt. Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1965), II, 243. See also Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments . . . ([1759] London: Henry G. feohn7 X553; rpt. Hew York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1966); and [Henry Home, Lord Karnes] Elements of Criticism, 3 vols. (1762; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1967). 2 3 Adam Smith, a fair judge, believed that "Johnson knew more books than any man alive." Life, I, 71. ^Aleyn Lyell Reade, Johnsonian Gleanings, V (1925; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1965), 214 and 215. 30 Sale Catalogue of Dr. Johnson's Library with An Essay by A. Edward Newton ‘ (‘ New Iork: Edmond Byrne HacKett, The Brick’ Ttow Bookshop, Tnc., n.d. [1925]), p. 6. ■^Quintilian is quoted in Rambler 55; IV, 99, and Longinus in Rambler 137; IV, 364. to students of rhetoric in his 174$ preface to Robert Dodsley's Preceptor3^ (Vossius being a seventeenth-century Dutch scholar who produced a rhetoric following Quintil ian) , and early in his career he projected an English translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.33 That Johnson read and absorbed classical rhetorics is further suggested by the number of his statements that parallel the precepts of the ancient writers. For example, upon Boswell's asking him how the Rambler papers might be improved, Johnson at once replied that "there are three ways of making them better;— putting out,— adding,— or Q I correcting." Quintilian gives similar advice concerning artistic structure: "The method of its achievement lies 3 3 in addition, subtraction, and alteration of words." ^ "Preface," The Preceptor [174$]? Samuel Johnson1s Prefaces and Dedications, ed. Allen T. Hazen (.Mew Raven: Yale Univ. Press, 1937)* pp. 171-$9* Hereafter cited as Hazen. 3 3 Life, IV, 3$1, n. 1. Alexander Chalmers recog nized Johnson's attention to rhetoric: see his "Biograph ical Preface" to the edition of The Rambler in his British Essayists (London: C. and J. Rivington, et al.. 1S23), XVT7 xxix and ff. Percy Houston comments on Johnson's familiarity with Quintilian in Doctor Johnson: A Study in Eighteenth Century Humanism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Dniv. Press, 1923), pp” 51-52. And Wilbur E. Moore, in his "Samuel Johnson on Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 30 (1944)» 165-6S, argues that Johnson followed Aristotle, not Plato, and that he thought it necessary to treat truth rhetorically if it was to win general acceptance. 3ZfLife, IV, 309. 35Quintilian, III, 591 (Bk. IX, iv, 147). 15 Johnson's argument that the "low terms" knife and blanket detract from the tone of Macbeth may have been influ enced by Longinus's criticism of Herodotus: The description of the storm in Herodotus is magnificent in conception, but includes expressions which are below the dignity of the subject. "The sea seethed" is one instance: the cacophony does much to dissipate the sublime effect. "The wind slacked" is another example. . . . "Slack" is an undignified, colloquial word. . . .37 Quintilian's comments on the development of language always represent an empirical view. For example, he writes that analogy was not sent down from heaven at the creation of mankind to frame the rules of language, but was discovered after they began to speak and to note the terminations of words used in speech. It is therefore based not on reason but on example, nor is it a law of language, but rather a practice which is observed, being in fact the offspring of usage. 38 Johnson may have had this passage in mind when he wrote in The Plan of an English Dictionary: To our language may be, with great justness, applied the observation of Quintilian, that speech was not formed by an analogy sent from heaven. It did not descend to us in a state of uniformity and perfection, but was produced by necessity, and enlarged by accident, and is, therefore, composed of dissimilar parts, thrown together ^ Rambler 165; V, 127-25. ■^'Longinus,' On Sublimity, trans. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) > p* 49 (Ch. xliii, 1). ■^Quintilian, I, 119 (Bk. I, vi, 16). 19 | by negligence, by affectation, by learning or by ignorance.39 j It is not, however, my present concern to determine the extent to which particular authors influenced Johnson but only to establish the point that Johnson was familiar j with classical rhetoric and that he therefore had neces- ! ] sarily encountered extensive analytical consideration of the techniques whereby language can produce psycho- ! i logical responses in an audience. Modern scholars have J I been particularly interested in Johnson's pervasive concern with the psychological foundations of human behavior but have too frequently accepted the assumption that his preoccupation reflects the allegedly "precarious balance" of his own state of mind and feeling.^ But such writers either ignore, or insufficiently consider, the fact that Johnson's age itself was one of intense psychological speculation; he was by no means unique in The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. (Oxford: Talboys and Wheeler; London: W. Pickering, 1&25), V, 11. The arbitrariness of linguistic meaning had been examined at length by Locke in Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ^See W. B. C. Watkins, Perilous Balance: The Tragic Genius of Swift, Johnson, and £>terne (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939)* p- $9: "It was the turbulence and power of his [Johnson's] imagination which put him so much on guard against it." See also Hagstrum, p. 152: "Emotions of sublimity frequently agitated the breast of Samuel Johnson, but madness and melancholy were too high a price to pay for their indul gence." Mrs. Thrale, of course, dwells much on this aspect of Johnson's character. 20 his interest. Modern empirical study of psychology was less than a century old, and virtually every writer of the time was attracted to the challenging new theme of making men aware of their subjective processes.^" Johnson himself refers to the contemporary trend in his Preface to Shakespeare: Speculation had not yet attempted [in Shakes peare's time] to analyse the mind, to trace the passions to their sources, to unfold the seminal principles of vice and virtue, or sound the depths of the heart for the motives of action. All those enquiries, which from that time that human nature became the fashionable study, have been made sometimes with nice discernment, but often with idle subtilty, were yet unattempted.42 It was, indeed, more or less as an accidental consequence of eighteenth-century psychological investiga tions that interest was renewed in the writings of classical rhetoricians. These ancient treatises, although dealing with the specific subject of rhetoric, amount virtually to textbooks of applied psychology Surprisingly, however, they were little read until the ^ Lancelot Law Whyte provides a useful survey of 18th century psychology in The Unconscious Before Freud (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 196^71 Ch. V. ^ Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, VII (New Uaven’ : Yale TTniv. Press, 1768) , 88. Hereafter cited as Works. ^See The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (New Yorkl Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), Bk. II, 1-17. eighteenth century; teachers, critics, and authors had been content to know them at second-hand through the interpretations of modern writers. Thus one of the most important consequences of neoclassical rhetorical empir icism was the rediscovery of the classical psychologists. The preface that Johnson contributed in 174& to Robert Dodsley's The Preceptor represents his most comprehensive expression of thoughts concerning teaching and persuading. Here, Johnson consistently advances the classical principle that each audience must be approached empirically if communication is to take place.^ He does not advocate merely catering to audience inclination rather, he assumes that the mind, though not furnished initially with particular knowledge, nevertheless possesses definite general modes of operation and that writers should discover and appeal to those natural processes of thought and responses. He observes, for example, that the restlessness characteristic of students minds, the chief cause of inattention, arises from undisciplined curiosity. The teacher therefore deals best with this problem, not by eliminating irrelevant sources of stimulation and thereby making the classroom duller than ever, but by learning to direct the irrepres sible vitality of the mind into profitable channels: ^Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. I, 5i see also Horace, Ars Poetica, generally. ; 22 ! That therefore this roving Curiosity [of j students] may not be unsatisfied, it seems neces- 1 sary to scatter in its Way such Allurements as j may withhold it from an useless and unbounded j Dissipation; such as may regulate it without j Violence, and direct it without Restraint; such as i may suit every Inclination, and fit every Capacity; ! may employ the stronger Genius, by Operations of Reason, and engage the less active or forcible I Mind, by supplying it with easy Knowledge, and obviating that Despondence, which quickly prevails, when nothing appears but a Succession of Difficulties, and one Labour only ceases that another may be imposed.^5 Teachers and authors should work with, rather than against, ! j the intellectual, emotional, and imaginative "grain" of j the human mind. The relationship of teacher and student or of writer I and reader is not, as Johnson presents it in his preface to The Preceptor, a static arrangement of transmitter and receiver but an active, collaborative relationship requiring that both parties reciprocally exercise inter pretive skill. "Judgment, like other faculties, is improved by practice," he writes in the Preface to Shakespeare, "and its advancement is hindered by submis sion to dictatorial decisions, as the memory grows torpid by the use of a table book."^ The same assumption is implicit in the passage of The Preceptor wherein Johnson remarks that, in teaching mathematics and science, ^5Hazen, p. 177. ^Works, VII, 10L. 23 it is not sufficient, that when a Question is asked in the Words of the Book, the Scholar likewise can in the Words of the Book return the proper Answer; for this may be only an Act of Memory, not of Understanding; it is always proper to vary the Words of the Question, to place the Proposition in different Points of View, and to require of the Learner an Explanation in his own Terms. . . . It is always of Use to decorate the Nakedness of Science, by interspersing such Observations and Narratives, as may amuse the Mind and excite Curiosity. Thus, in explaining the State of the Polar Regions, it might be fit to read the Narrative of the Englishmen that wintered in Greenland, which wilTmake^young Minds suffi- ciently curious after the Cause of such a Length of Night, and Intenseness of Cold; and many Stratagems of the same Kind might be practised to interest them in all parts of their Studies, and call in their Passions to animate their Enquiries. 47 Such passages illustrate the pragmatic emphasis of Johnson's advice that occasionally troubles commentators who regard the adapting of means to ends incompatible with sincere morality. But in these quotations, and in others of a similar nature, Johnson is not wandering away from a priori moral foundations; he is pragmatic only concerning their communication. It is not only when he is writing for the benefit of novice teachers and authors that Johnson expresses the opinion that the audience must be regarded as sharing in the author's work; his own stylistic preferences consistently imply his principle of enlisting the ^Hazen, pp. 181-82. 241 I j audience's "passions to animate their inquiries." For t example, despite his consistent advocacy of clarity and j perspicacity, Johnson regarded the absence of emotional i and imaginative appeal in Swift's plain style as an | exceedingly severe rhetorical shortcoming: j I His style was well suited to his thoughts, ! which are never subtilised by nice disquisitions, decorated by sparkling conceits, elevated by ambitious sentences, or variegated by far-sought learning. He pays no court to the passions; j he excites neither surprise nor admiration; he I always understands himself, and his reader always understands him: the peruser of Swift . . . is neither required to mount elevations nor to explore profundities; his passage is always on a level, along solid ground, without asperities, without obstruction. ! This easy and safe conveyance of meaning it j was Swift's desire to attain, and for having attained1 he deserves praise, though perhaps not the highest praise. For purposes merely didactick, when some thing is to be told that was not known before, it is the best mode, but against that inattention by which known truths are suffered to lie neglected it makes no provision; it instructs, but does not persuade Boswell recorded a less measured expression of a similar view: Swift having been mentioned, Johnson, as usual, treated him with little respect as an authour. Some of us endeavoured to support the Dean of St. Patrick's by various arguments. One in particular praised his "Conduct of the Allies." JOHNSON. "Sir, his 'Conduct of the Allies' is a performance of very little ability." "Surely, Sir, (said Dr. Douglas,) you must allow it has strong facts." JOHNSON. "Why yes, Sir; but id ^ Lives of the English Poets, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford: “Oxford Univ. Press, 1905), III, 52 (Swift). Hereafter cited as Lives. 25] i what is that to the merit of the composition? ! In the Sessions-paper of the Old Bailey there are strong facts. Housebreaking is a strong ; fact; robbery is a strong fact; and murder is a mighty strong fact: but is great praise due to the historian of those strong facts? No, Sir. Swift has told what he had to tell distinctly enough, but that is all. He had to count ten, and he has counted it right. "^-9 j These depreciatory statements should be contrasted ! with Johnson's response to Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesy: j In this, and in all his other essays on the j same subject, the criticism of Dryden is the ! criticism of a poet; not a dull collection of j theorems, nor a rude detection of faults . . . but a gay and vigorous dissertation, where delight is mingled with instruction, and where the author ; proves his right of judgment by his power of ■ performance.50 Johnson generally disliked Cowley's work; of his Davideis, he wrote that "Attention has no relief; the affections are never moved; we are sometimes surprised, but never delighted. . . ."5-*- And of Milton's Comus, he complained that the speeches were too long and too general: "The auditor therefore listens as to a lecture, without 52 passion, without anxiety." On the other hand, he hazarded the guess that none of Dryden's dramatic prefaces was ever thought tedious: 49Life, II, 65- ^ Lives, I, 412 (Dryden). •^Lives, I, 55 (Cowley). ^Lives, I, 166 (Milton). They have not the formality of a settled style, in which the first half of the sentence betrays the other. The clauses are never balanced, nor the periods modelled; every word seems to drop by chance, though it falls into its proper place. Nothing is cold or languid; the whole is airy, animated, and vigorous; what is little is gay; what is great is splendid.53 Such passages suggest that, had Johnson read The Rambler as subsequent critics have, he would have found the essays uncongenial by his own standards; yet even in his later years he said that "My other works are wine and water, but my Rambler is pure wine."^ Johnson appears to have possessed the capacity, and perhaps the intention, of appealing to his readers on more than a strictly denotative level. He was acquainted with the writings of classical rhetoricians, works which emphasized the empirical psychological study of audience response, and his literary criticism indicates his preference for techniques that appeal to more faculties than reason alone. Furthermore, in this respect his conversational and literary practices appear to have been consistent: ’ "Dr. Johnson's method of conversation was certainly calculated to excite attention," writes one •^Lives, I, 41$ (Dryden). ^Life, I, 210, n. 1 (Hill's note, quoting Samuel Rogers's Table Talk). 27 witness, "'and to amuse or instruct, (as it happened,) 5 5 without wearying or confusing his company.'"' I propose, therefore, a literary appraisal of The Rambler, the work which has for two centuries symbolized Johnson's allegedly oppressive morality and unreadable style, being at the same time the work which readers have 56 regarded as most characteristic of its author. It is probably Johnson's most substantial literary production (exceeded possibly only by the Parliamentary Debates) ; certainly it is an example of his mature artistry. I hope in my analysis to attain the objectives which Johnson set for critics generally: "Criticism reduces those regions of literature under the dominion of science, ^Life, IV, 236 (quoting William Bowles: see IV, 235 , n. TTFT 56 To Boswell, of course, Johnson was always The Rambler; see also Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), pp* 10^-10; and Walter J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, "Introduction," The Rambler, Works, III, xxi-xxii. Also William Wimsatt, Rhiloso'phic Words: A Study of Style and Meaning in the Rambler and Dictionary of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948) , p~ 54: And though it may be doubted that the finest passages of Johnson's prose are to be found in the Rambler, yet the Rambler is, in the elaboration and complexity of its structures and in the weight of its vocabulary, the most concentrated, and in its length the most sustained, example of the peculiarities which distinguish the prose of Johnson's maturity. To the end of his life Johnson remained the Rambler. which have hiterto known only the anarchy of ignorance, the caprices of fancy, and the tyranny of prescription” (R. 92; IV, 122). CHAPTER II A SURVEY OF THE RAMBLER'S CHARACTERISTICS Thera has always been a general impression that The Rambler was a desultory imitation of a popular mode, begun impulsively and concluded when interest flagged. Johnson himself is largely responsible for having intro duced this belief by claiming that he wrote many of the essays with the printer's boy standing at the door and by choosing a tonally ambiguous title.^ There has been a persistent notion that writing The Rambler was somehow connected with the concurrent project of compiling the 2 Dictionary; Curtis Bradford conjectures that the periodical afforded an easy source of income during that 3 period, and other writers have suggested that the essays provided mental relaxation from the lexicographical labors. ^Rambler lBJ^; V, 201; see also Life, III, 1±2; also Sir John Hawkins, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL. D., ed. Bertram H. Davis (New York! The Macmillan Co., 1961), p . 161. 2 William Wimsatt, for example, conjectures that The Rambler was partially a by-product of the Dictionary. Philosophic Words . . . (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, m . p . 7i" 3 "Samuel Johnson's 'Rambler,'" Diss. Yale University 1937, pp. 6-7. 29 However, a biographical circumstance deserving attention is the fact that, in the year preceding Johnson's initiation of The Rambler, he had published his final formal verse satire, The Vanity of Human Wishes, and produced his only tragedy, Irene. Although neither work had failed, strictly speaking, certainly neither one had made Johnson famous and respected nor had elevated him above the rank of journalist. It seems probable that Johnson Invested unusual hope in these works, for, contrary to his usual practice, he gave his name on the title pages of both;^ indeed, he appeared at the opening night of Irene wearing "a scarlet waistcoat, with rich gold lace, and a gold-laced hat." Today, viewing The Rambler within the context of Johnson's literary career as a whole, we can see that it marks the turning point in the discovery of his naturally congenial medium;^ but for Johnson himself, quitting poetic satire and blank verse tragedy for the periodical essay must have seemed a backward step. ^Not until 1793 did an edition of The Rambler bear Johnson's name as the author: William PrTHeaux Courtney and David Nichol Smith, A Bibliography of Samuel Johnson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925), pp. 30-3J+. 5Life, I, 200. £ Boswell's opinion was that "In 1750 he came forth in the character for which he was eminently qualified, a majestick teacher of moral and religious wisdom." Life, I, 201. 3i This hypothesis is supported by the implications of j the motto which appeared on the title-page of the first folio collection in 1751: Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, « Quo me 'cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes. j The lines are from Horace's first epistle, essentially an j i apologia for his abandoning of lyric poetry for the more retired and philosophical study of virtue. The motto j j occurs in the following context (my italics): | So now I lay aside my verses and all other toys. What is right and seemly is my study and pursuit, and to that am I wholly given. I am putting by and setting in order the stores on which I may some day draw. Do you ask, perchance, who is my chief, in what home I take shelter? I am not bound over to swear as any master Dictates; wherever tEe storm drives me, I turn in for "comfort. How 1 become all' action, and pTunge into the tide of civil life, stern champion and follower of true Virtue; now I slip back stealthily into the rules of Aristippus, and would bend the world to myself, not myself to the world.° n ‘Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London: William heinemann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1929), p. 252 (Epistles, I, i, 14-15). Donald Greene points out that the Royal Society chose the same motto to signify its strict adher ence to empirical method: The Age of Exuberance: Back grounds to Eighteenth-Century Engl'isK Literature (New York: Random House,1970),p. 104* The motto appears on the Society's coat of arms, which was first popularly published as the frontispiece to Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society in 1667. Johnson was well acquainted with Thomas birch, a Society member and frequent contributor to the Gentleman*s Magazine; Johnson reviewed his History of the Royal Society in 175o. It is thus quite possible tKat Johnson was aware of the earlier use of The Rambler1s motto. ^Horace, pp. 251-253 (Epistles, I, i, 10-19). 32 The motif of wandering evident in the motto's j i context has probably more than incidental relevance to i the mood of The Rambler. Rasselas, of course, represents human life as a perpetual quest never to be satisfied, a theme also expressed by The Vanity of Human Wishes (lines i i 5-10) : | Then say how hope and fear, desire and hate, O'erspread with snares the clouded maze of fate, | Where wav'ring man, betray'd by vent'rous pride, j To tread the dreary paths without a guide, ! As treach'rous phantoms in the mist delude, j Shuns fancied ills, or chases airy good. . . . j That Johnson regarded himself in such terms occasionally, ; at least, is evident in a letter of 1754 to Thomas Warton: ! You know poor Mr Dodsly [Robert Dodsley] has lost his Wife, I believe he is much affected. I hope he will not suffer so much as I yet suffer for the loss of mine. . . . I have ever since seemed to myself broken off from mankind a kind of solitary wanderer in the wild of life, without any certain direction, or fixed point of view.9 Johnson's representing human life as a voyage or journey of experience reflects, of course, a most ancient literary tradition. The conception itself admitted little variety until its potentiality for ironical representation was demonstrated by Don Quixote, whereupon its natural affinity with the mock-heroic temper of the Augustans The Letters of Samuel Johnson With Mrs. Thrale's Genuine Letters To Him, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 195^T» If 59 (no. 56). Hereafter cited as Letters. It is tempting to read a personal allusion in these lines from London (11. 190-1): 33 10 made it one of the dominant motifs of the age. The ambivalent character of the post-Cervantes questing wanderer, being consistently neither heroic nor comic, suggests a basis for Johnson’s choosing such a curiously undignified title as The Rambler for his periodical, a title, Boswell felt, "not suited to a series of grave and 11 moral discourses." Quixotic man, "the glory, jest, and riddle of the world," is perpetually in danger of his hopes’ being dashed and of his being made ridiculous; 12 neither his salvation nor his dignity is ever assured. Then thro' the world a wretched vagrant roam, For where can starving merit find a home? ■^See Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan ; Humanism (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965J, 'Ch. 11, "The Open— and Ironic— Road," pp. 262-32. The motif of travel, of movement over the open road, is a constant in all literature, from Homer and Dante and Chaucer and Bunyan to such beautiful contemporary diminished things as Frost's "The Road Not Taken." Eighteenth-century writers, fully committed as they were to Lockean psychology, produced perhaps slightly more than their share of travel books, travel images, and travel motifs. Indeed, it is easy to forget that the travel book was one of the chief eighteenth-century genres, a genre so appealing in both focus and conventions that almost every writer of consequence— regardless of his moral orientation— chose at some point to work in the form . . . (p. 262). ^Life, I, 202. But Thomas Percy disagreed with Boswell: see "Anecdotes and Remarks by Bishop Percy," in Miscellanies, II, 214-15. ■^Paul Fussell comments that "The travel motif is most often exploited by the Augustan humanists to reinforce their conviction of human inadequacy and their apprehen sion of the liability of man to the disappointment of his It is possible, at the same time, that Johnson's title expresses his attitude toward the style and structure of his work. Addison at least once uses ramble as equivalent to e s s a y and Johnson's definitions of the 1 / two terms in the first edition of the Dictionary suggest that he also may have associated them: To RAMBLE, v.n. . . . To rove loosely and irregu larly; to wander. Shame contracts the spirits, fixes the ramblings of fancy, and gathers the man into himself. SoutnT He that is at liberty to ramble in perfect dark- ness, what is his liberty better than if driven up and down by the wind. Locke. RAMBLE, n.s. . . . Wandering irregular excursion. This conceit puts us upon the ramble up and down for relief, 'till very weariness brings us at last to ourselves. L'Estr. Coming home after a short Christmas rambTe, I found a letter upon my table. “ Swift. She quits the narrow path of sense For a dear ramble through impertinence. Swift *s Miscel. RAMBLER, n.s. [from ramble.] Rover; wanderer. Says the rambler, we must e’en beat it out. L'Estrange. hopes" (p. 265). Alvin Whitley, in "The Comedy of Rasselas," ELH, 23 (1956), 49-50, discusses Rasselas essentially in these terms. It is worth noting, too, that Don Quixote was one of Johnson’s favorite books: see Life, II, 23S, n. 5* ^ The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965)j I, 14 (No. 3* line 1). "^Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language. . . . 2 vols. T1755; rpt. New Yorkl AKS-Press, IncV, 1§67). ESSAY . . . i 2. A loose sally of the mind; an irregular j indigested piece; not a regular and orderly ; composition. My essays, of all my other works, have been most ; current. Bacon. ! Yet modestly he does the work survey. | And calls his finish'd poem an essay. j Pope to Roscommon, j The likelihood that Johnson saw a similitude between ! the essay and the ramble has a further basis in Horace's customary metaphorical representation of prose as sermo pedestris, "Walking conversation": "et tragicus plerumque j dolet sermone pedestri Telephus et Peleus. . . . ("So, too, in Tragedy Telephus and Peleus often grieve in the language of prose. . . .") In his fourth satire, Horace argues that his poetry is akin to prose— remove the metre, change the word-order, and it will still retain its essential character: If one have gifts inborn, if one has a soul divine and tongue of noble utterance, to such give the honour of that name. Hence some have questioned whether Comedy is or is not poetry; for neither in diction nor in matter has it the fire and force of inspiration, and, save that it differs from prose-talk in its regular beat, it is mere prose [nisi quod pede certo differt sermoni, sermo mer'us J .lo Horace's distinction was widely adopted by critics, who sometimes used it, in their perfidious way, to ■^Horace, pp. 453-59 (Ars Poetica, 95-96). "^Horace, pp. 52-53 (Satires, I, iv, 43-4-3). disparage him. Thus Dryden, in comparing Horace with Juvenal, employs Horace's ambulatory metaphor as a dominant motif: Juvenal is of a more vigorous and masculine wit; he gives me as much pleasure as I can bear; he fully satisfies my expectation; he treats his subject home: his spleen is raised, and he raises mine: I have the pleasure of concernment in all he says; he drives his reader along with him; and when he is at the end of his way I willingly stop with him. If he went another stage, it would be too far; it would make a journey of a progress, and turn delight into fatigue. . . . Add to this, that his thoughts are as just as those of Horace, and much more elevated. His expressions are sonorous and more noble; his verse more numerous, and his words are suitable to his thoughts, sublime and lofty. All these contribute to the pleasure of the reader; and the greater the soul of him who reads, his transports are the greater. Horace is always on the amble, Juvenal on the gallop; but his way is perpetually on carpet-ground. He goes with more impetuosity than Horace, but as securely; and the swiftness adds a more lively agitation to the spirits. The low style of Horace is according to his subject, that is, generally grovelling. I question not but he could have raised it; for the First Epistle of the Second Book, which he writes to Augustus, (a most instructive satire concerning poetry,) is of so much dignity in the words, and of so much elegancy in the numbers, that the author plainly shows the sermo pedestris, in his other Satires, was rather his choice than his necessity. ' It seems likely that Johnson, greatly admiring both Dryden and Horace, would have read this passage; and, had he done so, it surely would have affected the attitude he would take toward himself after abandoning the grand Juvenalian manner of London and The Vanity of Human Wishes Essays of John Dryden, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press',' 1^26), II, ("A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire"). for the much more unassuming Horatian sermo pedestris j i style of the periodical essay. ! Consideration of Johnson's attitude and intention i in undertaking The Rambler leads naturally to the question ! | of its genre. Obviously, a comedy should not be judged j by the same standards that apply to a tragedy, nor should an epic be judged according to criteria that are appro priate in evaluating a pastoral. The question is particularly relevant to an analysis of The Rambler ! because the essay itself, as a form of literature, has never been clearly defined. To say, as critics often do, that the essay originated with Montaigne is as fallacious as claiming that the short story began with Poe. Obvi ously, the short story has antecedents in ancient tales, and it would be surprising if the essay, eminently suited as it is to expressing personal attitudes, had not been practised before the sixteenth century. One of the characteristics always required, informally at least, of a literary essay is that it possess the quality of a man speaking to men; the reader must imagine that he enters into a conversation with the author. This feature is equally true of Addison, Montaigne, Steele, Bacon, or Haslitt. The essay differs only in degree from the dialogue, in that, while the reader of the dialogue is but a passive audience, the reader of the essay has a sense of direct participation. 33 Describing the essay in terms of its relationship to the reader instead of its formal characteristics ; I emphasizes the fact that, of all literary kinds, the essay . most nearly resembles the letter, from which it differs only in its greater adherence to a particular theme and | in its more general direction of address. The usual ; I practice in writing letters is to direct the expression ; j to a single individual, but the essay addresses either ‘ an audience assumed to possess similar tastes (the practice | of Montaigne, Lamb, and De Quincey) or the undifferen tiated public at large (the practice of Horace, Seneca, and Plutarch in classical times and of Pope and the 1$ periodical writers in eighteenth century England). The essayist, thus, regardless of the particular literary form, writes as a distinct person to a reader capable of regarding himself as a distinct audience. A personal relationship between writer and reader is therefore basic to the essay genre, and because the relationship demands the reader's response and interpretation, it has also many essential elements of the drama. 1 & Ambiguity in the use of essay during the Augustan period is evident in the title of Dryden’s Of Dramatick Poesie, an Essay (title-page reproduced in Ker” I"i 21")7 a work which is actually a dialogue. The works known as Pope's "Moral Essays" were titled "Epistles" by Pope himself; it was not until after his death that Warburton introduced the designation of "Moral Essays." See F. W. Bateson, "Introduction," Alexander Pope: Epistles to Several Persons (Moral Essays) (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951), p. xv. In Bateson’s opinion, Pope's term "epistle" is preferable to "moral essay": pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. 39 i The neoclassical essay of the Tatler-Spectator i tradition, having the particular intention of regulating public manners, morals, and attitudes, differs from other manifestations of the essay in that it addresses (and, in I doing so, defines) a generalized popular audience: j specifically, the newly emerging mercantile class. And the reader of such essays, in the act of recognizing ! j himself as the person addressed, must necessarily identify ‘ i i himself as relating in some manner to the general public, j Hence, the neoclassical periodical essay characteristi- ' cally plays down the author and emphasizes, correspond- 19 ingly, the audience. Steele had begun the practice in the The Tatler with Isaac Bickerstaff, a persona endowed with vivid characteristics, but in the much more popular Spectator he and Addison substituted an entirely different sort, the colorless and reclusive Mr. Spectator. Indeed, although commentators have always praised the charm conveyed by the members of the "Spectator Club," the fact is that Will Honeycomb, Sir Andrew Freeport, and even Sir Roger himself are rather inconspicuous if one reads the papers in their sequence of appearance. It is by their practice of frequently publishing letters from the readers ^■%elvin R. Watson in "The Spectator Tradition and the Development of the Familiar Essay ," fciiH, 13 (1946) , 189-215» discusses the features in which the neoclassical periodical essay departs from the practices of the "familiar essay" originated by Montaigne in 1580. and by commenting on them that Addison and Steele both in ; The Tatler and The Spectator create a vivid impression of I 20 direct reader involvement. Such is not the effect of Montaigne or Lamb. Their essay, generally considered the i standard form, is noted for the singularity of its j appeal, for its intimate presentation of one man's mind j and style of life. The eighteenth-century periodical ; i essay is noted for its generality, for its inclusion of a wide "class" audience in its presentations; it has thus I more the character of a public institution than of a vehicle for a particular author's expression. ! A relationship between The Rambler and the ; contemporary essay fashion has always been taken for granted, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu complaining in 1754 that The Rambler is certainly a strong misnommer. He allwais plods in the beaten road of his Predecessors, following the Spectator (with See Donald F. Bond, "Introduction," The Spectator, I, xxxvi-xliii: Bond reports that of the first Spectator series of 555 numbers, nearly half contain letters; although it is possible that Addison and Steele wrote some of them, enough letters have survived in manuscript to prove that the majority were genuine contributions. The editors did, however, customarily revise the letters to conform with the Spectator's style; two volumes of unedited, unused letters were published in 1725 by Charles Lillie, a collection which Alexander Chalmers character ized as "a most wretched farrago of dullness and inspidity, such as the most contemptible of our modern periodical publications would not admit. . . ." The British Essayists . . . (London: C. and J. Rivington, et al., 1823), T? Ixxvii. 41- the same pace a Pack horse would a Hunter) in the style that is proper to lengthen a paper. . . . I should be glad to know the name of this Laborious Author.2! ’ However, the degree to which Johnson was influenced by j particular models is a point that still eludes definitive I settlement. Curtis Bradford assembles considerable evidence that earlier periodicals influenced Johnson, enumerating both the similarities and the differences between individual numbers of Ramblers, Tatlers, Specta tors , and Guardians. He observes that Johnson adopted the techniques, initiated by The Tatler, of signalling the essay's theme by a motto quoted from a classical author, of employing a persona-conductor, of including readers' letters, of illustrating themes with "characters," and of providing occasional diversity by inserting - - • allegories, dream visions, Oriental tales, and literary dissertations. On the other hand, Bradford notes, Mr. Rambler is neither society's censor, spectator, nor guardian; he does not associate with a fictitious social group; and, the most distinctive difference, he largely 22 ignores contemporary events. That Johnson undertook the periodical essay after it had been neglected by the top-ranking authors for 36 21The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, ed. Robert Halsband ('Oxford: “Uxfora Univ. Press , 1967) Y III, 65-66. 22Bradford, pp. 125-39- years suggests that it was not his intention to imitate a popular medium but to revive it, if possible, by treating of topics lying outside the range of his 23 predecessors. It had been their object to reform habits of behavior; it would be his to reform habits of thought.Johnson himself suggests the distinction. Many years after The Rambler, he wrote that Before The Tatler and Spectator, if the writers for the theatre are excepted, England had no masters of common life. No writers had yet undertaken to reform either the savageness of neglect or the impertinence of civility; to shew when to speak, or to be silent; how to refuse, or how to comply. We had many books to teach us our more important duties, and to settle opinions in philosophy or politicks; but an Arbiter elegantiarum, a judge of propriety, was yet wanting, who should survey the track of daily conversation and free it from thorns and prickles, which teaze the passer, though they do not wound him. For this purpose nothing is so proper as the frequent publication of short papers, which we 23 Boswell observes that a sufficient interval had elapsed since the termination of The Spectator, second series (Dec. 20, 1714), to enable Johnson to suppose that the form would have the advantage of novelty: Life, I, 201; and Bradford notes (p. 125) that despite the many imitators of Addison and Steele who appeared between the close of The Spectator and the beginning of The Rambler, Alexander Chalmers found none worth reproducing in his British Essayists. The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature seems to affirm Chalmers's good judgment: it lists several dozen periodical titles, but none are associated with important authors (save a few very short lived performances by Fielding and Burke) and none survive in general literary history. 2ifPaul Kent Alkon emphasizes this point: see his Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern l/niv. Bress, 1967) , pp- 3-9• 43"| | read not as study but amusement. If the subject i be slight, the treatise likewise is short. The busy may find time, and the idle may find patience.25 Rambler 3, then, should be read partially as a declaration j of Johnson's intention of adding to, rather than dupli- j eating, the contribution of his predecessors: Lest a power so restless [as that of thinking] should be either unprofitably, or hurtfully j employed, and the superfluities of intellect run to waste, it is no vain speculation to consider how we may govern our thoughts, restrain them from irregular motions, or confine them from boundless . dissipation. How the understanding is best conducted to the knowledge of science, by what steps it is to be ■ led forwards in its persuit, how it is to be cured of its defects, and habituated to new studies, has been the inquiry of many acute and learned men, whose observations I shall not either adopt or censure; my purpose being to consider the moral discipline of the mind, and to promote the increase of virtue rather than of learning. This inquiry seems to have been neglected for want of remembering that all action has its origin in the mind, and that therefore to suffer the thoughts to be vitiated, is to poison the fountains of morality. . . . (R. 8; III, 42) The probability that Johnson chose his course deliberately is further supported by his practice of introducing, at fairly regular intervals, demands by fictitious readers of The Rambler that he follow the of. older tradition more closely. Johnson always treats 25Lives, II, 93 (Addison). 2^See, for example, R. 23; III, 123-29; R. 106; IV, 201-02; R. 107; IV, 204-05; R. 127; IV, 310; and R. 134; V, 201. u; these demands ironically and satirically; and the one i Rambler (no. 126) which does closely imitate the practice of the Tatlers and Spectators does so by presenting three vapid fictitious letters without editorial commentary. i (I am not implying that Johnson censured Steele and j Addison; he admired them greatly. He was impatient only j with his own readers, who seemed slow to appreciate his j attempt to supplement, rather than reproduce, the earlier j series.) : For such reasons as these, scholars have been moving away from the supposition that The Rambler should be evaluated by precisely the same criteria as The Tatler and The Spectator. Bate and Strauss, in their introduc tion to the Yale Rambler, emphasize the point that Johnson modified and enlarged the periodical essay form through drawing on all his vast eclectic reading. Thus, they see influences of the Greek aphorists, of the portraits by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, of Renaissance writers of exempla, of Bacon and Montaigne, of William Law's Serious Call, of Jeremy Taylor's sermons, of the book of Ecclesiastes, and of seventeenth-century Theophrastan 27 "characters." ' Although each attribution seems probable, it is not likely that the relative degrees of influence can ever be agreed on. When Johnson himself told Boswell ^Works, III, xxvi-xxx. 45 that he had formed his style upon that of Sir William j Temple and Ephraim Chambers, Boswell's conclusion was 28 that "He certainly was mistaken." However long one I extends the list of potential influences on The Rambler, he must return finally to the unique mind of Johnson j himself. i | Because the Rambler essays have been commonly treated j as secular sermons (Arieh Sachs calls them "Moral ; 29 ' pamphlets," thereby evoking thoughts of Tracts for the Times), consideration of the mode of discourse is relevant I if only to demonstrate how poorly most of Johnson's papers fit the category of moral exhortation. The numbers written ' during the Easter and Christmas seasons, like the great denunciation of envy in Rambler 183, do often have the tone of sermons, and the attack on capital punishment in Rambler 114 resembles a crusading editorial; but in each case Johnson goes much farther than merely exhibiting conditions and exhorting reformation through probing for our independent consideration the fundamental principles of the subject. Here and elsewhere in The Rambler, Johnson obviously constructs his arguments and shapes his style for a reader possessed of sovereign reason, a 28Life, I, 218-19. 2^Arieh Sachs, Passionate Intelligence: Imagination and Reason in the Work of Samuel Johnson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19^7 J, p. ill.” 46 | I person willing and able to improve himself by easy stages; ! and in this important respect Johnson's techniques in The Rambler almost always are those designated in rhetoric i as pertaining to the deliberative mode. i Deliberation, as a kind of writing, is sufficiently | ’ i far from modern usage so that most editors assume they are ! viewing a typographical error when they read Johnson's j I statement in his Preface to Shakespeare that "Perhaps, ! I what I have here not dogmatically but deliberatively j written, may recal the principles of the drama to a new examination."-^ Editors usually have substituted deliberately, but the particular shade of meaning imparted ' by deliberatively is evident in these Dictionary entries: DELIBERATION, n.s. [deliberatio, Latin.] The act of deliberating; thought in order to choice. If mankind had no power to avoid ill or chuse good by free deliberation, it should never be guilty of any thing that was done. Hammond* s Fundamentals. DELIBERATIVE, adj. [deliberativus, Latin.] Pertaining: to deliberation; apt to consider. DELIBERATIVE, n.s. [from the adjective.] The discourse in which a question is deliberated. In deliberatives, the point is, what is evil; and of good, what- is greater; and of evil, what is less. Bacon. The author writing in the deliberative mode estab lishes a relationship with the reader, serving as advisor ^%orks, VII, SO. Deliberatively occurs only in the first edition, 1765; all subsequent editions during Johnson's lifetime read deliberately; it is thus possible (though not probable) that Johnson himself made the change. 47] i rather than judge and presenting for his reader's ! i consideration actions in which the reader has not yet J engaged. Therefore, since the actions are hypothetical, i the reader is able to give them full dispassionate atten- j tion, his position being still essentially uncompromised. j j The deliberative writer represents himself to his readers | as a respectful friend, collaborating as an equal rather : than instructing as a mentor. "Now we deliberate," writes Aristotle, "about such j things as appear to admit of two possibilities. On | matters which admit of no alternative, which necessarily were, or will be, or are, certainties, no one deliberates, at least not on that supposition— for nothing is to be gained by it."3^ " The advice must turn on possibility— not only in the sense that an event probably will transpire, but in the sense that the reader himself has the capacity to initiate or to arrest it: Clearly, the deliberative speaker is concerned with those things upon which advice is feasible; and these are all such as can be referred to ourselves as agents— all that we ourselves can originate and set in motion; for in deliberating we always carry back our inquiries to the point where we find that we have, or have not, the power to achieve our objects.32 3^The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-T^entury-Croi'ts, Inc., 1932), pp. 11- 12 (Bk. I, 2). 32P. 20 (Bk. I, A) . 43 Deliberative discourse is not concerned with defining ends, for it recognizes but one general objective, that ! 3 3 ' of happiness; advice concerns itself with the means of i 31 ' attaining happiness. ^ But although both Aristotle and Quintilian recognize happiness as the great general aim j of all human endeavor, both writers clearly realize that j discussion of happiness has no point unless it relates to | i actual circumstances. Quintilian therefore identifies [ j the three general subjects of deliberative discourse as j honor, expediency, and possibility. Honor includes right, justice, piety, equity, mercy, and various other virtues; expediency includes whether a thing is easy, great, pleasant, or free from danger. These subjects require deliberation when a person's progress in life is blocked by an apparent contradiction: an action seems honorable, yet unmerciful; or expedient, yet unpleasant; 35 or, though both honorable and expedient, yet impossible. 33P. 24 (Bk. I, 5)- In a note to his translation of Crousaz's Commentary on Pope's Essay on Man (about 1740), Johnson objected to Crousaz's assumption of the "ruling passion": "The author may, perhaps be conscious of a ruling passion that has influenced all his actions and designs. I am conscious of none but the general desire of happiness. ..." Quoted by James L. Clifford in Young Sam Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 195$)7 p. 2U5"I 3/4P. 29 (Bk. 1,6). 3 5 The Institutio Qratoria of Quintilian, trans. H. E. Butler (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1920), I, 491-97 (Bk. Ill, viii, 22-35). One of the silent legacies of our Puritan heritage i is a general tendency to assume that pragmatic delibera- j tions concerning means are somehow immoral; true morality, the thinking goes, should regard only a priori ends, j o £ i strenuously disregarding particular circumstances. The j inaccuracy of this position is emphasized by designating | i 'kh® Rambler essays "moralistic": the term implies a static i ethical view of man and society, and it connotes an author-reader relationship of adept and novice, or preacher and congregation. With the exception of a few allegories and exemplary ! tales, the essays of The Rambler generally address them selves to a reader whose pursuit of happiness is tacitly accepted as right and proper, the author wishing only to offer him benevolent assistance toward that goal. However, since a friend's good wishes rarely suffice to sustain another's aspiration, Johnson, in the hope of forestalling his readers' discouragement and subsequent termination of effort, frequently selects his subjects bearing in mind Seneca's precept that "He that never was acquainted with adversity, has seen the world but on one side, and is 37 ignorant of half the scenes of nature." Johnson puts ■^Paul Alkon explores (and rejects) the possibility of Johnson's "Christian hedonism," pp. 53-64- -^Seneca, De Providentia, III, 3; quoted by Johnson, R. 150; V, 34, and alluded to in R. 153; V, 51- the reader in mind of life's calamities and extremities to give his imagination a balanced perspective of his present situation, thereby indirectly uplifting his spirits. Johnson seeks primarily neither to amuse nor to instruct but to deliberate, to provide a climate of reasoned hopefulness, for he realized that "The natural flights of the human mind are not from pleasure to pleasure, but from hope to hope" (R. 2; III, 10) and that "Where there is no hope, there can be no endeavour" (R. 110; IV, 221). The term economy complements the meaning of deliber ation. Deliberation describes the reflective process itself; economy refers to the ultimate objective of reflection, an effective organization (or deployment) of resources, a constructive synthesis of past and present experience, and a mobilizing of effort toward the future. "Economical deliberation" therefore seems preferable to "moral essay," as more accurately describing Johnson's practice in The Rambler. Morality, particularly for twentieth century readers, connotes disapprobation, restriction, and forcible imposition of a behavioral code. In that sense, the majority of Rambler papers are not "moral" at all. The term economy, however, although in present usage limited almost exclusively to financial management, still implies an optimal simultaneous utilisation of various resources, and in that respect its meaning has not changed since Johnson defined it in the Dictionary: "1. The management of a family; the govern ment of a household. . . . 2. Frugality; discretion of expence; laudable parsimony. . . . 3* Disposition of things; regulation. . . . 4* The disposition or arrange ment of any work. . . . 5* System of motions; distribu tion of every thing active or passive to its proper place." The Rambler employs economy variously in the regu latory sense: "'my mother [writes "Euphelia"] is so good an oeconomist of pleasure, that I have no spare hours upon my hands. . . (R. 42; III, 223). "'I resolved [writes an anonymous fictitious reader] to take my estate into my own care, and methodise my whole life according to the strictest rules of oeconomical prudence'" (R. 35; III, 190). And Mr. Rambler refers to a person's heedless disregard for reputation as "ill oeconomy of fame" (R. 56; III, 301). In his Preface to Shakespeare, Johnson wrote that "from his [Shakespeare's] works may be 3 3 collected a system of civil and oeconomical prudence." And in 1776 Johnson wrote to Boswell that "it is best to throw life into a method, that every hour may bring its employment, and every employment have its hour," citing Xenophon's "Treatise of Oeconomy" [Oeconomicus] for 3%orks, VII, 62. •50 support. Other contemporary writers used the term in a similar sense. Hawkins refers to The Rambler as "a book fraught with the soundest precepts of economical wisdom. . . And in 1750 Robert Dodsley published a slender volume of homiletical aphorisms entitled The Economy of Human Life In short, the conception of life as inherently and eternally unstable, admitting at best only the hope for a regulation of contrary forces, seems to be the most constant and predominant characteristic of Johnson's attitude. Boswell presents it succinctly in discussing Johnson's review of George Graham's Telemachus, A Mask: The subject of this beautiful poem was particu larly interesting to Johnson, who had much experience of "the conflict of opposite princi ples," which he describes as, "The contention between pleasure and virtue, a struggle which will always be continued while the present system of nature shall subsist: nor can history or poetry exhibit more than pleasure triumphing over virtue, and virtue subjugating pleasure."42 One of the reasons for the prevalence of sweeping (and erroneous) generalizations concerning the nature of The Rambler is that no satisfactory classification of the 39Letters, II, 153 (no. 502). ^Hawkins, pp. 115-16; see also pp. 126 and 160. ^Robert Dodsley, The Economy of Human Life [1750] (London: T. and R. Hughes, 1809)• ^Life, I, AH; quoting Johnson's essay in the Critical Review, 15 (1763)» 314* essays has ever been made. The editors of the Yale edition, the first to account for the entire sequence, I have not adopted this scheme of classification. The categories are not sufficiently exclusive and are therefore not accurately descriptive. The Yale editors themselves comment on the ambiguity: We often think of the Rambler as consisting in the main of direct moral essays. This is a tribute to the tone and dedicated purpose of these essays; for fewer than half (92; can be strictly counted as such, though at least a dozen of the "portraits" could be added since in these cases the portrait, instead of comprising the essay, is contained within it as a part.44 The most obvious fault is the absence of a single principle for determining categories: the tales, alle gories, and letters are distinguished by form, but the literary criticisms and the moral essays are classified by theme and intention. Furthermore, the letters, which the Yale editors lump together, include both the most sombrely moral of all Ramblers (the deathbed meditations of "Athenatus" in no. 54) > the most extravagantly 43 distribute the papers in this manner:4 . "Direct Moral Essays" "Letters to the Editor" "Literary Criticism" "Eastern Tales" "Short Allegories" Not by Johnson 92 63 31 8 8 6 208 ^ Works, III, xxvi. ^The same. imaginative (the rhapsodies of "Hypertatus" in no. 117 and of "Hermeticus" in no. 199), and the most frivolous (the complaint of "Properantia" in no. 107j among others). Some letters are almost as impersonal as expository essays ("Eutropius" on good humor in no. 9$)J some mean the opposite of their purport ("Misellus" on the misery of fame in no. 16); and some try to arouse the reader's sympathy for victims of social injustice ("Misella's" tale of prostitution in nos. 170 and 171)• Even the 92 "direct moral essays," far from constituting a single homogeneous "tone and dedicated purpose," manifest great variety of subject and stance, ranging from the importance of mental and physical recreation to the management of unavoidable sorrow. The fundamental ambiguity of the Yale edition's system of classification results in certain logically indefensible decisions, consequences most clearly evident in the classifying of literary criticism. The editors include the following Ramblers among those they designate unequivocally as criticisms: $9* "The Luxury of Vain Imagination." The subject is the necessity of occasionally relaxing studious diligence and the superiority of conversation and genial companionship for that purpose. The essay does not mention literature. 137. "The Necessity of Literary Courage." The j ! primary theme is the possibility of succeeding in one's j endeavors by advancing one step at a time; the secondary i theme is the necessity of avoiding excess. The main theme is illustrated by examples drawn from the experience ! of authors, and, the secondary theme is illustrated by | examples from scholarship. Literature is not really the subject but only a convenient standard of comparison. 154. "The Inefficacy of Genius Without Learning." j The subject is this: "The mental disease of the present generation, is impatience of study, contempt of the great masters of ancient wisdom, and a disposition to rely i wholly upon unassisted genius and natural sagacity." The subject is not literature but scholarship, and the illustrations are drawn from science. 180. "The Study of Life not to be Neglected for the Sake of Books." The theme is that a scholar should not neglect social relationships through excessive immer sion in study; literature is not directly or indirectly the subject. I84. "The Subject of Essays often suggested by Chance. Chance equally Prevalent in Other Affairs." The main theme is expressed in the second statement of Johnson's title; the first three paragraphs offer the example of the essayist's subservience to chance, while the remaining nine paragraphs develop the general conclusions to be drawn from that example. The subject is not literature but chance; as in no. 137» literature is mentioned only for illustrative purposes. The Yale editors also list a number of essays as "partial" members of the category of literary criticism: 82. "The Virtuoso's Account of his Rarities." The entire essay is a fictitious letter from "Quisquilius a collector of worthless natural objects and antique relics. He does not mention literature. 83. "The Virtuoso's Curiosity Justified." Here, Mr. Rambler discusses the degree to which curiosity such as that of "Quisquilius" can be justified; he refers in passing to "the republic of letters" in the second paragraph, but otherwise ignores literature. 173* "Unreasonable Fears of Pedantry." This essay is directed toward scholars, particularly professors, whose fear that their occupation makes them unfit for general society causes them to adopt a falsely "popular" personality in company. It is an expression of the frequent Johnsonian theme of avoiding affectation and of being oneself. 177. "An Account of a Club of Antiquaries." The essay is a purported letter from "Vivaculus," who describes a club comprised of persons who collect books, not for their literary merit, but only for their value as curiosities of publishing. The letter thus supplements the theme of Rambler 32, the misapplication of inquisi tiveness. The club members' being book collectors does not in itself make the subject literature. Finally, the Yale editors list several Ramblers as "possible" examples of literary criticism. Of this group, numbers 1, 21, 60, and 106 appear fully to meet the criteria of literary essays, but the remaining one does not: 193. "The Author's Art of Praising Himself." This essay may seem to be a borderline case, in that Mr. Rambler discusses his having written himself an encomi astic letter, which, deciding it too good to waste on himself, he refrains from printing in his periodical. But the literary subject is more apparent than real. The primary theme is that, being susceptible to flattery, men are thereby vulnerable to various pitfalls; Johnson introduces his whimsical interlude of the self-addressed letter in the final two paragraphs only for the purpose of enlivening, through satiric extravagance, the main theme of flattery and its consequences. On the other hand, the Yale editors omit from their list several unequivocally literary essays (see Table 1). Such unreliability of classification has been a uniform flaw of Rambler criticism. Its effect has been particularly detrimental to the reputation of the so-called moral essays, whose characterisation by Boswell Table 1 Classification of the Literary Essays Present List Yale Edition "Literary" "Partial" "Possible"] 1 . The present author reflects upon launching his periodical. X X 2. (The same.) X 3. Authors and critics have a difficult relationship. X X 4. It is an author's responsibility to represent reality honestly. X X 14. An author's expression and his behavior should not be confused. X 21. Hope of fame should not dominate an author's imagination. X X 2 2 . An allegorical history of Wit, Learning, and Satire. X 23. A periodical writer must rely on his own judgment. X X 36. The pastoral and its relation to present poetic requirements (1). X X 37. (The same, 2.) X X 60. A description and evaluation of the biographical mode of writing. X X 77. It is an author's duty to serve virtue rather than vice. X 82. "The virtuoso's account of his rarities." X 3 3 • "The virtuoso's curiosity justified." X 8 6 . An evaluative description of Milton's versification (1). X X 87. All men resist advice, but moral writers should persevere. X 88. An evaluative description of Milton's versification (2). X X 3 9 - "The luxury of vain imagination." X 90. An evaluative description of Milton's versification (3). X X 92. An examination of the poetic doctrine of "sound and sense." (1). X X 9 3 - Impartial and just literary determinations are difficult. X X 94. An examination of the poetic doctrine of "sound and sense" (2). X X 106. Literary fame lasts but a short while. X X 121. Literary imitations, especially Spenserian, are usually inferior. X X 122. On the art of writing, especially that of writing histories. X X 125. Comedy and tragedy are not clearly distinct forms. X X Table 1 (Cont’d.) Present List E< >> u c f l U 0 ) -p Pj YaJ lit j 1 —1 n l ■H -P u n j Pi | o ( D "Possible1! 3 136. Literary dedications have both proper and improper uses. X 137- "The necessity of literary courage." X 139* An evaluation of Samson Agonistes (1). X X 140. (The same, 2.) X X 1A3• The distinctions between plagiarism, influence, and imitation. X 145. An appreciation of hack writers. X 152. A description and evaluation of the epistolary mode of writing. X X 154. "The inefficacy of genius without learning." X 15o. A denunciation of critics’ dogmatical rules respecting drama. X X 168. Diction expresses tone as well as meaning: examples from Macbeth. X X 169. Authors should avoid writing in haste. X X 173. "Unreasonable fears of pedantry." X 176. On the hostility between authors and critics. X X 177. "An account of a club of antiquaries." X 180. "The study of life not to be neglected for the sake of books." X 184. "The sub.iect of essays often suggested by chance. ..." X 193. "The author’s art of praising himself." X 208. The present author surveys his periodical in retrospect. X Totals 35 27 4 3 has never been challenged seriously: Johnson writes like a teacher [in The Rambler]. He dictates to his readers as if from an academical chair. They attend with awe and admiration; and his precepts are impressed upon them by his commanding eloquence.45 But the fact is that the essays comprising The Rambler vary so greatly in subject and in tone that they are very difficult to classify. Boswell himself is inconsistent, writing at first that As the Rambler was entirely the work of one man, there was, of course, such a uniformity in its texture, as very much to exclude the charm of variety; and the grave and often solemn cast of thinking, which distinguished it from other periodical papers, made it, for some time, not generally liked.46 A few pages later, however, Boswell writes that Every page of the Rambler shews a mind teeming with classical allusions and poetical imagery; illustrations from other writers are, upon all occasions, so ready, and mingle so easily in his periods, that the whole appears of one uniform vivid texture.47 Thus it is that The Rambler, more than almost any other literary work, demonstrates the truth of Johnson's principle that "It is not by comparing line with line that the merit of great works is to be estimated, but by their I general effects and ultimate result."^ But at the same ^Life, I, 224. ^Life, I, 208. ^Life, I, 217. 48 Lives, I, 454 (Dryden); see also Shakespeare 61 "! ! time, The Rambler demonstrates the limitation of that i i rule. "General effects," in order to be valid, must arise I directly from the work rather than from secondary opinions ! concerning it; furthermore, they must be based on impres- j sions of the work in its entirety. The reader's difficulty! in distinguishing effects created by Johnson from those ; created by his interpreters is complicated by The Rambler'sj being written in short, self-contained sections. It is J thus easy for the reader to obtain the impression that | he has surveyed the whole when in fact he has not done | so at all. In order to provide what has been lacking for so long, a rational basis for appraising The Rambler, I have prepared a series of tables enumerating the individual essays' distinctive features for the purpose of enabling the reader to estimate any essay's stylistic relationship within the whole series and to appraise its degree of imaginative and sympathetic appeal. The tables do not present a true statistical analysis of The Rambler; features are noted on the basis of simple incidence, not overall frequency, and notation is therefore the same, whether a particular feature occurs once or several times in an essay. It is therefore impossible, Preface, Works, VII, 111: "Parts are not to be examined till the whole has been surveyed; there is a kind of intellectual remoteness necessary for the comprehension of any great work in its full design and its true propor tions. ..." 62 J i using these figures, to distinguish the degree to which i i a feature is prominent within an essay. By thus limiting i my standard of description I have tried to avoid the | fallacy of assuming that frequency of occurrence has a directly proportional effect on literary character. As Johnson often demonstrates during the course of The Rambler, a few personal pronouns can create an overall ; impression of intensely personal statement; conversely, I i certain first-person narratives, such as that of 1 "Eutropius" in no. 9&> can convey an impression of impersonal detachment. Other Ramblers create problems of classification by their mixture of modes and forms, being divided almost equally into exposition and narration, or letter and deliberation. Assigning comparative values in such cases could only be arbitrary and would have to disregard the interpretive function of the individual reader. Table 2 summarizes the significant categories of each Rambler's primary and secondary characteristics. Primary characteristics are those which necessarily occur in every essay: type of theme, form, mode, and point of view. The secondary characteristics of metaphor, allusion, irony, and drama do not necessarily occur. Table 2 lists the primary and secondary characteristics of every Rambler essay, regardless of its type or its author; the subsidiary tables, however, analyze only Johnson's OJ <D i — I ,0 C t i E h Rambler No. H oj( " A-4LA vO 0-COONo —1 rH 1 —I OJ rH O' H -4 rH LA H VO 1 —1 H to rH ON 1 —1 o OJ rH OJ OJ OJ O ' O i - d OJ Contributed . - p p - l * • p a res Theme 1 Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X X X X .mary Featu: Form Delibera tion X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X Tale X X Pri Mode | Exposition X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X X Point of View 1st Person X x X X X X X X X X X X > < X 3rd Person X X X X X X Impersonal X X X X X X x X X X X X X X X X X res Extended Metaphor Character X X X X X X X Memoir X X Exemplum Allegory X X ndary Featu Ironical i View 1 Unconscious X X X Retrospec tive Seco Dramatic Elements Persona of Mr. Rambler X X X X X X X X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X X X X Other No. Types of Allusions Lit. = = = to - 4 --O'50 LA r\ V A Lit. OJ-4LA CA 0-to Lit. E = LA Rambler No. LA CM *o CM [> CM to CM Ch CM O ca H ca CM CA (A CA -d CA LA CA vO CA [>- CA to CA ON CA o -j 1 —1 -d CM -d CA -d -d -d LA -d -d ~d 50 'd Contributed I All H i —1 Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X Delibera te on X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X X X X Tale X X Exposition X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X X X X 1st Person £ o X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 3rd Person X X X X X C \ i 0 Impersonal t - i X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Character X X X X X X Memoir X X X X X X Exemplum X Allegory X X X Unconscious X X Retrospec tive X X X X Persona of Mr. Rambler X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X X No. Types of Allusions -d -d ca r-MD CM LA -dCM CM CM Lit. Lit. -d LA -d IT CM -d CM vO CM LA CA Table 2 (Cont’d. 65 Rambler No. o O -LP i— 1 lp (M LP tp 4 CP IP LP M3 u p ip t o LP O ' IP o M3 H M3 C M vO CP M3 4 M3 LP M3 M3 M3 [>- - o t o M3 O ' M3 o rH [ > C M [> Contributed Economical > - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X Delibera tion X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X X Tale X X Exposition f x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X 1st person X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 3rd person X X X X X X X Impersonal i * X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Character X X X X X X Memoir X X X X Exemplum X X Allegory X Unconscious X X X X Retrospec tive Persona of Mr. Rambler X X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X X X X No. Types of Allusions M3 cp H M3 -4 4 CM cp cp I p 4 Lit. cp CM IP -4CM CP4 • 4 M3 - 4 M3 M3 66 i i Rambler No. c * ' e-o trMD t> to o o [> o CO —1 o CM toto -d to L f N to VO toto to to CX to o O'o CM o 0 - N ON -4- ON u> ON \0 ON Contributed Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X X X X Delibera tion X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X Tale X X Exposition X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ■ y Narration -O X X X X X X X X £ o 1st Person X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X w 3rd Person X X X X oj ^ Impersonal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X H Character X X X X X X Memoir X X X X X Exemplum Allegory X X Unconscious X X Retrospec tive X X Persona of Mr. Rambler X X X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X No. Types of Allusions cm -t cm CM Lit. i •O -±vO r - ivQ Lit. - - -t Lit. 1 —1 Lit. - = tO 671 R a m b le r N o . O ' ■ C O O ' O ' O ' C C i — C c\ c r — (T c ,-4 o rH IT C 1 — v C c [> c -tc c o c c 1 — H 1 1 1 1 1 2 ro r — 1 H -= ■ L T 1 — V C 1 — r — 117 C O rH rH O ' 1 — 1 H 1 2 0 C o n t r i b u t e d i — i — « i P 0- E c o n o m ic a l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X L i t e r a r y X D e l i b e r a - t i on X X X X X X X X X X X L e t t e r X X X X X X X X X X X T a l e X X X E x p o s i t i o n X X X X X X X X X X X « ? N a r r a t i o n X X X X X X X X X X X X X X o 1 s t P e r s o n o X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X cv 3 r d P e r s o n X X X X X X C D h I m p e r s o n a l iT t X X X X X X X X X X X X H Character X X X X X X X X X X X X M em oir X X X X X Exemplum X A l l e g o r y X X U n c o n s c i o u s X X X X X R e t r o s p e c t i v e X P e r s o n a o f M r. R a m b le r X X M r. R a m b le r v s . R e a d e r s X X X X X X X X N o . T y p e s o f A l l u s i o n s p " \ L T ' i r\ ro ro-4ro c m • ■ p ■ H PI -4 -4 rH -4 -4 ~d V -4 "1 C O C M 1 — 1 68' Rambler No. i — C M iH C M C M H o' C M H -4 C M H U" C M H 126 o C M rH to C M H o C M rH 130 H oH H C M OH H O' O' 1 — 1 -4 O' rH UH o" \ i — 1 l -0 OH rH [> - OH H to OH ( — 1 139 o -4 1 — 1 141 C M -4 1 — 1 OH -4 — 1 -4 -4 rH Contributed Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X X X Delibera tion * X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X X X Tale Exposition X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X X f l 1st Person o X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X o ^ 3rd Person cv X X X X X X ^ Impersonal n X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ^ Character X X X X X X Memoir X X X X X Exemplum Allegory Unconscious Retrospec tive X X X X X Persona of Mr. Rambler X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X No. Types of Allusions • •p ■ H P 3 C M -4 • -p • H p -4 to UH UH M3 i r \ C M O' LT • p> •H PI UH C M • p ■ H P I J OH C M • ■p ■ r l p C M Table 2 (Cont'd 69 j Rambler No. A -a t —i MD H !> -4 H CO -4 H Ox -4 ( —1 O LA rH rH LA rH CM LA r —1 'A A H - 4 - LA H LA A —1 -O A E> A H CO A H ON A H 160 H lO —1 CM .o H A o H -4 NO rH A NO r —1 166 NO rH o £ > —J Contributed Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X Delibera tion X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X X Tale X Exposition x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X X X 1st Person X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 3rd Person X X X X X X X X X Impersonal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Character X X X X Memoir X X X X X X X Exemplum X Allegory Unconscious X Retrospec tive X X X X Persona of Mr. Rambler Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X X X X No. Types of Allusions • p •H PIvO AN A -4 LA A' ■ p ■H PI -4 LA -4 • p •H PIlO * p ■H PI HD A NO A NO A A v A 1 A p •r . p Table 2 (Cont'd.) Rambler No. cr vC r — ■O H i- i> r- CM r- o~ i — -4 t> r- 175 1176 o 1 —1 to I —1 179 o to H 181 182 CO oo 1 —1 -4 to H 185 186 > X) i —i 188 189 o ON 1 —1 161 CM o Contributed Economical X X x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary x X Delibera te on x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X X Tale X X X X Exposition x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Narration X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 1st Person x X X X X X X X X X X X 3rd Person X X X X X X X X X X X X Impersonal I x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Character X X X X X X X X X X X Memoir X X X X X X Exemplum X X X Allegory Unconscious X Retrospec tive X X X X X Persona of Mr. Rambler Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X No. Types of Allusions • ■ 1 “ l —1-4co-4vO( X ICO Lit. ro LO-4 -- 4 --4-4 ~4-4CM -4COrH CO CM 71! Rambler No. a" O' i — 1 -4 O' H U - ' O' i — t 196 O' H to O' 1 —1 661 1 200 —1 o c \ i 202 O CM " - 4 " O 205 206 207 to O Contributed Economical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X Delibera- t.i nn X X X X X X X X X Letter X X X X X X Tale X X 'T Exposition tJ X X X X X X X X X -p Narration c X ! X X X X X X X X X X X 3 1st Person X X X X X X X X X 3rd Person X X X X X X X X X X I 1 o s Impersonal X X X X X X X X Character X X X X X X X X Memoir X X X X Exemplum X X Allegory Unconscious X X X Retrospec tive Persona of Mr. Rambler X Mr. Rambler vs. Readers X X No. Types of Allusions -4 -4 -4 -4- L P i -4-43 ir\- T \- P \ -4 r H1 —1 -4 u r \ Lit. economical deliberations, the literary essays having more the character of single unique productions and using allusion for a different rhetorical purpose. The balance of this chapter will explain the rationale of each primary and secondary category of Table 2. Type of Essay I have already discussed my reasons for preferring the term economical to moral in designating the essays, apart from those on literary subjects, which promote in one way or another the "moral discipline of the mind." Many of these essays are not "moral," strictly speaking, but each one does contribute to the overall objective. The nature of the economy toward which Johnson urges his readers is, however, too complex for brief description, and I shall therefore postpone its explication to Chapter III, "The Economy of Life." Papers designated as literary include not only those of literary criticism but also those dealing with general literary concerns. Several of the essays consider the various relationships which complicate an author's life and within which he must function successfully: no. 3 discusses the relationship between authors and critics; no. 136 f that between authors and patrons; and Ramblers 1, 2, and 20#, that between authors and their readers. No. 4 considers the relationship between 73 artistic representation and reality, and no. 22 the tenuous balance between wit, satire, criticism, and scholarship. A number of essays are concerned with clarifying the uses and objectives of particular genres: no. 60 defines and discusses the art of biography; no. 122, that of history; and no. 152, that of the personal letter. Ramblers 36 and 37 weigh the suitability of the pastoral mode for modern poets, and no. 125 considers the difficulty of establishing categorical distinctions between comedy and tragedy. Various essays present problems of criticism: no. 93 discusses the difficulty of conscientious criticism, no. 156 the foolishness of dogmatism respecting drama, and no. 15$ the absurdity of setting down rules for writing generally, Johnson did not undertake an exhaustive "anatomy of literature" in these thirty-five essays, but their coverage is nonetheless impressively broad. Taking them as a group, it seems apparent that they are more than mere random improvisa tions. Johnson tries in each one to illuminate a different portion of the literary spectrum. But the literary essays serve a more subtly rhetorical function in The Rambler than that of expressing literary opinions; that is, they enable the author to speak to the reader in a tone of special intimacy. By presenting the author as functioning in a distinct professional capacity, they help to bring "Mr. Rambler" into imaginative existence, thereby laying the foundations for a subtle but pervasive sympathetic appeal (see Chapter IV). Mr. Rambler's demonstrable expertise as a man of letters qualifies him as a person of specialized knowledge and ability and identifies his distinctive stance toward life generally. Consequently, the reader regards Mr. Rambler’s serious moral reflections as an aspect of the sincere general interest in human behavior that has made him a literary specialist; obviously, he is not just an aggressive busybody usurping the position of personal advisor. The reader, therefore, feeling convinced both of Mr. Rambler's sincerity and of his professional qualifications, finds it easy to accept his deliberations. In this sense, the literary essays contribute, as a group, to Johnson's main objective in The Rambler of inducing a sense of personal economy in his readers. Form Many Ramblers are not pure in their form: a deliberation is sometimes mingled with a letter, as in no. 10, or with a "character," as in no. 24, or with a tale, as in no. 38. Table 2 indicates such complexity of structure without attempting to determine which of several forms should be regarded as dominant within a single essay. 75 Deliberation has already been presented in this paper as a replacement for the term essay in designating the primary generic subcategory within The Rambler. The adequacy of deliberation for papers otherwise not fitting into any scheme of classification, and the resulting simplification of formal categories, suggests that The Rambler does have a basically coherent character, once its organizing principle has been perceived. The letter presents its themes more directly than the deliberation. Most of the letters in The Rambler demonstrate, rather than evaluate, particular habits of thought or patterns of behavior; thus, they complement the overall deliberative pattern by supplying specific examples of subjects examined more generally and more extensively in the deliberations. In these letters, the ostensible author portrays either himself or persons whom he has observed; his self-portrayal is usually ironical, and more often intentionally than unconsciously so. Most of the sketches qualifying as "characters" occur within the letter form. Some letters are essentially deliberations (such as that of "Athenatus" in no. 54)> hut the greater number have the nature of memoirs, the purported author writing of his youthful errors with the hindsight of maturity in the hope of warning others who may still profit from his mistakes. 76 i \ i Critics have paid insufficient attention to the ! j impersonated correspondents of The R a m b l e r , ^ often brushing them aside as being merely imitative of the seventeenth century Theophrastan "characters" tradition, ; j and generally omitting them from collections of Johnson's j work. However, impersonation is of great rhetorical j importance to the series, in that the fictitious corre- | spondents, through engaging in dialogue with Mr. Rambler, i establish a dramatic situation wherein various writers [ interact among themselves and with the audience of readers, i The tale occurs less frequently in The Rambler than j either the deliberation or the letter, and it makes the least strenuous demand on the reader's attention. It occurs in two forms: the allegory and the Eastern tale. The tale usually employs third-person point of view, and it always expresses its meaning metaphorically. In the allegory, both characters and action are metaphorical, but only the action need be so in the Eastern tale. The Eastern tale is usually casually dismissed in describing The Rambler as if Johnson were obviously including examples of it merely in deference to popular taste. But in appraising the usefulness of an alternative ^An exception is found in Edward A. Bloom, "Symbolic: Names in Johnson's Periodical Essays," MLQ, 13 (1952), 333-52. Bloom shows how Johnson's familiarity with the nuances of Latin, Greek, and even Oriental languages enabled him to compress an astonishing amount of allusive meaning into the names of his fictitious correspondents. 77| i form, we should take into account more than just the ! rhetorical necessity of variety. The Eastern tales I I i included in The Rambler are, in each instance, exempla, a most difficult form to offer readers without appearing to sermonize; Johnson continually endeavored, as I shall show in Chapter IV, to avoid being tediously didactic, and tales about dwellers in Samarkand and Indostan must i have seemed to him admirably indirect vehicles. j | i Mode ! The effects created by the expository and narrative modes reinforce those produced by point of view. Impersonal exposition, the predominant mode, is frequently : tempered by brief shifts to narration that effectively variegate the texture. All of the tales and letters are basically narrative, and most Ramblers make allusive references, which, if at all substantial, require narra tive presentation. Narration, thus, by creating variety in The Rambler, both keeps the reader's perspective of the subject unsettled and trains his thoughts on the issue; for we are able to perceive only where there is contrast, and frequent shifts from expository to narrative mode and from personal to impersonal point of view provide the reader with contrasting perspectives and thus contin ually require the exercise of his inductive reasoning abilities. Point of View The essays are divided into the personal or the impersonal point of view, depending on whether the author expounds his thoughts as a first or third person narrator or whether he writes as the personification of Reason itself, as it were. Impersonal, or omniscient, narration is employed predominantly in The Rambler's expository essays as well as in most of the allegories and many of the tales. But impersonal presentation does not neces sarily result in a dull style, as many an eloquent scien tific writer has demonstrated; and, since in The Rambler a personal quality often builds up through the accumulating effects of several numbers, point of view must be weighed cautiously in appraising the character of single essays. The personal narrations, numerically a minority among the Ramblers, nevertheless carry the major burden of the rhetorical effort, for it is through their emotional, ironical, and dramatic qualities that Johnson arouses the sympathetic responses whereby he steers his readers' responses and perceptions. The narrators, writing either as the persona, Mr. Rambler, or as a correspondent (usually impersonated by Johnson), sometimes report satirically on the society that they ostensibly observe, but more often they satirise the purported author's own character, either as it is now (using dramatic irony) or as he 79! recalls its having been in the past (employing retro- | spective irony). Johnson is thereby able to include a much wider and more interesting range of direct testimony ! than would be possible were the essays limited to the views of Mr. Rambler alone. Tabulating point of view in The Rambler by simple j I incidence reveals that impersonal presentation predominates,) ! i but less decisively than one would expect. To be sure, ! many first-person occurrences amount to a single "I" in j an otherwise impersonal essay, but so great is the reader’s! investive power of imagination that even one such personal intrusion, appearing at the proper place, can color an entire issue for him. For example, in Rambler 13> on the management of secrets, Johnson signals his presence only in the final paragraphs; yet as a result he precipitates a kind of Gestalt transformation of the reader's impres sions and endows the whole essay with a personal tone. Considering each Rambler as a coherent organic unit rather than making evaluations on the basis of individual paragraphs affords evidence that Johnson does give his readers frequent though unobtrusive opportunities for making sympathetic identifications, one such technique being the strategic placement of first and third-person perspectives so as to create a subtle but lively counter point of thought and tone. Table 2, Secondary Features Extended Metaphor A "character" is a sketch which defines a pattern of behavior so predominant that it has become virtually the signature of an individual's personality. Such sketches differ from mention of mere occasional idiosyn crasies which, not being extended metaphors, I cite separately as allusions. Characters may be narrated by Mr. Rambler or by a fictitious correspondent, and they include portrayals both particular ("Gelidus is a man of great penetration, and deep researches") and general ("There is in the world a certain class of mortals, known, and contentedly known, by the appellation of 'passionate men'").^ The memoir differs from the character in that it describes a course of behavior manifesting itself over a substantial span of time rather than a configuration of personal characteristics that can be demonstrated in a *51 moment. It is thus possible for many different types 50 Theophrastus and most of his English followers created non-specific characters: see Sir Thomas Overbury's Characters (1614)— "A Courtier"; "A Dissembler"; "A Flat- terer"— similarly, John Earle's Microcosmography (1626) and Samuel Butler's Genuine Remains in Verse and Prose (1667-1669). *^See David Nichol Smith, "Essay on the Character," Characters from the Histories and Memoirs of the Seven teenth Century . . . (Oxford: ""Oxford Univ. Press, 191#) , S i ! of character to pursue the same course of behavior. Another difference is that the contributor of the memoir i I is capable of self-criticism, and he learns to correct his errors, but the subject of the "character” never does. ! But the greatest dissimilarity is that the author of the | memoir who offers a "character" does so within the , i framework of a cautionary tale. If his own history is his j subject, he exhibits his past self as a "character" for j warning others; if he recounts his observations of other ! persons, their descriptions become "characters" within ! 52 his overall perspective. The exemplum is, strictly speaking, a tale that implies a moral through a single metaphorical statement of an action. As such, exempla are rare in The Rambler. The fact that the action as a whole constitutes a single metaphor imposes the requirement that the exemplum possess obvious coherence; all features of style, form, point of view, and theme must be subordinated to the expression of the moral. To a certain extent, however, the exemplum also appears where the memoir consists of a cautionary pp. ix-liii. Smith discusses the memoire, a major French genre of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and weighs its possible influence on the English "character," especially after 1660: see pp. xxv-xxviii. 52 ' Such, for example, are the sketches of "Lady Bustle" in no. 51t "Mrs. Busy" in no. 133, and "Squire Bluster" in no. 142. 32 personal history, but this manifestation lacks the structural purity of the exemplum proper. Allegory is important rhetorically because, being a form of contraries, it is related to satire, and although in allegory the indirection is well controlled and easily perceived, it demands nevertheless an act of mental translation, for it conveys meaning in terms of equivalents rather than of literal denotation. Allegory is thus necessarily inductive; and since the allegories of The Rambler employ personification, the form also contributes dramatic elements which stimulate the imagination and provoke sympathetic alliances. Ironical View Irony, being a most subtle and important feature of The Rambler, is discussed extensively in Chapter IV. Table 2 records its incidence for the purpose of conveying a general notion of stylistic practices. It should be noted that the category reflects no instances of the ironic presentation of material by Mr. Rambler; it records only the irony with which Johnson has endowed his ficti tious correspondents. 831 Dramatic Elements i Entries in the category of Mr. Rambler's persona j represent all the explicitly stated features of his ! behavior, personality, or general character which can j possibly engage the reader's imagination. The category of "Mr. Rambler versus the Readers" represents the sugges- ! i tion of communication between Mr. Rambler and his audience, generally complaints that he is too serious, not enough I like Mr. Spectator, and so forth. These comments often take the form of challenges to Mr. Rambler's authority, particularly respecting his practical knowledge of the | world. Dramatic elements are discussed at length in Chapter IV; for the present, it should be borne in mind that these two subcategories include Mr. Rambler’s use of irony and that, where these elements are combined with the unconscious irony of fictitious correspondents, a most imaginatively stimulating situation results. Allusions Allusions are similitudes which illustrate, augment, and enliven the economical deliberations; they occur frequently, casually, and in great variety. Table 2, having as its purpose the providing of a comprehensive general survey of The Rambler, indicates the significance of allusion in each essay by specifying the number of 34 allusive types occurring therein; a subsidiary analysis, Table 3, presents the distribution of those types. Allusions are tabulated more extensively than other stylistic features of The Rambler because their visual breakdown provides a convenient (though incomplete) index to the imaginative appeal of a given essay; and, because an allusion's duration is brief, consisting perhaps of but a single word, its effect is easily overlooked. Table 3 follows the present study's uniform proce dure of recording features by simple incidence only, without attempting to estimate relative weight within the structure of particular essays. The categories were kept broad purposely, on the principle that classification should be refined only to the extent of revealing necessary distinctions. For the sake of convenience, allusions may be considered as falling into three subcategories: quota tions, references, and interrelated essays. Quotations Quotations are cited only insofar as they form an integral part of the argument itself; epigraphs, therefore, are not listed. Paraphrases are counted as quotations where the passage clearly intends to convey the sense of the original: _n D P~ O ) P “ O p . p- < 1 > - — r O N p- O l p- p- p- N j J p- ro p- I-' p- o vO 0o oJ ■ _ n jj r — r jj Jj ro Jj i-J jj 3 ro O ro D P ro < 3 ro O N ro O l ro r— » r ro o t-1 N O H O P H -o H O N M vn U J H 1 ro H H ( — 1 o N O O P -o C T non Rambler No. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Quotations X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Natural X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Historical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Hypothetical Persons X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Manners X X X X X X Contemporary Events X X X X Mythological X X X X X X X X X X X X Religious IS t ts • a ■ a • ro C O » C O » C O » 3 ► od * C o d » > • > 1 > f t > I > • Coordinate Ramblers V O n O o o a o <1 O N 0 01 v O H o a *0 0 1 o i 0 1 O J o a ro 01 H 0 1 o <1 • o ■ v ] 0 1 <1 o <1 Ol <1 F -' _o <1 ro <1 H -0 D O N - O ON 01 O N -0 O N O N O N o n O N £ - O N O J O ' ro O N H v_n N O o n O l Ol " J O l O ' Ol Ol Ol -P- O l o : Ol ro Ol H Rambler No. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Quotations X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary- X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Natural X X X X X X X X X X X X Historical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Hypothetical Persons X X X X X X X X X banners X X Contemporary Events X X X X Ylythological X X X X X X X Religious tX m rx • c_ « C h ■ c_ • H • :d l H • X » o c : « Q • o * Q • * X I * X) • Coordinate Ramblers - 1 Oa H P" -O 146 p - p- H p- ro h-1 ■ P - H H O O oa \L37 H ■ _ o o i i — 1 O O P~ H O O oo H oo ro H oo H 130 129 H ro oa H ro <3 H ro O N H ro P- I-1 ro oo 120 119 118 H H -0 H O' H 1 — f V J 1 I-1 H p- H H oo ( — 1 H ro l— 1 H H 110 109 H o oa o -0 H o on H o p- H o oo H o ro H o H 100 Rambler No. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Quotations X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological X X X X X X X X X X X X X Natural X X X X X X X X X X Historical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Hypothetical Persons X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Manners X X X X X Contemporary Events X X X X Mythological X X X X X X X Religious O • O ■ s • s • a • g f t g f t f • g f t t r 1 f t Coordinate Ramblers Table 3 (Cont* f —1 <D F- H nO V j J H vO K> H nO h - > vO O H CO MD H CO 00 H CO -^3 H CO o H 00 V _ M H 00 •p- H 00 V jJ H OO M H 00 1 —' f —’ CO o H <] 1781 H -u H H ->0 -F- H -U V jJ M -O ro w -o ( —1 170 H O' H ON On H O' NJl \ - > ON F- H O' V jJ H ON ro J —1 ON H 160 159 H v _ n <1 H VJ1 VJ1 H V J 1 •F" H N_n V jJ H H 150 M Lp- vO Rambler No. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Quotations X X X X f x j X X X X X X X X X Literary X X X X X W X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological X X X X X X X X X X Natural X X X X X X X Historical X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Hypothetical Persons X X X X X X X X x X X x : X X X X X X X X X Manners X X X Contemporary Events X X Mythological X X X X Religious cd • h - a • h3 • • - 3 • h3 • h3 • co « CO « Fd ■ Fd • o ■ o • Tl ■ X) 1 D I Coordinate Ramblers Table 3 (Cont’d.) ro o <1 206 ro 0 01 ro O ■O ro O OJ ro o ro 201 ro O O I-1 -O n O H vO C X L 197 K vO On 195 Rambler No. X X H X X X X X Quotations X X X X X X X Literary- X X X X X X X X X X Psychological X X X Natural X X X Historical X X X X X X X X X X X X Hypothetical Persons X X X X X X X Manners Contemporary Events Mythological Religious G ■ < = : • Coordinate Ramblers 90 1 j Locke, whom there is no reason to suspect ' of being a favourer of idleness or libertinism, j has advanced, that whoever hopes to employ any j part of his time with efficacy and vigor, must j allow some of it to pass in trifles. (R. 89; IV, 105) Furthermore, in order to qualify as an allusion, a j quotation must be employed not merely as supportive ! evidence, as in a literary criticism, but to point out j an analogy: We are taught by Celsus, that health is best [ preserved by avoiding settled habits of life, and deviating sometimes into slight aberrations from the laws of medicine; by varying the proportions of food and exercise, interrupting the successions of rest and labour, and mingling hardships with indulgence. . . . i The same laxity of regimen is equally neces sary to intellectual health, and to a perpetual susceptibility of occasional pleasure. (R. 112; IV, 231) Such quotations, whether literal or paraphrased, lend authority to Mr. Rambler’s position and broaden the context within which the reader considers his argument. References References serve a purpose similar to that of quotations, but, because their meaning is more implicit, they generally require greater use of the reader's inductive techniques and, therefore, of his imagination. Literary references may mention the title, the author, a character, or a famous incident of a literary work: 91 Theophrastus was discovered not to be a native of Athens, by so strict an adherence to the Attic dialect as shewed that he had learned it not by custom but by rule. (R. 173; V, 154) I am one of those who, with the Sancho of Cervantes, leave to higher characters the merit of suffering in silence, and give vent without scruple to any sorrow that swells in my heart. (R. 200; V, 277) Milton has judiciously represented the father of mankind, as seised with horror and astonish ment at the sight of death, exhibited to him on the mount of vision. (R. 7$; IV, 47) The same category also includes brief references to literary preoccupations: Let therefore the next friendly contributor [to The Rambler], whoever he be, observe the cautions of Swift, and write secretly in his own chamber, without communicating his design to his nearest friend, for the nearest friend will be pleased with an opportunity of laughing. (R. 56; III, 304) Psychological references consist of brief penetrating aphorisms respecting the fundamental characteristics of human thought, feeling, and action. On the operation of the mind: It is observable, that either by nature or by habit, our faculties are fitted to images of a certain extent, to which we adjust great things by division, and little things by accumu lation. (R. 108; IV, 211) On human egocentricity: It is easy for every man, whatever be his character with others, to find reasons for esteeming himself, and therefore censure, contempt, or conviction of crimes, seldom deprive him of his own favour. (R. 76; IV, 33-34) On humanity’s social orientation: It has been always considered as an allevia tion of misery not to suffer alone, even when union and society can contribute nothing to resistance or escape. . . . (R. 76; IV, 35) References to nature include both the observable features and the invisible processes of the natural world: He that enlarges his curiosity after the works of nature, demonstrably multiplies the inlets to happiness; and, therefore, the younger part of my readers, to whom I dedicate this vernal speculation, must excuse me for calling upon them, to make use at once of the spring of the year, and the spring of life; to acquire, while their minds may be yet impressed with new images, a love of innocent pleasures, and an ardour for useful knowledge; and to remember, that a blighted spring makes a barren year, and that the vernal flowers, however beautiful and gay, are only intended by nature as preparatives to autumnal fruits. (R. 5; III, 29-30) Other natural allusions refer to the properties of physical matter: I have found dulness to quicken into sentiment in a thin ether, as water, though not very hot, boils in a receiver partly exhausted; and heads in appearance empty have teemed with notions upon rising ground, as the flaccid sides of a football would have swelled out into stiffness and extension. (R. 117; IV, 262) To vegetable processes: It may indeed happen that knowledge and virtue remain too long congealed by this frigorifick power [of bashfulness], as the principles of vegetation are sometimes obstructed by lingering frosts. (R. 159; V, 32) 93 To medical science: The antidotes with which philosophy has medi cated the cup of life, though they cannot give it salubrity and sweetness, have at least allayed its bitterness, and contempered its malignity; the balm which she drops upon the wounds of the mind, abates their pain, though it cannot heal them. (R. 150; V, 33) Historical references cite actual events, individuals and social groups of all kinds, especially those of military, political, and scientific significance; contemporary events, however, and incidents involving persons of current interest, are classified separately. Historical allusions are valuable particularly for extending the reader’s imaginative perspective of a situa tion beyond local circumstances. They may point out the necessity of sustaining effort until the attainment of its ultimate objective: It was said of Hannibal that he wanted nothing to the completion of his martial virtues, but that when he had gained a victory he should know how to use it. (R. 127; IV, 314) Or the value of formal education: The principles of arithmetick and geometry may be comprehended by a close attention in a few days; yet who can flatter himself that the study of a long life would have enabled him to discover them, when he sees them yet unknown to so many nations, whom he cannot suppose less liberally endowed with natural reason, than the Grecians or Egyptians? (R. 154; V, 57) Allusions to manners mention the features of personal and social behavior which have captured the 94 contemporary popular imagination. Many describe fashion able trifling: Penthesilea is the son of a wealthy stock-jobber, who spends his morning under his father's eye, in 'Change-Alley, dines at a tavern in Covent-Garden, passes his evening in the playhouse, and part of the night at a gaming-table, and having learned the dialect of these various regions, has mingled them all in a studied composition. (R. 20; III, 111-21) And fashionable standards of conspicuous consumption: Prospero had now an opportunity of calling for his Dresden china, which, says he, I always associate with my chased tea-kettle. (R. 200; V, 279-30) Contemporary allusions consist of references to current events and concerns; to distinctive features of £ T the economic, political, military, and social situation. J The relocation of impoverished gentry: So young woman [says Mrs. Standish to "Zosima"], you want a place, whence do you come?— From the country, madam.— Yes, they all come out of the country. And what brought you to town, a bastard? Where do you lodge? At the Seven- Dials? What, you never heard of the foundling house? (R. 12; III, 64) Military events: I must indulge myself in the liberty of observing . . . that Euphelia [a soldier writing as a young lady] has not been long enough at home, to wear out all the traces of the phraseology, which she learned in the expedi tion to Carthagena. (R. 20; III, 111) 53 Bradford, pp. 93-94, cites some references to contemporary life in The Rambler. Scientific and scholarly inquiries: I have found him [Polyphilus], within this last half year, decyphering the Chinese language, making a farce, collecting a vocabulary of the obsolete terms of the English law, writing an inquiry concerning the ancient Corinthian brass, and forming a new scheme of the variations of the needle. (R. 19; III, 10$) The category of mythological allusions consists only of explicit references to specific figures or events By whom is his [the Spendthrift's] profusion praised, but by wretches who consider him as subservient to their purposes, Sirens that entice him to shipwreck, and Cyclops that are gaping to devour him? (R. 53; III, 2$7) The rarity of allusions of this type may be explained by this statement: He borrows too many of his sentiments and illustrations from the old mythology, for which it is vain to plead the example of ancient poets: the deities which they introduced so frequently were considered as realities, so far as to be received by the imagination, whatever sober reason might even then determine. But of these images time has tarnished the splendor. A fiction, not only detected but despised, can never afford a solid basis to any position, though sometimes it may furnish a transient allusion, or slight illustration.5A Religious allusions, like those to mythology and contemporary events, rarely occur in The Rambler. This fact must seem surprising, considering the attention which has always been given Johnson's allegedly religious point of view. Nevertheless, the fact Is that Johnson regarded religion as an unsatisfactory literary subject: ^Lives, I, 295 (Waller). "The paucity of its topicks enforces perpetual repetition, ! and the sanctity of the matter rejects the ornaments of c c figurative diction.Only two Ramblers, 30 and 44 > both i | contributed by outsiders, make religion their explicit theme. The majority of Johnson’s religious allusions are such simple and direct references as this, wherein he l points out the importance of mental discipline: For this reason the casuists of the Romish church, who gain, by confession, great oppor tunities of knowing human nature, have generally determined that what it is a crime to do, it is a crime to think. (R. 5; III, 4^-3) ! Religious allusions have the least complicated rhetorical significance among the kinds of allusion employed in The Rambler; they scarcely engage the imagination except insofar as they evoke a generalized air of authority. References to hypothetical characters constitute the most complex and probably the most important subcate gory of allusions. The classification includes all inventions of personal qualities which are too brief to qualify as "characters" but which nevertheless elicit a definite degree of imaginative and sympathetic response from the reader. They include the following character izations: Very briefly cited personal quirks: Gustulus, who valued himself upon the nicety of his palate, disinherited his eldest son for 55Lives, III, 310 (Watts). telling him that the wine, which he was then commending, was the same which he had sent away the day before as not fit to be drunk. Proculus withdrew his kindness from a nephew, whom he had always considered as the most promising genius of the age, for happening to praise in his presence the graceful horsemanship of Marius. And Fortunio, when he was privy counsellor, procured a clerk to be dismissed from one of the publick offices, in which he was eminent for his skill and assiduity because he had been heard to say, that there was another man in the kingdom on whose skill at billiards he would lay his money against Fortunio's (R. 40; III, 217-18) Similar but anonymous inventions: I once knew a man remarkably dimsighted, who, by conversing much with country gentlemen, found himself irresistibly determined to sylvan honours, His great ambition was to shoot flying, and he therefore spent whole days in the woods persuing game; which, before he was near enough to see them, his approach frighted away, (R. 66; III, 351) Even more generalised characterisations, yet still consistent with the common Theophrastan "character" practice of omitting the assigning to its creations of "a local habitation and a name": The dreamer retires to his apartments, shuts out the cares and interruptions of mankind, and abandons himself to his own fancy; new worlds rise up before him, one image is followed by another, and a long succession of delights dances round him. He is at last called back to life by nature, or by custom, and enters peevish into society, because he cannot model it to his own will. He returns from his idle excursions with the asperity, tho' not with the knowledge, of a student, and hastens again to the same felicity with the eagerness of a man bent upon the advancement of some favourite science. (R. 89; IV, 106) The principle which permits inclusion of sketches desig nating the subject as "the dreamer" also includes references mentioning the subject only by the personal pronoun: He who has seen only the superficies of life believes every thing to be what it appears, and rarely suspects that external splendor conceals any latent sorrow or vexation. He never imagines that there may be greatness without safety, afflu ence without content, jollity without friendship, and solitude without peace. He fancies himself permitted to cull the blessings of every condition, and to leave its inconveniencies to the idle and the ignorant. He is inclined to believe no man miserable but by his own fault, and seldom looks with much pity upon failings or miscarriages, because he thinks them willingly admitted, or negligently incurred. TR. 196; V, 259) The category of hypothetical characters also includes brief personifications: Eminence of station, greatness of effect, and all the favours of fortune, must concur to place excellence in publick view; but fortitude, dili gence, and patience, divested of their show, glide unobserved through the croud of life, and suffer and act, though with the same vigour and constancy, yet without pity and without praise. (R. 66, III, 359) And animations: The main of life is, indeed, composed of small incidents, and petty occurrences; of wishes for objects not remote, and grief for disappointments of no fatal consequence; of insect vexations which sting us and fly away, impertinencies which buzz a while about us, and are heard no more; of meteorous pleasures which dance before us and are dissipated; of compliments which glide off the soul like other musick, and are forgotten by him that gave and him that received them. (R. 66; III, 359) 99 Such are the principal manifestations of this very j abundant subcategory of allusion. Assigning passages to the category depends ultimately on whether or not the j reader has been given enough description for him to imagine1 a personal agent's initiating a sequence of action and consequence. Interrelated Essays The final type of allusion employed in The Rambler j to stimulate inductive thinking arises from relationships ! between separate essays. The particular numbers included i in this category are related not only by similarity of ' subject but by close proximity to each other; they are, r /I thus, truly coordinate thematic treatments. Two or more essays present several perspectives of a single subject but generally omit explicit mention of the similarity, leaving the reader to discover that for himself and thence ^ A. T. Elder has approached this aspect of Johnson's work in his "Thematic Patterning and Development in Johnson's Essays," SP, 62 (July, 1965)* 610-32. Elder writes, for example, that "The development of the themes that form the core of the essays lacks the apparent shaping we have noticed in some of the minor themes. Rather the process is one of constant reiteration in many different ways of Johnson's major preoccupation in the theme. There is an undoubted repetition of ideas, but not of material." (627). Professor Elder's analysis is, however, too broad to be very useful. See also Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955)» p. 13 7 i irBut hardly any theme is single in Johnson. It is always being subsumed within a larger harmony." idol to ponder its implications. I have identified twenty-one such groups (for details, see Appendix A). The combinations occur in certain patterns. The first pattern (groups A, D, H, L. R, and S) employs simple reiteration. In group A, for example, on the importance ! of regulating one's thoughts and feelings, each of the ; five essays is a straight economical deliberation, j i primarily expository and impersonal. The first four simplyj I express the theme from slightly different perspectives, j while the last, Rambler 11, discusses peevishness, a particular consequence of failing to regulate oneself. ! A second pattern (groups B, E, G, K, M, N, 0, P, and U) : employs statement and example: Rambler 17 of group B discusses our ability to conceive of greater accomplish ments than we have the capacity to perform, then Rambler 19 offers the example of Polyphilus, whose brilliant intellectual talents came to nothing because he allowed himself to aspire toward too many different goals. (Two groups— C and T— combine reiteration with statement and example.) A third pattern, represented only by groups I and Q, employs thematic comparison and contrast: in group I, Rambler 72, a recommendation of good humor, is balanced by no. 7kf a discussion of peevishness. Two groups, F and J, stand alone. Group F follows a sequence of thesis, criticism, and modification: in Rambler 53, Mr. Rambler exhorts his readers to avoid the abyss of 101 poverty; in no. 57, "Sophron," a hard-headed businessman, j | reproves Mr. Rambler for his literary approach and states j j the opinion that no willingly industrious person need every be poor; then in no. 5^, Mr. Rambler expresses the | position that, although a degree of affluence is neces sary, money alone does not make a person happy and should i not be valued above health, social esteem, intellectual j capacity, or love. And in group J, Rambler Si, urging readers to treat their fellows charitably, is followed by the apparently unrelated memoir of "Quisquilius," the aimless collector; but the next essay, Mr. Rambler's i defense of curiosity and his extenuation of the ridiculous ! impression created by "Quisquilius," synthesises the three by offering a practical demonstration of charity. These thematic interrelationships show that The Rambler should be regarded as possessing coherence, not uniformity, and they emphasise the necessity of approaching the work as a whole, rather than as a collection of discrete parts. I have pointed out only the most obvious groupings; the tonal variations employed by groups F and J suggest that there are other, more subtle, interrela tionships . Conclusion It is evident that for twenty years or more the evaluation of neoclassical literature has been undergoing 10"2 '| i a quiet revolution. Perhaps this statement by Paul J Fussell summarizes its most essential feature: j The alleged figurative ’thinness* sometimes | ascribed to eighteenth-century literature may j well be a function less of the things we read than of the expectations we bring to the reading. Anyone who has read the Essay on Criticism with real attention to figure or who has genuinely attended to the weight of sub-surface figure in j a sentence from The Rambler is aware of the heavy i freight of the figurative in the expression of ! even the most prosaic of the Augustans.57 j i This current of interpretation runs counter not only to j | that of Macaulay and Hazlitt but also to the purportedly modern one represented by William Wimsatt, who constructed | a rationale for evaluating Johnson by accepting literally his declaration in Rambler 20$ of having tried to "familiarize the terms of philosophy by applying them to popular ideas." But Wimsatt's Johnson, earnestly trundling in barrow-loads of scientific terminology, is still the tediously didactic schoolmaster of the nineteenth century critics. David Nichol Smith, on the other hand, represents the more flexible modern view in concluding that no one who reads The Vanity of Human Wishes aright ever ends it, I believe, without being most of all impressed by its emotional quality. In this poem Johnson shows himself to be a master of pathos. The forces of intellect and emotion are displayed in perfect balance.58 ^Fussell, pp. 139-40. ^"Johnson's Poems," New Light on Dr. Johnson . . . (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959)t P*17. As my analysis in this chapter shows, The Rambler makes a surprisingly complicated appeal. By identifying the various elements of metaphor, allusion, irony, drama, and pattern, we can come to understand that Johnson is continually pushing his reader toward acts of inductive reasoning and that, although the ultimate objective of that pressure is the formulation of rational principles, his effective agents of stimulation operate by engaging the reader's emotions and his imagination. Johnson thus recommends regulation not for the purpose of denying life but of accepting it; by revealing possibilities for order within the original chaos of the reader's thoughts and feelings, Johnson offers him reason to hope that he may attain a degree of real happiness. CHAPTER III THE ECONOMY OF LIFE The greatest difficulty in describing the moral discipline offered by The Rambler arises from the complex manner in which Johnson presents his themes. Although the majority of the essays bear at least an implicit relationships to a number of others, they are really not repetitions but new aspects, new perspectives of similar themes. Unlike The Spectator and most other periodicals, The Rambler is a coherent organic whole rather than a heterogeneous collection of reflections, and we cannot form a just estimate of its character through discussing single essays. Thus, one common opinion has been that The Rambler forms, in Boswell's phrase, "a series of grave and moral discourses,” yet on the other hand certain writers have argued plausibly that Johnson may be considered a humorist. One of my main objectives in this paper is to demonstrate that neither extreme is correct, and that the economical view of life expressed by The Rambler is a discipline which demands that the reader entertain, simultaneously, mutually contradictory conceptions. Johnson is trying to teach his readers how to live in a paradoxical world. Man, as Johnson and most of his contemporaries regarded him, is by nature aspiring toward the perfect fulfillment of all his faculties, constantly striving for immortality, omniscience, and omnipotence. But man's aspirations are continually being frustrated by the conditions of life. They are limited by time, in that the finitude of biological existence must put an end to the grandest and most apparently solid of worldly achieve ments. They are restricted by circumstance, in that the number of satisfactions that life affords are limited. They are limited by man's psychological nature, especially by his great difficulty in distinguishing between possi bilities for achievement afforded by real circumstances and illusory gratifications promised by imagination; the most tangible appearance of success tends to dissolve like a phantom as one approaches it. And they are limited, finally, by man's social orientation: all standards of happiness pertain, at last, to relationships with other human beings, yet society as a body has different require ments than do its component members. Thus it is that the attainment of personal happiness requires tempering aspira tion, balancing it against the limitations imposed by time, circumstance, human nature, and society. I shall present my discussion in two parts: first, a categorical description of the conditions affecting human happiness; second, a discussion of the balancing functions necessary in order to achieve an optimal degree j of happiness. In order to survey the distinctions as i they occur throughout the series, I have prepared a table j of their incidence; as in the other tables of this paper, there is no intention of estimating the relative weight j of the features (see Table 1+) : Biological Conditions: The Limitation of Time Man is an animal, and like all animals he must die. This most inescapable consequence of our nature places the most powerful limitation upon our achievement: The known shortness of life, as it ought to moderate our passions, may likewise, with equal propriety, contract our designs. There is not time for the most forcible genius, and most active industry, to extend its effects beyond a certain sphere. To project the conquest of the world, is the madness of mighty princes; to hope for excellence in every science, has been the folly of literary heroes; and both have found, at last, that they have panted for a height of 1 A. T. Elder concludes that the following seven categories (listed in order of importance) account for more than four-fifths of Johnson's themes: (1) contribut ing to society; (2) evaluating literature; (3) fitting into life; (4) seeking and promoting virtue; (5) filling life usefully; (6) seeing the world as it is; and (7) being true to one's qualities. "Thematic Patterning and Development in Johnson's Essays," SP, 62 (1965), 610-32. Anyone familiar with Johnson's essays will readily agree that these are important categories, but I should think he would also object that they are of little help in describing The Rambler. Part of the difficulty consists in Elder's failure to make his categories mutually exclu sive: "contributing to society," "fitting into life," and "filling life usefully" surely seem insufficiently 107] Rambler No. LT t>to O 'o 1 — 1 H H CV 1 — 1 co 1 —1 L T \ H v O pH 1 —1 to H O' H o c \ iC \ ! L T N :v -o C V<N to tv O' cv o O ' ) Biological The limitation of time X X X X ^Circumstantial no The limitation p a of chance X X X p U J ^Psychological, 1 o h Ambition is o)o insatiable X X X X X X ^Psychological, 2 Ho Man's original ignorance X X X X X X X o Psychological, 3 m The treachery ^ of imagination X X X X X X X X X X X o ' ° Social a > Man requires 4 J society X X X X X X X X “ Contradictory g Excess cancels ^ out its gains X X X X X X X X X ° Economical, 1 ^ Happiness o consists only !p in activity . . - 4 r n X X X X X T3-P £^Economical, 2 oft Imagination can be used -G constructively EhH j X X X X ro ^Economical, 3 •h More and less -p X X X X X X X X X o ^Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X X X X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd 108 Rambler No. H p " CM o ~ O" o' -4 LP o ' to O' C r O' c - 4 iH -4 CM - 4 - O' -4 - J -4 LP -4 M3 -4-4 CO -4 O' -4 o IP H IP CM IP O' IP - 4 i p Biological The limitation of time X X X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X * X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance x X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination x X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains X X X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively x X X X X X X Economical, 3 More and less X X X X X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd. 109; Rambler No. UN un UN un 00 UN ox un H U0 C M M O pn M O -4 M O un M O M O M O IN- M O 00 M O ON M O 0 r- H c- CM i> ON ! > - -4 0 UN 0 M O 0 - 00 i I > j Biological The limitation of time X X X X X I 1 Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance x X X X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X X X X X X X X X X Social Man requires society I X X X X X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains x X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X X X X Economical, 3 More and less > < 1 X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd. no] Rambler No. on O 00 1 —1 t o tv CO CO oo oo UN 00 O'- 00 I —1 ON UN ON NO ON ON oo ON ON O n o o H 1 —1 O H tv o H to o (H ■4 o H UN o H o r ~ H 00 o H Biological The limitation of time X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man’s original ignorance X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X X X X X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X Economical, 3 More and less X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 + The paradox of ambition X X X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd. ml Rambler No. O' o rH o H H rH H rH CM rH H ro H H -3 . - 1 rH LO H rH vO rH rH i —l i —1 to rH i —1 O' rH 1 —1 o 02 H ro 02 rH -t 02 H vO 02 H 02 H 00 02 H O' 02 rH o ro H rH ro rH 02 ro H ro ro rH Biological The limitation of time X X X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X X X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X X X X Economical, 3 More and less X X X X X X X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X X X X X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd. 112 Rambler No. -a ro j —1 ro rH o ro rH to ro rH 1 —1 H c m H rH \o -4 H H to -d rH O' rH o LO H H t r \ H ro uo i —1 - c h ir\ i —! uo ir\ i —i r " - U " \ rH ON I T N i —1 o ■O H H N O H CM *o ro vO rH Biological The limitation of time X X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X X X X X X X X X X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X X X X X X X X Economical, 3 More and less X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X X Table ! + (Cont'd 113 Rambler No. -d vO H LP VO 1 —: vO VO H o vO H o o 1 —1 1 —1 o iH cm O i —1 O' !> 1 —1 H LP o rrH - 0 0 H O' i —i o • 0 0 H H to 1 —1 CM to iH CP to rH to H LP to 1 —1 vO to 1 —1 tc tc tc Biological The limitation of time X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X x X X X X X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains X X X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X X X X X X Economical, 3 More and less X X X X X X X X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X X X X X X Table 4 (Cont'd.) 114 Rambler No. O' to H O O' H rH O' H CM O' i —1 O' -4 O' H LP O' 1 —1 vO O' i —! o J —1 t c o O' O' rH o o CH 1 —1 o cv CM o CM O " ' o CM -4 o CM LP o CM vO o CM a CM Biological The limitation of time X X X X X Circumstantial The limitation of chance X X X X X X Psychological, 1 Ambition is insatiable X X X X X X X X X X Psychological, 2 Man's original ignorance X X X X X X X Psychological, 3 The treachery of imagination X X x X X X X X X X Social Man requires society X X X X X X X X Contradictory Excess cancels out its gains x X X X X X X X X Economical, 1 Happiness consists only in activity X X X X X X X X Economical, 2 Imagination can be used constructively X X X Economical, 3 More and less X X X X Economical, 4 The paradox of ambition X Economical, 5 Humane pragmatism X eminence denied to humanity, and have lost many opportunities of making themselves useful and happy, by a vain ambition of obtaining a species of honour, which the eternal laws of providence have placed beyond the reach of man. (R. 17; III, 96) Having but a limited time in which to obtain happiness, we should try to enjoy life as it passes. Some of the most pathetic of the self-satirising fictitious letters included in The Rambler recount lives wasted through pursuing schemes for future happiness while opportunities for present enjoyment slipped by unnoticed. Such is the fate of "Cupidus," a man who has spent his life anticipating the deaths of rich relatives, and who, now finally in possession of his estate, finds himself so dominated by "an inveterate disease of wishing" that he is unable to enjoy the luxury he has inherited (R. 73)• Similarly, the compulsive gambler of Rambler 181 recounts the manner in which a "dream of felicity, by degrees, took possession of my imagination." We must seize the day as it shines upon us, for tomorrow may never come. But of course Johnson does not offer a heedless carpe diem exhortation. A person can put off performing acts of virtue as well as of self-indulgence. When we sit at the bedside of a dying friend, for example, we realize how many opportunities for expressing love and distinct. A greater difficulty, however, consists in Elder's overlooking a considerable number of significant themes. 116! J tenderness we have postponed until too late. Thus muses j "Athenatus": i When a friend is carried to his grave, we at once find excuses for every weakness, and pallia- | tions of every fault . . . and wish, vainly wish j for his return, not so much that we may receive, j as that we may bestow happiness, and recompense | that kindness which before we never understood. Let us therefore make haste to do what we shall certainly at last wish to have done; let us return the caresses of our friends, and endeavour by mutual endearments to heighten that tenderness which is the balm of life. . . . (R. 54; III, 293-94) Similarly, Johnson advises his readers, "A wise man will make haste to forgive, because he knows the true value of time, and will not suffer it to pass away in unneces sary pain" (R. 1$5; V, 208). But happiness consists in more than just knowing that time is to be used wisely: "It is necessary to the completion of every good, that it be timely obtained; for whatever comes at the close of life, will come too late to give much delight . . (R. 203; V, 293). The gloomy truth, to which everyone must assent if he will be honest, is that we can expect from the future only an increasing deprivation of temporal pleasure, for in the decrepitude of old age "our policy and bravery shall be equally useless," and wealth will have no use except that of frightening heirs into reluctant attentiveness. Satisfaction becomes every day more inaccessible as a 117; I I man grows older, until at last he stands "forlorn and j i silent, neglected or insulted, in the midst of multitudes, i animated with hopes which he cannot share, and employed ; in business which he is no longer able to forward or retard ...” (R. 69; I I I , 364-65). Thus time is running ! / out even for the man in his prime, glorying in strength 1 1 and worldly success. ; Circumstantial Conditions: The Limitation of Chance Just as biological finitude imposes unalterable conditions upon the quality of our lives, so also the chance combinations of casual circumstances exert greater ! influence upon the course of our existence than the programs of our reason. It is not commonly observed, how much, even of actions considered as particularly subject to choice, is to be attributed to accident, or some cause out of our own power, by whatever name it be distinguished. Whoever shall inquire by what motives he was determined on . . . [life's] important occasions, will find them such, as his pride will scarcely suffer him to confess; some sudden ardour of desire, some uncertain glimpse of advantage, some petty competition, some inaccurate conclusion, or some example implicitly reverenced. (R. 184; V, 202, 204) The tale of Seged, emperor of Abyssinia, in Ramblers 204 and 205 dramatizes the helplessness of even the most absolute temporal monarch before the power of chance events. Seged initially thinks it a small thing to llS i proclaim a ten-day respite from seriousness and care i throughout his kingdom, a holiday during which he and I his subjects shall indulge themselves in happy amusements; ; but at the conclusion of the period, crushed by one unforeseen disaster after another, Seged realizes that i uncertainty itself is all that we can anticipate with j assurance. i Chance affects our lives not only through calamitous j events, for physical circumstances define, to a very j great extent, our social relationships. The man sunk in poverty, for example, has great difficulty in convincing others of his merit: "It has long been observed that native beauty has little power to charm without the ornaments which fortune bestows, and that to want the favour of others is often sufficient to hinder us from obtaining it” (R. 166; V, 116). A person who has been doomed to form his manners among the uncouth will lack the polite accomplishments which procure advancement, "and though truth, fortitude, and probity give an indisputable right to reverence and kindness, they will not be distinguished by common eyes, unless they are brightened by elegance of manners. ..." Since mankind tends to continue in its first impressions, "he therefore who fails to please in his salutation and address is at once rejected, and never obtains an opportunity of showing his latent excellencies, or essential qualities." Furthermore, if a poor man’s confidence in his essential ! worthiness enables him to stand unabashed before persons i of superior rank and fortune, they will think him inso lent: "It is indeed not easy to prescribe a successful manner of approach to the distressed or necessitous, whose condition subjects every kind of behaviour equally to j miscarriage" (R. 166; V, 117)- Even exemplary diligence in performing service may be interpreted as manifesting | j craftiness rather than virtue, and acts of the utmost j benevolence are "easily disregarded as arts of insinua tion, or stratagems of selfishness" (R. 166; V, 113-19)- Recognising the power that casual circumstances exert over the quality of our lives can bring genuine humility. A person is less likely to feel excessive pride in his attainments if he realizes that, like Seged, he may be deprived by the next turn of fate of all his gains. Yet though we cannot pride ourselves for our triumphs, the same logic implies that we should not be shamed by our failures. "The same disposition, as differ ent opportunities call it forth, discovers itself in great or little things" (R. 161; V, 90). A man’s worth should be weighed on a scale entirely removed from his worldly success: "We must learn how to separate the real character from extraneous adhesions and casual circumstances . . ." (R. 166; V, 120). 1201 But it is not only outward circumstances which j restrict man's enjoyment of perfect bliss; our psycho logical constitution itself provides equally inflexible 1 i obstacles. In the first place, we are naturally possessed ; of an overriding ambition entirely without an inherent j governing principle. At the same time, we enter the world j j knowing nothing whatever, and we stubbornly resist i acquiring knowledge except through direct experience. j Finally, the faculty of imagination, essential though it j is to man's capacity for reflection and for his ability j to synthesize various elements of experience, is exceed ingly untrustworthy, for its representations tend to have a more compelling quality of reality than the actual facts of life. Psychological Conditions, 1: Ambition is Insatiable Such is the condition of life, that something is always wanting to happiness. In youth we have warm hopes, which are soon blasted by rashness and negligence, and great designs which are defeated by inexperience. In age we have know ledge and prudence without spirit to exert, or motives to prompt them; we are able to plan schemes and regulate measures, but have not time remaining to bring them to completion. (R. 196; V, 26l) It is, of course, a fundamental theme not only of The Rambler but of The Vanity of Human Wishes and Rasselas that there is a striking disproportion between man's potential capacity and his actual opportunities of development: All the attainments possible in our present state are evidently inadequate to our capaci ties of enjoyment . . . and after all our labours, studies, and inquiries, we are continually at the same distance from the completion of our schemes. . . . (R. 103; IV, 104) or, as Pope put it, "Man never is, but always to be, blest." Thus ambition, through being by nature unfulfillable, produces more than just trifling frustration; it can cause us to suffer pangs as debilitating as those produced by the sharpest physical misery, and, more important from the moral point of view, it can incite us to inflict harm upon others, who, envy persuades us, have taken what is rightfully our own. Such must inevitably be the consequence of an unreflecting response to the promptings of our psychological nature, for however much we have, it will always seem that others have still more: "The desires of mankind are much more numerous than their attainments, and the capacity of imagination much larger than actual enjoyment" (R. 104; IV, 191)• From this condition arises "the unwillingness of mankind to admit transcendent merit ..." (R. 207; V, 314)* Whatever we see that others have accomplished, we covet for ourselves. 122] Psychological Conditions, 2: Man's Original Ignorance Man is born lacking the skills necessary for his happiness. Furthermore, such is the natural insularity ! of each human being, that he steadfastly resists acquiring ; knowledge except from the most direct and imperative personal experience. Man is not an entirely rational creature, and he is not to be approached solely by | appeals to the faculty of reason: "experience is of much more weight than precept ..." (H. SO; IV, 60). Thus, "to little purpose is he [the youth] told, that the condition of humanity admits no pure and unmingled happiness . . ." (R. 196; V, 260). He must learn it for himself. Marriage has flourished since before the advent of recorded history, but men and women enter into it every day having drawn no conclusions whatever from the experience of their friends and ancestors. Courtship commonly provides the prospective lifelong partners no acquaintance with each other's actual personal qualities, and social custom invites them to expect a degree of temperamental congeniality after marriage which has no parallel in any other kind of human relationship. Such are the domestic miseries of so flagrantly disregarding observable consequences that Johnson comments, in the guise of a correspondent, "I am not so much inclined to 123s i wonder that marriage is sometimes unhappy, as that it appears so little loaded with calamity . . ." (R. 45; ' i III, 246). I The proper time for preserving health is while one 1 still enjoys it, but it is just then, in the prime of our vigor, that we have most difficulty in conceiving "the imbecillity that every hour is bringing upon us . . i (R. 43; III, 253). But the most astonishing manifesta- j tion of man's unwillingness to learn from observing the experience of others is his refusal to believe in the possibility of his own death: "perhaps if my readers will turn their thoughts back upon their old friends, they will find it difficult to call a single man to remembrance, who appeared to know that life was short till he was about to lose it" (R. 71; IV, 3). The state of ignorance in which each of us originally enters the world is particularly dangerous for those most inclined by nature to kindness and generosity. "He that endeavours to live for the good of others, must always be exposed to the arts of them who live only for themselves, unless he is . . . shewn at a distance the pitfals of treachery" (R. 175; V, 162). Nevertheless, despite his scant optimism concerning the possibility of guiding others by advice, Johnson frequently offers it through the indirect medium of the fictitious correspondents' memoirs. Such is the story of Misella the prostitute in Ramblers 170 and 171: j j Misella, the virtuous daughter of a gentleman, is forced by her parents' death and her subsequent impoverishment i to live upon the bounty of a cousin; his kindness over the years allays her suspicion and wins her gratitude. j When the cousin decides, at last, to make Misella his mistress, she has no power of resistance, but her ! remorse finally annoys him and he abandons her to the street, "the drudge of extortion and the sport of j drunkenness; sometimes the property of one man, and sometimes the common prey of accidental lewdness ..." (R. 171; V, 144). It is typical of Johnson to emphasize the ignorance of the errant individual rather than his wickedness. His attitude appears to be that people would act wisely and well if only they had the knowledge of doing so, and that their resistance to acquiring that knowledge is not a defect of personal character but of general human nature which, until it has been pointed out to him, the individual is powerless to resist. Johnson's position is thus the very antithesis of priggish morality. Psychological Conditions, 3: The Treachery of Imagination Of all the pitfalls which frustrate man in recon ciling himself to the limitations imposed upon him by physical nature, none is more powerful in its effect 125| than imagination. The time has fortunately passed when ! critics regarded the heading of Chapter kk of Rasselas t "The Dangerous Prevalence of Imagination," as evidence that Johnson believed too broad a dispersal of imagination ! i a bad thing; as the chapter itself clearly indicates, J prevalence means dominance. But the tradition lingers ; on, principally in the "perilous balance" theory, according! to which Johnson "feared" imagination, lest it fatally upset his wits. Johnson undeniably considered imagination ; a power to be treated with utmost respect, but his alleged "fear" is not supported by the general tenor of his argument. Johnson does not regard imagination as a separable faculty but as a necessary concomitant of reflective intelligence and of esthetic response. "Our sense of delight is in a great measure comparative, and arises at once from the sensations which we feel, and those which we remember . . ." (R. BO; IV, 56). "The time present is seldom able to fill desire or imagination with immediate enjoyment, and we are forced to supply its deficiencies by recollection or anticipation"^ (R. 203; V, 291). 2 To emphasize Johnson's esthetic modernity, I should like to cite Ralph Vaughan Williams, Some Thoughts on Beethoven’s Choral Symphony . . . (London and New York: Oxford liniv. Press, 1953)» p. 62: "It may indeed be argued that when we are actually hearing music the physical ear plays only a small part in our understanding of it. The physical ear can do no more than receive one moment of sound at a time, and our grasp of even the 1261 Indeed, imagination appears to be the very faculty which Johnson credits with making man a moral agent: The serious and impartial retrospect of our conduct is indisputably necessary to the confirma tion or recovery of virtue, and is, therefore, recommended under the name of self-examination, by divines, as the first act previous to repentance. It is, indeed, of so great use, that without it we should always be to begin life, be seduced for ever by the same allurements, and misled by the same fallacies. But in order that we may not lose the advantage of our exper ience, we must endeavour to see every thing in its proper form, and excite in ourselves those sentiments which the great author of nature has decreed the concomitants or followers of good or bad actions. (R. 8; III, kk) Such is the constructive employment of imagination; on the other hand, "Such is the pleasure of projecting, that many content themselves with a succession of visionary schemes, and wear out their allotted time in the calm amusement of contriving what they never attempt or hope to execute" (R. 20V; V, 310). If the imagination does not operate in conjunction with the reason, a distortion of individual perception may offset success itself. Thus "Hilarius" testifies in simplest tune depends on our power of remembering what has gone before and of coordinating it with what comes after. So that it seems that the mind and the memory play an even more important part than the ear in appreciating music." ■^Johnson was by no means unique in his view. Longinus wrote that "Grandeur is particularly dangerous when left on its own, unaccompanied by knowledge, unstead ied, unballasted, abandoned to mere impulse and ignorant temerity. It often needs the curb as well as the spur." On Sublimity, trans. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 127! I Rambler 101 that his having attained a reputation for wittiness caused him to lose his power of invention: "the power of pleasing is very often obstructed by the desire . . (R. 101; IV, 17^). Timidity is another ! unforeseen consequence of rising fame: \ No cause more frequently produces bashfulness I than too high an opinion of our own importance. i He that imagines an assembly filled with his merit, panting with expectation, and hushed with j attention, easily terrifies himself with the dread of disappointing them. . . . (R. 159; V, S4) And a person's desire for social popularity can suppress the sense of propriety that ordinarily tells him when to make necessary corrections: thus "Gelasimus," yearning ! to be a distinguished wit, finds reason to laugh very frequently in social gatherings: "The jest was indeed, a secret to all but himself, but habitual confidence in his own discernment, hindered him from suspecting any weakness or mistake" (R. 179; V, l&l). Imagination so greatly affects a person's percep tions of life that his observations of his associates may have little value in giving him standards whereby to form his expectations of happiness. In the first Press, 1965), p. 2 (Ch. I, 2). Similarly, Dryden wrote that "Imagination in a man, or reasonable creature, is supposed to participate of Reason. . . . Fancy and Reason go hand in hand; the first cannot leave the last behind: and though Fancy, when it sees the wide gulf, would venture over, as the nimbler, yet it is withheld by Reason, which will refuse to take the leap, when the distance over it appears too large." Essays of John Dryden, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1926J, I, I27-2S. place, a person can never be certain that his perceptions of others are not of mere surface appearance, for "iri the condition of men it frequently happens, that grief and anxiety lie hid under the golden robes of prosperity . . (R. 128; IV, 316). Furthermore, we easily misin terpret what others intend as candid self-disclosure, for "Every class of society has its cant of lamentation, which is understood or regarded by none but themselves; and every part of life has its uneasinesses, which those who do not feel them will not commiserate" (R. 128; IV, 317). So greatly are psychological perspectives affected by age, "so different are the colours of life, as we look forward to the future, or backward to the past ..." (R. 69; III, 365)jthat members of different generations commonly find themselves hopelessly at odds: This revolution of sentiments occasions a perpetual contest between the old and young. They who imagine themselves entitled to vener ation by the prerogative of longer life, are inclined to treat the notions of those whose conduct they superintend with superciliousness and contempt, for want of considering that the future and the past have different appearances . . . and that the miseries of life would be encreased beyond all human power of endurance, if we were to enter the world with the same opinions as we carry from it. (R. 196; V, 258) But the difficulty of observing others with accuracy provides a rational basis for the rule that "One of the great arts of escaping superfluous uneasiness, is 129 to free our minds from the habit of comparing our condi- i j tion with that of others on whom the blessings of life j i are more bountifully bestowed . . (R. 136; V, 211). ■ In aspiring to the possession of another's apparently j I i happy circumstances, we can never be sure that what we j i yearn for is substance and not mere appearance, but we j j can indeed be certain of one thing, that indulging the passion of envy will lessen that degree of happiness j which we find even now too small. Social Conditions: Man is a Social Creature Of all the frustrations which attend an individual's j endeavor to fulfill his aspirations, none are more immediately evident than those arising from his social nature. For human beings exist, effectively, in a social context: "The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness and safety, compels us to seek from one another assistance and support" (R. 104; IV, 190). Therefore, to regard a man's development as an individual phenomenon is to place it in an abstract and invalid perspective: "the boast of absolute independence is ridiculous and vain ..." (R. 6; III, 31)* Nor can considerations of personal fulfillment disregard the neces sity of social engagement as a medium for the exercise of individual subjective faculties, for "as the excellence of every power appears only in its operations, not to 130 have reason, and to have it useless and unemployed, is { nearly the same1 1 (R. 162; V, 95). j This social fact greatly complicates the pursuit i of happiness, for each individual member of society i aspires to a position of social dominance whereby he j would command all power, all respect, and all love. But, ! i paradoxically, were an individual to succeed in attaining j his goal of supremacy, he would remove himself from the i social milieu that both requires and enables him to exercise his subjective faculties; individuality cannot exist in a social vacuum. Therefore, each person's attaining a maximal degree of personal identity requires his learning to establish an economical relationship with others and to adopt a sincerely benevolent interest in their well-being. Man's social nature makes him vulnerable to the special social conditions of envy and self-interest. Rambler Ikk presents a memorable survey of the damage that rampant vanity inflicts upon society as well as upon the individuals who foolishly indulge in its exercise: It is impossible to mingle in conversation without observing the difficulty with which a new name makes its way into the world. The first appearance of excellence unites multitudes against it; unexpected opposition rises up on every side; the celebrated and the obscure join in the confederacy; subtilty furnishes arms to impudence, and invention leads on credulity. (v, 3) 131] i Although the initial assaults may be led by those ' who fear their reputations directly endangered by the success of the newcomer, "when war is once declared, volunteers flock to the standard, multitudes follow the camp only for want of employment, and flying squadrons j are dispersed to every part, so pleased with an opportunity of mischief that they toil without prospect of praise, and pillage without hope of profit" (V, A). These j j disparagers may be classified, according to their preferred! style of attack, as Whisperers, Roarers, and Moderators; and by their arts "the envious, the idle, and peevish, and ; the thoughtless, obstruct that worth which they cannot equal, and by artifices thus easy, sordid, and detestable, is industry defeated, beauty blasted, and genius depressed: (V, 7). Social ambition thus places an individual in a dilemma. On the one hand, "Distinction is so pleasing to the pride of man, that a great part of the pain and pleasure of life arises from the gratification or disappointment of an incessant wish for superiority ..." (R. 164; V, 106). But at the same time, "When once a man has made celebrity necessary to his happiness, he has put it in the power of the weakest and most timorous malignity, if not to take away his satisfaction, at least to withhold it" (R. 146; V, 13)* 132 Another perverse consequence of socially-oriented j personal ambition is a tendency to create artificial distinctions of value. Although there are so many differ- ' ent kinds of people in the world that everyone should have i friends in profusion, social vanity directs our attention away from the individuals whom we are qualified to please and causes us instead to court acceptance by those with i whom we are essentially incompatible. We thereby condemn | i ourselves to live "in a state of unsocial separation, ; without tenderness and without trust" (R. 160; V, S6). As with any other kind of aspiration, social approval is subject to the limitations of time and chance; and, in addition, it is affected by the natural self absorption of each individual. Even the utmost degree of human glory, being able to help or harm only an insignifi cant number of persons, fades almost before it blooms. The harsh truth is that most individuals, whether lovers, soldiers, courtiers, or businessmen, are so deeply engrossed in their private affairs that they have no inclination to extend their thoughts beyond their immedi ate spheres of activity: It is long before we are convinced of the small proportion which every individual bears to the collective body of mankind; or learn how few can be interested in the fortune of any single man.... It seems not to be sufficiently considered how little renown can be admitted in the world. Mankind are kept perpetually busy by their fears or desires, and have not more leisure from their own affairs, than to acquaint themselves with ; the accidents of the current day. (R. 146; V, 15, 16) ; Thus, where society expects neither mischief nor benefit, "the only motive to the mention or remembrance of others ' is curiosity; a passion . . . easily confined, overborn, j or diverted from any particular object" (R. ll£; IV, 267). j Functional Aspects of the Conditions of Life So severe seem "the conditions on which the goods of life are given" when they are enumerated one by one that "gloomy" scarcely seems adequate in characterizing them. But Johnson's morality cannot be described simply by cataloguing admonitions and prohibitions. A functional principle is also involved, the conception of personal economy already mentioned in Chapter II. Happiness consists partly in knowing what choices to make and partly in knowing how to regulate the measure of those choices, for Providence has fixed the limits of human enjoyment by immoveable boundaries, and has set different gratifications at such a distance from each other, that no art or power can bring them together. . . . Of two objects tempting at a distance on contrary sides it is impossible to approach one but by receding from the other; by long deliberation and dilatory projects, they may be both lost, but can never be both gained. (R. 17^; V, 173) 134 The only reasonable course is to compromise: Among many parallels which men of imagination have drawn between the natural and moral state of the world, it has been observed that happiness, as well as virtue, consists in mediocrity; that to avoid every extreme is necessary, even to him who has no other care than to pass through the present state with ease and safety; and that the middle path is the road of security, on either side of which are not only the pitfals of vice, but the precipices of ruin. Even the gifts of nature, which may truly be considered as the most solid and durable of all terrestrial advantages, are found, when they exceed the middle point, to draw the possessor into many calamities, easily avoided by others that have been less bountifully enriched or adorned. (R. 36; III, 206) Thus, To walk with circumspection and steadiness in the right path, at an equal distance between the extremes of error, ought to be the constant endeavour of every reasonable being. . . . (R. 25; III, 137) In explaining the manner in which Johnson expresses this advice throughout The Rambler, I shall first discuss the consequences of personal imbalance, then the attainment of personal economy. The Contradictory Function Every desire, however innocent, grows dangerous, as by long indulgence it becomes ascendant in the mind. (R. 207; V, 312) Not imagination only, but every aspect whatever of human behavior can become "dangerous" as it is allowed to prevail beyond its proper degree of influence. "Thus 135! i men may be made inconstant by virtue and by vice, by too much or too little thought . . ." (R. 63; III, 339). For | example, a person should not demand perfection habitually j in small matters lest he develop a sensibility so acute that he will receive pain where others find pleasure. j Such is the situation of "the peevish man" characterized J in Rambler 112, whose nurturing of "an artificial fastidi- ! ousness" "proceeds from an unreasonable persuasion of the importance of trifles." Just as it is in every man's interest to be pleased, so it is his obligation to please others: "It is therefore not less necessary to happiness than to virtue, that he rid his mind of passions which I make him uneasy to himself, and hateful to the world, which enchain his intellects, and obstruct his improve ment" (R. 112; IV, 236). In dealing with excessive indulgence of any sort, Johnson usually does not denounce it as a transgression against moral law but simply points out that it intensi fies present dissatisfaction: it almost always happens, that the man who grows rich changes his notions of poverty. . . . Thus in time want is enlarged without bounds . . . only because we do not sufficiently consider . . . that the claims of vanity, being without limits, must be denied at last. . . . (R. 36; III, 206) The claims must be denied because they are contradictory; in growing great they destroy the very grounds of satisfaction. Hamet and Easchid, for example, two shepherds of India, pray for water in a time of drought; the Genius of Distribution materializes and asks each to specify the quantity of water he requires. Hamet asks for and receives a stream which runs moderately at all seasons, but Raschid, through demanding that the Ganges be diverted through his fields, is swept away in a flood and eaten by a crocodile (R. 3$; III, 209-10). The implicit moral of the tale is, as Johnson writes in a later number, that Every man is rich or poor, according to the proportion between his desires and enjoyments; any enlargement of wishes is therefore equally destructive to happiness with the diminution of possession, and he that teaches another to long for what he never shall obtain, is no less an enemy to his quiet than if he had robbed him of part of his patrimony. (R. 163; V, 100-01) Aspiration should be commensurate with the conditions of the particular context; they must be neither too high nor too low. Uncontrolled petty curiosity can stultify busy and excursive minds, sinking ’’ the historian to a genealogist, the philosopher to a journalist of the weather, and the mathematician to a constructer of dials" (R. 103; IV, 187). Nugaculus, for example, a person of notable "liveliness of imagination, quickness of sagacity, and extent of knowledge" but lacking a particular purpose in life, has "given up his mind to employments that engross, but do not improve it.” He devotes himself to acquiring the secret histories of local families, an activity in which he sinks virtually to the level of a spy and grows daily more feared and hated throughout his neighborhood (R. 103; IV, lS7-$9)• Every cultivation of special talent is fraught with hazards. The solitary individual may not only cultivate a degree of "artificial fastidiousness" that will destroy his good temper but he risks removing himself from the social context necessary for effective intellectual effort. We are taught by Celsus, that health is best preserved by avoiding settled habits of life, and deviating sometimes into slight aberrations from the laws of medicine; by varying the proportions of food and exercise, interrupting the succes sions of rest and labour, and mingling hardships with indulgence. . . . He that too long observes nice punctualities, condemns himself to voluntary imbecillity, and will not long escape the miseries of disease. [R. 112; IV, 231) Scholars are particularly susceptible to this failing, for "Severe and connected attention is preserved but for a short time," and a person who isolates himself for meditation or study finds his thoughts continually stealing away from the subject, his attention returning finally "as from a dream, without knowing when he forsook it, or how long he has been abstracted from it." Although differences in the productivity of scholars arise from various causes, it is probable that "the most recluse are not the most vigorous prosecutors of study." They give appearance of exemplary diligence, but, ’’in reality, give themselves up to the luxury of fancy ..." (R. $9; IV, 105). A man who wishes to be wise, useful, and esteemed must break his captivity to "the art of regaling his mind with those airy gratifications" (IV, 106). He may take up a subordinate line of study in the hope of finding refreshment, but all study requires solitude, and that means risking destruction of the viable equilibrium between subjective and objective influences. A consequence even worse, perhaps, than frustration sometimes occurs to persons attempting a greater degree of superiority than their circumstances of life afford: they may be entirely unaware that they are making a ridiculous spectacle, so that they rage on unchecked by self-appraisal. Such persons are presented occasionally Ihe Rambler with great "biter-bit" dramatic irony. "Zosima," for example, a newly impoverished young woman of good family, relates in Rambler 12 how, in her quest for suitable employment in London, prospective employers consistently make her the object of their contemptuous and condescending witticisms; but she writes with such an ingenuous air of good breeding and gentility that she turns the tables on her would-be tormentors, and it is they, not "Zosima," whom the reader regards as contemptible. Similarly, in Rambler 55» an anonymous young woman reports that her development is being suppressed by her mother, 139 who, still coveting the favors of youth, finds a grown i daughter embarrassing evidence of her own ripe maturity. j I i In these as in most of The Rambler's presentations I I of contradictory consequences, the story is that of the ! person being frustrated; the effect of this direction of j i interest is to emphasize the necessity for vulnerable j j persons to develop adequate defenses. Johnson thus takes ; the stance not of the stern moralist who forbids conduct j but of the kindly counselor who deliberates on ways of circumventing obstacles to happiness. The Economical Function The principle of economy, of the effective deploy ment of personal resources, has already been mentioned briefly in Chapter II. I have previously discussed in this chapter the main categories of conditions requiring regulation, those of biology, chance, psychology, and society, and I have indicated Johnson's belief that excess of any human quality contradicts its own end. It remains to be shown exactly how The Rambler offers economy as a practical goal of personal life. Self-interest is the fundamental principle that ties together the various aspects of Johnson's appeal for the reader's balancing of forces; specifically, he appeals to the pride we naturally take in being independent, self directing entities. One of the complaints uttered by Milton's Samson, in the anguish of blindness, is, that he shall pass his life under the direc tion of others; that he cannot regulate his conduct by his own knowledge, but must lie at the mercy of those who undertake to guide him. (E. 162; V, 95) Accordingly, Johnson consistently emphasizes the necessity of the reader's having a firm sense of identity and of his following an ethic of self-realization. To some extent, he employs flattery: "scarce any man becomes eminently disagreeable but by a departure from his real character . . (R. 179; V, 177)- Similarly, for the motto of Rambler 6 Johnson translates two lines from Boethius as, Unless the soul, to vice a thrall, Desert her own original.A (R. 6; III, 31) Such passages should not be construed as indicating that Johnson leaned toward a Shaftesburian doctrine of the innate goodness of man; they merely indicate his willing ness to emphasize partial truths for immediate tactical advantage. In the two statements just cited, Johnson disregards the fallen aspect of man's nature in order to stress its divine origin. ^"Boethius, Gonsolatio, III, 6.9* In contrast, see Johnson's more candid position on original sin as Boswell recorded it. He begins, "With respect to original sin, the inquiry is not necessary; for whatever is the cause of human corruption, men are evi dently and confessedly so corrupt, that all the laws of heaven and earth are insufficient to restrain them from crimes." Life, IV, 123-2J+. 141 At other times, Johnson plays on our fear of I ridicule: "almost all absurdity of conduct arises from i the imitation of those whom we cannot resemble" (R. 135; i IV, 351)* The only preventative for making ourselves ; unknowingly ridiculous is self-knowledge coordinated with j empirical knowledge of the world's demands and opportun ities: "This is that conquest of the world and of ourselves, which has always been considered as the perfection of human nature ..." (R. 7; III, 40). But Johnson's offering his readers a "to thine own self be true" ethic is more than just rhetorical strategy. ; It has a sound basis in practical psychology, for Johnson j j is, in effect, urging us to avoid the personality config uration known to moderns as the neurotic— the person who is miserable because he cannot reconcile himself to fore going certain advantages which are incompatible with others which he also desires. In presenting the character of "Gulosolus," for example, Johnson observes that Nothing produces more singularity of manners and inconstancy of life, than the conflict of opposite vices in the same mind. He that uniformly pursues any purpose, whether good or bad, has a settled principle of action, and as he may always find associates who are travelling the same way, is countenanced by example, and sheltered in the multitude; but a man actuated at once by different desires must move in a direction peculiar to himself. . . . (R- 206; V, 305-06) The particular techniques which The Rambler recom mends for achieving personal economy employ five assump tions: (1) that happiness arises only from activity; 142; (2) that imagination can be used constructively; (3) that i most conditions are good or bad according to their degree of manifestation; (4) that ambition is paradoxical, in that it directs man toward his destruction as well as toward his salvation; and (5) that all endeavor should be informed by a humane pragmatism. Economical Function, 1: Happiness Consists in Activity Although circumstances can prevent happiness, they cannot confer it. This fact is most tellingly demon strated by surveying the example of material wealth: When . . . the desire of wealth is taking hold of the heart, let us look round and see how it operates upon those whose industry, or fortune, has obtained it. When we find them oppressed with their own abundance, luxurious without pleasure, idle without ease, impatient and querulous in themselves, and despised or hated by the rest of mankind, we shall soon be convinced that if the real wants of our condition are satisfied, there remains little to be sought with solicitude, or desired with eagerness. (R. 53; HI, 313) Such is the knowledge to which Almamoulin of Samarkand finally comes after vainly endeavoring to purchase happiness with the riches bequeathed him by his father. Utterly baffled at last, Almamoulin seeks out an old philosopher, who gives him this advice: "Brother," said the philosopher, "thou hast suffered thy reason to be deluded by idle hopes, and fallacious appearances. Having long looked with desire upon riches, thou hadst taught thyself to think them more valuable than nature designed them, and to expect from them, what experience has now taught thee, that they 143 cannot give. That they do not confer wisdom, thou mayst be convinced, . . . That they cannot bestow fortitude or magnanimity. . . . That they will not supply unexhausted pleasure. . . . That they rarely purchase friends, thou didst soon discover. ..." (R. 120; IV, 279-80) I On the other hand, Ajut and Anningait, the tragical j Greenland lovers who lack every convenience which a ' European considers necessary for basic comfort, would nevertheless be happy if only they could fulfill their love for each other (R. 186 and 187)• Human beings are created for action, not mere thinking: "upon practice, not upon opinion, depends the happiness of mankind ..." (R. 81; IV, 6l). And the restlessness of which ambition is the most conspicuous manifestation is a general, innate characteristic of the human soul: It is necessary to that perfection of which our present state is capable, that the mind and body should both be kept in action; that neither the faculties of the one nor of the other be suffered to grow lax or torpid for want of use. . . . (R. 85; IV, 84) No principle is more fundamental to the moral position of The Rambler. It accounts for the contempt with which Johnson always mentions Stoicism, which, being "An attempt to preserve life in a state of neutrality and indiffer ence, is unreasonable and vain" (R. 47; III» 256). From the same cause arises Johnson's apparent impatience with sorrow: 144' Sorrow is properly that state of the mind in which our desires are fixed upon the past, without looking forward to the future, an inces sant wish that something were otherwise than it has been, a tormenting and harrassing want of some enjoyment or possession which we have lost, and which no endeavours can possibly regain. (R. 47; III, 254) Implicit in this argument is the premise that man must j find the strength to accept the burden and the pain of his imperfect nature, his fallen state; the "separate peace" of Stoicism is a rejection of the divinely i ordained difficulty of life. "The utmost excellence at which humanity can arrive, is a constant and determinate pursuit of virtue ..." (R. 1&5; V, 209)• In this insistence on the impossibility of entirely ameliorating the severity of human imperfection consists the most austere aspect of The Rambler's philosophy. Johnson consistently refuses his readers the slightest hope of finding happiness through coming into possession of any particular circumstances whatever, neither of material, social, nor of psychological character. In so strictly refusing his readers any expectation for happiness through worldly opportunities, Johnson may be charged with manifesting Christian asceticism. It is undoubtedly true that there is some degree of such influence; however, unlike the typical Christian mystic (but perfectly in consonance with the neoclassical atti tude) , Johnson emphasizes not the losing but the saving of life. Man has been given his peculiarly imperfect nature for reasons that must lie forever beyond his knowledge, but one thing is certain: he must struggle to realize his temporal nature, attempting neither to deny it nor to rise above it. He that never extends his view beyond the praises or rewards of men, will be dejected by neglect and envy, or infatuated by honours and applause. But the consideration that life is only deposited in his hands to be employed in obedience to a Master who will regard his endeavours, not his success, would have preserved him from trivial elations and discouragements, and enabled him to proceed with constancy and chearfulness, neither enervated by commendation, nor intimidated by censure. (R. 127; IV, 315) Although a religious perspective alone can sustain a man in pursuing the duties of life, he must never make the mistake of assuming that he enjoys the benefit of private communication with divine intelligence and that he has thereby risen above the concerns of common mortals. No man is allowed such conviction of felicity. One assumption that Johnson's religious perspective did allow him to make, however, was that, since the world and all its creatures were created by a divine intelligence, it must be conformable to the divine intention for mankind to adopt the position of protecting and conserving living forces. We should not seek spiritual excellence in retirement but engage ourselves in forwarding the ongoing processes of life. The greatest degree of personal liberty is therefore attained, paradoxically, by breaking out of the prison of the self; a person 146"! ; must, in opposition to the Stoick precept, | teach his desires to fix upon external things; j he must adopt the joys and the pains of others, j and excite in his mind the want of social i pleasures and amicable communication. (R. 39; IV, 10V) j Nor is Johnson advocating the merely dogged pursuit of a cheerless altruism; his morality includes the positive 1 i obligation to nurture and sustain our own delight in the j j living world: i i The great resolution to be formed . . . is, that no part of life be spent in a state of neutrality or indifference; but that some pleasure be found for every moment that is not devoted to labour; and that, whenever the necessary business of life grows irksome or disgusting, an immediate transition be made to diversion and gaiety. (R. 39; IV, 107-03) By observing the manner in which the mind and the emotions naturally behave, we can see that our chief £ pleasures arise from little things frequently diversified. This position is not offered as a weak rationalization of human ineffectuality. It is Johnson's view that by allowing ourselves to be pleased by petty occurrences we are conforming more closely to the fundamental character of all natural phenomena: See Hesther Lynch Piozzi, Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson, L.L.D. . . . in Miscellanies, I, 208: "Nothing indeed more surely disgusted Or. Johnson than hyperbole; he loved not to be told of sallies of excel lence, which he said were seldom valuable, and seldom true. 'Heroic virtues (said he) are the bons mots of life; they do not appear often, and when they do appear are too much prized I think. . . . But life is made up of little things; and that character is the best which does little but repeated acts of beneficence. . . .'" As providence has made the human soul an active being, always impatient for novelty, and struggling for something yet unenjoyed with unwearied progression, the world seems to have been eminently adapted to this disposition of the mind: it is formed to raise expectations by constant vicissitudes, and to obviate satiety by perpetual change. Wherever we turn our eyes, we find something to revive our curiosity, and engage our attention. In the dusk of the morning we watch the rising of the sun, and see the day diversify the clouds and open new prospects in its gradual advance. After a few hours, we see the shades lengthen, and the light decline, till the sky is resigned to a multitude of shining orbs different from each other in magnitude and splendour. The earth varies its appearance as we move upon it; the woods offer their shades, and the fields their harvests; the hill flatters with an extensive view, and the valley invites with shelter, fragrance and flowers. (R. 30; IV, 55-56) An essential aspect of happiness thus consists, according to The Rambler, in one's learning to respond to the variety of life by accepting the principle of 7 concordia discors, "that suitable disagreement which is always necessary to intellectual harmony" (R. 167; V, 124). As a personal intellectual discipline it anticipates Keats's principle of "negative capability": "that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & 7 'Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1929)j P* 323 (Epistles, I, xii, 19)* The phrase is, of course, common in Latin literature. HS| d i reason. . . ." And as a religious ethic of universal world-affirmation it anticipates Albert Schweitzer1s i "Reverence for Life."^ ' Economical Function, 2: Imagination Can Be Used Constructively The whole moral character of economy depends upon i the exercise of the imaginative faculty. For the imagina- j i tion, which can cause us to waste lifetimes gazing into I futurity or dwelling on the past, can also enable us to ! bear in mind all the diverse circumstances which, operating together, shape the character of our worldly existence. As I have contended previously in this paper, Johnson by no means invariably depreciates the value of imagination. Where imagination is allowed to run unchecked, to prevail over the reasoning and perceptual d The Letters of John Keats: 1&L4-1&21, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), I, 193 (dated December 21, 27 [?], 1&L7). q 7"If man affirms his will-to-live, he acts naturally and honestly. He confirms an act which has already been accomplished in his instinctive thought by repeating it in his conscious thought. The beginning of thought, a beginning which continually repeats itself, is that man does not simply accept his existence as something given, but experiences it as something unfathomably mysterious. Affirmation of life is the spiritual act by which man ceases to live unreflectively and begins to devote himself to his life with reverence in order to raise it to its true value. To affirm life is to deepen, to make more inward, and to exalt the will-to-live." Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949J, p.T5^ 149 faculties, it becomes indeed "dangerous," threatening the unique synthesis which each individual must make in I reconciling his aspirations with the opportunities provided: by circumstance. For this reason, the imagination requires constant supervision: "The use of travelling is to regulate imagination by reality, and instead of thinking! how things may be, to see them as they are."^ But that ! Johnson had no intention of attempting to deny or ] suppress the faculty of imagination any more than other ! natural human powers seems evident in this statement: It is always pleasing to observe, how much more our minds can conceive, than our bodies can perform} yet it is our duty, while we continue in this complicated state, to regulate one part of our constitution by some regard to the other. (R. 17; III, 97) Johnson first directly proposes the constructive use of imagination in Rambler S. He begins by mentioning the perplexing fact that the mind remains relatively unengaged even during the most tumultuous physical activity; from this discrepancy between intellectual power and corporeal opportunity Johnson infers the necessity of schooling the mind, of teaching reason to control the imagination. Although memory, for example, places mankind in the class of moral beings, Its exercise cannot be given absolute license, for "The recollection of the past ^Letters, I, 359 (no. 326); written to Mrs. Thrale during the Highland Tour. is only useful by way of provision for the future ..." (R. 3; III, Alt-) • We must learn to employ the memory for practical purposes of personal and social well-being. The imagination is itself an agency of control that enables us to direct our emotions beneficially; it is the imagination which makes it possible for us to maintain productive application of our faculties in spite of discouragement (R. 25), to endure bereavement (R. 52), and simply to realize that we are happy (R. 150). Furthermore, it is imagination that enables us to adjust our feelings to others, to respond with natural and spontaneous morality: All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination, that realises the event however fictitious, or approximates it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while the deception lasts, whatever motions would be excited by the same good or evil happen ing to ourselves.il (R* 60; III, 313-19) Various aspects of human activity cannot be performed at all without the assistance of a disciplined imagination. For example, working toward any predetermined HCompare Aristotle: "Pity we may define as a sense of pain at what we take to be an evil of a destructive or painful kind, which befalls one who does not deserve it, which we think we ourselves or some one allied to us might likewise suffer, and when this possibility seems near at hand." The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (New Yorlf: Appieton-Uentury-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. 120 (Bk. II, 3). Sympathetic response is a fundamental premise of the rhetorical theories offered by Adam Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments and George Campbell's Philosophy "oT "Rhetoric . 151! ! goal requires that we bear the objective in mind in the ! midst of apparently unrelated present circumstances: "He j | that directs his steps to a certain point, must frequently i turn his eyes to that place which he strives to reach; he i that undergoes the fatigue of labour, must solace his weariness with the contemplation of its reward" (R. 2; i III, 10). Were it not that imagination enables us to look ' beyond the present, life’s apparently endless succession , of trials and calamities would seem unendurable: "Thus j every period of life is obliged to borrow its happiness ; from the time to come" (R. 203; V, 293-94)* And such exercise of the mind is not merely a pragmatic technique for surviving momentary circumstances but an element of man's most profound obligation: "The great task of him, who conducts his life by the precepts of religion, is to make the future predominate over the present . . (R. 7; III, 37-36). Paradoxically, a well-regulated imaginative view of existence enables us really to live in the present, "the only time which we can call our own . . ." (R. 29; III, 162). For the present time, insofar as we are conscious of it as distinct from past and future, is largely a psychological construction: Indeed, almost all that we can be said to enjoy is past or future; the present is in perpetual motion, leaves us as soon as it arrives, ceases to be present before its presence is well 152 perceived, and is only known to have existed by the effects which it leaves behind. (R. 41; III, 223-24) Our sense of the present consists of an imaginative context of time (now and then) and of place (here and there). The persons satirized for their inability to find present contentment are lacking in precisely this contextual facility. Thus the bored young people who profess themselves unable to endure the country during the off-season are unable to relate their present experience to what they remember and what they anticipate (R. 42, 46, 124, 135). Thus also the peevish man characterized in Rambler 112 becomes angry upon petty provocations, such as are incident to understandings not far extended beyond the instincts of animal life; but unhappily he that fixes his attention on things always before him, will never have long cessations of anger. (R. 112; IV, 233) The person who has learned to control his imagina tion, however, is psychologically versatile; he has acquired the ability to transcend the limited gratifica tions of immediate circumstances. An anonymous fictitious correspondent demonstrates, through recounting "the revolutions of a garret," how imagination, working with perception, can enliven the passage of an otherwise drab life. Fabricating the histories of the various tenants of the garret he now occupies enables the purported writer to regard it as a place with an interesting 1531 history and to observe that "amusement and instruction i are always at hand for those who have skill and willingness! to find them . , (R. l6l; V, 94) • i Economical Functions, More and Less j j The classical doctrine of mediocrity has a rhetorical counterpart in the technique of "more and less," whereby situations are defined by estimating their relative position between two poles of possibility. In The Rambler's! - — | morality, most human characteristics are considered good or bad according to their intensity, and perhaps only those which absolutely nullify the forward progression of life, such as envy, sorrow, and resignation, are to be avoided in every degree of manifestation. The frequency with which Johnson employs this comparative approach in evaluating behavior belies his characterisation as a strictly logical moralist. Actually, he rarely argues from fixed premises but proceeds instead by a process of approximation, endeavoring to balance what he obviously regards as essentially unstable values. For example, Johnson writes in Rambler 17$ that "The reigning error of mankind is, that we are not content with the conditions on which the goods of life are granted" (R. 17B; V, 174). Human beings have an inherent tendency to forget their present advantages, to reach for those they fancy their associates enjoy, and in doing so lose 154j everything. But instead of condemning this character istic, Johnson appeals to our desire to keep what we | j have, employing the tactic of more and less to suggest j that the reader need only claim his estate as a man in | order to enjoy the highest attainment possible in his present state: it is not necessary that any one should aspire j to heroism or sanctity, but only, that he j should resolve not to quit the rank which | nature assigns him, and wish to maintain the i dignity of a human being. (R. 1&3; V, 200) | Johnson frequently applies the technique of more and less to point out common grounds whereby apparently antithetical positions can be reconciled. For example, the "individual" is popularly regarded as opposed to "society." But the two categories are really but differ ent degrees of accounting for single persons, and neither "individual" nor "society" is a meaningful term unless the other is at least implicitly balanced against it. Society cannot, by definition, exist without component elements, and it is no less valid to say that personal identity becomes psychologically possible only when an individual is a functioning member of a social context. Preserving the social circumstances which define individual identity therefore requires compromise, for in the long run each man's enjoyment of society depends upon the economical development of all other members. Thus, the 155 passion for the honour of a profession, like that for the grandeur of our own country, is to be regulated not extinguished. . . . Every man ought to endeavour at eminence, not by pulling others down, but by raising himself. . . . (R. 9; III, 50) Each man's happiness depends upon that of every other individual. The technique of more and less has a practical application through enabling us to temper our responses to others’ behavior. So long as "pride" is regarded as fundamentally opposed to "modesty," we reject all its manifestations, but through recognizing in ourselves the constant pressure of ambition and its subtle disguises we become able to respond tolerantly to an old friend whose imagination has for a time yielded to the intoxica tion of success: Nothing has been longer observed, than that a change of fortune causes a change of manners; and that it is difficult to conjecture from the conduct of him whom we see in a low condi tion, how he would act, if wealth and power were put into his hands. {R. 172; V, 146) Common sense, if not our own experience, will tell us that "He that has long lived within sight of pleasures, which he could not reach, will need more than common moderation, not to lose his reason in unbounded riot, when they are first put into his power" (R. 172; V, 147-4$). Further more, eminent persons, like beautiful women and the iso lated gentry of remote counties, do not experience the casual censures which correct the vagaries of ordinary folk, and their judgment is consequently unusually vulnerable: Virtue is sufficiently difficult with any circumstances, but the difficulty is increased when reproof and advice are frighted away. In common life, reason and conscience have only the appetites and passions to encounter, but in higher stations, they must oppose artifice and adulation. He therefore, that yields to such temptations, cannot give those who look upon his miscarriage much reason for exultation, since few can justly presume that from the same snare they should have been able to escape (R. 172; V, 150) Such is Johnson’s position in presenting "Asper's" account of visiting his nouveau riche friend "Prospero." The character of Prospero is not (as it is generally rea so much a satirical portrait of David Garrick as a plea for our tolerant response to such a person. Johnson departs in this essay from his customary ironical presentation of the fictitious correspondents' letters by adding two paragraphs of editorial commentary to "Asper's" carping complaints: Though I am not wholly insensible of the provocations which my correspondent has received, I cannot altogether commend the keenness of his resentment. . . . One of the golden precepts of Pythagoras directs that "a friend should not be hated for little faults." . . . Such impropri eties [as Prospero’s] often proceed rather from stupidity than malice. Those who thus shine only to dazzle, are influenced merely by custom and example. . . . They are often innocent of the pain which their vanity produces, and insult others when they have no worse purpose than to please themselves. (R. 200; V, 250-Sl) Through employing the technique of more and less in The Rambler, Johnson demonstrates his radical freedom from dogmatism in approaching deliberative issues and suggests that his use of antithetical construction was not mere mechanical habit. More and less is a sophisti cated inductive procedure for defining a position by postulating two unknowns; it is an abstract intellectual equivalent of the artillery gunner's system of locating a target's range by deliberately firing one round "long” and one "short." Because in applying this method Johnson is demonstrating his courageous empiricism, his acceptance of an uncertain world— qualities many critics are still unwilling to grant him— I have collected in Appendix B a more extensive group of examples than the scope of this chapter permits. Economical Functions, 4-: The.Paradox of Ambition The technique of more and less applies most directly to the establishing of personal economy in that man's quest for superiority provides both the greatest danger of his destruction and the greatest hope of his redemption. Johnson's position in this respect is consistent with his assumption that, "As providence has made the human soul an active being, always impatient for novelty, and struggling for something yet unenjoyed with unwearied progression . . (R. SO; IV, 55-56), imagination and ambition have moral uses if we can but discover them. Johnson’s premise is that the soul of man, formed for eternal life, naturally springs forward beyond the limits of corporeal existence, and rejoices to consider herself as cooperating with future ages, and as co-extended with endless duration. (R. 49; III, 266) Properly directed, man's restless aspiration can exert the most powerful of all incentives to moral reflection, for, in social and historical perspective, individual actions are but all too immortal. Although the present moment, once passed, may seem gone forever, and "though its actual existence be inconceivably short yet its effects are unlimited, and there is not the smallest point of time but may extend its consequences . . . through all eternity . . (R. 41J III, 225). He who aspires to the performance of immortal deeds actually has opportunities in the most humble of circum stances, for any person whose merit has enlarged his influence can take pride in serving as a model worthy of emulation: The true satisfaction which is to be drawn from the consciousness that we shall share the attention of future times, must arise from the hope, that, with our name, our virtues will be propagated. . . . (R. 49; III, 26$) Even in discussing the circumstances of social happiness, therefore, Johnson avoids making a dogmatic denunciation of ambition: 159] 1 To gain the favour, and hear the applauses of our contemporaries, is indeed equally desirable with any other prerogative of superiority, because fame may be of use to smooth the paths of life, to terrify opposition, and fortify j tranquillity. . . . (R. 4 9; III, 265) It is man's nature to aspire, and aspire he must if he i is to fulfill the purpose of his being. The ends of life are hidden from us; we must accept our nature as it is j i given, with all its paradoxical confusion of strengths | I and weaknesses; j Irresolution and mutability are often the faults of men, whose views are wide, and whose imagination is vigorous and excursive, because they cannot confine their thoughts within their own boundaries of action, but are continually ranging over all the scenes of human existence. . . . Thus they are busied with a perpetual succession of schemes, and pass their lives in alternate elation and sorrow, for want of that calm and immoveable acquiescence in their condition, by which men of slower understandings are fixed for ever to a certain point, or led on in the plain beaten track, which their fathers, and grandsires, have trod before them. (R. 63J III, 337) Indeed, it is the very insatiability of man's ambition to which Johnson directs our attention as a strong proof of the superior and celestial nature of the soul of man. We have no reason to believe that other creatures have higher faculties, or more extensive capacities, than the preservation of themselves, or their species, requires; they seem . . . to have no exuberance of understanding to lay out upon curiosity or caprice, but to have their minds exactly adapted to their bodies. . . . (R. 41; III, 222) That Johnson thus respected human ambition provides a different basis upon which to evaluate his opposition to envy, peevishness, parental tyranny, and all forms of profligate wastefulness. Such excesses frustrate not only society's happiness and self-fulfillment but also that of the individual indulging in them: Almost every other crime is practised by the help of some quality which might have produced esteem or love, if it had been well employed; but envy is mere unmixed and genuine evil; it pursues a hateful end by despicable means, and desires not so much its own happiness as another's misery. (R. 1^3; V, 200) Likewise, the parental tyrant's severity serves none whatever of life's objectives: Even though no consideration should be paid to the great law of social beings, by which every individual is commanded to consult the happiness of others, yet the harsh parent is less to be vindicated than any other criminal, because he less provides for the happiness of himself. Every man, however little he loves others, would willingly be loved; every man hopes to live long, and therefore hopes for that time at which he shall sink back to imbecillity, and must depend for ease and chearfulness upon the officiousness of others. But how has he obviated the incon- veniencies of old age, who alienates from him the assistance of his children, and whose bed must be surrounded in his last hours, in the hours of langour and dejection, of impatience and of pain, by strangers to whom his life is indifferent, or by enemies to whom his death is desirable? (R. 148; V, 26) But the remedy does not demand that the reader "quit the rank which nature assigns him”: Upon an attentive and impartial review of the argument, it will appear that the love of fame is to be regulated, rather than extinguished; and that men should be taught not to be wholly careless about their memory, but to endeavour that they may be remembered chiefly for their virtues, since no other reputation will be able to transmit any pleasure beyond the grave. (R. 49; III, 266) Economical Functions, 5: Humane Pragmatism Discipline of the imagination consists above all in keeping the attention directed toward the realities of human life. Nothing is more foolish than "When a man employs himself upon . . . questions which cannot be resolved, and of which the solution would conduce very little to the advancement of happiness . . (R. 24; III, 131). Our proper business is with the present human situation and with practical virtue. Rambler 199 employs extravagant satirical irony in depicting an inventor's perverse disregard for human reality. "Hermeticus," the purported author, begins: Though you have seldom digressed from moral subjects, I suppose you are not so rigorous or cynical as to deny the value or usefulness of natural philosophy; or to have lived in this age of inquiry and experiment, without any attention to the wonders every day produced by the pokers of magnetism and the wheels of electricity. At least, I may be allowed to hope that, since nothing is more contrary to moral excellence than Envy, you will not refuse to promote the happiness of others, merely because you cannot partake of their enjoyments. <R. 199; V, 271) After this insolence, "Hermeticus" proceeds to explain how, "While my contemporaries were touching needles and raising weights . . . I have been examining those qualities of magnetism which may be applied to the 162 accommodation and happiness of common life” (V, 272-73). He has invented, of all this world's unwanted things, a device for detecting unchastity in women, and he is exulting in the expectation that ladies everywhere will flock to purchase his contraption in order to demonstrate their virtue to the world. Such were the investigators to whom Johnson was referring when he wrote that the innovators whom I oppose are turning off attention from life to nature. They seem to think that we are placed here to watch the growth of plants, or the motions of the stars. Socrates was rather of opinion that what we had to learn was, how to do good and avoid evil.12 Even the pursuit of moral excellence can become "dangerous" if a man allows abstract ideals of conduct to engross his attention, for his practice will inevitably fall short and he will lose touch with society. "'Books,' says Bacon,' can never teach the use of books.' The student must learn by commerce with mankind to reduce his speculations to practice, and accommodate his knowledge to the purposes of life" (R. 137; IV, 363). A person conducting abstruse researches who can converse only on questions of which the greater part of mankind is ignorant must pass most of his time in silence, standing by helplessly because his training has fitted him to be ^Lives, I, 100 (Milton). 163 useful only on great occasions. One must take care lest j he refine himself beyond the range of humanity: I i I No degree of knowledge attainable by man is | able to set him above the want of hourly ' assistance, or to extinguish the desire of fond endearments, and tender officiousness; and therefore, no one should think it unneces sary to learn those arts by which friendship may be gained. (R. 137; IV, 364) j Thus pride, properly subdued, is a proper element of personal economy: man cannot deny with impunity the socialj i needs of the character which providence has furnished him. ! Conclusion Two opposing but complementary assumptions pervade Johnson's moral perspective: first, that the pursuit of individual happiness is a worthy endeavour, and second, that the advancement of social happiness is a necessary obligation. Although a particular number of The Rambler usually emphasizes either the personal or the social aspect of morality, virtually each essay involves both, in some measure. Johnson thus consistently expresses his arguments as a weighing and comparing of alternatives, thereby making a valid application of the rhetorical mode of deliberative discourse (his Dictionary illustrates deliberative by quoting Bacon's statement that "'In deliberatives, the point is, what is evil; and of good, what is greater; and of evil, what is less'"). Applying his own observation that "men more often require to be reminded than informed" (R. 2; III, 14-), Johnson endeavors ■^n The Rambler to teach the reader, not "right" and "wrong," but names and categories that will enable him to classify his own experience and thereby put to use his latent psychological resources. In taking the position that no life-directed human tendency is bad in the abstract, and that pride and envy, the sources of man-made evil, result from misdirected self-interest, Johnson is at one with his age: God loves from Whole to Parts: But human soul Must rise from Individual to the Whole. Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake, As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake. . . .13 The moral man is the only happy man, for he alone has succeeded in balancing the degree of development demanded by his faculties with the physical, social, and personal limitations of time and circumstance. CHAPTER IV ENLISTING THE READER'S SYMPATHIES The pragmatic strategy of teaching that Johnson had j 1 1 advocated in The Preceptor occurs throughout The Rambler. j ! He nowhere indulges in the delusion that he addresses an ■ i audience already grouped eagerly about the pontifical j chair. ! That few things are so liberally bestowed, or squandered with so little effect, as good advice, has been generally observed; and many sage positions have been advanced concerning the reasons of this complaint, and the means of removing it. (R. &7; IV, 93-94) Johnson recognises that the entire responsibility for inducing the readers' interest rests with the author: Whoever desires, for his writings or himself, what none can reasonably contemn, the favour of mankind, must add grace to strength, and make his thoughts agreeable as well as useful. Many complain of neglect who never tried to attract regard. It cannot be expected that the patrons of science or virtue should be solici tous to discover excellencies which they who possess them shade and disguise. Few have abil ities so much needed by the rest of the world as to be caressed on their own terms; and he that will not condescend to recommend himself by external embellishments, must submit to the fate of just sentiments meanly expressed, and be ridiculed and forgotten before he is understood. (R. 163; V, 129) 1 See discussion, Chapter I. 165 166 Furthermore, Johnson's knowledge of human psychology prevents his holding sanguinary expectations for the success of even the most obviously useful advice: Few that wander in the wrong way mistake it for the right; they only find it more smooth and flowery, and indulge their own choice rather than approve it: therefore few are persuaded to quit it by admonition or reproof, since it impresses no new conviction, nor confers any powers of action or resistance. (R. 155; V, 62) No one can be taught against his will: the observation of every day will give new proofs with how much industry subterfuges and evasions are sought to decline the pressure of resistless arguments, how often the state of the question is altered, how often the antagonist is wilfully misrepresented, and in how much perplexity the clearest positions are involved. . . . (R. 31; III, 169) Because it is necessary to have techniques for circum venting students' resistance to unfamiliar information, educational psychology exists: "The gratification of curiosity rather frees us from uneasiness than confers pleasure; we are more pained by ignorance than delighted by instruction" (R. 103; IV, 186). Students experience emotional stress because, although they can be motivated to learn only by being made aware of inadequacy in the present knowledge, the admission of inadequacy produces fear, and "All fear is in itself painful, and when it conduces not to safety is painful without use" (R. 29; III, 162). Truth is, indeed, not often welcome for its own sake; it is generally unpleasing because contrary to our wishes and opposite to our practice; and as our attention naturally follows our interest, we hear unwillingly what we are afraid to know, and soon forget what we have no inclination to impress upon our memories. (R. 96; IV, 149) Therefore, the would-be educator or social critic must know how to suggest plausible remedies while he discloses deficiencies or his audience will barricade their minds against him: For this reason many arts of instruction have been invented by which the reluctance against truth may be overcome; and as physick is given to children in confections, precepts have been hidden under a thousand appearances, that mankind may be bribed by pleasure to escape destruction.2 (R. 96; IV, 149) The writer may relieve the reader’s anxieties by employing the analytical techniques of reason to divide the problem into comprehensible stages; he may tempt the reader to relax his guard by drawing him into imaginative exper iences which gratify his vanity; and, most effective of all, the moralist may teach the reader to play, in his imagination, the role of instructor. 2 Compare Johnson's statement with this: "The principal End of Romance . . . is the Instruction of the Reader; . . . but because the Mind of Man naturally hates to be inform’d and (by the Influence of Self-Conceit) resists Instruction; 'tis to be deceived by the Blandish ments of Pleasure; and the Rigor of Precept is to be subdued by the Allurements of Example." Huetius, The History of Romances, trans. Stephen Lewis (London, 1715)» pp. 4-5; quoted by Jean Hagstrum, who offers it in contrast to his conception of Johnson’s entirely logical rhetorical method. Samuel Johnson’s Literary Criticism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), pV 168 The Appeal of Reason In using rational argument to clarify difficult questions and thereby elicit the reader's confidence, The Rambler adapts itself to the mind's natural tendency to approach problems using either the method of division (analysis) or of accumulation (synthesis): It is observable, that either by nature or by habit, our faculties are fitted to images of a certain extent, to which we adjust great things by division, and little things by accumulation. Of extensive surfaces we can only take a survey, as the parts succeed one another; and atoms we cannot perceive, till they are united into masses. Thus we break the vast periods of time into centuries and years; and thus, if we would know the amount of moments, we must agglomerate them into days and weeks. (R. 108; IV, 211-12) Rambler 137 distinguishes the two processes more distinctly: [Paragraph 1 states the general proposition.] That wonder is the effect of ignorance, has been often observed. The awful stillness of attention, with which the mind is overspread at the first view of an unexpected effect, ceases when we have leisure to disentangle complications and investigate causes. Wonder is a pause of reason, a sudden cessation of the mental progress, which lasts only while the understanding is fixed upon some single idea, and is at an end when it recovers force enough to divide the object into its parts, or mark the intermediate gradations from the first agent to the last consequence. [Paragraph 4 specifies the method of analysis.] "Divide and conquer," is a principle equally just in science as in policy. Complication is a species of confederacy, which, while it continues 169 united, bids defiance to the most active and vigorous intellect; but of which every member is separately weak, and which may therefore be quickly subdued if it can once be broken. [Paragraph 5 specifies the method of synthesis.] The chief art of learning, as Locke has observed, is to attempt but little at a time. The widest excursions of the mind are made by short flights frequently repeated; the most lofty fabricks of science are formed by the continued accumulation of single propositions. (IV, 360 and 361) Rational analysis of deliberative issues serves chiefly to assure the reader of The Rambler that questions can be broken down into manageable proportions. The technique is particularly evident in the essays attempting to describe intangible qualities or emotions, such as those explaining how to handle grief (32 and 52). Johnson's characteristic approach is one which Cicero specified as definition: "Sometimes a definition is applied to the whole subject which is under consideration; this defini tion unfolds what is wrapped up, as it were, in the subject which is being examined."^ Thus Johnson begins a typical inquiry into pride by stating that "Nothing has been longer observed, than that a change of fortune causes a change of manners ..." (R. 172; V, 146). Then he explicates all the circumstances and conditions ^Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, [and] Topica, trans. H. M. Hubbe’ ll (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1949), p* 339 (Topica, Bk. II, 9)* 170 contributing to the fact that "few men are made better by affluence or exaltation . . ." (V, 14-6). But dividing and naming agents of cause and effect is only a preliminary stage of The Rambler1s expository strategy. Johnson does not regard rational argument so much as an instrument for terminating a deliberation as for initiating one; direct emotional commitment to inductive, empirical consideration must occur before moral instruction can transpire. It is natural to mean well, when only abstracted ideas of virtue are proposed to the mind, and no particular passion turns us aside from rectitude; and so willing is every man to flatter himself, that the difference between approving laws, and obey ing them, is frequently forgotten; he that acknowledges the obligations of morality, and pleases his vanity with enforcing them to others, concludes himself zealous in the cause of virtue, though he has no longer any regard to her precepts, than they conform to his own desires. . . . (R. 76; IV, 34) Analytical processes distinguish the significant elements of a deliberative question, but because Johnson accepts the inherent ambivalence of human aspiration he tries to lead the reader beyond a coldly logical answer to a realization that a person must reconcile himself to available, rather than ideal, circumstances. (For a detailed examination of the moral and stylistic manifesta tion of this characteristic, see the discussion of "more and less" in Chapter III and the examples in Appendix B.) Adjusting oneself to actual circumstances requires inductive rather than deductive skills, skills a stage more subtle than those of analysis and identification.^ Johnson introduces his readers to inductive thinking principally through the manner in which he arranges his arguments. Our common experience in reading poetry demonstrates that the semantic meaning of words is partly defined by culture and partly dependent upon the unique poetical context. All literary meaning is similarly unstable; inferences change as the reader progresses through a work, and they alter as he reviews it in memory. Any statement can thus be said to convey more than one meaning, and a total statement can mean something other 5 than the sum of its rational propositions. '■'William R. Keast insists on this point in his review of William Wimsatt's Philosophic Words: "The inadequacy of the mind to experience, tne radical operation of chance and non-rational motives in human affairs, and the impos sibility of reducing psychology and morals to any analytic system are fundamental tenets in his [Johnson's] moral and critical theory. . . . It is clear that in Johnson's view the [rationalist] tradition suggested categorical and abstract formulations utterly false to the diversity of human experience, and however trustworthy the science may have been, Johnson is interested in human life, which he is at pains to keep distinct from science. . . ." PQ, 28 (1949), 394. ^Alvin Whitley has observed that Rasselas does not proceed directly "but rather by way of contextual ironic implications which are only rarely explained outright," and that because Rasselas unfolds itself in a unified dramatic context, the study of selections misses "the cumu lative effect and the interrelation of part to part, the constant cross-references by which each individual chapter assumes more and deeper meaning . . . [and] also the irony which arises from our realisation that something has been said in a special way by a particular character in specific 172 Where Johnson wishes to keep the meaning of an essay j in flux, he shifts the direction at least once, thereby i I subordinating the initial subject to an apparently j | antithetical idea or perspective. Although the shift | emphasises contrast, it is nevertheless a technique of | indicating thematic unity within apparent diversity. In i The Rambler, among other purposes, the tactic of shifting enables Johnson to avoid arousing the reader's anxieties concerning potentially alarming subjects, and it induces in the reader a bland sense of effortless intellectual growth. (Such is one objective of the strategy of the ■ interrelated essay discussed in Chapter II and illustrated ; in Appendix A.) Rambler 66 affords an example of such internal shifting. Johnson begins the essay as a critique of moralists: The folly of human wishes and persuits has always been a standing subject of mirth and declamation, and has been ridiculed and lamented from age to age; till perhaps the fruitless repetition of complaints and censures may be justly numbered among the subjects of censure and complaint. (Ill, 349) Moralists themselves freely indulge in vanity by demanding control of the whole broad scheme of life, forgetting that their tools are suited only to the regulation of individual men's follies. "Some of these instructors circumstances." "The Comedy of Rasselas," ELH, 23 (1956), 49-50. 173] ! of mankind have not contented themselves with checking i the overflows of passion . . . but have attempted to | I destroy the root as well as the branches; and not only to confine the mind within bounds, but to smooth it for ever by a dead calm" (III, 349)* By allowing ambition excessive scope, such moralizing, indulged without regulation, contravenes itself, and its philosophers lose j i both reverence and regard. ■ "Yet it cannot be with justice denied," Johnson i adds almost as an afterthought in paragraph 5» "that these men have been very useful monitors, and have left many proofs of strong reason, deep penetration, and accurate attention to the affairs of life, which it is now our business to separate from the foam of a boiling imagina tion, and to apply judiciously to our own use" (III, 350). Taking this new course of refining and rectifying the teachings of conventional moralists, Johnson spends two paragraphs according them the appreciation they deserve for pointing out to mankind that most aspirations are "empty shows of felicity, which, when they become familiar, lose their power of delighting . . (Ill, 350). But most moralists take us no farther than that, Johnson implies in paragraph 8, turning again to their criticism: It seemed, perhaps, below the dignity of the great masters of moral learning, to descend to familiar life, and caution mankind against 174 that petty ambition, which is known among us by the name of vanity; which yet had been an undertaking not unworthy of the longest beard, and most solemn austerity. (Ill, 351) ! j Johnson now shows that the excessive thoroughness of moral ! philosophers causes them, paradoxically, to neglect one of | the commonest problems of ordinary human behavior. The j balance of the essay (just half of the whole) examines the ubiquitous influence of vanity in everyday life. Yet even this final section of Rambler 66 does not proceed in an unswerving progression, for, in the last paragraph but one, Johnson offers a reason to extenuate petty pride: It is common to consider those whom we find infected with an unreasonable regard for trifling accomplishments, as chargeable with all the consequences of their folly, and as the authors of their own unhappiness; but, perhaps, those whom we thus scorn or detest, have more claim to tenderness than has been yet allowed them. (Ill, 352) To what extent, Johnson implies in his conclusion, has the reader himself been guilty of tempting others to pursue empty appearances? In every instance of vanity it will be found, that the blame ought to be shared among more than it generally reaches; all who exalt trifles by immoderate praise, or instigate needless emulation by invidious incitements, are to be considered as perverters of reason, and corrupters of the world: and since every man is obliged to promote happiness and virtue, he should be careful not to mislead unwary minds, by appearing to set too high a value upon things by which no real excellence is conferred. (Ill, 353) 175 Here at last, in the two final paragraphs, Johnson delivers the direct exhortation toward which the preceding analysis has been leading. The essay has been suggesting that morality is everyone's concern, that it is not the exclusive province of remote philosophers, and that it is indeed the reader himself who should accept his responsibility as a potentially influential moralist. By introducing the same subject from the different perspectives of moralists and ordinary persons, Johnson leads the reader through the inductive process of discover ing his own capacity for extending the meaning of a work beyond the literal, denotative values of the individual words. And upon acquiring that knowledge of his ability, the reader begins to regard himself as a moral agent. Rational rhetorical appeal is thus a more subtle process than just writing out syllogisms in discursive form. Inference necessarily occurs in defining delibera tive questions, for in appraising any situation of actual life the extended ramifications cannot be known and assignment of causes and consequences must therefore frequently proceed on the basis of mere assumptions. Furthermore, since inference occurs at various crucial stages of rational analysis, emotion must also be admitted as an influential factor, for emotion commonly affects our casual perceptions: "The same thing does not appear the same to men when they are friendly and when 1761 1 they hate," writes Aristotle, "nor when they are angry and when they are in gentle mood; in these different moods the same thing will appear either wholly different in kind, or different as to magnitude."^ Johnson seems i I to have accepted that principle: | ! Truth finds an easy entrance into the mind when she is introduced by desire, and attended ! by pleasure; but when she intrudes uncalled, and brings only fear and sorrow in her train, the passes of the intellect are barred against ; her by prejudice and passion; if she sometimes i forces her way by the batteries of argument, 1 she seldom long keeps possession of her conquests, but is ejected by some favoured i enemy, or at best obtains only a nominal sovereignty, without influence and without authority. (R. 165j V, 111) The Appeal to Emotion: Tact The writer of deliberations must therefore court his readers' emotions, taking care, however, that emotional appeal appear as a natural consequence of the work itself, as something entirely outside the author’s intention, for "People grow suspicious of an artificial speaker, and think he has designs upon them. . . The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. 91 (Bk. II, 1). See also The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans. H. E. Butler (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. l_The Loeb Classical Library], 1920), II, 419 (Bk. VI, ii, 5): "Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal to the emotions will do more, for it will make them wish our case to be the better. And what they wish, they will also believe." ^Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 1$6 (Bk. Ill, 2). 177 i 1 Nothing is so fatal to the persuasive process as apparent calculation. It is important to recognize, however, that j | readers do not so much resist emotion itself as the I admission that they are susceptible to its influence; vanity urges them to believe themselves capable of being ! swayed only by logical necessity. The problem of rhetoric thus involves, as Johnson implies in Rambler 1, not only finding reasonable arguments but also guiding emotional J processes without appearing to: "In love, the state which fills the heart with a degree of solicitude next that of an author, it has been held a maxim, that success is most easily obtained by indirect and unperceived approaches . . ." (Ill, 5). Emotional involvement may be disguised by appealing to the reader's general desire to extend his knowledge, his power, and his happiness to their fullest possible extent, or it may arouse his vanity, his desire of attaining the ultimate degree of eminence among his fellows. The conception of literary tact generally covers the subject of influencing emotion by "indirect and unperceived approaches." The presence of tact is easily overlooked in literature, being indeed almost impossible to define in isolated passages, for it is an art, primarily, of removing irritations before the reader notices them. Tact, as Johnson writes of good humor, "pleases principally by not offending" (R. 72; IV, 14)* 178" i Like politeness, tact "is one of those advantages which i we never estimate rightly but by the inconvenience of its loss. Its influence upon the manners is constant and uniform, so that, like an equal motion, it escapes i perception" (R. 98; IV, 161). Tact steers the reader in a comfortable direction, maintaining a safe distance between the reader and the problem being examined. It encourages his optimism through raising his expectation of pleasure, and it shields his self-esteem by drawing censure away from him to other persons, groups, and settings. Tact also includes various subtle hints whereby the author manifests respect ; for the reader's intelligence, education, and good breed ing. Tact differs from flattery in that, while flattery exaggerates or falsely attributes praiseworthy qualities, tact chiefly operates silently. Johnson was well aware of the psychological conditions necessitating a moralist's tactfulness: It is by no means necessary to imagine, that he who is offended at advice, was ignorant of the fault, and resents the admonition as a false charge; for perhaps it is most natural to be enraged, when there is the strongest conviction of our own guilt. . . . But when a man feels the reprehension of a friend seconded by his own heart, he is easily heated into resentment and revenge, either because he hoped that the fault of which he was conscious had escaped the notice of others; or that his friend had looked upon it with tenderness and extenuation, and excused it for the sake of his other virtues; or had considered him as 179 j too wise to need advice, or too delicate to be I shocked with reproach. . . . (R. 40; III, 219-20) Advice tactfully offered enables the reader to distinguish himself from the ostensible audience; it allows him to identify at his option. The moralist must i therefore keep his criticisms abstract enough to forestall i the reader's taking a defensive stance. Fear, for example,! "is a passion which every man feels so frequently | ! predominant in his own breast, that he is unwilling to j hear it censured with great asperity ..." (R. 126; IV, 307). Perhaps The Rambler's allegedly excessive degree of generality may be extenuated on this ground. Whether the charge be stylistically justifiable or not (and by what absolute standard can the question be resolved?), it is certain that the reader of a moral essay resents being crowded by a vividly personal exhortation; he wishes to observe from a safe distance, and generality enables him to listen from across the room, as it were, and while appearing to be busily engaged in doing something else. By the consultation of books, whether of dead or living authors, many temptations to petulance and opposition, which occur in oral conferences, are avoided. An author cannot obtrude his advice unasked, nor can be often suspected of any malignant intention to insult his readers with his knowledge or his wit. Yet so prevalent is the habit of comparing ourselves with others, while they remain within the reach of our passions, that books are seldom read with complete impartiality, but by those from whom the writer is placed at such a distance that his life or death is indifferent. (R. 57; IV, 97) Rhetorical distance can be created by employing the trope of paralipsis, whereby a writer or speaker expresses an opinion on a sensitive subject in the very process of denying such an intention. In Rambler 172, for example, Johnson begins with the apparent intention of censuring the loss of humane perspective that commonly attends a man's sudden accession to wealth and power, and in the second paragraph he seems heading toward a general condemnation that will include the reader himself: "The greater part of mankind are corrupt in every condition, and differ in high and in low stations, only as they have more or fewer opportunities of gratifying their desires . . (V, I46). The reader must therefore experience distinct relief when, in the third paragraph, Johnson seems to reverse his course: "Yet I am willing to believe that the depravation of the mind by external advantages, though certainly not uncommon, yet approaches not so nearly to universality, as some have asserted in the bitterness of resentment, or heat of declamation" (V, 146). Having, as it were, tacked once to port and once to starboard, Johnson now proceeds on an apparently steady course through the remainder of the essay, offering reasons for extenuating the behavior of the wealthy and the privileged: "To imagine them chargeable with all the guilt and folly of their own actions, is to be very little acquainted with the world. . . . men who stand in the highest ranks of society, seldom hear of their faults . . ." (V, 149)* The apparent cause is not the effective one. Sycophants who employ their arts to aggravate their patrons' weaknesses contribute more directly to insolence in high station than innate defects of character. But because the arrogance of the great proceeds more from misapprehending reality through believing flattery than from following their natural inclinations, what ordinary person can be sure of escaping the snares that have entangled so many men of outstanding ability? Thus by imperceptible stages Johnson returns to the intention of the initial paragraphs, that of criticising pride generally and of pointing out the reader's relationship to that problem. There are more specific techniques for effecting tactful distancing. For example, Mr. Rambler frequently quotes or paraphrases the opinions and observations of others, thereby dissociating himself from the principles he espouses and giving the reader an illusion of considerable privacy. Sententious maxims are generally not offered as Mr. Rambler's own thoughts but instead are almost always quoted from famous authors (usually secular writers, moreover, who lack the weight of theological authority). Maxims also may be placed at the conclusion of a rational analysis arranged as an informal syllogism, ... l g 2 -; I ' J so that the reader easily regards the maxim as the formulation of his own thought. Precedents, an impersonal form of testimony, are cited frequently, and these again remove the sting of excessively immediate relevance from ! the argument. (Table 3> Allusions, in Chapter II, suggests the prevalence of these techniques in The Rambler.) I Statistics, in the unspecific sense of "Many j observations have concurred to establish this opinion : i . . (R. 172; V, 146), function much like precedents j and testimony in attesting to the universality of human experience and thereby relieving pressure on the reader. Statistics are particularly useful for inducing a sense of security in the reader, an illusion of "safety in numbers." For example, Rambler 63 begins with the statement, "It has been remarked, perhaps, by every writer . . . that no man is pleased with his present state ..." (Ill, 334)* Johnson thereby invites the reader to attend as a man, but otherwise protects him with anonymity. And at the outset of Rambler 36, the first of the two essays on pastoral poetry, Johnson carefully establishes the position that mankind universally enjoys natural scenery and that men have from ancient times sought to express those responses: The images of true pastoral have always the power of exciting delight, because the works of nature, from which they are drawn, have always the same order and beauty, and continue to force themselves upon our thoughts, being 183 at once obvious to the most careless regard, and more than adequate to the strongest reason, and severest contemplation. Our inclination to stillness and tranquillity is seldom much lessened by long knowledge of the busy and tumultuary part of the world. (Ill, 196-97) Johnson thus defines the pastoral as a literary form expressing a characteristic human interest and thereby limits the scope of his criticism to abuses of the genre. By so carefully avoiding disparagement of the reader's tastes, Johnson acquires the character not so much of a critic as a kind of public defender. A related technique of increasing the distance between the reader and the immediate topic of criticism consists in Mr. Rambler's demonstrating a generous view of the reader's moral character. Quintilian, in explaining the principle of this technique, advises that when we are pleading before a judge, who has special reasons for being hostile to us or is for some personal motive ill-disposed to the cause which we have undertaken, although it may be difficult to persuade him, the method which we should adopt in speaking is simple enough: we shall pretend that our confidence in his integrity and in the justice of our cause is such that we have no fears. We must play upon his vanity. . . Johnson accomplishes this end by such occasional remarks as "men more frequently require to be reminded than informed" (R. 2; III, 14)j or "every error in human conduct must arise from ignorance in ourselves, either ^Institutes, IV, 199-201 (Bk. XI, i, 75)* 134 perpetual or temporary; and happen either because we do ! i not know what is best and fittest, or because our knowledge! ] i is at the time of action not present to the mind” (R. 24; III, 131); or "We frequently fall into error and folly, i not because the true principles of action are not known, j but because, for a time, they are not remembered ..." I (R. 175; V, 160). i Johnson also occasionally expresses his confidence 1 in the integrity of his general audience by comparing its i judgment with that of some well-known authority: It is observed, by the younger Pliny, that an orator ought not so much to select the strongest arguments which his cause admits, as to employ all which his imagination can afford; for, in pleading, those reasons are of most value, which will most affect the judges. . . . But, though the rule of Pliny be judiciously laid down, it is not applicable to the writer's cause, because there always lies an appeal from domestick criticism, to a higher judicature, and the publick, which is never corrupted, nor often deceived, is to pass the last sentence upon literary claims. (R. 23; III, 123) Lipsius, the great modern master of the Stoic philosophy, has, in his celebrated treatise on "steadiness of mind," endeavoured to fortify the breast against too much sensibility of misfortune, by enumerating the evils which have in former ages fallen upon the world, the devastation of wide-extended regions, the sack of cities, and massacre of nations. And the common voice of the multitude uninstructed by precept, and unprejudiced by authority, which, in questions that relate to the heart of man, is, in my opinion, more decisive than the learning of Lipsius, seems to justify the efficacy of this procedure. . . . (R. 52; III, 230) 1851 I Tact, though always indirect, may be employed | nevertheless in an active way to engage readers1 interest j because, although vanity makes men reluctant to take i advice, it causes them to advise others with pleasure: "every one is eager to instruct his neighbours. To be j wise or virtuous, is to buy dignity and importance at a high price; but when nothing is necessary to elevation but j detection of the follies or the faults of others, no man J is so insensible to the voice of fame as to linger on the ground" (R. 87; IV, 95). Therefore, writes Johnson, "Censure is willingly indulged, because it always implies some superiority; men please themselves with imagining that they have made a deeper search, or wider survey, than others . . (R. 2; III, 9). Although Johnson professes contempt for the practice of curing one vice by substituting another, he nevertheless in practice frequently plays on the readers vanity by enabling him to feel that he is advising others. Such a distancing technique occurs when a scapegoat becomes the object of criticism. Rambler for example, softens its attack on the misrepresentation of reality in fiction by designating the past age, rather than the present, as one that deserves criticism: "almost all the fictions of the last age will vanish, if you deprive them of a hermit and a wood, a battle and a shipwreck" (III, 20). Contemporary literature merits praise, Mr. Rambler writes, for representing a more advanced stage of artistic development: "The works of fiction, with which i the present generation seems more particularly delighted, ! i are such as exhibit life in its true state . . . and | influenced by passions and qualities which are really to be found in conversing with mankind” (ill, 19)- Yet j i because the commentary proceeds in an entirely general i fashion, the reader is free to consider, if he should be j so inclined, a few excesses perhaps lingering among current literary productions. j When a scapegoat is the object of criticism, the reader does not consider defending himself, since another j is receiving the attack. The situation feeds his vanity by giving him someone to whom he can feel superior, and it provokes his active movement toward alliance with Mr. Rambler because the reader knows his own weak points, believes himself undetected, and hopes to escape suspi cion by openly concurring with the side of rectitude. The tactic enables the reader to stay out of the light of inquiry and yet it keeps him intensely interested in the advisory process. Greater empathic and imaginative participation by the reader occurs when Mr. Rambler instructs a surrogate audience. In the exemplary tale of Rambler 65, for example, Obidah strays from his tribal caravan one morning and loses himself after spending the day wandering idly 157! ! among the beauties of the countryside. A kindly hermit i rescues him, however, and gives him an admonitory lecture j on the brevity of life and the necessity for making a steady endeavor. The hermit's speech gives the reader a subtle satisfaction, for Obidah, not he, must listen j i to it; indeed, in his superiority he projects himself into j the didactic role of the sage, and, in the process of making that identification, the reader quite without i I realising the fact gives his full attention to the hermit's philosophy. Vanity often co-operates with curiosity. He that is a hearer in one place qualifies himself to become a speaker in another; for though he cannot comprehend a series of argument, or transport the volatile spirit of wit without evaporation, he yet thinks himself able to treasure up the various incidents of a story, and pleases his hopes with the information which he shall give to some inferior society. (R. 185; V, 222) In a variation of the same technique two issues later, Mr. Rambler narrates his own dream of wandering in the Garden of Hope. He indulges his curiosity and contemplates the progress of the persons struggling in the Streight of Difficulty and the Vale of Idleness; at last he is frightened into waking up by the sudden intrusion of two terrible monsters, Age and Want (R. 67). Here again, the reader is pleased to be able to view the vagaries of Mr. Rambler from a superior vantage point; and again, as in reading the story of Obidah, an additional pleasure arises from projecting himself into the position of the adviser. But in this essay, because no speaker is provided with whom to identify, the reader is subtly urged to imagine himself prompting the dreaming Mr. Rambler with the precepts of his waking hours. In the dream of Rambler 67f the reader probably projects himself into the action more readily because Mr. Rambler is represented as falling somewhat short of absolute perfection, at least when he is asleep. The moralist's character should be such as to inspire trust and confidence, but even a counselor should have a human side: We are most inclined to love when we have nothing to fear, and he that encourages us to please ourselves, will not be long without preference in our affection to those whose learning holds us at the distance of pupils, or whose wit calls all attention from us, and leaves us without importance and without regard. (R. 72; IV, 15) It is quite possible for slight errors in the counselor's judgment to compliment the reader without detracting from the author's overall air of ability. For example, occasional hard words and sesquipedelian sentences may, if used tactfully, seem an implicit acknowledgment of the reader's superior education and intelligence: Sir Joshua once observed to him [Johnson], that he had talked above the capacity of some people with whom they had been in company together. "No matter, Sir, (said Johnson); they consider it as a compliment to be talked to, as if they were wiser than they are. So true is this, Sir, that Baxter made it a rule in every sermon that he preached, to say something that was above the capacity of his audience."? Similarly, Johnson writes in Rambler 173 that It is as possible to become pedantick by fear of pedantry, as to be troublesome by ill-timed civility. There is no kind of impertinence more justly censurable, than his who is always labouring to level thoughts to intellects higher than his own . . . and [who] endeavours to shade his own abilities, lest weak eyes should be dazzled with their lustre. (V, 154) In truth, Johnson's diction and syntax rarely seriously cloud his meaning; they only appear to. There is, for example, no real lack of clarity in this notorious sentence: If we therefore compare the value of the praise obtained by fictitious excellence, even while the cheat is yet undiscovered, with that kindness which every man may suit by his virtue, and that esteem to which most men may rise by common understanding steadily and honestly applied, we shall find that when from the adscititious happiness all the deductions are made by fear and casualty, there will remain nothing equiponderant to the security of truth. (R. 20; III, 115) However unacquainted the reader may be with "adscititious" and "equiponderant," the general semantic import is nevertheless perfectly evident. Although the reader must pause momentarily in order, as it were, to translate Johnson's meaning, he has the compensatory pleasure of feeling he has added his own finishing touch to the work. 9Life, IV, 155. Quintilian observes that "there is even a class of hearer who find a special pleasure in such [obscure] passages; for the fact that they can provide an answer to the riddle fills them with an ecstasy of self-congratulation, as if they had not merely heard the phrase, but invented it."10 Consequently, and by no means the least effect of enlisting the reader's creative imaginative assistance, he will feel a growing affection for Mr. Rambler, for "no man is much pleased with a companion, who does not encrease, in some respect, his fondness for himself . . ." (R. 104; IV, 191). As the last several illustrations suggest, tact is not an end in itself; it relaxes the reader's natural protective resistance to stimulation and prepares him to engage empathically in artistically represented activity. Tact predisposes the reader toward the author's course of thought, and empathy draws him into active participa tion. Johnson frequently remarks on the necessity of actually capturing the reader's emotions, of eliciting his hopes and fears, as a basic requirement of effective communication. ^Institutes, III, 209 (Bk. VIII, ii, 21); see also Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 207 (Bk. Ill, 10): "Consequently, we are not highly gratified by enthymemes that are obvious — and 'obvious' means absolutely plain to every one, not demanding a bit of mental inquiry. ..." See also p. 66 (Bk. I, 11): "to complete imperfect things is pleasant, since the whole work then becomes our own." 191 But if the purpose of lamentation be to excite pity, it is surely superfluous for age and weakness to tell their plaintive stories; for pity presupposes sympathy, and a little attention will show them, that those who do not feel pain, seldom think that it is felt. . . . (r. 43; III, 259) It is not easy for the most artful writer to give us an interest in happiness or misery, which we think ourselves never likely to feel. . . . Histories of the downfal of kingdoms, and revolutions of empires, are read with great tranquillity; the imperial tragedy pleases common auditors only by its pomp of ornament, and grandeur of ideas. . . . (R. 60; III, 319) Dramatisation The reader's emotions are quite readily available if an author can touch them covertly, and discursive literary work may greatly heighten the possibility of involving the reader emotionally and imaginatively by borrowing certain techniques from the drama. But when an adventurer is levelled with the rest of the world, and acts in such scenes of the universal drama, as may be the lot of any other man; young spectators fix their eyes upon him with closer attention, and hope by observing his behaviour and success to regulate their own practices. . . . (R. 4; HI, 21) The dramatic technique of empathy, the involuntary kinetic or emotional response to observed activity, is especially suited to emotional persuasion because the reader does not realize he is responding until he has done so. He therefore does not resist being manipulated, and if he has 192 not betrayed his response publicly he will feel no subse quent resentment against the author. Johnson realized that the reader's mere passive respect for an author is of comparatively little weight in effecting persuasion: "We see that volumes may be perused, and perused with attention, to little effect; and that maxims of prudence, or principles of virtue, may be treasured in the memory without influencing the conduct" (R. 87; IV, 97). The discourse must claim the reader's active and even proprietary interest before it can become really meaningful to him, and for this reason dramatic activity is preeminently conducive to persuasion. Empathic absorption, whether in drama or discursive literature, enables the reader almost unconsciously to project himself into the author's personality and to imagine discoursing and advising in his words. Drama effects its influence over the audience's imagination by arousing their interest in the fortunes of a specific protagonist: All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination, that realizes the event however fictitious, or approximates it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while the deception lasts, whatever motions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves. (R. 60; III, 313-19) Therefore, "As the design of tragedy is to instruct by moving the passions, it must always have a hero . . . upon whom the attention may be fixed, and the anxiety suspended" (R. 156; V, 70). Don Quixote, though a character in a novel, is a successfully dramatized hero, for "When we pity him, we reflect on our own disappoint ment; and when we laugh, our hearts inform us that he is not more ridiculous than ourselves, except that he tells what we have only thought" (R. 2; III, 11). The author of moral essays is obviously far more restricted than the novelist or the tragedian in his choice of dramatic devices. Nevertheless, the essayist does have at his disposal three kinds of characters: protagonists of narrative tales, readers submitting letters, and, most important of all, the writer himself. The Dramatic Appeal of the Persona Johnson endows Mr. Rambler with personal character istics, therefore, in order to give him the substance to participate in the dramatic action that takes place in the reader's imagination. Mr. Rambler possesses, to be sure, a certain degree of reality simply through being the ostensible conductor of the periodical, but his value as a dramatic character comes about primarily through his being engaged in the social milieu of a reader-audience 19S \ (the category, ’ ’Persona of Mr. Rambler," in Table 2 j j enumerates the incidence of such interaction). i The relationships of Mr. Rambler and the various impersonated correspondents imply further dramatic elements of character and conflict (see the category, j "Mr. Rambler vs. Readers," in Table 2). The correspond ents’ expectations are always somewhat at variance with i i the readers': they may be impatient and even contemptuous of Mr. Rambler, addressing him with patronizing insolence, ; i or they may be timid, hardly daring to hope that he will notice them, but in any event their stance is probably not that which the reader has assumed. Dramatic representation in The Rambler never occurs merely to enliven the essay: it always has the pragmatic objective of directing the reader’s empathic alliances. Nor is the objective ever a simple one; Johnson does not set up straw men for the reader to demolish but instead puts the reader first on one side, then the other, to simulate the tentative course we commonly follow in 11 arriving at a firm opinion. In so doing, Johnson gives the reader an illusion of perfect detachment and thus enables him to be interested. Johnson largely rejects " I 1 Whitley points out that the dialogues between Rasselas and Nekayah on happiness employ dramatic tech nique: they "do not merely recite, they argue from differ ent viewpoints, and at times they quarrel. Johnson utilizes the clash of opposing temperaments. . . ." (61). the temptation to present himself as the infinitely saga cious mentor; therefore, what his readers learn, they think they have taught themselves. And because the readers regard their new insights as their own discoveries and therefore emblematic of their personal worth, they will defend them tenaciously. A writer's self-dramatization has significance only through the particular use of the character. There is no intrinsic rhetorical value, as Irvin Ehrenpreis points out, in the mere fact of an author's creating an alter ego; the persona has literary value only because it enables an author to guide his readers through ironic sequences of 12 discovery and reversal. The persona functions in a literary context not simply as another character but as an actor playing a role, and it is only when the reader accepts the persona as an enacted role that it acquires its peculiar power in his imagination. In A Modest Proposal, for example, the reader experiences the pleasure of discovery upon realizing that the author is writing a bitter spoof, but that does not account for his unabated and indeed increasing delight in rereading the work; that pleasure arises because the reader himself learns to play, 12 Irvin Ehrenpreis, "Personae," in Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature: Essays in Honor of Alan Dugald tacKillop, ed. Charles Carroll CamHeri (Shicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)> pp- 25-37* imaginatively, the role of Swift's persona and to imagine the effect "his" words have on readers. In its ultimate literary consequence, then, the persona becomes another dimension of the reader's self, an effect similar to what 13 Freud termed the "superego." There are reasons for believing that Johnson created Mr. Rambler intentionally as a fictitious dramatic projection.1^ The discrepancy in age provides the most obvious clue: although Johnson was just turning forty when he was writing The Rambler, he represents his persona as an elderly man in his sixties or even seventies (see Ramblers IS, 59, and 1$2) , A more subtle suggestion arises 13 ^See, for example, James Boswell, Boswell's London Journal, 1762-1763, ed. Frederick A. Pottle (New rfaven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 240: Boswell recounts attending a Drury Lane performance of Macbeth with his friend W. J. Temple: "We endeavoured to work our minds into the frame of the Spectator's, but we could not. We were both too dissipated." A few days later (p. 244), Boswell sets out early to visit Oxford: "I imagined myself the Spectator taking one of his rural excursions." ■^Robert Voitle gives Johnson credit for this achievement; see his Samuel Johnson the Moralist (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1961), pp. ix-x: "There is the further complication that Johnson, or for that matter, any practical moralist, speaks primarily not to inform his audience, as the theoretician does, but to reform their actions. Although this gives him no license to engage in sophistry, he can legitimately judge truth with respect to its formative effects instead of treating it as some body of absolute data to be expounded from a uniform point of view. He can select portions of the truth and stress them to whatever degree the occasion may demand. The safest course, then, is to assume that we are always confronted by a persona and that we must continually be vigilant with respect to the context in which ideas occur and the frequency of their occurrence." from the disparity of manner: although Johnson himself could not tolerate being bested in argument, Mr. Rambler often meekly accommodates himself to an ostensible correspondent's overbearing presumption. Appreciation of Mr. Rambler's nature as a persona has suffered from the fallacious notion that Johnson employed only one style of expression (this point is discussed in Chapter I), and, more important, from compar ing Mr. Rambler with such other authorial projections as Addison and Steele's Mr. Spectator, Goldsmith's Chinese Ambassador, Lamb’s Elia, and so forth, entities which serve primarily to lend thematic and tonal unity to the essays in which they appear rather than to induce empathic alliances with moral positions. Admittedly, Mr. Rambler does not provide an objective correlative of theme or tone. He does not appear as a character at all until the tenth issue, and he appears thereafter only occasionally; he never tells of his personal tastes and habits, and he lacks the small-talk about current events and petty interests which enables strangers to break the ice. Mr. Rambler can scarcely be considered successful, therefore, if he is bound to the norm of Mr. Spectator. The two personae can be clearly distinguished, however, by comparing their respective degrees of dramatic appeal. Mr. Spectator sometimes acts as master of ceremonies for the activities of the fictitious population consisting of Sir Roger, Will Honeycomb, and so forth, characters whose behavior enlivens and augments the narrative but does not affect the reader's alliance with Mr. Spectator. Indeed, because of his aloofness, Mr. 15i Spectator elicits very little supportive alliance at all. ■ But Mr. Rambler is depicted quite differently. From the ! | first of his sporadic appearances, in Ramblers 10 and 16, j he is represented as an author struggling against a current; of misunderstanding and prejudice and trying to cope with the imperious demands of haughty readers. Mr. Spectator, the embodiment of savoire faire, tacitly invites the reader to participate vicariously in the fashionable world and thereby to transcend the tedium of everyday routine. The reader accepts with gratitude the opportunity * | / to regard Mr. Spectator as his courtly host. Mr. Rambler, on the other hand, appears to be a rather rough- hewn old gentleman, deeply learned but almost unaware of his knowledge, and, though anxious to enjoy his readers' good will, ignorant of how to obtain it. Mr. Rambler 15 ^Donald F. Bond surveys the characterization of Mr. Spectator in his introduction to The Spectator (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965)» Ij xxxi-xxxii. 1 ^ee Boswell's London Journal, p. 76: "The Specta tor mentions his being seen at Child's, which makes me have an affection for it"; p. 130: "As we drove along and spoke good English, I was full of rich imagination of London, ideas suggested by the Spectator . . and p. 153i "We walked up to Hyde Park Corner, from whence we set out at ten. . . . As the Spectator observes, one end of London is like a different country from the other in look and in manners." . . . . ............. 199 does not occupy a position of superiority; like the reader, he is an imperfect being, and the reader is therefore able, despite the differences in age, learning, and experience, to feel an essential camaraderie. Mr. Rambler's real ancestors are to be found, not in the characters of Addison and Steele, but in the self-effacing 17 narrators of Horace and Chaucer. Johnson strives always to combine in Mr. Rambler a complex and even somewhat paradoxical mixture of qualities, endowing him with enough erudition to gain the reader's awe, sufficient discriminatory power to earn his respect, and such benevolence, generosity, and naivete as to win his affection. In creating Mr. Rambler, Johnson reflects a summary of ethical appeal that he had written a decade earlier: "The character of an Author must be allowed to imply in itself something amiable and great; it conveys at once the Idea of Ability and Good-nature, of Knowledge, and a Disposition to communicate it." But these qual ities are easily overlooked in Mr. Rambler because Johnson allows them to remain implicit; he does not describe ■^Interestingly, Johnson once planned to issue an edition of Chaucer: see Life, IV, 3&1, n. 1. i d "Reflections on Periodical Writers," Gentleman's Magazine, 9 (1739), 3. There has been at least one study of Johnson's ethical appeal: Jim W. Corder, "Ethical Argument and Rambler No. 154," QJS, 54 (1968), 352-56. Professor Corder mainly emphasizes ethical appeal, with illustrations from Rambler 154* Mr. Rambler's characteristics but instead lets him act them out. In the long run, it is the most effective method, for we really become convinced of a person's abilities only upon seeing them demonstrated. To a considerable extent, Johnson conveys a sense of Mr. Rambler's ability through suggesting his unexercised 19 inherent genius, his innate capacity beyond mere skill. "There is something captivating in spirit and intrepidity, to which we often yield, as to a resistless power. . . ." Johnson comments as he inaugurates his series (R. 1; III, 5), and he seeks to suggest such a quality through the practice of amplification, augmenting and accumulating words, phrases, and ideas so that the reader is at last astonished by the vigor and the fecundity of invention. The quality is manifested most effectively in essays exhorting more humane behavior, such as the denunciation of envy (Rambler 1&3), the plea for the forgiving of petty injuries (Rambler 1&5)> the rejection of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime (Rambler 114), and the analysis of the disadvantages of poverty (Rambler 166). Upon concluding one of these essays, the reader's sensation of having experienced the naked force of rectitude ■^Bertrand Bronson comments on this quality in Johnson in his introduction to Sherbo's Johnson on Shake speare: Works, VII, xiii-xiv. will far overshadow his impression of stylistic manner ism. In contrast to ability, which is an inherent quality, knowledge is an acquired accomplishment, but to the extent that the possession of knowledge suggests an innate capacity for wisdom, it reinforces the impression of ability. The wisdom with which Johnson endows his persona is not generally the kind associated with books (though, as Mr. Rambler's extensive allusions demonstrate, he is also most impressively erudite). Mr. Rambler's wisdom seems to arise principally from a long life, during which his wide experience with humanity, combined with a habit of profound meditation, has imparted knowledge of the difference between substance and appearance. One of Johnson's favored methods of demonstrating his power of discrimination is to show that the perspective of a subject may be changed by considering it as more or less in relation to a normative standard (see the explica tion of this technique in Chapter III and the examples in Appendix B). In discussing wealth, power, social position, personal relationships, and even our trifling gratifications, he reiterates his theme that "very little of the pain, or pleasure, which does not begin and end in our senses, is otherwise than relative ..." (R. 52; III, 2&2). Such comparative judgments depend necessarily upon a person's having practical, rather than theoretical, knowledge of life. Johnson also employs contradictions to demonstrate his practical wisdom, for reality, unlike literary narratives, is illogical (as popular wisdom puts it, "truth is stranger than fiction"), and a sense of the contradictory elements of life can be acquired only through living. Those that study either the body or the mind of man, very often find the most specious and pleasing theory falling under the weight of contrary experience. . . . That it is easy to . . . [keep secrets], the speculatist can demonstrate in his retreat, and therefore thinks himself justified in placing confidence; the man of the world knows, that, whether difficult or not, it is uncommon. . . . (R. 13; III, 69) A certain wry tone, bespeaking knowledge the possessor would willingly forego, often reinforces the impression of Mr. Rambler's thoughtful and extensive engagement in life: It has been remarked, that authors are genus irritabile, a "generation very easily put out of temper," and that they seldom fail of giving proofs of their irascibility, upon the slightest attack of criticism, or the most gentle or modest offer of advice and information. Writers being best acquainted with one another, have represented this character as prevailing among men of literature, which a more extensive view of the world would have shewn them to be diffused thro' all human nature, to mingle itself with every species of ambition and desire of praise. . . . (R. 40; III, 216) And in discussing literary critics, Mr. Rambler observes that they admit but one prejudice as worthy of an author's occasional indulgence: that is, a predisposition to civility and gentleness. Nevertheless, I am not of opinion that these professed enemies of arrogance and severity, have much more benevolence or modesty than the rest of mankind; or that they feel in their own hearts, any other intention than to distinguish them selves by their softness and delicacy. Some are modest because they are timorous, and some are lavish of praise because they hope to be repaid. (R. 93; IV, 133) Clearly, Mr. Rambler is not to be taken in by ordinary impostures. However, though a reader may feel inclined to trust an author who demonstrates ability and knowledge, he will yield to that inclination only upon being convinced that 20 good nature is present as well. "Without good humour," writes "Philomides," learning and bravery can only confer that superiority which swells the heart of the lion in the desart, where he roars without reply, and ravages without resistance. Without good humour virtue may awe by its dignity, and amaze by its brightness; but must always be viewed at a distance, and will scarcely gain a friend or attract an imitator. ^See Quintilian, Institutes, II, 423-25 (Bk. VI, ii, 13): "The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in an orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers. 204 Good humour may be defined a habit of being pleased; a constant and perennial softness of manner, easiness of approach, and suavity of disposition. . . . Good humour is a state between gaiety and unconcern; the act or emanation of a mind at leisure to regard the gratification of another. (R. 72; IV, 13) Good nature is manifested principally as benevolence and justice. An author can suggest benevolence by ! demonstrating tolerance of petty human faults, by i responding mildly to criticism, and by showing sympathy for the reader's aspirations; he can imply that he possesses the quality of justice by showing himself willing 1 to accept the impartial force of circumstances. Mr. Rambler conveys an impression of benevolence when, in discussing the difficulty of giving advice without arousing resentment, he remarks that we must "forbear admonition or reproof, when our consciences tell us that they are incited not by the hopes of reforming faults, but the desire of shewing our discernment, or gratifying our own pride by the mortification of another" (R. 40; III, 220). In the essay examining the adverse effects of habitual suspiciousness of others, he concludes that "it is our duty not to suppress tenderness by suspi cion; it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, and happier to be sometimes cheated than not to trust" (R. 79; IV, 55)* Rambler 29, by attempting to distinguish between the false and the legitimate applications of the carpe diem attitude, suggests that Mr. Rambler is concerned with 205 discovering the nature of real happiness, not just with applying the strict letter of morality. Above all, the essays exhorting the reader to attempt the attainment of their hopes (such as Ramblers 25 and 137) create a convincing impression of good will. Mr. Rambler often demonstrates his justice by his readiness to censure faults peculiar to the classes of which he is a member: writers, scholars, moralists, and old men. Of moralists, for example, he writes that Moralists, like other writers, instead of casting their eyes abroad in the living world, and endeavouring to form maxims of practice and new hints of theory, content their curiosity with that secondary knowledge which books afford, and think themselves entitled to reverence by a new arrangement of an ancient system, or new illustration of established principles. The sage precepts of the first instructors of the world are transmitted from age to age with little variation, and echoed from one author to another, not perhaps without some loss of their original force at every repercussion. (R. 129; IV, 321) And of old men he writes that It has been always the practice of those who are desirous to believe themselves made venerable by length of time, to censure the new comers into life, for want of respect to gray hairs and sage experience, for heady confidence in their own understandings, for hasty conclusions upon partial views, for disregard of counsels, which their fathers and grandsires are ready to afford them, . . . Every old man complains of the growing depravity of the world, of the petulance and insolence of the rising generation. He recounts the decency and regularity of former times, and celebrates the discipline and sobriety of the age in which his youth was passed; a happy age which is now no more to be expected, since confusion has broken in upon the world, and thrown down all the boundaries of civility and reverence. It is not sufficiently considered how much he assumes, who dares to claim the privilege of complaining. . . . (R. 50; III, 269-70) Such passages occur regularly throughout The Rambler. It may at first seem as if Johnson is foolishly risking the alienation of his readers by reminding them of the weaknesses to which men like him are subject; but in the final overall impression of Mr. Rambler's wisdom, justice, and benevolence, such recklessness appears as the admirable daring of a noble nature. Justice may also be suggested by demonstrating emotional detachment. In discussing marital unhappiness, Mr. Rambler surveys the very great popularity of the theme in literature but then observes that "as the faculty of writing has been chiefly a masculine endowment, the reproach of making the world miserable has been always thrown upon the women. ..." After having thus disqual ified previous commentators, he recommends himself: But I, who have long studied the severest and most abstracted philosophy, have now, in the cool maturity of life, arrived to such command over my passions, that I can hear the vociferations of either sex without catching any of the fire from those that utter them. (R. IS; III, 9S-9) Johnson supplies here a probable reason for the quality of emotional detachment for which so many critics have rejected Mr. Rambler: to endow a persona with preferences is to burden him with what will appear to the reader as prejudices. Whatever the literary vehicle, effective dramatiza tion requires, paradoxically, that the audience recognise the disparity between reality and appearance. "It is false," writes Johnson in his Preface to Shakespeare, "that any representation is mistaken for reality; that any dramatick fable in its materiality was ever credible, 21 or, for a single moment, was ever credited." "The truth is, that the spectators are always in their senses, and know from the first act to the last, that the stage 22 is only a stage, and that the players are only players." It will be asked, how the drama moves, if it is not credited. It is credited with all the credit due to a drama. It is credited, when ever it moves, as a just picture of a real original. . . . The delight of tragedy proceeds from our consciousness of fiction; if we thought murders and treasons real, they would please no more.^3 Johnson's position here resembles that of Aristotle, who writes that "Our delight is not in the original; rather, there is an inference: this [the artistic imitation] is that [the thing represented]; and so an act of learning 21Works, VII, 76. 22Works, VII, 77. 2%orks, VII, 73. 20# takes place.Aristotle's accounting for our pleasure in drama resembles his explanation of our pleasure in metaphor: both depend on the reader's or audience's making comparisons, drawing conclusions, and feeling 25 thereby an increase of overall capacity. The reader's primary pleasure consisting in the exercise of his own creative skill, he will be pleased by an author's success in creating characters but he will be engaged to a greater empathic degree by partial failure. That is, when the reader feels that the author has not taken the representation to its final degree of perfection, he himself can apply imaginative resources to give it the finishing touches. Amateur theatricals are often more enjoyable than mediocre professional productions for this reason: if the amateur actors are full of vitality but fall just short of realizing their roles, the audience may be drawn to "help" the cast, imaginatively, fulfill their characterizations. At such times, when the reader, or audience, perceives depths beyond the author's or performer's abilities, he will flatter himself with believing that he has created the whole artistic concep tion. ^^Rhetoric, p. 65 (Bk. I, 11). 2^See Rhetoric, p. 212 (Bk. Ill, 11). In The Rambler's dramatizing of moral education, the impersonated correspondents are presented as an audience for whom Mr. Rambler is performing, while the real, but unacknowledged, audience of readers is directed toward appraising the overall dramatic endeavor. That is, the reader's attention is drawn to a "play within a play" situation manifesting two kinds of dramatic activity: the dramatic efforts of Mr. Rambler to affect the ficti tious audience, and the efforts of that audience to communicate its response. Johnson summarizes for us, in Rambler 1, the tactics whereby Mr. Rambler will try to impress his ostensible audience: For who can wonder that, allured on one side, and frightened on the other, some [writers] should endeavour to gain favour by bribing the judge with an appearance of respect which they do not feel, to excite compassion by confessing weakness of which they are not convinced, and others to attract regard . . . by a daring profession of their own deserts, and a public challenge of honours and rewards. (Ill, 6) A practical application of the authors' tactic of exciting "compassion by confessing weakness of which they are not convinced" may be observed in the early issues of The Rambler, especially the first two, which concentrate on conveying an impression of the author's hesitancy and diffidence. Mr. Rambler debates with himself whether or not he has the power of successfully attracting readers until, at the conclusion of Rambler 2, he abandons the question and casts the fate of his venture into the lap of Fortune: "he that finds his way to reputation, through all these obstructions, must acknowledge that he is indebted to other causes besides his industry, his learning, or his wit" (III, 14). I have already mentioned, in discussing tact, Johnson's awareness that an author, especially a moralist, must be willing to stand out of the limelight: Vanity is so frequently the apparent motive of advice, that we, for the most part, summon our powers to oppose it without any very accurate inquiry whether it is right. It is sufficient that another is growing great in his own eyes at our expense, and assumes authority over us without our permission. . . . (R. 87; IV, 95) For this reason, Johnson does not try to arouse the reader's unqualified reverence and admiration for Mr. Rambler; instead, he follows this policy: I question whether some abatement of character is not necessary to general acceptance. Few spend their time with much satisfaction under the eye of uncontestable superiority. . . . He that would please must rarely aim at such excellence as depresses his hearers in their own opinion, or debars them from the hope of contributing reciprocally to the entertainment of the company. (R. 188; V, 221) Mr. Rambler's personal appeal becomes thus somewhat equivocal, for in spite of endowing his persona with an aura of competence and erudition, Johnson encourages the reader to feel a certain superiority. For example, in 211 presenting the Augustinian argument that an author, though morally imperfect, can nevertheless offer valuable moral i l commentary, Rambler 14 implies that self-doubt makes Mr. Rambler hesitant; "it may be prudent for a writer, who apprehends that he shall not enforce his own maxims by his domestic character, to conceal his name that he may ! not injure them" (III, 76). But it is not cold diffidence but an engaging wistfulness that Johnson conveys: "A man of letters for the most part spends, in the privacies of study, that season of life in which the manners are to be softened into ease, and polished into elegance, and, when he has gained knowledge enough to'be respected, has neglected the minuter acts by which he might have pleased" (ill, 79). Such modesty powerfully invites a friendly hand of encouragement from the reader, who, without being conscious of the fact at all, thereby designates Mr. Rambler's cause as his own and takes the stance of defender and sponsor. Johnson also depreciates the essays themselves as a technique of eliciting the reader's friendly support of Mr. Rambler. Thus in beginning the series he professes to find encouragement in the fact that "he who is confined Rambler 14 may have had its genesis in a real incident! Edward Cave wrote to Samuel Richardson that, before Johnson became known as the author, Bubb Dodington (later Lord Melcombe) directed a letter to Mr. Rambler, inviting him to his house, and that Johnson excused himself "in a subsequent number." See the introduction to no single topick, may follow the national taste through all its variations, and catch the Aura popularis, the gale of favour, from what point soever it shall blow: (R. 1; III, 8). In a similar vein, he writes many issues later that The writer of essays, escapes many embarrassments to which a large work would have exposed him; he seldom harasses his reason with long trains of consequence, dims his eyes with the perusal of antiquated volumes, or burthens his memory with great accumulations of preparatory knowledge. A careless glance upon a favourite author, or transient survey of the varieties of life, is sufficient to supply the first hint or seminal idea, which enlarged by the gradual accretion of matter stored in the mind, is by the warmth of fancy easily expanded into flowers, and sometimes ripened into fruit. (R. lSk't V, 201) Self-depreciation and self-appreciation, "confessing weakness of which they are not convinced" and "a daring profession of their own deserts," are really but contrasting manifestations of a single technique, hyperbole, for both tactics endeavor through exaggerating either the author's weakness or his strength to create an ironic impression that contradictory qualities exist simultaneously in the author. Since irony always generates an empathic movement toward correcting the observed discrepancy, these exaggerations have as their ultimate h° The Rambler by W. J. Bate and A. B. Strauss: Works, III, xxv. It seems nevertheless likely that in Rambler 14 Johnson was addressing a much wider audience than Dodington alone. purpose the reader's general emotional identification with Mr. Rambler's task of self-representation. Ironical self-appreciation, or "rhetorical infla tion," in John Traugott's useful phrase, may be effected by distorting tone, especially through violating the decorum of diction, to create thereby an "ambiguous 27 balance between pathos and bathos" comparable in effect to the mock-heroic. Rhetorical inflation is Johnson's chief tactic for allaying the reader's suspicion that Mr. Rambler takes himself too seriously; and herein consists another indirect purpose for the famous "hard words." Pedantic terms as such do of course occur in The 2B Rambler, but less frequently than reputation alleges. And when they do appear, they usually serve as tropes, in that they turn, slow, or otherwise alter the current of thought or feeling, thereby helping the author to steer ^John R. Traugott, Tristram Shandy's World (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), p. So. A. T. Elder in his "Irony and Humour in the Rambler," points out various instances of Mr. Rambler's self mockery, but he designates humor as their entire purpose. UTQ, 30 (I960), 57-71. 2 s i The classic objection to Johnson's "hard words" is Archibald Campbell's Lexiphanes . . . (London, 1767); but Curtis Bradford effectively shows that Campbell's objections flagrantly distort Johnson's style. "Samuel Johnson's 'Rambler,"' Diss. Yale University 1937, pp. 203-10. 214] the reader's attention toward the points which he wishes i to emphasise. For example, in Rambler 1, after Johnson ! has shared with the reader his ostensible anxiety over j launching the periodical, he finally blurts out that "having accurately weighed the reasons for arrogance and ; i submission, I find them so nearly equiponderant, that my impatience to try the event of my first performance will ; not suffer me to attend any longer the trepidations of ■ the balance" (III, 7). The Latinate terms stand out in ; the passage simply because they are not the rule, and their use suggests to the reader the distracted state of the author's mind: his forgetting verbal decorum to such an extent lends his overall statement a convincing air of sincerity. Rhetorical inflation should be regarded as a kind of practical joke which the author half-consciously plays on himself. Such a spirit seems evident in the way Johnson handles the motto to Rambler 65. He translates it, The chearful sage,2^ when solemn dictates fail, Conceals the moral counsel in a tale. (Ill, 345) 2^Works (III, 345) reads sege, but this is evidently a misprint, for the 4th edition of 1756, on which the Yale text is based, reads sage, as does every other edition I have been able to examine. Johnson gives only sage in the Dictionary. Horace originally wrote, however, — Garrit aniles Ex re fabellas.— 30 Literally translated, this becomes [our neighbor Cervius] rattles off old wives' tales that fit the case.31 Johnson adds cheerful sage, solemn dictates, and moral, and he elevates fabellas (tales) to counsel— thereby radically transforming Horace's chatty and mildly disparaging tone into one of dignified tranquillity. Contemporary readers of The Rambler could be expected to comprehend the Latin, however, and to see at once that Mr. Rambler has touched up the original, apparently "forgetting" that he surely will be found out. The deception is so trivial, and it represents such special ised scholarly vanity, that the reader is likely to feel indulgent rather than angry with Mr. Rambler's foible. And even if he is moved to outright laughter, the tactic has been successful, for as Longinus comments, "comic hyperboles, for all their incredibility, are convincing 32 because we laugh at them. . . 3°Satires, II, vi, 77-73. ^Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. R. Fairclough (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heine- mann, Ltd. [The Loeb Classical Library], 1929)> p* 217. ^On Sublimity, trans. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Oxford University Tress, 1965), p* 45 (Ch. XXXVIII, 5). 216! j Because of its subtle but outrageous exaggerations, j reading Rambler 20 from the perspective of an insider is a ; delightful experience. The subject is affectation, it being, Mr. Rambler claims, the most contemptible of all the stratagems by which the proud person endeavors to ! recommend himself. Mr. Rambler objects especially to "a very common practice among my correspondents, of writing i under characters they cannot support . . ."— above all, J of men's affecting the epistolary style of women! The modern reader (unlike Mr. Rambler's immediate contempor aries) , knowing that Johnson himself has already impersonated "Zosima" in Rambler 12 and "Cleora" in Rambler 15, reads with mingled amazement and delight Mr. Rambler's complaint that I cannot always withhold some expression of anger, like Sir Hugh in the comedy, when I happen to find that a woman has a beard. I must, therefore, warn the gentle Phyllis, that she send me no more letters from the Horse Guards; and require of Belinda, that she be content to resign her pretensions to female elegance, till she has lived three weeks without hearing the politicks of Bateson's coffee-house. (III> 111) Example follows example until Mr. Rambler concludes that When Lee was once told by a critic, that it was very easy to write like a madman, he answered, that it was difficult to write like a madman, but easy enough to write like a fool; and, I hope to be excused by my kind contributors, if, in imitation of this great author, I presume to remind them, that it is much easier not to write like a man, than to write like a woman. (Ill, 112) Then, very much the moralist, he proceeds to generalize: The hatred, which dissimulation always draws upon itself, is so great, that if I did not know how much cunning differs from wisdom, I should wonder that any men have so little knowledge of their own interest, as to aspire to wear a mask for life . . . and to hazard their quiet, their fame, and even their profit, by exposing themselves to the danger of that reproach, malevolence, and neglect, which such a discovery as they have always to fear will certainly bring upon them. (Ill, 112) Such is the implicitly dramatic situation estab lished for the famous words adscititious and equiponderant, which, occurring in a single sentence of the final paragraph, bring to a climax the preceding effort of the whole essay to establish the difference between "Mr. Rambler" and his fictitious correspondents. Coming at the end as they do, the hard words seem the natural slips of a bluff and masculine lexicographer, of all men the least likely to impersonate frivolous young ladies. The other expressive techniques that Johnson mentions in Rambler 1 as being available to authors for attracting the good will of readers, "an appearance of respect which they do not feel," and "a show of openness and magnanimity," are both essentially forms of flattery. That is, speaking to the reader as if the question were a matter for mutual deliberation is to raise him to the 3 3 status of a colleague. ^ Such unassuming frankness appears to bespeak the author's willingness to share his eminence, and, since we assume that no one practises such generosity unless it advances his interest, we conclude that when an author does so he holds a genuinely high opinion of us. In the first four Ramblers, especially in the first two, Mr. Rambler disingenuously talks shop with the reader, sharing his hopes and fears and confiding his plans for success. He observes, for example, that the shortness of the essay is an encouragement to fearful beginning writers: He that questions his abilities to arrange the dissimilar parts of an extensive plan, or fears to be lost in a complicated system, may yet hope to adjust a few pages without perplexity; and if, when he turns over the repositories of his memory, he finds his collection too small for a volume, he may yet have enough to furnish out an essay. (R. 1; III, g) On the other hand, he confesses- that he fears hope equally: Perhaps no class of the human species requires more to be cautioned against . . . [the] anticipation of happiness, than those who aspire to the name of authors. A man of lively fancy no sooner finds a hint moving -^See Quintilian, Institutes, III, 365 (Bk. IX, i, 30), quoting Cicero: "'We may confer with our audience, admitting them as it were into our deliberations . . . a device which is one of the greatest embellishments of oratory and specially adapted to conciliate the feelings, as also frequently to excite them.'" 219j in his mind, than he makes momentaneous excur- j sions to the press, and to the world, and, j with a little encouragement from flattery, pushes forward into future ages, and prognosti cates the honours to be paid him, when envy is extinct, and faction forgotten. . . . (R. 2; III, 12) , Such passages invite the reader to feel himself a j participant in Mr. Rambler's deliberations. Variations of the same technique occur throughout the essays. In Rambler 23, for example, Mr. Rambler ! confides that many readers complain of his failing to j resemble Mr. Spectator; he examines the issue from several perspectives and decides at last in spite of remonstrance to follow the bent of his inclination. His apparently unstudied frankness here implies the figure of classical satire, the vir bonus, the good citizen who speaks directly from the heart without premeditation. But also, by characterizing with seemingly absolute candor the ignoramus-readers who clamor for the return of Mr. Spectator, Mr. Rambler distinguishes the present reader from that category and places him with the inner circle of cognoscenti, "fit audience, though few." Similarly, in undertaking the series on Milton's poetry, Johnson discusses the difficulty of writing in a pleasing or instructive manner about "the minuter parts of literature," pointing out that if the analysis is too detailed it will repulse common readers, but if too general they will find it useless. The very 220: i mentioning of this rather specialized problem of communica-j tion apparently demonstrates Mr. Rambler’s assumption of ; the reader's high intelligence and literary sophistication. Sometimes Mr. Rambler seems to let the reader i overhear him trying to choose between different techniques,' as in the first two paragraphs of Rambler 107, where he weighs the propriety of mixing two types of letter in a single essay: the frivolous one of "Properantia" and | i the serious one of "Amicus." In this instance consulta- j tion forestalls criticism of "Amicus's" humane attitude toward prostitutes by allowing the reader to imagine that he participates in choosing to retain it. Occasionally, with apparent naivete, Mr. Rambler seems to place himself at the reader's mercy: That few things are so liberally bestowed, or squandered with so little effect, as good advice, has been generally observed; and many sage positions have been advanced concerning . . . it. It is, indeed, an important and noble enquiry, for little would be wanting to the happiness of life, if every man could conform to the right as soon as he was shown it. This perverse neglect of the most salutary precepts, and stubborn resistance of the most pathetic persuasion, is usually imputed to him by whom the counsel is received, and we often hear it mentioned as a sign of hopeless depravity, that though good advice was given, it has wrought no reformation. Others who imagine themselves to have quicker sagacity and deeper penetration, have found out, that the inefficacy of advice is usually the fault of the counsellor. . . . (R. 37; IV, 93-94) 221J ! But the "show of openness and magnanimity" has done its l ! work by the time the reader reaches the suggestion of j ineffectuality advanced in the third paragraph, and he rejects at once the possibility of its applying to Mr. Rambler, for it seems quite unlikely that anyone guilty i of such a fault could speak of it with such cool ration ality. Furthermore, because the reader dislikes giving j up the gratification to his vanity afforded by the i i intimate relationship that appears to be developing with Mr. Rambler, he pledges renewed allegiance and reads on through the essay. Audience consultations generally involve the tactic of anticipatory defense, a technique "whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.»»34 Thus in Rambler 2, when Mr. Rambler proposes to accustom himself to his most profound terror, that of his readers' neglect, he implicitly urges the reader to deny that possibility. And when, in Rambler 21, after having taken special pains in the preceding issues to create a scholarly ethos, Mr. Rambler writes that "The studious and speculative part of mankind always seem to consider the fraternity, as placed in a state of opposition to those who are engaged in the tumult of publick ■^Quintilian, Institutes, III, 3^5 (Bk. IX, ii, 13). business . . (Ill, 116), his surprisingly frank openness to criticism suggests that the reader should avoid haste in forming an opinion of his character. Such tactics of flattery are effective rhetorically not only because we listen readily to those who encourage us to please ourselves but also because we concede the flatterer the authority to speak for us. He has raised our worth in our own opinion, and we hope that, given a free rein, he will similarly improve the evaluations that others make of us. Successful flattery thus does more than simply catch the reader's ear. It obtains general freedom for the author, the reader willingly suspending envy and suspicion since he has come to regard the author as an agent or extension of himself. Dramatic Conflict: The "Correspondents" Dramatic conflict in The Rambler arises from the interaction between the protagonist, Mr. Rambler, and the supporting cast of correspondents, all but seven of whom are impersonated by Johnson (the first llS Ramblers solicited readers' letters, but the authorship of all those published has been assigned either to Johnson or 3 5 his acquaintances). ^Rambler 10, four letters by Hester Mulso; Rambler 30, Catherine Talbot; Ramblers 44 and 100, ElizabetH Carter; and Rambler 97j Samuel Richardson. It is also probable that the second letter in Rambler 15 was written 223 Impersonation resembles the techniques of personifi cation and allegory, but because it employs characters sharing the common features of human personality it more powerfully evokes empathic and imaginative involvement than they do. A personified abstraction cannot, for example, demonstrate dramatic irony. Johnson apparently disclaims the intention of arousing his readers1 belief in the fictitious correspondents by admitting in Rambler 208 having written most of the letters himself. But Johnson does not pretend that simple honesty has provoked his admission; rather, he suggests that he is renouncing the refuge of anonymity: "Having thus deprived myself of many excuses which candor might have admitted for the inequality of my compositions . . . I must remain accountable for all my faults, and submit, without subter- fuge, to the censures of criticism . . ." (V, 317). It is a final demonstration of Mr. Rambler’s masculine courage, a last bid for our belief in his sincerity. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, during the course of writing the series, Johnson sought by David Garrick, and that the second letter of Rambler 107 was contributed by Joseph Simpson. See textual footnotes to the essays, Works, III-V, and "Introduction," III, xxi, n. 1. -^Steele, in his final number of The Tatler (no. 271), goes through a similar process of unmasking himself not only as Isaac Bickerstaff but as the principal author of the essays purportedly contributed by readers. 224 I l 1 to create the impression that the "letters" were those j of actual readers. The "red herring" technique that Johnson occasionally employed shows him deliberately and audaciously confusing the reader's suspicions. For 1 example, in Rambler 20, Mr. Rambler complains of the j many attempts of his correspondents to conceal their true identity, and especially of the transparent efforts of I men to impersonate women. The rhetorical objective of j course is to emphasize the distinction between the "correspondents" and the persona, an unpolished moralist whose "hard words" make his lexicographical specialty unmistakably evident. Another essay employing the red herring tactic, Rambler 56, represents Mr. Rambler as a beleaguered editor beset by importuning readers. He begins with this observation: Nothing is more unpleasing than to find that offense has been received when none was intended, and that pain has been given to those who were not guilty of any provocation. ^The original issues through no. llB solicited readers' letters: W. P. Courtney and Nichol Smith, p. 31* Curtis Bradford (pp. 3-5) shows that Johnson initially made a considerable effort to conceal his identity and to foster the notion that The Rambler really did print contributions; nevertheless, Catherine Talbot reported to Elizabeth Carter in December, 1750, that Cave was com plaining of Johnson's unwillingness to admit correspond ents. And see Bate and Strauss, Works, III, xxiv, n. 4: Johnson confessed to Richardson that he had never intended to use readers' letters; at least one amateur author, Lady Bradshaigh, felt injured by Mr. Rambler's neglect. 225 As the great end of society is mutual beneficence, a good man is always uneasy when he finds himself acting in opposition to the purposes of life. . . . (Ill, 299-300) Mr. Rambler proceeds to develop his subject in a manner consistent with the sedate beginning: "I have therefore frequently looked with wonder . . . at the thoughtlessness with which some alienate from themselves the affections of all whom chance, business, or inclination brings in their way" (ill, 300). He divides thoughtless persons into their principal subcategories of those who pursue a favorite interest without regard for public opinion and the many who omit the forms of civility through simple neglect. The latter category may be divided again into the stupid and the proud. To this point, Rambler 56 perfectly demonstrates "logical, stepwise progression." But then it radically shifts its course: "I am afraid," writes Mr. Rambler, "that I may be taxed with insensibility by many of my correspondents, who believe their contributions unjustly neglected" (III, 303)* He describes the heaps of unread manuscripts before him, sighing that he "cannot remember how long they have lain in my boxes unregarded, without imagining to myself the various changes of sorrow, impatience, and resentment, which the writers must have felt in this tedious interval. Yet whatever the writers' importunity, Mr. Rambler professes his helplessness: 226 ! I I cannot but consider myself, as placed in a very incommodious situation, where I am forced to repress confidence, which it is pleasing to indulge, to repay civilities with appearances i of neglect, and so frequently to offend those by whom I never was offended. For such cruelty what atonement can be made? For such calamities what alleviation can be found? I am afraid that the mischief already done must be without reparation, and all that deserves my care is prevention for the future. (Ill, 304) Mr. Rambler can only recommend that aspiring authors refrain from telling their friends when they submit papers to The Rambler. If a contribution happens to be published and praised, the author may step forth; if it is published and censured, he may add his criticism to the others; and if it is ignored, he may wonder privately without embar rassment. With that advice, the essay concludes, leaving the reader to interpret it as he will. In Rambler 193» using red herring tactics to distinguish himself from the purported correspondents, Mr. ■Rambler forestalls suspicion by confessing having written himself a letter: Every other enjoyment malice may destroy; even other panegyrick envy may with-hold; but no human power can deprive the boaster of his own encomiums. . . . This art of happiness has been long practised by periodical writers, with little apparent violation of decency. When we think our excel lencies overlooked by the world, or desire to recall the attention of the publick to some particular performance, we sit down with great composure and write a letter to ourselves. The correspondent, whose character we assume, always addresses us with the deference due to a superior intelligence; proposes his doubts with a proper sense of his own inability; offers an objection with trembling diffidence; and at last has no other pretensions to our notice than his profundity of respect, and sincerity of admira tion, his submission to our dictates, and seal for our success. . . . A letter of this kind I had lately the honour of perusing, in which, though some of the periods were negligently closed, and some expressions of familiarity were used, which I thought might teach others to address me with too little reverence, I was so much delighted with the passages in which mention was made of universal learning— unbounded genius— soul of Homer, Pythagoras, and Plato— solidity of thought— accuracy of distinction— elegance of combination— vigour of fancy— strength of reason— and regularity of composition— that I had once determined to lay it before the publick. Three times I sent it to the printer, and three times I fetched it back. My modesty was on the point of yielding, when reflecting that I was about to waste panegyricks on myself, which might be more profitably reserved for my patron, I locked it up for a better hour, in compliance with the farmer’s principle, who never eats at home what he can carry to the market. (V; 24o-7) This application of the red-herring has three effects: first, Johnson implies that, were he to impersonate a reader, his style would differ greatly from the testy character of the ’’letters" generally printed in The Rambler; second, the comparison reminds the reader of the "correspondents’" typical hauteur and arrogance and causes him to reaffirm his growing alliance with Mr. Rambler; and third, employing paralipsis, Johnson does deliver encomiums upon himself in the very act of disavowing the intention. The question must arise of judging Johnson's artistry in creating his impersonations and of determining the extent of his authorial detachment. Certainly we are sometimes justified in perceiving a resemblance between Samuel Johnson and his creations, as in the tale of "Serotinus" in Rambler 165, which closely parallels the admitted self-portrait of "Gelaleddin" in Idler 75 The problem of estimating Johnson's detachment does not arise where his intentions are unmistakably satirical, as in "Euphelia," the imperious young lady (R. 1+2, 46), "Quisquilius,1 1 the virtuoso (R. 82), and "Papilius," the petty wit (R. 141)• But in many instances the distinction between fiction and self-representation is not so clear. For example, when Johnson impersonates a sober business man, as he does in "Sophron," he seems to personify the Samuel Johnson pilloried by Macaulay and his successors: You must not therefore think me sinking below the dignity of a practical philosopher, when I recommend to the consideration of your readers, from the statesman to the apprentice, a position replete with mercantile wisdom, "A penny saved is two-pence got"; which may, I think, be accommodated to all conditions, by observing not only that they who pursue any lucrative employment will save time when they forbear expense, and that the time may be t d J See Hesther Lynch Piozzi, Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson, L.L.D. . . . in Miscellanies, I, 17^1 2291 I employed to the encrease of profit; but that j they who are above such minute considerations, j will find, by every victory over appetite or passion, new strength added to the mind, will gain the power of refusing those solicitations by which the young and vivacious are hourly assaulted, and in time set themselves above the reach of extravagance and folly. I (R. 57; III, 303) ; For more than a hundred installments, the reader ! 1 has no reason to suppose that "Sophron’s" advice was j intended ironically; he knows only that the advice is j singularly arid and uncongenial. But in Rambler 196, Johnson analyzes the grounds of a beneficent outlook in a manner that seems an implicit criticism of "Sophron": He who has seen only the superficies of life believes every thing to be what it appears. . . . He is inclined to believe no man miserable but by his own fault, and seldom looks with much pity upon failings or miscarriages, because he thinks them willingly admitted, or negligently incurred. (V, 259) Then in the succeeding number Johnson exemplifies this perspective with a letter from "Captator," a professional legacy-hunter, whose youthful exposure to mercenary aphorisms suggests the probable training of "Sophron": My parents, though otherwise not great philosophers, knew the force of early education, and took care that the blank of my understanding should be filled with impressions of the value of money. My mother used, upon all occasions, to inculcate some salutary axioms, such as might incite me "to keep what I had, and get what I could"; she informed me that we were in a world, where "all must catch that catch can"; and as I grew up, stored my memory with deeper observations; restrained me from the usual puerile expenses, by remarking that "many a 2301 little made a mickle”; and, when I envied the finery of any of my neighbors, told me, that "Brag was a good dog, but Holdfast was a i better." (R. 197; V, 262-63) To suggest that Johnson deliberately characterised j "Sophron" in an ironical manner challenges the long- j prevalent critical assumption that he was primarily a lexicographer, editor, moralist, and conversational gladiator and only incidentally a literary artist. To > be sure, Johnson's attempts along ironical lines have not ! 39 been entirely without appreciators. 7 James Clifford, i one of the most sympathetic of modern Johnsonians, observes of the 1739 Compleat Vindication of the Licensers of the Stage that This time another favorite device of Swift was used— the "dead-pan" advocacy of a position just the reverse of his own. . . . Unfortunately, Johnson's irony lacks the superb control, the mock aloofness, of his model, and in places is heavy-handed and obvious. He could not lose himself, as could Swift, in the character of his imaginary speaker.^ But in 1739 Johnson was still learning his craft, and The Rambler appeared after another decade of steady application. useful comprehensive survey of Johnson's irony has just appeared: Stanley William Lindberg, "Johnsonian Irony: The Theory and Practice of Irony in the Prose Writings of Samuel Johnson," Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1969* ^James L. Clifford, Young Sam Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.), p. 2l'6. It is certain that Johnson's impersonations succeed in one respect, that of providing information about Mr. Rambler, for the reader's impression of that character arises mainly from the implied dialogues between Mr. Rambler and his correspondents. In Rambler 10, for example, the first number to include letters, the four billets by Hester Mulso are juxtaposed with Mr. Rambler's comments to create the impression of a dialogue: "A lady sends her compliments to the Rambler, and desires to know, by what other name she may direct to him; what are his set of friends, his amusements; what his way of thinking, with regard to the living world, and its ways; in short, whether he is a person now alive, and in town? If he be, she will do herself the honour to write to him pretty often, and hopes, from time to time, to be the better for his advice and animadversions. ..." (Ill, 52) Mr. Rambler replies that she is never to know his name but that she may often see his face, "for I am of her opinion, that a diurnal writer ought to view the world. . . Another letter, that of "Lady Racket," invites Mr. Rambler to play cards on Sundays, to which he replies that, as his interest is in observing mankind, he avoids card-parties, "for I could know nothing of the company, but their cloaths and their faces" (III, 53)* Two other letters in Rambler 10, those of "Flirtilla" and "a modest young man," directly solicit Mr. Rambler's advice. "Flirtilla," whose letter Mr. Rambler recounts to us, accuses him of being "old and ugly" and of lacking 232 "both activity of body and sprightliness of mind"; she i threatens to feed her monkey with his "lucubrations" until he writes a vindication of masquerades. Mr. Rambler hesitates in mock diffidence before responding to Flirtilla: "To write in defence of masquerades is no j easy task; yet something difficult and daring may well be j required, as the price of so important an approbation." j Finally he turns her letter over to his acquaintance "Nigrinus,” who bursts out in a rhapsodic declaration of devotion: "And can you, Mr. Rambler, stand out against i this charming creature? Let her know, at least, that from this moment Nigrinus devotes his life and his labours to her service. . . . Behold, Flirtilla, at thy feet, a man grown gray in the study of those noble arts, . . . by which reason may be blinded, when we have a mind to escape from her inspection; and caprice and appetite instated in uncontroulled command, and boundless dominion! Such a casuist may surely engage, with certainty of success, in vindication of an entertainment, which in an instant gives confidence to the timorous, and kindles ardour in the cold; and entertainment where the vigilance of jealousy has so often been eluded, and the virgin is set free from the necessity of languishing in silence. . . . if the rights of pleasure are again invaded, let but Flirtilla crack her fan, neither pens, nor swords, shall be wanting at the summons; the wit and the colonel shall march out at her command, and neither law nor reason shall stand before us." (Ill, 55-56) And there the essay ends, without a word from Johnson to assure the reader that his own position is not that of "Nigrinus." 233] I The impersonated correspondents also afford Johnson { vehicles for dramatizing satiric commentary through the j ostensible direct testimony of witnesses and they enable ; i him to express opinions incompatible with the specialized character with which he has endowed Mr. Rambler. For J j example, Rambler 45, an anonymous criticism of mankind’s ; i inability to find satisfaction in marriage, is imputed i i to a correspondent because it seems too bitter to accord i j with Mr. Rambler’s ethos of genial good nature. And in Rambler 54, "Athenatus's” discussion of the power of a deathbed to rectify one's values helps, by establishing a contrast of extreme sobriety, to correct the frequent accusation (as by Flirtilla) that Mr. Rambler is gloomy. On the other hand, Rambler l6l, an amateur historian's account of the garret he inhabits, might be considered too trivial for consistency with Mr. Rambler's far—ranging humane interests. The testifying correspondents fall into two groups: witnesses of misdeeds and exemplars of them. Among witness-correspondents may be accounted "Zosima," of Rambler 12, a refined young woman who describes her difficulty in finding suitable employment in London; the anonymous girl of Rambler 55, whose mother neglects and abuses her because she herself is clinging jealously to youth; "Melissa" of Rambler 75, who testifies concerning the contrasting faces that society presents to an 234 i attractive young woman when she is rich and when she is j poor; and "Misella," of Ramblers 170 and 171, "who recounts j the deception and exploitation that forced her to become i a prostitute. ! I Exemplar-correspondents may be subdivided once again j into those who narrate their stories with unconscious irony and those who view their histories with retrospective: irony. (See the analysis of their incidence in Table 2.) I i Exemplars narrating their histories with retrospective ! irony include "Eubulus" (R. 26 and 27), a young man who succumbs at Cambridge to the temptations of frivolity and who thereupon discovers the unreliability of friends made during a course of riotous living; "Cupidus" (R. 73), who spent so much of his life idly waiting for wealthy relatives to die that yearning became habitual and he cannot now enjoy his inherited wealth; and "Misocapelus" (R. 116), a country gentleman's second son prevented by pride from enjoying any of the stations in which life places him. More interesting demonstrations of rhetorical tactics, however, are found in those exemplars who write in blissful ignorance of their own excesses. Thus "Ruricola" (R. 6l), laments that he must live in a remote county at a great distance from London, and he describes with blind admiration the supercilious airs which London visitors assume in condescending to him and his neighbors. 2351 I Rambler 62, a related essay, offers the aspirations of ' "Rhodoclia," a young woman approaching twenty, who, like "Ruricola," lives in the country; she has been taught to yearn for London by parents who dwell in a fanciful ! memory of gay times in the nation's metropolis. Rhodoclia | has obtained permission to visit London, but she will not leave for three weeks, and her present motive in writing | is to ask how she may endure "this tedious interval." The essay provides three perspectives of the writer: a vain and frivolous young lady; an intelligent girl misled by her upbringing; and a doomed woman destined to repeat the dead-end course of her parents. The virtuoso "Quisquilius" (R. £2) begins his narration by asserting that "It will not be necessary to solicit your good will by any formal preface, when I have informed you, that I have long been known as the most laborious and zealous virtuoso that the present age has had the honor of producing . . (IV, 65). Quisquilius describes his steadfast resistance to every attempt at causing him to turn his talents to practical purposes and expresses pity for his father, who keeps hoping that his son may turn to the study of physical science, a notion that Quisquilius does not bother to contradict: "For you know that there are men, with whom, when they have once settled a notion in their heads, it is to very little purpose to dispute" (IV, 66). Unfortunately, the 2 3 6 ' writer's mania for collecting has so impoverished him i that he must now sell his specimens in order to pay his ; debts, and that, he reveals to Mr. Rambler in the final : sentence, motivates the present letter: "I have, while it is yet in my power, sent you a pebble, pick'd up by Tavernier on the banks of the Ganges; for which I desire ; no other recompence than that you will recommend my catalogue to the public" (IV, 70). For mad irony without j venom, this piece has few equals, and the final solicita- i tion, coming from such an innocuous person, arouses our compassion, not our contempt. The dramatized correspondents, both witnesses and exemplars, stimulate the reader's imagination, but the ostensible self-characterizations actually have little intrinsic power to affect one's attitude toward Mr. Rambler. For the purpose of actively steering the reader toward allying himself with the persona and imitating or rejecting the purported correspondent, Johnson employs another form of irony arising from the fictitious writer's dramatic stance. For example, the correspondent may act out a belief that Mr. Rambler is a trustworthy advisor to whom one can turn for reliable counsel, and the reader, identifying with the correspondent’s trusting attitude, then reduces his resistance to Mr. Rambler's moral influence. 237! There being, to my knowledge, no rhetorical term i for this tactic, I have adopted Erving Goffman's term shill, which he borrowed from the jargon of gamblers and carnival workers.^ A shill is a person who pretends i to be a member of the audience but who is actually in | league with the performers; by deliberately manifesting responsive behavior at appropriate times, he arouses empathy in the audience and, acting as a pace-setter, j guides their responses for the performers' profit. The function of the literary shill may be observed in Rambler 51* The purported author, "Cornelia," begins with this declaration: As you have allowed a place in your paper to Euphelia's letters from the country, and appear to think no form of human life unworthy of your attention, I have resolved, after many struggles with idleness and diffidence, to give you some account of my entertainment in this sober season of universal retreat, and to describe to you the employments of those who look with contempt on the pleasures and diversions of polite life, and employ all their powers of censure and invective upon the uselessness, vanity, and folly of dress, visits, and conversation. (Ill, 273-74) ^ Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, HI T75 DoublecTay and”7To., inc., 1959), pp. 146-47* Although Aristotle does not name the tactic, he nevertheless describes it: "To a certain extent an audience will be impressed by a device which speech-writers use to nauseous excess: 'Who does not know . . .?' 'We all know . . The hearer, ashamed to be ignorant, agrees to the fact, so as to have his part in the common knowledge." Rhetoric, p. 198 (Bk. Ill, 7). The shill of course resembles the opera claque, but expresses a much greater variety of responses. Cornelia's observation that Mr. Rambler seems "to think no form of human life unworthy of . . . attention" is much more effective, rhetorically, than a direct statement of policy from Johnson could be, for a declaration only notifies the reader of an intention, whereas a reader's observation of policy endows it with the authority of accomplished fact. Cornelia proceeds to delineate the character of her aunt, Lady Bustle, with whom she has been visiting in the country, and who, through living isolated from general society, has devoted herself to housewifely pursuits with excessively single-minded zeal. After presenting her aunt's portrait, Cornelia concludes with this appeal: The reason, Mr. Rambler, why I have laid Lady Bustle's character before you, is a desire to be informed whether, in your opinion, it is worthy of imitation, and whether I shall throw away the books which I have hitherto thought it my duty to read, for the Lady's closet opened, the Compleat servant-maid, and the Court cook, and resign all curiosity after right and wrong, for the art of scalding damascenes without bursting them, and preserving the whiteness of pickled mushrooms. (Ill, 277-75) In this conclusion, the disingenuous dramatic irony of erotema, the rhetorical question, reinforces the general shill function by provoking the reader into formulating an explicit position. 239) i Such an imitation-inducing gambit is plain enough, ; I but the technique is less evident where Johnson wishes the reader to reject, rather than affirm, the shill's stance. For example, Rambler 55, an anonymous young woman's account of her mother's jealousy, begins as a bid for imitation: "I shall venture to lay my case before you, in hopes that you will enforce my opinion, if you think it just, or endeavour to rectify my senti ments, if I am mistaken" (III, 295). But then the j correspondent changes direction, exhibiting suspicion instead of confidence in Mr. Rambler: "I expect, at least, that you will divest yourself of partiality, and that whatever your age or solemnity may be, you will not, with the dotard's insolence, pronounce me ignorant and foolish, perverse and refractory, only because you perceive that I am young" (III, 295). Her challenge stimulates the reader to examine his knowledge of Mr. Rambler and to recall that, though Mr. Rambler has printed some very foolish letters, his responses have been consistently courteous and benevolent. It is folly, not the individual, that Mr. Rambler condemns, and in reviewing the evidence for this conclusion the reader reaffirms his alliance with the essayist. The literary shill, as Johnson uses It in The Rambler, has thus two rhetorical forms: imitative and ironical. Imitative shills dramatize attitudes which the reader adopts directly as his own, whereas ironical shills express attitudes which the reader rejects and replaces with others, more or less contrary. The imitative shill exemplifies yet another of Aristotle's principles: "There are things which, if you say them of yourself, will bring you dislike, or will be tedious, or will arouse contradiction; and things which, if you say them of another, will make you appear abusive or ill-bred. Such things, if said, should be put into the mouth of a third person."^2 And, indeed, Mr. Rambler never does bid openly for the reader's trust; instead, he evokes it indirectly, avoiding the appearance of attempting to guide readers' responses, by producing shills to declare their impressions of Mr. Rambler's intention, manner, and technique. Ironical shill tactics resemble the trope of erotema, the rhetorical question, in that each asks for a clearly articulated imaginative response by the reader. The tactics differ in that, while the rhetorical question may be answered in the affirmative or the negative, the ironical shill offers as a statement of fact a misunder standing that can be answered only in the negative, thereby provoking a corrective response. ^ Rhetoric, pp. 236-37 (Bk. Ill, 17)* 241 Corrective tactics form the major source of dramatic conflict in the Rambler essays. The ironical shill either i fails to read Mr. Rambler's words accurately or lacks basic self-understanding; he therefore interprets Mr. I Rambler's statements or intentions in a manner radically j opposed to the reader's impression. Actually, the 1 misunderstanding draws the reader's sympathy toward Mr. Rambler for several reasons. We are always inclined to feel compassion for one who accomplishes the opposite of 1 his intention, and Mr. Rambler, by representing himself from the initial essay as a person anxious to be under stood, has won our hope for his success. The "correspond ent's" misunderstanding seems real simply because it does not occur to us that an author would deliberately represent himself as not communicating with his readers. The ironic shill's failure to read the essays accurately occurs because he is himself stupid, vain, or careless, and he censures Mr. Rambler for opinions he has not expressed or demands that he write what he has in fact already stated. An anonymous correspondent demonstrates such misunderstanding in Rambler 35: "As you have hitherto delayed the performance of the promise, by which you gave us reason to hope for another paper upon matrimony . . . I shall therefore lay candidly before you an account of my own entrance into the conjugal state" (III, 190). The correspondent has missed the preceding issue, in which another anonymous young man narrates his lucky escape from a union with the vapid "Anthea." Although no severe correction is necessary, the reader feels a definite pull on his imagination and a demand that he review Rambler 34* The letters of "Euphelia" in Ramblers 42 and 46 demonstrate a more complicated use of the ironic shill. Euphelia begins her first letter with well-bred brutality: I am no great admirer of grave writings, and therefore very frequently lay your papers aside before I have read them through; yet I cannot but confess that, by slow degrees, you have raised my opinion of your understanding, and that, though I believe it will be long before I can be prevailed upon to regard you with much kindness, you have, however, more of my esteem than those whom I sometimes make happy with opportunities to fill my tea-pot, or pick up my fan. I shall therefore chuse you for the confident of my distresses. . . . (Ill, 227) Euphelia*s tone of insolent negligence here will keynote her shill function. However, as he so often does, Johnson endows his creation with qualities that provoke an ambivalent response in the reader. We learn, as Euphelia recounts her history, that she is a gentlewoman of twenty- two, raised in the midst of London frivolity; this summer she is paying an extended visit to an aunt residing in the country. Euphelia has found that the pleasures of rural life soon pall, and she laments that "I had not in myself any fund of satisfaction, with which I could supply the loss of my customary amusements." And she concludes her letter with a sincere appeal for real assistance: Yet I have heard, Mr. Rambler, of those who never thought themselves so much at ease as in solitude, and cannot but suspect it to be some way or other my own fault, that . . . I am thus weary of myself. . . . I shall therefore think you a benefactor to our sex, if you will teach me the art of living alone. . . . (Ill, 231) The reader can but smile in agreement and must find himself feeling somewhat fond of Euphelia after all. Perhaps Johnson's actually sharing Euphelia*s need for varied social stimulation caused him to sketch her in a not wholly unflattering light. At any rate, he presents her as a redeemable person deficient in training rather than in essential qualities of character. Euphelia begins her second letter with the same imperious incivility as before: I am inclined by vanity, or gratitude, to continue our correspondence; and, indeed, without either of these motives, am glad of an oppor tunity to write, for I am not accustomed to keep in any thing that swells my heart. . . . While I am thus employed, some tedious hours will slip away. . . . You perceive that I do not pretend to write with much consideration of any thing but my own convenience; and, not to conceal from you my real sentiments, the little time I have spent, against my will, in solitary meditation, has not much contributed to my veneration for authors. I have now sufficient reason to suspect that, with all your splendid profes sions of wisdom, and seeming regard for truth, you have very little sincerity; that you either write what you do not think, and willingly impose upon mankind, or that you take no care to think right, but while you set up yourselves as guides mislead your followers. . . . (R. 46; III, 24#) 244| Euphelia goes on to reveal the immediate cause of her i hostility: the many romances she has read have portrayed rural life as one of unbounded charm and happiness, and it was as a consequence of their descriptions that she accepted her aunt's invitation. With this theme, however, ; Euphelia is also beginning to imply that a more general cause of her arrogance consists in society's generally slighting attitude toward feminine intelligence: You may, perhaps, wonder that I express myself with so much acrimony . . . and you are likely enough, for I have seen many instances of the sauciness of scholars, to tell me, that I am more properly employed in playing with my kittens, than in giving myself airs of criti cism, and censuring the learned. But you are mistaken if you imagine that I am to be intimidated by your contempt, or silenced by your reproofs. As I read, I have a right to judge. . . . (ill, 249} The reader gradually realises that Euphelia carelessly groups Mr. Rambler with the authors of the romances that have misled her expectations of country living. Yet, to complicate the matter even more, she quite evidently knows very well that Mr. Rambler stands apart from them; it is pride and vanity that make her unwilling to discipline her thoughts. Like Dickens's Mrs. Gowan in Little Dorrit, Euphelia plays the grande dame by deliberately disregarding distinctions between individuals, and upon recognizing such injustice the reader must inevitably feel an intense desire to set the case right. The reader at first identifies with Euphelia and participates vicariously in her insolence, only to reject her point of view the more decisively when the irony of it is revealed (such, Ehrenpreis points out, is the J n basis of Swift's success in A Modest Proposal). Following that reversal, however, the perspective changes again and Euphelia becomes not so much the object of satire as the recorder of satiric observations. She describes the petty preoccupations of "these distant provinces, where the same families inhabit the same houses from age to age, [and where] they transmit and recount the faults of a whole succession" (ill, 250). She describes how scandals and feuds are nurtured although the active participants have been dead four generations or more. But she concludes in a characteristically complex vein of good sense and rank impudence: "I hope therefore that you will not condemn my impatience, if I am weary of attending where nothing can be learned, and of quarreling where there is nothing to contest, and that you will contribute to divert me while I stay here by some facetious performance" (III, 252). The effectiveness of this essay is enhanced by the reader's temptation to agree with Euphelia at the outset and by his consistent feeling that some of her complaints are justifiable. Country life is apt to be petty and 43»perS0nae," pp. 34-36. malicious; authors do romanticize rural pleasures; and society does frequently neglect feminine intellectual development. But the reader must at last deal with an implicit question: is Mr. Rambler indeed at fault with the authors of whom Euphelia complains? The essay asks that the reader correct not only Euphelia1s opinion of Mr. Rambler but also of herself, for he has discovered a layer of common sense of which she seems insensible "Sophron’s" letter in Rambler 57 is an example of the ironical shill who has failed to read Mr. Rambler accurately because of self-preoccupation: Your late paper on frugality [R. 53] was very elegant and pleasing, but, in my opinion, not sufficiently adapted to common readers, who pay little regard to the musick of periods, the artifice of connection, or the arrangement of the flowers of rhetoric; but require a few plain and cogent instructions, which may sink into the mind by their own weight. (Ill, 305) In going back to the essay which Sophron criticizes, the reader will look in vain for "elegance" and "flowers of rhetoric." It is, indeed, precisely the absence of those qualities of which most of The Rambler’s correspondents ^■^Whitley, p. 53, remarks on this feature in Rasselas: "More subtly still, Johnson occasionally switches his comic mirrors. The younger pilgrims are normally the objects of ridicule, but at times their very ingenuousness becomes trenchant insight and makes them the true reflectors of it. . . . There are places where the reader is, to his own delight, not quite certain whether a character is a fool or an exposer of folly— or both." 247 complain. Thus Johnson impugns Sophron's reliability and prepares the reader to read his arguments with tongue in cheek. This essay serves the purpose, further, of distinguishing the humane character of Mr. Rambler, who, though of a serious temperament, nevertheless responds to others' opinions and desires their affection. "Eutropius," in Rambler 9^, represents the shill who fails to read carefully through sheer carelessness. He begins, You have often endeavoured to impress upon your readers an observation of more truth than novelty, that life passes, for the most part, in petty transactions; that our hours glide away in trifling amusements and slight gratifications; and that there very seldom emerges any occasion that can call forth great virtue or great abilities. (IV, 160) In this initial statement Eutropius plays the imitative shill by accurately summarizing one of Mr. Rambler's basic attitudes, but in the third paragraph he takes the ironic offensive: You have truly described the state of human beings, but it may be doubted whether you have accommodated your precepts to your description; whether you have not generally considered your readers as . . . susceptible of pain or pleasure only from powerful agents and from great events. To an author who writes not for the improve ment of a single art, or the establishment of a controverted doctrine, but equally intends the advantage, and equally courts the perusal of all the classes of mankind, nothing can justly seem unworthy of regard, by which the pleasure of conversation may be increased, and the daily 2481 j satisfactions of familiar life secured from interruption and disgust. For this reason you would not have injured your reputation, if you had sometimes descended ; to the minuter duties of social beings, and enforced the observance of those little civilities and ceremonious delicacies, which . . . contribute j to the regulation of the world, by facilitating I the intercourse between one man and another. . . . (IV, 160-61) j To be sure, Mr. Rambler has not previously devoted an essay to the express purpose of explaining savoir vivre, j I but the essential idea is implicit in everything he j writes; and the ignorance of ’ 'Eutropius" must therefore suggest to the reader the unreliability of the others who complain of Mr. Rambler's limited choice of subjects. A subtly ironic group of shills misinterpret Mr. Rambler not through failing to read him accurately but through failing to understand themselves. Sometimes this type of shill announces his opposition to Mr. Rambler and goes on to express a position of substantial agree ment, and sometimes he declares his agreement but proceeds to express radical difference. The usual consequence of ironic misunderstanding follows, and the reader feels urged toward supportive alliance with Mr. Rambler. Like the careless reader, the self-ignorant shill weakens the reader's trust in the correspondents generally, for if they are blind to their own qualities, how reliable is their perception of Mr. Rambler? 249 In Rambler 16, for example, the "modest young man" of Rambler 10, now identifying himself as "Misellus" (and this time impersonated by Johnson), reports on the consequences of his taking Mr. Rambler's advice to try the public press. His success has been so phenomenal that he is now besieged by scheming sharpers, and he bewails his lost obscurity: Thus I live, in consequence of having given too great proofs of a predominant genius . . . afraid to shew my face, lest it should be copied; afraid to speak, lest I should injure my character, and to write lest my correspondents should publish my letters; always uneasy lest my servants should steal my papers for the sake of money, or my friends for that of the publick. This it is to soar above the rest of mankind; and this representation I lay before you, that I may be informed how to divest myself of the laurels which are so cumbersome to the wearer, and descend to the enjoyment of that quiet from which I find a writer of the first class so fatally debarred. (Ill, 91) Few readers can fail to recognize that vanity has led Misellus into a self-congratulatory delusion. The author of Rambler 45 plays the role of the habitually truculent man who takes a stance of opposition even when he concurs substantially with the author whom he attacks: You seem, like most of the writers that have gone before you, to have allowed, as an uncon tested principle, that "Marriage is generally unhappy": but I know not whether a man who professes to think for himself, and concludes from his own observations, does not depart from his character when he follows the crowd thus implicitly, and receives maxims without recalling them to a new examination. . . . I am unwilling 250 f I to be restrained by mere authority from advancing what, I believe, an accurate view of the world will confirm, that marriage is not commonly j unhappy, otherwise than as life is unhappy. . . . (Ill, 243) This correspondent agrees with Mr. Rambler but cannot admit it without first going through the motions of a j contest. His scruples amuse the reader and at the same , time prompt him to review his own reasons for believing i i Mr. Rambler. j "Philomides," in Rambler 72, is somewhat similar. ■ He is introduced in the act of blandly instructing Mr. Rambler with his own advice: Those who exalt themselves into the chair of instruction, without enquiring whether any will submit to their authority, have not sufficiently considered how much of human life passes in little incidents, cursory conversa tion, slight business, and casual amusements; and therefore they have endeavoured only to inculcate the more awful virtues, without condescending to regard those petty qualities, which . . . make the draught of life sweet or bitter by imperceptible instillations. (IV, 12) Philomides proceeds then to recommend good humor as "the balm of being" in the manner of Johnson's usual expository style. Perhaps Johnson has simply failed here to distinguish the fictitious character; on the other hand, he may be playing a subtle joke, for, though priding himself on his independence of opinion, the correspondnet writes as Mr. Rambler's veritable alter ego. "Myrtilla," in Rambler represents an opposite type. She states initially a substantially accurate impression of Mr. Rambler: You seem in all your papers to be an enemy to tyranny, and to look with impartiality upon the world; I shall therefore lay my case before you, and hope by your decision to be set free from unreasonable restraints, and enabled to justify myself against the accusa tions which spite and peevishness produce against me. (IV, 76-7) Thus far, Myrtilla plays the imitative shill; she goes on, however, to reveal herself a miss of sixteen who chafes under familial restrictions and who believes herself entitled to absolute freedom. She closes with a plea that Mr. Rambler will advise her "whether I am not as wise as my aunt, and whether, when she presumes to check me as a baby, I may not pluck up a spirit and return her insolence. I shall not proceed to extremities without your advice, which is therefore impatiently expected by Myrtilla" (IV, Si). Myrtilla implies, in the opening and closing paragraphs of her letter, that Mr. Rambler is the sort of man who elicits the confidence of a frivolous young girl. But her statement is complicated by the fact that, although she represents herself ironically as excessively headstrong, her aunt appears by no means blameless: Myrtilla reports that My aunt often tells me of the advantages of experience, and of the deference due to 252 | seniority; and both she and all the antiquated part of the world talk of the unreserved obedience which they paid to the commands of ! their parents, and the undoubting confidence j with which they listened to their precepts; of the terrors which they felt at a frown, and the humility with which they supplicated forgive ness whenever they had offended. I cannot but fancy that this boast is too general to be | true, and that the young and the old were always at variance. (IV, 81) i i I The complexity of the characterization resembles that of ; "Euphelia." Myrtilla is wrong, but so is her aunt, and j the girl at least has the sense to ask for advice. Such a presentation serves to reinforce Mr. Rambler's ethical - - appeal as a man capable of deciding ambiguous issues with justice. The portrait in Rambler 109 of "Florentulus," a young man tragically unacquainted with himself, demon strates a profundity of psychological insight found in few literary works. Florentulus begins, Though you seem to have taken a view sufficiently extensive of the miseries of life, and have employed much of your specula tion on mournful subjects, you have not yet exhausted the whole stock of human infelicity. There is still a species of wretchedness which escapes your observation, though it might supply you with many sage remarks, and salutary cautions. (IV, 215) It is a typical beginning of the ironic shill. But in the second paragraph Florentulus reveals his particular bias: I cannot but imagine the start of attention awakened by this welcome hint; and at this instant see the Rambler snuffing his candle, rubbing his spectacles, stirring his fire, locking out interruption, and settling himself in his easy chair, that he may enjoy a new calamity without disturbance. For, whether it be, that continued sickness or misfortune has acquainted you only with the bitterness of being; or that you imagine none but yourself able to discover what I suppose has been seen and felt by all the inhabitants of the world: whether you intend your writings as antidotal to the levity and merriment with which your rivals endeavour to attract the favour of the publick; or fancy that you have some particular powers of dolorous declamation, and "warble out your groans" with uncommon elegance or energy; it is certain, that whatever be your subject, melancholy for the most part bursts in upon your speculation, your gaiety is quickly overcast, and though your readers may be flattered with hopes of pleasantry, they are seldom dismissed but with heavy hearts. (IV, 215-16) It may be suspected that many a subsequent unfriendly critic of Johnson has drawn his characterisation of "Mr. Oddity" from this self-depreciatory paragraph. But its significance in suggesting the state of Florentulus1s tormented soul does not become apparent until we learn through his narrative how a domineering mother super intended his education, forming all his tastes and manners, so that upon his accession to maturity his style of behavior and his outlook on life are feminine rather than masculine: I will not deny the mortification with which I perceived, that every man whose name I had heard mentioned with respect, received me with a kind of tenderness nearly bordering on compassion; and that those whose reputation was not well established, thought it necessary to justify their understandings, by treating me with contempt. One of these witlings elevated his crest, by asking me in a full coffee-house the price of patches; and another whispered, that he wondered why Miss Frisk did not keep me that afternoon to watch her squirrel. (IV, 219) Thus it becomes clear to the reader that the scarcely concealed hostility which Florentulus manifests toward Mr. Rambler demonstrates the smoldering anger he feels in being unable to claim the estate of manhood. And obviously, as his petulant tone indicates, he still does not understand his problem. Conclusion Dramatization demonstrates Johnson's versatility as a literary artist more compellingly than any other technique employed in The Rambler. He varies, with astonishing adroitness, point of view, tone, and even his projection of ethical qualities. Especially by employing the ironic shill, Johnson achieves far greater flexibility in representing fictional characters than most critics have granted him. Throughout the whole series, Johnson puts the reader sometimes on the side of the correspondent and sometimes on that of Mr. Rambler, endeavoring always to draw the reader out of himself, to engage him in the dramatic conflict, and ultimately to bring him ever more firmly into an alliance with Mr. Rambler's moral vision. CHAPTER V A RECAPITULATION AND SOME INFERENCES Scholars re-examining Johnson's political writings today find him surprisingly liberal and even radical; others discover in his Shakespearian criticism and his Lives of the Poets anticipation of modern critical perspectives. I contend that evaluation of The Rambler will presently undergo similar revision. Scholars still too frequently assume that Johnson's prose technique was obstinately conservative; they evaluate him using the practices of his predecessors as normative standards and consistently judge his artistry deficient. But The Rambler stimulates the reader's imagination differently from The Spectator. Addison and Steele engage the reader through imagery and through the topics of the day, and by reading them we still can share vicariously in the everyday life of England's Augustan Age. The Rambler largely lacks that kind of appeal. Mr. Rambler provokes a much more subtle and at the same time more profound response than Mr. Spectator does. Johnson presents his persona as an undisguised moralist and teaches the reader to respond sympathetically to his efforts. 255 256! Before we can understand such a perspective of Mr. Rambler, however, we must first read the essays in their i i original sequence. Johnson was writing a subtly inte grated series of twice-weekly essays, and he employed the reader's memory and imagination for creating incremental responses that transcend the stimulation provided by I individual issues. By reading the series of 208 Ramblers as a coherent whole, one comes to understand how Johnson ; coordinated diverse elements of subject, form, and tone j within a single tenuous framework of moral intention. j It is entirely possible to regard the Rambler essays ; as empirical and genial-spirited investigations into the modes of thought and behavior most conducive to human happiness rather than as the peremptory edicts of Boswell's dictatorial father-figure. Although Johnson presents happiness as a notion subject to capricious distortion, a dream which human beings pursue but seldom attain, it would be nevertheless a mistake to infer that he dismisses the impulse toward personal fulfillment as merely "the vanity of human wishes." Johnson recommends the power of perseverance and self-confidence so often and so emphatically that we must at once reject any suggestion that he sought to elicit passive obedience to his personal doctrines. Granted, Johnson does not recommend facile optimism. Although happiness arises from mental discipline alone, it 257; i i is at the same time not entirely subject to governance ! by the will. The power of outward circumstances cannot always be resisted, and poor health, old age, and poverty can rob a person of all spare capacity for feeling and i reflection, subordinating his entire range of consciousness1 to immediate problems of survival. | i But thematic analysis, however thorough, does not I adequately characterize Johnson's achievement in these I essays, for to a considerable extent The Rambler effects its persuasion independently of themes. To assume that Johnson wrote calmly assured of his audience's concurrence 1 in his tastes, interests, and objectives is to ignore considerable contrary testimony of internal evidence. Every man of genius has some arts of fixing the attention peculiar to himself, by which, honestly exerted, he may benefit mankind; for the arguments for purity of life fail of their due influence, not because they have been considered and confuted, but because they have been passed over without consideration. (R. #7; IV, 9#) Johnson's particular "art of fixing the attention" in these essays consists in locating a persona, Mr. Rambler, within a dramatic milieu of fictitious correspondents. Although Mr. Rambler avoids involvement in the London activities that make The Spectator*s pages lively reading, his apparently direct engagement with the readers compen sates for his meditative nature. By thus dramatizing the possible sources of conflict in Mr. Rambler's situation, 253 Johnson urges the reader to align himself first on one side, then another, and finally always to affirm his support of Mr. Rambler. The authorial distance that Johnson has placed between himself and his work becomes evident when the reader accepts Mr. Rambler as an independent dramatic persona. Obviously, when Mr. Rambler consults with the reader on a point of his own literary technique, one should not assume that Samuel Johnson is speaking; and indeed, if one takes the Ramblers at face value, the consistent exercise of authorial depreciation provides almost as much reason to patronize as to admire Mr. Rambler. Thus, contrary to the anxieties of father- fearing Victorian critics, careful readers of The Rambler are in no danger of sinking into the status of passive disciples. Johnson is continually pushing them toward independent thought by concealing his own judgment behind an ironical curtain of dramatic action. I have suggested the deliberation as a mode of discourse that describes Johnson's technique and overall strategy in these essays. But the tradition of satire provides a more specific and more familiar literary basis for comprehending The Rambler as a coherent harmony of diverse themes, styles, and points of view. To be sure, many of the individual essays are not in themselves satirical, yet all contribute nevertheless to an overall satirical structure. " * ■ Satire is essentially a kind of didactic strategy, a specialized form of deliberative discourse which, unlike the lampoon and the burlesque, draws the reader's attention always to general moral principles and future courses of action. Furthermore, it appeals ultimately to the reader's desire for happiness. Satire's distinctive intellectual character arises from the fact that contraries and contradictions, its customary techniques, are degrees of comparison, and comparison is the basis of inductive reasoning and indeed of perception itself. But whereas formal instruction ordinarily proceeds with "logical, stepwise progression" from generalities to specifics, satire leads the reader into new perspectives suddenly, bypassing intermediary steps, and for that reason imparting insights all the more vivid. Satire distorts its representations in order to draw the reader's attention more closely to the subject, for when customary guidelines change, the reader must exert original imaginative effort to correct the distortions. And because in making the correction he is ^See Mary Claire Randolph, "The Structural Design of the Formal Verse Satire," PQ, 21 (1942), 374> 37&* Miss Randolph points out that various satirists, particularly Persius, wrote clusters of coordinated satires explicating a single perspective. Two dissertations during the past decade on Johnson's satire both treat it as something that appears in a minority of the periodical essays: Delbert Leroy Earisman, "Samuel Johnson's Satire," Diss., Indiana University, I960; Arnold MacLean Tibbetts, "The Satire of Samuel Johnson," Diss., Vanderbilt University, 1964* 26cj i shocked into consciousness, as it were, the reader feels ! a special degree of proprietorship in his new insight. i For this reason, it is a mistake to emphasize logical pattern in The Rambler. It is obvious that the series as a whole does not proceed with unvarying ration- ! ality, and even in the individual essays Johnson quite often begins with one topic and then switches to another j after a few paragraphs; the second topic is implied by the first, but it is not causally connected. The arrange ment is neither strictly inductive nor deductive, and the reader cannot anticipate its course. It is almost as if the author set forth on an actual ramble and encoun tered his main topic by accident. Thus it is that the overall unifying thread of argument, the goal of estab lishing a personal economy of life, becomes apparent only upon regarding large groups of Ramblers and by recognizing the essentially dramatic {and rhetorical) character of the presentation. Many individual sections contribute to the overall purpose only in that they induce the reader to make certain assumptions about the author and perhaps to define a general stance toward him. Such, I have pointed out, is the major office of the essays dramatizing Mr. Rambler's relationships with the readers as well as an important incidental function of the literary papers. 261 There has always been a tendency among English critics to regard the Juvenalian mode of satire as somehow more true to the essential tradition than the more genial 2 and philosophical Horatian variety. Even today, we value most highly the satire that threatens actual destruction of the objects it condemns, forgetting that the important objective is destruction of a mental set rather than particular persons, customs, or institutions. Dryden, in his essay on satire, accords with critical consensus in preferring Juvenal; however, by quoting Andre Dacier's description of the Horatian mode, he acquaints us with the more humane and reformative satirical process: "In these two books of Satire, 'tis the business of Horace to instruct us how to combat our vices, to regulate our passions, to follow nature, to give bounds to our desires, to distinguish betwixt truth and falsehood, and betwixt our conceptions of things, and things themselves; to come back from our prejudicate opinions, to understand exactly the principles and motives of all our actions; and to avoid the ridicule into which all men necessarily fall, who are intoxicated with those notions which they have received from their masters, and which they obstinately retain, without examining whether or no they be founded on right reason. "In a word, he labours to render us happy in relation to ourselves; agreeable 2 Randolph discusses this point, p. 379, suggesting that it is a carry-over from the original confusion of the Latin satura and the Greek satyr-play. See also the very thorough discussion of satire's destructive implica tions in Robert C. Elliott's The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (Princeton: Princeton University ’ Press, I960). 262 and faithful to our friends; and discreet, ! serviceable, and well-bred, in relation to those with whom we are obliged to live, and to converse.”3 Dacier's description applies with perfect propriety t0 The Rambler, written more than a half-century later. j For Johnson's objective is not a strictly didactic one of inculcating specific principles but an essentially j satirical one of inducing a revelation of life's meaning beyond immediate rational apprehension and of inspiring ; confidence that our instinctive grasping toward infinite i accomplishment promises a higher order of existence. It is a more fundamentally moral objective than any mere transmission of precepts could ever attain, for such a conviction of essential order enables the individual to sustain hope, to discipline his thoughts, and thereby to persevere on a deliberate course in an unpredictable and often "absurd” world. My objective in this study is to provide a basis for including The Rambler in the canon of major English literary classics. I have shown that Johnson exercised deliberate pragmatic artistry, that his strategies draw on a versatile faculty of invention, and that his themes ^John Dryden, "A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire,” The Essays of John Dryden, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford: Oxford Dniv. Press, 1926), II, 97-93; quoting Andre Dacier, Preface sur les Satires d'Horace (16&7). relate to a profound and universal level of human life. By emphasizing the relationship between Johnson's literary practices and the rhetorical principles of Aristotle and Quintilian, I suggest that he wrote with a sense "not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence," for the ancient writers provided the theoretical founda tion both for the established literary tradition of England and the Continent and for the empirical and psychological trend that was gathering momentum during the second half of the eighteenth century. Johnson's actually having read the Rhetoric and the Institutes means that he was familiar with the specific passages that lent authority to the "new rhetoric" of his day. Johnson's inductive unfolding of mental discipline through pushing the reader toward discovering his own subjective faculties and their economical relationship with outward circumstances anticipates the objective which Coleridge postulated for the ideal poet, that of bringing "the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity." Johnson invites the reader's imaginative and empathic involvement at every stage of argument, offers him the experience of being an active co-discoverer of truth, and thereby accords him confidence and self-respect. Therein consists justifica tion for calling Johnson "the English Socrates." APPENDIX A INTERRELATED ESSAYS A. 6, 7, 8, 9> and 11: The Importance of Regulating One*sj Thoughts and Feelings. 6. On "The necessity of erecting ourselves to some degree of intellectual dignity, and of preserving resources of pleasure, which may not be wholly | at the mercy of accident . . (Ill, 31). 7* Concerning "that conquest of the world and of 1 ourselves, which has been always considered as the perfection of human nature; and this is only to be obtained by fervent prayer, steady resolutions, and frequent retirement from folly and vanity . . (ill, 40). S. "Lest a power so restless [as that of the mind] should be either unprofitably, or hurtfully employed, and the superfluities of intellect run to waste, it is no vain speculation to consider how we may govern our thoughts, restrain them from irregular motions, or confine them from boundless dissipation" (III, 42). 9* "This passion for the honour of a profession, like that for the grandeur of our own country, is to be regulated not extinguished. . . . Every man ought to endeavour at eminence, not by pulling others down, but by raising himself, and enjoy the pleasure of his own superiority, whether imaginary or real, without interrupting others in the same felicity" (III, 50). 11. An analysis of petty anger— a pattern of behavior arising from an habitual avoidance of self- discipline rather than from a natural predisposi tion. B. 17 and 19: We Conceive More Than We Can Achieve. 17. "The known shortness of life, as it ought to moderate our passions, may likewise, with equal 264 265 i propriety, contract our designs. There is not ; time for the most forcible genius, and most j active industry, to extend its effects beyond a certain sphere" (III, 96). i "It is always pleasing to observe, how much more : our minds can conceive, than our bodies can perform; yet it is our duty, while we continue j in this complicated state, to regulate one part j of our composition by some regard to the other" (III, 97). 19. The story of Polyphilus, who wasted his brilliant! gifts in considering which course of life to > pursue. "This will be the state of every man, who, in the choice of his employment, balances j all the arguments on every side ..." (ill, ! 109) . C. 24, 25, 26, 27, 23: The Importance of Knowing Our True Value. I 24. On the importance of knowing oneself; for "every error in human conduct must arise from ignorance in ourselves, either perpetual or temporary; and happen either because we do not know what is best and fittest, or because our knowledge is at the time of action not present to the mind" (III, 131) • 25. "False hopes and false terrors are equally to be avoided. Every man, who proposes to grow eminent by learning, should carry in his mind, at once, the difficulty of excellence, and the force of industry; and remember that fame is not conferred but as the recompense of labour, and that labour, vigorously continued, has not often failed of its reward" (III, 140). 26. 27. Letters from "Eubulus"— who was seduced by the life of fashionable insolence at the university— offended his uncle & benefactor— set out to display his genius in London but had to borrow from his friends, who soon dropped him. "You will easily believe that I had no great knowledge of the world. ..." He suffers many indignities in searching for a patron; his uncle dies at last, and he resolves to advise others not to embark upon lives of folly. 266! 28. "I have shewn, in a late essay, to what errors j men are hourly betrayed by a mistaken opinion of their own powers, and a negligent inspection ! of their own character" (III, 151). The essay then examines the patterns of thought which cause us to avoid recognising our true character and situation in life. D. 34 and 35: The Misery of Misalliances. 3k. A young man writes a sketch of "Anthea," an affected young lady whom he had been intending to marry, until he had the opportunity of observing her self-centered frivolity. j 35. A gentleman writes of his study of marriage, j and of his subsequent union with Mitissa, who I made his life miserable until he himself at last took control of his household affairs. E. 41 and 42: Occupying the Mind is an Acquired Art. 41. A theoretical discussion of the need for memory and imagination to come to the aid of sensory perception in "filling the mind." 42. An example, in the form of "Euphelia1s" memoir, of the difficulty an intelligent but untrained person experiences in finding material to occupy his mental facilities. F. 53j 57, and 5&: The Economy of Personal Finance. 53* Poverty, is, of all human evils, one of the most dreaded; every other misery can be forgotten at times, but the pressure of poverty is always upon us. Nevertheless, in spite of the readiness with which we may observe the condition, countless individuals rush into it with reckless prodigality. 57* "Sophron" writes a supplement to No. 53, adding his prudent wisdom gained during a life of business. His position is summarized in two maxims: "Let no man anticipate uncertain profits," and "Let no man squander against his inclination." 58. Modifies the preceding two essays: wealth is not; to be sought as an end in itself; "if the real 267 wants of our condition are satisfied, there remains little to be sought with solicitude, j or desired with eagerness" (III, 313). G. 61, 62, 63: It is Easy to Imagine Happiness Elsewhere. 61. A letter from "Ruricola," who laments that he ; must live "at a great distance from the fountain j of intelligence"— that is, London; and who complains of the condescending airs assumed by visiting Londoners, especially "Mr. Frolick." 62. A letter from "Rhodoclia," whose parents have raised her in the country but have imposed on her their conversation, which consists exclu sively of their memoirs of fashionable London life. She is to depart for the city in three weeks and asks Mr. Rambler to assuage her boredom; during the interval. 63. "... we are always disgusted with some circumstance or other of our situation, and imagine the condition of others more abundant in blessings, or less exposed to calamities" (III, 335). Sketches Eumenes, who spent his life alternating between country and city resi dence because each always looked better from the opposite perspective. H. 69 and 71' We Must Live Well While We Are Able. 69. On the inexorable misery of senescence— surveys the failure of every accustomed pleasure— "Piety is the only proper and adequate relief of decaying man. He that grows old without religious hopes, as he declines into imbecillity, and feels pains and sorrows incessantly crowding upon him, falls into a gulph of bottomless misery . . ." (Ill, 3671* 71. On the shortness of life— and mankind’s unwillingness to recognize that fact. "As he that lives longest lives but a little while, every man may be certain that he has no time to waste. The duties of life are commen surate to its duration, and every day brings its task, which if neglected, is doubled on the morrow . . ." (IV, 11). 265 I. 72 and 74: The Value of a Good Temper. I 1 72. Letter from "Philomides" on the value of good ! humor, the "balm of being"— its necessity at j all times and in every station. J * 1 74. Antithesis: "Peevishness, when it has been so | far indulged, as to outrun the motions of the will, and discover itself without premeditation, is a species of depravity in the highest degree J disgusting and offensive, because no rectitude of intention, nor softness of address, can i ensure a moment's exemption from affront and j indignity" (IV, 23). ! A character-sketch of "Tetrica." I j J. 5l, 52, and 53: The Importance of Exercising Charity. ! 51. An extensive examination of the grounds for exercising charity and for erring on the side of generosity. 52. A letter from "Quisquilius," a ridiculous : collector who has impoverished himself in acquir-j ing a hoard of worthless "natural rarities" and antique relics. 63. Mr. Rambler extenuates the impression created by Quisquilius; collecting novelties is not intrinsically bad, and it may indeed be useful; but it should not be indulged to the exclusion of other worthy pursuits. The essay constitutes an implicit demonstration of the charity recommended in R. 51. K. 95 and 99: The Importance of Courtesy. 95. Letter from "Eutropius" on the importance of politeness. "Wisdom and virtue are by no means sufficient without the supplemental laws of good-breeding to secure freedom from degenerating to rudeness, or self-esteem from swelling into insolence . . ." (IV, 161). A "character" of "Trypherus." 99* Supplemental commentary by Mr. Rambler: "The necessities of our condition require a thousand offices of tenderness, which mere regard for the species will never dictate" (IV, 166) . 269 "It has been justly observed, that discord generally operates in little things; it is j inflamed to its utmost vehemence by contrariety of taste, oftener than of principles; and might j therefore commonly be avoided by innocent j conformity, which, if it was not at first the motive, ought always to be the consequence of indissoluble union" (IV, 169). L. 127 and 129: The Importance of Persevering. 127. A person should persevere in his duty regardless i of circumstances. "He that never extends his | view beyond the praises or rewards of men, will j be dejected by neglect and envy, or infatuated by honours and applause. But the consideration j that life is only deposited in his hands to be j employed in obedience to a Master who will J regard his endeavours, not his success, would j have preserved him from trivial elations and discouragements, and enabled him to proceed with constancy and chearfulness, neither enervated by commendation, nor intimidated by censure" (IV, 315). 129. Moralists often declaim against imprudent boldness and the folly of attempts beyond our power— but only because so few individuals are guilty of it, most being inclined rather to the side of idleness. "There are qualities in the products of nature yet undiscovered, and combinations in the powers of art yet untried. It is the duty of every man to endeavour that something may be added by his industry to the hereditary aggregate of knowledge and happiness. To add much can indeed be the lot of few, but to add something, however little, every one may hope; and of every honest endeavour it is certain, that, however unsuc cessful, it will be at last rewarded" (IV, 325). M. 128 and 130 (133): Sympathy Arises Only Through Experience. 128. "Every class of society has Its cant of lamenta tion, which is understood or regarded by none but themselves; and every part of life has its uneasinesses, which those who do not feel them will not commiserate" (IV, 317)• I 270 "... whoever therefore finds himself inclined to envy another, should remember that he knows not the real condition which he desires to obtain ..." (IV, 320). 130 and 133* Two letters from "Victoria," who begins: "You have very lately observed that in the numerous sub-divisions of the world, every class and order of mankind have joys and sorrows of their own; we all feel hourly pain and pleasure from events which pass unheeded before other eyes, but can scarcely communicate our perceptions to minds preoccupied by different objects . . (IV, 326). Victoria goes on to relate how she was raised in luxury, enjoying, as a beauty, the acclaim of her world; but then, contracting smallpox, her perspective of life is radically changed: she sees the same people quite differently. N. 135j 13S, and 1J+2: Country Life Requires Especial Attention to Self-Regulation. 135* A reflection on the universal migration into the country during the summer months— not from inclination, for the greater part, but simply from fashion. Those, therefore, who do not care for country life should not complain of it, for they did not seek it with the intention of pleasure. 133. A letter from "Bucolus," who amuses himself during his country stay by studying people; he describes "Mrs. Busy." 142. A letter from "Vagulus," who amuses himself during his country stay by walking through the neighborhood; he describes "Squire Bluster." 0. 147, 143, and 149: Family Tyrants Produce Misery. 147* Letter from an anonymous young man who followed his uncle to London, only to be treated with contempt. 14$. "There are indeed many houses which it is impossible to enter familiarly, without discover ing that parents are by no means exempt from the intoxications of dominion . . ." (V, 23). 27lj I 149. Letter from "Hyperdulus," recounting the I misery suffered by his sister and himself; they j were taken in as poor-relations by an uncle, ! whose family loses no opportunity of inflicting psychological pain upon them. P. 157 and 159: A Consideration of Bashfulness. 157* "Verecundulus" chronicles his bashfulness. 159• Mr. Rambler comments on the letter and analyzes the causes of bashfulness and its treatment. "He that considers how little he dwells upon j the condition of others, will learn how little the attention of others is attracted by himself" ! (V, 34). Q. 162 and 163: We are Exceedingly Vulnerable to Flat tery. 162. Our susceptibility to flattery grows as we decline in years; and because of that conjunction we are then in danger of relinquishing control over our own lives. The tale of "Vafer," the embezzling clerk. 163. A contrasting essay: a letter from "Liberalis," who set out to win his fortune through flattery. Mr. Rambler introduces his letter with this analogy: "The punishment of Tantalus in the infernal regions affords a just image of hungry servility, flattered with the approach of advantage, doomed to lose it before it comes into his reach, always within a few days of felicity, and always sinking back to his former wants" (V, 101). R. 179 and 180: It is Important to Accept Our True Selves. 179. Discusses the proposition that "scarce any man becomes eminently disagreeable but by a departure: from his real character, and an attempt at something for which nature or education have left him unqualified” (V, 177). Character- sketch of "Gelasimus," a scholar who made himself ridiculous in society by trying to be facetious. 150. On the proper concerns of scholars: "No man can imagine the course of his own life, or the conduct of the world around him unworthy 272 his attention; yet among the sons of learning many seem to have thought of every thing rather ! than of themselves, and to have observed every ' thing but what passes before their eyes ..." (V, 184). S. 181 and 182: Insatiable Grasping at Futurity. I l8l. The chronicle of an anonymous compulsive gambler.) 162. "From the hope of enjoying affluence by methods more compendious than those of labour, and more 1 generally practicable than those of genius, i proceeds the common inclination to experiment ] and hazard, and that willingness to snatch all I opportunities of growing rich by chance. . . . j "The folly of untimely exulation and visionary prosperity, is by no means peculiar to the purchasers of tickets; there are multitudes whose life is nothing but a continual lottery . . ." (V, 192). A character-sketch of "Leviculus," who pursues rich heiresses in the hope of marrying a fortune. T. 183, 184, 185, 136, and 187: Pain Caused by Life’s Inequalities is More Imaginary Than Real. 183. "The hostility perpetually exercised between one man and another, is caused by the desire of many for that which only few can possess. Every man would be rich, powerful, and famous; yet fame, power, and riches, are only the names of relative conditions, which imply the obscurity, dependance, and poverty of greater numbers" (V, 196-97). 184. "In this state of universal uncertainty, where a thousand dangers hover about us, and none can tell whether the good that he persues is not evil in disguise, or whether the next step will lead him to safety or destruction, nothing can afford any rational tranquillity, but the conviction that, however we amuse ourselves with unideal sounds, nothing in reality is governed by chance, but that the universe is under the perpetual superintendence of him who created it . . (V, 205). 185. "No vitious dispositions of the mind more obstinately resist both the counsels of phil osophy and the injunctions of religion, than 273 those which are complicated with an opinion of dignity ..." (V, 206). "It is difficult for a man of the strictest justice not to favour himself too much, in the calmest moments of solitary meditation. Every one wishes for the distinctions for which thousands are wishing at the same time, in their own opinion, with better claims" (V, 207). "Whoever considers the weakness both of himself and others, will not long want persua sives to forgiveness. . . . We may charge to design the effects of accident; we may think the blow violent only because we have made ourselves delicate and tender; we are on every side in danger of error and of guilt, which we are certain to avoid only by speedy forgive ness" (V, 208-09). 186-7. The tale of Ajut and Annengait. "Of the happiness and misery of our present state, part arises from our sensations, and part from our opinions; part is distributed by nature, and part is in a great measure appor tioned by ourselves. Positive pleasure we cannot always obtain, and positive pain we often cannot remove. . . . But the negative infelicity which proceeds, not from the pressure of sufferings, but the absence of enjoyments, will always yield to the remedies of reason." "One of the great arts of escaping super fluous uneasiness, is to free our minds from the habit of comparing our condition with that of others on whom the blessings of life are more bountifully bestowed. . . . Few are placed in a situation so gloomy and distressful, as not to see every day beings yet more forlorn and miserable, from whom they may learn to rejoice in their own lot" (V, 211). U. 194» 195i 196: The Generation Gap. 194 & 195: Two letters from "Eumathes," who has a position as tutor to a spoiled young gentleman; the pupil entirely ignores the tutor's attempted instruction. 196. Discusses the "perpetual contest between the old and the young." The perspective of youth— its lack of direct experience with life— causes it to hold the opinions and attitudes which are characteristic of it. APPENDIX B REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE TECHNIQUE OF MORE AND LESS Group 1: More and less applied to defining the character- ; istics of personal conduct in relation to j “ ' * “ ' 1 ’ 1 j I society and circumstance. j To walk with circumspection and steadiness in | the right path, at an equal distance between the extremes of error, ought to be the constant endeavour of every reasonable being. . . . But, since to most it will happen often, and to all sometimes, that there will be a deviation towards one side or the other, we ought always to employ our vigilance, with most attention, on that enemy from which there is greatest danger, and to stray, if we must stray, towards those parts from whence we may quickly and easily return. Among other opposite qualities of the mind, which may become dangerous, though in different degrees, I have often had occasion to consider the contrary effects of presumption and despondency; of heady confidence, which promises victory without contest, and heartless pusillanimity, which shrinks back from the thought of great undertakings, confounds difficulty with impossibility, and considers all advancement towards any new attain ment as irreversibly prohibited (R. 25; III, 137). The controversy about the reality of external evils is now at an end. That life has many miseries, and that those miseries are, sometimes at least, equal to all the powers of fortitude, is now universally confessed; and therefore it is useful to consider not only how we may escape them, but by what means those which either the accidents of affairs, or the infirmities of nature must bring upon us, may be mitigated and lightened; and how we may make those hours less wretched, which the condition of our present existence will not allow to be very happy. 274 275 The cure for the greatest part of human miseries ■ is not radical, but palliative. Infelicity is involved in corporeal nature, and interwoven with i our being; all attempts therefore to decline it wholly are useless and vain: the armies of pain send their arrows against us on every side, the j choice is only between those which are more or I less sharp, or tinged with poison of greater j or less malignity; and the strongest armour which j reason can supply, will only blunt their points, ' but cannot repel them (R. 32; III, 175-76). | Among many parallels which men of imagination i have drawn between the natural and moral state of j the world, it has been observed that happiness, i as well as virtue, consists in mediocrity; that to ! avoid every extreme is necessary, even to him who j has no other care than to pass through the present 1 state with ease and safety; and that the middle path is the road of security, on either side of which are not only the pitfals of vice, but the precipices of ruin (R. 3&; III, 206). Against other evils [than poverty] the heart is often hardened by true or by false notions of dignity and reputation: thus we see dangers of every kind faced with willingness, because bravery, in a good or bad cause, is never without its encomiasts and admirers. But in the prospect of poverty, there is nothing but gloom and melancholy; the mind and body suffer together; its miseries bring no alleviations; it is a state in which every virtue is obscured, and in which no conduct can avoid reproach; a state in which chearfulness is insensibility, and dejection sullenness, of which the hardships are without honour, and the labours without reward (R. 53; III, 284-85). But though all wanton provocations and contemptuous insolence are to be diligently avoided, there is no less danger in timid compliance and tame resignation. It is common, for soft and fearful tempers, to give themselves up implicitly to the direction of the bold, the turbulent, and the overbearing; of those whom they do not believe wiser or better than themselves. . . . Some firmness and resolution is necessary to the discharge of duty; but it is a very unhappy state of life in which the necessity of such struggles frequently occurs. . . . Even though no regard be had to the external consequences of contrariety and dispute, it must be painful to a worthy mind to put others in pain, and there will be danger lest the kindest nature may be vitiated by too long a custom of debate and contest (R. 56; III, 302-03). It is not but by experience, that we are taught the possibility of retaining some virtues, and rejecting others, or of being good or bad to a particular degree. For it is very easy to the solitary reasoner to prove that the same arguments by which the mind is fortified against one crime are of equal force against all. . . . Yet such is the state of all mortal virtue, that it is always uncertain and variable, sometimes extending to the whole compass of duty, and sometimes shrinking into a narrow space . . . (R. 70; IV, 5). But though peevishness may sometimes claim our compassion, as the consequence or concomitant of misery, it is very often found, where nothing can justify or excuse its admission. It is frequently one of the attendants on the prosperous, and is employed by insolence in exacting homage, or by tyranny in harrassing subjection (R. 74; IV, 24.-25). Nothing is to be estimated by its effect upon common eyes and common ears. A thousand miseries make silent and invisible inroads on mankind, and the heart feels innumerable throbs, which never break into complaint. Perhaps, likewise, our pleasures are for the most part equally secret, and most are borne up by some private satisfaction, some internal consciousness, some latent hope, some peculiar prospect, which they never communicate, but reserve for solitary hours, and clandestine medita tion (R. 63; III, 359). Friendship is seldom lasting but between equals, or where the superiority on one side is reduced by some equivalent advantage on the other. Benefits which cannot be repaid, and obligations which cannot be discharged, are not commonly found to increase affection; they excite gratitude indeed, and heighten veneration, but commonly take away that easy freedom, and familiarity of intercourse, without which, though there may be fidelity, and zeal, and admiration, there cannot be friendship. Thus imperfect are all earthly blessings; the great effect of friendship is beneficence, yet by the 277 first act of uncommon kindness it is endangered, like plants that bear their fruit and die. Yet : this consideration ought not to restrain bounty, i or repress compassion; for duty is to be preferred ! before convenience, and he that loses part of the pleasures of friendship by his generosity, gains in its place the gratulation of his conscience (R. 64; III, 344). | To collect the productions of art, and examples of mechanical science or manual ability, is unquestionably useful, even when the things themselves are of small importance, because it is ; always advantageous to know how far the human powers have proceeded, and how much experience has found to be within the reach of diligence. . . . It may sometimes happen that the greatest efforts of ingenuity have been exerted in trifles, yet ' the same principles and expedients may be applied to more valuable purposes, and the movements which put into action machines of no use but to raise the wonder of ignorance, may be employed to drain fens, or manufacture metals, to assist the ' architect, or preserve the sailor (R. S3; IV, 73). With ease . . . many would be content; but nothing terrestrial can be kept at a stand. Ease, if it is not rising into pleasure, will be falling towards pain. . . . It is necessary to that perfection of which our present state is capable, that the mind and body should both be kept in action; that neither the faculties of the one nor of the other be suffered to grow lax or torpid for want of use . . . {R. £5; IV, £3-34)* It is happy when those who cannot content themselves to be idle, nor resolve to be industri ous, are at least employed without injury to others; but it seldom happens that we can contain ourselves long in a neutral state, or forbear to sink into vice, when we are no longer soaring towards virtue (R. 103; IV, 1S7). That God will forgive, may, indeed, be established as the first and fundamental truth of religion; for though the knowledge of his existence is the origin of philosophy, yet, without the belief of his mercy, it would have little influence upon our mortal conduct. There could be no prospect of 27Sj enjoying the protection or regard of him, whom the j least deviation from rectitude made inexorable for ever; and every man would naturally withdraw ' his thoughts from the contemplation of a Creator, whom he must consider as a governor too pure to be pleased, and too severe to be pacified; as an enemy infinitely wise, and infinitely powerful, whom he could neither deceive, escape, nor resist. I Where there is no hope, there can be no ! endeavour. A constant and unfailing obedience is above the reach of terrestrial diligence; and therefore the progress of life could only have ; been the natural descent of negligent despair from j crime to crime, had not the universal persuasion | of forgiveness to be obtained by proper means of ! reconciliation recalled those to the paths of virtue whom their passions had solicited aside; and animated to new attempts, and firmer persever ance, those whom difficulty had discouraged, or negligence surprised (R. 110; IV, 221-22). He that too early aspires to honours, must resolve to encounter not only the opposition of interest, but the malignity of envy. He that is too eager to be rich, generally endangers his fortune in wild adventures, and uncertain projects; and he that hastens too speedily to reputation, often raises his character by artifices and fal lacies, decks himself in colours which quickly fade, or in plumes which accident may shake off, or competition pluck away (R. Ill; IV, 228). It is not sufficiently considered in the hour of exultation, that all human excellence is comparative; that no man performs much but in proportion to what others accomplish, or to the time and opportunities which have been allowed him; and that he who stops at any point of excellence is every day sinking in estimation, because his improvement grows continually more incommensurate to his life. . . . These errors all arise from an original mistake of the true motives of action. He that never extends his view beyond the praises or rewards of men, will be dejected by neglect and envy, or infatuated by honours and applause (R. 127; IV, 315). None but those who have learned the art of subjecting their senses as well as reason to hypothetical systems can be persuaded by the most 279" specious rhetorician that the lots of life are equal; yet it cannot be denied that every one has his peculiar pleasures and vexations, that external accidents operate variously upon different minds, and that no man can exactly judge from his own sensations what another would feel in the same circumstances. We are either born with such dissimilitude of temper and inclinations, or receive so many of our ideas and opinions from the state of life in which we are engaged, that the griefs and cares of one part of mankind seem to the other hypocrisy, folly, and affectation (R. 123; IV, 216-17;. That there is a middle path which it is every man’s duty to find, and to keep, is unanimously confessed; but it is likewise acknowledged that this middle path is so narrow, that it cannot easily be discovered, and so little beaten that there are no certain marks by which it can be followed; the care therefore of all those who conduct others has been, that whenever they decline into obliquities, they should tend towards the side of safety (R. 129; IV, 322-23). [The Stoical philosophers are like physicians,] who, when they cannot mitigate pain, destroy sensibility. . . . Yet it may be generally remarked, that where much has been attempted, something has been performed; though the discoveries or acquisitions of man are not always adequate to the expectations of his pride, they are at least sufficient to animate his industry (R. 150; V, 33). The greater part of mankind are corrupt in every condition, and differ in high and in low stations, only as they have more or fewer opportunities of gratifying their desires, or as they are more or less restrained by human censures. Many vitiate their principles in the acquisition of riches; and who can wonder that what is gained by fraud and extortion is enjoyed with tyranny and excess? Yet I am willing to believe that the depravation of the mind by external advantages, though certainly not uncommon, yet approaches not so nearly to universality, as some have asserted in the bitter ness of resentment, or heat of declamation. Whoever rises above those who once pleased themselves with equality, will have many malevolent 2 gO' i 1 gazers at his eminence. To gain sooner than others that which all pursue with the same ardour, and to which all imagine themselves entitled, will for ever be a crime. When those who started with us in the race of life, leave us so far behind, that we have little hope to overtake them, we revenge our disappointment by remarks on the arts of supplantation by which they gained the , advantage, or on the folly and arrogance with which they possess it. . . . i It is impossible for human purity not to betray ; to an eye thus sharpened by malignity, some stains which lay concealed and unregarded while none ! thought it their interest to discover them. . . . Riches therefore perhaps do not so often produce j crimes as incite accusers (R. 172; V, 146-47)* i To talk intentionally in a manner above the j comprehension of those whom we address, is unquestionable pedantry; but surely complaisance requires, that no man should, without proof, conclude his company incapable of following him to the highest elevation of his fancy, or the utmost; extent of his knowledge. It is always safer to err in favour of others than of ourselves, and therefore we seldom hazard much by endeavouring to excel (R. 173; V, 153)* Of two objects tempting at a distance on contrary sides it is impossible to approach one but by receding from the other; by long deliberation and dilatory projects, they may be both lost, but can never be both gained. It is, therefore, neces sary to compare them, and when we have determined the preference, to withdraw our eyes and our thoughts at once from that which reason directs us to reject. This is more necessary, if that which we are forsaking has the power of delighting the senses, or firing the fancy (R. 176; V, 173)* The hostility perpetually exercised between one man and another, is caused by the desire of many for that which only few can possess. Every man would be rich, powerful, and famous; yet fame, power, and riches, are only the names of relative conditions, which imply the obscurity, dependance, and poverty of greater numbers. This universal and incessant competition, produces injury and malice by two motives, interet, and envy; the prospect of adding to our possessions what we can take from others, and the 2 8 1 ; hope of alleviating the sense of our disparity by lessening others, though we gain nothing to ourselves. Of these two malignant and destructive powers, it seems probable at the first view, that interest has the strongest and most extensive influence. It is easy to conceive that opportuni ties to seize what has been long wanted, may excite desires almost irresistible. . . . It must be more natural to rob for gain, than to ravage only for mischief. Yet I am inclined to believe, that the great law of mutual benevolence is oftner violated by envy than by interest, and that most of the misery which the defamation of blameless actions, or the obstruction of honest endeavours brings upon the ! world, is inflicted by men that propose no advantage to themselves but the satisfaction of poisoning the banquet which they cannot taste, and blasting the harvest which they have no right to reap. Interest can diffuse itself but to a narrow compass. The number is never large of those who can hope to fill the posts of degraded power, catch the fragments of shattered fortune, or succeed to the honours of depreciated beauty. But the empire of envy has no limits, as it requires to its influence very little help from external circumstances. Envy may always be produced by idleness and pride, and in what place will not they be found? Envy is almost the only vice which is practicable at all times, and in every place; the only passion which can never lie quiet for want of irritation; its effects therefore are every where discoverable, and its attempts always to be dreaded (R. 183; V, 196-98). Group 2: More and less applied to defining the innate characteristics of individual thought and feel- Ass- We represent to ourselves the pleasures of some future possession, and suffer our thoughts to dwell attentively upon it, till it has wholly ingrossed the imagination, and permits us not to conceive any happiness but its attainment, or any misery but its loss; every other satisfaction which the bounty 262 \ of providence has scattered over life is neglected j as inconsiderable, in comparison of the great object which we have placed before us, and is thrown from us as incumbering our activity, or ! trampled under foot as standing in our way. Every man has experienced, how much of this ardour has been remitted, when a sharp or tedious sickness has set death before his eyes, . . . All envy is proportionate to desire; we are I uneasy at the attainments of another, according as we think our own happiness would be advanced by the addition of that which he withholds from us; and, therefore, whatever depresses immoderate wishes, will, at the same time, set the heart free from the corrosion of envy , . . (R. 17; III, 93-94). ~ i One sophism by which men persuade themselves that they have those virtues which they really want, is formed by the substitution of single acts for habits. A miser who once relieved a friend from the danger of a prison, suffers his imagination to dwell for ever upon his own heroick generosity. • • • As a glass which magnifies objects by the approach of one end to the eye, lessens them by the application of the other, so vices are extenuated by the inversion of that fallacy, by which virtues are augmented. Those faults which we cannot conceal from our own notice, are considered, however frequent, not as habitual corruptions, or settled practices, but as casual failures, and single lapses (R. 28; III, 153)- It is a maxim commonly received, that a wise man is never surprised; and perhaps, this exemption from astonishment may be imagined to proceed from such a prospect into futurity, as gave previous intimation of those evils which often fall unex pected upon others that have less foresight. But the truth is, that things to come, except when they approach very nearly, are equally hidden from men of all degrees of understanding; and if a wise man is not amazed at sudden occurrences, it is not that he has thought more, but less upon futurity. . , . He is not surprised because he is not disappointed, and he escapes disappointment because he never forms any expectations (R. 29; III, 159-60). There is one reason seldom remarked, which | makes riches less desirable. Too much wealth I is very frequently the occasion of poverty. He ! whom the wantonness of abundance has once softened, | easily sinks into neglect of his affairs; and he ; that thinks he can afford to be negligent, is not far from being poor. He will soon be involved j in perplexities, which his inexperience will | render unsurmountable . . . (R. 3^; III, 209) ! There seem to be some souls suited to great, ; and others to little employments; some formed to soar aloft, and take in wide views, and others to j grovel on the ground, and confine their regard to a narrow sphere. Of these the one is always in danger of becoming useless by a daring negligence, | the other by a scrupulous solicitude; the one ; collects many ideas, but confused and indistinct; 1 the other is busied in minute accuracy, but without ; compass and without dignity (R. 43; III, 233). But as the soul advances to a fuller exercise of its powers, the animal appetites, and the passions immediately arising from them, are not sufficient to find it employment; the wants of nature are soon supplied, the fear of their return is easily precluded, and something more is neces sary to relieve the long intervals of inactivity, and to give those faculties, which cannot lie wholly quiescent, some particular direction. For this reason, new desires, and artificial passions are by degrees produced; and, from having wishes only in consequence of our wants, we begin to feel wants in consequence of our wishes; we persuade ourselves to set a value upon things which are of no use, but because we have agreed to value them . . . (R. 49; III, 264). There is another kind of comparison . . . very well illustrated by an old poet, whose system will not afford many reasonable motives to content. "It is," says he, "pleasing to look from shore upon the tumults of a storm, and to see a ship strug gling with the billows; it is pleasing, not because the pain of another can give us delight, but because we have a stronger impression of the happiness of safety." [Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.] Thus when we look abroad, and behold the multi- tudes that are groaning under evils heavier than those which we have experienced, we shrink back to our own state, and instead of repining that so much must be felt, learn to rejoice that we have not more to feel (R. 52; III, 282-83). It is natural to mean well, when only abstracted ideas of virtue are proposed to the mind, and no particular passion turns us aside from rectitude; and so willing is every man to flatter himself, that the difference between approving laws, and obeying them, is frequently forgotten; he that acknowledges the obligations of morality, and pleases his vanity with enforcing them to others, concludes himself zealous in the cause of virtue, though he has no longer any regard to her precepts, than they conform to his own desires; and counts himself among her warmest lovers, because he praises her beauty, though every rival steals away his heart (R. 76; IV, 34) * It is generally not so much the desire of men, sunk into depravity, to deceive the world as themselVes, for when no particular circumstances make them dependant on others, infamy disturbs them little, but as it revives their remorse, and is echoed to them from their own hearts (R. 76; IV, 37). Heroic generosity, or philosophical discoveries, may compel veneration and respect, but love always implies some kind of natural or voluntary equality, and is only to be excited by that levity and chearfulness which disencumbers all minds from awe and solicitude, invites the modest to freedom, and exalts the timorous to confidence {R. $9; IV, 103-09). To love all men is our duty, so far as it includes a general habit of benevolence, and readi ness of occasional kindness; but to love all equally is impossible; at least impossible without the extinction of those passions which now produce all our pains and all our pleasures; without the disuse, if not the abolition of some of our faculties, and the suppression of all our hopes and fears in apathy and indifference. The necessities of our condition require a thousand offices of tenderness, which mere regard for the species will never dictate. Every man has frequent grievances which only the solicitude of friendship will discover and remedy, and which would remain for every unheeded in the mighty heap of human calamity, were it only surveyed by the 285 i eye of general benevolence equally attentive to every misery (R. 99; IV, 166) The greatest human virtue bears no proportion to human vanity. We always think ourselves better than we are, and are generally desirous that others ; should think us still better than we think ourselves. To praise us for actions, or disposi- ; tions, which deserve praise, is not to confer a j benefit, but to pay a tribute. We have always pretensions to fame, which, in our own hearts, ! we know to be disputable, and which we are j desirous to strengthen by a new suffrage; we have | always hopes which we suspect to be fallacious, | and of which we eagerly snatch at every confirma- | tion (R. 104; IV, 192-93) It is observable, that either by nature or by habit, our faculties are fitted to images of a certain extent, to which we adjust great things by i division, and little things by accumulation. Of ! extensive surfaces we can only take a survey, as ; the parts succeed one another; and atoms we cannot | perceive, till they are united into masses. Thus we break the vast periods of time into centuries and years; and thus, if we would know the amount of moments, we must agglomerate them into days and weeks (R. 108; IV, 211-12). Long confinement to the same company which perhaps similitude of taste brought first together, quickly contracts his faculties, and makes a thousand things offensive that are in themselves indifferent; a man accustomed to hear only the echo of his own sentiments, soon bars all the common avenues of delight, and has no part in the general gratifications of mankind (R. 112; IV, 231-32). Ignorance or dulness have Indeed no power of affording delight, but they never give disgust except when they assume the dignity of knowledge, or ape the sprightliness of wit. Aukwardness and inelegance have none of those attractions by which ease and politeness take possession of the heart; but ridicule and censure seldom rise against them, unless they appear associated with that confidence which belongs only to long acquaintance with the modes of life, and to consciousness of unfailing propriety of behaviour. Deformity itself is regarded with tenderness rather than aversion, 2S6: when it does not attempt to deceive the sight by dress and decoration, and to seize upon ficti tious claims the prerogatives of beauty (R. 179; V, 177). " ! Of the happiness and misery of our present state, part arises from our sensations, and part from our opinions; part is distributed by nature, and part is in a great measure apportioned by | ourselves. Positive pleasure we cannot always obtain, and positive pain we often cannot remove. Wo man can give to his own plantations the fragrance of the Indian groves; nor will any precepts of philosophy enable him to withdraw his attention from wounds or diseases. But the negative infeli city which proceeds, not from the pressure of ; sufferings, but the absence of enjoyments, will always yield to the remedies of reason (R. 1S6; V, 211). Group 3: More and less applied to persuading the reader to choose a certain course of action. For, though the boast of absolute independence is ridiculous and vain, yet a mean flexibility to every impulse, and a patient submission to the tyranny of casual troubles, is below the dignity of that mind, which, however depraved or weakened, boasts its derivation from a celestial original, and hopes for an union with infinite goodness, and unvariable felicity (R. 6; III, 30-31J From the necessity of dispossessing the sensitive faculties of the influence which they must naturally gain by this preoccupation of the soul [sensual appetite], arises that conflict between opposite desires, in the first endeavours after a religious life; which, however enthusiastically it may have been described, or however contemptu ously ridiculed, will naturally be felt in some degree, though varied without end, by different tempers of mind, and innumerable circumstances of health or condition, greater or less fervour, more or fewer temptations to relapse. Thus it appears, upon a philosophical estimate, that, supposing the mind, at any certain time, in an equipoise between the pleasures of this life, and the hopes of futurity, present objects falling 2#7i i more frequently into the scale would in time j preponderate, and that our regard for an invisible j state would grow every moment weaker, till at ! last it would lose all its activity, and become i absolutely without effect. To prevent this dreadful event, the balance is put into our own hands, and we have power to transfer the weight to either side (R. 7; III, 39)* ; j Of the passions with which the mind of man is | agitated, it may be observed, that they naturally | hasten towards their own extinction by inciting j and quickening the attainment of their objects. j Thus fear urges our flight, and desire animates j our progress; and if there are some which perhaps may be indulged till they out-grow the good appropriated to their satisfaction, as is frequently observed of avarice and ambition, yet their immedi- : ate tendency is to some means of happiness really existing, and generally within the prospect. . . . Sorrow is perhaps the only affection of the breast that can be excepted from this general remark, and it therefore deserves the particular attention of those who have assumed the arduous province of preserving the balance of the mental constitution (R. 47; III, 253)* . . . many who have laid down rules of intellectual health, think preservatives easier than remedies, and teach us not to trust ourselves with favourite enjoyments, not to indulge the luxury of fondness, but to keep our minds always suspended in such indifference, that we may change the objects about us without emotion. An exact compliance with this rule might, perhaps, contribute to tranquillity, but surely it would never produce happiness. He that regards none so much as to be afraid of losing them, must live for ever without the gentle pleasures of sympathy and confidence; he must feel no melting fondness, no warmth of benevolence, nor any of those honest joys which nature annexes to the power of pleasing. . . . An attempt to preserve life in a state of neutrality and indifference, is unreasonable and vain. If by excluding joy we could shut out grief, the scheme would deserve very serious atten tion; but since, however, we may debar ourselves from happiness, misery will find its way at many inlets, and the assaults of pain will force our regard, though we may withhold it from the 2g£ invitations of pleasure, we may surely endeavour ; to raise life above the middle point of apathy at one time, since it will necessarily sink below it at another (R. 47; III, 256-57)* That all are equally happy, or miserable, I suppose none is sufficiently enthusiastical to maintain; because, though we cannot judge of the condition of others, yet every man has found frequent vicissitudes in his own state, and must therefore be convinced that life is susceptible of : more or less felicity. What then shall forbid j us to endeavour the alteration of that which is capable of being improved, and to grasp at augmen tations of good, when we know it possible to be increased, and believe that any particular change ! of situation will increase it (R. 63; III, 335-36)? As he that lives longest lives but a little while, every man may be certain that he has no time to waste. The duties of life are commensurate to its duration, and every day brings its task, which if neglected, is doubled on the morrow. But he that has already trifled away those months and years, in which he should have laboured, must remember that he has now only a part of that of which the whole is little; and that since the few moments remaining are to be considered as the last trust of heaven, not one is to be lost (R. 71; IV, 11). Milton has judiciously represented the father of mankind, as seized with horror and astonishment at the sight of death, exhibited to him on the mount of vision. For surely, nothing can so much disturb the passions, or perplex the intellects of man, as the disruption of his union with visible nature. . . . Yet we to whom the shortness of life has given frequent occasions of contemplating mortality, can without emotion, see generations of men pass away, and are at leisure to establish modes of sorrow, and adjust the ceremonial of death. We can look upon funeral pomp as a common spectacle in which we have no concern, and turn away from it to trifles and amusements, without dejection of look, or inquietude of heart (R. 7&; IV, 47)* Whoever commits a fraud is guilty not only of the particular injury to him whom he deceives, but of the diminution of that confidence which constitutes not only the ease but the existence of society. He that suffers by imposture has too often his virtue more impaired than his fortune. But as it is necessary not to invite robbery by supineness, so it is our duty not to suppress tenderness by suspicion; it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, and happier to be sometimes cheated than not to trust (R. | 79; IV, 55). " I But in all enquiries concerning the practice of voluntary and occasional virtues, it is safest for minds not oppressed with superstitious fears to determine against their own inclinations, and secure themselves from deficiency by doing more 1 than they believe strictly necessary. For of this j every man may be certain that, if he were to i exchange conditions with his dependent, he should expect more than, with the utmost exertion of his ardour, he now will prevail upon himself to perform; and when reason has no settled rule, and our passions are striving to mislead us, it is surely the part of a wise man to err on the side of ; safety (R. 3l; IV, 64). It has been always the practice, when any particular species of robbery becomes prevalent and common, to endeavour its suppression by capital denunciations. Thus, one generation of malefactors is commonly cut off, and their successors are frighted into new expedients; the art of thievery is augmented with greater variety of fraud, and subtilized to higher degrees of dexterity, and more occult methods of conveyance. The law then renews the persuit in the heat of anger, and overtakes the offender again with death. By this practice, capital inflictions are multiplied, and crimes very different in their degrees of enormity are equally subjected to the severest punishment that man has the power of exercising upon man (R. 114; IV, 243). That the world is over-run with vice, cannot be denied; but vice, however predominant, has not yet gained an unlimited dominion. Simple and unmingled good is not in our power, but we may generally escape a greater evil by suffering a less; and therefore, those who undertake to initiate the young and ignorant in the knowledge of life, should be careful to inculcate the possibility of virtue 290 I and happiness, and to encourage endeavours by- prospects of success (R. 119; IV, 270). He that resolves to unite all the beauties of situation in a new purchase, must waste his life in roving to no purpose from province to province. . . . He that has abilities to conceive perfection, will not easily be content without it; and since , perfection cannot be reached, will lose the j opportunity of doing well in the vain hope of : unattainable excellence. The certainty that life cannot be long, and the probability that it will be much shorter than nature allows, ought to awaken every man to the I active prosecution of whatever he is desirous j to perform. It is true that no diligence can ! ascertain success; death may intercept the swiftest career; but he who is cut off in the execution of an honest undertaking, has at least the honour of falling in his rank, and has fought the battle, though he missed the victory (R. 134; IV, 349). So much are the modes of excellence settled by time and place, that men may be heard boasting in one street of that which they would anxiously conceal in another. . . . but he who is solicitous for his own improvement, must not be limited by local reputation, but select from every tribe of mortals their characteristical virtues, and constellate in himself the scattered graces which shine single in other men (R. 201; V, 2&3) • bibliography Alkon, Paul Kent. Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline. Evanston, 111*71 ^rtlwes^rrrTTnlTrr^ress7~l^S7T Aristotle. The Rhetoric of Aristotle . . . Trans, and ed. Lane Cooper. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1932. Baker, Sheridan. 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"Dominant Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750-1600." Southern Speech Journal, IS (1952), 3-12. 1 Ehrenpreis, Irvin. "Personae." Restoration and Eighteenth- Century Literature: Essays in Uonor of“XTan Dugald j McKillop" Ed. Charles CarroTT Camden. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963- Pp. 25-37. 1 I Elder, A. T. "Irony and Humour in the Rambler." Univer sity of Toronto Quarterly, 30 (1900), 57-71. I Elder, A. T. "Thematic Patterning and Development in Johnson's Essays." Studies in Philology, 62 (1965)f 610-32. Elliott, Robert C. The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 19"6'0. Feder, Lillian. "John Dryden’s Use of Classical Rhetoric." PMLA, 69 (195A), 1256-76. Fussell, Paul. The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 19'63. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, H.Y.: Double day and' Co., Inc. , Greene, Donald. The Age of Exuberance: Backgrounds to Eighteenth-Century English Literature. New YorkT Random House, 1970. Greene, Donald J. "'Pictures to the Mind': Johnson and Imagery." Johnson, Boswell and Their Circle. Essays Presented to Lawrence Fitzroy Powell in Honour of His Eiglrty-Fourth Birthday. OxfordT Oxford Univ. Press, 19b5 * Ppd 137-56« Greene, Donald J. The Politics of Samuel Johnson. New Haven: Yale University Press, I960. Hagstrum, Jean H. Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. 294 Hawkins, Sir John. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Ed. and abridged Bertram H. Davis. New York: —1 the Macmillan Co., 1961. Hasen, Allen T. , ed. Samuel Johnson1s Prefaces and Dedications. New Haven! Yale Univ. Press,1937* Hilles, Frederick W. "Johnson's Poetic Fire." From Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to FrederickA . Pottle. Ed. Frederick W. Hilles and Harold Bloom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. 67-77. [Home, Henry, Lord Kames.] Elements of Criticism. 3 vols. 1762; rpt. New York: J ohnson "Reprint Corp., 1967. Hooker, Edward Niles. "The Discussion of Taste from 1750 to 1770, and the New Trends in Literary Criticism." PM LA, 49 (1934), 577-92. Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica. Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. London: William Heinemann, Ltd. (The Loeb Classical Library), 1929* Houston, Percy H. Doctor Johnson: A Study in Eighteenth Century Humanism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 194537 Howell, Wilbur Samuel. "John Locke and the New Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 319-33. Johnson, Samuel. A Dictionary of the English Language . . . 2 vols. London: W.~St'rahan, 1?5L; rpt, New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967. Johnson, Samuel. Johnson on Shakespeare. Ed. Arthur Sherbo. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, volsT” VYl and V11T7 Hew Haven: YaTe Univ. Press, 1968. Johnson, Samuel. The Letters of Samuel Johnson With Mrs. Thrale' s Genuine-Letters to Him."" Ed. R. W7 CHapman. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Johnson, Samuel. Lives of the English Poets. Ed. George Birkbeck HilTT J vols. Oxford":" Oxford Univ. Press, 1905. Johnson, Samuel. "Preface," The Preceptor* London: R. Dodsley, 174&; rpt. Samuel Johnson's Prefaces 295 j ] and Dedications. Ed. Allen T. Hazen. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1937. Pp. 171-89. ! Johnson, Samuel. The Rambler. Ed. Walter J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vols. Ill, IV, and V7- New Haven: ; Yale Univ. Press, 1969. Johnson, Samuel. "Reflections on Periodical Writers." Gentleman's Magazine, 9 (1739)> 3-4- ! Johnson, Samuel. The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 11 vols. Oxford: Talboys and Wheeler; London: W. Pickering, 1825. Keast, William R. "Johnson's Criticism of the Metaphysical! Poets." Journal of English Literary History, 17 (1950), 59-/0. Keast, William R. Rev. of Philosophic Words: A Study of Style and Meaning in the Rambler and DTctionary oT Samuel Johnson, oy~William Wimsatt. Philological Quart erly, 28 (1949)> 393-95* Keast, William R. "The Theoretical Foundations of Johnson's Criticism." Critics and Criticism Ancient and Modern. Ed. Ronald S. Crane. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 389-407. Keats, John. The Letters of John Keats: 1814-1821. Ed. Ilyder Edward RolTTns. 2 vols'. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Krutch, Joseph Wood. Samuel Johnson. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944* Leavis, F. R. "Johnson and Augustanism." The Conunon Pursuit. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Booles, Inc., 1962. Pp. 97-115. Lindberg, Stanley William. "Johnsonian Irony: The Theory and Practice of Irony in the Prose Writings of Samuel Johnson." Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1969. 'Longinus.' On Sublimity. Trans. D. A. Russell. Oxford: Oxford tTniv. Press, 1965. McDermott, Douglas. "George Campbell and the Classical Tradition." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (1963), 403-09. Montagu, Lady Mary Wortley. The Complete Letters . . . Ed. Robert Halsband. 3 vols"! Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. Moore, Wilbur E. "Samuel Johnson on Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 30 (1944), 165- 68. More, Hannah. "Anecdotes by Hannah More." Johnsonian Miscellanies. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill"! 1897 i rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966. II, 177-207 Percy, Thomas. "Anecdotes and Remarks by Bishop Percy." Johnsonian Miscellanies. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill. 1897; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966. II, 208-18. Piozzi, Hesther Lynch. Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson, L.L.D., During the Bast Twenty Years of His Life. 4th ed., London, 1786;"Johnsonian Miscellanies. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill. lB97; rpt. New ¥ork: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966. I, 141-351. Quintilian. The Institutio Qratoria. Trans. H. E. Butler. 4 vols. London: William Heinemann Ltd. (The Loeb Classical Library), 1920-1922. Randolph, Mary Claire. 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Creator Worden, John Louis (author)

Core Title The Themes And Technique Of Johnson'S 'Rambler'

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program English

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Advisor Greene, Donald J. (committee chair), Goldstein, Harvey D. (committee member), Harvey, Herman M. (committee member)

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