University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Participation Of Rank-And-File Member In The Decision Making Process And His Access To The Grievance Machinery Of His Union: Including A Survey And Case Study Of Uaw Local 1531, Amarillo, Texas

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Participation Of Rank-And-File Member In The Decision Making Process And His Access To The Grievance Machinery Of His Union: Including A Survey And Case Study Of Uaw Local 1531, Amarillo, Texas

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Content 71-21,1151
DUMAN, Barry Lance, 1943-
PARTICIPATION OF RANK-AND-FILE MEMBER IN THE
DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND HIS ACCESS TO THE
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY OF HIS UNION: INCLUDING A
SURVEY AND CASE STUDY OF UAW LOCAL 1531, AMARILLO,
TEXAS.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1971
Economics, general
University Microfilms, A X ERO X Com pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
PARTICIPATION OF RANK-AND-FILE MEMBER IN THE DECISION MAKING
PROCESS AND HIS ACCESS TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY OF
HIS UNION: INCLUDING A SURVEY AND CASE STUDY OF
UAW LOCAL 1531, AMARILLO, TEXAS
by
Barry Lance Duman
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Economics)
January 1971
UNIVERSITY O F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOO L
U NIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, C A LIFO R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
BARRY LANCE DUMAN
under the direction of hi-.s... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Gradu
ate School, in partial fulfillment of require
ments of the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
Dean
Date Febr_uary_l_971,
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
......
PREFACE
This dissertation grew out of many discussions that
I had with Dr. Spencer Pollard at the University of Southern
California. Many people contributed in numerous ways to
the development of this study. I am greatly indebted to
several officers of UAW Local 1531 for their time and highly
valued comments. They are: John Wafford, Carroll Bozarth,
Robert Cowgill, Jack Fancher and John Hunter. I am equally
thankful to George Pearce, President of Local 1531, for his
cooperation and interest in this study.
Two of my colleagues were also exceedingly helpful.
Drs. Patrick Kelso and Ghassan Arnaoot provided counsel and
encouragement on numerous occasions. Additionally, thanks
are due to my good friend, Rabbi Maurice Feuer for his
constructive criticism.
I would also like to thank several individuals at
the University of Southern California. The late Professor
Edwin C. Robbins was an early member of my dissertation
committee and as such offered valuable suggestions.
Professor Robbins will be missed. Drs. E. Bryant Phillips
and Edward H. Barker read the manuscript, made useful
ii
suggestions, and helped expedite its completion. Their
efforts were greatly appreciated.
There remain two individuals who have had a pro
found impact on this individual in ways that far transcend
the words and ideas in this paper. Dr. Spencer Pollard has
helped shape the course of my professional life in countless
ways and he will always be regarded as an outstanding
friend as well as mentor.
Lastly, I would like to attempt to express my
gratitude to my loving wife, Sofia. She was always stead
fast in her devotion and loyal to the belief that through
our cooperative efforts seemingly insurmountable obstacles
could be overcome. It was largely through her efforts that
they were.
« * •
111
TABLE. OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE............................................... ii
LIST OF TABLES...................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
Objective of Dissertation
Scope and Methodology
Sources of Information
Terminology Employed
Chapter
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN LABOR UNION AND
ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY................. 12
Philosophical Support for Unionism
The Union and Its Relation to Democracy
The Question of Attendance
Unions as Dual Purpose Institutions
The Essentiality of Democracy
Inherent Pressures for Democracy
Conclusions
II. REASONS FOR AND METHODS OF PRESERVING OFFICE 4 0
Background and Characteristics of Labor
Leaders
Reasons for Desiring to Maintain Office
Establishment of a Political Machine
Control of the Means of Communication
Establishment of Trusteeships
Disciplinary Procedure
An Attempt at Legislating Democracy
Democracy as a Potentially Retarding Force
Conclusions
iv
Chapter
XII.
IV.
V.
VI.
THE MEMBERSHIP VIEWS ITS INTERNATIONAL:
LOCAL 1531, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS . . .
Area Background
Background and Organization of Local 1531
A Profile of the Local Union Member
Methodology Employed in Analyzing
Local 1531
Rank-and-File's Relation to the National
Leadership
The Rank-and-File View of Democracy
The UAW's Internal Mechanisms and Functions
The UAW International as a Democratic
Union: Conclusions
THE MEMBERSHIP VIEWS ITS LOCAL: LOCAL 1531,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS .................
Attendance at Local Meetings
Opposition in Local Union Elections
The Election Procedure
The Member and His Local Leaders
The Grievance Procedure and the Members'
Attitudes Towards It
Access to the Arbitration Machinery
Conclusions
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S LEGAL ACCESS
TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY ...............
Legal Foundations
The Miranda Case— A New Approach
The Smith Case
Donnelly: A Clarifying Case
Obligation of the Grievant
Vaca v. Sipes: A Turning Point
Conclusions
THE AFTERMATH OF THE VACA DECISION ........
Modifications of the Vaca Doctrine
Vaca and Its Relation to the Arbitration
Function
Conclusions
Page
102
132
158
191
v
Chapter Page
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS..................... 219
APPENDICES.......................................... 234
A. Cover Letter and Approval Statement ............ 235
B. Questionnaire.................................. 238
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 243
vi
LIST OF TABLES
i
Table Page
1. Attendance at Meetings of Selected Locals . * 24
2. Attendance at Meetings of a Newly Organized
Local of 1800 Utility Workers............. 25
3. Education of AFL and CIO Leaders by Level of
Leadership.................................. 48
4. Nativity of AFL and CIO Leaders............. 50
5. Nonunion Organizations to Which Individual
Union Leaders Belong....................... 52
6. Pattern of Union Leaders1 Organizational
Membership.................................. 53
7. Union Presidents and Their Salaries, Selected
Unions, 1967 ................................ 56
8. Distributions of Prestige Ratings for Selected
Occupations, United States, 1947 and 1963 . 62
9. Rank-and-File Views as to the Attitudes of the
International UAW Leadership with Respect to
Power as a G o a l ............................ 114
10. Rank-and-File View as to the "Approachability"
of Their International Leadership ........ 115
11. Rank-and-File View as to the Adequacy of
President Walter Reuther!s Salary ......... 117
12. Rank-and-File View of Democracy as a Vital
Element in UAW Union Affairs . . . . . . . . 120
vii
Table Page
13. Rank-and-File View as to the Degree of
Influence in the Functioning of the
International Union ....................... 122
14. Rank-and-File View as to the Justness of the
Discipline Procedure ....................... 125
15. Rank-and-File View of the Process of Inter
national Leadership Selection ............. 126
16. Rank-and-File View of Accessibility to
International Union Office ......... 127
17. Rank-and-File Overall Assessment of the UAW as
a Democratic Union .......................... 130
18. Attendance at Local UAW Meetings............. 133
19. Rank-and-File View as to the Importance of
Political Opposition for Local Union Office 138
20. Rank-and-File View as to the Adequacy of the
Grievance Committee ....................... 147
21. Rank-and-File View as to the Support Offered
by the Union in Grievance Actions........ 148
viii
INTRODUCTION
Objective of Dissertation
The purpose of this study was to analyze the appli
cability and importance of democracy to labor unions and
further, to attempt to isolate the rank-and-file member's
expectations of his union in this regard. It is thought
that perhaps the laboring classes are not truly interested
in traditional representative democracy but prefer a
"tailor-made" system which is highly subjective and cannot
be generalized into a set of well-defined characteristics.
It was hoped, that through close investigation and inspec
tion, certain insights would emerge that would provide a
better understanding of just what function labor unions
ought to serve and what qualities they should possess.
One frequently hears the blanket claim that the
internal structure of labor unions must be democratic. At
the same time, though, the following question must be asked:
For whom is this democracy necessary? The field of indus
trial labor relations and labor law has become so complex
1
2
and pervasive, that it is vital to society at large that
this question be approached and the true intrinsic functions
of labor unions be understood. This is particularly neces
sary before any new congressional legislation is passed or
governmental programs initiated.
Scope and Methodology
Chapter I of this work is designed primarily to
orient the reader to the problems associated with any
attempt at defining the purposes of labor unions. This was
done through presentation and evaluation of the philosophi
cal support given for the existence of labor unions by such
individuals as Karl Marx, Robert F. Hoxie, Selig Perlman
and John R. Commons. Others might have been mentioned, but
the writings of these men are familiar to most students of
industrial labor relations and furthermore, they are con
sidered to be the path-breaking theoreticians in this field.
Next, an effort was made to indicate the appropriateness of
ascribing the principles of democracy to labor unions.
This was done through a comprehensive survey of the existing
literature. These writings were analyzed with a view to
the larger problem: that being the isolating of the essen
tial purpose of labor unions. Additionally, a discussion
3
of the importance of democracy as it pertains to the labor
movement was presented. Lastly, close study was given to
the claim that democracy may evolve in and of itself from
within the structure of the union.
In Chapter II we considered the reasons for main
taining positions of leadership and the techniques used in
doing so. For purposes of background information, the
character of the typical labor leader was investigated. It
was hoped that common and meaningful qualities would emerge,
thereby enabling us to better understand the forces that
motivate labor leaders to fight tenaciously to maintain
their positions.
The devices used for preserving union office too
often serve to deny union membership its rights. In this
chapter we considered four of the more important instruments
of control. They are the establishment of a political
machine, control of the communications media, the imposition
of trusteeships, and the unbridled use of the disciplinary
procedure.
Lastly, we considered the impact of' the Landrum-
Griffin Act on the internal operations of labor unions.
This was a major piece of federal legislation, and it was
hoped by its supporters that this law would eliminate or at
4
least greatly curtail the existing corruption and abuse of
power.
In Chapter III the focus of this work became much
more specific. At this point the views of a typical rank-
and-file membership were sought and analyzed. The group
studied was UAW Local 1531, Amarillo Texas. This particu
lar local was chosen for two main reasons. The first was
easy accessibility. The author currently lives in that
region and it was thought that distribution of materials
would be greatly facilitated if a local of geographic
proximity was chosen. Secondly, the officers of Local 1531
were responsive to the idea of a study of their union and
indicated a willingness to cooperate by making distribution
channels available and offering comments at various times.
A detailed questionnaire was randomly distributed
to the membership both through the mail and in person.
Specifically, the member was asked to give numerous
responses to two broad areas of inquiry. The first area
attempted to investigate the rank-and-file members' percep
tion of their international union and leadership with
respect to responsiveness, quality and attributes. The
second was designed to give evidence of the rank-and-file
members' view of their ability to accede to office and the
5
degree of influence that they feel they command. It was
hoped that through these lines of questioning, the rank-and-
file members would provide some meaningful conceptions of a
labor union's subjective qualities. These findings were
then compared with the responses given to a specific ques
tion which pointedly asked for an evaluation of the UAW
International as a democratic union.
Chapter IV is a continuation of the previous chap
ter. This particular section, though, dealt with the
members' views of and relationships with their local union.
Several topics were investigated in this connection. The
individual respondent was asked to comment on specific
questions relating to attendance at meetings, importance of
political opposition within the union structure, and the
adequacy of the grievance committee and grievance procedure.
At this time, the existing grievance procedure was analyzed
and an effort was made to indicate areas in which possible
abridgement of individual rights could occur. Finally, at
the conclusion of this chapter, certain observations were
made with respect to the overall desirability of democracy
and the members' opinions about it.
There is much evidence that the typical rank-and-
file union member has little, if any, knowledge of his
6
legal rights to the grievance procedure. This is extremely
important and consequently of great concern to this author
as this is one of the most vital and valuable aspects of
unionism. The reason for the individual's lack of
familiarity with his legal rights is largely due to the
fact that the area is clouded by vague, imprecise, and con
fusing judicial pronouncements. This fact led quite
naturally to the last two chapters of this work where an
attempt was made to indicate and clarify just what the
existing legal situation is.
Chapter V traced the evolution of individual rights
to the grievance and arbitration procedure commencing with
the well known Elgin*^ case. The focus was primarily on
U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. District Court decisions. In
some cases, state court decisions were presented where it
was thought that these cases would either be appealed to
higher courts or where the interpretation of the judges
amounted to significant reinterpretations of prior deci
sions. For the most part, decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board were not considered. The reason for this
" ' ‘ Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff’d on rehearing, 327 U.S.
661 (1946), 16 L. R. R. M. 749 (1946).
7
is that most of the litigation in the area under considera
tion involved aspects or interpretations of sections of the
Taft-Hartley Act which provides for adjudication in the
federal courts.
This chapter concluded with a comprehensive discus-
2
sion of the landmark decision of Vaca v. Sipes. This case
has provoked a great amount of discussion and criticism.
For that reason, the dissenting views of Supreme Court
Justice Hugo Black were presented and discussed at some
length. The Vaca case was viewed as a culmination of a
long line of precedent setting cases. It was the intent of
this chapter to tie together the various lines of reasoning.
Chapter VI presented the most recent cases pertain
ing to an individual's legal access to the grievance
procedure. Here the focus was primarily one of isolating
cases in which modifications of the Vaca decision were
evolving and in which clarifications were forthcoming.
Additionally, consideration was given to the legal pro
nouncements pertaining to the powers of the arbitrator.
Two recent cases, that of Nuest v. Westinghouse Air Brake
2
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369
(1967).
8
3 4
Company and Lusk v. Eastern Products Corporation were
presented and compared in this regard. At the conclusion
of this chapter, it was possible to summarize and designate
judicial attitudes concerning access to the grievance pro
cedure. This, it was hoped, would help eliminate much of
the confusion and uncertainty that now abounds in this
area.
In Chapter VII a summary and concluding statement
was presented. Several recommendations were offered based
on the evidence emerging from the study. These suggestions
are for the most part not of a specific nature, but involve
alterations in the philosophy of unionism that go far
beyond that which would interest any particular rank-and-
file union member.
Sources of Information
The sources used in this study are for the most
part quite conventional. Labor unions are eager to provide
information upon request, and these materials were
3
Nuest v. Westinghouse Air Brake Company, 74
L.R.R.M. 2564 (D. So. 111. 1970)
4 . •
Lusk v. Eastern Products Corporation, 74 L.R.R.M.
2594 (4th Cir. 1970).
9
extremely valuable to the author. Various agencies of the
U.S. Federal Government also make material readily avail
able. In fact, prior to and during the debates on the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, there were several very
excellent and comprehensive reports published. All of
these were most useful in the preparation of this work.
Additionally, the opportunity to speak informally
with many members and several officers of UAW Local 1531
was extremely valuable to this author. The casual comments
offered were informative and enlightening. The information
gathered during these conversations provided breadth and
clarity in many areas under consideration.
President Leonard Woodcock of the United Automobile
Workers also provided much highly useful information. In
an interview held in Dallas shortly after his ascendancy to
the presidency, Mr. Woodcock indicated his willingness to
comment on certain issues and agreed to be cited in this
work.
The questionnaire was prepared by the author and
was intended to reflect individual views and opinions. It
was detailed, but certainly not exhaustive as it was felt
that the typical respondent would be reluctant to devote an
excessive amount of time to answering the offering comments.
10
The terminology used in the questionnaire was direct and
designed to be easily understood by the reader.
In the preparation of the sections pertaining to
the evolution of an individual's legal rights to the
grievance procedure, there were two very important sources
worthy of mention. The first was a mimeographed report
prepared in 1967 by Edgar A. Jones, Jr. and Peter M.
Anderson for the Committee on Law and Legislation of the
National Academy of Arbitrators. This report provided a
comprehensive discussion of the Vaca case and cited numer
ous cases prior to and just subsequent to that decision.
The other source found to be extremely valuable was the
Labor Relations Reference Manual. This series, referred to
as the L.R.R.M., categorizes and indexes cases according to
their content and orientation. Furthermore, this series
reprints the relevant court cases in their entirety and
provides cross-references where appropriate. Regrettably,
in any reporting service, there is a considerable time lag
between adjudicating a particular case and the publication
of the opinion, but in the L.R.R.M., one can find the
quickest reporting by far.
11
Terminology Employed
In the chapters dealing with court decisions and
judicial pronouncements, legal phraseology was used wherever
possible. It was felt that through the use of this lan
guage the intentions and attitudes of the various courts
could be better communicated to the reader. References to
other cases were included wherever possible, and the method
of citation used is the well accepted form found in legal
style manuals.
It is with the above stated intentions and sources
in mind, that we can now proceed to an in-depth development
of the topics under consideration.
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN LABOR UNION AND
ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY
American unionism is said to have begun in
Philadelphia in 1792 when a group called the Philadelphia
1
cordwaxners (shoemakers) organized on a continuous basis.
From that moment to the present, labor organizations have
grown enormously and have had an all pervasive impact on
American economic and social life. The reasons for this
growth have been sought by countless writers. At this
2
point a few important contributors might be mentioned.
1
For a thoroughly detailed study of the history of
American labor unions see the classic by John R. Commons,
etal., History of Labor in the United States (11 vols.;
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918).
2
The following discussion is adopted from: Everett
Johnson Burtt, Jr., Labor Markets, Unions and Government
Policies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 85-93.
For a very detailed study of this topic see, Mark Perlman,
Labor Union Theories in America (Evanston, 111.: Row
Peterson and Co., 1958).
12
13
Philosophical Support for Unionism
The first of these is Karl Marx. Marx felt that
unions were a necessary outgrowth of the exploitative
character of capitalistic society both domestically and
world wide. Recognizing this, Marx, in his inaugural
address before the International Workingmen's Association
(also known as The First National), called for class soli
darity among workers of different countries.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their book, Industrial
3
Democracy, stressed the role of the union as a means of
extending representative democracy. In this regard, they
endorsed political action, social reform and a moderate
democratic socialism.
Robert F. Hoxie was another contributor. To him,
unions were opportunistic institutions developing in
response to specific occurrences within the economy. In
this regard, he analyzed four basic types of unions. They
were: "business," "uplift," "revolutionary" and
4
"predatory."
3
Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democ
racy (London: Longmans, 1911).
^Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United
States (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1928).
14
Selig Perlman, writing in 1928, presented a general
theory of the labor movement which he claimed was univer
sally applicable. It was his opinion that the capitalist
groups, anticapitalist intelligentia and self-seeking
laboring classes interacted to explain the nature of any
country's labor movement. Specifically, with respect to
the situation in America, Perlman theorized that job con
trol was the dominant issue. This was so since the
prevailing viewpoint among laborers was that work oppor
tunities were in short supply relative to the availability
5
of labor.
Of all those that have contributed to the theory of
union growth in America, John R. Commons stands out in the
mind of this author. To Commons, union dynamics were
directly related to the character of American life and
circumstance in the nineteenth century. In examining and
drawing together Commons1 works, Everett Burtt notes that
Commons felt that:
5Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 192 8}. For a useful critique of
Perlman's views see, C. A. Gulick and M. Beers, "Insight
and Illusion in Perlman's Theory of the Labor Movement,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, VI (July, 1953),
510-31.
15
Although the separation of the worker from property was
a necessary condition to the formation of unions, the
basic cause was the fact that competition in the
product market forced the employer to lower his costs
in order to survive. Since labor costs were a large
proportion of his costs, and since it was within his
power to control them, he reduced wages, but at just
this point his journeymen joined together to resist his
action. Later, as new transportation facilities—
turnpikes, canals, and railroads— lowered transfer
costs and widened the area of competition, wholesalers
and merchant capitalists began to play one firm off
against another, and employers were therefore forced to
attempt to reduce wages even further.*’
Commons was by no means single-minded in his
writings. In this regard Mark Perlman writes that it was
Commons' opinion that:
Other factors molding the American labor movement . . .
were the easy attainment of popular self-government, a
geographically large free-trade economy which gradually
became economically integrated, the diffusion of
political powers and the three branches of government,
and the "influx and immigrants" of diverse races,
nationalities and languages . . . thrown together into
a single competitive area.7
Commons' writings and investigations did not stop
with mere theorizing. His contributions to social legisla
tion are endless and his books have stimulated countless
thousands to action. However, it is this author's opinion
that Commons' most important contribution was his
6Burtt, Labor Markets, Unions and Government
Policies, p. 89.
Mark Perlman, Labor Union Theories in America,
p. 186.___________________________________________________
16
ideological befriending of the labor movement and his faith
in the union as a vehicle for promoting freedom. In this
connection he made the following point:
We have a much higher idea of the dignity of man than
ever before. But the acquisition of liberty has been
made at heavy expense in other directions. Though the
slave was compelled to work, he never suffered from
the terrible evil of the modern labourer, lack of work.
. . . The rights of life and liberty are practically
denied to labourers in our day, by virtue of the
denial of the right to employment.
Philip Taft further notes that Commons felt that
the right to employment should be guaranteed and this could
9
only occur if labor is organized. In fact, it is obvious
from Commons1 writings that labor unions were a vital
ingredient in any conceptualization of a democratically
organized system. The following is a quotation from
Spencer D. Pollard's book, How Capitalism Can Succeed.
Here Dr. Pollard utilizes Commons' writings in further
amplifying our understanding of his views:
Commons1 view of democracy, he tells us in Myself, is
not the historic meaning of a majority overruling a
minority, but "representation of organized, voluntary
8
John R. Commons, The Distribution of Wealth (New
York: Macmillan and Co., 1893), p. 80, quoted in Philip
Taft, Economics and Problems of Labor (3rd ed.; Harrisburg,
Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1955), p. 795.
9
Taft, Economics and Problems of Labor, p. 795.
17
but conflicting economic interests" in an "organized
equilibrium of equality." The essential point, he
says, is the elimination of a third party, whether
king, legislature, governor or dictator, handing down
rules and regulations from above— and the substitution
of rules agreed upon collectively by conciliation.
Though Commons did not deal directly with the
internal workings of labor unions, it is obvious that union
democracy was a prerequisite for his important notion of
11
"counterbalancing power." It is with this ideological
and philosophical backing that we now proceed to investi
gate the nature of the present day labor union.
The Union and Its Relation to Democracy
Modern American labor unions possess many of the
qualities of contemporary public government. They demand
loyalty, impose restraints, establish rules and regulations
and, if necessary, reprimand and punish. Though there are
similarities, there are also striking differences. They
10
Spencer D. Pollard, How Capitalism Can Succeed
(Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1966), p. 93.
Phrases in quotation marks are drawn from John R. Commons,
Myself (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), pp. 72-73.
11 .
For a full and enlightening discussion of the
concept of "counterbalancing power," later refined and
renamed "countervailing power" by John Kenneth Galbraith,
see Pollard, How Capitalism Can Succeed, pp. 75-101.
18
are most differentiable with respect to "their limited
purposes, their trait of homogeneity, their status as pri
vate voluntary organizations and their insistence upon
12
autonomy." Based on these dissimilarities, many writers
prefer to view a labor union as a type of private govern
ment exerting enormous influence on the variables associated
with and pertaining to employment.
After having studied labor unions in the Needle
trades and Railway industries, William Leiserson was
prompted to draw the following conclusion:
. . . American labor unions are so formally modeled
along the lines of public governments, so exacting in
their loyalties they require of their members and in
the obedience they demand to their laws, so insistent
on extending their rule over all workers and forcing
non-members to obey their regulations, that they are no
ordinary private governments. The effects of their
activities and assertion of rights are so profound
that they must be classed with those great private
governments like the church and the ethnic, landed, and
commercial groups which have challenged kings and
emperors, and taken over public governments.-*-3
12
Grant McConnell, "Historical Traits and Union
Democracy," Monthly Labor Review, LXXXI (June, 1958), 603.
A detailed survey of various views with regard to unions as
democratic institutions is provided by C. Peter Magrath,
"Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union
Democracy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XII
(July, 1959), 503-19.
13
William Leiserson, American Trade Union Democ
racy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 6.
19
Thus, those who attempt to ascribe the principles
of democracy to labor unions, as they have attempted to do
with public governments, must first recognize that unions
are faced with many specialized circumstances and situa
tions. For example, one should realize that American trade
unions by purposeful design restrict membership, must at
all costs present a united front, occasionally find it
necessary to coerce employers and managers and as a result
of all of this, continually face the possibility of creat
ing an internalized bureaucracy.
In view of the above realities, many authors argue
that to use classic definitions of democracy in analyzing
labor unions is a hopeless task. Essentially this approach
comes from two basic directions. The first relates to
14
Roberto Michels’ discussion of oligarchy and Will
Herberg's view of the evolutionary nature of union office.^
The point here is that large urban unions, characterized by
elected officers, are likely to be dominated by a form of
14
Roberto Michels, Political Parties, English trans.
(Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949).
15
Will Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor
Unions," in Readings in Labor Economics, ed. by Gordon F.
Bloom, Herbert R. Northrup and Richard L. Rowan (Homewood,
111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 292-302.
20
power elite drawn from the relatively few active and con
cerned members. The officers, faced with the prospect of
"returning to the shop if defeated," fight vigorously to
secure their positions. Eventually, if successful in main
taining positions of power, the leaders may begin to assume
that their personal goals and desires are synonymous with
that of the group. An observation by Herberg in evaluating
the philosophy of labor leaders with respect to their con
stituents follows:
The members of the union are essentially merely clients
who are entitled to the best service for their money
but who certainly should not presume to interfere in
matters of administration, since such matters are
properly the function of trained and experienced offi
cials specially selected for the purpose.^
What inevitably follows from this attitude is an
active attempt by leaders to tightly control finances,
communications media and subordinate officers; all of which
is incompatible with the standard concepts of democracy.
The second basic attack against labor unions as
traditionally democratic institutions places the "whole
17
concept of the rule of the majority . . . in doubt."
16Ibid., p. 293.
17
Alice H. Cook, Union Democracy: Practice and
Ideal (Cornell, New York: New York State School of Indus
trial and Labor Relations, 1963), p. 12. Much credit is
21
This indictment against labor unions points to the often
asserted claim that the proceedings of the local union
meeting do not adequately reflect the will of the majority,
but merely serve to "rubber-stamp" the policy proposals
made by the union leaders in direct collaboration with the
active minority. This possibility arises as most members
are viewed as apathetic. Leonard R. Sayles and George
Strauss in their important work, The Local Union draw the
following conclusion:
In theory, decision-making is the meeting's most
important function, for in doing this it acts as the
supreme legislative body of the local. Actually, how
ever, except in small and new locals, few of the
significant decisions are made on the union floor. In
large locals, the meeting cannot perform this function
effectively unless the alternatives are clearly
defined.
Meetings do provide opportunities for officers to
communicate downward about decisions already made and
for the members to communicate their fears and desires
upward. Only rarely do meetings do more than ratify
. . . proposals brought to them by the executive
committee.
due Professor Cook for categorizing the various attacks
questioning the assertion that unions are democratic
institutions. Her survey of the literature is exceedingly
comprehensive.
18
Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt. Brace and World,
Inc., 1967), p. 104.
22
Needless to say, not all writers place the blame
for this occurrence at the doorstep of the leadership.
Arthur Goldberg, for example, writing as Special Counsel
for the AFL-CIO, takes a somewhat different point of view.
To him, any abridgment of members' rights at the local
meeting is potentially traceable to the membership at
large. He says:
. . . rights cannot be achieved by a union membership
that does not exercise its responsibilities, a union
membership that sits back, bored or smug, and chal
lenges its officialdom to pull economic and ethical
rabbits out of the union hat.
The first responsibility of the union member is to
participate in the affairs of his union. When a union
member regards his union as a slot machine which may
pay back a quarter for each nickel invested or as an
insurance policy that can be obtained at little cost,
then that member is devaluating his union.
The Question of Attendance
Though there may be great truth to Goldberg's
assertion, many studies have shown that attendance is so
low that one may doubt that "boredom" or "smugness" could
be the sole cause. Close analysis of the results of a
statistical study conducted by Sayles and Strauss is
19
Arthur Goldberg, "The Rights and Responsibilities
of Union Members," American Federationist, LXV (February,
1958), 18.
23
warranted at this point. Table 1 shows variances in
membership attendance at meetings in locals of different
sizes.
In Table 2 Sayles and Strauss indicate variances
in the number attending meetings in relation to the busi
ness conducted.
Several interesting observations emerge from these
tables. In the first place it is evident in Table 1 that
attendance was relatively high in those locals comprised
of a highly skilled membership and specifically in the
needle trades locals. Sayles and Strauss attribute this
to the fact that these members had a significant amount
20
of emotional involvement with their work environment.
Also obvious from these statistics is the fact that small
locals were characterized by higher percentages of attend
ance than were the large locals. This is probably due
to the fact that small locals offer their members a more
21
meaningful forum at meetings. Of all those locals
studied, attendance was highest in the Insurance Workers
locals.
20
Sayles and Strauss, The Local Union, p. 98.
24
TABLE 1
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS OF SELECTED LOCALS
Industry
Size of
Local
Normal Attendance
No.
Per Cent of
Membership
Manufacturing 4,000 30 1
Manuf acturing 2,000 40 2
Steel 1,900 48 3
Utility (Production local) 1,800 100 6
Automobile Assembly Plant 1,800 35 2
Needle Trades (Italian local) 1,800 35 2
Needle Trades (Operators local) 1,500 75 5
Automobile Assembly Plant 1,100 70 6
Steel 900 35 4
Public Utility (White collar) 850 40 5
Manuf acturing 600 20 3
Foundry 600 30 5
Needle Trades (Pressers) 600 90 15
Needle Trades (Unskilled
Operators) 400 25 6
Needle Trades (Centers) 400 80 20
Needle Trades (Skilled
Operators) 200 60 30
Insurance Workers 150 50 33
Clerical Workers 110 12 11
Public Utility (Engineers local) 110 26 24
Source: Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1967), Table 5, p. 97.
25
TABLE 2
ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS OF A NEWLY ORGANIZED LOCAL
OF 1800 UTILITY WORKERS
Number in Percentage of
Month attendance Membership
July 350 20
Aug. 320 18
Sept. 220 12
150 8
Oct. 150 8
Nov. 325 18
Dec. 750 42
75 4
Jan. 90 5
Feb. 80 4
March 85 5
April 110 6
May 65 4
June 110 6
July 65 4
Aug. 9 0 5
Sept. 180 10
Significant Business
Election of temporary
officers
Discussion of contract
demands and proposed
seniority rules
Nomination of permanent
officers; discussion of con
tract questions
Rejection of proposal to
allow voting at more than one
place; report on negotiations
in progress
Report on negotiations in
progress; strike vote
Report on completed contract
Ratification [of] contract
Selection of committee to
draw up constitution
Selection of job evaluation
chairman
Blue Cross discussion; dis
cussion of dispute with
company over contract
Complaints about officers
Discussion of President's
salary
First reading of constitution
Adoption of constitution
Discussion of grievances
Election of Convention
delegates
Nomination of officers
Source: Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1967), Table 6, p. 98.
26
When we investigate Table 2 other interesting facts
emerge. With few exceptions, as the months wore on, levels
of attendance in a newly formed local continually declined.
In the particular local studied, the only truly significant
departure from that trend occurred in December at the time
of contract ratification, a period of vital concern.
In a similar study by Joel Seidman, Jack London,
Bernard Karsh and Daisy Tagliacozzo, the findings were
somewhat the same. They found that, "large numbers of
workers not attracted to routine union meetings make an
effort to attend when a crisis occurs or when something
22
important to them is under consideration." Of those
unions that they studied, it was found that the Plumbers'
Union showed the best attendance record with 500-1,500 or
4,400 attending semi-monthly meetings. In attempting to
explain this, the authors make the following observation:
[Attendance was high because] the meeting was the place
to learn about economic trends in the trade, about the
number and nature of the new jobs likely to be opening
up within the local's jurisdiction; in an industry
where jobs were so often of short duration. . . . New
materials or techniques developing in the industry
22
Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh and
Daisy Tagliacozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1958) , p. 188.
27
or new interpretations of the building code were like
wise of interest to all members.^
The fact that attendance is low is truly unfortu
nate. The negative aspects of this are compounded by
virtue of the fact that it is possible that those who do
attend are not truly representative of the membership at
large. If a "Town-Hall" type meeting is an important
ingredient of democracy, many unions fall significantly
short of any ideal conception of fully representative
institutions. It is crucial at this point to inquire into
the causes of this disappointing circumstance as interpre
tations such as Goldberg's appear to be too simplistic.
If, as Goldberg contends, members are in fact uninterested,
it is possibly due to the fact that they perceive them
selves to be largely ineffectual. Neil Chamberlain sub
scribes to this view and makes the following statement:
. . . small turnouts are sometimes regarded as indica
tion of membership apathy in the face of domination by
the labor "bosses." Why should members put in an
appearance simply to be told what their leaders have
done or propose to do, having themselves little power
to influence the affairs of their own organization?^^
2^Ibid., p. 189.
24Neil W. Chamberlain, The Labor Sector (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), p. 207.
28
Another possibility presents itself. That is,
members of unions may feel that meetings are extraneous
since most of the important business is actually carried on
outside the formal meetings. This is suggested in a study
by Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne. In their work they
endeavored to isolate the importance of interpersonal
communications at the "shop" level of union activity. In
this connection, they define "shop," as
the place where workers are gathered in the course of
their employment to perform their work.^
and "shop society," as
the group of workers who are brought together in a
common place of employment and more particularly, to
that part of a larger force of employees who are in
close enough touch with each other for conversation or
shoptalk.2°
The essential fact established by the authors is
that union society is a pervasive and all-encompassing one.
In fact, the relationships established, and friendships
made, were more meaningful than the activities carried out
in the name of democracy. Their point is clearly stated in
the following passage:
^Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne, "Shop Society
and the Union," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, VII
(October, 1953) , 3.
29
Our observations suggest that participation in formal
union activity— such as attendance at meetings, voting
in elections, and serving in office— is not the full
measure of awareness and interest on the part of the
membership; that on the contrary, these formal activi
ties, although carried on by only a few of the members,
are outward manifestations of an interest and awareness
of union affairs of most of the shop society. The
so called "active members" who participate in union
affairs are also in close touch with the rest of their
fellows in the shop. There is no organized selection
of the active participants, but they are in fact
representatives of the whole group, and so we call them
"informal representatives." The shop society and the
union organization are related to each other through
the informal representation of the members in the shop
by the active participants in formal union affairs.^7
This point of view is not fully shared by this
author. There can be no denying that informal channels of
communication exist and that some degree of popular senti
ment filters through to the union leadership, but it is
completely unrealistic to presume that this alone can
insure the effective representation of all parties.
In fact the outlook adopted by Seymour Lipset,
Martin Trow and James Coleman, in their classic study of
the International Typographical Union, seems far more
realistic. In this regard they note:
The large numbers of interested . . . members present
at any union meeting are . . . present at a forum given
over largely to the discussion of opposing policies and
alternative suggestions. These men are exposed to
^Ibid., p. 4.
30
opposition ideas and criticism in ways that are not
possible where debate is either suppressed or else
carried on in an atmosphere of crisis. Not only do the
men themselves come to know the opposition position
better by.virtue of their attendance at union meetings,
but they also serve to carry these arguments and
criticisms back into the shops with them, where they
provide first hand accounts of the events which occurred
at meetings. These accounts, of course, are quite
independent of control by the administration.
Unions as Dual Purpose Institutions
Many writers dealing with the character of labor
unions, emphasize the fact that they are dual purpose
institutions. That is, they are at the same time "business
like service organizations, operating a variety of agencies
under a complicated system of industrial relations," and
"an expression and vehicle of the historical movement of
the submerged laboring masses for social recognition and
29
democratic self-determination. " Faced with this diver
sity of purpose, some investigators have pessimistically
concluded that it is impossible for any union to fill both
roles. The usual approach, then, is to drop the requirement
28
Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S.
Coleman, Union Democracy (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 301.
29
Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy m Labor
Unions," p. 292.
31
of democracy. In this connection Clark Kerr summarizes
three arguments abounding in the literature:
1. Unions have become largely functionless organiza
tions, and nobody really cares whether they are
democratic or not since the state guarantees full
employment and social security and the employer has
been seduced by human relations. The result is
that the employee has a well paying job, and a
pension and consequently there is little left for
the union to do.
2. Unions have become quasi-governmental bureaus help
ing to set minimum wages, schedules of hours, and
adjudication of grievances in the same way that
government does. Their role has become largely
routine and as such is best handled in a bureau
cratic manner. If this is so, the question of
democracy is purely academic.
3. Unions function best if they are insulated and— -
protected from the pressures of democratic life.
They will be much more effective if they are per
mitted to take a broader view of events than the
current membership is likely to take. Further, it
is concluded that democracy causes internal and
external strife and irresponsibility.'*®
Kerr is willing to admit that each of these points
possesses some degree of merit. However, it is his feeling
that democracy is a superior form of government providing
Paraphrased from Clark Kerr, "Unions and Union
Leaders of Their Own Choosing," in Readings in Labor
Economics, ed. by Gordon F. Bloom, Herbert R. Northrup and
Richard L. Rowan (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1963), p. 282. For further discussion on this subject
especially with regard to British unions, see, V. L. Allen,
Power in Trade Unions: A Study of Their Organization in
Great Britain (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954).
32
workers with a more effective voice in the union in the
31
narrow sense and society in the broader sense. A similar
conclusion is reached by Clyde W. Summers in his often
cited report written for, and adopted by, the American Civil
Liberties Union in 1952. To Stammers, there are at least
three reasons why unions must maintain democratic stand
ards. They are:
1. . . . a union in collective bargaining acts as the
representative of every worker within the bargain
ing unit. It speaks for him, makes choices of
policies which vitally affect him, and negotiates
a contract which binds him. His wages, his
seniority, his holidays, and even his retirement
are all governed by this contract which becomes the
basic law of his working life. . . . The union, in
short, is the workers' industrial government. The
union's power is the power to govern the working
lives of those for whom it bargains, and like all
governing power should be exercised democratically.
2. . . . unions should be democratic because the power
which they hold over the individual worker is
largely derived from government. Labor relations
acts such as the Wagner Act affirmatively protect
the right to organize and place the government's
stamp of approval on unionization. Even more,
these statutes provide that government shall
certify unions as the officially designated repre
sentatives and compel employers to recognize these
unions as the exclusive representatives of all
workers within the bargaining units. Unions, in
the exercise of these powers derived from govern
ment, should maintain the same democratic standards
required of government itself.
31
Kerr, "Unions and Union Leaders of Thexr Own
Choosing," pp. 282-83.
33
3. . . . unions should be democratic because their
principal moral justification is that they intro
duce an element of democracy into the government of
industry. . . . Only to the extent that workers are
allowed to participate in determining union policies
do they become self-governing.
The Essentiality of Democracy
It is this author's opinion that society at large
must help preserve representative democracy within the
labor union movement. With a membership totaling some
17,900,0 00 or 22.6 per cent of the total labor force,^ it
is imperative that the political as well as the civil
rights of these individuals be safeguarded. The need for
democracy is even more obvious when the relative power of
several of the large unions is noted. Exclusive of
Canadian membership, in 1968, the Teamsters, Automobile
Workers, Steelworkers, Electrical Workers, Machinists, and
Carpenters accounted for 6,000,000 members, or 33.6 per
34
cent of total union membership. It is indeed alarming to
32
Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in Labor Unions: A
Report and Statement of Policy (New York: American Civil
Liberties Union, 1952), p. 4.
33
Gordon P. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup,
Economics of Labor Relations (6th ed.; Homewood, 111.:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 66.
34
Ibid., p. 68.
34
realize that without sufficient safeguards it is entirely
possible that millions of workers could be the tool of
unscrupulous leaders. Admittedly, conscious attempts to
corrupt labor unions are far from the norm. However, the
mere possibility of unethical practice should be sufficient
cause for concern and consequent action. Reasons for this
are obvious. Not only do labor unions enjoy tremendous
power by virtue of the fact that they represent so many
individuals in the process of collective bargaining, but
through financial and political means they are able to
exert very significant pressure in areas outside the bar
gaining unit as well. For example, even though the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 prevents
unions from making contributions to individuals competing
in national elections, this is not nearly as restrictive as
it appears at first glance. The language of the statute is
loose and reads in part:
It is unlawful for . . . any labor organization to make
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election at which Presidential or Vice Presidential
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be
voted for, or in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select candi
dates for any foregoing offices, . . .
3 5
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),
Statutes at Large, LXI, sec. 313, 159 (1947).
35
V. O. Key in pointing to the significance of this
passage makes the following statement:
A major consequence of the statute has been the use of
specially created affiliates of unions; the campaign
funds of these organizations come from contributions
solicited from union members for political purposes
rather than dues. The peak labor political committee
is COPE— the Committee on Political Education of the
AFL-CIO. . . . COPE and its related units in the
national unions, the locals, and the state federations
are not labor organizations as defined by the federal
statute. They are free to solicit funds and to make
contributions and expenditures in national elections.
Based on this actuality, it is imperative that
members have broad powers in challenging leadership, and
subsequently in controlling and allocating union funds.
This can only be achieved through the maintenance and
enforcement of individual rights.
Inherent Pressures for Democracy
Several prominent observers note that there exist
forces within the labor union movement which automatically
press towards democracy. The first of these is managerial
pressures. John R. Coleman feels that management has
frequently called for democratization in labor in hopes
3 6
V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups (4th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1963),
p. 557.
36
that, "decentralization of power will produce policy deci-
37
sions more conciliatory toward company interests." He
continues noting that, "employer interest in democratic
decision making may be expected to ebb and flow with chang
ing assessments of the ways in which greater member parti
cipation in the formulation of union policy would affect
3 8
the result." Interestingly, it appears that labor
leaders are very concerned with what "outsiders think."
For example, when management raises the point that attend
ance at meetings is lacking and therefore unresponsive to
the leadership, the leaders will at one and the same time
deny that this has any real importance and vigorously
39
attempt to encourage a larger turnout. illustrative of
this is the back cover of the American Federationist,
published by the AFL-CIO. Though similar statements are
found in many issues, the following appeared in the issue
of October 1959.
37
John R. Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressures of
Democracy in Unionism," in Labor and Trade Unionism: An
Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. by Walter Galenson and
Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1960) , p. 208.
38Ibid.
3^Ibid., pp. 208-209.
37
"See You at the Union Meeting"
If you want your union to do a good job for you and
to be clean and democratic, remember that you must do
your part by being a REAL trade unionist all the time.
One of the most valuable contributions you and your
fellow members can make is by regular attendance at the
meetings of your local union. Bear in mind that union
meetings are very important and it's your duty to be
present. Don't miss the meetings if you want your
union to be clean, effective and democratic.^®
Another possible force for democracy in labor
unions is attributable to a "safety-valve" theory. This is
fully discussed by Sayles and Strauss in The Local Union.
The theory states that unions are democratic because if
"things get too bad and the members become aroused enough,
41
they have the power to change things." The fact that
members have not for the most part insisted on a more
representative union in the face of corruption of dema-
goguery does not necessarily dishearten the proponents of
this theory. In this regard, they suggest that flagrant
and sustained abuse of democratic rights in unionism is
rare and workers have not yet been tested in "their acqui-
42
escence to a complete mockery of democracy."
^"See You at the Union Meeting," American Federa-
tionist, LXVI (October, 195 9), back cover.
41
Sayles and Strauss, The Local Union, p. 167.
^2Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy
38
As a further extension of this, J. B. S. Hardman
offers the following observations:
Pragmatic acquiescence is a native American mode of
behavior in workshops and union halls as it is in
political assemblies and in halls of learning. Where
leaders can prove to members that because of the
leaders' "policies," the boys get the bacon delivered
in as sizeable chunks as anybody gets, and maybe even
bigger and fatter chunks, there is a disposition to
overlook the absence of democratic procedure attending
delivery. The ineradicable fact that unionists are
human, it must be assumed, is at least in part respons
ible for the sad fact that they react to certain
realities no more wisely nor more nobly than do most
other people, i.e., statesmen, professors, clergymen,
scientists, politicans.
Conclusions
Many very important economists have viewed labor
unions as a potentially powerful force in the struggle to
promote economic freedom. It is true that unions can serve
that function but in so doing may possibly impinge upon the
very political freedoms of those whom they are in fact
trying to protect. This is a very real possibility if
in Unionism," p. 210.
43
J. B. S. Hardman, "State of the Movement," in The
House of Labor: Internal Operations of American Unions,
ed. by J. B. S. Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld (New York:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 69-70. Part of the above
quotation is cited by Coleman to emphasize the presence of
countervailing pressures against democracy. See Coleman,
"The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism," p. 210.
39
Hardman is correct in his observation that the typical
union man is acquiescent and slow to react to reality.
Unions are tremendously powerful organizations and
in some cases possess powers and controls that rival public
governments. It is clear, then, that if one accepts the
principles of democracy as being vital for effective public
government, strong logical arguments exist for their usage
in labor unions as well.
Because of the complexities of present day economic
systems and the widespread desire for personal power, many
obstacles exist to the insurance of internal union democ
racy. In the ensuing chapter, these barriers will be
presented and analyzed in the hope that their isolation
will enable us to focus more clearly on the nature and
function of the typical American labor union. Comprehen
sive evaluation is of critical importance because the
quality of society as a totality is wholly determined by
the attributes of its underlying institutions.
CHAPTER II
REASONS FOR AND METHODS OF PRESERVING OFFICE
As noted earlier, there are many important writers
that regard the activities of labor leaders to be less than
democratic in nature. In this chapter we will explore some
of the characteristics, the aspirations and attitudes of
labor leaders and investigate those areas which may be
utilized to enhance their own personal power and prestige.
These activities will be analyzed with respect to their
impact on internal democracy.
Background and Characteristics of
Labor Leaders
Labor union leaders are usually men who have come
up from the ranks. For the most part, they have worked at
the trade for many years and in so doing have acquired an
intimate knowledge of the problems that confront their
trade. Interestingly, on-the-job experience is not always
a prerequisite as leaders have come from the fields of law
and business. There are, however, certain traits common to
40
41
all who aspire to top union office. In this connection,
V. L. Allen in assessing the qualities of the typical
leader in England, makes the following observations:
The successful leader must not stand above the workers
he represents, with unique qualities that mark him off
from them. He must be one of them; a representative
member of his organization, but with each quality that
makes him representative developed above the average so
that his members feel some affinity to him because of
his representativeness but at the same time respect
him for his superior ability. He must be this if he
is to communicate effectively with his members, if he
is to interpret them correctly, and if he is to possess
that intense loyalty to them and their interests which
must be a prime quality in all trade-union leaders.
A similar and more exacting point of view is
expressed by Charles W. Anrod in his article, "Reflections
on Union Leadership." Here Anrod lists four qualities that
a successful labor leader ought to have:
(1) . . . The union leader must be a man wrapped up in
a cause: he must be enthusiastic for the ideals of
organized labor. In his devotion to the cause, he
must be prepared to make heavy sacrifices in terms
of financial rewards and social prestige. He must
be honest and sincere, with great reserves of
courage and self confidence and humility, too. In
short, he must be a man of exceptional strength of
character.
(2) . . . The union leader must possess a sharp intel
lect and distinct political capabilities. He must
have vision and imagination, the ability to observe
n
V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions: A Study of
Their Organization in Great Britain (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1954), p. 190.
42
and analyze, the capacity to make decisions and
coordinate a multiplicity of activities. He must
have great organizational and administrative
talent, with all the tact and diplomacy this
implies. And he must have the gift of making
friends.
(3) . . .he must be an inspiring and convincing
orator. Social currents can be stirred up by
feverish and irresponsible agitation. They cannot
be harnessed into constructive and permanent
channels without true oratory. The union leader
must be able not only to arouse the rank and file;
he must be able to maintain their devotion to the
union at high pitch through bad times as well as
good.
(4) . . , The successful union leader must have a vast
store of knowledge. He must be acquainted with the
economy of the country as a whole, as well as with
the particular interest industry with which he is
concerned. He must be familiar with costs of pro
duction, the relationship between wages and prices,
job analysis, welfare and pension plans and a host
of other technical problems. He must also be
familiar with labor legislation. In other words,
he must have extensive occupational preparation.
Jack Barbash feels that an individual striving to
maintain positions of leadership must above all conform to
two "imperatives." They are: (1) "sensitivity to the
immediate interests of his constituents" and (2) "a recog-
3
nition that the union is a political organization." He
2
Charles W. Anrod, "Union Leadership," in Unions,
Management and the Public, ed. by E. Wright Bakke, Clark
Kerr, and Charles W. Anrod (2d ed.; New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1960), p. 131.
o
Phrases in quotation marks are taken from: Jack
43
continues that: "The manner in which union leaders will
respond to these imperatives will vary by the different
ways they perceive their particular situations, but the
1 imperatives1 are the constants in the equation of union
4
leadership."
When one looks at those leaders who have been
successful, he can only conclude that Allen, Anrod and
Barbash are all correct. For example, the late Walter
Reuther embodied all of their enumerated traits. Until
1938 he was closely allied with various Socialist parties
and grasped opportunity as it developed. He was a man who
possessed a driving sense of power that knew few bounds
when it came to organizing and promoting the economic
interests of his followers. To be successful one need not
possess an extraordinary intellect. In fact, several years
ago Daniel Bell pointed out that Reuther, was not an
intellectual, as "his tastes, cultural ideas, manners,
5
morals and habits are conventional." George Meany,
Barbash, The Practice of Unionism (New York: Harper and
Bros., Publishers, 1956), p. 368.
^Ibid.
5
Daniel Bell, "Labor's New Men of Power," m
Readings in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, ed.
by Joseph Shister (2nd ed.; New York: J. B. Lippincott
Co., 1956), pp. 103-107. _____________________________
44
another exceptional labor leader possessing qualities
similar to those of Reuther, is a man who came "up through
the ranks" and his experience is characteristic of many
outstanding union officials. Daniel Bell provides us with
the following biographical information:
Meany's formal education stopped a year after grade
school. At sixteen he became an apprentice plumber,
and five years later a full journeyman. At twenty-five
. . . he was elected to union office.
Meany was business agent of the plumbers' local for
twelve years. . . . As secretary of The Building and
Construction Trades, he began to represent the unions
in legislative hearings, and in 1934 became the New
York State president of the A. F. of L.6
If one were to isolate the most important quality
needed for success in labor union politics, it would have
to be what Jack Barbash calls the "will to leadership." It
is his contention that a union leader must know what he
wants and be prepared to seize opportunities as they
occur. Men who have possessed this "will" and have suc
ceeded in moving to the top viewed their position as a
culmination of their dreams and desires. Such men would be
8
Philip Murray, David Dubinsky and Walter Reuther.
^Ibid., p. 107.
7
Barbash, The Practice of Unionism, p. 371 ff.
g
These names are mentioned by Seymour Martin Lipset
45
Monetary rewards for individuals such as these may be over
shadowed by a sense of achievement.
There are other union leaders whose motivations are
a good deal less noble. In many cases, they view their
role of leader as a position of leverage enabling them to
move to still more gratifying employments. Frequently,
these attitudes manifest themselves in the political arena.
Seymour Lipset characterizes this individual in the follow
ing way.
These "career" or bureaucratic leaders may include what
one observer of the trade union movement called the
"accidental" leader. He is often a man who is fairly
fluent and personable, who speaks up at meetings or is
chosen by his work mates for some minor position in the
shop, is recognized by the union leadership as a poten
tial asset, and is co-opted into office. An appren
ticeship in the lower rungs of the union hierarchy may
not seem rewarding to many such individuals, but those
who find it so may soon be in the position of the
consciously motivated union "careerist.1 1 For these
men, the rewards that go with status and office within
the union create a continuing motivation to retain and
increase them.^
as men "who have made special efforts to minimize the more
obvious negative consequences of bureaucratization and
oligarchy in their unions." See, Seymour Martin Lipset,
"The Political Process in Trade Unions," in Labor and Trade
Unionism: An Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. by Walter
Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset {New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 231.
9
Ibid., pp. 231-32.
46
Dave Beck, formerly of the Teamsters, exemplifies
this aggressive type of leader. At the outset of his
career Beck desired to be a successful businessman.
Shortly though, he was offered a job by Dan Tobin of the
Teamsters as a labor organizer in the Pacific Northwest.
Beck grasped the opportunity with relish and promptly
embarked on a ruthless and relentless campaign to enroll
members and control the trucking industry. In 1937, Beck
decided to spearhead an expansion campaign and shortly the
membership grew from 60,000 to almost 40 0,000. There is no
question that Beck received enormous satisfaction simply by
virtue of the fact that he possessed tremendous power. Not
surprisingly, Daniel Bell tells us that Beck in attempting
to succeed Dan Tobin as president was "sweet talk itself."
In this way he cut down all possible rivals including Dan
Tobin's sons in his pursuit of the soon to be available
. . 10
positron.
It is interesting to note that Dave Beck was never
really satisfied with his substantial success within the
Teamsters. In 1952 Beck associated himself with Jimmy Hoffa
and by 1957 the McClellan Committee unearthed the fact that
10
Bell, "Labor's New Men of Power," p. 111. Much
of the biographical data is drawn from Bell's article.
47
Beck had misappropriated several hundred thousand dollars.
This marked the end of Beck's domination of the Teamsters
as he was convicted of income tax evasion and was sentenced
to federal prison. Not surprisingly, Jimmy Hoffa, a man
possessing the same attributes as Beck, would soon emerge
as president of the union.^
In further attempting to shed some light on the
character of the typical labor leader, we may make use of a
12
study conducted by C. Wright Mills and Helen S. Dinerman.
Though their study is somewhat dated, having been conducted
in 194 8, several years before the merger of the AFL and CIO,
useful insights still emerge. One of their most interest
ing investigations dealt with the degree of education
acquired by AFL and CIO leaders. Their findings are shown
in Table 3.
The evidence indicates, among other things, that
those who aspire to national office are somewhat better
11
For thoroughly detailed biographies of labor
leaders see, Charles A. Madison, American Labor Leaders
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1950).
12
C. Wright Mills and Helen S. Dinerman, "Leaders
of the Unions," in The House of Labor: Internal Operations
of American Unions, ed. by J. B. S. Hardman and Maurice F.
Neufeld (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 24-47.
48
TABLE 3
EDUCATION OF AFL AND CIO LEADERS BY LEVEL
OF LEADERSHIP
AFL CIO
Educa L±un
National State City National State City
College 24% 16% 29% 47% 35% 38%
High School
Graduate 12 17 14 31 26 22
Some High
School 21 31 27 23 23 24
Grammar School 43 36 30 9 16 26
Total (100%) (61) (42) (124) (34) (43) (95).
Source: C. Wright Mills and Helen S. Dinerman, "Leaders of
the Unions," in The House of Labor: Internal
Operations of American Unions, ed. by J. B. S.
Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld (New York: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1951), Table 4, p. 27.
49
educated than those interested in state and city union
office. At the same time, though, one is struck by the
exceptionally high percentage of officers, especially in
the AFL, who have had nothing more than a grammar school
education. The investigators offer a possible explanation.
It was suggested that since they found in another segment
of their study that the age composition of the AFL in 1948
was much more spread out than it was in the CIO, the proba
bility is that older leaders had less opportunity to
receive a formal education than their younger counter
parts.^
Though the figures are not indicative of a very
high level of education, the investigators make note that
39 per cent of the AFL men and 56 per cent of the CIO men
surveyed had at least high school education. This is far
greater than the 1948 national average of 24 per cent for
males over 25 years of age.
Table 4 shows the findings of a second investiga
tion by Mills and Dinerman which relates to the origins of
the leaders. These figures are interesting because they
coincide almost exactly with the United states population
~^Ibid., p. 27.
TABLE 4
NATIVITY OF AFL AND CIO LEADERS
50
Birthplace AFL CIO
Born in United States 89% 89%
Foreign-born 11 11
Total (10 0%) (228) (174)
Source: C. Wright Mills and Helen S. Dinerman, "Leaders of
the Unions," in The House of Labor: Internal
Operations of American Unions, ed. by J. B. S.
Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), Table 6, p. 28.
at large. The authors therefore concluded that the often
heard claim that labor leaders are foreign agitators is
14
obviously incorrect. In commenting generally on the
subject of place of nativity and family origin with respect
to union relationships, Eli Ginzburg draws the following
conclusion:
The birthplace and racial background of American labor
leaders parallel to a high degree the origins of the
rank and file. Every group wants to be represented by
one of its own members. Southerners do not send trans
planted Yankees to Congress. The language barrier
forced immigrants from non-English-speaking countries
to rely on one another. The emergence of a foreign-
born leader on the executive board of an established
^Ibid., pp. 26-30.
51
union frequently reflected a past in which he brought
his countrymen into the union in exchange for a post
for himself.- * * 5
One additional study merits inclusion at this junc
ture. This investigation was undertaken by Leonard R.
Sayles and George Strauss in an attempt to point out the
nature of the relationship that typical union leaders main
tain with the community at large. Though this inquiry is
confined to the local leader, there is no conclusive evi
dence to suggest that affiliations appreciably change when
union officials attain higher offices. Their study dealt
with two predominantly Catholic locals: Local A located in
a large urban community and Local B located in an ethnically
divided city of 25,000. The results of their contacts with
officers of the two locals are presented in Table 5.
Table 6 shows a breakdown of these membership
statistics into type of organization.
The investigators draw the following conclusion
from their study:
Our impression is that in most locals 60 to 90 per
cent of the executive members participate in outside
organizations. At least a third attend meetings of one
kind or another two or three nights a month. This
•^Eli Ginzburg, The Labor Leader: An Exploratory
Study (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 46.
52
TABLE 5
NONUNION ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH
LEADERS BELONG
INDIVIDUAL UNION
Number of
Organizations
Local A Officers
Belonging
Local B Officers
Belonging
No. Percentage No. Percentage
None 5 17 3 12
One 14 49 3 12
Two 4 14 10 40
Three 3 10 3 12
Four or more 3 10 6 24
Total 29 100 25 100
Source: Leonard R.
Union (Rev.
World, Inc.
Sayles and George
ed.; New York:
, 1967), Table 1,
Strauss,
Harcourt,
p. 71.
The Local
Brace and
53
TABLE 6
PATTERN OF UNION LEADERS' ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP
Type of
Number of Officers Belonging
Organization
Local A Local B
Fraternal
Knights of Columbus 6 2
Italian 0 6
Polish 0 7
Other 11 11
Religious 3 3
Political 7 3
Athletic 4 3
Rifle and Conservation 0 4
Veterans 8 2
National Guard 3 0
Community Improvement 3 0
Volunteer Firemen 0 4
Total 45 45
Source: Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1967), Table 2, p. 71.
54
compares with a probable figure of 40 to 50 per cent
for working class membership in organizations
generally. ®
An interesting, though dated, composite picture of
American labor leaders is offered by Eli Ginzburg:
The majority were native born, although foreign-born
leaders were found in unions which had large foreign-
born memberships. Almost all leaders came from the
working class. They completed grammar school but went
no farther. They started work in their early teens.
After ten years or so they left the bench to devote
their entire time to union affairs. Many achieved
prominence while still very young. Their interest in
national politics was slight. They joined organiza
tions, but most of them were not good church members.
They were really not very different from most other
Americans.^
With the exception of degree of education, which is
universally on the increase, a more recent evaluation
18
proves not to be significantly different.
16
Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1967), p. 72.
17 .
Ginzburg, The Labor Leader: An Exploratory Study,
p. 54. Though Ginzburg limits his comments to "American
labor leaders during the period 1900 to 1940," there is
little doubt that these same comments are relevant today.
For an interesting discussion of some of the atti
tudes and goals of local union leaders see, Sayles and
Strauss, The Local Union, pp. 56-75.
With respect to British Trade union leaders, atten
tion is drawn to: H. A. Clegg, A. J. Killick, and Rex
Adams, Trade Union Officers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1961).
18
For an evaluation of some of the older studies
55
Reasons for Desiring to Maintain Office
Now that we have identified some of the character
istics of the labor leader, let us proceed to isolate the
reasons which prompt these men to fight with incredible
intensity to retain their positions. At least at the
national level, the most frequently cited reason is the
substantial remuneration. Though this is of considerable
import and will be considered at this point, monetary
rewards alone are considered no better than a contributing
factor in the mind of this author. Table 7 shows the
income statistics that surfaced in a 1957 study conducted
by the United States Department of Labor.
It is quite obvious from the table that many
leaders make very sizeable salaries. This is particularly
true in the case of James Hoffa and Joseph Curran. When one
looks at other less well known unions though, the salaries
are much more reasonable. In fact, a 1958 study of
seventy-five international unions showed that the annual
salary of the top officer of a national union was moderate
and updated comments see, Lois MacDonald, Leadership
Dynamics and the Trade-Union Leader (Washington Square:
New York University Press, 1959), pp. 106-108.
56
TABLE 7
UNION PRESIDENTS AND THEIR SALARIES, SELECTED UNIONS, 1967
Union Membership President Salary
Teamsters
Automobile
1,651,240 James R. Hoffa $87,163.68 $11,054.66
Workers 1,402,700 Walter P. Reuther 28,149.92 4,202.11
Steel Workers
Electrical
1,068,000 I. W. Abel 50,000.00 11,489.76
Workers (IBEW) 875,000 Gordon M. Freeman 36,333.00 6,041.00
Machinists 836,163 P. L. Siemiller 28,750.00 8,011.00
Carpenters 800,000 M. A. Hutcheson 37,700.00 11,374.71
Hod Carriers
Electrical
474,529 Joseph V. Moreschi 50,000.00 6,841.00
Workers (IUE)
Operative
320,000 Paul Jennings 25,499.91 7,180.00
Engineers 330,000 Hunter P. Wharton 55,000.00 18,026.64
Plumbers 284,707 Peter T. Schoeman 36,000.00 21,650.00
Rubber Workers 170,437 Peter Bommarito 17,712.70 5,616.05
Mine Workers
Oil, Chemical,
125,000a W. A. Boyle 50,000.00 7,796.00
Atomic 165,329 A. F. Grospiron 17,500.00 8,322.29
Railway Clerks 270,000 George M. Harrison 30,000.00 1,657.00
Railroad Firemen
National Mari
45,000 H. E. Gilbert 24,416.00 5,742.00
time Union
Railroad
45,000 Joseph Curran 79,350.07 3,332.00
Conductors 18,780 C. F. Lane 57,123.55 3,631.38
aExcludes 230,000 in District 50, disaffiliated in 1968.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and
Office of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Report.
Reprinted in, Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup,
Economics of Labor Relations (6th ed.; Homewood, 111.: Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), Table 3-2, p. 91.
57
and fell between $10,000 and $15,000.*^
One should not, however, deemphasize the importance
and availability of other types of income. For example,
the 1959 convention of the United Automobile Workers
amended the constitution "to permit the Executive Board to
determine 'from time to time' the level of expenses and
allowances 'necessary and appropriate to the discharge of
their obligations' for officers, board members, and inter-
20
national representatives.
Jack Stieber in his study of the UAW recounts a
financial report tended by Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey:
Officers and staff members receive in-town allowance of
$35 per week {$5 per diem). In addition, out-of-town
expenses are reimbursable up to $8 per day for food
and $10 for hotel room. The union also provides each
staff member either a car allowance of $94 per month if
he uses his own car, or the use of a rental vehicle.
Credit cards for gas and oil are provided to cover use
of cars on union business. Fringe benefits include:
group life insurance of $15,000; travel insurance of
$20,000; non-contributory Blue Cross-Blue Shield; a
1 q
S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta
tistics, Union Constitution Provisions: Election and
Tenure of National and International Union Officers, 1958,
Bulletin No. 1239 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1958), p. 21. This study is dealt with in Martin
Estey, The Unions: Structure, Development and Management
(San Francisco: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), p. 52.
^Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 33.
58
pension severance plan to which the international union
contributes 11 per cent and the individual 5 per cent
of payroll, and which yields benefits of seven weeks'
pay for each year of service upon termination of
employment; vacation schedule as follows— two weeks for
one year and three weeks for five years or more
service.^
The UAW is one of the more moderate unions with respect to
fringe benefits. The reason is probably because Walter
Reuther did not make particularly excessive demands.
When we look at the local union, the earnings
virtually disappear. Jack Barbash tells us that part-time
salaries vary from $25 to $50 per month. The exact calcu
lation of remuneration is based on the principle of
"reimbursing the officer for time lost on union business
and the remission of union dues plus a nominal sum on the
order of $5 to $10 a month."
From the foregoing studies, it can be seen that the
level of income is by no means excessive. In fact, even
Jimmy Hoffa's gross income of close to $100,000 does not
approach that of some of the top executives with whom he
has to deal. Actually, one could conceivably argue that
21
Ibid., pp. 33-34. Report cited appeared m UAW
Convention Proceedings, 195 9, pp. 494-511.
22
Jack Barbash, American Unions: Structure,
Government and Politics (New York: Random House, 1967),
p. 32.
59
union leaders are underpaid relative to the degree of
responsibility they assume. This is especially true with
respect to local unions. In fact, Martin Estey notes that
"the cost per member of Hoffa's salary is 6 2/3 cent per
23
year— hardly a heavy burden."
However, one wishes to view the salary structure,
it seems apparent that income alone could not explain the
lengths to which some union leaders will go to protect
their positions. A more meaningful reason, at least at the
national level, is to be found when one considers the
differences between the "blue collar" environment from
which the average leader has emerged and the newly attained
"white collar" surroundings. Positions of leadership in
and of themselves alter the outlook and attitudes of the
men who fill them. For example, Robert F. Hoxie writing
in 1920, made the point that the leader is tempered into a
conservative individual by virtue of the fact that he
realizes the power of the employers. On the other hand,
the rank-and-file tend to gravitate toward radical view
points since they are less knowledgeable about economic
23
Estey, The Unions: Structure, Development and
Management, p. 52.
60
24
conditions and constraints. In further illustrating the
diversity between positions of leadership and that of the
rank-and-file, Hoxie said the following:
. . . when the leaders get away from the bench, their
environment becomes more of the character of the
employer's than of the worker's. They no longer deal
with the physical, but with the spiritual, in negotia
tions and the handling of men. Almost inevitably they
develop something of the employers viewpoint and
feeling, and thus become unable to see things from the
workers' angle and to feel with and for the workers as
before. . . . Moreover the leader who rises from the
rank and file at once encounters temptations hard to
withstand. Many go wrong because they cannot stand
prosperity. . . . They may fall victim to the "mahogany
table. "2^
Presumably it is the worst of all evils to be com
pelled to return to the bench from a position of national
importance. It is one thing to be forced to relinquish a
substantial part of one's income; it is still another to be
forced to acknowledge defeat, loss of popularity and
dissipation of prestige. In this connection Seymour Lipset,
Martin Trow and James Coleman draw the following conclu
sions:
24Robert F. Hoxie, "The Leaders and the Rank and
File," in Unions, Management and the Public, ed. by E.
Wright Bakke, Clark Kerr, and Charles W. Anrod (2nd ed.;
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1960), p. 136.
25Ibid.
61
Once high status is secured, there is usually a press
ing need to at least retain and protect it. This is
particularly true if the discrepancy between the status
and the position to which one must return on losing the
status is very great. In other words, if the social
distance between the trade-union leader's position as
an official and his position as a regular worker is
great, his need to retain the former will be correla-
tively great.2®
A recent study by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) points out just how great the social distance
is. The NORC scale is derived from 2,900 ratings of some
ninety occupations. The ratings were made by men and
women of varying ages from different geographic and socio
economic groups. They were asked to rate each occupation
according to the particular view of the "general standing
27
of the person engaged in that occupation." An abridged
and altered version of the 1947 and 1963 NORC studies is
presented in Table 8.
The results of the study clearly point out that
union leaders, both international and local, by and large,
surpass their rank-and-file constituents back at the bench.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James
S. Coleman, Union Democracy (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 9-10.
27
For a full discussion of the methodology and the
limitations of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC)
test see, Thomas E. Lasswell, Class and Stratum (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp. 426-27.
62
TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTIONS OF PRESTIGE RATINGS FOR SELECTED
OCCUPATIONS, UNITED STATES, 1947 AND 1963
Occupation
NORC Score
March, 1947 June, 1963
U.S. Supreme Court Justice 96 94
Physician 93 93
Nuclear Physicist 86 92
College Professor 89 90
Minister
Member of the Board of Directors
87 87
of a larger Corporation 86 87
Priest 86 86
Economist
Official of an International
79 78
Labor Union 75 77
Electriciana 73 76
Policeman 67 72
Carpenter
A Local Official of a Labor
65 68
Union 62 67
Plumber 63 65
Machine Operator in a Factory 60 63
Truck Driver 54 59
Dockworker 47 50
Coal Miner 49 50
aWith respect to the Artisans, there is no informa-
tion as to whether or not they are unionized. It is this
author's assumption that for the most part they are.
Source; Thomas E. Lasswell, Class and Stratum (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), Table 19-1, pp. 428-
32. The table has been condensed and altered
exclusively for comparative purposes.
63
In fact, when one looks at the survey results, the prestige
differential between leadership and rank-and-file in 1963
is at least as great and in some cases greater than it was
in 1947.28
It is indeed a curious thing that once this posi
tion of power and prestige is achieved, labor union leaders
feel that "they have arrived." C. Wright Mills points out
that upon attaining power, they actively seek positions of
control with the Chambers of Commerce and other prestigious
organizations in order to acquire the "status accoutrements"
29
that they feel they merit. Though they have this feeling
of accomplishment, Mills tells us that they are most uneasy
with regard to prestige matters. He attributes this to the
fact that they are self-made individuals (as opposed to
those whose power is acquired at birth) and that their
"self-making" was helped considerably by government in the
decade following 1935. They are moreover uncomfortable
28
Ibid., pp. 428-32. With respect to prestige dif
ferential, the only exception appears to arise when
Electricians and Carpenters are compared with Local Union
Officials. Membership in neither of these trades approach,
however, the prestige levels of the officials of the
International Labor Unions.
29C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 263.
64
because they are "simply new to the power elite/' and
because they must tread carefully so as not to alienate the
30
rank-and-file by virtue of their new found associations.
This last point is undoubtedly of great concern to the
average leader and merits much consideration. In fact, it
appears safe to assume that one reason for David McDonald's
loss of power within the Steelworkers union was the fact
that he vigorously desired to promote the image of his
union by involvement in community affairs. In this connec
tion, some years ago McDonald actually hired the Pittsburgh
symphony to play in the small steel towns in the Pittsburgh
31
area. It is conceivable that from then on McDonald was
somewhat scornfully looked upon as a "social climber" and
"confidant of the upper strata."
This problem of fulfilling both roles is further
discussed by Hoxie. He says the following:
There is a real contest between the leaders and the
rank and file, especially in the case of business
unionism. So long as the union is small and the offi
cers work at the bench, there is no friction, but when
the union grows and the officers give up work and
become paid officials and devote their whole time to
official duties, then friction between the leaders and
the rank and file inevitably arises. The farther up we
30Ibid.
31
Bell, "Labor's New Men of Power," p. 114.
65
go in officialdom the less sympathy and mutual under
standing we find. The leaders for the most part
reciprocate the feeling of the rank and file. Their
attitude is likely to be one of contempt mixed with
fear. . . . Even leaders who pride themselves on
keeping close to the man at the bench speak contemptu
ously of the crowd.32
Given then, the adequate salary and the very sub
stantial prestige that accompanies union leadership, it
is understandable that the heads of labor unions would
fight vigorously to retain their positions. It is to the
techniques of maintaining their roles that we now turn.
Establishment of a Political Machine
Leaders of unions of any significant size are
capable, by virtue of their positions, to build powerful
political machines as well as regulate the selection of
lesser union officials. Powerful labor leaders have a
multitude of appointive positions at their disposal in much
the same way as publically elected politicians. Presumably
the union president will select those individuals who
respond well to his leadership and offer unqualified sup
port (or at least minimal opposition). These functionaries
32
Hoxie, "The Leaders and the Rank and File."
p. 136.
66
can be relied upon to press vigorously for the president's
reelection and serve as a buffer against criticism directed
at the top.33
Training of union leadership has become a very
costly procedure. Professor Alfred Kuhn feels that the
costs of acquiring the talents necessary for effective
leadership are "probably just as high as for corporate
executives, particularly when the issues are as complex as
.34
pensions, job evaluations, health plans, and automation."
This has resulted in a willingness on the part of the mem
bership to support entrenched power structures so as to
avoid costly upheavals. This can be compared with a large
corporation in that executives are sometimes retained
35
because the cost of replacement is so high. Even if the
rank-and-file members were displeased with the activities
of the leadership, it is very difficult to conceive of the
33
For an extremely comprehensive sociological
analysis of "organized labor's hired brains," see, Harold
L. Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, Publishers, 1956).
O A
Alfred Kuhn, Labor: Institutions and Economics
(Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt. Brace and World, Inc.,
1967), p. 79.
67
possibility that a new leader will independently surface
from the ranks. This -is because the principle source of
leadership training is located well within the control of
the entrenched power structure. As a result, it is
extremely difficult for an ambitious, reform minded indi
vidual to make effective inroads into the political mechan
isms of the union. What follows then is a succession of
leadership, substantially subscribing to the same views and
enacting the same policies.
In many instances the union constitution provides
for an election to be held at a convention. Even where
this exists, there is no assurance that the membership at
large will be adequately represented. In a substantial
number of unions, the national officers have the support of
the delegates and in that way control the entire election.
By necessity, then, there is a tendency for ambitious men
"to wait their turn for administrative support, meanwhile
showing their faithfulness and value to the head and build
ing up popular support in their own right so that they will
3 6
bring strength to the administrative slate."
36
Joel Seidman, "Requirements for Union Democracy,"
in Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting
the Rights of Members, Selected Readings, ed. by Sar A.
Levitan. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U. S. Senate, by the
68
The powers of control and patronage vary from one
union to the next. Depending upon the nature of the union,
the personal characteristics of the leader, and the degree
of acquiescence of the rank-and-file, positions of leader
ship may be either powerful or weak. Two studies are
relevant here. The first was conducted by Philip Taft in
which he analyzed the constitutions of some 115 inter
national unions with respect to extent of appointive power
of chief executive, the limitations on disciplinary powers,
and checks on the conduct of the union president. Sar A.
Levitan in summarizing Taft's findings says the following:
He [Taft] concluded that 51 of the international con
stitutions granted the chief executive "extensive
power.” While the powers of the chief executives
varied they all possessed the right to intervene in the
affairs of locals, issue or cancel local charters, and
appoint or remove international representatives or
organizers. In some cases the president was also given
the power to remove his colleagues on the union execu
tive board. The president of the musicians could even
suspend the constitution in the "interest of the
union."37
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress (Washing
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 104.
37
Philip Taft's study, originally appearing in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXII (May, 1948), 459-71,
is analyzed in Sar A. Levitan, Government Regulation of
Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, A
Report. Printed for the use of the Committee on Education
and Labor, U. S. House of Representatives, by the Legisla
tive Reference Service, Library of Congress (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 12.
69
A second study undertaken by Leo Bromwich is in
some ways more revealing than Taft's. Bromwich's investi
gation is based upon a sample of the constitutions of most
of the major international unions. This study incorporates
almost 16 million individuals. The smallest unions in the
study were the Sailors' Union of the Pacific and the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, both possessing
10,000 members. The largest was the Teamsters with
1,36 8,082 members. In analyzing the unions' constitutions,
Bromwich found that witn respect to the powers of the
international president there are really two types of con
stitutions: (1) those in which arbitrary exercise of the
president's power is checked by some balancing safeguards
3 8
and (2) those in which no such safeguards exist.
Generally, though, it is Bromwich's conclusion that
"most American unions reveal a concentration of power in the
hands of the international president and grant only a
limited effectiveness to the executive board in its task of
39 .
overseeing all policy decisions." An example of this is
provided for us by the author when he notes that:
3 8
Leo Bromwich, Union Constitutions (New York: The
Fund for the Republic, 1959) , p. 17.
39
Ibid., p. 38.
70
The president of the Steelworkers . . . appoints,
directs, suspends and removes organizers, staff members,
and other employees of the union; interprets the union
constitution; issues rules and regulations for the
day-to-day conduct of affairs; appoints the committees
of the international convention; and performs "such
other duties as pertain to his office."^0
If one were to try to isolate the reasons for
leadership strength as opposed to weakness, the answer
would not be apparent from a review of the various consti
tutions themselves. The reason for this is that most are
similarly worded. The real difference appears to be in the
interpretation of the constitution on the part of the
leadership. For example, Philip Taft is of the opinion
that John L. Lewis, late president of the United Mine
Workers of America was able to reduce "a once-democratic
union to a benevolent satrapy, where he is virtually a law
41
unto himself. ..." Yet, the constitutional provisions
with which Lewis was bound were not appreciably different
from those which constrained many other less aggressive
leaders.
40
Ibid., p. 17.
41
Philip Taft, "The Constitutional Power of the
Chief Officer in American Labor Unions," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, LXII (May, 1948), 471.
71
Control of the Means of Communication
Union leaders are able to thoroughly control the
formal means of communication. With few exceptions, the
union publication is merely a forum for leadership views
and as such potentially serves to stifle opposition. This
fact was acknowledged by Leonard Woodcock, current presi
dent of the United Automobile Workers, in an interview with
the author in Dallas, Texas. At that time Mr. Woodcock
frankly stated that the job of the present leadership is
not to encourage an opposition. Furthermore, it was his
opinion that the local union newspapers adequately provided
space for dissenting views and opinions. Mr. Woodcock
further indicated that he would feel obliged to offer
42
equal space to rival candidates if asked.
The techniques of managed journalism are well known
and have been noted by writers for years. Interestingly,
though, public awareness has done little to correct the
situation and one begins to wonder just what the rank-and-
file expects in the way of union journalism. It appears
that the average member merely desires informal reporting
42
Leonard Woodcock, President, United Automobile
Workers, private interview held in Dallas, Texas, July,
1970.
72
on matters of only a casual nature. For example, a typical
edition of The ITU Review, a weekly publication of the
Executive Council of the International Typographical Union,
contains several articles of historical interest, a
tribute to the ITU and its officers and various human
43
interest columns. A sxmilar ITU publication, The
Typographical Journal makes an attempt at upgrading the
levels of journalism, but a clause in the Book of Laws of
the International Typographical Union indicates the degree
of control that may be exercised by the president and the
executive council. The relevant clause follows:
The Typographical Journal shall be published once a
month and shall contain in addition to the reports and
other matters required by law to be published, the
reports of the International and Home Audits; official
orders; charters granted; charters suspended, and the
causes; a list of deceased members with register num
bers, the name (or number) of the local union to which
the deceased was attached; as well as the place where
the death occurred; state of trade; advertisements
meeting the approval of the Executive Council; all
reports (including detailed statement of expenditures)
and proceedings of the officers and members of the
Corporation of the Union Printers Home; "and such other
matters as may be of interest and importance to the
craft generally. 1,44
A O
The ITU Review (Colorado Springs, Colorado),
May 8, 1969. The International Typographical Union is one
of only a very few unions which provides space for opposi
tion viewpoints.
44Book of Laws of the International Typographical
73
Control of the press is such an important part of
the political success of leaders that several authors have
argued that without a biased press certain individuals
would not have acceded to the top. Jack Stieber, in his
study Governing the UAW, feels that Walter Reuther profited
immeasurably from a favorable press. In this connection
Stieber says:
While Reuther may not have had a pipeline to Fortune
his good copy in the United Automobile Worker, official
UAW newspaper, was no accident. Editor Eddie Levinson,
ex-Socialist, former labor reporter for the New York
Post and a Reuther admirer is credited with giving
Reuther an "extraordinary build-up" and creating a
"Reuther legend" long before he became president.^
A similar example of the leverage provided by con
trol of the press is indicated by Sar A. Levitan in his
evaluation of the United Steelworkers' election of 1957.
He says the following:
Union (1966), Article XXIV, Sec. 1. Quotation marks added
to indicate the flexibility permitted the executive council.
45
Stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 9. Stieber also
notes that Reuther took an active interest in the paper in
that he frequently suggested "how to play" a certain sub
ject. Also see p. 120.
Although the UAW changed the name of its paper to
Solidarity in 1957, the friendly attitude toward Reuther
continued. For example, in the January and February, 1970
issues, Reuther is clearly identifiable in seven photo
graphs, all of which show him in a favorable light. Two
key articles in those editions were "Reuther Proposes Plan
to Save Jobs in Defense Contract Cutbacks," and "Layoffs
Mount; Reuther Blames Nixon Policies. "______________________
74
In September 1956 the quadrennial union convention
voted to increase dues from $3 to $5. There was con
siderable opposition to this action and a rank-and-
file member, Donald Rarick, challenged the incumbent
president for the top position in the union in the
election scheduled for the following February. In the
5 months between the time of the convention in Septem
ber 1956 and the election in February 1957, the Steel
Labor, the monthly publication of the United Steel
workers of America referred only once to the fight over
the increase in dues. The name of the challenger of
the incumbent was mentioned twice; first, when the
names of the candidates were listed in the issue prior
to the election and, second, 3 months after the elec
tion when it was announced that the incumbent president
won the contest 404,172 votes to 223,516. Meanwhile as
the election campaign was in progress the Steel Labor
prominently played up the activities of the incumbent
president, David McDonald.
Even in cases where the union periodical is non
political in nature as in the case of the Advocate, the
official publication of the Retail Clerks International
Association, the incumbent president by virtue of his con
stitutionally granted control, can stifle any opposition.
Michael Harrington, for years concerned with the problem of
protection of civil liberties feels that it is likely that
if President Suffridge of the RCIA was seriously challenged:
"The Advocate, in the absence of any constitutional speci
fication of minority rights in the publication, would be
Levitan, Government Regulation of Internal Union
Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, A Report, p. 11.
75
a powerful Instrument for defending the position of the
incumbent.
There are a few unions whose periodical reflects
the needs and aspirations of the membership. Probably the
most outstanding is Equity Magazine, the official publica
tion of the Actors1 Equity Association. Although the
editorial aspects of the magazine are controlled by the
administration, there is always space given for regular and
independent candidates during the period of elections.
This is one of the areas that contributes to making the
Actors' Equity Association one of the most democratic
48
unions.
Due to the tight control of the union press from
above, it is virtually impossible for opposition candidates
in most unions to have their views aired. There remains
the possibility that an individual member might be able to
distribute circulars and pamphlets. In most cases the
expense, which must be borne by the individual, is
^Michael Harrington, The Retail Clerks (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 16-17.
A O
Leonard I. Perlin and Henry E. Richards, "Equity:
A Study of Union Democracy," in Labor and Trade Unionism:
An Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. by Walter Galenson and
Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1960), p. 269.
76
prohibitive and furthermore, it may not be possible to
obtain mailing lists of the membership. Illustrative of
this is the fact that even the Actors' Equity Association
does not permit access to membership files, but at least it
does provide an opportunity for the candidates to utilize
4 9
the union distributive machinery. It is regrettable that
even if a candidate is able to accumulate the necessary
funds and support, his attempt at making political inroads
may be blocked by spurious constitutional interpretations.
A condensed version of the discussion between James M.
Duffy, president of the National Brotherhood of Operative
Potters and Representative Andrew Jacobs of Indiana illus
trates this possibility:
Mr. Jacobs: Mr. Duffy, I would like to ask you a
few questions. This committee, of course, was not con
stituted for the purpose of deciding an election issue
in your union. That is the function of the membership.
Nor are we to sit in judgment upon the wisdom of the
membership in electing or rejecting any slate of
candidates.
The thing that I see in your case here is this:
That here is some literature that was gotten out. And,
as I view the evidence that you have given here and the
evidence that the other witnesses have given, it seems
to be pretty will [sic] conceded that some of these men
were actually tried and penalized for circulating
literature in an election. It may have been a dirty
campaign. . . .
77
Mr. Duffy: We are not used to them. It is new to
us. Maybe that is why we dislike it.
Mr. Jacobs: But doesn't it sort of seem to you
that it is just a kind of part of a political campaign
for people to print their ideas and their views and
what they think about the other fellow, et cetera, and
circulate it? That that is just a sort of part of the
American system of election, and that we just more or
less take it in our stride? Don't you think that is a
pretty good American custom?
What I am driving at is this: I would like to ask
this question. Do you think that unions should operate
democratically?
Mr. Duffy: We do. We do.
Mr. Jacobs: That means that the membership shall
vote upon who shall be the officers. Is that not right?
Mr. Duffy: No one has ever questioned that.
Mr. Jacobs: Don't you think that the membership
naturally must have some information about how to vote
— like we get in the campaigns? Sometimes you get
publicity in the newspapers. Sometimes you like it,
and sometimes you do not.
Mr. Duffy: Are you assuming, may I ask, Mr. Chair
man, that if there are two men contesting for public
office, equally worthy and clean in every respect, that
if one of those individuals by making nasty charges and
calling dirty, nasty names and definite insinuations of
dishonesty, can you by any moral standard that you know
of condone and regard that as decent and fair?
Mr. Jacobs: I am not talking so much, Mr. Duffy,
about whether it is decent or not as I am the fact that
no one has even [sic] been able to find the line where
censorship is to be drawn. I mean in order to have a
free press, in order to have free speech, in order to
have free elections, we have to endure many things that
are very distasteful and quite often very unfair.
78
Otherwise, we do not know where to draw the line in
order to make a fair rule.
Of course, you can always sue for libel if it is
utterly false.
And as to whether or not you could rebut them would
be a question for you to print counteracting literature.
Mr. Duffy; We don't indulge in that kind of stuff,
and we never are, so far as I am concerned.
Mr. Jacobs: I think he has a right to argue which
ever side he pleases, either verbally or in writing.
You seem to think that the union should have the
right to penalize these men for circulating the
literature.
Mr. Duffy; Because the constitution forbade such
literature.
Mr. Jacobs; I am inclined to be of the opinion
that the constitution of an organization cannot forbid
a member from exercising their natural rights, or, if
it can, that it should be forbidden for so providing.
In other words, I have a feeling that, if your union
is going to operate democratically, then the members
must have a right to print and disseminate literature
as they see fit— answering, of course, for libel.
Mr. Duffy: Now, let's assume that I have done my
job conscientiously and whole-heartedly and earnestly.
We have got as good increases in wages as any organiza
tion in this United States of America. We have main
tained industrial peace, which means taking care of
public welfare. Let's assume that I have done these
things with the aid of my fellow officers. Then along
comes an election. Here are men that couldn't be
elected on their own ability and so forth. Then they
resort to that kind of business.
79
Now listen, Chairman— Nr. Chairman— you know just
as well as I do the peculiar workings of the human mind
and in an eleventh-hour release what they can do by
some insinuation and that sort of thing. And such
things sometimes result in the more competent and
better man defeated and the lesser getting the job.
Mr. Jacobs: Well, I don't believe that you and I
have the same comprehension of what democratic proce
dure is.
I think that you are honest in your views. But, on
the other hand, I do not know just where you are going
to draw the line on censorship. If you are going to
have a censorship, you can draw the line at the wrong
place as well as you can at the right place, and I do
not believe that the one concerning whom the articles
are being written least of all should be a censor.
Mr. Duffy: I disagree with you that you and I have
any different comprehension as to democratic rights,
and so forth. We depend on the majority.
Mr. Jacobs: But curtailment of the right of free
speech, free press, et cetera, those are the things in
our way of life that a majority cannot take away from
a minority. We may be different in that.
Mr. Duffy: I agree with you in what you have said,
Mr. Chairman, but surely you do not believe in compro
mising with falsehood and that sort of thing, and that
can be involved.
Mr. Jacobs: Well, my view of it is that with a
good record such as you have described you should be
able to meet it, and apparently you did, and that seems
to me that that is the complete answer to your prob
lem. ^
5 n
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Educatxon and
Labor, Hearings, before a special subcommittee of the
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives,
81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, pp. 468-73. The relevant
section is taken from Neil W. Chamberlain, Sourcebook on
80
Establishment of Trusteeships
The use of trusteeships (receiverships) is another
device that has frequently been utilized in promoting the
interests of certain union officials. The intent of
including clauses in union constitutions permitting receiv
erships was to "prevent corruption, mismanagement of union
funds and to preserve the integrity and stability of the
51
organization itself." The mechanisms of instituting a
trusteeship are very simple. In most cases the interna
tional president merely creates a provisional government
for the local and suspends the local's power to supervise
their property and funds. Bloom and Northrup point out
that the use of trusteeships enabled John L. Lewis and his
successors to institute and maintain trusteeships for more
than forty years.
Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), pp. 9-13.
Though the conversation has been condensed, the spirit of
the discussion remains intact.
51
Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics
of Labor Relations (6th ed.; Homewood, 111.: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 87. For a discussion of the inci
dence of trusteeships in 1952 see Horace B. Davis,
"Receivership in American Unions," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXVII (May, 1953), 231-52.
~^Bloom and Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations,
p. 87.
81
It is unfortunate for the labor movement that in
the course of the McClellan Committee hearings so many
abuses of the principle of trusteeship came to light.
Illustrative of how pervasive these abuses had become is
the case of the Teamsters. At the time of the hearings,
"of the Teamsters' 892 locals, 113 were under trusteeship."^
These disclosures have served to provide the critics of
organized labor with much fuel. For example, Sylvester
Petro feels that the use of trusteeships has contributed to
the making of "every union man a serf." In supporting his
position he cites the well publicized case of the Bakery
and Confectionery Workers:
George M. Kopecky, a Committee [McClellan] investi
gator, testified that George Stuart, a vice president
of the Bakery Workers, did very well for himself during
his trusteeship of Bakery Workers Locals 100 and 300.
Among other things, the record indicates, he came into
possession of three Cadillacs and a Buick. Chief
Counsel Kennedy summed up with a statement that the
Committee has proof of an illegitimate gain by Stuart
of something like $40,000. Anthony J. Conforti,
business manager of Local 300, told the Committee that
he had no real alternative to following Stuart's
instructions and to making opulent gifts. He had to
53
Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon F. Bloom, Govern
ment and Labor: The Role of Government in Union Management
Relations (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963),
p. 158.
82
play ball with Stuart even after the trusteeship was
lifted, he said, for fear that it would be reimposed.
Disciplinary Procedure
Union leaders have very frequently been prone to
use disciplinary procedures as a vehicle for retention of
power. Professor Clyde Summers has done much investigatory
work in this area and feels that the whole area of union
55
discipline "is permeated with vagueness and uncertainty."
Generally, Summers found that it is possible to identify
several steps in the disciplinary process: "making of
charges by a fellow member, serving of notice on the
accused, naming of a trial committee, holding of a hearing,
reporting of recommendations to the local union for vote,
and appealing to international offices and the international
convention.
The most unfortunate aspect of the disciplinary
procedures is the fact that in many unions the leadership
of the union sits in judgment of the accused. This has in
Sylvester Petro, Power Unlimited: The Corruption
of Union Leadership (New York: The Ronald Press Co.,
1959), pp. 124-25.
^Clyde Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of
Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, IV (October,
1950), 29.
^Ibid. , p. 15 . ____
83
many instances stifled dissent. In this connection,
Summers mentions the following case:
When Local 534 of the Plasterers split into two warring
factions, centered around president Malloy and business
agent Carroll, discipline became the decisive weapon.
Carroll obtained the support of the international offi
cers, who ordered Malloy removed from office. Carroll
then succeeded in electing one of his men president,
and thereby gained control of the executive board.
Charges of violating the business agent's orders were
then brought against Malloy and 33 others. A hearing
was held by the new executive board, which found them
guilty and recommended expulsion. This recommendation
was quietly approved by the membership.^
In most unions there exists the possibility that a
member may present his grievance to the appeal committee at
the national union convention. This whole area is well
developed in a recent study by Charles Crapo. In the
unions studied, Crapo found that, "The majority averaged no
C p
more than one appeal per year, . . . " Reasons for this
were apparently not the result of limiting constitutional
language but may be influenced by: "Strong leadership, the
unpopularity of convention appeals and the desire for a
59
display of internal unity. ..."
57Ibid., p. 23.
5 8
Charles Crapo, "The National Union Convention as
an Internal Appeal Tribunal" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion, Michigan State University, 1966) , p. 69.
59
Ibid.
84
Crapo is highly critical of the performance of the
appeals committee. He says in part:
Although the committee ordinarily determines the proce
dure to be used, there are three kinds of restrictions,
one constitutional and two circumstantial in nature,
which can limit its ability to gather and assimilate
all the relevant information in appeal cases. The
constitutions of some unions specify that only the
previous record may be considered by the committee.
Others contain procedural regulations which prevent the
committee from calling certain witnesses and admitting
new evidence into the hearings.
A more serious problem is the voluminous record
which often accompanies appeals. With the limited time
available for committee work, the complete record in
each dispute cannot be examined by every member, and as
the number of appeals increases the opportunity for such
investigations is greatly diminished. 0
The problems and inconveniences associated with
the convention appeals procedure has prompted the United
Automobile Workers to substitute a new practice. Each of
the 18 UAW regions selects a delegate and two alternates.
The delegates then meet every six months to decide which
cases will be brought before the union for final dispensa
tion. The worth of this new procedure cannot yet be
evaluated since it has only been operative for a short
period of time.
^Ibid. , pp. 86-87.
85
The United Automobile Workers is one of two unions
that have taken very positive steps to try to improve the
administration of justice with respect to the judging of
the accused and hearing of appeals. In March of 1957
Walter Reuther, recognizing the difficulty of appealing to
the international convention, suggested the institution of
a Public Review Board comprised of distinguished citizens
from outside of the union. The Board was to have power to
make final and binding decisions with respect to all cases
placed before it. The only areas in which the public
Review Board could not act were in cases involving the
''processing of shop grievances, or official collective bar-
61
gaining policies of the union." The present list of
appointees to the Board in 1968 was impressive. They were:
Rt. Rev. Msgr. George G. Higgins, Director, Division
for Urban Life, Department of Social Development,
United States Catholic Conference, Chairman
Professor Harry W. Arthurs, Associate Dean, York
University, Toronto, Ontario
Dr. Henry Hitt Crane, Minister Emeritus, Central
Methodist Church, Detroit, Michigan
Professor Robben W. Fleming, President, the University
of Michigan
Hon. George N. Leighton, Judge, Court of Appeals,
Chicago, Illinois
®"'"Stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 78. The only
other union permitting outside review is the Upholsterers'
International Union. The scope of review, though, is much
narrower.
86
Dr. Jean T. McKelvey, Professor, New York State School
of Industrial Relations, Cornell University
Rabbi Jacob J. Weinstein, Rabbi Emeritus, Chicago,
Illinois.62
The Public Review Board has attempted to streamline
the appeals process so as to make it quite easily acces
sible to the rank-and-file. For example all the member has
to do is submit in writing the nature of his complaint
indicating the decision of the International Executive
Board. From there the Public Review Board takes charge and
holds oral hearings at the site of the original appeal. If
this is not possible, the Board will furnish travel expenses
for the appellant.
From the standpoint of most observers, the Public
Review Board has had a significant impact on the labor
union movement. Professor Jack Stieber, probably the most
dedicated student of the United Automobile Workers, feels
that "the review board's greatest contribution has been the
creation of an increased awareness and respect on the part
of the UAW leadership, for the importance of due process as
set forth in the union's own constitution." With regard to
6 2
Rt. Rev. Msgr. George G. Higgins, United Auto
mobile Workers, Public Review Board: Eleventh Annual
Report to the Membership of the United Automobile, Aero
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(Detroit: UAW Education Department, 1968), pp. 7-8.
87
the overall impact of the Public Review Board, Stieber says
the following:
Impartial review of internal union government has
progressed beyond the experimental stage- Open and
voluntary acknowledgment of a "public interest" in its
affairs has neither threatened the position of the UAW
leadership nor caused the union to surrender its right
of self government under its own constitution. Indeed,
by having the courage to submit its decisions to review
by a body of impartial and distinguished citizens, the
UAW leadership has increased its stature in the eyes of
the membership and the public, thereby strengthening
the union not only structurally but also as a political
and collective bargaining organization.^
The vagueness and breadth of the constitutional
phraseology with regard to discipline certainly plays into
the hand of unscrupulous leaders. Clyde Summers, in a
study conducted in 1950, found the following sweeping
reasons for disciplining members:
They may prohibit conduct which is "disloyal," "dis
honorable," "unbecoming a union member," or "detrimental
to the best interests of the union"; "which destroys
harmony," "causes dissension," or "disruption," or
which "undermines the union on its members," or "brings
the union into discredit or disrepute."®^
6 3
Stieber, Governing the UAW, pp. 81, 83.
For a very detailed account of the Public Review
Board's achievements as well as problems, see Jack Stieber,
Walter E. Oberer and Michael Harrington, Democracy and
Public Review: An Analysis of the UAW Public Review Board
{Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, 1960).
64
Clyde Summers, "Disciplinary Powers of Unions,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, III (July, 1950),
88
Illustrative of how prevalent these phrases are,
Summers found that in 1950 a total of 106 unions had
clauses "providing that 'any violation of the constitution'
shall be the basis for the charges" and a "total of 130
unions have either a vague clause such as 'conduct unbecom
ing a union member' or a general clause such as 'violation
of the constitution.'" Summers generously concludes that:
Even though the union leaders earnestly seek to main
tain democracy within the union, the very presence of
these provisions acts as a deterrent of full and free
criticism of union officers or union policies. The
political control of the procedure will almost
inevitably result in resolving doubts in favor of the
union administration and against the rights of the
individual members.^
505.
For an interesting and useful study of how the New
York State courts deal with the problems of union disci
pline, see, Clyde W. Summers, "The Law of Union Discipline:
What the Courts Do in Fact," Yale Law Journal, LXX
(December, 1960), 175-224.
65
Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,"
p. 30.
Interestingly, this viewpoint is not shared by all
investigators. For example, Sar A. Levitan, in his pre
viously cited report prepared for the House Committee on
Education and Labor, brought to light a study by Philip
Taft. In that study, Taft argued that members are not
afraid to protest the actions of their leaders and this is
evidenced by the large number of appeals that are filed with
executive boards of many large unions. See, Sar A. Levitan,
Government Regulations of Internal Union Affairs Affecting
the Rights of Members, A Report, pp. 17-18. The specific
results of this study are thoroughly discussed in Philip
Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 243ff.
89
An Attempt at Legislating Democracy
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) represents a vigorous effort
on the part of Congress to ensure the democratic operations
of internal union affairs. The law grew out of the
recommendations of the McClellan committee for eliminating
the corruption found in many unions. Among them were the
teamsters, laundry workers, meat cutters, bakers and the
textile workers. The law contains seven titles, six of
which relate to internal union affairs. The seventh con
sists solely of amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,
With respect to an individual bill of rights, Title I is
clearly the most important. Section 101 says in part:
Every member of a labor organization shall have
equal rights and privileges within such organizations
to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or refer-
endums of the labor organization, to attend membership
meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and
voting upon the business of such meetings, "subject to
reasonable rule and regulations in such organization's
constitution and by-laws.1 1
Every member of any labor organization shall have
the right to meet and assemble freely with other mem
bers; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of the labor organization
his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor
organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, "subject to the organization's established and
reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings:"
Provided, that "nothing herein shall be construed to
90
impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of
every member toward the organization as an institution
and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere
with its performance of its legal or contractual
obligations . ■ . . "
. . . No member of any labor organization may be fined,
suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except
for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served
with written specific charges; (B) given a "reasonable
time" to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and
fair hearing.
Though the LMRDA was the first comprehensive
attempt at federal legislation in the field of union democ
racy, Benson Soffer feels that "with few exceptions, either
evolving common law, state law, or union traditional prac
tice and formal government had for a considerable time
contained LMRDA1s restrictions on the power of union
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act), Statutes at Large, LXXIII, sec. 101,
522 (1959). Quotation marks added by author to emphasize
looseness in the wording. As significant as the language of
the LMRDA was, the American Civil Liberties Union still
felt prompted to make the following remark:
"While this new statute [LMRDA] contains much that
is desirable from the viewpoint of civil liberties, the
ACLU is not prepared to support in its entirety the law as
now written." For a critical examination of the weaknesses
and the strengths of the LMRDA as viewed by the ACLU, see
American Civil Liberties Union, "The Landrum-Griffin Act,"
(Published as part of a pamphlet prepared and distributed
by American Civil Liberties Union, New York, 1963), p. 29.
91
67
officials." He further points out that:
What appears to be a maze of exceedingly numerous and
at times detailed regulations represents no substantive
change in long accepted standards, and hence no major
difficulties for most unions in collective bargaining
or internal union government functions. But stringent
penalties, new administrative mechanisms, publicity and
controversy may have substantial psychological
effects.®8
The weaknesses of the LMRDA are obvious. The inclu
sions of the phrases relating to "reasonableness" serve to
further confuse the issue of individual rights. The only
way that clarification could be obtained was through
governmental administrative agencies (specifically the
Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, an agency of the United
States Department of Labor) and the federal courts. Paul
Sultan has observed that as of 1963 the "litigation antici
pated under provisions of the law has not been realized and
this probably reflects the fact that few union members are
willing or able to support the costs of legal representa-
69
tion." Furthermore, it appears that in those cases m
6 7
Benson Soffer, "Collective Bargaining and Federal
Regulation of Union Government," in Regulating Union
Government, ed. by Martin S. Estey, Philip Taft, and Martin
Wagner (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), p. 92.
The 1957 Ethical Practices Code of the AFL-CIO is in fact
more closely worded than the LMRDA.
68Ibid., pp. 92-93.
69
Paul E. Sultan, The Disenchanted Unionist (New
92
which the federal government and the courts have rendered
opinions, the decisions have been less than revolutionary.
For example, the statistics of the Bureau of Labor-
Management Reports with respect to Title I indicate that
between September of 1959 and December of 1962, of the 415
alleged violations of membership rights, 369 were declared
not actionable by the BLMR and 46 were dealt with by way of
voluntary compliance. Only with respect to charges of
fraudulent election procedures and violent deprivation of
rights was legal action instituted. The statistics show
70
that this constituted only 43 out of 977 allegations. In
the case of those 43 and others of a similar nature, Paul
Sultan points out that though it is too early to judge, "it
appears that some courts are interpreting Title I of the
act . . . in its narrowest fashion, occasionally straining
the interpretation of these provisions in order not to
71
upset well-established routines within unions."
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 238.
70
Violations of Landrum-Griffin Act; Distribution
of Cases and Administrative Actions by Bureau of Labor-
Management Reports, September 1959-December 1962. Cited by
Soffer in "Collective Bargaining and Federal Regulation of
Union Government," p. 105.
^Sultan, The Disenchanted Unionist, p. 23 8.
93
Benson Soffer offers the following remarks with
reference to Title I of the LMRDA and members' rights:
Unions can adjust to Title I without much diffi
culty. First union constitutions legally can (and do)
limit these "rights" very substantially provided these
limitations are "reasonable" and are designed to pro
tect the union against wildcat strikes, dual unionism,
schism, secessions, etc. The Labor Department and the
courts have been very cautious about opening "the
floodgates of litigation" and have defined rights
narrowly. . . .
On balance, no conclusion can be reached as to
whether, in effect, member rights, and democratic
practices have expanded or contracted under LMRDA. In
any event the net effect cannot be s i g n i f i c a n t . " ^
As previously pointed out, individual rights have
been abridged and violated by use of trusteeships. In this
area, the LMRDA took specific and effective steps to curb
this abuse. Title III stipulates that every labor organi
zation which imposes a trusteeship over a subordinate unit
must file with the secretary of labor and cite reasons for
its usage. The Title further states that the use of a trus
teeship must conform with the bylaws of the organization
which has assumed the trusteeship and that it can only be
instituted for certain specified reasons. The exact word
ing of Section 302 of Title III follows:
72Soffer, "Collective Bargaining and Federal Regu
lation of Union Government," pp. 97-98.
94
Trusteeships shall be established and administered
by a labor organization over a subordinate body only in
accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the
organization which has assumed trusteeship over the
subordinate body and for the purpose of correcting
corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the
performance of collective-bargaining agreements or other
duties of a bargaining representative, restoring
democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the
legitimate objects of such labor organization.^^
In this respect, the results of the LMKDA appear to
have been dramatic. Benson Soffer tells us that with the
exception of caretaker situations, the "active trusteeships
declined from 286 as of the effective date of the LMRDA to
120 when the Report on Union Trusteeships was presented to
Congress (March 13, 1962)." Soffer further points out that
the "government has not hindered trusteeships imposed under
74
conditions of due process."
The most flagrant violation of the LMRDA's procla
mations on the trusteeship principle exists today in the
United Mine Workers. The UMW imposed several trusteeships
73
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act), Statutes at Large, LXXIII, sec. 302,
531 (1959).
74
Soffer, "Collective Bargaining and Federal Regu
lation of Union Government," pp. 112-13. Soffer's statement
is substantiated by other authors. Two have pointed out
that during the past two and a half years new trusteeships
have continued to be imposed at a rate of about 10 per
month. They indicate that the LMRDA has not hindered
"establishment of trusteeships for legitimate purposes."
See, Northrup and Bloom, Government and Labor, p. 158.
95
in the 1920's and not until 1964, when the United States
Department of Labor filed a suit to eliminate them, was
any significant action taken. As of 1968, the suit had not
75
yet gone to trial.
Democracy as a Potentially Retarding Force
Union leaders often deny the importance of a demo
cratic union when faced with the costs of its implementa
tion. For example, John L. Lewis of the United Mine
Workers was opposed to district self government throughout
the period of his leadership. In this connection, Joel
Seidman and his associates relate the following speech
delivered at the UMW's 1936 convention:
I trust that the Convention, in considering this matter
(autonomy) will consider it for what it is really worth
and what it means to the organization. It is not a
fundamental principle that the Convention is discussing.
It is a question of business expediency and administra
tive policy as affecting certain geographical areas of
organization. It is a question of whether you desire
your organization to be the most effective instrumen
tality within the realm of possibility for a labor
organization or whether you prefer to sacrifice the
75
Bloom and Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations,
p. 664.
Benson Soffer notes that the UMW's reason, alleged
mismanagement of the districts twenty or more years ago,
"is the flimsiest of pretexts and borders on contempt for
the law." See Soffer, "Collective Bargaining and Federal
Regulation of Union Government," p. 100.
96
efficiency of your organization in some respects for a
little more academic freedom in the selection of some
local representatives in a number of districts. These
are the issues which are involved.^6
Although Lewis represents an extreme viewpoint,
other less militant labor leaders are also concerned about
the degree of democracy necessary. For example, Woodruff
Randolph, president of the International Typographical
Union made the following remarks:
After all of these years the International Typographi
cal Union is functioning in the basic town hall brand
of democracy whereby it is assumed that every member
knows all about everything that he needs to know to
actually take part in deciding the details of how this
great organization shall function. . . .
Obviously that is not true, obviously we are going
to run our business better through the larger aspect of
democracy, that is, of representative government that
is used in our cities, states and nation. . . . ^
Lipset, Trow and Coleman indicate that leaders of
trade unions feel a strong obligation to fully justify the
Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh and
Daisy L. Tagliacozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 211-12. For an
informative investigation of John L. Lewis and his methods
of operation in the UMWA see, Bernard Karsh and Jack London,
"The Coal Miners: A Study of Union Control," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, LXVIII (August, 1954), 415-36.
77
Taken from The Typographical Journal, September,
1955, and cited by Barbash, The Practice of Unionism,
p. 84.
97
occasional suppression. In this connection the authors
present two frequently heard arguments:
(1) Since labor unions are continually embroiled in
industrial conflicts, internal opponents only serve
to promote management's cause.
(2) Since all members are workers, they are more homo
geneous in their outlook than are members of civic
7ft
or polxtical groups. °
Through the usage of generalizations such as those
cited above, unscrupulous and self-seeking individuals have
been able to mobilize tremendous internal support based on
at best specious arguments. When faced with the alterna
tives of potentially destroying the effectiveness of the
union or supporting an opposition candidate, the concerned
member will no doubt bow to pressure and choose the
79
former.
7 8
Lipset, Trow and Coleman, Union Democracy, p. 11.
A recent comment by George Meany of the AFL-CIO serves to
illustrate the type of control that leaders would like to
have. In his statements, Meany was critical of bargainers
who go to the table lacking final power to conclude an
agreement. The problem as Meany sees it is that one side
will hold back out of fear that the final offer will be
rejected by the rank-and-file of top management. See,
"Shopcraft Unions Accept Meany's Offer of Help," Wall
Street Journal, February 24, 1970, p. 2.
7 9
In this connection, John R. Coleman cites three
ploys used by labor leaders to strengthen their relative
positions and combat democratic pressure. They are:
(1) the "All-Out-for-Welfare" strategy, (2) the "You-Never-
Had-It-So-Good" strategy and (3) the "Here-Come—the-
Saboteurs" strategy. For a full discussion see, John R.
98
Interestingly, very recent evidence suggests that
the rank-and-file member is becoming increasingly concerned
with the internal aspects of his organization. With respect
to voting procedures in unions (regulated by Title IV of
the LMRDA), the Department of Labor supervised reruns of
30 union elections in 1969 as opposed to 18 in 1968. Fur
ther, the number of elections challenged in court by the
Department of Labor climbed from 23 in 1968 to 29 in
80
1969.
Critics of labor unions frequently cite the long
tenures of such individuals as John L. Lewis of the United
Mine Workers (40 years), William Hutcheson of the Carpen
ters (3 7 years), and Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters (45
years) as proof positive of the monopolization of union
power and consequent lack of democracy. In actuality there
may not be any correlation between the two. What is
probably more significant is the frequency of elections and
the degree of opposition. It is in this area where there
is a notable deficiency. In a historical study conducted
Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Union
ism, 1 1 in Labor and Trade Unionism: An Interdisciplinary
Reader, ed. by Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 214.
80
Wall Street Journal, February 17, 1970, p. 1.
99
by Philip Taft in 1954, he found that in 202 presidential
elections conducted in thirty-four international unions,
only 3 8 or 18.8 per cent were contested. Taft's study
shows that the only union in which there was consistent and
strong opposition was the International Typographical
81
Union.
This lack of opposition does not alarm Taft as he
feels that agreements and compromises between divisive fac
tions may serve to satisfy the opposition. Furthermore, it
is his feeling that the lack of open opposition does not
necessarily imply that it "cannot be fanned into life by an
82
important issue."
Conclusions
The accuracy of Philip Taft's view is questionable.
It is true that a vigorous campaign may in fact split the
union into many factions thereby diminishing the union's
capacity to bargain effectively. It is equally true that
unions have become large-scale businesses and encumberances
81
Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor
Unions, pp. 38-40, 58. The ITU is by Taft's own admission
the most democratic union in the United States.
82
Ibid., pp. 35 ff. Quoted material is found on
p. 64.
100
upon leadership's actions do tend to diminish its effec
tiveness. But what of the alternatives? It is inconceiv
able that the rank-and-file individual should be denied his
full rights as a member. Still more is necessary. Not
only must the member be given full justice under the exist
ing bylaws of the organization, but he must feel uncon
strained in his ability to initiate change and bring about
reform. In only this way will both he and society be
protected. This was the intention of the LMRDA and this is
the spirit in which it must be applied. It is unfortunate
that more unions have not undertaken to initiate reform
from within. Only the Upholsterers, the United Automobile
Workers and the Ethical Practices Committee of the AFL-CIO
have sought to bring about significant change and all of
that was before the passage of the LMRDA. It is hoped that
more of this type of reform will be forthcoming. With
respect to this development, the words of Philip Taft
probably ring a prophetic note:
A union leadership that is uncertain or insecure is
likely to be weak and indecisive. Yet it is clear that
great power must be delegated and that such power can
be and is occasionally abused. In many instances
appeals against oppression are expensive, take time,
and constitute a great burden upon the suspended and
expelled member. Exercise of unlimited or even exten
sive and uncontrolled power can be justified only by
great emergencies. Fortunately, these are not
101
permanent. While the level of honesty, integrity and
public responsibility is as high among labor leaders as
other social or economic groups, the exercise of
unrestricted power encourages abuse, arrogance and
irresponsibility. Actions of labor leaders should be
subject to review, and where decisions involve a
serious loss or burden to individuals it is imperative
that an impartial body should exist for appeal. No
union officer should be immune from appeal against his
acts and to my mind "the labor movement should itself
create an impartial tribunal— a sort of Federal Trade
Commission— which would furnish quick and inexpensive
review. Most unions regard such suggestions with
extreme distaste, but only some such program, it seems
to me, can ward off permanent and more stringent
regulations of labor unions.
From a reading of both this and the previous chap
ter, it is obvious that the issue of union democracy has
captured the attention of countless writers. Most of them
attempt to evaluate labor unions through the use of either
some arbitrary or well-established subjective criteria.
Too frequently, these authors give little or no considera
tion to the attitudes and desires of those who work within
the system. In actuality, before one can fully assess the
worth of an institution, he must first pinpoint the role of
the organization as perceived by those who are supposed to
be the beneficiaries of its policies. The following two
chapters will attempt to shed some light on that question.
8 ^
Philip Taft, "Democracy in Trade Unions," American
Economic Review, XXXVI (May, 1946), 369. Quotation marks
added for emphasis. See also the discussion by Mark Starr
and Lloyd G. Reynolds which follows Taft’s article.
CHAPTER III
THE MEMBERSHIP VIEWS ITS INTERNATIONAL:
LOCAL 1531, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS
In an attempt to reduce the discussion in the fore
going chapters to more meaningful terms, it was decided to
analyze in some depth the opinions and attitudes found in a
representative local union. The local chosen was
Local 1531, United Automobile Workers, Amarillo, Texas.
Area Background
In order to be able to evaluate the prevailing
attitudes found within Local 1531, it is important to indi
cate the nature of the region and the views of the people
that reside there. On September 8, 1970, the author met
with several local union officers. Those present consisted
of the President, the Vice President, the Financial Secre
tary and three Committeemen. The following discussion of
the region and of the local union member is largely based
on the opinions expressed at that meeting. Any error made
102
103
with respect to interpretation is the sole responsibility
of the author.
Amarillo is located in the northwest section of
Texas known as the Panhandle. The philosophy of unionism
has never taken hold in this region. Many reasons are
offered for this, but the most plausible relates to the
nature of the industry found in the area. The industries
are primarily capital intensive consisting of ranching,
farming and oil. None of these activities require more
than skeleton labor forces. By virtue of this fact, the
residents have had little exposure to problems associated
with large blue collar labor forces. Lack of experience
frequently breeds attitudes based on misunderstanding and
negativism. These views are commonly expressed or at least
implied in the various newspapers of the region and one can
only speculate as to whether these publications reflect or
actually create the feelings present in the region.
In any event, it is obvious that the philosophy of
the area is not receptive to unionism. This is clearly
evidenced in political pronouncements which presumably
reflect the prevailing attitudes of the public. The imme
diate manifestation of this is the maintenance of the
so-called "right-to-work laws" which firmly commit Texas,
104
along with eighteen other states, to a policy of outlawing
compulsory unionism. A statement by a Vice President of a
well known Texas steel company is pertinent at this junc
ture. He says in part:
We must protect individual rights from erosion by
monolithic, legally privileged unions and unresponsive
collective bargaining practices. Our nation, which
derives its strength from democratic values and tradi
tions, cannot long tolerate the nullification of basic
rights by unions and expect these rights to flourish in
other segments of society. Furthermore, the pressures
of suppressed dissent and opposition boiling up within
unions themselves are gaining release through indus
trial strife harmful both to employers and the public
at large, as well as to employees themselves.
We urgently need a renewed defense of basic demo
cratic rights which are guaranteed to individuals not
only by our labor relations statutes but by the United
States Constitution itself.^-
The above cited statement is not intended to illus
trate anything more than one individual s views, but in
many discussions with local labor union personnel, it was
obvious that statements such as these make a lasting impact
and are thought to be generally representative of the
opinions held by the public at large.
1
Howard Jensen, Unions and the Decline of Individ
ual Rights (New York: National Association of Manufactur
ers, n.d.), pp. 1-2.
105
Background and Organization of Local 1531
Local 1531 was established in March of 1968 at the
Overhaul and Modification Center of the Bell Helicopter
Company installation located a few miles from downtown
Amarillo. Its founding was greeted with general indiffer
ence on the part of the residents of the region. The
management of Bell has apparently attempted to maintain
good relations with the union and this has worked to the
advantage of Local 1531 inasmuch as adverse publicity,
usually associated with strikes and disputes, has been kept
to a minimum.
The collective bargaining agreement between the
company and Local 1531 is exhaustive in all areas having
been negotiated by high ranking officials of UAW Inter
national and top management personnel from Bell. The con
tract has a three year duration after which time either
party may seek to amend or terminate it. The preamble of
the agreement commits both parties to a policy of coopera
tion. It states:
The company and the Union recognize that it is in
the best interests of both the employees and the
Company to improve the competitive position of the
Company. Both are partners in the same business, and
the success of that business is vital to all concerned.
This requires that the Company and the Union work
106
together toward the end that quality and cost of the
product will prove increasingly attractive to the
customer, and that the business will be continually
successful. The Union subscribes to the principle of a
fair days work for a fair days pay, and will use its
best efforts to effectuate it whenever possible with
the employees that the Union represents. The Union and
the Company agree that every reasonable effort will be
made to eliminate waste, increase efficiency, and to
improve operations in general.^
The Local itself appears to be well run. The mem
bers of the executive board are all devoted to the cause of
unionism and spend many hours actively attempting to
further educate the rank-and-file about the purposes and
functions of unions. The Local has a present membership of
800 with a potential membership of 1,100. Only a fraction
of these could be considered more than marginal members as
most do not take an active interest and in many cases have
probably joined the Union so as not to be "left out of the
crowd."
A Profile of the Local Union Member
The majority of the members of Local 1531 are
between nineteen and thirty years of age and by virtue of
2
Agreement between Overhaul and Modification Center
of Bell Helicopter Company and Local 1531, UAW and the
International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri
cultural Implement Workers of America UAW, March 16, 1968,
p. 1.
107
their youth find themselves in their first really permanent
work situation. For the most part, the members are from
the northwestern section of Texas and attended and graduated
from high school in the locality in which they now work.
Perhaps 30 per cent have matriculated into some type of a
college program. The membership is not politically moti
vated. As a result, interest in national politics is
minimal and, at least in the present situation, union
membership does not seem to imply a preference for the
Democratic Party which is traditionally the case. It has
been suggested that the members' voting habits have long
been fixed by virtue of family tradition or community atti
tude. The mere fact that an individual has joined the
union is not sufficient to lead one to conclude that he is
more "liberal" than one who has chosen not to join.
Approximately 13 per cent of the members are from
different minority groups. There are 37 Blacks, 72
Mexican-Americans, 1 Indian and 1 Oriental. There is no
evidence of racial prejudice or discrimination found within
the union. In fact, one Negro Committeeman pointed out
that the local union is the only entity to which the
minority groups feel that they can turn. Furthermore, he
vigorously asserted that the union would stand behind
108
aggrieved minority members. Apparently the camaraderie
that exists on the job is carried into the social aspects
of life as well. It was claimed by several union members
that the degree of dependence and friendship that exists at
the bench cannot be readily "turned-off" when working hours
are over.
The greater majority of the membership attends
church on a regular basis. This, however, appears to be
the only really organized extracurricular activity. The
union leaders, to a man, all agreed that the typical member
of Local 1531 could not be considered a "joiner." In
actuality, of those who had been employed in other capaci
ties before commencing work with Bell, only a slight
percentage had ever joined the available locals. Based on
this noninvolvement ideology, the fact that almost 73 per
cent of the employees of Bell chose to join the UAW is a
credit to the organizational abilities of the leadership
of the Local.
Throughout the course of the author's meetings and
discussions with the various leaders of Local 1531, it was
constantly apparent that they are overwhelmingly concerned
and disappointed that the rank-and-file member does not
take a more active interest in the affairs of his union.
109
In this sense, the experience of Local 1531 dovetails with
the findings of other authors in their studies of other
locals. (See discussion in earlier chapter). Unfortunate
ly , in the present case, the situation appears somewhat
more serious. In many casual discussions that the author
had with local members, it was evident that for the most
part these individuals have very limited knowledge as to
what the UAW does, what it stands for and what membership
implies. This is not the case in some of the older UAW
locals. (The accuracy of this assertion with respect to
Local 1531 will be examined below). Of course, one must
bear in mind that the vast majority of the members are
products of a rather special geographic region and there
fore have not been raised in the traditon of trade
unionism as would be the case in the larger cities.
This lack of involvement and interest was obvious
to this author when views and opinions were sought by means
of a questionnaire. Of the several hundred which were
distributed, only about 10 per cent were returned. When
this fact was presented to the Local officers, it was
acknowledged that similar results occurred when the union
leadership itself presented issues to the membership.
Specifically, the reasons offered for lack of response to
110
the questionnaire were: (1) that most of the members
react only when the issue presented affects them person
ally, (2) that some members are afraid to commit themselves
as they are somewhat insecure about their positions in the
union (it should be noted that inclusion of name and
address was not a prerequisite), and (3) that some men are
basically hostile to individuals who wish to delve into
their private thoughts and ideas.
Despite the poor response to the questionnaire, it
is thought that a rather wide cross-section of individuals
have responded and consequently it is believed that the
results will offer a fairly accurate measure of the pre
vailing views and attitude of the rank-and-file member
toward unionism, the UAW in general and Local 1531
specifically. It is, however, regrettable that the small
ness of the sample precludes comprehensive statistical
analysis.
Methodology Employed in Analyzing Local 1531
In attempting to accumulate as much information as
possible, the questionnaire was rather extensively detailed
as it was primarily designed to indicate personal views and
Ill
3
attitudes. It was recognized that m several instances,
the rank-and-file would not be able to accurately respond
to the issue raised but this was viewed positively by the
author inasmuch as all that was desired was a response
based on the individual1s preconceived thoughts and ideas.
Distribution of this survey provided some problems.
The UAW has a firm policy of not circulating the names of
the membership to any nonunion individual. Fortunately,
the President of the Local, Mr. George Pearce, agreed to
mail the questionnaires from his office. The author was
assured by Mr. Pearce that names would be selected in a
completely random fashion. Each individual selected was
sent a copy of the questionnaire along with a statement
drawn up by President Pearce indicating his approval of the
4
study. Included with these items was a stamped self-
addressed envelope designed to facilitate prompt return of
the questionnaire. Several hundred were mailed and as
indicated above, only a very small percentage were returned.
The author then prevailed upon President Pearce to
3
A complete copy of this questionnaire appears in
Appendix B of this work.
^A copy of this statement as well as a cover letter
by the author appears in Appendix A of this work.
112
distribute additional questionnaires. This was done and
regrettably no additional responses were forthcoming. This
poor response was noted by the author and it is felt that
this in itself is a meaningful barometer of rank-and-file
involvement.
As mentioned earlier, it was not required that
individuals responding to the questionnaire include any
personal or biographical data. It was hoped that the
ability to remain anonymous would encourage a greater
response. This apparently was not the case. With the
exception of only two individuals, all chose to include
name, address, telephone number and job classification.
Fortunately, those who did complete the question
naire felt motivated to write explanatory comments. These
are highly valued by the author as in preparing any ques
tionnaire it is virtually impossible to investigate all
areas and in fact to anticipate what areas are really
critical and crucial in the mind of the respondent. When
ever possible, relevant comments will be inserted so as to
provide greater documentation and elaboration concerning
opinions and attitudes.
113
Rank-and-File's Relation to the
National Leadership
The first area of inquiry related to the rank-and-
file view of its national leadership. One frequently hears
the claim that the rank-and-file can in no way relate to
the individual who assumes positions of national importance
within the union. It is thought that through analysis of
the relationship that exists between the leaders and the
rank-and-file more light could be shed upon the individual
member and how he regards the parent organization.
In this connection, the respondent was asked to
comment on how he felt the national leaders viewed their
potential for gain with respect to that of the membership.
The results are seen in Table 9.
As can be seen from the results of the table, the
rank-and-file member is satisfied that men such as Walter
Reuther and his successor, Leonard Woodcock, are actively
trying to further membership's position. In support of
this view, one of the respondents offered the following
statement:
The leader is continually forced to challenge and
contradict and buck the man who pays him. . . . Defense
of the contract requires a lot of dedication at his own
expense and personal sacrifice.
114
TABLE 9
RANK-AND-FILE VIEWS AS TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL UAW LEADERSHIP WITH RESPECT
TO POWER AS A GOAL
Number Per Cent
UAW leaders are primarily interested in
promoting their own positions 4 17
UAW leaders are primarily interested in
promoting the membership's position 16 70
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 3 13
N = (23) (100%)a
aWhere necessary, percentages have been rounded to
provide for clarity.
Another respondent generally agreed that leadership
is working to promote the interests of the rank-and-file.
His reasoning, though, was based on a cool, pragmatic
assessment of reality. He simply observed that for self
preservation the international officers work to support the
rank-and-file for:
. . . without the local membership, there would be
no international.
In further trying to assess the rank-and-file
members1 relation to the international union and its
leadership, the individual was asked to respond to a series
115
of imprecise, nontechnical questions. The first of these
was designed to reflect his views as to the type of rapport
that exists between top leadership and the rank-and-file.
The results appear in Table 10.
TABLE 10
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE "APPROACHABILITY"
OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP
Number Per Cent
Member would feel comfortable in the
presence of the international leadership 15
Member would not feel comfortable in the
presence of the international leadership 5
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 3
N = (23)
65
22
13
(100%)
At least with respect to Local 1531, the members
feel as though they can relate to and deal with men such as
the late Walter Reuther, Emil Mazey and now Leonard
Woodcock. This was not an unexpected response because over
the years Walter Reuther made a conscientious effort to
meet and speak with as many union people as he could. Of
those that responded negatively, two of the three that
elaborated indicated a general feeling of insecurity rather
116
than a conviction that the leadership was condescending or
disinterested. One indicated that he (the member) would
not feel comfortable because:
He would not even notice me.
Another pointed out that:
I probably would not [feel comfortablel though I am
not sure why.
In attempting to shed additional light on the
nature of the perceived relationship, the respondents were
asked to indicate which group, union personnel or upper
income groups in general, top leadership preferred to
associate with. In this instance many indicated that they
did not know, but of those who committed themselves, three
times as many felt that the top leadership had more in
common with the group that they represent rather than with
those in the same income bracket. This view of leader
ship's preferences does not coincide with Robert F. Hoxie's
suggestion that as union leaders' positions increase in
5
importance, "They fall victim to the mahogany table." In
fact one respondent felt top union leadership viewed upper
income individuals as the enemy as they are usually
5
For a more complete discussion of Robert F. Hoxie's
views, see Chapter II of this work.
117
managers, superintendents or others with whom relations by
necessity must be quite cool. By inference then, one might
conclude that the members believe and expect their leader
to be morally committed to the workingman's cause. This
rank-and-file is not interested in the "Tuxedo-type” union
ism of David McDonald, former president of the United
Steelworkers of America.
ship's salary structure. Since this survey was conducted
prior to the death of Walter Reuther, the question asked
related to his salary in particular. The results appear in
Table 11. It is assumed that these results can be applied
to Leonard Woodcock as well.
The last item in this series relates to the leader-
TABLE 11
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE ADEQUACY OF
PRESIDENT WALTER REUTHER'S SALARY
Number Per Cent
Reuther's salary of approximately $28,000
is adequate and I would not be in favor of
increasing it 12 52
Reuther's salary of approximately $2 8,000
is not adequate and I would be in favor
of increasing it 8 35
I I
Don’t Know" or meaningless response 3 13
N (23). (100%)
118
The evidence for the most part points out that at
least in the minds of the membership of Local 1531, the
UAW president is adequately compensated. Interestingly,
many of the respondents indicated regret and anger that
Reuther was earning as much as he was. In this connection,
one individual said:
In fact, I think it should be reduced. Why should
he make so darn much off of hourly paid employees.
Another pointed out that:
. . . I am local oriented. I dislike sending our
dues off to a phantom.
Obviously, most of these individuals are not will
ing to give their top officials a "blank check" no matter
what they can deliver. Only a very few respondents were
willing to accept that line of reasoning. In fact, only
two individuals forcefully pointed out that they would be
in favor of an increase in the UAW president's salary. One
felt that a raise would be merited:
If he increases my income and job benefits and the
income and job benefits of my fellow workers throughout
the UAW.
Prom the foregoing series of questions, it seems
quite clear to this author that the membership is greatly
interested in the activities and attitudes of their inter
national leadership. Apparently, these rank-and-file
119
members are concerned with more than merely economic bene
fit. Actually, it appears extremely important that those
who represent them make an active attempt to try to relate
to them as well. From the point of view of the majority of
those who responded to the questionnaire, in order to
satisfy his constituency, an international leader must be
receptive, understanding, truly sympathetic to the working
man as well as economically productive. In this connection,
there was much speculation that Leonard Woodcock, successor
to Walter Reuther, would not be well received since many
thought his background and interests to be too dissimilar
from that of the rank-and-file.
The Rank-and-File View of Democracy
The interest that the membership of Local 1531 has
in the internal workings of the international union is fur
ther explored in the following questions relating to union
democracy. Table 12 attempts to indicate the relative
importance of democracy.
Of course this overwhelming indication of a need
for democracy tells us little unless it is known what the
individual means by the term. One rather articulate
respondent noted that democracy means:
120
Complete fairness, equality and uniform distribu
tion of skills with compensative salary for same.
Personality, ability and willingness shall supercede
racial and personal preference.
Another indicated that:
Everyone has a vote and the right to speak his own
mind on any matter before the union.
TABLE 12
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW OF DEMOCRACY AS A VITAL
ELEMENT IN UAW UNION AFFAIRS
Number Per Cent
Internal democracy is a vital element 21 91
Internal democracy is not a vital element 1 4
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 1 4
N = (23) (100%)
All those indicating a need for democracy and wish
ing to elaborate, expressed similar ideas and notions. It
is noteworthy that not one respondent felt that union
democracy might be sacrificed for internal cohesion, for
functional reasons or for any other reason for that matter.
The general feeling was that the membership should be
influential in determining policy. In fact, one member
121
commented to the author that "were Woodcock to walk into a
local and try to coerce the members not to strike after
they had agreed to strike, he would be asked to leave in no
uncertain terms." Whether that point of view is truly
representative can be nothing more than speculation, but it
is evident that the rank-and-file wishes to be heard.
The UAW’s Internal Mechanisms and Functions
In further investigating this issue of democracy,
as it pertained to the international level, the individuals
were asked to comment on a series of questions designed to
indicate subjective valuations of the UAW international as
a democratic organization. As mentioned above, the
respondents indicated that democracy implied that each
man's views would be heard and considered. One test of
democracy, then, would be the individual's view of the
degree of influence that he had upon the international
union. Such a question was raised and the results appear
in Table 13.
The results are somewhat unclear. The differences
are not great with respect to assessing the degree of
influence but the large percentage of those that indicated
that they "don't know" is troubling and is viewed as
122
somewhat significant. One can only wonder why it is that
people would contribute significant amounts of money and
time and not be able to evaluate the degree of influence
that they can bring to bear.
TABLE 13
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE IN
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION
Number Per Cent
Have some influence 10 44
Do not have any influence 6 26
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 7 30
N = (23) (100%)
As pointed out in an earlier chapter, it is fre
quently claimed by the supporters of the UAW that the
existence of the Public Review Board enhances the demo
cratic nature of that union. In this connection, the
members were asked to express their views with regard to
its existence. Surprisingly, only 52 per cent indicated an
awareness that there was such a thing as a Public Review
Board. This result was somewhat unexpected inasmuch as the
UAW International Office in Detroit makes much information
123
on this subject available. Of those that did indicate an
awareness, two acknowledged having no idea what function
the Board served. Notably, all of those recognizing its
existence felt that it was contributory to making the UAW a
democratic institution.
The responses to the questions relating to the Pub
lic Review Board point up in no uncertain terms the fact
that by and large the membership is not fully aware of the
functions or activities of the parent organization. This
general conclusion is further justified when we note the
above finding that a high percentage felt as though they
could not form an opinion as to whether or not they had any
real influence with respect to policy making at the inter
national level. It was pointed out earlier that the
rank-and-file is concerned with the activities at the inter
national level but one now wonders whether this concern
might confine itself to the activities of the president and
ignore the internal mechanisms and controls of the organ
ization which functions under him. Additional responses to
topics in the questionnaire tend to confirm this overall
impression.
After explaining the notion of a trusteeship, the
membership was asked to comment upon the potential impact
124
of its usage on the democratic nature of the UAW. Again, a
large percentage indicated that they were not acquainted
with the concept. Interestingly, the majority of the
membership noted that its existence did not adversely
affect their outlook as to the democratic nature of their
union. This attitude can possibly be explained by noting
that the membership probably has sufficient faith in their
international leadership, specifically the president, to
reject the possibility that he or his associates could act
in an arbitrary or "undemocratic" manner. As an extension
of this, several respondents indicated that they were thank
ful that trusteeship provisions do exist. They viewed it
as a vital and necessary tool of the parent union. One
noted that:
If somebody is using my money wrong, then I'm glad
that somebody experienced can step in and protect the
rest of it.
This same confidence in the international leader
ship was evidenced when the respondents were asked to
comment on the usage of discipline procedures. Almost all
of the respondents indicated an awareness that the inter
national union could discipline a member. Attitudes
regarding the justness of its usage are recorded in
Table 14.
125
TABLE 14
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE JUSTNESS OF
THE DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE
Number Per Cent
The UAW never disciplines a member without
good cause 19 83
The UAW sometimes disciplines a member
without good cause 1 4
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 3 13
N = (23) (100%)
This result is not unexpected when one considers
the responses to the questions pertaining to the trustee
ship question. Obviously, in both of these areas the
members are content with the internal mechanisms of the
international. It should be emphasized, though, that the
reasons for these widespread attitudes may be based on
"blind faith" or, as noted above, confidence in the top
elected officials.
It is a widely held belief among critics of labor
unions that it is almost impossible for the rank-and-file
to make significant inroads into the political structure of
the parent organization. This claim was phrased as a
126
question and placed before the membership from two stand
points. Table 15 records the rank-and-file view of the
selection process.
TABLE 15
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW OF THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LEADERSHIP SELECTION
Number Per Cent
Future officers are hand picked by the
present officers 9 39
Future officers are not hand picked by
the present officers 8 35
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 6 26
N = (23) (100%)
The results are evenly distributed and no firm con
clusion can be reached. There was no significant indica
tion by those who felt that the leader was hand picked that
this posed any threat to the democratic process. A more
revealing response is seen in Table 16 in which the member
was next asked if he thought that he could someday achieve
an office in the UAW international.
The results here indicate a view of vertical
mobility. It is not clear, though, what level of office
127
within the international framework is considered. There
are various regional offices which are staffed by rank-and-
file members and this probably is as high as one can
realistically expect to go without specialized expertise in
a particular area. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the
aspiring member does not feel himself to be either trapped
at his local level or used as a pawn in a big game that he
in no way can relate to.
TABLE 16
RANK-AND-PILE VIEW OF ACCESSIBILITY
TO INTERNATIONAL UNION OFFICE
Number Per Cent
Some chance of becoming an international
UAW officer 18 78
No chance of becoming an international
UAW officer 4 18
"Don't Know" or meaningless response 1 4
N = (23) (100%)
It is frequently claimed that the international con
vention is nothing more than an extravagant show designed
to push through leadership sponsored proposals and resolu
tions. Naturally, the vast majority of the membership
128
cannot attend these conventions, but it was thought useful
to examine the degree of rank-and-file interest in the
proceedings. With very few exceptions, all indicated that
they were concerned with the activities that take place.
Unfortunately, there was no indication of just what part of
the proceedings was of interest. It is likely that member
ship interest is directed solely to the activities of the
local representatives. That is to say, the rank-and-file
member is concerned that he gets his "money's worth" from
those he has delegated to act for him. It is doubtful that
any greater interest is shown. If there was deep concern
with the convention proceedings, there would certainly be
greater familiarity with the existence of the trusteeship
principle and the Public Review Board.
The membership of Local 1531 showed great interest
in Solidarity, the UAW International newspaper. Most indi
cated that they read it on a regular basis and find that it
includes topics of importance and meaning. Surprisingly,
only 13 per cent thought that top leadership monopolizes
the newspaper. This is an extremely interesting finding
because even Leonard Woodcock is willing to acknowledge
that the leadership controls and oversees what is published.
(See discussion in Chapter II). It is difficult to try to
129
justify this impression unless one considers that the
average reader is interested primarily in the sections
relating to the activities at the local level or to news of
only a general nature. In this connection, one member notec
that
I do compare our local with others as to strike
results and proposals [and] settlements.
The fact that the major articles relating to
leadership are always cast in a favorable light and that
there are never any indications of divisiveness or leader
ship failures is apparently not recognized by the average
reader. One respondent, while indicating that he thought
that the leadership did not monopolize the paper, para
doxically noted that if he had a different political point
of view from that of the leadership and asked for equal
space in Solidarity:
They would listen to what I say whether they
printed it or not. It depends on how important and
who I am.
Another individual agreed and indicated that:
Like most papers they are not so likely to publish
the opposition.
One respondent, who acknowledged not having seen
Solidarity, still felt prompted to offer the following
critical comment with respect to availability of space for
130
opposition viewpoints:
. . . they want their members to know only what
they want them to know.
Another commenting from the same vantage point
offered that:
They might print it but it would not get an equal
shake.
Lastly, the membership was asked to draw a conclu
sion as to whether or not the UAW was one of the more
democratic unions. The results appear in Table 17.
TABLE 17
RANK-AND-FILE OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE
UAW AS A DEMOCRATIC UNION
The UAW International as a Democratic Union:
Conclusions
Number Per Cent
The UAW is one of the more democratic
unions 16 69
The UAW is not one of the more democratic
unions 2 9
II
Don't Know" or meaningless response 5 22
N (23) (100%)
131
The respondents were largely in agreement that the
International UAW is a democratic union. Presumably, they
are basing their evaluations on their own concepts of
democracy. One may of course criticize any particular
definition of democracy as being inadequate or insufficient,
but at this point it appears possible that, at least with
respect to the membership of UAW Local 1531, the tradi
tional definition of political democracy may not be
appropriate.
In the following chapter we will investigate the
individual in relation to his local union and hopefully
shed some light on the kind of democracy that the typical
member wants.
CHAPTER IV
THE MEMBERSHIP VIEWS ITS LOCAL: LOCAL 1531,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS
Attendance at Local Meetings
It was noted in earlier sections of this work that
attendance at local union meetings is extremely poor. This
fact has prompted many observers to conclude that labor
unions are run by a small group of individuals seeking
unlimited control of the local. As previously indicated,
there are many possible explanations for this. They range
from disinterest to a feeling of ineffectuality. Whatever
the reason, it is generally conceded that unions will be
run more effectively and be more responsive if there is
greater attendance at the meetings.
In the case of Local 1531, the leaders express
great concern and disappointment that attendance at meet
ings is not higher. One regrettable aspect of this, from
the standpoint of the union, is that if the company is to
be truly "countervailed," evidence of a sincerely active
132
133
and interested membership must be presented to the manage
ment. How much management is affected by numbers at union
meetings, cannot be authoritatively asserted. It seems
quite obvious, though, that if only 5 to 10 per cent of the
members take an active part in their union, management will
feel somewhat bolder in their dealings.
This issue of attendance at local meetings was
placed before the membership. The results appear in
Table 18.
TABLE 18
ATTENDANCE AT LOCAL UAW MEETINGS
Number Per Cent
I frequently attend local meetings 14 61
I infrequently attend local meetings 9 3 9
"Don't Know" or meaningless response —
N = (23) (100%)
It is clear that the percentage indicating frequent
attendance far outweighs that of nonattendance. This
result differs very significantly from the overall local-
wide statistics. It can be presumed that the reason for
this is that the individual who usually attends union
134
meetings would be more likely to complete a questionnaire
than one who was not so inclined. Reasons given for
attendance were essentially of two varieties. One group of
respondents pointed out that the union meeting provided
them with various types of information. The following
comments are illustrative of that position:
[I attend] to see what goes on at the plant and
around the city.
[X attend] to keep up with local matters.
[X attend] because it helps me to understand my
working conditions better.
A second group offered the more traditional reasons
for attending. Examples of these responses follow:
[I attend] because it is my local and without
everyone's support it becomes weak.
[I attend because of an] earnest belief in partici
pation in activities.
[I attend] to make sure my views on issues were
heard.
[I attend] for the same reason I look after my
other business interests. . . .
Since it is assumed that interest in local union
affairs and cooperation in filling out a rather lengthy
questionnaire go hand-in-hand, it seems valuable to inves
tigate the respondents' reasons for nonattendance. Almost
all felt that attendance at meetings entailed some degree
135
of inconvenience. One individual pointed out that the
actions of the company interfered with his ability to
attend. He said in part:
Every Saturday [that] I have made plans to attend
our union meeting, the company will call for overtime
(which I feel is not right).
This individual did further indicate though, that
it was his own desire to work as the company in no way
compelled him. Another individual offered a different
reason for his absence:
I can't find time. Three nights of school fill the
rest of my days with homework and odd jobs I must do.
It is perhaps noteworthy that none of the respond
ents indicated a feeling of futility or hopelessness in the
face of a "rigged" meeting. The reasons offered are weak
but are significant in that at the very worst they tend to
support the rather unimportant hypothesis that attendance
is poor because the meetings are dull. It should also be
pointed out, that since the membership of Local 1531 comes
exclusively from Bell Helicopter's installation, the union
meeting by its very nature does not offer the member
information about employment opportunities at any other
location. This would not be true in many of the other
unions or in fact in many other UAW locals; especially
136
those located in the larger cities. Nevertheless, based on
the local-wide statistics with respect to attendance made
available to the author, Local 1531 is not appreciably
different from the vast majority of locals throughout the
United States. This is a regrettable fact and is probably
an occurrence which will not easily be changed.
In fact, many writers are so perplexed by the low
levels of attendance that several years ago, Leonard R.
Sayles and George Strauss indicated that they thought that
the observed records of poor attendance had broader impli
cations. In this connection they said:
Whatever their attitude toward the union's economic
function, few workers have a feeling of identification
with the union. One attitude survey in a large indus
trial plant revealed that only a minority of the
workers showed any real emotional involvement.
Opposition in Local Union Elections
It is a fact of life that there is very little
opposition in local union elections. Occasionally, there
will be a rival candidate but this is certainly the excep
tion rather than the rule. In this respect also, Local 1531
^Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, "What the
Worker Really Thinks of His Union," Harvard Business
Review, XXXI (May-June, 1953), 95.
137
does not significantly differ from the norm. Interestingly#
there was some opposition in the last presidential election.
There were three rival candidates. Two were weak and did
not wage effective campaigns. The suggestion was made that
at least one of the candidates was not serious in his
attempt to win the office and offered little or nothing in
the way of a formal platform. Not surprisingly, the two
weak candidates were able to obtain only a very small per
centage of the total vote. It is notable# though, that two
of the rival candidates felt sufficiently motivated to come
before a membership meeting and express themselves on the
various issues. The presence of several candidates in this
presidential campaign can possibly be explained by the fact
that Local 1531 is a young local without a deeply
entrenched power structure. Furthermore, the former presi
dent had resigned and apparently had not taken an active
part in selecting his successor.
In trying to pursue this issue, the membership was
asked if it felt that the lack of meaningful opposition was
important. The results appear in Table 19.
More than twice as many felt that political opposi
tion was important. Reasons for this were not specifically
enunciated and no doubt vary. One individual saw fit to
138
offer a reason as to why the degree of opposition was so
minimal. He said:
More and broader interest in union affairs is
heartily solicited [but] due to the limited interest
about 50 people are forced to represent about 800
simply because it has to be done and they [the members]
won11 do it.
The above comment seems to make a good deal of
sense when one considers the deplorable levels of attend
ance at the general membership meetings.
TABLE 19
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL
OPPOSITION FOR LOCAL UNION OFFICE
Number Per Cent
It is of concern to me that there is
little political opposition at the local
union level 15 65
It is of no concern to me that there is
little political opposition at the local
union level 7 31
"Don't Know" or meaningless response
N = (23) (100%)
139
The fact that opposition is virtually nonexistent
is a source of annoyance to the leaders of Local 1531.
Several of them, including the president, indicated that
they would welcome political opposition. They generally
felt that through the process of competition many issues
not immediately evident to the leadership could be brought
out into the open thereby "clearing the air" and eliminating
some causes of divisiveness. It is probably also true,
though not explicitly stated, that the winner of a hard
fought election contest would feel emboldened to make
greater demands on management personnel as he now could
feel a sense of real achievement and confidence in his
ability.
The Election Procedure
One extremely articulate individual voiced some
indignation at the nature of the voting process used in the
last election. He noted that the ballots were distributed
at the time clock at the end of the work day and that in
some cases this was the first information made public as to
who in fact was running for office. It was his contention
that frequently the membership just does not know who the
opposition is. He further pointed out that it appeared, at
140
least to him, that the choices of the existing leadership
were listed with their nicknames and that this gave them an
advantage as they could be considered "one of the boys."
The significance of this is questionable. It is true,
however, that the local office does draw up and distribute
the ballots and in so doing great care must be taken in
order to insure the elimination of all forms of bias.
Improving the elective process is something that
local unions must be constantly striving to do. Even
though distribution of the ballot at the time clock may
have proven somewhat inconvenient, given the fact that
members do not appear to be inclined to attend the monthly
meeting, it is probably the only real alternative. Cer
tainly, it is an improvement over a situation in which a
clique of twenty or so individuals who see fit to attend
the meeting decide the election. From this author's point
of view, Local 1531 is to be commended for trying to
broaden the voting base.
The Member and His Local Leaders
More than 65 per cent of the members surveyed felt
that the local leaders were representative of their views
and attitudes. Naturally, it is impossible for a leader to
141
satisfy his entire constituency at any given moment, but
most of those interviewed by the author displayed a feeling
of genuine satisfaction with the current president. This
is apparently due to the fact that Mr. Pearce is a man who
has had a good deal of prior experience in union affairs.
One individual was somewhat critical pointing out that he
did not think that the current leadership was forceful
enough in the face of management opposition. Assuming that
this is the case, it is entirely possible that with greater
competition for union offices, leadership will be forced to
act more aggressively or run the risk of a diminution of
popularity.
The finding that the members of Local 1531 are
generally satisfied with their leadership dovetails nicely
with one study while at the same time conflicts with
another. In 1953 the Union Education Service of the Uni
versity of Chicago distributed questionnaires to twenty-
nine locals of a large industrial union. The findings were
that, "the majority of the members had confidence in their
2
union officers. ..." In the same year, however,
2
"Research on the Attitude of Trade-Union Members,"
Monthly Labor Review, LXXVI (June, 1953), 594.
142
Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss conducted a survey in
which the results were significantly different. Two
respondents1 comments taken from their study reflect the
attitudes of those that they surveyed:
You just get through throwing out one group and
another group gets in and before you know it there is a
clique again. It's always the same; no matter how
often you throw officers out, those that get in become
a clique within a year and start running things to suit
themselves.
Bill's in it just for what he can get for himself.
He gets that extra twenty dollars a month and a few
hours lost time, and a good many of those are cooked
up.3
The president of a local union is in an extremely
difficult position. He is, of course, interested in main
taining his position of leadership but he must at the same
time act in a way which will not alienate his constituents,
many of whom are his close personal friends. Relationships
that exist between elected union officials and their con
stituents differ greatly from other political associations.
In the first place, the local leader spends the greater
part of his day working side by side with those who have
elected him. There is no way he can insulate himself from
their feelings, attitudes and criticisms. Secondly, since
3Sayles and Strauss, "What the Worker Really Thinks
of His Union," p. 98.
143
the local leader is elected directly from the rank-and-file
and not given any increases in salary, his social relation
ships remain essentially the same even though his work life
may become somewhat altered. These two facts require the
leader to walk a veritable tightrope between fulfilling his
own wants and desires as an official and maintaining his
interests in the other facets of his life. This is not an
easy thing to do in a relatively isolated community such as
Amarillo, Texas, where one's social relationships emanate
primarily from his place of employment.
The existence of this strong social relationship is
denied by C. Peter Magrath. In his highly regarded article
appearing in 1959, he stated that:
Unions are service institutions catering to the workers'
needs in wages, hours, pensions, and working condi
tions, and they are so regarded by their members. Most
workers terminate their identification with the union
at the factory exit— at home they are parents, Poles,
Catholic or Jew, baseball fan, Elk, not union members.
At least with respect to Local 1531, this charac
terization does not apply.
4
C. Peter Magrath, "Democracy m Overalls: The
Futile Quest for Union Democracy," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, XII (July, 1959), 522.
144
The Grievance Procedure and the Members1
Attitudes Towards It
The grievance procedure is of very great interest
to the average member. It is probably true that this area
of internal union operations is considered by the rank-and-
file to be the most vital. Local 1531 and Bell Helicopter
have agreed to use what is called a three and one-half step
procedure in settling grievances. Briefly, the procedures
as outlined in the collective bargaining agreement follow:
(1) An employee having a grievance should approach his
Zone Committeeman and indicate the full nature of
his complaint. If the Committeeman decides to
press the issue further, he will discuss the
grievance with the Production Supervisor.
(2) If the grievance has not been settled by the
Supervisor, the Zone Committeeman may appeal to
the grieving employee's General Supervisor. After
discussing the case, the General Supervisor will,
within three days, present a written answer.
(3) If the written response by the General Supervisor
is still deemed unsatisfactory, the Grievance
Committee, consisting of all Zone Committeemen and
the Local President may place the issue before the
regularly scheduled meeting with the Management
Representatives.
(3h) In case that the grievance has not been satisfac
torily resolved in the first three stages, another
meeting will be arranged, this time including the
entire Grievance Committee, an International UAW
Representative and the Bell Helicopter Chief of
Personnel Relations.
145
(4) Should the union not be satisfied after all three
and one-half stages have been exhausted, it has
the right to appeal to an Impartial Arbitrator.
This procedure is by all means a thoroughgoing and
comprehensive one. There are certain provisions, however,
which must be viewed as potential threats to the democratic
rights of the grievant. In the first step, the Zone Com
mitteeman has at least some discretion in pressing the
grievance. It is conceivable that he could feel that the
grievance is not meritorious in which case the grievant
really has two struggles to win. It should be pointed out
that the grievant may go directly to his Supervisor and ask
him to speak to his Zone Committeeman who supposedly has
been apprised of the complaint. This is viewed as being
unpopular and potentially divisive. In any case, this pro
cedure would necessarily place some of the burden of
protection of individual rights on the company when the
individual is paying the union monthly dues for that
service. Even if the grievant goes directly to the Super
visor, his fortunes still ride on the attitudes and inter
pretations of his Zone Committeeman as it is this man who
must orally present the case to the Supervisor. It is
possible that if the Committeeman is still intransigent,
the grievant may request that his case be presented to the
146
Grievance Committee. This action is also viewed negatively
since it implies that his elected representative is doing
a less than adequate job.
The second step also involves some value judgments
on the part of the Zone Committeeman. It is his option
either to accept or reject the Supervisor’s decision
rendered after step one. Of course the grievant is con
sulted, but here again great care must be taken to see that
an individual is not forced to accept a truly unsatisfactory
decision. Should the grievance work its way up to the
third step, the problem of protecting the grievant's rights
becomes somewhat more complex. The nature of the discussion
now changes as does the composition of the group which is
to decide the issue. Generally, a more formal atmosphere
now prevails and broader aspects of the problem are studied.
This group now considers such things as implications,
precedents and the like. The actual grievant runs the very
real risk of finding that his complaint has become obscured
by a vast array of what to him are irrelevant considera
tions .
The same possibility of obfuscation exists at what
is called the third and one-half step. At this point much
time and money has been expended and it is quite possible
147
that neither side will be content to compromise, choosing
to deal with an impartial arbitrator instead.
These possibilities were presented to the rank-and-
file in two ways. They were first asked to indicate their
opinions with respect to the adequacy of representation by
the grievance committee. The results appear in Table 20.
TABLE 20
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE ADEQUACY OF THE
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Number Per Cent
The members of the grievance committee
adequately reflect my views
The members of the grievance committee
do not adequately reflect my views
"Don't Know" or meaningless response
N = ■
13
6
4
57
26
17
(23) (100%)
The responses clearly indicate a conviction that
the grievance committeemen sufficiently reflect the will of
the rank-and-file. This is noteworthy because it is con
ceivable that in some situations the Zone Committeeman,
while being selected by the membership for his similar
148
viewpoints will embrace new philosophies as a result of
attaining this prestigious position.
The members were next asked to indicate whether or
not they felt as though they could rely on the union, in
general, and the Grievance Committee in particular to press
their grievance all the way through to an arbitration hear
ing. Table 21 records the responses.
Access to the Arbitration Machinery
TABLE 21
RANK-AND-FILE VIEW AS TO THE SUPPORT OFFERED
BY THE UNION IN GRIEVANCE ACTIONS
Number Per Cent
I feel confident that if I had a
grievance my union would go to
arbitration for me 19 83
I do not feel confident that if I had a
grievance my union would go to
arbitration for me 3 13
1 1
Don't Know" or meaningless response 1 4
N (23) (100%)
149
The results show great faith in Local 1531. This
is interesting because the local has never had to take a
case all the way to the arbitration process. At least one
arbitration has been scheduled, but the grievance was
settled at the step just preceding the actual hearing. In
order for the rank-and-file to be able to display such
unbridled confidence, the Grievance Committeemen must no
doubt have performed thoroughly and skillfully at the lower
levels.
The same faith was displayed by the members when
they were asked to evaluate the fairness of any arbitration
proceeding which might arise. In this case, 87 per cent
felt that the outcome would be based on a fair and accurate
evaluation of all of the facts. Significantly, there was
only one respondent who felt that his union would "make
deals with management" or fail to fully represent the
grievant. This individual is one of the few members of
Local 1531 who was a member of another union prior to com
mencing work at Bell Helicopter. He candidly indicated
that his evaluation was based on his earlier observations.
Many studies, including that of Arnold S. Tannenbaum
and Robert L. Kahn, give evidence that the formal grievance
process is of very great concern to the rank-and-file
150
member. In this regard they point out that:
Placing a grievance with a steward occurs almost
exclusively in the plant, often a formal process. It
is a frequently exercised and highly important union
behavior. There is no question that it is central to
the operation of the union in the plant. . . . The
union member does not have to process a grievance him
self in order to become concerned with the grievance
machinery. He is interested in the grievances sub
mitted by his friends and co-workers as well— not only
because they are friends, but also because the
grievance process translates the words of the contract
into action. Through this process, the union-
management agreement is interpreted and precedents are
set.
Even though it is generally agreed that the griev
ance procedure is of paramount interest, there is much
evidence that the average rank-and-file member does not
know to what extent his rights are protected by law. This,
unfortunately, is not completely his fault. The statutes
under which he is protected are constantly being reinter
preted by one court or another and the whole issue is in a
state of continual flux. In the following chapters an
attempt will be made to clarify the rights of an individual
in this area.
^Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, Partici
pation in Union Locals {Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson and
Co., 1958), p. 57.
151
Conclusions
After rather extensively studying the views and
attitudes of the members of Local 1531, one is left with
the distinct impression that traditional definitions of
democracy just do not apply. The typical member's interest
in democracy is very limited as it stops short of anything
that does not concern him personally.
The average member expects his union to offer
security, improved salaries and working conditions, and a
countervailing voice against management. If the union
hierarchy can provide these things and at the same time do
so in a way which is respectful and considerate of the
rank-and-file views and ideas, the affiliate of Local 1531
will be quite satisfied that the union is operating
i
democratically. This in fact is the criterion of union
democracy employed by Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss
in their book, The Local Union. It is their feeling that
"union democracy can best be measured in terms of the
responsiveness of the officers to the demands of the
members."^ Using this as a criterion, at least 70 per cent
^Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local
Union (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1967) , p. 144.
152
of the respondents would agree that Local 1531 is democratic
inasmuch as that number indicated that the union was
responsive to their influence.
Interest in the democratic aspects of the internal
mechanisms of the union is almost nonexistent. The declar
ation by the membership that there should be more opposi
tion in election contests does not seem to be based on any
concrete philosophy. Were this not the case, there would
surely be more competition for office.
The members are very interested in the leadership
at all levels of the union. The leader must be a person
who talks like and thinks like the man on the floor. In
the view of one member, Walter Reuther was popular because
"he was one of us." Once the membership is satisfied that
the leader is adequate, tremendous faith and confidence
will be forthcoming. Presumably, this is because the
leader is thought to understand and commiserate with the
problems of the rank-and-file and for that reason it is
believed that he would be unlikely to deceive it. In this
connection, as long as the international officers are able
to maintain a favorable super-structure within which the
locals can function and deliver benefits, little question
will be raised with regard to how officers are picked,
153
access to the newspaper or monopolization of union office.
This view of the leader probably explains the negative
reaction to the suggestion of raising the international
president's salary. It is no doubt subconsciously thought
that if the president is to remain sensitive to the needs
of his constituents, his salary must not deviate too
greatly from theirs. Furthermore, confidence in the presi
dent's ability as a leader would be greatly diminished if
it was suspected that by virtue of any salary increase, he
attained an appreciably different social status.
It was obvious from the study that if one chooses
to join Local 1531, it is a certainty that his decision was
based on the anticipation of some possible gain. The
nature of that gain differs from one individual to the next.
In seeking to investigate this, individuals were asked to
give their views as to the major advantage of being a
member of the UAW. Representative comments follow:
. . . the company cannot fire me without just cause
as they can foremen or clerical personnel.
The UAW protects my rights to work at a fair wage
with reasonable [working] conditions and safety at the
skill level that I am qualified for.
I don't have to worry whether I have a job or not.
The union protects me from my employer.
154
. . . so that management can't run over the little
man.
[The union offers me] job security and friendship.
They [the UAW leaders] force the company to follow
seniority.
These are not unexpected answers but noticeably
lacking is the lofty idealism that is frequently associated
with unionism. Very few individuals expressed anything
more than a vested interest in their union. Two persons
offered more traditional advantages of unionism and they
are reproduced below:
I believe in unions in general. After the Civil
War and during the industrial revolution the standard
of living for the average American declined. I believe
that the labor unions of America have improved this
standard a great deal. Unions have stopped many of the
unfair practices of large industries. No one owes his
soul to the company store today. Why? Because of
labor unions. Most Americans have a saving of some
sort today. Sixty years ago his debts would have been
increasing at the rate his savings increases today.
Maybe unions cause inflation, but the people can more
readily afford inflation now. I think unions have
helped to spread the wealth of the nation a little more
evenly, and they have definitely stopped many unfair
practices.
Another individual offered his own question and
proceeded to answer it.
What would the working man be offered if it was not
for organized labor? Nothing more than the slave con
ditions of the south of this nation in the early days
of the United States.
155
It appears that Local 1531 serves another function
as well. To many it is a source of identity— a place to
which a person can belong. Apparently/ whether one
participates or not, is not of paramount concern. The fact
that somebody reliable is looking out for your interests in
the face of management strength is a source of great
satisfaction.
To finally conclude, it might be pointed out that
an assertion by V. L. Allen in his book Power in Trade
Unions: A Study of Their Organization in Great Britain sums
up nicely this author's impressions of the members of
Local 1531 with respect to their views of unionism and the
related aspects of democracy. He said in part:
. . . trade union organization is not based on theo
retical concepts prior to it, that is on some concept
of democracy, but on the end it serves. In other
words, the end of trade-union activity is to protect
and improve the general living standards of its members
and not to provide workers with an exercise in self-
government . '
It is a fact of life that investigations falling
within the framework of the social sciences cannot be
7
V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions: A Study of
Their Organization in Great Britain cited in Seymour Martin
Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, eds., Union
Democracy (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday
and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 458.
156
subjected to the scrutiny possible in the natural sciences.
No laboratory experiments with their precision tests and
measures exist. We must therefore content ourselves with a
much less exacting study. Regrettably, in the realm of the
social scientist, conditions are constantly changing as
they are influenced by a myriad of outside forces which we
in no way can control.
As a consequence of this unavoidable imprecision,
one must be exceedingly careful not to infer too much from
the case study of Local 1531. This is especially true in
this instance because of the small size of the sample with
which the author was confronted. It must also be kept in
mind that Amarillo, Texas differs vastly from other regions
of the United States. The heritage, political climate and
topography play a very great part in shaping the attitudes
and philosophies of the union membership. The fact that
Local 1531 has never had to undergo a strike is certainly
another important factor that would differentiate it from
many older locals situated in urban areas.
Still, one feels that in many ways Local 1531 is
representative of other locals. The evidence with respect
to attendance at meetings and degree and quality of opposi
tion in elections does not appreciably differ from other
157
locals. Basically, it is felt that the findings with
respect to democracy can be generalized to apply to other
locals, not only of the UAW but other unions as well. This
assertion is based on the fact that workingmen in Amarillo
are faced with the same problems and goals as men in other
parts of the country. Problems such as alienation and
insecurity know no geographic boundaries and techniques
used to solve these problems will be essentially standard
ized.
CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S LEGAL ACCESS
TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
The question of individual rights to the grievance
process generally and the arbitration process specifically,
is one which merits considerable thought and consideration.
It is a fundamental linch-pin upon which the degree of
democracy can be measured. Collective bargaining agree
ments are always negotiated between the union and the
company and the risk is that an individual member may not
be spoken for during the negotiations and furthermore, may
not be able to adequately defend himself via the steps pro
vided in the agreement. The courts have not been silent on
this issue. In fact, in some cases the justices have been
eager to express themselves on some of these issues. What
has evolved, though, is in some ways more confusing and
ambiguous than that which existed prior to the pronounce
ment.
158
159
In this chapter we are primarily interested in the
case in which there is a clash of individual and group
power. Further, in the specific area of arbitration, we
are concerned with the case in which the union fails to
promote the individual1s grievance due to either monetary
considerations or just the fact that the grievance "does
not merit union support." In either situation the employee
has much to lose. The problem arises when the individual
finds it necessary to bring action solely against his union
for lack of representation or against the company as well
for conspiring with the union against him. Admittedly,
there are many cases continually arising that by most
standards are insignificant, but by the same token, there
are others in which crucial issues are at stake. The
pressing problem is to attempt to draw the line between
where union leadership can use its discretion and where it
cannot.
Much work has been done in recent years with respect
to isolating and analyzing court decisions. Recent land
mark decisions, however, have served to alter the legal
framework in which the problem of individual rights to
arbitration is cast. The evolution of this "new philosophy"
is important and merits considerable elaboration.
160
Legal Foundations
The broad question of individual rights with respect
to labor unions has its legal foundation in the case of
Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley,^ heard
before the United States Supreme Court on June 11, 1945.
This case arose under the Railway Labor Act of 1934. The
Railway Labor Act provided employees the right to organize
without coercion or interference. The purpose, of course,
was to protect the individual from abuses associated with
his work environment. With the Elgin case, it became evi
dent that in some instances the employee would have to be
protected from the union's activities as well.
The background of the Elgin case is of interest.
Ten employees of the railway filed a grievance claiming
back pay for alleged violation of the starting time provi
sions of a collective agreement, in the aggregate amounting
to approximately $65,000. The claim arose out of a change
in employer at a train yard in Indiana. In ensuing nego
tiations, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen represented
•^Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company v.
Burley, 325 U. S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S.
661 (1946), 16 L.R.R.M. 749 (1946). In this and in
subsequently cited actions, the background material is a
paraphrasing of the language used in the text of the case.
161
all parties concerned. Agreement was reached on all
matters except starting time and a long controversy fol
lowed. Eventually the Brotherhood came to terms with the
company. Further confusion developed when secondary
disputes also arose and were subsequently settled by nego
tiation between the Brotherhood and the company.
The essence of the problem in the Elgin proceedings
was whether the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen possessed
the authority to agree to financial settlements on behalf
of the membership. The Railway claimed that it did and
that a settlement had been worked out with the union and
argued in the following way.
. . . the statute [Railway Labor Act], both by its
terms and by its purpose, confers upon the collective
agent the same exclusive power to deal with grievances,
whether by negotiation or contract, or by presentation
to the Board [National Railroad Adjustment Board] when
agreement fails, as is given with respect to major
disputes. And the aggrieved employee's rights of
individual action are limited to right of hearing
before the union and possibly also by the carrier.
The Court took a somewhat different view. Justice
Rutledge argued that it was not the intent of Congress to
submerge the individual interests. An individual's rights
would be meaningless "if the union, by coming to agreement
216 L.R.R.M. at 759.
162
with the carrier, could foreclose his claim altogether at
3
the threshold of the statutory procedure." Rutledge fur
ther pointed out that the collective agreement could not
deprive the employees of their individual rights as the
Railway Labor Act had no such intention, and it was his
view that individual rights may not be nullified merely by
an agreement between the carrier and the union in the
absence of any direct authorization to do so.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in the
Elgin case is important because prior to that decision the
unions were able to insist that "they were the exclusive
representatives not only for negotiating agreements but
also for settling grievances arising under such agree-
4
ments." The above cited case was additionally significant
in that it helped establish the wording of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Specifi
cally, section 9(a) illuminates "the congressional policy
5
to be effectuated in suits under section 301." The exact
^Idem at 760.
^Clyde W. Summers, "Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration," New York University Law Review,
XXXVII (May, 1962), 385.
^Ibid., p. 383.
163
words added were:
. . . and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representatives, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of
a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect: Provided further, That the bargaining . . .
representative has been given an opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.^
Clyde Summers comments on the purposes of adding
these words:
. . . the discussion was almost entirely in terms of
the individual’s rights and the proviso was viewed
through the eyes of the individual employee. Concern
focused not on the duty of the employer to bargain,
but on the relative rights of the individual and the
union. . . . The words added to the proviso were framed
with explicit reference to prior decisions. . . . the
effect of the proviso was measured against the Supreme
Courts decision in Elgin, Joliet and Eastern R.R. v.
Burley. . . . at a very minimum Congress intended to
secure by statute the individual rights recognized by
the Board [National Labor Relations Board] in Hughes
Tool [147 F. 2d 69 (5th cir 1945)], and to adopt the
principle of Elgin, Joliet.
Two additional early cases are worthy of mention.
g
The first is Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, a case which
arose under the National Labor Relations Act. In this
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), as
amended. Statutes at Large, LXI, sec. 9(a), 143 (1947).
^Summers, "Individual Rights in Collective Agree
ments and Arbitration," pp. 383-84.
®Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 33 0, 31
L.R.R.M. 2548 (1953).
164
instance the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
decide a case in which several union members brought suit
against the UAW-CIO and the Ford Motor Company. They
alleged that their positions on the seniority roster were
lowered because of certain provisions in the collective
bargaining agreements between Ford and the Union. The
complainants cited specific provisions in the agreement as
being in violation of their rights as provided for in the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. They further
felt that the Union had exceeded its authority under the
National Labor Relations Act by accepting these provisions.
They asked that the provisions be declared invalid as they
violated the seniority rights of the members. The relevant
sections of the N.L.R.A. are:
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. . . .
Sec. 9.(a) Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to pay, wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment. . . ®
^National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), as
165
In the view of Justice Burton, the powers of the
union as stipulated by the National Labor Relations Act are
broad enough so as to include considerations of seniority.
The implications here are much more important than the
decision itself. Burton went on to indicate that:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree
to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect
individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them
invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, sub
ject always to complete "good faith" and "honesty of
purpose" in the exercise of its discretion. ®
Thus the principle of union compromise and leader
ship discretion is firmly established. The court was now
thoroughly spelling out the principle that:
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal
strength from a delegation to the negotiators of a
discretion to make such concessions and accept such
advantages as, in the light of all relevant considera
tions, they believe will best serve the interests of
the parties represented.^'1 '
amended, Statutes at Large, LXI, secs. 7, 9(a), 140, 143
(1947) .
1031 L.R.R.M. at 2551. Quotation marks added for
emphasis.
11_,.
Ibid.
166
In a U. S. Court of Appeals case, that of Hard-
12
castle v. Western Greyhound Lines, the problem was similai
to that in the Huffman case. In this case a group of
employees, all bus drivers, brought suit against Western
Greyhound Lines and others alleging that they were dis
criminated against with regard to seniority classifications.
These individuals were all employed by Greyhound between
the period of June 1, 1957 and May 28, 1959. On January 10,
1958, the various locals representing the Greyhound employ
ees associated themselves into what was to be called the
Council of Western Greyhound Amalgamated Divisions. On
May 28, 1959, an agreement was entered into which super
seded all prior agreements with respect to seniority rights.
It provided that "only employees hired before June 1, 1957,
would be entitled to retain divisional seniority rights and
that all employees hired subsequently to June 1, 1957 would
13
have only system seniority rights." This was a consider
able distinction. The appellants alleged that this was an
unreasonable and retroactive action and as a result they
had been discriminated against.
12
Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F. 2d
182, 50 L.R.R.M. 2239 (9th Cir. 1962).
1350 L.R.R.M. at 2240.
167
Here the court explicitly and in great detail
14
developed what can be called the "bad faith" criteria.
Though the principle had previously been referred to in the
Huffman15 case, it took this litigation to properly empha
size that particular concept. The court pointed out that
in the present case the appellants have done nothing more
than indicate that there exists a difference of opinion
among the union membership. They are in essence dissatis
fied with a result adopted by a majority of their union
membership. The court further went on to say that:
There are no allegations of bad faith or purposeful
discrimination against appellants. Nor are there any
facts alleged from which we can infer the possible
presence of a bad faith motive in selecting June 1,
1957, as the date for starting system seniority.
Furthermore, appellants offered no facts in their offer
of proof from which the presence of hostile discrimina
tion could be detected by inference or otherwise. . . .
Collective bargaining representatives have broad
discretion to bargain with respect to seniority rights
and this discretion should not be interfered with in
14
In reality this line of reasoning was first
utilized in an action arising under the Railway Labor Act.
In this case, Steele v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 323 U. S.
192, 15 L.R.R.M. 708 (1944), the Supreme Court held that a
union which purports to represent its entire membership
must not engage in hostile discrimination against some
members, but must attempt to represent all fairly, impar
tially and in good faith.
15345 U. S. 330, 31 L.R.R.M. 2548 (1953).
168
the absence of some showing that a change in seniority
rights resulted from hostile discrimination.-'-®
The Miranda Case— A New Approach
17
The Miranda decision represented an important and
new approach. This litigation involved the National Labor
18
Relations Board. The essential elements in this case are
the following. Michael Lopuch was employed by the Miranda
Fuel Company. Since this was seasonal employment, the
agreement negotiated between the Teamsters (Lopuch1 s union)
and the company provided for the granting of a leave of
absence during the slack period without loss of seniority.
Lopuch applied for and received permission to take a leave
of absence but left Friday, April 12 instead of Monday,
April 15, which was the day designated in the contract.
The contract further stipulated that all workers were to
return to work on October 15. Lopuch was not able to
return on time due to illness. When Lopuch did report, he
1650 L.R.R.M. at 2243.
■^Miranda Fuel Co., Inc. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51
L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962) enforcement denied, 326 F. 2d 172,
54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
18
For a full and enlightening discussion of the
Miranda case and cases that preceded it, see R. W. Fleming,
The Labor Arbitration Process (Urbana, 111.: University of
Illinois Press, 1965), pp. 112-14.___________________________
169
found that the union had taken the position that he had
lost his seniority because of his failure to return to work
on the designated day. After being apprised of the fact
that his absence was due to illness, the union indicated
that he was still to be denied his seniority because he had
left his job too early. The company acquiesced to the
wishes of the union and placed Lopuch at the bottom of the
seniority list.
Upon hearing this case, the National Labor Relation
Board held for the first time that failure to represent a
member in good faith amounts to an unfair labor practice.
Specifically the Board indicated that:
Section 7 includes the right of employees to be
free from "unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment"
by the union which would violate the duty of fair
representation derived from Section 9. A breach by the
union of its Section 9 duty violates a Section 7 right
and therefore violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and, if the
employer participates, he violates Section (8)(a)(1).
One of the very significant aspects of this case
was that now the individual was provided with easier access
19
The present author relies upon the interpretation
offered by William P. Murphy, "The Duty of Fair Representa
tion under Taft-Hartley," Missouri Law Review, XXX (Summer,
1965), 378. Prior to this case, the N.L.R.B. had consid
ered only violations of section 8 to be unfair labor
practices and therefore under the purview of the Board.
170
to an adjudicating body. Prior to 1962, his only access
was to the courts which traditionally had been willing to
deal only with cases involving racial discrimination. As
a result, only a few cases had been taken to court and
this to some degree was caused by the high cost of litiga
tion. In the Miranda decision the N.L.R.B. was agreeing to
20
bear the financial burden of this type of action.
In concluding the Miranda case, the N.L.R.B. found
that Lopuch's reduction was arbitrary and his rights
guaranteed by the N.L.R.A. had been violated. Unfortunate
ly, the courts have refused to enforce the N.L.R.B.'s
ruling in this matter. The significance of this case
though, is that the Board was now taking decisive action
against discriminating unions. It is noteworthy that the
Board would continue to apply its theory in spite of the
21
adverse court ruling. In light of the Miranda decision,
the editorial staff of the Yale Law Journal felt prompted
to make the following remarks:
If the Board does succeed in extending its jurisdiction
to fair representation cases. There is a reasonable
prospect that the Board will act more aggressively and
perhaps more expertly than the courts have done . . .
20
Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process, p. 112.
21Ibid.
171
in elucidating standards to flesh out the duty. It is
not clear, however, that the role that fair representa
tion is designed to serve in federal labor law could be
effectuated by assigning jurisdiction over the duty to
the N.L.R.B. any better than it has been under the
27
aegis of the courts.
The principles established in the Huffman case and
the Hardcastle case figured in several additional federal
litigations. One worthy of mention at this point is Trotter
23
v. Street, Electric Railway Employees. In this case
several suburban Greyhound drivers brought suit that the
union entered into a particular seniority agreement with
the company that did not consider all relevant factors such
as total seniority, safety records, employment history and
other work related items. This they claimed, was discrimi
natory and sought that the union be enjoined from causing
Greyhound to give any force whatever to the agreement. The
court found that in this instance, much as in the cases of
Huffman and Hardcastle that the union acted reasonably and
did not violate the "bad faith" criteria. This case illus
trates the reluctance of the courts to find for the
22
"Federal Protection of Individual Rights under
Labor Contracts," Yale Law Journal, LXXIII (June, 1964),
123 8.
23
Trotter v. Street, Electric Railway Employees,
309 F. 2d 584, 51 L.R.R.M. 2424 (6th Cir. 1962).
172
employee. Had the remedy suggested in Miranda been used,
the outcome might have been different.
The Smith Case
In 1962 the Supreme Court considered the case of
24
Smith v. Evening News Association. Up to this point, the
courts had previously held that Section 3 01 of the Taft-
Hartley Act did not grant individuals the right to take
25
individual grievances of contract breaches to the courts.
In the Smith case, the court reversed itself. In this
instance Smith claimed that he had been discriminated
against by the company and that this was in breach of pro
visions of the contract. The Michigan court felt that
Smith did not have jurisdiction in the state courts basing
its view on prior decisions. The Supreme Court took a
counter position. It declared that Section 301 included
suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising from
2 6
a collective bargaining contract. The Court was thus
24Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U. S. 195,
51 L.R.R.M. 2646 (1962).
O C
See, Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Corporation, 348 U. S. 437,
35 L.R.R.M. 2643 (1955).
^"Federal Protection of Individual Rights under
Labor Contracts," p. 1227.
173
affirming that individuals could bring suits under
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Furthermore, in this
case the Supreme Court noted that with regard to Section 301
actions, the state and federal courts did not have to yield
jurisdiction to the N.L.R.B. even when an unfair labor
practice is involved. Prior to this decision an alleged
breach of contract would be handled as an unfair labor
practice thereby putting the issue under the purview of the
27
National Labor Relations Board. Now the Court was saying
that the jurisdiction of the District Courts prevails even
when an alleged contract breach constitutes an unfair labor
practice.
Donnelly: A Clarifying Case
While the courts were deliberating the general
aspects of individual rights, the case of Donnelly v.
2 8
United Fruit Co. delineated certain guidelines with
respect to an individual's rights to arbitration. Donnelly
had been employed by United Fruit as an assistant purser
^See, San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon,
359 U. S. 236 (1959).
^Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N. J. 61, 190 A.
2d 825, 53 L.R.R.M. 2271 (N.J. Sup. Ct., 1963).
174
for about four years. During that period he was a member
in good standing of an affiliate of the United Mine Workers.
The union and United Fruit had negotiated a contract which,
among other things,'gave permission to United Fruit to
discharge an employee for cause. Upon completion of a
voyage, Donnelly was informed that his services were no
longer needed and upon inquiry it was stated that the
company's reason was his alleged inefficiency. Donnelly
then proceeded to inform secretary-treasurer Edward J. Farr
of the union and asked that his problem be brought to the
attention of the appropriate committee established under
the provisions of the bargaining agreement. Upon investi
gation and thorough inquiry, Farr became convinced that the
discharge was for proper cause and declined to pursue the
matter any further. He advised Donnelly that he had "no
case." Connelly then submitted a letter of resignation
through Farr, but transmittal of that letter was to be
delayed until Donnelly received a letter of recommendation
from United Fruit. Donnelly received the letter but
thought it to be unsatisfactory. In November of 195 8
Donnelly brought a damage action claiming that the union's
refusal to arbitrate on his behalf violated the collective
bargaining agreement. The claim against the company was
175
for inappropriate discharge and refusal to arbitrate while
the claim against the union was for failure to arbitrate
on his behalf.
The court pointed out that prior to the rendering
of the opinion in the Smith case, the courts were not at
all responsive to individual suits arising from breaches of
contract. The courts held that such actions were limited
to parties to the contract— namely, the employer and the
labor organization. The Smith opinion did not, however,
delineate the scope of enforceable individual rights under
a labor-management contract regulating wages, hours and
conditions of employment. It was further indicated that in
the Smith case "no issue was presented there respecting the
grievance clause of such a compact, its breach tjy the union
or the employer, or the legal effect of their refusal of
the employee's demand to process in accordance with the
29
contract his alleged improper discharge grievances."
With direct reference to arbitration, the court
noted that:
As Smith has pointed out, however, Section 301 has been
applied to suits by unions to compel arbitration of
such individual grievances as rates of pay, hours of
2953 L.R.R.M. at 2277.
176
work and wrongful discharge; to obtain specific
enforcement of an arbitrator's award for reinstatement
and back pay to individual employees; and to recover
wage increases in a contest over the validity of the
bargaining contract.3^
In further elaborating on the issue, the court then
proceeded to cite a series of cases among them the famous
31
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills case, xn which xt
found precedent for the following statements.
. . . .it seems reasonable to say that in the evolution
of the law under Section 301, all aspects of arbitra
tion, whether the particular interest involved is that
of the individual or group, should and will receive
liberal judicial treatment to the fullest extent con
sistent with the federal labor policy as revealed in
the Labor Management Relations Act.32
The court found that the particular problems
involved were:
(1) The scope of the union's obligation under the con
tract to process his claim of discharge without
just causes
(2) The employee's right, if any, as an individual to
insist that the union, as the exclusive statutory
and contractual representative of all the employees,
invoke the grievance procedure in aid of his claim
of improper discharge, and
30Ibid.
31
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S.
448, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113 (1957).
3253 L.R.R.M. at 2278.
177
(3) Whether in the face of a refusal fay the union to
pursue the grievance procedure in his behalf, an
employee has a right under, or by virtue of, the
bargaining agreement to process the grievance
himself through to arbitration.33
With respect to the issues raised, the court noted
that a labor union which becomes the exclusive bargaining
representative of employees under the Labor Management
Relations Act becomes immeasurably powerful. Grave respon
sibility, though, accompanies that power. (Here the
principles established in the Huffman case were reiterated.
Specific reference was made to those elements relating to
"good faith" and "honesty of purpose"). The court further
indicated that when dealing with an employee who has been
discharged, the issues are vital. The purpose of the
bargaining agreement is not only to stabilize union-
management relations but also to adjust substantial job
interests of the employees. The court continued that:
If the protection of those employees1 interests is left
wholly to the unlimited discretion of the union, then
in a particular situation an important part of the
security the employee hoped to gain by union membership,
and which on the face of the bargaining contract he
appeared to have gained, might be lost without a fair
opportunity to defend himself or to realize upon the
benefits granted to him by the contract. And such loss
would occur even though the union acted in good faith
33Ibid.
178
in declining to use the grievance procedure to contest
the validity of his discharge from employment.34
The court further concluded that for the purposes
of the case under consideration, the individual has a right
to present his grievance to his employer when the union
declines to process it on his behalf. Employee rights
cannot be bargained away by the employer and the union.
When it comes to enforcing them, though, the substantive
terms of the agreement must be considered and in the par
ticular case of an employee appeal, "the union is entitled
to be heard and to insist upon an adjustment conforming to
35
the agreement." It was further stipulated that the
preferred way to pursue this action was for the aggrieved
to have asked the company to arbitrate as this was the
method which would be "least likely to cause discord in the
3 6
ordinary management-labor-union relations."
In concluding this case it is interesting to note
that the court did not find in favor of Donnelly. The
34
Idem at 2278-2279. Here the court makes use of
the reasoning developed in the article by Clyde W. Summers
entitled, "Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration."
^Idem at 2281.
36Ibid.
179
reasoning was that in this case the individual did not
undertake to process the grievance himself and by virtue of
this inaction there was no legal basis for litigation
against United Fruit.
The reactions to this case are interesting. R. W.
Fleming points out that shortly after the rendering of the
Donnelly decision the American Bar Association's Labor Law
Section polled many New Jersey labor lawyers in an attempt
to find out how they interpreted the outcome. Fleming
offers the following:
Some thought that to avoid litigation by individuals
the union would now have to take every discharge case,
meritorious or not, to arbitration. Others felt that
the union's obligation had decreased because doubtful
cases could now be discarded on the theory that the
individual could pursue his own remedy.
Obligation of the Grievant
38
The Maddox case of 1965 represents the next
important step in the litigation of individual rights. In
this particular case, Maddox, an employee of Republic Steel
^Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process, p. 117.
The author cites the following as his source: Report of the
Committee on State Labor Legislation, ABA Sect. of Lab. Rel.
Law 158 (1964).
38Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650
(1965).
180
Corporation attempted to sidestep available grievance
procedures in favor of a lawsuit. The Court in that
instance held that "it cannot be said that contract griev
ance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of
an aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to
39
implement the procedures and found them so." The Court
further pointed out that the employee "must attempt use of
the contract grievance procedure and must afford the union
40
the opportunity to act on his behalf." The Maddox case
was significant because the Federal Courts were acknowledg
ing their responsibility to hear individual cases, but
were first, demanding that the individual attempt to fulfill
all of the contractual options open to him.
Vaca v. Sipes: A Turning Point
In 1967 a landmark decision was rendered. In this
41
case, Vaca v. Sipes, the U. S. Supreme Court attempted
to fully detail and itemize the nature of the rights
possessed by an individual employee under a collective
(1967).
39 , . ,
Ibid.
40
Idem at 652-653.
^Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369
181
bargaining agreement. The background of the case was as
follows: In mid-1959, Benjamin Owens, a long-time high
blood pressure patient fell ill, took sick leave from his
employment with Swift and Company and entered the hospital.
During the period of his hospitalization, Owens lost con
siderable weight and simultaneously decreased his blood
pressure. Owens' personal physician certified that he
could return to work. Upon his return, Swift's company
doctor examined him and found that his condition was not
suitably altered so as to permit resumption of his work.
Owens then went to another outside doctor who also certi
fied him as sufficiently healthy to resume his job. Owens
now returned to the plant, and a company nurse permitted
him to return to his employment. When the company doctor
discovered that Owens had once again commenced work, he
was discharged on the grounds of poor health.
Owens then sought the aid of his union, the
National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, in securing
reinstatement. A grievance was promptly filed with Swift
on Owens' behalf. Eventually the grievance reached the
fourth step of the stipulated grievance procedure. Shortly
thereafter, the union sent Owens to another doctor in an
attempt to further clarify the state of his health. This
182
report was unfavorable and the executive board of the union
refused to take Owens' case to arbitration. Owens then
proceeded to initiate a legal suit in the Missouri courts
claiming that the union had not fairly represented him.
The jury found in favor of Owens, but the trial judge set
aside the verdict and entered judgment for the petitioners
on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over this controversy. Eventually
this case reached the Supreme Court of Missouri. This
court reversed and directed reinstatement of the jury's
verdict. The U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider whether exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
N.L.R.B. and, if not, whether the finding of union liability
and the relief afforded Owens are consistent with governing
42
principles of federal labor law."
The decision rendered in this case was important
but the comprehensive discussion offered by the Court was
even more meaningful. In fact it has been speculated that
"Justice White in writing the opinion of the Court deliber
ately went out of his way in order to clarify the confusion
which had heretofore existed with respect to this subject
4264 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
183
and which had been partially caused by his own opinion in
43
Humphrey v. Moore.1 1 As ambiguous as the Humphrey case
was# there was enough substance to prompt R. W. Fleming to
44
refer to certain elements as constituting a "new law."
In that case the Court held that even though a collective
bargaining agreement does not include a contractual obliga
tion for fair representation, such an obligation could be
assumed by virtue of the mere existence of the agreement.
Fleming continues by noting the following:
Such a ruling is significant for several reasons. In
the first place# it creates a wholly new cause of
action. Second# it federalizes the law which will be
applied in such cases since a 301 action# though prop
erly brought in either a state or federal court# is to
be decided by the application of federal law. Finally,
it seems to avoid the preemption problem because a
breach of contract claim, even by an individual,
A C
properly qualifies as a 3 01 action. . . .
At the outset of the Vaca case# the Court disposed
of the problem of preemption. The issue arose primarily
because it appeared that Owens in his suit was basically
43
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 55 L.R.R.M.
2031 (1964). Quoted material is taken from Edgar A. Jones,
Jr. and Peter M. Anderson, Arbitration and Federal Rights
under Collective Agreements, Report of the Committee on Law
and Legislation for 1967 (National Academy of Arbitrators,
1967), p. 2.
^Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process# p. 123.
^5Ibid., pp. 123-24.
184
claiming violations of various sections of the National
Labor Relations Act. As noted above, the Garmon case of
1959 had recognized the broad powers conferred by Congress
upon the National Labor Relations Board. Emerging from
that delegation of authority was the general rule that
neither state nor federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits directly involving Sections 7 or 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act. The Court in the present case, though,
noted that preemption doctrine has never been rigidly
applied except in those areas where it could be reasonably
inferred that Congress "intended exclusive jurisdiction to
4 6
lie with the N.L.R.B." In this connection the Court
further noted that:
Were we to hold, as petitioners and the government
urge, that the courts are pre-empted, . . . the indi
vidual employee injured by arbitrary or discriminatory
union conduct could no longer be assured of impartial
review of his complaint, since the [National Labor
Relations] Board's General Counsel has unreviewable
discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor prac
tice complaint. . . . The existence of even a small
group of cases in which the Board would be unwilling or
unable to remedy a unions breach of duty would frus
trate the basic purposes underlying the duty of fair
representation doctrine. For these reasons, we cannot
assume from the N.L.R.B.'s tardy assumption of juris
diction in these cases that Congress, when it enacted
N.L.R.A. Section 8(b) in 1947, intended to oust the
46
64 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
185
courts of their traditional jurisdiction to curb
arbitrary conduct by the individual employee's statu
tory representative.47
Once the Court had disposed of the problem of
jurisdiction, Justice White proceeded to fully discuss the
rights of individual employees under the applicable
statute, Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. From the
very beginning the Court rejected the view of Donnelly
which gave every individual the right to have his grievance
arbitrated. In this connection Justice White said the
following:
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a perfunctory fashion, we do not agree that the
individual employee has an absolute right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the pro
visions of the applicable collective bargaining agree
ment. . . . In providing for a grievance and arbitra
tion procedure which gives the union discretion to
supervise the grievance machinery and to invoke
arbitration, the employer and the union contemplate
that each will endeavor in good faith to settle
grievances short of arbitration. Through this settle
ment process, frivolous grievances are ended prior to
the most costly and time-consuming step in the griev
ance procedures. Moreover, both sides are assured that
similar complaints will be treated consistently, and
major problem areas in the interpretation of the
collective bargaining contract can be isolated and
perhaps resolved. And finally the settlement process
furthers the interest of the union as statutory agent
and as co-author of the bargaining agreement in repre
senting the employees in the enforcement of that
agreement. . . .
47Idem at 2374.
186
If the individual employee could compel arbitration
of his grievance regardless of its merit, the settle
ment machinery provided by the contract would be sub
stantially undermined, thus destroying the employer's
confidence in the union's authority and returning the
individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and
unsystematic negotiation. Moreover, under such a rule,
a significantly greater number of grievances would
proceed to arbitration. This would greatly increase
the cost of the grievance machinery and could so over
burden the arbitration process as to prevent it from
functioning successfully. 8
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that it has been
well established that under Section 301 the union must
represent individual employees fairly and in a nonarbitrary
way, and as a result the requirement of arbitration in
every instance is neither necessary nor desirable.
Therefore the importance of the Vaca case is
staggering. Unions now possess much flexibility in proc
essing grievances through to arbitration. All that is
required is that in "administering the grievance and
arbitration machinery as statutory agent of the employees,
a union must, in good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner
4
make decisions as to the merits of particular grievances."
With respect to Benjamin Owens in the present case,
the Supreme Court noted that the union had not breached its
48Idem at 2377.
4^Idem at 2378.
187
duty of fair representation. As a result the decisions of
the Missouri Supreme Court were reversed.
The rendering of the decision in the Vaca case
precipitated much discussion and disagreement. Justice
Hugo Black vigorously dissented. With respect to the
broader implications Black says the following:
The Court today opens slightly the courthouse door
to an employee's incidental claim against his union for
breach of its duty of fair representation only to shut
it in his face when he seeks direct judicial relief for
his underlying and more valuable breach-of-contract
claim against his employer. This result follows from
the Court's announcement in this case, involving an
employee's suit against his union, of a new rule to
govern an employee's suit against his employer. The
rule is that before an employee can sue his employer
under Section 301 of the L.M.R.A. for a simple breach
of his employment contract, the employee must prove not
only that he attempted to exhaust his contractual
remedies, but that his attempt to exhaust them'was
frustrated by "arbitrary, discriminatory or . . . bad-
faith" conduct on the part of his union.
Conclusions
Thus the path to secure an individual's rights to
fair representation and arbitration has been a winding one.
Even where the courts have acted, the results have been
less than overwhelming. For example, even though the Ninth
Circuit Court in 1962 in the Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound
50
Idem at 2382.
188
case explicitly indicated that a union's discretion may be
limited by virtue of the "bad faith" doctrine, this has
never really proven to be effective. This point is clearly
made in-a study by William P. Murphy, Professor of Law,
University of Missouri:
. . . the cases in which courts have upheld a complaint
as stating a cause of action are far more numerous than
those holding that the union has violated its duty.
Other factors have contributed to prevent the duty
of fair representation from being an efficacious doc
trine. The psychological impediments against suing the
union, the high costs of pursuing the claim through the
courts, and the inadequacy of the relief available have
discouraged frequent use of the doctrine.
What started out to be a movement towards unlimited
access to arbitration in the Donnelly case, received a
serious setback in the Vaca decision. This is regrettable.
Though Justice White is accurate in pointing to the vast
network of potential problems, he is at the same time pro
viding entirely too much discretion for the union leadership
and placing too much credence in the "bad faith" criteria.
The utilization of this approach prompts Justice Black to
make the following observation:
51William P. Murphy, "The Duty of Pair Representa
tion under Taft-Hartley," pp. 3 75-76.
189
The Court derives this standard of conduct from a long
line of cases holding that "a breach of the statutory
duty of fair representation occurs only when the unions
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."
What the Court overlooks is that those cases laid down
this standard in the context of situations where the
employee's sole or fundamental complaint was against
the union. There was not the slightest hint in those
cases that the same standard would apply where the
employee's primary complaint was against the employer
for breach of contract and where he only incidentally
contended that the union's conduct prevented the
adjudication, by either court or arbitration, of the
underlying grievance. . . . Either the employee should
be able to sue his employer for breach of contract
after having attempted to exhaust his contractual
remedies, or the union should have an absolute duty to
exhaust contractual remedies on his behalf. The merits
of an employee's grievance would thus be determined by
either a jury or an arbitrator. Under today's decision
it will never be determined by either.
Thus it now becomes incumbent upon the individual
to prove that his union's lack of action was-based upon
arbitrary or capricious considerations, terms which nobody
can adequately define. Of course as Justice White points
out, the standing of the union as a statutory agent is
enhanced but in the process, the interests of the injured
and aggrieved employee are completely overlooked. It is
indeed unfortunate that if the Court deemed it appropriate
to limit an individual's access to arbitration, that it did
5264 L.R.R.M. at 2383-2384.
190
not in the same action indicate when access was warranted.
To leave a rank-and-file worker with noting more than a
guarantee that his union will seek to represent him in a
nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory manner is grossly unsatis
factory. As a further consequence, Justice Black points
out that "in almost every Section 301 breach-of-contract
suit by an employee against an employer, the employee will
have the additional burden of proving that the union acted
53
'arbitrarily or in bad faith.'"
The legal developments after the Vaca case are
interesting and will be presented in the next chapter.
^ Idem at 2385. Underlining added by author for
emphasis.
CHAPTER VI
THE AFTERMATH OF THE VACA DECISION
The Vaca case had a significant impact on the
courts. Within a few short months, many important deci
sions were handed down that related either directly or
indirectly to the principles established in Vaca.^ One of
the more interesting developed in the U. S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey. This was the case of
2
Dessingue v. S. Klein Department Stores.
The case developed when the plaintiff, a refrigera
tion and heating engineer for S. Klein Department Stores,
Incorporated, brought suit against the company as well as
his union for back pay and failure to pursue his grievance.
The plaintiff, a member in good standing of the Interna
tional Union of Operating Engineers, was informed by a
^Though only a few are mentioned here, the reader
should bear in mind that these are only a small sampling.
2
Dessingue v. S. Klein Department Stores, 66
L.R.R.M. 2569 (D.N.J. 1967).
191
192
company representative that he had been laid off due to
budgetary considerations. Upon receiving his notification
and before leaving his job, the plaintiff charged that by
virtue of a newly established collective bargaining agree
ment, he was entitled to back pay from Klein's. The claim
was made to Klein's through the shop steward of the union,
but the company allegedly neglected the claim. The filing
was in the form of a grievance transmitted by the shop
steward to a clerk in the office of the employer's person
nel department. The present suit resulted when the plain
tiff, recognizing that no response was to be forthcoming
from either Klein's or the union, decided to bring suit on
his own.
Upon review of the facts, the court noted that at
no time did the plaintiff request or expect the union to
process his discharge by way of the grievance procedure.
In fact the court found ample evidence that the plaintiff
accepted the termination of his employment and only checked
with the union from time to time to see if there were any
jobs available. With respect to the issue of back pay, the
court found that although the shop steward and the plain
tiff sought to communicate with the business agent of the
union in regard to processing the claim, there is no
193
evidence that the business agent, who had the authority to
determine whether the claim should be processed, ever
received a formal request for processing. Therefore the
court concluded that there was no evidence to support the
claim that the union failed to act on behalf of the plain
tiff in processing his claim for back pay or that there was
any collusion between Klein's and the union with regard to
denying the plaintiff his rights. The court concluded that
the plaintiff failed "to show any evidence that the union
maliciously or in bad faith caused or induced, or conspired
with his employer to cause or induce, the employer's
3
refusal to honor the back pay claim. ..."
The significance of this case is considerable. The
court was now placing the full responsibility of protection
of rights upon the individual. It appeared, furthermore,
that the court was ignoring the fact that a business agent
by virtue of his position, takes on much of the responsi
bility of protecting the employment rights of the union
membership. In fact, the business agent, a salaried union
official, is in an excellent position to introduce actions
as he is usually involved in a close working relationship
^Idem at 2574.
194
with management. Moreover, it is completely unrealistic to
place the full burden of initiating grievances upon the
rank-and-file who in many cases are too unsophisticated or
insecure to properly act on their own behalf.
Modifications of the Vaca Doctrine
4
The case of Zalejko v. Radxo Corporation of Amerxca
is another extremely interesting by-product of the Vaca
decision. The facts in this case involve a plaintiff who
was employed by Radio Corporation of America from 1956
until her termination in December of 1962. In September,
the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and
found it impossible to continue to work. Her personal
physician advised her to return to work only when she felt
physically fit. The plant physician, after examining her,
granted her a leave of absence. After the passage of two
months, the plaintiff was again examined by the plant
physician and subsequently an orthopedic surgeon. Both con
cluded that she could return to work. As a result, her
medical leave was terminated and she was advised to return
to the plant. The plaintiff refused as she felt not yet
^Zalejko v. Radio Corporation of America, 236 A, 2d
160; 67 L.R.R.M. 2259 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
195
physically able to return and was furthermore utilizing her
own physician's recommendations as justification. The
plaintiff was terminated and she immediately presented her
grievance to her union representative for processing. Her
claim was that RCA had no right to terminate her while on
medical leave of absence.
The plaintiff's union then proceeded to process her
grievance through the preliminary steps. During this period
the union and RCA had numerous discussions and eventually
the company advised the union that they would reinstate her
if she would return to work immediately. The plaintiff
refused as her personal physician had indicated that she
was not yet physically capable. As a result, the union
decided to notify RCA that it would not take the case to
arbitration. The question that the lower court faced under
the Vaca principles was whether or not the union had acted
in "bad faith" in failing to promote the plaintiff's
grievance. The lower court judge found that while the union
had acted without "bad faith . . . the union has not ade
quately or did not adequately represent Mrs. Zalejko at
step three or step four of the grievance procedure. So,
5
she should have the opportunity."
567 L.R.R.M. 2260.
196
The judge further pointed out that neither the
union nor the company had sufficiently examined all of the
medical testimony and as a result the union had not ade
quately represented the plaintiff. In arguing along these
lines the court was wisely equating the words "duty of fair
representation" with "duty of adequate representation.1 1
Having established these lines of reasoning, the
court concluded that Mrs. Zalejko's claim was meritorious.
The present court being in agreement with the lower court
on these issues upheld the plaintiff's claim.
It is the opinion of this author that the decision
in the above case is important for at least one major
reason. It now appeared that the courts were once again
trying to insert some breadth into what was a very restric
tive and limiting doctrine enunciated in the Vaca case.
Though RCA vigorously argued that the word "fair" could
not be equated with "adequate," both the lower court and
Superior Court were liberally asserting that by not "ade
quately representing" the employee, the union had breached
its statutory duty of fair representation as defined in
6
Vaca.
6Idem at 2661.
197
From the present vantage point, it appears that the
Vaca case probably did more to confuse the issue of indi
vidual rights with respect to access to the grievance
machinery than it did to help alleviate the uncertainty.
The courts had never really defined what they meant by
"arbitrary," "discriminatory" or in "bad faith," and the
ensuing case illustrates just how confused the definitional
problem had become. The case of Dorris v. Local 1435
7
Electrical Workers arose when a Mrs. Mary K. Dorris brought
suit against her employer for wrongful discharge from her
job and against her union for its refusal to take her
grievance through to arbitration. Mrs. Dorris claimed that
she had been physically attacked by a fellow employee and
that she was subsequently fired for violating a company
rule against fighting. She further claimed that the plant
manager and community relations supervisor had wrongfully
charged her and knew their charge to be untrue and when she
approached her union and requested arbitration, the union
subsequently refused to comply.
The plaintiff then took her claim to the Chancery
Court and subsequently to the Mississippi Supreme Court
^Dorris v. Local 1435, Electrical Workers, 218 So.
2d 896, 70 L.R.R.M. 2671 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1969).
198
where she received a favorable response. The interesting
fact here is that the court was content to find for the
plaintiff without apparently questioning the union leader
ship as to their reason or reasons for not having taken her
case to arbitration in the first place. The fact that
Mrs. Dorris had been an employee in good standing for about
fifteen years may have influenced the court to look upon
her claims with favor. This, however, can be no more than
speculation as no more evidence is presented. In any event,
this case illustrates that some sort of meaningful defini
tion of the Vaca concepts is needed. The Dorris case is by
no means unique in its arbitrariness for there have been
g
several quite similar.
In January of 1969 the U. S. District Court rendered
a meaningful decision which it is hoped will establish
g
guidelines for the future. This case, Price v. Teamsters
initially arose as a result of a dispute relating to
g
There are many interesting cases that illustrate a
good deal of arbitrariness on the part of the courts. See
for example, Palmieri v. United Steelworkers of America, 65
L.R.R.M. 2709 (W.D. Pa. 1967), and Watson v. Teamsters, 399
F. 2d 875, 69 L.R.R.M. 2099 (5th Cir. 1968).
^Price v. Teamsters, 71 L.R.R.M. 2167 (D.E. Pa.
1969) .
199
seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement.
Among other things, the plaintiffs, members in good stand
ing of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters claimed
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation.
They further claimed that this violated a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement which provided for seniority
considerations by entering into a formal agreement with the
company with respect to dovetailing, in the event of trans
fer of operations. The issue arose when the Teamsters
found itself representing two groups of employees, the
transferred drivers and those previously assigned to the
terminals and relay points. The claim specifically pointed
out that the IBT failed to enforce the provisions respecting
terminal seniority and that the union found itself repre
senting two disputing factions and was therefore placed in
a conflict of interest position.
The court now reaffirmed the principles established
10
earlier in Humphrey v. Moore. Here it was pointed out
"that a union's duty of fair representation included its
activities in administering a collective bargaining contract
■^Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 55 L.R.R.M.
2031 (1964).
200
as well as negotiating it."
11
Prom this the court con
cluded that the plaintiffs were justified in their claims
based on the Vaca decision. More significantly, in its
discussion though, the court cited and supported an opinion
presented in a Supreme Court Review article by T. Lewis
which if employed, would help eliminate the constant con
fusion arising under Vaca and similar cases. In this
connection the court made the following statement:
An extremely constructive suggestion has been made
that when an employee complains of the administration
of an existing collective bargaining agreement, a
determination of the union's duty toward the employee
need not be separated from an analysis of the language
of the contract under which he is claiming. The court
would view the problem as a whole, avoid the breach of
duty-contract interpretation analysis, and possibly
develop requirements of fair dealing which demand more
than the absence of hostility and invidious discrimi-
point. The defendant IBT contended that the U. S. District
Court did not have jurisdiction since the "plaintiffs had
failed to exhaust mandatory internal remedies under the
1 7
nation.
The court proceeded to make another interesting
constitution of the International Union."
13
Here the court
11
71 L.R.R.M. at 2169
12
Idem at 2170
Ibid
201
noted that it would have been futile to require the plain
tiffs to exhaust internal remedies "in the face of a united
14
labor— management position." This aspect of the decision
is very much in line with the dissenting views of Justice
Black in the Vaca case. Black had pointed out that really
the Vaca case in conjunction with its predecessor, the
15
Maddox decision amounted to the establishment of a "new
rule" which at the very least forced an aggrieved employee
to exhaust all of his contractual remedies within the exist
ing framework before seeking aid in the court. The District
Court was now significantly and thoroughly clarifying the
issue.
A few short months after the Price decision, the
U. S. District serving the District of Connecticut handed
down a similar and therefore reenforcing verdict. This
is the well known case of Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid
Co.^ This case involved an employee who, after two back
operations, found himself not physically capable of
14Ibid. This possibility had been recognized
earlier in the Vaca case.
15379 U. S. 650 (1965). For a fully detailed dis
cussion of Justice Black's dissenting view, see above.
1
Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co. 71 L.R.R.M.
2050 (D. C. Conn. 1969) .
202
maintaining his job as a painter for American Cyanamid.
Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, an
individual was entitled to transfer to a job of equal or
lower classification if he so desired and if one happened
to be available. Based on this provision, Leo Desrosiers
sought such a transfer and attempted to secure one by
allegedly making numerous requests to both the company and
the union. His request for transfer was not granted and
subsequently his employment with the company was terminated.
Desrosiers' first step was to bring an action
against the company for violation of the collective bar
gaining agreement. The lower courts dismissed his claim on
the basis of Maddox pointing out that Desrosiers had not
utilized the grievance procedures as stipulated in the
agreement. In further litigation, Desrosiers raised the
issues that the union had breached its duty of fair repre
sentation by virtue of the fact that the union and the
company had conspired to deprive him of his rights under
the existing contract.
The court first approached the question of whether
or not Desrosiers was entitled to proceed with his claim
inasmuch as he had not in fact utilized the grievance pro
cedure. It first pointed out that under a narrow
203
interpretation of Vaca, he would not be permitted to do so
in light of the fact that at least the first step of the
grievance procedure, the putting of his complaint in
writing, was one which could have been taken even without
union cooperation. Nevertheless the District Court chose
to adopt a broader view. In so doing, the court made the
following statement:
. . . where the union will not help an employee secure
rights against the employer, the employee's attempts
to comply with grievance procedures are likely to be
futile. It undoubtedly is the union which normally
would inform the employee of the necessary steps in the
grievance procedure— such as putting the grievance in
writing. . . . 1^
The court next pointed out that the union had
apparently told the plaintiff that "it was preferable to
obtain a transfer by peaceable means rather than by use of
18
the grievance procedures." This the court noted "could
be read to indicate that the union effectively prevented
resort to the contractual grievance procedures thereby
bringing the case within the narrower interpretation of
..19
Vaca.
The principles established in Price and Desrosiers
are important. In both cases the District Courts are
^Idem at 2054.
18 . „ 19, .
Ibid. Ibid.
204
backing off somewhat from the very rigid and confining
positions of earlier decisions— especially that of Vaca.
The impact of this emerging philosophy will no doubt tend
to weaken Vaca as the interpretation now seems to be that a
union, by virtue of its basic function, must aid the
employee in pressing his case, even though this may require
leading him step by step through the grievance machinery.
Not to do so, amounts to a possible breach of the union's
duty of fair representation which is clearly worthy of
adjudication under the most restrictive interpretation of
Vaca.
20
The recent case of Canning v. Stevens, Inc. is
one of the more interesting and complex decisions to emerge
from a state court with respect to individual rights. The
case arose when unionized restaurant employees of a race
track in New York State complained that the gratuities
earned from serving at special party dinners were inade
quate. The collective bargaining agreement between Harry M.
Stevens, Inc. and the union provided that each customer
attending a special party dinner would pay a flat rate
gratuity of 54£ which was included in a "package special"
^Canning v. Stevens, Inc. 72 L.R.R.M. 2610 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969).
205
offered by the race track. The employees customarily
earned larger gratuities by waiting on patrons who were
dining independently of any "package deal" arrangement. A
group of employees demanded that the H. M. Stevens Company
raise the gratuity and at the same time curtail promotion
of the "package deal." This policy, they contended, would
enable them to earn greater income.
As a result of inaction on the part of the company,
the waiters commenced a work slowdown during one of the
special party dinners. The purpose of this was to vividly
display their dissatisfaction with the 54C gratuity. The
next day a meeting of all the concerned parties was
arranged. The result was that Stevens agreed to raise the
gratuity to 75C, the additional 21C to come from Stevens'
potential profits. Though it was pointed out that the 75<=
was still below the average of $1.00 per person for an a la
carte meal, the union leadership was satisfied in that the
new offer significantly exceeded the gratuity stipulated
in the contract.
The union leadership next advised the members of
the offer, asked that they accept it, and further pointed
out that there was a "no-strike" clause in the agreement.
The consequences of a walkout were also noted. Apparently,
206
many of the members were still dissatisfied. Stevens sub
sequently informed all parties that no further raise could
be expected. Another meeting ensued. At this time, the
Chairman of the New York State Harness Racing Commission
advised the union membership that:
if anyone violated the "no-strike" clause in the agree
ment and there was an illegal strike, and if a court
order enjoined the strike, any participant would suffer
a suspension or revocation of his license to work at a
Harness track in New York State.^
After the meeting with the Commissioner, the union
officials advised the membership that they were unable to
further increase the gratuity and urged the membership to
go back to work. Stevens then informed the employees to
either return to their stations, as the dinner hour was
approaching, or leave the premises. Racetrack security
was informed of Stevens' position and asked those employees
not willing to work to leave the premises. The following
day a picket line was established, and once again the union
leadership urged the dissident members to return to work.
The striking employees, plaintiffs, invoked the
principles developed in Vaca in bringing their case before
the courts. They claimed that the defendant union acted in
"bad faith" and violated its duty of fair representation
21Idem at 2612.
207
"in failing to pursue the exclusive arbitration procedures
22
provided by the collective bargaining agreement. ..."
The New York State Supreme Court flatly rejected this
charge utilizing the same precedent. The court pointed out
that the defendant union continually sought the return of
the employees and observed the members1 constant defiance
of the union leadership. Consequently, when Stevens con
sidered the "striking employees' employment terminated by
23
their illegal actions," the union was not obligated to
press for arbitration as it is well established that "an
employee's participation in a 'wildcat' strike in breach of
a no-strike clause constitutes valid grounds of deeming the
24
employment terminated."
The court, in this decision, seemed to be setting
forth the principle that rebellious employees, i.e., those
who violate fair and nondiscriminatory union dictates based
22 23
Idem at 2613. Ibid.
^ Ibid. The precedent for this court's decision is
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. 370 U.S. 238,246, 50
L.R.R.M. 2433 (1962). In that case the U. S. Supreme Court
said: "It is universally accepted that the no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement at the very
least establishes a rule of conduct or condition of employ
ment the violation of which by employees justifies
discipline or discharge."
208
on the contract, cannot bring charges against the union for
protection of their employment rights when they themselves
participate in illegal activities. From the present
author's point of view, this is certainly an appropriate
decision. If union membership is permitted to ignore
leadership directives, especially when based on legally
binding collective bargaining agreements, and then sue in
the courts for protection of their rights, labor unions
will be reduced to ineffective, second rate parties to any
future negotiations with management. One of the absolutely
necessary attributes of labor unions is internal strength
during contract negotiations. This can only be preserved
if the membership stands behind the leadership at least
with respect to contract interpretation and enforcement.
At the present writing it is too soon to know
whether the aggrieved employees will seek satisfaction from
a higher court. It is hoped that in the interest of future
labor relations, any subsequent court will maintain the
enlightened position taken by the New York State Supreme
Court.
209
Vaca and Its Relation to the
Arbitration Function
The first half of 1970 witnessed many cases per
taining to Vaca. Several of the more important considered
the arbitration function. One of these was Nuest v.
25
Westinghouse Air Brake Co. The plaintiff in this case
was an employee of Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO)
and a long time member in good standing of his union. In
1965 the plaintiff suffered a back injury and subsequently
underwent an operation. His back problems continued for a
period of two years. During this time he was paid a year's
sick leave. In February of 1968 the plaintiff refused to
perform work which the WABCO medical director had author
ized. WABCO interpreted this to signify that the plaintiff
was severing himself from his position. The plaintiff's
union then carried his discharge to arbitration where his
employment was restored without seniority loss provided he
accept a job approved by the medical director. He was not
to receive back pay, however. Eventually he was discharged
by the company because of his inability to safely perform
his job. This termination was sustained by an arbitrator
25
Nuest v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 74 L.R.R.M.
2564 (D. So. 111. 1970).
210
in a later proceeding promoted by the union. The plaintiff
then made the following charge:
The . . . complaint against WABCO is that it breached
the successive collective bargaining agreement in a
number of specified ways, causing substantial financial
loss to plaintiff and against Lodge 15 8 and Interna
tional in that they . . . have failed and refused to
represent the plaintiff in specified wilful and inten
tional instances and ways, including collusion with
WABCO to injure plaintiff and deny him his contract
rights.26
The first issue that the court dealt with was that
of jurisdiction. The defendants pointed out that the Maddox
decision required the individual to attempt to use the
existing grievance machinery before litigating in the
courts. The present court countered this defense by point
ing out that in this situation, though, the "union had the
sole power to invoke the higher stages of the grievance
27
machinery." The defendants also claimed that "the alle
gations of the complaint" constitute a collateral attack on
2 8
arbitrator's decisions. ..." At this point the court
enunciated the current legal view of an arbitrator's power.
The court said:
This court does observe that both of the collective
bargaining agreements under consideration here provide
26Idem at 2567. 27Idem at 2568.
28.,.,
Ibid.
211
that an arbitrator's award shall be final and binding
on all parties, and the court is conscious that the
federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitra
tion would be undermined if the courts reviewed the
merits of an award. Steelworkers v. Enterprises Wheel
and Car Corporation, 363 U. S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423
(1960). However an arbitrator's award is binding only
on the issues submitted to him and decided by him
within the scope of the powers enumerated in the agree
ment. If the arbitrator exceeds his authority under
the contract, the decision is void and unenforceable to
2 9
the extent such power is exceeded.
From this vantage point the court concluded that
the complaint does not constitute a collateral attack on
the arbitrator's decision since the claims, with the excep
tion of the claim for back pay, have not been brought forth
in either of the two arbitration hearings.
The court next proceeded to the most vital issue.
That is, "whether [the] court has any jurisdiction to
determine the merits of the allegations of the complaint
involving interpretation or application of the terms of the
collective bargaining agreements.Here the court
referred partly to Vaca in stating that if:
the allegations seek only the enforcement of clear
terms of such agreements, devoid of any questions of
interpretation or application, then the court may
properly reach the merits of the claims. . . . Contra-
distinctively, if the claims involve the interpretation
or application of such an agreement, this court's
jurisdiction is strictly confined to the determination
29 30
Ibid. Idem at 2569.
2X2
of whether or not the dispute is "arbitrable." Steel
workers v. American Manufacturing Co. 363 U. S. 564,
569, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (I960).31
The court now went on to point out that the major
parts of the plaintiff's claims against WABCO involved
issues of individual rights under interpretations of the
collective bargaining agreement. Though, the subject of
his discharge had been presented to an arbitrator, the
lateral issues of health benefits, insurances, et cetera
were not. These areas lie properly within the purview of
an arbitrator whose decisions are binding. The court con
cluded that no further action relative to the plaintiff's
claims would be taken until the issues pertaining to his
discharge are placed before an arbitrator. As a side
issue, the court noted that the original arbitrator's
decision restoring the employee to his job and granting full
seniority rights, but denying back pay was incorrect as
this holding was inconsistent with the collective bargain
ing agreement which stated that:
If an employee is found by this procedure to have been
unjustifiably discharged, he shall be reinstated and
compensated for time lost.^
In light of this clause, the arbitrator went beyond his
authority. The court pointed out that this issue remains
^Ibid. ^Idem at 2570.
213
open and the question of back pay is merely one of proof of
worthiness.
The significance of this case is that the court was
formally transferring some of its potential responsibility
to the arbitrator. In this sense, it is promoting the
arbitration function. It is asserting that an individual
must first utilize the arbitration process to press his
claims if they fall within the provisions of the contract.
At the same time, the court is noting that should access to
arbitration be blocked by virtue of unfair or discriminatory
action on the part of the unions, the courts stand ready to
litigate on behalf of the individual. The court is now
also reaffirming that the individual's access to the
exhaustion of his remedies is to be unimpeded. It fre
quently happens, as in the above case, that the union has
the "sole power to invoke the higher stages of the griev
ance machinery." In such a situation it may be impossible
for an individual to exhaust his remedies. When this
occurs, the court is providing that the mere attempt to
exhaust internal union remedies might be sufficient under
the Maddox principles to bring the issue before the courts.
This coincides nicely with the decision in Desrosiers v.
American Cyanamid Co. (See above.)
214
One final case is worthy of mention at this point.
33
This is the case of Lusk v. Eastern Products Corporation
and its real importance stems from the court's discussion
of the arbitration principle.
In this particular case the union entered into an
agreement with management to "freeze" shift differentials.
The union viewed this as a compromise made necessary by the
desire for a pension plan. A minority group of dissatis
fied members initiated a grievance and the union presented
it to the company. At the same time the plaintiffs brought
suit in the federal court under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act claiming inadequate representation.
The court decided to refrain from taking any action until
the grievance procedure/ possibly culminating in arbitra
tion, was completed. After hearing arguments from counsel
for the employees, the arbitrator rendered his decision.
He maintained that the grievance was without merit. In
rendering his opinion, the arbitrator noted that there was
no evidence "of deceit or improper representation by union
representatives.
33
Lusk v. Eastern Products Corporation, 74 L.R.R.M.
2594 (4th Cir. 1970).
^4Idem at 2596.
215
After the arbitrator rendered his decision, the
District Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. The
plaintiffs then appealed to the present court. The Court
of Appeals now developed a principle which had had its
35
genesis xn many earlier cases. The court said xn part:
. . . The allegations of a complaint alleging a
breach of a union1s duty of fair representation must
contain more than conclusory statements alleging
improper representation; conclusory allegations without
specifying supporting facts to show the^ijnion's lack of
good faith fail to state a valid claim.
The court further pointed out that:
Here plaintiffs complained of an illegal combination
between the Union and Company in language which was
purely conclusory with no specific allegations to sup
port the charges. Since such allegations are insuffi
cient to state a claim of improper representation by
the Union or collusion between Union and Company, the
lower court could have dismissed plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim. 37
The court now noted that the complaint was dis
missed by the lower court, not because the plaintiffs had
failed to state a claim but because the court felt that the
•^See for example, Balowski v. International U.,
United A:, A. and A. Imp. Wkrs., 372 F. 2d 829, 835, 64
L.R.R.M. 2397 (6th Cir. 1967); Hardcastle v. Western Grey
hound Lines, 303 F. 2d 182, 186, 50 L.R.R.M. 2239 (9th
Cir. 1962), Cert, denied, 371 U. S. 920, 51 L.R.R.M. 2616;
Brown v. Truck Drivers and Help Loc. U. No. 395 Baltimore,
Md., 264 F. Supp. 776, 64 L.R.R.M. 2574 (D. Md. 1967).
3674 L.R.R.M. 2596. 37Ibid.
216
nature of their problem fell within the arbitration process.
This in the view of the Court of Appeals was incorrect.
the same, this lower court decision if permitted to stand,
would have dovetailed nicely with the Nuest v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co. decision (see above) in that it placed con
siderable reliance on the arbitration process. The present
court now indicated that:
Where an employee member of a union bases his case
upon a conspiracy or an illegal combination between his
union and his employer to deprive him of his rights he
cannot be forced to submit that issue to arbitration
between the employer and the union since such procedure
would entrust representation of the complaining employee
to the very union which he claims refused him fair
representation and because it would present as adver
saries in the arbitration process the two parties
d by the employee with combining to defraud
the Nuest case. One can only point out that it appears
inconsistent with the previously cited judicial attempt at
broadening the arbitration function.
the grievance procedure suffered an unfortunate setback
Although the substance of the issues is not quite
Certainly one cannot dispute the court's logic in
Conclusions
The evolution of an individual's legal rights to
38Idem at 2596-2597.
217
when the Vaca decision was handed down. However, it is
evident, at least to this author, that the courts have con
scientiously attempted to weaken the impact of that
decision by an indirect but effective route; that being the
consistent undermining of the Maddox rule. Access to the
courts is now possible if an individual can prove lack of
"good faith" by showing that his union did not help him
exhaust his internal remedies. Prior to this, the individ
ual had to attempt to thoroughly exhaust his contractual
remedies and then prove that his attempts were frustrated
and finally, he had to establish that his claim was valid.
This heavy burden fell exclusively on the rank-and-file
member.
The courts have also, where possible, provided a
liberal definition of the verbiage found in Vaca. This was
obvious in Zalejko where the extremely broad word, "ade-
quate,1 ' was used to expand the applicability of the
existing doctrine.
Recent developments seemed to be pointing towards
greater reliance on the arbitration function as a means of
facilitating adjudication of various claims. The courts in
such a situation would have the primary responsibility of
seeing to it that rights to arbitration are protected.
218
Exact determination of issues would be left with the
arbitrator. The Lusk decision, however, seems to cloud
this view and leaves the lines of demarcation as imprecise
as ever.
The legal status of an individual in the face of a
collective bargaining agreement is still very much in doubt.
What is needed now is a redefining decision— one that would
update Vaca in light of the latest interpretations. This
new decision would hopefully resolve the semantic confusion
and in so doing provide precise and meaningful guidelines
to those labor and management personnel that constantly
confront these issues.
CHAPTER VXI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Countless authors have offered views as to whether
or not democracy should be a crucial ingredient in the
internal mechanisms of labor unions. The debate really
centers around the problem of determining just what kind of
an institution a labor union is and what function it ought
to serve. It is a fact that labor unions are in many ways
similar to public governments. Certainly they demand
loyalty and obedience, but they are differentiable in that
they lack comprehensive methods of enforcing their dictates.
Still, those sanctions possessed are so powerful that one
runs the very real risk that his access to employment might
be restricted or in fact denied. This consideration alone,
at least in the abstract, establishes the need for some
type of democracy within labor organizations. It would
seem that all further arguments rejecting the importance of
democracy overlook this crucial point.
219
220
It is true of course, that unions are multi-purpose
institutions and as such are constantly faced with conflict
ing functions. But too frequently, there is a proneness to
disregard the needs and desires of particular individuals
in the name of group solidarity. Where this happens it is
most unfortunate, because the losses to any member of the
bargaining unit are potentially so great as to deprive him
of his basic economic rights.
There are formidable problems associated with the
insuring of democracy within labor unions. In the first
place, there are those areas which could conceivably con
flict with the maintenance of union strength. Secondly,
there exist barriers which are outgrowths of a desire on
the part of certain individuals to use labor unions as
vehicles for their own personal aggrandizement. It is
quite possible that individuals such as these are not con
sciously attempting to subvert rank-and-file interests. In
fact, men resembling the late John L. Lewis of the United
Mine Workers and Walter Reuther of the United Automobile
Workers may well have been convinced that they were uniquely
capable. Consequently, to them, retention of office and
control was a prerequisite for economic gain and security on
the part of the rank-and-file. Even though it is true that
221
this possibility exists, the inequities associated with the
creation of an internalized, unresponsive bureaucracy are
too great.
The backgrounds of those who rise to positions of
top leadership vary. All, however, seem to possess certain
characteristics which ultimately set them off from the
rank-and-file. To a man, the well known, successful leaders
are aggressive, knowledgeable and capable of commanding
respect and loyalty. They are men who perceive their posi
tions to be more than vehicles for earning large sums of
money. This fact is obvious when one notes that many could
receive significantly larger amounts in alternative occupa
tions. It would seem that on balance, the considerable
prestige enjoyed by those who achieve high office is
sufficient to encourage them to eagerly pursue positions of
leadership and fight tenaciously to retain them.
The methods of job control are well known and it is
here that the critics find much support for their asser
tions that labor unions are not truly democratic institu
tions. As soon as a man is elected national union presi
dent, he immediately establishes a political structure that
is sympathetic to his views.- Frequently, these subordinates
have worked with him in other capacities and have been
222
carefully groomed for the job. Their selection is a
natural development since the cost of training other indi
viduals is probably prohibitive. In any case, those that
are chosen, serve as a protective and insulating super
structure within which the top elected official can func
tion. Since their jobs are appointive, it would be naive
to assume that these bureaucrats would not back the incum
bent president in future elections.
Union presidents also control the union press. In
such a way they are able to govern what news and information
is made available to the rank-and-file. Very few national
union newspapers make space available for opposition candi
dates. This problem is compounded because individuals
seeking other channels to publicize their viewpoints,
frequently find that the parent union will refuse to provide
mailing lists of the membership. In some cases, unions
such as the Actor’s Equity Association will make distribu
tive machinery available to opposition candidates, but even
when this occurs, the cost of distribution must usually be
borne by the individual.
In the course of the McClellan Committee hearings,
many abuses of the trusteeship principle were revealed.
Either by actual or threatened usage of trusteeships, unions
223
such as the Teamsters have stifled dissent and reduced
criticism to a virtually nonexistent level and in so doing,
have insured continuous reelection for many officers.
The' discipline procedure has also been frequently
used to maintain positions of power. The most unfortunate
aspect of the entire mechanism is the fact that in many
cases the leadership of the union passes judgment on the
guilt or innocence of those that they have accused.
Furthermore, the appeals process is unwieldy and the appeals
committee at the national convention is greatly limited due
to time and financial considerations. The most significant
innovation here was the establishment of the United Auto
mobile Workers' Public Review Board.
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act) of 1959 represented an attempt by
Congress to eliminate these threats to democracy within
labor unions. The Act had some measure of success, but it
appears as though the courts have been less than eager to
vigorously enforce the law. The greatest success of the
LMRDA seems to be in the area of trusteeship regulation.
Many authors writing about the desirability of
democracy in labor unions circumvent the really crucial
consideration. For the most part they have not given
224
adequate and comprehensive thought to what the rank-and-
file member expects from his union. It is a distinct
possibility that "textbook-type" traditional democracy does
not coincide with his particular views of the subject. If
this is so, the'abstract theoretical discussions relating
to the individual member's need for democracy may be
extraneous.
In attempting to discover the attitudes of those to
whom the question of democracy would be most urgent and
vital, this author investigated Local 1531, United Auto
mobile Workers of America, Amarillo, Texas.
Amarillo, Texas is a relatively isolated community
of approximately 125,000 people. Unionism is not firmly
rooted here as the region is primarily agricultural in
nature. The members of the union are young and for the
most part are involved in their first permanent work situa
tion. Those individuals surveyed, displayed nothing more
than a casual interest in union affairs. This was
especially true with regard to the international level.
They were vitally concerned, though, that the top leaders
display an interest in them and give evidence that they are
"working men at heart" with blue collar interests. Very
few members demonstrated anything resembling a comprehensive
225
knowledge of the internal mechanisms of their international
union. At the same time, they did indicate great confi
dence in their union and felt certain that they would
receive justice and equal treatment in all areas. Using
this as a frame of reference, the greater percentage of the
respondents seemed convinced that the International UAW is
a democratic union.
The same lack of widespread knowledge and concern
shown with respect to the international union was also
apparent when the individuals offered views concerning
their local union. Attendance is considered an inconveni
ence and very rarely is there any real opposition in local
elections. Again the membership exhibited a loyalty to and
confidence in the leadership. There appears to exist the
belief that since the president came from the rank-and-file,
he would be unlikely to do anything counter to the well
being of his constituents. In the case of Local 1531,
there is probably a great deal of accuracy in this presump
tion because the president is in close contact with much of
his membership both on the job and socially.
The existing grievance procedure between the company
and the union is thorough but too much latitude and discre
tion is permitted the union leadership. Nevertheless, the
226
rank-and-file displayed unbridled faith in the grievance
procedure and felt certain that the union would go to great
lengths— even to arbitration, if necessary— to protect
members' interests. Since Local 1531 has never had to go
to arbitration, these sentiments are clearly based on the
union's performance in other areas.
In light of this study, it appears that the average
member's view of democracy is extremely limited. To him,
unions are benefit-providing institutions. The individual
really cares little about the theoretical underpinnings of
his union. Once he has given his approval to the leader
ship, whether national or local, he is prepared to grant
his unquestioning allegiance and loyalty. His view of the
union is a pervasive one. His companions are members and
he thinks it unlikely that they would not support his
interests. If asked, the typical member would indicate
that is important that the officers be selected democrati
cally, that rival candidates get equal space in the union
publications and that all members share equally in the
decision making. Yet, one gets the impression that he is
saying this because it is the way he should feel, rather
than the way he really thinks or believes. Unions to him
are functional. They protect him and the leadership should
227
think like him and be considerate of him. Beyond that, the
need for democracy does not exist and as it relates to the
rank-and-file member, any further theoretical discussion of
it appears to be superfluous.
It is fortunate for the rank-and-file members that
they have confidence in their union's use of the grievance
procedure because they are universally unaware of their
legal rights in this area. The last section of this work
attempts to shed some light on the recent legal developments
in this field.
Judicial concern for the protection of individual
rights can probably be traced back to the 1945 case of
Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley. This
decision gave legal recognition that a collective bargain
ing agreement cannot serve to nullify individual rights.
In Ford Motor Company v. Huf fman (1953), the courts intro
duced the principle of union compromise noting that the
bargaining agent must be given a wide range of latitude
subject only to exercising "good faith" and "honesty of
purpose." In the Miranda decision of 1962, the N.L.R.B.
held that failure to represent a member in "good faith"
amounted to an unfair labor practice and that in such
cases, the N.L.R.B. could now have jurisdiction. Had this
228
doctrine been applied, it would have become easier for
aggrieved individuals to promote their cases.
The case of Donnelly v. United Fruit Co. (1963)
delineated principles to be followed with respect to an
individual's right to arbitration. The Court, relying on
the earlier decision of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills (1957), indicated that due to the gravity of the
issues, all aspects of arbitration will receive a very
liberal judicial treatment as long as they are consistent
with the intent of the Labor Management Relations Act. The
Court also pointed out that an individual has a right to
present his grievance directly to his employer when his
union declines to process it. In the Maddox case of 1965,
the Federal Courts acknowledged their obligation to hear
individual's cases but insisted that the grievant first
fulfill all of his contractional obligations existing under
the agreement.
In the Vaca v. Sipes case, 1967, the U. S. Supreme
Court handed down an extremely important and comprehensive
decision. The Court now took a much more conservative
viewpoint with respect to ultimate access to the arbitra
tion machinery. In essence it rejected the principles of
Donnelly pointing out that to guarantee all individuals
229
unlimited access to arbitration would tend to severely
limit union flexibility, raise costs of operation and serve
to diminish union stature.
It appears that the recent court decisions have
tended to modify the very restrictive principles which
emerged from the Vaca case. Among other things, the Court
in Vaca had reemphasized the principle established in
Maddox that the grievant must exhaust all of his internal
remedies before seeking redress elsewhere. The 1969 cases
of Price v. Teamsters and Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid
Co. served to weaken that doctrine. In these two cases,
the courts pointed out that it would be futile to try to
exhaust internal remedies in the face of a united labor-
management position. It further said that it is the
union's responsibility to aid an individual in pressing his
case. Also, where possible, the courts have interpreted
the wording of Vaca in the most liberal sense. For example,
in the Zalejko case of 1967 the New Jersey Superior Court
interpreted the words "duty of fair representation" found
in Vaca to mean "adequate representation." Now the union
must adequately and comprehensively represent the individ
ual's interests if it is to perform its duties equitably.
230
In this past year, at least one case, Nuest v.
Westinghou.se Air Brake Co. , recognized the important role
of the arbitrator in this area. The court ruled that if
the specific part of an individual1s complaint relates to
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
arbitrator would be the appropriate adjudicating body. The
court additionally stated that it would stand ready to
enforce access to the arbitrator and further, the individ
ual does not have to exhaust his internal remedies if the
union controls them. Interestingly, in the same year, the
U. S. District Court took a somewhat more limited view of
the duty of the arbitrator. In the Lusk case, the court
pointed out that when an employee claims that he was denied
his rights by virtue of a conspiracy between his union and
management, he cannot be compelled to submit any issue
relating to that illegal combination to arbitration. The
court's fear was that he would not receive adequate repre
sentation at the hearing.
It is clear that significant clarification is
needed with respect to how much support an individual can
legally expect from his union in promoting his grievance.
Vaca is still the key case in this field but one cannot be
certain that the principles set forth therein will be
231
consistently applied. Labor lawyers may find much latitude
in Vaca and subsequent cases and consequently feel a sense
of freedom. The rank-and-file union man, however, needs
more specific information as to what his rights are and
furthermore how he may protect them. Until he receives
this knowledge, he runs the very great risk of being eco
nomically abused and not receiving the full measure of the
"democracy" that he expects.
The fact that the rank-and-file expects only a
limited form of democracy must not discourage society at
large from seeking to implement it to the fullest extent
possible. In their desire to achieve economic security and
well being, union members frequently overlook the fact that
their activities help establish the norms of the wider
society in which they live. If democracy is to flourish on
a national level, the underlying institutions must unequiv
ocally support it. This line of reasoning is rejected by
C. Peter Magrath as not being a "tenable assumption" when
he notes that:
In all countries commonly recognized as democratic,
major voluntary associations— unions, trade associa
tions, churches— fail to meet the indispensable
criteria of democracy.^
^*C. Peter Magrath, "Democracy in Overalls: The
232
Even if one chooses to agree with Magrath's
reasoning, there is no ground to assume that these countries
might not become more responsive to the needs of their
citizens if improvements in the democratic nature of the
substructure were encouraged.
The recognition of the need for thoroughgoing
democracy in labor unions does not necessarily imply that
more legislation is required or even desirable. What it
does imply, is a painstaking reassessment on the part of
labor unions of their goals and methods of achieving them.
If carefully done, unions will stand a greater chance of
accomplishing their purposes as community support would now
more likely be forthcoming. To make labor unions fully
democratic institutions will require widespread and compre
hensive changes in the existing internal structure.
Professor Alice Cook, after concluding her study of four
local unions, indicated just how considerable these changes
may have to be and in so doing, provided us with a formula.
She pointed out that:
Approaches to fulfillment of democratic goals can begin
with attention to the crucial elements. . . . A
strengthened legislature, based on constituencies built
Futile Quest for Union Democracy," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, XII (July, 1959), 522.
233
around compelling group interests, is the major
requirement. Once these are instituted, the allocation
of significant autonomous powers to these intermediate
bodies, a rise in the level of membership participa
tion, choice in elections, free speech in legislative
forums, all flow from a rational organization of group
interest. In this climate emerge the demands for an
independent judiciary.^
These changes, though costly in terms of magnitude
of transformation and upheaval required, will prove bene
ficial to all concerned and reenforce the possibility that
one day a truly responsive society may be established.
2
Alice H. Cook, Union Democracy: Practice and
Ideal (Cornell, New York: New York State School of Indus
trial and Labor Relations, 1963), p. 239.
APPENDICES
234
APPENDIX A
COVER LETTER AND APPROVAL STATEMENT
235
236
WEST TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Canyon, Texas 79015
May 8, 1970
2405 S. Crockett Street
Amarillo, Texas 79109
Dear Sir:
I am writing this letter to ask your help in a study
that I am conducting. I have almost completed my Doctor of
Philosophy degree and only need to submit my dissertation.
My particular area of concern is the democratic aspects of
labor unions as viewed from within the union. It is for
this reason that I am earnestly seeking your aid so that I
may complete my work in the near future.
I have enclosed a questionnaire which I hope you will
complete and return to me at your earliest convenience
(hopefully within a few days). The questions are designed
to find out your true and honest feelings on the issues
raised. I sincerely hope that you will be able to take the
time to write some comments where you think they apply.
I am hoping that I will be able to interview some of
you after I have been able to look at your questionnaire.
In order to do this, I will need your address and telephone
number. Since I am most concerned with your honest feel
ings, if you feel as though you would rather not be
identified, do not complete the questions relating to name
and address.
There is no way that I can thank you enough for your
time and help. Please know that I am most appreciative and
will present a copy of my dissertation to your local UAW
offices.
Very truly yours,
Barry L. Duman
Assistant Professor of Economics
237
Dear Brother:
Professor Barry L. Duman has talked
to me about his dissertation, and I am in
full accord with him.
Fraternally yours.
George R. Pearce
President
Local 1531 U.A.W.
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE
238
QUESTIONNAIRE
239
Directions: Please circle the phrase in parenthesis that
best expresses your views. Your frank
opinions will be most appreciated. Any
comments that you would like to make will be
highly valued and useful.
1. Name:___
2. Address:
5. Job Title:
Biographical Data
___________ 3. Telephone Number:
___________ 4. Age:_____________
6. You (may or may not) call me at home and arrange for a
personal interview.
7. It is (very important, not very important) that the
UAW be run in a highly democratic fashion. Please
explain why below.
8. I (have, do not have) any influence in the functioning
of my union. Please indicate below whether you are
speaking of the local, international or both.
9. UAW International leaders are primarily interested in
furthering (their own, the membership's) position.
10. I have (some chance, no chance) of becoming an officer
in the UAW International even if I wanted to. Please
explain why below.
11. Walter Reuther (is, is not) truly representative of my
views on most issues.
240
12. Walter Reuther (is, is not) too powerful in getting his
own way.
13. It is of (concern, no concern) to me that Reuther has
no real opposition in elections.
14. Walter Reuther's salary is today approximately $28,000.
I (would, would not) be in favor of increasing it.
Please indicate why below.
15. Walter Reuther probably feels more comfortable in the
company of (union personnel, or upper income groups in
general).
16. If I were to meet Walter Reuther or Emil Mazey, I
(would, would not) feel comfortable in their company.
Please indicate why below.
17. The future officers of the UAW International (are, are
not) hand picked by the present officers. If you feel
that they are hand picked, does this bother you?
18. I read the union newspaper, Solidarity (frequently,
never).
19. The newspaper, Solidarity (represents, does not repre
sent) my views and ideas.
20. The UAW leadership (monopolizes, does not monopolize)
the union newspaper, Solidarity.
21. The union newspaper, Solidarity (tells me, does not
tell me) what I want to know.
22. If I were to have different political point of view
than the International leadership, and wrote my views
to the union newspaper, Solidarity, I think they
(would, would not) print it. Please indicate why
below.
23. I (frequently, infrequently) attend local UAW meetings.
Please indicate why below.
241
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
I (care, do not care) what goes on at the International
Convention.
I am (aware, not aware) of the fact that the union can
discipline me for several reasons.
To my knowledge the UAW (never, sometimes) disciplines
a member without good cause.
I am (aware, not aware) that the International offi
cers of the UAW can take over management of my local
union if they see fit through what is called a
trusteeship.
The possibility that a trusteeship may be imposed
(causes me, does not cause me) to have doubts about
the democratic nature of my union.
I am (aware, not aware) that the UAW has a Public
Review Board.
I am (aware, not aware) of the function of the Public
Review Board.
The fact that the UAW has a Public Review Board (makes
me believe, does not make me believe) that it is a
democratic union.
I (care, do not care) that the UAW International does
not have a two party system like is found in U. S.
National Politics.
The men on the local grievance committee (reflect,
do not reflect) my own views.
I (feel, do not feel) confident that if I had a
grievance my union would go to arbitration for me.
When a case goes to arbitration, I (feel, do not feel)
that the outcome will be based on a fair and accurate
evaluation of the facts.
The officers of local 1531 (reflect, do not reflect)
my own views.
242
37. It (bothers me, does not bother me) that there is
little opposition in local elections.
38. I (think, do not think) that the DAW is one of the
more democratic unions. Please indicate why and what
you mean by democracy.
39. Please indicate in the space below what you think is
the major advantage of being a member of "The UAW."
Thank you for your time and effort in this matter. Please
place this survey in the enclosed envelope and mail without
delay. . ...
Thank you again,
Barry L. Duman
Assistant Professor of Economics
West Texas State University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
243
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Creator Duman, Barry Lance (author)

Core Title Participation Of Rank-And-File Member In The Decision Making Process And His Access To The Grievance Machinery Of His Union: Including A Survey And Case Study Of Uaw Local 1531, Amarillo, Texas

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Economics

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Economics, General,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Pollard, Spencer D. (committee chair), Backer, Edward H. (committee member), Phillips, E. Bryant (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-508622

Unique identifier UC11362039

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Legacy Identifier 7121451.pdf

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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