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Role Conflict Resolution In Complex Social Systems: A Polyarchical Systems Model For Organizational And Social Change

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Role Conflict Resolution In Complex Social Systems: A Polyarchical Systems Model For Organizational And Social Change

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Content INFORMATION TO USERS This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this docum ent have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being p h o to g rap h e d +he photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. University Microfilms 300 North Z eeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Com pany 72-21,668 FICK, Robert Norton, 1929- ROLE CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS: A POLYARCHICAL SYSTEMS MODEL FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1972 Political Science, public administration University Microfilms, A X ERO X C om pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan © C opyright by ROBERT NORTON FICK 1972 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. ROLE CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS A POLYARCHICAL SYSTEMS MODEL FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE by R obert N orton F ick A D issertatio n P resented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In P artial F ulfillm ent of the R equirem ents for the D egree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Public A dm inistration) June 1972 UNIVERSITY O F SO U T H E R N CALIFO RNIA TH E GRADUATE SC H O O L U NIVERSITY PA RK LOS A N G ELES. C A LIFO R N IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by under the direction of M s ..... Dissertation C om m ittee, and approved by all its m embers, has been presented to and accepted by The G radu ate School, in partial fulfillm ent of require ments of the degree of R obgrt.H orton.F ick D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y Dean D a te ...... DISSERTATIi hairmatt PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company PREFACE Public adm inistration has undergone a very rap id change in both th eo retical and operational asp ects in attaining the public in te re s t value. The behavioral scien ces a re em erging as a stro n g influence in the th eo retical m odels while the techniques of business ad m inistration and law a re em erging at the operational level. T his paradox of inconsistent and often co n trad icto ry approaches to attain public policy is a reflection of problem s in h eren t in m aking the "public in te re st" value operational. The values of econom y and efficiency and the leg alistic approach to public ad m inistration a re receiv in g new im petus in program planning and budgeting sy stem s (PPBS) and collective bargaining. T hese approaches do not have the public in te re st among th e ir p rim a ry c rite ria fo r decision m aking as a value to be defended. The em ergence and p ro liferatio n of un related techniques that a re congruent to the b u rea u cra tic sy stem , but usually antithetical to d em o cratic values and the "public in te re s t," indicate a deficiency on the p a rt of the academ ic com m unity in m eeting needs of p racticin g a d m in istra to rs. The academ ic com m unity is not, how ever, e n tirely to be blam ed for the lack of th eo re tic al and operational m odels to m eet c u rre n t problem s of public a d m in istra to rs. Many public b u reau cra cies a re relu ctan t to allow academ icians to validate th eo retical co n stru cts e m p irically because of the ris k of public c ritic ism . As a re s u lt, the academ icians r e s tr ic t th e ir re s e a rc h to clients m ore read ily available, w hile the public a d m in istra to rs c ritic iz e them for lack of relevancy. It is hoped that the data generated from this re s e a rc h w ill narrow the d iscrepancy between th eo retical and operational approaches in im plem enting the public in te re st value. T his re s e a rc h te s ts th eo re tic al co n stru cts and hypotheses re la te d to two of the m ost c ritic a l issu e s facing public adm inistration: so cial conflict and organizational change and organizational conflict and change as m anifested in collective bargaining in public em ploy m ent. F ro m th is re s e a rc h , additional th eo ries and new hypotheses d irec tly re la te d to the needs of public ad m inistration m ay be generated and tested . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A re s e a rc h p ro ject of this scope and m agnitude req u ire s the support and participation of m any individuals and organizations in both academ ic and public organizations. I am indebted to P ro fesso r W. Bruce Storm for f irs t stim ulating my in te re st in studying the a re a of conflict and change, and the county of Los Angeles for the opportunity to e m p irically te st co n stru cts and concepts rela te d to th ese th e o rie s. P ro fesso r Alex M cE achern provided the in te re st in ro le as a m ethod for analysis of com plex so cial sy stem s as w ell a valuable suggestions and com puter se rv ic e s. P ro fesso r R ichard G able of the U niversity of C alifornia at Davis provided suggestions which re su lte d in the addition of control groups 1 and 2. T he county of Los Angeles A uditor's and Health D epartm ents provided c le ric a l and key punch se rv ic e s. T he Em ployee R elations Branch, D epartm ent of Personnel, provided the support of this re s e a rc h in m aking the initial contacts with the various departm ents. T he Public System s R esearch Institute at the U niversity of Southern C alifornia and the Com puting C enter at C alifornia State iv U niversity at Los Angeles provided the com puter pro g ram s for an aly sis of data. I would like to thank m y p a re n ts, wife, fam ily, and friends fo r th e ir continual support of this re s e a rc h . T his re s e a rc h would not have been undertaken w ithout th e ir support and to leran ce for my in te re s ts . T his d isse rta tio n is dedicated to my p aren ts. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................................................ ACKNOW LEDGMENTS........................................................................ LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................... C hapter I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ........................... Background of the R esearch T h eo retical P rem ises T h eo re tica l P erspectives The Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change R esearch D esign Im portance of the Study II. THE RESEARCH M E T H O D .......................................... C h a ra c te ristic s of the Sam ple Q uestionnaire C onstruction and A dm inistration Role as a M ethod of A nalysis M ethods of Role A nalysis U sed in the R esearch P roject Com ponents of Role A nalysis III. CONSENSUS: DEVIANCY AND CONFORMITY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIV ES................................. Introduction C onsensus Chapter Page Deviancy and C onform ity P ossibilities for Deviant Behavior A ssum ptions U nderlying Role C onsensus Sum m ary of A ssum ptions of Role C onsensus A lternatives for Behavior Role C onsensus, E quilibrium T heory, and Change Sum m ary of E quilibrium T heory and Change C hapter Sum m ary IV. CONFLICT: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES . . . 98 Introduction A pproaches to the Study of Conflict A Model for Conflict A nalysis C onflict, Change, and D irection of Action System s In teractio n s: C onsensus, Deviancy, C onform ity, and Autonomy C hapter Sum m ary V. CHANGE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES . . . . 148 Introduction A pproaches to O rganizational Change A Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change Public Personnel System s C onflict Resolution M echanism s in Public P ersonnel A dm inistration C hapter Sum m ary VI. RESEARCH F IN D IN G S .................................................... 185 M ajor H ypotheses Sub- hypotheses vii Chapter Page VII. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS............................................................................ 206 Sum m ary: T h eo retical P erspectives Sum m ary: R e se arch Findings Im plications of the Hypotheses Conclusions BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................. 231 APPENDIXES ............................................................................................. 249 APPENDIX A .................................................................................... 250 APPENDIX B ............................................................................ 292 APPENDIX C ..................................................... 305 LIST OF TABLES T able Page 1. Sam ple C h a ra c te ristic s by D epartm ents and S upervisory L evels (M aster S a m p le ).................. 29 2. Sum m ary of C ontrol Q uestion L egitim acy of E xpectations (All Sam ple G ro u p s )........................ 189 3. Sum m ary of L egitim ate E xpectations in P ersonnel P ractices (M aster Sam ple) ............... 192 4. Sum m ary of L egitim ate E xpectations in G rievance R esolution (M aster S a m p l e ) 193 5. Sum m ary of L egitim ate E xpectations in Personnel P ractices and G rievance R esolution (C ontrol G roup O n e ) ........................... 196 6. Sum m ary of L egitim ate E xpectations in P ersonnel P ractices and G rievance R esolution (C ontrol G roup T w o ) ........................... 198 ix 13 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 51 70 72 79 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS E lem ents of the Polyarchical System s M o d el. . . . A dyad m odel........................................................................ A p o sitio n -c en tric m odel ............................................. A sy stem s m o d e l............................................................... A h ie ra rc h ic sy ste m s m o d e l ....................................... A P olyarchical System s M o d e l.................................... A p o sitio n -c en tric m odel for m easuring d ifferences between decision expected and decision actually m ade in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance resolution for focal positions ............................................................ A Polyarchical System s Model used to m easure in te r r e la tio n s h ip s ...................................................... A m odel for ro le c o n s e n s u s .......................................... R esponses of opportunity s tru c tu re to ego's deviance ........................................................................ M ajor dim ensions of decision m a k i n g ..................... Types of o u ter p erform ances as consequences of tension levels of situational and inner s y s te m s ........................................................................... Types of a ctio n -sy stem s in conflict ........................ x Figure Page 14. E lem ents of the Polyarchical System s M odel. . . . 164 15. In teractio n m odel: elem ents of the Polyarchical System s M o d e l ............................................................ 166 16. P olyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social C h a n g e ...................................................... 169 17. P olyarchical System s Model for Public Personnel A d m in is tra tio n ....................................... 173 18. Model of conflict a n a l y s i s .............................................. 179 xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW Background of the R e se arch Problem T h ere a re se v e ra l different m ethods for allocating re s o u rc e s in society other than the trad itio n al bureaucratic^- m ethod form so com m on today, that a re often overlooked by public adm in is tr a to r s . It is im portant that public a d m in istra to rs view the attainm ent of public policy as the p rim a ry c rite rio n for perform ance and its im plem entation as an operational goal. When this p ersp ectiv e is m aintained, the public a d m in istra to r builds the public in te re s t value into the decision-m aking p ro c e ss. T he narrow p e rsp ec tiv e of viewing the b u reau cratic organ ization as the only m ethod of im plem enting so cial policy im pedes behavior in p red ictab le w ay s: ^The te rm "b u rea u cra tic " is defined as the form al organ ization w here em phasis is placed upon a h iera rch y that issu e s the p o licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and p ro ced u res to im plem ent organizational goals. T his te rm is not being used in the negative connotation. 1 2 1. T he stra te g ie s and techniques available for developing viable policies a re g rea tly re s tric te d when confronted w ith organizational and social conflict, change, and s tr e s s . 2. E ffectiveness in im plem enting p resen t public policy is considerably reduced sin ce a ltern a tiv e s to the b u reau cratic form a re not even considered o r evaluated as being potentially d e sira b le or feasible. T his lack of a spectrum for a ltern a tiv e s to the b u reau cratic form of organization provides an insight into the prediction of behavior when em erging p re s s u re groups o r em ployee organizations d e sire to influence the decision outcom e of public a d m in istra to rs. The lack of resp o n siv en ess in m eeting new dem ands from clients and em ployees is e x p re ssed in the form of citizen p ro te sts and em ployee s trik e s . One asp ect of this conflict, that of m an ag erial decision m aking in personnel p rac tic es and grievance reso lu tio n , is p resen ted in this re s e a rc h . M anagem ent behavior in these a re a s m ay contribute g reatly to latent conflict and m ay read ily becom e stim ulus for m anifest conflict in the form of strik e s . T his re s e a rc h focuses on w hether o r not conflict ex ists for th re e su p e rv iso ry le v e ls -- between decision expected and decision actually m a d e --in personnel p ra c tic e s and g rievances fo r eleven counter-positions. The re s e a rc h is not concerned with conflict involved in determ ining legitim acy or e sta b lishm ent of p rio ritie s for the decision expected, nor is it concerned w ith w hether o r not the m e rit system is enforced by line personnel. The events leading up to a collective bargaining ordinance for Los A ngeles County governm ent w ere ra th e r s tre ssfu l fo r the b u reau cracy , c lien ts, em ployees, and em ployee organizations. The ordinance was a re s u lt of se v e ra l se v e re strik e s in the Los Angeles County-USC M edical C enter and the D epartm ent of Public Social S erv ices. T h eo re tica l P rem ises T h ere a re two im portant th eo re tic al p rem ise s which underlie the re s e a rc h that gives m eaning to ro le analysis used in developing th e o re tic a l p ersp ectiv es for testin g the hypotheses. T hese p rem ise s a re concerned with (1) developing a ltern a tiv e s for the im plem entation of public policy; and (2) determ ining the c ritic a l linkages of autonomy in a system w here the p ro ce ssin g of c u rre n t inform ation, with its m em ory and w ill, o ccu rs. A lternatives fo r im plem entation of public policy R obert A. Dahl and C h arles E. Lindblom have developed a viable approach, p erv asiv e to all so c ie tie s, fo r the allocation of 2 social re s o u rc e s. T h e ir approach provides four altern ativ es to the attainm ent of so cial policy, which they call the basic m eans of social action, su m m arized as follow s: 1. The p rice sy stem : control of and by le a d e rs -- In this m echanism , ratio n al consum er choice is delegated through the freedom of choice in the m ark et place. T he assum ption underlying this approach is that the client (consum er) w ishes to m axim ize his econom ic in te re s ts and is the only one who can d eterm in e his so cial needs. The quantification of values into p ric e s and consum er choice a re the p rim a ry c h a ra c te ristic s of th is m ethod. T his approach would include: em ploy m ent of school superintendents and tea ch e rs by annual co n tra cts; governm ent subcontracting of defense c o n tra c ts, sanitation se rv ic e s, health s e rv ic e s, fire se rv ic e s, flood control, and sh e riff se rv ic e s; sim ulations of a m ark et 2 R obert A. Dahl and C harles E. Lindblom , P o litic s, E conom ics, and W elfare (New Y ork: H arp er and Row, P ublishers, I n c ., 1953), p. 54. econom y w ithin an organizational system by creatin g cost o r profit c en ters w here sp ecific se rv ice s req u ested from one departm ent by another a re offered at com petitive m ark et p ric e s. 2. H ierarch y : control by le a d e rs -- A h iera rch y occu rs when lea d ers e x e rc ise a very high degree of u n ilateral control over n o n -lead ers. In this approach, n o n -lead ers cannot peacefully displace lea d ers a fte r explicit o r im plicit voting; and lea d ers su b stan tially decide when, and in what conditions, and with whom consultation takes place. A lead er would be an individual in a group who p o sse sse s significantly g re a te r control over o th ers by v irtu e of his position o r rank with re sp e c t to o th er m em b ers. The c la ss ic "W eberian" bureauc rac y , technocracy, pro g ram planning and budgeting sy stem s (PPRS) would be som e exam ples of this approach in the im plem entation of public policy. 3. Polyarchy: control of le a d e rs -- A polyarchy is a com bination of both e x tre m e s --a u n ila tera l d ictato rsh ip and a pure dem ocracy. The tendency of rec ip ro city sufficiently counteracts the 6 tendency to u n ilateral control. T his fac ilitates developm ent of resp o n siv e lea d ersh ip w hile s till providing a d eg ree of sta b ility and directio n to the in teractio n p ro c e ss. The lead er m ust provide som e form of re c ip ro c ity to the other m em b ers of the group who a re n o n -lead ers in o rd e r to survive. The two key conditions for c re atin g an atm osphere conducive to re c ip ro c ity to occur a re : (a) lea d ers m ust win th e ir control by com peting with one another for the support of n o n -lead ers; (b) non lea d ers m ust have an opportunity to sw itch th e ir support away from the incum bent le a d e rs to th e ir r iv a ls .3 A polyarchy m ay be found in various settin g s. A h ie ra rc h ic a l and b u reau cratic organization m ay be a polyarchy at the point of im pact w ith the environ m ent in its behavior ju st as if it w ere a pure polyarchy. A polyarchy could be a group of th re e individuals, groups, a grouping of organizations into an asso ciatio n (i. e . , m ultiple em ployer bargaining 3Ib id ., p. 283. asso ciatio n s), a single bureaucracy, o r a political o r religio us group. The behavior of the system at the point of in teractio n with its environm ent a re the p rim a ry in te re sts. T his m odel is ap p ro p riate for those who view organ izations of the future as being com posed of pro fessio n als o r highly educated persons involved in group decision m aking. L ead ersh ip becom es a function of bargaining, h iera rch y , and rec ip ro city with n o n -lead ers. The polyarchy m ay take the form of a psychological co n tract in establishm ent of a ro le consensus ra th e r than the ballot box form originally proposed in the developm ent of the political m odel. Bargaining: control among le a d e rs -- Bargaining is a form of re c ip ro c a l control among le a d e rs. The extent of bargaining is an in v erse relatio n sh ip to the am ount of h iera rch y in existence. Bargaining takes place because th ere is no u n iv ersal agreem ent on the allocation of sc a rc e re s o u rc e s, and the altern ativ es to bargaining do not appear to be profitable. Bargaining takes place in both a 8 b u reaucracy and in a polyarchy, and in the m ark et p lac e--b u t the form , degree, and intensity is different. If th ere was no interdependency betw een the p a rtie s involved, no bargaining would take place. Bargaining appears to be a profitable altern ativ e to the p a rtie s concerned when faced with the conse quences of an undesirable outcom e. The bargaining m odel is a lso used as a m ethod for articu latio n of so cial values in society. T his approach is also p erv asiv e to the fields of political science and public ad m in istratio n since th e re is a sep aratio n of pow ers in the constitution of the leg islativ e, executive, and judicial branches and in intergovernm ental rela tio n ships between the fed eral, sta te , and local levels. Autonomy T he concept of autonom y provides the other c ritic a l p rem ise in developing a m odel for organizational and so cial change. An autonom ous individual, organization, or a society can be su m m arized from W arren Bennis's c rite ria for organizational health: 1. O rganizational adaptability and flexibility in learning through experience and changing as in tern al circu m stan ces a re redefined. 9 2. T he problem of id en tity --a req u irem en t of developing ad ap tab ility -- is that the organization needs to know who it is (and is not) and what it is to do. 3. R eality testin g techniques m ust be developed so the organization can determ ine its re a l p ro p erties 4 and environm ent in which it ex ists. K arl D eutsch pointed out that the c ritic a l linkages of autonom y occur at those points w here the fusion of new inform ation with the m em ory and w ill of the individual and the organization takes place. Autonomy in an organization is thus a function of the whole sy stem . It is not located at any one point in the sy stem , but th e re m ay be one o r m ore points of p a rtic u la r im portance for it. T hese cru c ial points for the autonom y of an organiza tion a re the points at which a flow of data re c a lle d from the past e n te rs the flow of data used for m aking c u rre n t decisions. T he location within an organization of its m ajo r m em ory fac ilitie s, and the points of channel p a ttern by which these m em ories a re used fo r ste e rin g and decision m aking, m ay te ll us m uch about the probable functioning as w ell as about possible stru c tu ra l w eaknesses and v u ln erab ilities of the organization. 5 4 W arren Bennis, Changing O rganizations (New Y ork: M cG raw -H ill Book Com pany, 1966), p. 52. ^ICarl D eutsch, The N erves of G overnm ent (New York: The F re e P re ss of G lencoe, 1963), pp. 206-207. T h eo retical P erspectives 10 The th eo retical p ersp ectiv es a re draw n from the following com ponents of ro le an aly sis: consensus, deviancy and conform ity; conflict and change; sanctions (rew ard s and penalties). When these com ponents a re fused w ith the th eo retical p rem ise s of polyarchy and autonom y, they provide for the integration and developm ent of a Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. C onsensus is concerned with the determ ination of expecta tions for one's behavior. C onsensus m ay be established in two ways 1. By accepting stan d ard s for behavior as absolute (given) from custom ; com m on, legislated, or n atu ral law s; organizational p o licies, ru les, reg u latio n s, and pro ced u res; religion; or som e other so u rce that is accepted as legitim ate. 2. By establishm ent of group o r so cietal norm s through an in teractio n p ro cess in determ ining consensus. T he term "consensus" also im plies two other elem ents of deviancy and conform ity. Once consensus is established, it becom es the norm s and p a ra m e te rs for the decision-m aking p ro ce ss. When deviancy o ccu rs, it brings the problem of conflict and change to the estab lish ed norm s. 11 Deviancy m ay be p ro ce ssed by the sy stem in two different w ays: (1) the sta tic approach w here the stan d ard s for behavior a re absolute and (2) the dynam ic approach w here stan d ard s a re rela tiv e to w hatever consensus is estab lish ed through the in teractio n p ro cess. The fo rm e r is d iscu ssed in relatio n to the closed sy stem s approach, w hile the la tte r focuses on open sy stem s approach to conflict, change, and redefinition of consensus. C onsensus also im plies an ability to influence the behavior of o thers to obtain conform ity. T his m ay be done in the form of authority, pow er, o r the ability to m otivate through the use of rew ards and penalties. The use of sanctions for influencing behavior is not d iscu ssed in this re s e a rc h project. T he Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change T he polyarchical sy stem s m odel is a co n stru ct that is developed from the fusion of the th eo re tic al p re m ise s and p e rsp e c tiv es. The th eo re tic al p rem ise s provide the s tru c tu re for the com ponents of ro le analysis in developing a re s e a rc h instrum ent capable of finding the c ritic a l linkages of autonom y within a social sy stem . Once th ese linkages of autonom y a re found, the concept of polyarchy em erg es as the fram ew ork for ro le analysis of individual, j group, organizational, and so cietal behavior. I 12 T he com ponents of ro le analysis se rv e in two cap acities: (1) developm ent of a re s e a rc h in stru m en t to find the c ritic a l linkages of autonomy and (2) developm ent and testin g of hypotheses fo r the p rediction of behavior. Autonomous linkages a re then viewed as m iniature polyarchies w ithin a la rg e r and m o re com plex polyarchical sy stem . T o change a group, organization, o r la rg e r sy ste m s, em phasis is placed on the c ritic a l linkages and behavior of the autonom ous polyarchical com ponents in the p ro cessin g of c u rre n t inform ation with its m em ory and w ill. Two elem ents of the Polyarchical System s Model a re re so u rc e s and in teractio n s. T hese two elem ents provide for a possibility of four different com binations: (1) high interactions and high re s o u rc e s, (2) high in teractio n s and low re s o u rc e s, (3) low in teractio n s and high re s o u rc e s, and (4) low interactions and low re so u rc e s. The re s u lts a re shown in F ig u re 1. The Polyarchical System s Model is then viewed w ithin the p ersp ectiv e of the re so u rc e s-in te ra c tio n s m atrix in developing stra te g ie s for individual, group, organizational, or so cial change. Purpose of the R esearch The purpose of this re s e a rc h is to develop an instrum ent capable of finding the c ritic a l linkages of autonomy within a larg e 13 INTERACTIONS low High Hioh RESOURCES Lew H i c h R e s o u r c e s Low I n t e r a c t i o n s H i g h Re s o u r c e s H i g h I n t e r a c t i o n s Low R e s o u r c e s Low I n t e r a c t i o n s Low R e s o u r c e s H i g h I n t e r a c t i o n s F ig. 1 .--E le m e n ts of the P olyarchical System s M odel and com plex organization. T he advent of collective bargaining in the public se c to r provides an opportunity fo r the m easu rem en t of an em erging polyarchy (em ployee organizations) on existing p o ly arch ies. Only a sm a ll segm ent of the re s e a rc h re s u lts w ill be d isc u sse d sin ce 1,100 v a ria b le s w ere m ea su re d in the questionnaire. E m phasis on the re s e a rc h re p o rte d w ill be on m an ag erial decision m aking in perso n n el p ra c tic e s and g riev an ce reso lu tio n . Sub hypotheses w ill be developed and te ste d as to the usefulness of the p o ly arch ical sy stem approach to organizational change. 14 The m ajo r hypotheses of the re s e a rc h focus on w hether or not conflict ex ists in m anagerial decision m aking in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance resolution. T hese m ajo r hypotheses w ere se lec te d so as to provide fo r fu rth e r re s e a rc h in future tim e periods in determ ining the im pact of an em erging polyarchy on existing p olyarchical sy stem s. The study of the f ir s t hypothesis is influenced by the control question, "Does the counter-position have a rig h t to expect this of you?" T his question has th re e possible resp o n ses: " y e s ," "n o ," and "don't know ." L egitim acy of expectations was chosen as a control v ariab le because the f irs t obstacle of an em erging union o r em ployee organization is to achieve recognition from the em ployer as the bargaining re p re se n ta tiv e for th e ir em ployees. The re s e a rc h focuses on those positions which accept the counter-positions as having leg itim ate expectations for th e ir behavior. M ajor hypotheses 1. M aster sam ple (N=423)-- T h ere is no difference in m an ag erial decision m aking in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n between decision expected and decision actually m ade for legitim ate coun ter-p o sitio n s. 2. C ontrol group 1 (N=36)-- T h ere is no difference in decision m aking for counter-positions in personnel p rac tic es and grievance resolution between decision expected and decision actually m ade as perceived by the focal positions. 3. Control group 2 (N= 15)-- T h ere is no difference in decision m aking for counter-positions in personnel p rac tic es and grievance resolution between decision expected and decision actually m ade, as perceived by em ployee organizations and pro fessio n al a rb itra to rs . Sub-hypotheses a re developed and teste d to explore the p o ssib ility and probability of the Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change as a viable and valid a ltern ativ e to p re se n t m ethods. T h ese sub-hypotheses focus on m easu rin g (1) the points of autonom y in the system ; (2) the d eg ree of bureaucratization of the organization; and (3) the autonom y of the system as reflected in se lf-id e n tity , job satisfactio n , and ability to influence the decisions of th eir im m ediate su p e rv iso r. T he product of th ese com ponents w ill provide indicators of organizational health: (1) behavior in a c ris is when c u rre n t inform a- 16 tion is p ro c e sse d with the m em ory and w ill, (2) the p o ssib ility and probability of changing the organization, and (3) em p irical validation of the P olyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. Sub-hypotheses: autonom ous linkages T he sub-hypotheses a re grouped according to a re a s of m easu rem en t. The sub-hypotheses fo r finding the points of autono m ous linkages a re lim ited to d escrib in g the num ber of participants and th e ir p refe ren c es for change and or stab ility . The exact location of autonom ous linkages and th e ir behavior w ill not be discussed. A dditional data show that those who p articip a te on a "v ery m uch so" b asis in a c ris is a re located in the following levels of supervision: level one, 28 p e r cent; level two, 28 p e r cent; and level th re e , 44 p er cent. A m ajo r c ris is is defined as the tim e when high p rio rity values of the organization a re th reaten ed , when th e re is a re s tric tio n on the am ount of tim e for resp o n se , and when the event is unexpected o r unanticipated. ^ ^C harles F . H erm ann, "Some Consequences of C risis W hich L im it the V iability of O rg a n iz a tio n s," A dm inistrative Science Q u a rte rly , VIII (June, 1963), 64. 17 H ypothesis 4. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between ability to influence the im m ediate su p e rv iso r and participation in decision m aking when a c ris is o ccu rs in the departm ent. H ypothesis 5. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between the reduction of com m unication channels and the cen tralizatio n of decision m aking in tim e of a m ajo r c ris is . H ypothesis 6. --T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between p refe ren c e for a job that stay s the sam e o r changes, and participation in decision m aking when a c ris is occurs in the departm ent. H ypothesis 7. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on form al organizational authority and p referen ce for a job that stay s the sam e o r changes. Sub-hypotheses: b u reau cratizatio n T his group of hypotheses m e a su re s the degree of bureau c ra tiz atio n of the organization so that an evaluation of the form al s tru c tu ra l p ro c e sse s can be m ade before undertaking an o rg an iza tional change pro g ram . H ypothesis 8. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on form al organizational authority and technical qualifications of individuals assig n ed to specific functions in th e ir departm ent. H ypothesis 9. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between the em phasis on im p erso n ality and the division of labor in the 18 departm ent. H ypothesis 10. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on the following p ro c e d u re s, regulations, and ru le s , and the w riting and filing of com m unications and pro ced u res in the departm ent. Sub- h y p o th eses: self- identity T his group of hypotheses m ea su re s latent conflict and self- identity as re fle cted in job satisfactio n , productivity, and possible so u rc e s of conflict from c u rre n t m ethods of perform ance a p p raisal. T h ese sub-hypotheses provide an insight into the c u rre n t m ental health of the organization as w ell as indications as to w hether trad itio n al approaches to organizational change a re applicable to public ad m in istratio n . H ypothesis 11. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between the p ercen tag e of tim e actually spent in productive se rv ic e s and enjoy m ent of w ork. H ypothesis 12. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between enjoym ent of w ork and satisfactio n w ith th e ir achievem ent. H ypothesis 13. - -T h e re is no difference between an em ployee's perception of the relatio n sh ip of his w ork to d epartm ental objectives and c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l a ccu rately m easu rin g job perform ance. 19 H ypothesis 14. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between enjoym ent of the w ork and the c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l accu rately m easu rin g job perform ance. H ypothesis 15. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between enjoym ent in w orking in th e ir position and satisfactio n with the p resen t amount of d iscretio n in decision m aking. R e se a rc h Design The re s e a rc h design focuses on em p irically testin g hypotheses from the data. The m a ste r sam ple (N=423) is a c lu ste red i and stra tifie d random sam ple of a population of 7,000 su p e rv iso rs. T he control groups v ary in th e ir function and purpose. The control groups a re not an iso lated sam ple that is used to m ea su re the effectiveness of specific change p ro g ram s on the m a ste r sam ple. T he control groups in th is re s e a rc h function as a m ea su re of conflict i within and between focal positions and o th er counter-positions. C ontrol group 1 is a random sam ple (N=36) of the m a s te r sam ple and I provides fo r analysis of focal positions' rig h ts and obligations with the co u n ter-p o sitio n s. C ontrol group 2 is not a random sam ple j (N=T5) rep re se n tin g em ployee asso ciatio n s and pro fessio n al ■ a rb itra to rs . T his group provides a p ersp ectiv e as to what other ! co u n ter-p o sitio n s expect of them . T h ere a re no before and a fte r 1 20 te s ts in this re s e a rc h design. Im portance of the Study The im portance of this study is d irec tly re la te d to the re s e a rc h design and m ethodology in selectin g the sam ple and the organization to be studied. Los Angeles County governm ent is the la rg e st local governm ent in the United States em ploying approxi m ately 70,000. The m a s te r sam ple re p re se n ts 7,000 su p erv iso ry personnel who su p erv ised 45,252 em ployees with an annual budget of $1. 6 billion at the tim e this re s e a rc h was conducted. The m a s te r sam ple is a clu ste red and stra tifie d random sam ple rep re se n tin g the ; e n tire su p e rv iso ry personnel in tw elve m ajo r departm ents. A lm ost a ll of th ese departm ental functions a re sim ila r to m unicipal and sta te governm ents. County governm ents a re d irectly involved in intergovernm ental relatio n sh ip s between the fed eral, sta te , m unici p a litie s, school d is tric ts , and other local governm ental units m o re than any o th er form of governm ent. A com plex sy stem of relatio n sh ip s is d e sire d to field te s t j the Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. T he re s e a rc h data a re tim ely to m ost local governm ents, j sin ce collective bargaining is ju st em erging in the public se c to r. The! i data point out a re a s w here train in g and developm ent should be under- | taken to fac ilitate the im plem entation of a collective bargaining agreem ent. The re s e a rc h was conducted at a very valuable point in tim e, since the data w ere acquired before the im plem entation of ag reem en ts o ccu rred . T his provides an excellent com parison for "b e fo re -a fte r" re s e a rc h in future tim e periods to determ ine the im pact of collective bargaining on m anagerial decision m aking in public em ploym ent. The Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change provides a viable a ltern ativ e fo r public a d m in istrato rs to m ake la rg e organizations m o re resp o n siv e to political and environm ental p re s s u re s . CHAPTER II THE RESEARCH METHOD C h a ra c te ristic s of the Sam ple Scope of the re s e a rc h study The scope of this study is lim ited to su p erv iso ry personnel in departm ents em ploying 1,000 o r m o re em ployees in Los Angeles County governm ent as of O ctober, 1969. T his included som e departm ents w here the departm ent head is elected (sheriff) o r a departm ent w ith its own governing body (flood control d istric t). S upervisory personnel who did not m eet the req u irem en t of su p e r vising a m inim um of th re e o r m ore individuals w ere excluded from the sam ple. S tratificatio n of the sam ple T he sam ple is c lu ste red into departm ental units and stra tifie d into th re e su p e rv iso ry lev els. The random sam ple is re p re se n ta tiv e of the th re e su p e rv iso ry levels ra th e r than of the c lu s te r (departm ent). T he siz e of su b -sam p le for each c lu ste r 22 23 ran g es from th irty - one to th irty - nine retu rn e d and usable question n a ire s. T hese su p erv iso ry levels a re defined as follow s: S upervisory level one. - -T hose involved in su pervising th ree o r m o re individuals at le a st 50 p er cent o r m ore of the tim e. T hese m ay include o th er su p e rv iso rs (two o r le ss) as w ell as voluntary and involuntary personnel (prison w ork crew s). T hose being su p erv ised a re not involved in su p erv isin g other em ployees. S upervisory level tw o. - -T hose who d irectly su p erv ise th ree o r m o re su p e rv iso rs, who in tu rn su p erv ise th ree or m ore individ uals not involved in su p erv isio n as defined in su p e rv iso ry level one. T his m ay include any num ber of firs t- level su p e rv iso rs as w ell as two second-level su p e rv iso rs rep o rtin g to the focal position being studied. S upervisory level th re e . - -T h o se who su p e rv ise d ire c tly th re e o r m ore other su p e rv iso rs, who in tu rn su p erv ise d irec tly th re e o r m ore su p e rv iso rs as defined in su p e rv iso ry level two, who in tu rn su p e rv ise th re e o r m o re n o n -su p erv iso ry em ployees as defined in su p erv iso ry level one. O rganization Los Angeles County governm ent w as chosen for the following re a s o n s : 1. A collective bargaining ordinance w as p assed in 24 O ctober, 1968. T his ordinance c reated an Em ployee R elations C om m ission as a component of the C ivil S ervice C om m ission to im plem ent the ordinance. 2. Los Angeles County governm ent is the m ost com plex and la rg e st local governm ent in the United States. T h ere a re approxim ately 70,000 em ployees in this organization. 3. The siz e of the organization also provides larg e enough sam ples (N=423) in the m a ste r sam ple as w ell as in control groups to provide data for the field of public adm inistration. 4. The organization is la rg e enough to provide stra tifie d random sam ples of th re e levels of supervision. 5. Many of the departm ental operations a re sim ila r with o th er local governm ental agencies. 6. T he siz e and function of Los A ngeles County governm ent provides an in term ed iate m odel between sta te and local governm ents. Data would be m ore applicable to other governm ental entities than city o r the sta te governm ents. 25 ; 7. The com plexities of Los Angeles County govern m ent provide analysis of intergovernm ental relatio n sh ip s between fed e ral, sta te , and local agencies. Los Angeles County governm ent has over 2,000 co n tract se rv ic e agreem ents with local governm ental agencies w ithin its ju risd ictio n . I 8. M ost im portant, th e re was a c c e ss, legitim acy, and support fo r this re s e a rc h from the Personnel D epartm ent and by departm ents studied. W ithout this support, this study would never have been undertaken. j D epartm ents studied. - -T h e p rim a ry c rite rio n fo r selection of a departm ent to be studied was that it contain at le a st 1,000 full tim e em ployees (both su p e rv iso ry and n o n -su p erv iso ry personnel). T his figure was picked because of the n atu re of the stra tific a tio n of the random sam ple. If departm ents with le ss than 1,000 em ployees i w ere se lected , th e re would not have been sufficient su p erv iso ry personnel at the th ird level of supervision to provide a random sam p le o r, in som e c a se s, a non-random sam ple siz e sufficient for j re s e a rc h purposes. ; All departm ents approached authorized this study except j two. T h ese w ere the D istric t A tto rn ey 's Office and the A s s e s s o r's | 26 Office. Both of th ese departm ent heads a re elected. In the tw elve departm ents studied, all departm ent heads a re appointed except the sh e riff, who is elected. The following departm ents w ere studied (listed in alpha betical o rd er): Building S ervices County E ngineer Flood C ontrol D istrict F o re s te r and F ir e W arden H ealth D epartm ent Los Angeles C ounty-- U niversity of Southern C alifornia M edical C enter (G eneral H ospital) M echanical D epartm ent Parks and R ecreation D epartm ent Probation D epartm ent D epartm ent of Public Social S ervices Road D epartm ent S h eriff's D epartm ent T h e re a re approxim ately 7,000 su p e rv iso ry personnel in th ese departm ents supervising 42,417 em ployees at the tim e the sam ple w as selected (O ctober, 1969), and 45,252 em ployees when the questionnaire w as ad m in istered (June, 1970). T hese tw elve dep artm en ts re p re se n t 67.27 per cent of the total em ploym ent of Los 27 Angeles County governm ent as of June, 1970. T he total num ber em ployed by the county of Los A ngeles as of June, 1970, was 67,266 personnel. A pproxim ately 9,000 of these w ere su p e rv iso rs. Selection of the sam ple T h ere w ere th re e different m ethods used to se lec t the sam ple. T he m ethod was dependent on the conditions and n atu re of the re c o rd s available. 1. Payroll data with em ployee nam es o r num bers w ere used in m ost of the departm ents. A ssigned num bers w ere placed in front of each nam e. A table of random num bers was used to determ ine which would be selected . T his was done for the following d e p a rtm e n ts: Building S e rv ic e s, County E ngineer, F o re s te r and F ire W arden, H ealth, M echanical, Parks and R ecreation, Probation, Public Social S erv ices, and Sheriff. 2. An a ltern ativ e m ethod using organizational position m anuals w as also developed. A ssigned num bers w ere placed in front of the resp e c tiv e position item num bers. A table of random num bers was used to d eterm in e who would be selected . T his w as the m ethod used in the Flood C ontrol D istrict and the Road D epartm ent. 3. Em ployee cardex files w ere used in the G eneral H ospital. The files w ere on a v e rtica l ro tatin g drum w ith four se p a ra te ro tatin g units on each drum . The m ain drum w as spun in one direction, and each of the four sub-units w ere spun in another. One sam ple w as then taken from each tie r, The drum s w ere then spun again in the sam e m anner, and the selectio n p ro cess was rep eated until a sufficient sam ple siz e was obtained. D escription of the sam ple M aster sam ple (N=423). - -T he m a ste r sam ple is a c lu ste re d and stra tifie d random sam ple of rep resen tin g 7,000 su p e rv iso ry personnel in tw elve departm ents (Table 1). C ontrol group 1 (N=36). - -A n o n -stra tifie d random sam ple w as selected from w ithin the original (m aste r) sam ple to act as a control group on the question concerning "counter-expectations for behavior" that the focal positions m ay have fo r th e ir resp ectiv e co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T his sam ple was not c lu ste re d according to departm ents nor stra tifie d as to levels of supervision. C ontrol group 2 (N=15). - -A non-random sam ple was obtained from two m ajo r groups that have in teractio n s or expectations fo r Los Angeles County governm ent in personnel p ra c tic e s and reso lu tio n . T h ese sam p les c o n sist of the follow ing groups: E m ployee A ssociations and Unions in the Public S ector (N P rofessional A rb itra to rs, M ed iato rs, C onciliators (N=6) TABLE 1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY DEPARTMENTS AND SUPERVISORY LEVELS (MASTER SAMPLE) DEPARTMENT S u p e r v i s o r t L c v e l s 1 I I I I I T o t a l N i N a U3 N Nu m s c * o r E M r i . o v c c a ( j u n c 1970) 1 9 7 0 - 7 1 B u o o e t ( m i l l i o n s ) S u i l o i h c S e r v i c e s 1 5 8 1 0 3 3 - 1 . 2 5 ' f * 10.65 . C o u n t * E n g i n e e r 1 5 1 2 1 1 3 8 1.526 19.91 f c o o o C o n t r o l D i s t r i c t 1 7 9 1 0 3 8 1.711 91.67 F o r e s t e r a h o F i r e Wa r o e n 1 3 1 U 8 3 5 2,065 17.21 He a l t h De p a r t m e n t 1 9 5 9 3 3 2.193 32.28 lAC-USC h e o i c a l C e n t e r 1 2 1 2 9 3 3 8. 9 2 1 * 108. 3!* Me c h a n i c a l De p a r t m e n t 1 5 1 5 7 3 7 1.639 1 6 . 1 * 5 P a r r s a n d R c c r c a t i o h De p t . 1 3 9 1 2 3*1 1 . 2 0 9 16. 2 1 * P r o b a t i o n De p a r t m e n t 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 * 3.891 * 9 . 3 1 De p t , o r P u b l i c S o c i a l S e r v i c e s 1 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 12. 1 * 3 6 1 . 0 3 2 . 3 7 Ro a o De p a r t m e n t 2 1 1 0 8 3 9 2.085 1 0 7 . 5 9 Sh e r i r r 1 0 1 3 1 5 3 8 6.319 9 0 . 1 3 To t a l 1 7 2 130 1 2 1 J»23 1 *5.252 * 1 . 5 9 3 - 6 2 . Q uestionnaire C onstruction and A dm inistration 30 Q uestionnaire construction T his questionnaire has four p a rts: (1) assigned v ariab les, (2) analysis of latent c o n flict,stre ss, and change, (3) definition of decision-m aking sy ste m s, and (4) analysis of conflict in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n . The questionnaire w as p re tested on th irty individuals over a period of four m onths. T hese respondents w ere se lec te d from departm ents sim ila r to those being teste d but who w ere not in the sam ple, o r w ere taken from the sam e d epartm ents to be teste d a fte r the original random sam ples w ere obtained. The questionnaire was p re te ste d a fte r each revision. Q uestionnaire ad m in istratio n T he questionnaires w ere self- ad m in istered in the following m anner: Each p articip an t receiv ed a sealed envelope through the Los Angeles County M ail System with "confidential" m arkings on the a d d ress label. Accom panying the questionnaire was a le tte r from th e ir resp ec tiv e departm ent head authorizing the re s e a rc h p ro ject and req u estin g th e ir cooperation. No nam es w ere assigned to the q uestionnaire itse lf, only assigned sam ple num bers. A double num bering system was estab lish ed so that the assigned sam ple num bers w ere not the sam e ones used to identify individuals com- 31 ; pleting the questio n n aires. C om pleted questionnaires w ere re tu rn e d d irec tly to the author. A fter reading the q u estio n n aires, the respondents w ere called and th e ir answ ers to the questions w ere clarified . If th e re ap peared to be any doubt o r confusion, a fac e-to -fac e interview was conducted. T he to tal num ber of questionnaires sent and the num ber retu rn e d was not rec o rd ed . Only eight respondents d irec tly refu sed to answ er the questionnaire. The rea so n given for the re fu sa ls was due to too m any personal questions being asked. T he departm ental liaison assigned by each departm ent to coordinate a cc ess to departm ental re c o rd s did not know to whom the q u estionnaires w ere sent. T his was done in the following m anner: At le a s t tw ice the num ber of sam ples needed was selected . T h ere was a double num bering sy stem . E ach sam ple rec eiv e s an assigned num ber. A nother num ber, known as sam ple num ber, was assigned to him for purposes of questionnaire re trie v a l and c ard identification.! All q uestionnaires w ere m ailed, coded, and tra n s c rib e d by i the author. E v ery respondent was called d ire c tly to verify that he filled out the questionnaire and to c la rify any questions that w ere m issed . i Q uestionnaires w ere m ailed on June 3, 1970. A follow -up m ailing o c cu rred on July 14, 1970. All interview s w ere finished by 32 January, 1971. Role as a M ethod of A nalysis Introduction A v ery difficult problem in public ad m inistration is the developm ent of an operational fram e of re fe re n c e which acts as a constant in the analysis of d iv erse and quite com plex fields. The sta te d goals of one departm ent m ay be com pletely different from o th er departm ents and actual goals in the sam e agency, and yet both p o sse ss the sam e philosophical value of the public in te re s t as th e ir goal. H ow ever, m aking this value and behavioral sy stem s analysis into an operational re s e a rc h in stru m en t that is both susceptible to m easu rem en t and yet coherent to the respondent being sam pled, re q u ire s a tran sp o sitio n to a different one that is easily and read ily understood. Role analysis provides such a fo rm at fo r re s e a rc h purposes and e a se of understanding by the respondent. Sim ply stated , ro le an aly sis can be su m m arized as what the expectations a re for the behavior of an individual occupying the position being studied. All questions asked a re p h rased in re fe re n c e to: "W hat do you perceive o th ers expect of you?" H ow ever, the concept of ro le is fa r m ore com plex than the sim ple definition ju st 33 : m entioned. Role analy sis in its p resen t and m ore elab o rativ e sta te is a re la tiv e ly new field of inquiry w ith no g en eral and uniform definition of dom ain of study, p ersp ectiv e, language, body of knowledge, theory, and m ethod of inquiry. ^ Although ro le analysis has th ese shortcom ings, th e re is agreem ent on th re e basic ideas which a re that individuals (1) in so cial locations (2) behave (3) with 2 re fe re n c e to expectations. T h ese th re e b asic ideas thus se rv e as a fram e of re fe re n c e for developing the re s e a rc h instrum ent. O ther disciplines sh a re the in te re s t of m easu rem en t and prediction of hum an behavior. H ow ever, ro le provides the unique com bination of being able to m ea su re individual, group, and organizational behavior.: T he language of ro le analysis The different languages of ro le analysis a re m any, dependent on the au th o r's p ersp ectiv e. F o r purposes of this re s e a rc h , the b asic language developed by G ro ss, M ason, and M cE achern a re j 3 i utilized. Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. T hom as, Role T h eo ry : Concepts and R e se arch (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, Inc. , 1966), ; p. 3. 2 Neal G ro ss, W ard S. M ason, and A lexander W. ; M cE achern, E xplorations in Role A nalysis: Studies of the School Super intendency Role (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, In c ., 1958), i p. 17. i r i 3Ib id ., p. 67. | 34 A "position" is the location of an acto r o r c la ss of a cto rs in a sy stem of so cial relatio n sh ip s. A "positional se cto r" is an elem ent of the relatio n al specification of a position, and is specified by the rela tio n sh ip of a focal position to a single counter-position. An "expectation" is an evaluative stan d ard applied to an incum bent of a position. A "ro le " is a se t of expectations applied to an incum bent of a p a rtic u la r position. A " ro le se c to r" is a se t of expectations applied to the relatio n sh ip of a focal position to a single counter position. A "rig h t" of an incum bent of a focal position is an expectation applied to the incum bent of a counter-position. An "obligation" of an incum bent of a focal position is an expectation applied to the incum bent of a focal position. A "ro le behavior" is an actual perform ance of an incum bent of a position which can be re fe rre d to an expectation for an incum bent of that position. A "ro le attrib u te" is an actual quality of an incum bent of a position which can be re fe rre d to an expectation fo r an incum bent of that position. A "ro le behavior se c to r" is a se t of actual behaviors which can be r e fe rre d to a se t of expectations for behaviors applicable to the relatio n sh ip of a focal position to a single counter-position. A "ro le a ttrib u te s e c to r’ .' is a s e t of actual attrib u tes which can be re fe r re d to a se t of expectations for attrib u tes applicable to the rela tio n sh ip of a focal position to a single counter-position. A "sanction" is a ro le behavior the p rim a ry significance of which is g ratificatio n al-d ep riv atio n al. Basic co n stru ct of ro le analysis The basic unit of ro le an aly sis is known as the "focal position. " The focal position is the specified position that is being studied. All o th er positions a re known as "co u n ter-p o sitio n s. " Since m an is alw ays situational and cannot be rem oved from his 35 environm ent, we th e re fo re m ust study the rela tio n a l specification of positions. "W hatever the im plications of the label, a position cannot be com pletely d escrib ed until a ll the other positions to which it is 4 re la te d have been specified. " T hus, we a re led to a study of the relatio n sh ip s between the focal position and the cou n ter-p o sitio n s in o rd e r to locate the focal position in the netw ork of sy ste m s. System s a re defined as a "grouping of interdependent v a ria b le s. " In o rd e r to c la rify the concept of ro le an aly sis, an analogy is found in G ro ss, et a l. Just as in geom etry a point cannot be located without d escrib in g its relatio n sh ip s to other points, so persons cannot be located without d escrib in g th e ir rela tio n s to other individuals, the points im ply the relatio n sh ip s and the relatio n sh ip s im ply the points. ^ Role analysis locates the focal positions and th e ir rela tio n ships with cou n ter-p o sitio n s as com ponents of la rg e r and m ore com plex in te rac tin g sy ste m s. In a sy stem of rela tio n sh ip s, the g eo m etric points acq u ire labels which seem to o bscure the functions of the incum bents. T he te rm "position" is used to re fe r to the location of the a c to r o r c la ss of a c to rs in a sy stem of so cial relatio n sh ip s. An acto r m ay be defined as an individual, a c la ss of a cto rs as a "la y e r" (su p e rv iso rs), a group of a c to rs with specific job 4Ibid. , p. 51. 5Ib id ., p. 48. objectives would be a d ep artm en t, and the "sy ste m of so cial rela tio n sh ip s" would include the fo rm s of p attern ed in teractio n re su ltin g in an organization o r a society. A d iscu ssio n of the definitions of focal position and c o u n ter-p o sitio n s developed in G ro ss, et a l. , w ill provide a s tru c tu ra l m odel in developing concepts m ea su re d in the re s e a rc h in stru m en t. ^ Position a n a ly sis. - -A position can be located w ithin a fra m e w ork of a system by its rela tio n sh ip s w ith o th er positions. T he organization is view ed as a com plex so cial system and the individual ro le of the focal position as a p a rt of th is sy stem . T his focal position m ay be analyzed in different a sp ects of its relatio n sh ip s with o th ers by se v e ra l different m ethods. Dyad m odel— In th is approach, the position is specified by its relatio n sh ip s w ith only one co u n ter-p o sitio n (F ig u re 2). C o u n t e r P O S I T J O N 1 F o c a l P o s i t i o n F ig. 2 . - - A dyad m odel ^ b i d . , pp. 51-55. 37 P o sitio n -ce n tric m odel. - -T h e position is specified by its rela tio n sh ip s to a num ber of co u n te r-p o sitio n s. T his approach w ill be used extensively in the re s e a rc h fo r an aly sis of ro le conflict in p erso n n el p ra c tic e s and g riev an ce reso lu tio n . It provides a fram ew o rk fo r focusing on one position and exam ining its re la tio n sh ip s to a s e rie s of co u n te r-p o sitio n s. T his approach does not m e a su re the rela tio n sh ip s betw een the co u n ter-p o sitio n s which m ay g rea tly influence the behavior of the focal position (F ig u re 3). F ig . 3 .--A p o sitio n -c e n tric m odel S ystem s m odel. - -T h is m odel is an extension of the position- c e n tric approach but is m o re com plex, sin ce it accounts fo r the ex isten ce of rela tio n sh ip s betw een the d ifferen t c o u n ter-p o sitio n s. C q u n t c r P o s i t i o n 2 C O IM IL R P o s i t i o n 3 focIC *' P o s i t i o n 38 A position in th is m odel can be com pletely d escrib ed only by d e scrib in g the to tal system of positions and the relatio n sh ip s of w hich it is a p a rt. T hus, in a sy stem of interdependent p a rts , a change in any rela tio n sh ip w ill have an effect on-all other re la tio n sh ip s (F ig u re 4). COUNTCft P o s i t i o n 2 COUNYCR P o s i t i o n 3 F ig . 4 . - - A sy ste m s m odel H ie ra rc h ic a l sy ste m s m odel. - -T h is is an extension of the sim p le sy ste m s m odel. T he sy stem is re a rra n g e d into a h ie ra rc h y of influence fo r sim p lic ity of an aly sis. T his approach is s till not a com plete d e scrip tio n , sin ce it leaves out the rela tio n sh ip s between n o n -adjacent positions in the s e rie s (F ig u re 5). 39 F o c a l P o s i t i o n M , V v Fig. 5 . - - A h ie ra rc h ic a l sy stem s m odel P olyarchical sy ste m s m o del.- - T h is approach is a re s u lt ! i i of in teg ratin g the h ie ra rc h ic a l sy ste m s m odel with the m ultiple | sy stem m odel into a h ie ra rc h ic a l-m u ltip le sy ste m s m odel. When j j autonom ous co u n ter-p o sitio n s a re located in a com plex organization, th e se becom e the c ritic a l linkages for undertaking an organizational | change pro g ram . A sim p le polyarchical sy ste m s m odel is illu strated j in F ig u re 6. 40 \ CO U N TE R > P o s i t i o n 2 * — COUKTCH P o s i t i o n 1 C o u n t e r P o s i t i o n 3 C o u N P o s i t P o s i t i o n 5 F ig. 6 .- - A P olyarchical S ystem s M odel M ethods of Role A nalysis U sed in the R e se arch P ro ject M ajor hypotheses T his p a rt of the re s e a rc h m e a su re s the rela tio n sh ip betw een the focal position and sp ecified co u n ter-p o sitio n s using the p o sitio n -c e n tric m odel (F ig u re 7). 41 E l e c t e d O t p i c i a l s F o r m a l Or g a n i z a t i o n C i v i l S c r v i c c C o m m i s s i o n E m p l o y e e R e l a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n O t h e r E m p l o y e e Or g a n i z a t i o n O t h e r Em p l o y e e Or g a n i z a t i o n P o s ITIQ N F o c a l Los A n g e l e s C o u n t y E m p l o y e e s A s s o c i a t i o n S u p c r v I V o r s W i t h i n Oc p a r t m e n t P r o p e s s i o n a l S o c i e t y S u p e r v i s o r s O u t s i o e Oc p a r t m e n t S u b o r d i n a t e s Fig. 7. - -A p o sitio n -c e n tric m odel fo r m ea su rin g d ifferen ces j betw een decision expected and decision actu ally m ade in p erso n n el ! p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n for focal positions. 42 Sub- hypotheses A p o ly arch ical sy stem s m odel is used to analyze the relatio n sh ip s between the focal position and co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T his approach a lso m e a su re s the in te rrelatio n sh ip s between the co u n ter positions (F ig u re 8). E l e c t e d o r P o l i t i c a l l y A r r o i n t c o G o v e r n m e n t O r r i c i A L S I n d i v i d u a l C i t i z e n s F ig. 8. - -A po ly arch ical sy ste m s m odel used to m e a su re in te rre la tio n sh ip s. Com ponents of Role A nalysis 43 Expectations The focal position and co unter-positions have been defined as being located in a system of so cial relatio n sh ip s. The term "expectations" is the m ost c ritic a l concept used in ro le analysis. T his term is in te rp re te d in two different w ays: (1) how the focal position should in te rac t and (2) how the focal position actually does in te ra c t w ith co u n ter-p o sitio n s. When the te rm is defined as how the focal position should behave, the m eaning is "e x p e c ta tio n s"--a s an evaluative standard. The m eaning of expectations as used in this re s e a rc h is norm ative ra th e r than predictive. The te rm "expectation"^ can also be applied to all incum bents o r to a p a rtic u la r incum bent of : a specified position. T his gives flexibility in analyzing specific groupings according to different levels and c rite ria . | T h ere a re two dim ensions to an expectation: (1) direction i and (2) intensity. A ccording to G ro ss, et al. , every expectation can be reduced to a statem en t for or against som ething. . . . T he em p irical re fe re n c e of the expectation m ust be introduced before its d irectio n can be specified. ^ : T he second asp ect of expectations is its intensity. Any expectation can be cla ssified som ew here on a continuum from "absolutely m ust" j 7I b id ., p. 59. 44 follow th e ir expectations to "absolutely m ust n o t." Role Role is defined as a se t of expectations (evaluative stan d ard s) applied to an incum bent of a p a rtic u la r position. G ro ss, et al. , have defined ro le so it can be used as a concept at any of the various levels of rela tio n a l and situational specificity that can be applied to positions. T h eir definition of ro le depends on the previous definition of position as a location of an acto r or a c la ss of a c to rs in a system of so cial relatio n sh ip s. Defined in this way, the ro le concept m ay be used in studies of dyadic o r m ore com plicated rela tio n a l sy ste m s, form al and inform al o rganizations, as w ell as of the s tru c tu re of a total society. . . . T his m eans that the concept is not re s tric te d to the situations o r rela tio n sh ip s which a re of in te re s t to a p a rtic u la r se t of in v estig ato rs but can be used in the analyses of problem s at d ifferen t lev els. . . . In addition, no re s tric tio n s a re placed by th is definition on the definers of the expectations. T he concept m ay consequently be used in analyses in which the incum bents of the position as w ell as non-incum bents of the position a re the definers of the ro le. 8 Role segm entation T his is categorization of a group or a se t of expectations th at individuals m ay hold for a focal position. Segm ents a re p a rts of ro le s. uIbid. , pp. 59- 60. 45 : M ultiple expectations Role s e c to r. - -T h is is defined as a se t of expectations applied to the relatio n sh ip of a focal position to a single counter position. In an em p irical inquiry the analysis m ay be concerned with one o r m ore se c to rs. The v ariety of possible relationships in which a specific position m ay be involved re q u ire s that in the analysis of the se t of expectations asso ciated with it, the investigator needs to specify p re c ise ly what ro le se c to rs w ill be exam ined. Rights and obligations. - -R ights of the incum bent of a focal position a re defined as expectations which a re applied to an incum bent of a counter-position. O bligations of the incum bent of a focal position a re defined as expectations which a re applied to the incum bent of the focal position. Expectations for behaviors and a ttrib u te s. - -T h is basis of | ro le segm entation provides concepts by which an investigator can distinguish between what incum bents of positions should do and what incum bents of positions should be, or the c h a ra c te ristic s they should | p o ssess. Sanction. - -Sanction is defined as a ro le behavior; the ; p rim a ry significance is g ratificatio n al-d ep riv atio n al. T his is j included in the original re s e a rc h but is not d iscu ssed in this re p o rt. CHAPTER III CONSENSUS: DEVIANCY AND CONFORMITY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES Introduction The concept of consensus provides a th eo re tic al p ersp ectiv e fo r m aking the Polyarchical System s Model fo r O rganizational and Social Change operational. C onsensus im plies deviancy, conform ity, and sanctions. T his ch apter focuses on how consensus is d e te r m ined and how deviancy and conform ity a re p ro ce ssed by the system . Since one of th e purposes of this re s e a rc h is to explore m aking the Polyarchical System s Model operational for groups of th re e through la rg e organizations, consensus, deviancy, and conform ity a re d iscu ssed in rela tio n to individual and organizational behavior. C onsensus m ay be estab lish ed by accepting a stan d ard as absolute o r by a dynam ic p ro cess involving individual and group values and norm s. When stan d ard s a re accepted as absolute, deviancy is determ ined by w hether o r not violations occur. This approach re q u ire s only two p a rtic ip a n ts--th e o b se rv e r and the deviant. When consensus is determ ined by the dynam ic p ro c e ss, deviancy is re la tiv e to group o r so cietal n o rm s. Deviancy is determ ined by w hether o r not the group p erceiv es the observed act as deviant and harm ful to th e ir in te re s ts . T he dynam ic approach does not accept stan d ard s as absolute but re la tiv e to the individual, group, and the situation. T his approach re q u ire s a m inim um of th re e p articip an ts to d eterm in e consensus. The consensus, deviancy and conform ity cycle opens up the d iscu ssio n of individual and organizational behavior reg a rd in g autonom y; closed and open s y s tem s approaches to conflict and change; and P olyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. C onsensus Role consensus In o rd e r to c la rify the definition of consensus, the rela tio n ship of this definition to two other te rm s used in the preceding chapter should be c la rified . The te rm "ro le " has previously been defined as a se t of expectations applied to an incum bent position. A " ro le se cto r" was defined as a se t of expectations applied to the relatio n sh ip of a focal position to a single co u n ter-p o sitio n . ^ 48 F o r purposes of this re s e a rc h , " ro le consensus" occurs when the sum total of the perceived legitim ate expectations held by the counter-positions for the behavior of the focal position become a m ajo rity for a specific p attern of expected behavior. T his definition of consensus focuses on the "norm ative" approach in determ ining expectations for the focal position's behavior. T his "ro le consensus” m odel can be applied to counter positions com posed of individuals, a single group, or groups. T his m odel also im plies a dim ension of deviancy and conform ity in behavior since the "decision actually m ade" to the "decision expected" re q u ire s som e form of sanction on the p a rt of the counter position to obtain the "decision expected. " It is now postulated that "ro le consensus" affects the behavior of the focal position. The directio n and intensity of the expectation as w ell as the sanctions fo r obtaining conform ity, coupled w ith ro le consensus estab lish es the p a ra m e te rs fo r the behavior of the focal position. H ow ever, th ese boundaries a re not fixed nor absolute, since the focal position has continuous in teractio n s with the ; counter-positions over tim e and the "decision actually m ade" also acts as inputs into the counter-positions in redefining his subsequent in te rp retatio n of the level of "ro le consensus. " The direction for the expectation for behavior is determ ined j 49 in the re s e a rc h p ro ce ss by f ir s t asking the focal position to answ er the question, "How do you p erceiv e a specific counter-position expects you to behave in relatio n to statem ent X?" In this re s e a rc h , statem en t "X" has been rep laced by "personnel p rac tic es" and "g rie v a n c e s." Once the d irectio n for the perceived expectation has been established, the intensity of the "ro le consensus" for the expected behavior of the focal position can be m easu red anyw here on a continuum ranging from indifference, through p re fe re n tia l, to com pletely m andatory on w hether o r not they w ish the focal position to conform to th e ir w ishes. T his p refe ren tial sc ale thus gives a m easu rem en t of the o rd erin g p ro cess in determ ining p rio ritie s in fulfilling expectations of the coun ter-p o sitio n s. The "m ajo rity " was chosen in the determ ination of "ro le consensus" sin ce the focal position w ill be m ore apt to be rig h t at le a st 50 per cent of the tim e and thus w ill have som e d irectio n to his j behavior. T his figure has no relatio n sh ip to the dem ocratic vote ; p ro ce ss that m ajo rity ru le s. F o r purposes of th is re s e a rc h , agreem ent on ro le consensus: is taken to have a single m ean in g --th at both p a rtie s ag ree. T hat is , : it is assum ed, that the focal position has c o rre c tly perceived the expectations for his behavior, and thus th e re is a single agreem ent 50 that both p a rtie s endorse his perceiption of the expectation. M odel for consensus In the d iscussion of consensus, two continuum s a re obtained: agreem ent and understanding. A m odel using th ese concepts was developed by Thom as Scheff which provides four a ltern a tiv e s to the 2 estab lish m en t of consensus. 1. M onolithic consensus: the m ajo rity a g re e s and understands that th e re is agreem ent. 2. P lu ra listic ignorance: the m ajo rity a g re es but thinks that th e re is d isag reem en t. 3. D issensus: the m ajo rity does not a g re e and understands that they do not ag ree. 4. F a lse consensus: the m ajo rity does not a g re e and m isunderstands the question. They think that they a g ree on the m eaning of the question and subsequently d isa g ree in th e ir decisions when estab lish in g consensus. F ig u re 9 was developed by T hom as Scheff to explain his 2 Thom as J. Scheff, "T ow ard a Sociological M odel of C o n sen su s," A m erican Sociological R eview , XXXII (F e b ru a ry , 1967), 32-46. 51 3 his m odel. note consensus M a j o r i t y Un d e r s t a n d s Mi s u n d e r s t a n d s Ao r e c Mo n o l o t h i c P l u r a l i s t i c Co n s e n s u s IGNORANCE AGREE ANO Ac r c c and UNDERSTAND Mi s u n d c r s t a n o m .t CONSENSUS Ma j o r i t y OlSSENSUS F a l s e Co n s e n s u s OlSACRCC ANO D i s a g r e e and Un d e r s t a n d Mis u n d e r s t a n d OlSAQRCC F ig . 9. - -A m odel fo r ro le consensus C om plete consensus on an issu e e x ists in a group when th e re is an infinite s e rie s of re c ip ro c a tin g understandings betw een the m em b ers of the group concerning the issu e . I know that you know that 1 know, and so on. T his is the definition of com plete 4 consensus. V arious d eg rees of p a rtia l con sen su s, depending on the level of co -o rie n ta tio n achieved. ^ 1. A greem ent. T his is the z e ro level, we have ag reem en t but not consensus. 2. F ir s t level. P erceived consensus. ^ Ib id ., p. 38. ^Ibicl. , p. 36. bid. 3. Second level. (We recognized that they recognized that we re c o g n iz e d .) M ost of the re s e a rc h rep o rte d w ill be on e ith e r the firs t level of agreem ent o r perceived consensus. The re s e a rc h in stru m ent did not m ea su re second level consensus. H ow ever, second level consensus is possible without d ire c t m easu rem en t through the use of "ta c it co-ordination" developed in the overt bargaining p ro c e ss by Schelling. In this m odel of ta c it co -o rien tatio n , th ere m ay be d ire c t com m unication by a "conversation" of g e stu re s. T his is tru e in form al collective bargaining p ro c e sse s. However, such o v ert and d ire c t bargaining relatio n sh ip s betw een the focal position and counter-positions do not occur with such re g u la rity that it is p o ssib le to m ea su re with a high degree of probability as to outcom es. Role conflict F o r purposes of this re s e a rc h , ro le conflict is defined as "the conflict between the decision expected and decision actually m a d e ." The re s e a rc h focus is on w hether o r not th e re is conflict in the decision-m aking p ro ce ss between decision expected and decision actually m ade. The consensus is accepted as being a valid p e rc ep tion of the focal position of the counter-expectations for his behavior. Thom as C. Schelling, The S trategy of Conflict (New Y ork: O xford U niversity P re ss, 1969), pp. 54-67. Deviancy and C onform ity Introduction Inherent in the discussion of ro le consensus is the concept that individuals w ill conform to the expectations fo r th e ir behavior. When the focal position does not conform to th ese expectations, the p rim a ry cu ltu re w ill view the actual behavior as deviancy. T he study; of behavior can be done from e ith er a sta tic or a dynam ic approach. S tatic approach D efinition of deviancy. - -T h e sta tic approach accepts the group norm s as given. T hese would include law s, p o licies, reg u la tions, ru le s , and p ro ced u res. Deviance is usually considered to be any violation of th ese estab lish ed and codified norm s. An en fo rce m ent unit is c re ate d to m aintain conform ity to the fo rm al and e stab lish ed n orm s. An exam ple would be a cen tralize d personnel agency*reporting to the Civil S ervice C om m ission any deviations from the m e rit principle. The m e rit prin cip le follows the leg islated norm s but m ay o r m ay not be com patible to group n o rm s. T he 1 sta tic approach also fits the philosophy of the b u reau cratic form of organizational influence and control, including negative sanctions fo r j influencing behavior since p o licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and j ! p ro ced u res have been codified as values. j 54 T he b u reaucratization of deviancy.- - T h is is the p ro cess w hereby the m e rit principle is im plem ented by the ad m in istrativ e staff of the Civil Service C om m ission in its relatio n sh ip s with line organizations. T his is generally found in the form of job and position d escrip tio n s, wage and sa la ry ad m in istratio n techniques, grievance p ro ced u res, the m e rit sy stem , and the continual g en era tion and filing of w ritten re p o rts and of placing them into personnel files to ratio n alize decisions in future tim e periods. The function of th is system is to bring control to the elim ination of deviance in the behavior of line organizations in a re a s of personnel p rac tic es and grievance resolution. In this sta tic sy stem , an agent of control o rd e rs deviance by bringing stab ility . T his is achieved in se v e ra l ways: 1. They reg u late deviancy by issu in g p ro ced u res for an o rd e rly approach to the selectio n of new m em bers and the prom otion of p re se n t m em bers through job d escrip tio n s, re c ru itm e n t, prom otion policies and p ro ce d u res, and by m em bers of the bu reau cracy ad m in isterin g the o ra l exam inations. 2. Apprehend any ru le v iolators. 3. T h eir very law s, reg u latio n s, and ru le s define deviant b eh av io r-- giving deviance stru c tu ra l 55 definition and form , both to the deviant and to the I agent of control in th e ir routine of typing individuals as deviant. T his actually rein fo rces deviant behavior because it "m olds" it into a definite value. Typing of dev ian ts. - -T h e p ro cess of classifying individuals ! into deviant types is dependent on the o b se rv e r's own internalization of the m e rit principle as the p rim a ry fram e of refe ren c e. One author holds that . . . in gen eral, social types a re m ore apt to be accepted into a group's system of m eanings when a high-ranking person does the categorization ra th e r than when a low- ranking p erso n does it. E ffective so cial typing, then, flows down ra th e r than up the so c ial s tru c tu re . . . . In tu rn , social typing is m ore apt to be effective if th e re is a sen se of violation of ru le s o r expectations. . . . S im ilarly, negative so cial typing is probably m o re read ily accepted than positive typing. < One would be m o re apt to find the enforcem ent agent fo r the ; j C ivil Service C om m ission to have a negative im age with the potential j deviants and to use the sta tic approach to the classificatio n of deviant behavior. E m phasis w ill be on in fractio n s of ru les and regulations ra th e r than on the actual p ro cess of enactm ent of the deviant act in the origination of position specification and o ral ! 7 E a rl Rubington and M artin W einberg, e d s ., Deviance: T he j In tera ctio n ist P erspective (New Y ork: The M acm illan Company, ! 1968), p. 7. | 56 exam inations. Typing of deviants w ill not flow up the so cial s tru c tu re when g the following o c c u rs: 1. The sen se of violation is som ew hat weak. 2. The type cannot be m ade out to be com pletely negative. 3. The illegitim acy of the a c ts, re a l o r im agined, a re of m inim al consequence. 4. A p attern of non-conform ity cannot be im puted or sustained. 5. T he audience stands to gain very little by r e defining the p erso n as deviant. Deviancy cycle: sta tic approach. - -T he hypothetical deviant c a re e r in a form al organization has the following sta g es under the 9 sta tic m odel of deviancy. 1. The em ployee belongs to a group in which qualities and acts a re view ed as deviant. 2. T his em ployee is believed to exhibit deviance. 8Ib id ., p. 10. 9 T his is an adaptation from E a rl Rubington and M artin S. W einberg, e d s ., Deviance: The In teractio n ist P erspective (New Y ork: The M acm illan Company, 1968), p. 204. 57 : 3. T his em ployee gets typed and assigned deviant statu s. 4. His actions come to form al notice by the bureaucracy, and he becom es an official case to the Civil S ervice C om m ission re p re se n ta tiv e s. 5. T he subsequent p ro cessin g of his g riev an ces, tra n s fe rs , prom otions, dem otions, and task assignm ents pushes him into an organized deviant ro le and out of the conform ity im age of organiza tio n 's m em b ers. 6. F inally, he rec o n stitu te s h im self into the deviant, assu m es the sta tu s, and p e rfo rm s the deviant ro le e ith e r w ithin the sam e organization o r for another. T he p ersp ectiv e of the defining agent of control is im portant in the definition and cla ssifica tio n of deviancy in the line organization.; When the defining agent of control views organizations from the I c la ssic a l b u rea u cra tic m odel, th e re a re no allow ances fo r in co n sist- i ency of human behavior nor em phasis on group n orm s. T he sta tic approach does not allow for m an 's inconsistency. T he n e ce ssity of this allow ance is seen in the following passag e: j . . . An understanding of behavior change, from non- | crim in a l to c rim in a l and vice v e rs a , re q u ire s a theory of 58 behavior which accounts for human inconsistency, and th e re fo re p erm its som e prediction and control of the range of this inconsistency. *-0 T he sta tic m odel c a rrie s a cu ltu ral b ias, which m ay be su m m arized as "the g re a te r the so cial distance betw een the typer and the p erso n singled out fo r typing, the bro ad er the type and the quicker it m ay be applied."** T his bias is due to the relatio n sh ip of the typer to the group o r individuals being c la ssified as deviant. Since the C ivil S ervice C om m ission's ad m in istrativ e staff is technically outside of the b u reau cratic sy stem , it ap p ears that this m ay be a c u ltu ral bias in the agent of control in defining deviancy in his relatio n sh ip s with departm ental units and individuals. Dynam ic approach T he dynam ic approach views that group norm s a re form ed out of in teractio n w ith m em b ers of the group and with la rg e r so cial sy ste m s. Individual m em b ers e stab lish group norm s and deviance i is judged as any d e p artu re from th ese norm s. Definition of deviancy.- - T h e dynam ic approach allow s for the p o ssib ility of group norm s taking precedence over the leg islated I ^ D a n ie l G la ser, "R ole M odels and D ifferential A ssocia- tio n ," Deviancy— T he In tera ctio n ist P ersp ectiv e, ed. by E a rl Rubington and M artin W einberg (New Y ork: T he M acm illan Company, ^ 1968), p. 329. | 11 1 Rubington, p. 10. 59 norm s of behavior. T h ere is a stro n g p o ssib ility that in som e in stan ces the "ro le consensus" as defined by the focal position w ill be counter to the leg islated norm s of the m e rit p rin cip le in m aking decisions p ertaining to personnel p ra c tic e s and g riev an ces. When th is o c cu rs, these norm s w ill be called a co n tracu ltu re. T his term w ill be applied w herev er the norm ative system of a group contains as 12 its p rim a ry elem ent a discontinuity with the m e rit principle. Devi ance is thus problem atical. It m ay or m ay not occur. The individual who is a non-deviant m ay becom e cla ssified as a deviant over tim e a s ; group norm s becom e reco n stitu ted . A dilem m a occurs when both se ts of norm s (sta tic and dynam ic) a re believed in by the focal position. The basic p re m ise underlying the dynam ic m odel is that deviance is in the eyes of the beholder. In our m odel, it is thus n e c e ssa ry to f irs t have a " ro le consensus" in the estab lish m en t of ; i expectations for behavior and a m inim um of th re e o r m ore m em b ers of the group. T h ree o r m o re a re needed to estab lish a m ajo rity opinion on " ro le consensus. " T his is different from the sta tic 12 i N orm an R. Jackm an, R ichard O 'T oole, and G ilb ert G eis, ! "T he S elf-im age of the P ro stitu te ," D eviance--T he In teractio n ist P e rsp e ctiv e , ed. by E a rl Rubington and M artin W einberg (New Y ork: j The M acm illan Company, 1968), pp. 350-351. j 60 approach which re q u ire s only two a c to rs since stan d ard s for behavior: a re absolute. Deviancy cycle: dynam ic approach. - - A hypothetical m odel of a deviant c a re e r with the dynam ic approach would be the following: 1. The person is a m em ber of a group of th re e or m o re individuals who have estab lish ed a "ro le consensus" for each o th e r's behaviors. 2. Behavior of the person, situation, o r event is observed by a m em ber of the group as a deviation from estab lish ed " ro le consensus"; the pace of the o ccu rren ce of the event is a c ritic a l facto r in the recognition p ro c e ss. If the observed event is uncomm on o r occurs gradually over the life cycle : of the group m em bership, the p ro ce ss of deviant classificatio n m ay never take place. Some events, j I even when observed, m ay never be c la ssified as | deviance because the agent of so cial control for j the group does not w ish to e m b a rra ss his fellow ! m em b ers. W hether o r not a specific behavior o r j event is deviant often depends on who it is that I com m its the act and at what sequence in tim e. If j the o b se rv e r feels that knowledge of the deviance 61 would only h arm the group if they knew about it, he m ay n ever re p o rt it. 3. T he behavior of the p erso n , situation, o r event is c la ssified by the o b se rv er as deviant. In o rd e r to c la ssify o r type an event as deviant, the agent of so cial control m ust have som e fram e of referen ce. T his m odel postulates that the " ro le consensus" of the group is the c rite ria for determ ining deviance. T hus, the agent of social control m ust subsequently re p o rt to the group the deviant act. 4. T he deviancy m u st be rep o rte d to other m em bers of the group by the o b se rv er. Sequence of steps m ay not be m utually exclusive. H ow ever, since the c rite ria for deviancy is determ ined by "ro le c o n sen su s," the o b se rv er functions as a feedback m echanism to m em b ers of the group. T he decision to take action is dependent on the group. 5. T he o b se rv er m ust obtain the support of other group m em b ers to accept his definition of deviancy. If they do, then he goes to the next phase (#6) of obtaining a resp o n se to a d m in ister sanctions. H ow ever, before giving a resp o n se , the group m ay 62 accom m odate to the deviance in any of the following 13 ways: a. T hey m ay optim ize by hoping that the deviance w ill p ass away. T he problem is only a tra n s ito ry episode. b. T hey m ay n e u tra liz e by accom m odating to the deviance in a way that o bscures it. c. They m ay n o rm alize by reg ard in g the deviance as but a sp ecial case of norm al behavior. d. They m ay p essim ize the deviance by defin ing it as b asically an irre v e rs ib le p ro ce ss. H ow ever, if the p rim a ry group p erceiv es that the deviance is sy ste m atic, they m ay act in any com bination of the four options liste d above. S ystem atic deviance o ccu rs only when deviance p e rs is ts , is p attern ed , and when the deviant takes 14 into account that o th ers a re aw are of his deviant ro le. S ystem atic deviance m ay not be read ily recognized in the fo rm al organizational and in other social settin g s since it is not alw ays so cially organized. Many deviants p ra c tic e in s e c re t and as individuals 1 3 Rubington, p. 30. 14Ib id ., p. 296. ra th e r than as a group. When sy stem atic deviance o c cu rs, the individual who is typed as a deviant a lread y has obtained his self- identity in this ro le before his behavior has been observed and brought to the attention of group m em bers by the o b se rv er (i.e., alcoholics, hom osexuals, rev o lu tio n aries, e m b e z z le rs, a s s a s s in s , and change agents). T he o b se rv e r m ust obtain a resp o n se that conform s to the definition of deviance. T he o b se rv e r's problem is that in sm a ll group relatio n sh ip s, w here m em b ers a re fa m ilia r with th e ir m utual "ro le c o n sen su s," the p o ssib ilities of typing and subsequent exclusion of the deviant m em ber is m inim al. How e v e r, if the o b se rv e r can get the support of non m em bers of the group to show to the m em bers continued deviance of the potential deviant m em ber induces s tr e s s on in te r group relatio n sh ip s, he m ay achieve definition of deviancy. However, he has a lso redefined the g ro u p 's "ro le consensus" and in effect has reco n stitu ted the group by adding additional m em b ers or th ird p a rtie s. E xclusion of the deviant from the p rim a ry group: 64 Once the group has typed the individual as a deviant, all in teractio n s betw een the group and the deviant take the new cla ssifica tio n of behavioral norm s into account. When the deviant is confronted with the typing by the group, he m ay take any one of the following stra te g ie s in n eu tralizin g his "self- ,,15 im ages. a. Denial of resp o n sib ility : T he deviant can m inim ize disapproval by claim ing it was an accident o r that his acts w ere due to fo rce s outside of his sp h ere of influence or control. b. D enial of injury: The deviant m ay question w hether o r not anyone has been re a lly hurt by his behavior. The deviant behavior m ay be illeg al but not im m oral. c. D enial of the victim : The deviant claim s that the victim w as getting his ju st punishm ent when the fo rm al p ro c e sse s w ere not functioning. * ^G resham M. Sykes and David M atza, "On N eutralizing Delinquent S e lf-im a g e s," D eviance: T he In tera ctio n ist P ersp ectiv e, ed. by E a rl Rubington and M artin W einberg (New Y ork: The M acm illan Company, 1968), pp. 367-369. 65 T his is viewed as "rightful reta lia tio n " by the deviant. d. Condem nation of the co n d em n ers: T his is a gam ing stra te g y w hereby the deviant shifts the focus of the attention from his own deviance to the m otives and behavior of those who a re accusing him of deviancy. T his approach attem pts to re p re s s o r lose the original a ccu sa tion of deviance by redefining the issu e . A c la s s ic exam ple of using this approach is 1 /L found in the New T estam en t of the Bible. 1. But Jesus went to the Mount of O lives. 2. And at daybreak he cam e again into the T em ple, and all the people cam e to him; and sittin g down he began to teach them . 3. Now the S cribes and P h arisees brought a woman caught in adultery, and settin g her in the m id st, 4. said to him , "M a ster, this woman has ju st been caught in adultery. 5. And in the law M oses com m anded us to stone such p erso n s. W hat, th e re fo re , dost thou say?" 6. Now they w ere saying this to te s t him , in o rd e r that they m ight be able to accuse him. But Jesus, stooping down, began to w rite with his finger on the ground. ^ S t . John, C hapter 8, V e rse s 1-11, Holy Bible (New Y ork: C atholic Book Publishing Company, 1952), p. 129. 66 ‘ 7. But when they continued asking him , he ra is e d h im self and said to them , "L et him who is without sin am ong you be the f ir s t to c a st a stone at h er. " 8. And again stooping down, he began to w rite on the ground. 9. But hearing th is, they went away, one by one, beginning with the eldest. And Jesus rem ain ed alone, w ith the woman standing in the m id st. 10. And Jesu s, ra isin g him self, said to h er, "W oman, w here a re they? Has no one condem ned thee?" 11. She sa id , "No one, L o rd ." Then Jesus said , "N either w ill I condem n thee. Go thy way, and from now on sin no m ore. " e. Appeal to higher lo y alties: T he deviant m ay him self appeal to "group loyalty" of the m em b ers j to n e u tra liz e in te rn al and ex tern al influences on typing his behavior as deviant. He poses that "group loyalty" takes precedence over o th er n o rm s. The o th er norm s a re not re je c te d , but a p rio rity is e stab lish ed in the acceptance of ; both n o rm s. 8. T he tran sp o sitio n of deviant identity: T he m aintenance : of a deviant identity is not alw ays d e sire d by the ; individual who is typed as deviant. H ow ever, if he ; decides to su stain deviant identity, he m ost likely | w ill a sso c ia te with o th er deviant groups and a j deviant su b -c u ltu re w ill em erg e. To be a deviant, a j 17 p erso n needs the following situ a tio n s: a. An effective audience of significant others b. A p ersp ectiv e on deviance c. An identity as a deviant It is ra th e r difficult for a deviant to tran sfo rm him self from the deviant su b -cu ltu re unless an identity c ris is occurs w here he can renounce his p resen t deviant behavior and then receiv e the a ssista n c e and support from the p rim a ry group for his re - en try into the group. If the p rim a ry group re fu se s a ssista n c e , the deviant w ill continue finding w ays in justifying his identity with his deviant su b -cu ltu re. P o ssib ilities for Deviant Behavior Introduction The concept of deviancy can thus be understood from two different approaches. 1. The sta tic approach, which focuses on p ro sc rib e d norm s enacted by e ith e r a leg islativ e act o r by 17 Rubington, p. 324. b u reau cratic p o licies, ru le s, reg u latio n s, and pro ced u res. The norm s a re p red eterm in ed and absolute. 2. T he dynam ic approach, which focues on deviance as being problem atical and dependent on the establishm ent of group norm s. T h ese norm s a re called "ro le consensus. " T he definition of deviancy is not com plete until the o b se rv e r and the group take som e form of exclusion on the deviant person. The overall cycle of deviance follows the sam e p attern for both the sta tic and dynam ic approach. T his cycle is: aw aren ess, definition, accom m odation, and exclusion. H ow ever, the p ro ce ss of perception, im plem entation, and effects on both the individual, the group, and the b ureaucracy is quite different. The sta tic approach fits the c la ssic b u rea u cra tic approach and could rea d ily be called a m orphostatic o r closed sy stem s approach. T he dynam ic approach fits the m orphogenic o r open sy stem s approach focusing on in teractio n s. The dynam ic approach allow s fo r the p o ssib ility of m easu rin g both the leg islated behavior in the form of the m e rit p rin cip le as w ell as the co n tracu ltu re. T he p o ssib ilities for deviant behavior grow out of the in teractio n p ro ce ss if the opportunities and legitim acy for deviant behavior a re p resen t. T he individual needs an audience to e stab lish the legitim acy o r non-legitim acy of his behavior. T he audience can belong to e ith er the p rim a ry group, which gives him legitim acy and subsequent c lassificatio n of deviant, o r the deviant group, which gives him illegitim acy and subsequently legitim acy w ithin th e ir group.: The question of deviancy is thus re la tiv e to whose n orm s. F o r purposes of this re s e a rc h , deviancy occurs when the focal position m akes a decision other than that which is expected by the m ajo rity of the co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T he decision expected is ro le consensus. Role consensus gives legitim acy to the m e m b e r's behavior and provides the c rite r ia for determ ining illeg itim ate behavior. O pportunities for deviance T h ere has to be opportunities available so the individual can m ake options during the exchange p ro c e ss for any behavior to occur during an in teractio n . W hether th ese options a re available o r not d eterm in es to a g re a t extent the behavior of the individual and the group in estab lish in g deviancy o r consensus. i The resp o n ses of the opportunity stru c tu re to ego's 18 deviance a re illu stra te d in F ig u re 10. ! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ^ i 1 o I A lbert K. Cohen, "T he Sociology of the Deviant Act: | Anomie T heory and Beyond," T he A m erican Sociological R eview , XXX 70 opportunities OPEN-UP ALTER1S RESPONSE Close-off F ig . 10. - -R esp o n ses of opportunity s tru c tu re to ego's deviance C ell 1 — Open up leg itim ate opportunities. C ell 2. - -O pen up ille g itim a te opportunities. The o b se rv er o r group, in stead of re p o rtin g the deviant and taking sanctions a g ain st him to conform , m ay actually join with him in an illic it a rra n g em e n t w hereby both would gain. C ell 3. - -C losing off leg itim ate opportunities. T his occurs when the deviant feels he has done som ething w rong, and th e re fo re cannot e x e rc is e the option of leg itim ate opportunities. T his is done in the form of " re c a s tin g a ro le " w here a so c ial ro le is a scrib e d to the deviant. T o change his public im age, a se t of ap p ro p riate (F e b ru a ry , 1965), 10-11. ICOIttHATC IllCafTlMATC C tL L 1 Op e n - u p Li o i t i m a t e Op p o r t u n i t i e s C e l l 2 OPEN-UP I l l e g i t i m a t e Op p o r t u n i t i e s CELL 3 C L 0 3 E - o r r L i e I T 1MATt O p p o r t u n i t i e s Ce l l * » C L o s E - o r r ILLCOITIMATE Op p o r t u n i t i e s resp o n ses is activated from his audience to e stab lish and confirm his identity and to subsequently close off legitim ate opportunities. C ell 4. - -C losing off illeg itim ate opportunities. T his is usually done f irs t in the sta tic approach to deviancy. However, it m ay actually c ry sta liz e the deviant ro le and develop a deviant sub cu ltu re. A ssum ptions U nderlying Role C onsensus Introduction T he assum ptions underlying both the sta tic and dynam ic approach to ro le consensus m ay be analyzed from two m ajo r dim ensions of decision m aking involving (1) beliefs about cause and 19 effect and (2) p refe ren c es reg ard in g possible outcom es. T h ese a re not the only dim ensions available, but they provide a m atrix that does not becom e cum bersom e. The product of th ese two dim ensions a re re fe rre d to as "ro le consensus" in our discu ssio n s (F ig u re 11). C ell 1. - -T h e m ajo rity of the a cto rs have a high degree of c ertain ty about cause and effect and the probability of decision outcom e. T his assum es that a thorough knowledge is alread y 19 Jam es D. Thom pson, O rganizations in Action (New Y ork: M cG raw -H ill, 1967), p. 134. 72 PREFERENCES REGARDING POSSIBLE OUTCOMES CERTAINTY Un c e r t a i n t y CCRTAINTY ' CELL 1 Ce l l 2 Co m p u t a t i o n a l Co m p r o m i s e B E L IE F S De c i s i o n s De c i s i o n s ABOUT CAUSE-EFFECT C e l l 3 Cc l l * 1 JUOCHCNTAL C h a r i s m a t i c De c i s i o n s De c i s i o n s F ig. 1 1 .--M a jo r dim ensions of decision m aking p o sse sse d as to the p o ssib le a lte rn a tiv e s and th e ir outcom es; the consequences of th ese a lte rn a tiv e s on the deviant; how the deviant and the group w ill respond; and that the n o rm s have c le a rly been estab lish ed . T he application of the m e rit p rin cip le by the agent of the C ivil S ervice C om m ission would be an exam ple. T h e re would be a high d eg ree of c e rta in ty about cau se and effect, sin ce the m e rit p rin cip le is based on the ra tio n a l o r h ie ra rc h ic a l organization and the p re fe re n c e s as to p o ssib le outcom es a re sta te d in the p ro ced u res. T he ro le of the agent of control is to enforce com pliance to the m e rit p rin cip le w here a ll v a ria b le s a re constant except fo r the sp ecific o b serv ed deviant act. T he f ir s t rea ctio n to deviance in this 73 approach is to im m ediately and ro u tin ely apply the sanctions to obtain conform ity. T h ere is no an aly sis of the norm s of e ith e r the subsystem or the individual deviance. The decision-m aking p ro cess is p rim a rily com putational in determ ining the o rd erin g of possible outcom es of th e ir decision. T he effectiveness of sanctions in the sta tic m odel of C ell 1 can best be su m m arized in the follow ing quotation on deviance in a sim ple system by T heodore M. M ills: When, c o n tra ry to the conditions in the sim ple sy stem , dem ands underlying deviance a re beyond the scope of legitim ate control we m ay expect e ith e r routine application of sanctions, which by definition cannot rea ch the dem ands, o r the application of m ore effective but illeg itim ate sanctions. In the f irs t in stan ce, th e re is no re a so n , beyond chance, to expect the sanctions to co u n teract o r n e u tra liz e the conflict ing dem ands. T h e re fo re , the question of reducing the probability of deviance has in the asking its answ er: only by chance. M oreover, in the second instance, deviance by a m em ber is followed by deviance on the p a rt of the agent of control, introducing the p o ssib ility of a vicious c irc le . ^0 T he effectiven ess of a c e n tra liz e d agent of control in his relatio n sh ip s w ith d ep artm en tal units in obtaining conform ity to the m e rit principle can rea d ily be seen in the following passage: When the sim ple sy stem contains su b p a rts, each of which is organized to m aintain its e lf larg e ly in its own te rm s , th ese sy stem s a re com plex because they contain su b sy stem s, each 20 T heodore M. M ills, "E quilibrium and the P rocess of D eviance and C o n tro l," A m erican Sociological R eview , XXIV (O ctober, 1959), 674. 74 w ith its own controlling agent. The sanctions p ro sc rib e d by the norm s of the subsystem s tend to intensify the conflict of dem ands leading to deviance. 21 T he assum ptions underlying the decision-m aking behavior of the sta tic m odel for the analysis and solution to deviance a re not on very solid ground when one co n sid ers its lim itations: 1. M ost individuals and organizations a re quite com plex and do not follow the recom m ended behavior p attern s p re sc rib e d by the sim ple sy stem . T his would be even m ore tru e in p ro c e s sing deviant v ersu s non-deviant behavior. 2. T he ex tern al and in tern al relatio n sh ip s a re not held constant on all p a rtie s concerned, including the agent of control. 3. It is im possible for the agent of control to know the e n tire dom ain of dem ands placed on the deviant behavior of the individual and the group. 4. T he c u rre n t sta te of ro le consensus, in this case the m e rit p rin cip le, is assum ed to be the point of equilibrium w hether or not individual o r group m em bers a g re e to it. 5. T h ere is a boundary of legitim ate sanctions in a 21Ib id ., p. 675. 75 d em o cratic so ciety that the agent of control can use. How ever, sin ce governm ent is the only agency that has legitim ate coercive pow er, this boundary m ay be b ro ad er than in p riv ate organizations. But th e re s till is a boundary. 6. The use of existing sanctions fo r controlling deviance a re not v ery effective. 7. Ignorance of the tru e cau ses of deviance. T h ere is a tendency to believe that the causes of deviant behavior a re not viewed as possible inputs to change the p re se n t m ethods of decision m aking in the sy stem . C ell 2. - -T h e com prom ise approach occurs when th e re is uncertainty on possible outcom es but a certain ty about cause and effect. The uncertainty of possible outcom es s ta rts to shift the pow er to the deviant when the deviant can show the agent of control that the enforcem ent of the sanctions w ill have a negative effect on the existing sy stem . T he com prom ise approach does allow fo r the p o ssib ility of bargaining and read ju stm en t of ro le consensus to estab lish new norm s that m ay s till be consistent with o riginal values. S everal p o ssib ilities e x ist in p ro cessin g deviant behavior in this ap p ro ach : 1. The com prom ise m ay be in the form of overlooking the deviant behavior and not rep o rtin g it to the p rim a ry group for establishm ent of a new ro le consensus o r enforcem ent of exclusion. 2. A redefinition of a new ro le consensus can occur w here a new position, but a com prom ise on original goal is undertaken by both p a rtie s as in labor ag reem en ts. C ell 3. - -D ecision m aking in this cell is judgm ental, since th e re is certain ty about p refe ren c es reg ard in g possible outcom es but un certainty about the cause and effects in obtaining them . D ecision m aking takes a stra te g ic ro le in handling the deviant situation. Although the ro le consensus approach of the dynam ic system would be used in th is position, one should re a liz e that the coalition of dom inant factions within the b u reau cracy w ill attem pt to e x e rt stro n g influence to shift decision m aking to the com putational m ethods used j in C ell 1. C ell 4 . - -D ecision m aking in this c ell is ch arism atic j because th e re is a high d egree of uncertainty of p red ictab ility as to cause and effects as w ell as p refe ren c es reg ard in g possible out com es. D ecision m ak ers w ill try to m ove to C ells 1, 2, o r 3 in I estab lish in g som e kind of a stru c tu re tow ard a ro le consensus of the i I group. C h arism atic lea d ersh ip and deviant behavior would both be found in this cell. D ecision m aking is often based on inspirations from the c h arism atic lead er as w ell as from som e form of co m p ari son to s im ila r situation in other dom ains. Sum m ary of A ssum ptions of Role C onsensus The definition of ro le consensus by the sta tic m odel would be re s tric te d to C ell 1. The dynam ic approach would include all four cells as possible a ltern a tiv e s in generation of inputs in establishin g consensus, which in tu rn e stab lish es the p a ra m e te rs for decision m aking. The sta tic approach in C ell 1 assum es that stab ility is prevalent and valued at the tim e deviancy o ccu rs. W hereas, the dynam ic approach assu m es that th e re is m ore of a tendency for the individual o r organization to be in a sta te of in stab ility in o rd e r to determ ine the im pact and significance of the new inform ation as a 22 com m unication input. T he concept of ro le consensus and deviancy have been d iscu ssed as growing out of in teractio n s w ith o th ers. T hus, both a re tre a te d as v ariab les re la tiv e to the developm ent of norm s by those who a re p articip an ts in the in teractio n p ro ce ss. If th ere is no in teractio n , th e re is no situation to e stab lish expectations for each 22 K arl W. D eutsch, T he N erves of G overnm ent (New York: T he F re e P re ss of G lencoe, 1963), p. 186. • 78 : o th e r's behavior. The boundaries of the system a re determ ined at the point w here counter- expectations and re c ip ro c ity of behavior occurs by both p a rtie s. The known p articip an ts of the in teractio n p ro ce ss function w ithin th ese boundaries, which m ay shift over tim e. The potential p articip an ts in the in teractio n p ro cess m ay not now be known by the p articip an ts w ithin the system but can be determ ined by the d irectio n of the to tal in teractio n and the probability of counter expectations being form ed from sp o rad ic in teractio n s with other individuals and the environm ent. F o r the estab lish m en t of a ro le consensus and subsequent behavior of conform ity o r deviancy, a situation conducive for in te r actions m ust be p resen t. T h e re a re two cru c ial elem ents in the in teractio n p ro ce ss which a re p erv asiv e to all encounters: (1) the situation and (2) the p a rticip a n ts. T h ese two elem ents would apply to individuals, groups, and whole so c ietie s. A ltern ativ es fo r Behavior T h ere a re se v e ra l different m odes of possible behavior j p attern s an individual m ay take when in teractin g with o th ers. j R obert M erton liste d the following m odes of adjustm ent by individuals! w ithin the cu ltu re bearing-society or group a s : conform ity, 79 23 innovation, ritu a lis m , re tre a tis m , and reb ellio n . S tu art P alm er developed a m odel for an aly sis of types of o u ter p e rfo rm an c e s as consequences of tension levels of situation al 24 and in n er sy ste m s. The two elem en ts of th is m odel a re situational opportunities and the s ta tu s -ro le identity p ro c e ss. W ithin this m a trix he developed M erto n 's m odes of behavior adjustm ent. A sim p lified adaptation of the m odel is illu stra te d in F ig u re 12. TEHSIOW LEVELS OF SYSTEMS OF SITUATIONS V e r y Moo- V e r y Low Low e r a t e H i c h H i g h Ve r y h i g h H i g h TENSION LEVELS OF INNER M o d e r a t e STATUS-ROLE SYSTEMS Low VERY L ow C » Co n f o r m i t y F ig. 1 2 .--T y p e s of o u ter p erfo rm an ces as consequences of tension lev els of situ atio n al and in n er sy ste m s. 23 R obert K. M erton, "Social S tru c tu re and A nom ie," A m erican Sociological R eview , III (O ctober, 1938), 672-682. 24 S tu art P alm er, D eviance and C onform ity: R oles, Situations and R eciprocity (New Haven, C o n n .: C ollege and U n iv ersity P re s s , 1970), p. 66. R i t u a l i s m C c c Re b e l l i o n C c c c C C c I n n o v a t i o n c 'c c c . C c c Re t r e a t i s m c c c R i t u a l i s m 80 Explanation of the m odel The two elem ents of this m odel a re a cto rs and situations w hich a re p ervasive to the in teractio n p ro ce ss. T ension levels of sy stem s of situ a tio n s. - -A system of situations is defined as a ro le se c to r, consisting of expectations of co u n ter-p o sitio n s for the individual's behavior. T ension m ay be perceiv ed as ranging on a continuum from high to low, dependent on the p erceiv ed expectations for his behavior and re c ip ro c ity of the co u n ter-p o sitio n s in the situation. T he tension levels of th ese situations a re influenced by (1) the intensity with which these expec tations for behavior a re held by the co u n ter-p o sitio n s, (2) the lack of p erceiv ed consensus for p erfo rm an ce, (3) the lack effectiveness of sanctions applied by the co u n ter-p o sitio n s, and (4) the situational opportunities for leg itim ate behavior. T ension levels of in n er s ta tu s -ro le sy s te m s. - -T he term "sta tu s-ro le " has the following m eaning: Status re fe rs to the in tern alizatio n of the expected p erfo rm an ces of the individual. It locates his position in the relatio n sh ip s w ith counter-positions. R ole re fe r s to the actual perfo rm an ce of the individual. The te rm " s ta tu s -ro le " is synonom ous w ith self-reco g n itio n and self-id en tity p ro c e sse s the individual undertakes to m eet the req u irem en ts of the situation. The p erv asiv en ess of the individual's se a rc h fo r identity 81 can be seen in the following quotation: The individual striv e s to develop and m aintain a p e rso n a lity -- an in n er sy stem of s ta tu s -ro le s and a se t of outer p e rfo rm a n c e s--th a t is identifiable to him and to o th ers. If he is to su rv iv e, he m ust be able to recognize him self in the m irro r of his m ind each m orning, and o th ers m ust be able to recognize him by what he do es, by the style of his perform ance. Y et the p erso n ality m ust change. . . . If his p e rso n ality does not change, he w ill stagnate, he w ill c ease to ex ist. He m ust at any given tim e function in w hat e v er so cial stru c tu ra l environm ent he finds him self. But he m ust not becom e so im m e rse d in his environm ent that he lo ses all identity. And he m ust not becom e so estran g ed from the environm ent that identity is im possible. E ith er ex trem e m eans extinction. 25 Role p e rfo rm an c e . - -R ole perform ance is a synthesis of the tension levels of both v aria b le s: the situational and inner sy stem . C onform ity in ro le perform ance is that range of behavior that m eets with the expectations of the m ajo rity of the cou n ter-p o sitio n s. The lim its to the range of conform ity can be determ ined in two w ay s: (1) by determ ination of the p articip an ts in the interaction p ro cess or by (2) an o b se rv e r who defines the lim its a rb itra rily as to what constitutes conform ity and deviancy. F ig u re 12 indicates that conform ity is pred icted as the predom inant m ode of behavior except for ex trem e levels of situational and inner tensions in sta tu s- ro le identity. Role perfo rm an ce involving the synthesis of the situational 25 Ibid. , p. 85. 1 82 and inner tension sy ste m s a re applicable to both leg itim ate and deviant sy ste m s. T he confirm ed deviant undergoes the sam e tensions in his s ta tu s -ro le identity p ro ce ss in try in g to break away from the norm s of the deviant group in his reh ab ilitatio n to the predom inant and legitim ate group. Types of behavior com binations In the m atrix of situational and inner tensions, five types of behavioral com binations a re possible: conform ity, innovation, reb ellio n , re tre a tis m , and ritu a lism . C onform ity. - -C onform ity to ro le consensus ap p ears to be the predom inant form of behavior except in the d ire c t c en ter of tension and in the fringe a re a s . In the re s e a rc h being rep o rte d h e re , conform ity occurs when the decision actually m ade is congruent with the decision expected. Innovation. - -Innovation occu rs when the tension levels of both the situational and in n er sy stem s a re m oderate. T his does not m ean that innovation does not occur in the fringe a r e a s . Innovation is concerned with the creatio n of new m eans to existing goals. The recom bining of elem ents p re se n t in both the situational and inner sy stem s is one way to solve the problem of m eeting conflicting expectations. When this o ccu rs, the individual w ill shift from the point of innovation to another altern a tiv e that eventually falls into 83 conform ity when the re s t of the system adapts to the new stim ulus. When innovation occu rs in the frin g e a re a s , it is m ost likely to be the re s u lt of a redefinition of e ith e r the situational or inner statu s sy ste m s, o r both, ra th e r than a recom bination of existing elem ents. Innovation m ay take the form of deviancy in fringe a re a s until it becom es rew ard ed by the organization. When deviancy is rew arded by the p rim a ry group, it becom es an innovation. R ebellion. - -R ebellion o ccu rs when tension levels of both situational and inner sy stem s a re very high. R ebellion m ay take various fo rm s: (1) overthrow of e stab lish ed goals re la te d to the situation, (2) creatio n of new goals, o r (3) the creatio n of new goals and the m eans of im plem entation. If estab lish ed goals a re overthrow n and not rep laced w ith new ones, th ere w ill be no directio n to the change p ro ce ss. The conflict w ill be episodic w ith no s tru c tu ra l p attern s em erging to p red ict behavior. When the reb ellio n includes the cre atio n of new goals, the effect w ill be in the form of an invention w here existing m ethods a re i devalued o r becom e obsolete. T he creatio n of new goals ra is e s the problem of p rio ritie s j between estab lish ed goals and the new goals. When new goals a re c re a te d w hile existing goals a re believed in, th e re is a g re a te r ! 84 probability of deviant behavior and s tre s s because of conflicting goals, p rio ritie s, and stan d ard s of perform ance. Deviant behavior does not becom e an issu e when new goals im m ediately rep la ce the old ones, since the goal stru c tu re has been redefined. The issu e then becom es one of im plem entation. When new goals com pete with existing goals o r rep la ce p re se n t situational goals, the am ount of tension felt in both the situational and inner tension sy stem s w ill be different. T ension w ill tend to in c re a se during the establishm ent of p rio ritie s in accepting o r re je c tin g new goals over p re se n t ones. T his is evidenced in the concern of public personnel a d m in istra to rs for the m e rit principle in collective bargaining. They se e no rep lacem en t of the m e rit principle as they p e rceiv e it to be in the p resen t procedural form . T he opposition to collective bargaining is intensified until p rio ritie s for the new goals a re established. C ollective bargaining is viewed by m any public a d m in istra to rs, le g isla to rs, and the judicial sy stem ; in the public se c to r, not as a legitim ate form of conflict reso lu tio n w ithin a dem ocratic society, but as an illeg itim ate form of reb ellio n . Much le ss s tr e s s w ill be in cu rre d if both new goals and the ; m eans of im plem enting them a re placed into m otion sim ultaneously, | then a s tru c tu re is im m ediately available that w ill reduce am biguities! and e stab lish p rio ritie s . T h e re w ill be le ss h o stility to overthrow ing! 85 p resen t goals, sin ce u n certain ties as to a ltern a tiv e s a re rem oved, and both the situational and in n er tension sy stem s have a directio n which by itse lf w ill bring sta b ility to a chaotic situation. C h arism atic lea d ersh ip is the e sse n tia l elem ent in this situation, w here tim ing and developm ent of recep tiv ity to change a re c ritic a l com ponents. R e tre a tism . - -R e tre a tism occurs when tension is very low in both the situational and inner tension sy ste m s. T h ere is a rejectio n both of the individual's s ta tu s -ro le identity and of the situational goals. Goal displacem ent occurs when the individual su b stitu tes his own goals of w ithdraw al for those of the self- identification and situ atio n al goals. He attem pts to reduce tension of both sy stem s by w ithdraw ing from h im self and from the situation, which eventually re s u lts in the se lf-d e stru c tio n of his own identity. R itu a lism . - -R itu alism o ccu rs in two different but s im ila r situations. In both in stan ces th e re a re ex trem e inconsistencies between situational and in n er tension sy ste m s. The cause and effect ; of ritu a lism is different in each situation. R itualism is ov er-co n fo rm ity with asp ects of com pulsion. It becom es deviation from both the individual and the situation since i it hinders both. When situational tension levels a re very low and the ; in n er tension sy stem is high, perform ance becom es ritu a lis tic . T he ; i effect of this is evidenced in the alienation of em ployees from th e ir j 86 w ork and th e ir em ployer. ^ T he other ex trem e of o v er-conform ity o ccu rs when situational tensions a re high and individual in n er tension sy stem s a re low. The individual does not reb e l because his inner tension system is too p assive. Instead he m aintains a statu s-q u o , following trad itio n al behavior p attern s as evidenced in p o licies, ru le s , reg u lations, and p ro ced u res. He cannot be a r e tre a tis t since others block his path by non- recip ro city . Goal displacem ent occurs when the m eans becom e the 27 end. T h ere is an elaboration of trad itio n al protocol in situations of in creasin g tension and s tr e s s . T his elaboration tends to d ep ress conflict from the individual's p e rsp ec tiv e but tends to a c c e le ra te conflict from the c lie n t's point of view. When ritu a lism becom es institutionalized, its pow er of survival becom es g reat. R itu alistic p erform ances becom e the norm , and other standards of perform ance a re eventually adjusted to them . R itu alistic perform ance ceases to be deviant behavior. 26 Irving Goffman, E n co u n ters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interactions (Indianapolis, Indiana: B obbs-M errill, 1966). K arl M arx, E arly W ritings, tra n s. and ed. by T . B. Bottom ore (London: C. A. W atts and Company, L td ., 1963). 27 R obert P resth u s, The O rganizational Society (New Y ork: Random House, 1962), p. 195. 87 T he ad m in istratio n of m any public agencies a re in this classificatio n , as evidenced by th e ir lack of resp o n siv en ess in m eeting urban and so cial needs. The m e rit prin cip le is ad m inistered by m any a d m in istra to rs in a ritu a lis tic m anner, so m uch so that the p ro cess of following m e rit pro ced u res becom es an end in itself. When th ese a d m in istra to rs a re faced with the rep lacem en t of th eir goals (which a re the o rg an izatio n 's m eans), they p erceiv e the em ployees to be reb ellin g ra th e r than questioning w hether or not the system should be changed o r elim inated. S ta tu s-ro le identity dilem m a and autonomy An individual's behavior focuses on the establishm ent of his identity through the goal of self- recognition in in teractio n s with o th ers. However, in o rd e r to take p a rt in self-reco g n itio n , the individual needs to have a cc ess to situational opportunities that provide the in teractio n in search in g fo r this self-id en tity . If the individual has high in n er tension and is faced with a low situational tension sy stem , he proceeds to ritu a lism with the loss of any fu rth e r additions to his self-id en tity . When faced with low tensions in both situational and in n er tension sy ste m s, he experiences loss of identity in re tre a tis m and eventual se lf-d e stru ctio n of w hatever im ages he m ay in itially have had of him self. When faced 88 w ith high tension in both situational and inner sy ste m s, he m ay read ily find his identity, but then im m ediately proceed to re tre a tis m in a system with both low situational and inner tension. R itualism also occu rs when th e re is high tension in situations and low tension p re se n t in the in tern al s ta tu s -ro le system . T he questions a re then asked: "W here does the individual find his s ta tu s -ro le identity in rela tio n to his coun ter-p o sitio n s?" "W here does he find the situational opportunity stru c tu re s that w ill provide him with the interactions n e c e ssa ry to find this identity?" "Is it possible and d esirab le to have a c le a r identity of one's self?" "W hat a re the p ro c e sse s of change that c re a te an opportunity to find one’s self-id en tity ?" T hese a re very im portant questions for the individual and the la rg e r so cial system . All individuals, organizations, and so c ietie s a re faced with the sam e question of how to m aintain the autonom y of th eir se lf-s te e rin g capacity, w hile sim ultaneously receiv in g significant inform ation from the environm ent and r e arran g in g th e ir inner stru c tu re s to m eet the new environm ental p re s s u re s . T he s ta tu s -ro le identity dilem m a confronts the public a d m in istra to r in two different w ays: 1. What is the ro le of the public organization in 89 m otivating em ployees so that the m issio n of the | agency m ay be achieved? i 2. What is the ro le of a public agency in providing fo r the developm ent of its citizens in overcom ing a social dilem m a (anom ie) in the im plem entation of public policy? Role C onsensus, E quilibrium T h e o ry , and Change T he consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle m ay be 28 sum m arized into two different approaches: (1) the sta tic approach with em phasis on conform ity to estab lish ed norm s and (2) the dynam ic approach with conform ity re la tiv e to group norm s. T hese two different approaches to the enforcem ent of consensus a re s im ila r in th e ir applicability to sm all groups as w ell as to larg e organiza tions. When these concepts a re applied to la rg e organizations, the discussion shifts to closed sy stem s (static) and open sy stem s (dynam ic) approaches to organizational conflict and change. T his section su m m arizes the consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle. 28 T his m ateria l is adapted from T heodore M. M ills, "E quilibrium and the P rocess of Deviance and C o n tro l," A m erican Sociological Review, XXIV (O ctober, 1959), 671-679. S tatic approach When ro le consensus is analyzed in a sta tic m anner, the equilibrium of estab lish ed group behavior p rev ails as the final outcom e. A sim ple m odel of the equilibrium approach is found in the following sequence: Conformity-------> Deviance > Sanctions > Conformity T his approach assu m es that a fte r the sanctions a re ad m in istered to the deviant, the group w ill then approach the initial sta te it was in before the deviant action cam e to its attention. The step s of rationalization inherent in m aking th ese assum ptions a re : 1. T h ere is a high degree of c ertain ty between cause and effect. 2. The controlling agent can influence the behavior of the deviant beyond the sym ptom atic act which is c la ssified as deviant. 3. The deviant does not have an influence on other m em bers of the group, e ith er as individuals o r as group m em b ers. 4. The controlling agent knows the full dom ain of dem ands on the deviant, including subconscious d riv es. 5. The group's value p re m ise s a re to m aintain stab ility . 91 6. T he controlling agent has an unlim ited re p e rto ire of legitim ate sanctions to obtain conform ity to group values. 7. Role consensus, as an ex p ressio n of group values, takes precedence over individual values and behavior of the se lf in so cial interaction. 8. L x tern al and in te rn al behavior dem ands on the group and the individuals rem ain constant. 9. The use of existing sanctions w ill re s to re the deviance to its in itial sta te . 10. The group does not have su b cu ltu res, each with its own controlling agent. 11. The boundaries of group behavior a re c le arly estab lish ed and m aintained as a group value. 12. The group was in a sta te of sta b ility at the tim e the in itial deviance took place. Dynam ic approach When ro le consensus is analyzed as a dynam ic m odel of group behavior, the final outcom e is not p red eterm in ed but is a re s u lt of the p ro cess of negotiations, psychological o r overt, between! the deviant and the group m e m b e rs --re su ltin g in the estab lish m en t of a new ro le consensus fo r the group. T he final outcom e is problem atical and m ay be p red ictab le within som e range. T he sequence of th is p ro cess can be approxim ated in the following m anner: Ro l e---> Deviance— >Evaluation and—>Reconstitution-> Sanctions— ^ r0le Consensus Accommodation Consensus T his m odel allow s fo r a new sta te of non-deviance by changing group n o rm s. The p o ssib ility of accom m odating to deviance is built into the relatio n sh ip s and the definition of ro le consensus, so that the group can be resp o n siv e to individual m e m b e r's needs as w ell as dem ands for its se rv ic e s from its dom ain. The steps of ratio n alizatio n inherent in m aking th ese assum ptions a re : 1. T he degree of certain ty as to cause and effect is rela tiv e to the possible outcome. The possible outcom e is dependent on m any v ariab les. 2. T he controlling agent can influence only c ertain segm ents of the d eviant's behavior, since m any fac to rs influencing all m em bers as w ell as the group a re beyond the com prehension of the agent of control. 3. T he full dom ain of dem ands on the deviant and group, as individuals and as a group, a re not known 93 by both the agent of control and group m e m b e rs. 4. T h ere is feedback to the group as to the deviant's behavior so the group can evaluate the deviant's input to d eterm in e w hether o r not it w ishes to change its stan d ard s and norm s in light of the new inform ation. 5. E x tern al and in te rn al needs and dem ands a re not constant but a re highly unstable. 6. At the o c cu rren c e of deviance recognition, the group m ay be in e ith e r a stab le or unstable position in re g a rd to consensus. The deviant m ay be adding stab ility , and the group is slow in adaptation to this new sta te . 7. The gro u p 's value p rem ise s a re to m eet the needs of the m em b ers and dom ain dem ands, and m ay not n e c e ssa rily be stab ility of its p resen t system of relatio n sh ip s. 8. The controlling agent has a lim ited re p e rto ire of legitim ate sanctions. If he re s o rts to illeg itim ate sanctions to influence the deviance, e scallatio n of deviant behavior w ill occur. 9. T he individual self, as ex p ressed in in itial deviant 94 action, is an indicator that the group is not m eeting the needs of its m em b ers. 10. The possibility e x ists that the group does have subcultures that m ay have influence on total group norm s. E ach subculture m ay have its own co n tro l ling agent. 11. The use of existing sanctions m ay not be effective in influencing deviance. New sanctions should be used as the group and individual redefine th e ir ro le consensus. As values change, so does the effective n ess and capability of sanctions for influencing behavior. 12. Boundaries of the group a re not c le a rly established, e ith er w ithin the group o r w ithin the a re a of demand from its dom ain by its c lien ts. Sum m ary of E quilibrium T heory and Change E quilibrium is influenced by the approach used in d eterm in ing and p ro cessin g deviancy. In the sta tic approach, all acts that do not follow the p re sc rib e d behavior a re co n sid ered negative inform a tion. As a re s u lt, the sta tic approach rew ard s conform ity and purges deviants from its system . 95 T he objective of the equilibrium system is to achieve a p re determ ined goal which is a sta tic sta te . When this occurs in an organization, p re s s u re to achieve equilibrium is placed on policies, ru le s, reg u latio n s, and p ro ced u res to obtain conform ity. Public a d m in istra to rs often fail to se e that the se a rc h for equilibrium of th e ir organization goes fa r beyond th e ir im m ediate bureaucracy in its effects. Many of the se rv ic e s provided by governm ent a re in them selves negative to the client. The end re s u lt is a sta tic m echanism , seeking its own equilibrium and attem pting to regulate its environm ent--w hich is an open system . Within a la rg e r social sy stem , such a m odel tends to a c c e le ra te conflict, change, and s tr e s s . When the dynam ic approach is used for the p ro cessin g of deviancy, the assum ption is that the organization is alread y in som e sta te of d isequilibrium , and the specific act m ay not be deviant until a value is placed upon it by the group, organization, or society. T his approach does not autom atically ru le out as irre le v a n t all inform ation which does not m eet its estab lish ed c rite ria . The inform ation rec eiv e s its value of being e ith e r negative or positive when the fusion w ith the m em ory and w ill of the system occu rs. 96 Chapter Summary T he p ro cess of defining and redefining consensus deviancy and conform ity in a rela tiv e ly sim ple s y s te m --th a t of the individual search in g fo r the fusion of his s ta tu s -ro le identity with situational o p p o rtu n ities--b eco m es even m o re com plex when p atterned in te r actions a re b u reau cratized . When b u reau cratizatio n of in teractio n s with o th ers occur, the definition of consensus is no longer based upon the congruency of ego and a lte r ’s value sy ste m s, but upon an absolute stan d ard im posed by a th ird party. C onform ity is rew arded, and deviancy tends to be su p p ressed . P articipants no longer volun ta rily choose those with whom th e ir values a re n e c e ssa rily congruent as recip ien ts of th e ir actions. The b u reau cracy thus tends to control the situational opportunities, and the individual's se a rc h for statu s- ro le identity is no longer within his sp h e re of influence. When the individual decides to change the stru c tu re d in te r actions, he is typed as a deviant and subsequently purged from the b u reau cratic system . How the deviant act is p ro ce ssed in the system is dependent upon w hether the individual, group, organization, o r a society take a sta tic o r dynam ic approach. T he assum ptions underlying the sta tic approach is that equilibrium has been estab lish ed by p rio r consensus, and all behavior that is c o n tra ry to e stab lish ed goals w ill be negative. The dynam ic approach assum es that the system is m o st likely in a sta te of disequilibrium and that deviancy is thus re la tiv e to definition of the c u rre n t inform ation with the gro u p 's values. T he observed act is n eith er im puted a positive o r a negative value until a fte r a fusion with the m em ory and w ill of the system occu rs. C hapters IV and V a re an extension of the consensus: deviancy and conform ity p ro ce ss. In th ese c h ap ters, em phasis is on conflict and change. The concepts re la te d to se lf-id en tity and autonomy occur throughout the e n tire d iscussion, since autonomous individuals o r organizations can give directio n to th e ir action sy stem s w hile o thers cannot do so. CHAPTER IV CONFLICT: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES Introduction The study of conflict is another dim ension of the consensus: deviancy and conform ity p ro c e ss. C onflict as an inform ation input into both the sta tic (closed) and the dynam ic (open) sy stem s. How th is inform ation is p ro c e sse d within the system determ ines w hether o r not the in itial inputs have negative or positive value. In a sta tic approach, conflict is viewed as inform ation inputs only in a negative m anner. In the dynam ic approach, the inform ation inputs a re viewed n e ith er positively o r negatively until an evaluation p ro cess with the m em ory and w ill takes place. T he two m ajo r approaches to the study of conflict a re the stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a list and the in te ra c tio n is ts . T hese c la ssific a tions a re not m utually exclusive but a re used to clarify the approaches of closed and open sy ste m s in the an aly sis and p ro cessin g of inform ation p ertaining to conflict and deviancy. 98 99 A m odel for conflict an aly sis is developed covering conflict w ithin and between sy stem s at the individual and collective level. T his m odel functions as an in teg rativ e unit, showing the relatio n sh ip s betw een conflict at the individual, in te rp e rso n a l, in trag ro u p , and in terg ro u p lev els, w ith the definition of group dependent on the scope of the term "collective level. " The synthesis of conflict, change, and the d irectio n the action system takes to achieve a new goal s ta te is dependent upon four c ritic a l v a ria b le s: (1) the assum ptions underlying the in itial stru c tu re of the system (closed o r open system ); (2) the p ast, p re se n t, and p ro jected s ta tu s -ro le id en tities; (3) the p ast, p re se n t, and pro jected situational opportunities; and (4) autonom y-- how the action system p ro c e sse s c u rre n t inform ation inputs w ith its m em ory and w ill. T h ese four v ariab les d eterm in e w hether th e re is autonom y w ithin the individual o r the organization. Autonomy is n e c e ssa ry to give directio n to the in teractio n p ro c e ss and to place the action system into m otion. If th e re is no autonom y, the individual o r the organization is propelled by its environm ent o r d rifts a im lessly . T he se a rc h for individual and organizational s ta tu s -ro le identity is dependent upon in teractio n s to provide the situational opportunities. H ow ever, once a new autonom ous goal or s ta te of 100 ex istence is achieved, the e n tire p ro cess s ta rts over and the p reserv a tio n of autonom y again becom es a d e sire d goal in o rd e r to influence in te ra c tio n s. The problem s encountered by an individual in achieving and m aintaining his own self-id en tity and autonom y a re compounded m any tim es when an organization com es into existence. An organ ization brings w ith it a higher probability of a m isallocation of the sta tu se s and ro le s , because not all of the m em bers a re voluntarily p articip atin g w ith oth ers in the achievem ent of organizational goals. T his m isallocation of hum an re s o u rc e s is m easu red against what could be accom plished under attainable conditions with a ltern ativ e and effective utilization of personnel. The organization has the sam e sta tu s- ro le identity and autonom y dilem m a as the individual but with the added problem s of conflict w ithin and between individuals and groups and the possibility of m isallo catin g personnel re s o u rc e s. When the individual o r the organization does not m aintain autonom y, a stro n g possibility for failu re e x ists. Political S cientist K arl Deutsch attrib u ted failu re to be re la te d to overvaluation of the n e a r over the far; fa m ilia r over the new; the past over th e p resen t; and the p resen t over the future. ^ All of th ese conditions fit the closed sy stem s approach in the p ro cessin g of conflict and deviant ^Deutsch, p. 229. 101 behavior. T h ere is little p o ssib ility for autonom y w ithin the closed sy stem , sin ce conform ity to estab lish ed p o licies, ru le s , regulations, and pro ced u res is rew arded. A p articip an t in a closed system usually is e ith er propelled by the b u reau cratic s tru c tu re in the decision-m aking p ro cess o r d rifts with indecisions. T he purpose of this ch ap ter is to develop an understanding of the approaches to conflict an aly sis, in te rac tio n s, directio n of action sy ste m s, se lf-id en tity , and autonom y w ithin the fram ew ork of the consensus: deviancy and conform ity p ro ce ss. A pproaches to the Study of Conflict T h ere a re at le a st two e sse n tia l elem ents for a social system to com e into existence: (1) a situational opportunity s tru c tu re that provides fo r in teractio n s between individuals o r sy stem s and (2) a cto rs (individuals o r organizations) who take p a rt in the in te r action p ro ce ss. T h ese two elem ents a re p re se n t in the m ost sim ple as w ell as the m ost com plex so cial sy ste m s. T h ese sam e two elem ents a re the p re re q u isite s for develop ing stan d ard s and norm s of individual and group behavior in both sim ple and com plex organizations. T hey also c re a te the dilem m a of p reserv in g se lf-id e n tity and autonom y w hile sim ultaneously receiv in g significant inform ation from the environm ent and subsequently 102 changing the in tern al s tru c tu re s and behavior p a tte rn s. Change and conflict a re also two com ponents of the essen ce of m an 's being. The study of c la ss and c la ss conflict, organizational conflict, social conflict, and individual conflict and adaptation (change) h isto ric ally fall into two c lassificatio n s of the stru c tu ra l- functionalists and the in te ra c tio n ists; ^ S tru ctu ral- functionalists The assum ptions underlying th is approach a re : 1. E very so ciety is a re la tiv e ly p e rsiste n t, stable stru c tu re of elem ents. 2. E very society is a w e ll-in te g rate d s tru c tu re of elem ents. 3. E very elem ent in a society has a function, i. e . , re n d e rs a contribution to its m aintenance as a system . 4. E very functioning so c ial stru c tu re is based on a 3 consensus of values am ong its m em b ers. The study of conflict by stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists usually 2 R alf D ahrendorf, C lass and C lass C onflict in In d u strial Society (Stanford, C alifornia: Stanford U niversity P re ss, 1959), pp. 161-162. ^Ibid. , p. 161. 103 has the elem ents of stab ility , integration, functional coordination, and consensus. T his m odel has been applied to organizational sy stem s by Katz and Kahn in th e ir discussion of generic types of organizational su b sy stem s: Thus we can d e scrib e the facts of organizational functioning w ith re sp e c t to five basic su b sy stem s: (1) production sy stem s concerned with the w ork that gets done; (2) supportive subsystem s of procurem ent, disposal, and institutional relatio n s; (3) m aintenance subsystem s fo r tying people into th e ir functional ro les; (4) adaptive su b sy stem s, concerned w ith organizational change; (5) m an ag erial sy stem s for the d irectio n , adjudication, and control of the m any subsystem s and activ ities of the stru c tu re . 4 In teractio n theory The in teractio n theory approaches the study of social sy stem s by focusing on the in teractio n p ro ce ss between p articip an ts (ac to rs) and the adaptations of behavior resu ltin g in estab lish m en t of ro le consensus, n orm s, values, conflict, developm ent of p erso n ality (individual, organizational, and cu ltu ral), self-id en tity , change, deviancy, conform ity, com m unications, and sanctions (pow er, authority, m otivation). T he in te rac tio n ist th eo ry to the study of society a ssu m es: 1. E very society is at ev ery point subject to p ro c e sse s of change; so cial change is everyw here. 4 D aniel Katz and R obert L. Kahn, T he Social Psychology of O rganization (New York: John W iley and Sons, 1966), p. 39. 104 2. E very society displays at ev ery point d issen su s and conflict. Social conflict is everyw here. 3. E very elem ent in a society re n d e rs a contribution to its disintegration and change; and 4. E v ery society is based on the coercion of som e of its m em bers by o th ers. 5 T he in te rac tio n ists approach the study of com plex sy stem s in two different ways which a re c la ssified as the norm ative and the in te rp re tiv e approaches. T he norm ative approach focuses on the deductive m ethod of determ ining behavior of the sy stem . T his approach s ta rts w ith the "ought to" m ethod of an aly sis, and then, through deductive reasoning, what actually w ill happen. The in te rp re tive approach focuses on actual behavior of the system and believes that the d escrip tio n of the interaction cannot sa tisfy the req u irem en t for lite ra l d escrip tio n im posed by the logic of deductive reasoning. 6 N either of th ese m odels by th em selves offer a sufficient base fo r undertaking an exhaustive analysis of a com plex so cial sy stem . The in stru m en ts of analysis utilized by both m ethods a re not m utually exclusive. The concepts of ro le , ro le consensus, deviancy, n o rm s, sta n d ard s, stru c tu re and function, closed and o p e n -sy stem s, in teractio n , and other concepts a re used in terch an g e ably between the stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists and the in te ra c tio n ists w ithout developing an in teg rativ e theory com m on to both approaches. ^R alf D ahrendorf c alls this "C oercion T heory, " p. 162. Thom as P. W ilson, "C onceptions of Interaction and F o rm s of Sociological E x p lan atio n ," A m erican Sociological R eview , XXXV (A ugust, 1970), 697. 105 A Model for Conflict A nalysis M ost tra c e the beginnings of the study of so cial conflict back to K arl M arx and Social D arw inists, although num erous authors preceded them . T h ere w ill be no attem pt to su m m arize the lite ra tu re on the different th eo ries and approaches to conflict reso lu tio n , since this task would be beyond the scope of the re s e a rc h re p o rt and would n e ce ssitate a m u lti-d iscip lin a ry approach encom passing the fields of psychology, sociology, sociopsychology, econom ics, political scien ce, theology, and philosophy. T h ere a re se v e ra l excellent 7 su m m aries available in the lite ra tu re . The esse n ce of the phenomenon of conflict lies in the fusion of the sta tu s- ro le identity and the situational opportunity stru c tu re for the individual, group, organization, and the en tire social sy stem . An approach was developed by Johan Galtung that provides an operational fram ew ork for analysis of both change and conflict th eo ries as w ell as conflict resolution m echanism s. The discussion w ill focus on change, conflict, and conflict reso lu tio n m echanism s in 7 Panos D. B ardis, "Synopsis of T h eo ries of Social C h an g e,” Social Science, XXXVIII (June, 1962), 181-188. Clinton F . Fink, "Som e Conceptual D ifficulties in the T heory of Social Conflict, " Journal of Conflict R esolution, XII (D ecem ber, 1968), 412-460. th e ir relatio n sh ip s to ro le conflict in com plex organizations (see F ig u re 13). ^ CONFLICT I n t r a - s y s t c m I n t c r - s y s t c h IlCOIVIOUAL C e l l 1 C e l l 2 INYNA-PCRSONAL I n t e r - p e r s o n a l C o l l e c t i v e C e l l 3 C e l l * 1 I n t r a - c r o u p I n t e r - c r o u p F ig . 13. - -T y p es of a c tio n -sy ste m s in conflict In tra -sy s te m conflict In tra -s y s te m conflict is defined as that conflict which can be found in the sm a lle s t su b -u n its of the sy stem . T his would include su b -u n its (ro le s e c to rs ) of an individual as w ell as a group. T he individual a c to r is the sm a lle s t p o ssib le sub-unit. C ollectively, a c to rs can be in a ll p o ssib le siz e s of groups. C onflict is defined as two incom patible goal sta te s betw een the subgroups but w ithin the sy ste m . H ow ever, by redefining the boundaries of the group, one m ay in c re a se o r d e c re a se conflict definitions as e ith e r in trag ro u p g Johan Galtung, "In stitu tio n alized Conflict R esolution, " Journal of Peace R e se a rc h , IV (O cto b er-D ecem b er, .1965), 348. 107 o r intergroup. In te r-sy ste m conflict In te r-sy ste m conflict sp lits the sy stem into p a rts, with each subsystem standing for its own g o a l-sta te . T his occurs for both individuals (in terp erso n al) and groups (whole so cieties). T h ere a re se v e ra l p o ssib ilities of conflict in the in te r-sy ste m m odel. One a re a of conflict occurs when two o r m o re p erso n s have the sam e goal sta te but th e re is a sc a rc ity of goal (rew ard s). The problem occu rs when one group a rriv e s at his goal sta te and the oth ers cannot do so. The other a re a of conflict occurs when th e re is such an in te r dependency between conflicting groups th at a ll cannot re a liz e th e ir ideal g o a l-sta te s. Individual level of conflict Individual conflict re fe rs to psychological conflict w ithin the p erso n as w ell as betw een p erso n s on an individual basis (ego and a lte r). T he in te rp erso n al conflict m odel can be applied to m ore than one co u nter-position (a lte r), but only on a one-to-one basis. C ollective level of conflict T he collective level applies to conflict w ithin groups (three o r m o re p erso n s defined as a group) as w ell as conflict between groups. The collective level would include groups of th re e o r m o re 108 to whole so cieties o r com binations of so cieties (nations) such as the W estern W orld v e rsu s the C om m unist W orld. C onflict, Change, and D irection of Action System s Conflict occurs when an individual o r a system has two o r m o re incom patible goal- s ta te s . Conflict com es into being when the individual o r the organization seeks patterned in teractio n s with situational opportunities in changing the p re se n t s ta tu s -ro le identity in m oving to a new sta te of being and ro le perform ance. The d irectio n the action sy stem takes depends upon four v aria b le s: 1. The assum ptions underlying the initial s tru c tu re of the individual or the so cial system . 2. T he p a st, p re se n t, and projected sta tu s -ro le identities. 3. T he p ast, p re se n t, and pro jected situational opportunities. 4. How the action system fuses new inform ation on p resen t and future sta te s of being with its m em ory and w ill. A ssum ptions underlying the in itial stru c tu re The assum ptions underlying the in itial stru ctu re; depend on 109 w hether the individual o r the organization is viewed by its m em bers (or by itself) as a closed o r open sy stem , o r a m ix tu re of both. When the individual o r the organization is viewed as a closed sy stem , the oth er th re e com ponents of the in tern al and ex tern al action system w ill probably be m odeled and p ro jected on h isto ric a l im ages, and p rim a ry em phasis w ill be on the elaboration of the presen t. All four com ponents w ill be p resen t in developing the future s tru c tu re of the action sy stem . H ow ever, the degree of elaboration of the other th re e com ponents a re dependent on the in itial assum ption. When the assum ption is that the system is an open sy stem , then p rim a ry em phasis w ill be on elaboration of the o th er th re e com ponents in determ ining the d irectio n of the system ra th e r than the elaboration and p ro liferatio n of the p re se n t b u rea u cra tic sy stem . When the individual o r the organization is viewed as a m ixture of both closed and open sy ste m s, then all four com ponents w ill function with varying degrees of em phasis on each elem ent, depending on each situation. S tru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists: conflict-change. - -T he concept of change involves the notion of som e feedback on in itial behavior, as to its effectiveness in achieving the objectives, and on subsequent in te rn a l o r ex tern al changes n e c e ssa ry to accom m odate the new 110 inform ation into the system . The concept of goal is g en erally assum ed as given, and the feedback m echanism is built around a negative input to c o rre c t deviancy to fit estab lish ed goals. Many personnel a d m in istrato rs accept the m e rit prin cip le as given, and all inputs for c o rre ctio n s tend to be taken as negative inputs even when they com e from so u rc es th at have been estab lish ed as legitim ate to undertake change w ithin the system . An exam ple of this would be the bargaining re p re se n ta tiv e s of th e ir em ployees. The concept of feedback w ithin a given goal sy stem , as viewed by the stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists, has quite a different im pact when it is com pared to the in te rac tio n ists approach. T his c o n tra st was m ade e a rlie r between the sta tic and dynam ic approach to deviancy. T he p rem ise s for the feedback system in an organization w here the goal is accepted as given m ay be seen in the built-in hom eostasis c h a ra c te ristic by which c e rta in e sse n tia l sta te s of being a re brought into balance by an autom atic equilibrium s y s te m --a system which has as its p rim a ry function the m aintenance of the p resen t sy stem , w herein all inform ation inputs from the environm ent tend to be receiv ed as d istu rb an ces. An exam ple of a feedback m echanism functioning in a closed I l l sy stem m odel is seen in the following passage: In all th ese c a se s (th erm o stats, e le c tric e le v ato rs, guided m issile s) . . . an e le c tric o r m echanical system f irs t of all is given a m ajo r in tern al im balance o r disequilibrium that functions as its d riv e, in the sen se that the system tends to m ove tow ard a sta te in which thin in tern al disequilibrium w ill be reduced, o r m o re loosely re p re ss e d , in which its in te rn al "tension" w ill be low ered. M oreover, this inner d isequilibrium m ust be of a p a rtic u la r kind, such that it can be reduced by bringing the whole system into som e p a rtic u la r situation in rela tio n v is-a -v is the outside w orld. T his situation of the sy stem to the outside w orld we m ay call a goal situation, o r briefly, a goal. Once the system has reach ed such a goal, its inner disequilibrium w ill be low er. . . . In o rd e r fo r the system to approach the goal effectively, the feedback condition m ust be given. The sy stem m ust rec eiv e inform ation concerning the position of the goal and concerning the changes in its distance from the goal brought about by its own perform ance. The m essag es a re often negative in that they oppose the previous actions of the sy stem , so as to oppose overshooting of the targ et. . . . The sy stem m ust be able to respond to this inform ation by fu rth e r changes in its own position or behavior. With th ese fa c ilitie s, and given sufficient freedom , the system w ill th ere fo re tend to approach its goal. . . . If th ese changes a re effective and the system reach es the goal, som e of its d rive o r inner tension usually w ill be low ered. 9 T he equilibrium approach does not account for the problem of la rg e d istu rb an ces from the environm ent nor how the sy stem w ill su rv iv e in a c ris is . T he equilibrium approach does indicate that the b u reau cratic organization as w ell as the m e rit system m ay take one of the following form s of behavior: (1) conform ity; (2) and when ^Deutsch, pp. 183-184. 112 pushed to ex trem es re tre a tis m ; o r (3) ritu a lism in ru le s , reg u latio n s; and p ro ced u res. A daptability to environm ental s tr e s s is even m ore im portant in public than p riv ate organizations, since governm ental goals usually include the creatio n and im plem entation of public policy responsive to changing econom ic and so cial environm ents. Many public organ izations charged with the re sp o n sib ilitie s to im plem ent so cial change a re them selves incapable of changing th e ir in te rn al stru c tu re s. The existing b u reau cratic m odel of an organization is th e ir im age of self- identity. M ost public a d m in istra to rs have seldom explored the p o ssib ilities of a ltern a tiv e s to the b u rea u cra tic form of organization in im plem enting public policy. T he b u rea u cra tic form of public organization is given even m o re rig id ity through the establishm ent of statu tes cre atin g a m e rit sy stem . T he c rite ria of the b u reau cratic form of organization have been institutionalized into governm ental organizations by legislation and have been m aintained by personnel a d m in istra to rs. Only rec en tly have they been challenged by the environm ent. T he equilibrium approach assu m es that the organization is a lre ad y in a sta tic sta te and that all d e p a rtu re s from this position would be deviancy. C onflict occurs when attainm ent of p red eterm in ed 113 ; goals a re in terru p ted by deviant m em bers o r environm ental p re s s u re s . The purpose of the organizational control m echanism s is to bring the deviant acts into conform ity to organizational goals. The deviant acts a re believed to be only episodic in th e ir n atu re and the organization is viewed as a ratio n al m ethod fo r im plem enting public policy. T hus, the organization is ratio n al and is assum ed by its m em b ers to be in a s ta te of equilibrium . T he lack of stab ility of the trad itio n al analysis of conflict and change is e x p re ss e d in the following p assage: . . . In sh o rt, w here c la s s ic m echanism often thought of equilibrium as a suitable o v erall d escrip tio n of an en tire la rg e sy stem , the concepts of equilibrium and disequilibrium a re now m ost useful as d escrip tio n s of tem p o rary sta te s of sm all com ponents of such sy ste m s, w hile the sy stem s them selv es a re recognized as engaged in dynam ic p ro c e sse s of change which go w ell beyond the c la s s ic equilibrium im age. ^ T o a p erson who assu m es the organization is a closed sy ste m , the em phasis is on m aintenance of the ex istin g s ta tu s -ro le identity and the p resen t situ atio n al opportunity s tru c tu re s . T h ere is little o r no elaboration of the o th er com ponents of the action system except for attention to m inor d istu rb an ces from the environm ent. C onform ity to the statu s-q u o becom es the norm for both individual and organizational behavior. 10Ibid. , p. 186. 114 In te ra c tio n ists: conflict- change. - -T h e in te rac tio n ists believe th at change and conflict a re p erv asiv e in all individuals and so cial sy stem s. . . . O ur belief in the fru itfu ln ess of an in terd iscip lin ary approach in this a re a is based on the conviction that the behavior and in teractio n s of nations a re not an iso lated and self-co n tain ed a re a of e m p iric a l m a te ria l, but p a rt of a m uch w ider field of behavior and in teractio n . . . . C onflict which is perhaps the key concept in international re la tio n s, . . . is a phenomenon studied in m any different field s: by so cio lo g ists, psychologists, p sy c h ia trists, eco n o m ists, and by political sc ie n tis ts. It occurs in m any d ifferen t situ atio n s: am ong m em b ers of a fam ily, between lab o r and m anagem ent, betw een political p a rtie s, and even w ithin a single m ind, as w ell as am ong nations. Many of the p attern s and p ro c e sse s which c h a ra c te riz e conflict in one a re a also c h a ra c te riz e it in o th ers. H T he im portant difference betw een the stru c tu ra l- functionalists and the in te rac tio n ists is th e ir views of the concept of conflict. With the stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists, em phasis is on the reduction of conflict and tension by e ith e r ignoring it o r by su p p ressio n . T he in te ra c tio n ists view the system itse lf in a tra n s i to ry s ta te and m ost likely alread y in disequilibrium . T he effectiveness of inform ation at the re c e iv e r depends on two c la ss e s of conditions. F ir s t of a ll, at le a st som e p a rts of the receiv in g system m ust be in highly unstable equilib riu m , so that the v ery sm all am ount of energy c arry in g the signal w ill be sufficient to s ta r t off a m uch la rg e r p ro cess of ^ E d ito r ia l, Journal of Conflict R esolution, I (M arch, 1957), 1-2. 115 change. W ithout such disequilibrium alread y existing in the re c e iv e r, inform ation would produce no significant effects. . . . The second c la ss of conditions involves the selectiv ity of the re c e iv e r. What p attern s a re alread y sto re d in the re c e iv e r, and how specific m ust be the p a tte rn of the incom ing signal in o rd e r to produce re su lts? ^ T he p erv asiv en ess of the concept of conflict in com plex so cial sy stem s can also be seen from the discussion of so cial disorganization and deviant behavior by R obert M erton and R. A. 13 N esbit. Social disorganization is defined as inadequacies of fa ilu re s in a so cial sy stem of in te rre la te d sta tu ses and ro le s such that the collective purposes and individual objectives of its m em bers a re le ss fully re a liz e d than they could be in an a ltern ativ e w orkable sy stem . T he cau ses and effects of so cial disorganization a re quite different than those of deviancy. Social disorganization is rela tiv e and a m a tte r of degree. It is not the sam e standard as they used in both form s of d ev ian ce--th at is an absolute o r group n o rm s, but it is a stan d ard based on what could be accom plished under favorable conditions. Social disorganization thus re la te s to effectiveness of organization of the sta tu se s and ro le s. Social organization occurs ^ D e u ts c h , pp. 147-148. 13 R obert K. M erton and R. A. N esbit, C ontem porary Social Problem s (New Y ork: H arcourt, Brace and W orld, 1961), p. 720. 116 when one o r m o re of the following do not m eet the functional 14 req u irem en ts of the system : 1. Social p attern s of behavior fail to be m aintained. 2. Personal tensions generated by life w ithin the system a re insufficiently controlled, canalized, o r siphoned off by so cial p ro c e sse s so that anxieties accum ulate and get out of hand. 3. The so cial system is inadequately re la te d to its environm ent, n eith er controlling it n o r adapting to it. 4. The stru c tu re of the system does not sufficiently allow its m em b ers to attain the goals which a re its raiso n d 'e tre . 5. The relatio n s between its m em b ers do not contain the indispensible m inim um of so cial cohesion needed to c a rry on in stru m en tal and in trin sic a lly valued activ ities. Social disorganization ex ists in the d egree to which patterned activ ities fail to m eet one o r m o re of th ese functional req u irem en ts of the sy stem , w hether this be in an o rganiza tion o r an institution, a com paratively larg e and com plex group, o r a sm all and slightly differentiated one. ^ T he elem ents of so cial disorganization a re com ponents of a ll so cial sy stem s in p atterned in teractio n s w ithin and between other su b sy stem s. If any one of the five elem ents is not functioning in the in teractio n , so cial d isorganization w ill occur. The degree, form , im pact, and effects of so cial disorganization w ill vary, dependent upon which one of the five elem ents is m issing. M erton and N esb it's m odel of so cial disorganization is a sy stem atic expla nation of s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunity m odels applied to groups and so cieties. 14 1S Ibid. Ib id ., pp. 720-721. 117 The conditions that contribute to so cial disorganization 16 a re : 1. Inadequacies o r p a rtia l breakdowns in channels of effective com m unication between people in a social sy ste m --w h eth e r a national society, local com m unity, o r purposive asso ciatio n --w h o a re rec ip ro ca lly dependent for doing what they a re socially supposed to do and what they individually want to do. 2. S tru ctu ral circu m stan ces w here statu s groups and so cial s tra ta having not only different but incom patible values and in te re s ts . . . . People m ay thus w ork at c ro s s p u rposes, even though, or p rec ise ly because, they a re living up to the req u irem en ts and values of th e ir resp ectiv e positions in society. 3. D efects in the p ro c e sse s of so c ializ a tio n --th e acquisition of attitudes and values, of sk ills and knowledge needed to fulfill social ro les. 4. Faulty arran g em en ts of com peting so cial dem ands upon people who inevitably occupy a v ariety of sta tu ses in society. T his often gives r is e to the fa m ilia r clash of the m ultiple sta tu ses that call for co ntradictory behavior. T he sta tu ses pull in different d irectio n s. When the so cial system fails to provide fo r a widely sh ared p rio rity am ong these potentially conflicting obligations, the individuals subject to them experience s tra in s , with th e ir behavior often becom ing unpredictable and so cially disru p tiv e. T hese and m any o th er s o rts of pattern ed occasions for conflicting obligations can m ake for d is- ■ organization in the d eg ree that the reg u lato ry system fails to e stab lish sh a red p rio ritie s of obligations. The fau lt-in the objective, not the m o ral, sen se lies in the inept organization of potentially conflicting obligations, not in the ineptitude of the people confronted with these co n flicts. Since the authors believe that all five elem ents of functional : req u irem en ts of the system have to be m et, and if any one is not m et,! 16Ibid. , p. 721. 118 the p ro cess of social disorganization o ccu rs. The conditions that have to be m et as req u irem en ts of the five elem ents indicate that only in a Utopian society would such a situation be rea liz ed . F o r m an, an Utopian society is im possible, since conflict e x ists w ithin him self. One of the req u irem en ts for a Utopian so ciety is the absence of conflict. One could thus conclude that in p attern ed in teractio n s w here an organization com es into being, that so cial disorganization is an inh erent entropic function, w ith only the degree of so cial d iso rg an i zation being the variable. The authors su m m arized this in the following m anner: T he type of so cial problem involved in disorganization a ris e s not from people failing to live up to the req u ire m e n ts of th e ir so cial sta tu se s, as is the case with deviant behavior, but from the faulty organization of th ese sta tu se s into a reaso n ab ly coherent so cial sy stem . R ather than ro le-c o n fo rm ity leading to people's rea liz in g th e ir se v e ra l and collective pu rp o ses, it leads to th e ir getting in one a n o th e r's way. ^ P ast, p re se n t, and projected s ta tu s -ro le identities T his com ponent is interdependent w ith the o th er th re e elem ents that give direction to the action sy stem . An assum ption that underlies this discu ssion is that the developm ent of the "self" and the "self-conception" of the individual, the sub sy stem , and com plex 17Ibid. , p. 723. so cial system s a re form ed in a continuous in teractio n p ro ce ss w here ego m akes g e stu res and a lte r e ith e r responds in a positive o r negative m anner, rein fo rcin g ego's identity and behavior. We a re concerned with the s tru c tu ra l asp ects of the p erso n ality of the individual, conceived as a sy stem , as d isc u sse d by T alcolt P a r s o n s .^ The origin of p erso n ality of the s e lf. - -T h e origin of p e rso n ality of both the individual and the organization stem s from the in itial in tra fa m ilia r rela tio n s of b irth and e a rly childhood and continues to be shaped throughout the e n tire life span of the individual w ith m odifications being m ade to the existing stru c tu re . When an em ployee begins his f ir s t day of em ploym ent, his p e rso n ality is accepted as given at that p a rtic u la r point in tim e. When w orking for the organization, the em ployee rec eiv e s new and continuing dem ands, sig n a ls, and resp o n se s from fellow w o rk ers w hich re q u ire specific resp o n ses on his p a rt. T hese resp o n ses a re based upon his perceptions of th e ir g e stu re s and his past experience. If his resp o n ses a re based p rim a rily on his p ast experiences and not the needs of his fellow w o rk e rs, he w ill soon leave the organization. 18 T alcolt P arsons, "T he Position of Identity in the G eneral T h eory of A ction," T he Self in Social In te ra c tio n , ed. by Chad G orden and Kenneth J. G ergen (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, I n c ., 1968), pp. 14-15. 120 If he re m a in s, he w ill be req u ire d to m ake adjustm ents in o rd e r to change his attitudes in acceptance o r rejectio n of req u e sts. The attitudes affect the s tru c tu ra l asp ects of his p erso n ality when he m akes adjustm ents over tim e, which eventually becom e patterned in te rac tio n s. H ow ever, unless a c ris is o c cu rs, the p erso n ality is added to by a slow p ro cess ra th e r than suddenly. It is the com plex consequences of this differentiating and upgrading p ro ce ss that the m ost c ru c ial problem s of the rela tio n between the p erso n ality of the individual and the so cial and cu ltu ral sy stem s a re to be found. 19 Identity and autonom y. - -T h e com plex consequences of the continual se a rc h for identity in relatio n to situational opportunities is the v ariab le that acts as inputs into the developm ent of the se lf and in subsequent evaluation of p re se n t and fu tu re capabilities and opportunities. T he p re se n t se lf com posed of p ast, p resen t, and fu tu re identities provides a p ersp ectiv e to the im m ediate inputs the individual o r the organization places into the action system . T he te rm "identity" also includes experiences that have been both positive and negative. The positive inputs re s u lt in higher sta te s of being o r consciousness from the fusion of s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities (assum ing higher sta te s of being : a re valued). N egative inputs would include experiences that provide 19 Ib id ., p. 16. 121 a base for latent conflict which m ay re s u lt in a m anifest conflict situation in future tim e periods. W hether o r not the positive or negative p ersp ectiv es en ter into the evaluation of p resen t s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities is re la tiv e to the p ro cessin g of specific inform ational inputs with the m em ory and w ill. The effectiveness of utilizing new inform ation depends on at le a st som e p a rts of the receiv in g system being in a highly unstable sta te of equilibrium and upon the se lectiv ity of the re c e iv e r. T he fusion of new inform ation with the m em ory and w ill of the individual and the organization is the c ritic a l point in d e te rm i nation of identity and autonom y. D eutsch su m m arized th is in the following m anner: . . . W hatever its physical form , m em ory is e sse n tia l for any extended functioning of autonom y. Indeed, we m ight define autonom y above the sim ple feedback level as the feeding back of data from som e form of m em ory, and thus from the p ast, into the m aking of p resen t decisions. Autonomy, in this view, depends on the balancing of two feedback flows of data. One from the sy s te m 's p e rfo rm ance in the p resen t and in its environm ent. The o th er from the sy ste m 's p ast, in the form of sym bols re c a lle d from its m em ory. . . . W ithout trad itio n s and m em ory, w ould-be se lf-s te e rin g organizations a re apt to d rift w ith th e ir environ m ent. W ithout openness to new inform ation from th e ir environm ent, how ever, s e lf-s te e rin g organizations a re apt to cease to s te e r them selves and to behave ra th e r like m e re p ro jectiles e n tirely ru led and driven by th e ir p ast. P ara doxically, selfhood in individuals and organizations is lost with the loss of inform ation from outside o n e's own closed system and one's own tim e. 122 Autonomy in an organization is thus a function of the whole sy stem . It is not located at any one point in the sy stem , but th e re m ay be one o r m ore points of p a rtic u la r im portance for it. T h ese c ru c ial points for the autonom y of an organization a re the points at which a flow of data re c a lle d from the past e n te rs the flow of data used fo r m aking c u rre n t decisions. T he location w ithin an organization of its m ajor m em ory fa c ili tie s , and the points of channel p a ttern by which th ese m em o ries a re used for ste e rin g and decision m aking m ay tell us much about the probable functioning as w ell as about possible stru c tu ra l w eaknesses and vulnerabilities of the organiza tion. 20 The form ation of the individual's self-conception, p e rso n al ity, se lf-im a g e s, identity, and autonom y grow s out of su ccessiv e in te ra c tio n s, both patterned and unpatterned, in the attainm ent of his s ta tu s -ro le identity (goals as reflectio n s of values). T alco lt Parsons pointed th is out in som ew hat the sam e m anner as D eutsch when he said: The cu ltu ral system (through the m edium of conscience) leg itim ates the individual's value-com m itm ents not only in his so cial ro le s and collectivity m em berships but also in a v a rie ty of e x tra so c ia l contexts. T he superego is the in te g rativ e subsystem of the p erso n ality not only in that it in te g rate s the p lu ral ro le- involvem ents of the sam e p erso n ality with each o th er, but also in that it in teg rates ro le- involvem ents w ith other aspects of p erso n al value-com m itm ent. T his extension beyond the level of so cial involvem ent is p a rtic u la rly im portant for the problem of identity. 21 One m ay conclude that the developm ent of the self, both individual and organizational, grow s out of patterned and unpatterned 20 D eutsch, pp. 206-207. 21 Parsons, p. 19. 123 in teractio n s with o ne's environm ent. T hat the origin of the "self" is refle cted in both the biological and m em ory sy stem s at the tim e he is evaluating c u rre n t inform ation inputs to im plem ent an action system to a rriv e at a new sta te of being o r consciousness. The c ritic a l link in the fusion of the s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities available w ill be found w here c u rre n t inform ation flows m eet with the m em ory system and the w ill of the individual o r the organization. Past, p resen t, and future situational opportunities Situational opportunities a re dependent on the developm ent of an in teractio n system (patterned o r unpatterned) on the p art of ego attem pting to attain his se lf-im ag e and autonom y. One author defined the in teractio n p ro cess as: An in teractio n episode begins with a g e stu re m ade by one party. G estu re is used h e re in the broad sen se of any behavior that can be assigned som e m eaning by the acto r o r o b se rv er. A g e stu re is an incom plete act: By itse lf it is nothing. T he h e a re r o r view er m ust determ ine what it stands fo r before he in tu rn can act. . . . The assignm ent of m eaning not only proceeds the g estu re but se rv e s as c rite rio n o r stan d ard by which ego judges his g e stu re afte r he has m ade it. F requently, as a p erson speaks o r acts he attends to his own g e stu re and rem ak es o r m odifies it so that it w ill fit m o re clo sely the m eaning he initially had in m ind. 22 22 Ralph T u rn e r, "T he Self-C onception in Social In te r action, " The Self in Social In te ra c tio n , ed. by Chad Gordon and Kenneth G ergen (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, I n c ., 1968), p. 95. 124 Since m an is situational and rela tiv e to his environm ent, the possibility of both unpatterned and patterned in teractio n s ex ists until his death. However, neither of these exist without other people. Situational opportunities for ego to m ake g e stu res a re dependent upon both in teractio n s and the m eaning of com m unication. The g estu re, without o th ers and without m eaning, would have no relevance to e ith e r ego o r a lte r. Since one of m an's needs is the p reserv atio n of the sp ecies, which cannot be obtained without the participation of another, it can be stated that the sim p lest elem ent in the in teractio n p ro ce ss is two p erso n s, and, subsequently, la rg e r fam ily units, until an e n tire society is form ed. E xpectations a re a p a rt of the interaction p ro cess. Ego would not m ake a g estu re to a lte r if he did not perceive that it would have m eaning. The te rm "expectations" includes the elem ents of uncertainty, as w ell as experience gained from p rio r in teractio n s, in teractio n s which act as re fe re n c e s for o rd erin g and predicting behavior. E xpectations cannot ex ist without the contem plation of the p o ssib ility of in teractio n with another. If expectations a re never re a liz e d in c ertain situations, ego soon recognizes the re a lity of the situation. Subsequently, the expectations a re redefined and ego seeks o th er a lte rs to give m eaning to his expectations. 125 The stag es of the in teractio n p ro ce ss have been defined by 23 Ralph T u rn e r as the following: 1. Based on his in te rp retatio n of his own g e stu re, ego adopts a sta te of p rep a red n e ss for c ertain kinds of resp o n se from a lte r. 2. A lter now re c e iv e s ego’s g e stu re , places his own in te rp retatio n upon it, and responds upon the basis of that in terp retatio n . 3. Ego not only rec eiv e s and in te rp re ts a lte r 's g esture but recognizes it as one for which he is p rep ared or one that falls outside of the anticipated range. But the sta te of p rep a red n e ss p reced es in terp retatio n , and the g e stu re as seen and understood is shaped by a lte r 's sta te of p rep a red n e ss. T he m ost general tendency is to place on the g e stu re som e in terp retatio n fo r which one is p rep ared . 4. T he subsequent co u rse of in teractio n depends upon w hether a lte r 's resp o n se g e stu re is recognized as falling w ithin the ran g e for which ego is p rep ared . We sh all speak of a lte r 's g e stu re as congruent if this o ccu rs. When the resp o n se is congruent, in teractio n continues in one of its p re -e stab lish e d d ire c tio n s. The above schem a re q u ire s: F ir s t, that the determ inants of g e stu re -in te rp re ta tio n be specified; and, second, that the so u rce of 24 the a ctio n 's d irectio n be indicated. The direction the in teractio n p ro c e ss tak es, beginning w ith the in itial g e stu re by ego, is dependent upon the value sy ste m s of ego and a lte r and continues as the in itial g e stu re becom es m o re interdependent and com plex. T he ro le of values in the in teractio n p ro cess not only guides the g e stu re s of ego and a lte r, it a lso provides for the 23tu . , 24TU .j nA Ibid. Ibid. , p. 96. 126 synthesis of the se lf w ith the m em ory and w ill in developing a new identity and sta te of consciousness. Values a re the e sse n tia l com ponents in determ ining the d irectio n of the s ta tu s -ro le identity and in selectin g the p rio ritie s with which to im plem ent an action system in relatio n to situational opportunities. Autonomy: com m unications, m em ory, and w ill How the action sy stem p ro c e sse s the fusion of new inform a tion on p resen t and future sta te s of being with its m em ory and w ill is dependent on its self-id en tity . When the se lf-id e n tity is that of an autonom ous individual o r organization, he is able to influence the in teractio n p ro c e ss. Developm ent of se lf-id e n tity . - -T h e developm ent of self- identity re q u ire s an in teractio n p ro c e ss as w ell as a feedback m echanism (resp o n se g e stu re by a lte r to eg o )--an evaluation of the event w ith the in itial im age of ego's values, needs, and g e stu res. T he basis on which the idea of se lf em erg es re q u ire s at le a st (1) the vital se n se of distinction betw een self, o th er se lv e s, and n o t-se lv e s; (2) the sen se of continuity of th e self; (3) the se n se of a se lf as d istin ct from m e re behavior and public appearance. ^ The d eterm ination of se lf, o th er se lv e s, and n o t-se lv e s is undertaken by 2=; Ibid. , pp. 98-99. 127 ego when determ ining what ro le behavior to undertake in specific situations. C ontinuity of s e lf. - -T he continuity of self is threatened when ego continually m akes g e stu res and rec eiv e s negative feedback and is not capable of e ith er redefining his values or in finding additional a lte rs . If ego cannot change his g e stu res to be m eaningful to a lte r, o r fo rce a lte r to re tu rn his g estu res in a positive m anner, then ego is faced with the need for redefining his values (individual and organizational goals) o r for finding new a lte rs (new cu sto m e rs, em ployees, o r clien ts) for his g e stu res (outputs). When ego cannot su ccessfu lly m ake any of th ese altern ativ es operational, he is then faced with the p o ssib ility of re g re ssio n and of the eventual self- d estruction of his p resen t self-id en tity . The th re e elem ents from which the idea of se lf em erg es a re interdependent and continuous. E m phasis is placed on different a sp ec ts, as ego se a rc h e s for its s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities to m ake g e stu res to a lte rs in rein fo rcin g its self- identity. T he sen se of se lf thus re q u ire s that the individual m aintain an autonom y of his im age from those of others o r of the environm ent. W ithout this autonom y, he does not keep a p ersp ectiv e of his own sta tu s- ro le identity in relatio n to the environm ent. T h ese sam e elem ents a re n e c e ssa ry in the attainm ent of 128 com plex individual, organizational, o r so cial goals when task - d irec te d in teractio n is in itiated by egos and subsequently becom es b u reau cratized . T his is illu stra te d in the following passage: Much in teractio n is not lim ited to noting the value- relevance of g estu res as they a re m ade, but is governed by som e purpose or aim which one o r both p articip an ts hold in m ind throughout a su ccessio n of g e stu re exchanges. G estures a re then not sim ply ex p ressio n s of feeling and naive com m unica tion but a re d irec te d by a stab le purpose, and in teractio n does not shift w illy-nilly as one value a fte r another com es into play. When in teractio n is d irec te d ra th e r than casual, the e n tire p ro ce ss of assigning m eaning becom es organized in relatio n to the goal o r purpose. A goal is sim ply a value elevated to a sp ecial guiding position in in teractio n . Like preoccupation with any value, p u rsu it of a goal disposes the a cto r to in te rp re t a ll ensuing experience according to its relevance to that goal. The re su lt is that for the duration of the in teractio n values a re placed in a h iera rch y , with som e values subordinated to the goal as "m eans" and "conditions. " 2 6 In tera ctio n s: C onsensus, Deviancy, C onform ity, and Autonomy S elf-identity and in teractio n s T he concept of o ne's se lf and of what kind of a p erso n a lte r is , determ in es w hether o r not ego w ill in itiate a g e stu re and what type of a g estu re w ill be initiated. T he resp o n se that a lte r m akes to ego is also dependent on im ages that a lte r has of ego as a person. The concept that ego holds for a lte r a re te ste d by the ge stu re ego 26Ib id ., p. 101. 129 m akes tow ard a lte r. E go's concept of a lte r a re upheld if th e re is a congruence o r noncongruence in a lte r 's resp o n se. When in teractio n is b u reau cratized , the analogy is w hether governm ental p ro g ram s or co rp o rate product lines a re congruent to client o r m ark et needs. Both the individual ego and the b u reau cracy continuously te s t th e ir g e stu res in rela tio n to a lte r, and re v is e th e ir g e stu res as a lte r continues to respond in e ith e r a positive o r a negative m anner. In the public se c to r, the problem is quite com plex, since m any governm ental agencies have a negative ro le with th e ir clients no m a tte r how positive they try to m ake th e ir g e stu res. C onversely, m any clients have only a negative im age w ith the public agency and do not d e sire to in itiate any in teractio n s w hatsoever. S tru ctu re in the in teractio n p ro cess occu rs when both ego and a lte r can p red ict each o th e r's behavior m ore than 50 p e r cent of the tim e. T he p ro cess of stru c tu rin g an in teractio n is d e scrib e d by Ralph T u rn e r in the following m anner: We can su m m arize the consequence of eg o 's continuing in teractio n with the sam e a lte r. F ir s t, his in itially tentative conceptions of a lte r a re m odified and rep laced until a conception is form ed which adequately p re p a re s him to cope w ith host of a lte r 's g e stu re s w ithout constant disruption and rev isio n of attitude in the c o u rse of in te r action. Second, as this conception becom es firm ly entrenched, ego develops an in cre asin g bias tow ard in te rp re ting any g e stu re by a lte r as the n atu ral act of a person c h a ra c te riz e d as he se es a lte r. T h ird , when a lte r 's g e stu re s a re noncongruent, ego tends in creasin g ly to m ake a sep aratio n between the im age of the p erso n at the m om ent 130 and the "tru e " perso n , as c h a ra c te riz e d in his conception. Thus person-conceptions a re both d e te rm in e rs and products of in teractio n . It is im portant that th ese two relatio n sh ip s a re obverse asp ects of the sam e p ro cess. Person- conceptions a re n e c e ssa ry to give stab ility to in teractio n w hile reducing the extent of disruptive non congruence which re s u lts from assum ing that a given g estu re m eans the sam e thing to a ll who em ploy it. Person- conceptions guide behavior by enabling ego to assign the m eaning to a lte r 's g e stu re which ego re q u ire s in o rd e r to fo rm u late his next g estu re. But because ego acts upon the b asis of the construction placed on a lte r 's g e stu re, and then is confronted by a resp o n se from a lte r which is e ith er congruent o r not, his conception of a lte r is subjected to te st. It is because he m ust act upon his conception of a lte r that ego m ust develop and re v ise that conception as in te r action p ro ceed s. 27 The p ro cess of stru c tu rin g in teractio n is dependent upon the values, n o rm s, and needs of the a c to rs involved in the initiation of and resp o n se to g e stu re s. H ow ever, values, n o rm s, and needs of a c to rs do not rem ain constant over tim e but change in relatio n to o n e's se lf-id e n tity , situ ational opportunities, and the in teractio n p ro c e ss. T he so u rc es of sta b ility , conflict, change, and develop m ent of the p e rso n ality r e s t on the in teractio n p ro ce ss with o thers ra th e r than so lely on those fo rces stem m ing from cu ltu ral influences, individual tr a its , and needs. 27I b id ., pp. 96-97. 131 In teractio n s and personality developm ent Paul Secord and C arl Backman have developed a th eo re tic al m odel of p erso n ality theory based on the in teractio n p ro c e ss. They have su m m arized th e ir approach in the following m anner: T he locus of behavioral sta b ility and change lies in the in te rp erso n al m atrix , which has th re e com ponents: an asp ect of the self-co n cep t of the subject (S), S’s in te rp re tation of those elem ents of his behavior re la te d to that asp ect, and S 's perception of re la te d asp ects of the other p erson (O) with whom he is in teractin g . An in terp erso n al m atrix is a re c u rrin g functional relatio n betw een these th re e com ponents. The behavior of a p a rtic u la r p erso n is episodic in c h a ra c te r, in that he shifts from one m atrix to another over varying periods of tim e. A m atrix is re fe rre d to as the sam e if, on two o r m ore occasions, the sam e self-com ponent, S- behavior and 0 - com ponent a re p resen t in the sam e functional relatio n . 28 Secord and Backman do not deny the im portance of habit, needs, tr a its , and cognitive s tru c tu re s as having an influence on the in teractio n p ro c e ss, since th ese m echanism s by them selves do not e stab lish the n e ce ssa ry conditions fo r behavioral stab ility and change. T h e ir m odel abandons the approach of the clin ical psychol ogists who m ake the assum ption that in te rn al stab ilizin g m echanism s a re inherently re s is ta n t to change and a re the sole so u rc es of sta b ility in individual behavior. The authors point out that behavioral 28 Paul F . Secord and C arl W. Backman, "P ersonality T heory and the Problem of S ta b ility ," Psychological R eview , LXVIII (1961), 22-23. 132 sta b ility is explained by constancy of stru c tu re , w hereas change tends to be explained by environm ental fo rces and fortuitous c irc u m sta n ce s. T h e ir em phasis on in teractio n as the focus of p erso n ality developm ent is a reflectio n of th e ir em phasis on "any theory of stab ility in se lf and behavior m ust also be able to explain change. Secord and Backm an's th eo re tic al m odel of p erso n ality developm ent through the in teractio n p ro ce ss assu m es a hom eostasis c h a ra c te ris tic tow ard stab ility when they m ention that S (subject) striv e s to achieve congruency am ong the com ponents of the m atrix . S striv e s to achieve congruency am ong the com ponents of the m atrix . C ongruence is a cognitive phenomenon; i. e . , each com ponent e n te rs into a sta te of congruency only as a p erceptual cognitive experience on the p a rt of S. All th re e com ponents of the m atrix a re in a sta te of congruency when the behaviors of S and O im ply definitions of self-co n g ru en t w ith relev an t asp ects of the self-concept. 30 T h e ir m odel provides for the possibility of an incongruent sta te of being, to be redefined by the a c to r to a new congruent sta te . T hat sta te m ay actually be a deviant form in relatio n to p rio r positions of values on the in te rp erso n al m atrix . Although the in te rp erso n al m atrix m ay eventually becom e deviant to p rim a ry groups, "S" s till focuses on m aking his m atrix congruent w ith "O. " T h e re a re th re e step s leading to change: the creatio n of an incongruency, the form ation of a new congruent m atrix which involves a different com ponent of se lf or behavior 29Ibid. , p. 26. 30Ib id ., p. 23. 133 from that existing p rio r to change, and the adjustm ent of relev an t m a tric e s which have been affected by the changes m ade in reso lv in g the incongruent m atrix . As m entioned e a rlie r, incongruencies a ris e from s e v e ra l so u rc es: from c u ltu ral, norm ative, and institutional fo rc e s, from fortuitous fa c to rs, and from O 's attem pts to estab lish congruency for him self. Incongruencies occur frequently, but a re often followed by re s to ra tio n of a congruent m atrix which does not involve a change in se lf o r behavior. As alread y noted, th ere a re two g en eral c la sse s of resolution. One of th ese re s u lts in re sto ra tio n of the o riginal m atrix , leaving se lf and behavior unchanged (although cognitive d isto rtio n s m ay occur), and the other leads to a new m atrix in which se lf o r behavior a re changed. T he probability of the in te rp e rso n a l m a trix of S taking on the deviation-am plifying p ro ce ss as d escrib ed by M agoroh M aruyam a now becom es possible w here s im ila r conditions m ay re su lt in d is s im ila r products. Since its inception, cy b ern etics was m o re or le ss identified as a scien ce of se lf-re g u la tin g and equilibrating sy stem s. T h e rm o sta ts, physiological regulation of body te m p e ra tu re , autom atic ste e rin g devices, econom ic and political p ro c e sse s w ere studied under a g en eral m athem atical m odel of deviation-counteracting feedback netw orks. By focusing on the deviation-counteracting asp ect of the m utual cau sal re la tio n sh ip s, how ever, the cyberneticians paid le ss attention to the sy ste m s in which the m utual cau sal effects a re deviation am plifying. T he deviation-counteracting m utual cau sal sy stem s and the deviation-am plifying m utual cau sal sy stem s m ay appear to be opposite types of sy ste m s. But they have one e sse n tia l featu re in comm on. T hey a re both m utual cau sal sy stem s; i. e . , the elem ents w ithin a sy stem influence each other e ith e r sim ultaneously o r alternatingly- The difference between 31Ib id ., p. 26. 134 the two types of sy ste m s is that the deviation- am plifying system has m utual positive feedbacks betw een the elem ents in it. T hus, the m ain focus on the developm ent of the p erso n ality lie s in the in teractio n p ro c e ss, w hile secondary im portance is placed on values, n o rm s, and needs of the individual o r the organization. The values, n o rm s, and needs give m eaning and d irectio n to the 33 in teractio n p ro c e ss betw een ego and a lte r. B ureaucratization of in teractio n s When in teractio n becom es b u reau cratized into a refined and o rd e rly p ro ce ss of achieving organizational goals, the problem of achieving se lf-id e n tity , of both the individual and the organization, tak es on a different p ersp ectiv e. In se lf-id en tity in teractio n , ego's p rim a ry goal is to control the attitudes of a lte r tow ard him self. T he task becom es secondary to both ego and a lte r, since p rim a ry relatio n sh ip s a re influenced by congruency of a c to rs' values as to 32 M agoroh M aruyam a, "T he Second C ybernetics: D eviation- Am plifying M utual C ausal P ro c e s s e s ," M odern System s R e se arch for the Behavioral S c ien tist, ed. by W alter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), p. 304, 33 An excellent d iscu ssio n of m aking values, n o rm s, m obilization of re s o u rc e s and situ atio n al fac ilitie s operational as com ponents of so cial action is found in N eil J. S m e lser, T h eory of C ollective Behavior (New Y ork: The F re e P re ss, 1962), pp. 34-45. 135 w hether they w ish to re tu rn com plim entary g e stu re s. Ego is also influenced by the adjustm ent p ro ce ss induced by the o th er m em bers of the organization to obtain conform ity due to the interdependency of ta sk s. Ego is thus faced w ith the dual problem of se lf-id en tity and p reserv a tio n of autonom y within a b u reau cratized system which controls situational opportunities available, rew arding conform ity and adjustm ent to b u reau cratized interaction. When in teractio n is b u reau cratized , the in teractio n p ro c e ss focuses on the attainm ent of a com m on se t of values o r goal. The objective is not the se lf-id e n tity of the individual a c to rs, but the attainm ent of the organizational goal. The attitu d es, values, and g e stu re s of a c to rs becom e m eans ra th e r than ends. T h e re is little em phasis on individual se lf-id e n tity and im age of a cto rs except as m ethods of m otivation. To do th is, the organization controls the situational opportunities. It is left up to the individual to fend for h im self in finding his se lf-id e n tity in an environm ent that rew ard s conform ity. In b u reau cratized in teractio n , em phasis is placed on the task at hand and not on individuals and th e ir self-im ag e. If the organization places em phasis on negative sanctions, the behavior of individual a c to rs w ill tend tow ard preoccupation w ith th e ir self- im ages. Ego in te rp re ts both his and a lte r 's g e stu res as being 136 re p re se n ta tiv e of th e ir tru e selves and attention focuses on the m otives of the a c to rs ra th e r than on the task itself. Goal d isp lace m ent and ritu alizatio n of behavior w ill eventually occur when this becom es the dom inant value of individuals and the organization. The organization faces an infinitely m o re com plex ta sk in seeking its own self- identity w ithin a la rg e r environm ent, while s till m aintaining autonom y and providing for a fusion of the organizational m em ory and w ill with c u rre n t inform ational inputs. T his goal is to a rriv e at a higher and m ore com plex sta te of being in resp o n se to a changing environm ent. The organization m ust also bring into balance the satisfactio n of its m em b ers' s ta tu s -ro le identity. When the organization in c re a se s the m ethods of control over deviancy by using trad itio n al negative m ethods, the em phasis on p articip atin g in the attainm ent of organizational goals w ill shift. E m phasis w ill be placed on th e ir own se lf-im ag e s ra th e r than on the ta sk s. T his re s u lts in deviation am plifying behavior on the p a rt of the deviant m em ber w ith the re s u lt of m o re conflict and alienation. T he effect of the se lf-im ag e in d irectin g the co u rse of in te r action would be sim ply to focus m o re sh arp ly the p re s su re s on the individual to conform to the w ishes of o th ers, with so cial approval as the effective control m echanism . F a ilu re of convergence tow ard uniform ity in in teractio n episode would then have to be cred ited principally to e r r o r s in perception. But w ith self-conception as the stan d ard or c rite rio n , the dynam ics of so cial behavior hinge le ss on im m ediate approval-w hich m ust be gained by u n ifo rm izatio n -- and m ore on the generation of se lf-im ag e s that confirm the 137 self-p ercep tio n . Self-identity and autonom y The se lf o r identity is a reflectio n of the value sy stem of the individual, and as such, gives direction to the n atu re of the interaction. When in teractio n is d irec te d tow ard som e goal, the em ergence of pattern ed in teractio n o c cu rs, and the p o ssib ility for b u reau cratizatio n of in teractio n follow s. The attitudes of ego and a lte r a re focused on the task at hand ra th e r than on se lf-im ag e s. T his is a n e ce ssa ry p re re q u isite for b u reau cratizatio n of in teractio n . If focus is on se lf-im ag e s, b u reau cratizatio n of in teractio n w ill not be su ccessfu l when the ch arism atic lead er (ego) leaves the system o r dies. In o rd e r to obtain a p ersp ectiv e on the direction of the in teractio n , ego m ust also have a p ersp ectiv e of his own identity. The p ersp ectiv e of his identity we shall call autonom y. The p ersp ectiv e of se lf is n e c e ssa ry for the autonom ous; fo r w ithout it, he would e ith er conform o r be a deviant. Ralph T u rn e r pointed out this perspective in the following m anner: F o r any self-im ag e to be evaluated, th e re m ust be som e standard of com parison. H ere is w here introduction of the idea of self-conception m akes a m ajo r difference from sim ple conform ity and so cial approval m odels of hum an 34 T urner, p. 101. 138 behavior. W ithout a stan d ard of com parison, the self- im age would convey chiefly the sentim ent of approval or disapproval detected in a lte r ’s g e stu re s, or anticipated on the basis of experience w ith p rio r a lte rs . 35 The function of the in teractio n to ego is to confirm its self- im age by in te rp retin g a lte r 's reactio n and its experience as suppor tive o r non-supportive of his self-conception. The stan d ard s fo r ego’s behavior and achievem ent a re his self- im ages and not the specific encounter with a lte r. T he self-conception in co rp o rates a stan d ard for each relev an t type of accom plishm ent or v irtu e, a stan d ard which is different for each individual. As a consequence, identical p erform ance by different individuals can be tra n sla te d into quite different im ages. 36 The problem of se lf-id en tity and autonom y for b u reau cracies is sim ila r to those of the individual, but fa r m o re com plex. To adapt to environm ental p re s s u re s , the b u reau cracy m ust change its in n er stru c tu re . T his usually involves the content and distribution of m em o ries, o r the location and sequence of decisions, or both. E very autonom ous decision system is thus req u ire d to m ake in te rn al changes in its stru c tu re , which m ay be viable o r not. D eutsch pointed out that fa ilu re s to adapt in tern al stru c tu ra l p attern s to new req u irem en ts of environm ental p re s s u re s , can be divided into 37 six broad groups: ^ Ib id . , p. 102. ^ Ib id . , p. 103. ^D eutsch, p. 222. 139 1. T he lo ss of pow er, that is , the lo ss of re s o u rc e s and fac ilitie s req u ire d to m ake the behavior of the system p rev ail over o b stacles in its environm ent. 2. T he lo ss of intake, that is , the lo ss in the effectiveness of previously existing channels of inform ation from the outside w orld, o r the lo ss of e n tire channels, o r the lo ss of the ability to re a rra n g e such intake channels and to develop new ones. 3. T he lo ss of ste e rin g capacity o r coordination. T he loss of control by the organization over its own behavior, o r of the ability to m odify behavior with sufficient speed and p recisio n . 4. T he lo ss of depth of m em ory, that is , not m erely the loss in the o v erall sto ra g e capacity of m em ory fa c ilitie s , but p a rtic u la rly any loss in the effectiveness of the fac ilitie s fo r the re c a ll and recom bination of data, and fo r the sc ree n in g and identification of the m ost relev an t of a ll the m any possib le com binations, by m eans of som e se a rc h c rite ria and se a rc h devices, in everyday langauge, th is category would thus include lo sses in m em ory, in im agination, and in judgm ent. 5. The lo ss of capacity fo r p a rtia l in n er rea rran g e m en t, and correspondingly, for the learn in g of lim ited new p a ttern s of behavior. T his is som etim es loosely d e scrib e d as the rig id ity o r flexibility of an organization, thus d iverting attention from the com binational aspects of learn in g and stru c tu ra l change. 6. T he lo ss of capacity for com prehensive o r fundam ental arran g em en t of inner stru c tu re , and thus fo r com pre hensive changes in behavior. In different contexts of d isc o u rse , th is is som etim es called " re s tru c tu rin g ," "p erso n ality c h an g e ," " re fo rm a tio n ," " re s o lu tio n ," " re b irth , ” o r "conversion. " T he problem s of the b u reau cracy a re fa r m o re com plex than those of the individual upon b u reau cratizatio n of the in teractio n p ro c e ss. The b u reau cracy is confronted with the sam e p ro c e ss as individuals, but, in addition, has the re a rra n g e m e n t of inner s tru c tu re s m entioned above and subject to the "so c ial disorganization" 140 o r entropic functions previously m entioned by R obert M erton and R. A. N esbit. David R iesm an provided a classificatio n capable of inte grating adaptations of ego and a lte r to expectations for behavior during the in teractio n p ro cess and the stru c tu rin g of this p ro ce ss by so c ietal institutions. His classificatio n s a re the adjusted, the 38 anom ic, and the autonom ous. T h ese th re e classificatio n s a re not exhaustive nor m utually exclusive. But they should be viewed as being in degrees and p erv asiv e in a ll c u ltu re s, with the probability that individuals and society shift continuously betw een th ese m odes of social s tru c tu re in tim e, so c ietal distance, and space as so cial, econom ic, population, and political p re s s u re s shift th e ir em phases. T he adjusted. - -T h e adjusted a re typically trad itio n - d irected , in n e r-d ire c te d , o r other d irec te d people who respond in c h a ra c te r stru c tu re to the dem ands of so cial c la ss at its p a rtic u la r stage. In determ ining adjustm ent (conform ity), R iesm an focused on the individual's c h a ra c te r stru c tu re , and not on o v ert behavior. His definition of "adjusted" would encom pass m istakes by the 38 David R iesm an, Nathan G lazer, and Denney R euel, The Lonely Crowd (A bridged ed. ; New Haven, C o n n .: Y ale U niversity P re ss, 1961), pp. 239-307. 141 individual as to his perception of ro le. T his would be c la ssified as tra n s ito ry deviance o r irra tio n a l behavior. T his would not be c la ssifie d as sy stem atic deviance o r estab lish m en t of a contra- c u ltu re. A djustm ent, as used by R iesm an, m eans "socio- psychological" fit and not adequacy in an evaluative sen se. T hose who do not conform would be cla ssified by "the adjusted" as d ev ian ts--b o th the anom ic and the autonom ous. T he anom ic. - - Anom ic individuals a re ungoverned in the se n se that they lack norm s and guidelines for th e ir behavior. R iesm an used the term alm ost synonym ously with m aladjustm ent (with re se rv a tio n s due to the negative connotations). The anom ies include those who a re p rep ro g ram m ed in th e ir behavior p attern s to respond to c e rta in signals that a re no longer being given by ego o r that no longer have m eaning to a lte r to induce a positive resp o n se to ego's g e stu re s. T he te rm "m aladjusted" (considered in a value n eu tral sen se) also m eans over adjusted but not autonom ous. O ver conform ity to signals from o th ers as cues for behavior becom es a goal in itself. The sign als m ay have been placed into thinking p a ttern s by intensive indoctrination by so cial institutions (churches and schools) and com m only called se lf-d isc ip lin e o r by contem porary egos who have tran sfo rm ed power into authority and into subsequent 142 conditioned resp o n se sim ila r to Pavlof's dogs. T he autonom ous. - -T h e autonom ous a re those capable of choosing w hether o r not they w ish to conform to the behavioral norm s of society. Autonomy and anom ie a re both deviations from the adjusted p attern s of so cial conform ity. But the stan d ard s fo r so cial deviation a re determ ined by the conform ity to the adjusted so cial n o rm s. The stan d ard s of deviation for the autonom ous person is derived from his se lf-im ag e and not so cial n o rm s. T he anomous and the adjusted p erso n is not capable of determ ining his own self-im ag e in p ersp ectiv e to so cietal norm s and thus accepts institutionalized so cial norm s as given. The autonom ous p erson in a so ciety depending on inner- d irectio n , like the adjusted person of the sam e society, p o ssesse d c le a r-c u t, in tern alized goals and was disciplined for s te rn encounters with a changing w orld. But w hereas the adjusted p erso n was d riven tow ard his goals by a gyroscope over whose speed and d irectio n he had hardly a m odicum of control and of the existence of which he w as som etim es unaw are, his autonom ous contem porary was capable of choosing his goals and m odulating his pace. The goals, and the d riv e tow ard them , w ere ratio n al, nonauthoritarian and noncom pulsive fo r the autonom ous; for the adjusted, they w ere m ere ly g iv e n .39 R iesm an believed that it is difficult to find an autonom ous p erso n during a period of high population grow th in society because the individual usually does not becom e aw are of the p o ssib ilities 39 Ibid. , p. 250. 143 that he m ight change his p ersp ectiv es of him self and of the a lte rn a tive ro les available to him. T his analogy m ay also be m ade of organizations undergoing a high growth ra te due to dem ands for goods o r se rv ic e s. A lternative ro le s a re a lso dependent on the stages of technology and in d u strializatio n which provide form s of interaction and ro le perfo rm an ce o th er than those d irec tly re la te d to a g ra rian and su b sisten ce functions. T h e re is a higher probability for an autonom ous individual to e x ist in a re la tiv e ly sta b le so cial sy ste m --o n e that has undergone in d u strializatio n and that provides altern a tiv e p o ssib ilities for p attern ed in teractio n s betw een individuals and groups. Patterned in te rac tio n s m ay be facilitated by innate objects such as tra n s p o rta tion, com m unication, and organizational sy stem s as w ell as by com m on values, n o rm s, vocabulary, and im ages that a re constant in m eaning. In public ad m in istratio n , the public in te re st value is constant, w hile organizational norm s a re a v ariab le for im plem enting public policy. T he m e rit philosophy would be a value, w hile the m e rit sy stem would be a norm re la tiv e to organizational needs. T he possibility of changing expectations for ro le behavior due to environm ental influences induces s tr e s s in the individual who ; is developing altern a tiv e p o ssib ilities. E ventually one of th re e ! 144 outcom es evolves: the adjusted, the anom ic, and the autonom ous. U nfortunately, m ost public organizations and a d m in istra to rs tend to fall into the adjusted c lassificatio n when predicting organizational behavior under s tr e s s . S elf-identity, autonom y, and failu re Once se lf-id e n tity and autonom y a re obtained, th e re is a continuous problem of m aintaining it from in te rn al p re s s u re s of the se lf and in teractio n s w ith a lte r. If autonom y is not m aintained in a dynam ic p ro c e ss, the six m odes of failu re d iscu ssed e a rlie r by D eutsch p re se n t ev ery individual and organization with a danger of eventual self-induced stagnation (conform ity), o r p a rtia l o r total self- d estruction. D eutsch attrib u ted the six m odes of failu re to be re la te d to overvaluation of the n e ar over the fa r, the fa m ilia r over the new, 40 the p ast over the p re se n t, and the p resen t over the future. He suggested the concepts of hum ility, re v e re n c e , love, c u rio sity , g ra c e , e c le c tic ism , and s p irit as values to be in tern alized both w ithin the individual and the organization to m inim ize the ov er valuation of p ast, fa m ilia r, and p re se n t individual and organizational 40 Deutsch, p. 229. 145 e x p erien ces, technical e x p e rtise , decision-m aking m ethods, com m itm ents, and c u rre n t w ill and in n er stru c tu re s to p o ssib ilities 41 of fundam ental change to fu tu re req u ire m e n ts of client s needs. D eutsch1 s approach clo sely p a ra lle ls those of W arren Bennis when he d iscu ssed his c rite ria for organizational health d erived from M arie Jahoda's d iscu ssio n on m ental health of the p erso n ality of the individual. Jahoda's definition of a healthy p erso n ality is one which ". . . actively m a s te rs his environm ent, shows a c e rta in unit of perso n ality , and is able to p erceiv e the w orld and him self 42 c o rre c tly ." F ro m Jahoda's definition, Bennis estab lish ed the c rite ria of organizational health as one which co n sists of (1) organ izational adaptability and flexibility in learn in g through experience and to change as in te rn al and ex tern al c ircu m stan ces a re redefined; (2) the problem of id e n tity --a req u irem en t for developing adaptability is that the organization needs to know who it is (and is not) and what | it is to do; and (3) re a lity testin g techniques m ust be developed so the organization can d eterm in e its re a l p ro p erties and environm ent in which it e x ists. 41Ib id ., pp. 229-241. ! 42 ' W arren G. Bennis, Changing O rg an izatio n s: E ssa y s on the Developm ent and Evolution of Human O rganization (New Y ork: M cG raw -H ill Book Com pany, 1966), p. 52. 146 T he c rite ria and concepts of individual and organizational m ental health developed by Jahoda and Bennis su m m arizes the en tire p ro c e ss of the four com ponents that the individual places into the d irectio n of the action system to bring about a new sta te of being o r consciousness of his s ta tu s -ro le identity. C hapter Sum m ary T he consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle re q u ire s in teractio n s to take place in o rd e r to fuse the individual's s ta tu s -ro le identity with situational opportunities. The d irectio n that the individual o r organization takes in defining its s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities depends on four com ponents: 1. The se lf-im ag e of the individual or the o rganiza tion as to w hether it is a closed or open system o r a com bination of both. 2. Past, p resen t, and p rojected s ta tu s -ro le id en tities. 3. Past, p resen t, and projected situational opportunities. 4. Autonomy in the p ro cessin g of c u rre n t inform ation with m em ory and w ill. When organizations a re c re ate d to achieve goals, the p ro cessin g of deviancy becom es m ore com plex. O rganizational, 147 individual, and group values com e into conflict. A m odel for conflict analysis within and betw een sy stem s at the individual and collective level is p resen ted as a classificatio n w ithin which the stru c tu ra l-fu n c tio n a lists and the in te rac tio n ists can be analyzed. In teractio n s provide the n e ce ssa ry elem ent for the consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle to com e into existence. Autonomy provides d irectio n to the in teractio n s w ith o th ers. T his is done through the fusion of c u rre n t inform ation w ith the m em ory and w ill to continue the s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunity cycle if g e stu re s from o thers a re not congruent. Auton omy a lso provides the c ritic a l linkage points in changing larg e o rg an izatio n s. CHAPTER V CHANGE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES Introduction The em phasis in this ch ap ter is on organizational change ra th e r than individual change. Patterned in teractio n s betw een ego and a lte r often re s u lt in the developm ent of a form al organizational stru c tu re . T his stru c tu re rep la ce s the individual initiative req u ire d to develop the situational opportunities for in teractio n s with a lte r. The fo rm al organizational stru c tu re provides for the stru c tu re d in teractio n s, situational opportunities, and the sta tu s- ro le id e n tity --a ll within the fram ew ork of the consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle. T he individual can no longer significantly influence the in teractio n s with other a lte rs and m ust conform to organizational values. If conform ity is not congruent to his value sy stem , he m ay take one of four altern a tiv e m odes of behavior: ritu a lism , re tre a tis m , rebellion, or d e p artu re from organization. 148 149 T he different approaches to organizational change a re su m m arized and the P olyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change is p resen ted as an altern ativ e. A Public Personnel System s Model is developed to dem o nstrate the applicability of the Polyarchical System s Model to public personnel adm inistration. To su m m arize the m ain approaches to organizational change, a sim ple classificatio n schem a of open and closed sy stem s w ill be used. A closed system can be defined as one in which conflict from w ithin and w ithout is su p p re ssed by d ire c t o r in d ire ct control m echanism s. P rim ary values of a closed system a re m aintenance of its existing g o a l-sta te , with m inor adaptations of in te rn al s tru c tu re n e c e ssa ry to m aintain su rv iv al of its own identity. An open system can be defined as one in which value is placed on receiv in g c u rre n t inform ation from the environm ent, and changing in te rn al s tru c tu re s to m eet new req u ire m e n ts w hile conflict (deviancy) is to lerated . A pproaches to O rganizational Change C losed system m odels of organizational change C losed system m odels a ll have the sam e c h a ra c te ris tic - - that of m aintaining the re la tiv e sta b ility of the statu s-q u o . V ariation between the m odels is dependent on em phasis of com m unication 150 within and between the system and the environm ent, s tru c tu ra l inner arran g em en ts, em phasis on people and production values, m ethods of su p p ressio n o r adaptation to sh o rt- and lo n g -term conflict, and capability to undertake a learn in g p ro ce ss involving changing in tern al stru c tu re s as environm ental needs shift. The o v erall em phasis of closed sy stem behavior tends to be called "m o rp h o static"--w h e re p rim a ry focus is on m aintaining the statu s-q u o of existing organizational stru c tu re . If s tru c tu ra l changes occu r, em phasis is placed on organizational goals w ith m inor m odifications to fit ex tern al p re s s u re s . M ost of the closed sy stem m odels tend to follow the b u rea u cra tic form of organizational behavior e ith er d irec tly or in o th er s im ila r m odifications. The analysis and various p ro g ram s developed for organizational change of closed sy stem s m odels a re re s tric te d in th e ir own effectiveness by the p ersp ectiv e of the stru c tu re and boundaries of the o rg an iza tional system . T his problem is seen in lim itations of the ratio n al com prehensive approach to decision m aking d isc u sse d by Braybrooke and Lindblom : While the conventional view of problem solving is that m eans a re adjusted to ends (policies a re sought that w ill attain c ertain objectives), it is significant asp ect of policy analysis as actually p rac tic ed that, in c e rta in sp ecific w ays, the re v e rs e adjustm ent also tak es place. Since the re v e rs e adjustm ent is superim posed on the conventionally conceived adjustm ent of m eans to end, the net re s u lt is a 151 re c ip ro c a l relatio n sh ip between m eans and ends or between policies and values that is different from that envisaged in the synoptic ideal. ^ M orphostatic m echanical m odel. - -T h is approach views organizations as a ratio n al system w herein the whole is equal to the 2 sum of the p a rts . As defined under this m odel, the organization is capable of running forw ard and backw ard w hile p a rts a re identical and thus interchangeable for assem bly o r disassem bly. P arts of the sy stem a re never significantly m odified o r influenced by o th ers. E ach p a rt rem a in s in its place and continues to fulfill its original function tow ard the organizational goal. 3 Man is view ed as irra tio n a l, and the organizational quest is for ratio n al behavior. E m ployees a re viewed as in ert in stru m en ts p erform ing assigned ta s k s, and hum ans a re assum ed as given ra th e r 4 than as v a ria b le s. ^David Braybrooke and C h arles Lindblom . A S trategy of D ecision: Policy Evaluation as a Social P ro cess (London: C o llier - M acm illan, 1963), p. 93. 2 D eutsch, p. 27. 3 E dgar H. Schein, O rganizational Psychology (Inglewood C liffs, New Je rse y : P ren tice-H all, I n c ., 1965), p. 48. 4 Jam es G. M arch and H erb ert A. Simon, O rganizations (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, In c ., 1958), p. 29. 152 T hus, with organizational values assum ed to be p rim a rily econom ic (m axim ization of m arg in al cost and m arginal revenue), operational norm s take the form of em phasis on production, and the quest for ratio n al behavior in both organizations and individual behavior com m ences. Individuals a re assum ed to be p rim a rily m otivated by econom ic rew ard s. T his approach was accepted until the advent of the H awthorne stu d ies, when a new school of thought a ro s e -- its focus was on the happiness of the individual. ^ The m echanical m odel is based on the ow ner's "p ro p erty rig h ts" as the foundation for authority. T he owner d eterm ines goals and issu e s the resu ltin g p o licies, ru le s, reg u latio n s, and pro ced u res to attain them . T h ese goals a re usually sta te d in production te rm s of econom y and efficiency. E m phasis is placed on the form al s tru c tu re of the organization and the functions n e c e ssa ry to attain the goals. M anagerial task s focus on cen tralize d decision-m aking techniques re la te d to planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the functions of the organization (POSDCORB). Since the organization is viewed as a superb m echanical m achine w here organizational values and needs take j ^F. J. R o eth lisb erg er and W. J. Dickson, M anagem ent and j the W orker (C am bridge, M ass. : H arv ard U niversity P re ss , I 1939). | 153 precedence over individual values, organizational change is achieved through ad m in istrativ e fiat alone. M orphostatic biological m odel-individual— T his approach views an organization as a biological sy stem w here the whole exceeds the sum of the p a rts . T he in te rrelatio n sh ip s and effective n ess of the com ponents a re seen as a to tal system ra th e r than as com ponents w ithout influence on each other. T his m odel follow s the individual life cycle of m a n --b irth , grow th, m atu rity , decline, and death. Its only d irectio n is forw ard in tim e. The interdependency is e x p re sse d by the autom atic checks and balances which a ris e from w ithin the sy stem if one o r m o re com ponents a re rem oved, th reaten ed , o r dam aged. T his is g en erally e x p re ssed in exam ples re la tin g to health p roblem s, w here the n atu ral cycle brings m inor d istu rb an ces into equilibrium . C onflict (deviancy) is allowed only for a sh o rt period of tim e until the se lf-re g u la tin g m echanism s of the sy stem com e into action and bring the sy stem back to a p red eterm in ed s ta te of equilibrium . O rganizational em phasis is placed on satisfy in g the so cial needs of m an ra th e r than the econom ic needs. T he assum ptions underlying th is m odel a re founded on the H awthorne ex p erim en ts. E a rly in te re s ts w ere in fusing the m an- m achine m odels of behavior together in the form of work- 154 sim plification and psychological testin g to m atch the rig h t m an to the rig h t job. As m an and jobs becam e m o re com plex, the em phasis shifted from the m an-m achine m odels to the individual- organization approach. A rg y ris's "se lf-actu alizin g " m an would be a contem porary p a ra lle l, w here individual and organizational goals a re synthesized to m otivate m an. T his approach focuses on in teg ratin g job satisfactio n and production. T he Blake and Mouton "m an ag erial g rid " for organizational change fits into th is c lassificatio n because of its assum ptions and em phasis on the "people-production” 7 m atrix . It closely p a ra lle ls the m echanical m odel, because it takes the organizational values and s tru c tu re as given, and focuses on e ith e r changing the individual to in c re a se productivity, or rem oving b a rrie rs to the individual through job enlargem ent so that realizatio n of his tru e potential and higher productivity can be achieved. M orphostatic biological m o d e l-sp e c ie s. - -T h is approach to organizational change views the organization as an evolutionary C ris A rg y ris, In teg ratin g the Individual and the O rganization (New Y ork: John W iley and Sons, I n c ., 1964). 7 R obert R. Blake and Jane Srygley Mouton, C o rp o rate E xcellence T hrough G rid O rganization D evelopm ent (Houston, T exas: Gulf Publishing Com pany, 1968). 155 biological system of a sp ecies w here s tru c tu ra l change occurs over a longer period of tim e , with a higher form of life resu ltin g afte r each evolutionary life cycle. T he evolutionary life cycle is a v a ri able dependent on the sp e cie s. T he individual life cycles a re dependent upon s h o rt-te rm changes to cope with environm ental influences. H ow ever, in the evolutionary life cy cles, s tru c tu ra l change of the sp ecies is slow to adapt to new influences. The environm ental influences m ust be pattern ed and continuous so the sp ecies can change its stru c tu re . The sp ecies biological m odel has hom eostasis c h a ra c te r istic s tow ard sta b ility sim ila r to the individual biological approach. E xam ples of individual o r organizational change m odels a re found in the original em phasis placed on T -g ro u p and sen sitiv ity train in g se ssio n s. H ere individuals follow an u n stru ctu red learnin g p ro cess of unfreezing, input of se lf-id e n tity , and, hopefully, stab ility of the new identity by being accepted into the group. The h om eostasis c h a ra c te ristic is that group norm s a re m anipulated ag ain st the individual to obtain conform ity. In organizational change m o d els, organizational n o rm s, group n o rm s, and so cial p re s s u re s a re m anipulated against the individual to obtain conform ity. ^ 8 c . W right M ills. T he Sociological Im agination (New Y ork: ! G rove P re ss, 1961), p. 94. 156 Open system m odel of organizational change The open system approach to organizational change focuses on in te ra c tio n s, w hereby ego and a lte r adapt th eir behavior to m eet each o th e r's expectations and needs. T his m odel re q u ire s a so p h isticated m ethod of m apping com m unications and m otivational sy ste m s in o rd e r to in teg rate c u rre n t inform ation with m em ory and w ill, in o rd e r to give direction and m eaning to behavior during the in teractio n p ro ce ss with a lte rs . T he boundaries of the open system m odel a re not determ ined in the sam e m anner as they a re in the closed system s approach. In the open system m odel, boundaries a re determ ined by actions a lte r m akes in anticipating the g e stu res to be m ade by ego. In the closed sy stem s approach, boundaries a re determ ined by specific identifiable m eth o d s--u su ally in the form of who is on the payroll. T he open system p ersp ectiv e of boundaries g reatly i influences the resp o n siv en ess of the individual and the organization to client and environm ental needs. In the closed sy stem , the client fits the needs of the system and is p ro ce ssed through the system according to the sy ste m 's values and needs. The c lie n t's needs are ’ usually not sa tisfa c to rily m et, since organizational values a re the 1 p rim a ry c rite ria for decision m aking. However, in the open sy stem ; approach, the values and needs of the client becom e the p rim a ry j 157 c rite r ia for decision m aking--w hile organizational values becom e secondary. An open system m odel is com patible w ith the dem ocratic value sy stem of our society, w hereas the closed system m odel is an an tith esis to d em o cratic values, sh a red decision m aking, and client values. The secondary school sy stem is an exam ple w herein the clien t (students) values have trad itio n ally had very little , if any, effect on changing educational goals and techniques. In this sy stem , the client is p ro ce ssed through the system according to a p re determ ined content and tim e schedule upon which he has little o r no influence. The values of the open sy stem approach a re different from the closed sy stem approach in m ore ways than in ju st m eeting client needs. The em phasis on stru c tu re -e la b o ra tin g p ro c e sse s precludes the values of econom y and efficiency assum ed in the closed system m odel. The stru c tu re -e la b o ra tin g p ro c e ss indicates an em phasis on organizational learning, w hereby, in o rd e r to change stru c tu re s , the organization cannot be operating at 100 p e r cent of capacity. A to leran ce fo r e r r o r m ust be p re se n t so that individuals w ill be encouraged to c re a te new m odes of behavior as clients' needs change. D eutsch su m m arized this in the following passage: F rom a s tru c tu ra l point of view, the learn in g capacity of an organization is thus indicated by the am ount of its uncom m itted inner re s o u rc e s. By the extent of th e ir possible dissociation into d isc re te ite m s, and by the extent and 158 probable relev an ce of its fixed su b assem b lies available for new recom binations. Som ew here between the ex trem e subdivisions of item s in infant learning, and the rela tiv e rig id ity of a sm a ll ensem ble of larg e fixed su b assem b lies, th e re probably ex ists a region of optim um solutions com bining a high degree of ric h n e ss and o rig in a lity --th a t is, im p ro b ab ility -- of new p a tte rn s, with a high degree of speed in th e ir selectio n , and with a high probability of th e ir relev an ce to the challenges offered to the organization by its environm ent. 9 T he open sy stem approach is highly responsive to client needs because of its capacity and capability to dem obilize fixed su b assem b lies of re so u rc e s and im age re sp o n se s, and to c re a te new com binations to m eet changing needs. H ow ever, the closed system approach is re s tric te d in its c re ativ ity and its capability in changing to environm ental stim u li. T his is because the s tru c tu ra l rigidity, and com m itm ent of organizational values a re its p rim a ry c rite ria for decision m aking. M orphogenic system m odel.- - T h is approach views an organization as a dynam ic stru c tu re -e la b o ra tin g m odel undergoing a continuous p ro cess of adaptation to environm ental stim u li. The te rm "m orphogenesis" re fe rs to those p ro c e sse s which tend to elab o rate or change a sy ste m 's given form , stru c tu re , o r sta te . ^ 9 D eutsch, pp. 166-167. ^ W a lte r Buckley, Sociology and M odern System s T heory (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey : P ren tice-H all, Inc. , 1967), p. 58. 159 T he stru ctu re-am p lify in g and elaborating p ro c e ss is based on receiv in g positive feedback from one's behavior ra th e r than negative feedback. The positive feedback approach gives an insight into the stru c tu re -e la b o ra tin g p ro ce ss. Values a re not im m ediately placed on the s tru c tu ra l am plifying p ro cess until the fusion of the m em ory and w ill gives direction. T he m orphogenic m odel allows fo r conflict and change to be a p a rt of the in teractio n s of the organization. When values a re im puted to the change p ro c e ss, it then becom es e ith e r a positive o r negative input into the la rg e r sy stem --d ep en d en t on the m em ory and w ill of the individual or the organization in evaluating the inform ation being receiv ed from the behavior of the m orphogenic subsystem . T his approach is quite different from the m orphostatic sy stem s d iscu ssed e a rlie r which view as negative all inputs that vary from p re -e sta b lish e d conditions. The m orphogenic subsystem is a com ponent of a la rg e r sy stem and w ill not function in isolation as a self-contained m echanism . T his is because of the following situational re s tric tio n s: 1. When a m orphogenic subsystem adapts to its environm ent, it no longer functions as a component of the original sy stem , and th e re fo re c ea ses to exist. 160 2. The m orphogenic subsystem cannot function in isolation, since it cannot rem ove its m em ory and w ill which give d irectio n and m eaning to the stru c tu re -e la b o ra tin g p ro ce ss. How ever, tem p o rary sta te s of am nesia m ay o ccu r, at which tim e the m orphogenic subsystem functions in an im p aired m anner. If general am nesia o ccu rs, the m orphogenic subsystem takes on the values of the environm ent and begins to build another m em ory and w ill. It c ea ses to function as a com ponent of the original system . If p a rtia l am nesia o c cu rs, the behavior of the m orphogenic subsystem becom es highly e rra tic and it m ay o r m ay not be a subsystem of the original sy stem or of the environm ent. If stab ility is not m aintained w ith e ith er the in itial organizational system o r the environm ent, the individual o r the organization eventually becom es n eu ro tic and loses its identity and capability to develop a new m em ory and w ill from its ex p erien ces. The concept of "change" in a m orphogenic subsystem m ay m ean to bring stab ility to highly neurotic behavior, o r to induce s tr e s s to bring about a change in p re se n t behavior. T hus, the concepts of change and conflict have n eu tral value in a m orphogenic su b sy stem , until a m orphostatic system with its m em ory and w ill e stab lish es a value on the behavior and the inform ation inputs it is 161 receiving. T he m orphogenic concept, in itially developed by M agoroh M aruyam a and refined by W alter Buckley and K arl D eutsch, provides a foundation fo r a viable a ltern ativ e to sy stem failu re and so cial d isorganization inherent in all behavioral sy ste m s. Another o rg an i zational m odel is suggested which encom passes both the m orphostatic and m orphogenic c h a ra c te ristic s w hile sim ultaneously providing for the public in te re st values in the im plem entation of public policy. A m odel which provides this capability w as developed by R obert A. Dahl in his discussion of "P olyarchical D em ocracy."^ The syntheses of th ese concepts into a co n stru ct re s u lts in the Polyarchical System s M odel for O rganizational and Social Change. In tera ctio n ists and change. - -An in te rac tio n ists m odel of open sy stem s encom passes both the m orphostatic and m orphogenic definitions of system behavior during the in teractio n p ro ce ss. T h ere is an evolutionary cycle going from a sim ple to a m o re com plex form . Individual and organizational behavior follows a stru c tu re - elaborating p ro cess req u irin g m ore so p h isticated m ethods of com m unication, m apping, and value p re m ise s for evaluation of sy stem s. ^ R o b e r t A. Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic T heory (Chicago: T he U niversity of Chicago P re ss, 1956), pp. 63-89. 162 The m orphogenic subsystem m ust m anifest the following 12 c h a ra c te ristic s according to W alter Buckley: 1. Some d eg ree of p lasticity and sen sitiv ity o r tension v is-a -v is its environm ent such that it c a rrie s on a constant interchange with environm ental events, acting on and re a c tin g to them . 2. Some so u rc e of m echanism providing for variety, to act as a potential pool of adaptive v ariab ility to m eet the problem of m apping new o r m o re detailed v ariety and c o n strain ts in a changeable environm ent. 3. A se t of se lectiv e c rite ria o r m echanism s against which the "v a rie ty pool” m ay be sifted into two c a m p s--th o se v ariatio n s which m o re closely m ap the environm ent and those which do not. 4. An arran g em en t for p re se rv in g and o r propagating th ese su ccessfu l m appings. A P olyarchical System s M odel for O rganizational and Social Change An in teg rativ e approach to analysis of com plex organizations is suggested to provide a fram ew ork for m aking the th eo retical 12 Buckley, Sociology and M odern System s T h eo ry , p. 63. 163 p re m ise s (autonom y and polyarchy) and p e rsp ectiv es (consensus: deviancy and conform ity) operational. E lem ents of the m odel T his m odel m ay be view ed as being com posed of two basic elem en ts: (1) in te rac tio n s with individuals, groups, and so c ietie s; and (2) re s o u rc e s. T h ese two elem ents a re assum ed to be inherent in all situations w here an organization com es into being. In te ra c tio n s. - -T he concept of in teractio n s is p ervasive in the creatio n of all so cial sy ste m s, for without in teractio n s with o th e rs, th e re would be no so cial sy stem . The te rm interactions" includes: conflict and change; decision m aking; events; com m unica tion and m otivation; and tim e. R e so u rc e s. - -T h e te rm " re s o u rc e s" re p re se n ts the m a te ria l as w ell as the in tellectu al elem ents th at a re needed by the so cial sy stem . T h ese can vary from econom ic to technological, age, av erag e w ork w eek, tim e , tra n sp o rta tio n , language, school attendance, etc. T his m odel is e x p re ssed in F ig u re 14. 164 INTERACTIONS Low HlGN N i g h RESOURCES Low F ig. 14. - -E le m e n ts of the P olyarchical S ystem s Model E xplanation of the m odel C ell l .--W h e n an individual, organization, o r a social sy stem has low in teractio n s and high re s o u rc e s , its ab ility to influence the environm ent is re la tiv e ly m inor. T he closed sy stem m odel (b u rea u cra tic ) is an exam ple of organizations found in this c e ll. T h ese organizations have high re s o u rc e s , but the only rela tio n sh ip to the environm ent is dependent upon th e ir output of goods o r se rv ic e s. If th e re is no feedback m echanism from th e ir environm ent, th e re w ill be a tendency to m ake blind decisions and com m itm ents due to lack of knowledge about clien t n e ed s. The environm ent is defined from th e p e rsp e c tiv e of o rg an izatio n al values and needs and not those of the clien t. ! j C e l l 1 H i g h R e s o u r c e s Low I n t e r a c t i o n s CCLL 2 H i o h R e s o u r c e s H i g h I n t e r a c t i o n s C e l l 3 Low R e s o u r c e s Lo w I n t e r a c t i o n s C e l l > » Low R e s o u r c e s H i g h I n t e r a c t i o n s 165 C ell 2. --In th is cell the individual, organization, and the so cial system have high re s o u rc e s and high in teractio n s with th e ir environm ent. T his could be called a power position, since the potential for influencing the environm ent is fa r g re a te r than in other positions. C ell 3. - -T h is cell is c h a ra c te riz e d by low re so u rc e s and low in teractio n s. The ability of an individual o r organization to function as a system is v ery low, as is its influence. T his is generally a very poor position to be in. Many so c ietie s can be found in th is position throughout the w orld. How e v e r, this position m ay be m o re valuable than altern ativ e positions when one is seeking s tra te g ic com m itm ents from m ore powerful g ro u p s. C ell 4. - -T h is cell is c h a ra c te riz e d by high in teractio n s but low re s o u rc e s. Again, the effectiveness of this position is very doubtful until new re s o u rc e s a re acquired o r value of existing re so u rc e s a re in cre ased by environm ental p re s s u re s . High in te r actions them selves m ay be viewed as a re so u rc e . In teractio n m odel Instead of viewing the cells as being m utually exclusive positions, one can change the four positions into horizontal and v e rtic a l ax es, with d eg rees of gradation on each axis. T his is helpful in show ing the overlapping a sp ects of the closed and open sy ste m as they function in te rm itten tly and interchangeably w ithin and betw een su b sy stem s and the la rg e r so cial sy stem s (F ig u re 15). H i g h Re s o u r c e s Low IN T E R A C T IO N S Low Re s o u r c e s Hich I n t e r a c t i o n s F ig. 1 5 .--In te ra c tio n m odel: elem ents of the Polyarchical S ystem s M odel. T h e o re tic a l p re m ise s j T h e o re tic a l p re m ise s a re built on two concepts of polyarchy | ; and autonom y. Autonomy provides the c ritic a l points of fusion of | i c u rre n t inform ation with m em ory and w ill. Polyarchy provides fo r \ 167 a ltern a tiv e s to the b u reau cratic form of organization in im plem enting public policy. The concept of polyarchy also provides the feasib ility of applying this m odel to c u rre n t organizations, since altern ativ e m odels of h iera rch y , bargaining, and the m ark e t system a re congruent to the polyarchical sy stem s approach. T h eo re tica l p ersp ectiv es T he consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle provides the im plem entation of the th eo re tic al p re m ise s to com plex organizations. T he study of consensus and behavior in individuals and organizations is facilitated by the use of ro le an aly sis. When b u reau cratizatio n of the in teractio n p ro cess o ccu rs, the focus leaves the individual cycle of consensus: deviancy and conform ity and shifts to closed and open sy stem s analyses of organizational behavior. T he m odel T his m odel has two elem ents of in teractio n and re s o u rc e s. W ithin this m atrix , a h ie ra rc h ic a l-m u ltip le sy stem s m odel of organizational behavior functions. E ach of th ese h iera rch ica l- m ultiple sy stem s m odels has a po ly arch ical unit at th e ir c ritic a l points of im pact with o th ers. The autonom y of the system is d eterm ined at th ese c ritic a l points of linkage w ith other polyarchical sy ste m s. In addition, the inform ation p ro ce ssin g sy stem s function 168 at th ese sam e points. The organizational change m odel focuses on changing the autonom ous polyarchical linkages ra th e r than on changing all of the com ponents of the system (F ig u re 16). D efinition of a polyarchy Once the autonom ous polyarchical linkages a re located, the key elem ent in tying this system together is the com m unication p ro c e ss n e c e ssa ry in establishing ro le consensus and in adm inis te rin g sanctions to place the system into m otion tow ard som e d e sire d direction. The polyarchical lead er m ust becom e fa m ilia r w ith the p ro c e sse s of different sty les of lea d ersh ip involving a ltern a tiv e s to the trad itio n al approaches. A definition of polyarchy is n e c e ssa ry before proceeding to place the system into m otion. A polyarchy is defined as: "A p ro c e ss, som etim es called 13 dem ocracy, in which n o n -lead ers control le a d e rs ." Dahl defined polyarchical dem ocracy as: "A political sy stem in which the follow ing 14 conditions ex ist to a rela tiv e ly high degree": D uring the voting period: 1. E very m em ber of the organization p e rfo rm s the a cts we a ssu m e to constitute an ex p ressio n of p refe ren c e am ong the scheduled a lte rn a tiv e s, e. g . , voting. 2. In tabulating th ese ex p ressio n s (votes), the w eight assigned to the choice of each individual is identical. 13 Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic T h eo ry , p. 23. 14 Dahl, P olitics, E conom ics, and W elfare, p. 84. H IG H RESOURCES INTERACTIONS INTERACTIONS ^ LO W RESOURCES F ig . 1 6 . P o ly a r c h ic a l S y ste m s M odel fo r O rg a n iz a tio n a l and S o cial C hange. 170 3. The a ltern a tiv e with the g re a te s t num ber of votes is d e clare d the winning choice. D uring the prevoting period: 4. Any m em b er who p e rc eiv e s a s e t of a lte rn a tiv e s, at le a st one of which he re g a rd s as p re fe ra b le to any of the a lte rn a tiv e s p resen tly scheduled, can in s e rt his p re fe rre d a ltern a tiv e (s) am ong those scheduled for voting. 5. All individuals p o sse ss identical inform ation about the a lte rn a tiv e s . D uring the postvoting period: 6. A lternatives (lead ers or policies) w ith the g re a te st num ber of votes displace any a lte rn a tiv e s (lead ers o r policies) w ith few er votes. 7. The o rd e rs of elected officials a re executed. D uring the in te re le c tio n stage: 8.1 E ith er all in te rele ctio n decisions a re subordinate or executory to those a rriv e d at during the election stage; i. e . , electio n s a re in a sen se controlling. 8. 2 O r new decisions during the in te rele ctio n period a re governed by the preceding seven conditions, operating, how ever, under ra th e r different institutional circ u m sta n ce s. 8. 3 O r both. C lassificatio n of polyarchies In o rd e r to d eterm in e when a polyarchy o c cu rs, Dahl assigned a sc a le of values fo r each of the conditions liste d , based on the frequency of th e ir actio n s, on a sc a le from 0 to 1 (o r 0 to 100). T his can be based on p a st o r expected freq u en cies. ^ Dahl p resen te d a possible c la ssifica tio n of polyarchies as 15Ibid. , p. 85. 171 1. Polyarchies a re defined as organizations in which all eight conditions a re scaled at values equal to o r g re a te r than 0. 5. 1.1 E g alita ria n polyarchies a re defined as polyarchies in which all eight conditions a re scaled at values equal to o r g re a te r than 0. 5. 1. 2 N o n -eg alitarian polyarchies a re defined as all other p o ly arc h ie s. 2. H ie ra rc h ie s a re defined as organizations in which all eight conditions a re scaled at values le ss than 0. 5 2.1 O ligarchies a re defined as h ie ra rc h ie s in which som e conditions a re scaled at values equal to or g re a te r than 0 .2 5 . 2. 2 D ictatorships a re defined as h ie ra rc h ie s in which no conditions a re scaled at values equal to or g re a te r than 0.25. 3. M ixed politics a re defined as the resid u al, i. e . , organ izatio n s, in which at le a st one condition is scaled at a value g re a te r than o r equal to 0. 5, and at le a st one at a value le ss than 0. 5. T he p ro ce ss of agreem ent in polyarchical dem ocracy is com patible with the definition of ro le consensus estab lish ed e a rlie r. T hat is , at le a st the m ajo rity of the counter-positions m ust a rriv e at the sam e perceived consensus for the behavior of the individual. T he voting re fe rre d to by Dahl in the p ro cess of achieving a polyarchical form of organizational dem ocracy is a form of psychological co n tract o r ro le consensus ra th e r than the trad itio n al ballot box m ethod p rev alen t in w estern d em o cracies. 16Ibid. , p. 87. 172 Public Personnel System s T he m anagem ent of public personnel sy ste m s has undergone a trem endous change from the trad itio n al approach em phasizing m aintenance of the statu s-q u o and a stab le b u reaucracy, to that of a viable organization capable not only of changing itse lf, but a lso of becom ing an instrum ent of so cial change in im plem enting public policy. Public personnel sy stem s m odel A Polyarchical S ystem s M odel for public personnel adm in istra tio n is being proposed as a new fram e of re fe re n c e for the ad m in istrato r. T his w ill provide for an integration of the th eo re tic al p rem ise s (polyarchy and autonomy) and p ersp ectiv es (co n sen su s: deviancy and conform ity) to c u rre n t problem s in public personnel ad m in istratio n (F ig u re 17). A nalysis of the personnel su b sy stem s m odel C ell 1, m orphostatic (m echanical) .- - C e ll 1 re p re se n ts the m orphostatic m odel re la te d to the trad itio n al approach to personnel adm inistration. T he " m e rit system " as leg islate d value codified into law and the b u reau cratic p ro ced u res developed to attain this value a re the m ost prom inent exam ples. 173 vsy/*-** ‘ f&fjFJiA w i Mo r p h o s t a t i c Mechanical A r e a a m w t f m m 1 3 I/p-', CCLL 3 C ELL 2 Area B Mo r p h o - Static B lO L O d lC A L Spccies Mo r p h o s t a t i c B i o l o g i c a l I n d i v i d u a l M f M C e l l 4 Mo r p h o o c n i c F ig. 17. - -P o ly arch ical S ystem s M odel fo r Public P erson nel A dm inistration. T he b u re a u c ra tic and C ivil S erv ice g riev an ce p ro ced u res a re a lso in th is cell. T he C ivil S erv ice p ro ced u res a re c la ssifie d in this cell through the f ir s t two ste p s, sin ce the b u reau cracy a d m in iste rs it. At ste p th re e o r above, the C ivil S ervice grievan ce p ro ced u re sh ifts to C ell 3 when the C ivil S erv ice C om m ission conducts h earin g s. 174 C ell 2, m o rp h o static (sin g u lar-b io lo g ical). - -C e ll 2 re p re se n ts the personnel functions that follow the life cycle of em ployees and specific p ro je c ts. T his cycle follows the p attern of birth , grow th, m atu rity , decline, and death. T he personnel functions re la te d to this cycle include re c ru itm e n t, m otivation, sk ill develop m ent, fringe benefits, su p e rv iso ry developm ent p ro g ram s, and term ination. C ell 3, m o rp h o static (sp ecies-b io lo g ical) .- - T h is cell re p re se n ts the C ivil S ervice C om m ission. It in te ra c ts with all th re e cells and acts as a stab ilizatio n ro le in the m orphogenic m odel (C ell 4) and as very slow change m odel on C ells 1 and 2 as it slow ly evolves to a higher s ta te (hopefully) than its previous form . The Em ployee R elations C om m ission can be viewed as an extension of the C ivil S ervice C om m ission. T he C ivil S ervice C om m issions w ill not be destroyed by the advent of collective bargaining, since they a re reg a rd ed as an institution to prevent the spoils sy stem . However, th e ir p resen t form and s tru c tu re w ill change to m eet the new dem ands for effective p erfo rm an ce placed upon them by the em ployee organ izations. C ell 4, m orphogenic. - -T h is c ell re p re s e n ts new and often s tre s s fu l inputs into the o th er c e lls in the personnel sy stem . Such item s as collective bargaining and a negotiated grievance procedure 175 in th e ir in itial stag es would be placed h ere. P rogram budgeting and m anagem ent developm ent would also be h ere. T his cell re c e iv e s the in itial im pact of new changes from the environm ent, since a ll of the oth er cells re je c te d this input. Once th is cell has obtained a form of sta b ility by routinization of the conflict, the function re la te d to specific v ariab les a re then tra n s fe rre d to e ith e r C ells 1 o r 2 in A reas B o r C. A rea A. - -T h is is a ro le overlay rep re se n tin g the in te r dependency of expectations and functions pertaining to re c ru itm e n t and prom otion. T his overlay occurs when the job o r position d escrip tio n is specified by the b u reau cracy , and the p ro ced u res of the m e rit system a re actually followed. T his overlay has an a re a fo r adjustm ent of expectations (redefinition of ro le consensus) between C ells 1 and 2. A rea B. - - T his ro le o verlay is between C ells 1 and 4 and is p rim a rily concerned w ith the in te rp retatio n of contractual a g re e m ents and the m aintenance of the negotiated grievance pro ced u re, once the te s t c ase s for policy im plem entation have been challenged and p ro c e sse d through the sy stem . T his a re a a lso acts as a stab ilizin g device on the m orphogenic system in Cell 4. A rea C . - -T h is ro le overlay betw een C ells 1 and 4 is p rim a rily concerned w ith the p ro ce ss of im plem enting a negotiated 176 grievance p ro ced u re as it re la te s to personnel p ra c tic e s reg ard in g tra n s fe r, prom otion, job assig n m en ts, and term in atio n of personnel. C ell 1, lin k ag es. - - Linkage to the environm ents is generally through leg islativ e acts o r the judicial system (i. e . , g rievances that go to co u rt for a decision). O therw ise, alm o st a ll o th er linkages a re in tern ally w ithin the sy stem . Cell 2, lin k ag es. - - Linkage in the form of re c ru itm e n t and term in atio n of personnel with the environm ent. In tern al linkages p rim a rily concerned w ith tra n s fe r, prom otion, m otivation, com m uni cation w ith em ployees, health and w elfare, and fringe benefits. C ell 3, lin k ag es.- - T h e linkages indicated a re in te rn al and e x tern al. Internal linkages a re concerned w ith tw o-w ay com m unica tion between the C ivil S ervice C om m ission and the a d m in istra to rs in the other th re e c e lls. E x tern al linkage re p re se n ts the political influence on this cell. C ell 4, lin k ag es. - - Linkage is p rim a rily concerned with collective bargaining, equal em ploym ent p ra c tic e s p ertain in g to m in o rity p ersonnel, urban and so cial problem s as re la te d to personnel p ra c tic e s , and a negotiated grievance p rocedure. . . 177 C onflict R esolution M echanism s in Public P ersonnel A dm inistration C onflict w ithin the individual is inherent in the se a rc h for a new sta te of being which takes place when sta tu s- ro le identity is fused with situational opportunities. If the individual does not rea ch his in tern al goal of se lf-id en tity , then fru stra tio n re s u lts . How ever, when a second person blocks a c c e ss to his goal, and this is identi fiable to ego, then conflict e x ists. Johan Galtung defined conflict in the following m anner: An a ctio n -sy stem is sa id to be in conflict if the system has two o r m o re incom patible g o a l-sta te s. T hus, conflict is a pro p erty of an a ctio n -sy stem . By the la tte r term we m ean a system of a c to rs in the W eber-P arsons sen se. ^ When in teractio n becom es b u reau cratized , this system needs to e stab lish som e form of c o n flict-reso lu tio n m echanism w ithin and betw een its com ponents, in o rd e r to m aintain its purpose. Conflict w ill be viewed from the operative levels within an o rganiza tion, even though the so u rc e of s tra in m ay lie w ithin individuals, in em ployee organizations, in political and so cial p re s s u re s , o r in environm ental so u rc es. C onflict reso lu tio n m echanism s in the public se c to r a re quite different from those in b u siness organizations. Business ^G altung, p. 348. 178 organizations have estab lish ed th e ir conflict resolution m echanism s on the co rn ersto n e of p ro p erty rig h ts , and th is has been extended into the m anagem ent rig h ts clauses in collective bargaining a g re e m ents. The value p rem ises in public adm inistration a re quite different from those in p riv ate organizations. T hese value p re m ise s include public in te re st, as w ell as the m issio n of the agency, as the c rite r ia fo r decision m aking in public organizations. A fram e of refe ren c e com patible with the b ro ad er concepts of conflict resolution is n e ce ssa ry in o rd e r to place into p ersp ectiv e sp ecific a re a s of conflict in public organizations reg ard in g em ployee rela tio n s. T h ere a re no pro p erty rig h ts o r m anagem ent rig h ts clau ses as in the p riv ate se c to r. However, th e re is the m ission of the agency as the su b stitu te for the m anagem ent rig h ts clause; and, through court in terp retatio n s in the p riv ate se c to r, the m anagem ent re s e rv e d rig h ts philosophy sta te s that all item s not m entioned in the agreem ent a re the rig h ts of m anagem ent. Johan Galtung su m m arized the m eaning of conflict reso lu tio n as (1) a decision as to who is the w inner and who is the lo se r and what the future distribution of value sh all be, (2) adm inistration of the d istrib u tio n of value, and (3) definition of the conflict as term in ated . ^ 1 R Ib id ., p. 354. 179 T he com ponents of a conflict reso lu tio n m echanism includes decision, sanction, and term in atio n sy ste m s. T he decisio n -m ak in g sy stem includes a definition of who m akes which decisions and at w hat lev els. Sanctions a re the m o tiv ato r o r enforcem ent techniques to obtain conform ity to the decision. T erm in atio n points e sta b lish the fo rm al end of the conflict in sh o rt-ru n te rm s only. L atent conflict m ay re s u lt to one o r both p a rtie s as a re s u lt of the o rig in al decision o r sanctions to obtain conform ity. T he m odel fo r an aly sis of conflict developed by Johan 19 G altung is used fo r this d iscu ssio n (F ig u re 18). I m d i v i o u a l M V O . C o l l e c t i v e F ig. 18. - -M odel of conflict an aly sis TYPES OF ACTION-SYSTEMS IN COWLICT CONFLICT IN T R A -ST ST C M I n TE R -SY ST E M C e l l 1 I n t r a - p e r s o n a l C e l l 2 I n t e r - p e r s o n a l C e l l 3 I n t r a - o a o u p C e l l fc IN TCR -C R O U P 19Ib id ., p. 348. 180 Conflict resolution by political sy stem s One channel available to em ployees in solving grievances is a p riv ate o r public hearing before elected officials. T his rig h t is a re s u lt of the L loyd-L aF ollette Act of 1911, prohibiting the gag ru le im posed by p resid en tia l d irec tiv e on fed eral em ployees to appear before C ongress. (T his would be C ell 2 of the conflict reso lu tio n m odel d iscu ssed e a r l i e r .) An em ployee has access to this m odel re g a rd le ss of other sy ste m s th at m ay be c re a te d to reso lv e em ployer- em ployee co n flicts. Conflict reso lu tio n by Civil S erv ice C om m ission J.n som e governm ental agencies a Civil S ervice procedure is established, w herein an agrieved em ployee files a grievance with the Civil S ervice C om m ission. The C om m ission subsequently holds a hearing and m akes a decision. The C om m ission is appointed by the elected officials and usually re p re se n ts the values of the elected officials and the o rgani zation ra th e r than those of the em ployees o r of m inority groups. T he C om m ission acts as an a rb itra to r in disputes and as a reg u la to r on pro ced u res pertaining to personnel p ra c tic e s. (C ell 2 would be the p rim a ry location for this m odel, since the individual em ployee usually re p re se n ts him self before the C om m ission. However, 181 w here an em ployee asso ciatio n is p re se n t, C ell 3 would be the ap p ro p riate conflict reso lu tio n m o d e l.) Conflict reso lu tio n by organizational g riev an ce p ro ced u re T his m ethod functions w here the C ivil Service C om m ission form is not p resen t. The Chief A dm inistrative O fficer c re a te s a p ro ced u re by ad m in istrativ e fiat. He a lso m akes the final decision in the sequence of p ro ced u res. (C ell 2 is the p rim a ry m ode-- w herein the individual em ployee files his grievance. C ell 3 m ay occasionally be utilized if an em ployee asso ciatio n is p re s e n t.) The organizational m odel is quite often called the m e rit sy stem by the m em b ers of the h iera rch y , and th is confuses the em ployee. T h ere a re usually th re e ste p s to the b u reau cratic grievance p rocedure, w ith sim ultaneous em phasis on the open door policy. T his m odel is in itially b e n ev o len t-p atern alistic, and eventually benevolent-exploitative in the decision-m aking c rite ria . C onflict resolution by judicial sy stem s T his approach involves a th ird p arty which e n te rs into the decision-m aking p ro cess at the re q u e st of one of the agrieved. Its decisions a re binding on both p a rtie s and enforceable in the c o u rts. O riginally, m ost grievances w ere filed by individuals fo r job 182 re in sta te m e n ts. H ow ever, w ith the advent of active em ployee re p re se n ta tio n , em ployee organizations a re now filing su its against the b u reau cracy , C ivil S erv ice C om m ission, and elected officials. Use of the ju d icial sy stem re s u lts in an a d v e rsa ry p ro ce ss between the em ployer and em ployee. (C ell 3 of the conflict reso lu tio n m odel is the m o st a p p ro p ria te location to c la ssify this m eth o d .) C onflict reso lu tio n by negotiated grievance p ro ced u re T he negotiated grievance procedure is a re s u lt of a collective bargaining agreem en t, w herein the behavior of all p a rtie s is specified. An individual em ployee m ay file a grievance without the approval of the em ployee organization. H ow ever, the em ployee organization has the rig h t to be p re se n t in all discu ssio n s to m ake su re the rig h ts of the em ployee organization a re not being jeopardized by the settlem en t. (C ell 3 is the ap p ro p riate m odel for conflict reso lu tio n , sin ce in m ost in stan ces it involves in terg ro u p c o n flic t.) C hapter Sum m ary In this ch ap ter a c lassificatio n schem a has been p resen ted , with two elem ents of open and closed sy ste m s. W ithin th ese two c la ssifica tio n s the different approaches to organizational change have i been su m m arized into four groups: (1) m o rp h o static-m ech an ical, (2) m orphostatic- biological m odel (individual), (3) m orphostatic- biological m odel (sp ecies), and (4) the m orphogenic sy stem s m odel. The change p ro c e ss is dependent upon in teractio n to c a rry out the consensus: deviancy and conform ity cycle. T he concept of in teractio n is perv asiv e to all sy stem s and becom es one of the elem ents of the Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. A P olyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change was developed as a syn th esis of both the closed and open sy ste m s m odels to organizational change with the addition of the following: 1. E lem ents of the m odel being in teractio n and re s o u rc e s. 2. Autonomy: The c ritic a l linkages in the organiza tion, located w here c u rre n t inform ation is fused with the m em o ry and w ill, a re the points at which the organizational or so c ial change m odel is im plem ented. 3. Polyarchy: O rganizations a re viewed as polyarchies at the points of autonom y. T hus, a ltern a tiv e s for im plem enting public policy m ay be in the form of bargaining, h iera rch y , polyarchy, o r the m ark et 184 sy stem . T he Polyarchical System s Model is com patible w ith other c u rre n t approaches, sin ce it encom passes these m odels as one of its a ltern a tiv e s. H ow ever, the stra te g ie s and techniques for im plem ent ing public policy a re quite different when it com es to changing public o rg an izatio n s. A Polyarchical System s M odel to public personnel adm in istra tio n problem s and issu e s has been p resen ted to dem onstrate its applicability to c u rre n t a d m in istrativ e p ra c tic e s. CHAPTER VI RESEARCH FINDINGS M ajor Hypotheses Introduction: (control question) T he m ajo r hypotheses of this re s e a rc h w ere developed and teste d as dependent v ariab les of a control question concerning the legitim acy of expectations for the focal p o sitio n 's behavior (Appendix A). T he following questions w ere asked reg ard in g su p e rv iso ry behavior in personnel p rac tic es and grievance resolution: D ecision expected? Do they have a rig h t to expect this of you? W hat type of com m unication is used to notify you? T o what extent do they expect you to conform to th e ir w ishes? W hat is the decision you actually make? W hat rew ard s a n d /o r penalties a re used to influence your decision? 186 T he m ajo r hypotheses a re concerned w ith w hether o r not a d ifference ex ists between decision expected and decision actually m ade for those who accept the expectations of the co unter-positions a s leg itim ate. Null hypotheses w ere not developed nor teste d for those who responded (to the legitim acy question) "no" o r "don't know ." T hose focal positions who accepted the expectations from the cou n ter-p o sitio n s as legitim ate re p re se n t 60.8 per cent of the sam ple for personnel p ra c tic e s and 60.1 p e r cent for grievance reso lu tio n . The stan d ard deviations a re 15.49 and 17.18, re s p e c tively, with v ariatio n s dependent upon levels of supervision and sp ecific co u n ter-p o sitio n s. In su p e rv iso ry level th re e the stan d ard deviation is la rg e r fo r both personnel p rac tic es and grievance resolution. T his indicates a g re a te r d isp ersio n in those counter-positions accepted as legitim ate. The "no" resp o n se, in answ er to the question of the legitim acy of co u n ter-p o sitio n s' expectations for behavior, r e p r e sen ts 15. 6 per cent of the sam ple questioned in personnel p ra c tic e s, and 14. 2 p e r cent fo r grievance reso lu tio n . Standard deviations a re 6.48 and 7. 21, resp ectiv ely . T he th ird level of supervision has the low est sta n d ard deviation fo r both personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance 187 reso lu tio n . T his indicates a very narrow d isp ersio n of resp o n ses and a definite position as to legitim acy. T he "don’t know" resp o n se to the legitim acy question re p re s e n ts 24. 0 p e r cent of the sam ple for personnel p ra c tic e s, and 25. 8 p e r cent for grievances. Standard deviations a re 12.12 and 14.21, resp ectiv ely . The th ird level of su p erv isio n has the g re a te st v ariatio n in the stan d ard for both personnel p ra c tic e s and g riev an ces, which indicates the g re a te st a re a for am biguity in establishm ent of legitim acy is at th is level. A conflict zone ex ists reg a rd in g rig h ts and obligations between focal positions and co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T his is found by m atching control group 1 to the m a s te r sam ple. The focal positions believe they have a g re a te r leg itim ate claim (rig h ts) on the counter positions than the cou n ter-p o sitio n s a re w illing to give them . T his conflict av erag es 23. 5 p er cent fo r personnel p rac tic es and 26. 6 per cent fo r grievance resolution. Standard deviations a re 11. 36 and 9 .9 0 , resp ectiv ely . A conflict zone between control group 2 and counter positions reg ard in g rig h ts and obligations av erag es 18.1 p e r cent fo r personnel p ra c tic e s and 15.4 p e r cent fo r grievance resolution. C ontrol group 2 re p re se n ts those with the le a st am ount of legitim acy in the organization--em ployee organizations. The average legitim acy 188 for em ployee organizations is 48. 58 per cent in personnel p rac tic es and 50. 71 p er cent in g riev an ces. Standard deviations a re 3 .1 6 and 2 .2 4 , resp ectiv ely . C ontrol group 2 believes that they have a leg itim ate claim on the decision outcom e of counter-positions 66. 67 p e r cent of the tim e fo r personnel p ra c tic e s and 66. 06 p e r cent for g riev an ces. S tandard deviations a re 15.94 and 7 .2 1 , resp ectiv ely (see T able 2). M a ste r sam ple H ypothesis 1: T h e re is no difference in m anagerial decision m aking in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance resolution between decision expected and decision actually m ade for legitim ate co u n ter-p o sitio n s significant at the .0 5 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate that fo r all su p erv iso ry levels and a ll co u n ter-p o sitio n s th e re is re la tiv e ly no difference betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade for those who accept expectations from co u n ter-p o sitio n s as legitim ate. T his is sig nificant at the . 01 level for both personnel p rac tic es and grievance reso lu tio n fo r the sam p le as a whole. When the data a re analyzed in rela tio n to su p erv iso ry levels and sp ecific c o u n ter-p o sitio n s, a ll a re significant at the .01 level except the follow ing, which a re significant at the .0 5 level: P ersonnel p ra c tic e s: Subordinates at su p e rv iso ry level three* 189 TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATIONS (ALL SAMPLE GROUPS) Ma s t e r S a m p l c N T o t a l N1 S a m p l c Me a n YES * N To t a l S a m p l e S t o . De v . (T NO N 2 * N S a m p l e To t a l Me a n S a m p l e S t o . Oe v . <r OON* N3 S a m p l e Me a n T K N O W * N S t o . T o t a l D e v . S a m p l e C T ' PERSONNEL P r A C T IC F S A l l Le v e l s 4 2 3 2 5 7 6o«8 1 5 M 66 15.6 6 . 4 8 1 0 0 2 4 . 0 1 2 . 1 2 Le v e l On e 1 7 2 9 5 5 5 - 0 1 5 . “ 3 30 17 .* + 6.5 6 . 4 8 2 6 . 9 1 1 . 5 3 L e v e l Tw o 1 3 0 S 3 6 3 . 9 15.88 1 9 1 * 1 .5 6 . 3 3 28 21.6 1 3 . 5 3 Le v e l T h r e e 1 2 1 69 5 7 . 6 1 3 . 9 5 i 4 1 1 . 4 3 . 8 7 3 8 31.0 i 9. i l G r i e v a n c e s Al l Le v e l s * 1 2 3 2 5 4 60.1 17.18 60 1 4 . 2 7 - 2 1 109 2 5 . 8 1 4 . 2 1 Le v e l On e 1 7 2 9 3 5 4 . 4 16. 61• 2 7 1 5 . 6 6.16 5 2 30.0 1 5 . 5 2 Le v e l T wo 130 82 6 2 . 5 16.85 18 1 3 . 8 7.68 3 1 2 3 . 7 1 3 . 7 5 Le v e l T h r e e 1 2 1 60 4 9 . 2 2 3 - 7 7 1 2 10.0 3 . 8 7 49 4 o , 8 2 3 . 5 0 Control Groin- One PcrsoMNRi Pr a c t i c e s A l l L c v e l s 3 7 3 » 8 3 . 1 11.96 2 . 5 6 . 5 5 5.00 **•5 1 2 . 5 5 7 . 1 4 G r i e v a n c e s Al l L e v e l s 3 6 3 1 86.11 11.00 1.6 5.10 2.83 4 11.22 8 . 7 2 C o n t r o l Gr o u p T wo Perso n n e l Pr a c t i c e s Al l l e v e l s 1 5 1 0 66.60 1 5 - 9 4 1 0 0 0 5 32.80 1 5 . 4 3 G r i e v a n c e s Al l Le v e l s 1 5 10 66.00 7 - 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 4 . 0 0 7 . 1 4 190 G rievance reso lu tio n : S u p erv iso rs outside of th e ir departm ent a t su p e rv iso ry level th re e . Subordinates at su p e rv iso ry level th ree . The following co u n ter-p o sitio n s did not obtain a c h i-sq u a re w ithin the . 05 level of significance in a n in e-c ell table. However, c lo se r exam ination shows that the observed frequency d istributions g en erally c en ter in the decision-expected and decision-m ade c ells. P ersonnel p ra c tic e s: O ther em ployee organizations at su p e rv iso ry levels two and th ree ; 79 per cent have no conflict at level two, and 86 p e r cent at level th ree . G rievance reso lu tio n : P rofessional so ciety at su p e rv iso ry level th ree ; 81 p e r cent of the sam ple has no conflict. Los A ngeles County Em ployees A ssociation at su p e rv iso ry level th ree ; 68 p e r cent have no conflict. O ther em ployee organizations at su p e rv iso ry levels tow and th ree ; 80 p er cent have no conflict at level two; and 82 p e r cent at level th ree. The null hypothesis is accepted as valid, and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is re je c te d as false. T h ere is no difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n fo r leg itim ate co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T his is significant at the .01 level fo r all co u n ter-p o sitio n s as a whole. The decision expected equals the decision m ade in personnel p ra c tic e s 191 84 p e r cent of the tim e, w hile this occu rs 85 p er cent of the tim e in grievance reso lu tio n (se e T able 3). C ontrol group 1 H ypothesis 2: T h e re is no difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade for counter- positions as perceiv ed by the focal positions, significant at the . 05 lev el--g iv en the control question legitim acy of expectation. C ontrol group 1 is a n o n -clu stered and n o n -stra tifie d random sam ple of the m a s te r sam ple. The re s e a rc h indicates that for the e n tire sam ple, th e re is a significant relatio n sh ip at the . 01 level for both personnel p ra c tic e s and griev an ces. H ow ever, a consensus could not be estab lish ed fo r a m ajo rity of the co u n ter positions, and the null hypothesis is re je c te d as false. The re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T h e re is a difference betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade by c o u n ter-p o sitio n s, as p erceiv ed by the focal positions. The focal positions p erceiv e th e re is no conflict betw een decision expected and decision m ade for personnel p ra c tic e s 52 p er cent of sam ple, and 58 p er cent for grievance reso lu tio n (se e T able 4). A lm ost a ll focal positions p e rceiv e that they have a leg itim ate claim on the decision outcom e of the c o u n ter-p o sitio n s. TABLE 3 SUMMARY OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN PE R S O N N E L PRACTICES (MASTER SAMPLE) COUNTER-POSITION. DEPARTMENT , Al l • Ma s t e r S a m ple Al l Le g it im a c y • v t a 1 . ‘DEPENDENT VARIABLE Ocg*s *o* c x p e c t c p - p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s OEPfHDE.wT v a r i a b l e D e c i s i o n a c t u a l l y k a q c - p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l s N - 2 . ^ 7 O c e i s ION E x p e c te d S u p e r v is o r y I cv c l Two Dc c i s i c n E x p c c t c o C h i- S q u a f ic 1*176***® * u z 0 Ch i- S quahc M r t ► « « 0 < u H C w t ► « • 2 2 C Dc c i s i c n M aoc m J x « X u A X A 0 Oc c i s i o n made 1 5 U L * * *» c & X. * X 0 K C « I O NLY 1 .7 6 7 1 8 58 10 J M cr iy only 6 3 0 h 16 *5 The i t pacrcRCtiCcs > > 3 51 *5 3 TiteiR pacrciK N CC i 12 7 7 2 Mt»CO OCCtSIOR *37 30 3 1 8 55 M ikco o c c is io n 7* 11 8 8 T9 Othcr 3 1 * 0 12 £ 8 Or ncr 8 0 1 10 .........J S u p e r v is o r y Lcvct. One S u p e r v is o r y l e v e l T h r e e N . 6” ................... Oc c i s i o n Ex n c c t c o N - 691 De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d C h i - S q u a r e ^ * 3 5 U X » • C h i- S q u a r e 180.12 z W m > U k u tf S ! M Oc c i s i o n M aoc i s 5 S £ U 0 Oc c i s i o n Maoc £ 0 ^ S x £ S MCRir ONLY 605 11 1 6 6 0 M e rit only *»75 3 16 2 8 THCIR PACrCRCKCCS 19 <0 8 1 Tkcia pRCfCPCNCcs 1 0 5 7 2 M iic o occision 70 11 1 1 9 21 MlKCO OCCISION 6 2 5 8 8 1 2 © tmcr 10 0 8 >10 OlNM 1 6 / 0 1 17 "O t h e r " c olum n and row no t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s q u a r e . TABLE 4 SUMMARY OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION {MASTER SAMPLE) eOUHTEB.POSITIOM * ^ 1 SAMH.C DEPARTMENT A it. Le g it i m a c y • r e s INOCPCHOC^T VARIABLE OtClQlQM CK ftC T fO - ONIgVANCt OgSdlUTION OEPCMDCNT VARIABLE D e c i s i o n actually maoc- q o i t v A n c t w r s o i u T j c n A l l Su^gRViaQWY LCVCL5 D e c i s i o n Cx pc c t c o S u ^ r « v i? 0 RY L e v e l Two K- g.^3 Cm i* S quarc 1 »1 *1 * 3 « 9 I * 0 4 • M M U !2 2 1 t ° H - i 2 l _ C n i - S c u a r c 297»*+8 D e c i s i o n Cx p c c t c o 5 ► : L ! ; * 5 i “ S ■ ; i £ » •* ; * ; o HC«IT OML» 1 .7 7 6 3 8 > 1 1 1 3 6 MCNIT ONLY 617 11 17 3 9 3 0 51 12 3 TltCIO MCrCSCoCCS 7 6 5 1 M lltO OCCISION 169 £ 0 266 6 3 H la e o OCCISION £ 8 »L 6 5 18 Othco 3 0 ' 1 0 1 0 e j O lM I 2 0 ii 1 9 SUPCftV tSO M L c v c i Owe S u p c o v i s o i t f L e v c i T n s c e N - 1 * 0 2 8 Dc c i s i c n Cx p c c t c d ; N - € 5 5 Oc c i s i o n C m 'C c t c o C m i- S o u a r c 7**8.?1 t ► C M 2 5 z ! « 2 5 c $ u W M * X u « * 8 C m i- S c u a n c 2^ H . H O c c i s i o n K ao c E * £ » « z « 1 1 0 u S £ £ 2 * 5 H iR lt ONIV 57? 9 16 61 I ie r it om it lilU 15 7 * 9 TnCIO M tf tlC M C I 15 *10 5 l TnCIA M C fC llH C tl i| 3 2 1 MiaCO OCCtSlCM 51 29 1 21 2 5 MlACO OCCISION 5 2 15 £ 2 9 C t«co 11 2 3 5 2 Ot m s 16 0 3 * 3 *O T H E R " C O I.U M I A N D ROW HC>T CAL c u l a t c » 0 I N T H E C H I - S Q U A R E . 194 T his leads to conflict betw een focal positions and counter-positions reg ard in g rig h ts and obligations in fulfilling th e ir ro le p erfo rm an ces. P ersonnel p ra c tic e s . - - The data indicate only four counter positions obtained a c h i-sq u are above the . 05 significance level. Because th ese four a re only a m inority of the group, a ro le consensus could not be estab lish ed . The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as tru e. T h ere is a difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade fo r co u n ter-p o sitio n s as perceived by the focal positions. Behavior of two cou n ter-p o sitio n s a re quite p red ictab le at the .01 level of sig n ifican ce--im m ed iate su p e rv iso r and o th er su p e rv iso rs w ithin th e ir own d epartm ents. The C ivil S ervice C om m ission is predictable 90 p e r cent of the tim e, as perceived by the focal positions. G riev a n ce s. - -T h e data indicate only four counter positions obtained a c h i-sq u a re above the . 05 significance level. Again, consensus could not be estab lish ed because this is a m inority of the co u n ter-p o sitio n s. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T h e re is a difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade by co u n ter-p o sitio n s as perceived by focal positions. T h re e of the counter-positions a re predictable at the .01 195 level of significance: the im m ediate su p e rv iso r, su p e rv iso rs w ithin th e ir own d ep artm en ts, and subordinates (T able 5). C ontrol group 2 C ontrol group 2 is a non- random sam ple of a selected group which has expectations for the behavior of su p e rv iso ry personnel in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n . T his group is com posed of em ployee organizations re p re se n tin g em ployees w ithin the county governm ent and p ro fessio n al a rb itra to rs fa m ilia r with the county ordinance. The re tu rn e d q u estionnaires re p re se n t em ployee asso ciatio n s and one union. H ypothesis 3: T h e re is no difference betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade by the counter- positions in perso n n el p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n , as perceived by em ployee organizations and p ro fessio n als, significant at the .05 lev el--g iv en the control question of legitim acy. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate that th e re is a relatio n sh ip between decision expected and decision actually m ade significant at the .0 5 level. H ow ever, since none of the co unter-positions obtained a c h i-sq u a re above the . 05 level of significance, a consensus could not be estab lish ed . T he null hypothesis is re je c te d as fa lse , and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T h ere is a difference betw een decision expected and TABLE 5 SUMMARY OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN PERSONNEL PRACTICES AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (CONTROL GROUP ONE) Personnel Practices N m 303 Chi-Scuare 98.50 Decision Made Decision Expected * 8 I 2 * - t - t S o < a - > • — ? | U H b l X U S S C j < 1 1 U u 5 - u & r x O V - “ s * N - 301 Chi-Souare 79.76 Grievance Resolution , Decision Expccteo Decision Made X O jf t£ • j ■ “ o O U flc -J u * * u X ui * x u - ir £ 0 ►- ac - • X O Me r i t on ly 97 0 0 0 Me r i t o n l y ' T30 0 0 0 T h e i r p R c r c R C N c e s 69 16 8 2 - Their p r c t c r e n c c s 55 9 9 0 Mixco o c c i s i o n 69 0 0 Kj x c o OCCISION 61 2 35 1 Other 52 2 7 3 Other 35 3 k 3 "Other" column and row not calculated in the chi-square. 197 decision actually m ade by cou n ter-p o sitio n s in personnel p rac tic es and grievances as p erceiv ed by em ployee organizations and p ro fessio n al a rb itra to rs . T h ere is no conflict fo r 45 p er cent of the sam ple in personnel p ra c tic e s, and for 47 p e r cent in grievance reso lu tio n (T able 6). A lm ost a ll respondents in control group 2 believed they have a leg itim ate claim on the decision outcom e of the counter positions. C ontrol group 2 re p re se n ts those w ith the le a st am ount of legitim acy with the focal positions (Appendix A). Sub- hypotheses T he sub-hypotheses w ere developed and teste d to explore the p o ssib ility of m aking the Polyarchical System s M odel for O rganizational and Social Change operational (Appendix B). T hese hypotheses focus on m easu rin g the points of autonom y in the sy stem , the d eg ree of b u reau cratizatio n of the organization, the autonom y of the system as re fle cted in se lf-id e n tity , job satisfactio n , productivity, and d e sire for in cre asin g p re se n t re sp o n sib ilitie s and sp h ere of influence. The im plications of the re s e a rc h findings a re d iscu ssed in the next chapter. TABLE 6 SUMMARY OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN PERSONNEL PRACTICES AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (CONTROL GROUP TWO) PERSONNEL PR ACTIC ES N «• Decision Expected Chi-Square 3°«77 « De c i s i o n Ma o e (j S 3 T © u u Z u >• & < Of UJ H L j X o X — uj >T X 6 . o Grievance Resolution N - 10R Chi-Square 23.15 Decision Expected 9 1 * * * * £ U d K Decision Made III <• * u 2 2 £ £ H * * u Mc r i t o n l t .- 10 0 0 0 Mc r i t ' o n l y 16 0 0 0 T h c i a rRcrCRCNCCS 1 5 1 4 1 0 Thcir p r c e c r c n c c s 16 6 2 0 Mixed OCCISION 2 9 3 1 5 0 MtXCO OCCISION 2 9 8 2 6 0 Other 10 0 12 1 Other If 2 0 0 "Other" column and row not calculated in the chi-square. £ o \D 0 0 S u b-hypotheses: autonom y H ypothesis 4 . - -N ull hypothesis: T h e re is no relatio n sh ip betw een ability to influence the im m ediate su p e rv iso r and p a rtic ip a tion in decision m aking when a c ris is occurs in the departm ent sig nificant at the . 05 level. T h ere is a rela tio n sh ip between ability to influence the im m ediate su p e rv iso r and p articip atio n in decision m aking when a c ris is occu rs in the d epartm ent significant at the . 05 level. How e v e r, this rela tio n sh ip is not a positive one in determ ining the autonom y of the sy stem . Only 29 p e r cent of the sam ple has som e ability to influence and p a rticip a te in decision m aking. T he autono m ous decision-m aking unit re p re s e n ts 3 .0 7 p er cent (N=13), while the secondary unit is 7. 6 per cent (N=32) of the sam ple. T his hypothesis locates the c ritic a l autonom ous linkages in the o rg an iza tion. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate that the p rim a ry and secondary units of autonom y re p re s e n t . 004 per cent and . 009 per cent, which am ounts to 1. 3 p er cent of the e n tire organization-m aking decisions in a m ajo r c ris is . T he null hypothesis is re je c te d as fa lse , and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry levels one and two and fo r the sam ple as a whole. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid fo r su p e rv iso ry level th re e --th a t is, that th e re is no relatio n sh ip betw een ability to influence the im m ediate su p e rv iso r 200 and particip atio n in decision m aking in a c ris is . H ypothesis 5. - -N ull hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between the reduction of com m unication channels and the c e n tra liz a tion of decision m aking at a tim e of a m ajo r c ris is significant at the . 05 level. T he data indicate that th ere is a relatio n sh ip significant at the . 05 level for su p e rv iso ry level one and for the sam ple in gen eral. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false for su p erv iso ry level one and fo r the organization as a whole. The null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry levels two and th ree , and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is re je c te d as false. T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between reduction of com m unica tion channels and cen tralizatio n of decision m aking in a c ris is at the second and th ird levels of supervision. H ypothesis 6. --N u ll hypothesis: T h e re is no relatio n sh ip betw een p refe ren c e for a job that stays the sam e o r changes and p articip atio n in decision m aking when a c ris is occurs in the departm ent, significant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate that the null hypothesis is accepted as valid and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is re je c te d as false. T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between th ese two v ariab les significant at the . 05 level. 201 H ypothesis 7 .--N u ll hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on form al organizational authority and p refe ren c e for a job that stay s the sam e o r changes, significant at the . 05 level. The data indicate that the null hypothesis is re je c te d as false fo r su p erv iso ry level one and for the sam ple in g eneral. T h e re is a relatio n sh ip betw een em phasis on form al organizational authority and p refe ren c e fo r job stab ility o r change fo r the organization as a whole. The null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry levels two and th re e , because th e re is no relatio n sh ip significant at the . 05 level. Sub- hypothes e s : b u reau cratizatio n Null hypothesis 8. - -T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on form al organizational authority and technical qualifica tions of individuals assigned to specific functions in the departm ent, significant at the . 05 level. The re s e a rc h findings indicate the relatio n sh ip is significant at the . 01 level for su p e rv iso ry levels one and th re e and for the sam ple in general. T he null hypothesis is re je c te d as false and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid for the second level of supervision, sin ce a . 05 significance level was not obtained. 202 H ypothesis 9 . --N u ll hypothesis: T h e re is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on fo rm al organizational authority and technical qualifications of individuals assigned to specific functions in th e ir departm ents significant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate th e re is a relatio n sh ip for su p e rv iso ry levels one and two and for the sam ple as a whole significant at the . 05 level. T he null hypothesis is re je c te d as false. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry level th re e since a . 05 significance level was not obtained. Sixty-one p er cent of the to tal sam ple responded that th e re was v ery little em phasis on im p erso n ality in th e ir dep artm en ts. H ypothesis 10. --N u ll hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between em phasis on following p ro ce d u res, reg u latio n s, and ru le s , and the w ritin g and filing of com m unications and p ro ced u res in d ep artm en ts, significant at the .0 5 level. T he re s e a rc h data indicate that th e re is a significant relatio n sh ip at the .01 level for a ll su p e rv iso ry levels. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as fa lse , and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. Sub-hypotheses: se lf-id e n tity H ypothesis 11. --N u ll hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip betw een the percentage of tim e actually spent in productive se rv ic e s 203 and the enjoym ent of the w ork, significant at the . 05 level. The re s e a rc h findings indicate that none of the su p e rv iso ry levels obtained a c h i-sq u a re at the . 05 level of significance. The null hypothesis is accepted as valid, and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is re je c te d as false. The data indicate a high d eg ree of enjoym ent of w orking w hile the am ount of tim e spent in both non-productive and productive se rv ic e s is d istrib u ted ra th e r evenly throughout a ll of the c e lls with a skew ness tow ard higher levels of productivity. One m ay conclude that both those who p erceiv e th e ir w ork to be non-productive and those who feel it is productive have the sam e am ount of job satisfactio n . H ypothesis 12. --N u ll hypothesis: T h e re is no relatio n sh ip betw een enjoym ent of w ork and satisfactio n w ith th e ir achievem ent, significant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate that th e re is a relatio n sh ip significant at the . 05 level fo r su p e rv iso ry levels one and th re e and fo r the sam ple as a whole. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false, and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry level two, sin ce a . 05 sig n ifi cance level w as not obtained. H ypothesis 13. - -N ull hypothesis: T h e re is no difference . between an em ployee's perception of the rela tio n sh ip of his w ork to 204 d ep artm en tal objectives, and the c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l a cc u ra tely m easu rin g job p erfo rm an ce, significant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate th e re is a relatio n sh ip significant at the . 05 level fo r su p e rv iso ry level two and for the sam p le in g en eral. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. The null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry levels one and th ree. T his rela tio n sh ip is both a positive and negative one, since 93 per cent p e rc eiv e th e ir w ork to be re la te d to departm ental objectives, but the c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l a re not accu rately m easu rin g th e ir job p erform ance. Hypothesis 14. --N u ll hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip between the enjoym ent of the w ork and the c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l acc u ra tely m easu rin g job perform ance, signifi cant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate th ere is a relatio n sh ip significant at the . 05 level for su p e rv iso ry level one and the sam ple in g en eral. T he null hypothesis is re je c te d as false, and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid for su p e rv iso ry levels two and th re e , since a significance level of . 05 was not obtained. 205 H ypothesis 15. --N u ll hypothesis: T h ere is no relatio n sh ip betw een enjoym ent in w orking and sa tisfac tio n w ith the p resen t am ount of d isc retio n in decision m aking, significant at the . 05 level. T he re s e a rc h findings indicate th e re is a relatio n sh ip significant at the . 01 level for su p e rv iso ry levels one and th ree and fo r the sam ple in gen eral. The null hypothesis is re je c te d as false, and the re s e a rc h hypothesis is accepted as valid. T he null hypothesis is accepted as valid fo r su p e rv iso ry level two, since a . 05 significance level was not obtained. CHAPTER VII SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS Sum m ary: T h eo retical P erspectives T h ere a re two focuses of the re s e a rc h . The f irs t is the determ ination of w hether o r not th e re is a difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade in personnel p rac tic es and grievance reso lu tio n for su p e rv iso ry personnel who accept expectations from co unter-positions as legitim ate. The second focuses on developing a fram ew ork for an aly sis of individual, group, organizational, and so c ietal s tr e s s . T his fram ew ork becom es the Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change. T h eo re tica l p re m ise s and p ersp ectiv es The th eo re tic al p re m ise s underlying this re s e a rc h a re based on the m odels developed by R obert A. Dahl and C harles E. Lindblom . T he authors re g a rd four a ltern a tiv e s for the allocation 206 of re s o u rc e s in society: h iera rch y , bargaining, p rice sy stem , and polyarchy. T he o th er c ritic a l p rem ise is from K arl D eutsch's postulation that the m ost c ritic a l linkage in a ll behavioral sy stem s o ccu rs w here c u rre n t inform ation inputs a re fused with the m em ory and w ill in o rd e r to give m eaning. T he polyarchical m odel of Dahl and Lindblom provides the foundation fo r the c ritic a l linkages m odel of D eutsch. Role an aly sis, as developed by G ro ss, M ason, and M cE achern, provide a m ethod of m ea su re m e n t in m aking the Polyarchical System s Model o p era tional at the individual, group, organizational, and so cietal levels. The com ponents of ro le analysis include ro le expectations, ro le con sen su s, ro le conflict, com form ity and deviancy,and sanctions. D evelopm ent of a P olyarchical System s Model The developm ent of a P olyarchical System s Model se rv e s as a fram ew ork for the null hypotheses. A polyarchy is defined by Dahl and Lindblom as a p ro c e ss, som etim es called dem ocracy, in w hich n o n -lead ers control le a d e rs. Polyarchical lead ersh ip focuses on re c ip ro c ity in m eeting n o n -le a d e rs' needs in o rd e r to survive. T he polyarchical sy stem s section in the re s e a rc h instrum ent m e a su re s: latent conflict, change, d ecisio n m ak in g , com m unications and m otivational sy ste m s. 208 C onsensus: deviancy and conform ity An an aly sis of the in te rac tio n p ro c e ss betw een focal positions and co u n ter-p o sitio n s leads to an evaluation of values and n orm s in the estab lish m en t of a ro le consensus. C onsensus sub sequently becom es the boundaries for the decision-m aking c rite ria . T he ro le consensus th at is e stab lish ed m ay o r m ay not include the leg islated , b u rea u cra tic , o r sta te d n o rm s. T hus, a possibility for the creatio n of a c o n tra cu ltu re w ith different norm s of behavior for its m em bers e x ists. T he p ro cessin g of inform ation inputs by the p articip an ts in the developm ent of a " ro le consensus" m ay be undertaken by e ith e r a closed or an open sy ste m s approach. In the fo rm e r, the p a ra m e te rs for decision m aking a re accepted as given and focus is on w hether or not the sta te d norm s a re achieved. C onform ity and deviancy a re evaluated in rela tio n to an absolute stan d ard by the agent of control. In the la tte r, the p a ra m e te rs fo r decision m aking a re re la tiv e and m ay even be redefined during the definition of ro le consensus. In the dynam ic approach, deviancy and conform ity a re re la tiv e to group and so c ietal n o rm s. In the open sy ste m s m odel, an aly sis of deviancy and conform ity re q u ire s at le a st th re e p a rtic i pants in the definition of consensus. N orm s a re developed out of the in teractio n p ro cess with significant o th ers. In teractio n takes a form 209 of sta b ility when prediction of p a rtic ip a n ts’ behaviors occur m ore than 50 p e r cent of the tim e. Once patterned in teractio n is e sta b lished, a ro le consensus com es into existence and a possib ility for the creatio n of an organization ex ists. C onflict is inherent in the continuous p ro cess of finding a s ta tu s -ro le identity and situational opportunities for in teractio n w ithin one's se lf and w ith other a lte rs in achieving a new sta te of being. Individuals, groups, organizations, and la rg e r so cial sy stem s a ll have this problem . S elf-identity is n e c e ssa ry to m aintain auton omy and d irectio n of the in teractio n p ro ce ss one has with o th ers and the environm ent. T his problem is even m ore acute in com plex organizations w here the p o ssib ility of so c ial disorganization is everyw here and the only v ariab le is the degree. When the individual o r the organization sy n th esizes the tension levels of the s ta tu s -ro le identity with the situational opportunities, th e re a re four options for p erfo rm an ces: (1) re tre a tis m ; (2) ritu a lism in the p erform ance of ta sk s due to alienation; (3) ritu a lism in b u reau cratic p o licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and p ro ced u res due to inability to cope w ith s tr e s s ; and (4) rebellion. Som ew here am ong th ese m odes of behavior lie innovation and conform ity. C onform ity w ill predom inate in individual behavior within organizations because it is rew arded. Conflict Conflict and change a re e sse n tia l in the in teractio n p ro cess in an open sy stem approach, w hereby the individual w ill modify his behavior to com ply w ith the situational opportunities provided by the co unter-position (a lte r) when a lte r re tu rn s the in itial g e stu res and th ese a re viewed by ego to be congruent to his values. Only one m odel of conflict reso lu tio n is d iscu ssed that p o sse sse s the viability of su m m arizin g m ost of the different a p p ro ach es. T his m odel provides a fram ew ork fo r analysis of in tra p erso n al, in te rp e rso n a l, in trag ro u p , and in terg ro u p conflict at the individual and collective level. T he se a rc h for a s ta tu s -ro le identity in rela tio n to situ a tional opportunities brings about conflict in the individual as w ell as in the organization, when the a ctio n -sy stem is activated. The d irectio n the action sy stem takes depends upon (1) the assum ptions underlying the in itial s tru c tu re of the individual o r the social sy stem (closed o r open sy stem behavior); (2) the p ast, p re se n t, and p ro jected s ta tu s -ro le id en tities; (3) the p ast, p resen t, and pro jected situational opportunities; and (4) autonom y-- how the action system p ro c e sse s the fusion of new inform ation on p re se n t and future sta te s of being with its m em ory and w ill. When the individual o r the organization views itse lf as a 211 clo sed sy stem , behavior w ill m ost likely follow elaboration of existing s tru c tu re s w ith little o r no m odifications and the other th re e com ponents w ill have little o r no influence. H ow ever, when the individual o r the organization is viewed as an open sy stem , then the f ir s t com ponent w ill be deem phasized and the la tte r th re e elem ents w ill be elaborated. When the la tte r elem ents a re elab o rated , a p ro cess of developm ent of the p e rso n ality and cu ltu re occu rs which is p erv asiv e in the s ta tu s -ro le identity p ro c e ss. The individual and the o rg an iza tion need to m aintain autonom y in o rd e r to give d irection to the p ro c e ss of in te rac tio n and to redefine the situational opportunities available if significant a lte rs do not respond o r a re not congruent to th e ir g e stu re s. An acute problem fo r individual autonom y occu rs when the organization stru c tu re s and controls the situational opportunities. In th ese in stan c es, the individual is rew ard ed to conform and th is soon becom es the dom inant value for behavior. The re s u lt is ritu a lis m , re tre a tis m , and the lo ss of o ne's se lf-id en tity and autonom y. T he m ental health concept m entioned by M. Jahoda su m m arize s the p ro c e ss of ro le consensus: self-id en tity ; conform ity and deviancy; and autonom y during the p ro ce ss of in te rac tin g w ith 212 o th ers. "A healthy p e rso n ality is one which actively m a s te rs his environm ent, shows a certain unit of p erso n ality , and is able to perceiv e the w orld and him self c o rre c tly . Change The different approaches to organizational change w ere su m m arized into the classificatio n s of closed and open sy stem s. O rganizational change m odels w ere d iscu ssed , sin ce organizations com e into existence when the p attern ed in teractio n s between ego and a lte r occur m o re than 50 p er cent of the tim e, and when a collective in te re s t ex ists and is valued for the attainm ent of goals. A polyarchical sy stem s m odel was developed to provide a c o n stru ct to place different concepts into an operational approach to organizational and so cial change. T his m odel has two basic c o m p o n e n ts--reso u rc es and in teractio n s. T hese com ponents provide four possible altern a tiv e com binations: (1) high re so u rc e s and high in te rac tio n s, (2) high re s o u rc e s and low in te rac tio n s, (3) low re s o u rc e s and high in te rac tio n s, and (4) low re so u rc e s and low in te ra c tio n s. Within this m a trix th e re a re other various possible com bi nations. T he re la tiv e positions of individuals and groups a re viewed ^Bennis, p. 52. 213 as polyarchical en tities w ithin this m atrix . The in te ra c tio n ists' approaches include a ll of the th eo re tic al p re m ise s (autonom y and polyarchy) and p ersp ectiv es (co n sen su s: deviancy and conform ity) in m aking the Polyarchical System s Model for O rganizational and Social Change operational. When one w ishes to change the sy stem , em phasis is placed on the in teractio n s betw een individuals, groups, organizations, and the e n tire so cial sy ste m s. Autonomous polyarchical lea d ers m ust be defined. At these points, one changes the sy stem . T he points a re located w here c u rre n t inform ation inputs a re fused w ith the m em ory and w ill in o rd e r to give the behavioral system m eaning, and subsequent decisions re la tin g to changing in tern al stru c tu re s in m eeting environm ental needs. T he re s e a rc h in stru m en t included the m easu rem en t of routine as w ell as c ris is decision m aking. When a c ris is is prolonged and the sy stem does not change its in te rn al s tru c tu re s to environm ental stim u li, it w ill fail. The c ritic a l autonom ous linkages a re found when p ro ce ssin g c u rre n t inform ation w ith the m em ory and w ill during a c ris is .o c c u rs . Sum m ary: R e se arch Findings M ajor hypotheses and ro le conflict resolution Role conflict m odel fo r the m ajo r hypotheses. - - A m odel w as, 214 developed for analysis of ro le conflict in m an ag erial decision m aking pertaining to personnel p rac tic es and griev an ces. T his m odel c o n sists of the m ajor com ponents of the in teractio n s p ro c e s s --ro le expectations; ro le consensus; ro le conflict, conform ity, and deviancy; and sanctions. A p o sitio n -c en tric m odel was used for analysis of the null hypotheses. R esearch findings M aster sam ple: hypothesis 1. - -T h e null hypothesis is accepted as valid at the . 05 level. T h ere is no conflict between decision expected and decision actually m ade for those focal positions that accepted the expectations of the cou n ter-p o sitio n as leg itim ate. C ontrol group 1, hypothesis 2. - -T h e null hypothesis is re je c te d at the . 05 level. T h ere is a conflict situation, sin ce a ro le consensus could not be estab lish ed for specific co u n ter-p o sitio n s. C ontrol group 2, hypothesis 3. - -T h e null hypothesis is re je c te d at the . 05 level. T h ere is a conflict situation sin ce a ro le consensus could not be estab lish ed for specific co u n ter-p o sitio n s. Interactions and conflict An analysis of in teractio n betw een focal positions and co unter-positions eventually leads to an evaluation of values and ] norm s in the establishm ent of consensus. T his re s e a rc h m easu red specific values and norm s in the section on m otivation by the sp ecific 215 counter- positions to obtain th e ir d e sire d outcom es from the focal positions. T his re s e a rc h is not being rep o rte d in this project. V alues and norm s a re m ea su re d in the sen se that decision expected re fle c ts values and decision actually m ade refle cts norm s. When ro le consensus is estab lish ed in the dynam ic approach, it m ay o r m ay not include the leg islated norm s of the m e rit sy stem . A po ssibility for creatin g a c o n tracu ltu re ex ists. T he re s e a rc h re la tin g to the m ajo r hypotheses focused only on the difference betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade, and not on the conflict between counter-positions in e sta b lish ing legitim acy and p rio ritie s fo r fulfillm ent of expectations. The data indicate that for hypothesis 1 th e re is no difference between decision expected and decision m ade in personnel p ra c tic e s. G rievances fo r those who accept the expectations of the co unter-positions as leg itim ate indicate .0 5 level of significance. T h ere is no conflict in decision m aking for 84 p e r cent of personnel p ra c tic e s and 85 p er cent of grievance resolution. T h ere is a difference betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade for control groups 1 and 2 (hypotheses 2 and 3), sin ce a consensus could not be estab lish ed for specific cou n ter-p o sitio n s. T he control v ariab le "legitim acy of expectation" is one of the m ost im portant v ariab les for the prediction of behavior. Once 216 legitim acy of expectation is estab lish ed , the p re d ic tio n of decision outcom e becom es highly probable for each counter-position. The focal positions tend to e stab lish an equilibrium to m inim ize conflict. T his behavior supports the th esis of Secord and Backman that "S” (subject) striv e s to m ake his in te rp erso n al m atrix congruent to "O" 2 (object). T he average legitim acy ra te for all co unter-positions is 60. 8 p er cent for personnel p ra c tic e s and 60.1 per cent for grievance reso lu tio n in the m a s te r sam p le, with stan d ard deviations of 15.49 and 17.18, resp ectiv ely . T he null hypothesis that th e re is no difference between decision expected and decision m ade for those who accept the expectations of the counter- positions as legitim ate a re g en erally 60 p e r cent of the m a s te r sam ple. V ariations as to leg itim acy is dependent upon specific co u n ter-p o sitio n s and which su p e rv iso ry level is involved. F o r those who accept the expectations as leg itim ate, the decision expected and decision m ade is usually b ased upon " m e r it." T hose focal positions who view ed the counter- positions as having "no legitim acy" averaged 15. 6 p er cent fo r personnel p ra c tic e s and 14.2 p e r cent for grievance reso lu tio n , with stan d ard 2 Secord, p. 23. 217 deviations of 6.48 and 7. 21, resp ectiv ely . T h ese focal positions m ay be c la ssified as having no conflict w ith the expectations of the co unter-positions as fa r as decision expected and decision m ade a re concerned. However, conflict would undoubtedly occur in the a re a s of estab lish in g legitim acy and consensus for the re sp e c tiv e co u n ter positions. T hose focal positions that "don't know" w hether the counter positions have legitim ate expectations, av erag e 2 4 .0 p e r cent for personnel p rac tic es and 25. 8 per cent fo r grievance reso lu tio n , with stan d ard deviations of 12.12 and 14.21, resp ectiv ely . S upervisory level th re e has the highest percentage of "don’t know" w ithin p ersonnel p rac tic es (31.0 per cent) and grievances (40. 8 p e r cent). T he legitim acy of the "don't know" c lassificatio n m ay be view ed as an a re a of latent conflict. One m ay conclude from the null hypothesis of the m a s te r sam ple that th e re is no conflict betw een decision expected and decision actually m ade. T hose who accept the expectations of the coun ter-p o sitio n as leg itim ate re p re s e n t approxim ately 60 p e r cent of the sam ple with v ariations dependent on sp ecific levels of su p e r vision and counter- positions involved. The a re a of latent conflict would involve the other 40 p er cent of the sam ple. F ifteen p e r cent of the latent conflict a re a would be 218 concerned with the problem of establishing legitim acy. T his would also be the fir s t a re a for m anifest conflict to occur, when counter positions decide to in c re a se th e ir sp h ere of influence. The rem ain in g 25 p e r cent would re p re se n t a re a s w here no definite positions have yet been taken by focal positions and counter positions. T he stra te g y fo r a counter-position to in c re a se its sp h ere of influence without risk in g im m ediate re p ris a ls from other counter positions would be to focus on those who "don't know" w hether he is legitim ate o r not. The focal positions who accept the expectations of the co unter-positions as leg itim ate, reg ard in g personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n , m ay be viewed as a rela tiv e ly "closed sy ste m d ’ approach in the definition of consensus. A lm ost all of these focal positions c la ssify "m e rit" as the decision expected and m ade. The p a ra m e te rs fo r decision m aking a re generally accepted as given by this group. H ow ever, additional data not re la te d to the control question of legitim acy indicate th e re a re stro n g tendencies for the estab lish m en t of departm ental co n tracu ltu res that take precedence over the m e rit principle as the p rim a ry c rite rio n for decision m aking. A conflict zone as to legitim acy of expectations ex ists 219 between focal positions and cou n ter-p o sitio n s. T his av erag es 23. 5 p e r cent fo r personnel p ra c tic e s and 26. 6 p e r cent fo r grievance reso lu tio n , with stan d ard deviations of 11. 36 and 9. 90, resp ectiv ely . T h is conflict zone occurs betw een the m a ste r sam ple and control group 1, when estab lish in g rig h ts and obligations for co u n ter positions by focal positions. The focal positions m aintain that they have a g re a te r legitim acy claim on the decision outcom es of the co u n ter-p o sitio n s than anyone gives them . S ub-hypotheses: the Polyarchical S ystem s Model and re s e a rc h findings Two of the m a jo r com ponents of the Polyarchical System s M odel re q u ire s the analysis of in teractio n s and re s o u rc e s. The definition of re s o u rc e s w ill be r e s tric te d to m ean the ability to influence budget re q u e sts for the pu rch ase of new item s. R e so u rc e s. - -T h e budgeted req u e sts for the departm ents studied in this re s e a rc h p ro ject am ounted to $1. 6 billion. However, those su p e rv iso rs who have the ability to influence budget req u e sts fo r the p u rch ase of new item s a re quite lim ited. A pproxim ately 12. 5 p er cent have an ability to influence the budget am ounting to $500,000 o r m o re. T his is broken down into the follow ing c la ss ifi cations of financial influence: $500,000 to $1 m illion = 3. 5 p e r cent; $1.1 m illion to $5 m illion = 5. 7 p er cent; $5.1 m illion to $100 220 m illion =3.3 p er cent. No one has a budget influence of m o re than $100 m illion. G enerally, except fo r se v e ra l departm ent heads, su p e rv iso ry personnel have little ability to m eet any financial com m itm ents they m ight m ake to co u n ter-p o sitio n s, unless they e n list the cooperation of the Chief A dm inistrative O fficer o r the Board of S u p erv iso rs. The Chief A dm inistrative O fficer has the g re a te s t potential fo r changing the organization from w ithin through the budgeting p ro c e ss. O rganizational change w ill m ost likely com e from outside of the p resen t b u re a u c ra tic sy stem through fed e ral and sta te "g ran t- in-aid" p ro g ra m s, collective bargaining, so cial u n rest and c ris e s , leg islativ e a c ts, tax in ita tiv es, and so cial m ovem ents by m inority em ployees from w ithin the b u reau cracy itself. All of the data indicate very little probability that the p resen t b u reau cratic system is capable of changing itse lf, sin ce its p ersp ectiv e is e sse n tia lly a "clo sed sy stem " w ith em phasis on m aintaining the statu s-q u o . In teractio n s and change. - -W hen the individual or the organization sy n th esizes the tension levels of the s ta tu s -ro le identity with the situational opportunities, th e re a re four possible p erfo rm ances: (1) re tre a tis m ; (2) ritu a lism in the task p erfo rm an ce due to alienation; (3) ritu a lis m in b u rea u cra tic p o licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and pro ced u res due to inability to cope with s tr e s s ; and (4) rebellion. 221 T he data indicate that all su p e rv iso ry levels a re "sa tisfie d w ith th e ir own achievem ent" and "enjoy w orking in th e ir position" and a re "sa tisfie d with the p resen t am ount of d iscretio n in decision m aking" e ith e r on a "v ery m uch so" or a "p re tty m uch so" b asis. T his would indicate th at p rim a ry perform ance p attern s would take on the c h a ra c te ris tic s of em phasis on b u reau cratic po licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and p ro ced u res when environm ental s tr e s s o ccu rs. R ebellion in the se a rc h of situational opportunity would be quite r a r e , because individuals who would have this propensity m o st likely have left the organization. T his is evidenced in additional data w here the question was asked: "Do c u rre n t m ethods of em ployee a p p ra isa l acc u ra tely m ea su re your job perfo rm an ce?" T he following levels of supervision responded in e ith e r a "v ery m uch so ” o r a "p re tty m uch so ” to this question: su p e rv iso ry level one, 71. 8 p e r cent; su p e rv iso ry level two, 66.9 per cent; su p e rv iso ry level th re e , 25. 6 p e r cent. T his indicates that if they w ere not sa tisfie d with th e ir p erfo rm an ce a p p ra isa l, they would e ith e r leave the organization o r do som ething about it. Although individuals appear to be m o re prone to change than the b u reau cracy , they ap p ear to do nothing about it. F ifty -se v en p er cent of the sam ple p re fe rs a job th at, in a c o u rse of a y e a r, e ith e r "changes quite a bit" o r "changes a g re a t deal. " 222 The data also indicate they w ish to p a rticip ate in decisions affecting th e ir own w ork. H ow ever, this has little value, sin ce they a re sa tisfie d with the p resen t am ount of d isc retio n in decision m aking and with th e ir p re se n t level of achievem ent. As m entioned previously, the se a rc h for a s ta tu s -ro le identity in rela tio n to situational opportunities brings about conflict in the individual o r organization when the p ro c e ss is activated. The d irectio n the actio n -sy stem takes depends upon the assum ptions underlying the in itial stru c tu re of the individual o r the organization; the p ast, p resen t, and p ro jected s ta tu s -ro le id en tities; the p ast, p re se n t, and projected situational opportunities; and how the action- sy stem p ro c e sse s the fusion of new inform ation on p resen t and future sta te s of being with m em ory and w ill. When the individual o r the organization views itse lf as a "clo sed sy stem " behavioral change co n sists of elaborating existing stru c tu re s w ith little o r no m odifications and the o th er th re e elem ents w ill have little or no influence. H ow ever, when the individual o r the organization is viewed as "open sy s te m ," the f ir s t elem ent w ill be deem phasized and the la tte r th re e com ponents w ill be elaborated. The data indicate that th is organization is a rela tiv e ly closed sy stem , and when confronted w ith organizational o r so cial change w ill m ost likely follow the elaboration of existing organizational stru c tu re s w ith : 223 v ery little o r no m odifications. T his is indicated from the c lu s te r of v a ria b le s used to analyze the d egree of b u reau cratizatio n . The average resp o n se w as 74.11 p e r cent, with a stan d ard deviation of 16. 70 for both the classificatio n s of "v ery m uch so" and "p retty m u c h ." Per Cent Is form al organizational authority em phasized in your departm ent? 82. 51 Is th e re em phasis on technical qualifications of individuals assigned to sp ecific functions? 71. 87 Is th e re em phasis on im p erso n ality in your departm ent? 39. 72 Is th e re em phasis on division of lab o r in your departm ent? 74.00 Is th e re em phasis on following p ro c e d u re s, re g u la tio n s, and ru le s in your departm ent? 91. 02 Is th e re em phasis on the w riting and filing of com m unications and pro ced u res in your departm ent 85. 58 Im plications of the H ypotheses M ajor hypotheses T he th re e m ajo r hypotheses indicate that once a co u n ter position estab lish es legitim acy w ith the focal position, th e re is a tendency for the focal position to achieve a sta te of equilibrium with the resp ec tiv e co u n ter-p o sitio n s. T h ere is conflict in estab lish in g 224 legitim acy of expectations by the co u n ter-p o sitio n s w ith the focal positions. T h ere is a lso conflict between rig h ts and obligations of the focal position with the c o u n ter-p o sitio n s. T h e re a re larg e a re a s of am biguity in determ ining the legitim acy of cou n ter-p o sitio n s in personnel p ra c tic e s and grievance reso lu tio n s. T he stra te g y fo r an em erging polyarchy (em ployee organ ization) is to obtain legitim acy w ith the focal position and then place em phasis on rem oving p re s s u re from other cou n ter-p o sitio n s on the focal position. The data indicating conflict in estab lish m en t of legitim acy support the re s e a rc h findings by G ro ss, M ason, and M cE achern that conflict ex ists in estab lish in g and determ ining p rio ritie s for ro le perform ance. Im plications of the sub- hypotheses The im plications of the sub-hypotheses go beyond the field of public ad m in istratio n , since m any academ ic disciplines a re borrow ed to m ake the public in te re s t value operational. H ypothesis 4 .--T h is hypothesis v erified the possibility of using the P olyarchical System s M odel for O rganizational and Social Change. T he points of autonom y a re found in c ris is behavior and the ability to influence the im m ediate su p e rv iso r. T his approach provides an a ltern a tiv e m odel to organizational change that is 225 com patible with p resen t ad m in istrativ e sy stem s while s till bypassing trad itio n al concepts. T hese data also indicate the vulnerability of the trad itio n al b u reau cratic system in a m ajo r c ris is w here the p rim a ry and secondary decision-m aking sy stem s co m p rise 1 p e r cent of the e n tire organization. H ypothesis 5. - -T h e re s e a rc h findings indicate that decision m aking is cen tralized at the top of the organization in a tim e of c ris is . T his supports the findings in the other hypotheses m easu rin g the d eg ree of b u reau cratizatio n of the organization and in locating the autonom ous linkages for influencing the organization. H ypothesis 6. --T h is hypothesis indicates that those who p re fe r e ith e r stab le o r changing job assignm ents a re not n e c e ssa rily those who p articip ate in the decision-m aking p ro ce ss when a c ris is o ccu rs. T his com bination of v ariab les a re not viable fo r p redicting organizational behavior. H ypothesis 7. --T h is hypothesis exam ines the relatio n sh ip between em phasis on form al organizational authority and the inclination fo r the individual to change. T h ere is a very stro n g em phasis on the form al organization to obtain conform ity from individuals within the sy stem . The data im ply that individuals a re m ore su scep tib le to change than the form al organization. If a 226 trad itio n al approach to organizational change is d e sire d , it is easily achieved by issuing new a d m in istrativ e fiats. H ow ever, its effec tiv en ess as an approach to organizational change is now very doubtful. H ypotheses 8, 9, and 10. --T h e s e hypotheses m ea su re the degree of b u reau cratizatio n of the organization. T his organization could be cla ssified as an oligarchy, sin ce th re e of the six m easu res 3 a re above the . 75 index used by Dahl in defining an oligarchy, and the average index for all six m e a su re s is only 1 p e r cent away from this classificatio n . The im plications of th ese data a re that this organization follows the trad itio n al p attern s fo r behavior and is thus highly predictable. Its p rim a ry c rite ria for decision m aking is p o licies, ru le s , reg u latio n s, and p ro ced u res. When the organization is confronted with both in tern al and ex tern al s tr e s s , it w ill follow the trad itio n al b u reau cratic behavior of c en tralizatio n of decision m aking and m aintenance of the statu s-q u o . T his sty le of behavior usually a c c e le ra te s conflict and s tr e s s , ra th e r than facilitatin g the im plem entation of the public in te re s t value. H ypothesis 11. - -T h is hypothesis indicates that the non productive and productive em ployees have the sam e am ount of job satisfactio n . T his im plies that the trad itio n al approaches to m anagem ent developm ent and organizational change, based on the 3 Dahl, P olitics, E conom ics, and W elfare, p. 87. 227 assum ptions that "happy w o rk ers a re productive w o rk ers" or "productive w o rk ers a re happy w o rk e rs ," a re no longer d irectly applicable to the field of public ad m in istratio n . H ypothesis 12. --T h is hypothesis indicates that th e re is a v ery good rela tio n sh ip betw een enjoym ent on the job and satisfaction w ith o n e's own achievem ent. T h ese data stro n g ly im ply that c u rre n t a d m in istra to rs would be likely to m aintain the sta tu s-q u o in the decision-m aking p ro c e ss. Conflict needs to be developed and built into the sy stem in o rd e r to m ake it su scep tib le to change. The p re se n t a d m in istra to rs have little se lf-id en tity , other than p resen t job functions, since th e re is an absence of conflict in fusing a sta tu s- ro le identity with situ atio n al opportunities. H ypothesis 13. - -T h is hypothesis provides an insight into the rela tio n sh ip of d ep artm en tal objectives and perform ance a p p ra isa ls. The com m unication of d epartm ental objectives is not a c ritic a l issu e , since alm o st all su p e rv iso ry personnel a re very w ell inform ed. H ow ever, c u rre n t perfo rm an ce a p p ra isa l m easu rem en ts have a larg e m argin of e r r o r at a ll levels of su p erv isio n , and th e re is a g re a te r probability that m o re inaccuracy ex ists at the upper levels of sup erv isio n . T h ese data indicate th at trad itio n al m ethods of job p erfo rm an ce evaluations a re not functioning effectively and m ay be a m ajo r so u rc e of latent conflict for su p e rv iso ry personnel. 228 H ypothesis 14. --T h is hypothesis m ea su re s job satisfactio n w ith w hether or not job p erfo rm an ce is accu rately m easured. The data indicate that they enjoy th e ir w ork w hether th e ir job perform ance is m easu red accu rately o r not. The perform ance a p p ra isa l p ro cess is not an effective m ethod of m otivating em ployees, since su p erv iso ry personnel a re sa tisfie d even with the larg e m argin of e r r o r with the p resen t sy stem . H ypothesis 15. --T h is hypothesis m ea su re s job satisfactio n and the satisfactio n with p resen t am ount of d iscretio n in decision m aking. The data im ply that trad itio n al m ethods of m otivating su p erv iso ry personnel by job enlargem ent and fusing the individual's goals with those of the organization (self-actu alizin g m an) a re not d irec tly applicable with c u rre n t a d m in istra to rs, since they do not w ish to en larg e the scope of decision m aking. C onclusions T he two elem ents of re so u rc e s and in teractio n s act as a classificatio n schem a for analysis of the th eo retical p re m ise s of autonom y and polyarchy. The th eo re tic al p ersp ectiv es of consensus: deviancy and conform ity provide for synthesis of individual, group, and organizational b e h av io r--a s w ell as fo r a re s e a rc h approach using ro le analysis to develop and te s t additional th e o rie s. 229 T his e n tire approach is su m m arized into a Polyarchical System s M odel for O rganizational and Social Change, w herein the c ritic a l linkages a re located at the points of autonom y in the p ro c e s sing of c u rre n t inform ation w ith the m em ory and w ill. The points of autonom y a re tre a te d as polyarchies and thus provide a ltern a tiv e s to the trad itio n al b u reau cratic form for im plem enting public policy. T he P olyarchical System s M odel was dem onstrated as a viable approach to organizational change, w hile the assum ptions underlying other c u rre n t and trad itio n al approaches a re no longer valid when applied to public organizations. When cou n ter-p o sitio n s a re accepted as legitim ate by focal positions, th e re is no difference between decision expected and decision actually m ade. T h ere is a tendency to seek equilibrium in relatio n sh ip s w ith o th ers. T his tendency tow ard equilibrium is evidenced in other data supporting high job enjoym ent, satisfactio n with own achieve m ent, satisfactio n with p re se n t am ount of d isc retio n in decision m aking, and propensity for jobs that stay the sam e. The high degree of b u reau cratizatio n is what holds this organization to gether, because th e re a re very few points of autonom y within the sy stem . Autonomous su p e rv iso ry personnel re p re se n t 10. 67 p er cent of all su p e rv iso rs and 1 per cent of the e n tire I b u reau cratic sy stem . All o th ers would tend to follow conform ity, ; ritu a lism , o r re tre a tis m when confronted with conflict and s tr e s s . 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APPENDIXES 249 APPENDIX A MAJOR HYPOTHESES: C ontrol Q uestion M a ste r Sam ple C ontrol Group 1 C ontrol Group 2 250 SUMMARY OT CONTROL Q U E S T IO N L E G IT IM A C Y OF E X P E C T A T IO N T O R C O U N T E R -P O S IT IO N S — P E R S O N N E L P R A C T IC E S (M A STE R S A M PL E ) Co u n t e r - P o s i t i o n H HI YES X* JfN N 2 W O X 2 ?N DOM 'T KMW N3 X 2 fN C l c c t c d O r r t c t A i s A u LCVCLS 1(23 237 10S.551 56.03 89 l.E o'i 21,0*( 97 5.000 22.93 Lc v c l ONC 172 83 !i9.i(39 1 (9. 1 (2 39 11.666 22.67 i(8 o .cco 27.91 Lc v c l two 130 Eo 50.C01 61, 5i( 21 5-250 16.15 29 3-000 22.31 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 ?l 31.722 75-21 18 5.000 14.88 12 0.000 9.92 C i v i l S c r v i c c C o m m i s s io n • Al l l c v c l s 1(23 331 111.133 78.25 37 > 1.523 8.75 55 5.881 13.CO Lc v c l o n c 172 123 36.111 71.51 19 6.666 11.05 30 1-333 17.44 Lc v c l tw o 130 ic6 1(2.210 81.5:1 10 2.916 7-6 9 14 5 .coo 10.77 Lc v c l t k r c c 121 100 61-922 £2.6i( 10 5.000 8 .2 6 11 0.1(1(1* 9.09 CMPLOYCC flCLATIONS COHH. Al l l c v c l s ‘ ‘23 225 139.3&( 53-19 1(8 3 .idi2 11-35 150 3.262 35-^6 Lc v c l o n c 172 1& £2.621* O U . 19 au 1-333 13-95 72 0.000 41.36 . Lc v c l tw o 130 62 23.71(6 63.08 11 1-333 8 .6 6 37 0.000 28.1(6 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 £o 23.212 1 (9.59 17 0.71*9 ii*.05 i(i( 0.000 36.36 F orm al Or g a n iz a t io n Al l l c v c l s 1(2 3 327 177-5S9 77.30 35 12.590 O.27 61 2 .oil* 18.65 Lc v c l on c 172 H 7 105.320 6 8 . 0 2 21 6.000 1 2 . 2 1 3 1 ) 1.895. 19.77 L c v c l two 130 105 1(2.1(03 80.77 9 0.599 6.92 16 1-333 12.31 L c v c l t h r c c 121 100 36.217 82.61* 14 3.111 11.57 7 1-333 5-79 I h m c o ia t c S u p e r v i s o r Al l l c v c l s 1(23 353 216.891 33.K5 35 6.606 3 .2 7 35 8.305 8.27 Lc v c l o n c 172 13S 65.256 80.61 13 3-333 7.5 6 .20 i*.666 11.63 Lc v c l two 130 1 1 0 58.266 81(.62 I3 3.650 10. CO 7 3.000 5.33 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 77 51-235 63. 6i( 9 2 . 2 2 2 7.44 35 1-333 28.93 S u p e r v i s o r s Wi t h i n Dc p t . Al l l c v c l s l|23 250 193.720 68.56 57 <(.0l6 13.118 76 3.781 17-97 Lc v c l o n c 172 101 95.61(3 53-72 27 3-•(37 15.70 iiii 5 .coo 25.53 L c v c l tw o 130 9 i* 58.659 72.31 18 O .3 1 6 13.85 18 0.000 13-35 L c v c l t h r c c 121 73 22.250 60.33 2 2 1.337 16.18 26 If.ooo 2 1 . 4 ? X* 6A3CO OH THC ACLATION5HIP or OCCI3IOH CXPCCTCO AND 0CCI3I0N HAOC WITH POUP OCORCC 3 OT THtCOOH. 251 252 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATIONS FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS — PERSONNEL PRACTICES (MASTER SAMPLE) (CONTINUED) YES HO DON'T K N O W C O U fttC ft-P O S IT lC M N N1 X2 3 fN H2 X2 fH N3 X2 S u r c r v i s o r s O u t 9 io c O C PT . A H . LCVCLS >123 157 169.367 37-12 81 7 .5 0 0 l y . 86 182 3 .2 1 ^ > 13.03 Lc v c l o n c 172 51 * 71.116 3 1 .1o 15 3 .3 7 1 2 6 .1 6 73 2 .0 0 0 m.ilH Lc v c l two 130 51 20.301 39.23 23 0 .0 0 0 1 7 .6 9 55 i».oco >(3.03 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 26 5.110 21.19 12 0 .0 0 0 9 .9 2 83 2 .0 0 0 6 8 .6 0 SUBOROINATCS Al l l c v c l s 123 317 116.835 71.91 67 5-236 1 5 .PA 39 k.o6z 9.22 Lc v c l o n c 172 123 6 3 .60I 71.51 29 6 A 6 I 1 6 .8 6 20 O .833 11.63 L c v c l tw o 130 100 33.521 76.9 2 19 0 .1 8 5 11.62 11 5 .0 0 0 8.1(6 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 50 9.751 I 1 .3 2 5 5 .0 0 0 I .1 3 66 1-333 5^-55 P fio rc ssio iM i S o c i c t t Al l l c v c l s 123 180 121.398 12.53 52 1 .2 8 5 12.29 191 0 .0 0 0 >15.15 L c v * l c :-T 172 £8 52.309 39-53 21 c .o o e 12.21 Sj 0 . 7* 1 * $ 17.03 Lc v c l tw o 130 51 19.353 11.51 16 2 .coo 12.31 60 O.COG > !6.15 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 63 7 3 . i l l 52.07 17 9-999 11.0 5 1l 2.CCO 33-83 Los A n o c l c s C o u n ty C m p l o y c c s . A s s o c i a t i o n Al l l c v c l s > 1 2 3 211 117.975 19.83 107 6 .0 I 6 25.30 105 2.236 2l(.S2 Lc v c l o n c 172 79 I8 .8 7 2 15.93 11 1.6 6 6 25.58 19 2 .0 0 0 23. > (3 L c v c l tw o 130 68 57.512 52.31 32 1.295 2 1 .6 2 30 0 .0 0 0 2 3 .0 8 Lc v c l t h r c c * 121 89 21 .3 5 6 73-55 11 0 .0 0 0 11-57 18 0 .0 0 0 11.33 Ot h c r E h PLOYCC Or g a n i z a t i o n s "A “ Al l l c v c l s 123 200 6 5 .3 8 2 I 7 .2 8 115 2.237 27-19 103 0.87^ 25-53 Lc v c l o n c 172 76 I 5 .9 U Jjl|.19 17 i-5 c o 27-33 19 o.oco m ? Lc v c l tw o 130 61 9.113 *(9.23 35 1 :9 5 0 26 .0 2 31 0.000 23.05 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 38 0.338 3 1 .1o 13 1-333 IO .7 I 70 o.oco 57.-85 X® 0ASCO ON THE RELATIONSHIP1 Of 0CCI3I0H CXRCC7EO AND OCCISIOH MA*f WITH rOUR OECRCES Or fRCIOOH. 253 SIAWARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS — GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (MASTER SAMPLE) COUNTCR-POM TION N N 1 YCS X* JtN N2 N O X* fH N 3 DON'T K N O W X 2 fit C l c c t c o O r r i c i A L S A l l l c v c l s 1 1 2 3 207 11.3.808 M8.9I. 69 1.051 16.31 i * * 7 4.612 3i*. 75 Lc v c l onc 178 76 1 .8.787 1 .1*.19 23 0.000 16.23 68 ■t.OOO 39-53 Lc v c l two 130 65 62.831. 50.00 83 9.000 17.69 1.2 o .o co 38-31 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 98 83.21.6 76.03 12 6.666 9-98 17 2.000 1U.05 C i v i l S c r v i c c Co m m is s io n ' Al l l c v c l s 1.23 329 123.218 77.78 18 0.000 >1.26 76 2.222 17-97 Lc v c l o n c 178 121 6o.oi*6 70.35 11 0.000 6.1*0 1.0 0 .0 0 0 23.26 Lc v c l two 130 10>t 18.270 80.00 5 0.000 3.83 21 3.000 16.15 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 98 ■ 35.689 80.99 6 0.000 1..96 17 0.000 1U.05 Cm p l o y c c Re l a t i o n s Comm. Al l l c v c l s 1.23 236 109.606 55-79 37 2.21*0 8.75 150 5. 11.2 35- « Lc v c l on c 178 85 58.702 ■19.*.2 2 0 0.1*66 11.63 67 ll.oco 38-95 L c v c l two 130 7* 13.197 56.98 11 1-333 8.1*6 H 5 If.CCO 3!. . 62 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 65 20.372 53-72 15 0.138 1 2 .1 .0 1 .1 0.000 33.o 8 F o rm a l Or g a n iz a t io n Al l c e v c t s 1.23 321. 227.110 76.60 35 it. 830 8.87 6 1 * 5.250 15.13 L c v c l on c 178 116 57.1.11 2 0 5.238 11.63 36 1.333 20.93 L c v c l two 130 101 * { 3.226 77.69 8 0.000 6.15 21 0.000 16.15 L c v c l t h r c c 121 99 81.82 15 o.oi*3 12.1*0 7 0.71*9 5-79 I mmcOIATC SUPERVISOR Al l l c v c l s . 1123 375 290.^90 88.65 27 3.122 6.38 21 h.000 4. £ > 6 Lc v c l o n c 178 lU^ I 32. 97t 83.72 16 1.1.06 9.30 12 o .co o 6.93 Lc v c l tw o 130 113 7ii.l6i| 50.77 3 2.099 6.15 1 * o .co o 3 -0 8 Lc v c l t h r c c 1 21 •78 36.653 C 4 .U6 H 0.000 3.31 39 0 . 0 0 0 32.23 S u p e r v i s o r s Wi t h i n Oc p t . A l l l c y c l s *123 2£l 190.365 66.U3 1 .1 * 3 . 851 * 1 0 .1 |0 98 19.999 23.17 Lc v c l onc 178 101 93.300 58.78 2 1 * 0.660 13.95 1 * 7 5-599 87.33 Lc v c l two 130 9’ 4 51-835 72.31 12 0 . 0 0 0 9.23 2l* 2 . 0 0 0 18.1*6 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 68 81..355 56.20 22 0.1.56 18.18 31 2 .1 .0 0 25.62 X VASCO CH THC ACLATIONSHIP OP OCCISION CXPCCTCO ANO OCCI3IOH MADC WITH POUR OEOACCS OP PRCCO0M. 254 SUMMARY or CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS — GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (MASTER SAMPLE) (CONTI NUEO) COUKTCft-POSITIOM N N1 YES X* i a NO X2 *N N3 DON'T K N O W X2 SUPERVISORS OuTSIOC OCRTo ALL LCVCLS *123 1 Ul 97.*)*)9 1 3 3 .3 3 83 0.355 1 9 .6 2 199 IO .999 117.01) Lc v c l on c 172 **8 33-3 5 * 1 27.91 36 *1.000 20. 93i 88 6 .6 6 6 5 1 .1 6 Lc v c l TWO 130 * * 9 51.637 3 7 .6 s 2 * 1 1.875 18.U6 57 0 .0 0 0 *13.85 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 21 1 1 .0 0 0 1 7 .3 6 15 0.7*19 12.1)0 85 0 .0 0 0 7 0 .2 5 S u b o r d in a t e s Al l l c v c l s * 1 2 3 31* * 1 1 )0.892 7* 1.23 76 *1.910 17.97 33 0 .6 0 6 7 .8 0 Lc v c l onc 172 120 7 9.035 69.77 32 2 .2 8 7 1 8 .6 0 20 0 .6 0 0 1 1 .6 3 Lc v c l two 130 101 2 9.716 77. 691 22 1.093 16.92 7 0.*)*)!) 5 .3 8 L c v c l t h r c c 121 * » 7 9. 01.5 38.8:1 8 0 .0 0 0 6 .6 l 66 7.000 5* 1-55 P r o f e s s i o n a l S o c i c t v Al l l c v c l s Il23 156 6 6 .3 5 9 3 6 .6 8 52 5 -5?3 12.29 215 3.750 5 0 .8 3 Lc v c l o n c 172 5!* 3 2 .i*B o 31 .*10 20 1-333 11.63 98 !).OC.O 5 6 .9 8 Lc v c l t w 130 51 2 0.390 39.23 18 2 .0 0 0 13.95 61 0 .0 0 0 1 )6.92 Lc v c l t h r c c 121 23 0 .0 0 0 19.01 1 0 0 .0 0 0 8 .2 6 88 O .OCO 72-73 Lo s An g c l c s C ou nty E k p i o y c l s As s o c i a t i o n Al l l c v c l s * 1 2 3 22** 5>).503 5 2 .9 6 107 1-795 25-30 92 * 1.277 21--75 Lc v c l onc 172 82 1)1.108 *17.67 * * 7 1-755 27-33 * 1 3 1 |.OCO 2 5 .0 0 Lc v c l two 130 7* 9.033 5 6 .9 2 28 0.281 2 1 -5 * ) 28 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 .5 * ) L c v c l t h r c c 121 33 2.5*15 27.27 l*i 0 .0 0 0 1 1 .5 7 7 * 1 0 . 0 0 0 6 1 .1 6 Ot h c r Cm rlo y cc Or g a n iz a t io n s "A " Al l l c v c l s *123 205 52.069 *)8.*)6 111 3.501 26.2!) 107 2-357 2 5 .3 0 Lc v c l o n c 172 81 3*t-790 *17.09 * 1 2 3.76*1 2*). *)2 *19 0 . 0 0 0 28. 1)9 Lc v c l two 130 €2 6.3 6 5 *17.69 39 o .* i8 i 3 0 .CO 29 2 . 0CO 2 2 .3 1 Lc v c l t h r c c 1 21 31 8.0*19 2 5 .6 2 12 0 .6 0 0 9-92 78 0.7*19 6*1.*)6 X® #WCO ON THC RCLATION3HIP Or DECISION CXPCCTCO AND OCCISION MAOC WITH TOUR DCCRCC3 OF'FRCCDOM. 255 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS ~ PERSONNEL PRACTICES (CONTROL GROUP ONE) C©UNTER*P03I T I 0N N N1 YES X2 N2 NO X * DON1T KNOW N3 x 2 iH Cl c c t e o Of f i c i a l s 37 3 » 1.8 9 1 1 83.73 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 M u o .c o o 1 0 .8 1 C i v i l S e r v i c e C o m m is s io n 37 37 7-?=9 1 0 0 .0 0 0 0 Cm p l o y c c Re l a t i o n s Com m. 37 31 1 .6 5 1 8 3 . 7 6 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 . 7 0 5 0 . 0 0 0 1 3 .5 1 Fo r m a l Or g a n iz a t io n 37 33 9-225 8 9 . 1 9 z 2 . 0 0 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 M I h h c o ia t c S u p c r v is o r 37 36 1 7 .6 7 3 97-30 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 . 7 0 0 S u p e r v i s o r s v / i t h i n Dc p t . 37 35 11). 392 5’ -*.53 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 M S u p e r v i s o r s Ou t s i o c Dc p t , 37 33 1 .2 1 )8 £ 9 . 1 9 z 0 . 0 0 0 5 .M 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 -M S u b o r d in a t e s 37 32 0-733 8 6 . 1)9 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 M 3 2 . 0 0 0 8 . 1 1 P r o f e s s i o n a l S o c i e t y 37 24 **•733 64.86 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 . 7 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 0 3 2 . *3 Lo s An c c l c s Co u n t y Ch p l o y c c s As s o c i a t i o n 37 29 6 . 2 6 8 78.33 1 | 0 . 0 0 0 io.8» k 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 .8 1 Ot h c r Cm p l o y c c Or g a n iz a t io n s "A n 37 2 2 1 2 .3 6 3 59 . 1 )6 7 0 7H 9 1 8 .9 2 8 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 . 6 2 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS — GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (CONTROL GROUP ONE) YES no DON'T K N O W Co u n t e r - P o s i t i o n N HI X2 fti N2 X2 10 X2 Cl c c t e o Of f i c i a l s 36 30 2.1)83 63.33 3 2.000 8-33 3 0 . 0 0 0 8 .3 3 C i v i l S c r v i c e Co m m is s io n 36 . 3 1 ) 5.171 94. i)U 1 0 . 0 0 0 2.78 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 .5 6 Cm p l o y c c Rc l a t i o n s C omm. 36 32 7.605 £8.89 1 o .o co 2.7S 3 0 . 0 0 0 3 .3 3 F o rm a l Or g a n iz a t io n 36 3t 6.357 J)!).!)!) 1 o .c c o 2.76 1 o .c o o 2 .7 8 I h h c o ia t c S u p c r v is o r 36 36 13.995 100.00 0 0 S u p e r v i s o r s Wi t h i n Dc p t . 36 33 18.1162 91.£7 1 0.000 2.78 2 2.000 5 .5 6 S u p e r v i s o r s Cj t s i o c Oc p t . 36 30 12.031 63-33 1 O.ODO 2.78 5 0 ,0 0 0 13.89 S u o o r o in a t c s 36 35 19.157 97.22 1 o .o co 2.78 0 P r o f e s s i o n a l S o c i c t y 36 22 L.69I) 61.11 2 o .co o 5.58 12 0 . 0 0 0 33.33 Los A n g c l c s C o u n ty C h p lo y c c s A s s o c i a t i o n 36 31 6 .oco 85.11 3 0 . 0 0 0 8.33 2 0 . 0 0 0 5 .5 6 Ot h e r Cm p l o y c c Or g a n i z a t i o n s *A* 3« 26 7.265 72.22 b 3.000 11.11 6 0 . 0 0 0 16.67 X* .ASCO OH THC RELATIONSHIP Or OCCISION CXPCCTCO AND OCCISION KADC BY COUNTCR-POS IT IONS AS FCMCCIVCO BY THC FOCAL POSITION WITH FOUn DECREES OF FREEDOM. LEGITIMACY IS THC RIGHT OF THC FOCAL POSITION TO HA VC THC9C EXPECTATIONS FOR THC C0UNTER-F03IT IONS. 256 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS ~ PERSONNEL PRACTICES (CONTROL GROUP TWO) . YES NO DON'T KNCW Counter Position N N 1 X* Hit N 2 X2 JSM «3 xz Clcctco Oppicials “ >5 11 5.238 73-33 0 U 0 .0 0 0 26.67 Civil Scrvicc Commission 15 lit 3 . ££6 93-33 0 1 o .o co 6.67 Cmploycc Rclations Comm. 15 11 3.080 73-33 0 k 0 .0 0 0 26.67 Formal Organization '5 12 £.Cfi2 8 0 .CO 0 3 0.0 0 0 20.00 Immediate Supervisor 15 13 8.651 85.£ 7 0 2 0.000 13-33 Supervisors W ithin Ocpt. 1 5 10 5-333 £5.57 0 5 0.000 3 3 .3 3 Supervisors Outside Ocpt. '5 7 3-333 0 6 0.000 5 3 .3 3 SUOOROINATCS '5 9 3.500 £o.co 0 6 0.000 U0 .0 0 Propcssional Society 15 9 O.7U6 £0.00 0 6 0.000 i;o.co Los Angclcs County Chployccs Association 15 ' £ 2.222 >10.00 0 9 2.000 60.00 Other Cmploycc Organizations "A* ’5 8 0.599 53-33 1 0.000 6,67 6 0.000 *10.00 SUMMARY OF CONTROL QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION FOR COUNTER-POSITIONS — GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION (CONTROL GROUP TWO) • YES NO D O N 'T KMCW Counter Position N N 1 X2 fH N2 X2 N3 X2 *N Clcctco o r r i c i A t s 15 •11 3.£50 73-33 0 > 1 0.000 26. £7 Civil Service Commission 15 11 >•.736 73.33 0 >1 0.000 26.67 Cmploycc Rclations Comm. 15 9 2.666 60.00 0 £ 0.000 >10.00 Formal Organization 15 10 2.857 66.67 0 5 0.000 33.33 Ihhcoiatc Supervisor 15 11 >>.190 73-33 0 > i 0.000 26.67 Supervisors W ithin Ocpt. 15 10 2.857 66.67 0 5 0.000 33-33 Supervisors Outsioc Ocpt. 15 10 2.057 66.67 0 5 0.000 33-33 Suooroinatcs 15 10 >1.285 66.67 0 5 0.000 33-35 Propcssional Society 15 11 8.995 73-33 0 > 1 0.000 26.67 Los Angclcs County Chployccs Association 15 8 2.099 53.33 0 7 0.000 •16.67 Othcr Employee Organizations "A" 15 8 6.000 53*33 0 7 0.000 >16.67 X* BASED OH THC RELATIONSHIP OP OCCISION CXPCCTCO ANO OCCISION MAOC OV C0UNTCR-P051 T IONS AS PERCEIVED OV CONTROL CROUP TWO WITH POUR OCCRCC3 OP PRCCOOM, tCOlTlKACT 19 THe RIGHT O p'c O N T flO L OROUP TVO TO HAVE THESE CXPCCTATION9 POR THC COUNTER-POSITIONS. 257 CONFLICT ZONE BASED ON LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOCAL POSITION (MASTER SAMPLE) AND COUNTER-POSITlONS (CONTROL GROUP ONE) PERSONNEL PRACTICES COUNTER-POSITION Control Group One Counter-Position (rights) N N1 X2 ,<N Focal N Master Sample Position (oslicat N 2 X2 Conflict On s) Zone £ N 1 -j£ N2 ElCCTCO OrFICIALS 3 7 3 1 1. 89!! 8 3 . 7 3 > 1 2 3 2 3 7 1 0 8 . 5 5 1 56.03 2 7 . 7 5 C ivil Service Co m m. 3 7 3 7 7.909 100.00 u 2 3 3 3 1 111. 133- 7 8 . 2 5 2 1 - 7 5 Ekployce Relations Co m m. 3 7 3 1 1.851 63.78 1 * 2 3 225 139- 38^ 5 3 - 1 9 3 0 . 5 9 Formal Organization 3 7 3 3 9 - 2 2 5 89.19 4 2 3 327 1 7 7 . 5 8 9 7 7 . 3 0 11.89 Immediate Supervisor 3 7 3 6 17.673 97. 30' 4 2 3 3 5 3 216.891 83. 1 ( 5 13.85 Supervisors W ithin Oe p t. 3 7 3 5 14.392 9 4 . 5 9 •* 2 3 290 193.720 68.56 26.03 Supervisors Outside Oept 3 7 3 3 1. 2 * 4 8 89.19 1(23 1 5 7 169.367 3 7 . 1 2 5 2 . 0 7 Subordinates 3 7 3 2 0 . 7 3 3 3 86. U 9 423 3 1 7 1 1 (6.835 7 4 . 9 ’* 11.55 Professional Society Los Angeles County 3 7 2 4 “i . 7 3 3 6 4 . 8 6 1(23 180 124.398 4 2 . 5 5 22.31 Employees Association Other Employee 3 7 2 9 6.288 7 8 . 3 8 1(23 2 1 1 1 1 7 . 9 7 5 49.88 28.50 Organizations "A" mean 3 7 2a 12.363 5 9 . * * 6 8 3 . 9 1 1(23 2 C0 65.382 47.28 60.78 12.18 23.50 CONFLICT ZONE BASED ON LEGITIMACY OF EXPECTATION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOCAL POSITION (MASTER SAMPLE) AND COUNTER-POSITIONS (CONTROL GROUP ONE) GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION Control Group Onc Co unter-Position (rights) Focal Hasten Sample Conflict Position (o bl ig a ti on s) Zone Counter-Position N N1 x 2 j£n N N2 2 X jfN ? N 1 -,<W2 Elccteo Officials 3 6 . 3 0 2 . 4 8 3 8 3 - 3 3 423 207 l 4 3 . 8 c 8 4 9 . 9 4 3 3 - 3 9 C ivil Service Co m m. 3 6 3 4 5 . 1 7 1 9 4 . 4 4 423 329 123.218 7 7 . 7 8 16.66 Employee Relations Co m m. 3 6 3 2 7 . 6 0 5 88.89 423 236 109.606 5 5 - 7 9 3 3 . 1 0 Formal Organization 3 6 3 4 6 - 3 5 7 9 M 4 4 2 3 324 227.110 76.60 1 7 . 8 4 Immeoiate Supervisor 3 6 3 6 1 3 - 9 9 5 100.00 423 3 7 5 2 9 0 . 4 9 0 88.65 1 2 - 3 5 Supervisors W ithin Dept. 3 6 3 3 18. 1 /6 2 91.67 423 2 8 1 1 9 0 . 3 6 5 6 6 . 4 3 2 5 . 2 4 Supervisors Outside Oe p t. 3 6 30 12.031 83.33 423 1 4 1 9 7 . 4 4 9 3 3 - 3 3 50.00 Subordinates 3 6 3 5 1 9 - 1 5 7 9 7 - 2 2 423 3 1 4 1 4 0 . 8 9 2 7 4 . 2 3 2 2 . 9 9 Professional Society 3 6 22 4.694 61.11 423 1 5 6 6 6 . 3 9 9 36.88 2 4 . 2 3 Los Angeles County Employees Association 3 6 31 6.000 86.11 423 2 2 4 5 4 . 5 0 3 52.96 33.15 Other Employec ■ Organizations "A* MEAN 3 6 2 6 7.265 72.22 66.62 4 2 3 O 1 52.069 4 3 . 4 6 60.10 23.76 26.61 CHI-SOUAXC 19 9ASC0 OM DECISION CXPCCTCO AMD OCCI3IOM MADC 1*0* £ ACM IT 13 MOT 8A3CD OM THC HCLATI0N3HIX DCTVCCM THC TWO &AMPLC HCAH3 DCtHO CONPAftfO. COUVTER-POSITlON Flcctco Officials PEPARTMENT All departhcnT3. Lccitihacy - Yrs_____ All Supervisory Lcvcls Decision Cxpcctco N - 237 Chi-Square 108.^51 Decision Mace HCBIT ONLY. 7hc«* *ftcrc*c>«cc* HtXQO OCCISION Othcn Z V " ^ « o X u 131* 1 6 l £ 6 U 5 0 16 0 2 > » 7 1 0 2 13 Supervisory Lcvcl Onc N -85 - Decision Cx p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r e i t o . U l Q L > - te J U u 2 X a o t - c u «r u u u x & : “ X »- S u O MCAIT ONLY ■ * 3 0 0 10 THCIR PACFCNCNCC* 3 2 2 0 KlXCO OCCISION 6 0 10 2 Othca 0 0 1 6 •Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t c o IN THC CHI-SQUARE. INDlPENDCNT VARIABLE Decision cxpcctc o. pcrsonncl practices DEPENDENT VARIABLE DCC13 ION MADE. PERSONNEL PRACTICES Supervisory Level Two N “ 6 0 * Decision Expcctco Chi-Squarc 50.601 2 r Decision maoe — X Hemr only 5* 0 0 5' Tiicir .rcfchchcc* 2 2 2 0 HlXCO OCCISION 1 5 0 5 2 Omen 0 0 1 2 i S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l T h r e e N m 9 1 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S q u a r e 3 U 7 2 2 H „ « H „ 5 • i Z t t Z “ So * t = K 5 De c i s i o n Ma o e ________________ ._£ ______ " ________ Mcait ©nut * * 7 1 5 Tmcia pftcrCRCHCc*' 2 1 If 0 HlKC© OCCISION e 0 1 3 1 Othca 2 0 0 3 COUNTER-POSITlON Civil Service Commission DEPARTMENT All departments, Legitimacy - res All Supervisory tcvcLS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision cxpcctco. personnel practlegs OEPE.NDENT VARIABLE OCCISION maoe. personnel PRACTic m Supervisory Level Two Decision Expcctco Chi-S«uare 1 11•133 Decision Made MERIT ONLY Thci* PAcrcnCNCCs ,Hixco OCCISION Other N - 106 Chi-Scuarc ^2.210 Decision Expcctco Decision Made MERIT ONLY Their pacecacnccs Mixco OCCISION : Supervisory Level One Supervisory Lcvcl Three Oecision Expcctco Dec is ion Maoc Hcait only Their prctcncnccs . Hixco occision ■ OTHER N - 100 Chi-Scuarc 6l.Q22 Decision maoe Merit only ThCIR FRCrCRCNCCS Mixco occision Otmcr Decision Expcctco M u * w t > * u ° 5 si is n ■ "Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w h o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i -s q u a r e * 259 C O U N T ER -PO SIT I ON SMftiortr Relations Commission DEPARTMENT ^ LL ocpartmcnts. Legitimacy - v c s N - J 21_ _ Ch I-S«uarc 13Q.?8*I All S u p e r v is o r y Lcv c l s De c i s i o n Ex pc cte o Decision Madc me«IT onur Thcia PPCYCaCnCCS HlXCO OCCISION Othcx a < - i - E D “ ‘J K V « I t — u U W 2 5 ,= S 139 0 P---SU. 3 18 1 » 6 1 2 15 1 iij 7 3 0 ° ....... 12 S u p e r v is o r y lev el une N - _2L C m I—S o u a r c 6 2 .6 2 * 1 D e c i s i o n Ma o c kcait ONLY ThCiA ^AcrcuCNCCS Hixco occision ©the* Decision Expected » > - ~ J u s £ i;o 0 1 8 2 5 0 0 2 1 6 3 0 0 I 7 : “O t h e r * c o l u m n a n o r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e CHI-SCUARE. I NDlP lNDSNT VAR I ABLE _Dtfi LaiOM_g.X£LEJEO. PER s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s____________ DEPENDENT VAR IA3LE. . P E C I M O N made, personnel practices__________________ S U PE R V ISO R Y LEVEL Two N _ g 2 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r c 2 R . 7 k6 J! 2 T . . i 5 S J * D e c i s i o n Ma d e A m u, KCflIT ONLY 58 0 0 8 8 Tm c i* FAcrcftCNCca 1 0 1 2 H i x c o occision • J; 0 2 z OThCA 1 0 0 3 1 Supervisory level Three N m gg Decision Expected Chi-Scuahe 28.212 5 > • 1 ■1 T 1 1 1 ■ " *" > jr ° O = ~ “ L ' * “ S l ° K u Xu Occision Made j ____________ MCAIT ©*UV 3 3 0 0 !» f r e t * f n c r c n c N c c s 0 0 0 0 Hixco occision k 0 7 3 OtmCX 2 0 0 2 O COUNTER-POSITI ON Formal organization________________ DEPARTMENT All dcparthcnts, Legitimacy - yes All Supervisory Levels N-J1L. Chi-Square 177-739 Decision Mage hcrit only Thcia pacycrcnccs . M ix c o o t e m o n Decision Expected 1^DEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expected, personnel practices DEPENDENT variable Decision hade, personnel phacticcs______ N . 105 Chi-Square *12.*105 Supervisory Level Two Decision Expcctco Decision Maoe Mcrit only Th e ir HlKCO DEC I SION OTKCA Supervisory Level One N - 117 Deeision Expected Chi-Scuarc 105-520 Decision Made HER IT ONLY Their prcfcrcnccs . HlXCO OCCISION "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i -s q u a r e Supervisory Level Three U m 100 Decision Expccteo Chi-Square 36-217 Decision Madc Merit only Thcir prcycrcnccs Mixes OCCISION Other COUNTER-POSITI ON I*mcdiatc supervisor____________ DEPARTMENT All departments. Legitimacy - ycs t NOEPCNDCNT VASIABLE Oc c i s i o n e x p e c t e d , pe r so n n e l p r a c t i c c s DEPENDENT VARIABLE D ecision m a d e ,. p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c t - s All S u p e r v is o r y Le v e l s S u p e r v is o r y Le vel Two De c i s i o n Ex p c c te o N - 353___ C h i- S q u a r e 21p . 891 De c i s i o n Hade Thcia PAcrcatNCC* HlXO OCCISION- De c i s i o n Ex pc cte o N - U P Ch i-S quahc 58.256 De c i s i o n Hade Mcrit only Their prcecachcci Mixco occision Su p e r v i s o r y Lcvel Onc N - 139 Ch i - S quare 85.296 Oc c i s i o n Ex p ec t e d ? X S - H S o i- u "Ot h c r" c o l u m n a n o r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i-s q u a r e . S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l T h re e N « f i D e c i s i o n E x p c c tc o C h i- S q u a r e „ , 2 a 5 s i i s 5 5 . . . . . A o £ u £ 2 , H C A I T O N L Y 71 2 5 2 M e r it o n l y 5 0 0 3 0 T h c i a p n c r c R c n c C s 8 1 T h e i r p r c t c r c n c c s 1 1 1 0 M l 'x C f t O C C I S I O N 1 2 1 22 1 M i x c o d e c i s i o n 8 0 1 2 0 O t h c a 0 0 3 3 O t h e r 1 0 0 0 262 CC'JNTER-POS1TI ON Supervisors within your department DEPARTMENT * LL pepahthcnts. leoitihacy - yes________ Al l S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l s N - £ 9 0 _______ D e c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i - S q u a r e ^ 9 3 - 7 2 0 - S I E - . i 5 - 2 3 2 I - > u £ » V X O c c i s i o n Ma d e HCKlT ONLV. 179 2 3 8 T nctn ^«crcRCncc» 3 3 0 H txto occision 21 1 * 55 5 OThCO / 1 0 0 2 S u p c a v is o r v Lcvcl One 2 a o De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d Ch i - S quare 9 1 *- O z * * • « u De c i s i o n M ade 5 ~ £ o £ ! ^ tc — K S u O M erit only 57 2 0 5 . TnLIR PRtrCRCKCCS 2 I* 1 0 Mixco occision 6 0 21 i Othcr 0 0 0 2 "O t h e r* c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e chi INDEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n e x p c c t c o , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s CCPEnCENT VARtABLE ... Oc c i s i o n m a o c ^ p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c « _______ S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l T wo N - _2|L De c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S q u a r e ci8 . 6 S 9 MC*IT ONLY 63 0 2 3 Tiicir PRCPCRCHCCS 0 0 1- 0 Mixco occision - 5 2 17 1 OTHCR 0 0 0 0 S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l T h r e e De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d Ch i- S quare 22.250 Decision Ma o c Thcir prc'crcnccs' Mixco occision -SQUARE. 263 COUNTER'POSITI ON Supervisor^ outside or your department PEPARTMENT All departments, Legitimacy - yes Al l S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l s Oc c i s i o n E x p e c t e d N - 1 5 7 Chi-Squarc 1 6 9 .3 6 7 D e c i s i o n Ma d e WKII ONLY. Th cir pRcrcRENCci Mixco occision OTnCR 1 0 1 INOEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expected, personnel practiccs DEPENDENT VARIABLE Occision made, personnel practices S u p e r v i s o r y l c v e l T wo N “ _51_ C n i - S c u a r e 2 0 . R 0 U O c c i s i o n Ma d e Merit only Their Mixco occision Othcr De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l O n e De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i «.S o u a r c 7*t - 1 1 *6 D e c i s i o n Ma d e . hcait ONLY Thcir prctcrchccs Mixco occision "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n o r o w h o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i -s q u a r e S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l T h r e e Oc c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i “ S o u a r c De c i s i o n Ma d e Hcait only Thcir prctcrcnccs Mixco occision Othcr 264 COUNTER-POSITION S u b o r d i n a t e s PEPASTMENT Al l d e p a r t m e n t s . L e g i t i m a c y - y e s A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l s N - .311__ C H I-S Q U A R C 1 **6.835 Oc c i s i o n M adc HCAIT ONLY THCIA PACrCACNCCS ' HiXCO OCCISION Othca O c c i s i o n E x p e c t e d INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expected, personnel practices DEPENDENT variable Decision hadc. personnel practices N - 100 Chi-Souarc 3 3 - 5 2 1 * S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T wo De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o D e c i s i o n made Hc a it only TllCIA PACTCACHCCS H i x c o o c c i s i o n ' Othca S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l On e O e c i s i o n Ex p c c t e o De c i s i o n Ma d e HCAIT ONLY Th cir pactcacnccs 2 0 H i x c o decision *Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i- s q u a r e N - J O S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l Th r e e Oc c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r e 9.7*51 O c c i s i o n Ma d c HCAIT ONLY Thcir PAcrcRCNCcs' H i x c o o c c i s i o n Othca 2 6 5 COUNTER-POSITION P R o rc s s iQ N R L s o c i e t y __________ DEPARTMENT All departments, Lccitimacv « yes INDEPENDENT VARIABLE. DEPENDENT VARIABLE__ A l l S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l s D e c i s i o n E x p e c t e d O c c i s i o n m a d e 125 MERIT ONLT Th c i r p r c f c r c n c c s M ix e s OCCISION Othcr S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l On e N - 6 8 De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d C h i —S q u a r c 52.109 D e c i s i o n Ma o c . MCRIT ONLY Th c i r p r c e c r Cn c c s . Mixco occision "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i- s o u a r e . De c i s i o n e x p c c t e o , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s De c i s i o n h a o c , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T wo N . 5*1 C h i - S o u a r e 1 9 . 3 5 8 O c c i s i o n Ma o c Hc a i t o n l y T h c i r a a c y c a c n c c* H i x c o o c e i s i o N Oe c i s i c n E x p c c t c o Z . > - u K J U L u S r u ? O 1 . k 39 0 r - N 0 2 1 0 0 0 5 0 1* 1 1 0 0 1 S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l T h a c c N - 63 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S q u a r e 71.iM o u * S t s £ S o Merit only “7 0 0 1 Thcir prcpcrcncc* 0 1 0 0 H ixco occision 7 0 3 2 Othcr' 2 0 0 0 D O O O ' COUMTER-POSITIOM *-o s An g e l e s Co u n t y E m p l o y e e s As s o c i a t i o n INDEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n c x p c c t e o . p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s DEPARTMENT Al l d e p a r t m e n t s . L r r . i T t M . r v - y e s _________________ DEPENDENT VARIABLE D e c i s i o n m a o c . p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s A l l S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l s S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l On e De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o . C h i » S o u a r c **8.872 De c i s i o n Ma o c M c r i t o n l y Thcir phctercnccs Mixco o c c is io n ’Ot h c r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i -s q u a r e . S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T u p N • De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i . S o u a r e Q7 c l i p 1 8 H . U « O J C i UN X 8 £ o £ . S X £ O c c i s i o n m a o c 1 2 _ MCA IT ONLY 51 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 M ix c o occision 6 0 5 1 Othcr 2 0 0 1 S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l T h r e e Oc c i s i o n E x p e c t e d --- U C h I - S Q u a r c 2 1 . R S 6 £ f u Z t s “ 2 0 u K w w c u Z Oc c i s i o n Ma o c 2 5 X X M O H C M T OMbV 65 0 2 5 Th c i * p«crtRCwCC» 2 0 0 0 M ix e d o c c i f t i o « 8 0 6 1 O t m c x 0 0 0 0 2 6 7 C OUNTER»POS 1TI ON Other Ehployce Organization 1 1 A" DEPARTMENT *LL departments, Lecitihacy - yes A l l S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l s N - 200 De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d INDEPENDENT VARIA3LE De c i s i o n c x p c c t e o . p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s DEPENDENT variable Oc c i s i o n m a pe, p c r s o n n c l p r a c t i c e s C h i - S q u a r e ^ 5.382 De c i s i o n M ade si- 128 Th cir prcfcrcnccs Hixco o c c m o H S u p e r v i s o r y l c v c l T w o N „ gij De c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S O u a r c 9 . 1 T 3 De c i s i o n Ma d e MCA IT ONLY Th c ir prcpcachcc* Mixco d c c ix io n Othca S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l On e N - 76 De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i - S c u a r c ^ 5 - 9 1 7 D e c i s i o n Ma o c Mc r it only ThCIR PACrCRCNCCS . Hixco o c c ix io n Othcr * -J « j t S Z K fc - “ X H X u © i»8 0 2 8 0 1 0 0 2 2 It 2 2 0 1 It S u p c RvisORY L c v c l T h r c c N " 3 6 Dec1 3 i o n E x p c c t c o C m i - S g u a r c 0 . 3 5 8 O c c i s i o n Maoc Hc a it cnlv Th cir pactcrcnccs HlXCD OCCISION Otmcx - ► i « li £ s u 1 0 1 = a C g u u A 4 . 22 0 2 It 0 0 0 2 It 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 ■OTHER* COLUMN AND ROW NOT CALCULATED IN THE C H I-S O U A R E . 268 COUNTER-POSITION Elected OmciALS DEPARTMENT. All o c p a r t m c n t s, l e g it im a c y ■ ye s All S u p e r v is o r y Lc v e l s N - 2°7 Ch i- S quare l ^ . S o S De c i s i o n Ex p ec t e d De c i s i o n M ade MCA I T ONLY. Thcir PACrcRCNCe* HIXCO DECISION Othcr Su p e r v is o r v Lcvcl One INDEPENDENT VARIABLE P e n s i o n expected, grievance resolution DEPENDENT VARIABLE DECISION MADE, GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION______ 1 2 0 22 De c i s i o n Expcc tco Ch i - S quare Occision Made T h c i r p a c t c r c h c c s . H i x c o o c c i s i o n S u p e r v is o r y Level Two De c i s i o n Ex pc c tco Ch i - S quarc 6 2 - 8 ^ Occision Made Mc r i t o n l y T h c i r p a c t c r c n c c s H ix c o o c c i s i o n • S u p e r v is o r y Lcvcl Three N- 92 O c c is io n E X P C C 7 C C Ch i - S cuakc Oc c i s i o n Made: Mc r i t on*.t Th c i r c o c n c c s' M ix co o c c i s i o w el u i y * Z * * © = b X > ■ o u * X o _?-OTH£R- c q l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u u a t c o _ i n t m g _ c h i - s q u a r e . 269 COUNTER-POS1 now Civil Servicc Commission DEPARTMENT All departments. Lecitimacy - res All Supervisory Lcvcls N - 329 Chi-Square 123.218 De c i s i o n Maoc M e * i t ONLV. The I* **crc*c*cct t M i x e d o c c i x i o h Ot n c* Decision Expected o u v K K O K ; 5 ; 5 as £ 5 h I ! S i 2 3 1 28 lU INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expected, grievance resolution DEPENOEi NT VARIABLE DECISION HADE, GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION S u P E R V I SORT LCVCL T w o N - lOU C h i - S o u a r c 18.270 D e e 1 s i o n M a d e . KCHIT ONLY Th c i r p r c p c a c n c c s M ix c o occision ' Othca Oc c is i o n Expcctco Supervisory Lcvcl One Supervisory Lcvcl Thrcc Occision Cxpccteo Ch i- S quare 60. 0U6 Occision Maoc m c r i t ONLY Tmcia pnerenCNect Hixco o c c i s i o n "Ot h e r" c o l u m n a n d r o w h o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i-s q u a r e N - 98 Chi-Square 35-689 Occision Maoc MCA IT ONLY Th c i r p r c f c r c n c c s H ix c o o c c i s i o n Decision Cxpccteo £ 5 68 o o 11 270 COUNTER-POSITI ON Ehploycc Relations Commission DEPARTMENT A ll o c p a r t m c n t s . Lc g i t i h a c y - y c s N - 2 3 6 C h I-S C U A R C 1 Q 9 - 6 o 6 Oc c i s i o n Ma o c HcsmT OMtT 7«iCi* * « r c * c » < c e * H lX ( » OCCISION OTh C* fm tc 3 o < a Z > Z r, u » » u « j u w * u * u 2 x h j: u *• £ 0 £ S = J O ll(2 12 11 26 21 A l l S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l s O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PECI3I0N cxpcctco, cricvancc rcsolution DEPENDENT VARIABLE Occision haoc. qricvancc resolution______ S U PE R V ISO R Y LCVCL T w o O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S o u a b c '1 3 - 1 9 7 O c c i s i o n m a o c HCAIT ONLY TllCI* PACECACNCCS H ix c o occision ' S u p c b v i s o b y Lc v c l Onc O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S o u a b c * 5 8 . 7 0 2 O c c i s i o n Ma o c Tk c i n rxc rcA C N C C s H i x c o occision • O t h c r " COLUMN AND ROW NOT CALCULATCO IN TMC C H I-SO U A B C S u p c b v i s o b y L c v c l T h r e e N m 65 O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C m i- S c u a r c 2 0 . 3 7 2 O c c i s i o n Ma o c H c a i t o n l y TmCIA PRCrCACNCCs' H ix c o occision Othca COUNTER-POSITI ON Fo r m a l ORQAni z a t ion___________ DEPARTMENT A*-1 - ocpartmckts, Legitimacy - yes A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L c vcl. s_ N » 3 2 1 * O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r c 227.110 S 2 -------------- n « \ o 3 ; 5 r 2 ¥ 5 ¥ 2'A 2 2 6 ! » 8 2 2 zk 5 3 8 1 0 2 0 1 1 * S u p c r v 1 s o r y L c v c l O n c N » 116 O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r c 1 1 * 1 .2 9 1 1 „ Oc c i s i o n m a o c . KenIT ONLY 67 0 1 !» Tncm nncrcftCNCCs 2 6 0 1 . Hixco occision 6 2 17 7 Ot h c n 0 0 0 3 •.Other" column and row not calculated in thc chi-square. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Pe c is io n c x p c c t e o , c r i c v a n c c r c s o l u t i o n DEPENDENT VARIABLE D e c i s i o n MAOC. CRICVANCC RESOLUTION S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l T wo N - 1 0 1 Oc c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i-S o u a rc * * 8 .2 2 6 O c c i s i o n m a o c MEN IT ONLY T h c i n n n c rc n c N C C * MtXCO OCCISION • Ci*c* tf « m U u W t * ■ » 7 *» 1 ___H_ 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 • 1 0 0 0 1 S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l T h r c c N - 2L C h i - S q u a r e **9.**19 O c c i s i o n Ma d c O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o - *■ I ‘ i “ 2 5 £ . Men IT o nly 6 L 3 0 2 Th c i r p r c t c r c n c c s’ 1 0 1 0 M ix c o o c c i s i o n 7 5 . 1 2 2 OTHCR 2 0 0 0 to COUNTER-POS IT! OS' I mmc° ‘ *tc 'supcrvispa DEPARTMENT A l l d e p a r t m e n t s , L e g i t i m a c y - y e s All Supervisory Levels N - 375 C h i - S c u a r e 2 9 0 . ^ 9 0 De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o Oc c i s i o n Ma o c He ft IT ONWY- Thci f t fftcrcftCNCcs H i x c o OCC t ft I ON Otmca a < cr .u» h u k V x — U K 2 e o 2 3 3 1 2 60 SUPERVISORY ICVEL OltC N - IhU C hi— S q u a re 132.971 De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o D e c 1 s i o n M a o c Hcait ©hly Thcia pRcrcftCftCcs Hixco occision ' Othca 80 2 5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expected, grievance resolution DEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision made, grievance resolution______ N - T lS C h i - S o u a r c 7 **- 1 8 k S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T wo De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o De c i s i o n Ma o c m c r i t o n ly T k c i r p r c t c r c n c c s Mikco occision S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T h r e e N - 78 Oc c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S o u a r c 3 6 . 6 * 5 3 _ H K * * r 3 ‘' 2 1 £5 Oc c i s i o n Ma o c H c a i t c h l y Thcir RRcrcftCKCca Hixco o c c i t 1 ON o w « h. u u K x * X Z 5 "Ot h c r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u c a t c o in t m c c h i - s c i m r e . 273 COUNTER-POSITION S»PEHVtsoq9 m T m y y o u r o c p a r t h c n t INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Oc c i s i o n c x p c c t e o . g r i e v a n c e r c s o l u t i o n DEPARTMENT A u l 0c p * R T m c n t s , L e g i t i m a c y - y e s DEPENDENT V A R IA B L E O c c i s i o n m a o c . g r i e v a n c e r e s o l u t i o n A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l s S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l T wo O c c i s i o n C x p c c t e o C h i - S c u a r c T 9 0 - 3 C 5 ■D e c i s i o n Haoe 1 7 8 T h e i r p a c y c a c x c c s K m c o O C C IS IO N Oc c i s i o n E x p c c t c o Cm i- S guarc 5T--35 Oc c i s i o n Kaoc Mc r i t o n l y T - c i h RHcrcACNCC M i x e s o c c i s i o n S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l O n e S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l T h r e e ft . . 1Q1 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t c o n - 6 G O c c i s i j s n E x p c c t c o . Hemr ohlv 55 1 3 . 3 KC*IT «NWV i*u 3 0 1 * T«ct* r * c r c n c « c c s l 5 l 0 Th c i r RftC'CACMCCft* 0 0 0 0 K u c » OCCI*iO« 6 0 19 U H ix c o o c c m o * * 0 2 c 1 O T hC * 1 0 0 2 Othcr 1 0 0 1 "Ot h c r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i -s q u a r e . COUNTER-POSITION Supervisors outside or your ocparthcnt INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expcctco, grievance: resolution DEPARTMENT All departments, Legitimacy - yes DEPENDENT variable Occision made, cricvancc rcsolution All Supervisory Lc vcls N - I1 *! Decision Expected Chi-Scuarc 97-M 9 tj 2 Decision made W rit okly. 97 0 1 9 1 2 0 0 . Hixco OCCISION 6 3 11 5 Othca 2 0 0 i* S u p e r v is o r y Level One N » 1,8 Ch i- S quarc 33-351 * Oc c i s i o n maoc De c i s i o n u c > : s ( J u u i 5 £ “ Ex pc ctc o C w >1 U hi w K A X — K •* Z M o Hcait only 31 0 0 3 Thcia rncrcACNCCt 1 1 0 0 HlKCO occision 1 3 3 2 Othca 0 0 0 3 ■Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i-s q u a r e . Supervisory Level Two N • kg Decision Expccteo Chi-Square 51.637 5 - Hc a i t o n l y 3<> 0 1 2 TllCIA PACYCACNCCS 0 1 0 0 H i x c o occision > k 0 2 3 O thca 0 0 0 0 Supervisory Level Three N m 2i Decision Expcctco Chi-Squarc 11.000 x w 1 I - > ■ « a e O Hc a i t o n l y • 9 0 0 2 Th c i a p a c t c a c n c c s ' 0 0 0 0 H i x c o o c c i s i o n 0 0 2 0 O t h c a 1 2 0 1 5 COUNTER'POSITI ON Subordinates________________________ DEPARTMENT All departments. Legitimacy - ycs All S u p e r v is o r y Lcvcl s N- ^ Oc c i s i o n Ex pc c tco . _ ? Ch i - S quarc 1U 0.89 2 De c i s i o n M aoc £ *. K -J A 5 u 0 z tc c — u u w z u « a . z 0 »- 0 < u f X U — U 2 6 . X C w Z £ Hcait qhuy- 189 9 1 5 7 T hcir mcecrchcca 0 3 0 0 H ixco o c c i&ion 2 1 1 5 **3 5 Othcr 3 0 2 2 Su p c r v is o b y Lcvcl Onc N ■ 120 Ch i- S quarc 7 9 -0 3 5 Oc c i s i o n M aoc Hcait only Tkcix pactcacnccs Hixco occision Cthca Oc c i s i o n Ex pc ctc o u u z V h . * y c o < • ► - * U U bJ K J u y X fc . S u 2 s U . - M » 2 © £ 2 b o 65 3 5 i; 0 3 0 0 6 £ 22 3 1 0 0 2 "Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t c o in t h e chi INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision cxpcctcd. cricvancc rcsolution DEPENDENT variable Occision hapc, cricvancc rcsolution S u p c r v is o r y Lcvcl Two N » 101 Oc c i s i o n Expcc tco C h i - S q u a r c 29-71& * ; t. « « *2 * • j - “ y u y * * y h 2 u • * u ; s « ^ t p» V O 3 ^ £ O Oc c i s i o n M aoc * • ; MCAIT ONLY 63 . . 2 r ~ 8 1 Thcir pacecachcc* 0 0 0 0 Hixco occision 7 5 12 1 Otnca 0 0 2 0 S u p c r v i s p r y Lcvcl Thrcc Oc c i s i o n Ex pc ctc o Oc c i s i o n Maoc TmCIR MtrtRCHCCa Hixco occ i» ion -s q u a r e . 276 COUNTEH-POSITl O N Pr ofe s s i on a l socirTv__________ PEPARTMENT A l l d e p a r t m e n t s , Le g i t i m a c y - YC3 A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l s O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o N - J 5 l _ C h i - S c u a r c 66.359 a ■ < u H K O - u X l independent variable. DEPENDENT VARIABLE__ M c r i t o n l y . 1 1 5 0 0 7 T h c i r pRtrCRCHce* 0 0 1 0 . H i x c o occision 1 3 z 9 z O t h c r 1 0 0 6 S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l On e N - 5 1 * C h i - S q u a r c 3 3 .1 lS o Oc c i s i o n Ma o c W a i t o n l y Thcir fflcrcMCwcc* H i x c o occision OthCR Dec I SI ON EXPCCTCD e u ho H & 3 8 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 !» 2 U 1 0 0 0 3 "Ot h c r " c o l u m n a n d r o w h o t c a l c u l a t c o in t h e c h i-s q u a r c . O c c i s i o n c x p c c t e o , c r i c v a n c c r c s o l u t i o n O c c i s i o n m a o c . c r i c v a n c c r e s o l u t i o n S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l T wo N - _ 2 L C h i - S c u a r c 2 0 - 3 9 0 O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o U ® a * 6 J • x u * ■ * ; u w • X U D e e i s i o n Ma o c A W r i t o n l y 3 8 0 0 1 * T h c i r p a c t c a c n c c s 0 0 0 0 M i x c o o c c i s i o n 3 0 3 1 Othca 0 0 0 2 S u p e r v i s o r y Lc v c l T h r c c N - J 2 _ C h i - S c u a r c 0,0Q 0 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t c o u u - > I S 2 “ 5 * I M U K “ X 2 5 # 5 £ 2 S W a i t o n l y 1 7 0 0 1 Th c i r p a c c c r c n c c * 0 "" 0 0 0 H i x c o o c c i s i o n I* ........ 0 0 0 O t h c r ' 1 0 0 0 fo COUNTER-POSITI ON Los A n g e l e s Co u n t y Eh p l o y c c s A s s o c i a t ion PEPARTMENT A l l d e p a r t m e n t s , l e g i t i m a c y - y e s A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l s 2 2 U N « _ _ _ _ _ Oc c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r e 5 ^ . 5 0 3 “ 2 !: > 5 2 S Z 5 * 4 Li L * “ * n u £ 5 £ S X l O D e c i s i o n Ma d e J5 _________ MCRIT ONLY 13 U 9 1 * 1 5 Th c i r r r c t c r c n c c ® 2 2 0 0 H i x c o o c c i s i o n 1 7 1 0 1 2 3 O t h c r X 2 0 1 1 3 S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l On c N » 82 D e c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i - S q u a r e U1.108 x . — — — *- « y c w - ► . - * u w D e c i s i o n Ma d c . Hcait only L6 1 i 6 Thcir pRcrcRCHCca 1 2 0 0 Mixco occision 5 3 7 1 Othca 2 0 0 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE_ "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i-s c u a r c . D e c i s i o n e x p c c t c o , c r i c v a n c c r e s o l u t i o n D e c i s i o n m a d c , o r i c v a n c c r e s o l u t i o n_____ S u p e r v i s o r y l c v c l T wo N - 7> * C h i - S q u a r e 9 - 0 3 3 De c i s i o n E x p c c t c d Oc c i s i o n Ma d e Z > - hi U C 4 U w K u 5 r w - 2 o L - « * Hc a i t ' only * * 7 3 2 k 1 0 0 0 Hixco occision 6 3 2 1 Othca 0 0 1 S u p e r v i s o r y L c v c l T h r c e N m 33 D e c i s i o n E x p c c t c o C h i - S q u a r c 2 . 5 1 *5 D e c i s i o n m a d e HCAIT ONLY 18 2 1 3 Thcir pactcachccs 0 0 0 0 Hixco occision k 2 1 1 Othca 0 0 0 1 D O 0 0 C O U N T E R -PO S IT IO N °THCR employee organization "A " DEPARTMENT All departments. Legitimacy - yes. A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l s N- 2°5 D e c i s i o n E x p e c t e d O c c i s i o n Ma d e HCRIT ONLY T n c iR prcxcaChccs MIXCO OCCISION O t h c r S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l Onc 8 l C h i - S q u a r e 3 **-79Q De c i s i o n Ma d e Merit only TticiN pHcrc»«CHCca H i x c o occihon Othca O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o r« « * ■ [, w u » — > — ., w w « x J O “ H E X 2 X 7. — x > - £ 0 »“ y s w O 1 )1 * "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e chi INDEPENDENT V A RIA 3LE Decision expected, grievance resolution DEPENDENT VAgiARig Occision haoe. grievance resolution S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T wo M „ 6 2 De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d C h i - S o u a r e 6- 3 6 5 % 2 O c c i s i o n Ma d c Merit only T h c i r Mixco occision 1)1 3 1 5 1 0 0 0 6 1 z i 0 0 0 1 1 S u p e r v 1 s o r t L e v e l T h r e e De c i s i o n E x p e c t e d N - _J1____ C m i - S c u a r c 8 .Q l* 9 h v ® Y o o * r z, - m u u 3 X - L 2 A i De c i s i o n Ma d e Hen IT ONLY 20 0 1 3 Thcir prctcrcnccs 0 0 0 0 M ixco occision 3 1 2 0 Othcr 0 0 0 2 7 9 COUNTER EXPECTATIONS TOR SEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 1 FOCAL POSITION All supervisory levels. Legitimacy - vcs INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision c x p e c t c p , pe rso nne l p r a c t i c e s DEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n made, pe r so n n e l p r a c t i c e s CGUNTER-P05IT10N El ect e o Of f i c i a l s N - 31 C h i - S q u a r c 1 -89** Dc c i s i o n Ex p e c t c p . - L E X U u «■* * X i. © t- O < (C COUNTER-POSITION C i v i l S e r v ic e Co m m issi n - 3 7 C h i - S q u a r c 7 - 9 0 9 De c i s i o n Ex p c c t e o 0 > - x K - 1 J “ ,J t i - • i "Ot h e r ” c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i- s q u a r c . COUNTER-POSITlON Employee Re l a t i o n s Co m m iss io n N - 31 O e c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S c u a r e 1 . 8 5 1 J - D e c i s i o n m a d e L . »- HC*<T OHWf o 0 0 0 Ken IT ONLY 7 0 0 0 T n c t f PA crcA C N cet 8 0 l 0 Th c i r p a c f c a c n c c s 8 0 1 1 M ix c o OCCIStCN 1 0 0 3 0 HIXCO OCCISION 7 0 2 0 CTh EA 3 0 0 0 OTHCR 0 1 0 COUNTER-POSITION Formal Or ga nic at ion n- 3 3 C h i - S c j a r c De c i s i o n Ex p ec t c o (j u H y < •- £ ° » 5 I i s s r ° w w v * Kc h i t o n ly I 1 * 0 0 0 Hen IT ONLY 1 2 0 0 c T n c m P n crcnC N C C s 7 0 1 0 T h c i r p n c r c R C iic c s fr 1 1 0 H i x c o o c c i s i o n 7 0 5 0 H i x c o o c c i s i o n 6 0 1 * 0 OVkCA 3 0 0 c OTxen 3 0 0 0 280 COUNTER EXPECTATI0N5 FOR BEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 1 FCCAL POSITION A1 -1 - supervisory levels, Lecitima£Y - YES COUNTER-POSITION I mmediate S u p e r v is o r______ N “ 3 6 D e c i s i o n C h i - S o u a r c ' 1 7 - 6 7 3 - B C l « S ( t ;f <J w U - S U D e c i s i o n Ma o c * ■ HCftlT CNlY. 13 0 0 0 T«ci« pAcrtftCKCci 9 \ 0 0 Hixco DCCI&ION 6 0 7 0 O t m c m 0 0 0 0 COUNTER-POSITION Su p e r v i s o r s Wi t h i n Your Department N - C h i- S c u a r c T**-392 De c i s i o n Maoc MCKit only Th c i r p r c t c r c a c H ix c o o c c i s i o n Othcr Oc c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d * — »• w u '■ i ? w K 4. * 1 9 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 0 6 0 3 0 0 ------- tx .P c c rc o o H £ < er X V S U R. - 5 ° "Ot h e r * c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i- s o u a r e . INDEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n c x p c c t e o , pe r so n n e l p r a c t i c e s DEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n made, pe r so n n e l p r a c t ic e s COUNTER-POSITION Su p e r v i s o r s Ou t s i d e Or Your Department N _ 3 3 De c i s i o n Ex pc ctc o C h i - S C u a r c 1 2 - 0 3 7 Oc c a s io n M aoc MCRIT ONLY T h c i r p r c t c a Cn cca H ix c o o c c i s i o n ’ O thcr COUNTER-POSITION Su b o r d in a te s O c c i s i o n E x p c c t e o De c i s i o n m a o c m c r i t ONLY Th c i r p r c t c r Cn ccs H i x c o o c c i a i o n 281 COUNTER EXPECTATIONS FOR BEKAVI OR— CONTROL GROUP 1 FOCAL POSITION All supervisory levels. Legitimacy - YE3 COUNTER-POSITION PnorcssiONAL Socicty N - 2U Ch i - S quare **-7t 3 De c i s i o n E xp ec t e d — U A . k c 5 .MCftlT OHWY 5 0 0 0 T h c i a p A c rc n tN C c s 6 3 i 0 KlXCO OCCISION- k 0 l 0 Ot»«c* 1 0 l 2 COUNTER-POSITlON Lo3 Ang clcs County Employces As s o c i a t i o n N - J2_ C h i - s q u a r c 6. 253 Oc c i s i o n Ma o c W r i t o n l y T h CIA rftC<*C*CnCCft MtxCO OCCISION CT hCH - > tt - J y o De c i s i o n Cx p c c t e o w \J « B G 5 I----- 6 0 0 0 6 3 2 1 5 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 ■Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d in t h e c h i-s q u a r c . INDEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n e x p e c t e d , pcrsonncl p r a c t ic c s DEPENDENT VARIABLE De c i s i o n made, perso nncl p r a c t i c e s COUNTER-POSITION 4 lOTnrp" Employee Organ i eat ion N - 22 Ch i - S quare ^ 2 .3 ^ 3 De c i s i o n Ex p c c te o C m : 1 s ; e r f u w i a» 2 5 is j - ; . W a i t o n l y ' 5 0 0 0 T h c i r p r c p c a c n c c * 3 3 0 0 H i x c o o c c i x i o n ' 3 0 3 0 Othcr 2 1 2 0 COUNTER-POSITION N C h i - S q u a r e Oc c i s i o n Expc ctco O o * Oc c i s i o n madc W R I T ONLY Th c i r p r c t c r Ch c c * H i x c o o c c i s i o n O t h c r 282 COUNTER EXPECTATIONS FOR 0EHAVIOR--CONTROL GROUP 1 FOCAL POSITION All svpcRVIS°H* lcvels, Legitimacy ■ yes INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expectco, grievances DEPENDENT VARIAP.l" Decision made, grievances COUNTER-POSITION E l e c t e d O r r i c i A L S N - TO O e c i s i o n E x p e c t e d - C h i - S q u a r c 2 - ^ 6 3 O < w ^ u COUNTER-POS1TICK C i v i l S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n n - Ji!L G e c t s i o t f Ex p c c t c o C m i - S u o a r c 5» *7^ _ ► a . * D * c V * * » u W O "Ot h c r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e o in t h e c h i -s q u a r e . COUNTER-POSITlOft E m p l o y e e R e l a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n N „ 0 ? D e c i s i o n E x p e c t c o C h i - S q u a r e 7 - 6 0 5 D e c i s i o n Ma d e m e i e 0 « > S U u h c a i t o h w T 7 0 0 0 MERIT ONLY 11 0 0 0 T m c i * pftcrcRCNCca 6 1 1 0 T h c i a p r c y c a c n c c s 6 0 1 0 Hixco OCClSlOH- 8 1 2 0 Hixco o c c i s i o n ; 0 0 O t h CA l* 0 0 0 Othcr 1* 0 • 1 1 COUNTER-POSITION F o r m a l O r g a n i z a t i o n N --21 C h i - S c u a r e 6. T S 7 O c r . i s i c N E x p c c t c o -2 - * « " c i w - < fc . S* o = u s * M c r i t o n l y 15 0 0 0 MCRIT ONLY 13 0 0 0 T h c i r p r c y c r c n CC s k 0 2 0 Th c i r p a c c c r c n c c s 6 0 0 0 M i x c o o c c i s i o n 6 0 2 0 M i x c o o c c i s i o n 7 0 3 1 O t h c r 3 0 1 1 O t h c r 1* 0 0 0 2 8 3 COUNTER EXPECTATIONS FOR OEMAVSOR— CONTROL GROUP 1 FOCAL POSITION All supervisory levels. Legitimacy - yes COUNTER-PCS ITIOM I m m e d i a t e S u p e r v i s o r N - Ch i - scuarc 1 3 -9 9 5 Dec 1s i o n Maoc De c i s i o n Ex pc ctc o 5 _ N Z 5 i S 1 1 « £ M C R I T C N L V - 15 0 0 0 T h c i r r « c r c N C H c c » 5 1 0 0 H l X C O O C C I t l O N - 8 0 c J 0 O r n C R 2 0 0 0 COUNTER-POSITION S u p e r v i s o r s W i t h i n Y o u r D e p a r t m e n t N - 33 O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o Ch i - S cuarc l6.4o2 HCAIT ONLY 14 0 0 0 Thcir pacccachcc* 5 2 0 0 . Hixco occision 4 0 4 0 OTkC A 4 0 0 0 “Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i -s c u a r e . INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision expectco. cricvances DEPENDENT VARIABLE Decision hap- ' crifvanccs COUNTER-POSITION' ' S u p e r v i s o r s O u t s i p e Or Y o u r D e p a r t m e n t Oc c i s i o n Expc c tc o N - 30 Ch i- S ouarc T2-Q31 — W U f c Z w Oc c i s i o n M aoc Hcait o mly’ 9 0 0 0 Thcir pacccacnccs 7 i 0 0 M ixco occision ' 4 0 4 0 Othca 5 0 0 0 COUNTER-POSITION S u b o r o i n a t c s 35 N _______ Ch i- S ouarc 1 9 -1 5 7 De c i s i o n maoc O c c i s i o n E x p c c t c o 6 o w < c. - K i- W Hcait only ’l7 0 0 0 Thcir pactcrcnccs 2 2 1 0 M ixco decision 8 0 4 0 Othca 1 0 0 0 2 8 4 COUNTER EXPECTATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 1 FOCAL POSITION All supervisory levels. Legitimacy - yes INDEPENDENT VARIABLE D e c i s i o n e x p c c t e o , g r i e v a n c e s OEPENOEnT VARIABLE D e c i s i o n m a d e , g r i e v a n c e s COUNTER-POSITION P r o f e s s i o n a l S o c i e t y N- 22 O c c i s i o n E x p c c t e o C h i - S q u a r c M9! ; O < xe N - 31 D e c i s i o n E x p e c t c o C h I- SQ U AI IC 6.00 •* u W V — !* ki ui u »- x 4. — u Z . - O H c« i t onl y 1 2 0 0 0 T h CIA PAC/*CACfiCCS 2 0 . 2 0 HlXCP o c c i s i o n 6 0 2 0 OTnCft 5 1 1 0 "Ot h e r " c o l u m n a n d r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e o in t h e c h i - s c u a r c . COUNTER-POSITION " O t h e r " E m p l o y e e O r g a n i t a t i o n N - 26 C h i - S o u a r c 7 - 2 6 5 De c i s i o n E x p c c t c o O c c i s i o n m a o c • Z > Z u « C J U k K ? 5 £ £ £ m c r i t only 9 0 0 0 . HCAIT ONLY • 8 0 0 0 T h c i r p a c p c r c n c c * 1* 0 1 0 T h c i r p r c p c a c n c c s 1* 2 1 0 HlXLO OCCISION 1» 0 3 0 H i x c o OCCISION 2 1 2 0 Otrcr 0 1 0 0 Othcr 3 1 1 1 COUNTER-POSITION Los A n g e l e s Co u n t y Im p l o y c e s Assoc 1 AT ION COUNTER-POSITION N - D e c i s i o n E x p e c t c o C h i - S s u a r c D e c i s i o n m a d e mcait only Th c i r r a c t c h c h c c o K i x c o OCCISION Otrcr 2 8 5 EX PECTATIONS FOB BEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 2 FOCAL P O S IT IO N A l l s u p e r v i s o r y l e v e l s , - L e o i t i m a c y - y e s COUNTER-POSITION El e cte d Oi t i c i a l s N- ” C h i-S c u a rc Oc c is io n Ex pec te d Deci s i o n Hade - ► - ^ U i P- u « 4 W w i U * u 2 X u " H X * r - * MC*IT ONbV 0 0 0 0 T hC I* MCrCfitNCC* 2 3 0 0 HlXCO OCCI410V 5 0 1 0 OtMC^ 0 0 0 0 CCXJNTCR-POSITlOf/ C i v i l S c r v ic e Co m m is s i o n H- 1 * De c i s i o n Ex p e c t c d ChI-SCl'aRE 3-666 Z y : « b -* u u u ' ■ * 1 * 2 c - M c U * U u u K *. X Xu O NCR IT ONLY 3 0 0 0 T h e m pacrcACHCCS 3 1 0 0 MlKCO OECISION 3 0 1 0 . O t m c a 1 0 2 0 "O t h e r " colum n ano row not c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s o u a r e . . UJDEPENOEt DEPENDENT IT VARIA BLE D e c i s i o n e x p e c t e d , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s V ARIABLE De c i s i o n m a d e , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s COUNTER-POSITION Employee Re l a t i o n s Co mm is s i o n N - 11 Cki-S cuarc R .O S O De c i s i o n Exp ec t c d £ ° ■ - ? Me r i t o n l y ' 0 0 0 0 TliCIR PRCrCRCNCCl 1 1 0 0 Mi k c o o c c i s i o n 1* 0 1 0 OThCA 2 0 1 1 COUNTER-POSITION Formal Or g a n i z a t io n N - 12 C hi-Souare 6.s62 De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d O e c i S i O n Made □ o U u * im “ X MCA IT ONLY 2 ' 0 0 0 ThCIR RAC'CRCMCCS 1 2 0 0 MlXCO OCCISION 1 1 2 0 Otmca 2 0 1 0 286 EXPECTATIONS FOR SEHAVIOR--CONTROL GROUP 2 FOCAL P O S IT IO N A li‘ 3UPI;R v i s o a y l c v c - s . L e g i t i m a c y •» y e s COUNTER-POSITION I mmcdiatc Su p e r v i s o r N - 13 Ch i- S ouaac 8.S6i Oc c i s i o n Ex p c c t co Oc c i s i o n Maoc te * * < « • — w P- u K V > X MCA 1T ONLY 2 0 0 0 T h c i a PACECr Cn CCS 1 2 0 0 M i x c o o c c i s i o n 3 0 » 3 o ' OTnCA 1 0 i 0 COUNTER-POSITION Su p e r v i s o r s Wi t h i n Th e i r Depar tment N * T O Ch i- S cuarc ? -3 3 3 De c i s i o n Ex pc c t c o MCAlT ONLY 0 0 0 0 Thcia pacecacnccs 2 ‘ 2 0 0 . KIXCO O C C IS IO N 1 0 3 0 Othca 1 0 1 0 ■Ot h e r 1 ' co lu mn and row no t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s q u a r e . INOEPENCCNT V ARIABLE D e c i s i o n c x p e c t c o . p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s DEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n m a d e , p c r s o n n e l p h a c t i c c s COL'NTER-POSITlON S u p e r v i s o r s Ou t s i d c Or Th e i r DcpartmcnT C h i- S c u a r c 3 .R33 De c i s i o n Exp cc t c o £ o - < COUNTER-POSITI O N S ub o r d in a t e s MCRIT ONLY 1 0 0 0 TllCIA PACrCACNCCS 1 1 0 c MtXCD O C C IS IO N 1 0 1 0 OTNCA 1 0 ■ 1 0 Chi-Squarc 3-5°° De c i s i o n Ex p e c t e d £ G MCAIT ONLY 1 • 0 0 0 Thcia pac/crcnccs 0 l 0 0 MIXCO OCCISION 3 i 1 0 Otmca l 0 1 0 D O 00 -2 EXPECTATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 2 FOCAL POSITION A l l s u p e r v i s o r y l c v e l s , L e g i t i m a c y «. y e s COUNTER-POSITION PRorcssiONAL Society N - 9 Decision Ex p cc t c o • Chi-Scuarc 0 .7 * * 6 o < e W ► * u H U I 2 5 © HCftlT ONLY 0 0 0 0 T h c i a p « r c « C n c c » 2 0 1 0 M ix e d o e c i& io M 3 1 . r 0 ' Otmca 0 0 i 0 C0DN7Eft«P0SIT!CN Los A n o c lc s County EmPloyccs A ssoc i at re N - De c i s i o n Cxp cc t c d C h i- S Q u a r c 2,222 < 2 u « U W u H a . : £ w o MCA IT ONLY 0 0 0 0 T h c i a p r c t c a c n c c s 1 1 0 0 . Mi x e d d e c i s i o n 2 0 1 0 Other 0 0 1 0 "O t h e r * colu mn and row no t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s q u a r e . INDEPENDENT VARI ABLE De c i s i ° n e x p e c t e d , p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c e s DEPENDENT VARIA3LE O c c i s i o n m a o c . p e r s o n n e l p r a c t i c c 3 COUNTER-POSITION " O t h e r " Em plo yee O r g a n i z a t i o n N m S Decision Expcctco Chi-S cu ar c °-599 £ 2 C v . S s 2 5 « e z y 5 - “ £ 3 ! ® £ * * £ © De c i s i o n m a o c MCAIT ONLY 1 0 c 0 Th c i a p r c p e a c n c c s 1 0 0 0 Mi x e d o c c i s i o n 3 i 0 0 Other 1 0 1 0 COUNTER-POSITION N - ____ Ch i- S quarc De c i s i o n Maoc MCRIT ONLY Th c i r PACTERCnCCS Mix c o OCCISION Other Oc c is i c n Exp cc t c o p o 0 0 . 0 0 EXPECTATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR— CONTROL GROUP 2 FOCAL POSfiOM All SUPERVISORY LEVELS, Legitimacy - v ' cs COUNTER-POSITION Elected Officials N « ^ ' Oc c is i o n Exp cc t c o Chi-S cuarc 3-^ 0 “ 2 Occision Maoc M e r i t only 0 0 0 0 Th c i a p r c f c r c n c c s 2 1 0 0 Mixco o c c i s i o n 1* 0 3 o' Othca 1 0 0 0 COUNTCR-POSITIOfI C ivil Scrvicc Commission N „ 11 Occision Expcctco Chi-Soua. ie *1.736 * >- “ ------- C » S * 5 “ g -I W “ X *. u A * X * * " Y K 2 * ~ i z w OtCisiCN Maoc ,____ ? -------- MCRIT o n ly 2 0 0 0 T h c i a p a c f c a c n c c s 1 1 1 0 HIXCO OECISION 3 0 3 0 Othca 0 0 0 0 ■ Ot h e r 11 co l u h n and row not c a l c u l a t e d i n th e c m i - s q u a r c * INDEPENDENT VAftlA9LC DEPENDENT VARtA0LE_ DECISION EXPCCTCO, GRIEVANCES Decision made, grievances CCUNTER-POSITI ON S>ploycc Relations Commission N - _____9 Oc c is i o n Exp cc t c o Chi-Scuarc 2.666 Occision maoc m e r i t ONLY Th c i a p a c f c a c n c c s Mix c o d e c i s i o n Other COUNTER-POSITION Formal Organization N - 10 Ch i-Square 2.857 Ocgisicn Expcctco Occision Madc MCA IT ONLY TmcIa PACTCACNCCS M ix c o o c c i s i o n O t h e r 1 ' 0 0 to 00 s O EXPECTATION'S FOR BEHAVIOR--CONTROL CROUP 2 FOCAL POSITION A l l s u p e r v i s o r y l e v e l s , L c o i t i m a c y - res COUNTER-POSITION Immediate Supcrvi. oor N “ 1]___ C h i - S c u a r c D e c is io n Ex p ec t e d D e c i s i o n Ma o c a < m U *- U X W X •• U K « * ■ o MCAIl ONcY 2 0 0 0 Trcir PAcrcnCNCCs 1 1 0 0 HlXEO OCCISION 3 1 3 o' Otmca 0 0 0 0 CCUNTER-POSITIOH Supervisors W ithin Their Department N - 10 Chi-Scuarc s -&57 Decision Expected C O * U I* u K < L X 2 o • - £ x 2 o Z > - « at -J u u k « l Me r i t o n l y 1 0 0 0 T h c i a PRcrcRCNCCs 2 0 0 0 HlXCO OECISION 3 2 2 0 Other 0 0 0 0 "O t h e r * colu mn and row no t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s q u a r e . INDEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n c x f e c t c o , g r i c v a n c c j DEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n m a d e , c r i c v a n c c s CCUNTlR-POSITION Supervisors Outsioc Or Thcia Department N- 10 Decision Expcctco C h i - S c u a r c 2 . 0 5 7 D e c i s i o n Ma d e tfCRiT o h l v Th c i a p a c f c a c n c c s H i k c o OCCISION COUNTER-POSITION Sudordinatcs Decisich E/pccteo Chi-Suuarc * l .2 S5 De c is i o n ma de ThCIA PACFCACNCCS HlKCO OCCISION t o vO o EXPECTATIONS FOR BEfftVI OR— CONTROL GROUP 2 FOCAL POSITION A l l s u p e r v i s o r y l e v e l s . L e g i t i m a c y - yes COUNTER-POSITION Pr o f e s s i o n a l S o c i e t y N - U Oc c is i o n Ex p c c t c o C h i - S o u a r e 8 . 9 9 5 O c c i s i o n h a d c NCR IT ONl Y . T hcia pactcrcnccs . MlXCO DECISION Ot h ca a a 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 COUNTER-POSITIQfJ Los An g e l es County Emp loy ee s As s o c i a t i o n N - 8 De c i s i o n Ex p c c t cd C hi— S cuarc 2.0 9 9 c J u C % i e U H u X e. - X u O H C R IT ONLY 1 0 0 0 T h c i a p r c t c a c h c c s 1 0 0 0 M i x e d d e c i s i o n 2 • 1 2 0 O t h c a 0 1 0 0 . . . . ’ OTMCft" COLUMN ANG HOW NOT CALCULATED IN THE C H I-SC U A R C . INDEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n e x p e c t e d , c r i e v a n c e s DEPENDENT VARIABLE O c c i s i o n m a d e , g r i e v a n c e s COUNTER-POSITION " O t h c r " E m p l o y e e O r g a n i z a t i o n ___________ Oc c i s i o n Exp cc t c o N - 8 C h i - S c u a r c 6 . 0 0 0 M e r i t ohly' 1 0 0 0 Th c i a p r c f e r c n c c s 0 1 1 0 M ix c o o c c i s i o n 3 0 0 0 Other 1 1 0 0 COUNTER-POSITION N Ch i - S quarc D C C IO IC N tX R C C T E O O c c i s i o n Ma o c HCRlT ONLY TkCIO F«CrC*CxCC& KlXCO OCC ISIO N O T m C R I i 291 APPENDIX B SUB-HYPOTHESES: Autonomy B ureaucratization S elf-Identity £6Z * D a n H z 8 v> ro U ro CD ro V I V I o Ov 4 r o sa VP ro CO CO 4 r CO •4 Co ro OV A) V I ro V O - ro V I VO o ro o o r t z ' ? • U ) </l , O I -* - 4 M I O S I* VCRY MUCH SO P r e t t y MUCH. S l i g h t l y ■ x Ot h e r * 0 0 2 ' 5 , VP t/> O c z VP m * OV CD 3 ro V I 4 r o ro vp CO o —4 VO 4 T V I ■tr V Oo CO CO 3 7 jr O s CO OV - e r - V v > ro * r V I vp o VCR Y MUCH s o P r e t t y MUCH S l i g h t l y O t h e r > - w j u fO O z CD ro s o CO o z 00 - 0 V I V I VERY HUGH SO V I O S 00 ■4 ro ro V I P r e t t y m u c h c o SO V I VD m * V I < r S l i g h t l y CO ro -* Ov Ot h e r S (A r " X 9 < n X n - » n o H < 9 X -r H < X r c < X n s X X 8 z C o Co o r •4 CO V CO VP ro * r V CD 45* O s _ - ro « - V ro CO ro 00 Ov ro vp ■4 • 4 VO c o * r o r> z i f . ■ I Ve r y m u c h s o P r e t t y m uch S l i g h t l y £ n O t h e r I n d e p e n d e n t Va r ia b l e ("X ") Ca m you in p l u e n c e the d e c is i o n s or your im m e d ia t e s u p e r v i s o r ! De p e n d e n t Va r ia b l e C y "! Whcn a major c r i s i s occurs in your d e p a r t m e n t , d o yo u p a r t i c i p a t e in the d e c i s i o n - making PRpccsat______ C h i - S q u a r e w ith 9 *or is l6.<?2 _ 9 5 < j m »C hl - s q u a r e o a sed on a I ) X 4 t a b l e . Zero row not c a l c u l a t e d in the c h i - s q u a r e I n d e p e n d e n t Va r i a b l e < " X " ) I n a m a jo r c r i s i s . t h e t o t a l h u m b e r o r c o m m u n ic a t io n c h a n n e l s w i l l « r n r p u c m . De p e n d e n t Va r i a b l e ( " Y " ) I h a m a jo r c r i s i s , d e c i s i o n h a k iw o t e n d s t o b e c e n t r a l i z e d a n d d o m e a t t h e t o r o r t h e d ei C h i - S q u a r e w i t h _ J j _ _ * o r i s 9 « * * 9 - . 9 5 i • Z e r o c o lu m n a n o r o w n o t c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e c h i - s q u a r e . A l l S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l s S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l Two **23 0 x"> ■ - S q u a r e 20.893 X 0 3 4 O 3 X Z c X 0 K M X c N > < L 0 M Z e r o • 2 1 0 0 1 "V V e r t m u c h s o 188 5 ’ ■ * 7 9 0 0 P r e t t y m u ch 1 7 6 2 2 5 3 1 0 1 0 Ot h e r 5 7 1 0 7 4 0 0 N 8 4 1 0 7 2 3 1 1 S u p e r v i s o r y l e v e l On e N - J Z L c h i - S q u a m " x * * O 3 X V • H C H U © W X K O S H w Q. O N N - 1 3 0 C h i - S q u a r e o r * * "X* N 3 X > 0- > P I X u u U K 3 > 0 .1 X u X K O • 0 X u Kl Ze r o . * 1 1 0 0 0 Ve r v m u c h s o 6 6 2 1 1 8 2 7 0 P r e t t y m u c h •57 6 1 3 2 8 0 Ot h e r 1 6 5 4 7 0 N 3 3 3 5 6 2 0 S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l Th r e e M - 1 2 1 C h i - S q u a r e 5 . 9 5 7 D r J*____ 8 z U X 3 i I Ze r o • 1 0 0 0 1 N u > X 0 . s v e r y m u c h s o 7 2 1 6 1 5 4 i 0 Ve r y m u c h s o 5 0 1 4 1 4 2 2 P r e t t y m u c h 6 7 5 2 0 4 2 0 T P r e t t y m u c h 6 2 1 1 2 0 3 1 Ot h e r 3 2 3 3 2 6 0 Ot h e r 9 2 0 7 ts ) vO N 2 4 38 1 0 9 1 2 7 3 1 * 60 I n o c p e n o e n t V a r i a b l e ( n X " ) ° ° y o u p r e p e w a . j o b w h e r e t h e t h i n g s y o u w o r k o n o v e r t h e c o u r s e o r a t e a r s t a y t h e b a k e o r c h a h q e T O e p c n d e n t V a r i a b l e f " Y " > W h e n a m a j o r c r i s i s o c c u r s i n y o u r d e p a r t m e n t , d o y o u p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e o e c i s i o h h a k i n o p r o c e s s ? C h i - S q u a r e w i t h 6 » q F | 3 1 2 . 5 9 - . 9 5 s» * Z e r o r o w h o t c a l c u l a t e o i h t h e c h i - s q u a r e . M. * * 2 3 C h i - S q u a r e 1 •^00 or 6_ A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l s ■x1 U M «J ► H « — § < ■ * S ! K-J U u u — OH 0 H IkO Z — Z< u < <a < u fcp- X Z K (L «t o< OO ZCHO * 2 1 0 1 ' VCRV MUCH SO 6 7 27 25 1 6 PRCTTV MUCH 1 1 8 1*9 Ito 2 9 S l i q h t l v 1 1 6 52 i»3 2 1 Ot h e r 1 2 0 5 3 1 * 1 2 5 N - 1 3 0 N l8l 1U 9 93 S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l ■x» T w o u 3.900 H H •»— C J u — H O U < 8 hJ O H Z — < O . j w < u a u S 5 4 u N ttH z u < X It u 1 1 Ve r y m u c h s o 1 9 8 8 3 P r e t t y m u c h “ 3 1 8 1 2 1 3 S l i q h t l v 3 5 1 2 1 6 7 O t h e r 3 3 1 2 1 4 7 N 5 0 50 30 n-_UL . 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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e ("Y") l f Y - s » 0 0 Y 0U a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e b y a t t e n d a n c e a t h e e t i n q s , v o t i n g , o r w o r k i n g o n p r o j e c t s C h i - S o u a . - ^ : w i t h * o r i s _ ? . * ? . _ 9 i T i A l l S u p e r v i s o r y L c v e l s S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l K - ^ 3 C h i - S q u a r e 12. 7 0 S * x * N - 1 3 0 C h i - S q u a r e 9 . 1 2 1 o r ____3_ o r . 3 N V ) u > 0 z 0 z u N N Z E R O * *»7 0 * 7 0 Z E R O * 1 1 *Ya Y ES 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 • * Y * Y E S 3 3 NO 2 5 5 2 3 0 2 5 0 NO 86 S O H C T IH E S 1 1 0 0 S O M E T IM E S 0 N 3 5 1 7 2 0 N 3 3 _ 7 1 * 11 1 2 1 0 7 2 3 S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l O n e S u p e r v i s o r y L e v e l T h r e e N - C h i - s q u a r e 6 .7 * * 5 o r 3 N ■ 121 C h i - S q u a r e 5 - 2 l»5 o r 3 Z ER O * 1 5 0 1 5 0 ZCRO* 2 1 0 2 1 0 YES 6U 6 ^ 0 0 Y E S • 2 3 2 3 0 0 NO 9 2 6 3 9 0 NO 7 7 7 3 i» 0 SOMETIMES 1 l 0 0 SOMETIMCS 0 0 0 0 N 1 n 8 2 L 0 N 9 6 2 5 0 * ZERO COLUMN AHO ROW NOT CALCULATED IN CHI-SQUARE. hi z « h 0 o — x n z - a o * n n M 7 n o n c n z > z o » H r T ' n Z f > ** - a < H - > 1 > » h r > 3 ' z V J 1 to O N o£i z o 5 r o V O - p* - -0 vn O to O N v _ n z o o C o 03 r o Y E S o o r o r o C o 1 0 Y E S V O o o r o C o x r t/l N O V O o r o to o > — j v o N O 00 o v n O to D O N * T K N O W V O o v n o D O N It k n o w a _* - o o O IN P O L IC Y O N L Y - - o o O IN P O L IC Y O N L Y £ 5 ? T hi i s z * o o r o - z n - < • * o * Z 2 r o 4 C n I 0 0 2 n 1 | S loo z o On m * 4r z < n r Z o - ©> ro Z o o o O O YES X X n o Vo o o v o 8 Y ES v> o - vn t o NO B ro - 0 © vn ro NO m * o o o - d o n ' t k n o w © o © o o o o n ' t k n o w o o o o o IN P O L IC Y ONLY o o o o o 1N POL ICY ONLY c 1 o ZIC flj V i II 7° h: f t ; 5! I rj ro O v o C O C O O ro i V O | C v rj V J I o - | ° O C O V - -- o 0 0 o O — --- --- --- --- 1 o o o - (o o o o © o o j o --- --- - 1° o YES |>< MO d o n ' t k n o w SOM ETIM CS ZERO* H O D 2 < A f> C f t •* u i \£> -• CO CO Y E S NO © DON'T know o o o t o i z I Y E S N O d o n ' t KNOW S O M E T I M E S m H f t : z I 0 3 N W O U 1 VC 3 I NO d o n ' t k n o w S O M C T I N C 5 2 C ^ O * o v » r* 7 *9 O ft n 7 ■9 O n n 7 7 O -< n z < H > X ’ < > ► D r >■ n a r n e ie I n d e p e n d e n t Variaol£ ("X“1 Po VOO r e c o m m e n d a r e s o l u t i o n t o c o i f v a n c f s ? D c p E n O E N T VaR IA CLC ("Y"l If * T 3T< ^ l » ~HC PROCCOURC T * * 2 3 N ■ _____ C'ril-SCUARE or to A l l S u p e r v i s o r y I e v c l s U wll 2*».COO N - Chs-Scjars or /O «v « N tl u >- 0 z Z 0 Q 0 ar u N XCRO® 1 2 6 * 1 6 Go 3C 0 f \R S T S T C P 165 1 6 6 0 0 0 SECOND STCP S 3 £ 6 0 0 2 T H IR D STCP 3 7 ! 36 0 0 1 IW PASSC RESO LU TIO N 2 2 0 0 0 o o n ' t kn ow i b 0 0 0 N O N -S U PC R V IS O R S ALSO ACPOMT TO HZ ■ 1 0 0 0 N 310 8 0 *> ■ 3 S 'J P E R V I 5 0 R Y L C V f L 0 ? « x u I c o o * M ♦ « ■ > u >• 0 z 6 K U M XCNO* 63 l i 1 . . . iM I 0 T I R S T STCP 93 93 j ° i 0 t i 0 SECOND S T C P . 3 <3 0 1° ! 0 T H IR D ST E P z 1 c i 0 1 1 IM PASSE RESO LU TIO N 0 0 0 0 ! 0 DON * T KNOW 1 p 10 10 : H O H -S U P C R V I 30*3 ALSO R E P O R T .T O ME 0 1 0 0 i 0 ! 0 N - 130 - - 26.000 Chi-Ecjar: ’ or /o S u p e r v i s o r y Levc l T lo “ ■X " N ZERO* 35 T I R S T S T E P 51 SECOND STCP 36 T H IR D STCP I * IH PA SSC R ESO LUTIO N 0 D O N 'T KNOW 1 NON-SUPERVISORS ALSO REPORT TO ME 1 N r 5 1 3 o 2 0 1 o ! i —I 0 i » 0 S 0 i 1 I 0 i 1 i 0 I 121 N 1 0 0 2 0 1 S U P E R V IS O R Y LEVCL T h RCC N ______ Cki-Squarc 26.000 or (O ZERO® r IR S T ST E P SECOND ST E P T H IR D ST E P IMPASSE R ESO LUTIO N DON1T KNOW N O N -S U PE h V I S C R S HLKORT TO KC A t S O N I I A. t ( . -,Y 1 C H I - 30 UARC W ITH ( 0 ° f ,s.33'*tf~ * ZERO COLUMN AND ROW NOT CALCULATED IN THE C H I - 3 0 UARC. * • TOURTCCN 0T THC'sC INELUCNCC AT BOTH THE P I HOT *ANO KNOW O O O O O O I O C C »O N ‘ T KNOW Do you RCCOMMCNO c h a n c e s o r i n f l u e n c e wage i n c r e a s e s 1n d e p c n o c n t V a r i a o l p /" sC M f o r c l c r i c a l . c r a f t , w h i t e a n o o l u e c o l l a r , a n o m a i n t a v a n c e e m p l o y e e s ? > * ' — ■ ■ ' ' ■ ■ — ---- — - — ■ — ---— — De p e n d e n t Va r i a b l e (wYn ) V0L' recommend changes o r in f l u e n c e salary i n c r e a s e s for s u p e r v i s o r y p e r s o n n e l? Ch i-Square w i t h 7 "or is at.cn - .9 9 i All Su p er v i s or y Levels Su p er v i s or y Level Two N - ^22 C h i-S q u a °r ? N - 130 = * 59-357 C h i-S o u a rc 219.720 . N m u w O z - > z 0 0 z c * ZERO1 o r 7 N w u > - 0 - 5 * O O Z 0 X 0 C E U N ZERO* 0 0 0 0 0 ZERO® 0 0 0 0 c YES 133 1C7 21 5 0 Y “ 39 • 0 0 N O 273 IS 2 * 0 1 "Y* N O 7 ^ 2 74 0 0 OONf T K N O W 15 2 2 11 0 OON *T K N O W 6 0 0 6 0 THROUGH EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION ** 1 0 1 0 0 THROUGH CHPLOYEC OROAN1ZAT 1OH ** 1 C 1 0 0 N 125 2S0 ^C 0 N *n 33 0 0 Su p er v i s or y Level One Su p er v i s or y Lcvel Three N - 1 7 1 C hi-S quare o r JL "Y" 2CRO* YES NO OON * T KNOW THROUGH EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION ** N 0 2 3 8 0 - y o 7 o ce o z u O X N 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 5 C 1 3 1 2 6 0 1 1 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 n : V .I 1 0 1 N - 121 Chi -S o uarc 2£Ll£57 o r 7 __ ZERO* YCS N O Y OON * T KNOW THROUGH EMPLOYEE ORG A N IZA TIO N * * * ZERO COLUMN AND ROW NOT CALCULATED IN THE C H l-S O U A R C , R* AS A MCMQER o r AN A D V I S O R Y COUNCIL OF A P R O FE S SIO N A L EMPLOYEE O R G A N IZA TIO N . N 0 6 3 57 1 0 -5 0 so e 02 u O X w 0 10 0 Jo 5 5 | s 0 0 i 56 0 |o i 0 0 jo 0 0 j 0 jo N 5? ^ 0 0 ( j O H-* INDEPENDENT VARIAULE ("X") Y0u rECCMMCK3 CHANCES OF INFLUENCE THC TERM 1 NAT I ON O f PERSONNEL? Dcpcnoent Variable (“Y") So you recommend chances op influence bucget requests tor ncw items? C h i - S c u a r c w i t h * o f i s 3 t. ?& - 99.5 j All Supervisory Levels S u p e r v i s o h v Le ve l Two N - ^ C h i - S q u a r e 1 0 ^ . 8 7 5 OF S ZERO* VCS NO OON'T KNOW X - — -J Of- k o 2 * < • a .> — Q o 2 J ffO « O 2 2 D C C U q - o i j a n 2 o 6 n - *30 C h i - S q u a r e 3 8 - 5 5 & O F ^ ZERO* , »y» YES NO ’ o o n't know »x* O V 2 2 0 O * - - J I3f- H O 2 < * 1> —cl O « 2 J ftr o a U O O Z it D I U > 2 a -o uo. m N 120 10 0 0 0 0 Supervisory Level One Supervisory Level Thrcc N- J72_ C h i - S q u a r e 3 ^ * ^ ^ or *6 • c — - j o>- t- O 2 < - 0. > -*} ZERO* 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 YES S > 6 77 1 6 2 0 0 NO £7 2 2 2 1 0 1 D O N 'T KNOW 9 3 3 3 0 0 0 , N 1 2 1 * t l 7 1 1 1 * * ZERO COLUMN A . nO ROW NOT CALCULATEO IN THE CHI-SQUARE. •n - iai C h i - S q u a r c 9 7 . ^ 7 1 O F S N ZCRO# 1 YC9 n o NO 8 KNOW 2 o z < • a. >- - o o J 2 0 tt 2 2 0 2 U — O OO. N 0 0 0 0 0 10 ; 5 0 0 0 0 4 k 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 N 110 10 1 0 0 0 316 annual dollar value OF BUDGET INFLUENCE S u p e r v i s o r y Le v e l Amount of budget influence All One Two Three Do h t k n o w 17V 69 81 W Z e r o 103 72 22 9 $ 0-100 1 0 1 0 101 - 300 2 2 0 0 301 - 500 3 2 1 0 501 - 1,000 6 4 0 2 1,001 - 2,000 3 3 O 0 2,001 - 5,000 5 0 I 1 5,001 - 10,000 8 3 % 1 10,001 - 15,000 5 1 3 1 15,001 - 20,000 5 1 3 1 20.001 - 25,000 1 1 0 O 25.001 - 50,000 17 1 9 7 50,001 - 75,000 3 0 2 1 75,001 - 100,000 13 2 5 6 101,000 - 3co.oco 11 2 1 8 301,000 - 500,000 8 1 2 5 501,000 - 1 MILLION 15 3 8 1.1 MIL. - 5 MIL. 2>» 3 H 17 5.1 MIL. - 10 MIL. 3 0 0 3 10.1 MIL. - 15 MIL. 2 0 0 2 15.1 MIL. - 20 MIL. 2 1 0 1 20.1 MIL. - 25 MIL. 3 0 0 3 25.1 MIL. ~ 30 MIL. 0 0 0 0 30.1 MIL. - 35 MIL. 1 0 1 0 35.1 MIL. - to MIL. 0 0 0 0 to.1 MIL. - > i 5 MIL. 0 0 0 c * 1 5 . 1 MIL. - 50 MIL. 0 0 0 0 50.1 MIL. - 55 MIL. 0 0 0 0 55.1 MIL. - 60 MIL. 1 0 0 1 £0.1 MIL. - 65 MIL. 0 0 0 0 65.1 MIL. - 70 MIL. 0 0 0 0 70.1 MIL. - 75 MIL. 0 0 0 0 75.1 mil. - 60 MIL. 0 0 0 0 80.1 MIL. - 85 MIL. 0 0 0 0 85.1 MIL. - SO MIL. 0 0 0 0 S0.1 MIL. - 95 MIL. 0 0 0 0 95-1 MIL. - ICO MIL. 2 0 2 0 1C0.1 MIL. - OK IOLC 0 0 0 0 Total number having influence 1H1 30 1 ) 6 63

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Creator Fick, Robert Norton (author)

Core Title Role Conflict Resolution In Complex Social Systems: A Polyarchical Systems Model For Organizational And Social Change

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Format dissertations (aat)

Language English

Advisor Storm, William Bruce (committee chair), Gable, Richard W. (committee member), McEachern, Alexander W. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-485548

Unique identifier UC11362055

Identifier 7221668.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-485548 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7221668.pdf

Dmrecord 485548

Document Type Dissertation

Format dissertations (aat)

Rights Fick, Robert Norton

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA